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 Christian errors infidel 
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 SEVEN DIALOGUES, 
 
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 A | e@xander os eit rat 
 SUGGESTED By 
 THE BURNETT TREATISES, THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE 
 
 PRIZE ESSAY, AND OTHER APOLOGETICS, 
 
 EDINBURGH: ANDREW ELLIOT, 15 PRINCES STREET. 
 LONDON: HAMILTON, ADAMS, & Co. 
 
 M.DCCC.LVII. 
 
EDINBURGH : 
 PRINTED BY JOHN HUGHES, 
 3 THISTLE STREET. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 INTRODUCTION, cccsssssesessercseseeeneneseeeenensscsssnsessesesseserescanentaetes 9 
 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT DEVELOPED IN THE 
 DIALOGUES, -...0c:sersccsecsssoescnsectnscccsdanorsensatsesesoseseanneneneseseseni 24 
 DIALOGUE I. 
 TRUTH AND ERROR, .....ccsccsccssssresseeceeseseeneseseesaeseesseasenenenenencnens 53 
 DIALOGUE It. 
 KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, .....::scscssssssssessesseeseeserssetenessssnsseneas 98 
 DIALOGUE II. 
 BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY, .......ccscsscscessescsssssenssensessosonnes 143 
 DIALOGUE IV. 
 MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION, .......cscscscsecssesesssssssssesseeeees 193 
 DIALOGUE V. 
 PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES,......cecsees 231 
 DIALOGUE VI. 
 CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY, .......ccccccsesececeeeceseessteneeeneness 280 
 DIALOGUE VII. 
 THE STANDARD OF MORALITY, .0...cccecsescsesesecsseeeseseseeeenes 298 
 CONCLUSION. 
 REASON AND FAITH: THEIR CLAIMS WITHOUT CON- 
 BTL OT icon cesscastaas asta eno seeks es persone Saeed 331 
 
oy 
 oF 
 
 PS tas | Sit a 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Ir would appear as if Christianized men were too 
 supine and careless to purge themselves from error, 
 through the sole stimulus of ardent love for pure truth. 
 Hence in the Providence of the Almighty an external 
 irritant is produced, which shall so act upon the lethargy 
 of the Christian body as to enable it to throw off its 
 diseases and corruptions. In the whole history of the 
 Christian community no power has ever risen up in con- 
 flict with her, so well calculated to sift her principles and 
 separate the precious from the vile, as infidelity in its 
 various forms. The attack of Unbelief on Christianity 
 will be continued ; and it will from time to time change 
 its form and augment its intensity, till Christians shall 
 by means of this process be cleansed from their impuri- 
 ties, and become one in Christ Jesus. Nor does it seem 
 as if there were any other means so suitable or efficacious 
 for accomplishing this desirable end. 
 
 Heathen idolatry has assailed Christianity with brute 
 force, but never contended with her in argument. Per- 
 secution with its fires has given the due temper of intense 
 
 A 
 
10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 hardness to the Christian cause ; another process is re- 
 quired to produce fineness and sharpness of edge. The 
 claims of Jupiter, or Brahma, or Baal, to be the object 
 of human worship and obedience, cannot stand a moment’s 
 examination before those of Jehovah. The contest be- 
 tween these parties was never much of an intellectual 
 east. The avowed reason, far less the real reason, for 
 worshipping the gods of heathen mythology and for 
 oppressing even to imprisonment and death the followers _ 
 of Christ, has never been an expression of intelligent 
 preference for the deities of the classics or the shastres 
 over the God of the Bible. All the evil that Paganism 
 can do to pure Christianity is to attempt to crush it by 
 violence; and all the good that can come out of this 
 attempt is the development of the virtues of patience 
 and endurance. 
 
 The same remarks apply to Mohammedanism. The 
 weapon of the false prophet, his Khaliphs, and the 
 Imams, is not argument or discussion, but war and the 
 sword. When Mohammedanism and Christianity, there- 
 fore, come into collision, the question at issue 1s one 
 simply and directly of life and death—of fealty or of 
 faithlessness to the King of kings and Lord of lords. 
 There is no call or necessity to examine the first prin- 
 ciples of truth, or to trace them in their varied ramifica- 
 tions. 
 
 Popery, so far as it is a persecuting power, stands in 
 the same relation to Christianity—the Christianity of 
 the Bible, as Mohammedanism or Pagan idolatry. Her 
 
INTRODUCTION. 11 
 
 persecutions, being the severest and most protracted, 
 have evoked the grandest displays of the martyr spirit, 
 and shewn that the soul of man, when he loves and 
 possesses the truth, can endure any amount of anguish 
 as well as part with life itself, rather than relax his 
 grasp of the gospel of Christ. It is no doubt also a fact, 
 that the discussions between protestantism and popery 
 have done very much to elucidate and define the truth 
 on those topics which are controverted between the two 
 parties. And every corruption from which the cause of 
 Christianity has been relieved by the Reformation of 
 the sixteenth century, is undoubtedly a weapon wrested 
 from the hand of unbelief. But in relation to infidelity 
 there is a good deal of ground occupied in common both 
 by the adherents and opponents of papal Rome. Both 
 parties accept Christ Jesus as the Saviour of men, and 
 the Holy Scriptures as the word of God. The disputes 
 between them turn very much upon the import of what 
 both adopt as fundamental principles. They are, there- 
 fore, apparently but not really, agreed in these funda- 
 mental principles; and yet the controversy is seldom 
 fought at the point where it must be ultimately lost or 
 won. Asa purely intellectual contest between truth and 
 error, the battle between popery and protestantism has 
 too frequently been one of outworks and skirmishes, 
 rather than one in which a decided victory is gained. If 
 this conflict were differently managed—if either party 
 were more thoroughly intellectual and consistent than 
 they actually are, the strongholds of both would become 
 
12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 more prominent and better marked, the engagement 
 would speedily be found gathering itself around these 
 strongholds, and, the onset being severer, the’ struggle 
 would be shorter and more decisive. Neither party, 
 however, seems to feel itself called upon to adopt this 
 more searching and resolute mode of action. Conse- 
 quently, the controversy between romanists and protest- 
 ants, as actually conducted, fails to develope the finer 
 lineaments and more delicate features of Truth, — to 
 bring out the full proportions and spotless purity and 
 divine majesty of New Testament Christianity. This 
 work must be done; and other means must be used for 
 its accomplishment. 
 
 Will not the schisms and divisions that prevail among 
 protestant and evangelical Christians assist in the pro- 
 motion of this end? Undoubtedly they do assist, and 
 would assist much more effectually, if they were carried 
 on in a more reasonable and Christian-like manner. But 
 what has been said of the popish controversy generally 
 is to a great extent true of protestant disputes. Pro- 
 testants are not agreed in the grounds or reasons of 
 their protest against the Church of Rome, and their 
 internal schisms are the proof of this disagreement. If 
 they would set themselves to the business of mutual 
 reconciliation—if in a spirit of devout, humble, charitable 
 diligence, Christians would strive to be “ of one mind 
 and of one accord”—if when they oppose each other in 
 sentiment on a matter of importance, they felt that one 
 party must be wrong, and that by prayer and effort 
 
INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 they could and ought to “see eye to eye,’—if they 
 would sedulously probe the matter to the bottom, con- 
 scientiously suspend their judgment when evidence was 
 imperfect, form their opinion only in the clear sunshine 
 of truth, and hold it in all humbleness and forbearance, 
 then, indeed, would Christianity soon “ shake herself 
 from the dust,” and “ put on her beautiful garments.” 
 But since Christians have not done so, and do not seem 
 as yet to be much disposed to do so, there are other 
 means in reserve and at hand, that the work may not be 
 left undone. The attacks of infidelity will force Chris- 
 tians to examine their own principles and purge away 
 their errors—a labour which apparently they would 
 never spontaneously undertake. 
 
 Infidelity has nothing valuable to maintain, no truth 
 to propagate. Hence when she is thrown on the defen- 
 sive, or begins to propound some theory, she is sure to 
 be worsted. We now regard Unbelief simply as a power 
 of resistance—a resolute and active determination to 
 repudiate and expose every belief, that cannot be sub- 
 stantiated by sufficient and valid and consistent proof. 
 Christianity comes into direct collision with this power ; 
 for the religion of the Bible is essentially aggressive, as 
 it demands the belief and attachment of every man under 
 the heaviest penalties. If Christians might consistently 
 remain satisfied with holding the ground they already 
 occupy, they might often avoid the conflict. But pro- 
 fessing as they do a system of positive truth, which, they 
 maintain, is divine in its origin, and in its nature adapted 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 to mankind, and in its results ineffably blessed, they are 
 under the necessity of constantly acting upon the aggres- 
 sive as well as the defensive. When Christians have ex- 
 posed and refuted the various positive theories of infi- 
 delity, their work with that same infidelity is less than 
 half-done. You have overthrown our system, an un- 
 believer may be supposed to say, now your system must 
 be made good by evidence and argument. But in de- 
 fending and expounding their own system, Christian con- 
 tradicts Christian in most momentous and vital points. 
 Infidelity has thus a temporary triumph. 
 
 When. the Christianity of this age comes before the 
 world displaying her banners, proclaiming her message, 
 and demanding the allegiance of men, her forces are 
 evidently in disorder, and her arguments fragmentary 
 and disjointed. Paganism is too stupid and sensual and 
 besotted to take notice of this disorganization or turn it 
 to her own advantage. If a stray Christian were to 
 come in her path, and provoke her malice in any way, 
 she would, if she could, trample him in the dust, and 
 leave his cause just as it was. In the same manner, 
 Mohammedanism acts towards the religion of the Bible. 
 She is too deeply steeped in fatalism and stained with 
 profligacy to take much interest either in the creeds or 
 conflicts of Christendom ; although, like her elder sister 
 just noticed, her scimitar could draw without reluctance 
 giaour blood. Popery has a system of her own to pro- 
 mulgate and defend, and she is too busy or too proud to 
 interfere deeply with the disputes that arise among her 
 
INTRODUCTION. 15 
 
 opponents. Christians themselves seem too lethargic to 
 undertake the task of self-reformation. 
 
 In this state of matters, infidelity confronts Christianity 
 in her onward progress, challenges every statement 
 which is made, sifts every evidence adduced, confronts 
 Christian with Christian and argument with argument, 
 and being equally regardless of character and consequen- 
 ces, carries on a desultory and remorseless warfare. In 
 the course of these attacks, Christians are brought to 
 feel, through sad experience and discomfiture, every 
 weakness that may be in their defences, every flaw that 
 may be in their weapons, every derangement in their or- 
 ganization, every deficiency in their supplies and every 
 quarrel in their camp. Under the stern teaching of 
 painful trial, they will be constrained to do what they 
 would gladly neglect ; they must begin to set their affairs 
 in better order. The shafts of infidelity will not cease 
 to fly, nor will they be innocuous—so long as the 
 panoply of the church is incomplete, or a fissure may be 
 seen in any portion of her armour. The scorn and con- 
 tempt of infidelity cannot be avoided or triumphantly re- 
 torted, so long as there is a rent in the garment of the 
 Church, or a stain upon her raiment. 
 
 Infidelity is thus, in the hands of God, the most 
 effectual, if not the only means, by which the Church of 
 Christ is to be purged of her more latent errors, as well 
 as reproved for her more obvious faults. It is but one 
 work, to expose and correct the mistakes and transgres- 
 sions of the Christian community, and to repel completely 
 
16 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 and satisfactorily the assaults of the most inveterate 
 Unbelief. 
 
 The “ Christian errors” which the author has had in 
 view in writing the following pages, are not those more 
 gross and open offences against-Christian principles, 
 which are palpable to the least reflective, and which are 
 made good use of by infidel orators, although constantly 
 acknowledged and lamented by our apologetic writers. 
 Lhe obvious and very painful fact that to a large extent 
 the truths of the Bible are not reduced to practice by 
 many who profess to believe them, belongs properly to 
 the pulpit, and affords abundance of work to the faithful 
 pastor. This evil, however, is found among the office- 
 bearers as well as members of our churches; and the re- 
 Jaxation of Christian discipline which is the consequence, 
 gives to the unbeliever some considerable advantages in 
 his opposition to the gospel. This matter, though trite, 
 is one of the most vital importance, but it does not fall 
 within the the scope of our present design. 
 
 The author has felt a lively sympathy with those who 
 have experienced a degree of dissatisfaction after the peru- 
 sal of even the ablest treatises in defence of Christianity. 
 He who goes to these treatises for the confirmation of 
 his belief in the gospel is more or less disappointed. He 
 does find much to strengthen his Christian convictions; 
 but neither can he avoid the impression that a thick mist 
 envelops some of the most important points in the argu- 
 ment, and he toils through volume after volume, vainly 
 seeking for that clearness which he is unwilling to regard 
 
INTRODUCTION. Lz 
 
 as an unwarranted expectation. When this confusion or 
 difficulty is freely confessed by the most skilful advocates 
 of Christianity, and is, at the same time, asserted to be 
 unavoidable and inexplicable, whatever others may have 
 felt, the writer is free to say, that this assertion has 
 appeared to him only to make “ confusion worse con- 
 founded.” His mind would indeed have been shaken, 
 and his Christian faith hopelessly overthrown, if he had 
 not been able to fall back upon the persuasion, that Chris- 
 tianity, as embodying the Truth, must be herself unen- 
 cumbered with that confusion and those contradictions, 
 and that they belong only to the present views and argu- 
 ments of her friends and defenders. 
 
 Since the writer has been led in the course of his stu- 
 dies to flatter himself that he sees a way through some 
 of this confusion, and a resolution of some contradictions, 
 which weaken the Christian defence, by putting weapons 
 into the hands of the enemy, he feels it to be a duty to 
 lay his thoughts before the public. The most prejudiced 
 cannot but admit it to be at least a possible thing, that 
 the Christian argument, as at present managed, may be 
 perplexed and enfeebled by the admission of one or more 
 erroneous principles, which, finding their development, 
 and bearing their fruits among the Christian people, 
 damage the cause of truth, and give to infidel objections 
 an importance far greater than they intrinsically possess. 
 It is obvious that to whatever extent this possibility may 
 be realised in our actual circumstances, to the same 
 extent the full and unanswerable overthrow of infidelity, 
 
18 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 by the clear and impregnable vindication of the prin- 
 ciples of the Christian religion, will depend upon a 
 reformation in some of the sentiments of the Christian 
 community. 
 
 We have been led to the persuasion that “the Resto- 
 ration of Belief” depends very much upon its Rectifica- 
 tion, and that the “ conflicts of Faith and Reason” being 
 most unnatural,—being in fact both unreasonable and 
 irreligious, will only cease when “the claims of Faith 
 and Reason” are clearly apprehended. It seems to us 
 as if some needful work were yet to be done at “the 
 Bases of Belief.” When the excavations are more nearly 
 completed, and the foundations more carefully laid, the 
 living temple may rise more rapidly and more securely 
 to its full proportions; for let no one suppose that the 
 work which we have taken in hand is one of mere hair- 
 splitting refinement or wire-drawn distinctions. If we 
 cannot make good our positions, both by the precise and 
 perspicuous statement of principles, and also by making 
 manifest their weighty practical consequences, let our 
 attempt meet with its merited reward in contempt and for- 
 getfulness. | 
 
 We claim the reader’s indulgence in stating the exact 
 design which we would endeavour to accomplish. It is 
 not our purpose to write a defence of Christianity in 
 which we believe, nor an exposure of Infidelity with 
 which we have no sympathy. But there are some salient 
 points in the argument, not less important than difficult, 
 on which the controversy frequently hinges, while the 
 
 See se en ee eee 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 lax views of some Christian writers, and the mutual con- 
 tradictions of all on these very points, give to the skilful 
 opponent no trivial advantage. To these points we solicit 
 a little candid attention. However much we may have 
 grieved over the inconsistencies and confusion which we 
 have noticed in the best defences and expositions of 
 Christian truth, we should never have undertaken the 
 heartless task of uttering that grief, and unfolding its 
 cause, unless we had been led to see something like an 
 outlet from the perplexity, and what appeared to our- 
 selves at least a hopeful mode of terminating the contilict. 
 At the same time, the views which we venture to pro- 
 pound will not be regarded, we trust, by any reader as 
 dogmatic assertions on our part, but simply as suggestions 
 for the consideration of the thoughtful. 
 
 Being placed in these circumstances, more than one 
 method of procedure lay ready for selection. 
 
 In the first place, an appeal might be made directly to 
 the Word of God. What saith the Scripture, it may 
 be asked, upon those points in the infidel controversy on 
 - which Christians are individually confused and mutually 
 at variance? Has the Bible not been often defended 
 with weapons which it neither supplies nor sanctions‘ 
 Are the advocates of Christianity never untrue to the 
 principles of Christianity herself? As a Christian, we 
 admit fully the validity of this reference. We shrink not — 
 from testing the positions which we may have to take up, 
 by their conformity or non-conformity with the testimony 
 of God; we rather court an exegetical appeal to the 
 
20 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 statements of Holy Scripture. But this is not our pre- 
 Sent purpose. 
 
 In the second place, the questions at issue might be 
 taken up in a strictly philosophical style. The nature 
 and limits of our knowledge might be speculatively ex- 
 amined and discussed. A treatise on moral science might 
 be composed, and an attempt made to solve some of its 
 hard problems. The views which we have to propose 
 might be vindicated after this fashion; nor do we shun 
 their exposure to this ordeal. If any one will lift them 
 up for discussion to the speculative or metaphysical plat- 
 form, we are not unwilling to follow. But our present 
 design is to leave abstruse and metaphysical or philoso- 
 phical speculation in its own lofty sphere, far from the 
 usual haunts of busy men. 
 
 The Scriptural argument is waived, because it is irre- 
 levant as used against the infidel. It is vain to refer a 
 man to the affirmations of a book whose very authority 
 he is disputing. And we are unwilling to abandon our 
 two-fold design of inflicting a severer wound on Infidelity 
 
 by the same process that will promote the union and ~ 
 
 spiritual prosperity of the Church. Both ends will be 
 to some extent gained, if we succeed in relieving the 
 Christian argument of any of its inconsistencies and con- 
 tradictions. The strictly speculative mode of treating 
 the subject is also adjourned for the present, though for 
 another reason. <A philosophical book is generally re- 
 garded by the reading public as beside the mark,—as 
 something with which they have nothing todo. We wish 
 
INTRODUCTION. 21 
 
 to be heard by the Christian and infidel commonalty ; 
 and, therefore, throw aside everything that might pre- 
 vent us from receiving a fair hearing. 
 
 The discussions which follow are intended to be chiefly 
 in the form of an argumentum ad hominem, addressed to 
 the Christian. The erroneous sentiments assailed in the 
 following pages will sometimes be exploded by showing 
 the practical absurdities to which they inevitably lead ; 
 sometimes they will be manifested to form as valid a plea 
 in the mouth of the infidel as in that of the Christian ; 
 and sometimes they will be shewn to be contradicted by 
 the wiser and better opinions of Christians themselves. 
 In making good these assertions, the title which has been 
 assumed will be justified. When infidels have it in their 
 power to show the practical extravagance of some of our 
 Christian arguments; to turn others of them against those 
 who use them; and to set one Christian advocate to 
 combat another, or to neutralize the proof asserted in 
 one page by the proof asserted in another page of the 
 same author, it will not be questioned that ‘“ Christian 
 errors are infidel arguments.” 
 
 The propriety of adopting the course now pointed out 
 may be vindicated on the principle, that Truth is be- 
 trayed when defended by weapons which she disowns. 
 This assertion is not only self-evidently valid, but is con- 
 firmed by many facts. He is reckoned not only an 
 unskilful advocate in any cause whatever, but even a dis- 
 ingenuous one, who is not careful to explain the difference 
 in material points between himself and his fellow-advo- 
 
2? INTRODUCTION. 
 
 cates. The want of such explanation indicates an 
 unworthy spirit of partisanship,—a desire to secure a 
 given end without much scruple as to the means of attain- 
 ing it. We may be allowed to say that there seems to 
 us to be a good deal of this temper manifested in the 
 infidel as well as in the popish controversy. <A zeal to 
 crush the adversary is frequently displayed without much 
 ardour to discover or defend the truth. All who come 
 to the same conclusion shake hands heartily together 
 without any inquiry as to the roads they have travelled, 
 although they may contradict each other as vitally as 
 their common opponent contradicts them all. The wiser 
 and abler defenders of Christianity are found, professedly 
 at least, to avoid this mistake. For nothing is more 
 common than the acknowledgment, that the divisions and 
 corruptions of the Christian Church are formidable ob- 
 stacles to the progress of the gospel, and a storehouse of 
 infidel shafts. The principle is most just; let it be 
 thoroughly and consistently applied. Our discussions 
 are based upon it. Christians have yet to ponder the 
 words ascribed to a heathen of remote antiquity, —‘ when 
 we teach perverted views in reference to divine things, we 
 hold out occasion for total scepticism.” * 
 
 There is another principle which the reader would do 
 well to take along with him. The difference between 
 what is true and what ts erroneous, when stated abstrac- 
 tedly, is often apparently very insignificant. As the 
 severest struggles have sometimes occurred, and the 
 
 * Plutarch. 
 
 NN ————————————— Cr rT 
 
INTRODUCTION. oo 
 
 most decisive victories been achieved, by a handful of 
 troops in a mountain pass, so the great battle of true 
 religion is sometimes most keenly and most vitally con- 
 tested, over the apparently little difference which forms 
 the ultimate and real distinction between two huge sys- 
 tems of truth and error. Hence the necessity of tracing 
 infidelity to its sources, and pointing out its latent and 
 subtle poison, as it distils among the masses from the 
 lofty heights of a false speculative philosophy. Hence 
 also the necessity of Christians being scrupulously care- 
 ful in stating the grounds which they assume as the 
 basement of their argument, lest even by an inadvert- 
 ence they may find themselves to their sore dismay 
 within the enemy’s encampment. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT DEVELOPED 
 IN THE DIALOGUES. 
 
 Iv has been said by a great mind, that confusion is 
 worse than error. Erroneous statements and opinions, 
 in their naked deformity, are generally too hideous to 
 win the regard and confidence of men even in their pre- 
 sent depraved condition ; while the manifestation of what 
 is true, in its simple grandeur and pure light, is often 
 too bright and fair to be agreeable to the eye and the 
 heart of man. The great work which a lover of truth 
 finds to do is to separate the conglomerate mass of know- 
 ledge, or what men call knowledge, into its two com- 
 ponent parts, the true and the false. What is false owes 
 all its plausibility and power to its being associated and 
 mingled with what is true. What is true is rendered 
 dim and uncertain and weak by being blended and con- — 
 founded with the erroneous. The human mind is like a 
 thrashing-floor. The honest inquirer will be constantly — 
 using the fan, to separate the chaff from the wheat. 
 
 The difhculties which are most frequently and gene- 
 rally felt in the controversy about the evidences of 
 Theism and Christianity are connected with the follow- 
 ing points :—the relation between truth and error—the 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 25 
 
 relation between Knowledge and Faith—the relation be- 
 tween [aith and,Responsibility—the distinction between 
 what is above reason and what is opposed to reason—the 
 distinction between Practical knowledge and Speculative 
 knowledge—the distinction between Certainty and Pro- 
 bability—or, finally, with the Criterion in morals. 
 
 The whole of our appeal to the defender of the reli- 
 gion of the Bible may be summed up in the following 
 questions. If you admit or assume a marked and irre- 
 concilable antagonism between truth and error in some 
 matters, why not in every matter? If there be some- 
 times a dependence of belief or faith upon knowledge, 
 why not always? Ifa man be held responsible for some 
 of his beliefs, why not for all of them? If there be a 
 clear and valid distinction between what transcends our 
 understanding and what is contrary to it — between a 
 mystery and a contradiction — between ignorance and 
 erroneous knowledge—why is this distinction forgotten, 
 mangled, and disregarded? If there be an obvious and 
 important difference between practical and speculative 
 knowledges, and a similar difference between certainties 
 _ and probabilities, is it not desirable and necessary dis- 
  tinctly to apprehend the nature of these differences, and 
 consistently to observe them in every question? And, 
 lastly, if there be no criterion whatever in morality 
 independently of the Bible, how can those who are 
 unavoidably ignorant of the Bible be considered account- 
 able beings; and if there be any such criterion, what is 
 it, or where is it to be found ? 
 
 B 
 
26 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 As to the first of these points, the immutability and 
 self-consistency of truth, and its direct and perpetual 
 opposition to error, no one theoretically or in form ques- 
 tions or denies it. All knowledge and belief, all reason- 
 ing and discussion, are avowedly based upon it. The 
 extremest scepticism which would refuse to grant it, would 
 in that very refusal affirm it. A favourite ruse of infi- 
 delity is to involve this point in mist and confusion by 
 the ambiguity of words, by insinuating doubts and ask- 
 ing hard questions, and by referring to the actual state 
 of human knowledge in which this fundamental antithesis 
 is so frequently lost sight of. The Christian can triumph 
 only by taking his stand upon the uncompromising oppo- 
 sition between error and truth. But we rarely meet 
 with a stern and unflinching adherence to this principle 
 in all the questions under discussion. If the flippancy 
 and pertness and levity of the professed unbeliever may 
 often be traced to the want of a clear intellectual con- 
 viction of the antithesis between truth and error, and 
 the absence of all reverence for Truth, so also may the 
 mental indolence, the blind faith, the indifferentism, lati- 
 tudinarianism, and formalism, which, like a blight, have, 
 times without number even to the present day, made sad 
 havoc with the garden of the Lord, be more or less 
 directly assigned to a lax apprehension and deficient 
 veneration of the sacredness and majesty of Truth. 
 There are not a few grave and urgent and momentous 
 questions on which Christians are at the present time 
 clearly and constantly contradicting each other, whilst 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 27 
 
 comparatively few among either of the conflicting par- 
 ‘ties seem to have any adequate perception of the fact, 
 that Truth lies wounded and bleeding in the fray, far less 
 any suitable compunction for the enermity that is per- 
 petrated. 
 
 As respects the second topic, we know not whether it 
 be more frequently affirmed or denied, in express terms, 
 that belief is dependent upon knowledge. At one turn 
 in the controversy the dependence is broadly asserted ; 
 at another turn it is flatly denied. The strongest army 
 which should as constantly and arbitrarily shift its posi- 
 tions, and follow a policy so vacillating, could scarcely 
 expect to cope with the weakest foe. To admit that 
 belief is never dependent upon knowledge, is equivalent 
 to a total and ignominious surrender of our religion. If 
 this dependence be conceded in some cases, common con- 
 sistency demands that it be maintained in every case. 
 To deny that even in a few instances belief requires to 
 be based upon knowledge, is to lay a foundation for 
 superstition, deep and strong. The severance, as well 
 as the opposition, of knowledge and faith is a very com- 
 mon phenomenon in the Christian community. The 
 seeds of superstition are thus extensively sown; neither 
 do they die in the soil, and bear no fruit. And every 
 one knows that infidelity is a re-action against super- 
 stition. 
 
 In reference to the third point, a somewhat similar 
 confusion prevails. Man is asserted to be responsible 
 for his belief. By and bye it appears that this means 
 
28 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 responsible for some of his beliefs, but not for all of 
 them. An intelligent and honest hearer of the debate in 
 favour of and against the Bible, cannot help asking, why 
 responsible for some beliefs and not for others? This is 
 a notable distinction. What are the grounds on which 
 it rests, and what the limits to which it reaches? He 
 vainly waits to hear the distinction explained and vindi- 
 cated. He ventures to ask for information, but receives | 
 no reply. And when he presses his inquiry, by signs or 
 silence, though perhaps seldom in words, he is desired 
 not to be troublesome. Here, to say the least, is a case 
 of most palpable confusion, and it occurs in a question of 
 the utmost magnitude. For no man can entirely shake 
 off his sense of responsibility, and every form of infi- 
 delity is an attempt to tamper with this deep and sacred 
 feeling. 
 
 When infidelity assumes the form of Atheism, it at- 
 tempts to veil the Sovereign of the Universe from the 
 eye of conscience, and to lull to sleep man’s indestructible 
 sense of accountability. Pantheism endeavours to amuse 
 and distract this feeling by its airy speculations and 
 gaudy dreams. Naturalism would stupify and over- 
 power our convictions of being responsible, by bringing 
 us within the range of physical laws of unrestricted 
 universality and adamantine stiffness. Spiritualism, by 
 distorting the facts of consciousness and ignoring the 
 statements of the Bible, presents to a man an untrue 
 image of himself, more flattering than the reality. He 
 is captivated with the deceitful beauty of this false repre- 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 29 
 
 sentation, and in his admiration forgets that he must 
 render an account. Indifferentism and Formalism are 
 fits of temporary insanity ; when a man denies or disre- 
 gards what everybody else acknowledges, and what he 
 himself recognises in his lucid intervals. The assertion 
 of human responsibility, then, and more specifically still, 
 of man’s responsibility for his belief, is by far the most 
 critical ground in the whole battle-field where Chris- 
 tianity and Infidelity meet; it is like the Malakoff tower 
 in the Crimea, the precise point where the victory will 
 be lost or won,—the very Thermopyle of the conflict. 
 Is it possible that just then and there the footing of the 
 Christian soldier should be uncertain, and the tactics of 
 his leader undecided and vacillating? Yetso itis. The 
 responsibility of man for his belief is asserted, retracted, 
 explained, re-asserted, and modified. The believer in- 
 flicts upon the unbeliever no wound with this weapon, 
 but it immediately recoils upon himself. If it be main- 
 tained that men are to be held responsible while examin- 
 ing, or refusing to examine, the evidences of Christianity, 
 can it be denied that they are responsible while inter- 
 preting or misinterpreting its written record? If an 
 individual is accountable for his interpretation of one 
 verse of the Bible, is he not accountable for his interpre- 
 tation of the verse that follows it? One child is to be 
 blamed for not listening to his father’s message, and 
 another exculpated for reversing its meaning ! 
 
 An indistinct and languid sense of personal responsi- 
 bility is often the cause of infidelity, and is certainly 
 
30 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 promoted by every infidel theory. A restricted and 
 enervated conviction of duty is one fruitful source of the 
 vice and indolence and crime and godlessness under 
 which the world groans. The potent and all-pervading 
 truth, “that whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also 
 reap,” is jostled from its place, its meaning mistified, its 
 brightness dimmed, its force evaded. To accomplish this 
 end every wile of deception is employed, and every 
 resource of wickedness exhausted. This evil is the 
 cardinal stronghold of all irreligion and unrighteousness. 
 The Christian Church, even the bravest and wisest of 
 her heroes, (we shall be blamed for writing thus, but so 
 it appears to our mind for reasons to be assigned,) instead 
 of meeting this foe foot to foot, and disputing with him 
 every inch of ground, are not sufficiently aware of his 
 character, and either allow themselves to be surprised by 
 his superior vigilance, or coming to a parley are en- 
 tangled in his snares. Few will question the general 
 fact, that in the Christian community the consciousness 
 of individual responsibility is much limited in its sphere 
 and relaxed in its tone; and that many serious blemishes 
 would speedily be removed from the visible body of 
 Christ, if every member thereof were to realise his per- 
 sonal accountability in its integrity, as extending to every 
 thought and word and action of his life, and in all its 
 intensity, as involving his own eternal welfare, the refor- 
 mation of society, the satisfaction of his Redeemer, and 
 the glory of God. Nor is it unlikely that the confused, 
 depressed, and contracted sense of responsibility which 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. St 
 
 weakens and divides the Church, has some important 
 connection with the undefined and wavering views enter- 
 tained respecting it by her teachers. 
 
 In regard to the fourth article in our enumeration, 
 there is no distinction more obvious or fundamental than 
 the one between a mystery and a contradiction ; and 
 there is none which has perhaps been more frequently 
 acknowledged in words, and in reality disregarded. A 
 mystery is evolved when we have two propositions, both 
 of which we know on independent grounds to be true, but 
 which we are not able to harmonise or reconcile with each 
 other. Here is something above or beyond our reason, 
 but nothing in opposition to it. A proposition which we 
 know to be true, but of which we do not know how or 
 why it is true, may also be justly regarded as involving 
 amystery. A contradiction, on the other hand, supposes 
 one proposition to be opposed to another in such a way, 
 that both of them cannot be true. We must, therefore, 
 reject the one or the other. To accept, or profess 
 to believe both, is to be in error,—that is, to think that we 
 know what we don’t know. To believe a proposition 
 which involves a mystery, is to know in part, and in part 
 to be in ignorance ; that is, to know that we know some- 
 thing, and also to know that we do not know more. [or 
 example, there is a mystery connected with animal life. 
 We can affirm with certainty of any animal whose 
 motions we are observing, that it lives and is not dead; 
 but we cannot shew what its life is, or explain the mode 
 and manner of existence. To affirm, however, that 
 
32 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 the motion of the blood is a chemical or mechanical 
 motion, is to involve ourselves in a contradiction. 
 
 The distinction between a contradiction and a mystery, 
 especially in difficult questions, may be easily lost sight 
 of, but not without detriment to the argument. When 
 one of the parties in a discussion asserts regarding any 
 topic that it is mysterious, the only legitimate way in 
 which the assertion may be met is by denying its 
 mysteriousness, and shewing that it involves a contradic- 
 tion. In such a case the burden of proof does not lie 
 with him who maintains that what he believes involves 
 something above our reason, but with him who contends 
 that it is contrary to our reason. He who vindicates, for 
 example, his faith in the doctrine of the Trinity, by 
 asserting that it is mysterious, acts entirely on the 
 defensive. But when an opponent affirms that this doc- 
 trine is contrary to reason, he is bound to produce his 
 arguments, and the believer is then expected to meet and 
 refute the arguments brought forward. 
 
 Now there are several ways in which such a discussion 
 may be mismanaged. The advocate of religion may 
 attempt to explain what cannot be explained, or, by way 
 of having two valid and independent pleas, he may at one 
 time affirm of a certain matter that it is mysterious and 
 
 ‘beyond our reach, and at another time endeavour to 
 clear away its perplexities. In this latter case, which 
 frequently occurs, the one argument completely neutral- 
 ises the other. Instances will be pointed out, in which 
 it is first maintained respecting some Christian truth that 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 33 
 
 it cannot be fathomed by human line, and immediately 
 after the lead is thrown with the intention of sounding its 
 depths. This procedure is clearly illegitimate; it is 
 confounding error with ignorance, and giving a great 
 advantage to the infidel, one of whose most successful 
 stratagems is to assail the mysteries of our religion, as 
 if they were contradictions. No wonder that he should 
 be successful, when the inconsistency just pointed out so 
 frequently mars the defence of the Christian mysteries. 
 Again, it is very possible that while there are no con- 
 tradictions in Christianity itself, there may be several in 
 the arguments of the adherents of Christianity. When 
 the infidel meets with a contradiction in the proofs urged 
 in behalf of the Bible, he will of course make use of it as 
 if it were a contradiction in the religion of the Bible. In 
 such circumstances, the argument in support of Christi- 
 anity will be sensibly and painfully weak. There is 
 an actual irreconcilable contradiction, not in our religion, 
 but which is the same thing for the time being to those 
 immediately concerned, in the vindication and exposition 
 of our religion. The enemy with keen discernment soon 
 fixes upon this contradiction, and works it frequently and 
 effectually. If the Christian advocate has not penetration 
 enough to see the error, or honesty enough to rectify his 
 argument, he will be reduced to one or other of the follow- 
 ing wretched shifts: he will perhaps maintain that what 
 is a contradiction is not a contradiction, in which he will 
 surely be baffled ; or he will avail himself of the enemy’s 
 
34 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 tactics, and confounding contradictions and mysteries, 
 preach a sermon on humility, since we cannot understand 
 every thing; or he will resort to the unfailing method of 
 escape from every dilemma, grow eloquent upon the 
 inconsistencies and absurdities of infidelity. 
 
 The fifth point to which our attention has been called 
 is the distinction between speculative and practical know- 
 ledges. This distinction, which is in everybody’s mouth, 
 learned and unlearned, has seldom been carefully ex- 
 amined, or clearly stated, or consistently adhered to. If 
 in religion the difference between speculation and practice 
 be held to be the same as in every other branch of know- 
 ledge, as it unquestionably ought to be, then we shall 
 have to consider Christianity as a scence, and Christianity 
 as an art. As the difference between scientific and 
 practical astronomy, for instance, is well marked, so is 
 there in reality a well marked difference, which has yet, 
 however, to be developed, between religion as an art and 
 as a science. One important result of attending to this 
 distinction would be, that as the mechanic, while entirely 
 destitute of philosophical attainments, has a valid, truth- 
 ful and reasonable knowledge of the art by which he 
 earns his livelihood, so also it may be shewn that the un- 
 lettered Christian, while totally unacquainted with the 
 literary and scientific evidences of Christianity, has, not- 
 withstanding, a valid, and truthful, and reasonable belief 
 in the gospel of Christ, through which he is looking for 
 life eternal. If this be conceded we need not be afraid 
 to grant or suppose what is by possibility actually the 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 35 
 
 fact, that the evidences of Christianity in a scientific form, 
 have yet to be accurately stated and adduced. It is our 
 persuasion that the practical argument is at present the 
 only valid, complete and satisfactory argument; and that 
 the scientific argument is imperfect as yet, and, conse- 
 quently, not fully conclusive. It shall be our object to 
 notice the confusion that is found arising from jumbling 
 together the practical and the scientific in the Christian 
 argument. 
 
 The distinction just adverted to, though unambiguous 
 and undoubted in itself, is not what is most commonly 
 intended when religious men contrast speculative or theo- 
 retic knowledge with practical knowledge. When it is 
 said that an individual knows the gospel theoretically, 
 but not practically, the fact referred to is this, that the 
 individual does not act upon the knowledge which he has. 
 It appears to us, that this fact, which is worthy of due 
 attention, is improperly described by the language com- 
 monly applied to it, especially as this language has, as we 
 have just seen, another meaning of its own, both proper 
 and important. Theoretic or scientific knowledge is 
 knowledge not to be acted upon, it is knowledge apart 
 from a practical end; this is its peculiar characteristic, as 
 it is to be distinguished from practical knowledge. Prac- 
 tical knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge which 
 may, or ought to be acted upon. To suppose that prac- 
 tical knowledge, taken in this sense, 7s always acted upon, 
 is to overlook one of the chief phenomena of human na- 
 ture, and to confound virtue and vice. And yet this 
 
36 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 fundamentally false supposition runs through many an 
 argument. c 
 
 Here, then, we have more than one source of confu- 
 sion. There are two important distinctions, both replete 
 with numerous, and varied, and momentous results— 
 namely, the distinction between religion as an art, and 
 religion as a science, or the distinction between a scientific 
 and a practical knowledge of Christianity ; and the dis- 
 tinction in moral agents between acting upon our know- 
 ledge and not acting upon our knowledge. Now, it has oc- 
 curred to us, that neither of these two distinctions has been 
 sufficiently developed or fairly used in the arguments 
 in defence of the Bible; and to make the matter worse, 
 that the one has been often confounded with the other. 
 
 Some, when the scientific argument breaks down in 
 their management, betake themselves to the practical 
 argument to cover their defeat. But they are ashamed 
 to rest their cause entirely and exclusively on practical 
 ground, which they ought not to be; and they are soon 
 observed slipping back among the mists of speculation. 
 This hurrying to and fro between scientific and practical 
 considerations is repeated as often as the exigencies of 
 the discussion demand. Others, or the same parties at 
 another time, will be found assuming that most men have 
 a theoretic or speculative knowledge of religious truth, 
 and that the great cause and criminality of infidelity lies 
 in this, that these men do not add a practical, to their 
 speculative, knowledge. It is our conviction that most 
 men have, not a speculative, or theoretic, or scientific 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 37 
 
 knowledge of religious truth (which few, if any, have), 
 but a practical knowledge of it to a greater or less extent. 
 If this practical knowledge were calmly looked at, the 
 evidences of Christianity, in their practical aspect, might 
 be clearly, and satisfactorily, and shortly manifested. 
 The chief cause and the condemning guilt of all infidelity, 
 irreligion and wickedness among men, lies in nothing else 
 but this, that they “do not obey the truth,” or, in other 
 words, do not act upon the (practical) knowledge which 
 they possess. 
 
 The effect of this confusion upon the argument is some- 
 what of the following kind :—The Christian having vir- 
 tually, if not formally, granted that the practical evi- 
 dences are somehow inferior to the scientific, the infidel 
 can make good his position that the belief of the mass of 
 Christians is also inferior, or, as he affirms, blind and 
 unintelligent. By practical evidences we mean those 
 which are within the reach of every man, independently 
 of learning and recondite argument. We should not like 
 to undertake to show, that the present faith in Christianity 
 held by multitudes is not as a matter of fact unintelligent 
 and blind. But it is a matter of immense moment to 
 show that it is a fact in some cases, and may be, and 
 ought to be, a fact in all cases, that, even amongst the 
 poorest and most illiterate, the gospel can be received as 
 true, honestly and reasonably. This point is seldom 
 made good by our apologists; when it is made good, it 
 does not receive the prominence which is due to it; the 
 argument is often so managed as to render the making 
 
38 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 of it good impossible, except by being inconsistent. If 
 this point be made good, we can afford to wait for the 
 proper evolution of the scientific evidences, and freely 
 and without alarm confess our ignorance. As matters at 
 present stand, the taunt that the belief in Christianity is 
 generally mystic, or enthusiastic, or traditional, not intel- 
 ligent and clear, is seldom fairly met or satisfactorily 
 repelled. 
 
 The perplexity is aggravated, when in the same con- 
 nection the moral character of the infidel becomes a 
 question. If the atheist be considered blameworthy, it 
 can only be on the assumption that he is not acting, or 
 has not acted, according to the knowledge he possesses ; 
 that he deals dishonestly with the facts of nature and the 
 facts of consciousness. When any other ground is taken, 
 the infidel can successfully defy all censure. If this 
 ground be taken, he can retort the charge most severely 
 upon the mass of professing Christians, that they are not 
 acting according to their knowledge. This ground seems 
 to us to be the only true and sure footing; though it be 
 rarely taken in a decided manner, and as a fundamental 
 position. When this point is waived altogether, or only 
 slightly adverted to, and the value of the practical evi- 
 dences overlooked, as explained previously, and the 
 defender of our religion plunges deeply into the details 
 of history or the thickets of speculation, however vigorous 
 may be his thrusts against infidelity in its various forms, 
 his defence of the truth is unsatisfactory and weak. 
 
 Another point in our enumeration refers to the dis- 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 39 
 
 tinction between certainty and probability. The discus- 
 sion frequently turns upon the import of these terms, 
 and yet the way in which they are employed baftles 
 every effort to form precise conceptions respecting them. 
 We have different kinds of certainty, and different de- 
 grees of certainty, and we have the higher probabilities 
 made equal to certainties. At one time we are told that 
 the conditions of the argument preclude the attainment 
 of certainty. At another time this denial of certainty is 
 transmuted into the assertion of moral certainty. At one 
 time the whole stress of the evidence rests upon the dis- 
 tinction between what is certain and what is probable; 
 and at another time this distinction grows gradually less 
 and less, and by and by vanishes away. 
 
 It appears to us that there can be in the nature of the 
 ease only one kind and one degree of certainty. When 
 we know that a proposition is true, our knowledge is cer- 
 tain. It matters not to what objects the proposition may 
 refer, or by what medium we may come to the knowledge 
 of its truth. Since truth is immutable, whenever we 
 know any truth in the way in which it is proper that 
 that truth should be known, we feel assured and certain 
 respecting it. Our knowledge that coal-gas is inflam- 
 mable, or that it is wrong to tell a lie, is just as certain 
 as that three and three make six. The certainty in each 
 case may be reached by a different process, and receive 
 a colouring from that process; but it is nevertheless one 
 and the same certainty. 
 
 When we know more or less respecting a proposition, 
 
40 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 without being able to pronounce it true or erroneous, 
 our knowledge is probable. This admits of course of all 
 variety of degrees, but even between the highest proba- 
 bility and certainty, there is a clear and appreciable 
 difference, which may be noticed frequently in the lan- 
 guage of common life, as when we say, it is very highly 
 probable, but not certain. 
 
 To admit that we cannot attain certainty, taking the 
 word in an unambiguous and forcible meaning, in morals 
 and religion, seems to us to give up the argument in 
 favour of Christianity altogether. If the truth be of 
 such a nature, or so far removed from us, or 80 covered 
 up, that our minds cannot clearly perceive it or firmly 
 grasp it—that we cannot legitimately feel fully assured 
 and convinced that we have got hold of the truth, where 
 is there any room for argument, or to what tangible or 
 precious result can argument lead? If the whole discus- 
 sion be, from beginning to end, a comparison of diffi- 
 culties, a discrimination of this and the other likelihood, 
 a mere weighing of probabilities, and nothing more, we 
 are entangled in the worst form of scepticism; for it 
 were better to reject truth altogether, than, believing in 
 it, concede that man cannot find truth and certainty in 
 religion. On this supposition, indeed, we should easily 
 escape from our painful and unseemly contradictions ; 
 for probabilities do not annihilate each other. Moreover, 
 every man’s opinion might now be easily admitted to be 
 true to him; for if there be nothing but probabilities, 
 truth is known to none. Thus the harmony and con- 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 4l 
 
 cord which so many desire, that is, the latitudinarianism 
 which treats all opinions with similar deference, will be 
 easily realised. The lowest development of Christianity 
 might be shewn, perhaps, to be a trifle more probable 
 than the highest development of Deism; and on either 
 side there might be found or fancied a graduated scale 
 down to the abyss of atheism and up to the heavenly 
 heights of true piety. But in such a series of barely 
 perceptible steps there would be no place for a real 
 conflict between truth and error ;.and every man might 
 entertain an equal confidence of being right ; for on such 
 a hypothesis error would be indeed partial truth, and no 
 man would be wrong, but men would differ only in pos- 
 sessing smaller and larger measures of knowledge. 
 
 To abandon the position, then, that we have certainty 
 in our knowledge of the truth of Christianity, as good a 
 certainty as we have in any other kind of knowledge, is 
 to surrender our stronghold into the enemy’s hands. 
 We admit that there is some difficulty in making out this 
 certainty. But the labour of maintaining a position of 
 importance is a bad argument for sounding a retreat. It 
 has been already admitted, that the scientific argument 
 is at present defective, and hence certainty cannot as yet 
 be reached in that direction. The deep consciousness of 
 this has doubtless led many to make an unwary conces- 
 sion, For to many the attainment of certainty seems 
 still more hopeless on the practical side. In practical 
 life, it will be asked, are not men guided by probabilities, 
 and by them alone ? 
 
42 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 We are not unwilling to allow the whole discussion in 
 which we are engaged to rest upon this one question : 
 Have men, or have they not, certainty, that is, a perfect 
 and unassailable confidence, in the accuracy of the know- 
 ledge on which they act in their ordinary practical 
 affairs ? 
 
 What certainty, it will be asked with a smile of tri- 
 umph, has the husbandman that the coming harvest will 
 reimburse him for all his toil and expenditure? What 
 certainty has the physician that he will cure his patient, 
 or succeed in his profession? What certainty has the 
 merchant that his merchandise will not be lost in cross- 
 ing the ocean? And so on in a thousand cases. None, 
 we reply; none whatever. Probabilities rather than 
 certainties, enter most largely into the busy affairs of 
 human existence. 
 
 But the question is by no means exhausted. The 
 inquiry may be made—Are there probabilities only in 
 the knowledge of the practical man? If his entire stock 
 of knowledge be nothing else but a congeries of conjec- 
 tures, and guesses, and probabilities, without even one 
 stray certainty to bind them together or preside over 
 them, he is more to be commiserated than the unhappy 
 sailor, who has to navigate his ship over unknown seas, 
 and through changeable stormy weather, without a com- 
 pass or a chart. If the sailor has but a compass on 
 hoard his vessel, he can pilot her fearlessly through 
 buffeting waves and against adverse winds; so also if 
 in our practical knowledge there be even one certainty, 
 
 ey gi 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 43 
 
 one point which we adopt and hold with unwavering 
 assurance, it may enable us to deal with manifold pro- 
 babilities, intelligently and safely. One positive un- 
 doubted assurance may be to us in practical business, 
 what the compass is to the navigator ; it may serve to 
 direct us unfailingly over the roughest portion of our 
 passage across the sea of life. 
 
 Is there, then, no certainty on which men invariably 
 fall back, when they are called to deal with any of the 
 endless probabilities of our social state? Are there no 
 sage maxims, which are in everybody’s mouth at one 
 time or another, and whose certainty forms a striking 
 contrast with the fluctuating nature of the events which 
 it helps us to regulate and control? Do not prudent 
 men always take the safe side? In how few cases is 
 there a shadow of a doubt, which is the safe side in 
 steering our way through a sea of perplexities? There 
 is as little doubt that that side should be chosen. There 
 are few men so dull or stolid as not to know, with 
 absolute and unconditional certainty, in ninety-nine cases 
 out of a hundred practical emergencies, where the risk 
 hes, and how best to avoid it. Thousands are ruined 
 not by the want of this knowledge, but by not acting 
 upon it. | 
 
 The application of this principle to Christianity is 
 obyious and most conclusive. Allowing that the Bible 
 has no credentials to sustain its assumption of being the 
 Word of God, except a few feeble probabilities ; still the 
 matter at stake is so momentous, and the time of action 
 
44. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 is so short and uncertain; the risk is so absolutely and 
 completely on the side of neglect, and that risk, in all 
 probability to say the least, is so awfully and tremend- 
 ously great; that not to avoid it,— not to choose the 
 safe side of humble hopeful obedience,—is in the estima- 
 tion of common prudence nothing better than the mad- 
 ness of infatuated folly. 
 
 On this conclusion, forcible and sweeping though it 
 be, a Christian may take his stand with perfect certainty 
 and unabashed assurance; and, having obtained this 
 firm foothold, he may adjourn for further reflection and 
 future decision the unsettled questions in the infidel con- 
 troversy, taking them up one by one, and reserving his 
 judgment till the full clear light of truth shall beam upon 
 his waiting soul. Having obtained this strong position, he 
 may, if he only be consistent with his own principles, 
 carry conyiction of guiltiness to every conscience through 
 the numerous ranks of infidelity. 
 
 The last point calling for consideration is the criterion 
 in morality. There are two distinct questions involved 
 in this topic; namely, Is there some standard of morality, 
 a knowledge of which is attainable by man, indepen- 
 dently of any assistance from a written revelation ? 
 And, if there be, what is it ? 
 
 A common mode of discussing this topic is to take the 
 last question first, and from the admitted fact that men 
 are not agreed in the principles or rules of morality, to 
 draw the inference that apart from the Bible there is no 
 certain knowledge attainable by man in moral questions. 
 
 ' 4 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 45 
 
 Although this be a very general and plausible manner 
 of disposing of the matter, it appears to us that a con- 
 sistent adherence to the principles herein implied would 
 land us in the most complete scepticism. 
 
 The inquiry is, Are men, without the Bible, wnder an 
 obligation, and possessed of capability, to attain some 
 certain and accurate knowledge of morals, or are they 
 not’ To infer what ought to be from what és, is an 
 obvious paralogism. This is precisely the argument of 
 those, who affirm, that because men disagree about moral 
 principles, therefore there is no obligation nor means of 
 coming to an agreement. It were as reasonable to plead, 
 that since a man has become a rogue, he could not, and 
 cannot, be anything else. 
 
 Again, to deny that men have, or can have, any un- 
 doubted knowledge as to their duty towards God with- 
 out the Holy Scriptures, seems to be equivalent to say- 
 ing that men who are ignorant of Christianity are irre- 
 sponsible for their conduct. Whoever knows nothing 
 can never be summoned to a reckoning. Therefore, not- 
 withstanding the painful fact, that apart from the Word 
 of God men have not found a criterion in morals, it is an 
 all-important position to maintain, that men might have 
 found, and ought to have found one. 
 
 Again, admitting the Bible, inasmuch as it is a revela- 
 tion from the God of truth, and the Supreme Governor 
 of the universe, to be a criterion in moral and religious 
 questions, yet it is to be noticed that Christians are by 
 no means agreed in their interpretation of this Book, 
 
46 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 and also that this Book contains or sanctions truths of 
 two distinct classes. The one class consists of truths 
 which are properly speaking revealed, and which men 
 could not have guessed or discovered without a special 
 revelation of them; and the other class consists of truths 
 which the Bible assumes or takes for granted as already 
 known or knowable by man. 
 
 To us it seems a plain inference, that if discrepancy 
 and contradiction in morals amongst men ignorant of the 
 Bible prove their incompetency to find a standard or 
 attain a true knowledge of ethics to any extent, the con- 
 tradiction and opposition that prevail among Christians 
 on several momentous questions in morals and religion 
 will equally prove their incompetency to find a standard 
 even with the help of revelation. If, then, there be no 
 standard whatever apart from the Bible, the Bible itself 
 cannot be a standard. Men have misinterpreted the 
 word of God, as well as abused the God-given faculty 
 within them. If the understanding and conscience, un- 
 aided by a written revelation, are to be cashiered, because 
 many or most or all men have grievously perverted them, 
 then, because these same faculties have been also griey- 
 ‘ously perverted in dealing with the word of God when 
 known, they ought to be entirely, and in every form, 
 rejected as invalid. This conclusion, which seems to be 
 unanswerable, if the assumption which we are considering 
 be granted, lands us in the bleak waste of scepticism. 
 If men, then, can know anything certainly and truly by 
 means of the Bible, there is something in morals and 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 47 
 
 religion which, without the Bible, they can certainly and 
 truly know. 
 
 The Bible itself is written throughout on this suppo- 
 sition. It invariably speaks to men as if they knew 
 something, with the purpose of telling them something 
 additional. It could not have been constructed other- 
 wise, so long as it is addressed to intelligent beings. 
 
 The inference which we draw is this, that there is a 
 eriterion in morals; that it must be found, and will be 
 found, by men; that men will come to agree in moral 
 principles and questions, and will be able accurately to 
 discriminate between the moral truth which the Bible 
 reveals or discovers, and the moral truth which the Bible 
 assumes as knowable by man without special divine 
 authority to sanction it, or express divine teaching to 
 disclose it. 
 
 The criterion is certainly not yet found and accepted. 
 Hence every honest and earnest mind will blush for 
 human nature and for the Christian Church, because of 
 our sloth and perversity. Every ingenuous mind will 
 also lend his best aid to elucidate and establish this crite- 
 rion. This criterion would have been discovered, to some 
 extent at least, long ago, if there had not been so many 
 among Christians, as well as among Jews and Gentiles. 
 who “ do not obey the truth.”—Rom. u. 8. 
 
 If now, instead of humbly confessing our ignorance of 
 anything worthy of the name of a moral criterion, and 
 earnestly doing our part to find it, we proceed to deny 
 that there can be anything of the sort, and on this prin- 
 
48 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 ciple enter the lists with the infidel, we shall goon find 
 ourselves discomfited, or, what is worse, be discomfited 
 without feeling it. 
 
 The disadvantages of this mode of conducting the con- 
 troversy are most conspicuous, when the assault upon 
 Christianity is made from what is assumed to be a 
 standard of moral truth. The only fair and successful 
 way of repelling such an assault is, by shewing that what 
 is assumed to be moral truth is in reality not so. But 
 this may prove a troublesome business; especially when 
 the opponent will demand not only a refutation of his 
 assumed criterion, but also the enunciation and vindica- 
 tion of the true criterion—a demand which, on the face 
 of it, is perfectly fair. It is a much shorter and easier 
 way to laugh and jeer at anything that professes to be 
 “a fixed moral basis;” but this is truly to refute a 
 moderate infidel by means of the principle of extreme 
 scepticism. To foil the Deist by the weapons of Atheism 
 may be successful for a time; but it will be awfully 
 ruinous in the end. 
 
 So long as Christians are not agreed in adopting a 
 standard of morality—not agreed as to what those 
 ethical principles are which we may know without the 
 assistance of the Bible, and which the Bible assumes to 
 be known, and not agreed in the principles or truths 
 more strictly speaking revealed—so long they must 
 carry on the infidel controversy at a serious disadvantage. 
 They must convert each other, before they can fully re- 
 fute the unbeliever. It is vain-glorious, as well as futile, 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 49 
 
 to attempt to teach the world the truth, so far as they 
 have yet themselves to learn the truth. Are not those 
 who have learned the truth agreed in holding the truth? 
 For Christians to reason with unbelievers without the 
 assumption of a fixed basis of morality is beating the 
 air. To assume as fixed a basis of morality, while there 
 is no harmony of opinion, or but little, among ourselves, 
 as to what that basis actually is, were simply ridiculous, 
 if the question were less important. 
 
 The evils entailed upon the Christian Church in conse- 
 quence of this state of matters, irrespective of the contro- 
 versy with infidelity, are numerous and great. For 
 Christians to be perpetually in conflict with each other 
 as to the grounds of their faith, as well as in regard 
 to the exposition of their faith, is to mar their Christian 
 fellowship and retard their spiritual progress, even 
 though they had no enemy to contend with. When 
 no foe is at the gate, the direful consequences of division 
 and schism on matters of moment are obvious and la- 
 mentable enough. How much is the evil intensified, and 
 how truly alarming does it become, when notwithstand- 
 ing the vigorous assault of strong and subtle opponents, 
 our schismatical contradictions and contentions are not 
 only prolonged, but their existence justified on the plea 
 of necessity, and their criminality palliated on the ground 
 of their indirect and secondary advantages ! 
 
 That Christians have not yet attained to a moral 
 position, outside the Bible, and independent of it, on 
 which as on.a common vantage ground they could assail 
 
50 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 and overthrow every infidel adversary, secret or avowed, 
 is not the worst feature of the case. It is equally 
 mournful to behold them, with the Bible in their hands, 
 debating and wrangling and contradicting respecting the 
 meaning of the simplest statements, the import of the 
 most precious truths, and the discharge of the most 
 onerous duties. But, to our minds, it is the worst of all, 
 and in a great measure the cause of the evils now speci- 
 fied, that the conscience of the Christian community is 
 content with this condition of its affairs. There is no 
 combined or continued or prayerful effort to effect a 
 change for the better, for there is no belief that such a 
 reformation is practicable. There needs no further evi- 
 dence to shew that we are a generation of babes in 
 Christ—“ Brethren, be not children in understanding : 
 howbeit in malice be ye children, but in understanding 
 be men.” 
 
 If an individual is constrained by his circumstances, or 
 contented from his groveling habits, to occupy himself 
 only with “the first principles of the oracles of God,” if 
 he will take his station on the lowest practical platform 
 of discussion, if his desire be, not to grow in grace or in- 
 crease in knowledge, but simply to escape from hell, and 
 no more, even to such an one, whose tone of morality 
 is so relaxed and whose spiritual aspirations are so low, 
 it is easy to find some current moral maxim, plain and 
 indisputable to all, which shall expose the flimsiness of 
 infidelity and vindicate his acceptance of, and submission 
 to, the Christian faith. Such practical and popular argu- 
 
DEVELOPED IN THE DIALOGUES. 51 
 
 ments must be held, and will be shewn, to be as reason- 
 able and valid in their own place, as the most laboured, 
 or recondite or scientific display of evidence is in its 
 place. 
 
 If, on the other hand, we would rise to the possession 
 of such evidence, we must be prepared for the toil which 
 its acquisition implies. If the question must be probed 
 to the bottom, and the argument assume a proper scien- 
 tific form, then we must not fancy, because we are tired, 
 that we have reached the bottom, while yet we have a 
 depth to fathom ; nor flatter ourselves that the symmetry 
 of our argument is complete, when in fact and to all im- 
 _ partial onlookers (as is manifested by prevailing contra- 
 dictions) it is in a rude and undigested state. 
 
 Cee ee 
 
 A Believer and an Unbeliever in Christianity having 
 agreed to hold some friendly converse upon the points of 
 difference between them, and having requested a mutual 
 acquaintance to act as Umpire, the following discussions 
 are reported to have taken place. No reader, it is pre- 
 sumed, will suppose that though the names, Origen and 
 Celsus, are given to the disputants, the opinions which 
 they are here represented as holding belonged to the 
 historical personages who bore those names in the second 
 and third centuries. The Umpire is called Theologus, 
 inasmuch as he is expected to know something of “ the 
 science of God and divine things.” 
 
De SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 If the sentiments expressed by Origen in the following 
 dialogues seem to any individuals to be too grossly incon- 
 sistent with each other, they are referred to the notes in 
 the margin, which prove that these contradictions have 
 not sprung from the author’s heated imagination, but are 
 held and published by some of the best writers of the 
 present day. The reader is likewise requested to 
 notice, that whenever words forming a part of quotations 
 are found printed in italic or capital letters, they are so 
 printed in the books whence the passage is taken. 
 
DIALOGUE I. 
 TRUTH AND ERROR. 
 
 Theologus.—Gentlemen, you both admit the distinction 
 between Truth and Error, I presume ? 
 
 Origen.—We do, assuredly ; for truth is the great ob- 
 ject of our search and belief ;—truth as opposed and 
 contradicted by error. 
 
 Celsus.—So do we; every discussion implies the fixed 
 and immutable nature of this distinction. If there be no 
 truth, there can be no knowledge. 
 
 Origen.—Then why have so many from 
 What is Truth? time immemorial asked, scoffingly, or in jest, 
 What is truth ? 
 
 Celsus.—Because it is so difficult to find truth; as is 
 manifest from the contradictions that have so long and so 
 extensively prevailed among mankind on the most im- 
 portant questions. 
 
 Origen.—But to admit that there is a distinction be- 
 tween truth and error, is of no avail, unless it be also 
 admitted that we can perceive and appreciate that dis- 
 tinction. If men cannot find the truth, it is the same to 
 them as if there were no truth. 
 
 Celsus.— But how are men to find the truth? Amida 
 multitude of conflicting opinions, how are we to know 
 which is right? It is obviously not enough to find the 
 
o4 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 truth; it is equally necessary to know that we have found 
 it. How then may an individual be reasonably assured 
 that his opinion is true, and that in the face of counter- 
 opinions held by the learned and the wise? The reality 
 of truth is not denied by us; but so long as men cannot 
 grasp it, or so long as they cannot be sure that it is in 
 their possession, it is scarcely anything to them, and we 
 have too much reason to ask, What is truth ? 
 
 He who seeks Ol WC%-—The difficulties which are met in 
 the truth shall the way of finding the truth are entirely in 
 ieee men themselves. He who seeks the truth 
 shall find it; and he who finds it after an honest and 
 diligent search will feel confident, and reasonably so, that 
 he knows it. 
 
 Celsus—You cannot mean to assert, that whatever 
 truth a man seeks for, he will be sure to findit. For 
 then any man, with ambition enough, might become not 
 only wiser than Solomon, but actually omniscient. 
 
 Origen.—The statement must, of course, be limited to 
 the truth, which it is competent for man to know. 
 
 Celsus.—Do you, then, mean the statement to apply 
 to all the truth which is within the reach of the human 
 mind? Ifa person by seeking can find any truth within 
 the sphere of human knowledge, then the dullest hind 
 may soon learn, if he choose, all that man can know; and 
 there will be some consolation for the utter hopelessness 
 of any new discovery in the fact, that none is needed. 
 Of what truth, then, do you affirm, that he who seeks 
 shall find ? 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 55 
 
 Origen. —We make this assertion of religious truth. 
 
 Celsus.—Mankind have differed as much, if not more, 
 about religion, than about anything else. By religious 
 truth, then, you can only mean your own views about 
 religion; and your principle amounts to this :—Those 
 who have adopted your views have sought the truth, and 
 those who have not adopted your views have not sought 
 the truth. Such an assertion is as uncharitable as it is 
 unreasonable. 
 
