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 Readings on fundamental 
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 READINGS 
 
 ON 
 
 Fundamental Moral Theology 
 
 BY THE 
 
 RT. REV. LOUIS J.’NAU, S.T.D. 
 Rector of Mount St. Mary Seminary of the West 
 
 CINCINNATI, OHIO 
 
 
 
 FREDERICK PUSTET COMPANY, Inc. 
 NEW YORK +} CINCINNATI 
 
 1926 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Preface 
 
 HESE studies are intended as supplementary reading to 
 Sabetti-Barrett. This well-known textbook on moral 
 theology is admittedly very brief and deals more with 
 
 conclusions deduced from principles, than with the proof of 
 the principles. This is especially true in the first or funda- 
 mental part. It takes for granted that the principles of 
 psychology and ethics underlying human acts, the norm of 
 morality, laws and legislation, moral obligation, etc., have 
 been fully established in the course of philosophy. Experience 
 however proves that the students coming for theology, though 
 they have a knowledge and judgment of these philosophical 
 principles, have not understood their full bearing on the 
 morality of concrete acts. For the purpose of reviewing and 
 refreshing these former studies and to give the more talented 
 and industrious students a better insight into the principles on 
 which the conclusions of moral theology are based, an extension 
 course was arranged for them in Mount St. Mary Seminary of 
 the West. ‘These studies contain some of the lectures given 
 in this course during the year 1925-1926. They are published 
 in book form in the hope that they will interest former students 
 and priests engaged in parochial work and urge them on to a 
 _ deeper study of the basic principles of moral theology. They 
 make no pretense to originality nor to the clamorous research 
 work so much in vogue today. Nor do they pretend to be 
 exhaustive. Their purpose is rather to be stimulative by 
 putting some of these problems before the student for investi- 
 gation and deeper study. 
 
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Preamble 
 
 St. Thomas and the Ethics of Human Conduct 
 
 T. THOMAS studies questions of Moral Theology ex 
 professo in the second part of his Summa Theologica. 
 Both the external and internal order of questions studied 
 
 in the Summa are theocentric, starting with God and ending 
 with Him. The Angelic Doctor indicates the reason for the 
 division of his Summa into three parts in the following words: 
 “Since the principal purpose of this sacred doctrine (theology) 
 is to give knowledge of God not only as He is in Himself but 
 also as He is the principal and end of all things and more 
 especially of the rational creature, desiring to give an exposition 
 of this doctrine, we will treat first of God; secondly of the 
 motion of the rational creature towards God; and thirdly of 
 Christ who (as He is man) is the way for us to come to God”’ 
 (I, q. 2. caption to article one). In the second part which 
 treats of ethics God is studied as the final cause and man is 
 studied in as far as he is a rational creature tending naturally 
 towards God. The second part of the Summa was admired 
 already by contemporaries as the most original and brilliant 
 treatise in the Summa. 
 
 To formulate a system of ethics thoroughly practical and at 
 the same time to observe a rigid external order in the disposition 
 of the subject matter and an internal order reducing the various 
 principles to be applied to a basic underlying principle was not 
 an easy task. But St. Thomas knew so well how to combine 
 consideration of the universal with the particular, analysis 
 with synthesis, deduction with induction as to enable him to 
 put forward a system of morals both speculative and at the 
 same time empirically practical in an eminent degree. 
 
 The second part of the Summa especially deserves the 
 encomium which Leo XIII passed on the works of the Angelic 
 ‘Doctor: ‘Among the scholastic doctors, the chief and master 
 
 5 
 
6 Preamble 
 
 
 
 
 
 of all, towers St. Thomas of Aquinas who, as Cajetan observes, 
 ‘because he most venerated the ancient doctors of the Church, 
 in a certain way seems to have inherited the intellect of all.’ 
 The doctrines of those illustrious men like the scattered mem- 
 bers of a body, Thomas collected together and cemented, 
 distributed in wonderful order and so increased with important 
 additions that he is rightly esteemed the special bulwark 
 and glory of the Catholic Faith’ (Encyclical Aeterni Patris— 
 Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII, Benziger Bros., p. 48). Speak- 
 ing of the practical value of the Summa the same Pontiff says: 
 “The teachings of St. Thomas on the true meaning of liberty, 
 which at times is running into license, on the divine origin of 
 all authority, on laws and their force, on the paternal and just 
 rule of princes, on obedience to the higher powers, on mutual 
 charity one towards another—on all of these and kindred 
 subjects have a very great and invincible force to overturn 
 those principles of the new order which are well known to be 
 dangerous to the peaceful order of things and to public safety”’ 
 Gbids pbb 
 
 The central and pivotal thought which gives internal and 
 cohesive order to the teachings on moral conduct in the Summa 
 is the same as in the whole philosophic system of St. Thomas, 
 namely, the study of the concept of being. Just as in his 
 psychologic study of the intellect the Truth of Being is searched 
 out, thus in the psychology of the will the whole question 
 hinges on the Gocd of the Being. ‘The rational being expresses 
 the fullness of his personal being by the deliberate acts of the 
 will. The fullness of personality is expressed by the acts of the 
 will guided by the intellect because these two faculties consti- 
 tute the being of personality. The fullness of personal being 
 can be found only where there is control of acts. This control 
 is exercised by the personal being because the will is free to 
 choose as it will the created objects for which it can strive. 
 It can thus freely choose because every created object is 
 contingent and defective in being. That which attracts the 
 
Preamble 7 
 
 
 
 will is the good of the object. Every being is good in the degree 
 in which it partakes of being, that is, in as far as it possesses 
 the requisite perfection which nature has apportioned to its 
 being. The lack of this being constitutes evil which is therefore 
 non-being and as such cannot attract the will. 
 
 To strive for, to enjoy and to love the fullness of being is the 
 ultimate end of the will and towards this the will by nature is 
 oriented. All its particular ends are ranged under and toward 
 this ultimate end. ‘The good of the object, of the circumstances 
 surrounding the object, of the end for which it is sought all 
 are attractions for the will. Its passive potency lies in this, it 
 can thus be attracted by the good. Its control arises because 
 when thus attracted the will can determine itself by its active 
 potency to act or not to act. 
 
 The intellect studies the truth of being as it is in the knower, 
 namely, as the external object is faithfully reproduced in the 
 passive intellect of the knower; the will strives for the good of 
 the object as it is in reality. The fullness of being in reality is 
 found only in God, the subsistent being in itself, the 7psuwm esse 
 subsistens. “I am who am, I am being, Jahve,”’ is the definition 
 of Himself which God gave to Moses. God is the highest good 
 because good and being coincide. As He is the highest being 
 in reality, the 7pswm esse subsistens, He is the highest good in 
 reality. For “a thing is said to be perfect in the measure in 
 which it is an actu” (I, q. 4, a. 1), 1.e., the degree of a being’s 
 perfection depends on the degree of its actuality. God is 
 highest good in actuality and therefore He is the ultimate end 
 of the will. 
 
 The fullness of being in actuality hence the fullness of good 
 of the divine essence prompted God to create, namely, to give 
 being to things outside of Himself which had it not. The 
 exemplar, the image and likeness of things created is the divine 
 essence which as it moved God to create the beings that are, so 
 it was given to them as the norm of their perfection. This is 
 the Eternal Reason of God and His Eternal Law. Conse- 
 
8 Preamble 
 
 quently the moral good of man is in the approach to this norm. 
 Consequently, too, the expressions of his personal being by 
 acts over which he has control will be qualified as good or bad 
 as they are in conformity or deformity to this norm of being 
 which God—the divine essence, has set for him. 
 
 The relation of human persons to human persons and to 
 human society are judged by this same law and from it the 
 obligations of man to man as an individual and as a social 
 being spring. In his political teaching the Angelic Doctor 
 applies the same theory: “The individual person is a part of 
 the multitude, and every man as he 7s and as he has is of the 
 multitude, just as every part is of the whole’ (I, q. 96, a. 4). 
 For the benefit of the multitude he must give a part of what he 
 has to receive back from the multitude in another form what 
 he has given up for it. 
 
 Now it would be a fatal mistake to deduce from these 
 considerations that the whole synthesis of Thomistic philosophy 
 and especially of the parts which treat of the ethics of human 
 conduct is based on mere a priorz reasoning. In the search 
 for the truth of being the Angelic Doctor proceeds by a 
 posteriort analysis. From the analysis of consciousness he 
 shows that the first concept of the mind is being, which then 
 is reasoned about, judged, and the formal conclusions of an svt, 
 quid sit, cur sit, propter quid sit are drawn. ‘This analysis, 
 too, brings the evaluation of the truth, the mind image faithfully 
 reflects the reality of things and thus scepticism is banished and 
 knowledge and science are possible. His study of truth does 
 not stop at the mental image, it goes out through the medium of 
 the mental image to reality. Being is not a mere mental image, 
 it exists in reality in the particular and the concrete and the 
 mental image of it is a true likeness of this reality which is 
 tested by the criterion of things as they are. This same 
 criterion is applied to human acts and to their morality. He 
 studies human personality as it is and as it expresses itself by 
 personal acts and then formulates his final synthesis. 
 
Preamble | 9 
 
 Herein lies the vigor and freshness of the whole Thomistic 
 system, namely, truth is not a figment of the mind, it is founded 
 on realities, the will does not rediscover as in the system of 
 Kant the being and knowledge objects and their values which a 
 sceptical mind has lost. A thing is not good because God has 
 so willed but God so willed because the thing is good. The 
 created will has a natural inclination to the good to the reason- 
 able; the fitness of the object and the good, the beauty, the 
 reasonableness, attract it. The will determines itself as it is 
 attracted by the good of the object. Because of the weakness 
 and defectiveness of man’s powers it may be deceived and 
 accept the apparent for the real; because of its own imperfec- 
 tion passions, affections and habits may grip it but, unless it 
 has gone insane, it can hold the mastery for its natural bent, 
 inclination and orientation is towards the good which is the 
 fullness of reality. Thus the ethics of St. Thomas hold the 
 balance equally between exaggerated individualism and social- 
 ism, between exaggerated indeterminism and absolute predeter- 
 minism. (Cf. L’Anima di San Tomaso, by Olgiati, professor 
 in University of Milan; Societa Editrice Vita et Pensiero, 
 Milan, 1923, translated by John 8S. Zybura under the title: 
 “The Key to the Study of St. Thomas,” Herder, St. Louis, 
 1925.) 
 

 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 Free Will and Moral Obligation 
 
 ARTICLE I 
 
 The Psychology of the Free Will 
 
 HE psychic activity of man falls under the purview of 
 moral theology in as far as his acts are attributable to 
 his human person, i.e., such acts over which he can 
 
 exercise control. Such are the acts of the sense and spirit life. 
 The mere vegetative life acts are beyond this control. 
 
 In this restricted sense the psychic activity of man proceeds 
 from two faculties classified generically as the cognitive and 
 appetitive. ‘Two cognitive faculties are distinguished, namely, 
 the sensuous and the intellectual. Under the sensuous the 
 five external and the four internal senses are ranged. Corre- 
 spondingly two appetitive faculties are distinguished: to wit, 
 the inferior or sense appetite, the superior or rational appetite. 
 
 Many among the moderns wish to distinguish a third 
 generic faculty, namely, feeling or better, perhaps, the emo- 
 tional faculty. Though a distinction can be made between 
 feeling, emotion and appetency, in reality they denote varying 
 states of the one appetitive faculty as it is slight or vehement 
 or efficacious. They are varying inclinations toward the good 
 or aversion from evil. And are thus all three nothing else than 
 inclinations toward an object as it is good or evil and in conse- 
 quence belong to the appetitive faculty. (Cf. Donat, S.J., 
 Psychologia, Innsbruck, 1928, n. 371 sqq. Maher, S.J., Psy- 
 chology, ec. III, XII, XIX.) 
 
 Every being by a natural tendency seeks its own good. 
 By good is here meant that which does or can bestow a per- 
 fection on a thing, or that which can help a thing to acquire 
 or retain that condition of being which is proper to it. Con- 
 
 11 
 
12 Fundamental 
 
 sidered thus it is called the worthy good (bonwm honestwm); 
 considered merely in the light of pleasure, either sensuous or 
 intellectual, it can produce, it is called the delectable good; 
 considered in as far as it is means to another good, it is called 
 the useful good. In the question of morals the bonwm honestum 
 is considered in its relation to the law of God and as such is 
 called the moral good. 
 
 The good, in as far as it is not merely the terminus of the 
 appetite but is exactly that which prompts by its own force 
 theappetite actually to go out toit, is called the end. The ration- 
 al appetitive faculty by which man pursues his good is the will. 
 It is the efficient cause of all human acts. The final cause of 
 such acts, namely, that which calls forth the activity of the will 
 is the good of the being of the object towards which this activity 
 tends. 
 
 The will of itself is undetermined to act, or not to act. Its 
 determinant in the abstract is the good in general. In the 
 concrete, it is some particular good apprehended as such. The 
 definite good is therefore that which determines the will which 
 is in potentiality to become active and to place this particular 
 act. The will, of course, is mistress of her own acts, in so far 
 as she can accept or reject the good proposed but yet if she 
 does will, it is because of the good proposed. The efficient 
 cause of the action and of the act is the will, but the cause which 
 moves the will is the good of the end. To the question: 
 Then why is the act posited? The answer must be: Because 
 the will so willed; and to the further question: Why did the 
 will posit this particular act and not another? The answer 
 is: Because of the good of the end. 
 
 The causality of the final cause is said to be metaphorical, 
 not, however, as if it were a mere fiction, but to distinguish it 
 from the efficient cause. St. Thomas points out the difference: 
 “As the influence of the efficient cause is to act, the influence 
 of the final cause is to be sought after and to be desired.” ! 
 
 (1) Quaest. Disp. de verit. 22 ad 2. 
 
Moral Theology 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 The final cause does not unfold any activity—it is “causa 
 movens non mota’”’. ‘The activity goes out from the appetitive 
 faculty which is so disposed by nature that it may (or must) 
 go out to its affinity—the good which is proposed to it. 
 
 The causality of the final cause does not extend to the 
 subjective element of the act, i.e., the being of the act, it 
 refers to the objective side, the specification of the act. 
 
 . The final cause is not identical with the formal cause which, 
 too, because it gives the matter its differentiating form, is a 
 principle of specification. Acts take their species from the 
 formal object. The difference lies in this: the final cause 
 does not move the will simply to the good but on account of 
 the good it moves the will to something else. 
 
 The final cause exercises its causal influence in a threefold 
 manner: 
 
 a. ‘To fix the intention on the end; 
 
 b. ‘To use means to the end; 
 
 ¢ To attain the end or to effect the end in its physical 
 being. Finis obtinendus vel efficiendus. 
 
 This latter causality might in a cursory consideration seem 
 to imply self-generation. However, the active elements of the 
 cause are the ideal good of the intended end and as such are 
 acts of apprehending and willing. In the effect the physical 
 being of the end obtained takes form in connection with the 
 activities produced by these acts of apprehension and willing. 
 
 From this, too, it is understood, why the apprehension of 
 the good, as at least not impossible of attainment, must precede 
 every causal activity of the end. 
 
 The will is a blind faculty, its appetite is ‘““motws non movens’’. 
 The good of the being (of the object) must be brought to it 
 and specified for it by some other faculty. The appetibility 
 of the object able to draw it is objective; but it cannot present 
 itself to the will except through a cognitive faculty. “ Nihil 
 volitum nisi precognitum.”’ 
 

 
 214 Hundamental 
 
 
 
 The will is the motor of the psychic acts of man; and the 
 psychic activity of man is subject to the command of the will. 
 However, the will cannot move the intellect unless previously 
 some thought of the object has presented itself to the mind. 
 Hence the axiom, “‘the first thought of a thing is not subject to 
 the command of the will.” For the will cannot determine 
 itself to act unless the good of the object has been previously 
 presented to it for selection. Nor can the will directly work 
 on the object by lending the object a convincing motive which 
 it has not of itself, in other words the will cannot produce 
 evidence capable of moving the intellect where none such 
 exists. The will can command reason to study the object 
 more intimately, to examine it more closely; it cannot increase 
 or lesson the vision power of the intellect, but it can give it a 
 different viewpoint. The light in which reason works must 
 be there, but the will can command the intellect to train the 
 spotlight from a different angle, to exclude the sidelights, to 
 dim or darken the light. To start with, therefore, there must 
 be a something which at least gives a vague or undefined 
 motive for the incipient assent of the intellect. “Then the will 
 can give the intellect a bent, a disposition or a condition which 
 otherwise would be lacking. In this way the will can muddle 
 even the self-evident first principles, and thus the act of the 
 intellect depends on the act of the will and is commanded by it. 
 This force is not despotically but diplomatically compelling, 
 for the intellect in turn can and does sway the will. Again 
 as there is nothing in the intellect except through the senses, 
 the senses through the intellect can grip the will and the will 
 in turn can sway the intellect to hold the mastery, and thus 
 there is an interplay of cognition and appetency. 
 
 In as far, and only in as far, as these faculties are in man’s 
 control can he be held accountable for their acts, and thus the 
 question arises: is this control free? 
 
 Free will, or rather to be more exact, free choice (St. Thomas 
 always speaks of liberum arbitrium rather than of libera voluntas) 
 
Moral Theology 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 -negatively means a freedom from an external cause compelling 
 man to do something against his will (libertas a coactione); 
 positively it means (1) the power to act or not to act (labertas 
 contradictionis); (2) the power to place this act in preference to 
 another (libertas specificationis). This freedom of the human 
 will is based on the natural propensity of the will to be moved 
 by the good. This, of course, is a necessity, the same as in 
 order that the sight can see, a colored object must be brought 
 within the radius of its vision. In this sense the will is in 
 potentiality to be moved. 
 
 When the good is placed before it in this present life the will 
 is free to accept or reject it. “The reason,’’ says Leo XIII, 
 “Judges that it is equally possible for each and every created 
 good to be or not to be and, in consequence of this, discerning 
 that none need of necessity be taken up gives the will the power 
 and option to elect as it chooses.”’2 St. Thomas expresses this 
 same truth in the following words: “If the will is offered an 
 object which is good universally and from every viewpoint 
 the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all since 
 it cannot will the opposite (evil).”’* “If on the other hand 
 the will is offered an object that isnot good from every view- 
 point it will not tend to it of necessity. Lack of any good isa 
 non-good.’’ Therefore the reason why the will is free with 
 regard to created good is: all such good is contingent, all such 
 good is defective. Therefore freedom of the will arises from a 
 disproportion between subject and object. The subject, the 
 will, is unlimited in its tendency to the good; the object, the 
 created good is limited. Thus the will, which is in potentiality 
 to be moved by any good, has the potency to move itself freely 
 to any good. If we inquire further, why can the will determine 
 itself in face of any particular good to act or not to act, i.e., to 
 accept or reject it, or prefer one good to another, the answer is: 
 
 (2) Eneyclieal, Libertas. See Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII, p. 186. Benziger Bros. 
 
 (3) Summa I-II, q. x, a. 2. Passages from the Summa are generally quoted from the 
 translation of the Dominican Fathers. London, Burns & Oates. 
 
 (4) Ibid. 
 

 
 
 
 16 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 every particular good is contingent and defective, and therefore 
 the will is free in its choice. 
 
 This act of choice is the fruit of a united act of the reason 
 and the will. “Man acts from judgment, because by his 
 apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided 
 or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some 
 particular act, is not from natural instinct, but from some act 
 of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judg- 
 ment and retains the power to be inclined to various things. 
 For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses as 
 we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now 
 particular operations are contingent.’’> This free choice is 
 not merely of the reason, it belongs likewise to the rational 
 appetite. ‘‘Choice is a desire proceeding from counsel. Now 
 counsel is terminated first by the judgment of reason; secondly, 
 by the acceptance of the appetite.”’« “The will can tend 
 freely towards various objects precisely because the reason can 
 have various perceptions of the good.”’ ‘‘Wherefore the root of 
 liberty is the will as the subject thereof but reason is the cause.” 7 
 Thus the real principle of man’s liberty les not in the first - 
 direct apprehension of the object, nor in the direct practical 
 judgment, but in the reflex selective decision: this is to be 
 done because it is good. 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 The Norm of Morality 
 
 Though man has a control over his faculties, when brought 
 face to face with actuality he senses a command, ‘‘I must do 
 this or I must leave this undone.” This prompting arises 
 from moral obligation. The good presented is evaluated by 
 the standards of morality. According as it conforms or is 
 opposed to these standards the decision is given I must or 
 
 (5) I, q. 83, a. 4. (6) Ibid., a. 3. (7) Ibid., a. 1. 
 
Moral Theology . ! 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 I must not do this. Hence the further inquiry arises: Why 
 is it that when the moral good is presented to the intellect, it 
 pronounces the judgment, “‘I must do this’; and why is it that 
 the will feels itself constrained to follow this judgment? 
 
 Divine Providence compels the irrational being to obtain 
 its end and purpose by a physical necessity which we call 
 instinct. Man is led by a moral necessity to attain the end 
 which this same Divine Providence has predetermined. Within 
 this predetermined order of God which is to lead him to his 
 ultimate happiness, man further provides for himself and those 
 subject to him by his own free choice. This free choice may 
 not, of course, run counter to the order willed by God. 
 
 The divine order is established from all eternity by the one 
 pure and immutable act of God, which is His divine essence 
 itself. Human intelligence cannot grasp the oneness of this 
 act. Wherefore we distinguish between the command of 
 God which decreed this order and the motive which impelled 
 Him to so will. God’s eternal will loving the infinite goodness 
 of His divine essence prompted Him in His wisdom to ordain 
 an order of nature which reflects the infinite goodness in the 
 things created. This is lex aeterna, or as St. Thomas explains, 
 “the eternal concept of the divine mind is the ratio of the 
 eternal law in as far as it is ordained by God for the government 
 of things which He foreknew.”’ 
 
 The human intellect perceives this essential and necessary 
 order of things in the creation and the government of the world 
 and thus man’s intelligence is said to participate of the divine 
 and eternal reason. At the same time human reason sees the 
 necessity of conforming to this order and expresses the necessity 
 which is upon it by the word “I must’. For whoever ac- 
 knowledges the existence of this order and acknowledges that 
 it exists by divine ordination by a spontaneous conclusion of 
 his reason says, “‘I must,”’ expressing thereby the necessity of 
 subjection to the will of God, commanding it to be obeyed. 
 Furthermore since nature and even divine positive revelation 
 
18 | Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 sketch this order merely in its outlines it immediately appears 
 to human reason that a further ordination of human life, 
 whether considered individually or socially, is necessary. 
 Human reason perceiving this necessity and grasping that it 
 has in its power the active faculty of meeting it, sets about to 
 thus further determine an order within the divine order for 
 itself and for those who are subjects. Thus ordaining human 
 reason becomes participant of the active excellence of divine 
 reason and its ordination is but the complement and continua- 
 tion of the divine. . 
 
 Could man by an intuition see this order in God Himself, 
 he would adore God as its author and creator. In this adora- 
 tion he would be conscious of a formal necessity of obeying 
 the order established. This obedience would be strictly 
 theological, namely, in the sense that such obedience is due 
 God because He is God. 
 
 However, here upon earth man can read this order only in 
 things created, wherefore without a formal recognition of God 
 the “I must’’ can be perceived and pronounced. For since 
 the judgment “‘I must” is an actus discursivus, a logical de-- 
 duction, it does not necessarily imply I must because God so 
 wills, it may stop at the conclusion I must because sound 
 reason so dictates. 
 
 Nominally an obligation is defined: ‘“‘An objective, absolute 
 necessity enjoined on the will.” 
 
 Objective necessity is opposed here to subjective coercion 
 or determination to one particular thing. It means, therefore, 
 a necessity perceived by the intellect and placed by it before 
 the will. It is absolute because just as physical necessity 
 excludes any and all exceptions so, too, this moral necessity 
 excludes every exception. The verdict is simply, “‘I must.” 
 It is enjoined on the will which feels itself psychologically 
 bound, yet free. 
 
