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 Wilson, Joseph, 
 Letters on the truth and 
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LETTERS. 
 ON . 
 THE TRUTH AND CERTAINTY 
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 NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION, 
 
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LETTERS 
 ow 
 THE TRUTH AND CERTAINTY 
 oF 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION; 
 ADDRESSED TO 
 
 A STUDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY: 
 
 AND INTENDED AS 
 AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 TO BISHOP BUTLER’S ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 
 NATURAL ANY REVEALED, 
 TO THE eae ozaniuas AND COURSE OF NATURE: 
 
 By Tue Rev. JOSEPH WILSON, A. B. 
 
 For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world 
 are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, 
 even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without 
 excuse, Romans i, 20. 
 
 Cee Da nae ae 
 
 LONDON: 
 PRINTED FOR F.C. AND }. RIVINGTON, 
 NO. 62, ST. PAUL’S CHURCH-YARD;} 
 BY LAW AND GILBERT, ST. JOHN’S SQUARE, CLERKENWELL, 
 
 (Ru 
 
 1810. 
 
JEROME, 
 
INTRODUCTION, &c. 
 
 LETTER IL 
 On Probable and Moral Evidence. 
 
 Cheam, J anuary, 1809. 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 OU have often observed to me, that you had 
 considerable difficulty in under standing Butler’s Ana- 
 logy; the same thing is generally experienced by 
 young men; and I have frequently wished something 
 done to make the book more easy. J do not think 
 the difficulty is so much in the subject, as in the 
 style; if, therefore, I can facilitate your understand- 
 ing the book, by simplifying it ‘alittle, I shall feel 
 very great pleasure. But do not think my letters to 
 you, upon this subject, will supersede the necessity 
 of reading the book itself. I wish you, by all means, 
 to study the book most attentively; for there is a 
 vastness of idea, and a generalization, and, at the 
 same time, a particularity of expression, which is 
 scarcely to be found in any other work, My pur- 
 
 B 
 
2 On Probable or Moral Evidence. 
 
 pose then is to give you what I hope will serve as an 
 introduction to it; and help you to understand it 
 more distinctly. And as his great object is to shew, 
 that there is an analogy between religion both natu- 
 ral and revealed, and the course of nature as it now 
 exists; let me, as nearly as I can, give you his ideas 
 upon Probability and Analogy, and the way in which 
 he applies them. 
 
 Now between probable and demonstrative evi- 
 dence for the truth of any thing, there is an essen- 
 tial difference; for demonstrative gives the most cer- 
 tain assurance of a thing’s being true, but probable 
 affords very various degrees of belief. You would 
 not believe a thing true upon one slight presump- 
 tion; but if that presumption be very often repeated, 
 it will make the thing morally certain. Thus, if a 
 man should this day observe the tide to ebb and 
 flow, and the sun to rise and set, he may suppose 
 the same thing will take place to-morrow: but when 
 he reflects that the tide has ebbed and flowed, the 
 sun has risen and set every day for ages, he is fully 
 assured they will do the same to-morrow. 
 
 You have no doubt often thought a thing was 
 probably true, when you did not feel sure it was. If 
 a child live to twenty, you believe he wil grow to 
 the strength and stature of a man; and you expect 
 your daily food will give you vigour and energy, 
 
 — 
 
 ‘® 
 
i On Probable or Moral Evidence. 3 
 
 Now why do you believe this, but because you know 
 this is generally the case? You compare like things 
 “in your mind ; and hence you make yeur inference. 
 A black prince, as Mr. Locke tells, who had al- 
 ways lived in a warm climate, would, from analogy, 
 suppose there was no such thing as ice; but you, 
 from greater experience of heat and cold, /eel as- 
 sured that in some part of our winter there will be 
 ice. You and the prince reason from analogy: but 
 your experience is greater, therefore your analagy is 
 more extenfive. It is true, indeed, that probable 
 evidence gives only imperfect information ; it applies 
 to finite creatures only, for to God nothing can be 
 probable. He knows all possible things, whether 
 past, present, or future. But to man, probability 
 is the very guide of life. 
 ~. On whatever side of a question then there is the 
 greater probability, to that side we must lean. Like 
 
 as when we weigh two things in a pair of true scales, - 
 
 the smallest inclination of the beam shews us which 
 is the heavier, so we determine often in matters of 
 mere speculation; and in matters of practice, the 
 smallest degree of weight on one side more than an- 
 other binds us to act accordingly. Nay, in some 
 
 cases, a man must act, not only where there is very 
 
 little probability, but where there is none, nay where 
 the probability is against him; for if a man were 
 
 drowning, he would endeavour to save himself by _ 
 
 Be 
 
 3 
 
 ii 
 
A On Probable or Moral Evidence. 
 
 vg rotten bough, though it were probable it would 
 break. : / oe 
 
 ~ Analogical reasoning you cen perceive ict 1s *: 
 very great use; indeed you employ it daily without 
 reflecting upon it. You act uponit, I may say, in- 
 cessantly in the business of life. Let us see then, 
 if there is not a likeness between that system of 
 things which revelation teaches, and that which is 
 the known course of nature. And if I can shew 
 you that there is (as I certainly shall), then it will be 
 probable that both these systems proceed from the 
 same author. Do you grant me that there is 
 a God, the author of nature, and the itelligent 
 governor of the world; and you fhall see, that 
 this concession will answer the leading objec- 
 tions, which are made aguinst divine revelation. But 
 remember, it is net reasonable to form your notions 
 of the constitution of the world, like Des Cartes, 
 upon principles without foundation ; or to form your 
 notions upon principles which are true, but imappli- 
 " cable to the case to which you apply them ;. as they 
 who would explain the’structure of the human body 
 by mathematics. For to form your opinions in this 
 manner, is to make an hypothesis to suit your rea- 
 soning. But, on the other ‘hand, it’ is proper to 
 join abstract reasoning with’ the ‘observation ‘of facts, 
 and to argue from known facts to others that are like 
 them. You'may fairly argue from what you know of 
 
 e 
 
On Probable or Moral Evidence. 5 
 
 the divme government over intelligent creatures to 
 that which is unknown; and from what is present, 
 to infer what is kely tobe hereafter. 9 
 ‘ Let it then be granted that there is a God, the 
 intelligent author of nature, and natural governor of | 
 the world, and we shall find apalogical reasoning, 
 both a practical thmg, and applicable to natural and 
 revealed religion. We shall find it a much better 
 method, than that of forming our notions of God's 
 government by hypothesis; or of vainly conjecturing, 
 -as some have done, how the world might have been 
 framed. We have not faculties to measure the de- 
 signs of God, or to discern the things which would 
 best accomplish them. An illiterate clown is not 
 competent ta judge of the conduct of a prime mi: 
 nister; infinitely less are we able to judge of the 
 ways of the Almighty. Zake the world then as it 
 ts, and compare the known course of nature, with 
 what is called the moral system of nature ; compare 
 also that dispensation of Providence which you find 
 yourself under, to that which christianity teaches 
 you to believe and expect, and you will find them 
 analogous, or alike. 
 
 You will find the analogy pursued in these letters 
 pretty extensive; it will shew you that both natural 
 and revealed religion are of serious moment; sub- 
 
 _ jects not to be ridiculed, unless, indeed, you will . 
 idicule the system of nature itself. You will find 
 B 3 
 
& 
 
 fame 
 
 6 On Probable or Moral Evidence. 
 
 also that this analogy will answer, in a very great 
 degree, the objections which are made to the évi- 
 cences for christianity; for you must. ever recollect, 
 that objections against a proof, and objections 
 against what is said to be proved, are different 
 things. 
 
 Now I shall apply this analogical reasoning to the 
 doctrine of a future state,—a future state of rewards 
 and punishments accordmg to our conduct in this 
 life; to the doctrine of our present life being a state 
 of trial and discipline for a fature one, notwithstand- 
 ing the objections drawn from the doctrines of ne- 
 cessity, or even of wisdom and goodness: I shall 
 apply it to the doctrines of this world being in a 
 state of wickedness and ruin, and hence that chris- 
 thanity was revealed to man, and is of the utmost 
 importance ; I shall consider christianity as being 
 proved by miracles; but yet containing many things 
 that may appear strange; and as being a system 
 managed by a divine person, the Messiah; though 
 not revealed to all men, nor with the strongest pos- 
 sible evidence to those to whom it is revealed, but 
 to those only and in that manner in which God 
 thought fit. It will appear also that christianity in 
 its scheme, its publication, its evidences, and in the 
 paiticular parts of it objected to, is analogous to the 
 known course of nature; and that if you object to 
 christianity you must also object to that kuown 
 
‘ 7 4 
 = ~ 
 
 On Probable or Moral Evidence. 7 
 
 course of nature. In one word, you must either 
 be a christian or an atheist. 
 
 These subjects [ shall pursue in my following let- 
 ters; and in my next shall begin with a future state, 
 as that which is the foundation of all those hopes 
 and fears, which are of any moment to man. 
 
 Iam, dear Sir, yours affectionately, 
 
 J.W. 
 
 P.S. On the subject of moral evidence, I par- 
 ticularly recommend to you a small but valuable 
 work, lately published by the Rev. Mr. Gambier. 
 And I would just hint, that I think all kinds of evi- 
 dence and proof, may, perhaps, ultimately be re- 
 solved into self-evident principles, 
 
Oe da. 
 
 LETTER. II. 
 Ona Future Life. 
 
 Cheam, Januaryy 1809. 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 YOU. have no doubt read and heard something 
 about identity; and that it is difficult to determine, 
 or even to conceive, how it is we are still the same. 
 But without troubling either you or myself about 
 this, let me point out to you some changes we have 
 undergone, and may undergo, without being de- 
 stroyed; and hence infer from analogy, that it is 
 
 ‘probable we may survive death: that death may be 
 
 nothing but a change; and that we may exist after it 
 in a state of life and perception. 
 
 Now observe, first, how different your state in 
 yafancy and manhood. When a man, your powers 
 
 and means of action, thinking, and enjoying, are 
 
 very different from what they were when you were a 
 chiid. Look also at the vast changes which take 
 place im worms that become flies; at the various 
 states of the butterfly, and consider how different a 
 bird exists when in the shell and when out of it. 
 But above all, think how different you yourself were, 
 when in the womb, from what you are now. You 
 
 as een 
 
Ona Future Life 9 
 
 were sustained by a perfectly different process; you 
 
 existed ina manner very different from that in which” 
 you now exist. You may then exist after death, just 
 
 as naturally as you now exist after birth. This 
 
 would be merely according to the analogy of na- 
 
 ture; and according to what we see in the world 
 
 every day. 
 
 But I would wish you to consider, secondly, that 
 you have capacities for action, for enjoying plea- 
 sure, and suffering pain: you know you are capable 
 of action, of happiness, and of misery. And as 
 you have these capacities before death, it is a pre- 
 sumption you will have them after death ; unless yow. 
 are certain death will annihilate you, of which you 
 are not certain. Unless you have a positive reason 
 for the contrary, it is probable all things will conti- 
 nue, m all respects, as they are. From analogy you: 
 think the world will be to-morrow as it is to-day : 
 nor have you any other reason for thinking aay suly- 
 stance, God only excepted, wil! continue to exist 
 another moment. But you see you. do. continue to 
 exist; it is probable then you will exist after death. 
 ‘There is nothing which you ean expect will anuihi- 
 late you but death: but you have no positive reason 
 for expecting this: the probability then is, that you 
 
 _ will survive it. 
 
 But let it be granted there should be a Suspie? ry 
 
 that death may annihilate you; yet there is no dise 
 BS 
 
10 On a Future Life. 
 
 tinct reason for such a suspicion. For if there is 
 
 any distinct reason, it must arise either from the rea- 
 son of the thing, or from the analogy of nature. 
 Now you cannot prove from the reason of the thing, 
 no nor argue from it, that death will annihilate you ; 
 for you do not know, properly speaking, what death 
 is: and as you do not know what it is, how can you 
 argue from it? You know nothing of death but a 
 few effects; such as, that it dissolves your flesh, skin, 
 and bones. but these effects do not by any means 
 necessarily imply your annihilation; or the destruc- 
 tion of a living agent. You donot know what your 
 faculties of perceiving and acting depend upon: but 
 you know that they exist, as in sleep or in a swoon, 
 when they are not exercised; what hinders then, that 
 they may exist in death? ‘Their existence may de- 
 pend upon something which death does not, cannot 
 destroy: their existence and their exercise are quite 
 different things; you cannot then, from the reason 
 of the thing, infer that death will be your destruc 
 tion. 
 
 And as for analogy, it. does not give you the 
 slightest reason to suppose, that animals ever lose 
 their powers of action and perception. Death, in. 
 deed, destroys the sensti/e proof of the existence 
 of these facultics; i: removes them from cur sight, 
 but does not prove that they are annililated. You 
 have not faculties to trace things through or beyond 
 
 I 
 
ais ‘i 
 On a Future Life. 11 
 
 death; and, therefore, you have no right to suppose 
 that they do not exist at all, nor in any manner after 
 death. But since you know that animals possess. 
 their powers of action and perception, up to the 
 very period to which you can trace them; this makes. | 
 it probable, that they retain them afterwards, and a 
 that death does not destroy them. And as you have 
 gone through prodigious changes in life-—from be- 
 ing im the womb to being born,—from infancy. to. 
 youth, and are still the same person ; it is probable, 
 that death may be only an introduction into a new. 
 state of being. Death, in fact, may. be but an- 
 ether birth to you. 
 
 But, perhaps, you have still some imaginary ap- 
 prehension, that death may annihilate you ;. for ima-. 
 gination often obscures reason, and we take things: 
 for granted of which we know nothing: We often + 
 get prejudices without any real foundation. Let me 
 then consider those apprehensions a little, and shew 
 you how groundless they are. 
 
 ‘Now, first, if death annihilates us, it must be be- 
 cause we are compounded and discerptible. But 
 consciousness is. an indivisible thing; that, then,. 
 which is conscious (which is properly ourselves), 
 must also be indivisible. Now suppose, that that. 
 which is properly yourself is a simple being, whieh. 
 is as easy as to suppose you. are compounded, then, 
 your body is a mere instrument. Upon this suppo- 
 
 3.6 
 
* 
 
 ae . 
 
 12 On a Future Life. 
 
 sition, your bodily powers are no necessary part of 
 yourself ; and you may live out of the body as well 
 as in it. The dissolution of your body, then, no 
 more implies the annihilation of yourself, i. e. of 
 that which is the subject of consciousness, and of 
 your faculties of action and perception, than the 
 dissolution of the chair you sit on, or the stick you 
 walk with.. 
 
 But though we cannot prove by experiment the 
 absolute oneness of what is properly ourselves; yet 
 suppose this unity or oneness, and then it must fol- 
 Jow, that our bodies are mere organs or instruments 
 with which we act. And whether the mind be ma- 
 terial or immaterial, yet the destruction of the body 
 does not imply the mind’s destruction. For only re- 
 
 collect that you have seen men without arms and 
 
 legs, and many other important parts of the body, 
 and yet be still the same persons ;—that you have 
 nothing of that body you had when a child, and yet 
 are still the same person :—recollect these things, I 
 say, and it must teach you to distinguish between 
 ‘what 1s properly yourself, and a large quantity af 
 matter called your body. It will teach you, that the 
 “body may be destroyed, and yet the mind remain en- 
 tire and ever thesame. Nay, to be more particular, 
 jet it be admitted that the mind is discerptible ; yet 
 
 you cannot determine its bulk. But unless you can, - 
 
 determine its bulk, a thing which no one can do, ta 
 
abi 
 
 iy : f i k : (he J ae ke 
 *- * iy 
 a J Ljapehtee- F 5 bee 
 ‘ On OW ature Life. oe f. 
 
 be larger than the solid elementary particles of mat 
 
 ter which no natural force can dissolve, then you 
 late no reason to suppose that death can dissalve 
 the mind. wr ee: 
 
 And as you remain the same, though your flesh 
 and bones change, and which therefore are not 
 yourself’: so also you have no reason to suppose any 
 internal system of matter is yourself. All thatcan 
 be said of any system of matter, however intimately 
 «we may be connected with it, is, that the mind and 
 it inutually affect each other; but this may be said, 
 in a degree, of all foreign matter which gives us 
 ideas, and over Which we have any power. The 
 
 dissolution then of any system of matter, whether 
 
 internal or external, does not prove the dissolution 
 of the mind. Your whole body has been changed 
 over aud over again, while you are still the same 
 and possess the same oneness; what reason then 
 have you to suppose, that because death makes a 
 sudden change, you will cease to be the sa ame, any 
 more than by the gradual changes you have already 
 undergone? 
 
 Nor have you any right to Suppose you are de- 
 
 _stroyed when your senses are. For what are your 
 senses, but instruments which convey ideas? and 
 
 the same thing may be said of a magnifying glass, a 
 tree, or a house, m a decree. But you do not 
 think you are destroyed, When the glass is broken, 
 
14  ° Ona Future Life. 
 
 _ the tree feiled, or the house burnt: nor ought you 
 to think then that the destruction of your body or 
 senses is the destruction of yourself. Does not the 
 
 mind use the eyes to perceive objects with, and when ~ 
 
 they fail do we not employ glasses? When our fect 
 fail, do we not use crutches; or our ears, a hearing 
 trumpet? Our senses, in fact our whole body, is. 
 but an instrument to the mind; and the destruction 
 of the body no more necessarily implies the destruc- 
 tion of yourself, than does the destruction of-your 
 spectacles, your crutches, or your hearing trumpet. 
 But, perhaps, you may ask, are not these obser- 
 vations applicable to brutes, and may they not be 
 immortal? Well, let this be granted; and it will 
 not at all invalidate them. Do you know what Ia- 
 tent powers brutes may be endued with? There was 
 atime, when you yourself had not the powers of 
 a brute. At one time, when in the womb, what. 
 were you more then an unconscious piece of matter? 
 But your powers were latent; and time and change 
 developed them. What, therefore, time and change 
 may effect in. brutes, you cannot tell. And though. 
 brutes be admitted to be ummortal, it does not fol- 
 low, that they are, therefore, endued with a ra- 
 tional or moral nature. For any thing you know to 
 the contrary, it may be necessary that there should 
 be creatures in the universe without such a nature 3. 
 and yet not suffer annihilation by death. How, 
 
 ee 
 
2 
 
 ‘ph ify , Pree 
 On @ Future Life. a5 
 
 brutes are to be disposed of, you neither know, nor 
 are able to know. .To know this, you must know 
 the whole system of the universe; which no finite 
 creature can know. ‘The objection, then, which is 
 made against a future life, drawn from the suppo- 
 sition that brutes may be” hi i pe really amounts 
 to nothing. 
 
 - But putting brutes out of the question, let us seé 
 whether it is not very probable that’ death, so far 
 ‘from destroying our powers of ‘reflection, bie not so 
 much as suspend their exercise. . - 
 Tt is plam that your powers of reason, memory, 
 
 and affection, do not depend upon your body, in the 
 
 same manner as your powers of perception by the 
 senses. Nor do those powers of reason, memory, 
 
 and affection, depend upon the bedy, in such a 
 
 manner, as to give ground to think that the disso- 
 
 ‘fution of the body will be their destruction or even 
 
 their suspension. For you may be said to live in a 
 state of sensation, as when you eat ; and ima state 
 of reflection, as when you think or reason. Now 
 it is not certain: that what death dissolves, is in any 
 way necessary to you m a state of reflection, after 
 you have gotten ideas: for you can and do reason 
 intensely, after you have gotten ideas by the senses, 
 without their help. The senses serve as hands for 
 your mind, to get things with; but when they are 
 
 gotten, it can do without them. The destruction of 
 
16 Ona Future Life. 
 
 your senses,—of your whole body,—does not then 
 necessarily imply the destruction of your mind; for. 
 you can think and reason hie clei of your senses, 
 —of your body. | ree i 
 
 _ Numbers die in ofall possession | ‘of hai Raia eeh 
 powers, after being worn down. and wasted with a _ 
 long disease; this then makes it very probable, that. 
 your mental powers may still continue in exercise, 
 though your body be dissolved. The suspension of 
 reason, of memory, and of the affections they.ex- 
 cite 10 us, is not implied in our idea of death; for. 
 men often exercise these powers, independent of | 
 their body, up to the very Jast gasp. This then. 
 makes it probable, that death may not, so (much. 
 as interrupt the exercise of our reflecting -pow- 
 ers. So that, as when we are born, we come into . 
 a new state, or rather into a state, which is a conti-_ 
 nuance of the one we had in the womb; so may it 
 be with us after death, for any thing that can be _ 
 proved to the contrary. Death may be but a birth 
 to us, in which we may get vast accessions of pow, _ 
 ers; as we did when we left the womb, and came 
 into light. It may be as natural to go into a new 
 state of existence by death, as it is by birth. 
 
 . But do not vegetables, you may say, resemble 
 man in their decay? No, not m such a manner as to 
 be compared; for man has mental powers, vegeta- 
 bles have not. Vegetables have no powers of per- 
 
 5 
 
On a Future Life. ‘2 , 
 
 ception and action, but man has; and it is about the 
 continuance of these powers we are enquiring. ‘The 
 decay of vegetables may afford poets and orators a 
 comparison with the decay of human life; but not 
 a comparison with mental powers, because they have 
 them not. 
 
 I think, then, it is very_probable, from the changes 
 you have undergone and may undergo, and yet be 
 still the same, that death will not annihilate you ;— 
 that death will not destroy your powers of reflection, 
 because they can be exercised independent of your 
 body ;—no, nor even suspend the exercise of these 
 powers, since death often dissolves the body when 
 these powers are in full use. Nay I will go further 
 still, and say, that even admitting atheism itself to 
 be true, yet a future state is probable, aud can as 
 well be accounted for upon its principles, as that 
 we now exist. To argue then from atheism against 
 a future state, is to the highest degree absurd. 
 
 Since then a future state is probable, we are 
 bound to act upon that probability just as much as 
 if the thing were demonstrated: for if there may 
 be a future state, it binds us to act as if we were 
 sure there will be one. 
 
 I am yours very sincerely, 
 
 RBA 
 
 nat 
 
} 
 ‘ 
 
 reese 
 
 [18 J 
 
 i, ay a 
 "LETTER MI. 
 
 On God’s Government by Rewards and Punish- 
 MENTS. : 
 
 Cheam, January, 1809. 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 I SHEWED you in my last letter, that it is very 
 probable, we shall still continue to exist im a state 
 of life and perception after death. But merely to 
 live, or exist after death, is a matter of little more 
 than curiosity; if there was nothing more in the 
 subject than the consideration of bare existence, it 
 might indeed be a subject of speculation, but could’ 
 not be one of much interest. But we are capable 
 of much happiness or misery in this life, according 
 to the general tenor of our conduct; and hence it is 
 probable, that we may be happy. or miserable after 
 death, according to the nature of our actions in this 
 world. This then makes the contemplation of ano- 
 ther life of the highest importance to us. Let me 
 then beg you to observe the analogy of the world 
 on this. point, and you will see, that it gives great 
 reason to believe, that we shall be happy or mise- 
 rable as we conduct ourselves here. 
 
On God’s Government, &c. (19 
 
 ’ Now the general course of the world is, that all 
 ‘we enjoy, and a great part of what we suffer, és 
 put in our own power: for pleasure and pait result 
 from our actions; and we can foresee in most cases 
 the pleasure or pain which will follow them. We 
 are under a law of acting to obtain pleasure even 
 from the first moment of birth. If the child, or the 
 man will not eat, he cannot so much as exist, set. 
 ting aside the pleasure of gratifying the appetite ; 
 so that God does not preserve our life without our 
 
 own care and exertion. If you are prudent and ~ 
 
 careful, you may in general enjoy quiet and tole- 
 rable ease; but you well know, that uneasiness, dis- 
 content, and misery, are the consequences of vin- 
 lent passion, envy and negligence. In general, if 
 you want any’ thing, you must make exertions of 
 some kind or other to get it. You cannot so much 
 as eat a mouthful of bread without exertion; and 
 though God has given you the means of enjoyment, 
 yet unless you will use the powers you possess, you. 
 know you must starve in the midst of plenty. So 
 also, if you misuse your powers, and be rash, pas- 
 sionate, dissipated, and idle; the consequences, in 
 general, are sorrow, misfortune, poverty and igno- 
 rance. ‘Ibis you know beforehand will be the case ; 
 and this is the general course of the world, though 
 all our sufferjngs be not the result of our own folly. 
 
 . 
 
 + 
 ee 
 
Kr 
 
 20 On God’s Government 
 
 Now it does not behove us to enquire whether 
 things might not have been otherwise ; or why they 
 are thus. We must take things as they are; and 
 nothing can be more plain, that, generally, impru- 
 dent conduct produces bad consequences, unhappi- 
 ness and misery; and that if we would obtain of 
 avoid such a thing we must act so and so. 
 
 But, say you, this is to be ascribed to the ge- 
 neral course of nature. True, But what do you 
 mean by the general course of nature? Is it not that 
 course which God has appointed? The words have 
 no meaning, but as they are referred to him; for 
 you must remember, that I take it for granted, that 
 there is a‘God, the natural governor of the world. 
 Course of nature, without reference to God, are 
 inere words ; when, therefore, you use them, they 
 can have no meaning, but the appointment of God. 
 If then the course of nature be the appointment of God j 
 he appointed the misery which results from improper 
 conduct; and your foresight of that misery, is a 
 varning from him, to tell you how you should act. 
 
 “But though pleasure naturally accompanies the 
 gratification of a particular passion, yet it does not 
 follow, that you are to gratify that passion in every 
 particular instance. Your eyes were made to see 
 with ; but not to look at the sun till you injure your 
 sight. Your ears were made to hear with, but not 
 to be deafened by going too near bells when ring. 
 
by Rewards and Punishments. eat 
 
 ing. So also with foreseen pleasure and pain, they 
 were appointed, that we might act accordingly, but 
 not that we might act improperly. 
 
 “Now, since you know beforehand that pleasure 
 will result from one kind of conduct, and pain from 
 another kind of conduct ;—as that we shall be warm 
 and comfortable at a proper distance from the fire, 
 hut be burnt, or suffer great pain, if we come too 
 near it;—it is plain, that we are under God's go- 
 wernment in the most proper sense of the ward; 
 und that in this life he punishes or rewards us ac- 
 cording to our actions. God is the author of na- 
 ture, 1.e. of the course of the world, by supposi- 
 tion; the effects then of that course must be referred 
 to him, for the effects are but a part of the course. 
 Indeed it is an absolute matter of fact, that we are 
 under God's government, in the same sense as under 
 the government of the civil magistrate ; for annexing 
 pleasure to some actions and pain to others, which 
 it is in our power to do or forbear, and giving us 
 notice beforehand of this appointment, ts the proper 
 formal notion of government. If then the pain you 
 feel, in eating or drinking too much, be‘intended to 
 preserve you in health, by temperance, as it really 
 is, this as much proves that God punishes your in- 
 temperance, and consequently that you are under 
 his government, as if it were declared by a voice 
 from heaven. 
 
 qs 
 
 & 
 
i 
 
 ep 
 
 QQ. On God's Government 
 
 _ The analogy of nature then plainly shews, that 
 there is nothing incredible in the general doctrme 
 of religion, that God will hereafter punish men 
 according to their actions in this fe; for you now 
 find that you are actually under a government: ap- 
 pomted by him, which not only implies, but in 
 which rewards and punishments are actually em- 
 ployed. y 
 
 . But still, perhaps, you may object to divine pu- 
 nishment ; and think that there are reasons why meng 
 will not be punished after death for improper con- 
 duct m this world. But if we prosecute the ana- 
 logy of the world a httle more particularly, we shall 
 find, that there is a general law of punishment in 
 this life so analogous to what religion teaches of 
 future punishment, as to make it very probable there 
 wil be such a thing. 
 
 Now there is a great deal of misery in the world, 
 which men bring upon themselves by their conduct ; 
 misery which they might have prevented, and which 
 is the natural punishment of their behaviour. | Sick- 
 ness, and, often, untimely death, are the general con- 
 sequences of intemperance; but though there may 
 be some pleasure, some jollity and mirth in intem- 
 perance, yet they are no advantages, no gain, com- 
 pared with sickness and death, the consequences of 
 intemperance, The advantages of dissipation will 
 
by Rewards and Punishments. 8s 
 bear no comparison with the evils it produces in 
 this life. You see, then, that even now, in general, 
 the punishment of improper conduct is much greater 
 than its pleasures or advantages: and as this is the 
 case now, the same thing, it is probable, may hold 
 true m a future life. It is true, that the natural 
 punishments of our improper actions do not al- 
 ways take place immediately ; but in general they do 
 take place at last; for the constitution of nature is 
 such, that delay of punishment is no ground to ex- 
 pect final impunity. They often come al! at once, 
 and when men least expect them; nay, when they 
 seem to have no fear of them. These punishments 
 in many cases seem hardly probable, the probability 
 is that men will escape them; but yet, afterall, they 
 do come with mighty force. 
 
 Apply these observations to youth, when in the 
 University, or any where else. If they are idle, 
 headstrong, or profligate, though they may not see 
 the consequences of their conduct, yet in general 
 they suffer most severely for it afterwards in life. 
 Their habits of idleness or profligacy often prove 
 their utter ruin; and they owe the misery of many 
 years to the indiscretions of a very short time. 
 Nay, in many cases, one night’s debauchery will 
 uin a man’s health and fortune for life. 
 
 In numberless cases also, if you neglect to secure 
 
 Bi 
 
ie 
 
 24 On God’s Government 
 
 the advantages of the present moment, you never 
 can get them afterwards. ‘The husbandman has no 
 crop if he neglects to sow; and if young men will 
 not study, they must be ignorant, and in general 
 suffer carough life for their idleness. Men may in- 
 deed be guilty of folly to a certain degree, and yet 
 retrieve their affairs ; but there is a fmt, which 
 if they pass, they never can retrieve them; and sick~ 
 ness, poverty, and infamy are inevitable. Nay, neg- 
 ligence itself is often attended with consequences as. 
 fatal as any which arise from bad conduct; for many 
 suffer sickness, declines, and an untimely death, from 
 being negligent about damp cloaths or bedding. 
 Civil government, you well know, is a natural thing, 
 as are its punishments. Now some of these punish- 
 ments are capital, as the effects of a dissolute life 
 are often mortal; so that many natural punishments 
 are final to him who incurs them, if you consider 
 only his temporal capacity; as many civil punish- 
 ments are final to him who suffers them. And 
 these natural punishments seem inflicted by natural 
 appointment, either to take the offender out of the 
 way of doing further mischief, or as a warning to 
 others ; just as civil punishment is inflicted upon , 
 civil offenders. 
 
 Now these things are not accidental; they are 
 
 according to general laws, by which the world is 
 
governed. You must. see, that they are so analo- 
 gous to what religion teaches respecting future pun. 
 ishment, as to afford great ground to believe, that 
 what religion teaches on the subject is true.” _ And 
 since a future state is probable, even upon the most 
 sceptical principles, even a future state of rewards 
 and punishments, nothing can “justify a disregard of 
 the subject. It is plain, a man may so act in this 
 life, as to be of no use; excepting to be made an 
 example to others, by being punished for his crimes. 
 And if so in this life, then there is no reason for 
 people to think, that licentious conduct will not be 
 punished in the next. 
 
 ‘es | ; 
 Yours, very affectionately, 
 
 ; yy ' 
 by Rewards and Punishments. O5 
 
 J. W, 
 At 
 om 
 : bl. ie 
 ey ie “ 4h i 
 es , si 
 ' ge “ag 
 ‘a ; i 
 Daa vets i 
 i 
 ee Rs bi 
 ey. { mth, oe “aS ci. ‘ ss auble C2 ye We: tee 
 
é . cee 
 ate ee 
 
 ee ACNE eee 
 
 LETTER IV. 
 
 On God’s Moral Government. 
 
 Cheam, January, 1869. 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 IT THINK I may say with certainty, that you scarcely 
 ever saw a watch or a clock without thinking some 
 person had made it: so also in the world, the con- 
 tinual proofs which appear of final causes, lead you 
 to believe that it was made by an intelligent maker. 
 But you also feel pleasure and pain as the fiyal 
 causes of your actions: this then proves that you 
 are under God’s government: the very same kind of 
 government which a master exercises over his ser- 
 vants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. 
 
 But still this alone does not determine at first 
 sight, that God’s government is moral :—for moral. , 
 government consists in rewarding the good, and g 
 punishing the bad as such; and in an exact propor- | 
 tion to their personal merits or demerits. It is not — 
 at all my intention to enter into any discussion upon | 
 the moral character of the Deity. Men are too — 
 
 apt to indulge in speculations of this kind; nor do 
 
 they always speak with that cautious reverence which — 
 ¢hey ought upon such a subject. But let’us see 
 
Ou God's Moral Government. (ar 
 
 whether there is not something in the course of na- 
 fure which makes it probable, that God’s govern- 
 ment is moral. He has proved to us, by the course 
 of nature, since we are here in no small degree pu- 
 
 wished or rewarded for our actions » that we are un- 
 
 der his government ag servants ; and if we pursue 
 this subject still further, we shall find, not only 
 from the reason of the thing, and the presages of 
 conscience, but from distinct intimations in the con« 
 stitution of the world, that his government is rightc« 
 o&s and moral. Beg 
 ~ But let me admit, as indeed I must, that the di- 
 xine government under which we now are, is not 
 the perfection of moral government : yet still it does 
 not follow, that there is not something truly moral 
 init. Indeed there are some general outlines of 4 
 moral government to be seen in the world, which 
 make it probable, that though it is not now exercised 
 in perfection, yet it will be hereafter, when more of 
 the divine administration shall be known and seen ; 
 and that what religion teaches us, respecting every 
 man being either rewarded or punished according to 
 his works, will at last take place. The principles 
 aud beginnings of a moral government may be dis- 
 covered, notwithstanding. all the confusion and digs 
 erder of the world. ‘ 
 
 Now it is plain from experience and fact, that, is 
 general, less uneasiness. and more satisfaction result 
 ae | 
 
 fix 
 | 
 
oo » On God’s Moral Government. 
 
 ' from a virtuous than from a vicious life ; though it 
 
 * certainly is difficult so to weigh pleasure and pain, as 
 © to determine the exact overplus of happiness on the 
 - side of virtue. There may certainly also be indi- 
 
 vidual instances of virtuous men, from various causes, 
 
 - suffering more pain than pleasure; yet still it is 
 plain, that, on the whole, eirtue is happier than 
 
 - ticular. 
 
 vice in this world. The general effect of dissipation 
 and profligacy, both to nations and individuals, is 
 certainly bad; while that of virtue is good. So that 
 
 “the beginnings of a righteous administration, are un- 
 
 questionably to be found in nature,- if we will atten- 
 tively enquire after them. But let me be more par- 
 
 Ki, 
 
 '. Now, first, you know itis a plain matter of fact, 
 
 that you are under God’s government, as a servant 
 
 ie 
 
 under his master, or a subject under the magistrate ; 
 for he now punishes, in the natural course of things, 
 bad actions, and rewards good ones. ‘This then 
 gives ground to suppose, that he is also a moral go- 
 vernor. And as it is a fact, that God governs men 
 according to a seétled rule, or method of rewards 
 
 ‘and punishments; what reason have you to suppose 
 
 he will not finally reward or punish you by a parti- 
 cular rule, namely, as you have been virtuous or vici- 
 ous? We seem naturally to think, that men in this life 
 should be rewarded or punished according to ‘their ¥ 
 conduct ; this then may be fairly considered as an in- 
 
On God’s Moral Government. 29 
 
 | ee 
 
 timation to us by the Deity, that. it will be perfectly 
 so hereafter, since our minds are so formed that we 
 think this rule the only. proper one. ‘The rule of 
 distributive justice unavoidably appears to us more 
 natural than any other: whether then the evidence 
 
 for religion be more or less clear, still the expec- / 
 
 tation, which that evidence raises in us, that upon 
 Me : 
 
 the whole the righteous will be happy, and the 
 
 wicked miserable, ought not to be thought chime- 
 
 rical, since this appears to us most natural. Indeed . 
 
 this is only expecting, that the same system of re- 
 warding and punishing, which we now see exists, 
 
 will be perfectly carried on hereafter by the parti- ; 
 
 cuiar rule of distributive justice, which ie oh to 
 us more proper than any other rule. 
 But, secondly, do not parents punish children, 
 when they act improperly, both for their own sake, 
 and for the sake of example? You know that this 
 must always form a part of right education. Now 
 
 look at the general course of things, and it is plain, 
 
 that tranquillity, satisfaction, and external advan- 
 tages, are the natural consequences of prudence, in, 
 our aifairs; and that many inconveniences and suf- 
 ferings, result naturally from rashness, profligate 
 negligence, and folly ; which evidently shews aright 
 
 constitution of nature. And since, then, God go-, , 
 
 -verns the world by general fixed laws, and has given 
 
 ce 
 
 Se 
 
 “- 
 
 = 
 
30 > On God’s Moral Government. 
 
 us capacities of reflecting upon them, and of fote- 
 seemg the good and bad consequences of our pru- 
 dence or imprudence, i. e. in a degree, of our 
 virtue and vice; this shews that we are under a mo- 
 ral government, and that our virtue and vice are re- 
 warded and punished as such. 
 
