Sa peers See a ah pasehtntentesrens ; Soe ha Spas Soe Bee he oe pisreihte : : Bnd abt saedpraes : oH Prati em ie aes 3 erreien tht riere teint) RNY OF Pa Le SEP 20 1919 Ay oe <2 o6tea. $€ seu BT LEP .P75. F919 00.7 Pohle, Joseph, 1852-1922. Grace, actual and habitual, a dogmatic treatise | « nes mr i ‘ J fs { EF =o as va hares Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/graceactualhabit0Opohl DOGMATIC THEOLOGY VII THE POHLE-PREUSS SERIES OF DOG- MATIC TEXT-BOOKS God: His Knowability, Essence and At- tributes. vi & 479 pp., $2.00 net. The Divine Trinity. iv & 207 pp., $1.50 net. God the Author of Nature and the Su- pernatural. v & 365 pp., $1.75 net. Christology. ili & 310 pp., $1.50 net. Soteriology. iv & 169 pp., $1 net. Mariology. iv & 185 pp., $1 net. Grace: Actual and Habitual. iv & 443 pp., $2.00 net. The Sacraments. Vol. I. (The Sacra- ments in General. Baptism. Confirma- tion.) vi & 328 pp., $1.50 net. The Sacraments. Vol. II. (The Holy Eucharist.) vi & 408 pp., $1.75 net. The Sacraments. Vol. III. (Penance.) vi & 270 pp., $1.50 net. The Sacraments. Vol. IV. \ (Extreme Unction,. Holy Orders, Matrimony.) iv & 249 pp., $1.50 net. Eschatology, or The Catholic Doctrine of the Last Things. iv & 164 pp., $1.00 net. The Whole Set, $18 net. < ARN OF PRI OF Palle SEP 29 1919 G RA C: 1D Cor yg Ls ecy\h sil ACTUAL AND HABITUAL 7 A DOGMATIC TREATISE ie LE A ag THE RT. REV. MSGR. JOSEPH POHLE, Pu.D.,D.D. FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY AT ST. JOSEPH’S SEMINARY, LEEDS (ENGLAND), LATER PROFESSOR OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY AT THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA ADAPTED AND EDITED BY | ARTHUR PREUSS THIRD, REVISED EDITION © B. HERDER BOOK CO. 17 SourH Broapway, St. Louis, Mo. AND 68, GREAT RussELL ST., Lonpon, W. C. 1919 NIHIL OBSTAT Sti. Ludovici, die 18 Jan. 1919 F. G. Holweck, Censor Librorum IMPRIMATUR Sti. Ludovici, die 21 Jan. 1919 H Joannes J. Glennon Archiepiscopus Sti. Ludovici Copyright, 1914 by Joseph Gummersbach All rights reserved Printed in U.S, A. BECKTOLD PRINTING & BOOK MFG. CO. ST. LOUIS, U.S. A. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE cilie SHB LOX Gol OG MAUR RO RoI a TAP SE ae OR oc eaiReaRDH UEMURA RED AL La OR PArtei ACTUAL’ GRACE. {\~) fc dM LAL eat cr at aan AL ge” reas Lhe: Nature. of sActual Graces) 5) Vio \ ue iin se eet. Dehmition: of “ActualMGrace so) ari ries eke Si 2. LMVisio OL: ACtBan Graben yi geen athe. ahh be eee Cri iene re roperties Oh vctual “Gracey, sia3.o%e wk AG § 1, The Necessity of Actual Grace . . 50 ArT. 1. The Capacity of Mere Nature: Without Grace . 50 Art. 2. The Ncceegi of Rerad Grace e. all Salltary Aces Wow. te 82 ArT. 3. The Necessity of Actual Grate for “the States of Unbelief, Mortal Sin, and Justification 096 $2) The: Gratuity.of Actual): Grace ire cea sean. Bat § 3. The Universality of Actual Grace . . Ne Le Art. 1. The Universality of God’s Will to Bate Bay st: Art, 2. God’s Will to Give Sufficient Grace to All Adult Fiuman) Bemas\in Particular ih) oom ART, 200 Lhe, Predestination | ot) ithe) Blecti wi uous Top ArT. 4. The Reprobation of the Damned . . . 212 Cu. III. Grace in Its Relation to Free-Will . . . . 222 § 1. The Heresy of the Protestant Reformers and the; Jansenistsy (34. gee § 2. Theological Systems Bavised) ia ip oniee) We Dogmas of Grace and Free-Will . . .. .). 231 Arr. 1); Thomism and Augustinianism'’\; .)./5 °°. 232 ART 2. evolinisns and Congriism |e) cose tiie an 285 BeAr Te GOAN CTIPVING MIRACE Ch RR ULTRAM Ulu a Re ECG arate Cu. I. The Genesis of Sanctifying Grace, or the Process of Justification . . PANG | Ea ary § 1. The Necessity of EN Vor Feetifeaton POR ey TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE § 2. The Necessity of Other Che Acts Besides Banths 20: : DUN UE 2) Cu. II. The State of FGunaton Noe Crete eH Py Sea tag 8 § 1, The Nature of Justification . . . 301 Art. 1. The Negative Element of fsieenice Wage Art. 2. The Positive Element of Justification . 310 § 2. Justifying or Sanctifying Grace . . ss) allah teens Art. 1. The Nature of Sanctifying Grant EEE Wat My 3-1 Art. 2. The Effects of Sanctifying Grace . . . 347 Art. 3. The Supernatural Concomitants of Sancti- fying: Grace)... Ea en UNE ait ope § 3. The Properties of eS ineheyile Grace rene / 398 Cu. III. The Fruits of Justification, or the Merit BE Good Works. f(r Qe RO en aaa Sr. The: Existence of Merit i a ie aalare Viete i eanened | § >. The Requisites of "Merit. 0) 5.02) nee 4aO § = The Objects of Merit 2 0.0 6 ee 8 ei) Aes ENE a Site le dog 10 acts aya al aR aN INTRODUCTION Humanity was reconciled to God by the Re- demption. This does not, however, mean that every individual human being was forthwith jus- tified, for individual justification is wrought by the application to the soul of grace derived from the inexhaustible merits of Jesus Christ. There are two kinds of grace: (1) actual and (2) habitual. Actual grace is a supernatural gift by which rational creatures are enabled to perform salutary acts. Habitual, or, as it is com- monly called, sanctifying, grace is a habit, or more or less enduring state, which renders men pleasing to God. This distinction is of comparatively recent date, but it furnishes an excellent principle of division for a dogmatic treatise on grace.* 1 The Fathers and the Schoolmen “do net emphasize the difference, and frequently speak of habitual and actual grace as of one whole. Controversial reasons account for this discrepancy, which readers of the older theologians should con- stantly bear in mind.” (Wilhelm- Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theol- ogy, Vol. II, p. 229, 2nd ed., Lon- don i901.) Ma Beier aty era: Be PART | ACTUAL GRACE Actual grace is a transient supernatural help given by God from the treasury of the merits of Jesus Christ for the purpose of enabling man to work out his eternal salvation. We shall consider: (1) The Nature of Actual Grace; (2) Its Properties, and (3) Its Relation to Free-Will. GENERAL READINGS :— St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 109-114, and the commentators, especially Billuart, De Gratia (ed. Lequette, t. III) ; the Salmanticenses, De Gratia Dei (Cursus Theologiae, Vol. IX sqq., Paris 1870); Thomas de Lemos, Panoplia Divinae Gratiae, Liége 1676; Dominicus Soto, De Natura et Gratia, 1. III, Venice 1560; *Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, 3 vols. (I, Bordeaux 1634; II, Lyons 1645; III, Cologne 1648). *C, y. Schazler, Natur und Ubernatur: Das Dogma von der Gnade, Mainz 1865; Inem, Neue Untersuchungen tiber das Dogma von der Gnade, Mainz 1867; *J. E. Kuhn, Die christliche Lehre von der géttlichen Gnade, Tiibingen 1868; Jos. Kleutgen, S. J., Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. Il, 2nd ed., pp.. 152 sqq.. Munster 1872; R. Cercia, De Gratia Christi, 3 vols., Paris 1879; *C. Maz- zella S. J., De Gratia Christi, 4th ed., Rome 18905; *J. H. Oswald, Die Lehre von der Heiligung, d.i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnaden- wahl, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885; *D. Palmieri, S. J., De Gratia Di- vina Actuali, Gulpen 1885 ; *Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theo- logie, Vol. VIII, Mainz 1897; *S. Schiffini, S. J.. De Gratia Divina, Freiburg 1901; G. Lahousse, S. J., De Gratia Divina, Louvain 3 4 ACTUAL GRACE 1902; Chr. Pesch, S. J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1908; G. van Noort, De Gratia Christi, Amsterdam 1908; E. J. Wirth, Divine Grace, New York 1903; S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. Ill, pp. 1 sqq.; Wil- helm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 227 saqq., London 1901; A. Devine, The Sacraments Ex- plained, 3rd ed. pp. 1-43, London 1905.— L. Labauche, S. S., God and Man, Lectures on Dogmatic Theology II, pp. 123 sqq., New York 1916-—J. E. Nieremberg, S. J., The Marvels of Divine Grace, tr. by Lady Lovat, London 1917. On the teaching of the Fathers cfr. Isaac Habert, Theologiae Grecorum Patrum Vindicatae circa Universam Materiam Gratiae Libri III, Paris 1646; E. Scholz, Die Lehre des hl. Basilius von der Gnade, Freiburg 1881; Hiimmer, Des hl. Gregor von Nazianzg Lehre von der Gnade, Kempten 1800; E. Weigl, Die Heilslehre des hl. Cyrill von Alexandrien, Mainz 10905. * The asterisk before an author’s name indicates that his treatment of the subject is especially clear and thorough. As St. Thomas is invariably the best guide, the omission of the asterisk before his name never means that we consider his work inferior to that of other writers. There are © vast stretches of theology which he scarcely touched. CHAPTER I THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE SECTION DEFINITION OF ACTUAL GRACE 1. GENERAL Notion oF GRACE.—The best way to arrive at a correct definition of actual grace is by the synthetic method. We therefore begin with the general notion of grace. Like “nature,” ! grace (gratia, xéps) is a word of wide reach, used in a great variety of senses. Habert2 enumerates no less than fourteen; which, however, may be reduced to four. a) Subjectively, grace signifies good will or benevolence shown by a superior to an inferior, as when a criminal is pardoned by the king’s grace. b) Objectively, it designates a favor inspired by good will or benevolence. In this sense the term may be applied to any free and gratuitous gift (donum gratis datum), as when a king be- stows graces on his lieges. 1Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- Vindicatae circa Universam Mate- thor of Nature and the Supernat- riam Gratiae Libri III, I, 4, Paris! ural, pp. 181 sqq., St. Louis 1912. 1646. 2Theologiae Graecorum Patrum 5 6 ACTUAL GRACE c) Grace may also mean personal charm or at- tractiveness. In this sense the term frequently occurs in Latin and Greek literature (the Three Graces). Charm elicits love and prompts a per- son to the bestowal of favors. d) The recipient of gifts or favors usually feels gratitude towards the giver, which he ex- presses in the form of thanks. Hence the word gratiae (plural) frequently stands for thanksgiv- ing (“gratias agere,’ “Deo gratias,’ “to say grace after meals”).? The first and fundamental of these meanings is “a free gift or favor.” The benevolence of the giver and the attractiveness of the recipient are merely the reasons for which the gift is im- parted, whereas the expression of thanks is an effect following its bestowall. Dogmatic theology is concerned exclusively with grace in the fundamental sense of the term. e) Grace is called a gift (donum, 8uped), because it is owing to free benevolence, not required by justice. It is called gratuitous (gratis datum), because it is bestowed without any corresponding merit on the part of the crea- 3“‘ The same name is loosely ap- 1: “ Secundum communem loquen- plied to the act of ‘blessing* the di modum tripliciter gratia accipt food before taking it, which is consuevit: uno modo pro dilectione properly the function of a priest, alicuius... 3; secundo sumitur pro but which is suitably performed by aliquo dono gratis dato... 3; ter- every Christian.” (Hunter, Out- tio modo sumitur pro recompensa- lines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. tione beneficii gratis dati, secundum III, p. 6.) Cfr. S. Thomas, Sum- quod dicimur agere gratias benefi- ma Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. ciorum.” ee ee THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE 7 ture. A gift may be due to the recipient as a matter of distributive or commutative justice, and in that case it would not be absolutely gratuitous (gratis). Grace, on the contrary, is bestowed out of pure benevolence, from no other motive than sheer love. This is manifestly St. Paul’s idea when he writes: “ And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace.” * It is likewise the meaning of St. Augustine when he says, in his Homilies on the Gospel of St. John, that grace is “ some- thing gratuitously given . . . as a present, not in return for something else.” ® 2, NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL GRACE.— Grace is not necessarily supernatural. Sacred Scripture and the Fathers sometimes apply the word to purely natural gifts. We petition God for our daily bread, for good health, fair weather and other temporal favors, and we thank Him for preserving us from pestilence, famine, and war, although these are blessings which do not transcend the order of nature.® a). Our petitions for purely natural favors are inspired by the conviction that creation itself, and everything con- nected therewith, is a gratuitous gift of God. This con- viction is well founded. God was under no necessity of creating anything: creation was an act of His free-will. Again, many of the favors to which human nature, as such, has a claim, are free gifts when conferred upon the individual. Good health, fortitude, talent, etc., are natural 4 Rom. XI, 6: “St autem gratia, Quid est gratia? Gratis data. iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia Quid est gratis data? Donata, non 4am non est gratia.” reddita.” 5 Tract. in Ioannem, III, -n. 9: 6 Debitum naturae. 8 ACTUAL GRACE graces, for which we are allowed, nay obliged, to petition God. The Pelagians employed this truth to conceal a per- nicious error when they unctuously descanted on the magnitude and necessity of grace as manifested in crea- tion. It was by such trickery that their leader succeeded in persuading the bishops assembled at the Council of Dios- polis or Lydda (A. D. 415) that his teaching was quite or- thodox. St. Augustine and four other African bishops later reported to Pope Innocent I, that if these prelates had perceived that Pelagius meant to deny that grace by which we are Christians and sons of God, they would not have listened to him so patiently, and that, consequently, no blame attached to these judges because they simply took the term “grace” in its ecclesiastical sense.’ b) Generally speaking, however, the term “grace” is reserved for what are commonly called the supernatural gifts of God, the merely preternatural as well as the strictly supernatural.® In this sense “grace” is as sharply opposed to purely natural favors as nature is opposed to the supernatural. The importance of the distinction between supernatural and purely natural grace will appear from an analysis of the concept itself. Considered as gifts of God, the strictly supernatural graces (eé. g., justification, divine sonship, the 7Epistula ad Innocent., n. 2: non culpandi sunt indices, qui ec- “Nam si intellexissent ili episcopi, clesiasticé consuetudine nomen gra- eam illum dicere gratiam, quam tiae [i. e. christianae] audierunt.”’ etiam cum impiis habemus, cum qui- 8 On the difference between these bus homines sumus, negare vere two categories see Pohle-Preuss, eam quad Christiani et filii Det God the Author of Nature and the sumus, quis eum patienter... ante Supernatural, pp. 180 sqq. oculos suos ferret? Quapropter 4 THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE 9 beatific vision) ontologically exceed the bounds of nature. Considered as purely gratuitous favors, they are negatively and positively undeserved. The grace involved in crea- tion, for instance, is not conferred on some existing bene- ficiary, but actually produces its recipient. The creation itself, therefore, being entirely gratis data, all that suc-_ ceeds it, supernatural grace included, must be negatively undeserved, in as far as it was not necessary for the recipi- ent to exist at all. But the supernatural graces are in- debitae also positively, 7. e. positing the creation, because they transcend every creatural claim and power. Both elements are contained in the above-quoted letter of the African bishops to Pope Innocent I: “ Though it may be said in a certain legitimate sense, that we were created by the grace of God, ... that is a different grace by which we are called predestined, by which we are justified, and by which we receive eternal beatitude.”® Of this last- mentioned grace (7. e. grace in the strictly supernatural sense), St. Augustine says: “ This, the grace which Cath- olic bishops are wont to read in the books of God and preach to their people, and the grace which the Apostle commends, is not that by which we are created as men, but that by which as sinful men we are justified.” *° In other words, natural is opposed to supernatural grace in the same way that nature is opposed to the supernatural. “| To believe] is the work of grace, not of nature. It is, I say, the work of grace, which the second Adam brought us, not of nature, which Adam wholly lost in himself.” 14 9 Epist, ad Innocent., l. c.: “ Etst “‘Haec est enim gratia, quam in quadam non improbandé ratione di- libris Dei legere et populis praedicare citur gratia Det quad creati sumus catholict antistites consueverunt, et [gratia naturalis],... alia est gratia quam commendat Apostolus tamen, qua praedestinati vocamur, non est ea qua creatt sumus, ut tustificamur, glorificamur [gratia homines essemus, sed qua iustificati supernaturalis].’’ sumus, quum mali homines essemus.” 10 Epist, ad Sixt., 194, n. 8: 11 St. Augustine, Ep., 217: “ Hoc 10 ACT UAL GRACE Adding the new note obtained by this analysis we arrive at the following definition: Grace is a gratuitous super- natural gift.” 3. THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE GRACE OF Curist.—Though all supernatural graces are from God, a distinction is made between the “srace of God” and the “grace of Christ.” The difference between them is purely accidental, based on the fact that the “grace of Christ’’ flows exclusively from the merits of the atonement. a) The following points may serve as criteria to dis- tinguish the two notions: a) The gratia Dei springs from divine benevolence and presupposes a recipient who is unworthy merely in a nega- tive sense (=not worthy, non dignus), whereas the gratia Christi flows from mercy and benevolence and is con- ferred on a recipient who is positively unworthy (indig- NUS). B) The gratia Dei elevates the soul to the supernatural order (gratia elevans), while the gratia Christi heals the wounds inflicted by sin, especially concupiscence (gratia elevans simul et sanans). y) The gratia Dei is a gratuitous gift conferred by the Blessed Trinity without regard to the theandric merits of Jesus Christ, whereas the gratia C hristi is based entirely on those merits. b) The Scotists hold that the distinction between gratia Dei and gratia Christi is purely logical. They regard [scil. credere] opus est gratiae, non non naturae quam totam perdidit in naturae. Opus est, inquam, gratiae seipso Adam.” quam nobis attulit secundus Adam, 12 Gratia est donum gratis datum supernaturale. THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE II the Godman as the predestined centre of the uni- verse and the source of all graces.1* The Thomists, on the other hand, regard the grace of the angels, and that wherewith our first parents were endowed in Paradise, purely as gratia Det; they hold that the merits of Christ did not become operative until after the Fall, and that, consequently, there is a real distinction between the grace of the angels and that of our first parents on the one hand, and the grace of Christ on the other. As it cannot reasonably be supposed that the angels are endowed with specifically the same graces by which mankind was redeemed from sin, the Scotists are forced to admit a distinction between the grace of Christ as God- man (gratia Christi Dei-hominis) and the grace of Christ as Redeemer (gratia Christi Redemptoris), so that even according to them, the dogmatic treatise on Grace is con- cerned solely with the grace of Christ gua Redeemer. Hence, grace must be more particularly defined as a gra- tuitous supernatural gift derived from the merits of Jesus Christ +" 4. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL GRACE.—FExter- nal grace (gratia externa) comprises all those strictly supernatural institutions which stimulate pious thoughts and salutary resolutions in the human soul. Such are, for example, Holy Scrip- ture, the Church, the Sacraments, the example of Jesus Christ, etc. Internal grace (gratia in- terna) inheres or operates invisibly in the soul, and places it in relation with God as its supernat- 13 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology. 14 Gratia est donum gratis datum, A Dogmatic Treatise on the Redemp- supernaturale, ex meritis Christi. tion, pp. 24 sqq., St. Louis 1914. 12 ACTUAL GRACE ural end. Internal graces are, e. g., the theolog- ical virtues, the power of forgiving sins, etc. The Pelagians admitted external, but obstinately de- nied internal grace.*” St. Paul 1° emphasizes the distinction between external and internal grace by designating the former as “law” (lex, véuos) and the latter as “faith” (fides, mlotis ). With one exception, (viz., the Hypostatic Union, which is the climax of all graces), external is inferior to, because a mere preparation for, internal grace, which aims at sanctification. We are concerned in this treatise solely with internal grace. Hence, proceeding a step further, we may define grace as a gratuitous, supernatural, internal gift of God, derived from the merits of Jesus Christ.*? s, “Gratia Gratis Data” and “GRATIA Gratum Faciens.”