 The psychological definition would thus be: A moral 
 obligation expressed by the word “I must” is a spontaneous 
 
Moral Theology 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (not free) idea of a something which I must do. There is a 
 consciousness that I am free and yet that there is a something 
 which is extorted by a spontaneous command of my reason. 
 Varying effects of sorrow or satisfaction, as the case may be, 
 are the signs of these movements of my intellect and of my will. 
 
 This spontaneous act is explained to be a quasi innate and 
 
 invincible appetite. It is invincible in the sense that, if I act 
 ~ contrary to it, I feel that I am doing something irrational. 
 My speculative judgment is absolute in telling me ‘“‘good is 
 to be done, evil is to be avoided’. My practical judgment 
 tells me this act now to be posited is good and therefore 
 must be done, or it tells me it is evil and must not be done. 
 
 All particular ends which man has are united essentially in 
 one final end of man’s whole life, namely his own personal 
 happiness. 
 
 That there must be such an essential union of particular 
 ends is proven as follows: (a) the very nature of an end de- 
 mands that its good be obtainable, otherwise it cannot exercise 
 a causal influence upon the will. Nowa good which is infinitely 
 distant and which can be obtained only by an infinite number 
 of steps, as it were, is in reality unobtainable. ‘Therefore, it 
 cannot be an end. (b) Every man believing in God and in 
 Divine Providence must plan his whole life in an orderly manner. 
 In the order of intention the end comes first; in the order of 
 execution the means to the end comes first. If, then, the 
 particular ends and means do not converge in an essential 
 connection to one ultimate end there can be no first and no last. 
 Therefore, no orderly planned life. 
 
 This does not mean that the good of a particular end or of 
 an act cannot of itself appeal as conformable to the dignity of 
 man. Nor does it mean that no deliberate appetite for a 
 particular good can be elicited unless it be referred formally to 
 the absolute final end of man’s whole life. Experience dis- 
 proves this. What is asserted is: Every particular good end, 
 which we intend, is intended because by its very nature it is 
 
20 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 intimately united in some manner to the ultimate end of our 
 whole life and is able to satisfy in part at least the infinite 
 capacity, as it were, of man for the good. St. Augustine 
 expresses this saying: “‘Man, lest he be miserable, is wicked 
 and because he is wicked he is the more miserable. For the 
 sake of doing away with misery and for the sake of acquiring 
 happiness, men do whatsoever they do of either good or evil. 
 They always wish to be happy, whether they live rightly or 
 evilly. But all do not attain what they wish; all wish to be 
 happy but they will not be, unless they live justly.’’ 1 
 
 This final end of man’s whole life must be absolutely one. 
 Every being strives for the full measure of perfection that is 
 proper to its nature. Therefore, the absolute final end must so 
 completely satisfy man’s appetite for the perfection which is 
 proper to his nature that there is nothing over or beyond this 
 for which he really hungers. 
 
 This final end of man’s whole life in the natural order is the 
 knowledge and love of God, giving man that relative perfect 
 happiness which is proper to his nature. In the supernatural 
 order it is the vision of God’s essence and the perfect love of 
 friendship with God, in which is perfect happiness proper to 
 God alone and as such entirely supernatural and absolutely 
 over and beyond created nature. 
 
 This appetite is not necessarily the formal craving for 
 happiness as if it were based on the following reason: I wish 
 to be happy. But I cannot be happy unless I do good and 
 avoid evil. Therefore I will do good and avoid evil. A 
 self-examination will prove that we often feel that we are 
 bound to do a thing, without thinking at all whether this act 
 will bring happiness. Contrariwise, a person will not conclude 
 that he is free of an obligation simply because he thinks the 
 act will be a perversion of his own happiness; for instance, 
 a materialist who convinces himself that there is no hereafter, 
 may yet feel bound to sacrifice his life in war because he thinks - 
 
 (1) In Psal. 62. 
 
 
 
ACEMMOHeOoUp EO as ii Nh Mes 21 
 
 
 
 patriotism demands it. Such a one knows full well that the 
 act of sacrifice is contrary to the only happiness he considers 
 possible, to wit, continued existence here upon earth. 
 
 This dictate of obligation rather arises from that deep 
 seated and inborn tendency to observe the order detected 
 by reason, which inclination, per consequens, is called a 
 
 rational inclination. “The virtues,’ says St. Thomas, 
 - “preexist in that natural predisposition to the highest good 
 which resides in reason recognizing the good and then in the 
 will naturally striving to attain it. Thus Cicero was right 
 when he said that the germs of virtue are implanted in us by 
 nature.”’2 As nature in its being imitates and participates 
 of the divine essence so, too, this rational inclination imitates 
 and participates of divine holiness. ‘“‘Since all things subject 
 to Divine Providence are ruled and measured by the eternal 
 law, it is manifest that they all participate to some extent 
 in the eternal law, in as much as by the stamp of that law upon 
 them they have their inclination to their several acts and needs. 
 But among the rest the rational creature is subject to Divine 
 Providence in a more excellent way, being itself a partaker 
 in Providence, providing for itself and others.”’ 3 
 
 God’s Providence is a decree of the eternal divine wisdom 
 motivated by the love of His divine essence in holiness so, too, 
 the decree of my intellect, ‘I must,” springs from a knowledge 
 of God’s ordination and is motivated by the holiness of that 
 divine ordination. On account of His holiness God wills the 
 order of reason. On account of participating in this holiness 
 man’s will has a necessary inclination to the moral good and 
 an aversion from doing moral evil. 
 
 Lest, however, we imagine that this inclination is a blind 
 instinct, our own consciousness tells us that “‘I must’ expresses 
 more than an inclination or a propensity to do good. The 
 “T must” remains even after we make up our minds to do 
 contrariwise. Inclination would only lead to this conclusion: 
 
 (2) III Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a.2 ¢. (3) Summa I-IT, q. 91, a. 2. 
 

 
 
 
 22 Fundamental 
 
 if you wish to follow your inclination you will do this. Now 
 we all feel that ‘‘I must’ is a much more absolute dictate than 
 this. It abstracts from this inclination and tells me “‘I must’’, 
 whether I am inclined to do so or not. 
 
 To sum up therefore this dictate of conscience, “‘I must’ 
 expresses implicity at least a perceived necessity to subject 
 myself to the order to which by nature I am inclined. This 
 subjection I perceive because I perceive that my nature is 
 created and in consequence dependent. Wherefore it stirs 
 up a consciousness, I must obey this superior. ‘“‘I must” 
 therefore signifies, not by a physical necessity or inclination, 
 I will to do this, but by a moral necessity I am forced to do so. 
 This moral necessity les in the fact that I perceive myself to 
 be subject and therefore I must obey, otherwise I will do wrong. 
 I can physically indeed do wrong but morally I may not do it. 
 
 Just as the infinite necessity of God’s holy will is explained 
 by His sanctity, so our moral necessity is explained by our 
 participated sanctity and the consciousness that we are sub- 
 jects. Wherefore again not merely this participated sanctity, 
 but this sanctity controlled by consciousness of our subjection - 
 imposes upon our will this moral necessity which we express 
 by the word “I must’. 4 
 
 In the concrete, when placed face to face before the question 
 what shall I do to act rightly, “the I must do this’ is a practical 
 judgment telling me this act is in conformity with the estab- 
 lished order of morality, to wit, the eternal law; in its negative 
 form it is the same practical judgment telling me I must not 
 do this because this act runs counter to the established order 
 of morality. In this sense we are said to be bound by the 
 practical judgment because we recognize the command to be, 
 as it were, the command of another who has authority to bind 
 the will to posit this action. 
 
 (4) Cf. Vermeersch, Theol. Mor., vol. 1, Nos. 156, 157, 158. 
 
Hloral Theology 
 
 1 | 
 | w 
 
 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 Conscience 
 
 The dictate “‘I must do this or leave this undone’”’ is gener- 
 ally called conscience. Etymologically conscience, derived 
 from the Latin word, conscientia, means the common knowledge 
 of many persons. In a derivative sense it is taken to mean: 
 the “habitual knowledge of the principles of the eternal law 
 congenital, as it were, to all who have the use of reason’. ! 
 ‘“‘Let no one,” says St. John Chrysostom, “‘pretend to ascribe 
 the neglect of virtue to ignorance or say he has no guide or no 
 one to show the way. We have a competent teacher, namely 
 conscience, of whose aid no one is deprived. For the knowledge 
 of what is to be done and what is to be left undone is in man 
 from the day in which he is formed.” 2 In a further derived 
 sense the term signifies the application of this knowledge to 
 particular acts and likewise the estimate of an act placed, 
 “namely, whether or not it was in accordance with the moral 
 law. Here we intend to use the term in the sense: It is “‘the 
 application of knowledge to particular acts’.* Or as Suarez 
 describes it, “the actual and practical judgment of the intellect 
 discerning about things to be done whether they are good or 
 bad, right or wrong, commanded or forbidden.‘ Sanchez 
 tersely unites the definition and the description saying: ‘‘Con- 
 science is the judgment of reason proposing the object to the 
 will as good or bad.”’ > 
 
 The dictate of conscience is an act of the intellect or under- 
 standing. The very manner in which we speak of conscience 
 as pronouncing judgment proves this. Further the will being 
 a blind faculty needs a rule so that its deliberate act may be 
 directed rightly. This rule must be of a kind that is actually 
 
 
 
 (1) Romans II, 12-26: ‘“‘Who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their con- 
 science bearing witness to them and their thought between themselves accusing or also de- 
 fending one another’”’ (ibid. 16). 
 
 (2) In Genesim Hom., 64, n. 1. 
 
 (3) St. Thomas, Summa I, Cento aele oY Loe 
 
 (4) Suarez, Tract Tit; disp. IPA als ual 
 
 (5) Sanchez de praec. Dec. L. L, CG: 9, n. ei Cf. Bouquillon, Theol. Mor. Fund., n. 254. 
 
24 Fundamental 
 
 present to us and actually directs us towards the object be- 
 fitting our rational being. To thus direct is an act of the 
 intellect. This directive force isa practical judgment because 
 it directs us how to act or rather how to do. It does not 
 pronounce the judgment “this is true’, but the judgment 
 ‘St is true that I must do or not do this’. It is further said 
 to be practico-practical because here and now it applies the 
 practical judgments of doing, such as: thou shalt not steal; 
 give to each one his due; honor thy father and thy mother; 
 to acts which must be done by me here and now. * 
 
 The judgment which discerns whether the thing to be 
 done is in accordance or not with right reason after the thing 
 has been done passes the verdict whether it was right or wrong. 
 This verdict stirs up in the will varying affections of joy, 
 peace, fear, anxiety, sorrow, remorse, as it is favorable or 
 unfavorable. This is called the conscientia consequens. It is 
 not a something new added to or different from the conscientia 
 antecedens. It is the same conscience, distinguished as it is, 
 looking to the present or to the past. It is not mere sentiment, 
 it is a judgment which connaturally stirs up these varying 
 affections which are not conscience but the effects of con- 
 cience.? The fact that some, who are keen in discerning 
 right from wrong, are sluggish to react to such judgment does 
 not necessarily demand that conscience be likewise of the will. 
 The intellect does not rule the will slavishly but diplomatically. 
 Knowledge alone does not make a good man. The scintilla 
 animae, of which the mystics speak, is reason’s participation 
 of the infinite truth and the will’s participation of the infinite 
 good. One can put down conscience but one cannot quench 
 this spark, because it is connatural and congenital to the in- 
 tellect and the will. 
 
 Some moderns * have revived the opinion said to be of the 
 older Franciscan school, namely, conscience is not exclusively 
 
 
 
 (6) Frins: Actibus Humanis, vol. III, 66. 
 (2) Toe 69. 
 (8) Koch-Preuss, vol. I, pp. 186-193. Linsemaier, Moraltheologie, §29, 2. 
 
Moral Theology | 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 of the intellect but is likewise of the will. This was the opinion 
 of Alexander of Hales. St. Bonaventure cannot be invoked 
 in its favor. His distinction was between conscience and 
 synteresis, the latter being the habit of first principles of moral- 
 ity. St. Bonaventure made it a habit of the will, describing 
 it as a “weight on the will inclining it to the good’”’. But few 
 of the scholastics accepted this distinction, they claim 
 synteresis, too, is of the intellect. ° 
 
 Conscience thus differs from synteresis—the one is a habit, 
 the other an act of the intellect. It differs, too, from conscien- 
 tiousness, which is a habit of the will to follow the dictates of 
 conscience quickly, readily and easily. It differs from pru- 
 dence, which is the right estimate of circumstances in the order 
 of obligation, and from the science of moral theology, which 
 is the knowledge of the general conclusions. All of these 
 are helps and means to form a right conscience or judgment. 1° 
 Conscience is thus the herald proclaiming the eternal law to 
 the individual for his individual guidance. Wherefore one is 
 bound to follow it. Erroneous conscience, known as such, 
 must be corrected. Since conscience is a judgment it must 
 be certain about the obligation: if reason wavers it must use 
 reflex principles to become stable, such as a doubtful law does 
 not oblige. ‘This is called forming conscience. The judgment 
 then pronounced is: it is true that in this circumstance I may 
 or may not do this act. 
 
 The objection raised especially in non-Catholic schools of 
 morals, namely, to proclaim conscience as the herald applying 
 an external law to our actions is against human dignity, was 
 answered by St. Thomas. Real conscience, they claim, exists 
 only there where the inner voice which urges to do good and 
 warns against evil, is the dictate of man’s own nature and not 
 that of a superior will. St. Thomas teaches that man’s dignity 
 lies chiefly in this: ‘‘He is his own lawgiver, since he instructs 
 
 (9) Frins, 1. c. 65. 
 (10) Bouquillon, |. c. 254. 
 
26 Fundamental 
 
 himself and urges himself on to that which is good.”’1: “But 
 just as in the theoretical recognition of truth reason has no 
 creative activity, but has to conform itself to a reality infinitely 
 higher than itself, so in its practical activity reason is not a 
 creative and final norm but rather a means of making known a 
 higher and infinitely perfect will.’ 12 
 
 St. Thomas carefully distinguishes between the influence of 
 external rules and the interior voice of conscience. He says: 
 “Although many things are not evil because forbidden by an 
 external law, they are nevertheless evil because forbidden by 
 an interior law. For the interior law is the light of reason 
 itself, by means of which we discern what we have todo. Any 
 human action which is in keeping with this light is good; 
 whatever is contrary to it is unnatural to man and evil, and is 
 termed evil in as much as it is forbidden by the interior law.” 
 
 ARTICLE IV 
 Sin 
 Man is responsible only for his human acts; these and these 
 only does he place in his true capacity as a man, namely, as a 
 free moral agent. This responsibility is either unto merit or 
 demerit, in as far as the object to which the act goes out is in 
 
 conformity or deformity with the law of God. The object, 
 however, is to be taken in the concrete, 1.e., with all the attend- 
 
 (11) In Epist. ad Romanos, c. 2. 
 
 (12) Summa I, II, q.71,a.6. In L. II sent., dist. 42, q.1,a.4,ad 3. Cf. Catholic Moral 
 Teaching and its Antagonists, by Joseph Mausbach, translated by A. M. Buchanan, Part II, 
 chapter 1. Wagner, New York. 
 
 Duns Scotus was generally credited with being an extreme Indeterminist in his dis- 
 cussions on Free Will, and a forerunner of Kant. This view has been much changed since the 
 publication of the epoch-making work of P. Ephrem Longpre, O.F.M., entitled La Philosophie 
 du B. Duns Scotus (Paris, 1924). Examining critically the works attributed to Scotus, the 
 learned Franciscan proves that the De primo principio, Quaestiones in metaphysicam, Opus 
 Oxoniense, Reportata Parisiensia are certainly authentic; but that the De reum principiis and 
 the Theoremata were not written by the Subtle Doctor, and that the other works attributed to 
 him are of doubtful origin. Specifically with regard to questions of Fundamental Moral 
 Theology this new review of the opinions of Duns Scotus has brought the avowal from M. De 
 Wulf that Intellectualism according to Scotus dominates the whole question of conduct; that 
 the morality of acts depends foremost on the object and the end relative to the dictate of reason, 
 that the Doctor Subtilis explains conscience, synteresis, right reason, prudence in intellectual- 
 istic terms just as the Angelic Doctor does. De Wulf, Histoire de Philosophie Médiévale. 
 Fifth edition, vol. II, p. 80 (Paris, 1924-25). 
 

 
 HMoral Theology 27 
 
 
 
 ing circumstances and with the end or purpose the agent has 
 in view. 
 
 This law is brought home to man by his conscience, which 
 in a practical manner tells him what is to be done or left undone 
 in the given circumstance. This practical judgment is formed 
 by the study of nature, namely, of things as they are, i.e., in 
 the order in which God stands to man, man stands to God, 
 and to fellowman. This study is made more easy, more 
 definite and more certain by the study of the positive law 
 given by God directly through revelation, or indirectly through 
 human authority, acting in His name and in His stead. 
 
 Man senses that he is free, unless his will is securely tied 
 down by law. The “I must’’, motivated by the intellect’s 
 participation of the divine truth and the will’s participation 
 of the divine sanctity, is therefore only pronounced when 
 conscience, by a present, practical judgment (which means 
 certainty), tells him in this circumstance you are bound. 
 
 ~ Man when he acts according to this dictate of conscience 
 is responsible unto merit; contrariwise, if he acts against it, 
 he is responsible unto demerit. 
 
 The good of the being (of the object) aes be brought to 
 the will and specified for it by some other faculty. The 
 God-given true guide is reason. The appetibility of the object 
 able to draw the will is objective, it is in the being of the object 
 itself, but it cannot present itself to the will, except through a 
 cognitive faculty. 
 
 The intellect forms the idea of a universal good which no 
 particular good can exhaust and tells us that it exists, not 
 indeed in its universal form, but particularized in the things 
 that are. Naturally, we strive for happiness, but as it is de- 
 termined in this or that particular good. ‘The good is present 
 in things in two ways,” says St. Thomas, “to wit, in the ordering 
 of one thing in its relation to another and in the ordering of 
 things in their relation to the ultimate end....... And as things 
 are ordered to their ultimate end through the agency of their 
 
28 Fundamental 
 
 own particular end their relation to their ultimate end varies 
 according to the diversity of their own particular ends. We 
 say therefore as the ultimate end of all being is one, to wit, 
 God; so also the ultimate end of all volition is one, to 
 wit, God. This, however, does not touch the particular ends and 
 when in accordance with these ends, the right relation of the 
 will to the ultimate end is secured, the will is morally good; 
 if not, it is morally perverse.’’: Hence, we are free to elect 
 whichsoever good we choose. And it is exactly this liberty 
 which makes it possible subjectively for man to sin. 
 
 “The rational mind naturally is drawn to hannineee 
 universally and indeterminately, and in this it cannot fail, 
 but the movement of the created will is not determined to 
 seek this or that particular good, and thus in seeking happiness 
 one can sin, if he seeks it where it ought not to be sought, as 
 for instance, he seeks for happiness in sensuous pleasure. 
 This holds for all good, for nothing is sought except under the 
 guise of good, as Dionysius says (cap. IV de div. nom.). It 
 is thus because the appetite of the good is natural to the mind, 
 but not the appetite for this or that particular good, and hence 
 man can fall into sin.” 2 
 
 St. Thomas defines sin to be a ‘‘bad moral act’’.* Not, 
 however, as if he wished to range a good or bad moral act as a 
 species under the genus moral act. There is no common factor 
 in moral acts which allows one to predicate good or bad of 
 them indifferently. 
 
 When one says it is a moral act, he already says of necessity, 
 good or bad, just as when we say “being’’, we necessarily 
 insinuate a certain kind of being. 
 
 Further, though we speak of a ‘“‘theological specification” of 
 sin into mortal or venial, they are not philosophical or natural 
 species. Sin, strictly speaking, is only one, namely, mortal. 
 Venial sin participates of sin in a diminished ratio. (Cf. below.) 
 wee: In II sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, c. 
 
 (2) Quaes. disp. de pis dq. XX1V, 18.00 ad 6.) Cf, ibid, art.)o. 
 (3) Summa I, II, q. 7, a. 6. 
 
HHoral Theology | 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 E'ssence of Sin—Sin, in as far as it is a bad act, implies a 
 privation of good, since it is a receding of some kind from the 
 order of reason. In as far as it is a moral act, it is a going out 
 to a good, toward which the appetite is inordinately drawn. 
 Bad as such, does not appeal to the appetite, which goes out 
 to bad only under the guise of good, or as it is joined to a good 
 which we love. Bad is, therefore, voluntary only per accidens. 
 Though the whole act is corrupted and is bad, yet in the election 
 of the bad, under the guise of good, a vestige of the positive 
 order remains. Wherefore St. Thomas says: “‘Malwm in 
 moralibus est quoddam bonum adjunctum privationr alterius 
 bon.” 4 Inthe physical order, there can be a total or a partial 
 privation of good, as for instance, deafness and hard of hearing, 
 but in the moral order, the positive appetence is totally bad 
 because it lays the foundation for the election of the bad. 
 
 “Though the sinner does not wish the deformity of sin, 
 - none the less, the deformity of sin comes under the will of the 
 sinner who elects to incur the deformity rather than to refrain 
 from the act.’ Before the tribunal of conscience sin is 
 presented under a double aspect: Reason sees the delectable 
 good coming from the sinful act, but at the same time sees that 
 it is against the order of nature. In temptation, there is a 
 conflict between the appetibility of the object and the law, 
 but when the sinful act is posited, the sinner directly and 
 primarily wills the delectation, but since it cannot be enjoyed 
 without the deformity, he wills this indirectly. Though 
 indirect, the choice is positive, for as St. Thomas explains: 
 “He who wills to enjoy a pleasure so vehemently that he does 
 not refuse to incur the deformity which he perceives to be joined 
 to it, is said to will not only the good which he wishes princi- 
 pally, but likewise the deformity which he chooses to suffer 
 rather than be deprived of the good desired.”’ ¢ 
 
 (4) Summa I, q. 48, a. 1 ad 2 et I, II, q. 73, a. 2. 
 
 (5) S. Thomas, de Malo, q. III, a. 2, ad 1. 
 (6) De Malo, q. ITI, a. 2. 
 

 
 
 
 30 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 But how can a man positively choose that which he knows 
 to entail a deprival of his real good? 
 
 The answer to this riddle is found in the cognitive process 
 of man’s reason. The passive intellect contains nothing 
 except what it has inferred from the senses: ‘“‘ Nzhil est on 
 intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu.’ The senses are the 
 foundation and origin of human knowledge. Sensible reality 
 acts on the understanding by means of the phantasm or the 
 image from which the active intellect forms the impressed 
 intelligible species. This, by its action on the possible intellect, 
 gives rise to the expressed species, “‘verbuwm mentis,’”’ or idea. 
 
 Now, ‘‘more men,”’ says St. Thomas, “‘follow the beginning 
 of things, rather than their consummation.’’7 Wherefore 
 more men will follow the inclination of the senses than the order 
 of reason. 
 