 But, thirdly, you know that, in a great degree, 
 vicious conduct is punished as being mischievous to 
 society; and that bad men, whose crimes deserve 
 
 _ civil punishment, are much afraid of a discovery ; 
 and that this fear is no small punishment to them. 
 
 Now the fear which such men feel, is a natural pro- 
 test against their crimes; it shews, that society can- 
 not suffer their conduct, because of its necessary 
 evil tendency. The crimes of falschood, injustice, 
 
 _and cruelty, must be punished by society, as being 
 
 destructive of itself; to punish these things is na- 
 tural to society, and is therefore an istance of a 
 kind of moral government naturally established, and 
 actually taking place in the world, You see, then, 
 that you are unavoidably under a kind ef moral go- 
 vernment in society. But this kind of government 
 is natural, and therefore was appointed by God, 
 though carried on by the instrumentality of men, 
 And since you are, then, unavoidably made ac- 
 countable, by God, for your actions here as they 
 
 are in themselves; this makes it probable, that you! 
 
On God’s Moral acne on 
 
 must be accountable for vote actions hereafter as 
 they are in themselves. 
 
 Nor is it any objection to this, that sometimes 
 _ good actions are punished, and bad ones rewarded ; 
 for this is not necessarily the case, and consequently 
 is unnatural. Good actions are never punished, nor 
 
 bad ones rewarded, as such. Any punishing of good, 
 
 or rewarding of bad actions is accidental; it is not 
 the natural order of things, for society is under as 
 great a necessity of punishing bad actions as such ; 
 as being mischievous,—as we are necessitated to eat 
 that we may live. 
 
 But further, put civil society out of the question, 
 and examine the “natural course of things ; and you 
 will find that virtue, as such, is actually rewarded ; 
 and vice, as such, punished. And as this is the 
 
 case, it shews us that there is a moral government, 
 
 in the stristest sense, begun and established upon 
 earth ; though not in that degree of perfection which 
 revelation teaches us to expect hereafter. But to 
 see this clearly, you must distinguish between an 
 action and its quality of virtue or yice. Many 
 
 actions simply of themselves, such as the gratifying 
 
 a natural passion, naturally produce pleasure, inde - 
 
 pendent of their moral character: while on the 
 
 other hand, an action, as it is virtuous or vicious, 
 
 produces pleasure or uneasiness. Now examine 
 
 your own feelings and experience, and you will find 
 Cc 4 
 
 fot 
 
7 
 
 y 
 
 62. On God's Moral Government. 
 me 
 
 that virtue, as such, produces great advantages ; and 
 vice, as such, disadvantages. When you do a thing 
 which you know is wrong, it produces uneasiness ; 
 and, on the other hand, the practice of virtue, gives 
 you complacency of mind. And let me ask you, 
 whether any disadvantage is so great, as internal dis- 
 Penapsbst > Or any advantage so great, as peace of 
 mind? Now, it is plain, this happiness or unhap- 
 
 _ piness of the mind, arises from the consideration of ~ 
 
 gi virtue or vice of your conduct; and is, there- 
 fore, a proof, that you are under a moral govern- 
 
 ment. ik 
 
 . taba ° 
 Why are good menin general confided and trusted in, 
 
 but for the sake of their virtue; and bad men distrusted 
 and suspected, but because of their vice? Why do you 
 resent injuries, but on account of the wrong that is 
 m them? Why do you reward and punish children: 
 but on account of the propriety or impropriety of 
 their behaviour? And in civil punishments, in ge- 
 neral, the morality of the action is considered for 
 
 which punishment is inflicted; for even in killing a 
 
 man, which is the same, considering simply the fact, 
 whether it be done by accident or from malice, the 
 perpetrator is not put to death unless design be 
 proved, It is plain then that God has given usa 
 moral nature, and therefore that we are under a 
 
 moral government ;—it is plain that vice, as such, is 
 
 punished, and virtue, as such, rewarded in this 
 
 ~~» 
 
i 
 
 ® | z at 
 
 ” 
 ~p- ® On. God's Moral ( Government, gia, 
 
 world ;—and hence it is probable, that after death 
 
 there will be a continuance of the same system, and 
 
 that it will be carried to perfection, 
 But whence is it, say you, that virtue, as such, is 
 
 often rewarded; and vice, as such, is punished, and 
 this rule never inverted? Why, but because God. 
 
 has given man a moral nature; and, in addition to 
 this, has given us great power over each other's hap- 
 
 tuted, that well doing, as such, at least in some in- 
 stances, gives us satisfaction ; ill doimg, as such, im 
 none. And secondly, since God has given us. a 
 moral nature, and has put our happiness and misery 
 much in each other’s power, it must follow, that in 
 most instances vice, as such, will be infamous, and 
 men will be disposed to punish it, as in itself detes- 
 table. You must regard veracity, justice, charity, 
 or ina word virtue, as being right or reasonable in 
 themselves. But there is no such thing as a like 
 natural regard for falsehood, injustice, or cruelty ; 
 for though an instance could be found of a regard 
 for vice, as such, a thing, I believe, impossible, 
 yet it would plainly be “monstrous and unnatural ; 
 and would not therefore invalidate,the general obser- 
 vation. It is evident then from the frame of our 
 
 nature, which God has given us, and from our hap- 
 piness being so much in each other's power, that 
 
 virtue, as such, must be favoured by us, and mus¢ 
 
 es 
 
 = 
 
 Pe 
 piness and misery. For, first, we are so consti- ae 
 
 & 
 
eK 
 
 Ae i” 
 “ 
 
 sh On Gods Moral Government. ~~ 
 
 tend to make us happy; while vice, as such, must 
 be discouraged, and must tend to make us miserable. 
 And since, then, we have an evident declaration in 
 our constitution, that God is on the side of virtue, 
 he who practises it must have a sense of security, 
 and an implicit hope of somewhat after death. 
 
 Now consider, my young friend, what is the ne- 
 
 essary tendency of virtue, and you will see that it 
 confirms this hope. In virtue there is a necessary 
 
 tendency to produce good, and in vice bad effects, 
 to a much higher degree than takes place in fact. 
 There is not adoubt but good men would be much 
 more rewarded, and bad men much more punished, 
 
 than they are, if it were not for accidental causes ; there 
 is no doubt, but men guilty of crimes would be much 
 
 more punished than they are, if justice was not artifi- 
 
 cially eluded. Extend this observation from individuals. 
 
 to society, and you will see, that virtue has a necessary 
 tendency when directing the power of society, 
 to overcome power not under the direction of vir- 
 tue; m like manner'as power directed by reason, 
 has a tendency to prevail over brute force. Is it not 
 reason that gives man the superiority over brutes ? 
 for it seems more than probable , that the sum of 
 all the brute force in the world is greater than the 
 sum of human force. But the superiority of reason 
 is necessary; of itself it tends to give pre-eminence 
 over irrational animals. So also is the tendency 
 
* ya “i 
 
 - On God’s Moral Government.. = 
 on Bh 4 
 
 of power directed by virtue, over power directed by 
 
 | 
 
 vice. 
 
 But let us pursue this tendency of reason a little 
 more particularly, that we may see more clearly 
 how the case stands with virtue. Now im the case 
 of reason, length of time, proper scope, and op- 
 portunity, and other circumstances may be neces 
 sary for it, before it can prevail over brute forces 
 There must be some proportion of power united. 
 with reason to the opposing power of brutes. For 
 if you suppose ten rational and ten irrational crea. 
 tures of like shape, and manner, and strength, it 
 is evident, that at first the rational might have no 
 superiority over the irrational ; and. that it would re- 
 quire time and union to give them any very decided 
 advantage. Suppose also, that a number of men 
 were landed on an island very full of wild beasts; a 
 number sufficient to overcome the beasts and esta- 
 blish themselves ; yet it is very plain that sickness, 
 want of union, and many other things, might pre- 
 yent them from overcoming the beasts, and that they 
 themselves might be extirpated. 
 
 Suppose further, that ten unarmed men, in an 
 open plain, were attacked by a hundred lions, would 
 their reason give them the superiority? It certainlys 
 in such acase, could not. Rational animals then 
 have ‘not a necessary superiority over irrational with=. 
 out due concurrent circumstances; for though reae. 
 
 c 6 . 
 
= 
 
 86 ud eee $ Moral piostllged, ,. ¢. 
 
 = 
 
 Ne ae # 
 
 son in itself ian tends to ei over brute 
 force, yet there must be concurring circumstances 
 _to enable it to prevail. | So also in society, virtue has 
 a like tendency to procure superiority and additional 
 power; but it must possess a due concurrence of 
 circumstances, i i r 
 
 Now suppose that things beyond death are ana-. 
 Jogous to things in this life, and that our state in the 
 next world will be a continuance of the moral system 
 we experience here; then the natural tendency of 
 that power which is directed by virtue will be, ulti- 
 mately to prevail over that power which is not di- 
 rected by it; as is the natural tendency of reason to 
 prevail over brute force. But then, in order to 
 
 ‘prevail, virtue must have some due proportion of 
 
 power, of time, and of a fair trial to produce its 
 effect. Virtue has not its full scope in this world; 
 Dut there may be scenes in eternity, in which it may 
 operate to its entire extent; in which its tendency 
 may receive due concurring circumstances, and its 
 power and energy be complete over all opposition. 
 Indeed you may easily conceive in your own mind, 
 how amazing would be the power and happiness of 
 a large kingdom, in which absolute virtue directed 
 every thing. I will not attempt to describe the ef- 
 fects of such a state of things; but only picture to 
 yourself a monarch perfectly virtuous, all his officers 
 
 eel. 
 
 ! me 
 
 Va 
 
 jie 
 
 pain 
 ERS 
 er f 
 
 i¢e 
 
* 4 On Gets Me V ral Government, ae ay 
 nak 
 
 the same, ay his nou ats same, and that this held 
 good for ages; and you mutt, feel assured, that such 
 a nation would not only be happy in itself, but would 
 
 communicate happiness to others in a way which 
 
 :" 
 
 > world has never yet seen. Such then being the 
 
 Pndaaey of virtue, and such its results, if it had 
 
 due scope, it is plain the present constitution of 
 things is of a moral nature. 
 
 But you may say, may not things go on hereafter 
 as they do now! May not virtue be sometimes de- 
 pressed, and vice be sometimes prosperous ? Now to 
 this [ answer, that I am not properly proving God's 
 
 perfect moral government, nor the truth of religion; 
 
 but shewing what there is in the course of nature to 
 confirm the proper proof of religion, which I sup- 
 pose to be known. But let it be granted, that plea- 
 sure and pain are to a high degree distributed among 
 men without any regard to their character; then the 
 course of nature would not afford ground of hope 
 or fear, that men wouid be rewarded: or punished 
 hereafter. Yet, granting this, you would have no 
 ground to think that vice would have the advantage ; 
 and then the doctrine of a future state of retribu- 
 tion would rest upon the usual known arguments, 
 which after all are unanswerable. But still these 
 me ts receive force from the observations I ha 
 
 made; for. these observations shew, first, that God 
 
 is not indifferent to virtue and vice, as st 
 
 * Ryu ar 
 ov 
 
 ee , 
 AT ALPS Oe 
 
 nee“ 
 > ov ie ie 
 
T 
 
 38 
 he has given a decided preference to the former over 
 the latter ;—and that from the course of nature it is 
 
 probable, the righteous will ultimately have the ad- 
 vantage over the wicked. ; 
 
 They shew, secondly, that when ae God * 
 shall reward virtue and punish vice, as such; or, ac-— 
 
 cording to religion, shall reward every man accord~- 
 ing to his works ; this will be the same thing in kind, 
 though different in degree, as that which takes place 
 tn this world. That it will be the completion of that 
 moral government, of which the principles and be- 
 
 sinnings are now clear in the course of this world. 
 
 They shew, thirdly, that as we have reason, from 
 the natural government of the world, to expect fu- 
 
 ture rewards and punishments; so also that God, 
 
 as a moral governor, will reward virtue and punish 
 
 - vice hereafter, to a much higher degree than we now 
 
 experience. And, lastly, they shew, that since the 
 necessary tendency of virtue is to good, and of vice 
 
 to evil; and since the hindrances to the effects of 
 
 virtue are but acezdental,it is very probable that the 
 necessary tendencies will remain : and hence, that vir- 
 tue will be rewarded, and vice punished, according to 
 
 ‘the perfection of moral government. But when, 
 or where, or im what particular manner, can be 7 
 _known only by revelation. Fh ae 
 _ Upon the whole, God’s moral government is - 
 “Implied j in his natural government. Virtue and vice 
 
 Ph 
 
4. ‘ « ‘ 
 e i 
 & On God's Mora 
 
 # 
 4 t ue % 
 oe overnment. 39 " is 
 
 are rewarded and punished as such in society. A : ; 
 moral scheme is natural; it isea matter of fact ¥, 
 actually begun upon earth. God has hereby given ae 
 _ adeclaration for virtue, and against vice; and hence ; ie 
 F. - there is just ground for supposing, that he will ’ i 
 hereafter perfect the scheme he has begun. The ee 
 
 tendency of virtue to good, and of vice to evil, isin 
 fact the voice of God, informing you what will be ae 
 hereafter ; and which voice I hope you \ will regard as 
 
 af you heard it by your ears. 
 
 es. 
 
 Tam yours, 
 ny W, 
 4 
 a 
 Ole ale 
 “ay — oe ; } 
 ‘a ee “al 
 
, mh 
 
 LETTER v. 
 
 F 
 
 On our present Lift Bene a State of Trial and 
 Probation. a aie 
 
 j Cheam, January, 1809. 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 You well know that religion teaches 1 us, that we 
 are here in a state of trial or probation for a future 
 life. Now this general doctrine contains many par- 
 ticulars ; such as, that our future interest depends 
 on ourselves ;—that in this life we have scope and 
 opportunity for that good and bad behaviour, which 
 God will reward or punish hereafter; and that we 
 have temptations to vice, and the inducements of 
 reason to virtue ;—in fact, that we are under God's 
 moral government, and must be accountable to him 
 for our actions. But in particular, probation means 
 allurements to vice, or to what is wrong; it implies 
 difficulty in adhering to what is right; that we may 
 
 miscarry through the force of temptation ; and that. 
 we are exposed to trial and danger. Let us then 
 
 see, whether we are not m a state of probation with 
 
 respect to temporal matters, similar to se religion — 
 
 teaches us in spiritual. And if the two cases can be 
 
 ‘shewn to be analogous, which they certainly may, 
 
: ie 
 
 then all objection to a state of trial in a religious — 
 
 sense must vanish; for you must not forget, that 1 
 
 suppose the course of nature is the appoimtment of | 
 
 God. ) 
 
 - Now, as you are under God’s natural government 
 of rewards and punishments in this life, this as much 
 implies natural trial and probation for this world, as 
 his moral government implies moral trial for a fu- 
 
 ture life. I need not tell you, that your future ad- . 
 
 vantages im life depend much upon your present ap- 
 plication tu study; or in other words, that much of 
 your happiness: or misery depends upon yourself. 
 And this you know also is the case with all men, ac- 
 cording to their condition in life. But are you not 
 often allured from your studies by company, by plea- 
 sure, and many other things? Things which you 
 may and can overcome if you will; but whiclyevi- 
 dently are a trial to you. And if you Wwyll/look 
 
 around you, all men will appear more or less subject 
 
 to trial in their temporal affairs. Setting religion. 
 
 then out of the question, you know that many suf- 
 fer great misery m their worldly capacity through 
 
 - their own fault. . But, say you, they were allured 
 
 into their conduct,—they were drawn by company, 
 by pleasure; they were imprudent, and were ex- 
 posed to danger. ‘True: this is the state of man in 
 his worldly affairs ; and to possess any tolerable ease 
 
 On our present Life, &c. 41> 
 
 : ; et 
 and happiness he must be prudent. This then 
 
 = 
 
ee ee 
 
 42 On our present Life 
 
 plainly shews, that in temporals, we are ina state 
 
 analogous to our moral and religious trial; for to 
 
 possess future happiness we must be religious. We 
 are exposed to difficulty and danger as well in the 
 
 One as the other. | alt mes 
 
 But lef me call your attention to this point a 
 little more particularly. Now I may lay it down 
 as a certainty, that your temporal happiness, gene- 
 rally speaking, depends much upon your prudence 
 or due management of yourself; and that your trial, 
 either in a religious or temporal sense, must be 
 somewhat in your external circumstances, or in your 
 nature. Now, if a man of general prudence and 
 good conduct do an imprudent thing, through the 
 force of a strong particular temptation, you attri- 
 bute his fault te that temptation or external circum- 
 stance: but if a man act improperly by habit, or 
 the indu’gence of any passion ; as in habits of drun- 
 ken»ess and debauchery, you attribute his conduct 
 to his habits or passions. But those habits or pas~ 
 sions, that are improper, are as much a temptation 
 to act. inconsistently with our temporal interest as to 
 act viciously. They serve to injure us in our pre- 
 sent good, as religion teaches us they do with re- 
 spect to our future. It is, indeed, certain, that 
 there must be something, even in prudent men, 
 which coincides with external temptation when they 
 yield to it. And when men are misled by their ha- 
 
 alll 4 poet lene of, en ae ee 
 
heing a State of Trial and Probation. 48 
 
 bits and passions, there must be objects to excite 
 and gratify those habits and. passions; and hence 
 temptations from within, and from without, coin- 
 cide and mutually imply each other. Since, then, 
 this is the case, anda man hurts his temporal hap- 
 piness, by the improper indulgeuce of his passions, 
 it is plain, that self-denial is as necessary for your 
 worldly advantage as for your future, and that you 
 are ina hke state of trial in both respects. It 1s 
 plain, that excess endangers your present prospe- 
 rity as well as everlasting peace. We have passions 
 which we may gratify innocently, and also impro- 
 perly: but if we gratify them improperly we hurt 
 our worldly interest. And hence it follows that our 
 passions are temptations, are trials to us ina tem- 
 poral point of view; and often make us lose a 
 ereater worldly good, for a very short indulgence. 
 And is not all this like what religion teaches? Is 
 it not analogous to that which she imforms us re- 
 specting men, who forego future glory for present 
 vicious practices and enjoyments. 
 
 Look also at the behaviour of men, both in a re- 
 ligious and temporal view, and you will find it very 
 analogous. Some care nothing about consequences 3 
 give them the pleasures of to-day, and they seem to 
 eare nothing for their peace in the latter part of 
 life, Others see their temporal ruin; but their bad 
 
44 On our present Life 
 
 habits have such an ascendency over them, that 
 they still proceed in their course till poverty and ab- 
 solute want come upon them; and some glory in 
 their extravagance, dissipation, and debaucher Ye 
 And do not men do the same in religious as in tem- 
 
 poral matters? Their conduct is often similar in 
 
 both respects. Indeed the man, whose conduct 
 naturally ruins his temporal good, is always wrong 
 in religion. 
 
 I may add also, that as our religious interest, so 
 
 also our temporal is often endangered by others. . 
 
 Bad education, bad company, false maxims, and 
 
 fashions, which are all extraneous, injure our pre- | 
 
 sent happiness, and also most seriously affect our 
 future. In fine, your difficulties and dangers, i. e. 
 your trials, in your temporal and religious capacity, 
 since they proceed from the same causes, and have 
 the same effect upon your ‘behaviour, are evidently 
 analogous, and of the same kind. 
 
 In concluding this letter, [ may add, that there is 
 no doubt, but we are an inferior part of creation; 
 for we bear evident marks of degradation. Nor are 
 
 we in the best condition that might be imagined for - 
 
 securing our present or future interest. But yet we 
 have no right to complam ; for with moderate care 
 
 we may pass our days on earth im tolerable quiet. . 
 
 And im religion we need not miscarry, unless we. 
 
 wa 
 
being a State of Trial and Probation. 45 
 
 will; there is nothing put upon us but what we may 
 bear and do, which is evidently equitable: so that 
 we have no more reason to complain of the want of 
 higher advantages, than the dog would have to com- 
 plain of the want of the eagle’s wings. Whatever 
 
 difficulties, then, may be stated about our being” 
 
 placed in a state of danger or hazard, the fact is, 
 that we are so placed. And as much of our happi- 
 ness or misery here depends on ourselves, and since 
 the various ills which result from neglect and folly, 
 might in general be avoided by care and prudence, 
 +t follows that the state of moral trial, which reli- 
 gion teaches, is rendered credible by the natural 
 state of trial in which we are placed in our tem- 
 poral affairs. 
 
 Had your worldly happiness been altogether inde~ 
 pendent of your own conduct, you might have had 
 an objection against the doctrme of your future wel- 
 fare depending upon it. But you see, that your tem- 
 poral advantage -does depend upon your conduct ; 
 why then may not your future advantage? You can- 
 not pass through life, with any tolerable comfort to 
 yourself, nor can you be endured by others, without 
 considerable self-denial on your part. What right, 
 then, have you to expect everlasting happiness 
 without self-denial? No fair objection, therefore, 
 can lie against the doctrine of probation, as imply- 
 ing danger or hazard. 9 
 
46 On our present Life, &e. 
 
 HTopmg your conduct will be such as to lead te 
 your present and future welfare, 
 
 "i Xam, yours, very sincerely, 
 Jc W. 
 
ory 
 
 On our present Life being a State of Moral 
 a Discipline. | 
 
 Cheam, February, 1809. 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 Ir must, Indeed, be acknowledged, that we are 
 not able fully to explain, nor perhaps to compre- 
 hend, Aow we came to be placed in a state of pro- 
 bation of so much difficulty and hazard: but still, 
 our present condition cannot be shewn to be incon- 
 sistent with the perfect mcral government of God ; 
 and religion teaches us, as you know, that we are 
 placed in this state of probation, that by virtue and_ 
 piety we may be qualified for a future state. Now 
 though this, which religion teaches us, be but a 
 partial answer to the enquiry, how we came to be 
 placed in a state of such hazard; yet it is a very sa- 
 lisfactory answer to another enquiry, of much greater 
 moment to us, viz» whatis our business here? The 
 known end, then, of our being placed in our pre- 
 sent condition, is our improvement in virtue and 
 piety; as a requisite qualification for a future state 
 of security and happiness. And we shall find our 
 temporal state to be very similar. 
 i) 4 
 
 & 
 
48 On our present Life 
 
 Now, first, what is the beginning of life, but as 
 education for mature age? Why do you learn so 
 u y things in youth, but for the use and business 
 se of after life? And in the same manner, this life 
 
 may be a state of moral discipline or preparation for 
 another. It is evident, that every species of crea- 
 
 tures is designed for a particular way of life; and 
 
 om 
 - 
 
 that its nature and external circumstances are adapted 
 to that way of life. The dog, the cow, and the 
 dromedary, are fitted each to a particular way of ~ 
 life, and their manner of living is adapted to it. So 
 is it with all other species of creatures ; and parti- 
 cularly with man. But you may easily conceive of 
 a man’s powers both of body and mimd being so 
 - changed, as to render him altogether incapable of 
 ’ - human life. Our nature and external condition 
 must correspond; and without this correspondence 
 - there can be no such thing as human life and human 
 happiness. Your life and happiness then are a re- 
 sult from your nature and condition jointly. Since, 
 then, you must here have a particular nature, so as 
 to enjoy human life, so also you must have some 
 particular, some necessary character and qualifica- 
 tions to enjoy the life;—the employment and hap- 
 piness of good men hereafter. You do not think a 
 man fit for keeping accounts who cannot write, nor 
 aman fit for an/ orator who cannot speak ; for in 
 ‘both cases there must be previous necessary quali- 
 
 whee NS Nets 6 avs. en iaeaaneanll a eed Aen 
 
being a State of Moral Discipline. 49 
 
 fications. Why, then, may it not be necessary, that 
 
 a character should be formed in this world; without 
 ° . ey one 
 
 which men could not enjoy, nor be fit for the em- 
 
 ployment and happiness of the just and good ina — 
 
 future state? 
 
 But, secondly, if you examine the constitution of 
 
 human, nay of all creatures, you will find them cas 
 pable of naturally becoming qualified for states of 
 life, for which they were once wholly unqualified. The 
 faculties of every species of creatures Known to us are 
 made for enlargement ;.and for the acquirements of 
 experience and habits. -And man in particular has 
 not only the power of perception and of obtaining 
 knowledge, but also of retaining his perceptions and 
 knowledge by means of memory. You are capa- 
 ble not only of acting in a certain way, but of 
 getting a new facility of acting in that Way: and 
 you are capable not only of momentary impressions, 
 but also of settled alterations in your temper or cha- 
 racter; fora man may not only be intoxicated by 
 accident, but may become an_ habitual drunkard, 
 and hence introduce an entire change in his whole 
 mauners and behaviour ; and on the other hand, he 
 may acquire such a habit of sobriety, though once 
 dissipated, as to have a fixed dislike to every degree 
 of intemperance. Indeed, every faculty you possess, 
 ls capable of great improvement by exercise or ha- 
 bit. Your reason and memory ; 
 
 D 
 
 your eye sight, 
 
 ne BAB tis 
 
 Oe. 
 
 * 
 
50 On our present Life 
 
 hearing, and feeling; and all your powers, both of 
 body and mind, may be made much more vigorous 
 and acute, by use and employment; so that you 
 may get habits both of perception and of action. 
 But let me consider more particularly habits of 
 body and of mind, and you will see, that the former 
 will assist us much to explain the latter. Now how 
 sit, that men get habits of body, such as graceful 
 or ungyaceful motions, expertness in tumbling, ) 
 leaping, or horsemanship, &c. but by repeated ex- 
 ternal acts or trials? And in like manner, by car- 
 rying. inward practical principles into action, men 
 get habits of life and conduct; such as obedience 
 to authority, justice, truth, and charity; and too 
 often get bad habits of malice, envy, and revenge. 
 By exercise, men get habits of attention, industry, 
 and self-government; and by indulgence m outward 
 act, or in thought and intention, which is mward 
 act, men get habits of doing wrong, and of be- 
 coming a prey to their passions. Resolving to do 
 well, and endeavowmg to enforce upon ourselves 
 and upon others a practical sense of virtue, are 
 evidently virtuous acts, and tend to produce good 
 habits. But I must here particularly remind you, 
 that it is not merely going over the theory of virtue 
 in your thoughts that will form a habit of it: nay, 
 it may have quite the contrary effect; for passive 
 
being a State of Moral Discipline. me 
 
 impressions, or thoughts which pass often through 
 the mind, are less sensibly felt. es 
 
 For what makes people less sensible to their own 
 mortality, than often seeing people die? The SOX« 
 ton of achurch, and a hangman, in general, feel 
 their own mortality less than other men; though 
 they have more to do with death. A person also, 
 who has from infancy been on board of a man of 
 war, has much less sense of danger both on the 
 _ ocean and in battle, than one who has made but 
 one voyage. The thing might also be illustrated by 
 a surgeon and many other professions. Since, then i 
 practical habits are formed and strengthened by re- 
 peated acts, and passive impressions grow weaker 
 by being often repeated ; it follows, that active ha- 
 bits may be increasing by acting upon certain mo- 
 tives, whilst these very motives are less sensibly felt. 
 Indeed experience confirms this; for those, who are 
 often exposed to danger, in general, get habits of 
 caution, though they feel less of fear. Good men 
 also, who very frequently see cases of distress, have 
 by degrees less of the feeling of pity ; though their 
 exertions to relieve distress actually increase. And 
 though their often seeing others die, makes them 
 more active in preparing for death, yet it certainly 
 makes them feel their own mortality less. 
 
 Thus, then, it is plain, that by accustoming your- 
 self to any course of action, you may get an apt- 
 
 D 2 
 
‘5a On our present Life: 
 
 ness, a readiness, and often pleasure in it. Your 
 
 disinclmation to it grows weaker; its difficulties 
 
 in your estimation grow less, and the reasons for it 
 
 offer themselves more readily, and operate more 
 
 constantly. Practical principles also, absolutely in 
 
 themselves, grow str onger by exercise, and also ob- 
 
 tain an ascendancy over opposite principles: and 
 
 thus a new character may, in several respects, be 
 
 formed ; and many habitudes of life may be made, 
 
 vi which were not given by nature, but which nature 
 directs us to acquire. | 
 
 But, thirdly, according to the present course of 
 
 nature, your power of improvement is absolutely | 
 
 necessary im your temporal capacity. You are not 
 
 : qualified wholly. by nature, much less all at once 
 
 fora mature state of life. Strength of understand- 
 
 ing as well as of body must be acquired by exercise. 
 
 ' Nor would a person, if left to himself, be at first 
 
 ie auch better than an ideot, if he were brought into 
 
 io the world with all his powers of body and mind in 
 
 maturity. He would not know how to use his 
 
 senses, but by experience or habit; and he would 
 
 have to learn how to see, and hear, and feel; and 
 
 would need discipline and tuition to render him ca- 
 
 pable of self-government and moderation, or even 
 
 of being sufferable to others. We are evidently, then, 
 
 left by nature in what may be called an unfinished 
 
 state; and must have the acquirements of know- 
 
being a State of Moral Discipline. 5% 
 
 ledge, experience, and of habits, to be fit for mas 
 ture life in this world. And as we need these things, 
 so we have, in the course of nature, to go through 
 the different stages of infancy, childhood, and youth, 
 to acquire them. What was the business of infancy 
 but learning the use of your senses, and of the va- 
 rious thines with which you were to be connected in 
 future life? The subordimation of childhood and 
 youth, prepared you for submission to civil autho- 
 rity; and you learnt by experience to avoid the dan- 
 gers of fire and water, &c. If people be intended 
 for bard and dangerous situations in the world, we 
 naturally suppose they should be educated accord. 
 ingly; and you know, from the experience you have 
 had in life, that if the former part of life be ill- 
 managed, ‘the latter generally turns cut ill. ‘It 4s 
 indeed amatier of fact, that the early part of life is 
 an important opportunity for preparing for the latter; 
 and if this opportunity be lost it canact be re- 
 covered. 
 
 Why, then, may not this life, be a state of edu- 
 cation fora future one? What we must go through 
 in our temporal capacity, is evidently analogous to. 
 what religion teaches respecting our spiritual: and 
 though we could ‘not ‘tell how this world is a- pre- 
 paration for another, yet this would be no fair objec-: 
 tion agamst its bemg so; for it isonly by experience 
 you know that your food and sleep invigorate the 
 
 D 3 
 
54 On our present Life 
 
 body, and since you could not know this excepting by 
 experience, you haye no ground for supposing this 
 world is not a state of moral discipline for another. 
 Children, also, little think how necessary their 
 sports and discipline are to them, and yet both are 
 necessary; for without them they would be un- 
 healthy, and unfit for future business. Supposing, 
 then, a future state, we ourselves are but children ; 
 and though we could not tell how the present life 
 could be a preparation for another, yet still the ge- 
 neral analogy of the course of nature would make 
 it probable that it is. 
 
 In my fourth letter I shewed you that God’s go- 
 vernment of the world is moral; and hence that 
 virtue and piety are a necessary qualification for a 
 future state: and if so, then the present life may be 
 a preparation for it. or since we want and are 
 capable of improvement in virtue and piety, by 
 moral and religious habits; then the present life is 
 jit to be a state of discipline for such improvement ; 
 in like manner, as I have already observed, that 
 infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary pre_ 
 paration, and a natural state of discipline for ma- 
 ture age. 
 
 Now it is evident from our natural capacity of 
 habits, that we are capable of moral improvement; 
 and that we want it, is plam from the wickedness 
 of mankind. Nordo we need moral improvement 
 
being a State of Moral Diseipline. 55 
 
 merely because of excess in the gratification of our 
 propensities, but because of those very propensities 
 themselves. For those propensities give us the ca- 
 pacity of excess, and therefore imply danger of de- 
 viating from what is right; and hence we stand m 
 need of virtuous habits for a security against this 
 
 danger. The objects which are naturally suited to 
 our desires naturally excite those desires, whether we 
 can gratify them lawfully or not ; and hence we need — 
 
 the security of virtuous habits in addition to a moral 
 principle within, that what we cannot lawfully enjoy 
 may make a less impression upon us.. 
 
 Habits of vice, as every one knows, render men 
 an easier prey to their passions; and on the con- 
 trary, habits of virtue give greater security to virtue. 
 But time and opportunity are necessary for the for- 
 mation of habits; and therefore this world may be a 
 state of preparation for a future life ; since it affords 
 
 time and opportunity for the formation of those ha- > 
 
 bits of piety and virtue, which are necessary for 
 forming the character of a good man. If you ex- 
 amine the state of the present world, you will find, 
 that it is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, to 
 
 those who. will set themselves to mend and improve. - 
 If we duly reflect upon the temptations of life, the » 
 
 wickedness of mankind, and the pains and sorrows 
 
 to which we are liable, they have all a direct ten- 
 
 dency to bring us toa settled moderation and reason- 
 D4 
 
i 
 56 On our present Life 
 
 ableness of temper. The very circumstance of our 
 being in a state of danger tends to produce, when 
 properly considered, a higher degree of practical 
 piety in some things, than if we felt no danger. It 
 tends to make us very watchful, and self denying. 
 Indeed this life affords great scope for the exercise 
 of patience, resignation, charity, truth, and justice ; 
 and hence for the formation of habits of the highest 
 virtue. It gives full room not only for what may 
 be called the active, but also for the passive vir- 
 tues ; and hence for the formation of a character of 
 universal benevolence, and of entire submission ta 
 the divine sovereignty. | . 
 Tn concluding this letter, I may say it is plain, 
 that though in our temporal capacity we have the 
 power of being fitted for mature age, yet we are 
 not fitted so immediately by nature ; nor can we be sa 
 fitted, unless we pass through various stages of dis- 
 cipline and improvement, and exert ourselves to ob- 
 tain the necessary acquirements. And is not all this 
 analogous to that which religion teaches us, respect- 
 ing this world being a state of discipline for an- 
 other? The general course of nature is, not to 
 gave us trouble or danger, but to make us capable 
 of going through them; and we experience as a 
 matter of fact, that what we were to be, was to be 
 the effect of what we would do. You do not ex- 
 
 pect a@ man fo be a musician, who never practised 
 
wi 
 being a State of Moral Discipline. 57 
 
 musi€ ; nor to obtain any acquirement in temporals 
 without exertion and application. So also, in piety 
 and virtue, experience and habits are the natural 
 supply to our deficiencies, and security against our 
 dangers. ‘The general law of our nature is, that if 
 we will not improve ourselves, and take the pains 
 to acquire those things which fit us for mature ages 
 and keep them when they are acquired, we must 
 remain deficient and wretched. It is, therefore, 
 perfectly credible, from the-analogy of nature, that 
 the same may be our case with respect to the hap- 
 piness of a future state, and the qualifications ne- 
 cessary for it. 
 Yours very sincerely, 
 
 REN o 
 
 < 
 = 
 
 Sy Re 
 
 = 
 
%, 
 
 LETTER VIL. 
 On the Doctrine of Necessity as influencing 
 : Practice. 
 