—The supernatural grace of Christ, existing invisibly in the soul either as a transient impulse (actus) or as a permanent state (habitus), tends either to the salvation of the person in whom it inheres or through him to the sanctification of others. In the former case it is called ingratiating (gratia gratum faciens ) in the latter, gratuitously given (gratia gratis data). The term gratia gratis data is based on the words of our Lord recorded in the Gospel of St. Matthew: ‘Heal the sick, raise the dead, 15 Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Duas 17 Gratia est donum gratis datum, Epistolas Pelagianorum, IV, 15. supernaturale, internum, ex meritis 16 Gir. “Rom; Iil,22: ‘sqq.4 ) Gal: Christi. LT e16. THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE 13 cleanse the lepers, cast out devils: freely have you received, freely give.” * a) The gratia gratum faciens is intended for all men without exception; the gratia gratis data only for a few specially chosen persons. To the class of gratuitously be- stowed graces belong the charismata of the prophets and the ordinary powers of the priesthood. Each of these two species of internal grace may exist independently of the other because personal holiness is not a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of the char- -ismata or the power of forgiving sins, etc. b) Considered with regard to its intrinsic worth, the gratia gratum faciens is decidedly superior to the gratia gratis data. St. Paul, after enumerating all the charis- mata, admonishes the Corinthians: ‘‘ Be zealous for the better gifts, and I show unto you yet a more excellent way,” *° and then sings the praises of charity:24 “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And if I should have prophecy and should know 18 St. Matthew X, 8: “ Infirmos curate, mortuos suscitate, leprosos mundate, daemones eiicite: gratis accepistis, gratis date (dwpedy O6Te).”"— The name “ gratuitously given,” as Fr. Hunter observes (Out- lines, III, 10), is ‘‘ tautological and not particularly expressive,’ and “helps in no way to indicate what is the nature of the graces which it is intended to exclude. These are such as, for want of a better word, we call ingratiating: the Latin name used by theologians (gratwm faciens) denotes that they make a man pleasing to God, grateful to Him, if we understand grateful of that which gives pleasure, and not in its commoner sense, which is nearly the same as thankful.’’ 19 For a list of the charismata see t Cor. XII, 4 sqq. Cfr. Englmann, Von den Charismen im allgemeinen und von dem Sprachencharisma im besonderen, Ratisbon 1848; Cornely, Comment. in S. Pauli Priorem Epistolam ad Corinthios, pp. 410 sqq., Paris 1890; Chr. Pesch, Prae- lect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 243 sqq., Freiburg 1908, 201 Cor. XII, 31: “ Aemulamini autem charismata meliora, et adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demon- stro.” 21 Caritas, dydaqn. 14 ACTUAL GRACE all the mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, I am nothing, etc.” 22. Charity is a gratia gratum faciens. Hence, since the gratia gratis data is treated elsewhere (Apologetics, Mystic and Sacramental Theology), we must add another note to our definition: Grace is a gratuitous, supernat- ural, internal gift, derived from the merits of Jesus Christ, by which man is rendered pleasing in the sight of God.”* | | 6. AcTtuUAL AND HapiTuaL GRACcE.—The gratia gratum faciens is given either for the perform- ance of a supernatural act or for the production of a permanent supernatural state (habitus). In the latter case it is called habitual, or, as it sanc- tifies the creature in the eyes of God, sanctifying grace. Actual grace comprises two essential elements: (1) divine help as the principle of every salutary supernatural act, and (2) the salutary act itself. Hence its designation by the Fathers as @cod évepyeia, 7 Tov Adyov xelp, Jeta xivgors, or, in Latin, Dei auviliwm, subsidium, adiutorium, motio divina,— all of which appellations have been adopted by the Schoolmen. Actual grace invariably tends either to produce habitual or sanctifying grace, or to preserve and 221 Cor. XIII, 1 sqq. Cir. St. paratoria finis ultimi, sicut per Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., 1a prophetiam et miracula et huius- zae, qu. 111, art. 5: “ Unaquaeque modi homines inducuntur ad hoc virtus tanto excellentior est, quanto quod ‘ultimo fint coniungantur. Et ad altius bonum ordinatur. Semper ideo gratia gnatum faciens est multo autem finis potior est his, quae sunt excellentior quam gratia gratis . ad finem [i. e. media]. Gratia au- data.” tem gratum faciens ordinat hominem 23 Gratia est donum gratis datum, immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi supernaturale, internum, gratum finis; gratiae autem gratis datae or- faciens, ex meritis Christi dinant hominem ad quaedam prae- THE; NATURE), OP (ACTUAL: GRACE 15 increase it where it already exists.. It follows that, being merely a means to an end, actual grace is inferior to sanctifying grace, which is that end itself. Actual grace may therefore be defined as an unmerited, supernatural, internal divine help, based on the merits of Jesus Christ, which ren- ders man pleasing in the sight of God, enabling him to perform salutary acts; or, somewhat more succinctly, as a supernatural help bestowed for the performance of salutary acts, in con- sideration of the merits of Jesus Christ. Actual grace is (1) a help (auxilium), because it consists in a transient influence exercised by God on the soul. (2) A supernatural help, to distinguish it from God’s ordinary providence and all such merely natural graces as man would probably have received in the state of pure nature.2** (3) It is attributed to the merits of Jesus Christ, in order to indicate that the graces granted to fallen man are all derived from the atonement both as their efficient and their meritorious cause. (4) Ac- tual grace is said to be given for the performance of salutary acts to show that its immediate purpose or end is an act, not a state, and that the acts for which it is given must be in the order of salvation. 7, THE TWoFOLD CAUSALITY OF ACTUAL Grace.—If grace is a supernatural help, mere nature cannot, of its own strength, perform salu- tary acts. Consequently, actual grace exercises a 24 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernat- ural, pp. 229 sq. 16 ACTUAL ‘GRACE causal influence without which man would be help- less in the matter of salvation. The causality of actual grace is both moral and physical. ; a) As a moral cause grace removes the ob- stacles which render the work of salvation difficult. Besides this negative it also has a posi- tive effect: it inspires delight in virtue and hatred of sin. This mode of operation manifestiy presupposes a cer- tain weakness of the human will, 7. e. concupiscence, which is an effect of original sin. Actual grace exercises a healing influence on the will?® and is therefore called gratia sanans sive medicinalis. “ Unless something is put before the soul to please and attract it,” says St. Au- gustine, “the will can in no wise be moved; but it is not in man’s power to bring this about.” ?® Concretely, this moral causality of grace manifests itself as a divinely in- spired joy in virtue and a hatred of sin, both of which incline the will to the free performance of salutary acts. These sentiments may in some cases be so _ strong as to deprive the will temporarily of its free- dom to resist. The sudden conversion of St. Paul is a case in point. Holy Scripture expressly assures us that God is the absolute master of the human will and, if He so chooses, can bend it under His yoke without using . physical force. ,.Cfr..Prov.. XXI;'t:) “he heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will, 25 Ibid., pp. 298 sq. mum, moveri nullo modo potest; hoe 26 Ep. ad Simplician., I, 9, 22: autem, ut occurrat, non est in ho- “Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occure minis potestate.” rerit quod delectet et invitet ani THE NATUREVORIACTUAL GRACE 17 he shall turn it.” “ Who will be so foolish as to say,” queries St. Augustine, “that God cannot change the evil wills of men, whichever, whenever, and wheresoever He chooses, and direct them to what is good?” ?” It is but rarely, of course, that God grants to any man a summary victory over his sinful nature; but this fact does not pre- vent the Church from praying: “ Vouchsafe, O Lord, to compel our wills to thee, even though they be rebel- liousi528 b) Even more important than the moral causality of grace is its physical causality. Man depends entirely on God for the physical strength necessary to perform salutary works. Grace ele- vates the faculties of the soul to the supernatural sphere, thereby enabling it to perform super- natural acts. Physical is as distinct from moral causality in the order of grace as in the order of nature. The holding out of a beautiful toy will not enable a child to walk without support from its elders. Moral causality is insufficient to enable a man to perform salutary acts. Grace (as we shall show later) is absolutely, 7. e. metaphysically, neces- sary for all salutary acts, whether easy or difficult, and hence the incapacity of nature cannot be ascribed solely to weakness and to the moral difficulty resulting from sin, but must be attributed mainly to physical impotence. A bird without wings is not merely impeded but utterly un- 27 Enchiridion, c. 98: “ Quis tam etiam rebelles compelle propitius impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum malas voluntates.’? For a full treatment hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, of God’s moral causality the stu- quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in dent is referred to Ripalda, De Ente bonum non posse convertere?”” Supernaturali, disp. 109, sect, 2 sq. 28“ Domine,...ad te nostras 18 ACTUAL: GRACE able to fly ; similarly, man without grace is not only handi- capped but absolutely incapacitated for the work of sal- vation. Considered under this aspect, actual grace is called gratia elevans, because it elevates man to the super- natural state.?° This double causality of grace is well brought out in Perrone’s classic definition: “Gratia actualis est gratuitum illud auxtlium,® quod Deus ** per Christi merita *? homint lapso * largi- tur, tum ut ems mfrmitatt consulat* .. . tum ut eum erigat ad statum supernaturalem atque idoneum faciat ad actus supernaturales elicien- dos,*? ut tustificationem possit adipisci*® in eaque 1am consecuta perseverare, donec perveniat ad vitam aeternam.” *" In English: “ Actual grace is that unmerited interior assistance which God, by virtue of the merits of Christ, confers upon fallen man, in order, on the one hand, -to remedy his infirmity resulting from sin and, on the other, to raise him to the supernatural order and thereby to render him capable of performing supernatural acts, so that he may attain justification, persevere in it to the end, and thus enter into everlasting life.” This definition is strictly scientific, for it enumerates all the elements that enter into the essence of actual grace. 29 Cfr, D. Palmieri, De Gratia 83 Causa materialis. Divina Actuali, thes. 15. 34 Causalitas moralis. 80 Causa formalis. 35 Causalitas physica. 31 Causa efficiens. 36 Causa finalis inadaequata. 32 Causa meritoria. 87 Causa finalis adaequata. SECTION, 2 DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE Actual grace may be divided according to: (1) the dif- ference existing between the faculties of the human soul, and (2) in reference to the freedom of the will. Considered in its relation to the different faculties of the soul, actual grace is either of the intellect, or of the will, or of the sensitive faculties. With regard to the free consent of the will, it is either (1) prevenient, also called cooperating, or (2) efficacious or merely sufficient. I. THe ILLUMINATING GRACE OF THE INTEL- LECT.—Actual grace, in so far as it inspires salu- tary thoughts, is called illuminating (gratia illu- minationts s. tllustrationis ). This illumination of the intellect by grace may be either mediate or immediate. It is mediate if grace suggests salutary thoughts to the intellect by purely natural means, or external graces, such as a stirring sermon, the perusal of a good book, etc.; it is immediate when the Holy Ghost elevates the powers of the soul, and through the instru- mentality of the so-called potentia obedientialis, pro- duces in it entitatively supernatural acts. The existence of the grace of immediate illumination follows from its absolute necessity as a means of salva- 1On the potentia obedientialis see Nature and the Supernatural, pp. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of 188 sqq. 19 20 ACTUAL. GRACE tion, defined by the Second Council of Orange, A.D. 529." a) The grace of mediate illumination may be inferred aprioristically from the existence of a di- vine revelation equipped with such supernatural institutions as the Bible, the sacraments, rites, ceremonies, etc. In conformity with the psycho- logical laws governing the association of ideas, in- telligent meditation on the agencies comprised un- der the term “external grace” ® elicits in the mind salutary thoughts, which are not Deceseat aly su- pernatural in their inception. It is not unlikely that Sacred Scripture refers to such graces as these when it recommends “the law of God” r “ the example of Christ” as fit subjects for meditation. Cfr. Ps. XVIII, 8 sai: ) °° Thetlaw of, the Lord -isjaine spotted, converting souls, . . . the commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes.’ * 1 Pet. II, 21: “ Christ also suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow his steps.”> St. Augustine probably had in mind the grace of mediate illumination when he wrote: “God acts upon us by the incentives of visible objects to will and to believe, either externally by evan- gelical exhortations, ... or internally, as no man has control over what enters into his thoughts.”® The grace 2Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 180. 3 Supra, p. 11. 4“ Lex Domini immaculata, con- vertens animas, ... praeceptum Do- vobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequa- mini vestigia eius.” 6 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 34: “Visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut velimus et ut credamus, sive extrin- mint lucidum, illuminans oculos.’’ 5“ Christus passus est pro nobis, secus per evangelicas exhortationes sive intrinsecus, ubt nemo habet in potestate, quid ei veniat in mentem.” DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 21 of mediate illumination has for its object to prepare the way quietly and unostentatiously for a grace of greater import, namely, the immediate illumination of the mind by the Holy Ghost. b) The grace of immediate far surpasses that of mediate illumination because the supernatural life of the soul originates in faith, which in turn is based on a strictly supernatural enlightenment of the mind. a) St. Paul expressly teaches: ‘And such con- fidence we have, through Christ, towards God; not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is-ef God.” 7 The salient portion of this text reads as follows in the original Greek: Ody 87 ixavol éopev AoyicacGat Tt ad’ eavTov os && éavtav, ddd’ 4 ixavdrns fav ex Tov cod. Speak- ing in the plural (pluralis maiestaticus), the Apostle con- fesses himself unable to conceive a single salutary thought (AoyioweGar), and ascribes the power (ixarérns) to do so to God. Considered merely ‘as vital acts, such thoughts proceed from the natural faculties of the mind (颒 cavtév), but the power that produces them is divine (é @cov), not human (é éavrsv). Hence each salutary thought exceeds the power of man, and is an immediate supernatural grace. A still more cogent argument can be derived from 1 Cor. III, 6 sq.: “I have planted, Apollo watered, but 72 Cor. III, 4 sq.: “ Fiduciam simus cogitare aliquid a nobis qua- autem talem habemus per Christum si ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ad Deum; non quod suficientes ex Deo est.” 22 ACTUAL GRACE God gave the increase. Therefore, neither he that plant- eth is anything, nor he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase.” ® In this beautiful allegory the Apostle compares the genesis of supernatural faith in the soul to that of a plant under the care of a gardener, who while he plants and waters, yet looks to God for “ the increase.” The Apostle and his disciple Apollo are the spiritual gard- eners through whose preaching the Corinthians received the grace of mediate illumination. But, as St. Paul says, this preaching would have been useless (non est aliquid) had not God given “the increase.” In other words, the grace of immediate illumination was necessary to make the Apostolic preaching effective. “For,” in the words of St. Augustine, “ God Himself contributes to the produc- tion of fruit in good trees, when He both externally waters and tends them by the agency of His servants, and internally by Himself also gives the increase.” ® B) The argument from Tradition is based chiefly on St. Augustine, “the Doctor of Grace,” whose authority in this branch of dogmatic the- ology is unique.?? His writings abound in many such synonymous terms for the grace of immedi- ate illumination, as cogitatio pia, vocatio alta et secreta, locutio in fOgu AH ORS aperitio veritatis, ete.) etc. tum, qui et forinsecus rigat atque excolit per quemlibet ministrum et per se dat intrinsecus incrementum.” Cfr. also Eph. I, 17 sq., Acts XXVI, 8x1 Cor. III, 6: “Ego plantavi, Apollo rigavit; sed Deus incre- mentum dedit (ad\d\a 6 beds nvéa- vey). Itaque neque qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui in- crementum dat, Deus (6 advtdvav Oeds).”” 9 De Gratia Christi, c. 19: “ Ipse in bonis arboribus cooperatur fruc- LO Sagi) 2) (Comal Vai 6. 2) Johnie, 20 and 27. 10 Cfr. Mazzella, De Gratia, disp. 1, art. 1, §4, 3rd ed., Rome 1882. ee ee DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 23 He says among other things: “Instruction and ad- — monition are external aids, but he who controls the hearts has his cathedra in heaven.” ** Augustine esteems human preaching as nothing and ascribes all its good effects to grace. “It is the internal Master who teaches; Christ teaches and His inspiration.”?? In harmony with his master, St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, the ablest defender of the Augustinian (7. e. Catholic) doctrine of grace, says: “In vain will our sacred discourses strike the external ear, unless God by a spiritual gift opens the hearing of | the interior man.” 1% 2. THE STRENGTHENING GRACE OF THE WILL. —This grace, usually called gratia inspira- tionts,'* may also be either mediate or immediate, according as pious affections and wholesome resolutions are produced in the soul by a preceding illumination of the intellect or directly by the Holy Ghost. Owing to the psychological inter- action of intellect and will, every grace.of the mind, whether mediate or immediate, is eo 1pso also a mediate grace of the will, which implies a new act of the soul, but not a new grace. What we are concerned with here is the immediate 11 Tract. in Ioa., III, 13: “ Ma- gisteria forinsecus adiutoria quaedam interioris aperiat.’ Other Patristic texts will be found in the classic sunt et admonitiones; cathedram in coelo habet, qui corda tenet.” 122. c.: “Interior magister est, qui docet; Christus docet, inspiratio ipsius docet.’’ 13 Ep. 17 de Incarn. et Grat., n. 67: “Frustra [divinus sermo] ex- terioribus auribus sonat, nisi Deus spiritals munere auditum hominis work of Ripalda, De Ente Super- naturali, disp. 1o1, sect. 3-4. 14 It is to be noted, however, that the term gratia inspirationis, both in the writings of St. Augustine and in the decrees of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 3), sometimes also denotes the im- mediate illuminating grace of the mind, 24 ACTUAL GRACE strengthening grace of the will, which is far more important and more necessary. We are not able to demonstrate this teaching frem Sacred Scripture. ‘The texts John VI, ‘44 and Phil. II, 13, which are usually adduced in this connection, are inconclusive. Hence we must rely solely on Tradition. The argument from Tradition is based mainly on St. Augustine. In defending divine grace against Pelagius, this holy Doctor asserts the indispensa- bility and superior value of the strengthening grace of the will. “ By that grace it is effected, not only that we discover what ought to be done, but also that we do what we have discovered ; not only that we believe what ought to be loved, but also that we love what we have believed.” 1 And again: .“ Let him discern between knowledge and charity, as they ought to be distinguished, because knowl- edge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. . . . And inasmuch as both are gifts of God, although one is less and the other greater, he must not extol our righteousness above the praise which is due to Him who justifies us in such a way as to assign to the lesser of these two gifts the help of divine grace, and to claim the greater one for the control of the human will.” +6 St. Augustine emphasized the 15De Gratia Christi, c. 12: inflat, quando caritas GEGIUCATO saris “Qua gratié agitur, non solum ut facienda noverimus, verum etiam ut cognita faciamus, nec ut solum dili- genda credamus, verum etiam ut credita diligamus.” 