c ODYeaT~ On Grit tie a vi O4) ing fr bina g Digitized by the Internet Archive In 2022 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https ://archive.org/details/godhisknowabilit0Opohl DOGMATIC THEOLOGY ] THE POHLE-PREUSS SERIES OF DOG- 12. MATIC TEXT-BOOKS God: His Knowability, Essence and At- ° tributes. vi & 479 pp., $2.00 net. The Divine Trinity. iv & 297 pp., $1.50 net. God the Author of Nature and the Su- pernatural. v & 365 pp., $1.75 net. Christology. iii & 310 pp., $1.50 net. Soteriology. iv & 169 pp., $1 net. Mariology. iv & 185 pp., $1 net. Grace: Actual and Habitual. iv & 443 pp., $2 net. The Sacraments. Vol. I. (The Sacra- ments in General. Baptism. Confirma- tion.) vi & 328 pp., $1.50 net. The Sacraments, Vol. II. (The Holy _Eucharist.) vi & 408 pp., $1.75 net. The Sacraments. Vol. III. (Penance.) vi & 270 pp., $1.50 net. The Sacraments. Vol. IV. (Extreme Unction, Holy Orders, Matrimony.) iv & 249 pp., $1.50 net. Eschatology. iv & 164 pp., $1.00 net. The Whole Set, $18 net. OM iy peer rs ~ Za ui ll Tis / wa we GOD: HIS KNOWABILITY, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES A DOGMATIC TREATISE PREFACED BY A BRIEF GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY BY WV THE RT. REV. MSGR. JOSEPH POHLE, Pu.D.,D.D. FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA ADAPTED AND EDITED BY ARTHUR PREUSS THIRD, REVIsED EDITION B. HERDER BOOK CO. 17 SournH Broapway, ST. Louis, Mo. AND 68, GreaT RussELL St., Lonpon, W. C. 1918 NIHIL OBSTAT Sti. Ludovici, die 31 Julu, 1918 F. G. Holweck, Censor Librorum. IMPRIMATUR Sti. Ludovici, die 31 Julu, 1918 *kJoannes J. Glennon, Archiepiscopus St. Ludovici. Copyright, Io1T by Joseph Gummersbach All rights reserved Printed in U. S. A. First impression, IQII Second impression, 1914 Third impression, 1918 VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK TABLE OF CONTENTS GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO DOGMATIC THE-- OLOGY’. GOD: HIS KNOWABILITY, ESSENCE, “AND AT- TRIBUTES Part I. THE KNowaBiLity oF GoD Cu. I. Human Reason Can Know God . § 1. Man Can Gain a Knowledge of God from ‘the Physical Universe . rf Art. 1. The Positive Teaching of Reve A Art. 2, The Idea of God Not Inborn . § 2, Our Knowledge of God as Derived from the Supernatural Order Art. I, The Facts of the Suse eanet Order Con- sidered as Premises for Unaided Reason Art. 2. The Supernatural Facts as a Preamble to our Belief in the Existence of God . § 3. Traditionalism and Atheism . Art. 1. Traditionalism a False System Art, 2. The Possibility of Atheism Cu. II. The Quality of Man’s Knowledge of God hea: ing to Divine Revelation ; § 1, Our Knowledge of God as it is Here on Earth . Art. 1. The Imperfection of Our Knowledge of God in This Life . Art. 2. The Threefold Mode of Rhowtug God Here on Earth . Why Seats Art. 3. Theological Conclusions . . . - iii AGE CONTENTS § 2. Man’s Knowledge of God as it Will be in Heaven ia Art, 1. The Reality and the Supernatural Character of the Intuitive Vision of God . 80 Art. 2. The Light of Glory as a Necessary Medium for the Intuitive Vision of God . IOI ArT. 3. The Beatific Vision in its Relation to the Divine Incomprehensibility . . , 107 § 3. Eunomianism and Ontologism II3 Art. 1. The Heresy of the Eunomians . 113 Art. 2, Why Ontologism is Untenable 116 Part II. Tue Divine Essence . 133 Cu. I. The Biblical Names of God Tae me eslag OE Kee § 1. The “Seven Holy Names of God” in the Old Testament Be E Asai RR ON Unk a) te eee a eR § 2. The Names Applied to God in the New Testa- ment and in Profane Literature — The Sym- bolic Appellations . Reigns Met bkarbh un Te. Cu. II. The Essence of God in its Relation to His At- arth 2 BO RG catalina Nh ee a § 1. False Theories a ivi a Ua CG ater ts or! Art. 1. The Herésy of Gilbert de la Porrée and the ' Palamites a Ma Nt Te ties Tet ic sat ae ae Art. 2. The Heresy of Eunomius and the Nomi- nalists Le) oe te 148 Art. 3. The Formalism of the Scotists Tet § 2. The Virtual Distinction Between God’s Essence and His Attributes Pa ae He 156 Cu. III. The Metaphysical Essence of God : 159 § 1. Untenable Theories . PORTE A OE . 160 § 2. Aseity the Fundamental Attribute of God . 165 Part III. Tur Divine Properties or ATTRIBUTES . 177 Cu. I. God’s Transcendental Attributes of Being . 180 § 1. Absolute Perfection and Infinity . . 180 Apt id. God's: Perfection cuit. 4) arr n e 5 og ArT. 2. God’s Tatimitys ih ost seg ee 190 1V CONTENTS § 2. God’s Unity, Simplicity, and Unicity (or Unique- var HESS Ps RE, est SORA eel hah ingen ak het Oly Art. 1, God’s Intrinsic Uiity a RE OA a dae a a Art. 2. God’s Absolute’ Simplicity (0's) 0269565. 200 Art. 3. Monotheism and its Antitheses: Polythe- isi aed Ua SEN eR ar giana ae e S sinGodithe *Absolutet: Trent eR Peo oe 3. 225 Arr. 1.'God as Ontological Truth a ie eo aos Art. 2. God as Logical Truth, or Absolute le 230 Art. 3. God as Moral Truth, or His Veracity and Paithininess) 70, 0 A Ab Asian (BUC. 6 6) Sa nGotas Absolute Goodness ooo 8a el nel etn. ts CAE Art. 1. God as Ontological Goodness... ws 241 -ArT. 2. God’s Ethical Goodness, or Sanctity . . 251” Art. 3. God’s Moral Goodness, or Benevolence . . 260* § 5. God as Absolute Beauty. . . . PENA Ty 9 Cu. II. God’s Categorical Attributes of Bains. ORAP OPN fs Sir sod’s: Absolate Substantiality 30.0. ale ve tego § 2. God’s Absolute Causality, or Omnipotence . . 281 S)3.. Gods incorporestyi 2) tie ee ee ee, ae SA iGods\ lnimafability isso ee ee a ie ein ah Os SSM ROASY LGLeUTeRry Uh ial Paaorp a ainarna da HON Ck tal An Gi § 6. God’s Immensity and Omnipresence. . H3E5 Cu. III. The Attributes of Divine Life — Divine Klowt edge bhai age SUA gh te ais Nh SHRED GS 20 § 1. The Mode of Divine Gudeledes SS URB er Mae CLK) de a Mie 219 § 2. The Objects of Divine Knowledge — Omniscience 349 ArT. I. Omniscience as God’s Knowledge of the Purely: Posse soe .\ ise ‘ ite GSE ArT, 2. Omniscience as God’s Knowledse of ‘Vision of all Contingent Beings — Cardiognosis, or Searching of Hearts. . . ah SS Art. 3. Omniscience as God’s Hotebiewiedes of the Free Actions of the Future . . . 361 ay CONTENTS Art. 4. Omniscience as God’s Foreknowledge of in the Conditionally Free Acts of the Fu- ture, of the “Scientia Media” 4.4 +47, 373 § 3. The Medium of Divine Knowledge. . , ie Cu. IV. The Attributes of Divine Life— The Divine VER rain ate ) Aer § 1. The Mode of Divine Volition Necessity piss Liberty: of, the: Divine: Will *.)\ ves (ou aan § 2. The Objects of the Divine Will. . Area . 438 § 3. The Virtues of the Divine Will, and in Paice. lar, Justice and Mercy . . . wig haa IC a a ART iL. Gad'ay Justicg x.) twiue Wary ay Bae ae ART 2ulaod $(Merey i uc es a hats | INDEX e e e e ® e ° ® @) e e e ie} e ‘e @ ° ® 469 GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY Notion, RANK, AND DIvIsION oF DOGMATIC ‘THEOLOGY I. GENERAL DEFINITION OF THEOLOGY.—Dog- matic theology forms an essential part of theology in general, and cannot, therefore, be correctly defined without an adequate notion of the latter. Theology, then, generally speaking, is the science of faith (scientia fidet). a) Like all sciences, theology deduces un- known truths from known and certain principles, by means of correct conclusions. As a principle to reason from in his quest of truth the dogma- tician receives, and believingly embraces the in- fallible truths of Revelation, and by means of logical construction, systematic grouping, and correct deductions, erects upon this foundation a logical body of doctrine, as does the historian who works with the facts of history, or the jurist who deals with statutes, or the scientist who em- ploys bodies and their phenomena as materials for scientific construction. 1 ye: GENERAL INTRODUCTION It is true that some Scholastics, e. g., Durandus and Vasquez, have denied to theology the dignity of a science, because it affords no intrinsic insight into the How and Why of such mysteries as that of the Most Holy Trin- ity, of the Hypostatic Union, and others.t. But neither do the profane sciences afford us always and everywhere an insight into their highest principles. Enclidian ge- ometry, for instance, stands and falls with the axiom of parallels, which has never yet been satisfactorily proved. In fact, of late years an attempt has been made to estab- lish a “non-Euclidian geometry” independent of that axiom. To this should be added the consideration that there are sciences which derive their basic principles as lemmata from some higher science. Such, for example, is metaphysics, which is quite generally admitted to be a true science. Hence it is plain that the notion of a sci- ence, while of course it includes certainty, does not neces- sarily include evidence of its principles. According to the luminous teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas,? “ Duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae proce- dunt ex principus notis lumine naturalis intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex principuis notis lumine superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometriam et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina [i. e., theologia] est sctentia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae scil. est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musicus credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.’ ? 1 Cfe. Hebr, xi, 1: Fides. &:. 8 Cfr. P. Schanz, Ist die Theolo- argumentum non apparentium,” gie eine Wissenschaft? Tiibingen 2 Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 1, art. 2. 1900. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3 b) Its specific character theology derives from the fact that it is the science of faith, taking faith both in its objective and in its subjective sense. Considered in its object, theology com- prises all those truths (and those truths only) which have been supernaturally revealed, have been included in Scripture and Tradition, and are, therefore, in the keeping of the infallible Church (depositum fidei). Hence all branches of sacred theology, including canon law and pas- toral theology, are bottomed upon supernatural Revelation. Considered as a science, theology necessarily presupposes faith; for the theolo- gian’s principle of knowledge is not pure and unaided reason, but reason carried as it were be- yond itself, elevated, ennobled, and transfigured by supernatural faith. It was in this sense that the Fathers* insisted on the proposition: “Gnosis super fidem aedificatur,”’ just as Scholas- ticism was founded on St. Anselm’s famous axiom, “Fides quaerit intellectum.” Hence there is a sharp distinction between philosophy and theology. Philosophy, too, especially that branch of it known as Theodicy, treats of God, His existence, es- sence, and attributes; but it treats of them only in the light of unaided human reason; while theology, on the other hand, derives its knowledge of God and divine things entirely from Revelation, as contained in Sacred Scripture and Tradition, and proposed to the faithful 4Cfr. Clement of Alexandria, Strom., VII. “4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION by the infallible Church. To elicit the act of faith de- manded by this process, requires an interior grace (gratia fidei). While philosophy never transcends the bounds of pure reason, and therefore finds itself un- able to prove the mysteries of faith by arguments drawn from its own domain, theology always and everywhere retains the character of a science founded strictly upon authority. 2. THE HicuH RANK oF THEOLOGY.—The- ology must be assigned first place among the sciences. This appears: a) From its inherent dignity. While the secular sciences have no other guide than the flickering lamp of human reason, theology is based upon faith, which, both objectively as Reve- lation, and subjectively as grace, is an immediate gift of God. St. Paul emphasizes this truth in rt Cor. Il, 7 sqq.: “Loquimur Dei sapientiam in mysterio, quae abscondita est, . . . quam nemo principum hums saeculi cognovit ... nobis autem Deus revelavit per Spiritum suum—We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery [a wis- dom] which is hidden, . . . which none of the princes of this world knew, . . . but to us God hath revealed by his spirit.” St. Thomas traces theology to God Himself: “Theologiae princi- pium proximum quidem est fides, sed primum est intellectus divinus, cui nos credimus.’’ ® b) From its ulterior object. The secular 5In Boeth, De Trin., qu. 2, art. 2, ad 7. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 5 sciences, apart from the gratification they afford to man’s natural curiosity and love of knowledge, aim at no other end than that of shaping his earthly life, beautifying it, and perhaps perfect- ing his happiness on earth; while theology, on the other hand, guides man, in all his various modes of activity, including the social and the political, to a supernatural end, whose delights “eye hath not seen, nor ear heard.” ° c) From the certitude which it ensures. The certitude of faith, upon which theology bases all its deductions—a certitude that is rooted in the inerrancy of Divine Reason, rather than in the participated infallibility of a finite, and conse- quently fallible, mind—excels even that highest degree of human certitude which is within the reach of metaphysics and mathematics. This threefold excellence of theology supplies us with sufficient motives for studying it diligently and thoroughly. No other science is so sublime. The- ology is the queen of all sciences,—a queen to whom even philosophy, despite its dignity and independence, must pay homage. Hence the oft-quoted Scholastic axiom: “Philosophia est ancilla theologiae.’* The more directly a science leads up to God, the nobler, the sublimer, and the more useful it necessarily is. But can any science lead more directly to God than theology, which treats solely of God and things divine? 62 Cor, ii,:\9. corum sententia philosophiam esse 7On the true meaning of this theologiae ancillam, |Monasterii dictum, see Clemens, De Scholasti- 1856. 6 GENERAL INTRODUCTION We should, however, beware lest our study of the- ology degenerate into mere inquisitive prying of the sort against which St. Paul warns us: “ Non plus sapere quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem — Not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.”* Let us not forget that it is punishable temerity to attempt to fathom the mysteries, strictly and properly so called, of faith. (Cfr. Ecclus. III, 25.) More than any other study should that of the- ology be accompanied by pious meditation and humble prayer.® 3. DEFINITION oF DoGmatic THEOLOGY.— The notion of dogmatic theology is by no means identical with that of theology as the science of faith. Moral theology, exegesis, canon law, etc., and indirectly even the auxiliary theological disciplines, are also subdivisions of theology. Nevertheless, dogmatic theology claims the priv- ilege of throning as a queen in the center of the other theological sciences. From another point of view it may be likened to a trunk from which the others branch out like so many limbs. We shall arrive more easily at the true notion of dogmatic theology, in the modern sense of the term, by enquiring into the manner in which theology is divided. | a) On the threshold we meet that most popu- lar and most important division of theology into 8 Rom. XII, 3. Theologia mentis et cordis. Prol. I, ® On this subject, cfr. Contenson, 2. Lugduni 1673. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 4 theoretical and practical, according as theology is considered either as a speculative science or as furnishing rules for the guidance of conduct. Theoretical theology is the science of faith in its proper sense, or dogmatics ; practical theology is ethical or moral theology. Although it will not do to tear these disciplines asun- der, because they are parts of one organic whole, and for the further reason that the main rules of right conduct are based upon dogmatic principles; yet there is good ground for treating the two separately, as has been the custom since the seventeenth century. A glance into the Summa of St. Thomas shows that in the Middle Ages dogmatic and moral theology were treated as parts of one organic whole. Upon the subdivisions of either branch, or the manner in which historical theology (either as Biblical science or Church history), is to be subsumed under the general subject, this is not the place to des- cant. b) Dogmatic theology naturally falls into two great subdivisions, general and special. General dogmatics, which defends the faith against the attacks of heretics and infidels, is also known by the name of Apologetics, or, more properly, Fundamental Theology, for the reason that, as demonstratio christiana et catholica, it lays the foundations for special dogmatics, or dogmatic theology proper.° Of late it has become cus- tomary to assign to fundamental theology a 10 Cfr. Ottiger, S. J., Theol. Fundamentalis, I, 1 saa. Friburgi 1897. 8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION number of topics which might just as well be treated in special dogmatics, such as, e. g., the rule of faith, the Church, the papacy, and the relation between faith and reason. This com- mendable practice grew out of the necessity of fairly dividing the subject-matter of these two branches of theology. The topics named really belong to the foundations of dogmatic theology proper, and besides, being doctrines in regard to which the various denominations differ, they re- quire a more detailed and controversial treat- ment. We purpose to follow this practice and to ex- clude from the present work all those subjects which more properly belong to general dog- matics. We define special dogmatics, or dog- matic theology proper, after the example of Scheeben,"? as “the scientific exposition of the en- tire domain of theoretical knowledge, which can be obtained from divine Revelation, of God Him- self and His activity, based upon the dogmas of the Church.” By emphasizing the words theo- retical and dogmas, this definition excludes moral theology, which, though based upon divine Reve- lation and the teaching of the Church, is yet practical rather than theoretical. A dogma is a norm of knowledge; the moral law is a standard 11 Dogmatik, I, 3; Wilhelm-Scan- ogy Based on Scheeben’s “ Dog- nell, 4 Manual of Catholic Theol- matik,” I, t sqq., London 1899. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 9 of conduct; though, of course, both are ultimately rooted in the same ground, viz., divine Revela- tion as contained in Holy Scripture and Tradi- tion, and expounded by the Church. c) Another division of dogmatic theology, that into positive and Scholastic, regards method rather than substance. Positive theology, of which our catechisms contain a succinct digest, limits itself to ascertaining and stating the dog- matic teaching contained in the sources of Reve- lation. Among its most prominent exponents we may mention: Petavius, Thomassin, Lieber- mann, Perrone, Simar, and Hurter.*? Thomas- sin, and especially Petavius, successfully com- bined the positive with the speculative method. When positive theology assumes a polemical tone, we have what is called Controversial Theology, a science which Cardinal Bellarmine in the seven- teenth century developed against the so-called reformers. Dogmatic theology is called Scholastic, when, assuming and utilizing the results of the positive method, it undertakes: (a) to unfold the deeper content of dogma; (b) to set forth the relations of the different dogmas 12 Hurter’s admirable Compen- dium has been adapted to the needs of English-speaking students by the Rev. Sylvester Joseph Hunter, S, J., in his Outlines of Dogmatic Theol- ogy, three volumes, London 1894, 2 to one another; (c) by and, still more succinctly, for the use of colleges, academies, and high schools, by the Rev. Charles Coppens, S. J., in his Systematic Study of the Catholic Religion, St. Louis 1903. _ 10 GENERAL INTRODUCTION syllogistic process to deduce from given or cer- tain premises so-called “theological conclusions ;” and (d) to make plausible, though, of course, not to explain fully, to our weak human reason, by means of philosophical meditation, and espe- cially of proofs from analogy, the dogmas and mysteries of the faith. These four points, since St. Anselm’s day, constituted the pro- gramme of mediaeval Scholasticism.** In order to do full justice to its specific task, dogmatic theology must combine both methods, the posi- tive and the Scholastic; that is to say, it must not limit itself to ascertaining and expound- ing the dogmas of the Church, but, after ascer- taining them and setting them forth in the most luminous manner possible, must endeavor to adapt them’as much as can be to our weak human reason. The great mediaeval Scholastics, notably St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure, treated what are called dogmatic truths as generally known data;—a safe pro- cedure in those days because collections of Biblical and Patristic proofs for each separate dogma were then in the hands of every student. As the most useful in- strument for the speculative treatment of dogma, they seized upon, not the Platonic philosophy, but the system elaborated by the great Stagirite. In preferring Aris- 13 Cfr. J. Kleutgen, Theologie der 14 Cfr. Pesch, S. J., Praelectiones Vorzeit, 2nd ed., V, 1 sqq. Miin- Dogmaticae, Vole I, 3rd ed., p. 24. ster 1874. Friburgi 1903. GENERAL INTRODUCTION II totle, Scholasticism did not, however, antagonize the Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers, who, as is well known, had a strong predilection for Plato. Both Plato and Aristotle may be said to lean on their common master, Socrates, who had grasped with rare acumen the fundamentals of natural religion, wherefore Socratic philosophy, despite its incompleteness, has justly been extolled as the “Philosophia perennis.” * It cannot be denied, however, that theology in all its branches, owes a wholesome impulse to modern philosophy, which, espe- cially since Immanuel Kant (d. 1804), sharpened the critical spirit in method and argumentation, deepened the treatment of many dogmatic problems, and made “ the- oretical doubt ” the starting-point of every truly scientific inquiry. Since the Protestant Reformation threw doubt upon, nay even denied the principal dogmas of the Church, dogmatic theology has been compelled to lay stress upon demonstration from positive sources, especially from Holy Writ. A fusion of the positive with the Scholastic method of treatment was begun as early as the seventeenth century by theologians like Gotti and the Wirceburgenses, and their ex- ample has found many successful imitators in modern times (Franzelin, Scheeben, Chr. Pesch, Billot, and others). To the works of these authors must be added the commentaries on the writings of Aquinas by Car- dinal Satolli, L. Janssens, and Lépicier. For reasons into which it is not necessary to enter here, the series of dogmatic text-books of which this is. the first, while it will not entirely discard the speculative method of the Scholastics, which postulates rare proficiency in dia- 15 Cfr. E. Commer, Die immerwihrende Philosophie, Wien 1899. I2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION lectics and a thorough mastery of Aristotelian meta- physics, as developed by the Schoolmen, will employ chiefly the positive method of the exact sciences.2® Mystic theology is not an adversary but a sis- ter of Scholastic theology. While the latter appeals exclusively to the intellect, mysticism ad- dresses itself mainly to the heart. Hence its ad- vantages, but also its perils, for when the in- tellect is relegated to the background, there is danger that unclear heads will drift into pan- theism, as the example of many of the exponents of later mysticism shows.'7 It must be remarked, however, in this connection that the greatest mystics, like St. Bonaventure, Richard and Hugh of St. Victor, and St. Bernard, were also thor- ough-going Scholastics. 4. SUBDIVISION oF Sprctat DocMaATiIc THE- oLocy.—The principal subject of dogmatic the- ology as such is not Christ,!® nor the Church,” but. God. Now, God can be considered from a 16 As helpful aids we can recom- mend: Signoriello, Lexicon peripa- teticum philosophico-theologicum, Neapoli 1872; L. Schitz, Thomas- Lexikon, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1895. On the subject of the “ philosophia berennis,” see especially O,. Will- mann, Geschichte des Idealismus, 3 vols., 3rd _ed., Braunschweig 1908. 17 Cfr. Proposit. Ekkardi a. 1329 damn. a Ioanne XXII, apud Denzi- ger-Stahl, Enchird., ed, 9, n. 428 sqq., Wirceburgi 1900. 18 Cfr, J. Zahn, Einfiihrung in die christliche Mystik, Paderborn 1908; A. B. Sharpe, Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value, London IQIO. 19-Cfr. t Cor. III, 22 sq. “ Om- nia enim vestra sunt, ... vos autem Christi; Christus autem Dei —for all things are yours, . and you are Christ’s; and Christ is God’s.” 20 Cfr. Kleutgen, J. c., pp. 24 sq. ~ ee, ee ae ee GENERAL INTRODUCTION 13 twofold point of view: either absolutely, in His essence, or relatively, in His outward activity (operatio ad extra). Dogmatic theology is ac- cordingly divided into two well-defined, though quantitatively unequal parts: (1) the doctrine of God per se, and (2) that of His operation ad extra. The first part may again be subdivided into two sections, one of which treats of God con- sidered in the unity of His Nature (De Deo Uno secundum naturam), the other of the Trinity of Persons (De Deo Trino secundum personas). His operation ad extra God manifests as Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, and Consummator. Dt1- vine Revelation, so far as it regards the created universe, includes the creation of nature, the es- tablishment of the supernatural order and the fall from that order of the rational creatures—4. e., menandangels. The treatise on the Redemption (De Verbo Incarnato) comprises, besides the re- vealed teaching on the Person of our Saviour (Christology), the doctrine of the atonement (Soteriology), and of the Blessed Mother of our Lord (Mariology). In his rdle of Sanc- tifier, God operates partly through. His invisible grace (De gratia Christi), partly by means of visible, grace-conferring signs or Sacraments (De Sacramentis, in genere et in specie). The 14 GENERAL INTRODUCTION dogmatic teaching of the Church on God the Consummator, is developed in Eschatology (De Novissums). Into this framework the entire body of special dogma can be compressed. Reapincs:—S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic The- ology, I, 1 sqq.— Wilhelm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic The- ology, London, 1899, I, xvii sqq.— Schrader, S. J., De Theologia Generatim, Friburgi 1861.— Kihn, Enzyklopddie und Methodologie der Theologie, Freiburg 1892.—C. Krieg, Enzyklopddie der theol. Wissenschaften, nebst Methodenlehre, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1910.— D. Coghlan in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, s. v. “ Dogma.”— J. H. Newman, The Idea of a University, Disc. 2 sqq. New edition, London 1893.— Hettinger-Stepka, Timothy, or Letters to a Young Theologian, pp. 351 sqq., St. Louis 1902.— T. B. Scannell, The Priest's Studies, pp. 63 sqq., London 1908.— F. J. Hall (Anglican), Introduction to Dogmatic Theology, New York 1907.— J. Pohle, art. “ Theology” in the Catholic Encyclo- pedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 580-597.— J. B Hogan, S.S., Clerical Studies, and ed., Boston s. a., pp. 151-196. GOD HIS KNOWABILITY, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES PREFATORY REMARKS Here below man can know God only by anal- ogy; hence we are constrained to apply to Him the three scientific questions: An sit, Quid sit, and Qualis sit, that is to say: Does He exist? What is His Essence? and What are His quali- ties or attributes? Consequently in theology, as in philosophy, the existence, essence, and at- tributes of God must form the three chief heads of investigation. The theological treatment differs from the philosophical in that it con- siders the subject in the light of supernatural Revelation, which builds upon and at the same time confirms, supplements, and deepens the con- clusions of unaided human reason. Since the theological question regarding the existence of God resolves itself into the query: Can we know God?—the treatise De Deo Uno naturally falls into three parts: (1) The knowability of God; (2) His essence; and (3) His divine properties or attributes. 15 PART I THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD CHAPTERTT HUMAN REASON CAN KNOW GOD Human reason is able to know God by a con- templation of His creatures, and to deduce His existence from certain facts of the supernatural order. Our primary and proper medium of cognition is the created universe, 4. ¢., the material and the spiritual world. In defining both the created universe and the supernatural order as sources of our knowledge of God, the Church bars Traditionalism and at the same time Atheism, though the latter no doubt constitutes a ‘splendid refutation of the theory that the idea of God is innate. 16 SECTION 3 MAN CAN GAIN A KNOWLEDGE OF GOD FROM THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE ARTICLE ‘5 THE POSITIVE TEACHING OF REVELATION In entering upon this division of our treatise, we assume that the reader has a sufficient ac- quaintance with the philosophic proofs for the existence of God, as furnished by theodicy and apologetics." As against the attempt of atheists and traditionalists to deny the force and strin- gency of these proofs, Catholic theology staunch- ly upholds the ability of unaided human reason to know God. Witness this definition of the Vatican Council:? “Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, anathema sit— If any one shall say that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by 1Cfr. Hontheim, S. J., Theodi- 1890; B. Boedder, S. J., Natural caea s. Theol. Naturalis, Friburgi Theology, 2nd ed., London 1899; 1893; Fr. Aveling, The God of Phi- J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: losophy, London 1906; C. Gutber- God, New York 1904, let, Theodicee, 2nd ed., Minster 2 Sess. III, de Revel., can. 4. 17 18 THE TEACHING OF REVELATION the natural light of human reason through created things; let him be anathema.” Let us see how this dogma can be proved from Holy Scripture and Tradition. | 1. THE ARGUMENT FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE. —a) Indirectly the possibility of knowing God by means of His creatures can be shown from Rom. II, 14 sqq.: “Cum enim gentes, quae legem non habent,? naturaliter ea quae legis sunt facwnt,* eiusmodi legem non habentes tpst sibt sunt lex: qui ostendunt opus legis,®> scriptum im cordibus suis, testimonium reddente illis conscientia tpso- rum et inter se invicem cogitationibus,® accusan- tibus aut etiam defendentibus, in die cum wudicabit Deus occulta hominum secundum Evangelium meum, per Iesum Christwm—For when the Gen- tiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these having not the law are a law to themselves: who shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their con- science bearing witness to them, and their thoughts among themselves accusing, or also defending one another, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, according to my gospel.’ The “law ” (lex, vones) of which St. Paul here speaks, is identical in content with the moral law of na- 3@6vn Ta un vomov ExorTa, 5 pyov vémov- 4 picet TA TOV vOpoVv Towa, 68 ray oyiouwr. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 19 ture;‘the same which constituted the formal subject- matter of supernatural Revelation in the Decalogue. Hence, considering the mode of Revelation, there is a well-defined distinction, not to say opposition, between the moral law as perceived by unaided human reason, and the revealed Decalogue. Whence it follows, against the teaching of Estius, that “ gentes,’ in the above- quoted passage of St. Paul, must refer to the heathen, in the strict sense of the word, not to Christian converts from Paganism. For, one who has the material con- tent of the Decalogue “written in his heart,” so that, without having any knowledge of the positive Mosaic legislation, he is “a law unto himself,’ being able, con- sequently, to comply “naturally” with the demands of the Decalogue, and having to look forward on Judgment Day to a trial conducted merely on the basis of his own conscience,—such a one, I say, is outside the sphere of supernatural Revelation.® From this passage of St. Paul’s letter to the Romans we argue as follows: ‘There can be no knowledge of the natural moral law derived from unaided human reason, unless parallel with it, and derived from the same source, there runs a natural knowledge of God as the supreme law- giver revealing Himself in the conscience of man. Now, St. Paul expressly teaches that the Gentiles were able to observe the natural law “naturaliter’—“by nature’—1. e., without the 7 Cfr. Rom. II, 21 sqq. egetical difficulties raised by St, 8 Cfr. the commentaries of Bisp- Augustine and Estius, see Franzelin, ing and Aloys Schafer on St. Paul’s De Deo Uno, thes. 4. Epistle to the Romans. On the ex- 20 THE TEACHING OF REVELATION aid of supernatural revelation. Since no one can observe a law unless he knows it, St. Paul’s supposition obviously is that the existence of God, qua author and avenger of the natural law, can likewise be known “naturaliter,’ that is to say, by unaided human reason. b) A direct and stringent proof for our thesis can be drawn from Wisdom XIII, 1 sqq., and Rom. I, 18 sqq. a) After denouncing the folly of those “in whom there is not the knowledge of God,” ® the Book of Wisdom continues (XIII, 5 sq.): “Ad magnitudine enim speciet et creaturae * cognos- cibiliter** poterit creator horum videri.'* . Iterum autem nec lis debet tgnosci; si enim tantum potuerunt scire, ut possent aestimare saeculum,’* quomodo huius Dominum non fa- cilius “* invenerunt?—For by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby. i But then again they are not to be par- doned; for if they were able to know so much as to make a judgment of the world, how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?” A careful analysis of this passage reveals the following line of thought: The existence of 9“ In quibus non est scientia Dei.” 12 Pewpei rac, 10 By hendyadys for “ beauty of 13 groxdoacba Toy aldva, i. e., the creature.” to explore the visible world. 11 dvaddyws. 14 rdx tov, KNOWABILITY OF GOD 21 God is an object of the same cognitive faculty that explores the visible world,—. e., human reason. Hence the medium of our knowledge of God can be none other than that same ma- terial world, the magnitude and beauty of which leads us to infer that there must be a Creator who brought it forth. Such a knowl- edge of God is more easily acquired than a deeper knowledge of the creatural world; in fact, absence of it would argue unpardonable carelessness. As viewed by the Old Testament writer, therefore, nature without any extraneous aid on the part of Revelation or any special illum- ination by supernatural grace, furnishes sufficient data to enable the mind of man to attain to a knowledge of the existence of God. | B) We have a parallel passage in the New Testament,—Rom. I, 18 sqq., which reaches its climax in verse 20: “Jnvisibilia enim ipsius [sctl. Det] a creatura mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, mtellecta conspiciuntur *° sempiterna quo- que ews virtus et divinitas, ita ut sint inexcusa- biles *°—For the invisible things of him [God] from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable.” In other words:—God, Who 15 rois woinuact voovmera Kabeo- 16 dvarohoynrot. parat, 22 THE TEACHING’ OF REVELATION is per se invisible, after some fashion becomes visible to human reason (voovpeva xafopara), But how? Not by positive revelation, nor yet by the interior grace of faith; but solely by means of a natural revelation imbedded in the created world (rots woujwaow), ‘To know God from nature appears to be such an easy and matter-of-fact process (even to man in his fallen state), that the heathen are called “inexcusable” in: their ignorance and are in punishment therefor “given up to the desires of their heart unto unclean- ness.74 c) By way of supplementing this argument from Holy Scripture we will briefly advert to the important dis- tinction which the Bible makes, or at least intimates as existing, between popular and scientific knowledge of God. The former comes spontaneously and. without effort, while the latter demands earnest research and con- scientious study, and, where there is culpable ignorance, involves the risk of a man’s falling into the errors of polytheism, pantheism, etc. We find this same distinc- tion made by St. Paul in his sermons at Lystra and Athens, and we meet it again in the writings of the Fathers, coupled with the consideration that, to realize the existence of a Supreme Being men have but to advert to the fact that nations, like individuals, are plainly guided and directed by God’s Providence. In his sermon at Lystra, after noting that God had allowed the Gentiles “to walk in their own ways,” that is to say, to become the prey of false religions, the Apos- 17 Rom. I, 18, 24 sqq. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 2% tle declares that He nevertheless ** “left not Himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness.” 7° Before the Areopagus at Athens, the great Apostle of the Gentiles, pointing to the altar dedi- cated “ To the Unknown God,” said: “God, who made the world, . . . and hath made of one [Adam] all mankind, to dwell upon the whole face of the earth, determining appointed times and the limits of their habi- tation, that they should seek God, if happily they may feel after him or find him,?° although he be not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and are.” 2! In the following verse (29) he calls at- tention to the unworthy notion that the Divinity is “like unto gold, or silver, or stone, the graving of art, and device of man.” Both sermons assume that there is a twofold knowledge of God: the one direct, the other reflex. The direct knowledge of God arises spontaneously in the mind of every thinking man who contemplates the visible universe and ponders the favors continually lavished by Providence. In the reflexive or metaphysical stage of his knowledge of God, on the other hand, man is exposed to the temptation wrongly to transfer the concept of God to objects not divine, and thus to fall into gross polytheism or idolatry.?? We have, therefore, Scriptural warrant for holding that the idea of God is entirely spontaneous in its origin, but may easily be perverted in the course of its scientific development.”? 18 kairo rye = nihilominus. 21 Acts XVII, 24-28. 19 Acts XIV, 16. 22 Cfr. Wisdom XIII, 6 sqaq. 20“ Si forte attrectent eum aut 23 Hieron. In ep. ad Tit. I, 10. inveniant.” For a further elucidation of the 24 THE TEACHING OF REVELATION 2. The Patristic argument may be reduced to three main propositions. a) In the first place, the Fathers teach that God manifests Himself in His visible creation, and may be perceived there by man without the aid of supernatural revelation. Athenagoras calls the existing order of the material world, its magnitude and beauty, “pledges of divine worship ” ** and adds: “For the visible is the medium by which we perceive the invisible.”25 Clement of Alexandria, too, insists that we gain our knowledge of Divine Providence from the contemplation of God’s works in nature, so much so that it is unnecessary to resort to elaborate arguments to prove the existence of God. “All men,” he says, “Greeks and barbarians, discern God, the Father and Creator of all things, un- aided and without instruction.” 2° St. Basil 27 calls the visible creation “a school and institution of divine knowledge.” #8 St. Chrysostom, in his third homily on the Epistle to the Romans (n. 2), apostrophizes St. Paul thus: “ Did God call the Gentiles with his voice? Certainly not. But He has created something which is apt to draw their attention more forcibly than words. He has put in the midst of them the created world and thereby from the mere aspect of visible things, the learned and the unlearned, the Scythian and the bar- barian, can all ascend to God.” Similarly St. Gregory the Great teaches:?® “ Omnis homo eo ipso quod ra- subject, see J. Quirmbach, Die 25 Legat. pro Christ., n. 4 sq. Lehre des hl. Paulus von der 26 Strom., V, 14. natiirlichen Gotteserkenntnis und 27 In Hexaém., hom. 1, n. 6. dem natiirlichen Sittengesetz, Frei- 28 SidacKanreiov Kai GOeoyvwalas burg 1906. WawWeEevTnpLoy, 24 évéxupa THs OeocePelas, 29 Moral. xxvii, 5. Cfr. Sprinzl, KNOWABILITY OF GOD 25 tionalis est conditus, debet ex ratione colligere, eum qui se condidit Deum esse — By the use of his reason every man must come to the conclusion that the very fact that he is a rational creature proves that his Creator is God.” b) The Fathers further teach: From even a superficial contemplation of finite things there must arise spontaneously, in every thinking man, at least a popular knowledge of God. To explain how natural it is to rise from a con- templation of the physical universe to the existence of God, some of the Fathers call the idea of God Pian innate conviction put by nature in the mind of man,” *° a knowledge which is “ not acciired..