 Cheam, February, 1809. 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 In my former letters I have shewn you, that our 
 present temporal condition is very similar to what 
 religion teaches us, respecting our being designed 
 for another world. But says a Fatalist, the doctrine 
 of universal necessity is reconcileable with the course 
 of the world; and therefore man is not responsible 
 for his conduct: well, let him say so; and let us for 
 the sake of argument admit, that the doctrine of 
 pecessity is reconcileable with the course of the 
 world; yet it will appear that the doctrine of neces- 
 sity, if reconcileable with the course of the world, 
 1s also reconcileable with religion; and the proofs 
 upon which religion rests; and that man is respon- 
 sible for his conduct. It will appear that even a 
 Fatalist has no ground, to conclude, that there is no 
 such thmg as religion. 
 
 You, no doubt, remember, that T have all along 
 
 supposed, that there is an intelligent author of na- 
 
rae 
 On the Doctrine of Necessity, 5c. 50. 
 
 ture, or natural governor of the world. But, 
 
 perhaps, it may be imagined that the doctrine of 
 necessity is‘an objection to this :—let us, first, then, 
 consider this objection, and we shall find that it 
 amounts to nothing; and then, secondly, consider, 
 whether it destroys the proof of their being a moral 
 governor of the workd, or of our being ima state of 
 religion. / 
 
 Now,. when a Fatalist asserts, that all things hap- 
 pen by necessity, and could not be otherwise, yet 
 this necessity does not exclude our deliberation,. 
 choice, and preference; for we are as conscious 
 
 that we exercise deliberation, choice, and_prefe- 
 
 rence, as we are that we exist. Hence, then, you 
 must perceive, that necessity will not alone and of 
 itself explain how things came to be and to continue 
 as they are; but merely accounts for this cercum- 
 stance, that things could not have been otherwise 
 - than they are and have been. When, therefore, a 
 Fatalist says, that every thing is by necessity, this 
 is not an answer to the question, whether the world 
 came into being as it is, by means of an intelligent 
 agent; but is an answer to quite another question, 
 viz. whether it came into being necessarily or 
 freely. ‘aug : 
 
 For suppose a Vatalist, and one who thought 
 himself a free agent, were disputing about their re~ 
 spective opinions, and that they instanced a house 
 
 » 6 
 
 1 Borg 
 
at % 
 
 60° On the Doctrine of Necessity 
 
 in the progress of their argument: they would both 
 agree it was built by an architect; their only dif- 
 ference would be, that the Fatalist would say, the 
 architect built it necessarily ; the other, that he bust 
 it freely. Suppose, then, that from the instance 
 of a house, they proceeded to the imstance of the 
 world; the Fatalist would be obliged to acknow- 
 ledge an agent in its formation, though he might 
 hold that this agent acted by necessity. An agents 
 I say, a Fatalist must acknowledge ; for we can no 
 more divest ourselves of the idea of something bemg 
 infinite and eternal, than we can suppose two and 
 two make five: and hence, from the scantiness of 
 language, we say that God exists necessari/y. But 
 it cannot be intended by the Fatallist, that every 
 thing exists, as itis, by that kind of necessity, which 
 is antecedent in nature to design; for we see it as a 
 daily matter of fact, that design in the actions of 
 men, makes many alterations im nature. And 
 should any person deny this, I certainly shall not 
 argue with him; for if all things exist, as they are, by 
 the same kind of necessity, by which we say the 
 Deity exists, then design in men’s actions cannot 
 produce any alteration i nature: but design in 
 men’s actions does produce alterations in nature, 
 and therefore 1 would never pretend to argue with 
 ene who denied it. | 
 ‘Hence, then, it follows, first, that when a Fa- 
 
as influencing Practice. 61 
 
 talist asserts that every thing is by necessity, he must 
 mean, though I know he would not chuse to mean 
 it, that every thing i is by an agent acting necessarily: 
 and, secondly, that necessity does not exclude intel. 
 ligence and design in the agent. Suppose, then, the 
 doctrine of necessity true, and it accounts for the 
 formation of the world just as much as it accounts 
 for the formation of a house, and no more. Ne- 
 cessity as much requires a necessary agent, as free- 
 dom requires a free agent in the formation’ of the 
 world; and the destgn and final causes that we see 
 in the world, as clearly prove choice aud intelli- 
 gence, in the designer, upon the scheme of nec ena , 
 as upon the scheme of freedom. 
 
 Since, then, the doctrine of necessity does not 
 destroy the proof of there. bemg a God,—the go. 
 vernor of the world; let us see, supposing such a 
 doctrine possible, whether it be not also reconcileable 
 with religion. Now I will put a particular case, 
 which may easily be made general. Suppose, then, 
 that you had been educated by a Fatalist ; and that 
 you had been made to believe, when a child, that 
 you were. not in any respect a subject of blame or 
 commendation; nor for any thing deserved, reward - 
 or punishment. Now, suppose further, that you 
 had acted upon this primciple; the consequence 
 must have been, that you would have been the 
 
62 On the Doctrine of Necessity 
 
 pldstie of all around you, sai your own tormentor, if 
 not destroyer. You must have been continually 
 corrected, that you might have a practical impres- 
 sion of your accountableness, though you did not 
 believe you were accountable. Your school-master 
 would not have taken your doctrine of necessity as a 
 plea for idleness, mischief, and stubbornness; nor 
 the farmers as a plea for robbing orchards, and 
 treading down the corn. Your college tutor would 
 ‘not admit it as a defence for bad conduct ; nor — 
 would any one you might injure ever listen to it. 
 Let it, then, be admitted, that the doctrine of ne- 
 cessity is true; yet in practical and common life it 
 does not destroy man’s responsibility: for men are 
 and must be punished for improper conduct. It 
 cannot be applied so as to destroy man’s accounta- 
 bleness in the affairs of this world. And. if, then, 
 it cannct be applied, so as to destroy your ac~ 
 countableness in the affairs of common life, you 
 have no right to suppose it can be applied, so as to 
 destroy your accountableness im religion. | You are 
 evidently treated, in the present general government 
 of the world, as if you were free, whether you are 
 so or not: the constitution of the world is such, that 
 men ust be accountable to one another for their 
 actions; so that the doctrine of necessity will not 
 
 apply, so as to destroy our responsibility in this life. 
 
as influencing Practice. - 63 
 
 But if ever a man does attempt to apply it in his 
 temporal capacity, it always musleads him in the 
 most dreadful manner. And since this is the case 
 with your present temporal concerns, you have, 
 therefore, no ground to conclude that the doctrine 
 of necessity, admitting it to be true, frees you 
 from accountableness in matters of religion. You 
 cannot apply the doctrine to the practical affairs of - 
 hfe; you have then no ground to apply it to reli- 
 
 ‘gion, which is in all respects a practical thing. In- 
 g10n, g 
 
 deed the doctrine of necessity is not applicable to 
 practical subjects ;—it is with respect to them as if 
 it were not true; and hence the doctrine of ne- 
 cesity does not at all destroy the system of reli- 
 gion. 
 
 But, further, you know and are conscious that 
 you have a will and a disposition, which determine ° 
 you to act in a certain manner. If then the doc- 
 trime of necessity be true, this is reconcileabie with 
 it; because it is a mere matter of fact, that you 
 you have this will and disposition. Ant if it be 
 reconcileable with fate im you, it is also recon~ 
 cileable with fate im the. author of nature. And 
 since necessity no more prevents men from being 
 benevolent than cruel, true than faithless, just than 
 unjust, or if the Fatalist pleases, what we call un- 
 just; you have, therefore, no reason to suppose, 
 that it prevents the Deity from possessing the cha- 
 
64 On the Doctrine of Necessity 
 
 racter of truth, justice, and benevolence ; which 
 character is the foundation of religion. But you 
 may, perhaps, say, that though the doctrine of ne- 
 cessity, if it be reconcileable with any thing, is re- 
 concileable with that character m the Deity, of 
 truth, justice, and benevolence, which is the foun- 
 dation of religion; yet does it not destroy the proof 
 that he is of that churacter? and consequently the 
 proof of religion? No. For cur happmess and 
 misery are not our fate in any manner, so as 
 not to be the consequences of cur behaviour; for 
 they are the Consequences of our behaviour. God 
 does govern us asa father his children; and as a 
 magistrate his subjects, i. e. with truth and justice 5 
 and, therefore, truth and justice are the natural 
 rule, by which he exercises his government; and, 
 therefore, he is of that character, which 1s the foun- 
 dation of religion. 
 
 Bui- let me prosecute this subject a little more. 
 Now it is a maiter of fact that we have a moral fa- 
 culty, by which we approve some actions, and dis- 
 approve others, as they are in themselves; it is 
 also.a -aatter of fact, that God, supposing there is 
 an intelligent author and governor of the world, 
 does govern the world by rewards and punishments, 
 according to our conduct; it is alsoa matter of fact, 
 that he has so constituted our nature and the course 
 of things, as to tell us Ae will reward or punish 
 
a3 influencing Practice. 65 
 
 us-in this manner in our temporal capacity; and 
 hence we have ground to suppose he will finally re- 
 ward or punish men after death by the same rule, 
 and according to thei deserts. It is also evident 
 that the tendency of vice is bad, and of virtue 
 good; and hence, that God, in the natural course 
 of Providence, punishes vicious actions as such, 
 and as mischievous to society. So that admitting 
 the doctrine of necessity to be true, yet if we argue 
 from what we sce in the world, it is no objection to 
 the general proof of religion.. 
 
 In addition to all this, consider the history of what 
 may be called natural religion, and you will find, 
 that something of it -has been\/ known in,all ages ;— 
 that the belief of one: God, the creatorand moral go- 
 vernor of the world, and of mankind being in a 
 state of religion, was received in the first ages ;— 
 and that there is express evidence of -history, as far 
 as history goes, that this was taught first by reve- 
 lation. ‘This history then of religion, whether the 
 doctrine of necessity be true or false, is a real.con- 
 fwmation of the truth of religion; and the external 
 evidence, even of natural religion, is very consi- 
 derable. , 
 
 But says a Fatalist, though I cannot answer your 
 particular argument drawn from probability, yet af 
 I can prove your system wrong, for which you em- 
 ploy that reasoning, I need not be anxious about 
 
66. On the Doctrine of Necessity 
 
 your particular argument. ‘The method, says he, 
 of rewarding good, and punishmg bad actions, as 
 such, must go upon the supposition that we are 
 free and not necessary agents: and it is incredible 
 to suppose that the author of nature would govern 
 uS UPON a supposition as true, which he knows to 
 be false; and therefore absurd to think he will re- 
 ward or punish us hereafter for our actions, espe- 
 cially as being of good or ill desert. 
 
 Here then I come to a point with the Fatalist ; 
 and the answer to him is full, and not to. be evaded. 
 Now the whole course of nature, the whole ana- 
 logy of providence, shews that this conclusion, viz. 
 that we are not accountable for our actions, 1s false ; 
 wherever the fallacy lies. ‘The doctrine ef freedom 
 shews where the fallacy lies, viz. im supposing our- 
 selves necessary when we are free agents: and sup- 
 posing the doetrine of necessity true; the fallacy 
 lies in supposing it incredible, that necessary agents 
 
 should be rewarded or punished. Tor daily facts 
 
 assure us, even upon the supposition of necessity 
 not beimg incredible, that necessary, agents should 
 be punished. For, im the natural course of things, 
 God governs even the brutes by the method of re- 
 wards and punishments: and as for men, it is mat- 
 ter of constant experience, that by the instru- 
 mentality of each other they are rewarded or pu~ 
 nished according to the nature of their actions ; that. 
 
as influencing Practice. 67 
 
 they are punished for vicious actions, as such, and 
 as being hurtful to society, whether they are free or 
 necessary agents. If then we admit that men are 
 necessary agents, yet since it is a matter of fact 
 that they are in this life punished for vicious actions 
 as such, it is not incredible that they may be ac- 
 countable for their conduct hereafter. 
 
 ‘Upon the whole, then, I think it must be clear 
 to you, that supposing the doctrine of necessity pos- 
 sible, aad reconcileable-with the course of nature ; 
 yet it by no means proves that God will not finally 
 make men happy or miserable aceording as in this 
 world they have behaved well or ill. The whole 
 analogy of nature shews, that the doctrine of necessity - 
 considered practically is false; and that if necessity 
 be reconcileable with the course of nature, yet it 
 does not destroy the proof of natural religion, nor 
 make any alteration in the proof of revealed. 
 
 Hoping, therefore, you will never forget your 
 accountableness to your Creator, for every part of 
 your conduct. 
 
 I am yours very affectionately, 
 
 Sus 
 
[68] 
 
 LETTER VHI. 
 
 On the Government of God being an incomprer 
 henstble Scheme. 
 
 Cheam, March, 1809.. 
 DEAR’SIR, | 
 
 TuHouc Hit be plam that the analogy of nature 
 gives great credibility to religion in general, and also 
 to all its parts as matters of fact; aud also shews, 
 that if we even admit the doctrine of necessity to 
 be true, stdl we are accountable for our actions: 
 yet objections may be made against the wisdom and 
 equity, the goodness and method of the divine go- 
 vernment, asimplied in.the notion of religion. Nor 
 will analogy give a direct answer to such objections ; 
 for the credibility of a fact proved by analogy does 
 not directly prove any thing concerning its wisdom 
 and goodness ;—and therefore analogy will only di- 
 rectly shew a thing credible as a matter of fact. 
 But.do you admit that there is a moral government 
 over the world; and then analogy will shew, that 
 this moral government must be a system, not only dis- 
 tinguished from, but comprehending many parti- 
 culars: and also, that it isa system, of which we 
 
| 
 
 On the Government of God, &e. 69 
 
 are so ignorant, as to make it very unreasonable for 
 us to object against its justice and goodness, either 
 in whole or in part. In this point of view, then, 
 analogy will be remotely of great use im answering 
 objections. . 
 
 Now I have already shewn you in a former letter, 
 that Ged’s govenrnment over the world is moral ; 
 let us then now take this for granted, and the ana- 
 logy of nature will make it plain, that this moral 
 government must be a system quite beyond our 
 comprehension ; and hence, that objections against 
 its wisdom, justice, and goodness, are unreasons 
 able. 
 
 Now the course of nature, or the natural go- 
 
 ‘vernment of the world, is evidently a system ; whose 
 
 parts fit, and are adapted to each other, just as the 
 parts of a watch, or a civil government. In this 
 great system, individuals have peculiar and various 
 relations to others of the same species; a3 man to 
 man, husband to wife, parents to children,’ masters 
 to servants, magistrates to subjects, &c. Whole 
 species are also variously related to other species 
 
 upon earth ; as horses and cattle for the use of man, 
 sheep dogs to sheep, and hounds to the fox or the 
 hare, &c. Nordo we know how far these relations 
 may extend. Nor is there any one action or event, 
 which we know, that is so single aud unconnected, 
 as not to have a relation to some other actions and 
 
70 On the Government of God 
 
 events. So that it is possible each action or everst 
 may have a natural and remote relation, though not 
 an immediate one, to other events and actions be- 
 yond the compass of this world. All events have 
 future wnknown consequences; and, as far as we 
 can trace any event, it is plam, that if it were not 
 connected with other things in nature, both past 
 and to come, it could not possibly have happened 
 atall. Nor is there any one thing whose circum- 
 stances we can fully explain: ‘those circum- 
 stances, I mean, which are so connected with it, 
 that without them it could not have been. So igno- 
 rant are we, with all our improvements in science, 
 that no man can answer all the questions that might 
 be proposed about the growth of a blade of grass, 
 or the motion of a finger. Every event, which we 
 know, is accomplished by a connection of causes 
 and relations, which are beyond the reach of our 
 faculties; and things, which seem the most insig- 
 nificant, are perpetually observed to be necessary 
 conditions to other things of the greatest import- 
 ance: so that, for aught we know, any one thing 
 whatever may be a necesary condition to any other. 
 
 It is a matter of fact, then, that the natural go- 
 vernment of the world, is a scheme far beyond our 
 comprchension. Suppose, then, that there is a 
 moral government of the world, is it not probable, - 
 that it also is a scheme beyond our comprehension ? 
 It is probable, that, asin nature events hang toge- 
 
being ant ncomprehensible Scheme. ria 
 
 i 
 ther, and are connected in a most wonderful man- 
 ner, so as to form one great plan, it is so also m 
 the moral world, and that every part bas a relation 
 to the whole. For example, the length of time, 
 and the degrees and ways in which virtue 1s under 
 discipline, and wickedness is permitted; also the 
 times and the instraments for the execution of jus- 
 tice; and the rewards of virtue and punishments of 
 vice, may all be parts adapted to each other of one 
 great moral system. And if so, then we are not 
 competent to judge of the whole scheme; and since 
 we can see and know but a very little of it, we can- 
 not reasonably object to parts of it. 
 
 Now though we acknowledge our ignorance in 
 common life, yet numbers forget it when they talk 
 about religion, or at least do not make due allow- 
 ance for it: let us then pursue this subject a little 
 farther, and you will see, how justly our ignorance 
 is an answer to objections against the scheme of 
 Providence. 
 
 Suppose, then, a person should boldly assert, 
 that the origin and continuance of evil might have 
 been prevented by repeated interpositions so con- 
 trived, as to prevent mischief from them: or if this 
 were impracticable ; suppose he should assert, that 
 a scheme of moral government was in itself an im- 
 perfection, and that things would have been better 
 administered by single acts of distributive justice, 
 
 4 
 
7% On the Government of God 
 
 and goodness. Well, admit all this, for argument's 
 sake, to be true, and what does it amount to? Why 
 just to this, and no more ;—that the government of 
 the world might have been better;—but it does 
 not shew that it is not good. But such assertions 
 are entirely arbitrary; for no man can give a proof 
 of them even to the dowest degree of probability. 
 Our ignorance, then, is. still a sufficient answer, to 
 all such objections against the divine government. | 
 We know but very little. of any part of it; and 
 therefore are incompetent to judge of the whole. 
 The very things objected to, may from some re- 
 lation to others, which relation we cannot see; may, 
 Lsay, be perfectly just and good. They may be 
 like the scaffolding of a building, which, though at 
 times unsightly, is absolutely necessary to the raising 
 of the building itself. , 
 But let me present you a few more observations 
 upon some particular things in the natural govern- 
 ment of the world by God, which may be supposed 
 to be analogous to what is in his moral government. 
 First, then, you know that, in the natural world, 
 nothing is accomplished without means; and not 
 only so, but those means are often very disagreeable, 
 though they produce a much greater good, than 
 their disagreeableness is an evil. In many cases, it 
 is only experience which teaches us the ends which 
 8 
 
being an incomprehensible Scheme. sc 
 
 certain means produce: nay, some means ‘seemy 
 quite contrary to what they effect; for -instance, 
 frost. and snow in a certain quantity, in this coun- 
 try, are favourable to agriculture, though . nothing 
 but experience could teach us it. Storms and hurri- 
 canes also in some countries, though destructive in 
 
 their immediate effects,:produce.a general good re- 
 
 sult. Since, then, this is the case in the .natural 
 
 world » it may beso in the moral; and our: hability - 
 
 to vice, ‘and to misery feom each other’s means, may. 
 upon the whole be friendly to virtue, and ultimately 
 produce an overbalance of happiness... Nor does it 
 amount. to any objection against the divine govern= 
 ment, that we do not see the direet tendency of all: 
 means, or that sometimes they seem to have a con+ 
 trary tendency; for sickness sometimes, as a fit: of 
 the gout or a fever, produces greater health, and: 
 
 _ may be, and often is, the means of saving’ a man’s 
 
 life. | : 
 But do not suppose I mean, that vice in désclf ig 
 better than virtue, or misery than happiness ; for 
 such an opinion would be both absurd and wicked, 
 Our capacity of vice and misery may, and does con- 
 tribute to the perfection and happiness of the world; 
 and the permission of evil may be beneficial to it: 
 yet it might have been much better for the world, 
 
 ‘if this very evil had never existed. It certainly 
 
 & 
 
74 On the Government of Ged 
 
 would be better for a man to abstain from, than te 
 commit wickedness; but it would be more mis- 
 chievous forcibly to restrain than to permit it. A 
 _ man may, and often does receive benefit from a fault, 
 when it would be infinitely better if he had never 
 committed ity as a fever sometimes saves a man’s 
 life -—though no sober man would say sickness was 
 better than health. : 
 
 But further, it is a fact, that the natural world 1s 
 governed by general laws 5 and that, no doubt, for 
 the best reasons: it is probable, then, that the 
 moral government of the world is by general laws. 
 Ln the natural world, all good ends are effected by 
 general laws; as health by foad and exercise ; crops 
 of corn, &c. by sun, rain, and labour ; nor can we 
 have any one enjoyment, but what we must get in 
 some degree or other for ourselves. And hence it 
 is, that we are under an absolute necessity of using 
 foresight, which otherwise we would not use: nay 
 st would mot exist, if the world was not governed 
 by general laws. You must see, then, that if every 
 particular irregularity was prevented by an imme- 
 diate interposition, the effects would necessarily be 
 bad. For mstance, if the effects of idleness, negli- 
 gence, and debauchery, were prevented by nnme- 
 diate interpositions, it would make ‘doubtful the 
 natural rule of life; which rule we ascertain by this 
 
being an incomprehensible Scheme.  % 
 
 very thing, that the world is governed by general 
 laws. Indeed, for any thing we know, it may be 
 impossible in the nature of things to prevent, by 
 general regulations, particular irregularities ; as we 
 find is the case in civil government. And still more, 
 perhaps those things which we call irregularities may 
 not be so at all; because they may be the means of 
 of accomplishing wise and good ends more con- 
 
 ‘siderable ; and, perhaps, interpositions to: prevent 
 
 particular irregularities, would produce greater evil 
 than they would prevent; and prevent greater good 
 than they would produce. And if so, then the not 
 interpesing 18 an instance of goodness; and not a 
 ground of complaint agamst the order and course of 
 
 nature, as established by the Deity. 
 
 But you may ay, since you lay so much stress 
 upon our ignorance, iu answering ebjections to re- 
 ligion; may not our ignorance be made use of as 
 an argument against the proof of religion? Now 
 
 to this I answer, first, that though feta! ignorance — 
 
 destroys all proof af a matter, yet partial igno 
 rance does not. For instance, we may be assured 
 that a person’s character is such, that he will pursue 
 certain ends in his mode of acting; but we may 
 not know the proper mode of acting to obtain those 
 ends. Our ignorance, then, ia such a case, is an 
 answer to objections against his mode of. acting; 
 Q 
 
 bea] 
 
d 
 7 
 
 70: On the Government of God 
 
 but does not by any means invalidate the proof that 
 such ends were pursued by him. Thus i in religion 5 
 its proof shews us, that the character and govern- 
 ment of God is moral; and that he will ultimately 
 ‘reward every one according to his works. But cetr- 
 tainly we are not able to judge of the proper me- 
 thod of accomplishing this purpose; for we are 
 finite, but he infinite in all respects. Our igno- 
 yance is, therefore, a full answer to. objections 
 ‘against his method of procedure. An ignorant 
 ploughman cannot conceive how all the parts of a 
 cotton-mill or a clock conspire to produce the effect 
 
 _ they do produce ; infinitely less, then, can we per- 
 
 ceive the propriety of all the parts and methods of 
 the divine government. | He rks 
 But,: secondly, suppose I admit, for the sake 
 of argument, that the proof of religion is doubtful, 
 in consequence of arguments’drawn from our ignor 
 yanee; yet this will not destroy moral obligations. 
 
 ¥or moral obligations would remain, though it were 
 
 not certain what would be the conséquences after 
 death of neglecting them; since the mind, unless 
 perverted, must feel those obligations; and  self- 
 jnterest, and the interest of society, makes them 
 necessary in the absolute sense of the word. And 
 though it were doubtful what-would be the future 
 consequences of virtue and vice, yet it is probable 
 
~ 
 
 being an incomprehensible. Scheme. vg 
 
 ‘that they may be what religion teaches us they will 
 be: and hence, we are under a certam obligation 
 to avoid vice and pursue virtue: for upon probali- 
 lity, in such a matter, we are bound to act as if 
 upon certainty. ; : 
 But, thirdly, you cannot apply arguments drawn 
 from our ignorance to. invalidate the proof of reli- 
 gion, as you can apply them to invalidate objections 
 against religion. For let it be granted, that God 
 exercises a moral government. over the world; thea 
 the analogy of nature will shew us, that it must be 
 a scheme beyond our comprehension. And if you 
 look at many particulars in nature, their analogy 
 will shew you, that many parts of the scheme of 
 moral government may tend to produce ends, which 
 at first sight they seem so far from accomplishing, 
 as even to.appear contradictory. Many things in 
 pature produce a good, of which nothing but ex- 
 perience could convince us, or shew to us. So,.in 
 the moral. goverument of the world, many things: 
 which appear entradictory, may ultimately produce 
 good. If, then, we understood, the whole scheme 
 of the divine government, it is more than probable, 
 we should find, that the disorders: which occur, and 
 _ which are objected against, are 1ot only consistent 
 with justice and goodness, but even instances of 
 them. But you cannot argue thus against the proot 
 : E3 
 
\ 
 
 78 On the Covernment of God 
 
 of religion; you cannot shew that if we knew the 
 whole of the case, it would then appear that reli- 
 gion is in itself unwise, bad, or unjust ; and, there- 
 fore, these observations, drawn from our ignorance, 
 serve in full force to answer objections against re- 
 gree but will not serve to invalidate its proof. 
 Lastly, Let me request yon to remember that, 
 
 ee the answers which have now been given to 
 the oBjections against religion, are drawn generally 
 speaking from our ignorance; yet not merely so,, 
 but from facts, which the analogy of nature shews 
 us tespecting our ignorance. For analogy shews us 
 positively, that we are incompetent judges in many 
 things m nature ; which are similar to the things in 
 religion, about which we pretend to judge and ob- 
 _ ject, as if we were competent judges. So that the 
 things here insisted upon are not mere sup positions 
 of unknown impossibilities and relations; but are 
 suggested to our thoughts, and rendered credible, by 
 the analogy of nature. And to argue thus, is to 
 argue from facts and from what we know; but to 
 @ argue contrary, 1s not judging by facts. 
 
 As, then, the scheme of the natural world, 18 to 
 us incomprehensible, so also must be the scheme of 
 the moral world; and, therefore, our ignorance, 1s 
 a sufficient answer to objections against it. In your 
 pursuit, then, after knowledge, remember there lea 
 
being an incomprehensible Scheme. 79. 
 
 limit to the human understanding, which it is us ful 
 to know; as this knowledge will prevent you from 
 mispending your time in useless exertions, and w+ 
 
 profitable attempts. 
 ~ Tam, yours, very sincerely, 
 
 J. W: 
 
 EB 4 
 
LETTER Ix 
 
 ~ 
 
 * Conclusion. 
 
 ‘ 5 Cheam, March, 1809, 
 DEAR SIR, : | 
 
 FROM the observations in my last letter to you, it 
 appears that our ignorance of the scheme of the divine 
 government, is a full answer to the objections, which 
 some would make against its equity and goodness. But - 
 it appears further, that our present little busy scene of 
 life, is connected with a much larger plan of things ; 
 for it is evident that we are placed in the middle of 
 a system even in temporals, for every thing we do is 
 connected with something present, past, and to 
 come: and if so, in temporals, then is it most. 
 likely that it is the same in religion. We find also; 
 as a matter of fact, that we cannot comprehend the 
 scheme of the natural world: surely, then, we can 
 less comprehend the scheme of the moral.. Permit 
 me, then, to offer you a brief recapitulation of 
 shat has been stated m these letters; by way of 
 
 * 
 Ll 
 
Conclusion. ere.) 
 
 concluding the subject of analogy between the con- 
 stitution and course of ‘nature and what is: called na- 
 ‘tural religion. | 
 First, then, it is seh peebanlé we shall hive after 
 _ death; for in this life we subsist im very different. 
 - shia ;—as in the womb before we were bora ;— a 
 as in infancy and manhood; and as having gone 
 through entire changes of body, and yet are still the 
 game persons. You are not certain that death will 
 destroy your powers of perception; and as you have 
 them now, the probability is that you will continue 
 to possess them; as you find you do in sleep, though 
 unconscious’ of their exercise... And as for your’ 
 powers of reflection, you know, that you often 
 _ exercise them, after you have gotten ideas, without 
 the help of the body at ail: it is probable, then, 
 that the destruction of the body, will not be the 
 destruction of your powers of pereeption or reflection. 
 But it is not only probable that we shall live after 
 death, but live in a state of rewards or punishments 
 according to our conduct in this life: for a man’s 
 happiness or misery in this life depends much, upon 
 himself; and, in a general way, is the result of his 
 own individual conduct. Vicious practices necessa- 
 rily produce misery here; and virtue good. Pru- 
 dence and good management in youth are for the 
 advantage of old age: im like manner virtue may be. 
 
 ia 
 
 E ov 
 
$2 Conclusion. 
 
 for our profit in another world. Vice and folly in 
 early life are followed by bad consequences here = 
 in like manner bad consequences may follow the 
 wicked beyond the grave. Unless the husbandman 
 sows, he cannot have a crop; so it 4s probable, 
 unless we pursue virtue, we cannot be happy after 
 death. In the natural eovernment of the world, it 
 is a matter of fact, that men are punished for bad 
 actions, and rewarded for good. And we are so con- 
 stituted, that we cannot think that any other rule 
 would be just: and though this present world does 
 not exlibit the perfection of moral government ; 
 yet we see such traces and beginnings of a. moral 
 government, as to make it credible, that it will be 
 carried forward to perfection in a future stage of our. 
 existence. 
 
 Our temporal interest is evidently put much in 
 our own power, and is exposed to danger, both on 
 account of our own mismanagement, and the influ- 
 ence of others upon us: it is probable, then, that 
 it may be the same in matters of religion. But as. 
 our dangers in temporals call for the continual exer- 
 cise of diligence and temperance: in other words,. 
 for a character, which may tend to ensure success * 
 so also this world may be a state of disciphne, in 
 which our business should be to acquire and exer- 
 eise a character or disposition, by which we may be 
 
 4 
 
Conclusion. 7 $3) 
 
 meet for the enjoyment of future happiness. In- 
 fancy is evidently a state of discipline for youth; and 
 youth for manhood and old age; this world, then, 
 may be a state of discipline for another. And what- 
 ever objections, drawn from the doctrines of neces- 
 sity, men may make against religion, yet it is plaim, 
 that if the present course of things. can be recon- 
 ciled with the doctrines of necessity, so also can re- 
 ligion : and hence it follows, that admitting the 
 doctrine of necessity, still, we are accountable for 
 our conduct and behaviour. And as we know so 
 very little of the natural scheme of the world, nor 
 can fully explain any one single event, we certainly 
 ought not to think ourselves competent to judge of 
 the whole plan of the moral government of the 
 world ; and therefore ought not to make objections 
 against it. - 
 
 Now the analogy here pursued is from matters of 
 fact. And surely after all this, it is a very possible 
 thing—it is very probable, that religion may be true. 
 But let it be admitted that religion is a thing not 
 true; yet a vicious man could gain but very little 
 by vice in this world, for society could not subsist 
 without restraining and punishing it. But if reh- 
 gion ‘may be true, as: it certainly “may, what 
 folly, what madness, can be so great, as to act con. 
 trary to its dictates? We account it folly ina man, 
 
 EO 
 
84, Conclusion. 
 
 to.risk his. whole temporal fortune upon a cast of 
 the. dice; but infinitely greater is his’ folly, who 
 risks his future happiness for the temporary pleasure 
 or gain of wickedness. The very probability, nay 
 the very possebzlity of religion being true, is fully a 
 
 sufficient reason for attending to its injunctions. 
 ‘Men. are obliged, independent of religious consi- 
 derations, to put-a restraint upon themselves in their 
 intercourse with each other, and in the prosecution 
 of their temporal affairs; why then should we not 
 practise self-denial, from religious motives, and for 
 religious purposes? God has evidently given us a 
 moral capacity; we feel the presages of conscience 
 from his appoimtment; we have a natural apprehen- 
 
 sion of him as a righteous governor and judge ;— 
 
 all of which things are proper proofs of religion. 
 Let it, then, be admitted, that there is a God, 
 
 the natural governor of the world, and analogy 
 
 shews that religion may be true; and if so, we are 
 
 under an absolute obligation upon every principle 
 from which we act in life, pare to hice and 
 practise it. 
 
 I have now finished my. letters to you upon 
 the subject of analogy, as applied to natural reli- 
 gion; and 1 hope soon to. send»you another series 
 upon revealed, according to the arrangement of the 
 very eminent author, whom I wish to render more 
 
 = aS ea aah a Te sa a a ae a a aaa 
 Sa ee as ae one aa Ce ae a Ee eR og 
 A BE et a es ome Seg Per” hee Eee ee me 
 
e 
 
 Conclusion. 85 
 
 easy to you. If I have facilitated your studies 
 upon this subject, I shall feel. much’ gratified, 
 And hoping that no application will be wanting on 
 your part, as Tam sure talents are not: 
 
 I am, yours, very sincerely, 
 
 J. W; 
 
far) 
 
 & 
 
 PART IH. 
 
 LETTER I. 
 
 On the Importance of Christianity. 
 
 Cheam, April, 1809- 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 In my last letter to you, I closed the subject of 
 analogy, as applied to what is called natural reli- 
 gion; let us now proceed to apply it to revealed ; 
 and as an introduction to the subject, point out the 
 unportanee of christianity. 
 
 Now, had the hght of reason been perfectly 
 sufficient in matters of religion, so as to render a 
 divine revelation useless, certainly no revelation 
 would ever have been given. But surely, you can- 
 not for a moment imagine, that a revelation «was 
 useless, when you reflect upon the religious state of 
 the heathen world before the times of christianity 5 
 
 } 
 
88 On the Importance of Christianity. 
 
 or turn your attention to those nations which? 
 have borrowed no light from it. You have no 
 sufficient: ground to suppose, | that any one person 
 could have reasoned out what is called ‘natural reli- 
 gion, in its genuine simplicity, and clear of super- 
 stition: and it-is almost: certain, that the bulk of 
 mankind could not -have done it. But sup- 
 posing some individuals could have reasoned out na- 
 tural religion; yet still they would have needed, im 
 a very high degree, some standing admonition to 
 inform them of it, and to inculcate it upon them. 
 And supposing their attachment to religion to be 
 very great; yet still there would be many occasions, 
 in which supernatural instruction and assistance 
 might be afforded to them, as being singularly use- 
 ful. To say, then, that revelation is useless, 1s not 
 less absurd, than to say, we are so well situated in 
 all respects in our present condition that we cannot 
 be better. 
 