16 Op. cit., c. 26: “ Cognitionem et dilectionem, sicut sunt dis- cernenda, discernat, quia scientia Et quum sit utrumque donum Dei, sed unum minus, alterum maius, non sic iustitiam nostram super laudem iustificatoris extollat, ut horum du- orum quod minus est divino tribuat adiutorio, quod autem maius est humano usurpet arbitrio.” DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 25 existence and necessity of this higher grace of the will in his controversy with the Pelagians. He was firmly convinced that a man may know the way of salvation, and yet refuse to follow it.17 He insisted that mere knowledge is not virtue, as Socrates had falsely taught. Ecclesiastical Tradition was always in perfect accord with this teaching, which eventually came to be defined by the plenary Council of Carthage (A.D. 418) as follows: “If any one assert that this same grace of God, granted through our Lord Jesus Christ, helps to avoid sin only for the reason that it opens and reveals to us an understand- ing of the [divine] commands, so that we may know what we should desire and what we should avoid; but that it is not granted to us by the same (grace) to desire and be able to do that which we know we ought to do, let him be anathema;—since both are gifts of God: to know what we must do and to have the wish to do it.” 18 Like the illuminating grace of the intellect the strength- ening grace of the will effects vital acts and manifests itself chiefly in what are known as the emotions of the will. St. Prosper, after Fulgentius the most prominent disciple of St. Augustine, enumerates these as follows: “ Fear (for ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wis- dom’) ; joy (‘I rejoiced at the things that were said to me: We shall go into the house of the Lord’); desire 17 He applies a variety of prac- tically synonymous terms to the strengthening grace of the will, for instance: delectatio coelestis, spiritus caritatis, inspiratio dilectionis, bona voluntas, voluptas, sanctum deside- rium, inspiratio suavitatis, cupiditas bont; ete. 18Canon 4: “ Quisquis dixerit, eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum D. N. propter hoc tantum adiuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis aperitur et revelatur intelligentia mandatérum, ut sciamus quid appetere et quid vitare debea- mus, non- autem per illam nobis praestari ut quod faciendum cog- noverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus, a. S.; ... quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus et diligere ut fa- ciamus.’”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 104.) 26 ACTUAL GRACE (‘My soul longeth and fainteth for the courts of the Lord’) ; delight (‘ How sweet are thy words to my palate, more than honey to my mouth’);”—-and he adds: “Who can see or tell by what affections God visits and guides the human soul?” , 3. ACTUAL GRACES OF THE SENSITIVE SPHERE. —Though it cannot be determined with certainty of faith, it is highly probable that actual grace in- fluences the sensitive faculties of the soul as well as the intellect and the will. God, who is the first and sole cause of all things, is no doubt able to excite in the human imagination phan- tasms corresponding to the supernatural thoughts pro- duced in the intellect, and to impede or paralyze the re- bellious stirrings of concupiscence which resist the grace of the will,— either by infusing contrary dispositions or by allowing spiritual joy to run over into the appetitus sensitivus. The existence of such graces (which need not necessarily be supernatural except quoad modum et finem) may be inferred with great probability from the fact that man is a compound of body and soul. Aristotle holds that the human mind cannot think with- out the aid of the imagination.?° If this is true, every supernatural thought must be preceded by a correspond- 19 Contra Collator., c. VII, 2: “Trahit timor; principium enim sapientiae timor Domini (Prov. I, 7). Trahit laetitia, quoniam laetatus enim faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel et favum ori meo (Ps. CXVIII, 103). Et quis perspicere aut enarrare possit, per quos affectus sum in his, quae dicta sunt mihi: in domum Domini ibimus (Ps. CXXI, 1). Trahit desiderium, quo- niam concupiscit et deficit anima mea in atria Domini (Ps. LXXXIII, 3). Trahunt delectationes: quam dulcia visitatio Dei animum ducat huma- num?” Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, thes. 11; Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 8. 20De Anima, i, 8: *Avev pavradcuatros ovK eare voeip. DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 27 ing phantasm to excite and sustain it. As for the sen- sitive appetite, it may either assume the form of con- cupiscence and hinder the work of salvation, or aid it by favorable emotions excited supernaturally. St. Augus- tine says that the delectatio victrix has for its object “to impart sweetness to that which gave no pleasure.” 21 St. Paul, who thrice besought the Lord to relieve him of the - sting of his flesh, was told: “ My grace is sufficient for rhea 74 4. THE ILLUMINATING GRACE OF THE MIND AND THE STRENGTHENING GRACE OF THE WILL CONSIDERED AS VITAL AcTS OF THE SouL.—If we examine these graces more closely to deter- mine their physical nature, we find that they are simply vital acts of the intellect and the will, and receive the character of divine “graces” from the fact that they are supernaturally excited in the soul by God. a) The Biblical, Patristic, and conciliar terms cogitatio, suasio, Scientia, cognitio, as well as delectatio, voluptas, desiderium, caritas, bona voluntas, cupiditas, all manifestly point to vital acts of the soul. But even where grace 1s described as vocatio, illuminatio, illustratio, excitatio, pulsatio, inspiratio, or tractio, the reference can only be — if not formaliter, at least virtwaliter —to immanent vital acts of the intellect or will. This is the concurrent teach- ing of SS. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The former says: “God calls [us] by [our] innermost thoughts,” 21De Peccatorum . Meritis et gratia mea.’ For further infor- Remissione, II, 19, 33: “... ut mation on. this point the student suave faciat, quod non delectabat.”’ is referred to Ripalda, De Ente 222 Cor. XII, 9: “ Sufficit tibi _ Supernaturali, disp. 44, sect. 9. 28 ACTUAL GRACE and: ‘“ See how the Father draws [and] by teaching de- lights [us].” 28 The latter quotes the Aristotelian axiom : “ Actus moventis in moto est motus.” *4 If the graces of the intellect and of the will are super- naturally inspired acts of the soul, by what process does the mind of man respond to the impulse of illumination and inspiration? The language employed by the Fathers and councils leaves no doubt that supernatural knowledge manifests itself mainly in judgments. But simple apprehension and ratiocination must also play a part, (1) because these two operations are of the essence of human thought, and the grace of illumination always works ‘through natural agencies; and (2) because some intellectual apprehensions are merely condensed judgments and syllogisms. The graces of the will naturally work through the spiritual emotions or passions, of which there are eleven: love and hatred, joy and sadness, desire and abhorrence, hope and despair, fear and daring, and lastly anger. With the exception of despair (for which there is no place in the business of salvation), all these passions have a practical relation to good and evil and are consequently called “graces” both in Scripture and Tradition. Love (amor) is the fundamental affection of the will, to which all others are reducible, and hence the principal function of grace, in so far as it affects the will, must consist in pro- ducing acts of love.2® The Council of Carthage (A. D. 418) declares that “ both to know what we must do, and to love to do it, is a gift of God.” ?® It would be a mis- 28\In ~ Psalmos,) ~ 102," n,)., 16% 25S.) Dheol.) ma-2ae, qu. 25;att.. 2. “Vocat [Deus] per intimam cog- nitionem.’’— Tract. in TIoa., 26, n. 7: “Videte quomodo trahit Pater, docendo delectat.” 24 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 110, ares 2. 26“. 2. quum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus, et diligere ut faciamus.” (V. supra, P. 25.) DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 29 take, however, to identify this “love” with theological charity, which is “a perfect love of God above all things for His own sake.” 2" Justification begins with super- natural faith, is followed by fear, hope, and contrition, and culminates in charity.?8 St. Augustine sometimes employs the word caritas in connections where it cannot possibly mean theological love.*® This peculiar usage is based on the idea that love of goodness in a certain way attracts man towards God and prepares him for the theological virtue of charity. In studying the writings of St. Augustine, therefore, we must carefully distinguish between caritas in the strict, and caritas in a secondary and derived sense.®° The champions of the falsely so-called Augustinian theory of grace ** disregard this important distinction and erron- eously claim that St. Augustine identifies “ grace”’ with caritas in the sense of theological love; just as if faith, hope, contrition, and the fear of God were not also graces in the true meaning of the term, and could not exist with- out theological charity. b) Not a few theologians, especially of the Thomist school, enlarge the list of actual graces by including therein, besides the supernatural vital acts of the soul, certain extrinsic, non-vital qualities (qualitates fuentes, non vitales) that precede these acts and form their basis. It is impossible, they argue, to elicit vital or immanent 27“ Amor Dei propter se super omnia.” 28V. infra, Part II, Ch. 1. t8Cir, 2. 2°) De Trinitate, VIII, 10: “Quid est dilectio vel caritas, quam tantopere Scriptura divina laudat et praedicat, nisi amor boni? ” — Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag., II, 9, 21: “ Quid est boni cupiditas nisi caritas?’”’— De Gratia Christi, ¢. 21: “ Quasi vero aliud sit bona voluntas quam caritas.” 30 It should also be noted that in Augustine’s writings inspiratio caritatis, as an immediate grace of the will, is not necessarily identical with the infusion of theological love, 31 FE. g. Berti, De Theol. Discipl., AL 7 30 ACTUAL GRACE supernatural acts unless the faculties of the soul have previously been raised to the supernatural order by means of the potentia obedientialis. The gratia elevans, which produces in the soul of the sinner the same effects that the so-called infused habits produce in the soul of the just, is a supernatural power really distinct from its vital effects. In other words, they say, the vital supernatural acts of the soul are preceded and produced by a non- vital grace, which must be conceived as a “ fluent quality.” These “ fluent’ (the opponents of the theory ironically call them “ dead’) qualities are alleged to be real graces.*” Alvarez and others endeavor to give their theory a dog- matic standing by quoting in its support all those passages of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers and councils in which prevenient grace is described as pulsatio, excitatio, vocatio, tractio, tactus, and so forth. The act of knocking or call- ing, they say, is not identical with the act of opening, in fact the former is a grace in a higher sense than the latter, because it is performed by God alone, while the response comes from the soul codperating with God. The theory thus briefly described is both theologically and philosophically untenable. a) Holy Scripture and Tradition nowhere mention any such non-vital entities or qualities—a circumstance which would be inexplicable if it were true, what Cardinal Gotti asserts,*4 that the term “ grace”’ applies primarily and in the strict sense to these qualities, while the vital acts are merely effects. Whenever Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church speak literally, without the use 32 Cfr. Alvarez, De Auz., disp. “ Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis 67,,in. 6. audierit vocem meam et aperuerit 33 Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 74.— mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum.” Cfr. John VI, 44: “Nemo potest 34 Comment. in Summam Theol. venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit SS. Thomae Aquinatis, p. 2, tr. 6, qu. me, traxerit eum.’ Apoc. III, 20: 2), att. Se, DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 31 of metaphors, they invariably apply the term “ grace” to these vital acts themselves and ascribe their supernatural character to an immediate act of God.* In perfect conformity with this teaching St. Augustine explains such metaphorical terms as vocare and tangere in the sense of credere and fides.** God employs no “ fluent qualities ”’ or “non-vital entities ” in the dispensation of His grace, but effects the supernatural elevation of the soul immedi- ately and by Himself.*7 8) The theory under consideration is inadmissible also from the philosophical point of view. A quality does not “flow” or tend to revert to nothingness. On the con- trary, its very nature demands that it remain constant until destroyed by its opposite or by some positive cause. It is impossible to conceive a quality that would of itself revert to nothingness without the intervention of a de- structive cause. Billuart merely beats the air when he says: “ Potest dici qualitas incompleta habens se per modum passions transeuntis.” °8 What would Aristotle have said if he had been told of a thing that was half roiwv and half wécxew, and consequently neither the one nor the other? Actual grace is transitory ; it passes away with the act which it inspires, and consequently may be said to “ flow.” But this very fact proves that it is not a dead quality, but a modus vitalis supernaturalis. In the dis- pensation of His grace, God employs no fluent qualities or non-vital entities, but He Himself is the immediate cause of the supernatural elevation of the human soul and 35V. supra, Nos. 1 and 2. 36 Ad Simplic., I, 2, n. 21: “ Ouis potest credere, nist aliqué vocati- one, h. e. aliqué rerum testificatione tangatur? Quis habet in potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo eius voluntas moveatur ad fidem?” 87 Cfr. Suarez, De Div. Grat., III, 4: “In Conciltis et Patribus nullum vestigium talis gratiae in- venimus, quin potius ipsam inspira- tionem ponunt ut gratiam primam et praeterea indicant immediate in- fundi ab ipso Spiritu Sancto et non mediante aliquaé qualitate.’ 88 De Gratia, diss. 4, art. 2. 32 ACTUAL GRACE its faculties. St. Thomas is perfectly consistent, there- fore, when he defines actual grace as a vital act of the soul.®° 5. PREVENIENT AND COOPERATING GRACE.— The vital acts of the soul are either spontaneous impulses or free acts of the will. Grace may precede free-will or cooperate with it. If it precedes the free determination of the will it is called prevenient; if it accompanies (or coincides with) that determination and merely codperates with the will, it is called cooperating grace. Prevenient grace, regarded as a divine call to penance, is often styled gratia vocans sive excitans, and if it is re- ceived with a willing heart, gratia adiuvans. Both spe- cies are distinctly mentioned in Holy Scripture. Cefr. Eph. V, 14: “Wherefore he saith: Rise thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead: and Christ shall en- lighten thee.” 2 Tim. I, 9: “ Who hath delivered us and called us by his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the times of the 39 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 110, modo adiuvatur homo ex gratuita art. 2: “‘In eo, qui dicitur gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei voluntaiis. Dictum est autem supra (qu. 109, art. 1), quod dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur: uno modo. inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cogno- scendum vel volendum vel agendum; et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animae; actus enim moventis in moto est motus, ut dici- tur Phys. 1, 3; text. 228). Alio Dei voluntate, secundum quod ali- quod habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur , .. et sic donum gratiae qualhitas quaedam est.’—Cfr. Pal- mieri, De Gratia Div. Actuali, thes. 16; Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 23 sqq.; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 220 sqq. The Thomistic doctrine on this point is viewed with favor by several Molinist theologians, e. g., Platel (De Gratia, n. 547) and Gutberlet (Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 25 sq., Mainz 1897). DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE B3 world.” Rom. VIII, 26: “ Likewise the Spirit also help- eth our infirmity.” Rom. VIII, 30: “And whom he predestinated, them he also called. And whom he called, them he also justified. And whom he justified, them he also glorified.” Apoc. III, 20: “ Behold I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear my voice, and open to me the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me.” St. Augustine says: ‘“ Forasmuch as our turning away from God is our own act and deed, and this is [our] depraved will; but that we turn to God, this we cannot do except He rouse and help us, and this is [our] good will, — what have we that we have not received?’’ *° An equivalent division is that into gratia operans and cooperans, respectively — names which are also founded onuscriptures)) Cir.) Phil. (1,12: For) it, is: Godiwho worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will.” Mark XVI, 20: “But they going forth preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.” St. Augustine describes the respective functions of these graces as follows: “He [God] begins His influ- ence by working in us that we may have the will, and He completes it by working with us when we have the will,?/41 A third division of the same grace is that into prae- veniens and subsequens. It is likewise distinctly Scrip- 40 De Peccat. Merit. et Rem., II, 18: “ Quoniam quod a Deo nos cipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens.’-—On certain __ differ- avertimus nostrum est, et haec est voluntas mala; quod vero ad Deum nos convertimus nisi ipso excitante et adiuvante non possumus, et haec est voluntas bona.’’ 41 De Grat. et Lib: Arbitr., c. 17, 33: “Ipse ut velimus, operatur in- ences of opinion on this point be- tween Suarez (De Div. Motione, III, 5) and St. Thomas (Summa Theol.;\1a2ae; qu.) 111;/art.. 2)irsee Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 252 sqq. 34 ACTUAL GRACE tural,** and its two members coincide materially with gratia vocans and adiuvans, as can be seen by comparing the usage of St. Augustine with that of the Tridentine Council. “ God’s mercy,” says the holy Doctor, “ pre- vents |2. e. precedes] the unwilling to make him willing; it follows the willing lest he will in vain.” #® And the Coun- cil of Trent declares that “in adults the beginning of jus- tification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of God, through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His voca- tion, whereby, without any merits existing on their part, they: are called.” * If we conceive a continuous series of supernatural graces, each may be called either prevenient or subse- quent, according as it is regarded either as a cause or as an effect. St. Thomas explains this as follows: “As grace is divided into working and codperating grace, according to its diverse effects, so it may also be divided into prevenient and subsequent grace, according to the meaning attached to the term grace [1. e., either habitual or actual]. The effects which grace works in us are five: (1) It heals the soul; (2) moves it to will that which is good; (3) enables man effica- ciously to perform the good deeds which he wills; (4) helps him to persevere in his good resolves; and (5) assists him in attaining to the state of glory. In so far as it produces the first of these effects, grace is called prevenient in respect of the second; and in so far as it produces the second, it is called subsequent in respect of the first. And as each effect is posterior to one and prior 42 Cfr. Ps, LVIII,: 113 XXII; 6, stificationis exordium in adultis a 43 Enchiridion, c. 32: “Nolen- Dei per Iesum Christum praeve- tem praevenit, ut velit; volentem _ niente gratia sumendum esse, h. e. subsequitur, ne frustra velit.’’ ab eius vocatione, qua nullis eorum 44 Conc, Trident., Sess. VI, cap. existentibus meritis vocantur.” 5: “ Declarat praeterea, ipsius ju- (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.) DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 35 to another, so grace may be called prevenient or subse- quent according as we regard it in its relations to dif- ferent, ettects:”))* Among so many prevenient graces there must be one which is preceded by none other (simpliciter praeven- tens), and this is preéminently the gratia vocans s. excitans. There is a fourth and last division, mentioned by the Council of Trent, which is also based on the relation of grace to free-will. “ Jesus Christ Himself,” says the holy Synod, “continually infuses His virtue into the justified, and this virtue always precedes, accompanies, and fol- lows their good works.” #* The opposition here lies be- tween gratia antecedens, which is a spontaneous move- _ment of the soul, and gratia concomitans, which cooper- ates with free-will after it has given its consent. This terminology may be applied to the good works of sinners and saints alike. For the sinner no less than the just man receives two different kinds of graces — (1) such as pre- cede the free determination of the will and (2) such as accompany his free acts. Thus it can be readily seen that the fundamental divi- 45 Summa Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 111, art. 3: “‘ Sicut gratia dividitur in operantem et cooperantem secundum diversos effectus, ita etiam in prae- venientem et subsequentem, qualiter- cumque gratia accipiatur (1. e. sive habitualis sive actualis). Sunt au- tem quinque effectus gratiae in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur; secundus ut bonum velit; tertius est ut bonum quod vult eficactter operetur; quarius est ut in bono perseveret; quintus est ut ad gloriam perveniat. Et ideo gratia, secundum quod causat in nobis primum effectum, vocatur praeveniens vespectu secundi effec- tus; et prout causat in nobis secun- dum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi effectus. Et sicut unus effectus est posterior uno effectu et prior alio, ita gratia potest dici praeveniens et subsequens secundum eundem effectum respeciu diverso- rum.” 46 Conc. Trideni., Sess. VI, cap. 16: “Iesus Christus in ipsos iusti- ficatos iugiter virtutem influit, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit et comitatur et subse- quitur.”