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 Abe eel FE ILEL RR SS 
 
CLARK’S 
 FOREIGN 
 
 THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY. 
 
 THIRD SERIUS. 
 VOL Ve 
 
 Borner on the Person of Christ. 
 
 HENS AO | Alem ANOGE IEE 
 
 EDINBURGH: 
 Tee eG WARK Ss GHEORGHE STREET 
 TSUie 
 
PRINTED BY 
 MORRISON AND GIBB LIMITED 
 FOR 
 
 T. & T, CLARK, EDINBURGH. 
 
 LONDON: SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT, AND CO, LIMITED 
 
 a 
 
 NEW YORK: CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS. 
 
 TORONTO: THE WILLARD TRACT DEPOSITORY. 
 
HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 THE PERSON OF CHRIST. 
 
 B ‘i y, f 
 Yv 
 
 DR. L A. DORNER, 
 
 PROFESSOK OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GOTTINGEN 
 
 DIVISION FIRST, 
 
 FIRST FOUR CENTURIES 
 VOLUME II. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 Rev. PRincipAL SIMON, D.D. 
 
 EDINBURGH: 
 Tec lSCLARK “3889 GEORGE STREET 
 1897. 
 
er 
 
 Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2022 with a from 
 
 https://archive.org/details/historyofdevelop00dorn_5 
 
 * ' i ay : =o af 
 ~via wi - it oe a? amy . a aed eee aot i a . 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 Page 
 
 Cuap. II. The Two Forms of Monarchianism, : : 1 
 1. Ebionitical Monarchianism , ; : 3 6 
 
 Cuap. HI. 2. Patripassian Monarchianism, ‘ 15 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF THE SON, AND THE REVIVAL OF MONARCHIANISM IN THE 
 FORM OF SABELLIANISM AND SUBORDINATIANISM. 
 
 Cuap. I. The Confutation of the New Form of Ebionism and 
 Patripassianism by the Church :— 
 
 1. The Struggle with the New Form of Hbionism, 47 
 2. The Struggle with Patripassianism, . : 49 
 Transition to the Further Development. Origen, . 104 
 Cuap. II. Sabellianism, ; : : ‘ : ee WY 
 
 Cuap. III. The School of Origen in the Third Century, and the 
 Subordinatianism of Dionysius of Alexandria, . soenyaal 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 THE CHURCH’S CONFESSION OF THE ETERNAL HYPOSTASIS OF THE SON, AND OF 
 HIS ESSENTIAL EQUALITY WITH THE FATHER, AT THE COUNCIL OF NICHA. 
 
 Cuap. I. The Controversy preliminarily carried on with Sabel- 
 
 lianism and Subordinatianism, : ; aneoe 
 
 Cuap. II. Arius and his Forerunners, : ; : wee 202 
 1. Lactantius, . . : : : . 205 
 2. Eusebius of Ceesarea, , é ; Sue 21 
 SaeATils,,- ; s : : a ADT 
 
 Cuap. III. The Council of Niceea, and the Beginnings of Atha- 
 
 nasius, : : ; 244 
 
Vill CONTENTS. 
 
 THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 FROM THE COUNCIL OF NICHA TO THAT OF 
 
 CONSTANTINOPLE, A.D. 381. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 TRINITARIAN MOVEMENTS. 
 Page 
 Cap. I. The Arian School, ‘ ; 261 
 Cuap. II. The Revival of Sabellianism, and the Ebionism which Y 
 sprang from it, : : | aagah 
 Cuap. III. The Confutation of Arianism and Sabellianism by the 
 great Church Teachers of the Third Epoch, . 28h 
 SECTION II. 
 CHRISTOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS. Ay 
 
 Car. I. The Christology of the Church Teachers prior to Apollinaris, 332 iY 
 
 Cuap. II. The Christology of the Arians and of Marcellus, and its 
 
 Redargution by the Teachers of the Church, . ee 
 Cuap. III. Apollinarism and its Overthrow by the Church, J GBGe 
 ad 
 
 APPENDIX, . pr Mekeel 
 
FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 
 MONARCHIANISM OF THE EBIONITICAL FORM, 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The Two Forms of Monarchiansm. 
 
 =jOWARDS the end of the second century, in harmony 
 | with the New Testament, the doctrinal development, 
 which had started with the historical, and had passed 
 gradually from lower to higher ground, arrived preliminarily 
 at its goal. Nothing short of attributing to Christ true divinity 
 was able to satisfy minds conscious of having attained absolute 
 reconciliation through Him. We find, too, that at a far earlier 
 date, probably through the influence of the teachings of the 
 Apostles, the conviction that Christ had introduced the abso- 
 lutely perfect religion, and that everything, both in its rise and 
 continuance, is essentially and originally conditioned by Christi- 
 anity, had found an expression in the general doctrine of the 
 pre-existence of Christ, and of His second coming to judgment. 
 During the second half of the second century, the mind of the 
 Church advanced unconcernedly onwards towards the goal 
 which the necessity of the case had fixed, until it finally landed, 
 and that with clearly defined consciousness, in the inner sphere 
 of the supramundane divine itself, and traced back the roots of 
 the Logos who appeared in Christ, to the ultimate ground of all 
 BOte iat A 
 
2 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 things, that is, to the very essence of God Himself. At this point, 
 however, a great shock was experienced: the course taken by 
 the development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ seemed 
 to be adverse to the reigning doctrine of God. A reaction, 
 therefore, took place on the part of the doctrine of the unity 
 of God,—a doctrine which had always been taken for granted, 
 and Christology was at first refused that resting-place in the 
 eternal divine essence which it undoubtedly needed. Nor was 
 this any longer a conflict with tendencies outside of the Church, 
 but within its own bosom. For the unity of God, which the 
 rational and religious mind universally regards as an unassail- 
 able certainty (with which conviction Christians had hitherto 
 unhesitatingly deemed themselves to be in harmony), appeared 
 on reflection to be so irreconcilable with the distinctive prin- 
 ciple of Christianity, that one or the other must needs give 
 way. Had the new Christian principle given way, a relapse 
 of humanity into its ante-Christian state would inevitably have 
 followed; and it could have made but little difference whether 
 the place of Christianity were taken by a pantheistic doctrine 
 of the unity of the All, moulded after a Greek type, or by 
 an abstract deistic monotheism, moulded after a Jewish type. 
 On the other hand, did the Christian principle firmly maintain 
 its position, as might be expected from the life and vigour it 
 displayed, and were the monarchy of God sacrificed to it, a re- 
 lapse into polytheism would be inevitable. In either case, the 
 certain conviction of faith, that Christianity, as the revelation of 
 the inmost essence of God, was the perfect religion, would have 
 received a deadly blow. For a long time already, a storm had 
 been brewing in the sphere of the unity of God, which threat- 
 ened to spend its force against the course taken by the develop- 
 ment of Christology; and no sooner had the doctrine of the 
 Logos led to the distinct and conscious equalization of the Son 
 with the Father, and to Christology directly touching the very 
 apex of theology, than the storm began to burst. 
 
 The reaction against the hitherto received Christology could 
 only originate, it is true, with a defective, partially ante-Christian 
 conception of God. For, although it cannot be denied that the 
 conception of the attributes of God had already undergone many 
 a change during the Gnostic movements, and that love had been 
 recognised as a determination of God alongside of the physical 
 
THE TWO FORMS OF MONARCHIANISM. 3 
 
 determinations, and also alongside of righteousness and sanctity; 
 still the doctrine of the inner nature of God had not been with 
 certainty transformed by the Christian principle. And yet all 
 depended on this latter. Christology gave thereto a mighty im- 
 pulse; and this impulse governed, in the first instance, the fur- 
 ther course taken by the matter, till, about the middle of the 
 third and during the progress of the fourth century, the Church 
 withdrew its attention from the development of Christology, 
 and, taking its Christology for granted, applied itself mainly to 
 the attainment of the true conception of God,—that is, to the 
 task of conciliating the doctrine of the higher nature of Christ, 
 and subsequently that of the Holy Spirit, with the idea of God, 
 .—.and to the clear and conscious exposition of the Trinity as the 
 properly Christian conception of God, in opposition to heathen- 
 ism on the one hand, and Judaism on the other. 
 
 From the end of the second century, then, we may say, 
 Christology demanded that the previously prevailing conception 
 of God should undergo a transformation in consonance with the 
 divine revelation in Christ. We find, as a general rule, that 
 whilst, on the one hand, the old is the fulcrum or stay for the 
 development of the Christian principle, on the other hand, this 
 development itself is unable to make way save as the truth em- 
 bodied in previous systems is incorporated with Christianity ;— 
 otherwise humanity relapses irrecoverably from Christianity inte 
 its ante-Christian condition. And the same process of concilia- 
 tion between nature and grace—that is, between the ante- 
 Christian and the Christian — we find accomplished again in the 
 remarkable stadium to which our attention is now to be devoted. 
 There were not lacking men who, though opposed in other 
 respects, were agreed in their dread of any approach to an 
 undermining of the unity of God (compare Origen in John. At. 
 ii. 2,— 70 Trodrovs hirod€ous eivat edyouévous Tapdacov, evAaBou- 
 pévors Sv0 avayopedoae Oeods ; Tertullian adv. Prax. 3,—“ Sim- 
 plices quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiote, que major 
 semper credentium pars est, quoniam et ipsa regula fidei a plu- 
 ribus Diis seculi ad unicum et verum Deum transfert, expa- 
 vescunt ad ofxovouiav. Monarchiam, inquiunt, tenemus”); and 
 because they paid sole regard to this one point, they were desig- 
 nated Monarchians. ‘The Judaizing Christians, indeed, are ne 
 longer deserving of much notice in this connection. The rigid 
 
4 FIRST PERIOD SECOND EFOCH. 
 
 conception of God entertained by unbelieving Jews had not 
 entirely escaped the corrosive power of Gnosticism; the prin- 
 ciples of Hellenism and Judaism had approximated to each 
 other, in consequence of their return into their pantheistic 
 ground; the old Ebionites, who denied Christ’s supernatural 
 birth, whose number even at an earlier period seems never to 
 have been large, and who appear to have been in part more 
 closely connected with the synagogue than with the Christian 
 Church, have now passed away, as far as their importance is 
 concerned. At the very moment, however, when the Christo- 
 logy of the Church had arrived at the above mentioned theolo- 
 gical problem, but, though seeking, had not found the solution, 
 old and new elements broke loose; consolidated themselves, as 
 at the time when Ebionism and Docetism prevailed, into opposed 
 heresies, —to wit, into Patripassianism, which was a higher form 
 of Docetism, and into a new form of Ebionism, which had passed 
 through, and therefore received a colouring from, Gnosticism. 
 As has been remarked, Christology still constituted the moving 
 principle; and the two heresies just mentioned were Christolo- 
 gical, and not Trinitarian, like Sabellianism and Arianism proper. 
 And as the two earlier Christological heresies found a new prop 
 in the doctrine of the unity of God, which now. became a factor 
 of the movement; so, in conjunction with the opposition raised 
 against them by the Church, did they prepare the way for, and 
 introduce, the century which in a doctrinal point of view may be 
 properly termed, the Trinitarian century. But what we found 
 occurring in the case of Cerinthus,—to wit, that when the 
 Docetism and Ebionism, confusedly combined in his system, 
 were separated, the principle of Ebionism logically led to Doce- 
 tism, and vice versd,—occurs again at this higher stage. The 
 Alogi (see Epiph. Her. 51; Ireneus 3, c. 11, 9; compare Hein- 
 ichen de Alogis, 1829), opposed to Cerinthus on the one side, 
 and to the Montanists on the other, appear, from the indefinite- 
 ness which they sought to maintain in reference to the doctrine 
 of the Holy Spirit and of the Logos, and from the latitudinarian 
 and regressive movement which they initiated, to form the point 
 of departure for the two possible forms of Monarchianism (Note 
 lin the Appendix). The Ebionite Theodotus is expressly termed 
 an d7rooTracpa éx Ths addyou aipécews. That the Alogi accepted 
 the supernatural birth of Christ, we may with certainty conclude 
 
THE TWO FORMS OF MONARCHIANISM. i) 
 
 from the position they assumed towards the Synoptics, which 
 they made the basis of their operations against the Gospel of 
 John. On this point, moreover, Epiphanius brings no charge 
 against them. Nor is it at all probable that they denied the divi- 
 nity of Christ, notwithstanding their rejection of the Gospel of 
 John; nay, even although they may have taken up a position, not 
 merely of indifference, but of actual antagonism, to the developed 
 dogma of the Logos (see Epiphanius’ Her. 51, 28; Anaceph. 
 ed. Pet. 2, 144). For such a denial would by no means have 
 been excused by Epiphanius; he would then rather have justly 
 classed them with the Ebionites: whereas he does the very con- 
 trary. They had no intention, therefore, of denying divinity 
 to Christ; but still it is not likely that they willingly traced it 
 back to the Holy Spirit, as a being distinct from God; for to 
 have assumed that, would have been incompatible with their re- 
 lation both to the doctrine of the Holy Ghost and to Montanism. 
 Even supposing they did the det Oeds Adyos TapeEéBarov, Tov amd 
 ITatpos (Anaceph. 2, 144, 5), it is improbable that they admitted 
 the existence of distinctions in God,—for the purpose of avoid- 
 ing which, they contented themselves with simply saying that 
 Christ was a man who had in Himself the deity of the Father, 
 instead of adopting the doctrine of the Logos, by which His 
 divinity was more distinctly defined. Naturally enough, when 
 their aim was to preserve the true humanity of Christ, as it de- 
 cidedly was (see Note 1, Appendix), the doctrine of the pre- 
 existence of the higher nature of Christ became converted into 
 the doctrine of the predestination (poyvwars, preedestinatio) of 
 this peculiar union of God with a man.' 
 
 Such a doctrine evidently left undetermined, whether the 
 divine in Christ was personal, or a mere force. According, 
 therefore, as the mind was more under the sway of religion, or 
 of the practical understanding, this Monarchianism necessarily 
 took a patripassian or an Ebionitic turn. Let us now consider 
 these two tendencies. 
 
 1 The passage from Origen’s Comm. in Ep. Tit. T. iv., in Pamph. Apolog. 
 p. 22,--‘‘qui dicunt . . . quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit 
 deitatem,”—-probably relates to the Alogi. If so, the heresies which are 
 there enumerated before and after, form a regular and orderly series. To 
 the ‘‘ Deitas Patris,” zaraixn becrns, would then be opposed the rartpixos Osos 
 Aogos, required by Epiphanius; see Heer. 51, 28. 
 
6 FIRST PERIOD SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 I. EBIONITICAL MONARCHIANISM; OR, THE REVIVAL OF 
 EBIONISM IN A HIGHER FORM. 
 
 The revivification of Ebionism, which we have now to con- 
 sider, differed from the old in two respects :—in that, firstly, it 
 allowed the supernatural birth of Christ ; and, secondly, perceived 
 the impossibility of the belief in the unique and exceptional 
 character of Christ standing its ground, or even of allowing the 
 reality of His human development, unless the divine element 
 which distinguished Him were confessed to have influenced it 
 from the very beginning. This form of Ebionism is in advance 
 also of that abstract, ethical point of view, which attaches worth 
 to a moral development only so far as it springs from human 
 power. There is no reason for doubting what Eusebius men- 
 tions having found in an old writing (H. E. 5, 28), that Theo- 
 dotus the Tanner, of Byzantium, arrived at his thesis— Christ 
 was Widos avOpwros, although born of the Virgin (Tertull. de 
 prescript. 53), after a denial of Christ, and that his heresy was 
 meant to serve as a cloak to his apostasy. But this ground alone, 
 even though, as is not improbable, he added higher predicates to 
 Christ, should prevent us regarding him as a worthy representa- 
 tive of the higher form of Ebionism which was now reviving into 
 existence. It is quite certain that neither the Alogi, with whom 
 he was connected (see above), nor the school which sprang from 
 him, held Christ to be merely an ordinary man ; for then they 
 would not have deserved even the name of heretics (Note 2). 
 We will direct our attention a little longer to this school. 
 
 It is probable that in the Theodotians a school was found for 
 a speculative, or, more precisely expressed, for a pantheistic 
 form. of. Ebionism connected with Gnosticism. The funda- 
 mental features of this view, as laid down by Theodotus the 
 Money-changer (Theodoret, Heer. fab. 2, 6), or by the Theo- 
 dotus whom Clemens Alexandr. mentions (with Neander, I hold 
 the two to be one and the same person), are the following :— 
 During the second half of the second century, we find, in 
 general, that the hypostases and mythical /on-world of Gnosti- 
 cism, which were formerly kept apart, began to be confounded 
 with each other; and the same thing is particularly observable 
 
 1 See the Inquiry into the true ‘dea of Heresy, contained in Note U, 
 Appendix, Vol. I. Transi. 
 
EBIONITICAL MONARCHIANISM. 2 
 
 in the Theodotians, in so far as they assert even the Logos to 
 be absolutely identical with the Father (Exc. Theod. 19). The 
 image of this Logos, whom they take pleasure in designating 
 High Priest (compare 27), or Melchizedek (Note 3; see Theo- 
 doret’s Heer. Fab. 2, 6), was borne by Christ (ibid.), as, indeed, 
 by all elect souls. No one individual, however, can be said to 
 be identical with that. eternal.idea; not even Christ contained 
 all its fulness, but was merely one word of the Word (Adyou 
 doyos, 19); one ray of the divine was in His soul, and that He 
 shares with all elect souls. ‘The presence of the Redeemer in 
 the world was but a shadow of the glory He has with the 
 Father. Both the elder and the younger Theodotus (Exc. 60) 
 readily appealed to Luke i. 35. They considered the words, 
 “The Holy Spirit will come upon thee, and the power of the 
 Most High will overshadow thee,” to refer to the body of the 
 Lord, and to the formative power of God, which moulded it in 
 the womb of the Virgin. In this case, also, they meant to exclude 
 the indwelling or incarnation of the wvedua or Aoyos. To the 
 Logos who was in identity with the Father there attached, it is 
 true, from eternity the mepuypady, but He had no personal exist- 
 ence (ovaia). He was the Father’s countenance, or His circum- 
 scription (Umschriebenheit) and form; and this is the meaning 
 of the word Son, as applied to God apart from the incarnation 
 (10, 19); Sonship is, as it were, a determination of the Father 
 Himself, the element of finitude in Him. The Father Himself 
 is the Aon so far as He turns His countenance towards us,—in 
 which alone we are able to know Him (10, 23). But the Logos 
 has by no means an exclusive relation to Christ. In becoming 
 incarnate,—and we must not suppose there to have been only 
 one incarnation, for the Son was incarnate also in the prophets 
 (19),—this Son, that is, God, not. merely assumed flesh, but 
 also personality (obcia), out BF the subject (man). ‘The person- 
 ality, however, held the position of servant; for it was capable 
 of suffering, and was subject to the active, supreme cause (19). 
 
 It is scarcely possible not to perceive the after-influence of 
 the system of the elder Theodotus in this form of Ebionism. In 
 a variety of ways he affirmed, in opposition to the Church, that 
 Christ was, after all, a true man; and whatever other divine ~ 
 attributes he may have given to Him, rested solely on the basis 
 of His full human personality. Such also was the position of 
 
8 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 the younger Theodotus (Note 4). Now, although, like the 
 Gnostic Ebionism which consolidated itself into definite forms 
 towards the end of the second century, after the elder Ebionism 
 had died out, Theodotus found little difficulty in attributing to 
 Christ, or to His elect and predestined soul, a divine substance, 
 the Ebionitic character of his views shows itself at once in his 
 supposition, that the Redeemer merely awakened the soul out of 
 sleep and kindled the divine spark, which lies at all events in 
 the elect (3); and in his not leaving to Christ even the dignity 
 of being an unique incarnation of the Word. The elect differ 
 from each other only in the measure in which the one ap- 
 proaches nearer to the Tédos mpoxoTs—that is, to the idea of 
 the true man, created in the image of God—than the other. 
 Accordingly, this form of Ebionism also was at last compelled 
 to agree with the elder Theodotus when he says (Tertull. de 
 prescr. 53),—“ Christ is raised above other men nulla alia nisi 
 sola justitize auctoritate.”’ An exactly similar position was oc- 
 cupied somewhat later than Theodotus the Elder, according to 
 Eusebius (see 5, 28) and Theodoret (see Heer. fab. 2, 4), by Ar- 
 temon; with the single difference that he had probably cast off 
 the Gnostic element (compare Note 3, and take in conjune- 
 tion therewith Heer. fab. 2, 5, at the commencement). Devoted 
 to Hellenic philosophy (Euseb. 5, 28), and, as it appears, deal- 
 ing arbitrarily with the Old and New Testament records, he 
 and his school believed themselves warranted in describing it as 
 an innovation to designate Christ, God ;—an assertion, the oppo- 
 site of which we have clearly enough shown to be true, and the 
 drift and nature of which is perfectly plain from his pretence of 
 having the Apostles on his side. The further assertion, that his 
 doctrine had prevailed in Rome till the time of Zephyrinus, does 
 not accord very well with the reception given to Praxeas there; 
 with the exclusion of the elder Theodotus by Victor, prior to 
 Zephyrinus; with the intimate relation existing between Iren- 
 zeus and the Romish Church; nor, lastly, with the remarks 
 made above respecting the dogmatical views of the Romish 
 Church subsequent to Clement’s day. In fact, he himself re- 
 cedes from this position to the extent of granting, what he could 
 not deny, that in ancient hymns deity had already been attri- 
 buted to Christ; but he pretends that, in a doctrinal form, his 
 ideas had held a place side by side therewith, or had even had 
 
EBIONITICAL MONARCHIANISM. 9 
 
 the predominance. ‘Taking it, however, to be a fact, as history 
 unquestionably teaches, that there was little doctrinal develop- 
 inent of the faith in Rome during the second century, this is in 
 itself a refutation of his affirmation; for if we deny the exist- 
 ence of doctrinal development in general, we must deny also 
 the existence of a doctrinal Ebionism. It is, of course, plain 
 that a faith as yet doctrinally undeveloped might tolerate many 
 principles which a keener eye would have condemned; but it 
 does not therefore follow, that the faith itself was identical with 
 such principles; although it agreed with the interest of the 
 Artemonites to maintain the fairness of such aconclusion. For 
 the rest, Artemon does allow that Christ was supernaturally 
 born of the Virgin, and that He was exalted above the prophets 
 by His virtue (Theodoret’s Heer. fab. 2,4). In the matter of 
 Monarchianism, therefore, he was at one with his predecessors ; 
 but he was scientifically in advance of them, his views having 
 acquired clearness and definiteness. Like them, he clung to 
 the sinlessness and the supernatural birth; but, instead of mis- 
 using the words, 0 Xoyos capE éyévero, as did the Theodotians, 
 who, notwithstanding their adhesion to the formula of the 
 Church, really attributed nothing distinctive to Christ, he en- 
 tirely avoids such lofty expressions; at the same time, however, 
 he acknowledges the more distinctly that, on account of His 
 sinlessness, an unique dignity appertained to Christ. The 
 divinity which he concedes to Christ is His virtue, which raised 
 Him above the most distinguished of the human race; and that 
 Artemon did not take a merely empirical view of this virtue by 
 representing it as the sole work of Christ’s human freedom, is 
 very evident, partly from the comparison with the prophets, 
 who were prophets because they participated in the Divine 
 Spirit, and partly from his assigning to Christ a rank above the 
 prophets, both in consideration of His supernatural birth and of 
 the superior measure of His virtue.! 
 
 ‘Kel ’Apréwoy 0¢ tig 2 1... rb ety xara rev Gawy Osdy rapararncinc 
 nuety eookaccy, aitov sipnxas sluat tov ravrds rointhy’ tov d¢ xvo1ov Iyoody 
 Xororcy kvbpwroyv sine Wirov, ex wopbevov veysvynusvov, tay b¢ wooPytay 
 aipern xpeirrove. Taira o¢ xeel rovs daoardrous tdsye xexnpuyeves, wopep- 
 Lenvevay ray bsioy ypaQay THy Oievoleyv, rods O¢ pest exeivous beoroyHoas Tév 
 Xplorov, ovx éyre Ozcv. Artemon’s party extended far into the second 
 
 century, and even Paul of Samosata is classed with it by the teachers of 
 the Church,—for example, by Theodoret, Heer. fab. 2. 8. 
 
10 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 Paul of Samosata! gave the completest development to this 
 higher form of Ebionism (about 270 after Christ). Many 
 points of his system, indeed, are but a repetition of what had 
 been taught before; and the early writers recularly described 
 him as an adherent of Artemon. He did away with the songs 
 of praise to Christ, under the pretence of their being of modern 
 origin ;—a mode of procedure resembling that of Artemon in one 
 respect, but in another respect in glaring contradiction to him ; 
 for Artemon had maintained (see Schleiermacher’s 4. Theol. 2, 
 490), that a @eoroyeiv of Christ was discoverable solely in old 
 hymns, and not in strictly doctrinal productions (to which the 
 author of the Little Labyrinth already gave a fitting reply: 
 Euseb. 5, 20). Like Artemon, with whom the ancients con- 
 stantly class him, he starts with the unity of God, denies the 
 existence of a codia, or Adyos, distinct from the Father (évuTro- 
 oTatos), and represents the Logos in God as merely that which 
 intelligence or reason is in the human heart. In this sense he 
 took the passage, “ I am in the Father, and the Father in Me.” 
 He advances, therefore, no further than that tautorns of the 
 Logos with the Father, which the younger Theodotus so de- 
 cidedly taught in opposition to the doctrine of the Church (dixe. 
 Theod. 19). Up to this time, the Church had found no better 
 way of describing the distinction between the divine in Christ 
 and God, than the, as we have seen, unsatisfactory one of 
 assigning the divine reason or cedia to the Son. Paul further 
 resembles his predecessors in laying the main stress on the 
 human personality of Christ; but he carries it out more fully. 
 His Christ is from beneath (xdtwOev, Euseb. 7, 80; Theodoret, 
 Her. fab. 2, 8): ébwpdOn tov Xpictov avOpwrov reyav, Geias 
 ydpitos Siadepovtas jEvwopévov. Kuseb. 7, 27,—Tovrov oé (IIav- 
 Nov) Tarrewa Kab yapal reTH TEpl TOD XpioTov Tapa THY EKKAN- 
 ciactiKiy Sidacxariav dpovicavtos, ws KoLWOD TI) diow avOpw- 
 mou yevouevou, etc. O. 30,—Tov pév yap viov Tod Oeod (So say 
 the Bishops in their Synodal Epistle) od Bovderae oUVOMLONOYELY 
 €€ ovpavod Katerndrubévar—reyet ’Incody Xpiotov Katwdev. 
 They term Him é£opxnodpevoy To pvaotnptov (whereas even he 
 
 1 Compare Euseb. 7, 27-30 ; Hahn’s “ Bibliothek der Symbole u. s. W.,”” 
 vp. 91-97, 129 f.; Epiph. Heer. 65; Theodoret, Heer. fab. 2, 8; Ehrlich’s 
 ‘de erroribus Pauli Samos.” Lips. 1745; Schwab's ‘de Pauli Sam. vita 
 atque doctrina,” Diss. inaug. 1839. 
 
EBIONITICAL MONARCHIANISM. 1] 
 
 had previously had faith in Christ as Lord and God: Euseb. ed. 
 Heinichen) cal éuropumevovta tH papa aipéces Tod “Aptewa 
 (compare Kuseb. 5, 28, at the commencement). The Logos, 
 that is, the activity of God which breathed through Him from 
 above, did not dwell in Him as a person, but merely as_a quality 
 or power (ovK ovatwdas GAG KaTa TroLOTHTa) ; and although he 
 does not appear to have questioned the supernatural. birth of 
 Christ (in opposition to the indefinite expression of Euseb. 7, 27, 
 we may adduce the distinct declaration of Athanasius c. Apoll. 
 2, 3, that he taught, Ocov 逫 wapOévov), he laid no particular 
 stress on it; and the utmost he could have meant by it was, that 
 Christ continued permanently the subject of divine influence, 
 and that His humanity was predestined to, and therefore also 
 prepared for, this abiding union with the divine power. What 
 is peculiar to him, however, is his endeavour to establish the 
 Sonship or deity of Christ, on the ground of the divine power 
 which dwelt in Him, after the analogy of the prophets, but in a 
 fuller measure (according to the Contestatio Cleri Constantinop. 
 quod Nestor. ejusd. sit sentent. cum Paulo Samos. Mansi Coll. 
 4, 1108, Paul’s doctrine was—iva unre 0 ék AaBid ypiceis 
 adXOTpLos 7) THS codlas, unte » codia ev Adw obTws evolKT: 
 compare Baur |. c. 1, 296), urging that it was the animating 
 principle of His human development, which, having attained its 
 goal, constituted Him, for its excellence, worthy of the name of 
 Son of God. (Compare the above passage from Theodoret, Heer. 
 fab. 2, 8; Athan. de Syn. c. 26,—Uatepov adrov peta tiv év- 
 avOparnaw €x mpoKxoTrhs TeCcoTrona Oat, TH THY prow avOpwTroVr 
 yeyovevat: c. 45,—€& avOparrwv yéyove Ocos. Fragm. Ep. Synod. 
 in Leontius c. Nest. et Eutych., he taught cvvddesav pos tv 
 codiay kata wadbnow Kat perovoiav; Epiph. Her. 65,—ép atta 
 évéTrvevoev dvwbev 0 AOyos.) As of alike tendency, I am inclined 
 to take the passage in Epiph. 65, 1,—éddwy 6 rAoyos evipynoe 
 Lovos Kal avhirOe mpos Tov Tatépa; but I doubt whether it teaches 
 a separation of the divine from this man, similar to that which 
 Sabellians taught, as Baur affirms (1. c. p. 305). For the only 
 idea justificatory thereof—to_wit, that after His perfection 
 Christ was possessed of deity in Himself, in the way above men- 
 tioned, and that He therefore needed no longer the influence of 
 the Logos—can scarcely have been entertained by him, seeing 
 that it would have still further weakened the, in other respects, 
 
12 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 feeble proof of the deification of Christ. At what moment 
 he considered the deity of Christ to have commenced, whether 
 after His resurrection or after His baptism, we are not informed 
 (Note 5). If God-manhood did not pertain to Him originally, 
 it became His through the medium of His mpoxor, of His 
 perfect human development, for the sake of which Paul repre- 
 sents Him as deified. This deification is annexed as an external 
 consequence ; but 1t cannot have been anything more than a 
 quality, a thing of rank and of dignity, not of essence (‘Theo- 
 doret 1. c.). The divine in the Son, or Christ, continues by itself 
 impersonal (avaupel THY TOD viod [of the eternal Son] UTocTacw, 
 hacker pi) evar avtov evuTrootator, GX év ad’Td Oe@, Epiph. 
 Heer. 65,1). When, to his doctrine, “God is one person with 
 the Logos, év rpécwmov (Epiph. |. c.), even as man is one with 
 his reason,” the objection was raised,—“ The doctrine of the 
 Church requires one God, but several T poo wa. of the same ;” 
 he replied, that as he also held Christ to be a person (namely, 
 as a man), his faith too (compare Epiph. |. c. 7) had several 
 mpocwra; God and Christ stand over against each other as 
 dpoovcrot, that is, probably, as alike personal (see Note 4) Ce 
 vexatious dialectical procedure of this kind could, of course, 
 Jeceive no one; but it had the effect of rendering the word 
 6jzoove1os, so employed and referred to personality in general, 
 suspicious for a time (according to Athanasius de Syn. Ar. et 
 Sel. c. 45, fears were entertained that, if Paul’s view were 
 adopted, a human personality must be admitted into the Trinity), 
 until the fourth century stamped it with the seal of Church 
 authority (Note 6). If the word ovc/a be taken in the sense of 
 substance or essence (Wesen), Paul teaches an érepoovaia of the 
 Son and the Father; in their inmost centre, as to their person- 
 ality, they continue apart; and the personality of the Son is 
 conceived as merely finite, although év atv@ évérrvevoev avwbev 
 6 Nyos (compare Pauli Serm. ad Sabian.,—ai dudpopos pucess 
 Kal Ta Sudhopa mpdcwra eva Kab povov Evacews ExovTL TPOTFOY, 
 Thy Kata OérXnow ovpBacw). 
 
 This Christology is remarkable for combining within itself 
 such varied elements; and, indeed, as Epiphanius already (Her. 
 65, 9) seems to hint, Paul’s aim in its construction apparently 
 was to attain a point of view from which principles, otherwise 
 antagonistic, would be seen to form part of a higher unity : hence 
 
EBIONITICAL MONARCHIANISM. 13 
 
 also, until recent times, many were uncertain in what class Paul 
 ought to be placed. We have no longer here to do with the old 
 Ebionism, and its abstract dualistic conception of God; Paul 
 taught, on the contrary, that the power of the divine Logos, in 
 its highest energy, had appeared in this man ;—not, however, in 
 a docetical manner, as the Gnostic Christology represented, but 
 permanently. His conception of it, indeed, was such as te 
 enable him to trace out a truly human, free development. for 
 Christ, in a_more complete manner than the Church teachers 
 of his day; yet at the same time he never supposed a time 
 when the man Jesus, who rose by gradual progress from a lower 
 position up to deification, had been without the Logos. He tried 
 also to assert for Christ Sonship and deity; on the condition, it 
 is true, that it should grow out of the humanity. In conse- 
 quence, the deity thus claimed for Christ was neither selfless, nor 
 involved a double personality. Further, the Logos who dwelt in 
 Christ was not something subordinate, but a truly divine power, 
 yea, God Himself in His activity. He formed as large a con- 
 ception of this activity as appeared compatible with the require- 
 ments of a free human development. In this respect, he occupied 
 a far higher position than the Patripassians and Sabellians; for 
 they were by no means able to give so perfect a representation 
 of the humanity of Christ. On the other hand, he was essen- 
 tially one with them in his unitarian conception of God; indeed, 
 he harmonized so completely with them, that we can easily ex- 
 plain how he should have been frequently classed with Sabel- 
 hans. Epiphanius also charges him with the cvvadidn of the 
 Logos and the Father; for he denies the pre-existence of the 
 Logos and His possession of an independent hypostasis. On the 
 other hand, he did not conceive God to be motionless and inert, 
 or far removed from the world; but taught that the one God, 
 who is in Himself Logos and Pneuma, and for whose unity he 
 pleads, as did the Sabellians, in opposition to the Church, revealed 
 Himself, became the dédyos mpopoptxos, and is present in His 
 revelation. Indeed, he might himself have laid down a kind of 
 ceconomic Trinity; and probably he meant to do something of 
 the sort, when, in referring to the Son, he maintained that he 
 also taught the existence of two hypostases, Father and Son. 
 But even if Schleiermacher’s supposition were correct, that he 
 regarded the soul in general as essentially divine, we should be 
 
14 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 scarcely warranted in attributing to him the idea of a self- 
 diremption of God, into the imner Logos and the Adyos mpodo- 
 puxos ; In the sense, namely, that God placed Himself over 
 against Himself in humanity (that is, God on earth), specially 
 in the perfect man ; and that, out of the independent freedom 
 with which He had, as it were, enfranchised Himself in man, 
 He returns back to Himself through the ethical exercise of 
 that freedom, in the first instance, in Christ. For Paul did 
 not hold the world or humanity to be the Adyos évepyos. And 
 even when he says,—* The Logos dwelt in Christ as in a temple ; 
 He was in Him what-the inner man is in us,”—he merely bor- 
 dered on, without actually proceeding to, the recognition of the 
 hypostasis of the Logos; for he conceived the inner man rather 
 as a simple attribute or quality. Because, however, he regarded 
 the free human and the divine personalities as mutually exclu- 
 sive magnitudes, we are justified in saying,—So far as Paul saw 
 ‘1 Christ a manifestation of the Father (Epiph. 1. c. 5), and 
 with the Sabellians appealed to John xiv. 9; and, further, so 
 far as he held this person, in its ideal development, to be deter- 
 mined by the évépyeva of God,—in so far was he on the point of 
 passing over into Sabellianism, and under the necessity of sus- 
 pending the évépyeua of the human aspect, of reducing it toa 
 purely passive condition. So far, however, he was unable to go. 
 For his fundamental Christological tendency plainly was to lay 
 chief stress on the humanity; and therefore, notwithstanding 
 some inconsistencies, his theory continued to be Ebionitical, an 
 ‘nearnation of God to be an utter impossibility, and the divine 
 to occupy a place merely on the surface of the kernel of the 
 strictly human personality of Christ. In this sense, we may say 
 that Paul considered the humanity to form the inmost centre 
 and proper substance of the person of Christ; and that the 
 divine, on the contrary, touched merely the actuality of the man 
 Jesus, that is, His phenomenal aspect. 
 
 Looking back from the point at which we now stand to the 
 commencement of the series here terminated, we have a spec- 
 tacle before us which will often be re-enacted,—the spectacle, 
 namely, that a system whose basis was originally pantheistic, is 
 necessitated, in consequence of the accession of the subjective, 
 personal principle, either to become deistic, or to throw aside its 
 error and accept the truth. For Judaistic and deistic it cer- 
 
PATRIPASSIAN MONARCHIANISM. 15 
 
 tainly is, to represent the essence of God and of man as neces- 
 sarily foreign to each other, and as only coming into contact 
 with each other through the medium of the divine power which 
 dwells in Christ, as in a temple (Contest. cleri Const., Cts slicer 
 ev XpiaT@ (iv 9 codia) ws év vad Ocod; and Paul frequently 
 employs the expression,—in Christ copia évouxel; compare 
 Neander 2, 1036). This, therefore, is again simply the inner 
 relation of the heathenish and the Jewish principle, as we found 
 it existing in the days of the older Ebionism and Docetism : 
 they form two extremes, which unavoidably tend to a false 
 union ; that is, they ceaselessly pass over the one into the other, 
 when they fail to find a true union in Christianity. 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 II. MONARCHIANISM OF THE PATRIPASSIAN FORM. 
 
 A FAR mightier tendency than the Ebionism just considered- 
 mightier, because more amicably related to the interests of re- 
 ligion—was Patripassianism, which, after undergoing a process 
 of refinement and development, attained its most perfect. form 
 and expression in Sabellianism. After making many uncon- 
 nected beginnings during the course of the second centur : 
 even prior to the time of Praxeas, this system attained sudden 
 ripeness and wide diffusion even in the Church ;—first, under 
 the imperfect form of Patripassianism, shortly before the end 
 of the second century; and again, after some links of develop- 
 ment had intervened, soon after the middle of the third century. 
 Relatively to those beginnings, we may remark in the out- 
 set, that Justin Martyr makes us acquainted, in his Dial. ec. 
 Tryph. 128, with men who are very like the later Sabellians. 
 One and the same divine S%vayus, say they, undivided and un- 
 separated from the Father, as the light on earth from the light 
 of the sun in heaven, has appeared under different names and 
 forms, as Messenger, Shechinah, Man, and Word; and these 
 appearances are the appearances of the Father. When He 
 wilis, say they, He causes His power to go forth; and when He 
 wills, H calls it back into Himself. Those who held such views 
 
1G FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 must, of course, have regarded all revelation as something mo- 
 mentary and abrupt: no such thing as a knowledge of perma- 
 nent forms of divine revelation, and of their connection with each 
 other is attainable ; everything remains theophany. We find, 
 however, even here, the characteristic feature, that the divine 
 Svvaus in itself is asserted to be absolutely identical with the 
 Father, and that the element of limitation, of distinction from 
 God the Father, is supposed to owe its existence to the entrance 
 ‘nto the world of finitude, to be the effect of the ofkovoyia, or 
 of revelation; whereas the divine substance in itself resists and 
 excludes all distinctions. But if we ask, what is the funda- 
 mental philosophical view which lies at the basis of such a 
 theory of the revelation of God; and if, in this behoof, we 
 apply the above propositions to creation in general, and not 
 merely to the Old Testament account (an application which 
 they themselves justify us in making, in that they trace back 
 the origin of the angels also to that divine Svvapus, in which the 
 Father as it were spreads Himself out),—we shall arrive most 
 surely at our goal by taking our stand on their favourite image, 
 and saying :—God is like the sun, which diffuses itself through, 
 and as it were expands itself to the boundaries of, the sphere 
 of light; and as the sun draws back every evening, at setting, 
 the rays in which it appeared to us, so God draws Himself back 
 into Himself. I would just hint with a word also, that the 
 Pseudo-Clementines, with their Monas, which dilates itself to 
 a Dyas, and again returns into itself, and perhaps also the 
 enosticizing Gospel of the Egyptians, may be placed under the 
 same category.| Whether the influence of the stoical cosmology 
 or theology should also be taken into consideration as a further 
 factor, is doubtful, notwithstanding that common or similar ex~ 
 pressions, like svotod7 and Suactony, éxoracts, suggest such a 
 course. More importance ought probably to be attached to the 
 Neo-Platonic philosophy, which began to come into vogue, even 
 before the end of the second century, specially through Celsus. 
 For it does teach that God eternally mediates Himself with™ 
 Himself through the world, that the divine life flows through 
 
 1 Baur, Ll. c. p. 274, refers the Gospel of the Egyptians to this connec- 
 tion with a positiveness which I am unable to share ; for we know only of 
 a sexual Dyas (Geschlechtsdyas) which becomes a Monas. Compare Grahe’s 
 ** Spici'egium” 1, 35. 
 
PATRIPASSIAN MONARCHIANISM. 17? 
 
 a circuit, and that God proceeds forth from Himself and be- 
 comes a Son to Himself in the world. Related thereto, and 
 unquestionably not without considerable influence on Neo- 
 Platonism, was finally Gnosticism, between which, with its pan- 
 theistic fundamental view and the principle of Sabellianism, the 
 affinity was all the greater, the more it turned from its ethniciz- 
 ing phantastic theosophy to the more sober doctrine of the unity 
 of the Alleinheitslehre—a doctrine essentially involved in it 
 from the beginning,—or the more fully it obeyed the injunc- 
 tion of Irenzeus, to reduce its endless hypostases to momenta of 
 the conception of God. The connection of Sabellianism with 
 Gnosticism, apart from the pantheistic basis common to both, 
 is specially noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the older 
 patripassian form of Sabellianism, which did not shrink from 
 attributing change and suffering to God, directs our attention 
 to the transformation already experienced by the rigid Jewish 
 conception of God at the hand of Gnosticism. Secondly, the 
 older patripassian form of Sabellianism was guided, not so much 
 by a philosophical or cosmological, as by a religious interest 
 (not till a later period did it betaine religio-historical or religio- 
 philosophical) ; and even in this aspect, the transition from 
 Gnosticism to it was effected by one of the most noted Gnostics, 
 Marcion.’ This religious interest manifested itself particularly 
 in the opposition consciously raised by it to every form of 
 Subordinatianism, and in its disposition to put Christ on a level 
 with God; nor did it object merely to Ebionitical Monarchian- 
 ism, but also to those doctrines of the Church which subordi- 
 nate the Son to the Father (compare Origen in Matth. T. 
 xvil. § 14, Neander 2, 994 f.). It is of far more consequence, 
 however, to note the stadium at which the doctrine of the 
 Church itself stood, when this tendency broke out. Here we 
 refer not merely to the indeterminateness which prevailed, and 
 which did not quite exclude Sabellian principles; for example, 
 when the presbyter says, in Irenzeus, “ Mensura Patris filius ;” 
 or when Clemens Alexandrinus says, with the younger Theo- 
 dotus, “The Son is the countenance of the Father ;” or when 
 Melito says, @eds témovOev bd Se€vas iopanditidos (compare 
 Routh 1, 116). Still more positive countenance was given by 
 
 So far as I know, Neander was the first to direct attention to this fact. 
 (See above. ) 
 
 VOL. II, B 
 
18 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 two circumstances. Firstly: From the days of the Apostles down 
 to Justin, the Church had, as we have seen, laid prime stress on 
 the hypostatic pre-existence of the higher nature of Christ; and 
 Justin, in connection therewith, had not even avoided subordina- 
 tian elements. He himself, however, firmly believed the Logos te 
 be of one substance with the Father ; and during the course of 
 the history of the doctrine of the Logos, this constantly assumed 
 a more definite shape, until, in the second half of the second cen- 
 tury, the Church was concerned not so much to distinguish the 
 Son from, as to establish His unity with, the Father. Inadequate 
 momenta, which had been intended to aid in establishing the 
 divine hypostasis of Christ, but which intertwined Him imme- 
 diately with the world, were then cast aside, and the Son was 
 introduced into the inmost adytum of the divine essence itself, 
 as the reason and wisdom of God. Had the matter rested there 
 (a thing to which the teachers of the Church were certainly 
 opposed), Sabellianism would have found a home in the Church, 
 and the impossibility of distinguishing the Son from the Father 
 would have become a manifest fact. For if the divine Trias, 
 which the faith of the Church had long held to be a settled 
 thing, meant nothing more than that reason and spirit (Adyos 
 Kal mvedua) are in God, Monarchianism would have had no 
 reason for its opposition. Moreover, inasmuch as the Church 
 most decidedly maintained that there was only one God, Sabel- 
 lianism was the more justified in, as it were, asking the doctrine 
 of the Church, whether a merely ceconomic Trinity would not 
 meet the wants of the Christian mind; and in the then posi- 
 tion of the doctrine of an immanent Trinity, it could with cer- 
 tainty reckon on receiving, in many cases, an affirmative reply. 
 Secondly: The revival of Ebionism must have caused the Church 
 to cling more firmly to the doctrine of the essential equality of 
 the Son; and fear both of it, and of the Arianism which now 
 began to raise its head,' must have prevented it from insisting 
 too strongly on the distinction between the divine in Christ 
 and the Father. And, in fact, it is quite possible that the ever- 
 
 1 Compare Recognit. Pseudoclement. (see Vol. I. 216 and Note BBBB) 
 On the other hand, after what has been advanced above (Vol. I. 192 ff.). 
 it is not improbable that a class of Ebionites also (of course a higher 
 
 class, to which one scarcely ought to apply the name) approximated te 
 Patripassianism 
 
PATRIPASSIAN MONARCHIANISM. 19 
 
 strengthened tendency to affirm, even as regards the soul, the 
 completeness of the humanity of Christ in opposition to Docetism 
 (Note 7),—a tendency unquestionably little favourable to any 
 form of Sabellianism,—w as, In many respects, restrained by the 
 necessity of combating Ebionism ; for Ebionism postulated above 
 all, for the integrity a the etait of Christ, a complete and 
 free personality. 
 
 The weakest side of the newer form of Ebionism, in the eyes 
 of simple-minded Christians, was its inability to lay any stress 
 on the death of Christ and His atoning work. (It was otherwise, 
 perhaps, with those alone who are ea tinneths in the note on the 
 last page.) Some, indeed, are said to have done so (Orig. Comm. 
 in Joh. T. xxxii. 9), but it was mere inconsistency ; ; and the iepov 
 Kal cwTnpLov yphwa, which, according to them, 6 cravpwbels Th 
 Koopw@ émdedyjxev, can scarcely be aiineaeal otherwise than 
 arbitrarily and magically, with an Ebionitic Chesniten In 
 this respect especially, the patripassian view was far more satis- 
 factory :—the more explicable, therefore, is the great impression 
 made by Praxeas, its earliest representative, and a confessor, 
 during his first stay in Rome. The heresy which Praxeas in- 
 Bonuced Victorinus endeavoured to strengthen (corroborare 
 curavit), says Tertullian in the passage from his “de prascr. 
 her.” 53. This was, without doubt, the Roman Bishop Victor, 
 who excommunicated Theodotus. The excitement which then 
 prevailed precisely in Rome, on account of the revival of Ebion- 
 ism, would appear therefore to have favoured the introduction 
 of views of a directly opposite character, of which Praxeas, 
 coming from Asia, was the advocate and representative. When 
 we remember that a certain predominance had hitherto always 
 been given to the Father over the Son, we shall confess the ad- 
 mission of the idea, that in Christ the Father had appeared, had 
 actually manifested Himself in His person, to have been an 
 unheard of but a mighty step. The inmost nature of God is 
 disclosed,— a completely new period is inaugurated. We thus 
 enter into fellowship with the Most High God, who is God alone; 
 and no middle being has been able to redeem us. It cannot 
 have been the idea of the mere abstract unity of God that led 
 Patripassians to the view they advocated; on the contrary, that 
 Jewish momentum, in itself, would have absolutely excluded 
 the possibility of change and suffering in God. But it was also 
 
20 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 the consciousness of entering into immediate fellowship with 
 the Most High God, who as such is the one God, in conse+ 
 quence of His completely clothing Himself with our humanity, 
 sharing the distress of finitude, and the sufferings which fall 
 solely to the lot of our nature,—that constituted a second and 
 equally important momentum of Patripassianism. On the one 
 hand, Praxeas and Marcion are thus brought into closer proxi- 
 mity, the former turning out to be the Church’s continuation of 
 the latter; on the other hand, a new explanation is given of the 
 warfare they waged in common with Montanism, and it is seen 
 to have been the natural result of their essential principles. 
 Montanism threatened the Church with a new form of 
 legality, incompatible with the revelation of the inmost nature 
 of God vouchsafed to men in Christianity. The doctrine of 
 the Trinity by no means furnishes a sufficient explanation of 
 the opposition raised by Praxeas to Montanism; for, in the first 
 place, there are too few traces of an old Montanistic doctrine of 
 the Trinity, and Tertullian had arrived at his doctrine of the 
 Trinity prior to embracing Montanism ; and, in the second place, 
 if, as some affirm, it were certain that the Montanistic doctrine 
 of the Trinity was ceconomical, that is, in principle Sabellian, it 
 would be difficult to explain Praxeas’ opposition thereto. 
 Praxeas, says Tertullian (see Adv. Prax. 20), treats the 
 words, “I and the Father are one; He that seeth Me, seeth 
 the Father,” as though they formed the entire Bible (Note 8) ; 
 and in the Old Testament, appeals most readily to the passages 
 which testify to the unity of God (c. 18). This, says Tertullian, 
 is right enough in opposing polytheism; but we are not thereby 
 shut out from understanding, by the one God, the Father, the 
 Son, and the Spirit. But what are the teachings of Praxeas 
 concerning the Christian idea of God, which, even in the general 
 baptismal formula, takes a Trinitarian form? One and the 
 same, says he, is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (c. 2). Now, 
 as he absolutely refuses to admit of distinctionsinthe-simple: 
 divine essence.(c. 12, the “unitas simplex,” the “unicus et 
 singularis Deus”), what significance can he attach to that tri- 
 plicity? The question of the Holy Spirit we must leave un- 
 touched, for we do not know what Praxeas said regarding Him ; 
 but we know that he denied the pre-existence of the Son, and. 
 proposed to apply the designation to the Incarnate One alone. 
 
PATRIPASSIAN MONARCHIANISM. 21 
 
 It was not a mere power of the Most High that was active in 
 the formation of Christ, but the power of the Most High is the 
 Most High Himself (c. 26); He descended into Mary. Had 
 Praxeas and his school brought the Trinitarian names into con- 
 nection with the different revelations, the word Father also would 
 have stood to him for a form of the revelation of the one God, 
 and this one God he would then have distinguished, as the 
 Monas, not only from the Son, but even from the Father. We 
 do not find, however, that he did anything of the kind; on the 
 contrary, it is probable that he identified the Father with the 
 Monas.’ The distinction, therefore, that he draws between God 
 in general and Christ, is the following,~“The Father is the 
 Spirit, that is, God, that is, Christ: the Son is the Flesh, that is, 
 the man, that is, Jesus. The higher element in the person of 
 Jesus is God Himself, or the Father; in Jesus, however, He 
 entered into finitude and became man. In the one person of 
 Christ, Praxeas distinguished the part that was born, to wit, the 
 
 flesh, and God, who is in Himself unalterable. The Father | 
 
 proceeded forth from Himself, and returned back into Himself 
 {c. 23). In this way, the incarnation is reduced to a mere 
 theophany; not even the eternal continuance of this person is 
 ensured, especially as Praxeas taught nothing concerning a soul 
 of Christ. The man, the “caro,” must have been conceived as 
 impersonal, as a mere garment, or as an organ whose office it is 
 to present the Father visibly to the world.? 
 
 Had Praxeas gone no further, his system would have differed 
 little from the old Docetism,—for example, from that of Mar- 
 cion. But he conceived the appearance of the Most High God 
 to be at all events one of long continuance, a permanent one: 
 like Noetus, he represents Jesus as having been actually born 
 of Mary, as growing, hungering, thirsting, suffering, and dying. 
 To the assumption of so permanent and peculiar an union of God 
 with human nature, Praxeas was undoubtedly impelled by a re- 
 gard to the religious nature of man, which feels that in Christ, 
 God did enter into the most intimate fellowship with our nature 
 Such a fellowship would not have been established, had not H« 
 
 16.16: ‘‘ Patrem in vulvam Marie deducunt.” C. 27: Out of the ‘‘ virtus 
 Altissimi” which overshadowed Mary, ‘‘ Patrem faciunt.” Compare c. 23, 2. 
 
 2 C. 23: ‘ Tolerabilius erat, duos divisos, quam unum Deum versipellem 
 pree licare.” 
 
22 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 participated in all the acts and sufferings of the man Jesus, and 
 had He assumed human nature merely externally as a garment. 
 For this reason, Schleiermacher (I. c. p. 497) had no right to 
 throw doubt on the statement frequently made by Tertullian 
 and others, to the effect that Praxeas and his school represented 
 God Himself, or the Father, as sympathetically suffering with 
 us. Tertullian’s expression, “Patrem crucifixit,’ must, of 
 course, perhaps be taken rhetorically ; for he distinguished _be- 
 tween the “caro” and the Father, and therefore also, that 
 which could befall the former alone, from that which might also 
 touch the latter. But that he in some way or other held the 
 Father to have participated in the sufferings of Christ, cannot 
 be doubted! He and his school believed themselves the rather 
 warranted in doing so, as even the recognised teachers of the 
 Church were accustomed to say,—The Son, or even God, suf- 
 fered; Christ, the Son of God, died? But they tried to make 
 their meaning more intelligible by the formula, “ compassus 
 est pater filio” (c. 29). For fear of directly blaspheming the 
 Father, Tertullian supposes, they adopted this milder form of 
 expression, and granted that the Father and Son are two. It 
 is scarcely likely, however, that Praxeas and his school meant, 
 in adopting the formula, to grant that there were two (duos) 
 subjects; for this would have thoroughly clashed with their 
 theory. Their meaning probably was,—The sufferings affected, 
 it is true, in the first instance, merely the body, through which 
 God is Son; for the human substance alone was mortal (c. 
 30). But the sufferings of the flesh could not remain in- 
 different and foreign to the higher part of this person; on 
 the contrary, the higher part, or the Father, sympathized in 
 the sufferings (compassus est). We do not find Praxeas ever 
 alluding to a human soul of Christ; and therefore it was im- 
 possible for him to avoid representing the ipse-Deus, the avro- 
 Oeos, as taking part in the sufferings of Christ. With this was 
 
 1 Inc. 2, where Tertullian professes to give an account of the doctrine of 
 Praxeas, we read, ‘‘Itaque post tempus pater natus, Pater passus:” c. 16, 
 —‘‘Tpsum credunt Patrem et visum et congressum et operatum et sitim 
 et esuriem passum.” 
 
 2 Ergo inquis, et nos eadem ratione Patrem mortuum dicentes, qua vos 
 Filium, non blasphemamus in Dominum Deum, non enim ex divina sed ex 
 
 humana substantia mortuum dicimus:” c. 80; compare Melito in Routh 
 Jn etee 
 
PATRIPASSIAN MONARCHIANISM. 23 
 
 connected his attributing a passible aspect to the nature of the 
 Father, his assuming in the Father Himself that momentum of 
 finitude, which others—as, for example, his opponent Tertullian 
 -—assumed in the Son, even prior to His incarnation. Tertullian 
 was quite right in drawing the conclusion,—Sympathy is, after 
 all, taal ; suffering, that is, with another. lither the 
 Father is tacapable of suffering, and then He is incapable of 
 sympathy ; or, if He be capable of sympathy, He is also capable 
 of suffering. And, in fact, a mere suffering of the body, espe- 
 cially as nothing is said of he existence of a human soul, would 
 be spiritless, and without significance relatively to redemption. 
 If we ask further, how Pr axeas found it possible to transfer 
 passibility to God, a reply i is offered to us by his doctrine, that 
 the divine had Bicaitel itself in itself as finite, had set forth 
 out of itself the momentum of finitude (the “caro”); or rather, 
 inasmuch as this would lead to a docetical, heavenly humanity, 
 the Father took up this finite momentum, that is, flesh, into His 
 essence, out of Mary, fully appropriated it and identified Him- 
 self with it, so that He really became man; and “caro,” with all 
 its liability to suffering, is, not something foreign to Him, but a 
 momentum of Himself. This incorporation of humanity with 
 His substance evidently presupposes, however, that the Father 
 was in one aspect susceptible to the finite, to the passible; and 
 it is this aspect which is manifested in the incarnation. So we 
 understand it, when Tertullian finds it necessary, in opposition 
 to Praxeas, to assure his readers, “caro non deus est” (c. 27) ; 
 and when he gives a long refutation and exposition of the above 
 mentioned theory, which at this period was not an uncommon 
 one, namely, that God had, as it were, transformed Himself into 
 “caro;” in consequence whereof, Christ’s flesh participated in 
 the divine essence, and it was possible to term His sufferings 
 divine sufferings (Note 9). None the less, however, was God 
 the Father present in this “caro,” even as to His unchange- 
 ableness: the distinction between “caro” and “spiritus,” that 
 is, “ Deus,” is a real one; for, without renouncing Himself, God, 
 as it were, gave Himself another form of being (Andersseyn) in 
 the “caro” of Christ; but inasmuch as it is God Himself who 
 gave Himself this other form of existence, the two aspects meet 
 in the person of Christ, and do not stand over against each other 
 as foreign. Whether this were the theory of Praxtas or not, we 
 
24 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 must allow that Tertullian was justified in charging him with 
 great inconsequence. For either he was in earnest in asserting 
 the Father, the adroGeos, to be an absolutely simple Being; and 
 then he could not attribute to Him a capability and an incapa- 
 bility of suffering at one and the same time, but must have 
 reduced the incarnation to a process, which merely transitorily 
 affected His unchangeable essence, and must have represented 
 Christ as an organ through which the omnipresent, unchange- 
 able Father appears differently from elsewhere, although the 
 incarnation was not on His part, that is, objectively, a pecu 
 liar deed. Or else, if he were in earnest in saying that God 
 took finitude upon Himself in Christ, he must have allowed the 
 existence of much more determinate distinctions in God, and 
 have renounced on the one hand his doctrine of the abstract 
 unity of God, and on the other hand his complaints against the 
 doctrine of the Church.? This, too, was the point to which 
 Tertullian endeavoured to drive him. With great insight he 
 shows him how the incarnation must. either be reduced_to a 
 mere semblance; how, consequently, it must be attributed to 
 the subjective manner of consideration, when He, who in Him- 
 self is unchangeable, appears in Christ and Christianity differ- 
 ently from elsewhere; and how humanity would thus relapse in 
 
 1 C. 11. ‘*Veracem Deum credens scio, illum non aliter, quam disposuit, 
 pronuntiasse, nec aliter disposuisse, quam pronuntiavit. Tu porro eum 
 mendacem efficias et fallacem et deceptorem fidei hujus, si cum ipse esset 
 sibi filius, alii dabat filii personam” (that is, if God in Christ seemed to be 
 another, appeared as another, than the Father, and yet was in reality merely 
 an appearance of the Father). Compare c. 23. 
 
 ? What does it mean, says Tertullian, when the Son is said to pray to 
 the Father, if there is no distinction between Father and Son? (c. 23). 
 What is the resurrection of the Son, and His anointing (c. 28), or the curse 
 which Christ was made for us? or the desertion of the Son, when He cried 
 out, My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me? (c. 30). It is a 
 blasphemy to say that the Father became a curse for us.—In fact, the 
 fellowship which God holds with man in Christ is reduced to a mere sem- 
 blance, if full justice be not done to the distinction between the Father and 
 the Son :—we see this most clearly in connection with the work of atone- 
 ment. If God continue in simple identity with Himself, the process of 
 reconciliation is a mere subjective play and appearance. At this point the 
 affinity between Patripassianism and the entire Sabellian tendency on the 
 one hand, and Docetism on the other, shows itself, as was hinted above, 
 with peculiar distinctness. 
 
PRAXEAS. HERMOGENES. 25 
 
 its ante-Christian condition: or that he must go forwards (c. 4, 
 2, 6, 80; Apolog. 21), admit the existence of objective distinc- 
 tions in God, reject the abstract simplicity of the divine nature ; 
 and then it would be possible for him to regard the divine Son 
 as really and truly participating in finitude. This he expresses 
 in the following way (c. 13),—“ Through the appearance of 
 Christ, the name of God has been more perfectly revealed. The 
 difference between the worshippers of one God and of many 
 gods (plurimz divinitatis) is fixed by Christianity; for if we 
 really meant that there are three Gods and three Lords, when 
 we teach that there are Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we, the 
 sons of light, should have extinguished the torches which hght 
 us to the martyr’s death. But also between Christianity and 
 Judaism (c. 31) there is no other difference than this, that the 
 Jews believe monotheism to be incompatible with reckoning the 
 Son, and after the Son the Spirit, to the one God. But what 
 would be the work of Christianity, and the substance of the New 
 Testament, which sets a limit to the law and the prophets with 
 John, if Father, Son, and Spirit, believed in as three, do not 
 constitute the one God?” 
 
 By several teachers of the Church a connection is supposed 
 to have existed between Praxeas and Hermogenes, the well- 
 known defender of the eternity of matter (compare Philostr. de 
 Heres. c. 54 f.; see Leopold’s “ Hermogenis de origine mundi 
 sententia,” 1844, pp. 22 f. 28 ff.). As he does not appear to 
 have called in question the deity of Christ (Tertull. adv. Her- 
 mog. 1), although he probably doubted His pre-existence as a 
 divine hypostasis and His participation in the creation of the 
 world, he belongs without doubt to the class now under consi- 
 deration. With this agrees the further circumstance, that, 
 according to Theodoret, he did not hold the humanity of Christ 
 to be eternal, but, like two Galatian heretics, Seleucus and 
 Hermias, represented Him as laying aside His body in the sun ; | 
 in proof of which theory, they appealed to Ps. xix. 4. His. 
 opinion was perhaps the following :—that Christ laid aside the 
 cross material element; whereas the soul, which (in his view) 
 -appertained to matter, might have continued Christ’s (compare 
 Theodoret’s Her. fab. 1,19). It is worthy of remark, that, 
 with his view of matter, he was able to attribute a soul also to 
 Christ,—without mvedua, it is true:—vedua, however, was 
 
26 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 involved in the divine substance of Christ. That the doctrine 
 of a matter, independent of God, might very well suit this class 
 of Monarchians, we shall see below. 
 
 In Asia, patripassian views appear to have already existed 
 a considerable period ; at all events, the names of several repre- 
 sentatives thereof have been handed down to us. So Epigonos 
 and Cleomenes (see Theodoret’s Her. fab. 3, 3). But we have 
 more precise information regarding Noetus, who, according to 
 Hippolytus (c. Noetum, ed. Fabric. T. 1, 235 ff, of the Greek 
 text, T. 2, 5 ff.) and Theodoret 1. ¢., as also according to John 
 of Damascus, was a native of Smyrna; according to Epiph. 
 (Heer. 57), of Ephesus. 
 
 Noetus also aimed at conciliating the true and perfect deity 
 of Christ with the unity of God,! by saying, “ Christ Himself is 
 the Father.” For the Father is God (Fabr. T. 2, 7), but Christ, 
 who Himself was Good, suffered ; inasmuch, then, as we know but 
 one God and no other, to wit, the Father, I must necessarily at- 
 tribute suffering to this God (rodrov b70 waos dépev). The 
 Father is Himself the Son; the Son was born, suffered, and 
 raised Himself from the dead. This explains, says he, why in the 
 New Testament the resurrection of Christ is at one time treated 
 as the work of the Father, at another time as the work of the 
 Son. The meaning of this, again, is undoubtedly that the Father, 
 God in Himself, is not the Son, apart from the incarnation ; and 
 that the existence of a Son began with the incarnation ; whereas 
 the Church terms the Logos doapxos, Son: so, for example, 
 Justin, Tertullian, and others? The Father, therefore, consti- 
 tuted Himself His own Son in Christ. Besides the passages in 
 Praxeas, Noetus appealed to Baruch iii. 35, Isa. xlv. 14, in proof 
 of the unity of God; on the other hand, to Rom. ix. 5, 1 Cor. 
 viii. 6, which put Christ on a level with the Most High God, in 
 proof of His identity with the Father. The fate of finitude, 
 of suffering, and the like, Noetus probably transferred to God, 
 much more decidedly than even Praxeas: moreover, he does 
 
 1. According to Hippolytus c. Noét., he said to his opponents, r/ ov» 
 xaxdy Toa sozeCay rov Xpirdy; according to Epiphanius, rf yap HOKOY En 
 wolnna; tye Osdy d024Ca, eve erlaramar nal odx &drov, vyevynbevta, a&70- 
 devévre. To judge from the reply of the presbyters and from the nature of 
 the case, Noetus considered the two to be indissolubly connected. 
 
 2 From this point of view Hippolytus ec. Noetum 15, must be estimated. 
 
PRAXEAS. NOETUS. 27 
 
 not appear even to have distinguished so clearly between the cap& 
 and the God in Christ, as did Praxeas; but rather to have re- 
 garded God Himself as one nature, which, in one aspect, is inca- 
 pable of suffering, in another aspect, capable of suffering, mor- 
 tal, and so forth ;—thus, like Praxeas, after blotting out the 
 distinction between Father and Son, importing a distinction into 
 the very essence of God. It deserves, however, acknowledg- 
 ment and remark, that Noetus had already completed the sys- 
 tem of Patripassianism, and had stripped it of that ethnic 
 appearance of rendering God’s dvaus immediately finite, which 
 it had in the hands of Praxeas. For, in the passage to be 
 immediately quoted from Theodoret, the é@édew plays a great 
 role relatively to the passible aspect A God’s being, sefaeanieea 
 by Noetus. Everything finite, all change and kena bes 
 God solely through the medium of His will; which, if it con- 
 tinues the same and is in itself absolute (for example, as the 
 will of love), is a sufficient guarantee of the unchangeableness 
 of the divine being. To be invisible, ungenerated, immortal, 
 and impassible, belongs, on the contrary, to the divine essence in 
 itself; at the same time, however, in the view of Noetus, this 
 His essence cannot be a check on His will, but remains subject 
 thereto, and on that account can be made passible, mortal, and 
 so forth. It would be interesting to ascertain Noetus’ precise 
 doctrine of redemption, in order to see whether his conception 
 of this will of God, on which he lays such great stress, as op- 
 posed to the divine nature, or to the physical categories of the 
 idea of God, is an ethical one; or whether he regarded it as 
 mere unconditioned, perfect power, which, being destitute ot 
 determinations in itself, is not raised above caprice. All that 
 we certainly know, however, is that, in the view of Noetus, the 
 eternal God put Himself, by His will, into the condition of pas- 
 sibility and visibility ; such is his estimate of the significance of 
 the appearance of Christ. I am not inclined, therefore, with 
 Schleiermacher (Theol. Nachlass 2, 506 f.), to charge Theodoret 
 with error in saying, éva faci eivar Oeov Kal marEpa, TOY Oh@V 
 Snpusoupryov" apavij HEV, oTay eOeNy, Pasvopevov € pine av Bov- 
 Aaya, Kab TOV aUTOV doparov Elva Kab op@p.evor, Kab ryevvy TOV 
 Kab ayéevynTov" aryévUNToV ev e& apXS, ryevunTov Oe OTE eK TIS 
 mrapbévou yevynOjvat iO noev' arab Kai abdvarov Kal Tadw 
 ad maOnrov Kal Ovnrov: arabs yap av, dno, TO TOO aTaUpOD 
 
28 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 wdOos eerjoas bréuevev. For Hippolytus, Epiphanias, and 
 Theodoret agree too decidedly in representing Noetus as attri- 
 buting suffering to God. Moreover, by introducing the element 
 of will, he refined the representation; and in the very act of 
 apparently undermining the unchangeableness of God (by mak- 
 ing the divine nature, which is in itself impassible, unbegotten, 
 immortal, dependent on the divine will), he gave it a new hold, 
 in the potence of the same will. Besides the passages which 
 those Fathers cite, and which, if not correct, they must have 
 forged, the view just mentioned is specially favoured by the 
 circumstance, that on the minds of Hippolytus and Epiphanius, 
 who made use of independent sources of information, the theory 
 of Noetus left the same impression,—the impression, to wit, that, 
 to be consistent, he ought to have assumed an essential connec- 
 tion between the humanity of Christ and the deity ; be it either 
 by Christ’s bringing humanity with Him down from heaven,_or 
 by God’s converting Himself into humanity: and this impression 
 evidently arose from the circumstance that on his principles fini- 
 tude was constituted a determination of the divine essence (Note 
 10). What further distinguishes Noetus from Praxeas is, not 
 that he attributes a human soul to Christ,—for that is done rather 
 by his opponent Hippolytus (c. Noét. 17),—but that he already 
 brings under consideration the other revelations of God. He of 
 course believed that it was one and the same divine nature which 
 manifested itself in the repeated and multiform revelations; and 
 to this one nature, which, like Praxeas, he designates Father, he 
 must have attributed the capability of being finite, visible, pas- 
 sible. ‘This general possibility became an actuality, in and 
 through the various revelations of God. Here the horizon 
 widens, and the task presented itself, of pointing out the distine- 
 tion between the revelation in Christ and all other revelations. © 
 Lo define this difference was the more necessary, as, from the 
 absence of distinctions in the divine nature, we should naturally 
 conclude that its revelations would be uniform and identical ; 
 and that, consequently, notwithstanding the purpose to exalt 
 Christ to the highest rank, there could have been nothing in 
 Him, as a revelation, which had not been substantially con- 
 tained in all other revelations. Noetus, however, did nothing of 
 importance towards the settling of this question. On the con- 
 trary, although he broke the ground for a comparison of the 
 
NOETUS. BERON. 29 
 
 Christian revelation with others, he did not advance beyond the 
 affirmation, that, when God wills, He is invisible, and when He 
 wills, He manifests Himself,—as though his sole task had been 
 to show that the unchangeableness of God was not such as to ex- 
 clude a revelation like that in Christ, seeing that related revela- 
 tions had already been made. In this way, Christianity is plainly 
 assigned a place again amongst mere theophanies ; nor, as a 
 matter of fact, do we find retin expressing any opinion as 
 to the duration of the Person of Christ. Quite as suspicious a 
 feature of his system is, that it sets no limits whatever to the 
 revelations of God. In each of them, it is true, He Himself is 
 present; but ever new revelations might appear necessary, un- 
 less it were proved that the full idea of a theophany had attained 
 realization in Christ, and that God had manifested Himself 
 once for all in the God-man. Thus viewed, the objection raised 
 by the Noetians to the doctrine of the Church, that it afforded 
 no protection against an endless polytheism, might have been 
 justly retaliated; for the Church might have objected, that the 
 Noetians came to no end with their endless theophanies. 
 
 To the class of men who shared the tendency of Noetus, be- 
 long further Beron and his associates (Note 11). “ Recently,” 
 says Hippolytus (Fragm. 5, Fabr. 1, 228), “ Beron and some 
 others made their appearance ; who asad the sect of Valentinus 
 in order to involve themselves in deeper error. They say,—The 
 flesh appropriated by the Logos worked like works with the deity 
 (ravroupyos), in virtue of its assumption (mpdcAnWs), and the 
 deity had the like capability of suffering with the flesh, in virtue 
 of its xevwous ; thus teaching that the two aspects were changed, 
 commingled, poured together, and converted into each other.” 
 Hippolytus answers,—If both, to wit, the flesh and deity, suffered 
 and worked in the like manner, then all distinction between deity 
 and flesh must have vanished, and they cannot have retained their 
 respective natures (Fragm.6). What conception can they form, 
 then, of the one Christ, who is at one and the same time God and 
 man by nature? What sort of existence can they attribute to 
 Him, if, as they say, He became man by the conversion of deity 
 into humanity; and if, on the other hand, He became God 
 through the conversion of the flesh? For the mutation of the one 
 into the other (uetamtwors) is the entire destruction of both. 
 
 However confused this theory may at first sight appear, 
 
30 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 light is thrown upon it when we commence our examination 
 with the point which Hippolytus mentions second ; and when 
 we assume, as the first and eighth Fragments J ustify us in doing, 
 that two things, which, according to the representation of Hip- 
 polytus, would seem to have been uttered, as it were, in one 
 breath, were actually separated by an interval of time. Hippo- 
 lytus was led to the view he took by Beron’s presupposition of 
 the essential equality of the two natures. But if we take the 
 xévoots, which Beron must have posited as the first, for our 
 point of departure, we are led into the following course of 
 thought :—God_has subjected Himself to the determination of 
 finitude or of humanity ; He entered into the limitation and cir- 
 cumscription of humanity; His self-emptying was real and_ob- 
 jective (see Fragm. 1); and the result thereof was, that God 
 posited Himself as an actual man. ‘The Tepiypagdn is thus 
 taken up into God Himself; the limitation did not affect the 
 humanity alone, but in positing Himself as a man, God sub- 
 jected Himself to limitation. The man thus originated, as we 
 may conclude from the second part of the frst Fragment, is 
 related to God in Himself, that is, to the complete idea-of- the 
 divine, as the lesser to the greater; and does not correspond to 
 the latter. At this point, however, commences the opposed de- 
 velopment. The humanity, which arose in such a manner, is 
 not foreign to the highest, to the divine; but, conformably to 
 its origin, carries the divine within itself, as its inner essence; 
 consequently, the development of this humanity 1s its deification. 
 We can now understand the proposition, on which Beron and 
 his school laid such great stress, that Hippolytus derived their 
 entire error from it (Fragm. 8, Fabr. 1, 229 f.). They maintain, 
 says he, that the divine activity, which in reality did but mant- 
 fest itself through the medium of the flesh in miracles, became 
 the very activity of the flesh itself ((Siav yevéoOar tis capkoy 
 tyv Oelav évépyevav, compare Bibl. Max. iii. 261, c. 7). At the 
 
 same time, we see that the eternal duration of the humanity of | 
 
 Christ is thereby secured,—a thing which always remained 
 doubtful with the other men of this tendency. One might, 
 indeed, here also imagine that God must restore Himself to the 
 state in which He was prior to the transformation, after the 
 revelation had been accomplished; but such a supposition would 
 involve the disappearance of the humanity. Whereas the deve- 
 
BERON. 31 
 
 lopment of the humanity, which the divine potence constituted 
 its own, is itself the return or restoration of God to Himself, for 
 it is deification; consequently, to teach the laying aside of the 
 humanity was forbidden on the same ground as that urged by 
 the teachers of the Church. 
 
 This theory is very far removed from Ebionism; but it is 
 equally remarkable as indicating that Patripassianism, which 
 had originally put the humanity of Christ surprisingly into the 
 background, as compared with His divine nature, had arrived 
 at a stadium when it found it needful to lay special. stress 
 thereon. No allusion, it is true, is made to a human soul; but 
 the doctrine that the divine had gained id/av ovcias mepuypadpny 
 by the xévwous, and indeed the entire course taken by this 
 Christology, secured for the humanity of Christ a dignity and 
 importance such as the doctrine of the Church was as yet far 
 from attributing to it. 
 
 Hippolytus answered Beron as follows: — “God is un- 
 changeable. The Logos, in the aspect in which He is identical 
 with the Father, was not, in any respect whatever, rendered 
 identical with the flesh through the cévwats; but what He was 
 prior to assuming the flesh, that He continued,—to wit, indepen- 
 dent of all circumscription (aepeypady). Through the whole- 
 some act of incarnation, He introduced into the flesh the activity 
 of His own deity; but this activity was neither circumscribed 
 by the flesh, in consequence of the xévwous, nor did it grow 
 puatxas out of the flesh, as it grew out of the deity (Fragm. 1, 
 11). What the divine was prior to the incarnation, that it was 
 afterwards,-—to wit, unbounded as to its essence, incomprehensi- 
 ble, impassible, incomparable, unchanged, unconverted, mighty 
 in itself, abiding in its own natural existence, and working ac- 
 cording to its own nature. So also, what the flesh was as to 
 essence and operation, that it continued to be even after it had 
 been most intimately united with the deity. ‘Thus the Incarnate 
 One worked both after a divine and after a human manner. 
 So far as He worked after a divine manner, the divine activity 
 shone through the flesh. For the nature of the deity was by no 
 means transmuted, as though it had become essentially flesh, 
 that is, flesh of deity; but the flesh remained what it was, that 
 is, weak flesh, in accordance with the word of the Lord, ‘The 
 spirit is willing, the flesh is weak.’ In the flesh, He performed 
 
32 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 and suffered that which pertained to the flesh. The abasement 
 of the deity was solely a thing for us; that is, it had no objective 
 reality. Moreover, the distinction between deity and humanity 
 is not a merely quantitative, comparative one (KaTa cUYyKpLOW) ; 
 otherwise, we should have to describe one and the same being 
 as both greater and less than Himself. But beings of the like 
 essence alone can be compared with each other; not those of 
 unlike essence. Between God, the Creator of the universe, and 
 the creature, between the unbounded and the bounded, between 
 illimitedness and limitedness, no comparison can be instituted. 
 God never falls out of Himself (wéves avéxrtwtos); never did 
 He enter on an existence outside of Himself (€& yéyove) ; and 
 yet the incarnation was a reality, and God truly revealed Him- 
 self in it.” By way of illustration, he employs the relation of a 
 thought to its representation in word, through the medium of 
 the tongue, or in signs written by the hand (Fragm. 3). 
 Thought is the self-moved energy of the soul, which flows forth, 
 according to its nature, in a continual stream (as did the energy 
 of Christ out of the deity). When I mould thoughts into 
 words, or delineate them in signs, employing the tongue as an in- 
 strument, or written signs, which in themselves are foreign to the 
 thing represented, the thoughts themselves remain unchanged. 
 Although they attain to actuality by means of something unlike 
 themselves, they are not changed, but simply revealed and per- 
 ceived. It is true, I employ my tongue and letters for the ma- 
 nifestation of my thoughts; and yet the thoughts do not belong 
 to the words or signs, but to me the speaker ; and I give expression 
 to them as mine in both ways, just as they flow out of my rational 
 soul, The tongue is merely the organ. Now, as the power, whose 
 essence is rational, whilst continuing unaltered in itself, expresses 
 itself by means of the bodily tongue; so, if two things utterly 
 incomparable may be compared, by means of the supernatural 
 cwpatwots, was the almighty, all-creating activity of the entire 
 deity manifested without change through the holy flesh of Christ, 
 in all that He worked after a divine manner; but the deity itself 
 remained essentially exempt from srepeypadn, although it shone 
 through a nature essentially limited. God is equal to Himself, and 
 has nothing unequal to Himself." But for our redemption’s sake, 
 and in order to constitute the universe a sharer in unchangeable- 
 1 Gott ist sich selbst gleich und hat nichts sich Ungleiches. 
 
BEKON. 33 
 
 ness, the Creator of the universe appropriated to Himself out of 
 the Virgin, without conversion (rpo77), a rational soul and a 
 sensitive body, became man, and worked nothing divine without 
 the body (yuuvov ceparos), and nothing human without the 
 participation of the deity (duoupov OeotyTos), in that He pre- 
 served for Himself a new and fitting method of working after 
 the manner of both, whilst leaving the nature of each unaltered. 
 We have no original information to the effect that Beron 
 taught that Christ had a human soul; but we need not be sur- 
 prised at Hippolytus’ not making this a charge against him, for 
 the human soul of Christ plays but an impersonal réle in Hip- 
 polytus’ own system: indeed, his favourite name for the humanity 
 of Christ is that.of a garment; and when he alludes to the soul 
 of Christ, it is not so much on its own account, as because he 
 meant to postulate the existence of two complete natures, and the 
 human nature would not be complete without the soul. But, 
 what is of still more importance, Beron is unquestionably in this 
 aspect superior to Hippolytus, although he does not give any 
 special prominence to the human soul. or the fundamental 
 aim of his system was to show, that that which is otherwise attri- 
 buted to the deity alone, working through human nature, must 
 also be attributed to the human nature itself, and be regarded as 
 its own activity.’ Beron’s aim was not an eternal or heavenly 
 humanity, although he did not consider it incompatible with the 
 eternal nature of God that He should be passible; but he be- 
 lieved that God first became passible when He posited Himself 
 as a man in Christ, by the act of Kév@ots.” But as he held that 
 an individual man, Jesus of Nazareth, a limited personality 
 (repiyparros), was thus brought into bene so also did he con- 
 ceive the act of incarnation to introduce fee into God Him- 
 self :—that is, by His own act, a limitation and circumscription 
 was introduced into God, sain had not previously existed. In 
 Christ, therefore, God was self-emptied, and had acquired an idéa 
 1 xewbevres idloey yeviobcs rns capnos ryy Osicv évépyecev. ‘This, like the 
 doctrine of the werarolnots capxos in God, reminds us of Paul of Samosata. 
 The point of departure, of course, in consequence of Beron’s doctrine of the 
 xévoots, 18 quite different; and, for this reason, everything stands, from the 
 very outset, in a different light. Beron, moreover, appears to have paid 
 leas regard to the ethical and the intellectual than to the davueare. 
 2 Another view was soon afterwards taken by the Manicheans, with 
 their ‘‘ Jesus patibilis.”’ 
 
 VOL. 1G, C 
 
34 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 rrepuypady. It is self-evident that, even though Beron spoke ef 
 the Logos, as we may perhaps conclude from the fifth Fragment 
 (Fabr. 1, 228; Bipwv tis, wel ETEpav twav Tv Barevtivou 
 davraciav aévtes, XElpove KaK@ KaTETapnTaV, EYovTES TI [Lev 
 mpoornpbcicay TO NOYH TapKa yeverOat TavToupyov TH OeoryTA, 
 Sua thy mpoodmw Ti GeornTa Sé yevécOar TavtoTraly Th capKi 
 Sud neva, TpoTV ood Kat pupow Kal ovyyvolw, Kal THY Els 
 addjrous duhorépov wetaBorv Soypatifovres), he cannot have 
 attributed to Him an hypostasis or 7epyypady of His own, apart 
 from the incarnation. Apart from the incarnation, he could 
 only speak of the Logos as perhaps Sabellius may have done 
 (Ang. Mai. 1. c. T. 7, 170 #f.), and as Noetus (Hipp. c. Noét. 
 15) did (see Appendix, Note 16). The more Beron felt him- 
 self compelled to attribute objective significance to the Kévwors, 
 the more necessary was it undoubtedly for him to distinguish, 
 from the time of the incarnation, between the divine which 
 became man and subjected itself to circumscription and passi- 
 bility, and God, so far as He did not enter into the weprypady ; 
 for it could never be his intention to maintain that the absolute 
 God existed solely and entirely in this xevwors, subsequently 
 to the incarnation. But inasmuch as he represented the divine 
 in Christ as acquiring a 7repuypady of its own through the incar- 
 nation, it is the more certain that he did not attribute to Him 
 a tepuypady previously.’ The divine element which thus sub- 
 jected itself to the fate of finitude, might, indeed, appear as an 
 aroxor of the original divine; nay, even, as though plunged 
 and lost in Lethe, through the «évwovs which it voluntarily un- 
 derwent; but, even after the transformation, it continued to 
 
 1 Gregor. Thaumat. speaks (see Ang. Mai 7, 170) of men who intro- 
 duce an oxox into the essence of God, through the cou of Christ, and 
 who, through the body, dvdoaxivas repiypaeQoves thy yévynot tov viod Ex Tov 
 xerpos. Quite as objectionable is it, says he, to attribute progress and 
 xeby to the deity, as to separate the progressing and suffering body (7.e., 
 the humanity) from the deity (that is, from the non-emptied, unchange- 
 able deity); as though the body were id:eCcvrws vQsorcs, that is, in the 
 language of Beron, as though all évéoyvei, even the divine, were (dia ri 
 onpxos OF ovamoas éxQvowévn Out of it (Fragm. 2). Because Beron did not 
 believe in the existence of a Logos, prior to the incarnation, who possessed 
 a xreptrype@y of His own, it was in his power to designate the deity which 
 set itself forth as man, the zerpixy dedrns; and for this reason, we have a 
 right to class him as above. 
 
BERON. BERYLL. oy) 
 
 constitute 1 the inmost-essence-of the humanity, and manifested 
 itself ever more and more fully in the development of the man 
 Jesus, until he was at last transmuted into.God.* Here, there- 
 fore, we find a course exactly similar to that taken by the theory 
 of Paul of Samosata, though starting from a completely oppo- 
 site theological point-of-view. The Ebionitical element, which 
 sinks back to the category of power, and which would be in- 
 volved in the dzroxo7, does not, however, like the azoxo77 
 itself, make its appearance in the Fragments of Beron ; indeed, 
 it is scarcely likely that he, on the whole, shared this tendency 
 to Ebionism. On the contrary, he may have been influenced 
 by the double desire, neither to represent the humanity of Christ 
 as impersonal, on the one hand, nor the natures outside of each 
 other as a double personality, on the other. 
 
 Similar, if indeed not more than similar, to Beron, both in 
 name and in views, was Beryll of Bostra. We have nothing 
 certain regarding him, save a passage in Eusebius, which has 
 given rise to the most varied combinations.” The views enter- 
 tained concerning him diverge as far as possible from each other. 
 Furthest removed from each other are those of Schleiermacher 
 and Baur. The former (1. c. 519-533) reckons him amongst 
 the Patripassians, and maintains, not that he transferred suffer- 
 ings into God, but that he believed the objective substance of 
 God to have undergone an alteration, a limitation (id/a ovovas 
 Tepiypad)), renee the incarnation; the latter (1. c. 284-292) 
 classes him with ne Artemonites or Neo-Ebionites. A middle 
 course between these two is taken by Neander (2, 1018-20) ; 
 (similarly also Rossel, the writer of a review of Baur’s “Trin. 
 und Menschwerdung” in the Berl. Jahrbiicher, 1844, Nos. 41-— 
 45.) The idea of areal indwelling of God Himself he does not 
 venture on attributing to him, but considers that he occupied a 
 middle position between Ebionism and Patripassianism, in that 
 
 1 LL. c., Fragm. 8; weraBorn dserntos yevepeevos dvbpwros, nal oapxos 
 petraroimocs Occ. 
 
 2 EHuseb. H. E. 6, 383; Béve rived trys wiorews moepesoQepely 7 El0TO, TOY 
 Larnpa xal Kupiov nuay rgyery TOALLOY LAN mpovQeor avers nar bolav voles 
 mepiypaPny =po tHS eho dvbpamous em iOnpelors, pe noe poyy Osornta idloey eyeuy, 
 GAN EeroAiTevomeuny aUTY LovnY chy weroimyy. The passage quoted from 
 Socrates, in Note 7, indicates that the discussions relative to the soul of 
 
 Christ plaved a great role at the Synod which was convened on his account. 
 Compare Euseb. 6, 20. 
 
36 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 he taught that the man Jesus was irradiated by a divine power. 
 According to Rossel’s further exposition, the humanity of Jesus 
 is the personal element; but alongside thereof are also patri- 
 passian elements. This view, however, renders the theory self- 
 contradictory, and introduces into it elements so heterogeneous, 
 that they could not continue in combination. According to 
 N eander, on the contrary, that irradiation which by the incar- 
 nation became an hypostatization of divine power, was the per- 
 sonific element. Even at an earlier period, the opinion was 
 expressed by Mosheim (“de rebus Christianis ante Constan- 
 tinum Commentarii,” p. 699 ff.), that Beryll did not conceive 
 the entire essence of the Father to have passed over into Christ, 
 on the one hand; nor, on the other hand, merely a divine power,. 
 which would have been decidedly Ebionitic; but the purest, 
 most glorious, wisest possible soul, taken out of, and therefore 
 perfectly like, the nature of the Father. Such an idea would 
 have been Arian. Against both Neander and Mosheim, how- 
 ever, is the text of Eusebius, which says, not that a power or 
 soul of the Father, or deity of the Father, but the (rv) deity 
 of the Father, dwelt in Him. Ullmann (see his “Comm. de 
 Beryllo Bostreno ejusque doctrina,” Hamb. 1835; and compare: 
 “Theol. Studien und Kritiken,” 1836, pp. 1073 f.) is of opinion. 
 that Beryll did not view the divine in Christ merely ebioniti- 
 cally, as a simple power, but conceived it also to be possessed of 
 consciousness or of personality ; thus approximating to Schleier- 
 macher’s position. On the other hand, however, he represents. 
 him not merely denying that the incarnation posited a distinction 
 in God Himself, but also as maintaining that the circumscrip- 
 tive, personific human element (das unschreibende personbil- 
 dende Menschliche) constituted the personality of Christ ; which 
 is scarcely reconcilable with the recognition of the personal 
 existence of the divine in Christ, and involves the assumption of 
 a double personality—an assumption, to which both Ebionites, 
 Patripassians, and Sabellians were most thoroughly opposed. 
 Baur also tries to show that Beryll assumed a twofold person- 
 ality, after the manner of Nestorius. His words are (I. ¢. p. 
 289),—“'The expression €urodteveo@as, although it involves 
 the idea of indwelling, implies, at the same time, that a free 
 relation existed between the Redeemer and the Father, even as. 
 a citizen stands connected with other citizens equal to himself 
 
BERYLL OF BOSTRA. 37 
 
 in the place where he lives.” I think, however, that the knot, 
 which Ullmann leaves behind, can be untied. We must either 
 start with the humanity as the primary, the personific element ; 
 and then Beryll must be acknowledged to have been Ebionitical : 
 or, we must take our start with the deity, as the personific, or, 
 more historically expressed, as the active, the hegemonical ele- 
 ment, the element which formed the cvoracvs (Hippol. c. Noét. 
 15). Those who took this latter view of the matter naturally 
 denied that the Son of God had an hypostatical, or an in any 
 way circumscribed pre-existence. He first became circumscribed 
 when He became incarnate. There is, however, an ambiguity 
 in this latter supposition, the clearing up and removal of which 
 throws an important light upon the whole; namely, the circum- 
 scription of the Son resulted either from the self-determination 
 of God, or from the activity of the human nature. In the latter 
 case, the divine aspect occupied a purely passive and receptive 
 position ; it was subjected to circumscription, to limitation: if, 
 however, it were inactive, nay more, passive, we cannot allow 
 that God and man were united in the highest way, to wit, per- 
 sonally and consciously; for such an union requires that the 
 divine stand in an active, hegemonical relation to the humar 
 aspect. If the divine aspect were passive, we must assume the 
 existence in Christ of a higher principle, of a power, which, 
 however, was by no means all-determining; in other words, we 
 must go over to Ebionism. In this way, Ullmann appears to 
 have glided over from the initiatory Patripassianism to the ulti- 
 mate Kbionism of Beryll. But—and this leads us to the second 
 case—it was not necessary that Patripassianism should pay this 
 price for the personality of Christ, although we by no means 
 intend to deny that many may have taken this course. ‘Those 
 are chiefly chargeable therewith who conceived God, after an 
 ethnic manner, to be immediately capable of suffering; or who 
 resorted to the idea of an amoxom of God in Christ, in order 
 not to be compelled to represent the entire Father as swallowed 
 up and absorbed by Christ, at all events for the period of his 
 development as a child: those are least chargeable therewith, 
 who, like Noetus, set the é@éXew, the divine will, in opposition 
 to the ethnic principle, and represented everything as depen- 
 dent thereon. Indeed, Patripassians might also have said,—The 
 conscious, personal God willed to exist in the form of an actual 
 
38 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 finite being; He consequently either produced the limited hu- 
 manity out of Himself,—which would be a Docetical idea, and 
 incompatible with their recognition of the birth from the Virgin ; 
 or, and this is the only possible alternative, God so perfectly 
 appropriated the body, which sprung from Mary, and took it up 
 into His own essence, that the unity of the person was complete, 
 and the Father, or the fatherly deity, possessed the finitude and 
 the passibleness of this man as its own. To this might be 
 added (as we have found Beron doing) the xévwous, and, on the 
 basis thereof, have been taught the doctrine of a conversion of 
 God into a man born of Mary, which man, however, owed his 
 rise out of the elements in Mary to the afore-mentioned divine 
 conversion. Finally, Fock, in his Diss. de Christolog. Berylh 
 Bostr. 18438, decides—and, as it appears to me, justly—both 
 against Baur, with his imputation of Ebionism, and Neander and 
 Mosheim, with their attempt to weaken the force of the words, 
 Ti TaTpiKny Ocornta €utroNtTEvopevnv év avT@, Which leads toa 
 kind of Arianism. For the reason assigned, he is also opposed to 
 Ullmann ; he therefore substantially adopts Schleiermacher’s 
 view, and classes Beryll with the Patripassians, putting him even 
 on the same level with Praxeas. He is above all averse to grant- 
 ing that Beryll attributed a human soul to Christ, as do Baur 
 and Ullmann (Neander and Rossel ought consistently to do the 
 same) ; justly urging, that unless Beryll had given occasion 
 thereto, the Synod which was held on his account would not 
 have proceeded so “ex abrupto,’ to the consideration and affir- 
 mation of the human soul of Christ (see Notes 7 and 30). He 
 fails, however, to answer the important objection, why Beryll 
 was never reproached with the denial of the human soul of 
 Christ. For we have shown above, that what he says regard- 
 ing the absence of a soul of Christ in the systems even of 
 Ireneus and other teachers of the Church, is historically inac- 
 curate. Further, Ullmann’s objection, that the idea of the 
 assumption of a mere body would be too coarse, Fock sets aside 
 by an appeal to Apollinaris. Nay more, he hints that much may 
 be urged in favour of the opinion, that they regarded the divine 
 subject as the Ego and the intelligence, in brief, as the Spirit 
 in Christ ; if, indeed, it be not quite maintainable. On the other 
 hand, however, not content with characterizing (after Schleier- 
 macher’s example) the strictly patripassian element, to wit, the 
 
BERYLL OF BOSTRA. 39 
 
 subjection of the Father to suffering, as an idea too coarse to be 
 entertained by this entire series of thinkers, and in particular by 
 Beryll,—a notion which, after what has been advanced above, is 
 by itself untenable ; he will not even concede, with Schleierma- 
 cher, that Beryll believed in the existence of a circumscription in 
 the divine nature itself, subsequent to the incarnation. He is 
 rather of Baur’s opinion, that we must then read, cat’ idiav ri}s 
 ovcias Teprypadny, instead of Kar’ idiav ovcias mepuypagpyv. His 
 judgment, accordingly, appears to be,—Beryll merely maintained 
 that, subsequently to the incarnation, the Redeemer existed in 
 the circumscribed form of an individual; whereas, previously, 
 He had been neither hypostatical nor circumscribed, but abso- 
 lutely identical with the Father. The circumscription was not 
 therefore in Him, but He in the circumscription. Here again, 
 however, we come upon the ambiguity cleared up above. If the 
 Father had not posited circumscription as an objective determi- 
 nation of His own being, He could only have existed in circum- 
 scription so far as His entire being was embraced and bounded 
 by finitude. But on this supposition, the finite would be the 
 active element; and, as we have shown, Beryll must then be de- 
 scribed asan Ebionite. As Fock, however, by no means intends 
 to class Beryll amongst Ebionites, his only alternative is to re- 
 turn to Schleiermacher’s view, and to accept the meprypady as 
 an objective determination of the divine nature itself, with the 
 following proviso—this determination and circumscription was 
 not the effect of the action of the human nature on the divine 
 (a notion which, besides being essentially Hbionitic, had been 
 already given up as untenable by Noetus), but the work of the 
 divine will. From what we know of the man as a whole, this 
 must be assumed to have been his view, even should the sense 
 of the words of Eusebius be, “The Redeemer exists since the 
 incarnation in the circumscription of an individual being 
 (ovcias).” It is more than questionable, however, whether this 
 is the true sense of the words. In the first place, this use of 
 ovcta is not the usual one, and is particularly unsuitable here, 
 because the idea of individuality is already expressed in the 
 words (dia mepuypady, as whose cbject we may very appropri- 
 ately take the substance (ovoia) which is circumscribed. The 
 article is not absolutely indispensable; for the connection itself, 
 as we shall directly see, indicates clearly what sort of an ovota 
 
40 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 is meant. Secondly, In the text of Eusebius, nothing is directly 
 said of circumscription by means of the incarnation. We first 
 arrive at that idea in the way of deduction. Eusebius rather 
 says, the Redeemer did not exist car’ idiav odclas Tepuypadiy. 
 How, then, can we translate as though Beryll maintained that 
 Christ had not pre-existed in the circumscription of an individual 
 being? for the Church itself did not assert such a pre-existence, 
 and the denial thereof would therefore have been no ground of 
 reproach. Eusebius blames him because he denied that the 
 general substance (ovoia) of God had been distinguished into 
 Father and Son; which is figuratively expressed by saying, he 
 attributes to the Redeemer no circumscription of the divine 
 substance peculiar to Himself. If we adopt the rendering, 
 “not in the special circumscription of an hypostasis,” it is true, 
 indeed, that ovcia, at an earlier period, and down to the fourth 
 century, was used as equivalent to trocracis; but then a new 
 difficulty arises, to wit, we shall be certainly compelled to com- 
 plete the sense by supplying the thought,—“ but since the 
 incarnation, the Lord and Redeemer exists in the particular 
 circumscription of an hypostasis.” That, however, would be 
 equivalent to saying, that Eusebius conceived the divine hypo- 
 stasis to be of precisely the same nature, or identical, with that 
 which was posited by the human circumscription ; which is hard 
 to believe. For such a human circumscription brings merely 
 limitation, finitude; whereas the idea of a divine hypostasis, be- 
 sides the negative element, demands in particular a positive, spe- 
 cial, independent divine existence. Eusebius, therefore, cannot 
 have meant to say,—The hypostasis which Beryll denies to the 
 Saviour, prior to the incarnation, he represents Him as acquiring 
 subsequently ; for that is not true. Beryll was not of opinion 
 that the incarnation introduced a special and distinct hypostasis 
 into the divine substance; but that one and the same hypostasis 
 or personality of the Father, continued to be the subject, the 
 inner personality, of the circumscription effected by finitude. 
 If, then, the translation, “‘ hypostasis,” is inadmissible, we must 
 necessarily take the word ovc/a in its usual sense; and then the 
 entire passage may be rendered,—The Redeemer did not pre- 
 exist in a circumscribed form of being of His own (in virtue of 
 a distinction in the fatherly deity); but after the incarnation a 
 peculiar circumscription was introduced into this substance ;— 
 
PATRIPASSIAN MONARCHIANISM., 41 
 
 naturally, as Beryll was not an Ebionite, in consequence of the 
 Father’s own act. Ovoias wepuypadi is, as it were, one con- 
 ception—circumscription of essence; the absence of the article 
 cannot, therefore, turn the scale. 
 
 It appears to me, therefore, that the following ideas are con- 
 tained in the words of Eusebius:—I. Beryll believed that the 
 Tatpixy Oeorns was in Jesus, but not an idia Bedtns (Note 12). 
 What the latter denotes, will be clear from the foregoing obser- 
 vations. II. Our Lord and Redeemer did not exist, prior to His 
 incarnation (émvdnuia), in the form of a circumscription of sub- 
 stance of His own (xat’ idlav ovcias Tmepvypadiy) ; that is, He 
 did not pre-exist as an independent being: consequently, it could 
 only be the divine itself, the fatherly deity, that was_in Christ. 
 III. But when Eusebius says, that, according to Beryll, the Lord 
 did not exist prior to the incarnation in the form of an indepen- 
 dent aepuypady, he gives us therewith to understand, that, sub- 
 sequently to the émdnuta, the case was different. From that 
 event onwards, the Redeemer, who had previously been identified 
 with the watpixn Oeorns, and destitute of an hypostasis, became, 
 at all events, a circumscribed being, possessed of an indepen- 
 dent existence—in the sense, indeed, that the fatherly deity 
 acquired a different determination in Him. Now, if the incar- 
 nation introduced limitation and circumscription into the watpexy 
 Georns, Beryll should unquestionably be classed amongst those 
 who import finitude into God Himself. Not, however, by any 
 means as though the humanity were a limit imposed from without, 
 by which the sratpixy Ocorns was reduced to a passive condition. 
 After what has been advanced above, on the contrary, it must be 
 plain that, as Beryll did not adopt the opinion of the Ebionites, 
 he, and other men of his age, must have traced the limit up to 
 the appropriative act of God itself, and have conceived the 
 divine as determining itself to finitude, as positing itself human. 
 It would seem, therefore, that, as in the view of Beron—of whom, 
 be it remarked, we are very distinctly reminded by some of the 
 expressions here employed—so also, in the view of Beryll, the 
 acquirement of an id/a ovelas treprypady by the Redeemer, and 
 the rise of the humanity, was one and the same act ; nay more, 
 the Father’s position of finitude and limitation in Himself was 
 one and the same act with His self-abnegation. But although 
 the aatpix) Georns thus circumscribed itself, that is, posited 
 
4? FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH 
 
 itself as finite and human, it did not absolutely cease to exist as 
 divine. On the contrary, as its inmost soul and motive power, 
 the divine was naturalized, yea, was at home in the human cir- 
 cumscription and nature ; for the union between the two was not 
 merely momentary, but essential and most intimate,—the latter, 
 in fact, owing its very rise to the Tar pee) Georns, so far as it had 
 given tect the determination of (d/a ovoias mepiypadgi). 
 
 If this were Beryll’s idea, we can easily understand that 
 Origen should have had greater influence on it than, for ex- 
 ample, Hippolytus, and in that teacher’s doctrine of the soul 
 should have been able to bring about that crisis m Beryll’s 
 views, which, after the hints given above, we may probably 
 assume to have taken place. Hitherto, namely, Beryll had 
 treated the question of the humanity of Christ rather lightly 
 than otherwise; the teachers of the Church, as, for example, 
 Hippolytus, held a too impersonal view of the humanity, treating 
 it as the mere organ or otony) of the divine. Patripassianism 
 was.at first marked by the same feature; in its first forms, it 
 conceded no place to the human soul of Christ. But the more 
 decided the advances made towards conceiving passibility, and 
 even finitude in general (wepeypady), as a determination of 
 God, and the greater were the importance and worth attached to 
 the finitude and the humanity, although merely as an aspect of 
 the divine itself. For this, a welcome connecting link was found 
 in the Church’s doctrine of the cévwats. This plainly involved an 
 approximation to Ebionism, whatever abhorrence Beryll might 
 inwardly feel for that system. In this state of mind, Beryll must 
 have welcomed the theory laid before him by Origen, in which 
 the free human soul of Christ held so important a place; and 
 as coming from the Church, it must have appeared to him a new 
 thing, nay more, as a development of that which he himself 
 aimed at, in laying greater stress on the humanity. On the 
 other Fand: however, the more decided the prominence given 
 to the human factor, the more Beryll’s theory assumed uninten- 
 tionally a predominantly Ebionitic character; and on this ground 
 also we can understand why he would willingly accept from 
 Origen the idea of the pre-existent divine hypostasis of Christ, 
 offering as it did that counterpoise which his own theory lacked. 
 To this course he might be led by several considerations. 
 Firstly, Origen did not overthrow the povapyia of God, but 
 
BERYLL OF BOSTRA. 43 
 
 protected it by a species of subordinatianism, growing out of 
 Sabellian principles. GSecondly; Beryll’s own Monarchianism,— 
 and Monarchianism was, without doubt, originally one of his 
 points of departure,—had gradually assumed such a form, that 
 he himself could not have avoided attributing to God a certain 
 objective circumscription; that is, he must himself have admitted 
 a distinction into his idea of God (Note 13). It could, there- 
 fore, be no great step for him to acknowledge this distinction, 
 properly modified, to have eternally existed in the divine nature, 
 especially as God Himself, and not the temporal world, was 
 represented as the ground thereof (compare c. Celsum, 8, 12). 
 From the view just given, it will be clear, on the one hand, why 
 in the Synodal Epistle reference was made to the human soul 
 of Christ; for it undoubtedly played a part in the conferences 
 with Beryll; and, on the other hand, why he was not charged 
 with denying the human soul of Christ. By raising the hu- 
 manity to the rank of a determination of God Himself, Beryll 
 secured it such a degree of relative independence and signif- 
 cance, that, with his general tendency of mind, he must already 
 have been on the way towards the assumption of the existence 
 of a human soul of Christ. This becomes still clearer when we 
 compare the related system of Beron, who, on the cround of 
 that divine xévwous which constituted humanity a determination 
 of God’s own essence, and of the immanence and hegemony of 
 the divine principle, was able to represent all its activity and its 
 deification as proceeding from the humanity itself. From our 
 exposition, it is also plain why doubts could be entertained whe- 
 ther Beryll held the circumscription to have been the work of 
 the human or of the divine aspect. For the human aspect un- 
 questionably was essentially connected therewith; it formed a 
 circumscription. It was, however, merely the means employed 
 by God for constituting circumscription a determination of 
 Himself, and not in any sense the original cause. To have sup 
 posed the latter, would have been Ebionitic. And now at last 
 we are in a position to mediate between Baur and Schleiermacher. 
 Neander was right in his surmise, that Beryll held a kind of 
 middle position between the Artemonites and the Patripassians.; 
 though I consider it should be argued on different grounds. We 
 must, in the first instance, direct attention to the consideration, 
 that the assumption of finitude into the fatherly deity, forming 
 
44 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 as it did one act with the cévwous of God, reduced the divine tc 
 the position of an active potence of the humanity itself; the 
 latter consequently gained considerably in importance, and deity 
 pertained as truly to its substance as it pertained to the sub- 
 stance of deity. It was therefore possible for it to develop 
 itself out of itself. So far the system bears a certain resem- 
 blance to Ebionism. On the other hand, however, this person 
 and its development owed their existence entirely to the fatherly 
 deity, which became man; and therefore, when the person 
 attained completion, its actual deity was not a mere title, nor a 
 mere moral unity with God, but the realization of its own inner 
 essence. Accordingly, the starting-point and the conclusion of 
 this theory bear rather an anti-Ebionitical than an Ebionitical 
 character. It may be said to occupy a middle position between 
 Ebionism and the early Patripassianism: neither treating the 
 human as a mere selfless accident, on the one hand, nor viewing 
 the divine in Christ after the type of the indwelling of the 
 Spirit in the prophets, on the other hand; but aiming to 
 combine both in inward, essential, and abiding unity. At the 
 same time, it did not teach that this unity was the result of 
 an influx of personific, divine power into the humanity. But 
 though Beron and Beryll aided decidedly in advancing Patri- 
 volved new difficulties; and these difficulties, in turn, further 
 explain Beryll’s adoption of Origen’s views. or the question 
 still remained, Did the entire Father, the entire atpsxi OedTns, 
 abase itself when God became man, and subjected Himself 
 to a human development; or merely one part or one aspect 
 of its substance? In the former case, we should come upon the 
 monstrous idea, that the Father had no longer an existence save 
 in the man Jesus; and that in him, in virtue of the Kkévwots 
 which had taken place, He existed at first as the mere potence 
 of true humanity : consequently, during the continuance of the 
 Redeemer’s development, the world in general had no actual 
 God. In the second case, we should arrive at Ebionism, that 
 is, in its new Hellenic form. As Beryll declined being classed 
 with the Ebionites, he would naturally welcome the loophole 
 offered by the Church, and thenceforth regard the divine in the 
 Redeemer, not as mere portion or segment, but as an aspect or 
 particular mode of existence, of the entire divine substance. 
 
BERYLL OF BOSTRA. 45 
 
 In the line of Monarchians, Beryll forms the connecting 
 link between the okler ones,—the Patripassians, who allowed of 
 absolutely no mpoowzrov side by side with the tarpuxiy BedTns,— 
 and Sabellius, who not merely recognised in Christ a distinct 
 TpocwTor, a distinct mepuypady), bee by advancing onwards to 
 the Holy Spirit, was able to construe a species of trinity. His 
 system was the bridge between the two, firstly, because it de- 
 scribed the being au God in Christ asa mepiypady. in God 
 Himself ; Gcanaly, because it assumed a peculiar relation of 
 ‘God to this man; and, lastly, seeing that the relation referred 
 to could only be grounded in the divine essence, because Beryll 
 necessarily regarded it as a determination of God Himself, con- 
 formably to which He had both the will and the power to posit 
 Himself as aman. Whether Beryll understood this in a patri- 
 passian sense, as a self-subjection of the divine nature to passi- 
 bility; or in Beron’s sense, as a conversion (tpo77) of God into 
 the man Jesus; or in a more Sabellian sense, as the non-passive 
 activity of God in the circumscription of the zpécwmov of Christ 
 (which unquestionably interweaves God with finitude, if He not 
 merely acted upon, but really dwelt in, Christ; see above, page 
 38) ; he is certainly akin to both, in so far as he attributes to the 
 mepuypady, or limitation and finitude, a relation tg God’s own 
 substance, whilst at the same time denying to it, as indeed to 
 distinction in general, any, save perhaps an ideal, reality in God, 
 apart from the incarnation. 
 
 All these theories, although it cannot be doubted that their 
 authors were stirred by religious motives, necessarily strike at 
 the very root of religion in general, and of Christianity in par- 
 ticular. If the Father Himself is immediately the revealer—if 
 there is no distinction in Him, no Son through whom, as through 
 His image, He reveals Himself, first in istmanrdl ml for Ea 
 self, and then also in the w meinen the object of revelation 
 is ieee and its idea is destroyed. For if the Father, as the final 
 Pend Himself comes forth in revelation ; and if, in order that 
 the revelation may be complete, nothing can be left behind in 
 the ground; then did the Father, that is, God, pass over into, 
 and really become, the world; and there is consequently nothing 
 left but the world. This is ins ethnical, pantheistic feature of 
 Patripassianism and Sabellianism. The Tek result is, to do away 
 altogether with revelation; for, on the supposition referred to, 
 
46 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 that which was to be made manifest by revelation no longer 
 exists. Noetus escaped this danger; for, in the absolute will of 
 God, which at one time decrees the assumption of visibility and 
 passibility, and at another time the return to invisibility and 
 impassibility, he had that potence, which, in that it has power 
 over itself, is unalterable, and can neither succumb to the world, 
 nor tolerate God’s passing over into it. But, not having laid 
 firm hold of the eternal ethical principle in God, which is the 
 only basis of an abiding incarnation, the incarnation recognised 
 by him is but a momentary thing, originating and grounded in 
 a particular act of will. Consistency, therefore, required him to 
 treat Christ’s person and appearance as transitory (although it is 
 scarcely likely that he actually taught it); unless he were pre- 
 pared to suppose that the Father did not again return into that 
 unalterableness which his Monarchianism compelled him to re- 
 gard as the true essence of God. 
 
STRUGGLE WITH THE NEW FORM OF EBIONISM. 474 
 
 SOUR, VA 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF THE SON, AND THE REVIVAL OF MONARCH- 
 [ANISM IN THE FORM OF SABELLIANISM AND SUBORDINA- 
 TIANISM. 
 
 (HA Rete. 
 
 THE CONFUTATION OF THE NEW FORM OF EBIONISM AND 
 PATRIPASSIANISM BY THE CHURCH. 
 
 I. Zhe Struggle with the New Form of £bionism. 
 
 When the Theodotians and Artemonites tried to surround 
 their innovation with the nimbus of antiquity, and to represent 
 it as the doctrine of the Apostles and the doctrine of the Church 
 down to the days of Victor, an old work, attributed, after the 
 example of Photius, to the Roman presbyter Caius (Cod. 48), 
 answered them drily, but yet correctly,—“ One might perhaps 
 believe them, if the Holy Scriptures, above all else, did not 
 stand in the way.’ But there exist also works of brethren, reach- 
 ing up to a time earlier than Victor, written against heresies, 
 and addressed to heathens; as, for example, those of Justin, 
 Miltiades, Tatian, Clement, and many others; in all of which 
 Christ is designated God (év ois dracv Oeodoyettar 0 Xpicros). 
 For who is not acquainted with the writings of Irenzeus and 
 Melito, and the rest, who proclaim Christ as God and as man? 
 How many psalms and hymns, moreover, have been composed 
 by believing brethren, from the beginning to the present time, 
 which glorify the Logos of God, the Christ, by landing Him as 
 
 1 Older writers, like Eusebius (H. E. 5, 28), Nicephorus (4, 21), and 
 Theodoret (Her. fab. 2, 5), were not acquainted with the name of the 
 
 author of the work. It bore, however, the title of ‘‘The Little Laby- 
 rinth.” 
 
4& FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 God?” And how many more witnesses the author might have 
 cited against them, we have already shown. In fact, the asser- 
 tion of the Artemonites, that theirs was the primitive Christian 
 doctrine, was so baseless, that the only witnesses to whom they 
 could at all appeal, namely, the older and proper Ebionites, 
 would have been held in horror by them; partly because of 
 their Jewish tastes, which sorely clashed with their own classical 
 culture (Euseb. H. E. 5, 28); and partly because these newer 
 Kbionites coincided with the Church in recognising the super- 
 natural birth of Christ. Complaints were made of their 
 arbitrary treatment of the Scriptures, of the erasures and 
 alterations they made in their copies of the Biblical text: 
 they were charged with swerving from and throwing it into 
 confusion ; with paying more attention to Aristotle and Euclid, 
 to syllogistic forms and geometry, than to the investigation of 
 the contents of the Sacred Scriptures. The Church felt that 
 theirs was a foreign, a worldly spirit: “They speak like men 
 who are of the earth, and know not Him who is from above.” 
 Their minds were open to worldly science, but not to religion : 
 their system, therefore, did not grow out of an interest in reli- 
 gion, in Christianity, but their views and their copies of the 
 Scripture were cut and shaped in agreement with principles 
 foreign to Christianity. We are not informed that they em- 
 ployed dogmatical arguments in defending and establishing their 
 own views, and in combating the prevailing doctrine: for this 
 reason, it was only just that they should neither attain wide 
 diffusion, nor be greatly regarded by the Church. Much as Ter- 
 tullian wrote about the Trinity and Christology, he passes over 
 this heresy, although contemporary, in perfect silence: he does 
 not appear to have been at all acquainted with it;* on the con- 
 trary, he speaks as though in his day the divinity of the Person 
 of Christ were already accepted as beyond all doubt.” Not till 
 
 1 The only mention made of it is in the catalogue of heresies at the close 
 of the work, ‘‘ de prescr. Her.” (c. 53), which is of doubtful genuineness. 
 
 ? De carne Christi 1: Examinemus corporalem substantiam Domini, de 
 spiritali enim certum est. ‘‘ Spiritalis substantia ” is,equivalent, with Ter- 
 tullian, to ‘‘divina substantia.” Compare Apol. 21; de orat. 1; adv. 
 Mare. 1, 19; 3, 6. 16; 4, 21; adv. Prax. 26.—‘‘ Spiritus” with him by no 
 means denotes merely the Holy Spirit: but he applies the term also to the 
 divine nature. Compare Tertullian, ed. Semler, 1825, T. vi. 572 ; and John 
 iv. 24: Rom. i. 4; 2 Cor. ili. 17. See Note QQ, page 391, Vol. I. 
 
THE STRUGGLE WITH PATRIPASSIANISM. 49 
 
 the second half of the third century did this tendency find a 
 vigorous representative in Paul of Samosata. In his hands it 
 excited far more attention; for the state of the Church, when 
 he appeared, was far more favourable to the introduction of his 
 theory, than at the time when the monarchian heresies were rife. 
 At the present time (as we have shown in the introductory 
 remarks to this third chapter), the mind of the Church was 
 powerfully occupied with the question of the equalization of the 
 Logos with the Father, and of the expulsion of subordinatian 
 elements from the conception of the Son. The patripassian 
 form of Monarchianism must, therefore, have worn a greater 
 appearance of affinity to the doctrine of the Church; and it was 
 really a consequence of the continuous and necessary struggle 
 carried on with this heresy, in the persons of the men who from 
 time to time attempted its revival, that the Church took so 
 strong a turn in the opposite direction, that is, towards the 
 assertion of the distinction between Christ and God, and that a 
 door was thus opened not merely to preludes of Arianism, but 
 even to Ebionitical teachings. For this reason, the struggle 
 with Paul shall be narrated at a later period. 
 
 II. The Struggle with Patripassianism. 
 
 During the period of the development of the doctrine of the 
 Church, which extended from the énd of the second to the mid- 
 dle of the third century, the part played by Ebionism is scarcely 
 worthy of notice; but the case was somewhat different with Do- 
 cetism. ‘There was a closer affinity between it and Patripassian- 
 ism, and that, not merely at the commencement in the hands of 
 Marcion, but even later also, in those of Beryll: indeed, one may 
 in a certain sense say, that Patripassianism was the continuation 
 of Docetism, under a more orthodox garb. At the same time, 
 we must be careful to remember, that the principle of Docetism 
 had already been negatived by the mind of the Church; and Ter- 
 tullian did but, as it were, collect together the manifold and rank 
 forms of Docetism, in order to pronounce on them the final judg- 
 ment of the Church. The reasons assigned by Tertullian for his 
 condemnatory judgment may be taken as the expression of the 
 general view, to which the Church had been led in the course 
 ef the struggle. But the after effects of the Docetical error 
 
 VOU. MI, D 
 
AQ) FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 were far from being rooted out by that condemnation. All that 
 it really did, was to lighten the labour of the Church; for the 
 future, all that was needed was to bring to light the Docetical 
 root of an opinion, and the Church at once, unhesitatingly gave 
 the required decision. 
 
 The Docetical aspect of Gnosticism is discussed by ‘Tertul- 
 lian, particularly in the work, “ de carne (or humanity) Christi.” 
 Marcion, says he, denies both the birth and the flesh of Christ, 
 in order that the one may not testify to the other; for the one 
 stands or falls with the other. “Thou hast cut away portions 
 of the Gospel, cries Tertullian, in which, according to a letter 
 of thine, and the confession of thy followers, thou thyself didst 
 formerly believe. Thou showest thus, that the faith rejected by 
 thee is the older; and that thy present faith is of yesterday.” 
 Marcion did not intend to deny the sufferings of Christ; but 
 how absurd to leave the sufferings and death standing, and to 
 deny the birth and the human pote ! Thou leavest fifa cruci- 
 fixion untouched; but how could God suffer without human 
 flesh? Or was His suffering a mere show? If so, He might 
 as easily have consented to the show of birth and childhood, 
 and there is therefore no need for thee to deny them.” (Com- 
 pare above, Epoch Second, Section First.) Apelles attributed 
 to Christ a solid body, but supposed it to be compounded of 
 sidereal elements. What, then, are we to understand by His 
 mother and His brethren in the Gospel, if, though He had a 
 human body, He was never born? Christ must then be classed 
 with the appearances of angels, who also, according to Tertul- 
 lian, gave themselves solid bodies, though they were never born. 
 But the cause of the appearance in the two cases is a different 
 one. No angelever appeared with a view to being crucified, to 
 dying, and to being raised to life again. Christ, however, having 
 been sent to die, must needs also be born, in order that He 
 might be able to die (de carne Christi 6). This is the “ mu- 
 tuum debitum” between “nativitas” and “ mortalitas,” that 
 whatever dies must be born, and whatever is born must die. 
 Why do we everywhere discover in His body the signs of its 
 earthly origin? Nowhere did men regard it with astonish- 
 ment ; nothing of heavenly brilliance clana to it, that it should 
 be despised and derided. ‘Tertullian saw the dmalieed element 
 which lay in this tendency; and acutely shows, not only that 
 
 EEE, 
 
THE STRUGGLE WITH PATRIPASSIANISM. o1 
 Apelles must needs abide by a “caro peccatrix,” if the prince 
 of matter (preses igneus) is the prince of the world, and if the 
 world be a “delictum ;” for the world is one: but also, that he 
 cannot represent our earthly world as made partaker of re- 
 demption, if he hold that the exaltation of Christ involved the 
 annihilation and dissolution of the humanity He had assumed. 
 According to another theory, the soul of Christ gave rise to His 
 body ; the soul became flesh; His flesh, therefore, was not like 
 that of other men, for, as it was derived from the “anima,” it 
 was soulical flesh (caro animalis). These latter teach that He 
 did not need to assume our flesh, inasmuch as He only came to 
 redeem oursoul. ‘“ Why, then, did His soul become that which 
 He had no need to redeem, to wit, flesh; nay more, flesh of a 
 different kind from ours, and which therefore cannot serve us? 
 Nay more, if His soul were made flesh (carnea facta), it was 
 not such a soul as ours; but was converted into a fleshly soul, 
 such as neither required redemption, nor could aid in the work 
 of redemption. They say, His soul became a body, in order 
 that we might see it born, die, and rise again; and in order that 
 the soul might look upon and recognise itself (that is, probably, 
 its own history, or the momenta of the inner process through 
 which it itself passes) in Christ, as the symbol of this inner 
 history." But the body of Christ concealed His soul ; how, then, 
 can the soul have been manifested in it? For that purpose, 
 they must surely devise another body, capable of making the 
 invisible visible.” This argument plainly cannot hold its ground. 
 The following, however, may :—“ They have reduced the soul 
 itself to flesh; what, then, remains to be revealed? Further- 
 more, the main point is not, that the soul should know itself 
 through Christ (as though it were already perfect in itself, and 
 only lacked the consciousness of its perfection), but that it 
 should know Christ in itself. ‘The soul is not in danger because 
 it has not perfect self-knowledge, but because it has not the 
 knowledge of Christ.” At the same time, therefore, he protests 
 against a theory of redemption which requires merely a process 
 of knowledge, and not a real and religious transformation through 
 Christ ; which confounds religion with a theoretical process ; 
 and which, consequently, has no need of the humanity of Christ, 
 1C. 11: Not the “ effigies anime” was given by or in Christ, says Ter- 
 tullian, but its ‘‘salus.” 
 
ae FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 save as its history is the symbol of a spiritual truth. This pas- 
 sage is in other respects remarkable, as showing that Tertullian 
 ateienied to Christ a true human soul. (C. 10: “Ut animam 
 salvam faceret in se ipso, suscepit animam Christus, quia salva 
 non esset, nisi per ipsum, dum in ipso.”) Others endeavour to 
 show that one of the pure, heavenly natures, which Christ (that 
 is, the eternal Christ) is supposed to have assumed, might supply 
 an organ qualifying Him for historical activity;—an organ which 
 matter and weak human nature appeared to refuse. They say 
 accordingly, —“ Angelum gestavit ut satellitem fortem, cum quo 
 salutem hominis operaretur.’ In support of which, they ap- 
 pealed to passages where Christ is designated an angel. _Ter- 
 tullian, however, simply replied,—An an als is often a messenger : 
 an ambassador. At the same time, Terai does not say that an 
 angel or a messenger redeemed them, but the Lord Himself. 
 It would, therefore, involve a shortening of the work of re- 
 demption, to represent an angel as the Redeemer. It is true, 
 they say,—Christ, in the angel. But that is superfluous, or too 
 much. If He redeemed through the angel, what part did the 
 angel take; and vice versd? But it is also too little. For the 
 angels did not need to be redeemed: to men, not to them, was re- 
 demption promised; and men would then come short. How 
 could He further be made lower than the angels, if He were an 
 angel and nota man? The Valentinians, lastly, invent a kind 
 of spiritual body. They suppose that Christ stood amongst the 
 angels invested with an earthly body, and was not born of the 
 Spirit, nor of God, but of the will of the man.’ Consequently 
 His body was of God, of the Spirit. “ Were it of the earth,” say 
 they, “how could He be unperishable? Why was His body 
 not dissolved into earth, if it was like ours? Orif we Christians 
 are so entirely like Him, even in relation to the body, why do 
 not we, like Him, rise again, and ascend into heaven, without 
 undergoing corruption? If we attribute flesh at all to Christ, 
 we must attribute to Him sinful flesh, and must suppose that 
 He then annihilated it, and laid it aside.’ ‘To this Tertullian 
 replies,—We say that neither did He lay aside His flesh, nor was 
 His flesh sinful in essence. Unquestionably He assumed our 
 flesh, in which dwell sin and guilt, and that not merely in ap- 
 
 1 Undoubtedly with reference to the ancient reading ¢s éyevy7dn, instead 
 of of yevvndnoav, John i. 10. 
 
THE STRUGGLE WITH PATRIPASSIANISM. o3 
 
 pearance ; but had Christ therefore “ caro peccatrix?” No; He 
 made our flesh His own by the act of assumption; and by 
 making it His own, He made it sinless.” In proof that to the 
 reality of the flesh, generation from the seed of a man was not 
 necessary, he reminds them of Adam. As, in his case, earth 
 was converted into flesh, even so was the Word of God able to 
 pass over into the material of the same flesh, without the inter- 
 vention of the seed of aman. “ Vacabat viri semen apud ha- 
 bentem Dei semen.” Converting his defence into an attack, 
 he goes on to say,— They believe that He died (c. 15), and 
 yet they represent that which died as having been born of the 
 unperishable. ‘They desire a man united with God (hominem 
 Deo mixtum), and yet they deny the man: for a man who has 
 not our body, a body taken from human nature, is a mere ap- 
 pearance. ‘Caro ex hominis carne erat sumenda;” therefore 
 He cannot have given Himself a body out of Himself. This 
 the Valentinians themselves also, strictly speaking, grant; for 
 they confess that He was born of the Virgin. And what can 
 this mean, if He did not receive from the Virgin the body which 
 He bore when He came forth out of her womb? It would then 
 be much simpler to say,—He received a body of a spiritual kind, 
 apart from Mary. “Sine causa eo se intulit, unde nihil extulit. 
 Sed non sine cause descendit in vulvam, ergo ex illa accepit.” 
 Though this line of argumentation goes back merely to the fact 
 of Christ’s birth, which was recognised even by his opponents, 
 Tertullian did not fail at the same time to recognise the idea 
 which was connected therewith. 
 
 Without doubt, says he, the seed of a man was not neces- 
 sary to the Person of Christ: had He been entirely, and in 
 every respect, like us—entirely and solely the Son of man—He 
 would not have been the Son of God. But He lacked nothing 
 that was necessary to constitute Him entirely one of us. ‘To 
 ‘this the seed of a man was not necessary, as Adam proves. On 
 the other hand, however, a mere creation (as in Adam’s case), or 
 self-generation, or self-conception, was not enough; but He 
 must needs stand in blood-relationship to the already existent 
 race. To Mary must belong, not indeed that which she con- 
 ceived, but what she bore; she must communicate to it her own 
 blood. It was necessary that Christ should be the fruit, and 
 not merely the guest, of her womb. Whoso denies that He was 
 
54 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 a blossom and fruit of the royal stem of David, denies not 
 merely the root to the branch, and to the blossom, and to the 
 fruit; but also the fruit to its root; in order that the root may 
 not be able to claim the glory of Him who was destined to be 
 its blossom and fruit. In this case, it is necessary to go back 
 through all the members (of the human race) to the beginning. 
 All participate in this blossom and fruit, and its nature is no 
 other than Adam’s; for, indeed, He is the second Adam. Ac- 
 cordingly, we must either say, that men have the same spirit-like 
 flesh as the second Adam, or else that the body of Christ, not 
 having sprung from a spiritual stem, was not a spiritual body. 
 Tertullian was not satisfied without declaring, in the strongest 
 terms, his conviction of the reality of the connection between 
 Christ and ourrace. “ Adhesit utero, avulsus est; ex utero est 
 per illum nervum umbilicarem adnexus origini vulve.” He 
 asserts a concarnatio, a convisceratio of Christ with our race. 
 Ex humana matrice did He derive the substantia for His caro 
 (c. 17). That is the new birth which He was appointed to 
 
 bring : a man was born in God (in Deo); and in this man, God 
 
 also was born; for He assumed the flesh of the old stem with- 
 out the old seed, in order that, in the power of the new seed, 
 that is, of the Spirit, He might recreate the old flesh, after hay- 
 ing atoned it, by the exclusion of the old impurity. At the 
 same time, that entire new birth (novitas) was formed out of the 
 old material, as is the case with all, in such a manner, namely, 
 that, by a wise arrangement, the Lord was born of a virgin. 
 “In virginem adhue Evam irrepserat verbum edificatorium 
 mortis. In virginem eque introducendum erat Dei verbum 
 extructorium vitee.” 
 
 Nor must we overlook the circumstance, that, when distin- 
 guishing between conception and birth, Tertullian designates the 
 former alone, not the latter, virginal. <After the birth, the womb 
 of Mary was no longer that of a virgin, but was in all respects like 
 that of any other mother; thus bearing witness to the reality of 
 the human body of Christ, which broke loose from her. >“ Virgo 
 Marie et non virgo; peperit enim que ex sua carne; non peperit, 
 que non ex virisemine. Virgo, quantum a viro, non virgo quan- 
 tumapartu. Si virgo concepit (if she conceived as a virgin) in 
 partu suo nupsit, ipsa patefacti corporis lege.” Hence the Apostle 
 says, “ Nonex virgine sed ex muliere editum filium Dei” (Gal. iv.). 
 
THE STRUGGLE WITH PATRIPASSIANISM. 55 
 
 His opponents, however, appealed especially to two consider- 
 ations, and these Tertullian then proceeds to examine more 
 carefully (c. 3,4). These considerations were,—1. It is impos- 
 sible for God to be born and become flesh; 2. It would be 
 unworthy of Him. Marcion, in particular, raised both these 
 objections; but they really lay at the basis of all Docetical and 
 dualistic Christologies. Had He been born, and had He truly 
 assumed a man, He would have ceased, thinks Marcion, to be 
 God, losing what He was in that He became what He previ- 
 ously was not. “ Converti enim in aliud finis est pristini.” 
 Tertullian answers,—The fixed, immoveable being of God runs 
 no 1 risk. It is true everything which stands far from God, and 
 God from it, is subject to the law, that if its nature undergo an 
 alteration, it can no longer remain the same as it was before. 
 But God differs from man-precisely in this respect, that of 
 Him the contrary holds good; that is, He is able to convert 
 Himself into whatever He wills, and yet to remain what He is. 
 In order to understand his meaning, we must take into consider- 
 ation his doctrine of the Trinity, and particularly the mode in 
 which he defines the distinction between the Son and the Father; 
 and to this point we shall immediately direct attention. Ter- 
 tullian demands, and that on religious grounds, that in recog- 
 nising the unchangeableness of God, we shall not deny the 
 possibility of His undergoing any process whatever, but merely 
 such a process as purely finite creatures undergo, change in whose 
 nature involves the loss of that which they had previously been. 
 This latter thought is unquestionably, to some extent, akin to 
 certain features of Patripassianism, though expressed in a tri- 
 nitarian form. All depends on the will of God: was it His will 
 to be born? For, if He willed it, nothing could prevent it, not 
 even His nature. And that He willed it, is clear; for otherwise 
 He would not have chosen to appear asa man. Who thinks of 
 denying, when he sees a man, that he has been born? If the 
 thing itself, the being man, has been displeasing to God, He 
 would not have been disposed to assume the semblance of a man. 
 If any one object,—He was satisfied with His self-consciousness; 
 I answer,—It was better even for His own self-consciousness, 
 that He should really be what He willed to seem to be. 
 
 He enters into a still more detailed examination of the second 
 objection (c. 4). The Valentinians ask,—“ Ergo Dei filius in 
 
56 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 tantum humilitatis exhaustus?” Avpelles assures, “carnem habere 
 ignominiam ;” Marcion (compare “ de carne Christi” 4; “ ad- 
 versus Marc.” 3, 10), “aspernatus est Christus carnem illam, 
 ut terrenam et stercoribus infersam.” Marcion. he meets with 
 the apt reply,—He is ever preaching up the “ lenitas dei,” and 
 the “ benignitas dei,” and will not hear of the stern-God, who is 
 distant from the world. And yet, when this God really descends 
 to the world, he complains that it is unworthy-of-God, that it is 
 a “pusillitas.” But what you blame as unworthy of God, the 
 Son of God has in Himself, in that He unites God and man; 
 for He has God in Himself, in His power, and man in His weak- 
 nesses (pusillitatibus). The entire disgrace of my God, as you 
 term it, is the sanctuary of that grace which is the salvation of 
 men. “ Deus pusillus inventus est, ut homo maximus fieret. Ex 
 eequo agebat Deus cum homine ut homo ex zquo agere cum 
 Deo posset.” If God despised man, why did He not also despise 
 the appearance of a man? why did He assume the image (si- 
 mulacrum) thereof? “ Nullius rei dedignande imago dignanda 
 est.” If He played the part of a man, why did He not play it 
 throughout, but omit, for example, its beginning, birth? Be- 
 cause a true birth was unworthy of God! In that case, declaim 
 against those holy, awe-inspiring works of nature; draw thy 
 sword against everything that thou art; cast down the origin of 
 the body and of the soul; call the womb of thy mother a cloaca; 
 and become the foe and persecutor of the workshop, wherein 
 that great being, man, is brought forth (adv. Marc. 3, 10; de 
 carne Chr. 4)! How canst thou still continue to love any one ? 
 Thou doest not love thyself; for thou hatest man, who is subject 
 to birth. And yet see to it, whether thou art displeasing to 
 thyself, or whether thou wast originated in any other way. 
 Christ, at all events, loves the man, who is in impurity, and is 
 doubled up in his mother’s womb, who is born in a manner 
 which the modesty of woman counts holy, with whom his mother 
 plays at her breast. For the sake of this man, He descended 
 from on high; He humbled Himself even unto death, the death 
 of the cross. So much did He, without doubt, love him, whom 
 He has dearly bought. But if He loved him, surely He must 
 also love his birth and his flesh. For nothing can be really 
 loved, unless we love that through which it is what it is. Or 
 take away birth, and still show me aman. Take away flesh, and 
 
THE STRUGGLE WITH PATRIPASSIANISM. 57 
 
 show me him whom God redeems. If this constitutes the man 
 whom God bought, because He loved him, thou convertest that 
 which God did into something of which He should be ashamed. 
 But if Christ be the Creator of nature, He acts rightly in loving 
 His possession. By the transformation of birth, by a heavenly 
 new-birth, He restored the flesh from all its sufferings; He 
 illuminated the blind, renewed the palsied, awakened the dead 
 to life,—and yet He ought to be ashamed of having been born 
 into the flesh! (“de carne Christi” 4). 
 
 In the last instance, however, it is invariably the atonement 
 which leads Tertullian to attach so much importance to. the 
 reality of the humanity of Christ. A Docetical Christ would 
 have been a vain pretence, a lie: he therefore exhorts his 
 opponents to believe (“de carne Christi” 5) that God would 
 rather become man than lie, appearing to be what He was 
 not, not willing to be what He is. Jf His human person- 
 ality were a mere appearance, so also were His human acts 
 and works; and, therefore, the sufferings of Christ deserve no 
 faith. The murderers of Christ are thus excused ; for in reality 
 He suffered nothing at their hands, and the entire work of 
 Christ is overthrown. “'Totum christiani nominis et pondus et 
 fructus, mors Christi negatur, quam tam impresse apostolus de- 
 mandat, utique veram, summum eam fundamentum Evangelii 
 constituens (adv. Marc. 8, 8). Nonne vere crucifixus est Deus? 
 vere mortuus et crucifixus?” ‘Did a mere phantom suffer, 
 “ quod vacabat a sensu passionum Dei?” Then is our faith a 
 lie, and our hope a phantom. Oh, spare the only hope of the 
 entire world! Why dost thou destroy the necessary reproach 
 of the faith? Whatever is unworthy of God, is for my benefit : 
 willing am I to be shameless and blessed as a fool, and I require 
 the material thereto. God’s Son was crucified; I am not 
 ashamed (to avow it), for it is worthy of shame: and the Son 
 of God died ; it deserves all faith, because it is foolish. He was 
 laid in the grave, and rose again: it is quite certain, because it 
 was impossible (“de carne Christi” 5).’ 
 
 1 Those whose nerves are too weak to bear the utterances of such a 
 xanpoQopia of faith, will find a tonic in the preceding chapter, where he 
 speaks of the divine folly, which confounds and puts to shame the wisdom 
 of the world, and where the ethical nature of God, love, is made the stand- 
 ard of the truly reasonable. 
 
58 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 So rich had been the development of Tertullian’s intellect, 
 relatively to the truth of the humanity of Christ. No preceding 
 writer can compare with him in this respect ; no one plunges 
 into the act of incarnation with such love and admiration, and 
 at the same time with such penetration; no one took the same 
 pleasure, as much speculative as religious, in conjoining the 
 most glaring contradictions, the furthest extremes, in Christ, in 
 order that he might behold in His complete concarnation and 
 convisceration (concarnatio et convisceratio) with our race, on 
 the one hand, the magnitude of the divine love, and, on the 
 other hand, the exaltation of mankind. To the reality of the 
 incarnation he considered it to belong, as did also Origen (Hom. 
 in Lucam 14), that Mary, after the birth of Jesus, should no 
 longer be a virgin, but a mother (Gal. iv.). 
 
 But also as regards the divine aspect, he did not remain in- 
 active. In narrating the course taken by the doctrine of the 
 Logos, we have found, as might have been anticipated from the 
 circumstance of the point of departure being the Person of the 
 historical Christ, that in the doctrine of the pre-existence of the 
 Son, which had been clearly laid down almost at the commence- 
 ment of the process, there was strictly included the momentum, 
 that the Son possessed a personality of His own, independent of 
 the Father; gradually, however, the efforts made to exclude sub- 
 ordinatian elements from the conception of the Son, and to ex- 
 hibit Him as a participator in deity, led to His personality being 
 no longer so strictly distinguished from that of the Father, as it 
 was in the incarnation. Clemens Alexandrinus, in particular, 
 furnished us an example of this ; but it appeared still more dis- 
 tinctly in his predecessors. The definition of the Son, as a mere 
 attribute, was a constant temptation to dissipate His hypostasis. 
 For if the Son is the Wisdom of the Father (Ratio, Xédyos, copia), 
 or His power (virtus, verbum), either the Father by Himself is 
 without wisdom and power, or the Father and Son are identical, 
 even as a man is identical with His reason and His will. That 
 the Fathers desired to estabiish a deeper distinction between the 
 Father and the Son, than that between a subject and its attri- 
 butes, could not indeed be denied; for they gave these attributes 
 again the form of a subject in the Son; and they supposed 
 themselves to have hit upon that deeper distinction, which 
 Christology required, when they had declared that a divine sub- 
 
 _ 
 
THE STRUGGLE WITH PATRIPASSIANISM. 59 
 
 ject, and not a mere divine power, dwelt in Christ. But still 
 they fell very far short of supplying that which was necessary 
 actually to establish and secure the personality of the Son. 
 
 Tertullian entered on this inheritance; and his opposition to 
 the gnostic doctrine of the AZons, which wore to him a mytho- 
 logical and pantheistic appearance, must have strengthened his 
 antipathy to the introduction of distinct and separate forms into 
 the inner sphere of the divine nature, and his tendency to give 
 the unity the predominance over the distinctions. “ Valentine,” 
 says he (adv. Prax. 8), “rends his eons, his probolas loose from 
 the Father, and sets them at such a distance from Him, that 
 they no longer know Him. But our Son knows the Father, 
 and is in the bosom of Him, whom He reveals. For who knows 
 what is in God, save the Spirit who isin Him? Ever was the 
 Word with the Father and in God.” This, however, is but one 
 aspect of the matter. If we are minded thoroughly to under- 
 stand Tertullian’s peculiar doctrine of the Trinity, we must 
 remember that his strong realism would naturally lead him to 
 insist much more vehemently on the reality of the incarnation 
 of the Son, than did Clement. As he gazed on the incarnate 
 Logos, he felt certainly convinced of His personality. For it 
 was not a meré impersonal power, but a divine subject, that had 
 become man in Christ (Note 14). When, therefore, Patripas- 
 sianism arose, which he justly deemed tainted with Docetism 
 (adv. Prax. 11, 23), and brought to light the consequences of 
 neglecting the distinction between the Father and Son, his real- 
 istic principles naturally impelled him to assert more strongly, 
 that the divine which had appeared in Christ was a distinct 
 subject; whilst at the same time he avoided infringing on the 
 ~essential equality of Father and Son, which he recognised along 
 with his predecessors, and in which he saw the true element of 
 Patripassianism. These, then, are the factors out of which we 
 must endeavour to construct and understand Tertullian’s re- 
 markable doctrine of God. 
 
 The following is the mode in which he endeavoured to recon- 
 cile the equality of the Father and Son, with the Son’s possession 
 of a distinct personality. To two Gods he objects as strongly 
 as the Monarchians (adv. Prax. 13); he desires but one God. 
 Consequently, a double or triple hypostasis seems an impossibi- 
 lity; in which case, the personality of the Father must be con- 
 
00 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 cluded to be that of the Son also, and the distinction between 
 the two to be a mere name. This he would be ready to con- 
 cede, but for that “dispensatio, quam Ciconomiam yocamus.” 
 But if the distinctions relate solely to God’s revelations, to His 
 manifestations of Himself, we arrive merely at. different works 
 of God, and not at distinctions in the divine being. The Trinity 
 is thus reduced to a mere name or appearance, and denotes, 
 strictly speaking, simply one and the same God engaged in 
 different works; which works themselves, considered in relation 
 to God and not merely in relation to man, must be pronounced 
 to be momenta of one and the same work. Against such a view 
 Tertullian protests (adv. Prax. 13). How, then, can he secure 
 objective and real distinctions in God Himself? By regarding 
 the deeds of God as modes of the divine being, by bringing 
 the divine essence into greater nearness to. the world, by attri- 
 buting finitude and growth to God Himself in one aspect of His 
 being, and by representing to himself the fellowship of man 
 with God as more intimate than it was commonly held to be. 
 Human souls he deemed to be of divine substance ; humanity 
 he held to have been from the beginning an object of the love 
 of God, and destined to be exalted and transferred into the 
 divine nature, through Christ. Again, he believed that it was 
 involved in the eternal idea of humanity from the very begin- 
 ning, that its history, and the history of the Son of God, should 
 be interwoven with each other; and that, consequently, the Son 
 of God was eternally related to and incorporated with humanity. 
 When God created Adam out of the earth, He looked on the 
 image of the future Incarnate One; and, creating Adam in His 
 likeness, God created him in His own likeness, (De resurr. 
 carn. 6 :—Quodcunque limus exprimebatur Christus cogita- 
 batur homo futurus. Id utique, quod finxit, ad imaginem Dei 
 finxit illum, scilicet Christi. Ita limus ille jam tune imaginem 
 induens Christi futuri in carne, non tantum Dei opus erat, sed 
 et pignus.) 
 
 But let us enter into details. “ Seeing that the Patripassians,” 
 says he (adv. Prax. 5), “regard the two as one, so that one and 
 the same stands both for Father and Son, we must investigate 
 the entire question concerning the Son, whether He is, who He 
 is, and how He is. According to some, His genesis is referred 
 to in the Hebrew text (Gen. i. 1), ‘In the beginning, God made 
 
 ee 
 
 0 
 
 ‘ 
 
THE STRUGGLE WITH PATRIPASSIANISM. 61 
 
 for Himself a Son.’ Supposing, however, that this be not cer- 
 tain, I am influenced by other considerations, derived from the 
 inner nature (dispositione) of God, which He had before the 
 creation of the world till the generation of the Son. For God 
 was before all things; He was solitary; He was world, place, 
 and everything to Himself. Solitary, because nothing besides 
 Himself had outward reality; and yet, again, not solitary even 
 then, for with Him was His Reason which He had in Himself. 
 For God is a rational being: Reason existed in Him earlier (than 
 the world); and so everything is from Him. This Reason is 
 His intelligence (sensus), designated Logos amongst the Greeks, 
 —a term which is usually not quite appropriately translated 
 ‘Word’ (sermo). Jor, strictly speaking, we cannot say that the 
 Word was in the beginning with God; for Reason in God is older 
 than Word, inasmuch as Word subsists through Reason, Reason 
 is its substance, and it is the revelation of Reason.” In these 
 words, Tertullian would appear entirely to deny the existence of 
 a distinction between Father and Son, in the inmost sphere of 
 the divine being; for Reason, which he unquestionably conceived 
 to be something substantial (corpus in his language, although 
 spiritus), is the Father Himself : Word, on the contrary, which, 
 as spoken being, contains, at all events, the first beginning of a 
 distinction, he refuses to admit into the inmost divine sphere, 
 treating it as the secondary, which the primary precedes, as the 
 beginning (of that which is distinct from God in Himself), not 
 as that which is prior to all beginnings. And plainly, those 
 who translated Logos by “ Word,” and represented the Word 
 as existing in the beginning, and not as first constituting the 
 beginning by its own rise, were far more decidedly than Tertul- 
 lian on the way to introduce the Word itself into the inner 
 nature of God, and to give it a place alongside of the Father, 
 however imperfect might be the result. And, as though with 
 the feeling that he was just on the point of quitting the path 
 trodden by the Church, he proceeds to say, as it were retracing 
 his steps,—“ Yet that lack of precision (namely, to represent the 
 Word as equally eternal with Reason, or to identify the two) is 
 of little consequence; for, even if God had not yet sent forth 
 the Word from Himself (miserat), He had it within Himself, 
 with and in His reason, quietly meditating and ordering what 
 He designed shortly to express in word. Consider thyself a 
 
62 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 copy of God, a rational being, animated by divine substance. 
 Dost thou not see that, when thou quietly, through thy reason, 
 communest with thyself, the same thing takes place in thee? 
 Thy reason takes up a position over against thee, by means of 
 words, at every movement of thought, at every pulsation of 
 thine intelligence. Whatever thou thinkest or perceivest, be- 
 comes a word in thee, and in the word is thy reason itself. In 
 thy soul thou must speak, thou canst not avoid it; and when 
 thou speakest, the word in thee becomes another than thyself, as 
 it were one who speaks with thee ; in the which, notwithstand- 
 ing, there dwells the same reason, which enables thee to speak 
 when thou speakest. ‘Thus there is, as it were, another than 
 thyself, a second, the word in thee, through which thou 
 speakest when thinking, and through which thou thinkest when 
 speaking. After the same manner also, God, in virtue of His 
 reason, quietly thinking and ordering, made the reason, word, 
 which, in speaking, He set in motion. If thou art a copy of 
 God, how much more perfect must this take place in the Arche- 
 type! for He, even when He keeps silence, has Reason in Him- 
 self, and in Reason the Word. So far, therefore, it is true, that, 
 even before the creation of the universe, God was not alone, 
 seeing that He had in Himself Reason, and in Reason the Word, 
 which, by an inner act, He constituted a Second, another self.” 
 Tertullian endeavours thus to give fixity to that eternal distinc- 
 tion in God, which, so long as the Logos was deemed equiva- 
 lent to Reason, continued a completely precarious and uncertain 
 thing, by inweaving the word, to wit, the objectification of 
 reason, with reason itself. This interesting passage sets further 
 before us an effort to show how there may be a duality in God, 
 from the necessity, immanent in all active, spiritual beings, to 
 effect a self-diremption into word and thinking reason. Spirit, 
 in order to be actually rational spirit, must not merely think, 
 but must also have an object which is thought,—the object for 
 the subject. That which is thought, again, must, on the one 
 hand, be itself rational, or else it is not a thought of reason; on 
 the other hand, as something thought, it must be different from 
 the thinking reason. Only in that it is fixed as other than 
 the reason, can it be termed thought, and can reason be said 
 to have accomplished its thinking activity; but this other 
 thing is fixed in and by means of a word,—be the word even 
 
THE STRUGGLE WITH PATRIPASSIANISM. 63 
 
 inner and quiet. It is clear, therefore, that Tertullian was al- 
 ready on the traces of those who, at a later period, tried to show 
 that the Trinity is the eternal process of the divine self-con- 
 sciousness, confronting itself with itself. But from what has 
 been advanced, it is equally clear, that Tertullian did not keep 
 God’s thought of the world and His thought of Himself apart ; 
 or, rather, he still puts the self-consciousness of God quite into 
 the background. If the thought of God, which He sets over 
 against Himself, and in which He sets Himself over against 
 Himself, is not God Himself, but the world, then either no dis- 
 tinction is effected in God’s being itself,—namely, when the 
 world is clearly distinguished from God, and the pretended 
 foundation laid for the Trinity turns out to be a mere distinc- 
 tion between the God who thinks the world and the world 
 thought by God; or—and to this alternative Tertullian neces- 
 sarily inclined—that which is thought is God Himself, in alte- 
 reity ; though, at the same time, owing to the circumstance of its 
 being also immediately the world, or the principle of the world, 
 there is the danger of confounding the mundane with the trini- 
 tarian process ;—in which case, it is evident that an immanent 
 Trinity can never be arrived at. Further, it cannot be regarded 
 as an accident that Tertullian, in this entire section, never 
 speaks of Father and Son, but solely of God, who is eternally 
 “rationalis” and “tacite cogitando” Himself in Himself, con- 
 stitutes Himself “ sermonalis.” Herein is decidedly involved, 
 what he also expressly confesses, namely, that there is no place 
 for a real, hypostatic Sonship in the inner, eternal essence.of 
 God: all that he has tried to point out, is the existence in God 
 of an eternally active potence of Sonship. God is the Thinking 
 One; the Word in God is His thought absolutely, in fixed objec- 
 tive form, though still confined to the inward sphere. As the 
 thought of God, He is the sum of the thoughts of the world, or 
 the idea of the world; and had Tertullian rested here, he would 
 have had no alternative but to follow the example of heathen 
 philosophers, and call the world the Son of God, so far as it is 
 the external realization of the idea of the world: plainly, how- 
 ever, an hypostasis of the Son would then be out of the ques- 
 tion. For, on the one hand, the eternal idea of the world was 
 not conceived in hypostatical separation from, but in unity with, 
 God; and, on the other hand, the realization of this idea is so 
 
64 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 characterized by discerption, that it no longer represents a real 
 unity, to which the predicate personal could be applied. 
 
 Here, however, we must take into consideration, that when 
 Tertullian taught that the inner Word was the thought of God 
 absolutely, under the impulse of His Christian consciousness, 
 he treated, though not clearly and definitely, God Himself, and 
 not merely the world, as the content of the divine thought. 
 Not that he represented God as placing Himself, so to speak, 
 over against Himself, even apart from the world and the idea 
 of the world; for that would have involved an actual inner, and 
 not merely a potential, Sonship: but he viewed God, considered 
 as the object of His own thought, solely in and with the idea of 
 the world. We are now in a position to understand the further 
 course of his entire theory. 
 
 In the first place, the heathen opinion, that the world is 
 immediately the Son of God, is set aside; for, on the contrary, 
 God, as the object of His own thought, is car’ é€oy7v the Son 
 of God, so soon as He attains positive reality in the actual world. 
 In the first instance, He has a mere ideal existence in the inner 
 essence of God, like the world-idea itself ; but in this world-idea 
 is involved that when it arrives at actuality, it will still have, in 
 that actuality, the God who was incorporated with its idea, to 
 wit, the Word, and in the manifestation of the Word, the arche- 
 type become a reality, God amongst men, the Head of humanity, 
 with a view to whose future realization God created Adam. 
 And because the manifestation of God Himself is thus inter- 
 woven with the idea of the world, and all the divine thoughts 
 necessarily become realities, not only is the world a progressive 
 actualization of the thought to which God gives objective exist- 
 ence over against Himself; but this same historical process. 
 through which the world passes, involves in itself, and requires. 
 for its own completeness, that the Word (the thought) of God, 
 so far as God Himself is its subject-matter, should have its his- 
 tory and actuality in the world; and that, abandoning its hidden, 
 tranquil, ideal existence, it should progressively manifest itself, 
 until, standing in the midst of humanity as the Son of God, it 
 give full objective reality over against God, to all that the 
 divine thought embraced within itself, that is, therefore, to God 
 Himself who is its subject-matter. Thus, in the actuality of the 
 God-man, of the Son, an adjustment (Ausgleichung, a squaring 
 
TERTULLIAN. 65 
 
 up) takes place between God as thinking, on the one side, who 
 now for the first time can in the full sense be termed Father, 
 and, on the other side, the thought of God, whose inmost sub- 
 stance is God Himself ;—primarily, it is true, in the form of 
 a conception, a potence; but in due time as actual Son and 
 God-man, possessed, like the Father, of objective existence and 
 personality.’ 
 
 The only difficulty yet remaining, is to account for Tertul- 
 lian’s not representing the Word as haying first attained realiza- 
 tion in the man Jesus, who formed the top-stone of that history, 
 whose mission it was to subject the entire Word to Himself ; 
 and why, on the contrary, he taught that the procession of the 
 Word from God, or, as he terms it, the generation of the Son, 
 took place prior to the creation of the world. The key to the mat- 
 ter is contained in the account given above. God, objectively 
 realized amongst men in Christ, is the climax of the idea of the 
 world, is that goal, that final aim which gives unity to the world, 
 and completion to the Word, that is, to the self-objectification 
 of God. Now the absolute aim, even prior to its full realization 
 at the end, must be more than a mere conception, it must be a 
 real mundane potence. Hence Tertullian represents God as 
 first_of all giving utterance to this potence, when the time came 
 for the world assuming areal shape; and thus the pre-mun- 
 dane Son of God entered on an actual, though still imperfect 
 existence, and the one God became Father and Son. But that 
 world-potence, although endowed with power, spirit, and wisdom 
 (sermo fultus, structus virtute, spiritu, sapientia), was not as 
 such sufficient to itself: it manifests, indeed, a certain reality, 
 energy, for the Son creates the world; but He creates it with 
 an eye to its idea, or to its future form as the God-man; and 
 therefore this first appearance of the Son in the form of a person 
 was not a renunciation of the goal, that is, of the incarnation, 
 but the means and preparation thereto. And during the entire 
 period from the creation onwards, Tertullian represents the Son 
 as governed by the thought, that something was still lacking to 
 ‘His full idea, until the incarnation had taken place ; and that it 
 behoved Him to prepare the way for thisincarnation. He pre- 
 pared, He trained Himself, for the incarnation. For this reason, 
 He appeared so frequently to the patriarchs, to Moses and others: 
 
 1 See Note and Appendix II. for the German of this passage.---Tr. 
 
 MODAII: B 
 
66 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 as it were testing Himself, in sympathy with the sufferings and 
 tears of men, and in loving intercourse with them (adv. Mare. 
 2,27; adv. Prax. 14,16). The Son of God, says he, revealed 
 Himself from the beginning. “Ipse enim et ad humana semper 
 colloquia descendit, ab Adam usque ad Patriarchas et Prophetas 
 —ordinem suum preestruens ab initio semper, quem erat persecu- 
 turus in finem. Ita semper ediscebat, et Deus in terris cum 
 hominibus conversari non alius potuit (such seems to be the 
 right reading) quam sermo qui erat caro futurus.” These His 
 revelations from the beginning stand, therefore, in the closest 
 relation to His incarnation; in the former, the Son of God had 
 already an eye to the latter.. He then proceeds to say,—“ Edis- 
 cebat (scil. que erat persecuturus), ut nobis fidem sterneret ut 
 facilius crederemus, filium Dei descendisse in seculum, si et 
 retro tale quid gestum cognosceremus. Sic etiam adfectus 
 humanos sciebat jam tunc, suscepturus etiam ipsas substantias 
 hominis, carnem et animam ; interrogans Adam quasi nesciens : 
 ubi es Adam? pcenitens, quod hominem fecisset, quasi non 
 preesciens, etc., cf. c. 30.” ‘The heretics who blame such things 
 as unworthy of God, and misuse them for the degradation of 
 the Creator, do not know that they pertained to the Son, who 
 was destined one day to take upon Himself hunger, thirst, tears, 
 birth, yea, even death itself. (Compare the “de carne Christi” 
 6.) But the Son reveals Himself more fully first in the flesh 
 (adv. Prax. 14). 
 
 “ With wisdom or reason,” says he (adv. Prax. 6), “ God first 
 impregnated His works, to wit, ideally, in the depths of His 
 Spirit” (“in sensu,” equivalent to Augustine’s “ memoria”) ; 
 “afterwards, however, thou shalt know it, as it stands in its dis- 
 tinctness alongside of Him, for it says, ‘When He created the 
 heavens, I was by Him.’ Now, when God willed to bring into 
 visible existence that which He had ordered within Himself, as 
 it were in inward dialogue with reason, with wisdom, according 
 to its various forms and substances, He first put forth the Word 
 itself (ipsum primum protulit sermonem), which was the vehicle 
 of reason and wisdom, in order that the universe might be 
 created by the same by which it had been conceived, nay 
 more, by which, regarded ideally in God (quantum in Det 
 sensu), it had already been made. For one thing still failed 
 the universe of things, to wit, an appearance coram in suis 
 
TERTULLIAN. 67 
 
 speciebus atque substantiis.” C.7: “Tune igitur etiam ipse 
 Sermo speciem et ornatum suum sumit, sonum et vocem, cum 
 dicit Deus; Fiat lux! Heec est nativitas perfecta Sermonis, 
 dum ex Deo procedit, conditus ab eo primum ad cogitatum, in 
 nomine Sophize dehine generatus ad effectum. Ex inde eum 
 parem sibi efficiens, de quo procedendo filius factus est primo- 
 genitus, ut ante omnia genitus, Unigenitus, ut solus ex Deo 
 genitus, proprie de vulva cordis ipsius. Sermo in Sophiz et in 
 rationis et in omnis divini animi et spiritus nomine filius factus 
 est Dei, de quo prodeundo generatus est.” We must have the 
 Sermo as substantivum, “in re, per substantize proprietatem ut 
 res et persona queedam videro possit, et ita capiat, secundus a Deo 
 constitutus duos efficere, Patrem et Filium, Deum et Sermonem.” 
 Now this Word, which was found in the form of God, did not 
 deem it robbery to be equal with God. It appeared at the end 
 of the times, in order to reveal, or to accomplish fully, what was 
 in the Father’s mind. The Father works ideally (sensu agit) ; 
 the Son’s office was to give external, real existence to all that 
 the Father inwardly thought (in sensu sentit, c. 14). In Him 
 is set before us the principle of objectivity (c. 15, fin.). 
 
 But of this the Son_is capable, not merely because in the 
 Word also dwelt reason, wisdom, and power,—“ totus animus 
 Dei,”—but also, and principally, because He has in Himself the 
 momentum of finitude, is in one aspect connected with the 
 world. For this reason, He was able to work in the world, 
 to constitute it a reality, and finally, to appear as the First-born 
 within its limits. The Father is only the Infinite One: division, 
 limit, finitude, lie outside of Him; His relation thereto is solely 
 that of the thinker. And even when finitude is the object of 
 His thought, as it unquestionably is, in the idea of the world, 
 He thinks it as a finitude united again with Himself (in Christ 
 and the Holy Spirit eternally). For in the entire divine world- 
 idea cogitated by the Father, is contained also the union of the 
 world with, its eternal return into, God. But the Son super- 
 intends the course of the world through time; He leads it, ho- 
 vering over it, as the archetype and principle wherein it subsists, 
 until He enter into it in complete actuality. 
 
 From this it naturally follows, that Tertullian must have re- 
 garded the Son as eternally destined to become incarnate, and 
 as capable of appearing in the flesh. The Father is not only 
 
68 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 not seen, but He cannot make Himself visible; He is “ inac- 
 cessibilis,” He alone has immortality, unchangeableness : no man 
 can see God and live. The nature of the Son was, from the 
 beginning, otherwise constituted ; it was capable of appearing. 
 He would not have become visible at the end of the days, had 
 He not been visible from the beginning. To Him we must 
 ascribe “mortalitas,” “ accessibilitas ;” and this is, in Tertullian’s 
 view, so important a distinction, that he deduces from it the 
 existence of a duality in God, of a “ Deus invisibilis et invisus,” 
 and a “ Deus visibilis et visus” (adv. Prax. 14,15). “It is. 
 true, the Son also is invisible,” says he, linking on again to 
 Irenzeus, “so far as He is.the Word and Spirit of God; and, 
 prior to the incarnation, He was visible merely in visions, enig- 
 mas, and similitudes.* As Spirit, the Word cannot be seen, 
 ‘nisi imaginaria forma.’ All religion, therefore, was symbolical 
 and shadowy prior to the coming of Christ ; for in the flesh the 
 Son became for the first time visible, from face to face. His 
 body, it is true, veiled His glory, and it could not be beheld 
 save by those who were exalted above their usual consciousness.” 
 This, however, happened to the three selected Apostles on the 
 mountain ; this happened afterwards to Paul; and at His second 
 coming the Lord will be seen by all (adv. Prax. c. 14, 15). 
 Nevertheless, the incarnate Word entered into visible existence 
 through the incarnation; and now we have an actual person, 
 whom we have seen, and heard, and handled.” 
 
 We see, accordingly, that Tertullian recognises a threefold 
 filiatio:—1. The eternal, inward one, which is shut up in God. 
 
 1 Moses alone appears to have been an exception; for to him the pro- 
 mise was given,—With him will I speak face to face, visibly, with others. 
 by dreams and in a glass darkly. But even this promise was not fulfilled 
 till a later period, on the mount of transfiguration (Matt. xvii.). During 
 his earthly life, like the prophets and patriarchs, he did not see Him face 
 to face, but merely in a glass and in enigmas, so that he knew that God’s 
 face was nich at hand. 
 
 2 At this point Tertullian’s view shows traces of montanistic influences : 
 in the place of the process through which men are conducted from a mere: 
 historical to a saving faith, which knows Christ in truth, he sets ecstasy ; 
 he fails to carry out the beautiful beginnings of an objective, historical. 
 accomplishment of the work of redemption, which he had made, in his 
 teachings, relative to Christ’s connection with our race; and even partially 
 retraced his steps, so far, namely, as he now represented the body merely as- 
 a veiling, and not also as a revealing, of the Logos. 
 
TERTULLIAN. 69 
 
 This ne designates Sonship, not in itself, but solely with refer- 
 ence to the second and third stages: strictly speaking, its name 
 is Sermo or Sophia. This is the real potence of Sonship, which 
 was eternally in God, though it had not yet assumed an inde- 
 pendent form; impersonal, but already a personific principle, and, 
 as it were, eternally on the point of breaking forth from its inner 
 divine root into an existence alongside of God, which, though 
 not yet including the world, included the real potence of the 
 world, as also the potence of God-manhood. ( 2.) This coming 
 forth to the creation of the world: Tertullian designates it, in 
 particular, the “generatio of the Son,” of the “secunda per- 
 sona” (adv. Prax. c. 6). It would be eternal if he had taught 
 an eternal creation; but as it is, it 1s to be conceived as occur- 
 ring in time.’ 3. Finally, the third stage is that in which the 
 Son became man, and stood over against God in the form of a 
 visible personality. 
 
 This doctrine of the distinction between the God who can- 
 not, and the God who can, become visible; the God who is 
 generated, and the God who is ungenerated, he employs in the 
 most various ways against the Patripassians. Both cannot be 
 predicated of one and the same being, as though they were but 
 two aspects ; consequently, we cannot rest in the abstract unity, 
 the “singularitas Dei.’ In accordance herewith, those passages 
 of the New Testament are explained, which speak of beholding 
 God, and of divine appearances. This he confirms by means of 
 passages from the New Testament, which refer to the distinction 
 between the Father and the Son. He asks,—What meaning 
 can Monarchians attach to the prayers of Christ to the Father, 
 to His sending, to His cry, “ My God, My God, why hast Thou 
 forsaken Me?” All the finitude, all the passibility, which the 
 Patripassians attributed to God in general, or to the Father, he 
 transfers to the Son; without, however, entirely denying the 
 passibility of God, as might at first sight have been expected. 
 That same religious interest, which found so inadequate an ex- 
 
 1 Adv. Hermog. 3. Here he denies that God had been always Dominus, 
 and therefore that the world, or something in it, has existed eternally. 
 ‘‘ Non ideo pater et judex semper, quia Deus semper. Nam nec pater potuit 
 esse ante filium, nec judex ante delictum. Fuit autem tempus cum ei de- 
 lictum et filius non fuit, quod judicem et qui patrem dominum (al. Deum) 
 faceret.” Conf. Novatian de Trin. 31. 
 
76 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 pression in Patripassianism, and which led to the work of atone- 
 ment being regarded as God’s sympathy with, and participation 
 in, the sufferings intended for us, moved Tertullian, when he 
 spoke without bias, to make use of such terms as “ crucifixus, 
 passus, mortuus est Deus.’’! 
 