 The affections of the senses are called passions because the 
 agent (the object presented to the senses under the guise of 
 a good) little by little changes the connatural state of the 
 patient to one which is more in harmony with the agent. The 
 state thus brought about changes the viewpoint, inclination 
 and disposition of the patient towards the particular good 
 which thus appears more agreeable and fitting to the appetite 
 and draws it more strongly. “‘Such as a man is, such the end 
 will appear to him.”’ 8 
 
 Such stirring up of the appetite can be to either good or bad 
 moral acts, because of the preponderant part played by the 
 sense passion in sinful acts; in the every day language it gener- 
 ally has the meaning of something morally wrong. Under the 
 influence of passion a vice is easily begotten but it can, too, 
 be turned to good advantage and beget virtue. ‘‘Since,”’ 
 says St. Thomas, “‘human nature is a composite of body and 
 soul and of an intellectual and sensitive nature, it pertains to 
 
 
 
 (7) Summa I, II, q. 71, a. 3. 
 z @) Summa I, II, q. 22, a. 1 et 2. De verit, q. 26, a. 3, dist. 15, q. 2, a.1. Aristotle Ethica 
 Cae 
 
Moral Theology 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the perfection (good) of man to subject his acts to virtue his 
 whole being, to wit, this intellectual and sensitive part and 
 the body.’’* As either virtue or vice thus dominate, the sense 
 appetite will be a help or a detriment to positing good moral 
 acts. For, says St. Thomas, ‘“‘as is manifest, man is changed 
 in his dispositions according to his sense appetite so that when 
 he is in a certain passion a thing will appeal to him as fitting, 
 which would not so appeal if he were otherwise disposed... . and 
 thus the sense appetite moves the will, not indeed in a despotic 
 manner as a slave is ruled but in a diplomatic manner as free 
 citizens are ruled.” : ° 
 
 Not only sense objects but likewise the immaterial goods 
 such as honor, glory, fame, self-interest, family pride, etc., can 
 affect the appetite in an analogical manner. The former 
 attract through the senses, the latter play more directly upon 
 the will. Both can have this effect antecedently to and beyond 
 the judgment of the intellect. Because of his composite 
 nature they are connatural to man. ‘They present a con- 
 natural good to the appetite, they insinuate themselves gradual- 
 ly and suavely and then draw the will with great force. The 
 will readily reacts and yields to them. If then these goods be 
 of evil in the order of morality, the will, being thus affected 
 and changed, as it were, in its most intimate nature, neglects 
 the higher good for the sinful. Under the eagerness of the will 
 reason ceases from considering the right rule, and thus the will 
 produces the act of sin.:: ‘“‘Man naturally is intent by his 
 senses and by his mind upon the things agreeable to the 
 appetite.’”’:2. These movements, in as far as they are spon- 
 taneous, affect the freedom of choice in the sense that the will 
 is not as free as it would otherwise be, but there is no coercion 
 from without, the force is entirely connatural to the will which 
 goes out to it voluntarily and even, perhaps, more so than 
 
 (9) De Malo, q. 12, a. 7. 
 (LO)BI TL ds.9;-a, 2,.et lbid.,.ad 3. Cl..etiam ibid..q. 10;/a.°3% 
 (11) Summa I, II, q. 55, a. 2, ad 1. 
 (12) Frins, De Actibus Humanis, vol. I, p. 317. 
 
32 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 when it is not under the spell. The eagerness of pursuit has 
 been heightened in the will. +3 
 
 But all sins cannot be ascribed thus to sense-passion 
 subjectively, as for instance the sins of infidelity. Even the 
 sins of the sense-passions often have a deeper foundation in 
 fact, namely, inordinate self-love. In the words of St. Francis 
 de Sales: ‘‘No doubt the will rules love, since she loves as she 
 chooses, and among the many loves presented to her affection 
 she chooses as she prefers: but having chosen one, she lives in 
 it and is ruled by it and thus the will takes on the qualities of 
 the love she has espoused.’”’ This explains the seeming 
 paradox: we sense that we are free and yet at the same time 
 we seem to be slaves. Now man loves himself as a totality, 
 he loves both his sensitive and his rational and spiritual being. 
 The good love their sensitive being as it is subservient to the 
 rational; the bad make their spiritual being subservient to 
 the sensitive. And thus, a friendship arises between man and 
 either his interior or his exterior self. Now argues St. Thomas: 
 “Five things enter into friendship: First, the friend wishes his 
 friend to be and to live; secondly, he wishes him “‘good’’; 
 thirdly, he strives to procure this good for him; fourthly, he 
 enjoys his company; and lastly, he is one with him in weal or 
 woe. Thus the good love themselves according to the interior 
 man, whom they wish to retain in his integrity; they wish him 
 goods which are spiritual; they strive to gain them for him; 
 and enjoy returning to their own hearts, because therein they 
 find good present thoughts, the reminiscences of past good and 
 the hope of future goods. This causes enjoyment and they 
 will not allow any dissension in themselves, because they love 
 themselves wholly. Not so the wicked: they do not care for 
 the integrity of the interior man, nor are they drawn to his 
 
 
 
 (18) Summa I, II, q. 77, a. 1: ‘‘For the corruptible body, says the Book of Wisdom, is a 
 load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that musseth up many 
 things’ (9, 15). And ‘‘the bewitching of vanity obscureth good things and the wandering 
 of concupiscence overturneth the innocent mind”’ (4, 12). ‘‘As long as reason remains free 
 and not enslaved by the passion the movement of the will which remains does not necessarily 
 tend to the object to which passion would sway” (Summa I, II, q. 10, a. 1). 
 
SMoral Theology | 33 
 
 
 
 spiritual goods; nor do they strive to attain them; nor do they 
 enjoy living with themselves, by returning to themselves, for 
 there they find evils, past, present and future, which they 
 abhor; nor are they in agreement with themselves, because of 
 the remorse of conscience which, according to the Psalmist, 
 says to them: ‘I will accuse them and stand before their 
 faces.’ And thus the wicked prove that they love bane 
 according to the corruption which is of the external man.”’ 
 Such inordinate self-love is the source of many sins. 
 
 The final source of sin lies in the pride of our own excellence. 
 The sinner acting freely and voluntarily, knows full well that 
 his act is against the law of God. Even while he is placing his 
 act, conscience is accusing and reproaching his disobedience. 
 The spark of truth radiating in him from the effulgence of the 
 eternal truth makes him see that the act does not tend to the 
 true good, and the last ember of the dying love for this law, 
 enkindled by the participated eternal holiness, would again 
 inflame for this law, but yet he chooses the disobedience and 
 even forces the practical reason to admit that it is better to 
 follow his own bent than to submit to reason, regulated by 
 divine law. His self-sufficiency and inordinate self-love 
 prompt him to admit no other law or command than his own 
 self-shaped rule and bent. “Just as,’ says St. Thomas, 
 “charity by the diffusion of its command is common to all 
 virtues and therefore is called the form and mother of all 
 virtues .... thus, too, pride by the diffusion of its command 
 is the common sin of all, wherefore it is called the root and 
 queen of all vices...... If one look to the effect one will find it 
 in every sin, for the effect of pride is to refuse to be subject to 
 the rule of a superior.” 1° 
 
 From these considerations we gather: (1) If we could see 
 God by a direct intuition, we would see that our happiness is 
 so intimately bound up with the observance of the natural 
 
 (14) Summa I, IT, 
 (15) De Malo, q. wil : 2. ie ibidem ad 11, 12, 18, 16, et 11 Sent. dist. XLII, q. 1, a. 3, q. 
 ll,a.3adl 
 
34 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 order, that these two things, our happiness and the observance 
 of the law, are inseparable. The opposite choice entails a 
 rejection of the true good and on the part of the agent, finis 
 operantis, and implicitly, a renunciation of the ultimate end 
 and of God. He who forces his practical judgment to thus 
 pervert the order of nature, errs, is imprudent in his judgment, 
 is malicious of will, and practically deserts the one way which 
 leads to eternal life. 
 
 (2) From this it follows that the sinner is guilty unto 
 punishment: ‘‘Where there is an order ordained unto an end, 
 it is necessary that this order lead to the end, and contrariwise, 
 receding from the order, excludes the obtaining of the end. 
 For those things which derive from the end are necessary be- 
 cause of the end, so that they are necessary if the end is neces- 
 sary, and likewise if they are present, without impediment, 
 the end must be obtained. But God has made an order for 
 the acts of men, relative to the ultimate end. Wherefore it 
 is necessary if the order is rightly placed that those who walk 
 according to this order be rewarded and that those who recede 
 from this order be excluded from the end of the good, 1.e., 
 they should be punished.:* This exclusion must be for all 
 eternity. ‘“‘Man, by virtuous acts, in which the intention of 
 the end is principally inherent, obtains his ultimate end, which 
 is happiness. But if he acts against virtue, turning away 
 from the ultimate end, it is proper that he should be deprived 
 of his ultimate end.”’:7 Sin therefore, in as much as it Is per se 
 voluntary, is a deed, saying or appetence against the law of 
 God, or as it is popularly expressed, a thought, word or deed 
 against the law of God. (The word “thought” here stands 
 for any merely internal act.) 
 
 Sin, in as far as it is bad, is a turning away from God, the 
 ultimate end, by a voluntary turning to a commutable good. 
 
 ‘‘Wherefore,”’ says St. Thomas, “‘a venial sin is not against 
 (contra legem) but is beside (praeter legem) the law.”’ Venial 
 
 
 
 (16) Contra Gentiles III, c. 143. (17) Ibid. 
 

 
 SHMoral Theology | 35 
 
 
 
 sin is predicated (analogice), according to an imperfect reason, 
 relative to mortal sin, as accidents are predicated as being 
 relative to substance in an imperfect reason of being. It is 
 not against the law, because he who sins venially does not do 
 what the law forbids, nor does he omit what the law prescribes 
 by precept, but he acts beside the law, because he does not 
 observe the mode of reason which the law intends. 18 
 
 Yet God hates venial sin because this mode of reason is 
 repugnant to His infinite goodness, and for the same reason 
 venial sin excludes from the vision of God as long as it remains. 
 
 ARTICLE V 
 Moral Indifference and the Perfection of Free Choice 
 
 Moral indifference, by which is here meant the potency to 
 elect that which is morally wrong, i.e., to commit sin, is an 
 imperfection not a perfection of the faculties which come into 
 play for a free choice. 
 
 Leo XIII, in his Encyclical Libertas, after having established 
 that free choice is an act of reason and of the will, continues: 
 “Since, however, both these faculties are imperfect, it is possi- 
 ble, as is often seen, that the reason should propose something 
 which is not really good, and that the will should choose 
 accordingly. For, as the possibility of error and actual error 
 are defects of the mind and attest its imperfection, so the 
 pursuit of what has a false appearance of good, though a proof 
 of our freedom, just as a disease is a proof of our vitality, 
 implies defect in human liberty. The will also, simply because 
 of its dependence on the reason, no sooner desires anything 
 
 
 
 (18) Summa I, II, q. 87, a. 1, ad 1. 
 
 On the discussion whether positive imperfections, namely, omissions of acts to place 
 which a person is particularly invited or of acts, all circumstances being duly weighed which 
 are undoubtedly better, are venial sins. (See Hugueny, O.P., Revue du Clerge Francais, t. 53, 
 pp. 641 sqq.) Who defends that such imperfections are Vvenial sins; Garrigoue-Lag-ange, 
 La vie spirituelle ascetique et mystique (St. Maximin-Var., Sept., 1923, pp. 583-592.) Who 
 defends they are not venial sins, Vermeersch concludes: This much is certain men generally 
 are in no wise obliged, to elect what is better it is sufficient to direct one’s acts according to the 
 norm of morality (Theol. Mor., vol., I, p. 424). 
 
36 Fundamental 
 
 contrary thereto, than it abuses its freedom of choice and 
 corrupts its very essence. Thus it is that the infinitely perfect 
 God, although supremely free, because of the supremacy of 
 His intellect and of His essential goodness, nevertheless cannot 
 choose evil: neither can the angels and saints, who enjoy the 
 beatific vision.” ! 
 
 St. Thomas proves how this imperfection affects both the 
 reason and the will—the two faculties which preside over 
 freedom of choice and from whose mutual and intimate union 
 the act of free choice springs. “Free will,’’ he says, “in its 
 choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to 
 conclusions. Now it is evident that it belongs to the intellect 
 to be able to proceed to different conclusions, according to 
 given principles; but for it to proceed to some conclusions by 
 passing out of the order of the principles, comes of its own 
 defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for 
 the free will to be able to choose between opposite things, 
 keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect 
 of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the 
 order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater 
 liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in 
 ourselves, who can sin.’’2 Wherefore in as far as sin implies 
 an aversion from the ultimate end, both the intellect and the 
 will choosing to commit sin denature themselves, stripping 
 themselves, as it were, of their essential perfection, namely, to 
 be guided by and to follow their natural principles. That 
 the intellect by reasoning should be able to split up its natural 
 light into its various rays and colors and thus find new truths 
 deduced truly from its first principles, is a perfection, but that 
 it should dim or totally darken the lhght of these its first 
 principles, is a defect; thus, too, that the will by its act of 
 choice should endeavor to exploit the richness of good which 
 lies buried in its ultimate end, is a perfection, that it should 
 
 
 
 (1) Libertas, op. cit., p. 138. 
 (2)i liq7625 82 S,7ado,.et lols Gail. ae oe 
 

 
 
 
 Sloral Theology 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 follow a false light and dig in a false direction, where good 
 cannot be found, is a defect. * 
 
 To sinners the words of Jeremias, the prophet, are applied: 
 ““My people have done two evils. ‘They have forsaken me, the 
 fountain source of living water, and have digged to themselves 
 cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water’ (2, 18). 
 This second element of sin, namely, seeking the ultimate end in 
 a.created good, is a like perversion of the freedom of choice. 
 “Since choice is either a judgment about things to be done or 
 follows upon such a judgment, it can only be in things which 
 are subject to our judgment. Now judgment of things to 
 be done is based on the end just as judgment on conclusions is 
 based on principles. But we do not judge of first principles 
 by examining them, we assent to them naturally and judge all 
 other things by them, thus, too, in appetible things we do not 
 judge the ultimate end by a judgment of discussion or exami- 
 nation but we naturally approve of it. Hence there can be no 
 choice of the ultimate end; there can be only a striving for it.”’ 4 
 Thus the sinner arrogates to himself a judgment and a choice 
 which nature does not and cannot allow. 
 
 The sinner attempting to satisfy his striving for the good 
 chooses the apparent for the real. He is digging “broken 
 cisterns which can hold no water’’. Good is the fullness of 
 being and in consequence the highest reality. ‘‘Knowledge is 
 of things as they exist in the knower but the will is directed 
 to things as they exist in themselves.’’*> Wherefore to force 
 the will to satisfy its craving with a phantom good perverts its 
 very nature. “‘Sin,’’ says the Angelic Doctor, “‘coming under 
 the free choice does not destroy essentials, otherwise free choice 
 would not remain, but by sin a something is added, namely, a 
 joining, as it were, of free choice with a perverse end which it 
 would effect for it.” * 
 
 (3) ‘‘As the intellect is to reason so is the will to the power of free choice,”’ I-II, q. i, a. 2. 
 (4) Quaest. disp. de verit., 24, a. 1, ad 20. 
 
 Ho )sed-i9, a, 3, ad.6: 
 (6) Q. disp. de verit., 24, a. 10, ad 14. 
 
38 Fundamental 
 
 Creatures should be means to the end; the sinner makes 
 them the end itself, and herein, says St. Augustine, “‘All human 
 perverseness lies, using what we should enjoy and enjoying what 
 we should use.”’? The natural tendency to the ultimate end 
 gives man the means to enjoy the good; but the sinner perverts 
 the order: he uses the ultimate good as a means and enjoys the 
 created good, which nature has given him as a means in this 
 striving, as if it were the end of his longing. 
 
 Thus man, when he freely chooses to sin, steps beyond the 
 limits which the very nature of freedom has set for him and 
 thus abuses instead of uses and perverts instead of perfects it. 
 The blessed in heaven enjoying the beatific vision possess and 
 enjoy the good in all the fullness of its being; they cannot err 
 as to what is good, they cannot chase after a phantom good, 
 they cannot try to content themselves with the means as if it 
 were the end and are thus in the fullness and perfection of their 
 freedom. 
 
 ARTICLE VI 
 Moral Insanity 
 
 The human will being, just as is the intellect, of a spiritual 
 nature, no sense infirmity or affection can directly destroy 
 or lessen the will power in itself. There can be no soul sickness 
 in this sense. But just as bodily sickness, derangement of 
 the external or internal sense organs can and do cause false 
 ideas, judgments, and reasonings both transiently and per- 
 manently and thus cause intellectual insanity, like derange- 
 ments might cause moral insanity. It is claimed, and with a 
 show of proof, that there are persons whose intellectual powers 
 are otherwise normal, who have a well developed theoretical 
 knowledge of right and wrong, who can readily enumerate 
 even the finer distinctions of morality, but who in their actions 
 show that they have no practical moral sense. Their theoretic 
 
 (7) S. Aug. lib. 88, qq. 80, quoted I-II, q. 71, a.-6, obj. 3. 
 
Moral Theology 39 
 
 knowledge of moral obligation seems to awaken no sense of 
 responsibility, call forth no reaction of the will, and furnish 
 no motive for the practical exercise of morality. 
 
 The question is not one of mere depravity arising from the 
 vehemence of unchecked passion or inveterate vice, nor yet of 
 sickness of the sense organs which affect sense perception, 
 memory or phantasy. All of these are accounted for in the 
 interplay of the senses and the intellect and, of course, enter 
 largely into the subjective guilt or innocence of the agent 
 (formal sin). 
 
 “The intellect of necessity,’ says St. Thomas, “receives 
 from the lower apprehending powers, wherefore if the imagina- 
 tive or cogitative or memorative power is disturbed, of necessity 
 the action of the intellect is disturbed. But the will need not 
 of necessity follow the inclination of the inferior appetite. 
 For though the irascible and concupiscible passions have a 
 
 certain power to incline the will, none the less it remains in 
 the power of the will to accept or refuse the passions.”’! ‘“The 
 intellect in its present state cannot function unless it converts 
 itself to the phantasms, the will can will something using the 
 _ judgment of reason and not following the passion of the sensi- 
 tive appetite.’”’2 This explains how, unless temptation or 
 concupiscence overcome the use of reason, man can resist. 
 Wherefore in order to account for moral insanity we must find 
 a derangement or disease of a sense organ which destroys the 
 practico-practical judgment of the intellect. Those who admit 
 with the Thomists against the Scotists: that the intellect 
 cannot form direct judgment of particulars and claim that the 
 intellect is of necessity dependent for such judgment on a fourth 
 internal sense with comparative powers, find the derangement 
 or defect in what is called the cogitative power. This power, 
 they say, is somewhat akin to the instinct, vis aestimativa, of 
 the brute. They place it on the borderline between the 
 
 (1) I, q. 115, a. 4. 
 (2), data dla. 2'et fi 
 (3) Donat, S.J., Psychologia, Innsbruck, 1923, n. 243 et 251. 
 
40 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 sensuous and the intellectual, making it as it were, a distention 
 of the intellect and of reason into the sensuous. ‘ 
 
 St. Thomas speaks of this power: ‘The animal needs to 
 seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are 
 pleasing or otherwise to the senses but also on account of 
 other advantages, uses or disadvantages, just as the sheep 
 runs away from the wolf not on account of its color or shape, 
 but as a natural enemy; and again, as a bird when it gathers 
 together straws not because they are pleasant to the sense, but 
 because they are useful for building its nests. Animals there- 
 fore need to perceive such intentions which the exterior sense 
 does not perceive.” ‘The power which in other animals is 
 called the natural estimative, in man is called the cogitative, 
 which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions 
 (particulars as against universals). Wherefore it is called the 
 particular reason... . for it compares individual intentions 
 just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions.” > 
 In explanation of this the following passages of St. Thomas 
 can be quoted: ‘“The mind concerns itself about individuals 
 per accidens, in as far as it is distended toward the sense powers 
 which deal with the individual.’”’* ‘‘The right estimate about 
 a particular end is called both understanding in so far as its 
 object is a principle, and sense in so far as its object is a particu- 
 lar. This is what the philosopher means when he says (Ethies 
 V1) of such things we need to have the sense, and this is under- 
 standing. But this is to be understood as referring, not to 
 the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but 
 to the interior sense whereby we judge of a particular.” ? 
 “This power which the philosophers call the cogitative is on 
 the border line between the sensitive and the intellective, 
 where the sensitive touches upon the intellective. It pertains 
 to the sensitive because it considers particular forms, to the 
 
 
 
 (4) 1. cit., nos. 168, 169, 170. 
 (byeLso.c6S, a4: 
 
 (6) Quaest. disp. de verit., 10, a. 5. 
 (7) Thali. 49 7as2rad. 3: 
 
HMoral Theslogy | 41 
 
 
 
 
 
 intellective because it compares.’ Now the practico-practical 
 reason which gives the final verdict about a thing to be done 
 at this moment, must of necessity depend on this understanding 
 and evaluation of the particular and therefore on the cogitative. 
 And since the will elects in accordance with this dictate of the 
 practico-practical reason it, too, thus depends on the cogitative. 
 For this same reason St. Thomas makes the cogitative play a 
 large role in the exercise of the virtue of prudence. ‘The 
 reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understand- 
 ing. The one is cognizant of universals, and this belongs to 
 the understanding, and is an intellectual virtue. The other 
 understanding which is a part of prudence, is a right estimate 
 of the particular end.”’» He explains that shrewdness, which 
 is ‘an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term’’, '° 
 namely the particular or individual end, and circumspection 
 and caution are large factors in the exercise of this virtue, and 
 _ since they deal with particulars, of necessity depend largely 
 on the cogitative. Accepting this theory, it is readily under- 
 stood how a derangement or disease of the cogitative affects 
 the will by blunting or even destroying what is called the moral 
 sense, or moral feeling, or moral emotion. The cogitative in 
 as far as it belongs to the sensitive, depends on the health of 
 the bodily organ or organs it uses, which like all other organs 
 can be affected by sickness. St. Thomas places this organ in 
 the middle of the head. Moderns differ greatly in their opinion 
 as to which organ is the seat of this estimating and comparing 
 power. 
 
 This being the case we can understand how, though the 
 particular sense may fittingly announce the phenomena, the 
 phantasy may fittingly form the sense image and yet the 
 cogitative will not react fittingly. We, too, can understand 
 how the speculative reason may still be sound in the judgment 
 of the universal and yet the practical reason because of its 
 
 (8) In Sent. III d. 23, q. 2, a. 2 sol., 1 ad 3. 
 (9) II-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 1. 
 (10) II-II, q. 49, a. 4, 7, 8 
 

 
 42 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 enchainment with an unsound cogitative is helpless in forming 
 a concrete operative judgment. :! 
 
 It would be a fatal mistake and an exaggeration to deduce 
 from these considerations that the cogitative gives the final 
 verdict on moral acts to be placed. The real practical 
 intellective reason does this. But just as the speculative 
 reason, in the earthly life of persons, must of necessity work 
 with and upon the phantasm supplied by the senses for its 
 knowledge and judgment of the universal, so, too, the practical 
 reason depends for its final reflex judgment of individual 
 intentions on the material supplied by the cogitative. And 
 under the spell of a blunted diseased cogitative the will, though 
 entitatively free in the exercise of its acts, is hampered. 
 
 This sense perception of moral values is awakened in the 
 child long before the reason becomes active and explains how 
 children of tender age know right from wrong in concrete cases 
 at times with astounding accuracy. From this the pedagogical 
 value of the cogitative in the early formation of the affections 
 is apparent. Sincere parents and teachers will be quick to 
 take advantage of it. The first germs of the so called child 
 virtues, namely, the sense of shame and self-respect lie in the 
 cogitative. Cultivating these, a sense-sentiment of respect for 
 parents, teachers, play and classmates can be cultivated. By 
 arousing self-respect and esteem, habits of application, behavior 
 and unselfishness can be formed. However in doing this 
 every endeavor, too, should be made to gradually lift these 
 sense-habits to the higher plane of intellectual and supernatural 
 virtues. For though the supernatural presupposes and is built 
 up on the natural there is no real virtue in the concrete unless 
 it be vitalized by the supernatural. Just as in infant age the 
 germs of sense-valuation and intellectual judgment are gradual- 
 ly coming to bloom, so too the supernatural in these children 
 by the grace of God which is in and with them is coming to 
 fruition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (41) For a fuller discussion of this problem see: Die Menschliche Willens-Freiheit von 
 Dr. Karl Schmidt, O.S.B., Engelberg, Switzerland, 1925, pp. 156-163 and 194-203. 
 