? 36 ACTUAL GRACE sion of actual grace, considered in its relation to free-will, is that into prevenient and cooperating grace. All other divisions are based on a difference of function rather than of nature.*’ a) The existence of prevenient grace (gratia praeveniens s. excitans s. vocans) may be in- ferred from the fact that the process of justifica- tion begins with the illumination of the intellect, which is by nature unfree, 7. e. devoid of the power of choosing between good and evil. That there are also graces which consist in spontane- ous, indeliberate motions of the will,*® is clearly taught by the Council of Trent,*® and evidenced by certain Biblical metaphors. Thus God is de- scribed as knocking at the gate (Apoc. III, 20), as drawing men to Him (John VI, 44), and men are said to harden their hearts against His voice (Ps. MEIV S)s etc.’ Cir iser, XV ilaee si Bamaney. did not hear, nor incline their ear: but hardened their neck, that they might not hear me, and might not receive instruction.” The Catholic tradition is voiced by St. Augus- tine, who says: “The will itself can in no wise be moved, unless it meets with something which 470On the distinction to be sqq.; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. drawn between the various mem- 241 sqq. bers of these pairs, whether it be 48V. supra, Nos. 1 and 4. real or merely logical, theologians 49 Sess. VI, cap. 5 and can. 4, differ. Cfr. Palmieri, De Div. Grat., quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s thes. 18; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Enchiridion, n. 797 and 814. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 17 DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 37 - delights or attracts the mind; but it is not in the power of man to bring this about.” °° St. Pros- per enumerates a long list of spontaneous emo- tions which he calls supernatural graces of the will.?* | Prevenient grace is aptly characterized by the Patristic formula: “ Gratia est in nobis, sed sine nobis,” that is, grace, as a vital act, is in the soul, but as a salutary act it proceeds, not from the free will, but from God. In other words, though the salutary acts of grace derive their vitality from the human will, they are mere actus hominis (O€rnors), not actus humani (Bovdrnos).°2 “ God,” ex- plains St. Augustine, “does many good things in man, which man does not do; but man does none which God does. not cause man to do.”*? And again: “ [God] operates without us, in order that we may become willing ; but when we once will so as to act, He codperates with us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without Him either working that we may will, or cooperating when we will.” ** St. Bernard em- ploys similar language.®® 50 Ad Simblic., I, qu. 2, n. 22: “Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occur- rerit, quod delectet atque invitet animum, moveri nullo modo potest; hoc autem ut occurrat, non est in hominis potestate.’’ 51 Conir. Collator., c. VII, 2: “Et quis perspicere aut enarrare possit, per quos affectus visitatio Dei animum ducat humanum, ut quae fugiebat sequatur, quae oderat dili- gat, quae fastidiebat esuriat, ac su- bité commutatione mirabili quae clausa et fuerant sint aperta, quae onerosa levia, quae amara_ sint dulcia, quae obscura sint Iucida?’’ 52 Cfr. M, Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq., Dublin 1909. 538 Contra Duas Epistolas Pela- gian., II, 9, 21: “ Multa Deus facit in homine bona, quae non facit homo; nulla vero facit homo, quae non facit Deus, ut faciat homo.’ 54 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr., c. 17, n. 33: “Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur; quum autem volumus et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobis- cum cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel operante ut velimus, vel cooperante quum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus.” 55 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr., ¢. 14: ‘Si ergo Deus tria haec, h. e. 38 ACTUAL GRACE b) Cooperating grace (gratia cooperans s. adiuvans s. subsequens) differs from prevenient grace in this, that it supposes a deliberate act of consent on the part of the will (fovAqos, not Gednors), St. Gregory the Great tersely explains the distinction as follows: “The divine goodness first effects something in us without our codpera- tion [gratia praeveniens|, and then, as the will freely consents, codperates with us in performing the good which we desire [ gratia cooperans].” °° That such free and consequently meritorious acts are attributable to grace is emphasized by the Tridentine Council: “So great is the bounty [of God] towards all men that He will have the things which are His own gifts to be their merits.” 57 Such free salutary acts are not only graces in the general sense, but real actual graces, in as far as they produce other salutary acts, and their exist- ence is as certain as the fact that many men freely bonum cogitare, velle, perficere, opus, etsi non ex nobis, non iam operatur in nobis (2 Cor. III, 5; Phil. II, 13), primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos facit. Siquidem immittendo bonam cogitationem, nos praevenit; immutando etiam malam voluntatem sibt per consensum iungit; ministran- do et consensui facultatem foris per aperium opus nostrum internus opi- fex innotescit. Sane ipsi nos prae- venire nequaquam possumus. Qui autem bonum neminem invenit, neminem salvat, quem non praevenit. A Deo ergo sine dubio nostrae fit salutis exordium, nec per nos utique nec nobiscum. Verum consensus et tamen sine nobis.’—On the mis- interpretation of this text by the Jansenists, see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, pp. 84 sq. . 56 Moral., XVI, 10: “ Superna pietas prius agit in nobis aliquid sine nobis [gratia praeveniens], ut subsequente libero arbitrio bonum, quod appetimus, agat nobiscum [gratia cooperans].”’ 57 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, c. 16: Tanta est [Dei] erga homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita quae sunt itpsius dona,.’? (Denzin- ger-Bannwart, n. 810.) ee DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 30 follow the call of grace, work out their salvation, and attain to the beatific vision. It is only in this way, in fact, that Heaven is peopled with Saints, a) St. Augustine embodies all these considerations in the following passage: “It is certain that we keep the commandments when we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we may will so much as is sufficient to make us act in willing. It is certain that we will whenever we like, but it is He who makes us will what is good, of whom it is said (Prov. VIII, 35): ‘The will is prepared by the Lord,’ and of whom it is said (Ps, XXXVI, 32): ‘The steps of a [good] man are ordered by the Lord, and his way doth He will,’ and of whom it is said (Phil. II, 13): ‘It is God who worketh in you, even to will.’ It is certain that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He who causes us to act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers _to our will, who has said (Ezech. XXXVI, 27): ‘I will cause you to walk in my commandments, and to keep my judgments, and do them.’ When He says: ‘I will cause you ... to do them,’ what else does He say in fact than (Ezech. XI, 19): ‘I will take away the stony heart out of their flesh,’ from which used to rise your inability to act, and (Ezech. XXXVI, 26): ‘I will give you a heart of flesh,’ in order that you may act.” 5° 58 De Grat. et Lib. Arbiir., c. 16, 32: ““ Certum enim est nos mandata servare, si volumus; sed quia prae- paratur voluntas a Domino, ab illo de quo dictum est (Ps. XXXVI, 32): ‘A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur et viam eius volet’; de quo. dictum est (Phil. II, 13): petendum est, ut tantum velimus ‘ Deus est qui operatur in nobis et quantum sufficit, ut volendo fa- velle.’ Certum est nos facere quum ciamus. Certum est nos velle, facimus; sed ille facit ut faciamus, quum volumus; sed ille facit ut velt- mus bonum, de quo dictum est quod paulo ante posui (Prov. VIII, 35): ‘ Praeparatur voluntas a Domino’; praebendo vires efficacissimas volun- tatt, qui dixit (Ezech. XXXVI, 27): “Faciam ut in tustificationibus meis ambuletis et iudicia mea observetis 40 ACTUAL GRACE 8) The manner in which grace and free-will codperate is a profound philosophical and theological problem. A salutary act derives its supernatural character from God, its vitality from the human will. How do these two factors conjointly produce one and the same act? The unity of the act would be destroyed if God ard the free-will of man in each case performed, either two separate acts, or each half of the same act. To preserve the unity of a supernatural act two conditions are required: (1) the divine power of grace must be transformed into the vital strength of the will and (2) the created will, which by its own power can perform at most a naturally good act, must be equipped with the supernatural power of grace. These conditions are met (a) by the supernatural elevation of the will (elevatio externa), and (b) by the supernatural concur- rence of God (concursus supernaturalis ad actum secun- dum). The supernatural elevation of the will is accomp- lished in this wise: God, by employing the illuminating and strengthening grace, works on the potentia obedien- tialis, and thus raises the will above its purely natural powers and constitutes it a supernatural faculty in actu primo for the free performance of a salutary act. The divine concursus supervenes to enable the will to perform the actus secundus or salutary act proper. This special divine concurrence, in contradistinction to the natural con- cursus whereby God supports the created universe,®® is a strictly supernatural and gratuitous gift. Consequently, God and the human will jointly perform one and the et faciatis.’ Quum dicit: ‘ Faciam ut the subject of this paragraph see faciatis, quid aliud dicit nisi (Ezech. Palmieri, of. cit., thes, 10, and Chr. XI, 19): ‘Auferam a vobis cor Pesch, op. cit., pp. 14 sqq. lapideum,’ unde non faciebatis, 59 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- (Ezech. XXXVI, 26), et ‘dabo vobis thor of Nature and the Supernat- cor carneum,’ unde facitis.’—On ural, pp. 67 sqq.- DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE AI same salutary act — God as the principal, the will as the instrumental cause.®° 6. Erricacious GRACE AND MrErety SuFFI- CIENT GrRAcE—By efficacious grace (gratia eficax) we understand that divine assistance which with infallible certainty includes the free salutary act. Whether the certainty of its opera- tion results from the physical nature of this par- ticular grace, or from God’s infallible foreknowl- edge (scientia media), is a question in dispute be- tween Thomists and Molinists.** Merely sufficient grace (gratia mere sufficiens ) is that divine assistance whereby God communi- cates to the human will full power to perform a salutary act (posse) but not the action itself (agere). The division of grace into efficacious and merely sufficient is not identical with that into prevenient and cooperating. Codperating grace does not ex wt notionis include with infallible certainty the salutary act. It may indeed be ~ efficacious, but in matter of fact frequently fails to attain its object because the will offers resist- ance. eA, a) The existence of efficacious graces is as cer- tain as that there is a Heaven filled with Saints. 60 Cfr. Palmieri, De Div. Grat. Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., Actual; thes. 17, and Chr. Pesch, pp. 28 sqq. 61 V. infra, Ch. III, Sect. 2. 42 ACTUAL GRACE God would be neither omnipotent nor infinitely wise if all His graces were frustrated by the free-will of man. St. Augustine repeatedly expresses his belief in the ex- istence of efficacious graces. Thus he writes in his treatise on Grace and Free-Will: “It is certain that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He [God] who causes us to act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers to the will.’ ®? And in another treatise: ‘‘ [Adam] had received the ability (posse) if he would [gratia sufficiens], but he had not the will to exercise that: ability [gratia eficax|; for if he had possessed that will, he would have perseverec, "2 b) Before demonstrating the existence of suf- ficient grace it is necessary, in view of certain heretical errors, carefully to define the term. a) Actual grace may be regarded either in its intrinsic energy or power (wvirtus, potestas agendi) or in its extrinsic efficacy (efficientia, efficacitas). All graces are efficacious consid- ered in their intrinsic energy, because all confer the physical and moral power necessary to per- form the salutary act for the sake of which they are bestowed. From this point of view, therefore, and im actu primo, there is no real but a purely logical distinction between efficacious and merely sufficient grace. If we look to the final result, 62De Grat. et Lib. Arbiir., c. “ Acceperat posse, si vellet [gratia 16, 32: “Certum est nos facere, sufficiens]; sed non habuit velle quum facimus; sed ille facit ut [gratia efficax] quod posset, nam si faciamus, praebendo vires efficacis- habuisset, perseverasset.” Cir. Pal- simas voluntati.” mieri, De Div. Grat. Actuali, thes. 63 De Corrept. et Grat., c 11: wT DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 43 however, we find that this differs according as the will either freely codperates with erace or refuses its codperation. If the will cooperates, grace becomes truly efficacious; if the will resists, grace remains “merely sufficient.’ In other words, merely sufficient grace confers full power to act, but is rendered ineffective by the resistance of the will. The inefficacy of merely sufficient grace, therefore, is owing to the resistance of the will and not to any lack of intrinsic power. This is a truth to which all Catholic systems of grace must conform, Merely sufficient grace may be subdivided into gratia proxime sufficiens and gratia remote suficiens. Proximately sufficient grace (also called gratia opera- tionis) confers upon the will full power to act forth- with, while remotely sufficient grace (also termed gratia orationis) confers only the grace of prayer, which in its turn brings down full power to perform other salutary acts. The gratia orationis plays a most important role in the divine economy of grace. God has not obliged Himself to give man immediately all the graces he needs. It is His will, in many instances, as when we are besieged by temptations, that we petition Him for further assistance. “God does not enjoin impossibilities,” says St. Augus- tine, “but in His injunctions He counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do.” & ; 64De Nat. et Grat., 43: “Nam possis, et petere quod non possis, Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed et adiuvat ut possis.” tubendo monet, et facere quod 44 ACTUAL GRACE Hence, though grace may sometimes remain ineffective (gratia ineficax = gratia vere et mere sufficiens), it is never insufficient (insufficiens), that is to say, never too weak to accomplish its purpose. Calvinism and Jansenism, while retaining the name, have eliminated sufficient grace from their doctrinal systems. Jansenius (-+ 1638) admits a kind of “ sufficient grace,” which he calls gratia parva, but it is really insufficient be- cause no action can result from it unless it is supple- mented by another and more powerful grace. ‘This heretic denounced sufficient grace in the Catholic sense as a monstrous conception and a means of peopling hell with reprobates.°* Some of his followers even went so far as to assert that “in our present state sufficient grace is pernicious rather than useful to us, and we have reason to pray: 8) Itis an article of faith that there is a merely sufficient grace and that it is truly sufficient even when frustrated by the resistance of the will. The last-mentioned point is emphasized by the Second Council. of ‘Orange (A.D. 529): “This also we believe, according to the Catholic 65 De Gratia Christi, IV, 10: — serviens.”’ . tia inefficax, ex qua operatio 3) (De Grat. Christi, III, 6é ° From sufficient grace, O Lord, deliver us!” °" ne possit quidem sequi, nisi etius inefficacia per aliam suppleatur.’”’ 66 “ Illud a recentioribus prolatum gratiae sufficientis genus, quo adiu- vante nullum unquam opus factum est aut fiet unquam, videtur mon- strum quoddam singulare gratiae, solummodo peccatis faciendis ma- iorique damnationi accersendae 67 “ Gratia sufficiens statui nostro non tam utilis quam perniciosa est, sic ut proinde merito possimus petere: ‘A gratia sufficienti libera nos, Domine.” This assertion was condemned by Pope Alexander VIII in 1690. It is convincingly refuted by Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 354 sqq. DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 45 faith, that all baptized persons, through the grace received in Baptism, and with the help and co- operation of Christ, are able and in duty bound, if they will faithfully do their share, to comply with all the conditions necessary for salvation.” °8 The existence of sufficient grace was formally de- fined by the Council of Trent as follows: “If any one saith that man’s free-will, moved and excited by God, . . . no wise codperates towards dispos- ing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of justification ; that it cannot refuse its consent if it would, . . . let him be anathema.” °% This dogma can be convincingly demonstrated both from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. (1) God Himself complains through the mouth of the prophet Isaias: “What is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to it? Was it that I looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it hath brought forth wild grapes?’ This complaint clearly applies to the Jews. Yahweh did for the Jewish nation what- ever it behooved Him to do lavishly (gratia vere sufficiens), but His kindness was unrequited 68“ Hoc etiam secundum fidem catholicam credimus, quod accepta per baptismum gratia omnes bap- tizati Christo auxiliante et cooperan- te, quae ad salutem pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere.’ (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 200.) ; 69'Sess. (VI, can, 42 Sj quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a@ Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari Deo, ... neque posse dis- sentire, si velit, anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.) T0Is,- VV, 4: “Quid est, quod debui ultra facere vineae meae et non feci ei? An quod exspectavi, ut faceret uvas et fecit labruscas? ” 46 ACTUAL GRACE (gratia mere sufficiens). In the Book of Prov- erbs He addresses the sinner in these terms: “TI called, and you refused: I stretched out my hand, and there was none that regarded.” ™ What does this signify if not the complete suf- ficiency of grace? The proffered grace remained inefficacious simply because the sinner rejected it of his own free will. Upbraiding the wicked cities of Corozain and Bethsaida, our Lord exclaims: “If in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.” 7 The omniscient God-man here asserts the exist- ence of graces which remained inefficacious in Corozain and Bethsaida, though had they been given to the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, they would have proved effective. The conclusion evi- dently is: these graces remained ineffective, not because they were unequal to the purpose for which they were conferred, but simply and solely because they were rejected by those whom God in- tended to benefit.”® (2) Though they did not employ the name, the Fathers were thoroughly familiar with the notion of sufficient grace. 71 Prov. I, 24: “ Vocavi et renu- @3 Cire Matth, XXIII) 3730 vActs istis, extendi manum meam et non Vile sts ereaConte..c13 3) 2GCor avi, fuit qui adspiceret.” i; Cre ThessyVeero: 72 Matth. XI, 21. DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 47 Thus St. Irenaeus comments on our Lord’s lamentation over the fate of the Holy City: “When He says: (Matth. XXIII, 37): ‘How often would I have gath-_ ered together thy children, . . . and thou wouldest not,’ He manifests the ancient liberty of man, because God hath made him free from the beginning. .. . For God does not employ force, but always has a good inten- tion. And for this reason He gives good counsel to all. . .. And those who do it [gratia efficaxr] will receive glory and honor, because they have done good, though they were free not to do it; but those who do not do good will experience the just judgment of God, because they have not done good [gratia inefficax], though they were able to do it [gratia vere et mere sufficiens].” 