°t9 Dut “a dowry of reason,” *? and which, precisely because it is so easy of acquisition, is quite common among men. Tertullian calls upon “the soul of the Gentiles” to give testimony to God,—not the soul which “has learned in the school of wisdom,” but that which is “ simplex, rudis, impolita et idiotica.”—“ Magistra na- tura,”’ he says, “ anima discipula — Nature is the teacher, the soul a pupil.” ®* St. Augustine says that the con- sciousness we have of God blends with the very essence of human reason: “ Haec est vis verae divinitatis, ut creaturae rationali ratione iam utenti non omnino ac penitus possit abscondi,; exceptis enim paucis [sc. atheis] in quibus natura nimium depravata est, universum genus hominum Deum mundi huius fatetur auctorem — For Die Theologie der apostolischen 81 ypnua ov didaxrdv, adrouadés, Viter, pp. 110 sqq., Vienna 1880. 32 qdagt oUpmuTOS OYos, 30 §déa éuguTos, éyvvoia EupuTos, 33 De Testim. An., c. 2 et 5. mpodrynyis Pvoiky, 3 26 .~THE TEACHING OF REVELATION such is the energy of true Godhead, that it cannot be altogether and utterly hidden from any rational creature. For with the exception of a few in whom nature has become outrageously depraved, the whole race of man acknowledges God as the maker of this world.” 334 Seeking a deeper explanation, several Fathers CelGs, Justin Martyr and St. Basil) have raised the rational soul to the rank of an essential image of the Eternal Logos, calling it a déyos omepparixés, which irresistibly seeks out and finds God in the universe, c) The Fathers finally teach that human rea- son possesses, both in the visible world of ex- terior objects, and in its own depths, sufficient means to develop the popular notion of God into a philosophical concept. The Greek Fathers, who had to combat paganism and the heresy of the Eunomians, generally relied on two arguments as sufficient to enable any man to form a philosophical concept of God; viz., the cosmological and the teleological. Augustine’s profounder mind turned to the purely metaphysical order of the true, the good, and the beautiful, to deduce therefrom the existence of Substantial Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.** This trend of mind did not, however, prevent him from ac- knowledging the validity of the teleological and cos- mological argument. “Interroga mundum, ornatum coeh, fulgorem dispositionemque siderum, . . in- terroga omnia et vide, si non sensu suo Anca tibt respondent: Deus nos fecit. Haec et philosophi nobiles 83a Tract. In Ioa., 106, n. 4. 84Cfr. Confess., VIII, 17; DeLib. Arbit., II, 12. = KNOWABILITY OF GOD. 27 quaesierunt et ex arte artificem cognoverunt. Quod curiositate invenerunt, superbia perdiderunt.” *° ARTICLE 2 THE IDEA OF GOD NOT INBORN 1. THE THEORY THAT OUR IDEA oF Gop Is IN- BORN.—Several of the Fathers insisted so strongly on the original and spontaneous char- acter of our knowledge of God, that a number of theologians ** were led to claim Patristic authority for the theory of innate ideas evolved by the famous Descartes. According to the teaching of these theologians, the Patristic concept of God is not based upon a conclusion of human reason (idea Dei acquisita), but is inborn (1dea Der innata). Our “consciousness of God,” says Kuhn, is but part and parcel of our “self-con- sciousness,” that is to say, it is “a knowledge of God founded upon His revelation to the hu- man mind.” ** It is a plausible enough theory. For as, ¢. g., Justin Martyr terms the idea of God “épdurov ry pica Tov avOporwv Sogav,—an opinion implanted in the nature of men,” *"* so also Ter- 35 Serm. 141. Cfr. Schiffini, Dis- natiirliche Gotteserkenntnis nach put. Metaphysicae Specials, II, 61 sqq. Aug. Taurin. 1888. Copious references from the Greek Fathers will be found in Petavius, De Deo, I, -1 sq-—Cfr. also on the whole subject: Van Endert, Der Gottes- beweis in der patristischen Zeit, Freiburg 1861; K, Unterstein, Die der Lehre der kappadozischen Ktr- chenviter, Straubing 1903-4. 36 Thomassin, Tournely, Drey, Kuhn. 37‘ Ein Wissen. von Gott auf Grund seiner Offenbarung im Geiste.”’ 37a Apol., II, n. 6. Klee, 28 THE IDEA OF GOD NOT INBORN tullian teaches: “Animae enim a primordio con- scientia Det dos est, eadem nec alia et in A egyptus et in Syris et in Ponticis—From the beginning the knowledge of God is the dowry of the soul, one and the same amongst the Egyptians, and the Syrians, and the tribes of Pontus,” 28 2. REFUTATION OF THIS THEORY.—The theory that the concept of God is inborn in the human mind, cannot stand the test of either philosophy or theology. Without entering into its philo- sophical weaknesses, we will only remark that aside from the danger of idealism which it in- curs, the very possibility of atheism renders this theory improbable. While not perhaps de- serving of formal theological censure, it cannot escape the note of “hazardousness,” inasmuch as it is apt to endanger the dogmatic truth that the existence of God is strictly demonstrable on ra- tional grounds.*® At any rate it can be shown beyond a peradventure that the Patristic teach- ing of the primordial character of human belief in God, is by no means identical with the theory of Descartes, and cannot be construed as an argument in favor of the proposition that the idea of God is inborn. a) In the first place, the assumption that it 88 Adv. Marcion., I, 10. Cfr. Ot- 89 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, S. J., Prae- ten, Der Grundgedanke der Carte- lect. Dogm., t. II, 3rd_ed., Fri- Stanischen Philosophie, Freiburg _ burgi 1906, 1896. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 29 can be so construed does not harmonize with the epistemology of those very Fathers who speak of our knowledge of God as “innate.” Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine and John of Damascus, uniformly teach that all our concepts, including those we have of God and divine things, in their last analysis are drawn from experience by means of a consideration of the material universe; hence they cannot possibly mean to say that our idea of God is inborn.*° b) A careful comparison of all the Patristic passages bearing on this subject shows that the Fathers nowhere assert that our idea of God is innate, though they frequently insist on the spontaneity with which, by virtue of an uncon- scious syllogism, this idea springs from any, even the most superficial, consideration of na- ture. What is inborn in our mind is not the idea of God as such, but rather the faculty readily to discover God in His creatures.*’ tullians, pp. 166 sqq., Paderborn 1893. 41 Gregory of Nazianzus, @é. g., “ Ratio a Deo data et om- 40 Tertullian seems to offer an exception; but, like the rest, he concludes “‘ ex factitamentis ad fac- torem’’ and explains the phrase “a says: € primordio,” which might give rise to a misunderstanding, as follows: “ Deus nunquam ignotus, ideo nec incertus, siquidem a_ primordio rerum conditor earum cum ipsis pariter compertus est, ipsis ad hoc prolatis [He created them for the purpose] «ut Deus cognosceretur.” Cfr. G. Esser, Die Seelenlehre Ter- nibus congenita et prima in nobis lex omnibusque conserta ad Deum nos deducit ex visibilibus’’? (Orat. 28, n. 6), which is in perfect ac- cord with the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas: “ Dei cognitio nobis dicitur innata esse, in quan- tum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum - 130 THE IDEA OF GOD NOT INBORN 3. THE NEcEssity oF PrRovING THE Exist- ENCE OF Gop.—If the idea we have of God is not inborn, but owes its origin to a consideration of the cosmos, it necessarily follows that the exist- ence of God must be demonstrated syllogistically. a) The knowableness of God, as taught by Holy Seripture and the Church, ultimately resolves itself into His demonstrability. To question the validity of the ordinary proofs for the existence of God, and to say, as €. g. W. Rosenkranz says:*? “The so-called meta- physical proofs, which theology has hitherto employed, have one and all failed when put to a critical test,’— is to advocate scepticism and to miss the meaning in- tended by the Church. If no conclusive argument for the existence of God had yet been found, it would be safe to say that none such exists, and that the case is hopeless. Gregory XVI obliged Professor Bautain, of Strasbourg, to assent to the thesis: “ Ratiocinatio Dei existentianr cum. certitudine probare potest.” (Sept. 8, 1840.) In 1855 the Congregation of the Index ordered Bonnetty to subscribe this proposition: ‘“ Ratiocinatio Det existentiam, animae spiritualitatem, hominis liberta- iem cum certitudine probare potest.’ *® The anti-Mod- ernist oath of Pius X expressly mentions the demonstra- bility of God. b) If we inquire into the nature of the middle term that is indispensable to a valid syllogistic argument for the existence of God, we find that Sacred Scripture and the Fathers agree that we must ascend to God a po- esse” (In Boéth. De Trin., prooem., qu... I, arts. 3, ad,’6)./ Cfr. Kleut- gen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, Ab- handl, 1 and 9; Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 7; Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. III, § 140. 42 Die Prinzipien der Theologie, p. 30, Miinchen 1875, 48 Cir, St. Thomas, Contra. Gent., Ty 12; KNOWABILITY OF GOD 31 steriort, 1. e., from the material world that surrounds us. This fact alone would explain the distrust which the- ologians have ever shown towards the a priori or on- tological argument of St. Anselm.** Of the other proofs for the existence of God, it may be noted that two, namely, first, that which from the consideration of possible or contingent beings passes on to the conclu- sion that at least one necessary being exists; and, sec- ondly, that commonly called teleological, which draws this conclusion from order and beauty in the physical universe, are imposed on us both by Holy Writ. and the teaching of the Fathers. Nor, as the example of St. Paul shows,** can the moral and historical proofs (conscience, providence) be brushed aside as lacking cogency. Whence it appears that these arguments cannot easily be improved, except perhaps with regard to method, and by formulating them with greater precision. Since it is not the object of Revelation to furnish an exhaustive course of proofs for the ex- istence of God, such other arguments as that of St. Augustine based upon the metaphysical essences, and the one drawn from man’s desire for happiness, must also be accepted as valid, provided, of course, they do not move in a vicious circle. c) The a posteriori demonstrability of God is con- firmed by the great theological luminaries of the Middle Ages. Thus St. Thomas Aquinas, the Prince of Scho- lastic theologians, teaches: “Simpliciter dicendum est, quod Deus non est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in Det cognitionem venimus, secundum illud Apostolt ad Romanos (I, 20): Invisi- 44 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Verit., qu. ‘45 Rom. II, 14 sqq.; Acts XIV, 10, art. 12. 16; XVII, 24 sqq. 32 THE IDEA OF GOD NOT INBORN bilia Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum praesentis vitae, est quidditas ret materials.” ** That St. Anselm’s view, apart from his ontological argument, was in substantial agreement with that of St. Thomas, has been established by Van Weddingen.** Reapincs:—Cfr. the compendiums of Hurter, Wilhelm- Scannell, and Hunter.—*Franzelin, De Deo uno, ed. ga, Romae 1883.*—Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, Ratisbonae 1881.— Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. III, Mayence 1883.— *Scheeben, Katholische Dogmatik, Vol. I, Freiburg 1873.—*De San, De Deo uno, 2 vols., Lovanii 1894-97. *Stentrup, De Deo uno, Oeniponte 1878.—*L. Janssens, O. S. B., De Deo uno, 2 tomi, Friburgi 1900——A. M. Lépicier, De Deo uno, 2 vols., Parisiis 1900.— Ronayne, S. J., God Knowable and Known, 2nd ed., New York 1902.— D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino, Dub- linii 1909.— P. H. Buonpensiere, O. P., Comment. in r P. (qu. 1- 23) S. Thomae Aquinatis, Romae 1902— Chr. Pesch, S. J., Prael. Dogmat., Vol. II, ed. 3a, Friburgi 1906.—R. F. Clarke, S. J., The Existence of God, London 1892.— Delloue-Leahy, So- lution of the Great Problem, New York 1917, pp. 55 sqq.— Of the Scholastics, especially St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 1 saqq. and Summa contra Gentiles, 1. I, cap. 10 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, London 1905, pp. 9 sqq.) ; also the treatises of Suarez, Petavius, and Thomassin, De Deo Uno, and Lessius, De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis, ed. nova, Parisiis 1881.— The teaching of Franzelin and Palmieri is summarized in English by W. Humphrey, S. J., in “ His Divine Majesty,’ or the Living God, London 1897.— Other references in the text.48 46S. Theol., 1a, qu. 84, art. 7. 47 Essat critique sur la philosophie name indicates that his treatment of the question is especially clear and de S. Anselme, chap. 4, Bruxelles 1875. See also Heinrich, Dogm. Theologie, Vol. III, § 137; A. Konig, Schépfung und Gotteser- kenntnis, Freiburg 1885; and E. Rolfes, Die Gottesbewetse bei Thomas von Aquin und Aristoteles, Koln 18098. 48 The asterisk before an author’s thorough. As St. Thomas is invari- ably the best guide, the omission of the asterisk before his name never means that we consider his work in any way inferior to that of others. There are vast stretches of dogmatic theology which he scarcely ever touched. SECTION’ 2 OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS DERIVED FROM THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER In relation to our knowledge of God the facts of the supernatural order may be viewed from a twofold coign of vantage: either as premises for a syllogism demonstrating the existence of God from the standpoint of human reason; or as a preamble to supernatural faith in God (actus fidei in Deum), which, being a cognitio Dei per fidem, differs essentially from the cognitio Det per rationem. ARTICLE "x THE FACTS OF THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER CONSIDERED AS PREMISES FOR UNAIDED REASON I. STATE OF THE QuEsTion.—Both nature and the supernatural order,—the latter even more convincingly than the former,—prove that there is a God. The arguments which can be drawn from the supernatural order—the fulfilment of prophecies, miracles (in the Old and the New Testament), Christ and His mission,—are his- 33 S34 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER torical, and therefore appeal most forcibly to the student of history, though scarcely any eee mind can escape their force. We must call particular attention to the fact that the proofs for the existence of God drawn from the supernatural deeds of the Al- mighty Himself, are really and truly arguments based on reason, and hence do not differ essen- tially from others of the same class. They all depend for their validity upon the law of cau- sality. But the proofs here under consideration possess the twofold advantage of being (1) more petfect-and (2) more.eftective. They are (1) more perfect, because the supernatural effects wrought by God far surpass those of the purely natural order, inasmuch as greater effects point to a more perfect cause. They are (2) more effective, because they are based, not upon every- day phenomena constantly recurring in accord- ance with Nature’s laws, but upon rare and startling facts (such as prophecies and mira- cles) which cannot fail to impress even those who pay little heed to the glories of Nature. 2. SKETCH OF THE ARGUMENT.—From the mass of available material we will select three prominent phenomena, which prove the existence of a Supreme Being. a) The first is the history of the Jews under the Old Covenant. As the Chosen People of God for two KNOWABILITY OF GOD 35 thousand years they led a religious, social, and political life radically different from that of the heathen nations around them. It was not due to a racial predisposition, such as é. g. a monotheistic instinct, that the Jewish people, encompassed by pagan nations, were able to pre- serve their peculiar belief, constitution, and discipline ; for was not the inclination to practice idolatry one of their chief faults? The true explanation is that all their peculiarities were traceable to supernatural causes,— a long, unbroken chain of prophecies and miracles, visi- ble apparitions of a hidden Power to individuals (Moses) and to the whole people (the laws given on Mount Sinai). The entire Old Testament is a most wonderful revelation of God and His attributes, and furnishes cogent proof for the existence of an almighty and gra- cious sovereign.? b) Secondly, there is the person of Jesus Christ. Cfr. Heb. I, 1, 2: “ Multifariam multisque modis olim Deus loquens patribus in prophetis, novissime diebus istis locutus est nobis in Filio, quem constituit haeredem um- versorum, per quem fecit et saecula— God, who at sun- dry times and in divers manners spoke, in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all, in these days hath spoken to us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the world.” The Old Testament was plainly a mere preparation for the New. In the person of the Messiah, God appeared 1Cfr. F. H. Reinerding, Theolo- by a number of eminent As- gia Fundamentalis, pp. 112 sqq., syriologists. For information on Monasterii 1864.— Frederick De- this intricate subject, which has litzsch’s recent attempt (Babel und called forth a veritable flood of Bibel, Leipzig 1902), to trace the books and pamphlets, the reader genesis of Jewish monotheism and is referred to J. Nikel, Genesis the Mosaic revelation back to the und Keilschrififorschung, Freiburg civilization and culture of ancient 1903. Babylon was promptly frustrated 36 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER bodily on earth. His wondrous conception, His miracles and prophecies, His superhuman teaching, His insti- tuting the Church, His resurrection and ascension, tri- umphantly prove Christ to be what He claimed to be: the true Son of God. Hence God exists. Historians and philosophers are constrained to acknowledge in the words of the Evangelist (John I, 14): ‘And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” Like the two hands of a clock, universal history, before and after Christ, gives testimony of Jesus: antiquity pointing for- ward as a “ paedagogus ad Christum,”’ while the Chris- tian era points backward to indicate fulfilment. The Incarnation represents the climax and culmination of God’s self-revelation to humankind. Thus Christ is in very truth the axis of the universe and of universal history, the living proof of Theism.? c) A third argument is derived from the wonderful religious and moral regeneration of the Mediterranean races wrought by the influence of Christianity in the first three centuries of its existence. Oppressed by the “shadow of death,’ the Gentiles before Christ walked in the ways of evil and darkness, or, as St. Paul puts it, God “in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways.” * The fourth century of the Christian era found these same nations radically changed — they had become “a new generation” walk- ing in “the way of the cross,” “burning what they had previously adored.” The bloody persecutions of the Czsars had proved so ineffective in stamping out the new religion, that Tertullian was able to exclaim: 8 Cfr. Didon, Jesus Christ, Lon- of Christ, New York 1906. . don 1897; Bougaud, The Divinity 4 Acts XIV, 15. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 37 “Sanguis martyrum semen Christianorum.’ Leaving aside all other considerations, from the purely histor- ical point of view alone such a radical transforma- tion of the family, and of economic and political life, the conversion of the masses, and their preservation in a state of moral purity such as the world had never known before, demand an adequate explanation. Where are we to seek for this explanation? Surely not in the circumstances, either extraneous or internal, of the re- generated masses themselves. For both in doctrine and morals Christianity was the antithesis of paganism, and therefore could not possibly have developed from it. All attempts to derive the Christian religion from rem- nants of Oriental beliefs or the philosophic theories of the Greeks (Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, Philo) have ut- terly failed. Far from aiding in the regeneration of the corrupt masses under the Roman Empire, philosophy made common cause against Christianity with a fanatical Jewry and a paganism already in the grip of death. Nor did the new religion owe its final triumph to force. The tulers of the mighty Empire, far from favoring Christi- anity and advancing its spread with the powerful means at their command, turned these engines against it as a deadly foe, and sought to drown the new faith in the life-blood of its adherents.’ It was not until the day of Constantine that a change set in. There is no satis- factory explanation for all this except that a super- human Being guides the destinies of men and lets the gentle sun of His providence shine. upon the weak and the strong alike. Filled with a conviction of this great truth, the unknown author of the Epistle to Diognetus * writes: “Ista non videntur hominis opera, 5Cfr. P. Allard, Ten Lectures on the Martyrs, London 1907. 6 Epist. ad Diogn., n. 7. 38 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER haec virtus est Dei, haec adventus eius sunt demonstroa- tiones.” * ARTICLE 2 THE SUPERNATURAL FACTS AS A PREAMBLE TO OUR BE- LIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD “1. STATE OF THE QuEsTION.—The supernat- ural facts described in the previous article are more than mere arguments of reason for the ex- istence of God. Inasmuch as they prove the Christian religion to be divine, they are also a praeambulum to the supernatural act of faith in the existence of God. To work out this argu- ment in detail is the business of apologetics.® There is another consideration that must be empha- sized. Although the Revelation made through Jesus Christ is demonstrable on rational grounds, yet it does not necessarily compel assent, but may leave the unbe- liever entirely unconvinced, whilst it leads the mind of him who receives it willingly to the act of faith. Since the praeambula fidei form an essential part of divine Revela- tion, they enter as a necessary ingredient into this actus fidei. From a mere outwork of (subjective) faith they 7Cfr. B. Jungmann, De Vera the first edition of this work, while Religione, pp. 197 sqq., Brugis several times reprinted, has not 1871; F. Bole, Flavius Josephus kept pace with the thoroughly over- tiber Christus und die Christen in den jiidischen Altertiimern, Brixen 1896. 8 Cfr. Schanz, Apologie des Chris- tentums, 3rd ed., Vol. II, Freiburg 1905. The English translation of hauled second and third editions of the German original. Recently a fourth edition has begun to appear under the editorship of Prof. Koch of Tibingen, ee ee ee KNOWABILITY OF GOD 39 become a part of its essence; what was previously an historic and apologetic certainty, is transformed into the certainty of faith. Nature gives way to the supernatural in the heart of man. Objectively, purely rational dem- onstration cedes its place to the infallible authority of God’s word, while subjectively, a supernatural light in- stead of the natural light of reason becomes the source of faith.? Like the “ preamble”’ itself, the existence of God becomes a formal dogma, to be embraced and held with the supernatural certitude proper to faith. 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GoD AS AN ARTICLE OF Faitu.—The knowableness of God being an ar- ticle of faith, a fortiori His existence must be a dogma. Although, as Heinrich says,** super- natural faith is an impossibility unless in the very act of faith itself we believe with supernatural certainty in the existence and veracity of God, in- asmuch as a revelation postulates the existence of a revealer ; nevertheless, the fact that there is one who reveals constitutes a separate and independ- ent article of the “depositum fidei.’ “Si quis unum verum Deum, visibilium et invisibilium creatorem et Dominum negaverit, anathema sit —If any one shall deny one true God, Creator and Lord of all things visible and invisible, let him be anathema.” *° a) In his Epistle to the Hebrews, Sty baa 9 Cfr. Fr. Hettinger, Fundamental- 9a Dogm. Theol., II, 21. theologie, 2nd ed., pp. 853-892, 10 Conc. Vat., Sess. III de Deo, Freiburg 1888. can. I. 40 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER declares belief in the existence of God to be an indispensable condition of salvation. NHebr. XI, 6: “But without faith it is impossible to please God. For He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” Here belief in the existence of God is coordinated, separately and independently, with belief in the truth that He rewards those that seek Him. Both these truths are based not only on philosophical arguments, but likewise on that supernatural faith which is the foundation of man’s justification. “De hac dispositione [ad justificationem] scriptum est: Credere oportet accedentem ad Deum, quia est et inquirentibus se remunerator sitt—Concerning this disposition it is written: ‘He that cometh to God, must be- lieve that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.’”** The examples of faith which St. Paul gives in Hebr. XI, 1 sqq., where he concludes with a reference to Christ as ‘“‘the au- thor and finisher of faith,” 12 admit of no other interpretation. b) The Fathers reécho this teaching of St. Paul, so much so that Suarez '* was able to state it as the conviction of the Schoolmen that “Fide catholica tenendum est, Deum esse.’ We have the most succinct proof for this proposition in 11 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 6. 13 In 1. p. S. theol. I, 1. 12 Heb. XI, 1 sqq.; XII, 2. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 4l the first article of the Apostles’ Creed: “Credo in Deum—moredo eis Ocov,” The paraphrase which the Vatican Council gives of this article ** shows clearly that “God” here means not the first per- son of the Most Holy Trinity (7. e., the Father), but God in His absolute essence and inasmuch as He is apt to be the object of a sure knowl- edge attainable by unaided reason. Thete can be no mistake about this; else how account for the fact that the canons attached to this proposition expressly condemn, not some anti- Trinitarian heresy, but atheism, materialism, and pantheism. If Atheism is a heresy, the existence of God must necessarily be a dogma,—the fun- damental dogma upon which all others rest. This explains why, as early as 1679, Pope In- nocent XI condemned the proposition: “Fides late dicta ex testimomo creaturarum simile mo- tivo ad justificationem sufficit—Faith in the wide sense, that is faith as based upon the testi- mony of creatures or some similar motive, suffices for justification.” * 3. KNOWLEDGE vs. FarrH.— It may be objected that if the natural cognoscibility of God and the necessity of supernatural faith are both supernaturally revealed, these dogmas would seem to exclude each other, inasmuch as no man can know God for certain by his unaided rea- son, and at the same time firmly believe in Him on au- 14 Conc. Vatican., Constit. de fide, 18 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiri- Grits \ dion, ni. 1173. 4 42 THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER thority. At the root of this objection lies the assumption that we cannot know a thing and believe it at the same time, because, what we believe on the authority of an- other we do not know, and what we know we do not and cannot believe. It is true St. Thomas ** seems to have held that an evident knowledge of God is incompatible with belief in Him; but Estius confessed himself unable to reconcile this opinion with the teaching of St. Paul in Hebr. XI, 6; while St. Bonaventure,17 De Lugo,*8 Suarez,*? and others, openly defended the contrary. Some theologians, like Cardinals De Lugo and d’ Aguirre, interpreted St. Thomas in favor of their own dissenting view. Whatever may have been the Angelic Doctor’s theory as to the subjective compatibility of knowledge with faith, it seems certain that we are not free to doubt the necessity, much less the possibility, of a co-existence of both modes of cognition in the same subject, especially since St. Paul and the Tridentine Council condition the justification of each and every man, whether he be learned or ignorant, upon a belief in the existence of God. The Vatican Council expressly defines both the knowableness of God from the consideration of the phys- ical universe, and the necessity of supernatural faith in God, as dogmatic truths. Hence we must conclude that both modes of cognition can co-exist in the same subject without conflicting. Such teaching involves no contradiction, for it does not oblige us to hold that we can know and believe the same truth under the same aspect or from the same point of view. Manifestly the material object of both acts (scientia — fides) is the same: ‘‘ God 16S. Theol. 2a z2ae, qu. 1, art. 53 18 De Fide, disp. 2, sect. 2. De Veritate, qu. 14, art. 9. 19 De Fide, disp. 3, sect. 9. 17 In 3 dist., 24, art. 2, qu. 3. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 43 exists.’ But between the formal object of the one and the formal object of the other, there is this essential difference, that rational knowledge depends on the de- gree of evidence in the argument, while faith flows from the authority of God Himself testifying to His own existence2® There is this further difference, that to know God by purely natural means does not require supernatural grace, while faith, on the other hand, is conditioned by the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost (gratia actus fidei), without which no man can have that belief in God which is necessary for sal- vation.”* ! Reapincs: — Alb. a Bulsano, Instit. Theolog. Dogm. Specials, ed, Graun, t. I, pp. 16 sqq., Oeniponte 1893.—Heinrich, Dogmat. ‘Theologie, Vol. II, § 149— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 8 sq.— W. Humphrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 28 sqq., London 1897, R. Kane, S. J., God or Chaos, London 1912. 20 Cfr. W. Humphrey, S. J., The point we must refer the student to Sacred Scriptures, ch. XIII, Lon- the treatise on Grace, which forms don 1894. Volume VII of this English edition 21 For a fuller treatment of this of Pohle’s dogmatic course. SECTION 3 TRADITIONALISM AND ATHEISM ARTICLE: 1 TRADITIONALISM A FALSE SYSTEM I. THE TRADITIONALIST TEACHING.—a) Re- duced to its simplest formula, the teaching of Traditionalism is this: Tradition and oral in- struction (language) are absolutely essential to the development of the human race, so much so, that without them man can attain to no knowl- edge whatever, especially in the domain of re- ligion and morality. Consequently, the knowl- edge of truth is propagated among men solely by oral tradition, and the source and fountain- head of all knowledge must be our first par- ents, or rather God Himself, who in what is called Primitive Revelation committed to Adam and Eve the treasure of truth to be kept and handed down to their descendants. Inspired by the best of intentions, 7. e., to destroy Rational- ism, the Traditionalists depreciate the power of human reason and exaggerate the function of faith. 44 KNOWABILITY OF GOD 45 b) In its crudest form?! Traditionalism asserts that a man can no more think without language than he can see without light— that without language reason would be dead and man a mere brute. Hence the Creator had to endow man with the gift of speech be- fore He could impress upon his mind the ideas of God, immortality, liberty, virtue, etc.; and it was only by means of language that Adam and Eve were able to transmit to their offspring the system of natural re- ligion and ethics based upon these ideas. Hence faith is the foundation not only of supernatural knowledge and life, but likewise of purely human science and rea- son. De Lamennais,? the inventor of the “sens com- mun’ as the supreme criterion of truth, insisted even more emphatically than De Bonald on the necessity of Primitive Revelation, from which alone, he says, all man’s religious and moral knowledge is derived. Tra- ditionalism reappears in a somewhat moderated form in the writings of Bonnetty (1798-1879) and P. Ven- tura (1792-1861).* Bonnetty admits that human reason is able, independently of language and instruction, to deal with the truths at least of the material order, but that for the fundamental doctrines of metaphysics and ethics we are dependent on Revelation. Ventura goes so far as to admit that unaided reason can form the basic notions of being, substance, causality, virtue, and so forth, but his Traditionalistic bent moves him to in- sist that these basic notions would needs remain unfruit- ful, so far as our natural knowledge of God is con- cerned, were it not for the aid of language and instruc- 1Cfr. De Bonald, Recherches phi- 2 Essai sur VIndifférence en Ma- losophiques sur les premiérs objets tigre de Religion, Paris 1817. des connaissances morales, Paris 3La Tradition, Paris 1856. 1817. 46 TRADITIONALISM tion, that is to say, ultimately, Primitive Revelation. Traditionalism was still further attenuated by the Lou- vain school of Semi-Traditionalists, whose chief repre- sentative, Ubaghs,* expressly admits the revealed teach- ing that human reason can acquire a knowledge of God from the consideration of the physical universe, though he hastens to offset his own concession by explaining that the full use of reason (in a child) depends essen- tially on education and instruction in divine things, and that the concept of God which it is the business of edu- cation to convey, is derived from the Primitive Revelation given to our first parents in Paradise. This theory is calculated to raise anew the question as to the extent of the cognitive power of human reason, and traces the notion of God back to Tradition as its sole source. Were it not for its admission that reason can subse- quently, by its own powers, perceive the existence (and. essence) of God from nature, Traditionalism would openly contradict itself. 2. WuHy TRADITIONALISM IS UNTENABLE.— The different systems of Traditionalism are phil- osophically and theologically untenable. a) Philosophically, the fundamental fallacy of Tra- ditionalism lies in the false assumption that language engenders ideas, while in matter of fact it is quite plain that, on the contrary, language necessarily pre- supposes thought and ideas already formed. Man must first have ideas before he can express them in words. “Verbis nist verba non discimus,” to quote St. Augustine, “imo sonum strepitumque verborum. 4Cfr. his Institutiones Philosophi- The Revival of Scholastic Philoso- cae. Ubaghs was directly inspired by phy, New York 1909, p. 215. Malebranche. Cfr. J. L. Perrier, 5 De Magistro, c. 11. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 47 . « . Nescio tamen verbum esse, donec quid significet sciam. Rebus igitur cognitis, verborum quoque cognitio perficitur.” It is quite true that language and instruc- tion play an important, nay, a necessary part in the formation of ideas, but only in so far as the spoken word of parent and teacher leads the child to think for himself and supports and aids him in such inde- pendent thinking. We may also concede that without the family and society no child can fully develop his mental faculties. : b) From the theological point of view Traditionalism is open to the following objections. Inasmuch as it denies that reason can attain to a knowledge of God from a consideration of nature, and asserts that all our knowledge of God is derived from language, human tradition, and Primitive Revelation, exaggerated Tradi- tionalism manifestly contradicts the teaching of the Vatican Council. The milder form usually called Semi- Traditionalism runs counter to dogma only in so far as it questions the certainty of the knowledge of God acquired by unaided reason. It can therefore be squared with the dogmatic definition of the Council on condi- tion that it be expressly understood that the knowl- edge of God handed down among men from generation to generation is derived not from Primitive Revelation in the strict sense of that term, but from an infused primitive knowledge.® Of the different Traditionalist schools only one, that of Louvain, has made an attempt to interpret Sacred Scripture and Tradition in accordance with its teaching. Its representatives endeavored to persuade themselves that the Bible and the Fathers refer to man as he grows @Cfr. Granderath, S. J., Constit. Vaticani ex ipsis eius Actis Ex- Dogmaticae SS. Oececum. Concilit plicatae, pp. 36 saqq., Friburgi 1892. 48 TRADITIONALISM up among his fellowmen, and converses with them by human methods, and consequently, when they employ the phrase “natural knowledge of God,” they do not mean that concept of God which each individual human being forms anew under the influence of parents and instructors, but that concept which, derived from hu- man instruction and tradition, has its roots in Primitive Revelation and can at most be confirmed and deepened by individual consideration of nature. If this explana- tion were true, we should have to interpret Wisdom XIII, 1 sqq., and Rom. I, 20, thus: A man is inex- cusable if he does not know God, for the reason that all men derive a knowledge of God from Primitive Revelation and are, besides, able to perceive Him in nature. Is this the sense of Holy Scripture? We are at liberty to assume an elision only when there is rea- son to think that a writer has omitted something which, being self-evident, did not require express mention. Is the indispensableness of tradition, oral instruction, and Primitive Revelation self-evident in the passages under consideration? Certainly not: hence the sacred writers can not have meant to pass this point over per ellipsin. This becomes still plainer when we reflect that the Traditionalist interpretation is a modern innovation, ex- cogitated for the purposes of a philosophical system that was entirely unknown in the past, Nor can the teaching of the Fathers be quoted in favor of Tradi- tionalism, True, the Fathers admit the existence, in Paradise, of a Primitive Revelation upon which the human race is perpetually drawing; but they never regarded this Primitive Revelation as an absolutely necessary instrument of education: they merely advert to it as an accidental fact with which it is necessary to reckon. They insist that the original purity of KNOWABILITY OF GOD 49 Primitive Revelation was tarnished among the heathen nations, and that the genuine knowledge of God had to be constantly rejuvenated in the perennial purity of the springs of nature.” READINGS: —*Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, p. I, qu. I, art. 3— Chastel, S. J., De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine, Paris 1875.— Denzinger, Vier Biicher von der religidsen Erkenninis, Vol. I, Pp. 149 sqq., Wtirzburg 1856.— For a philosophical appreciation of Traditionalism, see Schiffini, S. J., Disput. Metaphys. Spe- cialis, Vol. I, n. 338 sqq.; B. Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 149 sqq., New York 1891; Jos. Hontheim, S. J., Theodicaea, pp. 33 sqq., Friburgi 1893. ARTICLE 2 THE POSSIBILITY OF ATHEISM 1. DEFINITION OF ATHEISM.—Negative Athe- ism (Agnosticism, Criticism, Scepticism) holds _ that the existence of God is “unknowable,” be- cause there are no arguments to prove it. By positive Atheism we understand the flat denial of the existence of a supreme being apart and dis- tinct from the cosmos. Its chief forms are the different varieties of Materialism (Sensualism, Positivism, Mechanical Monism) and Panthe- ism, which constantly assumes new shapes, and has therefore been justly likened to Proteus of ancient classic mythology. Polytheism and Semi-Pantheism (e. g., the “Panentheism” of 7Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib, VI sq.; Lactantius, Divin. Institut? II, 8. 50 ATHEISM Krause) cannot, however, be branded as Athe- ism. For though both systems logically culmi- nate in the denial of God, their champions in some fashion or other hold to the existence of a supra-mundane and absolute being ® upon which all other beings depend. : 2. THE PossIBILITY OF ATHEISM AND ITS Limits.