SHloral Theology | 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
 The Virtues 
 
 I. Our English word, virtue, is derived from the Latin 
 word, virtus (vir), denoting, manly goodness, manhood and, 
 then in a further sense derived from this, a certain disposition 
 and quality befitting man as a rational being. Such a quality 
 perfects either the cognitive or the appetitive faculties; and thus 
 a division is made into intellectual and moral virtues. Strictly 
 speaking, manly goodness and, hence, virtue can only be 
 predicated of the moral virtues: the former would more properly 
 be called habits. Aristotle and St. Thomas enumerate five 
 such intellectual habits. 
 
 1. Understanding: a quality of mind which gives an ex- 
 -pertness to apprehend clearly and fix firmly the principles on 
 which all our thought processes depend; from which thought 
 begins, and around which thought revolves, they being the 
 starting point and radiating center of all thought. 
 
 2. Science, by which the mind is made expert to see the 
 inner relations of things, deducing one truth from the other, 
 and linking the discovered truths with one another especially 
 along the lines of causal relation. 
 
 3. Wisdom: the quality of mind disposing to bring all 
 things back to the first truth and principle and final end of all 
 being, namely, to God. 
 
 4, Art: the general knack and bent of arranging and 
 grouping the outward expression of the inward thought pro- 
 cesses. 
 
 5. Prudence, which, however, since it is the practical 
 reason of right conduct, belongs rather to the moral virtues 
 (see below). 
 

 
 44 Fundamental 
 
 II. ‘The merely intellectual habits denote good, but with a 
 qualification and restriction; namely, good in as far as it is 
 truth. Of course, truth makes us more like unto God, brings 
 us nearer to Him, and thus perfects our nature, making it more 
 like unto God; moreover a greater knowledge influences our 
 moral life, but yet it does not perfect our moral being. An 
 eminent philosopher might possess all the intellectual habits, 
 barring prudence, and yet lead a very immoral life. True 
 manly goodness, true manhood implies morality, wherefore the 
 term, virtue, strictly such, is applicable to the moral virtues 
 only. 
 
 III. Virtue is defined by Lactantius: ‘To do good and 
 avoid evil.’?! However, the term, virtue, implies a permanent 
 disposition, not merely a transient act; and, as such, is defined: 
 A habit of doing good. A habit is a permanent disposition to 
 act in a certain definite manner. It perfects or impairs the 
 faculty in which it resides either, entitatively, as ill health im- 
 pairs the vigor of the body, or operatively, as prudence perfects 
 the practical intellect. The moral virtues perfect man opera- 
 tively. 
 
 Thus we arrive at a more complete definition of virtue: 
 Virtue is an operative habit to do good and to avoid evil. 
 Good here means the moral good, conformity to right reason, 
 which, in the ultimate analysis, means to the ‘‘reason of God’’. 
 This reason of God is not a mere fiat of His will, but is the 
 effluence of God’s will, governed by His wisdom and benevo- 
 lence. An act is good, therefore, if it conforms to that stand- 
 ard of morality which the order of things in the world demands. 
 Good or bad is imputable to human acts only, namely, acts 
 either elicited or commanded by the will of its own free choice. 
 A virtue is therefore an operative habit of placing good human 
 acts. 
 
 The definition, which St. Thomas borrowed from St. 
 Augustine, in reality does not differ from this. Virtue, he says, 
 
 (1) De Divin. Inst., 1. 6, ec. 5 (M. 6, 649). 
 
 
 
Moral Theology 45 
 
 is a good quality or a habit of the mind, by which man lives 
 -rightly, which no one uses evilly, and which God operates in 
 us without us.2 To posit good human acts means to live 
 rightly; to place evil human acts means to forsake virtue. 
 The clause, ‘‘which God operates in us without us,”’ refers to 
 the supernatural virtues. However, since all men are elevated 
 to the supernatural state and this is the destiny of all, the 
 supernatural virtues are the only really good habits (see below). 
 
 IV. (a) Habit is different from power. Virtue pre- 
 supposes the power to act. It is not the power of doing good, 
 for even the wicked have such power; if it were otherwise the 
 wicked could not commit formal sin. 
 
 (b) Nor is virtue the act itself; for, otherwise, nobody 
 could have a virtue except at the very time he acts, whilst, in 
 fact, man may have a virtue, though he never places an act 
 of that virtue. For instance, a hermit in the desert may have 
 the virtue of justice, though he neither has nor will have an 
 occasion to posit an act of justice. 
 
 (c) Virtue differs from the affections and _ passions. 
 Affections are the stirrings of the rational appetite; passions 
 are the stirrings of the sensuous appetite. Virtues are not the 
 stirring either of the rational or of the sensuous appetite. They 
 are the forces which excite such stirrings. 
 
 The passions and the affections are morally neither good 
 nor bad in themselves; but virtue is always good.? Reason 
 holds the passions and affections to the moral good; hence, 
 the stirrings have their beginnings in the appetite and their 
 terminus in the reason, whilst reason stirs up the virtues which 
 in turn stir up either the passions or the affections, and thus 
 they have their beginning in the reason and their terminus in 
 the appetite. 
 
 (d) The common opinion, taught in the schools of the 
 Church today, holds that there is a difference between the 
 
 
 
 (2) Summa, QLYV, art. 4. 
 (3) Summa, 1.2, q. 49, art. 1. 
 
46 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 gifts of the Holy Ghost and the infused virtues. In name, 
 purpose and object to which they tend they are the same. . 
 The difference lies in the motive power which stirs them up. 
 The virtues are stirred up by reason elevated to the supernatural 
 state and illuminated by faith; the gifts of the Holy Ghost 
 (which of course are different from the charismata, which are 
 in the wicked as in the just,) are stirred into action by a special 
 direct movement of the Holy Ghost. They prompt the virtues 
 to act more quickly by an almost instinctive movement, which, 
 however, is still under command of the free choice of the will. 
 
 V. Since all moral acts are human acts and all human acts 
 are either elicited or commanded by the will, it follows that 
 the subject, wherein virtues reside, must be principally the 
 will. They can reside in the other faculties only in as far as 
 these faculties are under the command of the will. True, 
 sometimes virtue and good are predicated of acts of the intellect 
 considered without reference to the will; but, when this is done, 
 it is with a reservation or a qualification. ‘Thus we say that 
 the judgment is good in the sense that it is true; but we do not 
 say that true judgment makes a man morally good or virtuous. 
 Wherefore the habit of good judgment is not simply good but 
 good with a reservation and a qualification. 
 
 With all the more reason virtues cannot reside in the sen- 
 suous faculties, except in as far as they are controlled by the 
 will. Thus the subject wherein virtue resides is either (1) 
 the will, or (2) the speculative intellect in as far as it can be 
 moved to truth by the free will, or (3) the practical intellect 
 in as far as the acts to be placed are rightly commanded by the 
 will, or (4) the sensuous appetites in as far.as the irascible and 
 concupiscible are ruled by the rational will. + 
 
 VI. In the Book of Genesis we read: ‘“‘And God created 
 man to His own image; to the image of God He created him.” + 
 This image and likeness consists especially in this: The soul 
 
 (4) Cf. Pesch, Prae.-Dog. De Virtutibus Infusis, vol. 8, Tract 1, n. 6. 
 (5) Gen. i, 27. 
 
SMoral Theology 47 
 
 
 
 of man is, like God, a spirit endowed with intellect and will and 
 destined to live on forever. Man, by his own exertion, should 
 heighten this image of God, by using his intellect to learn 
 more of God, and by training his will to do more perfectly 
 God’s will. Thus, in this better knowledge of God and in this 
 better fulfillment of God’s will, man would make himself more 
 like unto God. ‘This is what is called the natural state of man 
 and his natural destiny. Wishing to make man even more 
 like unto Himself—to make him “but a little lower than the 
 angels .... to crown him with glory and honor’’.* God lifted 
 man up to the supernatural state. In this state man reflects 
 more resplendently God’s perfections, and thus becomes more 
 and more the likeness and image of God. 
 
 This lifting up God does by infusing into the soul of man a 
 supernatural habit, by which man becomes ‘“‘a new creature’, 7 
 “a, partaker of the divine nature,” * so that, the darkness of 
 sin having been expelled, man becomes a “‘light in the Lord’’, 
 
 walking as “‘a child of light’’ “in all goodness and justice and 
 truth’’, » and is fit “for the kingdom prepared from the founda- 
 tion of the world’’. 1° 
 
 VII. (a) This habit is called sanctifying grace. Sancti- 
 fying grace does not add a new faculty to our soul, but trans- 
 forms the faculties to know and to will that are in us. It 
 is not a momentary, passing transformation, but a permanent 
 inherent form. It is called a habit, but is not a mere disposi- 
 tion; it is a new form. Christ “emptied Himself, taking the 
 form of the servant’, 11 “that we may be found in His form’’, 2 
 Thus, as He was with us a man among men, we may become, 
 in as far as our condition of creature allows, as God with God. 
 
 (b) Sanctifying grace is not a virtue. It holds the same 
 place in the supernatural as nature does in the natural order. 
 The supernatural does not supplant; it presupposes nature, 
 yet it is not merely a perfecting but a lifting up of nature to a 
 
 
 
 (6) Psalm viii, 6. (Gals vi, 16. (8) II. Peter i, 4. 
 (9) Eph. v, 8-9 (10) Matt. xxv, 34. CEE Rieti aks 
 (12) rote of Mass of Christmas. 
 
48 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 higher plane. It gives the intellect not merely a clearer but a 
 higher and broader vision; it does not draw the will to the good 
 merely more intensely, but draws it on to a higher and a greater 
 good. 
 
 (c) The good in the natural and supernatural order, to 
 which the will is drawn, is God, the supreme good; but the 
 supernatural makes this good better known, and makes it more 
 desirable in itself. To be with God is the desire of men. In 
 the supernatural state this desire is to be with Him in a union 
 more intimate than nature can give—namely, to know Him 
 as we are known, to see Him face to face, and, thus seeing and 
 knowing Him, to be with Him, not merely as a creature with 
 the creator, or as a servant with the master, but as friend with 
 friend and as children with the father. 
 
 Sanctifying grace thus holds the same place in the super- 
 natural, which nature holds in the natural order. God gave 
 man’s nature certain faculties that it may function; with this 
 new form God gives special gifts and aids that nature and the 
 faculties of nature transformed can place the acts of this higher 
 life. Among these are the supernatural virtues, which we - 
 can thus define as permanent dispositions to place human acts 
 morally good, and fit to attain the supernatural end. 
 
 VIII. The moral virtues are put into action differently by 
 the believer and by the unbeliever; by the just and the unjust. 
 The first difference lies in the power which places the act. 
 The one is left to his natural resources; while the other acts 
 under the inspiration and help of the supernatural grace given 
 him by God. Secondly, the one seeks the good which man 
 perceives by the light of reason which points out to him that 
 standard of morality, which reason learns by the study of the 
 present order of things as they are in the present world. The 
 good to be obtained is only that happiness which the world 
 can give man, the satisfaction of knowing that he is right, a 
 feeling that he is acting in a rational manner becoming his 
 dignity asman. The other, by the glow of charity which is in 
 
Moral Theology 49 
 
 
 
 him and by the light of faith, sees a higher, a supernatural good, 
 which draws him on to act. This higher and supernatural 
 good is God Himself, known not only from the things which 
 are, but known more fully and evidently from His positive 
 revelation. The impelling force again is not merely the love 
 of good, but the love of God from Whom all good things come 
 and the Author Who has established the supernatural order 
 by the absolute free choice of His positive will. This force 
 endures morally in the habit of charity which is in the agent 
 acting. There is then for the just a higher vision and higher 
 impelling force and an object known as higher and more 
 desirable. Faith gives the vision; charity, the impelling force. 
 Thus the friend of God, when positing an act, refers the act 
 together with himself to this supernatural end. Or at least 
 the motivation of the act, in an implicit and confused manner, 
 is faith, understanding hereby that, in the final analysis, the 
 reason why the act is placed is because it is acceptable to God, 
 the supernatural good, and that it is endowed with that justice 
 which He demands in the supernatural order. 
 
 IX. But no moral virtue is supernatural, except in as far 
 as it regards the right use of means to the supernatural end. 
 Thus military prudence, in general, is not a supernatural 
 virtue—the means are chosen for a merely natural purpose. ': 
 
 From this it will be understood how the Fathers of the 
 Church frequently stigmatized the virtues of the unbelievers as 
 vices. All men are ordained by God to the supernatural state, 
 and must therefore desire and attain God not merely as the 
 natural but the supernatural good. The acts of the unbeliever’s 
 virtues fall short of this; and, hence, are in that sense vices. 
 
 However, nothing is wanting in them which is required by 
 philosophical consideration for the essence of virtue. The 
 formal supernatural object and the infused habit corresponding 
 to this object alone are wanting. |‘ 
 
 (18) Cf. Vermeersch, De Just., c. 1, n. 19. 
 (14) Pesch, Prael. Dog., Tract 1-13. 
 
50 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 X. All the supernatural virtues are moral virtues, since 
 they place good human acts, or, in other words, lead to the true 
 final end of man’s whole life. ‘“‘An end,” says Aristotle, ‘‘is 
 something desirable of itself and not for something else.” 
 This, however, does not mean finality; thus, in a race, to reach 
 the first mile post is an end, but the final end is the last post— 
 the first end is in a certain sense a means to the final end. Now 
 virtue may lead to God as its direct object; its end is then the 
 final end, for that reason it is given a nobler name, being called 
 a theological virtue. Or the first end of a virtue may be some- 
 thing desirable in itself, but yet dispositive as a means to the 
 final end. Thus, the end of the virtue of justice is to give to 
 each one his due as the standard of morality demands. This 
 is desirable in itself, but is dispositive to a higher end, namely, 
 this standard is fixed by God and to attain it is pleasing to 
 Him, and, as such, is a means of coming to Him. For this 
 reason these latter virtues are called simply the moral virtues. 
 
 The theological virtues tend to ordain human acts directly 
 to the supernatural end of man, to God Himself; the moral 
 virtues ordain such acts to the means which finally lead to 
 God. 15 
 
 In moral questions, matter and form are spoken of only by 
 analogy. In this analogy the material object to which a 
 virtue tends is the good to which its acts go out; the formal 
 object is the moral good at which the act aims. Thus, the ma- 
 terial object of justice is the rights of others; the formal object 
 is the moral good that lies in this, to give each man his due. 
 The formal object of the supernatural virtue of justice is this: 
 It is good to give each one his due, because this is pleasing to 
 God, and He will reward with eternal life. 
 
 XI. There are three theological virtues: Faith, Hope and 
 Charity. God is considered as being Truth itself, and, as such, 
 is the object of faith; or He is considered as our Supreme 
 Good, and, as such, is the object of hope; or He is considered 
 
 (15) Summa, 1 2, q. 62, art. 2. 
 

 
 Moral Theology 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 simply as the Supreme Good, and, as such, is the object of 
 charity. 
 
 The moral virtues are classified under the heading, Cardinal 
 Virtues, which are four: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and 
 Temperance. oa 
 
 Man must judge whether the object is morally good; this 
 is done by prudence. Man must observe the mean in reaching 
 out for the created goods; this is done by temperance. Then 
 he must overcome those difficulties which sway him from going 
 out after the real good, which is done by fortitude; and, lastly, 
 in seeking his own he must not trespass on the rights of others; 
 this is done by justice.1* This division is scriptural: “If a 
 man love justice (the sum total of morality), her labors have 
 great virtues, for she teacheth temperance and prudence and 
 justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have 
 nothing more profitable in life.”’ 
 
 St. Ambrose seems to have been the first to call these the 
 cardinal virtues. ‘‘We know,” he says, ‘“‘that there are four 
 cardinal virtues—temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude.’ 18 
 
 XII. Cardinal is used in the sense (a) of denoting the four 
 qualities which must be found in every virtue, prudent, just, 
 firm and temperate; (b) to denote a special virtue in which one 
 of these four attributes, common to all, shines forth in a special 
 manner, namely, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, 
 and thus these four virtues become heads, as it were, under 
 which the others are ranged. 
 
 However, as this hinging springs from the matter around 
 which these special virtues operate, it by no means follows 
 that they are better or greater than the virtues ranged under 
 them. Thus religion is put under justice; yet religion is greater 
 in dignity than justice. '° 
 
 Further, since this is a mere logical arrangement, because a 
 virtue is placed under one of these four, it does not necessarily 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 (16)"summa,, 2, q..60; art: 2:*q. 61, "art. 2; (17) Wisdom viii, 7. 
 (18) (Mi. P. 15, 1653.) (LO )}eSUIniIna ele. Ole AT use oa 
 
52 Fundamental 
 
 imply that it is of the same faculty or that it is more intimately 
 connected with this than with another virtue. Thus, for 
 instance, humility is ranged under temperance which is of the 
 concupiscible and sensuous appetite, whilst humility belongs 
 to the will. 2° 
 
 XIII. These are called the cardinal among the moral 
 virtues, but not in comparison with the theological, which are 
 by far greater. The latter are not called cardinal, because in 
 this term there is always an underlying meaning of turning 
 which is excluded in the theological virtues. The appetite of 
 man rests in the end of his being to which these tend; and, 
 therefore, these are compared not to cardinal (the hinge) but 
 to the foundation and root, as in the saying of St. Paul, “That 
 Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts, that being rooted 
 and founded in charity you may be able to comprehend.... to 
 know also the charity of Christ... . that you may be filled 
 unto all the fullness of God.” 2 
 
 For a similar reason wisdom is not enumerated among the 
 cardinal virtues. The moral virtues turn upon human things; 
 wisdom contemplates the divine. Contemplation cannot be 
 compared to the turning on a hinge, for it is not like a gate by 
 which one enters, but rather moral action is the gate by which 
 one enters unto wisdom. Prudence among the moral virtues 
 approaches closest to wisdom, yet with a difference: “‘Wisdom 
 contemplates the divine; prudence concerns itself with the 
 human things which lead to the wisdom of divine things. 
 Prudence shows men how to come to wisdom; it is the inter- 
 mediary, the minister of wisdom; it introduces and shows 
 the way as porter to the king.”’ 
 XIV. Experience teaches us that virtues can be acquired 
 by repeated acts. Revelation teaches us that God pours into 
 the soul of the just certain virtues; hence the division into 
 acquired and infused virtues. But, since the manner in which 
 
 2 2 
 
 
 
 (20) Vermeersch, De Just., cap. 1, 13. (21) Eph. iii, 17, 18, 19. 
 (22) Summa, 1, 2, q. 6, a. 5, ad 1. 
 
Horal Theology SS 
 
 
 
 
 
 the infused virtues act, the means they use and the end to 
 which they tend are over and beyond the natural, they are not 
 a perfecting of natural powers, which are only dispositive to 
 the supernatural, but can never attain it. On the other hand, 
 since the infused virtues presuppose the power which they 
 inform, they are not a new power superadded, but are habits 
 disposing unto supernatural acts. From this it is evident 
 that even the moral supernatural virtues cannot be acquired 
 by repeated natural acts. 
 
 Scotus and his followers hold that the supernatural end, 
 which the acquired virtues cannot have in their own species, 
 comes to them from the inclination of charity, and that the 
 infused virtue of faith gives the manner and the means of 
 acting; and, consequently, that they need not necessarily be 
 infused.22 To this argument the Thomists answer: It could 
 be thus, but yet, unless there be moral virtues infused, the 
 supernatural order is not perfect in all its parts. The irascible 
 -and concupiscible appetites, in as far as they are subjects of 
 moral virtues, would not be elevated to the supernatural. 
 
 Scripture and tradition seem to favor the opinion that the 
 the moral virtues are infused with sanctifying grace. St. Paul 
 tells Timothy: “‘God hath not given us the spirit of fear but of 
 power (fortitude) and of love and of sobriety’”’ (temperance). 2 4 
 Now, since the spirit of love is the infused virtue, it would seem 
 justifiable to conclude the spirit of fortitude and temperance 
 are likewise the infused virtues. 
 
 St. Augustine, speaking of the cardinal virtues, says: 
 “These virtues are given to us in this valley of tears by the 
 grace of God.”’ In another passage he says: “Piety, chastity 
 and sobriety and the whole army of virtues are in the just.’’ ‘“‘For, 
 as the commander leads his army whither and where he chooses, 
 thus the Lord Jesus Christ, beginning to inhabit the interior 
 man, uses these virtues as His ministers.” ? 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 (23) Seotus, D. 3 d. 36, q. 1, n. 28 (Lect. de istis). (2A Nel Dom barrow cats 
 (25) Ps. 88, 11, 37. 
 

 
 54 Fundamental 
 
 The opinion, commonly taught in the schools of the Church, 
 holds that God infuses the moral virtues in the soul of the just 
 together with sanctifying grace, and that an increase of sanctify- 
 ing grace or merit increases them in intensity but not in prompt- 
 ness or facility to act. 
 
 The Roman catechism favors this opinion, when it says: 
 “To this (sanctifying grace) is added the noblest train of all 
 the virtues which are divinely infused into the soul with 
 erace.”’ 26 
 
 XV. Promptness and facility come by repeated acts. 
 These repeated acts do not add a new habit; they confirm the 
 previous existing habit which becomes more ready and more 
 prompt to act. This facility and promptness can remain, 
 even though the supernatural habit is lost by mortal sin. 
 Experience proves this: Man acquires a greater facility and 
 promptness to place virtuous acts in proportion to the frequency 
 in which they are placed. From the negative side, experience 
 proves that, when the sinner is converted, he still finds great 
 difficulty in overcoming the vicious habits of his former life, 
 whilst his good habits, acquired previously, act promptly and - 
 easily. 
 
 XVI. All the infused virtues, except faith and hope, are 
 lost by mortal sin, though the acquired natural facility remains. 
 Faith and hope are lost only by sins directly against these 
 virtues. 
 
 When sanctifying grace is regained by penance, the infused 
 virtues are restored. Their intensity follows the intensity of 
 the restored sanctifying grace. St. Thomas explains the reason 
 for this: ‘‘Forms which can receive a plus or a minus are 
 increased or decreased according to the diverse disposition of 
 the subject .... wherefore in the measure in which the move- 
 ment of the free will is increased in penance, grace is given to 
 the penitent.” 27 
 
 
 
 (26) Cat. Rom. 2, 2, q. 50. 
 (27) Summa, 38, q. 89, ad 2. 
 
Sloral Theology 55 
 
 XVII. The mean of virtue is either the mean of the thing 
 or the mean of reason; the former is objective, and is the same 
 for everybody and in all circumstances; the latter depends on 
 the prudent use of reason, and differs for different persons and 
 in different circumstances. Justice, for example, holds to the 
 mean of the thing, for it demands from all and always: To 
 give each one his due, neither more nor less. If one gives 
 more, he does not act against but beyond justice. There is 
 only one extreme, namely, to fall short of what is due. Forti- 
 tude, on the contrary, holds to the mean of reason between 
 two extremes. He who exposes himself needlessly is foolhardy; 
 he who flies from danger, when reason tells him to stand his 
 ground, is timid; he who is neither timid nor foolhardy is 
 valiant. What is foolhardy in one circumstance may be 
 timidity in another. The mean here is between the extremes 
 of the contrary vices. ‘Temperance finds its mean between 
 excessive use and excessive abstinence. Let us say, for exam- 
 ple, in matters of food and drink. What is excessive for one 
 need not be so for the other. 
 
 Justice alone seeks the mean of the thing; the other moral 
 virtues, the mean of reason. 
 
 For the theological virtues there is no mean in regard to 
 the object to which they tend. We cannot believe, trust, or 
 love God too much. Wherefore the mean of faith, hope and 
 charity can only be that the act is placed in suitable time and 
 intensity with all the subjective conditions demanded by the 
 true act. 
 