7 St. Augustine is in perfect agreement with ecclesiastical tra- dition, and the Jansenists had no right whatever to claim him for their teaching. “The grace of God,” he ex- pressly says in one place, “assists the will of men. If in any case men are not assisted by it, the reason lies with themselves, not God.” 7® And again: “No one is guilty because he has not received ; but he who does not do what he ought to do, is truly guilty. It is his duty to act if he has received a free will and amply sufficient power to Bettie, a4\Contra’ Haer., IV;) 37,- 43 “Tilud autem quod dicit (Matth. AXIII, 37): Quoties volui colligere lud non operantur, iudicium iustum excipient Dei, quoniam non sunt operati bonum [gratia inefficax], filios tuos, et noluisti, veterem liber- tatem hominis manifestat, quia li- berum eum fecit Deus ab initio, ... Vis enim a Deo non fit, sed bona sententia adest illi semper. Et prop- ter hoc consilium quidem bonum dat omnibus. ... Et qui operantur quidem illud [gratia efficax], gloriam et honorem percipient, quoniam ope- ratt sunt bonum, quum possint now operari ilud; hi autem, qui il- quum possint operari illud [gratia vere et mere. sufficiens].” 75“ Gratia- Det... quae ho- minum adiuvat voluntates: qua ut non adiuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo.’ De Peccat. Mer. et Rem., II, 17. 76 De Lib. Arbitr., III, 16: “ Ex eo quod non accepit, nullus reus est; ex eo autem quod non facit quod debet, iuste reus est. Debet 48 ACTUAL GRACE READINGS: — St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, ta 2ae, qu. I10, art. 1; qu. III, art. 1-5—J. Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861.—M. Glossner, Lehre des hl. Thomas vom Wesen der Gnade, Mainz 1871.— Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 1-16, Gulpen 1885.—Oswald, Die Lehre von der Heiligung, 3rd ed., § 1-3, Paderborn 1885.—S. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, disp. 1, sect. 2; disp. 3, sect. 1-5, Freiburg 1901 Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 3 sqq., Mainz 1897.— B. J. Otten, S. J.. A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. Il, St. Louis 1918, pp. 234 sqaq. autem [facere], si accepit et volun- tatem liberam et sufficientissimam facultatem.”?” On the Jansenist dis- tortions of St. Augustine’s teaching see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 48. The doctrine of the Greek Fathers is thoroughly re- hearsed by Isaac Habert, Theol.’ Patr. Graec., II, 6 sq. CRAP TE Re EL THE ‘PROPERTIES’ OF ACTUAL GRACE Actual grace has three essential properties: (1) necessity, (2) gratuity, and (3) universality. The most important of these is necessity. 49 SECTION x THE NECESSITY. OF ACTUAL GRACE In treating of the necessity of actual grace we must avoid two extremes. ‘The first is that mere nature is absolutely incapable of doing any thing good. This error was held by the early Protes- tants and the followers of Baius and Jansenius. The second is that nature is able to perform su- pernatural acts by its own power. This was taught by the Pelagians and Semipelagians. Between these two extremes Catholic theology keeps the golden mean. It defends the capacity of human nature against Protestants and Jansen- ists, and upholds its incapacity and impotence against Pelagians and Semipelagians. Thus our present Section naturally falls into three Articles. ARTICLE 2 THE CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE WITHOUT GRACE The capacity of nature in its own domain may be considered with regard either to the intellect or to the will. 50 CAPACITY OF, MERE NATURE 51 Thesis I: Man is capable by the natural power of his intellect to arrive at a knowledge of God from a consideration of the physical universe. This proposition embodies an article of faith defined by the Vatican Council: “If any one shall say that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason through created things, let him be anathema.” ? For a formal demonstration of this truth we must refer the reader to our treatise on God: His Knowabthity, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 17 sqq. The argument there given may be supplemented by the following considerations: 1. The Vatican Council vindicates the native power of the human intellect when it says: “The Catholic Church, with one consent, has ever held and does hold, that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object: in principle, because our knowl- edge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known.”? This teaching, which the 1 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Revel., can. 1: “St quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae fac- ta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, anathema sit.’’ ; 2Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 4: “Hoc quoque perpetuus Ecclesiae catholicae consensus tenuit et tenet, duplicem esse ordinem cognitionis, non solum principio, sed obiecto etiam distinctum: principio quidem, quia in altero naturali ratione et altero fide divin& cognoscimus; ob- iecto autem, quia praeter ea, ad quae naturalis ratio pertingere potest, credenda nobis proponuntur mysteria SE ORPOR THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE In treating of the necessity of actual grace we must avoid two extremes. The first is that mere nature is absolutely incapable of doing any thing good. This error was held by the early Protes- tants and the followers of Baius and Jansenius. The second is that nature is able to perform su- pernatural acts by its own power. This was taught by the Pelagians and Semipelagians. Between these two extremes Catholic theology keeps the golden mean. It defends the capacity of human nature against Protestants and Jansen- ists, and upholds its incapacity and impotence against Pelagians and Semipelagians. Thus our present Section naturally falls into three Articles. ARTICLE I THE CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE WITHOUT GRACE The capacity of nature in its own domain may be considered with regard either to the intellect or to the will. 50 GAPACITY -OF MERE. NATURE 51 Thesis I: Man is capable by the natural power of his intellect to arrive at a knowledge of God from a consideration of the physical universe. This proposition embodies an article of faith defined by the Vatican Council: “If any one shall say that the one true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason through created things, let him be anathema.” ! For a formal demonstration of this truth we must refer the reader to our treatise on God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 17 sqq. The argument there given may be supplemented by the following considerations: 1. The Vatican Council vindicates the native power of the human intellect when it says: ‘The Catholic Church, with one consent, has ever held and does hold, that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object: in principle, because our knowl- edge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known.”? This teaching, which the 1 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Revel., can. 1: “Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae fac- ta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, anathema sit.’ : 2Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 4: “Hoc quoque perpetuus Ecclesiae catholicae consensus tenuit et tenet, duplicem esse ordinem cognitionis, non solum principio, sed obiecto etiam distinctum: principio quidem, quia in altero naturali ratione et altero fide divin@ cognoscimus; ob- wecto autem, quia praeter ea, ad quae naturalis ratio pertingere potest, credenda nobis proponuntur mysteria 52 ACTUAL GRACE Church had repeatedly emphasized on previous occasions against the scepticism of Nicholas de Ultricuria,? the rationalistic philosophy of Pomponazzi, the “log-stick- and-stone ” theory * of Martin Luther, the exaggerations of the Jansenists, and the vagaries of the Traditionalists,® is based on Revelation as well as on sound reason. Holy Scripture clearly teaches that we can gain a certain knowledge of God from a consideration of the created universe. Reason tells us that a creature endowed with intelligence must be capable of acquiring natural knowl- edge, and that supernatural faith is based on certain praeambula, which are nothing else than philosoph- ical and historical truths.? ‘The existence of God and other like truths,” says St. Thomas, “are not articles of faith, but preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection something that can be perfected.” ® Luther de- nounced reason as the most dangerous thing on earth, be- cause “all its. discussions and conclusions are as certainly false and erroneous as there is a God in Heaven.” ® The in Deo abscondita, quae, nisi revelata 4“ Klotz-, Stock- und Steintheo- divinitus, innotescere non possunt.? rie.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1795.) 3 Nicholas d’Autricourt, a master in the University of Paris, in 1348, was compelled by the Sorbonne and the Apostolic See to retract a num- ber of propositions taken from his writings which were infected with scepticism. These propositions, most of which had _ been as heretical, and some as merely false, may be found in Natalis Alexander, Hist. Eccles., ed. Bing., XV, 195, and also, with some ex- planatory remarks, in Denifle-Chate- — lain, Chartularium Univ. Paris., II, 1, Paris 1891. censured | 5 On Traditionalism, see Pohle- Preuss, God: His Kuowability, Es- sence, and Attributes, pp. 44 saq., 2nd ed., St. Louis 1914. 6 Wisd. XIII, 1 sqq.; Rom. I, 20 sq.; Rom. II, 14 sq. Cfr. Pohle- Preuss, op. cit., pp. 17 sqq. 7 Ibid., pp. 38 sqq. 8 Summa Theol., ta, qu. 2, art. 2,ad 1: “ Deum esse et alia huius- modi... non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos; sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem na- turalem, sicut gratia naturam et per- fectio perfectibile.’’ 9 Luther’s Werke, XII, 400, Halle 1742: ed. Walch, * Alles, was VCAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 53 Church teaches, in accordance with sound philosophy and experience, that the original powers of human nature, es- pecially free-will, though greatly weakened, have not been’ destroyed by original sin.1? The Scholastics, it is true, reckoned ignorance among the four “ wounds of nature ” inflicted by original sin.* But this teaching must be re- garded in the light in which the Church condemned Ques- nel’s proposition that “ All natural knowledge of God, even that found in pagan philosophers, can come from nowhere else than God, and without grace produces nothing but presumption, vanity, and opposition against God Himself, instead of adoration, gratitude, and love.” #2. The Tradi- tionalist contention that the intrinsic weakness of the hu- man intellect can be cured only by a primitive revelation handed down through the instrumentality of speech and instruction, or by a special interior illumination, involves the false assumption that there can be a cognitive fac- ulty incapable of knowledge,— which would ultimately lead to a denial of the essential distinction between nature and the supernatural, because it represents exterior reve- lation or interior grace as something positively due to fallen nature? Following the lead of .St. Thomas," Catholic apologists, while maintaining the necessity of a sie Ortert und schleusst, so gewisslich falsch und irrig ist, als Gott lebt.’? 10Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 1 and canon 5. 11 On the wulnera naturae cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 298 sqq., St. Louis 1912. Already St: Augustine observed: “ Ad miseriam iustae damnationis per- tinet ignorantia et difficultas, quam patitur homo ab exordio nativitatis suae, nec ab isto malo nisi Dei gra- iG liberatur.” (Retract., I, 9.) 12 Propos. 41: “ Omnis cognitio Dei etiam naturalis, etiam in phi- losophis ethnicis, non potest venire nist a Deo; et sine gratia non pro- ducit nist praesumptionem, vanitatem et oppositionem ad ipsum Deum loco affectuum adorationis, gratitudinis et amoris.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, nN. 1391.) 13 On the debitum naturae cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 184 sq. 14 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 4. 54 ACTUAL GRACE supernatural revelation even with regard to the truths of natural religion and ethics, base their argument not on the alleged physical incapacity of reason to ascertain these truths, but on the moral impossibility (7. e. insuperable difficulty) of finding them unaided. “ It is to be ascribed to this divine Revelation,” says the Vatican Council, “ that such truths among things divine as are not of themselves beyond human reason, can, even in the present state of mankind, be known by every one with facility and firm assurance, and without admixture of error.’’*® In con- formity with the teaching of Revelation and Tradition, the Church has always sharply distinguished between mioris and yvréous,— faith and knowledge, revelation and philosophy,— assigning to reason the double réle of an indispensable forerunner and a docile handmaid of faith. Far from antagonizing reason, as charged by her enemies, the Church has on the contrary always valiantly cham- pioned its rights against Scepticism, Positivism, Criticism, Traditionalism, Rationalism, Pantheism, and Modernism.2® 2. As regards those purely natural truths that consti- tute the domain of science and art, Catholic divines are practically unanimous * in holding that, though man pos- sesses the physical ability of knowing every single one of these truths, even the most highly gifted cannot master them all. Cardinal Mezzofanti had acquired a knowl- edge of many languages,'® and undoubtedly was capable 15 Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, De O, Willmann, Geschichte des Idea- Revel., cap, 2: “Ut ea, quae in lismus, Vol. III, 2nd ed., pp. 811 rebus divinis humanae rationi per sqq., Braunschweig 1908; Bellar- se impervia non sunt, in praesenti mine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, quoque generis humani conditione V, 1 sqq. ab omnibus expedite, firma certitu- dine et nullo admixto errore co- gnosci possint.” 16 Cfr. Chastel, S. J., De la Valeur de la Raison Humaine, Paris 1854; 17 The only dissenting voice is that of Cardinal Cajetan. 18 Mezzofanti spoke perfectly thirty-eight languages, thirty others less perfectly, and was more or less CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 55 of learning many more; yet without a special grace he could not have learned all the languages spoken on earth, though their number is by no means infinite. The science of mathematics, which embraces but a limited field of knowledge, comprises an indefinite number of propositions and problems which even the greatest genius can not master. Add to these impediments the shortness of hu- man life, the limitations of the intellect, the multitude and intricacy of scientific methods, the inaccessibility of many objects which are in themselves knowable, (e. g. the interior of the earth, the stellar universe) — and you have a host of limitations which make it physically impossible for the mind of man to encompass the realm of natural truths.?® Thesis II: Fallen man, whether pagan or sinner, is able to perform some naturally good works without the aid of grace. This thesis may be technically qualified as pro- positio certa. Proof. A man performing moral acts may be either in a state of unbelief, or of mortal sin, or of sanctifying grace. The question here at issue is chiefly whether all the works of pagans, that is all acts done without grace of any kind, are morally bad, or whether any purely natural works may be good despite the absence of grace. Baius and Jan- familiar with fifty dialects. Cfr. U. Pohle-Preuss, Christology, pp. 258 Benigni in the Catholic Encyclope- sqq., St. Louis 1913. Cfr. also St. dia, Vol. X,:p. 271. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 19 On the question whether grace 109, art. 1, and Palmieri, De Gratia can enable a man™o acquire an un- Divina Actuali, thes, 19. limited, universal knowledge, ~see 56 ACTUAL GRACE senius affirmed this; nay more, they asserted that no man can perform good works unless he is in the state of grace and inspired by a perfect love of God (caritas). If this were true, all the works of pagans and of such Christians as have lost the faith, would be so many sins. But it is not true. The genuine teaching of the Church may © be gathered from her official condemnation of the twenty-fifth, the twenty-sixth, and the thirty- seventh propositions of Baius. These proposi- tions run as follows: “Without the aid of God’s grace free-will hath power only to sin;’2> “To admit that there is such a thing as a natural good, 1. e. one which originates solely in the pow- ers of nature, is to share the error of Pelaouiie as “All the actions of unbelievers are sins and the virtues of philosophers vices.” 2 To these we may add the proposition condemned by Pope Alexander VIII, that “The unbeliever necessarily sins in whatever he does.” 28 I. Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, St. Au- gustine included, admit the possibility of per- forming naturally good, though unmeritorious, 20 Prop. Baii Damn., 27: “ Li- 22 Prop. Baii Damn., 25: “ Omnia berum arbitrium sine gratiae Det opera infidelium sunt peccata et adiutorio nonnisi ad peccandum philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia.”? valet,’’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 1025.) 1027.) 23 Prop. Damn. ab Alex. VIII: 21 Prop. Baii Damn., 37: “Cum “ Necesse est infidelem in omni Pelagio sentit, qui boni aliquid opere peccare.” (Denzinger-Bann- naturalis, 7. @. quod ex naturae solis wart, n. 1298.) , viribus ortum ducit, agnoscit.? (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1037.) CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 57 works (opera steriliter bona) in the state of un- belief; and their teaching is in perfect conformity with right reason. | a) Our Divine Lord Himself says:*4 “If you love them that love you, what reward ** shall you have? Do not even the publicans this? And if you salute ** your brethren only, what do you more? Do not also the heath- ens *’ this?’ The meaning plainly is: To salute one’s neighbor is an act of charity, a naturally good deed, com- mon even among the heathens, and one which, not being done from a supernatural motive, deserves no supernatural reward. But this does not by any means imply that to salute one’s neighbor is sinful. St. Paul ?* says: “ For when the gentiles,2° who have not the law,®° do by nature * those things that are of the law ; these having not the law are a law to themselves: who shew the work of the law written in their hearts.” By “ gentiles ” the Apostle evidently means genuine heath- ens, not converts from paganism to Christianity,®? and hence the meaning of the passage is that the heathens who know the natural law embodied in the Decalogue only as a postulate of reason, are by nature ** able to “ do those things that are of the law,” ** 7. e. observe at least ‘some of its precepts. That St. Paul did not think the gentiles capable of observing the whole law without the aid of grace appears from his denunciation of their folly, a little further up in the same Epistle: “ Because that, 24 Matth. V, 46 sq. 32 It is not our business to prove 25 Mercedem, poor. this here; see the exegetical com- 26 Salutaveritis, domdonode. mentaries on this text, e. g., Cor- 27 Ethnict, of éOvixol. nely, Comment. in Epist. ad 28 Rom. II, 14. sqq. Romanos, pp. 140 sqq. 29 Gentes, €Ovn. 83 Naturaliter, pices 30 That is, the Mosaic law. 84“ Quae legis sunt, faciunt.” 31 Naturahier, dice 58 ACTUAL GRACE when they knew God, they have not glorified him as God, or given thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened, etc.,” 5 and also from the hypothetic form of Rom. II, 14 in the original Greek text: éow — St quando gentes, . . . quae legis sunt, faciunt.” 34 In Rom. XIV, 23: “ For all that is not faith is sin,” 3” a text often quoted against our thesis, “ faith’ does not mean the theological habit of faith, but ‘“ conscience,” * as the context clearly shows.®® \ + NY Gaya ed Orav yap €Ovy . . . TH TOU VOmMOV ToI- b) The teaching of the Fathers is in substan- tial harmony with Sacred Scripture. a) Thus St. Jerome, speaking of the reward which Yahweh gave to Nabuchodonosor for his services against Tyre,*® says: ‘The fact that Nabuchodonosor was rewarded for a good work shows that even the gentiles in the judgment of God are not passed over without a reward when they have performed a good deed.” 4! In his commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians the same holy Doctor observes: ‘Many who are without the faith and have not the Gospel of Christ, yet perform prudent and holy actions, 35 Rom. I, 21 sqq. 36 For other germane texts see Ezech. XXIX, 18 sqq.; Rom. I, 21, me may d€ 6 ovK éx TicTews, dpmap- TLA €OTLD. 38 riotis = ouveldyors. 39 Cfr. also 1 Cor. VIII, 10 sqq. For a fuller explanation see Schee- ben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 954 sqq. 40 Ezech. XXIX, 20: “And for the service that he hath done me against it [the city of Tyre], I have given him the land of Egypt, be- cause he hath labored for me, saith the Lord God.” 41 In Ezech., XXIX, 20: ‘Ex eo quod Nabuchodonosor accepit mer- cedem boni operis, intelligimus etiam ethnicos, si quid boni fecerint, non absque mercede Dei iudicio prae- teriri.”’ a) CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 59 e. g. by obeying their parents, succoring the needy, not oppressing their neighbors, not taking away the possessions of others.” 4? 3 B) The teaching of St. Augustine offers some difficulties. There can be no doubt that. this Father freely admitted that pagans and infidels can perform naturally good works without faith and grace. Thus he says there is no man so wicked that some good cannot be found in him.*® He extols the moderation of Polemo‘** and the purity of Alypius, who were both pagans.?