 But there are some men, who, though they do - 
 not speak of revelation as being useless, yet over- 
 look it as a matter of small moment, provided that. 
 ‘natural religion be observed. “They admit, perhaps, 
 that the belief and practice of natural piety and vir- 
 tue were promoted by the first publication of chris- 
 tianity ; : but at the same time, think it a matter of 
 
 no moment, upon what motives this belief and 
 
 e 
 
On the Importance of Christianity. $9 
 
 @ractice are founded. Let us then, first, point out 
 the importance of christianity in answer'to such as 
 these; and this will lead us, secondly, to shew. the 
 extravagance of the opimion. that. revelation i is use- 
 less. Da . 3 
 
 Now, in genera], you must admit, that if God 
 has given a revelation, it certainly cannot: be an in- 
 different matter whether we obey or disobey its 
 
 commands. If a revelation. is hie there are no 
 
 doubt. sufficient reasons for it; though we cannot 
 see them: for the whole jai of nature shews, 
 that» there. may be infinite reasons for things, of 
 which reasons we are ignorant. But you’ must 
 consider christianity under a double aspect; first, as 
 a republication and external institution of natural or 
 essential religion adapted to the state of man, in 
 order to produce piety and virtue: and, secondly, as 
 a: dispensation not. discoverable by. reason, which 
 enjoins several distinct’ precepts peculiar to itself; 
 for natural religion is by no means the whole of 
 
 Christianity. | Considering it in’ this double point of 
 
 view, [ doubt, not, its importance will appear to 
 you obvicus. 
 
 Now, first, you know, ‘that site sblniday is a re- 
 publication of natural religion in its genuine simpli- \ 
 
 city, and free from all superstition.’ It instructs 
 
 mankind most clearly in the vreat doctrines of the. 
 
 moral system of the world ;—that the, world is the 
 
 | 
 
90 On the Importance of Christianily. 
 
 work of an infinitely perfect being, aud undew 
 his governmeut;—that virtue is his law -—and 
 that finally he will render to every man accord- 
 ing to his works. But christianity is not only a 
 yepublication of natural religion, but an authori- 
 tative republication of it; for the gospel not only 
 teaches the great truths of natural religion, but en- 
 jos them as from the Deity. Hence then, the 
 ‘miracles and prophecies recorded in the Scriptures, 
 not only prove a particular act of Providence in 
 the redemption of the world by the Messiah, but 
 also prove God's general providence over the world, 
 _as our moral governor and judge ; for these miracles 
 and prophecies, and, indeed, the who ole of christi- 
 ‘anity, necessarily imply, that God is a moral gover- 
 nor and judge. ‘Those also who wrought the miracles, 
 
 and delivered. the prophecies, always taught and 
 -4nsisted that this was the character of the Deity. 
 So that, in fact, natural religion, is as much proved 
 by revelation, as it would have been, if reve- 
 lation had been intended to prove nothing else. 
 
 But, perhaps, in speculation you may object to 
 miracles, as a proof of natural religion, But how- 
 ‘ever you may object in speculation, in practice no 
 such objections will hold good: for suppose a man 
 was to teach natural religion to a nation totally ig- 
 norant of it, and that he eould predict events with 
 certainty; could divide the sca with a word; could 
 
On the Importance of Christianity. 91 
 
 Yeed multitudes with bread from heaven ; could heal 
 all manner of diseases; and raise the dead, even 
 himself to life; would not all this give fresh weight 
 and additionat credibility ta what he taught ? There 
 can be no doubt, that it would sive increased 
 weight to his doctrines; that it would give the 
 greatest practical proof, which, perhaps, man can 
 receive, of their credibility and truth. ‘The law of 
 ‘Moses, then, and the gospel of Christ, are autho- 
 ritative publications of the law of nature + and they 
 are a proof of God’s general providence over the 
 world as a moral governor; as well as of a pare 
 ticular providence, in its redemption by the Mese — 
 siah. 
 
 But, further, suppose now a man of the greatest 
 and most improved mind, who had never heard of 
 revelation, convinced that the world, though im 
 great disorder, was under the moral government of 
 an infinitely perfect being; but yet suspicious, that 
 the subject was above is faculties ; and suppose, 
 further, that in consequence of this suspicion, of 
 the subject being above his faculties, that he was in 
 danger of being led away by the bad example of all 
 those around him, who had no practical sense of 
 religion. How would such a person be confirmed 
 in his good sentiments, when all at once he should 
 find this moral government, or system of the world, 
 actually revealed by that infinitely perfect being, in 
 
02 On the Importance of Christianity. 
 
 whom, from principles of reason, he had believed ; 
 and also should find, that those persons, whom God 
 employed to reveal it, were enabled to suspend and 
 
 change the laws of nature. So that however advan-. 
 
 tageously a man may be situated with regard to 
 natural religion, independent of revelation; yet 
 revelation will give weight and evidence to his good 
 sentiments. hey ¥ 
 
 But if you further consider christianity, you will 
 find, it not only enforcing natural religion at its first 
 publication, but continuing to do so, by a. visible 
 -society, pr-church ; which is distinguished from the 
 
 aest)\of the world by peculiar religious institutions, 
 
 and at appointed method of mstruction, and exter- 
 nal, religion’ and worship. By the institution of a 
 
 church, and its forms of service and worship, what 
 
 we.call natural religion is continued down to man- 
 kind, and -inculcated .vupou, them with additional 
 weight and. mfiuence.. ‘his church serves'as a me- 
 thod of education, by which men are constantly 
 taught the great truths of the being of a God, and 
 of a future State of rewards and punishments; and 
 
 by which they are trained to piety and virtue, so as. 
 
 to -be meet fora higher and better state. Now: all 
 these advantages arise from a visible church with po- 
 sitive institutions: and hence you must-see the good 
 of positive institutions ; since you. cannot have an 
 
 idea of a visible church without them. . Since, then, 
 
 ~ 
 
On the Importance of Christianity. 93 
 
 christianity affords such evident support to natural 
 religion, it is strange that some men should be so — 
 slow in perceiving this: for certainly no man will’ 
 pretend to say, that the state of the heathen world 
 was equally advantageous to natural religion, as is ~ 
 the state of the christian world. 
 
 Nor can you object against christianity, unless 
 
 . you will be a downright atheist, that it has been 
 
 perverted, or that its effects have been small; for 
 the same things will hold good, to a much greater 
 degree against reason, as supported by the princi- 
 ples of theism. Nor can it be said truly, that the 
 effects of christianity have been small; for it is” 
 a matter of fact, that mankind are much improved 
 by it. Nor can you argue against christianity from 
 its perversion: for you may as well argue against 
 food, because some men pervert it by gluttony; or 
 against reason, because.some abuse it. You must 
 argue respecting things from their genuine ten- 
 dency; and most certainly the gospel would pro- 
 duce the best and happiest effects, if men did their 
 part; that part which is left them to do, and which 
 _ they can do. 
 
 ~ Both revelation and reason teach men what to do, 
 and avoid; but do not force them to act accord- 
 ingly: both teach us how to act, but leave us at 
 liberty to act as we please, till the appointed time 
 
94 Onthe Importance of Christianrty: 
 
 of judgement; and every moment’s experience shews 
 us, that God has so constituted the state of man. 
 To object, then, against christianity, either on ac- 
 count of its perversion, or the smallness of its ef 
 fects, is in effect to object against theism itself, and 
 to go into downright atheism. ee 
 Christianity, then, 1s very, important; since it 1s 
 not only a promulgation of natural religion, but an 
 authoritative promulg@tion of it; since, also, it 
 contains new lights and circumstances adapted to 
 the wants and necessities of man. Its nature is 
 also such, that every individual member of the 
 church, is bound to promote its influence in some 
 way or another: some by teaching it professedly ; 
 and all by their lives and conduct. If, then, you 
 neglect the gospel, merely in this view of it, you 
 neglect to support even natural religien ; and you 
 expose men to entire scepticism and infidelity. 
 | But, secondly, christianity is a great deal more 
 than the promulgation of natural religion ;—for it 
 reveals a dispensation of providence to man as a 
 ruined creature ;—and hence, that he owes distinct 
 duties to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, on ac- 
 count: of their office, and work in his redemption. 
 Now, according to this revelation, we are com- 
 sanded to be baptized in the name of the Son, 
 and of the Holy Ghost, as well as of the Father; 
 
On the Importance of Christianity. 93 
 
 and other duties also towards the Son, and the Holy 
 Ghost are enjomed upon us. Now though reason 
 may inform us what are our relations to the father, 
 and hence our duty to him; yet it is scripture only 
 which reveals our relations to the Son and Spirit, 
 _and hence our duty to them. For if you admit, 
 from scripture, that the Son is your redeemer, and 
 the Spirit your sanctifier, as you admit, from rea- 
 son, that God is the moral governor of the world ; 
 then it is no more a question, why you should be 
 baptized im the name of the Son and of the Holy 
 Ghost, than m the name of the Father. Religion 
 is external and internal ; and the essence of internal 
 natural religion may be said to consist in religious 
 regards to God the Father Almighty; and the es- 
 sence of revealed, as distinguished from natural, in 
 ‘religious regards to the Son and Spirit. Now as 
 the Son and Spirit have each their proper office, 
 and are related to us in the werk of our redemp- 
 tion; are we not bound to pay them mternal reli- 
 gious regards, as we are bound to have good-will 
 to ourrelations and fellow men, in consequence of 
 their relations to us? But what are those religious 
 
 regards, say you, which we owe to the Son and. 
 
 Spirit? Why; honour, reverence, love, trust, gra- 
 titude, fear, and hope. As to the mamner in which 
 these divine persons should be eaternally wor- 
 
 I ne se Se 
 
96 On the Importance of Christianity. 
 
 shipped, it is a. matter of pure revelation : but. the. 
 tnternal regard or worship, which we owe te 
 them, is as much areal obligation of reason, i 
 consequence of their relations to us, if you. admit 
 those relations to, exist, as it is an oplentigns of 
 reason to fear and love the Father. 
 
 Our duties, then, towards the Son aaitl: ‘Lely 
 Ghost, are strictly moral duties ; since they arise 
 out of their relations to us, and are, therefore, an- 
 tecedent to external command. We are bound to 
 observe those duties to them, as much as to observe 
 charity to mankind, in consequence of our relation 
 to them: and to neglect those duties may, under 
 God’s government, be attended with the same kind. 
 of consequences, as to neglect or violate our du- 
 ties to him, or to one another: If Christ be our 
 mediator, who can tell. what may result, even na-) 
 rurally, from our neglect of him? For as misery 1s. 
 the natural consequence of vice, i.e. of violating 
 the relations in which we stand to God, our neigh- 
 bour, or ourselves; so. neglecting Christ, or vi0- 
 lating the relations in which we stand to him, may: 
 result in the most fatal consequences to us. And, 
 in like manner, to. neglect the Holy Ghost, may 
 be followed, even in.the natural course of things, 
 by unspeakable evils. If then, christianity be true, 
 or even credible ; to treat it with indifference can 
 
 q 
 
On the Importance of Christianity. Of 
 
 be no ‘light matter. Nor is there any obligation 
 more binding apon us, than that of examining its 
 evidence, supposing it credible; and of embracing 
 it, supposing it true. 
 
 Before I conclude this letter I would call your 
 attention.to the two following deductions, as illus- 
 trating what has been already observed. 
 
 And, first, you may deduce from what has been 
 said, the distinction between what is positive, and 
 what is moral in religion. Positive precepts: are 
 those, whose reasons we do uot see; moral pre- 
 cepts are those, whose reasons we do see. Posi- 
 tive duties depend on external command ; moral 
 duties arise out of the nature of the case, and are 
 antecedent to external command. But observe, 
 it is not the manner, in which any relation in which 
 we stand, is made known to us, that denominates 
 any duty either. positive or moral: for it is as much 
 a positive duty to be baptized in the name of the 
 Father as. of the Son, because both arise equally 
 from a revealed command ;—though our relation to 
 the Father is known by reason; to the Son it is 
 known by revelation only. And further, admit the 
 Gospel to be true,—and yeu are equally bound to 
 be grateful to the Son for his voluntary work in 
 your redemption, as to the Father for being the 
 fountain of all goodness ; though your gratitude 
 
 # 
 
188 On the Importance of Christianity. 
 
 to the Son is imposed by-revelation only, but your 
 gratitude to the Father by reason. 
 
 But, secondly, as there is a distinction between 
 what is positive and what is moral in religion; so 
 this appears the reason, why the scriptures teach us 
 to prefer what is moral to what is positive, when 
 both cannot be observed at the same time. But in 
 comparing positive iistitations with what is moral 
 in religion, you must reniember, that the former 
 have a moral nature ; since the reasons of them 
 _ appear in general, and they produce a moral effect. 
 In edmparing, theréfore, what is positive and what 
 is moral, you must take care to compare them no 
 - fartlier, than as théy are different. The external 
 worship of God, for instance, is a moral duty, 
 though no particular mode of that worship is; you 
 mitist be careful then ndt to ‘confound thmgs that are 
 difererit, nor to. sever those which are alike. 
 Keeping these distinctions thén in view, it Is evi- 
 dent that ‘both the reason of things, and the ‘scrip- 
 tures, teach us to prefer a moral duty to a positive 
 institution, when they so interfere as that both 
 gamiot be observed at the Same time. Men are 
 too apt to plaice religion in external forms, and to 
 neglect réal piety and virtue; and to counteract 
 this is one great design of revelation: hetice 
 Christ (Matt..ix. 13.) taught the Jews, that God 
 
 4 f 
 
On the Importance of Christianity. 99 
 
 would have mercy and not sacrifice; 1. e. preferred 
 moral duties to the observance of positive insti- 
 tutions. 
 
 But do not think, that any positive institution 
 appointed by God may be neglected; for any com- 
 mand from him lays us under a moral obligation 
 to observe it. When, therefore, it is said, that 
 moral duties are to be preferred to positive institu- 
 tions, you. must not suppose that positive institu- 
 tions may be neglected. - 
 
 From the whole, then, I think it must be plain 
 to you, that christianity is of great importance ; 
 whether we consider it merely as a publication of 
 natural religion delivered with authority; and as 
 containing new lights and circumstances adapted to 
 the state of man; and by a visible church, sup- 
 porting and extending the doctrine of one God, 
 and of a future state of rewards and punishments: 
 or whether we consider it as a system of Provi- 
 dence beyond the discovery of reason; by which 
 new obligations to moral duty, and also new moral 
 duties are imposed on us. : 
 
 I am, yours, very sincerely, 
 
 Jo Waa 
 
T° .100.:j 
 
 Lid Fe oe 
 
 On the supposed Presumption against.a Revelation 
 considered as Miraculous. “ 
 
 Cheam, May, 4909. 
 DEAR SIk, sin ib 
 
 Havine i im my last letter pointed out to you 
 the importance of Christianity, upon supposition of 
 its truth ; 1 shall in this shew you, that there is no 
 “presumption against a revelation in general ; and im 
 some following letters, 1 shall consider the objec- 
 tions against the christian revelation im particular, 
 and also the evidence in support of it, and the ob- 
 jections against that evidence. 
 
 It seems to be supposed by many, that there is. 
 a’peculiar presumption, arising from the analogy of 
 nature, against the scheme of christianity; or at 
 least against miracles. And hence they suppose, 
 that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the 
 truth of christianity, or at least of miracles, than 
 any other matter of fact. ‘Let us then consider , 
 
 this supposition 5 and though its consideration 
 
On the supposed Presumption, Se. 101 
 
 may be thonght of no great moment, yet it 
 may tend to open your mind, and remove some 
 prejudices. 
 
 Now the gencral scheme of cliristianify is, that 
 Cod created and invisibly governs the world by 
 Jesus Christ; that by hin he will hereafter judge 
 it in righteousness; and that good men are under 
 the secret influence of his spirit. Nor can f find 
 any presumption against this general scheme front 
 the analogy of nature ; for if there be any sucle 
 presumption, it must be either because this scheme 
 is not discoverable by reason or experience; or 
 else, because it is unlike that course of nature 
 which now is. But we shalk see that analogy 
 affords no presnmption against it upon either of 
 these accounts. 
 
 And, first, there is no presumption against the 
 scheme of christianity, because of its not being 
 discoverable: by reason or experience. Por Jet us 
 suppose a person, who knows nothing of revelation, 
 but yet is of a most improved mind, and acquainted 
 
 with our whole scheme of natural philosophy and 
 natural religion: such a person must be sensible, 
 that he knows very litle of the natural and moral 
 scheme of the whole universe. He must be sen- 
 sible, that there are innumerable things respecting 
 the past, the present, and the future dispensations. 
 of Providence, which he cannot knew, except by 
 wor Ss 
 
102 On the supposed Presumption against 
 
 revelation. ‘That part which we see of the whole 
 plan of Providence over the whole universe, is but 
 as a point; nay is but a point compared with the 
 whole plan of Providence over this world. Without 
 revelation it is a mere nothing that we.can discover of 
 the infinite plan of the divine government over the 
 unlyerse, or even over our own little world. Hence, 
 then, it is plain, that there is no presumption from 
 analogy against the truth of things, merely because 
 they y are beyond the reach of our natural faculties. 
 Nor, secondly, is there any presumption from ana- 
 logy against the gencral plan of christianity, because 
 of Ns being unlike the present known course of 
 mature: for certainly the analogy of this world can- 
 not afford a presumption against what may bea 
 part of the infinite plan of the divine government. 
 You. have no right to suppose, that the whole of 
 the scheme of Providence over the whole universe, 
 and every part of that scheme, is like to the very 
 little you can. see in this world. Even in the pre- 
 sent course of nature, you see many things that are 
 unlike, and for which you cannot account; you 
 ought not then to wonder at an unlikeness between 
 things visible and invisible. But however, that all 
 objection may be removed on this ground, we shall | 
 see, in some of the following letters, that there is 
 an actual likeness between the scheme of christi- 
 _-anity, and the scheme of nature. 
 
 But, further, there is no presumption from ana- 
 
a Revelation considered as miraculous, 103 
 
 logy against even miracles ; and particularly none 
 against a revelation bemg made at the beginning of | 
 the world. For you have no idea of a miracle, but 
 by referring it to a known course of nature : but at 
 the beginning of the world there was no course of 
 nature y Or at least you do not know what it was ;- 
 
 which on this question to you is the ene 
 
 therefore, you must consider the question of a re- 
 velation given at the beginning of the world, as a 
 common question of fact. You cannot consider 
 revelation, when referred to the beginning of the 
 world, as a. miracle, but as a common matter of 
 fact; and therefore that evidence of tradition or 
 history, which proves any common fact of equal 
 antiquity, for instance, W hat part of the world was 
 first inhabited, that evidence, I say, is equally 
 yalid to prove a revelation when referred to the be- 
 ginning of the Bond. The beginning of the w orld 
 affords you no, known course of nature to which 
 you can compare, as a miracle, a revelation made 
 at that time; you must then consider a revelation 
 made at that time, as a common question of fact. 
 
 _ The power, indeed, which placed man at first in 
 the world, cannot properly, be called meiracilos, 
 according to our notion ofa miracle ; but yet it 
 “must have been a power, at least’ in. its operations, 
 yery different from any w hich we see exerted in the - 
 present course of nature. Whether then this 
 
 F 4 
 
104 On the supposed Presumption against 
 
 power stopped immediately after man’s formation, 
 or proceeded to give bim a revelation ; is a ques- 
 tion of the same kind, as whether. any ordinary 
 power, after having produced one effect, pro- 
 ceeded to produce another effect. Or if you 
 choose to call that power miraculous, which was 
 exerted in the formation of the world, yet this will 
 not alter the case: for if you admit that a miracu- 
 lous power was exerted at the formation of the 
 world, there can be no presumption against that 
 miraculous power exerting itself Hither , in giving 
 a revelation to man. If you admit a satiaenines 
 power in one case, you certainly cannot say it is 
 impossible, nay nor improbable, in the other. 
 Froin all this, then, it is evident, that the analogy 
 of nature affords no presumption against a reve- 
 lation being given to man when he was first placed 
 upon the earth. 
 
 But in addition to these observations, you must 
 remember, that all history and tradition goes to 
 shew that religion first came by revelation. There 
 is.no historical evidence whatever to prove that re- 
 ligion was first discovered by reason; but there is 
 a great deal of historical evidence, setting the 
 scriptures out of the question, to prove that religion 
 first came by revelation. And if it was given by 
 revelation at the beginning of the world, then what 
 
a Revelation considered as miraculous. 15) 
 
 should prevent another revelation from: being given 
 afterwards? Lf the former revelation be true, the 
 latter certainly may be true. sil 
 
 “But, perhaps, you may still object and say, that 
 after the establishment and daring a regulated 
 course of nature, there is a presumption from 
 analogy against miracles, and particularly agaist a 
 revelation: , 
 
 Now before you have any right to make such att 
 
 objection, you ought to: be acquainted with a case 
 
 “parallel to that of this world; so as to be able to 
 compare the two, and’ reason from analogy: and: 
 therefore, till you. can produce such a case, you 
 cannot argue frony analogy against revelation it 
 general. But supposing you had such a case, yet 
 a presumptive proof drawn from ene instancc,. 
 either for or against revelation, would be: infinitely. 
 precarious. Granted that your instance liad or had 
 not a revelation; yet it would be very uncertain 
 from this oe case to infer, that our world’ must 
 either have or have not a'revelation. 
 
 But to be more: particular... Now, first, 1f you 
 ‘take any speculative opinion, or matter of fact 
 whatever, and lay aside every idea‘ of its proof, the 
 presumption is a million to: one ‘against’ its-truth 5. 
 and yet almost any proof will remove the presump- 
 tion against its truth. Independent of proof, the 
 
 RO 
 
106 On the supposed Presumption against 
 
 presumption is a million to one against the story of 
 Cesar, Pompey, or any other man. Nay let a 
 number of common facts come into your. mind, 
 and be. arranged by you as a history; yet, without 
 proof, no one would think them true: nor indeed 
 can any one. single common ‘fact be considered as 
 true, independent of proof. Supposing then that 
 there'is a presumption against miracles; yet it 1s 
 only what exists ia reality against the most common 
 facts: hence, then, the question is not so much, 
 whether there be any presumption against miracles, 
 but what degree of presumption there is against 
 them, and whether that degree of presumption 1s 
 so great as to render them incredible in general. 
 But, secondly, let religion be put out of consi- 
 deration; and yet, even then, on account of your 
 ignorance of the causes, and of all the circum=- 
 stances on which the present course of nature de- 
 pends, you have no right to suppose, that the space 
 of five or six thousand years may not have afforded 
 seasons for the miraculous interposition of the 
 Deity towards man. The presumption then for 
 miracles, in general, is beyond all comparison 
 greater than for any pardicular common fact, sup- 
 posmg neither iproved by any evidence.. But, 
 thirdly, if you take religion aad the moral state of 
 man into consideration, then you see positive rear 
 
a Revelation considered as miraculous. 107 
 
 sons for miracles; viz. that men might. receive in- 
 formation, which their own powers could not 
 reach, and might have that information confirmed 
 to them. -And as you see there are positive reasons 
 for miracles, by taking religion and the moral state 
 of man into consideration; this. gives a presump- 
 tion that it might be part of the infinite plan of 
 Providence that miracles shouid be-afforded to 
 man. But, lastly, miracles ought not to be com- 
 pared with common natural events, but with the 
 extraordinary appearances of nature; as for in- 
 stance, the appearances of comets, and of the 
 powers of magnetism, and electricity : and then the 
 comparison will be between the presumption 
 against miracles, and the presumption against such 
 extraordinary appearances. Now to a man, who 
 had never seen any such extraordmary appearances, at 
 the first hearing of them, there would be great 
 objections against them : but sull they would be not 
 -enly credible but true ; and so also may miracles be 
 both credible and true. 
 
 To sum up this letter then in few words ; I 
 think it is plan, that there is no presumption 
 against miracles in the abstra act, so as to render 
 them incredible. And since we can discover posi- 
 tive reasons for them, this gives a positive credi- 
 bility to their history, in cases im which those rea= 
 
 EG 
 
S 
 
 i08 Onthe supposed Presumption, &e. 
 
 sons hold good. And as miracles ought to be com- 
 pared with the extraordinary appearances of nature, 
 it is also plain, that there is no more presumption 
 from analogy against miracles, than against those 
 extraordinary appearances. 7 | 
 
 I am yours very sincerely, 
 
 4 J. WW, 
 
 Hs 
 : 
 4 
 e 
 
{ ‘vos "Y 
 
 LET TEReHL 
 
 On the Credibility that a Revelation would 
 appear liable ta, Objections. 
 
 Cheam, May, 18093. 
 DEAR SLR, 
 
 GSREAT and many are the objections which are 
 made against christianity. Some object, not ony 
 against its evidence, but against itself, independent 
 of its evidence; they object against its whole 
 scheme, and the manner m whiclr it 1s left to the 
 world, Some object against certain historical facts: 
 which are recorded in. seripture ;—and they pre- 
 ‘ter4 also that revelation is deficient ; and that many 
 things init have given occasion to enthusiasm and. 
 superstition, and to tyranny and wickedaess. “They 
 object also to revelation because it is not universal; 
 and because its evidence is not so convincing as they 
 think it might have been. Others think it a strong 
 objection against the scriptures because they) ane 
 
 wot composed according to what are’ called rules of 
 
 ca 
 
110 On the Credibilaty that Revelation 
 
 criticism ; and they treat them with inexpressible 
 scorn, because of the hieroglyphical and figurative 
 _Tanguage in which some parts are written. Now, 
 in some of my following letters, I shall attend to 
 
 the principal of these objections; but in this, if 
 you admit me that a revelation is possible, 1 shall ; 
 
 shew you, that it is highly credible we must be in- 
 competent judges of revelation in itself; and that 
 it must contain many things which’ will appear 
 liable to objection, unless we judge of it by the 
 nualogy of nature. And from hence it will follow, 
 that objections against christianity itself are chiefly 
 frivolous; though, at the same time, IT admit, that 
 
 particular objections against its evidence.are to be. 
 
 seriously considered and attended to. 
 ‘But do not suppose I mean to disparage reason ; 
 for it is only by reason that we can judge even of 
 
 the truth of revelation itself: nor by any means: 
 
 amagine I assert, that a supposed revelation cannot 
 be. proved’ false ; since any system which contains 
 clear ‘immoralities or contradictions. must be false. 
 But still, objections against christianity, itself, and 
 objections agaist its evadence are very different 
 things; and J feel no hesitation in saying, that the 
 former are quite frivolous. bide 
 
 Now you must not forget, that I all along take 
 it for granted, that there is a God, the. natural go- 
 ‘vemeor of the world. Keeping this then im mind, 
 
 a 
 
.tweould appear tiable to Objections., VA 
 
 you well know, that. as he governs. the, natural 
 world by a scheme of general laws, which are 
 _ known to us by reason and experience, so the scrip- 
 tures inform us of an additional scheme, which, he 
 has made known to us by revelation: a scheme, by 
 which he has informed. men of things, which they 
 themselves could not have discovered; and reminded 
 them of other things, which perhaps they might 
 have known without an immediate revelation, but 
 which they were too apt to neglect, And in attes- 
 tation of this scheme, the scriptures also inform us, 
 that God caused several- miracles to be performed. 
 Now if God be the author of both these schemes, 
 and if they form one, or at least are parts of one 
 great plan of Providence, then it is very probable, 
 that if we are incompetent judges of the scheme 
 of the natural world,. we are also incompetent 
 judges of the scheme of revelation. But the fact 
 is, that we are incompetent judges of the scheme 
 of the natural world; we cannot trace all the causes 
 and connexions of any one. single fact whatever ; 
 much less then are we competent to judge of the 
 whole scheme of the natural world; itis certainly, 
 then, more than probable, that we are incompetent 
 to judge of the whole scheme of revelation, Ex- 
 perience also teaches us, that the constitution and 
 course of nature are very different fromy what men, 
 
112 On iit Credibility that a Revelation 
 
 before experience, might have expected’; and some 
 fancy that great objections lie against tle course of 
 nature: hence then it 1s probable, that revelation 
 would be different from what men before expe- 
 rience,. might have expected; and that apparent 
 objections would lie against its scheme, and against 
 the degree and marmer of the miracles. wrought in. 
 proof of it. 
 
 To illustrate these observations, suppose that a 
 prinee should govern his domimons: in the best and. 
 wisest manner according to general laws; but that 
 on proper emergencies he should suspend those ge~ 
 neral laws, and govern in a different manner. Now 
 if one of his subjects was incompetent to judge 
 
 beforehand, or mdependent of experience, by what. 
 
 general laws the government was or should be 
 carried on, much more would ke be imcompetent 
 to judge iv what manner it should be conducted on 
 particular emergencies. If this subject was not an 
 adequate judge of the ordinary administration, he 
 ertainly could not be a judge of the extraordinary : 
 if there appeared objections against the former, there 
 certainly would against the latter: Tn like manner, 
 ax you are incompetent to judge of the whole 
 course and constitution of nature, and may, inde- 
 
 pendent of experience, suppose that objec tions He 
 
 against it; so also, independent of experience, it 
 
 4 
 
 fen See 
 
 ee er ee PO ie Pe en 
 
_ would appear hable to Objections. > fee 
 
 is evidently credible that objections may appear to 
 lie against revelation. ; | 
 
 Now let us apply these avilerkt observations to a 
 particular case ; for imstance, to the case of inspi- 
 ration. Now you do not know beforehand, or a 
 priori, in what manner, or by what means, God 
 would give man natural knowledge and instruction : 
 suppose, then, a revelation given to man, you can- 
 not tell beforehand, in. what manner, or by what 
 means, that revelation or supernatural light and in- 
 struction would be given. Youare not competent to 
 judge what quantity of natural knowledge God would 
 give to any particular man by the use of his own 
 reason and experience; you cannot then be com- 
 petent to judge what quantity of divine inspiration 
 he would be— pleased to give on matters of reve- 
 Jation. Nay, you do not know beforehand, whe- 
 ther reason itself would be given to man all at once 
 or gradually ; and therefore you ought not to think 
 yourself competent to decide in what manner, in 
 what degree, and in what circumstances, a reve- 
 lation would, or even should be given. You do 
 not know whether its evidence would be certaim, 
 probable, or doubtful; or whether it would be re- 
 vealed all at once or gradually: nay, I go further 
 and say, that you are not competent to judge, 
 whether it would be committed to writing, or left ta 
 
114 On the Credability that a Revelation 
 
 verbal tradition, and hence be very liable to be 
 corrupted, and at last to be lost, 
 _ But,a revelation not. committed to writing, and 
 so liable to be lost, would not, say you, have 
 answered its purposes, But I ask, what purposes 
 do you mean? It would not, indeed, have .an- 
 swered the purposes which christianity has effected ; 
 but it would have answered other purposes, or the 
 same in a different degree; and. which were best 
 adapted to God's general government, you could 
 not have determined beforehand. 
 Since, then,, we are not competent to judge 
 beforehand, how, or in what manner and degree a 
 revelation would, or even should. be given; it is 
 quite frivolous to object to a particular revelation, 
 because it. 18, given to us in one. way rather than an-. 
 other. . The only question, then, respecting _ chris+ 
 tianity, 18 this, is it a real revelation; and not, is it 
 given as we might have expected : and .the only” 
 question respecting, the scriptures is. this, are, they 
 what they claim to be; and not what, weak mien 
 might fancy they should be? All objections, then, 
 against the scriptures on account of obscurity, or 
 seeming inaccuracies of style, or on account of va~ 
 rious readings, or of disputes about the authors of 
 particular parts of. them, can never overthrow 
 their authority ; unless it could be proved, which 
 
 SS ne ge es J ea ee 
 
would appear liable to Objections.. 115 
 
 it never can, that the prophets, our Lord, or his 
 apostles, promised that they should be secure from 
 these things. Indeed no objections can ever over- 
 throw the christian revelation, but suchas can prove, 
 which they never can, that. no miracles were 
 wrought in proof of it; that there was nothing» 
 miraculous in its propagation; and that there are 
 no prophecies connected with it. If, indeed, it 
 could be proved, that there were none of these 
 things, then would christianity be overthrow n: but 
 if the proofs, for the truth of any one of them, 
 were much lower than they really are, yet even, then 
 we should be bound to regard christiamty, and.to 
 be influenced by it in our life and conduct: for any 
 probability of its truth would lay us under the most 
 serious obligation to observe it. And, as it respects 
 the scriptures, you cannot justly argue against them, 
 especially their prophetic parts, as you may against 
 common beoks; because you are not able to. de- 
 termine beforehand, in what manner, or how. clearly 
 the sense should have been expressed. . Of com- 
 mon books you may be a judge, but of the scrip-. 
 tures you are not; and therefore the question re- 
 specting them is, what is thew sense? and not, 
 whether that sense might have been more accurately 
 expressed. : , 
 
 But still you may object and say, that the exter- 
 nal probable proof of a thing must be weakened by 
 
116 On the Credibility that a Revelation 
 
 internal improbabilities existing in that thing. But 
 this objection will not apply against christianity 5 
 because you have already seen that, independent of 
 testimony, there is a presumption of a million to 
 one against the most common facts, which yet are 
 proved by the most ordinary testimony: the positive 
 testimony, then, that there is for christianity, wil 
 always so overcome any supposed internal impro- 
 bability, as to make it appear more than probably 
 true. And to this may be added, that you scarcely 
 know what are internal improbabilities in revelation, 
 if we except immoralities and phin  contra- 
 dictions, which never can be shewn to exist in 
 christianity. : 
 
 But to pursue this further. It certainly is evident, 
 that we are incompetent to judge befereband, m 
 what degree, or in what manner a revelation would, 
 or even should be given; the objections then of 
 incompetent judges against itself must be frivolous. 
 But if men will judge of revelation by precon- 
 ceived expectations, then the analogy of nature 
 shews us, that it is probable men will fancy they 
 have strong objections against it, though really un- 
 exceptionable. For if men were'to judge, by pre-’ 
 conceived ‘expectations, of the whole manner by- 
 which we gain struction in the ordmary course of: 
 nature, they would think they had objections agamst_ 
 that manner. For instance, mei would think that 
 
would appear liable to Objections. | ANF 
 
 they ought to know the nature and cure of all dis- 
 eases better than the motion and distances of the 
 planets, or of astronomy in general: since the sub- 
 ject of medicine seems much more important to us 
 than that of astronomy: but it is well known, that 
 our knowledge of astronomy is much more accu- 
 rate than our knowledge of the nature and cure of 
 diseases. How uncertain also at best is language, 
 by which we convey our thoughts to one another ; 
 though men might imagine that it should not be ~ 
 capable of deceiving us: and, in many cases, beasts 
 are much more sagacious and prudent than man. 
 If then these natural things appear, from precon- 
 ceived notions, to be liable to objection, it is but 
 reasonable to suppose, that if God did give a reve- 
 lation, it also would appear lable to objection, and 
 would be different im its design and manner from 
 what men might expect. 
 
 Now let us apply these general observations to 
 a particular objection against christiamty; for in- 
 stance, to the objection against the gift of tongues, 
 yiz. that it could not be miraculous, or from God, 
 because it was sometimes abused: and you will see 
 that these general observations are applicable to ail 
 other objections of a like kind. Now, if some of 
 the first christians had the gift of tongues by a mi- 
 racle, it is to be supposed, that they had the same 
 
418  Onthe Credibility that a-Recelation 
 
 controul over that gift, as if they had learned the 
 languages by ordinary study ; and, therefore, might 
 abuse itif they would. But to this you object, and 
 say, that if God gave the eift at all, itshould, nay, 
 perhaps you will say, would have been given so as 
 not to be liable to abuse: i.e. if you examine your 
 objection, that God should, or would have mir a- 
 culously interposed in a manner different from what 
 he did. But according to what has been already 
 advanced, you are not competent to judge in whit 
 manner he either should or would interpose, and 
 therefore your objection is altogether invalid. Do 
 but consider the natural gifts of memory, eloquence, 
 and reason, and let me ask, are they always rightly 
 applied? Are they never abused? If then natz- 
 ral gifts may be abused, as they certainly may, and 
 din are; then analogy shews us, that Gt is very 
 
 probable spirzéwal or miraculous & gifts © may also. be. 
 