 It might seem that in faith and hope there is a mean as 
 between overcredulity and incredulity, between presumption 
 and despair; but a closer analysis will prove that this is not a 
 mean of faith nor of hope but of the pious affection of credulity 
 or of trust, which pious affections are not theological but moral 
 virtues. The matter at issue is not whether we are to believe 
 or hope for the things of God firmly or lightly as we do when 
 men are in question, but whether we have reason to believe 
 
56 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 that God has really spoken or promised these things; and this 
 belongs to the pious affection of credulity, which, since it is a 
 moral virtue, finds its mean in the mean of reason. 
 
 XVIII. Even in the natural order, to be a man of character 
 and virtue demands not only one or the other good habit but 
 an endeavor to practice all virtues. A truthful man, who is 
 intemperate or unchaste, with all his fidelity to promises, is 
 devoid of character. As Cicero says: “‘If you confess that one 
 virtue is wanting you, it necessarily follows that you have 
 none.’” There must, then, be a something which blends all of 
 man’s moral actions into a mutual relationship and harmony. 
 In the moral life the will is dominated by its loves. St. 
 Francis de Sales explains this, saying: “‘No doubt the will 
 rules love, since it loves as it chooses; and among the many 
 loves presented to her affections she chooses as she prefers. 
 But, having chosen one, she lives in it and is ruled by it, and 
 thus the will takes on the qualities of the love she has espoused.” 
 
 This solves the paradox of the two testimonies of our 
 conscience. The one tells us we are free and responsible; the 
 other insists that our will is fixed by our loves. Our loves 
 prompt our will either to elicit or to command or to reject 
 certain acts not only transiently but permanently, not only 
 for one or the other action but for the whole line of action. 
 By its loves our will is qualified as noble or ignoble, pure or | 
 impure; and thus our moral life is our will. Therefore, even 
 in the natural order, the virtues are connected and federated 
 together, but not swallowed up so as to lose their identity, by 
 love. This love which binds the virtues together is the love of 
 God. Receding from this love, our habits become vices, are 
 disjoined one from the other, and vitiate the harmony of the 
 moral life. God is the supreme good, the author and exemplar 
 of all good; and our will can never cease yearning until it has 
 found this good. Its loves are good or bad, as they conform 
 to God’s will or recede from it. Wherefore St. Augustine says: 
 “Virtue is nothing else than the supreme love of God.” 
 

 
 
 
 Moral Theology Aff 
 
 
 
 XIX. In the natural order the moral virtues dispose our 
 love to the real good. Buta general inclination is not sufficient. 
 Kach human act must be brought before the bar of prudence. 
 The verdict must be given not merely along the lines of the 
 general principles of morality, but must take into consideration 
 the many-sided and varying circumstances of life. The 
 sentence must be passed on this point at issue: Is this particular 
 act good in this particular circumstance. ‘The judgment and 
 command, let the act be placed, belongs to the practical reason. 
 Prudence guides, checks and leads the sensuous and the rational 
 appetite, lest the practical reason be swayed by them unto 
 false good. Each moral virtue is thus brought before prudence 
 for such guidance, restraint and leadership. 
 
 On the other hand, prudence relies for such guidance and 
 restraint on the help of all the moral virtues. It is a question 
 of the end of man’s whole life; and, therefore, the help not only 
 of one but of all the virtues is sought. Moreover, a right 
 choice demands a right appetite. The moral virtues incline 
 both the sensuous and the rational appetite to right. Thus 
 prudence depends on the moral virtues as science depends on 
 the knowledge of true principles. Prudence perfects the practi- 
 cal reason and is disposed unto so doing by the moral virtues. 
 Prudence links the acquired virtues together; and they are 
 linked up with prudence. 
 
 But love, after all, is the determining factor; wherefore says 
 St. Augustine: ‘“‘Prudence is love discerning aright that 
 which helps from that which hinders us in tending to God.”’ 
 St. Thomas explains how St. Augustine can thus qualify 
 prudence as love, saying: ‘‘Now, of those things which are 
 directed to the end, there is counsel in the reason and choice 
 in the appetite of which two counsel belongs more properly to 
 prudence. .. . but choice can be ascribed to it indirectly in so 
 far as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel. It 
 (prudence) includes application to action, which application 
 is an act of the will.’’ 
 
58 Fundamental 
 
 XX. This union of all virtues in love is absolutely true in 
 the supernatural order wherein this union is effected by the 
 supernatural virtue of love which is called charity, which has 
 as its direct material object God Himself, and, as its formal 
 object, the supreme goodness of God. Its aim in this life is to 
 make us happy in the service of God as children serving their 
 father and, through this service, to come to a complete and 
 everlasting union with Him. 
 
 The Scholastics call charity the form of all the virtues—by 
 form meaning the vital principle—as the soul is to the body, 
 so charity is to the virtues. All the virtues are lifeless in the 
 supernatural life, unless informed by charity, and cannot make 
 aman virtuous. Charity makes him good in the full sense of 
 the word, and subordinates all the other virtues to itself, and 
 directs them to its end. 
 
 Lest some one reply that this is effected by sanctifying 
 grace, it is well to remember that many theologians hold that 
 charity is sanctifying grace, and that sanctifying grace is 
 charity. But even in the other opinion which perhaps is the 
 more probable, though charity is distinguished in reality from 
 sanctifying grace, the virtue, rather than the grace, is the vital - 
 form of the virtues. There is a mutual interchange of good 
 between man’s merits and God’s reward, which is friendship. 
 The formal reason of this friendship is charity. 
 
 XXI. Sanctifying grace and charity form one inseparable 
 bond which unites man to his final end. The moral virtues 
 do not regard the final end directly; they regard the means 
 to that end. Faith shows this end but does not obtain it, for 
 even the wicked can have faith; hope gives the guarantee that 
 we can obtain it; charity embraces it. As we do not tend 
 towards an unknown end, thus we do not embrace an absent 
 good, charity brings the supreme good to us: “If any one love 
 me....my Father will love him, and we will make our abode 
 with him.” 28 
 
 (28) John xiv, 21, 23. 
 
Sloral Theology 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Faith,” the Apostle tells us, ““worketh by charity.” 2° If 
 we accept “‘worketh” in the passive voice, as the Greek text 
 demands, it means, charity is the vital form of faith in the 
 same way as St. James says: ‘‘For even as the body without 
 the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead.’ ?° If 
 we take it in the active sense as in the Latin text, it means, 
 that as the body worketh by the soul, so faith worketh by 
 charity. 
 
 All other virtues are imperfect without charity. St. Paul, 
 enumerating the virtues of faith, mercy and fortitude, adds, 
 “but if I have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.’’3: This 
 charity makes man good and virtuous, and subordinates all the 
 other virtues to its end. “But above all things have charity, 
 which is the bond of perfection.’’ +2 Thus charity is the form 
 of virtue, for, just as in the body, the soul gives life, charity gives 
 vitality to the virtues. It is the examplar of all virtues, not 
 because they are begotten in its likeness, but because they 
 work according to its manner; namely, each virtue tends to 
 its own definite good, but charity tends to the Supreme Good, 
 which is the Author of all good. The finite good is but a 
 reflection of the Supreme Good.” :3 
 
 Charity with sanctifying grace is the source of all merit; 
 and to the quantity of charity the quantity of merit will 
 respond. For each virtue, in accord with the good which is 
 proper to it, there will be an accidental reward. 3 4 
 
 XXII. When we affirm that all virtues are connected into 
 one chain, this does not necessarily mean that one must possess 
 all or none. It merely means that, unless they are thus con- 
 nected, there is an imperfection. Again, this does not demand 
 that all be possessed in the same degree of perfection. In the 
 natural order the union of the virtues means theoretically that, 
 unless so linked up, they have not obtained their just develop- 
 
 (29) Gal. v, 6. (30) James ii, 26. 
 sl elee@orexiii, ol, ayo: (82) Col. iii, 14. 
 (33) St. Thomas, Q. Disp. de Car., a. 3, ad 6. 
 
 (34) St. Thomas, De Ver., q. 26, a. 6, ad 8. 
 
60 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 ment; practically it means that one or the other or even several 
 virtues cannot qualify a man as good. 
 
 In the supernatural order the union of the virtues in charity 
 means that, unless they are so united, the other virtues have 
 lost the vital form needed for this higher life that they have 
 lost their effectiveness. Again, not (a) as if charity must 
 elicit or command each meritorious act, but that charity holds 
 up the examplar, the mirror as it were, to the other virtues, 
 showing the Supreme Good of which the particular good is 
 only a reflection; (b) that a positive act of charity, elicited at 
 certain times, must subordinate and direct all these particular 
 goods to the Supreme Good loved for His own sake, which is 
 the final end of all virtue and of all meritorious action. 
 
 XXIII. Many theories are advanced for the betterment 
 of the individual. There are those who dream of a physical 
 betterment by a selective interbreeding of the vigorous and 
 healthy types to produce an ideal man of power, “‘whose body 
 is the ready servant of his will and does with pleasure all the 
 work that, as a mechanism, it is capable of.”’ 
 
 Others, seeing a little higher, would add to this, ‘‘whose 
 intellect is a clear, cold logic engine, ready to be turned to any 
 kind of work.”’ 
 
 The power of the body and the intellect thus fused would 
 perhaps produce a mechanism ready to produce the work of 
 the world. But to do this there must be control. The bolt 
 of lightning, shooting from the clouds, wreaks havoc; the mad 
 rush of the cyclone leaves ruin to mark its trail; steam is im- 
 potent, unless it is compressed in cylinders. Power of body and 
 mind can make a demagogue or a statesman, a tyrant or a ruler, 
 a hero or a scourge for humanity, a Nero ora St. Paul, an Attilla 
 or a Charlemagne. Something more then is needed. Culture 
 of the intellect makes a learned man; culture of the will makes 
 a good man. This culture is given the will by the moral 
 virtues. A man may be rich, honored and mighty; he may be 
 a renowned genius, an incomparable artist, an unconquerable 
 
SMoral Theology 61 
 
 general or a much heralded statesman, but this will not make 
 him who possesses it a good man, nor will it make his work 
 good for humanity. © 
 
 XXIV. Aristotle says: “Virtue alone makes him who 
 possesses it good.” Plutarch in his epigrams narrates this 
 anecdote. The question was put to Charislaus: ‘‘Which nation 
 is the best?” He readily answered: “That one in which the 
 citizens vie with one another for possession of virtue.’’ Holy 
 Writ summarizes this truth in the words of the Psalmist: 
 “Decline from evil and do good and dwell for ever and ever.’’ 
 It is not sufficient to avoid evil, doing nothing that would be 
 against the law of God. By doing good we heighten the image 
 and likeness of God which is in us by nature and which God’s 
 grace brings almost to a participation of His very nature. 
 
 Our earthly career is only then worth while if we endeavor 
 to perfect this participation day by day. “He that is just let 
 him be justified still; and he that is holy let him be sanctified 
 Vstill 3 
 
 In the first series of instructions given on the Mount, our 
 Lord explains the perfection of the law. He stresses the sanc- 
 tity of this law and concludes this first part of the sermon with 
 the words, “‘Be you therefore perfect as also your heavenly 
 Father is perfect.” :* Of course, we can never arrive at this 
 absolute perfection, but the Lord sets the ideai high, so that we 
 may never cease striving to make ourselves more and more like 
 unto Him. St. Paul admits this impossibility, explaining to 
 the Church at Philippi: ‘Not as though I had already attained 
 or were perfect,’’ yet he adds: “But the one thing I do, for- 
 getting the things that are behind and stretching forth myself 
 to those that are before, I press towards the mark, to the prize 
 of the supernal vocation of God in Christ Jesus.’ 7 
 
 Charity being the essence of this perfection, substantially 
 it is the same for all; yet there are varying degrees, because not 
 
 
 
 (35) Apoe. xxii, 11. (36) Matt. v, 48. 
 (87) Phil. iii, 12, 13, 14. 
 

 
 62 | Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 each state in life gives the same means, nor can the virtues be 
 practiced in the same manner by all, for “the Spirit breatheth 
 where he will’’.8 In every state of life the virtues must be 
 practiced according to the manner and the means given to each; 
 and thus we should strive to obtain such as are commensurate 
 to the state in life assigned to us. 
 
 XXYV. The virtues are not only helps to perfection; but, 
 since they heighten the image and likeness of God in us,_are, 
 in a certain sense, this perfection itself. Thus, for instance, 
 wisdom, by which we contemplate the divine things in the one 
 vision, namely, God, the first and universal principle and the 
 final end of all created beings, seeing that ‘‘every best gift and 
 every perfect gift is from above coming from the Father of 
 lights’’, impresses on our knowledge a unity similar to the unity 
 in God, Who, contemplating His own essence, sees all things. 
 The virtue of patience which, in weal or in woe, enables us to 
 possess quiet of soul in the full turbulence of life, reflects the 
 unchangeableness of God, “‘with Whom there is no change nor 
 shadow of alteration.’”’ The virtue of temperance, recalling 
 the rebellious manifestations of the passions to the soul centre 
 and thus begetting in man a feeling of concentration making 
 him act as a concentrating and concentrated being, reflects 
 the absolute oneness of God’s acts. Thus similarly for all the 
 virtues. 
 
 
 
 (38) John iii, 8. 
 
SHloral Theology 63 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
 The Obligation of Human Law 
 
 ARTICLE, 1 
 Laws of the Civil Government 
 
 I. In the chapter on Moral Obligation it is established 
 that man participates of the Divine Providence not only in 
 the sense of subjection but likewise because he can ordain for 
 himself and for his subjects a rule of individual or of social life. 
 From the foregoing, too, it is evident that to evoke the dictate 
 “T must’’, every law must in some manner participate of the 
 eternal law of God. “The freedom of those,”’ says Leo XIII, 
 “who are in charge is not that they may command rashly and 
 according to their whims. The force of human laws lies in 
 this that they are understood to flow from the eternal law and 
 that they sanction nothing which is not contained in this law 
 as in the source of all right.””: “For God in the things which 
 are and which are seen has fashioned certain secondary causes 
 in which, in a certain manner, the divine nature and action of 
 God is discernable and which make for that end to which the 
 whole universe tends; thus, too, in civil society He wills that 
 there be a ruling authority and that those who are vested with 
 this authority reflect the image of the divine power over man- 
 kind and of His Divine Providence.”’ ? 
 
 St. Thomas defines law as “an ordering of reason for the 
 good of the community, promulgated by one in whom the care 
 of the community is vested.’’* ‘Political subjection differs 
 from servile: the servile subject is and acts for the good of 
 another, the political subject is and acts for himself. The 
 
 
 
 (1) Weeerclical: Libertas, Letters of Leo XIII, Paee joy 1 
 (2) Encyclical, Immortale Dei, lib. cit., p. 10 
 (3) I-II, q. 90, a. 
 
64 } Fundamental 
 
 servant is ruled not for his own but for the benefit of the 
 master; the citizen is ruled for his own good, not for the benefit 
 of the ruler. The political ruler, governing the people, seeks 
 not his own good but the good of the people; the tyrant seeks 
 his own not the people’s good, as Aristotle teaches’ (Kthies - 
 1, 8,c. 10). Thus if there is question of servant in political rule, 
 he who presides rather than he who is subject should be called 
 the servant, as St. Augustine teaches: (1. 9, de civit., c. 14). 
 
 II. ‘Forms of government and titles to exercise it and the 
 power itself, as existing in its determinate possessors,”’ says 
 Cardinal Billot, “are not immediately from God, but only 
 through the medium of human consent, that is, the consent of 
 the community.” * He then explains: “‘Not in the sense that 
 the right of sovereignty in itself comes from the people after 
 the manner of an instrumental power which flows from a 
 supreme commissioner to one commissioned... . Since authority 
 in itself is constituted not by human but by divine natural 
 right, there is nothing left for the human will or action but the 
 determination and designation of the ruler. . . . Through this 
 designation the people become the proximate cause, not indeed . 
 of the power as such, but of the joining of power to such a 
 person, according to such or such a measure and such or such 
 conditions.”’ Our authority then goes on to explain the diffi- 
 culty; but how can the community give what it has not? “At 
 the moment,’’ he says, ‘‘before the institution of a government, 
 there exists a society constituted not indeed ultimately and in 
 perfect actuality, yet in potentiality.” ‘‘Whenever a determi- 
 nate multitude of men assembled to help one another for a 
 political purpose exists, there is at hand a social power, not 
 indeed for governing that body, but for constituting sovereignty 
 from which the governing power is derived. This power, in 
 
 (4) Bellarmine, de laicis., c. 7. Cf. Encyclical, Immortale Dei,““They, therefore, who should 
 rule with even- -handed justice, ate as masters, but rather as fathers, for the rule of God over 
 man is most just, and is tempered always with a father’s kindness. Government should, 
 moreover, be administered for the well-being of the citizens because they who govern others 
 possess authority solely for the welfare of the State.’’ Lib. cit., p. 109 at bottom. 
 
 (5) Billot, de Ecclesia Christi, c. III, q. X XII, 4th edit., p. 497. 
 
Moral Theology 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 as far as it is from God, exists immediately in a concrete subject 
 or possessor, namely, in the community itself, by which it is 
 afterwards retained or is transferred to one monarch or to a 
 select group.” *® From this it does not follow “that one 
 government can be deposed and another instantly substituted 
 at the whim of the multitude. A will which does not follow 
 the order of reason neither has nor can have validity.” 7 ‘The 
 right to sovereignty is unlike the right of property in as much 
 as by nature sovereignty is ordained not for the benefit of him 
 who holds it, but for the benefit of society. Hence,if at any time 
 the public good requires a new form of government and a new 
 designation of rulers, no preexisting right of any person or any 
 family can validly prohibit this change. The right to create 
 the new legitimate government inheres in the community 
 habitually or potentially. However it ought not to be used 
 rashly or whimsically but when its use is demanded by the 
 common good and social tranquillity.” s 
 
 III. The theory of law held by practically all outside of 
 the Catholic Church is: all law arises from the will of men and 
 whatsoever this will of man expresses, is law. For some this 
 expression must come through the ballot; for others it, too, 
 may come through violence. This theory is the direct offspring 
 of the dictum of Montesquieu and Bentham: “The State is 
 the source of all law.”’ 
 
 In the Catholic view law is the measure or rule of the human 
 will ordering it to place or not to place a certain act. ‘“‘The 
 measure,” says St. Thomas, “‘of the human will is twofold, one 
 proximate and homogeneous to the will itself, namely human 
 reason; the other is the first rule namely, the eternal law which 
 is, aS it were, the reason of God.”’ 9 
 
 The axiom, “Man is a law unto himself,’”’ is true therefore 
 in the sense that the immediate guide, the one homogeneous to 
 his will, is his own reason. But the axiom is false in the sense 
 
 (6) Ibid., p. 498. (7) Ibid., p. 500. 
 (8) Ibid., p. 502 and 503. (9) I, II, q. 71, a. 6. 
 
 
 
66 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 that man is not obliged to bring his own reason into conformity 
 with the ‘‘reason of God’’. This eternal law, “the reason of 
 God,” is not an arbitrary fiat of God; but is the effluence of 
 his will governed by his wisdom and benevolence. 
 
 A thing is right therefore not merely because God has so 
 willed but because the very order of things which God created 
 demands that it be thus. Man is a law unto himself, because 
 he must be guided by his own reason educated to see the “‘reason 
 of God” in his own very nature and in the very nature of things 
 round about him. | 
 
 The most precious natural gift bestowed upon man by the 
 Creator, is the freedom of his will, which enables him to choose 
 his action; but by necessity this freedom of the will is curtailed; 
 first, by the rule homogeneous to man’s will, namely, his reason, 
 which tells him that he has various duties towards himself; 
 then it is further curtailed because he is a creature of God, 
 and as such he has duties towards God, his Creator; thirdly, 
 it is curtailed by the fact that man was not created merely as 
 an individual, but as a social being destined to live with others, 
 and as such all his gifts, powers, possessions besides being his | 
 individual personal prerogatives are in a manner, too, the 
 prerogatives of the society in which he lives, and since the well- 
 being of the society in which he lives reacts upon his own 
 individual well-being what he loses in favor of this society, he 
 regains by the favor of this society. Therefore the curtailment 
 of human freedom by law can only be justified in so far as this 
 curtailment is necessary or useful, in the ultimate analysis, for 
 man’s individual well-being. Man can never lose the personal 
 dignity of being created according to the image and likeness of 
 God. Any law which would lessen or dim this image and like- 
 ness is by that very fact not a law but a tyranny. There are 
 therefore certain rights and prerogatives which are immutable 
 and inalienable. Such rights are not subject to the will of the 
 majority, or of the ballot, or of legislation. 
 
HMoral Thealogy | 67 
 
 
 
 IV. Some in order to justify the theory, the will of the 
 majority is the source of all rights, appeal to Public Conscience. 
 Vox popult, they say, vox Dei, ‘““The voice of the people is the 
 voice of God,”’ is true, if the opinion is practically unanimous, is 
 constant through many years, and is based on thoughtful 
 experience and sound judgment; for then, in its ultimate 
 analysis, this voice of the people arises from the very nature of 
 things and thus is the voice of God who created this order of 
 things. But the axiom is made to serve a totally different 
 purpose. Under the pretense of a free state the right of fran- 
 chise to vote is being extended to all and the vote of the 
 majority is proclaimed to be the Public Conscience. In theory 
 the majority rules; but in practice the majority is artificially 
 produced by relatively few, who style themselves leaders. 
 This majority is nowadays, not made so much by the cruder 
 methods of buying votes, of willful miscount, and such other 
 manipulations, as by the study of mob psychology and by 
 exciting a mob spirit by which the leaders make a majority. 
 This mob has well been defined: ‘‘A crowd of people showing 
 a unanimity due to mental contagion.” 1° 
 
 The mob spirit can be defined: a mental contagion arising 
 from suggestion and imitation which takes hold of the many 
 who in this frenzy become an unreasoning machine manipulated 
 by one or a few leaders. The suggestion is spread by some 
 catch phrase or sensational proclamation. ‘The telegraph and 
 telephone, steam and electricity, the press, the theatre and 
 moving picture spread the contagion like wild fire. The 
 unthinking many thrown off their balance, take up the cry. 
 No time is allowed to regain the equilibrium of sound judgment. 
 
 Imitation, too, is a powerful agent for spreading the 
 epidemic. The most damning phrase today is, ““Behind the 
 times,” “‘A Back Number.’”’ Our system of education, based 
 on much reading and much seeing, without definite aim or 
 perspective, has caused the power to discriminate between 
 
 (10) Foundations of Sociology, Ross, p. 103. 
 
68 Sundamental 
 
 
 
 ideas in respect to their value to lag far behind the capacity to 
 receive ideas and thus the individual is left with nothing to do 
 but to follow the drift. Our knowledge of facts has increased | 
 enormously, but our judgment of facts has decreased in the 
 same proportion. ‘The multitude can tell you trippingly what 
 so and so said, but few can tell why he said it. The voz 
 populi today is but an expression engendered by such sugges- 
 tion and imitation. The “political landslide’, the ‘“‘tidal 
 wave’’, is the expression of this hysteria. How else can the 
 sudden reversal of political thought and action which seizes 
 on the many be explained? 
 
 Some of those who now so violently defend the omnipotence 
 of the majority may some day be disillusioned, when a tem- 
 porary majority decrees the abolition of private property, and 
 the sequestration of private fortunes. It is all very well to 
 talk about the good sense of the American people: but in our 
 generation we have seen reversals of opinions on most vital 
 issues, such as a preceding generation would have scouted and 
 we ourselves have declared impossible of realization. 
 
 The builders of the American Constitution forsaw this dan- . 
 ger and to forestall it instituted the Supreme Court with the 
 power not only to interpret the words of the constitution or of 
 statute law, but likewise with power to decide whether or not a 
 legislative enactment runs counter to a man’s inalienable and 
 immutable rights, which spring from the very nature of things 
 and find their ultimate sanction in the will of God. '! 
 