 Origen.—Do you, then, deny that in any case a man 
 can find the truth, and be certain that he has found it ? 
 If you do, our present discussion and every other is alto- 
 gether unnecessary, so far as you are concerned ; and if 
 you admit that in some instances we can attain confident 
 knowledge of the truth, you are as much bound as I am 
 to answer the question, What truth can we know by 
 searching for it, so as to know that we know it? 
 
 Lheologus.—Undoubtedly, whoever makes a profession 
 of believing the truth, is bound, in order fully to justify 
 that belief, to answer this question. No creed, atheistic, 
 pantheistic or christian, can be regarded as philosophi- 
 cally * or scientifically based, till its supporters have given 
 a satisfactory answer to the inquiry, how, among so many 
 contradictory sentiments, may a man find the truth, and 
 know that he has found it? The following answer is 
 proposed for your consideration :— 
 
 Tf a man diligently and honestly seeks to know the truth 
 on any particular question, it matters not what, he may 
 
 1 See Dialogue 5. 
 
56 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 be tgnorant in a greater or less degree and for a longer 
 or shorter time, but on that question he will not err. 
 
 Origen.—You take a distinction between ignorance 
 and error, I apprehend. These words are often used for 
 each other, please to explain what you mean by the dis- 
 tinction. 
 
 ciao ea Theologus.—Knowledge seems to me to 
 Error, be two-fold. When we know the truth, 
 and know that we know it, that is true or normal know- 
 ledge. When we do not know the truth, but only 
 think that we know it, that is abnormal or erroneous 
 knowledge, or as it is commonly and shortly called 
 error. Ignorance is hkewise two-fold. When we do not 
 know the truth, which is really beyond the reach of 
 our understanding, and know that we do not know it, 
 that is proper or normal ignorance ; though it might also 
 be called knowledge. When we do not know the truth, 
 which we might, and ought to know, that is improper or 
 abnormal ignorance, and is rightly classed with erroneous 
 knowledge. To confound a rightful ignorance and an 
 erroneous knowledge as has been often done is a serious 
 mistake. 
 
 Celsus.—Your principle, then, will amount to this :— 
 That if any man fairly and earnestly seeks to know the 
 truth on any topic whatever, he will either know that 
 truth, or know that he does not know it. 
 
 Theologus.—Precisely so. 
 
 Origen.—This principle may sound well enough to the 
 ear, but stubborn facts will make sad work with it. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. oF 
 
 Theologus.—Or rather, it will place facts in their true 
 light. But let us see. 
 
 Origen.—How do you apply this principle, or what 
 inference do you draw from it ? 
 
 Celsus.—Its application is very easily perceived, name- 
 ly, if it be true, that when infidels oppose Christians this 
 opposition arises, as you affirm, because one of the 
 opposing parties, namely, the infidel, does not seek the 
 truth, then also it follows that when Christian contradicts 
 Christian it is for the same reason, because one of them 
 has not sedulously sought the truth. The conclusion is 
 what has been often maintained, —Christians should con- 
 vert one another before they undertake to convert the 
 world. 
 
 Lheologus.—They should do the one and not leave 
 the other undone; both are best done together. Besides, 
 the faults of others will not justify your faults. If the 
 gospel be true, and you refuse to accept of it, you must 
 bear the consequences. 
 
 Origen.—The principle which has been stated is liable 
 to many serious objections, 
 
 Theologus.—What are they? It is well to consider 
 them separately, though at the same time, it must not be 
 forgotten, that if either the eternal and immutable anti- 
 thesis between truth and error, or the validity of the 
 human understanding in dealing with that antithesis in 
 its own proper sphere, be denied, the principle itself 
 and the objections urged against it are both equally 
 futile. 
 
 D 
 
58 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 Origen. — You are forgetting that “ the 
 ohana difference of the evidence on which we receive 
 Truth. mathematical and religious truth respectively 
 
 is vital.” 
 
 Theologus.—It is easy to represent that difference in 
 such a form as to render it fatal to religious truth. How 
 do you state the difference ? 
 
 Origen.—* Religious truth is received not on demon- 
 strative but on moral evidence, and therefore the notions 
 of religion vary not only in degree but in kind, in differ- 
 ent ages and nations, and in the same individuals at dif- 
 ferent times. Mathematics merely differ by the more 
 and the less. He who does not get beyond the first 
 book of Euclid, believes nothing contrary to or znconsist- 
 ent with the knowledge of him who has mastered New- 
 ton’s ‘ Principia.’”’”? 
 
 Celsus.—If this means anything at all, it means that 
 in religion contradictories are true. If contradictory 
 religions may be all true, why may not the contradic- 
 tion of all religions or infidelity be also true? 
 
 Origen.—But you would not reject Christianity with 
 its mass of positive evidence, because of some znsoluble 
 oljections ? 
 
 insoluble op.  L Weologus.—What do you mean by an in- 
 JecHoub, soluble objection? If it mean evidence prov- 
 ing Christianity to be false, or désproving the evidence on 
 which our religion is alleged to rest; if it mean a contra- 
 
 1 A Defence of ** The Eclipse of Faith,” by its Author. Second 
 edition. London, 1854. Pp. 97, 98. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 59 
 
 diction in Christianity itself, or a contradiction in any part 
 of its evidence, the defender of Christianity is bound to 
 answer the objection or relinquish his position. In other 
 words, we cannot hold to Christianity if it contradict itself, 
 and we must abandon as valid evidence in its favour every 
 argument that is self-inconsistent or false. If those who 
 are so constantly talking of the objections and difficulties 
 connected with the Christian argument, and pleading 
 that even though they be admitted to be insoluble and 
 insurmountable, they do not invalidate the truth of Chris- 
 tianity, refer to the mysteries! involved in the question, 
 then it is plain, as has been often shewn, that the pre- 
 sence of mystertes is no reasonable difficulty or objection, 
 far less one of an insuperable character. The mystery 
 continues, of course, unfathomed, but its existence is no 
 disparagement to truth. 
 
 Celsus.—It has always puzzled me to understand how 
 the advocates of Christianity should allow insoluble ob- 
 jections to attach to their own system, when the strongest 
 ground they have ever occupied in assailing systems of 
 unbelief has been alleged insoluble objections. 
 
 Origen.—But the objections against Christianity are 
 less in number and less weighty than those against any 
 other system.? 
 
 Celsus.—If this be all the superiority which you claim, 
 your cause can attain, at best, but a sorry triumph. The 
 least contradiction is weighty enough. Besides, you 
 yourselves admit, what indeed cannot be denied, that the 
 
 * See Dialogue 4. 2 A Defence, &., p. 179, 116, &e. 
 
60 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 party who professes to defend and inculcate truth, should 
 come before the world purged from self-inconsistencies 
 and mutual contradictions. Speaking of my friends, it 
 has been said, ‘‘ In virtue of their spiritual apparatus, 
 they have arrived, as usual, at very different conclusions 
 on most momentous points; and though it is not of the 
 smallest consequence as long as they are merely attempt- 
 ing to destroy historical Christianity, yet the moment 
 people ask, ‘ and what are we to believe ?’ it becomes of 
 vital importance.” 1 When Christians profess to teach 
 us, then, what we are to believe, the fact that they come 
 to very different conclusions on most momentous points 
 is, on your own admission, of vital importance. 
 Theologus.—This importance must not be overstrained. 
 The contradiction even of eminent men on a given topic 
 does not prove that the truth on that topic is not to be 
 found, but only that both the disputing parties have not 
 found it. The conflicting sentiments of Christians are 
 objections against some of the present current arguments 
 in favour of Christianity, but not against Christianity 
 itself, We cannot admit, as has been suggested,? that 
 there may be a truce between parties fundamentally 
 opposed, because they are not throughout opposed. So 
 far as parties are agreed, no truce is needed. If one 
 person claims as true what another refuses, truth can 
 never consent to a truce. The collision should “ lead us 
 
 1A Defence, &c., p. 117. 
 * Theism : by Rev. John Tulloch, D.D. Edinburgh and Lon- 
 don, 1855. Burnett Treatise, Second Prize, p. 22. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 61 
 
 to ponder more thoroughly the grounds of our own con- 
 viction.” } | 
 
 Origen.— Suppose, then, that both parties ponder 
 thoroughly the grounds of their convictions, and continue 
 to embrace contradictory opinions, what is to be done? 
 Who is to be judge between them ? 
 
 Who is to be Celsus.—When we oppose and deny the 
 apieet truth of Christianity, Who is to judge be- 
 tween you and us? 
 
 Origen.—Why, God will judge between you and us 
 for rejecting his own message. 
 
 Celsus.—And will not God be judge between Christian 
 and Christian, when it is so obvious amid conflicting 
 interpretations of Scripture, that one party is represent- 
 ing God as saying what in reality he has never spoken ? 
 
 Theologus.—The retort seems to be fair. To admit 
 that two men, thoroughly honest and diligent in examin- 
 ing an important point, may yet come to antagonistic 
 conclusions, is to abandon the distinction between truth 
 and error, or to deny the validity of the human under- 
 standing ; that is, to plunge into utter and hopeless 
 scepticism. 
 
 Origen.—Yet what more can be demanded or expected 
 of any man than obedience to this precept, which, though 
 it be in the Bible, no infidel will dispute: “ Let every 
 man be fully persuaded in his own mind.” 
 
 Celsus.—We have no objections to this maxim, pro- 
 vided only that it be fairly applied. It answers our 
 
 1 Tulloch’s Theism, p. 21. 
 
62 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 purpose just as well as yours. What we complain of is, 
 that you refuse to give us the benefit of what you claim 
 for yourselves. In contradicting each other two Chris- 
 tians plead, each for himself, that he is fully persuaded 
 in his own mind. In contradicting both of them, I plead 
 that I am fully persuaded in my own mind. 
 
 Theologus.—When the text referred to is quoted to 
 justify conflicting sentiments, it is misapplied. Paul gave 
 a clear and unequivocal decision upon the question in 
 dispute (see Rom. xiv. 14, 1 Tim. iv. 4). For each to be 
 fully and honestly persuaded in his own mind, is the 
 proper way for intelligent beings to come to a harmonious 
 conclusion. The text does not teach indifference to truth, 
 but sincerity and charity. As it is frequently quoted, it 
 
 very man’s opi. 18 eQuivalent to the infidel adage, “ every 
 nion is true. man’s opinion is true to him,” or, in other 
 words, there is no such thing as truth. 
 
 Nocessary evils of  O7tgen.—You will not, however, deny 
 private judgment. that difference of sentiment is a necessary 
 evil attending the exercise of the right of private judg- 
 ment ? 
 
 Celsus.—This is a plea which we have often used. 
 This argument, if good in your defence, is equally good 
 in ours. If brother Christians, when they contradict 
 each other on the divinely instituted form of church 
 government, or on the extent of the atonement of Christ, 
 or on the duty of the civil magistrate in reference to 
 religion, or the obligation of signing the total abstinence 
 pledge, and so on,—if they may shake hands heartily at 
 
 Sa eae gare 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 63 
 
 the close of the discussion and separate amicably and as 
 bosom friends, only lamenting the necessary evils of 
 private judgment, why should not brother men do the 
 same, when they differ as to the claims of Christianity ? 
 
 Theologus. —If this necessary evil involve blame- 
 worthiness, then those Christians who are in error when 
 they oppose their brethren are to be blamed, on the 
 same principle that the infidel is to be blamed for reject- 
 ing the Divine message. The two parties may not be 
 blameworthy to the same eatent, but the one is as truly 
 culpable as the other. If this evil referred to has no 
 moral element, but is wholly natural and unavoidable, 
 then the infidel is as innocent as the erring Christian. 
 If both be innocent, there is no evil in error, or the sole 
 author of that evil is God. 
 aan Origen.—But you are not giving suffi- 
 ences of inferior clent prominence and weight to the fact, 
 eal that the differences, or contradictions, if 
 you will, between one Christian and another are much 
 less momentous, than those between Christians and infi- 
 dels. Christians, if at all worthy of the name, hold 
 the truth ;—can it be said of infidels that they hold the 
 truth at all? 
 
 Celsus.—Indeed ! we know nothing, or all our know- 
 ledge is worse than nought ! 
 
 Theologus.—If a man profess not to believe in truth, 
 or not to know any truth, he is not to be reasoned with ; 
 if a man really and in fact knows no truth, or, in other 
 words, if he has no knowledge, or if all his’ knowledge be 
 
64 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 erroneous, then it does not appear how he can be re- 
 garded as intelligent and responsible in any degree. 
 What do you mean by saying, that the Christian who 
 is worthy of the name holds the truth ? 
 
 Origen.—The true Christian holds much truth, and 
 the most important truth; and the points on which 
 Christians disagree are of very inferior moment to the 
 points on which they are harmonious. a 
 
 Celsus.— Admitting the case to be exactly as you now 
 represent it, it is plain that on your own principles the 
 censure so freely lavished on what you call the unbe- 
 lieving world comes pretty copiously back upon the 
 Christian community. If strict and stern adherence to 
 truth which is always immutable and self-consistent be 
 the duty and honour of every man, the adherents of 
 Christianity on their own confession have much need to 
 learn the very lesson which they are so anxious to incul- 
 cate upon unbelievers. Truth, whether it lie on your 
 side or ours, cannot triumph till its disciples disencumber 
 themselves of their contradictions. And the more insiy- 
 nificant you represent your contradictions to be, the 
 easier task it may be to get effectually clear of them. 
 One fact has been often observed, that the differences 
 among Christians swell into huge mountains when Christ- 
 ians are debating with each other, and presently sink 
 into contemptible mole-hills when they take the field 
 against infidelity. 
 
 Origen.—It cannot be denied that all sects are more 
 or less Christian. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. . 65 
 
 Celsus.—It is quite as fair to maintain that all reli- 
 gions are more or less true. 
 
 Origen.—* The consideration of the moral purpose of 
 life should check that miserable jealousy of speculative 
 or doctrinal differences which is so common ;—differences 
 which are often of words, more than things, and will 
 generally be found, when calmly analysed, either to 
 resolve themselves into ambiguities of language, or to 
 rest in dogmatism on things unknown.” ! 
 
 Celsus. — This argument is not very consistent with 
 some of your other arguments. It is not consistent with 
 the opinion that “speculation has been the bane of 
 Christianity,”? and that “speculative philosophy is one 
 of the causes of infidelity.”* If speculative inquiries are 
 busied only with “things unknown” or with empty words 
 and not with things at all, it is hard to see how they can 
 have done so much evil. Besides, the author you quote 
 might on his own shewing have been better employed 
 than writing two volumes, which are chiefly speculative. 
 He likewise elsewhere bears decisive testimony to the 
 serious character of the differences that are found among 
 Christians. For example, he says: “ By a large number 
 of Christians, even the fundamental truth of man’s moral 
 nature is altogether denied. They think they can exalt 
 
 1 Christian Theism. By R. A. Thompson, M.A. London, 
 1855. Burnett Treatise, First Prize, 2 vols. Vol. 2, p. 385. 
 
 24ib., p. 374. 
 
 3 Infidelity. By the Rev. Thomas Pearson. Evangelical Alli- 
 ance Prize Essay. London, 1853. P. 340, &c. 
 
66 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 the grace and sovereignty of God by taking away the 
 free agency of man.” This, of course, is not one of 
 those “doctrinal differences,” a “ jealousy” of which is only 
 “miserable.” In writing the passage which youhave quoted 
 he surely must have forgotten what he wrote in his first 
 volume thus: “The boast of the age to be guided by 
 practical wisdom and common sense, its contempt for the 
 niceties of speculation, often mean no more than—we will 
 avoid all troublesome thought unless it promise material 
 gain.’”? 
 
 Origen.—You do not, however, deny the fact that 
 evangelical Christians are all agreed in holding the funda- 
 mental truths of the gospel. 
 
 Celsus.—The fact is doubtful, for it is by no means 
 patent to the world. You cannot refuse to be judged by 
 your own rule: “ By their fruits ye shall know them.” 
 Not to dwell on the acknowledgement that there are 
 many among evangelical Christians, who, to use your own 
 words, have a form of godliness, but deny its power, and 
 are on this account stigmatised as the worst sort of infi- 
 dels ;? how many controversies have there been, such as 
 that about the extent of the atonement, or those between 
 Calvinists and Arminians, in which each of the opposing 
 parties has strenuously maintained, that the integrity 
 and value of the whole gospel are directly and deeply 
 involved in the issue. If now, however, Christians are 
 at length ashamed of their disputes, and if there be such 
 
 * Christian Theism, v. 2, p. 393. *Tb.; ved ep ere: 
 
 * See Christian Theism, v. 2, p. 234. 
 
 i ee a, oe ae bs 
 
j 
 
 \ 
 
 \ TRUTH AND ERROR. 67 
 
 a thing as an actual harmony of Protestant Confessions, 
 let the world behold the spectacle of the various Protest- 
 ant Churches unanimous in adopting this harmony. 
 Such institutions as the Religious Tract Society, British 
 and Foreign Bible Society, London Missionary Society, 
 and Evangelical Alliance, when looked at in connection 
 with prevailing schisms and sectarianism, confirm our 
 remarks. They are a practical demonstration of the in- 
 consistency of the Christian church. If their Catholic 
 principles be sound, ought they not to be carried much 
 further? If you say that this is impracticable, as the 
 London Missionary Society has found its once boasted 
 fundamental principle to be, then the question arises, 
 why is it impracticable? No answer can be given to this 
 question, except it be, that Christians are nearly as indo- 
 lent and careless in seeking for the truth, as they affirm 
 that infidels are. As to the Evangelical Alliance, many 
 of your best men have refused to join it, while its creed 
 is too meagre and indefinite to satisfy any church. This 
 alliance is, in fact, a mere stage, on which the drama of 
 union is acted for a few stated hours before the world. 
 But the life of an actor is generally different from his 
 stage-character. » 
 
 Theologus.—Is there any thing further to be urged 
 against our principle, that he who honestly and dili- 
 gently seeks the truth on any topic, may be ignorant, 
 but will not err on that topic, or against its application to 
 the contradictions prevalent among Christians, as well as 
 to the absurdities and inconsistencies of infidelity ? 
 
68 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 The advantages  Oregen.— The advantages of our divi- 
 of sects. sions, though indirect, have been great and 
 numerous——all these we should lose, and much more, 
 by leaden uniformity. Conflicting sects produce a 
 healthy rivalry. 
 
 Celsus.—Have no advantages flowed from the contro- 
 versy between infidels and Christians? Besides if schism 
 be not “a corruption,” it needs not the plea of these ad- 
 vantages to justify it; and if it be a corruption, these 
 advantages cannot justif y it. 
 
 Lheologus.—The principle under discussion would not 
 by any means, if fairly carried out, conduct men to a 
 leaden uniformity, but would produce, what can be pro- 
 duced in no other conceivable way, a free and intelligent 
 union. 
 
 Sperereoets Origen.—But this principle supposes, 
 argleey that there is “a progress of man in the- 
 ology ”—which is altogether inadmissible.! 
 
 Celsus.—Inadmissible ! Christianity as understood and 
 expounded by men, has been changeable at least, if not 
 progressive. 
 
 Origen.—*In the view of an intelligent and honest 
 mind, the religion of Christ stands as clear of all con- 
 nection with the corruption of men, and churches, and 
 ages, as when it was first revealed. It retains its purity 
 like Moses in Egypt, or Daniel in Babylon, or the Saviour 
 of the world himself while he mingled with scribes and 
 pharisees, or publicans and sinners.” 2 
 
 * Infidelity, &., p. 167. 21d. Peso 
 
 PI 
 
 ——- . 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 69 
 
 Celsus.—This uncontaminated religion of Christ is a 
 mere speculation. Granting that it is in the Bible, no 
 one has yet found it. One of your own friends says :— 
 “ Christianity is in gradual process of reforming the prin- 
 ciples and practices of mankind, and when the sanative - 
 operation shall have advanced some several stages 
 beyond its present point, the notions and usages of our 
 day, compared with the commands of Christ as then under- 
 stood, will, no doubt, seem incredibly defective.” } 
 
 Origen. —What then is to be done? “ That even the 
 sincere Christian will often be mistaken, and mistaken 
 views have pernicious effects, is no more than may 
 be expected from human fallibility. It needs but little 
 knowledge of human nature, to see that perver- 
 sions of religious truth will easily have demoralizing 
 effects.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—If this be the case, it must be admitted that 
 there is “ progress of man in theology.” You believe 
 that sincere Christians will some day or other escape 
 from their mistaken and pernicious views. Will that hap- 
 pen without “progress?” If “ Christianity has been fre- 
 quently so much corrupted in its doctrines, morals, and 
 institutions, as to have rendered it somewhat difficult to 
 trace any resemblance between the blotched copy and the 
 fair original,’’? there must have been some progress and 
 improvement already to justify such a statement. 
 
 * Natural History of Enthusiasm, London, 18380, p. 191. 
 * Christian Theism, y. 2, p. 392. 
 _ § Infidelity, p. 892. 
 
70 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 How is Christi.  Zheologus.—The question now arises, 
 ee ve ec i Since it is so important that Christianity 
 corruptions ? should not be confounded with its cor- 
 ruptions or made responsible for them, how is Christianity 
 to be distinguished from its corruptions? This question 
 contains the real gist of the controversy, and brings us 
 back to our original ground. 
 
 Origen.—* Man can have no infallible guide on any 
 subject. He may expect, as placed here in a state of 
 trial, to learn in morals, as on every subject, from various 
 sources, and by various means. His probation in life 
 depends upon the employment of all the faculties of his 
 nature. He needs all the light, both of reason and of 
 revelation, and will still be liable to error.””! 
 
 Celsus.—If, after the due employment of all the facul- 
 ties of our nature, we are still liable to err,—if, notwith- 
 standing an honest and diligent search for truth in any 
 matter, a man may not only be ignorant, but even err in 
 that matter, this is a scepticism too extravagant for me. 
 If my understanding, do as I may, may still deceive me 
 in one point, it may deceive me in any ; it may deceive 
 me in all. 
 
 Theologusx—Men are lable to err, as they are to 
 sin, if they choose. But to say that man must sin, 
 or must err, whether he will or not, is to destroy our 
 responsibility and itelligence. Besides, if, not only 
 ignorance, but error be absolutely unavoidable, then con- 
 tradictions may be stereotyped for ever, and the idea of 
 
 1 Christian Theism, v. 2, p. 408. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 71 
 
 progress is, of course, a pure delusion. But if men can 
 avoid error, as our principle implies, and grow in know- 
 ledge, progress is possible; and it is also practicable for 
 the upright and earnest to distinguish truth from error 
 in religion, and in other matters. 
 
 Origen.—But how is it possible for a man to avoid being 
 in error, when after all “error is partial truth?” } 
 
 Error is partial  Celsus.—This assertion will not help 
 ais your argument, unless 1t mean that in some 
 way or other error is a portion or fragment of the truth. 
 To suppose, however, that error in any form is found 
 among the elements or constituents of truth in any 
 degree, is to deny the antithesis between truth and error, 
 and to destroy truth altogether. If this were the mean- 
 ing of the author you quote, he contradicts himself, when 
 he says elsewhere :—“ The reason of man, and _ his 
 faculty of language, are gifts derived from the Creator 
 with his being ; and the knowledge which they are able 
 to convey, however imperfect and inadequate, is true as 
 far as it can go, and is such as He intends us to attain.’’? 
 
 Theologus.—This last quotation is a very fair enuncia- 
 tion of the principle under discussion. If the statement 
 that error is partial truth mean, that erroneous know- 
 ledge and true knowledge may be found in the same 
 individual mind, or that it is inaccurate to represent a 
 part of the truth as equivalent to the whole of the truth, 
 the statement is unquestionably correct, although we 
 
 1 Christian Theism, v. 1, p. 372. 21D Puedes 
 
72 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 cannot admire the manner of expressing it. But with 
 either of these meanings, it cannot palliate or excuse both 
 parties in a controversy, who contradict each other either 
 as to the truth of Christianity, or as to some important 
 point in the evidences, doctrines, or morals of the Bible. 
 We are all along supposing that in every contradiction 
 one of the parties must be in error. 
 
 Origen.—But may it not be said, that ‘“ arguments 
 often fail to reconcile differences of opinion, because men 
 differ in fundamental principles of judgment, which may 
 not have been ascertained, and which may lie beyond the 
 reach of observation.” } 
 
 Celsus.—If by different principles of judgment, you 
 simply mean diverse principles which are applicable to 
 diverse cases, there is no dispute between us. This, how- 
 ever, cannot be the meaning judging from the language 
 which you use, for such diverse or distinct principles 
 could never account for differences of opinion which cannot 
 be reconciled. Do you really perceive the meaning of 
 your statement’ Can you admit it to be possible that 
 the “fundamental principles of judgment” among mankind, 
 that is, not those which are heedlessly assumed to be 
 fundamental, but those which really are so, are contra- 
 dictory and inconsistent with each other? This is indeed 
 transcendental scepticism. The climax is reached when 
 we are informed that these conflicting principles lie be- 
 yond the reach of observation. If man’s nature at its 
 root and core be thus a lie ;—what shall we say? Isthis | 
 
 * Christian Theism, v. 2, p. 327. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. res: 
 
 Christian Theism? The same author says, (p. 248), “it 
 cannot need omniscience to guard against error.” 
 
 Limitation of the  Oragen. —‘‘ But God alone is perfect. 
 ne: The creature in his very nature is limited. 
 This limitation shows itself in man, in the presence of 
 error beside truth in his understanding.”! ‘“ Man’s 
 feebleness is apt everywhere not merely to limit, but to 
 spoil his judgments.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—There can be no doubt that in the limitation 
 of our nature is to be found the liability or possibility of 
 erring. But if it be supposed, that because we are crea- 
 tures we must therefore necessarily fall into error, the 
 validity of the understanding is abandoned. If our 
 rational consciousness err inevitably, involuntarily, and 
 unknowingly even in one instance, how can it be trusted in 
 any instance? In the words of the author you just quoted, 
 we may say, ‘‘ Man looks abroad with a clear confidence, 
 that what he everywhere reads in the light of his own 
 consciousness is the very truth and meaning which is there, 
 and which he therefore ought to receive. Let this con- 
 fidence be destroyed, and there remains for him no truth 
 or genuine science that we can imagine.”3 This last 
 sentence is emphatic ; and it is further obvious, that if this 
 confidence be destroyed in one case, it utterly and entirely 
 perishes. Your argument lands us again, even when 
 judged by your own principles, in the darkest scepticism. 
 
 Lheologus.— Undoubtedly ; when it is affirmed, that 
 the very limitation or narrowness of our minds as created 
 
 1 Theism, p. 340. = Thiol 10 * Tbs psdet 
 
 E 
 
14 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 beings necessarily entails, not merely ignorance, but in 
 some degree error, it may be asked, are we conscious of 
 any one of these errors when we actually embrace it, or 
 are we not? If we are conscious that we are in error, 
 when we are in error, it is not true that insuch a case we 
 really are in error. If again we may be in error neces- 
 sarily and unconsciously, then such may be our condition 
 for ought that we can tell, in the very instance in which 
 we feel most confidently that we know the truth. Our 
 assurance of knowing, the truth is thus irretrievably 
 lost. 
 
 Origen.—But while admitting that the facts of God’s 
 present administration are conflicting, and the reason of 
 man faltering and tottering, can an express and autho- 
 ritative revelation not supply the deficiency ? ' 
 
 Celsus.—No authority can reconcile facts that are 
 really in conflict. And if man’s reason be tottering, even 
 a divine revelation cannot give it strength and stability. 
 This is not my opinion only, but that of your own 
 friends. “There can be no question,” says one, “ that 
 man is dependent upon his faculties for whatever know- 
 ledge he can possess, natural or revealed. It is only 
 through the mental powers that he is able to understand 
 the language of nature, or to find a meaning in revela- 
 tion. Reason must also be called in to establish the evi- 
 dences of revelation ; and, consequently,” mark the 
 words which follow, “the known authority of revealed 
 religion cannot exceed that of the natural powers, and 
 
 1A Defence, &c., p. 180, and 387. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 75 
 
 must be commensurate with the veracity of reason.’? 
 Besides, if reason be tottering or faltering, how can even 
 its llusions be inveterate ? If the influences of Christianity 
 can be neither dissipated nor destroyed by arguments or 
 force,” and if these influences are somehow dependent 
 upon reason, reason must be strong and immovable. 
 Bap: ores: Origen.— All this reasoning, however, 
 
 is carried on in forgetfulness of a most 
 important principle, that moral and religious truth is not 
 demonstrable, but only probable. 
 
 Celsus.— Wherein does probable truth differ from other 
 truth ¢ For to a common understanding probable seems 
 a somewhat strange epithet of truth. What is true is 
 more than probable ; what is only probable can scarcely 
 be called true. 
 
 Lheologus.—There is an important distinction between 
 probability and truth, which falls to be considered here- 
 after. 
 
 Origen.—But every person understands the difference 
 between a probable and a demonstrative truth. 
 
 Celsus.—W hat is it then ? 
 
 Origen.—Take Locke’s statement— The comparison 
 of the evidence on both sides is the fairest way to search 
 after truth, and the surest not to mistake on which side 
 she is. There is scarce any controversy which is not a 
 full instance of this, and if a man will embrace no opinion 
 but what he can clear from all difficulties and remove all 
 objections, I fear he will have but very narrow thoughts, 
 
 ‘ Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 219. * A Defence, &c. p. 143-144. 
 
76 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 and find very little that he shall assent to. What, then, 
 will you say, shall he embrace that for truth which has 
 improbabilities in it that he cannot master’? This has a 
 clear answer. In contradicting opinions one must be 
 true, that he cannot doubt; which then shall he take? 
 
 That which is accompanied with the greatest light and. 
 
 evidence, that which is freest from the grosser absurdi- 
 ties, though our narrow capacities cannot penetrate it on 
 every side.” 
 
 Celsus.—Nothing surely can be more reasonable than 
 to distinguish between opinions which are to ourselves 
 clear from all difficulties and objections, and those which 
 we do not feel to be so clear. Why should not these 
 two classes of opinions be called by different names? 
 That which has no improbabilities in it which we cannot 
 master, cannot be more than true. To call that true 
 which has such improbabilities is sad confusion. On your 
 own shewing, then, Christianity is not true, but only pro- 
 bable. 
 
 Theologus.—Besides, it is obviously incorrect to say, 
 that ‘in contradicting opinions one must be érue.” For 
 example, if one man says, that the three angles of a tri- 
 angle are less than two right angles, and another man 
 says that they are more, these opinions are contradictory, 
 and both of them are wrong. Again, one person says, 
 Episcopacy 1s the divinely instituted form of Church 
 government, and another says, no, it is Presbytery. 
 These are conflicting opinions, one of them must be wrong, 
 
 ‘A Defence, &c., pp. 217-218. 
 
\ 
 
 TRUTH AND ERROR. Te 
 
 both cannot be true. Both of them, however, may be 
 erroneous, for a third party steps forward, and affirms, 
 that Congregationalism is the divinely instituted form of 
 Church government. Of these three contradicting 
 opinions, not one is necessarily true; for it is at least 
 possible, as some maintain, that there is no divinely ap- 
 pointed form of Church government at all. 
 
 Origen. — “I find, in reference to Christianity, as in 
 
 reference to Theism, what appears to me an immense 
 
 preponderance of evidence of various kinds in favour of 
 its truth ; but both alike, I find, involved in many diffi- 
 culties, which I acknowledge to be insurmountable, and 
 in many mysteries which [ cannot fathom. I believe the 
 conclusions in spite of them.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—But, then, you can believe these conclusions 
 only as probable, not as true. Is every opinion in morals 
 and religion involved in insurmountable difficulties? Is 
 it no more than probable that to tell a lie is wrong? 
 The author you quote does regard some things in reli- 
 gion as certain and true,—as more than probable. For 
 example, when he says, speaking of a third possibility 
 between the Bible and atheism, “ This third possibilit y— 
 such a god as he describes—is felt by the best instincts 
 of man to be none at all, but an absolute incredibility.” 2 
 Again he says, “ One thing is clear, clear as the day, 
 that human nature in general perfectly understands his 
 (the Deist’s) pretensions.” * Jt thus appears, on this 
 author’s shewing, that there are some things clearer and 
 
 1 A Defence, &c., p. 37. AL Dos pe 63: Th pe Oe 
 
 > 
 
78 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 more certain, not only in mathematics, but also in morals 
 and religion, than the existence of God and the divine 
 origin of Christianity. 
 
 Theologus.— When men express a judgment in matters 
 of opinion or of probability, a real contradiction is never 
 evolved. In matters of probability or of opinion, the 
 proposition is not known or affirmed to be either true or 
 erroneous. Hence men can agree to differ, while their 
 judgments are moving to and fro on this sliding scale of 
 mere opinion. ‘Their differences can be measured by 
 degrees of more and less probability. One man asserts 
 such and such an event is very likely ; another says it 
 is not likely at all; and there the business must rest till 
 the fact be developed. It is a totally diverse case, when 
 one affirms, and another denies, the reality of a fact, or 
 the truth of a principle. A man who holds his principles 
 as mere matter of opinion, is generally regarded as an 
 individual of no principle whatever. ‘The denial of one 
 principle implies the affirmation of a counter, or reverse, 
 principle. An undoubted contradiction is also manifested 
 in the affirmation and non-affirmation (that is, the refusal 
 to affirm), a fact which is of much importance to both 
 parties, and within the sphere of their knowledge. 
 Seneet. ye Origen. —The conclusions in natural 
 theology are not invalidated by the diverse 
 forms in which the argument is put. 
 
 Celsus. — The argument is not only diverse, but the 
 arguments of different advocates are contradictory. 
 
 Origen.—That is too sweeping an assertion. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 79 
 
 Celsus. — Let us look at the facts. One of your 
 friends says: ‘The argument for the Being of a God 
 is neither exclusively @ posteriori, nor exclusively & prior’, 
 but partakes of both. It is vain to assert an exclusive 
 claim for either argument, since they involve and aid each 
 other.”’! An exclusive claim has been often made for both 
 these arguments, and made by men whom you highly 
 honour; and now each claim is reprobated, and a good 
 argument is asserted to be found in the combination of the 
 two. Iam ata loss to understand how two invalid argu- 
 ments can form, or be regarded as forming, a sound one; 
 —unless it be somehow in this way, that a man must be 
 content, because he has two coats, although neither of 
 them fit his person. 
 
 Origen.—Surely you do not assert that Clarke would 
 deny the validity of Paley’s argument, or Paley deny 
 the validity of Clarke’s ? 
 
 Celsus.—This is not my opinion only. ‘“ We consider 
 that these writers (Brown, Brougham, and Chalmers), 
 while rightly repudiating the conclusiveness of a@ priori 
 reasoning in reference to our subject, have failed to set 
 forth, and even to apprehend with clearness and com- 
 prehensiveness, the subjective conditions, or, in our pre- 
 vious language, principles, which their a posteriori argu- 
 ment at once pre-supposes as its essential basis, and de- 
 mands in order to its complete and effective validity.” ” 
 A contradiction is surely affirmed here. And it becomes 
 all the more emphatic when taken in connection with the 
 
 ' Infidelity, pp. 35, 27. 2 Theism,,p. 7. 
 
80 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 following remarks, in which the essential unity of the 
 argument is asserted. ‘We deem it unnecessary to 
 enter into any question as to the separate force and 
 value of this department of evidence (moral intuitive evi- 
 dence.) All such questions are, according to our view, 
 quite irrelevant. For the genuine apprehension of the 
 theistic evidence is not that of a series of separate and 
 independent proofs, but that of a great scheme of argu- 
 ment presenting itself under a variety of aspects.” ! 
 Origen.—When such eminent and godly men thus dif-. 
 fer so seriously, one is almost tempted to conclude that on 
 such topics truth is not to be found by weak erring man. 
 Celsus.—Ha! that is exactly our conclusion; and it is 
 strongly confirmed by another of your distinguished 
 authors, who says :—‘ There is no more concurrence 
 among Christians respecting the foundations of natural 
 religion, than among the various systems of unbelief.” 2 
 He immediately adds :—“ Nothing is more certain to 
 retard the progress of truth, than to recommend it by 
 doubtful evidences, and inconsequent proofs.” In such 
 circumstances instead of talking of retarding the progress 
 of truth, would it not have been more to his purpose to 
 show its beginning ? 
 Origen.—But after all, the conclusions of natural theo- 
 logy are not invalidated by these contradictory arguments. 
 Celsus——At all events, on the shewing of your own 
 advocates truth is damaged. And it is always a suspicious 
 circumstance to find men agreeing to hold a conclusion, 
 ' Theism, p. 251. * Christian Theism, v. 1, Beds 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 81 
 
 while they cannot agree why they hold it ;—like travel- 
 lers, who during their journey are full of contention and 
 strife, at its termination suddenly and unexpectedly and 
 without apparent cause embracing each other as long- 
 tried faithful friends. 
 
 Religion not an 4 Origen.—We are on the wrong track, 
 affair oflogic- when we suppose that religion is an affair 
 of severe logic and hard argument. 
 
 Celsus.—Do you then abandon your favourite funda- 
 mental position, that your faith is reasonable ? 
 
 Origen.—No, not at all. ‘‘ Religious life is mainly of 
 an emotional character. That, in human nature, which 
 we have termed religiousness—that which capacitates man 
 for pleasurable communion with the Eternal Spirit—that 
 which craves, in order to its proportional development, a 
 communication of appropriate religious ideas—consists far 
 more largely of sensibility than of power. It is more 
 emphatically responsive to love than to light. Knowing 
 is less its characteristic exercise than feeling. Perfect 
 subjective religion is perfect oneness of will between man 
 and God—and the will, as everybody must admit, is less 
 influenced by the conclusions of the understanding than 
 by the affections of the heart. Not that religiousness has 
 no need of the intellectual faculties—for how but by their 
 aid can we become cognizant of God or of his will? But 
 such cognizance, although absolutely necessary to religious 
 life, is not the life itself.’ 
 
 Celsus.—While it is admitted, as you have just done, 
 
 ' Bases of Belief. By E. Miall, M.P. London, 1857. pp. 97, 98. 
 
82 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 that cognizance, or knowledge of God and of his will lies 
 at the basis of religious life, and so long as the question 
 concerns the nature and validity of that knowledge, it is 
 vain to talk of the mere quantity or amount of sensibility 
 and feeling that may legitimately enter into religiousness. 
 Besides, if knowledge be “ absolutely necessary to reli- 
 gious life,” then it is plain that knowledge must be re- 
 garded as much, and not less, a characteristic exercise of 
 religiousness as feeling. To assert that religiousness is 
 independent of knowledge, is sheer mysticism. To admit 
 this dependence, or, in other words, the reasonableness 
 of faith, is to open up the questions which we have been 
 discussing. | 
 
 Theologus.—It is necessary to observe, on the state- 
 ment that “ the will is less influenced by the conclusions 
 of the understanding than by the affections of the heart,” 
 that the fact may be admitted as it is here stated, with- 
 out any advantage to the scheme that would sever reli- 
 gion from truth. In morals, what is never can prove 
 what should be. Will any one deny that the will ought 
 to be influenced as much at least by the conclusions of 
 the understanding as by the affections of the heart? 
 Hence any religion that is worthy of the name, and that 
 would command the assent of intelligent beings, must 
 clearly state the truth on which it is founded, and suc- 
 cessfully vindicate its validity. Tuill this is done, emotion 
 and feeling must be suspended; only, however, like 
 waters under restraint, to burst forth more freely in due 
 season, 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 83 
 
 Origen. —But “ religious insight is not to be confounded 
 with intellectual processes.’ 
 
 Celsus.—Will you have the goodness to explain what 
 you mean? 
 
 Origen.—< Men may be thoroughly competent to de- 
 clare to their fellow men what there is of God’s character, 
 of God’s intention, of God’s will, in any special embodi- 
 ment of them, without being necessarily beyond the reach 
 of correction or criticism in any of the modes of commu- 
 nication they may deem it expedient to adopt. The 
 stammering tongue does not destroy the worth of a kind 
 message. The heart’s love may be truly declared even 
 in broken metaphors. The spirit of a law may be lucidly 
 and impressively set forth, although, in doing it, a man 
 may illustrate his point by a mistaken allusion, or an 
 exploded fact. And the mind of the highest may be 
 unerringly interpreted for us by those whose figures of 
 speech are occasionally confused, and whose chains of 
 argument are not always logically conclusive.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—All this only amounts to the simple statement, 
 that a man may be right in one point, and wrong in an- 
 other. And how he can be right on any point, where 
 truth is concerned, without an intellectual process of 
 some sort or another, I am at a loss to perceive. In 
 religious insight or instinct there is an exercise of the 
 understanding, or there is none. If there is none, reli- 
 gion is undiluted enthusiasm. If there be an exercise of 
 the understanding, then there is an intellectual process, 
 
 1 Bases, p. 376, &c. eb A ps 379s 
 
84 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 and the above distinction, for all practical purposes, falls 
 to the ground. 
 
 Origen.— The still, small voice of the Creator may be 
 heard within the soul, though formal proofs may be 
 unknown. Deeper than logic, and prior to it, is the 
 truth that God exists.””} 
 
 Celsus.—The truth which is deeper than logic, and prior 
 to it, is of course independent of it. Why, then, so much 
 bustle and labour to prove the existence of God? 
 
 Theologus.—That there is an unformal evidence, or, in 
 other words, practical proof, and that it is both valid and 
 sufficient, has not received the prominence which it 
 deserves.” The relegation or dismissal of religion from 
 the sphere of logic or of truth,—a shift which has been 
 so often resorted to by both parties,—can be regarded as 
 nothing better than a dexterous move to evade a diffi- 
 culty, or to escape the shame of confessing a failure. 
 
 Celsus._We have no objections whatever to the doc- 
 trine, per se, that religiousness is mainly a matter of sen- 
 sibility. As there is no reasoning about affairs of taste 
 and feeling, every man should be left quietly to indulge 
 the dispositions and propensities of his own peculiar con- 
 stitution. If Christians would only act consistently on 
 this principle, as we should do, if fanatics would let us 
 alone, the acrimony and anger and bitterness of religious 
 controversy would soon be buried in the grave of forget- 
 fulness. 
 
 Theologus.—There would be room in the same tomb 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. i. pp. 14, 15. * See Dialogue 5. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 85 
 
 for Truth deceased. At the obsequies of Truth, the uni- 
 verse would go into everlasting mourning. 
 
 Origen.—It seems almost too much to 
 expect that the present conflict of senti- 
 ment on vital doctrines and important duties that prevails 
 in the Christian community should terminate. 
 
 Celsus.—It is more likely that Christianity will perish 
 under these very contradictions, when the human race 
 shall rise from the minority of superstition to the man- 
 hood of reason. 
 
 Christian Union. 
 
 Theologus.—There is no chance of mankind adopting 
 infidelity, at all events, till the race is in its dotage. But 
 it cannot be doubted that the union of the Christian 
 Church, as described in the New Testament, is an union 
 of sentiment and judgment, as well as of love and affec- 
 tion. This union may allow “ endless varieties of admi- 
 nistration, and local laws and customs widely differing 
 from each other,” only so long as no religious principle 
 or weighty obligation is therein implicated. Whatever 
 “ intractable diversities” there may be, they surely can- 
 not be supposed to involve, when Christian union is 
 realised, a contradiction on any prominent moral or reli- 
 gious topic. 
 
 Origen.—W hat are the means by which you expect to 
 witness the accomplishment of such a marvellous consum- 
 mation ? 
 
 Theologus.—Y ou do not doubt, that if an unbeliever in 
 the gospel, Pagan, Mohammedan, Jew, Infidel, or Papist, 
 were to seck the truth, that God would leave him help- 
 
86 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 lessly entangled in damning error; so I believe, that if 
 Christians were to seek the truth, they would escape 
 from their scandalous contradictions and damaging errors. 
 If the world is ultimately to come to believe that Chris- 
 tianity is true, by giving it a devout and diligent atten- 
 tion, and the triumph can be effected in no other way, is 
 it extravagant to expect that by the use of the very same 
 means Christians shall come to know what Christianity 
 in its purity and integrity really is, and thus avoid every- 
 thing like collision in expounding its doctrines, and in 
 enforcing and obeying its precepts? And if a vigorous 
 and impartial examination, an honest search for truth, 
 may be reasonably expected and authoritatively de- 
 manded from the unbeliever, how much more from the 
 believer ? 
 
 Origen.—After all, the question still re- 
 turns, what is Truth? 
 
 Celsus.—Ay, that is the knot that has to be untied. 
 
 Theologus.—tf we treat Christianity and religion prac- 
 tically, as we treat any other subject practically, there 
 is no call to answer that question. An illiterate Christian 
 can give a reason for the hope that he entertains, without 
 the aid of metaphysics or science. If that reason is 
 
 Truth. 
 
 judged of, as reasons for acting in other matters are 
 judged of, it wili stand the test. 
 
 Origen.—Do you then decline to answer the ques- 
 tion? 
 
 Theologus.—No. But I take my main position on 
 practical ground, which shall hereafter be explained and 
 
 et ee ee ae 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 87 
 
 vindicated at length. So far as the science or speculation 
 of the matter is concerned, I have only a hypothesis to 
 propose for consideration. 
 
 Celsus.—How, then, do you propose to define Truth ? 
 
 Theologus.—We have thought that the foundation of 
 a speculative argument might perhaps be laid thus: know- 
 ledge implies an object known, and an intelligent subject 
 knowing. Knowledge is thus the act of the intelligent 
 being, when knowing the object, and may always be 
 expressed in a proposition. Hence we would agree with 
 those who have represented Truth to be the harmony or 
 agreement of a proposition (or knowledge) with the object 
 known. Hrror, consequently, is the disagreement of 
 knowledge, or a proposition with its object. Thus we 
 obtain immediately the two kinds of knowledge formerly 
 noticed. Normal or true knowledge is the first of these, 
 in which the agent knows the object, and knows that he 
 knows it. The second, abnormal or erroneous knowledge, 
 is developed, when the agent does not know the object, 
 and thinks he does. 
 
 Origen.—One or two points have come up in the course 
 of this discussion, on which I should like to hear your 
 views somewhat more at length. 
 
 Theologus.—I myself have felt the desirableness of a 
 fuller exposition of my sentiments, but was unwilling to 
 interrupt the course of argument in which you were 
 engaged with our friend here. 
 
 Origen.—I cannot see how you get over the distinction 
 between mathematical and moral truth. 
 
88 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 Alltruth specia-  Zheologus.—Since truth is the agreement 
 PaPriGpe. of a proposition with the object to which 
 it refers, all truth is specifically one. No truth, therefore, 
 can with propriety be called contingent ; although this 
 mode of describing some truths is very old and very com- 
 mon. We may suppose a contingent eaistence to be an- 
 nihilated, but we cannot suppose any true proposition 
 respecting that existence to become untrue. The state- 
 ment that Napoleon died at St Helena is true, universally 
 and for ever; that it should ever cease to be true is in- 
 conceivable ; it is as unchangeably and everlastingly true 
 as any axiom in mathematics. | 
 
 Sir W. Hamilton not only takes substantially the same 
 view, but explains the philosophy of the case. “I may 
 here also observe,” he says, ‘ that though the primary 
 iruths of fact, and the primary truths of intelligence (the 
 contingent and necessary truths of Reid) form two very 
 distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of con- 
 sciousness ; there appears no sufficient ground to regard 
 their sources as different, and therefore to be distinguished 
 by different names.” The reason which he assigns for 
 this representation is, that the distinction between these 
 two classes of truth is nothing more than “the distinction 
 between the data or deliverances of consciousness simply, 
 in themselves, as apprehended facts or actual manifesta- 
 tions ; and these deliverances considered as testimonies to 
 the truth of facts beyond their own phenomenal reality.” } 
 
 The matter may be represented to the mass of man- 
 
 * Sir W. Hamilton’s Edition of Reid’s Works, p.p. 748, 744. 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 89 
 
 kind thus. Evidence on any point whatever, if valid and 
 sufficient in itself, is irresistible to the intelligent being 
 who gives it due attention. When due attention is with- 
 held, however sufficient and valid the evidence may be, 
 or to whatever subject it may relate, knowledge of the 
 truth is not attained. When a proposition is professedly 
 supported by evidence, the evidence is valid, or it is not. 
 If it be invalid, it is improper to call it evidence at all. 
 When a proposition is supported by valid evidence, this 
 evidence is sufficient, or it is not. When valid evidence 
 is sufficient, the proposition is declared to be true; when 
 insufficient, the proposition is declared to be probable. 
 This principle applies equally well to every kind of pro- 
 positions, however diverse the objects of the propositions 
 may be. In thus abandoning the distinction between 
 necessary and contingent truth, we also abandon the dis- 
 tinction between moral and demonstrative evidence, 
 especially as this distinction is used in the infidel contro- 
 versy. 
 
 The reason why there is more discrepancy of opinion 
 in morals than in mathematics, seems to be twofold. 
 1. Moral subjects have far more to do, especially at pre- 
 sent, with the region of probability than the exact 
 sciences; and hence there is more occasion and room for 
 diversity of sentiment in the former than in the latter. 
 2. But, chiefly, there are contradictions in morals when 
 there are none in mathematics, because there is a greater 
 number of rash and prejudiced judgments in the one 
 than in the other, which may be traced partly to the 
 
 F 
 
90 DIALOGUE TI.- 
 
 fact, that there are stronger temptations in the one than 
 
 in the other, to pronounce a judgment without due atten- — 
 
 tion. The same amount of honest mental labour, which 
 is found to be necessary to master many a scientific prob- 
 Jem, would put an end to many a moral controversy. 
 
 It is not difficult to show that abnormal or erroneous 
 knowledge on any point whatever is not involuntary. If 
 asum in arithmetic be cast incorrectly, it must be be- 
 cause the mind of the calculator denied, in one part or 
 other of the process, that one and one are equal to two. 
 Since he has the means of attaining perfect certainty and 
 perfect accuracy together, if he shall affirm that the sum 
 is correctly reckoned, when it is not, is there not some- 
 thing wilful in this, and, if wilful, blameable? The same 
 remark applies to every department of science. Is a 
 man not deserving of some censure for saying or think- 
 ing of any proposition that it is true, before he has 
 given it proper attention, or before its evidence has been 
 seen by him to be valid and sufficient? If, therefore, 
 any one in olden times affirmed it to be an actual truth 
 that nature abhors a vacuum, did he do so altogether in- 
 
 voluntarily and inculpably ? Even those who affirmed 
 
 it to be true, had they duly reflected, must haye seen 
 and felt that it was somewhat misty in itself,—or, at all 
 events, that it was not supported by sufficient evidence. 
 Many may have held it as a hypothesis to be examined, 
 not as a conclusion to be trusted. 
 
 Hence, we infer, that on every question evidence 
 which is valid and sufficient is irresistible to him who 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 91 
 
 gives it due consideration, and to him only, and that on 
 no matter whatever can a man innocently or sincerely 
 take truth for error, or error for truth. It thus appears 
 that all true knowledge is equally clear and certain. 
 Mathematical proof is frequently cumulative or compli- 
 cated, just as moral proof is. An indocile mind can 
 ward off both. If man’s welfare were made to depend 
 on the study of Euclid’s Elements, individuals would be 
 found to profess that they could not understand them, 
 though they could not, just because they would not. 
 Others would be found misrepresenting the application of 
 the principles contained in that book to cases in actual 
 life. And many, doubtless, while well acquainted with 
 the principles would set them at practical defiance. To 
 deny the validity of some of Euclid’s demonstrations 
 might be described as polite and reasonable when com- 
 pared with some of the gross and violent perversions that 
 have been practised upon the word of God. 
 Origen.—There is another topic that needs elucidation, 
 namely, what you have called the validity of the human 
 
 understanding. 
 The validity of Theologus.—To set this in a forcible and 
 oon. practical light, allow me to quote the 
 
 words of M. Cousin. His remarks, which we are about 
 to transcribe, will be regarded by many Christians as 
 offensive ; they seem to us to be substantially correct. 
 After hearing them it will be necessary for me to show, 
 how this philosopher’s principle may be turned against 
 infidelity and in favour of Christianity. 
 
92 DIALOGUE TI. 
 
 “The Theological School, in order to defend religion 
 to better advantage, undertakes to destroy philosophy, 
 all philosophy, the good as well as the bad, and perhaps 
 the good still more than the bad. . . . . Here is 
 the well known argumentation of this school. Reason is 
 a faculty altogether personal. When therefore we 
 affirm anything in the name of reason, it is in the name 
 of our own reason that we affirm it; certainty in that 
 case has no other basis, no other criterion than our indi- 
 vidual sentiment; but this is absurd. Reason then 
 cannot give us genuine certainty. Now, reason once 
 proved to be impotent we must look for another autho- 
 rity. This authority is that of common sense opposed to 
 individual sentiment, common sense preserved by tradi- 
 tion, made visible by the church, and promulgated by the 
 Holy See. . . . . That no inconsistency may be 
 wanting, the Protestants have found it so admirable that 
 
 they have not hesitated to borrow it of Catholicism. 
 
 Open any of the Methodist publications; except in 
 ability, you would think that you were reading the Abbé 
 de la Mennais. The same principles, the same mode of 
 reasoning, the same hatred of reason and philosophy ; the 
 only difference is, that the word of God is substituted for 
 common sense, and the Holy Scriptures for the Church. 
 In every philosophy, they say, it is always a man who 
 speaks ; it is a single man who addresses himself to our 
 reason with his own; but we wish for no man between us 
 and truth ; we wish to surrender our minds to God him- 
 self and to his word. Assuredly our adversaries are 
 
 = ray) ‘ 
 ae ee ee a ee ee ee 
 
 ee ee ee 
 
 va: Vos 
 
 ee ee ee Se A 
 
 a 
 OO ie eset Sete 
 
 a ee, ee ee. eh eS 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 93 
 
 not difficult; but, I ask, who is to teach them that 
 word? Who will warrant them that it is the word of 
 God? What ground have they for believing it? Who 
 shall tell them that God has spoken? And by what sign 
 shall they know it? The former propose to us as proof 
 the researches of erudition and historical criticism; the 
 latter appeal to a sort of immediate illumination in the 
 reading of the Holy Scriptures. But it is not a little 
 strange to refer us to criticism through fear of philoso- 
 phy; to send us back to history in order to avoid the 
 intervention of men between truth and ourselves. As to 
 immediate illumination, the intervention of reason in that 
 is less evident, but quite as real.” } 
 
 Need I assure you that I have no sympathy with the 
 sneers or the sarcasm contained in this passage. The 
 subject scarcely admits of such treatment. But I have 
 felt it proper to introduce the passage for the purpose of 
 putting the matter vividly before the mind. I am con- 
 strained to acknowledge that not a few divines have been 
 found neutralising the distinction between truth and 
 error, or, which is virtually the same thing, abandoning 
 the veracity of reason, It is of the utmost importance 
 to notice how this argument of the philosopher may be 
 retorted against infidelity and ungodliness in some of 
 their subtlest forms. 
 
 Origen.—How is this to be done? 
 
 Lheologus.—-Philosophers, as a class of men, shrink 
 most sensitively from anything like an attempt to dis- 
 
 * Cabinet Library, vol. ix. pp. 34, 37. 
 
94 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 criminate between religious truth and religious error. 
 They thus, inconsistently with their own principles, limit 
 the extent of the distinction between truth and error, 
 and so far as the business of religion 1s concerned deny 
 the validity of the understanding. We blame them, not 
 for not finding, but for not seeking truth in religion. If 
 philosophy be the pursuit of truth, of all truth, we 
 demand a reason why one department of truth is put 
 under a ban. This exclusion can be justified only on 
 one or other of these grounds: because there is no such 
 thing as religious truth; or because its discovery is so 
 difficult it is hopeless to try; or because when found it 
 would be next to worthless. 
 
 As to the first, philosophy herself cannot prove a ne- 
 gative. And in regard to the second, granting even, 
 which we do only for the sake of argument, that religi- 
 ous truth were so very hard to find as some represent or 
 misrepresent, the consciousness of this difficulty would 
 prove to the genuine philosopher only an additional 
 stimulus to prosecute his search and promulgate its re- 
 sults. As to the third, even supposing that religious 
 truth when found would scarcely repay the labour of 
 seeking it—a supposition which any man would blush to 
 avow—still it is directly at variance with the noble spirit 
 of science to keep aloof from any field of inquiry, simply 
 because it promises no immediate practical good to the 
 student. Truth for its own sake is the watchword of 
 philosophy. Why then have philosophers avoided the ~ 
 domain of truth in religion, as sailors keep clear of a 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 95 
 
 sunken rock? The fact is as undoubted, as the inferred 
 inconsistency is incontrovertible. 
 
 As the most skilful pilot will sometimes be at fault, so 
 philosophers do sometimes, either from constraint or com- 
 placency, take up a religious topic. They are occasion- 
 ally observed mourning over the moral desolations of 
 religious controversy. Alas! with too much reason. 
 Men professedly in pursuit of religious truth, instead of 
 a friendly rivalry, have waged the fiercest warfare with 
 each other, and that not only in an irreligious spirit, but 
 often too about irreligious trifles. The men on the 
 mount of calm contemplation, who see and lament the 
 miseries endured by the toiling masses in the plains be- 
 low, surely lie under a strong obligation to recall their 
 fellows from such vain and guilty contests by searching 
 for the great realities of religion, and endeavouring to 
 place them in a brilliant light, and pointing the ignorant 
 and erring and unhappy to their benignant effulgence ! 
 Have philosophers done so, or made one worthy effort to 
 do so? By ignoring in religion the distinction between 
 truth and error, which they hold to be so important in 
 every thing else, they are convicted of self-inconsis- 
 tency. By refusing to help their fellow-men, or if they 
 could not help them, to sympathise with them in their 
 religious conflicts, they betray a sad lack of affection. 
 And by deliberately and systematically preferring to 
 pursue truth everywhere but in the religious sphere, 
 they have placed themselves in a position, for the occu- 
 pation of which they will have to render an account to 
 
 the God of Truth. 
 
96 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 If an individual having the true knowledge of God 
 refuse to submit his will to the Supreme, this refusal, 
 inasmuch as his knowledge of God’s character in its more 
 immediate relations to himself is correct and sound, is 
 exceedingly flagrant and criminal. If, on the other 
 hand, an individual has lost the true knowledge of his 
 God, it shows that he has proceeded no little distance in 
 the downward path of guilt and error. And in neither 
 case, we feel more and more persuaded, can a man 
 actually throw off his allegiance to the Most High, with- 
 out setting up something or other in His place and before 
 Him. In most of our philosophical writers, even when 
 they are defending the existence of God and illustrating 
 His attributes, there is a gross ignorance or strange dis- 
 regard of the most vital and commanding distinction 
 which man can ever hope to comprehend,—the distinction 
 between the character of God as He is in his relations to 
 us, and that character misrepresented. There is also in 
 most of the current literature of the day of all sorts—for 
 religion has become a common topic of late—a similar 
 ignorance or disregard of a distinction which is the first 
 we should know and the last we should forget,—the dis- 
 tinction between the religion of the man whose will is in 
 subjection to the Divine will, and the religion of the man 
 whose will is not in subjection to that will, or, in other 
 words, between true religion and false religion. Even 
 Plutarch could write, I would rather have men say that 
 there is no Plutarch, than that Plutarch is wicked; so I 
 reckon it worse to think evil (erroneously) of God, than 
 to deny that God exists, 
 
TRUTH AND ERROR. 97 
 
 Philosophy and Literature, to repel this charge, will 
 draw themselves up in a most dignified mien, and while 
 professing to pursue truth in the composure of unrufiled 
 seclusion, and to be desirous of having it elicited by the 
 healthy excitement of friendly debate, will protest against 
 the dishonour of soiling their hands or disarranging their 
 robes in the turmoil of heated controversy, and least of 
 all will they consent to be defiled with the mire, or ex- 
 posed to the perils, of religious strife. This plea is false 
 in fact, and it is futile in philosophy. It is in fact false, 
 for literary and philosophical controversies have neither 
 been few in number, nor wanting in a keen and rancorous 
 spirit. And admitting that religious contentions have 
 been still more numerous and more embittered, it is only 
 what might reasonably be expected on account of the 
 higher interests at stake. The plea is, moreover, worth- 
 less on philosophical principles; for it eviscerates the 
 distinction between truth and error of all meaning and 
 value. Better not to admit the distinction at all, than 
 having admitted it in one instance, deny it in another, 
 or, what is worse, depreciate its significance even to 
 nought, and that, too, in the most important of its appli- 
 cations. All argument, and all effort too, are forever at 
 an end, unless truth, yea all truth, be precious—so pre- 
 cious, that in the legitimate pursuit of it we may and 
 ought to put forth our utmost strength, and in defence of 
 it when found incur the utmost hazard. 
 
DIALOGUE II. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 
 
 Celsus.—It has been the opinion of many Christians 
 that men should believe what they do not understand. 
 
 Origen.—It is not unreasonable to ask men to act in 
 religious matters on the same principle on which they 
 act in matters of common life. You believe in the union 
 of the soul and the body of a man, although you do not 
 comprehend it. 
 
 Celsus.—But our belief is not independent of our 
 understanding or reason in any instance, far less con- 
 
 Does Belict a. “Ary to it. Let me put the question in 
 Ee eretigzon this form: May our belief in any case be 
 
 pe considered legitimate, when it is not found- 
 ed upon knowledge ? 
 
 Origen.—* The truth is, that both Reason and Faith 
 are coeval with the nature of man, and were designed to 
 dwell in his heart together. They are, and ever were, 
 and, in such creatures as ourselves, must be, reciprocally 
 complementary ; neither can exclude the other. It is as 
 impossible to exercise an acceptable faith without reason 
 for so exercising it,—that is, without exercising reason 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 99 
 
 while we exercise faith,—as it is to apprehend by our 
 reason, exclusive of faith, all the truths on which we are 
 daily compelled to act, whether in relation to this world 
 or the next.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—I do not quite understand you. Do reason 
 and faith invariably act together, or not? If they do 
 not always accompany each other in the act of being 
 exercised, when do they accompany each other, and 
 when do they act separately and independently? If 
 they are constantly found to be reciprocally complemen- 
 tary, do they act contemporaneously, or if not, which of 
 them precedes the other? Does knowledge precede faith, 
 or does faith precede knowledge ? 
 
 Origen.—But this argumentation is based upon “ the 
 fundamental vice,” which “ consists in the application of 
 purely logical or inductive conceptions to moral truth, 
 while this truth in its very nature transcends the grasp 
 of logic. It makes itself good in the inner spiritual con- 
 sciousness, but it cannot be inductively seized and ac- 
 counted for. The attempt so to seize it necessarily ter- 
 minates in misapprehending it.” ? 
 
 Celsus. — Then, of course, there can be no such thing 
 as moral science. But, passing this, Christians them- 
 selves begin the attempt to discriminate between belief 
 and knowledge. Nay, you are forced to do so by your 
 own Bible. You cannot maintain that your Christian 
 
 1 Reason and Faith: their Claims and Conflicts. By Henry 
 Rogers. London. Fourth Edition. 1854. P. 1, 2. 
 ? Theism, p. 342. 
 
100 DIALOGUE Il. 
 
 faith is reasonable, without shewing that it is founded 
 upon knowledge, Is it so in every instance, or is it 
 not ? 
 
 Origen.—* If in the actual course of our education for 
 another state of existence we give an unchecked ascend- 
 ency to either reason or faith, we vitiate the whole pro- 
 Gess.”} 
 
 Celsus. — But in some instances at least you give, if 
 not an ascendency, at least a decided priority, to the 
 exercise of reason ; — in those cases, I mean, in which 
 you contend for the reasonableness of your belief. In 
 what instances may belief take ascendency or priority of 
 the exercise of reason or the understanding? If there 
 be such cases, we shall have not a reasonable belief, but 
 a believing, confiding, or implicit knowledge. Is there 
 such a thing as knowledge resting upon faith; while that 
 faith does not itself rest upon knowledge ? 
 