—Seeing that Holy Scripture, Tradition, and the teaching of the Church emphatically in- sist on the easy cognoscibility of God, our first question, in coming to treat of Atheism, naturally is: Is Atheism possible, and how is it possible? a) We must, in the first place, carefully dis- tinguish between atheistic systems of doctrine and individual professors of Atheism. The his- tory of philosophy shows beyond a doubt that there exist philosophic systems which either ex- pressly deny,’ or in their ultimate principles. vir- tually exclude,** the existence of God. It must be noted, however, that by a happy inconsistency the atheistic tendency of these systems often re- mains more-or less latent, inasmuch as their ad- herents, in spite of atheistic (or pantheistic) premises, seek to uphold a belief in God.*° In considering the case of individuals who profess themselves atheists, the first question to suggest itself is not: Are there practical athe- 8 The Homeric Zeus, Vedic heno- 9a Scepticism, Criticism. theism, etc. 10 Ontologism is an example in 9 Materialism, Pantheism. point. KNOWABILITY OF GOD SI ists? (that is to say, men who live as if there were no God), but rather: Can there be the- oretical atheists in the positive sense of the term? It is certain that no man can be firmly and honestly convinced of the non-existence of God. For, in the first place, no human being enjoying the full use of reason can find a really conclusive argument for the thesis that there is no God. In the second place, the con- sciousness that there is a God, is so deeply in- grained in the human heart, and has such a tremendous bearing upon life and death, that it is impossible for any man to rid himself of it for any considerable length of time. Not even Agnosticism can plead extenuating cir- cumstances. For every thinking man is con- strained by the law of causality, consciously or unconsciously to form the syllogism: Where there is order, some one must exist who pro- duced it; now, nature evinces a wonderful order; therefore there must exist a superhuman power that produced it, namely, God. The prem- ises of this simple syllogism must appeal to every thinking man, no matter whether he be learned or unlettered; and the conclusion flow- ing from these premisses forces itself with ab- solute cogency on the mind of every one who realizes that there can be no effect without a cause. Hence it is held as a sententia communis 52 ATHEISM by theologians that no thinking man can be permanently convinced of the truth of Atheism. This does not, of course, imply that there may not exist here and there feeble-minded, idiotic, uncivilized human beings who know nothing of God. Their ignorance is due to the fact that they are unable to reason from effect to cause, which reasoning is a necessary condition of ac- quiring a knowledge of God from His creatures. b) As we have intimated above, even learned men may, from quasi-conviction, temporarily harbor a species of unbelief; though, of course, this always involves grave guilt. “Dixit in- sipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus—The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God.” *° Not scientific acumen nor a desire for truth, but folly is the source and fountain-head of Athe- ism. In most cases such folly is traceable to a corrupt heart, as St. Paul plainly intimates in his Epistle to the Romans, and as St. Augustine *°? repeats in his commentary on the Psalms: “Primo vide illos corruptos, ut possint dicere in corde suo: Non est Deus... . Dixerunt enim apud se non recte cogitantes. Coepit corruptio a mala fide, inde itur in turpes mores, inde in acerrimas indigmtates: gradus sunt isti.’ The psychological process of apostasy from the faith 10a Ps, XIII, 1. 10b In Ps. LII, n. 3. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 53 may be described as follows: First a man begins to doubt; then comes a period of practical un- belief, nourished sometimes by sensuality, some- times by pride, until finally he is deluded into theoretical Atheism. Not infrequently moral corruption precedes infidelity as a cause. Cfr. Eph. IV, 18: “Tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum, alienati a vita Det per ignorantiam, quae est in illis propter caecitatem cordis tpsorum —Having their understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ig- norance that is in them, because of the blindness Ot their’ hearts,’’*? 3. Wuy ATHEISM Is INTRINSICALLY PossIBLE.— Since the idea of God is spontaneous and forces itself almost irresistibly upon the human mind, purely moral causes do not suffice to explain Atheism; there must in each instance exist an intellectual factor also. This intel- lectual factor must be sought partly in the fallibility of human reason, which is controlled by the will, and partly in the circumstance that the proofs for the ex- istence of God do not produce immediate certainty. On the one hand man has it in his power to disregard the more or less cogent features of these arguments and by concentrating his thoughts on the manifold objec- tions raised against them, to delude himself into the notion that there is no God. On the other hand, these arguments, as we have said, carry no immediate, but 11 On the psychology of unbelief, | Hettinger-Bowden, Natural Religion, see X. Moisant, Psychologie de pp. I sqq. VIncroyant, Paris 1908. Cfr. also 54 - ATHEISM only a mediate certainty, inasmuch as the conviction which they engender depends upon a long chain of mid- dle terms. ! The number of real atheists is impossible to ascer- tain. It depends on conditions of time, of milieu, of degree and method of education, and on various other agencies. Our age boasts the sorry distinction of being immersed in a flood of Atheism which it may take a social revolution to abate.?? READINGS: — Segneri, S. J., L’Incredulo senga scusa, Venezia 1690.— W. G. Ward, Essays on the Philosophy of Theism, 2 vols., London 1884.—~Kaderavek, Der Atheismus, Wien 1884. —L. v. Hammerstein, Edgar, or From Atheism to the Full Truth, St. Louis 1903 W. M. Lacy, An Examination of the Philosophy of the Unknowable, Philadelphia 1883—A. W. Momerie, Agnosticism, London 1889.—Ip., Belief in God, Lon- don 1891.—G, J. Lucas, Agnosticism and Religion, Baltimore 1895.— G. M. Schuler, Der Pantheismus, Wurzburg 1881.— Ib., Der Materialismus, Berlin 1890.—E. L. Fischer, Die modernen Ersatzversuche fiir das aufgegebene Christentum, Ratisbon 1903.— H. Schell, Der Gottesglaube und die naturwissenschaft- liche Welterkenntnis, Bamberg 1904.—F. Aveling in the Cath- olic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, s. v. “ Atheism.”—F. Hettinger, Natural Religion, New York 1890—W. S. Lilly, The Great Enigma, 2nd ed., New York 1893.—L. A. Lambert, Notes on Ingersoll, Buffalo 1883.18—T, Finlay, S. J., “Atheism as a Mental Phenomenon” in the Month (1878), pp. 186 sqq. 12 Cfr. C. Gutberlet, Theodicee, perfectly true that popular speakers ond ed., § 2, Miinster 1890; B. Boed- der, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 76 saqq.. New York 1891; J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, 2nd ed., pp. 15 sq., New York 1904, 13 Father Lambert’s Notes on In- gersoll has been published in nu- merous editions and shall be men- tioned here, though it is, of course, and writers of the type of Robert G. Ingersoll, while they ‘‘ may create a certain amount of un- learned disturbance, . . . are not treated seriously by thinking men, and it is extremely doubtful whether they deserve a place in any historical or philosophical ex- position of Atheism.’’ (Aveling in the Catholic Encyclopedia, II, 42.) CLAP CNR: EL THE QUALITY OF MAN’S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AC- CORDING TO DIVINE REVELATION The arguments for the existence of God not only prove His existence, but at the same time reveal each some one or other aspect of the Divine Essence.’ Whatever knowledge of the Divine Essence we may thus acquire from a consideration of finite things, is sure to be stamped with the birth mark of the creature. It may be ennobled and transfigured by Revelation and faith, but its substance is not changed thereby. Not until we are admitted to the beatific vision in Heaven, does the abstractive and analogous knowledge of God acquired here on earth give way to that intuitive and perfect knowledge which enables us to see the Blessed Trinity as It is. Such are the limitations of the created intellect that it cannot even enjoy the beatific vision ex- cept by means of a specially infused light, called “lumen gloriae.” 1Cfr. S. Thomas, In Boeth. De nist quoquo modo de ea sciatur Priniiate, PQ 2, 0rd. 6, arty 13% ‘quid est’ vel cognitione perfecta “De nulla re potest scirt ‘an est,’ vel cognitione confusa.” 55 56 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE We shall treat of the two modes of knowing God, the earthly and the heavenly, in the next two sections, reserving a third section for the consideration of Eunomianism and Ontologism. SEGLION st OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS IT IS HERE ON EARTH In this section we shall consider, (1) the imperfection of our knowledge of God here be- low; (2) the threefold manner by which man can know God, viz.: (a) affirmation or causation, inferring the nature of His attributes from the nature of His works; (b) negation or remotion, excluding the idea of finite limitation; (c) inten- sification or eminence, ascribing to God every per- fection which is consistent with His infinity, to the exclusion of all quantitative and temporal measures and comparisons;? and (3) certain theological conclusions flowing therefrom. ARTICER’ 3 THE IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN THIS LIFE I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.—The perfection or imperfection of any act of cognition depends upon the manner tn which concepts are ac- quired. These may be, on the one hand, either 2Cfr. G. M. Sauvage in the Catholic Encyclopedia, art. “ Analogy,” Vol. I, pp. 449 sq. 57 58 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE abstractive or intuitive; or, on the other, either analogous or univocal. a) An intuitive concept is formed when consciousness and intellect put the mind into direct communication with objective truth (such is, e. g., the concept of a tree). A concept is abstractive—this term must not be con- founded with “ abstract ’— when its compound elements are derived from some other object or objects, and transferred to the object under consideration CAN 20 the concept of a golden calf). Whence it follows, that every intuitive concept is an immediate one (con- ceptus immediatus), while an abstractive concept is al- ways mediate (conceptus mediatus), because it can be gained only by means of other concepts or of syl- logistic conclusions. It follows also that an abstractive concept can never represent its object adequately, while an intuitive concept may, though it does not necessarily do so. b) An analogous (conceptus analogus) differs from a univocal concept (conceptus univocus) in the same way that a metaphorical differs from a proper concept (conceptus improprius — proprius). A univocal or Proper concept is one which applies to every individual comprehended under it in the same sense, as for ex- ample the concept “man” applies to Peter, Paul, John, etc. An analogous concept, on the other hand, is predi- cated of a number of objects partly in the same and partly in a different sense, as e. g., “ healthy ” of the human body, the color of one’s face, the climate, etc. c) Here we shall have to borrow from philosophy two important truths. The first is, that all rational knowledge is grounded on sense perception, so that the 8 For further details consult any good text-book of logic. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 59 material objects of the senses must be said to be the primary, proportionate, and adequate object of our in- tellect. The second truth is based upon the first: Our earthly knowledge of God is not the fountain-head and source, but the consummation and climax of human cognition.* This gives us the status quaestionis of the problem we are studying. If it is true that in this life we can acquire a knowledge of God only from the con- templation of nature, it follows that our concept of Him is not intuitive (immediate, adequate) but abstrac- tive (mediate, inadequate). And if the concept we form of God does not represent Him as He is in Himself, but only analogically, it follows further that our knowl- edge of God cannot be univocal, but must, be analo- gous. Being abstractive and analogical, then, it must be very imperfect —and this imperfection not even super- natural belief in God (fides in Deum) can remove.* 2. THE DoGMA IN SACRED SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.—The imperfection of man’s knowl- edge of God here below may be said to be in- cluded in the dogma of God’s incomprehensibility or inscrutability (dxaradypia), “Deus... m- comprehensibilis’;° “Ecclesia credit... Deum verum et vivum... incomprehensibilem.” * How the term “incomprehensible” is to be under- ‘stood, and in what the essence of incomprehen- sibility consists, the Church has never defined. 4Cfr. Egger, Propaeg. Philoso- For we walk by faith and not by phico-theol., 6th ed., pp. 146 sqq., sight.” Brix. 1903. 6Cfr. Conc. Lat. IV, A. D. 1215, 5 Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 7: “ Sta wiorews cap. “ Firmiter.” ¥ yap mepiratovper, o¥ dia evdovs — 7 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 1. 60 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE a) The Scriptural argument, drawn from the Old and New Testaments, covers both our nat- ural and our supernatural knowledge of God (2. é., that based on faith and grace). In the Old Testament, besides the Book of Job,® it is especially the Sapiential Books which insist that we cannot comprehend God while we are way- farers on this earth; nay, that He remains in- comprehensible to our mind even in the here- after, when we enjoy the light of glory.® The principal text in proof of our thesis is drawn from the New Testament, viz., 1 Cor. XIII, 12: “Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem [1. e. in coelo| cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum—We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I.know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known.” St. Paul here makes a sharp distinction between two modes of knowing God, the one earthly, the other heavenly, which are opposed to each other (nunc—tunc, épr-— tore), Limiting ourselves to the former (the lat- ter will engage us later), we find human knowl- edge of God here below characterized by three essential marks. It is represented first as a “see- ing through a glass,” *° a mode of perception di- 8 Job XI, 7 sqq. clus. XLII, 23 sqq.; Prov. XXV, 27. ®Cfr, Wisdom IX, 13 sqq.; Ec- 10 Per speculum, 5¢ ésémtpov, ~ tears. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 61 rectly opposed to intuitive vision “face to face.” As in Rom. I, 20, so here St. Paul describes our earthly knowledge of God as an abstractive, mediate, inadequate knowledge, which remains a vision per speculum even if a man “should have all faith.” ** The second mark is “enigmatic,” which means that the human mind on earth can conceive God only by analogy drawn from His creatures; for a proper and univocal con- cept of God could not be designated as enig- matical or compared to seeing “in a dark man- ' ner.” This characteristic is completed by the third mark, viz., partiality (ex parte, &« pépovs), _ which clearly designates our knowledge of God as being a knowledge “in part.’ All three of _ these notes prove the imperfection of our earthly _ knowledge of God as conclusively as they estab- _ lish God’s incomprehensibility by the human _ mind so long as man lingers in “this vale of 99 13 ; b) The Fathers of the fourth and fifth cen- turies defended this dogma against the Euno- mians, who claimed that the human mind is able _ to comprehend God adequately here below. They defended it first as mere witnesses to the ancient _ Tradition, and secondly as philosophers discuss- 4 ing the How and Why. 111 Cor. RETA 25 farer’s Vision, pp. 1 sqq., London 12In aenigmate, év alvlypart, 1909. 13 Cfr. T. J. Gerrard, The Way- 62 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE a) One of the first of these witnesses is St. Justin Martyr, who insists both on the incomprehensibility of God and the spontaneousness of our concept of Him. He says: “That same Being, which is beyond all es- sence,’* I say, is unutterable, and inexplicable, but alone beautiful and good, coming suddenly into souls well- dispositioned, on account of their affinity to and de- sire of seeing Him.”?® Gregory of Nyssa appeals to the Bible to give testimony against Eunomius: “ All those Scriptural expressions which have been invented to glorify God, designate something which belongs to God,** .. . whereby we are taught, either that He is almighty, or insusceptible of corruption, or immense. . . . His own essence, however, since it cannot be com- prehended by reason, nor expressed in language, He has not exposed to curious searching, inasmuch as He commanded [men] to venerate silently that which He withheld from their certain knowledge.” 17 “By the very act of confessing our ignorance,’ according to Cyril of Jerusalem, “we profess a deep knowledge of God.” 18 Of special importance in this connection are the five homilies of St. Chrysostom against the Euno- mians, entitled: ‘Of Him Who is Inscrutable.” We hear the same string faintly vibrating in the writings of the last of the Greek Fathers, for John of Damascus teaches: ‘“ The supreme, unutterable, impenetrable Being is alone in knowing Itself. True, it is manifest to all creatures that God exists; but they are utterly ignorant of what He is according to His substance and nature.” To quote at least one representative of the Latins, St. 14 éréxewa mdons ovolas, 17 Contr. Eunom., 12. 16 Contra Tryph., 4. 18 Catech.,’ Vi, n. 2. 1674 wept Ocdy—attributes of 19 De Fide Orthod., I, 4. God. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 63 Augustine says beautifully: “Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur — For God is more truly thought than He is uttered, and exists more truly than He is thought.” *° B) ‘In their capacity as metaphysicians, the Fathers seek to refute Eunomianism partly by a close analysis of the elements that enter into the human conception of God, partly by opposing to it a complete theory of knowledge. | In regard to the first point, the Fathers involved in the Eunomian controversy, especially the Cappadocians, prove the impossibility of man’s having an intuitive, ade- quate knowledge of God here below, by an analysis of the logical constituents of the various concepts he is able to form of God. Their argument may be summed up as follows: A careful classification of all these differ- ent concepts shows some of them to be affirmative, while others are negative in quality. The affirmative concepts connote some perfection, either concrete (é. g., God is wise), or abstract (e¢. g., God is wisdom). In the case of the former (affirmative), the human mind forms the concept of a being in which “ being wise” inheres after the manner of an accidental form; in the case of the latter (negative) notions, we conceive a form abstracted from its subject,—a form, therefore, which does not exist as such. Now, this mode of conception is proper to creatures, but not to God; for God, as Infinite Be- ing, is neither the subject of accidental forms of per- fection, nor Himself an abstract form of perfection. He is Substantial Wisdom, which is really identical with every other divine perfection, though it does not enter into any composition, either physical or metaphysical. On ‘20 De Trinit., VII, 4, 7.— For further references, cfr. Petavius, De Deo; I, 5 sqq. 64 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE the other hand, the negative concepts we form of God deny the existence in Him of any imperfection of the kind common to creatures (e. g., God is incorporeal), and hence do not express God’s essence such as it is in itself. But a concept which, in order to be a true concept, must first shed all imperfections, cannot pos- sibly claim to be adequate, intuitive, or univocal.?° The theory of knowledge elaborated by the Fathers, assumes that all our concepts are derived from sense perception, and concludes that a concept of God drawn from such a source must needs be imperfect. Thus, e. g., Gregory of Nyssa argues: “God’s epithets are based upon the things He works in us.... But His essence is anterior to its operations, and we derive our knowledge of these operations from the things we per- ceive by our senses,’ *4 The great Basil?? and John of Damascus 7° express themselves in like manner. Sev- eral of the Fathers go into the subject more deeply, anticipating as it were the Scholastic axiom: “ Cogmni- tum est in cognoscente non ad modum cogniti, sed ad modum cognoscentis,’ and emphasizing the truth that “the measure (70 pérpov) of our knowledge of God is immanent in man, who is a synthesis of spirit and mat- ter;” that is to say, the more perfect the power of cognition, the nobler is the resultant act or knowledge. Man, ranking midway between angels and brutes, ap- prehends the material things below him according to a higher, i. e., the notional, mode of being ; but his apprehen- sion of the things that are above him (the angels, God) 20a For the necessary references, kenntnis nach der Lehre der kap- see St. Basil, Contra Eunom., lib. padozischen Kirchenvater, Straubing I, n. 13 sqq.; Gregory of Nazianzus, 1903-04. Orat. theolog., 2; Gregory of Nyssa, 21 Contr. Eunom., 1. XII. Contra Eunom., lib. XII. Cfr. K. 22 Ep., 234. Unterstein, Die natirliche Gotteser- 23 De Fide Orth., I, 4. fy KNOWABILITY OF GOD 65 is cast in a more imperfect mould.** Consequently, our idea of God is necessarily imperfect. y) There are on record certain utterances of the Fathers which appear to contradict or at least to weaken the doctrine we have just propounded. But in reality they confirm it. The oft-repeated phrase, We know that God exists, but we do not know His essence,?> does not mean that we can have no knowledge whatever of God, but merely that our knowledge of His essence is imperfect. Nor can the Patristic dictum that we merely know what God is not, but do not know what He is, be cited in support of the Neo-Platonic teaching of a purely negative cognoscibility,?® or of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Philosophy (bless the mark!) of the Unknow- able. St. Augustine, ¢. g., insists: “Si non potestis comprehendere, quid sit Deus, vel hoc comprehendite, quid non sit Deus; multum profecerttis, st non aliud quam est de Deo senseritis — If ye are not able to com- prehend what God is, comprehend at least what God is not: you will have made much progress, if you think of God as being not something other than He is.”*7 We have his own authority #® for explaining, that he merely intends to define the sublimity of the divine Essence as surpassing all categories of human thought; that is to say, he merely emphasizes the purely analogical and abstractive character of our knowledge of God. There- fore Gregory Nazianzen admonishes us: “It is not enough to state what [God] is mot; but he who would discover the nature of Him Who is (rod dvros), must also define what He is. For he who defines only what 24 Cfr. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra confessio est, de Deo solum hoc Eunom., lib. I. nosse, quod est.” 25 Cfr. Hilary, In Ps., 129:— 26 Oeds Buds &yvworos,- “ Humanae infirmitatis religiosa 27 Tract. in Ioa., XXIII, n. 9g. 238 De Trintt., V, 1. 66 IMPERFECTION OF OUR KNOWLEDGE God is not, is like unto a man who would answer the question: How much is twice five? by saying: It is not one, nor two, etc., omitting to tell his questioner that it is ten.” ?° c) The dogma here under consideration is supported also by the authority of the great Scholastic theologians, notably St. Thomas Aquinas.*° Following in the footsteps of the Fathers, the School- men worked out a theory of knowledge which conforms not only to the psychology of the thinking mind, but likewise to the principles of revealed religion. As the foundation of their system they adopted the philoso- phy of Aristotle, for the reason that this system — at least in its fundamental lines — fitted in best with both the nature of the human intellect, and supernatural Revelation. Inasmuch as Sacred Scripture and the Fathers favor the basic principles of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, this theory can claim our uncon- ditional assent, and we must admit that in its essential features, aside from incidental details, it cannot be false. In making this assertion, we do not, of course, wish to advocate a slavish restoration of the ancient psychology, nor to condemn every effort at originality in stating and developing its principles. Our sole object is to impress upon the reader that not every system of psychology can be fitted into the framework of revealed theology. Thus, e. g., the critical Idealism of Kant, based as it is upon radically false premises, cannot be harmonized with Revelation. It is a mistake to believe that, by 29 Orat. Theol., 2.— See also Article 2, infra. 80 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 12, art. 12, Le ee a a sg a ee KNOWABILITY OF GOD 67 clinging to Scholastic Aristotelianism, the Church puts a brake upon theologians who endeavor to clear up special questions. On the contrary, was not, for in- stance, the psychology of Albertus Magnus, a heteroclite amalgam of omnigenous philosophical elements, which it required the master mind of an Aquinas to sift and transfuse into a coherent system, by eliminating all ex- traneous ingredients ? *4 ARTICLE 2 THE THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD HERE ON EARTH I, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—Our previ- ous article will receive confirmation from the de- tailed exposition, which we now undertake, of the manner in which man acquires such knowl- edge of God as is vouchsafed him here below. He attains to it in a threefold manner: wid aftirmationis seu causalitatis (os), wid nega- tioms (adbaipers), and wid superlationis seu emi- nentiae (*r«poxn). Every one of these methods is exceedingly imperfect. As we do not perceive God in His own form (in specie propria), but in that of some other being (in specie aliena), that is to say, by means of analogous concepts derived 31 Cfr. J. Bach, Des Albertus lastik, Mainz 1875; A. Otten, Allj- Magnus Verhdlinis zu der Erkennt- gemeine Erkenntnislehre des hl. nislehre der Griechen, Lateiner, Thomas, Paderborn 1882; De Wulf- Araber und Juden, Wien 1881.— Coffey, History of Medieval Phi- For a digest of ‘‘the traditional losophy, pp. 304 sq., London 1909; theory of knowledge,” see Heinrich, Id., Scholasticism Old and New, pp. Dogm. Theol., III, § 141. Cfr. also 124 sqq., Dublin 1907. M. Schneid, Aristoteles in der Scho- 68 THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD from His creatures, it is plain that our knowl- edge of Him must involve many imperfections, notably a certain inaccuracy in the notion of God, which calls for incessant correction if the judg- ments we formulate of God and divine things are not to be entirely wrong. When we affirm some divine perfection, such as, e. g., wisdom, we are immediately constrained to eliminate from this perfection, by an act of negation, every species of imperfection common to creatures (e. g., human wisdom), and furthermore to raise the perfection thus purged by a series of negations to its superlative degree and into the domain of the infinite (e. g., superhuman, abso- lute wisdom). This threefold process of affir- mation, negation, and intensification, is therefore merely a natural and necessary result of the ab- stractive and analogous character of our concep- tion of God.* It appears, then, that we may indeed claim to have a knowledge of the divine Essence, but only in a certain limited sense. As our earthly knowledge of God is neither intuitive nor univocal, we do not apprehend the divine Essence in the manner claimed by the Eunomians; though, on the other hand, as the Fathers insisted against the Gnostics and Neo-Platonists (who would admit the possibility of none but a purely negative knowledge of the divine Essence), it must be held that our cognition of 82 Cfr. Sauvage, art. ‘‘ Analogy,” Humphrey, His Divine Majesty, pp. in the Catholic Encyclopedia; Ger- 42 sqq. rard, The Wayfarer’s Vision, ch. 13 KNOWABILITY OF GOD 69 God comprises more than merely His abstract existence (Sr éorw), inasmuch as we are able, in a limited measure, by means of affirmative concepts of quality, to conceive the Divine Essence and to distinguish it from all other objects (rau wep) @edv). The doctrine that we know God by mode of affirmation is held by theologians to be “fidei proxima,’ because Holy Scripture applies positive as well as negative attributes to the God- head. 2. THESE THREE Mopes oF COGNITION ARE INSEPARABLE.—TLhe three modes of knowing God which we have just explained, are like parts of a cripple’s crutch—the human mind cannot pro- ceed by means of any one of them alone, it must employ all three simultaneously. a) The positive predicates at. which we arrive by means of the wa affirmationis, express either a sim- ple or a mixed perfection.2* The difference between the two classes is, that the concept of a simple per- fection (é. g., sanctity), does not include any sort of imperfection, while a mixed perfection always connotes some defect (e. g., syllogistic reasoning). Now it is obvious that no perfection can be affirmed of God that has not previously been subjected to a process of logical purification. We may not even apply our notions of simple perfections unconditionally to God, but only with the express restriction that such and such a quality exists in God not after the manner of the creature (negation), but in an infinitely higher mode, in what is called the eminent sense. 83 Perfectio simplex, perfectio mixta. 70 THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD b) With regard to the via negationis we must observe that this method is able to impart more than a purely negative knowledge of God; for inasmuch as it elimi- nates defects or limitations, it is essentially a negation of a negation, and thus attains to the dignity of an affirmation.** Thus the infinity of God, being essentially a denial that there are limitations in Him, postulates the plenitude of all being in God; which implies not only an affirmation, but also a modus eminentior, a more eminent mode of being. Hence there is no reason why, after the example of the Calvinist theologian, John Clericus, we should reject the via negationis as unfruitful and mean- ingless. c) Inasmuch as the superlative degree is merely the positive degree intensified, the via superlationis, or mode of eminence, naturally entails affirmations. But the process also implies a negation which serves the purpose of complement and correction. And for this reason, since even the purest perfections in God differ radically from those proper to creatures, in applying to God the notion of any created perfection, we must exclude every species of limitation. Language has three terms for three different forms of the superlative: First, abstract terms; e. g., God is goodness (ipsa bonitas — abraya6o- ms) ; second, terms compounded with the adverbs “ all” or “alone”; e. g., God is all-powerful or, “ God alone is powerful” (cfr. the “Tu solus altissimus” of the “ Gloria”) ; and third, terms compounded with the pre- fix “super” (e. g., God is super-temporal, i. ¢., above time, independent of it). The Scotist Frassen** appropriately compares these 34 Cfr. S. Maxim., In Dionys. de 85 Scotus Academicus, ‘* De Deo,” Divin. Nomin., c. 4: “Sunt effi- disp. I, art. 2, qu. a. caces positiones.” KNOWABILITY OF GOD 71 three modes of cognition with the modus procedendt peculiar to the three arts of painting, sculpture, and poetry. The painter produces a portrait as it were “ affirmatively,” by brushing his colors upon the canvas ; the sculptor may be said to proceed “negatively” in carving a statue; while the poet treats his subject “ superlatively,’ by applying to it all sorts of tropes, metaphors, and hyperboles.** 3. How Tu1s THREEFOLD MODE OF COGNITION AccorDSs WITH DivINE REVELATION.—The three modes by which the mind of man conceives God, as explained above, are clearly indicated in Holy Scripture and Tradition, and their existence and objective fitness must be admitted to be certain from a theological point of view. a) We have a plain Scriptural argument in Ecclus, XLIII, 29-32, a text which picturesquely describes the works of God, winding up as follows: “ Consum- matio autem sermonum |t. e., briefly stated]: Ipse [scil. Deus] est in omnibus [15 wav éorw adrds, 1, é., He contains all created perfections = via affirmations s, cau- salitatis]. Gloriantes ad quid valebimus? Ipse enim 36‘ The three ways may be lik- limitations. And just as a _ poet ened to the methods of the fine makes his word-picture more by arts. Just as a painter produces metaphorical suggestion than by his picture by putting paint on his canvas, so I use the positive way of forming my shadows—I take qualities from creatures and I trans- fer them to God. Just as a sculp- tor produces his statue by chipping off pieces from a block of marble, so I ‘use the negative way of form- ing my shadows —I think of quali- ties in creatures and I remove the exact description, so I use the more eminent way in forming my shadows —I take the qualities of creatures and knowing that they are all real- ized in infinite degree in God, I conclude that any mutual exclusive- ness which they have in creatures must be transcended in the simplic- ity of God.” (Gerrard, The Way- farer’s Vision, pp. 5 sq.) 72 THREEFOLD MODE OF KNOWING GOD ommpotens super omnia opera sua [the Septuagint has: avrds yap 6 péyas mapa mdvra. ta epya adrov, i. €., He is nothing of the things He has made — via negations]. . . . Glorificantes Dominum, quantumcun- que potueritis, supervalebit enim adhuc [tmepééer yap xat ér., 1. €., He is high above every thing = via eminentiae].” St. Thomas Aquinas finds the three modes or stages in- dicated also in Rom. I, 20: “‘ Invisibilia Dei’ cognos- cuntur per viam negationis ; ‘ sempiterna virtus’ per viam causalitatis; ‘ divinitas’ per viam excellentiae.” * b) The most famous and the best known formula that has come down to us from Patristic times, is that of the Pseudo-Dionysius: @eds . .. advrwv Oéors Kal mdvtov ddaipecis % Urép macav Oéow Kat ddaipeow airia.*® The same early writer, whoever he may have been, sailing in the wake of the Neo-Platonists, cultivated with a certain predilection the via superlationis: “ Nihil eorum, quae sunt... explicat arcanum illud omnem rationem et intellectum superans superdettatis superessentialiter supra omnia superexistentis (ras trép mdvra vrepovotas brepovons vmepfedryros).” *° He is equally familiar with the via negations, though in employing this mode he does not adopt the one-sided view of the Neo-Platon- ists. “ God”—he says—‘is not substance, not life, not light, not sense, not spirit, not wisdom, not good- ness, not divinity, but something that is far higher and nobler than all these.” *° Summing up the teaching of the Greek Fathers, St. John of Damascus says: “It is more becoming to speak of God negatively, denying all things about Him. Not as if He were nothing Him- self, but inasmuch as He is above everything which 37 In Ep. ad Rom., c. I, lect. 5. 89 De Div. Nom., 13. 88 Myst. Theol, c 2 — 40 Myst. Theol., c& 3 a ee ee ee ge ent ee es KNOWABILITY OF GOD 73 exists, nay, above being itself.” 4 For many other con- firmatory passages, see Thomassin, De Deo, IV, 7-12. As every negative conception of God essentially in- volves affirmations and intensifications, the negative mode of apprehending God is not quite so striking as one might conclude from the manner in which it was urged by the Fathers. Far from employing it for the purpose of proving the (Gnostic) “ incognoscibility ” of God or the (Neo-Platonic) “purely negative cognosci- bility’ of God, the Fathers rather strive by means of it to throw light both on the super-substantiality (iepovoia) of God, and on our (relative) ignorance of things divine. For as Pseudo-Athanasius cor- rectly remarks, @cds yap xataAapBavopevos odk ort deds. This explains why ever since the days of the Pseudo- Areopagite, the mystics have defended the principle that “The highest knowledge we can have of God is that we do not know Him.” * Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa devoted an entire book to the development of this thought. “In rebus divinis scire est scire, nos ignorare,” he writes.4? In speaking, as they often do, of a “ mystic night,” in which God’s obscurity reveals itself to us most clearly, the medieval mystics merely vary the dic- tum of the Apostle of the Gentiles: [Deus] “lucem _.. imhabitat inaccessibilem, quem nullus hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest —[God] inhabiteth light in- accessible, whom no man hath seen, nor can see,’ 44 41 De Fide Orth., I, 4. ypwoke vmep vouy YywwoKev,” 42 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionysius, Myst. 43 De Docta Ignorantia, I, 26. Theol., cap. I, § 3: “‘r@ under ye- 441 Tim. VI, 16. 74 GOD’S INEFFABILITY ARTICLE 3 THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS 1. Gop’s INEFFABILITY.—a) Language is merely the expression of thought, and therefore, if God is incomprehensible, it follows that He must also be ineffable or unutterable. “Deus . meftfabilis,’ says the Fourth Lateran Coun- cil. And St. Augustine beautifully observes: “Quid quaeris, ut ascendat in linguam, quod in cor hominis non ascendit?”’*® As God alone comprehends Himself, so He alone can utter Himself adequately. It is in this sense that the Fathers designate God as the ‘“‘ineffable”’ or “nameless” one (4verepos) , b) Nevertheless man is able to conceive God, though inadequately, by a series of concepts repre- senting His different attributes; and consequently can utter Him in a variety of names. Hence the Patristic term 7eAvovupos, “He of many names,” and the still larger term employed by some of the Fathers, wavevpos, ¢, @., “all-names,” ‘He to Whom all names apply.” In his sublime “Hymn to God,” Gregory Nazianzen beautifully sums up these conceptions: ‘20 mdvrey rédos éoot kat eis, Kal mdyta, Kal ovdev: ody ty éwv, ov mdvra, Tla- vaovupe, tl GE Tarésow, Tov povoy dxAniaror,’? 483 St. 45 Caput “ Firmiter.” 46a Thou art at once One, All, 46 In Ps. 85, n. 12. and None, and yet Thou art not KNOWABILITY OF GOD 76 Augustine expresses himself in a similar man- ner: “Omnia possunt de Deo dici et mhil digne dicitur de Deo. Nihil latius hac inopia. Quae- ris congruum nomen? Non invents. Quaeris quoquo modo dicere? Omma_ invenis—All things can be said of God, and nothing 1s worthily said of God. Nothing is wider than this poverty of expression. Thou seekest a fit- ting name for Him; thou canst not findit. Thou seekest to speak of Him in any way soever; thou findest that He is all.” * c) A comparison of the logical elements of the various names applied to God, shows that all taken together yet fall far short of. ex- pressing the fulness of his infinite and super- notional Being; hence the Patristic term t7«pévupos, We need not call attention to the fact that this threefold mode of appellation (woAvorvpos, ravaevupos, tmepovopos) corresponds exactly to the threefold mode of our apprehension of God, as explained above.** 2. THE COMPOSITE CHARACTER OF OUR CON- CEPTION OF Gop IN RELATION To His SIMPLic- 1ry.—The three modes by which we apprehend God produce in the human mind a great variety of concepts expressing attribution; hence the in- all or one. All-name! by what St) \ Thomas, (Sos Theol.;° 145; qu. rz, name can I call Thee, nameless arte is One, alone of all. 48 Cfr. Gerrard, The Wayfarer’s 4% Tract. in Ioa., 13, n. 5. Cfr. Vision, p. 7. 76 OUR CONCEPTION OF HIM COMPOSITE evitably composite character of our conception of God. We have a typical example of such com- position in the “Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith” adopted by the Vatican Council: “Ecclesia credit et confitetur, unum esse Deum verum et vivum, Creatorem ac Dominum coeli et terrae, omnipotentem, aeternum, wmmensum, incomprehensibilem, intellectu ac voluntate om- nique perfectione infinitum, etc.—The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in intelligence, in will, and in all perfection.” * There naturally arises the question: How can a composite conception of God be harmonized with the absolute simplicity of the Divine Es- sence? Already the Eunomians raised the objection that the doctrine of the abstractive and analogous character of our knowledge of God must necessarily lead to an (im- possible) piecing together of the Divine Essence, though it is quite evident that the supremely simple Being can be conceived only by the agency of an equally simple concept, and that consequently the various names ap- plied to God are mere synonyms. The Fathers, in par- ticular Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, solved this cunning objection by pointing out that though our knowledge 49 Conc. Vatic., Const. De Fide, c, 1. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n, 1782. KNOWABILITY OF GOD a7 of God is very imperfect, the Divine Essence com- prises all perfections and consequently cannot be com- pressed into a finite concept. While our abstractive analogical mode of cognition compels the intellect to conceive God by a series of partial concepts, the in- finite fulness of the Divine Being renders it impossible for us to exhaust that Being by means of conceptions formed in our finite mind.” 3. OuR CONCEPTION OF GoD, DESPITE ITs IM- PERFECTIONS, IS A TRUE CoNCEPTION.—Our in- ability to form an adequate conception of God is apt to make us suspect that the conception we do arrive at is false. Eunomius expressly declared it to be so, insisting that, in order not to be misled into forming wrong notions of God, it must nec- essarily be in man’s power to construct an ade- quate notion of Him. Proceeding from the axiom that no conception can be true that repre- sents a thing otherwise than it is, this heretic insisted that man must have the ability to form an adequate concept of God; because otherwise he would be doomed to form inadequate notions, and consequently to be deceived. a) In undertaking to refute this specious objection, - we must stress the fact that the truth and correctness of the concept which man forms of God by the agencies of reason and revelation, is a dogma coinciding with 50 For a more detailed explana- Cfr. also St. Thomas, De Pot., qu. tion of this difficulty, see Part II. atts Fe 78 OUR CONCEPTION OF HIM TRUE that of the cognoscibility of God.5 Among the di- vine predicates that human reason gathers from the consideration of nature, St. Paul °? expressly mentions two: % didis adtod divams, i, e., the eternal power mani- fested in the creation of the universe, and Oadrys, 1. €., a Divine Essence differing from all created things. As a third predicate the Book of Wisdom ** adds the attribute of divine “beauty.” Elsewhere the Bible re- fers to God as “ He who is,” i. e., Who has the pleni- tude of being; the Eternal, the Allwise, the Immense, etc.,— all predicates which, if they were incorrect or un- true, would belie the Word of God. b) The Eunomian contention, that unless we assume the possibility of man’s forming an adequate idea of God, we are placed before the alternative of forming either a false conception of Him or no conception at all,— is met by the Fathers with the retort that it rests upon a confusion of the separate and distinct notes of “imperfect” and “incorrect” on the one hand, and their contradictories, “perfect” and “ correct,” on the other. ‘The Fathers insist that there is such a thing as a true though imperfect concept of God; that our knowledge of God, in spite of its inevitable defects, is true and remains true for the very simple reason, among others, that we are fully aware, and do so judge, that the perfections we ascribe to God exist in Him in a quite different way than they exist in His creatures and in the concepts of the human mind; that, whatever wrong elements may enter into our conception of God, are eliminated by an express judgment; while on the other hand the Eunomians themselves are open to the charge of counterfeiting the notion of God when 61 Supra, Ch. 1. 52 Rom. I, 20. 58 Wisd. XIII, 5. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 79 they pretend to be able to conceive God and to com- prehend Him as He is, though in matter of fact they derive their conceptions of Him from analogy.** READINGS: — Suarez, De Divina Substantia eiusque Attributis, lib, I, cap. 8-12— Thomassin, De Deo, lib. IV, cap. 6-12.— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 10-13— Chr. Pesch, S. J., Der Gottesbegrif, Freiburg 1886—M. Glossner, Der spekulative Gottesbegriff in der neuen und neuesten Philosophie, Pader- born 1894.—Simar, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, 4th ed., Vol. I, pp. 113 sqq.— W. Humphrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 16 sqq., London 1897.—M. Ronayne, S. J., God Knowable and Known, 2nd ed., New York 1902—T. J. Gerrard, The Way- farer’s Vision, London 1909. 64 Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 13. SECTION 2 MAN’S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS IT WILL BE IN HEAVEN When we arrive in the abode of the Blessed, our knowledge of God will change. It will be different from, and far more perfect than the knowledge we have here below. Our mediate abstractive knowledge of God will give way to immediate intuition, analogical to univocal knowledge, because we shall see God as He is. In this section we therefore propose to treat three important questions, viz.: (1) the reality and the supernatural character of the intuitive vision; (2) the necessity of the light of glory to the intellect of the Blessed; and (3) the re- lation between the intuitive vision of God and His incomprehensibility. ARTICLE 1 THE REALITY AND THE SUPERNATURAL CHARACTER OF THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.—The expression “intuitive vision of God” is based on a metaphor 80 KNOWABILITY OF GOD SI which likens the human intellect to the eye. Bodily vision has two peculiarities: first, the eye sees a material object immediately, and, second, it perceives it clearly and distinctly. Analo- gously we may say that the intuitive vision of God means, first, that we know Him immediately, without depending on the created universe as a medium or mirror; and secondly, that our knowl- edge of Him is clear and distinct—an apprehen- sion in the proper sense of the word. The quality corresponding in God to our intuitive vision of Him, is His visibility (visibilitas Dei), which some dogmaticians treat as a separate di- vine attribute. If we take the term “vision” in its more extended sense, we shall be able to distinguish in abstracto a threefold visibility, corresponding to the four differ- ent kinds of intuitive vision. There is (a) bodily vision (visio oculis corporeis), which, being metaphys- ically impossible when applied to God, can never take place, not even in Heaven; (b) that mode of spiritual vision by which we see God through the cosmos, or by an act of faith (visio abstractiva) ; this constitutes the sole mode of seeing God natural to all rational crea- tures, angels and men; (c) that mode of spiritual vision by which we envisage God immediately in His essence (visio tntuitiva s. beatificia) ; it is in this the beatitude of angels and men consists; (d) the comprehensive or exhaustive vision of God (visio comprehensiva s. ex- haustiva), which is denied even to the Blessed in Heaven, being reserved to the Almighty Himself. 1 Vide infra, Article 3. 82 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD Corresponding to this threefold manner of seeing God, we may distinguish a threefold invisibility. (To the bodily eye, both in its natural and in its glorified state, God is absolutely invisible). Since the created mind has no means of knowing God other than the ab- stractive-analogical apprehension proper to its limited faculties, God’s essence and substance must ever remain invisible to the created intellect, except supernaturally, by means of the “lumen gloriae.’ But even in the light of glory God cannot be adequately conceived by His creatures, and therefore under this aspect, too, must ever remain invisible, 7 ¢., incomprehensible, even to the holy Angels and the Elect in Heaven. God alone “ sees” Himself fully and adequately to the limit of His essence and cognoscibility. 2. Dogmatic THEsEs.—The subject-matter propounded in the above preliminary remarks may be reduced to three problems, which we shall endeavor to solve in as many theses; vig.: (1) the absolute impossibility of a bodily vision of God; (2) the natural impossibility of an in- tuitive vision of God; and (3) the supernatural reality, and consequent possibility, of the intui- tive (beatific) vision of God in Heaven. First Thesis. To the bodily eye, even in its glori- fied state, God is absolutely invisible. This thesis is partly of faith, and partly repre- sents a theological conclusion. Proofs. To enable us to see God bodily, either God would have to appear in a material vesture, aS a NR a i Sk ee Sa le ee ee KNOWABILITY OF GOD 83 or our own corporeal organ of sight would have to be capable of attaining by supernatural means to a bodily vision of purely spiritual substances. Both these suppositions are inadmissible. a) God, being a pure spirit, has no material body, and therefore cannot be visible to the human eye. This sort of invisibility, conceived as incorporeity, is a dogma clearly taught in Holy Scripture, partly in those passages. which teach that God is a pure spirit,’ partly in those texts that insist on His invisibility in terms which exclude every possibility of bodily vision. Cfr. 1 Tim. VI, 16: ‘'‘O povos éxwv abavaciav, dds oixay dmpoottov, ov cidev ovdeis dvOpwrwv, ode idely d¥vaTar— Who only hath immortality, and inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen, nor can see.” Cfr. John I, 18: “Deum nemo vidit un- quam—No man hath seen God at any time.” Asserting as they do the spiritual invisibility of the Divine Essence, these texts must a fortiori be understood as denying the corporeal visibility of God. In the light of these Scriptural texts it is not to be wondered at that the Fathers and the infallible magisterium of the Church have always considered the invisibility of God, as just explained, to be a revealed dogma and have de- fended it expressly and vigorously against the Audians and the Anthropomorphites, who at- 2Cfr. John IV, 20 sqq. 84 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD tributed to God a material body and human limbs.? b) Another question here presents itself: Would it be possible for the human eye, by means of some super- natural light sut generis, to attain to a bodily vision of God’s spiritual substance? Leo Allatius‘ held that while the Elect in Heaven will not see the Divine Es- sence (he means the Divinity itself, not the human na- ture of Christ) until after the resurrection of the body, Mary, the Mother of God, with glorified eyes sees it even now. When, many centuries before Allatius, St. Augustine® undertook to denounce this view as “msipientia et dementia,’ his Catholic contemporaries were so scandalized by his harsh strictures that the great Bishop of Hippo in his little treatise De Videndo Deo,® found himself constrained to admit that it would require a more careful investigation than any one had yet made of the question whether, in virtue of the metamorphosis of man from an “ earthly ” into a “ heav- enly”’ being, his spiritualized eye after the resurrection will be enabled to envisage the Divine Substance. While his offended opponents appealed to Job XIX, 26: “In carne mea videbo Deum meum—In my flesh I shall see my God,” it seems St. Augustine personally never changed his belief that such a spiritualization of the flesh was impossible. In spite of the passage quoted from Job, the impos- sibility of the bodily eye being so highly spiritualized as to be able immediately to see God, while not an arti- 3 Cfr. Epiphanius, Haeres., 70. 4 De Consensu Eccles. Orient., II, See also Part III of this work, on 17. the Incorporeity of God. 5 Ep. 22 ad Italicam. 6 Ep. 147 ad Paulinam. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 8s cle of faith, is to-day generally received as a well es- tablished theological conclusion. St. Augustine himself trenchantly refuted the construction which his adver- saries put upon Job XIX, 26, and other similar texts. With regard to the effatum of Job, he says: “Non dixit Job: per carnem meam, quod quidem si dixisset, posset Deus Christus intelligi, qui per carnem im carne videbitur. Nunc vero potest et sic acctpt: in carne mea videbo Deum, ac si dixisset: In carne mea ero, cum videbo Deum — Job does not say ‘by the flesh.’ And, indeed, if he had said this, it would still be possible that by ‘God’ Christ was meant; for Christ shall be seen by the flesh. But even understanding it of God, it is only equivalent to saying, ‘I shall be in the flesh when I see God.’”* The spiritualization of the risen body, of which St. Paul speaks in 1 Cor. XV, 44 (odpa mvevpatikov), by no means consists in the transmission to the material body of spiritual powers and qualities —for this would mean an evolution of matter into spirit, which is impossible —, but in a clarification or transfiguration of the flesh enabling it to foster and support the activity of the soul, instead of pulling it down to the level of the senses, “ Evit spiritui subdita caro spiritualis,’ St. Augustine says, “sed tamen caro, non spiritus; sicut carnt subditus fuit spiritus ipse carnalis, sed tamen spiritus, non caro — The flesh shall then be spiritual, and subject to the spirit, but. still flesh, not spirit.”* At bottom the whole question ap- pertains to philosophy rather than theology. Philosophy, needless to remark, cannot admit the possibility of an intuitive vision of God’s spiritual substance by a ma- terial organ, for such a concession would imply that t De Civit. Dei, XXII, 29. &De Civit. Dei, XXII, 21. Cfr. Petavius, De Deo, VII, 2. 86 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD flesh could be changed into spirit without ceasing to be material flesh. The argument is strengthened by another theological conclusion, viz.: It is metaphysically certain that the bodily eye can see none but corporeal substances; on the other hand, it is de fide that the glorified bodies of the Elect after the resurrection will be and remain bodies of real flesh; hence it is the- ologically certain that the bodily eye, even in its trans- figured state, can perceive only what is corporeal — consequently, that it cannot see God, Who is a pure spirit. Second Thesis. No created spirit (angel or man), can by his purely natural faculties attain to the im- mediate vision of God. So far as it applies to existing spirits, this proposition is an article of faith. Proof. The supernatural character of the visto beatifica on the part of such rational creat- ures as exist under the present economy, was defined as early as A.D. 1311, by the Council of Vienne.? But we have not the certitude of faith as to the question whether God might not create a spirit—say, an angel of the highest pos- sible order—which would have a right to the vision of God in virtue of the perfection of its nature, this point having never been defined by the Church. A few of the Schoolmen (Duran- dus, Becanus, Ripalda) believed themselves free 9Cfr. also Propos. Baji damn., 3-5, 9, apud Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1003 sqq. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 87 to hold the view that in some other universe than ours God could create a spirit which, in virtue of its very nature, might claim beatific vision asaright. Ripalda*® in speaking of such a hy- pothetical spirit, calls it “substantia intrinsece supernaturalis.’” However, since Sacred Scrip- ture and Tradition trace the natwral invisibility of God to His innermost essence, the hypothesis of the possibility of a “supernatural substance’’ must be rejected as false and involving a con- tradiction.1t Hence our present thesis must be made to embrace all possible spiritual beings; and in that sense it is certainly true, because the proofs drawn from Revelation are applicable to all created or creatable intellects. a) Apropos of the Scriptural argument for our thesis, it must be noted: a) The natural inaccessibility of the Divine Essence is expressly taught in 1 Tim. VI, 15- 16: “Beatus et solus potens rex, regum et Dominus dominantium, qui solus habet immortals tatem et lucem inhabitat tnaccessibilem, quem nullus hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest— The Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings, and Lord of lords, who only hath im- mortality, and inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen, nor can see.” It ap- 10De Ente Supernaturali, t. I, mieri, S. J., De Deo Creante et disp. 23; t. II, disp. ult., sec. 40. Elevante, thes. 39, Romae 1878. 11 For further details, see Pal- 88 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD pears from this enumeration of such attributes as “‘blessedness,” “omnipotence,” and “immor- tality,” (attributes every one of which is quite invisible to the bodily eye), that the Apostle had in view not so much the bodily as the in- tellectual invisibility of God. Such expressions as “whom no man hath seen nor can see,” and “inhabiteth light inaccessible,’ must therefore be taken as referring mainly to the under- standing. Now if this light is inhabited by God alone, it follows that all who are outside of it —and all rational creatures both existing and possible are outside of it, because it is “‘inac- cessible’’ to all except God—neither “see” nor “can see” the Godhead. Nor is this conclusion in the least affected by the circumstance that invisibility is here predicated of God only in relation to man (“nullus hominum’”); for the decretory. principle—viz., inaccessibility—is so positive and universal that it comprises not only the angels but all spirits in general (even those which have no existence). That, on the other hand, St. Paul did not consider it impos- sible for finite rational beings to be admitted into the divine “light” by the favor of grace, is quite plain from his teaching in regard to the reality of the supernatural vision of God in Heaven.” 12 Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 8-12. wr a KNOWABILITY OF GOD 89 Rom. I, 20, Ta ddpara adrod . . . Trois rovjpace voovpeva xaSopara.— For the invisible things of him... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made ”’— can be quoted in support of the same truth. For “the invisible things of Him” (7. e., of God) are here contrasted with His visibility, that is to say, His knowableness in the light and by means of the created universe. That the contrast is intentional ap- pears from the use of the words ddpara— xafopara, which are calculated to convey the idea that without the medium of created things, the Godhead is in itself “ in- visible,” 7. e., cannot be envisaged in its essence. This invisibility is defined not as a bodily but as an “in- tellectual ” attribute (intellecta — voovjpeva). Though St. Paul in the passage under consideration means to refer primarily to the human understanding, as the context shows, it is quite plain that he looks upon “ invisibility ” as such a characteristic attribute of the Godhead per se (ra ddpata), and that we are not at liberty to make an exception in favor of any rational being, either actually existing or merely “ creatable.” 7° 8) There are a number of Scriptural texts in which the intuition of the Divine Essence is de- scribed as the exclusive privilege of the Godhead, or of the three Persons in the Most Holy Trinity, implying that God’s intuition of Himself can be communicated to creatures, even those endowed with reason, only by way of supernatural grace. Cfr. Matth. XI, 27: “Nemo novit F1- lium nisi Pater, neque Patrem quis novit (ém- 13 Cfr, the commentators on Rom.I, 20. go THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD ywoown) nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare (drroxadtya:)—No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth any one know the Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him.” Similarly in John VI, 46: “Non quia Patrem vidit quisquam (épaxé ms) mst is, qui est a Deo [scil. Filius]: hic vidit Patrem—Not that any man hath seen the Father; but he who is of God, he hath seen the Father.” The same thought is still more sharply brought out in John I, 18: “Deum nemo vidit Unquam (ovels Edpaxe momore) ; ynigenitus Filius, qui est m sinu Patris, ipse enarravit (é€yyhoaro)— No man hath seen God at any time: the only be- gotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.” Besides the Father and the Son, there is only the Holy Ghost Who intues “* the inner essence of the Divinity. Cfr. 1 Cor. Il, 11: “Quae Dei sunt, nemo cognovit (éyvoxer) nisi Spiritus Dei—The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.” Whence it follows that no created intellect can, by virtue of its own power, penetrate into the Divine Essence. If the revelation to believing men of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity is a supernatural favor, the intuitive “face-to-face” vision of the same must a fortiori be a grace, 14“ We will . . . use the word tion’ and the adjective ‘ intuitive,’ ” ‘intue ' as corresponding in every (W. G. Ward, Nature and Grace, respect with the substantive ‘ intui- I, 40, London 1860.) KNOWABILITY OF GOD QI and a much greater one. From all of which we may validly conclude that, according to the teach- ing of the Bible, the Divine Essence is absolutely invisible to any created being except through the operation of supernatural grace. b) The Fathers formulated their teaching along the lines of the Biblical texts just quoted. a) Those of the Fathers in particular, who did not content themselves with merely restating the dagma and showing it to be founded in Holy Writ, tried to bot- tom the natural invisibility of God on the metaphysical axiom that “the Uncreated cannot become visible to a created being.”*® They regarded solely the natural mode of cognition, as is evidenced by the fact that they did not hesitate to ascribe to the Elect in Heaven a supernatural intuition of God. Gregory of Nazianzus insists that an intuitive vision of the Divine Essence is possible only “in virtue of a special indwelling of God in the intellect and of the latter’s being penetrated through and through with a divine light,” ** — a divine act which St. Chrysostom designates more succinctly as ovyxatéBaois, 7. €., a condescension on the part of the Almighty. B) The teaching of St. Irenaeus is deserving of special mention because of its unmistakable clearness. He as- sumes that we can attain to a knowledge of God nat- urally, by contemplating the created universe, and then proceeds to distinguish three stages in the supernatural knowledge which man can have of God: (1) the “ sym- 15 Cfr. Chrysost. Hom. 5 de In- 16 Or. 34: Ad rd mAnolor elvat comprehens.: Ovcla yap ovciav Ocod kai bw 7@ pwrl kaTaddpure- irepéxovoay ovK ay duvadeln Ka- Oat, A@s eldévac, g2 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD bolical ” vision implied in the Old Testament theophanies; (2) the “adoptive” vision exemplified in the Incar- nation of the Logos; and (3) the “paternal” vision of the Elect in Heaven, which alone deserves the name of intuition. The principal passage is Adv. Haeres. IV, 20, 5, where St. Irenaeus says: “Homo etenim a se [ber naturalia sua] non videt Deum, ille autem volens videtur [ab] hominibus, quibus vult et quando vult et quemadmodum vult; potens est enim in omnibus Deus. Visus quidem tune [i. e., in V. T.] per spiritum pro- phetiae, visus autem et per Filium adoptive, videbitur autem et in regno coelorum paternaliter — For man does not see God by his own powers; but when He pleases He is seen by men, by whom He wills, and when He wills, and as He wills. For God is powerful in all things, having been seen at that time [in the Old Testa- ment] indeed, prophetically through the Spirit, and seen, too, adoptively through the Son, and He shall also be seen paternally in the kingdom of Heaven.”27 He sharply differentiates between the natural invisibility and the supernatural visibility of God, when he says: “Quit vident Deum, intra Deum sunt, percipientes eius claritatem. ... Et propter hoc incapabilis (6 édxépy- tos) et invisibilis (ddparos) visibilem se et comprehensi- bilem et capabilem hominibus praestat (épmpevov éavroy kat katadapBavopevoy Kat xXwpovpevoy) — And for this rea- son, He [although] beyond comprehension, and invisi- ble, renders Himself visible and comprehensible to men, 71% Third Thesis. The Blessed in Heaven, through grace, see God face to face, as He is in Himself, and are thereby rendered eternally happy. 17 Iren., Adv, Haer., IV, 20. 18 Iren., J. c. Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 12, art. 4. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 93 This thesis embodies an article of faith. Proof. “Ab esse ad posse valet illatio.’” The very fact that Sacred Scripture describes the beatific vision as the supernatural recompense with which God rewards virtue in angels and men, proves the possibility of such vision, al- though, despite the existence of Revelation, hu- man reason cannot demonstrate either the in- trinsic possibility or the reality of the beatific vision, which is consequently reckoned by nearly all theologians among the absolute theological mysteries.” The fact itself has been defined as an article of faith in the Constitution “Bene- dictus Deus’ of Pope Benedict XII (A.D. 1336), which says: “Defnimus quod [animae sanctorum]| post Domint Nostri Jesu Christi passtonem et mortem viderunt et vident divinam essentiam visione intuitiva et etiam faciali, nulla mediante creatura in ratione objecti visi se ha- bente, sed divina essentia immediate se nude, clare et aperte eis ostendente, quodque sic vi- dentes eadem divina essentia perfruuntur, necnon quod ex tal visione et fruitione eorum animae, qui tam decesserunt, sunt vere beatae et habent vitam et requiem aeternam.’?®? This definition clearly sets off both the reality and the super- natural character of the beatific vision. The fact itself is established in part (negatively) by 19 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, Pralect. Dogm., 20 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiri- II, 43 sqq., Friburgi 1899. dion, N. 520. 94 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD the exclusion of every other medium of cogni- tion, and in part (positively) by insistence on the immediateness of the act of vision. Its super- natural character appears from the fact that its beginning is traced back to the death of Christ and that it is described as the consum- mation of the theological virtues of faith and hope.** All possible doubt as to whether or not the vision of the Blessed Trinity is included in the beatific vision, has been removed by the Florence decree of 1439, which says: “Definimus . .. [dlorum animas] .. . in coelum mox recipi et intuert clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, Sicuit) est. 2? a) Holy Scripture promises to the just in the hereafter boundless bliss, which it calls “eternal life,” “the kingdom of Heaven,” “the marriage feast of the Lamb,” etc.,?2 and describes as a state in which tears stop flowing, pain ceases, pure joy and happiness reign supreme.?4 Now, in what does this heavenly bliss consist? a) In 1 Cor. XIII, 8 sqq., we read: “Sive prophetiae evacuabuntur sive linguae cessabunt sive scientia destruetur; ex parte enim cognos- cimus et ex parte prophetamus. Cum autem 21“ Ac quod visio et fruitio actus Kabos éorw,” Cfr. Denzinger- fidet et spei in eis evacuant, prout fides et spes propriae theologicae sunt virtutes.”’ Const. “ Benedictus Deus,’ 4. c. 22“ Kal Kkadapw@s Oewpeiy adroy tov éva Kal rpiovrdataroy Oeép, Bannwart, n. 693. 23 For further information on this point we must refer the reader to Eschatology. 24Cfr. Apoc, VII, 16; “S¥I, 4, etc. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 95 venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est... . Videmus nunc per speculum m aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam, sicut et cogmitus sum—Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed; for we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is per- fect is come,?** that which is in part shall be done away.**> We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face.2*° Now I know in part; 744 but then I shall know even as I am known.” 74°. As we have already observed on a previous page, the Apostle here contrasts the piecemeal, enigmatic, and per speculum vision of God that is vouchsafed us here below, with the radically different one which we shall enjoy hereafter, and which possesses the two distinc- tive marks of immediateness * and perfect clear- ness."° Man’s knowledge of God in Heaven is a vision “face to face,” or “person to person,” ** which is opposed to the vision “through a glass’ ** that we have on earth. Again, the “herfectum” (76 rédeov) is contrasted with the 24a rb Tédevov, 4. @., the beatific 24e rére 6&8 emvyvdcouat, Kalas vision. Kal éreyvaadny, 24b karapynOnoerat Td éK meé- 25 Sine speculo, non in aenigmate. povs, i. e., abstractive knowledge 26 Non ex parte. shall cease. 27 Cfr. Exodus XXXIII, 11: 24c mpdowmoy mpds mpdowmoy= pO_-ON DIR, visto factalis. oF Oe 77 24d éx juépous ; 28 Cognitio per speculum = ab- : stractiva e+ analogica. 96 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD cognuitio ex parte (76 & pépovs), and the perfect clearness of the beatific vision is illustrated in this wise: “As God sees me, even so shall I see Him;” that is to say, immediately, intui- tively, clearly, without veil or medium, no longer by means of analogy derived from the created universe.” 8B) The teaching of St. John accords perfectly with thatiof St. Pauki City) john IDf;.23 .We- rissum, nunc flu Dei sumus et nondum apparuit, quid erimus. Scimus, quoniam, cum apparuerit (av pavepwO}), sumiles et erimus, quonmiam videbi- mus eum sicutt est—Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know, that, when he shall appear, we shall be like to him, because we shall see him [12. e., Christ in His Divinity] as he is.” As in rt Cor. XIII, so here our knowl- edge of God on earth is contrasted with our knowledge of Him in Heaven. Here below, until it will “appear what we shall be,” we are “chil- dren of God” in an imperfect way only; but in Heaven “‘we shall be like to God,* because we shall see Him as He is.” **—In the light of these explanations we are able to understand the 29 Cfr. Al. Schafer, Erklarung ing on the present-day error of der beiden Briefe an die Korinther, pp. 268 sqq., Minster 1903. On man’s dark and enigmatical vision of God here on earth, its purpose, and the bearing of St. Paul’s teach- “‘ Pragmatism,’”? cfr T. J. Gerrard, The Wayfarer’s Vision, London 1909. 30 Suolot AUTO, 31 6Wdmeba avrov Kaus éorwy, KNOWABILITY OF GOD 97 deeper meaning of the Saviour’s dictum: “Beats mundo corde, quoniam ipst Deum videbunt— Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God./"?), The angels, too;) enjay, the beatific vision of God the Father, and consequently of the whole Divine Trinity. “Angeli eorum |sc. mfantium] in coelis semper vident faciem Patris met,** gui in coelis est—Their [the children’s] angels in heaven always see the face of my Father who is in heaven.’ ** b) The Patristic argument for our thesis offers some difficulties, though these difficulties appear to be hermeneutical rather than dogmatic. Vasquez contends that such eminent authorities among the Fathers as Chrysostom, Basil, Greg- ory of Nazianzus, Cyril of Alexandria and Cyril of Jerusalem, Ambrose and others, deny that the denizens of Heaven enjoy the beatific vision of God. But even if this somewhat strange con- tention could be proved, it would not destroy the argument based upon the unanimous consensus of the majority of the Fathers. For, be it re- membered, this dogma was not defined until much later, and its history shows a turning- point in the fourth century, when the Eunomian heresy began to influence considerably the tactics of the Fathers. 32 Matth. V, 8. 33 Brérovet 7d mpdowrov Tov waTpés pov, 84 Matth. XVIII, 1o. 98 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD a) The pre-Eunomian Fathers simply teach, in full accord with the Bible, that the angels and saints in Heaven are vouchsafed a real “face to face” vision of God. We have already ad- verted to the admirably lucid teaching of St. Irenaeus. Corroborative passages can be cited from the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyprian, and others.* 8) The rise of the Eunomian heresy led to a change of tactics, though the doctrine remained unchanged. Whenever the Fathers of Euno- mius’s time were not engaged in controversy, they employed the traditional phraseology with which the Christians of that era were so familiar. It is important to exonerate especially St. John Chryso- stom from the charge of material heresy made against him by Vasquez.** Treating of the Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor, Chrysostom says:%* “If the bliss produced by a dark vision of the future was suffi- cient to induce St. Peter to cast away everything, what will man say when once the reality bursts upon him; when the doors of the royal chamber are thrown open, and he is permitted to look upon the King Himself — no longer enigmatically as in a mirror, but face to face; no longer in the faith,** but in reality.” ®® Again he says:*° “The just, however, dwell there with their King, . 4.4 not.ias in. a :vestibule,**. not. in) the faith, 35 Cfr. Petavius, De Deo, VII, 7. 39 da eldous, 36 Comment. in S. Th., 1 p., disp. 40 Hom. in Phul., 3, n. 3. 27.) Cap. 23s 41 61a eloddov is probably a more 37 Ad Theod. Laps., n. 11. correct reading than d.d eldovs, 38 64a wicrews, | : 1 KNOWABILITY OF GOD 99 but face to face.” 4? It is only when he combats Euno- mianism, or at least when he has this heresy in view, that St. Chrysostom uses expressions which might strike the careless reader as a denial of the beatific vision in Heaven, or a limitation of it to the Blessed Trinity. Vasquez points especially to Hom. de Incompreh., 3, n. 3: “Nullt creatae virtuti Deum esse comprehensibilem,* et a nulla plene** viderit posse.’ To understand this and similar passages correctly, we must consider in the first place,*® that in St. Chrysostom’s time the distinction between such terms as knowing (yvaois), seeing (Gewpia), and comprehending (xardAnfis) was not yet clearly de- fined, and that the Saint was not minded to deny the sim- ple visio intuitiva, but merely combated the comprehensio adaequata asserted by Eunomius. Hence such guarded phrases as these: “‘yvadows dxpiBys, axpiBys KaTaAnyis THs ovcias, axpiBas ywookev,” etc. An adequate comprehen- sion of God, such as that taught by Eunomius, is plainly not granted to either angels or men, but, as St. Chrysos- tom himself elsewhere explains, is proper only to the three Divine Persons.*®° By putting a different construc- tion on St. Chrysostom’s teaching, we should not only muddle the sense and violate the context of his writings, but make him contradict himself.*? y) Vasquez’s accusations against certain other Fathers must be appraised in the light of this typical example. If St. Basil asserts that “the angels do not see the 42.a\\a mpdowmroy mpds mpdaw- Tov, 43 KaTaAnT TOY, 44 wera axpiBelas, 45 Cfr, Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, p. 238. 46 Hom. in. Ioa., 18 mM. 2% “wvacw yap evravda CInaois) Ty axpiBn Aéyer Oewplay re Kal karadnyw, kat Tocairyny, bonv 6 marnp exec wept Tov .madds — For by knowledge He here means an exact idea and comprehension, such as the Father hath of the Son.” 47 Cfr. Wirceburgenses, De Deo Uno, nn. 99 sqq. S 100 THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD Godhead as It sees Itself,” he expresses no doubt as to the beatific vision, but merely wishes to emphasize the dogma of God’s absolute incomprehensibility, which makes Him inscrutable even to the Elect in Heaven. “The face to face vision and the perfect cognition of the incomprehensible majesty of God,’ 48 he says, “is promised to all who are worthy of it as a reward in the hereafter.” *® Such was also the teaching of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, who, after declaring that “ the angels do not see God as He is,” ®® immediately adds: “ They see Him according to the measure of their ability, ... the Thrones and Powers [see Him] more per- fectly than the [mere] angels, yet short of His ex- cellency;*°* only the one Holy Ghost, besides the Son, can see Him in a becoming manner.” ®? 5) We can spare ourselves the trouble of defending the other Fathers who have been attacked by Vasquez, because it is quite plain to any one who reads their writings carefully and without bias, that they teach just the contrary of what Vasquez imputes to them. If the one or other of them does here and there appear to deviate from the orthodox view (as, e. g., Gregory of Nyssa), he must be interpreted in the same way as St. Chrysostom. There is no solid reason for charging a single one of these Fathers with heterodoxy. St. Augus- tine already showed ** how certain utterances of St. Ambrose and St. Jerome can be construed in a per- fectly orthodox sense.**. The only false note in the 4870 wev yap mpdowmory mpds 53 Ep, 148, alit. 111; Migne, P. apdcwmov kal ) rerela émiyywos, L., XXXIII, 622. 49 Basil, Serm. de Imp. et Potest. 54 For St. Augustine’s own teach- 50 00 Kadws é€oriv 6 Oeds, ing the reader is referred to De 51 €\arroy 6é THs atlas, Civ. Dei, XI, 29, XXII, 29, and 52ms xpn, Cyril of Jerusalem, De Trinit., XIV, 16. Catech., 6, n. 6. KNOWABILITY OF GOD IOI harmonious concert is an expression of Theodoretus, who says that the Angels “do not see the Divine Es- sence, but only a certain lustre,®> which is adapted to their nature.” It is likely that this passage is the source of the heresy of the fourteenth century Palamites,®* who alleged that the divine attributes can be contemplated separately from the divine Substance in the form of a “ garb of light’? enveloping the God- head."” ARTICLE 2 THE LIGHT OF GLORY A NECESSARY MEDIUM FOR THE INTUITIVE VISION OF GOD 1. WHAT THE LIGHT oF GLORY 1s.—The term “light” (lumen), like ‘“‘vision” (visio), has been transferred from the material world to the realm of intellectual cognition. As material light is the condition and the cause of bodily vision, so intellectual light is necessary for intellectual vision, t. e., cognition. As there are three states: that of nature, that of grace, and that of glory; so there are three specific modes of cognition, with as many different “lights” adapted and pro- 55 Sétap ruva. 56 On the heresy of the Palamites (from Gregory Palamas), cfr. Her- genrither’s Handbuch der Allge- meinen Kirchengeschichte, ath ed. by J. P. Kirsch, vol. II, pp. 804 sqq.; Blunt, Dictionary of Sects, etc., pp. I91 Sq. 57 Possibly Gregory the Great al- luded to Theodoretus when he wrote (Moral, XVIII, nn. 90 sq): * Fuere nonnulli, qui Deum dice- rent etiam in tlla regione beatitudt- nis in claritate quidem sua conspict, sed in natura minime vidert. Quos nimirum minor inquisitionis subtili- tas fefellit; neque enim ill sim- plict essentiae aliud est claritas et aliud natura, sed tpsa et natura sua claritas, tpsa claritas natura est.” On the whole subject, see Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 19, Romae 1883. 102 THE LIGHT OR GLORY portioned to each; wz.: the “light of reason” (lumen rations), which comes from the Creator ; the “light of grace” (lumen gratiae, fidet), which comes from the Sanctifier, and the “light of glory’ (lumen gloriae), which comes from the Divine Remunerator. Here we have to deal with the light of glory. What is the light of glory? Like the light of reason and the light of grace, the light of glory must be immanent in the human intellect, and hence cannot be objectively identical with the majesty or splendor of God (lumen quod videtur). Nor can it be the actus videndt of the Elect, inasmuch as this act, though im- manent in the human intellect, is impossible without the light of glory, just as cognition de- pends of necessity on the light of reason, and faith on the light of grace. The theologians accordingly define the light of glory as a super- natural force or power imparted to the intellect of the Blessed in Heaven, like a new eye (or principle of vision), enabling them to see God as He is:** 2. THE Docma.—The Council of Vienne (A. D. 1311) defined the necessity (and hence implicitly the existence) of the lumen glonae, when, through the mouth of Clement V, it con- demned the heresy of the Beguines and Beg- 58 Cfr. W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 48 sqq. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 103 hards,® that “Anima non indiget lumine gloriae ipsam elevante ad Deum videndum et eo beate fruendum.” °° a) The necessity of the light of glory flows as a corollary from what we have said above. If the order of grace and salvation instituted for all rational creatures is a strictly supernatural state, absolutely unattainable by purely natural means; if, in particular, the natural power of the created intellect is not sufficient to enable it to attain to an intuitive vision of God’s essence because He “dwells in light inaccessible;’’—then manifestly the cognitive faculty of rational crea- tures must, in virtue of the potentia obedientials latent therein, be elevated to the supernatural sphere and endowed with the supernatural power necessary for it to see God. Whoever denies this conclusion must perforce accept the heretical antecedent that the created intellect is able by its own natural powers to arrive at an intuitive vision of God.