 We find him, however, at the same time giving expression 
 to thoughts apparently of an opposite character, which must 
 have strengthened the opposition raised against Patripassianism. 
 He had, it is true, partially ensured the unchangeableness and 
 impassibility of God by the view he took of the idea of the 
 Father; but to have represented the Son as mere finitude, 
 visibility, and passibility, would have been Ebionitical. Conse- 
 quently, it was necessary to distinguish two aspects of the Son, 
 —one eternal, invisible; the other visible, and subject to the 
 process of finitude. The former he terms, car’ é€oynv, the 
 divine aspect, or God in the Son; and, accordingly, he is able 
 to say, towards the end of his work against Praxeas (c. 27 ff.), 
 without inconsistency, though differently from before (see the 
 “de carne Christ’ 3),—God is immutable ; consequently He 
 undergoes no process, no conversion: and that which he had 
 previously treated as an objection of Marcion’s against the ortho- 
 dox doctrine—“ transfiguratio interemtio est pristini’—he now 
 himself adopts in reference to the divine, that is, to the unalterable, 
 in God Himself. This unalterableness was unquestionably en- 
 dangered by Patripassianism; for, according to it, the Father, to 
 wit, the final ground, Himself comes forth and subjects Him- 
 self to change and finitude ;—unless it went on to distinguish 
 more plainly between God as He is in Himself, and God as He 
 is turned towards the finite ; in other words, unless it accepted 
 the distinction laid down by Tertullian in his doctrine of the 
 Son. In accordance therewith, Tertullian was able to say,— 
 
 1 For example, ‘‘de carne Christi” 5. Special prominence is given to 
 that aspect of the Son on which He is turned towards finitude, in the pas- 
 sage above adduced, adv. Prax. 16:—The Son not merely created the 
 world, but is the One who, throughout its entire history, has accomplished 
 the divine work in and for it; He has been the judge, the revealer. The 
 passage concludes with the following words,—Such things ‘‘ heeretici repre- 
 hendunt, quasi Deo indigna, ignorantes, hee in Filium competisse, qui 
 etiam passiones humanas et sitim et esuriem et lachrymas et ipsam nativi- 
 tatem ipsamque mortem erat subiturus, propter hoc minoratus a Patre mo- 
 dicum citra angelos.” 
 
TERTULLIAN ek 
 
 “The Word of God also abides eternally, perseverando in sua 
 forma.” But defective is it, that he supposes himself able to bring 
 this immoveable, unalterable One, the Son of God, immediately, 
 and without any connecting link of thought, into union with the 
 human in Christ. And the consequence thereof is, that he con- 
 verts the incarnation into a being and dwelling in the flesh, or 
 into a being clothed with flesh. (Adv. Prax. 27: Quem (sc. 
 Sermonem) si non capit transfigurari, consequens est, ut sic caro 
 factus intelligatur (Joh. i. 14) dum fit (al. sit) in carne et 
 manifestetur.) To this point he allows himself to be driven by 
 his fear of the theory of conversion; as though the incarnation 
 of the Word were not itself a condition of its abiding in its 
 nature, and as though he had not elsewhere usually taught that 
 the Word was eternally destined to become incarnate, and that 
 the full realization of Sonship was only possible through the 
 incarnation.! “There would be no longer two substances,” he 
 proceeds to say, “but one, a kind of mixture of spirit and flesh, 
 as electrum is a mixture ‘ex auro et argento, if He had been 
 converted into flesh. He would be neither God nor man; for 
 He would have ceased, through the conversion, to be that which 
 He was; and He would not be man, for He who was Sermo 
 could not be truly man. He would, therefore, be neither the 
 one nor the other, but a third something. On the contrary, 
 “videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed conjunctum, in 
 una persona Deum et hominem Jesum. Et adeo salva est 
 utriusque proprietas substantie, ut et spiritus res egerit in illo, 
 ‘e., virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit.” 
 Both substances remain “in statu suo (that is, immoveable) dis- 
 tincte aventes. Neque caro spiritus fit, nec spiritus caro. In 
 uno plane esse possunt: ex his Jesus constitit ex carne homo, 
 ex spiritu Deus.” As he refused to allow the Patripassians to 
 say, “compassus est Pater Filio,” because sympathy is a suffer- 
 ing, whereas the Father is impassible ; so also does he affirm the 
 latter of the Son, “ex ea conditione qua Deus est.” And yet, 
 precisely at this point, the idea of sympathy, as something 
 ethical, might have led him to the recognition of a suffering 
 and a participation in finitude, which involved no curtailment of 
 God’s infinitude; that is, to the idea of a participation, grounded 
 in an act of love, that is, in a “virtus.” The finite, it is true, 
 1 Compare the passage cited from the “‘ de resurr. carnis,” page 60. 
 
12 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 could not drag Him into suffering; nor could His nature, His 
 vous, in itself be liable to suffering, as the heathenish and, in 
 part also, the patripassian conception of God represents. At 
 the same time, however, His dvs could not be a limit to His love 
 and the manifestation thereof, but love, as the inmost essence 
 of God, must have power over His dvaus ; and if the will of the 
 former be seriously to sympathize with, and truly to participate 
 in, finitude, the latter may not throw any hindrance in the way. 
 
 To the above declaration, that the “Spiritus” worked in 
 Him the “ virtutes” and the “ signa,” and the flesh suffered (a 
 formula which we often meet with at a later period, and which 
 we find also in Hippolytus, but which, if it be not supplemented, 
 destroys the unity of the person in both aspects), he adds, for- 
 getting the doctrine of the participation of the Son in finitude 
 and suffering, which he had elsewhere laid down,—“ If the dis- 
 tinction utriusque substantie ceased to exist, in a third being 
 perhaps, then would have done et spiritus carnalia, et caro 
 spiritalia ex translatione;” as though the work of redemption 
 were anything apart from the participation of the divine in the 
 human, and as though he himself had not also regarded it in all 
 dther cases as a work accomplished in common by both “ sub- 
 stantiz.” He had opposed to the Patripassians the capability 
 of the Son to make Himself visible,—that is, surely, to become 
 finite and passible,—with the design of proving it to be necessary 
 that the Father, to whom absolutely no suffering and no process 
 can be attributed, should be another than the Son: now, how- 
 ever, he makes no allusion to this distinction, and retains only 
 the difference, that the Son was born and begotten of the 
 Father, and the Father unbegotten. Without doubt he meant, 
 in any case, to recognise in the Son an aspect turned towards, 
 and accessible to, finitude; but so far was he from having con- 
 ciliated this with his conception of the divine nature, that he 
 again denies it entirely to the divine nature, even of the Son. 
 In that case, however, the sufferings of Christ were merely finite 
 sufferings, and the incarnation was simply the origin of a man. 
 For the Word either had or bore the man Jesus as His gar- 
 ment; but the Son of God was not really the Son of man. 
 Still, it would be unfair to judge him solely from this chapter, in 
 which polemical zeal caused him to forget himself, and to strike 
 into a path which his living conception of God would not permit 
 
TERTULLIAN. 73 
 
 him further to pursue. At other times (for example, in the chap- 
 ter immediately following), he shows himself to be penetrated by 
 the conviction, that the entire “novitas” of the “ nativitas” 
 rested upon the circumstance, that the human was taken into the 
 divine, and that the divine transported itself into the human, 
 with its being and not merely with its activity, without being 
 swallowed up therein. We shall find that the anxiety to ward 
 off a pagan conception of God drove Hippolytus and others to 
 cling very firmly to the pure eternity and immoveability of the 
 divine essence, after the manner of the later Jews; instead of 
 representing God as standing in that more positive relation to 
 finitude, which was required by the idea of the incarnation. 
 Lertullian saw with particular clearness the importance of 
 insisting on a distinction of the Son from the Father; for, 
 according to Patripassianism, there was either no divine self 
 consciousness, apart from Christ, but the Father was solely and 
 entirely in Christ, and the rest of the world destitute of a per- 
 sonal God;’ or else the Father must be held to have been in 
 Christ merely as a power, and not with His entire personality ;— 
 in which latter case, Patripassianism would have been already 
 on the point of passing over into Ebionism. The reason why 
 Tertullian was so undecided and vacillating in his teachings 
 regarding that which distinguishes and unites Father and Son, 
 was, probably, apart from the undoubted difficulty of the ques- 
 tion, that he had not advanced so far as clearly to deduce from 
 ethical principles (which alone suffice in this connection), how 
 far it was possible, or not, for the Word to participate in finitude 
 and sufferings. At first he attributed finitude to the Word or Son 
 immediately, physically, and not ethically,—that is, not as the 
 result of a loving act of will (see pp. 68 f.); and the deeper ground 
 of this course is to be found in his above noticed supposition, that 
 the Son was directly connected and interwoven with the world, 
 in so far as He became a person for the first time, at, and for the 
 
 1 Ady. Prax. 16:—‘‘ How could the almighty God, the invisible, the 
 unapproachable One, who grasps the entire world in His hand like a nest, 
 in quo omnis locus, non ipse in loco, qui universitatis extrema linea est, ille 
 altissimus in paradiso deambulare, querens Adam, et arcam post introitum 
 Noe claudere, etc.? Scilicet et heec nec de Filio Dei credenda, fortasse non 
 credenda de patre, licet scripta, quem illi in vulvam Marie deducunt, et in 
 Pilati tribune imponunt, et in monumentis Joseph recludunt.” 
 
74 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 sake of, the creation of the world. And if we trace the matier 
 to its final roots, we shall find that the fault lay in his doctrine of 
 the Trinity. He recognised no act of self-objectification, by 
 which God’s self-knowledge was mediated prior to any creation ; 
 but what He knew, what He thought, though not merely the 
 world, was still only God so far as He passes over into the world. 
 
 If, then, we can concede him merely a partial victory over 
 Patripassianism, to the extent, namely, to which he showed that 
 the Son must be distinguished from the Father, in Himself and 
 not merely in Christ,—the latter was allowed even by Patripas- 
 sians (adv. Prax. 27: Fillum carnem esse, 7.e. hominem, 7.¢. 
 Jesum, patrem autem Spiritum, z.e. Deum, z.e. Christum),—how 
 do his views stand related to the monarchy of God? How does 
 he reconcile the duality, and subsequently the triplicity, of the 
 persons, to which he is led by the divine revelations, with that 
 unity of God which he maintained inviolate? 
 
 He preserves the unity, in the jirst place, by asserting the 
 equality of the nature of the persons, nay, even the identity of 
 their substance. The Son is designated “ Filius Dei” and 
 “Deus ex unitate substantie. Nam et Deus Spiritus” (Apol. 
 21). An Arian Subordinatianism was, therefore, foreign to his 
 mind; at that price he did not desire to purchase the unity of 
 God. All, Father, Son, and Spirit, are one, because all are of 
 one through the unity of their substance (adv. Prax. 2, 4). 
 According to Tertullian, all have one essence,—that is, one 
 power, one reason and wisdom. But that which gives rise to a 
 plurality in God is the “ordo” (adv. Prax. 19), the “ cecono- 
 mia,” which has not merely subjective, but also objective signi- 
 ficance (c. 11). The words in which Tertullian here gave ex- 
 pression to his meaning are remarkable ;—he says, Difference 
 and number are not in God, so far as He is conceived in His 
 eternal, immoveable being (in statu), but merely so far as He is 
 regarded in motion (in gradu; as it were, whilst passing on from 
 one form or stage of revelation to another). “ Giconomiz sa- 
 cramentum unitatem in trinitatem disponit,—tres non statu, sed 
 gradu. Unus Deus, ex quo et gradus isti et forme et species 
 in nomine Patris, Filii et Spiritus sancti deputantur” (adv. 
 Prax. 2). That is, we are to understand by the Trinity, not 
 merely a threefold work, a threefold activity, but a movement 
 of God Himself. When a ray proceeas forth from the sun, it 
 
TERTULLIAN. 1 
 
 is a part of the whole (portio ex summa) ; but the sun will be in 
 the ray, for the ray is a ray of the sun, and does not break loose 
 from the substance thereof, but merely dilates itself. So is 
 Spirit of Spirit, God of God, like a light kindled at a light. 
 Entire and unaffected remains the ground of a substance (ma- 
 trix materi), even though thou shouldst make use of its kind 
 for several branches; so is that which springs from God,—God 
 and God’s Son are both one. Thus did Spirit constitute an- 
 other of Spirit, God another of God, not in point of number, 
 but of form (modulo alterum, non numero, gradu non statu, et a 
 matrice non recessit, sed excessit). That ray of God, having 
 entered into a virgin, and made itself flesh in her womb, was 
 born as aman united with God (Apol. 21). “Ido not desire 
 two suns,” he goes on to say (adv. Prax. 13), employing the 
 same image, “but Christ I can call God, as does Paul in Rom. 
 ix. 5. Even a ray of the sun, considered by itself, I call Sun: 
 for example, when I say, ‘ There is sun ;’ but T do not, therefore, 
 at once designate the sun, from which the ray proceeds, Ray. 
 Two forms of existence, of one and the same substance (species, 
 forme, effigies, moduli unius et indivisee substantize), I acknow- 
 ledge, as of the sun, so of God, when I view Him in connection 
 with the ceconomia.’ 
 
 In the second place, he retains firm hold of the unity, 
 through the intimate connection which he recognises as existing 
 between the different persons. He does not regard them as 
 three men, merely united by one generic idea, between whom 
 there may otherwise be infinite differences ; but they are physi- 
 cally and ethically so one, that they may be constantly termed 
 one God. (Ady. Prax. 4: Filium non aliunde deduco, sed de sub- 
 stantia Patris, nihil facientem sine Patris voluntate.) Every 
 originator, says he, is in a sense a father ; everything originated 
 is therefore a son. Nec frutex tamen a radice, nec fluvius a 
 fonte, nec radius a sole discernitur, sicut nec a Deo Sermo. 
 Radix et frutex dus res sunt, sed conjuncte, dus species in 
 divisee, duze forme coherentes. Et tertius a radice fructus 
 e frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus ex Flumine, et tertius a sole 
 apex ex radio. Ita Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus 
 a Patre decurrens et Monarchie nihil obstrepit et Giconomix 
 statum protegit (adv. Prax. 8). Alium patrem, alium filium 
 dico, sed non diversum, separatum ;” “ distinctio,” he affirms, 
 
76 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 and “ distributio,” but not “ diversitas” and “ divisio.” “ Mo- 
 dulo,” that is, through a different mode of existence, each is 
 different from the other two; but they are equal to each other, 
 as in existence, so also in this, that as the Father constitutes the 
 Son a Son, so the Son constitutes the Father a Father :—the 
 Father does not constitute Himself His own Son, as the Patri- 
 passians teach. (Ady. Prax. c. 10: vanissimi isti Monarchiani 
 ipse se, inquiunt (Pater) Filium sibi fecit. Atquin Pater 
 Filium facet, et Patrem Filius.” According to Tertullian, God 
 was not Pater, but merely Deus, prior to the existence of the 
 Son. “ Et qui ex alterutro fiunt, a semetipsis sibi fieri nullo 
 modo possunt, ut Pater se sibi Filium faciat et Filius se sibi 
 Patrem preestet ; quee instituit Deus, ipse etiam custodit. Habeat 
 necesse est Pater Filium, ut Pater sit, et Filius Patrem, ut Filius 
 sit. Aliud est autem habere, aliud esse.) And, indeed, the true 
 element in the Valentinian Avons (probolz), is that the Word 
 is produced from God and made His Son. “ Hee erit probola 
 veritatis, unitatis custos” (c. 8). Connecting the two together, 
 we arrive at an unity, which is not an abstract “singularitas,” 
 but admits of distinctions, an “ unitas ex semetipsa derivans trini- 
 tatem,” which is confirmed instead of being destroyed thereby 
 (c. 3). The “ unitas irrationaliter collecta heresim facit,” the 
 “trinitas rationaliter expensa veritatem constituit.” 
 
 This trinitarian conception of God is opposed, on the one 
 hand, to Heathenism, which clings to a multiplicity, without re- 
 ducing it to unity (c. 13); and to Judaism, on the other hand 
 (c. 31). The belief of the Jews in one God, is of such a nature 
 as not to admit of the Son, and after Him, of the Spirit, being 
 reckoned to God. For what difference would there be between 
 us and them,—what would become of the work of the Gospel and 
 of the substance of the New Covenant, which does not suffer the 
 law and the prophets to extend farther than John the Baptist,— 
 if from his day onwards the Three in whom we believe, Father, 
 Son, and Spirit, do not constitute one God? The novelty of the 
 Christian religion consists in the fact, that God willed to be 
 believed in as One after a new fashion, to wit, through the Son 
 and the Spirit; so that now He who was formerly merely pro- 
 claimed by Son and Spirit, but was not known, is known in 
 mundane actuality, in His persons. 
 
 This view undoubtedly includes a speculative element, to 
 
TERTULLIAN. (7 
 
 which the later doctrine of the Church was long in attaining, 
 viz., the conception of the Three Persons as inwardly connected 
 (as consertos, cohzrentes). But the type of development to 
 which he subjects the Trinity takes again a turn unfavourable to 
 the doctrine of the Trinity , and thus he reaped the fruit of that 
 immediate interweaving of the Son with the world, to which allu 
 
 sion has been made above. He shows, it is true, that there was a 
 necessity for the objectification of the reason in the Word, which 
 was its vehicle ; but he does not explain why this objectification 
 should be limited to a triplicity ;—for, so far as we can see, new 
 branches might be continually produced. Because he did not 
 posit the Trinity as an actuality even of the inner essence of 
 God, but merely as a possibility, he found himself, like the 
 Patripassians, unable to say,—God is a Trinity, and cannot be 
 conceived of otherwise ;—all he could say was,—God wills to_be 
 a Trinity, really indeed, but still only in the world. Hence also 
 this Trinity is threatened with extinction, so soon as the world is 
 perfected and returns into God, and the Son shall have given 
 up all to the Father. Indeed, he goes so far (adv. Prax. 4) as 
 to say,— The Monarchy continues so truly unshaken, although 
 the Trinity is imported into it, that the kingdom will actually be 
 given up again to the Father by the Son. The Trinity, however, 
 appears thus to be reduced to a mere movement of God in his- 
 tory, unless he meant perhaps to say, that the ever-abiding and 
 essentially existent unity undergoes discerption in the world, and 
 in the forms of the divine existence in the world; the sole end 
 thereof, however, being that the divine persons, who are rendered 
 distinct in the course of history, and also continue permanently 
 distinguished, may afterwards be reduced to a more complete 
 unity.” He says further, ~The Ciconomia, or the trinitarian ex- 
 istence of God, is posited “in tot nominibus, in quot Deus voluit” 
 (c. 4): a formula which is thoroughly patripassian ; but the cor- 
 rective thereof was concealed, not only in Tertullian’s doctrine of 
 the necessary objectivity of the “ Sermo,” but also partially in his 
 doctrine, that not merely a single potence of God, of which 
 there might be an infinite number, but “ totus animus Dei,” 
 was in the “ Sermo ;” that in the revelation of Christ, therefore, 
 the inmost essence of God was declared to the world,—the 
 “ Filius” having been born, “ de vulva Patris,” out of the heart 
 of the Father (c. 5). Lastly, owing to the somewhat physical 
 
78 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH 
 
 character of his view of God, he applies inappropriate physical 
 categories to the Son,—such, for example, as that of the part and 
 whole: which, however, should be set rather to the account of 
 his mode of expression, than of his mode of thought. “ Portic 
 totius cessura erat in Filiinomen.” The Son is “ substantiva res, 
 ut portio aliqua totius (c. 26). Pater tota substantia est: Filius 
 vero derivatio totius et portio” (c. 9); from which might logi- 
 sally be deduced a still stronger Subordinatianism than that 
 which is involved in the doctrine of the later generation of the 
 Word to personal existence, to wit, an Ebionitical view of Christ. 
 It may undoubtedly be replied,—* Portio,” in Tertullian’s usage, 
 is also a designation of equality (cf. Index Latinit. Tert., ed. 
 Semler, s. h. v.); that he considered the entire sun to be in 
 the rays; that the Son knows the Father entirely, and also His 
 generation ; and, even more, that Tertullian, describing the re- 
 lation between the Father and Son in a quantitative manner, 
 gives an opposite view, when he says,—The sun expands itself 
 in the rays; or the Son is the river, the Father the fountain- 
 head. Too much stress, however, must not be laid on this aspect 
 of the images; but it must be acknowledged that he leaves the 
 Son in a certain dependence on the Father, although he repre- 
 sented Him as equal in essence, as most intimately conjoined 
 with the Father ; and as, indeed, constituting the Father, Father. 
 Tertullian refers Christ's words, “ The Father is greater than I,” 
 neither to the humanity, nor to the state of self-abasement, 
 but to the Son in Himself. It would be, indeed, totally opposed 
 to Tertullian’s meaning, to regard the Son as a mere partial 
 revelation of God: from Ebionism or Arianism he must be 
 pronounced free; for his total view of the Son rather implies 
 that he regarded Him and the Spirit as different modes of the 
 existence of the one God, who dwelt in His entirety in each of 
 them. The more evident is it, however, that the term “ portio” 
 was badly chosen ; and that, by giving occasion to the use of phy- 
 sical categories, it really disguised Tertullian’s proper meaning. 
 
 Notwithstanding the important defects of his system, the 
 fulness of Tertullian’s Christian consciousness, and the vigour 
 of his mind, unquestionably lent him a very great influence on 
 the development of doctrine in the Church, and enabled him to 
 give a new turn to the tendency which had prevailed since the 
 time of Justin Martyr. 
 
TERTULLIAN. 79 
 
 At that time, it is true, the hypostasis of the Logos was 
 exalted to the rank of pure divinity; but the price paid was an 
 increasing obscuration of the hypostatical distinction. Tertul- 
 lian, now provoked by Praxeas, struck into the opposite path, 
 and laid again energetic hold on the neglected momentum of 
 the hypostatic pre-existence of the Logos; with the feeling that 
 Patripassianism was threatening to substitute an ethnic for the 
 Christian conception of God. The positive doctrine laid down 
 by him may have its weak points; but it has also, as we have 
 seen, both religiously and speculatively considered, its excellences; 
 and as regards the latter, he pursued a course of his own, in- 
 dependent of Irenzeus and others. As the point of most im- 
 portance, and which gave a direction to the course of the sub- 
 sequent development, may be mentioned in this connection his 
 doctrine of the “Filiatio.’ Inasmuch as the Father also is 
 reason, the word Logos no longer satisfied Tertullian as a desig- 
 nation of the fy postaais of ane divine in Christ, although it 
 accurately expressed the nature thereof, its true divinity ‘(and 
 herein we see the man who clearly ae ned the true tendency 
 and work of his age). The other meaning, also, which was 
 attached to the Logos by the Church, to wit, “ Word,” ex- 
 pressed, not His hypostasis, but at the utmost the objectification 
 of reason; that is, it contained the hint of an hypostasis, but not 
 the hypostasis itself. And Tertullian not merely clearly saw the 
 inadequacy of existing terms, but endeavoured to find better 
 ones. The new point which he brought to light, and which 
 constituted an epoch in the future history of Christology, was 
 his designation of the personal element in the higher nature 
 of Christ by the name Son; and his endeavour to lay bare 
 more fully the genesis of the Sonship, and its relation to the 
 divine essence, with which, so long as he was merely termed 
 Logos, He was too completely aeniinen This was undoubt- 
 edly an important stroke; and, as we shall see, it met with the 
 approbation of the Church. The age of Logology was now 
 succeeded, in consequence of his labours, by the age of Son- 
 ship. Not that Logology was by any means set aside; but it 
 was reduced to its proper, that is, to a lower rank, because of its 
 inability adequately to convey il to preserve the Christian 
 thought: and, indeed, we find that John, though he began with 
 the Logos, Fe with the term uovoyerys. The New Testa 
 
80 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 ment expression, “Son of God,” had, it is true, naturally been 
 often enough employed at an earlier period, but without a de- 
 terminate, dogmatic idea being connected therewith ; very fre- 
 quently it served merely to designate the entire Christ, or even 
 His official dignity. Justin Martyr applied it also to the hypo- 
 static Logos, but not constantly. Henceforth, however, whereas 
 Logos marks in the first instance the impersonal nature, the 
 word “Son” is employed, in a specifically dogmatic sense, to 
 express the personality of the Logos and His possession of an 
 objective existence of His own, distinct from that of the Father. 
 On the history of the doctrine of the Trinity, this new turn had 
 an important influence, although much that was transitory was 
 connected with it. But even on Christology had the develop- 
 ment of the idea of Sonship a favourable influence, owing to its 
 suggesting and giving occasion to the attempt to view the reve- 
 lation in Christ, not as something external and foreign to the 
 divine in Christ, but as the full exhibition of the entire idea of 
 Sonship, which lay originally in the Son. 
 
 Closely related to, and dependent on, Tertullian, though 
 giving a superficial version of his master’s system, was Nova- 
 tian. He says (“ De Trinitate” 29, 30),—Because God alone is 
 termed good by Christ, it does not follow that He also was not 
 good. In Christ alone dwelt the Holy Spirit, entirely and per- 
 fectly, “nec in aliqua mensura aut portione mutilatus, sed cum 
 tota sua redundantia cumulate distributus et missus, ut ex illo 
 delibationem quandam gratiarum ceteri consequi possint, totius 
 sancti Spiritus fonte in Christo remanente, ut ex illo donorum 
 atque operum vene ducerentur, spiritu sancto in Christo affluen- 
 ter habitante.” Christ is God and Lord. The unity is not thereby 
 affected. God the Father is the Orderer and Creator of the uni- 
 verse, but unoriginated, invisible, infinite, immortal, eternal, the 
 one God, to whose majesty, greatness, and power nothing can 
 be compared, much less preferred. But out of Him has a Son 
 been born, the Word; not like a sound which strikes the air, or 
 a tone of the voice, but in the substance of a power produced by 
 God. As to the time, Novatian employs the words,—The Father 
 brought forth the Son quando voluit (c. 31). Nevertheless, he 
 says,—He was always in the Father, and the Father was never 
 without Son; but the “always” he does not use in the absolute 
 sense. Because the procession of the Son took place before 
 
TERTULLIAN. NOVATIAN. 8] 
 
 time and the world began, time cannot be applied thereto. And 
 in so far we may, or rather must, speak of an “always.” 
 Strictly speaking, however, He who has no origin must, In some 
 way, precede Him of whom He is the source and origin. He 
 had no intention of representing the Son as acreature; but still 
 the Father is really to him the One God. The Son, it is true, 
 knows the Father, and the secret of His own birth, which no 
 apostle, nor prophet, nor any creature knows. He is God, but 
 God born. “ We will not have two unbegotten ones,” says he; 
 “ consequently, not two Gods.” Clearly, therefore, he regards 
 the Father alone as “sensu eminenti” God, and the one God; 
 whereas Tertullian had endeavoured to show that the unity con- 
 stituted out of triplicity was the more perfect. The Father is 
 alone “omnium rerum principium et caput.” The Son is the 
 “Unigenitus et Primogenitus” of the Father; but, notwith- 
 standing His birth from the Father and not from another,— 
 notwithstanding that He also is God, He showed the unity of 
 God by subjecting Himself to the Father “in morigera obedt- 
 entia,’ and by being “ minister voluntatis paterne.” He was 
 born in order to be God and Lord, for the Father has subjected 
 all things to Him. But the time comes when the Son “ aucto- 
 ritatem divinitatis rursus ad Patrem remittit.” So that it fol- 
 lows from all, that the Father is the one true and eternal God, 
 “a quo solo hee vis divinitatis emissa etiam in filium tradita et 
 directa rursum per substantiz communionem ad Patrem revol- 
 vitur. Gradatim, reciproco meatu illa majestas atque divini- 
 tas ad Patrem, qui dederat eam, rursum ab ipso illo filio missa 
 revertitur et retorquetur ;” and the Father is the principle of all 
 things, even of the Son; the Son 1s God of all the rest, and ac- 
 cordingly Mediator between God and man (c. 31). In what has 
 been just adduced we can scarcely fail to discover a Subordina- 
 tianism even still stronger than that of Tertullian. Both as- 
 serted the unity of the substance of the Father and the Son; 
 both viewed Christ during the period of His mediatorship as 
 God; both take up a position of antagonism to the Monarchians ; 
 but neither was able to confute them. The Monarchians were 
 unable to establish the existence of distinctions in God; but 
 Tertullian and Novatian, though they acknowledge and start 
 with the distinctions, do not assert the divinity of Christ so 
 clearly as the Monarchians. The reason whereof was, that the 
 VOL. Il. F 
 
82 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 former had not really transcended the point of view of the lat- 
 ter. As the Patripassians rested satisfied with the work of 
 revelation, so their two opponents felt the need of the ‘Trinity 
 solely for the work of redemption. Relatively thereto, they 
 believed it necessary that the Son should have an hypostasis, but 
 not otherwise. And as the revelation was not eternal, there 
 remained a point “a parte ante,” in respect of which the anta- 
 gonists were essentially at one with each other. Prior to His 
 generation for the creation of the world, the Son had not a per- 
 sonal existence in God. In this respect, both parties were 
 agreed; nay, they were even further agreed, with the exception 
 of some opposed elements in Tertullian’s system, that the exist- 
 ence of the Son or the time of His origin, depended on the will 
 of the Father. And so, as soon as a mediator ceases to be neces- 
 sary, the personality, or, at all events, the deity (auctoritas divina), 
 of the Son will be endangered. The Trinity then threatens to 
 sink down to a mere ceconomy, as in the systems of those whom 
 they opposed. Irreconcilable, indeed, therewith was the Christian 
 consciousness, which regarded Christ not as a transient revelation, 
 not as a mere power; from which, however, all that follows is, 
 that from the Christian consciousness must proceed the impulse to 
 ever fresh efforts to secure for the doctrine of the Trinity a more 
 satisfactory form, and to point out eternal and not mere arbitrary, 
 both as to number and existence, distinctions in the nature of 
 God Himself. This would require, it is true, that the two Per- 
 sons, Father and Son, should renounce that exclusiveness towards 
 each other attributed to them in the systems of these teachers 
 of the Church. If the Son must again give up His deity or 
 power, in order that the Father may possess it entirely; or if 
 Christ be the ruler of the world in the stead of the Father, and 
 no way be found of allowing both, together with the Holy 
 Spirit, to participate in the entire work, each in His own way, 
 then must the unity of God be purchased with the subordination 
 or the merely momentary existence of the hypostases. We have 
 already hinted that this relation of exclusiveness arose from the 
 obscuration introduced by the application of physical categories ; 
 for in the @vaxs, not only qualities, but even individuality of being 
 is characterized by exclusiveness. This physical exclusiveness is 
 only a feeble reflection of the fixed, ineffaceable mits and dis- 
 tinctions which rule in the domain of spirit. But in the domain 
 
 Ee 
 
CYPRIAN. HIPPOLYTUS. 83 
 
 of spirit, exclusiveness is not necessary to the maintenance of dis- 
 tinctions, as in the finite, material world. There, on the con- 
 trary, as Tertullian already vaguely felt, distinctions confirm 
 unity; for an unity evolved out of distinctions 1s more compact 
 and self-sufficient. This we may learn even from a comparison 
 of organic with inorganic nature. In the domain of spirit, the 
 unity is not an abstract identity or continuity, but one that 
 posits and confirms distinctions. 
 
 As belonging to the same African school, we might further 
 mention Cyprian. His sphere was the practical, and he pro- 
 duced nothing new in the domain of Christology; but as a 
 prince of the Church, whose mind was bent above all things on 
 the attainment of unity, and who left aside everything that 
 was singular or still unfixed, we may fairly regard him as the 
 truest representative of the doctrine regarding the Person of 
 Christ, generally held about the middle of the third century. 
 With his distinct and individual character, he may be taken 
 as the embodiment of the Christological Symbolum of his age. 
 For this reason, however, it will be more fitting first to listen to 
 the voice of a man who took an active part in the dogmatical 
 struggle of the period,—to wit, Hippolytus, of the Oriental 
 Church, who combated Patripassianism in its very home. 
 
 As has been already remarked by others, Hyppolytus has 
 hitherto been unjustly neglected by writers on the history of 
 dogmas,—a course, ‘ny excuse for which may be pleaded the 
 possible doubts as to the genuineness of several of the works 
 attributed to him, but which is not thereby justified. (Note 15.) 
 
 What arguments he advanced against the Patripassianism 
 of Noetus, we shall see below. Beron, however, who undoubt- 
 edly spoke of the Logos as the manifested aspect of the Father 
 (see page 29), he answered to the following effect :—So far are 
 we from being able to assume a conversion of the Deity into a 
 man, or a Kévoous, by which that which was identical (TavTov) 
 with the Father became identical with humanity, that we can- 
 not even predicate movement, much less change and conversion, 
 of God. The divine will (Fragm. 1), by which God created 
 and moves all things, remains ‘tself unmoved. For the infinite 
 in no way admits of the idea of motion, seeing that there exists 
 neither place to which, nor anything about which, it might 
 move. ‘To that which is infinite and immoveable in its essence, 
 
84 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 movement would be already conversion. The Son of God, 
 therefore, in becoming incarnate, underwent no conversion of 
 any kind, but merely assumed circumscription by the natural 
 flesh, for our sake; He himself, however, remaining without 
 flesh (Séya capxés) and apart from all circumscription. So im- 
 possible is it that a conversion of deity into humanity, or of 
 humanity into deity, should take place, that God and man can- 
 not even be compared with each other. They are érepodueis. 
 Between the Creator of the universe and the creature, between 
 the infinite and the finite (7 aTreip@, TO Trepatov), between the 
 unlimited and the limited, no sort of comparison can be insti- 
 tuted ; for they are not merely relatively but essentially (puotxds) 
 different. What the divine was before, that it remained after 
 the incarnation, essentially infinite, unlimited, impassible, in- 
 
 comparable, unchangeable, and immoveable (avadrolwtov, ar- 
 
 pet Tov), possessed of all power in itself, and so forth. To the 
 ethnic changeableness of God, which was connected with pan- 
 theistic elements, is here therefore opposed His absolute immove- 
 ableness. But where God’s a7retpov, dtpeTtov, is treated as it 
 is by Hippolytus,—where even permission, in its distinction from 
 act and operation, is excluded from God, on the ground of His 
 unchangeableness, as we shall shortly see,—there the world is 
 
 kept impersonal, and God alone is, strictly speaking, allowed to 
 
 have reality. It appears, therefore, that Hippolytus, in the 
 fundamental idea of his theology, is chargeable with approxi- 
 mating in another way to pantheism, through raising a too hasty 
 opposition to Patripassianism. It may be well indeed to say, 
 that God cannot suffer through finitude (Fragm. 3: od TEhUKE 
 Teprypaherbar yevnth dices to Kata ducw ayévntov), even 
 though it grew into one whole together with Him, by means 
 of the conception which seizes hold on all understanding 
 (Tepuypagoveay crn). But it is not good to take the 
 love of the Son, its power, and the unity of the Person of Christ 
 so little into account, as to maintain that the divine, in its im- 
 moveableness, infinitude, and so forth, and the human,_as being 
 of a totally different substance, cannot be at all compared with 
 each other. Not only is there a forgetfulness of the doctrine of 
 the divine image; but with such premises the doctrine of Christ 
 p A 
 
 durch die allen Verstand gefangennehmende Empfingniss.” 
 
 - Wenn sie auch mit ihm zu einem Ganzen zusammenwuchs: 
 
 , 
 
HIPPOLYTUS. 85 
 
 can only assume an imperfect form. It will, nevertheless, be 
 instructive to examine the Christological theory of Hippolytus 
 more carefully. 
 
 Let us examine, first, what he teaches regarding the divine 
 aspect of the Person of Christ; secondly, his view of the incar- 
 nation ; and, thirdly, his conception of the union of the divine 
 and human in Christ. 
 
 J. Patripassians of the school of Noetus, who appealed to 
 the same passages as Praxeas,—to wit, Exod. i. 6, xx. 3; 
 Baruch iii. 836; Isa. xlv. 5; Rom. ix. 5; John xiv. 9,—arrived 
 at the conclusion that Christ was the Father Himself, that He 
 was the Son, was born, suffered, and raised Himself from the 
 dead. In reply, he urged that, in order to withstand Theo- 
 dotus, who looked only at the humanity of Christ, we must not 
 look solely at His deity, and attribute to Him the entire deity 
 (c. Noet. 3, 11). Both are equally one-sided (povoxwdor). 
 “Who will deny that God is one? But shall we, therefore, at 
 ouce set aside the ceconomy,” which introduced distinctions into 
 Him? If Christ be God, say they, and God is one, the suffer- 
 ings which befell Christ must be attributed to the Father also. 
 But the one God, in whom we are compelled to believe, is, on 
 the contrary, unbegotten, arabs, a0dvaros, and doeth all things 
 as and when He wills (c. 8). This self-identity of God is held 
 so firmly by Hippolytus, that he is unwilling to admit even of 
 the distinction of willing and not-willing in God (Habr. 1. 45). 
 The Adyos tod Oeod also is azabijs, and solely through the flesh 
 is He passible. It was not, therefore, as in the case of Tertul- 
 lian, the desire to constitute God a participator in Hnitude that 
 led Hippolytus to the distinction of the Son (vios, frequently 
 mais Qeod), but partly the passages of Scripture, which distin- 
 guish the Son from the Father, and partly the need of retaining 
 firm hold of the personal indwelling of God in Christ as the 
 unity of God. How, then, does he accomplish the task? He says 
 (c. 10),—“ Whilst God was still alone, and had nothing with 
 Himself that was contemporary, He willed to create the world. 
 Thinking, willing, and uttering the idea of the world, He created 
 the world; and soon that which was created was with Him, as 
 He had willed it. It is enough for us to know that nothing was 
 contemporary with God; nothing was besides Himself. But He, 
 although existing alone, existed in plurality (arodvs av); for He 
 
86 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 was neither without the Logos nor the Sophia (dAoyos, aaogos), 
 without power or counsel: all was in Him, and He was Himself 
 the All (ro wav). When it was His will, He showed His Logos 
 as He willed, at the times afore appointed by Him, and through 
 Him eral all things, creating all things through the Word, 
 through Wisdom ordering all things § in Beaute As the Prince 
 of that which then came into existence, as the counsellor and 
 master-workman, He brought forth the Logos. The Logos, 
 whom He bore in Himself, He made visible. This was His 
 own intellect (vods), invisible at first to the growing world, 
 and at an earlier period visible only to Himself. In that He 
 uttered the first word, and produced light out of light, He sent 
 forth for creation its Lord (apojKe 7h tices Tov Kvptov), to the 
 end that the world, seeing Him through His manifestation, 
 might be delivered. And so there stood another alongside of 
 God” (c.11). “I have no intention of teaching,’ he goes on 
 to say, “two Gods, but merely two wpdcw7a, the preservation 
 of the ofxovouia (c. 11, 14), Light of light, water from the 
 fountain, a ray from the sun. For He is one force out of the 
 whole; but the Father is the whole” (c. 11). Christ in His 
 divine aspect is wavtoxpdtwp (c. 6); everything is made by 
 Him; He alone is of the Father (c. 11). Paul ventures to say, 
 “ He is God over all;” and justly, for He Himself declared that 
 all things were given up to Him (c. 6). As, according to John 
 xvii. 22, we are not to be one with each other and with God in 
 Christ as to our personality (kata tiv odciav, Persdnlichkeit), 
 but as regards dvvayis and didPecus ths opodpovias (that is, 
 without doubt, so far as there dwells in us the like dive power, 
 and as we are animated by the same disposition); so did He 
 confess that He was in the Father duvameu, duadécer, or the 
 Son (6 Iais) is the one understanding of the Father. Coming 
 forth into the world, God’s voids is set fates men as the Son of 
 God (mats @cod; compare also “de Chr. et Antichr.” c. 3,—0 
 Tov Qcod traits, 6 Tadat AOyos). Do we, then, teach a plurality 
 of Gods, which have come into existence in the course of time? 
 By no means. All runs back again into one. The Logos is 
 the Father’s vods, copia, Aoyos itself, one and the same dvvapus 
 with that of the Father (uia dvvayus watpéa, c. 8, 6,11). As 
 regards the dvvapus, it is one God. But as regards the ceco- 
 nomy, its manifestation is threefold (éideEs, c. 8). The 
 
HIFPOLYTUS. 87 
 
 ceconomy, because it is an harmonious one (otkovowia cuppo- 
 vias), leads back to one God, for God is one. He who com- 
 mands is the Father; He who obeys is the Son; He who 
 enlightens is the Holy Ghost. The Father is over all, the Son 
 is through all, the Holy Ghost is in all (Eph. iv. 6); and it is 
 impossible for us to assume one God, unless we really believe in 
 Father, Son, and Spirit. The Jews boasted of the Father; but 
 they never got as far as thankfulness (that is, they never had a 
 childlike spirit, a real Father), for they did not recognise the 
 Son. The disciples knew the Son; but not in the Holy Ghost, 
 and therefore they denied Him (c. 14). 
 
 Consequently, besides the equality of substance and the 
 sameness of will and thought, it is their common origin from 
 the Father, and the identity of the work with which the three 
 Tpocwrra are occupied, each in its own way, that is to preserve 
 the unity of the deity, notwithstanding the plurality of the 
 mpocwra. The Father wills or speaks ; the Son accomplishes ; 
 the Holy Spirit enables the mind to apprehend Christ’s work, 
 and gives the necessary enlightenment (cuverifer, pavepody, c 
 14). Two different things are therefore connected, but not 
 united. The greater the stress laid on the latter point, that is, 
 on the identity of their work, the more is the basis withdrawn on 
 which the three hypostases rest : the triplicity then relates, not to 
 God’s inmost essence, but merely to His manifestations, to His 
 work. Hippolytus has, on this ground, been charged with 
 Sabellianism, but unjustly. For he claims divine worship for 
 each of the three, and must therefore have conceived them to be 
 hypostatical (c. 13; compare Theoph. 10). On the other hand, 
 the more he insists on the triplicity of the mpocw7a, and, in 
 particular, as regards the second srpocwrropr, assigns the precise 
 moment, when the Understanding or Word of God was begot- 
 ten as His Son, and was set into the world as an étepos over 
 against God, the more distinctly do we perceive that he has 
 Bat one means of guarding the unity of God, to wit, Subordina- 
 tianism. The power of unity is in the Father, Gain whom 
 everything, even the oixovoyia, proceeds, and to whom, as the 
 qav, the Son is related as a mere ray to the sun, or as a part of 
 the whole. He has, it is true, subjected all things to the Son, 
 but not Himself; on the contrary, He commands, whereas the 
 
 1 For example, by Hanell. 
 
&8 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 Son obeys; nay more, He called the Son, His own vods, to an 
 hypostatical existence alongside of Himself, because He willed, 
 and just when He willed. A clear line of demarcation separates 
 this doctrine of the Son from Arianism ; for, according to it, 
 the Son is equal in substance to the Father, and is not a creature, 
 but begotten by God prior to all creation. But though eternal 
 as to His essence, He was not eternal as to His personality. 
 His essence was the divine understanding, the divine wisdom, 
 the divine power itself; the theoloeumena of the divine Word 
 and the divine Wisdom were united in Him; but because 
 the Father Himself cannot be without power and wisdom 
 (aXoyos, acopos), Hippolytus, like Tertullian, ends with identi- 
 fying, at all events, the eternal aspect, or the essence, of the 
 Son with the Father; although, on the other hand, he broke 
 the first ground for an eternal distinction of the Father from 
 the Son, by teaching that the Father carried Him in Himself 
 prior to His generation. This thought, however, if the potence 
 of the Son in God was the voids, the codia, of which, be it re 
 membered, the Father could not be conceived destitute, could 
 not be further followed out, without encroachment on the Father; 
 unless the divine vods were represented as in some way doubling 
 itself, and, whilst abiding in the Father, to use Tertullian’s ex- 
 pression, as objectifying itself in the Word. Wisdom and power, 
 however, are not, in his view, hypostatical, but predicates of the 
 Father Himself : they become hypostases outside of God, in the 
 world. We may therefore briefly say,—With one foot, Hippo- 
 lytus, like all the Church teachers of his time, still stood on the 
 ground of his patripassian opponents ; and yet built.up a subor- 
 dinatian system, as it were, on Sabellian foundations? 
 
 Not distinctions which exist merely for the mind of the be- 
 holder, but real and objective ones, were sought. Eternal dis- 
 tinctions of essence, however, were not arrived at. The wisdom 
 and word of Omnipotence, considered as an activity or as an 
 attribute, must appertain also to the Father: hence the Son, 
 who is the Wisdom of the Father, is constantly on the point of 
 going back out of His hypostasis, which He owes solely to the 
 will, not to the essence, of the Father, into His essence, which 
 is undistinguishably one with the essence of the Father, whose 
 hypostasis alone is fixed and established. 
 
 Hippolytus gave more definite expression to this temporality 
 
HIPPOLYTUS. 89 
 
 of the Sonship than even Tertullian. The Only-begotten One, 
 says he, was indeed neces Logos prior to the incarnation, but 
 not yet perfect Son.’ Who was in heaven, save the Tatts 
 without humanity, who was sent in order to show that He ae 
 was on earth is also in heaven? The Logos took the name 
 which was customary amongst the children fi men, the expres- 
 sion of tender love (c. 15); and from the very beginning (for 
 example, by Daniel), although He was not yet man, allowed 
 Himself to be called Son of man, because He was destined to 
 become man, and to be set forth asa perfect Son (c. 4). (Note 
 16.) His Sonship, therefore, was a growing one, and first attained 
 completion at the incarnation. With the Sonship, however, 
 was connected His personality, which, out of consideration for 
 the redemption in Christ (c. 10) indeed, he represented the Logos 
 as attaining, even prior to the incarnation; but which he must 
 have been rae lited to derive from finitude, if the only place he 
 had for it was one outside of the divine sphere. If God is abso- 
 lutely arpemros (2, 45), immoveable (c. Ber. Fragm. 1), and if 
 the divine Logos, notwithstanding, first became an hypostasis or 
 Son in time, the hypostatical in Him cannot have pertained to 
 God. The essence of the Logos, indeed, cannot by any means 
 be described as a creature and finite; Bue His per sonality cer- 
 tainly :—the latter, so far as it began in time, and gradually 
 advanced from imperfection to perfection ; ; the former, in so 
 far as not the essence of God is conceived to be trinitarian, but 
 His understanding is held to have been constituted by Him into 
 an independent hypostasis, as and when He willed (see above, 
 and c. Noet.c.16). This birth of the Son, who out of the 
 Logos of the Father, and in the Father, was constituted Son, is, 
 like His birth in the flesh, a mystery ; the result and product 
 of which is before our eyes in Christ, without our being able 
 to understand the process. The eeennine thereof is re- 
 served for the saints, who shall behold the face of God. And 
 a still greater mystery than the incarnation is the birth of 
 the Son out of God, which took place (Ps. ex. 3) before the 
 morning star (c. 16). So much only he held to be certain, that 
 the Logos continued one with the Father even after He had 
 become a Person or a Son (axopiatos tod IIatpos; c. Noet. c. 
 
 1 C. 15:—Odtre yoo coopnos xat nab Eaurdv 6 Adyos rérsios Fy vide, 
 KAITOL TEALIOS GY Adyos Kovoryerys, etc., Cc. 4. 
 
90 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 18; Theophan. c. 7), and fulfilled all things notwithstanding 
 His hypostasis (Fabr. 2, 45). He is drreplyparrtos, akaTanT 708 
 (Theophan. 2). He terms Him povoyeri)s Oeod Aoyos (2, 29), 
 Aéyos TOD maTpos po TavTwV yeyevynuevos (de Christo et 
 Antichr. c. 11), or mpd aiwver wovoyerns (de Charism. T..d, 
 246). In his commentary on Genesis (Fabr. 2, 29), he appears 
 to go even still further. The words of Christ,—-namely, John 
 xvii. 5, “Father, glorify Me with the glory which I had with 
 Thee before the world was,’—he explains in the following man- 
 ner,—del yap vy €v TH SdEn Ocomrperret, TO iSio cuvuTapXov 
 yevyTOpl TPO TaVTos alOvos Kal YpovoV Kal THS TOD KOo- 
 wou KataBorys ; which reminds us of Ireneus. This passage 
 cannot indeed prove that Hippolytus recognised the existence 
 of the distinction of Father and Son in the eternal divine essence; 
 for it would clash with all that we have hitherto advanced : but 
 it does show that the apparently Arian elements in his system 
 were there, so to speak, against his will. That there ever was 
 a time when the Son as yet existed not, it would have been 1m- 
 possible for him to affirm, if for no other reason, because he 
 believed that time began with the world, and that the world was 
 created by the Son, who was not a creature, but a Son. At the 
 very same time, however, he unsuspectingly lays down the pro- 
 position, that the Logos was not eternally a person (that is, Son), 
 and represents His actual Sonship, His hypostatical existence, as 
 following upon His substantial existence in the Father, as the 
 Father’s power and wisdom ; or, what is to the same purpose in 
 his eyes, he taught that the Father was at first alone, in com- 
 pany solely with a plurality of attributes, and that when He 
 willed He set the Son over against Himself (c. Noet. 10). The 
 bringing forth of the Logos to light (Sevxvivat, ib.), who was 
 eternally present in the divine essence, but visible only to the 
 Father, was, in the view of Hippolytus, His bringing forth, or 
 generation’ (yevvdv), as the hypostasis of the Son, so that He 
 henceforth stood over against the Father as an érepos (c. 10, 
 ike 
 
 This hypostasis of the Son is not merely the Creator of the 
 
 1 I have tried here to render into English the play between the German 
 words zeigen and zeugen ; to show, and to beget. They might be otherwise 
 translated—‘ the producing” (7.e., to view) of the Logos, was His * produc- 
 tion” (i.e., generation).—TR. 
 
HIPPOLYTUS. G1 
 
 world (xdvrwy Snusoupyos, Theoph. 2; c. Noet. 10), but also 
 the Lord, King, and Judge of all heavenly and earthly things, 
 and things under the earth (de Chr. et Antichr. 26). He keeps 
 visible and invisible things together, and in a good condition (2, 
 29). The Logos or Son is the principle of all revelation; the 
 Word spake (I. c. 31) and dwelt in the prophets ; in that He be- 
 came His own messenger in them, He spake concerning Himself 
 (€v TovTOLs TodLTEVOpEVoS), showing the Word which was des- 
 tined to appear among men (c. Noet. 11). As Hippolytus did 
 not deem the prophets in particular, to whom Moses belonged 
 (1, 246), to have been themselves active at the moment of reve- 
 lation (compare “de Chr. et Antichr.” 2,—édpydvev Sixenv ivo- 
 pévov éxovtes év éavTots del TOV Aoyov, ws TAHKTpOV, Sv ob KwWov- 
 pevoe aTrnyyeAXov Tadta amep HOcrev 0 Meds; c. 12, where he 
 terms the prophets “ Christ’s eyes;” and c. 2, where he terms 
 them “our eyes’), he was able to say that Christ sojourned 
 already in them; and, as he appears to have done after the ex- 
 ample of Theodoret (Fabr. 1, 267), to distinguish three forms 
 of the wapovaia of Christ, if which the orcs) was undoubtedly 
 His walking with the eee or His appearance to them (com- 
 pare on Gan in. 8, Fabr. 2, 22); the second, His walking in the 
 prophets, when they fecans as it were, forms under which He, 
 for a time, manifested Himself ; the third, the incarnation, when 
 He perfectly and permanently assumed humanity, and lived a 
 thoroughly human life. This third he again distinguishes, in 
 the usual'manner, into the advent of the Redeemer in humilia- 
 tion, and His advent in glory (de Chr. et Antichr. 44). 
 
 II. We confine our attention, in the first instance, to the in- 
 carnation. The Father sent the immortal Son and Logos into 
 the world; and He, entering into man and begetting us anew to 
 immortality of the soul and of the body, breathed into us the 
 breath of true life, and clothed us with an imperishable panoply 
 (Theoph. 8). What the holy Virgin conceived was the Logos, the 
 First-born of God, who descended upon her from heaven; and a 
 man, who was formed in her womb as her first-born, in order that 
 the first-born Logos of God might exhibit Himself in union with 
 a first-born man (1, 267). Both substances, the divine and 
 human, must He receive, as it were, as a pledge of His ability 
 to appear in the character of Mediator, both of the two natures 
 and of God and man (1, 266).—Fhe protoplast Adam, the 
 
92 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 Logos sought out in the Virgin; the spiritual Adam sought out 
 the earthly in the mother. He became a helper of vanquished 
 man, by becoming like him (1, 269). The act of incarnation 
 itself Hippolytus describes as follows:—'The only-begotten 
 Logos of God, God of God, humbled Himself, voluntarily abas- 
 ing Himself to that which He was not, and invested Himself 
 with this dishonourable flesh of ours (2, 29, KexévwKev éavTov 
 xabels eOcdovtns éavTov eis Orrep ovK Hv, Kal Thy adofov TavTHy 
 cdpxa nyuméoxeto). At the same time, as the Logos of God, 
 the glory of God belonged essentially and inalienably to Him, 
 even after the act of incarnation. But His humanity partici- 
 pated also, to a certain extent, in this glory. He gives the fol- 
 lowing explanation of the passage Isa. xix. 1, “ Behold, the Lord 
 cometh on a light cloud:”—The Lord is the Logos ; the light 
 cloud is the purest of all tents, enthroned in which our Lord 
 Jesus Christ entered into life (1, 271). And on Ps. xxvin. 1, 
 he remarks,—“ The ark of imperishable wood was the Re- 
 deemer. For His incorruptible tabernacle, which was unaffected 
 by the rottenness of sin, was thus signified. The Lord was sin- 
 less, was of the wood which knows no corruption, as to His 
 humanity; that is, He was inwardly out of the Virgin and the 
 Holy Spirit, and outwardly out of the Logos of God, covered as 
 with the purest gold” (1, 268). We find in other writers also a 
 reference of the ark of the covenant to the humanity of Christ 
 (for example, Iren. Fragm. p. 342, Ed. Mass.). But whereas 
 Irenzeus gives the image the application,—the ark was inwardly 
 gilt, and outwardly covered with gold; and in like manner the 
 body of Christ was inwardly adorned with the Logos, and out- 
 wardly guarded by the Holy Ghost,—Hippolytus here takes 
 Christ’s humanity as corresponding to the wood of the ark, 
 that is, as the inner portion, surrounded by the uncircumscribed 
 Logos, and as having been, as it were, fitted for union with the 
 Logos, by the purifying and glorifying power of the Holy 
 Ghost. On Gen. xlix. 11 (Fabr. 2, 24), “In wine washeth he 
 his garments,’—he remarks, “ Through the Holy Ghost and the 
 word of truth, He will purify His flesh.” Akin to this is another 
 passage, which sets the incarnation in a still more determinate 
 relation to the Logos. Prov. ix. 1 ff. he explains (1, 282) as 
 follows :—“ Christ, the wisdom and power of God the Father, 
 built for Himself a house, to wit, He took the odpxwous from 
 
HIPPOLYTUS. 93 
 
 the Virgin for a temple. ‘She set up seven pillars ;’—these, 
 according to Isaiah, are the seven powers of the Holy Ghost, 
 which descended on Christ. ‘She mixed wine in her cup; 
 that is, the Redeemer united His deity, the pure wine, with the 
 flesh, in the Virgin, and was born of her as God and man, with- 
 out commixture. ‘She spread her table;’ that is, she commu- 
 nicated the knowledge of the Holy Trias.” Doubts may be 
 entertained as to the genuineness of the next sentence, which 
 explains the table to signify the Holy Eucharist, in which the 
 precious, sacred body of Christ is daily sacrificed on the mystical 
 divine table, in commemoration. In another simile, borrowed 
 from weaving, he depicts the various factors which worked to- 
 gether in the Person of Christ as follows:—When as yet the 
 Logos of God in Himself was destitute of flesh, He took upon 
 Himself holy flesh out of the holy Virgin, and wove for Himself, 
 as it were, a bridal garment in His sufferings on the cross (through 
 
 His death of love, the glory which encompasses Him and His 
 redeemed ones). The sufferings which He endured on the cross 
 were the loom; the warp was the power of the Holy Ghost ; 
 the woof was His holy flesh which was woven in with the Spirit; 
 the weaving thread is the loving grace of Christ, which binds in 
 one that which was dissevered; the Logos was the shuttle; the 
 master weavers were the patriarchs and prophets, who wove for 
 Christ His precious robe, His coat without seam; through them 
 the Logos passed like a shuttle, weaving by them what the 
 Father willed. These artificial allegories, which are very much 
 to the taste of Hippolytus, show that he conceived the Logos to 
 be the properly moving principle, as of all revelations, so also of 
 the incarnation; and although he assigns to the Holy Spirit 
 - His work in connection therewith, he really represents the Logos 
 as building for Himself His own tabernacle. Indeed, he says, 
 —‘* He raised His own body from the dead by the power of the 
 Father” (€{eoydver rov vadv éavrod, 2, 27). Nevertheless, he 
 insists, and repeatedly asserts, that the material, consecrated by 
 the Holy Ghost, for the temple in which Christ was to be en- 
 throned, was taken from the Virgin. He would not have been 
 a Mediator had He not, in the man Jesus, assumed a man of 
 our race. He lived through human conditions (c. Noet. 18; de 
 Chr. et Antichr. 26, 46), the entire human stadium, and for this 
 reason He is the arbitrator: He descended also into Hades, be- 
 
94 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 cause it was His will to be counted among the dead (de Chr. et 
 Antichr. 26 and 1, 269). “Let us believe, dear brothers,” says 
 he (c. Noet. 17), “ that God the Word descended from heaven 
 into the holy Virgin Mary; that He became flesh, assuming 
 from her also a human, that is, a rational, soul (compare also 
 the Fragment in Ang. Mai’s Coll. Nov. 7, 12; c. Beron. Fragm. 
 8, in Fabr. 1, 229 f.); that, in short, having become all that 
 man is, with the exception of sin, He saves the fallen, and is 
 able to confer immortality on those who believe in His name. 
 Born of the Virgin and the Holy Ghost, He exhibited a new 
 man, in that His heavenly nature was constituted of that which 
 was of the Father as Logos; and, as far as concerns the 
 earthly, He took a body from the old Adam, through the me- 
 dium of the Virgin. He now, coming forth into the world, 
 revealed Himself as God in a body; came forth as a perfect 
 man.” 
 
 III. But since Hippolytus, as we know, laid great stress on 
 the unalterableness of God, and also represents the Son, who 
 remains inseparable from the Father (the Father in the Son 
 and the Son in the Father), as participating therein, even whilst 
 He sojourned among men (c. Noet. 4), the question arises,— 
 How did He reconcile the incarnation therewith? The idea.ofa 
 humanity, possessed by the Logos already in heaven, must _ be 
 rejected; there was a time when the Logos was not man (G. 
 Noet. 4). Humanity exists in heaven, only since the paternal 
 Logos presented a perfect man as a gift to God. Accordingly, 
 He became what He was not before, without losing the divine 
 essence and glory, which He had from the beginning (2, 29), 
 consequently without conversion (c. Beron. Fragm. 1, in Fabr. 
 
 1, 225 f.; c. Noet.17). But from this he deduces, further, that. 
 
 the incarnation did not affect His being, but solely His Having 
 or Dwelling. It is frequently supposed that Hippolytus conceived 
 the divine and the human to have stood in a very intimate rela- 
 tion to each other: as, for example, when he says (c. Beron. 1, 
 230),—pndev Oeiov yupvov THpaTos evEpYNoAs, pndé avOperwov 
 6 autos dpotpov OeoTnTos ; OF when he reckons the incarnation 
 necessary to the perfection of the divine Sonship. But he does 
 not carry these ideas out. Consistently with the mode of thought 
 to which he mainly adhered, Hippolytus cannot properly say,— 
 The Logos became or was man ; but merely that He wore aman 
 
 anaes 
 
HIPPOLYTUS. BERON. 45 
 
 as a garment, or dwelt in him as in atemple. 'ron), évdupya, 
 vaos (de Chr. et Antichr. 11, 4; ; Theophan. 4,in Genes. xlix. 11; 
 Fabr. 2, 24), are also sioaihiye expressions x his; and when he 
 lays stress on Christ’s having a human soul, it is merely for the 
 sake of the completeness of the human nature, and has not at 
 all the effect of freeing the humanity of Christ from its total 
 dependence on the Logos. As we have seen, Hippolytus did 
 not conceive the freedom of man to involve his being an inde- 
 pendent agent; for that would have led to the recognition of 
 the distinction between divine volition and divine permission, 
 of the possibility of change in God. He was far, therefore, 
 from supposing himself to be curtailing the inten aspect of 
 the Person of Christ, when Me denied it a free human Ego and - 
 treated it as a meee organ. He gave the following account 
 of the relation between the two natures during their conjunc- 
 tion :—The dvvayis watpéa? which dwelt in Him worked all 
 that was an expression of power, the miracles, the resurrection, 
 and the like; whereas to His humanity appertained weakness 
 and suffering. By His weakness He was to prove Himself man 
 (2, 45; ¢. Noet. 15); by His glory He exhibited Himself as God 
 (c. Noet. 18; compare Fabr. 2, 28; 1, 218; and Theoph. 7). 
 Lhe work against Beron is simply a fuller development of 
 these ideas. Through His health-bringing incarnation (cap- 
 xwots), the Logos introduced into the flesh the activity of His 
 own deity ;—not that His deity was bounded by the flesh ; and 
 
 1 To this connection belongs the well-known passage, c. Noet. 15. 
 After the words adduced above (ore yao doupxos xal xa Exvrdv 6 Adyos, 
 etc.), he proceeds to say :—So 008 4 cetpS xb’ eauray Oiye tov Adyou vxo- 
 arava novvaro die To gy Adyw thy avotacy exeiv.—Svoracis, be it observed, is 
 not yet equivalent to personality. The sense is,—it had its subsistence in 
 the Logos; He was the connective and vehicular force. This is thoroughly 
 unobjectionable: he does not thus necessarily pronounce the humanity of 
 Christ impersonal; although, in view of what has preceded and what re- 
 mains to be adduced, there can be no doubt that Hippolytus would have 
 defended the impersonality, had the question been agitated at the period at 
 which he lived. 
 
 2 C. Noet. 6. 8.10.16. Beryll says, dvvapss rarpixy. The above 
 phrase employed by his contemporary, Hippolytus, shows how little right 
 Baur has to bring it forward in proof of Beryll’s Ebionism. ‘To Beryll’s 
 other expression also, dvvamss rarpiny gumorirevoutyy, x.7.A., parallels may 
 be found in the writings of Hippolytus (see c. Noet. 4; de charism. 1, 246). 
 For the incarnation, he employs also the term éxidnu/e. Fabr. 2, 29. 
 
96 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCR. 
 
 still less that it grew out of the essence of the humanity (Fragm. 
 1, 226). That which 1s revealed through the flesh, can by no 
 means be described as belonging to the flesh. In proof of 
 which, he brings forward the illustration above mentioned, of 
 the thought which is expressed by the tongue, but which neither 
 springs from nor belongs to it, nor to the hand that records it 
 (Fragm. 8; Fabr. 1, 229 f.; compare Fabr. 2, 29). For our 
 salvation, and in order to give the universe a share in unchange- 
 ableness, the Creator of the universe incorporated with Himself 
 a rational soul and a sensitive body (compare c. Noet. 17), drawn 
 from the holy Mary, who was ever a virgin,” by an immaculate 
 conception, without conversion. He thus became a man, who, 
 being as to nature foreign to sin, was at once God and Word. 
 For, as to His deity, He worked what was divine through His 
 holy flesh, that is, such things as did not appertain to the nature 
 of the flesh. As to His humanity, He suffered what was human, 
 that is, such things as did not appertain to the nature of the 
 deity, borne up by the deity (avoxyh Ths OedtnTos ; compare C. 
 Noet. 15, in note 1, page 95); working nothing divine, without 
 the body (yupvev coparos), and doing nothing human, without 
 participation in deity (dpotpov OedrnTO0s; Fragm. 8; Fabr. 1, 
 229 £.). 
 
 But if that which the divine nature worked pertained in no 
 sense to the human, as its property; and if the latter was the 
 mere passive organ of the former, wherein did the appearance 
 of the Logos in Christ differ from His walking in the prophets? 
 The distinction has already been mentioned : in Christ the 
 
 union between the Logos and a man was not merely momentary, 
 but permanent. By itself, the circumstance, that in the case 
 of Christ the Logos first prepared for Himself a man, whereas, 
 in the case of the prophets, the man was begotten by men, can- 
 not constitute a difference; for Adam also was prepared by the 
 hands of the Logos, and Hippolytus must consequently have 
 put him on a level with Christ, had he regarded him as a pro- 
 phet. If, then, the only difference were that between a momen- 
 tary and a permanent indwelling of the Logos, the distinction 
 
 1 This predicate probably signifies merely, that Mary remained, even 
 after the birth of Jesus, dice omirles civopes. With this supposition accord 
 well the words of Theoph. (c. 3),—‘‘ The Baptist made the unfruitful fruis- 
 ful; Jesus made the Virgin unfruitful.” 
 
 . 
 | 
 j 
 . 
 | 
 4 
 
HIPPOLYTUS. 97 
 
 between Christ and the prophets would manifestly be merely 
 quantitative. Christ would in reality have been nothing more 
 than a longer continuing theophany. We might thus account for 
 the title of his discourse, e’s Ta dyta Oeopavera — émrupdveia 3 as 
 also for his saying therein (c. 7),—He appeared, He did not be- 
 come manifest (é€7repavn, ov« épavn). The last-mentioned words, 
 however, refer to His self-abasement, in that at His baptism He 
 took the appearance of subordination, He who had been always 
 in the bosom of the Father; and assumed a human body for a 
 garment, and therewith concealed His deity, in order to elude 
 the snares of Satan. And the word @eoddvera had also, in the ° 
 following century (see, for example, the “‘Theophania” of Euse- 
 bius, recently edited by Cramer), a wider signification, which 
 tnelaaed the incarnation of Christ. In the third century, too, 
 the Feast of Epiphany bore also the name of Theophany. But 
 as to the question, whether Hippolytus teaches a merely quanti- 
 tative distinction between Christ’s working and appearance in 
 Jesus and in the prophets,—it cannot be denied, that so long as 
 the humanity of Christ is merely regarded as a garment or a 
 temple, so long as the Logos merely has, or is the vehicle of 
 humanity, without being man; and, vice versd, so long as the 
 humanity of Christ cannot be termed divine,—so long is there 
 no incarnation, but merely theophanies; so long is that imma- 
 nent union of the divine and human not logically demonstrated, 
 which faith feels to be the essentially new element in Christian- 
 ity. (Note 17.) 
 
 In reality, however, the very permanency of the indwelling 
 of the Logos in this man, shows that we have to do with some- 
 thing more than a theophany. If it be certain that the Logos 
 remains eternally clothed with humanity (c. Noet. 4), that He 
 no longer works apart from it, its relation cannot be merely 
 the accidental one of a garment or of a covering, but it must 
 be intimately and essentially united with the Logos Himself. 
 Hippolytus also felt this (see, for example, c. Noce 15, com- 
 pare note p. 89, and note 1, p. 95); and when he gives free 
 and _unbiassed_ expression to his Christian intuitions, he goes 
 far beyond the meagre category of a garment;* nay, even 
 
 1 Contra Beron, he says,—The union of the two natures is an d&éfyzros 
 and 2éppyros ; the Logos had reserved for Himself a new and fitting method 
 of so working what was divine and what was human, without that confu- 
 
 VOL. It G 
 
98 FIRST PERIOD SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 beyond the merely organic comparison, according to whicn 
 the humanity was related to the deity, as the tongue or the 
 hand is to thought. For he aimed at showing that in Christ 
 humanity had been renovated, and the first perfect man pre- 
 sented to God. “AvOpwros év avOpwrots éyyernOn avatrao- 
 cov d¢ éavtod tov ’Addu. Man, formed of the earth, and 
 bound with the bonds of death, He drew forth out of the 
 lowest Hades—He who descended from above and bore aloft 
 into higher regions that which was below: the herald, who | 
 brought the joyous message to the dead, became the Saviour of 
 souls, the resurrection of the buried. ‘The Logos became a 
 helper to vanquished humanity; in the Virgin He sought out 
 the Adam of the first creation, who was formed of the dust of 
 the ground; He, the eternally living One, sought out him who, 
 through disobedience, had fallen a prey to death. He who was 
 nobly born desired, by His own obedience, to put the bondsman 
 on the footing of a free man; He transformed him who was 
 dissolved into dust, and had become the food of the serpent, into 
 a diamond; He set forth Him who hung on the cross as the 
 Lord of the conqueror, and was found as a conqueror through 
 the wood of the cross (1, 269). Through death He vanquished 
 death. In Adv. Jud. 3, Fabr. 2, 2, we read,—* For that which 
 I have not robbed, says the Logos in Ps, Ixxviii. (Hebr. Ixxix.), 
 that is, for the sin of Adam, which I did not commit, I suffered 
 death.” In i. 266, again, —“ On His arms, stretched out on the 
 cross, He bore the sins of Gentiles and Jews, and nailed them, 
 along with Himself, to the cross.” In the de Antichr. 61,— 
 “ His holy hands, which were extended on the cross, are the 
 wings of the eagle in the Apocalypse of John, which delivered 
 the woman in the desert. He spreads out the right and the 
 left, inviting all who will believe in Him, and He covers them 
 as a hen covereth her chickens.” Again, in de Antichr. 11,— 
 “ Out of His side spring two fountains, one of water, the other 
 
 sion of the natures which he condemns in his opponent, that nothing divine 
 took place without the body, and that the humanity in its activity partici- 
 pated in the divine (Fragm. 1, 8). This connects itself with the principle 
 laid down above, that not even divine activity ever became the property 
 of the humanity, by the following link :—It participated in the divine at 
 every moment solely in consequence ot communication of fellowship with the 
 Logos. 
 
HIPPOLYTUS. 99 
 
 of blood, wherein the nations are washed and purified; and 
 humanity forms, as it were, the bridal garment with which He is 
 clothed.” The humanity which belongs to Him is the Church 
 (c. 59), the parturient woman (c. 61). Out of her heart she will 
 not cease to bring forth the Logos, who is persecuted in the world 
 by unbelievers.” “She bears a Son,” we read further, “ who 
 will feed all nations; to wit, ever bringing forth the man-child, 
 the perfect Christ, the child of God (who is preached as God 
 and man), the Church instructs all nations.” In this passage, 
 Christ is described as the inmost essence, as it were, the heart 
 of the humanity renewed by God, and the incarnation as a con- 
 tinuous thing: and so we find him elsewhere not shrinking from 
 the other view of Christ, as the sun with which the woman, the 
 Church, is clothed, as with a garment. If the latter signifies 
 that Christ, through his own person, wedded humanity with 
 immortality, and that the Logos, descending into it from above, 
 and encompassing it from without, transformed it, and set a 
 perfect humanity before the Father in Himself (Theoph. 6, 
 Fragm. on Ps. xxiv. 7, Fabr. 1, 2685 c. Beron'es)2 2000s). ue 
 former, essentially connected as it is therewith, describes Him 
 as the inmost vital principle and true substance of the humanity, 
 as the principle of the birth of the divine-human life, which is 
 ever continuing, and which diffuses itself through all nations. 
 Theoph. c. 6,—“ Christ caused Himself to be baptized; and 
 He renewed the old man, and entrusted to him again the sceptre 
 of sonship. Immediately were the heavens opened above Him, 
 for the visible and the invisible were reconciled ; the heavenly 
 hosts were filled with joy; on earth all sicknesses were healed ; 
 the mystery was revealed ; and enmity was turned to friend- 
 ship.! Before His baptism, He stood like a bridegroom about to 
 enter the heavenly bridal chamber, and the gates opened them- 
 selves to Him and to the Holy Ghost, which hovered down- 
 
 1 Similarly c. Beron, Fragm. 2: The God of the universe became man, 
 in order that, by suffering through suffering flesh, He might deliver our 
 entire race from the death to which it was sold ; that, doing wonders by His 
 impassible deity, He might lead men through the flesh to His immortal and 
 blessed life, and might establish in immoveableness the holy ordinances of 
 heavenly rational beings. The work of His capérwors was n TaY Cr@y es 
 wirey cévansQarcelosic. (Similarly in de Chr. et. Antichr. 26.) The latter 
 passage is like Origen :—The God of the universe became man iva re xan’ 
 
 ? \ iA , ~ ~ y ~ , ‘ . , 
 OUINVOUS YL THYLATH TOY YOSPUY OUTIMY OTOMGION TP0s atpebioy. 
 
100 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 wards, and to the Father’s voice, ‘Thou art My beloved Son,’ 
 which rang through the universe.” C. 2,—“ The Creator of the 
 universe (the Son) descended like rain, and divided Himself like 
 a stream, which is without limits, and rejoiced the city of God.” 
 C. 7,—“ He who was called the Son of Joseph, was the Only- 
 begotten One as to His divine essence , He hungered, who fed 
 thousands; He was weary, who by His labours relieved the 
 weary; He had not where to lay His head, and yet all things 
 were in His hand; He suffered, and healed all by His suffer- 
 ings; He suffered Himself to be beaten, and made the world 
 free.” ©. 8,—‘ The immortal Logos came into the world in 
 order to beget mortals again to immortality. When man be- 
 comes immortal, he becomes also God. But if he becomes God 
 by being born again of water and the Spirit, he will be also a 
 fellow-heir with Christ after the resurrection.” These passages 
 should suffice to show, that when he had to do with the prac- 
 tical, and wished to set forth the glory of Christianity, Hippo- 
 lytus was by no means chary in the use of terms which declare 
 the existence of the most intimate vital union between the divine 
 and the human in the Person of Christ, and through Him be- 
 tween God and humanity in general,—expressions which stretch 
 far beyond the strictly scientific results at which he arrived. 
 The two are combined, in that he not seldom refers to the mys- 
 tery which, after all inquiry, still encompasses the union of the 
 divine essence with human nature. 
 
 In his first two books against the Jews, Cyprian lays down 
 the principal momenta of the idea of the Person of Christ, as 
 far as they had become clear down to his day, with scriptural 
 proofs, as follows:—The entire Scriptures refer to Christ, and 
 He is the key to their understanding; not till we believe in 
 Christ can we understand them. Then we see that the old 
 covenant was destined to give place to a new one, circum- 
 cision to baptism, the old temple to Christ, who is to be the 
 house and temple of God, the old priesthood to the new eternal 
 Priest (B.1). This Christ is the First-born and the Wisdom of 
 God, through which all things were made (Prov. Vill. 1X7 
 j.; John xvii.); the Word of God (Sermo Dei, John i.); the 
 arm and hand of God (Isa. |. lix.; Ps. xevii.). He is the 
 Maleach Jehovah, the messenger of God, and God Kiumselt 
 (Rom. ix. 5, where @eds, which Tertullian read, is not adducedy. 
 
CYPRIAN. | 101 
 
 But, besides being Son of God from the beginning, He must 
 needs be born the second time in the flesh (cum a principio tfilius 
 dei fuisset, generari denuo habebat secundum carnem); and the 
 distinguishing feature of His birth (das Ausgezeichnete, signum) 
 was to be His being born of a virgin, God and man, the Son of 
 God and the Son of man at the same time (Num. xxiv.; Jer. 
 xvil.; Isa. lxi.; Luke i. 35; 1 Cor. xv.), ex utroque genere 
 concretus, ut mediator esse posset (2, 10). At His first advent, 
 the Scriptures declared that He would be humbled and slain ; 
 He is termed the Lamb of God, and was presignified in the 
 paschal festival; Isaiah (lii.) and Jeremiah foretold His suffer- 
 ings. But He became the precious stone laid in the foundations 
 of Zion (Isa. lviii.), which shall grow to a mountain, to which all 
 the heathen and the righteous shall come. He is the Bride- 
 groom of the Church, which spiritually bears Him sons without 
 number. For all power and might rest in His sufferings on the 
 cross, and in the sign of the cross. This sign is redemption to 
 all. After His death He was not to remain in the nether world, 
 but to rise again on the third day (ab inferis). And then He 
 received all power from the Father, and His might is ever- 
 lasting (Dan. vii.; Apoc. i.; Matt. xxvill.). No one can come 
 to the Father but by Him. He will come again as Judge, and 
 be King eternally in His kingdom. All these titles, given to 
 Christ, remind us of the ancient hymns, a specimen of which, 
 from Clemens Alexandrinus, was given in the first volume (see 
 page 182). At the same time, this collocation of Cyprian’s sets 
 clearly before us the essential features of the Christological 
 portion of the Apostles’ Creed. 
 
 We will now subjoin a few passages, in which he not merely 
 repeats passages of Scripture, but develops more carefully his 
 own idea of Christ. We find, indeed, no precise scientific defini- 
 tions; but still we gain a picture of that which Christ was to 
 him. Special attention must be paid hereby to Cyprian’s doc- 
 trine of the death of Christ and of the Eucharist. In his fifty- 
 sixth letter (ed. Basil. 1558, Epp. L. 4, 6), he says,—* How 
 can the servant be unwilling to suffer, when his Lord sutfered 
 before him? how can he refuse to suffer for his sins, when He 
 suffered for us, who knew no sin? The Son of God suffered 
 in order to make us sons of God; and yet the children of men 
 will not suffer in order to continue children of God.” In the 
 
102 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 “De Idol. vanit.,” ed. c. Sep. 122 f., he says,—“ The Word and 
 the Son of God, whom all the prophets proclaimed as the en- 
 lightener and teacher of the human race, was sent as the steward 
 of grace. He was the power of God—His reason, wisdom, 
 glory ; He entered into the Virgin,—He, a holy spiritual being, 
 clothed Himself in flesh.1. God constantly unites Himself with 
 man (semper Deus cum homine miscetur). This our God, 
 this Christ it was, who, as mediator between two, put on man, 
 in order to lead him to the Father. What man is, Christ was 
 resolved to be, in order that man might be what Christ is. The 
 Jews also know of His advent :—but, it is true, only of His 
 advent in glory. He must needs suffer, however, not that He 
 might taste, but overcome death; and that, after the accomplish- 
 ment of His sufferings, He might ascend up on high, to exhibit 
 the power of the divine majesty, and to set the man whom He 
 loved, whom He took upon Himself, whom He redeemed, as a 
 victor on the throne, at the right hand of the Father. We 
 follow Him as our guide, as the Prince of light and Saviour, 
 who promises heaven and the Father to those who seek and 
 
 believe. What Christ is, we Christians shall be, if we have 
 
 followed Christ.” (Compare also Serm. 1, de Eleemos.) But 
 especially does he regard Him as the revelation of pure love. 
 In Sermo 3, “de bono patientiz,” we read,— We shall be- 
 come perfect sons of the Father, if the long-suffering of God 
 the Father abide in us, and if the divine image, lost in Adam, 
 shines out of our actions. What a glory to belike God; what 
 blessedness to have, in His virtue, something which is worthy of 
 being compared with the divine! And this it is which Christ 
 
 has not merely taught us by words, but fulfilled by deeds. As. 
 He said regarding Himself, He descended to do the Father's 
 
 will; and therefore, amongst the other marvels of virtue on which 
 He stamped the seal of divine majesty, He proved the long- 
 
 suffering of God by the patience which He manifested. De- 
 
 scending from His heavenly glory to the earth, the Son of God 
 did not count it a shame to take upon Himself the flesh of man, 
 in order that, though Himself free from sin, He might bear the 
 
 1‘ Carne spiritus sanctus induitur.” See my remarks on the other read- 
 ing—‘‘ (hic)—carnem spiritu sancto cooperante induitur,”—vol. i. page 
 391;—where also the necessary explanation is given of the expression 
 ‘* Spiritus sanctus.” 
 
CYPRIAN. 103 
 
 sins of others. Laying aside for the time His immortality, He 
 undertook even to be mortal, that He might die, the mnocent 
 for the salvation of the guilty.’ Concerning the Eucharist, 
 he says in the fifty-fourth Epistle (Ep. 2, 1. c.), that he who is 
 ralled upon to shed his blood as a confessor, ought previously to 
 partake of the cup of communion in the Church. In the sixty- 
 third Letter (Ep. 3), after mentioning the prophecies iz the Old 
 Testament relative to the Eucharist, and referring in particular 
 Proverbs ix., where Wisdom is spoken of, which prepares her 
 table and mingles her wine, to the Eucharist, as Hippolytus had 
 done, he says, that “its blessing consists in the removal of all care, 
 the awakening out of worldly sleep to the understanding of God, 
 the forgetting of worldly conversation, the becoming drunk with 
 divine wisdom, and the recovering from the intoxication of the 
 world.’ Then he goes on to say (p. 89),—“ As Christ bore us 
 all, nay, as He bore even our sins, so are we to regard the water 
 which is mixed with the sacramental wine as the people, the 
 wine as the blood of Christ. But as the water is mingled with 
 the wine in the cup, even so is Christ adunated with His people 
 (adunatur), and believers are married and united with Him, in 
 whom they believe. This marriage and union of the water and 
 the wine in the cup of the Lord is of such a nature, that it can 
 no more be dissolved and broken up. For this reason, the 
 Church, the people of the faithful and persevering, can no more 
 be separated from Christ, but must ever remain firm in the em- 
 brace of the divinelove. Wherefore, no wine without water, nor 
 water without wine; even as Christ is not without us, nor we 
 without Christ. When both commingle and interpenetrate as 
 in marriage, the spiritual and heavenly sacrament is accom- 
 plished. As, further, in the Eucharist many grains go to make 
 the one bread, so is the people of Christians set before us as 
 united: in Christ, the heavenly bread, we know ourselves to be 
 one body, with which our race is connected and united. 
 
 As an antagonist of the Monarchians, Origen was more tri- 
 umphant than either Tertullian or Hippolytus, mainly from the 
 importance of his own positive teachings, and not merely because 
 of the arguments he adduced against them. As he not merely 
 prought a section to a close, but was the starting-point of the 
 
 1 Compare the beautiful further treatment of the same subject, page 
 LbosenGs 
 
104 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 a 
 
 new development and the new struggles, which took place «ll 
 the Council of Nice, we shall, for this reason, accord him the 
 special attention which he deserves. 
 
 TRANSITION TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. 
 ORIGEN. 
 
 However different may have been the opinions entertained 
 in all ages regarding the great Alexandrian Church teacher 
 Origen, he cannot be denied the honour of having combined 
 hearty love to the Church and its theology, with high scientific 
 culture. He felt, asno one had felt before him, and as few have 
 felt after him, the greatness and importance of the Trinitarian 
 and Christological questions: with the candour of a noble and 
 pure soul, he recognised the element of truth in preceding ten- 
 dencies of the most different kind; and his richly endowed mind 
 possessed resources and elasticity enough to overcome the difli- 
 culties which he thus threw in his own way, to combine views 
 apparently antagonistic, and to make them subserve the progress 
 of the Church. He did justice to the truth in Ebionism, by 
 asserting the completeness of the humanity of Christ, in a man- 
 ner unlike that of any preceding teacher ; not contenting himself 
 with the mere general recognition of the old canon in vogue even 
 as early as the second century,—to wit, ‘it was necessary that 
 Christ should assume the first-fruits of the whole of human 
 nature, because He could only save that which He assumed,’— 
 but assigning to each part of human nature an essential signifi- 
 cance, relatively both to the purpose of redemption and to the 
 possibility and reality of the incarnation. He allowed also the 
 right of the other monarchian tendency, which denied to the 
 higher nature of Christ any special hypostasis, in order to avoid 
 the introduction of a schism into the divine nature, by endeavour- 
 ing most carefully to preserve the unity of the Most High God. 
 But he did this quite differently from Clemens Alexandrinus, who 
 left the hypostasis of the Logos so far in the background, that 
 he gave aid and countenance to Sabellianism. Origen, on the 
 contrary, concurred with Tertullian and Novatian in the West, 
 and with Hippolytus in the East, in asserting the particular 
 hypostasis of the Son; his labours too in this direction bear a 
 
ORIGEN. 105 
 
 far more realistic stamp, and recognise more distinctly the basis 
 of the faith of the Church. He made it his aim, so to connect 
 the actual deity of the Son, conceived as a person, with the per- 
 fect humanity of Christ, as neither to give a low representation 
 of the Son of God, nor an unworthy (for example, ethnic or 
 polytheistic) one of God, that neither the loftiness of the Son of 
 God might curtail the full truth of the man Jesus, nor the 
 completeness of the humanity infringe on the deity (de princip. 
 L. 2, c. 6, cf. in Levit. hom. 13, 4). This endeavour to ex- 
 hibit the truth held by the Church, as the force which holds 
 together the scattered elements of truth contained in the various 
 heresies, and to show that these different and partial momenta, 
 each of which becomes an untruth as soon as it aims to be the 
 whole, are organic, and, in their proper place, essential, parts of 
 the fully developed system of Christian doctrine, reveals not 
 merely the liberality and greatness, the comprehensive and syste- 
 matic character, of his mind, but also the love which had enabled 
 him, notwithstanding his varied culture, to strike his roots deeply 
 into the doctrine of the Church, and to take it and its spirit as 
 the regulative of his Christian gnosis, and the goal and soul of 
 his efforts. 
 
 All this is seen in his system on a grand scale; but. it ap- 
 peared expressly also in the man. However many ideas of a 
 questionable character, and needing continuous agitation and 
 discussion, he may have thrown out; however many ideas he 
 may have laid down, either tentatively or positively ; he never 
 forgot—and herein consists his churchly character—the differ- 
 ence between that which was certainly believed by the Church 
 and his own theological speculations ; nor failed to demand un- 
 conditional recognition for the latter, whilst content that the 
 former should be simply examined and tested. It is such an 
 equilibrium of the fixed and the alterable as this that renders 
 progress possible in the Church. This he takes as his point 
 of departure in the doctrinal work “de principiis” (§ 1), when 
 ~ he remarks,—‘* All who believe in Christ are convinced that 
 grace and truth were revealed through Him, and are to be 
 found in the sacred books of the Old and New Testaments.” 
 But he did not rest satisfied with this general recognition of the 
 material and formal aspect of the Christian principle. For, 
 though this very general norm was enough in itself to distin- 
 
106 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 guish Christians from those who are not Christians, it was 
 insufficient relatively to (heretical) divergencies within the 
 Church itself; that is, it was insufficient relatively to such as, 
 whilst professing to recognise, at the same time diverged so 
 considerably on, essential points of doctrine as really to violate 
 that fundamental principle, and to reduce their recognition 
 thereof to a mere seeming. For this reason, he endeavoured to 
 lay down a standard, and to draw a clear line separating the 
 heretical from the orthodox. This plumb-line is, in his view, 
 the “ecclesiastica preedicatio,” also designated by him “ eccle- 
 siastica et apostolica traditio,” which had been uninterruptedly 
 the common property of the Church, and had combined within 
 itself the “elementa ac fundamenta” of Christian truth, its 
 public and necessary principles. It may be regarded, indeed, 
 as an imperfection, that he treats these “fundamenta,” that is, 
 the Church’s rule of faith, rather as a distinct authority along- 
 side of the first-mentioned principle, than as a necessary deve- 
 lopment therefrom; but still he throws a clearer light on the 
 common faith of the Church of his age, by setting specially 
 before us the “ Regula Fidei” of the period, or the summary of 
 the fundamental and essential doctrines of Christianity, as an 
 objective authority. This “Summa Fidei,” agreeing substan- 
 tially as it does with the “ Regula Fidei,” laid down by Nova- 
 tian, Tertullian, and Irenzus,* teaches, in harmony with all the 
 older formule, alongside of the unity of God, the deity of the 
 Son; alongside of the pre-existence of the Son, His incarnation 
 in the Virgin, and the essential features of His history—His 
 sufferings, death, resurrection, ascension, and second coming to 
 judgment. But whereas Irenzus, in his two “ Regule Fidei,” 
 which are substantially identical with each other and with that 
 laid down by Tertullian in his “de vel. virginum” 1, as also 
 Novatian, rested satisfied with these most general elements, 
 which had not yet been determinately distinguished from the 
 baptismal formula and the Apostolic Creed (which had gra- 
 dually grown out of the baptismal formula), and recognised 
 
 1 Compare Hahn’s ‘‘ Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der 
 apostolisch-katholischen Kirche,” 1842, pp. 63-78; Iren. adv. Heres. 1, 
 10; 1, 3,4, 2; Tertull. de veland. virgin. 1; adv. Prax. 2; de preescr. her. 
 18; Novatian de Trin. c. 1, 9, 29; Cyprian’s ‘‘Ep. ad Magnum” and the 
 ‘Libri adv. Jud.” 
 
ORIGEN. 107 
 
 as doctrinal—-we find, on the contrary, that the two other for- 
 mul of Tertullian (see note), and that of Origen, were con- 
 structed with a view not merely to give immediate expression to 
 the faith of the Church, but also to set forth this faith in the 
 form of dogma, as the summary of those fundamental doctrines 
 which are the norm of all doctrine, and shut out that which is 
 heretical. Even as it is, the arrangement was still mainly deter- 
 mined by the baptismal formula of Matt. xxvii., and by the 
 Apostolic Creed. The Regula Fidei also is trinitarian, and in 
 its Christology specifies the chief momenta of the history of 
 Christ. But that the doctrine of the Church was passing 
 through a further development, we see plainly, when we find 
 Tertullian placing alongside of the doctrine of the unity of 
 God the “ceconomia,” by which that unity became a trinity ; 
 or when he not merely mentions the “Filius Dei” in general, 
 and more distinctly affirms the actuality of His incarnation, 
 but also describes more particularly His relation to the Father : 
 —WUnicum quidem Deum credimus, sub hac tamen dispen- 
 satione, quam olxovouiay dicimus, ut unici Dei sit et Filius, 
 sermo ipsius, qui ex ipso processerit, etc.” (adv. Prax. 2) 5— 
 “Unum Deum esse, nec alium preter mundi conditorem, qui 
 universa de nihilo produxerat per Verbum suum primo omnium 
 emissum; id Verbum Filium ejus appellatum, in nomine Dei 
 varie visum Patriarchis—postremo delatum ex Spiritu Patris 
 Dei et virtute in virginem Mariam, carnem factum in utero ejus 
 et ex ea natum egisse Jesum Christum etc.” (de prescr. her. 
 13).1 Origen lays down the “certa linea et manifesta regula,” 
 which had formed the substance of the “ecclesiastica preedi- 
 catio” in relation to the Son, from the days of the Apostles, and 
 by which, therefore, he also aimed to be guided, in the following 
 terms :—“ Species eorum, que per preedicationem apostolicam 
 manifeste traduntur, istee sunt. Primo, quod unus Deus est.— 
 Deinde, quia Jesus Christus, ipse qui venit, ante omnem crea- 
 turam natus ex Patre est.2. Qui cum in omnium conditione 
 
 1 In adv. Prax. is subjoined :—‘ Hance regulam ab initio Evangelii de- 
 cucurrisse, etiam ante priores quosque heereticos, nedum ante Praxeam hes- 
 ternum, etc. ;” and in the ‘de preescr. heer.” (c. 12) the above is described 
 as a rule to which the Church holds in order to guard its truth against the 
 assaults of heretics. 
 
 2 That Origen had a good right to lay this down as the doctrine of the 
 
108 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 Patri ministrasset (per ipsum enim omnia facta sunt), novissi- 
 mis temporibus se ipsum exinaniens homo factus incarnatus 
 est, cum Deus esset, et homo factus mansit quod erat, Deus. 
 Corpus assumsit nostro corpori simile, eo solo differens, quod 
 natum ex virgine et spiritu sancto est. Et quoniam hic Jesus 
 Christus natus et passus est in veritate, et non per phantasiam 
 communem hance mortem sustinint, vere mortuus, vere enim a 
 mortuis resurrexit et assumtus est. Deinde honore ac digni- 
 tate Patri ac Filio sociatum tradiderunt Spiritum sanctum.” 
 That these words really express the collective, objective faith of 
 the Church in his day, is clear,—if further evidence, besides 
 his own testimony, which deserves perfect credit on the ground 
 of his travels, his learning, and his honesty, be required,—from 
 the abstinence, which induced him to leave his own doctrine of 
 the generation of the Son and of the human soul of Christ en- 
 tirely unnoticed, where his object was, not to set forth his own 
 views, but the views held by the Church at large. But let us 
 now pass on to the review of his own doctrine. 
 
 Tertullian had distinguished between God in Himself, who 
 is immoveable (in statu), and therefore without distinctions, and 
 God in movement (in gradu); assigning the Trinity to the 
 latter. But in this way the Son was not merely ethically, but 
 also as to His essence and origin, interwoven with finitude, if 
 not with time; in this way, further, he approximated too closely 
 both to the Valentinian apoPodais (prolationibus) and to the 
 very Theopaschitism which he himself combated under the form 
 of Patripassianism. ‘The final result was the subordination of 
 the Son to a degree which was incompatible with his own gene- 
 ral view of the actual God, who had come near to us in Christ. 
 Now, Origen denies every kind of physical emanation, of suffer- 
 Ing, and of changeableness of God—not merely of the Father, 
 
 Church from the days of the Apostles, and of the second century, even 
 during that portion of it when the development of the doctrine of the Logos 
 endangered the hypostasis and the pre-existence of the Son, is clear not 
 only from what is advanced above, but also from the testimony of Celsus. 
 To the period from the close of the first century until Athenagoras and 
 lrenzeus, the words of Origen apply, after what we have demonstrated 
 above, almost still more directly; for the hypostatic pre-existence of the 
 Son was recognised as distinctly during the age of the Apostolic Fathers 
 and Justin, as in the New Testament writings themselves. 
 
ORIGEN. 109 
 
 but also of the Son ;* though with no intention of thus laying 
 hands on the ofcovouia. Herein we see the Alexandrian. His 
 Trinity does not belong to the sphere of growth, not to that 
 
 At the same time, it is to be remarked, 
 that he does not regard the three hypostases as lifeless magni- 
 tudes, existing alongside of each other, without motion or ac- 
 tivity; but represents the Trinity as an eternal process in God. 
 Clement’s doctrine of the Logos, who is co-eternal with God (in 
 this respect, indeed, scarcely any longer hypostatical), on the 
 one hand; and that of Tertullian and others, of the hypostatical 
 Son, who is generated by a movement out of God Himself, on 
 the other hand; he combines, by asserting in agreement with 
 the latter, the procession of an hypostasis out of God Himself, 
 and, in agreement with Clement, assigning that procession to 
 eternity. And, indeed, consistency required this course to be 
 adopted, if the Son, being divine as to His essence, were 
 acknowledged to be identical with the eternal divine essence, 
 and the divine were at the same time, with Hippolytus, defined 
 to be unchangeable as to its essence. To this antagonism, 
 therefore, to the patripassian conception of God; to the con- 
 nection with Clement; and, finally, to the realistic doctrinal 
 tradition of the Church, which had always tacitly assumed the 
 divine aspect of the Son to be hypostatical, and which, since 
 Tertullian, had been compelled to insist more strongly than 
 
 1 C. Cels. 4, 16. In Rom. vii. 13:—‘‘ Inseparabilis a patre est per 
 naturam et immortalitatem.” C. Cels. 4, 5:—Key 6 Osos ray chav 7H EavTov 
 duvamcs ouynatapalvn t® Inood sis tov tov advOpwmray Blov, nev o ey coxa 
 mpos Tov Osov Advyos, Osdg nak autos dy, Eoxnt as Tpos nds, ox eSsdpoo yiverots, 
 ovds xaTarsines THY SauToD Eopav. C. 14:—Mévav 77 ovale &tpertos cuynuta- 
 Geives. The subject is @sés, with special reference to the Logos (compare 
 c. 16).—6, 62 :—Ei 0’ dveyvaxes (Celsus, who charged Christians, because of 
 their doctrine of the incarnation, with representing God as mutable) ra; 
 Trav mpoPurav rAgEsis—ovd 0 autres ci (Ps. ci. 28; Heb. Vers. cil.)—éya sigs 
 xal ovx rroiouwat (Mal. iii. 6), sopa dy, ors ovdsic nua Dror sivas “eT oBo- 
 Any ev rH Oca, olr’ Epyw ovr’ éxivole. De Princip. 1, 2, 6:—‘ Observandum est, 
 ne quis incurrat in illas absurdas fabulas eorum, qui prolationes quasdam 
 sibi ipsis depingunt, ut divinam naturam in partes vocent, et Deum Patrem, 
 quantum in se est dividant, eum hoc de incorporea natura vel leviter sus- 
 picari non solum extreme impietatis sit, verum etiam ultimee insipientiz.” 
 Compare § 10, 4, 28. 
 
110 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 ever on this point,—we may be said to owe the rise, at the 
 present juncture in the history of the Church, of that most 
 important principle, the eternal generation of the Son. But, in 
 conjunction with more external causes, we must not overlook 
 the inner soul of the entire historical process, which, though, it 
 is true, ever present, here more plainly manifested itself, as the 
 leading impulse. This soul was the conviction which possessed 
 the Christian world, that in Christ it had attained to unity, not 
 with a middle being and secondary God, but with God Himself 
 —an unity, the archetype of which is set before us in the incar- 
 nation of Christ. This conviction,—call it mystical if we will; 
 but whether mystical or not, it contained the kernel of Christi- 
 anity,—never permitted the Church to regard the subordination 
 of the Son as an end in itself, and as an independent dogma (as 
 did Arianism). On the contrary, subordination was merely 
 taught by the Church for a time; and during that time it was 
 an auxiliary doctrine, whose object was to show that the truth 
 in the general and ante-Christian conception of God, to wit, 
 the divine unity, was not violated by the new conception of 
 God set forth in Christianity. It must by no means, however, 
 be regarded as indicative of a disposition to give up the elements 
 which go to constitute the Christian trinitarian conception of 
 God, and to reintroduce ante-Christian conceptions of God, as, 
 for example, Arians, and on the whole Sabellians also, did (com- 
 pare, for example, Tertull. adv. Prax. 13, 31). The work of 
 transforming the ante-Christian conceptions of God, which the 
 Church of the first centuries executed to the utmost of its ability, 
 was greatly expedited by this proposition of Origen. The divine 
 in Christ was removed into the eternal divine sphere, without 
 therefore being represented asa mere power. Light cannot 
 exist without giving light ; it is never without brightness: even 
 so, the Father cannot be conceived without the Son. (Note 18.) 
 There never was a time when the Son was not.' If it was a 
 
 1De princ. 1, 2, 2,4; Anaceph. § 28 (de princ. 4, 28); c. Celsum 8, 
 12; in Joann. T. i. 82; Fragm. ad Hebr. from the Apology of Pamphilus 
 in dela Rue’s ed. iv. 697a, ad Rom. 1, 5. The expression gy dre ovx jy, 
 which at a later period became a watchword, is frequently discussed by 
 Origen in these passages, but most decidedly rejected by him. Compare 
 Note 18; Hom. in Jerem. ix. 4; 6 owrnp quay coPia tort rod Ocod. “Ears 38 
 % c0Qia dravyacua Curds didiov. Ei ovy ¢ caryp adel yevvaras, etc. The 
 
ORIGEN. 111 
 
 good thing for God to have a Son, why should He not have had 
 this good eternally,—why should He have robbed Himself of 
 it? These thoughts, recurring as they do frequently in the 
 works of Origen, show us that he was already on the point of 
 stabilitating the position of the Son in the divine sphere, by 
 representing Him as involved in the eternal idea of God Him- 
 self (compare Anaceph. 4, 28). That Origen found it easier 
 to give utterance to this eternity of the Son than others be- 
 fore him had done, because of his doctrine that creation also 
 should be conceived as eternal, and that God never was with- 
 out dominion and omnipotence, ought not to be denied : but 
 it 1s equally perverse to derive his doctrine of the eternity of 
 the Son from it, or even to identify the two.' Against the 
 co-ordination or identification of the Son and the world, speaks 
 already, that though he represents the world as existing always, 
 he at the same time, and for that very reason, leaves it within 
 the limits of time and subject to change, whereas the Son 
 exists eternally above it, as an hypostasis with the Father. The 
 eternal wisdom, which eternally hypostatizes itself as the Son, 
 contains within itself, it is true, the logical seeds of all things, 
 the world in the form of a conception; but the generation of 
 the Son was not eo ipso the position of the world as an actu- 
 ality. Neither in His inner wisdom and reason, nor in the 
 wisdom which eternally became hypostatical in the Son, had the 
 Father an object of His omnipotence and dominion; but He 
 first became almighty through the Son, who realized the idea of 
 the world.’ It is thus put beyond all doubt, that Origen ex- 
 
 fragment ad Hebr. runs as follows :—‘‘ Lux eterna quid aliud est senti- 
 endum, quam Deus Pater, qui nunquam fuit, quando lux quidem esset, 
 splendor vero ei non adesset ? Neque enim lux sine splendore suo unquam 
 intelligi potest. Quod si verum est, nunquam est, quando Filius non Filius 
 fuit—non erat quando non erat.” 
 
 * As Baur does, in his altogether very free account of Origen’s system 
 (pp. 208 ff.). Origen was certainly acquainted with the doctrine that the 
 world is the son of God, which some seek to fasten on him asa speculative | 
 ornament ; for his books against Celsus show this. But he gave it up as 
 ethnic to Celsus, and despised such ornaments. ‘The truth he perceived it 
 to contain, took the form in his mind, that the will, or the almighty love 
 and the wisdom, of the Logos, are the constant medium through which the 
 world is sustained. 
 
 ? De prince. 1, 2, 10: ‘‘ Per Filium enim omnipotens est Pater.” 
 
EL? FIRST PERIOD SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 alted the Son above the sphere of creatures (in Joh. T. xiii. 25) ; 
 
 and that the eternity of the Son is one thing, and His so-called 
 eternal creation of the successive worlds a Seally different thing. 
 Hermogenes also taught that the world was eternal; but he did 
 not, therefore, teach the eternal generation of the Son ;—on the 
 contrary, by means of the former, he dispensed with the neces- 
 sity of the latter.' Origen proceeds in a different manner, 
 because he attached an independent significance to the eternity 
 of the Son. It was not merely because of the world, that he 
 needed and laid down the doctrine; in other words, his aim in 
 teaching the eternal generation of the Son, was, not simply to 
 be abled to conceive he creation of the world, which fell to the 
 lot of the Son, as eternal. In general, the ground on which 
 Origen claimed a Son, was not identical with that to which he 
 traced back the existence of the world. A world exists because 
 otherwise God would not be an almighty Ruler ; the Son exists 
 because Light, to wit, the Father, cannot be without brightness. 
 Yor this reason, he was easily able to show that his doctrine of 
 the eternal creation of the world did not infringe on the dignity 
 of the Son.? The correct view will therefore be the following : 
 Not for the sake of the doctrine of the eternal creation of the 
 world, did he posit the eternal generation of the Son; but his 
 conception of God was such as to require that both world and 
 Son, although the conception of each stood otherwise equally 
 firm, should be eternally posited, though without. the violation 
 of their logical relation; for, even on the supposition of the 
 world’s being eternal, he still deemed it to remain a creature, 
 whereas he did not intend to represent the Son as an object of 
 omnipotence,—as a creature. God, namely, Origen supposes, 
 must be recognised as mutable, as needing progress from a de- 
 fective to a more perfect condition ; He would be deprived of 
 His self-identity ; if on the one hand the Son were not His 
 image, and on the other hand, if the world were not, through 
 the creative Son, the object of His dominion. When, how- 
 ever, we find Origen regarding it as an advantage for God 
 to have not merely a world, but an eternal image of Himself, 
 
 1 As also Baur, p. 210, is unable to comprehend why Origen should posit 
 an hypostatical Son alongside of an eternal world, it being in his view un- 
 necessary. 
 
 4 De princip. 1, 2, 10 
 
ORIGEN. 113 
 
 which the world cannot te (that image was rather destined 
 to be the archetype of the world, and the world to be its 
 copy), we must attribute it to the afore-mentioned Christian 
 impulse, felt by the Church, to transform the conception of 
 God, which had prevailed prior to the advent of Christ (Note 
 19). Had he been content with the ethnical idea of God, he 
 would naturally have regarded the world as a satisfactory sub- 
 stitute for that image, which he deemed a divine good. But 
 he refuses to hear anything of a natural God-marhood of our 
 race, in any other sense than that of a susceptibility to union 
 with God. In reply to the observation of Celsus,—e? todro 
 A€yels, OTL Tas avOpwros Kata Oetav Tpovotav yeyovws, vids eaTe 
 Ocod, Ti dv od ddXov Siadépns (that is, thou agreest with us 
 heathens),—he remarks (c. Celsum 1, 57),—“ Many indeed have 
 pretended to be sons of God,—as, for example, Judas Gal., 
 Theudas, Dositheus, Simon Magus; but their work perished, 
 their school is extinguished. Christians, on the contrary, who 
 are freed from fear, Paul calls indeed sons of God; but each 
 of them 7roAA@ Kal paxpd Siahépes mavtds tod did Thy dperhv 
 XpnwatiCovtos viod TOD Oeod, daTis @arepel THY Tis Kab dpyi) 
 TOV ToLovTwY TUyydvel.” As he justly held physical participa- 
 tion in the Logos to be something meagre, because immediate, 
 and not truly spiritual or ethical, he was necessitated to assume 
 for the world the existence of an ethical mediator, in order 
 that it might really participate in divine life; and for God 
 Himself, the existence of an eternal perfect image of His ethical 
 perfection, such as the world could not be, and whose place 
 it could not supply. For, even apart from sin, Origen held 
 it to lie in the essence of a rational creature, that it should con- 
 nect itself, by free efforts, with the ethical perfection of God; 
 and as such a conjunction must be preceded by a process in 
 time, it follows that, prior to the termination thereof, even if 
 nothing else hindered, the world would not supply to God that 
 absolute ethical image of Himself, which notwithstanding 
 He ought eternally to possess. It must accordingly be con- 
 ceded, that Origen’s doctrine of the eternal generation of the 
 Son owed its origin, in the last instance, to the transformation 
 of the conception of God brought about by the ethical appear- 
 ance of Christ; although, as in all the great productions of the 
 mind of man, other causes co-operated. These words of Origen 
 VOL. II. H 
 
114 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 gave expression to that which lay in the heart of the Church— 
 to its inmost intent—to that pvotixi mapddocts of the Church, 
 which existed, not as a formulated doctrine, but as an intuition 
 of faith. That he had found the word which the Church had 
 sought, and that he thus met its unconscious yearnings, is evi- 
 dent from the results which followed on its utterance. The 
 Church recognised it as its own; and whereas the other fruits of 
 his labours were subjected to a criticism in many respects unjust, 
 this determination immoveably held its ground. His doctrine 
 of the eternity of creation, with much else, found no recognition ; 
 it served merely the purpose of a ferment : his doctrine of the 
 eternal generation of the Son, on the contrary, attained, through 
 its own weight, the position of a corner stone in the doctrinal 
 edifice of the Church,—it was applied even as a plummet to 
 further doctrinal works, and became a standard for the judg- 
 ment of other parts of Origen’s own system, which did not ap 
 
 pear to harmonize with it. 
 
 Origen, however, was not content simply to regard the 
 generation of the Son as an eternal act, which, being accom- 
 plished, was accomplished once for all. Tertullian, for example, 
 still held it to be a single divine act, and naturally, therefore, 
 treated it as a revelation, which had become an hypostasis, as a 
 apoBory of God; and, consequently, either as an emanation or 
 as dependent on the will of the Father (de prince. 4, 28). Such 
 a view not merely involved the introduction of mutability into 
 God, contrary to Origen’s conviction, but even the Son was not 
 thereby brought into close connection with the divine essence. 
 Ele would owe His existence to a single isolated, and not to an 
 eternal, movement in God, essential to the very conception of 
 the divine essence; for otherwise a single divine act would not 
 have sufficed. Moreover, on the supposition that He originated 
 in a single isolated act, the Son would be shut out too much 
 from the essence and sphere of the Father; would be too inde- 
 pendent, if it were meant to represent Him as God and not as 
 creature; would be too far removed from the Father. Accord- 
 ingly, we find Tertullian inclined to represent the Son as re- 
 turning out of His independence into God at the close of the 
 oixovojla; and then it is difficult to see how His distinction 
 
 rom the Father can be preserved. Origen, on the contrary, in 
 this connection also anxious to exclude both mutability and dead 
 
 ” 
 
ORIGEN 115 
 
 torpor, teaches that in God there is an unchangeably active 
 vitality ; in other words, that the generation of the Son is an 
 eternally completed, and yet an eternally continued, act. On 
 the ground of the same conception of God (which aimed at 
 combining, in a higher form, the rigid Jewish and the mutable 
 heathenish conceptions), he was able to describe the eternal 
 creation of the world also as a continuous act: nor did he take 
 a different view of the work of the Holy Spirit in believers.! 
 The Son was not generated once for all, but is continuously 
 generated by God in the eternal to-day.” 
 
 He thus conceives the persons of the Trinity in most inti- 
 mate union with each other. The Son is the stream, of which 
 the Father is the source (in Joann. T. vi. 29). He employs 
 both this old image and also that of light, which cannot but 
 shine, not with the intention of favouring emanatistic ideas, 
 but in order to set clearly forth the inseparable connection 
 existing between Father and Son (dyépuotds éott Tod viod 6 
 matnp, in Matt. xiii. 19; contra Celsum 4, 14, 16; in Joann. 
 TD. ii, 1, xix. 1: His @eorépa gious is Hvapuévyn 7h AYEVIATH 
 Tov Tatpos ¢éce). Giving the former simile a different turn, 
 he says (in Jerem. hom. 18, 9),—The three sources (of salva- 
 tion) are Father, Son, and Spirit; whoso thirsts not for all three 
 
 * Hom. in Jerem. ix. 4; de prince. 1, 2,2; Anaceph. § 28. In the first- 
 mentioned passage he says:—Muxcpios 6 del yevvdmevos dad rod @sod. Ov 
 yap amas t0u roy Oinatoy yeyevvijobas Urd Tov Osov, &AN cael yevver bar nob’ 
 EXOTHY Tpaeiy ciryodiy, ev H yevue roy dinesoy 6 Osdc. This takes place also 
 in the Redeemer, 67s ody! eyévynoey 6 rarip rév vidv, xl cardrvoey airey 6 
 Tarp dro rng yeveosws aitov, darn oel verve LUTOY—aTavyaoie THs 06en¢ 
 ougs amas yeyevynros nol ovyl (1.€., ov 2s) yevvaeras &AN boov gor! ro Das 
 TOMTILOY TO aTaVYydcomaArtos, ex! ToTOUTOY yevVaTal TO ar aUYy ao we THs O6eNs, 
 tov ©cov. For this reason, also, it is said, xpd dé ravrav Bouvav yevvd us, 
 nob yeyevunne mee, noel cel yevdiras 6 owrdp Ure rov waerpds. In Joann. T. i. 
 32: LaOas, 4 eiyivere weploreras tov viod, bre-ro vids mov el od, bya ohecooy 
 YEYEVINKe Of, AévyeTas Tpos aUTdv UFO TOU Oeov, H al kort rd oreeepoy' odx evs 
 yap tomipe Osov, sya Of nryodwas ors ovdd rpwla, AAN 6 cupewopextelyay TH 
 cryevnty nol dlolo aired Can, iv obrac cixw, xpdvos qutow torly ceir@ onusoor, 
 ty n ysyevuntos 6 ules’ dpxins yevivews airov obras oxy edpioxomsyns, ag ovds 
 TIS NMEpas. 
 
 * The German runs—-‘‘ Der Sohn ‘st nicht gezeugt, sondern wird gezeugt 
 von Gott in dem ewigen Heute.” The distinction between “ist” and 
 “wird” can scarcely here be rendered without paraphrase into English.— 
 Tr. 
 
116 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 cannot find God. The Jews thirst after the Father, but de- 
 spise the Son, and therefore they have not the Father. Heretics 
 desire the Son, but not the Father, who is the lawgiver ; or not 
 the Spirit, who moved the prophets; and so they are without the 
 Son and without the Father. On this ground he attributes all 
 glory and all divine attributes, in common, to the Son and to the 
 Father. That which is in God is in Christ Jesus (in Jerem. 
 hom. viii. 2; mdvra yap, dca Tod Ocod, Tovadra ev avT@ éot ly’ 
 o Xpiotos é€ote codla—bsivapis—sixatocvyn Tod Oeod, etc., in 
 Joann. T. xx. 29, 30). When Celsus asked the Christian of 
 the second century, Why do you honour a second God, in 
 addition to the true one? Origen answered, He is one with 
 God; and God, in generating Him, gave over all things into His 
 hand (c. Cels. 8, 12, 18). Not alongside of, but in God, do_we 
 worship the Son (ib. c. 12). In particular, the Son knows all 
 that the Father knows, for the Son is the truth, and the truth 
 is an indivisible whole ; if but one part failed, the entire know- 
 ledge of the Son would be defective (in Joann. T. i. 27) ;—éav 
 Sé tis Enh, ef wav oTimoTe eyvwopéevov itd To TaTpos—eTi- 
 oTATAL 6 GWTIP HuaV, Kal pavtacia TOD Sokdfew Tov tatépa 
 dropaivntal Twa ywooKopeva iro Tov maTpos ayvoeiabat to 
 rod viod, émictatéov, aitov (because He is the arnOeva, and 
 drnOeva is ONOKANpOS) OvSev aANDES ayvoet (Vv?) iva pn oKaty 
 Nelrrovea % adijOeva ols od ywaoxet. Or let some one point me 
 out an object of knowledge which is not included in, but lies out 
 beyond, the domain of truth. ‘The case is the same relatively 
 to the will. The Son is not merely the executor of the divine 
 will, as though He worked outside of God, but the same will that 
 is in the Father is an almighty and holy will in the Son. 
 
 In short, the Father possesses in the Son an absolute image 
 of Himself. “For no one, I believe, embraces the entire glory 
 of the Father in Himself in copy, save the Son. He not only 
 
 1 In Joh. T. xiii. 36,—dare elvecs ro OeAnuce rod Ocod ev 7H Oernwors Tov 
 vlov draparranroy TOV bcrnaros rov warpos cig TO enners elves OV0 DeAnMaTo, 
 aan tv béanuwo. Hence Christ said, “‘I and the Father are one; ” there- 
 fore, ‘‘He that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father also.” All the 
 deeds of men are imperfect, but not those of the Son; He accomplishes the 
 entire will of the Father, for ré d:Asiv rov Osod yevduevoy ev TH via rossi 
 Tarra, amen Bovrcras TO beAnux Tov Osov’ wudvog 02 6 vidg wav 70 OeAnua moist 
 xuphoces rod warpds’ Oirep ual slnay avrov. C. Cels. 8, 12; in Johann. T. 
 xxxii. 18; compare Note 19. 
 
ORIGEN. 117 
 
 participates in wisdom, truth, reason, but is wisdom, truth, rea- 
 son itself," and all the wise are wise through their participation 
 in Him.” There can therefore be no doubt that Origen meant 
 to attribute deity seriously, and not merely figuratively, to the 
 Son. But as le maintained the eternity of the hypostasis of 
 the Son so decidedly in opposition to the Monarchians,” he must 
 needs consider how to reconcile the true element in the ante- 
 Christian conception of God, to wit, the divine unity, with his 
 Trinitarianism. We have seen already that he endeavoured to _ 
 secure this unity by bringing the Son, through the doctrine of 
 the eternal generation, into closer proximity to the essence of 
 the Father; in other words, he effected an adjustment between 
 the disparate elements of Tertullian’s system, with its temporal 
 and almost mundane personality of the Son, on the one hand, 
 and the eternity of His essence, on the other, by teaching that 
 the generation or the personality of the Son was coeternal with 
 the divine essence, and thus removing it out beyond the sphere 
 of the world. In his view, both eternity and generation consti- 
 tute the Father and the hypostasis (not merely the substance) 
 of the Son, one essence. No less also the afore-mentioned 
 common attributes of intelligence and volition, which can only 
 appertain to an hypostasis. But precisely at the point at which 
 enough seemed to have been done, a new danger arose. If 
 Father and Son have absolutely everything in common, how are 
 they distinguished the one from the other? Monarchianism 
 
 1 AdrocoDice, adroanrydesce, eiréroyos. C. Cels. 8,41; Exh. ad Martyr. 
 A feoiny Ol... Lie 
 
 * He speaks against them, for example, in Joh. T. ii. 2, 6, 18, x. 21; 
 C. Cels. 4, 5, 8, 12; in Matt. xvii. 14 ;—Od vogsordov sivas deo airod rods 
 Tae Pevdn Dpovovyras wepl eitov, Qavracie rov dokalew aitrov (Xpsordy)* dxoios 
 ciotv of ovyxeovres marpos noel vied syvoscey, xl TH UmocTeaEs Eve O1OOUTES sivas 
 TOY Tatepe nol Tov viev TH Exivole Ldn noel TOS dudmeceos OsceLpoDYTES TOY UTO- 
 xelevov. On John ii. 2, see page 101. Still more explicitly in Joh. T. x. 
 21: they say wy dsecQépew re dpidud cov vidv rod warpds, &AW fy od pedvov 
 ovgig hAAL nol Vroneievw tTuyxavovras duQotépovs nara tives trivoles Ola- 
 Qoows ov xara varcorecw, rtysobn: rartpe xal vidv. The proof of their 
 theory, drawn from the circumstance that the resurrection of Christ is now 
 attributed to the Father and then to the Son, does not stand scrutiny ; for 
 both were active, the Son through the Father. For the rest, it is necessary 
 to oppose to them the passages which prove the distinction between the 
 Father and the Son, amongst which he reckons those which speak in a 
 lower way of the latter. 
 
118 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 appears to him as objectionable as Polytheism; and therefore, 
 not merely interest for the unity of God, but even for the Son’s 
 own hypostasis, would seem to necessitate Origen to the adop- 
 tion of determinations, fitted to secure both the one and the 
 other. 
 
 This is the origin of the peculiar form of Subordinatianism 
 which we find in Origen’s system. He endeavoured to secure 
 the unity of the essence of God, by means of the opposed prin- 
 ciples of the equality and the subordination of the Son. The 
 latter was intended to leave a place for an independent hypo- 
 stasis of the Son; the former for His deity. 
 
 Let us now submit this form of Subordinatianism to a more 
 careful examination. Above all, we must here refer to his well- 
 known distinction between Oeds and 6 Oeds (in Joann. il. 2, 3). 
 The Son has, indeed, actual Oed7s; He is Beds, Erepos tv idt0- 
 cta: but He is not originally 60s; the Father alone is the 
 source of His deity... For this reason the Father alone-is adrd- 
 Ocos; He alone is the péyiotos él aot Oeds (c. Cels. 8, 14) 
 The conception which the Father has of Himself is greater than 
 that which the Son has of Himself. But the knowledge of the 
 Son is not thereby made imperfect. No one who, like Origen 
 (in Joh. T. i. 27, see above), knows that truth constitutes an 
 indivisible, organic whole, could style the Son adtocogia, avto- 
 adjOeva, if he did not attribute to Him absolute knowledge of the 
 Father ; and, indeed, otherwise He would not be the Father's per- 
 fect image or mirror. His meaning rather was :—The Father has 
 one self-consciousness, the Son another; the Father is the ulti- 
 mate principle (a4py7), not the Son ; in His self-consciousness, 
 therefore, the Son cannot, like the Father, appear to Himself as 
 the Last, although, nay because, the Son really knows the Father 
 as the final principle. The Father, therefore, is higher (xpeir- 
 tov); He is both the first beginning and the final goal of all 
 things. Although, therefore, the Son is the representative of 
 the Father to those who are still to be saved, is their God, and, 
 so to speak, their Father, as the goal at which they are preli- 
 minarily to arrive, because He alone is the way to the Father ; 
 and although it is accordingly natural enough for these to direct 
 
 1 In Joh.T. ii. 8,°6, 18, xili-'25; c. Cels. 85443; in Joh. T. 17S) aie 
 Father alone is rn bedrnros : in so far, He alone is to be worshipped ; the 
 Son and the Spirit are only to be worshipped in Him. 
 
ORIGEN, 119 
 
 their prayers to the Son, it should be otherwise with the re- 
 deemed. Christ continues to be their Mediator; but they pray 
 to the Father through the Son, not, however, to the Son Him- 
 self.1 Still more: it is the duty of a mediator to bring men to 
 the Father, who is the first and the last. Christ, therefore, does 
 not keep Christians near Himself, because otherwise they would 
 not attain to direct participation in the Highest; for the Father 
 alone, and not the Son, is the Highest. Christians rise above 
 the Son also to the Father, the pwovds or the évas (Note 20). 
 Not that they become higher than the Son, or that the Son is 
 lowered through the completion of His work; but His work 
 itself would remain incomplete if He did not lead them out be- 
 yond Himself to the final source and goal, even to the Father. 
 Naturally, too; for if the Most High God is not also in Christ, 
 if He be merely the leader to the goal, or a means, those who 
 arrive at full age must go out beyond Him, and, what is more, 
 through Him: the only question then is, whether He can, 
 strictly speaking, be the Mediator, the personal mediation of 
 God and man, if the absolute and final aim be not in Him also, 
 as it is inthe Father. Origen himself often enough elsewhere 
 treats Him as an end in Himself (for example, c. Cels. 6, 68) ; 
 thus showing how far he was from considering the subordina- 
 tion of the Son to be an end in itself, and that, on the con- 
 trary, he intended thereby to show, on the one hand, that the 
 Son had an hypostasis of His own, and, on the other hand, that 
 the Most High God is in the last instance only One, to wit, the 
 Father. But the passage in Joh. T. xii. 3 is specially fitted to 
 unfold the real sense in which he used the above expressions. 
 His intention was neither to give a Docetical account of Christ’s 
 
 1 Compare, respecting the knowledge of the Son, in Joh. T. i. 27; 
 Anaceph. § 35. The apparent contradiction between these two passages 
 Origen reconciled as follows :—The Son has true knowledge in its totality ; 
 He knows the Father also truly. But His knowledge of the Most High God 
 is never Being, as in the case of the Father. In so far as He knows that 
 He Himself and His knowledge have their ground in the Father, His know- 
 ledge is less perfect. For His knowledge of the Highest Being is never an 
 immediate self-consciousness, but a mediate, reflective knowledge. Solely 
 in this respect, however, is it less perfect. In every other respect higher 
 knowledge is inconceivable (in Joh. T. xxxii. 17); His exaltation affected 
 merely His humanity: 6 adyos, ¢v doxn wpds tov Osdy beds, ov ewidexeras Te 
 vrepupobyvas (de prince. 1, 2, 10). 
 
120 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 significance, as though all depended on the difference of the 
 point of view; nor an Ebionitical, as though Christ could ever 
 be surpassed : on the contrary, as the soul is dead, nay more, is 
 nothing, without the Logos, even so the Church owes all that it 
 has continually to Christ. It receives from Him, not merely 
 the forgiveness of sin, but He is the any) Swtuxod ropatos ; 
 so that the inner sense freely opens itself, and man attains to 
 the highest of all, to the knowledge of the Father (7s dvavolas 
 AD ropevns, Kal tayvota Svimtapévyns axohovws TH evKxwro 
 ToUT@ voatTe HépovTos avTod, TOV GArecOar Kat TMHdGY ETL TO 
 averepov (that is, probably, to the Father and the knowledge of 
 Him) ést tv ai@vov Swnv). 
 
 But if the divine unity is to be secured by the Father's 
 being the Most High God, and not the Son; and if the former 
 is, notwithstanding, one only, the hypostasis of the Son would 
 seem to be entirely excluded from the sphere of the divine, and 
 to be relegated to the sphere of the creature. How is it con- 
 sistent therewith to represent the unity of God, notwithstanding 
 the hypostasis of the Son, as secured by the fact of the Son 
 having all that the Father hath?’ There appears here to be so 
 glaring a contradiction in the system of Origen, that we can 
 easily understand why, from of old, the most different opinions 
 have been formed of it. In order to make him self-consistent, 
 Maran has taken all pains, as far as possible, to deny the subor- 
 dination; but his labour has been in vain. The orthodox oppo- 
 nents of Origen, on the contrary, and his Arian friends, have 
 left the other aspect of his system out of sight, and have inter- 
 preted everything as much as possible in a subordinatian spirit. 
 By recent writers the question has been put in the following 
 form :—Does Origen derive the eternal generation of the Son 
 from the essence, or from the will, of God? (Note 21.) 
 
 It is true, that mode of securing for the Son at once equality 
 of essence with, and at the same time hypostatical distinction 
 from God, which consists in regarding Him as a “ portio” of 
 the entire Deity, was not open to Origen. He justly persisted 
 in maintaining that the category of part and whole is not ap- 
 plicable to God; that God is an indivisible unity; that we can- 
 not allow of a greater and aless in Him, because wherever He is 
 
 1 Compare the passages quoted page 115 f. 
 
ORIGEN. bat 
 
 at all, He is entirely and indivisibly (de prince. 1, 1, 6:—“ Non 
 ergo aut corpus aliquod aut in corpore esse putandus est Deus, 
 sed intellectualis natura simplex, nihil omnino in se adjunctionis 
 admittens; utine majus aliquid et inferius in se habere creda- 
 tur, sed ut sit ex omni parte povds et ut ita dicam évds et mens 
 ac fons, ex quo initium totius intellectualis naturze vel mentis 
 est.” C. Cels. 1, 23 ;—@Ocds od5€ pépos, ov5é Oro», érret TO OAOV 
 €x pepav éotw. Compare c. 21, 4; 14, 6, 62). Accordingly, 
 one may fairly say, that Origen’s conception of God was such 
 as to render it difficult for him to recognise the presence of the 
 divine essence in the second hypostasis. In his eyes, as in Ter- 
 tullian’s, the Father is originally the entire Deity ; nay more, not 
 merely originally, but permanently: and He cannot constitute 
 a part of Himself, His Son. There appears, therefore, to be 
 no place for the Son save that of a creature. The case, how- 
 ever, does not stand thus. Instead_of resorting to a quanti- 
 tative division (through which the Father, who is originally the 
 entire God, constitutes Himself one portion, another portion the 
 Son, and a third the Spirit; on which supposition the Son, 
 strictly speaking, would not have what the Father has, and 
 either the nature of the Father would be changed, or, if He 
 still continued to be the whole even after the generation of the 
 Son, the hypostasis of the Son would be continually endan- 
 gered), Origen adopts a different view of the mode of exist- 
 ence of the divine as a whole. This is one of the most impor- 
 tant and luminous features of Origen’s system. He saw that 
 finite things are characterized by a certain exclusiveness: he 
 who makes something external his property, by that act with- 
 draws it from others; and so far as another is in possession, I 
 am not in possession. But in the sphere of the spiritual and 
 divine the case is otherwise. The art or science of any man is 
 not lessened by its being in the possession of others ; and as it is 
 with wisdom, so is it also with goodness, with ethical perfection. 
 They are indivisible, it is true, in the sense that no one can truly 
 possess any portion thereof without possessing the principle of the 
 whole; but this does not imply that only one individual can pos- 
 sess them. On the contrary, their nature is, to be principially* 
 
 1 T shall occasionally take the liberty of rendering the German word 
 principiell (adj.) by the fresh-coined English adjective principial, instead of 
 by the phrase ‘‘in principle,” ‘‘ as to principle.” —TR. 
 
| wy"4 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 indivisible and yet communicable; that is, they can be entirely 
 possessed by more than one subject at the same time. Applied 
 to the case before us, this means,—Though he held a division 
 of God to be impossible, he did not consider a duplication— 
 “dus positicnes” (Lev. hom. 13, 14)—or even a_multiplica- 
 tion of the divine perfections, that is, their existence in. several 
 hypostases, to be impossible. (De prine. 1, 1, 9 :—“ Intelligenda 
 est ergo virtus Dei, qua viget, qua omnia visibilia et invisibilia 
 vel continet vel gubernat, etc. Hujus ergo totius virtutis tantas 
 et tam immensse vapor et ut ita dicam vigor ipse in propria sub 
 stantia effectus, quamvis ex ipsa virtute velut voluntas e mente 
 procedat, tamen et ipsa voluntas Dei nihilominus Dei virtus 
 efficitur. Efficitur ergo virtus altera in sud proprietate altera in 
 sud proprietate subsistens,—vapor quidam prime et ingenite 
 virtutis Dei, hoc quidem, quod est, inde trahens, non est autem, 
 quando non fuerit.”) He is thus able to attribute the entire 
 fulness of the deity, and not merely one part thereof, to the 
 Son, and consequently brings out more completely that inner or 
 intensive equality of the Son with the Father, which Tertullian 
 also aimed at when he asserted that the entire sun is in the ray. 
 Tertullian, however, did not succeed like Origen; for in single 
 passages, he described the distinction between the Father and 
 the Son as a distinction between whole and part; in other, and 
 these more standard, passages, however, it is true, he represents 
 the entire divine essence as fixed under a determinate “ forma, 
 species, modulus,” though the genesis and being of these forme 
 are directly interwoven with the world and history. But this 
 new idea of a duplication, or multiplication, of the fulness of the 
 deity in several hypostases, brought also new difficulties. There 
 appears to be a danger of putting the world on a level with the 
 Son, inasmuch as the world also is susceptible of spiritual, ethi- 
 cal perfections, which may be termed divine. And as Origen’s 
 wish was to assign to the Son a distinctive position, which the 
 world cannot share with Him, all depends on finding a_principle 
 of-limitation. Such a limitation is set forth in his remarks “ in 
 Joh. T. xxxii. 18.” It was not fitting that the Father should 
 lack the good of having a perfect image of Himself; butit was 
 only possible for one, not for many, fully to reflect the perfect 
 glory of the Father in an image, and He who was_this full re- 
 flection was the Son. The Son, moreover, is the medium through 
 
ORIGEN. Ie: 
 
 which the divine essence 1s communicated to all who participate 
 therein. The indivisible unity and unchangeableness of God do: 
 not admit of the multiplicity and mutability of the world, being 
 directly grounded in Him, that is, in the Father." Equally im- 
 possible is it to conceive the world as existing independently, 
 or as an atomistic multiplicity without unity. For this reason, 
 the Son is the middle between God andthe world ;—in Him is, 
 (1.) the idea of the world, or its eternal ideal unity; (2.) the 
 principle of the actual hic —not, indeed, of an Pharite mul- 
 tiplicity of objects, but still en ang tives multiplication of 
 freedom in many subjects, completely resembling each other. 
 
 Therewith is given the possibility of an infinitely manifold 
 world; freedom hypostatized in countless Egos is its real po- 
 tence. (3.) And lastly, when the individual beings, through their 
 freedom, diverge infinitely from each other, the Word, or the 
 Logos, continues to be their common, connecting principle. He 
 is the substance which runs through the whole world, its heart 
 or reason, present alike in every man and in the entire world. 
 The Son is the truth, the life, the resurrection of the creatures , 
 He is the One, who lies at the basis of their manifoldness, how- 
 ever numerous may be His names, and various the modes in 
 which He is regarded.? And however far freedom may go 
 astray, however wide a field of action may be allowed it, as 
 rational it is indissolubly connected with the Logos, who con- 
 stantly manifests and maintains Himself, as the overarching 
 (iibergreifend), omnipresent, and all-dominating power, in the 
 development of the world. 
 
 What we have adduced, shows that he considered the Logos 
 to be the only perfect divine image, the archetype of the world, 
 and the real ground of its being, of its continuance, and of its 
 participation in the divine, in rationality, and in goodness. The 
 Holy Spirit is, at the utmost, the only other being whom Origen 
 would put on the same level as the Son: this latter doctrine, 
 however, was but little developed by him. Relatively to the 
 
 1 Ritter 1. c. 294 :—‘‘ He could not hesitate to maintain that God must 
 not be conceived as the ground of a multiplicity of mutable things; for the 
 ground of a multiplicity is itself a multiplicity of grounds, and the ground 
 of a change is grounded after a mutable manner.” 
 
 2 In Joann. i. 22; hom. in Jerem. 8, 2; de princ. 4, 28 (compare the 
 painstaking work of Thomasius on Origen, p. 130). 
 
124 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 world and revelation, Origen is unable to find expressions strong 
 enough to glorify and exalt the Son, the First-born of creation, 
 above all creatures, on the one hand; and profoundly to subor- 
 dinate them to Him, on the other. And so certainly as he not 
 merely recognised man’s need of being united with the Most 
 High God, but believed also that Christ alone met that need; 
 even so certainly must the Son be the vehicle and communicator 
 of veritably divine nature (de prince. 1, 2, 4, 6 ;—the likeness 
 borne by the Son contains “nature et substantiz Patris et Fili 
 unitatem.” In Levit. hom. 13, 4; in Num. 12, 1). 
 
 When Origen has in view the Most High God and His 
 unity, he seems to lay down contradictory principles, and com- 
 pletely to forget what he had previously taught; but it only 
 needs a deeper consideration of his conception of God, to free 
 him from a reproach so unworthy of a systematical theologian, 
 and to show that, and why, it was no contradiction for him, on 
 the one hand, to attribute an equal divine essence to the Son; 
 and, on the other hand, to subordinate Him so decidedly to the 
 Father, as even to allow himself the use of an expression such 
 as—The Son, as to His ove/a, is other than the Father.’ 
 
 He regards the Father, as the évas or ovds in absolute indi- 
 visibility and wholeness, infinitely exalted above all that is mul- 
 tifold and divided. Properly speaking, He is not truth and 
 wisdom, spirit and reason, but infinitely higher than all these, 
 out beyond being and_substance (ovc/a).? In short, He is the 
 utterly unutterable, incomprehensible One, or the Absolute. 
 All truth, goodness, power, is derived from Him; but He is not 
 adequately described by all these names. He is the Father of 
 wisdom and of all good; but will, reason, wisdom, cannot, 
 strictly speaking, be attributed to Him without an admixture of 
 _sensuous impurity. 
 
 The Father alone can be this one, supra-substantial being. 
 Tf, however, we wish catachrestically to apply to Him the ex- 
 
 1 De orat. c. 15. The Son is érepos rod werpos xar ovolav and xad 
 txdoreow. Thismay signify (compare in Joh. T.i. 23, p. 26),—In abiding 
 objective reality, not merely momentary being or subjective seeming. (The 
 more precise definition of this objective being different from the Father, is 
 his id/a odoies weorypey, here termed dxdoreos. But even so, the Son con- 
 tinues subordinated.) 
 
 2 ©. Cels. 7, 38,—éxréxesve vou xal ovcias; de princ. 1, 1, 6; see above; 
 in Joh. ii. 18, xiii. 21, 23. 
 
ORIGEN. 125: 
 
 pression ovcia, then we must say that the essence of the Father 
 is other than that of the Son. For the supra-essential as such 
 cannot communicate itself, because it would thus renounce its 
 abstract unity, simplicity. The Son is not supra-substantial, 
 supra-essential (tiberseyend, tiberwesentlich), but is through and 
 through évépyea: the Father is the primary principle, in Him 
 
 self purely ideal, shut up in Himself. Though the Son is the 
 Father’s perfect image, and has coeternally attracted to Himself 
 all divine perfections.(c. Cels. 8, 14), that in which these per- 
 fections inhere, which is their vehicle, can never become His: 
 the Father alone remains the primal causality. When the Son 
 makes Himself the object of reflection, He cannot regard Him- 
 self as the original, as the primal apy7); otherwise He would be 
 the Father, and not the Father’s image, to which the Father 
 must hold the relation of archetype. The Son may, indeed, be 
 the archetype of the world, and thus imitate, in the lower 
 sphere, the relation subsisting between the Father and Himself ; 
 but He can never Himself be the absolute archetype. Hence 
 Origen was compelled to say, that the Son, in this respect, 
 could not be compared with the Father; that the primal cause 
 could only be one. This is the explanation of the comparison 
 frequently made by him,—The Father is exalted above the Son, 
 as the Son is above the world. Specially significant in this 
 connection is the remark adduced above,—The self-consciousness 
 of the Father is higher than that of the Son. For it implies, 
 that the Father by no means beholds Himself in the Son, but 
 that the self-consciousness of each is distinct. In the Son, the 
 Father does not recognise Himself, but a derived being; and 
 His knowledge of Himself is perfect independently of the Son. 
 The duplication of which we spoke above is not a complete self- 
 objectification of God ;—not only because the Son is merely the 
 reflex, the image, in which, though the Father represents Him- 
 self, His knowledge of Himself is not supposed to depend on, 
 or to be mediated by, the Son; but 7 is merely the fulness of 
 the deity, the divine do€a that is duplicated. Light cannot do 
 otherwise than shine, the living God cannot do otherwise than 
 reveal.._Himself_in_an_ objective, adequate image; but still the 
 Father abides ever in the ground, and the ground does not come 
 forth in His revelation. The Father does, however, completely 
 embody His fulness and glory in the image of Himself. 
 
126 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 This will enable us to understand why, and how far, Origen 
 subordinated the Son. He had no intention whatever of deny- 
 ing to Him the fulness of veritable divine powers, that is, divine 
 essence ;! but he did not consider Him to be the primary ground. 
 In the Son, therefore, is indeed the entire fulness of God—He 
 proceeded forth from the divine essence : but He is God ina 
 derived sense; the Father alone is the eternal ground of His 
 being, and therefore also of the duplication of the divine power, 
 goodness and wisdom, which exists in Him. From this we see 
 clearly, that Origen approximated pretty nearly to principles 
 laid down by the teachers of the Church many centuries after 
 his time. For when they represented the Father,—as substan- 
 tially they always did,—as the Monas, and not merely as a mem- 
 ber of the Trinity, but as the whole, as the pita maons OeornTO0s, 
 it is identical with Origen’s designation of the Father, as the sole 
 any) waons Oeorntos, and the Son as the wnyn Ocornros for the 
 world2 In fact, all that Origen meant in teaching the subor- 
 dination of the Son, was to preserve strictly to God the original 
 causal relation referred to above. So far from the Son’s co- 
 essentiality with God being thus excluded, such an equality of 
 essence is required, when the causal relation appears in its abso- 
 lute perfection as in the case of the Word, the perfect image of 
 God. And, on the other hand, this equality of essence, if we 
 limit it, with Origen, to the possession by the image of the 
 fulness of divine perfections, does not exclude the subordination 
 involved in the image being, not the original, but that which is 
 grounded. On the contrary, this image, as being the most per- 
 fect possible effect, directs attention very surely to the most 
 perfect possible cause, and in so far leads us out beyond itself. 
 
 1 De prince. 1, 2, 4:—He is Son, not by adoption, but by nature. Com- 
 pare the fragment from Pamphilus in de la Rue’s Ed. vol. iv. 99. He can- 
 not change to a less perfect condition, nor be exalted to a more perfect, ib. 
 § 10, and in Joh. T. xxxii. 17; in Lev. hom. 13, 4: there is one will and 
 one substance in the Father and the Son, but there are two “‘ positiones,” two 
 distinct persons.—In the fragment of Pamphil. ad Hebr. (de la Rue, iv. 
 697b) it is said, after Sapientia vii. 25 :—‘* Vapor est (filius) virtutis Dei 
 et aporrhcea glorie Omnipotentis purissima.” As the * vapor de substantia 
 aliqua corporea procedit, sic etiam ipse ut quidam vapor exoritur de virtute 
 ipsius Dei. Sic et Sapientia ex eo procedens ex ipsa Dei substantia gene- 
 ratur.” 
 
 2 See note 1, page 117. 
 
ORIGEN. 127 
 
 But notwithstanding His subordination, the Son belongs as truly 
 to the divine sphere, or the divine being, as brightness does to 
 light. 
 
 We may regard it, therefore, as proved, that in the system 
 of Origen these two aspects do not contradict each other, that 
 neither the one nor the other can be put aside, because both are 
 equally:rooted in his conception of God, and both are necessary 
 to its full expression. He knows God as the living God, re- 
 vealed in Christ, and communicating His divine, above all, His 
 spiritual nature, His wisdom and ethical perfection. But, on 
 the other hand, he refuses to allow that the divine ground passes 
 entirely over into that which is grounded; for such an admis- 
 sion would have led him back to Patripassianism, which he had 
 rejected, or to a kind of Pantheism. For this reason, he distin- 
 cuishes between the communicable and the incommunicable in 
 God, terming both, however, divine essence. The incommunica- 
 ble in God, which he imagines to be the highest portion of the 
 divine nature, is His primary, superessential, self-occluded being; 
 the communicable is the fulness of His perfections, especially 
 His spiritual essence. For it must be remembered, that, for 
 example, moral unity with God is not, in his view, a mere ex- 
 ternal relation of resemblance, but implies a_real participation 
 in the ethical essence of God: so also as respects wisdom. 
 Hence, when he attributes to the Son likeness, nay more, identity 
 (ravrorns), of will with the Father, it means far more than is 
 commonly supposed. The incommunicable the Father cannot 
 communicate even to the Son; but, more closely examined, this 
 reduces itself entirely to the momentum of grounding (Begriin- 
 den), to the fact, that the Father is the primal apy7), the Abso- 
 lute. Inthe communicable, the world participates solely through 
 the Son, in whom all of the divine that can be communicated 
 has assumed an hypostatic form. We can understand, there- 
 fore, how he could say, at one time, that the Son, as the divine 
 image, the unity of the nature or substance of the Father and 
 of the Son, was set forth (de prince. 1, 2, 6); or (as in Joann. 
 T. x. 21) could allow that Father and Son are one év ovaig, but 
 not TO UroKxeévp or TH Urootdce (compare Selecta in Ps. 
 
 1 The Son is the expression of the entire will of the Father Himself, 
 embodied in a person. Anac. § 28; in Joh. T. xiii. 36; c. Cels. 8, 12; de 
 pring. 1, 2, 6: and the fragment from Pamphilus in de la Rue, iv. 99. 
 
128 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 exxxv. and note p. 125); and yet, at another time, say, The Son 
 is not one with the Father as to substance. ‘The former, when 
 his attention was directed to the essence of the Son, which is 
 derived from the Father, as a stream from its source, as a light 
 from light; which is an outflow of the divine essence. ‘The 
 latter, when his eye was fixed on the essence of the Father, and 
 that which distinguishes Him from the Son. If, for example, 
 he regarded the momentum of grounding, as that which distin- 
 guishes the Father from the Son, or saw in the dpy7 the essence of 
 the Father (as he perhaps does once, catachrestically; see de orat. 
 15, and note 2 p. 123), he could scarcely avoid maintaining, that, 
 in this respect, the Son cannot in any sense be put on a level with 
 the Father. In the same manner, also, he says regarding the 
 world, that it is of a different essence from the Son, in so far as 
 it is in no respect the ground of His existence." We can now 
 also more definitely answer the question, whether Origen con- 
 ceived the Son to have been posited by the will of the Father, 
 as the world was posited by the will of the Son; or whether the 
 relation between Father and Son was in this respect a more 
 essential one. 
 
 It was impossible for Origen, when he spoke with precision, 
 to say, that the Son was posited by the simple will of the Father; 
 for he did not allow that either the will, or any other aspect of 
 the simple essence of God, could undertake anything in parti- 
 cular by itself. It is true, the ground of the will, as of all the 
 rest, is the supra-substantial Father; but the will itself be- 
 longs to the évépyeva of the divine essence, to the fulness of its 
 d0£a, which is hypostatized in the Son. For this reason, he 
 could not properly say either of the wisdom or of the will, the 
 power, the holiness of God,—The Son was posited by the 
 Father’s will or wisdom; he must rather say,—The Son is out of 
 the will of the Father, or He is the expressed will andwisdom 
 
 1 We need not resort even to this expedient relatively to the passage 
 adduced by Baur, in Joh. T. xx. 16. For his protestation here against the 
 generation from the essence of the Father does not refer to the eternal gene- 
 ration of the Son, as a glance at the passage will show, but to the incarna- 
 tion; and his opponents were suchas Beron. Baur might more easily have 
 made use of in Joh. T. ii. 18, dséornxs rH odolge 6 raryp Tov viov, because, 
 whereas the Father is light itself, the Son is the light in the darkness. But 
 this passage also is cleared up by the remarks made above. Compare 
 note 1, page 1384. 
 
ORIGEN. 129 
 
 of the Father. His doctrine of the eternity of the Son would 
 thus be explained and established from a new point of view. 
 And in point of fact this was his opinion. He styles the Son 
 the Soul of God the Father,’ that is, the principle of actuality, 
 the €vépyeva. Nay more, he frequently describes the Son in His 
 relation to the Father, who is, it is true, the first principle, 
 though by Himself He dwells in pure ideality, as the “ voluntas 
 ex Patre (mente) procedens.” In Origen’s view, there existed in 
 God no actual will prior to the Son; the Son Himself was first 
 this will. If, then, the Son is not posited by the will of the 
 Father, but is Himself the existence of that entire divine fulness 
 Kat évépyevav, which is in the Father in the form of principle, 
 a fresh proof is given that the mode in which Origen conceives 
 Him connected with the will of the Father, instead of robbing 
 Him of His divine essence, as many fancy, ensures it to Him 
 afresh. Nor is the world, like the Son, the divine will; but is 
 posited by the will of the Father, that is, by the Son. The 
 world was the object of the divine omnipotence and predestina- 
 tion, but not the Son (ad Rom. i. 5); for, on the contrary, as 
 we have seen, the Father is first almighty through the Son. 
 It is also further clear, that Origen could not at all shrink 
 from the use of emanatistic expressions, although he endea- 
 voured to rid them of their sensuous, temporal elements. The 
 Son is not, like the world, a work and creature of the paternal 
 will, but the ethical and intellectual emanation of God, the re- 
 flection of the Father’s glory, which can no more be lacking 
 than brightness to light. He is, therefore, eternally equal with 
 the Father, and necessarily involved in His essence, though He, 
 the hypostatical image, is not the originating principle of His 
 own existence, but the Father who logically precedes all evépyeca 
 (Note 22). From this, it is evident that Origen already ap- 
 proximated to the doctrine of an immanent relation between 
 Father and Son. The Son is the form and image of God, eter- 
 nally assuming an independent existence (uopd1) Ocov; see note 
 1 p.127); the hypostatical realization of His fulness (8d£a) ; so 
 far is He from being related to the Father, as something merely 
 posited, that He eternally draws into Himself (in Joh. T. ii. 2- 
 c. Cels. 8, 14), and exhibits, the deity of the Father. But the 
 
 1 De prine. 2, 8, 4, 5. 
 VOD ILI. I 
 
130 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 existence of the Son presupposes, of course, not merely His 
 having been once for all generated and grounded by the Father, 
 but also that He continues to be united with the Father, and to 
 behold the depths of the divine being (without which He would 
 not be God’s image). Separated from the Father, the Son 
 could no longer be God (in Joh. T. ii. 2). Again, the Father 
 is not merely the inner substance, the material or content which 
 acquires shape in the Son, but remains something for and in 
 Himself; for, though the generation of the image is a duplica- 
 tion of God’s mode of existence, it is not a mere transformation 
 of the archetype into the image. Such a transformation would 
 be annihilation. The Father is, in his view, not simply divine 
 iAn, but a self-contemplative subject, who passes over into the 
 Son with the fulness of His essence, but not as the primary 
 ground (8400s). Origen did not regard the Father as identical 
 with the void Neo-Platonic *Ov, the mere arespov ;' but as the 
 most positive of all beings, as the highest, unmixed unity, with- 
 out any distinction, neither blind nor motionless, but knowing 
 and contemplating Himself (in Joh. xxxii. 18), eternally gene- 
 rating the Son, who is the causative principle of the many, and 
 the connective principle of the manifold. 
 
 Leaving aside for the time, the question, whether this con- 
 ception of God, which involves the apparently contradictory 
 determinations laid down by Origen, be a sufficient one or 
 not, let us consider the relation of the Son to the world. He 
 stands to the world in a more direct relation than the Father. 
 As we have seen, He is the truth and the soul of the world ; 
 in Him is all true reality, for only the rational can be said to 
 have true reality.2, Through Him, therefore, the true spiritual 
 substance of the universe, the world, this infinite Cov, is an 
 organism ; He is the 7yewovexov, the reason in every soul. This 
 substantial relation of the Son to the world, embraces not merely 
 men, but also angels—nay, the whole universe, which can only 
 have true reality so far as it also participates in spirituality, in 
 
 1 Whether in other respects he was quite free from the abstract "Ov, we 
 shall see further on. 
 
 2 We must understand it in Origen’s sense, when he assigns to the Son 
 the kingdom of the rational. As rational, the world belongs to Him ; to 
 the Father, so far as it points to a first cause. Compare Huet, * Ori- 
 peniana” |. c. 185. 
 
ORIGEN. Wo 
 
 the Logos. At first sight, this wears the look of Pantheism. 
 But he attributes to the world a relatively independent existence, 
 as is clear from the one circumstance, of his representing free 
 dom as the principle which posits the multiplicity of objects. 
 The Son, therefore, does not continue alone possessed of being, 
 but brings into existence an infinite number of subjects, of Egos, 
 all alike free relatively to each other, and essentially connected, in 
 common, with Him. No less again is the Son related in various 
 ways to the different beings ;—which cannot be said regarding 
 the Father. Nor is it a mere result of our mode of apprehen- 
 sion, that one and the same Logos wears a different appear- 
 ance to each different class, or each separate subject; but He 
 in Himself is related to the many, He has objectively different 
 modes of existence for different beings, without therefore ceas- 
 ing to be the one Logos.’ With all rational creatures, whatever 
 paths they may take in the exercise of their freedom, He is 
 present: He is wedded indissolubly to men as to angels, to 
 Christ as to Paul. This he deduces even from the omnipresence 
 of the Logos ;” but He is different in different beings. ‘To this 
 may perhaps be referred the thought, which repeatedly occurs :— 
 What Paul says regarding himself, that he had become all things 
 to all men, has held true in a much more divine manner of 
 the Logos in all ages, for He became an angel to angels, and 
 amantomen. Origen, however, by no means rests satisfied 
 with this natural participation in the Logos. Even the last- 
 mentioned thought implicitly attributes to the Logos a new 
 form of existence, besides the immanent one in subjects. This 
 is His objective appearance alongside of His creatures, particu- 
 larly men. In His goodness and loving-kindness, He shows 
 Himself to every one, according to his ability to apprehend Him. 
 These differences of form also are not mere subjective seeming ; 
 but He appears objectively in the forms which are necessary for 
 
 1 De prince. i. 1, 68; in Joh. T. i. 22; c. Cels. 4, 16 ;—Eilai yep de Qopos 
 olovsl tov Adrvyou opQal, xabac éxaotw Tay sig ExsoTHeny adrvyomsvav Dalveras 
 C Adyos, advacroyoy rH Eset TOD siceryomevov, em’ CAltyoy TpoxdwToVTOS 4 ETI 
 xasiov. Christ is objectively all dya@aduol up to the Holiest of all; He 
 unites in Himself all the stages, all the momenta of truth: and to each one 
 He gives to see that of Himself, for which he has an eye. 
 
 2 Ana. § 29. Although He is omnipresent, He is not ‘‘ similiter in uni- 
 
 versis. Plenius enim et clarius et ut ita dicam apertius in Archangelis 
 est, quam in aliis sanctis viris, ete.” 
 
132 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 His rational creatures; and though these forms are inadequate 
 to, or even partially conceal, Him, and in so far may be de- 
 scribed as a mere seeming, they nevertheless serve the purpose 
 of bringing Him objectively near to men. This is the self- 
 abet antl to which the Logos consented, concealing so much 
 of His divine brightness as men were unable to bear, and ob- 
 jectively revealing and setting before men so much as sufficed 
 to enable them to rise by its means to the vision of His higher 
 form, of his deity (zponyoupévn pices, wopdn). 
 
 For our purpose, however, Origen’s doctrine of the conde- 
 scension of the Logos to men, who occupy perhaps the lowest 
 position in the ranks of the’classes of rational beings,’ is of the 
 greatest importance. As is well known, Origen considered the 
 human race to consist of souls, which, during their pre-existence, 
 fell away from the Logos, through sin: the consequence of this 
 apostasy was, that the lower powers of the yruy7 broke loose from 
 their unity with the zrvedua (that is, the Logos), and made them- 
 selves falsely independent of the Logos, in whom alone it was 
 possible for thera to occupy their true position—the position, to 
 wit, of integrant, but still subordinate, momenta of the true 
 soeeatites ah are fired as it were by the mvedua. In_con- 
 sequence of this their first fall, men walk in bodies, forgetful 
 of their origin, forgetful of at Logos. But the rete could 
 not forget them; and in order to remind them of Himself, the 
 only true good, in order to enable them to approach Ean, He 
 assumed the a of man, in the state to which sin had reduced 
 it—He took upon Himself a mortal body—He lived a truly 
 human life, though without sin—He delivered men from the 
 curse of sin and death, partly by doctrine and example, but 
 mainly by His death—and He perfectly re-established the union 
 of souls with Himself, and, through Himself, with the Father 
 (in Joh. T. 1. 23-29). 
 
 At this point, however, we must halt and ask :—How far 
 
 ‘ These classes he represents, however, not as different races, but as 
 stages within one and the same race of rational beings. Here also bea is led 
 by the thought, that reason is one, like truth. Hence he believed that the 
 more perfect men become angels, even as, under the impulse of love, angels 
 may become men. The essential feature of all is, not the body, but the 
 spirit ; and the spirit is of the same nature, essentially alike in all, though 
 they may occupy different stages. 
 
ORIGEN. 133 
 
 did the Logos participate in the incarnation? Did He really 
 enter into fellowship with mutable, suffering men? Both the 
 idea of the incarnation and His work, which len not merely 
 in teaching, but in divine-human desde and sufferings, required 
 that He should do so. His union with Christ must have been 
 different from His union with men generally ; the history of the 
 man Christ, must in a certain sense have been His own histor Vy. 
 Otherwise, the incarnation would have been really nothing 
 new ; naeeanth as the Logos was previously everywhere present. 
 The new feature would bei mere subjective seeming, if the Logos 
 had not entered into a relation to this man, which had objective 
 significance for Himself. But if the history of this man were in 
 any sense the history of the Logos, the danger to which Patri- 
 passianism succumbed again reappears. In that case, it might 
 appear advisable to adopt the expedient of saying,—The esos 
 remained, even in Christ, unchangeably what He had been 
 Petal and nitkgance lle Then, however, His appearance 
 was a mere theophany, not an incarnation; the new element 
 was at the utmost an act of manifestation, oi a being and living 
 of the Logos, in new unity with artes 
 
 Origen felt the difficulties attending both courses. In the 
 Anaceph. (§ 30 f. p.191), he lays down the principle,—that two 
 errors are to be avoided : firstly, that of keeping this divine ele- 
 ment entirely or partially outside of Christ; secondly, the oppo- 
 site error, of conceiving the deity so shut in by the humanity, as 
 to be itself restricted and made finite through the limits of the 
 body, deprived of its universality, rent asunder from the Father, 
 and subjected to change and suffering.! In the solution of this 
 problem, he was aided to some extent by the spiritual concep- 
 tion he had formed of the divine. As the divine cannot be 
 divided, nor enclosed in space, but remains everywhere entire 
 and sitasttical with itself, no danger can be involved in saying 
 even that the entire ‘bts of the Son was in Christ. nese 
 
 1 L. c.: Nonita sentiendum est, quod omnis divinitatis ejus majestas 
 intra brevissimi corporis claustra conclusa est, ita ut omne Verbum Dei et 
 saplentia ejus ac substantialis veritas ac vita vel a Patre divulsa sit, vel 
 intra corporis ejus coercita et conscripta brevitatem, nec usquam preeterea 
 putetur operata. The two dangers to be avoided are rather—ut neque 
 aliquid divinitatis in Christo defuisse credatur, et nulla penitus a paterna 
 substantia, quee ubique est, facta esse putetur divisio. 
 
134 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 who suppose that a true incarnation would have been an un- 
 worthy coarctation of the Son of God within the limits of the 
 body, and who therefore maintain that merely a part of the deity 
 of the Son dwelt in Christ, whilst the other part was elsewhere 
 or everywhere, do not understand the nature of an incorporeal 
 and invisible substance ; they fear that if it entered fully into 
 the humanity of Christ, it would entirely lose its infinitude, and 
 yet, by their division, they make it a corporeal and finite thing. 
 
 But should it even be premised, that no danger to the deity of 
 Christ is involved in the supposition of its dwelling undividedly 
 in His humanity, nothing more is thereby done than to show the 
 general possibility of a punctual (punktuell) presence of the Logos, 
 the possibility of His dwelling entirely and fully in the humanity 
 of Christ, without either an Ebionitical attenuation of the divine, 
 or a Docetical dissipation of the human. That such a presence, 
 however, was not an incarnation, was not in reality more than a 
 theophany, Origen must have felt ; and all the more deeply, as 
 he himself, when combating Patripassianism, could not often 
 enough repeat,—The Son remained what He was, in that He 
 became what He was not.! The incarnate Logos was like the 
 sun, whose rays continue pure whatever may be the nature of 
 the place on which they shine (c. Cels. 6, 73). The wisdom of 
 God, which is His Only-begotten Son, is unchangeable in all 
 things. In Him is the entire sum of essential good, which, as 
 such, can undergo no change or alteration (de prine. 1, 2, 10). 
 Even during His self-abasement, He lost no part of His evOaL- 
 novia; He continued blessed, even whilst He was labouring and 
 suffering for our salvation. Unchangeable in essence (ovcia), 
 God descended to men in providence and activity (mpovota Kat 
 otxovowia) on their behalf. 
 
 It could not, therefore, escape him, that if the simple divine 
 nature continued entirely by and in itself, and so also the human, 
 no such a thing as an.incarnation took place. Hence, we find 
 a number of passages, in which, starting with the idea of the 
 Logos, whom on other grounds he represented as more closely 
 related to the world, its multiplicity and finitude, he evinces an 
 inclination to bring the Son into the intimate union with the 
 finite, required by the Christian consciousness. Accordingly, he 
 
 1 For other passages bearing on the unchangeableness of the Logos even 
 during the incarnation, see in Joh. T. xxxiii. 17, and note 1, page 108. 
 
ORIGEN. 135 
 
 says (in Joh. T. ii. 18), the Son is different from the Father; for 
 the latter is the light which is unapproachable by, and exalted 
 above all conflict with, darkness. ‘The Son, on the contrary, is 
 the light which shines in the darkness, which battles with, suffers 
 persecution from, but is not overcome by, the darkness.’ Else- 
 where he says,— He left father and mother, that is, God the 
 Father and the heavenly Jerusalem, His kingdom, and descended 
 to us.”” From this it would seem that His incarnation involved 
 a renunciation of His glory. So also, when Origen endeavours 
 to exhibit the entire depth of His participation in our sufferings, 
 he is frequently more concerned to assert that He notwithstanding 
 retained His deity, that is, His love, unchanged, than that His 
 blessedness and glory remained untouched. At such times, he 
 does not shrink from the employment of those paradoxes and 
 apparent contradictions, than which nothing is dearer to faith, 
 because they alone seem to furnish an explanation of that actual 
 contradiction which gnaws at the heart of a world created for 
 God, and yet lying in destruction. “Christ,” says he, “is both 
 Priest and Sacrifice. He committed no sin, but He became sin 
 for us through the flesh, in order that He might carry our sins 
 and nail them to the cross. He who is immortal, dies ; He who 
 is incapable of suffering, suffers; He who is invisible, reveals 
 
 1 Also de prince. 1. 2, 8, may be referred to this connection: ‘‘ Ut autem 
 plenius intelligatur, quomodo Salvator figura est substantize vel subsis- 
 tentiz Dei, utamur etiam exemplo.” After remarking,—this comparison 
 may be incomplete, but it is merely intended to show us how the Son of 
 God, who was in the form of God, intended by means of His very self-abase- 
 ment to reveal to us the fulness of deity,—he goes on to say,—Verbi causa, 
 si facta esset aliqua statua talis, quee magnitudine sui universum orbem 
 terre teneret, et pro sui immensitate considerari a nullo posset: fieret 
 autem alia statua, membrorum habitu ac vultus lineamentis, specie ac materia 
 per omnia similis absque magnitudinis immensitate, pro eo, ut qui illam 
 immensam considerare atque intueri non possent, hanc videntes illam se 
 vidisse confiterentur pro eo—quod omnia—prorsus indiscreta servaret: tali 
 quadam similitudine exinaniens se filius Dei, de equalitate patris et viam 
 nobis cognitionis ejus ostendens figura expressa substantiz ejus efficitur.— 
 Filius Dei brevissimee insertus humani corporis forme ex operum virtutisque 
 similitudine patris in se immensam ac invisibilem magnitudinem desig- 
 nabat. 
 
 2 In Jerem. hom. 10, 7: "Ide pcos cov ev eopQn Ocod vrcpyovra, dvra sv 
 TOlS ovpavols, Oe aUTOD TOY Oixoy UrEpoupaviov—ioE HUTOY OixoY dyTa TOY Osov. 
 Karaasixes roy Tlarépa, nol rqy penrépa, thy ava Ispovonarnec, noel epyerate sis 
 roy wepiyssov romov. Tlapédwxsy ceevrov ryy Puxny sic ras xsipas Tay ey dowy. 
 
136 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 Himself. By coming to become sin for us, He intensified and 
 awakened evil. For through His love He made Himself visible 
 in the flesh and displeasing to men, so that they killed Him” 
 (in Levy. Hom. 3,1). In Hom. Jerem. 8, 8 we read,—“ Let 
 our discourse be bold, and let us say,—The divine which entered 
 into the world, humbled (emptied) itself, in order that the world 
 night be filled by its emptiness. But though it had emptied 
 itself, its emptiness was still wisdom. For divine folly is wiser 
 than men. Had I been the first to make use of this word, 
 ‘divine folly,’ how would my accusers have assailed me! But 
 Paul himself terms apostolic wisdom divine folly. For, as com- 
 pared with the supra-celestial, supra-mundane wisdom, that 
 which became man (70 évideujoav) was mere divine folly, but 
 yet wiser than men,—wiser not merely than the foolish, but also 
 than the wise. It did not need the wisdom of God to put to 
 nought the foolishness of the world; the weakness and the folly 
 of God were sufficient. And so my Redeemer and Lord took 
 upon Himself all contradictions (€vavria), in order, by means of 
 contradictions (for example, the humiliation of the Son of God, 
 His xévwpa), to solve contradictions; in order that we might be 
 made strong through the weakness of Jesus, wise through His 
 divine folly, and, prepared in such a way, might rise to the wisdom 
 and power of God Himself, that is, to Jesus Christ.” What he 
 means here is not, that merely one part or one power of the Logos 
 became man, but the entire person of the Son. Nor again does 
 he mean that, strictly speaking, the entire fulness of the glory 
 of the divine Son became man, and was merely not recognised 
 by the folly of the world ;—that, consequently, His self-abase- 
 ment was mere subjective seeming, which must then be recog- 
 nised as such by faith. No; the incarnate One Himself was 
 humbled, was emptied of His glory. One thing unquestionably 
 was not given up, to wit, love, which retains its majesty even in 
 the midst of humiliation, and that most certainly, when the humi- 
 ation, though voluntary, is still not a mere show. ‘To this con- 
 nection belongs also the remarkable passage from the Hom. in 
 Jerem. 1. 8, where he says,—“ We cannot, indeed, say of Wisdom 
 in itself, that it was ignorant, and acquired knowledge by learn- 
 ing; but it is certainly true of Wisdom as it was in the flesh ; 
 for Christ must needs learn to stammer and speak like a child 
 with children (men).” Compare also de prince. 2, 6, 1. 
 
ORIGEN. 137 
 
 These passages show that Origen was not so completely 
 absorbed in his antagonism to Patripassianism, as to mistake the 
 essentially Christian elements, which it concealed under coarser 
 forms. The more pressing, therefere, became the question, how 
 both interests were to be reconciled :—On the one hand, there 
 was the unchangeableness of the Son of God, which, taken by 
 itself, reduces the incarnation to a mere theophany; on the 
 other hand, there was the not merely apparent, but living and 
 genuine, union of the divine with the human nature, which 
 threatened to mix up foreign elements with the conception of 
 God, especially when we take into consideration that the union 
 must embrace also the flesh of Christ? This now is the point at 
 which a view can be gained of Origen’s doctrine of the human 
 soul of Christ in its full significance. 
 ~~ With the body, the divine nature could not directly unite 
 itself, without subjecting itself, in a manner unworthy of God, 
 to mutability and suffering. In order, therefore, not to be 
 compelled to transfer sufferings to God, and yet, at the same 
 time, to be able to maintain the possibility of a true union with 
 humanity, we must note that the Logos assumed the soul of 
 Christ_directly; the body, however, indirectly, through the 
 medium of the soul. But, having secured in the soul of Christ 
 a means of carrying the incarnation through, even to the flesh, 
 the importance he attached to that soul enabled him to assume 
 the existence of a far more intimate relation between the Son 
 and the humanity than Hippolytus, for example, had ventured 
 to concede, and felt himself, consequently, able satisfactorily 
 to meet the true aspect of the yearnings of Patripassianism. 
 The perfect soul of Christ was as thoroughly able to participate 
 in all the pains and woes of humanity, as to be completely 
 united with the Son of God ;—thus also did it give Him a share 
 in. the sufferings and works endured and performed by it, in 
 His power. 
 