 ’ 
 
 abused. 
 
 There is'also a great similarity between the Tight 
 of nature and the light of revelation in ‘several other 
 respects; there is an analogy between the know- 
 ledge we obtam from nature and from revelation. 
 For instance, the faith and conduct which form a 
 christian, is a plain thing; as also are the rules of 
 common life: but to pare an extensive and accu 
 rate knowledge of the doctrines and’ prophecies’ of 
 
, : Roould appear liable to Objections. It O 
 
 the scriptures, requires much learning, study, and 
 care; as it does to become well skilled in what 
 may be called the natural sciences. The know- 
 ledge also of the whole scheme, of all the doctrines 
 contained in the scriptures, unless given by a mira- 
 cle, must be obtained, like natural knowledge, by 
 the progress of learning and liberty; and by pa- 
 tient investigation during many years. The pro- 
 gress of natural philosophy also appears to have 
 been but slow, when you reflect, that in all ages 
 there were the same phenomena and’powers in na- 
 ture, and the same natural facultics in man to in- 
 vestigate them: it is not then unlikely that there 
 may be man y truths in the Bible, though it has been 
 so long mm men’s hands, which may require much 
 time for discovery, and may yet be unknown. 
 Electricity and galvinism seem quite modern disco-_ 
 veries ; yet they always must have existed in mature : 
 so also, there may be many things im the Bible 
 Which are not yet discovered. God also might 
 intend, that events, as they arose, should deter- 
 imine the meaning of many par ‘ts of scripture; as 
 we find many truths in natural philosophy are dis- 
 covered by particular events and circumstances, 
 when men are neither trying nor expecting to disco- 
 ver such truths. ‘There is evidently then an analogy 
 between the manner in which truths in’ natural phi- 
 losophy and in 1 revelation are discovered; and since 
 
120 On the Credibility that a Revelatign 
 
 God does not dispense his natural gifts, according 
 to our notion of their advantage and consequence 
 to us; it follows, that the same thing will probably 
 take place in revelation. 
 
 But it may be said, since the scriptures repre- 
 sent the world as in a state of ruin, and christianity 
 as the means of its recovery, is it likely that so 
 many ages would elapse before it was given to the 
 world, if it was a revelation from God? Or is it 
 hhkely, that its effects would be sosinall, or its ob- 
 scuriues so great? Without determining whether 
 the effects of christianity have, or have not been 
 small, or its obscurities great; I] answer, it is by 
 no means unlikely that it would be so, if the 
 scheme of christianity and the scheme of nature 
 came from the same hand, which I take for 
 granted. For are not all men hable to natural dis- 
 eases, for which God has provided natural reme- 
 dies? But yet the best remedies bave been un- 
 known for ages ; and when discovered, then known 
 only by a few. It is probable many remedies are 
 yet unknown. Great difficulties also often attend 
 the application of the best medicines ; so that some- 
 times they cannot be used at all, because of certain 
 circumstances in the case of the patient. ‘The 
 
 createst discoveries in medicine have often been most 
 violently opposed; and in many particular cases 
 have been rejected, when they would have wrought 
 
would appear liable to Objections. 121 
 
 a cure. ‘Then they will not always adopt a proper 
 regimen to give remedies their efficacy ; and when 
 even proper remedies are applied, they are not 
 always attended with success. Many people also, 
 who are ill of diseases, for which there are cer- 
 tain and sure remedies,’ are. never so happy as 
 _to meet with them; or. even to know where to find 
 them. In one word, the remedies, which Ged hag’ 
 provided inthe natural world for natural dis- 
 eases, are neither certain, perfect, nor universal s 
 and since this is the case with respect to natural 
 diseases and remedies, it is probable that it may 
 and will be the same with respect to spiritual dis< 
 eascs and remedies; i, e. with respect to christianity 
 in. its application to the state and condition of many 
 I say in its application ; for in its own nature it is 
 Lertaim, perfect, and universal. 
 
 What, then, are we in no sort judges of reve- 
 lation? yes, certainly, in some sort we are. Tor 
 we must judge, not only of its meaning, but also 
 of its morality and evidence. It is our reason only 
 that can judge of the morality of a revelation ; but 
 observe, we must not judge whether it contains things _ 
 different from what we might beforchand expect 
 from God; for to this we are competent : buat 
 reason can and must judge, whether a revelation 
 contains any thing that is plainly contradictory to 
 the wisdom, justice; and goodness of the Deity. 
 
 G 
 
1e2 On the Credibility that a. Revelation 
 
 Now nothing of this kind can be ‘proved against 
 - the Seriptures, but what would also prove that the 
 constitution of nature is contrary to God’s wisdom, 
 justice, and goodness, which it certainly is not. 
 There are, indeed, m Scripture, certain particular 
 precepts, for performing a certain fact, which 
 would be immoral, had they not been given by God 
 to individuals fora particular purpose. . 
 
 For instance, no man possesses life or property 
 but by the grant and permission of God ; if then 
 he commands the life or property of an individual 
 to be taken away by another, which m some cases 
 the Scriptures say he did, then the precept justifies 
 the act, and renders that right which otherwise 
 would be wrong: Tf, indeed, the Scriptures, com- 
 manded us to be treacherous; ungrateful, or cruel, 
 then they would be immoral, and could not come 
 from God: but a particular precept from him, to 
 take away the life or property of an individual, 1s 
 not contrary to immutable morality ; andy therefore, 
 cannot be advanced as a valid objection against the 
 Scriptures. Judeed there is no difficulty in these 
 particular precepts, excepting that they may afford 
 an occasion tocnthusiastic and wicked men, of serving 
 the most horrid purposes. But objections on this 
 ground are not merely objections against the Scrip- 
 tures or revelation, but against the whole notion, 
 even of tana religion as a trial of our virtue, 
 
would appear liable to Objections. 128 
 
 and against the whiole constitution of nature: but 
 these objections you must recollect have’ becn an- 
 swered in a former letter, and amount to nothing, 
 unless you will be an’ atheist. Reason must, how- 
 ever, bea judge of the evidence, for the truth of 
 revelation, and of the objections against that evi- 
 dence; but having once found a revelation to be 
 true, it must yield implicit deference to it: 
 
 “In fine, the result of what [ have said to you 
 in this letter is, that the truth of christianity is 
 scarcely at all affected by objections agamst its 
 scheme, since there are no objections against its me- 
 rality; but that its trath would be affected by ob- 
 jections against its eviderce, if such objections 
 would hold good: or in other words, the great 
 question is, what proof’ is there of the truth of 
 christianity, after due allowance being made jor 
 the objections against that proof? For it is mani- 
 fest, that objections against the scheme of chris- 
 tianity are frivolous. Those objections certainly 
 
 can have no weight against christianity, which ex- 
 perience proves are inconclusive when applied to 
 the constitution of nature. That .constitution is. 
 not what men might have expected beforehand ; if 
 1s evidently, then, probable, that the pee er 
 of revelation would not be What men might before 
 expect. "To object against christianit: 
 
 ty, because it 
 is not what men mig ht. expect beforehand, j AS ta’ 
 
 hand 
 
 G g 
 
<a 
 
 124 On the Credibility that a Revelation, &c. 
 
 take for granted that God acts as we see he does 
 : mot act; and that he does not act, as we see he does 
 act. But the unreasonableness of these objections 
 “will still more clearly appear, when we come to 
 cousider some particular analogies in nature, which 
 will apply to and answer them. 
 
 Yours, very sincerely, 
 
 J. Ws 
 
pes Ly EW: 
 
 LETTER IV. 
 On Christianity being a System which we cannot - 
 7 cite vinspenfectly comprehend, 
 
 Cheam, June, 180% 
 
 f 
 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 SENCE, according to my last letter, the analog M 
 of nature shews, that a revelation. from ‘God ta : 
 man must and will appear different from what wet 
 might expect, independent of experience, and be 
 
 liable to apparent objections; it follows that suck: 
 objections must lose their force. - But some may say, | 
 this is a very partial answer to such. objections, » 
 since it does not shew, that the things objected > 
 against are Wise, just, and good: let us then at- 
 
 iend to: this: further objection, and we shall find 
 
 that the auswers, which were given im Letter vu, « 
 Part I, to the objections against the wisdom, jus- 
 tice, and. goodness, of the ‘constitution of nature,’ , 
 will also answer objections made against the wisdom, 
 
 justice, and goodness of christianity. 
 
 & 3 
 
126 On Christianity being « System — - 
 
 Now there were three observations which we em- 
 ployed to answer the objections against the wisdom, 
 justice, and goodness of the constitation of nature ;— 
 Ist, thatit is a vast system imperfectly known by us;— 
 2dly, that means are used in this system for accom. 
 plishing ends ;—and lastly, that it is carried on by 
 general laws: and from these observations it ap- 
 peared very probable, that the very things objected 
 against may not only be consistent with wisdom, 
 justice, and goodness, but even be instances of 
 them; and that the constitution of nature may be 
 
 perfect in the highest possible degree. If, then, 
 
 christianity be a system of the same kind, and from 
 the same being, as it really is, then objections against 
 its wisdom, justice, and goodness, may be answered 
 in the same way.: , 
 
 First, then, christianity is a system or scheme 
 quite beyond our comprehension, For as the mo- 
 ral government of God is a vast system gradually 
 conducting things im such a manner, that every one 
 shall finally receive according to his works; and 
 that truth and ‘right, not fraud and violence, shall 
 prevail at the last: so christianity is a particular 
 scheme under, and a part of. this vast system. Ever 
 since the world came into’ its present wretched 
 state, did a plan for its recovery commence under 
 a divine “person, the Messiah; who, by a long 
 mysterious ceconomy, will iinally unite all the just 
 
 “ 
 
which we cannot perfectly comprehend. 127 
 
 in akingdom of glory and happiness. And, as you 
 are acquainted with the Scriptures, you will readily 
 perceive, that the following is the outline of the 
 christian system. First, that. through a succession 
 of ages different dispensations of providence, such 
 as that of the patriarchs, of the law of Moses, and of 
 the prophets, were given, to man as preparatory to 
 the advent, of the Messiah ;—secondly, that in the 
 fulness of ‘time, that time. which infinite wisdona 
 saw best, this divime person came into the world m* 
 a humble and despised manner, and suffered an ‘ig- 
 nominigus death, for us men and for our salvation ; 
 —and, thirdly, that he rose from the dead on the 
 third day, and afterwards ascended up into heaven,. 
 and there ever lives to make intercession for us, and 
 thas a name given unto him above every name, so 
 that every knee. should bow to him, and “every 
 tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the 
 glory of God the Father. Further, that the Holy 
 Ghost was sent at a particular time, m a miraculous 
 manner, and now assists good’ men;—that Christ 
 carries on an invisible government over his church, 
 and will come at the end of the world to judge all. 
 men, and ‘to give to every man according to his 
 works; and that then shall the Son also himself be — 
 subject unto him that put all things under him, that 
 God may be all in all. top due «pele 
 | | 6 4 : 
 
128 On Christianity being a System 
 
 ¥ 
 
 New certainly, the whole, or any part of this 
 scheme, 3 1s but very partially known by us; we do 
 but know. in part. For as in the constitution of 
 nature, we soon find ourselves unable to compre- 
 hend any one part in all its connections ; so is it in 
 the ‘constitution of christianity. You cannot take 
 any one subject in nature, without being imme- 
 Giately convinced of your ignorance and incom- 
 petency to understand it fully; so also, if. you ex. 
 amine the whole, or any one part of christianity,’ 
 you will find, that though all things necessary to 
 salvation are clear, yet you can know but very little 
 of it.. How, then, can you reasonably object 
 against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of chris-. 
 tianity, when you are so incompetent a judge? You: 
 have already seen, that your ignorance affords a 
 sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom,. 
 justice, and goodness of the constitution of nature 5 
 much more, then, is it an answer to objections 
 
 against the wisdom, guetices and goodness, of chris=. 
 tianity. ‘ wit ae pts voce Lee ue TS. 
 
 But, secondly, as. in nature, so. also..in. ngolasldgie 
 anity, means are employed to, accomplish, ends. In. 
 nature many. means accomplish ends, .which, at 
 first sight, they do not seem ‘likely. to accomplish ; : 
 nay, many means appegr quite contrary. to their 
 effects; and yet, considering all circumstances, are. 
 
whieh we cannot perfectly comprehend. 329 
 
 the very best. This, then, shews, that though the 
 things objected against christianity may appear to 
 some foolish; yet they may be the very best. means 
 of accomplishing the very best ends ; and» their ap- 
 pearing foolishness: to some, is in reality no argu- 
 ment against; them, since ‘they ave parts of a 
 scheme, which»is so very far above our comprehen- 
 sion, and the reach of our capacity. 
 
 But, thirdly, it is credible that Christianity, as 
 well asi the course of nature, may have been car- 
 ried on by, general laws. But to ascertain this, let 
 us consider upon’ what ground it is we say, that the 
 course of nature ‘is carried on by general fore- 
 ordained laws. ,, | sg 
 
 Now, though we know some of the general laws 
 ‘of matter. and.of men’s conduct and behaviour ; 
 yet we know almost nothing of the laws by which 
 storms and tempests, earthquakes and famines oc- 
 eur, and become. destructive to man; nor of. the 
 laws by which some men are so much. superior to 
 others, ia their capacity and temper ; nor of those 
 laws by which thoughts come into our minds, in 
 numberless. cases ;, and by which myriads of things 
 happen, that are of the greatest. importance and 
 influence im the affairs of life. .To say that many 
 of these, things happen by chance, is, to say nothing ; 
 for all reasonable men know certainly, that. there. be: 
 
 ~ 
 
 Go 
 
130 On Christianity Being a System 
 
 no stich thing as chance im reality.. It is then by 
 analogy we determine, that all things in nature are 
 governed by general laws: for we see that the leada 
 ing things im nature and men’s conduct are redu- 
 ctble to general laws; and hence we infer, since 
 there is no such thing as chance, that all other 
 things, which have the appearance of chance, may 
 also be and are reducible to general laws. And 
 this inference is perfectly just ; for as there is no_ 
 such thing as chance, it follows, that all things in 
 nature, and in nicn’s conduct, are governed by ge- 
 neral laws as much as the world is subject to gra- 
 vitation. 
 
 Since, then, this is the case in nature, it is very 
 probable that revelation, or God’s miraculous in-. 
 terference with man, may also have been all alone 
 directed by general laws of wisdom; and hence 
 there is a fal answer to objections against parti- 
 cular things in revelation, as being contrary to wis- 
 dom, justice, and goodness. It may have been by 
 general laws that miraculous powers were exerted, 
 mm such a manner and place rather than any other ; 
 and that the world at precise times received divine 
 imterpositions, and in such, and im no. other, de- 
 grees and respects. But you must net think ita 
 valid objection against revelation, that those laws 
 are unknown tous; for we do not know by what 
 
 3 
 
which we cannot perfectly comprehénd. 181) 
 
 Jaws some die. in infancy, and others at extreme old 
 age ; ‘and that some are so superior in: intellect, and. 
 temper to others, though these: things do certainly. 
 proceed from general laws, | And) as, you have no: 
 reason to expect, that im nature every ‘particular. 
 exigence should be provided for by general: laws, 
 so you have no reason to expect it in revelation ; 
 though there may have been good! reasons. why re- 
 velation should be given by general laws, and that. 
 those laws should not be. imterfered with by other 
 miraculous interpositions. And since the schemes 
 of nature: and of revelation are supposed to be. 
 both from God, it is certamly more than probable 
 that they would be similar. Whatever deficiencies: 
 or irregularities, then, may appear, elther im ‘na- 
 ture or in christianity, it is because we know but: 
 in part: we are not competent to judge fully off 
 any part, much less of the whole. scheme; and, 
 therefore, certainly, not competent to make Rieie: 
 tions against it. 
 
 Before I conclude this letter I fill advert to: 
 an objeetion, which is sometimes made against the 
 whole of christianity. dees say it makes God 
 appear like mda; as if he, like men, was reduced 
 to the necessity of using a ee series. Of means: 
 to effect his designs, and. is therefore derogatory. to 
 him. 
 
 r | 
 
 é¢ 
 
132. On Christianity being a System 
 
 But all nature shews ‘the folly, the extreme folly” 
 of such an objection... Every thing in ‘the world is’ 
 carried on by means ; and is progressive : the ‘fruits 
 of the earth are ripened by means; every blade’ of: 
 grass, and flower, that grows, is supported by 
 ‘means; not>to mention man, and brute animals. 
 Every thing in nature is ‘also progressive; nothing’ 
 seems perfect all at:once. In corn there is the 
 stalk, the blade, and then the full corn im the ear; 
 in man there is infancy, childhood, youth, and 
 manhood: indeed, every part of our existence 
 seems but a preparation by means for another part. 
 God works in nature by slow and steady operations ; 
 and why may it not be so in revelation? Is it not 
 most probable it will be so? Admit, then, that 
 the system of nature is from God, and nothing can 
 be so futile as the objection we are now consi- 
 dering: for every part of nature is carried on by 
 means; and by means which, in many cases, seem 
 very slow and tardy, but which are most effectual,» 
 and extend in their connections both backward 
 and forward, far, very far, beyoud our utmost 
 view. 7 ‘il , 
 
 Since, then, you know so little, of the vast plan 
 of christianity, but yet know enough for all prac- 
 tical purposes either of life or godliness, let it ‘be 
 your great care to attend te what you do know; 
 
which we cannot perfectly comprehend. 133 
 
 and not to harass yourself with futile objections 
 because of things which you neither do nor can 
 know. 
 
 Yours, very affectionately, 
 
 ae 
 
wut 
 
 > 
 
 cite peerrere “Vy. 
 
 On the Appointment of a Mediator. 
 
 Cheam, July, 1809. 
 
 THERE is nothing m christianity which Deists 
 have more objected against, than the mediation of 
 ‘Christ. And not only do they object against. his. 
 mediation, in that high and peculiar sense mm which 
 christians believe him to be their mediator, but 
 against the whole notion of a mediator; as being 
 in itself, in any sense, absurd and unreasonable. 
 But let us look at the analogy of nature; and if 
 you admit that the scheme of nature is of Ged’s 
 appointment, then will no part of christianity appear 
 less hable to objection. 
 
 First, then, were not you, He, are not all living 
 creatures brought mto the world, and chiefly sup- 
 ported in it, by the means and instrumentality, 
 1. e. by the mediation of others’ The food you 
 eat, the raiment you put on, and. every enjoyment 
 you have in life, are all more or less procured for 
 you by the means of others; and in many cases, by 
 
‘ 
 
 On the Appointment of a Mediator. A385 
 
 unlikely means, and. by. those who. hold .the lowest 
 and most despised ranks in society.. Indeed, the 
 the whole natural government of the world, is car- 
 ried on by God through the means or medi- 
 ation ef one thing to another, and of, man to 
 man. If,..then, God's .natural government of the 
 world be by the mediation of others, why may net 
 his moral or rehgious?. And since it is 2 mere mat- 
 ter of fact, that the natural government of. the 
 world is by the mediation of others; it. certainly is ” 
 much. more probable, that. the religious is so also, 
 than that. it is mot.so.. We find by experience, that 
 God has so constituted. the course of nature, that 
 others are daily, nay., meessantly the, mediators of 
 good. to! us,, and! sonictinies.the mistruments or mes 
 diators of vengeance: there is, then, no ground of 
 objection, from. the light. of nature, against the 
 general doctrine of a mediater between God and 
 man, . 
 
 But, secondly, before we can in due order con- 
 sider the revealed doctrine, of the redemption of the 
 world by Christ, we must suppose, or take for 
 granted, that the \world is under the proper moraé 
 government’ of God: let us then take distinct no- 
 tice of this. !supposition.> Now: natural religion 
 ‘teaches ‘us, that. God's moral governnient .of the 
 world implies; that misery will be the. consequences 
 
 - 
 
136 On the Appointment of a M. ediator. 
 
 of vice in some future state ; yea, that his moral 
 ‘government necessarily implies, that misery will be 
 the consequence of vice. But yeu do not know all 
 ‘the purposes or reasons why God has ordained that 
 misery sitall follow vice in futurity, and you are 
 altogether ignorant how or ‘by what micans misery 
 or punishment will follow or be inflicted ; there 1s, 
 therefore, no absurdity m supposing, that it may 
 follow in a way similar to_ that in which, 1m this life, 
 “poverty follows: dissipation and idleness, and sick- 
 ness and untimely death follow intemperance or civil 
 crimes. The punishments of a future state may 
 follow vice, as a natural consequence ; just as it 
 follows of natural consequence, that if a man 
 -yashly trifles on a precipice he will fall, break his 
 —iimbs, and finally perish, unless he gets help by 
 the means or mediation of another. Nor does this 
 supposition disparage the execution of God's jus- 
 tice; since it is to us perfectly the same, whether 
 God inflicts’ punishment immediately by himself, 
 or mediately by the natural course and progress of 
 ‘things, i y bio | 
 Supposing, then, thirdly, that im a. future: state 
 ‘punishment will follow vice in the natural course of 
 things, or by any other means; yet we find, ac- 
 cording to the present constitution of nature, that 
 the baud natural consequences of men’s improper 
 
On the Appointment of a Mediator: 187. 
 
 actions do not always happen, or at least may often» 
 be prevented or remedied by the use of proper. 
 means. ‘This, then, makes it probable, that by. 
 the use of proper means, the bad natural. conse- » 
 quences of vice in futurity may also. be prevented. / 
 God has so constituted the world, that though bad 
 consequences naturally follow certain actions and 
 conduct, yet still, in many cases, he has provided 
 
 relief and remedies; and in some instances a per-. 
 fect remedy, if we will use it. A certain kind of 
 conduct, if persisted in, will often lead mevitably 
 to loss of health, property, and life; and yet all 
 this may be prevented by another proper kind of 
 conduct. For imstance, a man may prevent all the. 
 bad consequences of falling down a. precipice, if, 
 he does not rashly trifle with it; and though. he. | 
 should. fall, yet he may be saved, from. utterly. 
 perishing, by the help of others, if he does not re- 
 fuse their help: it is, then, a matter of expe-: 
 rience, that God has so, mercifully formed the world, 
 and the course of nature, that we of ourselves. may) 
 do much, and still more. by the help of others, to. 
 avoid and remedy the bad natural consequences: of, 
 improper conduct; ‘and since we find he has so con 
 stituted nature, that in many cases those bad natu.’ 
 ral consequences may be remedied or prevented, 
 
 it is probable. that he may have, made provision also, 
 
138 On the Appointment of a Mediator. 
 
 for remedying or preventing the future bad conse- 
 quences of vice. | oii | 
 But ‘though God should have made provision, 
 for preventing the future consequences of vice ; 
 yet observe, fourthly, there is no probability that 
 we alone and of ourselves could have prevented 
 them: for you do not know adi the reasons why 
 future punishment will be inflicted, ner what will be 
 ail the future consequences of vice; and: therefore: 
 you cannot tell whether any thing you could do could 
 prevent them, Look also at the whole analogy of © 
 nature, and you will find, that in numberless cases, 
 sorrow for past misconduct will neither prevent nor: 
 remedy its bad consequences. If, then, mere sor-' 
 row for misconduct in men’s temporal capacity will 
 not always prevent or remedy its bad consequences, 
 what right have men to suppose, that mere sorrow: 
 will prevent the future bad consequences, i.e. the’ 
 future punishment’ of vice?. In: nature also there- 
 are many diseases, in which the patient, so far frown’ 
 being able to effect his own cure, would’ inevitably 
 destroy himself, were it not for the help—the me-’ 
 diation of others. ‘The world also is so constituted, 
 that you neéd the skill of the physician when your 
 health is impaired; the assistance of friends, when: 
 your fortune ‘is ruined; and the advice of the wise: 
 and prudent, when you have adopted wrong plans :: 
 
On the Appointment ofa Mediator.. 139: 
 
 and still further, our natural ability to help our=. 
 selves is often so much lessened by our misconduct, 
 that there is no possibility of our affairs beimg re-. 
 trieved but by the aid and interposition of others. 
 And since, then, this is your case in your temporal 
 capacity, it is probable .that it is so in your reli- 
 gious and moral: it is probable that we of ourselves 
 could not prevent the future punishment of. vice, 
 The constant use also of propitiatory sacrifices , 
 among heathen nations plainly shews, that the 
 idea of mere sorrow. and repentance for sin being 
 sufficient to obtain remission. of it, is contrary to 
 the general sense of mankind. Beg) 
 _Upon the whole, then, it is evident, that we 
 could not be sure that any thing we could do, could. ; 
 prevent the future punishment of vice; and also that 
 some interposition might be necessary to make ree, 
 pentance efficacious. 
 
 As then, in the fifth place, analogy shews it pros, 
 bable, that we of ourselves could not prevent the 
 future punishment of Vice 5. so we find that reve., 
 lation, assures us we. could. not. Revelation tells 
 us, and experience confirms. it, that the world is. 
 -inoa wretched and lost estate; and that mere res 
 pentance is not of jitself effectual, to prevent. the 
 future punishment of wickedness. Bat at the same 
 time revelation assures us, that the divine govern= 
 mnent admits of au interposition of amerey and good- 
 
 | \ 
 
140 On the Appointment of a Mediator. 
 
 ness by means of a mediator, through whom the - 
 destruction of mankind may be prevented ;_ for God 
 so doved the world that he gave his only be- 
 gotten son; (John iii. 16.): that whosoever be- 
 lieveth in him should not perish: and the Son so 
 loved ‘the world, that he gave himself for us 
 (Ephes. v. 2.). He once suffered for sins, the just 
 for the unjust, that he mght bring us to Gad 
 (1 -Pet: iii. 18.). | ‘As in nature God gives us the: 
 help of others, without whose aid our temporal 
 ruin would be certain ;.so im rehgion, though in an 
 infinitely higher degree, he gave us his Son to re- 
 deem us: and as a friend helps those whom he’ 
 loves; so did Christ, in. a way infinitely beyond 
 any thing human, effect our redemption, and do” 
 what was sufficient to prevent those’ future pimish-_ 
 ments from taking’ place, which according to the 
 general laws of the divme government would have’ 
 followed men’s crimes, had it not been for his in- 
 terposition. And surely there is nothing imconsist- 
 ent with divine goodness’ in all this. It is true,’ 
 indeed, that christianity supposes we are in a lost: 
 state; this supposition seems the very ground of 
 its being given to man; but christianity did not’ 
 put the world in this state, and surely it 1s not in- 
 consistent with divine goodness, by an appointment | 
 of its own, to recover us, or to give us the. means 
 of recovery from it, Do but consider. the. extreme: 
 
On the Appointment of a Mediator. °141 
 
 fnisery that is in the world—the great wickedness 
 that is among markind—the wrong things that are 
 even in the best of men—the progress that bad 
 men, who form the bulk of the world, make in 
 vice, as they advance in age ;—consider also, that 
 many heathens thought. that this world was ‘a place 
 _of punishment ;—and you yourself must see, that 
 it bears evident marks of ruin; and then you mutt 
 feel little objection to the scripture doctrine of man’s 
 being in a state of degradation ;~—you. cannot feel 
 _ much difficulty im owning the, fact, though unable 
 to explain it in all respects. 
 
 Nor can any valid objection lie against the doc» 
 trine, of this degradation being in consequence of 
 the crime of our first parents; for the whole ana- 
 logy of nature shews, that the crimes of parents 
 often entail in this world, not only misery, but irre. 
 mediable misery, poverty, and ruin, upon. their 
 posterity: and the constant use of means or medi- 
 ation in the natural world, in communicating good 
 from maa to man, removes all objection: against 
 the general doctrine of Christ’s interposition to reco- 
 ver the world, and to reconcile us to God. 
 
 But it may be necessary, sixthly, to consider the 
 particular manner in which the Scriptures represent 
 Christ as our mediator: and’ this will be best done 
 by considering him, as divines: generally do}: asia 
 prophet, aking, and a priest. A SRNR! eR biD 
 
142 | On the Appointment of a Mediator. 
 
 Now as'a prophet he taught men the way of 
 God in truth, and how he ought to be obeyed and 
 served. He republished the law of nature with 
 increased clearness and obligations ; and informed 
 us of many things which reason of itself could not 
 have discovered. He distinctly revealed the man- 
 ner by which repentance might be made -efticacious, 
 and in which God ought to be worshipped; aad he 
 gave men the most certain assurance of their own 
 resurrection, and of a future state of rewards and 
 punishments. He left us also a perfect ex: ample 
 of purity and truth, and was in all respects the 
 prophet. . : | 
 
 As aking, he has a kingdom which is not of 
 this world. This kingdom is his church; or all 
 faithful and good men in the world, who live in 
 obedience to his laws, and who will be received by 
 ‘him into heaven. Over this kingdom he exercises | 
 an ivisible government and influence by his spirit ; 
 so that all his subjects may go through a proper 
 state of disciplme, and be fitted for that state of 
 happiness which he is gone to prepare for them. 
 And, as a king, he will come at the last day to re- 
 ward his faithful snbjects, and to pulley all those 
 who have resisted his authority. 
 
 And, asa priest, Clirist made atonement for us 
 by his own death and passion. Now | mention 
 . this last, because it is most objected against. But 
 
Onthe Appointment of a Mediator. 143 
 
 “you know that sacrifices were in use in all ages 
 among Gentiles and Jews; and that no good ac- 
 ‘count can be given of their origin, unless you sup- 
 pose them to origmate in revelation. You know 
 also the Gentiles thought, that. their sacrifices had 
 ‘an efficacy: aud as for the Jews, they were assured 
 ‘that their sacrifices had an ethcacy m some degree, 
 “when offered up in faith and piety; and also had a 
 typical reference to the sacrifice of Christ, who 
 now once in the end of the world appeared to put 
 away sin by the sacrifice of himself’ (Heb. ix. 26.). 
 But say you, how is Christ's death and passion, or 
 sacrifice, efficacious to the obtaiming of pardon from 
 God of our sias? T answer, I cannot tell, Nor 
 cai you teil, how the volition of your mind makes 
 your finger move, or ow rain and heat are effica- 
 cious to make a blade of grass grow. \ You have, 
 then, no right to object against the atonement of 
 Christ, because you cannot see how it is efficacious. 
 The gospel plaitly reveals its efficay; that through 
 it our repentance is accepted, and we are put into — 
 a state “or capacity of escaping future punishment, 
 and obtaining everlasting happiness. To object, 
 then, against Christ’s atonemeut, because you can= 
 not see how it is efficacious, is most unreasonable ; 
 for you cannot fully explain how any one thing in 
 nature produces the effects which you see it does 
 daily produce, 
 
he 
 
 144 On the iieccha of a Mediator. 
 
 But let us now, in the seventh place, briefly 
 review the observations already made on the ap- 
 poitment of a mediator. Now, since you neither 
 know how future punishment would bave followed 
 vice, nor the manner of its infliction, nor all the 
 reasons for its infliction; and since you know not 
 the particular nature of that happiness which Christ 
 has gone to prepare for his disciples, nor how far 
 any thing you could do, could of itself prevent 
 the future punishment of your crimes; it follows, 
 that antecedent to revelation, you could not tell 
 whether a mediator was or was not necessary to 
 prevent future punishment, and secure to you future 
 happiness. Let it then be supposed that a nie- 
 diator was necessary, you could not tell, antecedent 
 to revelation, what would be the whole of his 
 office, or what he should have to do or suffer in 
 fulfilling it. It follows, thea, that you are not 
 adequate to judge, what was or was not fit for him 
 to do or suffer; to object therefore against any thing 
 which he did or suffered, begause you do not see 
 all the reasons for it, or how it 1s efficacious, is te 
 the highest degree unreasonable. Surely it never 
 
 an follow that because we do not sce how the 
 po and passion of Christ avail to our redemp- 
 tion, that therefore they do not avail; and still 
 more especially, when you consider, that we do not 
 
 ~ 
 
#4 
 
 On the: Appointment of a Mediator. 145 
 
 now perfectly how any one thing ia nature avails 
 to produce another. | 
 But some’say, does not the doctrine of Christ? s 
 suffering for us, represent God as indifferent whether 
 he punishes the innocent or the guilty? But what 
 will this’ objection prove against ebristi: anity, that 
 it will not prove ‘in a much higher degree against the 
 whole scheme of nature. The world jis so. con« 
 stituted, that the innocent suffer daily for the faults: 
 of the guilty. [tis matter of constant experience, 
 that children suffer omaccount of the faults of their 
 parents ; and that. millions endure distress and pri- 
 vations on account of the evil passions of avery. 
 few. You cannot therefore hold such an objection, 
 unless you renounce even Deism, and profess your- 
 self an Atheist; and even then the objection would, _ 
 lie equally, as it does now upon supposition of a. 
 God, against the course of nature. Admit theres 
 fore that the world. is governed by God, which you 
 know I take for granted, and for any thing you can 
 tell to the contrary, the sutleriigs of Christ for US, 
 may be of the same kind, as. what we see takes 
 place in the world every day... Remember also that, 
 Chiist’s sufferings: were voluntary; whereas the. 
 sufferings of the great bulk of innocent people, on . 
 account of the faults of others, are wvoluntary. 
 {f then there is any force in this objection, it is, 
 
446 «On the Appointment of a Mediator. 
 
 “snore against the scheme.of nature than christianity. 
 
 more against the deist than the christian. It is true 
 that God will reward every man according to his 
 works: But this will be the completion of his plan 
 of moral government; and in conducting his plan to 
 this point, you cannot tell. but vicarious punishment 
 might. be necessary. You daily see numbers, who. 
 would be ruined in their temporal capacity, were it 
 not for the. interposition of others ; an interposition 
 which often costs them much pain,. trouble. and 
 grief: you. daily see that one: man’s sufferings | do 
 actually contribute to the benefit and relief of others 
 in. their present state; why then may not Christ's 
 sufferings be beneticial to us, in our religious capa- 
 city? According to the course of nature, i.e. the 
 appointment of God, vicarious, punishment occurs 
 antly among men, aud we are not surprized at 
 it,. nay, ‘we think. it natural 5 Christ's sufferings then 
 may even naturally contribute to procure for us the 
 highest benctits. _ Indeed, the whole of . the /ob- 
 are NOW consider ing, amounts to this ; 
 
 coust 
 
 jee tion we 
 that an appointment made by an tnfinite being, 
 cannot. be necessary OF expedient, because a finite 
 beimg cannot sec it necessary Or expedient. 
 
 Lastly; you have certainly no. reason to expect 
 
 the same information. respecting God’s conduct. and 
 
 appointments | as your own duty. » In nature God 
 
“On the Appointifient of a Mediator. 1&9 
 
 ‘instructs you, not by reason, but by experience; by 
 “experience he tells -you what are the bad conse- 
 quences of such and such actions, and how in general 
 you should act, though you know scarcely any thing 
 of the vast plans of ‘his providence. 50 also is it 
 “in religion : your duty is clearly revealed; but you 
 have no right to expect an equally clear revelation 
 of all his plans and appointivents in religion ; espe- 
 cially when you find you have it not in natural pro- 
 vidence. Because you do not see w hy God should 
 appoint a mediator, does it follow that he either 
 should or would not appoint ene? You cannot 
 understand or explain all the system of nature, why 
 tlien should you expect to be able to understand or 
 explain all the system of religion or grace! Surely 
 the deity may have reasons for his appointments 
 that we cannot.comprehend: but as for our duty 
 its reasons are plain; and the nature of the thing 
 speaks for itself. Our duty to observe public ine 
 stitutions in religion is evident; since without them, 
 at could neither be supported nor propagated among 
 mankind: and our regard, our worship and love to 
 Christ are hecessary ; since they arise from the rela- 
 tious m which he stands unto us. Supposing then 
 a mediator appointed by God, you have no more 
 voason to object against it, because you Cannot see 
 all the reasons for it; than you have to object against 
 a 
 
148 On the Appointment of a Mediator. 
 
 a medicine which cures you of a disease, because 
 you cannot, as you really cannot, see the mode of 
 its operation. | 
 
 I am yours, very sincerely, 
 
 SW 
 
ee cores eee 
 
 LETTER VI. 
 