°*? b) The necessity of the light of glory can be proved even more cogently from its relation to the habitus of theological faith. For while the supernatural habitus of love (habitus caritatis) will continue in the beyond,*’ faith, on the other 59 On the Beguines and the Beg- 60 Clement., 1. V, tit. 3, cap. 3. hards, see E. Gilliat-Smith in the 61 Cfr, Supra, Article 1, No. 2. Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. II, pp. 62 Cfr. 1 Cor, XIII, 8: 4 dydrn 389 sq. : ovdéroTe éxminTet, 104 THE LIGHT OF GLORY hand, will cease, being changed into vision,.** Now, if the supernatural life of faith here on earth is supported by a special habitus, viz., theological faith, it is plain that the light of glory, too, which takes the place of faith in Heaven, requires a habitus for its foundation; the more so because the beatific vision is far superior to the knowledge of faith, representing, as it does, the summit which grace makes it possible for any created intellect to attain. Cir. Apoc. XXII, 4 sqq.: “Et videbunt faciem ems;** . . . et nox ultra non erit; et non ege- bunt lumine lucernae, neque lumine solis, quo- niam Dominus Deus illuminabit tllos, et reg- nabunt in saecula saeculorum—And they shall see his face;.-... and night shall, be no mote: and they shall not need the light of the lamp, nor the light of the sun, because the Lord God shall enlighten them, and they shall reign for ever and ever.” | 3. SCHOLASTIC CONTROVERSIES REGARDING THE NATURE OF THE LIGHT oF GLORY.—While no Catholic is allowed to doubt the existence and the necessity of the light of glory—in the sense of “supernatural assistance’—we are free to discuss the question, in what the essence of this light consists, and what are its qualities; provided, of 63 Cfr. 1 Cor, XIII, 10: Bray 64 dforvrat 7d rpdowmoy adrod, dé €On 7d rédewor, 7d x ppous 856 eds gwriet ex’ avrois, Karapynoncerac, KNOWABILITY OF GOD 105 course, that the dogma itself is duly safe- guarded. a) Three Scholastic theories on the matter must be rejected as partly erroneous and partly inadequate. a) We must reject as incorrect in the first place the opinion of that school which holds that a mere ex- trinsic elevation (elevatio extrinseca) is sufficient % for the supernatural equipment of the human intellect, or that it is at least possible.*? The essence of this ele- vatio extrinseca is held by its champions to consist not in any intrinsic strengthening of the cognitive faculty, but in the exercise by God Himself of an immediate influence on the natural intellect, enabling it to at- tain to supernatural vision. Some theologians, as Cardinals Cajetan and Franzelin, regard this opinion as theologically unsound, and as involving a_ philo- sophic contradiction, on the ground that no vital potency can produce a supernatural act without undergoing an intrinsic alteration.°* Whatever view one may take of the possibility or impossibility of the elevatio extrinseca, this much appears to be certain: the theory does not accord with the spirit of the Clementine decision, be- cause the term “lumen gloriae elevans animam ad Deum videndum” implies just as much of an intrinsic (qualita- tive) change in the principle of cognition as does the phrase, “lwmen fidet elevans animam ad credendum.” B) There is a second theory, which accords some- what better with the sense of the dogma. It postu- lates an intrinsic strengthening of the soul by the agency 66 Durandus, Comment. in Qua- Toletus, Comment. in S. Theol., 1, tuor Libros Sent., IV, dist. 49, qu. qu; 312, art. 5, conel.-3. Sg: 68 Cfr., however, G. B, Tepe, 67 Cfr. Suarez, De Deo, II, 13; S. J., Instit. Theol., II, pp. 137 saq., ; Paris 1895, 8 106 THE LIGHT OF GLORY of an unbroken chain of actual graces (gratiae actuales). If it is true that in Heaven faith gives way to vision, while charity remains, and both are of the same species, i. é., habitual virtues, then should we not expect a cor- responding habitus visionis to replace the former habitus fidei? But this habitus visionis would be identical with the /umen gloriae. Hence, if the latter is at all to be compared to supernatural grace, it must be compared not to actual grace (gratia actualis), but to sanctifying grace (gratia habitualis), which inheres in the soul of the jus- tified as a permanent quality, a habitus infusus. y) Thomassin and several other theologians °® held that the beatific vision of God consists in a direct par- ticipation by the Elect in the Divine Vision itself, 7. e., in an actual transfer of the divine act of intuition to the intellect of the Just. Thomassin says:7 “ Videtur Deus a beatis non alia specie intelligibili quam Verbo ipso mentem imformante.’ Nay, he does not shrink from identifying the light of glory with the Holy Ghost, falsely drawing from Ps. XXXV, 10: “Jn lumine tuo videbimus lumen,’ the conclusion: “JIdeoque lumen gloriae, quo videtur Deus, est Spiritus sanctus.’ Sucha confusion of the beatific vision with the uncreated Logos, and of the light of glory with the Person of the Holy Ghost, deserves to be called adventurous. While it is quite certain that God cannot transfer His own vital act of self-contemplation to any extraneous being, it is equally certain that the Blessed in Heaven behold Him in virtue of a vital act of vision proper to, and immanent in, their own intellects. Can I see with the eyes of another? True, the Holy Ghost elevates and strengthens the intellect per appropriationem; but He is not the sub- 69 Mentioned by Lessius, De Summo Bono, Il, 2, 70 De Deo, VI, 16. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 107 jective principle of energy from which the supernatural act of vision vitally emanates. Pursued to its logical conclusion this theory leads directly to Pantheism. b) From what we have said in refutation of these false theories the reader can easily for- mulate the true view. According to the senten- tia communis, the light of glory consists in a “supernatural power which inheres in the intel- lect of the Blessed as a permanent habitus, en- abling them to see the Divine Countenance.” This definition possesses the twofold advantage of being in full accord with the Clementine de- cree, and of satisfying the scientific dogmati- cfan,"? ARTICLE 3 THE BEATIFIC VISION IN ITS RELATION TO THE DIVINE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY 1. STATE OF THE QUESTION.—The incompre- hensibility of the Divine Essence must not be con- ceived as merely relative. God is incomprehen- sible to us not only in the natural condition of our intellect here below, but likewise in the super- natural state of glory in Heaven. Holy Scrip- ture’? and Tradition both define incomprehen- 71 On some of the deeper prob- ject. more briefly in his Praelect. lems concerning the species im- Dogmat., vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 41 pressa and expressa, cfr. G. B. Tepe, sqq. Friburgi 1906. : Instit. Theol., pp. 145 sqq. Chr. 72 Cir. Job XI, 7; Ps. CXLIV; 3. Pesch, S. J., treats the same sub- 108 THE BEATIFIC VISION sibility as an absolute attribute, by which the Divine Essence is, and ever remains, impene- trable to every created and creatable intellect, even in the state of transfiguration and. elevation produced by the light of glory. The Fourth Lateran Council enumerates “incomprehensi- bilis’”” among God’s absolute and incommunicable attributes.7* Now there arises a difficult prob- lem. It has been defined by Benedict XII (1336) and by the Florentine Council (1439), that the beatific vision of the Blessed in Heaven is di- rected to the infinite substance of God, nay, to the Blessed Trinity itself, which the Elect intue immediate, nude, clare et aperte. If this is true, how can the Divine Essence remain incompre- hensible to those who enjoy the beatific vision? In other words: How can the dogma of the absolute incomprehensibility of God be reconciled with the dogmatic teaching of the Church that the Just in Heaven are happy in the intuitive vision of the Divine Essence? 2. UNsuCcESSFUL ATTEMPTS AT HARMONIZ- ING THE Two Docmas.—It is plain that no at- tempt to harmonize these two dogmas by at- tenuating either the one or the other can prove successful or acceptable. The incomprehensi- bility of God and the reality of the beatific vision must both be accepted in their true meaning and 78 Cfr, Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchirid., n. 428. KNOWABILITY OF GOD 109 to the full extent of their logical bearing. Be- cause they fail in this the theories enumerated below are all defective. a) By excepting from the beatific vision several divine attributes, and positing the essence of God’s incompre- hensibility precisely in the concealment of certain un- seen divine perfections, Thomassin and Toletus mani- festly minimize the dogma of the visio intuitiva. Tole- tus insists that “Decem attributa distincte percipere, maioris est virtutis quam octo; ergo infinita percipere infinitae est virtutis. Divinae perfectiones sunt infimtae: ergo impossibile est, omnes ab intellectu creato percipt.” ™ But to distinguish between seen and unseen attributes is contrary to the absolute simplicity of the Divine Es- sence. That some of God’s attributes remain hidden to the Elect, in contradistinction to others which they do see, is a theory which can be entertained only on the assumption that the Divine Essence is split up into an infinite multiplicity of objectively distinct perfections, of which one might become visible while the others re- mained hidden. But the essence of the Godhead is physically and metaphysically indivisible. Hence, who- ever enjoys an intuitive vision of this most sim- ple Being, must envisage either all its perfections or none. To the objection of Toletus that in that case “ sequeretur quod omnia Det iudicia, omnes voluntates occultae essent beatis manifesta, quia omnia talia sunt formaliter in Deo,” we retort that God’s occult decrees and counsels involve an extrinsic relation, i. e., a rela- tion to something which is not God. As little as the intuition of the Divine Essence eo ipso entails a knowl- 74 Comment. in S. Theol., I, qu. 12, art. 7. 110 THE BEATIFIC VISION edge of all real and possible creatures — for these do not form a part of the Divine Essence as such — just so little does a vision of the Divine Essence in its en- tirety necessarily imply knowledge of God’s free de- crees, which have their terminus outside of the God- head, and, therefore, remain hidden even to the Elect in Heaven, unless God sees fit to disclose them by a special revelation. b) The second theory under consideration detracts from the dogma of God’s incomprehensibility. Its cham- pions (notably Ockham and Gabriel Biel) assert that no concept formed of any object is complete, unless to the comprehensio tntrinseca (1. e., an exhaustive notion of its objective cognoscibility), there is joined a compre- hensio extrinseca, which implies that the subjective mode of cognition is the most perfect possible. This view does not necessarily deny the incomprehensibility of God, because after all it is only God’s contemplation of Himself which is entitatively and noétically infinite, inasmuch as only the infinite Being Himself is capable of performing an infinitely perfect vital act. But the underlying shallow conception of God’s incomprehensi- bility involves certain insoluble antinomies. It im- plies, on the one hand, that the Blessed in Heaven might enjoy a true and full comprehension of the Di- vine Essence without infringing on the “ dxatadyyia,” inasmuch as, subjectively and from the noétic stand- point, there would still remain an unbridgeable chasm between God’s divine apprehension of Himself and the vision which He vouchsafes to His creatures in Heaven. It implies, on the other hand, that the attribute of in- comprehensibility cannot be limited to the Divine Es- sence, but must be extended to all things without ex- KNOWABILITY OF GOD III ception, even the smallest and most easily knowable. Not only God, but every truth (e. g., the Pythagorean theorem), nay, every material object (e. g., a blade of grass) would then be incomprehensible even to the highest angelic intellect, for the simple reason that an infinitely perfect mode of knowledge is possible only to an infinite being.’® 3. THE TRUE THEoRY.—St. Thomas Aquinas strikes at the root of the problem by reducing the incomprehensibility of God to His infinity. “Ens et verum convertuntur.’. Therefore God’s knowableness, like His Essence, must be infinite. In- finite cognoscibility, however, can be exhausted only by an infinite power of cognition, and this no creature pos- sesses. Hence it is in the infinite, absolute Being only that cognoscibility and cognition, being and thought, can be really identical. ‘‘ Everything that is comprehended by any knowing mind, is known by it as perfectly as it is knowable. ... But the Divine Substance is infinite in comparison with every created intellect, since every created intellect is bounded within the limits of a cer- tain species. It is impossible, therefore, that the vision of any created intellect can see the Divine Substance as perfectly as it is visible.’’* In the light of this explanation we can understand why the Elect in Heaven, though they envisage the entire Substance of God (in- cluding all His attributes and the Divine Persons), nevertheless do not and cannot comprehend this Sub- stance either intensively, to the limits of its content, 75 On the unsatisfactory theory 76S. Thom., Contr. Gent., III, of Vasquez (De Deo, disp. 53, cap. ss, (Rickaby, Of God and His 2), see Franzelin, De Deo Uno, Creatures, p. 227. London 1905.) thes. 18, Romae 1883. 112 THE BEATIFIC VISION nor yet extensively, in its totality. They intue the whole Godhead (totum), but they do not intue it fully (fotaliter) ; they envisage the Infinite Being Himself (infinitum), but they do not envisage Him in an in- finite manner (infinite). As a keen eye, says Richard of Middletown,” perceives the same color more dis- tinctly than a weak eye, so the saints’ supernatural power of vision is proportioned to the measure of their merits, that is to say, to the different degrees of the light of glory vouchsafed to each, although they all be- hold the same object.7® ReEApincs:— Lessius, S. J., De Summo Bono et Aeterna Beatitudine Hominis, Antwerpiae 1616.— Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 222 sq., Ratisbonae 1881.— Bautz, Der Himmel, spekulativ dargestellt, Mainz 1881.—*Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 14-19. — Th. Conefry, The Beatific Vision, Longford 1907,— W. Hum- phrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,’ pp. 46 sqq., London 1897.— IneM, The One Mediator, pp. 296 sqq., London 1890.—Schniitgen, Die Visio Beatifica, Wirzburg 1867——*G. B. Tepe, S. J., Jn- stitut. Theol., Vol. Il, pp. 103 sqq., Parisiis 1895.— Scheeben, Die Mysterien des Christentums, 2nd ed., pp. 583 sqq., Frei- burg 18908— St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 12, and the commen- tators. 77 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., III, dist. 14, qu. 14. 78 Cfr. St. Thom., Comp. Theol., cap. 216. SECTION 3 EUNOMIANISM AND ONTOLOGISM The dogmas expounded in the two foregoing Sections have been attacked by two classes of opponents: (1) by those who deny the incom- prehensibility of God, either here on earth or in Heaven; and (2) by those who allege that the intuitive vision of God is proper to man even here on earth. To the first-mentioned class be- long the Eunomians, who pretended to an ade- quate comprehension of God here below (a for- tiort, of course, in Heaven). Prominent among the second class are the Ontologists, who claim that man has an immediate, intuitive knowledge of God even in this world. Fad oe RAEN 8B THE HERESY OF THE EUNOMIANS I. THE TEACHING oF EuNomius.—Eunomius, a pupil of Aétius, about A. D. 360, espoused the cause of strict Arianism and became the leader of the so-called Anomoeans, who, in order to emphasize their belief that the Logos was a crea- Loe 114 EUNOMIANISM ture, substituted for the ‘“‘épowvcov’’ of the semi- Arians the harsher term ‘‘évépov” (unlike). In the interest of Arianism, whose premises he car- ried to their legitimate conclusions, Eunomius soon added to his Trimtarian heresy a theological one by asserting that there is nothing in the God- head which can elude the grasp of human rea- son." The Eunomian heresy may be condensed into the following propositions: a) Human reason conceives God as ade- quately as He comprehends Himself. Accord- ing to St. Chrysostom,? Eunomius declared: “Deum sic novi, ut ipse Deus seipsum,’ which is merely a more pregnant formulation of the teaching of his master Aétius: “Tam Deum nOv1, sicut meipsum, imo non tantum novi meip- sum, quantum Deum.” * | | b) We acquire an adequate knowledge of the Divine Essence by forming the notion of “éye- vjoia’’ (uncreatedness), which perfectly expresses that Essence. By sophistically interchanging the terms “‘dyévyros” (uncreated, derived from “yiyvopa”) and “dyévvytos’”? (not generated, derived from “yevdo”) Eunomius infected the unsuspect- ing masses with two heretical errors. On the one hand, he discredited the Logos, Who, (he 1 Cfr. Alzog, Manual of Universal 8 Quoted by Epiphanius, Haer., Church History, English ed., vol. I, 76. Cfr. also Socrates, Hist. Eccl., p. 540, Cincinnati 1899. EV. 2 Hom. 2 De Incompr. Se a a nt wot haa SS SOT Oe et Oy Ba a en ie a Ae — ee . CRITICAL EstIMATE OF ForMALISM.—AI- though the Church has never officially pronounced against it, the formal distinction invented by the Scotists must be rejected as hair-splitting, un- justified, and dangerous. a) It is unjustified because it is an incon- ceivable hybrid which eludes every attempt of the mind to grasp it. The dichotomy of real and logical distinction has its roots deep down in the very principle of contradiction, for every true distinction must be conceived either as real or as not-real (i. e., existing only in the think- ing subject); and therefore it is as impossible to find room for a third member between the two, as it would be to establish an intermediary link between Yes and No. | b) But even if the logical possibility of a formal distinction were, for argument’s sake, conceded, what would theology gain thereby? Would not Formalism lead,—though not per- haps so straightway nor so evidently as Realism, _-to the same end, viz.: the destruction of God’s simplicity? For if, independently of and ante- cedently to the action of the mind, the jus- 17 Cfr. Kleutgen, Philos. d. Vor- alters, Vol. II, Mainz 1865; J. zeit, Vol. I, Abh. 25. Stéckl, Ge- Rickaby, General Metaphysics, pp» schichte der Philosophie des Mittel- 107 sqq. (Stonyhurst Series). 11 154 FORMALISM tice of God is not His mercy, this proposition, carried to its ultimate logical consequences, can only mean that the attribute of mercy is founded upon a different “reality” in God than the at- tribute of justice. What the Scotists call a “formalitas” thus ex subjecta materia becomes a reality. Different formalities, therefore, sup- pose as many varying realities. We will not here inquire into the applicability of Formalism to such creatures as are physically and meta- physically compound; in theology it plainly has no place, because the unique simplicity of the Divine Essence forbids all attempts to dissolve it. c) Finally, the arguments of the Scotist school, in so far at least as they apply to the dogmatic treatise on the nature and attributes of God, are absolutely unconvincing, For the logical necessity of defining mercy otherwise than justice, or necessity otherwise than liberty, and so forth, only proves that there co-exist in God perfections which, in spite of their concen- tration in one indivisible monad, offer to the thinking mind a basis for distinguishing sepa- rate, nay, even opposite excellencies (= distinctio virtualis). For the same reason the divine at- tributes cannot be negatived absolutely of one another, or of the Divine Essence, but must be predicated of each other in the same identical sense. St. Augustine exemplifies this truth as THE DIVINE ESSENCE Iss follows: “Una ergo eademque res dicitur, sive dicatur aeternus Deus, sive immortalis, sive incorruptibilis, sive tmmutabilis... . Bomtas etiam atque iustitia, numquid inter se in natura Dei, sicut in eius operibus distant, tamquam duae diversae sint qualitates Det, wna bonitas, alia iustitia? Non utique; sed quae iustitia, ipsa bonitas; et quae bonitas, ipsa beatitudo—lt iS one and the same thing, therefore, to call God eternal, or immortal, or incorruptible, or un- changeable... . Or do goodness, again, and righteousness, differ from each other in the nature of God, as they differ in His works, as though they were two diverse qualities of God —goodness one, and righteousness another? Certainly not; but that which is righteousness is also itself goodness; and that which is good- ness is also itself blessedness.” ** The younger Scotist school has diluted its Formalism so much that it now approaches the virtual distinction theory of the Thomists. It is not worth while to enter into a more detailed discussion of these subtleties. 18S, Aug., De Trinit., XV, 5, n. mat., Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 79 sqq- 7; Haddan’s translation, On the For a sharp critique of Formalism, Trinity, pp. 384, 385, Edinburgh vy. Gerson, Contra Vanam Curiosita- 1873.— Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- tem, lect. 1. SECTION 2 THE VIRTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOD’S ES- SENCE AND HIS ATTRIBUTES 1, Having rejected the Realistic, the Nomi- nalistic, and the Scotistic theories with regard to the distinction of God’s Essence from His at- tributes, as well as of these attributes among themselves, there remains but one other, vig.: that which asserts the distinctio virtualis. This is the theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, which has be- come sententia communis. Inasmuch as the ex- tremes, Realism and Nominalism, both lead to heresy, or at least come dangerously near it, Catholic theology must plainly seek a via media. We have seen that Scotistic Formalism cannot claim to be the golden mean. Hence we must adopt the Thomist view, which postulates a virtual distinction between God’s Essence and Flis attributes. What this means will be tea- sonably clear to the student who has read the first section of this chapter carefully. The subjoined quotation from St. Thomas? will elucidate the point even better: “Quod Deus excedat intel- lectum nostrum, est ex parte ipsius Dei propter 1 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., I, dist. 2, que 1, art. 3e 156 THE DIVINE ESSENCE 157 plenitudinem perfectionis eius, et ex parte intel- lectus nostri, qui deficienter se habet ad eam comprehendendam. Unde patet, quod pluralitas istarum rationum non tantum est ex parte mtel- lectus nostri, sed etiam ex parte tpsius Det, in- quantum sua perfectio superat unamquamque conceptionem nostri intellectus. Et ideo plural- tati istarum rationum respondet aliquid in re, quae Deus est; non quidem pluralitas ret, sed plena perfectio, ex qua contingit, ut omnes tstae conceptiones et aptentur.” 2. In order to gain a deeper understand- ing of the Thomistic distinctio virtualis, let us remember that it can be conceived in a twofold manner. Either the objective concept of one per- fection, which is (really) identical with its ob- ject, excludes that of another, which 1s also identical with the same object (as e. g. “sensu- ality” and “rationality” in man), and then we have a distinctio virtuals perfecta s. cum prae- cisione objectiva. Or the objective concept of one perfection includes the objective concept of the other, either formaliter or radicaliter (as e. g. “sensitive being’? and “substance,” the lat- ter being contained formally in the former; or “rational soul’ and “intellect,” of which the latter is contained radically in the former), and then the two are related to each other as an “im- cludens”’ to an “inclusum,’ and we have a dts- 158 THE VIRTUAL DISTINCTION tinctio virtualis imperfecta s. cum praecisione formal. The distinctio virtualis perfecta, inas- much as it implies real composition in its object (the notional indifference of the one perfection towards the other being an infallible index of their potentiality), cannot possibly be applied to God, Who is purest actuality (actus purissimus). Hence there must be posited between His Es- sence and His attributes a distinctio virtualis im- perfecta; which means that each separate at- tribute of God includes within itself formally His Essence, that His Essence includes within itself each separate divine attribute, and, finally, that each separate attribute notionally includes every other attribute.? REapIncs: —*S, Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 13, art. 4-5, 12.— IpeM, Contra Gent., I, 31-36 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 24 sqq., London 1905).— Suarez, De Div. Sub. eiusque Attrib., I, 10-14.— Petavius, De Deo I, 7-13.— *Gillius, De Essentia Det, tr. 6, cap. 6 sqq.— *Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit, 1. T., 2. Abh., 3." Hpst— W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 57 saq., London 1897.— Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 164 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899. 2 Suarez tried to demonstrate this mutual inclusion from God’s infin- ity. ‘Nam sapientia, v. gr., vel includitur in essentiali conceptu Dei vel non,” he says (De Deo, I, 11, 5). “ Si includitur, ergo praedica- tur essentialiter de illo, eademque ratio est de quolibet alio attributo vel perfectione absoluta, quae in Deo formaliter existat. St vero non includitur, ergo illud ens quod essentialiter est Deus, ex vi suae essentiae non est summe perfectum neque infinitum ens, quia non in- cludit in suo esse essentiali omnem perfectionem possibilem.” For a more detailed treatment of this point, see Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 69 sqq., Paris 1895. CHAPTER AT THE METAPHYSICAL ESSENCE OF GOD In order to come at the metaphysical essence of God, we must try to find among His many attributes one which fulfils four distinct require- ments: 1. It must be the first to be perceived (primum in cognitione). 2. It must signify God’s very being, not merely the status or mode of His being. 3. It must present a clean- cut distinction, after the analogy of an ultimate or specific difference, between God and every- thing that is not God. 4. It must be the taproot or a priori source of all the other divine at- tributes. As the Church has never defined in what the metaphysical essence of God consists, differences of opinion are permissible,—a right of which philosophers and theologians have lib- erally availed themselves. 159 SECTION 1 UNTENABLE THEORIES I. SURVEY OF THE F IELD.—Leaving aside for the moment aseity or self-existence, we find that three theories have been elaborated to solve the problem of defining the Divine Essence. a) The Nominalists held that the Essence of God was simply “the sum of His perfections” (cumulus omnium perfectionum), that is, the sum of all His attributes and perfections, whether known or unknown, quiescent or active, trans- cendental or predicamental, whether qualities of the intellect or of the will. They excluded only the divine Relations and Hypostases and ar- gued that, inasmuch as there are in God no accidents (ov8eByxdra) His attributes being strictly identical with His Essence,:—whatever is divine must eo ipso be part of the Divine Es- sence. | b) The Scotists pitched upon God’s infinity as that one among His attributes from which all others flow. They argued that since no attribute can be a truly divine perfection unless it is 1 V. supra, Chapter II. 160 THE DIVINE ESSENCE 161 stamped as it were with the seal of infinity, in- finity must be the one attribute in which all others are contained. By positing a radical in- stead of a formal infinity, several writers of this school managed to bring their theory into sub- stantial accord with that which makes self-exist- ence (aseitas) the fundamental attribute of God.* c) A considerable number of theologians of the Thomist school assigned intellectuality as the metaphysical Essence of God, some conceiv- ing this attribute as “absolute spirituality” (esse spiritum), others as formal intellectual activity (intellectio subsistens). It must be said in favor of this view that we can hardly imagine a more serviceable principle of distinction than absolute reason, inasmuch as this attribute neatly marks off the Divine Essence from matter and from created reason, and is at the same time the root from which all other vital attributes log- ically grow. 2. CRITICISM OF THESE THEORIES.—Neverthe- less these theories must all be rejected, either be- cause they do not meet the question squarely, or because they assume as God’s fundamental attribute some property which is not really the basic principle of His Divine Essence, but points to another still more fundamental. 2By “infinitas radicalis” they must necessarily enjoy all other understood that fundamental at- perfections, real and possible. tribute, in virtue of which God 162 UNTENABLE THEORIES a) The Nominalist solution does not solve the problem at all. The “sum of all divine per- fections” merely constitutes God’s real es- sence. ‘The question to be solved is, Which of the many qualities that make up God’s physical essence is the foundation or root of all the rest? Those writers of the Thomist school who take God’s metaphysical essence to be absolute spir- ituality, likewise evade the question, because absolute spirituality (including cognition and volition) formally constitute God’s Nature rather than His Essence. The essence of any thing is prior to its nature, nature being merely another name for essence viewed as the principle of operation. b) The remaining theories fail to comply with one or other of the four conditions laid down in the introductory paragraph of this Chapter. a) The Scotistic theory, which regards in- finity as God’s fundamental attribute, conforms to several of these conditions, but not to all. For infinity is neither the fundamental attrib- ute of God, nor is it the one which our mind perceives first (primum in cognitione). It is not the fundamental attribute, because aseity builds the logical bridge to infinity; and it is not the primum in cognitione, because infinity has its source elsewhere, namely, in the notion of aseity, atrovoia, actus purus. True, aseity can THE DIVINE ESSENCE 163 be logically deduced from infinity, but only by an a posteriori argument, concluding from the consequent to the antecedent, rather than vice versa. Now, it is plain that any attribute which must be conceived as the sequela rather than the source of other divine attributes, cannot claim to by the root principle of all others. B) There remains the theory of those Thomists * who define the metaphysical Essence of God as the activity or operation of the Di- vine Intellect (intellectio subsistens). It cannot be denied that God differs radically from all created beings by His absolute act of cognition. But He differs from them just as radically by several other absolute attributes, e. g., His eter- nity, immutability, immensity. Yet none of these can be said to constitute His metaphysical Es- sence. Hence underlying all these attributes there must manifestly be still another, from which the whole series derive their incommuni- cability. Besides it is an error to look upon intellectio subsistens as the basic attribute of God from which all others spring. For while it may be possible to derive from it @ priors a whole group of new properties, such as omni- science, wisdom, etc.; yet there are other neces- sary attributes of the divine Essence that can- not be derived from intellectio subsistens, and -3Gonet, Billuart, Salmanticenses. 164 UNTENABLE THEORIES which in turn must therefore be conceived as the fruit of a most comprehensive perfection of being, (viz.: the actus purus), rather than as the fount and origin of all other attributes. The in- telugere subsistens necessarily presupposes the esse subsistens as its ontological and logical prin- ciple.* 4Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 4, art. 2: “Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens, ex quo opor- tet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat.” For more detailed information, consult Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 125 sqq., Ratisbonae 1881. SECTION 2 ASEITY THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF GOD 1. THE Notion or AseEItTy.—Aseity (aseitas, from ens a se) is that divine attribute in virtue of which God exists by Himself, in Himself, and through Himself. In English it is generally called “self-existence.” + Opposed to the ens a se as its contrary is the ens ab alio, 1. é., a be- ing whose existence and essence are derived from an extraneous being. The created universe, as a whole and in all its parts, is thus conditioned. Hence we might, if we were allowed to coin a new word, designate as its fundamental quality “abaliety,’—that notion of created being which is most directly contrary to the metaphysical Es- sence of God the Creator.’ a) In its purely etymological sense, aseity denominates not the divine Essence, but its mode or status, vizg.: that it has no cause (ens a se = ens non ab alio). But we need only to analyze the concept of aseity or self-existence to find that 1Cfr. Hunter, Outlines of Dog- Author of Nature and the Super- matic Theology, 11, pp. 54-55, Lon- satural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916. don 1894. 2Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God _ the 165 166 THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE besides this negative it also contains a positive note, in virtue of which aseity expands and de- velops into the notion of being pure and simple (esse simpliciter, esse subsistens, ipsum esse) or pure actuality (actus purissimus),—all synony- mous terms, denoting the absoluteness of the divine being. Thus aseity becomes atrovota pure and simple, 7. ¢., identity of existence and es- sence. For in Him who does not derive His be- ing from another but possesses it of Himself, ex- istence and essence must coincide.® Here the enormous difference between Divine Being and created being again becomes manifest. God is being, the creature has being,— either this or that, such or another. God is pure transcendent being; the crea- ture is limited to the one or other category of being. If we hold them together, they are not only not com- mensurable, but, strictly speaking, cannot even be com- pared, inasmuch as the notion of being is predicated of God in an entirely different sense than of His creatures. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) defines: “ Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo no- tart, quin inter eos maior dissimilitudo sit notanda.” 4 Hence being does not represent a common genus in which God and creatures coincide. The concept of being in its proper sense (proprie et princtpaliter) ap- plies to God alone; to the creatures only improperly and analogically (improprie et analogice)—a relation which finds its most pregnant expression in the Biblical 3Cfr. S. Thom., S$. Theol., 1a, 4 Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. “ Dam- qu. 18, art. 3, ad 2: “Deus est namus.” ipsum suum esse? THE DIVINE ESSENCE 167 designation of the creature as “ something which is not ‘i or “ non-being ” (pa év).? b) In order to gain a deeper understanding of aseity, it is necessary to avoid two serious misconceptions into which even a trained thinker is liable to fall, viz.: confounding self-existence with self-realization on the one hand; and, on the other, absolute being with abstract being. a) It is a mistake to take aseity or atrovota to mean self-realization.2 This misconception was probably occa- sioned by the Scholastic use of the phrase “ causa sm,” as synonymous with “ens a se.” The phrase was ill chosen. The Schoolmen do not mean that God causes Himself (causa sui efficiens), but, on the contrary, they use the term causa sui precisely for the purpose of de- nying that the first cause is in need, or capable, of being caused by some other, ulterior cause, extrinsic or intrinsic (causa sui formalis). St. Jerome says: “ Deus ipse sus origo est suaeque causa substantiae,’* but he speaks metaphorically, as does St. Anselm when he declares: “ Quomodo ergo tandem esse intelligenda est per se et ex se [divina substantia], si nec ipsa se fecit nec tpsa sibi materia extitit nec ipsa se quolibet modo, ut quod non erat esset, adiuvit, nisi forte eo modo intelligendum videtur, quo dicitur, quia lux lucet per seipsam et ex seipsa?” ® The theory here under consideration runs counter to both the law of causality and the principle of contradiction. The law of causality, far from de- manding that it be applied to God, halts before the & Cfr. Wisdom XI, 23; Is. XL, 7In Eph., Ill, 14. 15 8 St. Anselm, Monol., cap. 6. 6 Ginther, Kuhn, Schell. 168 THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE causa prima incausata. He Who carries the reason for (not the cause of) His existence within Himself, neither requires an extrinsic cause, nor does he produce Him- self; for either the one or the other would presuppose a potentiality towards a reality not yet (logically) ex- isting, which would contradict the notion of aseity.® The notion that God causes Himself is likewise repugnant to the principle of contradiction. For, in order to cause itself a being would have to be conceived as being in order to be able to posit itself ; that is to say, it would exist before it had caused itself ; in other words, it would exist before it came into existence, which is absurd.° B) A second error, far worse than the first, is to confuse absolute being (ens a sé). with abstract being (ens universale), to which the philosophers sometimes apply the name of “ pure being.” According to Hegel “pure being” is that which, as yet absolutely vacuous and undetermined, awaits its realization ; it is only when the dialectical process reaches its apex that nothing develops into the plenitude of being. Now, the pure being of God must not be confounded either with Hegel’s “ pure being” or with the abstract being which forms the subject-matter of ontology. A comparison Ratisbon 1874. Also Gill, De Es- sentia atque Unitate Dei, lib. i We tract. 1, c. 3: “Deus non est a 9Cfr. Henry of Gent, Summa, Ila, art. 21, qu. 5: “Cum argui- tur, quod Deus non habet esse a se, quia [secus] esset causa sui tpsius, dicendum quod verum est, st haberet esse a se principiative [= efficienter]; hoc enim est impos: sibile, quia nihil est principiativum sui ipsius; formaliter tamen bene est possibile aliquid habere esse a se, ut dictum est. [Habet ‘enim esse ex hoc, quod est forma et actus purus.]”’ 10 Cir. Glossner, Dogmatik I, 64; sé causaliter ullo genere causalita- tis; nam nihil potest esse sibi causa essendi: omnis quippe causa est prior causato, at idem se ipso prius et posterius esse repugnat.’ For further details, consult Chr. Pesch, lc, pp. 64 sqq.3 Ipem, Theolo: gische Zeitfragen, Freiburg 1900}; L. Janssens, O. S. B., De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 229 sqq. Friburgi 1900. eS THE DIVINE ESSENCE 169 will bring out the difference between them. Pure being in God, and abstract being as a metaphysical conception, are logically distinct both in comprehension and exten- sion. Absolute Being, though the smallest in extension,. has the widest and fullest comprehension. Abstract being has no comprehension at all outside of the nude note of abstract being (esse), and for this reason the term is exceedingly wide in extension, as it can be predicated of every sort of possible and real being. The two notions differ also with regard to the man- ner of their origin. While the concept of abstract be- ing is formed by simple abstraction, that of Divine Being is the result of a syllogistic process. They differ thirdly in their mode of existence. Divine Be- ing is real, individual, personal; while abstract be- ing has no formal existence except in the abstracting mind; in the things themselves it exists only funda- mentally, and hence it is no real being at all, still less a personality. They differ finally in their properties. True, “simplicity ” and “ transcendence” are predicated of both, but in an essentially different sense. Abstract being, like a mathematical point, is simple only by virtue of its vacuity and logical incompositeness ; while Abso- lute Being is called simple, because, though possessed of an infinite plenitude of being, it is ontologically in- divisible. Again, abstract being is merely a transcen- dental concept, while God is a transcendental being, 1. é., a substance existing far above all genera, species, and individuals. _c) To prepare the ground for a scientific division of the divine attributes, to be made later, it will be useful to turn our attention to the twofold aspect presented by aseity in its full signification of atrovota or actus ‘ 11 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, De Fide, can. 4 2 170 ASEITY A TRUE ATTRIBUTE purus. We distinguish in it a static and a dynamic side, each of which can be taken as the source of a number of divine attributes, As ens a se, God is not only pure being, but also pure activity; not only pro- found repose, but also sheer motion. Both these mo- menta mysteriously coincide in the concept of actus purissimus, and our mind is led up to them spon- taneously by the same logical process by which it as- cends to a knowledge of the existence of God from the contemplation of nature. The argument from the con- tingency of the cosmos and that called argumentum ex gradibus point mainly to the absolute being, while the argument from motion, that from causality, and that called teleological, accentuate rather the absolute life of the First Cause. It is in these two aspects of aseity that we have the underlying foundation for two classes of divine attributes, viz.: attributes of being and attributes of life. 2. ASEITY A TRUE ATTRIBUTE OF Gop.