 Origen. — “ All knowledge must rest upon intuitions, 
 or self-evident truths, or upon faith in the veracity of 
 the faculties. Man enters upon the use of his reasoning 
 faculty, already furnished with the principles on which 
 all knowledge must be built. In his first experience, 
 reason and feeling unite and are inseparable from one 
 another.’’? 
 
 Celsus.—But even in this case the “ feeling ” is pecu- 
 liar and quite distinct from our common feelings :—what 
 the same author calls a “conscious feeling.”3 Of the 
 
 * Reason and Faith, p. 3. 
 * Christian Theism, vol. 1, p. 844. * Ib., vol. 2, p. 373. 
 
 = ee ee ee ee ee ea eS eee 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 101 
 
 most elementary or fundamental truth, is it not correct 
 to say, that we believe it, only inasmuch as we know it, 
 rather than, that we know it, because we believe it ? 
 
 Lheologus.—The conclusion, then, seems not unlikely 
 to be this, that knowledge invariably precedes belief. 
 Human mindde. 2/490 — But this conclusion leaves us 
 terminator of reti- without defence against the modern Ger- 
 oo man school, ‘‘ amid whose bewildering and 
 shifting speculations, one thing is especially observable, 
 namely, that the human mind is made the determinator 
 of religious truth, and that no weight is given to the ex- 
 ternal facts and evidences of revelation except in so far 
 as they harmonize with the inward sentiments and con- 
 ceptions.” } 
 
 Celsus.—You will at least go thus far, that a man can- 
 not receive on external testimony or evidence of any sort, 
 what contradicts his inward conceptions and sentiments. 
 
 Origen.—Granted ; for “faith and philosophy are not 
 enemies by nature.” 
 
 Celsus.—There are some of your friends 
 who admit or contend that the harmony 
 between a man’s inward sentiments and judgments on the 
 one hand, and the Bible on the other, is a most essential 
 and indispensable element of the evidence that proves the 
 Bible to be of divine origin. You must, therefore, either 
 abandon the internal evidences entirely and for ever, or 
 admit that in a valid and important sense the human 
 mind is the determinator of religious truth. 
 
 Internal evidences. 
 
 1 Infidelity, &c., p. 363. 
 
102 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 Origen.—You cannot, however, go so far as to main- 
 tain, that “first principles must be settled on philosophi- 
 cal and dogmatic grounds, before the interpretation of 
 the Scriptures can take effect.” * 
 
 Celsus.—Then you do not agree with your friend who 
 says, “ Christianity is not a religion for the religious, but 
 a religion for man. I do not accept it because my tem- 
 perament so disposes me, and because it meets my indi- 
 vidual mood of mind, or my tastes. I accept it as it is 
 suited to that moral condition in respect of which there 
 is no difference of importance between me and the man I 
 may next encounter on my path.”? Well now, you must 
 either accept of Christianity thus, or accept of it without 
 knowing whether it be suited to your moral state or not. 
 If the knowledge of its adaptation to the common moral 
 condition of men be supposed necessary prior to its being 
 accepted, and as an essential element in the ground on 
 which it is accepted, this implies that a knowledge of the 
 moral state of man, as man, has been attained, before 
 interpreting or even receiving the Scriptures. The first 
 principles of ethics are thus settled independently of the 
 Bible; nay their settlement is indispensable to a belief in 
 the Bible ; and if they have not been settled on “ philo- 
 sophical and dogmatic grounds,” they have been loosely 
 and popularly assumed. But is there not an attempt 
 among Christians to settle the first principles of morals 
 on strictly philosophical grounds ? 
 
 | Infidelity, p. 365. 
 * The Restoration of Belief. Cambridge, 1855. _p. 325. 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 103 
 
 Theology andPhi- Origen.—Yes; there have been many 
 ssopby ar vanines. attempts, but not with much success. But, 
 then, you know, “ There might be a false philosophy in 
 our colleges, and yet a true theology might retain a 
 strong hold on the hearts of our people.”! 
 
 Celsus.—That is very convenient, truly. If the philo- 
 sophy and the theology relate to distinct matters and 
 questions, the remark is out of place. But if the philo- 
 sophy and the theology referred to relate to the same 
 matters, and be really inconsistent with each other, then 
 the people think differently from their religious teachers, 
 or the teachers themselves are false either to their phi- 
 losophical or their theological principles. 
 
 Origen.—-Do you concede that “the moral judgment 
 is often found to be limited ? 
 
 Mere ot Celsus.—It were most absurd to deny 
 pavement. that it is not limited. The sole question is, 
 what are its limits? 
 
 Origen.—* There is no infallible criterion of right and 
 wrong. The law is not always written in clear and intel- 
 ligible characters. Man is not, in fact, as God created 
 him: different tribes and individuals sink to different 
 depths of moral degeneracy.” 2 
 
 Celsus.—Well, then, do any sink so low as to be desti- 
 tute entirely of “ moral judgment?” 
 
 Origen.—Probably some do; but certainly not all. 
 
 Celsus.—Then those who do sink so low, as to be des- 
 titute of all moral judgment, and “who have forfeited 
 
 * Infidelity, p. 361. * Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 224. 
 
104 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 the right of being enumerated with the human race,’’' 
 cannot be held as responsible, and to preach the gospel 
 to them is, of course, a work of supererogation. Again, 
 if “the judgments and feelings of mankind, notwith- 
 standing the prevalence of vice, are all but unanimous in 
 favour of virtue,”? then, we must know what virtue is, 
 and consequently we have a criterion, if not an universal, 
 at least a limited, “criterion of right and wrong.” 
 
 Origen.—But that criterion is not infallible. 
 
 Celsus.—It is just as infallible, as the validity of the 
 understanding, or the veracity of reason, can make it. 
 Christians themselves say so—let me read from the same 
 book. “ We can often be sure of the distinction between 
 right and wrong, between good andevil. Conscience has 
 a natural preference for virtue and benevolence, and gives 
 ug some acquaintance with our duty to each other and 
 to God. We have also an experience of the needs and 
 aspirations of the soul. So far, then, as our moral know- 
 ledge extends, we are able to judge of the internal evi- 
 dences of Christianity ; and may, by the light of nature, 
 discover its superiority to systems of false religion.’’” 
 When this author says, there is no infallible criterion of 
 right and wrong, one feels curious to know what more is 
 needed, than “ to be sure of the distinction between right 
 and wrong.” If the evidence of Christianity rest upon 
 “moral knowledge,” attained “by the light of nature,” 
 that knowledge must be somewhat like infallible before 
 it can sustain, as you believe, such a weight. 
 
 1 Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 73. 2 1b., p78) 7 Deas 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 105 
 
 Theologus.—The simplest way to bring the question to 
 an issue, is to ask for an example, in which a legitimate 
 faith is not based upon knowledge. 
 
 Origen.—Well, Columbus believed in the existence of 
 America, before he knew it.! 
 
 Praia Celsus.—Did he not believe in it, after 
 peawedse. he knew it? Was not his belief in it 
 after he knew it, very different from his belief in it before 
 he knew it? Is your belief in Christianity, like his 
 belief in it before he knew it—a guess, a conjecture / 
 But surely you do not pretend to say, that Columbus’ 
 expectation, or belief, of finding a great western conti- 
 nent, was utterly baseless in his own mind. It did rest 
 upon patient and learned investigation, — upon know- 
 ledge. 
 
 ee. Origen.—But faith itself is a source of 
 ofknowledge- knowledge. You must believe in first 
 principles before you can acquire much knowledge ; 
 and our Christian faith leads us into much knowledge. 
 
 Celsus.—But our belief in first principles, as formerly 
 remarked, is not without a knowledge of these principles, 
 a knowledge that they are true. We could not believe 
 them, unless we knew their self-evident truth. 
 
 Theologus.— A similar remark is applicable to the 
 _ Christian’s faith. A Book or Person whom we know to 
 __ be worthy of our confidence may convey to us important 
 information, which we could not obtain elsewhere ; 
 but in this case our faith in the Person or book is based 
 
 ‘See Reason and Faith, p. 22. 
 G 
 
106 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 upon our knowledge of his or its credibility. Correctly 
 speaking, therefore, it is not faith that is a source of 
 knowledge, but the object of that faith. 
 
 Reet! 0 Origen.—But is it not a fact, “ that all 
 ledge without the civilised nations of ancient or modern 
 eet: times, can be shewn to have deriwed 
 instruction, either from the Scriptures or from Scriptural 
 traditions? The people who have been found destitute 
 of such traditions aad beyond the reach of the Christian 
 revelation, are always reduced to a savage condition ; 
 and they who have possessed the traditions alone, with- 
 out the aids of more recent revelations, give evidences in 
 their history, or in their records, sometimes in very dis- 
 tinct terms, that their nation has passed through a course 
 not of development, but of degradation.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—In the first place, this is reasoning from what 
 man has done, to what man might do, and ought to do. 
 Now it is unfair to apply this principle to the heathen and 
 not to to the Christian world. If it be good in the one 
 case, it is good in the other. If the contradictions 
 and vices of the heathen prove that they could do no 
 more than they have done,—that the moral and religious 
 knowledge attainable by reason and nature independently 
 of the Christian Scriptures is nought, then the contradic- 
 tions and vices of Christendom prove that Christianity 
 can do no more than it has accomplished, and the moral 
 and religious knowledge attainable from the Bible is next 
 to nought. Hvangelical Christians are a small minority 
 
 1 Christian Theism, v. ii. p. 263. 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 107 
 
 amongst their brethren. In the second place, this 
 reasoning invalidates the internal evidences of Christi- 
 anity. 
 
 Theologus.—There seem to be two methods of argu- 
 ment open to the defenders of the Christian religion. 
 They may, in the first place, rest the whole weight of 
 the evidence upon méracles, as some do. If miracles 
 alone cannot sustain the whole weight, as others think, 
 they may, in the second place, associate with miracles 
 the judgments or intuitions, or whatever other name they 
 receive, of man’s moral nature. But if man’s moral 
 nature in any of its developments is to be brought into 
 _ court to prove the divine origin of Christianity, it must 
 be such developments as are independent of Christian 
 influences. Whoever asserts that all our moral know- 
 ledge is derived from the Scriptures, necessarily excludes 
 that moral knowledge as evidence in favour of Chris- 
 tianity. 
 
 Origen —We firmly believe that “ truth must lie be- 
 neath all the monstrous systems of Pagan theology.” } 
 
 Celsus.—Very good; but if all the truth that lies 
 beneath the systems of Paganism be derived, directly or 
 indirectly, from the Christian Scriptures, that truth can- 
 not be fairly adduced in attestation of the Bible. The 
 above reasoning, moreover, invalidates the whole argu- 
 ment of Natural Theology. For if all our instruction, all 
 that we possess beyond those who are ina savage con- 
 
 * Christian Theism, v. ii. p. 315. 
 
108 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 dition, be derived from the Bible, our laboured treatises 
 on Theism are so much waste paper. 
 
 Origen.—“ There is a revelation of God in man and 
 nature, yet it has not been interpreted without super- 
 natural aid.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—If that revelation could not be interpreted 
 without supernatural aid, then, while it remains alone, it 
 cannot be regarded as a revelation at all. Besides, if 
 the Christian Scriptures be necessary to interpret God’s 
 revelation of Himself in man and in nature, this revela- 
 tion can give no independent or valid testimony in favour 
 of the Christian Scriptures. 
 
 Theologus.—It is scarcely correct to say, that, even 
 with supernatural aid, this revelation has been inter- 
 preted ; for we have already seen that Natural Theology, 
 
 as at present expounded, is full of contradictions. If it - 
 
 be an obvious inconsistency in the unbelievers “ to receive 
 from Jesus Christ the highest truth they know of God, 
 and then reject the God whom He reveals ;”? it is as 
 gross an inconsistency in the believer to appeal to man’s 
 moral nature, to his ethical knowledge and judgment, in 
 proof of the character of God, and in attestation of the 
 pure morals and divine origin of the Bible, and then, 
 when the occasion is different, to turn round and say, 
 that without the Bible man is only a savage, without any 
 
 moral knowledge, and utterly destitute of the means of 
 improvement. 
 
 * Christian Theism, v. ii. p. 167. 2 Ths px Qt. 
 
 —— 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, 109 
 
 Belief in what is | Origen.—Are we, then, to believe no- 
 evesemers- thing which we do not understand? Is 
 faith never above reason and beyond knowledge ? 
 
 Celsus.—If you were always satisfied with this demand, 
 we should have less difficulty in reasoning out the matter 
 with you. N othing will satisfy some Christians, but to 
 put out the eye of reason altogether. 
 
 Theologus.—To contend that religious faith is belief in 
 the truth, and therefore reasonable, and, at the same 
 time, admit or assume, tacitly or openly, that, in any 
 instance, it is independent of knowledge, or contrary to 
 the understanding, is inadmissible as a clear contra- 
 diction. 
 
 Origen.—But this is not answering the question. 
 
 Pheologus.—Well, the question which you propose, 
 and which involves a serious difficulty which has been 
 often felt, may be answered by attending to the fact that 
 there are two distinct kinds of knowledge. 
 
 Origen.—What new distinction is this, that is to work 
 such wonders ? 
 
 Theologus.—The distinction does not appear to be 
 either novel or obscure. It has not certainly been gene- 
 rally applied to the case in hand; but in itself it is an 
 old acquaintance to most people. | 
 
 Origen.—Ha! Railroads were not so much indebted to 
 a@ new principle, as the novel application of an old one. 
 
 Theologus.—A proposition or statement may be known 
 simply to be true, while it is not known how or why it is 
 true. Another proposition I may not only know to be 
 
110 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 true, but I may also know how or why it is true. We 
 may know a fact without knowing its explanation. We 
 may know another fact, and not only itself, but its ex- 
 planation also. We know the size of the earth, and its 
 position in relation to the sun ; but we do not know why 
 it is so large, no larger and no smaller. We know how 
 far it is from the sun; but we do not know why it was 
 not placed nearer or further off. We know that water 
 rises in a pump to a certain height; and we also know a 
 reason why it rises exactly so high, neither more nor 
 less. Since we cannot know the reason or manner of a 
 fact, without knowing first the fact itself, the one of these 
 knowledges, the complex one, always presupposes and 
 implies the other, or the simple one. But the simple 
 one may be found without the complex. | 
 
 Origen.—How will this distinction help us? 
 
 Theologus.—We should never believe a statement till 
 we know that it is true, that it states a fact, or an un- 
 doubted principle. We must often believe statements, 
 because we know them to be true or to announce facts, 
 although we are entirely ignorant of the manner or mode 
 of the fact, and utterly incapable of understanding how 
 or why the principle which we believe is true. 
 
 Peis Origen.—Has faith, then, no difficulties 
 
 ores with which to contend, and over which to 
 achieve a triumph ? 
 
 Theologus.—What do you consider to be the difficul- 
 ties that lie in the path of belief ? 
 
 Origen.—“ The evidence is sufficient to justify our 
 
 ——— 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. Ti 
 
 faith, but it is not irresistible. There are other facts 
 which seem to conflict with the doctrine. Darkness and 
 difficulties, which have been felt by the best men in 
 every age, beset us in this field of inquiry. But what is 
 the darkness to the light?” } 
 
 Celsus.—I always thought that light dispelled dark- 
 ness. Or after all are Christians still in a field where 
 light and darkness mingle,——in the twilight ? 
 
 Theologus.—If facts really conjlict with your belief, it 
 cannot be a very steady or satisfactory one. If facts 
 only seem to come into collision with your belief, while 
 there is actually no collision at all, I am at a loss to per- 
 ceive what difficulty or darkness there is in such a cir- 
 cumstance, except the difficulty of getting at the truth. 
 As to the evidence not being irresistible, that is saying 
 nothing. It only amounts to this, that man is a free 
 agent, and responsible. 
 
 Origen.—‘ Faith is a moral act, and, while resting on 
 a strong ground-work of proof, it must have some diffi- 
 culties over which to triumph. Origen (the Christian 
 Father whose name I unworthily bear), speaking of 
 the difficulties in the Bible revelation, and of those 
 in the revelation of nature, says: ‘ In both we see a 
 self-concealing, self-revealing God, who makes Himself 
 known only to those who earnestly seek Him; in both 
 are found stimulants to faith, and occasions for un- 
 belief?’ ”’ 2 
 
 Theologus.—So far well. But still there is no very 
 
 1 Infidelity, p. 328. 2 Tb. p. 329. 
 
EW DIALOGUE II. 
 
 explicit statement of difficulties. How can what God 
 conceals be a difficulty worth naming to our cordially 
 receiving what He reveals of Himself ? 
 
 Origen.—But is it not very perplexing to faith to re- 
 concile the painful facts transpiring in the world—war, 
 oppression, slavery, sickness, and poverty, as well as 
 many statements in the Bible, with the Equity and 
 Benevolence of God? 
 
 Theologus.—I can understand how you feel these to 
 
 be trials to your intellect ; but how do they affect your — 
 
 faith, so far as you believe only what you are satisfied is 
 true? Or does your faith embrace statements which 
 you do not even know to be true ? 
 
 Origen.— What may seem a paradox in itself is in fact 
 a great principle applicable to this matter. “¢ When 
 there is no reason to doubt, there can be none to believe. 
 Faith ever stands between conflicting probabilities ; but 
 her position is (if we may use the metaphor) the centre 
 of gravity between them, and will be proportionally 
 nearer the greater mags.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—If this were the universal opinion of Chris- 
 tians, we should not have so much trouble in overthrow- 
 ing Christianity ; as the position of this centre of gravity 
 is obviously one of unstable equilibrium. How differ- 
 ently the matter is put by another writer.—“ Whoever 
 charges himself with such a task as that of conveying to 
 the intelligence and reason of others a system or body of 
 truth—of whatever kind—must be understood to have 
 
 * Reason and Faith, p. 22. 
 
 ee 
 
 ih eo? pe 
 
 BGP ee 
 
 / 
 a Oe ee ld ae SL ee ee ee ae ee oe 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. Pe 
 
 come upon his ground in some such manner as this: that 
 is to say—he professes to understand the subject of 
 which he is to treat; and those to whom he speaks must 
 believe that he does understand it, and that he is fa- 
 miliar with all parts of it, including its most difficult 
 problems. They must listen to him on the belief that 
 what he affirms to be true, he knows to be demonstrable ; 
 and they must believe too that he is prepared, at the 
 last, to meet and remove all reasonable objections. There 
 is nothing in the circle of philosophy, of criticism, of 
 history, or of physical science, that can fairly be set 
 forth and established, unless, formally or virtually, as 
 much as this is postulated on the one side, and is cheer- 
 fully allowed on the other.”! In this way, faith cer- 
 tainly does not “ stand between conflicting probabilities.” 
 
 Origen.—Are there no difficulties in the way of exer- 
 cising faith ? ) 
 
 Theologus. — A reasonable objection to the truth of 
 what is believed is not properly a difficulty in the way of 
 exercising faith, but a prohibition against its exercise in 
 that particular case. An unreasonable objection should, 
 of course, go for nothing. 
 
 Pea tiotion: to Origen. — You expect, then, at least, 
 cee satisfaction to your intellect. I thought 
 no one but an infidel would dispute the wise remarks of 
 Dr Arnold. “ Here is the moral fault of unbelief—that 
 a man can bear to make so great a moral sacrifice, as is 
 implied in renouncing God. He makes the greatest 
 
 1 Restoration of Belief, p. 259, 260. 
 
114 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 moral sacrifice to obtain partial satisfaction to his intel- 
 lect: A believer ensures the greatest moral perfection, 
 with partial satisfaction to his intellect also: entire satis- 
 faction to the intellect is, and can be, obtained by nei- 
 ther.” 
 
 Celsus. — The sacrificing of one part of our nature to 
 another is what we sedulously avoid ; because we believe 
 it to be wrong. To do so is the creed of certain Chris- 
 tians. Morals separate from, or independent of reason, 
 is only another name for prejudice and superstition. 
 
 Theologus.—To deny that man can obtain entire satis- 
 faction to his intellect, is ambiguous and dangerous. If 
 by “entire satisfaction” you mean a knowledge of all 
 things; that satisfaction is unreasonable and absurd. 
 But that man can and may obtain a proper, legitimate, 
 and, therefore, complete, satisfaction to his intellect, is 
 neither at variance with common sense nor Christianity. 
 And if there be not in this sense an entire satisfaction to 
 our understanding in believing the gospel of Christ as 
 true, we have little hope of escaping from the mists of 
 superstition, and of seeing the world converted to the 
 Lord Jesus. 
 
 Origen.—What then do you call a reasonable and 
 entire satisfaction to the intellect ? 
 
 Theologus.—We shall be able to obtain full and legiti- 
 mate satisfaction to the intellect, if we allow that the 
 intellect acts properly under these two conditions: First, — 
 that every man who duly seeks the truth on any point 
 
 1 Infidelity, p. 825. 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 115 
 
 shall not err on that point; and, secondly, that when we 
 know a statement or proposition to be true, we believe 
 it, although we do not know how or why it is true. 
 
 Origen. — According to this representation, faith has 
 no difficulties to struggle with whatever. 
 
 Theologus.—Plenty, my friend, plenty. Are there no 
 difficulties in seeking and finding the truth? Are there 
 no difficulties in acting consistently upon the truth when 
 found? It may not be precisely correct to say, that 
 faith has difficulties to master ; but the man who would 
 believe the truth and act upon this belief, has them in 
 formidable abundance. To suppose that doubt must 
 ever mingle with our faith itself, is not to try it, but to 
 _ strangle it. 
 
 Origen.—But what advantage is gained by your as- 
 sertion that faith ought to be invariably based upon what 
 you have called simple knowledge ? 
 
 ceed Dheplogusi= Wt you: once abandon this 
 
 position, or impair its integrity, you have 
 no defence against superstition, enthusiasm, or mysticism, 
 or whatever else it may be called. 
 
 Origen.—The transition from superstition to infidelity 
 has been often made; but you do not mean to plead that 
 this transition is allowable and legitimate, or that the 
 superstitions of the pious justify the unbelief of the un- 
 godly ? 7 
 
 Celsus.—If superstition be found in the statement of 
 Christian doctrine or of its evidences, the presence of that 
 superstition does not of itself indeed justify our infidelity, 
 
116 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 but you must allow that it so far weakens and damages 
 your own cause. 
 
 Origen.—How would you describe superstition ? 
 
 Lheologus.—It cannot be better described than in 
 language suggested by our present conversation. Belief 
 in a proposition or statement which the believer does not 
 know to be true, or belief which. does not rest upon know- 
 ledge, is superstitious. So far as this principle is not 
 recognised distinctly and broadly, or so far as it is not 
 acted upon in the details of religious life, so far does 
 Christianity suffer at the hands of its friends. 
 
 Origen.—Y our definition or description of superstition 
 will Apply almost equally well to infidelity. 
 
 Theologus.—How so? 
 
 Origen.—Because, when any man denies one or more 
 of the truths of the Bible, and is on that account reckoned 
 an infidel, his denial implies a belief that such or such a 
 doctrine is not true, and we of course affirm that his 
 belief does not rest upon knowledge. 
 
 Theologus.—Your remark is well-founded, and shows 
 us that infidelity and superstition are so far the same, 
 that they both have their roots in self-deception, or, more 
 precisely, in mental dishonesty and insincerity. Their 
 developments, however, endlessly vary with the circum- 
 stances in which men are placed, and the peculiarities of 
 individual character. , 
 
 Origen.—You formerly spoke of abnormal knowledge ; 
 
 —what difference is there between that, and belief with- 
 out knowledge ? 
 
 a 
 
 ney a a ee 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. IT? 
 
 Theologus.—None. It appears to us that belief and 
 knowledge are correlative. What a man believes, he 
 knows; and what he knows, he believes. Normal know- 
 ledge is accompanied by a normal belief; and abnormal 
 knowledge by an abnormal belief. If, as we saw, a man 
 honestly and diligently seek to know the truth, he will 
 not err on that point to which his attention is thus 
 directed. Then his knowledge and belief will be nor- 
 mal. He will not only know and believe what is true, 
 but he will also be conscious and certain of knowing 
 and believing the truth. When, on the contrary, 
 an individual takes up an opinion loosely or carelessly, 
 or at second hand, if the opinion be false, he thinks 
 he knows, when he does not know. His knowledge 
 and belief are both abnormal. Even the light which 
 is in him is darkness.- This is the case to which refer- 
 ence is made above when we speak of belief not based upon 
 knowledge. 
 
 Origen.—But what do you say of the case in which a 
 man takes up an opinion carelessly or loosely or at second 
 hand, while yet the opinion is really and in itself true ? 
 You cannot then say that the individual thinks he knows 
 when he does not know. 
 
 Theologus.—Of course, not. The case, however, is 
 easily described. A proposition may be true in itself, 
 and a person may profess to believe and know it to be 
 true, while in fact he has never paid due attention to it, 
 or given it impartial consideration. This is an obvious 
 case of self-deception as really as the former ;—accepting, 
 
118 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 or rather pretending to accept, as true, what we do not 
 know oh its own merits to be true. 
 
 Origen.—lIf superstition and infidelity be thus funda- 
 mentally the same, namely, abnormal knowledge and 
 belief in one form or another, is not the genuine disciple 
 of Christ free from superstition as he is from infidelity ? 
 
 Theologus.—A man may be a genuine disciple of the 
 Lord Jesus, without being immediately or absolutely 
 delivered from all erroneous knowledge. He may reject 
 some truth, or accept some error in religion, without for- 
 feiting salvation ;—on this principle, that a man may be 
 diligent and upright in seeking the truth on one ques- 
 tion, but not equally so in seeking it on another ques- 
 tion. One thing is needful, and if a man be conscientious 
 and vigilant on that point, he will be “a saint;” if on 
 that point he lack candour or assiduity, he may go off 
 either into the desert of unbelief, or the swamp of super- 
 stition. 
 
 Origen.—You once said that no man is wrong on every 
 topic, and now you affirm that no man is right on every 
 question. How can that be? You maintain that the 
 Christian is, or may be, wrong on some points; and you 
 
 have contended that no more can be said against the 
 
 infidel than that he is wrong only on some points, not on 
 all. Pray, what difference, then, is there between 
 them ? 
 
 Fesentialandnon.  _eologus.—The consequences of being 
 essential truth. qn error on any topic depend upon the 
 value and importance of that topic. If a man lives and 
 
le 
 
 KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 119 
 
 dies in error on the main question between God and his 
 own soul, his error is fatal and irretrievable. If a person 
 is right on that question, which is to every one the first 
 and chief, he is not necessarily exempted from error on 
 other questions of secondary moment. While yet error 
 on any one question whatever cannot but be delete- 
 rious. 
 
 Origen.—You adopt, then, the distinction between 
 essential and non-essential truth. But how is this dis- 
 tinction to be reconciled with the eternal and immutable 
 antithesis between truth and error? 
 
 Theologus.—The expression, essential and non-essen- 
 tial truth, is loose, and apt to mislead. Every truth, 
 regarded in itself, is essential. But one truth may be 
 more important to a person in certain circumstances than 
 another. When an individual is labouring under a fatal 
 disease, the knowledge of an effectual remedy is of all 
 things else most precious to him. So to mankind as 
 guilty before God, the knowledge of the gospel, that is, 
 of pardon and salvation through a crucified Redeemer, is 
 beyond all else needful and important. 
 
 Origen.—- You deny, then, the salvability of the 
 heathen, or of men who are from their circumstances un- 
 avoidably ignorant of the gospel of Christ. 
 
 Theologus—By no means. For there is a double 
 ambiguity in the distinction between essential and non- 
 essential truth. Every truth, as was remarked, is in 
 itself equally essential; and moreover, it cannot be said 
 of any one truth, that a man will perish everlastingly 
 
120 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 through ignorance of it, if his ignorance were in his con- 
 dition altogether unavoidable and necessary. 
 Origen.—What is the use, then, of sending the gospel 
 to the heathen, if they can be saved without it ? 
 Theologus.—No man can be saved but through the 
 blood of Christ. It is one thing to say, that salvation is 
 
 only through Christ, and quite another thing to affirm, | 
 
 that it is only through a knowledge of Christ. You 
 admit, I presume, that infants are saved by Christ with- 
 out their knowing Him. The cases in which there is a 
 possibility of salvation open to men ignorant of the gospel 
 are only those, in which ignorance is entirely unavoid- 
 able, so far as the personal efforts of the parties im- 
 mediately concerned extend. It can never be maintained 
 that a man shall be condemned for lack of knowledge, 
 which he had not the means of attaining. 
 
 As to the uses of sending missionaries to Pagan lands. 
 To send them is the command of the Lord Jesus; where 
 the gospel is unknown, heathen ignorance will be required 
 at the hands of indolent Christians ; and though the poor 
 pagan who gropes after God in the dark, “calling upon 
 the name of the Lord” (Rom. x. 18), shall be saved, no 
 sinner can obtain present peace with God but through a 
 knowledge of his crucified Saviour. This peace is of in- 
 estimable value fh itself, as well as the foundation, not 
 of ethical knowledge or responsibility, but of every ex- 
 cellency in moral or holy character.—There is surely 
 nothing to alarm you in the statement, that while the 
 objective ground of salvation remains for ever unchanged, 
 
 3 
 . 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 12} 
 
 the subjective conditions of salvation may vary, at least 
 in their developments with the varying circumstances of 
 men. 
 
 | Origen.—W hat truths, then, are essential, and which 
 are non-essential ? 
 
 Theologus. —They who hold the distinction may 
 answer your question. I have already said, that every 
 truth is in itself equally essential ; and if at any time one 
 truth be more needful or useful to one person than to 
 another, this must depend entirely upon the characters 
 and circumstances of the parties. 
 
 Origen.—Then you abandon the distinction between 
 essential and non-essential truths, as it is generally 
 understood. 
 
 Theologus.—How is it generally understood ? 
 
 Origen.—In some such way as this. There are some 
 truths which a man cannot neglect without endangering 
 his salvation, while there are others which he may safely 
 leave alone. 
 
 Lheologus.—It seems to me that there are no truths 
 whatever, which an individual ought to know and which 
 he might know, that he can with safety leave alone. 
 This is a doctrine which is often proclaimed ; but none is 
 more derogatory to truth, or dangerous to the church. 
 Of course, if you take up the case of any one individual, 
 it is most undoubtedly correct to say, that there are some 
 truths a knowledge of which is essential to him,—essen- 
 tial to his responsibility and essential to his salvation. 
 Will you assert that the amount of knowledge which is 
 
 H 
 
i273 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 essential to one man,—an ignorant and unprivileged man, 
 is all that is expected or will be required of other men — 
 possessed of better advantages ? 
 
 Origen.—What, then, is essential to salvation ? 
 
 Theologus.—— Objectively, the atonement of Christ is 
 essential to every man’s salvation, and subjectively, it is 
 essential that a man earnestly and habitually strive to add 
 to his knowledge, and also to act up to the knowledge 
 which he has attained. 
 
 Origen.—Do you intend to assert that Christianity or 
 the true religion is a constant state of flux, and that the 
 terms of man’s acceptance with God is subject to ceaseless 
 change ? 
 
 Theologus.—Will you deny that man’s knowledge of 
 the true religion or Christianity has been in a constant 
 state of ebb and flow? Have not nations that once 
 knew it sunk into ignorance or error regarding it? Did 
 not Paul know more of it than Abraham, and Luther 
 than Jerome? The ground of pardon through the blood 
 of Christ alone is not altered or set aside, by supposing 
 that God demands more knowledge from a man of supe- 
 rior advantages than from one of inferior privilege, and 
 that too as involved in the very terms or condition of his 
 personal salvation. 
 
 Origen.—That is, what is essential truth to a man 
 educated among evangelical Christians, or the truth with- 
 out a knowledge and belief of which he cannot be saved, 
 is not in all its extent essential to the papist of Italy or 
 Spain; and what is essential to such a papist is not in its 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, 123 
 
 whole compass essential to a person born and nurtured in 
 the midst of heathen idolatry. 
 
 Theologus.—Precisely so. And hence the truth a 
 knowledge of which may be essential in this age of 
 Christianity, is more than what was essential in the last. 
 As the human race advances in knowledge, collectively 
 or individually, the possible range of superstition becomes 
 in this way less and less, and the possible range of infi- 
 delity becomes wider and wider. Many of the supersti- 
 tions which in bygone ages have corrupted Christianity 
 are exploded for ever, and can never return to the light 
 of day. Christianity is thus from age to age presenting 
 a more extended front and a sharper outline, and her 
 open enemies are finding more numerous points of attack. 
 
 Origen.—I now perceive, also, how to explain the fact 
 that has been often witnessed of men rushing from the 
 frivolities of superstition to the blasphemies of infidelity, 
 or, vice versa, from the apathy of unbelief to the excesses 
 of enthusiasm. 
 
 Celsus.—It is time enough to talk in that vaunting 
 style, when you have purged yourselves of all supersti- 
 tious prejudices. 
 
 Origen.—When we have found a portion of the truth, 
 my friend, we may surely utter it. There is only one 
 way of course in which a man can be right—namely, to 
 * seek the truth as silver, and search for her as for 
 hid treasures,” and having found the truth to act upon 
 it. There seem to be, at the same time, these two great 
 trunk-roads of evil-doing, in one or other of which every 
 
134 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 “ fool,” and every “ simple one” (Prov. i. 22), will be 
 found. The man who “ does not obey the truth, but 
 obeys unrighteousness,” has only this wretched alterna- 
 tive before him, to amuse and stupify his conscience either 
 by the mummeries of superstition or the sophisms of 
 infidelity. Nor is it difficult or uncommon when the 
 mind has proved the worthlessness of the one remedy to 
 make a desperate trial of the other. 
 
 Theologus.—You may also notice that both of these 
 high roads have many by-ways, which are constantly 
 crossing and re-crossing each other. A sensitive mind 
 when awakened to a perception of some superstitious 
 observance or opinion clinging to the Christian com- 
 munity in which he finds himself, is easily tempted to 
 reject with that superstition some fundamental truth. 
 Again, a strong mind when disgusted with the extrava- 
 gancies of enthusiasm prevailing around him, may heed- 
 lessly take refuge on the barren rock of Atheism,—and 
 when tired of his heartless sojourn there, may seek satis- 
 faction in mystic observances. And so on in many dif- 
 ferent ways. | 
 
 Origen.—< The proper and best defence of Christi- 
 anity is, that it be understood.” ; 
 
 Theologus.—Most clearly. Hence so long as anything 
 superstitious—any thing that is not “ true, or honour- 
 able, or just, or pure, or lovely, or of good report,” is 
 found attached to Christian modes of worship, or forms 
 of government, or authorised creeds, as well as to Chris- 
 tian conduct, Christianity herself is so far burlesqued or 
 
 SS ee a 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 125 
 
 defamed before the world, and so far also her defences 
 are impaired or removed. 
 
 Origen.—W hat, then, are some of the leading super- 
 stitions that have damaged the cause of Christ ? 
 
 Theologus.—The statement of those belonging to past 
 ages is the work of the ecclesiastical historian; the ex- 
 posure of those now prevalent is perhaps not the duty of 
 any one man. If Christians would feel the importance 
 of examining anew their respective positions, and would 
 humbly seek the truth on every controverted question, 
 scrupulously suspending their judgment till the clear 
 sunshine of truth beamed on their understanding, much, 
 very much would speedily be done to improve and in- 
 crease the church of Christ, and to bless the unbelieving 
 world. 
 
 Celsus.—Perhaps you will favour us with some of your 
 thoughts on the superstitions of the present day. 
 
 Theologus.—I should not like to do so, without, at the 
 same time, endeavouring to expose some of the more 
 latent forms of infidelity. 
 
 Origen.—Well, well, let us have both. 
 
 Theologus.—Let us, then, assume this as our funda- 
 mental position, that to be reasonable is to be religious, 
 and a man is religious only so far as he is reasonable. 
 It follows from this, or is involved in it, that sacred truth 
 and secular truth, though not identical, are specifically 
 the same. They differ, and yet they agree; they are 
 varieties of one species. This view may be disregarded, 
 and error introduced in two ways; either by denying 
 
126 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 the specific agreement, or asserting the absolute identity, 
 of religious truth and other truth. In the former case, 
 these two varieties of truth will be placed in a hostile 
 attitude towards each other; in the latter, they will be 
 amalgamated; and in both cases serious injury will be 
 the result. Each of these errors, moreover, assumes two 
 distinct forms, according as the preference is given to the 
 one variety of truth over the other. When sacred and 
 secular truth are identified, one party will merge the 
 sacred in the secular, and become rationalistic or infidel ; 
 another party will merge the secular in the sacred, and 
 become superstitious. When the specific unity of sacred 
 and secular truth is denied, religion will sometimes be 
 found bleeding at the altar of rationalism, and reason 
 will sometimes be found bleeding at the altar of super- 
 stition. 
 
 Rationalisticanta. 0 ™— What then do you regard as 
 gonism betweenrea- some manifestations of the rationalistic 
 Wick ser antagonism between Science and Chris- 
 tianity ? | 
 
 Theologus.—To treat Christian or religious truth, as 
 if it did not, or could not, form one of the sciences, but 
 stood on lower ground, is evidently unphilosophical. For 
 the learned to be ignorant or neglectful of it, to an extent. 
 that they would be ashamed of in their treatment of any 
 other science, is to act inconsistently with their own prin- 
 ciples. An individual of any pretensions to learning 
 would blush to avow an entire ignorance of the leading 
 facts and general principles of any branch of knowledge. 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 127 
 
 Although every one has his own favourite pursuit, who 
 would consent to be always confined to it? True philo- 
 sophy, then, forbids that any one who has pretensions to 
 science, should remain unacquainted with true religion— 
 that is, Biblical Christianity. 
 
 The force of this statement is to a great extent felt 
 and acknowledged at the present time. There are few, 
 if any, intelligent men who have not had the claims of 
 the Christian Revelation forced upon their attention in 
 such a way, that they cannot continue to occupy a posi- 
 tion of neutrality. When the alternative of receiving or 
 rejecting the Christian Scriptures is seriously contem- 
 plated, the majority of minds tremble at the thought of 
 rejection; for a moment’s consideration is enough to 
 satisfy the reflecting man, that to renounce the Bible, is 
 to renounce not only all religion, but all science too. 
 Hence there are very few philosophers now, who do not 
 manifest towards the Bible respectful deference; and 
 there are comparatively few treatises or lectures of the 
 many that are making science popular, in which, as occa- 
 sion offers, some suitable allusion to the Bible does not 
 occur. 
 
 But is the treatment of the Bible, and of the God of 
 the Bible, consistent throughout? It is admitted to be 
 a canon of modern science, that no branch of knowledge 
 can with propriety or consistency be neglected by the 
 human mind. Philosophers have often felt themselves 
 under the necessity of contending for this principle, in 
 opposition to those who would disparage certain depart- 
 
128 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 ments of study, under the plea that they are not import- 
 ant to the general cultivation and industrial advancement 
 of the human family. It is a puerile presumption to 
 attempt to affix a stigma to certain researches, and pro- 
 scribe them as “purely theoretical ’’—unworthy of 
 notice or investigation. Reason emphatically condemns 
 such a contracted notion, and experience has amply 
 evinced its vanity. The investigation which promises 
 least to-day, may perform most to-morrow. The artizan 
 and tradesman have sneered at as futile, or smiled at as 
 simply amusing, the abstruse studies of a Davy or a 
 Laplace, which, by and by, however, have issued in the 
 most astonishing and beneficial discoveries. Under a 
 precisely similar and equally erroneous notion, scientific 
 men have been found sneering or smiling at the Christian 
 student, as engaged in a pursuit hopeless, unprofitable, 
 and dull, while their own cherished principles could tell 
 them, that possibly from that very study the weightiest 
 and grandest results may be evolved. If it be unreason- 
 able, as it clearly is, to think of drawing a veil over any 
 portion of God’s works,—if each footstep of the Almighty 
 has, prima facie, an equal claim upon our earnest atten- 
 tion,—if His operations are all equally worthy of devout 
 examination, then the facts of the Bible demand as care- 
 ful a consideration at least as the facts of Geology, and 
 the page of inspiration as rational and reverential a con- 
 templation as the face of the firmament. 
 
 The human body is an object of science, on which 
 many thousands of hours and volumes of investigation 
 
 5 MA Pn ee eee ea 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 129 
 
 have been lavished. Its varities, its size, its colour, its 
 nutrition, its reproduction, all its organs and all their 
 uses, its diseases and its dissolution, have become the 
 themes of intellectual inquiry. May it, then, be affirmed 
 that its ultimate and eternal destiny is a matter with 
 which reason has little or nothing to do? It may be 
 said, that reason has no appropriate means by which 
 she may become acquainted with that matter. Is there 
 not a telescope, by the use of which that far distant 
 object, our body’s everlasting destiny, may be discovered 
 and examined? Are there not accurate and accessible 
 tables of computation, by a reference to which the future 
 events that await different bodies may be foretold? This 
 telescope is Divine Revelation; these tables are the laws 
 of God. Is it objected that these are not scientific instru- 
 ments? The answer is obvious and conclusive,—science 
 refuses no instrument whatever which discovers or authen- 
 ticates facts. 
 
 Nor is any fact removed from the field of science by 
 its remoteness in space, or by its distance in time, by the 
 minuteness of its object, or by the difficulty of its expla- 
 nation. Remoteness in space only fixes the philosopher’s 
 gaze more intently; distance in time only summons all 
 his energies to the task; minuteness of parts only tests 
 his untiring patience; difficulty of explanation only fires 
 his genius; while each of these stimulates to seek the 
 improvement of instruments and the development of 
 resources. Littleness waxes great under the microscopic 
 lens; distance is annihilated by the gigantic telescope ; 
 
130 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 intricacy has well-nigh disappeared under the wand of 
 the infinitesimal calculus; and centuries look like hours 
 in the eye of the geologist. If the Bible were an instru- 
 ment of human invention or construction, and possessed 
 its present power of giving nearness to what is distant, 
 and visibility to what is unseen, and certainty to what is 
 doubtful, there is no tyro of any scientific school but 
 would labour to purchase and long to employ it. Which 
 is the greater folly, to decline the aid of a human inyen- 
 tion, or that of a Divine gift ? 
 
 But some will say, where is this fallacy manifested in 
 practical life? It pervades the more intelligent classes of 
 society. For. example, it seems to us to be clearly 
 involved in the very constitution of our Philosophical and 
 Mechanics’ Institutions. Their object is to instruct the 
 people in everything that is interesting, profitable, and 
 true. Variety is sedulously sought after in literature, 
 history, and sciences, so that everything may be intro- 
 duced which can either touch human feelings, or aug- 
 ment human enjoyments, or extend human prospects. 
 But one subject is silently, yet carefully and universally, 
 excluded, namely, religious truth, as embracing man’s 
 relations to his God, his present peace and his future 
 destiny. What is the reason of this exclusion? It can- 
 not with any force or propriety be maintained, that this 
 religious truth has nothing to do with a design to please 
 and profit the mass of the people. Is it because there is 
 a stronger and more obvious necessity for promoting 
 literature and science among the million, than true reli- 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 131 
 
 gion? Although there were, that would not justify an 
 absolute interdict being placed upon religious truth. Is 
 it because men cannot agree in their opinions upon reli- 
 gion, as they do upon other matters? This answer, 
 which perhaps would be very generally adopted, goes 
 upon the very assumption, whose fallacy we are endea- 
 vouring to expose, that, in fact, there is no such thing as 
 religious truth, or if there be men cannot find it—that 
 there is some antagonism or incompatibility between 
 sacred and secular truth, the sinister cause of which lies, 
 not in science, but in Christianity. 
 
 Let any one examine the constitution and proceedings 
 of the British Association for the advancement of science, 
 and consider whether or not they involve an unphiloso- 
 phical divorce between religious truth and other truth. 
 It is impossible not to perceive that all the laws and 
 doings of that great society are founded on the hypothesis, 
 that the page of the Bible and its bearings on human 
 character and conduct and destiny, do not belong to 
 science. If true knowledge, specially its diffusion among 
 mankind, be the object of that noble association, why 
 should it set aside one kind of true knowledge? The 
 assumption on which this procedure is founded may 
 indeed be regarded as so plain and incontrovertible as to 
 need neither statement nor explanation. To impugn it 
 will only provoke asmile in many. Nevertheless it may 
 in fact be one of the most profound and injurious fallacies 
 of the present day. 
 
 These suggestions will not appear so strange as they 
 
th DIALOGUE II. 
 
 might otherwise do, if you endeavour to realise the follow- 
 ing train of thought. Philosophers have united with 
 poets in expatiating with delight, upon the benefits which 
 men in every age and clime have obtained by holding 
 communion with nature, as well as carefully unfolded the 
 pleasures and advantages to be derived from scientific 
 observation and discovery. Whether we linger in rich 
 meadows teeming with exuberant fruitfulness, or climb 
 the mountain brow to inhale the fresh free air of Heaven, 
 or wander on ocean’s shore to listen to the music of its 
 waves, everywhere the mind is impressed with a sense of 
 nature’s grandeur, or pleased with its loveliness, or charmed 
 with its variety. The contemplation of nature’s beauties 
 suggests to the happy mind many elevating thoughts, 
 while it aids in calming the troubles of a vexed and 
 wearied spirit, as well as soothing and healing the heart 
 which has been broken by affliction. The vigorous pur- 
 suit of scientific truth sends a glow of purest delight 
 through the mental framework, and strengthens and 
 develops the intellectual faculties, besides augmenting 
 indirectly by successful investigations the physical well- 
 being of mankind. Thoughtful men have always rejoiced 
 in extracting for themselves such blessings from the study 
 of nature, and in inviting others to seek like precious 
 solace where they themselves have found it. Literature 
 summons all her resources to recommend and disseminate 
 this rational and unalloyed enjoyment. Philosophy adds 
 her august sanction to a frequent participation in this 
 
 feast of the soul. The Bible withholds not approbation, : 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 138 
 
 but benignantly smiles upon all who partake freely of the 
 ambrosia at nature’s banquet. 
 
 But granting all this to be true, it is not only a legiti- 
 mate but necessary inquiry—Is this enjoyment strong 
 and deep enough to meet and remove the uneasiness for 
 which it is often prescribed? Is it rich and abundant 
 enough to satisfy our large desires? The negative 
 answer, which will be universally returned to this ques- 
 tion, indicates the existence of a painful phenomenon in 
 all human experience. Philosophy may not, surely, 
 ignore this fact. The learned men who will not give it a 
 place among their studies are obviously under the influ- 
 ence of prejudice or bigotry. How stands the case? 
 There is a fountain of sorrow in every human breast and 
 in every social circle, ever welling up its bitter waters. 
 To sweeten this fountain of wormwood, the only specific 
 that the prevailing philosophy can recommend is com- 
 munion with nature and the study of science. This 
 remedy, though not unattended with some good effects, 
 is undeniably powerless on the whole and insufficient. 
 If this philosophy then were consistent with her own 
 principles, would she not call loudly and incessantly for 
 the consideration of these ominous facts, namely, the 
 general prevalence in humanity of a virulent disease, and 
 the ineflicacy of the most potent remedies which are 
 resorted to in her schools? If this disease, which cannot 
 be concealed, cannot also be cured, then benevolence 
 would weep over the miseries of our race, and her hot- 
 test tears would be shed over the failure of the antidotes, 
 
134 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 which human wisdom has devised to expel or neutralise 
 the poison of human grief. 
 
 Is there, then, another and unfailing antidote to be 
 found? To overlook this enquiry, or to treat it unwor- 
 thily, as has been done by almost every school in philo- 
 sophy, is a grave and fundamental error, even judging 
 philosophers on their own principles. If it be asserted 
 on anything like a plausible ground, that there is an 
 effectual remedy for the sorrows of the human heart, is 
 philosophy not bound in self-consistency to take up the 
 assertion, and give some deliverance as to its truth or its 
 falsehood ? When an individual, or a school, or an insti- 
 tution of any sort, professes to be philosophical, and does 
 in fact take up and discuss for the pleasure and profit of 
 men innumerable questions on every kind of subject, and 
 all the time is profoundly silent on this one point, the 
 omission, to say the least, is a glaring inconsistency. It 
 really seems to proceed upon the assumption, that there 
 is some deep and secret opposition between one sort of 
 truth and another. If it be indeed a fact, that there is 
 a remedy, and only one, which can heal radically and for 
 ever our aching hearts and dry our burning tears, the 
 self-styled philosophy that continues ignorant of this 
 precious and powerful balm, is more than half-blind; and 
 the philosophy that knows of this remedy, and yet pur- 
 posely or carelessly conceals its knowledge, — nay, that 
 does not proclaim its existence to the world, and teach 
 its celestial virtues, must be pronounced to be both de- 
 ceitful and cruel. 
 
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KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. L385 
 
 Origen.—These are the remarks of one who seems 
 desirous of digging about the deepest roots of infidelity. 
 Sone Celsus. — But you intimated that you 
 tagonism between had also some observations to make on the 
 tiie superstitious antagonism between one truth 
 and another. 
 
 Theologus.—There is undoubtedly a superstitious, as 
 well as a rationalistic, antagonism between reason and 
 religion. While some would exclude Christianity from 
 the pale of philosophy and science, and treat it under 
 that pretext unworthily, others as unwisely acquiescing 
 silently in the propriety of this exclusion, can cling to 
 the Bible and religion, only by cherishing a secret or 
 avowed dislike and suspicion of philosophy, or by making 
 religion, not so much a matter of the understanding and 
 the reason, as of the heart and the affections. For 
 example, it has been said of the Bible: ‘“ It appeals not 
 to our logical consciousness, but speaks at once to the 
 religious nature, or, as we more often term it, to the 
 heart.” It would be strange indeed if the Word of God 
 did not speak to our feelings, but it would be equally 
 sirange if it did not speak to the feelings through the 
 understanding. The Bible surely speaks to us as intelli- 
 gent beings, and its appeals are based upon rational 
 grounds. What may be meant by “logical conscious- 
 ness,” it 1s perhaps not very easy to determine. Man 
 has but one faculty of understanding to be employed on 
 different objects. That the Bible speaks to reason on 
 its practical side, no one will question; and it seems 
 
136 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 equally plain that the Word of God ought to be made 
 an object of philosophical study as well as His works. 
 When a philosopher begins to patronize the Christian 
 religion in the style of the above quotation, granting it 
 a sort of special license, as if it were of too delicate a con- 
 stitution to be tested as everything else is tested, its 
 enlightened friends will protest against such treatment 
 as involving a real indignity. 
 
 There is a numerous class of theologians, who, in ex- 
 posing the depravity of man and exalting the claims of 
 the Bible, virtually undermine the authority of the hu- 
 man understanding on all moral and religious questions. 
 It is unnecessary to quote illustrations of this statement, 
 they are so abundant. ‘The infidel, fully aware of the 
 advantage to be derived from this error on the part of 
 his opponents, has made frequent and effective use of the 
 taunt: “ The Christian makes the Bible the judge of 
 reason.” It is painful to hear from the pulpit and the 
 press sentiments such as the following, uttered and 
 penned by men who stand high in the Christian world. 
 *“‘ Reason has often deceived us but Scripture cannot.” 
 “See what comes of reasoning instead of believing.” 
 The fallacy involved in such representations is easily 
 made apparent. Men have been misled by erroneous 
 interpretations of Scripture as well as by false arguments. 
 If it be said, erroneous interpretations are not Scripture ; 
 neither are false arguments reason. Apart from the use 
 of his reason, to understand what is fundamental and to 
 prove what is susceptible of proof, man cannot legiti- 
 
 ch Sia vee 
 ee ee OR ONT a ee a 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, 137 
 
 mately believe a single proposition. Reason abused is 
 plainly the parent of many errors; reason rightly used 
 is the perfection of an intelligent being. 
 
 That this error is deeply-seated and widely spread in 
 the Christian community, is apparent in many ways. 
 Nothing is more common than to talk of speculative 
 philosophy as a cause of infidelity. Speculation, doubt- 
 less, has given occasion to the expression and advocacy 
 of atheistical and irreligious sentiments, and the abuse of 
 speculative inquiries has confirmed the prevalence of 
 loose and ungodly principles. But there never was a 
 case in which the cause was more clearly taken for the 
 effect. Infidelity is far more frequently the cause of a 
 false philosophy, than a false philosophy the cause of 
 infidelity. When, therefore, we are told again and again 
 by respectable authors, that philosophical speculation has 
 been co-extensive with civilization, and is not in itself to 
 be regarded as an evil, and are shortly afterwards in- 
 formed that it is also a cause of infidelity ; this incon- 
 sistency, which in certain circumstances might be con- 
 sidered as nothing more than a slip of the pen, seems in 
 the present case to be indicative of a general and inve- 
 terate prejudice. 
 
 In such ways as these, sacred and secular truth are 
 frequently found in unnatural opposition. Although it is 
 generally admitted in theory, that any clashing between 
 reason and religion is improper and injurious, yet prac- 
 tically and in detail, as we have seen, the claims of both 
 are by no means amicably or righteously adjusted. To 
 
 I 
 
138 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 tell some Christians, that the study of philosophy em- 
 braces Christianity as it embraces other objects, would 
 excite their direst fears and provoke their hottest jeal- 
 ousy. To tell some philosophers, that their philosophy 
 is partial and defective, unless it make them humble, 
 self-denying, heavenly-minded disciples of Jesus, would 
 awaken their bitterest scorn. To tell some pious people, 
 that there is a science of religion, and that to study it 
 would make them better Christians, and to tell some 
 scientists that their science is inconsistent unless it be 
 crowned with evangelical piety, is to expose oneself to 
 a cross-fire from superstitious and secular bigotry. To 
 assert that Christianity has not a stronger foundation to 
 rest upon than any of the sciences, will seem to some a 
 
 profane attempt to shake the very pillars of religious - 
 
 faith. While, on the other hand, to insinuate that science 
 has not a more rational or more certain conclusion to 
 teach than such as these: “ If any man love the world, 
 the love of the Father is not in him,” “ The friendship 
 of the world is enmity with God,”—will appear to others 
 an enthuiastic attempt to drive reason from her throne. 
 Notwithstanding all the prejudices of unbelieving reason 
 and of unenlightened faith, the Bible is an object with 
 which reason must deal as it deals with everything else. 
 The word of God must be entered in the inventory of 
 the inductive sciences ; it must be examined and tested 
 by suitable instruments and methods, as the human mind 
 examines and tests all other things; and its solemn and 
 precious statements are to be received with the reverence 
 
 SE a en ne ae 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 139 
 
 demanded by a message from the Most High, because 
 the volume itself is first received with the confidence due 
 to the deductions of reason. While we thus trace the 
 stream of knowledge to its fountain-head, we find that 
 every doctrine of science, and every doctrine of religion, 
 is equally authoritative and equally reasonable. 
 Celsus.—You also spoke of the amalga- 
 
 Superstitious 5 ‘ 
 amalgamation of Mation, as well as the antagonism, of sacred 
 
 sacred and se- 
 
 and secular truth, and of those who super- 
 cular truth. 
 
 stitzously merge the latter in the former. 
 
 Theologus.—In the days of medizeval darkness, which 
 have been called the stationary period of the inductive 
 sciences, the minds of meditative men were disposed to 
 regard the spheres of theology and of natural philo- 
 sophy as identical. Their knowledge of nature was very 
 imperfect, and their methods of investigation and rea- 
 soning were loose and inconclusive; hence it is not sur- 
 prising, that they fell into the error of supposing, that 
 all science is to be found in the word of God,—that the 
 _ Bible is not only true, but contains all truth,—that it 
 not only announces a message of mercy, but unfolds the 
 mystery of nature. The prevalent opinion was thus ex- 
 pressed by Scotus: true philosophy is true religion, and 
 true religion is true philosophy. The injurious influence 
 of this error was considerable. The ancient dogmas of 
 philosophy, which had remained unquestioned for many 
 centuries, were covered from assault under the egis of 
 divine authority ; while every discovery was branded as 
 a pestilent heresy. To doubt the teaching of Aristotle 
 
140 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 was equivalent to disputing the inspiration of Paul, and 
 the popular language of the word of God was adduced, 
 to justify an anathema against the true theory of the 
 motion of the heavenly bodies. This error led by a sort 
 of reaction to the strange assertion, that what is philo- 
 sophically true may be theologically false. 
 
 A similar error is frequently met with in the present 
 day. There are certain matters, such as geology and 
 moral philosophy, which are common property to the 
 inspired volume and to the book of nature, or, in other 
 words, on which we have information both in the written, 
 and in the unwritten, revelation of God. Now it is the 
 practice of some minds to set aside the information which 
 we have from one of these sources, and crudely and 
 erroneously to generalise the information derived from 
 the other source. The Bible is thus misinterpreted, and 
 hastily pledged to views which it does not sanction. 
 Whenever an attempt is made, however, to examine and 
 digest the information of the unwritten revelation, and 
 to bring it into harmony with the statements of the 
 Word, immediately a ery of heresy and impiety is raised 
 in certain quarters, because old prejudices are assailed 
 and cherished errors exposed. 
 
 | Origen.—But is religious truth never 
 Spee ee merged into secular truth with an infidel 
 
 secular and Sa. 
 
 - ? 
 ered trath tendency af 
 
 Theologus.—Undoubtedly. Many who 
 laugh at their forefathers for resolving natural science 
 into Christianity, are rushing into the opposite extreme, 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 141 
 
 and resolving Christianity into natural science. Their 
 knowledge of the Bible is so meagre and shallow, that it 
 is not very wonderful to find them fancying that true reli- 
 gion is contained in the enlarged and accurate sciences 
 of our day,—that modern philosophy is the only success- 
 ful expounder of mysteries,—that it has so improved the 
 habits of society and increased social comfort, that man- 
 kind need no other rule of life,—that in the deductions 
 of reason, unaided by written revelation, are to be found 
 the essence and the cream of all theology. ‘These opi- 
 nions are openly avowed by a few who say, that science 
 is the providence of life. They form, however, the 
 cherished and guiding principle of many more, who would 
 perhaps blush to avow them. 
 
 To neglect or mystify the facts of nature, by a sum- 
 mary and unfair reference to the statements of Scripture, 
 was the folly of medizeval sophists, and is still a delusion 
 of many pious people; to neglect or nullify the state- 
 ments of Holy Scripture, by inordinate devotion to the 
 study of nature, is the heresy of modern philosophy. 
 Implicitly to receive antique philosophic dogmas, and 
 attach to them the authority of written revelation, is 
 the grievous mistake of many now as of the scholastic 
 doctors of old; implicitly to receive the lessons of re- 
 ligion inculeated in youth, and then to confound them 
 with, or to merge them in, the conclusions of modern 
 science, is the fatal error of many of our accomplished 
 savans. Numbers still are the disciples of the monks, in 
 disregarding or distorting nature, out of a professed de- 
 ference to the words of inspiration; many of our learned 
 
B52 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 men are disregarding or distorting divine declarations, 
 out of a pretended deference to philosophy. The dream- 
 ing, drowsy ascetics of the past—and the race is far from 
 being extinct—flattered themselves that the Bible was the 
 only reservoir of science; the eager, active scientists of 
 the present are not unfrequently persuading themselves 
 that their discoveries are the most satisfactory interpre- 
 tation of the Bible,—or something better. Centuries 
 ago the monks would not study nature as they studied 
 the Bible, and they have still many followers; there are 
 thousands now who have never studied the Bible with 
 the zest, the patience, and the vigour, which they have 
 expended on some domain of nature. 
 
 Men may reach the same quagmire by different and 
 even opposite roads. We can suppose two men agreeing 
 professedly in the statement, that all organized beings 
 are animals. But it may turn out on examination that 
 the one allows those beings only who possess the power of 
 locomotion to be organized; while the other allows those 
 beings who are destitute of this power to be animals. 
 So by unduly magnifying the place and the claims of 
 Christianity, or by depreciating science, men may come 
 to believe that every truth is a part of religion; by which 
 they mean, that they cannot be pious and deyout with- 
 out being at the same time adepts in science. Again, by 
 erroneously magnifying the position and importance of 
 science, or by depreciating Christianity, men may come 
 likewise to believe that every truth is a part of religion ; 
 by which they mean, that the student of science cannot 
 but be an acceptable worshipper of God. 
 
DIALOGUE IIL. 
 BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 Celsus.—The fundamental assertion of Christianity, 
 that man is to be saved by faith, bears an absurdity on 
 the face of it. 
 
 Origen.—How so? 
 
 Celsus.—Because our belief, as we have just seen, is 
 always, or ought always to be, based upon knowledge, 
 and our understanding is not under our control; for we 
 must judge of any matter just as it appears to us at the 
 time to be. 
 
 Origen.—Our reason is certainly not directly under 
 our control; but very little consideration will shew that 
 it is under our power, to some extent at least, indirectly. 
 We can examine a matter, or refuse to examine it, at our 
 pleasure. Besides, we may examine it in two very different 
 ways, with prejudice or without prejudice. Surely, then, 
 we are responsible for the manner in which we use our 
 intelligence; and, consequently, we are responsible for 
 our belief. ; 
 
 Celsus.—If this reasoning proves anything at all, it 
 proves that man is responsible for all his beliefs, for one 
 as well as for another. 
 
144 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 Origen.—I cannot go the length of saying, that man is 
 responsible for all his beliefs. 
 
 Celsus.—Why not? How, then, do you distinguish 
 between those beliefs for which you are responsible, and 
 those for which you are not responsible ? 
 
 Origen.—* Our opinions, in so far as they are influ- 
 enced by our dispositions, our beliefs, in so far as they 
 are controlled by our inclination, are legitimate subjects 
 of responsibility.” 
 
 Celsus.—You cannot mention a single belief, that may 
 not at one time or another be controlled by our incli- 
 nation. 
 
 Origen.—Our belief in mathematical truth is not. 
 
 Celsus.—Many a youth has crossed the pons asino- 
 rum, because he was influenced by the ambition of excel- 
 ling, or the desire of obtaining a prize, who otherwise 
 would never have mastered the proposition referred to, 
 or intelligently believed its conclusion. 
 
 Origen.—* Inclination has nothing whatever to do in 
 believing that two and two make four, or that the three 
 angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. A 
 man in his senses could not believe otherwise. But incli- 
 nation has much to do in receiving or rejecting moral 
 and religious truth.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—Indeed! Pray what has inclination to do 
 with believing that it is wrong to steal, or that it is right 
 for the child to honour his father and his mother? Can 
 men in their senses believe otherwise ? 
 
 " Infidelity, by Pearson, p. 269. *Th. p.269. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 145 
 
 Theologus.—Unless the distinction be made clearly 
 out between our responsible and irresponsible beliefs, the 
 assertion of such a distinction will undoubtedly favour 
 and promote that “ weakened sense of responsibility,” 
 that “ utter absence of anything like the religious obliga~ 
 tion of belief,’ which are asserted! to be characteristics 
 of infidel “ indifferentism.” 
 