° He admires the civic virtues of the ancient Romans,** etc. Holding such views, how could Augustine write: “Neither doth free-will avail for anything except sin, if the way of truth is hidden.” #7 And what did his disciple Prosper mean when he said: ‘The whole life of unbeliey- ers is a sin, and nothing is good without the high- est good. For wherever there is no recognition of the supreme and immutable truth, there can 42 In Gal., I, 15: “ Multi absque fide et evangelio Christi vel sapienter faciunt aliquid vel sancte, ut paren- tibus obsequantur, ut inopit manum porrigant, non opprimant VICINOS, non aliena diripant.’’ 43De Spiritu et Litera, c 28: “Sicut enim non impediunt a vita aeterna iustum quaedam peccata venialia, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur, sic ad salutem aeternam nihil prosunt impio aliqua bona opera, sine quibus difficillime vita cuiuslibet pessimi hominis invenitur.?? 44 Ep., 144, 2. 45 Confess., VI, 10. 46 Ep., 138, c. 3: “Deus enim sie ostendit in opulentissimo et prae- claro imperio Romanorum, quantum valerent civiles etiam sine vera re- ligione virtutes, ut intelligeretur hac addita fiert homines cives alterius civitatis, cuius rex veritas, cuius lex caritas, cuius modus aeternitas,” 47 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 3, n. 5: ° * Neque liberum arbitrium quidquam nist ad peccandum valet, si Jateat veritatis via.’ 60 ACTUAL GRACE be no genuine virtue, even if the moral standard be of the highest.’ *° | To understand these and similar passages rightly and to explain at the same time how it was possible for Baius and Jansenius to bolster their heretical systems with quotations from the writ- ings of St. Augustine and his disciples, it 1s neces- sary to observe that the quondam rhetorician and Platonic idealist of Hippo delights in applying to the genus the designation which belongs to its highest species, and vice versa.*® Thus, in speaking of liberty, he often means the perfect liberty enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise; °° in using the term “children of God” he designates those who persevere in righteousness;°* and in employing the phrase “a good work’ he means one supernaturally meritorious. Or, vice versa, he designates the slightest good impulse of the will as “caritas,’ as it were by anticipation, and brands every unmeritorious work (opus informe s. sterile) as false virtue (falsa virtus), nay sin (peccatum). To interpret St. Augustine cor- rectly, therefore, allowance must be made for his peculiar idealism and a careful distinction drawn 48 Sent. ex August. n. 106: Cyprian (Ep., 93, ¢. 10, n. 39): “Omnis vita infidelium peccatum ‘‘ Habet quandam propriam faciem, est et nihil est bonum sine summo qua possit agnosci,” applies in an bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio sum- even truer sense to his own writ- mae et incommutabilis veritatis, falsa ings. virtus est etiam in optimis moribus.” 50 Cfr. Enchirid., c. 30. 49 What Augustine himself ob- 51 Cfr. De Correptione et Gratia, serves of the literary style of St. c. 9, n. 20 sqq. | q : CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 61 between the real and the metaphorical sense of the terms which he employs. Baius neglected this precaution and furthermore paid no attention to the controversial attitude of the holy Doctor. Augustine’s peculiar task was not to maintain the possibility of naturally good works without faith and grace, but to defend against Pelagius and Julian the impossibility of performing super- naturally good and meritorious works without the aid of grace. It is this essential difference in their respective points of view that explains how St. Augustine and Baius were able to employ identical or similar terms to express radically dif- ferent ideas.°? | c) It can easily be demonstrated on theological grounds that fallen man is able, of his own initia- tive, 7. e. without the aid of grace, to perform morally good works, and that Baius erred in as- serting that this is impossible without theological faith. a) With regard to the first-mentioned point it will be well, for the sake of clearness, to adopt Palmieri’s dis- tinction between physical and moral capacity.°* Man sins whenever he transgresses the law or yields to tempta- 52 For a fuller and more adequate mieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, treatment of this question see J. thes, 21. Ernst, Werke und Tugenden der Un- 53 Palmieri, 7, c., thes, 20.. Con- gliubigen nach Augustinus, Frei- cerning the effects of original sin burg 1871; Ripalda, De Ente Su- on free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, God pernaturali, t, III, Cologne 1648; S. the Author of Nature and the Super- Dechamps, De Haeresi Ianseniana, natural, pp, 291 sq. Paris 1645; and, more briefly, Pal- 62 ACTUAL (GRACE tion. This would be impossible if he were physically unable to keep the whole law and resist temptation. Hence he must be physically able to do that which he is obliged to do under pain of sin, though in this or that individual instance the difficulties may be insuper- able without the aid of grace. To put it somewhat dif- ferently: Baius and Jansenius hold that fallen man can perform no morally good works because of physical or moral impotence on the part of the will. This assump- tion is false. Man is physically able to perform good works because they are enjoined by the moral law of nature under pain of sin; he is morally able because, in spite of numerous evil tendencies, not a few gentiles and unbelievers have led upright lives and thereby proved that man can perform good works without the aid of grace.°# This is also the teaching of St. Thomas.” B) It is an expressly defined dogma that the process of justification starts with theological faith (fides), pre- ceded by the so-called grace of vocation, which prepares and effects conversion. To say, as Baius did, that all good works performed in a state of unbelief are so many sins, is tantamount to asserting that the preliminary acts leading up to faith, and which the unbeliever per- forms by the aid of prevenient grace, are sinful; in other words, that God requires the unbeliever to prepare him- self for justification by committing sin. This is as absurd as it is heretical.*° The whole argument of this section applies a fortiort to 54 On this distinction see supra, pp. 15 sqq. 55 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4: “ Bona opera, ad quae suf- ficit bonum naturae, aliqualiter operari possunt [infideles]. Unde non oportet quod in omni suo opere peccent; sed quandocunque aliquod opus operantur ex infidelitate, tunc peccant.” 56 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can, 7: “Si quis dixerit, opera omnia quae ante iustificationem fiunt, quacunque ratione facta sint, vere esse peccata vel odium Det mereri, aut quanto vehementius quis CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 63 the theory that no act can be morally good unless prompted by both theological charity and theological faith.®* 2. We must now define the limitations of fallen nature unaided by grace. -Though the graces dis- pensed by Providence even for naturally good deeds are in the present economy de facto nearly all supernatural, nothing prevents us from con- ceiving a different economy, consisting of purely natural helps, such as would have been necessary in the state of pure nature.*® As regards the limitations of man’s moral power in the natural order, we may say, in a general way, that the will is able to keep the easier precepts of the moral law of nature without the assistance of grace (either su- pernatural or natural). However, as it is impossible in many instances to determine just where the easier pre- cepts end and the more difficult ones begin, a broad field is left open for theological speculation. a) Theologians are practically unanimous in holding that man cannot observe the natural law in its entirety for any considerable length of time without the aid of grace. Suarez is so sure of this that he does not hesitate to denounce the contrary teaching,— which is (perhaps un- justly) ascribed to Durandus, Scotus, and Gabriel Biel — nititur se disponere ad gratiam, tanto 58 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- eum gravius peccare, anathema sit.’’ thor of Nature and the Supernat- (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 817.) ural, pp. 226 sqq. 57 V. infra, No. 3. 64 ACTUAL GRACE as “rash and verging on error.” °° In matter of fact the Church has formally defined that, because of concupis- cence, no one, not even the justified man, much less the sinner, is able, without divine assistance (grace), to keep for any considerable length of time the whole Decalogue, which embodies the essentials of the moral law. ‘“ Nev- ertheless,” says the Council of Trent, “ let those who think themselves to stand take heed lest they fall, and with fear and trembling work out their salvation, SLOT they ought to fear for the combat which yet remains aah the flesh, with the world, with the devil, wherein they cannot be victorious unless they be with God’s grace obedient to the Apostle, who says: ‘We are debtors, a LR eh RO St. Paul, who lived, so to speak, in an atmosphere of grace, yet found reason to exclaim: “I am delighted with the law of God, according to the inward man, but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members,’® and: “ Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord.” © Surely it would be vain to expect the proud ideal of the Stoics or Pelagius’ presumptuous claim of impeccability ever to be realized on earth except by a special privilege of grace, such as that bestowed Bion the Blessed Virgin Mary.** 59 “ Propositio temeraria et errori proxima.”’ 60 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 13: “Verumtamen qui se existimant stare, videant ne cadant, et cum timore ac tremore salutem suam operentur. ... Formidare enim de- bent... de pugna, quae superest cum carne, cum mundo, cum diabolo, in qua victores esse non possunt, nisi cum Det gratid Apostolo obtem- perent dicenti: Debitores etc.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 806.) 61 Rom. VII, 22 sqa. 62 Rom. VII, 24 sq. 63 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Mariology, pp. 80 sqq., St. Louis 1914, CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 65 The Fathers follow St. Paul in describing the power of concupiscence, even after justification.** b) A pertinent question, closely allied to the proposition just treated, is this: Can the human will, without the aid of grace, overcome all the grievous temptations to mortal sin by which it is besieged ? It is the common teaching of theologians that, without the aid of grace, man in the fallen state succumbs with moral (not physical) necessity to grievous temptations against the moral law, 7. e. to mortal sin. This conclu- sion flows from the impossibility, which we have demon- strated above, of observing the whole law of nature for life or for any considerable length of time without the help of grace. If man were able to resist all violent temptations, he would be able to keep the whole law. The theological teaching which we are here expound- ing may be formulated in two different ways: (1) No man can overcome all grievous temptations against the moral law without the aid of grace; (2) there is no man living who is not now and then assailed by temptations to which he would inevitably succumb did not God lend him His assistance. In its first and rather indefinite form the proposition is attacked by Ripalda,®® Molina,®°* and many later Schol- astics. These writers argue as follows: It is impossible to deduce from Revelation or experience a definite rule by which man could determine the conditions on which the grievousness of a temptation depends. To 64 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa 65 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 109, art. 5; Hein- 114, sect, 18. rich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theolo- 66 Concord., art. 13, disp. 19. gie, Vol. VIII, § 416, Mainz 1897. 66 ACTUAL GRACE say that a temptation is grievous when it cannot be re- sisted without the aid of grace, would be begging the question. Besides, the: possibility always remains that there be men who, though in theory unable to with- stand all grievous temptations without the aid of grace, de facto never meet with such temptations, but only with the lighter kind which can be overcome without supernat- ural help. The second and more specific formulation of our propo- sition is supported by Sacred Scripture, which explicitly declares that all men are subject to temptations which they could not resist if God did not uphold them.* If the just are obliged to watch and pray constantly, lest they fall,°* this must be true in an even higher degree of sinners and unbelievers. St. Augustine writes against the Pelagians: “Faithful men say in their prayer: ‘Lead us not into temptation.’ But if they have the capacity [of avoiding evil], why do they pray [for it]? Or, what is the evil which they pray to be delivered from, but, above all else, the body of this death? . . . the carnal lusts, whence a man is liberated only by the grace of the Saviour. . . . He may be permitted to pray that he may be healed. Why does he presume so strongly on the capability of his nature? It is wounded, hurt, harassed, destroyed ; what it stands in need of is a true confession [of its weakness], not a false defense [of its capacity].” © 67 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- — adest possibilitas, ut quid orant? mat., Vol. V, pp. 87 sqq. Aut a quo malo se liberari orant 68 Cfr. the following passage from nisi maxrime de corpore mortis the Tridentine Council: “... cum hwuius?...de vitiis carnahibus, timore ac tremore salutem suam unde non liberatur homo sine gratia operentur in laboribus, in vigiliis, in Salvatoris. . . . Orare sinatur, ut eleemosynis, in orationibus et obla- sanetur. Quid tantum de naturae tionibus, in ieiuniis et castitate.” possibilitate praesumitur? Vulnerata, 69 De Natura et Gratia, c. 48, n. Sauciata, vexata, perdita est; vera 62: “‘ Fideles enim orantes dicunt: confessione, non falsa defensione Ne nos inferas in tentationem. Si opus habet.” The necessity of grace, CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 67 c) Another question, on which Catholic divines disagree, is this: Can fallen man, unaided by grace, elicit an act of perfect natural charity (amor Dei naturalis perfectus ) ? Scotus answers this question affirmatively,” and his opinion is shared by Cajetan,” Bafiez,”? Dominicus Soto,” and Molina.“* Other equally eminent theologians, no- tably Suarez ** and Bellarmime,”* take the negative side. In order to obtain a clear understanding of the question at issue we shall have to attend to several distinctions. _ First and above all we must not lose sight of the im- portant distinction between the natural and the super- natural love of God. Supernatural charity, in all its stages, necessarily supposes supernatural aid. The ques- tion therefore can refer only to the amor Dei natur- alis." That this natural charity is no mere figment ap- pears from the ecclesiastical condemnation of two propo- sitions of- Baius,7? and of prayer to obtain grace, is ad- mirably and exhaustively treated by Suarez, De Necessitate Gratiae, I, 23, sqq. Cfr. also Bellarmine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, V, 7 saq. 70 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent: Ill, dist. 9273) qu.) ) unica: ** Ratio recta docet, solum summum bonum infinitum esse summe diligen- dum et per consequens voluntas hoc potest ex puris naturalibus; nihil enim potest intellectus recte dictare, in quod dictatum non possit voluntas rationalis naturaliter tendere.”’ 71 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu., 2a 2ae, qu. 171, arts- 2: 72 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu., 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 2. 73 De Natura et Gratia, I, 21. — 74 Concord., qu. 14, art. 13, disp. Id. 75 De Gratia, I, 33. 76 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, VI, 7: “ Existimamus non posse Deum sine ope ipsius diligi neque ut auctorem naturae neque ut largi- torem gratiae et gloriae, neque per- fecte neque imperfecte ullo modo, 7+ + Quicquid aliqui minus consi- derate in hac parte scripserint.’” On the attitude of St. Thomas (Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3) cfr. Billuart, De Gratia, diss, 3, art. 4. 77 It is not true, as Bellarmine argues, that the amor Dei naturalis at its highest would result in justi- fication. 78 Prop. Baii Damn., 34: “ Dis- tinctio illa duplicis amoris, naturalis videlicet, quo Deus amatur ut auctor 68 ACTUAL GRACE Another, even more important distinction is that be- tween perfect and imperfect charity. Imperfect charity is the love of God as our highest good (amor Dei ut summum bonum nobis); perfect charity is the love of God for His own sake above all things (amor Dei propter se et super omnia). The holy Fathers and a number of councils * declare that it is impossible to love God perfectly without the aid of grace. The context and such stereotyped explanatory phrases as “ sicut oportet”’ or “ sicut expedit ad salutem,” ®° show that these Patristic and conciliary utterances apply to the super- natural love of God. Hence the question narrows itself down.to this: Can fallen man without the aid of grace love God for His own sake and above all things by a purely natural love? In answering this question Pesch,*? Tepe,*? and other theologians distinguish between affec- tive and effective love. They hold that whereas the amor atfectivus in all its stages is possible without the aid of grace, not so the amor effectivus, since that would in- volve the observance of the whole natural law. This com- promise theory can be demonstrated as highly probable from Scripture and Tradition. St. Paul says ** that the gentiles knew God and should have glorified Him. This evidently supposes that it was possible for them to glo- rify God, and consequently to love Him affectively, as easily and with the same means by which they knew Him. naturae, et gratuiti, quo Deus amatur ut beatificator, vana est et commen- titia,”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1034).— 36: “Amor naturalis, qui ex viribus naturae exoritur, ex sola philosophia per elationem praesump- tionis humanae cum iniuria crucis Christi defenditur a nonnullis doc- toribus.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1036.) 79 Cfr. Conc. Arausic. II, a. 529, can. 25: “ Prorsus donum Dei est diligere Deum.” 80 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. Be 81 Praelect. Dogm., Vol. V, pp. 73 sqq. 82 Instit. Theolog., Vol. III, pp. 19 sqq. 838 Rom. I, 21. CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 69 Else how could the Apostle say of those gentiles who, “ when they knew God, glorified him not as God,” that they “ changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator’? This interpretation of Rom. I, 21 sqq. is explicitly confirmed by St. Ambrose when he says: “ For they were able to ap- prehend this by the law of nature, inasmuch as the fabric of the cosmos testifies that God, its author, is alone to be loved, as Moses hath set it down in his writings ; but they were made impious by not glorifying God, and unright- eousness became evident in them when, knowing, they changed the truth into a lie and refused to confess the one tsod, 65 3. It follows, by way of corollary, that Vas- quez’s opinion,” that there can be no good work without supernatural aid in the shape of a co gita- tio congrua, is untenable, as is also the assertion of Ripalda *’ that in the present economy purely natural good actions are so invariably connected with the prevenient grace of Christ that they practically never exist as such. a) Vasquez, whose position in the matter is opposed by most other theologians, contends * that no man can perform a good work or resist any temptation against. the natural law (Decalogue) without the help of super- 84 Rom. I, 25. 85In Epist. ad Roman., I, 18: “ Potuerunt enim id per legem na- turae apprehendere, fabricé mundi testificante auctorem Deum solum diligendum, quod Moyses literis tradidit; sed impu facti sunt non colendo Creatorem et iniustitia in eis apparet, dum videntes dissinuila- bant a veritate, non fatentes unum Deum.” 86 Comment. in Summam Theol. S. Thomae Aqu., ta 2ae, disp. 189 sq. 87 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 20. 88 Op. cit. (see note 86). 72 ACTUAL GRACE pothesis the necessity of grace is not theological but purely historic.°® Despite the wealth of arguments by which Ripalda at- tempted to prove his theory,®* it has not been generally accepted. While some, e. g. Platel ®? and Pesch,°® regard it with a degree of sympathy, others, notably De Lugo % and Tepe,’ are strongly opposed to it. Palmieri thinks it may be accepted in a restricted sense, 7. e. when limited to the faithful.1 Ripalda’s hypothesis of the universality of grace is truly sublime and would have to be accepted if God’s salvific will could be demonstrated by revelation or some historic law to suffer no exceptions. But Ripalda has not been able to prove this from Revelation.1” Then, too, his theory entails two extremely objectionable conclusions: (1) a denial, not indeed of the possibility ( Quesnel), but of the existence of purely natural good works, and (2) the possibility of justification without theological faith. Neither of these difficulties probably occurred to Vasquez 95 This must be kept in mind in judging Ripalda’s famous thesis: belief of Christians in the salutary effects of all good works, including “Ad quodlibet bonum opus morale sive ad quemlibet virtutis moralis actum necessarium esse per se naturae rationali elevatae auxilium theologicum gratiae.’”’ (Ibid., sect. 3.) 