 On Revelation not being universal; and its ‘Proof 
 being supposed to be defective. 
 
 Cheam, August, 1809. 
 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 THERE are some who think that a revelation” 
 cannot be true, if its evidence appears doubtful ; 
 because, say they, God would not leave it to rest 
 upon doubtful evidence : others:also object to reve= 
 Jation, because it is not universal. 
 
 But what do such objectors take for granted ¢ 
 " Why, what is most unreasonable; viz. that God 
 cannot bestow a favour upon man, unless he gives 
 it just in that manner in which we think he should ; 
 aud that he cannet bestow a blessing upon any one, 
 ‘unless he bestows it upon all. But docs not the. 
 whole analogy of nature contradict such suppositions, 
 and shew that such things cannot be taken for 
 granted? Kor myriads enjoy temporal advantages 
 
 HS 
 
150. On Revelation viol being universal; and 
 
 which myriads of others have not; and God gives 
 what may be called natural favours, in a way very 
 different from what we might expect. Have all 
 men the poctic talents of a Milton ; the mathema- 
 tical powers of a Newton'or-a Cotes ; or the reason- 
 ing capacity of a Locke? You see constant instances , 
 of one man’s superiority over another in his mind, 
 knowledge, state aud circumstances in common hfe. 
 God does grant favours to same, in their temporal 
 vapacity, which he does not grant to others; and 
 he grants those favours j in a way guite different from 
 what we might expect : to: suppose then that revela- 
 tion must be given as we might expect, is to suppose 
 What is in direct opposition to the whole analogy. 
 of nature, : b. 
 But stil some one serail says is not: the evidence” 
 for revelation doubtful? And if so, how can it) be» 
 from God? Well, let us. admit for the sake of are‘. 
 gument, that the evidence for revelation is doubtful 5.\: 
 and Task, have you always demonstrative: evidence 
 for your.temporal conduct? Do you always know 
 certainly ow you should act, as an mbhabitant’ of’ 
 this world merely? So far from this being the case, 
 you are obliged to act in general upon mere proba-:- 
 bility; and in numberless instances, in which’ the’ 
 probability is against your success. . This then being” 
 your state in your temporal capacity, and I take for’ 
 granted that this state is according to God’s appoitit-.. 
 
 # 
 
é ' if ius : . m ‘ * 
 zs Proof being supposed to be defective. 151 
 
 ment, it follows, that you cannot object to revelav 
 tion, the doubtfulness of its evidence; since the. 
 evidence for your conduct even in “common life is” 
 doubtful. The farmer ‘does. not know demon- 
 straticely that he shall have a crop next year, which’ 
 will be worth his labour and expence in preparing 
 the ground; but you would not think him wise, if — 
 he neglected to pr epare his ground for want of de- 
 monstrative evidence of a good crop next year. 
 The evidence, ‘or proof of success in men’s tem- 
 poral affairs, seems to hang constantly in doubt, in 
 consequence of their liability to change of temper 
 ‘and taste ; and in consequence of their exposure to 
 ill health, to accidents, and untimely death. The 
 best arranged plans are liable to many and great 
 objections; and ‘yet men do and ought to undertake 
 them, because of the good which will result from 
 them if successful’: but yet all plans of worldly and 
 temporal prudence are so precarious, that success’ 
 at best is but probable. The deceit of others also | 
 often” imposes en us; and hence it becomes very 
 doubtful in numberless cases how we should act In 
 our temporal capacity : and yet act we must, and 
 according to what is prudent and right. Look at 
 the gifts of Providence, and you will find them 
 given. in the most promiscuous way; you will find, 
 
 that as no two persons are exactly alike in shape and- 
 features, | 80 no two are exactly alike in capacity, 
 
 H 4 
 
132 On Revelation not being universal ; and 
 
 constitution and temper, or in the circumstances of, 
 their temporal state. Some have »almost: every, 
 natural means of success aud improyement ; whilst, 
 others have to struggle with constant difficulties and, 
 “opposition. And yet, amidst afl this uncertamty 
 and inequality, there is‘ such a thing as\a_ proper, 
 
 prudent conduct, which men are bound to observe 3 
 
 and which they must observe, if they wish to. pass 
 through hfe with any comfort whatever: So also in 
 religion, admitting its evidence to be, doubtful, there 
 ig an atteution and regard of ithe bint A degree due. 
 ‘to it. 
 
 tions, you will perceive, that even they have ap- 
 peared at different times with different degrees, of: 
 evidence to those who believed in them. The Jews,, 
 who ‘ved from the times of Moses to the captivity, 
 had stronger evidence for the trith of their religion}: 
 than they who lived from the times of the captivity 
 to the coming of Christ.. And the first Christians, 
 in consequence w seeing the miracles which were 
 wrought in proof of the Gospel, and the change, 
 which took place in men’s lives in consequence of 
 believing it, had stronger evidence of its truth than. 
 we have. And, on the other hand, we, or future, 
 penergtions, may have proofs of its truth which 
 they could not have ; for we may see the fulfilment 
 of many important prophecies which they could 
 
 “ 
 
 eas 
 
 If you consider the J pst wd Chi istian deel, | 
 
its Proof being supposed to be defectives 153 
 
 not see. Moreover only suppose, as is indeed the 
 fact, that some nations, as well as dividuals, have 
 received no light from the scriptures ;—that, others 
 have had some indirect: advantages from them, but 
 yet never properly enjoyed either them  or-their 
 evidence ;—that some have had the scriptures fully, 
 but yet have had them mixed with the greatest 
 fables, false miracles, and corruptions ;—and_, that 
 others, who have them in their genuine simplicity, 
 are yet very ignorant of their contents, and know 
 little. more than how they ought m general to re- 
 gulate . their lives: I say, suppose all this, and you 
 may. easily find clear analogies in the course and 
 natural government of the world, which will cor- 
 respond with it. You will find that the same things 
 hold good in our temporal as well as in our religious 
 capacity : that civilization, for instance, is at a high 
 pitch in some countries, though many crimes are 
 committed and much ignorance subsists in them ;—- 
 that in other countries the people are just emerging 
 from barbarism ;—and that in others they are mere 
 savages. | ‘ 
 
 Nor is there any thing harsh im man’s. religious 
 state being so unequal, when you reflect, that every 
 man shall be dealt with equitably; and that God 
 will make us accountable for what we have, and not 
 for what he never gave us. But because some men 
 have only a little light or knowledge in matters of 
 
 HO 
 
454 On Revelation not being universal; and 
 religion, are “they not to strive to get more? It 
 “might as‘well be’affirmed, that'a man, ignorant 18 
 
 liis temporal capacity, should not endeavour to_ 
 
 increase his knowledge. Every thing also in the 
 natural cecononiy of the world is progressive, and 
 even like things vary very much in their state - and 
 circumstances. Christianity, therefore, for any thing 
 we can tell, should also be progressive both among 
 
 nations and individuals; there may be wise reasons. 
 
 why the state of man should in religion be similar 
 to what it is in temporals ;—should be very various 
 and different. There may. be wise and just reasons, 
 in the general conduct of Providence, why creatures 
 of like moral capacity should, as it respects religion, 
 be placed in different. circumstances. Every day’s 
 experience shews them differently situated, as it 
 respects their present temporal capacity; the same 
 thing then may be perfectly proper and nght m 
 their religious capacity. 
 
 Indecd the system both of natural and revealed 
 
 religion imphes great variety; for as a system, it 
 must consist of very different and various parts. 
 
 “Way, let revelation be universal ; yet even then men’s 
 feligions state would be very different: for the dif- 
 
 ference in their capacities, their length of life, and 
 external circumstances; the variety m their bodily 
 health and constitution, and’ in their tempers and 
 dispositions, would make perhaps as much Inequas 
 
ats Prag being supposed t to be defective. 155 
 
 lity in their religious state as now atten exists. 
 But should any still complain, either of their own 
 or thé circumstances of others in religion, let them 
 attend to the following practical reflections. 
 
 te 
 Fs 
 
 First, then, there is no reason why the exercise 
 
 of our understanding upon religion and its evidence, 
 may not form: “part of our state of probation : and 
 hence, it may form a par ticular part of some men’s 
 moral trial, that the evidence of christianity appears 
 doubtfal ‘to them. The very doubtfulness of the 
 evidence, admitting it to be doubtful, gives scope 
 
 for the exercise of a virtuous examination, or a- 
 
 vitious tieglect of its truth. Our understanding, as 
 well as our general conduct, is much under our own 
 power ; we are therefore-accountable for its use: 
 and” there is no doubt, but the same inward prin-. 
 ciple, which incites a man to obey the precepts of 
 christianity after a conviction of its truth, would 
 
 also’ invite’ hima diligently to examine its evidence | 
 
 before a’ conviction of its truth, To neglect the 
 due consideration of the truth and evidence of 
 
 * o . > . f . . } : Cod 4 
 christianity, smee itis a matter of such vast import- 
 
 ance, is really as immoral ‘and depraved, as to live 
 
 vitiously when you believe it: and, on the other 
 
 hand, seriously to weigh its evidence, is the exercise 
 
 of a right general moral principle and disposition. 
 
 Hence, ‘nigh; it follows, that the consideration of’ 
 
 the truth and evidence of christianity, affords see pe 
 nu 6 
 
156 On. Revelation not being universal; and. 
 
 and opportunity for right and wrong behaviour, as 
 much as any thing can do. | Tti is admitted, that the. 
 evidence of the truth of christianity 3 is not intuitive ; 
 duly then to consider that evidence affords great op- 
 portunity for religious probation : and as men attend 
 to and treat the subject, so do they shew what is. 
 their moral character, and what is. in their hearts. 
 But, secondly, suppose that the, evidence, of , 
 christianity is doubtful to the highest supposeable 
 degree, yet even then you will be in a state of 
 . general probation. For if you had the least suspi-, 
 cion that you owed all your temporal welfare to. the., : 
 interest and kindness of a certam person, you ‘could | 
 not, if you had any gratitude or even prudence,. 
 you could not regard him with the same indifference, 
 as if vou had xo such suspicion: so also, the least | 
 suspicion that christianity is true, and that your 
 spiritual welfare depends on Christ, Jays you under , 
 a positive obligation to regard him. Certainty and 
 doubt are assuredly very differeut things; but doubt 
 itself implies some degree of evidence:, aud hence,,, 
 
 Fhe he 
 
 in a subject of such moment as. christianity, ev@n 
 
 doubt should beget in you a serious. practical appre- . 
 hension of its truth. The very possilility of the. 
 truth of christianity binds us, on every: praciple of 
 common sense and prudence, to be anxious about — 
 -.xeligion, whether natural or revealed;—to keep. at 
 the auwaost distance from every degree of profane- 
 
ats Proof being supposed to be defective. 157 
 
 ness ;——and to maintain great reverence for a subject. 
 of such high importance. So that in reality there 
 is very little difference between the moral obligations, 
 of those who fully believe christianity, and those. 
 who do not believe it; the difference is much less. 
 than men m general seem to think. And. hence, 
 even they who. doubt, are bound to form m then 
 that character, of which they are, who. truly and, 
 practically believe the Gospel. Those alse, who 
 doubt, should remember, that they do more harm 
 or good in society, by their contempt or regard for 
 christianity, than they can do by behaving ill or 
 well in the common concerns of life: and hence 
 they must be accountable for their regard of it, even 
 admitting its evidence to be doubtful. In common 
 life men are often bound to act upon the lowest 
 degree, of probability ;. surely then they must not, 
 suppose that they. are not bound to actin the matter, 
 of christianity, unless the evidence be overbearing 
 aud demonstrative. , wi we , 
 
 _ But, thirdly, the Bificaltien, or, the duchtatecais) 
 of the evidence of chyistianity, may be a matter of 
 moral trial to some; in the same way as temptations. 
 to vice, and difficulties in the discharge of practical 
 duty, aye a moral trial ta others. Difficulties in the 
 discharge of duty improve, our moral state and cha- 
 racter 3 so also may difficulties im the. evidence of, 
 christianity, kn this world it is plain that we.are in 
 
158 On Revelation not being universal; and 
 
 a state of frial and temptation, ; “and that the dangers * 
 of our state serve to shew, what 1 is our real cha- 
 racter; so also, some men’s particular trial of Cha 
 racter, may be the difficulties which they find in the 
 
 evidence of religion: for many appear to hive little” 
 or no difficulty in the discharge of the common 
 duties of life, who yet are not satisfied respecting’ 
 the truth of christianity. “And this Seems to be the | 
 touch stone for tke trial of their character 5 for the ' 
 
 importance of christianity makes it a subject of the 
 deepest speculative and practical attention. It is no’ 
 more a reason why men should reject revelation, 
 becatise its eviderice is doubtful; than that they” 
 should do what may ruin their temporal interest, 
 because the evidence is, asin fact it often is, 
 doubtful, whether they will be detected. ‘The very 
 
 difficulties, which’ attend the evidence of ravelatiba” 
 demand, ‘and are a ground for more care and atten- 
 tion in examining it; and for a greater exercise of | 
 
 that virtuous principle, which yields” to any real,” 
 though doubtful evidence. Men’ are nolan ace 
 for their internal as well as their external conduet + 
 aid they are bound duly to exercisé their reasoning’ 
 
 powers, as wéll as their bodily faculties. “But some’ 
 
 seem in general to exercise theit bodily faculties 
 aright, and to have little or no trouble in conducting | 
 themselves properly, who may yet need a higher 
 discipline j—the discipline of the mind. They may” 
 
 ¢ 
 
 ty =, 
 
 Pi 
 
its\Proof being supposed to be defective. 169. 
 
 need.a discipline, by which they must-give a greater 
 proof of their moral character than mere external 
 conduct can amount'to. it ut 
 Hitherto -I have supposed. hint men’s. doubts 
 about revelation do not arise from any fault of 
 their own: but is this always, or often the case’? 
 Do. their ‘doubts never arise from carelessness or 
 levity? It is'to be feared they eften do. If men, 
 beforehand, secretly wish christianity was not true ;—= 
 if they are more attentive to objections than positive. 
 evidence, and: indulge a spirit. of cavil and ride 
 cule ;—if they look more at human error than divine - 
 truth ;--and many do all this;—then surely such 
 people are not in a likely way to see the truth of 
 christianity, though its proof amounted to demon- 
 stration. You know, that if men become careless 
 and frivolous in thinking of and managing their 
 temporal affairs, they impair their capacity of 
 reasoning, and lose, or lessen their power of prudent 
 conduct: so also is it in religion; for by indulging’ 
 an improper temper and disposition on‘ the subject, 
 they render themselves incapable of perceiving what 
 is true. ‘They are hike men infatuated with ease and 
 pleasure, who neither can nor wish to sée’ their 
 danger. ‘The propositions im Euclid are reducible. 
 to intuitive principles; but yet niost ef these pro- 
 positions require great exercise of mind before their 
 truth can be ‘perceived; and numbers never é@o 
 I 
 
160 Cn Revelation not being universal; and 
 
 perceive it, because they will not take the necessary 
 trouble: so also in christianity, numbers from idle- 
 ness, from passion, and prejudice, may be incapable 
 of perceiving its truth ; and hence may be given up 
 to that ignorance and blindness, of which they 
 themselves are the cause. - pena sith 
 
 But whatever doubts some men ay raise about 
 either natural or revealed religion, yet the general 
 proof of both is level to the capacity of common 
 men ;—of those who are chiefly employed in pro 
 curing the necessaries of lite for themselves and 
 families. Common men ean see the proofs of the - 
 being of God, and of his moral government over 
 the world; avd they perceive also that he has given 
 them. a moral capacity, or a nature which must be 
 under moral regulation. They can see also that 
 christianity agrees with this moral nature; and that 
 aniracles were wroug'st, and prophecies completed 
 in proof of the Gospel. ‘But yet doubts may. be 
 raised against this proof; doubts which camot be 
 answered so as fully to satisfy mere curiosity. Nor 
 should you be surprised at this; for there is uo one 
 thing in nature about which doubts and difficulties 
 may not be raised, which cannot be answered. But 
 still the proof of christianity 1s not lost in these 
 doubts; it remains full and entire for all practical 
 purposes. And hence, if men will raise subtile 
 speculative difficulties about christianity, which may 
 
us. P roof being supposed to be defectives 16% 
 
 also be raised about ‘the most common | things in 
 nature, they are bound to examine it with vast care 
 and diligence; with much greater attention than 
 they generally do. But numbers are mere collectors 
 of objections, mere retailers of what they hear from 
 others; they will not seriously examine the subject, 
 and hence ‘they must remain. in ignorance, as_ they: 
 must do with regard to any science which they will 
 not study, | 
 
 » But still, some may object and. say, that if.a 
 prince or master were to give orders to his subjects 
 or. servants, he would take care that his orders should 
 not be doubtful either as it respects their authority, 
 or meaning. But the answer to this is easy. Lor 
 first, you know so little of the divine government, 
 that you cannot justly conclude, from what is merely. 
 human, what the divine ought to be: secondly, you 
 know that God does not give you ¢ertain proof and. 
 information ‘respecting your temporal affairs; you 
 are obliged incessantly to act upon mere probability, 
 and according to experience. God has so con- 
 stituted the world, as not to give you certain proof 
 or evidence of the manner in which you should 
 always act; what is most probable, not what is de- 
 monstrative, 1s the great rule of common life: and 
 if he has so constituted the course of the world, 
 why may it not be so in religion? But, thirdly, all 
 that a prince regards, is the dog or performing of 
 
~ 
 
 162 On Revelation not being universal; and 
 
 kis orders ; ‘he looks only to the accomplishment of 
 the external event, and is Indiffer ent to the motive 
 which influences his: subjects. “But God chiefly 
 regards the inotives of our actions ; and hence, our 
 fidelity to him is brought to ‘the test by those very’ 
 doubts which may be’ raised against revelation,’ 
 Moreover, if an earthly prince wished to prove and 
 try the loyalty of bis subjects, he would Ieave his’ 
 orders in doubt, that he might see how they would’ 
 act: the very doubtfulness of his’ orders would 
 afford an opportunity of proving their real ‘character. 
 So also God’s government is so’ constituted as to’ 
 prove what is in man, and to shew what he really is.’ 
 In matters of religion men must shew from what’ 
 principles they act, and whether a regard for God’ 
 and piety is their ruling motive ; and hence the very 
 doubtfulness in the evidence or proof of revelation’ 
 serves to prove their true character. . 
 ~ Finally, a state of religion necessartly implies in 
 this world a state of probation. Admit then that: 
 We are in a State of religion, and ‘there is no peculiar” 
 diffieulty in supposing that our probation may consist,’ 
 ina great degree, in being’ bound to -act upon 
 évidence which is not demonstrative, i. e. which is’ 
 doubtful; since this is “actually our temporal state, 
 for we must’ generally act, as inhabitants of- this’ 
 world, upon’ doubtful evidence. You cannot assert, 
 from the reason of the thing, that our religious 
 
its Proof being supposed to be defective. 163 
 
 trial can only be,, whether we will or will not act in’ 
 opposition to demonstrative evidence ; for ignorance 
 and doubt do as really give room and scope for pro- 
 batiow, as certainty and intuition, nay more so. It 
 is equally religious probation, to examine’ carefully 
 the evidence for revelation, and to act according to’ 
 that evidence, though doubtful; as it is to have 
 difficulties in obeying the precepts of revelation, 
 Indeed experience shews, that you cannot have that 
 evidence which is necessary for you'in your temporal: 
 capacity, unless you will take pains to acquire it: 
 you have to learn what you ought to do ; and often’ 
 to learn it’by long ahd’ painful attention. Men's’ 
 passions also and their prejudices very often deceive’ 
 them, so that they hide.or avoid the real evidence of | 
 a case : like men; whose affairs are desperate, they 
 will not éxamine the state of their accounts. Nor 
 is it mere idleness or profligacy that exposes us to 
 ruin in our temporal capacity; for very often our 
 
 ruin may be effected by what may be called small 
 
 imprudencies and want of care. Since then this is 
 our present state and condition in mere worldly 
 matters; those, who believe the constitution of the 
 world to be according to Ged’s appointment, have 
 no right to suppose that, in matters of revelation, — 
 they eught to be free from all care and attention, 
 either as it respects its evidence or its precepts. 
 They should reflect, that in common life they must- 
 
164 On Revelation not being universal ; Se. 
 
 necessarily act upon evidence which is much below: 
 what is commonly called probable ;—that they have 
 to guard, not only against what they fully believe 
 will happen, but against what they think.it possible 
 may happen ;—and that they must often engage in 
 pursuits when the probability is against their success. 
 Admitting then that the evidence for ‘revelation \is 
 doubtful ; yet still all levity and inattention. towards 
 a subject of such vast importance, must be to the 
 highest degree improper and. unreasonable. If re-. 
 velation should be true, and no. man can prove it 
 cannot, how awful must be their state who despise 
 and deride it, or even pass it over with. careless in- 
 difference. , , 
 
 ~ Yours, very affectionately, 
 | J.. W. 
 
165 ] 
 
 LETTER Vin” 
 
 On the positive or particular Evidence for 
 
 Christiant ty. 
 
 Cheam, Sept. 1809. - 
 
 MY DEAR SIR, 
 
 ~ 
 
 Ww E have hitherto been employed chiefly in con- 
 sidering the presupposed presumptions and objec- 
 tions against christianity or revelation; it remains 
 for us now to attend to the particular and positive 
 evidence or proof of its trath, and to compare that 
 evidence with the evidence which we admit in 
 common life, and upon which we must of necessity’ 
 act. It is but little indeed which I can state to you 
 upon this pomt, compared with what might be and 
 has been said upon it; [ would therefore take this 
 opportunity of recommending to your most careful 
 perusal, Grotius on the Truth of the Christian Re. 
 ligion; Bishop Newton on the Prophecies, and 
 Paley’s Evidences ; for in these works you will find: 
 
106 On the positive. or particular 
 
 the positive evidence for christianity detailed at 
 
 length, and with singular felicity and ability. The 
 view, which I shall present to you of the subject, 
 will be chiefly to shew how far it corresponds with 
 the analogy of nature, and the plain natural rule of 
 judging and acting im our common concerns and 
 temporal capacity. 
 
 Now. the direct and fundamental proofs. of chris- 
 tianity are two things, miracles and prophecy ; 
 and though there are many other proofs of great 
 weight, yet they ought always to be jomed with 
 these ‘two. . Let us then, first, consider imiracles 
 
 and prophecy ; and /point out what the analogy of 
 
 nature suggests in answer to objections made against 
 them: and, secondly, let us unite both the direct 
 and collateral evidence into one general argument ; 
 and hence we shall see, that the evidence and proofs 
 of the truth of christianity is a long series of things 
 reaching from the beginning of the world to the 
 present times; and that. the subject must be viewed 
 as one great. whole made up of many parts. 
 First, then, as it respects miracles, you must 
 mark, that there is the same Aistorical evidence for 
 the miracles of Moses andthe prophets, as for the 
 
 common civil history either. of themselves, or of the _ 
 
 kings and people of the Jews: so also, there is the 
 same historical evidence in the Gospels and the acts, 
 for the miracles of Christ and his Apostles, as for 
 
Loidence for Christianity. 167 
 
 the common events related in them. The miracles, 
 both of the Olid and New Testament, are related 
 in a plain unadorned narrative like. the common 
 matters of fact; they are told without ‘any attempt 
 to. surprise or please, which is not the case with 
 those authors, who make it their study to entertain, 
 and hence. introduce, the meation’ of miracles at 
 agreeablt intervals. Observe also, that those parts 
 of Scripture, which contain the account of miracles 
 sufficient in themselves to prove the truth of chris- 
 tianity, have been quoted.as genuine down from the 
 age in, which they were written. to the present times 3 
 and that no good account can be given of the estas 
 blishment, either of the Jewish or Christian religion, 
 but upon supposition of the miracles being wrought, 
 which are said to have been wrought when they were 
 founded. If you ask also, how came the Seripture 
 '- History. to, be received. in the world. as true, the 
 most plain and obvious answer. is, because. it is 
 true; nor can any other answer be given which wilh 
 fauly account for the fact: Hence then it follows, 
 that the Scripture History, both. of miracles and 
 common events, is an authentic genuine history ; 
 unless positive proof can, be given to. the contrar Vy’ 
 which never has, nor I believe, ever can be given :. 
 or at least, it follows, that the Scr ipture History, 
 both of miracles aud common events, cannot. be. 
 rejected as of no authority, | 
 
168 Ou the positive or particular 
 
 Secondly, it is plain that St. Paul’s Epistles, both 
 on account of the nature of epistolary writing, and 
 of their being addressed not to particular. persons 
 but to churches, carry an evidence of their being 
 genuine; and of the truth of christianity, beyond 
 mere historical narration. In particular, the first 
 Epistle to the Cormthians is proved cenuine by bemg 
 quoted by Clemens Romanus (Mp. 1. c. 47.) in an 
 epistle of his own addressed to that church. Indeed 
 the ‘genuineness of -St. Panl’s epistles cannot be 
 doubted by any particular pretext whatever, which 
 in such a case is the only thing to be regar ded; for, 
 as for doubts arising from general pretests, sagt 13 
 wo one matter of fact against which they may not 
 be raised. But on this subject, let me request you 
 carefully to pertise Paley’s Hore Pauline. Tlow- 
 ever, it may be of moment to observe, that 5t. 
 Paul’s testimony is to be considered as distinct from 
 the rest of the Apostles; for he declares (Gal. 1.) 
 that he received the Gospel not from man, but from: 
 Christ himself ;—that he (Rom. xv. 19. 2 Cor. Xil. 
 12.) had the power of working miracles s—and that 
 some (1. Cor. xiv.) abused their miraculous powers. 
 In many parts of his epistles, he also mentions 
 miraculous gifts and powers, asa thing well known 
 and quite familiar to those to whom he wrote; and 
 ebimetiities he speaks ‘of them quite incidentally ives 
 
Evidence for Christianity. 169 
 
 one would about a matter which is known to all 
 
 people. 
 - Observe, thirdly, it is an acknowledged fact, that 
 
 s 
 
 ‘christianity at first laid claim to belief upon the ground 
 of miracles being wrought in proof Of its divine ori- 
 _ gin; and that vast numbers did believe in it upon that 
 very ground. Now this particularly distingnishes 
 christianity, as including both the Old and New 
 Testament dispensations, from all other religions 3 
 for no other religion appears to lay claim to public 
 miracles for its foundation. Since then christianity 
 laid claim to belief upon the ground of miracles, and 
 vast numbers did believe in it upon that very ground, 
 and expose themselves to the greatest persecutions 
 and distresses on account of their attachment to the 
 Gospel; it follows, that they fully believed in the 
 miracles being wrought. Fence, then, we have, not 
 
 4 
 
 only the evidence of the Scriptures for the truth of - 
 
 the christian miracles, but the evidence also of the 
 first christians in addition: and ceriainly it is a great 
 
 corroboration to a history, when great numbers, co- | 
 
 temporary with the historian, bear testimony to the 
 same facts; as is the case with the first christians 
 and the writers of the New Testament history. But 
 perhaps you will say, men are credulous; true: but 
 are they not also suspicious, and backward to believe 
 
 What is strange; and still more, to practise what jg 
 
 against their ease and present quict? The persecu- 
 
 H 
 
170 On the positive or particular 
 
 tions, then, which the first christians underwent in 
 performing their duty as christians, and the natural 
 suspicion of the human mind, is more than a sufi- 
 cient answer to the argument, drawn from man’s 
 credulity, against the Gospel miracles. The edu- 
 cation, the manners,. and the prejudices of the first 
 christians, and the whole system of heathen worship 
 and civil power were in opposition to the Gospel ; 
 the conversion,’ then, of such numbers of men under 
 the circumstances which accompanied its first pro- 
 mulgation, is a strong presumption that christianity 
 rested upon a foundation of divine power and autho- 
 rity. 
 
 _ But it is said, im opposition to christianity, that 
 enthusiasm has often impelled men to sufter the 
 greatest hardships, and to give up their lives, for 
 the most idle follies and absurd opinions. Well; 
 without stopping to enquire about enthusiasm, which 
 after all very few people understand, let us grant 
 this; yet facts and opinions are guite different things ; 
 for no testimony can be a proof of wild or enthusi- 
 
 astic opinions, OF indeed of any opinions whatever ; 
 
 but testimony is, and ever must be, by the necessity 
 of our nature, a proof of facts. Hf, then, a person 
 dies in support of facts, which was really the case 
 with the Apostles, itis a proof that he believed those 
 facts: now there is no doubt the Apostles believed 
 
 the facts for which they suffered ; -and as they were 
 
Evidence for Christianity. 171 
 
 facts, of which they were competent to judge, and 
 of which their senses could determine, it follows, 
 that these facts, upon every mode of thinking and 
 acting in life, must be admitted as true. And not 
 only the Apostles, but the first ‘christiam martyrs also 
 -had full means of ascertaining the truth ef the Gospel 
 » miracles; and as they chose rather to suffer every 
 evil than deny those miracles, their testimony for 
 them is a proof of their truth. The Apostles and 
 first-martyrs gave their dying testimony ‘to the truth 
 of facts, of the truth of which they were perfectly 
 competent to judge; we are bound then to receive 
 
 their testimony according to every principle upen 
 
 which we act in life. _. a gad 
 
 But if men are enthusiastic, say you, does it not . 
 lessen the regard due to their testithony even of 
 facts? Well, let it be so: yet, ifsa ifmber of in- 
 telligent men, under no inrproper influence, assert 
 
 _ that they heard or saw such and such things, then is 
 such testimony the strongest you .can have for 
 
 any 
 fact, excepting that of your own senses. 
 
 Such tes. 
 timony you must receive, unless it asserts things ab-. 
 
 _solutely incredible in ti hemselves; or wnless it can be 
 
 opposed by contrary testimony of a proper kind. But 
 on the subject of christianity this cannot be done ; 
 
 for we have already shewn that it is not a thing in- 
 
 credible in itself; and you well kuow that there is 
 
 ho opposing testimony agai. it. For the truth of 
 12 | 
 
 =! 
 
s 
 
 172 On the positive or particular 
 
 those facts upon which christianity rests, you have 
 the testimony of numbers of honest, able, and up- 
 right men: to say, then, that enthusiasm lessens the 
 egard due: to their testimony, is really saying no- 
 thane against christianity; for this is taking for 
 granted that they were enthusiastic, which is not 
 admitted. Besides, it has been proved that revela- 
 tion is not a thing incredible im itself; and that mi- 
 racles are not incredible; and simce you have no 
 opposing testimony to that of the Apostles and first 
 martyrs respecting the christian miracles, you must 
 then either admit their testimony, or act contrary 
 to your whole conduct in-your temporal capacity. | 
 ‘Bat still, say some, might not the Apostles be 
 deceived; and hence, without intending it deceive 
 others? To this 1 answer, if men will make suppo- 
 
 ‘sitions, they may suppose any thing. But has it 
 
 ever been proved, even to the lowest degree of pro- 
 bability, that the Apostles were deceived? It never 
 has; and hence, to make suppositions of what might 
 be, and then to reason and act against christianity as 
 if the things were true, is, especially on such a ques- 
 tion, most unreasonable and absurd. When a mat- 
 ter of fact is tried before a jury, and the positive evi- 
 dence is all on one side, and no opposing evidence 
 en the other; would they give a verdict on the other 
 side, upon supposition that the witnesses, who gave - 
 the positive evidence, might be deceived? Surely, 
 
Lvidence for Christianity. 173 
 
 then, it is most unreasonable to refuse assent to the 
 Gospel upon supposition of what might be, when 
 there is such positive evidence for its truth. Men, 
 it is well known, are hable to deception and to great 
 wickedness, and hence often seek to deceive others ; 
 yet from the very constitution of our nature, human 
 testimony is and must be a proof of facts: surely, 
 then, the testimony of the Apostles ought to be re- 
 ceived, against whom no proof of being deceived, or 
 of endeavouring to deceive others, can be brought. 
 But is there not much historical evidence for fa- 
 bulous miracles, says another objecter? Granted: 
 yet this proves nothing against christianity; for fa- 
 bulous miracles have been proved such, but the chris- 
 tian miracles never have. When one evidence is 
 destroyed by contrary evidence, it does not follow 
 that another evidence is false, which is not confuted : 
 nor does it follow, that because a man of general 
 good character has been proved guilty of perjury in 
 a ease, with which another man of equally good cha- 
 racter had nothing to do, that therefore that other 
 man ought not to be trusted. Much less, then, does 
 it follow, that because some men have given their 
 testimony in support of miracles proved to be fabu- 
 lous, that therefore the testimony of the Aposties is 
 not to be received for the christian miracles, which 
 cannot be proved fabulous. Surely it was never sup~ 
 posed, that because seme men have been guilty of 
 
 cy 
 
 I» 
 
174 On the positive or particular 
 
 perjury in our courts of justice, that therefore no 
 human testimony ought to be received; and equally 
 absurd is it to suppose, that because some men have 
 borne testimony to fabulous miracles, that therefore 
 no testimony should be received for the christian mi- 
 ‘racles, which never have been shewn to be false. 
 Infme, though men from various causes are liable 
 to be deceived, and will often deceive others; and 
 though this may lessen, yet it never can destroy hu- 
 man testimony in any case: for nothing can destroy _ 
 ity excepting opposing testimony, or absclute incre- 
 dibility in the,thisg; ora proof or probability that 
 the persons who give evidence ‘are incompetent to 
 judge of what they assert, or are improperly influ- 
 enced. ‘Till this be done, the natural laws of hu- 
 man life lay us under an absolute necessity of admit- 
 ting human testimony: and men must not suppose, 
 that the great mass of historical evidence for the 
 christian miracles can be overturned by saying that 
 the Apostles might be deceived ; for in common life 
 no such reasoning can be’ admitted. Indeed, when 
 nien say, that’ the Apostles might be deceived, this 
 itself is a tacit confession that they think they perceive 
 some evidence for the truth of the Gospel mir acles ; 
 and if some, if any, then what an awful idea is It, 
 even at the least, that christianity may be true. 
 Having now laid before you a few reflections upon 
 the evidence for the christian miracles, and upon the 
 
Evidence for Christianity. 175 
 
 objections made against that evidence, let me pro- 
 ‘ceed to state to you a few brief observations upon 
 prop heey observations which are sug gested by the 
 natural and necessary rules of judging in matters of 
 common life. 
 