 Origen.—We effeetually expose that indifferentism by 
 maintaining that “ Reason and Scripture unite their tes- 
 timonies, in establishing the position, that responsibility 
 is in proportion to the means of information and the 
 weight and clearness of evidence.” ° 
 
 Celsus.—-This criterion applies equally well to any one 
 belief as to any other. If a man is to be blamed for 
 neglecting or perverting evidence or information on one 
 question, why not on another question? You must, there- 
 fore, cease to hold us responsible for what you are pleased 
 to call our disbelief, till you hold yourselves responsible 
 for all your beliefs. We have reason to throw back 
 upon yourselves the taunt, that you have pointed against 
 others : “ the doctrine of responsibility, in its high import, 
 is either denied, or fluctuating and feeble.” * 
 
 Origen.—The truth for which we contend may be 
 stated in another form. ‘So far as false opinion arises 
 from the influences of the conduct upon the mind, it is 
 unquestionable that man must be responsible for it.’’* 
 
 Celsus.—Does conduct here include inclination, as 
 
 1 Infidelity, by Pearson, p. 253. 2 Tb. 276. 
 > Ib. p. 286. 4 Christian Theism, vol. ii. pp. 872, 373. 
 
146 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 given in your former statement? In that statement, did 
 inclination include conduct? May we not complain of 
 looseness in the expression of your fundamental position? 
 But passing that, we are as far from a settlement of the 
 question as ever. Is every false opinion found to arise 
 from the influence of bad conduct on the mind? And if 
 not, how shall we distinguish those that arise in this 
 manner from those that do not so arise ¢ 
 
 Origen.—This is metaphysical quibbling. 
 
 Celsus.—It is no such thing. It is a most momentous 
 practical question, at least in your estimation. You affirm 
 that [ am responsible for my belief. Your affirmation is 
 worthless, unless you maintain that you and I are respon- 
 sible for all our beliefs, or shew me by some plain mark, 
 for which of my beliefs I am responsible, and for which 
 of them I am not responsible. 
 
 Origen.—* Man cannot justly be punished for what is 
 not dependent upon the will, and it is true that the 
 reception of truth or error is seldom immediately depen- 
 dent upon it.”! 
 
 Celsus.—This is a good specimen of the vague misti- 
 ness, in which the author you quote indulges, and espe- 
 cially on some of the most momentous questions. If this 
 be his ultimatum on the question before us, nothing can 
 be more unsatisfactory. It is a mere truism to say that 
 “man cannot justly be punished for what is not depen-. 
 dent upon the will;” unless indeed it be at variance with 
 your doctrine of original sin. As to his other remark, 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 373. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 147 
 
 nothing could be more beautifully indefinite, or palpably 
 false. It certainly implies, that the reception of truth or 
 error is sometimes immediately dependent upon the will; 
 —an assertion made by no other writer of any name. 
 The general import of the remark is, that we are res- 
 ponsible for some beliefs and not for others ;—a shallow 
 reiteration of this “ glorious uncertainty.” 
 
 Origen.—Stay now, I think I can answer your ques- 
 tion. That arduous responsibility which attaches to 
 
 tee ten man, . . - . is at once relieved, and 
 error. effectually relieved, by the maxim—the 
 key-stone of ethical truth—that only voluntary error 
 condemns us ;—that all we are really responsible for, is 
 a faithful, honest, patient investigation and weighing of 
 evidence, as far as our abilities and opportunities admit, 
 and a conscientious pursuit of what we honestly deem 
 truth, wherever it may lead us.’”! 
 
 Celsus.—In the first place, this does not meet my 
 demand. It amounts to this. I am responsible for 
 yoluntary errors, and not for involuntary errors; which 
 seems to come to no more than this tautology: [am res- 
 ponsible for the errors for which I am responsible. In 
 the second place, the statement is one quite to our liking. 
 If after ‘“‘a faithful, honest, patient investigation and 
 weighing of evidence,” I come to a conclusion, believing 
 it to be true, while, notwithstanding, it is really erroneous, 
 how can I be sure that in any case know the truth? In 
 asserting that there is such a thing as this involuntary 
 
 1 Reason and Faith, p. 22. 
 
148 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 error, how do you know that you are not in an inyolun- 
 tary error in making the assertion? Error that is in- 
 voluntary is, of course, as sages have long affirmed, in- 
 vincible. For ought that you can tell, your belief in 
 Christianity may be an invincible and involuntary error. 
 Theologus.—The doctrine of involuntary and invincible 
 error undoubtedly implies, that a man may be in error 
 on any point whatever without any possibility of his 
 escaping from it, or of knowing that he is entangled in 
 it. To know that we are in an error, is in fact to be free 
 from that error. If this doctrine, then, be “the key- 
 stone of ethical truth,” the edifice will be nothing better 
 than “‘ the baseless fabric of a vision.” 
 aes Origen.—In maintaining, as you have 
 conraTety been doing, Mr Umpire, the validity of 
 the human understanding, and in now denying the 
 existence of involuntary error, what becomes of the doc- 
 trine of original sin and the depravity of man ? 
 Theologus.—In denying the validity of the human 
 understanding, you deny the responsibility of man,—you 
 represent his understanding not merely as darkened, but 
 as utterly destroyed. If you do away with man’s res- 
 ponsibility, you annihilate both original and actual sin. 
 Again, in maintaining the culpability of error in every 
 instance, we are driven by logical necessity to the doctrine 
 of original sin; whereas by admitting the common philo- 
 sophical dogma of invincible and involuntary error, we 
 must either affirm the blamelessness of error, or cast the 
 blame of it from the creature upon the Creator. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 149 
 
 Celsus. —We have always felt that Christians, in deny- 
 ing the veracity of reason or the trustworthiness of the 
 understanding, were fighting with us at an enormous dis- 
 advantage. The very weapon they wield breaks in their 
 grasp. Besides, our doctrine of Pantheism needs no better 
 defence, than the ancient and universal belief in involun- 
 tary and invincible error. In our estimation it zs “ the 
 key-stone of ethical truth;” that is, of all that you can 
 ever expect to get as ethical truth. 
 
 Origen.—You deny, then, the moral in- 
 ability of fallen man, as distinguished from 
 physical inability. 
 
 Moral inability. 
 
 Celsus.—Your assertion of this distinction is an awk- 
 ward attempt to save yourself from the pantheistic con- 
 clusion involved in your own principles. One of your 
 friends says, “ Nor does the necessitarian appear to have 
 any escape from a semi-pantheism, in the distinction be- 
 tween physical and moral necessity. It would be more 
 consistent with the facts of life, to speak of chains of im- 
 moral necessity.” * 
 
 Theologus.—H the moral necessity under which man 
 as a fallen creature is represented as lying, or his moral 
 inability, or whatever else it may be called, involve ir- 
 responsibility, man’s nature is destroyed. If this moral 
 inability involve blameworthiness, the doctrine of original 
 sin is conceded, including in it man’s responsibility for all 
 his beliefs. What is called moral inability has no meaning 
 that we can perceive, unless it imply irresponsibility on 
 
 1 See Infidelity, p. 266. ? Christian Theism, v. i. p. 197. 
 
150 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 the one hand, or guilt onthe other. If it imply irresponsi- 
 bility, there is no retreat from the slough of pantheism. 
 And if it involve culpability, to call it inability or neces- 
 sity, or any such name, is a pure contradiction, and leads 
 to endless confusion. 
 
 Origen.—Granting that a man is responsible for all his 
 beliefs, so far as they are the result of his own personal 
 free agency, how can you maintain that we are responsible 
 for erroneous beliefs, which are the result of the free 
 agency of our forefathers ? 
 
 Celsus.—If you deny that you are held responsible for 
 your erroneous beliefs in which you are entangled in 
 consequence of the sins of your progenitors, pray what 
 do you mean by the famous doctrine of original sin and 
 human depravity ? 
 
 Origen.—But you cannot hold a man responsible in the 
 same degree, or to the same extent, for hereditary errors, 
 as for errors into which he has led himself ? 
 
 Celsus.—On your own principles you cannot deny his 
 responsibility for both sorts of error ; and the distinction 
 between greater and lesser sins is a sorry refuge for a 
 man who professes to believe in the Bible. Thus it ap- 
 pears that our creed, that we are not responsible for our 
 belief at all, is about as reasonable and far more consistent 
 than the Christian’s creed, that he is responsible for some, 
 and not for others, of his beliefs. 
 
 Theologus.—But if you maintain that you are in no 
 sense or degree responsible for your belief, you exclude 
 from the sphere of responsibility the most important 
 
 On Re en a Oe ee ee ee 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 151 
 
 function of your nature, you eviscerate the distinction 
 between truth and error of all meaning, you take refuge 
 in a self-immolating scepticism, to reason with which is 
 utter folly. But what objections do you urge to the state- 
 ment, that man is responsible for all his beliefs ? 
 
 Celsus.—To admit this, and then think of the numer- 
 ous and serious errors of mankind, is more than enough 
 to make me wish that man had never existed. 
 
 The Spirit's infu. Ortiger.—Man does exist, and the prob- 
 Ence. lems involved in his existence must be dis- 
 cussed. Your views, Mr Umpire, are totally at variance 
 with the Christian doctrine of the influences of the Holy 
 Spirit. 
 
 Theologus. — The doctrines of the Spirit’s work and 
 man’s degeneracy have generally been regarded as cor- 
 relative, so that whatever views enhance the one, in the 
 same degree, enhance the other. And we have already 
 noticed how human depravity is virtually denied, by 
 refusing either the validity of the human understanding 
 or the responsibility of man for every one of his beliets. 
 
 Origen.—But if reason never deceive us, and if we by 
 our own strength can avoid or escape from every wrong 
 belief, what room is there for the gracious work of the 
 Divine Spirit ? 
 
 Theologus. — When we speak of “ our own strength,” 
 we do not mean, nor have we ever said, that it is our 
 own strength independent of Divine assistance. Nothing 
 has been advanced by us to exclude the necessity of that 
 Divine Agent aiding and guiding us in searching for the 
 
152 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 truth, and strengthening us to act according to the 
 
 truth. 
 ae Cais Origen.—Do you mean to affirm, that it 
 believe. is possible for a man to know and believe 
 the truth, and yet not act upon it ? 
 
 Celsus. — If you grant me that a man always acts on 
 his belief,—always does in his conduct just as he believes 
 in his heart,—and that his belief 1s, we know not how 
 frequently, involuntary, I shall construct as nice a sys- 
 tem of Pantheism as any of the most popular projects of 
 the day. 
 
 Theologus.—W hat is sin? my friend. 
 
 Origen.—Sin is any want of conformity unto or trans- 
 gression of the law of God. 
 
 Theologus.—Very well. The transgressor of the law 
 knows and believes what the law is when he transgresses 
 it, or he does not. If he knows the law in transgressing 
 it, he acts contrary to his knowledge or belief. If he 
 does not know the law which he transgresses, he must 
 have been made in that condition, or he must have 
 brought himself into it. He could not have been made 
 in that condition. - Hence we are led to this conclusion, 
 that acting contrary to one’s knowledge or belief is direct 
 guilt, or presumptuous sin, and acting according to 
 almormal knowledge or erroneous belief is indirect guilt, 
 or a sin of ignorance. 
 
 Celsus.—If, then, amid an elaborate description of Infi- 
 delity in all its forms and causes, no express mention be 
 made of man’s acting contrary to his knowledge and 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. lias 
 
 belief, we have a tolerably good scheme of Pantheism 
 under a Christian guise. For if wickedness and irreli- 
 gion be nothing more than erroneous belief, and may 
 | always be resolved into it, and if erroneous belief be, we 
 know not when, involuntary and invincible, then it fol- 
 lows, that error and wickedness are the natural and 
 necessary developments of the Deity. 
 
 Theologus.—We are sorry to observe that this remark 
 applies to a book under the name of “ Infidelity,” to 
 which frequent reference has been made in this discus- 
 sion. Indeed we know of no book in defence of Chris- 
 tianity, in which it is maintained as the foundation of the 
 argument, that men may act contrary to their belief, and 
 in doing so incur guilt, and that all erroneous beliefs are 
 culpable, as the consequents of presumptuous sin. Unless 
 these principles be assumed, tacitly or avowedly, there 
 seems to us to be no escape from pantheism. 
 
 Origen.—But in your zeal to escape pantheism, do not 
 reject Christianity. The Bible teaches us the necessity 
 of the Holy Spirit’s work on the hearts of men, but there 
 can be no necessity for this work, if, as you affirm, the 
 validity of the human understanding be admitted, and the 
 ability of man to escape, or keep away, from all errone- 
 ous sentiments. 
 
 Theologus.—You affirm the culpability of the man 
 who does not believe in Christ, or who believes that Christ 
 is not his Saviour, and you acknowledge that it is through 
 the help of the Divine Spirit alone that any man‘believes 
 in the Saviour. Very well, then, if your assertion re- 
 
 K 
 
154 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 garding one erroneous belief that it is culpable does not, 
 on your own admission, interfere with the Spirit’s 
 agency, how does the assertion that every erroneous 
 belief is culpable, interfere with the necessity of the 
 Spirit’s work to lead us into all truth ? 
 
 Origen.—* It is the doctrine of Holy Scripture, that 
 the deeds of men are acceptable to God, only when their 
 motives originate in a Divine influence” '—* the mind has 
 no power of virtuous action but through Divine influ- 
 ence.”?” 
 
 Theologus.—If by Divine influence you mean, the 
 influence of the Creator on the creature, by which we 
 live and move and have our being, then without this 
 influence men have no power of vicious action even, as 
 well as no power of virtuous action. If by Divine influ- 
 ence you mean that gracious influence which is the pur- 
 chase of Christ’s atonement, then you must mean what 
 have been called, the common, or the saving, influences 
 of the Spirit. If you mean the Spirit’s common opera- 
 tions, your statement is not true. If you mean the 
 saving operations of the Holy Spirit, your mode of ex- 
 pression is not very precise. Taken in any way, your 
 assertion is certainly not available in the present argu- 
 ment, unless you mean to state, that the grace of the 
 Spirit is always irresistible, that there is no such sin as 
 grieving and quenching the Divine Spirit, and that those 
 who are destitute of this influence are irresponsible and 
 guiltless. 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. i. p. 198 2 Tb.p.263. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 155 
 
 Celsus. —It seems to me a self-evident truth, that 
 where there is no power of virtuous action, there can be 
 no power of vicious action. I am at a loss to perceive 
 the consistency of the author just quoted, when I com- 
 pare the sentiments of his already given with such as 
 those that follow: ‘“‘ What can be expected when moral 
 training is withheld, and moral power denied, under the 
 pernicious notion, that they can be of no use, till God’s 
 time shall come; to shed some extraordinary effusion of 
 Divine light within the heart, which shall overpower the 
 vicious affections, and constrain the finite will by Sove- 
 reign Grace?”?!_ How can “moral power ” be more ex- 
 pressly “denied,” than by the assertion that there is 
 “no power of virtuous action but through Divine influ- 
 ence! ” 
 
 Theologus.—The only way to steer clear of such con- 
 tradictions is to carry along with us the very important 
 principle, that the mode of the Divine agency in conver- 
 sion (and also in miracles, prophecy, and inspiration) 
 is altogether unknown to us, and consequently always in- 
 volves a mystery ; but that this agency leaves the mind 
 of man to act according to its own laws without interfer- 
 ence or disturbance, being simply something added or 
 given to the individual which he immediately assimilates. 
 “The supernatural ever bases itself on the natural.” 
 
 Celsus.—Christians in attempting to refute the various 
 forms of infidelity, as they say, tell us, “that responsi- 
 bility remains indestructible amid all objections from 
 
 1 Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 394. 
 
156 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 original temperament and external influences.” Now 
 they so represent the doctrine of original sin by making 
 it subversive of the veracity of reason, and the doctrine 
 of grace as it is called, by making it subversive of our 
 moral power, as to cause both of these, the one an origi- 
 nal temperament and the other an external influence, to 
 destroy our responsibility. 
 
 Theologus.—We saw that the doctrine of original sin 
 has no meaning, unless we receive both the validity of the 
 understanding and the culpability of every erroneous 
 belief. It may now be remarked, that if there be some 
 shew of reason in denying both of these positions in 
 regard to heathens and men destitute of the promise and 
 presence of the Holy Spirit, it appears to be utterly un- 
 tenable to deny them in regard to Christians. If it be 
 inadmissible to suppose an idolater so utterly degraded 
 and lost, that in an honest effort to distinguish between 
 truth and error, he cannot be sure but that he may be 
 wrong, how much less can this be supposed to be the 
 state of a man who is “ regenerated,” “created anew,” 
 “enlightened,” and “led” by the Spirit of God, the 
 Spirit of truth? If the erroneous beliefs entertained by 
 the savage and the cannibal must be considered culpable 
 and blameworthy, especially if we adhere to the tenet of 
 hereditary corruption and guilt, how can we hesitate about 
 the guilt of the erroneous beliefs held by Christians, 
 whose boast and privilege it is to possess the word of 
 God, which “is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for 
 
 ‘Infidelity, p. 278. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 157 
 
 correction, for instruction in righteousness ; that the man 
 of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all 
 good works?” The Spirit is given to help our infirmi- 
 ties, to rectify and restore our nature to its primitive in- 
 tegrity and beauty ; surely, then, even although the case 
 of the pagan were given up, the case of the Christian 
 might be different. If we do not know assuredly right 
 from wrong, can it be said that sanctification has begun ? 
 If our erroneous beliefs, all of them, are not to be 
 purged away, what does the sanctifying process consist 
 of? Is it a mere physical cleansing, or is it partial and 
 incomplete ? 
 
 Origen.—Do you then deny the sincerity 
 of the infidel? for we never thought of 
 going so far as this. 
 
 Sincerity. 
 
 Celsus.—When you admit our sincerity, it is done in 
 such a way as to be a very equivocal compliment. 
 
 Origen.—How so? 
 
 Celsus.—Because you admit it in form, and virtually 
 deny it. 
 
 Origen.—Can anything be more explicit than such a 
 statement as this: ‘As to what is written or spoken 
 ingenuously and sincerely, or as we say ‘ in good faith,’ 
 with the avowed intention to loosen or subvert Religious 
 Belief, I will never call the author of such utterances my 
 enemy.” ! Hear the same author’s meaning which he 
 attaches to sincerity, when he speaks of “ our modern 
 sense of the stern obligation of religious sincerity ;” ? or, 
 
 1 Restoration of Belief, p. 9. 2 1b: pase 
 
158 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 again, when he speaks of the “ marked simplicity, grave 
 sincerity, and quietness of tone,” in which “ the early 
 Christian writers” speak of Christ, their Lord. Else- 
 where the same writer says: “I shall impute no bad 
 motives to you as a cover to my chagrin in finding that 
 I do not bring you over to my side: I shall not tell you 
 that your resistance to my reasoning is nothing but an 
 immoral obduracy, springing from the corrupt wishes of 
 an unregenerate heart.” 
 
 Celsus.—But what value is to be placed on the import 
 of the word sincerity, when in the same volume we read 
 of “the sincere idealist,” 2 who is not unlikely to slide 
 off from the path of morality, of “ sincere gainsayers,” * 
 and of ‘sincere but unstable souls, wont to beguile them- 
 selves.” > In one place, indeed, he supposes himself to 
 be addressing “a reasonable and ingenuous opponent ;” ° 
 and in another place, remarks: that ‘“ candour is sorely 
 tried in supposing that educated men are honest when 
 they put forth what is so frivolous, 50 captious, and so 
 nugatory, as that which they advance in behalf of their 
 disbelief. I converse with those who profess this disbe- 
 lief, and instead of rigid argumentation—serious in its 
 tone, and ingenuous—I am met by a style of reasoning 
 which is unanswerable, only because it is vague, misty, 
 evasive, and sentimental.” 7 
 
 Theologus.—It is obvious that the meaning of the 
 words sincere, ingenuous, and so forth, is by no means 
 
 ‘ Restoration of Belief, p. 107. 7 Tb. p. 114. 5 Ib. p. 148. 
 1b. pias Abe psL63; ° Ib. p. 239. 7 Th. p. 340. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 159 
 
 fixed. To say the least, it is perplexing to find great 
 weight placed in the Christian argument upon the 
 sincerity of the martyrs, and to find the same qua- 
 lity of mind freely granted to the rejecters of Chris- 
 tianity. 
 
 Celsus.—When we are told that “no one who, in a 
 spirit of industry and honesty, would inform himself con- 
 cerning the ‘ Evidences of Christianity,’ the ‘ authenticity 
 and genuineness of the Gospels and Epistles,’ or any 
 kindred subjects, need be at a loss in finding books, 
 learnedly and conclusively written, where he may meet 
 with more than enough of proof and argument to satisfy 
 every seriously-minded and educated reader,” \—when 
 we are spoken of in this strain in one place, to suppose 
 in another place the case of an ingenuous opponent, or a 
 sincere unbeliever, seems to justify the charge of fanati- 
 cism and hypocrisy which has sometimes been brought 
 against Christians. 
 
 Theologqus.—Had we not better endeavour to settle 
 the meaning of sincerity ? | 
 
 Celsus.—A. writer of some eminence has said, that it 
 means one of two things. It may mean honesty and con- 
 sistency in expressing and maintaining our opinion; or 
 again, it may mean diligence and candour in forming our 
 opinion. To allow that we are sincere in the first sense 
 is a poor compliment; to allow that we are sincere in the 
 second sense is fatal to the exclusive claims of Chris- 
 tianity. We could multiply proofs to shew how we are 
 
 1 Restoration of Belief, p. 23; also 219, 257. 
 
160 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 in name allowed to be sincere, while the reality is denied 
 to us. 
 
 Theologus.— The distinction which you have men- 
 tioned in the two meanings of the word sincere, and such 
 like words, is very clear and very important. The first 
 meaning, or guilelessness and simplicity in expressing 
 our views, can have little to do with the present discus- 
 sion. But it is a most vital question, can a man be sin- 
 cere, that is, thoroughly honest and laborious, (not in 
 holding, but) in adopting and forming an erroneous judg- 
 ment ? 
 
 Celsus.—Many of our friends, holding that Chris- 
 tianity is not true, cannot regard Christians as sincere in 
 embracing it. And many more of them, beholding so 
 many Christians not only insincere, as they think, in 
 embracing it, but also inconsistent in holding it, are 
 tempted to regard the whole as a delusion and a cheat. 
 
 Origen.—But you would never “ make sincerity or 
 earnestness the test of truth and moral greatness.” } 
 
 Sincerity the test  Ce/sus.—In making this assertion, you 
 euth. virtually give up the position that he who 
 honestly and diligently seeks to know the truth respect- 
 ing Christianity will find it to be true, and you con- 
 tradict yourself when you trace infidelity, both specu- 
 lative and practical, in all its forms, and in each case “to 
 the same moral cause—the repugnance in human nature 
 to what 1s purely spiritual and divinely authoritative.” * 
 We lay no claim to the sincerity and earnestness, which 
 
 ' Infidelity, p. 67. 2 Ib. p. 333. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 161 
 
 do not exclude a repugnance to what is spiritual and 
 divine. If that is the sincerity which you allow to us, 
 we do not regard it as a compliment, but as an insult. 
 And if others attribute that sincerity to Christians, what 
 right have you to complain? 
 
 Origen.—When we appeal to the since- 
 rity of the primitive Christians and mar- 
 tyrs, in proof of the truth of their testimony, it is to be 
 remembered, that “ the matter in relation to which their 
 evidence is adduced was one to be resolved, not by the 
 understanding, but by the senses.” 
 
 Martyrs. 
 
 Celsus.—In the first place, we observe in reply to this 
 statement, the senses without the aid of the understand- 
 ing can resolve no question; in the second place, it 
 implies that the senses do not deceive us, but that our 
 understanding may deceive us; and in the third place, it 
 implies that there can be no true martyrdom, unless in 
 relation to a matter which can be resolved solely by the 
 senses. 
 
 Origen.—Our position may be stated in another form. 
 We believe the facts recorded by the writers of the New 
 Testament, on account of the undoubted sincerity of 
 these writers, that is, *‘ because hostile criticism hath 
 hitherto failed in shaking their character, either in 
 respect of their conscientiousness—of their meaning to 
 tell the truth—or in respect of their competency—of 
 their having within reach the materials of truth, and 
 being qualified to form a correct judgment of it.” 
 
 Celsus.—It seems to me that if you controvert a man’s 
 
162 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 opinion, or judgment, on any question whatever,—if you 
 affirm to be true, what he affirms to be false, or vice 
 ‘ versa, it is sheer absurdity to suppose that both of you 
 are equally competent and conscientious, in so far, at 
 least, as that particular question is concerned. Do you 
 admit the conscientiousness and competency of the pan- 
 theist, so far as he is a pantheist? 
 
 Origen.—Why, no. For “ pantheism expresses the 
 astonishment of reason to see nature separate from God. 
 It is the speculation of the soul which ought to be one 
 with the Eternal, but is robbed of the Divine Treasure, 
 and cannot realise her loss,”’ ' 
 
 Celsus.—But you are yourself a pantheist; unless you 
 mean what you have not very precisely expressed, 
 namely, that the soul is not robbed by another, but robs 
 herself of the Divine treasure, and will not, rather than 
 cannot, realise her loss. What, then, can you mean by 
 saying, that the author of ‘“ The vestiges of the Natural 
 History of Creation,” is “sincere” in “making a con- 
 stant and reverent profession of theism;”? or how can 
 you maintain, that Blanco White treated the question 
 between supernaturalism and rationalism with much 
 closeness of reasoning, and “ with perfect sincerity,” 
 while yet there is “a great mistake at the foundation of 
 his arguments.” 3 
 
 Lheologus.—It is plain that a man’s error on any point 
 must be traced directly to his want of competency or of 
 
 1 Christian Theism, vol. i. p. 204. TD. pe Fiz, 
 * Ib. vol. ii. p. 204; compare pp. 376, 378, 396, 414. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 163 
 
 conscientiousness in respect to that point. He who is in 
 error must be so, because he cannot, or because he will 
 not see it. To talk then of a “sincere mistake” is non- 
 sense. 
 
 Origen.—But do you deny that there are sincere 
 Roman Catholics, who may be saved, in spite of the 
 errors of their pernicious system ? 
 
 Theologus.—God forbid, that I should doom any man 
 to wrath, or affirm that no adherent of an apostate church 
 can be saved. I do not believe that there is such a thing 
 as “a sincere papist,” or a sincere errorist of any kind. 
 To examine a question with competency and conscientious- 
 ness, and yet call light darkness—it is impossible. But 
 a man may be sincere on one point, and be destitute of 
 that sincerity on another point. Anda sincere Christian, 
 though entangled among many of the errors of popery, 
 will be saved. 
 
 Origen.—But may we not speak of the grievous errors 
 held by an individual, and “ decline to speculate” “ from 
 what cause proceeding ” in his case? “I am no judge of 
 
 the heart, and do not wish to judge it.”' 
 ~ Celsus.—But your friends often speculate about the 
 cause of infidelity, and proceed, I presume, upon the 
 principle, that when the cause is found it applies to indi- 
 vidual cases. Those again who in words decline the 
 speculation, carry it out in reality. The very author 
 you refer to, says, on the next page but one, “I knew, 
 indeed, that it was possible for a man hastily to adept and 
 1A Defence of the Eclipse of Faith, p. 7. 
 
164 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 abandon any opinions, if he took but half of a seventh 
 of a tenth of a thirteenth of a survey of the evidence ; but 
 here I could not find that there was any survey of evi- 
 dence at all.” And yet weare to believe that he declines 
 to speculate as to the cause of a grievous error in any 
 individual case !- 
 
 Origen.—Well, well; I act on the principle of imputing 
 no ill motives,’ and even in the use of ridicule of leaving 
 motives untouched. 2 
 
 Celsus.—Of course, to complain of our “ acrimony and 
 petulance,” ? and “ presumptuous jargon”’* and so forth, 
 is not imputing ill motives! 
 
 Origen.—All this is carping at incidental expressions. 
 
 Celsus.—W ell, then, taking up the matter in its broad 
 outlines, how can any man who opposes the true religion 
 be sincere, if “ the evidence which substantiates any true 
 theory of religion must be, at least, tolerably appreciable 
 by every man who sincerely examines it.’””® 
 
 Origen.—But, then, everybody believes that “ the 
 genuine sceptic” is distinguished by “a love of doubt 
 itself,—a prejudice in favour of the ‘nothing true;’” & 
 and that “if there be such a thing as a bona fide atheist 
 —who is not also mad, argument with him, in any shape, 
 is a very hopeless sort of an affair.” 7 
 
 * A Defence of the Eclipse of Faith, p. 16. 4Th2 pe2%e 
 
 AUS PAE * Ib. p. 43; see also pp. 61, 62, 120, 133, 139. 
 
 5 Tb. p. 149, et alibi, 188, 228. 
 
 ° Edinburgh Review, No. 193. Genius and Writings of Des- 
 cartes, p. 9. 7 Tb. p. 40. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 165 
 
 Celsus.—It is obvious, then, that if, as you say, the 
 true Christian is distinguished from the formalist by his 
 sincere love of truth, and the genuine sceptic by his sincere 
 love of doubt, and the bona fide atheist by his sincere 
 madness, the ordinary unbeliever cannot be sincere in 
 any sense. 
 
 Theologus.—But has no case been alleged, in which 
 an individual is in error, neither through incompetency 
 nor unconscientiousness ? 
 
 Origen.—I have just laid my hands on one. ‘“ The 
 predisposition to find everywhere the germs of the yet 
 future sensational schools in Locke as their fountain head, 
 often leads M. Cousin, as we cannot but think, into ex- 
 treme injustice to our great countryman. This we are 
 far from attributing to any unworthy spirit of deprecia- 
 tion, for M. Cousin often gives frank expression to his 
 admiration of Locke’s sagacity and genuis. As little can 
 we impute it to ignorance, for he has evidently studied 
 the great work of Locke diligently, and cites him pro- 
 fusely.”’ ! 
 
 Oelsus.—Ah, well; how is this extreme injustice to be 
 accounted for, if it can be traced neither to ignorance nor 
 to an unworthy spirit? Does not such an opinion savour 
 of Pantheism ? 
 
 Origen.—This is the way in which it is accounted for : 
 
 1 Edinburgh Review, No. 202. Locke’s Character and Philo- 
 sophy, p. 411. See A Defence, &c., pp. 233, 234, where the 
 author approves of the two articles in the Edinburgh Review from 
 which we quote. 
 
166 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 “ we can attribute it only to what is but too apt to adhere 
 to the critic and historian of philosophy—the spirit of 
 system. Having laid it down that the roots of the sensa- 
 tional schools were to be found in Locke’s writings, he 
 unconsciously perverts or exaggerates whatsoever seems 
 to favour that hypothesis.” ' 
 
 Celsus.— What a poor innocent a critic and historian 
 of philosophy is, according to this statement. The fact 
 that he is too apt to adhere to a spirit of system leads 
 him to commit extreme injustice, while all the time there 
 is no ignorance (not to say, no error), in his mind on the 
 matter in hand, and no improper desire in his heart. We 
 are told that he perverts and exaggerates unconsciously. 
 The defence can only be complete by asserting, that in 
 “laying it down that the roots of the sensational schools 
 were to be found in Locke’s writings,” he did so uncon- 
 sciously, and that he was sincerely unconscious. Here, 
 then, we have a case of extreme injustice, of which no 
 one is guilty. If Pantheism consist in the destruction or 
 relaxation of responsibility, as you affirm, what is this? 
 
 Theologus.—If there be a great deal of infidelity, in “a 
 want of stern fidelity to doctrines” which are “ theoreti- 
 cally admitted,”* there is plainly some need to recast 
 certain portions of the Christian argument, as well as to 
 reform certain parties in the Christian church. 
 
 Origen.—If men be, indeed, responsible for all their 
 beliefs, it will scarcely be true, that the great problem 
 
 1 Edinburgh Review, No. 202. Locke’s Character and Philo- 
 sophy, p. 411. * Infidelity, p. 251. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 167 
 
 of the Religious Obligation of Belief was solved for us by 
 the martyrs of the primitive church. 
 
 Theologus.—We cannot estimate too highly the advan- 
 tages that have flowed from their practical and powerful 
 exemplification of the principle; but it is a very different 
 thing to suppose that, till then, it was unknown, or that 
 now it is fully understood. 
 
 Origen. —You do not allow, therefore, 
 that the “great Law of Conscience” has 
 
 been “ defined,” and that it is it “ which places the modern 
 29] 
 
 Law of conscience. 
 
 mind in so great an advance beyond the ancient mind. 
 
 Theologus—To suppose that the Law of Conscience 
 was both originated and perfected by the early martyr 
 church, is to degrade the ancient world beneath the level 
 of responsibility, and to elevate modern and medieval 
 Christians higher than they deserve. 
 
 Celsus.—I have not been able, even yet, to find any 
 where a definition of the Law of Conscience. 
 
 Origen. —So you never heard the text of Scripture: 
 “ We ought to obey God rather than men.” 
 
 Oeclsus.—Have you never heard of its contradictory 
 interpretations or applications ¢ 
 
 Origen.—It is plain beyond dispute, that no one ought 
 to be punished by the civil magistrate for his conscien- 
 tious opinions. 
 
 Celsus.—If it be the conscientious opinion of the civil 
 magistrate that he should punish some of his subjects 
 for holding an opinion which they regard as conscientious, 
 
 1 Restoration, p. 79. 
 
168 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 what is to be done? Is the conscience of the magistrate 
 to overbear the conscience of his subject? Or is the con- 
 science of the subject to overmaster that of the throne ? 
 Or are the two consciences to be in everlasting conflict, or in 
 a state of equilibrium, the one exactly balancing the other ? 
 
 Origen.—Nothing can sustain uninjured such meta- 
 physical manipulation. 
 
 Theologus.—The questions are most relevant and fair. 
 They bring us to the same conclusion to which the other 
 parts of the discussion lead, namely, that a really con- 
 scientious Judgment will be a true one. If men plead 
 conscience, when conscience has not been consulted, they 
 act with insincerity and disingenuousness. If conscience 
 be really consulted, if men seek the truth sincerely, that 
 is, with honesty and diligence, they will not err. Two 
 honest consciences, therefore, cannot come into collision. 
 And the Law of Conscience is not liberty to think as we 
 choose, or to suspend the arm of the magistrate by the 
 plea of conscience, but liberty to think truly, to form our 
 judgments in accordance with truth. No conscience is 
 at liberty to believe error. No man can deliberately 
 adopt error without deceiving himself. 
 
 Origen.—lIs sincerity, then, a test of truth ? 
 
 Theologus.— Unquestionably. 
 
 Origen. — Is a man’s dying in attestation of his sin- 
 cerity in holding a certain opinion, sufficient evidence of 
 his sincerity ¢ 
 
 Theologus.—Generally it will be so; but it cannot be 
 affirmed universally. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 169 
 
 Origen. — There may have been martyrs for a false 
 religion on that supposition. 
 
 Theologus. — The principles stated allow, we think, 
 the possibility of such an event. But when the cha- 
 racter of the martyr is properly defined, nothing can be 
 more erroneous or deleterious than the loose way of 
 speaking in which many indulge, allowing every reli- 
 gious system to have its martyrs. A martyr accurately 
 conceived of, is one who lays down his life rather than 
 renounce his belief, even while the option is before him 
 to renounce it and live. We are not aware of any well 
 authenticated case of such a sort of martyrdom, except 
 in connection with Christianity. 
 
 Origen. — Is such a martyrdom proof positive of the 
 truth of the martyr’s belief ? 
 
 Theologus. — It is a strong presumption. It is not 
 absolute proof, not because sincerity is not a test of 
 truth, but because even a voluntary submission to death 
 may occur through opinionativeness or pride. 
 
 é Origen. — What room can there be for 
 Charity. Cah 
 the exercise of charity, if we assume that 
 every man that is in error is insincere ? 
 
 Celsus. — What room is there for the exercise of 
 charity between your party and ours, if the following 
 statement, or such as it, be admitted. “In a manner 
 which is perfectly conspicuous, and which no man of 
 clear intellect can misunderstand, the religious contro- 
 versy of this passing time is bearing us forward toward 
 a single issue. The alternative, the only alternative now 
 
 L 
 
170 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 in front of the cultured branches of the human family, is 
 this—Christianity or Atheism. One feels that this alter- 
 native, and nothing short of it, is near in front of us, 
 because, on the one side, those many ill-judged and crazy 
 schemes for effecting a compromise with infidelity, which 
 of late have been propounded by intelligent Christian 
 men, all carry upon them the indications of their origin 
 in faltering belief, in mistaken discretion, and in con- 
 fusedness of brain. We may be sure that no such slender 
 devices as these can have power to check that mighty 
 movement to which we are all of us committed, or can 
 save us from its issue. On the other side —the side of 
 Disbelief—the endeayours that are making by Theists to 
 pack and float a raft a-head of Niagara would be purely 
 matter of ridicule, if the consequences to these schemes 
 were not what they are.’’! 
 
 Theologus.—It seems to us that there is just as much 
 room for the exercise of charity between Christians, on 
 the supposition that we are responsible for each one of 
 our beliefs, as on the admission of such views as the fol- 
 lowing. “ This is that sifting of spirits—this is that fiery 
 trial which, with a peculiar intensity, is going on at this 
 time, and is putting to the severest proof the loyalty — 
 the religious allegiance, of many minds born and trained 
 within the pale of Christian influence. To each of us, in 
 a more or less pointed manner, the critical question 
 is now put, whether we will stand by Heaven — by 
 Truth —by Goodness; or will range ourselves with 
 
 * Restoration, pp. 248, 249. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. Tid 
 
 primeval rebellion, and be compromised with those 
 whose quarrel with God may be older than the moun- 
 tains?” ! 
 
 Religious intoler- | Origen. — It is perfectly true that we 
 os must “earnestly contend for the faith 
 which was once delivered unto the saints,” but this opi- 
 nion that every error implies guilt and insincerity will 
 open the floodgates of “religious intolerance,” which “is 
 the most odious and insufferable of all.” 
 
 Theologus.—When two parties contradict each other, 
 if each of them immediately concludes that his neighbour 
 is wrong, and insincere and guilty, and acts on this con- 
 clusion, charity would be seriously outraged. But if 
 each of them will suspect himself of error and insincerity, 
 and re-examine the point in dispute with greater care, 
 both truth and charity would be gainers. 
 
 Celsus. — What is religious intolerance but one man 
 telling another man, that he is wrong and insincere, and 
 that on the most vital question of all ? 
 
 Origen. —No, my friend; you are now confounding 
 religious intolerance with “an enlightened attachment to 
 the truth itself.” 
 
 Theologus.—W ell, do you not see, that attachment to 
 the truth itself, cannot be enlightened, unless it be an 
 attachment to the truth, as truth, the whole truth, and 
 nothing but the truth? If it be possible in one question 
 to discriminate between intolerance and zeal for truth, 
 why not in every question ? 
 
 1 Restoration, p. 370. 
 
Le DIALOGUE III. 
 
 Origen. — Yes, but when every man begins to call 
 his crotchet true, and to treat as insincere all who 
 smile at him and it, we shall have old scenes renewed 
 in tenfold extravagance, and Christianity itself will be- 
 come “an inconceivably paltry, troublesome, intolerant 
 thing.” 
 
 Theologus.—Our principle sanctions no man in calling 
 his crotchet true. It is our principle alone that makes a 
 man guilty for elevating a whim into a doctrine or truth 
 to be defended even unto blood. Admitting the usual 
 maxim about involuntary error, there is no reasonable 
 means of guarding against the absurdity of men’s mag- 
 nifying mole-hills into mountains, and turning traditions 
 and fancies into commands of God. Truth being thus 
 sacrificed, charity is falsely inflated to conceal the wrong. 
 When once you look upon your neighbour as the hapless 
 victim of involuntary error, there is no room in your 
 bosom for that charity towards him which “ rejoiceth not 
 in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth ;? you must regard 
 him either with that bigotry which denies him, in one 
 form or another, the privileges of manhood, or with that 
 latitudinarianism which immolates truth at the shrine of 
 a pseudo-benevolence. 
 
 Celsus. — “I will be tolerant of everything else, but 
 every other man’s intolerance.” 
 
 Origen.—* The worst of it is, that this latitudinarian 
 charity is apt to degenerate into a curious sort of bigotry. 
 It is always vehement enough against any opinions that 
 imply that opinions are of any importance, or indeed 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. ITS 
 
 against any opinion eawcept the opinion that no opinions 
 are of any.” 
 
 Theologus.—All that I contend for is, that this senti- 
 ment be applied to every case to which it is fairly appli- 
 cable. Every truth is vastly important; wherever, 
 then, truth is involved and a conflict arises as to where 
 the truth is to be found, forbearance and kindness to each 
 other need not compromise ardour for the truth. Since 
 zeal for truth is only legitimate and consistent when 
 based upon the utmost diligence and candour in seeking 
 truth, the duty of charity itself will not be correctly 
 appreciated apart from this zeal. No one will profess to 
 care for a base counterfeit charity ; what we all want is 
 the true genuine charity. There is no such charity. 
 apart from truth. Without the love of truth, no one 
 can understand the true charity. Hence when any one 
 by a hasty and inconsiderate decision on any question 
 whatever, injures or opposes truth, he is the very person 
 who is likely to wound charity also in one of two ways, 
 according to his temper and his circumstances, — either 
 by intolerance and bigotry, or by pusillanimity and soft- 
 ness, in one or other of their thousand shapes. The 
 charity of truth and of the Bible breathes nothing but 
 tenderness and love to the person of every man, while 
 opposing with stern inflexibility every vice and every 
 error without respect of persons. 
 
 Celsus.—Though you thus refuse to acknowledge that 
 there is a sincere denier of the truth of Christianity, you 
 
 1 A Defence, pp. 28, 29—Note. 
 
174 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 are prepared to allow that a man may sincerely doubt its 
 claims. For unless you concede this, how can there be 
 a patient and honest investigation ? 
 
 Theologus.— Unquestionably. We would much rather 
 see a sincere doubter on any question, than a hurried 
 profession of the truth itself, without due examination. 
 At the same time, the sincere doubter and inquirer will 
 soon find more or less of the rock of truth beneath his 
 feet. There is far too little of this ingenuous hesitation 
 and childlike investigation on both sides of the contend- 
 ing hosts. There would be far less infidelity without the 
 Christian church, if there were less dogmatism within it. 
 
 Origen.—It is easy to bring a sweeping charge; it is 
 
 ‘more difficult to substantiate it. 
 
 Celsus.—Do you dispute what one of your own friends 
 has advanced, when he says, “ Do you imagine that I 
 can so think of the good Christian folks of this present 
 time, as to their judgment, as to their intelligence, or as 
 to their conscientious diligence, as that I could be willing 
 to leave Christianity in their hands, undisturbed and 
 irresponsible ? far from it.”? It is some consolation to us 
 to find, that even on the shewing of your advocates, we 
 are, on the whole, ethically and spiritually, not much 
 worse than the mass of professing Christians. 
 
 Theologus. — Has it never struck you as a singular 
 fact, that our denominational differences are almost as 
 hereditary as an entailed estate, or as Mohammedanism 
 and Hinduism? The young people born and educated in 
 
 * Restoration, p. 246. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. ss 
 
 one denomination are sure, almost universally, to adopt 
 the peculiarities of that denomination. Thus sectarian 
 controversies are perpetuated, which would die a natu- 
 ral death, if the rising generation, and especially students 
 for the ministry, would “ prove all things, and hold fast 
 that which is good.” The Christian church will never 
 preach this text with effect to the world, till they prac- 
 tise it more themselves. 
 
 Origen.—Might I now ask you to explain a little more 
 fully what you mean by admitting “sincerity to be the 
 test of truth?” 
 
 Theologus.—Taking sincerity as already 
 
 Sincerity shewn rs 5 
 to be the test of explained to signify, not consistency or 
 
 es firmness in adhering to our view, but care 
 and conscientiousness in adopting it, the position seems to 
 be free from difficulty. Light is the test of the eye, and 
 the eye is the test of light. That is dark, which to a 
 sound eye is dark; and that is light which to a sound 
 eye is light. The eye to which darkness is not darkness, 
 or light not light, is not healthy. So also, that is true 
 which to a sincere mind is true, and that ts error which 
 to a sincere mind is error. The mind to which truth is 
 not truth, or error not error, is not sincere,—not honest 
 with itself, if it have the power of intelligence. If by a 
 sincere mind be meant a mind which honestly desires to 
 know the truth on a given point, and which will not say 
 or think that a proposition respecting that point is either 
 true or false without due attention and sufficient evidence, 
 it seems impossible to avoid the inference, that sincere 
 
176 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 belief is belief of the truth, and belief of the truth is sin- 
 cere belief. It is well to notice, that there may be a 
 mere professed belief of the truth, which being without 
 sincerity is no real belief of the truth at all. So also 
 there may be an empty profession of sincerity, which 
 shall prove itself to be empty by denying truth or affirm- 
 ing error. 
 
 To maintain that an individual is responsible for some 
 of his beliefs, while at the same time it ig admitted, that 
 he may sincerely and unblameably believe error to be 
 truth on any subject, is a clear contradiction. For if a 
 man be lable in any instance to affirm as true an erro- 
 neous proposition,—that is, to mistake intellectual dark- 
 ness for intellectual light, it must be, either because he 
 is not able, or because he is not willing, to perceive the 
 distinction between truth and error in that particular 
 case. If he be unable to perceive the distinction, then 
 in that matter being destitute of the privilege of intelli- 
 gence, he is exempt from the obligation of responsibility. 
 But if while a man is able in anything to distinguish 
 between truth and error, he will not, then he is at once 
 intelligent, responsible, and culpable. 
 
 If it be no matter what a man believes, as is broadly 
 stated, and loosely assumed, and craftily insinuated, 
 times without number, then truth is an empty name. But 
 this opinion is a hackneyed phase of scepticism; for the 
 proposition that would make all other propositions worth- 
 less, makes itself worthless too, If, then, there be value 
 in truth, in all truth, and in some truth value incal- 
 
 ye ee ee 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. Vaz 
 
 culable, to suppose that mankind should be so consti- 
 tuted, that while they feel an obligation to eschew error 
 and embrace the truth, and while their welfare actually 
 depends upon their doing so, both in thought and in 
 action, they should yet without any fault on their part 
 mistake the one for the other, is surely to impeach the 
 character of their Creator. He who would attempt to 
 screen himself from the guilt of insincerity behind a 
 mere verbal orthodox creed, and he who would palliate 
 his erroneous belief by the plea of sincerity, are equally 
 endeavouring to vindicate themselves by criminating the 
 Most High. 
 
 It is a matter of profound regret, that in the contro- 
 versies regarding the Divine existence and character, the 
 contending parties should so frequently have taken hold, 
 the one of the one side of this truth, and the other of the 
 other side. It has been a main position of one party, 
 that his sincerity will acquit a man, whatever he may 
 believe. Their opponents, after granting that a man 
 may sincerely believe in error, have vainly bent their 
 efforts to the establishment of objective truth. For what 
 use can there be in displaying the truth objectively, if 
 the sincere and upright mind may contemplate without 
 recognising her? The plea of inward sincerity being 
 equally valid with the plea of outward truth, the warfare 
 between the occupants of these two impregnable citadels 
 must be endless. Let the defenders of the existence of 
 God and a divine revelation once refuse to grant that 
 sincerity is a test of truth, and start their apology with 
 
178 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 the affirmation or concession that a man may be consci- 
 entious in a bad cause as well as in a good one, and they 
 not only give their opponents an argument which, as we 
 have just seen, nothing can refute, but they also thereby 
 unwarrantably resign one of the most powerful weapons 
 of assault, and at the same time introduce into the very 
 camp of truth itself confusion and anarchy. 
 
 By this concession the only effective weapon of assault 
 falls from the Christian’s grasp. Let the position that 
 error regarding the Divine character, and the rejection 
 of Christianity, involve a want of sincerity and candour, 
 and consequent criminality—have once its integrity im- 
 paired, or its firmness shaken, or its prominence veiled, 
 and wherewithal can the theist, but especially the Chris- 
 tian, make an aggressive movement upon the unbelieving 
 world’ He may talk of miracles, and manuscripts, and 
 morals, of the glories of creation, and the wonders of 
 redemption, and the terrors of judgment—these are only 
 so many levers, which without some such point as that 
 now indicated to form a fulcrum on which to work, are 
 utterly powerless in hig hand. 
 
 Celsus.—* When you begin by assuming broad dis- 
 sent to be manifest guilt, it can matter little what you 
 say to such a man, or how you treat him.” 
 
 Lheologus.—Far from it; a very great deal depends 
 upon the manner in which a statement is made, and upon 
 the different modes in which even the manifestly guilty 
 may be treated. 
 
 Celsus.—< It becomes mere hypocrisy or complicity to 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 179 
 
 reciprocate courtesies with one whom you believe to be a 
 wilful criminal.” 
 
 Theologus.—Assuredly, and for the best of all rea- 
 sons; that if we do not protest against and resist rebel- 
 lion, when it is avowed and acted in our presence, we are 
 ourselves, by our very silence and inactivity, constituted 
 rebels. But there may, and there ought to be, a vast 
 difference between our deportment to a rebel whose trial 
 is passed, and sentence pronounced, and doom decided, 
 and our deportment to another whose timely submission 
 may yet restore his tarnished honour, and retrieve his 
 forfeited inheritance; the more especially when we are 
 free to confess, that we ourselves have but very recently 
 escaped from that condition, by availing ourselves of 
 what is as open to him as to us, heaven’s amnesty. 
 
 Origen.—You said, that to deny sincerity to be the 
 test of truth, is to throw discord into the camp of truth. 
 How is that? 
 
 Theologus.—In this way : when it is formally admitted 
 that a man may be sincere in error, sanction is virtually 
 though secretly given to the wide spread and calamitous de- 
 lusion, that belief in the truth, apart from sincerity, is the 
 way of acceptancewith God. Ifthere be such a thing as sin- 
 cerity in error, it is of course worthless, or next to worth- 
 less. How, then, can it be shewn that sincerity in the truth 
 isin any degree better? Mental honesty and candour thus 
 become degraded and ruined. The way is prepared for 
 professing the truth, without possessing it. The very 
 utterance of truth is turned into a lie; for the words of 
 
180 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 verity are frequently found upon the lips, while the reali- 
 ties of verity are far from the heart. The profession 
 even of religious truth may thus, alas! become, what we 
 fear it often is, nothing but a subtle superstition. This 
 hypocritical conduct finds its sanction or excuse in the 
 insult offered to sincerity. If my neighbour may be 
 conscientiously wrong, why should I toil at the hopeless 
 task of being conscientiously right? If all diligence and 
 candour will not preserve me from error, I must find a 
 short cut to the truth, or be content with what comes 
 first to hand. By such retorts as these, the injury done 
 to sincerity is avenged. And we thus perceive, that 
 when Christians attempt to exalt objective truth at the 
 expense of subjective uprightness, the consequences are 
 most disastrous; the outworks of infidelity are buttressed, 
 and genuine religion is virtually betrayed. 
 
 Might we be allowed to speak of the union between 
 the mind and the truth, as having all the security and 
 sacredness of the marriage relation? By unfaithfulness 
 on either side the bond is broken. There are truths 
 which will enter that mind only which proves itself 
 worthy of their reception. The mind that deliberately 
 embraces error prostitutes itself. The latitudinarian 
 charity of the day is based upon the assumption that 
 this prostitution is lawful. To deny, therefore, that sin- 
 cerity is the test of truth, and truth the test of sincerity, 
 is to leave no vestige of dignity, or purity, or strength, 
 either to eternal truth or to the human mind. 
 
 Origen.—The dignity, purity, and strength of the 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 181 
 
 human mind!! What, then, do you make of the doctrine 
 of human depravity ? 
 
 Theologus.—lIf you assert that there is “ no vestige of 
 dignity, or purity, or strength, in the human mind,” 
 inasmuch as it is depraved, in asserting its corruption, 
 you deny its intelligence and responsibility. 
 
 Origen.—In what, then, does the depravity of man 
 consist ? 
 
 Theologus.—In such circumstances as these, the de- 
 rangement and corruption of our desires and affections ; 
 the erroneous beliefs in which every man is involved 
 through the sins of his progenitors; the weakened tone 
 of the ethical sentiment or conscience; and the dimi- 
 nished power of the will, as compared especially with 
 the temptations to which we are exposed. 
 
 As to the indissoluble union between outward truth and 
 inward sincerity, it seems to be the very turning point 
 of every controversy, especially of the one that is now 
 agitated. On one hand, men may be observed extenuat- 
 ing the distinction between error and truth, till it becomes 
 a mere convenience or a petty conventionality ; and, on 
 the other hand, stretching their brotherly-love in such a 
 generous mood as to overlook all real diversity of inward 
 character. But all distinctions cannot be abolished ; con- 
 sistent communism is an actual, as well as a theoretical 
 absurdity. Nothing remains to be done, therefore, but 
 to erect this and the other fashionable foible of the day 
 into the partition-wall of human society. To stop short, 
 however, of the lowest degree of communism, to acknow- 
 
182 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 ledge diversity of some substantial kind among men, to 
 halt on this side of extremest pantheism, and admit that 
 any one thing is more divine than another — to refuse 
 to bury all the distinctions of taste, art, literature, and 
 science, in one huge, common, loathsome grave, while the 
 distinction between truth and error,—religious truth and 
 religious error, between sincerity and insincerity, or virtue 
 and vice, is really denied, or coldly admitted, or denuded 
 of its proper and supreme authority, and of its lasting 
 and weighty results,—to do so is surely inconsistent. 
 
 It is an inconsistency, moreover, involving the most 
 serious consequences. If sincerity may be divorced from 
 truth and wedded to error, then truth may not condemn 
 error, and virtue may not abhor vice. If the man, who 
 in some case of moment is possessed of true knowledge 
 and genuine virtue, may not speak of the man of erroneous 
 knowledge and spurious virtue in terms plain and forcible, 
 which are as far removed from drivelling charity as from 
 rancour and ill-will,—without incurring the charge of 
 acerbity and malice; it is solely because error claims to 
 be truth and vice to be virtue. To extend our Charity, 
 therefore, beyond the landmarks of truth and the bul- 
 warks of virtue,—-and sincerity, in the sense that has been 
 assigned to it, is of the essence of both, is not merely to 
 be inconsistent, or to nullify or obliterate the distinction 
 between truth and error and virtue and vice ;—it is more, 
 it makes error truth and vice virtue. The culprit seats 
 himself by some dexterous exploit upon the bench, and 
 has the audacity to summon the judge tothe bar. Truth 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 183 
 
 is scorned because she will not sympathise and associate 
 with error. Virtue is censured because she keeps her 
 robes unsullied. The good man for confronting and 
 withstanding the bad man, forfeits his goodness. Actual 
 manifestations of this spirit are constantly occurring in 
 social life; for while wickedness and ungodliness exist 
 they are altogether unavoidable. There are some who 
 on this path reach the very climax of folly and of crime ; 
 inasmuch as the Almighty himself has been spoken of as 
 the guiltiest of all, for inflicting without mercy everlasting 
 punishment on those, who to the last hour of their pro- 
 bation continue resolute and impenitent in guilt. 
 Origen.—Some additional explanation of 
 your views on Charity, in connection with 
 the matter just discussed, seems desirable. 
 Theologus.—Let us suppose that a number of indi- 
 viduals meet regularly together to prosecute various 
 studies. Their union is based on the principle of loving 
 truth, and loving one another. Their inquiries proceed, 
 and they rejoice in the mutual recognition of fascinating 
 and important doctrines. Their conjoint investigation of 
 weighty facts, and common assiduity in watching the 
 results of rare experiments, knit them together in closest 
 sympathy. One after another is successful in making a 
 valuable discovery ; and the joy of each is shared by all. 
 In this peaceful and prosperous way, while truth is 
 developed, friendship is cemented. If, however, after a 
 tume one of this group of scientific brothers shall come to 
 look upon a certain truth, which is recognised as such by 
 
 Charity explained. 
 
184 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 his companions, to be of vastly greater moment than they 
 have been accustomed to regard it, or shall come to receive 
 something, which they do not receive, not only as true, 
 but also of unspeakable importance, will not this change 
 of opinion unavoidably produce considerable change of 
 feeling ? 
 
 It would obviously be the duty of him who believed he 
 had made an all-important discovery, to communicate to 
 his fellows a statement of his new belief, with the grounds 
 on which it rested. To conceal it would be unfaithfulness 
 to truth, dishonour to himself, and unkindness to his 
 friends. It is possible he may err in the manner of 
 making the avowal, but make it he must. If his friends 
 on considering his statement shall regard it as unfounded 
 and extravagant, and refuse to adopt the new view, their 
 respect for him will very much diminish, as will also his 
 
 respect for them. Thus a change of sentiment, such as_ 
 
 has been indicated, must, from the very nature of the cir- 
 cumstances, seriously disturb and mar the longest and 
 most fraternal friendship. 
 
 Celsus.—‘ The chief lesson that man has to learn, is to 
 entertain contempt and aversion for all fanaticism in phi- 
 losophy as in every thing else, and to acquire the habit 
 of tolerating and even respecting all the theories which 
 are the legitimate offspring of the human mind and human 
 liberty.” 
 
 Theologus.—There is much and dangerous error, as 
 you admit, in the theories or systems you speak of ;—I 
 have yet to learn how to entertain respect for error. 
 
 me, 
 
 ; 
 
 ee ea aoe 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 185 
 
 Charity commands us not merely to tolerate but to love 
 men; truth forbids us to tolerate their errors. 
 
 Celsus. —‘* The most gifted of our brethren are no 
 more than the fragments of a larger and (as yet) ideal 
 manhood. Even Shakspeare is only a poet. But when 
 the fragmentariness becomes extreme, and when little men 
 insult over our endeavours to emancipate ourselves from 
 a littleness of ours, perhaps still less than their own, we 
 do well to be angry. And we do better still to assert 
 that the technical classes, from the mere shoemaker up 
 to the mere naturalist, and from him to the mere 
 theologian, could not do better than join our institution, 
 and listen to the broad and general prelections of men like 
 ———. If they soon discover that our instructors, 
 how well soever they may know the subjects they sever- 
 ally teach, do most notoriously differ from one another 
 in their more central views of things, then so much the 
 better ; for it does us all good to deal closely with the 
 heterodox on the neutral ground of the impersonal intel- 
 lect and the catholic feelings of our nature.” 
 
 Origen. — To speak of “heterodoxy” on “neutral 
 ground” seems something like a contradiction in terms. 
 Nor can we admit catholicity to be a test of truth, and 
 forget one of whom we have read :— 
 
 ‘* faithful found 
 Among the faithless, faithful only he ; 
 Among innumerable false, unmoved, 
 Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified, 
 His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal, 
 Nor number, nor example, with him wrought 
 
 M 
 
186 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 To swerve from truth, or change his constant mind, 
 Though single.” 
 
 Theologus.—It may be added, that the only sense in 
 which the “ impersonality of the intellect” can be main- 
 tained implies, that its aberrations are personal and 
 culpable. But let us return to the point more immediately 
 in hand. That there is a real and immeasurable differ- 
 ence between taking God Himself to be our God and 
 taking that which is not God to be our god,—-our idol, 
 will not surely be denied. The existence of the distine- 
 tion, and its weighty import too, have been often acknow- 
 ledged. Calvin, for instance, in the fifth chapter (§ 11) 
 of the first book of his Institutes, reasons thus: “* When 
 we direct our thoughts by means of God’s works to medi- 
 tate upon Him (which all must do,) having rashly formed 
 some conception of Deity, we immediately yield to some 
 wild or depraved imagination of our flesh, and corrupt 
 the pure truth of God with our folly. And although 
 every one has some peculiar error of his own, in this we are 
 all alike that we fall away from the one true God to mon- 
 strous conceits. In which disease not only common and dull 
 minds are involved, but also the shrewdest and most ex- 
 cellent.” Although Calvin in his further remarks 
 includes Plato by name in this sweeping censure, it is 
 true that the latter has himself recognised the very prin- 
 ciple on which the remarks of the former are founded, 
 and for which we are contending. Plato held that to 
 attempt to propitiate the gods toward criminal conduct 
 was a kind of blasphemy. This opinion evidently sup- 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 187 
 
 poses that to seek to approach Deity under a serious 
 misconception of His character, is equivalent to approach- 
 ing an idol, and thus offering indignity to the true God. 
 
 Let it be granted, then, as at least possible, that one 
 man may have a true knowledge of God, and also be 
 earnestly desiring and striving to have his will in obe- 
 dience to the will of God, while another man, his neigh- 
 bour, has not the true knowledge of God, or if he have, 
 cares not to have his will in habitual subjection to the 
 will of the Most High. What must be the state of feeling 
 between two such individuals? Both parties will feel 
 that there is an awful chasm between them; and if any 
 one shall by some means or other pass from one side of 
 that chasm to the other, it cannot but involve a sacrifice 
 of former companionships. The man who holds an opinion 
 to be as plain and certain as any proposition can be, and 
 at the same time unspeakably momentous, must appear 
 in some sort intolerant to all those who disagree with 
 him in that opinion. To deny that there are true opinions 
 of this description, is to deny the possibility of man know- 
 ing and serving his Maker, or to deny that there is any 
 such thing as guilt and ungodliness in the earth. If a 
 man know and hold to a truth which is not only most 
 luminous but weighty, affecting obviously and directly 
 the personal interests of every individual, though he speak 
 of this truth in the most gentle and courteous manner, 
 yet if he really does justice to the truth itself, his state- 
 ments will inevitably excite the most uneasy and painful 
 feelings in all with whom he differs. 
 
188 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 They who are cither theoretically or practically reckon- 
 ing as God, that which is not God,—the ungodly and 
 idolatrous of all shades,—have little patience with the 
 godly man, who knows and fears with all his heart God 
 as He is, when he begins to speak in their presence of 
 the errors in which they are entangled. The difference 
 between two such parties is so marked and so momentous, 
 that the subject is commonly avoided in their conversa- 
 tion: for it cannot be discussed without intensest feeling 
 upon both sides, and it is only in special circumstances 
 that the pious man may legitimately force it upon the 
 attention of the other. If the one would make any abate- . 
 ment in his averments, either as to the perfect plainness of 
 the truth or as to its untold value,—neither of which he 
 can do, the other might tolerate his opinions. If a traitor 
 and a loyal subject be thrown together for a season, they 
 must either avoid conversing about their common monarch, 
 or their conversation (unless one of them, indeed, conceal 
 his real views) will afford obvious evidence of the dread 
 diversity of their sentiments. The truth respecting the 
 character of God in his more immediate relation to our- 
 selves, is so clear and so precious, that to doubt or disre- 
 gard it is the greatest folly or the highest crime. This 
 must be the claim and bearing of intelligent devotion, 
 wherever she is found. This self-assertion she cannot 
 and dare not qualify. It is her life,—her essence; and 
 all compromise is impossible. Consequently she finds in 
 every man, with whom she forms anything like an inti- 
 mate acquaintance, either an enemy or a friend. 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 189 
 
 But when this high claim is allowed—a, claim which, 
 need we add, can be reasonably and effectually urged by 
 any individual upon his fellows, only by able arguments 
 and self-denying love, not by harsh words or haughty 
 looks, far less by pains or penalties—when the Divine 
 character is known and honoured in its essential integrity, 
 there will be a special and intense affection among all 
 those who agree in this fundamental position, while they 
 will feel compassion for all who differ from them. The 
 fact that this claim has been so often assumed, and by 
 parties so diverse, is proof sufficient that there is one party 
 to whom it rightfully belongs. To refuse to determine 
 who this party is among numerous competitors, is to run 
 the risk, whatever that risk may be, of disallowing the 
 supremacy of that which is supreme. True religion, then, 
 asserts, and must ever assert, the possession of the high- 
 est authority ; she claims the unfeigned and unqualified 
 submission of every man. Towards all who withhold this 
 submission she is intolerant, not physically, but morally 
 —not proudly, but meekly. 
 