 Never before Origen had the human soul of Christ been 
 seen to have so profound and integrating a bearing on the 
 intellection of the incarnation of God. But, though we may 
 grant that his system—laying, as it did, so great stress on free- 
 dom of choice, and concentrating therein, to a certain extent, 
 the essence of human nature—was, in the highest degree, such 
 as to necessitate the postulaticn, in particular, of the union of 
 
1338 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 the Logos with a human soul, as unconditionally requisite to 
 the full truth of the incarnation; whereas all the Fathers who 
 preceded him evidently attached chief importance to the body, 
 appearing frequently to see in it the real essence of humanity ; 
 it cannot be denied, that the very ground which powerfully im- 
 pelled him to the development of the doctrine of a true human 
 soul, was, in another aspect, the source of great difficulties. For, 
 if all souls must be deemed originally equal, on the ground that 
 it would have been an act of partiality in God not to make the 
 worth of each dependent on the use to which it put its freedom, 
 it would appear that the incarnation must, in the first instance, 
 have been a purely tentative thing, and that the union could not, 
 from the beginning, have related to the inmost centre of the 
 human soul,—to wit, its freedom. It was not permissible for the 
 assumptive divine activity to penetrate at once so completely 
 to the inmost centre of human nature as to leave it no longer 
 free. In that case, however, an opening would have been left 
 for sin and apostasy, and the tendency to incarnation which had 
 been initiated would have been arrested. Nay more, if freedom 
 of choice permanently belongs to the essence of human nature, 
 it would appear impossible for the God-man ever to constitute 
 an unity, and necessary that He should ever continue a double 
 personality. And, even supposing this unity were finally to be 
 in some way brought to pass, the incarnation must apparently 
 be attributed rather to human merit than to divine grace; for 
 the God-man was at the first a man like others, and the union 
 with the deity was the reward of His virtue, as the Ebionites 
 teach. These difficulties his clear eye discerned quite well. . 
 Let us now see how he endeavoured to overcome them. 
 
 In order to set them aside, he goes back to his doctrine of 
 the pre-existence of souls. Christ’s soul also must be of like 
 nature with ours:! however exalted Christ may have been 
 above other men, however distinguished and unique was His 
 appearance (so that even His body must have participated in 
 the glory of the soul, although usually concealed), He could 
 not have enjoyed this exceptional position from the very begin- 
 ning, but must_have attained it as the reward of His virtue. 
 
 1 De prince. 2, 8, 4. In general, as in Tertullian, so also in Origen, 
 
 we find the expression: Christ had two natures, He was a cuvbstoyv Tpmey Loe 
 (c. Cels. 2, 9, 24, 31). He first employed the term, @:cvdpoaros. 
 
ORIGEN. 133) 
 
 Now, had He earned this distinction on earth, the birth of 
 Christ would have been in no respect peculiar, it would not 
 have been an incarnation: His soud would have entered into the 
 present world as one still accessible to sin; nay more, if it were 
 David’s seed, it must have been stained with sin. Like all 
 souls, however, it pre-existed from the beginning of the world. 
 By its decision for the good, and by its virtue, it was fitted for 
 anflinchinely carrying out all the will and all the saving revela- 
 cons of the Word and Wisdom. The Logos dwelt in an unique 
 nanner in this soul. At the commencement of creation, it is 
 true, He was united with all souls; but this one alone clung to 
 Him so closely, faithfully, and unchangeably, that it became 
 ne spirit with Him. (De princ. 2, 6, 3: Cum pro liberi 
 arbitrii facultate varietas unumquemque ac diversitas habuisset 
 animorum, ut alius ardentiore, alius tenuiore, et exiliore erga 
 autorem suum amore teneretur, illa anima—(Jesu) ab initio 
 creatures et deinceps inseparabiliter ei et indissociabiliter in- 
 heerens, utpote sapientize et verbo Dei et veritati et luci vers, 
 et tota totum recipiens, atque in ejus lucem splendoremque ipsa 
 cedens, facta est cum ipso principaliter unus spiritus.) Hence 
 the Son of God did not dwell in this soul merely as He 
 dwelt in the souls of Peter and Paul; for neither of them was 
 free from sin. But the soul which was in Jesus had. chosen 
 the good ere it knew the evil. Connected with the Word of 
 God by an unspotted alliance, it alone was incapable of sin, 
 and precisely because of its capability of entirely and perfectly 
 receiving the Son of God. (De prince. 2, 6, 5: “Verum quo- 
 niam boni malique eligendi facultas omnibus presto est, hac 
 anima, que Christi est, ita elegit diligere justitiam, ut pro im- 
 mensitate dilectionis inconvertibiliter ei atque inseparabiliter 
 inhereret, ita ut propositi firmitas et affectus immensitas et 
 dilectionis inextinguibilis calor omnem sensum conversionis 
 atque immutationis abscinderet et quod in arbitrio erat positum 
 longi usus affectu jam versum sit in naturam.”) Wisdom, 
 truth, and life, it had made completely part of itself; it was the 
 box of the precious ointment, the Apostles have the smell; in it 
 was the entire fire of the Logos, and by His glow and heat it was 
 pervaded in love as iron heated in the furnace; the Apostles 
 
 ? Ad. Rom. 1, 5. Even so, if sin had been the substance of our nature, 
 Christ also would have been sinful, de prince. 4, 37. 
 
140 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 had the warmth which streamed forth from it.’ Hence also, 
 both the reason and mode of its entrance into this world were, 
 of necessity, completely different from other men. ‘The reason 
 was not punishment or chastisement for sins, committed during 
 its pre-temporal existence; nor the practice of, and establish- 
 ment in, good; but love to men. Having continued unchange- 
 ably in the Logos, even after men had fallen, and being united 
 with Him by the tenderest love, this soul willingly became the 
 organ by means of which He appeared on earth, and wrought 
 out human redemption. The self-abasement of which the 
 Apostle speaks (Phil. ii.) is not seldom referred by Origen, as 
 it would seem, to this soul of Christ, which gave up its glory, 
 although not its connection with the Logos,’ and entered into 
 the fates and sufferings of the finite, into the condition which 1s 
 the consequence of sin, but without being touched by the least 
 breath of sin; for, even prior to its entrance into the world, it 
 had become incapable of sin, through its perfect love to the 
 Logos (Note 23). In dignity, it is true, it is inferior to the 
 Only-begotten One, for it was created; but it, the most blessed 
 and most exalted of all souls, was so distinguished, that it stood 
 in the midst between God and the rest of mankind. Hence, 
 also, the mission of accomplishing the work of redemption 
 mainly devolved on it (ad. Rom. T. iii. 8). But, precisely for 
 this reason, its mode of entrance into this world could not be 
 
 1 De prince. 2, 6, 6. The image of glowing iron, so frequently repeated 
 at a later period, is here carried out by Origen in the following way :— 
 ‘Ferri metallum capax est frigoris et caloris. Si ergo massa aliqua ferri 
 semper in igne sit posita, omnibus suis poris omnibusque venis ignem reci- 
 piens—si neque ignis ab ea cesset aliquando, neque ipsa ab igne separetur, 
 num quidnam dicemus hance, que natura quidem ferri massa est, in igne 
 positam et indesinenter ardentem posse frigus aliquando recipere? Quin- 
 imo magis—eam totam ignem effectam dicimus, quoniam nec aliud in ea 
 nisi ignis cernitur: sed et si qui(s) contingere atque attrectare tentaverit, 
 non ferri sed ignis vim sentiet. Hoc ergo modo etiam illa anima, que, 
 quasi ferrum in igne, sic semper in verbo,—sapientia,—Deo posita est, 
 omne quod agit, quod sentit, quod intelligit, Deus est, et ideo nec conver- 
 tibilis aut mutabilis dici potest, quee inconvertibilitatem ex Verbi Dei 
 unitate indesinenter ignita possedit. Ad omnes denique sanctos calor aliquis 
 Verbi Dei putandus est pervenisse; in hac autem anima ipse ignis divinus 
 substantialiter requievisse credendus est, ex quo ad caeteros calor aliquis 
 venerit.” 
 
 2 Anaceph. §. 32. cli. 3i. 
 
ORIGEN. 14] 
 
 the usual one. It was in God and in the Pleroma; thence it 
 went forth at the bidding of the Father, and took from Mar Vy 
 the Virgin a true human Theres ; and because, in the strict sense, 
 those spirits alone can be designated men who have a mortal 
 body (for those who have no eth ought rather to be termed 
 angels), we may fairly say, that Greed then first became man, 
 although it be true that His soul, with which the Logos Hee 
 been ever united, had the same nature as all other souls —-con- 
 sequently, the same nature as the souls of men. 
 
 According to Origen, therefore, the incarnation was not ac- 
 complished in one act, but had a history, progressed from one 
 stage to another, and fell into three main acts ;—-and this is a 
 point of deep significance. The first two acts were played out 
 ere time commenced; the third commenced with the earthly 
 life of Christ. The first was the original and essential union 
 into which the Logos entered with this soul, and which sub- 
 sisted from the very commencement of its existence. But as 
 this first union with the soul of Jesus was simply that which 
 subsisted between the Logos and all souls, at the moment of 
 their creation (otherwise, Origen’s view of he divine righteous- 
 ness would be violated, de princ. 2, 6, 3), it was not by itself 
 any mark of ghana Sizictly speaking, it constituted 
 merely the presupposition of the incarnation, and declared 
 that hnman nature was susceptible thereto. To the actual 
 realization of the incarnation, it was necessary that the union 
 established, in the first instance, by the Logos, should be 
 affirmed by the soul of Christ. It actually did decide for 
 the Logos, and that with such sincerity and love, that it was 
 completely taken up into the Logos, or even, as many } passages 
 teach, into His essence; in other words, the incarnation was 
 perfectly accomplished as far as affects the soul. For, whereas 
 previously the bond was dissoluble, by this second act an in- 
 destructible union was founded between the soul and the entire 
 Logos. Origen did not intend thereby to shut out freedom ; 
 but to represent the freedom as one which can no longer 
 choose the evil, as one that is bound and perfected by love 
 (compare ad. Rom. L. v. 10). Equally far also is this perfect 
 love, which includes freedom of choice as a momentum of itself, 
 and no longer leaves it to occupy an isolated position (Note 24), 
 from shutting out the incarnation from further progress: on the 
 
142 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 contrary, this perfect love in the soul of Christ is itself the living 
 principle and motive of the assumption of a human body. The 
 idea of incarnation, so far as it is the work of condescending 
 love, arrived with this third act at its extreme limit; for, in 
 order_to be able to suffer and die on men’s behalf, the Logos 
 became flesh, by means of the soul of Jesus: even then, how- 
 ever, further development was not rendered impossible, but the 
 movement now began to take a reverse direction. At first, the 
 Logos learned to stammer in the man Jesus; the child Jesus 
 had a truly human development, and participated thoroughly in 
 human weakness, so far as it was not marked by sin. But this 
 self-abasement of the Logos in the soul which had descended 
 to earth, was intended to promote the glorification of humanity, 
 primarily in this same man. Even on earth, the glory of His 
 higher nature was communicated to the body (c. Cels. 3, 41), 
 as the transfiguration proves: usually, however, it was not per- 
 mitted to appear, but remained concealed, or was revealed as 
 men needed it (c. Cels. 6, 77; 4,16; Tract. in Matth. xxxv. 
 100; hom. in Gen. viii. 8; in Joh. T. i. 34; ad Rom. L. 1. 4). 
 In His miracles was displayed the divine power of His entire 
 person ; His death is not to be conceived as mere passive suffer- 
 ing, but also as the work of His free will: His resurrection also 
 was effected, not by the Father alone, but also by Himself Gn 
 Joh. T. x. 21). Finally, the entire Person of Christ, even His 
 body, ascended up to heaven and was glorified. In reward for 
 its condescension and love, His soul was then exalted, and ad- 
 mitted to a participation in the divine omniscience ; which was 
 not the case on earth (Tract. in Matth. xxx. 55). Its glory 
 communicated itself also to the body of Christ. When He 
 ascended into heaven, He took with Him His earthly body; 
 and the heavenly powers were filled with amazement when they 
 beheld humanity coming in Him into their midst. Elias and 
 Enoch did not, strictly speaking, ascend to heaven; Christ, 
 however, as He was the first-born from the dead, was also the 
 first to raise flesh into heaven (Fragm. in Ps. xv.,. And now 
 there is no longer any difference between His humanity and 
 His deity, the former having passed over into, and been entirely 
 blended with, the latter.’ 
 
 1 ¢, Cels. 3,41 :—To bvyréy aired chun, nai chy dvdpwmivny ev aire Luxny 
 ri woos éxsivoy od wedvov xowavie, BAAR xal Evooet nal advanpaoel Ta miryloTa 
 
ORIGEN. 143 
 
 These expressions are so strong, that at an early period 
 Origen was suspected of holding the humanity to be a transient 
 phenomena of the Logos." It is inaccurate, indeed, to charge 
 him with teaching that Christ laid aside His humanity: so far 
 from that, he rather conceived it to have been constituted, as it 
 were, a momentum of the Logos Himself, and regarded its 
 passage into deity as its perfection. All human weakness was 
 removed ; divine power and glory took its place. 
 
 At the same time, we here come upon a defect which, on closer 
 examination, we find running through Origen’s entire system, 
 and which leaves unsettled difficulties at all the chief points. 
 
 It is true he believed human nature to be destined for the 
 divine, and incapable of attaining its truth, save in union there- 
 with. But this divine is, strictly speaking, something which | 
 transcends human nature; and human nature must be exalted 
 above itself, that is, must change its nature, in order to fulfil 
 its destiny. Its ideal lies immediately in God, not in God’s 
 idea of man, of which unity with Him is an essential consti- 
 tuent. In order, therefore, to reach its goal, humanity must 
 cease to be humanity, must pass into another substance, to wit, 
 the divine, and be swallowed up by it. Accordingly, his theory 
 exposed him to the danger of representing the perfection of 
 humanity as the termination of its existence. The reverse aspect 
 thereof is, that when he attributes independence to the man, he 
 is compelled to exclude the action of God; as we find from his 
 not regarding the decision for the Logos formed by the soul of 
 Christ as the decision of the Logos Himself. At. this point, 
 therefore, the view he takes of Christ is really Ebionitical, not- 
 withstanding its relating to His pre-temporal existence. It_is 
 an important defect of Origen’s Christology, that when it aims 
 to assert the full truth of the humanity of Christ, it does not 
 entirely avoid Ebionism; and, on the other hand, when it sets 
 forth the deity of Christ in its victorious, all-conquering might, 
 
 Doceev TporesAnPevact, nal rns Exsivov Oeoryntos xexoivovynnora eis Osov merase. 
 Anniver. “Eely 08 rig apooxdrry xal wepl rod cdmatos aiTov ravd guar 
 Aeyovrwy, eriotycaTH TOls UO TAY EAAHVaY Asyomevols Tepl THs TO lOlw Aoye 
 aTrolov YAns, ToLerntas &uUPionouéyns Orolas 6 Onloupyos Bovarstas HLTH TeEple 
 Tibevert, wal TOoAAaKIS TAS Lesy TpoTepas aworiOsmeEvns, xpeitroves O€ xal d1eDd- 
 povs cvanrauBavovens. Tract. in Matth. xxxiv. 70. 
 
 " Compare Huet’s ‘‘ Origeniana,” in de La Rue’s Ed. iv. 152. 
 
144 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 it approximates too closely to Docetism, by representing the hu- 
 manity as absorbed in the deity. An exactly similar fault cha- 
 racterizes also his doctrine of the Trinity. The common root of 
 both defects is his peculiar conception of God. We have found 
 / that Origen’s doctrine of the Son follows necessarily and clearly 
 from his conception of God, according to which, the Son, who, 
 at one and the same time, is eternally generated, and is being 
 eternally generated (der ewig gezeugte und gezeugtwerdende), 
 possesses all that is communicable of the divine essence (that is, 
 volition and knowledge) ; and further, that he denies to the Son 
 solely that which appears to him absolutely incommunicable, 
 indivisible, and inconceivable in different hypostases, save on the 
 condition of denying the unity of the ultimate, ungenerated, 
 and generating ground. The consequence thereof was, that, 
 contrary to his soteriological principles, the Son was shut out 
 from the inmost sphere of the divine, and reduced to the rank 
 of something secondary, almost to the rank of a creature. That 
 which the Son did not possess, is represented as the inmost, the 
 highest part of God; this the highest part of God, therefore, is 
 -incommunicable, exclusive. lftows we come again upon the false 
 “jdea of God, which teaches that something shy sical, the physical 
 
 category of the Absolute, and not love nae Kosanees not His 
 spiritual attributes, are the highest, the inmost, the proper being 
 of God. Origen had not yet succeeded in Eviinae ireaiane 
 loose from the’ ‘Ov of Hellenic philosophy ; and the direct ae 
 thereof was the impossibility of the Son’s being one with the 
 Most High God. His primary and predominant tendency to set 
 the essence of the Son, as far as possible, on an equality with 
 that of the Father, fails because of this rigid “Ov, this dark 
 remnant of the old heathenish view of the world, which trans- 
 fers the inmost constituent of the conception of God to the 
 sphere of the natural, where all things are characterized by ex- 
 clusiveness. Heine would Helse, assumed an entirely dif- 
 ferent position, had he regarded love and the spiritual attributes 
 as constituting the inmost essence of God; for therein the Son 
 might participate. Aseity, on the contrary, instead of being 
 described as the inmost essence of God, in which it was impos- 
 sible for the Son to participate, would then have denoted simply 
 that which was distinctive of the Father, whilst the entire divine 
 nature would have been recognised as belonging in common to 
 
 — * 
 
ORIGEN. 145 
 
 the F'ather and to the Son. Origen, however, puts the matter 
 as follows :—The Son could only participate in the inmost and 
 highest part of the divine nature, so far as He entirely lost 
 Himself in the One, Indivisible God, and ceased to be any 
 longer Son; but so far as there is a difference between Him and 
 the Father, the latter sets forth the entire and inmost divine 
 essence, whereas the former remains excluded from this sphere. 
 
 We remark, therefore, in Origen a phenomenon which fre- 
 quently reappeared at a later period, especially in the Mystics,— 
 namely, because the divine, in its dissociation from all multipli- 
 city, singularity, or determination, was conceived to be the 
 Highest, whereas man in general, and the Christian in parti- 
 cular, demands that the very divine itself, and not merely a 
 derivative divine, be accessible to him; he was compelled te 
 speak of a going out beyond the image of God, to wit, the Son, 
 into the depths of the divine nature, into the essence of the 
 Father,—the effect of which naturally was, to threaten both the 
 mediatorship of the Logos, and the historical significance of 
 Christ. It is false, indeed, to regard it in Origen’s sense as a 
 mere subjective seeming ;! he had, at all events, no intention of 
 modalistically dissolving the hypostasis of the Logos and His his- 
 tory in the divine Monas; but still he by no means completely 
 extricated himself from this error, for, according to his teaching, 
 the inmost essence of the Most High God scarcely penetrates to 
 the essence of the Son. In the Son, we know the Father solely 
 according to His doa, and to the divine substance thereunto 
 appertaining, not according to His inmost essence. The world 
 represents to him, as in another form to Pseudo-Dionysius Areo- 
 pagita, a divine hierarchy, all the members of which are rational 
 in themselves, but in different degrees; and the higher stage, 
 by stretching out its hand in aid of the lower, leads it out be- 
 yond itself to a higher. Those who cannot lay hold on Christ’s 
 external appearance are retained in connection with the Logos, 
 by means of rational beings in whom He dwells more perfectly. 
 The second class lays hold on the outward appearance of Christ, 
 but does not understand the highest and alone true element in 
 Him, into which His own humanity passed, after enjoying for 
 a moment an individual existence. The third class is led on 
 through the humanity of Christ to His pure deity, and then 
 
 * As notwithstanding Baur does, 1. c. p. 219. 
 VOL. II. K 
 
146 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 knows Him no longer after the flesh. But even to be united 
 with the Logos is not the highest attainment; for, inasmuch as 
 He Himself is not in Himself the Highest, He directs us beyond 
 Himself to the Most High God, the Father, to whom we are to 
 enter into a relation of contemplation (@éa), as intimate as that 
 of the Logos. Origen forgets not, indeed, to remark that per- 
 fect Christians owe their attainment of this highest stage to the 
 Logos, that is, not merely to the eternal, but to the incarnate, 
 Logos; and that there is no way to this height, save the way 
 through the God-man and the Logos. In particular did he 
 regard the death of Christ as the eternally operative means of 
 reconciliation, which continues to be a necessary preliminary to 
 the attainment of the highest stage,—a circumstance which 
 leads us to form a favourable estimate of the depth of his Chris- 
 tian consciousness. His endeavours to exalt the sacrifice of 
 Christ to an absolutely universal significance, to strip it of the 
 limits of time and space, and to represent it as having been pre- 
 sented in heaven, were not dictated by a wish to dissipate His 
 historical death, but rather, on the contrary, by a desire to set 
 *t forth as the central event of history and of the universe,.as 
 the point in which heaven and earth meet, and God andthe 
 world are reconciled. For this reason, though the sacrifice of 
 Christ was presented on earth, he places it in heaven, and 
 teaches that even the pious who lived prior to His advent, were 
 counted among the reconciled, for its sake ;—indeed, he repre- 
 sents the entire world as participating in its blessing. But if in 
 Christ by Himself and in the Logos, we do not merely not 
 possess the entire God (for even the Church does not suppose 
 that), but not even the Most High God, then is merely a porch 
 of heaven, and not heaven itself, come down to us, and thus we 
 see clearly that the revelation of the highest in Christ can only 
 be viewed as a modalistic shining into Him. At this same 
 point, we are not less instructively reminded also of the essential 
 connection between Modalism and Subordinatianism. For when 
 Modalism endeavours to conceive the revelation in Christ as a 
 permanent, fixed thing, and not as a mere theophany, it falls into 
 Subordinatianism ; and so, on the other hand, all Subordinatian- 
 ism unavoidably represents the truly divine as merely shining 
 ‘nto the Son. Neither of them, consequently, possesses in Christ 
 the absolute religion, and both are impelled to aspire beyond this 
 
RETROSPECT. 147 
 
 revelation to a fanciedly higher and deeper mystery. This mys- 
 tery is, it is true, empty enough; but its influence is pernicious, 
 because it weakens the conviction that in Christ we possess the 
 highest ; it reduces His revelation from the rank of an absolute 
 to that of a relative one; and it may turn away the eye from the 
 mysterious treasures which are contained in Christ Himself, and 
 which demand to be revealed to our consciousness (Note 25.) 
 
 The statement just given may show us that the attempt 
 made by Origen, with a clear insight into the nature of his 
 task, to free the momenta of truth, scattered through the sys- 
 tems of his predecessors, from the one-sidedness of heresy, and 
 to unite them in one great whole, necessarily failed because o 
 the imperfection of his conception of God. Origen thereforc 
 forms a knot in the history of doctrine. Many threads meet in 
 him ; his far-reaching mind saw that they must be united in 
 one web; and, standing as it were at the cradle of the develop- 
 ment of Christian doctrine, he, the first Christian dogmatician, 
 lays down the problems which should busy the mind of the 
 Church for a long period, but was himself unable to find the 
 solution. The threads of thought, which, like so many lines, 
 had converged towards a centre in his great mind, separate 
 again still more widely from each other in quitting him; the 
 various aspects which he aimed at uniting, did not find a form 
 capable of embracing them all; and the more closely he brought 
 them together, the more clearly was their permanent disharmony 
 revealed. His attempt at effecting an union became, on the 
 contrary, a watchword for the unchaining of antagonisms and 
 the initiation of new struggles. This point now demands our 
 attention. 
 
 Let us first cast a glance at the development of doctrine 
 during this remarkable period, and at the three principal figures 
 who acted the part of representatives of the Church. From the 
 end of the second century and onwards, the teachers of the 
 Church arrived at the common conviction, that, in order to 
 secure doctrinally the hypostasis of the Logos, they must.advance 
 beyond the literal signification of the term, inasmuch as God in 
 general is also Reason (Adyos). Following Tertullian’s example, 
 the term “Son” was therefore adopted for a watchword. Hippo- 
 lytus now says, the Son is out of the Logos; the Logos is the 
 ‘spiritual substance of God or of the Father Himself: so far is 
 
148 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 He from being Himself the Son, that logically the Logos. pre- 
 cedes the Son,—a thought which is further carried out by Ori- 
 gen. A great part of Tom. i. in Joh., where he represents the 
 apy of John (in which was the Xdyos, that is, the povoyevijs or 
 Son) as the divine co¢éa, that is, as the vods or Adyos of God 
 Himself, out of which the Son then proceeds, 1s occupied with 
 the development of this same thought. By means of the word 
 Son, a clearer distinction was now drawn between the essence 
 and the personality of the second hypostasis ; but, at the same 
 time, Sonship was understood at first to denote, not the essence, 
 but merely the personality (for example, by Tertullian and 
 Hippolytus); whereot the natural consequence was, that whereas, 
 or because, the essence of the second hypostasis is eternal, its 
 personality was conceived to be non-eternal. The temporal 
 diremption, namely, was intended to aid in setting plainly forth 
 and establishing the distinction between the eternal substance 
 still undistinguished from the Father, and the personality. The 
 less mature and ready mind of Tertullian (for example) was 
 unable to discover any other means of mastering the distinction, 
 than by fixing it in time. Without doubt, too, the watchword now 
 chosen, “Son,” brought with it the temptation to conceive the 
 Sonship as having begun in time. At all events, one can easily 
 understand that men like Clemens Alexandrinus and Jrenzus 
 (the latter of whom had already begun to treat the doctrine of 
 the Logos critically), who in the main rested satisfied with the 
 word Logos, must have found it easier, yea, even more neces~ 
 sary, to affirm the eternity of the divine wisdom and reason 
 (that is, the eternity of the Son, in their sense), than those who 
 started with the word Son. The consequent commixture of the 
 Son with finitude, which on the one hand brought Tertullian 
 nearer to Patripassianism, and on the other hand involved him 
 ‘n contradiction with himself, seeing that he, notwithstanding, 
 deemed the Son to be derived from the eternal essence of God, 
 Hippolytus endeavoured to set aside by drawing a clear distinc- 
 tion between God, as the alone infinite, supra-infinite One, and 
 the world. His determinism, however, reduced the world, nay, 
 even the humanity of Christ, to selflessness ; and he also sub- 
 jects the hypostatic existence of the Son to the almighty will of 
 God. His gaze was already directed away from the later mani- 
 fested personality of the Son, back to His eternal essence: and 
 
RETROSPECT. 149 
 
 he tried to establish a connection between the two, by means of 
 the idea of the predestination of the personality of the Son. 
 But the Son is plainly thus reduced to still greater dependence 
 on the divine will; and that eternal essence is represented as 
 belonging to the Father alone, and as communicated to the 
 hypostatic Son, according to His will and counsel. Origen 
 first rose decidedly above this point of view. He saw the con- 
 tradiction between the supposition of an hypostasis, whose exist- 
 ence commences at a later time, on the one hand, and the 
 attribution to it of an eternal divine essence, and the denial that 
 it is a creature, on the other hand. He therefore combined the 
 eternity of the divine essence with the fact of the genesis of 
 the personality, by means of the doctrine of the eternal, that: is, 
 the eternally processive generation of the Son by the Father. 
 Earlier writers had spoken much of the will of the Father in a 
 way that equalized the Son and creatures, contrary to their in- 
 tention; and Origen, in whose system the will plays so impor- 
 tant a part, did not entirely escape this fault : at the same time, 
 he described the Son as the hypostatized will of the Father, which 
 proceeded forth from His wisdom, spirit, vods =Adyos. In har- 
 mony with the doctrine of the eternal generation, Origen thus 
 brought the tendencies of Tertullian and Hippolytus to a certain 
 sort of conclusion; but at the same time set himself into strong 
 realistic antagonism to the men of the second century, who had 
 viewed the Son more idealistically as the divine reason and wis- 
 dom, or, at the utmost, as the divine thought which is at the 
 same time world-creative. It is evident, however, that the 
 definition of the Son as Will, can, in itself, no more secure the 
 distinction of His hypostasis from the Father, than the definition 
 of Him as the Logos. For as the Father is, and must continue 
 to be, Logos, Reason, so also is He Will,—a circumstance which 
 might escape the attention of Origen, with his peculiar concep- 
 tion of God, but could not be concealed from the Church, 
 holding, as it did, the Christian idea of God. The only means 
 of averting that danger, was the idea of a diremption of the 
 divine essence. We have seen, also, that Origen repeatedly 
 approximated to this idea, but was unable fully to carry it out, 
 because his conception of God was essentially opposed to such a 
 diremption, and was interwoven with the Hellenic Absolute or 
 "Ov. On the other hand, it deserves to be noted with approval, 
 
150 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 that he tried to assign to the will also a place in the humanity 
 of Christ, although his efforts ended somewhat ebionitically.. 
 Still more does it deserve mention, that, primarily for the sake 
 of securing the truth of the ethical development of the humanity 
 of Christ, he represented the incarnation, not, after the universal 
 custom in his day, as a fact once for all accomplished and con- 
 cluded, but as a continuous, nay more, progressive one. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 SABELLIANISM. 
 
 SABELLIANISM—taking the word in its doctrinal, not in its 
 historical signification—is capable of assuming many forms, the 
 attainment of an acquaintance with which is our present object. 
 The essential feature, it is true, of all the forms of Sabellianism, 
 is the Movapyia, the unity of Gods. but the assertion thereof 
 was compatible with a recognition of the distinction between 
 God as He is in Himself, and God as revealed. ‘The relation 
 between the two, however, may be very differently Viewed. 
 Sabellianism, in its earliest form, did not deem the unchange- 
 ableness of God, His freedom from processes of growth and 
 from suffering, necessary to His absolute unity: on the con- 
 trary, the early Patripassians taught that God entered into: 
 change and suffering... That God Himself was present in His: 
 revelation, was maintained by them with such intensity, that 
 they directly identified the two. They took for granted, it is 
 true, that God still continued God; but how His subjection to 
 suffering and processes of growth was compatible therewith, 
 they did not further inquire: in other words, they did not 
 define the inner essence of God to be that which continues ever 
 the same, and permanently distinguish it from the sphere of 
 that which He became. Noetus does this more distinctly than 
 Praxeas. He distinguished God’s permanent being in Himself 
 and the revelations, in which He manifests Himself as He 
 pleases. It is clear, however, that even so, the unchangeable- 
 ness of God is not fully secured. For, in the act of manifesting 
 Himself, He enters, according to Noetus, into externality and 
 
SABELLIANISM. 151 
 
 passibility. At the same time, he thus affirmed the objective 
 truth of the revelations in harmony with the claims of the reli- 
 gious mind. But the speculative knowledge of God seems all 
 the more strongly contradictory thereto, as, on the one hand, no 
 motive is assigned why God should begin to reveal Himself, nor 
 the revelation reconciled with His unchangeableness; and, on 
 the other hand, the mode and number of God’s revelations are 
 not shown to be conditioned by His eternal essence. Beron and 
 Beryll also neglected to give more attentive consideration to the 
 divine unchangeableness, though, in a Christological point of 
 view, they occupy higher ground. 
 
 Another more refined form of Monarchianism was that which, 
 whilst aiming to exclude all suffering whatever from God, never- 
 theless held that God Himself was really present. in His reve- 
 lations under the form of deeds; and sought to reduce their in- 
 defined plurality within fixed limits. God would then be in all 
 His revelations unalterably one and the same; the possibility of 
 a difference of revelations being based on the distinction drawn 
 between God’s unchangeable inseity (Insichseyn) and His his- 
 torical life in the world, and the attribution of the change of 
 revelations solely to this latter. 
 
 A still more sublimated form of this tendency was, thirdly, 
 that which not merely excluded suffering and change from God’s 
 essence, but, instead of His historical life, admitted solely the 
 existence of a movement, which, as the movement.of His will, 
 was held to have Hone to do with His.being. So far as 
 revelation is regarded merely as a work, and not as a mode of 
 the existence “ae God, all that is present therein, is undoubtedly 
 His thought or will; He Himself, however, is not revealed, but 
 remains withdrawn from the world. But as the Christian mind 
 could never be content with the meagre description of Christ as 
 a mere work of God, the expedient might be adopted of saying, 
 that though the entire God was not present in the revelation, 
 or in the actuality, yet a ray of the divine essence was. A 
 merely quantitative distinction from Patripassianism,—a distinc- 
 tion, too, which, in addition, pays an earnest-money to Ebion- 
 ism,—is thus effected, but nothing more. 
 
 The final logical result of this tendency to give prominence 
 to the abstract simplicity and immutability of God, would natu- 
 rally be to transfer this abstract simplicity to the so-called reve- 
 
152 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 lation also. For, as the divine omnipresence itself forbids the 
 separation of the will and work of God from His being, seeing 
 that He continues present in both, the movement or change 
 which was meant to be confined to them, falls back into His being 
 Consequently, if God be regarded as the abstractly simple One, 
 we can no longer represent Him as active in the work of revela- 
 tion; for if He were, especially on the supposition of different 
 revelations, He must be brought under the limits of time. That, 
 therefore, which is termed revelation, is a simple subjective 
 matter: the objective God remains in His being and doing ever 
 and eternally the same: He merely appears as a different being, 
 be it that the objective medium through which He presents 
 Himself to the consciousness, breaks the rays of His essence 
 differently ; or be it that the individual subject, at different 
 stages, knows the divine, which is one and the same, and which 
 presents itself always alike, more or less perfectly. In the for- 
 mer case, we should have a feeble remainder of an objective self- 
 revelation of God, in the sense, namely, of the world, and not 
 God, being the cause of different aspects of the divine nature 
 being revealed at different times; in the latter case, no objective 
 revelation at all takes place, but the entire process of religion 
 and revelation is dissipated, after a Pelagian (or deistic) fashion, 
 into a simple matter of subjective human development :—so, in- 
 deed, that not even in the creation of the world is a place left for 
 a revelation of God; for the creation of the world must be as 
 incompatible with the abstract simplicity and unchangeableness 
 of God as the act of the second creation. The entire mode of 
 thought of early thinkers indisposed them for carrying this prin- 
 ciple out to its logical results; but representatives of the second 
 and third forms of Monarchianism made their appearance even 
 as late as the third and fourth centuries. 
 
 We see thus, within this tendency, a gradual_progress from 
 a pantheisti¢ principle, that is, a principle which.commingles 
 God and the world, to a deistic principle: these two extremes, 
 however, are connected by the predominance given to the con- 
 ception of God as substance, relatively to which the ethical 
 aspect of God is thrown into the background, and which, from 
 its unsatisfactory character, sways about between the extremes 
 of a God who is immediately passible, and one who is separated 
 from the world. 
 
SABELLIUS. 153 
 
 After these preliminary observations, let us return to the 
 history. The result of the development of the Church, which 
 since the days of Hippolytus and Origen had brought the doc- 
 trine of the immutability of the inner, divine essence decidedly 
 to the foreground, had been to repress Patripassianism. About 
 the middle of the third century, it withdrew from the scene : 
 and only a few forlorn, anonymous voices were raised on its 
 behalf: unless we take into consideration the pantheistic, dual- 
 istic movement which went forward almost outside of the limits 
 of Christianity, and whose occurrence at this precise period 
 cannot be regarded as accidental (Note 26). 
 
 But we have seen also, that even the system of Origen had 
 not advanced beyond the idea of the abstract simplicity of God. 
 If, as he maintains, the supra-essential God suffers within Him- 
 self no inner distinctions ; and if, notwithstanding, on the other 
 hand, the main matter is, that the Most High God should come 
 forth and enter into fellowship with humanity ; it appears more 
 correct, with Sabellianism, to posit the latter, and, whilst re- 
 taining hold on the simplicity of God in Himself, to distinguish 
 between the revealed and the hidden God, than, with Origen, 
 to represent the Most High God as constantly hidden. And 
 almost still more strongly than the interest in religion is the 
 interest in science opposed to the reduction of the Son, after 
 the example of Origen, to an uncertain middle being between 
 God and the world. 
 
 Sabellius the Libyan, Presbyter of Plotemais in the Penta- 
 polis, endeavoured to purify the patripassian system, and to 
 bring it to far more complete development.1. What had never 
 at all before, or only very indefinitely, been done by earlier re- 
 presentatives of this tendency, he drew the Holy Spirit into the 
 circle of his theory, and so laid down a doctrine of the Trinity 
 of his own. He thus reduced the indefinite plurality of the re- 
 
 1 Sources :—Athanas. c. Arian. Orat. iv. c 2, 9, 13, 14, 25, cll. 12, 22; 
 de Synod. c. 16 ; Expos. Fid. c. 2; Epiphan. heer. 62; and the Anaceph. ; 
 Eusebius, H. E. 7, 6; Theodoret, heer. fab. 2, 9. Compare also Basilius, 
 Kp. 210, 214; Ambrosius, de Fide 1, 1, 2; 4, 4, 6. Augustine con- 
 stantly confounds him with the Patripassians, but communicates some in- 
 teresting particulars in the Tract. in Joh. 36 ff., 53 l.c., iv. 725 ff. 731, 
 853. Hilarius, de Trin. 7, 39. Compare also Schleiermacher’s Simmtliche 
 Werke ; Erste Abtheilung, Bd. i. pp. 485-574. 
 
154 FIRST PERIOD, SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 velations of the one God to the number three, in agreement with 
 the Church. His fundamental idea is the following :—That 
 which in God is an unity, undivided and indistin ouishable, sepa- 
 rates into a plurality in the world, and init alone. Only in 
 virtue of the mundane aspect (Weltseite) can we speak of dis- 
 tinctions or of a plurality in God. These distinctions, it 1s true, 
 are not mere names, or mere subjective seeming ; but the divine 
 Monas is really and objectively in them, so that a real objective 
 something corresponds to the different revelations. For, though 
 they are by no means distinguished from the divine unity, in 
 which they are contained as momenta, and which is in them, 
 the one form of revelation is not identical with the other; for 
 example, law and incarnation are not the same: therefore, also, 
 Father and Son, which according to Theodoret correspond to the 
 above-mentioned two, are not the same. The Sabellians illus- 
 trated the relation between the divine unity and plurality by a 
 reference to the relationship between the Holy Spirit and His 
 charisms.! The Holy Spirit is one in the many gifts which He 
 bestows, although the gifts themselves really differ from each 
 other. But as the gifts can only be apprehended and appear, 
 in their difference, through the addition of the world, even so 
 the plur ality inGod. The question then arises,—Did Sabsltrte 
 conceive this plurality to be the work of God, or (just as the 
 differences in the charisms arise from the differences in the 
 natural bases on which they are engrafted) the effect of the al- 
 ready existing nature of the world, which reflects the one divine 
 ray in different ways, although it, for its share, strictly speak- 
 ing, works undividedly always and everywhere, and is merely 
 dividedly appropriated and reflected by the objective world ? 
 The former supposition would lead to a divine history, be it of 
 the nature or of the deeds of God: the latter would characterize 
 the differences in the revelations, as the mere effect of the world. 
 Applied to the incarnation, the latter would lead to Ebionism ; 
 applied to the Holy Ghost, to Pelagianism: for it depended, for 
 example, entirely on the man Jesus, how much of the divine 
 unity appeared in Him. 
 There can scarcely be any doubt that Sabellius referred the 
 
 1 Athan. c. Ar., Orat. iv. 25,—Qnal yep (SaBerrsos) dorep Iscespeosss yapto- 
 wcray elal, TO 08 aUTO TrEvmd, vita nal oO Tarip 6 aiTOs meV EoTI, FAUTUVET tS 
 
 d¢ sig vidv wel ryed me. 
 
SABELLIUS. 155 
 
 differences in the revelations back to God Himself, and insisted 
 on their being regarded not merely as different deeds and works, 
 but as different modes of the existence of God, although un- 
 donbtedly in the world.’ For the divine Monas is not, in his 
 view, motionless, but living. If it keep silence, it is without 
 operation ; if it speak, it is active. So far as it speaks, it may be 
 termed Logos, and that mpodopixds ; so far as it keeps silence, 
 it answers to the Logos évévaGeros. Logos, therefore, in the 
 language of Sabellius, means something different from Son, 
 who is but one of the forms of the speaking God.?__ Epiphanius 
 and Augustine also (in Joann. Tract. 53) designate the speak 
 ing of the Monas, deed or will. The Son is also called the arm 
 which God stretches out for action: probably, too, the Spirit is 
 represented in the same manner agreeably to older Church ana- 
 logies ; so that the image refers again to the entire God. The 
 outstretched arm is God engaged in action; the arm drawn back 
 is God in rest, in His insetty® (Insichseyn). The arm denotes, 
 therefore, that the revelation contains no new divine hypostasis , 
 but simply that the Monas, besides its motionless inseity, is also 
 ‘to be viewed as active and living. What and how many move- 
 ments and outstretchings of the arm, or revelations, pertain to 
 God, is no more clearly indicated by this image than by the 
 
 1 To the question of Athanasius, c. Ar. 4, 14,—Whether the Monas 
 expands itself for others or for itself? the answer may be given,—Tor 
 others, but also for itself; it is itself that whereto it expands itself. This 
 is not inconsistent with the charge brought against Sabellius, that, like 
 Arius, he made men of greater consequence than the Logos, representing 
 the Logos as proceeding forth from God for our sake. Athanasius himself 
 (c. Ar. 4, 11) affirms both of him. If, as they say, the silent God is power- 
 less (cévevgoynros), and first powerful when He comes forth on our behalf, 
 we are the means of His completion, our origin contributes to His perfec- 
 tion. We therefore are higher than He, because our creation gives Him 
 that which He did not yet possess: He needs us for His own existence. 
 
 2 The Logos is referred to the incarnation according to Athan. 1. c. 22, 
 cll. 20: He did not, however, first come into existence in Christ, but merely 
 became a Son. The Monas as Logos creates the world, 1. c. 11 :—Awray de 
 urlCew AoZero. They say :—Tov rdyov tv choy ety elvces Aoyov anras, ore OE 
 évnvdpamnae, Tore Gvoeceabes vicv' po yep Tis ExiDavelees fon civert viov dhAB 
 Adyou pedvov' nal womrEp 6 Adryos aap eryévero ovx Ay wpoTEpoy GAPS, OVTHE O Adryos 
 vids yéryovev ove dv wpérepov vids. The Logos, therefore, advanced to Son- 
 ship by degrees, as Tertullian taught. 
 
 8 After the analogy of “ aseity.”—TR. 
 
156 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 analogy of the charisms. All that we learn is, that in the 
 silent and motionless God, there is a potence of speech and 
 action; and this potence Sabellius undoubtedly conceived to be 
 eternal. 
 
 But now, as regards the relation between God’s being and 
 essence, on the one part, and His doing, on the other, there 
 arises the question,—Whether the Monas continues outside of 
 its doing and work, or whether its being is in the work, whether 
 it is itself each of the movements? ‘The latter is decidedly to 
 be assumed, and the different revelations are different modes of 
 existence, which the Monas assumes by means of its movements. 
 In proof of this, we cannot indeed appeal to the oynpariter Gat 
 of Sabellius; for this word, by itself, might characterize the 
 different oynuaticpovs as the result of the conjunction of the 
 Monas with different parts of the world, through which the One 
 appears as though it were diverse. But it is strikingly evident 
 from the proposition, that the Monas expands itself to a trias 
 (wratbveTat, éxtelverat), even as the one Spirit exposes and dif- 
 fuses its fulness in the multiplicity of charisms. This expan- 
 sion, extension, also termed evolution, wAaTuapos, ExTacts, ava- 
 Tracpos Tpocwmev (Athan. c. Ar. 4, 13, 14), is the positive 
 ground of the rise of the Sabellian plurality or trinity; its anti- 
 thesis is the cvorod7, the withdrawal or constriction, which is a 
 mere negative presupposition of a new IIAatucpos. In order, 
 namely, to accomplish a new act of revelation, or to assume a 
 new form of existence, the Monas must undoubtedly recede 
 from its full surrender to the previous mode, and must again 
 collect itself, so as to be able to come forth in its entirety 
 under a new shape. These two momenta, which appertain 
 to a divine revelation, Sabellius appears to have termed the 
 divine dudde&s, dialectic (see Basil. Ep. 210, compare Note 
 29). Revelation may, therefore, progress intensively, and yet, 
 extensively considered, the circles of the self-evolution of God 
 may become ever narrower, as he unquestionably appears to 
 declare, when he draws the parallel between body, soul, and 
 spirit, and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The general spirit 
 of the system, however, requires stress to be laid on the 
 fact, that all the forms of existence assumed by the Monas 
 in the course of the process through which it passes, are 
 of equal value, in so far as no one of them can fail, and in 
 
SABELLIUS. Hoey 
 
 all of them the entire Monas is present after some manner or 
 other.* 
 
 But if it be taken as certain that the revelations are move- 
 ments of the divine life itself, and that Sabellius does not dis- 
 tinguish the doing and work of God from His living being, his 
 system must plainly be pronounced completely pantheistic, unless 
 its Trinity presupposes a creation, and with the creation, the 
 distinction of the world from God. For then the world is no- 
 thing more than a mode of existence which God assumes ; 
 whereas, on the contrary, if an already created world be taken 
 as their scene and medium, the revelations may be regarded as 
 different modes of the divine existence, without any danger of 
 Pantheism: nay more, they must be so regarded, if God is not 
 to be kept strange to, and at a distance from, the world, and the 
 purpose of revelation to be frustrated. If Sabellius regarded 
 creation also as a self-expansion of God out of straitness (azo 
 atevoTntos), he must have designated this mode of existence 
 either Father or Monas or Logos, not Son; for one of the charges 
 most frequently brought against him, was that of denying the 
 pre-existence of the Son and the Spirit. He can no more have 
 termed that mode of existence Monas, than all the other modes 
 of existence ; for Sabellius regarded Monas, not as the individual 
 mode of the divine existence, but as the unity which continues 
 the same in all. If the relation between the Monas and the 
 revelations is similar to that between the Holy Ghost and His 
 charisms, it follows, that as the Holy Ghost cannot have a real 
 existence in the world and reveal Himself, save by means of His 
 charisms, so also the Monas can only come forth through the 
 medium of one or the other of its modes of existence and actions, 
 though it itself cannot be at all identified with a single action. 
 
 1 According to the work ‘ c¢. Sabellii Gregales,” in Athan. Opp. 2, 37 ff. 
 (in Basil. Opp. as the 27th Homily), the image of body, soul, and spirit is 
 employed by the Sabellians as follows :—As man consists of different parts, 
 and is notwithstanding one, even so the Trinity: it may be compounded— 
 that they were willing to allow (c. 13)—but the parts together form the 
 one divine hypostasis. Athanasius says :—Ov0? dvdpurov éx rpiay varovows 
 civdcrov, rvevwatos, WuxIs, cbpearos, ota xal Occv nadawep xansivos (0. €., 
 the Sabellians) rorawdor.—Ta yap rod ovydérov peton, nal r& xivovmsvou xLYN- 
 pare Tpds rhy cdovvdsrov nol kvaerroiarov Prat ovdepeloev exes xorvaviory. "Exel 
 nal Tas drOoTEANEL TO Epos 4 TO xivnua aITOV 6 FaTIp, eTOTTEAAwY roy viov $ 
 
 WTO Tvsipece TO Krylov I UlOs EXMEL TOM KEG TOY KOTLLOY ; 
 
158 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 On one supposition alone could Sabellius refer the Monas to the 
 creation,—the supposition, namely, that he regarded creation or 
 the world, not as a single revelation, but as a living presence or 
 existence of God in actuality. In that case, however, the dis- 
 tinction between the silent and the speaking God would be done 
 away with as regards creation, and a coarse Pantheism be substi- 
 tuted in its place. Every form of the actualization of the being 
 and life of God should rather, on the contrary, be conceived, if 
 not as one of the Sabellian wpocw7a, yet as something different 
 from the Monas in itself. Only in consequence of a confusion 
 of the Father with the Monas, therefore, could a single revela- 
 tion, like the creation of the world, be reduced back to the 
 Monas. It is quite possible that Sabellius may have made such 
 a confusion (Note 27); it was a common fault of the Church 
 teachers of this and even of a later period. The entire God, 
 the Monas, is undoubtedly designated Father in His relation to 
 the world (Athan. c. Ar. 4, 22, xowvos mavrov matnp), and does 
 not bear this title solely in the Trinity. The Sabellians, there- 
 fore, may also have frequently used the word Father, without 
 fault, for Monas. Be that as it may, so far as we know, the 
 Sabellians never traced back the creation of the world to the 
 Father, or to the Monas in itself. Legislation alone is attri- 
 buted to the Father (Note 28). It cannot be at all historically 
 shown that Sabellius referred one of his trinitarian Scarpécets, or 
 the trinitarian 7Aatucpovs, to the creation also. It 1s not even 
 certain whether he believed creation in general to have been 
 brought about by a self-extension of God. All that Athanasius 
 says (c. Ar. 4, 18) is,—The Sabellians perhaps derived their 
 doctrine from the Stoics, who represented God as contracting 
 nd expanding Himself with the creation of the world 
 
 Though it cannot be at all shown that Sabellius held the 
 Monas or the Father to be the Creator of the world :—it seems 
 certain rather, on the one hand, that his trinitarian distinctions 
 first arise within the world which had come into existence in 
 some other way, but do not refer to the creation; and equally 
 certain, on the other hand, that the creation was ascribed to 
 the Logos, whom Sabellius regarded as the Monas in life and 
 motion. But how could he posit a particular deed of the Logos 
 alongside of, and in addition to, the trinitarian revelation of 
 God in the world? If the silent God is powerless, and the 
 
SABELLIUS. 159 
 
 speaking God strong; if He could do nothing whilst silent, and 
 began to create when He spake, that is, as the Logos (Athan. 
 c. Ar. 4,11); we have a hint which distinguishes the act of 
 creation essentially from all the rest. Apart from the world, 
 God cannot be, cannot be conceived; it would be to conceive 
 Him powerless, whereas He is not fully conceived, unless con- 
 ceived as icyvovra, as speaking, or asin motion. Very similar 
 was the judgment both of Origen and of Hermogenes, whom 
 several older writers classed with the Sabellians. The distinc- 
 tion in God, on which is based the rise of the world, Sabellius 
 deemed essential to Him; for God cannot lack power; God 
 cannot, as to His essence, be merely the silent God; whereas 
 the case is a totally different one with the other revelations of 
 God in the world. They are not grounded in the nature of 
 God, but are occasioned by the world, by its necessities. ‘The 
 condition of the world rendered them necessary or desirable. 
 One of the most frequent accusations brought by the teachers 
 of the Church against Sabellius, was that of representing God 
 as appearing in the world, solely mpos tas éxaotote ypetas, 
 either as Father, as Son, or as Holy Ghost (Note 29). Therein 
 was involved also the transitoriness of the single Sabellian po- 
 oora. When the ypeta was once met, the mpocw7ov was no 
 longer required. ‘The need arises from sin, that is, from some- 
 thing which is not meant to be eternal; but if the ground of the 
 existence of the rpocwrra is ephemeral, they themselves also must 
 _be ephemeral. Such is the representation given by Gregory 
 of Nyssa, in a passage hitherto unnoticed (A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 
 T. 8, Appendix, p. 4). The Sabellians, says he, through reading 
 such words as,—‘ I and the Father are one;” “ Whoso seeth 
 Me, seeth the Father also ;” “ When He shall have given up the 
 kingdom to the Father and God,’—with too little acuteness of 
 judgment, have fallen into godless error, olojevot Sid peev AEvTrO- 
 
 Taklav avOpwreivny TpoednrvUévas TOV UioY EK TOD Tra1 POS TpoT- 
 Kalpws: avOus O€ weTa THY SiopOwcw THY avOpwTivey mrnupEedn- 
 patov avareducota évddvar Te Kal avapeniyGar TO Tatpi. The 
 same follows also from Sabellius’ notion, that God proceeds 
 from one revelation or self-extension to another by resumption, 
 which he appears to have figuratively described as a drawing in 
 again of His outstretched arm (Aug. in Joann. 53, Opp. 4, 
 853). 
 
160 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 A more fully developed system than that of Sabellius seems 
 to have been, would have been compelled to make greater efforts 
 to bring the creation, that general work of the speaking God, 
 which continues the same through all revelations, into connec- 
 tion with its doctrine of the Trinity, and, as the first and funda- 
 mental revelation, to co-ordinate it with the succeeding ones ; 
 in other words, to ascribe it to a wpdcw7rov after the manner of 
 those which followed. But, on the one hand, even the Church 
 itself did not do this, so far as it ascribed the creation indiffe- 
 rently both to Father and Son; and, on the other hand, crea- 
 tion itself and its character furnished Sabellius with an occasion 
 and starting-point for the assumption of certain distinctions in, 
 and manifold revelations of, the undivided divine unity : conse- 
 quently, the Trinity, in his view of it, presupposed creation as 
 an already accomplished thing; and apart altogether from a 
 Trinity, he necessarily attributed it to the speaking Monas, 
 which he terms Logos. If the work of creation pertained to 
 one member alone of the Sabellian Trinity, and not to the 
 speaking Monas in general, then the Monas must be divided, 
 independently of, and prior to, the creation, into a simple prin- 
 ciple of the creation of the world, a principle of incarnation, 
 and so forth ;—that is, God would be distinguished in Himself. 
 Sabellius, therefore, abode by the position,—The divine unity 
 does not divide itself ; wherever it is, it is in its entirety; as far 
 as concerns the eternal essence of God, the sole distinction is 
 that into a silent and a speaking God; but the world which 
 exists through His word, gives occasion, by the differences in its 
 constitution, not merely to three different acts of revelation, but, 
 as was indicated above, to three different modes of existence of 
 Himself, in the law, in the incarnation, in the Holy Ghost. 
 (Note 30.) 
 
 From all this it would appear that the relation of the Monas 
 to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, is the following :—The 
 Monas is the €v trroxeiwevov, the one hypostasis, which mani- 
 fested. itself, during the course of the history of religion, in those 
 three in ARs sits ways. Out of its fulness and unity, which 
 continue ever the same, it sets forth different things for the 
 different needs of the world. But it is not led to this manifesta- 
 tion by inner distinctions of essence, but by the world. It is 
 true, the world alone does not make the distinctions. Not that 
 
SABELLIUS. 161 
 
 it and revelation in general are mere subjective representation , 
 or that, as Ebionites might suppose, the one, indivisible, divine, 
 which in itself stands related alike to all, is unequally appre- 
 hended by the world,—perfectly, for example, by the most vir- 
 tuous man, Jesus. On the contrary, Sabellius recognised really 
 different divine deeds and movements ; but because these dis- 
 tinctions owe their existence solely to peculiarities of the world, 
 which have not their ground in God, they are transitory, so far 
 as the said peculiarities are transitory (Note 31); they do not 
 contribute to the perfection of the divine essence; whereas that 
 the silent God should speak, was necessary to the completion of 
 the conception of God. The teachers of the Church, taking the 
 opposite course, looked upon creation as in itself an accidental 
 feature of the conception of God, and in no respect necessary 
 to its complete intellection. By the Trinity, on the contrary, 
 they deemed it to be perfected; and they would sooner have 
 allowed, in opposition to Sabellius, that the ceconomic Trinity 
 set forth essential momenta of the divine life itself (which, be 
 it noted, is also of an ethical nature), than, in agreement with 
 him, teach that the genesis of the world was the completion of 
 God. Ath.c. Ar. 4, 11:—Odroe éXatrov TO Oeod, 7) Hyuty Sdoac. 
 “Hyeis yap ToraKws Kal crwmdvres pcr, evOupovpevor 5é évep- 
 youmev, WaoTe Ta éx THs evOuuncews Kab eiSwrorroLEtc ba ; these, 
 however, rov Ocov cwwrdvra pev dvevépyntov, Nadrobvra 8é io- 
 xveww adtov Bovrovrau eltye cuwTrav pev ovK NOUVATO TOLELV, NAN@V 
 de xriceiy hpEato. ’Epécbat yap avtovs Sixatoy, ef 6 Néyos ev TO 
 Oecd ov, Térev0s Hv, Sate Kal rovelv Sivacba ; Ei [eV OV ATES 
 WV, ev Oce wv, yevynbels S8 TérEL08 ryévyoven, niLels ai'tiot THs TENELO- 
 THTOS avTOD, eltye SL ds yeyévyntau Sv nas yap Kal TO Svva- 
 cOat Tovey Tpoceihnder’ et 8 TEdXE105 Fv ev Oc@, Wore Kal Tovey 
 dwvac bat, mepittiy 1) yévynots avtov, édbvato yap, Kat év matpl 
 OV, OnLoupyev’ Hate 7) ob yeyévyntat, 4} yeyévyntat ov Ov 1uas, 
 GAN OTe det x TOD TaTpds éoTtw. ‘H yap yévynaots avtod ov THY 
 Nov Ktlow Seikvucw, GNA Td éx TOD Ocod eivas. This passage 
 shows that the Sabellians spoke not merely of a Aoyos, but also 
 of a yevvnows Tob NOyou; probably they identified this latter with 
 the AaXetv of the Father, Like Tertullian and the Arians, they 
 represent this yévynots as taking place before the creation of the 
 world, nay more, as taking place for the sake of the creation. 
 In common with the former, they assume a process of growth, 
 VOL. I. L 
 
162 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 a progressive hypostatization. But they differ from both in con- 
 ceiving the yévynots, not as the origin of the hypostasis, but as 
 the manifestation of the world-creative power. This passage, 
 therefore, is an evidence, partly, that Monarchianism, about the 
 year 260, had already assumed a form in many respects like the 
 Trinity of their opponent Tertullian; and partly, also, that the 
 Sabellians decidedly ascribed creation to the Logos. 
 
 Having investigated the relation of the divine Trias to the 
 Monas, let us now take a glance at the relation of the members 
 of the Trias to each other. It is clear, from what has been 
 advanced above, that, as was frequently objected by the teachers 
 of the Church, these three were never simultaneously, and, 
 therefore, never properly speaking, members of the Trinity. 
 During the period when God revealed Himself as Father, the 
 Son did not yet exist ; and during the period of the Holy Ghost, 
 the Son and the Father no longer exist (cf. Montfaucon, Nov. 
 Coll. T. ii. 2, Epiph. her. 62, 1; and in Athan. c. Ar. Or. 4, 
 12). According to Epiphanius and Theodoret (heer. fab. 2, 9; 
 compare Germanus Constantinop. de heres. et Synodis in A. 
 Mai, Spicileg. Roman. T. 7, 11, 12), to the Father was attri- 
 buted legislation, to the Son the incarnation, to the Holy Ghost 
 the inspiration of the Apostles, as also the quickening and ani- 
 mating of believers. ‘The objective difference of these revela- 
 tions is thus expressed and characterized with sufficient clear- 
 ness (Note 32). But they employed two images in order to 
 describe this relation with greater precision. Father, Son, 
 Spirit, are analogous to body, soul, and spirit ;—the three mo- 
 menta or modes of existence of the one man. There isa similar 
 trinity also in the sun. Firstly, there is its form in itself, its 
 outward appearance (cidos, ox a TaONS THS imtoo tacews, Which 
 is to be distinguished from the imoctacts itself). This corre- 
 sponds to the revelation of the law, which was a strange and 
 purely objective thing; or, when the word Father is taken 
 strictly, to the Father. Secondly, the pure disk of the sun 
 makes its appearance for men, and enters into their sphere, in 
 that it expands itself, as it were, to a circle of light and illumin- 
 ates the earth. This corresponds to the revelation of the Son. 
 Lastly, the sun penetrates into things themselves, bringing 
 warmth and light. This corresponds to the visits of the Holy 
 Spirit. Both images connect the individual members of the 
 
SABELLIUS. 163 
 
 ‘Trias with each other, and both imply progress ;—not, however, 
 in the sense that those who have the Holy Spirit are more than 
 those who have Christ; but merely in the sense, that the divine 
 revelation or Monas penetrates ever more deeply into the exist- 
 ing world. The progress, therefore, is on the side of men, to 
 whom one and the same God approaches constantly nearer 
 through His different cynuaticpods. To God Himself the 
 Trinitarian process (dudAeEts) brings no progress. The sun 
 does not first acquire enlightening and warming power, but has 
 it from the beginning. Through the employment of special 
 means (law, incarnation), the entire divinity comes ever more 
 fully into activity. But although the entire divine essence is 
 present in each of these oynuatiopol, each of them sets forth a 
 different aspect of the objective divine essence, according to the 
 requirements of men; and thus prepares the way for an in- 
 creasing appropriation of God. 
 
 This, of course, implies that the incarnation of God, for 
 which Sabellius employs also the expression évavOpwrrnots Tob 
 Aoyou, could merely have the significance of a means to an end 
 in his system; and that, as such, it might cease as soon as it had 
 accomplished that for which it was brought into existence. He 
 did not regard the Person of Christ as an end in itself ; Christ 
 is not the essential good, or, as Head and King, an essential 
 part of the highest good, whose glorification we also have to 
 subserve. But the Logos was born for our sake, and returns 
 that He may be again as He was.!_ The reason thereof is, that 
 the incarnation was occasioned solely by the world, and had not 
 a necessary ground in God Himself, that is, in an inner distinc- 
 tion of the divine essence. Such a distinction did not exist in 
 God, prior to His appearance on earth: “Before the appearance 
 of Christ, there was no Son, but merely the Logos; and when 
 the Logos became flesh, not having previously been flesh, the 
 Logos became Son, not having previously been Son” (c. Ar. 4, 
 
 1 Athan. c. Ar. 4, 12 (see following note), 4, 25:—Avayxn 0¢ xel 
 mavbyoecbas ro bvopene Tov viod xal tov wvevmurtos, THs xpeias wAnpwOElons 
 nol eorot Dorwov ayer Wesdices, TR yyivopeva, Ors oy AnOcie, AR Gyopears 
 emedeixn. He goes on then to say that this is the destruction of the 
 Church and the world. ILevomévov d¢ rod cvopartos rod viov nur avrovs, 
 mavorrar xl rov Bantiomaros 4 xapis—xal ti axorovdyce 4 aPavic“os THS 
 wtiaewz. The latter would be true if the world owed its existence to the 
 Son, and not to the Logos (Note 32). 
 
164 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 22). The Son is an energetic, but still a transitory theophany. 
 Sabellius must, therefore, have treated the human_aspect. of 
 Christ as.a-mere accident; and so far from following up the 
 efforts made by Origen, to ensure the full reality of the human- 
 ity of Christ, by giving prominence to His soul, we do not even 
 know whether he acknowledged Christ to have had a human 
 soul. It is, in fact, improbable that he did; for otherwise he 
 could not so easily have persisted in maintaining that this reve- 
 lation would cease—and cease not merely at the end of the 
 days, but when Christ returned to the Father, and the Holy 
 Spirit was revealed.’ 
 
 1 Compare the passage from Epiph. in Note 29 ; Athan. c. Ar. 4, 12:=— 
 Ey cb yeyevigades adrov txriobnusy, nol TH yEevvyoes avTod ovyeaTnney n xTiols, 
 covert pinges 08 tux Thy OE TpoTEpoy fv.—llarrvdpomodytos Tov Advyov ovx, Umapess 
 4 xrlots. (For aéyov Sabellius probably said viov) ; compare c. 22, 25; 
 Ambros. de fide 4, 6,—‘‘ ut in Patrem filius refundatur.” Montfaucon, 
 Coll. Nov. T. ii. p. 2, in ‘‘ Eugenii Legatio ad Athan.” 
 
 2 Athan. 1. c. 20:— H oapé, nv 2Qopsaev 6 Aovyos, avrn gotly 6 vids. ib. :— 
 Tov dvdpwrov ov ePopeoey 0 névos airov elves Agyoucs TOV viov rov Oxrov ror 
 Lovoryzva. 
 
 —_——_ 
 
SABELLIUS. 165 
 
 God or Logos,—whom this system presupposes indeed to be in 
 Himself an intelligent subject, and nothing more than the living 
 Monas, but without being able to enter more deeply into the 
 question of its inner personality, in consequence of being based 
 on the category of substance,—appeared in Christ as limited, in 
 aman, and in this sense as a person, or as a vids; whereas as 
 hoyos, He was not vids. If we ask then,—Does not Sabellius 
 represent humanity as constituting the revelation in Christ per- 
 sonal ?—we may answer both in the negative and in the posi- 
 
 tive ; for, strictly speaking, both the divine and the human aspect 
 
 constitute the personality, though each in a different way, or in 
 a different sense. So far as the personality is taken to be some- 
 thing positive, which as positive must appertain also to God, the 
 divine is the principle of the personality of the Son; though in 
 no other sense than that in which the personal Monas is so in 
 itself, and in each of its revelations. So far, however, as a limit 
 and bound is to be conceived as attaching to this positive some- 
 thing,—and it must be allowed to attach to the human person- 
 ality, consequently also to Christ,—so far is the humanity. of 
 Christ that which is limited, and which, by bounding or cir- 
 cumscribing the divine extension, constitutes it Son. The real 
 meaning of Sabellius must therefore have been the following :— 
 The Son resulted neither from the correspondent expansion of 
 the Monas, nor arose solely through the man who was born of 
 Mary; but from the conjunction of the positive and the nega- 
 tive—a conjunction to which God gave the prime impulse. For 
 
 only on the supposition that the two were in some way united, 
 
 can the divine have had an historical, not merely a Docetical, 
 existence; and the human life of Christ have been, not merely 
 human, but of a higher significance. 
 
 But if the conjunction of the two (1) dudotv cbvoSos) cou- 
 stituted the Son, the question at once arises,—Did the divine 
 
 ' This is also the actual report which Athanasius gives of the Sabellians, 
 Lc. c. 21:—@ael wen cov dvOparrov xed’ éevrov, cv EQepscev 6 xUpios, AAC TO 
 nuvePorepov, Tov Te Aoryou nol tov evOpwaoy, sivecs viov, cuynumeva yap &uQe- 
 Tepe, vies, ws avrol Agyovuaty, cvomeleras. 
 
 * ilar. de Trin. 1, 16 :—The Sabellian incarnation is ‘‘ protensio potius 
 
166 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 existent world exercised an influence on God, and inasmuch as 
 God Himself is present in His extensions, made God passible, 
 or limited Him. This would involve attributing a false inde- 
 pendence to the world, relatively to God, such as might har- 
 monize with a deistic or an ethnic mode of thought, but not with 
 Sabellianism. He must, therefore, have regarded this limitation, 
 in which the Person of Christ originated, as itself again a deed 
 of the Logos. It was by His own act that the Logos subjected 
 Himself to limits and bounds, though He employed the world 
 as a means; and the world could not have possessed the power 
 to be a limit to God, save through God Himself. If, however, 
 God posits limitation in Himself, and yet, on the other hand, 
 the entire divine Monas is not absorbed in this oynwatapos,— 
 because, although in itself indeed it is entirely therein, actually 
 it is only therein in one aspect,—then a distinction is introduced. 
 into the inner essence of God, and the Monas must have posited 
 in itself the determination through which it became Son. This 
 limit now might be constituted by the principle of the Ay in 
 Christ, which would be transferred to God with a touch of 
 dualism. Christ’s humanity must then be judged to have been 
 protruded from God’s own essence, as the material circumscrip- 
 tion of His spiritual éxraous; but this would be incompatible 
 with the human birth of Christ, which Sabellius leaves un- 
 touched, and would lead back to the doctrine that God converted 
 Himself into the man Jesus. Such a view Sabellius can have 
 had no wish to adopt, inasmuch as he rejected what the earlier 
 teachers of his tendency allowed, to wit, that God underwent 
 suffering.! Consequently, unless he meant to sink back to a 
 deistic or to a patripassian conception of God, it was necessary 
 for him to suppose the distinction, by which God constituted 
 
 in hominem, quam descensio.” In order that the unity of God may remain: 
 unaffected by the “series ex solido in carnem deducta, dum usque ad vir- 
 ginem Pater protensus ipsi sibi natus sit in Filium,”’ that is, in order that 
 God extending Himself as in an unbroken line might stretch Himself even 
 unto Mary. Ib. 1, 26:—Sabellius—‘‘ Deum verum operatum in corpore 
 esse non ambigit.” 
 
 1 Augustine, indeed, brings this charge also against him. But as Epi- 
 phanius (heer. 62) expressly pronounces him innocent thereof, which he 
 would not have done had he not been necessitated thereto, we must take 
 for granted that Sabellius did not belong to the Patripassians, but forms 
 a new knotty point in their series. 
 
SABELLIUS. 167 
 
 Himself Son, to have been effected independently of all orn, 
 whether in or out of God; that is, he must have supposed it to 
 take place in the spiritual essence of God, in harmony with the 
 doctrine of the Church. The only other alternative was, to 
 lower the significance of Christ, and no longer to maintain that 
 the positive something above referred to, and the basis of the 
 personality of the Son, were the Monas itself (Note 33). But 
 if the distinctions fall into the essence of God, they cannot have 
 been successive, nor are they ephemeral, but must be simul- 
 taneous, as the Church teaches. Even at this point, therefore, 
 we see that Sabellius cannot maintain his position. This will 
 become still clearer, when we consider the opposite conclusions 
 which may be drawn from his system. 
 
 In point of fact, there is by no means a lack of elements of 
 an Ebionitical cast in the system of Sabellius. The one point 
 alone, that he reduces the revelation of Christ to the rank of a 
 mere means, and does not also regard Him as an end in Him- 
 self, is a degradation of Him, which approximates to Ebionism. 
 If we remark further, that he designates the divine in the Son 
 a ray (deriva), which proceeds forth from, and returns to, the 
 Monas,—for which reason, besides the common charge of con- 
 founding everything together, founded on his merging the 
 hypostatic distinctions into the one hypostasis of the Father 
 or the Monas, we find also the opposite charge of falsely sepa~ 
 rating (aroxo7) and dividing the divine essence, which neces- 
 sarily leads to Subordinatianism or to the Hellenic form of 
 Ebionism (Note 34) ;—if, finally, we consider how difficult for 
 him, who refused to admit of any distinctions in God, must have 
 been the question, whether the entire God was so present in the 
 Son, that during His existence He was not active outside of 
 Him ;—we can well understand how he should again seek for 
 expressions to lessen the importance of the revelation of the Son, 
 and thus allow Ebionitical principles to gain a foothold. An 
 intensive interest in religion might, indeed, have preserved him 
 from such a false course; but, however coarse Patripassianism 
 may have been in this respect, it was superior to Sabelliamism. 
 The latter was not a deepening of the interest in religion: on 
 the contrary, its greater refinement seems to have been accom- 
 panied by religious superficiality ; for if we ask what Sabellius 
 supposed Christ to have accomplished, no passage can be 
 
168 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 pointed out in which the Passion of Christ is made the sub- 
 ject of consideration. In agreement with Patripassians, on 
 the contrary, he appears in general to have formed a slight 
 estimate of the significance of the sufferings of the God-man, 
 even when he did not set them aside, and to have limited 
 Christ’s work principally to enlightenment and sanctification. 
 This, at all events, seems to be implied by his employment of 
 the image of the sun, and by his remarks on the activity of the 
 warming and enlivening Holy Spirit. 
 
 Yet all this pertains to Sabellianism, as it were, contrary to 
 its will, and in simple obedience to the law which binds extremes 
 together—in the present case, the extremes of Ebionism and 
 Docetism. It is interesting to take note of these Ebionitical 
 features of the system, in order to see the comparatively short 
 step from Sabellius to Paul of Samosata. Both agree in deny- 
 ing the pre-existence of the Son, and indeed the existence of 
 hypostatical distinctions in generalin God. ‘They further agree 
 also in their recognition of the distinction of the manifest and 
 revealed God, alongside of His unity. The silent Monas of 
 Sabellius answers to the Adyos évdudGeros of Paul; the speaking, 
 or the Logos of the former, to the Aéyos mpofoptxos of the 
 latter. And although Paul took the world for his point of 
 view, and Sabellius the divine, they approximate to each other, 
 in so far as Paul, on the one hand, conceives a divine power, 
 even though impersonal, to have been at work in the man 
 Jesus; and on the other hand, Sabellius, although he had no 
 ‘intention of denying the humanity of Jesus, did not really 
 advance beyond a determinate and momentary exhibition of the 
 power of God in Him (a stretching out of the hand of God), 
 It is true he believed the entire God Himself to have been pre- 
 ‘sent in the exhibition of power, after a determinate manner ; 
 but neither this presence nor its particular character was 
 grounded in inner distinctions of the divine essence; the occa- 
 sion thereto was given entirely by the world; and as far as 
 concerns God, it was solely His will, receiving its impulse from 
 the world, and not His own essence, that called into existence 
 the triple revelation, which is unquestionably to be termed a 
 manifestation, a coming forth, of His essence. That which He 
 wills in revealing, He also, it is true, becomes: His deed 1s 
 also being, self-unfolding, but merely momentary being, and 
 
DEFECTS OF SABELLIANISM. 169 
 
 has solely the purpose of communicating to humanity that 
 which it lacked." The needs of the humanity having been met, 
 it lives in unity with the indivisible Monas, and the Monas in 
 unity with it: Christ henceforth has no significance whatever, 
 nor even a bare existence. 
 
 To represent Christ.as transitory, as a mere passing means 
 to another end, contradicted the Christian consciousness in its 
 very depths. For the Person of Christ does not stand in a 
 temporary relation to the religion He founded, as do the 
 founders of other religions, but is an eternally constitutive and 
 integrant element thereof ; and even the view taken by Paul of 
 ‘Samosata was more satisfactory in this respect, for he assigned 
 to the man Jesus a permanent position, nay more, in reward 
 .for his virtue, a divine position after His exaltation. Whilst 
 ‘Sabellius taught that humanity would one day become the body 
 of God, through the Holy Spirit, apart from the Person of 
 Christ (see Note 31), Paul, on the contrary, left a place for 
 Christ as the eternal Head of humanity. Herewith, however, 
 is most closely connected something of still greater importance. 
 Sabellianism could not look upon humanity and. deity as_re- 
 conciled and united at the very centre; and as to this matter, 
 Paul and Sabellius occupy exactly the same position, though 
 they arrive at it from opposite-directions. Paul represents the 
 humanity of Christ as the final cause of the deity which he at- 
 tributes to Him; the divine, therefore, was an accident of the 
 man Jesus. Savalling reduces the humanity to an accident; it 
 is curtailed and made transitory. But an union with an hu- 
 
 1 The charge repeatedly brought by Athanasius against Sabellius, of 
 recognising merely distinctions xer éx/vomy, that is, distinctions which are 
 purely subjective, must consequently be explained in the light of what has 
 been advanced above. Sabellius aimed to represent God as objectively dif- 
 ferent in His different revelations. He believed the divine communications 
 to have as true an objective existence as the human needs. But it is un- 
 mistakeable, that if Sabellius had rigidly insisted on the indivisible unity 
 of the Monas relatively to the sphere of revelation, he could not have be- 
 lieved that the different revelations were objectively different. In itself, 
 and considered in relation to God, legislation and incarnation were one and 
 the same, that is, the absolutely identical Monas was in both. This conse- 
 quence, however, as we have seen, Sabellius does not draw. And he con- 
 sidered to be subjective representation, rpoawxoroi«, not the difference in 
 the revelations themselves, but merely the hypostatic difference of the 
 principle in each case. 
 
170 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 manity which is an illusion, is itself an illusion. Consequently, 
 according to the Sabellian view, that which is of the highest 
 importance, that for which there is the greatest need, has not 
 been effected. From the stand-point of Sabellianism, so long 
 as humanity and deity in Christ are represented as standing in 
 so exclusive a relation to each other, it is impossible to designate 
 Christianity the absolute religion, especially when we remember 
 that it leaves the rest of men but one choice, the choice, 
 namely, between an impersonal existence and an imperfect 
 union with God. 
 
 Instead of regarding the appearance of Christ as a mere 
 momentary exhibition of divine power, the Christian Church 
 sees in Him the eternal centre of regenerated humanity, in and 
 through whom God is personally and actually united with men. 
 It was compelled, therefore, to ground the divine in Christ in 
 the eternal essence of God; and the category of the will of 
 God showed itself to be inadequate. But if there is an eternal 
 element in God Himself corresponding to the divine in Christ, 
 and if the divine in Christ is not to be placed under the category 
 of power, but under that of hypostasis, then the distinction 
 between the divine in Christ, or the Son, and the Father, must 
 be posited as simultaneous and eternal, and the polemic of the 
 Church will, in this aspect, lay special stress upon the doctrine, 
 that the divine which was in Christ was the pre-existent Son 
 and a permanent hypostasis. As regards the other, the task of 
 the Church would be to assert the full truth of the human 
 aspect. During an entire century, however, this aspect was 
 thrown into the background relatively to the former. In fact, 
 the question of the Trinity, which engaged the attention of the 
 entire succeeding period, was absolutely necessary as a basis 
 for the accomplishment of the other task. For full justice 
 can never be done to the humanity in Christology, until the 
 self-limitation, the self-exinanition of God be recognised; but 
 how could such an idea be seriously entertained, where the 
 absolute unity of the divine Monas is maintained, and where, 
 consequently, the entire Monas must thus abase itself? 
 
 The chief opponent of Sabellius, Dionysius of Alexandria, 
 of the two chief defects of Sabellianism,—to wit, that it did not 
 recognise the truth of the humanity, and therefore arrived at no 
 real incarnation, and that it could not characterize the divine 
 
PIERIUS. PHOTIUS 171 
 
 in Christ as an eternal determination of the essence of God,— 
 appears to have taken notice almost solely of the latter. In- 
 deed, the designation of the humanity of Christ as a mere gar- 
 ment, was long employed by the teachers of the Church without 
 giving offence. And when Origen attempted to attain to a 
 higher point by giving prominence to the free human soul of 
 Christ, he did not succeed in lis aim without making a step in 
 the direction of Ebionism. Paul, however, to whom, be it re- 
 membered, this inheritance descended, and by whom it was 
 increased, only served the purpose of causing the teachers of the 
 Church to shrink from giving prominence to the free human 
 soul of Christ. This aspect of the dogma, therefore, was left 
 entirely untouched for the time; for, in fact, its day could 
 not arrive until the necessary trinitarian presuppositions had 
 been settled, the uncertainty of which laid open to question 
 the very primary, that is, the objective, divine, foundations of 
 
 Christology. 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 THE SCHOOL OF ORIGEN IN THE THIRD CENTURY, AND THE 
 SUBORDINATIANISM OF DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA. 
 
 BrrorE passing to the consideration of Dionysius of Alex- 
 andria, the most important follower of Origen, a few particulars 
 must be mentioned, relative to the school of Origen in general. 
 A great number of the first men of the East, during the second 
 half of the third century, was educated by Origen, or by his 
 writings. Apart from the exegetical schools of Egypt and 
 Antioch, whose rise appears to have been due to his influence, 
 and which were formed by Hesychius on the one hand, and 
 Lucian and Dorotheus on the other (compare Neander’s 
 “Church History” ii. 1247), except Methodius, who at a later 
 period became an opponent of Origen, we may enumerate, in 
 this connection, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, and his brother 
 Athenodorus; Pierius, with his brother Isidorus (Phot. Cod. 
 119), and Theognostus (cod. 106). Hierakas, also, was deci- 
 sively influenced by Origen. At the beginning of the fourth 
 century, we may mention Pamphilus and Eusebius of Ceesarea. v7 
 
yp. FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 It is not just, with Baur (1. c. p. 308 f.), to describe the en- 
 tire school of Origen as subordinatian, in relation to the Son; 
 still less is it just to charge them with letting go the predicate of 
 Kternity. Respecting Pierius, who was styled a second Origen, 
 Photius relates, that he taught evce8ads concerning the Father 
 and the Son; and that, although in one passage he termed 
 them two ovcias or ices, instead of two hypostases, he did not 
 use the terms in the Arian sense, as is clear from that which 
 precedes and that which follows (7@ tis ovcias Kal dicews 
 ovopatt, ws Ofjrov &k Te TOY éromevav Kal Tponyoupévov Tod 
 Xoplov, avtt THs UTocTdcews ypwpevos). The honour and dis- 
 honour of the image (e/xwv), he considered to be also the honour 
 and dishonour of the prototype. The Holy Ghost, however, he 
 subordinated to the glory of the Father and the Son. Had 
 Pierius denied the eternal generation of the Son, Photius 
 would not have failed to charge him with it. There must have 
 been a ground for the praise which he bestows on his doctrine 
 of the Son. Least of all is it likely that he classed him 
 amongst those who repeated the subordinatian element in 
 Origen’s system in a heightened form. The subordination of 
 the Holy Spirit, at that time, does not warrant us in concluding 
 that the Son also was sabordinated :—indeed, Photius expressly 
 contradicts it. For when he blames him as dvaceBds Soypari- 
 Covra, on account of the subordination of the Holy Ghost, and 
 praises his doctrine of the Son as edce8H, the praise must be 
 grounded on the circumstance, that he did not subordinate the 
 Son. And as he elsewhere reproaches Origen with subordinat- 
 ing the Son, it would seem probable that Pierius further de- 
 veloped rather that part of the system of Origen, which taught 
 the equality of the Father and the Son, than that which bore 
 a subordinatian character. According to Basilius (Ep. 210), 
 the same line was adopted by another important disciple of 
 Origen, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, who was even reproached 
 with confounding Father and Son, after the manner of Sabel- 
 lius.". In his panegyric of Origen (c. 4.), he designates the 
 Logos the Source of all good, who alone can heal our defects, 
 who is the Guide and Deliverer of our souls, the Creator and 
 Ruler of the universe. In relation to the Father, he terms Him 
 the rpwroyerns Adyos Tod matpos: He Himself is the truth, the 
 
 * Basil. Ep. 210, 5,—seeréooe nal viv rivole dv elves d00, Uxoardocs 08 Ev. 
 
THEOGNOSTUS. Lid 
 
 copia, and the dyvayus of the Father of the universe. Besides 
 this, He is in Him, and completely united with Him, not 
 atreEevrysevos avtTov, not too weak to attain to the Father; for 
 which reason, it is wrong to suppose that He either cannot or 
 will not lead everything to the praise of the Father; whereas, 
 in fact, He alone can give to the Father the most perfect 
 honour, on His own behalf, and on behalf of all things. For 
 the Father has made Him one with Himself; so that we may 
 almost say that the Father, through Him, goes out of Himself, 
 in order to embrace and encompass Himself (8? avdtod povov 
 ovyt avTos avtov (leg. abtov) éxmrepi@y), and to a certain extent 
 holds Him in like honour with Himself, and is held in like 
 honour. Himself, therefore, being perfect and living, and ani- 
 mated by the highest reason (tod mp@tov vod dOyos Euauyos 
 av), He fits us completely for presenting worthy sacrifices of 
 thanksgiving to God. That this is far enough removed from 
 Arianism is self-evident, notwithstanding the decided colouring 
 of Subordinatianism. He does not reckon Him as part of the 
 Universe, but represents the Father, after having gone out of 
 Himself, as it were, through the living Logos, as embracing 
 Himself in the Logos. He terms Him further, indeed, accord- 
 ing to Basilius, woipa and xticua; but this must not be so 
 interpreted as to invalidate his previous statements. That he 
 cannot have taught that the Son was of a different substance 
 from the Father, is evident also from his being regarded as a 
 patron of the Sabellians. He probably used these words in 
 agreement with Proverbs vili., without intending thereby to 
 call in question Origen’s doctrine of the procession of the Son 
 from God, by generation. It is probable, therefore, that, like 
 his-master, he combined emanatistic and subordinatian elements 
 in his system (Note 35). 
 
 Theognostus endeavoured, in his “ Hypotyposes” (vzotvu- 
 mooes, adumbrationes), to show that the Father.must-have a 
 Son, as also that we must conceive a Holy Spirit." In the 
 second discourse, he designates the Son a «ticua; for which 
 Photius blames him severely; but as the work appears to have 
 been written in the form of a dialogue, and as, according to 
 
 1 Athan. de decret. syn. Niczen. c. 25; Phot. Cod. 106.—Athan. Ep. 4 
 ad Serap. c. 9, 11, he speaks against the supra-ordination of the Holy Spirit 
 above the Son. | 
 
174 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 Photius, in the last conversation, especially towards the close, 
 he speaks more worthily of the Son, we may probably regard 
 the idea, which suggested itself also to Photius, as well grounded, 
 namely, that Theognostus wrote the passages which put the 
 Son on a lower level, not in his own name, but in the person of 
 another. But even if this were not the case, Proy. viii. would 
 prevent us allowing the words any weight, in opposition to the 
 passage which Athanasius has preserved, and which is also 
 found in the second book of his d7otut@ces. “The essence 
 of the Son,” says he, “was not superadded from without (ov« 
 &€wbev ths dot éehevpebetca % Tod viod ovola), nor was it intro- 
 duced out of nothing, that is, into the Trinity (o0d€ é« un dvtmpy 
 éretony On), but was produced out of the essence of the Father 
 (ex Ths Tod TaTpos odcias épu, @s TO pwTOos TO aTAVYAT LA, WS 
 iSatos atuts), as brightness arises from light, and as vapour 
 arises from water. The brightness is not the sun, nor the vapour 
 the water; nor, again, is it anything foreign, but an amoppova, 
 an outflow from the Father’s essence; which notwithstanding 
 no more undergoes division than the sun, which remains the 
 same, and is not lessened by pouring forth rays. Even so, the 
 essence of the Father undergoes no alteration through having 
 the Son for His image.” Here, therefore, we find those eman- 
 atistic comparisons which Origen also employed, and which in 
 his case were compatible with a certain degree of Subordina- 
 tianism. But we find no trace whatever of Arianism, of a sur- 
 render of the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. 
 From Arianism Theognostus is far removed, not merely by his 
 doctrine of the essential equality of the Son, but also by his re- 
 jection of the idea that the Son was in any sense a mundane 
 being: on the contrary, he polemicizes against those who repre- 
 sented the Son as having been produced out of nothing,—a 
 doctrine which became a watchword of the Arians at a later 
 period! Besides Athanasius, Titus of Bostra also (Phot. Cod. 
 232), together with the two Gregories, held Theognostus in high 
 
 1 According to Photius, he did not assume the existence of an eternal 
 ian, and cannot therefore have taught that the world was formed out of a 
 San in God, that is, out of the substance of God. Consequently, in this 
 respect also, it must have been impossible for him to put the Son on an 
 equality with the world. Agreeably to the prevailing views of the time, 
 he believed the world to have been created out of nothing. 
 
METHODIUS 175 
 
 honour. It would be interesting to know how he proved that 
 the Father must have a Son. ‘The very idea of such a proof, 
 however, shows that he did not regard the existence of the Son 
 as in any respect a matter of caprice or accident. What he 
 then says concerning the essence of the Son, warrants us in pre- 
 suming, that he aimed at discovering some sort of a necessity 
 for a Son in the divine essence itself. If this be the case, he 
 clearly cannot have given up the doctrine of the eternal gene- 
 ration of the Son. 
 
 Christology must have been treated by him in detail, for th 
 fifth and sixth sections of his “ Hypotyposes” are devoted to 
 the question of the incarnation of the Son. Photius found 
 therein many Origenistic elements, which he deemed it proper 
 to blame; but, as the worst point of all, he mentions his doc- 
 trine respecting the real omnipresence of Christ.’ He is said 
 to have taken special pains to demonstrate the possibility of an 
 incarnation. 
 
 Methodius of Patara (compare his Opp. ed. Combefis. 
 Paris, 1644, pp. 284-474), in his genuine writings, so far as we 
 can ete from the fragments still extant, did not indeed apply 
 the term ouoovctos to the pre-existent ce as did the Roman 
 Synod (I consider the work entitled “ De Sym. et Anna” to be 
 spurious) ; but still, probably accepted the doctrine of His eter- 
 nal pre-existence, though not in the Origenistic form of eternal 
 generation. He did not adopt Origen’s explanation of the 
 words, “ This day have I begotten Thee,’ denoting the eternal 
 to-day; but substituted for it another, to wit,—God willed to 
 generate Him who was before the Alons, for the world also; 
 that is, to reveal Him (1. c. 388,—rTov mpodvta dn mpd TeV 
 aievey €v Tots ovpavois éBovAnOny Kal TO KOcUm@ yervncaL 0 OH 
 éoTt, Tpoabev: ayvootjpuevov yvwpicat). His teachings appear to 
 have much greater affinity with those of Tertullian and Hippo- 
 lytus. ‘There still remains between them, however, this impor- 
 tant difference, that whereas the latter represented the hypo- 
 stasis of the Son as originating contemporaneously with the 
 creation of the world, and accordingly attached the highest 
 significance to the matter of generation, relatively to the Son 
 Himself, Methodius, on the contrary, made the entire signifi- 
 
 1 "Aroronpey Agvet ort tov vidv Davralcpeeber hAnoTE Ey KAAS TYTOLS TEBE 
 ypaDopeevoy, poovn Of TH Evepyeig po TepiryouPdpevoy. 
 
176 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 cance of the yévynois for the Son, to consist in its revealing 
 Him to the world (probably in Christ) ; whilst He remained in 
 Himself unchangeably what He was before the AZons. Christ 
 did not first become Son at His baptism by adoption; nor will 
 a time ever come when He will cease to be Son, but He is Son 
 out of the limits of time, timelessly (dopictws, aypoves, p. 387). 
 Of the words, “In the beginning (év apyn) God created the 
 heavens and the earth,” his explanation is, that apy7 is the 
 divine wisdom. In harmony herewith, as with Prov. viii. 22, 1s 
 John i. 1. For the ’Apy, out of which the Aoyos grew, is the 
 Father (ryv pev yap apynv.ad? ts aveBAdorncev 0 opGoratos 
 Aéyos, Tov ILatépa Kal Troumtiy TdV bdoV Payer €v @ Hv). On 
 the contrary, the words,—“ The same was in the beginning (ép 
 apy) with God,”—signify that the Son shared the dominion 
 with God (7d é£ovcractixov Tod Adyou, 0 cixe mapa Te Iarpt 
 Kal po Tod Tov KOcpoV eis yeveow TapehOelv, EorKe onpaweL, 
 tiv éLovolav apyiy eirwv). After the beginningless beginning, 
 the Father, He therefore becomes the beginning of the rest, 
 through which all things were made (Ov«odv APXNs META TID 
 idiav avapyov apXnV, TOV IIatépa avtos Tov dArd@v yiverat, Ov 
 fis Grravra Snucoupyetras, |. c. 345). If the Son be said to be 
 produced from the Father, the equality of His vous, His co- 
 essentiality, is affirmed in the strongest manner, Still, the pas- 
 sage adduced does not altogether exclude the possibility of Sub- 
 ordinatianism. 'The Son is not, indeed, said to have owed His 
 origin to the will of the Father; but, at the same time, He is not 
 said to have been coeternal with God. The highest predicate 
 assigned to the Son, according to p. 388, is that of aypovos; the 
 predicate dvapyos is reserved for the Father. We must not, 
 however, conclude therefrom, that he meant to teach regarding 
 the Son, jv te ovx Fv, for apyiy does not necessarily denote 
 origin in time (otherwise the word would be used in the context 
 alternately in three different senses), but denotes the real 
 ground:—the Father alone is the pifa of the Son. Another 
 passage also admits of being interpreted subordinatianally ; 
 though that is not necessarily its meaning :—De Creat. p. 344 ; 
 “There are two creating powers: one which produces whatever 
 it wills out of nothing, by its mere will,—this is the Father; the 
 second, on the contrary, which, in imitation of what already ex- 
 ists, and gives to the world its beauty, order, and variety, 1s the 
 
DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA. 177 
 
 Son, the Father’s almighty and strong hand, by which He estab- 
 lishes beauty and order, after having called matter into exist- 
 ence, out of nothing.” (Avo é Suvdpeus Edapev eivat, TountiKas, 
 TH && ovK dvTwD, YEVO TH Bovdyjpari, yopls pepicod dua Td 
 (leg. TO) Ochjcas adbroupyotcay, 5 Bobreras Tro.ely" Tuyyaver Oé 
 0 matip’ Odrepov S& Kataxocpodcay Kad croiktdroveup KaTa 
 hipnow Ths mpotépas ta iSy yeyovota. gore dé 6 vids 4 Tavto- 
 dvvapos Kal Kpatad XElp TOD Tarpds, &v H peta TH Tovhoar THV 
 vAnv €& ov dvtwv xataxoopet.) When, therefore, Photius 
 speaks of Arian adulterations by Methodius, what has been ad- 
 vanced above shows that they are, at all events, not discoverable 
 in the fragments now extant. As to Christology, he refers the 
 bride (“ Song of Songs” iv. 7), amongst other things, to the 
 humanity of Christ, for the sake of which He left the Father 
 and came to the world, to bestow Himself upon her (the vdudy 
 is the capE dpudduwtos Tod Kuplov, Fs Xapw Kataretbas Tov 
 Tatépa kath rGev évradba Ka) TpoTeKOAAHON adTH évavOpwmycas, 
 pp- 386 f.). Further, the queen who is placed at the right 
 hand (Ps. xlv.), whilst God actually places Himself at the left, 
 is the humanity of Christ adorned with virtue, as with a gar- 
 ment worked with gold, the unspotted blessed flesh, which the 
 Logos carried with Him into heaven, and set at the right hand 
 of the Father. The genuine fragments in our possession do not 
 contain more precise ideas on the subject of Christology: one 
 thing only deserves mention, that in the Sympos. Virg. p. 392, 
 Christ is styled the Archetype of virginity. In the work en- 
 titled “De Sym. et Anna,” the high estimate here put on vir- 
 ginity has already been developed into the doctrine of the 
 eternal virginity of Mary. 
 
 With Dionysius of Alexandria (about a.D. 200) the case is 
 otherwise than with the last-mentioned writers. That he was 
 far from entertaining Ebionitical views, indeed, is clear from 
 his relation to the First Antiocheian Council held against Paul 
 of Samosata.! But it can scarcely be denied, that, for a time, 
 the zeal with which he opposed the Sabellians, and endeavoured 
 to lay down fixed distinctions between the Father and the Son, 
 carried him to greater lengths in the matter of Subordinatianism, 
 than those to which Origen went. In a letter to Ammonius 
 
 * Euseb. H. E. 7, 27, 80. init, but specially from 7, 6. 
 VUL. 11. M 
 
172 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 and Euphranor against Sabellianism, which had spread se 
 widely in Libya, that several bishops became its adherents, and 
 the Son of God was scarcely preached any longer in the Church,’ 
 he said,—‘ The Son is a work and a creature of God, not ap- 
 pertaining to Him by nature, but in his essence as foreign to 
 God as the vinedresser is to the vine, the shipbuilder to the ship ; 
 for, inasmuch as he was a creature, he did not exist prior to his 
 creation.” (Athan. 1. c. 4:—IToiqpa kat ryeVNTOV €lval TOV ULOV 
 rod Ocod, ponte && dvoe iSav, ddrda Eevov KaT ovolay avTov 
 elvan Tod TaTpos BoTep EoTW O yewpyos Tpos THY GLTENOV, KAL O 
 vauTrnyos Tpos TO cKapos. Kai yap ws Tolnua, @v ovK Hv TpwW 
 yévntat.) He therewith attacks, consequently, both the doc- 
 trine of the eternal generation of the Son taught by Origen and 
 his school, and also that of the equality of the essence of the 
 Father andthe Son. Athanasius would fain, indeed, refer these 
 words to the God-man, instead of to the Logos. In fact, on a sub- 
 sequent occasion, Dionysius himself took partial advantage of this 
 expedient :” for in the same passage of his later work, he deemed 
 it necessary to justify his employment of those words, relatively 
 to the Logos. But when he pleads that the Greeks were in the 
 habit of styling the authors of books and the originators of ideas, 
 their creators, although, strictly speaking, the writer or the 
 thinker is their father, he is far from being excused; for the 
 latter image is also subordinatian in tendency. Least of all 
 does he thus justify the words—“ He was not, ere He was 
 brought into existence ;” and there is scarcely a hair’s-breadth 
 between them and the Shibboleth of Arianism. Still less can 
 the excuse pleaded by Athanasius be accepted, namely,.that he 
 did not intend to lay down a positive confession regarding Christ 
 in that letter, but merely to.controvert Sabellianism.; that, for 
 this reason, he simply laid. down the opposite view with all 
 possible emphasis, and by means of the passages of Scripture, 
 which teach that Christ thirsted, hungered, suffered, prayed to 
 the Father, and so forth, endeavoured to force from his_op- 
 
 1 Athan. de sententia Dionysil, c. 5. 
 
 21. ¢, 20,22. He might avail himself of the expedient, with some show 
 of justice, relatively also to the image of the vintner and the vine, which is 
 evidently borrowed from the Scriptures, where it bears upon the relation of 
 the Father to the God-man. His words, however, clearly referred the images 
 to the pre-existent Son (see the quotation given in the text). 
 
DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA. | 179 
 
 ponents, the recognition of the personality of the Son, in dis- 
 tinction from that of the Father. It is true, indeed, that the 
 Church was led to acknowledge the necessity of a distinction of 
 God from God, by the person of the historical Christ. Buta 
 man who, in his polemic against others, himself assailed the 
 true deity of the Son (as he did in that concluding proposition), 
 cannot have reserved for himself the right of positively confess- 
 ing that deity, as Athanasius appears to take for granted. 
 What he had to do, was simply to retract; and an open con- 
 fession, that his polemical zeal had carried him away into false 
 statements, would only have done him honour. 
 
 But however decidedly this is to be acknowledged, some 
 excuse must still be discoverable for the omission of this con- 
 fession, by aman of a so decidedly honourable a character. His 
 mind was directed more to the practical than to the speculative ; 
 and, whilst possessed of a healthy feeling for the actual, he was 
 endowed with but asmall measure of scientific acuteness : hence, 
 he did not fully grasp the consequences of the principles he laid 
 down. Further, when we compare him with Arius, there can 
 be no doubt that, in the main, his tendency and intention were 
 very different from that of Arius. “Si duo faciunt idem, non 
 est idem.” The principle referred to, which formed the central 
 and main feature of the Arian system, did not hold that position 
 in the system of Dionysius; but was a wrong and premature 
 deduction from the distinction which must be allowed to exist 
 between the Father and the Son. He had no interest in deny- 
 ing the reality of the deity of the Son ; and the actual infringe- 
 ment upon it, with which he is chargeable, was an unconscious 
 one. In the very same letter in which he drew that Arian 
 conclusion, he laid down completely contradictory principles. 
 Instead of the words, £évov tis ovcias Tod matpos, we find 
 again the old image of the fountain and the stream, of the root 
 and the stem (de sent. Dion. c. 18), and the new one of parent 
 and child (de decr. Nic. Syn. 25); which decidedly imply the 
 essential equality of the Son and the Father. It was possible 
 for him, therefore, with some show of justice, to complain that 
 his opponents had given a distorted version of his views. For, 
 said he, they quote the first-mentioned words as expressive of 
 my full and real views; whereas, those comparisons, as being 
 imperfect. I merely threw out in passing; and the more apt 
 
180 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 ones, such as those just mentioned, I treated in detail. In that 
 therefore he did not feel the contradictions of his letter, it was 
 the more necessary distinctly to charge him with his lack of doc- 
 trinal clearness, rendering him as it did, first incautious, and 
 afterwards too ready to give way, and preventing him from 
 seeing plainly that, as to the doctrinal principles actually laid 
 down, if not as to his inmost meaning and tendencies, he had 
 gone over to another point of view ;—to confess which, would 
 have been his duty, had he been capable of thinking with 
 greater precision and acuteness. 
 
 By the letter to Ammonius and Euphranor he was unable to. 
 convince his opponents, as in the Nepotian controversy : on the 
 contrary, Sabellians must have been confirmed in their own view, 
 when they found that the view taken by their antagonist led to 
 such results. His letter, in fact, did awaken opposition in the 
 minds of some non-Sabellians; and some of them travelled to 
 Rome for the purpose of laying the matter before the Dionysius 
 there. Besides what has been just mentioned, they complained 
 that he declined to term the Son equal in essence with the 
 Father (ouoovcwos). In his reply to this charge, the Alexandrian 
 Dionysius (a7roroyla Kal édeyyos) says,—It is not correct to 
 charge him with rejecting this word (c. 20). He states, that 
 though he could not find the word in the Scriptures, he did find 
 the sense; and with this sense his own opinion harmonized. 
 With the greatest distinctness, he then declares that he viewed 
 the Father as the eternal light, and the Son as the equally eternal 
 brightness ; because there cannot be light without brightness. 
 He calls the Logos an adméppora of God, as truly of like sub- 
 stance with Him as a human son is of like substance with his 
 father (c. 22). When he says, the Father created al] things, 
 he does not mean to reduce the Son to the rank of a creature, 
 but the Son is posited and meant along with and in the Father ; 
 that is, the word Father he considered to be of significance, not 
 merely in relation to mundane beings, but also in relation to 
 the divine nature itself (c. 15-21). In the main, therefore, 
 he returns to the doctrine of Origen, as regards the eternity 
 and essential equality of the Son. Nay more; Origen, as we 
 have seen, was never able to lay down this essential equality 
 with distinctness, because the incommunicable *Ov always ap- 
 peared to him to be the properly divine; whereas Dionysius, in 
 
DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA. 181 
 
 entire agreement with his more practical point of view, seems to 
 have been no longer confused by the distinction between the*Ov 
 and the do€a of God (Note 36). On the contrary, he believed 
 the Father to be the root of all deity ; that is, actually commu- 
 nicable as respects His @eorns. If Origen said,—The Son is 
 the Will, proceeding forth from the divine vods ; so Dionysius 
 designates the Father the Xoyos éyxeipevos, the necessarily and 
 self-existent Reason, the Son, Adyos rpomndav, the self-objec- 
 tifying Reason, the self-manifesting Word, in which Reason 
 is inmanent,—the former, indeed, being the appearance of the 
 latter (c. 23, Note 37). But as the Father and the Son are 
 inseparable and indivisible from each other (dyépeotor dd.at- 
 petot), even so is in their hands the Spirit ; which can neither 
 be emptied of Him who sends it, nor of Him who is its vehicle 
 and bearer (c. 19). 
 
182 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 THE CHURCH’S CONFESSION OF THE ETERNAL HYPOSTASIS 
 OF THE SON, AND OF HIS ESSENTIAL EQUALITY WITB 
 THE FATHER, AT THE COUNCIL OF NICA. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 THE CONTROVERSY PRELIMINARILY CARRIED ON WITH 
 SABELLIANISM AND SUBORDINATIANISM. 
 
 Tur Roman Bishop Dionysius (see Athanas. de decret. Nic. 
 Synod. c. 26) had informed the Alexandrian Bishop of the 
 charges brought against him by several African bishops. He 
 convened also a Synod in Rome, with the general tenor of 
 whose conclusions we are acquainted: Athan. de Synodis, c. 49, 
 Ard twov aitiacapévov Tapa TO érioxoTr@ Peps Tov THs 
 ’AnreLavSpelas éricKoTrov, @S Ayovta Tolnwa Kal put) OmoovaLOY 
 rov viov TO TaTpl, 1) MEV KATA ‘Padpny avvodos nyavaKTncey, O 
 Sé rhs ‘Pdyns érickotros THY TaVT@V yveuny ypaper mpos TOV 
 duovopov éavtod. Besides this, he appears to have written a 
 work under the title "Avatpomi etc., of which Athanasius has 
 preserved a tolerably large fragment (de decr. Nic. Syn. 26). 
 In this work, he first attacks the Sabellians, and tlien those who 
 distinguish and cut up the povapyia into three powers and 
 divided hypostases, or beings (Wesen), and divinities (SvarpouvTas 
 Kay KATATEMVOVTAS Kab GVALPOUVTAS Thy wovapylay eis Tpels SUVa- 
 els TWWas Kad pemeplopévas UTOGTATELS Kat Oedrntas Tpels: ib., 
 Eévas ddd jAaLS Kal TaYTATATL Keyopiopévas). can scarcely go 
 with Neander, when he asserts the inaccuracy of the statement of 
 the Roman Dionysius, that such doctrines were taught by some in 
 Africa (“ Church History” 2, 1045). tis not at all improbable 
 in itself, that, during this trinitarian century, the feeling of the 
 
DIONYSIUS OF ROME. 183 
 
 necessity of a Trinity, which then possessed the Church so 
 strongly, and which sought satisfaction in all possible directions, 
 may have led some to the verge of Tritheism: and this passage 
 gives us a hint, where those who gave way to such a tendency 
 are tobe sought. It isa modified form of Marcionitism, adapted 
 to the striving after a doctrine of the Trinity which characterized 
 this century, that here presents itself to us. To Marcion’s God 
 of legislation, and to the God of incarnation, there was added, 
 at this time, the Holy Spirit. If we note further, as did the 
 Roman Dionysius, that the Sabellians were intent above all 
 things on the assertion of the divine unity, whereas these Tri- 
 theists had landed in a triplicity of principles, we shall agree 
 with him in judging them to be diametrically opposed to each 
 other. At the same time, this does not prevent us seeing that 
 there is a connection between the two. We found above (see 
 Note 34, and the passage to which it relates, page 167), that 
 when the Sabellians tried to maintain the newness of the objec- 
 tive revelation in Christ—a point to which Marcion attached 
 prime importance—or, as we are now in a position to say, when 
 they yielded to the trinitarian impulse of their age, they actually 
 might be easily led to the topats, duaipéceow, arroppoiats, with 
 which Theodoret reproaches them. The Arians, too, almost 
 constantly charge the Sabellians with dividing the divine unity 
 (Note 38); and Athanasius and Hilary partially follow their 
 example; so that it is not improbable, that in Africa Marcion- 
 itism and Sabellianism were so commingled, that the entire 
 divine essence was, strictly speaking, held to be compounded 
 of these principles. 
 
 After pronouncing an adverse judgment on the Sabellian 
 doctrine, the Roman Dionysius passes on to the consideration of 
 the doctrine of the Alexandrian Bishop (without, however, men- 
 tioning his name), the natural tendency of which was to reduce 
 the Son to the rank of a mundane being. If the Son were born 
 (yevnros), if we may say that He was formed and created, then 
 there must have been a time when as yet He was not. He was, 
 however, always in the Father (who can never have been with- 
 out power and wisdom), as His power and wisdom (Note 39). 
 Of this absurd consequence, that the Father was once without 
 Son, those, he goes on to say, appear to have taken no notice, 
 who term the Son a creature («ticua). They do not under- 
 
184 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 stand Proverbs viii. 22—“The Lord created me as (geschagfen 
 als) the beginning of His ways’—aright; for the passage 
 refers to the dominion transferred over created things; and 
 other passages which speak of the generation of the Son ought 
 to be compared. His view of the true doctrine of the Church, 
 which preserves equally the divine Trinity and the holy procla- 
 mation of the divine povapyia, he expresses in the following 
 words :—“ With the God of the universe, the divine Logos 
 must necessarily be united; but in God, the Holy Spirit also 
 must be and dwell. But now the divine Trias must needs again 
 be combined and summed up in one, as in a head, that is, I 
 mean, in the Almighty God of the universe.” (De decr. Nic. 26: 
 —Hvicbat yap avayxn TO Oc@ TAv OdNev Tov Ociov Noyou" Ewht- 
 Aoxwpely 5E7O Oc@ Kat evdiaTao Oar Set TO Gyrov veda’ HON Kat 
 Tv Oelav Tpidda eis Eva Barre els KopupHy Tiva (TOV Ocov THY Ov 
 TOV TravToKpaTopa Néyw) cUyKEparaovabal Te Kail cuvdyerOaL 
 maca avayKn. Mapkiwvos yap tod watatoppovos Sidaypa, eis Tpets 
 apyas Ths povapylas Tounv Kat Siaipecw (sc. elapepovTos), K.T-A.) 
 Dionysius of Alexandria trod so closely in the footsteps of this 
 significant statement, in his Defence, that the formula itself is 
 legible out of the main position which he lays down. “So we 
 unfold,” says he, “ the indivisible Monas into a Trias, and sum 
 the Trias up again, undiminished, in the Monas (es 77v wovdda 
 ovyxeparatovucba, de Sent. Dionys.17).’ The utmost differ- 
 ence between the two is, that the Alexandrian Dionysius gives 
 more decided expression to the distinction than is given to it 
 by the formula of the Roman Bishop; and that, further, the 
 former allows the hypostasis of the Father more distinctly 
 to predominate, if, as is probable, he assigned to the Monas the 
 place of the Father. It is possible, however, that the Roman 
 understood by xopudy) the Father, and that the entire divine 
 sphere presented itself to his mind under the image of a 
 triangle, whose uppermost angle is the Father.’ 
 
 1 The other view would be,—The three constitute the one Almighty 
 God, concentring in Him, as different lines converge in one point or in one 
 centre. On this view, as well as on the other, the distinctions are taken 
 for granted, that is, the existence of a Trinity is presupposed; and then 
 steps are taken to combine them. In the latter case, however, the three 
 are and remain completely co-ordinated, which was not as yet the case even 
 in the system of Athanasius. 
 
LATIN CHURCH. 185 
 
 One might almost wish, with Neander, that Dionysius of 
 Alexandria had not so soon given way, but that the struggle 
 which so nearly awaited the Church, and of which a feeble pre- 
 lude occurred even in the third century, had been fought out 
 peacefully and thoroughly between men of like spirit such as 
 these. Not merely single individuals, however, but the Church 
 as a whole, was destined to take part in the great work, in order 
 that the knowledge which should finally result from bringing 
 the discerpted elements into the fullest antagonism to each other, 
 might the more clearly and surely become common property. 
 But even these discussions must have exerted a most important 
 influence on the more extended ones that followed, and, as it 
 were, have chalked out the course they should pursue. And as 
 this struggle preluded the great Arian controversy, so also did 
 the decision arrived at prelude the decision in the case of 
 Arianism. As the Alexandrian Dionysius, by withdrawing the 
 Arian proposition which he had advanced, did justice to that 
 general Christian consciousness which had always retained 
 its power over him, and which could never be satisfied with a 
 redemption effected by a mere creature, however exalted; so 
 are we fully warranted in anticipating that the Church, how- 
 ever great its previous vacillation, will prove capable of taking 
 the right course, relatively to the points which constitute its 
 foundation. But even at the time of Dionysius, the circum- 
 stance brought out during the struggle, that no one of the 
 controversialists was disposed to treat the Son as a mere crea- 
 ture, or even consciously and decidedly to subordinate Him to 
 the Father, must have greatly tended to strengthen this common 
 consciousness. The principle of the equality of the essence of 
 the Son with that of the Father, laid down by the early Church, 
 was merely revived by these controversies ; but, in consequence 
 of the temporary effort to conceive the Son as posited in time, 
 had developed into a clear conviction that Origen’s doctrine of 
 the eternal generation of the Son was an inevitable consequence 
 of the coessentiality or true deity of the Son, and must be 
 adopted by the Church, unless it were prepared to pass over into 
 Sabellianism or Arianism. 
 
 From the time of Tertullian onwards, the Eastern Church 
 alone was the arena of doctrinal movements; the Western 
 Church disappeared from the scene. Dionysius of Rome was 
 
186 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 the first to lead the Western Church again to take part in the 
 movement: but he was so far in advance, as compared with 
 Tertullian, and so very different from him, that, in order to 
 account for the sudden leap, we naturally look for connecting 
 links between the two; and such connecting links there must 
 unquestionably have been. Whilst the Greek. Church had 
 made such affinity with Hellenic philosophy, that it was unable 
 entirely to break away from the conception of God, as the 
 ‘Ov (even the ayévntov, which was employed to denote deity 
 “ sensu strictissimo,” and was deemed predicable of the Father 
 alone, was merely a new form of the “Ov),—the natural con- 
 sequence whereof was, that the Son could not be represented 
 as participating in the inmost divine essence, and must, there- 
 fore, even though in part contrary to intention, be subordinated 
 to the Most High God ;—the Western Church continued, as it 
 would appear, a stranger to the Hellenic. philosophy, and. its 
 idea of God. Taking the facts of Christianity for its starting- 
 point, it ventured to undertake the transformation of the old 
 conception of God, in a trinitarian sense; and never ceased 
 to attribute to the Son true divine substance,—as, indeed, fol- 
 lowed naturally enough from the circumstance, that it did not, 
 like Origen, assume a divine *Ov back of the divine d0£a, but 
 reckoned this divine 8d£a, in which the Son was acknowledged to 
 participate, as part of the inner divine essence, or reckoned the 
 inner divine essence to the d0£a. We have seen that Tertul- 
 lian and his school were unable to establish the hypostasis of 
 the Son, on which they insisted so strongly, and which, it is 
 true, they held to have proceeded forth from the inmost es- 
 sence of God, save at the price of a decided subordination 
 under the Father. In the hands of Dionysius, on the con- 
 trary, half a century later, we find that things wear altogether 
 a different appearance,—that subordination, namely, has been 
 strongly repressed, and that the unity of the essence of the 
 Father and of the Son is not merely asserted, but carried 
 out in such a way, that the hypostatic distinction of the Son 
 lost the clearness given it by Tertullian, and approximated 
 in some measure to Sabellianism; though with the difference, 
 that the distinctions in the divine essence were represented, 
 not as originating in consequence of the creation of the 
 world, but as immanent, eternal, and simultaneous. In order 
 
ZENO OF VERONA. 187 
 
 to fill up the gap between Tertullian and Dionysius, a man 
 deserves mention, who has been overlooked by recent writers 
 on the History of Dogmas,—I mean Zeno, Bishop of Verona. 
 The opinion, that the works attributed to him, and which were 
 first published at Venice a.p. 1508 (Bibl. MaxeePRectaa, 
 356 ff.), were either written by entirely different authors, or by 
 a Zeno who flourished somewhat before Ambrosius (about A.D. 
 360), and was Bishop in Verona, 1s based on a letter ad- 
 dressed by Ambrosius to Bishop Syagrius in Verona, where 
 he says (see Ambr. Opp. 5, 297) :—* Puellam (Indiciam) 
 Zenonis sanctee memorie judicio probatam ejusque sanctifica- 
 tam benedictione—in periculo reatus deducendam arbitrare.” 
 But this passage neither says that the nun was from Verona, 
 nor that the Zeno who confirmed her was Bishop in Verona. 
 On external grounds, little objection can be made to accepting 
 the statement as true, that these works were written by a Bishop 
 Zeno in Verona, who lived about the time of Origen and 
 Cyprian, and under Gallienus; unless internal grounds are 
 opposed thereto (compare Bibl. Max. 1. ¢. 357 ff.). But the 
 portions which we shall here bring under consideration, con- 
 tain a doctrine of the Trinity, such as could not have been 
 sanctioned by the Church subsequently to the Council of 
 Nicwa; and which indicates that their author most probably 
 flourished between Tertullian or Hippolytus, and Dionysius of 
 Rome. At the same time, the very decided originality and 
 individuality of the writings, alone render them worthy of a 
 more detailed consideration. In the first Homily on Genesis 
 (1. c. 359a), the author speaks against the eternity of matter, 
 and a duality of opposed principles, in terms similar to those 
 employed by Dionysius of Alexandria (see above). God_is 
 rather the principle; out of Himself He gave to Himself the 
 principle of being. This is our God, who has discriminated 
 Himself into God: this the Father, who, in His abiding state 
 (statu, which reminds one of Tertullian), in His entirety, duph- 
 cated Himself in the Son, in order not to rob Himself of any- 
 thing. “Hic est Deus noster, qui se digessit in Deum, hic 
 Pater, qui suo manente integro statu, totum se reciprocavit in 
 Filium, ne quid sibimet derogaret. Denique alter in altero 
 exultat, cum spiritus s. plenitudine una originali cozeternitate 
 renitens. Quemadmodum, si dicere dignum est, duo maria que 
 
188 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 in semet recumbunt, freto estus alternos in unum conferente 
 connexa ; que licet sui proprietate, locis, vocabulisque discreta 
 sint, tamen trini profundi vaporis (a7oppoias) una virtus, una 
 substantia, una est fluendi natura, nec potest incomprehensibilis 
 communisque unde dividi magnitudo, et tamen utrunque (utrin- 
 que?) commeando largiflua, utrisque propria, nulli privata. Ete- 
 nim damnum patientur ubertatis et gratize si adimatur (sc. id), 
 quod uno eodemque estu alterum ex altero decoratur.” This 
 obscure passage compares Father and Son to two seas, each of 
 which exists for itself, but whose waters meet and combine in a 
 strait. Hach of the seas is something by itself; is distinguished 
 from the other by its peculiar character, by place and by name; 
 but neither is lessened by the existence of the other. Through 
 the narrow channel, by which they are connected, both gain in 
 fulness, being otherwise of the same substance ; whereas both 
 would be losers if the interchange were to cease, and they were 
 deprived of the adornment they mutually owe to the meeting 
 and blending of their waters. The Holy Ghost appears here to 
 be described as the connecting link; but main stress is still 
 laid on Father and Son. He speaks in a similar way in the 
 third Homily :—“ The Son is equal to the Father. He says, 
 —The Father is in Me, and I am in the Father; one embraces 
 the other (invicem se capit), with the Holy Spirit.’ The 
 relation between the Father and the Son is treated with still 
 greater speciality in the Homilies “de eterna Dei generatione ” 
 (l. c. p. 386). If, on the one hand, what has been adduced is 
 sufficient to show, that for the successive Trinity of Tertullian 
 he had substituted a simultaneous one, and that, inasmuch as 
 he transfers Tertullian’s gradus, as simultaneous, into the status 
 of the divine essence, which he conceived to consist of several 
 centres, enjoying, notwithstanding their connection, an exist- 
 ence of their own, he had not witnessed the Sabellian con- 
 troversies without profit; the latter passage betrays, on the 
 other hand, a remarkable affinity with Tertullian. It is true, 
 the Son is termed “ Totus de toto,’ not merely “ portio;” the 
 Father brought forth in the Son another Self (pater in ipsum 
 alium se genuit ex se) out of Himself, out of His ungenerated 
 substance (ex innascibili (7.e., ayevvytw) sua substantia) ; out of 
 God, God is born—out of the unborn One, the only-begotten 
 One. But he says also,—Before all the ons, in the secret 
 
ZENO OF VERONA. 189 
 
 depths of His holy intelligence, in the counsel of His own mind, 
 unsearchable and known only to Himself, the Father embraced 
 the Son, not without love to Him, but without as yet revealing 
 Him. Hom. 2 :—“ Out of the mouth of the eternal Father, 
 who alone was acquainted with the secret of His own mind, 
 proceeded the only-begotten Son, the noble guest of His heart 
 (cordis ejus nobilis inquilinus), in order that the universe, which 
 as yet did not exist, might be created. Thence onwards, He 
 hecame visible, because He was destined to visit the human 
 race; though, in all other respects, He was equal to the Father.” 
 The third Homily says still more distinctly, that, prior to the 
 creation of the world, the Father kept the Son hidden in His 
 own consciousness (nescio qua sua conscientia velatum), and 
 embraced, not indeed without love, but without as yet fully 
 distinguishing Him from Himself (non sine affectu, sed sine 
 discrimine). In order, however, to the realization of the order 
 of things which had been devised, that unutterable power and 
 incomprehensible wisdom thrust forth the Word out of His 
 heart. Then Omnipotence propagated itself: out of God was 
 born God, who possesses in Himself all that the Father is, 
 and has,—not, however, withdrawing anything from the Father, 
 for that which is the Son’s is the Father’s, and that which 
 belongs to the Father belongs. to both (excogitatarum ut ordi- 
 nem instrueret rerum, ineffabilis illa Virtus, incomprehensibilis- 
 que Sapientia e regione cordis eructat verbum. Omnipotentia 
 se propagat. De Deo nascitur Deus, totum Patres habens, 
 nihil derogans Patri—quia, quod est Filii, Patris est, quod 
 Patris, amborum). The Father rejoices in the other Self, which 
 He has produced out of Himself (letatur Pater in alio se, 
 quem genuit ex se). The mode of generation is inexplicable ; 
 but to suppose that He cannot be termed generated, who pro- 
 ceeded forth, is madness. For the Son. limits Himself (tem- 
 perat se), on behalf.of nature; “ne eternze majestatis dominum 
 non possit mundi istius mediocritas sustinere.” In these latter 
 words, he seeks to guard against the appearance of bringing 
 the eternal divine essence of the Son. into too close proximity 
 to the world; as would seem to be the case, if He first pro- 
 ceeded forth from God as His Word, at the creation of the 
 world. It is unmistakeable, however, that he represents the 
 Son as proceeding out of the heart of the Father, and His 
 
190 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 determinate “discrimen,” as first taking place at the creaticn 
 of the world; and the sole perceptible difference between Zeno 
 and Tertullian is, that the former takes greater pains tc 
 make sure the full eternal deity of the Son in the Father (in 
 corde Patris), the co-ordination of the Son with the Father 
 after His procession to hypostatical existence, and, in general, 
 the permanence and simultaneity of the Trinity. The position 
 __that the Father has in the Son His other Self (alterum se), 
 or Himself as an object—was further carried out, at a later 
 period (in the fifth century), in the treatise appended to the 
 works of Cyprian, entitled “De Sina et Zion adv. Jud.,” after 
 the following manner: “ Salvator speculum Patris immacula- 
 tum, eo quod sanctus spiritus, Dei Filius geminatum se videat 
 Pater in Filio et Filius in Patre, utrigue se in se vident; ideo 
 speculum immaculatum.” We shall find similar language used, 
 however, even by Athanasius and Hilary. 
 
 The principal momenta of the Christology of Zeno (if the 
 sections which treat thereof be genuine; and in favour of their 
 genuineness many things plead, although I should not like to 
 assert it so confidently as in the case of the previous portions) 
 are as follows. We must distinguish a double birth of the Son 
 (as Tertullian and Hippolytus taught),—the first was without 
 mother, the second without Father. In the womb of the 
 Virgin He prepared for Himself a body (nothing is said re- 
 garding the soul). Out of love to His image, constricted into 
 a child, God weeps (amore imaginis sug coactus in infantem 
 vagit Deus). The Virgin comprised in herself Him whom the 
 world and its greatness cannot comprise. Meanwhile, He 
 threw aside His glory, but not His power. He whose eternity 
 admits of no age, went through the different ages of man. He 
 who confers eternity on the times, borrowed human life from 
 time. Contrary to His consciousness, he suffered as a weak 
 man, in order that immortality might become the portion of 
 man, who was snatched away by the law of death. This pas- 
 sage reminds one of early Christian hymns. Somewhat Doce- 
 tical in character is “de nat. Chr. hom. 2,” where he tries to 
 show, that if Mary were a virgin in conceiving, she must also 
 have been a virgin in bringing forth (sine dolore, etc.). As God, 
 He must have been able to be what He willed; accordingly, He 
 became what He was not, but did not cease to be what he had 
 
ARNOBIUS. 191 
 
 previously been (Hom. 1, de nat. Chr. :—“ Vultis scire in com- 
 pendio veritatem? actus est quod non erat: nec tamen 
 desiit esse ante quod fuerat”). But we need not be surprised at 
 these Docetical features; we know both from Hippolytus and 
 Methodius, that they were not foreign to the time. Jor a long 
 period after Origen, it was an universal custom to slight the 
 soul of Christ; and where it is done, it is a sign of high anti- 
 quity. Nor, again, need we be surprised at the repudiation 
 (hom. de nat. Chr. 1) of Ebionism, which teaches “Jesum 
 Christum ab utero Mariz sumsisse principium, Deumque exinde 
 ob justitiam factum esse, non natum;” of Subordinatianism, 
 which does indeed term the Son of God, God, “sed non ex 
 Patre nobilitatis perpetuitate progenitum, fuisseque tempus 
 quando non fuit ;” and of the “Judea secta,” which refuses 
 to distinguish between Father and Son. For, as far as con- 
 cerns the second in particular, we have certainly found the doc- 
 trine, that there was a time when the Son did not exist, both 
 taught under various forms during the third century, and also 
 expressly condemned by many teachers of the Church, for 
 example, by Origen. 
 
 This is probably the most suitable place for devoting a 
 word to some other men of the Latin Church ;—for example, 
 first to Arnobius and Minucius Felix, of whom the former at 
 all events was an African, and both of whom flourished in the 
 third century; then to Lactantius, who was a scholar of the 
 former. | 
 
 Arnobius endeavoured to demonstrate from the miracles of 
 Christ, that He was not one from amongst us (adv. Gent. 1, 
 45 f.); but, on the contrary, because of the great gifts which He 
 has brought us, deserves to be called God (1, 42). “Deus ille 
 sublimis fuit, Deus radice ab intima, Deus ab incognitis regnis 
 et ab omnium principe Deus sospitator est missus.” “Ye say, 
 it is true,” he cries to the heathen, “ Your God is dead.” “ But 
 death is no disgrace ; Socrates and others lost nothing by death ; 
 as little did their cause lose thereby. Moreover, the simple divine 
 essence did not suffer when Christ died. If the Sybil, whom 
 you believe to be filled with Apollo, were to be murdered by 
 wicked robbers, would you say, ‘Apollo was killed in her?’ 
 Death befell the man assumed by Him, not Him Himself; that 
 which was borne, not the vehicle and bearer (mors gestaminis 
 
192 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 fuit, non gestantis). And even this He would not have had to 
 endure, had there not been so great, so mysterious a work to be 
 accomplished” (1, 62). The illustration of the Sybil might be 
 taken to indicate that he regarded Christ as a mere prophet. 
 But he also designates Him, “ Deus radice ab intima,’ and in 
 1, 60, “vis invisibilis, habens nullam substantiam corporalem. * 
 So exalted, indeed, was He, that it was necessary for Him to 
 throw around Himself a covering of dark matter, on which the 
 eye might rest, and on which the gaze of dull contemplation 
 might be fixed. Had he presented Himself on earth, in His 
 “ primogenita natura,’ who would have been able to behold 
 Him? Wherefore He assumed the human form, and con- 
 cealed His might under a cloak of resemblance to our race, in 
 order that He might be seen, and might be able to execute all 
 that for which He came into the world, in pursuance of the 
 behest and commission of the Most High King. His Christ is 
 so far from being a man, that he rather verges strongly towards 
 Docetism ; and he does not appear to have objected even to the 
 expression—Christ was “homo simulatus” (1, 61). The real 
 kernel of the “velamen”’ or “ tegmen,” that is, of His humanity, 
 is His “ primogenia natura.” For this reason, he ascribes to 
 the death of Christ, as the taking away of that “tegmen,” the 
 peculiar effect that He was now seen in His real essence, espe- 
 cially by the spirits, who were seized with terror when they dis- 
 covered that He was God, whom they had esteemed to be one 
 of us. (Exutus corpore, quod in exigua sui circumferebat parte, 
 postquam videri se passus est, cujus esset aut magnitudinis 
 scirl: novitate rerum exterrita universa mundi sunt elementa 
 turbata, tellus mota contremuit, etc. Quid enim restabat, ut 
 fieret, postquam Deus est cognitus is, qui esse jam dudum unus 
 judicabatur e nobis? 1, 53.) He treats the work of Christ as 
 consisting mainly in His doctrine of the true God, who che- 
 rishes the same feelings towards all alike, who neither punishes 
 nor requires sacrifices ; and in the exhibition, in His own person, 
 of the divine longsuffering and tenderness. He was the Mediator 
 of the revelation of God. The idea of the God-man had no 
 constitutive significance for him ; indeed, with his undeveloped 
 system, he had scarcely arrived at the idea. Still, we may sup- 
 pose without improbability, that he did not wish to appear 
 oefore the heathen with all the mysteries of Christianity, and 
 
MINUCIUS FELIX. 193 
 
 that he passed over the doctrine of the Trinity in particular, 
 because the unity of God appeared to him to supply a peculiarly 
 forcible argument in favour of Christianity against the heathen, 
 —which argument he perhaps feared to shake by bringing for- 
 ward the doctrine of the Trinity, especially as he may have felt 
 incapable of fully grappling with the difficulties it presented. 
 This, however, is a new proof that he had not penetrated very 
 deeply into the soul of the doctrines of Christianity.—Still more 
 meagre are the results arrived at from an examination of 
 Minucius Felix. He says (Octavius, e. 20),—All philosophers 
 of repute teach one God, even though under different names. 
 So that everybody must believe, either that Christians are now 
 philosophers, or that philosophers were already Christians. In 
 his view, as in that of Arnobius, the principal and characteristic 
 doctrines of Christianity are, the unity of God, His invisibility 
 and omniscience, His providence, the end of the world, and the 
 resurrection of the dead. Of Christ, he only says in passing 
 (c. 29),—“ To our religion you ascribe a guilty man, and reckon 
 to him his cross. But you wander far from the truth, when 
 you fancy that a guilty man could deserve, or an earthly being 
 bring about, His own recognition as God (—“erratis, qui 
 putatis Deum credi aut meruisse noxium aut potuisse ter- 
 renum”). Still, these words imply, not merely that Christ was 
 holy, but also that He was not of the earth, and for this cause 
 He is believed in as God. “ Woe to him,” he goes on to say, 
 “whose entire hope rests on a mortal man; all his help is lost, 
 as soon as this man disappears.” Neither Arnobius nor Minu- 
 clus Felix allude to the Holy Spirit and the Trinity. : 
 
 The peculiar, and as yet little considered, Christology of 
 Lactantius, laid down in his “ Institutiones,” belongs properly 
 to another place; but the traditional elements thereof, which 
 are to a certain extent inconsistent with his own views, both in 
 tone, form, and substance, bear a remarkable resemblance to 
 that portion of Zeno’s system which we have touched upon. I 
 refer to what he says regarding the pre-existent higher essence 
 of Christ. This is the more remarkable, as the doctrine of 
 Christ’s higher nature, contained in his Tnstitutiones, though 
 evidently emasculated, is out of harmony with his general views 
 of things, could not be deduced from his premisses, and must 
 therefore be regarded as fragments of an entirely different 
 
 HOES AU N 
 
194 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 system of the world. Lactantius becomes, on this very ground, 
 a striking witness to the correctness of the view we have taken 
 of the history of this dogma, prior to Arius. The Son of God, 
 says he, proceeded forth from God for the creation of the world, 
 as a word proceeds out of the mouth,—hypostatically, however, 
 and not as “tacitus spiritus.” This Son is also termed the Word 
 of God, which the Greeks express still better by Logos, for 
 Logos denotes both word and reason (1. c. 8, 9). He is very 
 different from the other angels. “ Quoniam spiritus et sermo 
 diversis partibus proferuntur, spiritus naribus, ore sermo pro- 
 cedit, magna inter hunc Dei Filium ceterosque angelos differ- 
 entia est. Illi enim ex Deo taciti spiritus exierunt, qui non ad 
 doctrinam Dei tradendam sed ad ministerium creabantur. Ile 
 vero, quum sit et ipse spiritus, tamen cum voce ac sono ex Dei 
 ore processit, sicut verbum, ea scilicet ratione, quia voce ejus 
 ad populum fuerat usurus, 2.¢., quod ille magister futurus esset 
 doctrinze dei et ccelestis arcani ad homines perferendi.” He is 
 therefore God’s spokesman, produced by God, in order that He 
 might speak, “quod ipsum primo locutus est, ut per eum ipse 
 ad nos loqueretur, et ille vocem Dei ac voluntatem nobis reve- 
 laret. Merito igitur Sermo et Verbum Dei dicitur : quia Deus 
 procedentem de ore suo vocalem spiritum, quem non utero sed 
 mente conceperat, inexcogitabili quadam majestatis suz virtute 
 ac potentia in effigiem, que proprio sensu ac sapientia vigeat, 
 comprehendit.” This “sensus” and “potentia” He derived 
 from the Father (de Patre tanquam rivus de fonte traduxit). 
 If his derivation of the “Sermo Dei” from God, for the pur- 
 pose of the creation of the world and of revelation, fully war- 
 rants us in classing Lactantius amongst the teachers of the 
 Western Church, particularly subsequent to Tertullian, he 
 bears a special resemblance to Zeno, through the idea, which 
 he repeatedly advances, of the “ duplex nativitas” of Christ, the 
 one for the creation of the world, the other for the incarnation ; 
 then a still closer resemblance, through his description of the 
 first birth, which he says was “sine matre.” In this connection 
 he protests against the doctrine of Orpheus and Hermes, who 
 represented the Son as the fruit of a sexual dualism in God, 
 who is both adromdrwp and avtoujtwp. Apuleius quotes, as a 
 verse of Orpheus, the words, Zevs apanv yéveto, Zevs aPporos 
 erac.o voudn. At His first birth, on the contrary, we should 
 
LACTANTIUS. 195 
 
 rather say that the Son was aujtwp, and in the second aTaTW). 
 Finally, Lactantius follows the example of the older writers, 
 but specially of Zeno, in applying to the first birth of the Son 
 the words, “eructavit cor meum verbum bonum;” and shows, 
 in the above passage, how in his view the Son was at first con- 
 cealed in the “mens Dei,” and then was manifested through the 
 speaking of God. All this sufficiently proves that he too be- 
 lieved in the equality of the essence of the pre-existent hypo- 
 stasis of the Son with that of the Father. But Lactantius 
 undoubtedly betrays also a strong retrogressive tendency. Wher- 
 ever the Son is represented as proceeding forth from God for 
 the creation of the world, and for the revelation of God in We 
 it is possible in itself that such a doctrinal system may end either 
 in Sabellianism on the one hand, or in Arianism on the other, 
 and such a vacillation we find to have been characteristic of the 
 Fathers between Tertullian and Origen. Nor was it possible 
 for it to cease, so long as the various elements had not been 
 separated, and the heterogeneous principles to which they alter- 
 nately surrendered themselves had not been logically developed 
 into opposed systems. The decisive appearance of Sabellianism 
 in the third century led to a partial separation of the elements ; 
 and, as we see, even Lactantius very decidedly, though, it must 
 be allowed, inconsistently, ranged himself under the banner of 
 one party. In doing so, he repudiated very distinctly the Sabel- 
 lian view, with its denial of an hypostasis, but at the same time 
 inclined all the more decidedly to Subordinatianism. Zeno, on the 
 contrary, endeavoured to nullify the subordination involved in 
 the doctrine, that the Son first proceeded forth from God for 
 the creation of the world, by teaching that He was previously 
 an object of love in the heart of the Father, coeternal with 
 God; but he fails to answer clearly the question, as to the rela- 
 tion between the eternal existence of the Son in the Father, and 
 His production for the purpose of the creation of the world and 
 of the incarnation. Dionysius of Rome, on the other hand, 
 appears to have left the idea of the generation of the Son en- 
 tirely aside, and to have contented himself solely with the eternal 
 unity of the Son with the Father in distinction from Him, with- 
 out more carefully inquiring into the mode of this being, or 
 asking whether an eternal generation or production of the Son 
 took place in God. Dionysius of Alexandria, like Zeno, finally 
 
196 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 arrives at a kind of duplication of the vods in the Father and 
 the Son (Note 40). 
 
 Whatever other differences there may have been between 
 them, and whatever indefiniteness may have characterized their 
 expositions, it is evident that this entire series of men, from the 
 Eastern and Western Church, had certain fixed and invariable 
 doctrinal views. They all clung to the essential equality of the 
 Son and the Father, and to the distinction of the Son's pre- 
 existent hypostasis from that of the Father. But we find also 
 various indications that the Church was gradually arriving at a 
 more and more fixed doctrinal type, of this same general charac- 
 ter. After the controversy between the two Dionysiuses, Sabel- 
 lianism disappeared ever more completely from the scene; and 
 in the following century was treated, both by Arians_and 
 orthodox, as a view already repudiated by the Church,—a 
 circumstance which points back to the afore-mentioned Romish 
 Synod. In opposition to Arianism, also, the later Church 
 teachers appealed to this Synod. But the reaction which now 
 set in against the system of Origen, especially against its sub- 
 ordinatian aspect, is particularly deserving of notice. This re- 
 action was characterized, indeed, by many displeasing features, 
 but strikingly demonstrates the correctness of what has just 
 been said. The first and milder form of the polemic may be 
 found, perhaps, at the close of the Confession of Faith adopted 
 by the Synod of Antioch (Note 41). But a still more strong 
 polemic was waged about the year 300. It is instructive to 
 read, in the Apology of Pamphilus, the points of accusation 
 against Origen, as they are the same which were brought for- 
 ward even prior to the Arian controversy, and indicate very 
 plainly what was at that time deemed necessary to orthodoxy in 
 general. Inasmuch as Pamphilus does not say that the oppo- 
 nents of Origen were in error on these points, and required what 
 was false, but endeavours rather to show that Origen had taught 
 what they required; nay more, in that he grants that it would 
 have been heresy in Origen to have taught the doctrines which 
 his opponents attributed to him ; this monument is the more in- 
 teresting. Whether he was able to clear Origen of the charges, 
 or whether Eusebius took part in the composition of the first 
 book of the Apology or not, does not concern us in this connec- 
 tion. ‘Che work was certainly written between a.p. 307 and 309. 
 
PAMPHILUS. SYNODS OF ANTIOCH. 197 
 
 The first charge is, that Origen did not believe the Son to 
 have been born, or begotten,—which does not mean that he 
 recognised no distinction between the unbegotten Father and 
 the Son, but, as the answer shows, that he did not hold the Son 
 to be Son of God by nature; whereas he ought to have taught, 
 that He was of the substance of the Father, and of a different 
 nature from the creature." The second charge was that of re- 
 presenting the Son as having arrived at subsistence by mpo[3ony, 
 after the manner of Valentinus. The third charge was, that 
 he refused to designate Christ God, and made Him a mere 
 man. The fourth charge was, treating the history of Christ 
 docetically. The fifth, teaching two Christs. In connection 
 with this latter point, special remark is deserved by the hint 
 that the giving great prominence to the human soul of Christ 
 seemed to many to be equivalent to teaching two Christs, and 
 was, therefore, a cause of offence. “Si quis sane offenditur, 
 quod dixit, Salvatorem etiam animam suscepisse, nihil de hoc 
 amplius respondendum puto, nisi quod hujus sententiz non 
 Origenes auctor est, sed ipsa sancta scriptura, etc.;—from 
 which we see clearly how very far the completeness of the 
 human aspect of the Person of Christ was lost to the view of 
 the Church, in consequence of the prominence given to the 
 doctrine of His higher nature. We shall have occasion to 
 make the same remark respecting Athanasius, at the beginning 
 of his career. 
 
 Another very important source of information concerning 
 the character of the general views of the Church during the 
 second half of the third century, are the two Synods of Antioch, 
 convened in the years 265 and 270, for the purpose of judging 
 Paul. of-Samosata (Note 42). Their decrees, although they 
 undoubtedly, lacked a strictly doctrinal form, and had rather 
 
 1 Pamphilus adduces, in reply, a number of passages, in which the Son 
 is described as Light of Light; as Love from God, who is Love; as an out- 
 flow from God; nay more, as ¢“oovoros with the Father. The latter pro- 
 bably originated with Rufinus, though we have found that, on a subse- 
 quent occasion, Dionysius of Alexandria, when he was required to use this 
 term, showed himself ready to do so. But that, in the main, the translation 
 of Rufinus gives a correct impression of the work of Pamphilus and Eusebius, 
 1s evident from Jerome’s charge against it, of containing the poison of 
 Arianism. Compare the Introduction to this treatise in de la Rue’s ed. 
 Wer Rig: 
 
198 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 an exegetical character, were recognised as orthodox by later 
 Synods. We find in them a strong predominance given to the 
 Father over the Son, for example, at the very outset; and 
 other words and turns of expression are employed, which would 
 probably have been avoided subsequently to the Council of 
 Nice. The Confession runs as follows :—“ We believe that God, 
 to wit, the Father, is unbegotten, One, without beginning, in- 
 visible,” etc. “Through the revelation of His beloved Son, we 
 receive a knowledge of Him, though it is imperfect, owing to 
 our weakness.” “The Son is yevvntos,” it goes on to say, “the 
 only-begotten Son, the image of the invisible Father, the first- 
 born of creation, the Wisdom and Logos and Power of God, 
 who existed before the Alfons, not merely in the divine fore- 
 knowledge (srpoyveces), but we confess and proclaim Him, as we 
 have learnt from the Old and New Testaments, as God, both 
 in His essence and in His hypostasis (otela cat trrocracer).' 
 Whoso denies that the Son of God existed before the founda- 
 tion of the world, and maintains that this is to teach two Gods, 
 him we regard as estranged from the canon of the Church; 
 and all the communities of the Church General are of the like 
 opinion (TodTovy aANOTpLOY TOD eKKANTLATTLKOD KaVOVOS 1YyoU- 
 ela, Kal macar ai Kaborxal éexkrnolar cvpdwvodow Hiv). 
 Concerning Him who was always with the Father (adv Té 
 Tatpt ael dvta), we believe, that He accomplished the Father’s 
 will in the creation of the universe. Through Him the Father 
 created all things, not as through an instrument, nor as through 
 an impersonal wisdom (ody ws 6” dpydvou ov0 ws Ov ériaTHuns 
 avuTrooratov) ; for, when the Father begat the Son, He begat 
 a living, personal energy (@s f@cap évépyevay Kat évuTooTarov). 
 He appeared to Abraham, conversed with the patriarchs, now 
 as an angel, now as the Lord, now as God. But we say also, 
 that the law was given to Moses by the intervention of the Son 
 
 1 Judging from the context, ovo/g, as the antithesis to rpoyvaees, will 
 refer to the reality of the pre-existence. At a later period, the Arians 
 frequently adopted the above Confession as their own, possibly for the very 
 reason that it corresponded to the requirements of the Fathers of Antioch. 
 
 ? The Oriental bishops sent the Epistola Synodica to which this Con- 
 fession was annexed to the Western Church, to Dionysius of Rome, to the 
 Alexandrian Church, and, indeed, to all bishops, presbyters, and deacons, 
 nara thy olxovuévyy (Euseb. 1. c. 7, 30 init.). 
 
 —_ se 
 
CONFESSION OF ANTIOCH. 199 
 
 (Scaxovodvros Tob viod).”* And now the Confession passes on 
 from the pre-existent Son to His incarnation :-—“ We believe 
 and confess, further, that the Son, who was God with the 
 Father and Lord of all creation, was sent by the Father from 
 heaven, and became flesh, assuming humanity; for which cause, 
 tie body out of the Virgin, containing as it did all the fulness 
 of the Godhead bodily, is unchangeably united and deified with 
 His deity. Hence was one and the same Jesus Christ pro- 
 claimed as God and man in the law and the prophets, and in 
 the entire Church which is under heaven is believed in as 
 One.” (Tov 88 vidv rapa tO Tarpt dvta, Ocov pev Kal KUpLOV 
 TOV YEVYNTOV aTAVTOD, imo S€ Tod TarTpos amootanevta é& 
 otpavav Kab capxobévta évnvOpwrnxevat (Ojoroyoupey, K.T.r.)° 
 Suotrep Kal TO éx Ths mapOévov cpa, xwphoav wav TO TAN- 
 papa THS OeoTNTOS TOMATLKOS, TH Oeotnte aTpeTTMS HvwTat Kal 
 teOcomointar. (This last expression of Paul’s was allowed 
 to pass.) O8 ydpw 6 adtos Ocds kal dvOpwros ’Incots Xpioros 
 mpoednreveto év voum Kal mpopytats, Kab ev TH EKKANTIA TH 
 ind tov oblpavov rdcon TeriotevTat, Oeds pev KevOTas EavTOD 
 amd Tod elvat ica Och, dvOpwTos dé Kab x orréppatos Aavid T4 
 Kata cdpKa, TA pev onucia Kal Ta Tépata, Ta ev Tots EvaryryEdtoLs 
 avayeypappeva 6 eds Hv éritedécas, TO O€ GapKos Kal aipaTtos 
 precynkevas TOV avTov TeTELpapevoyv KATA TavTA Kal opowoTnTa 
 yopls awaptias. Otro Kab 6 Xpwctds mpo THs capkwoews €v 
 tals Oelats ypaais, ds eis, @vomacTat.”) 
 
 The Confession opens with the following words :—* It 
 seemed good to us to set forth as follows, in writing, the faith 
 
 1 As everything which relates to the hypostatical pre-existence of the 
 Son was directed primarily, indeed, against Paul,—naturally, however, 
 against Monarchianism in general, and, therefore, against Sabellius also,—so 
 should I be inclined to see in this very emphatic mention of the share taken 
 by the Son in the law, an allusion to the Sabellians, with whom the Ori- 
 eutals must certainly have become acquainted after, if not before, the 
 controversy between the two Dionysiuses. For the Sabellians ascribed 
 legislation to the Father, whereas they excluded the Son entirely from the 
 Old Testament. 
 
 2 Then follow the passages, Lamentations iv. 20; 2 Cor. iil. 17; 1 Cor. 
 eos Hob. x1..208) betcha Oat. to 1 Cor. i. 24. Ei b& Xptoros Ocov 
 Divers nal Osov coQicec, xpd wiavey éotly, ovr nol xaebo Xpisrds ev nal ro 
 xitd dy TH ovolae, ei xal TH MaALoTR morals xivolats emivocires. Nota 
 word is spoken concerning the soul, which, after the time of Apollinaris, 
 would be quite unintelligible. 
 
200 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 as we have received and held it from the beginning, which has 
 been handed down to us, and is preserved in the Holy Catholic 
 Church to the present day, which has come to us in an un- 
 broken line from the holy Apostles, who were eye-witnesses 
 and servants of the Word.” 
 
 By this act of the Church, Ebionism, in its higher Hellenic 
 form also was shut out (a circumstance which, as we shall see, 
 was not without an important bearing on the Arian contro- 
 versies); and if to this end it was necessary to confess. the 
 pre-existence of the hypostasis of the Son, Sabellianism also 
 was excluded; and if, finally, the real motive for the rejection 
 of Paul of Samosata was the conviction, that the full concep- 
 tion of Christianity requires us to acknowledge that the Deity 
 appeared in the Son in a personal form, and was not a mere 
 power; if, accordingly, the doctrine of the Son’s pre-mundane 
 generation out of the Father were taught, and these two points 
 —that is, the pre-existence of the hypostasis and the generation 
 out of the Father—were developed into, and summed up in, 
 the determinate doctrine of the eternal existence of the hypo- 
 stasis of the Son with the Father,—we may see very clearly 
 what direction the stream of Church thought... was..taking, 
 towards the end of the third century. It is the direction which 
 resulted, by an internal necessity, from the course pursued by the 
 preceding history, from its ever fuller and clearer development 
 of doctrine, no less than from the inner, ever-present principle 
 which gave the impulse. The position of the Arians was that 
 of men who are born out of due time; or, to adopt another 
 image, they resembled stagnant, or even receding waters; for, 
 just as the Church, in consequence of the favourable political 
 position in which it was placed, quitted its earlier career—a 
 career rich in conflict, and therefore rich in vitality—and en- 
 tered on the easy and open, but also flat plain; and further, 
 when, in consequence thereof, the vital power by which the 
 Church should work up, purge, and appropriate the ante-Chris- 
 tian elements, ceased, at all events, for the moment to bear any 
 proportion to the masses of the heathen world which now pressed 
 into it, the Arians stood still. At this point, however, our atten- 
 tion must be directed to a new aspect of the matter. 
 
 As early as the second half of the third century, we find 
 within the Church itself, independently of the heathens who 
 
CONFESSION OF ANTIOCH. 201 
 
 pressed rapidly into it, a dangerous mixture with the world, 
 and a suspicious attention to externals, to power and mere 
 numbers, even at the cost of inner truth; and, finally, an in- 
 timacy with heathen philosophy, without the vigour necessary 
 to its transformation, which necessarily reacted corruptingly on 
 the Christian mind, and sapped the energy of the conscience of 
 Christian science in relation to its subject-matter, that is, faith.’ 
 
 These external considerations alone, prove that the storm 
 which burst at the commencement of the fourth century was 
 not sudden and unprepared. On the historian, however, de- 
 volves the further task of showing that the possibility of even 
 the great Arian movement was promided in the doctrinal con- 
 dition of a previous.age, and that, agreeably to a higher order, 
 it was both necessary to, and exerted a wholesome influence on, 
 the development of doctrine in the Church. 
 
 To this subject the introduction to the next section will be 
 devoted, where we shall find the doctrinal materials of the great 
 conflict; that is, both the weaknesses and defects of the dogma, 
 in the form to which we have seen it grow; and the frequent 
 inclinations to subordinatian and Arian representations, on the 
 part of the world of cultivated laymen,—inclinations which 
 necessarily assumed greater power in the Church the more it 
 endeavoured to stand forth in a worldly shape and form. 
 
 1 Let us call to mind Paul of Samosata (Euseb. H. E. 7, 30), whose 
 part even Lucian the martyr is said to have taken; the claims of the 
 Romish bishops, which rose with every new success ; the commencing pomp 
 and externality of the Cultus; the opposition already necessary to be 
 raised against the worship of martyrs (for example, under Commodian) ; 
 the impurity of the view taken of marriage and celibacy ; the beginnings of 
 monasticism—a fleeing from the world which only a feeble Christian con- 
 sciousness could regard as identical with the denial of the world required 
 by Christianity, whilst it really served, along with that other, to make the 
 Church hierarchical, that is, to give it a worldly form, whilst preserving 
 the appearance of Christianity ; and, finally, let us call to mind how fre- 
 quently men highly esteemed in the Church were styled Rhetors and 
 Sophists—titles by no means so unobjectionable as that of Philosopher, 
 used in the second century. 
 
202 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOOR. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 ARIUS AND HIS FORERUNNERS. 
 
 Wuart led so many even of the cultivated into the Church, 
 from the end of the third century onwards, and from the time 
 of Constantine the Great, was not so much an universally dif- 
 fused and deeper conviction of the need of redemption and the 
 necessity for a redeemer other than man, as the total decompo- 
 sition of Heathenism, brought about by philosophy or illumina- 
 tism and by Christianity. As compared with Polytheism and 
 its superstition, Christianity was the religion of Monotheism, 
 and it was distinguished from Judaism by its universalism. It 
 was recognised, therefore, as the true religion, and as fitted to 
 give life and reality to the final conclusion at which heathen 
 philosophy had arrived, to wit, the unity of God, and to secure 
 for it a place amongst the convictions of mankind as a whole. 
 In which connection, it was not forgotten that the merely nega- 
 tive universalism at which the heathen world had arrived, after 
 the annihilation of its national gods, was converted by Chris- 
 tianity into a positive universalism. For the one God taught 
 by Christianity, and the knowledge of whom it deems to be the 
 true philosophy, is not a mere idea of the reason, but a living, 
 watchful Providence, who reveals Himself for the whole of 
 humanity, and thus satisfies not merely the intellect, but the re- 
 ligious impulse; which latter especially can be content with 
 nothing short of the communication of God Himself. We can 
 thus understand why Christianity took such immense strides, 
 and why also it made extensive, in part, at the cost of intensive, 
 progress. 
 
 The danger of taking a superficial view of Christianity, and 
 the temptation to regard the development of doctrine hitherto 
 considered, as a secondary matter, and the living Monotheism of 
 Christianity, on the contrary, as the main matter, could only 
 have been easily evaded in one way,—to wit, by connecting the 
 doctrine of the Person of Christ with a more fully developed 
 doctrine of His work and office, and thus giving the former a 
 greater hold on the mind. This, however, presupposed a deeper 
 
ARIUS AND HIS FORERUNNERS 203: 
 
 estimate of the doctrines of anthropology, and of the state of 
 sin and grace, for which the time had not yet come. Those 
 who were truly animated by the.spirit of the Church devoted 
 their best powers to the subject of the Trinity, and had there- 
 with enough to do. Did not the foundation-stone need first to 
 be laid?—what Christianity is in itself objectively, first to be 
 ascertained? So long as the reason why Christ ought to be 
 regarded as the Son of God, in an hypostatical form, and why, 
 because of the appearance of Christ, the old Morcthician should 
 be so boldly cast aside, was as imperfectly understood as it was 
 at first; many Christians, specially of the just-mentioned mo- 
 notheistic sort, were necessarily driven to regard it as an useless 
 expenditure of pains on the part of God, to appear, as the creeds 
 of the Church maintained, in the hypostasis of the Son in 
 Christ; and to such a feeling neither the Scriptures nor the 
 tradition of the Church could furnish a sufficient counterpoise, 
 where the religious impulse, whose cry is for a marriage of the 
 perfect God with humanity, lacked vitality, and there had been 
 no experience of the need of redemption. Precisely in this con- 
 nection the circumstance must-be-considered, that the Eastern 
 Church had taken a predominantly theoretical, the. Western a 
 predominantly practical turn; and that both had diverged in 
 many respects from the true religious centre. — 
 
 In the _East,.from the time of Origen onwards, theological 
 science flourished ever more and more, but passed frequently 
 over into a supernatural intellectualism, which laid chief stress 
 on doctrine in general; and, as the character of this Church 
 would lead us to expect, on the doctrine of God in particular. 
 
 0 regard ( Christ, however, merely as the teacher, the revealer 
 of God, is, at the very outset, to make Him a mere organ and 
 means, and not a constitutive element, of that which is to be 
 revealed.” His person, and therefore the Trinity also, could not 
 then be regarded as forming part of the contents of His doc- 
 trine, as He would rather be the mere “ principium cognos- 
 cendi,’ or the formal principle. To this conclusion, too, many 
 actually arrived, both_Arians—and Sabellians. Furthermore, 
 the theology of the Eastern Church had not yet freed itself 
 from the abstract conception of God, taught by Hellenic philo- 
 sophy, as we see most plainly from the circumstance that aseity 
 was attributed, not to the entire trinitarian God, but to one 
 
204 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 hypostasis; the consequence of which was, that this hypostasis 
 was inevitably put into the position either of the Most High 
 God, or of the entire God, and a constant vacillation between 
 Subordinatianism and Sabellianism. It is particularly deserv- 
 ing of remark in this connection, that the Church teachers of 
 the fourth century very frequently appeal to Philo, to Por- 
 phyry, to Plotinus, to Amelius, to Numenius, and other Neo- 
 Platonists; and believed that they could find the Christian 
 conception of God in an almost pure state in the writings of 
 these men, who, in consequence of the Christian influences 
 under which they had lived, had constructed a kind of doctrine 
 of the Trinity. The Father is the "Ov, the airiov, etc. This 
 Ov, which is the Father, was probably the ultimate foundation 
 of the Subordinatianism from which the Eastern Church found 
 such difficulty in freeing itself, notwithstanding the evident in- 
 compatibility thereof with its religious convictions. We need 
 scarcely remark, that such an intellectualism as this could not pos- 
 sibly ensure to Christ an eternal significance, nor indeed assign 
 to His humanity in general a sure place, but always necessarily 
 inclined to seek a one-sided support in the Logos; nor, lastly, 
 that there invariably slumbered behind it a superficial view of 
 sin, a notion that it could be overcome by higher enlightenment. 
 Indeed, there is no doubt that this intellectualism, with its dis- 
 regard of anthropology, of the doctrine of sin, and of the work 
 of Christ, was already Pelagianistic at the bottom. 
 
 The Western Church, on the contrary, was stirred by a 
 spirit of a more practical or ethical kind. It very quickly saw 
 the change in the position occupied by Christianity in the world, 
 and understood how to make use thereof; accordingly, instead 
 of taking up a negative position, or theoretically isolating itself, 
 the Church set itself the task of morally transforming the world 
 by means of Christianity. This powerful moral impulse was 
 embodied in the Western representative of Montanism, Tertul- 
 lian, but propagated itself from him in Novatian, Cyprian, in 
 ‘Aaroniie! Minucius Felix, and Lactantius, the last mentioned 
 of whom incorporated a kind of ethics with his Institutions. At 
 a later period, Ambrose and Augustine intensified this tendency 
 in the direction of religion ; ‘Pelagius made it more superficial. 
 
LACTANTIUS 205: 
 
 I. Lactantius. 
 
 At the period now under review, when, although the Western 
 Church was stirred by the practical impulse just described, at 
 the same time the consciousness of the need of redemption and 
 of the power of sin was still undeveloped, the significance of the 
 Person of Christ was limited principally to a aiiseantes to the 
 will. He appeared in order to bring about right action. Now, 
 it is self-evident that, if Christ came merely to be a teacher and 
 example of virtue, the Church was at very useless pains in 
 bringing forward its doctrine of the Trinity. At this point, 
 however, the idea of the ethical incarnation of God, which re- 
 quired to be included as a momentum of Christology, was 
 brought forward for the first time in a more developed shape. 
 Nor need we be much surprised to find that Lactantius, who 
 represented this aspect in a vigorous and original manner, did 
 not succeed very well in combining it with the Trinity. We 
 shall have occasion, however, to recognise that the tendency in 
 the Church to assert the identity of the essence of the Son with 
 that of the Father, must have been very strong, when it forced 
 from Lactantius, with his one-sided ethical fundamental views, 
 such a Christology, however defective its form. 
 
 In the view of Lactantius, the ethical constitutes the central 
 feature of Christianity. The vigour of his moral consciousness 
 expresses itself in a remarkable manner, and in glaring contrast 
 with most of the Oriental Fathers, in his work “ De via Dei;” 
 especially also in his Christology. “He bade His only-begotten 
 Son,” says he (Instit. 4, 11), “the Creator of the world (opificem), 
 His counsellor, descend from heaven, in order that He might 
 carry the holy religion of God to the nations of the heathen, and 
 might teach ee the righteousness which a faithless people 
 had cast away.” Here, deeds he places religion and ethics 
 Agus of each other; but, as is well known, he derives 
 “religio” from “religare” (4, 28), and, accordingly, gives to 
 the ethical element even in religion the decided predominance. 
 Christ he terms, therefore, “Magister, doctor virtutis (4, 11), 
 doctor, preceptor justitie” (4, 10, 13, 23, 24, 25). He does 
 not understand this, however, merely of His words :—the Son 
 was sent to be the “viva prasensque lex,” so different from the 
 Old Testament law, that Moses, the lawgiver, was himself 
 
206 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 obliged to prophesy His coming (4, 17, 25). He is the bringer 
 in of anew law. No one, since the foundation of the world, 
 was like Christ, who taught wisdom by His word, and con aed 
 His doctrine by the presence of His virtue (c. 23), But why 
 was it necessary for such a teacher to come from heaven? In 
 order that henceforth there might be no longer a difference be- 
 tween earthly and heavenly. Here he (ae for support on his 
 supernaturalism. “ In homine interna et propria doctrina nullo 
 pacto esse potest.” The spirit which is shut up in the body, and 
 its perishable nature, cannot by itself understand and lay hold of 
 the truth, if it do not learn it elsewhere. The pure knowledge 
 of virtue must therefore come from above. But why would not 
 an earthly teacher (terrenus doctor), to whom the good had been 
 revealed, have sufficed? Because it did not depend merely on 
 the teaching, but also on the representation, of virtue, and be- 
 cause the former, without the latter, is an imperfect and inope- 
 rative thing. An earthly teacher could not be perfect; for, even 
 if we were to conceive him in possession of a pure knowledge of 
 the good, he could neither grasp the highest virtue, nor resist all 
 sins, the incitement to which lies in the body. On the contrary, 
 the heavenly teacher, whom His deity made partaker of wisdom, 
 and His immortality of virtue, must needs be perfect, both in 
 His doctrine and in all things. Accordingly, it is not merely 
 necessary for the right teacher of virtue to come down from 
 God; but he alone is the true teacher, who personally embodies 
 the good, or who is the living and present law. He is thus led 
 by the ethical to the recognition of the necessity of the incar- 
 nation, to the idea of the incarnation of the law. God must 
 become man _in order to realize righteousness on-earth. On this 
 thought he dwells with peculiar fondness, and by its means was 
 able to give an explanation even of the exinanition and the 
 death of Christ. “It has often been denied,” says he (c. 
 22), “that anything can be taken away from an immortal 
 nature, and that incarnation, the burden of the flesh and its 
 sufferings, could be either worthy of or necessary for God. 
 For surely it must be easy enough for Him to show Himself to 
 men, and to teach them righteousness, without assuming the 
 weakness of the body; nay, indeed, with the better result if He 
 showed Himself as God. For if the power and might of the 
 commanding God had approached to men, all would have ren- 
 
LACTANTIUS. 207 
 
 dered obedience. Why, then, did He come, not as God, but 
 poor and lowly, so that He was despised and punished by men? 
 Why did He not warn the men who sought to lay hands on 
 Him away, by His power, or escape from them by His deity? 
 Why did He not reveal His majesty, at all events, in the article 
 of death?” All these objections, says he, I will carefully 
 examine and refute, that every one will not merely cease to 
 wonder that God should be crucified, but will see clearly that 
 Christ could not have been believed in as God had not that 
 happened which some blame. 
 
 He who gives a command must himself observe it; other- 
 wise, it has no force, For if that which is commanded is good 
 in itself, the lawgiver must not separate himself from the num- 
 ber and fellowship of the rest of men; on the contrary, he must 
 himself live as he teaches other men to live. Only on condition 
 that he who commands, puts himself on a level with him who is 
 commanded, is the freedom of the latter ensured to him. Then 
 the latter is free in obeying; if, however, he who commands, 
 does not submit to the law which he imposes on others, and 
 lives otherwise than as he commands, those who are commanded 
 are not free in their obedience, and cannot be bound to render 
 obedience. For this reason, it behoved God to subject Himself 
 to His own law; and this He could only do, by becoming a man 
 and living as we live. Now, for the first time, is our obligation 
 complete. For now no one can any longer say,—* IT am unable 
 to do what Thou requirest ; my nature is too weak. ‘Thou for- 
 biddest me anger, concupiscence, passion, the fear of pain and 
 death, and yet it is against nature : or, if Thou supposest we can 
 resist nature, show me how, that | may know. What presump- 
 tion to impose laws on a free man, which one does not obey 
 oneself! Hence comes it, that no man obeys the laws of philo- 
 sophers. Rather will I have examples than words; for to talk 
 is easy, but to do, hard. Such excuses, which lead to our de- 
 spising the teachers when they are men, and, when God is the 
 teacher, lean for support on human weakness, are put to silence 
 as soon as God subjects Himself to the law,—the condition 
 whereof is His incarnation. 
 
 ~ From this statement, we might, strictly speaking, draw the 
 conclusion, that the incarnation was necessary to the ethical per- 
 fection of God Himself, to the full actuality of His ethical 
 
208 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 existence. This aspect of the matter he passes over lightly, 
 and gives the greater prominence to the ceconomical (c. 24). 
 “ Without assuming a mortal body, God could not be a perfect 
 teacher of righteousness. For if He came to men as God, He 
 could not, even apart from the consideration that mortal eyes 
 would be unable to bear the brightness of His majesty, as God 
 teach virtue ; for without body, He could not do what He had 
 to teach, and therefore His doctrine would be imperfect. It is 
 true, Thou sinnest not, one might have said to Him; but it is 
 because Thou art free from this body of ours. Thou hast no 
 desires, because, as an immortal, Thou hast no needs. I, on the 
 contrary, need many things, for the support of this life of mine. 
 Thou fearest not death, because it has no power over Thee. 
 Thou despisest pain, because it can do Thee no harm. But Tyra 
 mortal, fear both; for both cause me pain. Such excuses the 
 teacher of virtue must needs cut short; but he could only do so if 
 he were able to say,—‘ What thou callest impossible, I do myself ; 
 therefore thy sin is not necessary, but is thy guilt. The flesh, 
 concerning which thou sayest, To sin is essential to it, I also 
 bear; and yet sin does not reign in me. Pain and death for 
 righteousness’ sake, which appear to thee unbearable because of 
 the weakness of the flesh, has also its power in me; and that 
 which thou fearest I conquer, in order to make thee also a victor 
 over pain and death. I go before thee, through that which thou 
 callest unbearable ; canst thou not follow one who merely com- 
 mands ? so follow him who goes before thee as a leader,’ Thou 
 seest, therefore, how much more perfect a mortal teacher is than 
 an immortal one; for the former can teach mortals, whereas the 
 latter, not being himself subjected to suffering, cannot instruct 
 in patience. I do not, however, say this in order to place man 
 higher than God; but in order to show that a man cannot be a 
 perfect teacher, if he is not at the same time God, and there- 
 fore able to impress upon others the necessity of obedience by 
 heavenly authority : nor, on the other hand, can God be a per- 
 fect teacher, if he do not clothe Himself in a human body, in 
 order, by carrying out His words into action, to shut up all 
 others under the necessity of obedience. The leader to life, the 
 teacher of righteousness, must have a body ; otherwise it is im- 
 possible that His doctrine should be full and perfect, should 
 have root and ground, should abide in and cling to men. He 
 
LACTANTIUS. 209 
 
 Himself must needs subject Himself to the weakness of the flesh 
 and the body, and take up into Himself the virtue of which He 
 is the teacher, in order that He might teach it both by word 
 and deed” (c. 24). 
 