 First, then, let it be admitted that some parts of 
 the Scripture prophecies are obscure; yet this does 
 not invalidate the proof of foresight in those parts 
 which are understood, and which appear to be com- 
 pleted. Because you cannot discern cer tain objects 
 ata distance, so as to determine what they are ; it’ 
 does not follow, that you caimot distinguish objects 
 which are near to you: because you do not under- 
 stand add the passages of a book, it certainly does: 
 not follow that you understand vone of them. vit 
 you had a letter sent to you, part of which was plain, 
 and contained facts well known to most people, and 
 part in cypher, or in a language you did not under- 
 stand; you certainly would not suppose, that if you 
 understood the whole of the letter, it would thence 
 follow that the writer did not know the well known 
 facts which it contained. Now in Scripture there 
 are many prophecies which appear clearly and fully 
 accomplished; the ebscurities then which exist with 
 respect to some prophecies, cannot prove want of 
 foresight in others which are evidently fulfilled. 
 Common men, it is true, from want of education 
 and reading, cannot perceive the nunute accomplish- 
 
 1 4 
 
176 On the positive or particular 
 
 ment of several prophecies, nor, indeed, in some in- 
 stances can the most learned; yet still there is an 
 evident fulfilment, in a general way, of many pre- 
 dictions, which proves a foresight beyond what is 
 human ; and that certain events, which have taken 
 place, were intended by these very predictions. 
 Secondly, if a long series of prophecies can be 
 applied to a long series of events, this is a proof that 
 those prophecies intended these events. Nowa long 
 series of prophecies in the Scriptures can be applied 
 to a long serics of events; for there are many pre- 
 dictions, which were delivered at very ‘various and 
 distant times, which are applicable to Christ 3—to 
 the present siate of the christian church ;—and of the 
 pohtical kingdoms of the world: and this conformity 
 is a proof that these predictions were intended of 
 Christ, and the events to which they apply. Ifa 
 long satire was put into your hands, which you could 
 apply to the leading men, and principal. events in 
 policics of the present times; you would think you 
 had found out its meaning, and you would have good 
 ground for so thinking: in like manuer, since a long 
 series of Scripture prophecies, which were delivered 
 some thousands of years ago,. are applicable to 
 Christ, and to the present state both of the church 
 and of the political kingdoms of the world, it follows, 
 that these prophecies mtended these events, and are 
 a proof of more than human foresight. Upon this 
 
— Evidence for Christianity. 17 
 subject you should also remember that the Jews, 
 before the coming of Christ, interpreted the pro- 
 phecies respecting him in much the same way as we 
 do now after his coming; and that the primitive 
 christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the 
 church and the state of the world from the times of 
 Christ to the present times, as events seem to have 
 very clearly fulfilled. : 7 
 
 But, thirdly, let it be admitted that the prophets 
 did not understand the full meaning of their predic- 
 tions, and that their predictions are capable of being 
 applied to other events than those to which cliristians 
 in general apply them; yet even this will not confute 
 the argument drawn from prophecy in support of 
 christianity. For observe, first, the meaning of a 
 book or writing, is nothing but the meaning of the 
 author. But the prophets are not properly the au- 
 thors of their predictions, or the writings which con- 
 tain them; for to say they are, Is to take for granted 
 that they were not inspired, the very thing which 
 . the deist has to prove: and if not properly the au- 
 thors of their predictions, then it follows, that what 
 they might think their meaning is not necessarily $0. 
 Observe, secondly, that if a man was to compile a 
 book from original documents furnished. him bya 
 person of much superior knowledge, and who pera 
 fectly understood the documents; it would not fol- 
 low, that you knew the whole meaning of the book 
 
 Lo 
 
178 On the positive or particular 
 
 because you knew the whole meaning of the com- 
 piler; for itis plam, the compiler might in many 
 things be mistaken. Supposing, then, that the pro- 
 phets were inspired, it follows that they can only be 
 considered as compilers ; and hence their predictions 
 may have a further meaning than what they saw and 
 understood. The question, then, is not what the 
 prophets thought was the meaning of their predic- 
 tions, no, nor what we may think is the meaning ; 
 but, has a series of prophecies been fulfilled ma 
 natural and proper sense of the words? And this 
 certainly has been done, so as to give decisive proof 
 of foresight more than human, mdependent of what 
 the prophets might think was the meaning of their 
 predictions. ‘There certainly is a series of prophe- 
 cies applicable to Christ, and to the present state of 
 the world and of the christian church, so as to im- 
 ply and prove more than human foresight, and hence 
 to shew that these prophecies were from God. 
 But let us now proceed to the second division of 
 
 this subject, and unite in one view the direct and 
 
 circumstantial evidence for christianity: but to. do 
 this at any proper length would require a very large 
 work of itself; you must not then expect any thing 
 more than a mere outline of the subject, if so much. 
 It may also be necessary to state, before we enter 
 immediately upon the subject, that the evidence for 
 the truth of the Gospel is not merely certain direct 
 
 - 
 
Evidence for Christianity. 179 : 
 
 and express things, but others also whieh are cir~: 
 cumstantial ; and that all of ‘them, both direct and 
 circumstantial, are to be united im one great argu-— 
 ment, as well as to be considered separ ately. You 
 should remember also, that all questions of evidence 
 are determined by considering what is circumstantial 
 as well as what is direct, and uniting them together ; 
 and that very often we must determine matters of 
 fact by circumstantial evidence only. 
 
 Now, what we assert and enquire into is this,— 
 that God by external revelation, in addition to our 
 natural. reason and affections, has given us an ac- 
 count of himself, and of his moral government over 
 the world; a moral government which includes 
 future state of rewards and punishments: and that 
 he has also given usa particular dispensation of Pro- 
 vidence, called the Gospel, which human reason 
 never could have discovered; and which contains a 
 particular system of religion for the recovery of man 
 from his present wretched and sinful state. 
 
 Now this revelation may be considered as wholly 
 historical : for its prophecies are the history of events 
 before they occur; and its doctrines may be treated 
 as facts, As a history it particularly treats of the 
 world as God's world: it shews us that he made it; 
 —that he is the only object of worship ;—and that 
 the idols and gods whith the heathens worshipped 
 
 were no gods. It shews us (John, 1. 3. and Ephes, 
 
 16 
 
180 On the positive or particular 
 
 ii. 9.) that God created all things by Jesus Christ;— 
 it gives us the religious history of mankind in all ages ; 
 —-and points out the fate of mighty empires, such as 
 Babylon, Greece, and Rome, so far as they were 
 connected with that religious history: in short, it 
 gives us the history of religion from the beginning 
 of the world, when the first transgression took place, 
 to the consummation of all things. Now consider 
 what a vast space of time all this occupies; and 
 that six thousand years of it are already nearly 
 elapsed: think also, what a vast number and variety 
 of minor things are mentioned in the Scriptures as 
 - connected with the greater and more important; so 
 that if there was any possibility of confuting either 
 the greater or the less there is full scope, from the 
 length of time they occupy, and from their number 
 and variety, to do it. But neither the greater nor 
 the minor points of the Scripture prophetic history 
 can be confuted, or shewn to have nothing in them, 
 by any historical evidence whatever ; all the learning 
 and improvements. of this enquiring age cannot over- 
 turn either the Scripture facts or prophecies: and 
 hence, though it should be admitted that the evi- 
 dence for revelation is doubtful, yet-this very doubt- 
 fulness implies a positive argument for its truth, or 
 at least that there is something for its truth; for if . 
 it could have been proved false, or to have nothing 
 in it, this certainly would have been done long ago. 
 
Evidence for Christian ity. 191 
 
 In addition to the religious history of the world, 
 the Old Testament contains first a chronological ac- 
 count of things and a genealogy of persons, from the 
 beginning of the world downwards for between two 
 or three thousand years. It gives, secondly, an ac- 
 count of God's selecting a particular nation, ~the 
 Jews, to be his people in a peculiar sense; and it 
 informs us of the miracles which he wrought in their 
 behalf, and of his threatenings to make them a re- 
 proach and a bye word among all nations, if they 
 fell into general idolatry. It predicts, thirdly, that 
 for the disobedience and idolatry of the J ews, God 
 would scatter them among all nations: ; but that he 
 would restore them again to their country. And, 
 (Deut. xxviii. 64. and xxx. 2, 3. Is. xlv. 17. and 
 
 Ix. 21, Jer. xxx. 11. and xlvi. 8. and xxxi. 86737. 
 Amos ix. 15.) in the fourth place, that though God 
 would make a full end of all other nations, yet he 
 would not make a full end of them. It also fore- 
 told, fifthly, that a great person » the Messiah, should 
 come into the world, in whom eventually all God’s — 
 promises would be finally fulfilled: and it is a cere 
 tain fact, that in consequence of the predictions con- 
 cerning this personage, a very general expectation of 
 him prevailed in the world,-at the time when Christ 
 made his appearance. It also foretold, sixthly, that - 
 the Messiah would be rejected by the J ews; but 
 thas the Gentiles would believe on him. And, lastly, 
 
182 On the positive or particular 
 
 the New Testament informs’ us, that at the very 
 
 time, when men were expecting the Messiah, a 
 person did rise up among the Jews, who claimed 
 that title:—that he spent some time in working’ 
 
 many aud great miracles, and that he gave his im- 
 mediate followers and disciples power to perform 
 
 the same ;—and that his disciples made numerous - 
 converts throughout the world, of the religious state 
 
 of which the New Testament professes to give an 
 account to its very end. 
 Now let us suppose a person totally ignorant of 
 
 revelation to have all this told him. Or suppose 
 
 you were ta put the Scriptures into his hands, and 
 he should ask if the whole was not a fiction; and 
 that you, instead of telling him whether you thowht 
 it'a fiction or not, should tell him the following cer- 
 tain facts. | 
 
 Tell.him, first, that the belief im one God, and 
 
 that virtue is his law;—and the belief also that man 
 will be hereafter punished or rewarded according to 
 
 his works in this life, 1s chiefly owing to the Scrip- 
 tures, yea even in those countries, such as the maho- 
 mietan, which do not acknowledge their proper au- 
 thority: tell him, further, that many nations do ac-~ 
 
 knowledge their proper authority; and certainly he 
 must think that the Scriptures are a most wonderful’ 
 
 book, and deserving the most serious attention. Let 
 him consider the importance of religion to mankind, 
 
 ¥ 
 
 rgd 
 
Evidence for Christ lanitys 183 
 
 and how much their temporal advantage is connected 
 with its observance ; and surely he must think ita 
 great proof in favour of the Scriptures, that they 
 have so much promoted religion, by giving just ideas 
 of God, and of a future state of rewards and punish- 
 ments. Let him be told, secondly, of the known 
 antiquity of the first parts of the Bible; and that its 
 chronology, and account of the first peopling of the 
 world, are confirmed by common histor y,—by the 
 State of the earth,—and by the late invention of arts 
 and sciences. ‘Tell him, what is the fact, that as 
 the whole Bible-history of common events is con-' 
 firmed by the state of the world and by other wri- 
 tings; so the whole history itse/f contains nothing 
 for any reasonable ground of suspicion either of its 
 truth or accuracy: tell him, that it relates manners 
 and events suitable to the times in which they are 
 said to have existed; and that the Scriptures bear 
 evident inéernal marks of truth and veracity. And 
 certainly he would think all this very much in favour 
 of the Scriptures; and still more so, when he was 
 informed, that as the New Testament confirmed the 
 Old; so the New Testament itself is confirmed to a 
 very high degree by pagan authors. And hence he 
 would think, that as the common Scripture history 
 is rendered so credible by different means; so also 
 is its miraculous history rendered credible by the 
 
184 On the positive or particular 
 
 common, since the one implies and is connected 
 with the other. | 
 
 Let him be told, thirdly, what is an acknowledged 
 fact, that there was a nation, the Jews, whose very 
 being as a nation depended upon their belief and 
 worship of one only God;—that as a nation they 
 did worship him, while all other nations were sunk 
 in idolatry ;—and that, though they frequently fell 
 into idol worship, yet still the belief and worship of 
 one only God was revived and is preserved to this 
 day among them. Fourthly, tell this man, supposed 
 wholly ignorant of history, that a person claiming to 
 be the Messiah sprung up among the Jews at the 
 very time when from former prophecies they ex- 
 pected him ;—that also, according to prophecy, they 
 rejected him and put him to death, but that soon 
 afterwards, upon the evidence of miracles, he was 
 “believed on by numbers of Gentile nations. Tell 
 him also, that Christ’s religion, in a short time, 
 spread itself over a great part of the world, and sup- 
 ported itself im spite of the greatest opposition. and 
 persecutions; but that the Jews, because they re- 
 jected the Messiah, were dispersed over the earth, 
 as had been foretold long before. Tell him further, 
 that though the Jews are dispersed over the whole 
 world, yet they still remain a distinct people, ac- 
 cording to predictions which were delivered some 
 
Neidence for Christianity. 183 
 
 thousands of years ago: and that their preservation, 
 according to prophecy, looks forward to something 
 yet to come, when they also will believe on that 
 Messiah whom they once rejected. 
 
 Finally, let such a person, who does not know 
 whether the Scriptures are a fiction or not, be told 
 these positive facts; and let him compare them with 
 the Scripture prophecies. Let him know, that so 
 far as the belief and worship of one God prevails in 
 the world, it is either dir ectly or indirectly by means 
 of the Scriptures ;—that the Bible is a book of ac- 
 
 -knowledged antiquity, and that its common history 
 and chronology are highly credible. Let him know, 
 that the Jews were once the people of God in a 
 peculiar sense ; and that they expected a Messiah, 
 in consequence of predictions which had been for 
 ages delivered to them ;—and that a person did arise 
 among them, at the very time when they expected 
 the Messiah, who laid claim to that distinction : tell 
 him that the Jews rejected this person, but that the 
 Gentiles, through the evidence of miracles, believed 
 on him; but that the Jews, as had been predicted, 
 were dispersed through the world. Tell him also, 
 that though the Jews are dispersed through the 
 world, yet they still remain a distinct people; and 
 seem to be reserved for some great future event, 
 when they will believe on Christ. Tinally let him 
 know, that the present state of the christian church, 
 
186 On the shai or particu lar 
 
 and of sever: al kingdoms, such as of Babylon, Grecce, 
 and Egypt, and of many other countries, exactly cor- 
 responds with what is predicted im the Scriptures re- 
 specting them: and surely in all this he would ac- 
 knowledge that there is some thing more than human ; 
 and that at least there is an evident probabi lity of 
 foresight,—of something divine. He must see, that 
 all these things, when ‘put together, amount to a 
 great mass of evidence, which nothing but the most 
 culpable negligence or prejudice can overlook. He 
 must acknowledge, that the evidence for the truth of 
 the Scripture miracles, and the conformity of events 
 with Scripture prophecies, amounts to something ; 
 to something upon which every prudent man should 
 act, and upon which iu the common affans of = 
 he would be obliged to act. 
 
 ‘It cannot be reasonably supposed, that the con- 
 formity of so many great and important events with 
 _ prophecy could be by accident; and if not by accl~ 
 dent, then is the proof for revelation decisive. So 
 Jong as revelation cannot be proved absolutely false, 
 we are under the most awful responsibility for our 
 conduct and behaviour; indeed the very possibility 
 of its truth, as I have often told you, imposes upon 
 us the greatest attention to our principles, and te 
 our lives and conversation. 
 
 Finally, as there is no presumption beforehand, 
 nothing in the nature of the thing against a revela~ 
 
Evidence fer Christianity. 187 
 
 ' 
 tion; and as christianity, both in general and in its 
 particulars, is conformable to the present course of 
 nature, and as there is positive evidence for its truth ; 
 it follows, that to reject or despise christianity, must 
 be to act in opposition to every practical principle 
 of commen life, 
 
 Iam, yours, very sincerely, - 
 
 J. W. 
 
LETTER VIL. 
 
 On Objections against arguing from the Analogy 
 of Nature in Defence of Religion. 
 
 Cheam, October, 1809. 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 It is by no means unlikely but some thoughtful 
 men, as well as those who can give their opinion 
 of matters without considering them, and censure 
 without knowing the real case, may object to our 
 manner of answering objections against natural and 
 revealed religion. ~'They may say:— it is a poor 
 thing to endeavour to solve the difficulties of revela- 
 tion, by telling us that there are the same difficulties 
 in natural religion; when we want the difficulties of 
 both removed. ‘They may alledge, that it is a strange 
 way of convincing men of their religious obligations, 
 and of reconciling them to doubtful evidence in the 
 matter of christianity; to tell them, that they are 
 obliged to act upon’ doubtful evidence in their tem.- 
 poral conduct; and they may say, it is equally 
 strange to vindicate the justice anc goodness of God, 
 
On Objections against arguing, &c. 189 
 
 and the reasonableness of certain things in religion; 
 by shewing that like objections lie against natural 
 providence. They may also add, that at best. the 
 reasoning adopted in these letters must leave the 
 mind in a state of great doubt; and that it is not 
 likely men will forego their present pleasures from a 
 regard to religion supported only by doubtful evi- 
 dence.” | oe | 
 
 Let us then attend to these objections, and per- 
 haps something may be advaneed which will tend 
 to silence thoughtless reasoners and talkers; and to 
 assist those who are really serious in matters of this 
 ‘nature. Iirst, then, what do. such objections not 
 only imply, but directly require? They require that 
 all difficulties should be removed on questions re- 
 specting the divine government. And surely this is 
 wanting to know too much; for itis in fact wanting 
 to know the divine nature, and the plan and manner 
 of eternal Providence. But certainly no creature 
 like man, a creature of such limited powers and fa- 
 culties, can understand this; it is necessarily beyond 
 his reach and comprehension, and therefore it must 
 be absurd to desire it. To argue from what is 
 known to what is disputed, is a fair and proper 
 mode of reasoning; it is what we do constantly in 
 the concerns of life: to argue, then, from natural to 
 revealed religion, is perfectly just aud proper; and 
 to solve the difficulties of the latter by the former, 
 
190 On Objections against arguing 
 
 110 more deserves the epithet poor, than the process 
 of our reasoning in every case of common life. And 
 sndeed it must be admitted, that the epithet poor 
 may be applied to almost the whole of our know- 
 ledge in our temporal capacity ; for certainly it is a 
 poor thing that the wisest physicians know so little 
 ofthe nature and cure of diseases, which involve the 
 life of man; and also a poor thing that the wisest 
 philosopher is not able to answer questions which a 
 child can propose: and yet poor as all this is, still 
 you are well assured, that our knowledge both of 
 natural philosophy and medicine 1s infinitely better 
 than absolute ignorance. So also the knowledge, - 
 avhich we can and may obtain in matters of religion, 
 is infinitely better than none at all. Observe, fur- 
 ther, it is 6f great importance to shew, that the ob- 
 jections which are made against revealed are ulti- 
 mately levelled against natural religion ; im order that 
 men may see to what their objections tend ; and that 
 while they pretend a regard to natural religion, they 
 are really domg ail they can to lessen its miluence 
 upon men’s minds. If you do admit natural religion 
 to be true, then must the objections made against 
 revelation fall to the ground; for we have seen that 
 the same objections may be made agamst what you 
 allow, as against what you deny. In fact, the ob- 
 jections which are made against christianity, are of 
 the same kind with those which may be made against 
 2 
 
from the Analogy of Nature, Sc. 191 
 
 both natural religion, and the common course of na- 
 tural providence : admit then that there is a righteous 
 Governor of the world, and your objections against 
 revelation are invalid; and christianity may be vin- 
 dicated from its conformity to the constitution and 
 course of nature, as well as s from its analogy to na- 
 tural religion. 
 
 But, secondly, you must ever bear in mind that 
 religion is a practical thing; and tends, if you take 
 ‘its truth for granted, to promote net only your pre- 
 
 sent but your future happiness. Now, convince a 
 man, that attention to religion is as necessary to se- 
 cure his future happiness, as prudence is to secure 
 his temporal welfare, and he must certainly think it 
 his duty to reg ard it; for he knows that prudence is 
 essentially necessary to his worldly prosperity and 
 “peace. Let us suppose, what indeed I take for 
 granted, that a due regard to religion is as hkely to 
 secure a man’s future happiness, as prudence is to 
 obtain temporal success; and it must follow, that if 
 his future happiness be of more importance than 
 his present, if eternal things be of more moment 
 than temporal, he will see greater reason for secur- 
 ing the former than the latter. But still an objector 
 will say, if religion were true, it would not be left 
 upon doubtful evidence ; and since its evidence is 
 doubtful, this is a presumption that it is not true. 
 _ But what does the word doubtful here mean? why, 
 
192 On Obj ctions against arguiiig 
 
 that the evidence for religion is not intuitive or de- 
 monstrative. But, im. our affairs in life, we are 
 obliged to act upon doubtful evidence; God has 
 so constituted the world, that in your present con- 
 cerns of the greatest moment, you must act upon 
 doubtful, very doubtful evidence ; this objection, 
 -then, takes for granted, that God will not act as you 
 see he does act; and is therefore altogether invalid. 
 It must then be an argument in proof of religion, to 
 find that we must act with regard to it as God has 
 determined we shall act in our temporal capacity ; 
 and that religion requires of us to act in no other 
 manner with respect to it, than our worldly affairs 
 absolutely demand and make necessary with respect 
 to them. 
 
 I wish you, thirdly, to recollect, that it is not 
 so rauch the business of these Letters to vindicate the 
 character and providence of God, though perfectly 
 capable of vindication, as to point out your duty; 
 for it behoves us much more to know the latter, than 
 to trouble ourselves with objections about the former. 
 Your duty is your great concern ; the character and 
 providence of the. Deity much less so than many 
 imagine. For, first, religion does not make it ne- 
 cessary to vindicate the character of God any further 
 than to shew, that the things, which are objected 
 against as being contrary to. justice and goodness, 
 may really be agree ‘ble to and instances of them. | 
 
from the Analogy of Nature, &c. 193 
 
 You cannot see the whole of things j—you see but a. 
 mere, point in the plans of infinite Providence ;—and 
 are therefore incapable of judging of its ways. The 
 very things, then, which are considered as bemg con- 
 trary to justice and goodness, may in their connec- 
 tion with the'vast: plans. of divine Providence be jn- 
 stances of infinite: justice and goodness; and this is 
 all the vindication which it is necessary for religion 
 to make of the divine character, Observe, secondly, 
 ‘We do not vindicate the justice and goodness of God 
 ia matters of. religion, by admitting that objections 
 do really and infact lie against his justice and 
 goodness in’ natural providence: but) we suppose 
 such ebjections. :to be made, sand then’ ‘shew that 
 they are inconclusives,’Henée then ip follows, that 
 the things, which até: objected agamst in religion, 
 are credible as matters of fact; since ‘they corre- 
 spond with the !presént!icourse ‘and order of nature; 
 Lor. instance,.-it is eredible,iias a fact, ‘that! God will 
 hereafter, pnnish, the wicked ; ‘because jt) 4s a fact, 
 that by. the natural course of things he now jn this 
 life punishesthem. . Whatever objections then, third] Ys 
 mien, inay raise, either from their ideas of justice and: 
 goodness, or from. the doctrine of hecessity, against 
 future )punishnient, still the thing is credible; bes: 
 cause we see that God does now rule the world by 
 rewards and punishments, Fourthly, the system of 
 religion} is ‘reducible. to facts; but the credibility of 
 facts may, bel proved.zndependent of their reasonably. 
 
 5 Pg 
 AS 
 
194 On Objections against arguing 
 
 ness: hence then it follows, that we are bound to 
 practise religion upon the credibility of its facts. 
 He, who has due conceptions of the perfections of 
 the Deity, will be perfectly satisfied of the reasou- 
 ableness of his precepts, though he may not be able 
 to perceive it in every instance ; aud hence he will 
 yield a ready. obedience to his authority. If you 
 adinit the perfections of God, you can have no doubt 
 of the reasunableness of every thing He enjoms: 
 Hence, lastly, though analogy is nota direct answer 
 to objections against the reasouableness of certain 
 things in religion, yet it is a direct answer to objec- 
 tions against their credibility: and as we poor h- 
 mited creatures are very Inadequate to judge of their 
 reasonableness, we ought certaimly to be influenced 
 by their credibility ; if that credibility can, as indeed 
 it has been shew. m 
 
 But, fourthly, I do admit that the argument we 
 have pursued in proof of religion does not amount 
 to demonstration ; but it does amount to such a very 
 high degree of probability as to become fully prac- 
 tical. Nor should you be surprised that it does not 
 amount to demonstration ; since no system of com- 
 mon life and conduct can be proposed, which is ca- 
 pable of demonstrative evidence. If you put reh- 
 gion out of the question, many men will tell you 
 that they doubt whether human life itself be worth 
 enjoying 5 and that it is very doubtful whether our 
 
 easures or our pains ew There are ‘ge- 
 
jrom the Analogy of Nature, &c. 195) 
 
 neral rules for conducting life, and: for preserving » 
 aud recovering health; but these rules are not de-~ 
 monstrative ; they are precarious and uncertain, and 
 ‘very far from being exact. But still the constitution 
 of our nature absolutely determines us to preserve 
 health and life, and. to procure their enjoyments; 
 aud yet, thouzh Ged has so formed us, sull He has 
 left us to act upon doubtful evidence with respect | 
 ta.the means by which we: should preserve either. 
 life er health ; we must gather our rales of life from” 
 experience, not from intuition or demonstration, In 
 the most-common as well as the inost important 
 affairs of life, probability is all that we have for our 
 guide; and if we even could ensure success in our 
 undertakings, yet wé do not know that we shall be. 
 happy when we have obtained it; for the very things 
 Which we think would make us happy may be the 
 occasion of misery and anxiety. Indeed it ig ‘almost 
 impossible to describe the vast uncertainty of every 
 thing in eur temporal capacity; and yet we de not 
 throw away life, aud refuse to act at all, because 
 Wwe do not know demonstratively how we should act: 
 surely, then, men are not at liberty to disregard re- 
 ligion, because its evidence is not demonstration. 
 Recollect also that religion takes for granted, that 
 We have a certain degree of honesty and integrity ; 
 in the same manner as you take for granted, that a. 
 man can hear or anderstand your language when you 
 K 2 
 
196 On Objections against arguing 
 
 address him. Religion is then to exercise and im- 
 prove our moral capacity ; and though its evidence 
 may not be able to satisfy curiosity, yet it is suffi- 
 cient for the purposes of probation, and even more. 
 ‘so than if it amounted to demonstration. Tn your 
 temporal capacity you act Hot upon certain evidence, 
 but upon that which on the whole appears the most 
 satisfactory; you are not sure of success, but must: 
 pursue that conduct which appears the most prudent. 
 “You are every day obliged to act in your worldly - 
 concerns upon very low degrees of probability, and 
 often even in opposition to probability; this 1s 
 surely then a reason why you should act upon pro- 
 pable evidence in matters of religion. 
 
 But, fifthly, you may say, is it likely that man 
 will be influenced by probable reasoning in matters 
 of religion? ‘To this I answer, they ought : what 
 they will or will not do is their own concern. Ought 
 aman to give himself up to total idleness, because 
 
 he is not sure, as he really is not, of success in busi- = > 
 
 ness? If men will not act till they have demonstra- 
 tive evidence for their conduct, they must altogether 
 cease to act; for that kind of evidence they never 
 have in the general concerns of life. IT point out 
 what you should be, and how you should act; but 
 if you act differently you are to blame. ‘The very 
 offer of religion to men puts them into a state of 
 probation, however they may please to conduct 
 
 5 
 
From the sili of Nature, &c. ig7 | 
 
 themselves ; yea, the very supposition of its being 
 doubtful 1 imposes upon them a most serious regard 
 to it. So long then as ‘there is any likelihood that 
 men can and will be influenced by probable reason- 
 ing, so long ought we to press ‘it upon them. And 
 it zs likely that they will be influenced by reasoning . 
 of this kind in matters of religions for they own its 
 authority and sway, and Fn Cealsiiy act under its in- 
 ' fluence i in all the various concerns and business of 
 life. As, then, they act upon it in one case, it ought 
 im reason to be expected that they will act upon it 
 - An the other. — 
 
 ~ ‘There is one thing more to athe observed, ie is 
 of great moment; and that is, that we have consi- 
 dered religion (hevaly asa matter of fact. Through- 
 out the whole discussion we have omitted two most 
 important principles; viz. those of human liberty, 
 and the eternal moral fitness and unfitness of actions 
 prior to all will whatever: and not only have we 
 ‘omitted these two principles, but we have shewn 
 that if even the doctrine of necessity be supposed 
 to be true, yet still the obligations of religion will 
 remain in full force. Christianity and natural reli- 
 gion are both reducible to questions of fact: for in- 
 stance, in natural religion, the proposition, that there 
 is a God, the righteous Governor of the world, isa 
 question of fact; and yet this proposition may be 
 fairly said to contain the whole Systane of natural 
 
 K 3 
 
» 
 
 498 On Objections against arguing 
 
 religion, As a fact, then, we have discussed it, aid 
 without reference to the eternal moral fitness and 
 unfitness of actions. ‘The doctrine of a future state 
 of rewards and punishments also becomes a question 
 of fact: for as it is a matter of plain experience, that 
 men are necessarily punished by natural providence 
 
 for improper conduct, whatever difficulties specula- 
 
 tive men may raise about it 5 so also the questiou,~-— 
 Will God in a future life punish a certain kind of 
 behaviour ?—becomes merely a question of what will 
 
 or willnotbe. Whatever difficulties speculative men 
 
 may raise about either present or future rewards and 
 punishments, it is a fact that in this life natural pro- 
 vidence does punish bad actions as such, and reward 
 good actions as such: it is then probable, as a fact, 
 that the same thing will take place in futurity. | 
 I grant, that the proof we have given of a future 
 
 ‘gtate of rewards and punishments, is not 2 demon- 
 
 strative but a probable proof ; and hence, like all pro- 
 bable proofs, may be objected to and cavilled at. 
 Bat bad I used the two principles of human liberty, — 
 and the moral fitness aad unfitness of actions, the 
 proof would have been much stronger. Bat still, 
 without these two principles, we have made out a 
 
 ‘proof which neither can be answered nor evaded ; 
 
 and which is of the greatest imzportance, because it 
 is wholly practical, and founded on constant matter 
 of fact and experience. And hence the obligations 
 
from the Analogy of Nature, &c. 199 
 
 of religion have been proved independent of the 
 principles of liberty and moral fitness; principles 
 which have been perplexed, as every thing of that 
 kind may, with difficulties and abstruse reasonings. 
 
 From the whole of this letter perhaps*you have 
 already gathered two observations; first, that the 
 proof of religion from analogy, will be an additional 
 proof to those, who believe in the principles of Ji- 
 berty and moral fitness ;—and secondly, an orig’nal 
 proot to those who do not believe in them. Be- 
 lievers will find christianity cleared of objections ; 
 and unbelievers will find all their attempts to prove 
 christianity false, to be vain and really absurd. Re- 
 ligion is reducible to facts; a8 a matter of fact then 
 we have discussed the subject, and compared the 
 facts of religion with those which exist in nature: 
 amd since the latter are taken for granted to be ac- 
 cording to the will of the Deity, it follows, that the 
 former are most assuredly probable; and if proba- 
 ble, how ought we to live and conduct ourselves in 
 all truth and piety. 
 
 I am yours, 
 
 J. W. 
 
pss | 
 
 200° F 
 
 e LETTER: IX: 
 Recapitulation and. Conclusion. | 
 
 Cheam, Getober’ 1809. 
 
 DEAR SIR, nt Bt) aa 
 epraktoesin bie 
 
 Wuen one reflects upon ae seta of, Shas 
 tianity, it seems almost incredible that there should 
 be any man, in countries where the Gospel is known, 
 who can disregard or be indifferent to religion., The 
 morality of the Gospel, when proposed. to the mind, 
 seems almost intuitively true ; whatever reasons, then, 
 may be assigned, to account for, some .men’s, disres 
 gard of religion in ages and countries.in which chris- 
 tianity was not known, it seems almost incredible, 
 did we not see the contrary, that men should disre- 
 gard religion where it is known. The proofs that 
 there is a God, who made and governs the world, 
 and will eventually judge it in righteousness, are 
 level to the capacity of all men: for the innumera- 
 ble instances of design in the works of creation, must 
 prove a designer; and it is intuitively certain, that 
 
 ba 
 
Recapitulation and Conclusion, 201; 
 
 creatures ought to live in obedience to their Cre- 
 ator; and it is as certain, that his laws and conduct 
 towards us are founded in justice and charity, since 
 he has made us necessari/y social beings and mem- 
 bers of civil society, which cannot subsist without 
 justice and charity. And since of necessity we must 
 be punished in civil society for acts of wrong and 
 injustice, and be rewarded by protection for pro- 
 priety of conduct ; it follows, that God has put us 
 under a system of rewards and punishments, which 
 we cannot avoid, and hence that we are accountable 
 for our conduct. 
 
 But still it must be sii that -the truth of 
 revealed religion is not intuitive; it requires external 
 proof before we can receive it: yet inattention to 
 revealed implies a disregard of natural religion; for 
 since both claim to be the voice of G od, both there- 
 fore claim and demand Our most serious attention 
 and regard. To examine then the evidence for the 
 truth of the Gospel, and fo receive it if true, is pro= 
 perly and strictly moral ; because a religion claiming 
 to be revealed must of necessity impress men’s minds 
 with awe and reverence towards the Deity, and if 
 true, must have considerable influence upon their 
 manners and conduct. But some profess to reject 
 both natural and revealed religion upon speculative 
 _ principles: they deride the idea of God’s moral go- 
 vernment over the world; they renounce his protec. 
 
 KO 
 
202 Recapiiulation and Conclusion. 
 
 tion, and defy his justice. Others pour the utmost 
 contempt upon christianity, both as it respects its 
 author, its whole scheme, and its different parts ; 
 aud act viciously upon principle: while some, whose 
 lives are not grossly immoral, oppose the Gospel, 
 and represent it as groundless. . Let it then be ad- 
 mitted, that such people act upon what they think 
 principles of reason; yet it is impossible to imagine 
 that they can think the evidence for the truth of the 
 Gospel amounts to nothing, if they allow, which 
 they must in all reason allow, that its system and 
 circumstances are credible like other matters of sci- 
 ence and history. ‘The opposition, then, of such men 
 to. christianity, must arise either from objections 
 which they think lie agaist all religion, and which 
 objections we have answered ; or fram. objections 
 which they think He peculiarly against the Gospel. 
 Elence we find, that they object to the very idea 
 of a revelation ;—they think certain things im chris- 
 tianity are unreasonable ;—they suppose that, if a 
 revelation. were true, it would be universal ;—and 
 that its evidence would be perfectly satisfactory, i. e. 
 demonstrative ;—and they also imagine, that if a re- 
 velation were gtven by God to man, it would be 
 giver in a@ manner different from that m which the 
 Gospel is giver. Now all these objections against 
 christianity do not prove that its evidence appears 
 te them to be nothing; but they prove that they 
 
Recapitulution and Conclusion. 268 
 
 fortify themselves against its evidence, whatever that 
 evidence may be: and as for those who oppose chris- 
 tianity, and yet are in doubf of its truth, their con- 
 duct is to the highest degree unreasonable ; for they. 
 act as if they considered doubt and certainty to be 
 the same thing; than which nothing can be more 
 absurd. . 
 ' Now the manner in which we have treated the 
 subject of both natural and revealed religion, is 
 adapted to those who object to all religion; and to 
 those also who. believe i) nature! religion, but either 
 deny revelation, or are in doubts respecting it. For, 
 first, we have answered the objections which are 
 made against the moral system of natures and then 
 we have shewn, that there is HO pbeubap presump- 
 tion, beforehand, or from the nature of the thing, 
 against christianity either as a matter of fact, of 
 ‘Feason, or of miracle. We have seen, from the ana- 
 logy of nature, that if God did give a revelation 
 to man, it would contain many things which would 
 appear hable to objection, though perfectly proper, 
 just, and goood, in themselves ; and that they would. 
 appear so tous, if we could but see the whole of 
 their connections and’ relations. We have shewn 
 also, from the general course of nature, that the 
 ehristian scheme of redemption would be effected 
 ‘by a long series of events; and not all at oncé, as 
 ‘some imagine: and that the appointment of a me- 
 Kk 6 
 
 ¢ 
 
204 Recapitulation and Conelusion. ~ 
 
 diator between God and man, is perfectly analogous 
 to the constitution and course of the world.. We 
 have shewn that neither reason nor experience can 
 -prove any thing against that vast and particular effi- 
 cacy, which the scriptures attribute to the interpo- 
 sition of Christ: and, that as in nature God has af- 
 forded us the means of recovering from and avoiding 
 evil; so also in christianity, he has provided us the 
 ‘means of recovering from that wretched state ia 
 which it supposes us to be, and in which experience 
 -proves we are. It has been proved further, that the 
 want of universality in revelation is no objection 
 against it; since both nations and imdividuals expe- 
 rience the greatest variety and difference in their na- 
 tural advantages: nor is it any argument against the 
 Gospel, that its evidence does not amount to demon- 
 stration ; since we are necessarily obliged to act throngh 
 — life in our most important concerns upon doubtful, 
 and ‘sometimes not only upon very doubtful but al- 
 most. improbable evidence. Further, we have shewn 
 that there is a great mass of positive proof m favour 
 of christianity ; and that when all due deductions are 
 ‘made for objections against that proof, still there is 
 a great quantity of positive evidence remaining: and 
 hence, that all immorality and prophaneness is greatly 
 aggravated in those to whom revelation is offered. 
 Nay, still. more,it has appeared, that the very doubt- 
 ‘ing of the truth of christianity imposes upon men 
 
Recapitulation and Conclusion. 205 
 
 nearly the same obligations seriously to regard it, 
 and to observe its precepts, as if they firmly believed 
 in it: in fme, that all prophaneness and blasphemy 
 respecting christianity is absolutely without excuse ; 
 and that there is no reason to believe, that those 
 men; ‘who can be prophane, and can blaspheme the 
 Gospel, would alter their conduct, though its evi- 
 dence amounted to demonstration. 
 