 If there be no such thing as the true knowledge of 
 God in the world, then dismal indeed is the condition of 
 humanity. But if there be, it may not be compared 
 with speculations that are yet unsettled; neither may it 
 be placed on a level even with the established doctrines 
 of science ; for while as certain as they (on the principle 
 that all true knowledge is equally certain), it transcends 
 them immeasurably in value. True religion, therefore, 
 must be confessed to be the choicest of our acquisitions, 
 
190 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 and her crown may not be dishonoured. But her rai- 
 ment is love. She breathes unbounded kindness to all 
 men, and inspires the strongest mutual confidence and 
 esteem among those who yield her due respect. To 
 those who decline and resist, she is inflexibly and awfully 
 severe. She frowns in all her divine dignity on the man 
 who will not pay her homage. There cannot, therefore, 
 be anything worthy of the name of harmony or sym- 
 pathy among those who are not substantially at one in 
 their views of the Divine character; while among those 
 who are thus at one, there will be not only the closest 
 intimacy, but large and rational forbearance, when they 
 differ in opinion on subordinate topics. 
 
 This forbearance, however, even on points of inferior 
 moment, cannot rest on the supposition, that men may 
 sincerely contradict each other on any matter whatso- 
 ever. This were to return to the quicksands of unbelief. 
 Christian forbearance is based on the principle, that 
 direct collision of sentiments implies blameworthiness in 
 one of the parties or the other ; and inasmuch as it does 
 so, this collision ought to be avoided to the very utter- 
 most by the sacrifice of everything but truth itself, and, 
 when collision does arise, each party should first suspect 
 himself of being the censurable cause of the conflict. 
 And even when we have found some truth, and know we 
 have found it, without deceiving ourselves, that truth 
 should be always uttered in the meekness of wisdom. 
 
 It is thus apparent, that Truru, all truth, has at once 
 a repellant and an attractive force,—a dissevering and an 
 
BELIEF AND RESPONSIBILITY. 191 
 
 uniting tendency. She not only binds together those 
 who know her, but excludes from their fellowship those 
 who deny her. Is it proper that ignorance of sacred 
 truth only shall not invalidate a man’s claim to scholar- 
 ship? Is it seemly that it should be indifference to reli- 
 gious truth only that does not injure any one’s preten- 
 sions to be a man of letters? There cannot be a graver 
 inconsistency than to set aside truth in religion at the 
 eall of a counterfeit charity, especially when it is done so 
 seldom in anything else. Is not the engineer who makes 
 a scientific error in constructing or conducting a steam- 
 boat or a railway, and thereby causes the loss of life or 
 the ruin of property, considered guilty of a high mis- 
 demeanour? Does charity save him? 
 
 Nothing can be more insidious and dangerous, than 
 the attempts which are constantly made at present, both 
 within and without the pale of the Christian church, to 
 ignore the repellent force and disallow the dissevering 
 tendency of truth. There are many who can scarcely be 
 regarded as belonging to the Christian church, who — 
 never cease their sentimental harping on the attractive 
 power and uniting influence of charity, as if religion, that 
 is, the correct knowledge and habitual fear of God as He 
 as, or the only means by which man can be restored to 
 that high wposition, were some curious contrivance to 
 gather together without discrimination everything that 
 comes in its way,—or a solvent to dissolve into one 
 putrid mass the ill-assorted and corrupt materials of 
 human society! Is it not more worthy of God, more 
 
192 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 needful to man, and more consistent with reason, to con- 
 ceive of religion as a fire, which shall purge the dross, 
 and thereby send forth a mass of purest gold ? 
 
 In like manner, there are not a few Christians who 
 fancy that the best way in which their union may be 
 accomplished, is to excavate to a sufficient depth, and 
 thus provide a grave of forgetfulness, wherein to entomb 
 all the contradictory and clashing opinions of the disciples 
 of Christ. Having finished the interment, they would 
 erect on the same spot of ground, and in commemoration 
 of the event, the temple of Christian concord. The build- 
 ing might be beautiful, but it would not be lasting. The 
 buried and hushed-up controversies at its foundation 
 would prove so many charges of inflammable material, 
 which any accident might ignite and lay the temple in 
 ruins. These controversies must be resolved by Chris- 
 tians seeking, and finding, and agreeing in the truth 
 which each controversy involves ; for as genuine charity, 
 whether it be brotherly affection for the good or com- 
 passion for the erring, must fall unless supported by 
 truth, so also is it on the immoveable rock of truth alone, 
 that the temple of Christian union can be erected in its 
 full proportions and in enduring splendour. 
 
DIALOGUE IY. 
 MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 
 
 Celsus. — Since it has been established in this discus- 
 sion, that reason rightly used never deceives us, we can- 
 not be expected to accept a religion, unless it make good 
 its pretensions to be thoroughly reasonable. 
 
 Origen. —What do you mean by thoroughly reason- 
 able ? 
 
 Celsus.—‘* What the light of your mind, which 1s the 
 direct inspiration of the Almighty, pronounces incredible, 
 —that, in God’s name, leave uncredited ; at your peril 
 do not try believing that.” 
 
 Origen.—Faith may embrace what reason rejects. 
 
 _Celsus.—How is this ? 
 
 Origen.—I shall explain what I mean by an example. 
 «¢The doctrines of prayer and predestination are often 
 regarded as inconsistent, and by many Christians are 
 not reconciled but by explaining away either the moral 
 agency of man or the Sovereignty of the Creator. At 
 first sight, they will generally appear to be incompatible; 
 but cease to be so to those who have laid aside false 
 notions of infinite wisdom.”’’ 
 
 1 Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 214. 
 
194 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 Celsus. — Your statement is not very clear. Do you 
 regard the doctrines of prayer and predestination as 
 simply not incompatible, or do you regard them as re- 
 conciled ? You first speak as if they could be reconciled, 
 and afterwards seem to think it enough if they cease to 
 appear to be incompatible. 
 
 Origen. — The distinction is perhaps of little conse- 
 quence. 
 
 Celsus.—So it would appear to be in the estimation of 
 the author from whom you have just quoted. For in one 
 page he remarks that, “‘ between the inflexible laws of 
 nature, and a Providence who answers prayer, there is 
 no inconsistency of opposite doctrines; but only an in- 
 competency of the human understanding, to know how 
 they co-exist.” While in the next page, he endeavours 
 to show how they co-exist, or how God “can answer 
 prayer consistently with the laws of nature, and by 
 means of them.”! It seems rather puzzling to find such 
 a distinction formally introduced, and immediately dis- 
 carded. 
 
 Lheologus.— The distinction is a most important one, 
 and has been already adverted to. The only difficulty 
 lies in clearly apprehending its import, and consistently 
 adhering to it in our discussions. | 
 
 Origen. —It is a distinction, as some think, of vital 
 moment in the theistic argument, which may be shortly 
 stated thus: “The question of the origin of nature is 
 one which we cannot possibly evade. It forces itself 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. ii. p2ikyet2: 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 195 
 
 upon the reason, and presently involves it in a dilemma. 
 But it is not, as is commonly thought, a dilemma of oppo- 
 site incomprehensibles, but between an incomprehensible 
 and an absurdity; between a conclusion above reason 
 and one contrary to it. We cannot but shrink from the 
 absurdity, the incomprehensibility 1s no more than was to 
 be expected.”’? 
 
 Celsus.—It seems to me that a man should shrink as 
 much from an incomprehensible conclusion, as from an 
 absurd one. If a conclusion be above my reason, how 
 can my reason accept it ? 
 
 Theologus.—This remark shews us the 
 
 Mystery and / : 
 contradiction necessity of clearly understanding what an 
 
 oa incomprehensibility or mystery is, and how 
 it is to be distinguished from an absurdity or contradic- 
 tion. A mystery is not found in a fact or proposition 
 taken by itself. For if a fact or proposition be in itself 
 mysterious, how can it be known at all? A mystery 
 may attach itself to a proposition in two ways. The 
 proposition may express a fact, whose explanation is 
 incomprehensible or mysterious; or one proposition, 
 known to be true, may stand in an evident but icom- 
 prehensible relationship to another proposition known 
 to be true. A mystery, therefore, can be affirmed with 
 propriety, not of a conclusion, but only of the eaplana- 
 tion of a fact, or of the relation between two truths. A 
 conclusion or proposition is absurd, when it contradicts 
 another proposition, which is believed by the party 
 
 1 Christian Theism, v. i. p. 282. 
 
196 DIALOGUE Iv. 
 
 drawing the conclusion, or which is conceded to be 
 true. 
 
 Origen.—But is there not something mysterious in the 
 very statement, that all things were made by God, who 
 is infinite in all His perfections ? 
 
 Lheologus. —It may seem trivial to some, but it is 
 really of great consequence, to distinguish between a 
 statement that is mysterious, and one that is connected 
 with, or implies, a mystery. A mystery is something 
 not known. A proposition cannot be believed, unless we 
 know its meaning, and also know that it is true. To 
 say that a mysterious proposition may be believed is 
 absurd, for it makes ignorance identical with knowledge. 
 
 Origen. —Do you then know the meaning of the 
 infinite ? 
 
 Theologus.—I know that there is an infinite Being ; 
 but the explanation of this fact, the mode of His exist- 
 ence, is tome a mystery. Infinity is to my mind simply 
 equivalent to the non-finite, that which is without limits, 
 —a negative conception. Every thing around me exists 
 under conditions; I think of the absolute Being as simply 
 without conditions, unconditioned. The positive concep- 
 tion of the infinite or absolute is what I have not; it is 
 to me unknown, a mystery. Hence those who affirm 
 that they have an intuition of the unconditioned seem to 
 involve themselves in a contradiction. A whole is some- 
 thing made up of parts; if, then, I affirm the absolute to 
 be a whole without parts, I simply contradict myself. 
 If I affirm the infinite to be a whole whose parts are 
 
 a a 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 197 
 
 numberless, I again oppose myself; for so long as the 
 parts are really unnumbered the whole is incomplete. 
 
 Celsus.—I regard the command im- 
 puted to God to extirpate the nations of 
 Canaan to be “incredible, because it contradicts my 
 moral and spiritual convictions of what God would do. 
 It attributes to God what would be ‘harsh, cruel, and 
 
 b) 
 
 The Canaanites. } 
 
 unjust in man;’ and therefore I must reject it.” 
 
 Origen.—Is not God good, even in permitting war, 
 tyranny, slavery, earthquakes, shipwrecks, volcanoes, 
 sickness and death? ‘Yes, I say; yes, with an un- 
 faltering faith ; but I believe it, and cannot see it; these 
 things are what we should call ‘harsh, cruel, and unjust 
 in man,’ and are utterly incomprehensible to our ‘little 
 wisdom,’ and ‘ little goodness,’ and ‘little love ;’ just as 
 His command to exterminate the Canaanites, though not 
 so perplexing, nor a tenth part so perplexing, is also in- 
 comprehensible. But I believe that God is good in 
 spite of these facts.’’! 
 
 Celsus.—It is hard to conceive how there can be two 
 degrees, far less ten, in things unknown and incompre- 
 hensible. But passing that, and assuming that when you 
 speak of the command itself as incomprehensible, you 
 mean the relation between the command and the charac- 
 ter of God, you surely have forgotten that the Bible 
 itself does not speak of it as incomprehensible, but 
 attempts to explain and vindicate God’s proceedings in 
 
 1A Defence of the Eclipse of Faith, p. 44. 
 
198 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 the matter.—(See Levit. xvii. 24-30; Deut. xx. 10-18; 
 Josh. ii. 12-14, xi. 19, 20.) By calling it an incompre- 
 hensible mystery, you virtually admit that this explana- 
 tion and vindication are incomplete and unsatisfactory. 
 If this command utterly to destroy the people of Canaan 
 involve a real mystery, it cannot be expounded and 
 defended and brought to the level of the human under- 
 standing. But your Scriptures themselves endeavour to 
 do so; if they fail in this endeavour, and according to 
 your statement they have failed, we do not see how you 
 can complacently receive these Scriptures as the word 
 of God in spite of this failure. Not that this failure 
 destroys positive independent evidence, but it opposes 
 and neutralises it, and must leave the mind in that state 
 of believing doubt, or doubtful belief, in describing 
 which many grow eloquent. 
 
 Origen.—“ The Christian believes, from -an immense 
 variety, complexity, and convergence of proof, that the 
 Book which contains Christianity, and the system it re- 
 veals, never came from man. Particular objections to 
 portions of it, nevertheless—both as respects doctrine 
 and history—may, like the correspondent difficulties in 
 the outward universe, be attended with unanswerable 
 perplexities ; but the Christian listens to them just as he 
 would to a judge, who, in his summing up, tells the jury 
 that there can be no doubt that the evidence—nine parts 
 out of ten—will justify them in bringing in one, and only 
 one verdict ; though he says there may be one, two, or 
 three points on which the evidence is conflicting, and on 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 199 
 
 which neither himself nor mortal man can give or even 
 suggest any plausible solution.’ 
 Celsus.—The force of this reasoning depends entirely 
 
 ‘ on the nature and value of the point or points on which 
 
 the evidence is conflicting. If the evidence on some main 
 point in the charge be at variance, or if the contradictions 
 of witnesses implicate the moral character of one of their 
 number whose testimony is important, will any judge 
 affirm that in such a case there is but one verdict, and 
 there can be no doubt about it? Now the command to 
 exterminate the Canaanites, does involve directly and 
 deeply the character of God; and since the Bible itself 
 does not treat it as a mystery, you are bound to afford a 
 sufficient explanation and defence thereof, or greatly 
 modify, if not entirely abandon, your faith in the Chris- 
 tian Scriptures. 
 
 Theologus.—The assertion that the Divine command 
 wholly to extirpate the inhabitants of the land of Canaan 
 involves a mystery, and connot be explained, or vindi- 
 cated to the moral sense of mankind, throws the Chris- 
 tian advocate into more than one serious disadvantage. 
 Whenever we appeal to the events of Providence, or the 
 statements of the Bible, to justify God’s ways to men, 
 our appeal is legitimately arrested, unless we extend it to 
 all these events and all these statements. To allow that 
 some of them, and these the most forcible and critical, 
 remain hopelessly inexplicable, is virtually to abandon 
 our defence of the character of the Almighty. 
 
 1A Defence, &c., p. 181. 
 
200 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 Again, it is certainly the fact, as has been stated, that 
 in the Bible itself once and again are found arguments 
 and representations, which are evidently intended to 
 manifest the righteousness and holiness of God in His 
 dealings towards the exterminated people. 
 
 Further, when the Christian assumes that some of 
 God’s proceedings toward men are mysterious,—in other 
 words, that men can learn nothing from these proceed- 
 ings, the unbeliever, basing his reply upon the truth 
 which this assumption denies, namely, that it is absurd to 
 expect that intelligent beings can learn nothing of the 
 Divine character from the actions of the Deity towards 
 themselves, is able, with the power thus attained, to 
 carry confusion into his opponent’s line of argument, and 
 give to his assertion that the command in question is 
 immoral, a point and a force otherwise unattainable. 
 
 Origen.—< Objections to the doctrine of 
 
 ec 4h) Redemption generally rest on false views 
 
 of the competency of man’s moral judgment. On such 
 
 a subject the Divine conduct cannot be within the reach 
 of human criticism.” ! 
 
 Celsus. —Does not God himself invite and demand cri- 
 ticism on his conduct ?’—(See Isa. i. 2, 8, 18; Jer. ii. 12, 
 13; Rom. v. 6-9). 
 
 Origen.—‘* We cannot sufficiently know those prin- 
 ciples of eternal morality, which have their foundation in 
 the Divine nature, to be able to apply them, in judgment 
 of His dealings with a fallen world. We have not ac- 
 
 Christian Theism, v. ii. p. 309. 
 
"MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION, 201 
 
 quaintance with universal nature, to perceive the effects 
 of the fall, or to pronounce what will be the agency of 
 Infinite Holiness and Love to the fallen. Human reason, 
 or human morality, is quite inapplicable to the ques- 
 tions.” ' 
 
 Celsus.—If, then, you hold the doctrine of the Atone- 
 ment as a fact, and regard its explanation as a mystery 
 (and I perceive no other meaning that may be attached 
 to your words), then you regard as inconclusive and 
 unsatisfactory the thousand attempts that have been 
 made to shew the wisdom of that procedure on the part 
 of God; and what you will make of one half or so of the 
 New Testament itself, I am at a loss to conjecture. N ay, 
 the author from whom you quote immediately contradicts | 
 himself. After reiterating his assertion in these words: 
 —‘“ The Divine conduct in the Redemption of the world 
 is thus wholly beyond the criticism of reason;” he pre- 
 sently begins to criticise, that is, to explain and vindicate 
 what he professes not to understand. ‘“ The revelation,” 
 he says, “of the Divine Perfections in Scripture, and 
 especially in the doctrines of Christianity, is consist- 
 ent with the inferences of natural theology. The Chris- 
 tian’s God is therefore both the God of nature, and the 
 God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ. It scarcely 
 falls within our subject, to examine the direct evi- 
 dences which confirm the doctrine of the Atonement. 
 But its importance may justify a short notice of some of 
 them.” ? ) 
 
 * Christian Theism, v. ii. p. 309. * 1b. ppv ote, 314; 
 
 N 
 
202 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 Theologus.—If the assertion that the destruction of the 
 Canaanites is morally incomprehensible be extravagant 
 and perilous, much more so is the statement that the rela- 
 tion between the sacrifice of the Lord Jesus and the cha- 
 racter of His Father, Jehovah, is mysterious. The 
 remarks which we formerly offered on the first case apply 
 more forcibly to the present one. It seems almost un- 
 accountable how any Christian apologist could say, that 
 ‘‘human reason, or human morality is quite inapplicable 
 to the question.” Is not God’s gift of His own Son—His 
 best and greatest gift, the clearest and most impressive 
 manifestation of the Divine character? Is it not here, 
 more than anywhere else, that Divine wisdom, love, and 
 righteousness, are most conspicuously displayed? And 
 is it not this very display of God’s Holiness and mercy, 
 that is the fittest and most effectual means in working 
 upon men’s obdurate hearts, to bring them to their right 
 mind, and win them back to their God? To tell us that 
 the Atonement is a mystery, is to give a death-blow to 
 intelligent practical Christianity, and plunge us in the 
 depths of superstition. 
 
 Then as to the mere logic of the question, if an intel- 
 ligent being thinks that the Great God acts toward him- 
 self on principles which he does not and cannot understand, 
 his worship will be blind, and his confidence, if confidence 
 there be, that of a slave. When a Christian speaks of the 
 mysteries of Providence, he means, or he ought to mean, 
 not that he cannot now reconcile the events referred to 
 as mysterious with God’s infinite wisdom, love and power, 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 203 
 
 but simply that they form part of a large plan which he 
 does not comprehend in all its details. For to the godly 
 man there is properly speaking no mystery connected 
 with his sufferings, however sharp or long continued ; the 
 consciousness of his guilt ever harmonises his tribulation 
 with the righteousness of his God. The hypothesis, then, 
 that the principles on which God deals with us, even in 
 any instance, and much more in the case of “not spar- 
 ing his own Son, but delivering him up for us all,” are 
 unknown to us or unapproved by our intelligence, re- 
 duces us to fatalism, and confounds slavish submission to 
 mere power with childlike submission to mercy and wis- 
 dom. Ona hypothesis like this, how can Theism, much 
 less Christianity, be successfully defended? The pal- 
 ladium of true religion is all but abandoned into the 
 enemy’s hand. ) 
 
 It thus appears that it is necessary to be always care- 
 ful in distinguishing a mystery from a contradiction. 
 When we have a doctrine which involves a real mystery, 
 as that of the Trinity, taken by itself, or those of the 
 Divine Foreknowledge and man’s responsibility taken 
 together, we must be cautious in the use of language, lest 
 we involve ourselves in a verbal contradiction and give 
 an advantage to the gainsayers. On the other hand, to 
 plead as a mystery, what is not a mystery, is sure to land 
 usin a self-inconsistency, as we have just seen in the cases 
 of the Atonement and the destruction of the Canaanites. 
 Origen.—It will not be denied that the 
 
 Moral Evil, i 2 : 
 best method of settling the disputes in re- 
 
204 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 gard to the relation between God’s character and the 
 prevalence of evil in the world, is to treat moral evil as a 
 profound mystery. 
 
 Theologus.—One mystery is as profound as any other, 
 if you adhere to the definition given above; and the best 
 method in every case is the method that is according to 
 truth. 
 
 Origen —Let me explain myself. “ All that we can 
 know is, that the possibility of sin lies in the fact of 
 personality ; in other words, in the fact of human freedom. 
 And as this fact is wholly inexplicable, so is equally, the 
 sin which has sprung from it. As to the final difficulty of 
 the origin of evil, it admits in its nature of no solution. 
 It presents an impenetrable mystery.” } 
 
 Celsus.— When one fact can be traced to another fat, 
 it 1s not usual to call the former inexplicable; for 7¢ is 
 explicated by the latter. Again, whoever assumes that 
 the origin of evil is an impenetrable mystery, thereby 
 precludes himself from attempting any explanation of it, 
 
 and rejects the explanation offered by others. With — 
 
 what consistency, then, can the writer you have quoted 
 afterwards say, “ Having acknowledged to the full ex- 
 tent the awful mystery of sin, we might rest our answer 
 on this mystery?” Clearly, if it be a mystery, the answer 
 must rest there. But he adds: “ Wholly inscrutable, 
 there is nothing about it more inscrutable than its -con- 
 tinued power of resistance to the gospel—than its oppo- 
 sition to the truth bearing upon it at every point, and 
 ' Theism, pp. 348, 344. 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 205 
 
 summoning it to surrender. A few words of explanation, 
 however, suggest themselves.” ! It is curious, indeed, to 
 hear the explanation of what is inscrutable and un-. 
 known, | 
 
 Origen.— But the existence of evil in the world does 
 not affect the inference which we draw from the good 
 that is in the world in regard to the Beneficence of Deity. 
 “ It is certainly puzzling that the works of a good Being 
 should be in any respect marred by unhappiness. Yet 
 the partial unhappiness cannot for a moment be entitled 
 to set aside the prevailing happiness.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—If the existence of the partial unhappiness be 
 an awful and inscrutable mystery, as many of your 
 friends affirm, so also will be the existence of prevailing 
 happiness ; unless we act like children who reject the 
 bitter medicine, and suck the sugar plum. If the good 
 that is in the world justify some belief in Divine good- 
 ness, the evil that is in the world must affect our estimate 
 of the Divine character. 
 
 Origen.—“ The very utmost that can be demanded is, 
 that the more serious aspects of misery which exist in 
 human life be recognised as difficulties in the way of the 
 complete theistic inference.” 3 
 
 Celsus.—If you even grant, that the evils in the world 
 are “ negative presumptions,” which “ leave the conclu- 
 sion of absolute goodness (in God) uncertain on the mere 
 sphere of nature,”* you abandon the notion of their 
 mysteriousness ; you allow them to have weight and 
 + Theism, p..363.  ? Ib. p. 801. *Ib.p.301.  .4 Ib. p. 300. 
 
206 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 meaning in the argument; and till they are satisfactorily 
 explained without detriment to the Divine character, 
 your conclusion is confessedly uncertain. We observe, 
 then, a plain.contradiction in this author when he after- 
 wards asserts: “ It is only the evil (not the good in the 
 world) that is utterly unintelligible.”’ How can it be 
 utterly unintelligible, if it be ‘a negative presumption,” 
 rendering the theistic conclusion uncertain? Neither is 
 it unintelligible, if, as other Christians affirm, it can be 
 reconciled with the Divine Goodness. On either suppo- 
 sition its mysteriousness 1s given up. 
 
 Origen.—* But if we could see the whole plan (of 
 Divine government) in its extended development, many 
 
 things that now seem to us exceptional and contradictory © 
 
 might lose this character altogether, and even expand 
 into special means of advance in the ever-enlarging dis- 
 play of the Divine beneficence. The mystery which 
 every where encompasses our finite sphere of observa- 
 tion, may only conceal from us the wisdom and the good- 
 ness that are really present in many phenomena where 
 we cannot even trace them. The limitation of our facul- 
 ties is thus recognised as in some manner explanatory of 
 the difficulties that meet us in regard to our subject ; 
 and it is quite validly so held in a general sense.” ? 
 Celsus.—In these remarks you speak as if a mystery 
 must necessarily be an argumentative difficulty. That I 
 do not understand. We have just seen in a special in- 
 
 stance that if the evil in the world be a difficulty in the | 
 
 * Theism, p. 303. 2 Th. p. 801, 302. 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 207 
 
 theistic argument it is not a mystery. And if it be a 
 mystery it cannot be a difficulty. It is an abuse of lan- 
 guage to affirm, that something which we cannot know, 
 or do not know, is a difficulty or stumbling-block in re- 
 gard to what we do know. The reason why a mystery 
 is supposed to involve a difficulty is, because it is con- 
 founded with a contradiction, as is done in the above re- 
 marks. What is unknown or mysterious may be dis- 
 covered or revealed, and thus “ lose its character,” and 
 untold to us “ the wisdom and the goodness that are 
 really present in many phenomena, where we cannot 
 even trace them” now. But what is “ contradictory ”’ 
 ean never lose its character. , 
 
 Origen.—The author referred to, however, qualified 
 his observation, thus: ‘ many things that now seem to 
 us exceptional and contradictory might lose this charac- 
 ters’: 
 
 Celsus.—This only makes the matter worse; it is 
 strange that so often in our best writers a mystery and 
 a seemmng contradiction are regarded as synonymous. 
 Let it be said plainly that a mystery and a contradiction 
 are the same; and there is an end of the matter—-an 
 end of all truth, argument, and religion to finite beings. 
 If this be so, to speak or write as if a mystery were a 
 seeming contradiction—an incomprehensible, a seeming 
 absurdity ; 1s a most palpable mystification. You might 
 as well say, that a guinea is apparently brass. Because, 
 if what is called a seeming contradiction be a real contra- 
 diction, why not say so openly and at once, and avow the 
 
208 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 identity of the absurd and the mysterious? If what is 
 called a seeming contradiction be not a real contradiction, 
 it is improper to call it a seeming contradiction, except in 
 
 speaking of those parties who take it to be what it is not; 
 
 and whose error it would be praiseworthy to point out. 
 Theologus.—Certainly. A mystery is not a contra- 
 diction, nor, if viewed aright, is it an apparent contradic- 
 tion. Hence it involves no real or legitimate difficulty. 
 As to the argument about the prevalence of evil and 
 misery in this world, it may be observed, that if we are 
 to base our knowledge of God’s character on the consi- 
 deration of what God has done, we are bound to take an 
 
 impartial view of all the Divine works. It will not do, . 
 
 when some facts go against our theory, to set them aside 
 as mysterious. Our theory must rest on all the facts. 
 Unless, therefore, we can reconcile the existence and pre- 
 valence of evil with the Holiness of God, our argument 
 is uncertain or incomplete. The Bible and reason effect 
 this reconciliation by referring moral evil to the free 
 agency of the creature. 
 
 Origen.—But is not free agency itself a 
 mystery ? | 
 
 Celsus.— What is more precisely the meaning you in- 
 clude in this statement ? 
 
 Free Agency. 
 
 Origen.—* The fact of human freedom is in its very 
 character inexplicable. This fact transcends the condi- 
 tions of the logical faculty. It is not only not wonderful 
 
 that we cannot understand freedom, but the fact is such 
 
 in its very idea that it is impossible we ever can under- 
 
 a =) = 
 tal ec ~~ ew 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION, 209 
 
 stand it, transcending as it necessarily does that logical 
 power of which it is the condition. We have no claim to 
 comprehend it, for (as logicians) we do not contain it— 
 it contains us.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—This language seems to mean that the fact 
 itself is mysterious ; we cannot, then, have even a simple 
 knowledge that it is true. Unless the fact of liberty can 
 be expressed in an intelligible proposition, no man can 
 believe or accept it. How can the author referred to use 
 the words which you have quoted, and in the very same 
 page affirm, that “ this fact is to be reasoned from. It 
 stands at the head of our rational nature as its source ?” 
 How can we “reason from” a fact, which “ does not 
 come within the conditions of our logical faculty, but 
 transcends these conditions?” 
 
 Origen.—That author, perhaps, meant that it is the 
 explanation of the fact that is mysterious; it is ultimate, 
 and cannot be referred to any other fact. 
 
 Celsus.—Does he, then, deny that man is created by 
 God? Is not our moral liberty referred by theists to 
 the Creating fiat of Him they «all the Almighty ? 
 
 Origen. — He must simply mean that the relation 
 between God’s sovereignty and our free agency is 
 mysterious. 
 
 Celsus.—If that were his meaning his language is 
 somewhat inappropriate. Besides, in a few pages further 
 on he distinctly speaks of this relation and its imcompre- 
 hensibility ; and therefore, it is the more probable that 
 
 1 Theism, p. 260. : 
 
210 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 he really means to say, that the fact of moral freedom 
 itself is incomprehensible. 
 
 Theologus.—This much, at all events seems to be © 
 
 granted, that there is a mystery in the relation between 
 the freedom of the intelligent creature and the foreknow- 
 ledge and Sovereign control of the Almighty Creator. 
 
 Origen.—This is not generally admitted, for the neces- 
 sarian scheme of philosophy, which is held by many, is 
 an attempt to explain as well as defend the prescience of 
 the omniscient. 
 
 Celsus.—But it is the opinion of others, as competent 
 probably as those you refer to, that this scheme defends 
 foreknowledge in God by abandoning free agency in 
 man. This will better appear if we consider the ques- 
 tions regarding the Providence ascribed to God in the 
 working of miracles and answering prayer. 
 Is the mode in which God effects a 
 miracle, mysterious in your estmiation or not ? 
 
 Origen.—The point you mention is mysterious to this 
 extent at least, that man cannot distinguish between one 
 mode of the Divine efficiency and another. “To suppose 
 that, because the order of nature is fixed to us, the 
 Divine Father cannot exercise through that order a 
 special providence towards His children, is simply a pre- 
 sumptuous imagination of the most unworthy kind. To 
 conceive of any order of events, or any facts of nature, 
 as less directly connected than others with their Divine 
 Author, is an absurdity. Only suppose the Deity 
 equally present in all his works, equally active in all, 
 
 Miracles. 
 
 re 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION, pay 
 
 and Providence no longer admits of a twofold apprehen- 
 sion.” } 
 
 Celsus.—This is a fair inference from the principles of 
 necessity, which assert that in the moral as in the 
 physical world, every event has for its cause another 
 event, till we go back to the first fiat of the Almighty 
 “in the beginning.” If you admit this theory, and the 
 consequence from it which has just been stated, that a 
 twofold apprehension of Providence its impossible, then 
 it is equally impossible to distinguish a miracle from a 
 common event, or an answer to prayer from the pros- 
 perity of fools. Ifthe reality of miracles and the effi- 
 cacy of prayer be given up, you must admit that man’s 
 free agency is in some danger. 
 
 Origen. —“ Because God, for obvious reasons, main- 
 tains the forth-puttings of His Efficient Energy, after 
 certain modes which, collectively, we call Nature, why 
 should this exclude new and special forth-puttings of that 
 energy, when He may see meet—in other words, when 
 fitting occasions may arise? Why should such fresh 
 expressions of Creative Power be supposed to be irregu- 
 larities, ‘interferences’ in the great plan of creation— 
 and not, as according to the genuine theistic conception 
 they truly are, parts in the development of that great 
 plan contemplated from the first ?”’? | | 
 
 Celsus.—If these “ new and special forth-puttings” of 
 Divine energy do not give us “a twofold apprehension”’ 
 of Providence, we must begin to doubt if one and one 
 
 1Theism, p. 66, 67. SUE Pinyin 
 
212 _ DIALOGUE Iv. 
 
 make two. Suppose we witnessed ‘‘a fresh expression 
 of Creative Power,” it must have-something to dis- 
 tinguish it from the older “ forth-puttings of His Efficient 
 Energy which we call nature.” If there be “fresh ex- 
 pressions of Creative power,” “the order of nature is 
 fixed to us,” not universally and to the last iota, but only 
 an a limited degree, and one event must be “less directly 
 connected than ” another with God. 
 
 Origen.—Any supposition, similar in its features to 
 the theory of development, which embraces the causes of 
 all change and progress, and is limited in its application 
 to the material world, is not incompatible either with 
 theism or with Christianity. For the manner in which 
 these causes have been communicated by the Creator to 
 matter, whether through occasional interventions or by 
 continuous agency, may be, in the main, but a secondary 
 question. It may be known or conjectured that these 
 different notions of the Divine agency have no ultimate 
 difference of objective signification, and are equally 
 true. ! 
 
 Celsus.—Y our mode of speech is peculiar, and liable to 
 objection, although it has an air of modesty. Why do — 
 you say, “It may be known,” “may be a secondary 
 question?” If it is known, why not say so? if it is not 
 known, how do you learn that it may be known? But 
 as to the merits of the question, if a development theory, 
 embracing “ the causes of all change and progress,” be 
 limited to the material world, it can be so only on the 
 
 * See Christian Theism, vol. i. pp. It1,'4:28, 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. B18 
 
 supposition that the moral world has no influence over 
 the material world. Is this supposition consistent with 
 facts? Does not the conduct of man, who is a moral 
 agent, modify and control, to a great extent, the phy- 
 sical events that take place on the globe? The Deluge 
 that happened in the time of Noah, had, as you believe, 
 a moral cause, and it materially affected the changes and 
 progress of animal and vegetable life. Looking at the 
 entire range of Providence, as we are bound to do, is 
 there no difference between an “ occasional intervention” 
 and a “ continuous agency ?” 
 
 Origen.—There seems no ground to affirm a difference. 
 For “the question of motives internal to the Divine 
 Nature is manifestly out of our sphere. Reason can bear 
 us to a Great First Cause, but cannot look into His un- 
 searchable Nature, much less affirm that the connection 
 of causes and effects, which is universal within the sphere 
 of our observation, is in any way applicable to the Divine 
 Essence.” } 
 
 Celsus.—The plea of ignorance is very convenient ; but 
 is not always valid. The very conception of a miracle 
 is impossible ; unless you admit a distinction between the 
 occasional agency of God, and his continuous agency in 
 general laws. And that occasional agency is impossible, 
 if “the connection of causes and effects” be “ universal 
 within the sphere-of our observation.” 
 
 Origen.—* But it is here necessary to bear in mind 
 the distinction between a physical and moral necessity. 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. i. p. 334. 
 
Dt4 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 A doctrine which regards the Divine Agency as neces- 
 sarily determined by the eternal attributes of Wisdom 
 and Goodness, and in conformity with their eternal moral 
 law, is something very different from an evolution of phy- 
 sical causes.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—Then this distinction between moral and phy- 
 cal causes, you regard as determined and without excep- 
 
 tion? 
 | Origen.—Not exactly. “It is worth consideration, 
 whether the doctrine of human necessity do not verge on 
 pantheism, at least when the determining causes of the 
 will, whether physical or moral, are derived by necessity 
 from the Divine Sovereignty. To deny all originating 
 power of the will, must be to place the primordial and 
 necessary causes of all things in the Divine Nature.” * 
 
 Celsus.—To deny this distinction in humanity, of which 
 we know something, and assert it of Deity, into “ whose 
 unsearchable nature” reason “ cannot look,” is a double 
 inconsistency. The confusion is only intensified by add- 
 ing :—‘ Whether it be choice or necessity, that a good 
 and powerful Being does that which is good, is nothing 
 more than a question of words.” Nor is the darkness 
 lessened, when the same author says elsewhere, “ with- 
 out doubt it must be morally necessary that God will do 
 what is good and right.” 4. The argument indeed is not 
 directly affected by the contradiction involved in the two 
 last quotations. It concerns a man himself alone to assert, 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. i. p. 195. * Ib. p. 196. 
 * Ib. pp. 195, 196. MAG poe. 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 215 
 
 first, that the distinction between choice and necessity in 
 Deity is one of words, and secondly, to maintain that 
 “ without doubt” God “ must” act necessarily. But it 
 does concern the argument, when in the next page he 
 writes thus: “It may still be asked,—Does this moral 
 necessity, that God will do what is good and right, extend. 
 to the whole agency of the Almighty, and determine His 7 
 work in the universe to be in all things exactly what it 
 is? We have here,” he says, “it is evident, a curious 
 and a useless question.” Now this curious and useless 
 question is exactly the question between the Pantheist 
 and the Christian. 
 
 Theologus.—To a great extent it is. ‘Io deny the pos- 
 sibility of miracles is to affirm pantheism. Till we obtain, 
 therefore, a clear and accurate notion of what a miracle 
 is, we are certainly not free from the entanglements of 
 pantheism. And since scarcely two Christian men agree 
 in their conceptions of a miracle, the intellectual conflict 
 between pantheism and Christianity is yet undecided. ° It 
 has yet to be determined in some of the higher questions, 
 what is the line which separates the most important truth 
 from the most seductive error. 
 
 Origen.—What can be more explicit on the question 
 than such a statement as this :—“ If the whole pheno- 
 mena of the universe be one chain of necessary develop- 
 ment; if man and his actions are strictly inevitable pul- 
 sations of the one great source of being, then what is 
 properly called moral evil has no existence.” * 
 1 Infidelity, pp. 71, 72. 
 
216 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 Celsus.—This writer does not say whether he means 
 by necessary development, a physical or moral necessity. 
 He probably meant a physically necessary development ; 
 and elsewhere you would find him pleading for a moral 
 necessity. In stating the distinction between these two 
 necessities, however, he would find the same difficulties 
 as have now been pointed out in others. 
 
 Theologus.—The truth seems to be, that when men 
 plead for necessity as ruling in the affairs of the universe, 
 it makes little matter whether it be called moral or phy- 
 sical; for on either supposition it follows, “that the chain 
 of endless causation cannot be broken ;” hence miracles 
 are impossible, and pantheism is unavoidable. | 
 
 Origen.—“ But even when it is admitted that the 
 Divine agency is always ordered according to fixed laws, 
 which may be called laws of nature, it is a great mistake 
 to take for granted that these laws are either indepen- 
 dent of the Deity, or unfit to authenticate a special reve- 
 lation of His Will.” } 
 
 Celsus.—It seems to me self-evident, that if the Divine 
 agency be always ordered according to fixed laws, it is 
 impossible that these laws can authenticate a special reve- 
 lation. 
 
 Origen.—Surely “it is no less a miracle, when the 
 lower law of nature is modified by the higher law, at the 
 exact time at which it pleases God to make a revelation 
 of His Will, than if the nature which is known to us were 
 modified by His immediate interference, Thus, to illus- 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 201. 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. O17 
 
 trate by the calculating engine of Mr Babbage, it is no 
 less a proof of knowledge and of power superior to the 
 engine itself, to predict that a law which has held good 
 for a million and one instances will change at the million 
 and second, than to be able to produce such a change, 
 by interfering with the movements of the machine.” ! 
 
 Celsus.— But the prediction of such a change is as 
 inconsistent with the original supposition as is the effect- 
 ing of such a change. If the prediction is included in 
 the Divine agency, which is “ ordered according to fixed 
 laws,” then the engine should predict the change, or the 
 illustration fails in the most important point of the com- 
 parison. If it be granted that the prediction is not the 
 work of the machine, the assumption that the Divine 
 agency is always-ordered according to fixed laws is aban- 
 doned. Besides, the author referred to openly departs 
 from this assumption, when in the same page he says :— 
 “after all, it is impossible to ascribe the knowledge of 
 Joshua that the sun and moon would obey so extraordi- 
 nary a command, to anything less than an immediate 
 revelation from heaven.” An immediate revelation must 
 mean a direct interposition as distinguished from the 
 working out of an eternal law. 
 
 Theologus.—The conclusion to which we are led seems 
 to be this. The Providence of God must be recognised 
 as operating sometimes by gencral laws, and sometimes 
 by special interpositions. And as there is properly 
 speaking only one kind of necessity, this necessity must 
 
 ! Christian Theism, vol. ii. pp. 201, 202. % 
 ) 
 
218 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 be denied both of human and Divine actions. We believe 
 in the necessity of the Divine existence without extending 
 it to the Divine works; as Augustine says, God changes 
 his operations but not his purpose ;! and thus we obtain 
 a well-defined line between Pantheism and a Personal God. 
 It is our own personality alone that gives us any con- 
 ception of a personal God. And our power over matter 
 by working in harmony with the laws of matter may give 
 us some notion of God’s power to change events, without 
 changing laws, but by new interpositions in accordance 
 with these laws or independently of them. If we exclude 
 special interferences from Divine Providence, and reduce 
 it all to the carrying out of laws, eternal and immutable, 
 what mystery remains in the relationship between the 
 subordinate actions of man and the sovereign control of 
 God? Liberty, as well as mystery, is altogether ex- 
 cluded, and nothing but fatalism remains. Fatalism is 
 not a deep mystery, as some Christians would say; but 
 a horrid lie, a black contradiction. On the other hand, 
 
 admit occasional interpositions of the hand of the Almighty 
 among the doings of mankind, and there is plainly room 
 for miracles and pr ophecy and inspiration and answers to 
 prayer, and there is also before us the unapproachable 
 mystery, before which we would stand in silent awe,— 
 How can we be free and yet the Most High predict our 
 actions ? How can we do our will, and God do His will, 
 however contrary they may be? How can man purpose, 
 and plan, and act, as if there were no God, while God 
 
 * Conf. Lib. i. ¢. 4. 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 219 
 
 controls his plans and thoughts, no less than his actions ? 
 
 Origen.—In attempting to escape from 
 Scylla you will fall into Charybdis. If 
 you assume the occasional agency of God to find an 
 
 Prayer. 
 
 answer to prayer, you must abandon “ the uniformity of 
 the laws of nature,”—you must deny that “all things are 
 bound in unerring laws.” 
 
 Theologus.—The principle of special manifestations of 
 Divine power, in addition to His agency through general 
 laws, does not at all interfere with the uniformity of these 
 laws. Man can influence the course of events without 
 changing laws; so surely God can. Afany “ things are 
 bound in unerring laws,” because there are some laws, 
 and these laws are uniform. But to assert that “ all 
 things are bound in unerring laws” is sheer pantheism. 
 This sentiment, extending the “ inflexible laws of nature,” 
 “the fixed course of nature,” and so forth, universally to 
 every event or change which is diffused through our 
 Christian Theology, cannot be distinguished from the un- 
 blushing Pantheism which affirms, “ that the forces in- 
 herent in matter, and those which govern the moral 
 world, exercise their action under the control of prim- 
 ordial necessity” —for after all the thing is really the 
 same whether it be called physical or moral necessity. 
 Christian theism thus becomes, in reality as well as in 
 name, ‘‘a pantheism of goodness.”! Pantheism being 
 the denial of the distinction between good and evil, for 
 “the possibility of evil is the alternative of pantheism,” ” 
 
 * Christian Theism, v. i. p. 198. 2 Ib. p. 203% 
 
220 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 a pantheism of goodness is of course equivalent to a pan- 
 theism of evil. 
 
 Celsus.—How do you account for an answer coming to 
 prayer on the supposition that all events are fixed by 
 primordial laws ? 
 
 Origen.—Many hypotheses have been framed to meet 
 this difficulty. 
 
 Celsus.—Indeed ! So Christians are at variance on this 
 point as well as on others. 
 
 Origen.—Some regard the reconciliation of these two 
 facts—the divine response to prayer, and the necessary 
 concatenation of all events, as impossible, and the relation 
 between them as mysterious to man. 
 
 Celsus.—But the remarks that have been made show 
 that these two alleged facts are really contradictory and 
 in opposition to one another. For if the answer to prayer 
 be the ordinary result of an eternal law, then the event, 
 which is affirmed to be in reply to a petition, would have 
 happened independently of the prayer, or else the prayer 
 itself is only another link in the unbroken chain. And if 
 your supplications, as well as the events which are called 
 their answers, be fixedly predetermined from all eternity, 
 or, in other words, take place according to inflexible laws, 
 then our responsibility and personality are a mere name, 
 and Providence resolves itself into a necessary develop- 
 ment of Deity. | 
 
 Origen.—* The divine agency need not be occasional, 
 fo answer occasional prayers, because infinite wisdom 
 takes account of all occasional events of finite wills, in 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 221 
 
 the foundation of its eternal plans. Hence the Almighty 
 does not contravene the laws of nature; He can answer 
 prayer consistently with them, and by means of them. 
 All the changes of endless time were spread before Him 
 in the first constitution of things. That vast plan took 
 account of all the revolutions of the material world, and 
 all the movements of the capricious wills of men, and 
 contained provision for every particular emergency. It 
 included an answer to every true prayer.”’! 
 
 Celsus.—The author should have added ;—It included 
 also every prayer, true as well as untrue, and his pan- 
 theistic scheme would have been completed. No pan- 
 theist ever denied the wisdom of the development of the 
 Deity in the universe; or, in other words, that this 
 development is systematic and according to a plan. 
 Nor has the absolute goodness of this system or plan 
 been ever questioned. And as to its vastness, that is the 
 key-stone of the pantheistic doctrine; every change, 
 mental and material, is included in its universal sweep. 
 
 Theologus.—That all the changes of endless time were 
 spread out before God in the beginning, is involved in the 
 attribute of omniscience. To reconcile this truth with 
 the free agency of man, is the question. To us it seems 
 to be a mystery ; and nothing more can in propriety be 
 said about it. If it be a mystery, any attempt to dispel 
 its mysteriousness,—to fathom its depth,—to defend it 
 by explaining it, will only lead, as we have just seen by 
 two examples, to self-contradiction. 
 
 1 Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 212. 
 
pe DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 Mistakes through Origen. — Still I cannot but think, that 
 SPACE ARCH: an absurdity and an incomprehensible, — 
 a mystery and a contradiction, are more nearly related 
 than you have represented. Maya man not go seriously 
 wrong through ignorance? “ It has come to be felt and 
 seen, and to be acknowledged too, on all sides, that 
 TRUTH, in relation to any particular subject, touching 
 immediately or remotely the well-being of men — either 
 the individual man, or the social—can be only one por- 
 tion of, or one aspect of, UNIVERSAL TRUTH; and that if 
 we would secure ourselves against mischievous mistakes 
 and illusions as to that single subject, whatever it may 
 be, we must know, not merely the whole of itself, but 
 what it borders upon, and then the bordering of those 
 remoter neighbours, one upon another ; and so onward 
 and round about must we advance, until we have fairly 
 made the circuit of all things, or of all things which it is 
 granted to man to measure and compass.”! 
 
 Celsus.—If we can know nothing accurately and surely 
 till we have made the entire circuit of human knowledge, 
 the mass of mankind must be doomed to infidelity or 
 implicit faith. If our only reasonable security “ against 
 mischievous mistakes and illusions,” be the possession of 
 “universal truth ”—a knowledge “ of all things which it 
 is granted to man to measure and compass,” then indeed 
 ignorance and error are confounded, and there is no dif- 
 ference between what is above or beyond our reason and 
 what is opposed to reason. On this supposition, it is 
 
 * Restoration of Belief, p. 4. 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 205 
 
 vain to profess our belief in any truth, till we find, and 
 profess our belief in, all truth ; and the author you have 
 quoted departs from his own principle, when he says 
 elsewhere: “I would not be thought disposed to treat 
 slightly the catalogue of difficulties that attach to the 
 Christian argument, at specific pots. Real are some of 
 these difficulties ; and some are fatal to certain gratuitous 
 assumptions, held to on the Christian side: not one of 
 them should be inconsiderately dismissed. But not one 
 of them touches the integrity of our faith; nor can the 
 mass entire avail at all to abate the confidence of our 
 persuasion, that the GospEeL or CurisT is from HEAVEN, 
 and carries with it an AurHority which time does not 
 impair, and which eternity shall unfold and confirm.’ ! 
 The presence of difficulties most certainly proves igno- 
 rance. If this ignorance does not impair “the integrity 
 of your faith,’ mere ignorance on one point does not 
 necessarily entail “a mischievous mistake ” on another 
 point. 
 
 Origen. — But these intellectual or logical difficulties 
 are not so easily got quit of. JI understand the argu- 
 ment, that if they be mysteries, they are properly speak- 
 ing no difficulties at all; and if they are contradictions 
 or absurdities, they lie not in the objects of our thoughts, 
 but in our thoughts themselves, and are not to be tole- 
 rated, but cleared away. Still may not these difficulties 
 be something else than a mere absurdity or incompre- 
 hensible ? 
 
 1 Restoration of Belief, p. 110. 
 
224 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 Theologus.—W hat else may they be? 
 
 Origen. — “ The very same body of facts concerning 
 the woes and disorders — hopeless as they are, and pur- 
 poseless as they seem, which press upon humanity— 
 these facts, rudely regarded by the sages of pagan an- 
 tiquity, and which impelled them to reject the hypothesis 
 of a Supreme wisdom, benevolence, and power — come 
 before us now, unchanged or scarcely mitigated, and they 
 not merely perplex the reason—they do more, they dis- 
 tract us, because we have been long trained in the medi- 
 tative converse with an Idea of the Supreme Wisdom, 
 Benevolence, and Power, immeasurably surpassing any 
 conception of these attributes which the ancient mind 
 had ever entertained. That which was an insoluble 
 problem to the ancient classic reason, is also, to the mo- 
 dern mind, a problem insoluble ;—but it is more than an 
 intellectual stumbling-block, for it puts at fault our con- 
 sciousness of first Truths.”! 
 
 Celsus.—Just so, I understand you. These difficulties 
 are not a sheer absurdity, or we might and ought to 
 shake ourselves free of them. Neither are they a blank 
 and fathomless mystery, or else we might, as we ought, 
 patiently stand humble and self-abased before it. But 
 they are something, which peels the reason” in such 
 a way, and so “ distract us,” as not only to present “ an 
 insoluble problem,” but “an intellectual stumbling-block,” 
 which “ puts at fault our consciousness of first Truths.” 
 The only interpretation which I can assign to this de- 
 
 * Restoration of Belief, p. 367. ‘ 
 
S 
 
 MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 225 
 
 scription is, that these difficulties are the result and evi- 
 dence of the fact that consciousness in-man is not trust- 
 worthy, and that human reason is inherently invyalid—a 
 sentiment which, as you know, is the ne plus ultra of 
 scepticism. 
 
 Origen. — But whatever may be the nature of these 
 difficulties, the Bible shews us how to bear them. The 
 Great Teacher “does not propound the main articles of 
 a Theistic belief, or speak of them as if they needed to 
 be ascertained or defended. Much less does He recog- 
 nise, as if they were a burden upon that belief, the stag- 
 gering difficulties which oppress us of this age, and with 
 which the thoughtful in all times have so vainly striven. 
 That heavy load of troubled speculation which weighs us 
 down, does not seem to have come into His view when 
 He invites the weary to seek their rest in Him. This 
 * Man of sorrows,’ and ‘acquainted with griefs,’ gives no 
 expression to those griefs which, to many of the thought- 
 ful and sensitive among His followers, have outweighed 
 the pressure of the most extreme personal sufferings, so 
 that they have been tempted to say —‘I am indeed 
 
 é afilicted — yet would endure all with cheerfulness, if the 
 
 thick darkness that overspreads these heavens were with- 
 drawn, or if only I could see a verge of the dawn upon 
 the cloud.’ And yet if we do not find in the teaching of 
 Christ that which we should so gladly find, we find at 
 least the rudiments of peace, and a remedy against dis- 
 traction, which, if we will accept it and use it, brings 
 with it as much acquiescence as is to be had, in the 
 
226 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 nature of things, on earth; and as much, perhaps, as is 
 to be found even among those that have encircled the 
 Eternal Throne since the morning hours of the Crea- 
 tion.” } 
 
 Celsus. — And is this the conclusion of the whole 
 matter? You admit, that there are “ staggering diffi- 
 culties which oppress us,’”’ with which it is vain to strive ; 
 you confess to a “heavy load of troubled speculation | 
 which weighs us down,” which to the sensitive and 
 thoughtful “ outweighs the pressure of the most extreme 
 personal sutferings,” and which drives the earnest and 
 reflecting wellnigh to the very brink of despair ;—and 
 then in philosophic mood calmly acknowledge that this 
 bitter root of mental distress and anguish was left un- 
 noticed almost, and certainly unmedicated, by Him of 
 whom you boast as the Great and Able Physician. And 
 your only solace is the one borrowed from the fatalist and 
 the atheist, that what little bits of comfort you can pick 
 up is as much as is to be had “in the nature of things.” 
 And if this is not enough, console yourself with the 
 thought, that you are, perhaps, as well off as the best of 
 your brother creatures. Is this the climax of Theism 
 and of Christianity ? 
 
 Lheologus.—When an individual’s thoughts and senti- 
 ments are in disorder and mutual conflict, it is a serious 
 evil. When a man’s meditations upon the grandest and 
 most important themes are antagonistic and self-contra- 
 dictory, the more sensitive and reflecting his mind, the 
 
 * Restoration of Belief, pp. 371-373. 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION. 227 
 
 more intolerable will he feel the burden; the more poig- 
 nant the anguish. It seems to be an undoubted fact, 
 that through this excruciating ordeal some of the finest 
 spirits of our race have age after age been observed to 
 pass. It is well to know precisely the cause of such a 
 painful and general phenomenon. That we are beset 
 with mysteries, cannot account for it. That our con- 
 sciousness deceives us, only makes the darkness deeper 
 still, and utterly hopeless. That men’s opinions are con- 
 tradictory, arises from the circumstance of our being in- 
 volved in many erroneous beliefs, in consequence of our 
 own and our fathers’ guilt. 
 
 There is an obvious and adequate reason to account 
 for the fact, that the Lord Jesus does not directly notice 
 or meet the difficulty in question. God in his dealings 
 towards men seems to act on the principle of parsimony. 
 He never affords extraordinary means for the accomplish- 
 ment of an end, which may be accomplished by ordinary 
 means. The painful confusion and contradiction of 
 
 thought which prevail among reflecting men is an evil, 
 
 which can be corrected by reason itself. The resources 
 of the understanding, independently of any special reve- 
 lation or direct supernatural aid in addition to what the 
 gospel provides for us as fallen creatures, are of them- 
 selves sufficient, when diligently and properly employed, 
 to clear away the intellectual mists which perplex and 
 bewilder us; and, therefore, these collisions of thought 
 formed no proper subject for the direct teaching or 
 immediate interposition of the great, Prophet of mankind. 
 
228 : DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 Origen.—By what means then can men deliver them- 
 selves from the burden of their conflicting thoughts, and 
 avoid the entanglements of self-contradiction ? 
 
 Theologus.—By choosing to be in ignorance, rather than 
 in error; and preferring “a prudent nescience” to a 
 false knowledge. | 
 
 Celsus.—But people do not like to be found in igno-. 
 rance, and are ashamed to profess it. 
 
 Theologus.—To wish to appear what we are not is 
 hypocritical; and it is only a morbid modesty that 
 blushes to acknowledge a normal or proper ignorance. 
 
 Origen.—Men won’t distinguish between a commend- 
 able and a culpable ignorance. 
 
 Theologus.—Men are constantly making the distinc- 
 tion in daily life. Those who refuse to observe it in re- 
 ligion must bear the consequences. 
 
 Origen.—What a revolution it would produce in our 
 philosophies, if our learned men ceased to be dogmatic 
 when they should suspend their judgment ! 
 
 Celsus.—What a revolution would the application of 
 the same rule effect in the Christian community ! 
 
 Origen. — Well, no doubt, Christians are often too 
 hasty in forming their judgment, and plead a conscien- 
 tious conviction in defence of a rash decision. But our 
 creeds and confessions are always held in subordination 
 
 to the word of God; and we cannot go wrong in follow- 
 
 ing the Bible. 
 
 Celsus.—May you not go wrong in interpreting the 
 Bible? Moreover, your creeds and confessions are in 
 
MYSTERY AND CONTRADICTION, 229 
 
 great measure a theological reflection of different philo- 
 sophical schools. The charge, therefore, which you 
 brought against philosophers resiles upon theologians. 
 Moreover, not to speak of the ambiguities and doubtful 
 assertions which Christian creeds certainly contain, how 
 many a young or half-instructed man is called upon to 
 pronounce a solemn and dogmatic assertion on points, on 
 which a suspense of judgment would be more manly and 
 reasonable. 
 
 Lheologus.—It is not only in the improper use of 
 ecclesiastical symbols, that this evil manifests itself. That 
 man is prone to swallow a contradiction, rather than 
 stand silent and humble before a mystery—ready to pro- 
 fess a knowledge and belief in any thing, and assign the 
 shallowest reason for his belief, rather than delay deci- 
 sion while diligently and candidly seeking the truth, is 
 evident in a thousand forms. Even in those Christian 
 societies where there is no authoritative or recognised 
 creed, there may sometimes be found a stereotyped mass 
 of sentiment, which answers many of the purposes of a 
 creed, and which may also entail more serious evils. In 
 all classes of society, and in all the affairs of men, we find 
 this intellectual malady. The prevalence of premature 
 judgments, unauthorised decisions, and crude sentiments, 
 is an evil both general and inveterate. Nor is it lessened, 
 because it is so commonly concealed, or palliated, or de- 
 fended, under various pretences, such as patriotism, phil- 
 anthropy, and religion. Men would surely, if not 
 speedily, extricate themselves from the most painful and 
 
230 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 perplexing of their inconsistencies, if they would use their 
 
 understanding, as they use their feet, and follow the - 
 prudent maxim of Burke :—“ where he did not see his _ 
 
 way clearly, he would tread cautiously.” 
 
 In making some of the above statements, our design 
 may be misunderstood. It is not to overthrow, or de- 
 stroy, but to remove “ those things that are shaken, that 
 the things which cannot be shaken may remain.” In the 
 creeds of the churches, written and unwritten, there is 
 much invaluable truth in which all are agreed, but to make 
 this agreement manifest a winnowing process is required. 
 In building up the Christian Evidences, sctentzfically, 
 or rather in collecting materials for such a building, 
 much, very much has been well and validly done, 
 though the structure is by no means complete. And if 
 some readers have thought us tardy in expressing our 
 respect for the men whose works we have ventured to 
 criticise, it is not because we have not felt such emotion 
 deeply. Christian advocates and Christian arguments 
 have so much solid truth on their side, that they pass 
 with advantage through the most rigorous sifting and the 
 
 severest purgation. We do wish “ the wood and the hay © 
 
 and the stubble” to be burnt up; but nothing more. 
 Our motto is, Onward. 
 
DIALOGUE V. 
 PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 
 
 Lheologus.—As to the distinction between practical and 
 scientific or speculative views, is it not one, which is fre- 
 quently resorted to by the advocates of Christianity ? 
 
 Origen.—We do indeed adduce scientific or dogmatic 
 proof. ,‘ But, after all, to use the weighty words of Dr 
 Arnold, ‘ the real proof is the practical one; that is, let 
 a man live on the hypothesis of its falsehood, the prac- 
 tical result will be bad; that is, a man’s besetting and 
 constitutional faults will not be checked ; and some of his 
 noblest feelings will be unexercised, so that if he be right 
 in his opinions, truth and goodness are at variance with 
 one another, and falsehood is more favourable to our 
 moral perfection than truth ; which seems the most mon- 
 strous conclusion which the Hens mind can possibly ar- 
 Five at.’ ” } 
 
 Celsus. —If I understand your statement aright, it 
 amounts to this: that the practical and best evidence in 
 favour of Christianity consists in an individual's acting 
 upon its principles, or on the supposition that it is true, 
 
 * Infidelity, by Pearson, p. 38. 
 
Zon DIALOGUE V. 
 
 and that the reasonableness and sufficiency of this evi- 
 dence is manifested by the fact, that whoever acts upon 
 the supposition of its falsehood is reduced to the mon- 
 strous conclusion that truth and goodness are opposed to 
 each other. Admitting the force of this reasoning, it will 
 be necessary to find a clear and satisfactory answer to 
 these three questions: 1. How shall we 
 distinguish practical from scientific evi- 
 dence? 2. Is the practical evidence or proof sufficient of 
 itself, independently of the scientific ? and, 3. If so, what 
 additional or specific advantages follow from the scientific 
 
 Three questions. 
 
 proof ? 
 
 Theologus.—It is perfectly fair and most necessary 
 that these three questions should be distinctly ayswered. 
 This much will be conceded by all, that anything that 
 deserves the name of practical proof, must be such, as to 
 be appreciable by the mass of mankind, without literary 
 lore or scientific research, and if there be no such prac- 
 tical evidence in favour of the Christian religion, or if 
 this evidence by itself be not reasonable in its nature and 
 sufficient in quantity, the Christian belief of the common 
 people must be regarded as unintelligent and blind. 
 
 Celsus.—It was just now asserted that “the real proof 
 is the practical one.” Does this mean that by itself it is 
 sufficient and reasonable ? 
 
 Origen. —‘‘ The external and internal evidences of 
 Christianity constitute a mass of proof fully sufficient to 
 justify our belief in its truths; and, as if aware of the — 
 force of it, our modern infidels attack one part of it, and * — 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES, 230 
 
 represent us as if resting on that, to the exclusion of the 
 rest.” ! 
 
 Historical evidence Celsus.—Nay, my friend, it is not we 
 —Is # practical? ho do so alone, but the author from whom 
 you quote does so, when he says that “the read proof is 
 the practical one.” That many Christians rest on part 
 of the proof which is offered by others, to the exclusion 
 of the rest, or independently of the rest, is notorious. 
 Some illustrations of this fact have occurred in this dis- 
 cussion, and many more might be given. For example, 
 not a few have asserted that the historical evidence is 
 the sheet-anchor of your cause,—that it, and it alone, 
 is sufficient. Is it, then, scientific or practical? If it be 
 the only. satisfactory and impregnable proof, and yet be 
 not practical, but scientific, the faith of the common people 
 is nothing better than superstition. 
 
 Origen.—< What means this constant insinuation, that 
 historical evidence must be wholly without value to men 
 not learned in history? Is it not manifestly the senti- 
 ment of our nature—a sentiment so common and rooted 
 as to seem to be instinctive, that there is a credibility in 
 historical testimony, even as relating to the mass of man- 
 kind, sufficient to bring the remote past into a certain and 
 living connection with the present? Not only is it a fact, 
 that the least learned are influenced by historical testi- 
 mony as truly, if not as immediately, as the most learned, 
 _ but it is manifestly a law of Providence that it should be 
 so; and it remains to be shewn why the law which em- 
 
 * Infidelity, p. 330. 
 P 
 
234 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 braces testimony to this effect concerning Cromwell or 
 Alfred, should not embrace testimony to the same effect 
 concerning Paul and Esaias.”! 
 
 Celsus.—These statements are not precisely to the 
 point in hand. It is freely granted that ‘there is a 
 credibility in historical testimony, even as relating to the 
 mass of mankind, sufficient to bring the remote past into 
 a certain and living connection with the present.” The 
 question is, what is the nature of that connection? It is 
 admitted by you, that the unlearned are influenced by 
 historical testimony, not directly but only mediately ; is 
 that medium such as to be within the reach of the masses, 
 and is it such as will bear the pressure that is laid upon 
 it? Is the knowledge which a working man can attain 
 of Cromwell and Alfred, to use your own illustration, so 
 precise and authentic, as to be able to support all the 
 weight of his duty to God, and of his everlasting interests ? 
 The question is this: Are the historical evidences of 
 Christianity so palpable and accessible as to be within the 
 cognizance of the unlettered commonalty, and that in such 
 a shape as to form a reasonable and sure foundation for Pi 
 their religious belief? Besides, if there be a practical 
 evidence real and sufficient independently of the historical 
 evidence, as is often maintained, why the frequent effort 
 to make out that the historical is indeed practical proof ? 
 
 Origen.—* Beier and Hisrory God has joined, nor 
 shall man, to the end of time, succeed in effecting a divorce. 
 Religion, disjoined from History, is a flickering candle, 
 
 * Infidelity, p. 186. . 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 235 
 
 held in the hand of one who looks back upon utter dark- 
 ness behind him, and looks into the blackness of darkness 
 in front of him,” ! 
 