 In order, then, that virtue and the law might abide in us, be 
 perfectly implanted in us, Lactantius supposes that it was neces- 
 sary for it to assume a living shape, to become man; the good 
 must suffer, virtue must become incarnate. But this living 
 law, this living virtue, is. Christ, God and man, as Mediator 
 between the two. (uit ergo et Deus et homo, inter Deum 
 atque hominem medius constitutus. Unde illum Greci Meoirnp 
 vocant: c. 25.) . 
 
 One might still suppose that Christ, though conceived as the 
 living law, as the personal embodiment of virtue, stood outside 
 of us, even as did the law of Moses. He reminds us, however, 
 that example has a very different effect from commands. It is 
 a hand which draws us after itself (He is “ preevius et manum 
 porrigit secuturo,” c. 24); it is an attraction and an incitement 
 (incitamentum) ; first when the Lawgiver becomes man, does 
 His law acquire perfectly obligatory force, and therefore its per- 
 fect power (c. 25). Through Him who is eternal, and as man 
 also God, God has confirmed the eternal law (c. 17), and the 
 law has gained an authority and force, which it would not have 
 had if the Lawgiver had been a mere man. Men could not be 
 compelled to righteousness by a merely human lawgiver, unless 
 a higher power and authority were superadded (c. 25). But 
 inasmuch as He is both God and man, necessity is laid on men 
 to obey (that is, the law has acquired power to influence) ; not 
 by any sort of violence, but by shame, and in such a way 
 that freedom, rewards, and punishments remain;—the former, 
 because it was still possible for them to disobey if they chose. 
 in that He appeared, not in might and glory, but in lowliness_ 
 the latter, because they were able to obey if they would. Veilea 
 in the flesh, He has shown that flesh also is able to lay hold on 
 virtue (carnem posse capere virtutem). The Master of virtue 
 became perfectly like men, in order, by His own victory over 
 sin, fo teach men that sin may be conquered by them (c. 24). 
 A spirit without body could not conduct to immortality, for it 
 is the flesh which prevents us men from following God; being 
 earthly and mortal, it drags down the spirit which is united with 
 
 Welle O 
 
210 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 it to the earth, and from immortality to death. For this reason 
 the Mediator came, God in the flesh, in order that the flesh might 
 follow Him, and that He might rescue man from death, to 
 whose dominion the flesh is subject. In order that we might 
 be able to resist the lusts of the flesh, God has opened up and 
 shown us a way to overcome the flesh. The perfect and ideal 
 virtue (omnibus numeris absoluta) confers on the victors the 
 wreath and the reward of immortality (c. 25). 
 
 This ethical view of the Person of Christ, Lactantius then 
 carries out in relation to His work. He by no means denies the 
 outward miracles of Christ; on the contrary, he regards them 
 as proofs of His higher nature ; but still he takes particular 
 delight in searching out their ethical significance. They are 
 the types of much higher spiritual miracles: and so also have 
 His sufferings a deep figurative meaning (c. 26). The heavenly 
 power opened the eyes of the blind, and proclaimed by this 
 deed, that, turned towards the nations which knew not God, it 
 would illuminate the heart of the foolish with the light of 
 wisdom, and open the eyes of their understanding to the con- 
 templation of the truth. He unstopped the ears of the deaf ; 
 and thereby proclaimed, that those who knew not the truth 
 would soon be able to hear and understand the words of God. 
 He caused tongues to speak; for not until the tongue pro- 
 claims the power and majesty of God, does it come to its natural 
 use, whereas previously it is dumb. In like manner He goes 
 through the miracles of healing and the raisings of the dead. 
 Not merely what He did, but also what He suffered, had a sig- 
 nificance for the future, and announced that wisdom would be 
 an object of hatred, The vinegar mixed with gall, which was 
 given Him to drink, foreboded to His disciples bitter and hard 
 experiences ; for truth seems harsh and hateful to all who, not 
 knowing virtue, spend their life in deadly lusts. And the 
 crown of thorns which surrounded His head denoted that He 
 would gather to Himself a divine people from amongst sinners. 
 We, who were unrighteous, and were gathered together from 
 amongst thorns, surround the sacred head of God; called by 
 Him who is the Master and Lord of all living creatures, we 
 surround Him like a wreath. He bore tortures, blows, and at 
 last death, in order that, under Him as a leader, man might 
 lead death, vanquished and bound with chains, as a captive in 
 
LACTANTIUS. 211 
 
 triumph. But this most shameful mode of death, to which the 
 lowest alone are condemned, was inflicted on Him in order that 
 He might bring help to the low and weak; in order that there 
 might be none unable to imitate Him; and, further, in order 
 that His body, which was destined to rise again the third day, 
 might remain unmutilated. But, above all, because He was 
 appointed to be lifted up, in order that His sufferings might be 
 evident to all. And so, in His passion, He stretched wide His 
 hands and embraced the world, in order even then to show that, 
 from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same, a 
 great people should be gathered together, out of all tongues and 
 tribes, under His wings, to receive that highest and exalted sign 
 on their foreheads (c. 26). 
 
 It cannot be denied that Lactantius thus struck a new and 
 very remarkable chord; nor ought it to be objected, that the 
 ethical method adopted by him leads only to a perfect man, but 
 not to the incarnation of God. For he maintains that man 
 eannot even know, much less set forth, the perfect good apart 
 from God. And if, as he hints, the ethical perfection both of 
 the law and of God requires that God also should realize virtue 
 as aman, living amongst men; and if, further, the revelation 
 of the good remains incomplete, so long as the heavenly and the 
 earthly are not fully adjusted, until the former manifests itself 
 completely in the latter; Lactantius had ground enough for 
 teaching an incarnation in the strictest sense, especially as he 
 must have been concerned to represent the love which mani- 
 fested itself in the “ viva preesensque lex,’ or “virtus,” as the 
 inmost essence of God. 
 
 This, however, he does not carry out: on the contrary, out 
 of regard to his Monotheism, he glaringly contradicts the doc- 
 trine of the Church; at the same time, also, falling into in- 
 consistency with himself. God he-considers-to -be-absolutely 
 simple and indivisible (Inst. lib. i.). It is true, uncultivated 
 people, such as misunderstand the Scriptures, are incautious, 
 and weak in the faith, look upon Christ as a second God (4, 29). 
 But He never called Himself God, in order that He might not 
 be untrue to His mission of overthrowing Heathenism, as He 
 would have been had He introduced in its place a new kind of 
 Polytheism; and in order not to seek His own, and thus be 
 guilty of falling away from God, who sent Him (4, 14). Lac- 
 
ai? FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 tantius could not indeed have held a mere man to be the living 
 law, the personal virtue; for the flesh drags all to the earth, to 
 sin, and to death, with the sole exception of Christ. In order 
 that it might have no power over Him, He must be an_un- 
 changeable and perfect. spirit, who merely assumed flesh for the 
 purpose of vanquishing it, and who, to the end that He might 
 be able to withstand its assaults, had been previously established 
 in good. He thus arrives at the idea of a higher nature in 
 Christ, which he even conceives as a pre-existent hypostasis ; 
 but his Monotheism prevents him admitting this hypostasis into 
 the inner circle of the divine. We see from this connection 
 that Lactantius ought properly to have represented Christ as 
 assuming an humanity tainted with the sin of the race, in order 
 that He might endure and overcome the temptations which we 
 experience, and which, in his view, proceed from the body. 
 And, in point of fact, he did not deem the significance of the 
 supernatural birth of Christ to be its protecting Him from the sin 
 of the race; but He must be born differently from other men, to 
 the end it might be certain and plain that a heavenly spirit had 
 become man, in the man Jesus. With the flesh which He bore, 
 He took upon Himself sins,—not of course His own sins, for He 
 had none, but the sins of the flesh; and the effect of His bap- 
 tism was to wash out these sins, as in a spiritual bath (4, 15). 
 This higher, blessed spirit (beatus, 4, 8), although he is a 
 spirit amongst others (ceteri angeli, 4, 8, 16), although he is a 
 creature and belongs to the world (factus), is also very different 
 srom the rest. He was created before all, that He might be 
 the Creator of the universe and the counsellor of God. When 
 God was about to put His hand to this glorious work of crea- 
 tion, He brought forth an holy, incorruptible, and irreprehen- 
 sible spirit (sanctum et incorruptibilem et irreprehensibilem 
 spiritum genuit), whom He designated Son. And although He 
 afterwards created innumerable other spirits through Him, whom 
 we term angels, He deigned to confer the divine name on this. 
 first-born One alone, the Head of the angels (4, 14), because in 
 Him was the fulness of the Father’s power and glory. His 
 proper name no one knows, save He Himself; but it will be 
 made manifest at the end of the days. Amongst men He is 
 termed Christ, that is, King; not because of this earthly king- 
 dom, for the taking possession of which the time is not yet 
 
LACTANTIUS. peal hs 
 
 come, but because of the heavenly and eternal kingdom. But 
 as His origin from God was a peculiar one (see pp. 193 f.), out 
 of the heart of God—for which reason, also, the words “ gionl, 
 generar,” are applied to Him (c. 6, 8),—so also was His nature 
 exalted. The personal Word of God, which He is, abides to all 
 eternity; for power and wisdom flowed over from the Father 
 into Him, as a stream from its source (c. 8). God having 
 determined to send to men the perfect law and the teacher of 
 virtue, He commanded the Son to subject Himself to a second 
 birth. He entered, accordingly, into the pure womb of the 
 Virgin, and clothed Himself with a human body. But because 
 Christ came on earth, adorned with virtue and righteousness, 
 nay more, because He was Himself virtue and righteousness, it 
 was right (He deserved it from all peoples, for His virtue’s 
 sake) that He should be believed as God (4,16). For the sake 
 of the virtue and faithfulness He displayed towards God on 
 earth, the kingdom and the honour and the dominion were con- 
 ferred upon Him, and all peoples and tribes and tongues shall 
 serve Him, and His power is eternal, and His kingdom shall see 
 no end. Even now He has power with those who honour His 
 name, who confess His majesty, who follow His teachings, who 
 imitate His virtue; but when He shall come again to judge all 
 souls, and to restore the righteous to life, then will He truly be- 
 come the Governor of the whole earth ; and the golden age will 
 begin (c. 12). In the eternal temple which He founds, He 
 will be the eternal Priest (c. 14). Notwithstanding -all.the 
 subordination, therefore, he places Him so high, as not merely to 
 assign Him a thoroughly unique position in the universe; but 
 even to see occasion for justifying Christians in asserting that 
 they worship but one God, whilst at the same time they speak 
 of two, to wit, of God the Father and God the Son (ec. 29). 
 When we speak thus, says he, we do not mean an entirely 
 different one, nor do we separate the two (non diversum dici- 
 mus, nec utrumque secernimus) ; for neither the Father can be 
 separated from the Son, nor the Son from the Father ; indeed, 
 God could not be termed Father without Son, nor could the 
 Son have been generated (generari) without Father. Inasmuch, 
 then, as the Father makes the Son (faciat), and the Son is 
 made, both possess one common mind, one spirit, one substance 
 {una utrique mens, unus spiritus, una substantia est). The 
 
214 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 former, however, is, as it were, the overflowing fountain (fons 
 exuberans); the latter is the stream which flows out of it. 
 “ Ile tanquam Sol,” says he with Tertullian, “hic quasi radius 
 a Sole porrectus.” Because the Son is as dear as He is faithfur 
 to the most high Father, He is no more separated from Him 
 than the stream is separate from its source, or the ray from the 
 sun; for the water of the fountain is in the stream, and the 
 light of the sun is in the ray. Even so, we cannot conceive the 
 word without the mouth which gives utterance to it, nor the 
 hand and power separated from the body. But all these names 
 are given to the Son. And,though a father concede to his only 
 and beloved son the title and authority of the master of the 
 house, still the house continues one and the lord one. Father 
 and Son, therefore, are one God. One is alone, free, the 
 Most High God, without beginning (carens origine), in that 
 He Himself is the beginning of things, and in Him all things, 
 even the Son, are included. And because the mind and will 
 of the one is in that of the other, or, better, because one mind 
 and will is in both (vel potius una mens et voluntas in utroque), 
 both persons are justly termed the one God; for all that is in 
 the Father flows over into the Son, and whatever the Son has 
 He derives from the Father. Wherefore, also, the Most High 
 and singular God (singularis Deus) can only be worshipped 
 through the Son. Whoso honoureth not the Son, honoureth 
 not the Father. 
 
 Lactantius thus approximates more closely to the doctrine 
 of the Church, at the close of his treatise on Christ; for, in 
 agreement with it, he recognises the equality of the essence of 
 the Son with that of the Father, His hypostatical pre-existence, 
 and His divine dignity. When, however, he denies that He is 
 coeternal with the Father, who alone is without beginning, he 
 contradicts his own assertion of the equality of the essence of © 
 the pre-existent hypostasis of the Son with that of the Father. 
 
 He also, according to what was advanced in the preceding sec- 
 tion, fell foul of the clearly indicated tendency of the Church 
 subsequently to Origen; but, at the same time, he must be 
 allowed to have been justified in entertaining the view he did, 
 so long as teachers of the Church, like Zeno of Verona, main- 
 tained that the generation of the Son occurred simultaneously 
 with the commencement of the world. For thus the generation 
 
LACTANTIUS. 215 
 
 of the Son and the creation of the world were brought into too 
 close proximity. When, then, he modified this view of the Son, 
 as originated prior to, and for the purpose of, the creation of 
 the world, which was traditional in occidental Africa, by placing 
 the Son in the series of mundane beings, and thus representing 
 Him asa creature, even though the highest, he separated, indeed, 
 elements which, though incompatible with each other, Tertul- 
 lian had combined in his system ; but fell, in consequence, into 
 inconsistencies, and failed to meet the claims of his own ethical 
 construction of Christology (see p. 210). Nor did he ward off the 
 danger of Polytheism; for he gave to a creature the name of 
 God, designated Father and Son the one God, and attributed 
 to the Son equality of essence with the Father, in such a way 
 as to give the idea of creation an ethnic and emanatistic colour- 
 ing. Even at this point, it is clear enough that Monotheism, 
 out of regard for which he adopted subordinatian views, is more 
 completely secured when the Son is put on an equality with the 
 Father, than when He is subordinated in any sense, at all satis- 
 factory to the Christian mind. Indeed, Lactantius himself was 
 at last compelled (c. 29), for the purpose of securing the unity 
 of God, to recognise the equality of the Father and the Son 
 (una mens, unus spiritus, una substantia). 
 
 By this doctrine of the pre-existent and created Son was 
 his Christology also destined to be pressed; for it is incom- 
 patible both with a true humanity and a true self-abasement. 
 The highest of the angels can naturally only assume a human 
 husk, the body; otherwise, two complete, finite beings would 
 be, as it were, incased in each other. Further, that higher 
 spirit comes to the earth with virtue already perfect ; and yet 
 He is to be an example to men, and is to grow in virtue and be 
 rewarded for it; whilst, at the same time, as an eternal spirit, 
 He is unshakeable, and therefore in no danger whatever from 
 the assaults of the flesh. That a being with such a nature bore 
 merely an apparent resemblance to us, who possess a soul, and 
 are through it exposed to temptations, could only have escaped 
 the notice of Lactantius in consequence of a further fault of 
 his, that, namely, of regarding the spirit of man as perfectly 
 good and pure in itself, and of attributing evil entirely to the 
 body. Herewith also are connected Pelagian principles, such 
 as, the presupposition that, if we have the perfect image of 
 
216 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH 
 
 virtue before us, our spirit is capable of the same virtue, and of 
 vanquishing the flesh; which involves him in plain contradic- 
 tion with the argument he had previously employed, that an 
 earthly teacher could not be without sin, and that a higher 
 power, a heavenly teacher, is therefore necessary to the exhibi- 
 tion of perfect virtue in the flesh. For, indeed, our moral power 
 would be greater if He needed the indwelling of the Word, in 
 order to set forth perfect virtue; whilst we, through simply be- 
 holding this representation, without the communication of His 
 power, and even without having previously attained the forgive- 
 ness of sin by Him, are able to rise up to heaven. It is at this 
 point we see that Lactantius must either attribute a higher sig- 
 nificance to Christ, or the pains he is at to posit such a person 
 as he does, are useless and without sufficient ground. The 
 fault thereof, however, must by no means be sought in the 
 stress he lays on the ethical, but in his inadequate conception 
 of the ethical. His virtue is confined to secondary spheres ; 
 even the moral relation to God is not more carefully considered. 
 Had he distinctly recognised the ethical to be the highest, as, in 
 agreement with his entire tendency, he should have done, he 
 would not have been able to call a secondary being the “ lex 
 viva,” but the Most High God alone. Then the question 
 arises,—Can a subordinate being bind us to unconditional obe- 
 dience to the law in his own name? Or, can the arbitrariness 
 which is not bound to the law find a place in God, when it can 
 find no place in Him who is the living law? In that case, the 
 ethical has in the last instance no hold, is based on caprice, and 
 has its ground, not in the sphere of the absolute, but in that of 
 the secondary. Had he conceived God Himself to be the living 
 law, the appearance of the living law would have been, as the 
 Church teaches, the appearance of God Himself, and the latter 
 might have been shown to be an ethical necessity. Lactantius’ 
 strange doctrine of the “manus sinistra Dei,’ the Holy Spirit 
 who takes part in the evil, the “interpretamentum boni,” is a 
 clear enough proof that he deemed it necessary to think God in 
 false and fancied exaltation above the ethical. But to represent 
 arbitrariness, caprice, as the highest in God, is simply the prac- 
 tical Occidental expression for the absolutely indeterminate “Ov 
 of the East,—it was falling back into the physical. A similar re- 
 gression was his making the body the seat of sin ; in consequence, 
 
EUSEBIUS OF CESAREA. a 
 
 however, of failing to show completely that the ground of the 
 ethical is in God Himself, and therefore of not recognising its 
 absoluteness, he failed also to see that the ethical must root in 
 fellowship with God, and in His real communication of Himself. 
 Had he weighed this properly, he would have arrived, with his 
 deeper view of the divine righteousness (de via Dei), at a clearer 
 conviction of the necessity of the atonement, which is quite left 
 out of sight, even in the beautiful remarks which he makes con- 
 cerning the death of Christ. In this way, also, the significance 
 of Christ the Mediator would have been heightened; and both 
 for the sake of the atonement and of vital fellowship with God 
 (necessary to be established even on account of the ethical 
 alone), he would have been driven to see in Christ, not the 
 presence of an exalted finite spirit, but of the Most High God 
 Himself. 
 
 With all this, however, we must mention, to his praise, that 
 he did not regard Christ as a mere organ of God, as a means in 
 God’s hand, as Sabellianism was compelled, and as Arianism 
 was inclined, to do. In his view, Christ is an end in Himself, 
 and that in a sense which does not hold of men or spirits in 
 general; He is, namely, the object of divine worship together 
 with the Father. He recognised it also as necessary to the per- 
 fection of the Son, that He should have fellowship with the 
 Father, nay more, that He should be of one substance with the 
 Father. 
 
 Il. Husebius of Caesarea. 
 
 In casting a glance at the Eastern Church prior to the 
 appearance of ne on the scene, the system of Eusebius of 
 Czesarea gives us the truest picture of the points which the then 
 prevailing doctrine of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ 
 had left unsettled, and which rendered it possible for many to 
 continue vacillating between Subordinatianism and Sabellian- 
 ism. He stands both near enough to, and far enough from, 
 Arius and Athanasius, to show us plainly that he decision 
 arrived at by the Council of Niczea, in the case of Arius, could 
 not but be adverse; and that, notwithstanding, the controversies 
 which succeeded that ddeieiea were still a possibility. We learn 
 from him, further, that the Church had arrived at a point at 
 
218 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 which it could not.stand still, but must choose one_or other of 
 two courses,—either to take a step in advance, and define the 
 indefinite, or to go backwards either into Heathenism_or into 
 Judaism. 
 
 It has been matter of controversy for a long period, whether 
 Eusebius should be reckoned orthodox after the Nicene standard, 
 or be classed with the adherents of Arius.’ In recent times, the 
 Catholic Church has shown a decided inclination to the latter 
 supposition; the former supposition has become almost tradi- 
 tional with investigators belonging to the Anglican Church.’ 
 German science, on the contrary, is pretty unanimous in the 
 opinion, that neither of the two is the case.* In fact, his doc- 
 trinal system is a chameleon-hued thing, a mirror of the un- 
 solved problems of the Church of that age. 
 
 According to Eusebius, God is in His inmost essence one : 
 only with an eye to the world, and God’s relation to it, can we 
 speak of a Trinity. ‘To hold that the unity of God, or the Monas, 
 expresses that which is inmost in God, and not that the unity 
 is to be conceived as containing plurality within itself, appeared 
 to him necessary, whether regard be had principally to the 
 general, or to the distinctively Christian, idea of God. Inas- 
 much, namely, as God is the highest, and as this highest can 
 only be one and not several; inasmuch, further, as there cannot 
 be more than one uncreated being; contemplation, in its loftiest 
 flights, arrives at the One. This One is exalted above all plu- 
 rality, for plurality has place only in subordinate spheres; it is 
 absolutely perfect in itself, self-sufficient, and is as far from 
 needing, as it is from suffering itself, to be complemented by 
 another. It lies out beyond all that has been-created, because it 
 
 + Amongst the ancients, Socrates, Theodoret, Gelasius Cyzic. pronounce 
 him orthodox ; Athanasius regarded him with a degree of suspicion; Epi- 
 phanius and Jerome treat him more harshly. 
 
 * For Arian, he is held by Petavius, Baronius, Montfaucon (Coll. Noy. 
 T. I. xv.-xxix.), Clericus, and Mohler; for orthodox, by Montacutius, G. 
 Bull, Cave (Hist. liter. Appendix, Diss. 3, pp. 193-206), and with a refer- 
 ence to the work of Eusebius on the Theophany, first edited by himself, 
 Samuel Lee, in a longer treatise (pp. xxiv.—xcii.). Valesius, also, takes the 
 favourable view of the case. 
 
 3 Martini, Eusebii Cesar. de divin. Christi sententia, 1795; Baur, Tri- 
 nitiit. 473 ff.; and specially Henell, de Euseb. Cees. religionis christ. de- 
 fensore,” Gott. 1843, pp. 42 ff. 
 
EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA. 219 
 
 is absolutely self-caused: for this reason, it cannot be compared 
 with the world; and to attempt a comparison is godless. ‘There- 
 fore, also, is it the Unutterable, the Inexplicable, Being abso- 
 lutely (70 *Ov), or the primal substance (77 mpatn Ovoia) ; it is 
 aseity conceived as a person. In setting forth this (as he 
 deemed it) exalted conception of God, Eusebius was quite 
 aware of his accordance with the Neo-Platonists; but it did 
 not seem at all objectionable, that the extra-Christian and the 
 Christian idea of God should be identical. In its relation to 
 all things lying outside of this unity, he designates the “Ov, 
 apxn avapyos, the mpatov aitvov. But as respects the Chris- 
 tian idea of God, it is universally allowed that even the Son is 
 not self-caused, but is caused by the Father ; and if the Son is 
 generated, then the Father alone can be described as ungene- 
 rated. But as the Ungenerated is one and the same with the 
 ‘Ov, the Christian expression “Father” is to be referred to the 
 ‘Ov; and as that aseity, and the supreme unity involved there, 
 constitutes the proper essence of the Deity, deity can be predi- 
 cated alone, “sensu eminenti,” of the Father. He is the repre- 
 sentative of the wovapyia. If another, for example, the Son, 
 were coeternal with the Father, we should have two eternals, 
 or Polytheism (adv. Marcell. 2, 12). 
 
 By this line of argument, however, Eusebius meant rather 
 to establish than to do away with the Trinity. As Polytheism 
 is abhorrent to faith, the Christian mind could never acknow- 
 ledge a Trinity if Father and Son were placed on exactly the 
 same level. And if they be supposed to constitute together 
 the one Eternal, we should arrive at Sabellianism. For, either 
 both would be completely the same, and then every trace of a 
 Trinity would be blotted out;* or if they constituted one, in 
 the sense of one being the complement of the other, neither the 
 Father nor the Son would be complete, neither would be en- 
 tirely the one, by Himself, apart from the other. H, however, 
 they need another element to constitute their being, neither of 
 
 1 Compare Prep. Evang. 11, 9, 16-19. Theoph. 2, 24. 27. 29. 
 
 2 Ady. Mare. 2, 12:—¢ 09 Mapxeanos, oindels el olov sivas avtoyv Tov O¢ov 
 Aéyov, rovréoriv dyevuyrov, ToAranxis aplowro, ov avvopay, ors ek “ey Erepoy TOU 
 OQz0v rev Advyov Deonst, O00 Zoras ki'dia, 6 Adyos nai 0 Oxos nol oux &r cares 
 cox) pela. Ei 08 y rgyorro af Osov, tov aires Gpiopeevos sivas roy Ozoy Tq 
 ACY, yupevoy TOY—LaBEAALOV Gmoroynasl, viowarTopa Toy Eve slocryuy. 
 
220 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 the two would be a perfect, self-sufficient hypostasis ;' but the 
 one must be reduced to the rank of divine mowoTntes, that is, 
 become a predicate, and the other be recognised as the subject : 
 in which case, the distinction can have no reality. Or the one 
 will be accident, the other substance; or the one divine essence 
 will be divided into several parts, which taken together consti- 
 tute the Deity. In either of these cases, the hypostasis of the 
 Son, which is universally recognised as necessary, would become 
 an unreality; for the Christian mind is not satisfied that God 
 should be in Christ as a mere power, or transitorily, but demands 
 that He have a personal existence in Him. 
 
 Precisely, therefore, in order that a lofty and permanent 
 significance may be attached to Christ, and that a Trinity may 
 be possible, the Son must be regarded as something different 
 from the Unbegotten One, who is the highest deity itself. 
 He must be the debrepos Oeds, in rank (74) inferior to the 
 Father; He is the devTEpa ovala or brdéotacis: the Father is 
 to be conceived as existing prior to Him (mpovTapyeav), not 
 indeed in time—for before the creation of the world there was 
 uo time—but causatively: for the Father is the highest and 
 ultimate aizvov.? Both His being and the mode of His bein 
 the Son derives from the Father, and that through the medium 
 of His will and purpose (qvén, Tpoaipecis, Bovrn).° 
 
 The idea of God, therefore, is complete, prior to and apart 
 from the Trinity; the unity alone constitutes the full concep- 
 tion of God, and not the plurality with the unity; the Hovapyia 
 is God, “sensu eminenti;” and the Hovapyia pertains to the 
 Father alone. God’s being a Trinity depends on His will, At 
 the same time, this does not signify that God might be other 
 
 * Demonstr. ev. 4, 3, ed. Paris, 1628, p. 148:—o ev x06 sevurdy 
 Tersioc xeel Tparos we Tarinp xal tis row viov ovoracems aitios, ovdey éic TUL 
 TAnpwow rhs éevrov bedrnroc Tepe Tov vied AeuBavav. 
 
 “Dem. ev. 4,8 7" 0 03) de && eirlov (xarpos) yeyovas vide, devrepoc ov 
 catty vids nedéornxen, Tape Tov weerpos nol rd elvees xeel rordade elves SiAnQuc. 
 
 ° L. ¢. "H pév adyy (this had been the favourite image of Origen; but 
 it seemed insufficient to Eusebius, because of its physical, or even emanatis- 
 tic character) ob xara Tpotipsow Tov Qwros exhaperes, xara 08 rt THe odoles 
 guKB<Bnx0s déxapiorov. ‘O Oe vids xara yraneny xel wponipecw sixdv dxtary 
 Tov TarTpos. Bovandele yap 6 Osds vévovev viod Tarnp, nol Dag Osvrepoy xara 
 Favre savrg &Pupeosomévoy, vrearhoato. He designates the Son also dnzesovp- 
 Yum, &pxirextoyvnux. Dem. Ey. 6: 
 
EUSEBIUS OF CAHSAREA. Ppa 
 
 than trinitarian, for it is impossible to God not to will the per- 
 fect. Indeed, Eusebius seems to have introduced volition and 
 consciousness, simply in order that nothing in God might appear 
 to be dominated by an unconscious being, by a mere natural 
 necessity. The doctrine of the Church, also, really had this 
 same end in view, when it connected the eternal self-causation 
 of God with His self-love ; with the difference, however, that 
 Eusebius most decidedly represents the self-grounding of the 
 Trinitarian God as a grounding of the Trinity by the Father ;— 
 the Father alone ‘being the cause of Himself, the Son being 
 grounded by the Father. In one aspect alone was Eusebius 
 able to conceive the Son as eternally in God, and so, to a certain 
 extent, to represent Him as a constitutive element of the entire 
 conception of God. Namely, that which the divine will posits 
 or generates must have already lain eternally in the under- 
 standing and will of God (potentia) ; above all is this true of 
 the Son, who was spoken out of the heart of the Father, who is 
 His manifested understanding and will. Eusebius, however, 
 does not further lay ‘stress on, or follow out, this idea of the 
 eternal being, which the Son had whilst He was still entirely 
 immanent in the Father, and, as it were, nothing but an attribute 
 or quality of God Himself. That by itself would have seemed 
 to him an approximation to Sabellianism, because it represented 
 Christ as without hypostasis. He does not even term this eternal 
 existence of the Son in the Father, His eternal generation! 
 
 But what necessity of reason was there for Eusebius actually 
 positing a Trinity, when he believed the Father, therefore also 
 the Supreme Deity, to be completely the Deity, even apart from 
 the Trinity? To take this step, he was induced, partly by_in- 
 terest in Christianity, and partly by a regard to the world: in 
 
 * Theodoret H. E.1,12:— Exel xol wply évepryetee vyevunbijves, duvcmss ny 
 sy to warpl adyevynras, dvros Tov martpos was nel Bacirtas asl, xeel our npos 
 noel Ouvemet woveTes ovros asl re nal nara Ta mira, nal doadrws Fyovros. The 
 passage is not contained in Socrates; nor is it quite certain whether these 
 words belong to Constantine or to Eusebius. That they fit into the system 
 of Kusebius, although he could not have said, ‘‘ There was a time when the 
 Son existed in God alone,” is clear from what has been advanced above. 
 On the contrary, the mode in which Lee (1. c. L. not.) tries to reconcile 
 the passage with Nicene orthodoxy, is unsatisfactory. For duveuer, as 
 opposed to évepye/e, signifies not power (Gewalt), but potentially (der Potenz 
 nach). 
 
222 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 general; and so far is he from being sparing in lofty predicates 
 for the Son and Christ, that we are decidedly justified in saying 
 that he does not teach subordination for its own sake; on the 
 contrary, he willingly rose as high as seemed compatible with a 
 due regard to the dyévyntov of the Father. 
 
 The Father, or God, cannot communicate His being, that 
 is, the ayevynota; He is unapproachable; He cannot be in any 
 respect compared with the world, and therefore cannot enter 
 into any direct relation to it. From this it follows, that He, by 
 Himself, could not be its Creator. He is too high to be a 
 Creator; which, of course, implies that creation is too low for 
 Him : it could not bear Him and His hand; it would be con- 
 sumed (Dem. Evang. 4, 13). This shows us clearly enough, 
 that the inmost. being of God is conceived, not as Love, but as 
 abstract infinitude. On this ground, a middle being is required, 
 which is neither the Father nor the world ; for if it were either 
 the one or the other, it could not create. This middle being, 
 even apart from the incarnation, is the Son (Dem. Evang. 4 
 13); He is the Logos, who did not abide in God (€véov pévay 
 év novyatovtTs T@ TaTpl, adv. Marcell. 1,1), but came forth, and 
 thus acquired an independent existence, became an hypostasis, 
 which needed not another to complement it, although He needed 
 the Father as the ground of His being. So far, indeed, from 
 needing to be complemented, He is in Himself a separate and 
 distinct totality. He is not to be counted part of God in the 
 highest sense; for the principle of His being is in another. But 
 as He is not God, so also is He not world; for He is endowed 
 with all divine attributes,—with omnipotence, wisdom, and so 
 forth, even as is the Father Himself. He was not merely not 
 produced out of nothing (even the world, in the view of Kuse- 
 bius, is not created out of nothing, but the divine will and the 
 divine power supplied, as it were, the material), but He was be- 
 gotten in an unique manner of God, Light of light (Dem. Ev. 
 4, 3); nor is He merely like, but oaaTe carries within Himself, 
 the essence of God. Here also we meet again w ‘ith the Ori- 
 genistic distinction between God as LN: and the divine 
 predicates (60£a). So far as the Father is the supreme divine 
 subject, so far can the Son, of course, be termed God only figu- 
 ratively, or in a derived sense; He bears this title, namely, in 
 
 so far as, like God, He is One in Himself, and by His unique 
 
EUSEBIUS OF CEHSAREA. 923 
 
 character sets forth the unity of God to the world; and as God 
 in Himself, is the In principle of all, so He is the prin- 
 ciple of the universe! But if we look at the predicates, which 
 in the wider sense appertain also to the essence of God (a7)j}- 
 powa Oeod, or THs TAT PLKNS Oeorntos), and are frequently attri- 
 buted thereto by Eusebius,—they themselves, and not merely 
 their likeness, appertain to the Son. To describe the matter 
 briefly—the Son was a personal duplication of the mode of 
 existence of the divine attributes, which themselves are of a 
 divine essence; irrespective, however, of the divine subject, 
 which as dyévynrov is incommunicable." This is the sense 
 of his favourite designation,—The Son is the Father’s perfect 
 image (Theol. Eccl. 1, 2, 1. c. pp. 61, 62; Dem. Ey. 4, 3); 
 aie hence, taken in the whole he alt rather to be ane 
 amongst the Tritheists, than amongst the Arians. ‘The Son is 
 not the original; nor is He a duplication of God in Himsel/; 
 but the copy, that which is posited. He not merely has the 
 characteristic features of the archetype, that is, the divine attri- 
 butes in perfection, but is Himself living and hypostatical, and 
 therein also similar. or_equal.to.the Father. For this. reason, 
 Eusebius could find no difficulty in attributing to the Son the 
 same_nature as to the-Father;-without thereby retracting any- 
 thing of the ayevynoia of the Father. 
 
 He would appear, therefore, to be the independent organ of 
 God for the creation of the world—an organ which, like the 
 Father, has life in itself, though, unlike the Father, not out of 
 itself. He is the metaphysical, personal Mediator between God 
 and the world, the bond which connects the world with the Un- 
 created One, and constitutes it capable and worthy of existence.” 
 
 1 De eccl. theol. 1, 2:—The Son is Son not merely through His earthly 
 birth, but through His birth from God the Father, before all A‘ons, ~«é" 
 qv TO TAN PU cb THs Tarpings Oeorntos zal avroy vicv Osoy vrsaornoaro (com- 
 pare Dem. Evang. 4, 3). He then goes on to say,—Odx idixrnroy xe 
 TOU ToT pos aadlaalievon ov? ctvocpyov tive nal cyévuntov, ovde aArOMEY Fort: 
 Sévyyv nol Tov woerTpos kA AOT pie 2Derncuesvoy bedrnra, 2S abrig 0€ THs TarTpinns 
 wetovalas worep ard anys ix adrov wpoysopeevns eAnpovyeevoy. For this 
 reason, Eusebius designates the Son atréaroyos, atrocoPix, and even xvrc- 
 ‘cos; for although grounded by God, He has all this in Himself, as in a dis- 
 tinct and separate totality. He is réassos dao rerssov, etc. 
 
 2 Asin Philo’s system; but far more definitely hypostatical. See the 
 Dem. Ev. 4, 5, 18. 
 
924 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 He is its head and first-born, and through Him the world has its 
 perfection: He is also the bond running through the universe, 
 and as it were its soul: He is not, however, diffused through 
 it, but hypostatically concentred in Himself. As the creative 
 principle of the world, which comprises in itself the imitated 
 fulness of the deity, He does not form amere part of the world, 
 but occupies in it an unique or specific position: by no means 
 the position of a mere means; He is the highest personal good 
 in the world, wherein consists its perfection. As the world is a 
 wéya o@pa, with many members, so must the Son also neces- 
 sarily be one, its soul. In this respect also, He is the image of 
 the Father, setting forth His povapyxia (Dem. ev. 4, 5. 3; Eccl. 
 
 Theol. 1, 2). We can only conceive of one most nerregt thing 
 amongst the many; and this most perfect thing is the Son, ae 
 is in all points as like, or equal, to the Father as is possible, 
 unless we substitute identity for distinction, and thus adopt the 
 Jewish error, which renounces the highest boon (yépas), to wit, 
 that new view of the world which secures to it unity and good- 
 ness through its Mediator, in whom, as in its head, consists its 
 perfection (compare the de eccl. theol. 1, 4; Dem. Ev. 4, 3. 5). 
 But He is the personal, creative principle of the world; it 
 follows, therefore, that as time first came into existence with the 
 world, He could not have been begotten, that is, He could not 
 first have attained an hypostatical existence outside of God, 
 
 in time. He was begotten before all AZons, and is in so re 
 avapyos, that is, without beginning in time, for He was be- 
 gotten out of time. We see one that had it been necessary, 
 
 he might have described the generation as eternal, though in a 
 somewhat different sense from Origen’s. He did not do so 
 however ; nor, further, does he ever style the Son cuvaiézos with 
 the Father. Plainly in order to be able to give more decided pro- 
 
 minence to the distinction between that which is cause and that 
 which is effect, he avoids teaching the coeternality of the two, 
 theta Tess he also ee the Son to be exalted above 
 the world and time, and therefore oe the position—“ There 
 was a time when the Son was not.’ He was able to say, and 
 actually did say, The Son was always with the Father." He 
 might even have consented to the use of the term ouvaiécov, on 
 the understanding that the causal relation should be left un- 
 
 * Dem. ev. 4, 3, p. 149 :—ra rarpi dg viv did ravres ouvdvre. 
 
EUSEBIUS OF CEHSAREA. 225 
 
 touched. For its integrity seemed to him better assured, when 
 as it were an interval was left between the Father and the Son, 
 by way of sensibly expressing the logical relation, about which 
 he was really concerned. The difference between him and Ori- 
 gen, therefore, is the following :—For the doctrine of the eternal 
 generation, and the principle that light is inconceivable without 
 brightness, he substituted the idea of the untemporal generation 
 before all AYons. He was not satisfied with the image employed 
 by Origen, because, to teach that the procession of the Son was 
 inevitable, seemed to him to be emanatistic, ethnic, unworthy of 
 God; because brightness could be taken as a mere quality of 
 light, that is, as amere accident of the divine substance; in short, 
 because the figure appeared to favour Sabellianism. Further 
 reasons were—because it implied the hypostasis of the Father to 
 be imperfect in itself, without the Son, even as light is not light 
 without brightness; and lastly, because it did not express the 
 ayévyntov of the Father, which is to be conceived as rpotzro- 
 xetwevov.' On the other hand, however, he again exalts the Son, 
 attributing to Him divine ovcia, more frequently, and in amore 
 comprehensive manner, than Origen. Nay more, in relation to 
 the first he says,—-The idea of the Son is involved in that of the 
 Father; the Son was always with the Father, and so forth: it 
 is clear, therefore, on the whole, that he had no intention of form- 
 ing a lower estimate of the Son than did Origen. The conse- 
 quence of Eusebius giving, as it were, a sensuous stamp to the 
 causal relation between the Father and the Son, was that he con- 
 ceived the procession of the Son to have been effected by one 
 single act of God, whereas Origen represents the generation as 
 a continuous thing. 
 
 From the metaphysical position assigned to the Son rela- 
 tively to the world, as its Mediator, it naturally follows, that He 
 is the principle of all revelation, both of the general revelation 
 (Dem. ev. 4, 6. 10. 13) and of the historical revelations made 
 subseque.tly to the Fall. Even in Old Testament times He 
 appeared in the form of a man (Dem. ev. 5, 11, p. 218); and 
 rays of the Logos were in the prophets (Dem. ev. 4, 10: “ Bpa- 
 xetat axtives of His light”). But the entire Logos appeared 
 
 * Dem. ev. 4, 3. He prefers the image of eiwd/« to that of light and its 
 brightness; for ¢dad/« proceeds forth from ointment, and forms an inde- 
 pendent atmosphere, without diminution or division (Dem. ev. 4, 3). 
 
 VOU, 11: Ve 
 
226 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 A 
 
 under the New Testament, to heal humanity in its deeply 
 sunken condition (Dem. ev. 4, 10). He appropriated’ a truly 
 human body out of Mary, without therefore renouncing His 
 indissoluble unity with the Father, or rendering Himself pas- 
 sible. The sun does not suffer, says he, after the example of 
 Origen, when its rays shine on an impure place: the relation 
 of the Logos to the humanity, appropriated by Him, was_a 
 purely active one; the relation of the humanity was a passive 
 one,—it was the harp, the Logos was the player»(Dem. ev. 4, 
 13). The death of Christ he views as a sacrifice, as a propitia- 
 tion for our sins; and displayed, at this point in particular, the 
 deep Christian interest he took in the incarnation of the Logos 
 (Dem. ev. 4, 12). After His exaltation, His body was deified 
 and swallowed up in deity; but neither His hypostasis nor His 
 kingdom shall ever come to an end. 
 
 This idea of Christ, which existed prior to the Council of 
 Nice,! was entertained, not by an isolated few, but by very 
 many in the Church about A.D. 320 (Note 43). In agreement 
 with the great body of the Church, he regarded it as equally 
 certain with Monotheism itself, that the distinctively Christian, 
 new element, that the highest element, is the reconcilement of 
 God through God in Christ (Eccl. Theol. 1, 2); that the divine 
 was given in Christ in a personal form; that thus the true view 
 of the world was opened up to men—that view, namely, accord- 
 ing to which, humanity, nay, even the world, is a great whole, 
 one body, whose eternal Head is Christ, the Prophet, High 
 Priest, and King (Dem. ev. 4, 4; adv. Mare. 1, 1). Although, 
 then, his theory may be pronounced unsatisfactory, and fairly 
 charged with curtailing the one or the other aspect, concerning 
 himself we may say, that he did not design such a curtailment. 
 On the contrary, his true and proper efforts were in harmony with 
 the demands of the Church. The more, therefore, must he be 
 content to be tested by the question, whether his theory aids in 
 doing full justice to those bases, whose recognition he himself 
 aimed at securing by its means; indeed, he himself demanded 
 ‘to be judged by this very standard. But of this, more here- 
 after. In the first instance, however, it must be acknowledged, 
 en the one hand, that the dogmaticians of the Church of his day 
 
 1 It is not quite accurate to regard this middle theory between Arius 
 aud Athanasius as the fruit of the conflict between the two men. 
 
ARIUS. 227 
 
 had not arrived at a fixed judgment concerning the chief points 
 about which his theory was concerned; and, on the other hand, 
 that his theory was closely connected ati wide-spread _repre- 
 sentations: had this not been the case, Arius could not have 
 found the support he did when he appeared. The Church ad- 
 vanced to the full understanding of the points referred to 
 during the Arian controversy. The majority had no definite | 
 theory, , and were compelled by the Arian struggles to enter for | 
 the first time on a deeper investigation of these questions. In- 
 deed, this was precisely the OTIS of the Arian controversy, 
 dee owing to its profound inner significance, and to the Synods 
 which it caused to be convened at so many different points of 
 the Christian world, the collective powers of the Church were 
 concentrated on fe problem, and thus the dogmatic progress, 
 which had become necessary, was realized. It i is true, indeed, 
 that even before the Church formally devoted itself to hie 
 dogmatical work (about 4.D. 325), that Christian conscience or 
 tact, which is immanent in faith, enabled it to decide on the 
 character of Arian principles; and it did actually give its 
 judgment. But this judgment had no scientific worth; its 
 worth was simply and solely that of a confession of the common 
 faith,—a character which it is necessary for a creed to possess. 
 And scientific efforts, so far from being thereby rendered un- 
 necessary, were thus supplied with a firm ground on which to 
 stand. We can accordingly understand the apparently contra- 
 dictory circumstances, that Arius should at first be so unani- 
 mously condemned by the great Synod of Nicza; and yet that 
 afterwards, not Arianism indeed, but still semi-Arianism, should 
 for a time have held so eaental a position in the Church. 
 
 IIL. Avius. 
 
 We do not give a complete and adequate description of 
 Arius, when we merely say that his system gathered up and 
 combined in itself everything of a subordinatian or lowering 
 character relative to the Son, that had not been excluded a 
 the preceding development of the Church: were this all, 
 would have been impossible for him to have made any sy 
 impression. His system owed its seductiveness to the circum- 
 stance, that the features of the kind just referred to, were 
 
228 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 dominated by an idea apparently favourable to a tendency to lay 
 stress on the hypostasis of the Son, which had not only become an 
 historical necessity, but was in itself completely justified; nay 
 more, not merely to favour, but to give it for the first time fixity 
 and substance. The almost hundred years’ controversy with 
 the various forms of Sabellianism had necessarily given rise to a 
 tendency to attach greater importance to the hypostasis ; and, 
 as many even of the ancients saw, the athletic law of avOorKn 
 (antagonism) exerted its influence on many of the Church 
 teachers of this age. Sabellianism, which was simply a higher 
 potence of Docetism, constantly threatened to reduce the incar- 
 nation of Christ—that is, in reality, the Christian religion—to 
 a transitory phenomenon. Nor could the conception of the 
 reconciliation between God and man fail to be superficial, so 
 long as the union of God and man in Christ was deemed 
 momentary, or almost of the nature of a vision. Humanity 
 cannot have been reconciled with God through Christ to its 
 very roots; the reconciliation cannot become a certain truth 
 and a permanent reality in us; unless a perfect man, and not 
 a mere body, a mere human shell, were assumed by God, and 
 unless this assumption penetrated to the inmost centre of the 
 human personality. This point Sabellianism never reached ; 
 on the contrary, its efforts to attain to a true humanity neces- 
 sarily ended in Ebionism. There was something dazzling in 
 the great pains it took, relatively to the revelation in Christ: 
 but the actual performance was so far from corresponding to 
 the efforts put forth, that it would have been more satisfactory 
 had some of the pains been spared, and, instead thereof, a more 
 permanent and substantial result presented. 
 
 This is the reason why we have found the Church teachers, 
 from Tertullian onwards, with few exceptions, far more favour- 
 ably inclined. to, at all events, some form of-Subordinatian-_ 
 ism, than many of the second century (for example, Irenzeus). 
 These latter, on the contrary, were most concerned to assert 
 the true deity of the Son, and therefore approximated more 
 nearly to Monarchianism of the Sabellian kind, than did the 
 teachers of the third century. But when Monarchianism went 
 on definitely and systematically to repudiate that which the latter 
 Church teachers had merely momentarily left in the background, 
 the duty devolving on the Church, during the third century, 
 
ARIUS. 229 
 
 no longer continued to be that of establishing the truth of the 
 deity of Christ and His equality with the Father; for, during 
 the second century, this had been clearly seen and established. 
 Its work lay, on the contrary, so decidedly in the opposite 
 direction, that for a time it was almost necessary to take regres- 
 sive steps, in order to the attaining of a full apprehension of 
 the problem awaiting solution. The new point to be gained 
 was, the idea of the hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ ; 
 which was the only thing fitted to raise the Church above both 
 Ebionism and Sabellianism, above the category of divine power 
 and that of divine substance, and to constitute the eternal and 
 absolute significance of the Person of Christ and Christianity a_ 
 matter of settled conviction. Consequently, the task devolving 
 on the fourth century was, in the first instance, simply that of 
 connecting the idea of hypostasis—which, after being toned 
 down by Irenzeus and his successors, had been more carefully 
 considered during the third century—with the ancient affirma- 
 tion of the true deity of the Son. This, however, was just the 
 most difficult task of all, requiring as it did both the transfor- 
 mation of the preceding, and the determination of the Christian, 
 conception of God. Even in Nicza, no attempt was made to 
 explain the mode of this conjunction, to conciliate the hypo- 
 stasis of the Son with the unity of the divine essence: all that 
 the Fathers there assembled did, was to declare that the hypo- 
 static form of the higher nature-of-Christ, and the true deity 
 thereof, are two points equally certain to faith; that the con- 
 junction in question is immediately effected in, and should be 
 confessed by, faith; for which reason, it is incumbent on 
 Christian science to bring about the recognition of the union of 
 the two, without detriment to either. 
 
 Shortly before Arius, we find that the zeal displayed by the 
 teachers of the Church, in opposition to Sabellianism, and in 
 the assertion of the reality and permanence of the hypostasis of 
 the higher nature of Christ, was moderated by the controversy 
 with Dionysius of Alexandria; and that they received a warning 
 to avoid the’onesidedness which forgets that the true path of the 
 Church, in relation to doctrine, lies always between two errors. 
 Clear tokens have shown to us, that from his day onwards there 
 more and more frequently arose men, who, whilst adopting the 
 doctrine of the essential equality of the Father and the Son 
 
230 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 from the Sabellians, and that of the hypostasis of the latter 
 from the Subordinatians, set their faces, not merely against one 
 or the other of these two parties, but against both (see Section 
 Third, Chapter First). Even the school of Origen furnished 
 its full share of men of this tendency (see Section Second, 
 Chapter Third). But we have found also, that’many, both in 
 the West and in the East, were unable to maintain that the 
 Son was of the like substance with God, and had an hypostasis, 
 save on subordinatian principles. They either represented the 
 Son as first proceeding forth from or begotten by God, for the 
 creation of the world; or else as a middle being between God 
 and the world. Contradictory as these transitional theories were 
 in themselves, and certain as it was that they necessarily cur- 
 tailed the equality of the essence of the Son with that of the 
 Father, which they desired to uphold, their authors still clung 
 to them, because, apart from such subordinatian elements, they 
 feared having to surrender the hardly-won hypostasis of the 
 Son, falling back into Sabellianism, with its denial of distinc- 
 tions, and thus renewing the old struggles, These theories, 
 therefore, and its own marked antagonism to the already repu- 
 diated Sabellianism, apart altogether from other matters, must 
 have decidedly facilitated the introduction of Arianism; even 
 as, on the other hand, after Arianism and Athanasianism had 
 openly entered the lists against each other, it became possible 
 for men like Eusebius to wear the favourable appearance of 
 pursuing a middle course between two extremes. ‘This appear- 
 ance drew around them a great multitude of very agile but un- 
 steady forces, which, affected by the struggles going on around, 
 were forced to enter more deeply into the matter; and were 
 unable to ga a firm footing, until they decidedly ranged them- 
 selves either on the side of Arius or on that of Athanasius. 
 After the controversy of Dionysius, the anti-subordinatian 
 tendency attained to constantly greater predominance in the 
 Alexandrian Church, although it was at first repressed by Ori- 
 genistic traditions. About a.p. 270, Theognostus flourished 
 
 there; and from A.D. 283 to a.p. 300, Pierius. A fragment is 
 
 still extant of a lost work, entitled epi tis émidnpias Tod 
 Xpiorod (in Greek, in A. Mai’s Coll. Nov. 7, 306, 307, cll. 
 134), by Petrus, Bishop of Alexandria from A.D. 300 to 311, in 
 which he teaches the identity of the nature of the Son with that 
 
ARIUS. 231 
 
 of the Father. (Note 44.) Shortly after the death of Petrus, 
 Alexander became Bishop of Alexandria. According to an 
 account which is not thoroughly accredited, Arius was not merely 
 a presbyter under him, but also the successor of Pierius as 
 teacher at the school of Catechetes, and enjoyed the reputation 
 of varied learning. He received his education, probably in 
 company with Eusebius of Nicomedia, whom he designates. 
 Svurroveravicta, from Lucian in Antioch, amongst others. 
 Personal considerations, and especially conceit, which manifests 
 itself in his Thalia, may have partly influenced him in attacking 
 Alexander and the growing anti-subordinatian tendency ; but 
 still there is no doubt that, even prior to the controversy, his 
 point of view was different from his opponent’s (Socr. H. E. i. 
 6; Epist. Alex.). Alexander reproached him with having con- 
 cealed his opinions for a considerable period. In an association 
 of presbyters, the Bishop had delivered a discourse on the Trinity, 
 of whose contents all that we know (Soer. H. HH. i. 5) is, that he 
 set his face against a onesided tendency to the discrimination of 
 the hypostases, and endeavoured to lead the mind back from the 
 triplicity to the unity, seeking to point out the latter in the 
 former (év rpidds povdda eivat dirocopav eOeoroyer). That to 
 which we drew attention above, thus manifests itself at the very 
 commencement of the controversy,—namely, either progress 1s 
 made to the recognition of the full deity of the Son; or else a 
 return is made from the anti-Sabellian momentum of hypo- 
 stasis to the earlier one of the true deity of the Son, but under 
 a higher form. That Alexander meant to give up the point 
 cinta had been gained during the third century, to wit, the 
 hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ, is not probable ; sebut 
 he appears to have taken the Trinity, as a thing already estab- 
 lished, for his starting-point, and thence to have gone on to the 
 unity of the hypostases. He would seem, therefore, to have 
 laid hold of the problem, just as it had been set forth by Diony- 
 sius of Rome. Arius believed that he saw Sabellianism therein, 
 —without doubt, however, unjustly ; ; fora Sabellian might well 
 have joined mth Arius in saying,—“ There was a time when 
 the Son was not.” On the contrary, it Is probable, inasmuch 
 as Arius at once objected to Alexander,—ei 0 0 TaTNp eyevvnee 
 TOV vior, apxy braplews ¢ Eyer 0 yerunOels, wal éx TovTov O7jAov, 
 Ore Hv Ore odk Hv 6 vids,—that Alexander agreed with Arius in 
 
232 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 teaching the generation of the Son; but held that the generation 
 should be conceived as eternal, on the ground that if the Logos 
 and Wisdom were not coeternal with God, God must have been 
 at one time dAoyos, dcodos (compare Socr. H. E. i. 6; compare 
 Note 46; see Note 45); whereas Arius tried to show that the 
 idea of generation, consequently of apx7, in the sense of prin- 
 ciple, involves a beginning in time, or an “initium.” In this 
 matter he was undoubtedly very unlike the speculative Origen ; 
 but on that very ground more to the taste of common under- 
 standings, especially as he possessed considerable dialectical 
 skill.? 
 
 As Arius was unwilling to posit time as existing prior to the 
 world, therefore also prior to the Son, the unscientific, clumsy 
 phrase, »v dre ov jv, did not denote, in his hand, strictly what 
 the words expressed, but something different, for which it was 
 intended to prepare the way. It acquired its true meaning from 
 the negation which it was intended to convey,—to wit, the Son 
 is not coeternal with the Father.? The causal relation involves 
 the priority of the cause to the effect. In ‘this way, however, 
 the cause, God, would be placed in time, in order that the Son 
 might be placed in time. Instead, therefore, of being unlike 
 each other, both would be alike, in so far as the one is as truly 
 
 * After Athanasius, however, he shrunk from entirely following the 
 common understanding of men, and supposing time to have been even 
 before the existence of a world: hence he avoided saying, qv xpovos, ore ovm 
 av, and left out xpévos; and yet he went on to argue as though he had used 
 xpovos. What he really aimed at showing was, that the idea and being of the 
 Father do not necessarily involve the idea and being of the Son, but that 
 the Son, in relation to the Father, ig somethin g accidental. 
 
 2 Epiph. Heer. 69, 6, from the letter addressed by Arius to Eusebius :— 
 ‘We are persecuted, because we say—The Son had an cépxy.” Here also 
 there is again the same amphiboly. In the Kp. ad Alex. ib. 7, and Ath. de 
 Syn. 16, we read :—'O pév Ocde wirios ray coverup TUYKAVOY, EOTIV eYALOXOS 
 Movareros. “Od¢ vids, dxpsvac yevunbele dad tod THaTpOS nal Tpo eiavuy 
 xriobels xeel bemersbels, ovx Hy po TOU yevynOyveet, dAN axpovag pO mavray 
 yevunbels, movos var TOD martpos urtotn. Ovoe yap tori al d105, 4 avvatoios, 4 
 cuvayevuntos TH warpl ovds kun TH Torol TO elves exes, WS TiVves Asyouas Ta 
 pos Th OVO a&ysvynrovs ciprycs slanyougevol, aA ws poves xal box wavray, 
 ovrwgd Osds xpo maura toriv’ did xal rod tov vied gril, ws xal Tapa cov fs. 
 Maenxausy, xara Meany Thy exxAnolay xnpveavros. To Eusebius, indeed, he 
 wrote in a different tone regarding Alexander. The latter probably assigned 
 
 to the Father the pre-eminence of the principle, but he can scarcely have 
 designated Him the Monas 
 
ARIUS. 23a 
 
 bound by the conditions of time as the other. In order, there- 
 fore, to bring out the wished-for subordination, he was com- 
 pelled to go back to the law of causation, and out of its different 
 forms to select the one which most distinctly involved the sub- 
 ordination of the Son. A cause may be either onesided or 
 reciprocal; that is, the action may be either all on one side, or 
 each may act in turn. It may be essential and necessary to a 
 cause, to pass into action; indeed, it is possible for it to be so 
 necessary, that the cause would not merely not be a cause, but 
 would have no existence at all, if it did not act: or the effect 
 may not arise necessarily from the essence of the cause, but be 
 dependent on something, which may either exist or not exist 
 without detriment to the cause ;—it may depend, for example, 
 on a free act of will; in which latter case, the effect would 
 owe its rise to something accidental and indifferent to the 
 essence of the cause, and would consequently be itself fortui- 
 tous, contingent. Finally, the effect may be something equal 
 or similar to the cause and its essence, or something foreign and 
 disparate ;—the latter, when the causative energy does not flow 
 naturally and necessarily out of the essence of the cause, but 
 waits for an external, that is, a fortuitous impulse. Arius does 
 not enter on an investigation of these different forms of the 
 causal relation with a view to ascertaining which is applicable 
 to the case in question, but selects the one that suits him best,— 
 that which first suggests itself to superficial thinking. God 
 (the Father) isthe airtov, the Cause absolutely; besides Him 
 there is only the Nothing. Out of Himself, He could not.pro- 
 duce the Son; for that would make the Son either a Valen- 
 tinian mpo8on1), or a portion of God, having the like essence 
 with Him (Manichean) ; and the unity of God would berent 
 asunder_after_a_Sabellianfashion, as was done by Hierakas 
 (7 (Note 46)., Atnasmuch, therefore, as there was no eternal matter, 
 God_must_haye eile the Son into existence.out.of nothing.’ 
 From which it follows further, that because He cannot be a 
 the substance of God, He was created_by the Wall of God _ 
 (Oernpate Ocod Ktic0évTa). ee 
 On these two principles, Arius at first took his stand : Ae . 
 
 Son is not eternal, and He is created out of nothing. The for- 
 
 . Ep. ad Euseb. :—‘' We say this (that the Son is ¢2 odx évrwy), because 
 He is neither a part of God, nor formed from previously existing material.” 
 
234 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 mer principle has but little force in itself, because he immediately 
 adds (see note 2, p. 232), He was begotten out of time, before 
 the world and time (spd aidvev). The proper significance of 
 the first position is determined by the second, which leads us 
 from the time to the mode of the genesis of the Son, to His 
 creation. The idea of the deity, he means to say, is complete 
 in itself; its being is to be presupposed perfect, even apart from 
 the Son. The Son forms, in no respect, a constituent part of 
 the divine essence. There was no eternal necessity whatever in 
 the essence of God that He should have a Son; for such a ne- 
 cessity would have been equivalent to a potential being of the 
 Son in God. It was therefore not the idea of causality that 
 impelled him to maintain that the Son was created out of no- 
 thing, and did not arise out of the essence of God. For between 
 parents and children, for example, the causal relation is also one 
 of essence, as Athanasius often objected. A further consideration 
 co-operated to induce him to deny that the Son was of the sub- 
 stance of the Father. This consideration was not the unity of 
 God, or a strict Monotheism; for Arius unhesitatingly, after his 
 manner, set his face against a rigid Monotheism. But his con- 
 ception of God admitted absolutely of no distinctions, no self- 
 diremption, no self-communication. He feared that if passages 
 like “Of Him,” “ Out of His bosom,” “I proceeded forth from 
 the Father,” were referred to the Son as an essentially equal 
 portion (1épos ofoovatov) or as a mpo8or, God would be made 
 cvvberos, Siaiperos, that is, He would lose, if not His unity, yet 
 His simplicity (Kp. ad Alex.) and His self-sameness; He would 
 become tpemros kal c@ua Kat Ta axddovba TO c@parTi TATKOV. 
 He can only preserve His singularity by retaining His simplicity. 
 Arius’ chief blows were directed therefore against Sabellianism : 
 he does not indeed deny that it is monotheistic, but charges it 
 with robbing God of His singularity, and with commingling God 
 and the world by neglecting to note the simplicity of the divine 
 being. In Arius’ eyes, God is dvapyos, povararos, advatperos. 
 The development of the idea of God has therefore now 
 reached the point when the question arises, Whether God is in 
 Himself rigid, abstract being, or living motion, and therefore 
 the subject of distinctions. Arius failed to see the great differ- 
 ence between that which Alexander aimed at and Sabellianism ; 
 he was blind also to the fact that the Monarchianism of Sabel- 
 
ARIUS. Doo 
 
 lius started with a conception of God exactly like his own, to 
 wit, from the conception of the essence of God as abstract unity. 
 The only difference between Sabellius and Arius was, that the 
 former placed the unity and simplicity of God under the cate- 
 gory of substance, and was therefore able to conceive it as 
 having accidents (the aspect of revelation, for example), which 
 must ever return unto, and be commingled with, the substance ; 
 whereas Arius advanced further to the category of aitiov or 
 cause, and first by means thereof aimed at distinguishing more 
 determinately between that which posits and that which is 
 posited. God is wovwtaros, the highest causality in relation to 
 the world; and that which is itself ayévvytov, the final cause, 
 alone deserves, in the strictest sense, the name of Deity. Arius 
 did not deem the conception of that causality to be complete, 
 unless taken together with the incomparableness and simplicity 
 of God. Then first, in his view, do we arrive at a determinate 
 and fixed distinction between the final cause and that which 1s 
 posited, and consequently at the truth of the causal relation. 
 That a speculative element was contained in this advance from 
 the category of substance to that of causality, cannot be doubted. 
 The only question is, Whether Arius, in his zeal for the causal 
 relation, did not so overstrain the distinction between that which 
 is effect and that which is cause, as to arrive at precisely the 
 opposite result, to wit, that the cause can never really produce 
 an effect, or, in other words, that the cause is incapable of being 
 a cause. But, before proceeding to consider this question, let 
 us first bring under notice the other aspect of Arius’ first point 
 of view. In his Epistle to Alexander he says, not merely,— 
 “ God alone is wise, good, unchangeable, the God of the Law, of 
 the Prophets, and of the New Testament;” but also,—* He begat 
 His only-begotten Son before eternal times (wrpo x povov aiwviwr), 
 by whom also He made the world and the universe; He begat 
 Him, however, not merely in seeming (Soxijces), but in truth; 
 He constituted Him an hypostasis by His own will (i7éorn<¢), 
 and made Him unchangeable and unalterable (dtperrov Kat 
 dvaddolwrov. To the same effect in the Epistle to Husebius,— 
 Bovrypate Kal Boumy vréorn Tpd ypovev—mAnpNs Ocos povo- 
 yevys Gvaddolwros); a perfect work of God (kticpa Oeod Té 
 Aevov),—not, however, like one of His other works; a production, 
 but not like one of His other productions.” 
 
236 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 From this we see clearly, that at first he had no intention of 
 depriving the Son of His unique position. The beginnings of 
 Arius still bear very marked traces of the development which 
 had preceded. The Son was still regarded as occupying an 
 unique position among creatures ; as unalterable and unchange- 
 able; as bearing, therefore, a distinctive and peculiar likeness to 
 the Father; as not needing first to merit the dignity and name 
 of God, but as at once wArjpns Oeos (Ep. ad Euseb.). In giv- 
 ing Him life and being, the Father at the same time gave Him 
 also His glory (ras d0€as cuvurocticavtos avT® TOV TaTpos, 
 Kp. ad Alex.). He is therefore again represented as a middle 
 being between God and the world. We find a new confirma- 
 tion of this in the circumstance, that the Son was equipped for 
 the creation of the world. For not only Athanasius, but even 
 Alexander (Socr. H. E. 1, 6), justly asked,—“ How can He who 
 creates be like that which is created?” Precisely Arius’ view 
 of the causal relation necessarily involved fixing the greatest 
 gulf also between the world and the Son, its Creator. The Son 
 is raised to this high position, not indeed as an end in Him- 
 self, but merely as a means, with the design of filling up the 
 still greater gulf naturally existing between God and the world; 
 but in order to His being the principle of the cosmos, He is 
 equipped with these lofty predicates. God in His uniqueness 
 and majesty is too exalted, says Arius also, according to Eusebius 
 (see above), for it not to be unworthy of Him to create the world; 
 the world would not have been able to bear His hands (cf. de 
 decr. syn. Nic. c. 8). For this reason, He created at first a 
 single being, whom He termed Son and Logos, in order that 
 He, taking up a middle position, might create the other things 
 (TovTov pécov yevouévov: Athan. c. Ar. or. 2, 24 f.)." We 
 
 ' It is therefore probable that the idea of the creation, as effected by 
 means of the Son, had even at that time been entertained by Arius. The 
 notion advanced by Asterius, that the Son learnt how to create from the 
 Father (Athan. c. Ar. or. 2, 28), belongs to an entirely different doctrinal 
 formation, for there the rperrév of the Son is already visible; but the 
 Father is represented as creating immediately, and not merely through the 
 Son. For if the Son be reduced to a lower rank than that assigned to Him 
 at first, even by Arius, if a world is to be created at all, its creation must 
 be entrusted to the Father Himself; that is, the entire basis on which they 
 had originally begun to build their conception of God was again destroyed 
 (see below). The opinion entertained by some Arians appears to have held 
 
ARIUS. Bart 
 
 here see quite clearly, that the old higher conception of the Son 
 hovered before the mind of Arius at the commencement of His 
 career. For if God is too exalted, and the world too low to 
 bear the immediate creative action of God; and if, on the other 
 hand, He is not too lofty to create the Son immediately, nor the 
 Son too low to be immediately created; evidently the Son must 
 be as nearly as possible adequate to God: and this stands in 
 most intimate connection with the circumstance of Arius then 
 attributing perfection and unchangeableness to the Son (wAjpns 
 Ocds povoyevs avaddolwTos). 
 
 Arius, however, soon went further; indeed, he could not 
 avoid doing so; and although, from time to time, as though 
 shocked at the conclusions to which he was being led,' he evinced 
 a disposition to retrace his steps (for example, in the above-men- 
 tioned epistles to Eusebius and Alexander, after having allowed 
 himself, even during his stay in Alexandria, in the first heat of 
 the controversy, to be partially led away to statements which he 
 was not able fully to endorse till a later period: compare the 
 Ep. Alex. in Socr. 1, 6, and the Ep. Alex. ad Alex., Theodoret, 
 H. E. 1, 3), the necessity of the case drove him irresistibly on- 
 wards, till he arrived at the system laid down in the Thalia.’ 
 
 If, then, the Son is exalted above the world, and is constituted 
 its Creator, in order that He may bridge over the gulf between 
 it and the majesty of God; and if, accordingly, He continues in 
 the nearness to God described above; what becomes of that 
 utterly incomparable elevation and singularity of the Father? 
 For, in that the Son was the worthy image of the Father, there 
 was no longer any need for this very vehement opposition. On 
 the contrary, something of the cause must have passed over into 
 its adequate effect; consequently, the received doctrine of the 
 essential equality of the Son could no longer be deemed objec- 
 tionable, nor the use of the expression é& ov« dvtwy be justified. 
 Precisely this, however, appeared to him to lead, on the one 
 hand, to Emanatism and to a division of God; and, on the other 
 
 a middle position between this and the one above mentioned. To the Father 
 appertained the dusovpyia, that is, probably, the creative act considered as 
 an unity ; to the Son the xricwerx. that is, the creative works, which are 
 a plurality. 
 1 Unless we are ready to charge him point blank with double dealing. 
 2 Compare, in particular, Athan. c. Ar. or. 1. 
 
238 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 hand, to involve a corruption of the idea of causality, in con- 
 sequence of importance enough not being attached to the dis- 
 tinction between effect and cause. He apprehended the reduction 
 of the causal relation to a patripassian identity, or to a Sabellian 
 substantiality, if too great a resemblance were posited between 
 the Son and the Father. Inasmuch, therefore, as he intended 
 by means of the causal relation to denote the distinction be- 
 tween the incommunicable, exalted Deity, and everything out- 
 side of it, he was compelled to adopt the course of giving 
 greater prominence to the difference between the Son and the 
 Father. If the Son really stood so near to God as he repre- 
 sented, for His very excellence sake, a certain necessity would 
 have lain on the essence of God to bring Him forth; the ex- 
 istence of the Son would be, to a certain extent, involved in the 
 idea of God Himself ; He must be in some way supposed to have 
 existed eternally in God, especially as His excellence could not 
 have been derived from nothing, but must have been crounded 
 in the divine essence and self-communication. Arius therefore 
 passed by this form of the divine causality,—which involved 
 the transmission of something of the essence of the cause to 
 the effect, as in the case of parents and children; and which 
 further seemed to him to bear a physical character, and to lessen 
 the distinction between cause and effect,—and preferred another. 
 To this course he was impelled by the decisive words, €& ovx« 
 -ovtoy, implying as they did, that the essence of the Son was 
 absolutely different from that of the Father; for they required 
 both the development of the consequences involved in them, and 
 the rejection of traditional determinations, the more inexorably, 
 as, in the view of Arius, this was the only way in which full 
 justice could be done to the incomparable dignity of God. 
 
 He ought, then, logically to have gone on to say,—Inasmuch 
 as the Son must have sprung from nothing, and was a creature ; 
 and inasmuch, further, as everything which belongs to the world 
 is unworthy of the dignity of God; there can exist neither Son 
 nor world, but God alone in His singularity and solitude. For 
 obvious reasons, however, he was unwilling to go so far; and 
 contented himself with the obvious advantage offered by the é 
 ov« évt@v, which appeared to him satisfactorily to provide for 
 the dignity of God, and which presupposes a conception of 
 causality, whose analogue is the free will of man, positing things 
 
ARIUS. 239 
 
 that are not essentially necessary or homogeneous, but rather 
 fortuitous, casual.* 
 
 That which is created out of nothing, is of a nature totally 
 different from that of God. Least of all can it be unchange- 
 able, unalterable; for otherwise it would, in some way or other, 
 be possessed _of absoluteness; and absoluteness belongs to God 
 alone. Nor could it be a temporal being; for the temporal is 
 subject to growth, and therefore to change. Consequently (he 
 now teaches), the Son is alterable and changeable (TpemTos Kat 
 ddrowwrods THY PUoW, Os Kal TaVTA TA NoytKa). As to essence, 
 He is foreign to God (£évos, addddrpuos), completely separated 
 from Him (drecxowtopévos), unlike the substance of the Father, 
 not veritably and naturally Logos of the Father, not the true 
 power of God; but one of the so-called powers of God, as the 
 locust (dxpis) also is termed not merely a power, but a great 
 power (see Joel il.); the many other powers, however, resemble 
 the Son (Ep. Alex. in Socr. 1, 6; Athan. c. Are: Oraglegos Oye 
 If the case stand thus with the physical quality of the power 
 and might of the Son, what remains for the will and the intel- 
 lect? The Son neither knows Himself nor the Father com- 
 pletely ; the Father is by nature a mystery, unutterable, in- 
 cognizable by the creature ; it is His idea to be unsearchable. 
 For which reason, even the Son cannot reveal Him perfectly 
 (Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 6.95 de Syn. 15; Note 47). 
 
 At this point we discern most clearly the feebleness, not 
 merely of the religious, but even of the higher scientific impulse 
 in Arius. In the sphere of the relative, his movements are easy 
 and skilful; in the handling of the lower categories of logic, he 
 evinces dialectic address ; but he applies them as a standard to 
 
 1 In consequence of not having the idea of true, ethical freedom, Arius 
 feared to represent the cause of the world as working by necessity ; and he 
 was, therefore, unable to give a satisfactory account of its origin. Its 
 author, therefore, in the last instance, was Chance ; only Arius gives this 
 chance a seat in the will of God, in the form of caprice. He was right in 
 repudiating a purely physical conception of God, seeing that it admits of no 
 distinction between God and the world. But still he clings with one hand 
 to the very same conception of God, when he gives an irrationality like 
 accident, caprice, a place in God; and that with the notion of highly ex- 
 alting Him. The fortuitous, in the form of an ‘‘accidens,” may be attri- 
 buted to God, viewed as substance ; indeed, like Arius’ conception of Ged, 
 it is necessarily characterized thereby. 
 
240 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 everything, and is unable to rise to anything higher. He is 
 entirely destitute of the strictly speculative faculty. God’s 
 essence he represents as totally incognizable, and this incog- 
 nizableness he deems to form part of His exaltedness: at the 
 same time, he forgets that if we cannot know anything of God, 
 we cannot know that His essence is incognizable. And further, 
 although he maintains that we cannot truly know anything of 
 God, he applies the idea of causality to Him in any way that 
 answers his purpose. As concerns the religious aspect of the 
 matter,—Christianity cannot on such a theory be the absolute 
 religion ; it can only differ from other religions in degree, not 
 in kind. Nay more, we cannot even entertain the hope that 
 another revelation will supply the lack. Alike by the divine 
 loftiness, and by his own essential lowness—a lowness which 
 not even God can change—man is condemned to remain eter- 
 nally distant from God. God is, and continues, removed to 
 an invisible distance; to communicate a knowledge of Him- 
 self, would be to communicate Himself, to break through the 
 limits imposed by His loftiness. God therefore remains by 
 Himself, and man by Himself : their separation is an essential 
 one. 
 
 Finally, as to the Will :—this also is changeable. Arius 
 denies to the Son essential goodness. Even whilst still in Alex- 
 andria, Socrates informs us, the Arians were asked (1. c.),—If 
 the Logos, that is, the Son, were mutable, was it possible for Him 
 to change into the opposite, as did the devil?—and they an- 
 swered in the affirmative. Arius allowed, it is true, that Christ. 
 remained virtuous, and did not turn to worse things ; but if He 
 should will, it is always in His power to turn to evil. Because 
 God foresaw that He would continue faithful, He chose Him 
 from all others: as God foreknew that He would be good 
 (xarov), He anticipatorily conferred upon Him the honour of 
 being called Logos and Son. This honour He subsequently 
 earned for Himself, as a man, by His virtue; so that the works 
 foreseen by God were the cause of His becoming that which 
 He now is.' | In this way, the dignity of being Son of God by 
 
 \ bod ‘ ‘ uA 2 or ¥ 
 1 Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 5:—Kal TN “ey Duos, WorEep Weavres, ovtws xx 
 > ‘ € , sy \ \ ~ DA dC > ~ / [77 U 4 ‘ 
 AUTOS O Aayos toTh TpEMTOS, TH OE dim HUTESOVTIM, £a¢ CovAsTal, Lever xaAOZ, 
 7 Ld ’ ery \ \ 7 \ c ~ ~ a” 
 ore wsytos OAs, Ovvaras tpercobar nal avros OO%ED Hab HUSIS, THETTYS ws 
 , \ x \ 5 , G ‘ ” ‘ ae GA 
 Quoeas. Arie rovro yao Dyot, xb Toovyivaocuwy o Osos, eosabas xaxAcv cevres 
 
ARIUS. 241 
 
 birth, and consequently by nature, is taken away; and saints 
 also, with the aid of the like tpovwv émipéreva kal aoxnors, may 
 become what He is (compare Theodoret, H. E. 1, 3). An en- 
 tirely different principle now begins to be adopted, and a merely 
 ethical Sonship to be substituted for that of essence and nature. 
 We have already found the idea of an ethical Sonship in a 
 very developed state in the system of Lactantius (after hints by 
 Paul of Samosata) , Lactantius, however, never ceased to pre- 
 suppose the essential and natural Sonship. The only novelty, 
 therefore, is, that Arius reduces the natural divine Sonship of 
 Christ to a completely inoperative thing, or, more exactly ex- 
 pressed, reduces it to nonentity. This harmonizes very well 
 with one part of his system. He was concerned not merely to 
 establish the loftiness of God, which, in the last instance, he was 
 compelled to define as the absolute freedom of an arbitrary 
 causality ; but also to separate God and man in such a way as 
 to secure to each complete (deistic) independence. If man is 
 completely set loose from God, he is by that very means endowed 
 with a likeness to God, in that, namely, God and the divine 
 bear the same non-essential relation to him as the world bears to 
 God. This separation, therefore, restores to man his equality to 
 God ;—neither the will of God nor the will of man is deter- 
 mined by anything essentially contained in it. Man also enjoys, 
 in his measure, that. formal freedom, which in God is absolute, 
 and which constitutes the divine loftiness. Although, therefore, 
 the divine causality was unable to transfuse any part of the 
 divine essence into man and into the nature of Christ, because 
 otherwise the distinction affirmed by Arius, between God and 
 the world, would be effaced; yet the freedom of Christ, indeed 
 the freedom of men in general, is the principle which enables 
 that which was created out of nothing, and is yet void of con- 
 tent, to secure a divine substance for its form; which, in a word, 
 renders it capable of producing the divine out_of_itself,.and of 
 thus becoming deified. And, if we are not very nice in our 
 use of words, this self-deification might be described as a divine 
 apts, or Géous or Oeorroinats,* so far as God does not prevent it, 
 
 wporeBayv arte ravryy tiv dofey dédwxev, qv kvOpuros nal ex rig coerijs axe 
 Let e TavTe, WoTe ef Epyav avTOV, ay rpotyyw 6 Osds, ToLovrov avToy vUY vErYo- 
 vives ~eroinzgy. Compare Theodor. H. E. 1,3, and the next note. 
 
 1 Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 5. 6:—Ei 6¢ xeel Agyeras Osos, AA ove &Anbivds 
 
 VOL. Vt, Q 
 
242 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 but allows it to come to pass, and so far as He accepts the per 
 fect man, the man who has become God, as His Son, and con 
 fers upon Him titles and dignities. 
 
 But although this formally ethical principle fits very well 
 into one portion of the system of Arius, it is equally far from 
 suiting the remainder. If divine Sonship, not merely in the 
 new and higher form, but in general, must first be earned 
 through the medium of formal freedom; if, further, the pre- 
 existent hypostasis, and the good which may be inherent therein, — 
 ought to be, nay more, must necessarily be, inactive, inasmuch 
 as resemblance to God cannot proceed from God Himself, but 
 must be the fruit of the exercise of freedom, not only in the 
 case of men, but also in that of Christ ;—to what purpose, then, 
 this pre-existent hypostasis, which is reduced to inactivity? It 
 is without significance relatively to Christology; it is nothing 
 but a burdensome, confusing, cosmological appendage, which 
 ought rather to have been cast aside with the occupation of this 
 totally new point of view. Athanasius and Alexander were 
 justified in saying to Arius, that his home was rather with Paul 
 of Samosata than in the Church. Or is the pre-existent hypo- 
 stasis of the Son supposed to render any service at all, even 
 though merely in connection with creation? But he has so 
 lessened it, and reduced it to the level of other rational creatures ; 
 he has made its entire dignity so completely dependent on its 
 moral behaviour, that it is powerless to effect the creation of 
 the world." Or was this necessary, that Christ might be able 
 to bring His revelation? What Arius thought of this matter 
 we have seen already; and, at all events, his disciples very 
 gOTIV, AAAL METoXH Ku piTos, aamep xoel ol AAAOL WavTEs, OUTH xual KITOS Aéyercee 
 cvouars wovoyv Oecev. Desent. Dion. c. 238 :—Odx gars pev xard Qdow xel 
 aAnOivoy Tov Qeov vies, xara Beary O€ Agyeras xael oTOS vids, ws uticue. Or. 
 1,9 :—Meroxyy nai adres ebeoroindn. Ep. Alex. ad Alex.in Theodor. H. E. 
 1, 3:—‘ No one is Son of God by nature,” say they ; ‘‘ therefore also the 
 
 Son has not Qvcss eZc/perdv ts above others: but God selected Him from all 
 others (éZesney das atrov xo xevrwy) because He foreknew that He would 
 not go astray.” 
 
 ‘ It is true, even in the Thalia, he does not venture to give utterance te 
 this thought, but, at the same time, it sets forth the Son, so far as, in 
 virtue of His office of Creator, He must occupy a higher position than we, 
 as a mere instrument and means, of which we are the end; and, so far as 
 He does not exist solely on our account, He is put on a level with us. 
 Compare Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 5. 6; Socr. H. E. 1. c. 170: 
 
ARIUS. 243 
 
 properly went on to maintain, that the Son also needed first to 
 learn what He knew, and to deny to Him both essential know- 
 ledge and essential goodness (see note, p. 236). Nay more, 
 Kustathius of Antioch (Gallandi Bibl. IV. 580) informs us 
 that some Arians did not even shrink from classing Christ 
 amongst sinners. Inasmuch, further, as, in his view, all men 
 are alike free, being rational creatures, what need can there be 
 of Christ? Even in his Thalia, Arius found nothing whatever 
 to say regarding sin. Nay more, according to his idea of 
 virtue and freedom, every man must be able to redeem himself, 
 or rather to raise himself up to God. Still, Arius must always 
 have attached great significance to this pre-existent. hypostasis ; 
 for he regarded it as, strictly speaking, the personal element in 
 the human life of Christ, and on its account was compelled to 
 mutilate the humanity of Christ, by denying to it a human 
 soul; because, otherwise, two finite spirits must have been 
 represented as constituting one person. But even on this 
 supposition, the only office discharged by the hypostasis, is that 
 of an hindrance ; and precisely at this point does it become 
 very evident that his principles, carried to their logical results, 
 necessitated the rejection of the notion of a pre-existent hypo- 
 stasis. Had he taken this step, he would have completely 
 identified himself with Paul of Samosata. As it is, however, 
 he is neither one thing nor another; and, being occupied solely 
 with finite and single objects, never rises to a free survey of the 
 connections of the whole as such. He reduces God Himself, in 
 His pre-eminence, to singularity, to an abstract individual, shut 
 up in His own egoism: of love, that is, of the absolutely ethical, 
 he has no notion whatever. Even the ethical which he recog- 
 nises is a relative thing, grounded in the antithesis between 
 God and man. We might also show, in connection with all 
 the main points, that his dialectic, being that of the understand- 
 ing, never fails, agreeably to its innate character, unconsciously 
 to nullify earlier by later principles; although, at the same 
 time, it consoles itself with the ineradicable conviction of the 
 clearness and certainty of its own knowledge. Let it suffice, 
 however, to draw attention to one or two. Arius affirms that 
 there is but one God; and, because he refuses to allow any- 
 thing to be abstracted from Him, he represents Him as mcom- 
 municable. And yet his deistic point of view drives him ta 
 
244 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 attribute such an absoluteness to the world, as constitutes it in 
 reality a plurality of deities. In presence of the freedom of 
 man, God actually recedes completely into the background. 
 Further, let it be remarked how Arius at first represents the 
 Son as a «rica, in order to preserve the simplicity and unity 
 of God; and at the same time constitutes Him a creative, in- 
 ferior God, in order that the gulf arising from the loftiness of 
 God may not be too great. On a subsequent occasion, for the 
 sake of this same divine loftiness, he puts the Son on a far lower 
 level ; but did not reflect that he was thus depriving the world 
 of its basis, as which, his conception of God required him to 
 regard the Son, and the Son alone. Finally, if this basis can 
 no longer consistently be held to lie in the Son, but must be 
 contained immediately in the Father alone, the principle of the 
 entire course of thought, that on which he had mainly leant 
 for support when reducing the Son to the rank of a xricpa, is 
 undermined; to wit, that of the abstract simplicity, incommuni- 
 cableness of God, and His absolute separation from the world. 
 It is clear, that a system of thought so destitute of hold, and so 
 unweariedly occupied in refuting itself, could never ER iliie: a 
 permanent type of doctrine ; the renee however, with 
 which it jumped from one momentum to Lire and ever 
 turned the one against the other, was fitted to set them all in 
 motion and ferment, and thus to prepare the way for their 
 interpenetration and intermixture. 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 THE COUNCIL OF NICZA, AND THE BEGINNINGS OF 
 ATHANASIUS. 
 
 Ine doctrine of Arius met with the warmest opposition, in the 
 first instance, in Alexandria. Alexander refuted it from the 
 Holy Scriptures, specially by means of the prologue to the 
 Gospel of John. How can He be the First-born, if He is to be 
 put on the same level with us all? Or how can He be the 
 creator of Him whose equal He is? If the Logos and Wisdom 
 were not as eternal as God, God must at one period have been 
 
ALEXANDER AGAINST ARIUS 245 
 
 without wisdom and reason. Further, were the Son mutable, 
 how could He be so intimately united with the Father? If He 
 is in the Father, and the Father in Him, He must thus be pre- 
 served from mutability; and not even the incarnation can have 
 produced an alteration in Him. Further, how is it possible 
 that He, who is reason itself, should not know the Father, 
 whose reason He is (Adyos)? Or how can He have been 
 brought into existence solely on our behalf, for whose sake, 
 and by whom, all things were created? (Socr. H. E. 1, 6.) So 
 far from having been Himself created out of nothing, He rather 
 Himself created all things out of nothing, and must, therefore, 
 be far removed from that which is created. On the contrary, 
 it is impossible even in thought to represent an interval (éca- 
 oTnua) between Father and Son. Not as though the Son had 
 not been generated; one only is unbegotten, to wit, the Father ; 
 but the generation of the Son was something so exalted, that it 
 surpassed the understanding of the Evangelists, and surpasses, 
 perhaps, that of the angels also. He then, in particular, lays 
 bare the subreption contained in the Arian proposition—jp drte 
 ovx nv. ‘This, again, involves the existence of a time; but all 
 time is created by Him, and comes into existence along with 
 the world ; consequently, the time in which He is said not to 
 have existed, must have existed through Him, for otherwise the 
 cause would be posterior to its effect. If a time had been 
 created anterior to Him, He could no longer be described as the 
 First-born of all creation. The Father, therefore, must always 
 have been Father, because the Son, through whom He is Father, 
 sways existed. Precisely for this reason is He ever the perfect 
 Father, who never lacks anything good (rédevos avedduTijs év 
 T® Kadk®). Whoso denies the brightness, denies also the arche- 
 typal light (wpwrdtumov das), of which it is the reflection. If 
 He, who is the express image (yapax7yp) and copy of the divine 
 essence, is not eternal, neither is the substance of the image and 
 the object of the copy eternal. On this ground, the Sonship of 
 the Redeemer has nothing in common with that of others; for 
 His was a natural Sonship (cata dvow tijs maxpuxfs Oeorntos) : 
 the latter is one of adoption (@écer). We are mutable in both 
 aspects, and therefore need help from the Unchangeable One. 
 How, then, can the wisdom of God be supposed to progress, or 
 the power of God to increase? Or how can wisdom be sup- 
 
246 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 posed to be turned into folly, and strength into weakness? To 
 the creature alone, on the contrary, is it given as a blessing, to 
 be able to increase in virtue; and through Him, who is by 
 nature Son, to be freed from the spirit of fear, and to receive 
 sonship by grace, by adoption. The latter may possibly be 
 lost ; the former cannot be lost. But it is a calumny of the 
 Arians to charge him (Alexander) with teaching that there are 
 two ungenerated Beings, or to maintain that he ought to teach 
 it, if he do not. The Father alone is unbegotten; He alone 
 nee no oon of His being out of Himself (ovdéva rod civas 
 avT® Tov aitvov dvta). ‘The*Son is in every other respect equal 
 to the Father, and falls short in nothing, save that He is not 
 unbegotten (ons TO ayEevynT@ AELTrOM“EVoY avTOD) ; and to this 
 difference refer the words, “'The Father is greater than I.” 
 But He was not, therefore, created out of nothing, but is of 
 the Father. In connection herewith, not only Arius, but also 
 Sabellius and Valentine, are repudiated, who ascribe to God 
 something resembling the body, corporeal divisions and emis- 
 sions, instead of resting satisfied with the unutterable mystery, 
 whose unsearchableness is declared even by the Scriptures (Isa. 
 li. 8), “ Who shall declare His generation?” (Theodor. H. E. 
 1, 3.) We see from this, that Alexander’s aim was to establish 
 the closest possible connection between the hypostasis of the 
 Son and His eternal divine essence. In carrying out his design, 
 he decidedly posits a duality in God, and, if we may judge 
 from the images employed by him, conceives the Logos of the 
 Father to be objectified in the Son; though he does not express 
 any opinion as to the relation between the reason and power of 
 the Father (apart from which, no conception can be formed of 
 Him), and the reason and power of the Son. His images, in 
 themselves, would warrant us in concluding, that he conceived 
 the Father to have reason and power, not in Himself, but in 
 the Son ; that he simply identified the reason of the Father 
 and of the Son; that, consequently, the Son was the Father 
 Himself, under a determinate form, and, as a determination or 
 attribute, constituted part of the full conception of the Father. 
 This, however, would contradict the duality which he had pre- 
 viously laid down. 
 
 A very numerously attended Synod, held at Alexandria 
 (Soer. 1. ¢.), concurred with Alexander, and deposed Arius and 
 
COUNCILS OF ALEXANDRIA AND NICHA. 247 
 
 his followers. But as Arius had a supporter in Eusebius of 
 Nicomedia, and other Oriental bishops also took his part, an 
 (Ecumenical Council was convened at Niczea, in the year 325, 
 for the settlement of the points in dispute. The judgment of 
 the Alexandrian Synod was confirmed, and the Nicene Creed 
 was framed, which acknowledges the generation of the Son 
 from the Father, and gives the following more precise defini- 
 tion of it:—That the Son is of the essence of the Father; that 
 He is very God of very God; that He was begotten, not 
 created. Mainly, however, in consequence of the efforts of 
 Athanasius—that vigorous champion of Christian interests— 
 there was added the recapitulatory term, ofoovcvoy, the main 
 purpose of which was, to express the identity of essence, though 
 it also further implied or presupposed the equal coexistence of 
 two: this latter was involved also in the term yervav. The 
 only expression in the Symbolum, bearing on the nature of the 
 distinction between the two, is the following: “The Son is of 
 the Father, who begat Him.” It is primarily directed against 
 Arianism, not against Sabellianism. The latter, however, was 
 also excluded, in so far as it was unable to attach any meaning 
 to the idea of generation, specially not to that of the generation 
 of a pre-existent hypostasis, which, as the Symbolum affirms, 
 created the world. But the Creed contains also the idea of the 
 eternal generation, as is clear when we combine the simultaneity 
 of Father and Son with the yeyvav. To the double affirmation 
 contained in opoovctov, there is a correspondent double nega- 
 tion :—1. The Son did not arise out of nothing, nor indeed out 
 of any other substance, or any other essence, than the Father 
 (consequently, not merely duosos to the Father) ; He was, there- 
 fore, neither created nor mutable. 2. It is unlawful to say, 
 There was a time when He was not, or, He was not ere He was 
 generated; for these are propositions which apply the idea of 
 time to the generation of the Son, and imply that the genera- 
 tion had a commencement. (Note 48.) 
 
 The duty devolving on the Fathers at the Council of Nicza, 
 was to set forth and confess the substance of the Christian faith, 
 not to give doctrinal speculations. Hitherto, only.a few had 
 entered on dogmatical investigations ; not till twenty years later 
 did the Church in general devote attention thereto. If we take 
 into consideration that the first effect of devoting attention te 
 
246 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 the dialectic conciliation of doctrines must necessarily be to rob 
 many of that immediate assurance of the truth of Christianity 
 by which they were possessed, and that the place of the really 
 grand unity of spirit evinced in Nica must be usurped by a 
 manifold variety of views, which, ere they could be brought, 
 as to their principal features, not to say into uniformity, but 
 into an harmonious unity, must be discussed, reflected upon, 
 and thoroughly cleared up,—we shall esteem it a special favour 
 of Providence, that the conscience of the Church was appealed 
 to for its testimony and confession, so long as it still retained its 
 direct certitude and simplicity; and that thus, at the very com- 
 mencement of its voyage, a beacon was enkindled to mark the 
 Church’s pathway across the stormy seas which lay before it. 
 But a firm and steady pilot’s hand was also provided for the 
 voyage, in the person of a man who was endowed with a 
 superior, farseeing, and no less speculative than Christian 
 mind, and who, through his power of endurance and strength 
 of character, always remained master of the position. Athana- 
 sius the Great made it the task of his long and very eventful 
 life to defend the creed adopted by the Nicene Council, with 
 all the weapons of science and spiritual chivalry, against the 
 vacillating and shortsighted on the one hand, and the apostate 
 on the other hand, and to constitute it, not merely a vital and 
 common treasure of all believers, but also a subject of real 
 knowledge. And to him was given what, is given to but very 
 few—the happiness of seeing the idea to which, as youth and 
 man, he had devoted his life, attain to ever wider influence and 
 recognition, and of sinking into the grave, not merely crowned 
 with honour, but laden with the fruits of his labours. 
 
 Specially noteworthy, as indicative of the character of the 
 tendency of the Church at the beginning of the fourth century, 
 are (besides the above) the two works written by Athanasius 
 prior to the Nicene Council, and without reference to Arius, 
 entitled Adyos Kata ‘ENjvev (oratio contra Gentes), and sept 
 ‘THs evavOpwricews tod Adyou (de incarnatione Verbi Dei). 
 These works set before us, at the same time, the beginnings of 
 Athanasius. He evinces an acquaintance with Greek philo- 
 sophy, and his presentation of Christian doctrine has many 
 points of affinity therewith; at the same time, however, the 
 vital centre of Christianity is grasped by him with such intense 
 
ATHANASIUS. 249 
 
 fervour, and is treated in such a scientific spirit, that it gives us 
 the groundwork of a grand system of speculative Christian 
 theology. What engaged his attention above all things else, 
 was the Logos. His existence he presupposed, firstly, as the 
 faith of the Church, secondly, as conceded by the philosophy 
 of the day; lastly, on historical grounds. He does not, it is 
 true, enter into a closer investigation of the relation of the 
 Logos to the Father, and to the unity of God; he does, how- 
 ever, examine His relation to the world in all the three aspects, 
 of creation, preservation, and incarnation. 
 
 The purpose of his work was to communicate that which he 
 had learnt from the many blessed teachers who had explained 
 the holy. Scriptures, and to show that the Christian faith—by 
 which he understood the belief in the incarnation of the Logos 
 —was no slight (edredés) nor irrational (dAoyov) thing. 
 
 Let us, in the first place, consider his doctrine of God and 
 man, in order thus to see what was the basis of his doctrine of 
 
 the God-man. Oe oe 
 
 He arrives at his idea of God, in the first place, by overcom- 
 ing the error of Heathenism. God is neither the world, says he, 
 nor a part of the world. In the world, every part is dependent 
 on the other,—the rivers on the mountains, the mountains 
 on the earth, the earth on the sun. God, however, cannot be 
 dependent on another; if He were, He would not be God (ce. 
 Gent. c. 27). God must be self-sufficient, and requires for His 
 existence nothing beside Himself. Nor can the whole world, 
 its members joined together, as it were, into one body, be called 
 God. It is true, there is nothing outside of the entire universe ; 
 and therefore it appears independent, self-sufficient. But if 
 the individual members combine to form a whole, and this whole 
 is therefore constituted by them, the whole consists of the indi- 
 vidual parts, which together are the parts of the whole. This, 
 however, is totally different from the idea of God. God is a 
 whole; but He is not the parts; He does not consist of differ- 
 ent parts, but is the cause of the world and of its composition. 
 If He consisted of parts, He would be unequal to Himself, 
 inasmuch as that which is unequal would be the complement 
 of His being. Sun is not moon; moon is not earth; earth is 
 not sea. The ear is not the eye; nor the hand the foot. This 
 difference of the parts pertains to the idea of the body; the 
 
} 
 
 | 
 
 a 
 
 250 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 same difference, therefore, would appertain to God also, if 
 He were identical with the universe, conceived as one body. 
 Further, not being compounded, God is incorporeal, invisible, 
 not tangible by hands, but apprehensible solely by the spirit ° 
 for this reason, therefore, He cannot be the world. On the 
 contrary, He is in Himself, in His essence, self-sufficient, full 
 of Himself (contra Gentes 28); and the cause of the existence 
 
 _-of the universe. 
 
 But he does not believe that this self-sufficient God abides 
 in His transcendence, On the contrary, like the old propounders 
 of the doctrine of the Logos, particularly of the Alexandrian 
 school, Athanasius says,—He is in the world as the immanent 
 principle of its harmony. He desires no abstract loftiness of 
 God, as did unbelieving Judaism; he neither apprehends any 
 danger to God, nor regards it as unworthy of Him, that He 
 should come into contact with the world. Although it is created 
 out of nothing, and therefore, considered in itself, can neither 
 bear nor maintain itself; still its idea involves an essential con- 
 nection between God or the Logos and itself. This presupposes 
 an entirely different conception of God from the heathenish 
 one of the “Ov, and from the Jewish, to both of which abstract 
 simplicity is essential,—in the former case, the simplicity of 
 substantial Pantheism, in the latter case, that of Deism. Rather, 
 says Athanasius, giving the idea of God an ethical turn,—God 
 is good and not envious; therefore did He create the world ; 
 but especially in men has He taken an interest, through the 
 Logos. Seeing that they cannot live always, He created them 
 in His image, and endowed them with the power of the Logos, 
 so that they became, as it were, shadows of the Logos (cxvat 
 Aoyov) and Aoyxot. In that He further saw that the will 
 of men was in itself still empty, and might incline to either 
 side, He protected it preveniently by the command and by 
 paradise. By nature, man was mortal; for he was created out 
 of things that were not (é& ov« dvtwv). But he possessed the 
 capacity of immortality, through his union with the Logos. 
 Had he by obedience continued in that union, the physical 
 necessity of death would have been overcome by the divine 
 principle of immortality, the Logos: men would then have 
 been as gods. But man disobeyed, and death penetrated into 
 the world, even as the divine threatening had announced. It 
 
ATHANASIUS. pols Ai 
 
 entered by an inner necessity ; for sin deprived man of the Logos, 
 the only principle able to overcome his natural mortality. As 
 sin grew, death grew; the image of God was destroyed; the 
 work of God was overthrown (de ince. c. 38-6). The knot was 
 tied still more firmly by the threatened punishment. ‘The 
 divine threat, the pledged word of the God of truth, could not 
 suffer: on the other hand, must the work and image of God 
 perish? It was not worthy of God to allow His own noble 
 work of art to perish, for the sake of a deceit of the devil. 
 Better had it been for God not to have created, than for the 
 evil to have the better. To have allowed that which love had 
 created to perish, would have been weakness, and inconsistent 
 with omnipotence. Still more inconsistent with love. God did 
 not look with indifference on His perishing work; it appealed 
 to His love (€exanréoaro, c. 4, 6). 
 
 Should God then require repentance, and through repentance 
 restore man to immortality? In itself, this would not have been 
 unworthy of Him; but He could not lay Himself open to the 
 charge of untruth, even though for our benefit. Repentance 
 was not sufficient: had sin been the sole point in question, and 
 not also punishment, repentance would have sufficed. But as 
 matters actually stood, and seeing that God (the righteous) 1s 
 true, who could help out of the difficulty, save the Logos? He, 
 who created man out of nothing, was able to suffer for all, to 
 stand in the stead of all (c. 7). Therefore the Logos came ; 
 He, who was incorporeal, imperishable, omnipresent, appeared 
 in order to reveal Himself. He saw both our misery and the 
 threats of the law; He saw how unseemly (drozov) it would 
 be to annul the law, save by fulfilling and satisfying it; and 
 at the same time, how unseemly it would be that the Creator 
 should allow His rational world to perish. And as He saw the 
 ever-swelling tide of sin, and that all were in bondage unto 
 death, He took compassion on them and assumed.a body, not 
 by any necessity of nature (ficews axodoviig), for His essence 
 is incorporeal (c. 1), but for the purpose of confirming and 
 maintaining. the. first..creation. by..means of the second. It 
 is characteristic of the speculative mind of Athanasius, that 
 he everywhere treats the first and second creations as closely 
 connected with each other; that, in accounting for the miracle 
 of incarnation, he goes back to that of creation ; and shows that, 
 
202 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH 
 
 for the sake both of the unity of the idea of the world and of 
 God, it was necessary that He, and He alone, through whom 
 the Father created the world, should renew it. 
 
 But He assumed no other body than ours. Had His object 
 merely been to appear in some sort of body or other, He would 
 not have needed ours; and if a simple theophany had been all 
 that was required, He might have taken to Himself a much 
 worthier organ. Rather did He assume our body, and out of 
 the unspotted Virgin He built to Himself a body for a temple. 
 This He constituted His organ (idcoTroteioae Bamep dpyavor), 
 that He might dwell in it and be known through it. In con- 
 Sequence of this appropriation of our nature, He was able to 
 give His body to the death for all. And now, inasmuch as all 
 have died in Him, the law is annulled by being fulfilled, that 
 is, its curse is removed through the satisfaction. But in appro- 
 priating the body, He bestowed upon it immortality, and through 
 it has restored immortality to our nature. That which the act of 
 appropriation implanted in our nature, as a mere potence, at the 
 incarnation, became an actuality through His resurrection. He 
 must needs let death have power over His body; in order that, 
 by the death of death (the negation of the negation), in His 
 resurrection there might be revealed the full and settled reality 
 of life triumphing over, and reaching beyond, its antagonist, 
 death (c. 8, 9). 
 
 The entire appearance of Christ, but, above all, His death, 
 had an universal significance ; because the Logos, who is above 
 all, who is the Creator and Archetype, thereby made human 
 nature His own. The appropriation had an effect not merely 
 on the particular man Jesus, but also on human nature in 
 general; for this reason, the death of all found its fulfilment 
 in the body of the Lord (€7AnpovTo, c. 20). Guilt was heaped 
 upon Him, collected itself in Him, the representative of the 
 race; and His death was a payment for all. It was necessary 
 that death should be broken, not merely in some one particular 
 form, but as a general principle; and therefore did it behove 
 Him to admit and take it up into Himself, so that He might 
 overcome it completely. Now, inasmuch as the Logos, being 
 the immortal Son of the Father, could not die, He took upon 
 Himself a mortal body, to the intent that, by participating in 
 the Logos, who is over all, it might be capable of dying for all, 
 
ATHANASIUS. 253: 
 
 that is, of taking the euilt of all upon itself, of admitting the 
 universal principle of death into itself, and of thus paying the 
 universal debt and obtaining an universal victory over death. 
 ‘Note 49.) Athanasius had the deepest insight into the con- 
 nection between that which the incarnate Logos did and men, 
 into its validity for us. To no other did it pertain to convert 
 mortality into immortality, than to Him who in the beginning 
 created the universe out of nothing, and who was Himself the 
 Life (avtofw7); to no other than the archetype, the image of the 
 Father, did it appertain to create man anew, “in the image of 
 God” (c. 20, 13). If an image has been defaced, in order to 
 its renewal the original must be compared (c. 14). Now that 
 this Logos has taken to Himself our nature, our nature possesses 
 Him; He belongs to us, who constitute the body of which He 
 is the Head. Henceforth corruption has no more power over 
 men, even in death; for in virtue of the unity of the body 
 (which believers constitute for Christ), the Logos dwells in 
 them. When a mighty king enters into a great city, even/ 
 though he should but occupy one house therein, the whole 
 city (just because it constitutes a whole) receives the highest 
 honour. And so, when the Logos entered into our region and 
 became the tenant of (even though only) one body, which was 
 like ours, the power of death, which had reigned over all men 
 from of old, disappeared (c. 9). We die still, it is true; but 
 merely in order that we likewise may participate in the resur- 
 rection to a better state. 
 
 The first and principal ground of His incarnation, therefore, 
 was, that the condemning law might be done away with, which 
 burdens us with guilt and with the punishment of death. With 
 this, also, was most closely connected, that death itself should 
 be overcome by His payment of our debt, that is, by His own 
 death. Another ground why the Logos must needs become 
 man, was that_men were otherwise too weak to know God 
 (c. 11-13). Without the knowledge of God, men would have 
 lived in vain; for, from the very beginning, they were created 
 thereto. They had received a share in the Logos, the image of 
 God; they were created to be His and the Father’s image, in 
 order that they might be able in the Spirit to lay hold on the 
 Logos, and, in the Word, on the Father. This grace of the 
 commencement (% Kat’ eixova ydpis) sufficed in itself, apart 
 
254 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 from the world or anything else, for attaining a knowledge of 
 (rod (c. 12, c. Gentes 2, 30); it of itself reflected God. But 
 as God knew the weakness and negligence of man, He gave 
 him the world as a revelation, that great and beautiful edifice, 
 which, in its harmony and unity, reflects the unity and wisdom 
 of God. He further sought to help them through the law and 
 the prophets, as through a sacred school, appointed to give the 
 knowledge of God to the whole of humanity, in order that it 
 might learn to rule its passions, and to live virtuously. Men, 
 however, degraded themselves ever more to the level of irra- 
 tional and brute creatures. How then were they to be helped? 
 By the revelation in creation, which they no longer regarded as 
 a revelation, but as a deity? They had turned their gaze 
 downwards; and therefore the Logos also descended, assumed 
 a body from beneath, made Himself like men, in order that 
 they who refused to know Him out.of creation might learn to 
 know Him from the works which He wrought through the 
 body (de incarn. c. 12-14). In this latter exposition, the in- 
 carnation is represented, not as the substance, but merely as 
 the means or organ of doctrine. It might appear, therefore, as 
 though, in the view of Athanasius, the main point was simply 
 the knowledge of the Acoyos deapxos and of the Father, prior 
 and subsequently to Christ. But, after the above account of 
 the points to which Athanasius attached chief importance, this 
 would plainly be a false view. His object was rather, after 
 having treated of the main purpose of the appearance of Christ, 
 which he deemed to consist in deeds, to show that even the 
 intellect of man required a revelation, such as was given by 
 the incarnation: as was natural, however, he did not succeed 
 so well in showing the unconditional necessity of the incarnation 
 in relation to the prophetical office as he had succeeded in rela- 
 tion to the high-priestly office; as to the latter point, indeed, he 
 approximated very nearly to Anselm. 
 
 But in opposition to this incarnation objections are raised. 
 Tfow can we reconcile, he goes on to say, the dwelling of the 
 Logos in a human body with His all-embracing infinitude? 
 (c. 16,17.) He replies—Though He dwelt in the body, He was 
 not shut up in it; nor was He shut out from other places; but, 
 as the Logos, He was in the body, moving it even as He moves 
 the universe, which He created. It is true, He is not merely 
 
ATHANASIUS. 255 
 
 in the universe, but also outside thereof, as to His essence (xar’ 
 ovciav); He is also in the entire creation, seeing that He is in 
 all its powers (€v Tacw éotlv tats éavtod dvvapece), ordering 
 all things, extending His providence to all in all, giving life to 
 each individual thing, and to the universe as a whole, embracing 
 the universe without being embraced by it, existing everywhere 
 in His entirety (60s kata mavra) in His Father alone. Our 
 soul images forth in a weak way, how He, though in this body, 
 was yet able to animate the universe. For, whilst sitting in 
 the house, it is able to embrace distant objects, and to think of 
 the heavens,—only, that its thoughts are not deeds, and do not 
 move the heavens, as did the Logos in Christ; it merely knows 
 their motion. What he here above all insists upon is, that the 
 Logos, and not the limited humanity, is the true point of de- 
 parture for the consideration of the Person of Christ. The 
 Logos was not bound by the body, but held and bore it, even 
 as He holds and bears up the universe; at one and the same 
 time He was in the body and in the universe; nay more, as He 
 was in, so also was He outside of, the All, resting in the Father. 
 For this reason, it was impossible for the Logos to suffer either 
 through birth, or through sin, or through death; on the con- 
 trary, in holding, He sanctified the body. Out of the Virgin He 
 formed for Himself a body, in order to show that He was the 
 Oreator of the universe; and, without being seen as the Logos 
 in the body, or being shut in by it, He made Himself known as 
 Creator by His miraculous works. ‘That Athanasius appro- 
 priates the sufferings of Christ to the divine nature also, even 
 though not immediately, is evident from his doctrine of the 
 iSvomroinots, referred to above. Because the Logos appropriates 
 the sufferings of the human nature along with the nature 
 itself, they acquire a significance in and for the Logos Him- 
 self; and, on the other hand, because they are His, they ac- 
 quire, as does His victory, an universal significance. He takes 
 special pains, however, to point out that His miracles were 
 revelations, self-representations, of His person, of Himself, as 
 the Creator. He did not regard them as the mere credentials 
 of His doctrine, but as veritable victories over nature, and over 
 the heathenish view of the world. In the miracles, Creator 
 and creature were most clearly discriminated from each other ; 
 for by the obedience which nature then rendered to His com- 
 
256 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 manding word, He was revealed to it as its Ruler and Creator, 
 Still, he deems the constantly occurring spiritual marvels the 
 greatest of all (c. 27 ff.). No one doubts, when darkness disap-- 
 pears in the morning, that the sun is the cause thereof. And 
 so, no one can doubt who Christ is, when he once beholds His 
 works. Fear of death, and impotence to resist it, reigned ere 
 He came. Now His followers tread death under their feet. 
 They despise it as already dead; and the devil, who had the 
 power of death, is treated by believers as dead. Previously, 
 death was a terror; now, youths and maidens despise him and 
 hasten to the martyr’s fate. That Christ rose again and now 
 lives, is evident from what He does: He daily erects trophies to 
 Himself out of His disciples. That He is not a dead man, is 
 clear from His omnipotent workings in the hearts of Greeks 
 and Barbarians (c. 46 ff.). Since the incarnation of the Logos, 
 Heathenism has fallen, the wisdom of this world has become 
 folly, and the oracles are dumb. In the place of innumerable 
 particularistic religions, one has been substituted which em- 
 braces all nations. In heaven, in hades, in humanity, and on 
 earth—everywhere does man see the deity of the Logos un- 
 folded before him, and himself encompassed by it. IT[dvrwp 
 yap TOV THs KTicews pepav inNvato 6 Kupuos (c. 45, cll. 16 faye 
 Our heathen opponents, it is true, advance, as their principal 
 objection, “It was not worthy of the Logos to appearin a 
 body”’ (c. 41 f.). With the penetration of a speculative mind, 
 he answers,—If the Logos is in all things, in the entire world, 
 which is justly termed one great body,—nay, even in each in- 
 dividual thing,—why could He not also dwell in a man, whom 
 He moved, through whom He manifested Himself, even as He 
 manifests Himself through the world? That which is true of 
 the whole, must be true also of the parts; if the former is not 
 unworthy of the Logos, neither is the latter; and if it be un- 
 worthy of Him to dwell in this body, it must also be unworthy 
 of Him to dwell in the world. If He is in the whole, He is also 
 in the parts. If He is in one part, He can use it as His organ 
 for and on the whole. He is in Himself indivisible, 6Aos év 
 ExdoT@ Kal mace; as He is in the sun and moon, so is He in 
 humanity, which is a part of the universe. But—and he here- 
 with provides for assigning a specific position to Christ—the 
 spirit of man, also, although it pervades the whole man, reveals 
 
ATHANASIUS. 25 
 
 itself at one point of the body, to wit, the tongue. They ask, 
 further,—“ Why then did He not, at all events, assume a shin- 
 ing body?” Because His coming had not an epideictical, but 
 a curative purpose. The main point was not simply to appear 
 and to strike the eyes of beholders. He came to teach and to 
 heal: therefore did He become a servant; therefore did He 
 become that which men needed, in order that they might not 
 be merely stunned by the loftiness and divinity of His appear- 
 ance. It was not the brilliantly shining bodies, the sun, the 
 moon, the ether, that had gone astray; they had remained in 
 their proper order, the order appointed for them by their King, 
 the Logos: it was men who had gone astray. He therefore 
 constituted their body His organ, in order that, although they 
 were unable to know Him in the universe as a whole, He might 
 perhaps not remain concealed from them in the part; and in 
 order that, though they were unable to behold His invisible 
 power, they might possibly be able to understand and know 
 Him through His resemblance to themselves. For the contrast 
 between His divine works and the body like their own must 
 needs suggest a comparison, and thus lead them to the know- 
 ledge of His deity. If this is inconceivable, it is inconceivable 
 also that He should be known by means of the world. Although 
 in the world, nothing of the world pertains essentially to Him; 
 but the world does participate in Him. Even so, though He 
 employed the body as His organ, there was nothing in common 
 between them; on the contrary, He sanctified the body. Plato 
 says,— W hen the Generator of the worlds sees the world storm- 
 tossed and in danger of coming to the place of inequality, He 
 ascends His throne at the helm of the soul, gives it aid, and 
 sets all things to rights. What marvel, then, if we say,— 
 Humanity had gone astray, and therefore the Logos ascended 
 His throne on it, and appeared as a man (ce. 42, 43)? 
 
 Another objection is,—“ God might have helped men by a 
 mere nod.” Athanasius answered,—The world, it is true, was 
 created by a nod; but now it was a question not merely of the 
 creation of man, but the man already created must be consi- 
 dered: and he could only be helped by one like himself; in 
 other words, man could not be magically helped by an entirely 
 new creation, but the redemptive work must make use of, and 
 begin with, his already existing powers and character. The 
 
 VOLAEI 1: R 
 
258 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND EPOCH. 
 
 Creator must come nigh to the fallen through the medium of a 
 human organ, and this organ He must take from that which 
 already existed; for it was the existent, and not the non-exis- 
 tent, that stood in need of salvation. Further, the death which 
 needed to be overcome was not something external to the body, 
 but adhered inwardly to it; as a permanent principle, and not 
 merely as a single assault or act, did it threaten man. He 
 might have overcome death from without; but it would still 
 have remained in man. Hence it was necessary. that the pro- 
 cess should be an inward one. Our body, subjected as it was 
 _to death, was assumed, and was married with life; it was clothed 
 with immortality, and death was vanquished. ‘The body now 
 has life for its garment,—as it were, a robe of asbestus. This is 
 far more than if a stop had been put to death’s work, by a mere 
 external and authoritative command, and it itself hae remained 
 unvanquished. It was therefore perfectly worthy of the Logos 
 to come in the body in order to overcome death, and to reveal 
 Himself everywhere,—as through creation, so also through His 
 body and His deeds, and to fill all things with His knowledge 
 (c. 44). Therefore, let every man regard the Logos in the 
 works which He accomplished as God-man, which were _not 
 human works, but works of the Logos, and let him judge for 
 himself whether that be human or divine. If it be human, let 
 him mock. If it be not human, but divine, let him stand and 
 admire this revelation. Through this trifling thing (apadyya 
 evTedes) was the divine exhibited to us; through this death did 
 immortality penetrate to all; through the incarnation of the 
 Logos was providence made ariteee for the universe. But 
 ee things which He accomplished by His incarnation are so 
 numerous, that to attempt to count them up would be like 
 attempting to drain the sea. Wave presses on wave, and for 
 the eye to embrace the whole is impossible. ‘O Xédyos évnv- 
 Oparrnoev, tva iets OcotromOayuev (c. 54). 
 
 Although the immediate subject of these writings is not the 
 relation of the Logos to the Father, so much is clear, that, ac- 
 cording to this view of the matter, drawn as it is out of the very 
 centre of Christianity, to wit, the idea of the atonement, to the 
 Son pertains true and perfect deity, even as to the Father. He 
 is discriminated in the clearest manner from all creatures; 
 and as the Logos over all, rather rests in the Father (aird- 
 
ATHANASIUS. 259 
 
 Aoyos Kat eos, de incarn. 54); is the Father’s image and like 
 the Father, the archetype of men (c. 13). He is also most 
 decidedly distinguished from all angels, for they are not the 
 image of the Father (ibid.). In these treatises, therefore, - 
 Athanasius stands nearer to Sabellianism than to Subordina- 
 tianism ; so far, namely, as he is more concerned about the true 
 and full deity of the Son than about His distinction from the 
 Father. But he differs from Sabellius in regarding the Logos 
 as the image of the Father, pre-existent, yea, ever resting in 
 God, ata Marcellus, for example, could not allow. As re- 
 spects his Christology, by the depth of his view of the funda- 
 mental idea of Christianity, he reminds us of the best Fathers 
 of the second century, particularly of Ireneeus. He surpasses 
 them, however, in clearness and scientific precision. ‘The soul 
 of hig system, is the Logos over all, who, as such, in that He 
 became man, is the eeu and representative of humanity in two 
 respects,—to wit, in that He took upon Himself its guilt and 
 punishment ; sl that the healing of human. nature in and 
 through Him becomes the portion a humanity, and is diffused 
 fon ern to all. At the same time, it is worthy of note, that 
 he did not conceive the Logos in Christ as a mere influence, 
 but as a being of God in Him. In fact, he looked upon the 
 Logos as the motive, hegemonic, personal principle in the God- 
 man; but he makes no particular allusion to the human soul. 
 The arguments he advances, undoubtedly presuppose a complete 
 humanity (compare, for example, de incarn. c. 42 f.); but he 
 makes express mention of the body alone (c@pua, cap&); and 
 the enemy to be vanquished is principally death. The impo- 
 tence of the soul to know itself immortal, is undoubtedly repre- 
 sented as one ground of the incarnation; but his theory, in the 
 form in which it is here set forth, does not require for the 
 removal of this impotence, that Christ should substitutionarily 
 appropriate or feel it Himself, but merely that He should admit 
 into Himself the objective principle of death, that He should 
 take upon Himself the debt (dhevAopevov, not culpa) of men ; 
 and this supplied no occasion for more carefully considering the 
 question of the human soul of Christ. Such a view leaves no 
 place in the humanity for free choice, free determination, for 
 change, or even for true development (although he aimed at 
 preserving the reality of the humanity); but the man Jesus was 
 
260 FIRST PERIOD. SECOND FPOCH. 
 
 simply and solely the Logos, walking among men in the human 
 nature which He bore. Athanasius thus verged towards the 
 old representation of the body of Christ as a garment or temple, 
 which excludes the full idea of the incarnation. It is remark- 
 able, however, that precisely here, Athanasius made a decided 
 effort to rise beyond that meagre notion, in that he started from 
 a different point, to wit, nts the idea of Christ as the repre- 
 sentative both of guilt- ans and of God-pleasing and immortal 
 humanity. For he frequently repeats the remark,—What we 
 needed was not a mere theophany, but that He shouid really - 
 become one of us; in order to be our representative, He must 
 not merely have, or bear, or dwell in a man, but must Himself 
 be this man. Athanasius thus rose most decidedly above every 
 form of Sabellian Christology; and therefore, taking our stand. 
 on this thought, which was the centre of his system, we may 
 beforehand anticipate the nature and degree of the progress 
 which we shall afterwards find him making. 
 
THE ARIAN SCHOOL. 261 
 
 KPOCH THIRD. 
 
 FROM THE COUNCIL OF NICHA TO THAT OF 
 CONSTANTINOPLE, A.D. 381. 
 
 eee AS OTE EE 
 SECTION FIRST. 
 
 TRINITARIAN MOVEMENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 THE ARIAN SCHOOL. 
 
 Tue creed adopted by the Council of Nicaea did nothing more 
 for Christian science, in the first instance, than define the goal 
 at which it should aim; it neither did, nor pretended to, attain to 
 the goal. But the determination of the goal is the commence- 
 ment of its attainment. After the long course through which 
 the dogma had run, now unduly inclining to the one side and 
 then to the other, it became very necessary that the immediate 
 conviction entertained by the Church, relatively to Christ, 
 should assume a more concentrated form, and that testimony 
 should be laid concerning the totality of His person. To this, 
 Arianism gave occasion; for it called everything in question. 
 Not merely did it tend back to Ebionism; not merely was it 
 unable, with its Docetism and its doctrine of a created higher 
 spirit, to allow even the possibility of an incarnation ; but, by 
 putting a fantastical under-God between God and man, it sepa- 
 rated the two quite as much as it appeared to unite them. 
 Finally, the secret of Arianism was simply, in the first place, 
 that a real, above all, a complete, revelation of God Himself was 
 
262 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 an impossibility ; ; and in the second place, that such a revela- 
 tion, if it were possible, was unnecessary. But the creed ad adopted 
 by the Fathers of the Council of Ni iczea, to the point which had 
 been established during the preceding century,—to wit, the in- 
 dwelling of God in Christ under the very highest, that is, under 
 a personal form, in other words, to the hypostasis of the Son (a 
 point which was now confirmed, in substance, if not in a strictly 
 doctrinal form, as in accordance with the faith),—added that of 
 His true deity, which also had been recognised at a previous 
 period, though for a time allowed to recede to the background. 
 Each of these points, as we have learnt from the course hitherto 
 taken by them, stands or falls with the other, notwithstanding that 
 they appear to be mutually opposed. They are opposed in the 
 sense, namely, in which two poles are opposed. In reality, they 
 constitute the momenta of the higher nature of Christ, which 
 relate to, are inwardly conditioned by, and therefore depend on 
 and are involved in, each other. Hach preserves the truth, which 
 was of essential importance relatively to its own aspect of the 
 Person of Christ. They being taken for granted, the necessary 
 conditions of Christian piety are completely fulfilled, as far as 
 this matter is concerned. Without one of the two, a scientific 
 Christology is impossible. An hypostasis without deity (such as 
 Arianism teaches, which is but a refined form of Ebionism, 
 differing therefrom merely in degree, not in kind), would be as 
 paneeicee to Christian piety and science asthe divinity, 
 without a particular hypostasis, of the higher aspect of Christ 
 (such as is taught by that refined form of Docetism, Sabellian- 
 ism). Whilst the former, strictly speaking, denies the Christian 
 revelation altogether, the latter changes its inner character, and, 
 not recognising Christ as an abiding revelation, it cannot roe 
 God and man as truly and completely baoaiteitar Both, there- 
 fore, necessarily arrive at the same conclusion—at the conclu- 
 sion, namely, that the highest revelation has not yet been made, 
 nay, more, that such a revelation is an impossibility. Both are 
 characterized by the abstractness of their conception of God ;— 
 the latter clinging to the abstract unity of God, which may 
 easily change into the notion of the All-unity (Alleinheit) ; the 
 former clinging to the quite as abstract, incommunicable simpli- 
 city of God, to the POdvos THs Oelas picews, as Gregory Nazi- 
 anzen aptly terms it (Or. 1). According to both, therefore, we 
 
THE ARIAN SCHOOL. 263 
 
 are still bound by the ante-Christian view of the world in gene- 
 yal, and have not yet arrived at the Christian. 
 
 But though the Nicene Creed very clearly recognised these 
 two constitutive momenta of the higher nature of Christ, it 
 avoided with right tact a more determinate doctrinal formula- 
 rization thereof. This creed, it is true, claims unconditionally 
 for the Son, deity and full “eqetiltie of essence with the Father ; 
 but it passes over without further investigation, the questions of 
 the precise nature of the hypostasis, the mode of its generation, 
 and the basis of the Trinity in the Christian idea of God. In- 
 deed, the greatest variety of opinion prevailed amongst the 
 principal Church teachers of this and the following centuries 
 regarding this matter; and all were recognised as christolo- 
 gically admissible, in so far as they did justice to the funda- 
 mental demand of faith, to wit, to the doctrine, that the divine 
 which was in Christ was personal, and corresponded to a dis- 
 tinction in God, or of God from God, really existent, though 
 not more precisely defined ; and was therefore not a momentary, 
 but a permanent and eternal, being of Ged in Christ. 4 
 
 The stormy discussions of the half century succeeding the 
 Nicene Council, for which the scientific position occupied by the 
 Church afforded, as is clear from what has been advanced, op- 
 portunity enough, were in the first instance excited by Arianism. 
 We have already remarked, that through Arianism the momenta 
 hitherto recognised were set into a condition of ferment relatively 
 
 1 In accordance herewith, the history of the doctrine of the Trinity 
 henceforth pursues a separate course from that of Christology, so far as it 
 is mainly occupied with its own distinct and peculiar questions ; though it 
 continues to hold by the two momenta above mentioned, which are the indis- 
 pensable conditions of Christology. These its theological presuppositions once 
 recognised (similarly also, the necessary anthropological presuppositions), 
 it was possible for Ciritloes to enter on its distinctive work ;—and this 
 we find it doing in the fourth century. All that we shall therefore need to 
 do, in order to accomplish the purpose we have in view, is to consider, on 
 the one hand, how, during the conflicts in which the Church engaged till 
 the Second CHeunenical Synod, the trinitarian conception of God, laid down 
 in the Nicene Creed, was established and confirmed, and consequently the 
 momenta of the higher aspect of Christ's person, which had been completely 
 gained, were ensured; and, on the other hand, how the elements of the 
 Mioase aspect were poatpleesta and conclusively recognised ; and on the 
 basis of these presuppositions, to proceed to our further Christological 
 work. 
 
264 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 to each other. Hence we find that all the principal heresies of 
 an earlier period were revived; be it that they proceeded forth 
 from, or were set loose by it. Inakind of rapid recapitulation, 
 they reappeared for a moment on the stage of the Church, 
 serving the purpose of ripening its judgment in all directions ; 
 but themselves sinking quickly again into oblivion, and losing 
 all their former seductive power, as soon as they had fulfilled 
 their mission. 
 
 Lhese struggles took place principally between three factors : 
 jirstly, the Arian school ; secondly, the newly revived Sabellian 
 school, with the new form of Ebionism; thirdly, the Church 
 and its tendency. One section of the first-mentioned school, the 
 Semi-Arians, an unsteady and bustling party, were in a special 
 degree the life of the movement; and after they had stoutly 
 overcome Sabellianism and Ebionism, embodied in themselves 
 on a large scale, the tendency towards the doctrine of the Nicene 
 Council. In their own system, with its undecided character, 
 and inability to offer serious resistance, religion and science were 
 in conflict; but the more advanced Arians pressed them to a 
 decision ; and having once allowed their interest in Christianity 
 to predominate over other considerations, this inner approxima- 
 tion to the great Church teachers of the time, gave their system 
 also by degrees a firmer hold. 
 
 As far as concerns the Arians proper, their number always 
 was relatively small; for, without truly satisfying the intellect, 
 or advancing beyond the dualism between God and the world, 
 they inflicted a death-blow on christianly religious interests. 
 Hence they gained admission and acquired importance, solely 
 either where they were favoured by external combinations, or 
 where they resorted to reserve and accommodation, or even 
 made concessions. Small as this party or school was, as the 
 nature of the case would lead us to expect, its influence on the 
 further development of the dogma of the Trinity was by no 
 means insignificant, nor did it lack important representatives.! 
 
 Above all, mention must be made of Aétius and Eunomius,, 
 both of whom lived in Antioch; the former a physician and theo- 
 logical writer, the latter deacon? 
 
 ’ The strict Arians were designated "EZovxévrios, Avoeesos, or, after their 
 chiefs, Aétians and Eunomians, also Eudoxians. 
 * Compare Lange’s ‘‘ Der Arianismus in seiner weitern Entwickelung,” 
 
AETIUS. EUNOMIUS. 265 
 
 Neither of them followed out further that ethical principle 
 which, as held by Arians, would lead back to Ebionism; on 
 the contrary, so far as we are informed, Aétius was principally 
 occupied in confuting the equality of essence and the coeter- 
 nality of the Son with the Father, whereas Eunomius directed 
 his efforts to the development of Arianism as a doctrinal system. 
 In their polemical works, both start with the conception of God 
 as the abstractly simple Being, of whom neither self-communica- 
 tion nor generation can be predicated. God Himself is, in their 
 view, nothing but this absolute simplicity,—Being, in the abso- 
 lute sense. They regarded it as the most sublime and lofty, but 
 also as the indispensable, predicate of God; and therefore they 
 identified this primal simplicity, which is neither derived from 
 another being, nor can generate another being out of itself, with 
 the essence of God in general. Accordingly, adopting the style 
 of the Church, they taught,—The Father is, as all allow, ayév- 
 yntos; nay more, the Father is the ayévynrov in God. But 
 this dyévyntov is absolute Being, or the strict and proper essence 
 of God; consequently, the Father, who alone is unbegotten, is 
 also, in the strict sense, alone God. And as He cannot have 
 been derived along with the Son from another source, for then 
 He would no longer be unbegotten ; so also can He not generate 
 the Son, for then He would not be the unbegotten, simple one, 
 but God would be divided into a begotten and unbegotten one. 
 The dyévynrov excludes parts and division, difference and com- 
 position ; but it is neither a mere subjective notion, nor the bare 
 negation of generation, but something positive and objective. 
 This positive something is the absolute sel/-relatedness (Bezo- 
 genheit auf sich), absolute selfsameness or simplicity, which 
 needs only to be made the object of thought to exclude all 
 generation; because generation necessarily involves the diremp- 
 
 in Illgen’s Zeitschrift 5,1, and Klose’s‘‘ Geschichte und Lehre des Euno- 
 mius,” Kiel 1833. With special love, but also with his usual disfavour to- 
 wards the Church, is this portion of the History of Dogmas treated by Baur, 
 ]. c. pp. 361-394 ; with skill and happy insight by Meyer, in his “ Trini- 
 titslehre,” pp. 175 ff. Of Eunomius himself, there belong to this connec- 
 tion his Apology (Fabr. Bibl. gr. vol. 8), and the” Exéeoss xiorews in Socr. 
 5,10. Against him Basilius wrote the’ Avrifpnrixds xara bvaceBovs Evvomiov; 
 and Gregory of Nyssa replied to the response of Eunomius in 12 books, 
 entitled ’Avripénrixol pcs Edvoytoy advo: 12. For notices of Aétius, see 
 Epiph. Her. 76, and the first Book of Gregory, c. 6. 
 
266 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 tion, the division, of the absolutely simple. The causal relation, 
 which the Arian school so stoutly defended in opposition te 
 Sabellianism (see above), is therefore not applied directly to God 
 in Himself, as though His absolute Being were regarded as an 
 eternal volition or grounding of His own existence; but the 
 fundamental presupposition is, that God can only be said to Be, 
 and that He is absolutely identical with Himself.' If God 
 abides unceasingly in His unbegotten essence, and that which is 
 begotten continues ever begotten, the notion of equality of sub- 
 stance or of similarity is plainly untenable. For as long as the 
 two beings continue what they are, so long is it impossible to in- 
 stitute a comparison between their essence. And as their being, 
 so also is their knowledge of themselves, totally different. Each 
 of the two knows Himself, when He knows Himself at all, as 
 He is, and not as the other:—the one knows Himself as un- 
 generated, the other as generated. Were Father and Son equal, 
 as the Church teaches, the Son also must be unbegotten ; and 
 what would then become of the doctrine of His generation, or 
 of His distinction? Eunomius therefore requires of the doctrine 
 of the Church, etther, that it exclude every species of subordi- 
 nation, even that which is involved in the one being unbegotten 
 and the other begotten; in which case, it would soon be seen 
 whether, in returning to the one God, all distinctions between 
 Father and Son must not be allowed to fall to the ground; or, 
 that it take the subordination seriously, as do the Arians, and 
 represent the one unbegotten One as unbegotten, absolutely 
 simple, and therefore incapable of generating anything out. of 
 His essence, and place the Son in the class of creatures. What, 
 asks he, could the unbegotten One take out of His essence, ex- 
 cept that which is unbegotten? But according to the doctrine 
 of the Church, inasmuch as the Son is conceived to be on the 
 one hand begotten, and yet on the other hand, to spring from 
 the essence of God, there must be both a begotten and an un- 
 begotten element in God. The Church has undoubtedly its 
 meaning, said they, when it teaches that God is to be conceived 
 
 * Thus Aétius says, in No. 5 of the ’Exiyepjpuara (see Epiph. heer. 76), 
 —‘If God has not given Himself being, not because of any weakness of 
 nature, but because He is exalted above all causality (above being caused), 
 how can a being that is generated reach up to His essential unchangeable- 
 ness ?”” Compare No. 2. 
 
AETIUS. EUNOMIUS. 267 
 
 as the cause of Himself ; but that lies beyond our horizon; fer 
 we regard abstract simplicity as the ultimate and highest in God. 
 Better, says Aétius naively, is the unbegotten than the begotten ; 
 for the former has in itself the advantages which the latter has 
 outside of itself. That which is unbegotten, Kunomius goes on 
 to say, cannot possibly resemble the essence of that which is be- 
 gotten ; the unbegotten is unbegotten, and that is its essence : 
 if then the begotten resembles the unbegotten in its essence, it 
 also must be unbegotten.* 
 
 Without doubt, Eunomius was quite right in maintaining, 
 that if God in Himself is merely the one simple Being, which, 
 being absolutely without distinctions, stands related solely to 
 itself, there is no place for distinctions in God, and therefore 
 none for a Son. But that is a mere tautological proposition, 
 
 dogmatical system of their opponents. When, in opposition to 
 the Son who is generated, the Father is said to be ungenerated, 
 the Father must be deemed identical with the Georns, with the 
 divine essence in general, if aseity were thus meant to be pre- 
 dicated of the Father alone, and, after the example of older 
 writers, they did not go on to say that the Father is as truly 
 constituted Father by the Son, as the Son is constituted Son by 
 the Father. So long as it was deemed necessary to the pre- 
 servation of the unity of the Trinity to represent the one Father 
 as the source, not merely of the hypostasis, but also of the deity, 
 of the others; and so long as the Son was not most distinctly 
 conceded a participation in the aseity of the divine substance ; 
 so long was He not freed from subordination, notwithstanding 
 its being called for by the ideas of His equality of essence and 
 eternal generation. If, however, the Son be allowed to partici- 
 pate in aseity, the passivity, which the Arians were never weary 
 
 1 Besides, Eunomius persists in asserting that Sonship and generation 
 imply a beginning ; that they are consequently incompatible with the pre- 
 
 dicate of eternity ; and that the predicate of eternity would involve the 
 Son’s being unbegotten. 
 
268 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPCCH 
 
 of asserting to be necessarily characteristic of generation, must 
 be decidedly excluded from the generated, and the Son be rather 
 constituted a living momentum of the self-causative God, and 
 thus the Trinity be introduced into that inmost-root_of the 
 deity, the aseity. The bases thereof were laid even in the fourth 
 century ; but they had not yet been plainly and completely car- 
 ried out. So much the more instructive is it, therefore, to see 
 how the defenders of the view, that God is abstract simplicity, 
 fall into contradiction with themselves, and thus give negative 
 testimony in favour of the very tendency which they were en- 
 gaged in combating. 
 
 The incomparable (davyxpitos), self-sufficient, simple, un- 
 approachable (ampoceros) God, who is exalted above every cause, 
 whether in or out of Himself, must not be represented as en- 
 tirely alone, nor the world as without its cause. But to repre- 
 sent God as the cause of the world, and yet to maintain that 
 the world is characterized solely by unlikeness to its Author, is 
 scarcely reconcilable with the idea of the first cause; and the 
 only resource of Arianism is, to take refuge in the mystery of 
 the creation out of nothing, which nothing it is compelled to de- 
 scribe in an absolutely supernatural or Docetical manner as the 
 essence of the world (7 efvav). The following point, however, 
 is still more important. How can the absolutely simple, self- 
 identical God, ever come to create? Eunomius denies both 
 movement and self-communication to the divine essence, but 
 goes back to the divine will (évépyewa), which—as to be dis- 
 tinguished, be it noted, from the divine essence—called into 
 existence out of nothing that which is, and first of all, the Son 
 as the Creator of the world.!. But to appeal to the will in dis- 
 tinction from the substance—that the Church had a right to do, 
 and availed itself of its privilege when it taught that the world 
 was grounded in the will of God; but Eunomius was not at 
 liberty to make this distinction between will and essence, unless 
 he ceased to represent God merely as abstract, absolute simplicity, 
 and turned to a more living conception. And then the strength 
 of his opposition to the generation of the Son would have been 
 broken, in so far as he could no longer say that aseity or sim- 
 plicity constituted the essence of God, was that in Him which is 
 inviolable. The method adopted by Eunomius necessitated his 
 
 * Compare Gregor. Nyss. adv. Eunom. or. 1. 
 
AETIUS. EUNOMIUS. 269 
 
 dissociating the divine will from the divine essence, contrary to 
 his own presupposition, if he meant to arrive at a world. He 
 might, indeed, have described the will in God, as something non- 
 essential, accidental, superadded from without. But being un- 
 willing to do so, he fell into new difficulties. He was compelled 
 to trace not only the active will (évépyeva) of God, but also the 
 idea of the world, back to the divine essence, as its aE seat. 
 The real and ee potence of the creation of the world, must 
 surely have been contained eternally in God, as he himself ac- 
 knowledges ; but how could it break loose from the simple 
 essence of God? We see, therefore, that when he abides by 
 the rigid simplicity and self-identity of God, he either arrives 
 at no world at all, or is compelled to assign the actual world a 
 place eternally, tit even immediately, in he essence of God: 
 in other words, he unavoidably falls into the very heathenish| 
 error which he himself repudiates—that error which is unable 
 to distinguish between the substance and the will of God, and is, 
 therefore pantheistic.” 
 
 The Son was held to owe His existence, not to the essence, 
 but to the eve pryela of God; and the essence not to be in any 
 sense contained in the évépyea. The divine essence, therefore, 
 cannot properly be termed Father; for the essence continues 
 immoveable in its simplicity outside of the évépyea: the évép- 
 ryeca alone can be termed Father, so far as it brings forth the 
 Son. And the Son is not unlike this energy, but is its image 
 and likeness, seeing that He also has the power to create. In 
 this direction, it was possible for him to approximate to the 
 Nicene Creed, and to return to the milder form of the doctrine 
 of Arius; and, in fact, he says, in his Confession of Faith,— 
 “The Son is a creature, but not like other creatures, etc.; and 
 the higher dignity possessed by Him was not solely the reward 
 of His virtue, but, on the contrary, He became God because He 
 was the Son, and as a Son was generated.” Still there is a wide 
 gap between him and Lactantius, who laid down essential deity 
 
 1 Apol. Eunom. ec. 24. 
 
 2 Kunomius does neither the one nor the other, but continues helplessly 
 clinging to the dualism between the finite and the infinite, which, under his 
 hands, forces its way into God Himself :—the dualism, namely, between the 
 essence of God, which is ézsipov and simple, and the will of God, which 
 relates to finite objects. Gregory, therefore, charges him with Manicheism. 
 
270 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 as the starting-point for the ethical. Eunomius, on the con- 
 trary, lets the ethical go; indeed, he lacked real interest as well 
 in the ethical as the religious. (Note 50.) 
 
 These Arians, to whom substantially belonged Arcacius also, 
 who tried to make himself out more orthodox than he really was, 
 exercised a special influence on the Semi-Arians (‘Hysdpevoc), 
 who bore, besides, the names Eusebians or Homoiusiasts. Over- 
 powered by the force of the arguments brought against their 
 halting and uncertain position, both by the Arians and the 
 Church, and feeling themselves repelled by the former, these 
 Homoiusiasts advanced ever more completely from the doctrine 
 of the similarity to that of the identity of essence. Athanasius 
 aptly met them with the consideration, that similarity can only 
 be spoken of in relation to qualities, not to the essence.by itself ; 
 for the essence must either be the same or not the same. And 
 so also, the Arians urged, if God or the Father is the ungene- 
 rated One, everything outside of Him must belong to the class 
 of generated things; if to be ungenerated is the essence of the 
 Father, to be generated must be the essence of everything out- 
 side of Him; consequently, the essence of the latter is the anti- 
 thesis of the former, and completely dissimilar, not similar, to 
 it. In fact, the Semi-Arians displayed little power of resistance 
 and little productiveness: they belong rather to the general 
 history of the Church than to the history of Dogmas; and, in 
 consideration of this circumstance, or, in other words, in con- 
 sideration of their interest in religion, might with greater justice 
 be termed Semi-Nicenes than Semi-Arians. 
 
 For a long period they did not advance beyond the doctrinal 
 position held by Eusebius of Ceesarea (see above); and the various 
 formulze adopted by them bore essentially the same stamp, until 
 the Synod of Ancyra, in the year 358, distinctly asserted the 
 Son not to be a created being, and taught that He was begotten 
 of the substance of the Father. Athanasius now recognised 
 them as brethren; and the doctrine of Cyrill of Jerusalem, who 
 also acknowledged the Son to be coeternal with the Father, is 
 scarcely distinguishable from the Nicene Creed. (Note 51.) 
 Apart from external circumstances, they had a hold only so long 
 as the authors of the Nicene Creed could be supposed to have 
 inclined towards Sabellianism. This supposition was strength- 
 ened during the first twenty or thirty years after the Council 
 
REVIVAL OF SABELLIANISM. 271 
 
 of Nicea, by the conduct of Marcellus, who was one of its 
 adherents; and against him, rather than against the Council 
 itself, were their weapons directed, especially those of Husebius 
 of Cxsarea. After having convinced themselves that those who 
 taught the duoovcvov were not Sabellian, they gained an ever 
 clearer insight into the untenableness of their own position, and 
 consequently passed more completely over to the party of the 
 Nicene Council. 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 
 THE REVIVAL OF SABELLIANISM, AND THE EBIONISM WHICH 
 SPRANG FROM IT. i 
 
 Marcewuus of Ancyra had stood in the foremost ranks of the 
 antagonists of Arianism,—a circumstance which spoke in his 
 favour at Rome longer than it ought to have done. (Note 52.) 
 A short time after the Nicene Council, however, when he be- 
 came aware of the strength of the party which, whilst conceding 
 to the Son divine essence and eternal generation, yet, in perfect 
 agreement with Eusebius of Caesarea, assigned to the Father the 
 first, to the Son the second place, and in many other respects 
 subordinated the latter; and further, when he found that 
 Arianism derived great support from this vacillation, he opened 
 a campaign in a great work, especially against this middle tend- 
 ency. At the same time, he attacked also older writers, such 
 as Origen; but he particularly assailed the strong Oriental 
 party, which consisted of the two Eusebiuses, Paulinus, and 
 others, whom he also expressly mentions, although he pretended 
 that Asterius was the proper occasion of the work (compare ady. 
 Marcell. 1, 4, p. 27). They cannot, said he, maintain the divine 
 unity, if they regard the Son as actually God; for by making 
 Him a distinct personality, outside of God, they rend the divine 
 essence; but if they assert the divine unity, they deprive the 
 Son of deity by subordinating Him. — So far, therefore, Mar- 
 cellus was at one with the Arians; the Semi-Arians could not 
 continue in their vacillating position. But he goes beyond the 
 Nicene Council when, with a view to destroying in its very 
 
272 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 roots the Arian separation between Father and Son, he believed 
 it necessary to subject to examination, and to cast aside, all 
 points on which those were accustomed to lay stress, who main- 
 tained a distinction between Father and Son. These are the 
 ideas of generation, Sonship (in the place of which he wished to 
 substitute “ procession of the Logos,” Kecl. Theol. 2, 8), zmage, 
 visibility, which were applied by the Fathers of Nicza to the 
 Logos. The Semi-Arian party in particular took pleasure in 
 calling the Son the image of the Father; so also Asterius. 
 But they drew the conclusion, that so certainly as the image is 
 different from, and inferior to, that which it represents, even so 
 certainly must the Son occupy a lower position than the Father. 
 Further, the Father is absolutely exalted above the world, invi- 
 sible; the Son, on the contrary, in virtue of His relationship 
 with the world, is characterized by visibility, and therefore ap- 
 peared under the Old Testament ; finally, Sonship and genera- 
 tion subordinate the Son as an effect to its cause. In order to 
 evade these objections, Marcellus endeavoured to limit all these 
 expressions, which even the Fathers of Nica had referred to the 
 higher aspect of Christ’s Person, to the human aspect, or to the 
 person in its unity and totality ; thus hoping the more certainly 
 to exclude every element which could prove of advantage to the 
 Arians. Hence he says,—Not the Logos is termed the image 
 of God, but the God-man; for otherwise the Arians would un- 
 questionably be justified in subordinating the Logos to God, 
 and denying to Him true divinity. The Logos, who is invi- 
 sible like God, first became the visible image of God when He 
 assumed the man Jesus, and in Him humanity, which is the 
 image and likeness of God. Thus also the Logos first became 
 Son through the humanity which He assumed. Christ usually 
 styles Himself Son of man, and this is to be carefully noted 
 (Eccl. Theol. 1, 16): He first became Son of God by becoming 
 Son of man, or man; for the Logos caused the man whom He 
 assumed and completed to be exalted to the rank of Son of 
 God.’ The passages in the Old Testament, otherwise referred 
 to the pre-existence of the Son, he described as prophetical an- 
 ticipations of that which should come with the incarnation; 
 hence also he treated Prov. viii. as a prophecy, and counted 
 
 i Compare ady. Marc. 1, 4, pp. 20, 24 (Ed. Paris, 1628), 2, 3, pp. 
 43, 46. 
 
MARCELLUS. 273 
 
 Soiomon amongst the prophets.!. When Wisdom says, “TI was 
 set up from the beginning of the world,” he referred it to that 
 divine purpose of incarnation through which the Logos first 
 received a sort of existence outside of God as the Son of God. 
 The idea of generation also would remove the Logos outside of, 
 and subordinate Him to, God. He therefore justifies the Arians 
 in asserting that the Nicene Fathers cannot maintain their point 
 of view, unless they call the Son ungenerated, and therefore 
 eternal like God; but accepts without hesitation the consequence 
 threatened by the Arians, and avows his belief in a Logos, who 
 is unbegotten, eternally united with the Father, coeternal with, 
 consequently in no sense subordinate to, but also not discrimi- 
 nated from Him (adv. Mare. 2, 1, p. 32). The Logos, in his 
 view (ady. Mare. 2, 2, pp. 35 f.), is equivalent to Pneuma, as 
 he endeavours to prove by a comparison of the prologue to the 
 Gospel of John with the Synoptics; but Pneuma is equivalent 
 to God, for God is a Spirit: the Logos, therefore, is simply 
 God Himself—conceived, namely, in activity. 
 
 We have directed attention above to the great significance 
 attached to the words, Son, generation, etc., since Tertullian’s 
 time ; and to the circumstance, that in the third century the doc- 
 trine of the Logos taught during the second century was cast 
 into the shade, by the hypostatical element denoted by the word 
 Son. We have seen also, that the Sonship continued to be 
 marked by subordination, so long as it had not found a place in 
 the eternal essence of God Himself. Now Marcellus, who took 
 the doctrine of the Church as his point of departure, stands 
 before us as the embodiment of the-despair of solving the pro- 
 blem, how the eternal Logos can be at the same time designated 
 the eternal Son. If we suppose the Son to have a place in the 
 inner sphere of the divine nature, He must be unbegotten, like 
 the Father, and then He is no longer Son. There is therefore 
 no alternative but to renounce the idea of a Son, both as far as 
 affects the inner essence of God (in which there is room for 
 identity of essence, but not for a distinct hypostasis), and also 
 for the period preceding the creation of the world. The renun- 
 
 1 Adv. Mare. 2, 3, pp. 44 f.; Eccl. Theol. 3, 2, p. 154; adv. Marc. 2, 1, 
 p. 82:—-Mare sive, ware wpovPeoraves, ents brug romwore vidv drdpla: ro 
 Oy, wpo row rex Oqvar Oi THs moepévov dosaelayv avrdv 08 mdvoy Elvees Aovyos 
 Dacnoy. 
 
 aa & s 
 
274 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 ciation of the idea in this latter respect leads of itself to the 
 subordination of the Son, as is abundantly clear from the his- 
 tory of the third century. 
 
 But by thus letting go the fruit of the struggles of the third 
 century, namely, the idea of “ Sonship,’ and going back on the 
 mere Logos, the entire system was at once altered. Out of 
 regard, however, for the full deity of the Son, in the sense in 
 which he still conceded Him an existence, namely, to the deity 
 of the God-man, he totally denied His hypostatical pre-exist- 
 ence; for only in this way did it seem possible to him to ascribe 
 full deity to the Son, to preserve His equality with the Father. 
 As he constantly repeated,—Before the incarnation there was no 
 Son, but merely the Logos; so also did he go on to say,—Prior 
 to the creation God alone existed.1 God abode in Himself, 
 keeping silence; besides Him was merely the Nothing. But 
 out of nothing, God purposed to create the world. He carried 
 the idea thereof in Himself, but the idea lacked actuality. ‘Tvhe 
 world was conceived, and also named (or more correctly, “ pre- 
 pared,” érowudfwv, according to Kecl. Theol. 2, 8, p. 113, to be 
 read for dvowafov, adv. Marc. 2, 2, p. 41), by God through the 
 Logos, who was in Him. For He was ever reason, and always 
 spake within Himself. But in order that the world might be- 
 come an actuality, He gave utterance to the creative word; and 
 tltis was the procession of the creative omnipotence of God, in 
 whith wisdom also is inherent, or the procession of the Logos, 
 as the évépyeva Spactixy mpa£ews of God.’ With men also the 
 ordering, commanding word is that by which they accomplish 
 most of their works. This word is, on the one hand, distin- 
 guished from God at rest and silent; on the other hand, how- 
 ever, united with Him; both together constitute the complete 
 conception of God. Marcellus was quite aware how closely he 
 thus approximated to Sabellianism; but he expressly blamed 
 Sabellius both for his lack of insight into the significance 
 
 1 For example, adv. Marc. 2,1, p. 32. The consequence of applying 
 the word Son to the Logos, Marcellus supposed, were sensuous representa- 
 tions of God. Adv. Mare. 1, 4; Eccl. Theol. 2, 8. 
 
 Ady. Marc. 2, 2, p. 89. Prior to the world, ovdev erepov qv xarny Ocov 
 uovov. The Logos alone first dvyeémer in the Father, and absolutely one with 
 Him (ib. p. 37), ofos dv etn 6 év dv dpaxw rdyos. 
 
 2 Also Adyos évepyés. Compare Hecl. Theol. 2,9.15. p. 125; adv. Mare. 
 2,2. p. 41; Eccl. Theol. 3, 3. p. 166. 
 
MARCELLUS. 275 
 
 cf the term, and for not having the right conception of 
 (sod. 
 
 It must be allowed that there is an important difference 
 between Marcellus and Sabellius. Marcellus decidedly main- 
 tains a creation out of nothing,’ and imports into God Himself 
 a Kdo/L0$ vonTos, reason and the potence of the Logos; whereas 
 Sabellius gives a more substantial and physical representation 
 of the process. Marcellus had also appropriated the category of 
 absolute causality, of which Arius made such vigorous use, and 
 had engrafted it on the principle of Sabellianism as far as con. 
 cerned the relation of God to the world. 
 
 Still, Eusebius was probably right in characterizing his doc- 
 trine of the Trinity as Sabellian.? We see this especially from 
 the mode in which Marcellus explains the words, “Let us make 
 man.” Instead of regarding them as addressed to the Son, as 
 did the Fathers of -Niczea, he explains them as follows :—Even 
 an human artist, when all lies ready, and he is just about to 
 commence his work, may say, Let us make the picture. In such 
 a sense did God speak these words to Himself. One might, 
 indeed, suppose for a moment that the idea of a distinction in 
 God was not hereby completely cast aside; but had merely 
 passed over into that of the divine self-diremption, which fre- 
 quently recurs at a later period, and which was supposed to 
 constitute the divine self-consciousness. In favour of which 
 might also be pleaded, that he, notwithstanding, assigned to 
 reason an eternal place in God. ‘This, however, cannot be 
 carried out; for, firstly, nothing whatever is said regarding the 
 Holy Ghost in the silent God; secondly, Marcellus would then 
 
 * Ady. Mare. 2, 2. p. 39; de eccl. theol. 2, 15. p. 125. But still we find 
 him also employing the expression, ‘‘ The Monas expanded itself into a 
 Trias.” De eccl. theol. 3,4: dzofégrw radyw 4 povas Dalverces Bharvvoweyn 
 wey sig rptoda, Oscerpeioboer 02 wndapeas drousvovoc. In conjunction with 
 which, however, must be taken c. Mare. 2, 2, according to which the ex- 
 pansion of the Monas related not to it itself, but merely to the évépysia of 
 the deérys, whereas the Monas continues indissolubly one (évepysig 4 deérns 
 oun Trcutuvecbecs Ooxsl). 
 
 * Keel. theol. 1, 1.15. pp. 76 f., c. 17 p. 79; adv. Mare. 2, 2. pp. 39, 40: 
 The Logos is not an angel or other being outside of God ; not even in the 
 revelation, o¥02 yap rov rod evdparov Adyov duveues noel Srocrcéast apiaces 
 Tivk Ouverdy® Ev yap éort noel rebrdv Ta ckvbohaw 6 Advyos xxl adder! xoprlouevos 
 
 (fee, >\ , ~ ~ , > f 
 STEPD, 4 Keon TN THS Tpakcoc Eveoyeloe. 
 
276 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 have a double Trinity, an immanent and an ceconomic one :—of 
 which no evidence can be adduced. He evidently conceived 
 the évépyera Spactixy, so far as it accomplished its highest work 
 in the incarnation, as the second momentum of the Trinity; and, 
 so far as the Holy Ghost proceeds from the God-man, he aimed 
 at representing the third momentum as a branch of the second 
 (Eccl. theol. 3, 4. p. 168). Finally, the distinction he draws is 
 by no means between a speaking and a spoken, but between a 
 speaking and a silent God. _The speaking God is his évépyeva 
 Spacrixy, which constantly dwells in, and remains inseparable 
 from, God, and bears within itself the divine power and wisdom. 
 The alent or resting (jovydtov) God, on the contrary, is God 
 in His inner fale and glory, sree acral to the Father ; 
 even as the évépyera Spactixn has the Son for its goal, carries 
 within itself the principle of the incarnation, and, as it were, 
 attains to and satisfies itself in the effect produced, when it brings 
 forth Him in accordance with whose idea all things were created 
 from the beginning. For this reason, Baur’s conjecture, that 
 Marcellus tried to draw between the Father and the Son some 
 such distinction as that between being and thought, is untenable ; 
 for there can be no doubt that he regarded the silent God as 
 identical with the Father, and believed the latter to have in Him- 
 self all fulness, with reason and thought. Marcellus was necessi- 
 tated, it is true, to regard speaking and thought as still one in 
 the inner essence of God; but for this very reason, speaking, 
 in the strict sense of the term, had as yet no existence. The 
 God who merely thinks is primarily silent, and silent alone; 
 contrasted with whom is the Speaking One, the Aoyos. This 
 silent one is the Father; the Logos, so far as He does not yet 
 speak, must, according to the fundamental view of Marcellus, 
 be simply identified with the Father, who is also designated the 
 One who is (der Seyende), though not in the sense of His not 
 being able to think. Undoubtedly, the principle of the speak- 
 ing Ged the Logos, must also be contained in God; and in 
 he aspect, one might say that the speaking God is the Xéyos 
 mpoopixos, and that this Noyos is in God évdidberos (Klose, 
 p. 29). This distinction, however, we do not find that Mar- 
 cellus drew; still less did he distinguish in the inner divine 
 essence between being and self-consciousness ; but the "Ov itself 
 Marcellus conceives to contain the divine fulness, to which be- 
 
MARCELLUS. 277 
 
 long also reason and thought. He does not teach a preforma- 
 tion of the évépyeta Spacrvxy in the inner divine essence, but is 
 accustomed to look upon the silent God monadically, or as the 
 ov; and not till he comes to the speaking God (the évépyeca 
 Spacrixn) does he refer to the Church doctrine touching the 
 Son. Still less, as is clear from what has been arene are 
 we warranted in representing him as teaching that Father, anne 
 and Spirit are three persons of the Monas, completely co-ordi- 
 nated with one another (as Klose does; see pp. 27 f.), and so 
 co-ordinated, that the Son (and the Spirit also?) is not derived 
 from, but united with (sjvwpévos, cvvnpévos), the Father as an 
 equally independent apy (or, if we include the Holy Spirit, 
 apxat). In opposition to this view stands Marcellus’ conception 
 of God as the ov, of the Monas which admits of no d.aipeas, 
 and the series of passages (Klose, pp. 27 f.) in which he lays 
 stress on the unity of God, after the manner of the Monarchians. 
 Nowhere does he attempt to reduce back the Trias, taught by 
 him, to the Monas; and he could scarcely have avoided doing 
 this had he held the Trias to consist of eternal hypostases in 
 God. 
 
 The incarnation he considered to have been undertaken on 
 account of the sin and necessities of men, and on no other 
 ground ; ‘but he can only assion even to Christ the transitory 
 position of a means to another end. “Who was worthy,” says 
 he, “amongst righteous men and angels to take away the punish- 
 ment suspended by God over men? No other being but the 
 Logos, who was with the Father, and who created along with 
 Him, and to whom God said, Let us make men in our image 
 and likeness’ (adv. Mare. 2, 2. pp. 40, 41). “Not to seek or 
 to find anything for Himself, but purely on our account, did 
 He become man," in order to set forth him who had been van- 
 quished by the devil, as the devil’s conqueror. For this reason 
 He took man upon Himself, in order to bestow on him the first 
 fruits of His power. Now, this man who is united with the 
 Word is the beloved one. His purpose was to battle with the 
 devil in human flesh; and to render man not only imperishable 
 and immortal, but also to set him on a throne in heaven with 
 
 1 Ady. Mare. 2, 3, 4, pp. 48 ff: Ody iy 6 Adyos dDerndn, rdv guerépay 
 civelAnQe oorpuo, &AA ive 4 cape Ose Thy wpos Tov Adyou xomvwvieey dbavacios 
 TUXN. 
 
278 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 God. In His immeasurable goodness, He purposed not only te 
 free man from bondage, soi and parichableness but also to 
 confer upon him a glory Piel transcends man (THs virép av- 
 Opwrov So€ys). Fallen man, who had lost the kingdom, was 
 meant by God’s will to cit Lord and God; and, therefore, 
 the method of salvation was devised. When the Logos came 
 in human flesh, and became King, man, who was previously 
 abased, Aeened all the power and might of the devil.” “What 
 greater glory,” he exclaims, “can be conferred on man than 
 this glory! Fallen man He has counted worthy to be united 
 with His Logos, through the Virgin” (cuvapOjvar, |. c. p. 48, 
 c. 8). “Let not Asterius be surprised that something which is 
 younger than the body (that is, the divine Sonship of Christ, 
 which was the result of the incarnation) should attain to the 
 dignity of being regarded as the eldest. For in that the Logos 
 thought fit to take upon Himself, out of the pure Virgin, 
 humanity, although younger, and therewith to conjoin His 
 own nature (évwaas), He not only constituted the man created 
 in Him the first-born of all creation, but wills also that he be 
 the principle of everything which is in heaven and upon earth.” 
 What he means to say is, that Christ, although later in point of 
 time, was, as the idea and operative principle, the earlier; even 
 as the final aim, though later in point of appearance, is the first 
 in point of idea. In Him humanity attained its completion. 
 At this point one would expect Marcellus to introduce the doc- 
 trine of the eternal duration of the person and kingdom of 
 Christ ; why he did not do so, we shall soon see. On account 
 of His humanity, therefore, Christ is termed the First-born of 
 all creation, and not as though He had been begotten prior 
 thereto. For how could He who had always existed be the first- 
 born of another? On the contrary, the first-born is the new 
 man, in whom God purposed to sum ap all things. (IIpwro- 
 ToKos obv Taons KTloEws Sia THY KATA cdpKa yéverw wvou“acOn, 
 ov Sid THY TpPOTHV, WS adTol olovTaL KTiTW. . . . . TOV MPOTOV 
 xawov avOpwrrov eis Ov Ta TaVTA avaxehadai@cacbar éBovrAnOn 
 6 Ocds, TodTov ai Octar ypahal tpwrotoKoy Taans dvouafovot 
 cticews: l.c. p. 43.) 
 But what is Marcellus’ conception of the incarnation, when 
 he endeavours to describe it more precisely? ‘The body was a. 
 1 Adv. Marc. 2, 3, p. 44. 
 
MARCELLUS. 279 
 
 truly human body, and consequently, like all things else, in the 
 :ast instance, created out of nothing. In so far, therefore, the 
 évépyera Spacrixy of God, or His Word, held precisely the same 
 relation to this man as to other things in the world. But with 
 this man (cap&), the évépyera Spactixy was connected in a 
 peculiar manner. For, whereas generally it remains outside of 
 the objects which are brought into existence by its command, 
 it dwells in His cap&; the action of God was, as it were, fixed, 
 so long as the purpose in view required it. The divine évép- 
 yea, says he, expanded itself as far as, and into, this man, lay- 
 ing hold on, assuming, and uniting itself with him. Henceforth 
 this divine évépyeva was the motive, the active principle of the 
 body.* Marcellus was thus able to assign to the God-man a 
 distinctive position ; for, whereas the divine activity does not 
 fill, and is merely present with, so far as it outwardly works 
 upon, other things, it filled Christ with its presence, and had an 
 existence in Him. 
 
 But, even on this view of the matter, the divine in Christ 
 cannot be described as a peculiar hypostasis different from the 
 Father. The operative Word, when it extends itself into the 
 humanity of Christ, is not personal in itself; personal alone is 
 the Father in His entirety, and He, as Father, keeps silence ; 
 and if He also, like the Word, is immanent, we cannot suppose 
 that Marcellus conceived the entire divine évépyesa, which was 
 fixed in the man Jesus, to have been included in Him. For 
 humanity appeared to him absolutely incapable of being the 
 suitable organ of God.” Here, therefore, we find occurring 
 again what we have noticed at an earlier period, namely, that 
 
 TL. c. 2, 4, p. 54: Apecorinn volo evepyste wivy tH capxl ovydy rod 
 HAYELY LUT YY “oll WaT TEL, COUTEp Ey EdaryryeAlois Deperees, ovoig TH OcQ avvirro, 
 ole Adryos Uarcepyow ovTOU axoptotos nel dd:eotaros. For this reason, also, he 
 magnifies in forcible terms the greatness and novelty of the mystery re- 
 vealed in Christ. De eccl. theol. 8, 3, p. 157: Tés yap xpo rig trav rpary- 
 earav amodsiSews eriorsvocy dv, ort Adyos Oov, Osk wapbévov tex dele rHy 
 Neeetepay civaenn perce copro, rol THy Taoav Oscrnte gy avTn cwomatinos ETI- 
 dsiZercs. The flesh assumed by Him had not previously existed: the Lord 
 our God created it, the Creator of the «4 cv. Adv. Mare. 2, 3, p. 453 2, 
 2, p. 40: Ti yep erepov qv drroxexpympevoy mvorypioy, 4 neta Tov Advyoy ; 
 ovTaH O¢ Hy droxexpuyeeevoy ey TH Oeg rovTi rporepoy TO evaTyplov, Wore Londevee 
 TOU Tporeoov Anov caus Ta xaTad Advoy eidéveet, AAA Nuads TOV TAoUVTOV Tis 
 DoSns noel Tov ckroxsxpuumtvov mvornploy a&mroravery vuvi. 
 
 2 Ady. Marc. 2, 4, p. 52: If any one suppose, riy dvdowmivyy saoxe 
 
280 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 the God-man is represented as owing His personality to the 
 limit, the circumscription, the negation, added by the humanity 
 to the divine évépyesa, which continues the. positive element, 
 though not hypostatical in itself. Marcellus, it is true, did not 
 by any means consider the hypostasis of the God-man to have 
 been grounded in an human Ego, and a positive finite principle ; 
 but looked upon the circumstance, that so long as the Logos 
 dwelt in, and was encompassed by, the humanity of Christ, He 
 had a certain existence of His own outside of God, and was so 
 far a kind of hypostasis, not as an advantage possessed by, but 
 as a defect of, the person: of the God-man, as part of His 
 humiliation? 
 