—Both Holy Scripture and Tradition teach that aseity is an attribute proper to God, and to God alone.” a) The argument from Sacred Scripture is based upon the revealed name of God, Yahweh. Ex. III, 14 sqq.: “Ego sum qui sum. . Sic dices filus Israel: Qui est (6 4v), misit me ad vos.... Dominus "2, Deus patrum ves- trorum ... misit me ad vos: hoc nomen mihi est in aeternum—I am who am.... Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is, hath sent me to you.... The Lord 12 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, De Fide, cap. z. THE DIVINE ESSENCE 171 God of your fathers . . . hath sent me to you: This is my name for ever.” ** Modern exe- getes take M2 as merely expressing God’s fi- © delity in keeping His promises. But this view is contradicted by Jehovah’s own interpretation of His name, and runs counter to the whole Jewish and Christian Tradition. Of course, fi- delity necessarily follows from self-existence. But God is not called ™?% because He is faith- ful; He is faithful because He is ens a se.'* Nu- merous paraphrases of aseity are found in the Apocalypse. Cfr., e. g., XXII, 13: “Ego sum a et », primus et novissimus, principum et finis (6 mpdros kot & goxatos, 4 adpxy Kat 76 rédos )— am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the be- ginning and the end.” *° b) Tradition elucidates and confirms the above-quoted texts from Holy Scripture. Greg- ory of Nazianzus explains the appellation 6 dv as follows: “Quia totum esse (Srov 7d vat) in ipso collocandum est, a quo cetera habent, ut sint—The totality of Being must be embodied in Him from Whom everything else derives its being.’”’ Gregory’s famous description of aseity ‘as “an immense ocean of being’ ’* was taken 13 Cfr, Is. XLII, 8: “ Ego yn’ I the Lord, I am the first and the 3c) hoc est nomen meum.” last.” Detailed Scriptural proof 14 Cfr, Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, PD. apud Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 120. 22. i 18 Cfr, Is, XLT, 4: “Ego MM, 6 Or., 45: “oléy re wédaryos primus et novissimus ego sum— obalas &meipov Kal ddpioror.” 172 SELF-EXISTENCE over literally by St. John of Damascus into his treatise De Fide Orthodoxa."* Hilary gives us a beautiful paraphrase of airovola, when he says: “Ipse est, qui quod est non aliunde est, im sese est, secum est, ad se est, suus sibi est.” 18 3. ASEITY THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF Gopv.—The more general and more ancient opin- ion among theologians favors the view that aseity constitutes the metaphysical essence of God. Hence we shall act prudently in adopting this theory, especially since it is well founded in Holy Scripture and Tradition, and can be de- fended with solid philosophical arguments, a) Sacred Scripture defines MM as 6 ov, and it would seem, therefore, that this definition is en- titled to universal acceptance. Now, God Him- self (Ex. III, 14) interprets His proper name Nn as “Sum qui sum—éys ey 6 dv,” that is, 1 am He who is, 7. e., I am Being itself, Consequently being, atroveia, self-existence, is the signature of the Divine Essence. This interpretation, based as it is upon the literal meaning of mm , ex- plains not only the ineffability of the Tetragram- maton,” but likewise its absolute incommunica- bility to creatures, inasmuch as the essential proper name of a person is of its very nature 17 De Fide Orth., I, 9. 19 Cfr. Ex, III, 13 sqq. 18 Tract. in Ps., 2, n. 13. Addi, 20V. supra, pp. 135 sq. tional texts quoted by Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, I, §160. THE DIVINE ESSENCE 173 incommunicable. Hence aseity denotes the very essence of the Godhead and differentiates it sharply from every thing that is not divine." The Old Testament definition of "7 also proves the statement, made a little further up in our text, that the aseity of God must not be con- ceived as inert or dead being, but as living, per- sonal activity. For God does not say: "Bye cu 7d dv, but 6 dv == “He Who is, not “het which is.” The Hebrew text brings out the idea still more clearly. After explaining His Essence and His name by declaring: “Fgo sum qui sum? (AAR WR TN), He commands Moses to tell the children of Israel, not: eae who is (Sept., 6 6v; Vulg., qua est) has sent me to you,” but far more trenchantly: ‘“The ‘I am’ (the ™8) has sent me to you.” 2. This araé Aeysuevov has led not a few Scholastics to enter- tain the false notion that the verbal form used here as a substantive is another divine name quite distinct from ™™. “It is perfectly proper and quite correct,’ observes Oswald,” ‘‘to designate God’s essence as 79 8v or 79 évrws 6v; but it is more appropriate to call Him é 4v, because by this term He is described as a personal and intellectual be- ing; besides, 6 4 (MIS) gives the best and most 21-Cfr, Deut. XXXII, 39 sqq5 23 Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, p. Is. XLIV, 6. 76. 3 22 Ex. III, 14. 174 SELF-EXISTENCE complete answer to the question: What js God ?” b) The Fathers, too, treated aseity, or self-existence, as a real and fundamental attribute of the Divine Essence. Contemplating the profundity of the name Yahweh, Hilary exclaims: “ Admiratus sum plane tam absolutam de Deo significationem. ... Non enim aliud proprium magis Deo quam esse intelligitur.” #* Gregory of Nyssa, arguing against Eunomius, insists upon aérov- gia as a divinely revealed note of God’s essence (in contradistinction to dyewnota): “If Moses has incor- porated in the Law an essential note of true Divinity, it is to know of God that He is Being; as is proved by the effatum: I am who am.” 244. St. Jerome suc- cinctly declares: “Deus solus essentiae vere nomen tenet... ego sum qui sum.” ® Profoundly as is his wont St. Augustine observes: “Non est ibi nisi est. --. Ego sum qui sum. Tu diceres: Ego sum, quis? Caius. Alius, Lucius. ... Ego [Deus] sum. Quis? qui sum. Hoc est nomen tuum, hoc est totum quod vocaris.” ®® No one has described the fundamental at- tribute of God more graphically than St, Bernard: “Quid est Deus? Non sane occurrit melius quam qui est. Hoc ipse de se voluit respondere: qui est, misit me ad vos. Merito quidem... . Si bonum, si magnum, st beatum, si sapientem vel quidquid tale de Deo dixeris, in hoc verbo imstauratur, quod est Est.’ 27 c) Philosophy supports the Scriptural and Traditional argument by demonstrating that 24'De Trin, 1.1,)D. ss." 27 De Consid., V, 6. Cfr. also 24a Contr. Eunom., I, 8. S. Anselm., Monol., c. Spun) Bess 25 Ep. 15 ad Damasum, n. 4. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 165 1a0ts 26 In Ps., 1ro1, serm. 2. II. THE DIVINE ESSENCE 178 aseity alone among all of God’s attributes com- plies with the four conditions enumerated above.”* To begin with, aseity or self-existence, as theodicy shows, is the first of the divine attributes to be perceived by the thinking mind. Secondly, taken in its full com- prehension as adrovoia, aseity reveals to us not only the mode or state of God’s Essence, but that Essence itself. “Ouum esse Dei sit ipsa etus essentia,’ observes Aquinas,?° “ manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc [scil.: qui est] maxime proprie nominat Deum.” In the third place, unlike the so-called communicable attributes, aseity differentiates God primarily and essentially from every thing that is not-God, while the other incommunica- ble attributes are incommunicable to creatures precisely because they are rooted in aseity. Finally, aseity is the fount and origin of all the other divine attributes. fay Thomas deduces all divine perfections from the con- cept of the actus purus.*° 4. ATTRIBUTES DERIVED IMMEDIATELY FROM Gov’s AsEITy are all those divine perfections which refer to God’s mode of existence and His knowability. a) God’s inoriginateness, independence, and necessity, are merely different names for His aseity or self-ex- istence. The first-mentioned perfection (not to be con- founded with the innascibilitas of the Father as the first Person of the Blessed Trinity) results from the fact that God, in virtue of His self-existence, has no efficient cause outside Himself (ens non ab alio). In 28 Supra, p. 159- caea, pp. 283 sdq., Friburgi 18933 29 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 13, art. 11. Stentrup, Synopsis de Deo Uno, pp. 30 Cfr, Hontheim, S. J., Theodi- 51 saqq., Oeniponte 1895. 176 SELF-EXISTENCE this same fact are also rooted His independence (in- dependentia) from all extrinsic factors, and His neces- sity (necessitas), which flows from aseity in so far as a Being that exists by virtue of its own essence, exists necessarily (non potest non esse). b) The three attributes of invisibility (invisibilitas), incomprehensibility (incomprehensibilitas), and ineffa- bility (ineffabilitas), which have reference to the know- ableness of God, are likewise founded upon his aseity Or avrovoia. Scheeben says: “Precisely because the notion of essential being penetrates to the very depth of the Godhead, its mode of expression is the most imper- fect, and its content, more than that of any other human concept, remains dffyros, ineffabilis, unutterable. Hence the holy dread which surrounded the name Jehova among the Jews and kept them from employing it or giving it utterance.” ** For the same reason the Fathers referred to God ‘not only ‘as’ the aérovcws ahd the mrep- ovows, but likewise as the dvdvows or essence-less one. Reapincs:—S. Thom., S. Theol., Ia, qu. 13, art. 11—IpEM, Contra Gentiles, I, 21-24 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 16 sqq. London 1905).— Thomassin, De Deo, J. IIT, cap,’ 21— 24.— Petavius, De Deo, 1. III, cap. 6— D’Aguirre, Theologia S. Anselmi, disp. 24.— Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, Bad. i Abh. 5, Bd. II, Abh. 9.— Ine, Theologie der Vorzeit, T. 1, Abh. 2, Hpst. 6—*Gillius, De Essentig atque Unitate Dei, Lugdun. 1610.— D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino, pp. 106 sqq., Dublinii 1909.— W. Humphrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 59 saq., London 1897. 81 Dogmatik, I, 502. PART III THE DIVINE PROPERTIES OR ATTRIBUTES In our imperfect human way of thinking we are led to conceive the divine properties or attributes as forms enveloping the already constituted essence after the man- ner of qualities. But our judgment proceeds to correct this inadequate conception by insisting on the absolute identity of God’s attributes with His Essence.* The Fathers speak of the divine attributes as proprietates (iSépara) or ea circa Dewm (ra mept @cdv), as dignitates (détar, d€uspara), or rationes (vonpara, ériAoyiopol), OF as virtutes (dperat) or mores (émirnSedpara). More important than this nomenclature is the ques- tion how these attributes are to be divided. The most common classifications are: First, negative attributes (attributa negativa, apaiperixd, aropatixa), and affirmative attributes (atiributa affirmativa, s. positiva, KaTapatiKd ) . This division is based on the different modes in which we acquire a knowledge of these attributes, some being conceived by the negative method,? others by the positive method or that of supereminence.? This classification has its roots deep down in our creatural knowledge of God, and must therefore be considered. fundamental. There is a second classification, viz.; into incommunicable (attributa incommunicabilia) and communicable attributes (attributa communicabilia). This coincides materially 1 V. supra, Part II, Ch. II, § 2. 3 V. supra, p. 69 saq. 2V. supra, p. 70. 177 178 HOW DIVIDED with the first, inasmuch as the negative qualities of God, expressing as they do a fundamental contrast between Him and His creatures, cannot be communicated to any being outside of God; while in His affirmative perfec- tions (both in the order of nature and of grace), crea- tures may be allowed to share. Since, however, it is more difficult to draw a hard and fast line between com- municability and incommunicability, than between affir- mation and negation (even certain negative attributes, as, €. g., unchangeableness, are communicable, in a degree, by grace; the only really and absolutely in- communicable attribute is aseity), we do not consider it advisable to classify the divine attributes according to this principle of division. A favorite division is that into quiescent (at- tributa quiescentia, avevepyyré) and operative at- tributes (attributa operativa, évepyyt«é), accord- ing as we conceive God in His being or in His operation (nature). In making this distinction, however, we must never forget that God’s Es- sence is pure actuality and His actuality is pure being.’ As this classification brings out the two aspects of aseity already referred to, vig.: the static and the dynamic, we consider it better adapted than any other to facilitate a scientific study of the divine attributes. We therefore divide the divine attributes into attributes of be- ing and attributes of operation. All being may be reduced partly to the five 4V. supra, p. 170. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 179 a "transcendental categories, viz.. ens, unum, verum, bonum, pulchrum; partly to the ten pre- - dicables: substance, quality, quantity, relation, _ place, time, posture, habiliment, action and pas- -sion.® Accordingly we shall divide the divine Petiributes of being into transcendental, and cate- ae or predicamental. 8 Cfr. P. Coffey, Ontology, London 1914, pp. 114 Sqaq., 207 sqq. CHAPTER I GOD’S TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF BEING SECTION 1 ABSOLUTE PERFECTION AND INFINITY The term being (ens) includes in its signification both existence (existere) and essence (esse, essentia). We have treated of the existence of God in the first part of this volume. Here we are considering the Divine Ens in its essence. God’s proper essence (essentia metaphysica), as we have seen, consists in aseity (abrov- gia) or self-existence. Therefore there remain to be considered only perfection and infinity, as special at- tributes flowing from the divine ens. ARTICGUE a GOD’S PERFECTION I, PRELIMINARY OssERVATIONS.—‘“‘Perfect” etymologically means that which is finished, to which nothing can be added (réAewv, from réAos ==an end accomplished). In this sense perfec- tion connotes fieri, development. More specif- ically, perfection signifies the accomplished end or state itself (7eAeérys), as the possession and 180 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 181 enjoyment of goods obtained. It is in this nar- rower sense that we apply the term to God." But even within these circumscribed limits the con- cept of perfection admits of degrees. In the first place all being, considered as being, is necessarily perfect. The degree of a thing’s being is also the measure ‘of its perfection, while, conversely, not-being furnishes the measure of imperfection? In a higher sense, how- ever, perfection denotes the sum total of all those ex- cellences which a being ought to have in considera- tion of its nature and end. The absence of even one of these (essential or integral) excellences constitutes a privation (privatio,. orépnos), a concept which coincides with that of evil (e. g., blindness, eternal damnation). In its highest sense, lastly, perfection means the pos- session and fruition of all the aforementioned excel- lences, not only in a large, but in an extraordinary measure. Thus supernatural or eternal bliss means, for man, the state of highest consummation or achieve- ment, and Mary, the Mother of God, is the beau idéal of a human being, surpassed only by Christ Himself (in His human nature). It goes without saying that between divine and crea- ted perfection—even taking the latter in its highest sense — there yawns a chasm as immense as that which separates the ens a se from the ens ab alio. For, while the creature acquires all its perfections through cre- ation and development, God possesses His own of, from, and through Himself. He is adroreAns, essentially and originally perfect. Again, while creaturely perfection 4Cfr. S., Thom., Contra Gent., qu. 5, art. 1: “In tantum est per- I, 28. fectum unumquodque, inquantum 2Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, est actu.” 182 PERFECTION. is limited to certain well-defined categories, God, on the other hand— as zavredfs, all-perfect — unites within Himself every existing and every conceivable perfection. Finally, while the measure and end of creaturely per- fection is outside of and above the creature, God car- ries the measure and end of His perfections within His own Essence, as a centre from which He communicates excellencies to His creatures; in other words, He is vmepteAns, more-than-per fect. 2. THE Docmatic Proor.—That God is orig- inally perfect, all-perfect, and more-than-perfect, is an article of faith. “Deum... intellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitum—lInfinite in intelligence, in will, and in all perfection.” ? » a) We find all three of the characteristic modes of perfection attributed to the Deity in Sacred Scripture. That God is original or archetypal perfection, follows not only from the name 7? which He Himself has revealed as signifying His essence,’ but is expressly taught in the Gospel of St. Matthew: “ “Ecco otv ipeis réde101, dorep 6 maTyp vpov 6 ovpdrvos Tédewds eoTw-—Be ye therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect,” which the Fourth Lateran Council interprets as fol- lows: “Estote perfecti perfectione gratiae, sicut Pater vester coelestis perfectus est perfectione naturae.”° Note also those passages of Holy 3 Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, De Fide, 5 Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. “ Dam- cap. 1. namus.”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, En- 4 Cfr. our remarks on His aseity, chiridion, n. 432.) supra. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 183 Writ which emphasize the divine self-sufficiency, ase. ¢3 Rom. XI, 35: “Quis prior dedit wh et retribuetur ei?—Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?” °—Being all-perfect, God is the exemplar and the catise of all created perfections, which He comprises within Himself in their highest purity. 4 Ke- este) X LITE aol) ite ner conyy airds—The sum of our words is: He is all.” Rom. A260: Or, @& adrod Kal dv avrov nah es abdtov Ta mavtra—Hor of him, and by him, and in him, are all things.” Out of His inexhaustible fund of being, there- fore, God draws the concepts of created things and bestows upon them all the perfections of their being. Ps. XCIII, 9: “Oui plantavit aurem non audiet, aut qui finxit oculum non considerat?—He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? or he that formed the eye, doth he not consider?”7° The superabundance of di- vine perfection, finally, so elowingly described ty eclic. s&s LIL. 20. sag, is apt. to inspire rational creatures with fear: “Terribilis Do- minus et magnus vehementer et mirabilis potentia ipsius — The Lord is terrible, and exceeding ereat, and his power is admirable.” Here no univocal comparison between the Creator and the creature is possible, becatise we have no e Chr Us! Xba tas Pe AV, 23 Acts’ XVII, 253°." 7Cfr. Is. LXVI, ~9. 184 PERFECTION common standard by which to measure their respective perfections. Cfr. Is. XL, LAL nations are before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to him as nothing and vanity.” b) The Fathers resolved divine perfection into its various momenta, and found that it con- tains all creatural perfections in their most highly sublimated form. Hence the golden rule formulated by St. Ambrose: & “Quidquid religiosius sentiri potest, qguidquid praestan- tius ad decorem, quidquid sublimius ad potestatem, hoc intelligas Deo convenire.’ St. Bernard has the follow- ing beautiful passage:® “Non quod longe ab unoquo- que sit, qut esse omnium est, sine quo omnia nihil. Sane esse omnium dixerim, non quia illa sunt quod tlle, sed quia ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia.” The philosophical proof for God’s perfection rests partly on aseity as the taproot of all divine perfections, and partly on the arguments for God’s existence. Among these the profound argumentum ex gradibus per- fectionum, unfortunately too much neglected now-a- days,*° shows God to be the ens perfectissimum. St. Thomas ™ proves this as follows: “Deus est ipsum. esse per se subsistens, ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi im se contineat.... Secundum hoc enim ali- qua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent, unde sequitur quod nullius rei perfectio Deo desit.” 8 De Fide, I, 16. 11S, Theol., 1a, qu. 3, art. 2. 9 Serm. In Cant., 4. 12 Cfr. S. Schiffini, S. J., Disput. 10S. Theol., 1a, qu. -3,. art. 3: Metaphys. Spec. Vol. I, disp. 2, “Quarta via; ”’ Contra Gent. II, 15. sect. 1, August. Taur. 1888. sh THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 185 3, How THE CREATED PERFECTIONS ARE Con- TAINED IN Gop.—All creaturely perfections must be somehow contained in God, because He is the all-perfect and more-than-perfect Being. But how are they contained in the Divine Essence? It is quite plain that finite perfections cannot be attributed to God until they have been put through a refining process. Since the time of St. Anselm,}* theologians have been wont to distinguish two classes of divine perfections — viz.: pure or simple, and mixed perfections (perfectiones simplices — perfectiones mixtae s. secundum quid). The former in their form and concept exclude all imperfec- tion, so that they contain nothing but “ pure” perfection (as e. g., spirituality, wisdom) ; while the latter are per- fections with an admixture of imperfection (as, ¢. 9., matter, the faculty of drawing conclusions). St. Anselm appropriately defines a pure perfection as “ melius ipsum quam non ipsum,” a mixed perfection as “ melius non ipsum quam ipsum.” Thus, measured by the absolute standard, spirit is better than non-spirit or body ; while, conversely, corporeity is “ not-better * than, 7. e., inferior to, spirituality. a) These considerations furnish the key to the question how both kinds of perfection are contained in the Divine Essence. The pure perfections, inasmuch as they can be notionally intensified to an infinite degree, are contained in God formally; the mixed perfections, on the 13 Cfr. Monol., c. 143, Proslog., C. 5- 13 186 PERFECTION other hand, are in Him virtually and eminently only." It is easy to see the reason for this, For, as the formal attribution of the pure perfections is founded in the fact that they signify nothing but perfec- tion, so the concept of a mixed perfection postulates that it be first put through a process of logical re- finement (which takes place by means of negation) be- fore it can be applied to God. E. g., 1f there were such a thing as infinite contrition, we should not be justified in predicating it formaliter of God, because the very concept of contrition implies sin, which is an im- perfection. b) It remains to be determined how one thing may be virtually and eminently contained in an- other. God contains all mixed perfections virtually or equiva- lently (virtus — valor), inasmuch as He is their ideal or exemplar (causa exemplaris). But He also contains the mixed perfections after the manner of a cause contain- ing its effects, inasmuch as He creates them, or is able to create them, out of nothing (virtus = potentia ac- tiva). ‘Thus material light is contained in God virtually, because He is both its exemplary and its creative cause. Eminent containment involves three elements: first, the necessity of previous purification by means of negation ; second, elevation to a different and higher mode of being; and third, absolute identification of one perfec- tion with all the others. A mixed perfection cannot 14 Hence the theological axiom: formaliter, mixtae autem tantum “ Perfectiones simplices sunt in Deo virtualiter et eminenter.” THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 187 be formally predicated of God, unless it has been properly ‘refined by negation (¢. g., God is incorporeal). But even after it has been so purified, a form cannot exist ‘n God in its creatural mode (¢. g., as filling space) ; but must be elevated to a higher mode of existence (@. 9., omnipresence). Since, however, this divine attribute is not to be conceived as an accident, but as a substance, it ‘must in the last analysis be identical not only with God’s essence, but with all His other perfections, the pure as well as the mixed:— It is’ easy to, see that there is an intrinsic connexion between the two modes of presence, the virtual and the eminent. They partly complement and partly condition each other. Eminent presence is no doubt the more comprehensive of the two, wherefor some theologians © confine themselves to the thesis; ‘‘ The mixed perfections are contained in God eminenter.” It is in this sense that we must in- terpret the following curious proposition taught by Car- dinal Nicholas of Cusa: “ Deus est complicatio om- nium” (namely, non formaliter, sed eminenter). c) The proposition that the mixed perfections are in God virtualiter et emimenter only, must not, however, be taken to mean that the pure perfections are 101 So contained in Him. In mat- ter of fact the pure perfections no less than the mixed, are virtually and eminently in Him, the only difference being that the former are form- ally attributable, while the latter are not. But even this is not true without some limitation. For inasmuch as the perfectio simplex, too, is invariably 15 Among them Lessius and Kleutgen. + Fe 188 7 PERFECTION an abstractive and analogical conception derived from created things, it is congenitally affected by a creatural mode involving imperfection, This can be removed only by way of negation or intensification.1* On the other hand, it would be a Serious mistake were we to rely for our knowledge of God solely upon an analysis of the simple or pure perfections, neglecting the per- fectiones mixtae. The mixed perfections are equally helpful to a true knowledge of God, first, because they are ektypa or likenesses, and secondly, because they are effects (effectus) of God. As ektypa or likenesses they suggest a corresponding archetype (causa exem- plaris), while as effects they point to an efficient cause. sy It is in intimate connexion with these truths that the a Schoolmen teach, that all creatures bear the stamp of God’s likeness; though not, of course, in the same man- _ mer or to the same extent. The irrational creatures are as it were God’s footprints (vestigia), while those en- dowed with reason are true images of Him," 4. A PanrTHetstic OBJECTION.—Against the doctrine set forth above Pantheists object that “God plus the universe” must obviously be more perfect than “God minus the universe,” If this objection means that God and the uni- verse are two separate and distinct beings (plura entia), Pantheism simply reverses itself. If, contrariwise, it means that from an addition of creaturely perfections and divine perfections 16.V, supra, pp. 70. *‘The Vestiges of God in Creation,” tn Otr, S. Theol., ta, qu. 93; and see M. Ronayne, S., J., God Know- Janssens’ commentary, De Deo Uno, able and Known, Chap. IV, 2nd tom. I, p. 250, Friburgi, 1900, On ed., New York 1902. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 189 there restilts a higher degree of being (plus entis), the Pantheists forget that God and the universe cannot be added together, because divine Being belongs to an altogether different order than creatural being. It is only homogeneous things, objects of the same kind, that admit of addition. Now, the concept of being applies to God in its proper sense, to creatures only analo- gously. Therefore, “God plus the universe” is a sum that can not be added. Besides, all crea- tural perfections, both pure and mixed, are in matter of fact already present in God, either for- maliter or virtualiter et eminenter, in a plenitude which is infinite, and with a reality concentrated in the highest degree. Were we to attempt, ¢. £., to blend the corporeal perfections of the material world with the immanent perfections of God, in order to obtain a third being superior to God Himself, the attempt would not result in a higher form of perfection, just as little as if we should try to “improve” human reason by amalgamating it, by some intrinsic process, with what 1s wrongly called animal intelligence. In either case we should simply deteriorate the grade of perfection. As little as “Dante plus the Divina Commedia,” or “Michelangelo plus The Last Judgment,” constitute a higher perfection than either Dante or Michelangelo alone—a work of art obviously derives all its merits from the artist 190 INFINITY —just so little, and even less, can “God plus the universe” be said to constitute a higher degree of being than God alone minus the world of creatures,’® RbADINGS : — *Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 71 (summarized in Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, pp. 177-179).— Heinrich, Dog- mat. Theologie, Vol. I, § 163.— *Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 163 sqq— S. Thom., S$. Theol., 1a, qu. 4.— IbeM, Contra Gentiles, I, 28, 29 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 22 sq.).— Pe- tavius, De Deo, VI, 7.— W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Ma jesty,” pp. 74 sqq., London 1897.— F. Aveling, The God of Philosophy, pp. IOI sqq., London 1906, ARTICLE 2 GOD'S INFINITY 1. THE Notion oF Inrinity.—Finite’ we call that which has limits or an end (finis, Spos) ; “infinite” (infinitum, 4zepov) is that which is un- limited or endless. a) A being can be infinite in one of two ways; either potentially (infinitum potentiale) or actually (infinitum actuale). The latter is called infinitum categorematicum, the former, infinitum syncategorematicum, Infinity of the last-mentioned kind is merely the susceptibility of be- ing multiplied or increased indefinitely (indefinitum). What is indefinite, is not therefore infinite, but merely, in the phrase of the Schoolmen, “sine fine finitum.” That which is actually infinite (infinitum categoremati- cum), on the other hand, is absolutely limitless; it is 18 Cfr. Suarez, Metaphys. Disput., sénlichkeit Gottes und thre modernen 28, sect. 3; J. Uhlmann, Die Per- Gegner, pp. 56 saqq., Freiburg 1906, THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 191 really infinite in the proper sense of the term. Leaving aside the vagaries of Hegel,*? we must say that, al- though the actually infinite (infinitum categorematicum) is the only real infinite, the potentially infinite (infimtum syncategorematicum Ss, indefinitum ) is not a mere figment, but a real, objective concept. Aristotle and the School- men attributed a true (though potential) infinity to pri- mordial matter (materia prima, vAy mpotn), because its determinability is unlimited.2® Similarly they conceived the created intellect as potentially infinite, because of its unlimited capacity for knowledge.* At the same time, however, they held that no created intellect can. actually know all things knowable. And even the few things that the human mind does know, it knows not like God, of and in itself, but either by means of infused forms (as the angels), or (as man) by a process of abstraction from material things. b) We must furthermore draw a sharp line between quantitative infinity (imfnitum quanti- tate) and infinity of being (infimtum perfectione s. essentid). Quantitative infinity belongs to mathematics; infinity of being or perfection, to theology. The mathematician reckons with “infinitely large” and “infinitely small” quantities, leaving it to phi- losophy to determine whether these magnitudes are actually infinite or only potentially so.22, Even if the Unendlichen,” in the Katholik, Mainz, 1880; Idem, “ Das unend- 19 Cfr. Enzyklopidie, pp. 90 Sd. 20“ Materia prima est potentia omnia.” 21‘ Intellectus fit omnia.” 22 Cfr, Pohle, ‘‘Das Problem des quodammodo lich Kleine,” in the Philosoph. Jahr- buch der Gorresgesellschaft, 1888, 1893. 192 INFINITY quantities with which mathematics deals were actually infinite, they would yet retain their character of ac- cidents, and could not, therefore, form a connecting link with God, Who is infinitely perfect. In the domain of the finite we should have at most an actu infinitum secundum quid, never an actu infinitum simpliciter. The term infinite in the strict sense always denotes infinity of being and substance, and therefore must be objectively identical with the absolutely perfect, though formally there may be drawn between them a three- fold distinction: first, because absolute perfection is an affirmative, while infinity is a negative attribute of God; secondly, because absolute perfection is related to in- finity in the same manner in which the universal is re- lated to the particular, or the whole to any one of its parts; and thirdly, because absolute perfection empha- sizes God’s intrinsic plenitude of being, while infinity rather accentuates the extrinsic magnitude of His being and attributes, 2. THE Docma.—The Church has repeatedly defined infinity to be an attribute of God. The first definition of this dogma was uttered by the Second Council of Nicaea CA.'D. 787): 78. the last by the Vatican Council,4 a) In proceeding to prove the dogma from Sacred Scripture, we will not tepeat the texts already quoted in establishing the attribute of divine perfection,?> but confine ourselves to such passages as bear directly on the infinity of the Divine Substance. Ps, CXLIV 32 23 Oeds dveriypados. 24“ Omnique perfectione infinitum.” 25 Supra, pp. 182 sq. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 193 “ Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis et magnitudinis eius non est finis — Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised: and of his greatness there is no end.” In- asmuch as there can be no accidents in God (quan- tity is an accident), “ magnitude” in the foregoing pas- sage must refer to the Divine Substance. Nor can the infinity which the Psalmist ascribes to God’s magni- tude, be an infinitum potentiale, because potentiality in an ens a@ se would involve contradiction, Manifestly the meaning of the passage is that God is actually in- finite. There are other texts which ascribe infinity to the one or other of God’s attributes. For instance, Ps. CXLVI, 5: “Magnus Dominus noster et magna virtus eius, et sapientiae eius non est numerus — Great is our Lord, and great is his power, and of his wisdom there is no number.” All such passages prove the infinity of the divine Essence, which is identical with each divine attribute. The infinity of the divine Es- sence is furthermore taken for granted in all those Scriptural texts which contrast God as the absolute Be- ing (6 dv, MN?) with His creatures, which are often described as mere shadows or zeroes (}8). Also when- ever the Bible distinguishes God in an especial manner by superlative predicates.” b) It is hardly necessary to develop the argument from Tradition. The Fathers of the Church invariably postulate God’s infinity whenever they discuss His in- comprehensibility. Gregory of Nyssa expressly excludes from God potential infinity when he says: “ He be- comes neither larger nor smaller by addition or sub- traction, because in the Infinite there can be no such addition as takes place in creatures, when they grow 26 Cir. Is, XL, 173; Ecclus, XLITI, 32. 194 INFINITY larger.” *7 St. Hilary gives a beautiful description of God’s infinity in his commentary on the 144th Psalm: “Haec Dei prima et praecipua laudatio est, quod nihil in se mediocre, nihil circumscriptum, nihil emensum et magnitudins suae habeat et laudis.... Finem magni- ficentia eius nescit.” 28 c) Scholastic theology deduces God’s infinity directly from the concept of His self-existence. It is in this sense that St. Bonaventure writes: “Ipsum esse puris- simum non occurrit nisi in plena fuga ros non esse.” 2 St. Thomas Aquinas argues trenchantly in this fashion: “Secundum modum, quo res habet esse, est suus modus im nobilitate. . . . Igitur si aliquid est, cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitas deesse potest, quae alicui rei conveniat. Deus autem sicut habet esse totaliter, ita ab eo totaliter absistit 73 non esse.” *° By the a pos- teriort method the infinite perfection of the divine Es- sence can be deduced from the concept of God as the cause of all being.*+ Reapincs:—S. Thom, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 7—Contra Gent., I, 43 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 30 sqq.).— Suarez, De Deo, II, 1.— Aguirre, Theol. S. Anselm., disp. 32.— *Gutberlet, Das Unendliche, pp. 130 sqq., Mainz 1878.— Lépicier, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 263 sqq., Parisiis 1902—~ Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 100 sqq.— Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 185. 27 Contr. Eunom., 1. 12. Toletus, Comment. in S. Th., I, qu. 28 Tract. in Ps. 144, n. 66. For VE other Patristic testimonies, cfr. 82 Chr,’ S.. Theol.) ta, qu. a, art Aguirre, Theol. S. Anselmi, disp. 32. 29 Itin. Mentis, c 5. 80 Contr. Gent., I, 28. Cfr. also 2. The philosophical arguments are developed systematically by Gutber- let, Das Unendliche, Mainz 1878 SEGTION 2 GOD’S UNITY, SIMPLICITY, AND UNICITY (OR UNIQUENESS ) The essence of oneness (unum, 7 &) lies in this that it is intrinsically undivided. Hence the Scholastic definition of unum as “td quod est indivisum in se.” A being which is not merely undivided, but indivisible, possesses simplicity (unitas indivisibilitatis s. simplicitas). Unicity (or uniqueness) differs from both unity and simplicity in that it superadds to the concept one (unum) the further note of “exclusion of all other beings from the possession of some at- tribute or quality.” Hence uniqueness is no more a transcendental attribute of being than mathematical unity, which is the principle of numbers or quantity. As a pure perfection, metaphysical or trans- cendental unity, raised to infinite power, must be predicable of God both as indivisio and indi- divisibilitas. Thus understood, the uniqueness of God is plainly a postulate of reason. While created units exist as individuals, the uncreated Being must of necessity be sole and unique. 195 196 INTRINSIC UNITY Hence from the concept of unum there are de- ducible three additional attributes of God, viz.: Flis intrinsic unity (unitas Dei); His simplicity (simplicitas) ; and His uniqueness (unicitas). ARTICLE 1 GOD’S INTRINSIC UNITY I, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—The concept of metaphysical (transcendental) unity adds the note of indivision to the general notion of being. Whatever is undivided in itself is one. Con- sequently, the essence of unity consists in the negation of division. Nevertheless, unity is a positive predicate of being; first, because ens re- mains the fundamental concept; and secondly, because to deny that there is division is at bot- tom only a negation of a negation, and therefore an affirmation or position. a) There is a distinction to be made between things that are undivided. Some are incapable of being divided (indivisible), and therefore simple, while others are composite. Hence, besides unitas indivisionis, we must distinguish two other kinds of unity, viz.: unity of in- divisibility (simplicity) and unity of composition (unitas compositions). The latter may be unitas per se (e. g. a man) or unitas per accidens (e. g., a house). It follows that unity must be co-extensive with being: “Ens et unum convertuntur.’ For every being is either simple or composite. If simple, it is indivisible THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 197 and therefore surely indivisum in se; if composite, it has no being so long as its parts are not united into one, receiving its indivision, 7. e., its unity, at the mo- ment when composition sets in.’ b) Over against this metaphysical unity we have to distinguish sharply between two cognate concepts that do not represent transcendental determinations of be- ing, viz.: mathematical unity and unicity. Mathematical unity (one), as the “principle of numbers,’ has its place in the category of (discreet) quantity, and there- fore is not a general determination of being as such. Unicity, on its part, connoting as it does “ the exclusion of others from the possession of some perfection,” also belongs to the class of determined beings, although, of course, in their quality of beings, both mathematical unity and unicity embody the notion of metaphysical or transcendental unity. c) The opposite of one (unwm) is many (multa). Over against simple unity as mere indivisio, we have multiplicity as division into parts, unities, or monads. But the contrary of indivisibility or simplicity is not multiplicity (multipler)— God, though absolutely one, is threefold in person — but composition (compositum). Inasmuch as both division and composition involve im- perfection (orépyows), they are contrasted with unity in a privative manner (as “ seeing,” and “ blind”). Mathe- matical unity is related to multiplicity as a part is re- lated ta its whole, inasmuch as “one” is both the first in the series of numbers, and likewise one of that series; and this opposition must be conceived as a rela- tive one (¢. g., “ father” and “son”). And as, finally, the notion of unicity (unicum) directly excludes every species of multiplicity within the same genus, the two 1Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 11, art. I. 198 INTRINSIC UNITY catia are hie to each other as contradictories (as “yes? -and * , From Cod the species of multiplicity, as opposed to unity, must be rigorously excluded, so far as His divine nature, substance, or essence is concerned ; though in respect of personality, there is a real Tinity, The Divine Essence more particularly excludes every kind of intrinsic division, every species of composition, all multiplicity of like beings. On the other hand, it nec- essarily includes intrinsic unity, absolute simplicity, and unicity. We shall devote separate chapters to the two last-mentioned attributes. Here we have to consider God’s intrinsic unity,— an attribute which, it is hardly necessary to remark, is virtually implied in His sim- plicity. 2. THE Docma oF Gop’s Intrinsic Unity.— In view of the fact that the subjoined proposi- tions merely paraphrase dogmatic definitions of the Church (aseity, simplicity, etc.) they must be received as substantially de fide. a) If we consider God’s unity in connection with His self-existence, it is plain that He is wnus a se. Hence He must be conceived as the primarily One,? or, in the language of the Fathers, as unity itself (ipsa unitas, 4 povds, évds). Of course, this unity is not, like abstract being, a vacuous unity devoid of content. It is rather “the smallest kernel of being that can pos- sibly be conceived, and smaller than which nothing can be conceived”; and, on the other hand, because of its plenitude of being it is also “the largest being that 2We adapt this English term from Wilhelm-Scannell (Manual, Vol. I, ‘p. 203). THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 199 can possibly be conceived, and larger than which noth- ing can be conceived.” ® The description which St. Bernard gives of the divine primordial monas, may be cited here as a gem of both theological and rhetorical exposition: “Est qui est, non quae est.... Purus, simplex, integer, perfectus,... non habens quod ad numerum dividat, non quae colligat ad unum, .Unum quippe est, sed non unitum: non paritbus constat ut corpus, non affectibus distat ut anima... . Tam sim- plex est Deus quam unus est. Est autem unus et quo- modo aliud nihil, si dict possit, unissimus est... . Quid plus? Unus est etiam sibi: idem est semper et uno modo. Non sic unus est sol, non sic una luna: clamat uterque —ille motibus, illa et defectibus suis. Deus autem non modo unus sibi, et in se unus est; nihil in se nisi se habet: non ex tempore alterationem habet, non m substantia alteritatem.... Compara huic uni omne quod unum dici potest, et unum non ent." b) Inasmuch as God is one in an infinitely higher sense than all created entities, He may be said to be Super-Unity, with which created unities are absolutely incomparable. Concentrated in the very smallest focus, as the minutest possible unity, the super-fulness of His infinitely great and various perfections coalesces into a “ super-one monas, which in its simplicity is the most narrowly contracted and therefore the richest and also the purest being.”® From this concept of super-unity, St. Thomas Aquinas*® deduces the proposition that God is not only unum, but maxime unum. That is maxime unum, he says, which has the greatest fulness of be- ing and the largest measure of undividedness. Now, 3 J. v. Gérres, Preface to Sepp’s 5 Gorres, 1. c. 3 Leben Jesu, Ratisbon 7853. 6S. Theol., 1a, qu. 11, art. 4. 4De Consid., V, 7. 200 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY God as the actus purus is very being, and as the ab- solutely simple He is that being which is most undivided in itself; hence He is maxrime unum, 1. é@, one in a supreme and unique sense.? READINGS : — Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 177 sqq.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 82.— Picus a Mirandola, De Ente et Uno.— Thomassin, De Deo, II, 1 sq.— Jos. Gorres in Sepp’s Leben Jesu, Vol. I (Preface, pp. 18 sqq.), 2nd ed., Ratisbon 1853.— Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 85 sqq.—J. T. Driscoll, Chris- tian Philosaphy: God, pp. 209 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1904. ARTICLE 2 GOD’S ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY I. STATE OF THE QuEsTIon.—In treating of the relation of God’s Essence to His attributes,® we drew a virtual distinction between them, based on the simplicity of the Divine Nature. This we shall now endeavor to explain more fully. Since a contrary opposition lies not between the simple and the multiplex, but be- tween the simple and the composite,® we can de- fine simplicity as “the absence of composition.” 1° a) Now, composition is twofold, physical and metaphysical, according as a being contains within itself parts that are really distinct, or parts that are merely notionally or metaphysi- 7¥For Scriptural proofs, consult of the Trinity (De Deo Ipso, p. Gregor, de Valentia, Comment. in 1 185). P., qu. 11, art. 4. Kleutgen shows 8 Supra, pp. 144 sqq. that the unutterable super-unity of 9 V. supra, Art. 1, No. x God is not affected by the dogma 10 “ Simplicitas est carentia com- positionis.’? THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 201 cally distinct. Physically composite beings are those in which there is substantial composition (e. g., of matter and form, body and soul), and also those in which there is a composi- tion of accidents (e. g., substance and accident). Metaphysical compounds are those whose parts (e. g., genus and specific difference), though really identical, are nevertheless represented by objectively distinct concepts. Every compound consists of parts. “Part” signifies “an incom- plete being, requiring to be complemented by an- other.” It follows from what we have so far explained, that the parts which enter into any compound mutually complement and perfect one another, giving completeness to the compound and in their turn receiving completion from the whole. b) While this conclusion is evidently true of physical compounds, the complementary function of metaphys- ical parts is not quite so clear, for the reason that in God virtually distinct perfections can easily be mistaken for metaphysical parts. Yet the dogma of the absolute simplicity of God forbids the assumption that there is in the divine Essence any sort of composition, even though it be a mere composition of logically distinct parts. The essential difference between metaphysical and virtual composition lies in this, that the latter is founded on a distinction purely subjective, while the former is based upon truly objective differences. The metaphysical parts of any creature, even though it be 14 202 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY the most indivisible of all creatures, an angel, bear the same objective relation to each other which potentiality (potentia) bears to actuality (actus). Hence, when there is objective composition in a being, this is certain proof that such a being is contingent. Moreover, in the creature the determinable element (@. g., animal) ap- pears to stand in need of being determined by another (e. g., rationale); while at the same time both these elements are mutually indifferent to such a degree that either can be realized without the other ( e. g., brute, angel). In God, on the other hand, there is neither a determinable nor a determining element. He is pure actuality, and His perfections are anything but mutually indifferent. None of them can exist apart from the others. 2. THE DocMa oF Gon’s ABsoLuTE SIMPLIC- try.—The Fourth Lateran Council (A. D. 121 5) defined the Blessed Trinity as “One absolutely simple essence, substance, or nature—una essen- tia, substantia, seu natura simplex omnino,’ © The Vatican Council as “one... absolutely simple and immutable spiritual substance—sim- plex omnino et incommutabilis substantia spir- itualis.”’ 1? a) The Bible teaches God’s absolute sim- plicity (a simplicity which does not even admit of metaphysical composition) in all those pas- sages where it speaks of God’s attributes sub- stantively, that is to say, where it identifies them 11 Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. “ Fir- 12 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, De miter.” Fide, cap. 1. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 203 really with the Divine Essence. Thus God not only “hath life in himself” ™ but He “is life it- self,” 14 and, therefore, is the only one who hath immortality.® As God possesses within Him- self “all the treasures of wisdom and knowl- edge,’ 1° so He is wisdom itself," .andythere- fore, “alone wise.” ** He is a God of charity, because He has charity; but it is still more cor- rect to say that He “ts charity itself,” #® and, in so far, “alone good.” He is “full of truth,” a but He is more properly “the truth.”** In a word, according to the teaching of Sacred Scrip- ture, God is purest actuality without any qualifi- cation. His attributes are identical with His substance. This is merely another way of saying that God is pure actuality without any admixture of potentiality, and that there is in Him no manner of composition, not even metaphys- eal? b) We proceed to formulate the argument from Tradition. a) That the simplicity of the Divine Essence is real, can easily be shown to have been the belief of the 13 John, V, 26. 21 John I, 14. 14 John I, 4; XIV, 6; 1 John I, 22 ddndea, John XIV, 6; 1 Py John V, 6. 151 Tim. VI, 16. 23 Cfr. 1 John I, 5: “ Quoniam 16 Col. II, 3. Deus lux [= actus] est, et tene- 17 Prov. I, 20; Wisdom VII, 21; brae [= potentia] in eo non sunt TrCOr sh, 24. ullae—God is light [actuality], 18 Rom. XVI, 7. and in Him there is no darkness 19 1 John IV, 8. {potentiality].”’ 20 Math, XIX, 17; Luke XVIII, 19. 204 ,. ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY Christian Church through all the centuries of her ex- istence. Origen mentions it among the earliest dogmas.”4 Irenzus asserts against the Gnostics who taught emana- tion that “ Deus simplex et non compositus, totus tvwouw et totus vous et totus ddyos.” ** Cyril of Alexandria says this truth is attested by the whole human race.?¢ The opposing error is branded by the Fathers in terms so harsh that they must plainly have meant to strike at a heresy: “absurdum et nefarium” (Maximus), “summa tmpietas” (John of Damascus), “ blasphemia” (Athanasius). The Fathers repeatedly employed this dogma as a weapon against the Arians, who, whatever errors they may have taught with regard to the relation existing between God the Father and the Son, never de- nied the divine simplicity.27 B) The simplicity of God as taught by the Fathers is to be taken not only as a real, but also as a necessary quality, because of the absolute identity be- tween God’s Essence and existence, His attributes and Essence, and between His separate attributes. ‘“ Not only as seeing partially, and partially as not seeing, but in His whole substance He is all eye and all hearing and all spirit (dos vois),”’ says St. Cyril of Jerusalem. Hence the Augustinian axiom: 78* “ Deus quod habet, hoc est,’ and its Patristic conversion: “ Creatura non est, sed habet sapientiam, etc.” In the words of St. Gregory the Great: “Sapientia Dei est et sapit, nec habet aliud esse, aliud sapere. Servi autem sapientiae [t. e., homines], quum habent vitam, aliud sunt et aliud 24De Princ., I, 1,6. ovalas marpés) esse dixistis: aah 25 Adv, Haer., Il, 13. yap éorw ovcla, év 3 ovK éors 26 Thesaur., 31. Two.orns,”” 27 Cfr, Athanasius, De Synod. 34: 28 Catech., VI. “ Dixistis ex Deo esse filium, ergo . 28a De Civit. Dei, XI, 10. tam ex substantia Patris (ék ras THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 205 habent, quippe quibus non est hoc ipsum esse quod vivere.’ 28 The technical phrase of the Schoolmen, which is so familiar to us, viz.: that God is pure actuality with- out any potentiality, dates back to the time of St. Maxi- mus the Confessor, who wrote: “God exists actually, not potentially (évepyeig éorw, ov Suvdper), as if He were originally not wisdom (d&poovvy) and then in reality became reason; therefore He is only pure reason (vots povoy Kkabapds), possessing cognition not as something additional, but He thinks only through Himself (arap’ gavtod voc). ®° Petavius has collected a large number of additional passages from Patristic literature bearing on this subject.*+ c) The philosophical explanation of the dogma must proceed on the assumption that God’s perfect sim- plicity does not consist merely in His indivisibility (i. @., the absence of parts)— for else the “monads i of Leibnitz, the “ Realen” of Herbart, the “atoms” of the chemists, and the “points” of the mathematicians would eo ipso be endowed with supreme perfection — but primarily in the simultaneous plenitude of God’s positive perfections of being. From this point of view the argument by which we prove God's simplicity from His aseity or self-existence is a most cogent one. Sti Thomas *? luminously formulates it as follows: “Jn omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod in Deo non est, quia vel una partium est actus respeciu alterius, vel saltem omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius.” An equally stringent argument is that based upon the absolute causality of God:** .“ Omne compositum causam habet; quae enim secundum se di- versa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum, nist per 29 Gregor. M., Moral., II, 27. 81 Petav., De Deo, II, sq.; cfr. 30 Comment. in Dionys. De Div. also Thomassin, De Deo, IV, 4. Nom., c 5. 82S, Theol., 1a, qu. 3, art. 7. 33S. Thom., }. c. 206 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus autem non habet causam, cum sit prima causa efficiens.” 34 3. Docmatic ConcLusions.—In virtue of His simplicity (which we have proved) there must be excluded from God all manner of composi- tion, and all parts, both physical and metaphys- ical. We begin with the cruder forms of com- position, gradually ascending to the higher ones. Thesis I: God is not composed of matter and form (ex materia et forma). Proof. Matter (#Ay zpér) is mere potentiality (S%vams) 5 but God is pure actuality (&épyaa, évre- Aexea), without a trace of potentiality. In the words of St. Thomas: “Deus est actus purus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde im- possibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex ma- teria et forma.” °° Therefore St. Bernard says: “Ipse sibi forma, ipse sibi essentia est. Non est formatus Deus, forma est. Non est compositus Deus, merum simplex est. Tam simplex Deus, quam unus est.” *° Materialism alone believes in a material God. Thesis II: God is not composed of substance and accidents (ex substantia et accidentibus). Proof. It is the function of an accident to perfect the substance in which it inheres, by 84 Other philosophical arguments 85 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 3, art. 2. in St. Anselm’s Monol., c. 16, 17. 36 De Consid., V, 7. Cfr. also Schiffini, Metaph. Special., Vol. II, disp. 2, sect. 2. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 207 giving it something which it does not possess of itself. Substance and accident are conse- quently related to each other in the same man- ner as the potential is related to its actuation. God as 6 4v is incapable of being perfected. In other words, whereas the created substance pos- sesses and supports its properties, which in turn are possessed and supported by their substance (ratio habentis et habiti), God 1s what He has. Hence there can be no accidents in Him.*' Thesis III: There is in God no composition of fac- ulty and act (ex facultate et actu). Proof. If God were not immutable actuality from everlasting, there would have taken place, or there would still be taking place within His Essence a transition from potentiality to actuality (a potentia ad actum), and the resulting act would inhere in the Divine Substance after the manner of an accident. This is repugnant to God’s pure actuality and the absence of accidents in His Essence. Consequently, in the words of St. Thomas, “Deus est sua operatio et actio.” ** Thesis IV: There is in God no composition of really distinct activities (ex actu et actu). Proof. If knowing and willing and transient operation in God were really distinct activities, 37 Cfr. St. August., De Trinit., tristic testimonies, see Petayius, De AY Deo, V, 10-11. 38 Contr. Gent., II, 10. For Pa- 208 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY there would exist in the Divine Essence three acts, none of which would be identical with either of the others. In other words, the God- head would consist of a real trinity of acts, cul- minating in some sort of “organic unity,” as Gunther taught. To hold this would be to deny the identity of God’s Essence with His attributes, and also His aseity, His absolute per- fection, and His infinity. It follows that the di- vine Nature must exercise its activity in one sim- ple act. There can be no reasonable objection to this thesis so far as it applies to God’s necessary operation ad intra (cognition, volition). It is only when it is applied to God’s free operation ad extra (@. g., creation, sanctification) that difficulties arise. Yet, when we consider the question carefully, we find that creation and sanc- tification: do not add to the perfection of God, but merely to that of the creature. It is not the divine operation as such that undergoes an intrinsic change, but solely the product of this operation. Hence God’s free operation ad extra furnishes no objective reason why His operation and nature should be split up and His simplicity endangered.*° 39 For a more detailed treatment disp. go, sect. 9; cfr. also supra, of this thesis, see Suarez, Metaph., Chapter II, § 4. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 209 Thesis V: There is in God no composition of sub- ject and essence, or of nature and person (ex subjecto et essentia; ex natura et hypostasi). Proof. According to the teaching of Aris- totle,*? it is only in material things that indi- vidual determination lies outside of specific de- termination, so that the production of an indi- vidual requires a principle of individuation—the tn mporn or materia signata. Of the “pure forms” (angels) St. Thomas asserts ** that their specific coincides with their individual determi- nation, so that every individual eo ipso consti- tutes a separate species. Regardless of what one may think of this theory (which is not entirely unobjectionable from the view-point of philoso- phy) it is certain that in God individuality (in the sense of singularitas) must coincide absolutely with essence. ‘To assume composition in the Deity, even if it were a merely metaphysical composition of subject and essence, would be to attribute to the Divine Essence potentiality, and consequently to deny its aseity. Therefore Eu- gene III, at Rheims, in 1148, laid down against Gilbert de la Porrée’s heretical proposition, “Divinitate Deus est, sed divinitas non est Deus,” * the dogmatic declaration: “Ne aliqua ratio in theologia inter naturam et personam divideret, neve Deus divina essentia diceretur, 40 De Anima, IIl, 4. 42See St. Bernard, Serm. im 41,5. Theol., 1a, qu. 4, art. 3. Cant., 80, n. 6. 210 ABSOLUTE SIMPLICITY ex sensu ablativi tantum, sed etiam nominativi.’ Whence it is plain that the Divine Essence ab- solutely excludes a composition of nature and hypostasis. We are therefore bound to profess, not only “Pater est Deus,’ but likewise, “Pater est divinitas,’ and conversely. But how does the mystery of the Blessed Trinity affect the absolute simplicity of the Di- vine Essence? Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though really distinct as Persons, do not subsist in three different natures (Tritheism), but in one and the same divine nature. “Quaelibet trium personarum est alla [summa] res, vid. substantia, essentia s. natura divina.”’ ** We conceive this threefold subsistence of the one “summa res’ by drawing a virtual distinction between nature and person,—a distinction which does not imply objective composition.*® Hence the theological axiom: “Jn divinis omma sunt unum, ubt non obviat relations oppositio.” *° Thesis VI: There is in God no composition of genus and specific difference (ex genere et differen- tia). Proof. “Impossibile (4dvarev) est mentiri Deum ——It is impossible for God to lie.” 2* The mean- ing of the well-known antithesis in St. Paul’s letter, to, the).Romans:.*°*, Est isquiem.Deme 33 Comment. in Quatuor Libros 85 Tit. I, 2, Sent., III, dist. 38, qu. x. 36 Heb. VI, 18. 84 John VIII, 26. 36a Rom. III, 4. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 239 verax, omnis autem homo mendax—God is true, but every man a liar,” is evidently this: Man is capable of lying, God is not.** b) While some of the Fathers (like Chrysos- tom and Jerome) appear to base the immorality of lying on its positive prohibition by God, rather than upon its intrinsic wrongfulness, the ma- jority, under the leadership of St. Augustine, teach that mendaciousness is something so essen- _ tially immoral in itself that it would be sinful even if there were no specific divine command- ment forbidding it. What is intrinsically and essentially sinful, God’s sanctity can never per- mit, either in the present or in any other con- ceivable Economy. Even St. Chrysostom, no- toriously so mild in condoning the little “white lies” of daily life, expressly declares that “there are certain things impossible to God, wiz.: to be deceived, to deceive, and to lie.” *° 3. THE DocMa oF Gop’s FIDELITY. Ll eard ing to the consentient teaching of all theologians, it is de fide that infidelity or deceit is absolutely contrary to the Essence of God. a) The Scriptural proof for this dogma is bottomed first upon those texts which teach God’s faithfulness,*® and secondly upon the re- peatedly asserted impossibility of God’s breaking $7 Ronis’ LIT, 4. \.-Cfr, Numb. 39 Cfr, Ps. CXLIV, 13: “ Fidelis TET 79, Deus in omnibus verbis. suis.” 38 Hom. in Symb., 1. 240 FIDELITY 4 the faith, because if He broke the faith He would contradict Himself.t? Jesus Christ de- scribes divine fidelity in these subtime terms: * “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.” * b) From the writings of the Fathers we shall content ourselves with citing this one pas- sage of St. Augustine: ** “Spes nostra tam certa est, quast 1am res perfecta sit. Neque etiam timemus promittente veritate. Veritas nec falli potest nec fallere—Our hope is as cer- tain as if the promise were already fulfilled. Nor do we fear, seeing we have the promise of truth. Truth can neither be deceived nor de- ceive.’ The theological argument rests upon God’s veracity. He would not be veracious if He failed to keep His promises or to carry out His just threats. All those circumstances and motives which at various times induce men to become faithless or to deceive others (such as forgetfulness, change of mind, impotence, malice, etc.) are formally excluded from God’s Essence by the divine attributes of omniscience, immuta- bility, omnipotence, sanctity, etc. READINGS : —*Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 397 sqq.— Alb. a Busano, ed. Graun, Theol. Dogmat. Special., I, pp. 99 sqq., Oeniponte 1893. 40 Cfr. 2 Tim. II, 13: “ S# non continueth faithful, he cannot deny credimus, ille fidelis (aworéds) Himself.” permanet [quia] negare seipsum non 41 Math. XXIV, 35. potest (adpyjnoacbar yap éavrdy ov 42 Cir. Deut. XXXII, 4; VII, 9; dvvara:)—If we believe not, he 1 Thess. V, 24; 2 Thess. III, 3; etc. 43 Praef, in Ps., 123. SECTION 4 GOD AS ABSOLUTE GOODNESS Goodness, too, is a pure perfection and there- fore formally predicable of God. Like truth, goodness may be either ontological, ethical, or moral (bonitas in essendo, in agendo, im com- municando). From the notion of bonum, there- fore, we can develop three other divine attributes which correspond to the attributes of truth, vig.: ontological goodness, ethical goodness (sanctity), and moral goodness (benevolence). ARTICLE 1 GOD AS ONTOLOGICAL GOODNESS 1. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.— Aristotle defines on- tological goodness thus: “ Bonum est, quod omma ap- petunt — The good is that which all desire.’* On- tological truth denotes objects inasmuch as they are in- telligible; ontological goodness (bonitas) describes them as appetable, or desirable. | But this definition is incomplete, because it describes goodness merely in its effects, not in its essence. An object is good when it is appetable. But why is it ap- 1 Ethics, 1. 1. This is not to be men, but in the sense that whatso- understood, says St. Thomas, as if ever is desired has in it the idea every good were desired by all of good. = SAT 242 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS petable? It is not good because it is appetable, but it is appetable because it is good. In order to arrive at an essential definition of goodness, it is first of all necessary to distinguish between absolute goodness (bonum in se s. bonum quod), and relative goodness (bonum alteri s. bonum cui). Both of these combined will give us the adequate definition we are in search of. a) Now, what is absolute goodness? A thing is called absolutely good (bonum quod) when it is exactly what its nature requires it to be, 7. e., when it has all the perfections due to, and demanded by, its essence. The notion of bonum quod, therefore, materially coin- cides with that of perfectum, with this sole difference that the former connotes a relation to some (conscious or unconscious) appetency, which the notion of “ per- fect’? lacks. Hence we may say that what is perfect in its species is (absolutely) good. If a being lacks some perfection which it ought to possess (as, é. g., a deaf person lacks the sense of hearing), we have the concept of “ evil,’ which may consequently be defined as the privation or absence of some perfection required by the nature of a thing.? If an object lacks even one of those perfections which its nature postulates, it is ‘bag OR \Gwil., ie b) Relative goodness (bonum cui) consists in the communicability of that which is good (perfect) to some other being or beings. As (ontological) truth tends to reveal itself to the intellect, so (ontological) goodness tends to communicate itself to other beings, and thereby to produce more good.’ This communicability formally consists in the adaptability of one object to another, so 2° Malum est privatio perfec- integra causa, malum ex quocunque tionis debitae.”” defectu.”’ 8 Hence the axiom: “ Bonum ex 4“ Bonum est diffusivum sui.” THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 243 that the other has a motive for desiring or striving after the bonum with an “ appetite” (appetitus), and this may be either conscious or unconscious. It is easy to see how relative goodness, in virtue of its adaptability (con- venientia), at once becomes bonitas finis, and how the latter spontaneously overflows, coloring with its own goodness all the means that lead to the end, and com- municating to them the characteristic note of usefulness or utility (bonum utile). The opposite of relative good- ness, which we obtain by a process of contrary conver- sion, is “inadaptability (harmfulness) of one thing to another,” irrespective of whether the harm is caused through the instrumentality of some positive perfection (e. g., capital and labor), or by its absence (¢. g., drunk- enness in parents and spoilt children). c) By welding the essential marks of absolute and relative goodness into one concept, we obtain the fol- lowing definition of goodness in general: “That is good which is perfect in itself and adapted to another.”’ Under either aspect goodness is evidently a trans- cendental attribute of being.» For a thing is more or less good according to the measure of being which it contains, e. g., “good” bread, a “good” poem. Even bad things are good under at least one aspect, vtz.: in as much as they are. Whence the dictum of St. Augustine: “In quantum sumus, boni sumus.” Rela- tively speaking every being as such is good, 7. e., adapted to every other being, because all things are related to one another either as substance to accident, or as a part to the whole, or as an effect to its cause; or vice versa. Hence all beings are constantly perfecting themselves and each other. To a superficial observer it might seem as 5“ Ens et bonum convertuntur.” 6 Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 5, art. 1-3. 244 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS if ontological goodness had a wider scope than the con- cept of being, inasmuch as it can be predicated, e. g., of phantoms, “ air-castles,’ etc. But this is a delusion. In matter of fact the goodness of a thing is always and everywhere commensurate with the measure of its being, even if it were only an ens rationis.7 2. THE DocmMa.—God is ontologically good, both in the absolute and in the relative sense of the term. The dogma of His absolute goodness is clearly contained in that of His divine per- fection.* His relative goodness is implied partly in the condemnation of Dualism,® partly in the goodness of the created universe.’ a) Considering God’s absolute ontological goodness we find that a) It is, in the first place, closely bound up with aseity and primal goodness (bonitas a se). While creatures have all their goodness (perfection), as they have their being, by participation (bonum ab alio s. per participationem), God, and He alone, is orig- inally good in Himself; or, to express it substantively, He is goodness itself (ipsa bonitas, 4 abrayabdrns). This can be proved from Holy Scripture. St. Paul teaches: 1 “Omnis creatura Dei bona est—Every creature of God is good.” Christ, on the other hand,!? says that 7Cfr. A. H. Tombach, Unter- dico, cum voco Deum bonum, ac si suchungen iiber das Wesen des album vocarem nigrum.” Guten. Bonn 1900, 9 Supra, pp. 221 sqq. 8 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, 10 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., |. c.; Cone. “ De Fide,” cap. 1; cfr. Propos. 28 Trident., Sess. VI, can. 6. Ekkardi damn. a Ioanne XXII a. Tgp hams! LV a 1329: “ Deus non est bonus neque 12 Luke XVIII, 19. melior neque optimus; ita male THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 248 “nemo bonus nisi solus Deus — None is good but God alone.” These two statements can be harmonized only by attributing essential, aseitarian goodness to God alone, and conceiving the goodness predicated of His creatures as derived or participated goodness, which is as nothing in comparison to God’s. It is in this sense that we must interpret Tertullian’s dictum: “Bonus natura Deus solus; qui enim quod est sine initio habet, non institutione [ab alio] habet, sed natura [a se] —God alone is good by nature; for He, who has that which He is without beginning, has it not by creation, but by na- ture.” 23 Clement of Alexandria testifies to the belief of the Greeks on this head when he writes: “The essential good is not said to be good on account of its being possessed of virtue, . . . but on account of its be- ing in itself and by itself good.” ** B) Since all goodness found in creatures is virtually and eminently contained in the Divine Essence, God is the universal good (bonum uni- versale) or, more correctly, universal goodness (4) mavayaborns ) , While created goodness by its very nature can never be more than partial and particular, and is limited to certain definite stages of perfection, God’s goodness com- prehends within itself and is infinitely superior to all particular goodness found elsewhere. Cfr. Ex. XXXIII, 19: “Ostendam omne bonum tibi —I will shew thee all good,” (i. e., Him who contains within Himself everything that is good). St. Ambrose tersely declares: 13 Contr, Marcion., II, 6. kal 8’ adrnv dayabhny elvar.— 14’A\AA Te adThy Kas’ a’tny Paedag., I, 8. 246 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS “Deus universitate bonus, homo ex parte.”’?** St. Au- gustine develops the notion of God’s universal goodness trenchantly as follows: “ Bonum hoc et bonum illud, ... bolle ‘hoc’ et ‘illud’ et vide ipsum bonum, si potes. lia Deum videbis non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni.... Quid hoc nisi Deus? Non bonus animus aut bonus angelus aut bonum coeli, sed bonum Bonum— This thing is good and that good, but take away this and that, and regard good itself if thou canst; so wilt thou see God, not good by a good that is other than Himself, but the good of all good . : and what can this be except God? Not a good mind, or a good angel, or a good of heaven, but goodness itself.” *° It is impossible for the mind of man to con- ceive the universal good more profoundly than St. Augustine does in this luminous passage. y) Lastly, inasmuch as all created goodness has its measure and goal in God alone, while the Divine-Good, on the other hand, has its measure and end not above but within itself, the concept of God’s universal goodness nat- urally expands into 4 trepayabdrys, 7. e., His good- ness transcends all other goodness. It is in this sense that the Church, without regard to the possible existence of rational creatures, re- fers to God as “the highest, the most beautiful, the best good” (summum bonum in se). Be- cause God knows and loves Himself as the Su- 15In Luc., I, 8. 16 De Trinit., VIII, 3, 4 (Haddan’s translation, p. 205). THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 247 preme and Infinite Good, He is infinitely happy in the possession of His own Essence.” The attribute of twepayabdrns implies that the Highest Good is not merely primus inter pares, but that It is transcendental, and, therefore, beyond comparison with other things that are good, and related to them not as a part to the whole, but as 6 éy to py dv." b) It remains for us to consider God’s relative goodness. As the primordial, universal, and transcendental good, God possesses in a higher degree than any of His crea- tures the ability and desire to communicate Himselt to others, and to enrich them with perfections drawn from the plenitude of His own essential goodness. Himself overflowing with goodness, He causes His crea- tures to share it by freely endowing them with being.” This relative goodness (4. e., communicability) of God, may be traced in a fourfold direction, according as we make the exemplary, the efficient, the final, or the formal cause our point of departure. a) As exemplary cause, God is the ideal and the archetype of all created goodness. Created goodness, therefore, is merely a faint imitation of the abounding goodness of the Divine Es- sence. | SCs Time VE arson Bee sit in eo excellentissimo modo et kdp.ios — He who is the Blessed.’ propter hoc dicitur summum_ bo- 18 Cfr. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 6, art. num.” 2: “Cum bonum sit in Deo sicut 19 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, in causa non univoca, oportet quod ** De. Deo,”. cap. 13.can. 5. 248 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS Created things are consequently good only in so far as they resemble, and correspond to, the ideal good in God. If the mere possibles (7. e., things which never come into being) can be said to possess a species of goodness distinct from their exemplary cause — which some theologians misdoubt — they derive that ideal good- ness, as they derive their ideal being, solely from God, Who is the plenitude of goodness. 8) As creative or efficient cause, God endows His creatures with all their (absolute and relative) good- ness at the same time that He gives them being. It is plain that from the hand of the Lord there can come forth nothing but what is good.?° Hence it is more than a mere phrase to say: “ All creatures are an emanation of God’s goodness.” y) God is the fints absolute ultimus of the whole created universe. He is the end of all things, because He is for all, including His rational creatures, “‘the highest, the most beau- tiful, the best good—a good that is worthy of all love and honor for its own sake” (swmmum bonum nobis). Lessius proves this as follows: “ Quod est summum bonum honunis, necessario est ultimus eius fins. Rur- sum quod est summum bonum hominis, in eo necesse est consistere eius beatiiudinem, quae nihil est aliud quam summi boni possessio. Summum bonum et ulti- mus finis dicitur et res ipsa, cuius possessione et fruitione beati sumus, et ipsa huius rei possessio et fruitio, Simili modo et beatitudo accipitur et pro ipsa re, cuius — 20 Cfr. Gen. I, 31: ‘‘ And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good.” THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 249 unione beati eficimur, et pro ipsa unione: illa a doc- toribus vocatur beatitudo objectiva, haec formals — That which is man’s highest good, must necessarily be also his last end. Again, man’s beatitude, which is nothing but possession of the supreme good, must be identical with the highest good attainable by him. We also call supreme good and last end that particular ob- ject by whose possession and fruition we are rendered happy, and the possession and fruition of that object itself. Similarly the word beatitude designates both the object by the possession of which we are made happy, and the state of possession or union itself; the former is called objective beatitude, the latter beatitude in the formal sense.” 2. As veracity and faithfulness consti- tute the formal motive of theological faith and hope, so the summum bonum is the formal motive of the- ological love (charity), and at the same time the founda- tion and corner-stone of ethics, morality, and asceticism. The terms final end, highest good, and beatitude, are furthermore organically related to a fourth, the glory of God (gloria, glorificatio), because the attainment of the final end, by the creature that is to be endowed with beatific vision, necessarily tends to the glorification of the summum bonum. Rom. XI, 36: “Ex ipso per ipsum et in ipso (cis avrdv—=in ipsum) sunt omma: ipsi gloria in saecula— For of him, and by him, and in him, are all things: to him be glory for ever.” ‘The Schoolmen teach with St. Thomas that God’s creatures tend to their final end, 7. e., seek Him as their highest good, by the very fact that they labor at their own perfection. By seeking their own end they seek God, though not all in the same manner, some being endowed with life, others not; some being irrational, others 21 De Summo Bono, I, 1. 17 250 ABSOLUTE GOODNESS enjoying the use of reason. Thus all creation tends, either consciously or unconsciously, towards God. While His irrational creatures objectively manifest His glory by their very existence, those that have the use of reason are bound to glorify Him formally by know- ing Him, loving Him, and praising Him; and thus, by glorifying God, work out their final Hester 8) God is not the formal cause of creatural goodness in the strict sense of the term, be- cause essential goodness, with respect to its formal content, is quite as incommunicable as Divine Being itself. Only from the Pantheistic point of view is it possi- ble to confound created goodness with the absolute goodness proper to the Creator, thereby merging the infinite essence in the finite, which reflects its splendor, though inadequately. But when we consider God’s supernatural manifestations and the graces with which He has whelmed mankind, we must conceive Him philosophically as their formal cause, because in the supernatural order God surrenders Himself so com- pletely to His creatures that created goodness be- comes merged as it were in His own absolute good- ness. By exaggerating this truth Christian mysticism has more than once verged dangerously near the abyss of Pantheism.?? Without in the least identifying the creature with God, St. Peter speaks of its formal par- ticipation in the divine nature,?