 Celsus.—These remarks are somewhat loose, and there- 
 fore of little argumentative value. Please to explain 
 yourself more at length. 
 
 Origen.— Culture has much to do with that faculty 
 of the understanding on which history lays a firm hold. 
 Apart from a certain amount of culture, we do not find 
 that history, as a reality past, comes home to the intel- 
 lectual consciousness. Hence springs a disadvantage attach- 
 ing, in the nature of things, to the labours of those who aim 
 to impart an historic belief to the masses of the people, 
 in the way of definite proof. The process finds an indis- 
 pensable quality wanting in those who are the subjects 
 of it; hence too, of course, comes that poor advantage 
 which is snatched at by those whose aim it is to loosen 
 an historic belief from the minds of the same classes. 
 There is nothing of arrogance in what is here alleged.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—According to this representation of the case, 
 I can conceive of an intelligent martyrdom in the primi- 
 tive age of Christianity among the uninstructed classes 
 of society, but I perceive no room for such a martyrdom 
 among the same classes in later times. 
 
 Origen.—How so ? 
 
 Celsus.—State the ground which supported, as you 
 - suppose, the primitive martyrs in their fiery trial. 
 Origen.—“ The ground of that Christian fortitude 
 1 Restoration of Belief, p. 14. 2 1b. pada 
 
236 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 which, in the end, prevailed over the polytheism of the 
 State, was a Beier toward a PERSON; it was not an 
 opinion as to a doctrine: and here we should take care 
 to distinguish between the various motives that might 
 come in to sustain the courage of a martyr in his extre- 
 mity of suffering, and the onE Grounp on which his 
 constancy rested. Considerations of personal honour, or 
 the fear of eternal punishment, or other motives, would 
 have shewn little intrinsic force, if they had rested upon 
 an opinion: their power sprang from their connection 
 with a definite historic belief.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—Well, then, if “a definite historic belief” be 
 the “ one ground” of an intelligent martyrdom, hew can 
 a martyrdom of this character be found among the mass 
 of modern professing Christians, when the very “process 
 of imparting an historic belief to them finds in them an 
 indispensable quality wanting ? ” 
 
 Origen.—* Tn all departments of knowledge it is the 
 Resutts that are for the many ; but the Proczss through 
 which results have been reached are for the few. Espe- 
 cially must it be so in the departments of history and 
 criticism. Results may be rendered into the vernacular ; 
 and when thus translated they become public property. 
 Processes of inquiry are carried forward in symbol, and 
 these signs always imply that a knowledge is already 
 possessed, ten times outmeasuring that to which the bare 
 symbol gives expression. The imperfectly educated suf- 
 fer no real damage on this ground, so long as they are 
 
 * Restoration of Belief, pp. 77, 78. 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 237 
 
 not tampered with by sophists. Where the Press, the 
 Pulpit, the Platform, the Class-room, are quite free, 
 popular incompetency, as to matters of science or of 
 learning, as it cannot be much abused by the privileged, 
 so should it not be wrought upon, flattered, and cajoled 
 by ambitious declaimers.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—These statements reveal distinctly the diff- 
 culty which I have been endeavouring to explain. It is 
 maintained, that the historical evidences are the most, if 
 not the only, available and valid proof, and that, of 
 course, they are practical and popular; while at the same 
 time it appears that there is a “ popular incompetency,” 
 in dealing with these evidences; and that “ the imper- 
 fectly educated suffer no real damage on this ground,” 
 only ‘so long as they are not tampered with by sophists.”’ 
 It is mere trifling to tell us, that this “‘ popular incom- 
 petency” “should not be wrought upon, flattered, and 
 cajoled by ambitious declaimers.” When it 7s so wrought 
 upon, what are the people to do? Is the following apos- 
 tolical injunction not addressed to the common people, or 
 has it been recently repealed :—‘‘ Beloved, believe not 
 every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God?” 
 
 Origen.—These things cannot be altered, and ‘“ the 
 inference hence resulting is just this—that, knowing 
 _ these things, the well-informed, the honestly-intending, 
 the seriously-minded, will scorn the easy triumph of 
 trampling in the dust the Religious Belief of the people 
 —the uneducated and the half-educated.” * 
 
 ' Restoration of Belief, p. 18. 2 The p.20: 
 
238 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 Celsus.—And this is the conclusion of the whole mat- 
 ter— “it is an easy triumph to trample in the dust the 
 Religious Belief of the people!” Is this not quite as 
 bad in your estimation as what the German philoso- 
 phy says about the blind and unintelligent faith of the 
 masses ¢ 
 
 Theologus.—It thus appears, that what are generally 
 
 known as the historical evidences of Christianity are not | 
 
 so patent to the popular mind, as to form by themselves 
 a sure and reasonable ground of their belief. Before 
 
 eee eee proceeding to inquire, is there no such 
 dence—how far sci- practical evidence? it may be well to ask, 
 oe what is the scientific value of the histo- 
 rical evidences ? 
 
 Origen.—It will not be doubted that “ history is solid 
 ground; or, to exclude exceptions, let us say that, within 
 the region it embraces, perfectly solid ground is dis- 
 coverable in all directions.” | 
 
 Celsus.—Explain what you mean by “ solid ground.” 
 
 Origen.—Solid ground is manifest, “ when certain his- 
 toric positions are brought into comparison, as to their 
 demonstrative value, with any assumed principles of ab- 
 stract science (not mathematical). It is certain that the 
 Normans brought the Saxons under their sway in the 
 eleventh century; but it is questionable whether a chi- 
 valrous race will always succeed in vanquishing an agri- 
 cultural and a trading people.” 2 
 
 Celsus.—Strictly speaking, the certainty of history, as 
 
 * Restoration of Belief, p. 16. SID poli 
 
 Sirti: 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 239 
 
 history, lies wholly in its facts. Religious Belief includes 
 the ought, as well as the is. But you can never deduce 
 what ought to be solely from the things that are or have 
 been. The question may be stated otherwise, thus If 
 miracles, looked upon merely as works of power, be suf- 
 ficient in themselves to establish the truth of Christianity, 
 then your historical evidences may be symmetrical and 
 strictly scientific. But if the structure of your religion 
 be made to rest upon miracles only in conjunction with 
 certain moral principles or spiritual congruities, then, till 
 these principles or congruities be stated and vindicated 
 in a scientific form, your proof 1s, of course, to be 
 regarded as scientifically incomplete. Either the whole 
 weight of Christianity rests upon its miracles alone, or 
 whatever else is associated with miracles to support your 
 religion has to be logically expounded. 
 
 Origen.—I am aware that many eminent men take 
 the one side of this alternative, and many as eminent 
 take the other. 
 
 Oelsus.—So here again there is a vital and funda- 
 mental contradiction among the defenders of Chris- 
 tianity! Which side do you take? 
 
 Origen.—* I can imagine myself to have so profound 
 a sense of primary moral truths, as that miracles would 
 be confluent with the deep movements of the soul, and 
 
 » 4] 
 
 would produce no surge. “ The miracles of the evan- 
 gelic history come to us with the force of CoNnGRUITY, 
 
 . just so far as we can bring ourselves morally within the 
 
 1 Restoration of Belief, p. 224. 
 
240 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 splendour of those eternal verities which are of the sub- 
 stance of the Gospel.”’ “Throughout the epistles (of 
 the New Testament) morality is made to rest upon the 
 solid basis of universal and permanent religious considera- 
 
 tions.” ? The writers of these epistles “do not throw 
 
 the stress of any ethical argument upon the supernatural 
 attestations of their message.”* “It is my steadfast 
 conviction that Christianity will not henceforth maintain 
 its ground, as related to the present intellectual condi- 
 tion of instructed communities, so long as ‘ Christian 
 apologists’ (so called) take up a position upon the ‘ out- 
 works,’ or spend their efforts upon the well-meant but 
 fruitless endeavour to put forward the ‘ Historic Evi- 
 dences,’ apart from that Princrpa Trutu, which forms 
 the substance of the Gospel. So long as this Principal 
 Truth does not occupy its due position in the mind and 
 faith of the writer, and so long as it is not boldly pre. 
 sented to the mind of the reader, there is a conscious- 
 ness, on both sides, of an interior incoherence in the Sys- 
 tem itself: there is a painful and perplexing feeling of 
 incongruity, which sets these evidences a jarring, as 
 well in a logical as in a moral sense, one against an- 
 other.” 3 
 
 Oelsus.— Very good. It is abundantly obvious, then, 
 that till this Principal Truth be not only found, but 
 found to be “a truth ;” till « the solid basis of universal 
 and permanent religious considerations” be laid bare to 
 inspection ; till the “eternal verities which are of the 
 
 ’ Restoration, p. 224. * Tbhopp: 173,174: 5 Ib. p. 81%: 
 
a 
 
 PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 241 
 
 substance of the Gospel,” or “ primary moral truths,” be 
 investigated, and stated and vindicated, the historic evi- 
 dences must be considered as scientifically incomplete ; 
 and you are necessarily driven in defence of Christianity 
 to speculative or ethical Philosophy. 
 
 Origen.—God forbid; for, “however abundant may 
 be the means available for constructing a Theistic Doc- 
 trine, and however irresistibly conclusive the argument 
 may be on this ground, yet, if we rigidly deduct from it, 
 as we ought, all aids and materials that are due, directly 
 or indirectly, to the Hebrew and Christian canonical 
 books, we then find ourselves in an undefended—an in- 
 defensible position as towards the very darkest of those 
 surmises which take their rise from that spectacle of 
 misery and disorder which the human family has every- 
 where, and has always, presented. On this road, has 
 not the Terminus been reached long ago? If it were 
 required of us “to report progress” in the department 
 of Abstract Philosophy, let me be told whether, as honest 
 men, we could affirm that those who profess to shake off 
 every restraint of theological bias and religious preju- 
 dice, have at length reached a scientific position, which 
 is so solidly based, and which is so well defined, as that 
 it commands the assent, and may boast the adherence of 
 all well-constituted and disciplined minds? If there be 
 any such Philosophy which is now available as a resting- 
 place for the human mind, it must surely be easy to 
 name it. No such Philosophy can be named.” * 
 
 1 Restoration, pp. 318, 319. 
 
242 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 Celsus.—But it is unquestionable that till such a Phi- 
 losophy can be named your historical argument is defec- 
 tive and inconclusive on your own shewing. You have 
 reduced yourself to the necessity of travelling on this 
 road, and if the Terminus be already reached, and be so 
 dark and dreadful as you have represented it to be, 
 Christianity should no longer refuse to shake hands with 
 infidelity as her sister and friend. 
 
 Theologus.—It is a mere gratuitous assumption, to say 
 that the Terminus has been reached,—that men can 
 achieve no more than has been already done in the field 
 of abstract thought or ethical science. It is another illus- 
 tration of the fallacy, which reasons from what has been 
 done in moral questions, to what might have been done, 
 
 or what ought to be done, or what may yet be achieved. © 
 
 There is, and there can be, no resource against philoso- 
 phical scepticism, but in the satisfactory establishment of 
 the Fundamental Principles of human belief. If this 
 work is not yet performed, it must be done; and the 
 sooner the better. 
 
 Origen.—* You will not tell me that a consciousness is 
 unreal, merely because I fail in my endeavours to give it 
 intelligible expression, or indeed to put it into words at 
 all. Do not the uncultured minds around us possess a 
 genuine consciousness, as to moral principles, in behalf 
 of which, either to explain or to defend them, they would 
 not have a word to say?” } 
 
 Celsus.—You are now away from the scientific argu- 
 
 * Restoration, p. 226. 
 
 eit 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 243 
 
 ment, and taking refuge in the practical. You are aban- 
 doning the position which the same author thus marks 
 out :—“ The earliest developed of the beneficial results 
 of an outburst of Infidelity is this, that it compels intelli- 
 gent Christian men to look anew to the ground on which 
 they stand, to sift the ‘Evidences,’ and thus to regain 
 logical possession of their religious persuasion.” ' Here, 
 then, it is distinctly avowed that your controversy with 
 us tends to enable you to regain in another form what 
 you already possessed. You were persuaded of the truth 
 of Christianity before you ever listened to an infidel ar- 
 gument. Your investigation of these arguments does not 
 shake your faith, but gives you a logical possession of 
 that faith. Now, we have just seen that a logical pos- 
 session of that faith implies a knowledge not only of 
 certain historical facts, but of certain “primary moral 
 truths” also. And when we ask for a logical statement 
 of these primary moral truths, we are referred, on the 
 one hand, to the dense and troubled darkness of Abstract 
 Philosophy, and on the other hand, to the misty vague- 
 ness of the popular consciousness. Is this not an evasion ? 
 
 Origen.—Let us, then, take the practical view of the 
 case. 
 
 Celsus.—You cannot do so, without ad- 
 journing, for the time being, its scientific 
 aspect; and in doing so, we beg to recall your attention 
 to the three questions proposed in the earlier part of this 
 dialogue. 
 
 Practical Evidence. 
 
 1 Restoration, p. 247. 
 
244 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 Origen.—* Those of our convictions upon which we 
 are accustomed to act with the most unhesitating confi- 
 dence, and to which we commend ourselves without fear, 
 when life itself, or estate, is at risk, are not, or seldom 
 are, those which we may obtain by processes of catenary 
 deduction ; or by a course of reasoning which, in a tech- 
 nical sense, is logical. It is not so. Man, such as we 
 find him, on the beaten road of real life, is no such syllo- 
 gistic automaton, as that he should bring propositions in 
 threes to bear upon the business and conduct of every 
 day. Pedants do this, and break their heads in conse- 
 quence.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—Ha! So you think some other men break 
 their heads as well as infidels? What, then, is your 
 practical reason for being a Christian—a reason, which 
 shall stand clear and independent of all learned lumber 
 and misty abstractions, and which shall be palpable and 
 satisfactory to an untutored mind ? 
 
 Origen.— It is on no ground of its abstract credi- 
 bility, that this fundamental fact of the Christian life 
 (the Resurrection of the Lord Jesus) is accepted by those 
 in whom that life has indeed had its commencement. As 
 to those of them who are informed and intelligent, they 
 can at all times fall back upon that body of evidence 
 which secures them against disbelief. But going far 
 beyond any such merely intellectual persuasion, Christ’s 
 true disciples have a sense of the import of His resurrec- 
 tion, which renders them, except as towards others, indif- 
 
 * Restoration, pp. 220, 221. 
 
 ¢ * ee 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 245 
 
 ferent to logical methods of proof. Ask them for a reason 
 of their faith, and they can well meet the challenge; but 
 having done so, they retire to a ground of consciousness, 
 concerning which no distinct conveyance can be made 
 from mind to mind, through the medium of language. 
 Verbal propositions do not represent those intuitions 
 within the circle of which this conviction takes place.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—If I understand the statements which you 
 have adduced, they amount to this, that the true and 
 powerful reason why a man becomes a Christian is to be 
 found, not in “ processes of catenary deduction,” but ina 
 “sense,” or feeling, which renders believers, so far as they 
 are themselves concerned, “ indifferent to logical methods 
 of proof.” An individual becomes a Christian, not by 
 “bringing propositions in threes to bear upon the busi- 
 ness,” but on ‘‘a ground of consciousness concerning 
 which no distinct conveyance can be made from mind to 
 mind, through the medium of language.” <A Christian 
 belief is a “ conviction” taking place among “ intui- 
 tions,” which “ verbal propositions do not represent.” If 
 nothing more than this can be said, you only exchange a 
 * syllogistic” for a superstitious “ automaton.” 
 
 Origen.—I shall now quote from another author, who, 
 I hope, will be able to answer your inquiries. 
 
 Celsus.— Well, then, does he acknowledge the distinc- 
 tion between the practical and the scientific; and the 
 independence and sufliciency of the former ? 
 
 Origen.—Yes. For example, he remarks, “ on specu- 
 
 1 Restoration, pp. 344, 345. 
 
246 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 lative grounds, it is impossible to establish a theory of 
 either freedom or necessity ; but, on practical grounds, 
 there are reasons of the strongest kind for believing 
 that man is really free and able to originate from him- 
 self.” * 
 
 Celsus.—But this does not appear to be a case where 
 the distinction, as properly understood, applies. His 
 reasoning is to this effect, that we accept free-will as a 
 fact—but a fact which we cannot explain. Now when- 
 ever we attempt to explain this fact, we look at it scienti- 
 fically ; and when in common life we act under the con- 
 viction that we ourselves and our neighbours are respon- 
 sible, we take the fact practically. As a fact, it does not 
 rest on practical grounds alone, but, like every other 
 fact, on grounds common to practice and to speculation. 
 
 ey nh Theologus.—The proper distinction be- 
 tween Practice tween practical and scientific knowledges 
 and Speen seems to be this: Practical knowledge is 
 knowledge of an object in its relations to our own personal 
 interests. Speculative or scientific knowledge is know- 
 ledge of an object in its relations to other objects gener- 
 ally. 
 
 Origen.—In this sense the author referred to acknow- 
 ledges the distinction in religion. He says, “ We have 
 endeavoured to estimate the argument from the idea of 
 God in human nature. It conveys truth to the ignorant, 
 but cannot give scientific knowledge till it has been estab- 
 lished on general principles.”* Again, he remarks, “We 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. i. pp. 267, 268. 2 Tb, vol. ii. p. 278. 
 
 ee 
 
sa 
 
 PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 247 
 
 are to investigate the reasons of this belief, — reasons 
 which, before examination, have their influence on the 
 mind.” ?} 
 
 Celsus.—Very well. The important question has now 
 to be considered: Is the truth which is conveyed to the 
 ignorant, while yet it is not “established on general 
 principles,” and has not assumed the form of ‘scientific 
 knowledge”—real truth? Can it be depended upon and 
 vindicated as such? If not, what is its value? Are the 
 reasons of your faith which influence your mind, before a 
 scientific examination of them, valid apart from that ex- 
 amination? And if they are valid, how shall we know 
 that they are valid and good ? 
 
 Origen.—Certainly they are to be regarded as good 
 and valid. For we do not “speak of the Existence of 
 the Supreme Being as a truth which can reasonably be 
 called in question. It is a truth as natural to the mind 
 as the existence of itself or of an outward world, and can- 
 not be represented as doubtful, but by the same audacity 
 of scepticism.”? “ Speculative inquiries are not to be 
 evaded, by assuming the result of any system as received. 
 Yet need we not, on this account, either despair of phi- 
 
 _ losophy, or regard the great truth of theology as hanging 
 
 in uncertainty, till philosophers have agreed upon their 
 principles.”? Tt is one which no inquiry can unsettle, 
 no scrutiny can invalidate.’’4 
 
 Celsus. — But the same author virtually abandons 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. i. p. 14. ? Tb. vol. i. p. 43. 
 “by p..29: aT p26. 
 
248 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 these positions, when he says: ‘‘ Man may know by the 
 teaching of nature: he cannot know that he knows with- 
 out reflection. He needs philosophy to estimate the 
 value of his cognitions, and to give them currency.”! 
 Our practical knowledge is worthless unless we know 
 that it is valid. That it is not valid, is plainly implied 
 in the following statement. “It is impossible to estab- 
 lish the great truth of the Being of God on a firm basis, 
 without investigating the principles of reason and the 
 limits of knowledge, and examining the procedure of the 
 mind in its acquirement of truth.”? If this be correct, 
 “the great truth of theology” must be regarded “as 
 hanging in uncertainty, till philosophers have agreed 
 upon their principles.” 
 
 Origen.—But “if strict proof be impossible, we may 
 expect that it can be shewn to be impossible, and may 
 see good reason to be satisfied without it. If we have 
 moral reasons and practical proofs, we may perhaps know 
 them to be such as the case admits of, and may ‘find 
 them to be as convincing on this subject as exact demon- 
 stration in geometry.’’? 
 
 Celsus.—It appears, then, that this author admits a 
 practical knowledge, as well as a speculative. When he 
 speaks of the latter, he disparages, and even in some 
 instances invalidates, the former. Then when the philo- 
 sophic argument leads him into unfathomed depths and 
 unsettled controversies, he retires back for support upon 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. i. pp. 29, 30. 2 Ib. pp. 8, 9, see p. 292. 
 Ib; pp 9,10: 
 
ee 
 
 PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 249 
 
 practical proofs. At one time, the practical evidence 
 seems in his estimation to be all in all, but anon it must 
 be supported and supplemented by scientific reflection. 
 Again, it seems as if religion were nought till vindicated 
 by philosophy, and when philosophy is rather difficult 
 to manage, then the reader is treated with a popular de- 
 monstration. 
 
 Lheologus.—There is, undoubtedly, too much of this 
 vicious reasoning in almost all the writers of the day. If 
 the practical evidence in favour of religion be insufficient 
 or invalid, then the faith of the common people must be 
 blind and superstitious. If it be sufficient and valid, then 
 every disbeliever will be guilty, and may be easily con-_ 
 vinced of sin. If the scientific evidence be yet incom- 
 plete, there is no loss sustained in making the acknow- 
 ledgment, and there is work to fill the hands of our re- 
 flecting men. But to confound the two together, and to 
 be constantly shifting ground from the one to the other, 
 —to profess to be scientific in order to be reasonable, 
 and then be content to be practical because our science 
 breaks down, is as injurious to Christianity asit is de- 
 grading to the understanding. 
 
 Celsus.—A. defence of religion, then, which ignores the 
 practical evidence altogether, must in your estimation be 
 very imperfect ; since it professedly rests the weight of 
 religion upon the scientific evidence, which is difficult to 
 be understood, even though it were in every respect 
 satisfactory. 
 
 Lheologus. — This is unhappily the case with the 
 Q 
 
250 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 volume entitled “‘ Theism;” so that its author virtually 
 acknowledges that the faith of the common people is des- 
 titute in their minds of a reasonable foundation. His 
 theme certainly calls upon him to vindicate the faith of 
 unlettered men; and this he has not even attempted to 
 do. 
 
 Origen.—It is scarcely correct to say, that he has en- 
 tirely overlooked the practical aspect of the question. In 
 a note he remarks, that if reason were taken in a cer- 
 tain sense, it and faith “ would be clearly seen to form a 
 unity of power, in which the whole soul, intellectually and 
 practically, goes forth towards the truth.” ' 
 
 Celsus.—This does not make the matter any. better ; 
 for if his language has any meaning as regards the point 
 immediately before us, it seems to imply, that what is 
 practical is not intellectual, or something of that sort. H 
 so, it denies intelligence in the belief of the uninstructed, 
 which is just one of our favourite positions. 
 
 Origen.—Again, he observes: pantheism “may bid 
 man live purely as reason dictates; but man, in his 
 common life, is not governed by the clearness of his 
 intellect, but by the rectitude of his affections and his 
 will.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—This evidently means that there is a palpable 
 distinction between intellectual clearness and the morality 
 of common life. There is of course a plain distinction be- 
 tween moral rectitude on practical questions, and clear- 
 ness of intellect on other questions not of a practical 
 
 ‘Theis, p. 278. 2 Ib. p. 374. 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIEIC KNOWLEDGES. 251 
 
 nature. But to suppose, as this author seems to do, that 
 on the very same questions of practical morality there 
 may be rectitude of the affections and will, and at the 
 same time dimness and obfuscation of the intellect, is to 
 reduce morality and religion to a contemptible supersti- 
 tion. We need ask no more for what you style infidelity, 
 than what this author has conceded, that “it bids man 
 live purely as reason dictates !!” 
 
 Origen.—Let me introduce to your notice a writer who 
 formally announces, that he “has appealed from specula- 
 tive dogmatism to undeniable facts and universally recog- 
 nised principles.”' 
 
 Celsus.—I shall be glad to hear how he states the 
 evidence ; although it is obvious to those who read his 
 work that his argument as a whole is addressed to the 
 cultivated classes of society, and could not be appreciated 
 by the unlettered and rude. 
 
 Origen.—He remarks, for example, “ Any lengthened 
 process of reasoning, if constituted the instrument of 
 belief, would have limited the benefits of the supposed 
 revelation to a very narrow minority. By far the 
 greater portion of men are incapable of estimating evi- 
 dence, the force of which depends upon a nice logical per- 
 ception—and the very want of exercise which ineapaci- 
 tates them for close reasoning, indisposes them also to 
 attempt it. Had it, therefore, been possible to authenti- 
 cate Christ’s mission by other and more elaborate proof 
 than that supplied by miracles, there would still remain 
 
 ’ Bases of Belief, p. v. in the preface. 
 
Zou DIALOGUE V. 
 
 sufficient reason for resorting to the latter. They speak 
 to men’s convictions in intelligible and homely language. 
 Their testimony requires no translation by the more 
 intellectual to make its force felt by rude and uncultivated 
 minds. Ignorant people, common people, busy people, 
 can understand and appreciate it. And of such the 
 world mainly consists.” } 
 
 Celsus.—So far well. But in this aspect of the case, 
 the evidence of miracles is available only for those who 
 witnessed them, or who lived ne&r the time and place of 
 their occurrence ; certainly not for those who live centu- 
 ries afterwards. To make it available for men now-a- 
 days, historical criticism must be resorted to. Does not 
 your author, accordingly, proceed to a disquisition on the 
 historical evidences? 
 
 Origen.—No doubt he does. 
 
 Celsus.—How then does he supply for the present 
 generation the evidence whose character he has so well 
 described ¢ 
 
 peu pint 2H f. Origen.—He says, ‘“‘ assuming the facts 
 the conscience of (stated in the New Testament) to contain 
 ai a divine revelation, that interpretation of 
 their spiritual meaning which is found to be congruous 
 with our religious consciousness may complete our con- 
 viction that we are rightly instructed in the mind of God. 
 This congruity is, toa great extent, the ultimate basis 
 of very much, if not most, of the actual belief existing in 
 the Christian world.”? ! 
 
 1 Bases of Belief, p. 189. ? Tb. p. 366. 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 253 
 
 Celsus.—But may not our religious consciousness mis- 
 lead us, and be at fault? 
 
 Origen.—* Men are misled easily enough by sophistry, 
 by assumption, by ecclesiastical authority, but seldom 
 by the testimony of their religious consciousness that it 
 has found a suitable object. ‘He that doeth the will of 
 my Father, shall know of the doctrine whether it be of 
 God or not.’ Yes! practical experience is a safer instruc- 
 tor in this school than theoretic certainty. As touching 
 theological science, it may often be wrong—but as touch- 
 ing religious truth, it is for the most part right.” } 
 
 Celsus.—On this supposition, how do you account for 
 the people asking Aaron to make the golden calf, and for 
 the difficulty of converting heathen nations to Chris- 
 tianity? Your argument appears to be similar to an old 
 maxim, vou populi vow dei; were it not completely inva- 
 lidated by claiming for religious consciousness a semi- 
 infallibility which is refused to the other faculties of the 
 mind. Moreover, if you admit that this religious con- 
 sciousness may err, even though it be but “seldom,” and 
 that it is right, not always, but only “for the most 
 part,” you acknowledge that it is really deceptive; and 
 if it cannot be depended upon invariably, it cannot be 
 depended upon at all. 
 
 Lheologus.—The principles which have been already 
 developed in this discussion enable us satisfactorily to 
 
 _ meet these objections. The congruity or harmony be- 
 
 tween our religious consciousness and the Bible is a prac- 
 * Bases of Belief, p. 368. 
 
254 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 tical argument in favour of Christianity, and is obviously 
 available to all men. Its validity and reasonableness can 
 be maintained, however, only on these conditions,—that 
 by religious consciousness we mean the religious convic- 
 tions of those only who diligently and honestly seek reli- 
 gious truth, and also that the convictions of men on any 
 point, on which they diligently and honestly seek the 
 truth, will not be erroneous. 
 
 Origen.—You have already stated the distinction be- 
 tween practical and speculative knowledge, namely, that 
 the former regards its object in its relations to our own 
 personal interests, and the latter regards its object in its 
 general relations to other objects. How do you shew 
 that the former is reasonable and valid without the 
 latter ? 
 
 Practical Evidence 2 /"00409Us:—Many a man can build a 
 of itself valid and substantial bridge, who cannot discuss its 
 a: theory on the principles of the differential 
 calculus. This knowledge is practical, because it is 
 within the reach of every man of common intelligence 
 and care, and because it refers to a matter of daily ad- 
 vantage. This knowledge is reasonable, because animals 
 destitute of the human understanding cannot build a 
 bridge. This knowledge is valid, for the bridge answers 
 the purpose of its construction. 
 
 Origen.—Please to state, then, the practical evidence 
 in favour of Christianity. 
 
 Theologus.—It may be stated in various forms. One 
 has been already given: The congruity and correspon- 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 255 
 
 dence between the statements of the Bible and the con- 
 sciences of men; that is, of those men who are careful 
 and candid in seeking the truth. This evidence is prac- 
 tical, because it is within the reach of all, and deals in 
 matters bearing directly on the best interests of every 
 man. It is reasonable, because without reason it cannot 
 be appreciated. It is valid, because it leads to a conclu- 
 sion of great and immediate advantage. 
 
 Origen.—Can you state this practical evidence in an- 
 other form ? 
 
 Theologus.—Here is a very satisfactory statement of 
 jt, which I shall transcribe from a hand-bill published for 
 gratuitous circulation among the people.—“‘ Well, Hodge,’ 
 said a smart-looking Londoner to a plain cottager, who 
 was on his way home from church, ‘so you are trudging 
 home after taking the benefit of the fine balmy breezes 
 in the country this morning.’ ‘ Sir,’ said the man, ‘ I have 
 not been strolling about this sacred morning, wasting my 
 time in idleness, and neglecting the duties of religion; 
 but I have been to the house of God, to worship Him, and 
 to hear His holy word.’ ‘ Ah! what, you are one of those 
 simpletons that, in these country places, are weak enough 
 to believe the Bible. Depend upon it, my man, that book 
 is nothing but a pack of nonsense; and none but weak 
 and ignorant people now think it true.’ ‘ Well, Mr 
 Stranger, but do you know, weak and ignorant as we 
 country people are, we like to have two strings to our 
 bow!’ ‘Two strings to your bow! What do you mean 
 by that?’ ‘Why, sir, I mean that to believe the Bible, 
 
256 . DIALOGUE V. 
 
 and act up to it, is like having two strings to my bow; 
 for even should it turn out to be untrue, I shall have 
 been a better and happier man in this world for living 
 according to its dictates; and so it will be for my good 
 in that respect—there is one string; and if it should 
 prove true, it will be better for me in the world to come 
 —there is another string ; and a pretty strong one it is. 
 But, sir, if you disbelieve the Bible, and on that account 
 do not live as it requires, you have not one string to your 
 bow. And, oh! if its tremendous threats prove true, 
 think, oh think! what will become of you then?’ This 
 plain appeal to common sense silenced the gainsayer, and 
 afforded proof that he was not quite so wise as he had 
 supposed.” 
 
 Origen.—But do you really maintain that such a clear 
 and short cut to a conclusion so momentous is valid and 
 satisfactory, even in the eye of hostile criticism ? 
 
 Theologus.—Undoubtedly it is. What objection can 
 be urged against it? 
 
 Origen. —Y our conclusion in the above argument restson 
 a probability, not on a certainty. It is all made up of ifs. 
 
 Lheologus.—To a great extent it is; but it is based 
 upon a principle than which no one is more clear or cer- 
 tain in any of the sciences; namely, that in practical 
 affairs men should avoid all risk, and invariably prefer 
 the safe side. In the case before us, the prncipie is as 
 unquestionable as its application. 
 
 Origen.—Is this nut-shell evidence of itself sufficient 
 to bear the weight of martyrdom ? 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 257 
 
 Theologus.—Why not? Is it not more reasonable, and 
 manly, and noble, to lose our mortal life, than even risk, 
 or expose to danger, our life eternal? We say not, how- 
 ever, that any martyr has been left to pass through a 
 fatal ordeal sustained by this evidence alone. 
 
 Origen.—What advantages are obtained by making 
 the practical evidence independent of the scientific, and 
 by itself valid and sufficient ? 
 
 Theologus.—The responsibility of the masses is main- 
 tained inviolate, and the faith of illiterate Christians is 
 vindicated as intelligent and praiseworthy, against the 
 insinuations and scoffs of learned pride and philosophic 
 vanity. Onno other principle can these all-important 
 positions be consistently maintained. 
 
 Origen.—lIs there any other advantage ? 
 
 Theologus.—There is one other, of the very utmost 
 importance. We are led, or rather forced, to a conclu- 
 sion, in which we find ourselves entirely at one with the 
 statements of the Bible and the sympathies of Christian 
 men, namely, that whenever a decided neglect or rejec- 
 tion of the gospel of Christ is manifested, and an attempt 
 made to excuse or justify this rejection or neglect, on 
 abstruse speculative and critical grounds, the true source 
 of this scientific error or speculative aberration is to be 
 found in practical guilt. 
 
 Origen.—Does this conclusion hold good in other mat- 
 ters, when applied to them, as you have now applied it 
 to Christianity ? 
 
 Theologus.—Most certainly. The man who disregards 
 
258 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 some well tried, practical maxim, out of deference to 
 some speculative crotchet, in any of the affairs of life, it 
 matters not what, is justly set down as a simpleton. 
 Many thought that the impracticability of railroads and 
 steam locomotives was demonstrated before they were 
 constructed. To profess to believe in that demonstration 
 now, is something the same as professing to reject the 
 New Testament for philosophic reasons. 
 
 Origen.—If the practical evidence be in itself reason- 
 able and sufficient, what need is there at all of scientific 
 evidence ? 
 
 Lheologus. —- What need is there of science in any 
 other department of human life ? 
 
 Advantages of  . Origen.—Science is needed, for example, 
 piilosophy: in astronomy and mechanics to rectify and 
 increase our practical knowledge. But you will not as- 
 sert that a scientific elaboration of the evidences or doc- 
 trines of Christianity will confer a similar advantage on 
 practical religion ? 
 
 Theologus. — If the assertion be properly explained 
 and understood, we see no reason for shrinking from it, 
 but many reasons for its adoption. 
 
 Origen.—Indeed, you surprise me. The apostle Paul 
 says, “ Beware lest any man spoil you through philo- 
 sophy and vain deceit ;” and you are directing us to 
 philosophy for the improvement of our practical reli- 
 gion | 3 
 
 Lheologus. — Do you suppose, that the apostle spoke 
 thus of a true and sound philosophy? And you may 
 
 EEN OPN Shiai eae Se eae 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 259 
 
 depend upon this, that if the right philosophy can do us 
 no good, a wrong philpsophy could do us no harm. 
 
 Origen. — The Bible, and the Bible alone, is the reli- 
 gion of Protestants. You are denying this, and assert- 
 ing that without philosophy our religion is imperfect. 
 
 Theologus.—It is my object to show you how a man, 
 as an intelligent and responsible being, can be a Chris- 
 tian without philosophy—a position which is rarely ex- 
 plained or defended in anything like a satisfactory man- 
 ner in the mass of our Christian literature. And now 
 when I affirm that the full development of the Christian 
 life, individually and socially, is dependent upon the ela- 
 boration of critical and ethical philosophy, I am not lead- 
 ing you away from the Word of God. I am only affirm- 
 ing what seems to have been often proved, that a mature 
 and proper interpretation of many portions of God’s 
 Word is reached only through scientific labours. 
 
 Origen. — Do you then draw the same distinction be- 
 tween art and science in religion, as in everything else ? 
 
 Theologus.—Undoubtedly. Will you explain the dis- 
 tinction as it is held generally ? 
 
 Origen.—Dr Whewell in his Philosophy of the Induc- 
 tive Sciences says (v. li. p. 205), “I have already en- 
 deavoured to shew, that the advance of the arts which 
 give us a command over the powers of nature, is gene- 
 rally prior to the formation of exact and speculative 
 knowledge concerning those powers. But art, which is 
 thus the predecessor of science, is, among nations of acute 
 and active intellects, usually its parent.” 
 
260 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 Theologus.—There is in every art, even in its rudest 
 state, some portion of true practical knowledge. The 
 re-action of science upon any art in promoting its im- 
 provement does not consist in giving certainty to the 
 true knowledge already involved in the practice of the 
 art, but in adding to that knowledge. Thus savages in 
 constructing the roughest raft to cross a river have un- 
 doubtedly some amount of true knowledge, which they 
 turn to good account. Science, whatever improvements 
 it may effect upon the raft, does not attempt to rectify 
 that knowledge, but is based upon it ;—does not enable 
 man to do a different thing from what he did before, but 
 to do the same thing more speedily, economically, and 
 elegantly. Improvements in the arts of life by the dis- 
 coveries of science do not give us new desires; they only 
 stimulate and enlarge the desires common to human na- 
 ture by multiplying and diversifying the means of their 
 gratification. 
 
 True practical knowledge is sufficient for its own pro- 
 per and proposed end, and is, therefore, final and satis- 
 factory. The savage wishes to cross a river; his raft 
 however rude answers this purpose. Speculative know- 
 ledge, on the other hand, even when true, always comes 
 short of its own proposed and proper end; for its aim is 
 to know to the utmost. That which is defective, when 
 tested by its own avowed and inherent purpose, must be 
 in some measure unsatisfactory. Since, then, we cannot 
 but continually feel some deficiency or gap in our specu- 
 lative attainments, it must be to the practical knowledge 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 261 
 
 of truth that the mind of man ought to look for genuine 
 intellectual repletion and repose. 
 
 If there be no religious truth, or if that truth be un- 
 known to men, then religious faith of any form or kind 
 is only a mockery and a delusion. Religious faith should 
 be nothing else but belief in religious truth, as the belief 
 of astronomical truth might be called astronomical faith. 
 If, then, there be such a thing as truth respecting the 
 character of God which is known to men,! since it has 
 both a speculative and a practical aspect, let this distinc- 
 tion be attended to, and let religion as an art be discri- 
 minated from religion as a science. The consistent appli- 
 cation of this distinction would clear away several per- 
 plexities and expose some mischievous fallacies. 
 
 Origen.—Please to state some of these ¢ 
 BAe Theologus.—In the first place, when 
 gionindependent philosophical views of religious truth are 
 ofphiiosophy- absent or confused or erroneous, practical 
 views may be to some eatent correct. Religion as a 
 science may be unknown, while religion as an art may 
 not only exist, but exist as a reasonable thing, accomplish- 
 ing its proposed end and giving satisfaction to the mind. 
 To dissever practical religious faith from science and 
 philosophy and speculation of all sorts, is not only de- 
 
 1 “Toute religion suppose deux choses: que les vérités qu’elle 
 proclame sont des vérités absolues, et qu’elle les proclame au nom 
 de Dieu méme qui les lui révéle.”—Cousin. Cours de I histoire 
 de la philosophie moderne, vol iii. p. 333. It would have been 
 well if Cousin had always attended to this statement. 
 
262 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 sirable but absolutely necessary. But to dissever it from 
 reason, from the understanding, or from truth, is a pure 
 contradiction and a wide-spreading calamity. 
 
 Learned men, who never confound science and art in 
 anything else, will confound them in religion. Cousin 
 says that “philosophy is found among the masses under 
 the naive, deep, and admirable form of religion and wor- 
 ship. Christianity is the philosophy of the people.” If 
 this were only a play upon words, it would be unsuitable 
 to a scientific page ; for to identify practical religion with 
 philosophy is either to deny the former to the mass of 
 mankind, or to degrade and destroy the latter. 
 
 Celsus.—* Theology and religion are two widely dif- 
 ferent things. Theology implies a body of truth, founded 
 upon indisputable principles, and having a connection 
 capable of carrying our reason with it, running through 
 all its parts. Religion, on the other hand, is the spon- 
 taneous homage of our nature, poured forth with all the 
 fragrance of holy feeling into the bosom of the infinite. 
 Religion may exist without a theology at all, properly so 
 called. We may never have attempted to render account 
 of a single theological idea; we may never have stepped 
 out of the region of our purely spontaneous imaginations ; 
 we may be destitute of the least notion of the grounds 
 on which our belief rests, and yet the deepest waters of 
 our religious being may be stirred by the divine impulse 
 upon the soul, and lead to all the noble results of a living 
 and entire devotion to God.” 
 
 Lheologus.— This is plainly going to the other extreme, 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES, 263 
 
 dissociating practical religion from the understanding and 
 from truth,—a grave error, which is as frequently found 
 by implication, as in such explicit statements as the above. 
 If “religion may exist without any theology at all,” and 
 our belief be religious belief, while “‘ we may be destitute 
 of the least notion of the grounds on which our belief 
 rests,” then all religions are equally true. To ignore in 
 this manner the distinction between the true and the false, 
 even though somewhat in a poetic strain, is bad philo- 
 sophy, and worse religion. To dissociate in any such 
 way as this practical religion from the objective truth 
 and the subjective use of our understanding, and thus 
 make all religions alike true or alike untrue, is to perpe- 
 trate a folly in the weightiest matter which is seldom wit- 
 nessed even in trifles. 
 
 If a man holds any opinion, or observes any practice 
 in religion, without reasons as sound and conclusive as he 
 has for holding an opinion or observing a practice in any 
 other matter—that religious opimion or practice, even 
 though it be perfectly right regarded simply in itself, 
 yet as held or observed by him is really superstitious 
 or unreasonable. On the other hand, if a man has in 
 defence of his religious views and conduct reasons, such 
 as are considered satisfactory in all the other affairs of 
 practical life, then his religion has a connection with 
 truth as clear, intimate, and indissoluble, as is desirable, 
 or as it is possible for any human action to have. To 
 deny what might be called the specific identity between 
 practical religion as an art, and all the other arts of 
 
264 DIALOGUE VY. 
 
 human life, or, in other words, to dissever our religious 
 feelings or actions from the truth, and from the one 
 faculty of our nature by which truth is known, is to ratify 
 an eternal divorce between reason and religion, either 
 making reason essentially irreligious, or religion essen- 
 tially unreasonable. And it seems obvious that the man 
 who is really irreligious or ungodly will be constantly 
 seeking refuge in this error, in one or other of its numer- 
 ous forms. For the ungodly man has perhaps no pro- 
 fession of religion at all, or his profession of it is a mere 
 formality, or the religion which he professes is unreason- 
 able, and consequently for such a one to admit that there 
 is a true knowledge and real fear of God is virtually to 
 condemn himself. 
 
 Origen.—You formerly gave a statement of the prac- 
 tical evidence in favour of the Christian religion ; per- 
 haps you might put it in another shape, and more in 
 accordance with the train of thought into which we have 
 been led. 
 
 Theologus.—It is impossible for any individual to 
 prove that there is no God. It is, therefore, clearly the 
 duty of men, even though ignorant of evidence certifying 
 Divine existence, to live as if God did exist, trembling 
 lest we should give Him offence, and employing every 
 available means to dispel the darkness in which this in- 
 comparably momentous subject may be enveloped. 
 
 Let now a copy of the Bible be presented to an indi- 
 vidual who is in this state of mind, and who, we shall 
 suppose, knows nothing whatever respecting that book 
 
 ee ae ee ee ee a, a 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 265 
 
 but what he can learn from its own pages. He cannot 
 read much of that singular volume without perceiving, 
 that it claims for itself again and again the dignity and 
 authority of a Divine message, while there are only very 
 few statements in it which have any apparent tendency 
 to throw discredit upon that claim. Whoever accord- 
 ingly is disposed to act as if he had a Creator in 
 heaven, will feel constrained, even after a cursory perusal 
 of the Bible, to act as if it were the word of God. 
 
 It seems impossible for any man to read the Bible 
 with the smallest degree of honest attention, without 
 feeling that he is most unequivocally reduced to the neces- 
 sity of choosing the one side or other of the following 
 dilemma: either to reject and loathe it as the most arro- 
 gant and impious of forgeries, or to venerate and 
 obey it as if a were a message from his Maker. If it 
 be extravagant to assert that there is evidence to 
 prove that God is not, it is no less extravagant to 
 affirm that there is evidence to prove that the Bible is a 
 forgery. 
 
 If a man will not read the Bible, he is like the simple- 
 ton, who on receiving a document purporting to be a 
 letter from his father or his Sovereign, and to contain 
 his title to a rich inheritance, throws it carelessly past, 
 and leaves it unexamined, and its contents unthought of. 
 The man who after perusing and examining the Bible 
 just as any unlettered peasant is capable of doing, and 
 who brings to the task the practical good sense which he 
 carries with him to to the market and the field, will feel 
 
 R 
 
266 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 that since he cannot regard it as a mass of shameless 
 sophistry, fit only to be burned, he is bound to reverence 
 and submit to it as the oracle of God. Between these 
 two courses reason does not allow us an inch of ground 
 on which to stand. Whoever after examining the 
 Christian Scriptures can pronounce them a work of dark- 
 ness—a plot of hell, is not a man. Every nerve of our 
 nature quivers, no less at the thought of pronouncing the 
 Bible a base and blasphemous contrivance, than of pro- 
 nouncing the assertion of Divine existence to be a lie. 
 It is then possible at least, that God is, and that the 
 Bible is his word. The individual, then, who is not in- 
 different to all hope of gain, or callous to all the pleadings 
 of love, or dead to all sense of duty, will act as if the 
 Bible were a rescript from his Maker; while he knows 
 no more than this ;—it is just possible that it may be so. 
 Let it be remembered, that acting as if the Bible were 
 the word of God implies, that we use our utmost en- 
 deavours to yield to all its statements attentive considera- 
 tion, and to all its plain commands immediate, universal, 
 and unconditional obedience. 
 
 Celsus.—But why should we act as if the Bible were 
 the word of God, so long as we doubt that it zs ? 
 
 Lheologus.—In all abstract and theoretical questions, 
 by which man’s feelings are untouched and his welfare 
 not directly involved, there is ample room for the mind 
 to repose in a state of unbelief or simple doubt, midway 
 as it were between affirmation and denial ; but is it so in 
 the affairs of practical life? When any one hears a 
 
 De ti ges 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 267 
 
 report that a new planet has been discovered, is he in the 
 same state of mind as when he hears that his parent or 
 his child is dying? In the one case he can quietly remain. 
 in a state of suspense, neither knowing, nor caring to 
 know, the correctness or incorrectness of the report ; but 
 can he so act in the other case? Human nature rises in 
 all her dignity and power to protest against the enormity 
 of dealing with the two reports in the same manner. 
 The one we may leave unexamined ; the other we cannot. 
 We not only feel that we must entertain it, but we im- 
 mediately begin to act upon the assumption of its truth 
 or of its falsehood. A man when he hears the report of 
 any matter deeply affecting his interests, scrutinizes the 
 information quickly and shrewdly as to whence and how 
 it came, and forthwith decides, for he cannot but decide, 
 upon its versimilitude or the contrary. If it appears to 
 be entirely false, it may not alter his urgent previous 
 arrangements for the next hour or the remainder of the 
 day ; but if it seem to be true, it immediately and totally 
 disturbs his present plans. By his action he thus un- 
 avoidably expresses some belief in the accuracy or inaccu- 
 racy of the report. In physics, unstable equilibrium is 
 just possible ; but in practical business doubt or the eqi- 
 librium of the mind as to a momentous topic is such 
 exquisite torture, that the man most legitimately seeks and 
 finds certainty, and acts upon the finding. 
 
 Suspension of faith, when the case demands it, is one 
 of the best characteristics of the philosophic temper of 
 mind; because without it no progress has ever been 
 
268 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 made in discovering the secrets of the universe. But sus- 
 pension of faith amid the substantial interests of daily 
 life, at once impales the heart upon a stake of anguish 
 and rivets upon the limbs fetters of iron. There is no 
 healthy, happy, and successful man in any department of 
 business, who does not ehange by the very instincts of 
 his nature, every phantom of uncertainty that flits across 
 his path, into a living and positive certainty for the time 
 being, while he makes preparation to resist or evade its 
 evil, or patiently labours or waits to enjoy its good. 
 There is not in the page of history or in the record of 
 passing events, a more common or correct sentiment than 
 this: —‘“ Such an expectation had all the effect in 
 anticipation which such an event would have had in 
 reality.” 
 
 If any person hears a rumour that one of his relatives 
 has died in a foreign land, and left him a considerable 
 fortune, his doubts respecting the truth of the report will 
 have an influence somewhat similar to what his knowledge 
 of its falsehood would have. A prudent individual placed 
 in such circumstances will not abandon his usual occupa- 
 tion, or indulge in expensive luxuries, till he has attained 
 reliable information. He will make all possible inquiry ; 
 but he will run no risk. Since his acting as if the 
 report were true would entail shame and sorrow in the 
 event of its turning out to be false, he will act as if it 
 were false so long as the uncertainty continues, This 
 resolution is confirmed by the reflection which will occur 
 to most minds, that in the event of his hopes being real- 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 269 
 
 ized he will lose nothing by the exercise of patience and 
 delay. We may, therefore, say, that, while unbelieving or 
 doubting, he acts as if he disbelieved or denied the 
 report. 
 
 Again, if evil be anticipated, even on very slight 
 grounds, men act as if it were really coming. <A small 
 expenditure can often make sufficient provision to meet 
 
 _ a threatened danger, which, if it were encountered with- 
 
 out preparation, would produce serious loss or absolute 
 ruin. The probability that plague will invade the land, 
 leads in well ordered states to as many exertions and 
 precautions as would the certain knowledge of its ap- 
 proach. Inaction being in this case hazardous, men act 
 on the barest presumption. Of all such instances it 
 may be said, that men while doubting act as if they 
 believed. 
 
 Hence we conclude, that when acting on a probability 
 incurs much risk and avoids none, men abstain from act- 
 ing till they know the certainty. But when acting on a 
 probability incurs no risk and avoids much, men act even 
 while the certainty is unknown. In practical questions, 
 therefore, there is no such state of mind as may properly 
 be called unbelief, doubt, or uncertainty. When such a 
 state of mind might be expected, it immediately and inva- 
 riably resolves itself into certainty, under the form of 
 
 belief or disbelief. 
 
 Origen.—These remarks seem to explain and vindi- 
 cate such Scripture sentiments as these :—‘ The friend- 
 ship of the world is enmity with God.” “He that is not 
 
270 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 with me is against me.” Not to love God is to hate God. 
 Admitting, now, that you have shewn the independence 
 of practical religion upon philosophy, how can you sub- 
 
 stantiate your opinion that practical religion may be ~ 
 
 improved by philosophy ? 
 
 =e Theologus.—The arts of life, in their 
 may be improvedby more rudimental forms, are independent 
 Pie es of the sciences, while yet the sciences de- 
 velop and improve the arts. So in religion. While a life 
 of piety is attainable without philosophy, we have no 
 reason to expect a full and proper manifestation of indi- 
 vidual and social piety without philosophical or scientific 
 advancement. This, then, is our second remark in refer- 
 ence to the distinction between religion as a science and as 
 an art, that its improvement as a science will lead to its 
 amprovement as an art. 
 
 Let the question be proposed, in regard to those who 
 have emerged from ignorance and error on the most 
 momentous topics, and had the burden of their guilt re- 
 moved by belief in the gospel, and are pressing onwards 
 toward unbeclouded knowledge and unswerving recti- 
 tude,—by what means may their progress be facilitated, 
 and may they be enabled to surmount difficulties, and dis- 
 encumber themselves of impediments? It does not seem 
 unlikely that among other means to be employed, an 
 analysis and elucidation of the first principles of all know- 
 ledge and belief may be found to be profitable. Or 
 rather, is it not apparent that this work must be done, 
 and along with it the science of morality developed and 
 
 Weg Ses 
 — 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES, 271 
 
 matured before we can expect to approximate to moral 
 perfection ? 
 
 Are there not many problems of great moment in 
 human life, individual and social, on which wise and good 
 men are found not only at variance, but in direct anta- 
 gonism? These religious and moral contradictions, which 
 perplex every upright mind, and bring many evils on 
 society, cannot be resolved into a mere harmless and una- 
 voidable diversity of sentiment, nor can they be accounted 
 for on the supposition that the opposing parties disagree, 
 not in their principles, but only in the application of them. 
 Though this last difference might be calamitous enough, 
 yet it is notorious, that men who in most of their conduct 
 shew themselves to be of generous and exalted minds are 
 widely and painfully opposed to each other on several 
 very important religious and ethical questions. For ex- 
 ample, one party affirms that zt 7s the duty of the govern- 
 ment of a country to undertake the responsibility of 
 securing the education of the young, and the instruction 
 of the adult members of the community in religion, while 
 another party aftirms that it is not duty, but a transgres- 
 sion. Who can estimate the amount of national evil 
 springing from this contrariety ? 
 
 How often, also, are good men perplexed about the 
 path of duty which they themselves should follow? This 
 perplexity, moreover, terminates, not always in a convic- 
 tion that the path chosen, even after anxious deliberation, 
 is the right one absolutely ; and the only satisfaction left 
 to their consciences is the reflection, that they have 
 
ye DIALOGUE V. 
 
 adopted, in the pressure of events, what to the best of 
 their knowledge was the right one. But surely it admits 
 of doubt whether the condition of moral perfection will 
 allow of painful distraction in the mind, respecting the 
 proper course of action in any possible combination of 
 
 circumstances. Nor can it be conceded that a thoroughly. 
 
 virtuous agent may choose what is really wrong under 
 the conviction that it is right. But how frequently have 
 individuals, that have attained the utmost purity and intel- 
 ligence within the present reach of man, had to regret 
 that the path which they have followed, after the most 
 careful consideration which they could at the time bestow, 
 has led them astray. And though the fact that they 
 have done their best preserves them from the bitterer 
 remorse of conscience, the other fact, that notwithstand- 
 ing they have done their best they have erred, cannot 
 but be regarded as indicative of some serious defect in 
 human character, or some strange anomaly in human 
 aifairs. 
 
 That this imperfect and unsatisfactory state of matters 
 is not to continue always, that it admits of some ameliora- 
 tion, and that the moral and religious condition of society 
 is not stationary and stereotyped, but progressive, every 
 one most cordially believes. If, then, advancement is to 
 be made, if human nature in its individual and social 
 developments is to be rectified and improved, and if any 
 approximation to the grand and final issue is to be 
 achieved in the direction now specified, how, or by what 
 means, 1s it to be accomplished ? 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 213 
 
 That an improved philosophy is one of these means 
 seems very highly probable. Without it to expect the 
 maturer and more lovely fruits of virtue to appear, is 
 unwarranted either by the statements of Sacred Scripture 
 or by the experience of mankind. If correct knowledge 
 has uniformly conferred power, and if man believes that 
 it must always do so, then it cannot be doubted, that the 
 loose and undefined notions respecting some prominent 
 points of human duty prevalent in the mass of even 
 christianized society, along with the unsettled contro- 
 versies bristling on the pages of our best ethical and 
 religious treatises, form too sure a symptom of moral 
 lassitude and spiritual weakness. 
 
 The assertion that the study of philosophy is to be 
 regarded as one means to meet and counteract this 
 deeply seated and wide-spread evil, will excite the alarms 
 of some who may be found exclaiming, Christianity is the 
 alone remedy for the mental maladies of humanity, and 
 “ Christianity is a fixed not a floating thing.” 
 
 Far be it from us to advocate any change in the know- 
 ledge necessary to the exercise of responsibility, or in the 
 knowledge respecting the fundamental relations between 
 God and man, as if the conditions of man’s acceptance 
 with God, or the primary laws of social existence, were 
 liable to vicissitudes from age to age. If it be absurd to 
 assert or insinuate, that a written revelation from the 
 Most High, after such a revelation has been actually 
 vouchsafed, is not absolutely necessary and highly bene- 
 ficial, it seems not less absurd to maintain, that the main 
 
pari! DIALOGUE V. 
 
 import of the heavenly message, its chief and weightiest 
 lessons were not understood by those who in primitive 
 times honestly perused the Word of God, or that they 
 cannot be understood by any, even among the rudest of 
 mankind, who in succeeding ages shall read it attentively. 
 Nor can anything be more unreasonable or impious, than 
 the enormity which has been perpetrated in the name of | 
 reason, of eviscerating the Bible of the momentous mean- 
 ing with which its pages are replete, robbing Christ Jesus 
 of all his Divine glory, His death of its propitiatory value, 
 and the promised Spirit of His regenerating power. 
 
 But it does appear scarcely less preposterous to con- 
 tend, that the first or the fifteenth generation of readers 
 extracted from the Bible all the instruction which it was 
 designed and is fitted to communicate. Philosophy has 
 to study God’s revelation as a whole, both the written 
 and the unwritten. As scientific principles do not lie 
 ready to our hand on the face of nature, neither are 
 they so found on the page of the Bible. And as no 
 desecration is offered to God’s works, when they are 
 brought under patient investigation, neither is there any 
 dishonour done to God’s word, when it is subjected to 
 similar scientific processes. The written revelation from 
 heaven, doubtless, remains unchanged, and so does the 
 Divine law engraven on the heart, which renders every 
 one amenable to the government of God. But to affirm 
 that man’s knowledge.of the one or of the other, is like 
 the things themselves unaltered and unalterable, is not — 
 only contrary to all analogy, but is also in defiance of 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 275 
 
 the plainest arguments, and of the most instructive facts 
 of history. To attempt to arrest all progress in the art 
 of life, not the baser but the nobler life, the art of living 
 as we ought, the art of unmasking temptation, of avoid- 
 ing evil and achieving good,—an art in which the best 
 men are the first to confess their unskilfulness, is to do 
 violence at once to reason and religion. Hence it is in- 
 ferred that the pursuit of philosophy is not only allow- 
 able as a pleasing recreation, and praiseworthy as an 
 elegant employment, but success therein is indispensable 
 to the maturity of individual character and the reforma- 
 tion of our social economy. 
 
 President Edwards of America set himself to one part 
 of this work, as is clearly and forcibly stated in his pre- 
 face to “ A Treatise on Religious Affections.” Few will 
 read that book and say, that nothing remains to be done 
 even in the same direction. “It is evident,” he says, 
 “there will come a time of much greater purity in the 
 Church, than has been in ages past. And one great 
 reason of it will be, that at that time, God will give 
 much greater light to his people, to distinguish between 
 true religion and its counterfeits. . . . . After reli- 
 gion has revived in the Church of God, and enemies 
 appear, people that are engaged to defend its cause are 
 commonly most exposed where they are least sensible of 
 danger. While they are wholly intent upon the opposi- 
 tion that is openly before them, in. order to make head 
 against that, and while they neglect carefully to look 
 around, the devil comes behind them, and gives a fatal 
 
276 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 stab unseen; and he has opportunity to give a more 
 home stroke, and to wound the deeper, because he 
 strikes at his leisure, being obstructed by no resistance 
 or guard. And so it is ever likely to be in the Church, 
 whenever religion revives remarkably, till we have 
 learned well to distinguish between true and false reli- 
 gion, between saving affections and experiences, and 
 those manifold fair shows and glistering appearances, by 
 which they are counterfeited ; the consequence of which, 
 when they are not distinguished, are often inexpressibly 
 dreadful.” 
 
 We venture to affirm that this work which Edwards 
 undertook, “to distinguish between true and false reli- 
 gion, between saving affections and experiences, and 
 those manifold fair shows and glistering appearances, 
 by which they are counterfeited,” has not yet been 
 achieved. Certainly there is no book, which Christians 
 generally regard as having accomplished it. Nor can 
 this work be done, till we have more accurate or scien- 
 tific knowledge both of our own hearts and of the Word 
 of God. 7 . 
 
 Let no one grudge philosophy the high function now 
 assigned to her, or think that we are forgetting or dis- 
 regarding any of the cardinal doctrines of Holy Serip- 
 ture. We believe that it is only when God shall pour 
 out His Holy Spirit from on high that knowledge shall 
 
 increase—only when the Spirit shall descend “as water 
 on the thirsty land,” shall the Church be united, and “ all ¥ 
 the ends of the world remember and turn unto God.” 
 
PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGES. 277 
 
 But as universities and theological halls, missionary and 
 medical-missionary societies, and their thousand adjunets, 
 are mere instrumentalities which acquire their efficiency 
 in elevating man only from the agency of the Holy Spirit 
 of God, so also is it with philosophy. Nor need it be a 
 matter of surprise if it shall be found, that amid all the 
 armory of this honourable and arduous warfare, moral 
 science and the higher philosophy generally shall obtain 
 a chief place, inasmuch as their maturity will be needed 
 to give to the other weapons that keenness of edge which 
 will secure the victory. 
 
 Men are prone to fall into two errors, — the one the 
 reverse of the other. Some in the firm grasp which they 
 take of truth by its practical handle, are disposed to de- 
 preciate the importance of its speculative aspect, while 
 others in their eager pursuit of its philosophical side, are 
 inclined to undervalue the worth and deny the clearness 
 of its practical bearings. Man’s duty and safety lie 
 chiefly in the honest pursuit of the practical pole of 
 truth, and in unwavering adherence to it at all hazards ; 
 while his honour and privilege and higher advantages 
 consist in the calm and patient investigation of its specu- 
 lative pole. 
 
 He who has charge of a locomotive engine may guide 
 it in safety to its destination, without knowing or desir- 
 ing to know its cost or the principles of its construction. 
 But if he never reflect upon these things during some of 
 his leisure hours, and make no effort to become acquainted 
 with them, he neglects to cultivate a noble portion of his 
 
278 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 humanity, and deprives himself of certain benefits. On 
 the other hand, the engineer who, in his excessive eager- 
 ness to study these to him theoretical points, should fail 
 in attention to his immediate and weighty duties, and by 
 disregarding a given signal, for example, should ruin life 
 or property, exposes himself most justly to suitable retri- 
 bution. Every man may be compared to a locomotive 
 on the railway of life; his will is engineer; his destiny 
 is eternity; his charge is his own true welfare. Some 
 religious men feeling confident that they are moving on 
 exactly according to the rules issued by sovereign autho- 
 rity, not only dismiss from their own minds all philo- 
 sophical inquiry, but treat even with contempt the inves- 
 tigations of their more inquisitive fellow-men. In doing 
 this, they abjure a precious and fair portion of their 
 nature, and act towards others unreasonably and un- 
 kindly, and would doom our race in civil affairs to bar- 
 barism, and in religious matters to pupilage. On the 
 other hand, if a philosophical spirit shall so engross him- 
 self in speculations, or so overestimate their importance, 
 as to fail to work the locomotive as he knows, or with a 
 little consideration might know, it ought to be wrought, 
 protesting that he cares for nothing till he understands 
 its mechanism, he surely need not be astonished, if he 
 find himself during the journey itself exposed to serious 
 accidents, and the journey perhaps brought to a pre- 
 mature close, and at its termination his person placed 
 ~ under arrest. If it be unwise and injurious in those who 
 are practically and in the main right on religious ques- 
 
s to discountenance and censure speculative inquiry, it 
 amentable to behold ardent and aspiring minds stum- 
 | ling and falling on the highway of life, by looking too 
 gerly at the firmament above them. 
 
 iw 
 ' 
 
DIALOGUE VI. 
 CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 
 
 Celsus.—Is not the difference between certainty and 
 probability one, which is frequently resorted to by the 
 advocates of Christianity? Will you be so good as state 
 wherein the distinction consists ¢ 
 
 Origen.—The distinction is so obvious and clear, that 
 it scarcely requires any statement. 
 
 Celsus.—If the clearness and prominence of the dis- 
 tinction render its verbal announcement unnecessary, as 
 many of your friends seem to think, when they fall back 
 upon it without explaining it, it will be all the more easily 
 stated when a statement is respectfully requested. 
 
 Theologus.—It is truly to be regretted that in the 
 best authors we read of moral as distinguished from 
 mathematical certainty, of high and low degrees of cer- 
 tainty, of high probabilities being equal to certainties, 
 and so forth, with few efforts to draw a well-marked 
 line between them. To rest the stress of a weighty argu- 
 ment upon these distinctions, as is very frequently done, 
 while they are left as loose as the sand and shifting as 
 the clouds, is sheer puerillity. 
 
CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 281 
 
 Origen.—Then you are of Mr Gladstone’s opinion, 
 that “the association of these two ideas, activity of in- 
 quiry, and variety of conclusion, is a fallacious one?” ! 
 