 Not merely the earthly form of His humanity, therefore, 
 but His being a man at all, he necessarily counts part of. His 
 humiliation, which, as such, could not be permanent. With 
 some degree of acuteness, he argues as follows (adv. Mare. 2, 4): 
 If the Logos had become man for His own sake, to seek some- 
 thing for Himself, or if He Himself could have profited any- 
 thing by His humanity, it would be conceivable that His 
 humanity should abide for ever. But as it was pure love which 
 moved Him to condescend to appear in the form of a servant— 
 that form in which we are not completely united with God, 
 and as, on the other hand, His work for us willterminate 
 at the judgment; it would be erroneous to suppose that. His 
 humanity will abide eternally. By His incarnation, the Logos 
 subjected Himself to a limit and form inadequate to His true 
 essence. He was extruded from God, it is true, merely évep- 
 yela, but still this is not a small matter; and the distinction 
 between God and Him became to a certain extent an actuality, 
 through the humanity which He assumed. The God-man spake: 
 “J do not Mine own will, but the will of My Father.” And in 
 Gethsemane, the harmony (cupdavia) between the will of 
 Christ and that of God was dissolved for a moment, though 
 aSiav elves rov Adyov, at all events, the cdp which rose again, let him 
 know, ors ob way, orep &bavarov, rovro &Zi0v Ocod" tellav yelp xual airings tis 
 abavacias 6 Osdc. 
 
 1 Thid. p. 51: Keyapiodes (leg. xeyapicbas) rod reerpds Dalveras wpoQceoss 
 sapxos. Kecl. theol. 3, 18, p. 181: evepyele wcvn xupiler airov dona». 
 Adv. Mare. 2, 4: [lag tors rijv rod dovrcv popQyy gu ctvelAn@ev 6 rovyos, 
 HopQyv ovocy dovarcv avusivas tO Adyw duyardv; God, or at all events His 
 fvéprycie, IS passive under the limitation : a remnant of Patripassianism. 
 
MARCELLUS. 281 
 
 without sin." Must the Logos, then, be supposed to be eternally 
 saddled with this humanity, which is inadequate to Him, and 
 to the assumption of which love alone moved Him to humble 
 Himself? By no means. Were such the case, not even He 
 Himself could ever be said to be perfect; on the contrary, He 
 would for ever fall short of His idea. He must needs, there- 
 fore, become again that which He previously was. One might 
 suppose, indeed, that the humanity of Christ could be so glori- 
 fied as to be worthy of, and adequate to, the eternal indwell- 
 ing of the deity, of the Logos. But even though the humanity 
 should be made immortal and imperishable, the deity would 
 continue infinitely exalted above it. And, further, what end 
 would the eternity of the humanity of Christ serve, even rela- 
 tively to us? Christ Himself said, “It is the spirit that 
 quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing.” Accordingly, the hu- 
 manity of the Logos and its regiment will continue so long as 
 the work of redemption lasts, and the victory begun therein is 
 not fully completed. The goal, however, once gained, the con- 
 summation of things will demand that the Logos return into 
 God, and become that which He previously was (adv. Mare. 2 
 4, p. 53: wa ottas 4 ev Oc@ 6 Royos WoTrep Kal TpOTEpoV HY) 3 
 
 tap the body must be emptied of the Logos, or laid aside lem 
 écec0at TO cHua ToD Adyou, |. c. c. 2—4).? 
 
 Looking at the high position Marcellus had assigned to the 
 God-man, to wit, the position of the crown of humanity, we 
 should deem Him fitted for something better than a mere 
 transitory means. And yet he was compelled at last to regard 
 Him in the latter light. On the one hand, Marcellus con- 
 sidered the destiny of man in general to be perfect union with 
 God (c. Mare. 2, 2, pp. 40 ff.); and the incarnation was in his 
 eyes so great a thing, because the God-man and His fate were 
 the solution of the problem, the beginning of the perfection of 
 humanity. But, on the other hand, humanity contradicts full 
 union with God ; it has something in..it..essentially.imadequate 
 to God, which, so long as it exists at all, cannot be abolished. 
 For this reason, the “perfect man, the Goan must needs 
 
 Seve Marc..1, 4) po coteue2 ep. oiqog- 
 
 * Compare adv. Marc. 2, 8 and 4; Eccl. Theol. 3, 12-14, pp. 180 f 
 He denies, therefore, the eternal pre-existence and post-existence of the 
 Son, and limits His existence to the miadle period. 
 
282 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 return out of the other form of existence which He had as- 
 sumed, into identity with God, and cease to be man, in order 
 that He may be made perfect. This was necessary, further, 
 in order that He may go before us in the process through which 
 we too are destined to pass. We also can only attain to per- 
 fection by being raised above ourselves (l. c. p. 42), in order 
 that God may be all in all. The conclusion, therefore, is un- 
 avoidable, that our humanity, too, must cease to be, in order 
 that God alone may be. At this point, Origen’s opponent be- 
 comes almost more Origenistic than Origen himself. He re- 
 marks,—If at the time of the universal doxardotacts, accord- 
 ing to Paul, even creation itself is to be converted into freedom, 
 will not the servant’s form which the Logos assumed, be by its 
 very idea unsuitable to Him? (Euseb. Eccl. Theol. 3, 1} 
 From this passage, as also from the view given by Marcellus of 
 the relation between the human and the divine, we may con- 
 clude with certainty, that finitude in general was, in his eyes, 
 equivalent to bondage and the form of a servant; that, conse- 
 quently, if the world is destined to attain to freedom, which is 
 its goal (as he often asserts),’ it also, as well as Christ, its 
 Captain, must cast aside the servant’s form ; or, in other words, 
 humanity must be abolished, and be transferred or transformed 
 into the divine essence.’ 
 
 We see, therefore, that Marcellus separates the divine and 
 human in the same abstract way as the Arians; and the con- 
 clusion to be drawn also is substantially the same, to wit, that 
 the one member of the antithesis excludes the other. Those 
 Arians whose tendency was predominantly empirical, and who 
 lacked, so to speak, both practical and theoretical piety, really 
 represented man as the Highest, as the concrete and living 
 Divine, whilst they reduced the personal God to a bare abstract 
 unity. Marcellus, on the contrary, in consequence of his more 
 religious and speculative tendencies, arrived at the conclusion, 
 that, in the last instance, God alone will exist. The God of 
 the Arians is purely envious; but man, notwithstanding, took 
 care of himself, by setting himself substantially in the place of 
 God. The God of Marcellus is good and communicative ; but, 
 because He is represented as only communicative (His com- 
 munication is effected through the medium of the plan of sal- 
 
 ' Adv. Mare. 2, 4, p. 52. ? Adv. Mare. 2, 3, pp. 44, 47. 
 
MARCELLUS. 883 
 
 vation),—in auch a sense, too, that nothing permanent, nothing 
 good, can be allowed to pertain to the first creation,—the con- 
 tinuity of the communications of the divine life leaves no room 
 for any distinction whatever; in order that man may be per- 
 fected, God sets Himself in his place; the aoxatdotacts does 
 away with the very grounds of the creation; the perfection of 
 the world is its termination; and finally, therefore, the God 
 whose sole work was self-communication, stands as isolated, as 
 worldless, as He was in the beginning. From which it is clear, 
 that, even according to this system, God continues Gezov pOovepor, 
 until He allows the world to be distinguished from Himself as 
 a Good, and concedes to it an unity with Himself, which admits 
 of and maintains the distinction. If the divine love has not 
 the dpos in itself, it becomes in its very effusion again exclusive, 
 and therefore physical. 
 
 And, in point of fact, this exclusiveness shows itself clearly 
 enough in the circumstance, that he continues to view the 
 inmost divine essence as an abstract, simple point, as a silent 
 Monas. Love is not the inmost and highest element in God ; 
 nor is that inmost substance ever revealed. He tries to keep 
 God far from all division and separation, by assigning every- 
 thing outside of Him, not to Himself, but solely to His activity.’ 
 This activity neither touches nor moves the divine essence in 
 its simplicity; the divine simplicity admits of no distinctions 
 whatever. But, as this simplicity is represented as the highest 
 element, as the very essence, of God, it follows, that the évép- 
 yeta Spactexn, or the will of God in its actuality, can only play 
 on the surface of the divine being. (God is not through and 
 through will or living; but in Himself is inactive and rigidly 
 silent; at times, however, He breaks this silence, though we 
 can scarcely attribute it to any necessity of nature. Once again, 
 therefore, as in the case of Eunomius, we find the doctrine of a 
 will, which, on the one hand, has nothing in common with that 
 which constitutes the essence of God (that is, with its simple 
 infinitude, its solitariness), and yet, on the other hand, relates 
 to the finite, which is supposed to be excluded from the divine 
 nature. In this way, the world’s existence is at one and the 
 same time posited and made impossible ; and both by God, for 
 
 1 Compare Hilarius de Trin. 7, 3-7, pp. 916-919, ed. Maur. The Sabel- 
 lius to whom he refers in these passages, is in my opinion Marcellus. 
 
284 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 the évépyera Spacrixy is in both cases His. The world alter 
 nates between existence and non-existence. But the same con 
 tradiction of position and exclusion affects God also, who Him- 
 self has an alternating idea: at one time He speaks and works ; 
 at another, He returns to silence, absorbs the world into Him- 
 self under the pretence of perfecting it, and shuts it out from 
 independent existence. What was necessary, was that that 
 rigid distinction, which afterwards passes over into uniformity, 
 should be given up, and that, instead of the alternation, an 
 inward mediation should be effected between unity and distine- 
 tion, and that the one should be shown to involve and be con- 
 tained in the other. This work, however, could never be ac- 
 complished so long as attention was devoted solely to the 
 relation of God to the world, and no successful efforts were 
 made, above all, to reconcile the divine unity itself with distinc- 
 tions. 
 
 In the respects just touched upon, the system of Marcellus 
 contains a still unvanquished remnant of Dualism. But it has 
 besides still more objectionable features. If the highest in God 
 is that unity which abides in itself; and if the essence of God 
 takes no part whatever in His productive activity (évépyeca 
 dpactixn); then, in Christ there dwelt, not the essence, but 
 merely an action of God, fixed in the man Jesus through a longer 
 series of momenta. Marcellus thus diverged, it is true, from 
 the earlier Sabellianism, which conceived God to have converted 
 Himself into the man, even more distinctly than Sabellius him- 
 self, who regarded God’s self-unfoldment in the Son as an 
 unfolding of the divine essence itself. By this means also, he 
 removed, more completely than Sabellius was able to do, the 
 appearance of a change having been produced in the divine 
 essence by the incarnation. For time and change, the manifold 
 movements, etc., undertaken by the Logos in Christ, affected 
 merely the divine activity, not the divine essence On this 
 supposition, however, the presence of God in Christ is reduced 
 to a purely dynamical one; not, indeed, as though there had 
 been in Christ merely a divine effect, whilst the power produc- 
 ing the effect remained outside of Him, for both the divine 
 
 ? Only in so far as he allows the evépryeice Opaotixy to be connected with 
 
 the essence of God, does he fail to exempt it from the movements and 
 changes which the former undergoes, 
 
MARCELLUS 285 
 
 action and the acting power were in Him. Notwithstanding, 
 the inner essence of God took no part in the incarnation. Nay 
 more, where a more living conception of the omnipresence of 
 God is entertained, where the “ omnipresentia operativa ” is 
 conceived to involve the “omnipresentia essentialis,” there the 
 distinguishing features which Marcellus supposed he was pre- 
 serving for Christ, fall away of themselves. Nor shall we be 
 able to charge Eusebius with injustice, when we find him ob- 
 jecting,—“ A divine power lived and moved in many men, even 
 before the days of Christ: the new element introduced by 
 Christianity, is the personal indwelling of God.”! Such a per- 
 sonal indwelling, however, Marcellus was unable to concede, 
 because he denied the existence of distinctions in God. A 
 personal God-man, objective to God, appeared to him an essen- 
 tially imperfect thing; humanity, being inadequate to the 
 divine, must be cast aside ere a perfect union with God can 
 become possible. We arrive, accordingly, at the principle,— 
 It is impossible for the incarnation of God to be a complete 
 one, nor can the union of God and man be thereby brought to 
 pass ; both are essentially, physically (#¥ow) separated, and 
 can only be united on one condition, that the humanity cease 
 to exist. But so long as the so-called divine Sonship lasted, it 
 was sustained solely by the divine power, by divine action, not 
 by the divine essence. Eunomius also was quite willing to 
 allow the Logos to be as close a resemblance to God as possible, 
 provided only the resemblance were not referred to the essence, 
 but merely to the will of God. 
 
 The Ebionism into which this new and refined form of 
 Sabellianism (compare above, p. 150) debouched, occupies in 
 one respect a lower position than Arianism, or even than the 
 Ebionism of the common kind :—to wit, the means which Mar- 
 cellus represents God as employing for the production of Christ, 
 merely sufficed to exclude the human personality of Christ, and 
 
 1 Adv. Marc. 2, 4. Eusebius raises, also, frequently the very apt 
 objection, that although Marcellus affirms that the Logos is invisible, and 
 that no man can know God, save through Him in His visible state, or in 
 the God-man, he still arrives at no revelation, because he is unable to allow 
 that God had a real existence in the Son; all that he attains to is a hint or 
 a symbol of revelation, a ongayzixzy Svvemis; for example, Ecc!. Theol. 1, 
 175°20,p. 90. 
 
286 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 to constitute His entire appearance a living theophanic symbol, 
 which continues in existence till the judgment; without, how- 
 ever, on the other hand, advancing beyond the category of the 
 dynamical. In this respect, the system of Marcellus’ disciple, 
 Photinus of Sirmium, shows traces of progress.’ 
 
 Photinus developed more clearly the Ebionitical conse- 
 quences of Sabellianism; but he also, after taking his stand 
 on the true and full humanity of Christ, which he only allowed 
 to have been the subject of a divine influence, sought a com- 
 pensation for the lack of a physical unity between Christ and 
 God, in their moral unity; for which he required no further 
 condition, than the supernatural birth of Christ. From which 
 it follows of itself, that there can no longer be any reason why 
 the man Jesus, crowned and deified for His virtue’s sake, should 
 
 not be eternally King and Lord in His kingdom. (Note 53.) 
 
 CHAPTER THIRD. 
 
 THE CONFUTATION OF ARIANISM AND SABELLIANISM BY THE 
 GREAT CHURCH TEACHERS OF THE THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 WHEN treating of the struggles with Gnosticism, through which 
 the Church had to pass, we found that it had at command an 
 array of able men, who had been raised up to fight its battles 
 and gain its victories; and so now, especially towards the close 
 of the conflict with Arianism, a series of great men was called 
 into existence, distinguished alike for the depth of their Christian 
 life, and their ability for speculative inquiries, who served the 
 Church by their labours, and adorned it by their intellectual 
 and moral eminence. ‘The greatest Fathers of the Church 
 flourished at this period: during the second half of the fourth 
 century, the Patristic literature of the early Church reached 
 its culminating point. To the objections raised by Sabellians 
 and Arians, apt replies flowed forth out of the fulness of the 
 Christian intellect; and the wounds inflicted by opponents, 
 
 1 Compare Athan. de syn. 26; Epiph. Heer. 71; Socr. H. E. 2, 18; 
 Hil. de Trin. 7, 8-7; Fragm. 2, 5, 12; de Synod. c. 38, 39; Marius 
 Mercator Nestorii, serm. 4; Theodoret. heer. fab. 2, 11. 
 
STRUGGLE WITH ARIANISM, ETC. 287 
 
 served but to unseal afresh the sources of Christian knowledge, 
 and to cause them to overflow more richly. Arianism, it is 
 true, was soulless, a product of the bare understanding; and, 
 incapable of viewing the matter from the centre, and the parts 
 in their connection with the whole, it clung to the individual 
 and empirical. The positive element which it lays down, or, at 
 all events, leaves standing, is also characterized by abnormity. 
 Not only to minds of the present age, but also to sound reason 
 in general, does an inferior God, a finite, created being which 
 is represented as a creator, appear monstrous, and even super- 
 stitious. Furthermore, seeing that, as a system, Arianism has 
 little or nothing to recommend it in itself, and that the human 
 mind would never by itself have arrived at such a monstrous 
 mixture of rational and supernatural elements, it testifies in- 
 voluntarily to the prior existence of an entirely different faith, 
 which, on the one hand, it has essentially altered, though, on 
 the other hand, it bears clear traces of its influence and impress ; 
 in other words, it testifies to the true power of the Christian idea. 
 It stands like a soulless, fantastic ruin, which points to a higher 
 past, and owes its existence to a blundering attempt to coerce 
 the fulness of the primitive Christian idea within the forms 
 of the abstract understanding. In so far, it has a certain 
 resemblance, not only to Socinianism, but also to the older 
 Rationalism of the present day. ‘This latter had no intention 
 of breaking with Christianity ; but was willing to allow all that 
 the Scriptures teach regarding Christ to be true in an inferior 
 sense; without perceiving, in its self-deception, that there re- 
 mained merely a fantastic shell, a soulless, idealess history, which 
 is at once too much and too little. But however untenable 
 Arianism may be as a system, in a scientific point of view; and 
 so certainly as only those whose sole culture is a superficial one 
 of the bare understanding, can regard it as the golden mean be- 
 tween two extremes; in another respect, as we have previously 
 shown, it was a highly important phenomenon; and it was 
 justified in disputing the right of the Church to the principle 
 which is its life, until the Church had refuted the objections 
 brought against it, and reconciled the contradictions, to which 
 its attention was called, by setting forth the empirical and 
 individual in the light of that view of the whole with which 
 it started; and, above all, until it had renounced all connection 
 
288 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCII. 
 
 with the basis on which both Arianism and Sabellianism rest, 
 That basis is the ante-Christian idea of God, as the unknown, 
 infinite being, which, remaining shut up in the rigid simplicity 
 of its own nature, cannot enter into true fellowship with man, 
 —an idea, whose natural and logical end is either Deism_or 
 Pantheism. 
 
 We have seen previously (compare the Second Epoch), 
 that during the conflict with the various heathenish and Jewish 
 forms of Gnosticism, the Christian Church acquired its know- 
 ledge of the essential attributes or momenta of the idea of God 
 in general. Subsequently to that period, Pantheism and Deism 
 
 made their appearance in great, though still bungling and in- 
 consequent, forms. Both were far superior to the two older 
 tendencies of Gnosticism and Ebionism, with which they have 
 otherwise so many points of affinity, in so far as they were pene- 
 trated by many Christian elements, which, on the one hand, were 
 the source of strength, though, on the other hand, the source of 
 inconsistency and weakness. Both Arianism and Sabellianism 
 appeared to recognise, or at all events to leave untouched, the 
 results at which the Church had previously arrived relatively to 
 the attributes of the idea of God. And yet, in accordance with 
 the experience, that when new and deeper questions are asked, 
 doubt is always thrown for a time on the whole of the principles 
 already recognised, these heresies were destined to make clear, 
 that the Church must either be prepared to lose all that it had 
 gained, or, besides refuting objections, advance on to new results. 
 In point of fact, both Sabellianism and Arianism introduced 
 changes into the doctrine of the divine attributes. In the case 
 of the former, this is quite evident from its older and predo- 
 minantly physical forms; for it drags down God completely 
 into the physical ; it establishes no distinction between God and 
 the world, that can hold its ground; and the very continuity 
 which it posits between the world and God, prevents it taking 
 an ethical view of the latter, prevents it from gaining an insight 
 into that divine love, which, having power over itself, wills the 
 existence of free creatures, and even in the incarnation honours. 
 the freedom of humanity. In its later forms, Sabellianism en- 
 deayoured, as far as possible, to avoid emanatistic elements ; but 
 to the extent to which it succeeded, to that extent did it repre- 
 sent Ged as abiding in Himself, without communicating His 
 
STRUGGLE WITH ARIANISM, ETC, 289 
 
 essence; and His revelation as merely “ showing” Him, as mere 
 doctrine ;—and the doctrine of a God who does not communicate 
 Himself is meagre, nay more, is manifestly self-contradictory 
 in substance, and therefore fitted to lead the way to the opposed 
 deistical point of view. Deism distinguishes more clearly be- 
 tween God and the world, by substituting, as we have pointed 
 out, the category of causality for that of substantiality :—though, 
 be it observed, this substitution affected merely the relation of 
 God to the world, and by no means His relation to Himself, as 
 the cause of Himself. In the relation of the divine causality to 
 the world, Arianism recognised the following point,—that the 
 effect, if it have areal, and not merely an apparent existence, is 
 neither a momentum of, nor primarily annexed to the cause ; 
 but exists outside, and relatively independent thereof ; and that 
 a cause is not really a cause, has not really worked, until it gives 
 its effect a being of its own. This relative independence of the 
 effect is then heightened by the introduction of the ethical prin- 
 ciple. Arianism, however, in consequence of its deistic character, 
 was not able fully to carry out the category of causality, even 
 in relation to the world, but advanced no further than the first 
 step. It posits, indeed, an activity of the first cause ; not, how 
 ever, on its own account, but merely in so far as is necessary to 
 demonstrate the possibility of a world independent of God; it 
 goes back to a first cause for the commencement, but not for the 
 continuance, of the world. It believed the world, once brought 
 into existence, to possess in itself, in particular, power for the 
 exercise of virtue and the attainment of knowledge. Nay more, 
 from the Arian point of view, a deed of God, an act of divine 
 self-communication, must necessarily have been esteemed a 
 dangerous commingling of God and the world, a threatening of 
 the existence of the latter, and a resumption as it were of the 
 act of creation; for the world owed its independent existence 
 to the fact, that the divine causality posited something outside 
 of God. But herein is involved also, that for Arianism, God 
 must stand in an alien and cold relation to man, that He cannot 
 be Love; nor, on the other hand, can the virtue of man be 
 viewed as love, seeing that love eries out for real fellowship 
 The only ethical element, therefore, that can here be recognised, 
 on the supposition that God and man stand over against each 
 other as personalities, justified in maintaining a kind of exclu- 
 WOOL aL, T 
 
290 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 sive independence of each other, is justice or righteousness, but 
 not love :—the view taken of the ethical, is simply a juridical, a 
 legal one. The very discrimination, therefore, aimed at by 
 Arianism, like the continuity aimed at by Sabellianism, rendered 
 it impossible to retain a hold on the full ethical character of the 
 idea of God. Both alike lost sight of the attribute of divine 
 love, in a rigid conception of God. Rut if love fail, all other 
 attributes receive at once another significance and position. On 
 this matter, however, it is not necessary further to dwell. In con- 
 nection with the idea of creation, we may remark further, that 
 when Arianism represents the causality of God merely as one 
 single act, that is, the one act of the production of the Son, who 
 was destined to be the Creator of the world, it has at once toc 
 little and too much. The world is deemed too bad for God to 
 have been concerned either in its creation or sustentation; and yet, 
 after it has once been created, it confronts God almost on_a foot- 
 ing of equality, in accordance with the category of bare justice. 
 God being supposed to be absolutely immutable, cannot take part 
 in the world any further than is necessary for its attaining an 
 independent existence outside of Him. And yet, to assert Him 
 to have been only once the cause of the world, and to deny that 
 He continues at every moment its cause, is to represent Him as 
 inutable. Nay more, the divine causality also is interrupted, if 
 God is not also the ground of the continuous existence of the 
 world. And if it be incompatible with the divine sublimity or 
 unchangeableness, that God should live in constant activity, a 
 single act, the quitting of His rest even for once, 1s equally in- 
 compatible therewith ; and Arianism, therefore, must either deny 
 the existence of the world, or conceive God to be constantly 
 active. This would indeed lead back to Pantheism, if, in cha- 
 racterizing the causality as perennial, the idea of causality itself 
 were given up, instead of acquiring completeness. But so cer- 
 tainly as the idea of a perennial causality destroys the possibility 
 of Deism, even so certain is it that, instead of involving, as some 
 think, the abolition of causality, it is its confirmation and full 
 carrying out. As such, it also confirms and establishes the dis- 
 tinction between God and the world. This it only does, of 
 course, when such a view is taken of the ethical causality of God, 
 or of self-communicating love, as does not involve its passing 
 beyond the category of right and law, without at the same time 
 
STRUGGLE WITH ARIANISM, ETC. 291 
 
 constituting that category part of the full ethical idea; in other 
 words, without assigning to subjective freedom its place as a 
 momentum in the collective process. 
 
 The only way to protect the treasures once gained, against 
 the new heresies, and to overcome Pantheism and Deism, was 
 determinately to_advance, on the foundations laid, to.the deve- 
 lopment of the doctrine of. the Lrinity.' If God is merely 
 self-communicative, without at the same time, and above all 
 things, possessing and maintaining Himself (sich selbst zu haben 
 und zu halten), He is selfless and undistinguishable from the 
 world, He is a being which can neither be termed God nor 
 world, because it is physical and absolute at one and the same 
 time. If God, on the contrary, 1s conceived as personal, as 
 master of Himself, the world is shut out, it is true, from form- 
 ing part of His idea, it is no longer a momentum of His being. 
 The idea of God, however, is first to be viewed in its auTdapKe.a, 
 purely by itself. But if we rest there, as Arianism did, we cannot 
 posit the existence of any world at all; or, if one exist, it has a 
 merely accidental existence. God shuts Himself up in abstract 
 self-sufficiency and simplicity. But as such an abstract simplicity 
 contradicts the ethical nature of God, it must be renounced; and 
 accordingly, the very preservation of the result already arrived 
 at, that is, of the ethical idea of God, rendered it necessary that 
 the Church should further define God as He is in Himself to 
 be, not an abstract Monas, but rather, even apart from the world 
 and His activity therein, a living spirit, originating movements 
 in His own being. Therewith was laid the foundation-stone of 
 a speculative doctrine of the Trinity. 
 
 This was the knowledge at which the great Church teachers 
 of the age then arrived. The idea of a living God, as_con- 
 trasted with the pantheistic or heathenish, and with the deistic 
 idea, found fixed expression in the doctrine of a Trinity of the 
 divine essence. It is undoubtedly true that Christendom owed 
 its conviction that God is a Trinity to revelation, and did not 
 deduce it directly from the conception of God. But at the 
 same time, the doctrine of the Trinity rescued for, if it did not 
 directly confer upon, the Church, the idea of God as the essen- 
 
 * Nitzsch has shown, with peculiar clearness, that the doctrine of the 
 
 Trinity is the victory alike over Pantheism and Deism, over the error of 
 Heathenism and that of Judaism. 
 
292 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 tially living God. That God can only be conceived by us as 
 possessed of spiritual vitality through the medium of the Trinity, 
 was not yet clearly perceived; and few attempts were made to 
 construe the Trinity out of the idea of God. At all events, 
 however, the conviction was arrived at, that there is the widest 
 difference between the Christian idea of God and both that of 
 Hellenic philosophy and that of Deism, inasmuch as God is to 
 be conceived as a living spirit. The Church felt that it had 
 secured this living idea of God in the Trinity, the existence of 
 which was vouched by faith, although it was not yet scientifically 
 understood, that is, the perception had not yet been arrived at, 
 that a triplicity of momenta was necessary to the constitution of 
 the conception of God as the living Spirit. 
 
 Let us now examine more carefully the conflict of the 
 Church with Arianism and Sabellianism. This conflict in- 
 volved three things :— 
 
 I. The critical examination of the systems. 
 
 Il. The confutation of their objections. 
 
 Ill. The further development of the doctrine of the Church. 
 
 I. Athanasius was fully justified in asserting the Arian doc- 
 trine to be an innovation (c. Ar. or. 1, 8). Never had the 
 Church defined the Son to be a being created out of nothing ; 
 never had it separated Him from God, or attributed to Him a 
 different nature from that of the Father. As little had any 
 teacher of the Church ever dreamed of dwelling with satisfac- 
 tion, as Arius did, on expressions which lower the Son, still less 
 of basing his system upon them. To curtail the dignity of Christ, 
 was not the end they had in view; they taught subordination 
 only so far as they were unable to reconcile the highest utter- 
 ances of Christ (to which, be it remarked, they felt themselves, 
 properly speaking, chiefly drawn) with the unity of God. Their 
 view of redemption was totally different from that of Arius, and 
 they saw in Christ the realization of fellowship, not merely be- 
 tween a higher and a lower creature, but between God and man. 
 The Fathers at Niczea were fully justified, therefore, in appealing 
 both to the whole of Christian antiquity and to the Scriptures ; 
 and alongside of many men of the third century, Athanasius 
 adduces Ignatius as a witness against Arius (de Synod. c. 47) 
 
 The individual elements of the Arian conception of God are 
 
ATHANASIUS—ARIANISM. 293 
 
 then, in particular, condemned. Athanasius aptly directs atten- 
 tion to the lack of a religious principle in the system of Arius, 
 when he says (de decr. Nic. Synod. 1),—The entire position 
 taken up by Arianism is a false one; for, instead of asking, 
 How could Christ, although God, become man? it asks, How 
 can Christ be God although man? In other words, its Christ- 
 ological starting-point is untheologically the humanity, and 
 therefore it failed to arrive at the deity. The deity can be 
 shown to be the principle of itself and of humanity; but the 
 humanity can neither be the principle of itself nor of the deity. 
 Further, God is to them as light without brightness, as a dried 
 up fountain (c. Ar. or. 1, 14, 19). Through sheer sublimity, 
 the God of Arius is unable to create (c. Ar. or. 2, 25). But if 
 the world is so unworthy of God, and cannot bear Him, what 
 help is it to posit a Son whose work is to create, but who is 
 Himself a creature? If the world cannot bear God, no more 
 can the Son, seeing that He also is a mere creature; and He 
 would require another mediator, that mediator a third, and so on 
 in infinitum (2, 26). Again, if the principle which created the 
 world is not itself God, but is superadded from without (€EwOev 
 émencayomevov, érixtntov, compare or. I, 17), God stands in 
 no connection with the world, but both He and the world remain 
 by themselves, isolated and abstract. The Son is said to have 
 come to bring us into connection with God. If He is to effect 
 this object, He must Himself also be an object of faith ; but 
 how can a creature be the object of faith? The true and pro- 
 per object of faith is the divine ; if, then, faith were directed to 
 a creature alongside of the true God, it would be divided in 
 itself, and we should have 8vo aléoreus,! and the dismemberment 
 of the divine and the disunity of the religious consciousness, 
 which were characteristic of the heathens, would characterize us 
 also (or. 8,16). A creature made an object of worship is an 
 idol, and to no being created out of nothing can it pertain to 
 create out of nothing (2, 20-22, 29; 1, 26). 
 
 A creature has not the power or capacity to unite us with 
 God (2, 69); and miserable is the self-deception which con- 
 
 1 Avarynn rye adrove duo bcode, Eve beev xriorthy Toy Of ErEpov xTLaTOv, xoel 
 Ovo xupiows Acerpevery Evl eesv dyevyytw, TH dE ETépy yevunto, nal xtiowers GVO 
 Te lores exe, eloev prev cic Tov &rnbivov, Srépoev O¢ eis Tv woindévre al Trao- 
 ivr, wap cebrav xual rAsybévre Oedv. 
 
294 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 tents itself with the mere semblance of a gift, which supposes 
 itself to be able to receive from a creature that which God alene 
 can bestow. Freedom is inconceivable, if he who is to free us 
 is himself a bondsman, and not rather God (2, 16). The Son 
 alone can make us children; adoptive sonship presupposes a 
 real sonship. Only in union with God are the wants of men 
 satisfied ; but how can we be deified or made free from the 
 curse by a nature that is foreign to us, or indeed by any other 
 than God Himself? God-must.reconcile and unite us to Him- 
 self through Himself (1, 37-39, 49-51; 2, 69, 70). We first 
 received the Holy Spirit asa lasting possession (GeBalws), after 
 Christ had animated humanity with the Holy Ghost in Himself, 
 in His own person. Jivery created thing is mutable ; in order, 
 therefore, to our standing fast, it was necessary that we should 
 participate in the immutable. Man was to be deified; and that 
 God alone could effect : he was to be made like Him: ; and that 
 was possible alone through the archetype, whose image we were 
 meant to bear from the beginning (2, 70, cll. 1, 49). How 
 could a creature, which itself must be subject to judgment, de- 
 liver us from judgment? (2, 6.) How can he, whose know- 
 ledge of himself and God is imperfect, reveal God to us even 
 in the way of doctrine? How can he who, like the Logos of 
 Arius, needs first to learn, and who therefore may be subjected 
 to error, forgetfulness, and change, be Wisdom ? (1, 23 ff.) In 
 short, both the idea of religion and that of creation are incom- 
 patible with Arianism. The world is a whole, a living being. 
 If, then, the Son is Himself a creature, and yet at the same 
 time the creator of the world, we arrive at a world that both 
 creates and is created,—a notion which rends the unity of the 
 world, in the same manner as we have previously seen the unity 
 of faith to be rent (2, 28). Such a mediator for the creation of 
 the world would derange and disturb, instead of mediating." 
 
 Yet ae strictly speaking, gave up the ae of union an 
 
 RFRA 
 
 union to be the task imposed on the Logos and the God-man. 
 It therefore assigned to Christ merely the position of .a teacher 
 and example. Athanasius also acknowledged Him to be such 
 
 ! Athanasius points out the dualistic features of this point of view when 
 
 he speaks of the Manichzism of its advocates, ad Episc. Algypt. et Lib. 
 C102 C. Atl eo: 
 
ATHANASIUS—ARIANISM. 295 
 
 (c. Ar. 1, 51; adv. Apoll. 1,4, 5; Ps. xvii.); but he at the 
 same time shows that if this be all, Arianism ought consistently 
 to pass over into Ebionism. The Arians maintain, that Christ 
 merely proclaimed the forgiveness of sins (c. Ar. 2, 68); but a 
 remission of sins by mere edict must necessarily remain exter- 
 nal to man; the guilt and bondage of sin would still remain. 
 What was required, was.a.real redemption by means of a real 
 _union with God (2, 14, 69). When God works, His work must 
 be permanent, and cannot require to be constantly repeated : 
 on the Arian view, therefore, man can never arrive at perma- 
 nent perfection, Nay more, Arianism depotentiates man alto- 
 gether; for it denies that union with God is his destiny; whilst, 
 on the other hand, it degrades God, and reduces Him to a Oetov 
 p0ovepov, by the false sublimity which it feigns for Him. 
 
 The error of Arianism, therefore, is, that, on the one hand, 
 it commingles God-and the world, by setting up a creature as 
 mediator between God and man, and making thereof an article 
 of faith ; and yet, on the other hand, separates the two so essen- 
 tially and completely, that not even love is able to reduce the 
 distinction to unity. As then the pretended exaltation of God 
 turns into an abasement of Him, nay more, to a confusion of 
 Him with the world, in the Son, so is it with the Son also. Ap- 
 parently He receives a lofty position, for He is the Creator, the 
 causality ; but because He is not the final cause, He is in reality 
 lower than the world, for the world is the final cause. Hence 
 Athanasius rightly says,—If the Son exists only for our sake, 
 if He came into existence merely that we might be brought 
 into existence, He is a mere means, and we, as the end in view, 
 were the object of the divine thought before Him. His exist- 
 ence, therefore, is a transitory one,—that is, only necessary so 
 long as the means, the organ, is necessary, by which we are to 
 be called into existence. His origin He owes to us. The case 
 is the same, if His exaltation affected His higher nature also, 
 and if it were exalted on account of the virtue, which He had 
 the opportunity of displaying towards us (c. Ar. or. 1, 40). All 
 this Athanasius sums up in the one proposition,—If He was 
 not God, there was no need of Him (2, 41). But we need 
 God; for we are created to know, and be united with, Him ; 
 and He alone can give us this knowledge, and bring about this 
 union.—In so many respects does he show that Arianism, with 
 
296 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 its inner invalidity, is incapable of affording the mind the satis- 
 faction which it promises. 
 
 II. No less acuteness characterizes his rejoinders to the 
 main objections brought against the doctrine of the Church 
 by the Arians and Sabellians. To notice in detail their explan- 
 ations of Scripture passages and the Church’s exposure thereof, 
 would lead us too far away from our main purpose (compare, 
 however, on Prov. viii. 22, Heb. i. 4, Rom. viii. 29, Col. i. 
 15, -Heb:,iv.'2, Athan. e.-Ary or.>2,,.and! 3,7 it.; BasileMi ae. 
 Eunom. L. iv.; Greg. Naz. or. 30). Let us now consider the 
 refutation of their dogmatical objections. The Arians _said,— 
 The Son must be a creature; for if He were of the substance 
 of God, coeternal with Him, God would be divided, and physi- 
 cal ideas be applied to Him. They asked therefore also,—Did 
 God beget His Son voluntarily or not? If involuntarily, God 
 was subject to compulsion; if yoluntarily, the Son having been 
 begotten by the will of the Father, does not belong to His sub- 
 stance, but is a creature. Further,—Did He exist ere He was 
 begotten, or not? If He existed, He must have been eternal ; 
 and then we should have the contradiction, that He existed ere 
 He was generated. Consequently, He was not before He was 
 generated ; and there was therefore once a time when He did 
 not exist. Finally, they asked,—If the Father is unbegotten, 
 and the unbegotten alone can be designated God, how can deity, 
 in the strict sense, be said to belong to the Son? If the Son 
 is begotten, but yet eternal like the Father, He ought to be 
 described as the unbegotten-begotten one (ayevyntoyévyntos) ; 
 He must be the Father’s brother, and, in order to be perfectly 
 like Him, must Himself also have a Son; not to mention that 
 we should thus fall into Ditheism. That the latter objections, 
 in a slightly altered form, proceeded also from the Sabellians, 
 we have seen in the case of Marcellus. Athanasius replied as 
 follows,—Heathenish it is not, to give the Son divine honour, 
 if He is really God; certainly, however, if He be a creature, 
 as the Arians affirm. Perfect resemblance to the Father does 
 not require that the Son be the Father, i.¢., it does not require 
 identity. The Son is perfectly like the Father, in virtue of 
 His immutability, because He remains what He is, even as the 
 Father remains what He is, Amongst men we see only imper- 
 
ATHANASIUS. 297 
 
 fect copies of fatherhood and sonship; for the same person stands 
 successively in both relations: he who is now a father was once 
 a son, and he who is now the son will one day himself be a 
 father. Instead of the mutability and mobility which characterize 
 men, in the deity the Father represents Fatherhood absolutely 
 and eternally, and the Son Sonship. Indeed, this absolute Father- 
 hood and Sonship in heaven are the archetype of all fatherhood 
 and sonship on earth.’ The Arians, as we know, were parti- 
 cularly proud of the syllogisms which they derived from the 
 position, that ayéyyntov was equivalent to Gedrns. Athanasius 
 maintains, that it is an abstract formula to describe God as the 
 Unbegotten One. In prayer, when we seek out the fullest 
 and worthiest conception, no one dreams of addressing God 
 by the name, “Unbegotten One.” The proper name of the 
 Unbegotten One is Father. If we look at the world, which 
 was created or begotten, in this sense the Son was not at all 
 begotten, but is unbegotten like the Father. So also, if we 
 look to the relation between the Son and the divine essence, 
 and designate this essence unbegotten, it belongs to the Son 
 equally with the Father, and therefore the latter is eternal; but 
 the Father ought not to be identified with the divine essence.2 
 On the contrary, considered in relation to the Son, the Father 
 is unbegotten, and the Son begotten by the Father. Human 
 mothers, it is true, first become mothers, and are not such eter- 
 nally; even as they themselves come into existence out of non- 
 existence. But this is a sign of finitude. The F ather, on the 
 contrary, because He is perfect, does not first begin to be a 
 Father, as though He had not been a Father previously ; it 
 belongs to His essence to be a Father, even as brightness belongs 
 to light; and this His essence He does not acquire gradually, 
 but it is His eternally. Therefore, because the Father exists 
 either not at all, or is eternally Father, the Son also is eternally 
 
 7 C. Ar. or. 1, 21. Of dv Oparor nerd diadoyiy &rrhrov yevvavror nok 
 J yevvawevos éx yervapiven worpds yevundels cixéras nal cebrdc erépov yiverocs 
 TarHp'—O10 ovoe éorsy ev Tov, ToLovToIS nuplas rarnp nal xuplac vids ovde ornxev 
 ér avToY TO warno xol TO vids, 6 yep avrds vies yiverat nal rarnp. “Obey 
 él ris Oeornros movns 6 Tariyp xuplag warnp tort, xal 6 uldc xuplas vioc 
 £oTly. 
 
 * Compare c. Ar. or. 1, 80-34; de deer. Nic. Syn. 28. ’Avyévyroc is the 
 Father designated, not in relation to the Son, but sclely in relation to the 
 SEV NT 
 
298 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 Son.’ Gregory Nazianzen developed this idea further, as 
 follows,—Not even in earth is the causal relation limited to 
 cases in which the cause precedes and the effect follows; in 
 other words, succession in time, is not an essential attribute of 
 the causal relation: the causal relation may have a place, he 
 urges, in connection with things whose existence is contem- 
 poraneous ; and adduces as an illustration, light and the effects 
 it produces.” This contemporaneity of cause and effect is .evi- 
 dently a form of the causal relation which is more akin to the 
 higher category of interaction, according to which, without con- 
 fusion of the distinction, both members of the relation are fully 
 co-ordinated. It is plain also, that causality is in one aspect 
 more perfect, when it is contemporaneous with the existence 
 of that which is the cause. For then it is not merely an acci- 
 dental cause, which might just as well not be a cause at all; 
 but it is essentially a cause, and it is involved in its very idea 
 that it should be a cause. At the same time, however, it is 
 quite as evident, that on this view of the causal relation, the 
 effect ceases to be something external to the cause, and to occupy 
 an independent position relatively thereto. for, inasmuch as 
 henceforth we are not to conceive the cause without the effect, 
 the effect must belong to the essence of that which is the cause. 
 Not that the Son is therefore the Father, or the brightness the 
 sun; on the contrary, the distinction still continues; but it must 
 be transferred to the sphere of eternal being and its reciprocally 
 related distinctions. Taking this view of the connection between 
 causality or generation and the eternal essence of the Father, 
 two..conclusions must be drawn :.firsily, that it is no longer 
 contingent or dependent on. the pleasure of that which is the 
 cause, whether it be a causality or not; for if the generation 
 of the Son had its ground primarily in a particular act of will, 
 He could no longer be maintained to be coeternal with the 
 Father, in the full sense of the term; it would be possible 
 
 1 ©. Ar. or. 1, 12-14, 20, 22, 23, 27.—C. 27. “Qerep gparnoav res 
 yuvaines Tepl ray xpovov, ovtTa mruvdavecbacay xal rov HAlov wepl Tov drav- 
 YHOULTOS KUTOD nal THS BnyHS Tepl Tov z= adriIg, Lye wadwoww, Ori—radre 
 gorsv—aisl* avy exeivois. CO. 12:—Tis otras early cdvdnrtos, as d&u@iBarrsiv 
 wept tov cel sivas tov viev; Ilors yap tis elds Qas Kapls TIS TOV dTavyAouaTOS 
 Axum poryros ; 
 
 “ Greg. Naz. P 29, 3 :—Ajjroy 02 70 aitiov, as ov wavras mwpeaBuTepor 
 TOVT@Y, WY EoTLY aITLOY, OVOE yap TOU DuTds HALOS. 
 
ATHANASIUS—GREGORY NAZIANZEN. 29 
 
 to form a complete conception of the essence of God apart 
 from the Son; and the Son must be looked upon as some- 
 thing superadded to the divine essence from without. For this 
 reason, secondly, that which is effected can no longer wear the 
 character of fortuity or mutability; but as a necessary effect, 
 without which a proper conception cannot be formed of ie 
 divine, both the fact and the mode of its being are determined 
 by the essence of that which is its cause. No wonder, then, 
 that the struggle was concentrated specially on this point. 
 Arianism did its utmost to prevent the application to the rela- 
 tion between Father and Son of this form of causality, which 
 supposes an eternal connection to exist between the effect and 
 the essence of that which is its cause: this is the explanation of 
 the dilemma adduced above (page 295). Athanasius, however, 
 replied,—If the Arians talk of constraint, because the genera- 
 tion of the Son did not take place after precedent consultation, 
 or in accordance with an act of volition, they ought to apply 
 the same rule to other matters pertaining to the essence of God ; 
 for example, to His attributes. Does God, then, first consider 
 ere He resolves to be good? Does freedom consist alone in the 
 possibility of choice, in the capability of acting otherwise? No; 
 a nature that is good and perfect is higher than choice (3, 
 62 f.)." Similar also is the reply given by Gregory Nazianzen.” 
 But the Son is not on that account of the nature of a mere 
 attribute, as the Sabellians affirm; nor is He an efflux of God, 
 which would involve the division of the essence of God, but the 
 entire (oNdKAnpov) divine essence, which, wherever it is present, 
 is present in its entirety or not at all, and in this aspect is 
 simple, indivisible, uncompounded, is in the Father and in the 
 Son, though in each after a peculiar manner: to wit, in the 
 Father Salida otal , as the living archetype, the primal source ; 
 in the Son antitypically, as the absolute image, which reflects 
 the Father. 
 
 1Q, Ar. 3, 62:—Kel cis 6 ryy dvayuny triBardy aire, Tovnporarol, xol 
 Tovrea Thos THy ipso sevray ernovres; To dy yop dvtineiusvoy TH Bovarnoss 
 (compulsion) tapaxcor, ro 08 wsiCov xal varepnsiwevoy on edeopnonv—r0 naTe 
 Quow.—Eirarocay nuivy adrol ro dyodoy sivas xal olxtipove tov Osov, ex 
 Bovarnosag wpoccotiv avt@® 4 ov Bovaryoss; In the first case, it is possible that 
 He be not good, for the sake of the choice (ford eis txarepe, of the rads 
 
 of the rAcyix} Qvais). But to say this of God is absurd. 
 * Greg. Naz..or. 29, 6. 
 
¥ 
 
 300 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 If. This leads us to the third point, which was the further 
 development of the doctrine of the Church. Each of the two, 
 both Father and Son, directs attention through Himself to the 
 other," because each of the two is involved in the distinctive 
 essence of the other (édvdrys is the word used by Gregory 
 Nazianzen). When then, asks Athanasius, are we to suppose 
 God to have existed without Him who is His own (that is, who 
 is so far from being contingent, who is so imperdible, so indis- 
 pensable to the integrity of His own idea, that this other self 
 constituted as it were a part of the very divine being)? Or 
 who can regard that which is His own (iévov) as something 
 foreign, as something pertaining to another substance? No 
 created thing, indeed, whatever bears any resemblance to its 
 Creator, as far as the essence is concerned, but is external to 
 Him; and, owing its existence to His good pleasure and His 
 will, exerted through the Logos, it is possible for it to cease to 
 exist, should such be the Creator’s will. This is the nature of 
 the creature. But that which belongs peculiarly to the essence 
 of the Father, namely, the Son, how can it, without audacity 
 and impiety, be described as a something created out of nothing, 
 as something which had no existence prior to its generation, or 
 as something contingently superadded, which may, some time 
 or other, cease again to have being? If any man find such 
 ideas arising in his mind, let him consider well, that nothing 
 may be deducted from the perfection and fulness of the essence 
 of the Father ;* and in order that he may perceive more clearly 
 the absurdity of the error, let him remember that the Son is 
 the image and brightness of the Father, the configuration (ya- 
 pax7ip) of His essence and the truth. If the light exist, the 
 brightness is its image ; if the essence exist, He is the complete 
 expression of the essence (yapaxtnp orOKAnpos).’ Let those, 
 therefore, who subject the image and form of the divine to the 
 
 t Ath. c. Ar. 1, 33: To rerip dnrwrixdy tors rod viod. Compare c. 34, 
 16 :—Adroy O¢ rev vidv BAswovtes Cpauey tov waréon. “H yep rov viov tyvore 
 nal narannlis yvaots totl wepl Tov rarpos, did 6 éx THs ovalas adroD Pos0y 
 elvas yévunud. 
 
 *C. Ar. 1, 28, in a manner similar to this the eternity of the Son is 
 argued, from the consideration, that it was x«adyv that the Father should 
 always have been Father. See above on Origen. 
 
 * Ist das Licht, so ist der Abglanz sein Bild, ist das Wesen, so ist er des 
 Wesens vollkommner Ausdruck. 
 
HILARY OF PICTAVIUM. 301 
 
 conditions of time, look well to the abyss of godlessness into 
 which they are falling. If there ever was a time when the Son 
 did not exist, then the truth cannot have dwelt eternally in 
 (zod ; for the Son says, “I am the truth.’ Given the essence 
 (vTocTacus), the image and expression must also be given; for 
 the image of God is not a thing painted from without, but God 
 Himself i as the begetter thereof, 2; hehotding fT, ereserp therein, He 
 rejouces (ares 0 Oeds yevyntns ects tabrns év i éavtov Opav 
 mpooxaipes tavty). When can the Father be said not to have 
 
 looked on Himself in His image? or when was it not His 
 delight? (Prov. viii. 30.) How could the Creator and Origi- 
 nator of the world behold Himself in that which was merely 
 created? For the image must.needs be, as is the Father of the 
 image.” 
 
 We have found writers in the West giving utterance to 
 similar thoughts even at an earlier period (see above, pages 
 186 ff.). In the fourth century also, the same view was pro- 
 pounded by Hilary cf Pictavium. The idea that Father and 
 Son know and behold themselves in each other, was familiar to 
 him. One is, as it were, the mirror of the other; not in the 
 sense that the divine lucific essence projected the merely ima- 
 gined image of a being foreign to itself, but the mirror or the 
 image is a living nature, and the one is essentially identical with 
 the other. But if they (along with the Holy Ghost, who is 
 still less made the subject of consideration) constitute the Deity, 
 then it necessarily follows from the premises, that the self-con- 
 sciousness of the Deity consists in this reciprocal knowledge of the 
 Father and the Son (cognitio mutua), which is not merely a 
 knowledge which the one has of, but which each has in, the 
 other. And this relation seemed to Hilary so clear and cer- 
 tain, that he applied it also to the ceconomic Trinity. To the 
 sphere of the Father’s thoughts belong the things which He 
 predestines to realization in the future. The Son, looking into 
 the will of the Father, has the knowledge of the idea of His 
 
 1C. Ar. 1, 20: Tas troordoewg trrcepyovons, wavras ebbds elvas det rey 
 xepantinoae xa ryy eixove ravtns’ ov yap eeubév tors ypaPouevy 4 Tov Osov 
 sinay’ &AA adres 6 Oeds yevunrys tors ravens ev n Eavrdy cpay wpoovelpes Tavry. 
 Ilore you ody, eupee Eevroy 6 rarip ty ry Eevrod eludvis y Tore Ov Tpoaexcelps s— 
 aus Of noch eevrov dy Voor 6 roinris nol urioris ev xriotn nol yevnrn ovola; 
 Toscevrny yoo sivecs Ost Hy sixdvec, olde eoTiy 6 THUTYS TAT. 
 
302 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 own work; in other words, by gazing on the thoughts of the 
 Father, He attains to the self-knowledge of that which is essen- 
 tially the will of His own nature. But this introspection is 
 brought about through the medium of their mutual love and 
 nature." 
 
 This remarkable theory contains already a kind of specula- 
 tive construction of the doctrine of the Trinity, out of the idea 
 of the divine self-consciousness. The Father must see, must 
 gaze upon, Himself. In the world, that is, in the created world, 
 He cannot do this; for it is not His perfect image, unchange- 
 able, eternal, divine. If it were, it would no longer be world, 
 but would rather belong to the essence of God; it could neither 
 be said to have become, nor to be now becoming. And, on the 
 other hand, to suppose that genesis (das Werden) belongs to 
 the character of God, is to substitute the heathenish in the 
 place of the Christian conception of God. But if the world is 
 not the other self, in which He can contemplate and know 
 Himself, He must have a perfect image in and with Himself, 
 and this image is designated Son. It belongs necessarily to the 
 essence of God, and is as eternal as God, inasmuch as He can 
 neither begin, nor ever cease, to know Himself. We see now, 
 therefore, ae significance of the thought which so frequently 
 occurs in the writings of AG Ree iatiee Saar from the Son, the 
 Father would be without reason, without wisdom (knowledge), 
 without the truth (without the knowledge of Himself, the 
 truth). It has not the same import as it perhaps had in some 
 of the older writers, that the Father, taken by Himself, has not 
 in Himself the principle of all this, but the Son alone; for that 
 would lead to the notion, so frequently repudiated by him, 
 that God is a composite being; whereas he asserts the entire 
 deity to be in the Father and in the Son. Nor can he mean 
 
 1 De Trin. 2, 3: ‘‘ Pater autem quomodo erit (sc. Pater), si non quod 
 sn se substantie atque nature est, agnoscat in Filio? 9, 69: Tanquam 
 speculum unus unius est, speculum autem ita, ut non imaginatam speciem 
 naturge exterioris splendor emittat, sed dum vivens natura nature viventi 
 indifferens est. Comment. in Matt. c. 11, v. 27: Eandem utriusque 
 (Patris et Filii) in mutua cognitione esse substantiam docet (Christus). 
 Tract. in Psalm. xci. 6: Voluntatem Patris Filius tanquam exemplum 
 operationis introspicit, quia intra paternarum cogitationum providentiam 
 quadam futurarum rerum predestinatione formantur (sc. res future). In- 
 trospicit autem per mutuam caritatem atque naturam.” 
 
HILARY—ATHANASIUS. 303 
 
 to teach that the Son was a mere quality of the Father, that is, 
 of God (compare, for example, c. Ar. 4, 4, 2); for then there 
 would have been no need to battle with Arianism and Sabelli- 
 anism, inasmuch as both would, without hesitation, have con- 
 ceded the existence of such a Logos in the Father. His mean- 
 ing must rather have been the following (especially as it was a 
 common custom to attribute wisdom, reason, etc., to the Father 
 also) :—that divine self-knowledge, in other words, the divine 
 knowledge ‘ sensu eminenti,” is inconceivable, save on the 
 assumption, that a perfect image, a Son, stands over against 
 Him, in whom He beholds Himself, or with whom He has 
 self-consciousness.. That a very decided step was thus taken 
 in advance of the ante-Christian conception of God, needs no 
 further elucidation; it deserves notice, however, that a death- 
 blow was thus finally dealt at the view of the divine essence, as 
 abstract, motionless, simplicity. The positing of a perfect image, 
 in which the Father contemplates Himself, would be impossible, 
 had not God previously discriminated Himself in Himself; in 
 other words, were it not as just to apply the idea of distinction 
 as that of unity to the divine nature. This point, opposed as 
 it was alike to Sabellianism and to Arianism, was so far from 
 being regarded as dangerous by Athanasius and the other 
 Church teachers of that day, that they used it as a new argu- 
 ment for the refutation of their opponents, and as a funda- 
 mental principle for the development of the doctrine of God 
 into a doctrine of the Trinity. That idea of God which ex- 
 cluded a Trinity, to wit, the idea of Him as shut up in His 
 own sublimity, as indiscriminated in Himself, as the Monas, 
 they considered to be false. They believed, on the contrary, 
 that in God is eternal life, eternal movement. Who is able, 
 says Athanasius (de decret. Nic. Syn. 12), to separate bright- 
 ness from the sun, or to conceive of a fountain without life 
 (c. 15)? God is not to be compared to a sea, which receives 
 its water from without, but to a fountain. The divine foun- 
 
 1 After the above account, it will be impossible to give Baur the credit 
 vf having gone to the sources for the view of Athanasius contained in such 
 words as—‘‘ At one time he regards the Son as a free subject, at another 
 as selfless and dependent, without doing anything to combine the two ;” 
 and, ‘*‘no trace of an attempv to reconcile the unity with the distinctions is 
 discoverable in his writings” (I. ¢. 489). 
 
304 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 tain is never dry; light never lacks brightness. God is not 
 unfruitful (@yovos). Were He dyovos, He would also be dvevép- 
 yntos, and could not create; for He creates through the Son. 
 This was a correct view to take of the matter, whether they 
 had regard to the Scriptures which teach that the creation was 
 the work of the Son, or to the circumstance (see above, pages 
 287 ff.) that, through the Trinity, the idea of God acquires that 
 completeness in the self-consciousness by which pantheistic 
 elements are excluded, and the idea of creation rendered pos- 
 sible; or, finally, to the consideration, that, through the Trinity, 
 the idea of God as a self-occluded, motionless being, with which 
 the existence of a world is incompatible, is overcome, and that, 
 with the assumption of a Son, who, inasmuch as He is deity 
 under a fixed form, stands in a closer relation to finitude, a 
 path of transition is opened to an external world.” But that 
 we must not merely say,—the Father and Son eternally coexist, 
 but,—The Son is begotten by the Father, he demonstrates as 
 follows: If we only say the former, we arrive at a double God 
 (Supuh Geov, c. Ar. 4, 3), at a duality of original beings, which 
 do not derive their existence from some one being. The divine 
 unity, therefore, is preserved by representing the Logos as de- 
 rived from the Monas, not by introducing a dyas of beings, 
 neither of which is the Father of the other. In like manner, 
 Sabellianism also is to be condemned, because it shuts out a 
 duality conciliated through the medium of unity. Athanasius 
 reproaches it with fusing the distinct ideas of cause and effect 
 (aitvov Kat aitvatov), of generator and generated, into one. On 
 the contrary, Gregory Nazianzen remarks (or. 29, 2 ff.), carry- 
 ing the matter out further in this aspect,—There were three 
 cases possible: the divine might be represented either as an 
 
 1C. Ar. 4,4: El dyovoc, xcel ctvevépynros 6 Occ, yévvnuce yap “vTov oO 
 vids, O¢ ov éoyeleras. Adv. Sab. Greg. Init.: The Jews have a God éyovoy 
 viov, xa axaprov Cavros Adyou xat aoQies éArnbivys. Athan. c. Ar. or. 1, 
 14, 19. 
 
 2 C. Ar. or. 1, 16: It is precisely the same thing to say,—God gives a 
 share in Himself, as to say, He begets. No one teaches that the self-com- 
 munication of God introduces division and separation into God; for, were 
 it so, we could have no part in Him. But if we can have part in God, it 
 follows, that the Son also can have part in Him, and that indeed ‘sensu 
 eminenti ;” for we can only have part in God, so far as He communicates 
 Himself to us. 
 
ATHANASIUS—GREGORY NAZIANZEN, 305 
 
 anarchy, or as a polyarchy, or as a monarchy.. The first is 
 disorder; the second brings tumult, and leads also to the dis- 
 order of a dissolution. We must regard_ monarchy, therefore, 
 as the preferable alternative. Not, however, a monarchy cir- 
 cumscribed by one mpécwrov; for the one also revolts against 
 itself (€ore Kal 7d &v oractatov Tpos éavrov), in that it strives 
 to pass into plurality; but a monarchy constituted by the like 
 dignity of the essence (opotuuia), by harmony of sentiment 
 (yvoOuns cvumvoa), by identity of motion (Tavrorns KivicEws), 
 and by inclination (suvvevors) to one of them (the Father). In 
 finitude, a plurality without division is an impossibility ; but it 
 is possible in God. For this reason, the Monas moved forward 
 from the beginning into the Dyad, and finally came to a stand 
 in the Triad (8a rodtTo povas an’ apyiis eis Sudda Kw Oeioa, 
 uéxpt tpiddos gore); and this we hold to be the Father, the 
 Son, and the Holy Ghost,—the one the generator and producer 
 (arpoBorevs), Impassive, above time, incorporeal ;_ the second, 
 begotten; the third, produced (7poBAnwa). For we cannot 
 venture, with some of the wise men of Greece, who, when dis- 
 coursing of the first and second cause, compared God to an 
 overflowing bowl], to designate these, overflowings of goodness 
 (Urépyvow). To do so, would be to run the risk of introducing 
 an involuntary generation, a physical overflow, which God was 
 unable to repress (epirrevja puaotxov, Svoxdbextov), and which 
 would be totally unworthy of Him. Epistle 243, mpos Ev- 
 aypiov povayov (which, however, it is true, is probably spurious), 
 employs, besides, the simile of a circle and its radii, which, 
 although distinct, can yet only be thought in conjunction with 
 each other; the simile of a word, which, without being separated 
 from the speaking intellect, acquires, at the same time, an ob- 
 jective existence in the souls of the hearers, and, instead of 
 separating, unites the souls; that is, a word continues identi- 
 cally the same as to essence, and yet exists in different forms. 
 “ As the rays of light have their peculiar constitution (tiv wpos 
 adrnra cyéow), without division of substance, and are neither 
 separated from the light nor cut off from each other, but carry 
 the pleasant light to us; so also our Redeemer and the Holy 
 Spirit, these twin rays, bring to us the light of the Father. 
 They diffuse their blessings even to us, and yet they remain 
 united with the Father.” Accordingly, there are different 
 WO ledge U 
 
306 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 modes of existence (e/5n) of one and the same substance (ovcta) 
 in the Trinity. There is one river (ula por), flowing forth from 
 the one eye of the source (that is, from the Father) from the 
 beginning; but there are two branches, inasmuch as the streams 
 assume distinct forms (d/ppuTos, TOY ToTapaVv oxnuatia Devt wv 
 trois eiSeov). Although, therefore, the distinctions in God are 
 termed three tpeor@res in point of number, as Athanasius saw 
 in each hypostasis not merely a part of God, but.the entire 
 God (édov ddov TUTrov Kar TavTOV padXrov 7) apopwoimpa, Com- 
 pare Greg. Naz. or. 30, 20),—yet there is one deity, one puts 
 in all, and Father, Son, Spirit, are tpets iSudtntes voepal, TéE- 
 Deval, KAP EavTas KperTaoas (compare mpos Apetay sub fin.), 
 that is, three different modes of existence of one and the same 
 whole,’ 
 
 With their derivation of the Trinity from the eternal vitality 
 and movement of God in Himself, we must undoubtedly con- 
 nect the circumstance, that Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen 
 were inclined to suppose that the generation..was.not moerely..an 
 eternal, but an eternally continuous act. Otherwise, the act of 
 generation would be represented as a single act of God; and 
 God, therefore, must be concluded to have been imperfect prior 
 to the act, if to generate and the thing generated pertain to His 
 inmost essence.* 
 
 It will repay our labour to ascertain more exactly the views 
 entertained by Basilius.and Gregory of Nyssa on the subject of 
 the Trinity. The main position of the former, in opposition to 
 Eunomius, is,—the word “unbegotten” 1s_a name, not of the 
 essence of God, but of one of His modes of existence (c. Eun. 
 4, p. 763, C., umdapyews TpoTros TO ayevyNnTOV Kal ovK ovaias 
 dvouwa) ; the divine essence has other predicates. If every pecu- 
 liar mode of existence brings with it a distinction in the essence, 
 and if the Son cannot be of like substance with the Father, be- 
 cause He has one mode of existence peculiar to Himself and 
 the Father another, men could not be of like substance with 
 each other, because each of them has his own distinctive mode 
 
 1 Compare Greg. Naz. rep! viod roy. w. (or. 29, 13). The Arians ob- 
 ject,—el atv od wixavras Tov yevvay o @edc, areas 4 yévunois, xal wore 
 wotosre:. He endeavours to show that it never ceases, although it can 
 never be said to be areags. Athan. c. Arian. 4, 12; Basil. c. Hunom. 4, 
 760, ed. Paris, 1638, T. 1. 
 
BASIL—-GREGORY OF NYSSA. 307 
 
 of existence. We regard Father, Son, and Spirit, therefore, 
 not as different ovcias, but as names denoting the vrrapEs of 
 each of them (p. 765, B.). As they are all God, the Father 
 cannot be more God than the Son; even as one man is not 
 more man than another. Quantitative differences do not bear 
 application to essences; there, it is either to be or not to be. 
 But this does not_make.it.impossible.for the Son to be other 
 than the Father (érépws éyew, p. 762); for example, the former 
 is other in virtue of His generation. The dignity of both must 
 be alike, for the essence of the generator and the generated must 
 be one; and the effect is not always less than the cause (paiols 
 B.). Were the dyévyntov a title of honour, it must be given to 
 the Son also; and it does belong to Him, in so far as we under- 
 stand by it, the uncreated, the unbegotten, the one who is with- 
 out beginning (pp. 715, 719; ¢c. Eun. L. 1). Whence, then, the 
 necessity for a subjection in point of rd£is, or a precedence in 
 point of time, finding place amongst those whose essence is one? 
 Why could not the God of the universe coexist eternally with 
 an image of Himself eternally reflected? In this case, there- 
 fore, we can only speak of an order involved in the inner reia- 
 tion of the matter itself, to wit, the relation of cause and effect. 
 As the cause, the Father takes precedence of the Son (p. 720, 
 C.); but although the Father in this respect may be termed 
 greater (TO Tijs dpyns Kal Ths airlas Oyo), it does not interfere 
 with the ouoripuov ris dElas. 
 
 But notwithstanding that their essence and their dignity are 
 equal, the one is not the other. The Unbegotten is God, it is 
 true; but it is not a definition of God, for not everything which 
 God is, is unbegotten. The conception of God is not covered 
 by the term a@yévynrov; but to the common essence must be 
 superadded characteristic marks, which distinguish the Father 
 and the Son. In the first place, the Father begets-the Son. If 
 God, as our opponents maintain, is not to be supposed to beget, 
 for fear we should have to hold the doctrine of an efflux; let 
 us also say that He does not create, in order that He may not 
 become weary. But if God can create without. being passible, 
 much more can He beget. without being passible (c. Eun. 4, 
 760). And in the second Book against Kunomius (p. 730), he 
 sharply blames those who talk in a tone of compassion about the 
 multitude, confuting opinions which they pretend only brute 
 
308 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 like men can entertain respecting God; but who, whilst they 
 themselves reject the figurative word generation, and, in re- 
 jecting the word, reject also the idea of the hypostatic essential 
 equality of the Son and the Father, and leave unreproved those 
 who lower the Son to the rank of a creature. Secondly, the 
 Son,—such is the import of generation,—has His apyn from 
 _the Father, in-equality.of.essence (c, Kun. 9,737). He 1s not 
 a part of God, but ddos ddov yervntov ; they are not two parts, 
 made out of one whole, but are téXeva Sv0 (c. Eun. 4, 765). Nor 
 is the element common to the two, a substance which existed prior 
 to the persons, and which was divided, one part being given to 
 the one, and another to the-other; but the entire essence is in 
 each, though each has it in a different mode. This mode con- 
 stitutes the distinction or peculiar character (duaopa, wvoTns 
 yapaxtnpifovca, c. Hun. 1, p. 719; compare 2, 728). Now, 
 whereas, in the case of men, the differences between those who 
 are of like substance are constituted also thereby, that one has 
 an advantage which the other has not; in other words, whereas 
 human individuals are discriminated from each other also by 
 limitation or privation (distinctions which in their very nature 
 may be transitory, if the one acquires the advantage of which 
 he was formerly destitute) ; such differences cannot exist in the 
 Trinity. For each of the rpocw7a must possess all divine qua- 
 lities and excellences. The distinctions, therefore, are not con- 
 stituted by orépnous, that is, by one possessing an advantage 
 which the other lacks: the distinctive characteristic must rather 
 be something positive, something which does not involve the su- 
 periority either of the one or the other (c. Eun. 4, 765). Nor, 
 on the other hand, is this positive something a superior quality 
 pertaining to the divine essence. It is another mode of being 
 of that essence; and the names, Father, Son,. Spirit, are-not-ab- 
 solute, but relative, designations ; for, were they absolute desig- 
 nations, the three would be different. essences. They refer to a 
 relation of the mpécw7ra, not_primarily.to the world,-but.rcather 
 toeach other; just as the idea of Friend, of one who is begotten, 
 says nothing regarding the essence, but is a relative idea which 
 we can imagine to be connected with another essence. For this 
 reason, Basilius, like Gregory of Nyssa and Athanasius, says,— 
 The idea of the Father is given with that of the Son, and vice 
 rersd. This other mode of being or these idvrtyrTes, which he 
 
BASILIUS 309 
 
 also terms yapaxtijpas, popdas (c. Eun. 2, 744), distinguish 
 the common substance, it is true, by characteristic marks (Tots 
 io.dfover yapaxthpat), but do not discind it. For example, 
 deity is common to all; Fatherhood and Sonship are distinctive 
 peculiarities ; and the union of the two, of the common and the 
 peculiar (€« Ts éxatépov cuptAoK}s TOD Te KoLWOD Kal TOD idiov), 
 gives us the true conception of both. 
 
 How, then, do they describe the relation of these peculiar 
 modes of existence of the one Deity to each other? In the first 
 place, although totally distinct from, they are not contradic- 
 tory to, each other; seeing that they share the same essence. 
 Secondly, they do not merely exclude, but rather mutually pre- 
 suppose, each other,—the one suggests to the mind the idea of 
 the other. They stand in such an inner relation to each other, 
 that the thought of the one necessarily involves the thought of 
 the other; in other words, they are relative conceptions; even 
 as one cannot think an angle, or a side of a triangle, separately, 
 without thinking both. By way of explanation, Basilius uses 
 the following illustrations :—The Son is like a seal, which ex- 
 presses the entire nature of the Father, or like the knowledge 
 which passes entirely out of the teacher (that is, out of a sub- 
 jective mode of being) into the pupil, and acquires in this latter 
 another (objective) mode of being. Or He may be compared 
 to thoughts, which as products are different from the producing 
 intellect, or from the movements of the intellect, but yet are, 
 and remain, connected therewith, in a manner unaffected by the 
 conditions of time. Neither Father nor Son is a designation of 
 passivity; but both are relative ideas, which declare that the 
 two are intimately united with each other, that they are in- 
 wardly related to, whilst distinguished from, each other (compare 
 ce. Eunom. 2, 740, A., 737, B.). In consequence of this intimate 
 relation between the mpdcwma, which makes it impossible to 
 form a conception of the one apart from the other, the unity, 
 the simplicity of God, is not endangered by the different TpOTrot 
 Ths UTapEews (p. 745). With equal justice we might say, that 
 to affirm any plurality whatever of God, disturbs His simplicity. 
 As the persons are internally connected_with each other by the 
 identity of their-nature, and of their eternal point of departure ; 
 so also are they connected in their works, and yet remain dis- 
 tinct. Every work is accomplished by the entire Deity, by each 
 
310 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 person in a different way; so that we arrive at the formula,—- 
 the divine will, starting with or deriving its impulse from the 
 first cause as from a source, passes through its own image, the 
 God-Logos, in order to manifest itself in actuality (c. Kun. 2, 
 745, E.). It is true, the simplicity of God is in this case not 
 so disturbed by the Trias, that a different conception is formed 
 of it than that recognised by the Arians. The Arians reckoned 
 thereto, the divine incommunicableness ; the self-communication 
 of God, which the Church represents as absolute in the relation 
 between the Father and the Son, His image, they considered to 
 be a passivity on the part of God. ‘This, all the teachers of the 
 Church deny. Negatively contrasting it with divisibility and 
 composition, they view the simplicity of God positively in the 
 following manner :—the occluded, eternal unity of the divine 
 essence subsists in a trias of hypostases, which can neither be 
 increased nor diminished, but are indissolubly conjoined with 
 each other. This latter idea, Gregory of Nyssa especially has 
 carried out. But Basilius also did something of the same sort, 
 in his own way. If we ask, namely, whether, when he speaks 
 of hypostasis, he means a person in the sense in which we use the 
 term of men, we must answer, No. There is a resemblance be- 
 tween person and hypostasis, it is true, in so far as both are con- 
 stituted by the superaddition of distinctive momenta to the 
 common essence (by mpocOjxn of the idvopata, or of the iédud- 
 fovca evvora, or of the yvdpicpa, c. Kun, 2, 745). They re- 
 semble each other, further, in.that.each ofthe hypostases_has 
 something which the other has not (é€aipera idu@yata, de vera 
 Fide, T. 2, 390). A difference between them, however, lies in 
 what we have advanced above, namely, that each of the divine 
 hypostases possesses all the qualities which can be regarded as 
 superiorities ;—a thing which cannot be said of human persons. 
 With this is connected the further consideration, that whereas 
 men can be numbered, number is inapplicable to God. Com- 
 putability presupposes a separateness of existence which can have 
 no place in God. We do not designate God one, at all, as to 
 number, but as to essence; that is, we define Him as simple ; 
 whereas amongst creatures, even that which is one is not simple. 
 It does not follow, because a thing is one in point of number, it 
 is therefore simple ; and that which is one as to essence, that is, 
 simple, is not therefore one as to number: to the divine simpli- 
 
BASILIUS. 311 
 
 city, the idea of number cannot be applied, for number relates 
 to corporeal objects (Ep. ad Ces. 141, T. 3, 164). His idea 
 seems to be, that whatever is subjected to the laws of number, 
 is for that very reason not absolute. or the One involves the 
 possibility of a duality (see above, page 303 f.), of a plurality 
 of beings of the same genus; it implies therefore a limitation, 
 which has no place with God. Sooner could we suppose Father, 
 Son, and Spirit, if not the essence of God, to be subjected to 
 number. But even this, Basilius refuses to allow (de spir. S. c. 
 18, T. 2, 334). “We donot maintain three Gods, but one 
 essence. The king and his picture are one. But each of the 
 hypostases is like itself alone, and therefore cannot be taken 
 together with the others by computation. We cannot say of 
 Father, Son, Spirit, one, two, three; but one Father, one Son, 
 one Spirit.’—In the last point, he goes undoubtedly too far, 
 unless he means wholly to exclude number from the Trinity: 
 for what objection can there be to comprising the three under 
 the common idea of the tpozros trdp£ews, and to saying, there 
 are three hypostases? His intention, however, was simply to 
 avoid viewing them as three Gods; the unity of essence, de- 
 nominated deity, must remain unaffected by the triplicity; re- 
 garding the matter in the light of the deity alone, there is but 
 a simple, indivisible unity. asilius appears further to have 
 been guided by the just feeling, that deity, divine essence, 
 ought not to be taken as the higher, the generic conception, 
 under which the three are subsumed; ‘for if deity be the 
 generic idea, it will scarcely be possible to avoid Tritheism, 
 and then the distinctions in the divine substance would be di- 
 visions. Whereas everything wears a different aspect if hypo- 
 stasis be taken as the common conception, under which are in- 
 cluded Father, Son, and Spirit; for hypostasis can undoubtedly 
 be a subject of computation, seeing that, as a relative idea, it 
 suggests at once another like itself, which cannot be affirmed of 
 the divine essence. 
 
 In this respect, the position taken up by Gregory of Nyssa 
 is peculiarly interesting ; for he enters into a more careful con- 
 sideration of the question of the relation of the divine essence 
 to the hypostases, and of the unity in the plurality. 
 
 Our opponents, says he (de s. trin. T. 3, 6 ff.), charge us 
 at one time with Tritheism, at another time with Sabellianism, 
 
312 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 or the error of the Jews. We abhor both. In opposition to 
 the heathen, we maintain the unity of the divine essence; in 
 opposition to the Jews, the distinction of hypostases (Orat. 
 catechet. Magna, T. 3, 43 ff.). We do not reject every sort 
 of plurality, but merely that kind which penetrates so deeply 
 as to discerpt the essence of God; for that is heathenish. ‘The 
 truth holds its onward course between the two, Heathenism and 
 Judaism; overthrows the heresies on both sides, and adopts 
 what is good from all. By the unity of essence, we cut away 
 the phantastic plurality of Heathenism, and so heal the heathen ; 
 by number, on the other hand, in the form in which we hold it 
 (the plurality of hypostases), we cure the Jews (Cat. c. 3). But 
 now it is possible for the same thing to fall under number, and 
 yet not to fall under number, to be distinguished as to hypostasis 
 without being divided as to the substratum (vzroxeiwevov); a 
 vague notion may be formed, but it cannot be clearly expressed. 
 That there is a plurality of Deerviers in God, he deduces, in 
 the first place (Cat. M. 1, on from the consideration, that no 
 one maintains that God is devoid of utterance or word. If 
 God be not without word, it follows that He must have a Logos 
 (Noyov Eye Tov wn aroyov). It is true, that men also have 
 word, without therefore having the Logos. But the word must 
 be conceived to be appropriate to the nature of which it is an 
 utterance ; and will have a loftier import in the case of God; in 
 our case, a lower import, agreeably to the finitude of our nature. 
 Indeed, the same thing holds good of power, wisdom, life; all 
 which pertain to us also, though in limited measure. In ac- 
 cordance with our nature, our word has no fixed form (azray7s). 
 But when we speak of the word of God, we must not suppose 
 ‘that it has merely a momentary existence in the movement of 
 the speaker, and that it immediately disappears again. On the 
 contrary, just as the word of our perishable nature is perishable, 
 even so the word of the eternal and unchangeable essence of 
 God is eternal and substantial. But from the idea of the eter- 
 nity of the divine word, we must advance to that of its vitality ; 
 for it cannot be regarded as lifeless, after the manner of stones ; 
 on the contrary, its subsistence is so completely incorporeal 
 and spiritual, that it would have no subsistence at all, if it had 
 no life. As spiritual, it is further to be deemed simple and not 
 composite ; from which it follows, that it does not merely parti- 
 
GREGORY OF NYSSA. 313 
 
 cipate in life, whilst it has its subsistence in some other being , 
 for on the latter supposition, it would be composite. Seeing, 
 however, that it is not composite, but simple, it must be life in 
 itself (abtofwnv elvat tov Noyov). If the divine word is a living 
 Word, it must be able to determine, to form resolutions; and 
 this capacity (mpoarperext Svvauis) cannot be impotent, but 
 must be conjoined also with power. Now the almighty will of 
 this Word is always inclined to the good and never to the evil, 
 and is able also to carry out whatever good it may resolve. Ac- 
 cordingly, everything is created through the Logos; He is able 
 to do what He will, and He wills only the good, the perfect, the 
 wise (compare Rupp’s “ Gregory of Nyssa,” pp. 168 ff.). 
 
 But as far as concerns the relation of the Logos to the Father, 
 he goes on to say,—The Word is different from Him whose word 
 it is; it is, in a certain sense, one of the relative ideas (TOV pds 
 TL Aeyouevav éotiv), for a word suggests a speaker. Accord- 
 ingly, Judaism is kept at a distance. Even a human word is 
 something different from the mind, and yet it is not separated 
 from it, nor is it identical therewith ; for the word renders the 
 mind (vods) visible (dyes ets To éudavés) or reveals it. Hence 
 Gregory of Nyssa regards the relation between Father and Son 
 as an inner self-revelation of God. By its independent subsist- 
 ence, the Word is distinguished from Him through whom it 
 exists; but having the same attributes as God (for example, 
 goodness, power, wisdom, etc.), it is by nature one with God 
 (Cat. M.c. 2). Should some one reply,—If you count three 
 hypostases, why do you not count (in other words, hypostatize) 
 the other attributes, but say, One power, one goodness ?—we 
 answer,—Because we believe in one deity, and because the 
 attributes together constitute this deity, or the divine essence. 
 Inasmuch now as we know the divine essence solely from its 
 works and revelations, one may also say,—By deity, as it exists 
 for us, we understand the divine activity (€vépyeua). But this, too 
 (like all the divine attributes), pertains to all three hypostases, 
 though to each after its own manner (de s. Trin. T. 3, 6 ff.). 
 
 Relatively to the Trinity, Gregory lays special stress on the 
 distinction between the ideas otcla and trédctacis, — ideas 
 which at an earlier period were frequently confounded, because 
 UToatacts was held to be etymologically identical with substance 
 (Heb. i.3); whereas ovc/a, as opposed to a mere notion, or to # 
 
314 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 merely phenomenal existence, might be employed to denote 
 the real substantial distinction in God; for as actual realities 
 they can be termed ovcias. But the distinctive feature (édcxor, 
 idtoTns) was not designated thereby. Gregory now sets apart 
 the word broctacis to express the distinctive peculiarity, and 
 employs it no longer in the sense of ovc/a, of substance, as the 
 Nicene Fathers, and with them Athanasius, had frequently 
 done, but as equivalent to 7pocw7ov, interchanging the terms 
 iroctacis and mpdcwrov. On account of the misuse of the 
 latter word by the Sabellians, he limited himself to the former 
 when he aimed at logical precision, for in his view it expressed 
 the real objective substance of the idcxov.' 
 
 Gregory devoted three works to the discussion of this ques- 
 tion, and contributed materially to fix the uncertain usage of the 
 Church :—the work “De differentia essentize et hypostasis” 
 (T. 3, 32 ff.); the “Quod non tres Dii sint” (T. 3, 15 ff.); 
 and the Ilepi xowav évvordv (T. 2, 82 ff.). In the first-men- 
 tioned work, he describes it as an error common to both Arian- 
 ism and Sabellianism, to confound the two ideas of essence-and 
 hypostasis. Because the hypostases are different, therefore, say 
 the Arians, the essence also is different; because the essence is 
 one and the same, say the Sabellians, therefore there can only 
 be one hypostasis. But they ought to be discriminated as fol- 
 lows :—ovc/a is the common element; the hypostases are to be 
 defined as the centres of unity of the distinctive peculiarities 
 (cuvdpoyn TeV Tepl ExacTov idiwpatwr, |. c. p. 85; compare 
 Basil. c. Eun. 2, 728); and these hypostases are incommuni- 
 cable in relation to each other, and cannot meet in one common 
 hypostasis (Ta iSiipata or yroplopata yapaxtnpivovta Tas 
 UTocTAcEls, aKoWwarvynta, actuPata, |. c. p. 382). So far ought 
 we to be from interchanging essence and hypostasis, that the 
 latter is related to the former as an accident (cuuSe8nxora) is 
 related to its substance (rept x. évvol@y, p. 88). Now, as hypo- 
 
 1 The divine essence, ovo/a or vroxeiwevov, he does not term hypostasis, 
 though there can be no doubt that he ought to have ascribed to it that 
 which we call personality, because personality is the highest form of spiritu- 
 ality, and spirituality in its full compass belongs, according to Gregory, 
 to the very essence of God. His view of the matter therefore was,—he had 
 not at all fully developed it,—that the one divine Ego exists in the three 
 
 hypostases; in each, however, after a different manner ;—each hypostasis is 
 a particular form of the Ego. 
 
GREGORY OF NYSSA. 315 
 
 stasis is that which discriminates those who have the like essence 
 (Father, Son, Spirit), and as each of them has this distinctive 
 characteristic, Gregory is perfectly right in not hesitating to 
 apply number to them ae 2, 82): he treats the fynoetasie 
 however, and not the essence, as the One, which repeatedly 
 occurs in the Trinity (“ Quod non tres Dil,” p. 17: “O pev trav 
 imroctdcewy AOyos Sia Tas evOewpoupéevas idioTHTAas exadoT@ TOV 
 Svapepiopov émidéyetat, Kal Kata obvOecw év aplOu@ Oewpetrat, 
 the hypostases can be counted by addition, 7) dé dais pia éoriv). 
 But if the three hypostases can be counted, and are incommix- 
 tible (no wikis nor avaxvKrnats of the hypostases can take place, 
 because the distinction between cause and effect, the dsadopa 
 KATA TO aiTLoy Kal aitLaTov, always remains) ; if they are ovcias 
 peptxal, or, more precisely, if each is (Ouxa, dtopov Strep éoti Tpo- 
 owrov (I. 2, 83), the question arises, Does not this lead to ‘Tri- 
 theism? This question is handled in detail in his other two works. 
 Ablabius had asked,—Peter, James, and John are called three 
 men, although they have one nature; and it is not absurd, there- 
 fore, to use the plural of the term nature, in reference to several 
 beings of the like substance. And yet we are suddenly told 
 that the sacred Trinity is an exception to the rule; that Father, 
 Son, Spirit, are three, and of like nature, and yet are not to be 
 counted as three Gods. Gregory’s answer seems at first sight 
 strange ; but it is rooted, and that deeply, in the realistic cha- 
 racter of his entire view of the world. It is an abuse of lan- 
 guage, says he (8, 17), to describe those who have the same 
 essence as several, by cyanate to them the plural of the word 
 nature. The cord “man” denotes the nature which is com- 
 mon to all, and this nature can only be one; there are not 
 many human natures. The nature is in itself incapable either 
 of increase or.of alteration. And yet we use the word which 
 describes the nature in the plural, and speak of many men; 
 which is just as if there were many human natures, or many 
 humanities. Gregory, therefore, does not protest against all 
 counting whatsoever, but against the use of a word to denote 
 plurality, which has been coined to denote the nature, which 
 cannot be multiple. Those who think of three Gods fall into 
 precisely the same error. The idea of God, or of the deity, is 
 one, indivisible ; there exists but one simple hile essence; the 
 plurality does not affect this essence itself, but merely the hy- 
 
316 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 postases, each of which contains the entire essence. It is wrong, 
 therefore, to speak as though the divine essence itself were a 
 plurality. If we wish to speak accurately, scientifically, we 
 ought not to attribute that to the essence, which falls solely into 
 the sphere of the hypostases. Consequently, the idea of God 
 must not be treated as the generic idea under which Father, 
 Son, and Spirit are subsumed, but the idea of hypostasis. This 
 he expresses in various ways. ‘The essence is not divided in the 
 three Persons, therefore also not the word “God;” for it de- 
 notes the essence. That unscientific mode of expression is 
 attended with no danger when we speak of men, because scarcely 
 any one will fall on the notion of several humanities. But 
 when we speak of God, we must use greater accuracy ; for if we 
 say that there are several Gods or divinities, we lose the idea of 
 God altogether : we no longer have any God at all, seeing that 
 God is simple and unchangeable (8, 25 f.). In the case of hu- 
 manity, it is, to a certain extent, allowable to treat the word 
 man, although it denotes the essence, not as the self-same, iden- 
 tical, simple essence, but as capable of change, and of being used 
 in the plural form. For that which falls within the compass of 
 the idea man is, in fact, mutable; of those who bear the name 
 man, there are at one time more, at another time less; at one 
 time these, at another those. He means to say, therefore, that 
 in the case of the human race, humanity itself is, to a certain 
 extent, drawn into the change of the individuals, so that it is 
 partly justifiable to use the term in the plural. But in the 
 Holy Triad there remain eternally the same mpdcwra; these 
 mpocwra continue eternally the same; they admit of no increase 
 to a Tetrad, no diminution to a Dyad, of no growth and no ter- 
 mination (2, 84). Herein lies not only the thought, that the 
 idea of God, which excludes change and multiplicity of Gods 
 by its simplicity, does not allow of being subjected to the law of 
 number, but also the beginnings of an answer to the further 
 near-lying question,— Whether the persons of the Trinity are 
 not distinguished from each other, as, for example, human _per- 
 sons are distinguished? Individual men are peculiar modes 
 of existence of the entire genus. The question is negatived. 
 There is undoubtedly a certain similarity ; namely, neither in 
 the case of God nor of man is it allowable to identify essence 
 and hypostasis ; nor is it just to regard the latter as the former 
 
GREGORY OF NYSSA. SL 
 
 when we wish to speak precisely,—for example, to speak of the 
 Son as a God. But there is also a difference; and the percep- 
 tion of this difference prevents us in another direction from 
 using language which implies that there are three Gods. We 
 are able to conceive of a man by himself; he is so subjected to 
 the laws of space, especially through his body ; he is so exter- 
 nally separated from others, that counting has its full import as 
 applied to him. And when several carry on the same work, 
 each usually ackomplishes it by himself, and separated from the 
 rest (T. 3, 22, 25). Indeed, the loose connection between, the 
 isolation of, the persons of the human race, mark their mutabi- 
 lity. Itis otherwise in God; for no conception whatever can be 
 formed of the one hypostasis apart from, but solely in and with, 
 the two others, and there is not room for a more or a less. They 
 are relative conceptions, which stand or fall with each other; and 
 are therefore conjoined in the most intimate manner to a solid- 
 aric unity.’ This idea is then developed, both in relation to their 
 being and to their operation. In regard to the former, Gregory 
 refers to the fact, that not all human zpocw7a are derived from 
 one tpocw7ov, but each from a different one. In the Holy 
 Triad, on the contrary, everything proceeds forth from one 
 centre of unity, the Father, who on that account is termed 
 xupiws God,” because in His hypostasis, as it were, divinity has 
 its principial seat (apx7).” But as to the operation of the hypo- 
 stases, all divine activity proceeds forth from the Father as the 
 primary impulse, advances onwards through the Son, and cul- 
 
 1 De diff. ess. et hyp. p. 36 :—The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews 
 (c. i. 8) speaks as xeracxsvalay To ddieoraros exivosiobcs TH moaTpl Tov vier. 
 —So also is the Son involved in the conception of the Father :—dore tov to 
 KLPAXTHOL TOD pLovoryevors ie Tov THs LUKAS buMaTOY avaTEvicMYTA, Kal TIS 
 TOU Tarpos UTosracews ey Tepivola yeviabas, ovx ETaHAAMOTOMEYNS OLDE GUYHYE- 
 usyvumeyns THs Oewpovmedyns avrois idsetnTOS, Hore Yeh waTpl THY yevoNTLY y TE 
 via Thy aysvunolayv erimopDalesw, etc. Ovdd yep eorl duvarov, vidv dvopaoarta 
 Ly nal warpos ey wepivole yevicbat, ox%ETIn aS THS Tpocnyoples TavTNS Hal TOD 
 marépe cvvevadavovons. 
 
 2 That is, because He is the principle of the hypostatical element in the 
 two others, but not of their divine nature. At all events, he says (2, 82 ff.), 
 —Not as God, is the Father this distinct hypostasis (that is, Father); other- 
 wise the Son would not be God. 
 
 3 T.2, 85:—Ep yep xal rd aire rpdawmoy tov weerepos && ov 6 vids yev- 
 vero nol ro music TO chy. sxmopsverac’ O40 wal nvplag TOV Eve aiTiOY GYTH THY 
 
 > ~ > Sect ec , 
 avTOV aitiaray, sve Osov Daey. 
 
318 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 minates in the Holy Spirit. Every work, therefore, passes 
 through the three points or prosopa, wy, évépyela, TehElwats ; 
 in their respective activity, which setting forth, as it does, one 
 movement and one governing (kivynots Kat dvaxoopnaols), of the 
 good divine will, they are not separated by time." Accordingly, 
 the Son is immediately out of the first (poceyas €x TOU TpwToOV), 
 and the Spirit is immediately through that which is out of the 
 first (Quod non tres, etc. fin.). Not, therefore, by time, not by 
 place, not by will, not by work, are the persons separated.” Not 
 even number bears a full application to them, because they are 
 essentially connected, and in no respect separated, momenta of 
 the entire divine essence (T..3, 25). Those things alone can be 
 arithmetically added which have an (8/a repuypady ; such an iota 
 mepuypady is possessed alone by objects corporeally bounded ; 
 consequently, the divine cannot be counted. Gregory, there- 
 fore, employs also an expression which connects the hypostases 
 (cupPS_eBnxora) more closely with the essence, without, however, 
 confounding them therewith ; to wit, the divine nature is simple, 
 but it is discriminated in itself (Ssapopay dé mpos éavTny Exel), 
 as becomes its majesty (c. Eun. 1, 842). What his meaning 
 was, will probably be clear from another passage (de differ. ess. 
 et hyp. pp. 38, 84). The Trinity, says he, presents us with an 
 enigma—a conjoined distinction (dudxpiows ouvnevn) and a dis- 
 criminated conjunction (d:axexpiynévn cuvadera). He employs 
 a beautiful image to show that the distinction need not destroy 
 the unity, nor the unity exclude the distinctive (r@v yvwpioua- 
 tov To tduatov). The rainbow is a reflection of light which, 
 whilst it proceeds forth from, is also refracted back to, the sun. 
 To the light corresponds the divine essence. The light in the 
 rainbow and in the sun is one; but in the rainbow the light, 
 which in itself is one, arrives, as it were, at its maturity. The 
 one light does not therefore distribute itself into many lights, 
 but the colours of the rainbow remain conjoined in unity, and 
 
 1 T, 3, 22 :—Tldow évéoysie 1 bcodev ext ryy xtiow Oinnovon, nal nora Teas 
 morvrpomous gyvores dvomaloutyn, é% wartpos dQopudra: xal dic tov viov 
 Tpistol, nel ev TH yl TeAiovTa:. Asad rovto eis AROS THY EvepyouYTmY TO 
 Ovopece Tis eveprysias ov OsocoxiCeras. 
 
 2 T. 2, 85 :—Odre yap xpcvw Oioipsiras: dranray ta rpoowre THs bsornros, 
 ours TUTW, OV BovAY obx EmitndedMaTI, oVx EvEepysio, ov Tabet ode! ToOLoUTMY, 
 olemep Ocapeiras tml cov &vOpamruv' 4 ovov, OTs 6 waTHp Tarrp soTl, nal Wx 
 vids, etc. 
 
GREGORY OF NYSSA. 319 
 
 although clearly distinct each from the other, shade away im- 
 perceptibly into each other. After the same manner may the 
 hypostases be represented as the full-blown flower of the one 
 divine essence; its distinctive characteristics beam forth from 
 each of the three whom we believe to constitute the sacred Triad, 
 as from the rainbow. No difference, however, can be perceived 
 between the essence of the one and that of the other; but along 
 with the unity of essence, there shine forth from each the pecu- 
 harities by which it is known (@omep toivuy év TO brrodelypare 
 (sc. Ths iptdos) Kat Tas TOY YpopaTwv Siahopas pavepas Suaryt- 
 voorKouer, Kab Sudatacw étépou Tpos Erepov od &aTt TH aicOnoet 
 AaPelv, obTw pot hoyicat Suvaroy civat Kab Tep Tov Oelwy Soy- 
 Latwv avadoyicacba, Tas wev TOV UTooTdcEwV LdL6THTAS, WOTEP 
 TL avOos TaV KaTa THY ipw Tmpohawopmévwy éracTpaTTew eKdoT@ 
 TOV EV TH ayia TpLdd. TeTLoTEULEVOV THS 6€ KaTa THY d¥ow 
 tOuorntos pundepiav érépov mpos To erepov érrwvociabat duaopar, 
 ANN €v TH KOWOTHTL THs ovolas Tas YyvwploTiKas iSioTNTAS emI- 
 AdpuTrEwW €KaoTH).” 
 
 A more careful examination, therefore, shows that there is 
 uo ground for reproaching him with Tritheism. It is incorrect 
 co say, that Gregory conceives the hypostatic distinctions in the 
 Trinity to be related to each other as are two individual men; 
 for, on the contrary, he rather reduces the entire distinction be- 
 tween Father and Son to this—that the former is the airuop, 
 the latter the aitiaroy (7. x. é. p. 85), whereas the distinctions 
 between actual men are much deeper.” In connection herewith 
 
 1 T. 3, 36 :—Read further, Kai yop xaxei ty ro drodelyport 4 druvyc- 
 Covoe ryyv rorAvxpameoy exsivay ceiyny pele ovola gy, y did Tis Arsenic a&urivos 
 avaenrasyn, 70 OE kvbos Tov Deesvomévov woruetoes, TasdevouTos Olteas TOD Adryou 
 Lal THS uTloEwS Huds, Lyn noeoredsiv toils wept Tov Odyparos Adyols, orav sis 
 70 Ovodcapuroy ereadures (1. terrépupeev) rods Thy ouynaradeow Tay Asrvyoedvun. 
 
 * Baur’s view of Gregory (1. c. p. 453) is inaccurate, because he has 
 not taken into consideration the chief works which bear upon this point. 
 The imperfection of his acquaintance with Gregory is particularly clear, 
 from the judgment contained in the words,—‘‘ What he says respecting 
 the unity of ‘man’ is plainly invented in the interest of the Christian doc- 
 trine of the Trinity.” Nor would he otherwise need to say (p. 451), that 
 he cannot quite make out what Gregory means to teach. The judgment 
 just quoted proves also that Baur has taken no notice of Gregory’s work, 
 wepl xareoxevis avOparov; for its fundamental idea (c. 16, 17, ed. Bas. 
 1567) is, that humanity before God is to be considered as one man. Gom- 
 pare Rupp’s ‘‘ Gregor v. Nyssa,” pp. 175 ff. 
 
320 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 it must be carefully borne in mind, that neither Gregory nor 
 his age generally, regarded the Ego as the central feature of 
 the person. He considered human zpdcwza to be formed by 
 the arepuypady or circumscription of human nature, and by the 
 idvxov, the principle of individuation or the distinctive charac- 
 teristic. Men are constituted droua by both together. These 
 aroja are not described as Egos, but merely as the centres of 
 unity of the characteristics, which distinguish the one from the 
 other (cuvdpoun Tov iditoudtov, 3, 35). Kqually far is he from 
 speaking of an Ego in connection with the divine hypostases ; 
 and it is the more unjust to charge Gregory with teaching three 
 divine Egos, as he takes pains to forefend the application to the 
 sphere of the divine, of the series of determinations by which 
 one finite individual is distinguished from the other. If he 
 defines the divine hypostases also to be cuvdpopat tov ivwpd- 
 Tov, itis in a different sense from that in which he uses the 
 expression relatively, for example, to men; as is very evident 
 from the simile of the rainbow. Had Gregory more carefully 
 examined the matter, he would undoubtedly have arrived at the 
 conviction, that to be an Ego, or to have self-consciousness, is 
 the highest form under which spirit in general can appear; he 
 must therefore have reckoned it to pertain to the ovc/a of God 
 (see note, page 313), and have regarded the Ego as the com 
 mon vzroxeiuevov of all three. Gregory does not plainly teach, 
 as did Athanasius, that the eternal self-consciousness of God 
 is brought about or mediated by the trinitarian distinctions ; 
 though there are faint traces of such an idea in his writings :— 
 for example, when he appears to represent the Logos as an inner 
 revelation in God Himself (C. M. c. 2); or anon he says,— 
 “ As aman who has looked upon the expression of his form 
 in a clear mirror, so he who knows the Son has taken up into 
 his heart the distinctive characteristic of the hypostasis of the 
 Father through his knowledge of the Son” (de differentia, etc., 
 Dahale 
 
 When we glance backwards at the.period through which 
 we have passed, with a view to determining the doctrinal. pro- 
 gress made, relatively to the higher aspect of the Person of 
 Christ, we find it to be in the main the following. The two 
 factors, the true divinity and the hi ypostaliia ice of the 
 higher element in Christ, of which the former had had the pre- 
 
GREGORY OF NYSSA. SEMI-ARIANS. a | 
 
 dominance in the Church during the second, the latter during 
 the third century, were destined to unite and coalesce by inter- 
 penetration during the fourth century, if things took their 
 orderly course. As it were, in order that this process of inter- 
 penetration might be properly accomplished, it happened that 
 each of the two factors found its own representative, the one 
 in the new_Sabellians, the other in the new Arians; and that 
 the two confronted each other at one and the same time. The 
 former asserted the true deity, eternal, non-subordinate, and 
 itself the apy, but conceded no distinct hypostasis to Christ ; 
 hence the possibility of a relapse into Docetism or Ebionism. 
 The latter affirmed the hypostasis; but it is one that bears merely 
 the name of divinity, and, as a creature, remains constantly 
 outside of God. Each of these parties, in their mutual anta- 
 gonism, repudiated the factor affirmed by the other; whereas the 
 Church teachers of the second and third centuries, whilst giving 
 predominance, now to the deity and then to the hypostasis, had 
 always tacitly recognised the non-predominant factor. The 
 consequences of retaining the one factor to the exclusion of the 
 other being thus set livingly and clearly before the mind of the 
 Church, it saw the necessity of combining both together, anc 
 prepared to accomplish its task. But it was precisely to this 
 combination that the two heresies above mentioned were equally 
 strongly opposed; for its realization would be their extinction. 
 Earnest attention was devoted to the problem from the com- 
 mencement of the fourth century onwards, in Alexandria, as 
 we see from the labours of such men as Peter of Alexandria, 
 Mierakas, Alexander, and others. Alongside, however, of this 
 line of thinkers, who alone were occupied with the further de- 
 velopment of dogmas, there arose another party which adhered 
 more rigidly to the system of Origen. Partly because it co- 
 alesced with elements of the older school of Antioch (that of 
 Lucian) ; and partly, because, for the one it bridged the way 
 over to Arianism, and for the other to a higher view of 
 Christ, this party speedily attained great influence and dimen- 
 sions. Husebius of Caesarea was its chief representative. For 
 a long time, it looked upon itself as the true golden mean 
 between the two extremes; inasmuch as it actually did bring 
 about an apparent union of the factors, by commingling the 
 Sabellian and Arian principles. Had the great teachers of 
 VOUT. x 
 
322 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 the Church, however, contented themselves with this seeming 
 solution of the problem, that sharp separation of principles 
 which was destined to bring about the crisis and to prepare 
 the way for a higher union, would have been a lesson given 
 in vain. Instead of making progress, the Church would then, 
 in the best case, have been forced to fall back on the vague 
 and indeterminate doctrinal condition of the third century. 
 The peace thus established, would have been merely apparent ; 
 for the Christ of the Semi-Arians was not in a position to 
 accomplish that work of atonement and deliverance which 
 the Church believed their Christ to have accomplished. The 
 Church was compelled to adhere to its conviction, that the 
 inmost, the veritable divine had been revealed to and conferred 
 on humanity, in Christ ; whereas the delusive nature of the 
 solution furnished by Semi-Arianism was demonstrated by the 
 circumstance, that its conception of God was essentially identi- 
 cal with that of Sabellianism and Arianism, and that it was 
 as incapable as they of expressing the fulness of the Christian 
 revelation. This is specially apparent from the position taken 
 up by Eusebius relatively to Marcellus. Marcellus, with a 
 view to establishing the true deity of the higher element in 
 Christ, taught that the Logos was coeternal with God; and, in 
 order to exclude all subordination, affirmed Him to be an aryév- 
 yntov like God. At the same time, in agreement with the 
 Arians, he required of the teachers of the Church, that if they 
 meant to assert the true divinity of the higher element in Christ, 
 they should represent the Logos also, and not the Father alone, 
 as dyévyntov. By this Marcellus did not merely mean, that the 
 Logos must have true deity (that aseity must pertain also to 
 Him); but in excluding yévunots, he deemed himself also under 
 the necessity of excluding the Sonship and the particular hypo- 
 stasis of the Logos. To Eusebius, not merely the latter, but also 
 the former, seemed very objectionable. For, even though Mar- 
 cellus were free from the fault of denying the hypostasis, in his 
 view, to introduce the Logos, after this manner, into the inmost 
 divine sphere, would involve the assumption of a plurality of 
 divine dpyat, that is, Polytheisin or Dualism (de eccl. theol. 1, 
 5, 2, 12); from which it is evident, that the hypostasis of the 
 Son, according to Eusebius, is unsuitable to the inner divine 
 essence, and must destroy the unity of God and of the divine 
 
SEMI-ARIANS. ARIANS. Ooo 
 
 self-consciousness. He cannot, therefore, have regarded Christ 
 as the absolute revelation of the Most High God Himself, but 
 must have believed that God remains shut up in Himself. That 
 Sabellianism also participated, against its own will, in the in- 
 communicableness of God which characterizes Arianism and 
 Semi-Arianism, so far as it did not fall back into Patripassian- 
 ism, we have seen above. 
 
 What position did the teachers of the Church take up in 
 relation to this matter ? 
 
 I, With the Arians, they advanced decidedly beyond the 
 Sabellian idea of substantiality (the traces of which are still 
 discernible in the 7Xatvapos of the Monas, taught by Marcel- 
 lus) to that of causality; in the first instance, with regard to the 
 relation between God and the world. They thus excluded 
 everything of the nature of Pantheism. All that is called 
 world, was absolutely caused by the first aizvov, which itself 
 has no cause higher than itself. Accordingly, everything truly 
 divine stands over against the yevntots (that is, the world), as 
 ayevyntov, or, more precisely, ayévntov. So far they were 
 agreed with the Arians. So also, in conceiving that the higher 
 element in Christ existed in the highest, that is, in the hypo- 
 statical form, and neither as mere activity, influence, nor as an 
 indwelling of the entire God in general, which would have in- 
 volved Patripassianism or Docetism. For this reason, the dis- 
 tinction between aitsov and aitvarov, generator and generated, 
 must_not be allowed to sink down into identity. 
 
 IL. But instead of supposing, as did the Arians, that the 
 highest had been predicated of God when they had predicated 
 mp@tov altsov and ayevvnoia, they say,—To describe God as the 
 cause of the world, is not to describe His essence (otherwise He 
 would be merely the substance or the force of the world) ; nor, 
 when we deny that He is caused like the world, or attribute to 
 Him ayevynota, have we described His true essence, for this is 
 a merely negative determination. All that the ayevynaia does, 
 is to bring the chain of causality to a stand still; it does not 
 bring the cause itself to perfection. And though the teachers of 
 the Church do not view the ayevyncia positively, as the eternal 
 self-grounding of God, of which no conception can be formed 
 apart from a Trinity, and in which the Son also participates, 
 the distinction just referred to, between generator and generated. 
 
324 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 between aitiov and aitiatov, leads to the same result; for it 
 implies that causality has a place also. in. the.divine essence, 
 that God stands to Himself in the relation of cause.and.in the 
 relation of effect. The emptiness and abstract simplicity of the 
 deistic conception of God they despise, and refuse altogether to 
 allow that the highest in God or His essence is described when 
 we say,—He is the cause of the world, or He has not Himself 
 been caused ; their conception of God includes, besides the idea 
 of causality, also the spiritual ideas of love and wisdom. How- 
 ever highly they. may estimate the significance of the idea of 
 causality relatively to the world, they assign it. but..a.secondary 
 or subordinate position when. they treat of the conception .of 
 the divine.essence. So is it to be understood when the Fathers 
 say,—Lhe Son is partly not to be subsumed at all under the 
 category of causality, for He does not form part of the world, 
 but is ayévntos; and yet the category bears a partial application 
 to Him (for He is yeryntds, a yévynwa of the Father, and this 
 ensures the unity along with the distinctions), though in a sub- 
 ordinate, secondary sense (cuuSeBnxdtas). For that He is 
 caused, is not His essence, otherwise He might be a “con- 
 tingens” like the world, which, the ground of its existence lying 
 out of itself, has the yu) dv cleaving to it. The essence of the 
 Son is the divine itself, the ayévnrov (as Marcellus teaches) ; 
 and, compared with this His absolute essence, His relation to 
 the Father, His being begotten (such is the form in which he 
 presents the category of causality), is a secondary feature. The 
 yopiotiKat iuoTnTes are cupPeSnxviat in comparison with the 
 essence or with the conception of God, of which the Son forms 
 as nécessary a part as God Himself. 
 
 III. If, now, that which constitutes the Son (and the Spirit) 
 a particular hypostasis is a cvp~PeSnxos in comparison with His 
 divine essence, a secondary relatively to the common primary, it 
 might appear as though the view propounded by Marcellus, who 
 regarded all distinctions in God as merely momentary, posited for 
 our sake, but not as required by the divine essence itself, were 
 justified. The intention of the Church teachers, however, was 
 not_to.reduce.the Triad in God to something accidental, to some- 
 thing dependent on the will of the Monas. We have seen even 
 Origen striving to advance beyond such a representation: the 
 teachers of the fourth century had decidedly advanced beyond 
 
SEMI-ARIANS. ARIANS. eb 
 
 it (see above, pp. 301 ff.); for they regarded it as necessary ta 
 the full conception of the living God, that He should exist in 
 the form of a Triad. Wehave also already come upon very 
 remarkable attempts to show that the triplicity is a necessary 
 one. But attempts of this nature could never succeed, unless 
 the three hypostases were presupposed to be perfectly equal in 
 dignity ; and this presupposition was adopted in the following 
 form :—They are equal in essence, in the fulness of attributes, 
 divinity pertains alike to all; they are included in that unity of 
 the divine essence which must be taken as the point of departure ; 
 the eternal diremption of that unity, therefore, with the iSéuuara 
 of the individual hypostases to which it gives rise, can no longer 
 be deemed incompatible with their equal dignity and deity; this 
 stands firm once for all, the iScouata NapaxTynptotiKa are for it 
 something indifferent (cupSeByxos). But they are by no means, 
 in every respect, something accidental; on the contrary, they 
 are required both by the Christian faith and by the Christian 
 conception of God, which has left behind it the lifeless, self- 
 absorbed “Op of the ages preceding the advent of the Redeemer, 
 The Christian God,—this is implied by the constructive efforts 
 referred to,—opens Himself, in the first instan ce, in and for Him- 
 self (placing Himself over against, knowing and loving, Himself), 
 and then for the world. This height was ascended neither by 
 the Arians, with their idea of causality, nor by the Sabellians, 
 with their substantiality, nor by the Semi-Arians :—indeed, such 
 a conception of God was derivable neither from the Platonic philo- 
 sophy, nor from any other region of the ante-Christian world. 
 But undoubtedly. the Church teachers, in order to be able to 
 place the Son.as the objectified- divine. over against.the objecti- 
 fying-Father,-must.needs partially renounce.the conception. of 
 hypostasis, which had been frequently laid down in the third 
 century, and by the Semi-Arians, and which was essential to 
 Arianism. To Arians, the main matter was the hypostasis, 
 which they viewed as essentially finite, with whatever lofty pre- 
 dicates theymight adorn it. The personality of the Son, so under- 
 stood, has in it an exclusive, a repelling element, and cannot at 
 all be represented as endowed with the veritable divine nature, 
 vithout an approximation to Paganism, that is, to Tritheism. 
 “It-is therefore deserving of all recognition, that from the moment 
 the Church clearly saw that the problem awaiting solution was 
 
326 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 the full union of essential deity with the hypostasis, new dog- 
 matical terms were coed, in order to define the word Hypo- 
 stasis more precisely, and in such a manner as to show its recon- 
 cilability with the unity of the deity. Such terms were diaopat, 
 Suaxpicess, TO ETEPWS EXEL, ro iduxdv, idiafov, cvvdpopat or cup- 
 TroKal Tov iLoLdTwV, OL TOV yvOpLoTLK@V yapaKTnpllovg wv 
 iStoTTeVv, THs Lvalovans évvoias, THY éEarpérov (Oimpatav, TOV 
 iStalovT@y yapaKTnpor, oyNpaTic Los TOV Ela, that is, points of 
 unity, foci, or central-points for the marks by which the dis- 
 tinctions are constituted; and starting with this, it was possible 
 to speak of three principles in God, for example, under the 
 image of three connected, suns. Further, tpovou vmap&ews, 
 pophal, 7) pos adAnAG oYeTls TOV TPITwWT OD, elon, LOLoTNTES. 
 As the content of the divine essence, its fulness, is common to 
 all three, the distinction can only relate to form, or to the 
 different. modes of existence which are eternally contained in, or 
 appertain to, the one deity, and which are. the presupposition of 
 God’s revelations and-their--diversity. With all this, these 
 Fathers by no means succeeded in answering the further ques- 
 tions which here suggested themselves ; though, as far as lay in 
 their power, they prepared the way fora further development 
 of Christian knowledge. This they would not have done, but, 
 on the contrary, would have stifled all further activity of the 
 Christian mind, under the pretext of the Trinity being an abso- 
 lute and unapproachable mystery, if, as many seem still to sup- 
 pose, they had appropriated the Arian, or even the Semi-Arian 
 conception of God, and therewith the problem, that three are 
 no more than one. But, in fact, they-objected_quite- as-strongly 
 to subjecting the hypostases.to number in respect.to their_essence, 
 that is, to-their-divinity,-as-the entire deity itself, notwithstand- 
 ing that it has the distinctions eternally in itself. They were as 
 zealous in opposing those abstract and exclusive representations 
 of the Monas, which reduced it to something finite, as against 
 circumscribing the hypostases in a finite manner (aepiypad2). 
 The consequence whereof plainly was, that the hypostases were 
 approximated more nearly to the divine essence than was possible 
 for Arianism, whilst at the same time, unlike Sabellianism, they 
 did not represent the distinctions as affecting God merely in His 
 relation to the world, or reduce them to mere activities, or, in the 
 best case, to different modes of the divine existence, in the world. 
 
DEFECTS OF NICENE TRINITY. 327 
 
 It must of course be allowed, that the doctrine of the 
 Trinity, as laid down even by the Nicene Fathers, leaves much. 
 to be desired. In one point above all, to wit, that the Father 
 is represented, not merely as the fonieal commencement of the 
 trinitarian process, but not seldom flee, as the root and source 
 of all deity and identified with the Monas. He thus acquires 
 a predominance which necessarily involves the subordination of 
 the Son-and Spirit. But it would be a gross misapprehension 
 of the spirit of the Church during the fourth century, to sup- 
 pose that the subordination of Aan Son and Spirit therein in- 
 volved, was distinctly intended; above all, to maintain that it 
 132° ine one essential determination, in comparison with which 
 all other determinations must withdraw to the background ” 
 (Baur 1. c. p. 468). Inasmuch as these teachers of the 
 Church, on the contrary, uniformly resisted everything of an 
 Arian character, and plainly gave decided prominence to the 
 idea that Son and Spirit are of like substance, like honour, like 
 glory, and coeternal with the Father, and deny that they lack 
 any excellence possessed by the Father; inasmuch, further, as 
 they even go so far as to lay down the principle, that the 
 causal relation between Father and Son does not involve the 
 subordination of the Son under the Father, that the Son is as 
 far exalted above originated things as the Father; and make 
 the proviso, that if the causal relation imply that the cause lies 
 outside of the effect, the idea of causality is altogether inappli- 
 cable to the Son (compare Basil. c. Eun. 1, 715, D.) ; and, 
 lastly, when we find that the teachers of the Church in general 
 maintain, that that which distinguishes one hypostasis from the 
 rest (that, therefore, which is peculiar to it, but not to the others), 
 cannot be subsumed under the category of having (é&is, Haben), 
 and of deprivation (arépyats), that it implies no superiority, but 
 merely signifies the peculiar being, which in all three is of like 
 dignity, ad also equally divine; the afore-mentioned~predomi- 
 nance given. to the Father as the Monas, cannot be regarded.as 
 penconal: but simply as an unyanquished remnant of the 
 ideas =a prevailed during the third.century. The historian, 
 therefore, if he is minded not to mistake the living pulse of the 
 entire dogmatical movement, must at this point take pains to 
 recognise the true nature of the task reserved for the next 
 period: and which demanded the complete separation of the 
 
328 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 old, heterogeneous elements. That the complete equalization 
 of the hypostases was, and continued to be, the goal of the 
 collective efforts of the Church, is evident, not merely from 
 the course pursued by the doctrine of the Trinity, during 
 which, by means of the idea of the wepyywpyous of the persons 
 in each other, on the one hand, and in the Latin Church, by 
 the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit, not only out of the 
 ¥ather, but also out of the Son, on the other hand, the object 
 aimed at was ever more completely attained ; but, especially 
 during the fourth century, from the circumstance, that the 
 subordinatian consequence undoubtedly involved in that prin- 
 ciple was in no instance drawn, whilst, at the same time, the 
 whole of the view otherwise entertained and clearly indicated, 
 expressly stood in the way of the drawing of such a conse- 
 quence. That position, therefore, was a remnant of the old 
 subordinatian inheritance handed down from the third century, 
 the influence of which was already broken by the development 
 given to the true, permanent idea of the equality of essence 
 which had been received as an inheritance from the primitive 
 Church. We can also clearly see, what it is that prolonged 
 the existence and vitality of that principle,—to wit, its apolo- 
 getic significance. It was intended, namely, to show that, not- 
 withstanding the triplicity of persons, the unity 1s preserved, 
 inasmuch as the Son and the Spirit both proceed from, and 
 return to, the one Father. But the moment this proof is found 
 insufficient, and a more satisfactory one is discovered (as, for 
 example, the idea of the immanence of the persons in each 
 other), we shall find the teachers of the Church readily reject- 
 ing the one and embracing the other; and the more so, as they 
 were not in the habit of considering the Father to comprise the 
 entire deity within Himself, and therefore did not designate 
 Him the source of all divinity, in the sense of the other hypo- 
 stases being merely parts of Him, the whole (compare Eusebius) ; 
 ——and this must certainly have been their meaning, had they 
 aimed at saving the unity of God, by representing Him as the 
 source of all deity. Two things, however, must not be_over- 
 looked in connection herewith :—(1) ‘The more recent of the 
 teachers referred to already arrived at the principle,—The_ 
 Father is not the source and root of the entire deity; the.Son. 
 and Spirit derive merely their hypostases, not their deity, from 
 
DEFECTS OF NICENE TRINITY. 329 
 
 the Father; for the essence is one and the same in all. Deity 
 is the element coeternally possessed in common by the three 
 persons. (2) The Church teachers ofthe period now under 
 consideration say, indeed, that no one of the persons can be 
 cogitated apart. from ee other, that each suggests the other, 
 ae that the idea of God. cannot..be perfectly grasped, save 
 under the form-of-a-Trinity. But even supposing, as this im- 
 plies, that the three stand in precisely the same relation to the 
 divine essence, the question still arises, How_are they related to 
 each other,.so far as they are distinguished from each other, or 
 are hypostatical? And here they were justified in taking the 
 Father as their point of departure, to prevent the three bee 
 regarded as three effulgurations, completely independent of 
 any other, and only Sonnred a the common divine essence 
 from which they proceed. For, on the latter supposition, we 
 should have three atoms, or individuals, without inner connec- 
 tion; and the unity would either be reduced to a nominalistic 
 generic idea, or the divine essence, lying at the basis, must be 
 allowed the independence which it has in Tetradism. In this 
 respect, therefore, the teachers of the Church were quite right 
 in describing the Father as the motive principle and starting- 
 point of the process, out of which the hypostases arose. For, 
 logically viewed, the Father must continue the first hypostasis. 
 The only thing, therefore, for which they deserve blame, is that 
 in oui eeaes to the propositions which say,—Not the Father 
 by. Himself, but the Trinity, is the entire God; they occasion- 
 ally constitute the Father the Monas. This latter fault, how- 
 ever, is partially to be excused, on the ground that they never 
 say,—The Father by Himself is the Monas; their meaning 
 rather is,—The Father is the Monas, so far as He is conceived 
 in His actuality and not as an abstract idea, or, so far as He 
 must be conceived as the principle and starting-point of the 
 hypostatical process; in other words, so far as He does not 
 exclude the two other hypostases from the deity, but so com- 
 prises them in Himself that He would not Himself be the 
 Father if He had not eternally possessed the Son and been the 
 principle of the Spirit. 
 
 Thecsecond defect is, that these teachers determine rather 
 negatively than positively what hypostasis is. What their posi- 
 tive determination would be, may be best ascertained by con- 
 
330 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 sidering the claim they make relatively to Christology. Their 
 fundamental presupposition undoubtedly was, that God in Christ 
 was not merely a motive power, nor a mere activity, but a con- 
 scious, permanent mode of existence of the deity, distinct.from 
 that of the Father.. They felt, therefore, that in the incarnation 
 the Most High God Himself was present among men, and that 
 He had not withheld the highest, but had communicated Him- 
 self without reserve to hurianite’ in Christ. But Patripassianism 
 having been found worthy of repudiation, the question naturally 
 suggested itself,How shall we determine the nature of the 
 distinction between the God who became man and the God who 
 did not become man, without destroying the unity of God, on 
 the one hand, or interfermg with Christology, on. the other ? 
 Neither the Gonne of Mace nor the (Cras Fathers of the 
 century now under review, Prat rl answered this question. 
 Instead, then, of complaining, as some do,‘ that a clear and 
 distinct answer to the question,—What is the true conception 
 of hypostasis ? 
 and just to pay the tribute of acknowledgment due to the 
 efforts of these “reat”? men, as they are allowed to be; in 
 doing which, we should perhaps, nay, after what has been ad- 
 vanced above, must discover, that they did their full share 
 towards the accomplishment of the task which they actually 
 did and were necessitated to set for themselves. (Note 54.) 
 Through their labours the pantheistic and deistic conception 
 cf God, or the heathenish and Jewish error, was excluded ; and 
 fh point established, relatively to the divine aspect of the Per- 
 son of Christ, which it was necessary to take for granted, if the 
 divine and human were to be conceived as having attained to 
 absolute union in Christ :—this aim, moreover, they consistently 
 and consciously kept in view, in opposition alike to Heathenism 
 and Judaism (compare Gregory of Nyssa, Cat. M. T. 2, 43 ff. ; 
 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 33, and the Homily in Athanasius 
 adv. Sabell. Gregales, which may be read also in Basilius, Opp. 
 T. 1, 518 ff.). However decidedly they testify, as with one 
 voice, that in the nature of God there are unsearchable depths, 
 they are equally decided in asserting the possibility of, and in 
 endeavouring to attain to, a knowledge of God through the 
 medium of His revelation; and the charge brought against 
 1 See Baur 1. c. 441-470. 
 
DEFECTS OF NICENE TRINITY. 33) 
 
 them, of taking their refuge in a Platonic, or, more precisely, a 
 Neo-Platonic ignorance of God, is utterly baseless. That God 
 is triune is not merely to be believed, but to be known (com- 
 pare Gregory Nazianzen’s IIpos Evaypuov epi Georntos, ed. 
 Basil. p. 193). But this knowledge must flow forth, in the 
 first instance, from religious experience, through the medium of 
 the Holy Scriptures, They expressly declare it to be both pos- 
 sible and necessary, that in relation to the cogitation of God as 
 a Trinity, faith should become gnosis. Only the “ How ?”’ of 
 the procession of the Son and the Spirit is unsearchable ; 
 although, even in relation to this point, they maintained that a 
 knowledge becomes every day more possible, in that we are able 
 to say what the process is not; and such a negative explanation 
 implies a certain positive insight. On the other hand, too, they 
 deserve all praise for the sobriety and moderation which they 
 display, and which give the lie to the opposite reproach, fre- 
 quently brought against them, of being too much given to 
 formularizing and dogmatizing. The spirit of modesty just 
 alluded to prevented them from treating as settled that which 
 was still unsettled, impelled them to continue their investiga- 
 tions into the true idea of hypostasis, and to give free play to 
 all attempts to further a solution, provided only, on the one 
 hand, the interest of Christology were kept in sight, and, on 
 the other hand, that neither mixture nor separation, neither 
 Sabellianism nor Arianism (or Tritheism), were favoured and 
 aided. In fact, we have found also among the Nicene Fathers, 
 considerable differences in this respect, which both indicate that 
 the field still left open was very wide, and show that these first 
 post-Nicene teachers at once earnestly set about the work left 
 them to perform,—the work, to wit, of determining the precise 
 nature of hypostasis and its relation to unity. on the one hand, 
 and to other hypostases, on the other. 
 
332 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 SECTION If. 
 
 CHRISTOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE CHURCH TEACHERS PRIOR TO 
 APOLLINARIS. 
 
 WE have already had frequent occasion to remark, how the 
 activity of the Church in connection with Christology abated 
 during the century to which may be given the title of the 
 Irmitarian Century. Indeed, the Christian conception of God 
 was to furnish the groundwork for the construction of a doc- 
 trie of the Person of Christ. How this foundation was laid, 
 we have described in the preceding section. We should be 
 very greatly mistaken, however, if we were to suppose that 
 Christological labours had meanwhile been totally suspended : 
 
 on the contrary, in the case of the thinkers of the Church, 
 Christology was the perennial motive of their trinitarian efforts. 
 These inquiries, however, took precisely the form which they 
 alone could take, and which corresponded to the position held 
 by Christology as the mainspring of the trinitarian movement; 
 they related, to wit, not to the individual momenta of the Per- 
 son of Christ in their relation to, and movement towards, each 
 other; nor to the question, What are the fundamental elements 
 of this person? but the Person of Christ, in its entirety, was 
 the object of the attention of the Church. What we have in 
 the first instance to recount is not, points which became matter 
 of clear consciousness, in consequence of the solicitations of 
 heretics ; not the settlement and defence of a single point, in 
 opposition to single attacks; not the analysis of the momenta of 
 
CHRISTOLOGY PRIOR TO APOLLINARIS. 333 
 
 Christology as a whole; but the utterances which proceeded 
 from the Church concerning the Person of Christ, when it gave 
 free and unreserved expression to the impression once and con- 
 stantly made upon it by this person in its entirety. The grand 
 total image of the living Person of the God-man, who includes 
 heaven and earth in Himself,’ hovered before the eyes of the 
 greatest teachers of the Church, especially in flourishing periods, 
 as, for example, in the time of Irenzus and Tertullian, or at 
 the epoch now under consideration, when the Christian mind 
 gathered up its powers for a full or new exercise on the work 
 set before it. They were not able, it is true, to set forth the 
 entire fulness of that image in a scientific form; but still we 
 have numerous scattered utterances of theirs, which indicate its 
 nature, and show that the fixed logical forms which they adopted 
 did but faintly reveal the substance that occupied their hearts 
 and minds—a substance which science could only slowly, and 
 perhaps by long roundabout methods, reproduce. As the im- 
 mediate and original outflow of the Christian mind, this total 
 image of the living Person of Christ deserves special considera- 
 tion in the present connection ; especially as it throws the true 
 light on the attempts made during the following period, to con- 
 struct the unity of the person on the basis of two distinct 
 natures. For, on the one hand, it will show us clearly that the 
 existence of this mystical intuition of the Person of Christ, in 
 which the conjunction of the divine and human aspects to per- 
 sonal unity is immediately posited and intentionally anticipated 
 by faith, does not render unnecessary, but rather requires, that 
 full justice be done to the distinctions between the two aspects, 
 in order that an unity may be arrived at based on the recogni- 
 tion and conciliation of the distinctions. It further, also, shows 
 us, that even when the work of discrimination was carried too 
 far, or scientific thought remained entangled in the distinctions 
 drawn, the total Christological possession of, at all events, the 
 better teachers of the Church was not absorbed by such imper- 
 fect attempts; on the contrary, that unity of the person or con- 
 junction of the widely separated distinctions, which they had not 
 been able scientifically to establish, was certified to them in the 
 sphere of faith by the immediate intuition of the image of Christ 
 
 1 yeQ@upoi, compare the Homil. on the Theophan. in the Opp. Greg. 
 Thaum. ; dvaxcParciodvras, after Paul. 
 
334 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 in its totality. That immediate intuition accompanied their 
 mind in its dialectic activity; and as it could not be replaced, 
 so neither was it supplanted, by the scientific process. 
 
 This primitive Christian intuition of the Person of Christ, of 
 which we discover frequent traces even in the New Testament, 
 and which is of the highest significance relatively to His redemp- 
 tive work, to baptism, to the Eucharist, and to the right view of 
 the idea of the Christian Church, we have found repeatedly ex- 
 pressed, in the most fully developed form, however, by Ignatius 
 and the Ep. ad Diognet., by Ireneeus and Tertullian. ‘he same 
 remark holds good of the Fathers of the third century also, as 
 we have seen, for example, in the case of Hippolytus, Cyprian, 
 and others. Origen especially lived in it, though it took in 
 his mind a distinct and peculiar character. 
 
 The First-born of all creation, says he, the noblest nature, is 
 designated King and Son of the King; the man whom He 
 assumed, was formed by Him in righteousness, and so they are 
 one. For the Redeemer made of two one, in that He united 
 the first fruits of both in Himself.? If God has made Him, who 
 knew no sin, sin for us, we can no longer say that. there was 
 no darkness in Him (as there is none in the Father). But He 
 took our weakness upon Himself, our sin did He bear; and the 
 sickness of the soul, the pains of the hidden man of the heart, 
 lay upon Him. On their account, in order to carry them away, 
 He confessed that His soul was troubled and shaken, and, accord- 
 ing to Zechariah, put on unclean garments. Because He took 
 upon Himself the sins of the people which believeth in Hin, 
 therefore saith He so frequently, as though speaking in our 
 name,— The account of my sins is far from salvation; Thou 
 knowest my folly, and my sins are not hidden before Thee.” No 
 one can suppose that we thus blaspheme against the Anointed 
 
 1 See Vol. i; 103 ff., 259 f., 818, 816 fl. ; 11. 65 fi. 96 ff." 101aE 
 
 2 Ad Rom.i. 5. Origen designates the Logos ‘‘ promiscue” Only-be- 
 gotten and First-born. During the Arian controversy (compare Ath. c. 
 Ar. or. 2, 663), these ideas were more precisely defined as follows: ‘‘ Only- 
 begotten” refers to the eternity and singularity of His Sonship; whereas 
 ‘‘ First-born” has reference also to the many brethren, whom He does not 
 lack notwithstanding His own pre-eminence, nay more, whom He gains 
 through it. The designations, therefore, are taken as mutually comple- 
 mentary. The former is the absolute expression for Christ; the latter, the 
 relative, which refers back to the former. 
 
 eet” ew oe) ee 
 
ORIGEN’S TOTAL IMAGE OF CHRIST. 335 
 
 of God. For as the Father alone has immortality, whereas the 
 Lord took our death upon Himself, out of pure love to men, we 
 can only say of the Father, “ In Him is no darkness.” If God 
 has made Him, who knew no sin, sin for us, we cannot say of 
 Him, “In Him is no darkness.” For Christ, in His love for men, 
 took our darknesses upon Himself, in order that by His power 
 He might kill our death, and dissipate the darkness of our soul, 
 as Isaiah saith, “ The people which sat in darkness, hath seen a 
 creat light (rod Kupiov hua Sia prrabpwriav Gavarov TOV UTEP 
 HOV aveiknpotos,—ep avTOV TAS 1)LOV TKOTIAS avadedeyLevor, 
 etc. In Joh. T. ii. 21). His flesh also is termed “sin;” for 
 He came in the form of sinful flesh. It is called sin, because 
 it is a sacrifice for sin; through this sacrifice, which is termed 
 sin, He has put sin to flight and destroyed it (ad Rom. iv. 12 ; 
 T. iv. 589). Life is stronger than death ; righteousness is 
 stronger than sin; the grace is greater than the mischief. For 
 the grace of Christ is more richly and widely poured out than the 
 death of Adam ; seeing that it has not merely driven away death, 
 but brought life to dominion ; nay more, it has even brought us 
 to dominion through Christ (ad Rom. v. 2). He is the tree of 
 life, into whom we must be implanted. His death becomes the 
 tree of life to us. In this way we can imitate Him in holiness. 
 And the Church is His body (in Joh. T. x. 23, 27) ; so that the 
 resurrection of Christ embraces the mystery of the resurrection 
 of the entire body of Christ (in Joh. T. i. 34, x. 20). ‘This is 
 the deeper reason why, in all the principal momenta of the 
 history of Christ, Origen sees our history, the history of in- 
 dividuals or of the Church. In this aspect, his allegorical in- 
 terpretation is not a play with coincidences ; Christ he viewed, 
 not as a naked symbol, but as the principle of the process 
 through which the Church must pass in imitation of its Head. 
 For this reason, the thought recurs in the greatest variety of ex- 
 pressions,—His history is our history, and_our history is His. 
 The anointing of the Son, the union of the Spirit and of man 
 in Him, denotes the marriage, the commingling, of the believing 
 soul with the Holy Ghost (in Joh. T.i. 30). He gives a similar 
 turn to our crucifixion with Christ (in Joh. T. i. 34), and to the 
 sufferings of believers (ibid., and in Jerem. Hom 14, @:t8312): 
 In every martyr, Christ is condemned. For if a Christian is 
 condemned, not because of a sin, but because he 1s a Christian, 
 
336 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 Christ is condemned in him. Throughout the whole earth, 
 Christ is constantly suffering from unbelievers and sceptics, who 
 divide Him in sunder. It is foolish to suppose that Christ has 
 been only once scourged, by Pilate. As often as unbelievers 
 persecute Christians, Christ presents His back to the smiters. 
 When Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 28, speaks of the subjection of the 
 Son under the Father, he shows us that all that he means thereby 
 is, the subjection of believers, whom He comprises in Himself.! 
 Because Christ is the life in each, the life multiplies itself ; for 
 Christ is found in every saint, and for the sake of the one Christ 
 there are born many christs, His imitators, formed after H im, 
 ' who is the image of God (Ava yap tov év éxdot@ Xpuorov dvta 
 Sony mrnOvvovras ai Soai—otovel yap kal’ &caorov dytov Xptartos 
 eupioKetat, Kal yivovtat du Tov eva Xpictov woAXol Xpttrol, ot 
 exeivot pyuntal Kal Kat adbrov, ecxdva dvTa Ocod ELoppwpevor 3 
 in Joh. T. vi. 3). Between this birth of Christians from God, 
 which he conceived to be mediated by Christ, and the birth of 
 the Son from the Father, he finds also a resemblance (in Jerem. 
 Hom. ix. 4). As the Father did not generate the Son once for 
 all, and then send Him forth from Himself, ceasing therewith 
 any longer to generate, but begets Him eternally ; so also, if 
 thou hast the spirit of sonship, God begets thee continually in 
 Him, in every work and every thought ; and thus begotten, thou 
 becomest a continually begotten son of God in Christ Jesus. 
 That which gives the humanity of Christ this universal sig- 
 nificance, is simply and solely the Logos, who united Himself 
 with it in vital unity. The Logos illuminates everything, even 
 the ideal world, and the logical souls in the real world Gn Joh. 
 T. i. 24). As wisdom, He is the beginning and the end; in 
 Him is included the idea of the entire world, so far as He is 
 wisdom in God (i. 22, 34). He is the light for all men and all 
 rational beings, the source of all pure life (1. 28, 29). Christ, 
 the only-begotten One, is all in all, beginning and end. As the 
 1 II. dex. L. iii, 5, 6: Quid non solum regnandi, verum etiam obedi- 
 endi venerat reparare disciplinam, in semet ipso prius complens, quod ab 
 aliis volebat impleri, iccirco non solum ad mortem crucis Patri obediens 
 factus est, verum etiam in consummatione seculi in semet ipso complectens 
 omnes, quos subjicit Patri, et qui per eum veniunt ad salutem, cum ipsis 
 et in ipsis quoque subjectus dicitur Patri: dum omnia in ipso constant, et 
 
 ipse est caput omnium, et in ipso est salus et salutem consequentium 
 plenitudo. Compare above, pp. 134-138 
 
 a ae oe ee 
 
 . “tee et, Meet e 
 
 — 
 
ORIGEN’S TOTAL IMAGE OF CHRIST aay d 
 
 beginning, He is in the man whom He assuined ; as the end, iz 
 the last of the saints. Or otherwise put,—Even in those who 
 are in the middle (between the beginning and the end of the 
 world) is He: as the beginning in Adam; as the end in the 
 Son of man, the second and last Adam (i.. 34). Christ is 
 Alpha and Omega. No one knows the Father save through 
 Him, no one can stand connected with the Father save through 
 Him. And perhaps, as in the temple the steps were many 
 which led to the sanctuary, so is the First-born of God all steps 
 to us; as reckoning downwards, He is the first and the second, 
 so also the last. His humanity is the first and lowest step. 
 Beginning with it, we pass on through the entire series of steps, 
 so that we ascend through Him, who is also angel and the rest 
 of the powers. Above all, however, He must be to us the 
 Lamb, which takes away our sins (in Joh. xix. 1). In a much 
 diviner way than Paul He became all things to all, passing 
 through all stages, from the angels down to the beings in the 
 néther world, in order to win all. To the angels He became an 
 angel, to men aman. If there exist letters of God, after the 
 reading of which, the saints say that they have read in the 
 tables of heaven, elements through which heavenly things can 
 be read, these are the ideas, which are, as it were, broken into 
 small fragments, to wit, into the Alpha and the following letters 
 to Omega, which is the Son of God. Again, regarded from 
 another point of view, the same Son is as Logos, simultaneously, 
 both beginning and end (in Joh. T. i. 34). 
 
 In passages like that just adduced, and in similar ones, the 
 distinction between the first and second creation is not always 
 thoroughly maintained. Sometimes the Logos is represented 
 as the soul of the world, which is broken up into a plurality of 
 beings (Novos). This by itself would not sufficiently explain 
 why che Logos should become man, angel, and so forth; for in 
 a certain sense He became man and angel by the creation of 
 these beings: why, then, was a further special act of union 
 with them necessary ? From our previous exposition of Origen’s 
 system, however, we know that he considered the participation 
 in the Logos involved in the creation to. have been but imper- 
 fect, so far as free beings were brought into existence, to whom 
 an abid ng and indissoluble connection with the Jogos was 
 primarily a task to be accomplished. This is the point at which 
 
 COLOR ERE x 
 
338 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 his theory, that the Logos must take His place in history, and 
 undergo a regular process of development on behalf of all 
 yational creatures, finds application. He must become all 
 rational beings, in order that, as one of them, He may be near 
 to all, may be laid hold of by them as the atoning principle in 
 its totality, and may lead them to the Father. He zs able to 
 assume all, because all are created by Him; and in them all is 
 but one generic substance of different grades, for there is but 
 one Logos. For this reason, He pervades all the genera of 
 beings as different stages of the Noyxov. But believing as he 
 did, that all rational beings are, as such, inwardly connected 
 with the Logos, and that He, as their common principle of 
 unity, assumed them all, and exhibited all in Himself in their 
 perfection, the way was paved to his doctrine of the aoxara- 
 otaots of all things (c. Cels. 8,12). He set forth all in their 
 verfection by becoming all; but He returned out of them to 
 Himself, by deifying them in Himself. As He passed through 
 all stages, even so must we, strengthened by His power, and, 
 jn imitation of His example, advance from stage to stage, till 
 ve become one spirit with Him. 
 
 In this aspect also, therefore, Origen’s Christology may be 
 said to have a somewhat Docetical character. Not because of 
 the universality lent to his view of redemption, by his doctrine 
 of the assumption of all classes of beings; for, as we have re- 
 marked, he looked upon angels, not as a different genus of 
 beings, but merely as a different grade of one and the same 
 logical genus. Nor because the historical life of the Logos was 
 blended with and dissipated into His life in eternity, by the 
 doctrine of His assumption of all beings; for He was actually of 
 opinion, that the Logos showed Himself to angels as an angel, 
 and as a man to men, and that men, at a higher stage, will 
 become angels, in consequence of the Logos having first become 
 man for them. Finally, the Docetical element does not he in 
 his notion, that whilst the Logos was.man, He was aiso the 
 light and vital principle of the entire world; for Origen appears 
 to have connected the two things as follows,—the soul of Christ 
 heing indissolubly united with, and fired throughout by, the 
 Logos, was one spirit with Him, and the centre whence He, 
 unhindered by body and space, was universally active. We 
 have seen above, that he regarded the sacrifice of Christ on the 
 
ORIGEN AND ATHANASIUS. 339 
 
 cross as the sacrifice offered in the centre of the werld on be- 
 nalf of the entire world; and to those who expressed surprise 
 that the Pneuma (that is, the Logos) should be sent into a 
 corner, instead of filling all bodies in the entire world, he re- 
 plied,—“ We have enough with one sun; it is for all. This 
 Anointed One made many anointed; Christ is the head; He 
 and the Church are one body. If thou desirest to see many 
 bodies full of the Divine Spirit, look at the Church (c. Cels. 5, 
 78, 79).” The Docetical element rather consists in his denying 
 to hte humanity of Christ constitutive and permanent. signifi- 
 cance in itself. (for example, ad Rom. i. 6, compare TS 
 pp. 218, 214), even as he denied it to the feiss forms which he 
 Sate ; attributing to them, on the contrary, a merely peda- 
 gogical or anagogical significance, as guides to the pure and 
 needs deity. Our perfection, too, will be the termination of 
 our personal existence; and thus the system which made so 
 strictly ethical a beginning, ends by being physical. The 
 utmost that remains is, that a new world may arise through a 
 new apostasy; which, however, must be represented as running 
 through the same course, unless the ideas, respectively, of God and 
 the mera) are stripped of their mutually exclusive character.’ 
 
 How important was the position held by that image of 
 Christ in His totality, in the system of Athanasius, prior to the 
 Arian controversy, we have seen above (pp. 249 ff.). Arianism 
 necessarily felt inwardly estranged from it; all that it sought 
 in Christ was a teacher and pattern of virtue. Only men like 
 Kusebius of Czesarea endeavoured to retain their hold on it; in 
 the sense, however, that the Logos in and by Himself, and not 
 first the Logos incarnate, or the God-man, was the First-born of 
 creation, the Head of humanity and of the world (see above, 
 pp. 221 ff.). When the office of mediator or substitute for 
 humanity is conferred on a creature, such as the one proposca 
 
 ' The ideas of Irengeus and Tertullian, which belong to this connecticr, 
 have been treated above. The important thought, that Christ was the 
 archetype even for the creation of Adam, appears to have been contained 
 also in Methodius’ Suuxcoiwy rapdevixcv, where he remarked,—i-o/noev o 
 Oso¢ tov dvdpwmrov nar eindve duoicy tis eixdvos ebtov, Tour tots xad sindve 
 Xpiorod, The word Xpsres might refer, it is true, merely to the Son of 
 God in Himself, for Methodius goes on to say,—Adrés yap gor 70 drat- 
 YAO ~alO KdpuxTHp THS UTooTACEHC a’rov. Compare Gregory of Nyssa 
 wepl natacx. &vboooror, c. 16. 
 
340 ¥IRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 bv Arianism, it becomes ethnic and unethical; for only on the 
 ground of an act of deification, and of the curtailment both of 
 our personality and of the task assigned to us, can a mere crea- 
 ture be represented as taking our place, and as holding the 
 position of our representative before God. In the aioe di- 
 rected against Arianism, Athanasius constantly recurs to this 
 idea, wieneect his object is to confront the entire fulness and 
 weight of true Christianity with the scanty view of it taken by 
 Arianism. It was that intuitional image of the Redeemer in 
 His totality that marked out for cies during all his 
 controversies, the direction which he ought to pursue; like a 
 never-erring compass, it enabled him to steer safely between 
 heresies wearing the appearance of the full truth, like those of 
 Marcellus and Apollinaris. He employed it against Arianism, 
 not merely when his purpose was to establish the Christian idea 
 of atonement, in opposition to the false deification of man, on 
 the one hand, and his false humiliation and separation from 
 God, on the other; but both he and his friends used the idea 
 frmotpally3 in order to turn aside Arian objections, which de- 
 duced the lowness of Christ’s higher nature from the lowness 
 of the declarations concerning Him contained in the New Tes- 
 tament. To a whole series of passages of this nature in the 
 New Testament they applied the canon,—When Christ was 
 troubled unto death, and cried out, “ My God, my God, why 
 nast Thou forsaken me?” He spalien in our name, bechu seule 
 naa put himself into our place, and had taken upon Himself 
 our guilt and abasement.t Against Sabellianism they aroued, 
 on the basis of this intuition of theirs, that Christianity was 
 not a mere transitory theophany, or an évépyeca of God; but 
 that its aim was the perfection of humanity. Now the perfec- 
 
 1 Athan. c. Ar. i. 48; Greg. Naz. or. 29, 18: ‘‘ Count up, unthankful 
 ynan, the words, ‘My God and your God,’ ‘greater,’ ‘ created,’ ‘made,’ 
 ‘sanctified ’ ‘servant,’ ‘obedience,’ ‘He learned,’ ‘ He was commissioned, 
 
 ‘he was sent,’ ‘Of myself I can do, speak, judge, give, will nothing.’ Add 
 tnereto His ignorance, His subjection, His prayer, His questions, His pro- 
 gress, His being perfected. Add, further, His sleeping, being hungry and 
 weary, His weeping, His trembling and shuddering. Perhaps thou wilt 
 reproach Him also (O Arian) with His death and His cross.” Let the 
 answer serve: ‘Ev! xsQaralia rad wc orbnrdrepe wacoays tH Jeoryti xml ri, 
 xpertrore Quasi waday nol cojmaros, ra 0 Tamewarepe TO CUVbETY. nel TH Osa 
 ba xebwosres re ncel capxadévri, xal avOpwmicbsyes. Compare 30, 1, 21. 
 
ATHANASIUS’ TOTAL IMAGE OF CHRIST 341 
 
 tion of humanity requires that it be constituted the Church, 
 the body of the Lord, of which He is the Head.’ How, in the 
 last place, Apollinarism was combated by the aid of this image, 
 we shall shortly see. 
 
 Let us now specify a few of the more important passages. 
 In becoming a man Himself, says Athanasius repeatedly, the 
 eternal Son constituted mankind sons and gods; for He set 
 forth in Himself, in the first instance, a man who was God, and 
 now He draws us into fellowship with Him (viozroince, Kat éGeo- 
 moinoe TOs avOpwTrous yevomevos adTos dvOpwrros, c. Ar. or. 1, 
 38).? Neither the Logos was exalted by becoming man and 
 displaying virtue, as the Arians suppose, nor was He humbled 
 (jrAaTToON) by the assumption of a body; but deification be- 
 came the portion of the body which He assumed (c. Ar. 1, 40, 
 LON As humanity is worshipped in Him, the heavenly powers 
 can no longer wonder when they see us, who wear His nature, 
 entering into heaven (c. 42). His humiliation is a fact; but it 
 produced no change in Him. For not physical defect, but the 
 riches of His love, was the cause of His humiliation, and there- 
 fore He remained the same, though we were savingly altered 
 (c. Ar. or. 1, 48). He first sanctified Himself in order that He 
 might sanctify us all. ‘I, the Logos of the Father, give even 
 the spirit to Myself, the Incarnate One, and thus sanctify Myself, 
 the Incarnate One, in order that all may be at once sanctified in 
 Me, who am the truth.” Accordingly, He gives as God; He 
 receives as man; but in His person we have made a beginning 
 of receiving. From Him streams forth the Spirit as a precious 
 ointment over tne whole of humanity (or. c. Ar. 1, 46-48). C. 
 Ar. 4, 33 :—“ He wrapped Himself in our first fruits, and mar- 
 ried Himself therewith. Taking this perishing man into Him 
 self, He renews him: by a stable renewal unto eternal duration.” 
 (Hvora. dirravbporas jpiv, Thy arapynv nov Tepiepevos, 
 Kal tavtn avakpabels.—Ei towvy (tov avOpwrov) cabpwobévta 
 
 1 Compare c. Ar. 4,12, 25. The question with which we have to do, 
 is not something epideictical, a rasd:2, but the éaqder«, which is contained 
 in Christ for the individual and the Church. 
 
 2 Compare 39,1, 48. Of dvdpwmos eioiy ctpyiy Exovres TOV AnmBavery ty 
 wire xal 00 cebrod* aire yap viv Asyoutvov civdpwmivus xplecbas, necis Eo (ED 
 of tv aire xpicpeevos’ exesdy xal BarriComévov abrov gusis topev of ev aut 
 BumrsCoucvor. 28, 34 
 
342 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 els EauTov AaBomevos Tar avakawiter Sua THS BeBaias avtot 
 avaveHcews Tpos Stamovnv atereUTHTOV Kal dia TODP EevovTas Ets 
 Oevotépav avtov avdywov MEw—Tas olov Te—Tols atroaTONoLS— 
 cuvaplOwely Tov TOV aToaTOAwY KUptov;) “The Word became 
 flesh, in order that, as the Logos is Son, God might be termed 
 our Father for the sake of the Son dwelling in us. Whoso, 
 therefore, has not the Son in his heart, of him God cannot be 
 termed the Father” (Ata rodto yap 6 Adyos yéyove oapé, ty’, 
 ETELON O AGYOS €oTlY Vids, Sia TOV évolKodYTA ev Hiv ViOV NeyNTat 
 Kal Hua Tatip.—OvdvxKodv oO év tuly vios Tov idioy TaTépa emI- 
 KANOULEVOS KAL HuUdV AVTaV ToLee TaTépa KaretcOar. *Apénet 
 @V OvK EoTLY Eis TAS Kapdias 0 Vids, TOUTwY OvdE TraTIpP 0 Oeds 
 dv rex Gein, 4, 22). “ When the Spirit descended on Him in the 
 Jordan, He descended upon us, whose body Christ bore. When 
 He was washed in the Jordan, we were washed in and by Him 
 (Evdnrov, dts Kal 7 eis adtov év TO Iopdavyn tod TVEVILATOS 
 yevouevn KaO0d0s eis Huds Hv ywvomevn, ia TO hopety avToV TO 
 HpweTepov THua.—T'od yap kupiov ws avOpwrrov Novopevoyv—nwets 
 Huey of &€v ALTO Kal Tap avTod Aovopmevor, etc., 1,47). “ God 
 calls men, who are created, sons, as though they had been be- 
 gotten. As they are created natures, they can only become 
 sons by receiving the Spirit of Him who is by nature and truly 
 Son. He who was our Creator becomes our Father, from which 
 it is clear that we are not by nature sons, but the Son who is in 
 us. Nor is God by nature our Father, but the Father of the 
 Word, which is in us. But the Father designates those sons in 
 whom He sees His Son” (2, 59). “ Man united with a mere 
 creature could not have been deified, nor could he have ven- 
 tured to present himself to the Father, had not Christ been the 
 _ essential Word of God. As man, He is become the beginning 
 of the new creation (adpyn xawns Kticews); for He is the man 
 created for us. For this reason, this union of the divine and 
 human (cuvvady)) took place in Him, in order that, with that 
 which is by nature divine, He might unite that which is by na- 
 ture human, and the salvation and deification of the human 
 (Georroinots) might be firmly established” (2, 70). “ As a wise 
 builder does not merely think how to build a house, but also 
 arranges it so that it can be restored if it should receive damage, 
 so the basis of our renewal was laid in Christ ere we ewisted, in 
 order that we might be created again in Him” (2, 77). ‘This 
 
ATHANASIUS’ TOTAL IMAGE OF CHRIST. 343 
 
 passage appears to represent the connection of our nature with 
 Christ as so essential, that it must.have subsisted even if sin had 
 not entered the world.! “ We must not be surprised, therefore, 
 to find Christ speaking of His image (tv7r0s), which is in us, as 
 of Himself; for when Saul persecuted the Church, in which 
 was His image and likeness, He said, as though He Himself 
 were the object of the persecution,—Saul, Saul, why perse 
 cutest thou Me?” Similar also is the import of the passage, 
 Prov. viii. 22:—He speaks of the creation as of Himself. 
 After explaining in c. Ar. or. 3, 32 f. that the grand thing is, 
 that whatever sufferings are undergone, or works are performed, 
 by a man in Christ, do not concern this man alone, but the 
 Logos also, who makes all things His own (olxevo?, idvorovet ), 
 he goes on to say,—Inasmuch as the flesh was born of the Vir- 
 gin (Mapla OcorcKos), He Himself was said to have been born, 
 who is the principle of the birth of others, namely, that He 
 might transfer our birth to Himself, and thus obtain the mas- 
 tery over the principle of death in us.” He regarded the work 
 of redemption, therefore, as already begun with the act of incar- 
 nation ; the entire finitude to which He subjected Himself, and 
 ‘of which that act formed the beginning, finds its explanation, 
 “hot in His nature, but in His substitutionary love. (Note 55.) 
 “This leads us to notice a particular class of passages whicn 
 relate to the sufferings of Christ. (Note 56.) ©. Ar. 1, 41: 
 “ As man He endured death for us, that so He might present 
 Himself to the Father for us. As He died for us, so also has 
 He been exalted on our behalf, in order that, like as we all died 
 in the death of Christ, even so we might all be unutterably 
 exalted in Him.” “He takes our sufferings upon Himself and 
 
 1 His meaning can, however, also be,—The posstbilety of the incarnation 
 was grounded in the creation itself, because the Logos or the Wisdom of 
 God was informed in the world (compare c. 79); but still merely typicaity, 
 in comparison with the archetype, wisdom itself. 
 
 2 "Tye civ quay sis &avrdy meradn vyéveosy, nal wnneTh OS YR LoUN Ovres 26 
 viv arinbamcy, AAW OS TH EE ovporvod Advyou suvaQbévres cis odpavovs vada uey 
 rap avtov. Ovxovy svt wal Te brrw wadn Tov ooparos ovn areinoTas sig 
 joeuroy werednusy’ lvoe “ennets Os avOpaTrol, &AA dic 10108 TOU Acyou THs ehavioY 
 Cons wsracyoper. THs yevissns nav nol maons THS capuixns dobeveias Ueto 
 reBévru els tov rdvov (cf. 2, 69) eyespoedae dad ys, Avoslans THs O00 humerioy 
 narepes, ete. Obdxérs as ynivis, BhA& Rosmoy noyobslons THs coeonos Aum Tex 
 rod Ocov ndyor, 65 O8 Huss eyévero cae 
 
344 FIRST PERIOD THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 presents them to the Father, interceding for us, that they may 
 be destroyed in Him” (4, 6). “Although not weak, He took 
 upon Himself our weakness ; although not hungering, He hun- 
 gered; He sacrifices that which is ours, in order to extinguish 
 it; but instead of weaknesses (which were laid on Him, and 
 through His bearing of them were extinguished), He receives 
 gifts from God, of which those will become partakers who are 
 united with Him” (c.7). “The death, which is termed His, the 
 death of the Logos, was a ransom for the sins of men, and a 
 death of death” (1, 45). “aden with guilt, the world lay 
 under the condemnation of the law; but the Logos took the 
 judgment (xpiua) up into Himself, and suffering in the flesh 
 for all, He bestowed salvation on all” (compare Ar. or. 1, 51. 
 60 5! 25569): 
 
 Similar expressions occur repeatedly in the works of the two 
 Gregories and of Basilius. Gregory Nazianzen, after saying, in 
 Hom. 30,—the rameworepas and avOpwrixorepar dovat which 
 are recorded respecting Christ, are to be referred to the véos 8” 
 nas avOpwros; he proceeds (c. 3),—7@ dvru éSovAevTE capKl 
 Kab yeveoet Kai Tabect Tois tywerépors Sid tiv Apetépav €dev- 
 Gepiav, kal maow ols céowxev b16 THs dwaptias KaTEyoLEVOLs. 
 Ti d€ petlov avOpdrrov tarreworntt, ) Oc@ TAaKHvat Kal yeverOau 
 Ocov €x tis piEews ; The Oela eixav is commingled with the 
 covtixn poppy. On 1 Cor. xv. 28 (c. 5), he remarks,—Is He 
 not now subject? Did He need, as God, to be subjected to 
 God, like a rebel? "AN odtw cKdTeL, bt. Horep KaTdpa 
 jnKovoe Ou ene, 0 THY wiv Nav Katapay, Kal dwaptia 6 aipov 
 THY Gpaptiay ToD Koopov, Kab’ Addy dvti Tod TadaLod yiverat 
 véos' oUTW Kal TO éuov dvuTrOTaKTOV EaUTOD TroLEtTAL Kepary 
 TOU TavTos cwmatos. “Ews pev ody avurrdraxtos éy® Kal ota- 
 ciwdys, avuTrOTAKTOS TO Kat’ e“e Kal 6 Xpiotos AeyeTa' Grav Se 
 UTOTAYH avT@ Ta TavTa (iToTaynceTas Sé Kal TH éeriyvooer Kal 
 TH MEeTATIOWNTEL), TOTE KAL ALTOS THY UTOTAYY TETANPOKE, ™ poo- 
 ayov ee Tov cecwopévov. The Father subjects all things to 
 the Son, the Son to the Father; the former by His decree, the 
 latter by His deed. Thus, He who subjected it sets forth before 
 God that which belongs to us, as subjected, by appropriating to 
 Flimself that which belongs to us (&avrod rovotpevos TO *yere- 
 oov). In like manner, he then further explains the desertion of 
 Christ. He was not left in Himself. either by the Father or by 
 
ATHANASIUS. GREGORY NAZ R44 
 
 His own deity, but representea in Himself that which we ex- 
 perience (€v éavt@ TuTot TO Huétepov). “Hyeis yap wer ot 
 eyKATANEAELMLEVOL Kal Trapewpapévol TpOTEpoV, Elita VoV Tpoc- 
 Ei\nupévoe Kal ceawopévor Tots TOD aTrabobs Tabeow. “QNaorep 
 cal TV ahpoctynY HuaV Kal TO TANUMENES OiKELOUpEVOS TA EES 
 &ia Tod Yradwod (Ps. xxii.) dyow. C.6:—So also must we 
 understand the words, —“ He learnt obedience,” “He was heard.” 
 As Logos, He was neither obedient nor disobedient, for He was 
 the Lord; as 6€ dovdov pop pn ouycaraBatver TOUS opodovrots 
 Kal Sovhaus, Kal tasted eh TO GANOTPLOP, OXOV Ev EAUTO epe Pepow 
 ueTa TOV éuav, va év EavT@ SaTravicn TO xXElpov ws KNpoV Tp, 
 ) @s aTpida yhs TALos, Kayo peTarxdBw Tov Eéxelvou Sia THD 
 avyxpacw. The perfection will consist in our ceasing to be 
 many, to be as we are now—for now we carry little or nothing 
 of God in our movements and feelings; aAX drot Peoesdets, 
 Orov cod yopntixol Kai povov, seeing that Christ is all in all 
 (Gal. iii. 28). C.14:—He lives eternally, in order to intercede 
 for us, as a man for my salvation. For He will continue united 
 with the flesh which He has assumed, until He shall have deified 
 me by the power of the incarnation (7H duvdpes THs avOpwrn- 
 cews éue Oeov troinon). (Note 57.) 30, 21:—He is called (and 
 is) Man, ody wa yopnOh povov Sia capatos capaci, adros 
 ov av xwpnbels dia TO THS HUoEws AAnTTOV, GN iva Kat dylan 
 60 éavtod Tov avOpwrror, daTEp Gbun yevomevos TO TavTi pupa- 
 watt, Kal Tpos EavTov Evocas TO KaTaKpiHev brov NUCH TOD KaTa- 
 Kpluatos, TaVTAa UTép TaVT@V YyEvo“EVoS boa HpEis, TAHY TIS 
 dpaptias, cua, Wyn, vods. Similar passages are contained in 
 the Ep. ad Cledon. 1, 10, 14. 
 
 A more complete conception of the mediation, of the repre- 
 sentation of the entire race by the God-man, could not be framed 
 than the one given here. Gregory, like Athanasius, did not 
 derive it from the Logos as He is in Himself, but from the Logos 
 incarnate; or from the fact that, as to His humanity, He became 
 the vine-stock, the Head, cahichi as it is the first, so. also is it the 
 principle of Ne holes whole in_ its eel powerful, all- 
 mastering, and all-appropriating unity.’ 
 
 1 Athanasius did not hold Origen’s doctrine, that Christ became an 
 angel tor angels; but still he believed that the incarnation had some sort 
 of a reference to them also. Previously they had not seen the Logos; but 
 since He has become man, they behold Him, c. <r. or. 4, 36. 
 
346 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 Specially rich in passages of this kind are the works of 
 Gregory of Nyssa. According to him, God, in uniting Himself 
 with one man, united retina ats with the abe of humanity, 
 assumed the entire race, because the one man whom He assumed 
 was the dzapy7), in which all men are potentially or pringiaalsy 
 included. Humanity is, in his view, one living being, €v Gov ; 
 hence the divine power of the Head, which is at then same time 
 an integral member of the great body of humanity, diffused 
 itself through the whole race. And so, in this One all died; 
 and the resurrection and exaltation of this One is the resurrec- 
 tion and exaltation of all. This fact is brought also into the 
 most intimate connection with baptism and the Kucharist. 
 
 (Note 58.) 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 
 THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE ARIANS AND OF MARCELLUS, AND 
 ITS REDARGUTION BY THE TEACHERS OF THE CHURCH. 
 
 REFERENCE has been already made to the Christology of Arius 
 and of the Sabellianism revived by Marcellus; but we have 
 only given closer attention to it, so far as the view to be taken 
 of one aspect of the Person of Christ depended on the form 
 assumed by the doctrine of the Trinity. We have therefore 
 still a word to say regarding their view of the human aspect, 
 and of the unity of the person. 
 
 The First-born of creation, whom the Arians say became 
 man, is a being of another genus than man :—still, however, a 
 creature, which, on the ground of its mutability (tpemrov), of 
 its, in the first instance, merely growing, unestablished virtue, 
 of its imperfect knowledge, and above all, of the freedom of 
 choice attributed to it in common with all finite rational beings, 
 may be described as possessing all the elements strictly consti- 
 tutive of the spiritual aspect of the humanity of Christ. Arian- 
 ism was therefore unable to concede to Christ a human soul : 
 for how could two finite beings, t wo free wills and so forth, be 
 conceived to be conjoined in one andthe same person? It con- 
 sequently attached equal importance to the two principles ;— 
 
ARIANS AND MARCELLUS. 547 
 
 1), Whenever the spiritual aspect of Christ is spoken of as having 
 humbled itself, it must be referred to the Logos ; 2.°Christ had 
 no human soul; but the bright lucific. substance assumed a hu- 
 man body, partially in. order. to veil itself, partially in order. to 
 become visible to.men. | 
 
 The latter principle evidently renders it impossible that 
 Christ should have been the subject of an actual development 
 from youth upwards. The higher, premundane, lucific spirit 
 must have attained to a high degree of virtue, of ripeness in 
 general, ere He became man. Accordingly, it was impossible 
 that He should learn and grow after a human fashion, beginning 
 at the lowest stage ; and the entire process through which Christ 
 is said to have passed, becomes Docetical, unless we resort to the 
 monstrous supposition, that this highest creature reduced itself 
 again to the level of a potence, plunged into Lethe after the 
 manner of the Platonic souls, and metamorphosed itself to an 
 earlier stage of its existence, in order to be able to become man. 
 But if Christ’s growth were a mere appearance, His conflicts, His 
 temptations also, were an appearance ; and one cannot under- 
 stand why He should be rewarded for them. Moreover, what 
 reward could be conferred on Him? All that Arians could do 
 at this point, was to represent that higher spirit, whom even prior 
 to His incarnation they designate Creator and First-born, as re- 
 turning to the position He occupied before ; for, as He had no 
 human soul, they could not fairly speak of His humanity being 
 exalted and becoming eternal. But the body by itself could 
 only, strictly speaking, be the instrument of a momentary theo- 
 phany; it could not have an eternal significance. We see, 
 therefore, that the Christ of Arianism, who is a higher spirit, 
 walking upon earth, and apparently undergoing a development 
 in a human body, was really a completely mythical shape. At 
 this point, Arianism, which commenced with being jejune and 
 coldly logical, assumes a fantastical character, and reveals an 
 affinity with Gnosticism ; which also we have found to combine 
 within itself the opposite elements of Ebionism and Docetism. 
 In order to reduce the miracle of the incarnation to as low a 
 level as possible, Arianism began with referring all the defects 
 that are attributed to the human nature of Christ to His higher 
 nature ; and now, as though by way of punishment, instead ot 
 a miraculous person, it was compelled to adopt a monstrosity, 
 
348 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 and the veritable humanity, for which it apparently took up 
 arms, was dissipated into a Docetical seeming In one word, as 
 fr epithe: occurs elsewhere, Arianism preferred! the raarecene 
 to the miraculous, taught by the Church. 
 
 ‘This aspect of the Arian system did not remain entirely 
 unnoticed even at an earlier period; but all eyes were at first 
 so completely occupied with its trinitarian aspect, that neither 
 Arians themselves further developed the Christological prin- 
 ciples of their system, nor did the Church teachers recognise 
 the real significance of this point. In Antioch alone, soon after 
 the close of the Nicene Council, was a protesting voice raised 
 against the Arian principle, that Christ assumed a body without 
 soul, by the Bishop Eusebius. It would appear, howey er, that 
 the iN ians themselves, in laying down and frequently eae 
 to the principle, were led, not so much by a conviction of its 
 indispensableness to the complete construction of their Christo- 
 logy, as by a feeling that it was a convenient and near-lying 
 middle idea. For, had it once been decided that Christ assumed, 
 not a human soul, but merely a human body, then the conclu- 
 sion was inevitable, that the lower utterances regarding Christ 
 contained in the Scriptures, referring, as they unquestionably 
 do, to a spiritual, and not to a merely corporeal element, must 
 hold good of His higher nature, which was in reality the only 
 spiritual element in Him. (Note 59.) 
 
 We should have expected that, in order to refute this line of 
 argumentation, the Church would have at once fallen back on 
 the ancient doctrine of the soul of Christ, which had never been 
 retracted. So far as we know, however, the only teacher in the 
 East who did so prior to Apollinaris, was Eustathius in Antioch. 
 According to Epiphanius (de Ancorat. c. 33), the doctrine, that 
 the Son of God assumed, not a human soul, but merely a human 
 body, had long been held by the school of Lucian. Although 
 Lucian’s motive in laying down the principle was probably dif- 
 ferent from that which influenced his followers,\—for neither 
 he, nor, at first, Arius, had been specially concerned to represent 
 the Logos as mutable,—still, we must conclude it to have been 
 ventilated for the first time in Antioch, especially as the Arians 
 
 * Without distinguishing between Lucian and the Arians, between 
 
 Lucian and Lucianists, Kpiphanius (1. c.) attributes the Arian motive to 
 hoth the latter. 
 