 V. The ideal government, according to St. Thomas, is 
 one wherein are combined the various forms of human govern- 
 ment: ‘The kingdom, is so far as one is the head of all, the 
 aristocracy in so far as many participate in this rule, the 
 democracy, in so far as all the people are eligible to become 
 rulers and the rulers are elected by all the people.”’ ' 2 
 
 He compares the co-ordination of rule in such a state to the 
 human body wherein all “‘is dependent on one moving dominant 
 
 (11) Cf. Life of John Marshall, by Albert Beveridge. (12) I-EI, q. 105; a. 1. 
 
Parcre jenleupse eh nN L eS ee Fee 
 
 principle, yet so that every member retains its own distinct 
 nature and peculiar function and is of benefit to every other 
 member and of the whole body’’.:* Just as some Gothic 
 cathedral of the Middle Age, wherein each part reflects in 
 detail the idea and plan of the whole structure. 
 
 Such a government must reflect the whole scheme and 
 general system of creation, wherein each separate organism 
 receives from the central motor, God, in accordance with its 
 peculiar nature and mode of existence, its vital impulse and 
 the laws of activity, disposed to the final end and purpose of 
 all things—God. ‘Thus, though there is an evolution from the 
 particular to the general, from the individuals to the family, 
 tribe, city, state, empire, this evolution is centrifugal—it 
 evolves out of the centre out of which comes the principle of 
 authority, tending upwards to God, its author, and downwards 
 to the man, its subject. ' 4 
 
 For as the Psalmist says: “Unless the Lord build the house, 
 they labor in vain that build it. Unless the Lord keep the city, 
 He watches in vain that keeps it.”?15> “‘There is no power but 
 from God; and they that are, are ordained of God.” ! 6 
 
 The authority in human society cannot recede from God. 
 The personality and dignity of man cannot be swallowed up 
 by the society, and the individual cannot stand separate and 
 aloof from the society. There must be laws; but they may 
 not contravene the law of God; they may not debase the 
 liberty of the individual, they may not rend asunder the bonds, 
 which hold the individuals together in the society. There 
 must be inalienable and immutable rights not subject to human 
 legislation, not subject to the will of the majority. 
 
 VI. It is the function of the state to regulate by wise laws 
 those elements which enter into the civil and political life of the 
 nation, those things, namely, which make for the temporal 
 
 (18) De regim. princ., IV, 23. 
 
 (14) Meyer, S.J., Sociale Frage; Stimmen aus Maria Laach, Ergaenzungs Hefte, p. 62 sqq. 
 (15) Psalm 126, 1, 2. y 
 
 (16) Romans 13, 1. 
 
70 Fundamental 
 
 happiness of the people, which happiness presupposes and is 
 based on the higher life of Christian perfection. 
 
 Its scope thus embraces whatsoever makes for the preserva- 
 tion, perfection and purpose of human government, namely, 
 for the good of all its subjects. These goods are various: 
 they are intellectual, wherefore it is the duty of the state to 
 provide means of education for its people and even to compel 
 all to receive at least a minimum of such education in letters, 
 science, and the arts necessary not only for the individual but 
 for the common weal; the goods of the will, wherefore it is the 
 duty of the state to promote the social and moral virtues, to 
 fight vice and to punish crimes; the goods of the body, where- 
 fore it is the duty of the state to watch over the health of its 
 subjects; the goods of fortune, wherefore it is the duty of the 
 state to. govern the production, distribution and consumption 
 of wealth. 
 
 In fulfillment of its mission the state must uphold and en- 
 force the natural law and punish those who transgress it. 
 However it is not of the province of the state to enforce all the 
 precepts of the natural law, some of these must be left to- 
 private conscience. The state has not the purpose to sanctify 
 the individual; but to regulate the morals of the individual in 
 so far as they affect directly the common weal and fall under 
 the public notice of the public authority. In this connection, 
 St. Thomas remarks: “‘Human government is derived from 
 the divine government and should be modelled after it. God, 
 though He is omnipotent and is the supreme good, allows 
 some evils to be in the universe, though He could stop them; 
 He tolerates these, lest impeding them other and greater good 
 be thereby impeded, or greater evils follow. Thus too, the 
 civil government must tolerate certain evils lest greater good 
 be impeded or greater evils follow.:7 God left the sanctifica- 
 tion of the individual to His Church and the punishment of 
 private sins to conscience and the hereafter. 
 
 (17) F-II, q. 101, a. 8, ad 2. 
 
Moral Theology 71 
 
 The state has the right to determine by positive law those 
 points which are vague and undetermined in the natural law. 
 Such as, for instance, how last will and testaments are to be 
 drawn, how children may succeed to the fortune of their 
 parents and other such rights, which though established under 
 a general form by the natural law, yet are not determined in 
 detail. The general determination of natural law must how- 
 ever be the basis for the specific determination of the positive 
 law of the state. The state has the right to supply where the 
 natural law is silent; but the state has no right to forbid what 
 the natural law allows or to allow what the natural law forbids. 
 Nor has it the right to violate equity by serving the private 
 advantage of some rather than the common good of all nor by 
 unequal distribution unequally distributing the burdens nor by 
 commanding what for the many is morally impossible. 18 
 
 VII. When Christ, the Son of God, instituted the Church, 
 He gave into her keeping the spiritual welfare of mankind. In 
 order that she might be able to carry on her mission of the 
 salvation of souls, He gave her full power to make laws necessary 
 for the general spiritual welfare of the people. “To me,” 
 says the Savior, “is given all power in heaven and on earth. 
 Go ye therefore and teach ye all nations—teaching them to 
 observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.”’ ! 9 
 
 By these words Jesus transferred the plentitude of power, 
 which was His to His Church. That the Apostles were con- 
 scious of this power is evidenced by the words of St. Paul to 
 the Corinthians: ‘“‘Having in readiness to revenge all dis- 
 obedience.” 2° 
 
 And again from the warning he sends them: “‘I write these 
 things being absent, that being present, I may not deal more 
 severely, according to the power which the Lord hath given 
 me unto edification, and not unto destruction.” 2! 
 
 This power over the souls of men Christ gave exclusively 
 
 
 
 (18) Bouquillon, Theol. Mor. Fund., p. 448. 
 (19) Matth. 28, 18. (20) 2-Cor. 10, 6. (21) 2 Cor. 12, 10. 
 

 
 72 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 to His Church; to use it independently from all other society. 
 “The Church,” says Leo XIII, “is a society chartered as of di- 
 vine right, perfect in its nature and its title, to possess in itself 
 and by itself through the will and loving kindness of its founder 
 all needful provision for its maintenance and its action.” 22 
 
 Whatever, therefore, has reference to divine worship and 
 the salvation of men’s souls, such as the offering of the sacrifice, 
 the administration of the sacraments, etc., comes under the 
 exclusive jurisdiction of the Church. In the exercise of its 
 ministry the Church stands in need of material goods. She 
 has a right, therefore, that the state recognize and protect her 
 title to such material goods as she has acquired for the purpose 
 of carrying on her mission. 
 
 Though the state has received no direct commission from 
 God to watch over the spiritual interests of man and its 
 jurisdiction is entirely confined to the temporal well-being of 
 the community, it is none the less a creature of God and as 
 such owes him worship. The state must, therefore, recognize 
 in its actions the existence of a Supreme Being. 
 
 Moreover the moral status of the individuals in the com- 
 munity makes for the temporal well-being of the community, 
 it is thus to the interest of the state to protect, to help and to 
 second the efforts of religion. 
 
 The observance of law depends to a great extent on God’s 
 sanction of the laws of the state. The police protection of 
 the state, the threat of penitentiary sentence is hardly sufficient 
 to maintain law and order in the state. Something more is 
 needed and this something more is the conviction among men, 
 that a transgression of a just law of the state is a sin, just as is 
 the transgression of the law of God and will be punished by 
 Him. In the words of the Apostle: ‘‘Vhere is no power but 
 from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. He that 
 resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. Be subject 
 of necessity not only for wrath but also for conscience sake.” 2 3 
 
 (22) Encyclical, Immortale Dei, 1. c. (23) Romans 18, 2-5. 
 
Moral Theology 73 
 
 
 
 It is thus to the interest of the state to help the Church 
 spread such and other like religious motives for the observance 
 of law and order. 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 The Binding Force of Civil Law 
 
 ““Give therefore to Caesar,’ says the Lord, “‘the things that 
 are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s.”’: In this 
 passage our Lord undoubtedly teaches obedience to the civil 
 power and to a certain extent He puts this obligation on the 
 same plane as subjection to God’s law. 
 
 St. Paul after having posited the premises: ‘There is no 
 power but from God and those that are, are ordained of God;’’ 
 “He that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God,”’ 
 concludes, ‘““They that resist, purchase to themselves damna- 
 tion.’’ ‘‘Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, 
 but also for conscience sake.”’ 2 
 
 St. Peter just as emphatically tells the faithful: ‘Be 
 subject therefore to every human creature for God’s sake; 
 whether it be to the king as excelling; or to the governors as 
 sent by him for the punishment of evil doers and for the praise 
 of the good.’’: Wherefore there can be no doubt but that 
 human legislators can bind in conscience even under pain of 
 eternal reprobation. Every law must have a sanction, namely, 
 an efficacious means to induce obedience. The underlying 
 notion of a moral law, as a moral force which compels the 
 otherwise free will to yield to it, makes this plain. In the state 
 of fallen nature the very good or evil of the act—satisfaction or 
 remorse—is not sufficient to bind all men or even to bind the 
 average man in all circumstances. Some further reward or 
 punishment must be attached to the observance or non- 
 
 (1) Matt., 22, 21. 
 
 (2) Romans 1, 2, 3. 
 (3) I. Peter ii, 18, 14. 
 
 
 
74 Hundamental 
 
 observance of a law. There must be some way to force ‘re- 
 bellious subjects to obedience, if they will not do so because of 
 the good that comes from observance, they must be forced by 
 the threat of the evil consequent upon transgression. ‘The 
 very nature of this binding force of law, since it is not a physical 
 outward but a moral inward tie, proves that it must react to 
 conscience, 1.e., place an obligation in conscience.‘ This 
 obligation in conscience may be direct or indirect, namely he 
 who violates the law will thereby incur guilt in conscience or 
 hypothetically, as in merely penal laws, if convicted he will in 
 conscience be obliged to pay the just penalty. 
 
 Some maintain that this obligation in merely penal laws 
 is placed disjunctively, namely, either you will do this or you 
 will undergo this punishment. In this opinion the choice would 
 be left the subject either to do as the law commands or to pay 
 the penalty.* This is hardly tenable, for the legislator is not 
 indifferent as to whether his subjects want to obey or prefer 
 to suffer. He really wants obedience and to force this obedi- 
 ence he hypothetically states: “If you will not obey you will 
 have to suffer.’ . 
 
 If it were disjunctive the obligation as such would arise 
 only after sentence is passed. In reality though the obligation 
 is there from the beginning. 
 
 Wherefore Suarez justly says: “Obligations under threat of 
 punishment, though they do not oblige in conscience to place an 
 act, do oblige under pain of punishment.’’ ‘“‘Mere penal laws 
 contain only one precept which is hypothetical—you will be 
 amenable to this punishment if you do not do this.” * After 
 the transgressor has been found guilty he is in conscience 
 bound to pay the fine assessed. If he defrauds the government 
 of the fine, he is bound to make restitution. A penalty such as 
 
 (4) Sum. I, II, q. 96, a. 4. Suarez, de legibus d. Bat 21 et 22. 
 
 (5) Antoine, Theol. Mor. Tr. de legibus, c. 8, q. 1, n. 2. Tanqueray, Theol. Mor. de 
 legibus, n. 347. D’Annibale, Summula 1, n. 207. Bouquillon, Theol. Mor., n. 131. 
 
 (6) De leg. 1. 5, c. 4, n. 1. Vermeersch, Theol. Mor., vol. I, n. 169. Jos. Biederlak, S.J., 
 Zeitschrift, Innsbruck, vol. 23, pp. 159 et 160. 
 
Floral Theology 75 
 
 
 
 
 
 imprisonment may be avoided by legitimate means. Im- 
 prisonment is not a debt due the government in conscience. 
 
 Vermeersch maintains: The effect to produce obligation 
 need not necessarily be inherent in a law. He argues thus: 
 The legislator who wills that his practical dictate of something 
 to be done by his subjects become a practical dictate for all his 
 subjects, in reality ordains them for the common good. This 
 his will or intention is a legislative will. Now this his will 
 may be really efficacious, i.e., it does generally dispose the 
 subjects for the common good. ‘This effect can at times be 
 obtained without urging an obligation, namely, the good will 
 of the subjects is sufficient to effect compliance. If then an 
 external punishment be a sufficient and effective means the 
 legislator would attain his purpose by obliging them merely 
 under threat of such external punishment. Such punishment 
 would be just because it would be inflicted because of a trans- 
 gression of an order legitimately established, though this order 
 would not be essential nor enjoined under pain of sin. There 
 would be a crime in the external forum but none in the forum 
 of conscience.’ The argument if examined closely does not 
 fully prove. Psychologically, why is it that subjects obey? 
 Because they feel that their wills are bound by the will of the 
 legislator. This force again is the interior moral force which 
 we call conscience. 
 
 Those who would otherwise be rebellious are forced to obey 
 by the consideration, I will be forced to undergo punishment. 
 This is not a yielding merely to outward force. ‘Though per- 
 haps not reasoned out in detail by the individual subject, 
 basically the force lies in this: my will is tied down, for when 
 sentence is passed I will be bound to pay the penalty. This 
 moral force is conscience. 
 
 St. Thomas answers the objection, if there is no fault 
 there can be no punishment, by the distinction “if punish- 
 ment is considered as punishment it can be inflicted only 
 
 (7) Vermeersch, lib. cit., n. 169. 
 
76 | Fundamental 
 
 because of sin, but if it be looked upon as promotive of the 
 common weal it can be inflicted where there has been no 
 fault but where there is a cause.’’ This gave rise later on 
 to the rule of law, “‘where there is no fault there may be no 
 punishment, unless there be a cause.’’’ This in turn gave 
 rise to the distinction between a moral fault and a juridical 
 fault, or as some prefer to qualify the latter, social fault. 
 Thus for the common good those stricken with communicable 
 disease may be isolated; negligence though there was no fault 
 in conscience may be punished, certain acts may be declared 
 null and void. In penal laws there was no fault in conscience, 
 but for the sake of obtaining the common good, those found 
 guilty must pay the penalty fixed by law. Bouquillon places 
 a limitation by demanding that the punishment inflicted must 
 be a real compensation for the fault. Thus he says breaking 
 the fast could be punished by assessing an alms; tax dodging, 
 by assessing fines; but not wearing the ecclesiastical dress 
 cannot be compensated for by a fine. In the first cases there 
 is a real compensation, the punishment being in the same order 
 as the purpose the legislator has in view, to wit, mortification - 
 or revenue for the state; in the latter case there is no such 
 interchangeability.* This theory is more tenable in the view 
 mere penal laws place a disjunctive obligation than in the view 
 the obligation is hypothetical. 
 
 To sum up therefore it may safely be maintained that the 
 laws of civil government may bind either in conscience directly 
 and thus be strictly moral laws placing a moral obligation, or 
 they may be mere penal laws binding in conscience indirectly 
 to undergo punishment if found guilty. This opinion is to 
 say the least both intrinsically and extrinsically probable. 
 
 On what will it depend whether a certain law is binding 
 directly in conscience or is a mere penal law? 
 
 
 
 (8) II-II, q. 108, a. 4. Regula juris 25 in sexto “‘sine culpa, nisi subsit causa, non est aliquis 
 puniendus.”’ 
 
 (9) Bouquillon, lib. cit., n. 131. 
 
SHoral Theology G7 
 
 
 
 
 
 The only tenable answer which can be given is: the extent 
 of the binding force depends on the reasonable will of the legis- 
 lator. 1° 
 
 To maintain that all laws of modern legislators are merely 
 penal because the trend seems to be to eliminate God and 
 conscience entirely from civil legislation, is an extreme view. !! 
 No formal belief in a Deity or in the hereafter is needed to 
 put an obligation in conscience; it suffices for the legislator 
 to will to govern in the strict sense of the word with all the 
 power at his command. 
 
 Furthermore, the natural law demands that some govern- 
 mental laws bind in conscience. Legislation by civil govern- 
 ment is needed to apply the natural law to the ever varying 
 circumstances, such as the political or economic conditions of 
 the country may bring about; it is likewise needed to further 
 determine in detail the outlines of natural or divine positive 
 law. This determination to be effective must put an obligation 
 in conscience. ! 2 
 
 The observance of all laws in all circumstances by all with- 
 out a direct sanction in conscience is a moral impossibility. 
 Legislators who would will that all the laws of the country 
 be merely penal would act against the dictate of nature, per 
 consequens their will would be unreasonable and the natural 
 law would supply the defect. 
 
 Because many legislators affect not to believe in God and 
 wish to eliminate all idea of a Deity from human government, 
 even if the statement in its sweeping generalization were true, 
 would not of itself make all their laws merely penal. 
 
 To break down the sweeping statement, all modern legisla- 
 tion is atheistic, the fact is cited that in some countries, though 
 
 
 
 (10) Lex non obligat ultra mentem legislatoris; ergo si intendat sub sola poena obligare 
 hoe, e.g., expresse declarando clarum est quod ex se ad culpam non obligent...nam actus 
 agentium non operetur ultra eorum intentionem. Reiffenstuel, Jus Canonicum Universum 
 Tit de constitutionibus, n. 199. 
 
 (11) Konings, Theologia Moralis de Legibus, n. 178, 179. 
 
 (12) Kenrick, Theologia Moralis, p. 176. Genicot-Salsman, Theo. Mor., vol. 1, 141, 4. 
 Vermeersch, Theo. Mor., vol. I, 25, 32. Bouquillon, Theo. Mor. Fund., n. 210. A. Jansen, 
 Jus Pontificium, Annus V, p. 24. John A. Ryan, State and Church, p. 252. 
 
78 | Fundamental 
 
 
 
 avowed atheists are in control, they none the less refuse to do 
 away with the oath in civil matters. This argument cannot 
 be used in our country where the option is given in such cir- 
 cumstances to either affirm or swear to the truth. In the 
 United States this option would rather indicate that in formu- 
 lating legislation our legislative bodies prescind from the ques- 
 tion of conscience. 
 
 A stronger argument is the fact that very many hold all 
 morality to be a mere convention among men and the police 
 power of the state to be the real effective sanction of human 
 law. In spite of this undeniable fact some human laws must 
 bind in conscience. 13 
 
 On the other hand the modern fury to make laws and thus to 
 cure all the ills which human nature is heir to, oversteps all 
 bounds. We are thus put to the alternative, either some civil 
 laws are merely penal or there are many which are no laws at 
 all.:+ For surely these lawgivers cannot put an unsupportable 
 yoke upon us and rush us all pell mell to hell. As Suarez con- 
 tends, “‘Lest the salvation of souls be jeopardized, it is frequently 
 more expedient to make laws bind merely as penal laws.” 
 Some coercion is (necessary) useful but that the coercion be not 
 too great is likewise useful to the soul and befits rather a benign 
 watchfulness than rigor.1* If some external punishment 
 threatened will bring about observance of a particular law, 
 no further sanction is needed and no further obligation should 
 be put. Such punishment is just because it is decreed for a 
 violation of the constituted order although this order is not 
 essential nor commanded under pain of sin. There isa juridical 
 fault and that suffices for inflicting punishment. 
 
 A peculiar sophistry is used to prove that an atheistic 
 government might be presumed to will to bind in conscience 
 more frequently than a Christian. The Christian legislator, 
 they say, is often deterred by the thought not to jeopardize 
 
 (13) Ct. above. 
 (14) In New York City we are some 16,000 laws. 
 (15) De leg., 1. 5, c. 4, n. 1. 
 
SAoral Theology 79 
 
 
 
 the eternal salvation of his subject, whilst the atheist would 
 rejoice because on account of the conscientiousness of his sub- 
 jects such a powerful weapon for law enforcement is put into 
 his hands. But how will you make such, we might say, 
 diabolical intention rhyme with the very basic principle of 
 all law, to wit, the will of the legislator must be reasonable? 
 Can any sane man imagine that God has given such power to 
 human beings? ' 6 
 
 Some writers and preachers seem to be much troubled 
 with the thought, to tell people openly that certain laws do 
 not oblige in conscience makes for a disregard of all laws and a 
 contempt for civil authority. These good people in their 
 eager patriotism lose sight of the fact that making false 
 consciences paves the way to hell. If it is not well to break 
 down respect for civil laws, it certainly is not well either to 
 exaggerate and make false consciences. ‘To harass conscience 
 is a more deadly sin than to diminish chauvinism. Instead of 
 - harping continually on the theme: disrespect for one law 
 engenders disrespect for all laws, would it not be well to change 
 the tune and sing to the world, fool laws enacted by fanatics 
 and enforced by violation of personal liberty make for a com- 
 plete breakdown of civil government? History teaches that 
 invasion of personal liberties rather than disrespect for law 
 has caused the overthrow of governments. 
 
 To interpret the reasonable will of the legislator the same 
 criteria should be applied as when there is a question whether 
 a law binds under pain of mortal or venial sin. Such criteria are: 
 
 1. The wording of the law. 
 
 2. The purpose the legislator may have in view. This 
 purpose does not of itself fall under the law but yet is a good 
 indication whether the common weal demands an obligation 
 in conscience. This obtains more frequently with regard to 
 laws which determine the rights of people living in the com- 
 munity than with regard to laws which directly command or 
 
 (16) A. Jansen, Jus Pontificium Romae, Annus V, p. 27. 
 
80 , SHundamental 
 
 forbid an action. Laws which aim to protect the individual 
 from himself, namely, lest he abuse indifferent things to the 
 detriment of his own health or wealth, are to be interpreted 
 as merely penal more readily than those which protect more 
 directly the health and the wealth of the community as such. 
 Of course all civil law must aim to protect or procure the com- 
 mon welfare, but this is more direct and apparent in some 
 laws than in others. 
 
 3. Acceptance of law by the subjects is not necessary to 
 fix the binding force, nor does non-observance or repudiation 
 of a law by the people necessarily nullify it; but custom is the 
 best interpreter of laws.17 Here it might be urged: in the 
 United States a goodly number of otherwise moral people 
 openly scoff at the idea of civil laws binding in conscience; ! 8 
 another goodly number take an obligation in conscience to 
 mean nothing more than one is in honor bound to fulfill his 
 duties; this in honor bound can scarcely be stretched to mean 
 an obligation in conscience; others again take conscience in a 
 very wide sense to mean only a something a good citizen ought 
 to do (the law of the State or the will of the majority is their. 
 fetish).18 The comparatively few who recognize a real 
 obligation in conscience would be doubly bound, namely, unto 
 guilt and unto wrath. Under such conditions would it not 
 perhaps be safe to hold, that unless it is manifest that the 
 common weal demands an obligation in conscience for certain 
 laws, civil laws are mostly purely penal? How in different 
 countries different interpretation may be put on the will of the 
 legislator can be seen from the example that in Belgium, for 
 instance, traffic laws for automobiles are looked upon as merely 
 penal, whilst in United States such laws, at least in larger cities, 
 are absolutely necessary to protect human life and are taken 
 therefore more seriously. 
 
 (17) John A. Ryan, State and Church, p. 256 sqq. 
 
 (18) They reduce the moral obligation of legal statutes to the evil chance of incurring the 
 penalty for violation. 
 

 
 SMoral Theology 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. The severity of the external punishment — heavy 
 fines—and more especially extraordinary means taken to 
 ferret out arrest and convict offenders are good criteria of 
 purely penal laws. This rule cannot be applied promiscuously, 
 because this severity and vigilance can be an indication of the 
 determined will of the legislator to enforce the law by every 
 power at his command. But it may, too, prove the contrary, 
 namely, that very little is left to conscience. 
 