96 He urges the supernatural char- acter, in principle, of the present economy of salvation; the practical identity of the naturally good with the supernaturally salutary acts of the will, which he claims is taught in Sacred Scripture (cfr, Acts XIV, 14 sqq.; Rom. I, 19 sqq.), and also by St. Augustine and his disciples Prosper and Orosius; the merciful dispensation of grace towards heath- ens, unbelievers, and_ sinners (uv. infra, Sect. 3, Art. 2); the universal those of the purely natural order, etc. For a discussion of these argu- ments consult Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, pp. 254 sqq. 97 Synopsis de’ Gratia, n. 530. 98 Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, p. 72. 99 De Virtute Fidei Divinae, disp. 125); S@ct. | -2. 100 Instit. Theolog., Vol. LID tpps 22 sq., 248 sqq. 101 De Gratia Div. Actuali, p. 268: “Si tamen ad solos fideles coarcte- tur, quum nulla argumenta obstent et pro hac hypothesi maxime valeant rationes Ripaldae, eam censemus veram esse.’ 102 VV. supra, No. 1. CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 73 or Ripalda,*°* because at the time when they wrote Pius VI had not yet condemned the teaching of the psetido- Council of Pistoia,1°* nor had Innocent XI censured the proposition that “ Faith in a broad sense, as derived from the testimony of creatures or some other similar motive, is sufficient for justification.” °° If the love of God, even perfect love, (such as we have shown to be possible in the natural order), were of itself necessarily super- natural, as Ripalda contends, it would be possible for a pagan to receive the grace of justification without theo- logical faith, which he does not possess, as is evident from the Vatican teaching that it is “ requisite for divine faith that revealed truth be believed because of the authority of God who reveals it.’’ 1° Thesis III: Not all actions performed by man in the state of mortal sin are sinful on account of his not being in the state of grace. This is de fide. Proof. Though this thesis is, strictly speak- ing, included in Thesis II, it must be demonstrated separately on its own merits, because it embodies 103 Cfr. Mazzella, De Christi, disp. 2, art. 9. 104 V, supra, p. 71. 105 “ Fides late dicta ex testimonio creaturarum similive motivo ad iusti- ficationem sufficit.”” (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 1173.) 106 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Fide, can, 2: “Si quis dixerit,.:. ad Gratia of Ripalda’s opinion can be studied in Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actu- ali, pp. 265 sqq. Cfr. also Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 996 sqq. A difficulty arises from the twenty- second canon of the Second Council of Orange (A.D. 529): ‘Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium et peccatum.”” But this canon was fidem divinam non requiri, ut reve- lata veritas propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis credatur, anathema sit.’ On this whole dispute cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 156 sqq. The arguments adduced by the defenders probably never approved by the Holy See. It is ably discussed by Gut- berlet in his continuation of Hein- rich’s Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VITT, $478. 74 ACTUAL GRACE a formally defined dogma which has been denied by the Protestant Reformers and by the followers of Baius and Jansenius. Martin Luther taught, —and his teaching was adopted in a modified form by the Calvinists,—that human nature is entirely depraved by original sin, and conse- quently man necessarily sins in whatever he does," even in the process of justification. Against this heresy the Tridentine Council de- fined: “If any one shall say that all the works done before justification ... are indeed sins, fone let him ibevanathema0° The Protestant notion of grace was reduced to a theological system by Baius ?°® and Jansen- ius,’*® whose numerous errors may all be traced to their denial of the supernatural order. The Jansenist teaching was pushed to an extreme by Paschasius Quesnel, 101 of whose propositions were formally condemned by Pope Clement XI in his famous Constitution “ Unigenitus.” + The Jansenistic teachings of the Council of Pistoia were censured by Pius VI, A. D. 1794, in his Bull “ Auctorem fidei.’ The quintessence of this heretical system is embodied in the proposition 107“ Ex viribus suis [natura] coram Deo nihil nisi peccare potest.” (Solida Declar., I, § 22.) Cfr. J. A. Mohler, Symbolik, §6-7 (English tr. by J. B. Robertson, Symbolism, sth ed,, London 1906, pp. 54 sqq.) 108 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 7: “ Si quis dixerit, opera omnia, quae ante iustificationem fiunt, ... vere esse peccata,... anathema sit.’ 109 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Super- natural, pp. 183 saqq., et passim. 110 A. D. 1585-1638. Cfr. Pohle- Preuss, op. cit., pp. 223 sqq. 111 On this important document (issued A. D. 1713) see A. Schill, Die Konstitution Unigenitus, Frei- burg 1876; Thuillier, La Seconde Phase du Jansénisme, Paris 1901; M. Ott, art. “ Unigenitus ” in Vol. XV of the Catholic Encyclopedia. — CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 75 that whatever a man does in the state of mortal sin is necessarily sinful for the reason that he is not in the state of grace (status caritatis). Baius 1? and Quesnel 143 gave. this teaching an Augustinian turn by saying that there is no intermediate state between the love of God and con- cupiscence, and that all the works of a sinner must con- sequently and of necessity be sinful. This heretical teach- ing is sharply condemned in the Bull “ Auctorem fiders + Quesnel pushed it to its last revolting conclusion when he said: “ The prayer of the wicked is a new sin, and that God permits it is but an additional j udgment upon them? 116 The teaching of Baius and Quesnel is repug- nant to Revelation and to the doctrine of the Fathers. a) The Bible again and again exhorts sinners to repent, to pray for forgiveness, to give alms, ete Gir Hochws(iK boigt “My son, thou hast sinned? Do so no more: but for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.” Ezech. XVIII, 30: “Be converted, and do pen- ance for all your iniquities: and iniquity shall not 112 Prop. Damn., 38. quae ante wustificationem funt, 113 Prop. Damn., 44. 114“ Doctrina synodi de dublici amore enuntians, hominem sine gratia esse sub virtute peccati ipsum- que im eo statu per generalem cupidi- tatis dominantis iniuxum omnes suas actiones inficere et corrumpere — quatenus insinuat, in homine, dum est sub servitute sive in statu pec- cati, ... sic dominari cupiditatem ut per generalem hutus inhuxum omnes illius actiones in se inficiantur et corrumpantur, aut opera omnia quacunque ratione fiant, sint peccaia, quasi in omnibus suis actibus pec- cator serviat dominanti cupiditati: falsa, perniciosa, inducens in errorem a Tridentino damnatum ut haereti- cum, iterum in Baio damnatum art. 40.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1523). h 115 Prop. Damn., 59: “ Oratio impiorum est novum peccatum, et quod Deus illis concedit, est novum in eos iudicium.” (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 1409.) 76 ACTUAL GRACE be your ruin.” Dan. IV, 24: ‘Redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor: perhaps he will forgive thy offences.” Zach. I, 3: ‘Thus saith the Lord of hosts: Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of hosts: and I will turn to you.” If all the works thus en- joined were but so many sins, we should be forced to conclude, on the authority of Sacred Scripture, that God commands the sinner to com- mit new iniquities and that the process of justi- fication with its so-called dispositions consists in a series of sinful acts. Such an assump- tion would be manifestly absurd and blasphe- mous. Quesnel endeavored to support his heretical conceit by Matth. VII, 17 sq.: “ Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and the evil tree bringeth forth evil fruit ; a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.” But as our Lord in this passage speaks of prophets, the fruits he has in mind must obviously be doctrines not works.1%* And what if they were works? Are not doctrines and morals ultimately related, and may we not infer from the lives they lead (according to their doctrines) whether prophets are true or false? By their fruits (7. e. works) you shall know them (i. e. the soundness or unsoundness of the teaching upon which their works are based). 116 This passage, and the meaning in Enchiridion S. August., cs 15. it evidently bears in the context of | Other Scriptural texts distorted by St. Matthew’s Gospel, is thoroughly the Jansenists are quoted and ex- discussed by Suarez, De Gratia, I, plained in their true sense by Schee- 4. Cfr. also J. B. Faure, Notae ben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, Pp. 923 sqq. CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 07, b) In appealing to the testimony of the Fathers the Jansenists were notoriously guilty of misin- terpretation. a) Origen plainly teaches that prayer before justifica- tion isa good work. “ Though you are sinners,” he says, “ pray to God; God hears the sinners.” 227 The seemingly contradictory text John IX, 31: “Now we know that God doth not hear sinners,” 28 is thus explained by St. Augustine: “ He speaks as one not yet anointed ; for God also hears the sinners. If He did not hear sinners, the publican would have cast his eyes to the ground in vain and vainly struck his breast saying: O God, be merciful to me, a sinner,” 119 Moreover, since there is question here of extraordinary works and signs only (vig. miracles), the text is wholly irrelevant in regard to works of personal righteousness. St. Prosper teaches: “ Hu- man nature, created by God, even after its prevarica- tion, retains its substance, form, life, senses, and reason, and the other goods of body and soul, which are not lack- ing even to those who are bad and vicious, But there is no possibility of seizing the true good by such things as may adorn this mortal life, but cannot give [merit] eternal life.” 12 117 Hom. in Is.; 5, n. 2. 118 “ Scimus autem quia peccatores Deus non audit.” 119 Tract. in Toa, 44, m. 13: “ Adhuc inunctus loquitur; nam et peccatores exaudit Deus. Si enim peccatores Deus non exaudiret, fru- stra tle publicanus oculos in terram demittens et pectus suum percutiens diceret: Domine, propitius esto mihi peccatort [Luc.. XVIII, 13].” 120 Contr. Collat., n. 36: “ Na- turae humanae, cuius creator est Deus, etiam post praevaricationem manet substantia, manet forma, manet vita et sensus et ratio cetera- que corporis et animi bona, quae etiam malis vitiosisque non desunt. Sed non illis veri boni perceptio est, quae mortalem vitam honestare pos- sunt, aeternam conferre. non pos- sunt.”’ For additional Patristic texts in confirmation of our thesis see Ripalda, De Ente Supernatural, t. ITI, disp. 20, sect, 4. 78 ACTUAL GRACE 8B) Baius and Quesnel succeeded in veiling their heresy by a phraseology of Augustinian color but with implications foreign to the mind of the Doctor of Grace. Augustine emphasized the opposition between “ charity ” and “concupiscence”’ so strongly that the intermediary domain of naturally good works was almost lost to view. Thus he says in his Encluridion: “ Carnal lust reigns where there is not the love of God.” #4. And in his trea- tise on the Grace of Christ: ‘ Here there is no love, no good work is reckoned as done, nor is there in fact any good work, rightly so called; because whatever is not of faith is sin, and faith worketh by love.” #? And again in his treatise on Grace and Free-Will: “The command- ments of love or charity are so great and such, that what- ever action a man may think he does well, is by no means well done if done without charity.” 178 We have pur- posely chosen passages in which the “Doctor of Grace” obviously treats of charity as theological love, not in the broad sense of dilectio** At first blush these passages seem to agree with the teaching of Baius, who says: “Every love on the part of a rational creature is either sinful cupidity, by which the world is loved, and which is forbidden by St. John, or that praiseworthy charity which is infused into the heart by the Holy Spirit, and by which we love God;’—1*> and with the forty- 121 Enchiridion, c. .117, n. 31: . quid se putaverit homo facere bene, * Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non est Dei caritas.” 122 De Gratia Christi, c. 26: © Ubi non est dilectio, nullum bonum opus imputatur, non recte bonum opus vocatur, quia omne quod non est ex fide peccatum est et fides per dilectionem operatur.’’ 123 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 18: “ Praecepta dilectionis, t, e. caritatis, tanta et talia sunt, ut quid- si fiat sine caritate, nullo modo fiat bene.” 124 Cfr. supra, p. 29. 125 Proposit. Batti Damn., 38: “Omnis amor creaturae rationalis aut vitiosa est cupiditas qué mundus diligitur, quae a Ioanne prohibetur, aut laudabilis caritas qué per Spiri- tum Sanctum in corde diffusa Deus amatur.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1038.) 2 el ae eT —- = CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 79 fifth proposition of Quesnel: “ As the love of God no longer reigns in the hearts of sinners, it is necessary that carnal lust should reign in them and vitiate all their ac- tions.’ °° Yet the sense of these propositions is any- thing but Augustinian. Augustine upholds free-will in spite of grace and concupiscence, whereas the Jansenists assert that the carnalis cupiditas and the caritas dominans produce their effects by the very power of nature, 7. e. necessarily and of themselves.127 Besides this capital difference there are many minor dis- crepancies between the teaching of St. Augustine and that of Baius and Quesnel. Augustine, it is true, in his strug- gle with Pelagianism,'*® strongly emphasized the opposi- tion existing between grace and sin, between love of God and love of the world; but he never dreamed of asserting that every act performed in the state of mortal sin is sinful for the reason that it is not performed in the state of grace. Scholasticism has long since applied the neces- sary corrective to his exaggerations. It is perfectly orthodox to say that there is an irreconcilable op- position between the state of mortal sin and the state of grace. “No one can serve two masters.” 12° This is not, however, by any means equivalent to saying, as the Jansenists do, that the sinners not being in the state of grace, of necessity sins in whatever he does. Augus- tine expressly admits that, no matter how deeply God may allow a man to fall, and no matter how strongly concupiscence may dominate his will, he is yet able to pray for grace, which is in itself a distinctly salutary 126 Prop. Quesnelli Damn., 45:3 127 Infra, Ch. III, Sect. I. “Amore Dei in corde peccatorum 128 Especially against Julian of non amplius regnante necesse est, Eclanum. Cfr. Contra Iulianum, ut in eo carnalis regnet cupiditas ~ IV5i'3. omnesque actiones eius corrumpat.” 129 Matth. VI, 24. (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1395.) *- 80 ACTUAL GRACE act. “If a sin is such,” he says in his Retractationes, “that it is itself a punishment for sin, what can the will under the domination of cupidity do, except, if it be pious, to pray for help?” 18° Compare this sentence with the fortieth proposition of Baius: ‘“ The sinner in all his actions serves the lust which rules him,” "1 and you will perceive the third essential difference that sep- arates the teaching of St. Augustine from that of the Jan- senists. The former, even when he speaks, not of the two opposing habits, but of their respective acts, does not, like Jansenism, represent the universality of sin without theological charity as a physical and fundamental necess- ity, but merely as a historical phenomenon which admits of exceptions. Thus he writes in his treatise On the Spirit and the Letter: “If they who by nature do the things contained in the law, must not be regarded as yet in the number of those whom Christ’s grace justifies, but rather as among those whose actions (although they are those of ungodly men who do not truly and rightly worship the true God) we not only cannot blame, but actually praise, and with good reason, and rightly too, since they have been done, so far as we read or know or hear, according to the rule of righteousness; though were we to discuss the question with what motive they are done, they would hardly be found to be such as to deserve the praise and defense which are due to righteous conduct.” 1°? 180 Retract., I, 15: “Quando 48: “Si hi qui naturaliter, quae peccatum tale est, ut idem sit poena legis sunt, faciunt, nondum sunt peccati, quantum est quod valet habendi in numero eorum quos voluntas sub dominante cupiditate, Christi iustificat gratia [Rom. II, nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxi- 24], sed in eorum potius, quorum lium? ” 131 Prop. Baii Damn., 40: “In omnibus suis actibus peccator servit dominanti cupiditati.” (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 1040.) 132 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 27, n. (etiam impiorum nec Deum verum veraciter iusteque colentium) quae- dam tamen facta vel legimus vel novimus vel audimus, quae secun- dum iustitiae regulam non solum vituperare non possumus, verum CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 81 In conclusion we will quote a famous passage from St. Augustine which reads like a protest against the distor- tions of Baius and Jansenius. “ Love,” he says, “is either divine or human; human love is either licit or illicit. . .. I speak first of licit human love, which is free from censure; then, of illicit human love, which is damnable; and in the third place, of divine love, which leads us to Pleaven)!'. ...You, therefore, have that love which is licit; it is human, but, as I have said, licit, so much so that, if it were lacking, [the want of] it would be cen- sured. You are permitted with human love to love your spouse, your children, your friends and fellow-citizens. But, as you see, the ungodly, too, have this love, e. g. pagans, Jews, heretics. Who among them does not love his wife, his children, his brethren, his neighbors, his relations and friends? This, therefore, is human love. If any one would be so unfeeling as to lose even human love, not loving his own children, . . . we should no longer regard him as a human being.” 488 Tepe perti- nently observes 1% that St. Augustine in this passage as- serts not only the possibility but the actual existence of naturally good though unmeritorious works (opera steri- etiam merito recteque laudamus; vobis humana caritate diligere con- quamquam si discutiantur, quo fine iuges, diligere filios, diligere amicos fant, vix inveniuntur quae iustitiae vestros, diligere cives vestros. Sed debitam laudem defensionemve mere- videtis istam caritatem esse posse et antur.”’ ; impiorum, 7. e. paganorum, Iudae- 133 Serm. de Temp., 349, c. Fis il orum, haereticorum. Quis enim sq.: “Caritas alia est divina, alia eorum non _amat uxorem, filios, humana; alia est humana licita, alia __ fratres, vicinos, affines, amicos? ilicita, . . Prius ergo loquor de Haec ergo humana est. St ergo tali humana licita, quae non reprehendi- quisque crudelitate effertur, ut perdat tur; deinde de humana ilicita, quae etiam humanum dilectionis affectum, damnatur ; tertio de divina, quae nos et non amat filios suos,... nec berducit ad regnum.... Licitam inter homines numerandus est.” ergo caritatem habete;. humana est, CMignes| Pape XXXIX, 1520.) sed ut dixi licita, sed ita licita ut, 134 Institutiones Theologicae, Vol. si defuerit, reprehendatur. Liceat III, p. 23. 82 ACTUAL GRACE liter bona), and that the theory of Ripalda *** is unten- able for this reason, if for no other, that the quoted passage is cited in Pius VI’s Bull “ Auctorem fidei.’ 1°6 ARTICLE 2 THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE FOR ALL SALUTARY ACTS Salutary acts (actus salutares) are those directed to the attainment of sanctifying grace and the supernatural end of man. According to this double purpose, salutary acts may be divided into two classes: (1) those that prepare for jus- tification (actus simpliciter salutares), and (2) those which, following justification, gain merits for Heaven (actus meritorit). In consequence of the supernatural character of the acts which they comprise, both these categories are dia- metrically opposed to that class of acts which are good only in a natural way,’ and hence must be carefully distin- guished from the latter. The Fathers did not, of course, employ the technical terms of modern theology; they had their own peculiar phrases for designating what we call salutary acts, e. g. agere sicut oportet vel expedit, agere ad salutem, agere ad iustificationem, agere ad vitam aeternam, etc.? I. PELAGIANISM.—Pelagianism started as a reaction against Manichaeism, but fell into the 135 As explained above, pp. 71 , Augustinus, Vol. II, pp. 260 sqq., sqq. Freiburg 1909. 136 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1824. Cir supra, “Art. 1. On the teaching of St. Augustine, 2On these and similar formulas see J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 22. SE NECESSVUY OR ACTUAL, GRACE 83 opposite extreme of exaggerating the capacity of human nature at the expense of eraces Nt denied original sin* and grace. As the necessity of grace for all salutary acts is a fundamental dogma of the Christian religion, the Church proceeded with unusual severity against Pelagian naturalism and condemned its vagaries through the mouth of many councils. a) Pelagius was a British lay monk, who came to Rome about the year 400 to propagate his er- roneous views.