 —— 
 
 me. a 
 
EUSTATHIUS. MARCELLUS 349 
 
 appealed very readily to Lucian, and applied to the purposes 
 of their doctrine of the Trinity that which in his hands had 
 probably related solely to Christology. We know not merely 
 that Eustathius disapproved of the Arian denial of the human 
 soul of Christ, but also how far he succeeded in securing to the 
 doctrine thereof a positive and independent significance. (Note 
 60.) 
 
 the active e | pr heed the human the passive : : the human by itself 
 he represented as completely will-less, as a mere organ of the 
 divine évépyeva, as passive in the manner in which the prophets 
 were held to have been passive during their ecstasies. He was 
 unable to conceive the human consciousness as awake and alive: 
 indeed, he scarcely conceded it an existence, and therefore stood 
 in the same relation to the question of the human soul of Christ 
 as did the Arians. 
 
 Now, the Church teachers refused to content themselves 
 with the doctrine of a divine ray, or of an operation of the 
 Logos from the distance, in the man Jesus (see Note 58; 
 Basilius, Hom. 25), whether supposed to constitute Christ a 
 theophany, or to produce a holy man whom it unites with God. 
 If it were not the Logos Himself who became man; if the in- 
 carnation were not that of the Logos ; if the doings and suffer- 
 ings of Christ did not in some way pertain to the Logos as His 
 own; they saw clearly that they were deprived of that which 
 they believed highest and best. Theophanies belong to the Old 
 Testament; under the New, they are Docetical: but if Christ is 
 a mere man, who, although He already existed apart from, was 
 assumed by, the Logos, the saying holds true,—“ Cursed is he 
 who putteth his trust in men.’ On innumerable occasions, 
 therefore, does Athanasius say,—Our redemption consists in His 
 making His own that which belongs to us. He not merely had, 
 but_ was, man. Even the Jews would allow us a theophany ; 
 that would be no stumblingblock to them; even to an indwell- 
 ing little objection would be raised, for the Logos came in 
 former days to the saints who received Him worthily. But 
 concerning none of them was it said, when they were born,— 
 The Logos Himself is born; or, when they suffered,—The 
 Logos Himself suffered. Precisely this, however, must be said 
 of Christ. That He made His own that which was lew,—this, 
 
350 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 the point of the whole matter, without which the very soul of 
 Christianity is lost—this offends them. Only on that supposi- 
 tion, however, can humanity be said to have been exalted to God 
 in Christ. (Note 61.) Had not the opinion of Athanasius 
 been, that humanity was completely assumed, and that what 
 the Logos assumed He constituted part of Himself, how could 
 he have taught that our entire nature, of which-the soul surely 
 forms an essential feature, was redeemed and established in the 
 divine by the Logos ?* 
 
 More indefinite descriptions of the mode of being of God in 
 Christ are the following :—The cap was His ofxos, vaos (c. Ar. 
 3, 52, 53); which passage, however, is to be supplemented by 
 3, 30 (see Note 61). So also the expression,—Humanity was 
 the organ of the Logos, by which He revealed Himself ever 
 more completely,—is merely a relative description. It expresses 
 the relation of the God-man to His work, and the fact that the 
 impulse proceeded from the Logos. This comparison, by itself, 
 however, would reduce the humanity of Christ to a passive, 
 lifeless accident. Hence, the most_perfect.expression attained 
 by Athanasius..is,—The Word did not progress; and, on_ the 
 other hand, the humanity (cap£) was not Wisdom (to ‘the 
 avO pam wor pertains dyvoetv); but it was made the body of 
 Wisdom; that is, it set forth Wisdom in the sphere of actuality 
 (cr AT HONDO, Ths Sodias chua yéyovev » cap— = avOpwros 
 in 8, 30). The cap& was not Wisdom; so far as it was 
 Wisdom, Wisdom did not progress in wisdom ; it did not suffer, 
 and so forth, in itself. But it was so one with humanity, that 
 we may ake say, it progressed capxt; for the human in it 
 
 1 We might arrive at a different conclusion if we assumed that Athana- 
 sius recognised no other evil than corporeal death, from which men needed 
 deliverance. But, however important the rdle Sap in his system by such 
 ideas as @avaros, &davecia, etc., he does not limit redemption solely to 
 them; for he knows something also of guilt and sin. How could he further 
 say, c. Ar. 38, 53:—’Ev aire yap qu n caps 1 mpoxomrovan, nal auToU AtyeTel, 
 nal tod Ive rer 4 ray avbporav Tpoxory akaTwTOS 1 TOY GUYoVTH Adyor 
 diazeelvy? Indeed, it is altogether very clear that Athanasius cannot have 
 referred Christ’s progress in wisdom to His body (c. Ar. 3, 52, 53), any 
 more than in our case; but it is quite as impossible that he should have 
 referred it to the Logos (c. 51). There is. therefore, no alternative but to 
 say that he presupposed the existence of a soul in the oapZ, in the avépaxivn 
 Picts, ete. (c. Ar. 8, 80): without, however, giving special prominence to 
 it as a constituent element of the complete human nature. 
 
 | 
 
 __ SS OO ee eee 
 
ATHANASIUS. 351 
 
 (7d av6p@rwov év TH Xodpia) advanced, gradually transcended 
 human nature, and was deified (d7repavaBaivov car’ orLyov TH 
 avOporivny daw Kat Ocorrovovpevov Kat dpyavov adTis mpos Tv 
 évépyevav Ths OcotnTos Kal THY Exrapnbw adTis yivopevov Kat 
 haivopevov Tact (compare c. 52). Ibid.: Av§dvovtos ev 1)dtxia 
 TOD awmatos cuveTrediooto év a’T@® Kal 1) THS OeornTos avépw- 
 ows, Kal édeikvuTO Tapa Taow, StL vads Yeov €ott, Kat Oeds Hp 
 év T®@ copatt). The true sense of the words, “He grew in 
 grace and wisdom,” is consequently this,—He progressed in and 
 through Himself (adrés év éavt@ mpoéxorrev, c. 52), for 7 
 Sodhia @xodopuncey éavth oixov, kat év éavth Tov otKoyv mpoKoT- 
 rew émroiet. Athanasius can scarcely have meant that the body 
 of Christ grew in wisdom; he must therefore have included 
 the soul of Christ in the av@pemwov. 
 
 But, however many hints of the doctrine of a human soul 
 of Christ may be found in the works of Athanasius, one thing 
 is lacking—freedom of choice. He lays great stress on it for 
 men, but he never attributes it to Christ. This is perhaps the 
 reason why he, whose system, as a whole, insists on the full and 
 entire humanity of Christ in general, and on a human soul in 
 particular, who, as it would at first sight appear, must have 
 been driven, even by his opponents, to set that forth which 
 would have disarmed them, yet hesitated to give special prom}- 
 nence to freedom of choice. Freedom of choice and mutability 
 occupied so large a place in the system of Arius, that the ap- 
 pearance of Christ bore rather the character of the deed of a 
 “finite spirit than of a deed of God. The tpemrrov ascribed to 
 even this person made the decree of redemption and the cer- 
 tainty of its accomplishment doubtful; nay more, it reduced the 
 divine redemption to a self-redemption. Athanasius feared, 
 and not without reason, being compelled to admit of freedom of 
 choice in this sense, if he should give special prominence to the 
 full human soul. In one word, the entire danger to which the 
 stability of the faith and the divine-human Unio were exposed 
 by the Arian tperrov, threatened to break forth from the 
 system of the Church itself at another point, if the doctrine of 
 the human soul of Christ were allowed that integral significance 
 which it had in the form in which it last appeared, to wit, in 
 the systems of Origen and Paul of Samosata; unless, indeed, 
 such a conception was formed of it, as should prevent its 
 
352 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 freedom of choice from undermining the certainty of the divine 
 decrees and of their accomplishment. (Note 62.) 
 
 On the other hand, however, it is quite as evident that the 
 incarnation must remain Docetical as to its main feature, so 
 long as Sabellianism and Arianism had not been confuted in 
 this point also. The great progress made in the doctrine of 
 the divine aspect, or in that of the Trinity, must remain com- 
 pletely without that influence on Christology which it ought to 
 have, if a representation were adopted of human nature, such. 
 as rendered it impossible that the hypostasis of the Son, which 
 is of like substance with God, should be conjoined in vital unity 
 with a complete humanity ; or, otherwise expressed, Christology 
 would derive no advantage-from the labours of the Trinitarian 
 Period, notwithstanding that it gave them their impulse, if 
 decided progress were not made, above all, in relation to the 
 human aspect. To the required advance, the Church was, as 
 it were, driven by Apollinarism. 
 
 CHARDE RD ELERD, 
 APOLLINARISM AND ITS OVERTHROW BY THE CHURCH. 
 
 Amonest the most interesting systems occurring in the History 
 of Dogmas, is undoubtedly that of the younger Apollinaris of 
 Laodicea, a man who was distinguished for comprehensive 
 culture, intellectual power and depth, and who enjoyed the 
 reputation of devotedness to the Church and sincere piety. 
 Not only did Athanasius therefore hold him in high esteem, but 
 even Hpiphanius treated him with respect and consideration. 
 He was a remarkable man, if only on one account, namely, 
 that he himself was the turning-point at which ihe Church 
 ceased to devote that exclusive attention to the doctrine of the 
 Trinity which it had for a considerable time devoted, and began 
 those Christological investigations which engaged its powers 
 unremittedly, especially in the East, during centuries to come. 
 He was, in particular, the occasion of the Church’s decidedly 
 affir ming the existence of that feature of the humanity. of Christ 
 which ne hitherto held.a.precarious.position, to wit, His true 
 
APOLLINARIS AND HIS SCHOOL. 353 
 
 human soul. But the question regarding the human soul of 
 Christ at once gives rise to a new problenan that of the unity of 
 the two natures; indeed, the theory of Apollinaris may be re- 
 garded as a premature attempt at the solution of the problem. 
 This is, at the same time, the point which gradually compelled 
 the Church to investigate the question,—whether the human 
 nature of Christ is to be conceived.as.impersonal.or personal. 
 In denying the existence of a human soul of Christ, Apollinaris 
 meant to represent His human nature as rsayesretonell ; and in 
 this respect, we may fairly assert that the Church, in its later 
 doctrinal inquiries, arrived at the very goal towards which 
 Apollinaris, actuated by regard for the unity of the divine- 
 human person, believed it necessary to strive; with the differ- 
 ence, however, that the coarser form of a denial of the human 
 soul of Christ adopted by the latter, in order to avoid the 
 , assumption of a double personality, was exchanged by the former, 
 (| ‘/for the finer form of teaching, that Christ had a human soul, pnd 
 EAR areal human nature. 
 
 The sources of information respecting Apollinarism are 
 pretty copious (Note 63); but it has been hitherto impossible to 
 make clearly out what Apollinaris’ own opinions were, in several 
 important respects. ‘That the school of Apollinaris fell into in- 
 consistency with themselves, and became untrue to their master, 
 in some points, is certain. But it is less certain whether Apol- 
 linaris was always. self-consistent. in his teachings.. There will 
 be no reason, however, for doubting the matter, if it can be 
 shown, that tes who charge him en changing his views, as, 
 for example, Theodoret, were unable to perceive that opinions 
 which seemed self-contradictory, and to belong to different stages 
 in his intellectual history, are really very compatible with each 
 other. Confusion seems to have been introduced into the view 
 taken of the principles of Apollinaris, specially through the 
 unhesitating ascription to him of ideas, which bore a distant or 
 closer family resemblance to his system, notwithstanding they 
 made their appearance prior to, and in total independence of 
 him. By Apollinaris himself they were probably never adopted ; 
 but first by a portion of his school, which appears unquestion- 
 ably to have identified itself with these earlier tendencies, in 
 consequence of a certain affinity with them. These tendencies 
 were in part of a patripassian character; though the doctrine 
 
 VOL. IT. Z 
 
354 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 of a suffering or a change, undergone by God, had been mean- 
 while modified by the doctrine of the Trinity, and had been re~ 
 stricted in its application to the Son: connected therewith, 
 however, was a partial revival of Gnostic elements, such as the 
 doctrines of a heavenly humanity of Christ, of a merely apparent 
 birth, and so forth. These reviving tendencies might derive a 
 certain support from the great stress laid by Apollinaris on the 
 unity of Christ, and his decided antagonism to the duality of the 
 natures: and so, vice versa, they afforded a certain support to 
 the idea of Apollinaris. For both the one and the other of these 
 suppositions—both the supposition that the divine nature became 
 human, and consequently underwent conversion ; and the sup- 
 position that the human nature was derived from the divine, 
 and the humanity was a heavenly one—appeared favourable to 
 the doctrine of the unity of the two natures. Our object, how- 
 ever, must be to separate Apollinaris from those tendencies, and 
 to view him simply as he was in himself. For, in the nature 
 of the case, greater weight must be laid on the distinct hints 
 given by ancient writers, that Apollinaris taught an actual birth 
 from Mary, and repudiated the notion of a conversion of God 
 into humanity,—hints which Epiphanius in particular repeats 
 (1. c.),—than upon the confusion of the view really entertained 
 by Apollinaris with theorems set forth by his school, and by 
 men who were totally independent of him—a confusion so very 
 possible, where the acquaintance with his system was but super- 
 ficial. (Note 64.) 
 
 Athanasius (Ep. ad Epict. 2) gives the following account of 
 the views pertinent to this matter, which were at that time en- 
 tertained in Corinth, and which he drew from a work written 
 by a member of the party, apparently under the title of w7ro- 
 yvnwata. In order to retain the unity of the Person.of.Christ 
 (this question was really the motive principle of their inquiries), 
 whilst conceding to Him a specific dignity, they derived His 
 humanity from the essence of the Logos; and in so far enter- 
 tained the notion of a heavenly humanity. The body born of 
 Mary was opoovcvov 77 TOD AOyou OeoTnTL; consequently, in their 
 view, there was no duality of natures in Christ. The body, say 
 they, is not younger than the deity of the Logos, but coeternal 
 with it (cuvaidioy avtd dia Tavtos yeyevnobat, érrevd) éx THs 
 ovaias THS Sophias cvvéotn). If the humanity of Christ be re- 
 
FORERUNNERS OF APOLLINARIS. 300 
 
 garded as an independent whole, instead of being derived from 
 the Logos, His exaltation would be the introduction of a Tetrad, 
 instead of a Trinity, into God; inasmuch as the human also is 
 represented as raised to God in Him. But, however decidedly 
 they asserted that the humanity of Christ was derived from the 
 essence of the Logos, they could not immediately identify it with 
 His deity ; for then the humanity would have had no existence 
 at_all, and the Docetism to which they in other respects tended 
 eer have gained the upper hand. For this reason, by way of 
 more carefully defining the notion of the heavenly humanity, 
 which is derived from the Logos, they supplemented it as fol- 
 lows,—The Logos formed a body capable of suffering, out of 
 His own substance, by conversion (ueTazroince) ; as to one aspect 
 of His essence, He renounced His immutability, fell away from 
 His own nature (7AAayn Tis idlas p¥cews), and thus converted 
 Himself into flesh, bones, and an entire body. In this way, the 
 deity of the Son, which is of the same substance with the 
 Father, curtailed itself and reduced itself from perfection to 
 imperfection (aTeAys yéyovey éx Tedelov).' Accordingly, they 
 were able to say both, that which was nailed to the cross was not 
 so much a body like ours, as the dypsovpyos ovoia of Wisdom 
 itself, that is, the natwre in God the Logos, by which He also 
 created the world: and, that Christ who suffered in the flesh, 
 and was crucified, was not the Lord and God, not the Son of 
 God; for that in Him which, in the stricter sense, was divine 
 and unchangeable, could not become man and suffer, but 
 merely that which, in one aspect of His being, He became 
 and set forth, to which He humbled Himself, into which He 
 converted Himself. It cannot be denied, that, on this sup- 
 position, apart from all other considerations, precisely that 
 which was, in the strict sense, divine in the Logos didnot. be- 
 come man: or, to use the words of the teachers of the Church, 
 
 1 Besides the forerunners of Apollinaris, with whose names we are not 
 acquainted, mention should here be made of a part of his school, which 
 Theodoret (heer. fab. 4, 9, cll. 8) is candid enough to distinguish from the 
 master himself. 4, 9 :—Tloa¢gesos (elsewhere also called Polemo) zai cuvov- 
 ciaciy Agyse vyeysvijabes xal xpaow THe bsdrnros nel Tov camaros. (Hence the 
 name Synousiasts given them by Diodorus and Theodoret.) Kal dros o¢ 
 ives tx ring Amrodiwepiou cvvayaryiys tx Tay ovpavayv eDacay xaTEAnrvbEvoes TOV 
 xuplov To cad. ArceQopa Os evpovres ey ols Exsivov cuyypapepcas Ody pecer oe of 
 (Lev TovTols, of O¢ Exeivoss Npcobncay. 
 
B96 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 such a view would throw us back on the Gnostic duality of 
 Christ. 
 
 Inconsistent with the theory just set forth seems the last 
 feature thereof, as reported by Athanasius :—The Word entered 
 into a holy man, as into one of the prophets; He Himself, how- 
 ever, did not become man when He assumed the body from Mary, 
 but Christ was one ; another, the Logos of God, who existed 
 before Mary and before the AXons, and who was the Son of the 
 Father. For whence the holy man, into whom the Word en- 
 tered, if the said man was nothing more than the Logos, who 
 had converted Himself into a man, as to the one aspect of His 
 being? ‘The explanation of the discrepancy appears to be the 
 following :—That that which we may designate nature in the 
 Logos is first distinguished from, and then again combined with, 
 that in Him which, in the strict sense, was deity and spirit. In 
 the view of the advocates of this theory, the fact of its deriva- 
 tion from the Logos seemed to secure the unity of the entire 
 Person of Christ; but it is derived from Him in different ways. 
 [ts physical aspect was the nature of the Logos, converted, 
 transformed into a man; the proper deity of the Logos did not 
 become man. On the other hand, it gave this man a share in 
 itself, in that it animated him spiritually after the manner of 
 the prophets. Thus the elements contained in the Logos may, 
 in a certain sense, be said to have been in the man Jesus, 
 though in a reverse order ;—namely, on the one hand, that 
 which in the Logos was merely a potence, to wit, the capability 
 of converting Himself into a man, had become in Jesus an ac- 
 tuality, and formed the basis of further developments ; and, on 
 the other hand, that in the Son of God which was an actuality, 
 to wit, the deity, was in Jesus a mere potence or power. Ina 
 word, the poles in the conception of the Son changed places, as 
 it were, and the result of this change was the incarnation. 
 
 With this theory the assumption of an actual body derived 
 from Mary would seem to be incompatible. And, in point of 
 fact, the heretics whom Athanasius had in view, notwithstand- 
 ing the stress they laid on the concrete humanity of Christ, pro- 
 bably did not themselves teach that Jesus had a body derived 
 from the substance of Mary.!. The same remark may, in all 
 
 ' Ad Epist. 2:—Ovx 2x Maplas, dan’ ix ric Saurov ovolas eTETOInTEY 
 EaUT A) coun radnroyv 6 Aorvos. 
 
FORERUNNERS OF APOLLINARIS. rt | 
 
 probability, be made regarding the heretics whom Basilius 
 attacks." But that such a view must necessarily lead back to 
 the long-repudiated Docetism is so very self-evident,” that we 
 can understand how efforts might, nay more, must be made, to 
 combine the theory referred to with the idea of Christ’s deriv- 
 ing His humanity from the substance of Mary. And this we 
 find in some of the heretics mentioned by Hilary (see Note 64) 
 According to the eleventh canon of the Synod of Sirmium, be- 
 sides the form referred to above, according to which, the Word 
 converted Himself into flesh, and set forth this flesh out of 
 Himself, there existed another, according to which, already ex- 
 isting flesh was received or assumed by the Word, in the sense, 
 namely, that He converted Himself into the material which He 
 found already existing (the Son “demutationem sustinentem 
 carnem accepisse”). In a similar manner, Tertullian speaks of 
 a twofold possibility in relation to the bodies of the angels who 
 appeared in Old Testament times, to wit, that they either gave 
 themselves bodies out of themselves, or took them from the 
 ether. The latter also may be termed a conversion, in so far 
 as the angels constituted the, in itself, foreign material, a form 
 of manifestation of themselves, and thus a mode of their own 
 existence. Such a doctrine of conversion, however, necessitated 
 the giving up of the notion of a humanity whose substance was 
 heavenly. This latter theory approached considerably nearer 
 the doctrine of the Church; for the Church also held that the 
 Logos appropriated from Mary a substance essentially foreign 
 to Him, and constituted it a form of His self-manifestation. Its 
 advocates, however, probably meant to go further; at all events, 
 if their prime aim was to preserve the unity of Christ. That 
 they should consent to representing the material taken from 
 Mary as something foreign to the Logos, was impossible; their 
 only course, therefore, was to lessen the distance between the 
 Logos and the humanity, into which He converted Himself, 
 either by the enhancement of the human, on the ground of the 
 divinity of human nature in general, and consequently of the 
 nature of Mary and the material taken from her; or by the 
 
 1 Ovpeviov comune txovre tov Kupiov rapayeyevicbe:. Further, they say :— 
 tx avrny tiv brotyra Ta dvbpazav Oiaaivery rebn. Basil. Ep. 65,T. 3, 104 f. 
 
 * As is remarked by Athanasius in the Epistle above referred to, and 
 by Basilius. 
 
358 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 depreciation of the Logos. As they do not appear to have 
 adopted the former plan, like some later writers, for example, 
 in the period of the Reformation, nor to have derived the 
 material in Mary, along with the whole of external nature, 
 from the nature of the creative Logos, there only remained to 
 
 them the latter alternative—the alternative of approximating. 
 
 the Logos to the flesh, on whose full humanity, derived from 
 Mary, they were resolved to insist. And accordingly they said, 
 —The Logos converted Himself into a form which rendered it 
 possible for the growth and sufferings of humanity to pass over 
 and pertain to Him without hindrance; and thus what belonged 
 to the flesh was able to become in a fuller sense His. When 
 He abased Himself, and renounced divine glory and immutabi- 
 lity, He acquired the capability of taking up humanity with its 
 affections into Himself, and constituting it a part of His own 
 being. On this view of the matter, the body must evidently be 
 regarded as the main feature of the humanity of Christ; and 
 the divine Logos alone is the soul or centre; as Apollinaris 
 taugut afterwards. Another view of the matter of a more 
 Ebionitical character we have already noticed above (see Note 
 64; Hilarius, de Trin. 10, 18, 20, 21). It also takes its start 
 with the idea of the conversion of the Logos, in its endeavours 
 to diminish the distance between the divine and human natures ; 
 but succeeds better in showing that Christ’s body and soul were 
 of like substance with us, than in demonstrating the unity of the 
 two natures. The reason whereof was, that they derived the 
 body and soul of Christ from the Adamitic humanity, and re- 
 duced the Logos to the rank of a potence animating the man 
 Jesus. But, as Athanasius frequently remarked, every theory 
 of conversion must end in Ebionism, if it follow out its_prin- 
 ciples to their legitimate results, and.say,—The Logos who.con- 
 verted Himself into man ceased thereby to be Logos, ceased to 
 be what He was. For then, in fact, nothing remains but the 
 holy man Jesus; and instead of an union of the divine and 
 human natures in the incarnation, we have the absorption of the 
 former in the latter. The Ebionism thus arrived at is different 
 indeed from the old, rigid, dialectical form thereof ; it brings the 
 divine and human aspects into flux, but without being able to 
 combine their unity with their distinction. The man who was 
 brought into existence by the conversion of the Logos into a 
 
 Ee 
 
FORERUNNERS OF APOLLINARIS. 359 
 
 man, may be converted again into God ; in such a manner, how- 
 ever, that the humanity then ceases to exist. In each we dis- 
 cover the presentiment of its union with the other, but not of 
 that unity which, by preserving the distinctive characteristics of 
 each aspect, does equal justice to both. On the contrary, it is 
 such, that now the one and then the other aspect suffers. When 
 it was the turn of the humanity, the deity was excluded; and 
 when it was the turn of the deity, the humanity was excluded. 
 The aspect which at one time excludes, is afterwards punished 
 by being itself excluded; but this punishment of error is not 
 identical with the truth. A system which does nothing but 
 alternate between two extremes, inclining first to Ebionism, and 
 then to Docetism, cannot lay claim to being the truth, which is 
 fixed and abiding; for truth, instead of substituting the one 
 error for the other, must exclude both, and this is ail possible 
 if the truth eyniainedn in the two extremes is combined to form 
 a higher unity. It is this higher unity which minds that had 
 arrived at the stage of vacillation just mentioned were already 
 seeking; and this is the explanation of the frequent occurrence 
 at this time of theories which had had a partial existence before; 
 for now the day was approaching when the intellect of the 
 Church must apply itself to the task of combining in unity the 
 two aspects of the Person of Christ. (Note 65.) 
 
 The theories just considered, which, as in the third century, 
 were only set forth in rough outline, and which inclined back- 
 wards, now to Ebionism, and then to Gnosticism, acquired in the 
 hands of Apollinaris.a new form, characterized by greater refine- 
 ment and ‘greater freedom from the old heretical excrescences 
 
 To take our start with the antagonistic element which de- 
 termined the form of his system :—it was not the doctrine of 
 the Church with which he felt himself in conflict; but, from 
 the state of the Church’s Christology in his day, there is every 
 reason for judging that he believed himself to be in harmony 
 with its spirit and meaning, and desired to express himself as it 
 required. The element to which he felt himself_in antagonism 
 
 was rather, in the first instance, . Arianism ; and Ranta con- 
 ditioned the form assumed by his ideas and expressions. We 
 know what a high significance Arianism attached to the posi- 
 tion,—The Son of God is mutable, is a tperrov, which was able 
 to be either good or evil, and which decided for the good by a 
 
360 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 free act of will. This position, ascribing as it did freedom of 
 choice to the Logos also, and thus subjecting Him to the laws 
 of a finite development, set the seal to His finitude, and gave 
 such predominance to the moral over the religious point of 
 view, that we may fairly regard it as the central feature of the 
 Arian polemic against the doctrine of the Church. We can, 
 therefore, easily understand that the speculative mind and re- 
 ligious soul of a man like Apollinaris, must feel itself intensely 
 revolted ther eby. 
 
 Still, the objection felt to the position by Apollinaris must 
 have been of quite a different character from that felt by those 
 Church teachers who devoted almost exclusive attention to the 
 doctrine of the Trinity, and ‘little or none to Christology. Not 
 that the principle was more objectionable in his eyes than in 
 the eyes of the other teachers of the Church, because it en- 
 dangered the doctrine of the Trinity, which he also entertained ; 
 but he saw more clearly than the rest. its. Christological.conse- 
 quences. If in Christ everything depended on the free will of 
 a finite being, redemption is not a divine work at. all, but_a 
 finite being made himself redeemer by his.own free act. On 
 this supposition, He who is termed Redeemer rather shows us 
 how it is possible for a finite being to redeem himself than re- 
 deems us; the redemption of Christ Himself becomes vacillating 
 and uncertain ; nay more, no such thing as a Christology can 
 exist, for a Christology necessarily presupposes the presence 
 and action of God in Christ. 
 
 Hence the point against which Apollinaris directed-his-chief 
 arguments was the tpemror, or the idea of freedom of .choice.in 
 Christology. One might readily suppose that he must exclude 
 freedom of choice from the higher nature of Christ; but why 
 did he not concede it to His humanity? The other teachers « of 
 the Church, also, were reserved in relation to this, as yet little 
 considered, point (see above, pages 350 f.); the more naturally, 
 therefore, could Apollinaris follow out the inclination he felt, to 
 exclude every trace of the tpem7év from this person. He had, 
 moreover, really the strongest occasion for doing so in the cir- 
 cumstance, that his aim was to construct.aChristology.on the 
 basis of the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity. He was the first 
 who endeavoured to turn to account for Christology the results 
 attained in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity. 
 
 ar 
 
APOLLINARIS. 361 
 
 With the greatest decision he takes his start from the prin- 
 ciple, that the higher element in Christ must be conceived, not 
 as a mere power, but as an hypostasis, as an independent t7ro- 
 xejwevov. An incarnation has not taken place at all, if the 
 Logos was present in Jesus merely in the form.of an animating 
 power, as in the prophets, or if He merely joined Himself on 
 to a perfect and personal man. For, on the former supposition, 
 He merely worked, He did not personally dwell, in the man 
 Jesus; on the second supposition, the Logos can, it is true, be 
 more correctly said to have been present in Jesus. At the 
 same time, inasmuch as He is omnipresent, and we live and 
 move in Him, nothing specific is left for Christ; and we can 
 no more speak of an incarnation in this case, than we can de- 
 scribe His omnipresence as an incarnation. (Note 66.) 
 
 Christ must be one person; He cannot have merely assumed, 
 He must have become, man. If the divine, the Logos, dwelt 
 personally in Him, there cannot have been a second human 
 person in Him; for in that case Christ must have been a mon- 
 strosity, rather than an unity.” If the humanity of Christ also 
 possessed its own living, spiritual centre, we should have to 
 attribute to Him two wills; and as freedom of choice pertains 
 essentially to the human centre, we should be driven to assume 
 the existence of an immutable will (that of the Logos) and a 
 mutable will (that of the man Jesus), in one and the same sub- 
 ject. Such a result can only be avoided by denying to Christ 
 the human vods or the human zvedua, in which freedom of 
 choice has its seat; not, however, as though this person had no 
 vous whatever, but the Logos constituted Himself the human vods 
 in Him. By thus excluding voids and the tpemrov, he supposed 
 that he had not merely laid a firm basis for the unity of Christ’s 
 person, but also that the way was cleared for a specific and per- 
 sonal indwelling of the Logos, and, as a natural consequence, for 
 the acknowledgment of the full reality of the incarnation. 
 
 The principle that, on the assumptionof anusual. human 
 vods, the incarnation would be an impossibility; and that, on 
 the other hand, if we deny a human vods to Christ, the Logos 
 
 LL. c.c. 49, p. 257: Ei 62 qusic wey éx cpsay (compare c. 35, 46, p. 
 248; c. 48, pp. 254 f.) abrds 02 éx reocapav, ovum avbowxos &AN avOparmcdcos. 
 Unless, says he, this person is half man and half God, which would be no 
 unity, but a monster, like a tpayérnQos, wivaroupos, xevTaupos, lamernnQas. 
 
362 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 as He is in the Father, first attains a personal existence in the 
 man Jesus, His incarnation can be acknowledged to have been 
 a reality,—Apollinaris establishes in the various ways. 
 
 In his work entitled, “ Proof of the Divine Incarnation in 
 the Image of Man,” he says (compare Gregor. Antirrhet. adv. 
 Apollinar. c. 6): Paul of Samosata, Marcellus, Photinus, re- 
 present Christ as a man in whom God was, as a God-animated 
 man, avOpwrros évOeos. He is not, however, a man of the earth; 
 but it is testified of Him, that He came down from heaven, the 
 Son of man. He is the man who came down from heaven, 
 although in another respect He was born of Mary. Christ 
 must not be described as a man who carried God within Him- 
 self (év@éov), as though one being had been in another, different 
 being; but the Christ who was incarnate in human flesh, had 
 God for His rvedua, had God in Himself as His vods (p- 143. 
 Keretvor, évOcov avOpwrov jun éyew Tov Xpictov, Oeov e&xovra 
 ev éavTd ws addov év GA\AW—TOV capKobévta TH avOpaTrivy 
 capkt Tov Xpiocrov év éavT® Ocov 70 wvedpa Todt eote Tov vodv 
 éyew). If, alongside of God, who even in Himself is voids, 
 there was also a human vods in Christ, the work of incarnation 
 was not at all accomplished in Him (1. c.: Ee peta tod Ocod, 
 dnow, vod dvtos Kal avOpemwos vovs Fv év Xpiote, ov“ apa 
 eTLTEAElTAL EV AUT® TO THS capKocews Epyov; c. 38, p. 220); 
 for, in that case, the man must have remained by himself, and 
 God also by Himself. We should then have two persons 
 (zpdcw7ra), God and the man assumed by Him (ec. 35). If 
 the divine vods was not in Him in the flesh, He was merely the 
 wisdom which enlightens the spirit of man; and, inasmuch as 
 this wisdom dwells in all men, the advent of Christ was not the 
 dwelling of God amongst.us,.but.simply the birth of an ordi- 
 nary man (c. 36, p. 215). C. 48, p. 237: “If he who receives 
 
 1 Compare, further, c. 9, p. 142: To dy rvedue, rove’ gore rv vou soy 
 exay o Xptores mera Wuxis nal cwmeros sixcrac dvOpwmros eS ovpavov Agyerau. 
 C. 7, p. 1387: eds mév Qnot, ro rvedmari, TO cupxabertt, avOowmros Of TH UmO 
 rov Ocov, rpooanPbcion oceoxt. 
 
 2 Avo xpéowre Agyovos (our antagonists) rév @sdv, xal tov rape Ocod 
 zpocrnQbevtra c&vOowrov. On the contrary, we ought rather to speak of the 
 aapxabels, Who odx erepds gare Tape Toy écawerov, but the same x08 duolaciw 
 nucrépas tv cepxi Canc. The passage, c. 36, p. 215, see Note 66.—C. 43, p. 
 237: El 6 Osov deZauevog sds gariv &Anbivoc, rorrol ay elev Beal, exeidn rorrol 
 Déxovrees Tov Ody. 
 
APOLLINARIS. 363 
 
 God into himself is very God, there must be many Gods, for 
 many receive God into themselves ;” consequently, no specific 
 dignity can be assigned to Christ. If the perfect God was 
 united with a perfect man, there must-have been two. Where- 
 fore, the human race could not be saved by the assumption of 
 the vods and of the whole man, but solely by the assumption of 
 the cdp& (ovK apa cateras 70 avOpwrwov yévos Ss avadirews 
 vod Kat drov avOpwrrov, Grd Sia TpoTdipews capKos. Kai 
 yap et avOparr@ Tédelp auvijpOn Oeds Tédevos, dVo av oar. 
 Compare c. 34, 35). Gregory of Nyssa replied, indeed (c. 39), 
 How can the imperfect, the capé, combine with its antithesis 
 (the Logos) to form an unity? for the perfect in union with 
 the imperfect rather forms a Dyad, a Dualism. Why does the 
 divine vods shut out the human? But Apollinaris had already 
 given a reply (c. 40). Because the human is a vets tperros, 
 mutable in virtue of its freedom of choice; whereas the divine 
 is immutable. But the work of redemption demanded for its 
 accomplishment an immutable spirit, which would not succumb 
 to the flesh, by reason of the weakness of its knowledge; but 
 which would be able harmoniously to accommodate and annex 
 the flesh to itself without violence. He cannot save the world 
 who is himself subject to the universal corruption of men; no 
 one can_break the curse..of sin who 1s_not essentially a sinless 
 man (c. 51). Now, men generally, and angels, are free to 
 choose; and for beings endowed with freedom of choice to be 
 no longer free to choose, i is destruction. 'The Redeemer, there- 
 fore, could not share freedom of choice, accessible as it is to 
 evil; nay more, this freedom of choice must not be supposed to 
 have existed, and to have then been annihilated by the Logos, 
 for no nature is destroyed by Him who created it. ‘This-man 
 was rather destitute of freedom.of choice from the very begin- 
 ning. And, notwithstanding this lack, He was man. Man 
 consists of ere elements,—flesh, soul, iG ‘Spirit (vods, c. 8, p. 
 141; c.46, p. 248)3 in’ proof of aan he appeals to 1 Thess. 
 v. 23. But Christ also consisted of three elements,—vvedyua, 
 Wuxn, and c@pua (Note 67). He did not, of course, derive His 
 mvedua from men; nor was it fitting age He should do so; for 
 then He would not have been the eaeurtl Adam from heaven, 
 but like the earthly Adam. If the man from heaven had been 
 in all things like us who are earthly, even to the possession ot 
 
364 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 the same qvetua as we the yoixol, He would not have been the 
 heavenly man, but rather the mere lodging-place, the receptacle 
 (Soyetov) of the heavenly God. Of the Church teachers, some 
 supposed the souls of men to be a direct creation, and not tobe 
 derived from the race (compare Hilarius, de Trin. 10, 20). 
 Were this to be accepted as true, connection of blood with the 
 race must be concluded to be unnecessary to the truth of the 
 humanity of the soul; all that is necessary is, that it should 
 proceed from God. Taking his stand on this principle, Apol- 
 hnaris might have argued,—Christ cannot be fairly said to 
 belong to a different genus from other men, because the Logos 
 became His votds; for all souls proceed directly forth from God, 
 and are not derived from the race. He does not appear, how- 
 ever, to have adopted-this course (compare Hilar. ed. Maurin. 
 p. 1047, Not. e). According to Nemesius, he held that souls 
 are generated by souls, as bodies are generated by bodies. But 
 this idea also presented to him a new outlet, nay more, a new 
 argument for his theory. That which arises in the way of pro- 
 pagation, is not in the full sense zvedua, but merely soul; Adam 
 became a living soul, but he lacked wvedpya, which was first 
 brought to him by Christ, the Man from heaven. What Adam 
 did not possess, he was naturally unable to propagate. Now, 
 although the creation of man did not attain completion till the 
 divine wvedua assumed the highest place, the hegemony in 
 him,—for the first time in Christ, through the incarnation, 
 when the Logos became the vods or wvedua of the individual 
 man Jesus; afterwards in believers, who become by grace 
 what He was by birth;—Jesus, possessed as He was of body 
 and soul, was a man, even apart from the qvedua; for no one 
 hesitates to call Adam a man, notwithstanding he was not yet 
 endowed with spirit, but was merely a living soul (uyn Sdoa, 
 c. 12). Apollinaris appears to have thought that, with the 
 incarnation and regeneration, a new third element was super- 
 added, without which man is not quite complete; for, to the 
 full idea of man belong three elements, although it is right to 
 term him man even before the addition of the third element. 
 According to this theory, therefore, those who lived prior 
 to Christ, or who now live out of Him, are not yet actual 
 persons, but mere generic beings, individuals who stand in-the 
 relation of accidents to the genus that produces them. First, 
 
APOLLINARIS. 365 
 
 when a higher element than that which the kind can bestow 
 unites itself with them, and constitutes itself the central-point 
 of their essence, do they become persons; and then every other 
 part of their being stands in the relation to the higher element 
 (the é>@ av@pwros) of the subject to the ruler. The inner 
 man becomes the kernel of the essence; the outward man, on 
 the contrary, is something almost accidental, merely determined 
 by the inner man. In Christ, the Logos assumed the place of 
 the inner man.’ Whereas in Adam there was at the very 
 utmost a vods, which was the servant of the cap&, and was 
 compelled to make the flesh its content, but never passed out of 
 its potential and impotent existence to actuality and dominion ; 
 in Christ, on the contrary, because the Logos was His voids, 
 there came an all-prevailing holy principle. No evil thought 
 could arise in the inner being of Christ; however seductive the 
 flesh might be, it found a ruler instead of a response, in the 
 vods of Christ. But if Christ never had even an evil thought, 
 and if His spirit never carried an evil thought into execution 
 by means of the body, sin found no place in Him, however 
 strongly the flesh, with its yuvy7, may have been opposed to the 
 voos. or only that can be called evil in which the vods takes 
 part (Athan. c. Ap. 1, 2).” 
 
 From what has been advanced, we may see that Apollinaris 
 might without hesitation have designated Christ a composite 
 person (cvvGerov), after the example of the Church ;* save that 
 he most decidedly protested against representing the factors as 
 anything else but elements of the one, indivisible person: a com- 
 position of the person out of two persons, to which the opinion 
 of many of the teachers of the Church seemed to lead, he felt 
 compelled entirely to repudiate. ‘T’o his mind also, the duality 
 of the dicets,—if the dvcevs are to be conceived as complete,— 
 was equivalent to a duality of wpdcwma. For if Christ’s hu- 
 man nature hada vods and an avre£ovccov like other men from 
 Adam, according to Apollinaris, it was an independent spo- 
 
 1 Ath. c. Apoll. 1, 2: “Avt? rod goadev gy quiv avOnamov vous éroupeeyios 
 Ey Xpiot@" as yao opycvinw nevpnToroxynuati TO TeolsxovTse’ ov yelp oldvrs ys 
 TéAciov cevOoumrov airov yévecbasr. Avo rércice Ev yévecdocs ov Ovvaret. 
 
 2 Compare Gregor. ]. c. p. 273, c. 55; Athan. c. Ap. 1, 2. 
 
 3 But still he only believed in ule Qvais ovyvberos. Compare A. Mai 7 
 301 f. 
 
366 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 cwrov. For this reason, he deemed it necessary to refuse con- 
 ceding even a duality of guceis. We see, therefore, that the 
 favourite phrase of the later Synousiasts, pia dtvows Ocod royor 
 cecapxwpévn, belonged to him also as to its sense. On the other 
 hand, the preceding exposition shows that it could occasion him no 
 difficulty to represent the humanity of Christ (cdua and ux) 
 without vods) as something appropriated from Mary, to designate 
 it érixtntov.! ‘To teacha conversion of the deity into humanity 
 and its tpemrov, could by no means be his intention ; for the very 
 obvious reason, that in order to avoid the tpemov, and to secure 
 unalterable virtue and wisdom (dvowxn) for this man, he repre- 
 sented the Logos as his vods. By doing so, he would unneces- 
 sarily have posited the very thing which he had made every 
 effort to avoid. Without giving up His being and undergoing 
 conversion, God cannot become man, says he, save in the 
 sense of His taking the place of the vods in the man (J esus).” 
 
 The features hitherto mentioned, give us, however, but a 
 superficial view of the theory of Apollinaris. Were that all, the 
 charge of teaching a Christ who does not at all belong to our 
 genus or class of beings, repeatedly brought against him by 
 Gregory of Nyssa, would be, without any restriction, well 
 founded. For in the case of men, the new divine principle con- 
 nects itself with a vods which is human, although it may be 
 merely an impotent or subject potence until the wvedua comes, 
 which proceeds from Christ : in the case of Christ, on the con- 
 trary, no trace whatever of vods would appear to have been de- 
 rived from the humanity. On this supposition, the charge of 
 positing as one, things which are two and cannot be one, brought 
 by Apollinaris against the doctrine of the Church, would recoil 
 upon himself; for the humanity which he attributes to Christ 
 is something external to the personal centre therein, like a gar- 
 ment, or like the house in which any one dwells. In point of 
 fact, although he saw that to represent the human as the mere 
 
 1 Compare Gregor. 1. c. p. 230; p. 222, c. 29; p. 207, c. 34; p. 240, 
 c. 44. 
 
 2 Tas, Onot, Oscs dvdparos yiveras, poy mera Banbels dao TOV civas Osos, sl 
 Len vous gv dvoparw xertorn, |. c. c. 56, p. 277. Both Theodoret (see above, 
 page 355, note) and Epiphanius discharge him of intending to teach such 
 a conversion, as also of the doctrine of a heavenly c@oZ. Athanasius also 
 
 (c. Apol. 1, 2) speaks of the different theories which had been worked out 
 relatively to this point. 
 
APOLLINARIS. 367 
 
 doyxetov of the Logos did not exhaust the idea of the incarna- 
 tion ; notwithstanding, further, that he frequently condemns 
 the avOpwrros évGeos as a meagre representation, the propositions 
 adduced above do not give us anything more than the notion 
 of a God present in a human shell, unquestionably impersonal ; 
 which is very far from an incarnation, and is rather a mere 
 theophany. We must, however, at the same time, not forget to 
 mention that the (clint teachers..of his day had not really ad- 
 vanced a: any fur ther. ' They were even undecided whether the man 
 Jesus, so far as a human soul is to be attributed to Him, ought 
 not to be conceived as personal by Himself ; in which case, seeing 
 that the Logos could only influence Jesus from without, either 
 Christ must have been a double person (whose unity falls more 
 into the subject and its presuppositions than into the object),” or 
 God was not present in Him in any specific sense ; and consis- 
 tently they ought to have gone back from the idea of a theophany 
 as far as Ebionism (compare A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 7, 20 a). 
 
 But what makes the theory of Apollinaris specially interest- 
 ing, is the mode in which he overcomes this difficulty, in which 
 he represents the composite person as an indivisible unity, and 
 in which he aims at assigning to the Logos, as the substitute for 
 the human voids, not an external and foreign position, but one 
 which constitutes Him the truth of the humanity, and gives 
 His incarnation its reality. 
 
 “The humanity of Christ,” says he, “is that which is moved, 
 the deity is the mover; the former, which was not a perfect 
 living being by itself, in order that it might be a complete being, 
 was compounded to an unity, was conjoined with its hegemoni- 
 eal principle. It was united with, and made part of, the hege- 
 monical principle from heaven, as to its passivity ; and it in turn 
 
 received the divine, which was constituted its own, as to its 
 
 1 The less can we be surprised to find Apollinaris sometimes using also 
 the simile—Humanity was the temple of the Logos. A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 7, 
 203. John does not say that the Logos became cap and Wuyy, édvveroy 
 recip Sv0 vospa, noel bernrind ty TH dua norolnsiv, ive Loy TO ETEpov nate TOD 
 Erépov ctvrioTpareunr es dice THs olxslas bernocws nal evepysias. The Logos, 
 therefore, assumed, not a human soul, but merely Abraham’s seed, roy yap 
 roy coaros Inoov vacv mpoditypabev 6 arpuxyos, nal dvous, xal a&beang tov 
 Sorowavros vadc. 
 
 2 Deren Einheit schon mehr in das Subject und seine Voraussetzungen, 
 als in das Object fallt. 
 
368 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 activity. And so one living being was formed of the moved 
 and the mover, and not two beings ; nor one being out of two 
 complete, self-moved beings.”* In the Holy Scriptures, we find 
 no separation whatever made between the Logos and His hu- 
 manity ; but it is one being, one hypostasis, and one activity 
 (Ovdeuia Svaipecis Tod Adyov Kai THs capKos adTod ev tals 
 Geiaus ypadais: ad’ éore pla pious, ula bTrooTacts, wia évépyeta } 
 A. Mai I. c. p. 73). A disciple of Apollinaris, Julian, writes 
 to another, Polemon, as follows: °—“ Alone, and for the first 
 time, did our father Apollinaris give utterance to, and clear up, 
 the mystery hidden from all; to wit, that Christ became one. 
 being and a composite nature, constituted out of the moveable 
 and the immoveable ; which nature alone, moved by the one will, 
 by one activity accomplished the miracles and the sufferings.” 
 Apollinaris himself also was very well aware that the Church 
 teachers of his time made too light of Christology, and he set 
 for himself a higher and truer goal, in that he aimed at attain-. 
 ing a living intuition of the unity of this person, and at an 
 understanding of how the same subject can be designated both 
 God and man; whereas (as he objects) the teachers of the 
 Church contented themselves with merely saying what belonged 
 to a complete humanity, and what to a complete deity, but 
 troubled themselves little with the question of how the two can 
 become one person. And yet this question was just the prin- 
 cipal thing ; for unless it be answered, the incarnation cannot 
 be shown to have really happened, and all previous labour has 
 been in vain. They who, under the cloak of faith, take up a 
 
 * A. Mai, Coll. Nov. 7, 301 :— Hadpé érepoxiunros oven ravras bd Tov 
 xivovrros wal cryouTos, O%oIds Tore ay Eln TOUTO’ xal odw gyTSASs ODTH Caov &@ 
 eauriis, &Ar eis ro yévecdars Coon evrenrss ovuredereeeyy TpOs EVOTNTA TH Nryepooving 
 ovynrdev, xk cuvstedn mpos TO ovpayioy rysovinoy, eLorxeiwmbcion AUTO xara TO 
 waenrixoy savrns, sal AcBovoe ro bciov oixsiwbev aUTN noted TO Evepyntinoy" 
 ovra yelp sv Caov éx xivoumsvov xael xivytixod ov¥lotero, ucel ov U0, } gx O00 Té- 
 Asian nal avroxivynrar’ didmep dvbomros nev Erepov ts Caov wpdg Osdv, xcel ov @sds, 
 aAAG DOvAS Ocov, dev ovpaviay Tis Ovvaels, aoavTUS eyes caps 02, Ocod aap 
 yevowevn, Cacy tors sta ravta cuvredcion cig wlav Quow. 
 
 7 A. Mail. c. p. 70: Ex xuvarinod nol céxivyrod, tvepyntinod ce nel 3ee- 
 Ontixod, tov Xpiorcy shvecs, winy ovolev noel Qvow avvderov, vl re nal wovoy 
 xivovpeevyy Osrnuwarh nal wie evepysla re re Oavmora reroinnsva nol ra rebn 
 udvos xl rpuros 6 rarhp quay Aworwepies EC0syZero, +6 HEXOULLEVOY TAAL 
 “xaetTaQor ioe: MvoTApioy 
 
APOLLINARIS. 369 
 
 position, with which the incarnation is as good as incompatible, 
 are chargeable with entertaining ante-Christian views, either of 
 an heathenish or of a Jewish kind. But such a position is taken 
 up by those who teach two self-moving (adtoxivyta) beings, a 
 twofold vods, a twofold will; for these can never be made one. 
 (Note 68.) The human aspect of Christ must rather be so 
 conceived, that it shall of itself point to the divine as its comple- 
 ment, and not be represented as a perfect thing, standing side 
 by side with another perfect thing. Consequently, the only 
 satisfactory course is to represent the divine as the active ele- 
 ment, the human as that which is moved by the hegemonic 
 divine principle, not as moving itself. In this way, he consi- 
 dered, we can understand that the two together first constituted 
 the one person. For that which is moved presupposes, and of 
 itself suggests, that which moves; and, on the other hand, the 
 divine that moves would continue shut up in itself, a lifeless 
 principle, if it did not display its motive power on something 
 that is moved; indeed, without an object moved, the Logos 
 would have no organ by which to manifest Himself.t Mover 
 and moved are correlative ideas : a mover is inconceivable with- 
 out a moved ; and vice vers4, a moved is inconceivable without 
 a mover; and so, deity and humanity, as belonging in this re- 
 spect inwardly to each other, combined to constitute one actual, 
 indivisible divine-human life. 
 
 Apollinaris, however, endeavoured to gain a still more com- 
 plete conception of this personal unity. It is true, he_repre- 
 sented the humanity of Christ, considered by itself and apart 
 from the Unio, as an imperfect being ; but the deity which took 
 the place of the soul and of the human vods, was not something 
 alien to the human essence ; but the human essence, which tends, 
 as it were, towards the perfection of itself in the form of a per- 
 son, acquired it for its own: and, in like manner, the Logos made 
 the human His own, constituted it a determination of Himself. 
 As it is an imperfect description to say,—I have, or am the 
 vehicle and bearer of a body or a soul, seeing that the connec- 
 tion of the two with my essence is not accurately expressed till 
 
 * He designates humanity an organ, A. Mai 1. c. 302, and p- 20 b. :— 
 
 ” \ \ ae, ] me , re > ~ \ 2) ae ew ONS 
 Opyavoy nal ro xosvory (1. xvod) pricey méQunev drorensiv ray bvéprescey bd 
 
 cepxoc. (From his work against Diodorus.) 
 VOL. It. 24 
 
370 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 having is supplanted by being; Apollinaris felt that merely to 
 speak of God bearing a man in Himself, or of God having | a 
 man as His organ or Annee was not to do justice to. the idea of 
 the incarnation. NaonEE his aim was to show that each 
 of the two, humanity and deity, stood in the position of a deter- 
 mination of the being of the other, both belonging together. 
 In these genuinely speculative efforts, he was guided by the 
 most important practical and religious interests. “ If there was 
 in Christ one being and another being, unity and sameness of 
 worship must be condemned; for the Creator and the creature, 
 God and man, may not be worshipped after the like fashion. 
 But the worship paid to Christ is one, and therefore God and 
 man are included under one ‘and the same name. Consequently, 
 we must not say that in Christ there were two essences, God 
 and man; but one undivided being, constituted by God’s con- 
 junction of Himself with an human body.t And as it would 
 involve the division and destruction of the object of Christianity, 
 the Person of Christ, to maintain that He ought to be worshipped 
 as to one aspect of His being, and not as to the other (which we 
 certainly must maintain, if the humanity were not in some way 
 or other a momentum of the deity); so also would it involve the 
 breaking up of the unity of His own consciousness (A. Mai 7, 
 301). ‘Adwvaror, TOV avTov Kal T poo KUUTOV éavTov eidévat Kal 
 un. “Adtvarov dpa Tov adtov etvat Oedv Te Kal dvOpwmov é€ odo- 
 KANpPOV, ANN €V {LovoTntl cuyKpatou praews Oeixis TETAPKWLEVNS. 
 Further, the idea of the incarnation is weakened, and we fall 
 back into long-repudiated. heresies, if we teach merely an activity 
 (évepyeta) of the Logos in a complete man, instead of teach- 
 ing that an human Slevin formed. part.of the Logos Himself. 
 
 1 A. Mar. 1. c. 16:—"Aaans xal darng ovolas play elvas nal roy aoriy 
 mpooxvynow abéuiroy, TouTéotiy ToinToD xeel roimworos, Osod xal cevOparov. 
 Mic 02 4 pooxtyqots Tov Xpiorod xal xara rodro ev rH Evl cvomars vosiras Osos 
 nol dvbpwmros. Ovx dow &rrn xol arrn ovale Osds nal evOpumos? arred olor 
 nar cvvbcow Ocod xpos coma evbporivov. Compare ibid. the fragment from 
 the letter to Jovian. 
 
 2 A. Mail. c. p. 20:—Ted caQas eAnrer/ eve zoel Lah sada EnneeY- 
 puypéve viv mary aveveovobal rives ET IMEKELPIKOO, wel cov && ovpavov dev- 
 repov avOpumroy moxpordedopuevoy UrO THY aTOCTOAMY &x YS dv Bpucroy elvoes ofoy 
 roy ~pdrspov BrcoOnuovar, ro avOpamrivoy Tov Aavyou eis Evepyssay THY EV civ Opormes 
 wsrapaarnovtes. (From the work of Apollinaris entitled, xepi ris Oelas oap- 
 XOTEOE, Cc. 12.) 
 
APOLLINARIS. ayilé 
 
 F inally—and this he deemed of chief importance—a perfect 
 union of the divine and human appeared to him indispensably 
 necessar y to the accomplishment of the redemptive work of 
 Christ.1 Against the doctrine of the Church he brought the 
 char ge of having merely human sufferings in the sufferings of 
 Chia eras, that the death of a man could not be the 
 death of death (Greg. Antirrhet. c. 51, pp. 263 ff.). Gregory 
 saw Clearly enough the importance of the objection, and sought 
 to show that the Logos was truly humbled and truly took part 
 in sufferings ; but all he really succeeded in doing, was to repre- 
 sent Christ as reckoning to Himself the sufferings which, strictly 
 speaking, belonged solely to His humanity, on the ground of the 
 ment belonging to His person. Apollinaris, on the contrary, 
 maintained at he unity..of..the.Person..of..Christ..was.not 
 secured, unless we can say,—Our God was.crucified, and man 
 is Peed to the right hand.of God: the Son of Man was.from 
 heaven, and the Son of God was born of a woman (Greg. Nyss. 
 Antirrh. c.6; A. Mai 7, p. 73 :—Tovéaiou 76 cha cravpob&rtes 
 (leg. oravpdcavtes) Ocdv éotavpwoav). And the work of unit- 
 ing God and man is first accomplished when God puts Himself 
 completely in the place of humanity, and man is exalted to God. 
 
 But how does he bring the two together? We have already 
 remarked, that whilst representing the humanity of Christ as 
 neste apart from the incarnation, he refuses to allow that, 
 
 on this ee the ee Sor in the Person of Civ 
 
 expresses ¢ as Stern. TVvEd La In iret was freee TVEVLA, 
 although divine (c. 27). Nay more, he says also, the divine 
 mvedua or the Logos, which in Christ was human mvedua, was 
 eternal, and _existed.before the incarnation. The Logos must 
 eRorere have existed as man also, prior to the incarnation, and 
 His deity was in itself man from “ke very beginning. Gregory 
 took the words to mean, that Apollinaris held the flesh of Christ 
 
 * Greg. Nyss. Antirrhet. p. 131 ff., c. 5. His entire aim in the Aoyo- 
 ypePie on the incarnation is to show,—ré dyyrdy rod Movorysvovs viod ray 
 eornra, xl ory! Ta dvOpwrivw ro wabos OsEacbat, AAR THY drodH nal dvar- 
 Aolwroy Quow wpos wabous pustrovolayv &arroiwdyves.—C. 27: The doctrine of 
 the Church allows Him who was crucified nothing divine in His own nature, 
 not even the best, that is, tyvsiue. C. 26, p. 185; ¢. 54, p. 271. 
 
Si2 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 to be eternal; and inasmuch as he, notwithstanding, represented 
 Mary as the mother of Christ, therefore, concludes Gregory, 
 he must have conceived Mary also to be eternal. He posits 
 coarse composite matter as eternal. But Apollinaris never 
 taught this; nowhere did he assume an heavenly humanity in 
 this sense. But he viewed the wvedua or the Logos in Christ 
 as the eternal humanity ;' probably on the ground of His 
 being the archetype of universal humanity. To him the Logos 
 was ina God and archetypal man; and that in the sense of 
 His having been eternally destined to become man, in an his 
 torical form. The Logos thus revealed that iy had been 
 latent in His nature from the very beginning.” It is possible 
 that, in his mind, he connected therewith the Platonic doctrine 
 of a Kdapos vonros, in which the archetypes (e/67) of all things 
 are ideally or potentially contained, though as yet by no means 
 possessed of phenomenal, external actuality ; hence also the in- 
 carnation of the Logos. Of this tendency are undoubtedly the 
 words attributed to him by Gregory, ovpdvidv tt capkos eidos 
 advaTatTeL Tept TO Oeiov (c. 42, p. 234, compare c. 6); which, 
 however, cannot by any means have been already the principle 
 of the material element of the humanity of Christ, but merely 
 the form or plastic power. At all events, regarding the Logos as 
 he did, not as something foreign to, but as the truth of, the hu- 
 manity itself, he was able to say,—The primal grounds of the 
 incarnation lay, not in the Virgin,* but in the eternal Logos 
 
 1P. 149, c. 18:—Tlpourapyes, Qnaly, 6 &vbowros Xpisrs, ovx%, as Erépov 
 Gyros weep avToy TOU TvEV[LaTOS, TOUT ZoTs TOV Ocod, HAA ws Tov Kuplov ev rn 
 Tov becevOparov Quoes delov avevaros dvros. He existed as a man zpo ris 
 Davepiozas, to wit, abray rod viod deornrae && cipxns avdpuxay elves, that is, in 
 Himself, in essence, but not in appearance. 
 
 2C.14:—"Oxep qu ri Quoet, toro EPavepadn vu». C. 15, p. 154: Ta 
 Aavbcvoy Osiov xara Quow dv, rovtTo TH THs EvavPpwaryoews EPavepady xeelpy. 
 Compare below, page 372, and notes. 
 
 3°H dele ceprwots ov ry dpyny dro Ths Tapbevov toxev, Cc. 15, p. 153. 
 But he cannot have added,—the humanity of Christ, which existed from 
 the beginning, before Abraham and the creation toe’rn ravrws qv, ole ois 
 wabnrais taparo orefpa. However strongly Apollinaris may have expressed 
 the identity of the eternal <ido¢ of Christ, in the central-point of the xéoo¢ 
 vonros, he cannot have transferred the earthly corporeality of Christ to 
 heaven ; for otherwise the xéojos voyros would have been aicdyrcs and not 
 yvontos. That he did not hold the humanity out of Mary to be eternal, we 
 shall show hereafter (see page 373 ff.). 
 
APOLLINARIS. 373 
 
 Himself, who, by His essential nature, is the eternal archetype 
 of humanity, and bears within Himself the potence of a real 
 incarnation. The divine nature is humanity (7 Qela gvous capt 
 éoti, c. 18, p. 163); of the man in Christ, he says—He was the 
 brightness of the Father’s glory, and in Him the essence of God 
 acquired a form." His humanity was of one substance with 
 God (opoovetos, cvpdutos)’ prior to the birth on earth, yea, 
 prior to the universe, and was the companion of God (ec. 28). 
 Now, although, fixing our eye on the latent potence of incarna- 
 tion, humanity was far from being something merely accessory 
 in relation to God (érixtntov, émuywopmevor), seeing that it be- 
 longed to the eternal idea of the Logos; and although, further, 
 humanity, as realized in the unity of the Person of Christ, can- 
 not be termed accessory, and is therefore cvvovotwpevn, cvp- 
 dutos (c. 17, p. 160) with the deity; we may still say, the 
 equality of Jesus Christ with the Father was eternal, and pre- 
 ceded the incarnation, but His resemblance to men is something 
 superadded.? For the rest, believing as he did the humanity 
 of Christ to be essentially one with the Logos, Apollinaris was 
 in a far different position from the Church teachers of his time 
 for providing for the eternal continuance of the humanity ; and 
 of his superior facilities in this respect, he was well aware. For 
 him there was no necessity, indeed no_reason, for allowing the 
 humanity to disappear in the Logos, whether by conversion or 
 absorption into the divine glory; for he deemed it to be a de- 
 termination of the Logos coeternal..with the..Logos Himself. 
 On the other hand, the more strongly the Church teachers 
 were compelled to feel that they had not taken sufficient care 
 
 10.19, p. 164 :—Tov dybpurroy sivas ris Tod Osov O6Ens dravycopec, xoel 
 éy TH cupxivg OsQ iy Tov Osov Vrcoraciy xapaxtnpiCeobas. 
 
 2 ©. 18:—God designates (Zech. xiii. 7) the Shepherd whom the sword 
 strikes, dydpe cve@vacy wov; which Apollinaris refers to the humanity 
 of Christ. P. 161 :—"Eors 0¢ dv rovrots xataQaves, Ors autos 6 kvbpwros o 
 Aaryoes Qulv re TOU wats, Osds eors ToInTHs TAY alavaY, dravYATKe d0Ens, 
 KLPUNT Hp THs UTOGTATEMS aUTOD, are ON TH IDlw rveduuts Osds ay xual ov Oxov 
 txwy ty Eaut@ erepov wap avtov, autres 6 0” Exutod, TovTéoTs Die THs TupKOS 
 xabaplous xdomov &ueptioy. Compare c. 28. 
 
 3 ©. 17, p. 160 :—Ovx éarixrnros (as, for example, Eustathius had said) 
 éxl rn evepysoin yiveras 4 ops Tn Oecrnti, dAna cuvovatapeéeyn nol ovuQuTos. 
 CO. 21:—Id0d rod adrod “Inood Xpsorov 4 wpcs warépe icorns wpourapyovoe. 
 9 ~p0¢ avOpamrous Guororns Emiyivoutvy. Compare p. 231, c. 41 
 
374 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 to secure the unity of the Person of Christ prior to His exalta- 
 tion, the greater prominence they gave it at the termination ; 
 so that, in fact, they frequently fell out of Dualism into a false 
 identification (Note 69). They regarded Christ, indeed, as a 
 man, but neither before nor subsequently to the time of His 
 earthly sojourn: consequently, the incarnation was reduced, 
 in their hands, to a theophany of a somewhat longer continu- 
 ance. It is true, the God-manhood 1s represented as continuing 
 in that glorifying consummation of humanity which took place 
 at the end of the theophany; but sufficient grounds are not 
 assigned for the representation. Apollinaris, from his point of 
 view, was far better able to assign an eternal place for the hu- 
 manity, by the adoption, spel of a reverse method ;—in 
 order to be able to conceive the humanity as eternally united 
 with the Logos a parte post, he persists in asserting that, 
 although in a latent. state, it pertained to the essence of the 
 Logos a parte ante.’ 
 
 "Gregory _ of Nyssa, it is true, looked upon Apollinaris as 
 teachifig” the existence in Christ of an eternal, realized hum amltys 
 or, vodv évoapKov évTa Tov vioy ex yuvaLKos ey baud OUK €V TH 
 Tapléve capKa yEevopLEvoY, AAA TrAPOSLKAS Ov avTHs dueEeNOovTa, 
 olos Tpo TOV aiwver Hv, TOTE havepwOhvat avTd TO hawopevor, 
 capkiwov ovta Ocov, 7) KaQws avTos dvowafer, EvoapKov voov (Cc. 
 24, p. 180). In the latter clause, however, Gregory himself 
 says that he has not quoted the exact expressions of Apollinaris, 
 but merely given his own impression of his real doctrine. Had 
 he attributed to Christ real flesh prior to Dis birth from Mary, 
 and merely represented Mary as the channel through which the 
 already complete Christ passed into visibility (after the manner 
 of the Valentinians), how would it be reconcilable with the 
 statement of Gregory, that Apollinaris deemed the incarnation 
 to form a highly important event in the history of Christ’s 
 person? For he did not ascribe to Him suffering and toil 
 (xo7ros) prior to the incarnation, but He became incarnate that 
 He might undergo suffering and toil. Nay more, Gregory 
 
 1 He objects to the doctrine of the Church,—w4 #2 dpyiis elvas tov Xpi- 
 ETOV, Tap Nuiv rsyeobus wore Tov Acyo» sivas Oecv, that is, undoubtedly, so 
 that the évdparivoy rov Adyou (A. Mai 7, 20) was excluded, and the Logos 
 was altogether indistinguishable from God, because His eternal and essential 
 relation to the incarnation remained Latest 
 
APOLLINARIS. 375 
 
 himself had previously (c. 18) so distinctly recognised that 
 Apollinaris believed Christ to have been born of Mary, that he 
 could hit upon no other method of reconciling therewith his 
 doctrine of an eternal humanity, than by fastening upon him 
 the notion, that the Virgin also had existed in eternity. But 
 this latter charge must free him from the earlier. He could 
 not have attached so great importance to the earthly birth from 
 Mary, if he had conceived the humanity of Christ to have been 
 complete even prior to the incarnation. How very differently, 
 too, would the teachers of the Church have treated him, had 
 they really been able to point out Valentinian passages in his 
 writings! Further, where does Apollinaris speak of a double 
 body of Christ? And yet without a double body he could not 
 have attributed to Him a real body prior to, and have repre- 
 sented Him as acquiring a body capable of suffering by means 
 of, the incarnation. Not only, therefore, must the view taken 
 by Gregory undoubtedly be pronounced incorrect, but we can 
 very easily explain how he came to entertain it. For when 
 Apollinaris regarded humanity as an essential and eternal de- 
 termination of the Logos, and taught that the historical incar- 
 nation brought to light simply and solely what the Logos had 
 always been in Himself, nothing could seem more natural than 
 to suppose that Apollinaris held the notion of an eternal, real 
 body. From which it followed at once, that the birth from 
 Mary was merely an apparent one. The true opinion of Apol- 
 linaris, however, probably was,—In Himself, or latently, Christ, 
 if is true, had_always been man, for the Logos was the arche- 
 type of humanity in general, and the primal man; moreover, 
 He had always carried within Himself the potence, or even the 
 destiny to become flesh; that is, besides the eternal humanity, 
 which is attributable to Him as the archetype, to assume that 
 form thereof which is like us; but His historical _humanifica- 
 tion first became _a reality (sefpa) when He was actually born 
 of Mary.’ After this explanation, it will be clear how Apol- 
 
 1 Q, 25 :—@edy fuoepnon xpd celovav dre mera Taro, Osc yuveernos terex dos 
 nak pos Thy Tay Tabnwatuy Teipcy, nol wpos Thy THs Duosws ctvaryuny endelv. 
 Apollinaris did not say, di yuvasos (compare ¢. 25, p. 183), but that is 
 Gregory's own view of the matter; the position of Apollinaris rather was, 
 rov Osdv ix yuveinds texévre. For this reason, also, he cannot have de- 
 signated Him Osos fvoaoxos x06 aiovwy, or, at all events, only in the sense, 
 
376 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 linaris was necessitated to refer the humiliation of Christ to 
 His humanity, agreeably to the charge brought against him by 
 Gregory.’ If the Logos Himself was the eternal archetype of 
 humanity ; if He sets forth humanity as to its principal part and 
 centre, the mvevya; and if the humanity accordingly was the 
 amavyacuwa of the divine dofa; the birth from Mary, the as- 
 sumption of our form, of the form of a servant, must be re- 
 garded as an act of condescension, as an humiliation of His 
 humanity (cdp€, c. 23); having for its object the making of the 
 new humanity, which eternally existed in the Logos, a reality 
 on earth, and a common possession of the race.” Full light is 
 thus thrown on the title of the treatise by Apollinaris, ’Avd- 
 devEis mept Tis elas capxwoews Ths Kal cuolwow dvOpomov, 
 and it now becomes quite intelligible. If the creation of man 
 was completed, and the idea of humanity realized, in Christ, we 
 should have expected that Apollinaris would describe the incar- 
 pation as the realization of this archetype, as the quadration of 
 the humanity to its archetype (after the manner of Irenzeus and 
 Tertullian). Instead thereof, he describes it as an assimilation 
 of Christ to men, by which he means the form of our humanity. 
 This now acquires a meaning when he asserts Christ to have 
 been a man even in eternity, cata mvedya, or as the archetype; 
 for, in that case, the historical incarnation, and the becoming 
 like men in their actual state, was an act of condescension on 
 the part of that humanity, which in itself is Logos. But in 
 becoming like, He did not become identical with.us; for as He 
 remained the Logos, so also did He remain the archetype of 
 that that which first became a reality through the birth from Mary, per- 
 tained to Him eternally, in so far as the destiny to incarnation by birth 
 from Mary formed part of His full idea; an idea which was intended to be 
 realized in time. 
 
 1 C. 23, p. 178: Apollinaris teaches that the xévwor¢ related to the cups, 
 that is, to the humanity. He said, Through the cap He humbled Himself, 
 ramewaccure (-devte) capul, vrspupwbevra Of dxd Oxov (consequently as to 
 His humanity) ray delay SWaow. C. 24, p. 179: Aogalercs yap, Onoww, ws 
 avOpwros, £& kdoklas dvecBelvay (p. 183) d0Zav dé Exes xpd row xoomov as Osos 
 Tpovrdcoxoy ray eiwvav. 
 
 7 0. 22, p. 174: Kupsov ev dovrind Davévre oxnueart, and riv rov civ bpe- 
 may &oogov Popéscvra wopPyv. Compare the passage quoted in Note 1, p. 
 371. CO. 18, pu 149; IIpovrapxyer, Quo, 6 &vbowxos Xprores ody ws Erdpou 
 
 »” ? ‘ ~ / > ’ € ~ , 
 OUTOS FO HUTOY TOV TYEYMLATOS—AAA wo TOD xvpiov . . . belo TVEVLETOS 
 Ovros. 
 
APOLLINARIS. 377 
 
 humanity, though He assumed our form of humanity in order 
 to exalt it and to transform us." This He was able to do, be- 
 cause, as mvedua or avOpwros érrovpavios, He was in Himself 
 also Divine Logos. Hence, too, the condescension of His 
 eternal humanity to our form was a divine deed (@cia odp- 
 coos). A further evidence of the correctness of the view we 
 have presented, is in particular the circumstance, that whereas 
 the theories of a heavenly humanity of Christ were strongly 
 marked by Manichzan or Docetical features, and aimed, on 
 the one hand, at raising Christ.as muchas possible above 
 earthly lowness, and, on the other hand, at reducing His earthly 
 humanity to a era transitory thing, an the design, 
 as they fancied, of thus giving a worthier representation of 
 Him; the erdeney of Apollinaris was precisely the contrary 
 one,—to use the expression employed by Gregory, the ultimate 
 purpose of all his writings was to represent the divine nature as 
 mortal, that is, to vindicate for it as complete a participation 
 in suffering as possible. This leads us to the other aspect of 
 the matter. In the foregoing, we have seen how he endeavoured 
 to conjoin deity and humanity to a perfect unity, by maintain- 
 ing at all events the cupswtatov of man, his wvedua, to be an 
 eternal determination of the Logos Himself; nay more, by 
 positing the incarnation as a latent potence of the Logos. In 
 addition to this, it must also be mentioned, that he tried to 
 bring the deity as near as possible to huagndt ee and that not 
 merely to the eternal humanity which he asserts the Logos 
 “Himself.to.be (for therein would merely be involved the im- 
 mediate or essential unity of the two), nor merely by means of 
 the Platonic eidos of the cap£, but also to humanity in its tem- 
 poral form, To take note hereof was the more necessary, as at 
 
 1 So is it also clear that Apollinaris says,—obx cv@pum0s,— aan as cy- 
 Ooumos, O1ors ovx, Cmoovatos TH ckvOparw xaTa TO xupiaratoy. C. 35, p. 212 :— 
 "AAA ovn advbpwmroyv evry Elves, Ono, AAA xcebawep cvOowroy (that is, only 
 like, not identical with, a man of the same nature as ourselves ;—as to His 
 inner essence, setting forth the true idea of man, the gow &vdpwxos, which 
 is to become our true personality also; as to His appearance in time, on 
 the contrary, like, but not equal to, our present humanity, as it exists 
 apart from Him) dvovy, évowpxov dvre. His favourite expression was,— 
 Christ is vos Evowpxos, not Acyos evoepxos. For vovs seemed to him to ex- 
 press the eternal point of unity of the divine and human ; and this vod< 
 became LYTU PHO. 
 
375 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 this point a gap, or, if we will, a break, was discoverable in the 
 system of Apollinaris. The Logos, or the eternal srvedua, which 
 he also designates the eternal man Christ, is supposed to con- 
 tain the potence of an incarnation in time. This thought 
 appears to require that the historical humanity of Christ be 
 regarded as the exposition of the eternal potence contained in 
 the Logos. But how can His assumption of a cdma, and of 
 the Wuyn Sortxy from Mary, be reconciled therewith? Accord- 
 ing to the former idea, consistency would appear to necessitate 
 him to derive the earthly humanity of Christ also from the 
 essence of the Logos or the wvedua; according to the latter, the 
 earthly humanity was derived to Him from Adam through 
 Mary. In the former case, the Logos is conceived as pro- 
 ductive; but what becomes, then, of the birth from Mary? In 
 the latter case, He is conceived as receiving, assuming (dvada- 
 Sev); but what becomes, then, of the unity, the identity of 
 the Logos with Himself in the earthly humanity of Christ, 
 which is not derived from His own essence? In point of 
 fact, Apollinaris betrays here a certain degree of uncertainty. 
 He frequently condemns the notion of a mere “assumption” 
 of humanity; for he desired to advance beyond the category 
 of “having” to that of “being,” and to regard. the..Person_ 
 of Christ as a veritable unity, of which humanity -as-well-as 
 deity was an integral, constitutive. element, and not-a~mere 
 external addition. But, on the other hand, unless he were 
 prepared to give up the doctrine of the birth of Christ from 
 Mary, he must allow the presence in His person of something 
 received, appropriated from without (an ésletntov, émuyevdpe- 
 vov).. For he is far from adopting the principle referred to 
 above, and which may he termed pantheistic, to wit, that 
 human nature generally, cdua and aruy7), pertained to and was 
 
 * As he also does; see note 1, p. 365; cf. note 3, p. 872. According 
 to a fragment preserved by Theodoret, Dialog. 1, p. 70, he said;—Ei ¢ 
 TpoorceeBaver Tis, ov tpémeras sis TovTo, mpoctraee Of oapuae 6 Xpiatos, dpo 
 ove exparn cic ocepxo.—Kal votp tevrcy uiv cic ouryyéverny eyeplouro die TOD 
 comoros, ive chon. Meaxpoy 08 ncbdArsoy Tod culouévov TO aalov’ maxpa epee 
 moeArLoy nuay nol tv TH caparoocs’ ox dy Do qv xcArrsOy sic CapKe TpeTEic 
 (-€v). P. 71:—Tpooxvvoduev 32 Osdy ccepnoe tx rig dylas ruobévov xpoo- 
 AaBovrae, xal oie rodto kvOpwrov pecy dura xard Thy oepnee, Ocdy 08 nara 
 TO vsveece.— Onoroyoduey tov vidv Too Weod vid avbpamov yeyevijcbat, ov 
 Ovomats aan Andel roocrabduTx tx Meplas rio mwopbivov caoxn. 
 
APOLLINARIS. 379 
 
 the external realization of the @vats of the Logos. How then 
 does he combine the two? In one way alone ;—not indeed by 
 asserting the Logos to be eternally c@a and yvyx7, in the same 
 sense as he asserted Him to be essentially and eternally wvedua ; 
 but by regarding it as an essential and eternal determination of 
 His being, to yearn for the assumption of both, to be susceptible 
 of that which meets and is offered to it by the already existing 
 humanity. If, then, there was in Him an essential and eternal 
 inclination to this humanity, we are warranted in saying, that 
 in receiving and assuming the human element from Mary, He 
 was receiving that which belongs to His own complete idea, or, 
 in other words, the potence of incarnation contained in Him is 
 capable of becoming an actual, visible reality. What He thus 
 received was something lower, something suffering, not some- 
 thing higher: the receptivity which thus appropriated the lower 
 was therefore in reality an act, an act of love; or, regarded 
 from another point of view, He gave far more than He received, 
 when human nature was given to Him; for, through being 
 assumed by the Logos, the human nature became participant 
 in divine nature. Still, this deed is not a deed of productive 
 or creative power or majesty; but being an act of condescend- 
 ing loye, it implies that the Logos by love had constituted Him- 
 self susceptible of the lower element from Adam’s stem, and to 
 His humiliation or condescension belonged His actual assump- 
 tion of that humanity from Mary. Inasmuch, therefore, as 
 He lovingly assumed our lower humanity, instead of creating a 
 humanity afresh, or setting it forth and producing it out of 
 Himself, the real earthly incarnation is converted from a physi- 
 eal into an ethical process undergone by God the Logos. or 
 this reason, it was possible for two things which, prior to the 
 act of incarnation, were separate, to wit, the Logos and the 
 Adamitic nature, to coalesce to a personal unity, provided only, 
 that on the part of the Logos, there was a susceptibility to that 
 in respect to which the humanity was, as it were, a giver and 
 actor; and that, therefore, the presentation to the Logos of the 
 human elements of Jesus, by the Adamitic nature, was simply 
 as it were the fulfilment of His eternal yearning to become man. 
 Humanity and deity.are perfectly capable of combining to form 
 a personal unity, because the idea. of each points to the other 
 from the.very. beginning. We have seen above, that, according 
 
380 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 to Apollinaris, when the Adamitic humanity received the divine 
 vous, it received its true ruler, the ruler which. its very vous 
 compelled it to demand, in order that it might pass from an 
 imperfect to a perfect form (which vods, however, it could not 
 beget out of itself ); and that the two in combination set forth 
 the unity of the moving principle and the object moved, or, in 
 other words, the movement of life in its normal state. Even SO, 
 (lo we find on the part of the Logos a susceptibility to that which 
 the humanity has to communicate to Him,—a susceptibility rest- 
 ing, however, on an ethical basis ;—accordingly, in this aspect 
 also, it is clear both that the conjunction of humanity and deity 
 to a complete personal unity was a possibility, and that that 
 which the Logos in the first instance received from without, 
 might become verily His own and a momentum of His being. 
 It is therefore possible that Apollinaris himself may have taught, 
 what his school certainly taught, that through its union with 
 the uncreated, the flesh also became uncreated; that is, the 
 idea of creation passed in this instance into that of being (com- 
 pare Ath. c. Apoll. 1, 4). For it not merely became the pro- 
 perty of the Logos by the Unio, but was brought to sameness 
 of nature (c. 5), and was made coeternal with the nature of 
 God ;—naturally, not in the sense of eternal pre-existence, but 
 of post-existence. 
 
 These observations will throw light on that which Apollinaris 
 says regarding the participation of the Logos in human, par- 
 ticularly in suffering, conditions. He maintains that we ought 
 not to teach merely that Jesus was born as to His humanity ; 
 and characterizes it as an Hellenic and Jewish error to form so 
 incorrect a conception of that unity of the divine-human per- 
 son, which first gave the incarnation its truth, as not to admit 
 of God being represented as born of a woman As far as 
 concerns the suffering in particular, according to Gregory, his 
 intention was to teach, not merely that the deity of the Only- 
 begotten took suffering upon itself in its humanity, but also 
 that the divine nature converted itself to participation in suffer- 
 
 1 G25, p., 188 Ra anves yep, not, xoel Lovdaios xpoQavac dartorodes 
 un xaraderd Osov a&xov yy é } b¢ C. 36 215 :— 
 xomevos Osoy ainovery tov &x yuvainos rexbevra. C. 36, p. : 
 Ei “y vovc, Qnow, tvoupuds tori 6 xUploc, oPia dy ein, QuriLovee vod cky- 
 doazov, etc. (see Note 66); but then odx ny Exsonuin Ocov 4 Xpiotod rxpove ire 
 akrA advOoarov yévurosc. 
 
APOLLINARIS. 381 
 ing." Gregory's account would lead us to believe that he made 
 the Logos Himself die. But that this cannot have heen his 
 meaning is plain, even from the observation directed against 
 him by Gregory,—“ One cannot say that He died as to one 
 part of Himself, and therefore not as to the other, for He was 
 without parts, and uncompounded; what He is termed He was 
 entirely, not this to one part and that to another.” Apol- 
 linaris himself grants that the Son is the Father’s wisdom, 
 power, and so forth (p. 133); but if He is such, and yet, on 
 the other hand, ceases (in death) to be what He was, every- 
 thing dies with Him. Being indivisible, He must either die 
 entirely or live entirely: if He die, everything dies, for every- 
 thing depends on His deity, which is supposed to have died. 
 From this it is clear, as Gregory himself also acknowledges 
 afterwards, that Avpollinaris had no intention of absolutely re- 
 presenting the Logos as dying; but he distinguished in the 
 one Logos two aspects (Gregory says “parts”), as to one of 
 which He was susceptible of receiving what humanity was 
 able to communicate, whilst as to the other He was and con- 
 tinued immortal.? It must be possible to refer sufferings to 
 the divine nature of the Logos; otherwise Christ. did not 
 really put Himself in our place, and could not have conquered 
 sin, for then it would have been a mere man that suffered 
 (c. 51, 54). “If Christ were united with the Father even 
 prior to the resurrection, why can He not have been united 
 with the God in Him? ‘The Redeemer suffered hunger, 
 thirst, weariness, conflicts, and sadness. But how could He 
 be at the same time God? He is not two persons, as though 
 God were one, man another. Accordingly, God suffered ;_and 
 that suffered, which, properly speaking, admits no suffering 
 into itself, not by a necessity of its nature altogether—inde- 
 
 1 C. 5:—Ovnrgy rod pmovoysvods vlod rhy Oscrnre, nai ovyt TH évOpurives 
 To Tabos OfEacbe, drArAR TAY away nal éverAOlatov Quo pos Tebous LuETOv- 
 clay &Aroiwdjves. 
 
 2 Gregory (ibid.) brings against him the charge,—dveraAartte: Arn» 
 duvewiv (along with the aspect which was susceptible of receiving the 
 communication of the human, of the passible) avaxaarovuéuny ravtny &x Tov 
 dxverov, that is, in the aspect which was and continued immortal, was con- 
 tained, according to Apollinaris, the power to overcome death, and to re- 
 
 unite with itself, the aspect of His essence, which had as it were been 
 given up to death along with the body 
 
382 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 pendent of the will, but in agreement with the arrangement of 
 its own substance ; that 1s, the deity did not suffer immediately 
 or by physical necessity, but in consequence of a free impulse 
 given it by the Logos, who panto to sympathize with, or par- 
 ticipate in, the sufferings of men.’ From the words of Christ 
 concerning the corn of wheat that dies (John xii. 24), Apol- 
 linaris concluded,—Christ’ s dying could not have brought so 
 much fruit if it had been the death of a mere man, instead of 
 the suffering of the deity. But the Church, in its doctrine, does 
 not leave to Him who was crucified anything divine in His own 
 nature; not even in His noblest part, in the mvedua, was the 
 human at the same time also divine.” 
 
 If, in the view of Apollinaris, the Logos did not, properly 
 speaking, take the place of the usual human vods, as something 
 foreign to humanity; and if, on the contrary, He who became 
 flesh (€voapxos) set forth true humanity, and was the mvedua 
 in Christ, he had no alternative but to represent this human 
 mvedua, Which was at the same time Logos, as actually man, 
 and as participating in all human qualities. We discover at 
 once, however, that this 7vedua presents two aspects : one, as 
 to which it is Logos or God, and absolutely immutable ; the 
 other, as to he it is finite, and is able really to humble itself 
 and sympathize with our sufferings and conflicts. This duality 
 of aspects in the one Logos necessarily leads to a distinction 
 being drawn between the Logos and the Father (see Note 
 1, page 378); and, in fact, he consistently persisted in referring 
 the words éuov Oénua, which occur in Luke xxi. 42 (“not 
 My will, but Thine be done”), not merely to the human will of 
 Christ, but also to the Logos,—that is, so far as the Logos was 
 united with the man.2 The will of the Logos in the man, says 
 
 1 C. 58, p. 283:—Ei xpos rov Tlarépa yywras o Xpioros Tpo dvacracews, 
 wis mpeg Tov ey adt@ Osoy ody, quwras; 6 Suryp werovbe weivey, Oipav noel 
 noworoy nol eyaviev, nel Avanyv. Tis dv 6 Swrip; 6 Osos, Drow, (5) od 
 Ovo wpdowme, wo etépov meeyv dyTOS, ErEpov de tov dvbpaxov. Ovxody o Osos 
 rimovber, nal maoyer TO amapadextov Tabous, ox civaryxn Quaews &BovaArroy, 
 nabamep dvOowmos, AAA cexoravbie Ducews. 
 
 2 C. 27. Compare c. 51, 52 :—Alridras roy exxarnoreotiney Aovoy, Ort 
 wep) cavbpuroy Ocapotucy ro webos* avOparov Of bavaros ov xarapyel Tov Pava- 
 TOY, OVOE ceviaTaral 6 oy} aTrobavar. 
 
 3 C. 81:—Od pynuovedoval, Qnaorv, ort 70 bérAnux rodte Tdsey elpyroes oom 
 avipnmov ToD tx Vis, xabas avrol voui(Covow, aAAe TOV Osad Tov xaTaBavTog 
 
APOLLINARIS. 383 
 
 he, did not therefore come into conflict with that of the Father; 
 for, even when He was not heard, not to be heard was His will, 
 and consequently, in any case, His will was done. Accordingly, 
 the Logos and His will were rendered by His humanity dif- 
 ferent from, but not antagonistic to, the Father: the truth of 
 the humanity of Christ manifested itself in this difference (ro 
 iwOpomwov Xpiorod eelxvuto Oédnpa). One can easily under- 
 stand how, with such principles, he came to be charged with 
 Arianism; for Arius also taught that there was a TpeTTov in 
 Christ different from the will of the Father. But apart from 
 the consideration that the tpewrov posited by Arius involved the 
 possibility of sin, whereas Apollinaris represented it as an out- 
 flow of the unchangeable Jove and essential sinlessness of 
 Christ, those who brought this charge forgot that Arius at- 
 tributed immutability to ane Father alone, and mutability alone 
 to the Son. Apollinaris was far from intending to do this: 
 he represented the Son also as unchangeable as to His deity, 
 but believed, notwithstanding, that by His incarnation the 
 Logos made iiemagal unequal to Himself, though He restores 
 Himself again to His original equality with Himself,'—an 
 equality Bich always continued to be potentially His. He 
 is much rather chargeable, therefore, with entertaining patri- 
 passian principles 1 in relation to the deity of the Son, than with 
 Arianism. But even this would not be correct, for he totally 
 repudiates ae idea of a conversion, nay more, of a passibility of 
 the Logos ;” on the contrary, he regards His suffering, as in the 
 last ae an act of love, as évépyesa. Not merely the ad- 
 justment of the dsatpecss, but even the submission thereto, the 
 xévwols, was an act of the eternal and ever self-identical love 
 of the Logos. It is true, the first product of this love was suf- 
 
 ~ ci ~ ¥ > 
 22 otpavod, 70 els Eywosy eavrov wposstanicuévov. A. Mai 7, 203:—Ei 0¢ ioo- 
 \ \ ‘ ~ ~ 3 ° \ 
 abeving nok noLvavos THs marpinys ovolas oeml To Teebos noel Tov oTaAUpOY EpyoLeEvOS 
 Ss Jul > / / ~ 
 iy, was ev cyavie yevopsvos wpoonvyero wapenbeiy cevtoy To morypioy, xal Ley 
 ’ ~ ~ = ~ nw 
 vyevioboes cirov To béAnuec, dARL MAAAOY TO TOD TaTpos; Ti Os nal Tpoomryoper- 
 ) oa \ ~ > , t 9 Soe teh s ~ ig , 
 ely éxpiy TO TOU svxopcevou HéAnicce, AAA y doveQuvoy Oov xoek eveevTiov; 
 1 ©. 29:—Arcipav peo (Xpiorcs) tiv evépystav nord ocpxa, eeioov OE 
 ~ Tangs \ / 
 nur Tuevpeo, Owep Eyer Thy ev Ovvaemer THA locryTa, mal THY KaATe OupKO 
 ~ ? ‘ , < Pp oo > , 2 / ) / ‘ 
 ris évepysioes Oseelpeosy’ xa qv, Quo, ov wevras sCworolnoey, AAAS Tivos, obs 
 nbennosy. 
 ow / 
 2 Compare c. 56, p. 277 :—Tlac, Quoi, Oeds kvboumwos vyiveraly ey peres- 
 ’ ’ | iA 9 
 . ~ ~ . % , 
 Banbels deo rov sivas Osds, ci on vos ev avdpurw XOTEITY | 
 
384 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 fering, was a feeling of pain, resulting from the conjunction of 
 the Logos with the suffering Jesus; but if the Logos could 
 not lovingly have sympathized with humanity, even whilst in 
 the humanity of Christ, His divine nature would not have 
 been in harmony with, but would have stood in the way of, His 
 love; and therefore the physical categories in the conception of 
 the Logos, instead of heing subject to, would set a limit and 
 restraint to the ethical, or, in other words, to His love. 
 
 “Gregory Nazianzen directs special attention to this inequality 
 of the Logos, who is at the same time the archetypal man, with 
 Himself." He says,—The words, He was begotten, tempted, 
 He hungered, thirsted, slept, was weary, they (that is, the 
 Apollinarists) refer to the human aspect; but that He was 
 glorified by the angels, that He conquered the tempter, and 
 wrought miracles, they attribute to the deity. The question, 
 “Where have you laid Lazarus?” belonged to our weak 
 nature; but when He cried, “ Lazarus, come forth,” and raised 
 him from the dead, that belonged to the nature which is higher 
 than ours.” When He struggled with distress, was nailed to the 
 cross, and buried, it affected the outward husk; that He rose 
 again and ascended to heaven, was due to the inner treasure.” 
 But when Gregory Nazianzen asserts, that thus the very fault 
 is committed which was charged upon the doctrine of the 
 Church, and that it involves the assumption of two mutually 
 conflicting natures, he overlooks, in thé first place, that at that 
 time the Church had not seen as clearly as did Apollinaris, that 
 Christ must be regarded as one indivisible person, and that we 
 must not take such a view of His humanity as would constitute 
 it a second person; and, in the second place, that, as we have 
 shown, Apollinaris believed the human and divine aspects, 
 which he never describes as natures, to be contained in each 
 other. The inequality of Christ to Himself, referred to above, 
 did not affect merely one of the two aspects, but both, each by 
 and in itself. In the; first\place, humanity was present in 
 Christ in its complete form; the archetype, the eternal wvedpa 
 
 1 Ep. ad. Cledon. 2, 7, or Or. 52. 
 
 * Compare Athan. Tom. ad Antioch. 7. But see also Note 65. 
 
 * Compare Athan. c. Apoll. 1,3, where the same is designated by %ewées 
 dvdoamoc. He speaks also, in c. Ap. 1, 12, of men who say,—’Or: dadog 
 tatly 6 reba vicg and daros 6 uy radon. 
 
APOLLINARIS. 383d 
 
 was there; but it passed into inequality with itself, by assuming 
 the form of our humanity. That eternal wvedua in Him was, 
 further, and at the same time, the deity of the Logos; conse- 
 quently, the deity also passed into inequality with itself, in the 
 suffering God-man. (Note 70.) 
 
 In that Apollinaris thus represented the divinity of the Logos 
 as having, in itself, an aspect turned towards, yea, even apper- 
 taining to, the humanity (even as humanity has an aspect turned 
 towards the divine), we can understand how it was possible for 
 Gregory Nazianzen further to charge him with introducing a 
 “scala” into the divine (Ad Cledon. 1, 16). He constructs 
 the Trinity, says Gregory, by representing it as compounded of 
 a great, a greater, and a greatest." This can only refer to 
 the circumstance of his attributing to the Logos, besides His 
 perfect deity, an aspect turned towards finitude; and of his 
 using similar words respecting the Holy Spirit, so far as He 
 dwells in believers, groans in them, as Paul teaches, is grieved, 
 and so forth. But this ceconomic Subordinatianism is as 
 widely removed as possible from Arianism; for it might very 
 easily have the doctrine of the Council of Nicaa, the onto- 
 logical Trinity, for its presupposition (Mansi 3, 461). Further- 
 more, on the basis thereof, by the application of ethical prin- 
 ciples, it was possible for him to teach an humiliation, that 
 is, a self-emptying of the Son and the Spirit, in the sense, 
 namely, both of their making themselves unequal to the Father, 
 and, as we have shown above, of their making themselves each 
 unequal to Himself. This, however, must be evident from 
 what has preceded. We have also express testimony to the 
 effect that he adhered firmly to the Nicene doctrine of the 
 Trinity. (Greg. Nyss. l.c. c. 52, p. 264, says, —“ He established 
 piav ths Tpsiddos Geornta, in opposition to the Arians ;” Theo- 
 doret himself (1. c.) was compelled to testify,—“In some of his 
 writings we find also the Church doctrine of the Trinity, év évéous 
 ouyypaupaciw—opolas npuiv Kal thy piav ths OedtnTos ovciav 
 Kal TAS TpEls UTOaTaceLs Exnpvéev.) Apollinaris believed, further, 
 that the power to adjust that Scaipeots was always inherent in 
 
 1 Compare also Theodoret, Her. Fab. 4,8: Adrod yep toriy eipnuc ro 
 Héyee, siCov, evyiotoy, Or the Babuol &Ziwmarav’ as weycrov uesy bvtos ToD 
 IIvevecros, tov 02 vlot gesiCovoc, weyiorov d¢ rov Ilerpds. Then we shoul 
 have the reproach of Sabellianism. 
 
 VOL. II. 2B 
 
386 . FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 Christ; and that the perfect adjustment would take place in 
 the thousand years’ kingdom, when the glorified person cf the 
 Redeemer, having attained to complete unity, will dwell and 
 walk among men on earth, in a form which shall be at once 
 adequate to the deity, and perfectly human. (Note 71.) 
 
 The remarks just made throw light on an expression of 
 Apollinaris which has occasioned much surprise. The man 
 Jesus Christ, says he, is one, as God the Father is one; this_ 
 belongs to the idea of an essence. ‘This same unity is, in like 
 manner, predicable of the compound being which stands in the 
 middle between God and man (@oTe Kal TodTO dicews cur- 
 Gétov petakv ovons Oeot Kai avOpwrwv). In his Syllogisms, 
 Apollinaris had said,—If different qualities concentre in one, 
 there arises a kind of middle thing; for example, spring is a 
 middle thing between winter and summer. No middle thing, 
 however, includes within itself the points of both extremes in 
 completeness, but merely partially. Wherefore, the middle 
 between God and men, in the Person of Christ, is neither 
 completely man nor completely God, but a commixture of God 
 and man.’ At first sight, this passage does not at all seem to 
 fit into Apollinaris’ system; this wecorns appears to merit being 
 charged with the same fault as he himself had brought against 
 the doctrine of the Church (see Note 1, p. 360). Indeed, 
 Gregory of Nyssa already makes the same observation (c. 49, 
 p- 257). The doctrine of the Church does not desire a half, 
 but réXevov Ocdv and térevov dvOpwrov in Christ; Apollinaris, 
 on the contrary, presents us with a mutilated man. But that 
 he omits the one axporns, the human zpoaipecis, the human 
 vovs from his conception of Christ, is certain; and equally 
 certain, that he allows the Aeyos during Christ’s life on earth to 
 become unequal to Himself, and does not allow Him to exhibit 
 His proper axporns. The pecdrns resulting herefrom fits per- 
 fectly into his system, provided it remains eternally; the more 
 so, as with this “temperamentum,” which the God-man sets 
 
 1A, Mai 7, 310: Mecorures yivovres idsornray die Dépay eic Ey cuverboucay, 
 aos Ev Hecsovm Diudens 6 dvov xal immoy, noel Ey VALUED Kpapecert idsorng Agvxov xeel 
 feerocvos, nol év cteps xeseavos noel bepats idiorns gap epryaloutun' ovdeule dé 
 Hecdtns exaetépas exer tas aupdrntas && CAonANpov, GAAR pecpinas arimEenly- 
 usvas. Meodrns df Osod xeel avbparwy év Xpiord, on kpe aire kvbowmxos bros. 
 cits Occ, dara Ocov xal ctvdparov pelts. 
 
APOLLINARIS. 387 
 
 forth on earth, well consists an idea to which Apollinaris at- 
 tached great importance,—the idea, namely, that the Logos, or 
 the eternal wrvevywa, was a determination of humanity, and that, 
 on the other hand, the cap was a determination of the deity 
 thus approximated to it. 
 
 Christ therefore is wéa duvors, one essence ; by which he un- 
 derstood both the unity of the person and the essential unity of 
 the two aspects, the divine and the human. To the unity of 
 the person corresponds unity of volition and of thought! The 
 hegemony in this unity is constantly in the hands of the Logos 
 who became vos évcapxos. For this reason, Christ was raised 
 above all necessity of practice (@oxnows) ; and only on the con- 
 dition that He was raised above practice, both as to knowledge 
 and virtue, could He be the Redeemer. Without learning, He 
 must needs be wise and holy from His very birth.” He worked 
 His miracles, not like a prophet by the power of God, but by 
 His own power (Cat. Cord. p. 255; Greg. Antirrh. c. 29, p. 
 196.—Cat. Cord. pp. 884, 329). He spake not by revelation, 
 but was Himself the lawgiver. Consequently, the inmost core 
 of His personality remained untouched by that inequality or 
 diremption (dvaipeous) ; this core was not merely a principle, 
 but the complete inner man, the perfect mavedua or the Logos. 
 
 It is, further, particularly interesting to bring under consi- 
 deration the relation of believers to Christ. The principal term 
 employed by Apollinaris to designate it is wyunows. Mohler has 
 coarsely interpreted the word to denote a mechanical copying or 
 mimicking. With a Protestant colouring, this is repeated also 
 
 by Baur (pp. 635 ff.), who finds in the word a species of Pela- 
 
 1 Compare A. Mai 7, 70. The passages from Apollinaris, Polemon, and 
 others, p. 20: pla évipyeia, ule Qvots. P.16:—wla Qvois otvberos, ovy- 
 xparTos, copxiny xo being. °O. xeivy loric, exclaimed Apollinaris, xx! wigss 
 bcomeolae, Ocds nal oobpS wlav dweréacae Quay. 
 
 * Greg. Nyss. c. 38. Ei ts wagov erepog Erépov xomilercet, rovro Of aoxyory 
 ylveros’ ovdeuele 02 hoxnots ty Xplore ove kpa vovs toriv aevdparivos. C. 28, 
 p. 192 :—Tés Qnotv, 6 &ysos éx yeveris 3 (Therefore, in order that it might 
 be sinless, it was necessary for Christ’s humanity to be deity: thus was it 
 equal to the enemy.) Tis edldcexrog coe; Compare especially c. 51. A 
 man subject to the common corruption of men, even to the tpexzev, could 
 not help. Only a perfectly sinless being could take away the curse of sin. 
 Compare Cat. Cord. in Joh. 8, 88, where he designates this essential know- 
 ledge of Christ yvaors Quciny. 
 
388 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 gian idea of imitation, which would involve the laying of a false 
 stress on the moral example of Christ. Against such a suppo- 
 sition, his antagonism to the Antiocheians, especially to Diodorus 
 of Tarsus, ought alone to have protected him.’ Still more, the 
 importance he attached to the death of Christ (compare, for 
 example, the Cat. Cord. on Joh. xix. 17). Apollinaris’ fault 
 was rather that of allowing the ethical to fall into the back- 
 ground, as compared with the religious. ‘The passage quoted by 
 Athanasius (c. Apoll. 1, 2), indeed, of which the men above- 
 mentioned seem alone to have taken notice, does not show us 
 clearly what Apollinaris’ real opinion was. All it reports is,— 
 capKos mev KawwoTnTa Xpiotos eTrwdéberxTar Kal” opolwow (that 
 is, Christ exhibited the new humanity in likeness to us) tod 6é 
 bpovovvtos év iv THY KawoTHTA, Sid pinTEwS Kal OpotwcEews 
 Kal aToyns THS apbaptias Exactos év éavT@ emoeixvutas (that 
 is, the novelty of him who thinks in us, each one shows by 
 imitation, resemblance and abstinence from sin). More light 
 is thrown on the matter by Ep. ad Cledon. 2, 3, where the 
 complaint is made against the school of Apollinaris (Gregory 
 alludes particularly in the letters to Vitalis, for whom, in other 
 respects like Epiphanius, he entertained a very high regard, 
 Ep. ad Cled. 2, 5), that it gives a different explanation of the 
 words, “ We have the spirit of Christ” (1 Cor. xi. 16), from the 
 Church, understanding by the spirit of Christ, His deity. This,. 
 however, first becomes quite clear from several passages pre- 
 served in a Catena to the Gospel of John.’ 
 
 How far removed he was from Pelagianism, we may judge 
 from his remarks on John iil. 5:—The Lord leads Nicodemus 
 to true knowledge by attributing regeneration to grace, which is 
 accomplished by the service, indeed, of water, which cleanses the 
 body, but by the energy of the Spirit sanctifying the soul and fill- 
 ing it with deity. If He dwell in usas a pledge and first fruit, the 
 perfect kingdom of God will come, and the fulness of the deity 
 fillus.” On vi. 27, he remarks,~<The eternally enduring food is 
 
 1 Compare p. 232, c. 42, where he protests against the Antiocheian dis- 
 tinction between vids Qices Osos and vide Ocov (see Note 63). 
 
 2 Compare Cat. Corder. 1630, p. 89, on John ili. 5,; on vi. 27, p. 180 ; 
 ver. 28, p. 181. 
 
 3° AvaBiBales pos Thy dAnOLYaY EvvEleY, TH woepITL THY dvayévynoly cive- 
 ridcic, yris Emirersizas 00 vmovpylas dy vdaros, 00 Evepyslas O¢ rvEevmaros, 
 thy Luyiy dayiclovtos nal wAnpovvros beornts, uv 04 xaroinnourTos von Ev Huiv 
 
APOLLINARIS. 389 
 
 the faith that makes alive, by which we are assimilated to the body 
 (the humanity) of Christ, and are sealed by the Father with the 
 power of God.’ On vers. 28 f.:—Faith is a holy, perfect work ; 
 for which reason, it both justifies and sanctifies without human 
 works, seeing that it contains within itself the noblest energy, 
 and is not slothful and inactive.” On viii. 56 :—What day did 
 Abraham see? Christ, the true light, the Sun of righteousness, 
 appeared to Abraham, in that He illuminated him with His rays 
 in virtue of his faith. This faith was counted to him for right: 
 eousness, and so he exulted with joy to have seen the day of 
 God in the ideal world (tiv vontiv Ocod nuepav). (Note 72.) 
 These passages show that Apollinaris had attained a deeper in- 
 sight into the nature of faith. Through faith we are made par- 
 takers of the deity of Christ, which is at the same time humanity 
 (7rvebpa) ; in other words, we are made partakers of the principle 
 of the divine-human life. Hence righteousness does not come 
 from works, but through God, and becomes the portion of faith, 
 which is not merely passive, inactive, but the highest energy. 
 Christ works faith, in that He sets forth virtue and wisdom 
 through the medium of His humanity as an organ ; through 
 His meekness and humility He attracts us to Himself, and 
 works upon us until we decide either for or against Him—in 
 the latter case, the decision is a rejection, not excusable on the 
 ground of passion, but conscious.” In another passage still ex- 
 
 dorep d&fpabavos nal drapxns 9 rersiac Ales Bavirciee Tov OQzod, TAnpwots ovo 
 Oeorrntos év nuiv. 
 
 1 Aven O¢ (the true tp0Qy) Gv 4 wlotis 4 Caoroses, xed gv eZomcosovvr as 
 Tos Thy caepue Tov xuplov, THy Vad TOU Tlerpds eoDparyiopecyyy 7 belo Svveepest. 
 
 2 *Epyoy tiv rloriv droPaivay bepdv re xael cérssov. Aid noel dvev rav ey- 
 Opamtvav tpyay einorus dinesor Te xoel cory so Cel, Ort maAALoTHY Evepretay Exes THe 
 Wuyins, ove dpylav rive xal dxpeSiev. Thisreminds one of Luther’s preface 
 to the Epistle to the Romans. 
 
 * On John xii. 86 :—EQv’aurre 08 abrod ro rpaov nal ravreras &Qeo- 
 Tnxas Opeairnros, kxpt Tocovrov weepiay sic potoor, kyps TOY Oscepecepruphacee Tip 
 aanverev. Ov yap Cpyis ToAUnKe nate TOD awThpos Epyoy aiTay tet yévecbeed, 
 anna nanbes Bovreupea’ EAatroy yep cic xatraexpiowy amay TO ee Opyis TOAMO- 
 feEevoy cxpoy O& ey nonie To mera Bovars rovnpevecdasr. Verse 40:—But the 
 hardness brought on by God is not therefore the work of holy power, but a 
 permission of the divine judgment and the work of the evil, hostile power. 
 For (see on xiii. 21) evil also continues subject to God, and must serve the 
 good; and the devil has power only through the evil that already is in men 
 (compare on xiy. 30). 
 
390 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 tant, he expressly explains what he understands by that [ipLnols. 
 His unity with the Father is an unity of nature (fvoc«y); His 
 unity with the Apostles is a matter of grace. Nevertheless the 
 latter resembles the former, and that which is natural is imitated 
 by that which is the work of grace (opolwpa éxeivou Kab LiLnols 
 Tod Kata iow Td Kata yapw),—to wit, by means of faith. 
 Christ accomplished His miracles by a natural power, not by 
 faith in the Father; the Apostles, through faith in the Son; 
 wherefore also the Son is worshipped, the Apostles not. We 
 owe to the Lord what He demands, says he in another place ; 
 but He gives what He claims. (Note 73.) We are to love 
 Him, because He loved us. As I, says Christ, belong to the 
 Father as to My deity, and yet am at the same time loved by 
 Him as one who has raised Himself out of the circle of men 
 (€& dvOpwrev avactas), so are you, who belong to Me after the 
 flesh, loved by Me (on John xv. 8). By His ascension to the 
 Father, He set forth the righteousness which pertains to be- 
 lievers. For it is this that justifies men, to wit, that our flesh 
 and the human form ascended in Him the throne of heaven, sat 
 down at the right hand of the Father, and was exalted higher 
 than the human eye can reach.’ Although we are called upon 
 to imitate Him in thought and deed, to be in harmony with 
 Him, as His spirit and will are in harmony with the Father, we 
 can do nothing without Him ; separated from Him, we dry up 
 like branches cut off from the vine. In our own firmness (avéeia) 
 we cannot confide; for in us there is nothing solid, nothing un- 
 changeably good (oreppov, atpertov aya0ov): He, on the con- 
 trary, says,—My invincible power is a sure source of courage for 
 all those who participate in Me (in John xvi. 33; xv. 7). All 
 human virtue and perfection prior to Christ remained imperfect 
 for lack of Him; but, on the other hand, the divine deeds and 
 care for men first attained completeness through the redemption 
 in Christ. In Christ, therefore, both humanity and the revela- 
 tion of God were perfected.” Man was both raised above him- 
 
 1 Todro voip rods cvdpirous ebinalase 76 ocepree 8S quay nal eidos ctv Opa) 
 wivoy eriBqves Opovov ovpeviov xal xabeodnvar rape Ilarpl, x7.A. Compare 
 on xx. 18, p. 455. ‘Through Me, God will be your Father, sray dvapo 
 thy && duav dvayav aTrapyyy.” 
 
 2 On John xix. 30. He says, ‘‘ It is finished,” and justly, raons wey ras. 
 
 ? , / > ~ , > ~ / ~ 
 iy dvOodrots cbperns posipryuomtuns a&rereds mevovong avev Xosotov, waonc Oe 
 
APOLLINARIS. 391 
 
 self, and made like Christ, and thus perfected." A new and 
 wonderful birth was introduced by Christ: it is attended by 
 inexpressible pains ; but the suffering is followed by the resur- 
 rection, and brings a joy which will no more change, and which 
 cannot be taken away ; for through the resurrection of the new 
 man ye stand as new men, and obtain free access to God. Ye 
 will rejoice when ye shall witness the birth of the child which 
 was unknown to the world, and which is exalted above death 
 and corruption; and that is He in you. ‘These propositions are 
 plainly fitted to establish the owooveia of Christ, if not with the 
 human race in general, at all events with perfected men, with 
 Christians. 
 
 It cannot be denied that Apollinaris’ doctrine of faith is a 
 logical development of his Christology; and that, on the whole, 
 his system is governed by one principle. Faith corresponds to 
 the fact of the incarnation: by the incarnation Christ became 
 like us; by faith we become like Christ. As the divine voids 
 was the hegemonic principle in Christ, so is the Spirit of Christ 
 inus. And as that divine vods was not something foreign to 
 humanity, but rather the true, the eternal man, the éow avOpw- 
 Tos; even so are we perfected by our reception of the vods of 
 Christ, although we are thereby at the same time exalted above 
 ourselves. Prior to the coming of Christ also, it is true, human 
 nature appeared as a relatively independent being: it had a 
 relative centre of unity, a vovs, in which the powers were con- 
 joined to unity. But this was not yet the true vovs; for, inas- 
 U0 Qcov wepl advdoarove yevomevns wpovoles ey TH wape Xptorod awrnole ro 
 Téreoy crore Scvovons. 
 
 1 On John xvii. 13 :—‘‘ These things speak I in the world.” Saag gv 
 Tout O1eipe? TO xara Qvow xal xad cuolworv. He, namely, is not of the 
 world ; His disciples also are not of the world: the former is clear, for He 
 did not descend from heaven. O/ 02 daréoronro: xara thy ouolwoty tiv Xpiorov 
 wereBeRnxsoav ad tov xdojov. They became strangers to me, ds& ray vxrep 
 avbpamov éperqy. Through their ofxesérng with Him also, they were estranged 
 from the world. 
 
 2 On John xvi. 21:—otrms adcroBycera: viv gal rod xervov nol Oevpo- 
 ciov rovrov Toxerov. Nov yep ag dandas dvdpuros sis Tov xdapeov vyevuciros én 
 rapeoczav aolvav, noel Avany wsy duly ai wepl To ~edos Adives wpocoicovar, 
 xyopoy 06 n eerae TO TeLbos cevdaTaaIs’—oTE Dice THs dvaaTaTEMS TOU YEOv ctv bpa- 
 Tov vot wareoravres sig thy pds Ocov ners wafpyalav. Xeapyosade yap orev 
 yonre (10.) Zévov ro noon rasbloy drorex bev &Pbaprov re nal avcnrebpay, sevToy 
 32 Onrovers Oyaiv. 
 
392 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 much as it lacked a divine content, its content was sensuous, 
 and thus all was disfigured. The vods in Christ ruled, and was 
 no longer merely mutable, elective, or psychical (1 Cor. i. 14) ; 
 it was the hegemonical spirit; and through faith the same thing 
 takes place by grace in us. We also need the drpemrov for our 
 perfection, the veda as a new principle, which must be our 
 essential righteousness; we, however, attain to it by grace. 
 This, like many other ideas of Apollinaris, reminds us strongly 
 of the system of Andreas Osiander, of his “ justitia essentialis.” 
 Apollinaris has, notwithstanding, left a discrepancy in his 
 system. Men, even apart from Christ, have vods in themselves ; 
 but it is, as it were, merely the form or the possibility thereof, 
 it is Sexrexds for good and evil, tpemros, and so forth; in reality, 
 however, the servant of sin. Christ, on the contrary, has no 
 vovs at all which is derived from the Adamitic nature; and, 
 therefore, His equality of essence with men suffers. Had Apol- 
 linaris been minded to carry out the parallel between Christ and 
 men strictly, he must have maintained, ether that believers have 
 no vods, no mvedua, before they believe; and that it is first 
 created in them by Christ. But although Apollinaris sometimes 
 inclined thereto, he could not be prepared to carry the notion 
 out strictly; because men prior to Christ would thus be degraded 
 almost to the rank of beasts, and redemption and completion 
 would be a new creation, instead of a renovation; especially 
 as the new element superadded by creation, the mvedpua, con- 
 stituted, in the view of Apollinaris, the inmost centre, the very 
 kernel ‘fi the human personality itself. Or, on the other hand, 
 as it was impossible to carry this out, he must have attributed. a 
 voos, a human soul, to Christ as to ie human nature, the nature 
 assumed from Mary at all events, in the sense that this vovs, so 
 far as it owed its existence to the first creation, was a vovs dex- 
 rwxos, neither filled with the sensuous nor with the divine, but 
 still endowed with the possibility of both. In the incarnation 
 itself, however, he must have conceived it filled and appropriated 
 by the divine vods or Logos, as was required by the idea of a true 
 incarnation and a true development. At the same time, justice 
 would thus be done to the deep, speculative insight of Apollinaris 
 into the fact, that the Logos who fills this ainanet soul, and con- 
 joins it with Himself, is not a something foreign to - essence, 
 but that which it had, as it were, yearned for and expected, be- 
 
APOLLINARIS. 3935 
 
 cause it could not attain to its true shape and form until it had 
 been filled with its true content ;—in other words, it was com- 
 patible with the view in question, to hold the Logos to be the 
 truth of human nature. We have found previously that Irenzeus, 
 pursuing a course of thought similar to that of Apollinaris, en- 
 deavoured to avoid the fault just mentioned, by distinguishing 
 in the human soul between possibility or susceptibility, and 
 realization or fulfilment: attributing the former to the human 
 aspect_of Christ derived from the Adamitic nature, which the 
 Holy Ghost had prepared and consecrated for the scene of the 
 incarnation ; the latter to the Logos;—and believing, on the 
 one hand, that the human nature, because pure, tended towards 
 union with the Logos; on the other hand, that the Logos, out 
 of love, strove towards an incarnation. Apollinaris, however, 
 did not do this, because he reckoned to the Adamitic nature, no#* 
 merely opposed possibilities in the form of a double susceptibi 
 lity, but also an independent power to take opposite resolutions, 
 the adre£ovcwv. If he necessarily regarded an human vods, 
 possessed of independence, as an hindrance to the incarnation, 
 it was still more the case, because he appears to have attributed 
 to the soul derived from Adam’s race, as others had done to the 
 body, a natural bias to evil, and because he deemed it impossible 
 that a human being with freedom of choice should remain with- 
 out sin. His only resource, therefore, was to shut out this 
 human pods; which he then futilely endeavoured to make good 
 by designating the vots émoupavios or Noyos, also avOpwires 
 
 came to heal and perfect ; supposing that the only way to secure 
 the unity of the divine-human person was to let fall the truly 
 human soul, instead of so defining it that it should be able to 
 be conjoined in unity with the Logos, without being tainted 
 with sin, and without having a separate personality of its own. 
 A God in a human body with animal life (puy7 Soren), they 
 say to him therefore, is a mask, but_not_a God-man. Apolli- 
 naris, it is true, constantly exclaims afresh,—Christ cannot have 
 
394 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 so entirely become that which we are as to have lost the ability 
 to make out of us that which He is. He says, in particular, 
 influenced by his antagonism to Arianism, a human voids of the 
 first creation must necessarily possess freedom of choice, and 
 thus an uncertainty and an impotence against sin would have 
 attached to Christ, that must have rendered it impossible for 
 Him to fulfil His vocation of Redeemer. But they replied,— 
 That which was not assumed by Him remained unhealed (To 
 ampoohnrrov Kal abeparevtov). They asked,—Is not the soul 
 precisely the highest in man? and would not, therefore, an 
 incarnation without soul be Docetical in the main point?* Or, 
 did the body alone stand under sin and condemnation? and did 
 the soul need no redemption ? 
 
 To this he might indeed have answered,—The work of re- 
 demption consisted precisely in the perfection brought by Christ, 
 or in the completion of the creation of our nature; and it be- 
 comes unnecessary to lay special emphasis on the redemption. 
 Yor if through faith the vods of Christ enters into us and becomes 
 our hegemonical principle, we become thereby new persons, 
 pleasing to God, sinless. Plainly, however, the second creation 
 thus comes into conflict with the first, inasmuch as the second 
 neither recognises nor seeks a living link of connection in the 
 first. And even if he recognised the existence of such a point 
 of union in believers, and thus escaped a magical creation of a 
 new constituent of human nature, he did not acknowledge its 
 existence in Christ ; otherwise, as we have just shown, he must 
 have attributed to Him a human wy, which was susceptible 
 to the active divine vods. This also floated before the minds of 
 the teachers of the Church when they remarked,—His theory 
 renders the incarnation more difficult, instead of explaining it. 
 For, through denying the human soul, he lost that middle link, . 
 by means of which it was possible for the deity to appropriate 
 the body and its sufferings.’ It is true, Apollinaris professes 
 
 ' Greg. Nyss. 1. c. c. 33, p. 204, charges him with teaching a rootless 
 man, cévoparoy appsCov, ral chovvaPy wpds viv qerépav Ovow. 212 :—ExQvarov 
 Tis Nustépas Ducews. He teaches strictly two species of men :—an earthly, 
 consisting of body, soul, reason; and an heavenly, consisting of body, soul, 
 God. Christ, therefore, stands over against us as érepoovetos, and is not 
 Cuoovatos xara +d xvpiararoy, in relation to the highest element of the 
 Adamitic humanity. 
 
 alee 25Gec. 46 7—He proceeds we olxsiotépas rapa Tov vovy TH, ocep- 
 
APOLLINARIS. 395 
 
 that it was necessary for Christ, in order to exhibit virtue, to 
 walk among men as a man. But if His humanity was a body 
 without rational soul, His virtue was not human virtue. Nay 
 more, says Gregory of Nyssa, if He had no freedom (adrefov- 
 ovov), His virtue was no virtue.’ 
 
 This curtailment of the human nature in itself has a Doceti- 
 cal character; but that Apollinaris was tainted with Docetism, 
 shows itself still more clearly in the circumstance, that (as, 
 indeed, might consistently be expected) he was unable to attri- 
 bute growth in wisdom and grace, learning, exercise, tempta- 
 tion, to the human soul of Christ. But if He was not the 
 subject of actual growth, and merely revealed to others in ever 
 increasing measure the inner treasures of His being, which re- 
 majned in themselves ever the same, and, being complete and 
 closed, were susceptible neither of enlargement nor diminution, 
 He did not pass through a truly human course of life. The 
 cause of this fault, was his assuming the human mvevpa of 
 Christ to be immediately of like nature with the eternal Logos. 
 Instead of positing merely the possibility of the incarnation in 
 the eternal Logos, distinguishing therefrom every actualization 
 of this possibility, and representing the possibility as becoming 
 an actuality, by an ethical process (that is, through the love of 
 the Logos, wnich impelled Him to the act of xévwous, and by 
 the ethical process which Christ underwent), he posits the 
 humanity as eternally complete, KaTa TO Kupt@Tatov ; he repre- 
 sents it as the Logos Himself. Prior to the incarnation, it is 
 latent merely in relation to men; in itself, it is eternally com- 
 plete. On this view, however, the childhood of Christ was 
 necessarily mere appearance. He cannot be a moral example, 
 but the physical or metaphysical process of the incarnation of 
 God, begun in Him, is simply continued in believers, who re- 
 ceive, in the place of their earthly vous, His veda, or the 
 victorious principle of that union of the divine with the ‘flesh 
 xos obons pds THY Ths bedrntos Evaow. CO. 41, p. 239: The assumption of the 
 cip2 by the Logos becomes more intelligible, if the vod; formed the transition 
 to the God Adyos. 
 
 1 Tbidem:—How can the cap have virtue without the exovosoy? And 
 the éxoveroy is impossible without a vods. OC. 41 :—- wpoulpeats ovdey erepoy ¥ 
 vode ris forty. How, then, could Apollinaris say,—Man, in whom is no vous, 
 weranauBaver THs xedupes dosrig? To darpouiperoy can neither be é@iasror 
 nor praiseworthy, although it may be without sin. 
 
396 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 which was archetypally realized in Christ. Apollinaris seems 
 to have had not the slightest notion, that even if the Redeemer 
 did assume a human soul, and with it subject Himself to a pro- 
 cess of development through freedom of choice, His victory and 
 work of redemption were notwithstanding sure; and, besides, 
 that only on this supposition could His virtue be human virtue 
 and be tested. Freedom he believed to involve sin, at all 
 events for a soul of Adam’s race. Such notions may not be 
 directly branded Manichzan ; but, at all events, the notion that 
 freedom of choice is not fit for appropriation by the Logos, 
 whilst at the same time it is an essential constituent of the 
 nature of men and angels, involves a complaint against the first 
 creation. This complaint is. the more unjustifiable, as, in the 
 further course of his system, a representation is given of the 
 essential nature of man, according to which freedom of choice 
 by no means forms part of its eternal idea, but merely appertains 
 to man at a lower stage; for he maintains that Christ was the 
 perfect man, and the process of the “ Unio” of the Tvevpa With 
 the cap&, undergone by Him, is continued also in those whe 
 believe on Him. To Christ, however, he ascribes no freedom 
 of choice; and so likewise believers, in his view, are first raised. 
 by the Christian principle above mutability. In accordance 
 herewith, therefore, instead of saying, the first creation was 
 not suitable in its completeness for appropriation by the Logos, 
 he ought rather to have expressed himself as follows :—The 
 first creation itself was still imperfect ; it was marked by un- 
 fixity and mutability: the true idea of creation was first realized 
 in the man, who was raised above all freedom of choice. It 
 would thus have appeared as a mere defect or transition-stage, 
 as the not yet existent divine fixity. But this he did not wish 
 to teach; he regarded freedom of choice as something positive, 
 which, though derived from God, was incompatible with the 
 full goodness of the world, seeing that it was not even capable 
 of aiding in the realization of this goodness. Accordingly, 
 Apollinaris is undoubtedly chargeable to a certain extent with 
 Manicheism. On such a theor 7, redemption must of course 
 consist, above all, in deliverance from that freedom of will 
 which naturally tends to evil, and in the informing of the 
 fleshly man with a higher principle, with the third factor of 
 the true human essence. This leads us to the other aspect of 
 
APOLLINARIS. 397 
 
 the matter. Apollinaris had no conception of an historical 
 mediation, of an historical process, but believed that the whole 
 result was brought into existence at one stroke. His strength 
 lay alone in describing magnitudes already complete, in their 
 mutual connection and simultaneous existence. Accordingly, 
 the idea of perfection predominates over that of reconciliation 
 and redemption; and, strictly speaking, he can only attribute 
 activity to the divine aspect ;—-for the human aspect he has no 
 essential place, no mediatory significance. The human aspect, 
 selfless in itself, has the office of showing, of revealing, the 
 divine—nothing more; it is simply the organ moved by the 
 divine. 
 
 The preliminary decision arrived at by the Synod of Alex- 
 andria, in relation to the question of the human soul of Christ, 
 in the year 362 (see above, pp. 985 ff.), was adhered to by 
 the Church teachers, Athanasius, the Gregories, Basilius the 
 Great, Amphilochius Damasus (Mansi l. c. 488 f.), and others. 
 That they also justly regarded the incarnation, in and by itself, 
 as the principial completion of the reconciliation between heaven 
 and earth, we have shown above (Chapter I.). But precisely 
 on that account, Apollinaris was unable to satisfy them. For, 
 although he appeared to be able to charge the Church with 
 arriving rather at an dvOpw7os évOeos, or a double person, that 
 is, at a monstrosity, than at an incarnation, if a complete man 
 and complete deity are to be supposed to have met in Christ ; 
 they in return might justly reply, that precisely he, with his 
 repudiation of a human voids, could never show the possibility 
 of an incarnation. For vy and cdpé do not constitute, they 
 are merely momenta of, a man: they could only form the doyetov 
 or temple in which the Logos dwelt. On the other hand, vods 
 forms part of man; but He is not supposed to have become 
 an human vods; consequently, He did not become man. It is 
 true, he maintains that the Logos was eternally man in Him- 
 self, kata Td Kupibtatov, TO TYE} wa; but inasmuch as cap§ 
 and yuy7 belong as essentially to the idea of man as the mvedpa, 
 both which he is supposed to derive from Mary, Christ, as 
 mere mvedua, was not yet a complete man. One might sup- 
 pose, indeed, that He found His complement, and became a 
 complete man, through the appropriation of yy and oapé ; 
 but the wvedua or vots differed too widely from these two to be 
 
398 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 able to constitute with them one living unity. The vovs was 
 complete, eternally perfect, identical with the Logos, so that a 
 divine person appeared and dwelt in an human living body; 
 but to represent this as the accomplishment of an incarnation 
 is inadmissible, for the simple reason, that a complete and per- 
 fect vos can only stand in a purely external relation to a body 
 that must grow ere attaining to completion. And if, for the 
 purpose of avoiding this fault, Apollinaris had posited the vous, 
 which connected itself with the cap£, as imperfect, inasmuch 
 as the vots was at the same time the Logos becoming incarnate, 
 he would have fallen out of Docetism into Arianism or Ebionism. 
 If, further, the work of redemption could not be accomplished 
 unless Christ passed through all the stadia of human develop- 
 ment, sanctifying and honouring them all, it must necessarily 
 be mutilated by a theory which does not allow of such a de- 
 velopment of the human soul in the case of Christ, and repre- 
 sents Him as commencing His career with a complete spirit 
 (vods), which was also the Logos.’ 
 
 The Church teachers must be allowed to have rightly per- 
 ceived that the first and most important thing to be done, was 
 to lay the foundations completely, prior to thinking of further 
 tasks. What profit would be the appearance of bringing out 
 the unity of the Person of Christ more completely with Apolli- 
 naris, if it were purchased at the price of the completeness of 
 the incarnation? First of all, it was necessary to recognise 
 the elements constitutive of incarnation in their completeness, 
 and then it might be permissible to ask how they could be 
 united in the Person of Christ. The Fathers, therefore, acted 
 rightly in decidedly affirming that Christ had a human soul; 
 and that in defiance of the great difficulties pointed out by 
 Apollinaris—difficulties which they thus took upon themselves, 
 and which he had pronounced insoluble. The problem of re- 
 ducing two complete magnitudes, the Logos and man, to unity, 
 
 1 Compare Theodoret, H. E. 5, 3:—Tyy royinny Woxny eorepncbas ring 
 yeyevnuéuns Enos cwtnpias. Odx eianQads yep ravrny xara tov éxeivov Adyoy 
 6 @eds Adyos ore larpslas HEiaoev, ore timis merédaneyv. “AAAA TO peey 
 Goipee TO yyivoy (Man) ore THY cdopatay wpooxuueites Ovyamsewy (that is, in 
 Christ) ; 4 02 Luxq (ours) 4 ner eixdve belay yeyevnutyn xaTo memvnne 
 Thy THs aucotias arimiay wepixeievy. Ib.1018: Flavian’s expression,—res 
 voUY TOY HuérEpoy THs owrnplas aroorEpEls. 
 
APOLLINARIS. HILARIUS. 399 
 
 may be much more difficult than that of uniting two magnitudes 
 which are incomplete and tempered; but faith demands that 
 the humanity be complete, because, otherwise, the work which 
 it feels to be complete, must be confessed to be incomplete ; and 
 because Christ could not work upon us at all, if He were not of 
 like substance with us. Accordingly, the alternative lay before 
 them, either to let fall the incarnation itself, or to take up the 
 more difficult problem, which faith assured them must be soluble. 
 In connection herewith, it is deserving of special remark, that 
 they did not allow themselves to be driven to the opposite ex- 
 treme by their opposition to Apollinaris. Because they assumea 
 that Jesus had a human soul along with His body, they were 
 by no means disposed to reduce the incarnation to a besouling 
 or bespiriting (Beseelung, Begeistung) of this man: they re- 
 pudiated the notion that Christ was merely an dvOpwzros evdeos ; 
 they refuse to hear anything of such a predominance of the hu- 
 man aspect as would reduce the divine aspect to an accident of 
 the human hypostasis. Their wish rather was, that the Logos 
 in hypostatical form should be there, as a perfect man. With 
 equal firmness also, they rejected an error nearly allied to the 
 truth just set forth, to wit, the doctrine of a double personality, 
 of the ulds Oerds side by side with the vids Ocod dice. The 
 two complete aspects of the nature of Christ must constitute, 
 they taught, a living personal unity. In this respect, they ap- 
 proved of and directed their own efforts to the same goal as 
 Apollinaris ; and they were far from falling into the mistake of 
 later Christian thinkers, who laid great stress on the distinction 
 between the two natures, but did not bestow equal care on 
 showing how they could be united in one person. 
 
 When we review more carefully the attempts made plainly 
 to set forth the union of the two complete natures, our attention 
 is above all attracted to Hilarius of Pictavium, who flourished 
 about A.D. 350 :—we feel the more drawn to him, because he 
 does not appear hitherto to have met with the consideration he 
 deserves. 
 
 Hilarius is one of the most difficult Church teachers to un- 
 derstand, but also one of the most original and profound. His 
 view of Christology is one of the most interesting in the whole 
 of Christian antiquity. But in order to form a proper estimate 
 of this theory, we must bring to mind the tendencies to which 
 
400 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 it was opposed. In the first place, Sabellianism had been re- 
 vived in a new form; and the older patripassian doctrine of 
 conversion had also been resuscitated, with the difference that 
 now—at all events by some—it was referred to the trinitarian 
 Son. The former (compare Hilar. Comm. in Matt. xi. ¢. 9, 
 De Trin. 10, 50 ff. 18 ff.) regarded the incarnation of the Logos 
 as a mere operation of the divine power and wisdom, not as a 
 personal existence thereof in a man, and thus naturally fell into 
 Ebionism ; for the obvious reason, that the incarnation was un- 
 avoidably reduced to the level of a mere extension or continua- 
 tion of the divine power of the Logos into the man Jesus: the 
 latter also arrived at an Ebionitic result; for if the Logos so far 
 fell away from, as to lose Himself, and if, in particular, by 
 emptying itself and submitting to weakness, the Word became 
 a human soul, then there remained nothing but the man in 
 Christ." We have seen above, that even Arianism, which as 
 to its inmost essence was Kbionitical, by availing itself of the 
 Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of spirits, and of the for- 
 
 getfulness which resulted from their earthly birth, was able to _ 
 
 arrive at the same result, as this latter view. In opposition to 
 these errors, it was necessary to demonstrate the existence of a 
 truly divine and a truly human aspect, or, if one will, the 
 duality of the natures in the Person of Christ; in other words, 
 it was necessary to draw as clear a distinction as possible be- 
 tween the divine and the human. 
 
 1 De Trin. 10, 50, 52:—Plures eludere dictum apostolicum, quo ait 
 Christum Dei Sapientiam et Dei virtutem, his modis solent: quod in eo 
 ex virgine creando efficax Dei sapientia et Virtus exstiterit, et in nativitate 
 ejus diving prudentiz et potestatis opus intelligatur, sitque in eo efficientia 
 potius, quam natura Sapientiew. De Trin. 10, 50:—Per quod etiam illud 
 vitii adjungitur, ut Deus Verbum tanquam pars aliqua virtutum Dei quo- 
 dam se tractu continuationis extendens hominem illum, qui a Maria esse 
 coepit, habitaverit et virtutibus diving operationis instruxerit, animee tamen 
 suz motu naturaque viventem. C. 51 :—The power of the Word who thus 
 extended Himself from without unto Jesus, strengthened him to perform 
 deeds of power after the manner of the prophets: thus also may be ex- 
 plained the words, ‘‘My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” 
 Jesus, namely, was again also a Dei Verbo contracta rursum protensione 
 desertus. De Trin. 10, 50:—defecisse omnino Deum Verbum in animam 
 corporis volunt, ut—de se defecerit Deus Verbum, dum corpus officio anime 
 viviticat.—51: ut Deus Verbum anima corporis per demutationem nature 
 se infirmitatis exstiterit, et Verbum Deus esse defecerit. 
 
HILARIUS. 401 
 
 In the second place, there were not wantizg men who, it is 
 true, took their start from this duality, and thus left room for 
 an act of grace, nay, even for a personal appearance of the Son 
 of God in the sphere of Adamitic humanity ; but, through rest- 
 ing in the duality, did not attain to a living unity.of the person. 
 To this class belonged that part of the Arians which did not ac- 
 cept the idea of a conversion of the Logos into the soul of Christ, 
 nor of a substitution of the Logos in the place of the human 
 soul; but taught that there was an human soul, nay more, an 
 human Ego alongside of that of the Logos.t. Further, all those 
 who, in the predominance they gave to the bare understanding, 
 were the forerunners of the school of Antioch, and believed it 
 necessary to be more on their guard against commixture than 
 against separation, and objected less strongly to a double Christ 
 than to theories like that of Apollinaris and his predecessors. 
 In opposition to these separators, it was necessary, on the con- 
 trary, to make every effort to point out the solid unity of the 
 person. For, independently of these, the doctrine of the Church 
 itself, as we have seen in the case of Apollinaris, was threatened 
 with the danger of the God-man being reduced to an av@pwzrogs 
 évOeos. But if this task presented great difficulties for Apolli- 
 naris, whose doctrine of the divine vovds, which took the place of 
 the soul of Christ, appeared to lessen it ; still more difficult must 
 it appear, when a human soul also was reckoned to the humanity 
 of Christ. It deserves remark, that even prior to_the public 
 appearance of Apollinaris, Hilarius had most decidedly upheld 
 the true human soul of Christ ; and that he had continued both 
 the doctrine of Tertullian (with whom he had otherwise many 
 points of affinity) and that of Irenzeus in Gaul. A denial of 
 the human soul of Christ would have appeared to him a Docetic 
 confusion of the human and the divine. So much the more 
 desirous, therefore, must we be to learn what he had further to 
 say. The more widely he separated the two aspects, above all, 
 the more distinctly he affirmed, and the more sharply he defined, 
 the completeness of the human nature, whilst at the same time 
 quite as jealously asserting for the divine aspect, everything that 
 pertains to its full idea; the more interesting is it to observe, 
 that he displayed quite as intense an anxiety to demonstrate the 
 
 1 Valens and Ursacius (compare Hilar. de syn. 79 f.) assumed a com- 
 passio Filii Dei, which involves the duality. 
 
 VOL. TI. 2¢ 
 
402 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 unity of the clearly discriminated aspects. By the combination 
 of these two tendencies, Hilarius evinced himself to be, in the 
 true sense, a teacher of the Church. 
 
 As to the former :—Hilarius, who was one of the most 
 resolute defenders of the cause of Athanasius, developed the 
 doctrine of the eternal divine Son, who exists alongside of the 
 human aspect, by, above all things, bringing more decidedly 
 into play than others the creative activity which per tains to the 
 Son of God, in connection also with the act of incarnation, 
 though, as we shall soon see, only in order afterwards to convert 
 the category of creation more completely into that of incarna- 
 tion. It was not the human race or Mary that gave body and 
 soul to the Person of Christ’; but if we distinguish accurately, 
 the creation of the human soul of Christ was a deed of the 
 Logos... In the view of Hilarius (Tract. on Ps. exvin., Lit. x. 
 pp- “298 ff.), it is an error to suppose that the souls of men spring 
 from Adam in the way of propagation. They have a higher 
 nobility, a worthier origin ; they are of a heavenly, God- role 
 nature, and their nature in itself is not stained with earthly 
 material. In the case of Adam, indeed, we know that his soul 
 was created before the body, which is of the dust. The dust, 
 when reduced to form, was not yet man, but matter; the giving 
 a form to the rough matter was not a creation, but a moulding 
 of the already existent dust. It was fitting that a creative hand 
 should show itself in connection with this highest work, and 
 that it should not be a mere forming of what already existed. 
 Hence the origin of man is divided into several acts. ‘The first 
 is indicated by the words, “ Let Us make an image, which shall 
 be like Ourselves.” This refers to the creation of the soul, which 
 was called into existence to be an image of the First-born. The 
 second was the formation of the earthly image out of the dust. 
 Whereupon followed, as the third act, the conjunction of that 
 soul with this material, by the Spirit af God, in consequence of 
 which the soul soit a body, the matter was animated, and 
 the unity, the living man, became an actuality. However strange 
 this theory may appear at first sight, Hilarius seems to have 
 regarded it as typically teaching what takes place at a higher 
 stage in connection with the incarnation. In the case of Adam, 
 he fixes the material and spiritual aspects each by itself, and sepa- 
 rates them as widely as possible from each other, in order then 
 
HILARIUS. 403 
 
 to conjoin them the more firmly to an unity in man; and such 
 also is his course of procedure with the total humanity of Christ, 
 on the one hand, and the deity, on the other. The theory de- 
 scribed has also a further significance for him: by its means, 
 the share taken by Mary in the work of incarnation is reduced 
 to its proper limits. She did not give Jesus His soul, otherwise 
 His soul would have been sinful, like that of Adam; and yet 
 His soul was of like substance with the souls of men, for they 
 also are created immediately by the Logos. Nor, further, did 
 she give Jesus His body, if we speak strictly ; for a body is first 
 formed out of the material by the accession of the enlivening, 
 animating soul, which she did not give. Not by themselves, but 
 through the soul, have the members of our body their sensations. 
 As soon as the soul ceases to have anything further to do with 
 the body, as soon as it ceases to feel the body with its sensations, 
 it has already become alien from it, and, properly speaking, no 
 longer belongs to it. As a consequence, the body soon corrupts, 
 and must be cast aside. If, then, the soul first constitutes the 
 material a body, and if the material without soul is an unformed 
 mass, we can only partially say,—Christ derived His body from 
 Mary; for, strictly speaking, Christ’s body first became a body 
 through the soul, and His soul He did not derive from Mary. 
 For this reason the Son of God, or the “Spiritus Dei,” is 
 termed the “conditor” of the body." The God-man derived ; 
 His origin from Himself, and not from Mary, even as to the 
 corporeal aspect of His being. Hence also was His body con- 
 secrated and pure from the beginning, through His God-de- 
 scended soul. And as His soul was most intimately united with 
 the heavenly Son, Hilarius did not hesitate to use even the ex- 
 pression,—-The body of Christ was of heavenly origin.” 
 
 * De Trin. 2, 5: —Humani generis caussa Dei Filius natus ex virgine est 
 et spiritu sancto, ipso sibi in hac operatione famulante, et sua, Dei videlicet 
 inumbrante virtute, corporis sibi initia consevit et exordia carnis instituit. 
 10, 16:—Non enim corpori Maria originem dedit,—inasmuch as without 
 the Spiritum Sanctum and the Verbum Dei no man would have been 
 brought into existence. By the potestas Verbi is the caro initiata et con- 
 dita. C.18:—Ipse corporis sui origo est. C. 22 :—Si conceptum carnis, nisi 
 ex Deo, virgo non habuit, longe magis necesse est, anima corporis, nisi ex 
 Deo aliunde non fuerit. C.25:—Ipse quidem per virginem ex se natus homo. 
 ‘To exactly the same purpose, Gregor. Nyss. Antirrhet. c. 54, pp. 271 fff. 
 
 2 De Trin. 10, 73 :—Caro illa de ceelis est. C 15-—Corpus celeste. 
 
4()4. FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 This has been understood as though he denied Mary to have 
 been the actual mother of Christ xara cdpxa; as though he left 
 her merely the function of the bringing forth, or of the nour- 
 ishment and reception in her womb, of an human germ, im- 
 planted into her from without,—a germ which was derived, as 
 to soul and body, from the essence, or, at all events, from the 
 creative power, of the Logos; and to which Mary, therefore, 
 stood, as it were, in the relation of foster-mother.’ This view, 
 however, notwithstanding many passages appear to justify it, 1s 
 incorrect. Rather did the Son of God, by becoming incarnate, 
 appropriate something which was foreign to Him (quod alienum 
 a se erat), even as Adam’s body also was not created, but was 
 formed out of a substance that already existed. From God the 
 soul, from the Virgin the earthly material of the body. What- 
 ever a child derives from its mother from the beginning, that 
 Christ’s humanity derived from Mary. (Note 74.) If Hilarius 
 derived the body of Christ from the essence of the Logos, or 
 even, as to material, from the creative power of the Logos, how 
 could he have conceived the God-man to be so completely united 
 and interwoven with collective humanity as he evidently did? 
 His entire doctrine of the “evacuatio,” for the sake of assuming 
 the “forma servilis,” would then be useless, unintelligible. For 
 if the Logos had produced the “ forma servilis” out of His own 
 substance, or had lowered Himself thereto, the “ evacuatio” 
 would be identical with the “forma servilis ;” whereas he draws 
 a clear distinction between the two. And if He did not derive 
 His body from Mary, He was a stranger in the human_race, and 
 was neither born into humanity nor rebare humanity in Him- 
 self. The Son of God, considered in Himself, had no “ caro,” 
 although He possessed the power to acquire “caro.” He did 
 acquire it, in that He “se ex alto defixit in limo profundi” (in 
 Ps. Ixviii. 4). Rather by His human birth, therefore, was “nova 
 natura in Deum illata” (de Trin. 9, 54), which previously was 
 not in God. The Son really received something from_humanity, 
 which He previously had not, to wit, the “forma servilis,” and 
 
 1 Baur l. c. p. 686, says :—‘‘ The Divine Logos became man by creating 
 out of Himself the human nature which consists of body and soul.” Even 
 the writer of the very thorough treatise prefixed to the Benedictine edition 
 of the works of Hilarius, and which Dr Baur does not take the trouble te 
 favour with a refutation, took a more correct view of the matter. 
 
HILARIUS. 405 
 
 what pertained thereto. Nevertheless, His birth and rise were 
 not like those of other men: without the divine act of the Son, 
 who united Himself with the soul, which He created, and who 
 by, this soul animated the material which became the body of 
 Christ, that material would not have become a body, much less 
 would a man have been produced. ‘The grounds or causal prin- 
 ciples of this origin lay not in humanity; the stamina or ele- 
 menta of this person lay in God alone; for without the divine 
 act, Mary would not have given birth to anything at all." If we 
 ask after that which was originally active in connection with the 
 generation of Christ, we must go back, not to Mary, but to the 
 Son and to the Holy Ghost.” The material contained in Mary 
 was but the means employed by the Logos for the realization of 
 His will of incarnation. What Mary gave, was simply the mass 
 susceptible to the divine act of appropriation through the Logos. 
 Substantially she gave the same for the generation of the second 
 Adam, as the earth gave for the first Adam, with the sole dif- 
 ference, that the second was born into our race.” The “ caro” 
 thus acquired by Christ was able to experience pain and change; 
 the divine aspect, on the contrary, is “indemutabilis;” it can 
 neither lose its dominion, its omniscience, and so forth, nor fall 
 away from, nor lose itself. 
 
 The parts taken by the human and the divine in the work 
 of incarnation having been thus set as far apart from each 
 other as possible, the second problem presented itself for solu- 
 tion; and to this Hilarius devoted himself with equal earnest- 
 ness. The Person of Christ is of the earth, of the “limus” of 
 Adam ; but it is also from heaven. How are the two things 
 compatible? How can heaven enter into such close union with 
 
 1 De Trin. 10, 35 :—Maria licet sexus sui officio genuerit, tamen non 
 terrenze conceptionis suscepit elementis. Genuit enim ex se corpus, sed 
 quod conceptum esset ex Spiritu. 
 
 2 De Trin. 2, 27 :—Initia nascendi Spiritus sanctus superveniens (cf. 2, 
 26) et inumbrans Virtus Altissimi moliuntur. 10, 35 :—Corpus illud spiri- 
 talis conceptionis sumsit exordium. 
 
 * Compare Hil. on Ps. lxviii. c. 4 :—Ineuntium passionum non aliunde, 
 quam ex assumtione carnis et virtus est, et potestas. Non enim incidere 
 in Deum hic infirmitatum nostrarum terror valebat, aut exserere se nisi in 
 carne corporis nostri tanquam in subjacente materia, potuerant passiones.— 
 Primus homo de terree limo: et secundus Adam in hujus limi profundum 
 de coelis descendens se ipsum tanquam ex alto veniens defixit. 
 
406 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 earth, and earth with heaven? Hilarius found means to com- 
 bine the two, on the one hand, by venturing to attribute to 
 humanity a great capability of being exalted ; and, on the other 
 hand, by forming a full enough conception of the loving con- 
 descension of the Son. The second point claims our attention 
 first, as the motive power of the entire process lies on the side 
 of the divine. At the same time, we may precursorily remark, 
 that Hilarius shows peculiar skill in setting forth the factors in 
 the act of undergoing their process, and declines accepting any 
 unity until justice has been done to the distinctions, and the 
 distinctions have been conciliated by the process 
 
 Hilarius frequently makes the remark, that if in Christ the 
 Son had still retained His divine form, He could not at the 
 same time have had a truly human form, for the humanity 
 which He had to assume was in the form of a servant. The 
 divine form and the servant’s form cannot subsist together in 
 one and the same person, at one and the same time.’ In addi- 
 tion to this, it must be remembered that the Logos was neces- 
 sitated to take the servant’s form into Himself; only thus could 
 a personal unity of the divine and human be brought.to_pass, 
 and the weakness of humanity be converted into divine power. 
 To his mind, the incarnation had accomplished nothing, unless 
 the entire person was as truly God the Word as the man 
 Jesus; that is, unless God was also man, and man was God.’ 
 If, then, he were compelled to demand such an intimate “ intus- 
 susceptio” of the human into the divine, and of the divine into 
 the human, that each belongs to the other, and is necessary to 
 its completeness; we see also that it devolved on him to show 
 that the introduction of the servant’s form was compatible with 
 
 1 On Ps. lxviii. c. 25:—In forma hominis existere, manens in Dei 
 forma qui poterat. De Trin. 9, 14 :—The ‘ concursus utriusque forme ”— 
 that is, ‘‘et Dei et servi””—became Him not; not merely because it would 
 have been a logical contradiction, but because the reality of the state of 
 humiliation would thus have been done away with, the divine condescen- 
 sion would have been reduced to a mere show, or else the Person of Christ 
 would have been split up into a duality. 
 
 2 In De Trin. 10, 52 ff., he speaks against the division of the one Christ. 
 GO. 52 :—Totum ei (ecclesia) Deus Verbum est, totum ei homo Christus est 
 retinens hoc in sacramento confessionis suze unum, nec Christum aliud 
 eredere, quam Jesum, nec Jesum aliud preedicare, quam Christum. C. 22: 
 —Ut totus hominis filius sit. C. 54, 55. 
 
HILARIUS. 407 
 
 the idea of th divine nature, and that the latter does not by its 
 inherent glory and majesty exclude the former. At this point 
 Hilarius brings forward his doctrine of the “ evacuatio forme 
 Dei.” The Son of God emptied Himself of the divine form, in 
 order that He might exist in the servant’s form of men.' 
 
 Now, wherein consisted this self-renunciation or self-evacua- 
 tion of the divine nature? He resigned the “forma Dei;” but 
 the “forma Dei” is identical with countenance. By the “forma 
 Dei,” in the case of the Son, therefore, we may understand the 
 full actuality or personality, as stamped in the countenance, and 
 by which the Spirit appears for others.? Consequently, the 
 subject of the “ exinanitio” or “evacuatio” was the form of the 
 Son which shone in eternal glory. He renounced His own 
 countenance, His “ substantia” (hypostasis ?), in order that, 
 during the period of His earthly humiliation, the “forma servilis” 
 might be His countenance, until, by glorifying humanity and 
 its “forma servilis,” the Logos should have restored the glory 
 of His countenance in the perfected God-man. ‘This implies, 
 therefore, regarded from another point of view, that the incar- 
 nation was not complete from the very begining; that the 
 Logos did not all at once enter into humanity with His entire 
 essence, but kept back His majesty in Himself, and perfectly 
 exhibited His countenance or His personality in the man Jesus, 
 for the first time, at His exaltation. In his view, then, the 
 human countenance, the servant’s form, occupied the foreground 
 during the earthly life of Christ; this, however, must not be 
 confounded with the human Ego, for to the Ego he never 
 alludes. On the contrary, the deity of the Son, which, having 
 renounced its glory, had been able to unite itself perfectly with 
 
 + On Ps. lxviii. c. 25:—In forma servi veniens evacuavit se 2 Dei 
 forma. Nam in forma hominis existere manens in Dei forma qui paterat ? 
 De Trin. 10, 50 :—Erat enim (sc. Christo) nature proprietas, sed Dei forma 
 jam non erat, quia per ejus exinanitionem servi erat forma suscepta. On 
 Ps. liii. c. 8, 14:—Cumque accipere formam servi nisi per evacuationem 
 suam non potuerit, etc. 
 
 2 On Ps. lxvili. c. 25 :—Forma et vultus et facies et imago non dif- 
 ferunt. ©. 4:—The divine nature semet ipsam exinaniens transit, ut ex 
 Dei forma in formam servi decideret. This is also described as follows :— 
 Substantia ei non fuit, infixo in limo profundi. The substantia existed 
 quee assumta habebatur ; that existed no longer nec jam videbatur restare, 
 que in aliud se evacuando concesserat. 
 
408 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 the servant’s form, continued to be the ruling power in Christ 
 and His soul. At the same time, he constantly repeats, that 
 the Son Himself remained the same even in the “ exinanitio;” 
 that He was constantly, by His own deed, by His own will, in 
 “ exinanitio;” which, of course, implies, that the same will 
 which maintains the “exinanitio” so long as it 1s necessary, 
 possesses in itself the latent power to return to full and entire 
 actuality.! This he often expresses as follows :—The divine 
 natura, although not the “substantia” (that is, probably, v1 0- 
 cracts), not the “ forma (or “ facies”) Dei,” remained unalter- 
 ably His. The limit of the “exinanitio” was, that it could 
 never advance to a renunciation of the “divina natura,’ or 
 to the point when the “ forma servi” alone would remain in 
 Christ without the “divina natura.” That would be Ebionism ; 
 nay more, on that supposition, inasmuch as the Son would have 
 lost Himself and disappeared in the servant’s form, the very 
 purpose of His self-abasement would have been frustrated. 
 Moreover, to the attainment of the end in view, it was neces- 
 sary that the divine should be introduced right into the ser- 
 vant’s form, or into the humanity, in order then to accomplish 
 its work of exaltation as from within.? Besides, the ‘“ exina- 
 nitio” could not then be regarded as a continuous deed, as an 
 expression of might or power, but solely as a suffering. Had 
 
 1 De Trin. 11, 18 :—In forma enim Dei manens formam servi assumsit, 
 non demutatus, sed se ipswm exinaniens et intra se latens (sc. in Dei forma) 
 et intra suam ipse vacuefactus potestatem, dum se usque ad formam tem- 
 perat habitus humani, ne potentem immensamque naturam assumte humili- 
 tatis non ferret infirmitas, sed in tantum se virtus incircumscripta mode- 
 raretur, in quantum oporteret eam usque ad patientiam connexi sibi 
 corporis obedire. Tract. in Ps. Ixviu. 4. 
 
 2 On Ps. Ixviii. 25:—Aboleri autem Dei forma, ut tantum servi esset 
 forma, non potuit. Ipse enim est et se ex forma Dei inaniens et formam 
 hominis assumens. Evacuatio non est divinee nature interitus. Fragm. 
 ex opere hist. ¢. 82 :—Iccireo immutabilis et inconvertibilis filius Dei, ut in 
 assumtione hominis corruptioni potius gloriam intulerit, quam labem eeter- 
 nitati. De Trin. 9, 14 :—Obedientia mortis non est in Dei forma, sicut nec 
 Dei forma inest in forma servi. Per sacramentum autem evangelice 
 dispensationis non alius est in forma servi, quam qui in forma Dei est 
 although the evacuatio takes place. It does not abolish the identity of the 
 subject: non alius atque diversus est, qui se exinanivit et qui formam servi 
 accepit. Accepisse enim non potest ejus esse qui non sit.—Ergo evacuatio 
 forme non est abolitio nature, quia, qui se evacuat, non caret sese, eb qui 
 accipit, manet. 
 
HILARIUS. 409 
 
 He lost Himself, He would not have been able to assume 
 humanity. For the assumption of humanity must also be con- 
 sidered as a deed following upon the “ evacuatio.” 
 
 We now come to the second momentum, the “assumtio 
 forme servilis.’ In the view of Hilarius, the “evacuatio,” so 
 far from being identical with, was merely the condition of, the 
 incarnation, on the part of God, to which corresponds a further 
 condition on the part of man... The Son of God laid aside His 
 divine form so far as He did, in order that in Him there might 
 be no obstacle in the way of His making the servant’s form to 
 such a degree His own, that it might be counted as forming 
 part of His own existence. For the same reason the humanity 
 was not swallowed up through its union with the Logos, or its 
 essence done away with (de Trin. 11, 48; see Note 1, page 
 407). But as the divine nature, on the one hand, rendered 
 itself, as it were, susceptible of the “intus-susceptio” of the 
 humanity, which, though originally a foreign element, it was 
 the divine will should be appropriated ; even so was it necessary 
 that humanity should possess a capability of being exalted to 
 unity with the Son of God. How Hilarius conceives this to 
 have been brought about we shall shortly see. As far as relates 
 to the divine aspect, he makes the “assumtio forme servilis” 
 follow upon the “evacuatio,” as the second momentum in the 
 act of incarnation. The “evacuatio” proceeded so far that the 
 way was prepared for the “assumtio forme servilis,’ but by no 
 means so far as in itself to constitute the servile form. ‘That 
 would have been a falling away of the Logos from Himself, a 
 conversion ; suffering would thus have been introduced into the 
 Logos. We can only avoid this passivity, this self-losing, of 
 the Logos in the servant’s form, by supposing the assumption 
 thereof to be a new, distinct act of the Son, who thus showed 
 that even in the “evacuatio,’ He had maintained and had re- 
 tained power over Himself. (Note 75.) 
 
 That which belonged to the divine Natura could not be 
 lost by the Son: the “ potestas generis sui” He retained (9, 51; 
 11, 48). The divine essence is not something void and indeter- 
 minate; but contains a fulness of attributes: these attributes, 
 therefore, pertained to the Son whilst He was in the “ forma 
 servilis,” because the “natura Dei” remained His. Nor did 
 they lie inactive; but were operative and benefited humanity, 
 
410 FIRST PERIOL, THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 which was to be raised to God. (Note 76.) This leads us to 
 notice Hilarius’ doctrine of the susceptibility of human nature 
 for God. 
 
 We have, in the first place, to remark in general, the high 
 estimate he formed of the nobility of the human-soul. It is 
 not of foreign substance, like the body, which is taken from the 
 earth; but springs from God, and is a likeness of the image of 
 God (imaginis Dei exemplum), of the First-born of creation. 
 By its thoughts and their infinite speed, the spirit imitates the 
 omnipresence of God. It is true, the souls of men have laden 
 themselves with guilt; but when they proceed forth from God, 
 they are pure, and so also continued the soul of Christ. It was 
 therefore spiritual, and of héavenly, yea, of divine origin, shin- 
 ing with its natural brightness. The body, on the contrary, 
 is not directly from God, but “ex aliena substantia.” The 
 souls of men are all defiled by their entrance into the body. 
 So also must it have happened to the soul of Christ, if His 
 body had not been conceived of the Holy Ghost. He sanctified 
 the inner being of the Virgin, and, breathing therein, united 
 Himself with the nature of the human flesh. And in order 
 that no discrepance might remain by reason of the weakness 
 of the human body, through which the “Unio” would have 
 been rendered impossible, the power of the Highest over- 
 shadowed the Virgin and strengthened her weakness. In this 
 manner, her corporeal substance was prepared for the implant- 
 ing activity of that Spirit, which was to enter into her (of the 
 Son).” His body thus became, indeed, different from ours,— 
 that is, as to its attributes, not as to its substance. So far is 
 the integrity and excellence of the body of Christ from being 
 opposed to the idea of the human body, that we rather are to 
 participate in its glory: and first, when we are conformed to 
 
 1 Although Hilarius speaks of different kinds of souls, he has laid down © 
 
 nothing particular relative to the ‘‘species” of the soul of Christ. On 
 Ps. cxli. (c. 4), he says,—‘* Anima Christi signis et factis Deum se pro- 
 
 baverat.” 
 * De Trin. 2, 26. For the commencement of this passage, see Note 74. 
 
 It proceeds as follows :—Atque ut ne quid per imbecillitatem humani cor- 
 poris dissideret, Virtus altissimi virginem obumbravit, infirmitatem ejus 
 veluti per umbram circumfusa confirmans, ut ad sementivam ineuntis 
 Spiritus efficaciam substantiam corporalem divine virtutis inumbratio tem- 
 peraret. 
 
HILARIUS 411 
 
 the glory of the body of God (that is, of Christ), will that image 
 of God be completely formed in us, to which regard was had 
 from the beginning. (Note 77.) 
 
 The advantages which accrued to the humanity of Christ 
 from the consecrating and sanctifying power of the Divine 
 Spirit, who prepared it for assumption by the Logos, are still 
 further enhanced by the assumption itself, or by the activity of 
 the incarnate Son of God. According to Hilarius, to Christ 
 pertained corporeally also, natural immortality, freedom from 
 pain, from want, etc. This must not indeed be understood to 
 sionify that He was incapable of dying, of suffering, of hunger- 
 ing, etc. His history shows the possibility thereof, by the 
 actuality ; and He also grew, passing through the different ages 
 (de Trin. 2, 24; see Note 78). On the other hand, we should 
 not quite hit the view entertained by Hilarius, were we to 
 suppose that the divine Sonship of Christ, and the union of 
 humanity therewith, merely gave Him the power at every 
 moment to rise even physically above all suffering and need, | 
 if such were but His will. For that would be to represent the 
 humanity of Christ as in itself needy, mortal, and so forth, even 
 subsequently to its assumption by the Son of God; out of which 
 passive condition it could only be raised by a particular act of 
 will in each particular instance. Indeed, on the contrary, by 
 the incarnation, the humanity of Christ was, strictly speaking, so 
 completely raised above everything of the kind just mentioned, 
 that no assaults of hostile powers could harm it or involve it 
 in actual suffering, save when, by a special act of will, He laid 
 Himself open to their operation, and voluntarily submitted Him- 
 self to suffering. Hilarius’ great aim was totally to avoid repre- 
 senting the weakness or the perfection of Christ as a physical 
 determination and necessity; and, on the contrary, to view all 
 His sufferings as deeds, that is, as ethical. As he refused to 
 allow that the Son of God, by His act of self-abasement, as it 
 were, lost Himself and reduced Himself to a fixed condition of 
 humiliation, the necessary and physical consequence of that act 
 (for, on the contrary, His self-abasement was the effect of con- 
 tinuous loving acts of will, and He remained at every moment 
 in possession of power over Himself); so neither, on the other 
 hand, did the humanity assumed by Him, ever in any instance 
 impose on Him the necessity of suffering or dying. Far from 
 
412 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 that, conceived. as it was by the Holy Ghost, and personally 
 united with the Son of God, it was in itself raised above every 
 necessity of the kind. Indeed, in the view of Hilarius, such a 
 necessity never did pertain to the true idea of humanity in itself, 
 but merely to the form of humanity embodied in us. But, on 
 the other hand, the same free will of love, which was the cause 
 of the “evacuatio” of the Son of God, and which went through 
 the entire period of Christ’s earthly existence, must then have 
 become the will of the entire God-man ; consequently it must 
 have gone on to the more concrete determination, that the God- 
 man should freely will that which, because of the perfection of 
 His humanity, was not a matter of necessity, to wit, the keeping 
 back of the deification and the laying Himself open to suffering 
 and need. That this was Hilarius’ meaning, is most apparent 
 where the sufferings of Christ attained their climax. For Christ 
 not to have been able to suffer at all, would have been an imper- 
 fection, would have been a limit imposed on His love; His 
 ethical would have been restrained by His physical nature. On 
 the other hand, the necessity for His death must not be sought 
 in His own spiritual or physical nature; the ground thereof Jay 
 outside His perfect nature, in us, to whom it was His will, and 
 it was necessary, He should become like, if He were purposed to 
 redeem us,—like, not merely in general, as a man, but also as a 
 man in the servile form, in the present form of our humanity. 
 For this reason He gave Himself up, by a free act of will, to 
 suffering and death: His very death was an act.! He who in 
 Himself was exalted above all subjection to hostile powers from 
 without, allowed them to force their way to Him, conceded them 
 power, in order to conquer them, in order that they might, as it 
 vwere, exhaust themselves on His person. In this way He demon- 
 strated, even in suffering, His power and dominion ;—primarily, 
 His power over His own nature, which He constituted passible, 
 that is, accessible by suffering (for thereto also was His éfoucla 
 necessary, John x. 18); and then in the triumph which He 
 gained over the hostile powers by His patient endurance of 
 suffering. But if every part of the suffering of the God-man 
 was, in the full sense, an ethical deed, He must at every moment 
 have had power over Himself and over His sufferings, and never 
 have been passively lost therein. Hilarius was therefore able to 
 * De Trin. 10, 57. 61 62; specially ¢. 11. 
 
HILARIUS, 413 
 
 say,—in the mystery of the Son of man, who is also the Son 
 of God, we have this, that He ruled even whilst dying; and, 
 although ruling,-died (De Trin. 10, 62, 48). It is self-evident 
 that, as Hilarius held the suffering of Christ in its inner essence 
 to be a deed, he was able to concede to the divine nature also a 
 participation therein; and even in regard to this matter, to up- 
 hold the unity of the divine and human aspects. His suffering 
 was not merely voluntary; it was His joy: it pertained to His 
 blessedness, for the head loves the members.’ This delight in 
 suffering love passes over also to His members: through love, 
 the pain which is undergone for the honour of God or for the 
 brethren, is scarcely felt, but is forgotten ;—the less felt and the 
 more forgotten, the more completely love in all its fulness enters 
 into the very depths of suffering for others (De Trin. 10, 44). 
 We find also in the writings of other teachers of the Church 
 —for example, Epiphanius, Athanasius, etc.—substantially the 
 same notion of the glorification or deification of human nature 
 in Christ, >esulting from the “assumtio,” which was a reality 
 from the very beginning. And even if they did not all agree 
 in teaching that the humanity in union with the Logos ex- 
 perienced no needs, but went, in this respect, some farther than 
 others, they were all one in the conviction that the humanity of 
 Christ by itself was subject to the necessity of death, even as is 
 ours. Death does not belong to the idea, but merely to the 
 present form, of humanity. Had death been a physical neces- 
 sity for Christ, He would not have been the perfect man, and 
 His death could not have had redeeming efficacy. They there- 
 fore assert merely the ethical necessity, as of the birth, so also 
 of the suffering and death of Christ ; and persist in maintaining, 
 that, even after the act of incarnation had taken place, it lay at 
 every moment in the power of Christ, in virtue of the indwelling 
 of the Logos, the advantage of which felt to the humanity also, 
 to rise above sickness and death, suffering and sorrow; in 
 other words, His servile form was at every moment the work of 
 His free will. MHiularius carried out this thought further, not 
 
 1 Tract. in Ps. cxxxvili. c. 26 :—Domino itaque passio ista delicize sunt, 
 dum portas areas confringit, dum vectes ferreos conterit, dam omnem potes- 
 tatem despoliat, dum de his in se triumphat dum eum, quem ad imaginem 
 suam fecerat. redimit, dum deliciis paradisi restituit. In his igitur pas- 
 sionis oblectamentis atque deliciis nox ei illuminatio est. 
 