* and the Fathers speak of a “ deification ”’ (Oeiwors, not drobéwors) of the creature. In this class belongs the threefold elevation of man 22 Citi iS. Dheéol.,/ ta; qu. 6, art, 4. 23 Cfr. 2 Petr. I, 4: ‘ divinae consortes naturae.” THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 251 through supernal grace: (1) The Hypostatic Union as the personal communication of the Divine Logos to the humanity of Christ; (2) the state of sanctifying grace as the supernatural transfiguration of the soul, and (3) the beatific vision as the immersion of the soul in the life of truth and love enjoyed by the Most Holy Trinity.** READINGS: —Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 84.— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 29—Lessius, De Summo Bono, 1. 2; De Perfect. Div., 1. 7—S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 5-6 (Bonjoan- nes-Lescher, Compendium, pp. 15 sqq.).—L. Janssens, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 253 saq., Friburgi 1900.— Lépicier, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 221 sqq., 242 sqq., Parisiis 1902— Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,’ pp. 95 saa. ARTICLE 2 GOD’S ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY t. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—Men attrib- ute sanctity (sanctitas) to those persons only who lead a life pleasing to God. The definition of sanctity varies according as we consider either its proximate or its more remote elements. a) To begin with the most common and most pal- pable notion, sanctity is freedom from sin, coupled with purity of morals.?* Both these notes, the positive and the negative, belong together; for a being that is merely free from sin, as, é. g., a child that has not yet arrived at the use of reason, cannot be called holy, at least not 24 Cfr, 2 Cor. III, 18—Damas- wavdyabos Kal twepdyados xal cene sums up the dogmatic teach- dws Ov dyadés,” (De Fide Or- ing of the Church on the on- thod., IV, 4). tological goodness of God in this 25 “‘ Immunitas a peccato cum pu- terse sentence: ‘'‘O ayados Ka ritate morum coniuncta.” 252 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY in the full sense of the term, even after it has received the sacrament of Baptism. Akin to, and practically identical with, this definition is the classical one given by Pseudo-Dionysius: “ Sanctitas est ab omni. scelere libera et perfecta et prorsus immaculata puritas (ayidrys bev obv eotw 4 mavrds ayous éehevOépa kai mavreAns Kal mdvry axpavtos kafapdrys ).” 28 b) If we enquire into the deeper reason for that im- munity from sin and purity of the will which sanctity implies, we shall find that both are conditioned by conformity of the will to the moral, which is ultimately the eternal law (lex aeterna). Hence sanctity can be genetically defined as the ethical equation between the will and the divine law of morals.27 Thus conceived, sanctity runs exactly parallel to logical truth, except in that it has an additional necessary element in persever- ance. A merely temporary “ equation,” i, e., the occa- sional performance of acts conforming to the moral law, does not make a man holy; to rise to the level of sanc- tity, moral goodness must be continuous, lasting, and based on principle.?8 c) In its highest sense sanctity is charity or the love of God (amor Dei, caritas). For whoever loves God truly above all things, will live in accordance with His law and avoid sin. Obedience to the divine law here below has no other end than union with God in Heaven in inseparable love. Hence eternal beatitude, as the status in which man enjoys the love of God without danger of ever again losing it, represents the very high- est degree of sanctity.?° 26 De Divin. Nomin., ce. 12. videtur importare: primo mundi- 27“ Adaequatio voluntatis cum tiam, secundo firmitatem.” lege aeterna.”’ 2901 dyiur=the Saints. Cfr. 28 Cfr. S. Theol., 2-2ae, qu. 81, Lessius, De Perf. Divin., VIII, 1. art. 8: “ Nomen sanctitatis duo THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 253 2. THE Docma.—The Church has condemned as heretical the teaching of Gottschalk, Scotus Eriugena, and Calvin, that God is the author of sin. “St quis dixerit, non esse im potestate hominis, vias suas malas facere, sed mala ita ut bona Deum operari, non permissione tantum, sed etiam proprie et per sé, . . . anathema sit— If any one saith that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly, and of Himself, ... let him be anathema.” *° The essential sanctity of the Most Holy Trinity, 4. e., the Godhead, is also implied in the dogma which defines the personal holiness of the Holy Ghost. Scientific theology develops the dogma of God’s sanctity in a twofold manner, consid- ering it first by itself, and secondly in its relation _ to created sanctity. a) According to the Roig atonal ins defini- tion God’s sanctity is in the first place a) “Absolute immunity from sin, and 1im- maculate purity.” The first (negative) note not only implies that God does not sin (wm- peccantia), but also that He cannot sin (wm- peccabilitas). It is plain that there can be no dissonance in a Being Whose Will coincides 30 Conc, Trident., Sess. VI, c. 6. 254 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY with His Essence. Therefore God’s love of — moral goodness is synonymous with infinite — hatred of sin (infinitum odium peccati). There — are many passages in Holy Writ which prove this... Deut.:, XXXII,\ 4, we “read: “Deus: fi delis et absque ulla iniquitate—God is faithful and without any iniquity.” ** Ps. V,5: “Thou art not a God that willest iniquity. . Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity; thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.” *? The “mys- tery of iniquity” (Hvorhpiov dvopias), of which St. Paul speaks in 2 Thess. II, 7, does not consist in this that God wills iniquity, either as an end Or as a means to an end, but rather in that He permits it at all. But although He permits it, He hates sin; and the sole reason why He © permits it is that it is objectively better to per- mit it than to prevent it absolutely, in order — that the divine attributes of love, mercy, and justice may have their proper scope.—The _ other (positive) note of sanctity, viz.: immaculate purity, is frequently mentioned in Sacred Scrip- ture. Thus Ps. CXLIV, 17: “Justus Dominus in omnibus vits suis et sanctus in omnibus operibus suis—The Lord is just in all His ways, and holy in all His works.” Deserving of special mention is the famous “Trisagion,”’ Is. VI, 3: “Sera- 81 Cfr. Rom. IX, 14. 82 Cir. Ps. XLIV, 8: “Dilexisti iustitiam et odisti iniquitatem.” THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 255 phim clamabant alter ad alterum et dicebant: Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, Dominus Deus exer- cituum—The Seraphims ... cried one to an- other, and said: Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God of hosts.” ** In the Primitive Church the Trisagion was seldom sung except at solemn Mass; since the sixth century it concludes the daily Preface. On Good Friday the choir sings in Greek: ‘“Ayvwos 6 @eds, aywos icyupds, aytos abavaros, éhénoov jas—O holy God, holy and strong, holy and immortal, have mercy on us.” B) If sanctity in general is “the ethical equa- tion between the will and the moral law,” the sanctity of God, being essential to Him and deeply rooted in His divine nature, must be sub- stantial. For as the will of God is absolutely one with His Essence, from which flows the lex aeterna, God cannot acquire sanctity;** He must be holy by His very nature and in His proper Essence.* Nor is sanctity an ethical perfection superadded to the Divine Essence; °° it is absolutely identical with God’s Substance.*’ Therefore God 1s Sanctity in the same way in which He is Absolute Reason. Holy Scripture adumbrates this aseitarian character of sanctity when it calls God “the alone holy.” Job XV, 15: “Ecce inter sanctos eius nemo immutabths, 83 Cfr. Apoc. IV, 8. 86 Sanciitas accidentalis. 84 Sanctitas participata s. ab alto. 87 Sanctitas substantialis. 35 Sanctitas a se s. per essentiam, 256 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY et coelt [angel] non sunt mundi in conspectu a evus—Behold among his saints none is un- changeable, and the heavens [angels] are not pure in his sight.” 1 Kings Il, 2: “Non est sanctus, ut est Dominus—There is none holy as the Lord is.” Consequently God alone is holy as He “alone is good.” * 7) We penetrate even more deeply into the nature of divine sanctity when we define it as “the essential love that God has for His own goodness.” As identity of being and thought, of cognoscibility and cognition in God entails the highest form of truth-life, 7. e., the most com- plete comprehension of His own Essence (com- prehensio sui), so absolute identity of being and willing, His amiability and His love, involves the highest form of volitional life, 7. ¢., substan- tial, living; subsisting sanctity.*® Hence it is that the intrinsic product of God’s notional un- derstanding is “Hypostatic Wisdom” (i. e., the Son of God, or Logos) while the intrinsic product of His notional volition and love is “Hypostatic Love” (i. e, the Holy Ghost). God's sanctity, conceived as charity, is the main- spring of His volitional life, just as wisdom is the mainspring of His living knowledge. In the 388 Luke XVIII, 19: “None is Nomin., c. 4): “Est Deus amor good but God alone.’ Cfr. Ps. bonus boni propter bonum (Eoeriy XXXVIII, 6. 6 Oceds Epws dyabds dyabod dia 89 Cfr. the profound dictum of 7d dyabdy).” the Pseudo-Dionysius (De Divin. ‘THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 257 light of these truths we understand the principle of moral theology, that “Charity is the fulfilment of the whole law,” and that love of God (caritas) must be considered as the “soul” and “queen” of all virtues, and, consequently, as absolute sanctity. This deeper conception of the divine attribute of sanctity as an affective and effec- tive transformation of the infinitely Loving One into the infinitely Lovable Good—rather than as a merely “ethical equation’’—is of the highest importance in aiding us to understand the es- sence of sanctifying grace as well as the Third Person of the Most Holy Trinity.” b) In its relation to those creatures which are endowed with intellect (angels and men) the sanctity of God, like His relative (ontological) goodness, is fourfold. In the first place, God is the inaccessible ideal and ex- emplar (causa exemplaris) of all created sanctity, es- pecially in the supernatural life of faith and glory.“ Secondly, He is the fount (causa efficiens) of natural justice and of supernatural sanctity through “ sanctify- ing grace.’ The Sacraments also derive their sanctify- ing power ex opere operato from God’s sanctity, or, by appropriation, from the Holy Ghost. Thirdly, di- vine sanctity is the causa finalis of creatural sanctity, inasmuch as the latter constitutes the aptest and most excellent medium of the glorification of God.*? Lastly, the divine sanctity must be called the quasi-formal cause 40 Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I am holy.” Cfr. I Pet. I, 15 sq. Lp 34. 42 Compare Math. VI, 9: ‘* Sanc- 41 Lev. XI, 44: “For I am the fificetur nomen tuum — Hallowed Lord your God: be holy because be thy name,” with : Thess. IV, 3: 258. ETHICAL (GOODNESS, (OR ISANCTITY (causa quasi formalis, sed non informans) of creatural sanctity, inasmuch as sanctifying grace inheres in the soul as a formal principle, as the Holy Ghost indwells personally in the just.* 3. THE OBJECTIVE SANCTITY OF Gop.—The term sanctity is sometimes employed in a non-eth- ‘ical sense, to denote the dignity, the inviolability, or the sacredness of a person or thing (augustum, sacrum, Sowv), | a) This objective sanctity, which is closely related to ontological goodness (bonum quod), may be attributed both to persons and things. But since it grows in pro- portion with dignity, it is in the very nature of -things greater in persons than in objects (objecta sacra, dow). Therefore the Schoolmen were wont to designate the angels as “hypostases cum dignitate.” Creatures en- dowed with intellect are persons, and therefore sui iuris, inviolable, venerable, and deserving of particular honor. It is for this reason that slavery is so damnable. It is in this sense, too, that the Pope is called “ His Holiness ” ; that an asylum, or the last will of a dying man, is termed “sacred,” Palestine “the Holy Land,” and so forth. These persons or objects are sacred or holy in so far as they are honorable, and venerable, and alto- gether inviolable. b) Manifestly God, Who is “the supreme Good” sans phrase, because of His infinite dignity must be absolutely honorable and venerable, and therefore objec- “ Haec est autem voluntas Dei, per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus sanctificatio vestra — For this is the est nobis— The. charity of God is will of God, your sanctification.” poured forth in our hearts, by the 43 Cfr, Rom. V, 5: “Caritas Holy Ghost, who is given to us.” Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris sy ” THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 259 tively sacred or holy, both to Himself and to His crea- tures. In fact, He is the Absolute Majesty, any violation of which by blasphemy, sacrilege, or formal hatred, 1s an awful crime. As God, out of respect for Himself, must needs honor His own dignity and majesty (4. @., objective sanctity), so the merest self-respect also com- pels Him to demand that every rational creature should honor and respect His absolute dignity and majesty by paying Him the highest possible form of worship, viz.: divine adoration (adoratio, latria). Under this aspect God’s objective sanctity may be regarded as the formal motive of the virtus religionis.4* The Bible frequently alludes to this divine attribute, as when, e. g., it refers to God as ‘‘ the Holy One of Israel,” that is, He Whom the Israelites must venerate; or in those texts where the name of God is spoken of as “holy and ter- rible.” 4® Creatures derive their objective sanctity from God as their exemplary and efficient cause. The dig- nity of civil rulers is sacred and inviolable, because all authority comes from God. The Bible sometimes refers to prophets and kings as “gods” on account of the dignity they had received from the Almighty. We often refer to churches, vestments, pictures, relics, rosaries, etc., as sacred (in the objective sense of the term), because, and in so far as, they are consecrated by God and to His use.“ In the same manner among the Israelites the Ark of the Covenant was called “ Sanctum Sanctorum,’ the place where Moses beheld the burning bush, ‘holy land,” and so forth. 44 Mazzella (De Virtutibus In- 45 Cfr. Ps. CX, 9: “ Sanctum et fusis, n. 45, 4th ed., Rome 1894), terribile nomen eius.” holds a different view. Cfr. S. 46 Consecrare = sacrum reddere. Thom., S. Theol., 2 2ae, qu. 81, art. 4 8q. : 260 MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE Reapincs: — Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, § 201.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, 8§ 99, 104 (summarized in Wilhelm- Scannell’s Manual, pp. 205 sq.).— Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 348 sqq.— Lessius, De Perfect. Div., 1. VIII.—J. Stufler, S. J., Die Heiligkeit Gottes und der ewige Tod, Innsbruck 1904.— Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 304 sqq— Humphrey, “ His Di- vine Majesty,’ pp. 98 saqq. ARTICLE 3 GOD’S MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE 1. DEFINITION OF MorAL Goopness.—As sanctity refers to the bonwm quod, so moral good- ness, or benevolence, is related to the bonum cut. The basic note of benevolence is a gratuitous love *7 which promotes the happiness of others — out of sheer kindliness. It follows that benevo- gq lence can be attributed only to intelligent, per- sonal beings, whilst the simple bonitas alteri s. relativa is predicable also of irrational things (e. g., the sun is good for terrestrial life). The contradictory of benevolence is malevolence (malevolentia), a disposition or inclination to in- jure others and to deprive them of their belong- ings. 7 As a moral attribute, 7. e. a virtue inherent in the will, God’s benevolence corresponds to His veracity and faithfulness. Like veracity and faithfulness, benevolence cannot be detached from its ontological basis, . 47 Amor gratuitus, benevolentia. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 261 2, THE Docma.—The Vatican Council has de- fined God’s benevolence in these terms: “Hic solus verus Deus bonitate sua... ad manijes- tandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae crea- turis impertitur, liberrimo consilo . . . utram- que de nihilo condidit creaturam. . . . Universa vero, quae condidit, Deus providentia sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad tinem fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter—This one only true God, of His own goodness... to manifest His perfection by the blessings which He bestows on creatures, and with absolute free- dom of counsel . . . created out of nothing... both the spiritual and corporal creature.... God protects and governs by His Providence all things which He hath made, ‘reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweet- ly.’ 99 48 ) a) In extension and essence God’s benevolence may be characterized as “the firm will which He has, out of pure but free love to confer natural as well as super- natural benefits upon His creatures, according to the nature and final destiny of each.” Its root lies in His ontological goodness.*® Its motive is God’s gener- ous love for His creatures; whatever contravenes this love, rms counter to His Divine Nature. Hence the 48 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, c. 1 fitate, propendet ad sui communio- (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, nem, sicut vas perfecte plenum ad n. 1783). effusionem sui liquoris.” (De Perf, 49“ Ex eo enim,” says Lessius, Divin., VIII, 1.) “ quod res sit perfecta in sua en- 262 MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE Bible says simply: “Deus caritas est (‘O @eds ayamn éortv) — God is charity.” °° St. Ignatius of Antioch had a beautiful motto to this effect: “ Amor meus cruci- fixus est ("Epos éuds éoravpwra)— My Love is cruci- fied.” Pseudo-Dionysius, in calling God benevolent and generous “not deliberately and by choice, but by His very nature,” * did not mean to deny the freedom with which He dispenses His favors, but only to emphasize that it is not a matter of free choice with God either to be or not to be love. In virtue of this essential char- acteristic, Divine Love is creative; for, “ Amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.” °2 b) Considering the attribute of divine benevolence in respect of its comprehension, we must say that it com- prises all created beings, rational and irrational. God is “the All-Good One,” His benevolence is universal. To begin with, all irrational creatures constantly receive innumerable favors at His hands. For not only does He give food to the young ravens,®* but He clothes the lilies of the field, and without His will not a sparrow falls from the roof. Therefore there exists no more beautiful formula for saying grace at table than Ps. CXLIV, 15 sq.: “ Oculi omnium in te sperant, Domine, et tu das escam illorum in tempore opportuno; aperis tu manum tuam et imples omne animal benedictione — The eyes of all hope in thee, O Lord, and thou givest them meat in due season. Thou openest thy hand, and fillest with blessing every living creature.” It is char- acteristic of Dante’s profundity of conception that he 50: John IV, 16. Dogmatik, Vol. III, § 202, and Les- 51 De Div. Nomin., c. 4. sius, De Perf. Divin., IX, 3. 52S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 53 Ps, ‘CX LVI o, 20, art. 2-—QOn the “eight quali- | 54 Math. VI, 28, A wer ties ” of benevolence, cfr. Scheeben, THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 263 closes his Paradiso with the line: “ L’amor che muove il sole e Valtre stelle.” *° But nothing can equal God’s love for man, both as a species and as an individual. The free creation of the human race and its immediate elevation to the supernatural plane, was the first and fundamental proof of divine benevolence towards man. Cfr. Ps. VIiLI;.6: “ Minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis, gloria et honore coronasti ewm— Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honor.” Even after man had fallen, God’s benevolence did not fail him. The Lord “raineth upon the just and the unjust,”®* and showers blessings upon the idolatrous gentiles, “ benefaciens de coelo, dans pluvias et tempora fructifera, implens cibo et laetitia corda nos- tra — Doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness.” °7 The acme of His love for humankind is reached in the Incarnation, this mystery of love, in the light of which the “ mysterium iniquitatis ” literally pales into insignifi- cancé. John III, 16: “ For God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son.” In His Son He gave us the most precious thing He had. Rom. VIII, 32: “He that spared not even his own BON eter Math he not also, with him, given us all things?” With kindly care He consults for each and every indi- vidual man. Cfr. Is. XLIX, 15 sq.: “Can a woman forget her infant, so as not to have pity on the son of her womb? And if she should forget, yet will not I forget thee. Behold, I have graven thee in my 55 “ But yet the will roll’d onward, That moves the sun in heav’n ~ like a wheel and all the stars.” In even motion, by the Love (Cary’s Translation.) impell’d 56 Math. V, 45. 57 Acts XIV, 16. 264 MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE hands.” The history of Divine Providence is an elo- quent commentary on Wisdom XII, 1: “ Quam bonus et suavis est, Domine, spiritus tuus in omnibus — How — good and sweet is thy spirit, O Lord, in all things.” Such boundless love should elicit a strong and ardent affection in return. “Let us therefore love God, because God hath first loved us.” 58 REApDINGs : ~ Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. III, § 202— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 98.— *Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., 1, IX.— St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., I, 91 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 67 sq.).— Ipem, S. Theol., ta, qu. 20. 581 John IV, 19. SECTION 5 GOD AS ABSOLUTE BEAUTY 1. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—The nature of beauty has been the subject of much contro- versy. The safest thing for the theologian to do is to adopt the Patristic, which is also the Scholastic, view. a) The “ Angel of the Schools” describes the beau- tiful thus: “ Pulchra sunt, quae visa placent — Those things are beautiful which please when seen.” * Hence, clearly, cesthetic pleasure or delectation is of the es- sence of beauty. But this definition is merely ex effectu, as was already observed by St. Augustine : “Non ideo pulchra sunt quia delectant, sed ideo de- lectant, quia pulchra sunt — Things are not beautiful be- cause they please, but they please because they are beautiful.” 2 To determine the essence of beauty we must therefore seek out the cause of esthetic pleasure. This cause, according to St. Augustine, is unity amid variety ®>—“ Unitas in multiplicitate,’ but so that unity is the determining element: “Ommis pulchritudinss forma unitas.’ *— Now, if unity is to give pure pleasure to the mind of him who contemplates it, the beautiful ob- ject must needs be visible and evident. A hidden or im- 1S. Theol., 1a, qu. 5, art. 4, ad 1. 8 Unitas in multiplicitate.” 2De Vera Relig., c. 32, TN. 59- 4S. August., Ep. 18 ad Coelestin. 18 ce 266 ABSOLUTE BEAUTY perceptible unity, could not be productive of zsthetic pleasure. St. Thomas® resolves the Augustinian con- cept of beauty into the following three essential ele- ments: completeness of the whole (perfectio rei), har- monious relation of its parts (proportio debita partium), and, shed over all, a certain definiteness, clearness, lustre or splendor (claritas). Claritas renders a beautiful — object visible to the mind; the proportio debita partium — is the basis of “unity in variety”; and the perfectio ret is the necessary foundation of both, because that which is imperfect lacks both proportion and clearness.® b) From what we have said it follows that beauty is essentially related to the intellect and will, and also to truth and goodness. Truth and goodness are _ linked together by the notion of ens, with which they are both convertible; but they are still more closely - bound up with the concept of beauty, because Beauty, as it | i were, draws with one hand from the well of truth, and with the other from the fountain of goodness. It holds the middle between truth and goodness, St. Augustine calls it “splendor veri —the brightness of reality,” 7 while St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that between beauty and goodness there is only a logical distinction. A beautiful object must above all else be good (4. é., per- fect) in order to be able to elicit from the beholder pure love of complacency (amor complacentiae). But 5S. Theol., 1a, qu. 39, art. 8. 6 Cfr. John Rickaby, S. J., Gen- eral Metaphysics (Stonyhurst Se- ries), pp. 147 sqq. 7 Cfr. Ch. Coppens, S, J., Eng- lish Rhetoric, pp. 98 sq., 3rd ed., New York 1887. 8Cfr. S. Theol., 1-2ae, qu. 17, art. 1;).ad > 3% bono, sola ratione differens. Quum enim bonum sit, quod omnia appe- “ Pulchrum est idem — tunt, de ratione bont est, quod in eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad ra- tionem pulchri pertinet, quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus.... Et sic patet, pulchrum addit supra bonum quen- dam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, tta quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui, pul- chrum autem id cuius ipsa appre- hensio placet.” quod THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 267 it must also be clear and evident, because if it lacked evidence, the mind could not easily perceive the con- formity and grouping of the various parts around the central point of unity. Whence follows the important deduction, that the intellect, and the intellect alone, perceives beauty; while the will, and the will alone, is the seat of zsthetic pleasure. Beauty, therefore, is a supra-sensual quality; and this holds true not only with regard to spiritual beings, such as God, the angels, and the soul, but also in respect of material objects, such as painting, sculpture, music, etc. The irrational brute may perceive a beautiful object, but it can not perceive its (intelligible) beauty. We may therefore define beauty with Kleutgen® as “rei bonitas, quatenus haec mente cognita delectat —The goodness of an object, in so far as this affords pleasure when perceived by the mind.” c) As beauty and goodness materially coincide, the former must be a transcendental attribute of being like the latter.1° In matter of fact the elements of beauty, 1. €., perfection, harmonious proportion, and clearness, or splendor, are proper to all objects in the same manner in which being is proper to them."? ' 2. DoGMATIC APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCI- PLES.—Though the Church has never defined it as of faith, yet Sacred Scripture and Tradition make it quite certain that beauty is an attribute of 9 De Ipso Deo, p. 418. 10 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Div. Nomin., c. 4: “‘ Eorum quae sunt, nullum est quin pulchri et bont par- ticeps sit—-No thing exists but what partakes of beauty and good- ness.” 11 On the subdivisions of beauty, sublimity, elegance, charm, etc., see Jungmann, S. J., Asthetik, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Freiburg 1886; G. Giet- mann, S, J., Allgemeine Asthetik, Freiburg 1899; John Rickaby, S. J., General Metaphysics, pp. 147 sq4q.3 Chas. Coppens, S. J., English Rhet- oric, 3rd ed. pp. 98 sqq., New York 1887. 268 ABSOLUTE BEAUTY God. Perhaps no divine attribute has been so generally neglected by theologians as this, owing probably to the circumstance that in the unsettled state of the science of zesthetics it was not easy to determine whether beauty should be classed as a “pure” or as a “mixed” perfection of the Divine Essence. We claim that it is a pure perfection; that the notion of pulchrum is formally predica- ble of God; that beauty in its formal sense is proper to God; that He is primordial beauty, all- beauty, and beautiful in a higher sense than any creature, and that, precisely for this reason, He is the exemplar and the cause of all created beauty. a) Reason tells us that God must be beautiful; for if He contains within His Essence the elements of beauty (perfection, harmonious proportion, and splendor), the attribute which necessarily results from these elements must also be His. Now, God is infinite perfection; His infinitely numerous good qualities (not parts) coalesce in His Divine Essence into a most intensive unity; and, finally, He is all light, and pure clarity, and conse- quently, He must be beautiful. The Book of Wisdom concludes from the beauty manifest in the physical universe that the Creator is transcendently beautiful. Wisdom XIII, 3 sq.: “ Quorum [i. e., ignis, coeli, solis, etc.] st specie [pulchritudine] delectati deos putaverunt, sciant quanto his dominator eorum speciosior [ pulchrior | est; specter enim generator (6 rod KdéAXovs yeveoidpxys ) haec omnia constituit — With whose beauty [viz., that of fire, the sun, etc.], if they, being delighted, took them THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 269 to be gods: let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they: for the first author of beauty made all those things.” Scripture frequently compares the beauty of God to a garment wrapped about the Divine Essence. Cfr. Prov. XXXI, 25: “ Forti- tudo et decor indumentum eius — Strength and beauty are her clothing.” Ps, CIII, 1 sq.: “ Decorem induistt, amictus lumine sicut vestimento — Thou ... art clothed with light as with a garment.” Ecclesiasticus compares “Eternal Wisdom”? to the splendor of exquisite flowers, and calls it “mother of beautiful love.” In the Can- ticle of Canticles Divine Beauty appears in the guise of a charming bride-groom.'? With the exception of St. Augustine, who has written on the subject with his usual profundity, the Fathers seldom descant on this divine at- tribute. b) God is not only beautiful, He is the very essence of beauty (pulchritudo a se), just as He is essential truth and goodness. And in the same manner that He is true in virtue of being Himself the Truth, He is beautiful in virtue of being Himself Beauty, because beauty is His very Essence. This proposition is demon- strable as a theological conclusion from the three ele- ments of beauty: perfectio, proportio partium, claritas. God is infinite perfection itself.1* He is the subsisting monas, comprising within Himself all being,“* and He is light and splendor.1® Consequently, He is substantial, subsisting, aseitarian Beauty. This becomes still clearer if we apply to Him St. Augustine’s definition of beauty, vig.: “Unity in variety.” There can be no greater variety than that implied in God’s infinite perfections ; 12 Cfr. Cant. Cantic., I, 15: 13 Supra, pp. 180 sqq. “Ecce tu pulcher es, dilecte mi, et 14 Supra, pp. 196 sqq. decorus — Behold thou art fair, my 15 Supra, pp. 225 Sqq. beloved, and comely.” 270 ABSOLUTE BEAUTY. nor a more intensive unity than the identity of the Divine Essence with its attributes, Consequently the notion of beauty is realized in God absolutely ; and all the more perfectly as the element of multiplicity is not confined to the virtually distinct properties of the Divine Essence, but applies in an even higher degree to the real distinction of the Divine Persons. Abso- lute unity in real trinity must culminate in absolute beauty.16 ; Because God is Primordial Beauty, therefore He is All-Beauty, and excels every species of created beauty, as Nazianzen intimates when he says: “Who is all beauty and far beyond all beauty.”27 We will not re- hearse the utterances of Pseudo-Dionysius, who has written so sublimely on the beauty of God, because we know now that this supposed “ disciple of the Apos- tles,’ whom the Schoolmen held in such high esteem, was not the real Areopagite, but a Christian pupil of the Neo-Platonist philosopher Proclus (+ 485). The sooner theologians cease quoting Pseudo-Dionysius as an authority, the better. He can at most serve as a witness to Tradition such as it existed in the latter part of the fifth and in the early part of the sixth cen- tury.18 c) How is Divine Beauty related to created beauty? Divine Beauty is the ideal and source of all created beauty, both in the spiritual and the material order. 16 Why beauty is especially ap- propriated to the Logos, is ex- plained by St. Thomas, S. Theol., Tay Gi, FO atte Se 17 Or. Theol., 2. Cfr. IpEm, De Virginit., cap. 11: “No one is so obtuse as to be unable to see that God alone is beauty kar’ efox7nr, in the original and exclusive sense.”? 18 Cfr. H. Koch, Pseudo-Diony- sius Areopagita in seinen Beziehun- gen zum Neuplatonismus und My- sterienwesen, Mainz 1900. Also the article ‘‘ Dionysius, the Pseudo-Are- opagite,” in the Catholic Encyclo- pedia, Vol. V, pp. 13 sqq. and Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 535 sqq. Freiburg and St. Louis 1908. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 271 With reference to Wisdom XIII, 3 sqq., St. Hilary teaches: “De magnitudine enim operum et pulchritu- dine creaturarum consequenter generationum conditor conspicitur. Magnorum Creator in maximis est, et pul- cherrimorum conditor in pulcherrimis.’ Augustine con- fesses: “Nulla extra te pulchra essent, nist essent abs te — No beautiful objects would exist outside of Thee, had they not received being from Thee,” *® and deplores his own defection from the Source of Beauty thus: “Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova. ... Et ecce intus eras, et ego forts, et ibi te quaere- bam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis trrue- bam — Too late have I loved Thee, O Beauty so an- cient, O Beauty so new, too late have I loved Thee! And behold Thou wast within, and I was abroad, and there I sought Thee, and deformed as I was, ran after those beauties which Thou hast made.” #° Unfortunately for himself, the great Bishop of Hippo had not fol- lowed the advice of St. Isidore of Seville,?* who urged that fallen man should use the beauties of creation as a ladder whereby to ascend to Primordial Beauty. God’s beauty is most splendidly reflected, not by the mineral, or the vegetable, or the animal kingdom, nor yet by the fine arts, but by the immortal soul of man, which presents a likeness and an image of Divine Beauty. Origen says: “The human soul is most beautiful; in fact, it possesses a beauty that is truly marvelous; for the Artist Who created it said: Let Us make man according to Our image and likeness. What can be more beautiful than such beauty and similitude?” ?? Let it be added, however, that the soul is capable of 19 Confess., IV. 10. 22 Hom. in Ezech., 7. (See S. 20 Confess., X, 27. - Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 3, art. 1 21 De Summo Bono, I, 4. sqq.) 272 ABSOLUTE BEAUTY various degrees of beauty according as it is consid- ered as the natural or the supernatural image of its Creator. The infusion of sanctifying grace, the forma- tion in the soul of the image of Christ, the immersion of the spirit into the beatific light of the Divine Sub- stance — produce in man a degree of beauty which no tongue can utter and no pen is able to describe? Therefore ascetic writers justly claim that the attain- ment of moral perfection is the noblest of all arts, and that no masterpiece of art can be compared to a holy soul. The most beautiful product of Divine Art is the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God, in whose person innumerable privileges and perfections are harmoniously blended. Jesus Christ Himself. (as Adyos évoapxos = the Word made Flesh) would have to be called the apex of creatural beauty, and therefore the most perfect image of Divine Beauty, were it not for the fact that we must admire in Him rather the Hypostatic Union of created with Uncreated Beauty. For in His Divine Nature Christ is Substantial Beauty, while created beauty shines forth in His human nature only.?4 Closely related to beauty is the divine attribute of sublimity (sublimitas, peyadonpéxaa), which is rooted in God’s infinity, incomprehensibility, and omnipotence. Several of the Psalms de- scribe this attribute in language of imposing 23 Cir. Scheeben, Die Herrliche Cfr. Clem, Alex., Strom., II, 5: keiten der géttlichen Gnade, 6th “ Redemptor noster... est vera ed. Freiburg 1897. pulchritudo, nam erat lux vera — 24 Cfr. Ps. XLIV, 3: “‘ Speciosus Our Saviour ... is the true Beau- forma prae filiis hominum, diffusa ty, because He was the true Light.” est gratia in labiis tuis — Thou art On the whole subject, cfr. J. Sou- beautiful above the sons of men: ben, Les Manifestations du Beau grace is poured abroad in thy lips.” dans la Nature, Paris 1901. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 273 grandeur, and the famous “Prayer of Habacuc’”’ is rightly reckoned among the gems of litera- ture; READINGS: — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 85 (Wilhelm. Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 206 sqq.).—*Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 417 sqq.— Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 30— Nierem- berg, Della Bellezza di Dio— Petavius, De Deo, VI, 8— Thomassin, De Deo, III, 19 sqq.— *Stentrup, De Deo Uno, cap. VII, Oeniponte 1895.— H. Krug, De Pulchritudine Divina, Fri- burgi 1902.— Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 113 sqq., Lon- don 1897. 25 Habacuc, Ch, III. CHAPTER II GOD’S CATEGORICAL ATTRIBUTES OF BEING The so-called categories (xeryyopia, praedica- menta) differ from the transcendental attributes of being in that they are not univocally predicable of all being, but of certain determined classes of being only. By reducing all concrete beings to their highest genera, Aristotle arrived at the ten so-called categories: substance (oteia) and the nine accidents (ovmBeByxdra) : quality (mov), quan- tity (mooev), relation (pés 7), place (mov), time (more), position or attitude (situs, xeioOu), habitus or external belongings (xe == potency and fac- ulties), action (7oeiv), and passion (7éoxew, pati). In entering upon the discussion of the remain- ing attributes of God, we base the theological teaching concerning them upon these summa genera essendt, 1. e, “the two all-embracing classes (substance and accident), to one or other of which all terrestrial things capable of being conceived in thought belong.” We do not, of course, mean to apply the predicaments to God in their strict sense—God is beyond and above 1Cfr. Clarke, Logic, pp. 187 sqq., and the article ‘‘ Category ” in the Catholic Encyclopedia III, 433 sqq. 274 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 275 all categories of being—but we employ them merely as points of departure and development. “Relation” (7pés ™) is omitted here, because it plays its part chiefly in the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, with which we are not specially concerned in this volume.? “Quality” and “habi- tus’ we have already done with. Hence there remain to be considered only two groups of categories: (1) “Substance”? and “action,” which by the method of affirmative differentia- tion give us the two positive attributes of absolute substantiality and omnipotence; (2) “Quantity,” “passion,” “time,” and “space,” (704 and «eio6a), which by the method of negative differentiation yield the four negative attributes of incorporeity, unchangeableness, eternity, and omnipresence. Hence we shall divide this chap- ter into six sections. 2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1915. SECTION: 1 GOD’S ABSOLUTE SUBSTANTIALITY I, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.—An accident by its very nature inheres in some other being as its subject (esse in alio); while substance, on the other hand, essentially connotes inseity (esse im se); 1. @., it essentially excludes the notion of a subject in which to inhere. “Substance is being, inasmuch as this being is by itself (per se);* accident is that whose being is to be in something else.” ? Inseity must not be confounded with aseity, and a sharp distinction must be drawn between ens a se and ens im se. It was because he confused these two no- tions, after the example of Descartes, that Spinoza fell into the error of teaching that there is but “one sub- stance” with two attributes, viz., spirituality and exten- sion.? While it is quite true that the ens in se, like the ens a se, is “an independent being,’ they differ 1The Schoolmen, in order to accident, which exists in alio, or leave per se applicable to both un- created and created substance, have chosen a se to signify the special character of the former.