 Theologus.—If by “ activity of inquiry,” you mean 
 diligent and conscientious inquiry, then it appears to us, 
 that while there will be always variety of conclusion in 
 matters of probability, there will not be contradictory 
 conclusions in matters of certainty. 
 
 Origen.—*“ Our way of ascertaining the tendency of 
 free inquiry is simply to open our eyes and look at the 
 world in which we live; and there we see that free in- 
 quiry on mathematical subjects produces unity, and that 
 free inquiry on moral subjects produces discrepancy. 
 Discrepancy there will be among the most diligent and 
 candid, as long as the constitution of the human mind, 
 and the nature of moral evidence, continue unchanged. 
 That we have not freedom and unity together is a very sad 
 thing; and so it is that we have not wings. But we are 
 just as likely to see the one defect removed as the other. 
 It is not only in religion that this discrepancy is found. 
 It is the same with all matters which depend on moral 
 evidence,—with judicial questions, for example, and with 
 political questions. All the judges will work a sum in 
 the rule of three on the same principle, and bring out 
 the same conclusion. But it docs not follow that, how- 
 ever honest and laborious they may be, they will all be 
 of one mind on the Douglas case.” 2 
 
 + As quoted in Infidelity, p. 459. 
 ? Macaulay, quoted in Infidelity, pp. 459, 460. 
 s 
 
282 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 Oelsus.—You affirm “ that free inquiry on moral sub- 
 jects produces discrepancy.” Free inquiry then pro- 
 duces discrepancy on every moral question, or only on 
 some questions; if on every question, there is no moral 
 certainty at all; if discrepancy arise only on some moral 
 questions, till we know what these questions are as dis- 
 tinguished from others exempt from discrepancy, cer- 
 tainty of any sort is a hopeless expectation. If we must 
 wait for certainty on moral and religious questions, till 
 we shall have been equipped with “ wings,” which is very 
 reasonable if it be as “sad” a thing to be without the 
 one as without the other, then we must wait also, and who 
 knows how long, for the privilege of responsibility and 
 for the prospect of social regeneration. 
 
 Aide ene Theologus. —There is, there must be, 
 probability dis- a distinct line of demarcation between 
 fake those questions on which discrepancy of 
 opinion is admissible, and those on which it is not ad- 
 missible among honest and diligent inquirers. We have 
 already seen that contradiction is not admissible on any 
 question whatever. When a proposition ts clearly known 
 to be true, our knowledge is certain, and contradiction ts 
 excluded. When a proposition is not clearly known to be 
 either true or erroneous, our knowledge is probable, and 
 differences or discrepancies of sentiment (but not contra- 
 dictions) may be legitimately expected. There are, con- 
 sequently, political and judicial and moral questions on 
 which variety of opinion will prevail; for on many points 
 our information is limited and our principles undeveloped. 
 
CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 283 
 
 But who will say that this is the case with all such ques- 
 tions ¢ 
 
 Origen. — Then you deny the distinction between 
 moral and mathematical certainty. 
 
 Theologus—It seems to me on the first blush of the 
 statement, that what is less than certain, it matters not 
 what business you have in hand, is not certain at all; 
 and to talk of increasing certainty is like carrying 
 water to the sea. But let us hear what the distinction is. 
 Be cious Origen.—* The Christian miracles are 
 knowledgepro- of ‘a convincing and stupendous character,’ 
 ae and yet not so overpowering as the axiom 
 that a whole is greater than its part. . . . . Evi- 
 dence is obligatory on man, not because it is overpowering 
 or irresistible, but because it preponderates. Indeed, 
 on the former supposition, to talk of obligation were an 
 absurdity.” 
 
 Celsus.—But how can the knowledge which rests only 
 on preponderating evidence be certain? If on any given 
 matter there be evidence both for and against a particu- 
 _ lar view, how can I feel assured that I have got posses- 
 sion of the truth? So long as there is a particle of good 
 and valid evidence against a proposition, I cannot with 
 any satisfaction adopt it as true. Do you allow that 
 _ there is any good and valid evidence opposed to Christi- 
 anity? If you do, your cause is a feeble one; and if 
 you do not, it is absurd to represent it as resting on pre- 
 _ ponderating evidence. 
 
 1 Infidelity, p. 330. 
 
284. DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 Theologus.—If moral and mathematical truths are to 
 be compared in regard to the certainty which belongs to 
 them, it is improper to take an elementary principle of 
 the one and contrast it with an advanced principle of the 
 other. Man’s knowledge that a whole is greater than its 
 part, is not a whit more certain than his knowledge that it 
 is wrong to steal. And as to a knowledge of less patent 
 truths in both of these departments, it can be attained 
 only by a man of sound or honest mind in the diligent 
 use of his faculties. When it is attained we see no room 
 for different certainties. Our knowledge that the Bible 
 is the word of God, is quite as certain, or may become as 
 certain, as our knowledge that when a straight line 
 bisects one of the angles of a triangle, dividing the base 
 into two segments, these segments are proportional to the 
 adjacent sides. It is undoubtedly true to affirm that 7 
 evidence be irresistible, obligation ceases. But mathe- 
 matical evidence is not irresistible ; it requires competent 
 ability and due attention. If mathematical evidence be 
 styled irresistible to the man of sufficient diligence and 
 power, so may moral evidence. In the moral aspect of 
 any case, to deny a man’s power is to exclude his res- 
 ponsibility ; to deny his diligence is to affirm his guilt. 
 
 Celsus.—It is not every advocate of Christianity that 
 rests its claims upon preponderating evidence, or denies 
 the certainty of religious knowledge. Here is another 
 illustration of Christian contradictions. ‘ The investiga- 
 tion,” says one, “of the principles of all knowledge, 
 attention to the teaching of nature in the soul and in the 
 
CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 285 
 
 world, discovers these (moral and religious) instincts 
 (which are common to humanity) to be as truthful, and 
 their conviction as certain, as any knowledge that man 
 can possess.”’! 
 
 Theologus.—On what, then, does this author rest the 
 certainty of religious knowledge ? 
 
 Origen.—He rests it upon the validity of the human 
 understanding, and carries it into speculative as well as 
 practical knowledge. Speaking of the system of Spinoza, 
 he remarks, “timid writers, distrusting the faculties 
 which God has given, and which distinguish man from 
 the brutes, will sometimes warn us to turn from such 
 investigations without seeking to ascertain the limits of 
 certainty, lest we see God and man, mind and matter, 
 swallowed up in pantheistic nihilism.”? And again, 
 “ Natural theology rests on principles, which are equally 
 competent to establish its truth, and to expose the 
 sophisms of unbelief. . . . . God does not deal so 
 hardly with man, his condition is not so pitiable, as that. 
 to think much must involve him in error and uncer- 
 tainty.’’> 
 
 Celsus.—Much more might be quoted from this author 
 in confirmation of these views; but like many others he 
 does not adhere consistently to his principles. Having 
 admitted only one kind of certainty in human knowledge, 
 he speaks elsewhere as if that certainty had suffered a 
 total shipwreck. For example, he says, ‘man has in 
 himself no infallible criterion of right and wrong, and can 
 1 Christian Theism, vol. i. p. 162. hep 16. 2 Ao an ey 
 
286 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 have none, not even from revelation, because what is in- 
 fallible in itself, becomes fallible in his interpretation of 
 it.”! If we understand this, it means that human cer- 
 tainty is not a genuine but counterfeit certainty, and 
 when we feel certain, we are only certainly deceived. 
 If no human interpretation of the Bible be infallible, or, 
 which is the same thing, true, your certainty is but a 
 broken reed; if every reflection of the glory of your 
 God (to use your own metaphor) from the mirror of his - 
 word carries a distorted image to every eye that looks 
 upon it, the mirror must be imperfect, or is the same to 
 you as if it were imperfect. 
 
 Theologus.—Certainty, when legitimately attained, must 
 be held in all cases to be infallible—otherwise you pro- 
 claim a divorce between eternal immutable truth and the 
 human mind. An individual man is fallible, inasmuch as 
 he is responsible,—that is, has the power to use aright, or 
 wantonly abuse, the faculties of his mind. To cast any 
 doubt or uncertainty upon the conclusions of the under- 
 standing, when it is properly employed, is one of the 
 snares of scepticism into which it is marvellous to find 
 so many Christians falling. 
 
 Origen.—What objection can possibly be taken to the 
 following statement: “We affirm that the kind and 
 amount of evidence offered in support of Christianity 
 suffice to meet the demands of reason, inasmuch as we 
 are involved in many more, and much greater difficulties, 
 by the rejection, than by the admission, of the proof 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 80. 
 
CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 287 
 
 tendered to us. And this is the highest kind of moral 
 demonstration that the subject will admit of.” ! 
 
 Celsus. — This admission of difficulties, which need to 
 be compared and weighed, so as to have their respective 
 values estimated and a balance struck between them, 
 brings us back to the old ground of preponderating evi- 
 dence, and degrades your religion from the eminence of 
 certainty to the changing sands of probability, where only 
 a few of its modern advocates are contented to leave it. 
 And when you are pleased to add that “ this is the 
 highest kind of moral demonstration that the subject will 
 admit of,” the remark is a rebuke to some of your own 
 friends rather than an assault upon us. 
 
 Origen.—How are we to get out of this dilemma? 
 
 Is religious know.  Leologus.— The course of argument 
 ledge certain? = nurgued in these discussions suggests a way 
 of escape. If the difficulties referred to be mysteMes,— 
 depths which we cannot fathom, they are not, properly 
 speaking, argumentative difficulties at all. If these diffi- 
 culties be conflicting statements in the evidence or con- 
 tradictory principles in reasoning, they must suspend our 
 judgment so far as they extend. Jf it be really the case 
 that such difficulties do attach themselves to the great 
 Christian argument, viewed scientifically, the conclusion 
 must be regarded as no more than probable. But then 
 it is not to be allowed to be unlikely, far less impossible, 
 that these difficulties shall be cleared away. On the con- 
 trary, it is to be hoped that we shall ere long find our- 
 
 1 Bases, p. 256. 
 
288 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 selves in possession, even speculatively, of a certain know- 
 ledge of the Truth, through humble and unwearied 
 investigation. Meanwhile, so long as these difficulties shall 
 beset our path, and constrain us to admit that our conclu- 
 sion in favour of Christianity is, philosophically, only 
 probable, we have the practical certainty on which to fall 
 back, namely, the indubitable principle universally ac- 
 cepted by mankind in the affairs of life, that in dealing 
 with probabilities it is dutiful and wise to take the safe 
 side, and avoid all needless risk. 
 
 Origen.—lIt does, after all, seem to be extravagant to 
 reduce all our religious and moral knowledge to a pulpy. 
 mass of probability. For what can be more obvious than 
 this, that “reasoning proceeds from the known to the 
 unknown — from what is certain to what is proble- 
 matical?” ’ So that if we had no certainty in religion 
 we could not have a probability either. 
 
 Celsus.—It is an equally clear inference from what has 
 been advanced, that if there be no certainty apart from, 
 and independent of, a written revelation, that revelation 
 cannot confer certainty. 
 
 Origen.—There is, of course, certainty in many de- 
 partments of knowledge independently of the Bible; 
 and it is easy to draw the line between matters of pro- 
 bability or opinion and matters of certainty in history 
 and in the sciences both mathematical and physical. For 
 “itis a mistake, and a prejudice, fertile in errors, to ima- 
 gine that opmton belongs to one department, and 
 
 1 Bases, p. 6. 
 
 Eg et ee 
 
— 
 
 CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 289 
 
 CERTAINTY to other departments; as if the honours and 
 immunities of an exemption from the toils of controversy 
 were the class-privilege of this or that aristocratic 
 science.” ! 
 
 Celsus.—This is very good, and is a severe castigation 
 of those whose sentiments were formerly noticed, and who 
 seemed to rest satisfied without that certainty in religion 
 
 ‘and morals which is possessed in other branches of know- 
 
 ledge. You now claim the same, or a similar, certainty 
 in your Christian belief, as is acknowledged to belong to 
 the sciences, even the mathematical. The question which 
 I would now propose for your consideration is this : Does 
 
 On what does reli- YOur religious certainty rest solely and 
 gious certainty rest? entirely on what you call the written 
 revelation ? 
 
 Origen. — One palpable mark of distinction between 
 heathen and Christian nations surely is to be observed in 
 the fact, that the latter possess what the former are 
 destitute of, religious certainty. 
 
 Theologus.—It ought to be remembered that the ques- 
 tion is not now regarding the objective truth of Christian- 
 ity and heathenism (certainty is sometimes used in this 
 sense); but the question is, have Christians a feeling of 
 certainty in their hearts respecting the truth of their 
 religion which heathens do not experience? 
 
 Celsus.— Many Christian writers are loud in their la- 
 mentations over the comparative lethargy and lukewarm- 
 ness of protestants, as contrasted with the self-denial and 
 
 Restoration, p. 117, &c. 
 
290 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 devotedness of papists and idolaters in their religious 
 services. One of your poets has expressed it thus: “In 
 Christian hearts, oh! for a pagan zeal.” Religious zeal 
 and religious certainty have surely some connection with 
 each other. 
 
 Origen.—You are forgetting that there is a false zeal, 
 and a false certainty too. 
 
 Celsus. — What, then, is the difference between the 
 false certainty and the true ? 
 
 Dee Theologus.—The principles brought out 
 ra a ai in the course of this discussion may, per- 
 
 haps, answer your question. When a man 
 
 embraces error in any form whatever, he cannot do so 
 without at the same time doing some violence to the 
 better portion of his nature, —without practising, somehow 
 or other, deception upon himself. He may, of course, 
 work himself up into a certain persuasion that his error 
 is truth ; but this certainty will ever retain infallible indi- 
 cations of its spurious origin. It will ever be of a totally 
 different character and constitution, the man himself 
 being judge, from that simple and genuine assurance 
 which is the result of thorough honesty. The zeal which 
 springs from legitimate certainty will be just and kind, 
 calm and irrepressible. The spurious zeal of a counter- 
 feit certainty will be passionate, fickle, and cruel. The 
 religious assurance of the Christian believer, even in its 
 modesty, is thus easily distinguished from the blustering, 
 intolerant, or malignant zeal of every enthusiast. 
 
 Origen.—It will not be denied, however, that at least 
 
CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 291 
 
 in some states of the heathen world, the characteristic 
 feature of society has been that of a painful want of cer- 
 tainty in religion. For example, in the days of Alex- 
 ander Severus, Emperor of Rome, when Christianity 
 was about to win one of its most important triumphs, 
 “ uneversal incertitude was the chacteristic of the times ; 
 the gloom of that moral dismay which comes upon cul- 
 tured minds, when they abandon in despair the long- 
 cherished hope of seizing upon truth and certainty — of 
 knowing something beside the theorems of Euclid — of 
 grasping in the hand a stay immoveable. . . . Let 
 any one whose course has not been altogether sensual, 
 or merely busy, but who has known what are called 
 ‘exercises of mind,’ go back to those moments of his life 
 when convictions, beliefs, persuasions of every kind, 
 were passing from his view, and when nothing remained 
 to him but a dread uncertainty, and the feeling that 
 never again should he grasp a truth. In the recollection 
 of such a season one would not reject the figure as inap- 
 propriate, if it were called the night-time of the soul ; 
 and not less so, although all the splendours of literature 
 and science were then glittering around him. It must 
 be so: for the first necessity of man’s higher nature is 
 TRUTH, and the despair of finding it is indeed — a dark- 
 ness that may be felt.” } 
 
 Celsus.—It. has been already conceded, that if a man 
 has no knowledge whatever of truth, he can have no 
 responsibility. To speak of the dread uncertainty of 
 
 1 Restoration, pp. 47, 48. 
 
292 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 never being able again to grasp a truth, must be either 
 an extravagant statement, or the description of a most 
 morbid feeling. If an individual has some true know- 
 ledge, he has some certainty. If a man has no know- 
 ledge of truth, and no certainty in himself, till a book is 
 put into his hands, that book can communicate neither 
 certainty nor truth. What use can an unintelligent bemg 
 make of a book ? 
 
 Theologus.—The whole perplexity will disappear, if 
 we bear in mind that the Bible comes to us, not only 
 as revealing some truths that are unknown, but also as 
 assuming other truths as known to man. This statement 
 has been strangely overlooked, although it is plainly 
 implied in the very character of a revelation from God 
 to responsible and intelligent beings, and is confirmed by 
 almost every page of the Bible itself. As there is no end 
 to the vagaries of error and the follies of mankind, it is 
 a very possible thing for persons to work themselves up 
 into any conceivable state of madness or despondency. 
 We would not, therefore, for a moment question the 
 accuracy of the alleged fact, that some individuals, more 
 or less, may be found, whose real condition, or fancied 
 condition, is one that cannot be otherwise described 
 than that of total doubt or blank despair. As to the 
 few who may be in such a state, it will not be denied 
 that such a state is the result of personal or heredi- 
 tary guilt, and that its horrible darkness will not be 
 long protracted, provided an individual deal honestly 
 with himself. 
 
CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 293 
 
 Origen.—But do you mean to affirm that we can 
 
 joes attain any sort of religious certainty 
 tainty apart from the without the aid of the Bible and Chris- 
 ee tianity ? 
 
 Theologus.—To assert that any one could attain a cer- 
 tain knowledge of God’s mercy in Christ, and the way 
 of salvation, except through Divine revelation, were 
 indeed fool-hardy ; for this is one of the great truths, if 
 not the greatest, specially revealed. But do you deny 
 or doubt, that every man may, and that many men do, 
 attain a certain knowledge of their guilt and wretched- 
 ness without any Biblical assistance? Can it be ques- 
 tioned that the word of God, over and over again, 
 asserts or assumes the validity of the divine law writ- 
 ten on the human heart? The validity of this law, 
 not only in man’s pristine condition, but even now 
 and in the densest darkness of heathenism, as avail- 
 able to guide a man’s footsteps so far, and to con- 
 demn him if not obeyed, is plainly implied in many 
 passages of the Bible. From the very nature of the 
 case it must be so. 
 
 Origen.—But the great mass of men who are ignorant 
 of Christianity have not this certain knowledge of their 
 guilt and misery. 
 
 Theologus.—You cannot, however, infer from this, 
 that therefore they have not the means of attaining 
 it. They may have the means without employing 
 them; just as a great number of those who may 
 be said to know Christianity are equally destitute 
 
294 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 of this certain knowledge of their wretchedness and 
 sin. 
 
 Origen.—On what, then, does the certainty of our 
 knowledge rest ? 
 
 Theologus.—It can rest on nothing else 
 than the immutability of Truth, and the 
 validity of the human understanding. Truth itself is 
 eternal and unchangeable. When any truth is found by 
 the mind while honestly and diligently seeking for it, the 
 mind is conscious of having found the truth. The clear 
 
 Grounds of certainty. 
 
 and satisfactory consciousness of having found truth is 
 the only possible, and an amply sufficient, basis of cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 Celsus——So you agree with us, that “the basis of 
 certitude lies in the essential characteristics of the intui- 
 tions themselves—in their distinctness, in their unifor- 
 mity, and, under due influences, in their universality ; 
 not in their symbolical representation upon the sacred 
 page.” 
 
 Origen. And you take part with the enemies of the 
 gospel in removing the basis of religious certitude 
 “from the Bible page to the religious consciousness of 
 humanity.” By your decision “ the test is shifted from 
 the inspired Book—the law and the testimony—to a 
 comparison of inward experiences.” ' 
 
 Theologus.—Your conclusions are rather too hasty, 
 my friends. ‘Truth, as formerly explained, presupposes 
 in every instance an object known as well as a subject 
 
 1 Infidelity, pp. 211, 212. 
 
=—s 
 
 CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 295 
 
 knowing, being the agreement of the thought within us 
 with the object about which we think. A clear con- 
 sciousness, then, that we know any object which is exter- 
 nal to ourselves, implies that by some means or other we 
 have got beyond ourselves, and come into intercourse or 
 contact with that object, so as to know it. Hence, there- 
 fore, the basis of certitude does not lie in the essential 
 
 _ characteristics of purely subjective intuitions. Knowledge, 
 
 or what is worthy of the name of knowledge, never is, 
 and cannot be, purely subjective. Knowledge is the act 
 of the knowing agent going forth upon, seizing, and 
 holding the object known; it is a transition from the 
 subjective to the objective. Normal or true knowledge 
 consists in making this transition in a due and proper 
 manner. And certainty consists in the consciousness that 
 we have done so. 
 
 Now, this representation of the case does not remove 
 the basis of religious certitude from the Bible page to 
 human consciousness. But this language conveys alto- 
 gether an inaccurate conception of the matter. For sup- 
 pose a truth which we know independently of the Bible 
 entirely, such as the fact that guilt prevails in human 
 society, and that we ourselves have been offenders 
 over and over again, our certainty as to this truth lies 
 plainly in the distinct and unhesitating consciousness 
 that our understanding has gone beyond its own im- 
 mediate precincts, by some medium or other, and 
 grasped events in the external world. In this case 
 it is altogether irrelevant to talk of our certainty 
 
296 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 being “removed from the Bible page to human con- 
 sciousness.” 
 
 Some one may now say, oh! but I know that man is 
 a sinner, just because the Bible says so. Very well. But 
 remember, that whoever says there is no other means of 
 knowing that men are guilty, but the statements of the 
 Bible, contradicts the Bible itself. And even if you 
 believe in the depravity of man simply and soely because 
 the Bible inculcates this doctrine, it is incorrect to say 
 that the ground of your certainty is not human con- 
 sciousness, but the page of the Bible. The real basis 
 of your certitude in this instance, is unquestionably 
 your own consciousness that such is the teaching of the 
 Bible. | 
 
 Lastly, as to those all-important truths which man has 
 no means of knowing but through the page of inspira- 
 tion, such as justification by faith, and sanctification 
 through the Holy Spirit, to set the page of the Bible 
 against human consciousness in discussing the ground 
 of our certain knowledge and belief of these saving doc- 
 trines, is sheer folly. The foundation of our assurance 
 as to these precious truths is, and can be, nothing else 
 but our vivid and unembarrassed consciousness that the 
 Bible is indeed the word of God, and that these glorious 
 and blessed doctrines are revealed therein. In stating 
 these views, we appeal to those who feel “that it is not 
 a greater happiness to inherit a good religion, than it is 
 a fault to have it only by inheritance; that it is the 
 greatest of follies to neglect any diligence that may pre- 
 
ae *; 
 
 4 = 
 = 
 
 7 
 
 CERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY. 297 
 
 vent the being mistaken where it is the greatest of 
 miseries to be deceived ; and that how dear soever things 
 taken upon the score are sold, there is nothing worse 
 taken up upon trust than religion, in which he deserves 
 not to meet with the true one that cares not to examine 
 whether or no it be so.” 
 
DIALOGUE VIL 
 THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 
 
 Origen.—* In none of the classic schools do we find a 
 moral doctrine at once adequate and consistent. This is 
 only to be found in the revelation of Jesus Christ.” } 
 ways Celsus.—In order to feel yourself com- 
 Is there a criterion? i 
 
 petent to pronounce this decision, you must 
 be in possession of some standard of morality. Being in 
 possession of that standard, you test by means of it, first, 
 the moral doctrine of the classic schools, and next the 
 moral doctrine of the New Testament, and then pronounce . 
 your verdict, that the first comes short of the standard, 
 and that the second comes up to it. Just as a merchant 
 cannot determine the respective lengths of two pieces of 
 silk, till he apply to both the standard measure. 
 
 Origen.— Well, of course, we have a standard, if such 
 you choose to call it, namely, conscience; to which we 
 appeal in proof of the existence and character of God. 
 “It is not merely to the fact of a divine power that con- ’ 
 science testifies, but eminently to the character of that — 
 power. The moral law, which it reveals, is not simply — 
 
 1 Theism, pp. 351, 352. 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 299 
 
 the expression of a supreme Will, but of a Will which is 
 essentially good and righteous.” ' 
 
 Celsus.—In these remarks you base Theism upon the 
 moral law given by conscience; and elsewhere it isasserted, 
 “that morality only finds a valid basis in a theistie doc- 
 
 trine.” ? 
 
 IT hambly submit, that some explanation is here 
 required. Religion and morality may be allowed in their 
 practical working mutually to support each other ; but ulti- 
 mately you must rest the one upon the other, or give to 
 both an independent foundation. So also, when you affirm 
 that there is “in the teaching and character of Christ a 
 rare exhibition of wisdom and goodness,” that “ He taught 
 a pure and exalted morality,” and remind ‘those who re- 
 pudiate the Divine authority of Christianity,” that they 
 do not deny these assertions,* is it not plain that you 
 appeal to some criterion in morality, independent of the 
 Christian Scriptures, whose authority is acknowledged in 
 common by you and by us? What is that criterion ? 
 
 Theologus.—The question is perfectly legitimate and 
 fair. And it is one of the weakest points in the Christian 
 apologetics, that this question is not only not satisfactorily 
 answered, but not even calmly and courteously enter- 
 tained. 
 
 Is conscience the  Ortgen.—Is not conscience the criterion ? 
 as * All the authority of this faculty is on the 
 side of righteousness and truth; it has sanctions for the 
 enforcement of its utterances; it approves the good, and 
 denounces the evil.”’4 Have we not a standard “in the 
 
 +Theism, p. 274. 7 Ib. p. 373. *%Ib. 350. 4 Infidelity, p. 33. 
 
300 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 supremacy of conscience, enthroned, as it were, above the 
 whole (of our faculties), and ever uttering her voice on 
 the side of whatsoever things are true, and lovely, and of 
 good report, and against their opposites; and not only 
 so, but rewarding well-doing, and punishing wrong- 
 doing ?”} 
 
 Celsus.—In every such appeal as this which is made 
 
 to Conscience, you are doing the very thing which you’ 
 
 blame us for doing. You affirm that something subjec- 
 tive, something within us, it matters not whether it be 
 called reason or conscience, “is to be umpire in every 
 dispute ;” that “there are laws of the mind, which are 
 exact and uniform, and which are absolute tests to man, 
 and by means of them the pretensions of every doctrine 
 must be decided.” 2 If consicence really be what you 
 have now claimed it to be, then why sneer at us for 
 maintaining, “that each man possesses in his own mind 
 the power of discerning the absolute truth, so that every- 
 thing supposed to be included in religion is to be tested 
 by this intuitive susceptibility or power?” You tell us 
 that we exchange “an infallible Bible for an infallible 
 
 Self.”* In your description of conscience you make it 
 
 infallible; for otherwise you could never reach an infal- 
 _ lible Bible. When you have reached an infallible plat- 
 form, to deny the assistance, or destroy the ladder, by 
 which you ascended, is not the best way to persuade 
 others to join you. . 3 
 Origen. —“ Two things are here confounded: the 
 ’ Infidelity, p. 34. ? Ib. p. 166. * Ib. p. 169. ‘Ib. p. 170. 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 301 
 
 capacity for receiving religious truth, and the capacity of 
 unaided reason to discover it.”? 
 
 Celsus.—You have claimed for conscience, as is con- 
 stantly done by others, a great deal more than a simple 
 capacity for receiving religious truth. It will dono good 
 to confound what you have now distinguished. But if 
 you deny to man independently of the Bible, all moral 
 and religious knowledge, and assert that he has only a 
 capacity to receive it when the Bible comes before him, 
 then, how with any consistency can you speak of “ the 
 clear imperishable utterances of our moral nature,”? and 
 express your willingness “ to abide by a fair trial of the 
 contents of the revelation itself;”2 inasmuch: as the 
 “nature of the doctrine must be taken into account, as 
 well as the external evidence which attests it? 2 
 
 Theologus.—The key to the whole is found in the fol- 
 lowing statement, which I am afraid has not recieved due 
 attention from either party. “It is not enough for our 
 author to say, as all sensible men have ever said, that 
 our knowledge of ‘the true, the beautiful, and the good,’ 
 coines to us in part from our intuitions; he is peremptory 
 in asserting that it comes to us only from that source—a 
 doctrine which can never be made to harmonize with any- 
 thing deserving the name of philosophy ; and which must 
 prove eminently hostile to the purity of religion.”? This 
 is the gist of the whole controversy. Christians are con- 
 stantly affirming we have no moral or religious know- 
 
 1 Infidelity, p. 173. “1h. ern eae 
 * Quotation in Infidelity, pp. 201, 202. 
 
302 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 ledge without the Bible; and infidels are perpetually 
 crying, the Bible can give us no additional knowledge to 
 what we have without it. Both statements, we appre- 
 hend, are wrong. 
 et Origen.—It is affirmed that mankind 
 Baer ener have no moral and religious knowledge 
 except what they derive from the Bible, 
 and that for two substantial reasons. First, In point of 
 fact nobody can tell us what that knowledge is; and 
 secondly, the supposition of its possession is unnecessary 
 in conducting the Christian argument. If men possessed 
 religious knowledge and a moral law independently of 
 the Bible, these might be allowed to form a criterion, if 
 we only knew what they were. ‘‘Are not the vast 
 majority of men at this moment—have they not been in 
 all ages—bowing down to stocks and stones ; worshipping 
 all sorts of false deities, and honouring them with rites 
 well worthy of them? Has there not been among vast 
 communities for unknown ages, the easiest reception of 
 the most hideous superstition, the most unshrinking, un- 
 questioning perpetration of the most horrible cruelties 
 and pollutions in obedience to even the falsest pretensions 
 of priestcraft? Is it not the rarest thing to find men 
 evincing any capacity for criticising the religious and 
 moral systems by which their faculties have been swathed 
 and bound from infancy? It is plain they do not.”! 
 Celsus.—The facts are admitted as you describe them. 
 They are, however, of no avail in the argument, unless 
 1A Defence of the Eclipse of Faith, p. 104. 
 
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THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 303 
 
 you infer from them, as your author does, that the 
 heathen could not do any better than they did, and con- 
 sequently are not guilty and worthy of condemnation, 
 but are simply objects of commiseration and pity. Now 
 your Bible affirms that they are guilty ; and Iam surely 
 right in inferring that they could have done, and ought 
 to have done better. Moreover, the author referred to is 
 constrained to admit that men have, or may have, some 
 knowledge independently of divine revelation, when he 
 says that we are allowed “partially to judge of God’s 
 character, rights, and jurisdiction.” ! 
 Origen.—Well, then, do tell us what your standard is; 
 set before us “the fixed basis of morality,” ‘ the common 
 conscience and heart morality.” _“ Is it an absolutely in- 
 variable standard, or a variable one that is spoken of? or 
 is it a measure of India rubber that will hold three 
 bushels or one? Whose ‘fixed moral basis?’ That of 
 the New Zealander, or of a Hottentot, or of an ancient 
 Greek, a Roman, a Jew, or of a Hindoo, or of a Chinese, 
 or of an Englishman? For all these have had very dis- 
 cordant notions on many points of morals, and therefore 
 (as well as for other reasons) about God. Or is every 
 body in general meant, and nobody in particular?” * 
 Celsus.—Your argument has two edges. The Bible is, 
 of course, your criterion or basis. But the Bible is no- 
 thing to anybody except as it is understood or inter- 
 preted. Now, pray, whose interpretation of the Bible is 
 your fixed moral and spiritual basis? Which doctor is 
 1A Defence, &c., p. 48. 2 Tby p. 105. 
 
304 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 your authority? Whose doctrine is your standard— 
 that of Arius or Luther; that of John Knox or John 
 Wesley; that of Canterbury or the Vatican; that of 
 Calvin or Arminius; that of the Quakers or Moravians; 
 that of Sandemanians, or Hutchinsonians, or Swedenbor- 
 gians, or Muggletonians, or Fifth-monarchy men ? 
 
 Lheologus.—The mere fact that a moral and religious 
 standard is not known, or not recognised, or not obeyed, 
 whether among heathens or Christians, cannot be ad- 
 mitted as evidence that there is in reality no such stan- 
 dard at all, or that it cannot be found by a diligent and 
 honest search. 
 
 Origen.—But the existence of a moral standard, inde- 
 pendently of the Bible, is quite irrelevant to the Chris- 
 tian argument. For “the first principle of morals is 
 the implicit submission of a creature to the Creator, 
 absolute surrender of the finite to the Infinite, whose 
 declared will is of itself all-sufficient authority.” ! “The 
 authority of God is of itself, even if no reasons were 
 given, and none were imaginable but his will, the suffi- 
 cient and all-sufficient authority.” ? 
 
 Celsus.—Your principle, then, is this, that actions are 
 right, simply because God wills them; and you reject 
 the other principle, that God wills them because they are 
 right. On this supposition, our argument would clearly 
 be at an end, provided you adhered to your own 
 assumption. But this you cannot do. If actions are 
 right, simply because God wills them, then God cannot 
 
 + A Defence, &c. p. 107. aie sae Sty 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 305 
 
 manifest his righteousness to his intelligent creatures. 
 But you say that “the Bible theory . . . . does 
 not shut the door against the possibility of God’s proving 
 himself a moral Governor; on the contrary, assures us 
 that he He will prove himself an exact one.”! And in 
 the very next page of the same book an appeal is made 
 to “the general convictions of men in all ages,” and to 
 certain “moral intuitions,” to shew that such a being as 
 some persons call God “is not the God of human con- 
 sciousness.” 
 
 Origen.—We admit, of course, the receptivity of the 
 
 human mind; its power to acquire know- 
 me ledge. “I see that men have moral capa- 
 cities; but I see also with my own eyes, and other men 
 see it too, that those capacities, as they are variously 
 developed, lead to the most various and erroneous ‘ moral 
 judgments,’ and consequently also to the most various 
 and erroneous conceptions of the Deity. They are in 
 every man, as is the instrument that has developed them, 
 yarying between the wide limits of a ‘Hottentot and a 
 StrPaul?)* 
 
 Celsus.—Our moral capacities “are in every man, as 
 is the instrument that has developed them!!” If nothing 
 be due to our use or abuse of the instrument, and of our 
 capacities too, you should have said so distinctly ; and 
 we could have recognised at once in your statement the 
 logic of Spinoza or of the Koran. Nay, more, if in any 
 case the instrument be a bad one, who is the author of 
 1 A Defence of the Eclipse of Faith, pp. 60, 61. Ip: pe li2 
 
306 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 it? If you say God is its author, you make him the 
 originator of evil. If you affirm that man is its author, 
 you attribute to him something more than mere capa- 
 city. 
 
 Origen.—* The concession of the principle, that from 
 without there may come a light which may develope into 
 act the latent moral and spiritual capacities of our nature, 
 is sufficient for the overthrow of the dogma, ‘that an 
 authoritative external revelation of moral and spiritual 
 truth is essentially impossible to man.’ ? } 
 
 Celsus.—It is granted that man’s capacities or powers 
 are developed only by coming into contact with objects 
 external to himself. What we maintain is this, that if 
 our moral and spiritual capabilities are not developed at 
 all till the Bible developes them, then are we not respon- 
 sible beings till this development takes place. And we 
 further maintain, that whatever external object is the 
 first instrument to develop our moral capacities, it can- 
 not, in so far as it is the instrument of development, be 
 invested with authority; for the very conception of autho- 
 rity, and the rightfulness of submission thereto, implies 
 some development of our spiritual faculties. 
 
 Origen.—Notwithstanding all that can be said, it is 
 plain, that “amidst the variety of human judgements, a 
 jxed basis of morality may easily be shewn to be a quick- 
 sand, without any personal God.” 2 | 
 
 Celsus.—You are surely not ignorant of the fact, that 
 many cannot find a personal God except on the basis of 
 
 * A Defence, &e. p. 93. ? Ib. pp. 63, 64. 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY, 307 
 
 man’s moral nature. Nor is there any escape from this 
 inference, that if man without the Bible be entirely with- 
 out light, he “is inwardly so dark that he cannot pos- 
 sibly have any religion but what he receives blindly.” 
 Origen.—Then you believe that there are “ definite @ 
 prior? notions, which everywhere enable man at once to 
 pronounce on the truth or falsehood of whatever pro- 
 fesses to be an external revelation.” * 
 Theologus. — Some indeed have conten- 
 
 Bible assumes 
 some truths and eq for such a position ; but it seems to be 
 
 reveals others, 
 loosely worded, and is somewhat extrava- 
 gant. The conclusion to which we are now led by the 
 discussion is this; the necessities of the Christian argu- 
 ment constrain us to admit, that there is in mankind, in- 
 dependently of written revelation, some knowledge of 
 religion and morality, which implies something like a 
 standard or criterion ; and that the difficulty of pointing 
 to that standard does not prove its non-existence, or the 
 impossibility of finding it. We have been led to perceive 
 also, that the Bible is intended to reveal to man some- 
 thing additional to what he knew before, and very pre- 
 cious in itself; and the very possibility of such a revela- 
 tion implies, as the terms in which the revelation itself is 
 couched show, that those to whom it is made not only 
 have moral capacities, but also have these capacities to 
 some extent developed, as intelligent beings, in the exer- 
 cise of their responsibility. 
 Celsus.—I have just found a passage in the work of a 
 1A Defence, &c., p. 94. 
 
308 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 Christian advocate, which if I could not show you the 
 page where it is printed, you would have asserted, I am 
 sure, to be from the pen of an opponent of Christian- 
 ity. ‘If men’s religious sensibilities were already awake 
 —if the spiritual life had already been begotten in them 
 —if their souls were on the point of detaching themselves 
 from the low and the trivial interests of the hour, and 
 were on the earnest look-out for objects to gratify their 
 higher instincts, and to nourish their diviner capabilities 
 —this material universe would, no doubt, exhibit a ful- 
 ness and a force of symbolic significance adequate not 
 only for instructional, but for emotional improvement 
 and elevation. We make no question that there have 
 been occasional instances, and that there are still, al- 
 
 though rare indeed, in which the Father of Spirits has. 
 
 looked in upon the human soul through the medium of 
 Nature, and has won from it an inarticulate response 
 which, rightly interpreted, would be, ‘ Let me come to 
 thine arms —let me rest on thy bosom — let me lose 
 my littleness in thy greatness, and merge my will in 
 thine.’ ””1 
 
 Theologus. — It is necessary to maintain on the one 
 hand the integrity of man’s responsibility under all cir- 
 cumstances, and, on the other, the peculiar preciousness 
 of God’s revealed mercy. While, therefore, it is held 
 objectively, that not one of the sinful children of men can 
 be pardoned and accepted of God except on the ground 
 of Christ’s atoning death, it must also be maintained sub- 
 
 * Bases of Belief, pp. 102, 103. 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 309 
 
 jectively, in the first place, to preserve man’s respon- 
 sibility, that men destitute of a knowledge of the gospel, 
 may and ought to “seek the Lord, if haply they might 
 feel after him and find Him” (Acts, xvii. 27), because 
 ‘God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he 
 that feareth Him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted 
 with Him ” (Acts, x. 34, 85). And in the second place, 
 to vindicate the glory of the gospel, it must be conten- 
 ded, that no man can jind God except through believing 
 in the Lord Jesus Christ, — that no one can become ac- 
 quainted with the method of reconciliation between guilty 
 man and his righteous Sovereign, and be filled “ with all 
 joy and peace in believing,” except through the know- 
 ledge of “ the glorious gospel of the blessed God,” which 
 is a matter of pure revelation. 
 
 Celsus.—These views are materially different from what 
 some have told us of Christianity ; which is represented 
 as “an expedient, not to zmpart new religious ideas, but 
 to vivify pre-existent ones—not so much to convey some- 
 thing beyond reach to the intellect, as to stimulate 
 dormant affections and subjugate the will.”! “We have 
 already said enough to show that mankind needed not so 
 much a directive as a suasive revelation of God’s will. It 
 is a special characteristic of the manifestation of God in 
 Christ, as given us in the New Testament, that its leading 
 design is, not so.much to instruct our race in duties, as 
 to supply a motive for their performance.” ? 
 
 Origen — These statements are very loose and un- 
 
 1 Bases of Belief, p. 74. 2 Tipe bon 
 
310 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 warranted ; and few, if any, among Evangelical Chris- 
 tians have any sympathy with them. “The eternal life, 
 which is offered to me in the Gospel—the Gospel being 
 interpreted as it is in my creed, and therefore not to be 
 thought of as if it were a superfluous announcement of 
 known moralities, but as a revelation of Truths quite un- 
 attainable by reason—is of universal aptitude, in relation 
 to human nature in its actual condition; and it must be 
 so thought of even although in fact it were but one in 
 millions that should accept it.” } 
 
 Celsus.— You now contend, then, for these three posi- 
 tions. First, that in the Bible there is a manifestation or 
 discovery of new and otherwise unobtainable truths. 
 Secondly, that there is an aptitude or fitness between this 
 revelation and the moral nature of man. And thirdly, 
 that though millions should not acknowledge or act upon 
 this agreement and aptitude, you would still maintain 
 that it exists. In the last point you have conceded a 
 great principle, that we cannot judge of what man can 
 do, or should do, by what he has done. Do you still 
 adhere to the second point, and to this plain inference 
 which it sustains, that if there be a fitness or aptitude in 
 what you affirm to be a divine revelation in relation to 
 man’s nature, there must be in the actual or possible pos- 
 session of man, even while destitute of that revelation, 
 some standard of morality and some religious knowledge? 
 
 Origen.—The inference is legitimate. ‘ Christ, as the 
 reformer of the human system in its secular aspect, takes 
 
 * Restoration of Belief, p. 325. 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. oUt 
 
 up and authenticates those well understood principles 
 which as soon as they are heard approve themselves to 
 the consciences of men, and which the sages of all times 
 have recognised and taught. That the teaching of an 
 ethical reformer should be consentaneous with the better 
 feelings and convictions of men, as embodied in the say- 
 ings and teachings of minds of the highest order, is what 
 we should look for as the First requirement in one who 
 comes forward to regenerate a world that has fallen into 
 disorder.” 
 
 Celsus.—Was Pliny, the younger, then, 
 innocent or guilty in persecuting the early 
 Christians? Did he know, or might he have known, that 
 he was doing wrong? 
 
 Pliny. 
 
 Origen.—* This enlightened Roman gentleman, well 
 conversant as he was with whatever had been said and 
 taught by the philosophers of Greeee or Rome, was con- 
 scious of no humiliation, he did not blush when these 
 stupid symbols had been poised near him, and he, prompt- 
 ing the form of appellation—praeunte me—pointed to 
 them as fit objects of devout regard.” ? ‘The severities 
 to which Pliny had allowed himself to have recourse were 
 prompted entirely by his own sense of public duty.” ° 
 
 Celsus.—If Pliny could go to such lengths in cruelty 
 and degrading idol-worship, “ conscious of no humiliation,” 
 while yet he was fully acquainted with “those well- 
 understood principles which approve themselves to the 
 consciences of men,” those “better feelings and convic- 
 
 1 Restoration of Belief, p. 269. 2 Ib. p20: 3 Tb. peed: 
 
oLe DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 tions, embodied in the sayings and teachings of minds of 
 the highest order,” and notwithstanding this be reckoned 
 “an enlightened Roman gentleman,” “‘ prompted entirely 
 by his own sense of duty,’—where shall we look for 
 those “ sophistically constituted, or sophisticated and 
 debauched minds, that do succeed in reasoning themselves 
 out of their instinctive beliefs ;—men who, with a suicidal 
 wantonness, having applied logical scissors to the nerves 
 of the moral life, do, and may, with truth declare that 
 they are conscious of no impulse leading them to look to 
 the supreme power or mercy ?”’! 
 
 Theologus.—Do you, then, admit, or do you not, that 
 there is amongst mankind some standard of morality inde- 
 pendently of written revelation? Is it too much to ask 
 you to be consistent with yourself either in its admission 
 . or rejection ? 
 
 Origen.—We, of course, appeal to such a standard in 
 maintaining the internal evidences of the Bible. Take, 
 for example, the First Epistle general of Peter. “The 
 calm majesty, the fervour, the bright hopefulness, and 
 the intense moral import of the Epistle carry it home to 
 every ingenuous mind as an embodiment of whatever is 
 the most affecting in theology, and the most effective and 
 salutary in ethics. With those—if there are any, who 
 have no consciousness of these qualities in the writing 
 before us, I should not court controversy. In any such 
 instance nature must have dealt in a very parsimonious 
 manner with the mind and heart, and sophistry must 
 
 ’ Restoration, p. 274. 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 313 
 
 have greatly overdone her part.”! “This Epistle, if 
 judged of purely on the ground of its intrinsic merits, 
 carries home to our understandings and best feelings an 
 irresistible impression of the goodness, wisdom, and sim- 
 plicity of the writer. Search the entire compass of ethi- 
 cal writings, ancient and modern, we should not find even 
 one that carries more decisively upon it the character- 
 istics of sincerity and truthfulness.”2 Similar remarks 
 apply more or less to every page of the Bible. 
 Celsus.—Here then you appeal to heathens and infi- 
 dels to judge of “ the intrinsic merits” of the Bible, and 
 even decline to have any controversy with those who are 
 so degraded by vice or so deficient by nature, as to be 
 unable to perceive and appreciate its moral and spiritual 
 excellences, which of course they cannot do without 
 obtaining a conception of these excellences from some ~ 
 other source. Elsewhere you say as to the heathen, that 
 in the course of the arduous martyr struggle of the early 
 Christians, “a New Principle came to be recognised and a 
 New Feeling came to govern the minds of men; which 
 principle and feeling conferred upon the individual man, 
 however low his rank, socially or intellectually, a dignity, 
 unknown to classical antiquity ; and which yet must be 
 the basis of every moral advancement we can desire, or 
 think of as possible.”* If, then, there be a principle and 
 feelmg which “must be the basis of every moral ad- 
 vancement,” and which confer a dignity unknown to 
 the most refined and cultured heathens, because they 
 ’ Restoration of Belief, p. 186. be pari. PIDY fel0G: 
 U 
 
314 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 ean be produced by Christianity alone,—“ which neither 
 Phlny nor any man of his time had thought of, or could 
 have been made to comprehend,” ! how can you ask such 
 men to sit in judgment upon the intrinsic merits and 
 ‘moral excellences of the Bible ? 
 
 As to unbelievers in Christianity, or those who decline 
 to admit its claims when pressed upon them, you smile 
 at their complaint of suffering a sort of martyrdom for 
 their opinions, or their convictions, as they would call 
 them, and you remark :—“ A claim, in behalf of the gos- 
 pel, must be made of what is its own, and which these 
 writers, without leave asked, have appropriated. As to 
 
 Is there teuth or CVCTY Word and phrase upon which the 
 conscience in man significance of this their profession (of suf- 
 Re fering for the truth) turns, it must be given 
 up, leaving them in possession of so much only of the 
 meaning of such phrases as would have been intelligible 
 to PLuTarcn, to Porruery, and to M. Aurgentius. A 
 surrender must be made of the words Conscience, and 
 Trutu, and Rigurrousnsss, and Sry; and, alas! mo- 
 dern unbelievers must be challenged to give me back 
 that one awe-fraught Name which they (must I not 
 plainly say so’) have stolen out of the Boox: when they 
 have frankly made this large surrender, we may return 
 to them the Te @zio of classical antiquity. Yet this pla- 
 giarism, as to terms, is the smaller part of that invasion 
 of rights with which the same persons are chargeable. 
 
 When those who, after rejecting Christianity, 
 
 * Restoration of Belief, p. 73. 
 
 — 
 
 OS oy nn ee 
 
 j 
 fy 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 315 
 
 talk of suffering for the ‘truth of God, and speak as if 
 they were conscience-bound ‘toward God,’ they must 
 know that they not only borrow a language which they 
 are not entitled to avail themselves of, but that they 
 invade a ground of religious belief whereon they can 
 establish for themselves no right of standing.”! But 
 let me ask you in all candour how, after we have made 
 ‘this large surrender,” and confessed that we have bor- 
 rowed, or rather “stolen,” from the Bible, not only the 
 terms, but the meaning of the terms, “ Conscience, and 
 truth, and righteousness, and sin,” and after penitently 
 acknowledging our worst plagiarism of all in respect to 
 the name of God himself, how can we be considered 
 capable of sitting in judgment, as you ask us to do, upon 
 “the calm majesty, the fervour, the bright hopefulness, 
 and the intense moral import” of a portion of the Bible, 
 and to acquiesce in your decision that it is “an embodi- 
 ment of whatever is the most affecting in theology, and 
 the most effective and salutary in ethics?” J can under- 
 stand you when you say that you should not court con- 
 troversy with those who have no consciousness of those 
 qualities. But for that very reason I do not see that 
 there can be any controversy at all, if a consciousness of 
 these qualities is only to be had through the Book itself. 
 You blast the very rock on which you build. 
 
 Origen.— Christianity must be looked at in its own 
 hght.” * 
 
 Celsus.—Very good. But what I have said is this, 
 
 1 Restoration, pp. 92, 93, 94. abe pa2s. 
 
316 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 that if Christianity be the only moral and religious light 
 in the world, controversy between us is vain; and the 
 very arguments which you use, and on which you rest 
 the greatest weight, are absurd. ‘“ You assume the truth 
 of Christianity, in order that you may shew it to be 
 true.” ! 
 
 Origen.—‘ I admit that it is so, in great measure, and 
 it must be so in the nature of things. So long as your 
 mood of mind is this, that you will grant nothing which 
 it 1s possible for you to deny, you will catch only a 
 glimpse of things, disadvantageously presented to the 
 eye. But if you allow me to exhibit the same objects in 
 their true position, and in their natural proportions, you 
 will yourself see them to be real. After this you will 
 not ask me to follow you from point to point in so rigid 
 a manner. If I undertook to teach you the modern 
 astronomy, and you would at once grant that my inter- 
 pretation of the visible heavens is the true one, I should 
 be able to convince you that it is so in much less time, 
 and by a far less painful process, than as if you make it 
 a point of honour to dispute every inch of ground,” } 
 
 Celsus.—It appears, then, that you yourself admit the 
 substantial accuracy of my position, namely, that you 
 have been begging the question at issue. And you now 
 assert that in assuming the truth of Christianity in order 
 to prove that it is true, you are yielding to necessity ; 
 “it must be so, in the nature of things.” The assumption 
 of such a necessity is scepticism in its subtlest and most 
 
 Restoration, p. 236. 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. ola 
 
 malignant form. Iam no such sceptic as that. Unbe- 
 liever in Christianity though I be, I profess this belief; 
 namely, that if Christianity be true, it is possible so to 
 represent it to the human mind as to be free from incon- 
 sistencies and contradictions in itself, and in its proofs 
 or evidences unbetrayed by vicious argumentation. 
 
 As to the parallel which you draw between Christianity 
 and the modern astronomy, I grant that in a loose and 
 popular sense your remark is correct enough. But why 
 not do in Christianity what has been done in astronomy, 
 and make good your ground “from point to point in the 
 most rigid manner?” Why not do so, especially when 
 there are individuals who do “make it a point of honour 
 to dispute every inch of ground?” Even though the 
 process be tedious and painfal, let us have it, that truth 
 may not suffer but be fully vindicated. To take refuge 
 in the bare assertion, that this achievement cannot be 
 effected, looks like a pusillanimous betrayal of the truth, 
 or a clumsy effort to conceal your own incompetency. 
 
 Theologus.—Why should not Christians honestly ac- 
 knowledge that the scientific argument for Christianity 
 in its present state of development is incomplete? And 
 resting the strength of their cause, in the meantime, on 
 its practical defences, they might set themselves to a 
 vigorous prosecution of the truth in its scientific aspect. 
 
 Origen.—W ell, supposing that we have not yet reached 
 the goal, it may be asked, how far are we on the way, 
 and is it possible to compute the distance between us and 
 the goal? 
 
518 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 Theologus.—One of the first things to be done is evi- 
 dently to determine the moral criterion in some form or 
 other. ven the practical argument demands the estab- 
 lishment, of course in a practical shape, of the moral 
 standard. 
 
 The practical cri.  Ovigen.—How would you state the cri- 
 Re terion in morals for practical purposes? 
 
 Lheologus.—It might perhaps be stated thus: Every 
 responsible being such as man has true knowledge of his 
 moral and religious obligations to some extent, more or 
 less ; and the man who does not act up to the knowledge 
 which he has is guilty. As to the first point in this state- 
 ment, it will not, we think, be disputed. “For neither 
 do the spirits damned lose all their virtue ;” that is, they 
 do not cease to be ethical or responsible beings, and as 
 such they must have some moral intelligence and con- 
 science left to them. How much more the children of 
 men in their present state of probation! As to the second 
 point, his present amount of knowledge is made the guide 
 in moral questions to every individual man. Conscience, 
 so commonly pleaded, cannot be considered the standard 
 in morality, generally or scientifically, because it is cor- 
 rupted and one man’s professed conscience contradicts 
 another. But his own conscience, honestly followed, is 
 to every man a practical guide, inasmuch as it is always 
 near him, and is not wholly blinded; and he who follows 
 the ight which he has, is in the way of obtaining more. 
 
 Origen.—How do you apply this principle in defence 
 of Christianity ? . 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 319 
 
 Theologus.—Simply thus: There is more than prima 
 facie evidence to show that Christianity is entitled to a 
 fair hearing. When Christianity obtains from any man 
 a fair hearing, there is a congruity or harmony between 
 it and the dictates of his conscience, which brings him 
 under an obligation to believe and obey. 
 
 Origen.—If any one disputes this position what would 
 you say to him? 
 
 Theologus.—This is my ultimatum or stand-point, and 
 I cannot reason with the man who disputes it. If any 
 one affirms that he has carefully and conscientiously ex- 
 amined Christianity, and has found in it no beauty to 
 attract his affections, no truth to arrest his soul, no autho- 
 rity to subdue his will, with such an one I can enter into 
 no controversy. 
 
 Celsus.—Ah well, that makes short work of it. As to 
 the scientific view of the question, have you anything to 
 advance ? 
 
 Theologus.—In this case the difficulties, as we have seen, 
 are numerous and formidable. Nor do I feel that I as 
 an individual, or as occupying my present position, am 
 under any special obligation to answer this question. 
 
 Celsus.—Has anything been done towards a solution of 
 this question, or is anything likely to be accomplished ? 
 
 Origen. —- Much has been attempted at 
 least. Here is a definition of sin to begin 
 with. ‘The line must be drawn in theory, as we may 
 be sure it will in the Divine Judgment, between the na- 
 tural disorder of human nature, and the wilful sins of the 
 
 What is sin? 
 
320 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 individual; but there can be nothing objectionable, if we 
 consider the perfection of the Divine Nature and Agency, — 
 in defining sin to be, whatever, in the nature or agency 
 of intelligent beings, is in opposition to the Divine Will, 
 or in discord with the harmony of His works, whether in 
 any particular instance it be voluntary or involuntary.” ' 
 
 Celsus.—Passing the objection that this seems to re- 
 solve the distinction between vice and virtue into a 
 Divine volition, I am at a loss to perceive how sin or 
 guilt can in any case be involuntary. To say that some 
 sins are voluntary and some involuntary is “most ad- 
 mired confusion.” The guilt that is involuntary in the 
 creature, must be ascribed to God himself, or to some 
 Manichean eternal principle of evil. 
 
 Origen. — Ah, you don’t understand me. « Every 
 one knows that prolonged habits of vice destroy the 
 power of the will, and enslave reason to passion; yet 
 none would refuse to call an action sinful, because com- 
 mitted by a man who has become the slave of sin.” 2 
 
 Celsus.—Of course such an action is guilty ; but who 
 would call it involuntary, when it is plainly the result of 
 the former acts of the will, even supposing that the man 
 was the most fettered slave when he committed it ? 
 
 Theologus.—There is obviously a distinction between 
 what is voluntary directly and voluntary indirectly, which 
 will clear up the present question. Many sins can only 
 be regarded as indirectly voluntary ; to call them invo- 
 luntary seems altogether inadmissible. 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 249. 21D) pr 2501 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. bal 
 
 Origen. —“ Evil is, at the most, a deprivation of 
 good.” | 
 
 Celsus. — Does this mean that all sin is involuntary ? 
 
 \ Please to explain yourself. 
 
 Origen. — “ If, notwithstanding the Perfections of the 
 Creator, sinfulness and imperfection be inseparable from 
 the creature, it cannot give a higher view of the Divine 
 Character, to regard sinfulness and imperfection as ori- 
 ginal in every man, than as transmitted from generation 
 to generation.”* “It is not improbable that the deal- 
 ings of God with the race of mankind are, in some way, 
 dependent upon the original weakness and frailty of 
 human nature.’”’3 “Evil abounds in finite beings.” * 
 
 Celsus. —If I understand your language, you identify 
 the necessary imperfection of the finite creature with 
 evil and guilt. This interpretation of your words is the 
 only one which will bear the inference which you draw, 
 and which, you say, is confirmed by revelation, namely, 
 «that every man will be accountable for his own works, 
 and will not be responsible for any hereditary taint of 
 evil.’>5 Is this indeed the doctrine held by the Protes- 
 tant Churches? Leaving them and you to settle that 
 question, I go on to observe that you do not adhere con- 
 sistently to your own opinion. At one turn of the con- 
 troversy you hold this opinion; at another turn you 
 espouse an opinion exactly the reverse. For example, 
 you say, ‘“‘ morally, a creature must surely be considered 
 
 1 Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 141. ?Ib. p. 251. *Ib., p. 358. 
 * Tb. p. 366. ib pazay 
 
g22 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 perfect, when it is in exact adjustment to universal na- 
 ture, in all the relations of the position in which God has 
 placed it; when its faculties, to the extent of their power, 
 combine in harmonious action in themselves and with the 
 world which environs it; and all its agency is directed, 
 within its sphere, to fulfil the Will of God. Such moral 
 perfection is certainly conceivable, and, reason naturally 
 conjectures, is the actual condition of all the creatures as 
 they proceed from the hands of the Creator.”! And still 
 more explicitly do you contradict yourself when you 
 remark, ‘“ The difference between the Scriptural doctrine 
 of the fall, and the opinion that man was originally im- 
 perfect, may seem, at first sight, to be one of little im- 
 portance. But it touches the foundation of the whole 
 system of revelation, and extends to the question of 
 Christianity or infidelity.” 2 
 
 Theologus.—The result of this discussion seems to be, 
 that in order to establish the evidences of Christianity 
 on a scientific basis, it is necessary to settle the preli- 
 minary question, what is the ethical criterion, or in 
 other words, what is the difference between virtue and 
 vice, or between sin and holiness. Though this ques- 
 tion be encompassed with serious difficulties—though 
 the road thus indicated as the one in which we must 
 travel be rugged and steep, yet inasmuch as it is the 
 only legitimate one to our destination, we should nerve 
 our minds and gird up our loins to perform the jour- 
 ney. 
 
 * Christian Theism, vol. ii. p. 248. 7 Thy pe206. 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. §23 
 
 Origen.—Can you tell us, then, what is the criterion 
 in morals ? 
 
 Theologus.—We do not by any means profess to solve 
 the problem. But there must be some considerations, 
 not far to seek, which will afford some material aid in 
 any attempt to reach a solution. 
 
 Origen.—What are these considerations ? 
 
 Theologus.—At your request I have no objections 
 to state briefly some thoughts upon this topic, which I 
 may take another opportunity of unfolding and illus- 
 trating. 
 
 There is, however, another question which takes pre- 
 
 Man's fandamen. ce“ence of that respecting the ethical eri- 
 ueeene terion, and which forms the first and great 
 topic in philosophy. ‘The solution of this question is the 
 creat desideratum of modern speculation, as it may be 
 shewn to be common to all the sciences. Scientific or 
 strictly logical evidence on any subject must have for its 
 foundation a definition of terms and a statement of first 
 principles. Without an exact apprehension of what is 
 assumed, as well as a correct conception of what is to be 
 proved, it is impossible to produce evidence that shall be 
 satisfactory to a reflecting mind. Looking at matters in 
 this light, it is observed that all human knowledge divides 
 itself into two branches: Assumptions and Inferences,— 
 truths which are taken for granted, and truths which 
 are not assumed but proved. Aristotle stated this dis- 
 tinction with great precision, and it has been universally 
 acknowledged. The problem, therefore, may be pro- 
 
324 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 posed to draw a line between these two sorts of truths, 
 which have been designated noetic and dianoetic, by 
 embodying the former in verbal statements. To express 
 simply and orderly whatever is taken for granted in the 
 various departments of human learning, seems to be the 
 very first duty of philosophy. The want of such a state- 
 ment must multiply and aggravate disputes, and fre- 
 quently retard the progress of knowledge. There are 
 truths which we legitimately believe, which we cannot 
 but believe, but which we cannot prove by falling back 
 upon anything simpler or surer than themselves. What 
 are these truths? No question can be more distinct or 
 more important. 
 
 A little reflection. may convince us that a clear state- 
 ment of our primary notions and first principles would 
 tend to dispel many clouds from man’s intellectual firma- 
 ment. A map of the elevated table-land, whence all the 
 sciences, like fertilising streams, take their rise, would 
 confer immense advantage on every inquiring mind; it 
 would accelerate the discoveries of the thoughtful, and 
 facilitate the instruction of the thoughtless. If a philo- 
 sopher shall attempt to prove by argument one of our 
 fundamental assumptions (and how often has this been 
 done’), his conclusion will be true, and may be admitted 
 by all; but his logic will be at fault. In such a case, the 
 mind is resting on a truth, which it has reached by a 
 forced and illegitimate road. Again, if a philosopher 
 shall assume what needs to be proved (and has this never 
 been done?), his whole demonstration will be like a house 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 325 
 
 upon sand. If his fundamental position be not only illo- 
 gically assumed, but in itself false ;—not only formally, 
 but really, erroneous, the superstructure will be nothing 
 better than rubbish. The confounding, then, of assump- 
 tions and inferences,—of what cannot be proved and 
 what must be proved,—the want of some well-defined 
 line between these two widely different domains, has not 
 only given support and vigour to numerous errors, but 
 throws a dimness on the scientific or speculative aspect 
 of every truth which mankind have hitherto embraced. 
 No one proposition can be expounded and defended in a 
 thoroughly scientific form till we can distinctly say: So 
 much we assume; so much we prove or demonstrate by 
 the help of these assumptions. 
 
 It is our conviction that the proposition which asserts 
 the existence of God will be found to be itself one of our 
 fundamental truths, or to be an immediate and obvious 
 inference from them. Proceeding, then, on the hypo- 
 thesis that this is the actual state of the case,—that 
 God exists, and that He is the Creator of man, we 
 shall throw out a few hints in regard to the ethical cri- 
 terion. 
 
 The scientife eri. Lhe first pot to be settled in this 
 terion. investigation is, What are the objects, of 
 all which, and of which alone, virtue or vice (sin or holi- 
 ness) is predicated. We shall call these objects ethical, 
 to distinguish them from non-ethical objects, or those 
 which are neither right nor wrong, and unworthy of 
 either praise or blame. Ethical objects, we conceive, are 
 
326 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 those living beings whose constitution is found to embrace 
 the various elements of ethical discussion, such as, desire, 
 action, volition, intelligence, and conscience. The ethical 
 quality, or the function of accountability, attaches not to 
 this or the other part of man, to this or that development 
 of his nature, but to man himself. The question, then, 
 what is the difference between virtue and vice, resolves 
 itself into a more manageable question, what is the dif- 
 ference between a moral and an immoral being ? 
 
 To answer this question, we must inquire what sort of 
 a creature man is, as an ethical or responsible agent. As 
 such he appears to us to be possessed of Desires, Actions, 
 Intelligence, Will, and the Ethical Sentiment or Con- 
 science. 
 
 As to the Desires of mankind they are either proper 
 or improper, or to use words which may be found more 
 precise, normal or abnormal. If there be harmony and 
 agreement between the object which is desired, and the 
 constitution and situation of the agent desiring it, the 
 desire is suitable or normal. If there be no such accor- 
 dance between ourselves and the things which we are 
 desiring and wishing, our desires are unworthy and 
 abnormal. 
 