 5. Laws declaring certain formalities necessary for 
 validity do not as a rule forbid the placing of such invalid acts. 
 Whether a person can in conscience profit by such informal acts 
 depends whether the nullifying clause is attached merely as a 
 bar to judicial procedure or not. 
 
 6. ‘Today probably only such civil laws bind in conscience 
 for which the common good demands such an obligation. This 
 obtains more frequently with regard to laws which determine 
 the rights of persons in the community than with regard to laws 
 ~ which directly command or forbid an action. ! ° 
 
 7. Accidental circumstances may make that laws other- 
 wise merely penal bind in conscience, e.g., time of war, 
 famine, general poverty, ete. Formal contempt of civil 
 authority, not of some particular law, is a grievous sin. 
 
 After the French Revolution the tendency of laws was to 
 protect the individual rather than society. The extremeness 
 of this tendency gave rise to socialism. In the last quarter 
 century a marked tendency has set in to subordinate almost 
 entirely individual to social rights. How far the state can go 
 in limiting individual rights is often difficult to state in the 
 concrete. ‘To hold the balance equal between the individual 
 and the community, protecting the one and the other, is a 
 difficult task. The destruction of private initiative, thrift, 
 personal liberty, is as fatal to the community as an over ex- 
 aggerated individualism is destructive of human society. 
 Private good must at times cede to the public good and Justice 
 
 (19) Vermeersch, Theol. Mor., vol. I, n. 252. 
 
82 | Fundamental 
 
 must be tempered by charity. Life would be intolerable if 
 each individual would stretch his rights to the utmost. The 
 state regulating the minutiae of individual life would thwart 
 the very purpose of the common weal. 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 The Taxing Power of the Government 
 
 I. Praenotanda: The question here does not touch on 
 rents to be paid for special privileges, franchises, or direct 
 utilities furnished, such as water, light, heat, gathering of 
 ashes, garbage, mail service, etc. These are questions of 
 commutative justice—a direct service is rendered for the 
 benefit of the individual—there is therefore a direct quid 
 pro quo. 
 
 The question is concerning contributions made for the com- 
 mon weal in which of course the individual participates, but 
 only indirectly. Distributive justice demands that these 
 burdens be distributed equally on the subjects according to 
 their means and according to the need of the common weal. 
 The duties imposed on the subjects corresponding to this right 
 are in legal justice. 
 
 This duty is personal, hence it falls directly on the person, 
 but since in measuring the amount to be contributed the means 
 are to be estimated, indirectly it falls on the goods the person 
 possesses. It is a personal duty. As man benefits by the 
 society in which he lives, and as man being of a social nature 
 normally must live in some kind of community, it follows that 
 he must contribute in some manner to the support of this 
 community. 
 
 Indirectly this can be proven by the dilemma, the duty is 
 either personal or real. But it is not real. For if it be real, 
 then it must be admitted that the community has a direct 
 right to a man’s goods as if they were indentured to the 
 

 
 
 
 Moral Theology 83 
 
 
 
 community. But whence could such a right of the community 
 arise? Man does not hold property by the grace of the state. 
 How then can it be proven that the state has a right to a part 
 of the goods movable or immovable which a man possesses or 
 produces? 
 
 Some maintain that men entering upon a political union 
 bring all their goods and fortune to a common treasury to 
 form, as it were, the social capital of the community, and thus 
 when the state exacts contributions it is merely as the over- 
 landlord exacting his share of the harvest, like the ‘‘Seigneur 
 lounging in the ‘Oeil de Boeuf’.’”’ The idea contradicts both 
 the psychology and the history of private property. The state 
 is a society not of purses but of persons. 
 
 If it is a personal obligation imposed because one is a mem- 
 ber of this community, where is the justice in imposing a tax 
 on foreigners who possess property in this community? We 
 can answer: This is the license fee paid for the privilege of 
 doing business or for the protection of property. The tax fee 
 is rather re-tribution than contribution. Then again, in a 
 certain sense they, through their property, are by international 
 agreement considered for this purpose members of this com- 
 munity, or perhaps better, since this tax is imposed in all 
 countries on foreigners, it might be called an equalization 
 among nations. 
 
 II. The end which justifies the imposition of taxes is the 
 common weal. There must thus be either a general need or 
 general utility. The purpose’ is not directly to equalize 
 fortunes. Private right cedes only to the public good; the 
 state has no right to take simply because it judges that one 
 individual has too much. Indirectly, though, because it 
 imposes according to the means of each, the state may tax 
 more heavily swollen fortunes than meagre incomes and thus 
 to an extent decrease superabundance of fortune. In the 
 Hegelian system, the omnipotent state imposes taxes because 
 it so wills—pro ratione stat voluntas. This makes the state 
 
84 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 to be its own raison d’étre when in truth it exists only for the 
 common weal. To hold the payment of taxes to be a con- 
 tractural obligation means to hold the false theory of the social 
 contract. It would mean that tax levying is directly an act of 
 commutative justice and would demand exact service to each 
 individual. 
 
 Nor can it be held that taxes are a commutation of benefits 
 received by the state and individual. What benefits accrue 
 individually to the man, who is never in court, by the public 
 administration of justice? Nor is it a payment to insure the 
 safety of goods. The scope of the government and its needs 
 are far beyond mere safety insurance. It has been well said 
 therefore that for the state to exact more than it needs for 
 the public good is a species of larceny. 
 
 The proportion of the levy should be according to the 
 means of the individual by which is meant the ability to 
 contribute. The proportion is not therefore the benefits 
 derived from the government. “If we wanted,” says Stuart 
 Mills, “‘to estimate the degree of benefit which different persons 
 derive from the protection of the government, we should have - 
 to consider who would suffer most if that protection were 
 withdrawn; to which question, if any answer could be made, 
 it must be, those would suffer most who are weakest in mind 
 or body, either by nature or by position.” ! 
 
 The demand that the amount of taxes paid shall adequately 
 correspond to the amount of income received, is a practical 
 impossibility. Nor does the amount of income necessarily 
 exactly prove the extent of the capability to pay. Of course, 
 in fixing a norm the state must work on general averages and 
 therefore the ideal system would be to approach such an 
 equalization as much as possible. The demand that the same 
 rate be paid on all property regardless of whether there be 
 revenue or none, whether the revenues be large or small, is 
 made, it is claimed, on the basis of the equality of all before the 
 
 
 
 (1) Principles of Political Economy, S. 5, ¢. 2, n. 2. 
 
SHloral Cheslogp 85 
 
 law. In reality though far from equality, it levies an unequal 
 burden. Why should a home be taxed at the same rate as a 
 store, or a government bond that nets 5 per cent per annum be 
 taxed at the same rate per hundred dollars face value as a 
 corporation bond that brings 8 to 10 per cent? 
 
 Discussing unearned increment in land values, both Dr. 
 Michael Cronin (Science of Ethics, vol. Il, pp. 290 sqq.) and 
 Dr. John A. Ryan (Distributive Justice, pp. 102-177) give 
 the state rather broad leeway for imposing taxes. The former 
 says: ‘“‘Though, therefore, what is spoken of as unearned 
 increment in land is not unlawful, still in dealing with, and 
 imposing taxes on increments in the value of building sites the 
 government ought to be given a very free hand. For, first, a 
 good deal of money would thus accrue to the community; 
 secondly, such a tax would help to prevent extortions which at 
 present are only too common in cities.’’ No principle, title 
 or practice, Ryan holds, nor any canon of taxation has intrinsic 
 or metaphysical value. All are to be evaluated with reference 
 to human welfare..... In general then any method of distri- 
 bution, any modification of property rights, any form of taxa- 
 tion, is morally lawful which promotes the interest of the whole 
 community, without causing undue inconvenience to any 
 individual.’”’ This would make taxes not only revenue getters, 
 but likewise equalizers of fortunes, punishment for extortion, 
 subsidies for the poor, etc. Possession of private property is 
 not an end in itself, it is only a means. But the welfare of the 
 whole community is not the only thing which determines the 
 lawfulness of such possession. ‘The individual person does not 
 exist merely for the welfare of the community, he, too, exists 
 unto and for himself. His title to private property is not de- 
 rived merely from the community, it is derived, too, from his 
 very dignity as a human person. Dr. Cronin’s first argument 
 sounds very much like Satan’s offer, “‘All these things will I 
 give thee, if thou wilt fall down and adore me’”’ (Matt., 4, 9). 
 
86 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 In the United States even in the largest cities it is not the 
 scarcity of land which makes home owning difficult. Many 
 have themselves to blame; they would rather herd together 
 close to the centres of amusements, thrills and excitement. 
 Street cars, motor busses and like transportation facilities 
 make the open spaces, God’s out of doors, where building 
 lots are cheap and plentiful, available to the humblest. Light, 
 water and like home comforts are easily obtainable today in 
 these semi-rural districts. The poorer classes live in tenements 
 on streets where a front foot costs about as much as an acre 
 does in a semi-rural district. 
 
 If the title to unearned increment is lawful, which both 
 concede, it must be treated on the same equality as other 
 property. If then the need in the wider sense is established 
 for the community and unearned increment can stand the 
 strain of higher taxation better, it may be rated higher. There 
 are canons to taxation which have intrinsic value; no man can 
 be despoiled of his right by the mere will of the state. ‘The 
 right of sovereignty is unlike the right of property inasmuch 
 as it is by nature ordained not for the benefit of him who | 
 holds it but for the benefit of society’’ (Cardinal Billot, Moral 
 Origin of Civil Authority, in Ryan-Millar, State and Church, 
 p. 65). 
 
 ARTICLE IV 
 Obligation.in Conscience of Tax Laws 
 
 Questions at issue: 
 Do tax laws oblige in conscience? 
 If so, by which virtue? 
 
 Some maintain that all tax laws are merely penal. Thus 
 Crolly says of the English tax laws: ‘‘It is really very difficult 
 to state in general what is to be held in different countries and 
 times about the obligation of laws imposing taxes, since this 
 
Hloral Theology 87 
 
 depends greatly on the mind of the legislator. But from what 
 has been stated it is evident that it is by no means certain that 
 nowadays these laws oblige in conscience or in any other 
 manner than as penal laws. That tax laws among us today 
 practically only oblige in the manner of penal laws seems 
 certain, because it is morally certain that the legislator does not 
 intend to impose a further obligation. No one, or scarcely no 
 one, holds that custom duties oblige in conscience. The same 
 can be said of excise taxes. In the opinion of our people, 
 these laws are looked upon as being in the same category as 
 other tax laws. In fact there are so many tax inquisitors that 
 it is evident that the government in this matter does not in 
 any way trust to conscience.” ! 
 
 Further along he confirms his opinion saying: “If there 
 would be such an obligation, it would fall on the good only. 
 It would produce no effect on the ungodly.”’ 
 
 Others hold: ‘According to Catholic teaching, statutes 
 imposing taxes bind in conscience. ‘The general reason is the 
 same as that which attaches moral obligation to other civil 
 laws. Moreover the obligation is not merely one of legal 
 justice but also of strict justice which requires restitution to 
 be made when it is violated.’’2 Those who hold this view 
 allow only extrinsic causes as an excuse from this obligation— 
 such as excessive taxation, unequal burdens, the common 
 custom of tax evasion, ete. 
 
 That tax laws of civil governments can bind in conscience is 
 certain from Holy Writ: “Give unto Caesar, says our Lord, 
 the things that are Caesar’s.’”’: Christ Himself shows the 
 example by paying the tribute for St. Peter.: In this same 
 sense St. Paul writes, ‘For therefore also you pay tribute for 
 they are the ministers of God, serving unto his purpose. 
 
 
 
 (1) De Justitia et Jure, vol. III, disp. XITI, dub. XI, n. 1015. 
 
 (2) Ryan-Millar, State and Church, p. 267. Koch-Preuss, Handbook of Mor. Theol., 
 vol. 5, p. 448. 
 
 (3) Matt., 22, 21. 
 (4) Matt., 17, 26. 
 
88 Fundamental 
 
 Render therefore to all men their dues. Tribute to whom 
 tribute is due, custom to whom custom.”’ 5 
 
 These text of Holy Writ do not define whether the obliga- 
 tion arises from legal or commutative justice. Wherefore 
 another school of moralists bases the duty of paying taxes 
 simply on legal justice. Others again make a distinction, to 
 wit, the obligation in conscience arises only after the tax bill 
 is made out by the fiscal agents of the government. When 
 the bill is made out some claim the obligation is in commutative 
 justice; others, however, just as stoutly maintain that even 
 then it binds only in legal justice. Vermeersch says this last 
 opinion is the common opinion.* Ryan says: “As a rule, the 
 citizen is not bound to pay taxes until the amount due from 
 him has been defined by the fiscal authorities. When he is 
 legally required to furnish a statement of his property he is 
 obliged by legal justice to comply. This same authority 
 claims that if the law compels the citizens to come forward and 
 list their property, the citizen is bound by legal justice to pro- 
 vide a statement of his taxable property.”’7 Here again the 
 trend of modern opinion is against Ryan. It holds there is no- 
 obligation in conscience to come forward and list property for 
 taxation. The laws so compelling citizens are merely penal. 8 
 
 In this variety of opinion among moralists of the highest 
 repute, no confessor or preacher has a right to assert an obliga- 
 tion in conscience to come forward and list property for taxa- 
 tion. Neither has he the right to impose the obligation of 
 restitution on one who has successfully evaded listing his 
 property. If one has been sentenced for failure to file a report 
 he must pay the amount of taxes and fines assessed. This 
 obligation after sentence has been pronounced is in commuta- 
 
 (5) Raw 18, 5-7. 
 
 (6) Vermeersch, Theo. Mor., vol. II, n. 567, 2. 
 
 " ) Ryan-Millar, State and Church, p. 269, quoted approvingly by Koch-Preuss, vol. 5, 
 p. 449, 
 
 (8) Vermeersch, ibid. Wafferaert, De Justitia, vol. II, 421, says: ‘‘Quod spectat obliga- 
 tionem declarandi demonstrari nequit obligationem hance esse justitiae sed immediatam obli- 
 gationem si agnoscere debeamus haec solius obedientiae est. Praeterea leges qua parte declara- 
 tionem imponunt esse mere poenales probabiliter defendi posse putamus.”’ 
 
Floral Theology 89 
 
 tive justice. Fraud or evasion after sentence consequently 
 entails the onus of restitution. 
 
 What if a false return has been made? Here, too, there is 
 a very wide range of opinion. The application of the general 
 principles, says Ryan, “‘is not entirely very simple, owing to 
 the complexity and injustice of our tax system, and the very 
 large proportion of persons who habitually understate their 
 taxable property .... in these circumstances the conscientious 
 citizen cannot be required to do more than pay that proportion 
 of the full amount which is paid by the majority.’”’ Vermeersch 
 says: “‘Moreover before the fiscal agents have made out the 
 bill as to how much the particular citizen must pay, the state 
 has no acquired right. When the bill is thus made out, the 
 question of an obligation in justice to pay just taxes is disputed. 
 There can be no question but that civil rulers have the power 
 to compel the citizens to pay their just share of taxes. But 
 even before our time many have held that the intention of the 
 legislator extends only to assessing fines on those caught 
 defrauding. Much less does it seem as if the legislators of 
 today wish to bind in conscience. Unless, therefore, in some 
 country the general persuasion be to the contrary (such 
 persuasion where it exists must be accepted), we deny the obliga- 
 tion in conscience.”’ 
 
 A further objection is urged. Because of false returns the 
 government on account of its needs is forced to raise the tax 
 rate or pass other tax measures in consequence, certain ones 
 who would otherwise escape the higher rate or the new tax are 
 made to suffer an injustice. The objection would be valid if 
 it could be proven that the increased tax rate or recourse to 
 other taxes is the direct effect of an act unjust in commutative 
 justice. Now since the evasion cannot be proven to be unjust 
 before the pro rata is actually assessed on the individual and 
 even then it is disputed whether it is a violation in commutative 
 justice the proof is wanting to show that precisely by commuta- 
 
 (9) Vermeersch, 1. ec. 
 
90 SHundamental 
 
 tive justice one is held not to place this act precisely lest this 
 effect follow. It could further be alleged “‘Scienta et volentr 
 non fit injuria’. A cursory study would show that property 
 holders in general do not act so scrupulously. If some one is 
 forced by a sentence of judge to list his property higher, he 
 is the victim of an evil chance for violating a penal law. It is 
 his misfortune not the other man’s blame. 
 
 The question likewise arises: Is there not present the sin of 
 telling a lie implied in such false declaration and undervalua- 
 tions? | 
 
 Officials and the public in general know full well that such 
 declaration are only relatively true. Hence the words or signs 
 used can be readily and usually are interpreted in their relative 
 sense, namely, that is the tax value. The intention 
 ““‘decipiendi’’ is wanting; by this is meant the words or signs 
 used are of such a nature that they do not necessarily convey a 
 false notion. The malice of lying lies in the abuse of external 
 sions. God gave us speech to express our internal thoughts 
 externally. External signs are arbitrary for the most part and 
 are interpreted according to custom and circumstances. | 
 
 Perjury is a lie which God is called upon to witness. If 
 then the external sign is not a lie there is no sin of perjury. 
 In the United States no one is obliged to take an oath, a solemn 
 affirmation isallthat isrequired. Furthermore, considering the 
 frivolous and hurried manner in which an oath is administered 
 in many cases, it may well be doubted whether the formula, 
 though obviously it implies an oath, is really such. The 
 “accidentale sequitur essentiale’’, the oath being subsidiary we 
 can say: if the statement is not a lie, neither is the oath a 
 perjury. !° 
 
 Nearly all authors agree that internal revenue and tariff 
 laws are merely penal.:: The reasons they allege are: the 
 fines levied on those caught, coupled with the extraordinary 
 
 
 
 (10) Waffelaert, lib. cit., n. 42, p. 373. 
 (11) Vermeersch, vol. II, No. 567. 
 
Horal Thealogp 91 
 
 means taken to catch offenders show plainly that nothing is 
 left to conscience. ‘This is especially true of the enforcement 
 laws of the Eighteenth Amendment in most of the states. 
 “Tariff duties are saturated with economic and ethical un- 
 equalities.”’12. The so called nuisance taxes are generally 
 held to be penal. Laws forbidding the manufacture, sale and 
 importing of certain articles, which can serve no legitimate 
 purpose in themselves, oblige in conscience. The manufacture 
 and sale of such things is intrinsically wrong. Articles which 
 can serve a legitimate purpose but can be used for very wrong 
 purposes, such as narcotics, poison, etc., may not be manufac- 
 tured or sold except one have good reason to believe that they 
 are to be used for legitimate purposes. As to other things 
 which may be abused and by their abuse become dangerous, 
 but which the general run of people do not abuse, to sell them, 
 even though the sale is forbidden by law, is not held to be an 
 offence in conscience. Stamp taxes on bonds, deeds, mort- 
 - gages, stocks, etc., universally are held to be merely penal. 
 False returns for inheritance tax, provided of course no injustice 
 is done to the heirs, are likewise said to be merely penal 
 violations. 
 
 N. B.—In this matter of tax returns and of listing one’s 
 goods for taxation in the United States a further circumstance 
 affecting Catholics must be considered, namely, by unjust laws 
 they are made to contribute doubly for the education of child- 
 ren. If then they do their just share for Catholic education 
 they canin conscience compute thisamount as payment of taxes. 
 The new Code is entirely silent on the question of immunity 
 from taxation formerly enjoyed by clerics. Wherefore can- 
 onists today assert that clerics are bound to pay taxes just as 
 civilians. ! 3 
 
 (12) Ryan-Millar, lib. cit., p. 262. 
 (18) Koch-Preuss, vol. 5, pp. 445, 446, 450. Augustine, A Commentary on Canon Law, 
 vol. III, p. 65. 
 
92 Fundamental 
 
 ARTICLE V 
 Tax Officials and Their Duties 
 
 Fiscal agents enter upon a contractural obligation with the 
 government to do their full duty in finding, listing and assessing 
 of property for taxation. This duty certainly arises from 
 commutative justice in as far as they have a right to their full 
 salary only if they do their full duty. ‘They are therefore held 
 to restitution for a part of their salary if they are willfully 
 negligent. | 
 
 Would they be held to make restitution for the amount of 
 taxes the government did not receive because of their negli- 
 gence? The government’s right in commutative justice to the 
 tax does not arise until the property has been assessed, hence 
 they could be held to make restitution only for negligence in 
 not collecting taxes actually assessed against property. They 
 are never held to make restitution for fines which were not 
 assessed because of their negligence. 
 
 There is a difference between negligence and a conspiracy. 
 to prevent the government by fraud from prosecuting its just 
 rights. Thus though a man who knowingly undervalues his 
 property may not violate commutative justice, he does so, if 
 he presents, e.g., fraudulent vouchers or checks to show 
 indebtedness. The axiom, caveat emptor, can be used to exempt 
 a seller from making known certain hidden faults, but cannot 
 excuse when positive fraud has been resorted to in covering 
 up such hidden faults. 
 
 The government is here the buyer and it is its business to 
 investigate returns to see whether they are correct. It may 
 not be hindered by positive fraud from making such investiga- 
 tion. Fiscal agents who accept bribes for allowing false returns 
 to pass prevent such investigation, wherefore by force of 
 their contract they violate commutative justice and are held 
 to make good the damage accruing to the government from 
 

 
 Horal Theology 93 
 
 
 
 this inability to collect the full tax. Those offering the bribe 
 are held in solidum with them. ‘The briber, being the gainer 
 by the fraud, is held first, and if he fails to make the restitu- 
 tion the one who was bribed is held. 
 
 In searching for property to list, officials need use only 
 ordinary diligence. In fact they may not unduly vex citizens. 
 Neither may they list below the minimum nor above the 
 maximum value for tax purposes as fixed by law and the custom 
 of the better class or general run of citizens. 
 
 An obligation to make restitution sub grave arises only if 
 there was a culpa theologica in re gravi. Little derelictions in 
 the discharge of duty can coalesce into serious matter. In this 
 case double the amount required to constitute a grievous sin of 
 theft, when the amount is taken at one time, must be figured. 
 The absolute norm is to be applied as for thefts from rich people. 
 Some authors maintain that the sum required for little thefts of 
 children from their parents is to be used here as the norm. ! 
 
 Those who resist violently the collection of taxes, fines, etc., 
 sin doubly against commutative justice: first against the 
 person of the officials, and then against the government. 
 
 Professional bootleggers, smugglers, etc., generally sin 
 against charity towards themselves and their families, by 
 risking the assessment of heavy penalties. Wherefore a 
 Catholic cannot in conscience engage in bootlegging, as a 
 business. 
 
 A confessor will therefore: (a) impose the obligation of 
 restitution only when it is really certain that restitution is 
 due. (b) As there can be good faith among many, since the 
 confessor is not a government official, he need not disturb 
 such good faith. (c) If asked he is to exhort the faithful to 
 pay their taxes, with due allowance made for Catholic school 
 support, as others in the community pay. 
 
 Specifically as regards the Eighteenth Amendment and 
 Volstead Act, there is a very founded and probable opinion 
 
 
 
 (1) Pruemmer, Manuale Juris Canonici, p. 87. 
 
94 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 that this law does not oblige in conscience. (1) See general 
 obligations of civil laws. (2) This law is held by many re- 
 spectable citizens as an undue invasion of personal rights. 
 (8) And by very many is made light of. 
 
 (a) It is, therefore, nothing short of criminal for either 
 preachers or confessor to urge the observance of this law in 
 conscience upon Catholics. 
 
 (b) Those who buy, sell, keep, make, or use intoxicants 
 privately, i.e., do not engage in this as a business are not to be 
 molested in conscience. | 
 
 (c) If they are condemned by a legitimate judge (whether 
 the village fee-splitting courts are legitimate in the sense of 
 recognition in conscience is very doubtful) they may not use 
 violence, or other frauds to prevent payment of fines. Pre- 
 sumptio stat pro superiort. 
 