414 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 merely in an anti-Arian interest, but also in order that the unity 
 of the Logos with the humanity thus assimilated to Him might 
 be at every moment a present fact. Whatever judgment may 
 be pronounced on his manner of carrying it out, the rigidness 
 with which he adhered to the ethical point of view deserves so 
 much recognition, that we ought not to be too ready with the 
 charge of Docetism, especially as the ethical basis on which he 
 stood enabled him to acknowledge that Christ truly suffered and 
 really died ;—the only difference between Him and us being, 
 that in His case they were free acts, whereas in our case they 
 are the result of a necessity of nature. As is evident from his 
 doctrine of the “evacuatio,” and from his frequent use of ex- 
 pressions like “God was born; God died,” he was so far from 
 shrinking, after the manner of Docetists, at the idea of the 
 incarnation of the Logos and of the closest unity of the two 
 natures, that he might rather be charged with adopting the idea 
 of God-manhood too quickly, and without the necessary inter- 
 mediate steps. Jor one might undoubtedly ask,—Why is the 
 glorificatory influence of the Logos on the humanity with which 
 He was united conceived to have been from the very beginning 
 so great, that it could in no instance undergo suffering without 
 a special act of self-abasement, if this same glorification had to 
 be immediately resumed again for the sake of the work of 
 redemption? ‘To posit a thing which must immediately after- 
 wards be done away with, seems to be an useless labour; and 
 the view laid down by Hilarius comes into conflict, not merely 
 with the passages in which Christ declares Himself to be igno- 
 rant,’ but quite as much with all true development on the part 
 of His humanity; which he persists indeed in attributing to it, 
 though he fails to find a fit place either for it or freedom.? 
 
 The more does it deserve mention, that Hilarius himself also 
 recognised this defect, and endeavoured to solve the problem. 
 He sought, namely, to show not merely that there were moments 
 
 1 ** Non sibi nescivit (horam), sed nobis” (9, 51, 71); such is the turn 
 which he found himself compelled to adopt. 
 
 2 De Trin. 2, 24:—Dei imago invisibilis pudorem humani exordii non 
 recusavit, et per conceptionem, partum, vagitum, cunas, omnes nature nos- 
 tre contumelias transcucurrit ; in de Trin. 9, 50, he speaks of the ‘‘ libera 
 voluntas” of Christ, but understands thereby merely will and power, like 
 vther Church teachers of this period—for example. Gregory Nazianzen 
 
HILARIUS. 415 
 
 of “exinanitio,’ by which the “exaltatio” of humanity, which 
 began with the “assumtio,” was interrupted, but also that there 
 was a “status exinanitionis,’ a “servilis habitus;” at the same 
 time avoiding all curtailment of the idea of the God-manhood. 
 In attaining this end, all depended on the incarnation being 
 conceived, not as absolutely completed in one act, but as under- 
 going a process. ‘This process, again, required to be so viewed 
 that space was left for a stadium during which the idea of God- 
 manhood came into inequality with itself, only, however, to 
 restore itself from the inequality to the true equipollence of the 
 ideal and factual. It is at this point that Hilarius displayed in 
 a particular manner the speculative character of his mind. 
 
 He by no means wished to represent the idea of the God- 
 manhood as adequately realized all at once, but demanded for 
 that purpose a longer process. Nor does he refer the process to 
 the human aspect alone, but also to the divine, which submitted 
 itself to the “evacuatio” and fell into inequality with itself, in 
 order afterwards to restore itself to itself, in unity with human- 
 ity. Humanity in itself, in its idea, is not inadequate to the 
 divine: had it been possible for a perfect humanity to have been 
 at once assumed, the “evacuatio” of the divine nature would 
 have been unnecessary. Inasmuch, therefore, as he asserts that 
 the “evacuatio,” which ceased at the end, was necessary at the 
 beginning, he must have regarded the status of the humanity 
 assumed by Him as really imperfect at first, and therefore have 
 intended to restrict the afore-noticed glorifying influence of the 
 Logos within certain limits. The real purpose of the idea of 
 the “evacuatio Verbi” was to enable him to conceive the Logos 
 as SO intimately united with the man Jesus, even whilst He was 
 in the “forma servilis,” that the progress of the man might 
 appear as an ever increasing return of the Logos into equality 
 with Himself, even as the humiliation attendant on the servant’s 
 form was a ne behind His true reality and glory on the 
 part of the Logos. We see that on this view everything was 
 common to the entire person at every moment, though to each 
 aspect in its own distinctive manner. The entire person entered 
 into inequality with itself: the actuality of each aspect, during 
 the state of humiliation, fell short of its idea-—of the idea of the 
 Son, of the idea of the perfect man, of the idea of the God-man. 
 Tt was not merely the human aspect that was at first inadequate 
 
416 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 to the divine; for, through the medium of the voluntary “ eva- 
 cuatio,” it dragged down the divine nature also, so far as it per- 
 mitted it, into its own inequality. ‘Non conveniebat forme 
 utriusque (Dei et servi) concursus” (de Trin. 9, 14). As room 
 was to be left for the “forma servilis,” the “forma Dei” must 
 needs become latent. “Decedere ex Deo in hominem nisi ex 
 forma Dei Deus evacuans non potuit” (de Trin. 12, 6). Seeing, 
 then, that by means of the “evacuatio” the Son of God appro- 
 priated to Himself the “forma servilis,” a diremption, a disturb- 
 ance of the unity (amissio, offensio unitatis) with the divine 
 nature, found its way into this person. (Note 79.) Not, indeed, 
 in the sense that the unity of the Son with the Father was en- 
 tirely done away with, or even interrupted; for otherwise the 
 Word could not have attained the end for which He emptied 
 Himself. He entered into humanity in its low estate, in order 
 that God might be born into humanity :* consequently He must 
 have retained within Himself the potence of that which He was 
 to bring and to bestow. Only, however, by becoming like us, 
 and unlike or unequal to Himself, that is, by entering into a 
 state inadequate to Himself, into the “forma servilis,” was 1t 
 possible for the Word to do away with the inequality of human- 
 ity with itself and its idea, to make it like Himself, in the glory 
 to which the Son should restore Himself. To this glory, how- 
 ever, He returned not merely as the Logos, but as the God-man ; 
 that is, created humanity was in Him and through Him trans- 
 lated into the sphere of the divine essence. Christ, therefore, 
 in the state of humiliation, was “dividuus a se;” He had taken 
 up into Himself the inadequate element humanity, in order 
 that it might be reborn in Him; but, notwithstanding all these 
 “ sacramentorum diversitates,” He never so far fell away from 
 Himself as no longer to be the Son and Christ, possessed of 
 power over Himself.’ For this reason, also, it was possible for 
 
 1 De Trin. 10, 7:—Namque cum in hominem Deus natus sit, non idcirco 
 natus est, ne non Deus maneret, sed ut manente Deo homo natus in Deum 
 sit. Nam et Emanuel nomen ejus est, quod est,—nobiscum Dominus ; ut 
 non defectio Dei ad hominem sit, sed hominis profectus ad Deum sit. Vel 
 cum glorificari se rogat, non utique nature Dei, sed assumtioni humilitatis 
 hoe proficit. (But to this belonged also the evacuatio forme Dei.) Nam 
 hane gloriam postulat, quam ante constitutionem mundi apud Deum habuit. 
 
 2 De Trin. 10, 22:—Cum Jesus Christus et natus, et passus, et mortuus 
 et sepultus sit: et resurrexit (that is, by His resurrection He manifested 
 
 : Tt 
 
HILARIUS. 417 
 
 Him finally to restore Himself to equality with Himself (zequa- 
 litas) ; into which equality human nature, too, is taken up. 
 
 The distinction between the last and the preceding stadium 
 becomes especially clear, when we consider that Hilarius desig- 
 nates the third again a_birth.? The jirst birth of the Son was 
 the eternal one out of the Father, on the ground of which He 
 was equal to Him in all things, even in glory. The second is 
 His birth into humanity, and into the humble form of a servant, 
 through which, by a free act of love, He acquired a different 
 mode of existence; He sunk Himself into humanity, in order 
 to raise it up out of its depths into Himself. And yet, even 
 during this relative separation from the divine unity, to which 
 He subjected Himself by His union with humanity, He re- 
 tained sure hold upon Himself. The overreaching power of 
 the divine essence perfected the humanity, created a “forma 
 Dei” out of the “forma servilis;” and so, with the perfection 
 of the humanity, the Son was again restored to Himself. (Note 
 80.) And that was the third birth. The day of resurrection 
 was the birth-day of His humanity to glory; and thenceforth 
 Te was, as a whole (as the God-man), that which He had 
 been before time as Logos. Although He was born to that 
 which He had been before time, still, He was born in time to 
 be that which He previously was not: henceforth, however, the 
 Son of man is to be seen at the right hand of power; for 
 humanity having been made partaker of glory after the resur- 
 rection, advanced onwards to the brightness which the Logos 
 had previously enjoyed; and the Son of man, enthroned at the 
 Father's side, the mortality of the flesh having been swallowed 
 up in immortality, celebrated His birth as the living, never: 
 dying Son of God. 
 
 Taking a survey of the whole, we find that Hilarius consi- 
 dered the eternal Son, who created the souls of men as images 
 of Himself, to be naturally the archetype of these souls, and, 
 
 the divine Natura which had ever remained His). Non potest in his sacra- 
 mentorum diversitatibus ita ab se dividuus esse, ne Christus sit. 
 
 1 De Trin. 9, 54:—Si nativitas hominis naturam novam intulit, et 
 humilitas formam demutavit sub assumtione servili; nunc donatio nominis 
 (Phil. ii. 10) forme reddit equalitatem. 
 
 * De Trin. 9, 6, and Ps. cxxxviii. 19, he distinguishes a threefold state 
 of Christ: ante hominem, in homine, post hominem. 
 
 TwOtaIT: 2D 
 
418 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 therefore, to stand in an original relationship to them; hence 
 the possibility of the incarnation. Because of the entrance of 
 sin, the Son, the archetype, manifested His love by being born 
 ‘nto the servile form of the image: our archetype made itself 
 like us. This is his predominant mode of looking at the 
 matter. But, as Hilarius was as far as possible from regarding 
 the assumption of humanity as a mere transitory theophany, or 
 as a mere means of redemption, but believed humanity to have 
 attained to eternal and permanent perfection in the glorified 
 God-man ; he arrives, at the close of the process, to the convic- 
 tion, that in the God-manhood the full idea of humanity was 
 first realized, and in Christ, the creation of our race fully ac- 
 complished. The necessity for the God-man, previously de- 
 monstrated from the existence and nature of sin, was now 
 traced back absolutely, and for all stadia, to the idea of our 
 nature. Henceforth, not the Logos alone by Himself is our 
 archetype, but the entire God-man, with body and. soul,—He 
 who took upon Himself the likeness of our servile form, in 
 order that we might bear the likeness of His divine form. Into 
 that divine form were swallowed up primarily, in His person, 
 the mortality and weakness of humanity, to the end that we 
 also might be converted into the image of the Creator, agree- 
 ably to the idea which God had even at the creation of the 
 first man Believers also participate in this divine-human 
 life. By faith they become, not merely morally like or one 
 with Him, but essentially.” All believers have put on the one 
 
 1 Compare de Trin. 11, 49 (see Note 77) ; specially the words,—‘‘ Con- 
 summatur itaque homo imago Dei. Namque conformis effectus gloriz 
 corporis Dei, in imaginem Creatoris excedit secundum dispositam primi 
 hominis figurationem.” According to this, even the first man was created 
 under the idea of the God-man; and the idea of the ™ imago Dei” is first 
 completely realized when man becomes conformed to the God-man. Com- 
 ment. in Matt. c. 3, $ 2:—‘‘ Exspectatum Deo Patri manus hominem, quem 
 assumserat, reportavit.” 
 
 2 De Trin. 8, 7, 9, 12; 11,19. Compare, in connection with what fol- 
 lows, the Preefatio (pp. 24 ff.) to the Opp. Hilar. ed. Maur.; de Trin. 8, 
 13 :—‘ Eos qui inter Patrem et Filium voluntatis ingerunt unitatem, inter- 
 rogo, utrumne per nature veritatem hodie Christus in nobis sit, aut per 
 concordiam voluntatis? Si enim vere Verbum caro factum est, et vere 
 nos Verbum carnem cibo dominico sumimus, quomodo non naturaliter 
 manere in nobis existimandus est qui et naturam carnis nostre, jam insepa- 
 rabilem sibi, homo natus agsumsit, et naturam carnis sue ad naturam eter- 
 
HILARIUS. 412 
 
 Christ, and have become the same. We put Him on in baptism ; 
 but the holy Eucharist is of special significance to Hilarius, in 
 this respect. 
 
 Christ is in the Father through His divine nature; we, on 
 the contrary, are in Him through His corporeal birth, and He 
 is in us through the sacraments. In this way, a gradually as 
 cending, perfect unity is brought about. We remain in Him, 
 He in the Father; but, remaining in the Father, He remains 
 also in us, so that we also advance onwards to unity with the 
 Father; for in Him, who by His nature, on the ground of 
 birth, is in the Father, we also dwell by our nature, even as He 
 dwells in us by His nature. Hilarius employs the strongest 
 and boldest expressions to designate the universal sionificance 
 of the incarnation of Christ, in relation to our entire race, 
 maintaining that therewith something was potentially done, not 
 merely for, but to us all; because human nature, in its entirety, 
 was reborn and united with God in Him. Tract. in Ps. i. 
 ce. 16: “Ut et Filius hominis esset Filius Dei, naturam in se 
 universe carnis assumsit, per quam effectus vera vitis genus in 
 se universe propagationis tenet.” (Note 81.) His humanity 
 is the city on the hill; in Him, as in a city, the human race 
 is gathered together; accordingly, He who thus gathers us to- 
 gether in Himself is the unity of many, the “civitas;” we, 
 bound together in Him, participating in His body, are the 
 inhabitants of the city, we are one in Him. For our sake the 
 Son of God Himself laid the foundation of His humanity, in 
 order that, having become man, He might take to Himself, out 
 of the Virgin, the nature of the flesh, and that, by means of 
 this marriage and union, the body of the entire human race 
 might be sanctified in Him. As His will in assuming a body 
 was to see all rooted in Himself, so was it His will to give Him- 
 self back to Himself in all, by means of His invisible nature. Not 
 that He, through whom man was created, needed to become man; 
 but we needed that God should become flesh and dwell in us, that 
 is, that He should take up His abode in the inmost essence of hu- 
 manity in general, by the assumption of one man (carnis unius). 
 nitatis sub sacramento nobis communicande carnis admiscuit? Ita enim 
 omnes unum sumus, quia et in Christo Pater est, et Christus in nobis est. 
 
 Quisquis ergo naturaliter Patrem in Christo negabit, neget prius naturaliter 
 vel se in Christo, vel Christum sibi inesse.” (C. 15. 
 
420 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 As might be anticipated, we find Hilarius taking a corre- 
 sponding view of the work of redemption. Having assumed 
 our sinful body, Christ bore our sin (de Trin. 10, 47). All 
 the weakness which He took upon Himself, He bore voluntarily, 
 translating Himself into our nature and its weaknesses. ‘T’his 
 weakness, therefore, can only be understood when its substitu- 
 tionary significance is recognised. We have previously referred 
 to this point. But He did not merely wish to stand in our 
 stead ; no, we died in Him; in Him humanity as a whole sits 
 at the right hand of the Father ; in Him all peoples behold 
 their own resurrection and perfection ; every momentum of His 
 history becomes, as it were, an active potence to reproduce the 
 same history in men. (Note 82.) 
 
 It is evident, therefore, that Hilarius, equally with Apol- 
 linaris, aimed at showing the union of the two aspects of Christ 
 to be so intimate, that one should be warranted in saying,— 
 “totus hominis filius totus est Dei filius,’ and vice versa; that 
 is, this person is entirely man, or the perfect man, and it be- 
 longs to His perfection to be also God; and vice versa,—this 
 person is entirely God; in other words, His humanity was not 
 a mere possession or dwelling-place of the Logos, but a momen- 
 tum of Himself, apart from which no complete and exhaustive 
 conception could be formed of Him. At this point we see very 
 clearly that his aim almost coincided with that of Apollinaris, 
 only that he goes to work more carefully, and does justice to 
 the distinction, ere attempting the union of the two aspects, as, 
 in fact, an union is nothing, if it be not the union of elements 
 that are distinct. Quite as clear is it also, that there is a very 
 wide difference between the Christology of Hilarius and that of 
 a later period, when, on the one hand, the distinction between the 
 two aspects was exaggerated, and, on the other hand, their union 
 was effected solely by the subjection of the human aspect; that 
 is, by curtailing it relatively to the divine. In short, Hilarius 
 had not yet, like a later age, repudiated the truth lying at the 
 basis of Monophysitism. Having the same object in view as 
 Apollinaris, to wit, the unity of the person, he showed his 
 superiority to him particularly by attaining it in more complete 
 measure, and without the sacrifice of the human soul. On the 
 
 | contrary, he employed the soul for the purpose of denoting the 
 personal unity of Christ. Furthermore, he did not, for the 
 
HILARIUS—ATHANASIUS. 421 
 
 sake of the unity, resort to the representation of the humanity 
 of Christ, that is, the mvedua, as eternal, complete, and im- 
 mediately identical with the Logos. He maintained that the 
 human created nature was susceptible of being so appropriated 
 by the Logos, that creation might pass over into the incarnation 
 of the Logos. The Logos, however, brought this to pass, in 
 that He stripped Himself of His actual glory by an act of His 
 loving will; having done which, He became capable of incar- 
 nation—a work which was demanded indeed by love, but was 
 not physically, immediately, eternally accomplished. 
 
 Undoubtedly, however, the unity of the Person of Christ, as 
 delineated by him, although settled as to its main outlines, bore 
 no reference to the question raised in connection with Apol- 
 linaris—Can the human soul of Christ be conceived without 
 freedom of will? <And if not, how can the unity of the person 
 be preserved, if a human will, possessed of freedom of choice, 
 existed alongside of the divine hypostasis ?» 
 
 This question was taken into partial consideration by the 
 other Church teachers of this age, though hesitatingly. We do 
 not find in their writings the doctrine of the two natures in its 
 later form; for they also demanded that the human aspect of 
 the Person of Christ should be regarded as a determination of 
 the Logos Himself.’ 
 
 Athanasius demands nvither freedom of choice nora duality 
 of wills for the God-man (compare c. Ar. 4, 30-34; see above, 
 p. 350). He says,—Christ appeared in order that the flesh dvei- 
 dextov dpaptias det€ar, which Adam, from being innocent, had 
 made dextix apaptias. Tadrnv avicrnor kata diow avapudap- 
 
 ' Hilarius speaks, indeed, in de Trin. 9, 50, of Christ’s free will, but 
 only as in opposition to constraint. In his view, Christ had freedom of 
 will, even as the Father has it. Of a ‘‘ dissentire” between the “ voluntas” 
 of Christ and that of the Father, there was no trace, for the Son was “sic 
 liber in voluntate, ut, quod volens agit, factum sit paterne voluntatis.— 
 Et cum Filius voluntatem Patris facit, docet per nature indifferentiam, 
 naturalem sibi voluntatem esse cum Patre, cum voluntate ejus sit omne 
 quod faciat.” He regards, therefore, the volitional unity of the God-man 
 with the Father as immediate, as grounded in the very ‘‘ natura,” whereas 
 other men have the capability of choosing between good and evil. Com- 
 pare Tract. in Ps. cxviii.; Lit. 22, 4, in Ps. ii. 16. 
 
 * Athan. c. Apollin. 1, 8-12, and above, Chapter Second, pp. 349 ff. 
 ‘Greg. Naz. ad Cledon. 1, 9. 
 
422 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 rntov, wa SelEn Tov Snloupyov avairiov THS dpaptias, Kal Kata 
 THY GpYeTUTrOY TAATW TNS iSias picews KaTETTHTATO (va autos 
 i THs avapaptncias 1 emiderges. Here the Logos is represented 
 as the archetype of human nature : the archetype, which could 
 not sin, entered into its production, in order to exhibit Himself 
 in actuality, and thus to complete His work. On this view, 
 Adam is the not yet completed creation ; the archetype was ne- 
 cessary to the completion, to the definite and stable perfection of 
 creation. The humanity of the first Adam was not indeed 
 merely animal life, but was also soul; and the Logos was in 
 Christ not as a mere power, but as a person. And yet there 
 were not two persons in Christ; for, even in Christ, the soul, 
 considered in relation to what was below it, was power,—in rela- 
 tion to what was above, was void form or susceptibility, which 
 acquired its determinate actuality through the incarnation. The 
 first Adam stood under the power and nature of the soul, and 
 was therefore psychical ; but the body of the second Adam 
 stands with its soul under the power and nature of the mvevpa, 
 and is therefore pneumatical. For God the Logos is 7vevpa 
 (c. 8). That a duality of wills, etc., would not fit in with this 
 view, seems to me evident. Athanasius speaks much also of an 
 &wos vow of the divine and human in Christ (c. 10, 12,— 
 dobyxuTos puotKn Evwots TOU AOyou mpos THY idiay avTod yevo- 
 wevny capa. The cap xara piow idia éyévero, and so forth). 
 Never, indeed, can the flesh become equally eternal with the 
 deity, opsoovaros ; never substantially one therewith, «a@ iro- 
 cracw: that would be a commixture, a confusion (c. 10), which 
 would border on the heathenish. Undoubtedly, however, the 
 divine nature made the human its own, anda physical union 
 took place; by which he appears to understand that they met in 
 one being, in which they were indissolubly conjoined, though 
 they continued to be two distinct momenta (Suy@s voovpeva, C. 
 Ar. 4, 31), and were never commingled. The vous through 
 which they were indissolubly one can neither be merely divine 
 nor merely human, consequently, in particular, not merely the 
 divine Ego as such. It can only be the divine Ego so far as the 
 divine Ego was the archetype of, and therefore could at the 
 same time be reckoned to, the human. To say that an union 
 kata vow is equivalent to an union in the person, is a too 
 superficial solution of the question. Why should not Athana- 
 
ATHANASIUS. 423 
 
 sius, then, have used the term rpocwrov? On the contrary, we 
 ought rather to say,—Our idea of person had no existence at 
 all in his day, and first arose out of the ideas, being, essence, 
 substance ; and the bridge between the two was the use of these 
 latter terms to designate a single or individual being, essence 
 and the like, and not merely in abstracto. Whereof the natural 
 consequence was, vagueness or even confusion of usage, until 
 a distinct expression had been formed for the idea of the Ego, 
 and thus the meaning of ovc/a, dicts, substantia, essentia, na- 
 tura, had been more accurately defined. At the time at which 
 Athanasius wrote, this had not yet taken place; for example, he 
 opposes dvaus to ovaia; nor, further, did the word trroctacis 
 denote to him quite as much as our word hypostasis. In his 
 usage it still signified the nature (c. Apoll. 1, 12), that is, the 
 particular divine nature of the Son. bis 
 
 — With this particular divine nature now, he supposed the 
 humanity to be united; but he neither represents it as imperfect, 
 nor ever directly terms it impersonal. At the same time, he 
 neither wished to confound the two natures, nor to place them 
 unconnectedly outside, and alongside, of each other, as though 
 they were two persons. What, then, could be more natural 
 for him than to leave the question of the personality for the 
 time on one side, and to devote attention exclusively to the 
 essence, that is, to the idea of the Logos and of humanity, en- 
 deavouring to demonstrate that as to essence each belonged to, 
 and required, the other? Accordingly, the import of the ex- 
 pression duvatx7) €vwots probably was,—the human ¢vaus, even 
 apart from the incarnation, is, it is true, a rational unity, which 
 governs the powers subordinated to it; but that which, relatively 
 to what is below it, is power and rule, relatively to what is above 
 it, is simply susceptibility. Bearing the image of the Logos and 
 destined for Him, humanity arrives at the actuality of its possi 
 bility, at the substance of its form, in a word, at its perfection, 
 when the Logos enters into vital unity with it. And so, on the 
 other hand, we have found Athanasius, even prior to the Nicene 
 Council, treading in the footsteps of Irenazus and Tertullian, 
 and teaching that, as its archetype (apyérv7ros), one aspect of the 
 Logos’ own essence stood.in_affinity.with humanity, and that 
 the archetvpe called for manifestation (émidevEis) in actuality. 
 This momentum of actuality was acquired by the Logos when, 
 
424 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 having connected Himself with the man Jesus, He set forth in 
 him the perfected humanity. Accordingly, the &vwaus puctKn 
 is that union which is demanded by the essence or conception of 
 both, and in which the idea of both first attains realization ;— 
 humanity, because its nature remained imperfect, its creation as 
 it were incomplete, without the incarnation; deity, because even 
 its nature, to wit, its ethical nature, could not satisfy itself till 
 it became man. For the rest, we see clearly that Athanasius 
 thus approximated very closely, without therefore denying the 
 human soul of Christ, to that which was the great aim of Apol- 
 linaris’ efforts. For it was the notion of the inner or essential 
 connection of the two natures which mainly decided Apollinaris 
 to abide constantly by the pia dvous, and to reduce the two 
 natures to two momenta..or..aspects.of the.one nature of the 
 God-man, that is, of His essence or idea. They are one nature 
 as to their idea; for no perfect conception can be formed of 
 either of them, save in essential connection with the other. 
 That Apollinaris_left_out. the human..soul was.a.mistake, and 
 involved him in misunderstandings ; his system did not require 
 him to do so, although he fancied it did. He supposed this, 
 because he could form no conception of a human soul without 
 attributing to it such a degree of freedom of choice as would 
 have co-ordinated the humanity to the Logos as a second com- 
 pletely independent potence, as a second mpocwrov. The 
 Church teachers also, as we may well imagine, had no intention 
 of teaching that there were two persons in Christ ; but they did 
 not therefore let fall His human soul: the one, because they did 
 not consider freedom of choice to be necessary to the truth of 
 the human soul (freedom of choice they would undoubtedly have 
 held to involve a second Ego, co-ordinate with the divine); the 
 other, because they believed it possible to attribute to Christ a 
 free human will, without a particular human Ego. Thus Gre- 
 gory of Nyssa, who understood by the free will of Christ mainly 
 the tperov, that is, mutability, but not the power of self-deter- 
 mination. But capability of development belongs also to the 
 tperrov. Had Apollinaris, like the above-mentioned teachers 
 of the Church, been able to conceive of freedom of choice with- 
 out an human Ego, or of a soul which had no power of choice, 
 and was yet human, pertaining to the first creation, he would 
 not have resorted to the second and completing creation in the 
 
ATHANASIUS—APPOLINARIS. {25 
 
 manner in which he did, nor have found himself compelled to 
 substitute the eternal archetype, the IIvedua, in the place of the 
 human soul, whose actual existence and susceptibility are the 
 necessary presupposition to the manifestation and realization of 
 the eternal idea of humanity or of the IIvetua. 
 
 Taking this as the basis of the difference between Apollinaris 
 and the Pecrene of the Church, we see also, that although the 
 unanimous assertion of the true human soul of Christ, by all 
 the more prominent Church teachers, was perfectly right, the 
 question which must necessarily arise, after the completeness of 
 the two aspects—the divine as well as the human—-had been 
 recognised, still remained unanswered. The teachers of this 
 feried thought it possible to avoid all dissonance, and to secure 
 the unity, by assigning to the divine aspect overpowering and 
 sole-dominating power. Above the lower, the human, above 
 soul and body, stands the hegemonic divine and encompasses 
 it. Against this course of procedure, the school of Apollinaris 
 continued to protest, saying :—If you assume the existence of a 
 true human soul, derived from the first creation, you must also 
 allow it freedom of choice, and therewith such a degree of in- 
 dependence over against the Logos as to render impossible that 
 encompassing, and as it were overpowering of the human, as the 
 lower, by the hegemonical, the higher, as to cause the unity of 
 the person at once to disappear. And from an entirely different 
 direction, another important theological power in the Church, to 
 wit, the schiool of Antioch, danas in this same protest. ‘This 
 school opposed. Relies and agreed with the Church, in so 
 far as they assumed the existence of a truly. human soul. in 
 Christ ; they opposed_the Church, however, in so far as they 
 asserted for the human soul, freedom.of-choice. 
 
 The view which we have set forth as that of Athanasius, 
 was further developed by Gregory of Nazianzen (ad Cled. 1, 
 19) as follows :—When we teach that both, to wit, the humanity 
 and the deity, are complete or perfect in Christ, we do not mean 
 to say that two absolutely perfect beings are united in one, for 
 then one of them must inevitably give way to the other. Be- 
 cause a thing is perfect in its kind, it is not therefore perfect as 
 compared | ean other things, for Suave) a hill as compared 
 with a mountain, a mustard-seed as compared with abean. The 
 former are respectively less than the latter, even though they 
 
426 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 may be greater than other hills and mustard-seeds, and may be 
 perfect in their kind. So likewise is our spirit (relatively) 
 perfect, and has dominion, that is, over body and soul: but it 
 is not therefore perfect in an absolute sense; for it serves God, 
 is subjected to Him, and is not the sharer of His rule and 
 majesty. Even as Moses also was termed Pharaoh’s God, 
 whilst at the same time he was God’s servant. The stars 
 brighten the night, but disappear before the sun, so that by day 
 we do not even know that they exist. When a little torch is 
 thrown on a great burning pile, it is not extinguished, nor does 
 it give light, nor does it remain separate; the whole forms one 
 pile, one flame, in that that which is the stronger overpowers 
 the rest. To similar purpose, he uses the image of a ray and 
 of the sun, of moisture and a river :—it is not necessary that 
 the rays should give way, in order that there may be room for 
 the light of the sun; the separate rays remain, although they 
 are as it were absorbed in the entire light of the sun, and can 
 scarcely any longer be said to exist; that is, they become mo- 
 menta of the whole.t This passage, taken together with similar 
 words of Athanasius, throws avery instructive light on the con- 
 ception, still formed at that day, of the relation between God 
 and humanity. They were by no means considered to be two 
 essentially different natures, as at alater period by the Dyophy- 
 sites ; and this was undoubtedly an advantage of the earlier over 
 the latter time, which materially facilitated the construction of a 
 Christology. On the other hand, however, the distinction between 
 the two was very imperfectly apnea According to the images 
 above referred to, the human is a part, the divine is the whole ; 
 the distinction between the two, therefore, is simply a quantitative 
 one. The Christian mind, therefore, had arrived at a point, in 
 relation to Christology, identical with that at which it had pre- 
 viously stood for a time, in relation to the doctrine of the ‘Trinity. 
 But as the Church found itself compelled to desist from applying 
 the merely physical category of the whole and part to the rela- 
 tion between God the Father and the Son, and to advance to more 
 spiritual determinations; so also was it iineble to rest satisfied 
 with a Christology based on a mere Unio of the whole and the 
 part. If the Logos in Himself is the whole, humanity in its 
 
 1 Compare Ullmann, “‘ Gregor v. Naz. der Theologe,” 1825, pp. 396 ff., 
 410 ff. 
 
GREGORY NAZIANZEN. 42% 
 
 positive aspect is in no respect distinguishable from the deity. 
 The latter, therefore, has, from the very outset, such a predom- 
 inance in the person, that the human, if not exactly a mere 
 “ aecidens,” can only be regarded as a gradually disappearing 
 momentum of the divine: a foundation was thus laid for a 
 Docetical predominance of the divine. I, further, the Logos 
 in Himself is the whole, to what purpose an incarnation be- 
 sides? What can He gain by an incarnation? Or regarded 
 from another point of view :—if a part of the Logos was brought 
 to view in humanity, and the entire Logos in the incarnation ; 
 hen human nature in general must be a part of the Logos. in 
 which case, the creation of man is not specifically distinguish- 
 able from the incarnation, but was itself a commencement 
 thereof as to body and soul. In conflict therewith, however, 
 was the doctrine of the Trinity which had been arrived at; for 
 it secured the idea of God against every species of immediate 
 identification with the world. 
 
 In point of fact, also, the Church teachers did not lose sight 
 of the distinction between creation and incarnation ; and, as is 
 evident from their polemic against the Apollinaristic predicate 
 dxtiotov, given to the human nature, they demanded that in 
 Christ, the first creation should be presupposed instead of being 
 negatived, and now be appropriated by the Logos as His own. 
 They were of opinion, that, along with the unity of the person, 
 there was a subordination of the human aspect; in other words, 
 whilst believing human nature to have been appropriated by, and 
 raised to a participation in, the Logos, they allowed it a certain 
 independence of existence. Whereas, if the category of part and 
 whole had been strictly adhered to, the homogeneous part must 
 have been held to disappear with the introduction of the whole, 
 although its relative independence is imperiously required by 
 the state of humiliation, as indeed, in general, by the idea of a 
 truly human development. 
 
 Hilarius, as we found, devoted his attention principally to the 
 state of humiliation. In connection therewith, he arrived in one 
 instance at the idea of an incarnation which first reached com- 
 pletion when Christ rose from the dead, and was consequently 
 able, like Athanasius, to leave room for a truly human. develop- 
 ment (p. 349). Furthermore, he advanced far beyond the 
 mere Unio of the part and the whole, in that, unlike most 
 
428 FIRST PERIOD. THIRD EPOCH. 
 
 others, he did not endeavour to describe the humanity as a 
 momentum of the Logos Himself, as the Logos Himself exist- 
 ing in outward actuality, by adopting the principle,—“ totus 
 Christus filius Dei est;” but ventured to lay down the reverse 
 principle,—“ totus hominis filius totus est Dei filius.” At the 
 same time, it must be remarked that the process of the union 
 of the two aspects advances according to his representation 
 much too rapidly, as is clear from his expressions regarding 
 the earthly body of Christ and His knowledge, but especially 
 from his inability to assign to the free will of Christ any media- 
 tory significance in connection with the advancing incarnation 
 of the Logos. He thus curtails the human aspect also, and, 
 contrary to his own intention, leaves room for Docetical ele- 
 ments. He resorts to the boldest measures for showing that 
 the Son of God really united Himself with the servile form, 
 that is, with that which did not form an essential part even of 
 the idea of human nature in itself, but pertained solely to 
 humanity in its fallen state: he takes far less notice of those 
 momenta which are really constitutive of humanity in general. 
 By his doctrine of the “ evacuatio forme divine,” he left room 
 for a truly human development: he never used it, however, 
 for this purpose, but merely for the appropriation of the “forma 
 servilis.” Had merely an incarnation in general been required, 
 and not a “forma servilis,” no place would be left for the 
 “‘evacuatio,” or for that temporary “cohibere formam divinam 
 intra semet ipsum:” humanity would have been at once deified, 
 and in total independence both of a “forma servilis” and of 
 growth, would have at once in itself set forth the “forma or 
 facies divina,” the full actuality of the Logos under a mundane 
 shape. The principle, that the entire Son of man is the entire 
 Son of God, which could not acquire its full truth till the God- 
 man had attained completion, he really applies, with the aid of 
 his doctrine of the “evacuatio divine forme,” to every stage 
 of the divine-human life, from its commencement onwards ; 
 not sufficiently considering that the Son of man Himself could 
 not be completely Himself from the beginning, and attributing 
 to the glorifying divine nature, even whilst on earth, too great 
 an influence,—an influence which interfered with the relative 
 independence of the humanity and of its development. 
 
 We see accordingly, that precisely at the moment when the 
 
HILARIUS. CONCLUSION. 429 
 
 Church took a great step in advance, as regards the human 
 aspect of the Person of Christ, by expressly repudiating Apol- 
 linaris at the Synod of Constantinople in the year 381, and 
 thus recognising the existence of an human soul, it became 
 more clearly than ever absolutely necessary to assign to the 
 entire human aspect a position of relatively greater independ- 
 ence and certainty than it had hitherto occupied within the one 
 Person of Christ. (Note 83.) Attention having been engaged 
 on the Person of Christ in its relation to the Trinity or to God, 
 the turn came for considering its relation to man; and the 
 conflict with Apollinarism formed the transition thereto. We 
 are thus set into the midst of the questions which stirred the 
 Christian mind during the fifth century. It deserves remark, 
 that just about this time the Western Church, in consequence 
 of the struggle between Pelagianism, and Augustinianism, 
 began to apply itself vigorously to the consideration of anthro- 
 pological questions. In harmony with its entire character and 
 tendencies, the Eastern Church arrived at anthropological ques- 
 tions through the medium of Christology, and therefore also 
 contented itself, in a narrower circle of view, with the dogmas 
 objectively laid down, and with more indeterminate utterances 
 relatively thereto. The vocation of the West, which had adopted 
 as its own the Eastern inheritance of dogmas, was, after pass- 
 ing through a long intermediate and preparatory course, the 
 ‘incepta development of anthropology to a point of clear- 
 ness and’ fixity, at which it should react on the doctrine of the 
 Trinity. and_of the Person of Christ, and contribute specially 
 to the completeness of the latter. To follow the further course 
 of Christology in this direction, will be the task of the Second 
 Part of this work. 
 
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 NOTES. 
 
 Note 1, page 4. 
 
 Eprpu. |. c. 1:—xal ofror ta oteped TOD KNpiYWaToS [ELeo} 
 caow. O. 32:—tl wderet Huds 4 Tod “Iwavvov ’Atroxaduyis ; 
 Whether they rejected the doctrine of the Logos altogether, or 
 not, is not quite clear from what Epiphanius reports. It is true 
 he designates them (c. 3), Tavtatracw GddotTpiovs TOD KNpUYyLa- 
 Tos THS adnOelas ; but, from the connection, we should judge 
 him to refer to their rejection of the Gospel of John. Besides, 
 the name Alogi was given to them, not because of their rejec- 
 tion of the doctrine of the Logos, but because they rejected the 
 strongest witness for it in the canon,—a course the more irra- 
 tional, as, apart from this critical point (c. 4), Ta toa piv 
 muotevew Soxodot, and as they protested against being at all 
 charged with the Ebionism and Docetism of Cerinthus. They 
 represent Cerinthus as the author of the Gospel which they 
 repudiate. Epiphanius was quite justified in entertaining a low 
 opinion of such criticism. The isolated voices which in recent 
 times have attached importance to this criticism, have given in 
 their adherence, not to its positive, but solely to its negative 
 aspect, that John was not the author of the Gospel which bears 
 his name. But the two things cannot be separated. On the 
 contrary, an attentive reading of Her. 51 shows that, in their 
 view, the beginning of the Gospel—which passes so rapidly from 
 the 6 Adyos cdpe éyévero to the calling and witness of the Bap- 
 tist; contains no reference to a history of the childhood of 
 Christ ; at once brings the Incarnate One into connection with 
 
432 APPENDIX. 
 
 the Baptist; in chapter i. 6 (compare 1. 11) appears to repre- 
 sent the Baptist as having made his appearance prior to the 
 incarnation, and first mentions the act of baptism supplement- 
 arily,—was fitted to favour the heresy of Cerinthus. This is 
 the abrupt feature, the feature favourable to Docetism, which 
 they supposed themselves to find in the Gospel of John; and 
 the contradictions which they discover between the fourth 
 and the other three Gospels may be all reduced to this one 
 point. Herein lies the reason of their doctrinal criticism; and 
 it is useless for Heinichen to attempt to show, on a priort 
 grounds, to wit, from the malice of Epiphanius, and so forth 
 (pp. 42 ff.), that the Alogi attributed the Apocalypse alone to 
 Cerinthus. If they followed the example of others in regard 
 to this latter point, it is easy to see that they might the more 
 strongly incline to use similar language relative to the Gospel ; 
 nay more, I should be almost surprised if modern critics did 
 not adopt this view of the prologue, and, with the Alogi, find 
 Cerinthianism in it. What they otherwise say,—namely, that 
 according to the first three Gospels, one Passover alone took 
 place during the official life of Christ; according to John, 
 two,—does not give a very favourable idea of their ability for 
 historical criticism. For the first they derived not from the 
 Synoptics, but from a false explanation of the passage relating 
 to the gracious year of the Lord, rather usual at that time; and 
 the second is false, for, according to John, more than two 
 Easter festivals occurred during the interval between the bap- 
 tism and the death of Christ. Finally, also, their doctrinal 
 acuteness must have been very limited, or else they could never 
 have so completely failed to see the relation of the Gospel and 
 Kpistles of John to Docetism and Ebionism. The Alogi ap- 
 pear to have laid chief stress on the practical intelligence, not 
 without a certain degree of superficial illuminism. Compare 
 Neander’s “Church History” 2, 908 (Germ. ed.). They can- 
 not be shown to have had Marcionitic tendencies. We may 
 remark by the way, that the Alogi did not venture to describe 
 the Gospel of John as a new work; but completely harmonized 
 with the tradition of the Church in relation to the date of its 
 composition. Indeed, Cerinthus was a contemporary of the 
 Gospel of John. ‘This testimony, given as it was about the 
 year 170 after Christ, deserves notice. Had they had before 
 
NOTES. 433 
 
 them a single trace of the recent origin of the Gospel of John, 
 they must certainly have made it the chief basis of their attack. 
 
 Norte 2, page 6. 
 
 It may be justly questioned whether this Theodotus did 
 deny the supernatural birth of Christ. At all events, the words 
 of Tertullian, in “de preescr. heeret.” 53, imply the contrary,— 
 he maintained that Christ was a mere man, and denied that He 
 was God, though he believed Him to be born of the Holy 
 Ghost from the Virgin Mary, “sed hominem solitarium atque 
 nudum, nulla alia pre coeteris nisi sola justitiz auctoritate.” 
 Theodoret also says (Her. fab. 2, 5),—“ He taught the like doc- 
 trine with Artemon.” The testimony of Epiphanius, who attri- 
 butes to him the words (Her. 54),—“ Christ was born of the 
 seed of a man,”’—cannot prove the contrary. For, in the first 
 place, Epiphanius makes the same remark concerning his school, 
 which, so far as we are acquainted with Theodotus the Argen- 
 -tarius, is not correct. In the second place, it does not follow, 
 from the denial of the birth from a virgin, even if it should be 
 attributed to the elder Theodotus, that he therefore denied the 
 supernatural birth of Christ. For Theodotus might still have 
 assumed a divine act in connection with the origin of Jesus; 
 nay more, he did assume this, according to the testimony of 
 Epiphanius himself. He says that Theodotus appealed to the 
 circumstance of its being written, not “the Spirit of the Lord 
 will be in thee” (yevjcetas év coi); but, “the Spirit of the 
 Lord will come upon thee” (Luke i. 35): by which he intended, 
 on the one hand, to acknowledge the action of God in connec- 
 tion with the birth of Christ; and, on the other hand, to exclude 
 the incarnation of the Holy Spirit (compare Epiph. 54, 3), or 
 of the Logos, if with Justin Martyr we understand mvetywa and 
 duvamus to signify the Xeyos. He deemed Christ to be the prophet 
 who mediates between God and men; retaining hold, however, 
 solely on the humanity of Christ, and appealing merely to Deut. 
 xviii Lays Ser xvid selsaelin on Actsiine22 s\ LiDim.i. 5. 
 His mediatorship he undoubtedly regarded as grounded in His 
 higher divine gifts, and, above all, in His righteousness. Nay, 
 further, when we consider that, according to Epiphanius, he was 
 a learned man, who stood in connection with many heretics, and 
 when we remember, besides, that his disciple Theodotus the 
 
 VOL. IT. 2 E 
 
434 APPENDIX. 
 
 Money-changer evinced an affinity with the Valentinians, and 
 was the founder of the Melchizedekians, we may very fairly 
 raise the question, whether Epiphanius did not misunderstand 
 the position, “Jesus was born of human seed,” if he really did 
 lay it down. For, in the Excerptis Theodoti in Clemens Alex- 
 andrinus (whose doctrinal principles Neander, for example, in 
 his “Genetische Entwickelung, etc.,” p. 189, attributes to the 
 Money-changer, and which certainly belongs to this school), 
 much is said of the orépya appnvixov (see 2, 21, 39, 40), from 
 which the elect souls are derived, and Christ in particular (17). 
 In this case, however, the o7épwa appnvixoy is said to denote 
 Christ’s origin from the codua. 
 
 Norte 3, page 7. 
 
 Theodoret, Her. Fab. 2, 6:—Tods 6& Meryicedexcavors 
 Tuhpa pep evar TovTwy (the Theodotians) ¢act, cal’ év O€ ovo 
 Sabwveiv, To TOV Medyucedex Svvapiy Twa Kar Oelav Kal peyio- 
 cnv brodapPdvew Kat eixdva dé abtod Tov Xpiorov yeyevjoGat. 
 "Hp£e Sé tijs aipécews TavTys addos OcdSoros apyvpopouBos THY 
 réyynv. Tertuil. de preescript. heret. 55 :—Alter post hune 
 (after the Byzantine Theodotus) Theodotus hereticus erupit, 
 qui et ipse introduxit alteram sectam, et ipsum hominem Chris- 
 tum tantummodo dicit ex spiritu sancto ex Virgine Maria con- 
 ceptum pariter et natum, sed hune inferiorem esse, quam Mel- 
 chisedech.—Nam illum Melchisedech preecipuze gratize coelestem 
 esse virtutem, eo quod agat Christus pro hominibus, deprecator 
 et advocatus ipsorum factus: Melchisedech facere pro coeles- 
 tibus angelis atque virtutibus. Nam esse illum usque adeo 
 Christo meliorem, ut dmrdrap sit, durjrap sit, ayeveadoyntos sit, 
 cujus neque initium, neque finis comprehensus sit aut compre- 
 hendere possit. Christ is, therefore, merely compared with Mel- 
 chisedek in the Epistle to the Hebrews. 
 
 Note 4, page 8. 
 
 As further disciples of the elder, we find mentioned Ascle- 
 piades, Hermophilus, Apollonides, Natalius (Euseb. 1. c.). So 
 completely do these later Ebionites betray their connection with 
 Gnosticism, which had notwithstanding despised the human 
 aspect of the Person of Christ, that the Theodotus mentioned by 
 Clemens Alexandrinus (xe. 2) 
 
 gave even to baptism a similar 
 
NOTES. 435 
 
 meaning to that given it by older Gnostics, in order to be quite 
 certain of describing the human aspect of Christ as that which 
 presented the ovcéa. Instructive in relation to the conception 
 of ovcia at this period, is the fragment of Clemens Alexandrinus 
 in Fabric. Opp. Hippolyti, T. 2, 74. The fundamental idea is 
 To Ka?’ éavtod vpeotos, whether it be inorganic or gurév, or 
 éurpvyov aicOntixov, CHov, or, in addition to the latter, Noyexdv 
 also, like man. Ovcia, therefore, is always the essential element 
 of a thing, its substance. Hence we can see how, in certain 
 circumstances, ovaia might be used to denote that which we 
 understand by Ego or personality ; only that ovc/a then stands 
 for the completely undefined notion of personality. In the Tri- 
 nitarian Controversy, during the fourth century, odcia and tmo- 
 oTaclis were separated. Compare also Ang. Mai Collectio nova, 
 
 L 7, 52 ff.; Suicer..Thesaur. s. v. 
 
 Norte 5, page 12. 
 
 Baur |. c. pp. 297 ff. attributes greater importance to the 
 inoral perfection of Christ in connection with His glorification, 
 than the authorities warrant him in doing. Nay more, in op- 
 position to his own account (according to which, on the one 
 hand, divine Wisdom exerted a permanent influence on, and 
 heightened the spiritual and moral power of Christ, and on 
 the other hand, there dwelt in the man Jesus a divine prin- 
 ciple, developing itself in Him, p. 298), he remarks in con- 
 clusion (p. 305),—“ The divine Logos works, it is true, upon 
 the man, but the Logos is properly and essentially merely the 
 inner man himself” (nowhere does Paul go so far, but merely 
 compares the Logos in Christ, in so far as He is a mere quality 
 and not hypostatical, with another common personification, the 
 inner man, which also simply signifies a zrowdrns) ; “and man 
 therefore can, by himself, through the progressive development 
 and perfection of his moral power, arrive at divine dignity.” 
 Such an universalization of the divine Sonship cannot be his- 
 torically established; nor can the idea of the man Jesus raising 
 Himself to perfection by moral power. On the other hand, 
 Neander, in avoiding these faults, has wrongly overlooked the 
 moral element in Christ's poxomn and pabnou. 
 
436 APPENDIX. 
 
 Note 6, page 12. 
 
 In other respects also, Paul evinced little honesty. Eusebius 
 styles him xpuiivous, admatydos (7, 29). In the matter of the 
 doctrine of the Trinity, he endeavoured to accommodate him- 
 self to the Church expressions, Holy Ghost and Word. Thus 
 he teaches also a N6yos wrpodopixds. Anacephal. 2, 146 :—royov 
 mpodopixov avtov (Tov Xpiatov) axnwatlcas (comp. Theodoret. 
 Her. Fab. 2, 8). Naturally, this Adyos is impersonal; He is 
 merely God conceived in a particular ézwolg or activity. Huse- 
 bius tells us (7, 29), that at the Synod of Antioch, held in the 
 year 269 on Paul’s account, a learned presbyter, by name 
 Malchion, compelled him to give utterance to his real opinions, 
 after he had for a long time taken refuge behind ambiguities. 
 At this Synod there were present, besides a great number of 
 other teachers, Firmilian from Cappadocia, the brothers Gre- 
 gory Thaumaturgus and Athenodorus, and so forth (see Euse- 
 bius 7, 28, 30). They all agreed in describing Paul’s doctrine 
 as an innovation, a revival of the already condemned heresy of 
 Artemon ;—indeed, their confession contained already a more 
 fully developed, far higher doctrine of the Son of God and 
 of Christ. Paul, on the contrary, held an isolated position 
 in the discussions of the Synod. In this respect, there was a 
 marked difference between his age and that of Arius. Arte- 
 monites there undoubtedly continued to exist, but they did not 
 hold a position within the Church (Kuseb. 5, 283; and 7, 30, 
 ed. Heinichen 1. c. p. 404). Still, Paul does not seem to have 
 entirely lacked disciples, although they too were excluded after 
 the Synod of Antioch (compare Athan. de Synod. c. 26). It 
 is simply one of that scholar’s daring, but historically unjustifi- 
 able propositions, when Baur (1. c. p. 305) maintains that Paul's 
 view, and that too in the form in which he gives it (see Note 5), 
 is to be regarded as a general type of a determinate doctrinal 
 system. It is true, he was Bishop of Antioch, where we shall 
 find kindred views subsequently upheld by Lucian, but still 
 Lucian himself was very different from Paul. 
 
 Note 7, page 19. 
 Compare, besides the above, Melito in Routh 1, 115;—he 
 
 taught Oedv dpod Te Kal avOpwrop Tédevov, Sv0 ovcias : further— 
 
NOTES. 437 
 
 TO adnbes Kai abavractov Ths uxijs adtod Kat Tob cépyaros THs 
 Kal nas avOpwrivns procws. ¥ urther, may be compared 
 Socrates, H. E. 3, 7:—ottw yap waves of aN aor Epo) mept 
 ToUTOU Noyov Seay GaauT es éyypahov nuty Katédutrov' Kat yap 
 Eipnvatos Te Kal Krjpns, "Arronwadpwos Te o Leparronirns Kal 
 Sepatriav euapvyov tov évavOpwrncavta év Trois trovnbeiow 
 avTots NOYoLS WS OmoroyoUpEVvoY adTois ddcKovoLW* ov p\v Gra 
 cal y da Bypudrrov tov Piraderdgias rhs év’ ApaBia émlaKxorrov 
 yevouévn ctvocos ypadovca ByptAXw Ta abta rapadédoxev. 
 ‘Dpuyévns dé Tavtayod év Tots pepopévors abrod BiPrLous, uabv- 
 xov Tov évavOpwrijcavta oidev. Kusebius and Pamphilos testify 
 that Origen, he goes on to say, was not the first to lay down the 
 principle ; addAda tHv THs éxKAnolas MUOTLEND Eppnvedoas Tapa- 
 doow. These words, like the commencement of the chapter, in 
 which he believed it necessary as it were to justify Athanasius 
 and the bishops of the Synod of Alexandria who taught that 
 Christ had an human soul against the charge of innovation, suf- 
 ficiently prove that that doctrine had not, up to this time, been 
 completely adopted by the Church ;—neither as to all the mo- 
 menta thereof, nor with sufficient insight into the full conse- 
 quences of its denial. 
 
 NorTE 8, page 20. 
 
 Adv. Prax. 20, 26. When Baur (I. c. p. 254) maintains 
 that the polemic of these Monarchians (as also of the Alogi) 
 against the Church’s doctrine of the hypostatical Logos is in- 
 compatible with the supposed fact of the Gospel of John hay- 
 ing already long been in existence and operation in Asia, I can 
 only say, that I am surprised, and that it betrays a misappre- 
 hension of the course of development run by the doctrine of the 
 Logos.—W hat was it not possible for heretics to do, who, to use 
 the words of Irenzeus, like bad wrestlers, were accustomed to 
 iay convulsive hold on one member of the truth? Finally, like 
 Theodotus of Byzantium, Praxeas also recognised the Gospel 
 of John, though he at the same time clung to his theory; not to 
 mention other more recent and more pertinent cases (compare 
 adv. Prax. 23-25). As to the Romish Church, that is, the 
 pretendedly Ebionitical Church,-—if it had been really Ebioni- 
 tical, it must plainly have taken the greatest offence at Praxeas. 
 Whereas, on the contrary, we know from Tertullian that at first 
 
438 APPENDIX. 
 
 he found in Rome much sympathy, even with the Bishop him 
 self. How is it possible, then, to regard the favourable recep- 
 tion accorded to Praxeas as a proof of the Ebionism of the 
 Church at Rome in the second century? Supposing the Church 
 did incline to Patripassianism prior to the coming of Praxeas, 
 they must have believed that the Most High God Himself 
 appeared in Christ, though not a particular hypostasis ;—for re- 
 gard to the divine unity prevented them believing the latter 
 If we take into consideration, that the teachers who at that time 
 taught most definitely that the Son was a distinct hypostasis, 
 did not free themselves from a certain measure of Subordina- 
 tianism, which was favourable to Arianism or Kbionism, we are 
 compelled to say,—Patripassianism was really further from 
 Ebionism than these teachers of the Church; and that, what 
 was intended to prove the Ebionism of the Romish Church, is a 
 proof to the contrary. A fresh warning not to treat the ideas, 
 “ Judaizing Christianity” and “ Ebionism,” as interchangeable. 
 Judaizing the Patripassians may be termed, because they clung 
 so rigidly to the unity of God in the Old Testament sense; but 
 they were not therefore Ebionites. Tor the one God in whom 
 they believe, does not abide shut up in Himself, but manifests 
 His essence in the form of actuality ; appears in, nay more, be- 
 comes, a man. 
 
 Note 9, page 23. 
 
 The passage runs as follows (¢. 27) :—“ Et de hoc queeren- 
 dum, quomodo sermo sit caro factus. Utrumne quasi transfigu- 
 ratus in carne, an indutus camem? Immo indutus. Ceterum 
 Deum immutabilem et informabilem credi necesse est, ut eeter- 
 num. ‘Transfiguratio autem interemtio est pristini. Omne 
 enim, quodcunque transfiguratur in aliud, desinit esse, quod 
 fuerat, et incipit esse, quod non erat. Deus autem neque desinit 
 esse, neque aliud potest esse.—Si ex transfiguratione et demuta- 
 tione substantize caro factus est, una jam erit substantia Jesus 
 ex duabus, ex carne et spiritu mixtura quedam, ut electrum ex 
 auro et argento, et incipit nec aurum esse, 1. e. spiritus, neque 
 argentum, i. e. caro, dum alterum altero mutatur et tertium 
 quid efficitur. Neque ergo Deus erit Jesus, sermo enim desiit 
 esse, qui caro factus est; neque caro, 1. e. homo, caro enim 
 non proprie est, qui sermo fuit. Ita ex utroque neutrum est, 
 
NOTES. 439 
 
 aliud longe tertium est, quam utrumque.” Hippolytus informs 
 us that this was the view held by Beron. My opinion is not 
 that Praxeas actually taught the view in question; but that 
 it appeared to Tertullian a possible and nearly-lying deduction 
 from his theory—nay more, to constitute a proper termination 
 thereto. We may here beforehand direct attention to the cir- 
 cumstance, that Beron in Hippolytus, and at a later date Apol- 
 linaris, arrived at similar conclusions from similar premises. 
 Servetus and Schwenkfeld are examples of the same thing in 
 recent times. 
 
 Norte 10, page 28. 
 
 Epiphan. her. 57, 8. Tl ody épe? Nontos év tH attod dvo- 
 nola; pn €v TO Olpave® capE Fv; and so forth :—which words 
 are partially borrowed by Hippolytus (c. Noet.),—TV otv Syret 
 
 3 pate pel, OTL ev ovpav@ capE Hv; C.17:—od yap Kata 
 pavraciay 1} TpoTny, AN adnOas yevowevos avOpwros hv. It 
 would seem, therefore, that the theory of Noetus contained, 
 though in vague outlines, the doctrine of the wia pious cecap- 
 Kowevn advanced at a later period; naturally, with the differ- 
 ence, that he repudiates the Trinity, and consequently refers the 
 incarnation, with the 7a@yTov, etc., not to the Logos, but to 
 the Father Himself. At this point, therefore, it becomes for 
 the first time clear, that even now it was necessary to oppose 
 the atpertov dvaddolwtov, acvyyutov of the two natures, al- 
 though not in these precise terms, to those who aimed at con- 
 stituting the Father and humanity an unity without distinction 
 in Christ. At a higher stage, the very question which now 
 occupied the Church in relation to the Father, was raised again 
 in relation to the Logos. Had this position of the matter been 
 properly understood, the chief objection against the genuine- 
 ness of Hippolytus’ work against Beron must have fallen to the 
 cround of itself. 
 
 Norte 11, page 29. 
 
 Compare “ Hippolytus contra Beronem et Helicen” (cara 
 Bypwvos cai" HA Xuxos), in Fabric. 1, 225, who conjectures that 
 we ought to read, cal 7AtKwTa@v aipetixov. I consider the work 
 from which these fragments were taken, and which bore the title 
 mept Ocoroyias Kai capKwcews, to be genuine. The eight frag- 
 
440) APPENDIX. 
 
 ments relating to Beron appear to me to be taken from the 
 larger work of which the treatise against Noetus formed a part: 
 —indeed, the Biblioth. Max. iii. 261 introduces the treatise 
 against Noetus with the similar title, “De Deo trino et uno et 
 de mysterio incarnationis.” Its commencement also shows that 
 it formed part of a greater whole. The work appears, too, to 
 have been designated “Memoria Heeresium” and “adversus 
 omnes heereses.” The arguments against its genuineness, so 
 far as they deserve consideration, are the following (compare 
 Christ. Aug. Salig’s “ De Eutychianismo ante Eutychen.” 1723, 
 pp. 26 ff.; Hiinell’s “De Hippolyto Episcopo,” 1828, p. 41) :— 
 1. His style of representation is heavy and obscure; his proofs 
 are philosophical, not exegetical :—both which things are opposed 
 to the manner of Hippolytus. But the work, although requiring 
 thought, is not more difficult to understand than, for example, 
 many passages of the treatise against Noetus. In the latter, 
 in particular, the entire discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity 
 is quite as difficult, and its tone quite as philosophical. Besides, 
 it must be borne in mind, that we only pessess fragments of 
 the work against Beron, selected for a particular purpose, and 
 relating to a subject which is comparatively little fitted for 
 an exegetical treatment.—2. The work presupposes a definite 
 heresy, which reminds us of Apollinaris and Kutyches (Hinell, 
 p. 42); nay more, the word évépyeva, which plays so great a 
 part here, reminds us of the Monotheletic controversies. And 
 we cannot suppose the author to have refuted an heresy which 
 had not yet been devised.—We have already subjected this 
 reason to a preliminary examination in Note 10. Only those 
 can attach importance to it, who fail to perceive how necessary 
 it was in the development of Christology that, prior to the deter- 
 mination of the doctrine of the Trinity, the same synusiastic 
 theories should make their appearance, as were set forth at a 
 higher stage, and in a more fully developed form, subsequently 
 to the Council of Nicea. After the Nicene Council, it was 
 regarded as a settled point, that the divine in the Person of 
 Christ was the Logos, who is decidedly distinct from the Father ; 
 but there were not a few (as the Monophysitic controversies 
 from the time of Apollinaris onwards show) who knew of but 
 one method of securing the divine-human unity of the Person, 
 to wit, by clinging to the unity of nature; for though, in itself, 
 
NOTES. 441 
 
 it consisted of two momenta, they represented these momenta 
 as passing over into each other. Was it not necessary, then, 
 that prior to the Nicene Council,—at a time when, though the 
 conception of the divine in Christ in its relation to the Father 
 was still a very indeterminate one, the unity of the Person of 
 Christ, the union in Him of the divine and human, was unques- 
 tionably recognised,—there should be preludes of the attempt 
 to view the divine and human aspects of the Person of Christ 
 in each other? Is not the history of Christology even during 
 the pre-Nicene period full of such attempts? But a simple 
 reference to what has preceded is enough to show, that Beron 
 by no means stood alone in the first half of the third century. 
 Tertullian, as we have previously shown (p. 23 f.), makes fre- 
 quent allusions to heretics, who endeavoured to establish the 
 unity of the Person of Christ by representing the one nature 
 as passing into the other (transfiguratio; in Hipp. c. Noet. 17, 
 tpom). The objection which is derived from the word évepyeva 
 scarcely deserves a refutation. If the expression Geavdprxy 
 évépyeva, or some such other one, had been used, it might be 
 suspicious; but no such expression can be found in the frag- 
 ments. Indeed, I cannot understand how it is possible to find 
 anything particular in the word, when we know from the writ- 
 ings, for example, of Origen and Paul of Samosata, that 1t was 
 in common use at that period.—3. The argument drawn from 
 Theodoret’s not adducing any testimonies from this work in 
 his refutation of the Apollinarists, is allowed to be feeble even 
 by Hinell himself; but it completely loses its force when we 
 take into consideration the fragments preserved by others from 
 the work “de Theologia et Verbi incarnatione” (Fabr. 1, 235; 
 2,45; A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. 7, 14, 68), and which harmonize 
 completely with the otherwise well accredited doctrine of Hip- 
 polytus.—4. What does Hiinell mean by denying the first of 
 these fragments (Fabr. 2, 45) to be the work of Hippolytus, 
 because the words, 7d Oérew eyes 6 Oeds, ob TO px Oérewv, do 
 not seem to him to betray the lover of philosophy? Does not 
 the fragment in Fabr. 1, 280, from the “Cantic. trium puer- 
 orum,” harmonize most fully with this theory of the freedom 
 of the will? Does not the decided protest raised against all 
 cperrov in God, in the first fragment c. Beron, agree perfectly 
 with the procedure of Hippolytus, in attributing merely volition 
 
442 APPENDIX. 
 
 and refusing to attribute non-volition or permission to God, for 
 fear of introducing a tpewtov into His essence?—5. That, 
 further, Hippolytus most decidedly opposed the duality of the 
 natures to every species of cvyxvaus thereof, and that the terms 
 ovyxXvels, dxpavtos, TpoTn, évépyera (c. Beron, Fragm. 5, 8, 1), 
 were certainly familiar to him, is plain, for example, from c. 
 Noet. 17, and Pfaff’s fragment in Fabr. 1, 282. No less is the 
 early character of the work evident from the circumstance, that 
 where later writers say ojoovotos, it uses the terms ouoduns 
 and oudduros; whereas opoovotos never occurs at all. See 
 
 Note 4. , 
 Nore 12, page 41. 
 
 Baur’s view (1. c. 284 ff.) does not square with the words 
 of Eusebius. For how could Beryll have taught that the 
 matpixn Oedtys (not merely dvvayus) was in Christ, if his con- 
 ception of Christ were Ebionitical, essentially the same as Arte- 
 mon’s? We should then have expected a totally different 
 description of Beryll’s views, and a totally different polemic 
 against them: moreover, it 1s scarcely likely that an Ebionite 
 would have so readily yielded ground to Christian truth as Beryll 
 is said to have done. Baur translates as though, according to 
 Eusebius, Beryll denied the @eorns of Christ; but he merely 
 denied the i8/a @edrns prior to the incarnation, that is, the 
 hypostatical Logos with pre-existence, scarcely, however, His 
 post-existence. For, as Fock justly remarks, the passage in 
 Kusebius constantly uses the present of the Redeemer, and 
 alludes to Him as one still present. Besides, he was not 
 charged with error on this point; and from our statement of 
 his views it will be evident, that he could have had no ground 
 for representing the Person of Christ as transitory, but that, in 
 his case (as already in that of Beron), Patripassianism had 
 taken the forward step of ensuring the eternity of the humanity 
 of Christ. If it could be affirmed, in the manner in which 
 Baur affirms it, that Beryll believed the humanity to be the 
 personific element in Christ, and conceived the divine to be a 
 mere power, he must have laid the greatest stress on the soul 
 of Christ, because, without it, a human personality would be 
 inconceivable. Instead of that, we find that the Synod, which 
 addressed an epistle to Beryll, gave special prominence to the 
 
NOTES. 443 
 
 soul of Christ (Socr. H. E. 8, 7). Grammatically, also, this 
 interpretation is inadmissible. 1. The most natural explanation 
 is, that the words, Oeornta idiav éxyew, have the same subject as 
 the preceding words—rov xuptov py Tpovpertavat. Now, in 
 the latter, «Upuos evidently stands for the higher nature of 
 Christ; for Beryll would not have merited blame for denying 
 pre-existence to the human nature or to the divine-human unity. 
 Consequently, the higher nature of Christ must also be the 
 subject of the words, OedrnTa idlav ovd« Exew ; and the meaning 
 cannot be that which Baur brings out, to wit, “the humanity of 
 Christ had no iSia Oedrns”” (where idia, moreover, would be com- 
 pletely superfluous) ; but, “the higher nature of Christ had no 
 isla OedTys, as had the Logos or Son;” the divine in general, 
 the Oedrns marprx alone was in Him. Only when we thus take 
 the iSia Oedrns, in agreement with what precedes, as equivalent 
 to idla, that is, Tod viod OedTyTa, does the antithesis TAT pLKn 
 Oedrns become clear.—2. Baur takes the word é€utronuTever Gat 
 in the sense—“to be a citizen alongside of a citizen ;” that is, 
 the expression implies that the matpikn Oeorns merely dwelt, as 
 it were, side by side with another citizen, to wit, the personal 
 humanity of Jesus; from which he deduces the further conclu- 
 sion, that Beryll conceived the indwelling of God in Christ, 
 under the category of influence and moral union. But, even 
 supposing the explanation were lexicographically justifiable, the 
 conclusion referred to would be too hasty. For, inasmuch as, 
 on the explanation adopted, two persons must be supposed to 
 have co-existed in Christ; why should this be reduced to a 
 mere influence of the divine power? Baur ought rather to 
 have attributed to Beryll the assumption of a double person- 
 ality in Christ. Besides, the works of Hippolytus (which Baur, 
 it is true, has left unnoticed) show us, that the word é€u7roX- 
 revecOas was used in an entirely different sense. As eTrLonpLla 
 was employed even at this time to denote the incarnation, so 
 the Church, which repudiated the notion of a duality of per- 
 sons, and of the separate personality of the human nature, in 
 Christ, adopted the term éumontteveoOat, which, with its 
 dative, was used as about an equivalent to évavOpwrety (com- 
 pare, for example, adv. Noet. 12 with 4). So that this word 
 can by no means be regarded as having an Ebionitic stamp.— 
 3. Finally, as regards the word Teovypady), a more careful con- 
 
444 APPENDIX. 
 
 sideration of the writers of this period shows us, that we must 
 be very cautious in transferring our idea of personality, in the 
 sense of the Ego, to them. Our idea of personality, notwith- 
 standing its apparent simplicity, presupposes very complicated 
 processes of reflection; and we shall altogether fail to see that 
 the Church’s doctrine of the Person of Christ and of the 
 Trinity made real progress, if (as I did myself in the first edi- 
 tion of this work, and as Baur repeatedly does) we start with 
 the presupposition, that our idea of personality was familiar to 
 every period, instead of regarding it as a result of the conflicts 
 of many centuries. Only by keeping these remarks in view 
 can the changes in the use of such terms as ovola, irdataats, 
 mpocwmov, be understood and followed. For example, “ own 
 proper personality,” is not a correct rendering of the words, 
 idia ovalas meprypady) (although such is Neander’s opinion; see 
 his Church History 1. c. 1020, Note 1, German Edition) ; they 
 signify rather simply, “circumscription,” “determination,” and 
 contain directly no trace of the “Ego.” In the formation of 
 this expression, on the contrary, we find an unmistakeable re- 
 flection of the point from which ancient thinkers started in 
 seeking the idea of human personality, to wit, limitation through 
 the body, or individuality. See Note 4; and compare Niigels- 
 bach’s “ Homerische Theologie,” Section Seventh. Of course 
 there is an analogous specific distinction between those who 
 regarded the divine, and those who regarded the human, as the 
 proper substance of the Person of Christ, on the one hand, and, 
 on the other hand, between those who represent the divine 
 nature alone, and those who represent the human nature alone, 
 as the personific element; only that, until a determinate idea of 
 personality has been arrived at, he who says merely, “ Christ 
 was filled with divine power or OedrTns,” might mean the same 
 as he who says, “God dwelt personally in Christ,”—namely, 
 if the former does not apply the word personality also to the 
 humanity. For the rest, the word Tepvypady was applied 
 already at an early period to God, or the pre-existent Logos. 
 Compare above in connection with Theodot. Excerp. 10, 19; 
 Orig. in Joh. 1, 42, Vol. iv. 47. There it is equivalent to 
 iToatacis. On the other hand, in Hippol. c. Ber. Fragm. 1, 
 we read,—'O dXoyos—vorxiis capKds Trepuypadijs aVATYOMLEVOS 
 —mTdons &Ew Tepiypadhs pewevnxer. Fragm. 4: ‘H Oedrntos 
 
NOTES. 445, 
 
 évépyea Tdaons éxTos Kata piow Treprypadis Suapévovoa b.é- 
 Aapape Sia capKos puces TeTEpacpEryjs ov yap TépuKe TeEpt- 
 ypaherOar yernth pice TO Kata piow ayévntov. There, repi- 
 ypady) is not equivalent to b7dcracts, but signifies “limit.” 
 
 Nore 13, page 43. 
 
 The same ambiguity characterizes his doctrine also, accord- 
 ing to the account given of it by Kusebius. It contains the con- 
 tradiction that, on the one hand, in the interest of Monarchian- 
 ism, the pre-existence of the Logos and His ida Oeorns are 
 denied, and no step is taken in advance of the simple divine or 
 Tatpixn Oeorns: on the other hand, the entire mode of ex- 
 pression would lead us to suppose that, precisely like the Beron 
 of Hippolytus, he represented the divine itself as made subject 
 to limitation, through the incarnation. For if, with Baur, we 
 were to take the words ida otclas mepuypady with tatpixy 
 Qeorns, as though Beryll meant to say,—“Christ was a man 
 who was the subject of special divine influence,” the expres- 
 sion for this very obvious thought would be too forced and 
 prolix. For that a man is an (dla ovolas Trepuypady, and that 
 as a mere man he has no (d¢a Oedrys, is self-evident. Neander, 
 therefore, appears to me to have approached in the main nearer 
 the truth, and still more Schleiermacher ; though Baur is pro- 
 bably right when, in opposition to them, he urges that Beryll 
 attached greater significance to the humanity of Christ than is 
 commonly supposed. But it seems to me impossible to form a 
 clear conception of this significance, if, as it has almost become 
 customary to do, we make it our aim to strip this line of thought 
 as much as possible of all trace of Patripassianism ; for it must 
 have been stirred by both religious and speculative considera- 
 tions, when it represented God as a suffering God, and asserted 
 His intimate participation in finitude. ‘The defect was simply 
 that Patripassianism unavoidably tended, even against its own 
 will, towards an ethnic mutability of God, because it did not 
 take its stand definitely enough on the ethical idea of unbounded 
 participative love. In one aspect, indeed, the line of thought 
 which we have considered is the proper continuation of that 
 principle of love which Marcion had more energetically brought 
 to light and advocated. But the view taken of these unques- 
 tionably difficult questions is still bungling. In consequence 
 
446 APPENDIX. 
 
 of the lack of the intermediate links, the love which they set 
 forth threatens constantly to become a merely physical thing, 
 and the entire tendency acquires a pantheistic character, shared 
 also by Monophysitism, which was the revival thereof at a 
 higher stage. Nay more, the Manichzeism which made its ap- 
 pearance some few decennia after Beryll or Beron, was a 
 degenerate pagan form of this same tendency. For the rest, 
 this age was so stirred by such questions, that theories of this 
 nature were probably developed in much greater variety than 
 has been commonly supposed. Indeed, traces enough of their 
 actual existence are discoverable, though we must not make it 
 our aim, as some do with a confidence that I cannot share, to 
 reduce back all doctrines which bear any resemblance to each 
 other, and are anonymously handed down, to one common 
 source. For example, when Origen (see his Comm. in Joh. T. 
 ii. 2) speaks of those who, out of anxiety for the unity of God, 
 denied to the Son an independent subsistence of His own (i610- 
 rnta ToD viod érépay Tapa THY TOD matpos), and distinguished 
 Father and Son merely in name, he is said to refer to the same 
 party with the Patripassians (as in the above-mentioned pas- 
 sage from the Apology of Pamphilus, T. iv. 22; or as in his 
 Comm. in Joh. x. 21, Vol. iv. 199, and c. Cels. 8, 12, Volar 
 750). But when in the first quoted passage (in Joh. ii. 2) he 
 mentions, as the second class, dpvoupevous Thy OeoTnTa TOU viot, 
 ribevtas d8 adtod Thy iSubtnTa Kab THY ovatay Kata Teprypapny 
 Tuyyavovoay éTépay TOU matpos; and in the further passage, 
 cited by Pamphilus,—“Sed et eos qui hominem dicunt Do- 
 minum Jesum precognitum et predestinatum, qui ante adven- 
 tum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non extiterit, sed quod 
 homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit Deitatem, ne illos 
 quidem sine periculo esse, ecclesize numero sociari;” or when 
 Greg. Thaum. (A. Mai l. c. 7, 171) alludes to men who, 
 though they conceived Christ to be filled with deity, really 
 allowed no distinction between Him and the saints and pro- 
 phets, but approximated to heathenism or Judaism by offering 
 worship to a man endued with divine power; for it is hea- 
 thenish aAnpwbevta deotntos céBewv, Jewish, to regard Christ 
 as a xtlowa:—there is undoubtedly a relationship between 
 them, but we van scarcely be warranted in identifying them 
 al), either with each other or with Beryll, or with any other 
 
NOTES. 447 
 
 teacher. ‘The passage cited from Origen by Pamphilus re- 
 minds us of what Eusebius says respecting Beryll, and may 
 very well relate to him ; for it does not attribute Ebionism, but 
 rather the contrary, when it speaks of the “deitas Patris:” 
 which is further evident also from the mild and rather warning 
 character of the judgment pronounced by him. Still its iden- 
 tity with Beryll is by no means certain; for we miss an essential 
 feature noticed in the account given by Eusebius, namely, that 
 when it became incarnate, the watpsxi Oeorns took up into, 
 or posited in, itself a limitation, a mepvypady. Through the 
 omission of this feature, the description becomes vague and in- 
 definite enough to suit many others, for example, the Alogi. 
 At the same time, this feature may lie in the first passage (in 
 Joh. ii. 2); for the party there mentioned, posited the idcorns 
 Tov viob, and said,—His ovela is cata mepvypadiy étépa Tapa 
 tiv Tod Twatpos. But they again denied the @edTys, and not 
 merely the idfa Oeorns, of the Son; they would therefore ap- 
 pear to have been Ebionites, and cannot have been identical 
 with the previous ones. Schleiermacher also (I. c. 532), and 
 with him Fock and Rossel, seems to hint at the same view of 
 the matter. The words of the latter passage can only be re- 
 ferred to Beryll, or better to those who resembled him, if we 
 understand them to deny the @edrns of the Son not absolutely, 
 but “ad tempus,” or on the ground of the xévwous, by which 
 God posited Himself as a man. In favour of which meaning 
 might be adduced the consideration, that otherwise in this con- 
 nection also the following words, from tufevres dé to matpoy 
 (see above), would have far too wide a scope, if they were 
 merely intended to state that Christ was a man, and indeed a 
 man whose ovcoia cata trepiypadiyy étépa mapa tT. T. 7.3 for 
 the latter point would only have been regarded as too self- 
 evident by Ebionites. Whereas, on the contrary, these wide- 
 reaching words acquire their full and sufficient import if we 
 suppose them to set forth an opinion which, according to the 
 account given in the text, resembled either that of Beron or that 
 of Beryll. They would then refer, namely, to a form of their 
 doctrine, in which fuller development had been given to the 
 very nearly related element, to wit, that by the xévwous a dis- 
 tinction, a section (dmroxo7m) of the divine essence in general, 
 or a second mpécw7ev in addition to that of the Father, was 
 
448 APPENDIX. 
 
 brought to pass (compare Orig. in Joh. T. xx. 16: de princip. 4, 
 31); a form with which Gregory Thaum. also was acquainted, 
 and which constituted a point of transition to Subordinatianisni 
 (see Note 1, page 34). But I should be unwilling to lay any 
 particular stress on this explanation. It must always be a 
 perilous thing, supplementarily to give definite names and 
 shapes to the authors of systems which have been anonymously 
 and vaguely handed down. Nor would Baur have been able so 
 confidently to refer the passage in Joh. T. ii. 2 to Beryll, if he 
 had considered that Origen began his commentary on John as 
 early as A.D. 219, and that, according to in Joh. vi. 1, and Kuseb. 
 6, 24, the first five tomes thereof were ready before a.p. 231; 
 whereas the discussion with Beryll took place far later, to wit, 
 in the year 244; although I, for my part, should by no means 
 decidedly conclude from this circumstance, that Beryll could 
 not be meant. Jor Origen had been even at an earlier period 
 in Arabia; and in that land, where mystical and theosophic 
 movements were the order of the day (see Ullmann, p. 8), 
 might easily long before have become acquainted with the 
 opinions entertained by Beryll or those related to him, especi- 
 ally as Beryll must have attained to an advanced age about the 
 year 244, and was then designated Bishop. For this reason, 
 also, it is not improbable that Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus 
 Romanus, in Arabia, named Abulides in the East, may have 
 had fruitless discussions with Beryll prior to 244, although we 
 have no information to that effect, unless where Beron is men- 
 tioned we ought to understand Beryll. Eusebius also (see his 
 H. E. 6, 20) sets Beryll and Hippolytus together. Completely 
 indefinite is the description given by Gregory of those who 
 worshipped a man filled with deity. It looks like what we 
 know of Paul of Samosata and his followers; but, as we shall 
 soon see, might also have belonged to the school of Sabellius. 
 
 Note 14, page 59. 
 
 He had this realistic tendency, and therefore also substan- 
 tially the same doctrine of the Trinity, even prior to his adop- 
 tion of Montanism. Indeed, he gives utterance to it already in 
 his Apologeticus, c. 21. In the Adv. Prax. he gives the “ Re- 
 cula Fidei,” which contains the belief in a real Trinity, and says, 
 —“Hane regulam ab initio Evangelii decucurrisse probabit 
 
NOTES. 449 
 
 novellitas Praxez hesterna.” “ As always, so now more than 
 ever, instructed by the Paraclete, who leads into all truth, we 
 believe, indeed, in one God, but agreeably to the divine order 
 which we call ceconomia;” c. 2, 13, 30. Tertullian himself, 
 therefore, in a work intended to justify Montanism, and to con- 
 fute its opponents, confesses that, prior to coming under the 
 influence of Montanism, he held, with the Church, substantially 
 the same doctrine of the Trinity as he now expounds. Indeed, 
 altogether apart from what has been previously advanced, it 
 must in itself be much more likely that the later Montanism was 
 modified and rid of its character of abruptness by the influence 
 of the doctrine of the Trinity settled by the Church, was puri- 
 fied by the principle of gradualness and order defended by 
 Church teachers like the author of the Epistle to Diognetus or 
 Irenzeus, and was brought to the recognition of the divine ceco- 
 nomia and its orderly course, than that the Church was led to 
 the doctrine of the Trinity through the influence of Montanism. 
 
 Nore 15, page 83. 
 
 Baur also, in his large work on the Trinity, has left him 
 entirely unnoticed ; and Hiinell gives an inaccurate and incom- 
 plete picture of him (1.c.). Reuter has justly directed attention 
 (see the “ Berliner Jahrbiicher,” 1843) to the importance of the 
 man, who was not only ranked among the first by his own age, 
 but stood high in the esteem of Eusebius, was much used by 
 Epiphanius (for example, Her. 31), and on the ground alone 
 of his work, mpos amdcas tas aipéces (Kuseb. H. E. 6, 22; 
 Photius Cod. 121), occupies a high position as an Heresiologer. 
 We know from Photius that the work commenced with Dosi- 
 theus, ended with Noetus and the Noetians (Phot. |. c.), and 
 discussed the Nicolaitanes, Montanists, Cainites, Marcicn, and 
 Valentine. The Valentinian sect (of which the Beron referred 
 to in the text was an offshoot) appears to have made an effort at 
 the beginning of the third century to enter into closer connec- 
 tion with the doctrine of the Church. We have previously 
 remarked the same course of procedure adopted by the school 
 of Marcion. This is proved, after his fashion, by Apelles, who 
 inclined towards Valentinianism; by Alexander (Tertull. “de 
 Carne Christi” 15, 16), who taught that Christ truly suffered ; 
 and by the afore-mentioned Beron. For the rest, in considering 
 
 VOL. IL 2 F 
 
450 APPENDIX. 
 
 the question of the genuineness of the writings of Hippolytus, 
 we must take our start from the fragment of his work against 
 the heresies, entitled “Against the Heresy of Noetus.” That 
 the heeresiological work with which Eusebius was acquainted, 
 and which Epiphanius used, was identical with that read by 
 Photius, no one will doubt. But as the work seen by Photius 
 concluded with Noetus, and the fragment extant on Noetus, 
 which was invariably attributed to Hippolytus, not only con- 
 cludes in a manner suitable to the termination of an entire 
 work, but begins also in such a manner as to show that it is a 
 fragment, and not a homily, as the title of the Vatican manu- 
 script represents it; nay more, the fragment of a work in which 
 other heresies had been spoken of, consequently of an heeresio- 
 logical work,—we have every reason for assuming it to be the 
 last part of the work with which Eusebius and Epiphanius 
 were acquainted. To this must be added, that Gelasius, Bishop 
 of Rome (Fabric. 1, 225) adduces a passage which is identical 
 with c. 18 of our fragment, the commencement being taken 
 from c. 11 and 12 or 17. Still more striking are the mner 
 grounds. For the views of the author are so peculiar, that they 
 could no longer have been put into the mouth of au orthodox 
 teacher of the Church even in the fourth century. They set 
 before us the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity at a stage at 
 which it had not yet been warned by Arianism of the conse- 
 quences of teaching that the Son first attained an hypostatical 
 existence outside of the divine sphere, at the creation of the 
 world. The author still adhered to that more harmless form of 
 Subordinatianism, the very inner inconsistency of which impelled 
 it to further progress and to the exclusion of all inadequate ele- 
 ments; and there could be no doubt whatever that, when the 
 time arrived for deciding between Athanasius and Arius, he 
 could not possibly feel drawn towards the latter. He had not 
 yet reached the stage at which Origen stood; on the other 
 hand, we find that, as compared with Tertullian, he took up a 
 more decidedly antagonistic position relatively to the continuous 
 patripassian movements. The work, therefore, of which this 
 fragment formed a part, must be concluded, on inner grounds, 
 to have been written between Tertullian and Origen ; and this 
 would exactly suit Hippolytus, who is said, by Gelasius, Bishoy: 
 in Arabia, to have addressed a letter to the wife of Philippus 
 
NOTES. 451 
 
 Arabus. This fragment shall furnish us, to use one of his own 
 figures, with the warp into which we shall weave our image of 
 Hippolytus. J further believe myself justified in describing as 
 genuine, among the works bearing upon Christology, that which 
 treats of Antichrist. As he occupied himself greatly with 
 chronological studies, and wrote a commentary on Daniel (com- 
 pare abr. 1, 272); and as the Catenz on the first three Gos- 
 pels (compare on Matt. xxiv.; Luke xxi.) show that he had 
 bestowed much thought on the subject of Antichrist; and, 
 finally, as the style and thoughts are both archaic (Photius 
 makes the same remark),—there seems to me to be no ground 
 for doubting the genuineness of the work. Further, in it Hades 
 plays a great role (c. 11, 45); hence also the work, Adyos pds 
 “EXaAnvas, of which the treatise entitled cata IIddtova (Fabr. 
 1, 220 ff.) formed a part, and the fragment in A. Mai’s Coll. 
 Nova (7, 12), may very fairly be assigned to him. With the 
 Christological principles of the treatise against Noetus, and of 
 the work on Antichrist, harmonizes also the Xoyos els Ta ayta 
 Jeopavera : compare c. 6 with c. Noet. 18. Chapter Third of 
 these homilies appears indeed to contain the doctrine that Mary 
 remained a virgin even subsequently to the birth of Christ, 
 against which Tertullian strongly protests. But, in the first 
 place, even the discourse at the Feast of Epiphany, attributed 
 to Gregory Thaumatureus, contains this doctrine ; in the second 
 place, perhaps Tertullian’s serious defence of the true view may 
 be a sign that an antagonistic view was beginning to be taught ; 
 and, in the third place, another explanation of the passage seems 
 to me to be more probable than the one referred to (see Note 
 3, page 95). This doctrine may have been first taught by 
 Docetists, who were willing to recognise the birth of Christ,—for 
 example, by the Valentinians,—and have then commended itself 
 to the Church of this age on other grounds. Indeed, the history 
 of Montanism shows a similar course of things. The teachers 
 of the second century, and in particular Tertullian, were con- 
 cerned to assert the complete truth of the incarnation of Christ 
 on quite different principles from Hippolytus, as we shall soon 
 see. As far as concerns the remaining fragments, that of Mai 
 7, 134, is preserved in Latin by Leontius (Fabr. 1, 266), in 
 greater compass; that of Mai, p. 68, we possessed previously in 
 
 Greek (c. Beron. Fabr. 1, 227). The fragment (Fabr. 1, 266) 
 
452 APPENDIX. 
 
 from his commentary on Genesis is attested by Jerome; and 
 the fragments, Fabr. 1, 267-269, by Theodoret. The remain- 
 ing Christological fragments from the commentary on Genesis 
 (Fabr. 2, 22-31), and the “ Demonst. c. Jud.” (abr. 2, 2-5), 
 are as far from causing difficulty as the trinitarian and Christo- 
 logical fragments, 1, 267 to 281. Doubt may be thrown on the 
 fragment 1, 282, because of the superscription taken in conjunc- 
 tion with its doctrine of the Eucharist. On the other hand, the 
 work srepl yapicpdtov is above suspicion, with the exception of 
 the uncertain title ; though there is nothing in it of importance 
 for our purpose, if we except the confession of faith (246), 
 which is brief, simple, and archaic in its character. Spurious, 
 on the contrary, is that communicated by Joannes Antioch. 
 (Fabr. 2, 32), which is completely Monophysitic in tone, and 
 contradictory of all the accredited Christological views of Hip- 
 polytus. 
 
 Nore 16, page 89. 
 
 Herewith Hippolytus aimed at showing that he was justi- 
 fied in giving to the Logos also the name Son. It is very 
 remarkable that the Monarchians, to whom he was opposed, 
 raised no objection to the use of the word Logos, nor even 
 against the position that the Logos became flesh. But they 
 protest, as against an innovation, a £évov, against identifying 
 the Logos with the vids, in that they explain the word Adyos so 
 that it retains no hypostatical significance, and assert. that this 
 was the sense in which it was used by John. “Iwdvyns pév yap 
 Eyes AOyov, GAN adAXwS aAXnyopel. Two things herein are 
 remarkable. Firstly, we see again the groundlessness of Baur’s 
 argumentation, that Patripassianism furnishes an indirect but 
 powerful testimony against the authority or genuineness of the 
 Gospel of John, seeing that the doctrine of the Logos plays a 
 great role with John, and that it was rejected by the Patri- 
 passians. For, inasmuch as both understood how to get over 
 the difficulty, by adopting a peculiar interpretation, John could 
 by no means have brought about a collision. On the contrary, 
 the adherents of this tendency believed the Gospel of John to 
 furnish the strongest scriptural proofs in their favour. In the 
 second place, the assertion of the opponents, that it was some- 
 thing new to identify the Logos with the Son, and thus to 
 
NOTES. 453 
 
 ensure to the Son a premundane hypostatical existence, if it 
 deserve credit, introduces us very plainly to an age in which 
 all alike were thoroughly convinced that the higher nature of 
 Christ was of one substance with God; but in which also the 
 inclination to assert for that higher nature an hypostasis of its 
 own, which we found so strong and lively at the commence- 
 ment of the second century and subsequently, had almost died 
 out in the neighbourhood of Noetus. The reason whereot 
 being, that the Christian mind had laid firm hold on that which 
 it considered preliminarily to be the main point; to wit, that 
 the person of the eternal God Himself had drawn near to men 
 in Christ, which seemed possible, without ascribing to the Son 
 an independent hypostasis of His own. Even the Patripassians 
 could say, The wisdom, the understanding, the omnipotence of 
 God, became man in Christ; and, in point of fact, they recog- 
 nised the eternity of the hypostasis which appeared in Him 
 even more fully than the Church teachers whom we have 
 noticed, for they conceived the one hypostasis acknowledged by 
 them—that is, God Himself, the Father—to have personally 
 appeared in Christ. Therein lies also a further evidence of the 
 high antiquity of this work, nay, even of its composition during 
 the first half of the third century. For, as the indifference to 
 the hypostasis of the Logos and of the premundane Son, which 
 was so markedly a characteristic of Tertullian, presupposed the 
 entire course of the doctrine of the Logos depicted above, so, 
 on the other hand, no later writer could have made the con- 
 cession made by Hippolytus (c. 15 init.), that the identification 
 of the Logos with the Son, who had always been conceived to 
 be hypostatical, was a new thing, although justified by Paul and 
 Apocalypse xix. 11. When we ask historically, what was new 
 and what was old, we must undoubtedly reply,—It was new to 
 employ the word Son, in this distinctly doctrinal sense, to de- 
 note the momentum of personality; for at an earlier period the 
 term, Son of God, had been applied, not merely to the pre-ex- 
 istent second hypostasis, but also to the entire earthly person- 
 ality of Christ—a thing which now, when writers aimed at 
 creater precision, was no longer suffered, or suffered solely out 
 of regard for the higher nature of Christ. ‘This clearly de- 
 fined use of the word owed its rise to the necessity (a necessity 
 whose grounds we have previously pointed out) of establishing 
 
454 APPENDIX. 
 
 the hypostasis of the Son by other means than by the doctrine 
 of the Word and the Sophia, the union of which in the Logos, 
 after the manner indicated, sufficed solely to establish the divine 
 essence of the Son. ‘The perception of this necessity impelled 
 the Church to endeavour to seek another basis of the hypostasis 
 of the Son; but it was tempted to aim at securing this object, 
 in the first instance, by connecting the genesis of the hypostasis 
 of the Son with the genesis of the world: thus, of course, glid- 
 ing into thoughts of an Arian tendency,—not, indeed, in relation 
 to the essence, certainly, however, in relation to the personality 
 of the Son. That from the days of Tertullian onwards, stirred 
 especially by the influence of Patripassianism, the Church 
 aimed with renewed energy at asserting for the Son a distinct 
 hypostasis,—this was old; for that the higher nature of Christ 
 was a pre-existent divine hypostasis, had long been allowed to 
 be a fact, although, as we have remarked, less attention had 
 been bestowed on it from the end of the second century on- 
 wards. But the mode of establishing that He was or became a 
 person was new ; for earlier writers had not gone so far as, out 
 of regard to the divine unity, to remove the hypostatical ele- 
 ment in the Son outside of the inner divine sphere. This new 
 feature soon became antiquated, it is true, and passed away ; 
 indeed, those who insisted on it could not avoid falling into the 
 Arianism which they did not desire to adopt. To the praise, 
 however, of the Church teachers whom we here have in view, 
 it must be said, that they did their best to oppose that Arian 
 tendency, which threatened to reduce the hypostasis, and not 
 merely the hypostatical element, of the Son to a mere creature. 
 And that not only by always requiring truly divine essence to 
 be attributed to the Son, but also by endeavouring to bring the 
 Son, although outside and alongside of God, yet into the most 
 intimate relation to the inner Logos of the Father. Tertullian, 
 as we have seen, aimed at pointing out the existence of the 
 potence of Sonship and incarnation in the inner, eternal essence 
 of God, the inner Word; Hippolytus appropriated to the Adyos 
 acapxos in God, also the name of Son, in particular on ac- 
 count of His destiny to incarnation,—a course which he him- 
 self, as we have said, allows to be to a certain extent an inno- 
 vation, but which was at the same time in agreement with 
 Scripture. Its adoption may be taken as an indication that he 
 
NOTES. 455 
 
 was unwilling, and very justifiably, to be content with an 
 hypostasis of the higher nature of Christ, whose origin and 
 subsistence lay outside of the inner essence of God; and that 
 he felt compelled to give it a seat in the inmost sphere of the 
 divine. This effort, as, on the one hand, it was evidently closely 
 allied to the tendency which prevailed in the earlier days of the 
 Church’s existence (a thing to which Patripassianism also, in 
 its peculiar way, testifies), so, on the other hand, it was the fore 
 runner of that doctrine of the Trinity which was laid down by 
 the Fathers of the Council of Nicsea, and which made its ap- 
 pearance in the course of the third century, so soon as the 
 Arian elements contained in the systems of the Church teachers, 
 above referred to, began to be consolidated to an independent 
 and self-consistent whole. The remark just made remains true, 
 although we should have to grant that the attempt to unite the 
 hypostasis of the Son with the inner Logos could not realize its 
 object, so long as no other basis of the doctrine of the Trinity 
 was discovered in God Himself than the illusory one of the 
 multiplicity of the divine attributes (for example, wisdom). 
 That this was insufficient, is clear alone from the consideration, 
 that a Trinity does not result at all, if the divine attributes are 
 to be taken as so many potences of hypostases. In that case, 
 to reply to Hippolytus with Hippolytus himself, God is rows, 
 not a Trinity. Furthermore, until the conception formed of 
 God had been transformed, and thus a different foundation 
 laid for the distinctions of the Trinity, that connection of the 
 wisdom and omnipotence of God with the mundane Son in- 
 volved a partial retrocession to the very ground which had just 
 been quitted, with the design of establishing the hypostasis of 
 the Son on a surer footing than the doctrine of the Logos was 
 able to afford. But although we perceive here a remainder of 
 the obscuration of the insight which we have praised above, 
 this defect is fully counterbalanced by the consideration, that 
 the reduction of the mundane Son back to the inner divine 
 essence, thus commenced, was also the commencement of the 
 rejection of creatural and Arian features from His hypostasis. 
 So that the very same thing which we found accomplished 
 during the second century in relation to the essence of the Son, 
 we now find accomplished in relation to His hypostasis. For, 
 in the second century, the Logos was brought far nearer to the 
 
456 APPENDIX. 
 
 essence of the created world than was the case in the third ;— 
 He was conceived to be immediately (that is, without the 
 mediation of ethical categories) the world itself, in its ideal 
 aspect, the xocpos vontos ; on which view, justice could not be 
 done to the idea of creation. That was cast aside towards the 
 end of the century through the acquisition of the “stamina” of 
 the Christian idea of God, during the conflict with the many 
 forms of Gnosticism; and although we can trace the influence 
 of the earlier theory in Tertullian, who regarded the inner 
 divine Logos as also the idea of the world; and although the 
 entire distinction between the inner Logos and the mundane 
 Son bore a certain analogy to the doctrine of the Aoyos évdua- 
 Oeros and mpodopixds rejected by Irenzeus, we must not forget 
 to notice the step taken in advance, in that the Aoyos évdud- 
 eros and mpodopixos, in its new, higher potence, was no longer 
 represented as containing the idea of the world, both as resting 
 in God and as actually realized, but was rather taken to denote 
 the inner divine reason on the one hand, and, on the other 
 hand, the reason after it had become hypostatical, or a Son. 
 In other words, the distinction now drawn between Logos and 
 Son, instead of relating as heretofore to the product, in the 
 idea of the world, related to the idea of God Himself; although, 
 in the first instance, a precipitate resort was made to the world, 
 in order to secure the hypostasis—not the divine essence—of 
 the Son. 
 
 Norte 17, page 97. 
 
 Patripassians of the earlier kind failed also to advance be. 
 yond the idea of a theophany. So that the result described 
 above in connection with the Trinity, reappears also in connec- 
 tion with Christology:—the teachers of the Church at this 
 period still stand on the same basis as their opponents. Cling- 
 ing as they still did to their premises, they were unable to attain 
 the mastery over them. It is instructive to observe how the 
 doctrine of the absolute unchangeableness of God led the 
 teachers of the Church to the like theophanical result, as the 
 doctrine of the immediate passibility of God, held by their 
 opponents of the so-called Patripassian school. Both were 
 necessitated to regard the humanity as impersonal, as a mere 
 husk of God. We have already indicated that the idea of God. 
 
NOTES. 457 
 
 which on both sides was still dominated by physical categories, 
 only needed to be taken in an ethical sense, in order to the 
 doing of full justice to the immutability of God on the one 
 hand, which the Patripassians misapprehended, and on the 
 other hand, to open up the prospect of a much more intimate 
 participation of God in the finite, without endangering His 
 divine essence, than Hippolytus judged admissible. 
 
 Norte 18, page 110. 
 
 De princip. 1, 2, 2:—“ Quomodo extra hujus sapientize 
 generationem fuisse aliquando Deum Patrem vel ad punctum 
 momenti alicujus quis potest sentire vel credere—? Aut enim 
 non potuisse Deum dicet generare sapientiam antequam gene- 
 raret, ut eam, que ante non erat, postea genuerit, ut esset ; 
 aut, potuisse quidem et, quod dici de Deo nefas est, noluisse 
 generare, quod utrumque et absurdum et impium esse omnibus 
 patet, id est, ut aut ex eo, quod non potuit, Deus proficeret ut 
 posset, aut cum posset, dissimularet ac differret generare sapi- 
 entiam. Propter quod nos semper Deum Patrem novimus 
 unigeniti Filii sui, ex ipso quidem nati et quod est ab ipso tra- 
 hentis, sine ullo tamen initio, non solum eo, quod aliquibus 
 temporum spatiis distingui potest, sed ne illo quidem, quod sola 
 apud semetipsam mens intueri solet, et nudo ut ita dixerim in- 
 tellectu atque animo conspicari. § 4: Est namque ita eterna 
 - ac sempiterna generatio sicut splendor generatus ex luce. Non 
 enim per adoptionem spiritus Filius fit extrinsecus, sed natura 
 Filius est. § 7: Deus lux est; Splendor hujus lucis est 
 unigenitus Filius ex ipso inseparabiliter velut splendor ex luce 
 procedens. §10: Pater non potest esse quis si filius non sit. 
 Lhe Father is not omnipotent prior to the birth of wisdom; per 
 filium omnipotens est pater. Ever created thing accidentem 
 habet justitiam vel sapientiam, et quod hoc quod accedit, etiam 
 decidere potest, gloria ejus sincera et limpidissima esse non 
 potest. Sapientia vero Dei, que est unigenitus Filius ejus, 
 quoniam in omnibus inconvertibilis est et incommutabilis et sub- 
 stantiz in eo omne bonum est, quod utique mutari atque con- 
 verti nunquam potest, idcirco pura ejus ac sincera gloria pre- 
 dicatur. 4,2,8: Sicut lux nunquam sine splendore esse potuit, 
 ita nec Filius quidem sine Patre (Pater sine Filio?) intelligi 
 potest, qui et figura expressa substantiz ejus et Verbum ef 
 
458 APPENDIX. 
 
 Sapientia dicitur. Quomodo ergo potest dici, quia fuit ali- 
 quando, quando non fuit Filius?” Compare in Joh. xin, 25. 
 
 Norte 19, page 113. 
 
 Compare the de princ. 1, 2, 7 :—“ Splendor est gloria Dei 
 et figura expressa substantize ejus, capable of leading us to the 
 light of the Father.’ Ib. §9-13. I Joh. T. xxxu. 18 :-—"OXns 
 pev odv oluat THS SoEns ToD Ocod adtod aravyacpua eivat Tov 
 viov,—bOdvew pévtos ye ard Tod arravydcpatos ToUTOU TIS OAs 
 So€ns pwepiKa aTravydopata emt Thy NOLTTY oYLKNY KTITW OvK 
 oiuas yap Tiva TO Tay Sivaclar ywphoat THs ONS d0Ens Tod Ocod 
 dmatvyacpa, i) Tov viov avtov. Ibid. on Joh. xiv. 9 (“ Whoso 
 seeth Me, seeth the Father also”): Oewpettar yap é&v TO hoy 
 dvt. Oc Kal cixdve Tod Ocod aopdtov o yevvijcas avtov Tarnp, 
 Tod évidévT05 TH eiKoVe TOL adpadtov Ocod evOéws évopav Suvapevov 
 Kal TO TpwTOT’T® THS EiKoVvos, T® Tatpi. Everything besides 
 Himself is created by Him, or comes into existence through 
 Him, even the Holy Spirit, to whom he ascribes hypostasis and 
 wisdom (see in Joh. T. ii. 6), and who notwithstanding does 
 not belong to the world (ibid.). C. 29,—“ John says, He is in 
 the midst of you.” This Origen refers to the Logos, and takes 
 occasion therefrom to set forth the uniqueness of His relation 
 to the world :—'Emloxewat, ef dua TO év péom Tod mavTos eivat 
 cdpatos thy Kapdlav, év é 7H Kapdia TO HYyEemoviKoV Kal TOV ev 
 éxdat@ Noyou, Suvatat voeicHar TO pécos tudv EoTyKev, Ov pets 
 ovx oldate. Compare de prince. 4, 28 :—Supra omne tempus et 
 supra omnia secula, et supra omnem zternitatem intelligenda 
 sunt ea que de Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto dicuntur. Hee 
 enim sola Trinitas est, que omnem sensum intelligentiz non 
 solum temporalis verum etiam eternze excedit. Czetera vero, 
 que sunt extra Trinitatem, in seculis et in temporibus metienda 
 
 sunt. Compare Note 1, page 116. 
 
 Nore 20, page 119. 
 
 Compare Huet’s “ Origeniana” in de la Rue’s Ed. iv. 150. 
 In Ad Rom. L. 1. 5, he speaks of the eternal Evangel which 
 will be manifested when the shadow passes away, when death 
 is swallowed up, and the truth has made its appearance. In 
 Joh. T. i. 29:—Kait éet év 76 watpi odx Eats yevéoOae 7) 
 wapa TO Tatpl, mi POacavtTa, TpaTov KaTwOev avaBalvovTa, 
 
NOTES. 450 
 
 éri THY Tod viod Oeornta, dv Hs Tis YepayoynOjvas Sivatas Kah 
 éml THY TaTpLKnY paKkaploTnTa, Oipa o YwtHip avayéypartat. 
 Specially characteristic is the classification of men given in “in 
 Joh.” T.ii. 3. The highest class Qeov éyoucr Tov THY OX@V Ocov: 
 of & Tapa TovTOUS SEevTEpOL ioTapeEvoL ert TOV viov Tot cob, Tdv 
 Xpictov avtod- Kat tpitor ot Tov iALov, Kal THY cEARVHY Kal 
 Tavta Tov Kocpov, etc., which is indeed an error, but far better 
 than idolatry. In Joh. T. xix. 1 (towards the close) we read,— 
 “The knowledge of the Son is not the same as that of the 
 Father, for an avaPaivew takes place aio Ths yvOoews Tod viob 
 éml THY yv@ow Tov Twatpos: but the Father cannot be seen 
 otherwise than in the Son (yu) GAdws opdcbar tov matépa 
 [StvacOat| 7) TO opacOas Tov vidv).—Kat 0 Gewpav tiv codiar, 
 iy exticev 0 Ocds Tpd Tov aldvar, avaBaiver ato Tod éyvaxévas 
 Tv copiay éml Tov TatTépa avTns. Previously, however, must 
 Wisdom or the truth be recognised, iv’ obtws €XOn emt TO éviety 
 TH ovola, ) TH Umrepéxewa THS ovolas Suvaper Kai dioew Tod 
 Ocod. Kal rayarye, dotrep kata Tov vaoy avaBa0puol tives tjoav, 
 dv wv eiones Tis els TA Ayta TOV aAyiwv, OUTWS Ob TAVTES 71)WOV 
 avaBabpuol o povoyerns éote Tot Ocod, cai daTrep Tev avaPabpov 
 0 govoyerns eats TpOTOS éml TA KAT, 0 O€ TOVTOY avwTépw Kal 
 otTws épeEhs pméypt TOU avwTdTw, oVTWS ol Mév TaYTES ELoW 
 avaSabuol 6 cwtip* 0 5é oiov TpATOs KaTwTépw TO avOpwTwop 
 avtod, © ériBaivovtes odevomev, Kai ta é&fs adbtobd évta Ti 
 macay, év Tols avaBabmols odov, ate avaBhAvas dv advTod bvToOS 
 Kal ayyéXov, Kab TOV AoLTraV Svvayewv. In “in Joh.” T. xx. 7, 
 he expresses his belief that the end will come (1 Cor. xv. 28) when 
 glorified spirits shall see the Father Himself as He is seen by 
 the Son, and no longer know Him merely in the Son (dyrovrae 
 TA Tapa TO TaTpr ovKéte Sia pecitov Kal vmrnpétou BA€trovtes 
 avTa.— Ore ws 0 vids Opa TOY TaTépa Kal Ta Tapa TO TaTpi— 
 olovel opolms TO viP avtomTns eotar TOO TaTpOsS—ovKETL ard 
 THS ELKOVOS EVVOOV TA TEpt TOUTOV, ov 4 Eik@v é€oTL). Yet he 
 adds in the previous passage,—The first thing is, that He be- 
 came to us also the Lamb, which bears our sins and sanctifies 
 us; then, having been cleansed, we eat His flesh, which is the 
 true food. Compare contra Celsum 6, 68 
 
&60 APPENDIX. 
 
 Nore 21, page 120. 
 
 Baur (1. c. 204 ff.) gives it as his opinion, tliat Origen vacil- 
 lates between a generation out of God’s will, and a generation 
 out of God’s essence; and refers to “in Joann.” T. xx. 16, as 
 containing the former view. The point, however, is to discover 
 the cause of this vacillation. Had Baur taken this course, he 
 would perhaps have been able to confine the vacillation within 
 very narrow limits. Neander starts with the view—one with 
 which I am unable to agree—that the doctrine of the identity 
 of the essence of the Son with that of the Father was gradually 
 arrived at, and first clearly taught in the West, during the third 
 century; that, on the contrary, Subordinatianism had its home 
 in the East, from the days of Origen onwards; and that, in 
 order to exclude Emanatism, Origen assumed that the Son 
 originated from the will of God. The first-mentioned point is 
 contradicted both by Patripassianism and by a whole series of 
 Church teachers of the second century ; and the Subordinatian- 
 ism of Tertullian and Novatian, so far from being weaker than 
 that of Origen, is, taking all things into consideration, stronger. 
 As far as concerns Kmanatism, Origen, it is true, was opposed 
 to it in its coarsely sensuous forms; he could neither allow of a 
 division in God (azroxovn), nor of a “fatum” above God, ne- 
 cessitating the Father to the generation of the Son. But he 
 was not therefore obliged to represent the generation of the Son 
 solely as a matter of the “liberum arbitrium” of God. He did 
 not even trace the origin of the world to that “liberum arbi- 
 trium.” On the contrary, he held that the divine will was the 
 unity of freedom and necessity. If, however, it should be 
 replied,—The existence of the Son is undoubtedly not accidental, 
 in the sense, namely, in which the world’s existence is not acci- 
 dental; but still the Son, no less than the world, owes His 
 existence to that divine will in which freedom and necessity are 
 combined ; out of the divine essence, on the contrary, neither 
 the world nor the Son is derived ;—we shall shortly give it closer 
 consideration. Ritter (see his “ Geschichte der christlichen 
 Philosophie” i. 498, 501) represents the Son as brought forth 
 by the will of the Father, though out of His essence. He justly 
 recognises that the essential tendency of Origen’s teachings was 
 to show that the entire fulness of the Deity dwelt in the Son; 
 
NOTES. 461 
 
 aud that the Son is not to be regarded as a creature, but as the 
 creative spirit, the true Mediator, of equal perfection with the 
 Father. The subordination of the Son and the appearance of 
 a commixture with creatures did not attach to the doctrine 
 which he really meant to teach, but merely to the imperfect 
 development thereof: they were a remnant of the sensuous 
 ideas, which prevented him from seeing the difference between 
 the dependence of the Son as generated, and the dependence of 
 creatures. ‘The assumption of the imperfection of the creation 
 must also have reacted on the conception he formed of the 
 creative power of God (that is, of the Son, or Word). Possibly, 
 however, a certain degree of subordination may be shown to be 
 grounded in Origen’s conception of God; but no less also His 
 equality with the Father. 
 
 Note 22, page 129. 
 
 The chief passages relating to this personification (Person- 
 werdung) of the divine will in the Son, who proceeded inde- 
 pendently eternally forth from the divine “Mens” (Augustine 
 uses the word “ memoria”), through the self-duplication of God, 
 are collected in Note 1, page 125. In the “de prince.” 1, 2, 6, 
 he teaches, that to describe Him as the image of God, is to 
 affirm “nature ac substantise patris et filil unitatem. Si enim 
 omnia, que facit pater, hec et filius facit similiter, in eo,— 
 Imago patris in filio deformatur, qui utique natus ex eo est velut 
 quzedam voluntas ejus ex mente procedens. Et ideo ego arbitror, 
 quod sufficere debeat voluntas patris ad subsistendum hoc, quod 
 vult pater. Volens enim non alia via utitur, nisi que consilio 
 voluntatis profertur.” It might appear as though, in the last 
 words, he returned completely to the stage at which Tertullian 
 and Hippolytus stood, apportioning all to the will instead of to the 
 essence of God. We must not, however, overlook the “ideo,” 
 which refers to what has gone before. God’s will being of such 
 a nature that it can personally objectify itself in the dupli- 
 cation of God, therefore, says he, it appears to me unnecessary 
 to resort to anything else than the will; in other words, if the 
 divine will were merely creative, we should have to leave it out 
 of consideration in the present case. If Origen had intended, 
 as Baur maintains (1. c. p. 207), by the mention of the will, to 
 represent the origin of the Son as the work of a kind of divine 
 
462 APPENDIX. 
 
 caprice, he must have contradicted his own position, that for the 
 Father to have a Son, a perfect image, was a good; and that to 
 bring forth the Son belonged as truly to the essence of the 
 Father as brightness belongs to light. Moreover, Origen does 
 not allow the existence of such a thing as caprice in God. But 
 he does not even content himself with a creation of the Son by 
 the will of the Father, grounded in rational necessity or rational 
 freedom. For, apart from the consideration that the idea of an 
 immediately creative will of the Father was something foreign 
 to his conception of God, he says (see Note 1, page 116, and 
 Note 19, Appendix), He was the divine Will proceeding forth 
 from the divine “ Mens;” He was the will as proceeding ; how 
 can He have been created by this will? The words “consilio 
 voluntatis profertur” exclude all caprice; though, at the same 
 time, they are an outflow of the defect already mentioned, of 
 conceiving the Father to be self-conscious in and by Himself, 
 and not in and with the Son. But the idea of purpose, of decree, 
 cannot lie in the word “consilio;” for that would involve His 
 being a creature, and contradict Rom. i. 5, according to which 
 the Son cannot be the object of a divine decree. In the original 
 Greek probably stood yeu, which was intended to set forth 
 the divine will, which emanates and becomes a person, as con- 
 scious; that is, it was intended to set aside the passivity and 
 unconsciousness which attach to the common Emanatism. With 
 this explanation harmonizes the immediately following polemic 
 against such emanatistic doctrines. “Magis ergo,” he concludes, 
 “ sicut voluntas procedit e mente (this favourite expression of 
 Origen’s shows that he deemed the so-called generation of the 
 Son to be quite as truly His own act as the act of the Father) 
 et neque partem aliquam mentis secat neque ab ea separatur aut 
 dividitur, tali quadam specie putandus est Filium genuisse, ima- 
 ginem scilicet suam, ut sicut ipse invisibilis est per naturam, ita 
 imaginem quoque invisibilem genuerit—Imago ergo est invisi- 
 bilis Dei patris Servator noster; quantum ad ysum quidem 
 patrem, veritas, quantum autem ad nos, quibus revelat. patrem, 
 imago est, per quam cognoscimus patrem.” 
 
 Norte 23, page 140. 
 
 We can scarcely do otherwise than characterize it as play, 
 when some make the play on words in which Origen indulges 
 
NOTES. 463 
 
 the corner-stone of his doctrine, deducing from his derivation of 
 uy from vye, and his supposition that yrvy7 denotes cooled 
 down 7rvedua, the conclusion that he conceived Christ’s soul also 
 to be not entirely free from impurity. When Baur—not very 
 confidently, it is true—gives utterance to this conjecture, he 
 overlooks the numberless passages in which the perfect sinless- 
 ness of the soul of Christ is maintained in the strongest terms 
 (compare ad Rom. 3, 8; 6, 12; in Joann. I. xx. 17; de prince. 
 2, 6, 3, 4, 5; 4, 81), and has not properly considered Origen’s 
 course of thought; otherwise he would have seen that the acces- 
 sibility of the soul to suffering, and its subjection to finitude, as 
 taught by him, was based, not on the guilt, but on the love of 
 Christ, which condescended to us and became a curse for us. 
 In Paul also was a reflection of this love, which neither vanishes 
 nor cools down, in that it is ready to become a curse for others, 
 but during its humiliation remains what it was as love, though, 
 instead of enjoying the blessedness naturally belonging to it, 
 sympathizingly makes the unhappiness of the brethren its own 
 (compare the passages quoted, page 134 f.). In general, more- 
 over, Origen did not understand yvy7 to mean merely some- 
 thing cooled down, but frequently something substantially good ; 
 nor did he regard the human soul as a mere cooled down vedpa. 
 Thus he calls the Logos the soul of God, speaks very frequently 
 of holy souls, and therefore uses yvy7 in its usual sense of an 
 individual spiritual being, which also, as such, may proceed 
 forth from the hand of God: compare ad Rom. i. 8. The 
 soul of Christ was foreordained to be a sacrifice; de Martyr. 
 AT; Noysexn vrvyy. In Joann. T. xiii. 25, yuyy dueaia; xiii. 
 3, Oevorépar puyai; T. x. 16, dvvatas Kai puvoe lepov eivar 1) 
 evpuns ev Aoyw Wuy7) Sia TOV cUpTrEduKOTA Adyov: 13, 43; 20, 
 7. he a&ortpa also are éuypuya, and the Logos éuuyos. In 
 Joann. T. ii. 25, xi. 25. 
 
 Nore 24, page 141. 
 
 Compare de prince. 2, 1, 2; 8, 3; and the passage quoted 
 ADOVe#2. GO) 3,8) pe Of Oso gnc. Wels, 8,072 sead_ Romuilsi 5,910: 
 Origen’s conception of freedom was by no means so formal as 
 appears commonly to be supposed. His doctrine of a final 
 atoxataoracts, after all possible delays, relapses, purifications, 
 shows clearly that he looked upon grace as a power which over- 
 
464 APPENDIX. 
 
 arches even freedom, without, however, exercising physicai con- 
 straint. He regards not merely choice or caprice as freedom, 
 but whatever stress he lays on the middle momentum or stadium 
 of the idea of freedom, represents it as preceded by the essential 
 connection of the spiritual nature with the Logos, or by essen- 
 tial freedom; and, on the other hand, in that perfect love which 
 is the goal, he sees neither the possibility of evil nor unfreedom, 
 but rather the union of freedom and ethical necessity. At all 
 the lower stages, says he, ad Rom. L. v. 10, a relapse 1S pos- 
 sible; but where there is the love of the whole heart, it pre- 
 serves from the possibility of a fall. If, as the Apostle says, 
 nothing can separate us from the love of God, the faculty of 
 choice cannot separate us. It remains, it is true; but the power 
 of love is so great, that it draws all powers and all virtues to 
 itself, especially since the love of God manifested itself as pre- 
 venient. The free grace which apparently renounces the jaw, 
 establishes the rule of love in opposition to caprice and to free- 
 dom of choice. 
 
 Note 25, page 147. 
 
 The correctness of the above exposition, which starts with the 
 conviction that Origen is by no means chargeable with vacillation 
 in his teachings regarding God, but, on the contrary, remained 
 in the main self-consistent throughout,—that, in agreement with 
 this his conception of God, he always, and very distinctly, 
 assigned essentially the same position respectively to the Logos, 
 to Christ, and to the world,—and that he by no means at one 
 time conceived the entire divine essence to be present, for 
 example, in Christ, and at another time regarded the Logos as 
 a mere creature,—finds confirmation in the circumstance, that 
 it appears to furnish an explanation of his strange doctrine of 
 several worlds successively following upon each other. As 
 God is the goal of the world, and His inmost essence abstrac- 
 tion from all multiplicity and finitude, the world is threatened, 
 the nearer it approaches perfection, the more with complete 
 absorption into God: nay more, in order to attain perfection, 
 it must be raised above its own nature; in other words, it must 
 really cease to exist. Feeling this, Origen was driven to seek 
 for a counterpoise, especially as he held the existence of the 
 world to be a great good for God Himself. For this reason, 
 
NOTES. 465 
 
 he keeps the world as long as possible undergoing processes of 
 purification,—processes which he represents as continuing even 
 after the resurrection. On the same ground, also, he leaves the 
 matter open, and conceives it as a possibility, which may become 
 an actuality, that freedom should, by renewed apostasy, prolong 
 that relative independence of God, which he was able to deem 
 perfect solely outside of God, not in Him. And thus the unre- 
 conciled antagonism between finite and infinite in his system 
 assumed the form of a doctrine of objective alternating worlds ; 
 and the same thing assumed subjectively the form of an alterna- 
 tion between mystery and revelation (see Martensen’s “ Meister 
 Eckart”). With this is further intimately connected another 
 point. Corporeality he represents at one time as the product 
 of sin, or at all events as the seal of imperfection, the existence 
 of which is therefore threatened when it approaches perfection : 
 at another time, he deems it to be that through which the ideal 
 world first becomes a reality; and accordingly posited its ex- 
 istence as eternal. That perfection would bring at once the 
 most intimate union with God, and the most complete confir- 
 mation of individuality, Origen was as yet unable to see; 
 because he neither viewed individuality as a work of God, nor 
 reckoned it as a part of the divine creation. He regarded it as 
 grounded, not in God’s idea of the world, but solely in the 
 freedom of man. Thus viewed, however, it had a very doubt- 
 ful existence. The eternal and true element in the idea of the 
 world does not extend to the concrete and individual, but is 
 merely the potential creation, the xdcpos vontds. The actual 
 world, on the contrary, in his representation, hovers constantly, 
 so to speak, between existence and non-existence ; and accord- 
 ingly very much that he posits at one time, becomes at another 
 time doubtful. This alternation between position and negation, 
 however, which characterizes his system at so many points, was 
 erounded, not in caprice and unsteadiness, but in his concep-~ 
 tion of God, which still suffers from the contradiction of cor- 
 stituting the lowest and most abstract determination the most 
 essence and highest element of God, though Origen himself 
 elsewhere saw clearly enough that the spiritual determinations 
 are the highest. It was reserved, however, for the teachers of 
 a later period to perceive the erroneousness of Origen’s notion, 
 that the divine essence contained within itself a fulness of 
 VOL. II. 2G 
 
466 APPENDIX 
 
 qualities, of which those embodied in the divine volition and 
 knowledge are but a feeble copy; and to acknowledge that 
 spiritual love is itself the inmost essence of God, His uncreated 
 being; and that consequently the Son, if He be actually in 
 relation to will and intelligence of a truly divine nature, may 
 also be of one substance with the Father. The task then be- 
 comes to establish the distinction between the Father and the 
 Son in another way; for this distinction could not be estab- 
 lished without subordinatian and modalistic vacillations, so long 
 as the Father was identified with the ungenerated divine essence, 
 instead of ime same essence being attributed to the Son equally 
 with the Father. If we take for granted at the very outset 
 that the true distinction cannot be established unless we sup- 
 pose that the Father, for the sake of knowing Himself, objecti- 
 fied His knowledge and will eternally in the Son, we find 
 Origen far removed therefrom; for he believed the Father to 
 know Himself in Himself, and not in the Son, His image. 
 Still we may say,—Origen also represents the Father as be- 
 coming objective, and, as issuing forth out of the inner depths 
 of His being, in the Son, who is His évépyeva; but He did not 
 contemplate Himself in the Son as in the mirror of Himself, 
 but merely an imperfect image, not equal to the one only 
 
 archetype, Himself. 
 
 Norte 26, page 153. 
 
 Baur has rightly directed attention to the fact, that Mar- 
 cionitism (which even during the fifth century, to judge from 
 Theodoret’s letters, had many adherents in the East, and, ac- 
 cording to the above exposition, was intimately allied with 
 Patripassianism) subsequently passed over into Manicheism. 
 The occasion thereof was the rigid antagonism posited between 
 Law and Gospel. But Sabellianism also offered a point of con- 
 nection for this antagonism, in that it represented the earlier 
 revelations as disappearing when a new one was given; for 
 example, the law disappeared when Christ came. Athanasius 
 also (c. Ar. 4, 23) charges it with dividing the Testaments 
 (Siatpety tas SiabijKas, Kal yu) rHv éxépay Tis Erépas &yvecOar— 
 Maviyaiov—ro éritiSevpa). Manicheism proper, which arose 
 about the year 260, like Patripassianism, subjected the divine 
 in the world to physical suffering, to wit, through matter; and 
 
NOTES. 467 
 
 its doctrine of the “Jesus patibilis omni suspensus ex ligno” 
 (see August. c. Faust. 20, 2; compare Baur’s “Das mani- 
 cheische Religionssystem,” pp. 71 ff.) may be regarded as a 
 cosmological extension, though also a dissipation, of Patri- 
 passianism with its more soteriological character. Only in 
 one aspect, it is true; for though both alike attribute suf- 
 fering in the physical sense to God, Patripassianism repre- 
 sents Him as subjecting Himself thereto by assuming an ex- 
 ternal, visible shape; whereas Manicheism teaches that the 
 sufferings of the pure lucific principle arise from an antagon- 
 istic primal dark principle. We shall find afterwards that 
 Sabellianism was finally driven to Dualism, and that, with its 
 rigid conception of God, it was unable to allow even of a 
 creation, and was compelled to fall back on an eternal iAn; but 
 the presages of this course of things are discernible even in the 
 earlier forms of this tendency. For, so far as the one God 
 converts Himself into corporeality, as they in part teach, not- 
 withstanding that they retain their Monism, and only their 
 conception of the one God comprises contradictory elements, 
 the reality of the incarnation and of the birth from Mary was 
 threatened. Now, when the adherents of this system, with a 
 view to escaping the danger of Docetism, represented God as 
 assuming from without that which constituted Him passible, to 
 wit, His body, we have an entrance of God into passible matter, 
 similar to that which Manicheism sets forth in its “ Jesus 
 patibilis,” or its duvayuss taOntixy). The more, then, all obscura- 
 tion and darkness are removed outside of the pure divine 
 essence, that is, the more the pure divine essence is fixed in 
 its immutability, the more, as we shall see, does the Sabellian 
 system become affected by Dualism, until at last it is unable 
 to allow the one Divine Being to be even the cause of the 
 world, and is therefore necessitated to represent the world as 
 having its principle in itself, and as a second primal principle 
 standing over against the first. Clearly, however, Sabellianism 
 contained this Dualism merely in the form of a consequence, of 
 which its adherents were partially unconscious, whereas it was 
 the constitutive principle of Manicheism. Sabellianism differs 
 essentially, not only from Manichzeism, but also from the milder 
 Platonic form of Dualism, in that it scarcely occupied itself at 
 all with the question of the creation of the world, and limited 
 
468 APPENDIX. 
 
 its inquiries entirely to the already existing world; the other 
 two systems were decidedly cosmogonical. The same remark 
 may be made also of the Sabellianism of Schleiermacher. This 
 is not the place to give a more detailed account of the Manicheean 
 Christology.. Compare Baur, who says (I. ¢. p. 407),—“ The 
 Christ of Manichzism has nothing but the name in common 
 with the Christ of Christianity.” It is an expression cata- 
 chrestically, traditionally adopted. The Manichzan Christ is 
 the universal lucific Spirit, enthroned in the sun and moon, the 
 pure efflux of God, represented perhaps as the pure archetypal 
 man, between whom, however, and their “ Jesus patibilis,” or 
 the seed of light enchained and suffering in every plant, etc., 
 there is a clear difference. The latter is bound and com- 
 mingled with matter (Sdvapus maOntixy). For whereas the 
 second divine Stvapus, the Snusoupyixn, the world-forming dvva- 
 pus, is only able to set limits to the dominion of matter by 
 bringing the world into order, but was unable to rescue the 
 light-germs confined in it; a third power, Christ, the form 
 which is enthroned on the sun, draws all related elements out 
 of matter upwards to the light of the sun. Baur. |. c. pp. 205, 
 991. This Christ, therefore, cannot be born; for birth would 
 bring with it the loss of the purity which gives Him redeeming 
 power. In general, that physical and cosmical process of re- 
 demption is by no means connected with the person of the 
 historical Christ, although the Manichzans frequently use Him 
 as an allegory of the Christ on the sun, to wit, so far as the 
 inmost essence of Jesus, which came to light at His transfigura- 
 tion on the mount, like the essence of every “ Electus,” may 
 undoubtedly be designated pure and divine. But quite as 
 truly, and even more fully, is the historical Christ a mere 
 allegory of the “ Jesus patibilis,’ who himself needs redemption 
 in his sufferings. On the Christology of the Priscillianists, 
 who diffused Manicheeism in the East from the fourth century 
 onwards, compare Liibkert’s “ de Heresi Priscillianistarum,” 
 1840, pp. 25-29. Similar phenomena manifest themselves in 
 connection with the Bogomils (compare Gieseler’s “de Bogo- 
 milis Comment.”) and the Cathari. According to Augustine 
 (ad Oros. c. Priscill. et Orig. C. 4, T. x. 735, ed. Maur. 2 a.), 
 the Priscillianists were Sabellian in their doctrine of the Trinity. 
 It is also allowed that the Sabellians made use of the Gospel of 
 
NOTES. 469 
 
 the Egyptians, which contains dualistic elements. Augustine 
 says (1. c.),—* Priscillianus Sabellianum antiquum dogma resti- 
 tuit, ubi ipse pater, qui Filius, qui et Spiritus S. perhibetur.” 
 Similarly Orosius, Leo the Great, and others. Leo’s terming 
 them, besides, Patripassians, is plainly explicable from the 
 character of their Christology. But when he entitles them 
 also Arians, he is certainly chargeable with inaccuracy, especi- 
 ally in view of the position—“ Christum innascibilem esse,” 
 which probably related to His divine nature, which it was thus 
 intended to put on a level with the Father (Conc. Tolet. Reg. 
 fid. Anath. 6); though, as Liibkert justly observes (p. 25), it 
 may undoubtedly be explained from the Emanatism which, ac- 
 cording to the same Council, the Priscillianists combined with 
 their Monarchianism, as did also the Arians. ‘ Credimus,’ 
 says the Council (Anath. 14), “Trinitatem indivisibilem indif- 
 ferentem ; preeter hanc nullam credimus divinam esse naturam.” 
 The Priscillianists are charged with entertaining the opinion, 
 “esse aliquid, quod se extra divinam ‘Trinitatem possit ex- 
 tendere.” It is not likely, however, that they represented these 
 emanations as concrescing into definite hypostases. A canon 
 of the Synod. Bracarensis says,—“ Si quis extra sanctam ‘Trini- 
 tatem alia nescio qua divinitatis nomina introducit dicens quo? 
 in ipsa divinitate sit Trinitas Trinitatis, sicut Gnostici et Pris- 
 cilliani dixerunt, anathema sit.” How it was possible for Sabel- 
 lians to arrive at propositions concerning a double or triple 
 Trinity of this nature, which had been already laid down by 
 Neo-Platonists, for an explanation see Note 31. As the Pris- 
 cillianists looked upon the body as the seat and work of the 
 devil, they could not attribute an earthly body to Christ; hence 
 the charge of Docetism brought against them by Leo. Ac- 
 cording to the Conc. Tol. Anath. 6, they denied also the hu- 
 man soul of Christ. Had they remained simply content with 
 denying to Christ both human body and human soul, they 
 would not have deserved even the title of heretics, for they 
 would have cast aside the fundamental idea and fundamental 
 fact of Christianity. (See Note U, vol. i., on the true con- 
 ception of Heresy.) With this, however, it does not harmonize 
 to say that they maintained “Deitatis et carnis unam esse in 
 Christo naturam” (1. c. Anath. 13). These words, namely, im- 
 ply, that they assumed the existence of something analogous to 
 
470 APPENDIX. 
 
 matter in the divine nature itself, of which they took a physical 
 view. In harmony therewith is also the further charge of 
 teaching “ Deitatem Christi convertibilem esse et passibilem ” 
 (1. c. Anath. 7), which, with their Monarchianism, caused them 
 to be blamed for Patripassianism. This admission of finitude 
 into the nature of God, indicates undoubtedly that the original 
 Dualism had begun to be conciliated and weakened down ; but 
 even the old Manicheism had done the same with its “ Jesus 
 patibilis.” For this reason I consider unsatisfactory the view to 
 which Liibkert inclines (Il. c. pp. 27, 28), plainly through not 
 paying sufficient attention to the many appearances which speak 
 of a tpo7m7 of God, or of an origin of the body of Christ from 
 the essence of God,—to wit, that this conversion was not ob- 
 jective, but merely subjective, symbolical or Docetical; the effect 
 of which would be, contrary to his own intention (p. 28), to 
 reduce the entire historical appearance of Christ to a mere 
 illusion. There is the more reason for accepting this supposi- 
 tion, as, according to Leo, they taught the birth of Christ from 
 the Virgin; not, indeed, as Neander rightly remarks, in the 
 sense of the doctrine of the Church, but still in the sense that 
 He passed through Mary with the glorious body which He 
 brought with Him from above, and which He derived from 
 God. They may indeed have supposed that this heavenly or 
 divine body appeared to be sensuous to the sensuous, to the 
 spiritual, spiritual, according to their different power of appre- 
 hension; but still a real and objective union of God with the 
 “caro” took place. How far they admitted suffering also into 
 this divine “caro,” is difficult to say; at all events, it contains 
 the element of finitude. As they denied the resurrection of 
 Christ, they must have denied either the susceptibility of His 
 body to injury, or the continuance of His corporeality. Against 
 the latter alternative is the objection, that they can scarcely 
 have been willing to give up a body derived from the divine 
 nature to the kingdom of earthly matter. But in that case, 
 Christ’s body, which is supposed not to have needed resurrec- 
 tion, cannot have experienced injury and death; in the place 
 of the resurrection must be substituted the ascension; and, ac- 
 cordingly, His sufferings must undoubtedly be deemed Doce- 
 tical. 
 
- NOTES. 471 
 
 Note 27, page 158. 
 
 Decidedly favourable thereto is Athan. c. Ar. 4, 25 (see 
 Note 1, page 153). Contrary thereto appears to be the pas- 
 sage 4, 13, where we read,—Ei tolvuyy 1) wovas wratuvOcica 
 yéyove TpLas, y Sé wovas eoTLv oO TaTHpP, Tplas Sé TaTip, vids, 
 dywov mvetua: mpatov pev, TAaTUVOEica 4 movas Tabs wrré- 
 pewve, Kal yéyovey Orrep oOvK Hv,—to Wit, cHua—errAaTUVON yap 
 ovK ovca TAaTeia. “HEretta, e+ avty 1 povas ératuvOn eis 
 Tptdda,—o avTos apa TaTnp yéyove Kal vos Kal TVEDMa KaTA 
 SaBerriov: exrds ef pur) 1) Neyowévyn trap av’T@ pwovds ado Ti éote 
 Tapa Tov matépa. Ovx ére ody TAaTUVETVaL (sc. avTOV) det 
 Aéyerw (al. Adyov) GAN % povas Tpidyv TromTiKH, HoTE Eivas 
 povdea, eita Kal Tatépa Kal viov Kal mvedua. But even it does 
 not prove, either that Sabellius consistently carried out the dis- 
 tinction between the Monas and the Father, or that he gave 
 distinct utterance to it (for otherwise Athanasius could not 
 have spoken so doubtfully regarding it); the utmost it proves 
 is, that Sabellius sometimes verged towards the distinction 
 (compare Neander’s “Church History,” ed. 2, vol. 11. pp. 1024 
 f., German Ed.). Baur, on the other hand, following the 
 example of Schleiermacher, is of opinion, that Sabellius dis- 
 tinguished the Monas very clearly from the Father. Sabellius’s 
 designating the one God viordtwp, Son-Father (Greg. Nyss. 
 Or. c. Ar. et Sabell. in A. Mai Coll. Nov. T. 8, Appendix p. 1), 
 does not decide the matter; for we do not know whether to 
 translate,-—“ The Monas became viordtwp, that is, both Father 
 and Son ;” or, “The Father as unity becomes also Son.” The 
 prefixing of vids seems to be opposed to the former translation ; 
 whereas it is very intelligible if we adopt the latter. This also 
 was the view taken of the matter by Gregory of Nyssa. 
 
 Nore 28, page 158. 
 
 The words of Hilarius in his “de Trin.” 7, 39,—“ut in 
 assumto homine se filium Dei nuncupet, in natura vero patrem,” 
 etc. might be taken to imply, that as Sabellius designated God 
 in the incarnation Son, so he designated God in nature Father. 
 But “in natura” may also signify “by nature ;” for this notice 
 is too isolated, and is too little accredited by Greek Fathers, te 
 permit us to build any argument upon it. Even Athanasius 
 
472 APPENDIX. 
 
 did not know in what relation the 7Aatucpol stood to the crea- 
 tion. C. Ar. 4, 14. If, says he, the self-expansion of God 
 did not exist from the very beginning, He must have had a 
 reason for passing over into expansion. What was this reason? 
 After inquiring whether this reason could be that the Father 
 might acquire a Son, or that the incarnation might take place, 
 he says,—ei 5é dua 76 xtlcas éraTUvOn, atoTrov. For the Monas 
 cannot have become powerful in consequence of the expansion, 
 but must have been powerful already in itself. Moreover, on 
 that supposition the world would cease to exist when the 7Aa- 
 rucjos was withdrawn. Athanasius quotes elsewhere expres- 
 sions of Sabellius verbatim (for example, 4, 25). And yet 
 even he was unable to say whether or no Sabellius conceived 
 creation to be one of the purposes of the expansions of God. 
 Against this supposition may be pleaded, too, that he represented 
 God as arriving at a new revelation only after withdrawing from 
 the earlier: this may be carried out to a certain extent in the 
 relation between legislation and Christ, and between Christ and 
 the Holy Ghost; that is, if the significance of Christ is con- 
 ditioned solely by sin. But how can Sabellius have supposed 
 that the creation would cease, if the revelation begins with the 
 
 incarnation? (Compare pp. 160 f.) 
 
 Nore 29, page 159. 
 
 Athan. c. Ar. 4, 25:—To the Sabellians the Father must 
 be both Logos and Spirit, in that, mpos tv ypelav éxdorou 
 dppofomevos, to the one He is Father, to the other Logos (that 
 is, Son), and so forth. ’Avayxn 5é cal mavOncecbar TO dvopa 
 Tov viov Kal Tov mvevpmaTos, THS xpEelas TANPwOEicns. Basil. 
 Ep. 210,—Tov airov Ocov &va TO UTroKenpév bvTA TpOs TAS EKa- 
 OTOTE TapaTITTOVGAS YpElas WEeTAMOpPOU[EVOY VUV eV WS TATEpA, 
 vov S€ ws vIOV, VOY WS TO ayLov mrvedua SiadéyerOas (a passage 
 without doubt quoted verbatim). Ep. 214,—"Eva pév eiva, rH 
 iToctace. Tov Oeov, mpocwromoseicOar Sé WTO THS ypadhs Sia- 
 popws, Kata TO ilwpa THs UTroKEwévns ExdotoTE yYpelas, Kal viv 
 EY TAS TaTpiKas éavT@ TrepiTOévar dwvas, bray TovTOU KaLpos 
 9 TOU Tpocw7Tov, voy Sé€ Tas vim TMpeTOovVaas viv Sé TO TOU 
 TvEevpatos viTodverOat mpocwreiov. Ep. 235,—Thv adrny 
 iToctacw Tpos THY ExdoTOTE TapeuTinTovcay ypelay peTa- 
 oynuativecOar. August. Tract. in Joann. 53,—“ Pro diversi- 
 
NOTES. 473 
 
 tate causarum ipsum dici Filium, ipsura dici Spiritum Sanctum.” 
 Of the Son, in particular, Epiph. Heer. 62, 1;—ITeudh0évta tov 
 rN lal (4 > a \ 
 
 VLOY KALP@ TOTE, WOTTED AKTIWA, Kal Epyacduevoy Ta TavTa ev 
 A A a > f a > aA an 
 TO KOTMW TA THS OLKOVOMLAS THS EevayyEhKs Kal cwTNplas TOV 
 > , ) / de 50 > 5) A ¢ eee NY TR 
 avOparrav, avarnplerta dé avis eis ovpavov, ws td Alou 
 
 TeupGeioav axtiva, Kal TAL Eis TOV HALOV avadpamovcar. 
 
 Nore 30, page 160. 
 Whether the speaking of God, through which the world 
 
 was brought into existence and still exists, is conceived as an 
 actual creation, and the trinitarian self-evolution of Ged as there- 
 fore taking place on the basis of a world distinct from God; or 
 whether God Himself is the plurality which attaches to His 
 works (for Athanasius repeatedly asserts that God Himself ¢s, 
 that to which He expands Himself); or whether the creation 
 also was represented as a self-evolution of the Monas (a view 
 which Athanasius frequently attempts to fasten upon him; see 
 ce. Ar. 4, c. 11-14), is not quite clear. As he certainly held the 
 trinitarian revelation to be a self-continuation of the speaking 
 Monas or Logos—which is very clearly evident in connection, 
 at all events, with the incarnation; and as the standing desig- 
 nation of the incarnation is self-evolution; we might refer the 
 same expression to the creation also. The views of Sabellius 
 would thus acquire a certain unity, in that all the relations of 
 God to the world would be classed under the one type of self- 
 expansion. It is possible, however, that Sabellius may have 
 shrunk from the pantheistic consequences contained in the 
 term “self-expansion,” have limited it to the sphere of spirit, 
 and have conceived it as a gradually intensitied informing, by 
 God, of a world which already existed in distinction from Him- 
 self. And, indeed, this charge of Pantheism was not brought 
 against him; a circumstance which ought to be noted. The 
 charge of Dualism lay much nearer. For he represents the 
 impulse to the divine movements within the world, as arising 
 solely from that which for God already had existence; and 
 conceived that God needed a given material, an eternal An, 
 for His work of creation. His view may have resembled 
 that of Hermogenes. (Compare Leopold’s “ Hermogenis de 
 origine mundi sententia,” 1844, pp. 8-22; especially note 9.) 
 Dionysius of Alexandria also demonstrated the impossibility of 
 
474 APPENDIX. 
 
 an eternal #Am, in opposition to Sabellius (Kuseb. Preep. Evang. 
 7,19). Further, if Sabellius had held that God Himself be- 
 came the world, he could not have retained the unity of God, 
 which it was his purpose to retain; the distinctions would then 
 have existed in the divine life itself, and not have first owed 
 their rise to the world. Creation, redemption, and sanctifica- 
 tion would then be three momenta or stadia of the development 
 of His life: and Sabellius would thus have given up the efforts 
 he had been making to combine the objectivity of revelation 
 with the unity of God and the indivisibility of His essence. 
 Instead of saying,—For the sake of the ‘dua, of the peculiarity 
 of the need of the world, He purposed to assume the mode 
 of existence of the Son,-although it stood in no essential and 
 necessary relation to His own inner being; he was now com- 
 pelled to say,—The vital evolution of God took the course of 
 evolving itself into a world, and so forth. And if, in the view 
 of Sabellius, it was essential to the idea of God, that He should 
 be not merely a silent, but also a creative or a world-forming 
 God, even so essential must also have been the other revela- 
 tions. The correct view to take of the matter is, probably, that 
 Sabellius accepted and presupposed the doctrine of the Logos 
 traditionally ; though neither in the strictly hypostatical form 
 given it by Origen, nor in the sense that the world is clearly 
 and purely distinguished from the Logos. But just as some 
 of the older writers,—for example, several of the Apologists, 
 Clemens Alex. and Tertullian,—held that the world was imme- 
 diately contained in God, and conceived the distinction between 
 the Logos and God as He is in Himself to have been first fully 
 accomplished at the creation of the world, without therefore 
 intending to be pantheistic ; so may it have been with Sabellius, 
 with the difference, that inasmuch as he assumed an eternal 
 drm, he identified merely the idea or the forms of the real world - 
 with the Logos, and more distinctly than Clemens let fall the 
 hypostasis of the Logos :—indeed, strictly viewed, to represent 
 the world as immediately contained in the Logos, is to exclude 
 His hypostasis. It is also deserving of remark, that in com- 
 bating (c. Ar. 4, 11) the Sabellian dcetrine of the Logos, 
 Athanasius really combated all those older teachers of the 
 Church who conceded to the Logos, prior to the creation of the 
 world, at the utmost a latent and inactive existence in God 
 
NOTES. 475. 
 
 (compare Note 1, page 154), and au actual existence merely 
 subsequently to the creation. 
 
 Norte 31, page 161. 
 
 The Fathers of the Church adduce no evidence to show 
 that he believed that the world would one day perish. It is in 
 itself improbable that he held such an opinion, and is very 
 likely a mere conclusion drawn from the transitoriness of the 
 members of the Sabellian Trinity. It would undoubtedly be 
 correct if the Father, as the first member of the Trinity, were 
 the Creator. In that case, however, creation must have disap- 
 peared with the appearance of the Son in the incarnation, even 
 as the law also was then done away with; which may again be 
 an indication, that Sabellius did not attribute creation to the 
 first member of the Trinity. As concerns the Spirit, Sabellius 
 neither demonstrated nor proclaimed a new revelation after 
 Him; nay more, he did not even teach that He would some 
 time cease to confer His gifts: indeed, this would have been 
 far from harmonizing with the continuance of the world, which 
 he undoubtedly assumed. Nor did he maintain that the mpo- 
 cw7ov of the Spirit would cease to exist, unless we accept the 
 words of Gregory, quoted in Note 32, as true. He might, 
 accordingly, have held that history terminates with the age of 
 the Spirit. If he held that God began to create as the speaking 
 God, we might suppose that creation would attain its perfection 
 in the age of the Spirit (Athan. c. Ar. 4, 1l,—ow7av pev 
 [Qeds] ove HddvaTo Tovey, Maddy dé KTiew HpEaTo). The 
 intervening sin would then be set aside by the revelation in the 
 law and the incarnation (Aerota&ia; see the passage from 
 Gregory of Nyssa, quoted on page 712); humanity would be 
 led back to the beginning, to the rd&s in the Holy Ghost, in 
 a higher way; thus the Holy Spirit would have brought in a 
 new and permanent element. It is more probable, however, 
 that he believed the Holy Ghost to lead men back merely to a 
 perfection which they had at the beginning. At all events, 
 Epiphanius says,—The Holy Ghost is sent into the world te 
 every one who is counted worthy of receiving again life and 
 warmth (avafmyoveiv 5é tov TotodTov Kal avatéew) ; with which 
 agrees also the passage above quoted from Gregory of Nyssa. 
 Accordingly, he was able to represent the mpdcwzrov of the 
 
A76 APPENDIX. 
 
 Holy Spirit, so far as it was directed against sin, as ceasing to 
 exist, whereas the positive element in His gifts remains, <o wit, 
 the life in God, which is represented as the life in Paradise. 
 The period of perfection would then no longer stand under the 
 special apdcw7rov of the Holy Spirit, but would be the return 
 to the undivided life in God, without its being necessary that 
 the world, or even the gifts of the individual revelations, should 
 cease to exist; the work of the Holy Spirit would then be to 
 lead back out of division, and out of the individual revelations, 
 to the undivided God. Man is then again what he was, and 
 God also is again what He was (compare Athan. c. Ar. 4, 12, 
 22, 25), prior to the entrance of sin, and to the Trinity, which 
 it had rendered necessary. 
 
 Note 32, page 162. 
 
 In relation to the Father, notice is further deserved’ by the 
 following passage from the Expos. Fidei, which may indeed have 
 been in great measure wrongly attributed to Gregory Thauma- 
 turgus, but still does not need to be placed below the fourth cen- 
 tury (compare Neander 2, 1243). It was first edited in Greek 
 by A. Mai (Nov. Coll. 7, 170 ff.). After saying that Sabellius 
 refused to allow that the three persons were real, and rather 
 introduced an avuTdctatovy mpocwmov, that is, masks instead 
 of hypostases, he goes on to say,— damodetryopev Tov }aBEdXwov 
 EyovTa Tov avTov TaTépa, TOV avTOY Viov" TaTépa meV yap Aéeyet 
 civat TOV NadovvTA, vidv 5é TOV AOyor ev TS TaTpi pévovTA Kal 
 KaTa KaLpov THS Snpoupylas hawopmevov' ErrerTa peTa THY aTraV- 
 TOV TANPwoW THY TpayyaTav eis Ody avatpéxovTa TO avTo 
 dé Kai Tepl TOD Tvevpatos Aéyet. This hitherto unnoticed pas- 
 sage is plainly very favourable to Neander’s view of the rela- 
 tion between Monas and Father. For the Monas, as speaking, 
 is decidedly designated Father. Now, this is not merely more 
 closely in accordance with the mode of thought common at that 
 time, which regarded the Father as the supreme Unity, as the 
 speaker in relation to the spoken Logos, as the Father in rela- 
 tion to the Son; but it furnishes also an explanation of the 
 circumstance, that many of the Church teachers represent 
 Sabellius as holding the Father and the Monas to be one. 
 According to this passage, the silent God would be the Monas 
 in itself; the speaking God, or the speaking Monas, would be 
 
ROTES. 477 
 
 the Father; the spoken word (naturally conceived to be imper-. 
 sonal), or the discourse of God, would, as thought, be primarily 
 in God, manifesting itself, however, in its effects in the creation 
 of the world: it might also figuratively be termed Son; indeed, 
 we find even Celsus giving this name to the world. From 
 this we see that Sabellius did not regard the already created 
 world as the first basis and occasion of the Trinity; but, though 
 he described Father and Son as one hypostasis, considered them 
 to be two eternal and essential aspects of the divine nature, to 
 which the Spirit was added as a third. There thus remained a 
 place for the historical Trinity, which Sabellius is well known 
 to have taught, and on which doubt cannot be cast, though the 
 passage in question gives but a superficial and imperfect hint 
 of it. If, namely, the speaking God be the Father, and that 
 which He speaks (that to which, according to another image, the 
 Monas expands Himself) be the Logos, or figuratively the Son, 
 this relation might be conceived as recurring twice (or more 
 frequently); first, in the external creation, and then in the 
 spiritual world. As the Father, indeed, thinks in Himself, 
 though first through the spoken word, the dawdépevos déyos, 
 the creation of the world, is a reality (the Snusoupyla); so also 
 in the domain of spirit the ideal exists, it is true, in the law,. 
 but God is therein merely as speaking, and that in such a. 
 manner, that the spoken word of the law still yearns after or 
 proclaims the reality, is consequently conceived as Father; 
 whereas the law acquires reality in the incarnation, first in 
 Christ, and then through the Holy Spirit in the Church. The 
 God-man is the spoken God, or God in the form of actuality. 
 It would then be the Holy Ghost who raises the first creation 
 to the rank of the second, by means of the tendency towards 
 God which dwelt in it from the beginning; which tendency in 
 the first creation might be termed the work of the Holy Spirit. 
 So far, then, we should have to maintain that it is essential to 
 God to be, (1) not merely silent, but also to speak; (2) not 
 merely an idea, but also an objectifying real principle; (3) the 
 One who leads back the objectivity into Himself: we should 
 have three principles in God, which, though relating essentially 
 
 1 “Wie der Vater zwar in sich denkt, aber erst durch das gesprochene 
 
 Wort, den Qarvéuevos rdyos, die Weltschépfung dasteht (die dnzsovpyia), so 
 ist auch auf dem geistigen Gebiete, ete.” 
 
478 APPENDIX. 
 
 to the world of revelation, are objectively distinct and eternal— 
 principles which were gradually set forth in history, an eternal 
 Trinity of revelation, as some recent writers have termed it. 
 But as this passage is not particularly marked by accuracy, 
 and stands very isolated, much stress cannot be laid on it. The 
 sense may also be,—Sabellius reduces our Father, who begets 
 the Son, to the merely speaking God, and out of our Son he 
 makes a thought or a word. But still it is remarkable, that 
 here the distinction between Father and Son is reduced back 
 altogether, and consequently also for the entire revelation, to 
 that between the God who speaks and that which He speaks ; 
 which, be it remarked, must not be confounded with the dis- 
 tinction between the silent and the speaking God; for the latter 
 Dyad is the necessary presupposition to every species of Sabel- 
 lian Trias. (Compare Neander’s “Church History ” in loc.} 
 
 Nore 33, page 167. 
 
 Athanasius also saw clearly (1. c. c. 21) that Sabellianism 
 could not permanently occupy the point of view at which it then 
 stood. He argues against it as follows,—If the man Jesus by 
 Himself cannot be designated Son and Only-begotten One, but, 
 as they urge, both united, the Logos and the man ; the question 
 arises——Which of the two is the cause of the other, and consti- 
 tuted Him Son? Did the man constitute the Logos Son? If 
 so, the man would be the Only-begotten One, the Creator, the 
 Redeemer; for all these things are attributed to the Son in the 
 Scriptures, identifying Him as they do with the Logos (cf. ¢. 
 20), and we should be baptized into the name of aman. But 
 if the man Jesus is called Son because of the Logos, the Logos 
 must have been Son apart from the incarnation, as the Church 
 maintains. And because He was the true Son, He was able to 
 make other sons (c. 22). If, finally, we say that the Son be- 
 came Son neither through the one nor through the other sepa- 
 rately, but through the union of the two, we must assume a 
 cause of the union of these two; this cause was above and prior 
 to both ; consequently the principle of Sonship must have pre- 
 ceded, and this precedent cause ought to be termed Son. Hence, 
 in whatever aspect we consider the matter, Sabellius had no 
 alternative but either to go over to the doctrine of the Church, 
 or to allow a false predominance to the human aspect. He 
 
NOTES. 479 
 
 himself also failed not to see that, in such acase, the Son would 
 be derived from the world, that consistency would require His 
 being conceived ebionitically, and that He could not redeem 
 
 the world (c. 20). 
 Norte 34, page 167. 
 
 We have already conceded above, that Sabellius, strictly 
 speaking, believed the entire God to be present in the revelation 
 of Christ, under a particular mode of existence. But although 
 this revelation of the Son may be something objective and new 
 in relation to the previous and to the succeeding revelation, that 
 which characterizes it is not, in the strict sense, the entire God, 
 but merely a momentum in Him, which He set forth specially 
 to view for the sake of men; andthe means for leading souls to 
 the Monas in His entirety. A part of God therefore remains out- 
 side of Christ, be it the resting, or even the active Monas. In- 
 deed, the creative and sustaining activity of God existed outside 
 of the revelation in the law, as Sabellius will not have denied. 
 Nowhere do we find him representing the entire Monas (totam 
 totaliter) as absorbed in a single revelation; indeed, to have 
 done so, would have necessitated a denial of objective distinc- 
 tion to the revelations. He must then have made all progress 
 purely subjective, and therefore have regarded the history of re- 
 ligion merely as the progressive knowledge of God who, in Him- 
 self, remains ever the same and unmoved, and not as a course 
 of divine deeds, which, though without the inherent significance 
 involved in having their end in themselves, were still necessary 
 as the means whereby that knowledge should be conducted to 
 its eternal goal. But as he does not do so, and on the contrary 
 (not very consistently, it must be allowed) believes God Himself, 
 the movements of the divine life, to be in that which he repre- 
 sents as mere means, we are compelled to conclude, that he con- 
 ceived the differences in the revelations to arise from the entire 
 God not being present in each one of them. Sabellianism, 
 therefore, was necessarily driven on to say, that in each of the 
 three revelations, merely some portion of God was manifested. 
 This now is the point from which Sabellianism, if it refused to 
 accept the Nicene doctrine of simultaneous distinctions in God, 
 might pass over to the notion of the gradual emanation of 
 powers out of God—a notion which must have commended 
 
480 APPENDIX. 
 
 ‘itself, specially on account of the Person of Christ, in which 
 was contained a constant and fixed circumscription of a portion 
 of the divine essence. At the same time, even as Tertullian 
 he'd that the entire sun meets the eye in a single ray, so might 
 Sabellius have conceived the entire God to be present in the 
 ray which was in Christ. The idea of emanation was not strange 
 to Sabellianism, but it manifests itself frequently in the History 
 of Dogmas, as the middle link between Sabellianism and Arian- 
 ism or Ebionism. So, for example, in the fourth and the six- 
 teenth centuries. For this reason, it was not unjust to direct 
 attention to the danger of a false separation from, and a false 
 division of God, to which Sabellius was exposed. Not to men- 
 tion Athanasius (I. ¢. c. 12, cll. Expos. Fid. init.), who remarks 
 concerning the position assigned by Sabellius to the Logos, rela- 
 tively to the Monas,—that if the Logos was in God prior to 
 His generation, He must be outside of God, that is, a mundane 
 being, subsequently thereto ; the Arians, in particular, fre- 
 quently drew attention thereto. See Theodoret. H. EH. 1. 3, 
 T. ii, P. 2, p. 743, ed. Schulze :—Kat eis eva viov Oeod povoyevij 
 —vevunbévta ob Kata Tas TOV THMLAT@V OMOLOTNTAS, Tals Tomais, 
 4 rails ex Siaipécewv atroppolais, aoTep YaBearriw cal Barer 
 tiv Soxe?. Compare also Note 1, page 156, and Note 38 in 
 the Appendix. 
 
 Note 35, page 173. 
 
 Later ages appear to have added new portions to the work 
 § xatd wépos riots, as often as circumstances appeared to ther 
 to require it (in the Greek in A. Mai Coll. Nov. 7, 170-176). 
 Whether any portion is genuine or not, is hard to make out. 
 Individual parts—as, for example, those which betray antagonism 
 to Paul of Samosata, to patripassian and Sabellian principles— 
 might be genuine, but Gregory's doctrine cannot with certainty 
 be deduced from these fragments. Otherwise we should have, 
 at the very commencement (I. c. p. 170), express proof that, like 
 Origen, in whose writings also the terms KTigpa, Tolnert OCCUL, 
 ne held the doctrine of eternal generation. There is some re- 
 semblance between the commencement and what we read of 
 Theognostus in Athan. de decr. Nic. 25. The discourse for the. 
 Feast of Epiphany is spurious (ed. Paris, pp. 30-37) ; besides: 
 also the 12 Keddava rept wlatews. The Ep. Canonica and 
 
NOTES. 481 
 
 the Metaphr. ad Eccles. are genuine, but contain nothing Chris- 
 tological. On the other hand, however, A. Mai (Spicil. Rom. 
 3, 696-698) has published a fragment of Gregory’s from an 
 Arabian Codex in the Vatican Library, which is remarkable, 
 because it designates the divine persons “nomina.” Different 
 beings bear different names, even when they have the same sub- 
 stance and belong to the same class of natures: so is it with 
 Father, Son, and Spirit. These names, it is true, are not some- 
 thing superadded,as in the case of men, but realities (subsis- 
 tentiz). Even in the case of men, however, the distinction 
 arises not from the humanity, but from the name ; for example, 
 Adam, Abraham, and so forth, are names. “Sed divine per- 
 son sunt quidem nomina, nomina tamen sunt persone.” The 
 persons first designate that which is, and subsists; and that is 
 the “essentia Dei.” According to this, he would appear to have 
 conceived the divine essence to have first become a reality, in 
 the three ““nomina;” even as man first becomes a concrete man, 
 when he receives his name. ‘This does not necessarily contain 
 a Sabellian element ; for, on the contrary, he says afterwards,— 
 The Logos is neither a merely cogitated word (xar’ &vo.av), 
 nor merely a word spoken by God (like the Adyos rpodopexds, 
 which was spoken to the prophets), nor merely an apO@pcxds, an 
 articulate human word, but “substantiale Verbum, etc.” Still, 
 if the fragment is genuine, the designation of the person of the 
 Logos by the totally unusual term “nomen” may have given 
 rise to the appearance of Sabellianism, of which Basilius (1. c.) 
 speaks. Much more probable, however, is the following. <Ac- 
 cording to the letter of Basilius, the new Sabellians appealed in 
 Neo-Cesarea to the words of the baptismal formula, “in this,” 
 urging that they denote that we ought to read, “ baptize unto 
 the name,” not “ unto the names.” Consequently, it is one per- 
 son unto whom we are baptized. JBasilius, therefore, endeavours 
 to show that baptism unto three names is required; and uses in 
 this connection the unusual designation “three names” for the 
 “three persons.’ As those Sabellians appealed to the &@ects 
 miatews of Gregory Thaumaturgus, which for the rest appears 
 to have been a disputation, and therefore certainly comprised 
 passages which sounded rather Sabellian than Arian ; and this 
 may have been the occasion of ascribing the above fragments 
 which treat of the names to Gregory, with the idea of securing 
 VOL. II. 21 
 
482 APPENDIX. 
 
 him as a witness against the Sabellian view of the baptismal 
 formula. On the various Confessions of Faith which were at- 
 tributed to Gregory, the “Ex0eous miotews Kara aTroKdnuypu 
 (translated already by Rufinus), the “ Confessio Fidei ad Adlia- 
 num” (Basil. Ep. 210), and the longer one, the Greek text of 
 which is contained in A. Mai Coll. Nov. 7, 170-176, compare 
 Hahn’s “ Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der apo- 
 stolischen Kirche,” 1842. With Walch, Hahn regards the first 
 as genuine, with the exception of the conclusion, which may be 
 suspected to be an anti-Arian addition; although even Origen 
 in his day had to do with such antagonists. It runs as follows :— 
 Eis Ocds rwrarnp Noyou Cavtos copias ihestoons Kai Svvapews Kal 
 yapaxThpos aidiov, TédeLos TEAELOU yevUNnTwp TaTHpP Viod povorye- 
 vods. Els xipsos ovos éx provov, Oeos &x Ocod, NAPAKTHP Kab 
 cixav Ths OcdTNTOS, NOyos evepyos, Topla Ths TOV Ow TUTTATEDWS 
 TEPLEKTLKN KAL SUAS THS OANs KTLTEWS Toutikn vios adnOwos 
 > a \ Suh > ff Ninoy, > / \ 
 adnOwod rarpos, dopatos aoparou, Kat apGaptos ad@aptou, Kat 
 > tr b v4 \ > Sf. 9eQ/ NU a ee > 
 dOdvatos aOavatou Kal aidsos aidiov. Kai ev mvevpa ayvov, eK 
 Ocod tv UrapEw exov, Kat dv avtod mednvos Sndadi Tots avOpo- 
 mots, ekaVv TOD viol TEAr«lov TErcla, Fon Covrov aitia, ayloTns 
 ayiac pod Yopnyos, €v @ pavepodTar Ocds 6 TaTHp O él TavT@V 
 Na a? aA \ x SN € \ is AN / I \ 
 Ka ev Tao, Kat eds vids 0 Ova TaVTMV, TpLaS TEhEla do&n Kat 
 aidwornts Kal Bacirela pr) peptCopév 5é amandXoTpLouper 
 dry uotrela pa) mepibopcvn poe oTpLoupiern. 
 > 3 3 an 3 > > 
 Oiire obv Kxtictov te 1) SodNov ev TpLad., OTE eTELTAKTOV, WS 
 / \ > ¢e / ef NG? / A 9 
 TpoTEpov pev ovX UTapXoV, VaTEPOV dé émrecceAOov. Ovrte ovv 
 evérumé mote vios Tatpl, ote vid TrEeDUA, GAN aTpeTTTOS Kat 
 avadrXrolwros % adtl tpids ae’. In favour of the genuineness 
 speaks the Origenistic form of the sentences before the con- 
 clusion, the vagueness with which the question of the essence 
 of the Son is treated ;—it was a characteristic feature of the 
 age of the Arian conflict, to return from the subject of the 
 personality to that of the essence. Suspicion may be enter- 
 tained relatively to the last words, concerning the Holy Spirit ; 
 because they already teach His eternity. But compare Note 
 1, page 173. 
 
 Norte 36, page 181. 
 In his first work against Sabellius, Dionysius of Alexandria 
 said (Euseb. Prep. Evangel. 7, 19),—Ei pev yap avts ayévyn- 
 rév éotw 6 Ocds, Kal ovola éativ abtod, ws dv elirot Tis H ayer 
 
NOTES 483 
 
 vnola, ovk av ayévynrov ein 4 DAN; in other words, not to be 
 generated is represented as the essence of God, after the man- 
 ner of the Arians. But if that be the essence of God, then 
 must the Son, whom he probably described as generated in this 
 work also, stand outside of the divine essence. To this, how- 
 ever, we may reply,—In the passage referred to, the unbegotten- 
 ness of God,—not of the Father,—is opposed to the #An as be- 
 gotten, not to the Son. Besides, we never afterwards find any 
 trace of such a view in the Alexandrian Bishop. He only re- 
 tained subordination in the sense in which the teachers of the 
 Church long continued to hold it,—in the sense, to wit, that the 
 Father is the source of deity, which would imply that He is at 
 one and the same time the whole and a member of the Trinity 
 (compare de Sent. Dionys. c. 18, 22, 23). To this connection be- 
 longs also, perhaps, the fragment of the work of Dionysius, vrepi 
 édeyxou Kal aoroyias, in A. Mai’s “ Coll. Nov.” T. 7, 96:— 
 "Avapyla uadrov Kal otdots, #) e& icorywlas avriTrapeEayouern ; 
 from which it is evident that he was an opponent of Tritheism. 
 
 Nore 37, page 181. 
 