 In regard to Actions, they admit of the same two-fold 
 division as desires, for action, we are disposed to consider, 
 is nothing else than the gratification of desire. Man 
 never acts without a desire of some sort. If the desire 
 gratified by an action be abnormal or normal, so is the 
 action. It is well to notice that this distinction of our 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 327 
 
 desires and actions extends to every action and every 
 desire. The inference is clear and weighty, that no 
 action of an ethical or responsible being is indifferent. 
 
 The Intelligence possessed by an accountable being has 
 such functions as the following to discharge. 1. To dis- 
 tinguish between his normal and abnormal desires and 
 actions, and between the relative values of two normal 
 desires when the gratification of both is impracticable. 
 2. To determine the fit and proper means to obtain the 
 gratification of his desires. 3. To determine what are 
 the final desires or ultimate aims worthy of his immortal 
 nature. 
 
 Now in a responsible being desire does not pass into 
 action without the interposition of his Well. In any case 
 when the desire is passing into action, the agent either 
 knows or he does not know, whether the desire he is con- 
 templating the gratification of be normal or abnormal, 
 If he does not know whether the desire be normal or ~ 
 abnormal, his ignorance is avoidable or unavoidable. If 
 his ignorance be unavoidable, he is not responsible; if it 
 be avoidable he is blameworthy. We suppose, therefore, 
 that when an ethical being is about to will the gratifica- 
 tion of a desire, he knows whether that desire be normal 
 orabnormal. On this supposition four distinct manifesta- 
 tions of ethical agency will emerge. 1. The desire of 
 the agent may be normal and his belief or knowledge 
 respecting it may also be normal; that is, the desire may 
 be really good and the agent be right in believing it to 
 be good. Let such a volition as this be called normal. 
 
328 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 2. The desire may be abnormal and the belief regarding 
 it normal ; that is, the desire may be actually bad, and the 
 agent know very well that it is bad, and yet gratify it. 
 Let such a volition be called directly abnormal. 3. It is 
 possible that while the desire is in itself normal, the belief 
 of the agent respecting it may be abnormal; that is, an 
 action may be lawful enough in itself, while an individual 
 believes it to be unlawful. The commission of an action 
 in such circumstances involves guilt. This volition must 
 be designated like the former directly abnormal. 4. Itis 
 very common for a desire to be abnormal and a man’s 
 belief regarding it abnormal too; in other words, an 
 action may be wrong and the agent may consider it right. 
 This volition will be recognised as abnormal indirectly. 
 
 This statement assumes it to be a fact, that the will of 
 a responsible being does not always follow the dictates of 
 his understanding in gratifying his desires, and also that 
 in this neglect to obey the voice of reason hes the essence 
 of guilt. We are thus led to such conclusions as the 
 following :— 
 
 The first guilt of an ethical being consists in gratifying 
 an irregular or abnormal desire, while he knows that it 
 is such, and has power to refrain from the gratification. 
 
 One abnormal volition, or one guilty action as just 
 described, constitutes an ethical being immoral; or, 
 conversely, he only is a moral or virtuous agent all 
 whose volitions are normal, or who has never committed 
 a transgression. 
 
 A moral agent, without any marvellous stretch of his 
 
THE STANDARD OF MORALITY. 329 
 
 understanding, but in the ordinary and easy use of it, 
 while believing that his actions are normal, believes at 
 the same time, that they are agreeable to the will of God 
 and conducive to his own best welfare. 
 
 The only way in which an ethical being can certainly 
 know what is normal or right in desire and action is by 
 the use of his understanding in examining the nature of 
 himself and the objects of his desire, or by some autho- 
 rised manifestation of his Maker’s will. 
 
 The only legitimate way in which man, as a respon- 
 sible being, can pursue his good upon the whole is by pur- 
 suing what he knows to be right, in the manner just in- 
 dicated. 
 
 It would occupy too much of your time at present to 
 specify the various features of the immoral agent, or to 
 state the different steps by which we have been led to 
 these conclusions. Let it suffice to sum up the character 
 of the virtuous or moral agent. It consists not only in a 
 permanent and paramount desire to conform, but also in 
 actually conforming, in every thing, to the dictates of his 
 reason or to some authentic promulgation of the will of 
 his Maker, by which course, as he knows, his own true 
 welfare is best consulted. The dictates of his reason may 
 be supplemented, but are never opposed, by the mani- 
 fested will of God. By a perpetual and dutiful attention 
 to the good and righteous pleasure of the Most High 
 when made known, or, in the absence of such, to the 
 teaching of his own understanding, an individual will con- 
 tinue in that state of happiness and perfection, of which 
 
 x 
 
330 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 his nature is capable, and which his Creator intended 
 that he should enjoy. Every movement of this perfect 
 creature will reflect honour upon Him whose workman- 
 ship he is. The moral being will perceive that such is 
 the fact, and will desire that so it should be. His every 
 act, whether simply in accordance with the understand- 
 ing which God has given him, or in obedience to some 
 express Divine command, is thus homage directly and 
 worthily rendered to Deity. Whether, therefore, the 
 issue of his conduct or the intention of his heart be con- 
 sidered, it would appear that whatever the moral agent 
 does, he does it to the glory of his God. 
 
 These principles may be vindicated, we think, on 
 strictly philosophical or scientific ground. Grant us 
 these, or some such principles as these, and we feel as if 
 we might hopefully undertake, with the aid also of the 
 conclusions to which we have been brought in the different 
 preceding discussions, to vindicate the cause of Christian- 
 ity against all deistical objections. If, however, every- 
 thing in the form of an ethical basis or moral criterion, 
 which is supposed to be common to both parties be 
 refused, the controversy, as we have been led to see by 
 actual observation, must prove to be endless and unsatis- 
 factory. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 REASON AND FAITH; 
 THEIR CLAIMS WITHOUT CONFLICT. 
 
 (Theologus loquttur.) 
 
 TuErE are two facts which have been elicited in these 
 discussions, and which cannot but be familiar to the 
 readers of the higher literature of the age, and which are 
 as pregnant with interest as they are palpable to obser-. 
 vation. The first of these facts 1s this, that, in the dis- 
 cussion of religious and ethical questions, those who hold 
 the same conclusions, or contend -for the same great 
 truths, are not substantially agreed in their statements of 
 the main arguments by which their common position is 
 supported. The second fact that obtrudes itself, and 
 which is probably a consequence of the first, is this, that 
 on some points, which are generally and justly regarded 
 as of the utmost practical importance, the most intelli- 
 ~ gent and religious among mankind are found to be not 
 only of various sentiments, but in actual collision and 
 conflict. 
 
 Those who maintain the validity of natural religion, 
 
ao2 CONCLUSION. 
 
 for example, are not agreed as to the doctrines which it 
 embraces ; and what is more, they are not at one in 
 stating the evidence of those doctrines which they in 
 common believe it to embrace. This want of agreement 
 consists not merely in variety of language and illustration, 
 or in a different arrangement of topics, or in any other 
 diversity of inferior moment, but also not unfrequently in 
 direct and unqualified contradiction. Some, for instance, 
 deny that the assertion of Divine existence either requires 
 or admits of proof; some again affirm that proof is 
 needed and must be adduced. Among the latter class 
 one finds sufficient evidence in himself; another denies 
 this, and finds sufficient evidence only in the material 
 universe; and a third rejects both opinions, and finds his 
 belief in Deity warranted only by taking a conjoined view 
 of himself and the world of matter. The conclusiveness 
 of the argument from design is maintained by some and 
 refused by others. 
 
 In hke manner, if we look into the literature which 
 expounds the evidence in favour of Christianity being a 
 religion from God, we observe not only diversity but op- 
 position, not only variety but contradiction. Some con- 
 tend that sufficient evidence for the divine origin of the 
 Bible lies, and must lie, within the book itself. Others 
 maintain that the historic evidence is at once necessary 
 and of itself sufficient. These last, moreover, are by no 
 means harmonious in their modes of developing the his- 
 toric argument. Some assert that miracles are of them- 
 selves sufficient to authenticate a divine commission or 
 
CONCLUSION. Soa 
 
 message ; while others affirm that the evidence of 
 miracles is imperfect, and requires to be supplemented 
 by the virtuous character of the messenger, and the veri- 
 similitude of his message. 
 
 This repugnance or contrariety of sentiment and judg- 
 ment appears not only in unfolding the evidences of reli- 
 gion, but also in explaining and inculcating religious 
 truths ; that is, not only in discussing more abstruse and 
 speculative problems, but also in enforcing the most 
 fundamental and onerous duties. The question, what 1s 
 faith, gives rise to much controversy, and carries us im- 
 mediately into the depths of philosophy and among the 
 momentous practical realities of our responsibility. The 
 ingenuous mind, while yet standing on the threshold of 
 Christianity and trembling on the confines of eternal 
 bliss or woe, is perplexed and almost confounded by 
 noticing, that among the most reputable disciples of 
 Christ contradictory opinions prevail, as to what that 
 act is by which he should become a Christian. Some 
 doctors assure him that it is in itself a mere intellectual 
 act, while others protest against this view as most errone- 
 ous and dangerous. We need only allude to such con- 
 troversies as those respecting the freedom of the will, the 
 extent of human depravity consequent on the fall of 
 Adam, the nature of Divine inspiration, the extent of 
 Christ’s atonement, and the duty of Civil Government in 
 relation to Christianity. Conflicting opinions have not 
 only been adopted on these and other points, but the 
 holders of these contradictory sentiments have each 
 
334 CONCLUSION. 
 
 believed and maintained, that the reception of his own 
 view and the rejection of its opposite was identified 
 with the integrity of truth and the weightiest interests of 
 men. Hence it appears that the most intelligent and 
 devoted followers of Christ, even with a written revela- 
 tion of the divine will in their hands, are frequently 
 found to be mutually and diametrically opposed, while 
 discussing the most significant truths and enforcing the 
 most urgent duties. 
 
 The contradictions prevalent among Christian men 
 resolve themselves, however, into disputes in speculative 
 philosophy, ethical science, or grammatical interpreta- 
 tion. Whatever disadvantages, therefore, Christians 
 labour under in consequence of the mutual repugnance 
 of some of their views, they occupy an intellectual posi- 
 tion in no respect inferior to that occupied by the gene- 
 ral students of philosophy, ethics, and language. The 
 controversies, that have disturbed schools and colleges 
 and learned men, are necessarily transferred to the arena 
 of the Christian Church, or spring up spontaneously 
 there, because the topics of discussion are fundamentally 
 common to both those parties. 
 
 While revolving these facts the question arises, is there 
 any. reasonable prospect that these controversies, some 
 or all of them, shall terminate,—these contradictions dis- 
 appear, — and the truth, hitherto half-concealed, shine 
 forth in a form so distinct and in colours so brilliant as 
 to win the conviction of every honest mind? A full and 
 satisfactory answer to this: question involves many con- — 
 
CONCLUSION. anu 
 
 siderations, and calls for the removal of some weighty 
 objections. But that the question must be answered in 
 the affirmative will on reflection be doubted by few. 
 
 Every thoughtful man will at once reject the supposi- 
 tion, that conflicting sentiments, especially on the mat- 
 ters that have been specified, should continue for ever 
 unreduced, and fill human society with distraction. Such 
 a supposition seems to imply, that one chief end for 
 which intelligent beings like men have been created, is to 
 be intellectual gladiators. We may indeed admit that 
 intellectual conflict will be eternal, if it be also conceded, 
 that the ground of conflict will be ever changing, that 
 whenever a dispute is terminated by the establishment of 
 truth, a new contest will arise only to issue in a fresh 
 victory. But to imagine that intelligent beings shall 
 exhaust their immortal energies in mutual contradictions 
 on questions of moment is monstrously absurd. If 
 through the lapse of countless ages there will always be 
 found problems to exercise man’s increasing powers, and 
 if controversies will be ever emerging to stimulate his 
 powers to their utmost intensity, it can only be by new 
 difficulties appearing after the old have vanished. No 
 drudgery can be conceived more painful or degrading, 
 than endless disputation and collision on a vital problem 
 that shall remain for ever unresolved. 
 
 While our speculative or theoretic contradictions are 
 in themselves intolerable to every well-constituted mind, 
 they assume a graver and more urgent character, when 
 they are seen in many cases to be identified with our 
 
336 CONCLUSION. 
 
 practical quarrels, and thus form the most formidable 
 difficulty in the way of social improvement. The mutual 
 antagonism of professed friends is, in every sphere of 
 human life, always more disastrous than the attacks of 
 open enemies. It is the internal weakness or inherent 
 inconsistency of many promising schemes of usefulness, 
 rather than the outward force of opponents, that defeats 
 them, and consequently retards the amelioration of 
 society. Philanthropy herself, therefore, is pleading 
 and waiting, bathed in tears, for the cessation of strife, 
 and the propitious announcement that the friends of 
 truth have sheathed their internecine swords, and are 
 marching one in hand, and one in heart, because they 
 have become one in knowledge and belief, to overcome 
 and bless the world. While we are looking for this 
 great consummation, it is not irrelevant to ask, how is it 
 that in so many cases the truth is so slow in triumphing 
 and the conflict so fiercely prolonged? One reason not 
 uninfluential will, we apprehend, be found to be this, that 
 he who holds the truth in one particular, in others holds 
 what is erroneous; in other words, the defender of one 
 special truth is not, in all his opinions or convictions, con- 
 sistent with himself and with truth. 
 
 Truth, we must assume, is a whole of many parts, 
 which are neither disconnected nor disjointed, neither 
 isolated nor thrown together in confusion. ~As there isa 
 profound harmony between each truth and every other 
 truth, so every erroneous proposition will come into con- 
 flict, more or less directly, with one or more propositions 
 
CONCLUSION. 337 
 
 that are true. If then on any occasion a particular truth, 
 held intelligently by one man, be assailed or denied by 
 another man, the strength of the assault will he very mate- 
 rially in the false assumptions or erroneous propositions held 
 by the defender of the truth, and introduced in the course 
 of his defence. Leta truth be distinctly stated, let its evi- 
 dence be sufficient and fairly marshalled, and let the mind 
 give due attention to that evidence, and the intellect will 
 yield acquiescence, From the very nature of the case, 
 then, it would appear, that the chief or only ground on 
 which the denial of any truth can make a plausible and 
 effectual stand is the error or errors that are mingled 
 with the defence and exposition of that truth. All ex- 
 perience seems to confirm the correctness of this remark. 
 
 Besides, the only conceivable way in which a man can 
 be rationally convinced of being in error is by making 
 manifest to himself his own inconsistency. If an indi- 
 vidual can be led to see that one of his beliefs contradicts 
 another of his beliefs, or, which is much the same thing, 
 that the evidence which he admits in one case he refuses 
 in another case, or that the principle which he applies in 
 one instance he rejects or ignores in another instance, he 
 is thereby constrained to acknowledge his error; and in - 
 no other possible way can he be induced, at once freely 
 and intelligently, to make such an acknowledgment. 
 Every real difficulty, therefore, with which man as an 
 intelligent being has to contend, will, we think, be found 
 resolving itself, more or less speedily, into a self-contra- 
 diction. What we do not know can never come into 
 
338 CONCLUSION. 
 
 conflict with what we do know. An unsolved question 
 cannot shake or unsettle a question that is solved. Ab- 
 normal ignorance, or not knowing what we should know, 
 issues In transgression, which is a practical error. But 
 error in all its forms impinges against truth. The clashing 
 of two knowledges or beliefs in the mind, (as well as col- 
 lision between outward conduct and inward conviction), is 
 the effectual test of the presence of error, and is the one 
 great danger which an intelligent being has to fear. 
 Scepticism, whether religious or philosophical, is best 
 refuted, nay, can be effectually refuted only, by its own 
 inconsistency. Universal doubt destroys itself. To affirm 
 an universal negation is obviously suicidal. On the other 
 hand, there is not probably a single man living who is 
 not a disbeliever or sceptic in part,—that is, there is no 
 man of whom it may be said that he is ignorant of no 
 truth which he might and ought to believe, or that he 
 holds no error which he might and ought to reject. But 
 when any one becomes a professed sceptic, or makes it 
 his business to assail truths which are held intelligently 
 by his fellows, the vigour of the assault lies in the errors 
 which are received by them. It is difficult to conceive 
 how pure truth in its abstract discrete state, should be 
 attacked argumentatively by an intelligent being; but 
 it is easy to perceive how it may be opposed in a concrete 
 or agglomerate condition. If these views be at all correct, 
 it appears that the only foothold of scepticism, excepting 
 that of unblushing wickedness and vice, is the blunders 
 and mistaken admissions of the friends of truth. The 
 
CONCLUSION. 339 
 
 only seasoned or dressed food of Disbelief consists in the 
 self-inconsistencies and mutual contradictions of those 
 who Believe. 
 
 It has been said, as we have seen, with too much ac- 
 curacy, that the argument, that is, the scientific argu- 
 ment, in favour of Christianity may be summed up in this 
 statement, that there are fewer difficulties in receiving, 
 than in rejecting, the Bible. But then what is meant by 
 a difficulty? It means either an incomprehensibility, a 
 mystery, something too high for the understanding to 
 scale; or it means an inconsistency, a contradiction, some- 
 thing that the understanding rejects. It has been shewn 
 - that to affirm that there are fewer mysteries in Christi- 
 anity than in infidelity, is no argument in favour of the 
 one against the other. For there are mysteries on our 
 right hand and on our left wherever we go. Nor is at 
 all an unlikely thing that truth may have more mysteries 
 than falsehood. To affirm that Christianity has fewer 
 contradictions than infidelity is not true. There are no 
 contradictions or self-inconsistencies in the Christian 
 religion itself; if there were, it ought not to be be- 
 lieved. But there are contradictions in scepticism; and 
 these contradictions form the only available argument for 
 its refutation. To affirm that the arguments usually 
 urged in favour of Christianity have fewer contradictions 
 than the arguments against Christianity, is, we fear, too 
 correct. The urgent inference from which is this, that 
 the defenders of Christianity will most effectually meet 
 and repulse the assaults of unbelief and disbelief, by re- 
 
340 CONCLUSION. 
 
 examining their own positions and banishing from their 
 camp every traitorous error. 
 
 The following is the closing sentence of ‘‘ The Restora- 
 tion of Belief.” “If now the question be put to me, 
 whether my Christian Belief enable me to rid myself of 
 that burden of far-reaching care and trouble which I 
 share with the thoughtful of all ages,—my reply is this— 
 In truth I have not found the means of ridding myself of 
 this burden; but in the Gospels I have found Him in 
 communion with whom I am learning how to bear it; 
 and thus I hope to bear it to the end, still retainmg my 
 faith and trust in God as supremely Good and Wise — 
 ‘a Just God and a Saviour.’ ” Now this burden is com- — 
 posed of mysteries or of contradictions ; it is something 
 that merely transcends, or something that rudely shocks, 
 our intelligence. If the former, it is no burden at all, 
 at least it ought not to be felt as such. It is no hardship 
 to be a finite creature. But if it be the latter, and it is 
 the latter, and not the former, which has been, and still 
 is, the real burden shared by all the thoughtful, then 
 while the Gospels teach us how to bear even that burden 
 whilst it rests upon us, they teach us also how to labour 
 and hope for its removal. 
 
 There is a considerable number of able and intelligent 
 men who affirm, that we cannot get quit of our contra- 
 dictions, that we cannot even hope to escape from them, 
 —that we must believe in propositions which contradict 
 each other, or which at least seem to do so. For 
 example, it has been said, “the theologian, like every 
 
CONCLUSION. 341 
 
 other deep thinker, must believe and act upon proposi- 
 tions that seem contradictory to intelligence because it is 
 finite, and that can be proved to seem thus in consequence 
 of its finitude.’’! Here we have the old fallacy which 
 confounds ignorance and error, — contradiction and 
 mystery. As finite creatures, we must be in ignorance 
 of many things. But if it be said that as the direct and 
 necessary consequence of our being created, and not un- 
 ereated, we believe in contradictory statements or in 
 error, we asperse the Divine character, or entirely des- 
 troy finite intelligence. But the quotation does not say 
 “‘ propositions that are contradictory ;”’ it says “ proposi- 
 tions that seem contradictory.” This evasion has been 
 already exposed. If the propositions are contradictory 
 in appearance only, and not in reality, how do we know 
 this? Supposing that we do know that their contradic- 
 tion is a mere shddow without a substance, then they are 
 not contradictory, and why should they seem to be what 
 they are not ? Why should they seem to us to be what 
 we know they are not? If the propositions which we 
 must accept as true be contradictory only in appearance, 
 we ought to make them appear as they really are. To 
 believe propositions that in fact contradict each other, is to 
 be in error. 
 
 It cannot, therefore, we think, for a moment be 
 doubted that it is not only highly desirable, but also 
 strongly obligatory upon all the friends of truth, that 
 they endeavour to extricate themselves from their an- 
 
 1 Fraser’s Essays in Philosophy, Edin. 1856, pp. 319, 320. 
 
342 CONCLUSION. 
 
 tagonistic opinions and beliefs,—that is, from prominent 
 and prejudicial errors, which they, or some of them 
 at least, are embracing. It will as little be doubted that 
 the proper and effectual method to secure this auspicious 
 consummation, is for each lover of truth, each genuine 
 philosopher, each honest believer, to seek devoutly and 
 diligently to disencumber himself of his own inconsisten- 
 cies. 
 
 Suppose now that an individual sets himself to the 
 noble but arduous task, of eliminating from his stock of 
 knowledge all contrariety, and rejecting from among his 
 beliefs all contradiction, what is the process which he 
 must pursue, and what the first step which he must take? 
 He must analyse his knowledge, reduce it to its ele- 
 mentary parts, and assort them in order. When we have 
 to deal with a number of articles, we can avoid confusion 
 only by adopting an accurate arrangement. In like 
 manner discord can be banished from the mind only by 
 a systematic classification of our beliefs. If a man’s be- 
 liefs are lying in his mind in a disorderly and random 
 state, he may easily and frequently contradict himself 
 without immediate consciousness of the contradiction, and 
 find out his blunder only by tasting the bitterness of its 
 fruits. But if our beliefs be methodically digested and 
 disposed, a collision between any two of them will be 
 readily and sensibly felt, and if not entirely prevented 
 ~ may be checked with comparative ease. 
 
 In attempting to arrange our knowledges or beliefs, 
 the most prominent classification that occurs is this :— 
 
CONCLUSION. 343 
 
 Some of our beliefs are primary, fundamental, self-evident, 
 independent; others are derived from, or dependent 
 upon, the first, and are, therefore, secondary, demon- 
 strable, or susceptible of proof extraneous to themselves. 
 It thus appears that the only effectual and reasonable 
 way in which man, as an intelligent being, can hope to 
 avoid self-ticonsistency is by attempting to determine what 
 are his primary or original beliefs. 
 
 The well-informed reader will at once perceive that 
 this statement of the manner in which our knowledges 
 are to be harmonized, and the burden of our contradic- 
 tions removed, is precisely the statement of the great 
 problem of speculative philosophy. There are, as all 
 perceive, certain principles without the admission of 
 which all reasoning is impossible. It seems, therefore, 
 to be the preliminary question in philosophy to deter- 
 mine what these principles are. Every one of the modern 
 sciences is based upon some of these principles virtually, 
 if not avowedly. It may, therefore, with propriety be 
 affirmed, that any science which proceeds without stating 
 these assumed principles, but taking them for granted 
 silently, and probably in a loose and inaccurate form, is 
 so far unscientific. An orderly and correct enunciation 
 of first principles would, as we have already had occasion 
 to remark, obviously contribute to the stability and 
 enlargement of the stock of human knowledge, while it 
 is urgently demanded by the intellectual instincts of our 
 nature, and is the only achievement that can give some- 
 thing like symmetry and completion to our philosophy. 
 
 , 
 
344 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Bit few vigorous and well-directed attempts, we fear, 
 have been made to meet this want; and hence it would 
 not be difficult to shew, that in all the physical sciences, 
 and even in the pure mathematics, which is the most 
 exact science of all, there are assumptions found whose 
 language is vague, and of which no methodical account is 
 rendered. Moreover, as new discoveries in the sciences 
 are constantly bringing us to higher and more extensive 
 principles, and as each science has more or less intimate 
 connection with every other science, the unavoidable result 
 of progress in the Inductive sciences, both of mind and mat- 
 ter, is to force upon our attention the problem of our 
 fundamental beliefs, and to conduct us onward towards 
 at least an approximate solution. 
 
 The question, then, of our primary beliefs cannot be 
 evaded, unless we are willing to arrest the progress 
 of philosophy, abandon the hope of attaining self-con- 
 sistency, and despair of being able to act intelligently 
 and rightly in the more complicated and perplexing cir- 
 cumstances of practical life. These primitive beliefs or 
 knowledges are found in a conerete state, pervading the 
 common sentiments of mankind. The opinions of the 
 vulgar and illiterate are interwoven with them; they 
 are the warp of all our knowledge. There is an im- 
 plicit, undeveloped metaphysic or philosophy in every 
 man’s mind; and if it be not the true, it is a false philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 The remarks that follow are intended as a contribution 
 towards the solution of one of the elements of this great 
 
CONCLUSION. 345 
 
 problem, namely, to elucidate the true nature of know- 
 ledge and faith, in one of their aspects. 
 
 The antithesis, truth, error, is obtained, as we have 
 already stated, by observing that a proposition agrees or 
 disagrees with its object. If the affirmation and negation 
 involved in the proposition be exactly in accordance with 
 the object, and, so far as it is described, describe it as it 
 is, this agreement is truth, and the proposition so agree- 
 ing with its object is true. On the other hand, if the 
 object spoken of do not precisely tally or correspond 
 with what is affirmed and denied respecting it, this dis- 
 agreement is error, and such proposition Is erroneous. 
 
 Every proposition is thus either true or erroneous. 
 There is no possible exception. The proposition is as its 
 object, or it is not. In the one case, it is true; in the 
 other case, it is erroneous or false. 
 
 ‘The objection taken by Kant to this definition of truth 
 seems to be unfounded. “ If truth,” he says, “ consist in 
 the accordance of a cognition with its object, this object 
 thereby must thus be separated from others; for a cog- 
 nition is false, if it do not agree with the object to which 
 it refers, although it contains something which may cer- 
 tainly be valid for other objects. Now, a general crite- 
 rion of Truth would be that which was valid for ail 
 cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But it is 
 clear, that as we make abstraction by this of all content 
 of cognition (reference to its object), and Truth relates 
 exactly to this content, it is quite impossible and absurd 
 to inquire after a mark of the truth of this content of 
 
 S 
 
346 CONCLUSION. 
 
 cognitions,—and consequently, that a sufficient, and, 
 moreover, at the same time, general characteristic of the 
 truth, cannot possibly be given. As we have already 
 before called the content of a cognition its matter, we 
 are thus compelled to say that no universal charac- 
 teristic can be expected of the truth of the cognition in 
 respect to its matter, since this is in itself contradic- 
 tory.”! This argument is based upon the author’s doc- 
 trine of pure reason, and must stand or fall with it. It 
 cannot stand, if Sir W. Hamilton’s doctrine of perception 
 be admitted, and if consciousness be regarded as trust- 
 worthy. If a man can know an object immediately (pre- 
 sentative knowledge), whether internal or external to 
 himself, and if in thus knowing he does not necessarily 
 deceive himself, then the statement that truth consists 
 in the agreement between our knowledge, or the pro- 
 position in which that knowledge is expressed, and 
 its object, affords an obvious rule or canon, and the 
 only conceivable one, by which all minds can test the 
 accuracy of all knowledge. Hence, also, to consider 
 “ cognitions without distinction of their objects,” in- 
 stead of leading us to a “ general criterion of Truth,” 
 actually ignores and excludes the truth. Has Kant 
 ever told us what truth is? In denying the possibility 
 of a sufficient and general characteristic of the truth, 
 he virtually denies that there is any such thing as 
 truth. 
 
 Kant’s own criteria, which he gives in the next para- 
 
 1 Kant’s Critic. Trans. by Haywood. London, 1848, p. 54. 
 
CONCLUSION. 347 
 
 graph, extend, as he acknowledges, only to the form of 
 knowledge, and amount to this, that a man’s thoughts 
 are to be consistent with each other. We do not know 
 that he provides or points out means by which one man’s 
 views may be known to be in harmony with his neigh- 
 bour’s. To do this would be empiricism ; it would cast a 
 spot upon the purity of reason. To be self-consistent is 
 a great attainment; but it is eviscerated of all meaning 
 and value, if the condition of its attainment be a complete 
 isolation of each individual from all around him ;—if 
 each possessor of ideas be the universe, and the universe 
 a bundle of ideas. It was vain for Kant to go in search 
 of Truth, after he had in his fundamental principles 
 ignored, or rather excluded it. The same great error 
 runs through the bulk of the German Philosophy. 
 
 More particularly, first, as to knowledge. It is clearly 
 impossible for an intelligent being to take a true propo- 
 sition to be erroneous, or an erroneous proposition to be 
 true, at the very time that he perceives the true proposi- 
 tion to be true, or the erroneous proposition to be erro- 
 neous. If, then, there be such a phenomenon as a man’s 
 taking an erroneous proposition to be true, and such a 
 phenomenon 1s, alas! too common, it implies, that though 
 the proposition be really erroneous, the man in making 
 or accepting it does not perceive, or think, or know, that 
 it is erroneous. 
 
 The fact now stated being admitted, as it will un- 
 doubtedly be, it is no empty question to inquire, how is 
 
348 CONCLUSION. 
 
 this phenomenon to be accounted for? It must be traced 
 either to an original defect in the constitution of the 
 mind that adopts such a proposition, or to the abuse of its 
 undefective powers by the mind itself. Since a proposi- 
 tion in itself erroneous can never be embraced as such, 
 or directly, by an intelligent being ; in other words, since 
 a man can never call white black, knowing it to be white, 
 the phenomenon generally named error must be the 
 inevitable yet indirect result of some weakness or per- 
 version in the understanding; and this weakness or 
 perversion in the understanding must either be connate 
 and constitutional, or self-induced in some way or other 
 by intelligent beings themselves. If it be affirmed that 
 the weakness or defect of mind which leads a man to call 
 an erroneous proposition true is constitutional, and 
 belongs to him as a creature in the state in which he 
 came from the hands of his Creator, it is obvious that a 
 serious charge is thus brought against the most High 
 God. But if we affirm that such a perversion of intellect 
 is in some form or other self-induced, inasmuch as such 
 self-injury involves a degree of folly and guilt, we shall 
 be able to vindicate the character and government of 
 God by throwing the criminality upon the creature. 
 Assuming that there is no question'which of these two 
 theories is to be preferred, we are led to the distinction 
 which has been already introduced to your consideration, 
 namely, that knowledge which takes a true proposition 
 to be true, and an erroneous proposition to be erroneous, 
 is normal, and that knowledge which takes an erroneous 
 
CONCLUSION. 349 
 
 proposition to be true, or a true proposition to be erro- 
 neous, 1s abnormal. 
 
 It is worthy of special notice, as we saw, that zgno- 
 rance, as well as knowledge, may be either normal or 
 abnormal. When a man is ignorant of the truth or 
 erroneousness of a proposition, or, which is the same 
 thing, ignorant of an object, which by a little care he 
 might and ought to have known, his ignorance is abnor- 
 mal and culpable. Since, on the other hand, there are 
 many objects which we have no means of knowing, many 
 propositions of which, using all diligence, we can affirm 
 neither the truth nor the falsehood, in regard to these 
 objects or propositions, ignorance is proper and becom- 
 ing, and therefore normal. We agree with those who 
 regard it as one of the greatest philosophical problems 
 of the day, and one of our most urgent practical necessi- 
 ties, to determine when we should be ignorant,—to fix 
 the limits of a “ prudent nescience.” 
 
 As it is not by any means uncommon to confound 
 error, or what we have just called abnormal knowledge, 
 with ignorance, so the distinction between normal and 
 abnormal ignorance is perhaps as frequently overlooked 
 or disregarded. These two mistakes have a tendency to 
 produce and reproduce each other, and they both lead, 
 especially when combined together, as they have often 
 been, to the most perplexing and painful consequences. 
 Illustrations of this have been given, and more could be 
 easily found, but we must hasten to our conclusion. 
 
 It now becomes a most important question, has an 
 
350 CONCLUSION. 
 
 intelligent being the power of distinguishing between his 
 normal and abnormal knowledges, and between his nor- 
 mal and abnormal ignorances? If he has not, what is 
 the meaning of intelligence? T'o deny that a man who 
 will act uprightly and deal fairly with himself can cer- 
 tainly distinguish between what he knows he knows, and 
 what he only thinks or fancies that he knows, is surely 
 to make the understanding something like an unsubstan- 
 tial shadow or an empty shell, or to extinguish it alto- 
 gether. The great and chief function of intelligence can 
 be none else than to discriminate the true and the false. 
 When intelligence is legitimately used, it makes this dis- 
 crimination infallibly, or feels that it cannot make it. 
 When the true and the erroneous are not accurately dis- 
 tinguished by the understanding, or when the under- 
 standing attempts to distinguish them in cases that are 
 beyond its power, the understanding is abused. But, 
 then, it is impossible to conceive of intelligence apart 
 from consciousness ; and if consciousness be not fallacious, 
 when a man misuses his intelligence he must know that 
 he is doing so; and therefore all men, if they will act 
 conscientiously, may succeed in severing their normal 
 knowledge and normal ignorance from what is abnor- 
 mal. 
 
 By consciousness is meant a man’s knowledge of 
 everything that takes place within himself. Whatever 
 a man does or says or thinks or knows, he knows what 
 he is doing, saying, thinking, or knowing. This know- 
 ledge is immediate; whatever a man does, then and 
 
CONCLUSION. 351 
 
 there he knows what he is doing; it is not the know- 
 ledge of what he did yesterday, but of what he is doing 
 now. The knowledge of consciousness 1s universal in 
 regard to the individual himself; if it do not compre- 
 hend the whole sphere of our activity, to the extent of 
 this deficiency we shall cease to be responsible. For 
 unless we know what we are doing, so as knowingly to 
 come up to, or fall short of, what we know to be right, 
 we cannot in such a case be regarded as accountable. 
 Consciousness is infallible ; for if 1 deceive us, it deceives 
 us either always or only occasionally. If consciousness 
 always deceives us, our knowledge is in every instance 
 abnormal, and truth is for ever hidden from our eyes ; 
 for then when we know an object, we do not know that 
 we know it, and when we do not know an object, we know 
 that we know it. If consciousness deceive occasionally 
 only, then we can distinguish between the occasions in 
 which we are deceived and those in which we are not 
 deceived, or we cannot distinguish between them. If we 
 can distinguish between them, that is, if we know when 
 we are misled and when we are not, then in fact con- 
 sciousness does not deceive us at all. But if we cannot 
 distinguish between them, then we shall be found trust- 
 ing consciousness when we should distrust her, and dis- 
 trusting her when she should be trusted. On this sup- 
 position, intelligence is a mockery and the possession of 
 it a pure misfortune. 
 
 If it be the proper function of the understanding to 
 adopt true propositions, to reject erroneous propositions, 
 
ooo CONCLUSION. 
 
 and to pause and be ignorant when neither the truth nor 
 erroneousness of a proposition is known, there is an obvi- 
 ous and not unimportant sense in which reason may be 
 said to be ¢mpersonal. To call anything impersonal may 
 mean—I, that it is not a person; or 2, that it does not 
 belong to any person; or 3, that it does not belong to 
 any one individual or class of persons exclusively. 
 
 When Victor Cousin pleads, as he so earnestly does, 
 for the impersonality of reason, he chiefly uses the word 
 in the first or the second of the three meanings just 
 specified. His opinion seems to be that reason is not a 
 person, or rather does not even belong to a person, but is 
 identical with the eternal substance before it comes to 
 self-consciousness or personality in the creation of the 
 world. His doctrine of the impersonality of reason is 
 closely connected with his distinction between spontane- 
 ous and reflective reason, and with the monism and tran- 
 scendental intuition of the German school. For the re- 
 jection of all these views many and weighty arguments 
 might be easily adduced. 
 
 Reason is impersonal in this sense that it does not 
 belong to any one individual or class of persons exclu- 
 sively. Truth is universal, eternal, and immutable ; what 
 is once true, is true everywhere and always. Reason, 
 inasmuch as it is conversant with truth, is not peculiar to 
 one individual or one class, but is common to all minds. 
 Truth is not the creature of my volition, or of any voli- 
 tion. Neither is intelligence, abstractly considered, the 
 creature of volition, but the means, and the only instru- 
 
CONCLUSION. abo 
 
 ment or means, by which truth can be perceived and 
 - appreciated. 
 
 My possession of a certain degree of intelligence is the 
 eift of God, and my responsibility lies in the use which I 
 make of this gift. The way, then, in which we shall 
 employ our reason being the hinge of our responsibility, 
 and, therefore, a matter of choice, the actual employment 
 of it may be either legitimate or illegitimate. In the 
 legitimate or proper use of the understanding all our 
 knowledges and ignorances are of course normal. But 
 when we use our reason improperly, then what is true is 
 confounded in our minds with what is not true, and what 
 we may know with what we cannot know. Since truth 
 is catholic and unchanging, and ever consistent with her- 
 self, so also will reason or intelligence be in all her teach- 
 ings so long as she is used legitimately. Men using their 
 understandings aright would never contradict themselves 
 nor contradict one another. The exclusion of contradiec- 
 tion from our sentiments is not to be understoed, you 
 will remember, as excluding all sorts of diversity and 
 variety of opinion in matters of probability. Reason, 
 then, when duly exercised, cannot be supposed to teach 
 truth which shall be held as the peculiar property of any 
 party ; and her real impersonality consists simply in this, 
 that her doctrines, however numerous or varied, are 
 always catholic to the sincere, and harmonious with each 
 other. 
 
 On the other hand, when reason is misused, her teach- 
 ings, or rather what passes for her teachings, are found 
 
354 CONCLUSION. 
 
 to be contradictory with each other. But error is not 
 universal in any of its forms; much less in one of them. 
 To employ reason illegitimately by attempting to pass 
 the due limits of knowledge, or by confounding truth and 
 error within those limits, is not characteristic of all intel- 
 higent beings, but is limited to some of them, and is, 
 therefore, peculiar and personal. Abnormal knowledge 
 or erroneous judgment, then, is not to be traced to any- 
 thing that God has given, or failed to give, to an intelli- 
 gent being, but to the improper use which that intelligent 
 being has chosen to make of the gift of God, and, there- 
 fore, in an obvious sense personal. } 
 
 Though the exercise of our understanding, whether 
 legitimate or illegitimate, be thus dependent upon the 
 will or voluntary, it must not be forgotten, as already 
 intimated, that, no erroneous judgment whatever can be 
 voluntary directly. For to take an erroneous proposition 
 to be true, knowing it to be erroneous, is impossible. But 
 the common opinion that any error is involuntary and 
 invincible, as it is generally held, is equally inadmissible. 
 This opinion not only asperses the character of God, but 
 is, strictly speaking, self-contradictory. Nothing seems 
 to be plainer than this mode of stating the case, that if 
 an intelligent creature in forming his sentiments con- 
 founds what is true with what is erroneous involuntarily, 
 inevitably and unblamably, the intelligent Creator must 
 be held responsible for the defective character or unpro- 
 
 1“ Tu fecisti eum, et peccatum non fecisti in eo.” God made 
 man, and did not make sin in him.—Augustine. Conf. Lib. i. ¢. 7. 
 
CONCLUSION. aug 
 
 pitious circumstances of his creature. But more than 
 this, if erroneous judgment be, even in a single instance, 
 strictly and absolutely involuntary and invincible on the 
 part of him who adopts it, there are no means left to him 
 whereby he may distinguish the erroneous from the true. 
 If, notwithstanding the use of all proper diligence and 
 precaution on my part, I may yet, without the consent of 
 my will and altogether unconsciously, take what is true 
 to be erroneous or what is erroneous to be true, then I 
 can never feel certain that I have found the truth. On 
 such a supposition, consciousness itself deceives me, and 
 my very nature is a lie. 
 
 We shrink not, therefore, from the assertion that 
 human reason rightly or conscientiously employed is at 
 once supreme and infallible. 
 
 By reason, however, we mean reason practical, as well 
 as reason speculative. Truth is the end of the latter, 
 action of the former. In the one case we know that we 
 may know; in the other, we know that we may act. 
 These two functions of the understanding, however, are 
 not to be subordinated the one to the other, as they 
 have often been, and with the most ruinous consequences. 
 They are to be considered not only as distinct, but also 
 as co-ordinate in authority ; and hence it is nothing but 
 a vain, proud boast to say, that “ philosophy is the 
 light of all lights, the authority of all authorities.” 
 
 The human understanding has two fields in which to 
 expatiate, the written and the unwritten revelations of 
 God; she has two volumes to study, the Bible and the 
 
356 CONCLUSION, 
 
 book of nature. Reason, moreover, entirely severed 
 from both of these, can learn nothing and know nothing, 
 It is, therefore, an equal perversion of the plain facts of 
 the case, to set reason against the word of God, or the 
 word of God against reason; or to set the volume of 
 nature against the volume of inspiration, or the volume 
 of inspiration against the volume of nature. 
 
 Reason per se has nothing that can by any possibility 
 be contrary to the statements of the Bible or to the facts 
 of nature; her function lies simply in the reception and 
 apprehension of both of them. And there cannot be a 
 greater absurdity than to suppose, that what the under- 
 standing learns from one divine revelation may be con- 
 tradicted by what it learns from another divine reyela- 
 tion. But though the declarations of Scripture fairly 
 interpreted can never be in conflict with the fair deduc- 
 tions of natural science, it is worse than childish to deny 
 that reason can learn from the one revelation truths 
 which she could never learn from the other. It ought 
 never to be forgotten, moreover, that reason may gather 
 in both revelations many propositions, of which we 
 clearly and surely know that they are true, while we feel 
 altogether baffled and confounded in the very attempt to 
 know how they are true. 
 
 It follows from what has now been said, that while 
 reason cannot possess a higher authority than the 
 word of God, neither does the word of God possess 
 a higher authority than reason. The authority of 
 reason is the infallibility of consciousness, which, in 
 
CONCLUSION. 857 
 
 other words, is the belief that God would not make us so 
 as to trustalie. The authority of reason, therefore, and 
 the authority of the Bible, are identical; they are both 
 divine. How then can we speak of the one as supersed- 
 ing the other ? 
 
 It still further appears that reason in itself is not the 
 source of any knowledge whatever. This is the proper 
 answer to those who represent Scripture to be unneces- 
 sary, on the ground that reason is the only source of 
 knowledge, or, as they say, the arbiter of all truth. To 
 repel this objection, it is sufficient to say, that knowledge 
 is not derived from the faculty of reason in an isolated 
 state, but is acquired by the employment of reason on 
 its appropriate objects. These objects, we have seen, are 
 the all things within our intellectual range, mental and 
 material. To deny that the Bible is one of those objects, 
 and a most important one, is surely a delusion. 
 
 It is equally futile to assert that there is no certainty 
 to man apart from the word of God. On those par- 
 ticular matters, of course, with which Scripture is spe- 
 cially conversant, we can expect certain knowledge only 
 from written revelation. But if reason could not attain 
 certainty in some things without the Bible, neither could 
 she attain certainty in other things by means of the 
 Bible. Nay, more, there are special truths lying at the 
 foundation of all Bible teaching, which the inspired 
 writers do not so much authoritatively announce as un- 
 obtrusively take for granted. And apart from these 
 fundamental truths, the peculiar doctrines of the word 
 
358 CONCLUSION. 
 
 of God would lose all their significance. Many of the 
 defenders of revelation in the present day, as well as its 
 opponents, would do well to study the masculine writings 
 of such men as John Howe. Speaking of the “non 
 scripta, sed nata lex,” he remarks, ‘“ when we say the 
 Scripture is a complete rule, we do not mean as severed 
 and cut off from the law of nature, or in opposition to 
 that, or as excluding that, but as including it, and as 
 excluding only the unnecessary and arbitrary inventions 
 of men, and the additions that they think fit to subnect 
 to it.” 
 
 There is another grave mistake prevalent in some 
 circles, when what is called mere reason is opposed to 
 reason assisted by the grace of God. When our under- 
 standing 1s assisted by the gracious aid of our Maker, it 
 is assisted but to fulfil its proper function, and not to 
 transcend it. If our mental powers were in our present 
 circumstances sufficient of themselves to lead us to the 
 knowledge of all needful truth, Divine aid would neither 
 be required nor given. If our intellect leads us astray, it 
 is no lonyer mere reason, but perverted reason. But the 
 only legitimate and effectual way in which those who 
 accept the proffered assistance of divine grace can mani- 
 fest the necessity and realization of this heavenly help, 
 is by shewing that their opinions or convictions are agree- 
 able to reason, and that the opposite opinions espoused 
 by those who deny or reject this help are contrary to 
 reason. If mere reason be pure or right reason, then, 
 in man’s corrupt state, it is only found in alliance with 
 
CONCLUSION. 359 
 
 God’s Holy Spirit. But if mere reason be reason reject- 
 ing that divine aid which is both needed and offered, to 
 suppose that it is right reason is absurd. And if it be 
 not right reason, but reason abused, it is incumbent on 
 the disciples of truth to trace it through all its wander- 
 ings, and expose its manifold errors. To assert that any 
 one is wrong in all his opinions, is to deny his intelli- 
 gence or responsibility. But there are certain important 
 questions on which men can form accurate sentiments only 
 by the aid of the Holy Spirit. Those who ask and accept 
 this aid should be able to shew that on these questions 
 their opinions are reasonable, and that the contrary 
 opinions of those who reject this aid are unreasonable. 
 Hence we obtain an all-important conclusion, that not 
 only Error and Truth, but also the adherents of error 
 and the adherents of truth, ever are, and ever must be, 
 in antagonism and conflict. To state the case more pre- 
 cisely, when of two intelligent beings the one takes a 
 proposition to be true, and the other takes it to be false, 
 each of them feels not only that there is a difference or 
 contradiction between them of less or greater moment 
 depending upon the nature of the question in dispute, 
 but also that this opposition must be traced to a defect 
 of judgment, or to a deficiency of candour in himself or 
 in his opponent. In every controversy each disputant 
 proceeds, and must necessarily proceed, on the assump- 
 tion not only that his adversary is wrong, but also that 
 if he would listen without prejudice to the arguments 
 
360 CONCLUSION. 
 
 adduced he would perceive his error and change his sen- 
 timents. It would be an act of intellectual suicide to 
 attempt to convince another, unless we are well assured 
 that our representations are such as will win to our opi- 
 nion an honest and unbiassed mind. 
 
 It is one of the great heresies of the age to forget or 
 deny this twofold antagonism between truth and error. 
 This heresy has, as we have seen, two sides, both of 
 which are almost equally fatal to philosophy and virtue. 
 To allow that every man’s opinion is true is no graver a 
 mistake, than to allow that those who hold conflicting 
 opinions are equally capable and equally conscientious in 
 (not holding but) adopting their opinions. A deficient 
 capacity exempts from responsibility ; a deficient con- 
 scientiousness incurs guilt. In every vital and moment- 
 ous dispute the opposing parties are seen to be driven, 
 as by some unceasing necessity, to charge each other 
 with a serious defect in intelligence or in honesty. No 
 believer in Christianity allows that the unbeliever has, 
 with ordinary ability, and due diligence and integrity, 
 examined the Christian evidences. While a glance at 
 infidel publications and arguments is sufficient to perceive 
 the correctness of the remark, that “ Christians must be 
 fools or knaves, for the ease and comfort of those who 
 reject Christianity.” The same result is developed in 
 every urgent and weighty discussion, though not always 
 with the same unambiguous distinctness. 
 
 As this result seems to be replete with the most serious 
 
a ee ee 
 
 CONCLUSION. 361 
 
 inconveniences, having an apparently strong tendency to 
 repress everything like good feeling, and to excite vari- 
 ance and hatred in society, the legitimacy of the result 
 has been more or less openly negatived or evaded in a 
 thousand forms. Many illustrations might be selected 
 from our current literature, but we prefer one of older 
 date. Locke, in his “ Letter concerning toleration,” 
 goes so far in vindicating every man’s right to think for 
 himself, as virtually in some places to base this right 
 upon the assumption that every man’s opinion is true. | 
 This is clearly the case in his definition of heresy, which 
 both in its scriptural and ecclesiastical sense means, and 
 must mean, an opinion or opinions opposed to and sub- 
 versive of the great and simple truths of the New Testa- 
 ment, on the intelligent and honest reception of which 
 the salvation of those possessing the Bible depends. 
 “ Heresy,” says Locke, “is a separation made in eccle- 
 siastical communion between men of the same religion, 
 for some opinions no way contained in the rule itself. 
 Amongst those who acknowledge nothing but the Holy 
 Scriptures to be the rule of faith, heresy is a separation 
 made in their Christian communion for opinions not con- 
 tained in the express words of Scripture.” Locke here 
 virtually, if not expressly, denies that there is such a 
 phenomenon as a man professing to hold the exact words 
 of Scripture, and rejecting the truths contained in these 
 words; or, which is the. same thing, that every man’s 
 interpretation of the Bible is sound and correct, or that 
 each man’s opinion is to all intents and purposes right. 
 Vs 
 
362 CONCLUSION. 
 
 It would be easy to multiply examples of the pre- 
 valence of this mistake on its other side. Nothing is 
 more common than for disputants to exchange cowpli- 
 ments of mutual respect, to allow concerning each other, 
 not only that they are in their general character honour- 
 able men, but also conscientiously and earnestly seeking 
 the truth in the particular matter under dispute. This 
 mode of procedure is unexceptionable, provided no one 
 holds any fixed sentiments at all, or all men regard every 
 conclusion with like indifference. But as soon as men 
 adopt principles, which are felt to be at once unspeak- 
 ably momentous and directly antagonistic and exclusive, 
 to reciprocate conventional phrases of sincerity, integrity, 
 and honour, is to mock the majesty of truth and insult 
 poor suffering humanity, as if truth and error were inter- 
 changeable epithets, or as if there were no perceptible 
 or worthy difference between the mind that embraces 
 truth and the mind that embraces error. 
 
 In connection with this point you will recollect that 
 the proper foundation and nature of the virtues of charity 
 and forbearance were in some degree made manifest. 
 
 Having thus endeavoured to point out the distinction 
 between abnormal and normal knowledges, we now pro- 
 ceed, secondly, to advert to a similar distinction between 
 our beliefs. Belief seems to us to be the immediate and 
 invariable consequent of knowledge. Different kinds of 
 belief will thus entirely depend.upon the different kinds 
 of knowledge ; and since knowledge may be always ex- 
 pressed in a proposition, there will be no belief without 
 
CONCLUSION. 1 0ys) 
 
 a proposition believed. It is, however, obviously impro- 
 per and unusual to speak of believing a proposition when 
 we only understand its meaning and do not know whe- 
 ther it be true or erroneous. To profess to believe a 
 proposition to be true or erroneous without even per- 
 ceiving its meaning, is as great hypocrisy as to profess to 
 believe it to be true while regarding it as erroneous. ‘T’o 
 believe a proposition, then, clearly implies both that we 
 comprehend its import and perceive it to be true; but 
 not by any means that we know how it is true. Belief 
 in a simple proposition containing one unambiguous affir- 
 mation is the most elementary form which faith assumes, 
 to one or more instances of which every variety of trust 
 or confidence may be easily reduced. 
 
 Some have supposed that belief should be restricted 
 to those propositions whose truth we know by other 
 means than by our own direct personal effort. This 
 isage is not universal, nor is it founded on any obvious 
 or sufficient reason. For it is quite as correct, gramma- 
 tically and logically, to speak of belief resting on the 
 evidence of our own senses, or on argument and deduc- 
 tion of our understanding, or on an intellectual intuition, 
 as on the testimony of witnesses or on the declarations of 
 divine authority. _ 
 
 Some, again, have proposed to limit the application of 
 faith or belief to propositions connected with religion or 
 the Bible. But this restriction is equally destitute of the 
 sanction of reason and custom. Indeed the objects of 
 belief are co-extensive with the objects of knowledge. 
 
364 CONCLUSION. 
 
 If belief is to be classified by its objects, there will be no 
 end to the division. All beliefs are, subjectively and 
 fundamentally, one and the same—the acceptance by the 
 mind of a proposition known to be true. For example, 
 there seems to be no valid distinction between theologi- 
 cal faith and metaphysical or philosophical faith. Theo- 
 logical faith is belief in a proposition which we know to 
 be true on the authority of the Word of God. Meta- 
 physical or philosophical faith is belief in a proposition 
 which we know to be true on the authority of our own 
 understanding. In both cases we must know that the 
 proposition is true; in neither case may we know how 
 it is true. The proposition believed must be known as 
 true, but may also involve something incomprehensible. 
 There is obviously no real difference between these two 
 beliefs; for we cannot trust our understanding without 
 trusting God whose gift it is, nor can we trust the Word 
 of God without trusting our own understanding, by which 
 alone we can comprehend the declarations of God. 
 Misbelief cannot be distinguished from disbelief, which 
 is the denial that a proposition (believed by others) is 
 true. Unbelief or doubt is properly the state of mind in 
 regard to a proposition which is not perceived to be either 
 true or erroneous. Hence we infer that belief or faith 
 imphes an affirmation or knowledge that a proposition is 
 true; desbelief or misbelief implies the knowledge that a 
 proposition is erroneous; while unbelief or doubt is the 
 immediate and invariable consequent of ignorance, or the 
 refusal of the mind to make an affirmation either as to 
 
CONCLUSION. 365 
 
 the truth or erroneousness of a proposition. Disbelief 
 and unbelief, like error and ignorance, are often used 
 indiscriminately, with the not unfrequent result of much 
 confusion and evil. 
 
 Belief and its compounds are often used objectively, 
 that is, for the matter accepted or rejected by the mind. 
 This is a secondary use of the words, with which we have 
 at present nothing to do. 
 
 Since faith or belief, as we have seen, always presup- 
 poses knowledge, it cannot be a source of knowledge. 
 «No man can apprehend as true, what he does not ap- 
 prehend at all.” It is a contradiction to say that a man 
 can believe what he does not know to be true. And 
 though, as has been already remarked, we must be often 
 content to believe without knowing the mode, the how, 
 the philosophy of what we believe; yet are we traitors 
 to truth, and to our own understanding, and to God him- 
 self, when we believe, or rather profess to believe that, 
 of the truth of which we have not an intelligent per- 
 suasion. 
 
 Some have distinguished between knowledge and faith 
 as if the former implied or was equivalent to certainty, 
 and the latter could boast of nothing higher than pro- 
 bability. The remarks already made are sufficient to 
 shew, that though these words may be sometimes so used . 
 in popular discourse, such usage is not general nor un- 
 attended with disadvantage ; nor are there any arguments 
 sufficient to justify it, or render it universal. 
 
 We have seen that there are normal and abnormal 
 
366 CONCLUSION. 
 
 knowledges; corresponding to these there are normal 
 and abnormal beliefs. If we have succeeded in proving 
 that there is no such thing as involuntary or invincible 
 error, it follows that there is no such thing as an irre- 
 sponsible belief. 
 
 In addition to what has been already advanced against 
 the doctrine of involuntary error, it may be further main- 
 tained, that if it be conceded that man is responsible for 
 any of his beliefs, it will follow that he is responsible for 
 all his beliefs, unless some important and well-marked 
 distinction can be pointed out between the beliefs for 
 which we are responsible and those for which we are not 
 responsible. Now, no such distinction has, in fact, been 
 pointed out and substantiated ; nor do we think that it is 
 possible to do so. 
 
 No man believes a proposition, whatever he may pre- 
 tend, till he knows or fancies that it is true. If the 
 proposition be actually true, then an individual in know- 
 ing it, and believing it, to be true, acts the proper part 
 of an intelligent being, and worthily acquits himself of 
 his responsibility. But if the proposition be not really 
 true, and notwithstanding this an individual allow him- 
 self to think that it is true, then undoubtedly his know- 
 ledge and belief are both abnormal, and who shall say 
 that guilt is not incurred. That when knowledge and 
 belief are thus abnormal, guilt is frequently at least in- 
 curred, is generally admitted, and we shall therefore for 
 the present take this for granted. If it be said that when 
 belief is abnormal guilt is not always incurred, then on 
 
eS a. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 367 
 
 what ground does the distinction rest? Is it said, that 
 “in some cases a man is able to perceive the truth, and in 
 other cases that he is not able? If unable to perceive 
 the truth, or if from any cause the truth be not perceived, 
 then ignorance and not knowledge, unbelief and not 
 belief, should be his state of mind. Is it said, that he is 
 constrained by force external to himself to think that 
 what is true is erroneous? The supposition is inconsis- 
 tent with the possession of intelligence. Is it said, that 
 belief in what is false is sometimes invincible and involun- 
 tary? The assertion, as has been shewn, renders every 
 belief doubtful and nugatory. There is only one consis- 
 tent conclusion left for our adoption, namely, that in every 
 instance abnormal knowledge and its corresponding belief, 
 being voluntary indirectly, involves a responsible being 
 in culpability and liability to punishment. 
 
 This conclusion, however, is not unattended with an 
 apparent difficulty of the most formidable character. Tor 
 it will be asked, how can any man living hope to escape 
 from all erroneous sentiments! or how can men be re- 
 garded as culpable, who have done what they could to 
 reach the truth ! 
 
 It is not maintained that in the present state of human 
 society every man who acts conscientiously will amime- 
 diately attain exemption from erroneous judgments and 
 self-inconsistency. But the cases in which this immediate 
 exemption is not attainable, may be so specified and ex- 
 plained as to vindicate the correctness of the principle 
 that has been announced. 
 
368 . CONCLUSION. 
 
 The understanding of a child being, like his body, im- 
 mature, his mind is dependent upon the instructions of 
 his parents, as his body is sustained by their care. If 
 the child did not believe, on the authority of those who 
 are charged with his education, what he himself by his 
 own intelligence does not and cannot know to be true, he 
 would never grow up to bea man. Thereis accordingly 
 in children a natural instinct or disposition suitable to 
 their cireumstances, which leads them to believe the 
 word, or trust the authority of their parents, without 
 questioning and without hesitation. If, then, human 
 society be fallen and corrupt, as it undoubtedly is, young 
 persons who are brought up among prevailing erroneous 
 sentiments, and are legitimately bound while in their 
 minority to accept their beliefs on the authority of their 
 natural guardians, will be inevitably led, notwithstanding 
 any efforts which they might make to the contrary, to 
 adopt not a few erroneous principles. Having, in this 
 manner, adopted false opinions, and having moreover 
 often acted upon them, it is not to be expected that, do 
 what they may, they will easily or quickly extricate 
 themselves from the maze of error in which they have 
 been trained. 
 
 Besides, when such individuals reach full maturity, 
 even though they may be conscious of being involved in 
 error, and be intensely anxious to escape from it, and to 
 know the truth on every subject, they are not at liberty 
 to dismiss all their beliefs and suspend all action, till they 
 shall have calmly and at liesure examined every needful 
 
=— SS, aoe 
 
 CONCLUSION. 369 
 
 topic for themselves, and adopted a ripened judgment. 
 They are urged on irresistibly by the pressure of events, 
 the eagerness of desire, and the calls of duty, to reason 
 and decide and act, even while there minds are prepos- 
 sessed and governed by prejudices and erroneous prin- 
 ciples. Here, then, is a well-marked class of cases, 
 whose features may be easily discriminated and recog- 
 nised. We must, therefore, expect to meet with many 
 individuals adopting and acting upon false principles, 
 Srom which no personal consceentiousness on their part 
 could have saved them. Neither must it be forgotten, 
 that these false principles were not conscientiously adopted, 
 but simply received on hereditary authority. The fact 
 that the first reception of these prejudices was legitimate 
 enough, and that afterwards no fair opportunity was 
 afforded for revising and considering them on account of 
 the urgent pressure of circumstances, may qualify the 
 personal culpability of those who are thus situated, but 
 it cannot alter the nature of error or of erroneous judg- 
 ment. 
 
 Making every allowance, then, for such cases as the 
 above, it still remains true, that every man is bound to 
 avail himself of every proper opportunity to examine 
 with all diligence and scrupulosity the accuracy of his 
 beliefs. Moreover, it is only a strong and practical 
 necessity which can in any degree excuse a man for hold- 
 ing, and acting upon, a hereditary belief, which he has 
 not examined for himself and found on satisfactory 
 grounds to be true. And more specifically it cannot be 
 
370 CONCLUSION. 
 
 denied, that when a man deliberately examines a ques- 
 tion, and avows his opinion after due and _professedly 
 impartial consideration, maintaining that the belief which 
 he has adopted is necessary to secure the welfare of him- 
 self and others, he cannot be mistaken in this belief 
 without justly incurring censure. 
 
 It is no doubt proper to distinguish between those of 
 our abnormal beliefs which are the result of our own per- 
 sonal derelictions, and those which are hereditary and 
 may be traced entirely to our circumstances; but it is 
 no less proper to notice their connection and agreement. 
 It may be easily shewn that both kinds of abnormal 
 belief imply guilt. Guilt is twofold; direct and indirect. 
 Direct guilt is incurred by doing what we know at the 
 time of doing it to be wrong. Indirect guilt is incurred 
 by doing what we know or think at the time of doing it 
 to be right, but which is in reality wrong. Erroneous 
 or abnormal belief, therefore, is the distinguishing peculi- 
 arity of indirect guilt. To deny that abnormal belief 
 involves guilt is to deny the guilt of infanticide, sutteeism, 
 and a thousand abominations. To shift the guilt of 
 abnormal belief from the creature is to cast it upon 
 the Creator. Abnormal belief is culpable indirectly, 
 not only because it leads, or may lead, to improper 
 actions, but also because it is always the result of direct 
 guilt. 
 
 We fully admit the distinction between the abnormal 
 beliefs which may be traced to our own personal trans- 
 gressions, and those which may be traced to the trans- 
 
CONCLUSION. ST 
 
 gressions of our forefathers. In practical life, however, 
 it is not always easy to distinguish between them. Be- 
 sides it is the duty of every man to endeayour to escape 
 from both these sorts of erroneous judgments, and it is 
 the ultimate destiny of every honest man to effect a full 
 and final escape from them all. Moreover, while we 
 are implicated in them, we find ourselves exposed to 
 suffer the penalties of the one sort as well as of the 
 other. 
 
 For it is an undoubted fact, that guilt or liability to 
 punishment is found attaching itself to an erroneous 
 judgment, over which the individual who holds it has had 
 little or even no personal control at all, being strictly 
 hereditary, as well as to one which is the unquestionable 
 result of his own carlessness, apathy, or wilful prejudice. 
 This fact involves the principle that among a race of 
 beings constituted as men are, individuals may be seri- 
 ously implicated in the guilt of their progenitors, inde- 
 pendently of their own will and without their own con- 
 sent. In this simple statement of the case as it actually 
 exists in the world around us, we have a strong confirma- 
 tion of our assertion that every abnormal belief is culpable. 
 And though many attempts have been made to deny or 
 soften the painful fact just alluded to, they have all been 
 manifestly unsuccessful. And if it be indeed the case, 
 that every erroneous judgment is culpable, and that men 
 are justly held responsible for such, it follows that the 
 most honest and effectual method for the Christian 
 Church to refute Infidelity and Popery and to con- 
 
Bie CONCLUSION. 
 
 vert the nations, is just to do herself what she exhorts 
 others to do, ‘‘ Buy the truth, and sell it not.” When 
 she does so, her schisms will be healed, and the world, 
 seeing her union, will believe that God has sent His 
 Son. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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