 (d) Law enforcement officials need not proceed against 
 possible violators unless they have real founded evidence of 
 violation. ‘They are not allowed to search private dwellings, 
 vehicles, etc., unless they have real evidence of violation. It 
 is an accepted axiom in American law that a man’s home is. 
 inviolable. Bribe taking and giving, follows the same rules as 
 above. 
 
 (e) Those who possess intoxicants, whether legitimately or 
 not, though they are contraband, are the real owners until 
 such intoxicants have been confiscated by the government. 
 Private appropriation is theft. 
 
 Some would find fault with Catholic theologians for what 
 are called lax views on the obligation in conscience of civil laws 
 and taxes. Moral theologians are not to blame for the false 
 views the majority of legislators and civil jurists hold concern- 
 ing the police power and sanction of the state. They cannot 
 be blamed because modern legislators have banished God and. 
 the hereafter from the schools and by this have brought up a 
 generation that believes only in the evil chance of being caught 
 and punished for violations of civil law. They are not to 
 
Floral Theology 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 blame for the use of tax money in making propaganda against 
 God, the hereafter and conscience. They feel that where these 
 convictions against obligation in conscience are so widespread 
 they would commit an injustice on the Catholic people if they 
 made them believe that they were burdened where the majority 
 of fellow citizens refuse to take like burdens. All advise 
 Catholics to do their duty at least in the same manner and 
 proportion as the others do. There is quite a difference 
 between telling people you should respect every law of the 
 country and to tell them unless you obey every law of the 
 government you jeopardize your eternal salvation. Respect 
 and external compliance to civil enactments which are just 
 should always be insisted upon; observance as obliging in 
 conscience can only be urged when there is a moral certainty 
 that the particular law in question does so oblige. 
 
96 Fundamental 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 Moral Education 
 
 ARTICLE [| 
 Education and Catholic Faith and Morals 
 
 The Church does not vindicate for herself a monopoly or an 
 exclusive right to teach and educate Catholic children. In her 
 legislation on this subject she insists that “parents are held 
 by a most serious obligation to take care, in every possible 
 manner, of the religious, moral, physical and civil education of 
 their children’? (Canon 1118). She has always recognized the 
 native right of parents to teach their children, and further she 
 has always recognized that parents are allowed to form groups 
 among themselves for this purpose. She has always recognized 
 that the state has interests in this matter and that the state has 
 the right and even the obligation to aid parents to procure a 
 good education for their children. She denies that the state. 
 has a monopoly in this field or that the state has a right to 
 dictate to parents to which school they must send their children. 
 She has always resisted every attempt on the part of the state 
 to suppress the rights of parents in this matter. The Church 
 has always insisted that she has a divine right to build schools, 
 engage teachers, instruct and educate children even in the 
 profane sciences; therefore to give elementary, high school, 
 university training in all its branches (Canon 1375). To prove 
 this right it is not necessary to appeal to her inherent character 
 as a perfect independent society. Just as well as other groups 
 formed for this purpose she has the right to offer parents 
 advantageous means of teaching and educating their children. 
 From the fact that she is a perfect, independent society she has 
 a right to be free from all direct interference in this matter on 
 the part of the state. Because she has not been able always 
 

 
 
 
 SMoral Theology 97 
 
 
 
 to assert her right in fact, or because in order to prevent 
 greater evils she has been willing by concordats or by tacit 
 consent to waive her rights, in no wise prove that she has ever 
 abandoned this her right to complete freedom. She has been 
 willing always to enforce by her authority the just enactments 
 of the state on school attendance, on the minimum of learning 
 required, on the qualification of teachers to teach the profane 
 sciences. But as a perfect society whose reputation is estab- 
 lished by centuries of history, she has a full right to demand 
 of the state to accept her assurance and guarantee in this 
 matter. Where she has allowed state supervision or inspection 
 as regards profane studies in her schools, she has done so as an 
 act of. amity to a friendly likewise perfect society or else to 
 prevent greater evils, when the state was more or less hostile 
 and invaded her rights. In matters of profane science, she 
 pretends to no infallibility, nor even to any superiority over 
 other legitimate groups or societies. 
 
 The Church does vindicate for herself the sole and exclusive 
 right to give religious instruction and Christian education to 
 young and old. In pagan countries she claims only the right 
 to be allowed to give such instruction without let or hindrance 
 to those not baptized, who seek it. For those who are members 
 of the Church, she reserves to herself absolutely and exclusively 
 this right. The Catholic Church alone has received the mission 
 to teach the gospel. For those who are baptized but remain 
 outside her fold, she cannot cede her exclusive right, she does 
 perforce tolerate other conditions. Truth, because it is truth, 
 is necessarily unwavering and unyielding. This is not intoler- 
 ance in the sense in which this charge is brought against the 
 Church. Right is right always and everywhere. 
 
 “The religious instruction of the young in all schools is 
 subject to the authority and inspection of the Church” (Canon 
 1381, No. 1). 
 
 The Church asserts this right declaring, ““The Ordinaries of 
 places have the right and duty to be vigilant lest in any of the 
 
98 Fundamental 
 
 schools in their territory any thing be taught against faith or 
 good morals” (ibid., No. 2). 
 
 “They likewise have the right to approve the teachers and 
 books of religion, and on account of religion and morals, to 
 demand the removal of both teachers and books”’ (ibid., No.3). 
 
 A difference will be noted between the first and second 
 part of this Canon. In the first part it asserts the direct, 
 positive right to approve of books and teachers of religion; in 
 the second part, it asserts the right to demand the removal of 
 books and teachers dealing with the profane sciences who offend 
 against religion and morals. | 
 
 The Church’s divine mission gives her the right to command 
 that ‘‘all the faithful from childhood on, are to be instructed 
 in such a manner that not only nothing be taught them con- 
 trary to the faith and good morals, but likewise that religious 
 instruction occupy the principal place (Canon 1372, No. 1). 
 
 “Not only parents, as enjoined in Canon 1113, but also all 
 who take their place have the right and the most serious duty 
 to care for the Christian education of the children”’ (ibid., No.2). 
 
 ‘“‘In every elementary school children must be given re-. 
 ligious instruction suitable to their age’’ (Canon 1373, No. 1). 
 
 “Young people who attend high schools or colleges, are to 
 receive fuller religious training, and the Ordinaries of places will 
 take care that such instruction is given by priests known for 
 their zeal and learning’’ (ibid., No. 2). 
 
 The code demands that such instruction be given to those 
 who attend “‘medias et suwperiores scholas’’. This is understood 
 to mean cultural schools, not trade or vocational schools. 1 
 It does, of course, include normal schools where teachers 
 are formed. These canons reject the divorce of education from 
 religion and moral instruction and likewise the viewpoint 
 assumed by many, namely, it is well to defer religious and moral 
 instruction until adult age. And rightly so. Education with- 
 out religion does violence to the religious nature of man. A 
 
 
 
 (1) Creussen, S.J., Nouvelle Revue Theologique, vol. 53, n. 3, p. 185. 
 
SMoral Theology 99 
 
 non-religious training is fitting for brute animals, it is a crime 
 against the free and moral nature of man. It denies the tradi- 
 tional continuity of the human race and sins against the first 
 principles of pedagogy. Pretending to defer freedom of choice 
 in religious and moral matters to a more mature age, inculcates 
 license, scepticism, and atheism. Character can not be formed 
 unless it be cast in the mold of religion. Religion of necessity 
 demands a definite creed. In view of the erroneous opinions 
 broadcasted everywhere, these canons should be preached from 
 the housetops in season and out of season. 2 
 
 To remove all danger to faith and morals the Church com- 
 mands further: ‘“‘Catholic children shall not attend non- 
 Catholic, neutral or mixed schools’ (Canon 1374). The 
 term mixed school might be misinterpreted as meaning coedu- 
 cational schools for both sexes, to make plain what the term 
 means, the canon gives the definition of mixed schools, namely, 
 those ‘‘which are open likewise to non-Catholics’’. It would 
 be a too literal interpretation to extend this to strictly Catho- 
 lie schools which admit non-Catholic children. However on 
 several occasions the Holy See has warned especially com- 
 munities of nuns not to be too free in admitting non-Catholic 
 children to their schools and academies and has admonished 
 that where it is done it be with watchful care lest it constitute 
 a danger to the faith and morals of the Catholic children. : 
 
 The Church does not want her children to grow up illiterate 
 and therefore the canon adds: “It is the exclusive right of the 
 Ordinary of the place to judge when and under which safe- 
 guards, so that all danger of perversion is avoided, such schools 
 may be tolerated, according to the norms laid down by the 
 Holy See.’”’ From the wording of the canon it is manifest that 
 this refers directly to the duty of the Ordinary in the question 
 of using means at his disposal to see to it that the schools in his 
 district are not neutral in the matter of religious instruction 
 
 (2) Epitome Juris Canonici, Vermeersch-Creussen, vol. II, n. 710. 
 (3) Libs cit., 711, 2. 
 

 
 
 
 100 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 and in so far refers more especially to distinctly Catholic 
 countries. Yet it is evident that it refers, too, to the right of 
 judging either in a general manner or in particular cases 
 whether Catholic children may attend such schools. In allow- 
 ing such attendance, a difference is to be made between schools 
 of heretical sects and public or private neutral or mixed schools. 
 ‘“‘Catholic parents or those taking the parent’s place who know- 
 ingly have children taught or educated in a non-Catholic re- 
 ligion’’ (Canon 2819, No. 4); “those who enter upon a mar- 
 riage with an agreement explicit or implicit to have all or any 
 of the children educated outside of the Catholic Church’’ 
 (ibid., No. 2), are subject to excommunication latae sententiae 
 reserved to the Ordinary. The instruction given to our 
 bishops by the Congregation for the Propagation, makes the 
 same distinction: ‘“‘Above all it must be considered whether in 
 the school which is to be attended there is such a danger of 
 perversion that it cannot in any manner be made remote; this 
 will be as often as things are taught or done in the school con- 
 trary to Catholic doctrine or good morals. Such a danger as is 
 evident of itself must be avoided no matter what may be the | 
 temporal damage or even danger of life.”’ 4 
 
 (a) Under no consideration may Catholic parents, guard- 
 ians, etc., send children to schools, colleges, universities where 
 instruction in a non-Catholic religion is a compulsory part of 
 the curriculum, nor where chapel attendance is compulsory for 
 them. 
 
 (b) When this is not compulsory, the very atmosphere of 
 such institutions being heretical, it would be only on most 
 serious reasons with every possible precaution taken by the 
 children, parents and pastors to remove the danger of perver- 
 sion that the Ordinary could grant permission for attendance 
 on schools controlled by sects. 
 
 (c) This holds likewise with regard to summer schools, 
 recreational camps, clubs, etc. In fact even more so, because 
 
 (4) III. Council Balt., Appendix, p. 279 sqq. 
 

 
 Moral Theology 101 
 
 as a rule there is no very stringent reason to go to such camps 
 or join such clubs. Here it might be well to note that it is the 
 height of folly to try to duplicate all these fads and fancies of 
 non-Catholics. Our children and their parents should be 
 taught that Catholic life demands sacrifice. The burden put 
 on our people to support Catholic schools is sufficiently heavy 
 to forbid diversions of such funds as are available. Nor 
 should the yoke be made heavier. Newman Clubs and such 
 like features at non-Catholic colleges and universities may at 
 times be helpful, but they should never be stressed to the 
 detriment of Catholic colleges and universities. An associa- 
 tion to maintain professors of Catholic philosophy, especially of 
 ethics, of the history of the Catholic Church and of Catholic 
 literature in non-Catholic universities, could accomplish much. 
 If we are to form leaders for Catholic thought and action, the 
 cultural content of Catholicism in the arts, literature and 
 sciences must be emphasized. 
 
 “Ordinaries are advised to send a certain select number of 
 their clerics to universities and faculties established or approved 
 by the Holy See to pursue higher studies in philosophy, theolo- 
 gy, and canon law in order to obtain degrees”’ (Canon 1380). 
 
 Existing conditions may demand that some priests attend 
 lay universities, i.e., neither founded or approved by the Holy 
 See. TheS. Congregation of the Consistory has issued a special 
 instruction on this matter. It is summarized by Vermeersch- 
 Creussen: (a) Clerics are to be allowed to attend such 
 universities, not for private utility but only on account of the 
 common necessity or utility of the diocese. (b) None but 
 priests are allowed such attendance. (c) These should be of 
 a kind as give founded hope that by their studies, their talents 
 and sanctity of morals, will reflect honor and credit on the 
 clergy. (d) Attendance at such universities does not excuse 
 from the examens prescribed in ce. 130 et 590. (e) “No 
 cleric may accept a teaching or other secular office of his own 
 accord and especially not against the will of his Ordinary, if 
 
102 Fundamental 
 
 notwithstanding he does so, let him be punished with condign 
 punishment not excepting suspensio a divnis’’ (April 380, 
 1918). Matters pertaining to priests, students or teachers in 
 lay schools come under the competency of S. Cong. Concilli 
 (A? Ay S:, 1923, vol} 15; p.°39): 
 
 The commands of this instruction are applicable to nuns and 
 likewise to clerics belonging to an exempt order or congrega- 
 tion. For these latter, the Provincial is the Ordinary. 
 
 Canon 1379: 
 
 “Tf Catholic schools whether elementary or high schools 
 such as are required by Canon 1373, do not exist, measures 
 must be taken especially by the Ordinaries of places to establish 
 SUCH e(IDIde NOL): 
 
 “Where public universities are not imbued with Catholic 
 doctrine and viewpoint, it is desirable that Catholic universities 
 be founded either for the nation or the region’ (ibid., No. 2). 
 
 “Let the faithful not be remiss to lend their aid, according 
 to their means, to build and to maintain Catholic schools’’ 
 (ibid., No. 3). 
 
 The law of charity obliges every one to succor his neighbor ~ 
 in need; almsgiving, prayer and fasting are the good works 
 specially recommended by Holy Writ. Moral theologians 
 readily excuse from the sin of neglect to give alms because 
 there are so many public agencies which take care of the poor, 
 the sick and the infirm that rarely there is pressing need. But 
 in our country the spiritual need of children to receive proper 
 instruction in the faith and to be safeguarded from perversion, 
 is pressing in nearly every diocese. There, too, is a crying need 
 to form leaders among the Catholic laymen, especially in the 
 field of law, medicine and teaching. Such leaders cannot be 
 had without Catholic university training. Here then is a 
 duty of charity, almsgiving if you will, that cannot be too 
 strongly impressed upon the faithful. 
 
Horal Theology 103 
 
 
 
 ARTICLE II 
 
 The Catholic School 
 
 The canons cited make clear the notes which distinguish a 
 Catholic from a non-Catholic, neutral or mixed school. The 
 dominant distinguishing note is religious and moral education 
 must go hand in hand with the physical and civil teaching and 
 education of the pupils. Catholic doctrine must underlie the 
 teaching of the profane or secular branches; at least nothing 
 contrary to it must be taught. Further such schools must be 
 subject to the legitimate rights and duties of the authority 
 recognized and established by the Church in this matter. It 
 would be a serious mistake to imagine that only the parochial 
 school can measure up to this standard. The Church recog- 
 nizes and approves such schools founded and directed by (1) 
 parents or groups of parents; (2) directed by the state; (8) 
 directed by private individuals not specially delegated by 
 parents; (4) schools directed immediately by the Church. All 
 these can deserve the name Catholic, provided they live up to 
 the demands of the Church. She reserves the right to see to it 
 that the Catholic religion is taught, that nothing is taught or 
 done against Catholic faith and morals, to approve those who 
 teach religion, to approve the books used for religious instruc- 
 tion, to demand the removal of books and teachers which 
 offend against faith or morals (Canon 13881). 
 
 To safeguard these rights, she demands that ‘The Ordinar- 
 ies of places have free access, whether in person or by delegate, 
 to visit and inspect schools, oratories, recreational centres, 
 homes, etc., in matters which pertain to the religious and moral 
 training; the schools maintained by religious of any kind are 
 not exempt from such visits, except the intern schools for the 
 professed of exempt religious” (1382). 
 
 If any of these rights or duties are denied the Ordinary 
 they are not Catholic schools. 
 
104 Fundamental 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Instruction in Christian doctrine is to be given by the pas- 
 tors and their assistants, by religious, clerics or lay, the former 
 under the control of their superiors, the latter under the control 
 of the priest designated by the Ordinary of the place, namely, 
 pastor, chaplain or diocesan inspector, lastly by lay people 
 under the immediate direction of the pastor or priest assigned 
 by competent authority. The choice of books to be used for 
 religious instruction such as the catechism, bible history, 
 church history, etc., belongs directly to the Ordinary. ! 
 
 However the Ordinary has not the full right to exclude from 
 the schools not immediately and directly subject to him, 
 manuals of religious instruction which are irreproachable in the 
 matter of faith and morals. Nor has he the right to demand 
 the use of one absolutely against any other. He has the right 
 to prescribe that certain matters be treated and to establish a 
 minimum in this matter, but in itself he has no right to say that 
 a particular method, for instance, the Socratic, project problem, 
 visualization method, be used. Of course, for schools which 
 are directly and immediately subject to the Ordinary, such as 
 our parochial schools, he has full rights as to choice of books, 
 methods, teachers, etc., not only for religious instructions but 
 for all the branches taught. He can demand that teachers 
 belonging to religious communities, who teach in his diocesan, 
 regional or parochial schools, have certain qualifications, use 
 certain books, methods, etc.2 Yet too much standardiza- 
 tion can prove harmful. Some individuality should be left an 
 experienced teacher, and especially the approved methods of 
 religious communities. When granting even exempt religious 
 the needed permission to establish houses, colleges, etc., certain 
 agreements may be made. * 
 
 (1) Wernz, Jus Decret., vol. III, n. 76. 
 
 (2) III. Council Balt., pp. 221, 222. 
 
 (3) Council Balt., p. 223. Cf. Especially Creussen, S.J., L’ecole Catholique in Nouvelle 
 Revue Theologique, vol. 53, n. 3, p. 184 sqq. 
 
Moral Theology 105 
 
 ARTICLE III 
 
 Bible Reading in the Schools 
 
 The reading of the Bible or rather parts of the Bible in the 
 public schools is fraught with many difficulties. A Catholic 
 cannot allow the Bible to be studied or read from a merely 
 literary standpoint. The Bible is to him the word of God, and 
 as the author of the Imitation says, “to curiously study the 
 Holy Scripture is unto destruction.”’ 
 
 To look upon the Bible as a book merely for character 
 building and moral training without reference to dogmatic 
 principles and truths of faith it contains, emasculates the word 
 of God. ‘“‘It seemed good to me... to write to thee in order 
 ... that thou mayest know the verity of those words in which 
 thou hast been instructed”’ (Luke 1, 3-4). ‘“‘But these are 
 written, that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son 
 of God, and that believing you may have life in His name’”’ 
 (John 20, 81). 
 
 When this movement is palliated with the pretense of 
 literary study or morality without dogmatism, no Catholic can 
 actively promote it. The crime wave sweeping over the 
 younger generation is proof sufficient that children need 
 religious instruction, that the Sunday-school does not suffi- 
 ciently take care of it, that religious training at home is sadly 
 deficient. Educators are at their wits ends as to ways and 
 means of introducing some moral training, some religious educa- 
 tion into the curricula of the public school. The half-way 
 measures they advocate of some hymn singing, some readings 
 from the Bible unobjectionable to all the sects represented, 
 practically make for a spirit of indifferentism which is as bad 
 and, perhaps, worse from the Catholic standpoint than the 
 spirit of non-religion resulting from the complete exclusion of 
 these branches. A Catholic can scarcely give any aid to help 
 them in the movement. The only stand he can take conscien- 
 
106 Sundamental 
 
 tiously is to advocate a separation of the children according to 
 their religious persuasions for a period a day and allow the 
 various churches in the district to engage a teacher to take of 
 the children during this period. Politically it would not be 
 well to co-operate with obtaining the money for this purpose 
 from the taxes. 
 
 What about Catholic children attending the Bible reading 
 periods in public schools? 
 
 Where there are facilities to attend a Catholic school this 
 cannot be allowed. It fosters indifferentism to say the least, 
 no matter under what guise or pretense it is palliated. But we 
 can well imagine a situation where it is a question of either no 
 schooling, because there is no Catholic school in the place, or 
 attendance on the Bible reading period, namely, the law might 
 make it compulsory on all to attend. 
 
 (a) If in the selection made or the interpretations made, 
 things are taught directly against Catholic faith or morals, 
 Catholics would be obliged to resist even unto death. Such 
 attendance would be a denial of faith. 1 
 
 (b) If the passages selected and the explanation given are 
 colorless, every attempt must be made to have Catholic 
 children excused from these periods. But if these attempts 
 prove fruitless, the hardships resulting, i.e., fines assessed, or 
 the children by not attending school would grow up illiterate, 
 dissensions in families of mixed religion, might be a sufficient 
 cause for remote cooperation. The parents and pastors of 
 such children would have to redouble their endeavors to give 
 the proper antidote to the spirit of indifferentism. 
 
 (c) Where the law is not compulsory or where these hard- 
 ships would not follow, Catholic children even under sacrifices 
 would be obliged to absent themselves from these periods. 
 
 Another difficulty which could scarcely be avoided would 
 arise, namely, what version of the Bible is to be read? As it is 
 only a question of excerpts and in the supposition of harmless 
 
 (1) Cf. Inst. to Bishops of America, III Counc. Balt., Appendix, p. 279 sqq. 
 
Moral Theology 107 
 
 extracts the law against Bible reading of Protestant versions 
 might be waived (Canon 1399). 
 
 For the sake of insuring uniformity before action is taken 
 by any confessor, priest or pastor, the matter is to be placed 
 before the Ordinary of the place. The code as well as the in- 
 struction declare the Ordinary to be the competent judge. 
 
 If American Catholics are to be the vanguard of culture and 
 progress, a position due them, they need leaders in thought and 
 action. Neither a knowledge of the faith nor yet a deeper 
 understanding of its truths will suffice. A continuity with the 
 past must be established. This postulates an impregnation 
 with the culture of the ages, a heritage of which every Catholic 
 should be proud. ‘This heritage is found in the achievements 
 of Catholics in the arts, literature and sciences. To cultivate 
 this Catholic sense, psychology of action and culture is the 
 special prerogative of the Catholic college and university. 
 
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Table of Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 PYRE Lo 2 Pn ge OE ag Bie. Ne nN ee BOC Rete Mn ot a ee AE 3 
 MEE OLE ES Wal ee ety Pew eben ia ses MRE LON cents lk oa | 5 
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 aREBa (OleANDAVLORAL CBLIGATION joi ie eons eee ee Ls 
 inesbsevconologcy oi.the Pree Wile. 0) ey cee Doe ial 
 IePINOCDI OfMvLOTLIL Veta 2 Gis ca ho Fee, 16 
 EY SSUES 1S ae ad 0 LO OE dl EE 28 
 SITU. od Beaphependle 2 Oot aes Bek aE edit Reni ie Rene ae Ca 26 
 Moral Indifference and the Perfection of Free Choice. 35 
 PULSE MEETISAIITL Youn Oar etter an Alcott Wie set Nt EMO ats en 38 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 Ee RUSE HOT ONS pee ak oo ac gc ha a 2 43 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 rset nities PION OB: LL UMAN, LiA Wise ses eos wc eek ok wa 63 
 DAWG: GIvil Government eiew- a. cele bass ea 63 
 aeeiemcino: borce of. Civil Lawak chav havens 73 
 The Taxing Power of the Government.............. 82 
 Obligation in Conscience of Tax Laws.............. 86 
 axerrcinis and, | heir Duties: 22.2 ssn oes 92 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 SHIPS E21 BY BCI (eS a OO ee emia fa 96 
 Education and Catholic Faith and Morals........... 96 
 SCE AT NOL COOOL. ott hase wie es ene cheeks ich ana Bae 103 
 Pei Oleetveacinonintne OCROOIS tm accals. oot ke oo alet ea 105 
 
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