 Before I close our correspondence, give me leave 
 to add a few words more. You must have observed, 
 that I have always spoken of religion as something 
 more than a mere assent to its truth: true religion 
 affects the temper and disposition, and regulates tie 
 conduct: while therefore you are studying the*evi- 
 dences of its truth,, be careful to seek its spirit and 
 influence, that your, faith maybe ively and opera- 
 tive. Christianity supposes that man is in a wretched, 
 jn a fallen state; and hence offers to him a Media- 
 stor and a Sanctifier ; and I think it is of great im- 
 portance to observe, that the wise, the learned, the 
 pious Butler, through, all his treatise, has no con- 
 ception of any thing being christianity, which is not 
 founded on the doctrines of a Mediator and Sanc- 
 tifer., If you take away these two things, you re- 
 duce the Gospel to what is. called natural’ religion ; 
 I say, to what is called natural religion ; for in point 
 of fact, there never was a time, since the creation 
 . of, the world, when there was not a revelation, ‘As 
 
206 Recapitulation and Conclusion. 
 
 then a Mediator and a Sanctifier are two essential 
 things m cebristianity, remember the duties which 
 you necessarily owe to them, as well as to God the 
 Father. . You necessert/y owe them worship, trust, 
 love, and obedience; beeause of the real relations. 
 in which you stand unto them. As a wretched and. 
 fallen creature, you need a renewed nature and a 
 right spirit; you ueed the mediation of the Son, and 
 the influence of the Holy Spirit ;—you need to be 
 put into a capacity of bemg accepted by your Cre- 
 ator, and of being made happy m a futere state. 
 Let me then hope, that in all your studies you will 
 have a chief regard to the expertence and practice 
 of true religion and virtue. Pursue your studies. 
 with all possible ardour, store your mind fully with: 
 a knowledge of natural and moral philosophy; but 
 above alt, seek the knowledge of God through his 
 Son; seek that wisdom which is from above. You 
 will find religion your best comfort in adversity, arid 
 adversity you will have in hfe; you will find it to be 
 the only true regulator of your temper in prosperity, 
 and prosperity perhaps you may acquire; and it will 
 be your only sure support m the hour of death. 
 Rehgion will best fit you for every state in hfe; 
 it will make you bold in danger, and wise in 
 council ;—it will make you diligent in your profes- 
 sion, and faithful in the discharge of every duty. Ht 
 will add a noble dignity to your attainments m sci- 
 6 
 
Recapitulation and Conclusion. 207 
 
 ence; and will enlarge and elevate your mind beyond 
 the effect of any other cause: for to meditate upon 
 the works ef creation as the works of God,—upon 
 the redemption of the world by the Son,—and upon 
 the sanctification of eur nature by the Holy Spirit,— 
 will afford you the greatest source of the grandest 
 and most sublime ideas; and give the most enlarged 
 scope for the exercise of your reasoning powers and 
 devout affections. 
 
 Yours very sincerely, 
 
 JW. 
 
\ ave Y Kien nab: 
 
PART. I. 
 . CONTENTS AND ANALYSIS. - 
 ih: 
 
 wvidh i SETTER Is 
 On probable and demonsbrative Evidiere, as 
 
 1. Turre is an essential difference: between probable 
 and demonstrative evidence :. because demonstrative 
 gives in all cases absolute certainty ; probable pro- 
 duces various degrees of assent. But— | 
 
 2. Probable evidence belongs to finite beings; and 
 is toman the great and general rule of life: but to 
 the Deity, all possible things are certain; to Him no» 
 thing can appear probable. And— 
 
 _3. Men are so formed, that they must act according 
 as the probability appears greater or lefs on any side 
 of a question.  Indeed— 
 
 4. Men constantlyand of necessity use and act upon 
 analogical reasoning; if, then, the system both of na-— 
 
210 / Contents end Anilysis. 
 
 tural and revealed religion can be shewn to be similar 
 to the natural course of the world; then it is probable 
 that they are both from God, if it be admitted, that 
 there is a God, the natural and righteous Governor of 
 the world. And 
 
 5. Hence the truth both of natural and revealed 
 religion may be proved from the admission of there 
 being a God, the natural and righteous Governor of 
 the world.— 
 
 LETTER IL, 
 On a future Life. 
 
 3. In this life men exist in very different states; as 
 in the womb,—in infancy,—in manhood ;_ therefore 
 they may live in a different state after death, And 
 as--- a 
 
 2. There is no positive reason, either from the reason 
 of the thing or from analogy, to believe that death will 
 annihilate us ; hence itis probable that. we shall sur- 
 vive death. 
 
 3. Nor does it follow that death will ddeia'by the 
 mind; though it should be supposed to be either dis+ 
 zs ga or indiscerptible. 
 
 . The body is an instrument to the mind; there- 
 sik the destruction of the body does not imply the 
 iho ui of the mind. ) 
 
 . We can reason independent of the senses, i.e. of 
 hy vada | ; therefore the destruction of the body does 
 “not imply even the suspension of our reasoning powcrs. 
 
Contents and Analysis. $14 
 
 ~ 
 
 6 The body often dies when the mind seems in full 
 vigour; therefore it is probable the mind survives, the 
 body. Indeed— | 
 
 7. A future life is probable even upon'the principles 
 of atheism. 
 
 LETTER UL. 
 On God's Government by Rewards and Punishments. 
 
 1. Mere existence in a future life, isa subject of 
 no very great mement: the important point is, dow 
 shall we exist. ‘ 
 
 _ 2, It is probable that we shall exist in a future state 
 of rewards or punishment, i Bahia to our conduct 
 in life, because— | 
 
 3. All we enjoy, and 2 ‘iia ee of tay we suger, 
 is put in our own power: and hence— 
 
 » 4. Pradent conduct necessarily produces good, and 
 -imprudent conduct necessarily produces bad couse- 
 quences: And hence— 
 
 5. It is a matter of fact, that we are aan a system 
 of rewards and punishments in this life: And hence-= 
 
 6. It is probable that we shall exist in a state of re- 
 wards or punishment in a future life, according to our 
 conduct in this. And— / rpmeyey 
 
 7. That future punishment will be, what religion 
 teaches us to expect, is probable from what happens 
 in life: for often, im a man’s:natural capacity, one 
 single.act of impropriety intails upon him a. life of 
 
212 Contents und Analysis. re 
 
 misery and ruin; and in his civil capacity, one crime © 
 is often the cause of his death. | 
 
 LETTER. IV. 
 
 On God’s moral Government. 
 
 1. We feel pleasure and pain as the final causes of 
 our actions: hence then we are under God’s govern- 
 iment in the same way as servants under a master, or 
 itl under a civil magistrate. © ‘ 
 
 2. But this, at first sight, does not: determine that 
 God’s government of the world is moral > But—= > 
 
 8. An attention to the analogy of nature will shew, 
 that there is something truly moral't in sb govern- 
 ‘ment of the world. For— wd ut 
 
 4. We have a moral nature; since men ndtieigtily 
 feel more satisfaction in virtue than in. vice ;—and 
 virtue is necessarily more productive of human’ happi- 
 ness than-vice. And also—~ iy" 
 
 _§. In the natural course of things, good conduct is 
 yewarded as such; and’bad conduct punished as such: _ 
 and this course of things appears just to our minds, 
 ‘and its appearing just to our minds, proves that we 
 have a moral nature, and are under a moral govern- 
 ment. Further— 
 
 6. Society must and does punish bad conduct as 
 such: but society is natural; hence we are naturally 
 under a moral government. Also— 
 
 7. Good men as such are trusted; bad men as nee 
 
 Wi 
 
Contents and Analysis. 215 
 
 distrusted : hence, then, there is a moral order of 
 things necessarily established in ‘the world; and hence 
 it is probable, that it will continue after death, and be 
 carried on-to perfection. Further— 
 
 8. Our happiness and misery are placed much in 
 each other’s power: and hence virtue as sucly is en- 
 couraged, vice as such discouraged; and hence good 
 men have hopes, not only for this life, but for the fu- 
 ture; and bad men have fears. But— 
 
 9. Though the necessary tendency of virtue be to 
 good, yet it must have scope and opportunity to pro-. 
 duce its full effect: but in this life there is not scope 
 for its full effect ; hence-it is probable it will have scope 
 in futurity, and receive its reward. And as the ne- 
 cessary tendency of vice is to evil, so in futurity it will 
 receive its full punishment. 
 
 LETTER V. 
 
 On our present Life being a State of Trial and Probation, 
 
 1. It is probable that our present life is a state of 
 trial and danger in a religious sense: because— 
 
 2. It is afact that men are in a state of trial and 
 danger with respect to their temporal affairs. And 
 because— 
 
 3. Their temporal success and welfare are in danger 
 -poth from their external circumstances, and their na-. 
 ture;—from their ‘passions and habits ;—from thie al- 
 lurements and temptations which they haye to resist ;-—- 
 
Qh Contents and Analysis. 
 
 and from the example and influence of others, &c. &e, 
 
 Now— | | 
 4, All this is similar to what religion teaches us re- 
 
 specting our trial fora future hfe. And— 
 
 _§. All this is equitable; because ag with prudence 
 
 men may cnjoy tolerable quiet upon earth; so in reli- 
 
 gion, with due care, men may secure future happi- 
 
 ness. And— 
 
 6. Hence, as our worldly happiness depends upon 
 
 our own conduct, so it is probable that our future does 
 
 also. 
 LIETER VI. 
 On a State of moral Discipline. 
 
 —That our present state is intended fora state of 
 moral discipline, that we may be fitted for a future 
 
 state, is probable—because— 
 
 7 
 
 Le ie oy Hi 
 1. The begmning of our present life is but an edus — 
 
 cation for mature age. And— 
 
 2. Men are so constituted as to be capable of being 
 made fitfor things, for which they were once totally 
 unfit. And — 
 
 3. All our improvement in our temperal capacity is 
 progressive. And— 
 
 4, We need and are capable.of moral improvement. 
 And— 
 
 5. Hence, as-each part-of our present life is a ne- 
 
 cessary preparation for the next, and ss we need and. 
 
: Contents and 4 nalysis. 215 
 
 are capable of moral improvement; so the whole cf 
 our present lie may be a preparation for a future one. 
 
 LETTER VIL. 
 On the Doctrine of Necessity, as influencing Practice. 
 
 -—Admitting that the doctrine of necessity is recon- 
 cileable with the course of nature, yet this will not 
 destroy man’s accountableness, as a moral agent, for 
 his actions: Because— ) 
 
 1. It isa matter of fact that we de exercise in our 
 actions deliberation, choice, and prefercnee. And we 
 know by experience that— 
 
 Design in men’s actions produces alterations in. 
 nature. And henece—~ 
 
 3. The doctrine of necessity as much requires a, He- 
 cessary agent, as the doctrine of liberty requires free 
 agent. And— 
 
 _ 4. As itis.a matter of fact that in this life men are 
 and must be accountable for their conduct, it follows 
 that they may be accountable in matters of religron sin 
 a future state. Also— 
 
 5. Our present happiness and nrisery, are much the 
 consequences of our behaviour: For— 
 
 6. God does govern the world by rewards and pue. 
 nishménts according to the moral nature of our wetions, 
 And— 
 
 7. Hence, as we are accountable in this life for our 
 conduct, whether the doctrine of becessity be true or 
 
216 Contents and Analysis. 
 
 false, it follows that we may be accountable ina fa- 
 ture life for our present behaving inde Ciostily 
 
 & 
 
 LETTER VII 
 
 The moral Government of God is to us an incompre- 
 
 hensible Scheme. 
 
 1. Analogy, though it may prove a thing credible, 
 yet it does not immediately prove it to be Wines: Just, 
 or mn But— | 
 
 . Still, if it ‘be admitted ‘that’ there is a moral go- 
 vernment over the world, then will analogy make it: 
 probable that this moral government is wise, just, ‘and 
 ood)! Fors gi gh 
 
 3. The course of the natural world is ‘a system far 
 beyond our comprehension, ‘and hence we cannot rea- 
 sonably object to it: so also- ‘the’ moral system of the 
 world may be a system far beyond our comprehension, 
 and thérefore we’ cannot reasonably oe to it. “And 
 
 ; YY : hy Litt 
 
 also— 
 “ai In the! natural world ‘things that are dood are’ 
 often effected by unlikely means; so also tae aa be’ in’ 
 yi moral world And? 78 te om 
 . The natural world ‘is “governed by ¢ general laws,” 
 hee ‘do’ not’ remedy: particular irtedularitics by it~ 
 
 mediate interposition; so also may it be in the moral’ 
 a Hy A 
 world. And— : 
 
 * 
 
 26) We of f ourseltes dot not’ elt what is is mannicr, 
 
 ae) fs} ‘si are YNIG 
 
 w> 
 
Contents and Analysis. 217 
 
 in which it is best for the Deity to act in order to ace 
 complifh his purposes. Moreover— : 
 
 7. If it be admitted that the proof of religion is 
 doubtful; still, on account of our present self-interest 
 and the peace of society, we must be under moral obli- 
 gations. And— 
 
 8. No argument can be drawn from our ignorance 
 to invalidate the proof of religion. And also— 
 
 9. As analogy shews us positively, that we are in- 
 competent judges in the things of nature; so also must 
 we be incompetent judges in the things of God’s moral 
 government, and therefore ought not to object against 
 it. | 
 
 LETTER IX, 
 Recupitulation, 
 
 _ 1. Probability is the great and general rule for man’s 
 conduct in life, ; x 
 2. It is probable we shall exist in a state of life and _ 
 consciousness after death ; because we exist in this life 
 in very different ways and manners: as in the. womb— 
 in infancy —in manhood—-and are continually chang- 
 ing our bodies, and yet are still the same: and since 
 in this life our powers of perception are often sus. 
 pended, when they are not destroyed, and our powerg 
 of reflection are often exercised independent of the 
 body ; it follows, that death may not destroy our powers 
 of perception, nor even suspend our powers of reflec. 
 ion. . 
 
 L 
 
‘ets “Contents and Analysis. 
 
 wg. ‘Bat it is probable that: ‘we shall live in a future 
 life, in a state of rewards and’ punishments 5 ; because in 
 “this life Weare in a state Of rewards and punishments 
 according to the moral nature'of our actions. 
 
 “<4. That God’s government of ‘the’ World is Moral fs 
 probable; because in this life virtue necessartly tends 
 ‘to good, and vice to ‘evil; and virtue as such is  re- 
 warded and trusted, while vice as such is punished agi 
 “distrusted. ; 
 
 , 5. That our present life may bea “state of trial and 
 ‘danger i ina religious sense, is likely; because it 1§ SO 
 jn‘a temporal sense. 3 
 
 6. That our present life is a state of moral discip- 
 
 line and preparation for a future life, is probable; be- 
 cause every Stage of our present life is a preparation 
 for the following one. | 
 
 7. Nor will the doctrine of necessity, if even ad: 
 qmitted to be true, destroy moral obligation or our ac- 
 countableness to God for our conduct 3; because we are 
 ‘and must be accountable and under moral obligation 
 
 sto society, and to each other as individuals, for our | 
 
 conduct. aigeghity Wray 
 
 »8.: Since the system of the deiiote alls is aischeme 
 
 mynitc! beyond our comprehension ; so also may be the 
 ‘echemeé of God’s moral government of the world: and 
 
 shence we are incompetent to make objections against 
 
 jts wisdom, ‘goodness, or justice. 
 -9 If, then, religion’ may be true; we ought to prac- 
 tise it, as if it-were proved by demonstration to us that 
 it is true. 
 
onto dope iw > LEPPER 1. 
 
 ¥ 
 
 . 
 
 oh the Zmortance of Christianity. 1 
 
 Mitte 3 ‘ f "*?'} ¥ ai 
 
 be Christianity is of the’ greatest iniportatice; be. 
 cause there is no sufficient ‘reason for supposing, that 
 any person could of himself have reasoned out even 
 natural religion; and it is certain that the great bulk 
 of mankind coat not have done it. Because— 
 2. A standing. admonition and institution were neces- 
 sary to inculcate natural religion upon men: And— 
 ~ 3. Because many cases may occur, in whieh super- 
 “natural.aid would be useful, And also, because— 
 A, Christianity i is a republication of natural] religion 
 “in its genuine simplicity. And not only so, but 
 ~ 8. Christianity is an. authoritative el sehesonos of 
 ‘y natural religicn. > F urther— 
 ir 3G, Christianity will assist.a man, however fatoivoul,y 
 “situated, upon the subject of natural religion. | Also 
 7. Christianity supports ‘and maintains natural reli. 
 “gion, by means of a tr church ‘vr s society, - Fur- 
 ther—- ble | way! ) 
 8. The Saal discovers to’ us’the ee ie 
 “in which we stand to the Son and Holy Ghost, as well 
 
 L3 
 
#450 Contents and Analysis. 
 
 as to the Father Almighty: and hence the necessary 
 duties of love, trust, reverence, worship, &c. which 
 we owe to them. And hence— ‘ 
 
 9. Our neglect of the duties which: we owe to Wk 
 
 Son and Holy Ghost, may as naturally be attended and 
 
 followed by evil consequences in-a future life, as our — 
 neglect or violation of our duty to God or each other. _ 
 
 From the whole, two things are to be observed— 
 
 10. First, positive precepts are those, whose reasons 
 we do not sec ; moral precepts are those, whose reasons 
 we do see: and hence, secondly, moral precepts should 
 
 ‘be observed before positive, when both cannot be ob- 
 
 _served at the same time. 
 
 LETTER Il. 
 
 On the supposed Presumption against a Revelation con- 
 sidered as miraculous. 
 
 - 1, There is no presumption against christianity as 
 miraculous, either on account of its not being disco- 
 verable by reason or experience; or on account of its 
 
 - not being like that course of nature which now is: if 
 
 it even be admitted that it is unlike the present course 
 of nature; which however is not admitted. ' 
 
 9, For it is no argument against any thing, that it~ 
 
 is beyond the reach of eur faculties. And— 
 
 3. This world is so small a point compared with the Pe: 
 
 if whole universe, that we cannot justly argue from what 
 
 ‘Uh: 
 
Centents and Analvsiss 22 
 
 takes place in it, against what may respect and affect 
 the whole universe. And— y 
 
 4. As there is no presumption against miracles being 
 performed at the beginning of the world, because there 
 was no known course of nature to which we can come 
 pare them: Hence— , 
 
 5. Ifa revelation, which is a miracle, were made at 
 the beginning of the world, it follows, that a revelation 
 might be made in after times. And that a revelation 
 was made at the beginning of the world is proved, be- 
 cause— 
 
 6. All history goes to shew that religion was first 
 given to man by revelation. But—~ 
 
 7. Let it be supposed, that there is a presumption 
 against miracles; yet this is only what there is against 
 the most common fact or opinion, independent of proof. 
 Moreover— ; 
 
 8. In the course of the world, 5 or 6000 years may 
 have afforded fit and proper occasions for the interpo- 
 sition of miracles. And further— 
 
 9. The religious and moral state of man give posi- 
 tive reason for believing, that for his benefit miracles 
 would be wrought. But— 
 
 10. Miracles ought to be compared, not with the 
 ordinary, but with the extraordinary occurrences of 
 nature: and as there would be great and strong objec- 
 tions in a person’s mind against the extraordinary o¢s 
 eurrences of nature, at the first hearing of them and 
 independent of proof, whilst they were still perfectly 
 «redible and true; so also miracles may be perfectly 
 
 L 3 *, 
 
222 Contents and Analysis. 
 
 credible and true, though objections. may be made 
 
 against them. 
 
 LETTER III. 
 
 On the credibility that a Revelation would appear liable to 
 Objection. 
 
 4. Objections against christianity itself are frivolous. 4 
 
 For— 
 2. Since we cannot trace all the causes and connec+ 
 
 tions of any one single natural fact or event, much less 
 of the whole scheme of nature; it follows, that we 
 must be incompetent to judge of the whole scheme of 
 revelation, i. e. of christianity. Moreover— , 
 
 3. Experience teaches us, that the scheme of nature 
 
 is different from what man might have expected, inde- 
 pendent of experience; therefore the scheme of chris- 
 tianity may be so also, nay, will most probably be so. 
 And as— | 
 
 4. We do not know beforehand, or independent of 
 experience, how God would give us natural light and 
 knowledge ; ; therefore we cannot tell, independent of 
 experience, how God would give us supernatural light 
 and knowledge by a revelation. The question then is— 
 
 >. Do the scriptures or do they not contain a diyine 
 revelation; and what are the proofs that they do. 
 Farther— 
 
 6. We ought not to judge of a revelation by pre- 
 conceived notions; for we find. by experience, that if — 
 
 *; 
 
 eiits| 
 
 % 
 
 w 
 
 s 
 — 
 
e ws Baal svi Rugs , 
 | Contents and.A whi 223) 
 
 pies Sapp. 
 we judge of the course of nature by preconceived no- | 
 
 tions, we fall into error-and vain objections. And as— 
 
 7. God does not give natural gifts as we might ex- 
 pect beforehand; it follows, that he may not give mi- 
 raculous or spiritual gifts, as we might beforehand ex- 
 ‘peets, i 
 
 8. Reason has a iby to ane must judge of the truth: 
 of a revelation; butwhen it has ascertained its truth, 
 reason must then yield implicitly to revelation, 
 
 LETTER IV. 
 
 On Christianity being a Sehaaus which we cannot perfectly 
 comprehend, 
 
 pe 
 
 Bi 
 
 1. Christianity isa scheme which we cannot per- 
 fectly comprehend, Because— 
 
 2, [tis a system including sucha number of par- 
 ticulars, and is of such vast comprehension, as to reach 
 from. the beginning to beyond the end.of time. And 
 because— : 
 
 _. 3. As in nature means, and often the. most unlikely, 
 Ntipiintsy accomplish the best purposes; so. also.is it in 
 christianity. And because— 
 _ A. Christianity, like nature, may be ataied: on cies 
 general laws, the causes and. reasons of which we can- 
 hotsee. And further— 
 
 / 5, [tis no objection against¢ christianity. that it has. 
 ‘been carried on progressively ; because all. Alpina 3 in 
 nature are carricd on progressiv ely. 
 
 Te A, 
 
224 Contents and Analysis. 
 
 LETTER ‘V. : 
 
 On the Appointment of a Mediator. 
 
 Ne part of christianity less liable to objection than” 
 the appointment of a mediator, since it corresponds so 
 much with the whole analogy of nature. For— 
 
 1. God conducts the whole system of nature by the. 
 
 instrumentality and mediation of one thing to aie 
 
 and of manto man. And since-— 
 2. We do not know ai/ the reasons why God has or- 
 
 dained future punishment; but do know that in the 
 natural world he has appointed means for remedying 
 
 the bad natural consequences of improper conduct : 
 Hence— 
 
 3. It is probable, that he would appoint reer for 
 preventing future punishment, the consequence of sin, 
 And— ) 
 
 ' 4. As in our temporal capacity we find that in num- 
 “perless cases mere sorrow or repentance for misconduct 
 will not prevent nor remedy its bad consequences; so 
 we cannot be sure that any thing, which we of our- 
 
 selves could do, would prevent the future a 
 
 of sin. And— ‘ 
 
 5. Hence, if God appointed a mediator, as the scrips 
 tures assure us he has, by whom we may be saved from 
 our present wretched and sinful state, and by whom 
 future punishment may be prevented, it follows, that 
 
 FoR} 
 
 ’ 
 
Contents and Analysis. 295 
 
 such an appointment is necessary and proper, though 
 we cannot see all the reasons for it. Further— 
 
 6. Christ is our Mediator as.a prophet to teach us 
 —a King to rule over his people—and a Priest to atone 
 for the sins of mankind. _And— ; 
 
 7. To object against Christ’s atonement, because we 
 cannot see how it is efficacious to prevent future punish- 
 
 -ment and to procure for us the favour of God, is to, 
 
 the highest degree unreasonable; since in nature we 
 cannot see ow any one thing ayails to produce another. 
 And also as— | 
 - 8. Vicarious punishment takes place in nature ale 
 most constantly ; it follows, that vicarious punishment - 
 might be necessary in religion. And moreover— 
 9. It is no argument against God’s appointments that 
 
 -. we cannot see the reasons for them, 
 
 LETTER VI. 
 
 On Revelation not being universal, and its Proof being 
 supposed to be defective. 
 
 - It is no valid objection against christianity that it is 
 not universal; or that its evidence is doubtful: Be- 
 
 scause— 
 
 1. God may ‘give his favours as he thinks best; and 
 
 not as we may imagine he should give them. And— 
 
 2. Since men enjoy different degrees of advantage in 
 their temporal capacity; so also may it be in their re- 
 ligious. And as— 
 
ia 
 Toye ; Pee el cael davis Cyr wis ook 
 ee 
 998 Contents andl ri ca 
 od Oi te -oaigenat Tt ms Hy 
 
 3 ‘Nien do gd ifuide 60% in the’ ‘affairs of , common 
 life,: upon doubtful evidence; so also “may. they be 
 optics to act in matters of religion. Further—~. +. 
 
 ‘4. The: jewish and christian’ revelations have beth 
 appeared at different times’ with different degrees of 
 evidence, And + ack’ ht “ceil 
 
 §. Since’ men will ‘be juaber heap eae) to the ade 
 vantages they lave had, and not according to what) 
 they have not had, they will,’ therefore; be» treated’ 
 
 2 
 “AR: 
 | 
 
 | 
 | 
 | 
 | 
 | 
 
 justly: And-alsos 12, 8h leh 
 
 6. If christianity were universal, men’s religious ad- 
 vantages would not be equal, because of their dif- 
 
 ference of temper, capacity, &c. &c, And as weare — 
 
 in a state of probation— os Jat 
 7. The exercise of our reason and understanding 
 upo christianity and its evidence, may form a : 
 
 our probation. And as doubt and certainty are vege ; 
 
 different things; so— , » CR 
 8. Supposing the evidence for christianity to be 
 
 _— doubtfal to the» highest ssupposeable degree, still wei 
 
 should be in a state’of general prebation. And— 
 
 9. The doubtfulness of the evidence for christianity 
 may form the necessary trial of some men’s character. | 
 
 But some men’s doubts do not arise for want of-evie 
 
 dence 3; for— o's 
 
 ©10. Numbers think very carelessly and lightly upon 
 
 the subject, and hence arise their doubts. But: still ee 
 JIL The proofs both of natural and revealed: religion 
 
 are level to the capacity of common men, Andi 
 
Contents and Analysis. | 997 
 
 1. The: very a eithenslancs of the evidence serves to 
 shew what isin man. And— 
 
 13. If we are in a state of religion, then our state 
 of probation. may, ina great measure, Consist in being 
 obliged to act upon doubtful evidence in matters of 
 religion, as we are obliged to act upon doubtful evi. 
 dence in matters of common life. 
 
 LETTER VII. 
 On the positive or particular Evidence for Christianity. 
 
 The positive or particular evidence for christianity 
 consists principally of two things; viz. miracles and 
 prophecies. 
 
 1. Now, for the miracles both in the Old and New 
 
 Testament there is the same historical proof, as for the 
 - common events related in them: but the common 
 events are acknowledged to be true; so then may the 
 _ miracles. And— 
 
 2. St. Paul’s epistles are in a particular manner a 
 proof of miracles, and of the truth of christianity. 
 Moreover— 
 
 3. Christianity claimed belief upon the ground of 
 - miracles, and obtained belief upon that very ground. 
 —« But— 
 
 4 If it be said that men are credulous; to this it 
 : may be answered, that men are suspicious; and that 
 when the Gospel was first published, all their sahil 
 
998 Contents and Analysis. 
 
 manners, principles and prejudices, &c. &c. were in 
 opposition to it. Also— 
 
 5. The apostles and first christians died in + obteeting 
 to facts, of which they were competent judges; those 
 
 facts, then, viz. the miracles of the New Testament, 
 ~ ought to be admitted as true upon every abhi of 
 
 common life. Besides— 
 
 6. The evidence of a number of intelligent and aunty 
 uninfluenced men for the truth of any, event, is the 
 highest evidence we can have of events; excepting that 
 of our own: senses: but this evidence,. of a number 
 
 of intelligent and duly uninfluenced men, we have for 
 
 ‘the christian miracles; and: therefore we ought to be- 
 lieve in them. Moreover— 
 
 7, No one can, with. any shadow of reason, object 
 against christianity, that: the apostles might be de- 
 
 ‘ceived ;. because there is no proof whatever that they. 
 
 were deceived. And— 
 
  g. That there have been pretended miracles; is no: 
 
 objection against the christian miracles; because the’ 
 christian miracles cannot be proved false in the least: 
 degree. Farther, as to prophecies— 
 
 4. The obscurities of some prophecies do not invali-: 
 
 “date the proof of foresight in. others that are plainly : 
 
 fulfilled. And— 
 
 2. Since in scripture a very long series of prophecies: 
 ean be applied to a very long series of events, it fol- 
 lows, that these prophecies intended these events» 
 
 And 
 
Contents and Analysis. 929 
 
 3. If it be admitted that the prophets didnot know 
 the meaning of their own prephecies, or that the pro- 
 phecies might be applied to other events than those to 
 which christians in general apply them; still even this 
 will not invalidate the argument drawn from prophecy 
 in support of christianity. Further, as to the direct 
 and circumstantial evidence for christianity, it must— 
 
 1. Be united i in one view, as well as considered se- 
 parately. And also— 
 
 2, Revelation, or christianity, may be considered 
 both in its facts and doctrines as wholly historical; 
 and as its facts never have been proved false, this im- 
 
 plies a strong positive argument, that they are true. 
 And— 
 
 3. The Old and New Testament contain many 
 prophecies all connected one with another, and which 
 have been fulfilled in a proper sense. Now— 
 
 4, Let a person, wholly unacquainted with history, 
 be informed of the scriptures facts, and of the prophe- 
 cies, and of events which have fulfilled these prophes 
 cies, and he must own, that at least there is a proof of 
 ‘divine foresight, and of something more than human. 
 ~ Hence— 
 -~ 5, Men are bound, upon every principle of commen 
 life, to receive christianity and to act according to its 
 - precepts. 
 
gga0 - Contents and Analysis. 
 
 Essai Seating SERTTER. ite oT 
 “Ow ‘Objections against arguing now tte Analog ey ik 
 yg : ein’ in io whee Religion: TS Sy 
 
 ve tad 
 Pat Es 
 
 Preeti: 
 
 ‘dn dP require ne diff cul¥iss: tobe: desu oviil respect _ 
 ing the divine government, \is requiring too much—it 
 ~1s requiring moreithan:in fact we are capable of know- 
 ing. Nor do men seem aware. that,objections against — ; 
 brevelation are ultimately levelled against sgl reli- 
 > gions. And— re 
 
 ai If it be objected.against christianity, that it. can- 
 «not be from God, because it rests upon doubtful evi- — 
 
 dence: to this it is answered, that the objection. is false; 
 - because, accordhng to the course of nature, which is G 
 ‘from God, we are obliged to act. in common life con- 
 
 stantly upon doubtful evidence. . Moreoyer—  .- * 
 3. Itis not so much the business of religion’ to.vin- — 
 - dicate the character of the Deity, though perfectly ga~ 
 -pable of vindication, as‘to shew us ourduty,  But— oy 
 » (4. Though+the argument drawn fromthe analogy of 
 “nature in support of revelation be not demonstrative ; ae 
 yet it amounts to such a very high degree ‘ef proba- 
 ‘bility; as to beeome perfectly practical. «And 
 ‘6 $, If it beebjectedsthat men are not hkely to be in- 
 fluenced by doubtful evidence on the matter of reli- 
 gion: it is answered, that they oughé to be influenced 
 by that kind of evidence 3 and that it is likely they will, — 
 since they are influenced by it in their temporal affairs. — 
 Lastly — 6 Pelt ‘e 
 
- Contents ind Analysis. *831 
 
 ® 6. Religion is all along, in these Letters, ‘treated as 
 - a -matter of fact ; and, as a mattcr of fact; shewn'to be 
 credible: hence, asa fact, we ought to be influenced 
 
 ‘by ite” ny ee ; 
 OE be stocrveiau, ao bbe Pale 
 ““Recapitulation and ps 
 
 of “The morality of the Go dpae! 18 almest intuitive 5 
 ‘that any, one, therefore, would neglect or despise chris 
 ctianity, seems almost. incredible, did we not sce it. 
 “And, asa fact— 
 
 2. Itis plain, that by the very course of nature, we 
 are in this life placed in a state of rewards and punish- 
 ments; and therefore it is likely we shall be ina state 
 ef reward or punishment after death. And— 
 
 3. Though the evidence for revealed religion be not 
 intuitive, yet, since revealed religion claims to be from 
 ‘God, to neglect it imphes a neglect even of patural 
 reer, And also— 
 
 A The evidence for the Gospel cannot be shewn to 
 amount to nothing. And— _ j 
 
 5. Since doubt and certainty are. very different 
 things, the very doubting of the truth of the Gospel 
 imposes on men a positive obligation to attend to it. 
 Moreover— 
 
 6. If God did give a revelation to man, it 1s proba- 
 ble that it would appear liable to objection; though, 
 in facts not liable. And the analogy of nature shews—- 
 
232° Contents and Analysis. 
 
 7. That the redemption of the world would not 
 effected all at once, but by a long series of event 
 And also— i 
 
 8. The appointment of a | mediator corresponds - Witt 
 the known course of nature. And as— * 
 
 9. Temporal advantages are not universal, so als 
 it is no objection against eRe that it is not uni- | 
 versal. And since— a 
 * 10. We are obliged in common life, according to 
 God’s appointment, constantly to act upon doubtful 
 evidence; it is no objection to the Gospel, that its 
 evidence is uot demonstration. And in addition to 0 all 
 this— “4 
 
 11. There is a great mass of positive evidence f 
 christianity. And hence— 
 12. Men are bound, upon every principle of com 
 ‘mon life and conduct, to receive the Gospel, and to 
 act according to its injunctions. For— ; f 
 - 13. True faith is not merely an assent to the truth i 
 of christianity ; but incites us to love, to trust, to wor: 
 ship, and to obey the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
 ‘Ghost, in consequence of the positive and real rela 
 
 tions in which they stand to us, and we to them. 
 ay 
 ” 
 
 FINIS. 
 
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