 \ io e e ld / A A 
 [Tpocipnrat pev odv, says Dionysius, bre myn tov dyabev 
 / e NS \ >) A / id \ 
 aTavtwv éotly 6 Ocds, TOTAMLOS O€ UT aUTOD TPOYEOMLEVOS O VLOS 
 / , A / \ 
 avayeyparral amdoppota yap vod NéOyos (the Word). Kail os 
 / fal \ i / - 
 ém avOp@rav eimeiv ad Kapoias Sta oTOmaTtos eEoyverTeveTas, 
 ¢ / Cali} / / ¢ \ / ral 
 ETEPOS YEVOMEVOS TOU ev Kapdia AOYoU O dia YAWooNS vos Tpo- 
 a & \ / / Ne, @ 9 \ 
 TNooV" Oo mev yap Eéueuve TpoTreuwpas, Kal EaTLv otos Hv: Oo bé 
 / A \ \ 
 e€emtn mpoTrendpbels Kal pépetar Tavtayod: Kat ottws eat 
 V4 p 3 fe ld (6 
 exaTepos év éexatépo, Etepos av Garépou' Kat &v eiaw, dvtes Svo° 
 e \ VS si \ ¢ e\ v4 \ > b) / (4 
 OUTM Yap Kal 0 TATHP Kai oO ULOS EV Kal ev ANXjdOLS hey Ojoav 
 2 ° ° ¢ / 
 eat. Another passage runs as follows (ibid.) :—'Ds 0 jérepos 
 a / b) A \ / 4 \ 
 vovs epevyetas ev ad’ éavtod Tov AOyov—Kal gore pev EKATEPOS 
 ? Ye An / > XN 
 €tepos Oatépov, idvov Kal tod Rourod KEYWPLOLEVOV ELMNYXOS 
 / € \ 3 a / e Nee EEN fal / \ a / 
 TOTOV, O pev ev TH Kapdia, oO Oé ert THS yAwTTNS Kal TOU oTd- 
 PE a / \ > \ / 
 HATOS OLKGY TE KAL KIVOUpEVOS’ ov piv SieaTHKacLW, OUSE KAdTraE 
 b) / / Ea) ” e an bY oo v7 
 aNdWY TTEPOVTAL, OVSE EoTLY OUTE O VOdS dAOYOS OTE VOUS 
 ¢ / 5) > a a \ if > b) A / Ae as 
 0 Noyos, AAX O ye vows Totes TOV AOyoU év aUT@ Paves? Kal O 
 / ( / al aA 
 Aoyos eyKelpwevos, 0 € NOYos vods mpoTNdSav' Kal peOlaTaTaL ev 
 id A \ / ¢ f \ A \ \ 
 0 vovs els TOV AOYoV, 0 SE Adyos TOV vod eis TOS akpoaTas 
 an a id An / an an / 
 EYKUKNEL, KAL OUTHS O VoDS Sia TOD Aéyou Tals TOV adKovdvT@V 
 , / A y ¢ \ a 
 Wuxats evidpverar cvvectov TO Oyo" Kal otw 6 pev olov 
 
484 APPENDIX. 
 
 maTnp 0 vovs TOD Noyou, ay eh’ EavTod, 6 Sé Kabdrep vids 6 
 NOyos TOO vod" mpd éxelvou pev advvaTor, arn ovdé &Ewbév Trobev 
 civ éxelv yevopevos, Bractycas Sé am avTod oTws O TaTHP 
 6 péytotos Kal KaOdXou vods TpeTov TOV viov Noyov épynvéa Kat 
 dryyedov éavtod éye. This exposition reminds us of Origen 
 and Hippolytus; but it bears a still closer resemblance to the 
 Logology of the Apologists. Still the step taken in advance 
 since Tertullian’s time, which consisted in discriminating the 
 Son from the Xdyos = vods, is not given up. It is true, the 
 Son is spoken of as vods here also; not, however, as such, but as 
 the vods which had assumed another mode of being (we@iotatae 
 6 vods eis tov NOyov). Thus through this werdoracis of the 
 xaddXou vods into the hypostatized Word he arrives at an ob- 
 jectified vods, or a duplication of God; for in speaking of a 
 uetdotacs, he by no means intends to teach a conversion in 
 which God the Father should cease to be what He was. 
 
 Norte 38, page 183. 
 
 De Synodis 16;—3aBerruos tiv povada VIOTTATEPA €LTTED. 
 Compare Hilar. de Trin. 4, 12; 6, 5, 11. Hilarius adds in the 
 latter passage,—“ Divisee a Sabellio unionis (that is, of the 
 Monas) crimen exprobrant, cujus unionis divisio non nativita- 
 tem intulit, sed eundem divisit in virgine.’ Schleiermacher 
 finds these words obscure; but the meaning probably 1s,— 
 There would be no objection to be made against a distinction, 
 still less against the division of the Monas, if it preceded and 
 were the principle of the birth of Christ; but they rather 
 divide God in the Virgin ; that is, the birth and humanity of 
 Christ are the principle of a division in God, and since the 
 incarnation the person of the Son stands over against that of 
 the Father. We find exactly the same thought also in the 
 work adv. Sab. Gregal. c. 8. When the objection was brought 
 against the Sabellians, that the Scriptures so frequently dis- 
 tinguish Christ and the Father as two persons, they replied,— 
 We also recognise two hypostases ; the one is God the Father, 
 the other is the Son, who is a man (kal odtw dvo0 troctacets 
 dalvecOar, Eva Tov Tatepa Ocov, Erepov SE Tov viov avO@pwrrov) ; 
 to which it was again answered,—In that sense Paul of Samo- 
 sata also recognised two hypostases. Here is, at the same 
 time, the weak point of the Sabellian system, at which Patri- 
 
NOTES. 485 
 
 passianism might again be resuscitated; even as, through the 
 incarnation, an dzroxo77 might be introduced into God. The 
 same thing is clear also from ec. 6 and 12, where Sabellians, in 
 order apparently to meet the demand for a Trinity, are said 
 to have resorted to the evasion,—when they conceded distinc- 
 tions, they wished at all events that God (so far as He reveals 
 Himself in the world) should be compounded of three things 
 (atvOeros éx TPLaV TrPAYWaTwV). 
 
 Nore 39, page 183. 
 
 Some difference remains here between the two Dionysiuses. 
 The Roman Dionysius develops nothing that resembles a dupli- 
 cation, a self-objectification of the vots, and must therefore 
 either have conceived the Father in Himself, apart from the 
 Son, as without power and wisdom, or have regarded the Son 
 in the light of an attribute: and it is not probable that he 
 intended to do either. Whereas the Alexandrian Dionysius 
 reckoned, even at a later period, power and wisdom to the 
 essence of the Father; for he held the Father Himself to be 
 the Aoyos as éyxetuevos (see page 180). This was more cor- 
 rect in itself, and was also accepted by later teachers of the 
 Church, in order that the Son might not be reduced to a mere 
 attribute of the Father, and that there might not be attributes 
 of which the Father was destitute. The Alexandrian Diony- 
 sius probably intended thus to characterize the Father as per- 
 fect in Himself, even apart from the Son; whereas the Roman 
 Dionysius, with his doctrinal form, intended to say, that apart 
 from the Son only an imperfect conception could be formed of 
 the Father. His aim, therefore, was to connect the Son more 
 distinctly with the divine essence itself. Still this formula 
 always threatens the hypostasis of the Son, in the manner of 
 Sabellianism. And, in point of fact, the Roman Dionysius 
 does not appear to have expressed himself so strongly against 
 Sabellianism as against the Tritheites and Subordinatianists of 
 the above kind. 
 
 Norte 40, page 196. 
 
 For the sake of completeness, we will here devote a word 
 to Victorinus, who, as a Greek by birth and yet a Latin 
 Bishop, occupies a middle position between the East and the 
 
486 APPENDIX. 
 
 West. We have a tolerably long fragment of his, entitled 
 “de Fabrica Mundi” and “Scholia in Apocalypsin” (compare 
 “ Victorini Petavionensis in Pannonia superiore episcopi opera ” 
 in Gallandii Bibliotheca Vett. PP. T. 4, pp. 49-64). The 
 genuineness of the fragment is unquestionable; but it is in 
 part scarcely intelligible, owing to its bad Latin and the writer’s 
 awkwardness in the use of language, with which even Jerome 
 also seems to have been struck. These faults are somewhat 
 less glaring in the other work, which may possibly be due to 
 the copyist. In the fragment we not merely read,—“ Verbo 
 domini cceli firmati sunt, et spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum; 
 —sic dicit Pater ejus; eructavit cor meum verbum bonum: and 
 John,—in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, 
 et Deus erat Verbum—omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine eo 
 factum est nihil,’—but he also assigns to the incarnation so 
 high a place, in virtue of mystical numbers (in use also by 
 earlier writers), that he regards it and the history of Christ as 
 the idea that dominates the universe. The Son with the 
 Father, he holds to be the unity of the seven spirits of Isaiah ; 
 in the six days of creation these spirits successively revealed 
 themselves. He completes the number seven by representing 
 the Son as revealing Himself to the human race in two prin- 
 cipal forms:—firstly, as the principle of the fear of God; 
 secondly, as the principle of blessing and sanctification. Fur- 
 ther on, however, the six days’ work is typically employed for 
 the parallel with the history of Christ, and particularly with 
 the week of the Passion (c. 2, 6). For example :—As Christ 
 came (in carnem conversus) that Adam might be created anew, 
 He assumed human nature on the same day of the week on 
 which Adam was created, He suffered on the same day on 
 which he fell, and so forth. At the basis hereof lies the idea 
 of a full “ recapitulatio,’—an idea which we have already found 
 set forth by Irenzeus. With this fragment, whose conclusion 
 also treats of the Apocalypse, the other work has the most un- 
 mistakeable affinity, both in style and thought. Jor example, 
 the “septem spiritus” are very frequently employed for the 
 explanation of apocalyptic passages; the mystic numbers of 
 the fragment occur also in the Scholia, especially the construc- 
 tion of the history of the world according to the number seven, 
 —a procedure which has drawn upon its author the unjust 
 
NOTES. 487 
 
 charge of Chiliasm (for example, from Cave), whereas the con- 
 clusion of the Scholia expressly protests against the supposition 
 that the completed kingdom of Christ will endure only 1000 
 years, and not for ever. Both monuments undoubtedly lay 
 very great stress on eschatology, on the judgment through 
 Christ, and on the perfection at the last day. These scholia 
 supply far fuller Christological data; but as the work has pro- 
 bably suffered from interpolations, doubt is thrown on the 
 elements just referred to. So, for example, the number 666, 
 Apocalypse xiii. 18, alongside of earlier and more absurd ex- 
 planations (recrav, Diclux), is referred also to a “ verbum gothi- 
 cum Tevorpixos.” The words, “ He who is, and who was, and 
 who is to come” (Apocalypse i. 4), he explains as follows,— 
 “ Est, quia permanet, erat, quia cum Patre omnia fecit, et nunc 
 ex virgine initium sumsit, ventwrus est, utique ad judicandum.” 
 He redeemed humanity by His sufferings (1,5; 5,45; 12, 1-4). 
 Death is the “debitum” of every descendant of Adam ; not, 
 however, of Christ (qui de semine natus non erat, nihil morti 
 debebat, propter quod eum devorare non potuit, id est in morte 
 detinere). He became “agnus;” but “tanquam leo confregit 
 mortem” (5, 5), Thus was he made heir (“ heres Domini,’ 
 not “Diaboli”), “ut possideret substantiam morientis, 1. e., 
 membra humana (5, 4, 5). Ut sicut per unum corpus omnes 
 homines debito mortis suze ceciderant, per unum etiam corpus 
 universi credentes renati in vitam resurgerent.” The higher 
 nature of Christ is here also described as the unity of the seven 
 spirits (Apol. 1, 4; 5, 6); but on c. x. 1 he remarks,— 
 “Patrem esse dicimus et hujus Filium Christum ante originem 
 seculi apud Patrem genitum, hominem factum in anima vera (?) 
 et carne,—morte devicta et in coelos cum corpore a Patre re- 
 ceptum effudisse Spiritum Sanctum.—Hunc per prophetas 
 preedicatum, hunc per legem conscriptum, hunc esse manum 
 Dei et Verbum Patris ex Deo, per omnia Dominum et con- 
 ditorem Orbis.” The author is specially zealous in his attacks 
 on Dualism, because it aims at rending asunder the Old and 
 New Testaments. The Word was the founder of both Testa- 
 ments. Eyerything in the Old Testament is treated by him as 
 atype of Christ. But the type still resembles an unbroken seal, 
 a shut temple; nay more, one seal has been added to the other 
 
 in the Old Covenant. The opening of the seals (Apocalypse 
 
488 APPENDIX. 
 
 v.), which no one could accomplish save the Lion of tlie tribe of 
 Judah, the Root of the stem of Jesse, is the opening of the Old 
 Testament (v. 8, 9); by Christ all the seven seals are broken 
 at once. He is the opened temple of God (compare Apoc. v.). 
 The new song which is sung after the breaking of the seals by 
 His death, is the confession of the new element in Christianity. 
 New is it, that the Son of God should become man (whose 
 Head is God, Apocalypse i. 14); that He should ascend up to 
 heaven in the body (which He united with the spirit of His 
 glory, Apocalypse i. 12); new, that He forgives our sins, and 
 so forth (Apoc. v. 8, 9). In accordance herewith, he explains 
 the woman, which is adorned with the sun and travails in 
 birth, to be the old Church of the fathers and prophets, of the 
 saints and apostles (prior to its union with Christ). This old 
 Church “ genitus et tormenta desiderii sui habuit, usquequo 
 fructum ex plebe sua secundum carnem olim promissum sibi 
 videret Christum ex ipsa gente carnem sumsisse.” He deemed 
 the incarnation, therefore, to be the uncovering of the divine 
 mystery, on which the noblest minds of the old period had 
 toiled with earnest longings. He then naturally conceives this 
 humanity to be permanently united with the Word. Because 
 of His incarnation, says the Scholium to Ap. i. 16, is He ap- 
 pointed judge of the world. The Father intended to show, 
 “quoniam verbo preedicationis judicabuntur homines” (com- 
 pare on Apocalypse vi. 1, 2, 5), that only the highest revelation 
 of God can judge men. 
 
 Note 41, page 196. 
 
 The unity of Christ, ef xal ta padwota ToAXals érrwotats 
 émwoeitat, is expressly defended. Pamphilus, however, found 
 it necessary to answer the charge of teaching two Christs, 
 which was the fifth brought against Origen (Apol. c. 5). 
 Now, as Paul of Samosata did not teach two Christs, but a 
 Logos and a man, representing the latter, however, as becom- 
 ing Christ, through His union with the former, the words of 
 the Confession of Faith (Hahn’s “ Bibliothek,” ete. p. 96) will 
 not refer to him; unless we suppose that here also Paul had 
 spoken dishonestly of the generation of the Logos, in order to 
 make it appear as though he attributed an hypostasis to the 
 Logos (even as to the man Jesus), either prior to the creation 
 
NOTES. 489 
 
 of the world, as the spurious letter of Dionysius of Alexandria 
 maintains; or at the incarnation, as Ehrlich thinks, when the 
 évépyeva, which had hitherto been impersonal, became a person. 
 This view bears some analogy to that of Tertullian and others, 
 according to whom the Logos became a person at the creation, 
 but it was not Paul’s; compare Schwab’s “de Pauli Samos. 
 vita atque doctrina dissert. inaug.,” 1839, § 12, pp. 64 f. 
 
 Norte 42, page 197. 
 
 Eusebius, who gives us long fragments of the discussions of 
 this Synod (H. E. 7, 27-30), says also, that a doctrinal por- 
 tion was recorded in writing; but he has not preserved it. The 
 Confession of Faith directed against Nestorius, discovered 
 amongst the Acts of the Synod of Ephesus, is spurious (see 
 Hahn |. c. p. 129); for it contains the word ojoovctos, whereas 
 we know that the Synod of Antioch avoided it, because of the 
 abuse made of it by Paul. On the other hand, with Hahn and 
 Walch, I consider that recorded in Mansi 1, 1035, Hahn, pp. 
 91 ff., to be genuine. It neither contains the term opooveros, 
 nor any other determination which does not completely suit the 
 period to which it is attributed. The vagueness which charac- 
 terizes it in important points, and of which the Arians took 
 advantage, would be inexplicable if it had been framed subse- 
 quently to the Council of Nicea. But precisely because of 
 this remnant of vagueness, that other Confession of Faith 
 appears to be a spurious changeling. 
 
 Nore 43, page 226. 
 
 More particular mention is here deserved by a man who ex- 
 erted a great influence on many Orientals of the Nicene gene- 
 ration, to wit, Lucian of Antioch, the martyr. That he was 
 like-minded with Paul of Samosata, is an unfounded suspicion 
 cast upon him by the heresy-hunters, with which it is inconsist- 
 ent that the Arians appealed to him as a witness in favour of 
 their views (Epiph. Her. 48). But quite as far am I also from 
 believing that Lucian’s affinity to the Arians is the result of a 
 falsification of his writings by that party, as Athanasius sur- 
 mises. On the contrary, there is no reason for throwing doubt 
 on the declaration of the Semi-Arian Synod of Antioch, held 
 in the year 341, that the Confession of Faith which they 
 
490 APPENDIX. 
 
 adopted as their own (the so-called Second Anticcheian For- 
 mula) was that of Lucian the Martyr (see Sozomen. H. E. 3, 
 5, cll. 6, 12). It runs as follows (according to Athanas. de 
 Syn. Arim. et Seleuc. § 23, T.i. p. 2, 735),—“ We believe in 
 one God, the Almighty Father, the Former and Creator of the 
 universe, and the Provider; and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, 
 His only-begotten Son, the God through whom are all things 
 (dc ob), who was begotten of the Father before all ‘Mons, God 
 of God, a whole of the whole (€£ 6dov), an only one of the only 
 one (ovov), a perfect one of the Perfect, a King of the King, 
 a Lord of the Lord, who is living Word (Adyos), living Wisdom, 
 true Light, the Way, the Truth, the Resurrection, the Shep- 
 herd, the Door, immutable and unalterable (dtpemrov te xat 
 avanrdolwtov); the unchangeable image (a7rapadnaxtov eixova) 
 of the deity, of the essence (ovcias), of the will, of the power 
 and glory of the Father, the First-born of all creation, who 
 was in the beginning with God, as God the Word, according 
 to the Gospel;—who in these latter days came down from 
 above, and was born of a virgin, according to the Scriptures, 
 and became man, Mediator between God and men, the Apostle 
 of our Faith, the Captain of our salvation, as He saith, ‘I came 
 not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me;’-— 
 who suffered for us and rose again the third day, ascended up 
 to heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of the Father, from 
 whence He will come again, with power and glory, to judge 
 the quick and the dead ;—and in the Holy Ghost, who is given 
 for the comfort, sanctification, and perfection of believers; as 
 the Lord commanded to baptize into the name of the Father, 
 of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matthew xxviii.). Since 
 the Father is truly Father, the Son truly Son, and so also the 
 Spirit truly Spirit, and the names are not empty and idle, but for 
 each of the afore-mentioned exactly denote the hypostasis, the 
 order and the glory (ra&w «al Sd£av), so that there are three as 
 to hypostasis, but one in harmony (77 cvpdovia dé &). In this 
 faith, which we hold from the beginning and to the end, we 
 condemn all heretical false faith; and if any teach in opposition 
 to the sound true faith of the Scripture, saying, There was an 
 interval, a time, or an Alon, before the Son was generated, let 
 him be anathema. And if any call the Son a creature, like one 
 of the other creatures, or a production or work, like one of the 
 
NOTES 49} 
 
 other productions or works, and refuses to teach each one of 
 the afore-mentioned points, one after the other, as the Holy 
 Scriptures have handed them down, and teaches other than as 
 we have received, let him be anathema,” etc. ‘This Confession 
 of Faith, with the exception perhaps of the close, which does 
 not really belong to it, accords exactly with the Pre-Nicene 
 period, and is marked by the following noteworthy features: 
 1. The Father is identical with the one God (eis Oeds); He 
 represents the povapyia. The Son, therefore, is termed, not 
 coeternal with the Father, but the image of His essence and of 
 His attributes ; He is not equal to the Father, but stands in ra€es 
 and 60a under Him. We can, accordingly, understand why 
 Athanasius was not quite satisfied with the Confession, and why 
 Arian falsifications were surmised. 2. On the other hand, how- 
 ever, the Son is designated God of God; His perfection, singu- 
 larity, immutability, and exaltedness above time, are asserted 
 with a decision which proves how offensive Arianism must have 
 been to those whose doctrinal convictions were firmly established, 
 and tolerably developed. Lucian therefore (he died a.p. 311) 
 vecupies substantially the same point of view as Kusebius. 
 Measured by a strictly scientific standard alone, both of them 
 are more closely related to Arius than to Athanasius. For, 
 without question, if the Father is the one God by Himself 
 alone, nothing remains for the Son but to be a creature, and 
 there is no place for a Trinity. To posit a middle thing be- 
 tween God and a creature, is unquestionably a contradictory 
 procedure, and an expedient of the resort to which Eusebius 
 and his adherents had already anticipatorily deprived them- 
 selves, by representing God as too exalted to enter into any 
 immediate connection whatever with the world, and therefore 
 with that which resembled the world. But to a this, would be 
 to measure them by a scientific standard foreign to them. For 
 such a middle being, which is for us an incogitable thing, 
 seemed to them not only cogitable, but even the solution of the 
 difficulty. They are consequently not to be measured by the 
 more perfect scientific standard ; for, according to it, they 
 ought, without doubt, consistently to have gone on to Arianism. 
 But precisely because their theory was in itself so far from 
 meeting the requirements of science, it is necessary to refer 
 back to their Christian consciousness, as the second factor, 
 
492 APPENDIX. 
 
 which alone furnishes an explanation of their procedure. In- 
 deed, with men like Eusebius, this second factor was so de- 
 cidedly the earlier and more powerful of the two, that if they 
 had become aware of the results to which their theory, scienti- 
 fically considered, must lead, or if they had been compelled to 
 choose between the doctrine of Arius and that of Athanasius, 
 they would not merely have declared themselves against Arius, 
 as in fact, at a subsequent period, they constantly did, but would 
 have given up their own views, and endeavoured to reconcile 
 themselves to the formula of Athanasius. This also was the 
 exact position taken up by Eusebius relatively to the Nicene 
 Council. That Arianism ought to be repudiated, he felt sure; 
 but he was by no means so sure that his theory must scientifi- 
 cally end in Arianism. Now, so far as he feared that Sabelli- 
 anism would be favoured by the term ojoovccov, and supposed 
 either the hypostasis of the Son or the unity of God not to be 
 sufficiently ensured, he shrunk from adopting it; but he con- 
 sented thereto as soon as he had convinced himself, that the 
 Synod had no intention of rejecting Arianism in a sense that 
 would involve giving in its adhesion to Sabellianism or Poly- 
 theism, and that his own view might possibly coexist along with 
 the formulas of the Synod. It is true, the points of difference 
 between him and Athanasius, and to which he also subsequently 
 clung, did not attain recognition at the Council of Nica; but 
 he had a presentiment that a path was thus struck into, which 
 must lead away therefrom, namely, the path towards a lessen- 
 ing of the hypostatical distinctions. Hence the zeal with which 
 he subsequently battled for them in opposition to Marcellus. 
 The momentum about which he was chiefly concerned he saw 
 defended by the Arians, though, it is true, under an exagge- 
 rated form. Herein appeared to him to lie the justification of 
 Arianism; and therefore he was never able to take so decided 
 a part against Arius as others, although he by no means in- 
 tended to rank himself amongst his followers, least of all in a 
 religious point of view. So much the more gratifying is it to 
 find, that Athanasius (de syn. Ar. et Sel. c. 41 f.) did not con- 
 found men of Eusebius’ mode of thought with Arius, as did 
 later Inquisitors, but regarded them as brethren, because they 
 accepted the entire substance of the Nicene Creed, and did not 
 stumble even at the term ouoovccor, in the sense of wishing to 
 
NOTES. 493 
 
 represent the Son as a creature. On the contrary, they derived 
 Him from the substance of the Father and no other, and be- 
 lieved Him to be the true Son of the nature of the Father, 
 who, as Logos and Wisdom, was eternally with the Father. 
 That Eusebius, with Origen and Pamphilus, could well accept 
 the latter determination, we have shown above. Athanasius, 
 with the equitable judgment he pronounced on the matter, was 
 right in taking into consideration the religious convictions 
 which alone could have produced formulas attributing such 
 lofty attributes to Christ. But he must be pronounced to have 
 been in the wrong, if we regard their doctrine merely in a 
 scientific point of view, and not in the light of the opinion and 
 tendency they really entertained in their inmost heart. Fixing 
 our eye solely on the former, we must allow that they were con- 
 stantly liable to fall into Arianism , it was, therefore, both 
 necessary and highly advantageous for the doctrinal progress 
 of the Church, that Arius should make his appearance: for in 
 him, those who had hitherto held an indeterminate position 
 saw, embodied in a distinct and repellent form, principles which 
 they had no intention of avowing as their own, but the possi- 
 bility of which they had not consciously and thoroughly 
 enough excluded, and were thus led to a decision. 
 
 Nore 44, page 231. 
 
 Ta te onpeia Tava, doa érroincer, Kat ai dvvapers Seixvucw 
 avtov Ocdv évavOpwmncavta’ Ta cuvaudhdtepa Toivuy deiKkvUTat 
 OTe Ocds Hv dices, Kab éyévero dvOpwios ducer. In Galland. 
 Bibl. Vet. PP. T. iv. 112, another passage is communicated 
 from the Chron. Pasch., which runs as follows:—O traons 
 dopatov Kal dopatis Ktlicews Snpwoupyos Kal Seamdtns 0 povo- 
 yevns vios Kab Noyos, 6 TO ILarpi nal TO ayiw Tvet pate cuvai- 
 610s, Kal Omoovatos Kata THY OeoTHTA, oO KUPLOS HuoV Kal Oeos, 
 ‘Incods Xpiotés, éml tH cuvtedela TOV aiovev KaTa capKa 
 TeyOeis ex THs aylas évddEou Seorolvns uav OeotoKov Kai 
 aevrapbévov, Kal Kata adjGeav OeotoKov Mapias, Kai éri Tijs 
 yiis odbels, Kal Tols opoovators Kata THY avOpwrotnTa av- 
 Opetrots @s avOpwros adnOHs cvvavactpadeis, etc. This pas- 
 sage, however, with its formulas, betrays too clearly a post- 
 Nestorian, Eutychian period, to permit of its being taken 
 into consideration in this connection (compare the Prolegg. 
 
494 APPENDIX. 
 
 ad Bibliuth. Vet. PP. T. i. cxxi.). On the other hand, we 
 may regard as genuine the passage (Gall. 1. c. p. 108), which 
 is preserved in the Acts of the Council of Ephesus,— Grace 
 and truth came by Jesus Christ; by grace are we saved ; it 
 is the gift of God, etc. Oedjpyats Ocod o Aoyos capE eyé- 
 veto Kal oxnpate evpebels ws avOpwros’ ov KatedeipOn Tis 
 OcétynTos* ode yap iva Ths Suvdwews adtod » d0&)s—amooTh, 
 TTMXEVTAS TAOVTLOS WV, TODTO éyéveTo, ANA Wa Kal Tov Bdva- 
 rov iTrép hudv Tov dpaptorav avadéEnrat, Sikatos U7ep adiKov 
 Straws Hyas Tpocayayn TO Oc@, OavarwOels wev capKl, Cworrown- 
 Gels 88 rvebpart.” In another passage, he says,—“ ‘The incar- 
 nation took place when the angel spake to the Virgin, saying, 
 ‘O cds dAéyos apd (notwithstanding) tiv dvdpos arovclay 
 Kata BovAnow Tod TdvTa Suvapévov Katepydcacbat Oecod, yéyovev 
 év pntpa Ths Tapbévov capé, pyte SenOels Tis avopos evepyelas, 
 i) mapoualas: évepyéotepov yap TOD avépos eveTroincev 7) TOD Oeod 
 Sivamis, émicKidcaca Th Tapléve ody TO émEdAAVOOTL ayi 
 avevpatt.’—Mention may further here be made of Eustathius 
 of Antioch (about 325). See Galland. Biblioth. Vet. PP. T. 
 iv. 573 (from Theodor. Dial. 1). Christ’s true descent, says 
 he, is not from Mary. Ei 6€ Adyos Kal Oeds tw avéxabev 
 Tapa TO TaTpl, Kat Ta cbpmavtTa SV avTo yeyevjolat paper, 
 ove dpa yéeyovev eK yuvalKos 0 OV, Kal Tols yerynTots aTrac tw 
 altios BV, GAN éatte Tip dicow Ocds avtapKns, aretpos, aTrept- 
 vontos’ ék yuvaikds S€ yéyovey avOpwros o év TH TapOeviKh 
 patpa mvetpaTe mayels dyio. One of his favourite designa- 
 tions of the Logos is, 6 ¢vceu Tod Ocod vids. Page 574 :—Paul 
 does not say that we shall be formed like the Son of God, but 
 like the image of the Son of God (Rom. viii. 29). ‘O pev yap 
 vids Ta Ocla Tis TaTpwas apeThs yvapicpata Pépwv eik@v éoTe 
 Tod jwatpos, meld Kat Suovor €E opoiwy yevvapevot, eiKoves ot 
 TiKTomevot aivovtat TOV yevvnTopwv adnOeis. The image of 
 the Son is the man whom He bore. His humanity was re- 
 lated to the Logos as the wax to the colours, which, although 
 very unlike it, are painted on it. His sufferings and humilia- 
 tion did not pertain to the essence of the Logos, but are expli- 
 cable solely from His love. By no means, therefore, 6 Xoyos 
 imréxetto TO Voww KAOdTrep of cuKopavTat Sof§dfovor (that is, the 
 Arians, who derived the subjection of Christ under the law of 
 the Old Testament from His subordinate essence), avros dy a 
 
NOTES. 495 
 
 vowos.— AXN et Kal ex THS TapVévov 70 avOparwov spyavov 
 avaraBav épopece, Kal U7TO Vomou éyévEeTO, KATA Tas TOV TPwTO- 
 roxov alas Kabapiobels (Luc. ii. 21 f.), ode adtos Sedpevos THs 
 TovTav yopnylas Uréueve Tas Oeparrelas, GAN Wa THs TOD vopov 
 Sovrelas eEayopdon Tovs TeTpapévous TH Sixn THs apds. When 
 it is said, “They crucified the Lord of glory (Acts ii. 36), but 
 the same hath God exalted to be Lord and Christ,” both the 
 sufferings and the exaltation refer, not to the Logos, but to the 
 man Jesus, who might well be termed Lord of glory (compare 
 the fragment in Theodor. Dial. 3, Galland. |. c. 575, 576), 
 anabés Xpictod To mvedua ov dSejoe waos TO Oeiw Tpoc- 
 dmrew ; nor did the exaltation concern the Logos (tov ra@ovra 
 "Inoobdv Kvpiov éroincev, Kat od THY Zodpiav ovbé tov Adyov Tov 
 avéxabev Exovta THs Seorrotelas to Kpatos). If there was any 
 defect, any weakness (acOévera) in Him, 76 av@pwr@ tadra 
 Tpocaptav axoovOov civas pain Tis av, odte ye 8) TO TANPO- 
 pate Ths OedTnTOS, ) TO aEtoOpatL THs avwTadTw Zodpias, } TO 
 én mavtwv Kata Ilatrov ypadopévm Oc@. The sun, a visible 
 body, does not suffer, although it is compelled to witness so 
 much that passes on earth; nor does it go out of its path. 
 Shall we then believe, tiv adowpatov Sopiav ypaiveoOa, kai 
 peTadratrew THY diaow, Eb O VALS aUTHs cTAaVPe TpocyrodvTAL, 
 ) AWow Uropéver—} StabOopay rrodéyeTat; ANA TaTKEL MEV 
 6 veds, 7 S€ AKNALOSwWTOS OVola TavTaTacWW dypavTos THY 
 aktiav Kabéotnkev. 
 
 Hierakas also, who was the most influential and learned 
 ascetic of Egypt about the year 300, belongs to this connection. 
 Much as Epiphanius finds to blame in him (Heer. 67), he praises 
 him for not coinciding with Origen in the doctrine of the Father, 
 the Son, and the Spirit ; and for really believing that the Son 
 was begotten of the Father. Arius was the first—and not with- 
 out a certain sort of astuteness—to charge him with heresy in 
 the matter of the doctrine of the Trinity. To him we owe a 
 more precise account of the mode in which he conceived the 
 Son to be related to the Father (Epiph. her. 69, 7). He was 
 as a lamp kindled at another; or, God is as a torch which is 
 divided into two (@s Avyvov amd AUxVOV, 1) Os NapTrdda eis SvO; 
 compare Athanas. de syn. c. 16). We have here the same 
 diremption of God into Father and Son as in the case of Zeno; 
 the same fault which Arius finds in Sabellius (see above) 
 
496 APPENDIX. 
 
 Hierakas held the Spirit to be as nearly like as possible to the 
 Son, but at the same time subordinated the former to the latter. 
 
 Note 45, page 232. 
 
 This is implied also by the oldest document we have of 
 Arius, to wit, his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, written prior 
 to his stay with him, during which he appears to have written 
 his Thalia. Alexander has driven us away, says he, because 
 we do not agree with him in the doctrine which he publicly 
 teaches :—“ Always was God, always the Son; at the same 
 time is the Father, at the same time the Son; the Son exists at 
 one and the same time with the unbegotten God, for He is ever 
 begotten, unbegotten begotten, ayévyntoyeryntos (this is natu- 
 rally one of the specious conclusions drawn by Arius); in no 
 respect is God before the Son, for the Son is derived from God 
 Himself.” And then, after appealing to Eusebius of Cesarea, 
 Theodosius, Paulinus, Athanasius in Nazarbe, Gregorius and 
 Aetius, and in general to the teachers of the Oriental Church, 
 who all, with the exception of Philogonius, Hellanicus, and 
 Macarius (in Jerusalem), say, that God avdpyws precedes the 
 Son; whilst the three exceptions term the Son an épevy?), mpo- 
 Bor» ayévvntos, he proceeds to give his own doctrine. 
 
 Nore 46, page 233. 
 
 Compare Arius’ “ Ep. ad Alex.” in Epiph. and Athan. 1. ec. 
 In this latter he gives the following further remarkable testi- 
 mony to Alexander :—That he had frequently, in the Church 
 and in assemblies, refuted those who taught such doctrines. 
 Preceding are the words,—“ To be rejected is tov dvta mpotepor, 
 votepov yevvnbevta 1 érixticOévta eis viov;” that testimony, 
 therefore, refers perhaps merely to the fact that Alexander had 
 frequently controverted those who supposed that the Son had 
 being prior to His generation or to His suppletory creation. 
 What else can this refer to, than to the circumstance that Alex- 
 ander rejected also the view entertained by many older writers, 
 who conceived indeed that the Son had a certain potential and 
 eternal being in the Father, but still represented Him as first 
 proceeding forth from God for the creation of the world ? 
 Without doubt, therefore, Alexander was unwilling to separate 
 the genesis of the hypostasis of the Son from His deity, which 
 
NOTES. 497 
 
 existed eternally in the Father; and, on the contrary, endea- 
 voured so to conjoin the eternal divine essence of the Son with 
 His hypostasis, that the latter should be coeternal with the for- 
 mer. But when Arius denied that theory of Tertullian’s, he 
 did it with a different purpose from Alexander. The latter 
 aimed at doing away with the interweaving of the Son with the 
 world, and the subordination essentially therein involved; he 
 therefore removed the yévvnows of the Son into eternity, substi- 
 tuting, in the place of “ potentia” and “actus,” either the eternal 
 “actus,” or, at all events, the idea that the one is eternally con- 
 tained in the other. Arius, on the contrary, in denying the 
 eternal “potentia” of the Son in God, aimed at doing away 
 with the last trace of His eternity. He was to have no essential 
 root in God. 
 
 Note 47, page 239. 
 
 Or. 1, 6 :—"EOnxev &v th Oadrela, os dpa Kat TO Vid 6 TaTIp 
 dopatos UTrdpyel, Kal OUTE Opay OTE yiVdcKEW TENELWS Kal aKpLBaS 
 duvatat 0 Adyos Tov éavTOD Tatépa: GAA Kal 6 ywwodoKer Kal d 
 
 / b) / PX NG, ig a3 \ , v4 \ 
 PreTret, avadoyws Tots idiots wétpots ode Kal BréErrEL, WoTrEp Kal 
 nels ywwaoKouev Kata THY idlav divauw. Kat yap Kai o vids, 
 dyow, ov povoy Tov Tatépa axpiBas od ywooxes' AelTrEL yap avTO 
 
 > % al b) \ \ SVEN ¢ e\ \ ¢ a > if b Lg 
 ELS TO KATAAAP ELV ANAG Kal AUTOS O VLOS TI EAUTOD OVTlaV OVK OLE" 
 Kal OTL pmemeplopévat TH pvoet, Kat amreEevwpévat, Kab aecxot- 
 
 / \ > / \ b) / / > b) A € b) / 
 
 VITMEVAL, KAL AAOTPLOL Kal ALETOXOL ElolY GAN@V AL OVTlaL 
 TOU TATPOS Kal TOV viOD, Kal TOD ayiov TVEvpaToOs, Kal WS a’TOS 
 b) / int. / b) J an x > HA \ / 
 epbeyEato, avomowor Tamav GAAnAwY Tals TE OVoIaLs Kal ddEaLS 
 
 siee\ Si dee EY ° ° 
 elo em arretpov. ‘Lhe axiom thereby is always,—that every- 
 thing which is not God, is essentially foreign and unlike to God 
 (kat ovoiay &évov). If the entire world is so essentially foreign 
 to God, the Son also must be so (kata mavta avdopmotos THs TOD 
 TaTpos ovolas Kat idvoTnTos) ; and must be classed with things 
 that have been brought into existence, with creatures (/dcos 
 eivat), of which he is one. De Syn. 15:—“ That which has a 
 beginning, is plainly unable either to embrace or to know Him, 
 who is without beginning (€urrepwvoncar 1) Ewrrepidpagacas).” 
 
 Nore 48, page 247. 
 
 The Nicene Creed runs in the revised form, given by Hahn 
 (1. c. 105-107), as follows :—ITiorevopev eis va Ocov trarépa 
 VOL. II. 2 J 
 
498 APPENDIX. 
 
 , e lal 4 t \ > 
 TAVTOKPATOPA, TAVTWY CpaTaV TE Kal adopaTov TonTHY. Kai «is 
 
 &va Kbpiov Incodv Xpiarov, tov viov Tod Oeod, yervnOévta €K 
 Tov TAaTpOS MovoyEvhj, TOUTETTW EK THs oVTIas TOU Tatpos, Oeov 
 x Ocol, dds é« hwris, Ocdv adynOwov ex Ocod adrnOwvod, yevvn- 
 bévra ob Trombévra, doovctov TO TaTpl, Sv ob TA TaVTA eyEVETO, 
 Ta Te &v TO OUpAVe Kal TA em) THs As Tov Ov was Tous avOpe- 
 mous Kab Sut Thy jwetépav cwrnpiay KateNOovta Kai capx@bevta 
 kat evavOpwnijcavra, Tabovta Kal dvactavta TH TpITN LEAs 
 cai averbdrvra eis Tods ovpavods, Kal épyopevon Kpivat CovTas Kal 
 vexpots. Kat eis 7d aysov mvebua. Tovs oé AéyovTas, OTL Hv 
 more OTe ovK Hv, Kal Tply yevvnOVvaL OdK Tv, Kal OTL EE OVK OVTOY 
 éyéveto, ) e& érépas tUmoctdcews 1%) odclas pacKovtas eivat, 7) 
 KTLTTOV, TPETTOV, 4) GAXOLwTOV TOV viov TOD Ocod, avalepariter 
  kaboruxn éxkanola. The two main positions of Arius—of 
 which the drift of the one was the temporal origin of the Son; 
 of the other, His creation out of nothing—-were excluded by the 
 double affirmative significance of the term ojoovctov, whose two 
 meanings, however, probably found their unity in the fact that 
 both Father and Son are equally truly the essential being ; for 
 which reason, they must both be coexistent or coeternal, and of 
 like substance. Compare, on the double force of opoovoros, 
 
 Athan. de Syn. 41, 48, 52. 
 Nore 49, page 253. 
 
 \ X e / xX / qn 
 C. 9:—Suvidov yap o Noyos, 6Tt GAAS OVK av AVOEin TV 
 > , ¢e N: > \ \ an "6 b] an > / 
 avOporrav 1 pOopa, et pn Sua ToD TavTws amolaveiv, aBavatov 
 nr \ i if, 4 \ / > lal 
 dvTAa, Kal TOV TATPOS VIOV, TOUTOU EVEKEV TO Suvdpevov atroVavetv 
 la we an n \ / / 
 éavT® AapBaver cHpa, iva todTo Tov emi TaVTwV oyoU METAra- 
 % e \ / / \ \ \ , 
 Rov avtt wdvrwv txavoyv yévntat TO Oavato, Kat Oud TOV EVOLKN- 
 / ” / \ \ ’ % / € \ 
 cavTa Noyov aplapTtov dtapeivyn, Kal NOLTFOY ATO TAVT@V 1) plopa 
 / An VA e nm \ 4 
 TAVONTAL TH THS avacTacEews YapUTl. "“Oev ws lepeiov Kat Ovpra 
 \ iA / A > \ ¢ a dF. lal / 
 TAVTOS édevOepov OTLAOV, 0 AUTOS EAVTH érxae TWA TPOTAY@V 
 ’ / >] x / ’ \ n id / >) f x / 
 els CavaTov, amo TAVTMV evOds TaV opolwv Hpavite TOV Oavatov 
 An A ral f ¢ \ / x xX e / 
 TY Tpoapopa TOV KATAAANAOU. L7rep TAaVTAS Yap WV O Aoyos 
 n n / \ lal \ sN \ / 
 Tod Oeodv, eiKoTwS TOV EaUTOD VaoV Kal TO TWLATLKOY Opyavov 
 / > v4 id \ / > / A: 3 / , 
 Tpocayov avThpuxoy UTEP TAVTWY, ETANPOU TO OevAojevov eV 
 A ¢ \ \ Aut / n € / 
 7 Oavdto Kal odTws cuv@V Sid TOD ofolov Tols TAT O ad@ap- 
 lal n e\ b>) / \ if bed b] / b] lal 
 Tos TOD Meod vids, ELKOTWS TOUS TAVTAS évéducev apPapatav €v TH 
 an \ ’ 
 mept ths dvactdcews érrayyedia. OC. 22:—Tov Oavaroy eis 
 / \ al ” 
 dvalpecw Trepiéuewe, Kal Tov Sidopevoy Cdvatov UTrEp THs TAVTOY 
 
NOTES. 499 
 
 cwrTNplas EoTevoe TEAELM@TAL. Od TOY EavTOD Gavarov, GANA TOV 
 TOV avOparreoy mrGe TENELMOAL O TOTTI" oOev ov« idio Oavato 
 ovK elye yap, Sar) wv: amreTiOeTo TO opty GNA TOV Tapa TeV 
 avOpwrreav édéxeTo, va Kat TodTOV év TO EavTOD GepaTs TpocEr- 
 Govra té\eov efapavion. Compare 21, 387. Similarly also ce. 
 20 :—The main cause of His appearance was the common guilt 
 of humanity, which demanded payment. Wherefore tarép zrav- 
 Tov THY Ouvolav avédepey avTt TavTwV TOV EavTOd vadv eis Odva- 
 Tov Tapacioovs, iva Tors ev TaVTAS avuTevOUVoUS Kal édevOEpouS 
 THS apxyaias TapaBacews Tromon SelEn Sé éavtov Kal Oavdrov 
 KpelTTOVa, aTrapyny Ths Tov blov avactdcews TO idiov cHpma 
 apOaprov émiderxviuevos. And afterwards, ibid. :—Through 
 the union with the Logos (77 émuBdoet Tod Adyou els adTO) two 
 wonderful things met in the same being ; OTL TE O TaVTwWY Oava- 
 TOS EV TO KUpLaK® Topatt eTANpovTO, Kal o Odvatos Kal 4} dOopa 
 Sia Tov cuvovTa Noyou &Enhavitero. 
 
 Nore 50, page 270. 
 
 It is interesting to see how, under the hands of these Arians, 
 who fought in so abstract a manner for the infinitude, the 
 absoluteness of God, God was reduced to an individual shut up 
 in Himself, that is, substantially to a single finite being. In 
 this is rooted the, not “bold,” but cool (nicht kiihne, aber 
 kiihle) and irreligious assertion of Eunomius, that he knew 
 God even as God knew Himself. If the divine essence is 
 nothing more than the abstractly simple independence of the 
 primitive, fixed, ungenerated Monad; and if, by applying this 
 meagre category to the idea of God, all higher categories are 
 anticipatorily excluded, it is a small or even a trivial thing 
 thoroughly to know such a God. And the teachers of the 
 Church had a thorough right to maintain, in opposition to him, 
 the incomprehensibleness of God. In addition to this, Baur 
 ought, for the sake of historical completeness, to have added, 
 that they defended the cognizableness of God in the Son, in 
 opposition to Arius :—it is clear, therefore, that they aimed at 
 taking a middle course between the timidity of the one and the 
 defiance of the other class of heretics; both which lead to the 
 same result, to wit, to the denial to man of any actual knowledge 
 of God. — Still more mistaken is it to reduce the teachers of 
 the Church hack to Platonism, the Arians to the philosophy of 
 
500 APPENDIX. 
 
 Aristotle; for, amongst the teachers of the Church also, were 
 some who had received an Aristotelian training. The questions 
 considered were, on the contrary, new; and neither Eunomius’ 
 doctrine of the creation, nor that of the Son, nor that of God, 
 can be said to be Aristotelian. And these are the doctrines in 
 question. These unspeculative men, who employed the simple 
 dialectic of the understanding, were entirely destitute of the 
 Aristotelian mpaétov cwodv, which moves itself. Their concep- 
 tion of God was that of the abstractly simple “Ov, which we 
 find in Neo-Platonism; the Church, on the contrary, which 
 demands that room be left for motion and distinctions, opposed 
 that conception, and ever more completely freed itself from its 
 influence. But at this*Ov an empty abstract idea of God 
 arrives in every age; and in the “étre supreme” of the last 
 century no one will fail to discern the same fundamental 
 thought. Although, therefore, I grant that the Arians were 
 trained in the Aristotelian dialectic, and, on the ground of the 
 empirical feature common to both, recognise a relationship be- 
 tween them; I consider it rather adapted to promote confusion 
 than an understanding of the matter, more to resemble play than 
 sober inquiry, to seek, as Baur does, to class the Arians and their 
 opponents in the Church as Aristotelians and Platonists. 
 
 Nore 51, page 270. 
 
 Catech. 11,12. His designating the Logos eternal High 
 Priest, the Father the dpyi of the entire deity, which is the 
 head also of the Logos, and his esteeming the unity of God. to 
 be preserved by the Father, from whom alone divinity proceeds, 
 are slight further traces of his Semi-Arianism. On the other 
 hand, he confesses that the Son was Son of God, not by adop- 
 tion, but by nature,—the only-begotten One, because He has 
 no brother, no one equal to Himself. For, on the contrary, all 
 others become sons through Him, by means of adoption. “He 
 did not rise from the condition of a servant to sonship; but 
 was brought forth by an unsearchable act of generation; He 
 was not first another, who then became other than He had 
 been.” On the question of the mode of this generation he lays 
 down merely negative determinations: that it took place and 
 is to be believed, he will endeavour to show, not how. It is 
 interesting to observe, in his case, how Semi-Arianism was led 
 
NOTES. 501 
 
 on to the recognition of the coeternality of the Son with the 
 Father, by following out the idea—In the production of the 
 Son, who was not out of nothing, but out of His essence, God 
 is not to be supposed subjected to the limits of time. If time 
 is absolutely to be denied of the Father, and the Son be of the 
 essence of the Father, no interval can be conceived to have 
 existed between the being of the Father and that of the Son, 
 but the latter must proceed eternally forth from the essence of 
 God. From which it follows, strictly speaking, that this gene- 
 ration cannot have been the work of one moment, which never 
 happened again, but must be eternally going on, even as light 
 constantly proceeds from light. Athanasius gives distinct ex- 
 pression thereto; Cyrill also approximates to this idea of Origen, 
 when he asserts that the words, “ This day have I begotten thee,” 
 must be understood of the eternal to-day. At the same time, 
 we find also expressions of an opposite tendency; for example, 
 when he says, “ Far more rapidly than we produce words and 
 thoughts, did He generate the Son.” In this case, the genera- 
 tion is again represented as a single act. He describes the act 
 of generation more precisely as follows:—“The Father did not 
 generate the Son, as a master begets his pupil by his teachings, 
 or as we Christians are made His children by enlightenment. 
 Nor, again, as the spirit of man begets words; for, whereas 
 sounds are scattered, Christ is a consistent and living word; 
 not spoken by the lips and then again dissolved, but continually 
 born of the Father in an unutterable manner and with an in- 
 dependent being. Whilst generating, the Father is neither 
 unconscious, nor does He proceed by choice and reflection; for 
 to say that He does not know and love Him whom He begets, 
 would be godless; and no less godless, to represent Him as first 
 considering a long time and then generating, seeing that He 
 never was without Son. We have not two unbegotten beings, 
 nor again two only-begotten ones; but one is the unbegotten 
 Father, who has no Father; the other is the eternal Son, born 
 of the Father. The Begetter neither robs Himself, nor con- 
 verts Himself into the Begotten; and the Begotten lacks nothing. 
 Not the Father became man, nor did He suffer for us; but the 
 Son, whom the Father sent to suffer for us. Let us then neither 
 estrange Father and Son from each other, nor combine the two 
 to a Sonfatherhood (Sohnvaterschaft) ; let us rather walk in the 
 
502 APPENDIX. 
 
 royal road, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left. 
 We will not call the Son Father, in order thus to honour Him 
 the more; nor, with the notion of doing honour to the Father, 
 will we regard the Son as a creature ; but let the one Father 
 be worshipped through the one Son, and the worship not be 
 divided.” This, therefore, is all that he demands,—that the 
 unity be not reduced to uniformity, and the distinction be not 
 converted into separation; for the rest, he refrains from more 
 precise determinations, and declares, if not a progressive know- 
 ledge of, yet a full and satisfactory insight into, the nature of 
 this generation, to be impossible. (Catech. 11.) 
 
 This eternal Word now, begotten before all Afons without 
 mother, took upon Himself in these last days a body from the 
 Virgin, without father. To worship a mere man would be 
 idolatry ; but quite as perverse would it be to designate Christ 
 simply God. If Christ, who is God, did not assume humanity, 
 we are far from redemption. The causes of the incarnation 
 were the following:—Man was the noblest creature, having 
 been made, not by the mere command, but by the hands of 
 God. In six days was the world created—the world for the 
 sake of man, who is in the image and likeness of God. But, 
 moved by envy, the devil cast this noblest of all creatures out: 
 of paradise; the human race became constantly more wicxed. 
 Deep were the wounds of humanity; from the crown of the 
 head to the sole of the foot, there was no soundness in it; its 
 wounds were not attended to; they were not anointed nor 
 dressed. Then God, hearkening unto the prayer of the pro- 
 phets, sent His Son, the Lord and Physician, from heaven. To 
 every one of My warriors, saith He, | will give the royal seal 
 which I won by My wrestlings on the cross, that he may bear 
 it on his forehead. Where sin abounded, there did grace much 
 more abound. Our Lord must needs suffer, but without the 
 devil recognising Him; for had he recognised Him, he would 
 not have approached Him. His body thus became a bait of 
 death; so that when the dragon expected to swallow up it, he 
 was rather compelled to give up those whom he had swallowed. 
 Again, men had heathenishly worshipped God in human forms ; 
 God now became truly a man, in order that the imagination 
 (the self-made service of God) might cease. It was further 
 necessary for Him to be with us, to become like us, in order 
 
NOTES. 503 
 
 that we might be able to lay hold on, to enjoy, to trust Him. 
 Daniel could not be quickened till a human hand touched 
 him: so did it behove the Physician to be present, the Lord to 
 eat with us as He ate with Abraham; for we could not have 
 
 borne His naked deity (Cat. 12). 
 
 Norte 52, page 271. 
 
 Compare Klose’s “ Geschichte und Lehre des Marcellus und 
 Photinus,”’ Hamburg 1837. The fragments of Marcellus are 
 collected in the Marcelliana, etc. of Rettberg, Gottingen 1794. 
 Compare Epiphan. her. 72; Theodor. her. fab. 2, 103; Basilii 
 M. Ep. 52 (Ed. Paris 1638, T. ili. 80); Hilarius, fragm. 1-3. 
 Above all, Eusebius’ “Libri duo adv. Marc.,” of which the 
 “Libri tres de ecclesiast. theol.” are a continuation, belong to 
 this connection. The Eastern Church held him for heterodox, 
 especially since the appearance of Photius; even Athanasius 
 denied him fellowship. See Klose |. c. pp. 17 ff. Hilarius and 
 Epiphanius hesitate, but still incline to condemn him. The 
 charge of Samosatenism brought by Arians and semi-Arians was 
 unjust, as fairer thinkers have allowed. After his resignation at 
 Constantinople, in the year 336, he betook himself with a Con- 
 fession of Faith to Julius in Rome: it was so framed that Mar- 
 cellus could continue to hold his own view, and yet deceive 
 others. He does not say that he believes in the eternal Son, 
 but refers the being always with God to the Logos. At the 
 close, he speaks of the eternal duration of the kingdom, but in 
 such a manner that the words may be referred to the Father or 
 the Son; indeed, the Father is mentioned immediately before 
 
 these words. The Confession of Faith is given by Epiphanius. 
 
 Norte 53, page 286. 
 
 His doctrine of the Trinity does not appear to have differed 
 from that of Marcellus; indeed, there was no reason why it 
 should. The Dyad, with which Marcellus really contented 
 himself, between the silent and speaking God, he did not need 
 to let drop. For the Holy Spirit he might have found a 
 similar place to that assigned Him by Marcellus, who designates 
 Him a secondary expansion (Theodor. Heer. fab. 2, 10, wapéx- 
 Tacis THs éxtdcews, a branch) of that expansion which was 
 contained in the Son. Only the latter, Photinus was compelled 
 
504 | APPENDIX. 
 
 to describe rather as an influence on, than a dwelling in, Christ. 
 As to the mode in which Photinus passes over to the humanity 
 of Christ, from a passage in Epiph. heer. 71, we might surmise 
 that he represented it as being brought to pass by means of a 
 conversion of God into man (compare Hilarius, de syn. 38, xi.). 
 This information, which is indirectly sustained by the circum- 
 stance, that he is so frequently styled a Sabellian, might in 
 itself, according to what has been set forth above, be correct, 
 and would only presuppose that Photinus, with the view, on 
 the one hand, of instating the humanity of Christ in its rights 
 (which he declares to have been his intention), and, on the 
 other hand (in agreement with the influence still exerted on 
 him by Marcellus), of drawing in the divine dvvapls, repre- 
 sented this dSdvvauis as converting itself, that is, as reducing 
 itself to the potence which became the man Jesus. By his 
 virtue, this man raised himself up to deity; and thus the 
 deity, or divine power, which had lowered itself to a potence in 
 the complete humanity of Christ, attained again to its original 
 actuality. But although Photinus was by no means alone in 
 entertaining such a theory, it is scarcely reconcilable there- 
 with, that others should speak of him as rejecting all conversion 
 and change on the part of God. Compare especially Vigil 
 Taps. Dial. adv. Arianos, Sabell. et Photin. 1, 4;—“Ceterum 
 Deus inviolabilis et immensus non ex se alium genuit, nec ipse 
 unquam genitus fuit ut merito de se filium habere aut ipse sibi 
 filius esse credatur. (He rather designated the one God Doyo- 
 mdtwp in imitation of the Sabellian viordrwp, avoiding, how- 
 ever, the hypostasis which might lie in the word Son.) Sed 
 est unicus et singularis nec generando passioni obnoxius, nec 
 se ipsum protendendo cumulatus, nec suam in virgine portionem 
 derivando divisioni subjectus.” Independently of this passage 
 in Vigilius, his opposition to Sabellius, against whom he ad- 
 vances it as a reproach, that he represents the essence of God 
 as expanding itself, is scarcely reconcilable with a conversion 
 or division of God. With Marcellus, he restricts this expan- 
 sion to the divine activity. Opposed thereto is also the assump- 
 tion of a true birth from Mary, and of the eternal duration of 
 the humanity. For this reason I coincide with Klose, who 
 characterizes the above statement of Epiphanius as erroneous 
 (p. 79). Epiphanius was, perhaps, led astray by Anathemat. 
 
NOTES. 50 
 
 xi. of the Synod of Sirmium (of the year 351, in Hilar. de syn. 
 1. c.), which he may have referred to Photinus, as others did 
 whereas, according to Klose’s probable view, it may have been 
 a justification, as far as Photinus was concerned.—This Synod 
 anathematized also both the application of the idea of the Xeyos 
 mpodopixos and évdtaberds to the Son, and the doctrine of a 
 “ dilatatio” and “contractio” of God. 
 
 Nore 54, page 330. 
 
 Baur indeed assigns them an entirely different task from 
 that to which they actually did, and were compelled, to devote 
 themselves. In his opinion, they ought to have described the 
 world as the Son of God; and finding that, instead of doing so, 
 they repudiated the notion as heathenish, he has no alternative, 
 but to look upon the second and third centuries as further ad- 
 vanced than the fourth. For the former had not yet attained 
 a clear perception of the distinction between God and the world; 
 in the Son, many regarded the world as still immediately or 
 physically one with God. And the heathen philosopher Celsus 
 had formed a still more complete conception of this unity of 
 God and the world already, in the second century. Now, as 
 the aim of the Church, during the history of its doctrine of 
 the Trinity, was to overcome both the Jewish and heathenish 
 conception of God, and above all, to render it complete in itself, 
 and then to derive the world (because it is not to be reckoned 
 to the essence of God in Himself) from the will of the essentially 
 purfect God; the entire doctrine, in its further phases, is for Dr 
 Kaur one mass of confusion. The Nicene Council having ex- 
 cluded the Hellenic conception of God, the Church from this 
 time onwards is, in his view, on a false track. A few heretics 
 silone can be said to have seen the truth from afar, and some 
 of the teachers of the Church to have given utterance, at all 
 events in the form of suggestive questions, to sentiments more 
 desirable to hear. That a historian thus at the very outset 
 takes up a polemical position towards the central-point of the 
 efforts of the teachers of the Church, scarcely needs mentioning ; 
 we can well understand also, that such a position must bring 
 with it a perennial feeling of discontent with the entire work of 
 ene teachers of the Church (that is, in reality with the entire 
 course of the history of the doctrine), which is not likely to 
 
306 APPENDIX. 
 
 further the true understanding of the matter. Our great aim 
 ought to be, to penetrate to the very centre of the efforts of the 
 Church Fathers, and thus historically to comprehend why the 
 heathenish conception of God neither did nor could satisfy 
 them; further, to consider the endless contradictions which 
 marked the conception of God laid down by heathenish philo- 
 sophers ; and therefore, not to cease criticism here, but to do 
 honour to that criticism which was pronounced in so grand a 
 manner by history. If, on the contrary, we treat that heathenish 
 idea of God, without further inquiry, without even giving it 
 an essentially new turn, as the self-evidently true one, we take 
 up a point of view which, though clearly too self-contradictory 
 to allow of our feeling contented with it, leads to our examining 
 the history of the doctrine of the Trinity in the light of princi- 
 ples foreign to itself. The natural consequence whereof is, that 
 our criticism of the individual phenomena of the History of 
 Dogmas, instead of coinciding, as it should, with the criticism 
 pronounced by the history itself, and with the positive advances 
 made by the dogma, is in conflict with the judgment of history 
 at all the points at which the Church gives judgment, and there- 
 fore remains alien from the heart of the matter itself. Regard- 
 ing the subject from the centre of the movement, the sole strength 
 of that method of precedure appears to consist in looking at 
 things separately which are really connected with each other, 
 and in then taking advantage of the isolation to strike each down 
 im succession. A notable illustration thereof is furnished by 
 Dr Baur, |. c. pp. 443-470, where, by bringing to view now 
 solely this, and then solely that aspect, he makes Basilius, 
 Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa, first Tritheites, then 
 Monarchians or Sabellians, and finally appears to rest in the 
 conclusion that they were Subordinatianists. We have already 
 referred to the charge of Subordinatianism (p. 326). As to the 
 two other charges, one would suppose that, at all events, if the 
 first were brought against these men, they would escape the 
 second and opposite one, especially, when we find Dr Baur 
 himself, in several passages ; expressing his respect for the great- 
 ness of their mind. In the case of heretics, he frequently suc- 
 ceeds in happily pointing out a connection between things ap- 
 parently contradictory : we are therefore justified 12 asking,— 
 firstly, whether the position taken up beforehand towards the 
 
NOTES. DOT 
 
 doctrinal development of the Church, or the nature of that de- 
 velopment itself, furnishes an explanation of the constant charge 
 of inconsistency? and secondly, why, in the case of the teachers 
 of the Church, no attempt whatever is made to reconcile ap- 
 parently contradictory elements, to distinguish the fixed goai 
 and the immoveable kernel of their doctrine, from its moveable 
 and, in part, still fluctuating elements, and thus to view their 
 efforts in their very centre and motive principle? In the main, 
 then, it is not at all the fault of these men, if they appear to be 
 Tritheites and Sabellians at one and the same time; especially 
 as it is only through making an inadmissible use of passages 
 which speak of the difference of the hypostases, and of the divine 
 unity, that Dr Baur has succeeded in setting them forth in the 
 light in which they appear. If we allow ourselves to translate 
 the important term (sons (distinctive characteristic), as applied 
 to the hypostases, by “quality” or attribute,” whereas these 
 men call the divine attributes zroorntes, and unweariedly re- 
 peat that all the zrovornres belong to each of the hypostases— 
 not, however, the (Svorntns; it cannot be difficult to show them 
 to be Sabellians. And so, if from the simile of the rainbow 
 employed by Basilius (see Baur 1. c. p. 469), we draw the con- 
 clusion, that as the one light appears in the rainbow in different 
 colours, even so God “ appears” differently in the three persons ; 
 whilst at the same time there is nothing to prevent us supposing 
 that Basilius regarded the different colours of the rainbow as 
 objectively different modes of existence of the one light; for- 
 getting, at the same time, that Gregory of Nyssa also uses the 
 simile, and further, how strongly, for example, Basilius (Ep. 52) 
 requires not merely that the sword be drawn against Arians. 
 but also that Sabellians be formally rejected. Precisely the 
 same course must be adopted by Dr Baur in order to make them 
 out Tritheites; both in regard to the image of the three suns, 
 and the comparison with the plurality in the one humanity. 
 For in this case also, all that is needed is to stretch the simile 
 far enough, and to take little notice enough of the annexed 
 limitation of the resemblance,—indeed, in general, of that of 
 which the simile is meant to be asimile ; by such means, Trithe- 
 ism may withoat difficulty be deduced therefrom,—only that it 
 does not harmonize with that which all these teachers of the 
 Church intended, not figuratively, but logically, to convey when 
 
508 APPENDIX. 
 
 they employed the term édudrns. Of Gregory of Nyssa’s use 
 of the last-mentioned comparison, we have already spoken (pp. 
 313 ff.). If we take the various utterances of Gregory Nazi- 
 anzen together, not even in his case can we finally deduce Trithe- 
 ism from his employment of the image of the three suns. For 
 the meaning of his words is not, that the three hypostases are 
 three suns, existing in independence of, and isolation from, each 
 other: on the contrary, the very discourse in which he employs 
 this simile contains a protest against Tritheism (or. 31,14; rept 
 Tvevpatos ayiov, ed. Bas. p. 222). The stress is not to be laid 
 on the isolation ; for immediately before, he says,—“ What have 
 we to do with Tritheism or Ditheism? We have one God, for we 
 have one divinity ; and that which proceeds therefrom has its 
 relation to the unity (mpos & ra é£ abrod tiv avadopdy éyer, 
 Kav Tpla meotedntat). For the one is not less God, and the 
 other not more ; neither is prior to, or later than, the other; they 
 are not split up in relation to the will, not divided in power ; 
 nor do we find here any of the characteristics which pertain to 
 divided things (ovdért Tév dca Tots pepictois uTapyet Kav Tad0a 
 AaBelv eorwv) ; but, in one word, the deity is undivided, in those 
 which are distinct from each other (duépiotos év Tots [eMEpio-- 
 pevors 9 Oedrs) :”—after which follow the words, ofov év nrlots 
 Tplaty éxouévous GAMjrwD pla TOD dwTos otyKpacts. This image, 
 therefore, as he himself says, was not intended to denote a 
 division of the one deity: but his meaning was,—One light is 
 in the three suns (the Oedrns); and besides, the three are most 
 intimately united with each other, for they adhere to, or rather, 
 according to what has preceded, depend on each other, and dart 
 their rays into each other. The import of the image then is as 
 follows,—The three are different points of unity, different centres 
 for all that which pertains to the divine essence in general, that is, 
 for the divine attributes ; the divine essence, however, although 
 present in each of the hypostases in a different manner, is en- 
 tirely and undividedly present in each: so that, considered in 
 their connection, the words denote precisely the same thing as 
 the usual comparison,—the Son is the Father's perfect image, 
 or stands over against Him as a living mirror. That this is the 
 right view to take of the matter, is put beyond all doubt by the 
 following chapter (c. 15). He represents some one as objecting, 
 Have not the heathen also, at all events the more intelligent, 
 
NOTES. 903 
 
 one deity and yet many gods, even as there is one humanity 
 and yet many men ?—in other words, the unity and sameness 
 of the essence, of the Gedrns, does not preserve you Christians 
 from Polytheism. He answers,— Exe? pev 4 xowdrns rd ev 
 exer povov érivola Dewpyntdv’ ra dé xa’ Exactov Tretotov dAN- 
 Awv Kal TO Xpov@ Kal ToIs TAaDEoL Kal TH SuVdper pEeweptoéva. 
 ‘Hyeis re yap od abvOerou pdvov, dArd Kad avriOetou Kab adr}- 
 Aows Kal juiv avdrois, ode éml pds Hépas Kabapas pévovres oi 
 aUTOL,—aAXA Kal copact Kal ~uyais del péovtds Te Kal peTa- 
 mimrovtes. And the like remark may be made concerning the 
 heathenish gods: they are in conflict with each other and with 
 the first causes. But not so we. Each of the hypostases has 
 unity (To év éyev), no less when we look to that which is together 
 with it (To ovyxeipevov, namely, the other hypostases), than 
 when we have regard to itself: and that, indeed, through the 
 identity of essence and power (c. 16). We must further consider 
 what he says regarding the use of comparisons in general (for 
 example, c.11). When, on the contrary, Athanasius (or. c. Ar. 
 3, 15) says,—We have not used the image of three suns, but 
 that of the sun, its brightness and so forth; he rejects, not that 
 which Gregory meant to teach in using the image, but merely 
 one explanation thereof, namely, that which represents it as de- 
 noting the isolation of the three,—an explanation which Gre- 
 gory would have repudiated, seeing that he intended in the 
 passage to speak of unity (compare c. Ar. 3, 4); precisely as 
 the same Gregory repudiates the similes of the sun, of the ray 
 and the light, of the primal source, of the bubbling fountain, 
 of the flowing stream, not absolutely, but merely so far as they 
 could be used to obliterate the hypostatical distinction. On 
 this ground, he elsewhere unhesitatingly avails himself of these 
 images ; finding them sufficient, indeed, to mark the unity of 
 essence, but not sufficient to define the i&iéTnres of the different 
 hypostases. Gass also has justly directed attention to the fact, 
 that the two Gregories (Naz. or. 35; Nyss.c. Eun. 2, 6; com- 
 pare T’. i. p. 22; like Athanasius T. i. 530, ii. 5), understand 
 by “ God,” not merely the essence common to the hypostases, 
 but also the “ collective divine image” (the dv0os of the essence), 
 which embraces essence and hypostasis, in a word, the Trini- 
 tarian God. They best succeeded in doing this in relation to 
 the divine activity; which they persistently regard as a one, 
 
510 APPENDIX. 
 
 undivided, collective activity of God. God, therefore, is 1n 
 their view an acting personality ; though, leaving Athanasius 
 out of sight (see above, pp. 301 f.), they do not enter on the 
 questions, whether this one personality is constituted by the 
 hypostases ; and whether the divine Ego has its seat in the 
 essence, apart from the hypostases, or in the essence, so far as 
 it unfolds itself into hypostases. ‘To such questions as,—lIs the 
 common essence, the basis of the hypostases, self-conscious spirit 
 or Ego? or, does each of the hypostases form a distinct Ego? 
 or finally, whether the absolute self-consciousness of the deity 
 results eternally from its hypostases, being as it were the col- 
 lective consciousness of the distinctions ?—these Fathers would 
 supply us with no answers. Indeed, we have frequently had 
 occasion to remark that the idea of the “ Ego” belongs rather 
 to modern times, and that tadctacts, or even mpoowtTrov is by 
 no means to be identified with our conception of personality. 
 The utmost that can be done, is to divine from the principles 
 laid down by these Fathers what side they would have taken 
 had such questions come within their range of vision. We un- 
 hesitatingly aver our conviction, that Athanasius and Hilarius 
 would have decided for the last-mentioned view ; for they were 
 furthest of all from regarding the hypostases as oupBeBnkoTa ; 
 indeed, on the contrary, they incorporated them, as mediatory 
 causes of the divine self-consciousness, that is, as essential, with 
 the idea of God. Basilius the Great, however, and Gregory of 
 Nyssa, would probably have maintained that the one, common, 
 divine essence knows itself in a different manner in the three 
 hypostases, and would therefore have taken the first-mentioned 
 view of the matter, though without intending to adopt Sabellian- 
 ism. Whilst, finally, Gregory Nazianzen, without any thought 
 of being a Tritheite, would probably, with greater determinate- 
 ness than the rest, have ascribed a distinct and independent ex- 
 istence to the hypostases. Compare Or. 31, 31-33. 
 
 Note 55, page 343. 
 
 Baur (pp. 573 f.) misunderstands the doctrine of Athanasius, 
 —‘“that the Logos, in the very act of being born as a man, 
 éOcorrovet the humanity, in the first instance naturally His own,” 
 —-so far as he affirms that the Logos did not really become man, 
 but that man was at once “deified and raised above his natural 
 
NOTES. 411 
 
 attributes.” Of such an elevation of man there is not a trace 
 in the works of Athanasius, but the contrary (for example, c. 
 Arian. 8, 37 f. 42-48). The deification may, however, be a 
 growing one; and, indeed, was so in the view of Athanasius; 
 for he believed that the human nature of Christ attained per- 
 fection with the resurrection and ascension. Nowhere does he 
 say that the body of Christ did not in itself, and by its nature, 
 suffer hunger, but merely that the Logos did not; in that He 
 subjected Himself to the body and the laws of finitude merely 
 out of substitutionary love. Baur has neglected to take into 
 consideration that passages of this nature were directed against 
 Arianism, which attributed to the Logos immediately and 
 physically, what Athanasius attributed to Him merely ethi- 
 cally and through the medium of the humanity, which love had 
 moved Him to constitute His own. Compare, for example, ad 
 
 Serap. 4, 14. 
 Norte 56, page 343. 
 
 Psalm xy. p. 1024:—To xowdy domep tpocwrov rijs évOpw- 
 TOTHTOS avaraBav Tovs mpos Oeov Kal matépa Trovetrat Adyous ; 
 > € \ lal € n Cy MK 4 aA \ Nae \ e An ©. e@ > 
 OUK UTrEp Ye MANAOV EavTOD, Ov Ids OE Kal UTEp Hudv ws els &F 
 e la \ \ > / XN \ \ > / e€ \ x 
 Nav Sia THY oiKoVvoLiav—i Sid Ty éKKdnoiav,—1 oap— yap 
 avtod 7 éxxhynoia. Many other passages of this kind may be 
 found in other works of Athanasius; for example, in the 
 Epistle to Epictetus, in the two books against Apollinaris. 
 ‘Compare the “de Incarn. c. Ar.” c. 20. On the words, “ When 
 we shall be subjected” (1 Cor. xv. 28), he remarks,—“ When 
 we are found as His members, and have become sons of God 
 to Him. ‘Yueis yap, dnow, eis ote év Xpictd ’Inood. Tore 
 
 n A \ 
 6€ abTos Umotayjcetar avO iyav TO TaTpl, ws Kepady irép 
 cal a A lal A / / 
 TOV Wioy pedov. Tov yap merav avtod pndéra trotayévtav 
 TAVT@V, AUTOS, 1) Kepady) avTOY, oUTw UTOTéTAKTAL TO TaTpl, 
 avapévov Ta iva médn. (Here, therefore, he represents Him 
 as identifying Himself with those who do not yet believe, but are 
 . ¢ An 
 first to become believers; compare c. Ar. 2, 80.) ‘Hyeis éopev 
 Ol €V AUVT@ UToTaTaOpEVoL TO TaTpl, Kal Huets eopev ot ev aire 
 5) an a ig \ x 
 Bacirevovtes, ws av TeGow oi éxOpol uaY Ud Tods Todas 
 ¢ an \ \ \ \ aA > fa) 
 nea@v. Compare c. Ar. 1, 43-—Aia tiv mpds TO cHpa adTod 
 ovyyéveray vaos Ocod yeyovamev Kat 7pels, Kal viol Oeod rosrrov 
 wetrounucla, @ate Kal év Hiv nOn TMpocKuvetaVaL Tov KvOLD. 
 
Gai APPENDIX. 
 
 3, 88; on baptism, which he views in accordance with this idea, 
 see c. Ar. Or. 1, 48; compare 3, 22:—Epwtd, iva Kal adtol 
 yévervtat &v Kata TO év €uol cua Kal KATA THY AVTOD TEdElwow, 
 iva Kal avtol yévwvtTat TédeLot, ExovTes TpOs TODTO THY évoTNTA, 
 Kal eis avTo Ev yevopevor iva @s av TavTes hopebévtes Trap’ éuod 
 TAVTES WoW EV CHUA Kal Ev TVEDWA, Kal Eis dvOpa TédELOY KaTAY- 
 THTWOLW. 
 
 Nore 57, page 345. 
 
 The passage concerning His ignorance of the day of judg- 
 ment he refers, with Athanasius (ec. Ar. 3, 37 f. 42-48), to the 
 human nature of Christ; it, therefore, he held to be actually 
 ignorant in some respects (Or. 30, 15). It is not said, “The 
 Son of God knew it not,” but “the Son,” which in this case is 
 equivalent to the Son of man. Athanasius says,—dvOpeécrov 
 idtov TO ayvoeiv, as TO Trewvav. Nor does he afterwards recede 
 from this position, as Baur’s account makes it to appear (pp. 576 
 f.), but abides by the principle,—“ As man He was able to say, 
 I know it not; for as man He did not know it, although the 
 Word knew it.” It is a misrepresentation of the opinion of 
 Athanasius, when Baur argues as follows,—According to 
 Athanasius, Christ had merely a body, not a human soul; for 
 him, therefore, there was no other subject to which knowledge 
 or ignorance could be attributed save the Logos; but if the 
 Logos was the speaker, the subject, His attribution of ignorance 
 to Himself must necessarily appear to Athanasius as a false 
 accommodation.—Baur has overlooked, that though Athanasius, 
 prior to the appearance of Apollinaris, never gave special pro- 
 minence to the human soul of Christ, he never denied it. On 
 the contrary, the entire view he took of the incarnation and 
 redemption as something affecting the totality of man, rests on 
 the presupposition that Christ had a human soul. This pre- 
 supposition shows itself still more clearly in passages like the 
 present, which without it would be destitute of meaning. For, 
 that ignorance cannot be ascribed to the body, Athanasius was 
 surely well aware; and in this passage he uses the term dv@pe- 
 mos as a substitute for cap& For the rest, we find similar 
 things elsewhere also during the period before Apollinaris; for 
 example, he frequently says, the Logos assumed a man (c. Ar. 4, 
 34), the anointed element in Christ was the man out of Mary; 
 
NOTEs. 513 
 
 He is visible and invisible at the same time, the former 8: thy 
 "pos TOV opemevov avOpwrrov &wcuy, opapevos S& dnt, od ™ 
 aopat@ Oeorntl, Gra TH Ths OedTyTOs evepryela, Sid Tod avépw- 
 TiVOU T@maTOS Kal dAouv avOpwrou, dv dvexaluice TH OLKELO- 
 get TH Tpos éavTov (c. 36). But Athanasius speaks also in the 
 same manner of mpoxom in Christ, and defines it, c. Ar. 3, 
 o1-53, as ) Tapa Tijs copias wetadiSouévn Ocotroinats Ka) XApLS. 
 —To avOparwov &v tH codla mpoéxorren, uTepBaivov Kar’ 
 orLyov THY avOpwrivnv diow, Kal Ocorrovodpevov—Ka) Opryavov 
 —Tpos Thv évépyevav Ths Oedrntos Kat Tv éxraprbw avris 
 yivouevov Kal davdpevov tact. When he further, c. Ar. 3, 34, 
 speaks of the AoywOfvas of the odpé in Christ, it is evident 
 he cannot have meant, that the body of Christ was endowed 
 with wisdom and divine reason, but the humanity. On the 
 words of John xii. 27, “ Now is My soul troubled,” he remarks, 
 not, with the Arians, that they relate to the Logos, but they 
 were spoken, ore 0 Aoyos oaipE éyévero Kal ryéyovev avOpwrros 
 (compare c. Ar. Or. 3, 54, 55, 57). Another thing is the 
 question, whether Athanasius succeeds in combining a non- 
 knowing humanity and an all-knowing deity into a personal 
 unity; to this point Baur might with much greater justice 
 have directed his attack. Yet more on this subject below. 
 
 Nore 58, page 346. 
 
 Compare Or. Catech. M. c. 16, 32, 33 ff., 37; T. Opn 
 92, 95 ff., 102; c. Eunom. L. 2, T. 2, 464. His treatise on 
 1 Cor. xv. 28, T. 2, 12-16,—é« mdons 88 rhs avOpwrivns picews, 
 9 KaTewiyOn TO Oetov, ofov aTapyn Tis TOD KoWod hupdwatos 6 
 Kata Xpiotov avOpwros tréorn, that is, from humanity as a 
 common mass, the “primitie” are united in Christ with the 
 divine; hence through Him all that was human grew into con- 
 nection with the divine (8? ob mpocedin th OcéryTe wav TO dv- 
 @pwmwvov). All good things are now gained, @ote ia rdvT@v 
 Tv Ociav Cony dieEeNOodcav, éLadavicar xaborov é« tov dvtev 
 tov Oavarov. (The divine life proceeding from Him, and per- 
 vading all, drives death totally out of the world.) That which 
 took place in the first fruits, must take place also in the whole 
 mass of humanity. Tore ddov 7d hipaa ths pucews TH aT anyn 
 cuppenGer, Kal &v KaTA TO cUvExYes THA Yyevouevorv, TOD avabod 
 wovov Tv ayewoviay éd’ éavtod Sd£erar. And when the entire 
 
 VOL. II. . 2 6. 
 
Fila APPENDIX. 
 
 substance of humanity shall thus have been penetrated by the 
 divine nature, that. daoray? will take place which is designated 
 a subjection of the Son, because it is His body in which He 
 brings it to pass. The image of the ¢vpapa is physical ; but 
 that the “tertium comparationis” was not a physical process, 
 is clear, in part, even from the circumstance that He is repre- 
 sented as the soul of the humanity, His body (c. 16). To ova 
 TOD THpaTos HudV ywwomevov KaTa cvvjOeLav TWA TH WUXH oyto- 
 ucba.— Sepa & adrod raca } avOpwrivn vats, 4} KaTewixOn, 
 and, as far as men are concerned, Gregory lays special stress on 
 human freedom (Or. Cat. c. 7, 31). Indeed, Rupp justly re- 
 marks (1. c. p. 262), that in contrast to the physical point of 
 view of Eunomius, a strictly ethical estimate of Christianity 
 was characteristic of Gregory of Nyssa. But Gregory's notion 
 of the ethical was certainly not of so meagre a nature, that he 
 deemed it feebler and less sure of attaining a result than physi- 
 cal power; nor did he regard the unity founded by it as less 
 intimate and firm than a physical unity. For this reason, he 
 might very well apply the above images, in order to mark 
 the final certainty of redemption, and the uniting power of 
 love :—this all the more, as he did not rend the ethical from 
 religion, and recognised no freedom which needs to cast a 
 jealous eye on grace.—Or. Cat. 16,—“ As that which had 
 been dissolved by death was again united, to wit, in the resur- 
 rection; even so, the union of that which is dissolved passes 
 over, as from one principle, to the whole of humanity ” (otov 
 amd Twos apxis eis Tacav THY avOpwrrirny plow Ti Svvapet 
 KaTa TO tcov 4 Tov SuaxpLOévTos Evwors SiaBaiver). In C. 32 he 
 expressly describes the same idea as something 6 els tds é« 
 Tapadocews Hxet (p. 93). The entire Gospel contains a pigss 
 of the divine and human; everywhere are both conjoined; and 
 so also on the cross. Its very figure sets forth four lines, which 
 radiate in all directions from one centre. That is the symbol of 
 the God-man. He who was nailed to the cross was To map 
 Tpos EavTO cuvdéwv Te Kal cvvappLoCwv, Tas Suapopous TOV OVTWY 
 dices pos wiav cvpmvovay Te Kal appoviav S¢ EavTod cvvaywv. 
 As, when one of our sensuous organs is active, everything 
 united with the part is drawn into sympathy and participation, 
 so, inasmuch as the God-bearing flesh (cap& Oeodoxyos) was 
 taken from our mass, the resurrection of one part passes over 
 
NOTES, | 515 
 
 to the whole, as though the entire nature (humanity) were one 
 living being (caOdzrep twos dvtos wou rdons Tis dpvcews). For, 
 agreeably to the continuity and unity of nature, it communi- 
 cates itself from one part to the whole. ©. 37. As a little 
 leaven leavens the whole lump, so does His slain body, having 
 passed into ours (in the holy Eucharist), convert it entirely into 
 itself. Our body also thus becomes cpa Geodoyov, and by 
 this perovola in adOapaia we also become immortal.—As the 
 soul is united with the Logos by faith, so also through the 
 Eucharist is the body, or its dvcts, united with the body of 
 Christ, which has life in itself. Concerning baptism, he says, 
 —lts true idea is the full and entire extinction of death and 
 sin, and the complete resurrection to a new immortal life, in 
 the imitation of Christ. Because, however, of the weakness of 
 our nature, that which really forms one connected whole was 
 separated into its parts, and the entire force of the baptism 
 unto Christ is not concentrated in the one ritual act. But 
 believers are not therefore less sure and certain of becoming, in 
 the future, complete copies of Him into whose death and life 
 they are baptized.Compare Basilius, de Bapts Ti. je. 15.2); 
 T. 1. 551, 553, 561, 565, 568, 574; Lib. 2, Q. 1, pp. 582. f. 
 Specially worthy of comparison, also, is the homil. rye AN Vi a oF 
 04 if. of Basilius. God is amongst us in the flesh: not as in 
 the prophets, working from afar, d\Ad ouput EAUT@ THV av- 
 Opwrornta Kab Hvopévny KATAKTNTAMEVOS, Kal Sia THS TuyryEVOdS 
 nuiv capKos abtod mpos éavtov éravdyav THv avOpwrornta. 
 ITés ody 80 évds, dyow, eis mdvtas HOE 7d AaTTHpLOV ; Tiva 
 Tpotrov ev capri % Oedtns ; bs TO Tp EV oLOnp@ Ov MeTAaBaTLKaS 
 (that is, so that the Logos would have changed His place), but 
 petadotixas. He lost nothing ; He underwent no conversion. 
 Aia todtro Ocds &v capri, wa évatroxretvyn Tov éudwrevovta 
 Gavatov. ‘Qs yap tov dapudKkav ta aneEntnpia KaTaKpatel 
 Tov dbaptixav oikewOévTa TH cHpmaTtl,-—obTos 6 évduvvacTEevor 
 7H avOpworivyn (pice) Odvatos Th Tapovola ths Oeorntos nda- 
 vicOn. (The genuineness of this homily is established; not so 
 that of the Libri de Baptismo.) Ephram (Phot. cod. 229) 
 designates Christ rov odvxov, not Tov twa dvOpwrrop, that is, an 
 “homo universalis,” and not merely “singularis.” “I will,” 
 says Christ, “that they all become one body in Me,”—in Him 
 who carries all in Himself, through the one temple assumed bv 
 
516 APPENDIX. 
 
 Hin (é €uol—a@s travtas hopobvrs dia Tod évds avadnpOévTos 
 vaod). Legat. ad Athanas. f. Marcell. in Monttauc. Coll. 
 Nov. 2, p. 3. The Exposit. Fid., professedly by Gregor. 
 Thaumat., in A. Mai, 1. c. 7, 175:—@avat@ wapadovs tiv 
 capka tod Oavatouv édvce Oia THS avactacews els THY TAVTOV 
 nuav advactacw: aviprOe Sé eis ovpavorv, wrydv Kal dogalov 
 avOpwrrous év €avt@. Similarly Chrysostom (Opp. Paris 1840). 
 Christ’s sufferings are to be regarded as a deed (9, 6, E.; 70 
 malos mpaéis). ‘Through them, namely, He has worked more 
 good in the world than sin has worked evil (4, 786, E.); @ava- 
 tov Oavatos 0 Gavatos abtod yéyovev (9, 585, A.; 11, 426, A.; 
 734 D.). He paid the debt for Adam and us all (i7ép Tob 
 Katexouévou KatédaPe Tov-Oavatov); and even more than that 
 (3, 910, A.; 9,574 D.). He humbled Himself, in order to 
 exalt thee; He died, in order to make thee immortal; He be- 
 came a curse, in order to fill thee with blessing. In Him 7vAo- 
 ynOn 4 avOpwrivn pdous (Expos. in Ps. xlv. T. 5, 198).—We 
 are born of Christ, as Eve was born of Adam, by baptism, and 
 in the holy Eucharist He nourishes with Himself (8, 258, on 
 Ephesians v. 25 ff.; de prodit. Jud. hom. h. 1, 6; T. 2, 453; 
 3, 389 f.). He calls us brethren, friends, bride; yea also His 
 members and His body; and, as though all other things failed 
 to satisfy Him, and still appeared too alien, He styles Himself 
 our Head (2, 278; 8, 193; 9, 763): now, as body and head 
 are one man, so is Christ and the Church one (hom. 30, 1, in 
 1yGorsu Sl 2 wl OaS lb ys 
 
 Cyrill of Alexandria says (Thesaur. 20),—Grace has deified 
 our nature, first in Christ, a ov abtod tpéyn AovTrov eis TavTas 
 ) Xapls, WS On Ooleioa TH hicet, Kal owTrdov OAM TwloMEVN TO 
 yévet. (See other passages from his writings in Petav. de in- 
 earn. 2,9; 17, 9; Hilarii Opp. ed. Maur. Pref. pp. xxi. ff.) 
 
 Similarly Theodoret (Her. fab. 4, 13; Opp. ed. Schulz, 
 T. iv. pp. 373, 374):—In His nature, our nature rose again; 
 but inasmuch as this happened to our nature, it is counted to 
 our persons. Similarly Ep. ad Eneraph. viii. p. 1066; Ep. 15, 
 p. 1291.—Page 275,—2) amapyn tiv mpos TO ddov ExeL ouyyé- 
 vecav. Christ, however, is not amapy7 as God, rola yap cvy- 
 yevera Oeotntos Kal avOpwrroty 1:5; on account of His capé, we 
 are termed His members, and He the head (p. 279, 16, cf. 278, 
 15). In Dial. 1, 40-44, this idea is already subjected to a cri- 
 
NOTES. abr 
 
 tical treatment, with reference to Eph. ii. 6. One might sup- 
 pose that when He is said to have become man, or even a curse, 
 for us, we ought to understand it subjectively,—namely, that so 
 it appears to us, without objective reality. This is the one 
 extreme. ‘The other extreme is that of Apollinaris, who taught 
 that Christ, in becoming man, converted, transubstantiated us 
 into Himself. This is refuted by 2 Cor. v. 21; for we cannot 
 say that Christ substantially became sin. The substitution, how- 
 ever, he is determined to retain. In pp. 424-426, he shows, 
 from Rom. v. 12 ff., 1 Cor. xv. 21 ff., that the unity of all in 
 Christ was the purpose of the incarnation. As the Apolli- 
 narists exaggerated, so the Arians fell short, of the idea. They 
 acknowledge that Christ had a body, in order that it might be 
 possible for us to see Him, in order to reveal the brightness of 
 His divine essence in such a manner that it might be endurable; 
 in other words, they limit the significance of Christ to His pro- 
 phetic office. But for this purpose, an incarnation was not 
 needed: did not the Son appear to Abraham without becoming 
 aman? What was necessary was, that the same nature which 
 had been conquered should gain the victory; in this the Arian 
 theory fails. On its basis, namely, we do not know ourselves as 
 victors in Christ, through the victory gained by our nature in 
 Him. Even Theodore of Mopsuestia (A. Mai, Spicileg. Rom. 
 T. 4), in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (c. vi. 
 6, p. 508), says,—76 X pict, dnow (Paul) éoravpopéve dorep 
 amraca nuav 1) bro Thy Ountornta Keipévn dvors cuvertaupoOn 
 ETELON KAL TACA avuT@ cvvavéotn, TaVTOV avOporrav avTe cup- 
 Ketacyely éeXmiovtwv Ths avactdcews’ ds évredbev ovvavaha- 
 via Ohvat ev THY Trepl TO apaptavew huav edtxoriav, Sid THs émh 
 trv aBavaciay Tob cdbsaros petactacews. Compare my Christ- 
 mas Programme for 1844, “'Theodori Mopsy. de imagine Dei 
 doctrina,” pp. 23, 24. In Christ the likeness to God borne by 
 man is brought to perfection; He is the fixed, the indissoluble 
 bond of unity for the entire world, which Adam was not com- 
 pletely: Adam, on the contrary, rent the bond. Of later writers, 
 we may further mention John of Damascus, “de orthod. fide” 
 3, 12, 4,4; Theodorus Abukara, Opusc. ed. Gretser, 6, p. 453. 
 This latter tries to make clear by images how it was possible 
 for sin and salvation to pass through the whole of humanity ; 
 and how the first and the second Adam might have the signifi- 
 
518 APPENDIX. 
 
 >ance of an universal principle. Coll. Nov. ed. A. Mai, T. 9, 
 104, of Photius: efSes rpecBevtod iravOpwriay, ob yap Tpos 
 &va Kat Sedrepov HrOev, GAA Tpos THY Kowny poow. For fur 
 ther passages, see Petav. 1. c.; Hilar. Opp. ed. Maur. |. c. ; Calov’s 
 “Examen doctrine public eccl. refer. de persona Christi,” 
 Viteb. 1663, pp. 95, 130 ff., 170 f., 192, 290, 331, 394 f., 419, 
 450; Mansi Coll. Conc. 4, 1186 ff. 
 
 Nore 59, page 348. 
 
 Compare the fragment of Eustathius in Theodoret’s Dialog. 
 8, T. 4, ed. Schulz, p. 233 :—Aua ti O€ wept ToNXOV TroLovYTaL 
 ) ) I ir 
 / \ lal / 
 Seuxvivat, Tov Xpiorov dapvyov avethnpévat copa, yewders TAT- 
 rovtes amrdtas ; Wa et Suvneiev trrodOcipat twas, TavO ovTwS 
 yew opifecbat, Thvixadta Tas Tov Taber adrotocers TO Gein 
 Tepiarparres Trevpatl, padiws avaTretowow AUTOUS WS OUK EOTL 
 \ a es: ams / / / > 
 TO TPETTOV EK THS ATPETTTOV pucews yevynbev. ‘That this was 
 the doctrine of Arius (and specially also that of Eunomius ; 
 compare Marcelliana, ed. Rettberg, p. 157), is repeatedly af- 
 firmed by Athanasius; for example, c. Apollinaristas 1, 15 :— 
 parnv obv Apeavol copiforvras capKka movny vToTWemevor avet- 
 Andévat Tov cwrthpa, trv é Tod wdOous vonow emt THv aTraby 
 Ocdrnta avadépovtes doeBas. 2, 3:—'Apevos capKa BOVNV TpoOs 
 A ¢ a A 5 lal 
 amoxpupny THs OedtnTos Oporoyel, avTt dé TOU écwbev ev nut 
 avOpwrrov, TouTésTL THS Wuyijs, TOV hoyou év TH capKl. eve ye- 
 yovévat, THY TOD wdOous vonow, Kal Tv €E dou avacTacw TH 
 Oeotnte mpocdyew Torpev. Greg. Naz. Ep. ad Cledon. 1, 7; 
 Gregor. Nyss. c. Eunom. 2, 484:—spopépovoa tiv Tod evary- 
 / \ e e / \ xs ¢ \ n \ 
 yediou hoviy: 6Tt 0 Aoyos aapE éyEveTo, ws Ola TOV PN TULpVYN- 
 povevOnvat Kai tv Wuynv KatacKevdferOa TO apuxov avel- 
 MibOas Tv cdpKa, wabérwoar, br aivnbés eote TH ayia ypahh, 
 an / A . 
 TO pepes cuptrepirapBavew To brov. Kpiphan. her. 69, 19 :— 
 ’ an \ > peas e / > / > Sal den la} 
 Apvobvrat Wuyi avtov avOpamuwny ethynpévat, avVTO TOUTO Tpo- 
 / "4 N: e a 9 \ ) \ / 
 KatacKevacovTes: cadpka yap Oouoroyovow adnOinv aro Mapias 
 24=\ > i \ / ¢/ b) \ b) > t \ A 
 avrov éaynkoTa, Kal Tata boa éoTiv ev avOpeTre, xapis WuXI)s- 
 This they do, he proceeds, in order that they may be able to 
 say,—Such things (as éuBp/ynows, etc.) the flesh did not work 
 by itself, without soul; but Christ had no soul; consequently 
 they must be ascribed to His higher nature. 
 
NOTES. 519 
 
 Note 60, page 349. 
 
 The fragments of Eustathius in A. Mai, T. 7, of the Coll. 
 Noy., contain scarcely anything bearing on this subject. Only 
 the words contained on page 85, which are taken from the work 
 to which the above passage belonged, might possibly, inasmuch 
 as they are directed against the idea broached by certain philo- 
 sophers, that the soul in its wanderings drinks the cup of for- 
 getfulness prior to each new birth, have a reference to the 
 Arians, who may have made use of the philosopheme for the 
 purpose of demonstrating the reality of the human development. 
 The work of Eustathius was entitled arep) wuyijs cata bidocd- 
 gov; and the peculiar circumstances of Antioch (see the text) 
 probably gave occasion to these investigations, which initiated a 
 new series of works on the soul (compare Gregory of Nyssa, 
 “de Anima;” Augustine, “de Anima;’ Nemesius, “de natura 
 hominis”). More to the purpose is offered by the fragments in 
 Theodoret, Dial. 1, 3; Galland. 1. c. pp. 578 ff. The passage cited 
 above, in Note 59, page 518, proves that Eustathius not merely 
 understood and remarked the Arian artifice of teaching that 
 Christ had a cama apuyov, in order to be able to transfer the 
 emotions and so forth to the Logos; but also saw that the 
 Church must of necessity either accept the Arian, subordina- 
 tian consequence, or teach a human soul. LEustathius, however, 
 was led to the same result by other considerations,—to wit, by 
 the consideration of His descent into Hades. In death, the soul 
 of Christ was separated from His body; but ris capkos éxtods 
 yevouérn Ff kai bpéoryKe, Nay more, yéyove Kat €v TS Yopio TOV 
 avOpotivov yuyav. It thus had experience of both the things 
 which befall us (éxatépwv creipav oye); Noyexi dpa Kab tais 
 wuxais TOv avOpeTrwv capKt Tuyydvel, ex THs Mapias tpoed- 
 Qotca. He therefore attached great importance to the truth of 
 the human development of Christ. In his view, it was by no 
 means deified or in possession of divine prerogatives from the 
 very commencement (Gall. pp. 577 f.). The exaltation (Sofa 
 émixtytos) did not concern the Father, who is TéNevos, azretpos, 
 aTEpwvontos, ampocdens Kaos; nor the Son, to whom Eusta- 
 thius gives the same predicates; dAN 6 dvOpwros tod Xpictod 
 ex vexpav éyetpomevos trrovtat Kat So€dkerar. P. 578 :—adros 
 tip’ oUTOS éaTLV O peTa TAS UBpes, devdrs, duophos opabels, eira 
 
520 APPENDIX. 
 
 Tddw €« weTaBorHs evTrpéTrerav evduTapmEvOS’ OVSE YAP 0 KATOLKAV 
 év avT@® Oeds apuvod dixnv eis Oavatov iyyeTo, etc. Pp. 580, 581 
 (from Facundus Herm. 11, 1):—‘“ Dicamus, inquit (Kusta- 
 thius) cujus rei gratia filius hominis diem proprii adventus ignoret 
 (Matt. xxiv. 36). For our good, He was ignorant of the day 
 of judgment. Sicut enim hominem—Verbo coaptavit et Deo 
 (salutis hominum causa); sic et insignem judicii diem caussa 
 divini beneficii homini competenter abscondit, ne forte ineffa- 
 bilia mysteria similis generis hominibus indicans et diem secundi 
 adventus ostenderet.” But unquestionably for the sake of His 
 voluntary sufferings on our behalf, He is crowned with honour 
 and glory. He sits also as to His humanity on the holy throne, 
 avvOpovos amrodédekTat TO OevoTadtw Tvevpatt, Sia TOV oiKODYTA 
 Ocov &v avT@ dunvexas (Theod. Dial. 2, Gall. 577). Page 581: 
 —The words of Ps. ix. 8, “ Dominus in ceelo preeparavit sedem 
 suam,” refer neither to the Father nor to the Word, who both 
 already have the kingdom, but to Christ. “Nam omnium 
 simul creaturarum dominator (sc. Christus est) propter Verbi 
 divini commixtionem.” Similarly the fragment in Gelasius’ 
 “de duabus naturis in Christo” (Gall. 581):—Homo Deum 
 ferens, qui mortis passionem sponte censuit sustinere,—honorem 
 et potestatem percepit. Ht ubi (ibi) recipitur gloria, guam ne- 
 quaquam prius habuerat.” HKustathius, therefore, conceived the 
 communication of the divine attributes, not as complete from 
 the very beginning, but as first fully accomplished at the ascen- 
 sion. Indeed, he was in general concerned to allow the humanity 
 of Christ free and full play; thus showing himself to be a true 
 Antiocheian. According to a passage in Gelasius (Gall. 581), 
 he taught that Christ had an human soul, expressly because he 
 could not otherwise deem the incarnation complete. Sadness, 
 emotions, hunger, and the like, could not affect the fulness of 
 the deity. “ Homini vero heec adplicanda sunt proprie, qui ex 
 anima constat et corpore; congruit enim, ex ipsis humanis et 
 innoxiis motibus demonstrare quia non phantastice et putative, 
 sed ipsa veritate totum hominem indutus est Deus perfecte adsu- 
 mens.” At the same time, we must not omit to notice that, after 
 the manner of the later Antiocheians, the deity and the hu- 
 manity remain separate and distinct, and do not constitute a 
 living unity. He describes the incarnation most frequently 
 under the image of the indwelling of the Logos in the temple of 
 
NOTES. 521 
 
 humanity ; the unity of the Logos with the humanity he reduces 
 to the anointing of the humanity with the Holy Ghost by the 
 Logos, who, at the same time, remained by Himself. Accord- 
 ing to A. Mai, 1]. c. p. 203, in his homilies on the Gospel of John, 
 he remarked on the passage, “Ido not Mine own will,’—In 
 Christ there was no will which stood in need of negation (“ Ne- 
 gation,” caradvcews), neither the divine (@eixov), nor that which 
 sprang from the incarnation (To 7Hs avOpwmjcews) :—which 
 latter will, according to another fragment, superadded aperas 
 émuxtytous. From this it would seem that Eustathius assumed 
 the existence of two wills in Christ, which, however, will the 
 same thing. ‘The same conclusion may be drawn from a frag- 
 ment in Theodor. Dial. 3, Gall. 576 :—Birth did not lessen His 
 é£ovoia; the cross did not wound His mwvetwa. To pev yap 
 THUA peTapatov éoTavpodTo, TO dé Ociov THs Zopias mvetwa Kat 
 TOU c@uatos elow SinTatTO, Kal Tots oUpaviols eTEBaTevE, Kal 
 Tacayv Trepletye THY HV, Kal TOY aBvocwV expadTel, Kal Tas 
 ExdoTov Wuyas aviyvetav Siéxpive, Kal TAaVTA O600 cvV}OIws ola 
 Ocos erpattev. Ov yap elow TOV cMpaTiKoY OyKaV 7 aVwTATw 
 Aopia kaberpypévn TeprexeTat, Kabdrrep ai TOV typav Kat Enpav 
 Var TOV Lev ayyelwv elow KaTAKELOVTAL, TrepLeyovTaL 5é Laddov 
 i) Tepleyovot Tas Onxas. *ANAa Gcla Tis odca Kai avéxppacTtos 
 Sivas TAT evdotatwo Kat éEwtdtw Tot vew TepthawPavovca 
 Kparatot KavTedOev éréxewwa SujKovaea TaVTAS Omov TOS OyKOUS 
 Kparet mepiéyouca. Page 582 :—God (and the Logos is God) 
 fills the universe; for Him, therefore, there can be no such 
 thing as movement from one place to another (ovdauas é& Eré- 
 pov eis éTépovs peOlotatat ToToUs, Ta TavTa TAnpav) ; for if 
 He were outside of a place, the place which He failed to fill, 
 would bound Him (e¢ yap é@ NéyouTo TOTOU TLVOS, avayKN TreE- 
 propiver Oat adtov tm éxeivov, obTep otepicxetat). ‘This now 
 must be applied to the incarnation also :—and, at a later period, 
 we find Theodore of Mopsuestia taking it as his point of depar- 
 ture. But if no advance were made beyond the position thus 
 described, the Logos must be judged to have had His own inde- 
 pendent consciousness and sway (at all events, during the earthly 
 life of Christ), and the man Jesus also his; and it is not clear 
 how Eustathius could avoid assuming a double personality, at 
 all events during the time referred to. It will therefore not be 
 accidental, that, besides Theodoret, Facundus of Hermione, an 
 
522 APPENDIX. 
 
 adherent of the doctrine of Theodore of Mopsuestia, so fre 
 quently cites him. He pays quite too little regard to the unity 
 of the person, although he still unsuspectingly supposes himself 
 to be in possession thereof. The utmost he arrives at i an ac- 
 tion of the Logos in and on this man; an incarnation, an hu- 
 manification of the Logos lay beyond his reach. 
 
 Nore 61, page 350. 
 C. Ar. 3, 30:—O Aodyos oapE éyévero—avOpwrros Sé yéyove, 
 
 Kal ovK €is avOpwrrov AVE Kal TodTO yap avayxatov cidévat, lest 
 being led astray by the ungodly, we should suppose, érz do7rep 
 a , a ° 
 év tois éumpoobev ypovols eis Exactov TOV aylwv éyiveTo, olTH 
 kai vov eis avOpwrov érednunoev 0 Oxyos ayiatwv Kai TodTOV 
 \ he WA \be. a ” S) \ ee 9S 
 Kab davepovpevos wamrep Kal év Tois adAOLS. Hi yap ovTws Hv 
 \ / > 5) , \ 9 IQ\ 3 / 
 Kat povov év avOpworrm dhavels hv, ovdév Hv tapddoEov. Then, 
 those who saw Him, would not have asked, What manner of 
 man is this? and, Why doest thou, being a man, make thy- 
 self God? Nop 6é, éretd2) 0 Tod Ocod Aoyos Sv od yéyove Ta 
 TUVTa, UTéeweWE Kal viov avOp@Tov yevécOat, Kal érarretvwceV 
 éauTov, AaB@v Sovrov popdyv, dia TodTo Tovdalows péev oKdv- 
 darov €otw 0 Tod Xpiotod ataupos, piv dé Xpratos Ocod Sivas 
 cal Ocod copia. “O dAoyos yap capE éyéveto, THs ypadhs eos 
 éyvovons, eye cdpKa Tov avOpwtov. C. Arian 4, 35, he shows 
 that Christ Himself counted His body part of His person and 
 actuality. In Luke xxiv. 39, Christ says not—“Touch this 
 man, or My man (that is, the man, whom I have); but, touch 
 Me” (ovx etme tov oe i) Tov avOpwrdv jov, dv aveiAnda GAN 
 ewe). Thus in the presence of Thomas (see John xx. 27), God, 
 the Logos, terms the hands and the side His own. He in His 
 entirety is God and man at the same time (6dov adrov dvOpw- 
 Tov Te Kat Ocdv owod). Ep. ad Maximum Philos. c. 2:—Od 
 yap avOpérou Tivos Hv TO BrETOMEVOY Hua, GArXd Ocod. For 
 this reason, we cannot say,—6re els dvOpwrrov Twa e&ytov éyévero 
 6 ToD Ocod Aoyos" TobTO yap ev Exdotw éyévero TOV TpodnTav 
 Kal TOV adrAaVv aylov' va pH Kal’ Exactov yevveOpevos Kal 
 / b] , / ’ ” \ ec \ / 
 Taw atrobvnckwv paivntar. Ovx gate dé ottws, pu) ryévolTo, 
 b) oe, Pea af a / a I. > ts, a ¢e 
 arr amaké etl TH cvvTedcia TOV aidver eis atéOnow THs apap- 
 if > \ ¢ / \ > if: \ > fe A / 
 Tlas avTOS 0 AOYos GapE eyéeveto Kal éx Mapias THs TapOévov 
 A BA ») e , e , eee 
 mponOev avOpwros Kal duoiwow ierépav, John viii. 40. 
 Ovx« avOpeérov te Twos METEYOVTES TWMATOS, GANA avTot Tod 
 
NOTES. 523 
 
 Aoyuu cowa AawBdvovres (in the Holy Eucharist) Geor ocov- 
 peGa. 
 
 Norte 62, page 352. 
 
 The question appears to me to have taken in the mind of 
 Athanasius the form which I have indicated in the text; not, 
 however, that a human soul alongside of the Logos would 
 threaten the unity of the person, as Baur supposes (p. 579). 
 The soul by itself would scarcely have occasioned him difficulty ; 
 for he did not conceive it as a particular substance, or as a sub- 
 ject, which, as such, would exclude another subject from itself 
 (in the present case, therefore, the hypostasis of the Son), or 
 would at all events come into conflict therewith; but rather 
 as a multiplicity of powers, or as a movement of thoughts and 
 volitions, which have an individual limitation in and through the 
 body. On such a view of the soul, the union of the hypostasis 
 of the Logos with a human individuality might be accomplished 
 without much difficulty, because two subjects would not then be 
 supposed to meet in the one Christ. The divine hypostasis 
 alone (as it were the universal element) in Christ receives hu- 
 man individuality. At this time, not a single word can as yet 
 be spoken regarding an human Ego. Athanasius felt that, in 
 order for Christ’s soul to be of like nature with us, it must be 
 free; and on other grounds, this seemed to him a doubtful 
 opinion. We see, as often as he approaches this question, that 
 he feared it would be necessary to exchange the theological 
 point of view of the Church with the anthropological one of 
 Ebionism, if a free human soul were posited. For he constantly 
 warns against forming such a conception of the full humanity 
 of Christ as leads to Samosatenism, and against seeing in 
 Christ merely an independent man apart from the Logos. 
 Compare the passages c. Ar. 4, 35; 3, 30; Ep. ad Max. Philos. 
 2, 3. 
 
 Norte 63, page 393. 
 
 The main sources are the very numerous fragments in 
 Gregor. Nyss. Antirrheticus adv. Apollinarem, ed. Zacagni, p. 
 123-287; A. Mai, Coll. Nov. T. 7; Gregor. Naz. Ep. i. ii. ad 
 Cledon. and ad Nectar.; Athanasius c. Apollinaristas, L. 1, 2 
 (compare below, Note 65); Epiphanius, Her. 62; Theodoret 
 
524 APPENDIX, 
 
 her. fab, 4, and Dialog. 3. Many fragments of Apollinaris are 
 contained in the Catene ; compare especially the Catena to the 
 Gospel of John, ed. Corderius, 1630. He forms the strongest 
 antagonism to the school of Antioch, which even in his lifetime 
 had already acquired, under Diodorus of Tarsus and Carterius, 
 the features which were distinctively characteristic of it; and 
 from it, for a considerable period, proceeded many attacks on 
 Apollinaris and his school (so, for example, from Diodorus in his 
 work against the Synusiasts, from Theodorus of Mopsuestia xv. 
 LL. ady. Apollinarist. et Eunom., and from Theodoret). That 
 even as early as the year 360, it was usual for some in Antioch 
 to draw a distinction between the divine and human aspects of 
 Christ (see Note 60), which, in the apprehension of many, 
 threatened the introduction of a double personality, is evident 
 from Athanasius, c. Apoll., and from the Alexandrian Synodal 
 Epistle, entitled Tomus ad Antiochenos a. 562. Apollinaris 
 himself perhaps wrote to Diodorus (Marl! o.\7, 17) aqme 
 events, he wrote about and against him. If we consider, on the 
 one hand, that Apollinaris deduced the description of the per- 
 son, the dissolution of the incarnation, relapse into the heathenish 
 error of denying the incarnation of Christ, and into the Jewish 
 error of viewing it ebionitically, from the doctrine of a par- 
 ticular human soul, to which his opponents gave such promi- 
 nence; and on the other hand, that which we know of Eusta- 
 thius of Antioch; this doctrine would undoubtedly appear to 
 have found a seat in Antioch from the year 330 onwards, and 
 to have been vigorously represented by Diodorus and his school, 
 though at the same time to have been strongly opposed both by 
 Apollinaris and others. 
 
 Nore 64, page 354. 
 
 Many polemical arguments of the Church Fathers have been 
 prematurely referred to Apollinaris, which did not relate to him 
 at all. For example, what has Athanasius’ Ep. ad Epictetum 
 Corinth. Episc. (Opp. 1, 901 ff.) to do with Apollinaris? The 
 ““tessera” of Apollinaris is not mentioned amongst the views 
 there controverted, namely, the denial of the human soul of 
 Christ. The only allusion is to a heavenly humanity and a 
 conversion of God; just as in the Ep. Basilii M. to the Sozo- 
 politans (1. c. Ep. 65, T. 3, 103). Still less can the words of 
 
NOTEs. 525 
 
 Hilarius (de Trin. 10, 15 ff.) be referred to Apollinaris. For 
 that work was composed before the doctrine of Apollinaris had 
 attracted the attention it subsequently did. Besides, the views 
 there controverted are totally different: they combine three 
 momenta in themselves :—-1. The Logos emptied Himself, fell 
 away from Himself in the incarnation (defecit a se Deo), and 
 was present in the man Jesus merely as a passible potence or 
 power. 2. In this form He animated the man Jesus, even as 
 the Spirit of prophecy stirred in the prophets. 3. Hence Jesus 
 was so perfectly a man, that He had not merely a body, but 
 also a soul from Adam. They reproached the teachers of the 
 Church with not bringing out the full equality of the essence of 
 Christ with us, in relation to body and soul ; which is necessary, 
 seeing that the body and soul of Adam lay in sin. We have 
 here, therefore, another illustration of the truth of the assertion, 
 that the doctrine of a conversion of the Logos may pass into 
 Ebionism. How widely diffused such views were, we see from 
 the circumstance, that Athanasius controverts them in his Ep. ad 
 Hpictetum 2, 11,12. They did not deny the birth from a virgin ; 
 nor the Trinity ; but from Apollinaris they were so far removed, 
 that in point of result, they might be more justly classed with 
 the Antiocheians of the fifth century. Nor is it allowable to 
 distribute the above views between different parties ; they stood 
 all together, for example, in one work, Athan. ad Epictetum, 
 cap. 3. Further, even in Can. 11, 12 of the Synod of Sirmium 
 of the year 351, we read,—“Si quis Verbum caro factum est, 
 audiens Verbum in carnem translatum putet, vel demutationem 
 sustinentem accepisse carnem dicit, anathema sit.—Si quis uni- 
 cum Dei filium crucifixum audiens dealitatem (Ocoryra) ejus 
 corruptionem vel passibilitatem aut demutationem, aut deminu- 
 tionem vel interfectionem sustinuisse dicat, anathema sit.” 
 
 Norte 65, page 359. 
 
 These views are partially controverted also in the three books 
 of Athanasius, which usually bear the title, “Adv. Apollina- 
 ristas ;” in which, however, neither Apollinaris nor any other 
 name is distinctly mentioned. Still, the form of the refutation 
 is such as to betray that its author had gone through the Apol- 
 linaristic phase of doctrine. It is a mistake to suppose that 
 these books contain, strictly speaking, an account of the theory 
 
526 APPENDIX. 
 
 of Apollinaris himself; but it would be equally erroneous to 
 suppose that Athanasius did not think he was really combating 
 the view propounded by Apollinaris. The true state of the case 
 is rather the following:—These books, according to Proclus, 
 written after the death of Apollinaris, are taken up with his 
 school in general, which, in consequence of coalescing with 
 theories such as those above described, had separated into dif- 
 ferent parties, pursuing different tendencies. Many of the 
 opinions controverted by Athanasius in these books, must there- 
 fore not be laid to the account of Apollinaris; although they 
 may be fairly counted part of Apollinarism, as a phenomenon 
 of the Church. The three positions—the conversion of the 
 Logos (dAXolwois Tod AO¥Yov) ; that the passion of Christ was 
 mere seeming; that the flesh of Christ was heavenly and un- 
 created (cap Xpiotod dxtiotos, émoupavos)—in particular, 
 were laid down as we have seen by writers prior to Apollinaris :— 
 whether by himself also, we shali soon see. The existence of 
 these parties prior to Apollinaris throws also a clearer light 
 on the Synodal Epistle of the Alexandrian Synod, which was 
 written about 362 (Athan. Opp. 1, 770 ff.; entitled Tomus ad 
 Antioch.). This Synod, namely, lays down the principle,— 
 ‘Dporoyour yap Kab TodTO, 6tt ov cHua dapvyov ovd’ avaiaOnTor, 
 ov’ avontov elyev 6 wtp ; whereby the opinion of Apollinaris 
 is substantially excluded. Moreover, it is scarcely to be doubted 
 that Paulinus, who shortly after handed over to Epiphanius a 
 copy of this Synodal Epistle, which he had subscribed (Hpiph. 
 l, c.), referred these words of the Council, either to Apollinaris 
 or to his faithful pupil Vitalis. At the same time, we have no 
 right to conclude that the Council attributed to Apollinaris or 
 to Vitalis all the opinions which it condemns, and that it con- 
 sequently had had to do with Apollinaris alone. Neither the 
 opinion, that the Word did not become flesh, but that it “ hap- 
 pened to Christ,” or that it came upon Him, as upon the prophets; 
 nor that of a duplicity of Christ, in the sense, that the Son of 
 God before Abraham was one, the Son of God after Abraham 
 another (repos): He who raised Lazarus from the dead one, 
 another He who inquired after him, fits Apollinaris. But by 
 these are meant such as Hilarius describes (de Trin. 10, 21), who 
 represented the man Jesus as influenced after the manner of the 
 prophets, and brought against the teachers of the Church the 
 
NOTES. 527 
 
 charge, “quod Christum dicamus esse natum non nostri corporis 
 atque anime hominem.” Indeed, from the latter one might ven- 
 ture to surmise, that when the Synod of Alexandria maintained 
 that all the orthodox with them, agreed 67 0b capa dapuyov ov 
 avaic@ntov ovS avontov eiyev 0 cwTNp, it merely meant in the 
 first Instance to say,—In rejecting that Ebionitical view, the 
 Church teachers have no intention either of leaving the charge 
 brought by Ebionites unnoticed, or of detracting from the com- 
 pleteness of the humanity of Christ; on the contrary, if there 
 are any who posit, for example, no human soul, this also is to 
 be blamed. Looking at the matter in this light, Apollinaris 
 and his followers can by no means be said to have been arraigned 
 before the bar of the Synod, although they were eventually con- 
 demned. What was in the first instance arraigned, was a Chris- 
 tology which substantially led back to Ebionism, which no 
 longer took up an unitarian position relatively to the doctrine 
 of the Trinity, but merely, out of regard to the unity of the 
 Person of Jesus, represented the Logos as a mere power in the 
 human personality, either on the basis of a conversion of the 
 Logos into a mere potence (see Note 64),—a view which was 
 certainly taken by some; or without such aconversion. In the 
 latter case, even on the supposition of a partial conversion, we 
 should arrive at a double Christ, and at an Ebionism engrafted 
 on the doctrine of the Trinity,—a phenomenon which we shall 
 shortly find in the school of Antioch. Deputies from Apollinaris 
 attended the Synod and subscribed its decrees; so that it is 
 doubtful whether the Fathers always had Apollinaris in view, 
 or whether his position was not at that date a more favourable 
 one :—namely, whether he and his adherents were not at that 
 time the strongest defenders of the view of the Church, in op- 
 position to those who arrived at a double Christ, and approxi- 
 mated to Ebionism as regards the human aspect of the Re- 
 deemer. But, however it may stand with the persons and with 
 the judgment of the Synod as to the views entertained by the 
 persons, it is substantially clear that the Fathers rejected, not 
 only a double Christ, but also such an unity of His person as 
 involved the mutilation of His human nature, or as was in any 
 way effected by a conversion of the divine into the human. 
 Compare also, Mansi Concil. T. 3, 355. 
 
528 APPENDIX. 
 
 Nore 66, page 361. 
 Gregor. Nyss. |. c. c. 48, p. 237; ¢. 36, p. 215 :—Ei un vods 
 
 dnow evoapKos éotw 0 Kbptos, Sopia av ein dwrifovca vodv 
 avOparrov (but He would not be God-man). <Adrn o€ Kai &v 
 Tacw avOpwros. Hi 5é tadta, ovK« iy éridnuia Ocod 1) Xpic- 
 Tov Trapouvcia, AAN avOparrouv yévynots. ‘This, therefore, would 
 be the Ebionitical consequence. P. 216:—Eav yap Sodia 
 eumuatevOy eivar 0 Kuptos n ev Tat SnAab? Seyouévols THY YapL, 
 ovKéere ertdnpiav Ocod THY Xptotod Tapovalay oporoynToMeEev, WS 
 NANOTpPLOLEVNS TOD Ocod THs Zodias (that is, as though the Sophia 
 in Christ were different from the Sophia in us, as the word 
 érvdnula requires us to suppose); ¢. 37, p. 217:—in that case, 
 no KxataPaivew, no self-abasement, of the Kupuos took place. 
 The opponents, indeed, who laid special stress on the human 
 soul of Christ, styled Jesus an av@pwrov évfeov; and were 
 therefore not disposed to fall into monarchian Ebionism; they 
 clung firmly to the T'rinity, and desired an union of the Logos 
 with the man Jesus, an union of the perfect Logos with the 
 perfect man. ‘To this, however, he replies, 1. c. c. 42, p. 282: — 
 Ei avOparr@ cuvihOn Ocds, Tédevos Terelw, SVo av Trav, eis wev 
 dices vies Oeod, eis 6é Gerds. Plain reference is here already 
 made to the Christology of the school of Antioch. He sees 
 clearly that, on such a view also, no incarnation would have 
 taken place; that the gain realized in connection with the doc- 
 trine of the Trinity, would lie useless and dead; and that a 
 Christology would be formed, in which a monarchian concep- 
 tion of God would amply suffice for that which the human 
 personality of Jesus was held to have profited by the capxwaus. 
 
 Nore 67, page 363. 
 
 C. 40:—To the capE is duotxov TO Hryewovever Oat édetto Sé 
 atpémTou vov, p) UToTimtovTos avTH Sia émiaTnmoovvns acbe- 
 vetav, GAA cvvappolovTos avTiy aBidoTws éavTo. C. 51:— 
 Od Svvatat colew Tov Kocpov 0 avOpwiros Mev OV Kal TH KOWH 
 
 fal an \ 
 tov. avOporrav POopa troxeipevos. °“AAN ovde tO Ocod pn 
 2 / Chane. / / \ \ / 
 emripuyOévtos nuiv cwtouela; Miyvutar o€ cap& yevopevos 
 toutéow avOpwmos. “ANN ovdé MWe THY TOV avOpaTTMYV apap- 
 Tlav fn yevomevos avOpwrros avaydapTnTos, OvdE THY KATA TAVTWV 
 > / a / / / > \ e 4 
 avOporwv tod Oavatov Bactrclav KaTanvet, eb wn os aVOpwTrOs 
 
 ws 
 
NOTES. 529 
 
 amébave nal avéctn. OC. 45, pp. 244 f.:—Ei avopworov, dbnow, 
 vieTat Tis evodcbat Oe (in the Person of Christ) rapa wdvtas 
 avipwmous Kat ayyéhous . . . Trouser pr adte£ovalous Tovs 
 > t \ \ > 4 e EERO ai ¢ \ 5) / 
 ayyedous Kat Tovs avOpwrous, ws ovdE ) capE adte£ovctos" 
 Popa dé tod avteEovolov Sdov TO wn iva adte£ovaov ot 
 Pbeiperas 5é 1) Hvats UO TOU TromcayToS avTyV. 
 He appears also to have said,—Where there is a complete 
 
 man, there also is sin. Athan. c. Apoll. 1, 2:—’Oou yap 
 
 /. ” > a Nese ts > ee 3 nm ¢ 
 TeheLos avOpwrros, éKet Kai duapTtia’ érrel EaraL Kal év XploT@ 1) 
 cv Nu Layn THS dpaptias, Kal értat ad’T@ ypela Tob Kal” Huds 
 Kabaptopod, et To ppovoty Kai TO aryov év julv Tv cdpKa, Xpic- 
 TOs év EavT@ érridcbeuxtar yevouevos avOpwros. “AAA edra/Pé, 
 bot, TO avontor, iv’ ats 7 vods év abTa, Kal dyevotos  rdvTH 
 THS amaptias, Kata ye TO Oeixov Kal TO dvontov Ths capKos. 
 Ovre yap dpudpro dv 7 cap, Tod dyovtos THY cdpKa, TovTécTL 
 Tod hpovovytos, yun TpoevOupnOévtos tiv Tpakw THS apaptias 
 Kat éevepynoavtos dia Tod cdpatos eis éxTAIpwow THs apap las. 
 
 Gregory of Nyssa’s Antirrhet. c. 48, p. 254:—Ex tpidv 6 
 
 avOpwrros, to wit (p. 248), wvedpuaros Kab apoyns Kal oop.1TOS 
 (c. 8, p. 141 :—oapxos te kat uyhs Kat vod). P. 255:—AdAd 
 Kai 0 Kupios avopwrros éx tpiav Kaxelvos, tvebvpartos Kal puyns 
 
 \ / 3 \ VO 9 / BA pee / 
 Kat cwpatos. “Ada Kat éroupdvios avOpwios. Ei é« rdvrev 
 TOV Lowy Hiv éaTe Tols xoiKois 6 érroupdvios avOpwrros, ovK 
 > / ; % 9 / * = . A 
 eTOUPaVios GAN éTroupaviou doxeiov. That is, if man is complete 
 apart from the heavenly, it can only stand in the relation of an 
 unnecessary accident to the humanity of Christ. Present or 
 absent, the man remains complete. Theodoret, Heer. Fab. 4, 8. 
 Sapx@Ohvai tov Ody ence AOyov, cha Kab apuyny avetAndora, 
 
 b] \\ \ >’ \ \ yA xX a\ + / 
 ov THY hoyiKnY aAdAG THY adoyov HY huTiKHY Hryouv CwoTiKHY TIVES 
 ’ / \ x a BA \ \ \ 5 / b 
 ovopacovar Tov dé voov aAXO TL Tapa Thv ruxnv evar NEyov ovK 
 edyncev averknplat, aN apkécar tHv Olav pvow eis TO TAN- 
 pOcat Tov vod THY YpElav. 
 
 Nore 68, page 369. 
 
 A. Mail. c. p. 70:—Aaxtiro yridovet rérpav of S00 véas 
 emi Xpictod Soyparifovres, Oeiov, dnt, Kab avepwrwov. Hi 
 yap Tas vods avtoKpatwp éorlv (dike Oehnpuare Kata dvow Kivov- 
 peevos, advvatov éotw &i Kal TH adT@ brroKxeywev Sv0 TOds 
 tavavtia Oédovtas addjdows cuvuTrapyetn, exatépov TO Oernbev 
 EavT® Kal’ oppiy abtoxivntov évepyotvtos. My antagonists, he 
 
 WOU. LI. | ou 
 
 ot 
 
530 APPENDIX. 
 
 goes on to say, do not consider, what must be clear to every one, 
 Bre 6 pev Oeios vods abroxivyTos ott Kat TAVTOKWWNTOS, AT PETTOS 
 yap, 6 8é avOpaerrwos avToKivnTos MEV, Ov TAVTOKIVNTOS Oe" TPETTOS 
 yap' Kal Ore TEep ATpéeTT@ VO TpEeTTOS Ov ptyvuTae vods els évOS 
 imoxetpévov cvoracww, craciacbijcetat yap Tots €& ov Gat, OveAKO- 
 wevos evavtiow Oernpact, 80 i aitlay jets Eva Tov X PloTOV OfL0Q0- 
 yoomev Kal play as Evds abTod THY Te HUoW Kal tiv OérAnow Kal THY 
 évépyevav TpocKuvoduev, Oavpacw 6pod Kal TaOnpace c@fovoar. 
 
 Norte 69, page 374. 
 
 C. 57, p. 280:—Ei pera thy avactacw, says Apollinaris, 
 Beds yéyove, kal ovKéte Eotw avOpwTros, THs vios avOpwrrou 
 aTooTENE. TODS ayyédous avTOd, etc., TAS dé Kal Tp ev@bFjvar 
 cal arrobewbhvar Neyer eyo Kai 6 matnp &v éopev ; For this Gre- 
 gory rebukes him sternly, asking, whether he denies altogether 
 the glorification and conversion of the humanity of Christ, or 
 whether hair, nails, form, and compass, are all to remain ? On 
 the contrary, nothing corporeal must be conceived to cleave to 
 the perfected Redeemer; we must not any longer rest in av6po- 
 mivows iSwopact. He will appear in the glory of the Father, 
 and the Father has no body; compare c. 25, p. 185. In chap- 
 ter 53, Gregory says,—pera TH els ovpavor dvodov is the cap& 
 ovKére ev TOIS iSlows iSubpaor. God did not remain cap. Even 
 Paul says, “I know Christ no longer after the flesh.” The 
 human nature is changed into something better, from corrup- 
 tible to incorruptible, from corporeal into acwpatov and aoxyn- 
 uatictov. But compare also Mansi Coll. Cone. 3, 480; 8, 489. 
 
 Nore 70, page 380. 
 Greg. Nyss. lL. c. c. 50, p. 259 :—Ei éx dv0, PNTL, TEAELWY, 
 
 ore ev & Ocds Eat, év TOOTH GVOPWTOS EaTIV, OUTE EV @ avOpw- 
 mos, év ToUT® Oeds. He aims, then, at taking up the point of 
 view, from which the humanity appears as an essential determi- 
 nation of the Logos, and vice versd, the Logos of the humanity. 
 This he carries out both in the aspect in which the xéveovs is an 
 humiliation of the wvedya of the heavenly man (see Note 1, page 
 376); and especially in that other, in which the Getov became 
 aaOnrov in Christ (see the text). How important and familiar 
 to him was this dialectical method of combining opposed ele- 
 ments, by showing the one to be contained and involved in the 
 
NOTES. 531 
 
 other, we may see from the circumstance that he applied it to 
 the Trinity also, in order to set forth the relation between the 
 unity and the distinctions. As he endeavoured to point out the 
 man in the Logos, and the Logos in the man, in the sense, 
 namely, of each being a determination of the other; even so did 
 he conceive the Father and Son to be related to each other. 
 The Son has the Father as a determination of Himself; He is 
 accordingly qartnp though vixds, etc. He lays it down as a 
 canon,—Ilaytayyn cvvelevypévws, wadrov S€é Hwopevos TH ére- 
 poTnte voey avayKaiov THY TpwTnY TavTOTnTa, etc. Basil. M. 
 Ep. 129, 1. This has been interpreted as Sabellianism (Theo- 
 doret, Her. Fab. 4, 8); but may also be interpreted in agree- 
 ment with the Nicene Creed, and serve to introduce the doctrine 
 of the repry@pnots of the hypostases. 
 
 Note 71, page 386. 
 
 Such I believe to be the true sense of the difficult passage, 
 Ep. ad Cledon. 1,15. It is true, if Apollinaris, like Origen, 
 had held that the inequality of Christ with Himself, as also the 
 inequality of the regenerated with themselves, would con- 
 stantly recur; and that thus there would be an eternal alterna- 
 tion between the draipeous (Greg. Nyss. Antirrh. c. 29) and 
 the €€ccodv; he must also have assumed that the same history 
 would be constantly repeated, that the incarnation would be 
 again and again accomplished, metempsychosis, etc. We have, 
 however, no sufficient ground for such a supposition. The 
 necessary basis of such an alternation in the endless progress, 
 would be a dualistic view of the two connected aspects, God and 
 man; for then they would constantly be as strongly repelled 
 from as they are drawn towards each other. Apollinaris un- 
 doubtedly appears sometimes to regard human nature, the free 
 will, as sinful in itself (see ad Cledon. 1, 10; Note 68 and 
 Note 2, page 387). This, however, he scarcely deemed a prin- 
 cipal point, but employed it rather as a proof. In order to 
 show that the divine zrvedua must be the vous in the perfect 
 man, he assigns to the human vods as low a position as possible. 
 For the rest, he everywhere aims, not at dualism, but at unity, 
 and tries to grasp the Logos as the truth of the human vots, as 
 the vods of the completed, second creation, which notwithstand- 
 ing he conceived to be eternal. 
 
4532 APPENDIX. 
 
 NoTE 72, page 389. 
 
 On John xi. 35:—Ovd yap dvaivetas tiv Tpds avOpe@rous 
 Cuolwow, ovd évdeikvuTar TavTayod TO UTép avOpwroV, cupTa- 
 Oevay dé THY Tpds Tovs TeVvOobVTas diravOpwrras bToTLOncL,— 
 Kal ua TovTO els Chua KaTAANMEV oO AOYos, i avOpwTroLs ériba- 
 Kpvon Keymévois Kal THY ao@patov BeoTnTa Tpos Cworroinow 
 avOporav érayayntat. "Eyouev yap apyvepéa Suvapevov cuptTra- 
 Ojcat tats acbevetars yuov. On John xiv. 7:—Eavtov ama 
 TOPEVOMEVOY ElpnKE Kal OOOV VTA TopEVOMEVOV [LEV KATA THY éTTl 
 ys ToduTElay, ev ) TaCaY eTANPwWOEV apETHY, Kal THY CwonY émn)- 
 yayev @oTrEp Eis GTéhavoy THS TodtTElas’ OdoV Sé dVTA, KaOOTE 
 autos av Swas apeTn, WoTE OV KaTA THY do@paTov OedTynTaA TropEia 
 TLS AUTOU Kal TPAELS ETL POS TaTépa GUVaTTTOVGA, AAA dUcts 
 avtTn Kat ovata. TI poceitnde 5€ bia capKocews Kal Tas él yis 
 évepyeias kal mpakéers ayabas, 8¢ av Twacw érl Ocdv KaOnyeiras 
 mpos THv tdtav PeornTra. At the same time, He was constantly 
 perfect in Himself, like the Father, and was in fact the Father’s 
 processive will. His growth was subjective; in other words, 
 that which was already present in Him was more and more 
 clearly revealed to us. Compare on xi. 42, xii. 28, pp. 292, 
 314. On John xiv. 14, “ Whatsoever ye shall ask, that will I 
 do, that the Father may be glorified,” for the Father appears 
 through the power of the Son (éxdaiveras). Ov yap éotw 
 étépa Tpos Tatépa Tpdcobos, 7) St viod, ovTE mdadat, OTE VoD, 
 oute éoavdis, dX oiKeLoTeEpoy 1) St’ Viod Tpocebus ~ayNKE VOD, 
 OTL TANGLAITEpov Hiv KaTécTn capKwbeis. On verse 17:— 
 aopatov dowpatov Tapovela; hence also, when the spiritual is 
 present, it is not perceived by the sensuous. But those who 
 are susceptible thereof, know from fellowship with Him who is 
 present, the inner essence, which is better than the sensuous per- 
 ception, comprehending themselves out of the other (é é erepaoy 
 EavTovs KaTadauPavorTes). 
 
 NoTE 73, page 390. 
 
 2 3 / 
 
 On John xiv. 12, p. 360 f.:—"Apte pév tv huotny évornta 
 ¢ bps \ \ / r , Asia's A ures \ 
 eavTov mpos Tov ITarépa SdieEnes, péper 5é ees Kal thy Kata 
 Xapw EavTov Trpos TOds aTroaTOAOUS Evol" TODTO Yap Opolwpa 
 exelvou, Kal minnows Tod KaTa hvaw TO KaTa Yap 
 Kat yap oud trictews tobra ywerat, éxeivo 5é ody) dua TiaTews 
 
NOTES. add 
 
 dANG Kata Svivapw dvotxny. Od yap lore. TH eis IT atépa Ta 
 Gaupacva Xprotos épydberar, wiates dé TH ets vlov émiTeNodow 
 GTOCTONGL TA viod TA Sta TOUTwV Tpattopeva. Arad Kat oéBas 
 HEV TO VIG Tpocayerat, céBas Sé ovdamobev atroaréXots opet- 
 AeTat, ovde av peilova Tod Kuplov troujcwow. On John xiv. 
 13:—Ta pev ddetretar TO Kupio map’ jue wept av Kai Tapay- 
 t N \ Cy eS / \ @ b] A 
 yedret Ta 6€ avTos TAPENEL, TEPL WY ETTayyEAAETAL. ( Compare 
 Augustine’s words,—“ Da quod jubes et jube quod vis.) Our 
 obedience is a sign of our love to the Lord (amrodetEts ayarns), 
 Tap avtot dé hiv 4 TAS Oelas gucews yopnyla Kowvwvetrat. 
 On xiii. 16 :—Not men lay hold of the good, but the good con- 
 fers on men communion (o’Ketwors) with itself. Od yap apé- 
 gavres eEehéyOnuev, GAN iva dpécaper. Awd xal dyow éxnre- 
 Eauevos abtovs él KapTopopia Téeker, iva ef kab wi) Sid Ta 
 J, / nA / 3 \ \ \ las i 
 TpoTepa Titov Med xabeatynKerpev, AAA Sia TA TEXEUTALA yevo- 
 fi NaS na ’ / \ v 3S \ >] 
 
 Hea. Tis 86 0 tov’ AroctéXov KapTros aplaptos obTos, Kal eis 
 aiava pévev ; 7) Exxvnola. 
 
 Nore 74, page 404. 
 
 The soul of Adam and the soul of Christ was created, not 
 formed out of already existing material. This opus non habet 
 in se assumte aliunde alterius nature originem. The forma- 
 tion of the body, on the contrary, was a “sumere, accipere 
 materlam,” in order to give it a form; it was not a creation; 
 it was, therefore, a recelving of an external, foreign material. 
 That Hilarius entertained a similar conception of the incarna- 
 tion also, is clear from de Trin. 2, 26, where we read,—“ Spiritus 
 sanctus desuper veniens virginis interiora sanctificavit, et in his 
 splrans nature se humane carnis immiscuit, et id, guod alienum 
 @ sé erat, vi sud et potestate prasumsit. 10, 15:—Quod si 
 assumta sibi per se ex virgine carne, ipse sibi et ex se animam 
 concepti per se corporis coaptavit, secundum anime corporisque 
 naturam, necesse est et passionum fuisse naturam.” When 
 Hilarius aims at precision, he says, as here,—animam ew Sey 
 corpus per se, habuit; ex virgine corpus conceptum ;” but “non 
 per humane conceptionis coaluit naturam, anima ex Deo.” (, 
 15, 22. So, for example, c, 22:—ut per se sibi assumsit ex 
 virgine corpus, ita ex se sibi animam assumsit quee utique nun- 
 quam ab homine gignentium originibus prebetur. C. 10, 16, 
 17 :—Mary contributed ad incrementa partumque corporis omne, 
 
534 APPENDIX. 
 
 quod sexus sui est naturale. ‘The nativitas ex virgine officio 
 usa materno, sexus sui naturam in conceptu et partu exsecuta 
 est.—Conceptus est ex Spiritu Sancto et ex Maria. 
 
 Norte 75, page 409. 
 
 That the “forma servilis” was not the immediate, as it were 
 physical, consequence of the “evacuatio,” but that between the 
 two intervened an ethical act, performed by the “ evacuatus” 
 Son, that is, by the Son who willed to become man, Hilarius 
 maintained with just emphasis; thus excluding, in the most 
 distinct manner, the opinion attributed to him by Baur. Com- 
 pare on Psalm Ixvii. c. 25 :—“Tpse enim est, et se ex forma 
 Dei inaniens et formam hominis assumens; quia neque eva- 
 cuatio illa ex Dei forma nature ccelestis interitus est, neque 
 forme servilis assumtio tamquam genuine originis condition- 
 isque natura est; cum id, quod assumtum est, non proprietas 
 interior sit, sed exterior accessio, quod ipsum consequentibus 
 docet (v. 30). Pauper est, qui cum esset omnium dives, se 
 ipsum, ut nos ditesceremus, paupertavit : dolens est, qui secun- 
 dum prophetam pro nobis dolet—Hune pauperem in salutem 
 vultus Dei (i.e., filius) qui forma Dei est, in zeternitatis sue vita 
 —collocavit.” De Trin. 9, 14 (compare Note 2, page 408) : 
 —‘Ttaque evacuatio eo proficit, ut proficiat forma servi non ut 
 Christus, qui in forma Dei erat, Christus esse non maneat, cum 
 formam servi nonnisi Christus acceperit. Qui cum se evacua- 
 verit, ut manens Spiritus Christus idem Christus homo esset, in 
 corpore demutatio habittis et assumtio natures naturam manen- 
 tis divinitatis non peremit, quia unus atque idem Christus sit, 
 et demutans habitum et assumens. ©. 51 :—Manens sibi Dei 
 natura in se humilitatem terrenze nativitatis susceperat, generis 
 sui potestatem in habitu assumte humilitatis exercens.” 
 
 Norte 76, page 410. 
 
 11, 48:—Quod autem se ipsum intra se vacuefaciens con- 
 tinuit, detrimentum non attulit potestati cum intra hance exi- 
 nanientis se humilitatem virtute tamen omnis exinanite imtra 
 se usus sit potestatis (compare the fragment cited in Note 2, 
 page 408). According to 9, 51, cll. 68, c. 25, one might sup- 
 pose Hilarius to have conceived the “ evacuatio” of the Son, 
 whom the Father eternally generates, to have consisted in His 
 
NOTES. 535 
 
 returning out of the existence which He had independently of 
 the Father, into the “natura Dei,” to the potential existence of 
 the “facies,” or of the “vultus,” or of the “imago Dei;” and 
 that, during the state of humiliation, His actual personality 
 (facies, vultus) was limited entirely to the “forma servilis.” 
 The passage 9, 51, runs as follows :—“ Nos enim unigenitum 
 Deum in natura Dei mansisse profitemur, neque unitatem forme 
 servilis (that is, the personality in the form of a servant, which 
 alone remained after the accomplishment of the ‘ exinanitio’) 
 in naturam divine unitatis statim refundimus, neque rursum 
 corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio praedicamus, sed ex eo 
 ejusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem 
 se habuisse naturam; que in forma nature se gignentis 
 manens formam nature atque infirmitatis corporalis acceperit.” 
 
 Nore 77, page 411. 
 
 Tract. in Psalm Ixviii., Lit. x. c. 6-9. De Trin. 11, 49 :— 
 Nostra hee itaque lucra sunt et nostri profectus, nos scilicet 
 conformes efficiendi gloriz corporis Dei. Ceterum unigenitus 
 Deus, licet et homo natus sit, non tamen aliud quam Deus 
 omnia in omnibus est. Subjectio enim illa corporis, per quam, 
 quod carnale ei est, in naturam Spiritfis devoratur, esse Deum 
 omnia in omnibus eum, qui preter Deum et homo est, con- 
 stituet : noster autem ille homo in id proficit. Ceterum nos in 
 hominis nostri conformem gloriam proficiemus, et in agnitionem 
 Dei renovati ad Creatoris imaginem reformabimur (Col. iu. 9, 
 10). Consummatur itaque homo imago Dei. Namque con- 
 formis effectus gloriz corporis Dei in imaginem Creatoris 
 excedit, secundum dispositam primi hominis fiqurationem. Et 
 post peccatum veteremque hominem, in agnitionem Dei novus 
 homo factus, constitutionis suze obtinet perfectionem, agnoscens 
 Deum suum, et per id imago ejus; et per religionem proficiens 
 ad eternitatem, et per seternitatem Creatoris sul imago man- 
 surus.” 
 
 Nore 78, page 411. 
 
 On Psalm liii. 12 :—Unigenitum Dei filium frequenter imo 
 semper predicamus non ex nature necessitate potius, quam ex 
 sacramento humane salutis passioni fuisse subditum, et voluisse 
 se magis passioni subjici, quam coactum. Et quanquam passio 
 
536 APPENDIX. 
 
 illa non fuerit conditionis et generis (that is, physically ne- 
 cessary), quia indemutabilem dei naturam nulla vis injuriose 
 perturbationis offenderet, tamen suscepta voluntarie est, officio 
 quidem ipsa satisfactura poenali, non tamen poenz sensu lesura 
 patientem ; non quod illa ledendi non habuerit pro ipsa passi- 
 onis qualitate naturam, sed quod dolorem divinitatis natura non 
 sentit. Passus ergo est Deus, quia se subjecit voluntarius pas- 
 sioni; sed suscipiens naturales ingruentium in se passionum 
 (quibus dolorem patientibus necesse est inferri) virtutes, ipse 
 tamen a nature su virtute non excidit, ut doleret. 10, 47 :— 
 Passus igitur unigenitus Deus est omnes incurrentes in se pas- 
 sionum nostrarum infirmitates, sed passus virtute nature su, ut 
 et virtute nature suze natus est: neque enim, cum natus sit, 
 non tenuit omnipotentize suze in nativitate naturam. 10, 23:— 
 Caro illa, i.e., panis ille de ccelis est, et homo ille de Deo est. 
 Habens ad patiendum quidem corpus, et passus est; sed naturam 
 (that is, neither physical necessity nor susceptibility in itself, 
 apart from a particular act of will) non habens ad dolendum. 
 Naturee enim propriz et sue corpus illud est, quod in ceelestem 
 gloriam conformatur in monte, quod attactu suo fugat febres, 
 quod de sputo suo format oculos. C. 24:—Cum potum et 
 cibum accepit, non se necessitati corporis sed consuetudini 
 tribuit. C. 387:—Non sibi tristis est: neque sibi orat, sed illis 
 quos monet, orare pervigiles. C. 55 ff.:—There was no “ne- 
 cessitas flendi” in Him; non sibi flevit, sed nobis. And yet 
 His weeping was not a mere seeming; for the needs of men 
 are not mere seeming, nor anything of that to which He sub- 
 jected Himself, moved not by necessity, but by self-emptying 
 love. ‘Specially important, however, are the passages, 10, 23, 
 48; de Synod. c. 49; in Psalm Ixviii. c. 4, 10, 23 :—“ Hominem 
 verum secundum similitudinem nostri hominis, non deficiens a 
 se Deo sumsit: in quo, quamvis aut ictus incideret, aut vulnus 
 descenderet, aut nodi concurrerent, aut suspensio elevaret, affer- 
 rent quidem hac impetum passionis, non tamen dolorem passi- 
 onis inferrent: ut telum aliquod aut aquam perforans, aut 
 ignem compungens, aut aéra vulnerans omnes quidem has pas- 
 siones nature sue infert, ut foret, ut compungat, ut vulneret ; 
 sed naturam suam in hec passio illata non retinet, dum in 
 natura non est, vel aquam forari, vel pungi ignem, vel aérem 
 vulnerari, quamvis nature teli sit, et vulnerare et compungere 
 
NOTES. 537 
 
 et forare. Passus quidem est dominus Jesus Christus, dum 
 ceditur, dum suspenditur, dum crucifigitur, dum moritur, sed 
 in corpus Domini irruens passio nec non fuit passio, nec tamen 
 naturam (that is, physical necessity) passionis exseruit: dum et 
 peenali ministerio deszevit, et Virtus corporis sine sensu poene 
 vim pcene in se deseevientis excepit. Habuerit sane illud 
 Domini corpus doloris nostri naturam, si corpus nostrum id 
 nature habet, ut calcet undas et super fluctus eat—penetret 
 etiam solida. At vero si dominici corporis sola ista natura sit, 
 ut sua virtute, sua anima feratur in humidis, insistat in liquidis, 
 et exstructa transcurrat, quid per naturam humani corporis con- 
 ceptam ex Spiritu carnem judicamus? To the right under- 
 standing of this passage, the following further citations are 
 necessary (10, 48) :—“Succumbere ergo tibi videtur Virtus 
 ista vulneris clavo et ad zctum compungentis exterrita, demutasse 
 se in naturam dolendi?—Si in passione sua necessitas est et 
 non salutis tuee donum est, si in cruce dolor compungendi est, 
 et non decreti, quod in te mors est scripta confixio est; si in 
 morte vis mortis est, et non per potestatem Dei carnis exuvie 
 sunt; si denique mors ipsa aliud est, quam potentum de- 
 honestatio, quam fiducia quam triumphus: adscribe infirmi- 
 tatem, si ibi necessitas est et natura, si ibi vis est, et diffidentia 
 et dedecus.” This, therefore, is, in his view, the “punctum 
 saliens,” that in Christ there was no “infirmitas nature,” no 
 “necessitas.” For this reason he says (10, 23),—if the “na- 
 tura” of the God-man and the hostile powers are confronted 
 with each other in and by themselves, the latter cannot cause 
 the former pain, any more than the air can be harmed by a 
 dart. The pain felt by Christ, therefore, was due to an act of 
 love, which emptied itself on our account, and which not merely 
 coerced the hostile forces by its “potestas,” but also discharged 
 the “ ministerium pcene” (compare Psalm Ixviii. c. 8) ;—and 
 Christ bore punishment, not as an evil or a pain, but “sine 
 sensu peene;” for it was rooted, not in guilt of His own, but in 
 a love which forgot itself, and forgot all suffering. We see, 
 accordingly, that he can say of Christ, “dolet et non dolet.” 
 The latter, so far as He took delight in suffering; and as the 
 pain which He endured never, as in our case, got the master of 
 His body, nor was able to change or destroy Him by its power 
 (compare de Synod. c. 49), although His “ passio” was a reality. 
 
538 APPENDIX. 
 
 Thus we read in 10, 47:—Fallitur ergo humane estimationis 
 opinion, putans hunc (al. hinc) dolere, quod patitur. Pro nobis 
 dolet, non et doloris nostri dolet sensu, quia et habitu ut homo 
 repertus habens in se doloris corpus (that is, a body which is 
 capable of suffering), sed non habens naturam dolendi, dum et 
 ut hominis habitus est, et origo non hominis est, nato eo de 
 conceptione Spiritus S. Tract. in Psalm cxxxix. c. 11 :—Per- 
 missum enim corpus passioni est, sed permissa sibi dominata 
 mors non fuit. De Trin. 10, 27 :—Quam infirmitatem domi- 
 natam hujus corpori credis, cujus tantam habuit natura virtu- 
 tem? C. 32 :—Extra carnalem naturam dolendi vulneris re- 
 peritur. 9, 7:—Tametsi in partu et passione et morte nature 
 nostre res peregerit: res tamen ipsas omnes virtute naturz 
 suze gessit, dum sibi ipse origo nascendi est, dum pati vult, quod 
 eum pati non licet, dum moritur, qui vivit. By thus setting 
 forth the sufferings of Christ in the light of deeds, he deprives 
 Arians of their proofs of the lowness and physical passibility of 
 the Logos, in a more striking manner than if he had appor- 
 tioned them to His humanity. But when he represents Christ’s 
 suffering as a deed, as a display of power, it is of course im- 
 plied that he did not consider Him incapable of suffering, that 
 he did not deny Him the power of making Himself passible. 
 Undoubtedly he frequently repeats, the “ Verbum Dei’ as such 
 cannot suffer; but the body taken up into union with Him, is 
 the “materia” in which sufferings might be undergone. Tract. 
 in Psalm Ixviii. ¢. 4:—“ Non enim incidere in Deum hic infir- 
 mnitatem nostrarum terror valebat, aut exserere se nisi in carne 
 corporis nostri, tanquam in subjacente materia, potuerant pas- 
 siones. . . . Cum se contra nature ccelestis terrenzeque diversi- 
 tatem, in hunc limum potestatis sue virtute definit: quia ea, 
 que natura dissident, ad quandam connexionis sus soliditatem 
 non generis ipsius propinquitate conveniunt, sed potiore vi tan- 
 quam confixa sociantur, tunc et pati coepit et mori posse.” In 
 accordance herewith, therefore, is also “impassibilitas” to be 
 judged, on the ground of which Hilarius has been partially 
 charged with Docetism, in that it is supposed to signify that 
 He neither could nor did suffer. A passage, however, has been 
 overlooked, which clearly explains the bearing of the term, 
 de Synod. 49 :—* Pati potuit, et passibile esse non potuit (Ver- 
 bum caro factum), quia passibilitas nature infirmis significatio 
 
NOTES. 539 
 
 est, passio autem est eorum, que sunt illata, perpessio: que 
 quia indemutabilis Deus est, cum tamen Verbum caro factum 
 sit, habuerunt in eo passionis materiam sine passibilitatis infir- 
 mitate (that is, without the weakness which is unable to do 
 otherwise). Manet itaque indemutabilis etiam in passione 
 natura, quia auctori suo indifferens ex impassibilis essentiz 
 nata substantia est.” Psalm Ixvii. 18; x. 15. 
 
 Norte 79, page 416. 
 
 De Trin. 9, 38 :—Dispensatione assumtz carnis et per exin- 
 anientis se ex Dei forma obedientiam, nature sibi novitatem 
 Christus homo natus intulerat, non virtutis natureeque damno, 
 sed habitus demutatione. Exinaniens se igitur ex Dei forma, 
 servi formam natus acceperat, sed hanc carnis assumtionem ea, 
 cum qua sibi naturalis unitas erat, Patris natura non senserat ; 
 et novitas temporalis (that is, the new condition of the entire 
 person) licet maneret in virtute nature, amiserat tamen, cum 
 forma Dei, nature Dei secundum assumtum hominem unitatem. 
 Sed summa dispensationis heec erat, ut totus nune filius, homo 
 scilicet et Deus, per indulgentiam paterne voluntatis unitati 
 paterne nature inesset, et qui manebat in virtute nature, 
 maneret quoque in genere naturee. It enim homini acquireba- 
 tur, ut Deus esset. Sed manere in Dei unitate assumtus homo 
 nullo modo poterat, nisi per unitatem Dei in unitatem Dei na- 
 turalis evaderet, ut per hoc quod in natura Dei erat Deus ver 
 bum, Verbum quoque caro factum rursum in natura Dei inesset, 
 atque ita homo Jesus Christus maneret in gloria Dei Patris, Sl 
 in Verbi gloriam caro esset unita; rediretque tunc in nature 
 paternee etiam secundum hominem unitatem Verbum caro fac- 
 tum, cum gloriam Verbi caro assumta tenuisset. Leddenda 
 igitur apud se ipsum Patri erat unitas sua (i.e., a Patre filio), ut 
 nature suze nativitas in se rursum glorificanda resideret: quia 
 disnensationis novitas offensionem unitatis intulerat, et unitas, wt 
 perfecta antea fuerat, nulla esse nunc poterat, nisi glorificata 
 apud se fuisset carnis assumtio. 
 
 Nore 80, page 417. 
 
 De Trin. 9, 54:—Major Pater Filio est, et plane major, cui 
 tantum donat esse, quantus ipse est; cui innascibilitatis (ayye- 
 ynolas) esse imaginem sacramento nativitas impertit, quem ex 
 
540 APPENDIX. 
 
 se in formam suam generat (to wit, in the eternal generation), 
 quem rursum de forma servi in formam Dei renovat, etc. Tract. 
 in Ps, i. c. 27-80; c. 27:—Christ begged that id, quod tum 
 filius hominis est, ad perfectum Dei filium, i.e., ad resumendam 
 indulgendamque corpori eternitatis sux gloriam, per resurrec- 
 tionis potentiam gigneretur; quam gloriam a Patre corporeus 
 reposcebat.—Non nova querit, non aliena desiderat; esse talis 
 qualis fuerat, postulat, sed precatur: id se, quod antea erat, 
 esse, gigni scilicet ad id quod suum fuit. Non erat autem idip- 
 sum tunc totus, quod fierl precabatur: fieri autem totus non 
 aliud, quam quod fuerat, postulabat. Sed cum fit (1.e., gloriosus) 
 quod fuit, et quod non erat, est futurus (on account of the 
 humanity, which is to participate in the glory), ad id quod 
 fuerat, id quod totum non erat, quodam novi ortus nascebatur 
 exordio. Ergo hic resurrectionis sue ad assumendam gloriam 
 dies est, per quam ad id nascitur, quod ante tempora erat. 
 C. 30:—The words, “To-day have I begotten Thee,” refer, not 
 to the birth from the Virgin, not to the baptism of Christ, but, 
 according to the Apostle, to the first-born from the dead (Acts 
 xi. 82). According to Baur (pp. 690 ff.), with this elorifica- 
 tion at the end, the Docetism, which does away with the human, 
 shows itself quite plainly. He adduces in evidence, de Trin. 9, 38 
 38 (see Note 79), and c. 41; these passages, however, are not at all 
 pertinent to the matter (see Note 79). He might have adduced 
 other passages with a far greater show of reason ; especially de 
 Trin, 11, 40:—“ Quibus subjectis subjicitur subjicienti sibi 
 omnia, Dominus scilicet, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus (1 Cor. 
 xv. 28) natura assumti corporis nostri nature paternee divini- 
 tatis invecté. Per id enim erit omnia in omnibus Deus, quia 
 Mediator, habens in se ex dispensatione, quod carnis est, adep- 
 turus (est) in omnibus ex subjectione, quod Dei est, ne ex parte 
 Deus sit, sed Deus totus. Non alia itaque subjectionis causa 
 est, quam ut omnia in omnibus Deus sit, nulla ex parte terrent 
 m eo corporis residente natura, ut, ante in se duos continens, 
 nunc Deus tantum sit.” Compare ec. 41, 42, 49. But, on the 
 other hand, Hilarius says, that we are to become like the glori- 
 fied body of Christ (11, 19; Ps. ii. 41, lv. 12). Ixviti"35'; ‘conm 
 pare Note 82). Further: Christ presented the expected gift, 
 the man He had assumed, to the Father (Comm. in Matt. c. 3, 
 PA F134 oD brought into heaven materiem assumti corporis conso- 
 
NOTES. 541 
 
 ciatam Spiritus et substantiw suze eternitati” (ib. c. 4, 14). 
 Indeed, his fundamental view of the work of redemption re- 
 quired that there should be no necessity for the humanity to be 
 annihilated, in order that the man Jesus might attain to perfec- 
 tion; but that the humanity should really be exalted to God in 
 Christ. Not merely for Thomas had the Risen One a body, 
 but eternally; and at the day of judgment, they will know 
 Him whom they have pierced (de Trin. 3, 16, 20). We shall 
 therefore have to consent to take note of passages of this second 
 kind, in order that we may not form a false representation of 
 Hilarius, and the many Fathers who use similar language to 
 him on this point. But how are the two things to be united? | 
 In fact, the contradiction would be unreconcilable if the words, 
 “nulla ex parte terreni in eo corporis residente natura,” taught 
 the complete annihilation or swallowing up of the body by the 
 deity. This, however, cannot be the opinion of Hilarius. For 
 he adds, immediately after (11, 40),—the perfection is accom- 
 plished non abjecto corpore, sed ex subjectione translato, neque 
 per defectionem abolito sed ex clarificatione mutato, acquirens 
 sibi Deo potius hominem, quam Deum per hominem amittens. 
 Subjectus vero ob id, non ut non sit, sed ut omnia in omnibus 
 Deus sit, habens in sacramento subjectionis esse ac manere 
 quod non est, non habens in defectione ita se carere, ne non sit. 
 That which is swallowed up by the divine “Gloria,” is not the 
 “materies” of the humanity, but the “corruptio,” the “ infir- 
 mitas,” which is an “accidens” of it, but not its essence (com- 
 pare Ps. lv. 12). This is also clearly declared, Ps. exliii. 7. 
 Who was it that was thus exalted? (Phil. ii. 7, 9). “Non ei 
 utique, qui in forma Dei erat, donatur, ut Dei forma sit.” For 
 although “cohibens in se formam Dei,’ the Son of God re- 
 mains in Himself “ Dei virtus,” and can restore Himself to the 
 “forma Dei” when He will. It is given to Him, as the One 
 who took upon Himself the form of a servant, “ipsi habitui ser- 
 vili id donatur, ut quod erat, esset in forma scilicet Dei esset.— 
 Et heec quidem evangelici sacramenti et humane spei veritas 
 est, humanam naturam corruptibilemque carnem per hujus 
 gloriz demutationem in eternam transformatam esse substan- 
 tiam.” What, then, is the perfection of the God-man, save that 
 by it humanity is brought to its true state, to God; is stripped 
 of all false independence; 1s deprived of that existence outside 
 
542 APPENDIX. 
 
 of God which characterizes the “servilis forma,” with its “io- 
 firmitas” and “corruptio:” and, on the other hand, that the 
 creature is taken into the divine sphere and glory, in which it is 
 a never-disappearing, eternal momentum of the divine life itself. 
 
 Norte 81, page 419. 
 
 Verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, naturam scilicet 
 in se totius humani generis assumens. Ps. liv., c. 9: —“ Uni- 
 versitatis nostree caro est factus.” In Matt. iv., c. 12 :—“The 
 city on the hill is the humanity assumed by Christ, quia, ut 
 civitas ex varietate ac multitudine consistit habitantium ita in eo, 
 per naturam suscepti corporis, quedam universi generis humani 
 congregatio continetur. Atque ita et ille ex nostra in se congre- 
 gatione fit civitas et nos per consortium carnis sua sumus civi- 
 tatis habitatio.” Ps. exxiv.,c. 4, 143,c.18. De Trin. 2, 24:— 
 (ut) homo factus ex virgine naturam in se carnis acciperit, perque 
 hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo universi generis 
 humani corpus exsisteret, ut quemadmodum omnes in se per id, 
 quo corporeum se esse voluit, conderentur, ita rursum in omnes 
 ipse per id, quod ejus est invisibile, referretur. ©. 25:—Non 
 ille eguit homo effici, per quem homo factus est, sed nos eguimus, 
 ut Deus caro fieret, et habitaret in nobis, i.e., assumtione carnis 
 unius interna universe carnis incoleret. In Matt. 2, c. 5 :—Lrat 
 in Jesu Christo homo totus. Ps. xii. 4. 
 
 NOTE 82, page 420. 
 
 Tract. in Ps. xiii. 4, 56, c. 7, 8:—“‘ Compatiendi et com- 
 moriendi fides nos glorificat in Christo.” Hence David calls 
 the sufferings and glory of Christ His own, quia se per assum- 
 tionem carnis in ccelestibus collocandum Propheta non nescit, 
 quippe cum concorporales et comparticipes effecti simus in 
 Christo Jesu. Ps. exxiv., c. 8:—Christus est mons superim- 
 minens et excelsus, in quo ipsi nosmet ipsos per assumtionem 
 carnis nostra corporisque speculamur. ©. 4:—In eo enim 
 sumus resurrectionem nostram in resurrectione nostri in eo cor- 
 poris contemplantes. It is true, Hilarius says also concerning 
 others besides Christ, that all are in them; and from this the 
 Benedictine draws the conclusion, |. c. p. xxv. § 81:—“Kos omnes 
 qui humanz nature consortes sunt, Hilarii aliorumque Patrum 
 sententia naturali unitate esse conjunctos. Et uniuntur quidem 
 
NOTES. 543 
 
 in illa massa, ex qua omnes originem habent et ex qua Christus 
 ipse carnis sue substantiam sumere non recusavit;” in support 
 whereof might further have been adduced, that, according to 
 Hilarius (compare Ps. li. c. 21), all men are “ generalis anime 
 et corporis.” But even this does not furnish an explanation of 
 the phraseology in question. If all are one in virtue of their 
 common origin, it may justly be said,—AIl individuals subsist, 
 have their roots therein, as in the universal, but not in each 
 other, or all in one, unless indeed this one can in some aspect 
 or other be regarded as the vehicle and representative of the 
 whole and the universal. In point of fact, Hilarius does not use 
 the terms in question relatively to every man ; but only relatively 
 to Adam, on the ground of his being the universal father as to 
 the body, with which also is connected the spread of sin over the 
 entire race. Hence he frequently says,—“ We all fell in him” 
 (in Matt. c. 8,5; Ps. exliv. c. 4, 1386; ¢. 5,7). In his remarks 
 on Matthew xviii. c. 6, he uses Abraham with Sarah as a symbol 
 of the whole of humanity; but merely allegorically. Hence the 
 application to the first Adam along with the Second proves all 
 the more clearly that, like the other Fathers, Hilarius regarded 
 Christ also as the representative of the race. As all men were 
 potentially in the first Adam, so in a spiritual sense are all men 
 potentially in the Second Adam; so, namely, that as the Logos, 
 the Second Adam is the final cause of the origin of the first 
 Adam and all his descendants. On the other hand, the Mau- 
 rinist is right when he denies that Hilarius held Christ to have 
 assumed merely the general nature of the human race, and not 
 an individual human nature. This is evident from the passage 
 
 de Trin. 2, 25, quoted above. See Note 81. 
 Note 83, page 429. 
 
 Even at an earlier period, the opinion entertained in the 
 Church respecting Apollinaris was pretty unanimous, as is clear 
 from what has been advanced above (see page 424). For, 
 independently of the Synod of Alexandria, held in the year 
 362 (see Note 65), through the influence of Vitalis, Apol- 
 linarism was condemned by several Roman Councils under 
 Damasus. Compare Dozom. 6, 25; Theodoret. H. E. 5, 10 
 Mansi Cone. Coll. T. ili. 461, 447-482, 486, and the epistle of 
 Damasus to Paulinus in Antioch. In this letter we find the 
 
544 APPENDIX. 
 
 following words (I. c. p. 426) :—“Confitendus ipsa sapientia 
 sermo, filius Dei humanum suscepisse corpus, animam, sensum, 
 1.e., integrum Adam, et ut expressius dicam, totum veterem 
 nostrum sine peccato hominem. Sicuti enim confitentes eum 
 humanum corpus suscepisse, non statim ei et humanas vitiorum 
 adjungimus passiones: ita et dicentes eum suscepisse et hominis 
 animam et sensum non statim dicimus et cogitationum cum 
 humanarum subjacuisse peccato.” According to Theodoret, the 
 Romish Council (Mansi 488) said,—’ Avabewarifowev xaxelvous 
 ov TWvES aVTL KoytKHS Abuyts Sicyupifovrat OTL 6 TOD Ocod Aoyos 
 eotpagdn év Th avlpwrivy capKt’ avTos yap ovToOs 0 ToD Oeod 
 Aoyos ovyl avTl THs NoyiKs Kal voepas wuyns ev TO éavTod 
 TMOLATL yéyover, GAA THY HyeTépav, TOOT eoTL AoyiKIY Kal 
 poepav avev THS dpaptias ~ruyny avéraBe Kal érwoev. Another 
 Roman Council under Damasus says (p. 461) :—Adserunt (the 
 Apollinarists) dicere, dominum ac salvatorem nostrum ex Maria 
 virgine imperfectum, i.e., sine sensu (vods) hominem suscepisse. 
 Heu quanta erit Arianorum in tali sensu vicinitas! Jl imper- 
 jectam divinitatem in Dei filio dicunt, isti imperfectam humanita- 
 tem in hominis filio mentiuntur. Quod si utique imperfectus 
 homo susceptus est, imperfectum Dei munus est, imperfecta 
 nostra salus, quia non est totus homo salvatus.—Nos autem, qui 
 integros ac perfectos salvatos nos scimus, secundum catholica 
 ecclesiz professionem, perfectum Deum perfectum suscepisse 
 hominem profitemur. This was constituted an cecumenical 
 decree in the year 381, when the Council of Constance in Can. 
 1. said,—avaGeuaticOjvas (sc. Set) Tacav aiperw, Kal (diKdS.. . 
 Thy Tov AmoddvaptoTov (1. c. p. 560). With this cecumenical 
 decree were soon associated imperial edicts, forbidding Apol- 
 linarism. We cannot, therefore, understand how Baur can 
 assert it to be inaccurate (1. c. 647), to say that the doctrine of 
 the complete humanity of Christ received the official sanction 
 of the Church at the Synod held in the year 381. 
 
 END OF VOL. LI. 
 
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 Pre-Organic Evolution and the Biblical Idea of God: 
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 Philosophy and Theology, the First Edinburgh University 
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 but adjusting each stone to its place and use.’—Church Bells. 
 
THE LATE PROFESSOR FRANZ DELITZSCH, D.D., LEIPZIG. 
 
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 The Prophecies of Isaiah. By Professor Franz Deuirzsocs 
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 A System of Biblical Psychology. §8vo, 12s. 
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 re Pa er es ee ae 
 
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