* He found a willing pupil in Ce- lestius, who after distinguishing himself as a lawyer, had been ordained to the priesthood at Ephesus, about 411. The Pelagian heresy gained another powerful champion in the person of Bishop Julian of Eclanum in Apulia. Its strongest opponent was St. Augustine. Under his powerful blows the Pelagians repeatedly changed their tactics, without however giving up their cardinal error in regard to grace. Their teaching on this point may be summarized as follows: The human will is able by its natural powers to keep all the commandments of God, to resist temptation, and to gain eternal life; in fact it can attain to a state of holiness and impeccability ® in which the petition “ Forgive us our trespasses ” no longer has any meaning except perhaps as an expression of hu- mility.© In so far, however, as free-will is itself a gift of 3 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- gianism ” in Vol. XI of the Catholic thor of Nature and the Supernatural, Encyclopedia. pp. 218 sqq. 5 Impeccantia, dvayaprnaia- 4For details of his life see 6 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Haeres. J. Pohle, art. ‘‘Pelagius and Pela- ad Quodvultdeum, n. 88, \ 84 ACTUAL GRACE the Creator, man can perform no good works without grace. Ata later period of his career Pelagius admitted the existence of merely external supernatural graces, such as revelation and the example of Christ and the saints,— which led St. Augustine to remark: “ This is the hidden and despicable poison of your heresy that you represent the grace of Christ as His example, not His gift, alleging that man is justified by imitating Him, not by the ministration of the Holy Spirit.”7 But even this external grace, according to Pelagius, does not con- fer the strength necessary to perform good works; it merely makes it easier to keep the commandments. Pelagius did not deny that justification and adoptive son- ship, considered in their ideal relation to the “ kingdom of Heaven,” as distinguished from “ eternal life,” ® are not identical in adults with the grace of creation, but he denied their gratuity by asserting that the free will is able to merit all these graces by its own power. Whatever. may have been the variations of Pelagian- ism, it is patent from the writings of St. Augustine that its defenders one and all rejected the necessity and exist- ence of the immediate grace of the will.1° Their attitude towards the illuminating grace of the intellect is in dis- pute. Some theologians ™ think the Pelagians admitted, others ** that they denied its existence. No matter what 7“ Hoc est occultum et horren- dum virus haeresis vestrae, ut velitis gratiam Christi in exemplo eius esse, non in dono eius, dicentes quia per eius imitationem fiunt iusti, non per subministrationem Spiritus Sancti.” (S. Aug., Opus Imperf. contr. Iu- han, 13, 146.) 8On the regnum coelorum in contradistinction to vita aeterna, in the teaching of Pelagius, see St. Augustine, De Pecc. Mer. et Rem., I, 18 sqq. 9V. infra, Sect. 2. 10 V. supra, p. 8. 11E, g. Petavius, De Pelag. et Semipelag., c. 8 sq.; Wirceburg., De Gratia, n. 182; Palmieri, De Gratia Div. Actuali, pp. 140 sqq. 12 Among them Suarez, Prolegom. de Gratia, c. 3, and J. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 739 sq. PeT—y THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 8s they may have held on this point, there can be no doubt that the followers of Pelagius conceived the object of grace to be nothing more than to facilitate the work of salvation. b) Within the short span of twenty years (A. D. 411 to 431) no less than twenty-four councils occupied themselves with this new heresy. At first the wily heretic succeeded in deceiving the prelates assembled at Lydda (Diospolis), A. D. 415; but the bishops of Northern Africa, among them St. Augus- tine, roundly condemned his teaching at two councils held with the sanction of Pope Innocent I at Carthage and Mi- leve in 416. Shortly afterwards, deceived by the terms of the creeds and explanations which they circulated, Pope Zosimus (417-418) declared both Pelagius and Celestius to be innocent. Despite this intervention, however, two hundred African bishops, at a plenary council held at Carthage, A. D. 418, reiterated the canons of Mileve and submitted them for approval to the Holy See. These proceedings induced Zosimus to adopt stronger measures. In his Epistula Tractoria (418) he formally condemned Pelagianism and persuaded the Emperor to send Julian of Eclanum and seventeen other recalcitrant bishops into exile. The canons of Carthage and Mileve were subse- quently received by the universal Church as binding defi- nitions of the faith. The most important of them in re- gard to grace is this: “If anyone shall say that the grace of justification is given to us for the purpose of enabling us to do more easily by the aid of grace what we are commanded to do by free-will, as if we were able, also, though less easily, to observe the commandments of 86 ACTUAL GRACE God without the help of grace, let him be anathema.” The Ecumenical Council of Ephesus (A.D. 431), with the approval of Pope Celestine I, renewed the condemna- tion of Celestius, but it was not until nearly a century later that Pelagianism received its death-blow. In 529 the Sec- ond Council of Orange defined: “If any one assert that he is able, by the power of nature, and without the illu- mination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, who grants to all men the disposition believingly to accept the truth, rightly (ut expedit) to think or choose anything good pertaining to eternal salvation, or to assent to salutary, 1. e. evangelical preaching, such a one is deceived by a heretical spirit.” "* This decision was reiterated by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that the grace of God through Jesus Christ is given only for this, that man may be able more easily to live justly and to merit eternal life, as if by free-will without grace he were able to do both, though hardly indeed and with difficulty, let him be anathema.” + 2. PELAGIANISM REFUTED.—Sacred Scripture and the Fathers plainly teach that man is unable to perform any salutary act by his own power. et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti, qui dat omnibus suavitatem in consen- 18 “ Ouicunque dixerit, ideo nobis - gratiam tustificationis dari, ut quod facere per liberum iubemur arbitri- um facilius possimus implere per gratiam, tamquam etsi gratia non daretur, non quidem facile, sed tamen possimus etiam sine illa im- plere divina mandata, anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 105.) 14“ Si quis per naturae vigorem bonum aliquod, quod ad _ salutem pertinet vitae aeternae, cogitare ut expedit aut eligere sive salutari, i. e. evangelicae praedicationi consentire posse confirmat absque illuminatione tiendo et credendo veritati, haeretico falhtur spiritu.”” (Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180.) 15 Sess. VI, can. 2: “Si quis dixerit, ad hoc solum divinam gra- tiam per Iesum Christum dari, ut facilius homo iuste vivere ac vitam aeternam promereri possit, quasi per liberum arbitrium sine gratia utrum- que, sed aegre tamen et difficulter possit, anathema sit.” (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 812.) THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 87 a) Among the many Biblical texts that can be quoted in support of this statement, our Lord’s beautiful parable of the vine and its branches is especially striking. Cfr. John XV, 4sq.: “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, un- less you abide in me. I am the vine; you the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit: for without me you can do nothing.” *° a) The context shows that Jesus is not speaking here of purely natural works of the kind for which the concursus generalis of God suffices, but that He has in mind salutary acts in the strictly supernatural sense; and the truth He wishes to inculcate is that fallen nature cannot perform such acts except through Him and with His assistance. This supernatural influence is not, how- ever, to be understood exclusively of sanctifying or habitual grace, because our Divine Saviour refers to the fruits of justification and to salutary works. ‘“ Of these he does not say: ‘ Without me you can do but little,’ but: ‘Without me you can do nothing.’ Be it therefore little or much, it cannot be done without Him, without whom nothing can be done.” 17 If this was true of the Apostles, who were in the state of sanctifying grace,!® it must be 16 “' Sicut palmes non potest ferre 17 St. Augustine, Tract. in Ioa., fructum a semetipso, nist manserit 81, n. 3: “ Non ait, quia sine me in vite: sic nec Vos, nisi in me man- parum potestis facere, sed nihil seritis. Ego sum vitis, vos palmites: potestis facere. Sive ergo parum qui manet in me, et ego in eo, hic sive mulium, sine illo fieri non pot- fert fructum multum:-quia sine me est, sine quo nihil fieri potest.” nihil potestis facere (dre xwpis 18 Cfr. John XV, 3. éuod ob divacbe Toteiy ovdéy).”- 88 ACTUAL GRACE true a fortiori of sinners. Consequently, supernatural grace is absolutely necessary for the performance of any and all acts profitable for salvation. B) Nowhere is this fundamental truth so clearly and insistently brought out as in the epistles of St. Paul, who is preeminently ‘‘the Doctor of Grace” among the Apostles, There are, according to him, three categories of super- natural acts: salutary thoughts, holy resolves, and good works, St. Paul teaches that all right thinking is from God. 2 Cor. III, 5: “Not that we are sufficient to think any- thing of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God.” 19 | Fe also declares that all good resolves come from above. Rom. IX, 15 sq.: “For he saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” ?° He furthermore asserts that all good works come from God. Phil. II, 13: “ For it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will.” ** 1 Cor. XII, 3: “No man can say: Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost.” 22 Pronouncing the 19“ Non quod sufficientes simus, cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Déo est.” On this text cfr. Cornely, Comment. in h. 1., Paris 1892. 20“ Moysi enim dicit: Miserebor cuius misereor et misericordiam prae- stabo cuius miserebor. Igitur non volentis neque currentis (ob Tov OéXovros ode Tov TpéxovTOS), sed miserentis est Dei.” (Rom. IX, rs sq.) 21“ Deus est enim, qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere (kad TO OéNew Kat 7d évepyeiv) pro bona voluntate.” (Phil. II, 13.) 22“ Nemo potest dicere: Dominus Tesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto.” (1 Cor, XID a:) THE NECESSITY @F ACTUAL GRACE? (89 holy name of Jesus is obviously regarded as a salu- tary act, because mere physical utterance does not require the assistance of the Holy Ghost.?* But the act as a salu- tary act is physically impossible without divine assistance, because it is essentially supernatural and consequently exceeds the powers of nature.24 b) The argument from Tradition is based almost entirely on the authority of St. Augustine, in whom, as Liebermann observes, God wrought a miracle of grace that he might become its pow- erful defender. There is no need of quoting spe- cific texts because this whole treatise is inter- larded with Augustinian dicta concerning the ne- cessity of grace. a) An important point is to prove that the early Fath- ers held the Augustinian, 7. e. Catholic view. It stands to reason that if these Fathers had taught a different doctrine, the Church would not have so vehemently re- jected Pelagianism as an heretical innovation. Augustine himself insists on the novelty of the Pelagian teaching. “Such is the Pelagian heresy,” he says, “ which is not an ancient one, but has only lately come into existence.” 2° And this view is confirmed by Pope Celestine I, who de- clares in his letter to the Bishops of Gaul CA Diagn): “ This being the state of the question, novelty should cease to attack antiquity.” In fact the teaching of the Apostolic Fathers, although 23 Cfr. Matth. VII, 21; VIII, 29. c. 4: “Talis est haeresis pelagiana, 24 Others explain. the passage 1 non antiqua, sed ante non multum Cor. XII, 3 differently, Cfr. also tempus exorta.’’ Ron. VITI (26; Phil, if, 63-Epha I, 26 “ Desinat, si res ita sunt, in- 5 sqq. : cessere novitas vetustatem.” 25 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 90 ACTUAL GRACE less explicit, agrees entirely with that of Augustine. Thus St. Irenaeus says: “As the dry earth, if it re- ceives no moisture, does not bring forth fruit, so we, being dry wood, could never bear fruit for life without supernatural rain freely given. ... The blessing of sal- vation comes to us from God, not from ourselves.” ?7 The necessity of grace is indirectly inculcated by the Church when she petitions God to grant salutary graces to all men — a most ancient and venerable practice, which Pope St. Celestine explains as follows: ‘The law of prayer should determine the law of belief. For when the priests of holy nations administer the office entrusted to them, asking God for mercy, they plead the cause of the human race, and together with the whole Church ask and pray that the unbelievers may receive the faith, that the idolaters may be freed from the errors of their impiety, that the veil be lifted from the heart of the Jews, and they be enabled to perceive the light of truth, that the heretics may return to their senses by a true percep- tion of the Catholic faith, that the schismatics may receive the spirit of reborn charity, that the sinners be granted the remedy of penance, and that the door of heavenly mercy be opened to the catechumens who are led to the sacraments of regeneration.” *° In matters of salvation 27 Adv. Haer., III, 17, 2: “* Sicut arida terra, si non percipiat hu- morem, non fructificat, sic et nos — lignum aridum existentes nunquam fructificaremus vitam sine superna voluntaria pluvia. ... Non a nobis, sed a Deo est bonum salutis nostrae.” 28‘° Legem credendi lex statuat supbplicandit. Quum enim sanctarum plebium praesules madaté sibi lega- tione fungantur apud divinam cle- mentiam, humani generis agunt causam et tota secum Ecclesia con- gemiscente postulant et precantur, ut infidelibus donetur fides, ut ido- lolatrae ab impietatis suae liberentur erroribus, ut Iudaeis ablato cordis velamine lux veritatis appareat, ut haeretici catholicae fidei perceptione resipiscant, ut schismatici spiritum redivivae caritatis accipiant, ut lapsis poenitentiae remedia conferantur, ut denique catechumenis ad regenera- tionis sacramenta perductis coeles- tis misericordiae aula reseretur.” (Migne, Ph.) £.5 XLV, 1759.) =e — oS Se ee sada ete ai Mt Hb NECBSSITY’ GR ACTUAL GRACE) ison prayer and grace are correlative terms; the practice of the one implies the necessity and gratuity of the other.* B) That the Fathers not only conceived grace to be necessary for the cure of weakness induced by sin (gratia sanans) in a merely moral sense, but thought it to be metaphysically necessary for the communication of physical strength (gratia elevans ), is evidenced by such oft-recurring sim1- les as these: Grace is as necessary for salvation as the eye is to see, or as wings are to fly, or as rain is for the growth of plants. It will suffice to quote a passage from the writings of St. Chrysostom. ‘ The eyes,” he says, “ are beautiful and useful for seeing, but if they would attempt to see without light, all their beauty and visual power would avail them nothing. Thus, too, the soul is but an obstacle in its own way if it endeavors to see without the Holy Ghost.” *° This view is strengthened by the further teaching of the Fathers that supernatural grace was as indispensable to the angels in their state of probation (in which they were free from concupiscence) and to our first parents in Paradise (gifted as they were with the donum inte- gritatis), as it is to fallen man; the only difference being , that in the case of the latter, grace has the additional ob- ject of curing the infirmities and overcoming the diff- culties arising from concupiscence. In regard to the angels St. Augustine says: “ And who made this will but He who created them with a good will, that is to say with a chaste love by which they should cleave to Him, in one 29 For additional Patristic texts see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 26. 80 Hom. im 1. Cor, 7. 92 ACTUAL GRACE and the same act creating their nature and endowing it with grace? ... We must therefore acknowledge, with the praise due to the Creator, that not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels, it can be said that ‘ the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given unto them.’ ” *1 Equally convincing is the argument that Adam in Para- dise was unable to perform any salutary acts without divine grace. “ Just as it is in man’s power to die when- ever he will,” says St. Augustine, “. . . but the mere will cannot preserve life in the absence of food and the other means of life; so man in Paradise was able of his mere will, simply by abandoning righteousness, to destroy him- self; but to have led a life of righteousness would have been too much for his will, unless it had been sus- tained by the power of Him who made him.” *2 This is also the teaching of the Second Council of Or- ange (A.D. 529): “ Even if human nature remained in the state of integrity, in which it was constituted, it would in no wise save itself without the help of its Creator. If it was unable, without the grace of God, to keep what it had received, how should it be able without the grace of God to regain what it has lost?” 33 -.. ad vitam vero tenendam voluntas non satis est, si adiutoria sive alimentorum sive quorumcunque 31De Civitate Dei, XII, 9: velit, “Istam [bonam voluntatem] quis fecerat nisi ille, qui eos cum bona voluntate, i, e. cum amore casto quo tlh adhaererent creavit, simul eis et condens naturam et largiens gra- tiam? ... Confitendum est igitur cum debita laude Creatoris, non ad solos sanctos homines pertinere, verum etiam de sanctis angelis posse dici, quod caritas Dei diffusa Sit in eis per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est eis.”’ 32 Enchiridion, ec. 106: “ Sicut mort est in hominis potestate, quum tutaminum desint, sic homo in pa- radiso ad se occidendum relinquendo iustitiam idoneus erat per volunta- tem; ut autem ab eo teneretur vita iustitiae, parum erat velle nisi ille, qui eum fecerat, adiuvaret.” 33Can. 19: “ Natura humana, etiamsi in illa ivtegritate in qua est condita permaneret, nullo modo seip- sam, Creatore suo non adiuvante, servaret. Unde quum sine gratia Dei salutem non possit custodire THE: NECESSITY: OF ACTUAL GRACE 193 c) The theological argument for the meta- physical necessity of grace is based on the essen- tially supernatural character of all salutary acts. a) St. Thomas formulates it as follows: “ Eternal life is an end transcending the proportion of human nature, . . . and therefore man, by nature, can perform no meritorious works proportioned to eternal life, but requires for this purpose a higher power,—the power of grace. Consequently, man cannot merit eternal life without grace. He is, however, able to perform acts productive of some good connatural to man, such as till- ing the soil, drinking, eating, acts of friendship, etc.” *4 For the reason here indicated it is as impossible for man to perform salutary acts without grace as it would be to work miracles without that divine assistance which trans- cends the powers of nature.*® B) Catholic theologians are unanimous in admitting that all salutary acts are and must needs be supernatural ; but they differ in their conception of this supernatural quality (supernaturalitas). The problem underlying this difference of opinion may be stated thus: A thing may quae accepit, quomodo sine Dei manae...et ideo homo per sua gratia poterit reparare quod per- naturalia non potest producere opera didit?’’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. meritoria proportionata vitae 192.)— St. Augustine holds that our first parents would have been able to preserve the state of grace by the divine adiutorium sine quo non, and that consequently the adiutorium quo would have been superfluous to them. On this subtle question cfr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, pp. 55 sqq., and Schiffini, De‘ Gratia Divina, pp. 472 sqq. 34 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 5: “Vita aeterna est finis ex- cedens proportionem naturae hu- aeternae; sed ad hoc exigitur altior virtus, quae est virtus gratiae. Et ideo sine gratia homo non potest merert vitam aeternam. Potest tamen facere opera perducentia ad bonum aliquod homini connaturale, sicut laborare in agro, bibere, man- ducare et habere amicum et alia huiusmodi.” ; 35 For the necessary Augustinian citations in proof of this assertion see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Ac- tual, pp. 174 sqq. 04 AC UUALTGR AGE be supernatural either entitatively, quoad substantiam, or merely as to the manner of its existence, quoad modum. The supernaturale quoad substantiam is divided into the strictly supernatural and the merely preternatural.** The question is: To what category of the supernatural be- long the salutary acts which man performs by the aid of grace? Undoubtedly there are actual graces which are entitatively natural, e. g. the purely mediate grace of il- lumination,*’ the natural graces conferred in the pure state of nature, the actual graces of the sensitive sphere,** and the so-called cogitatio congrua of Vasquez.*® ‘The problem therefore narrows itself down to the t- mediate graces of intellect and will. Before the Tri- dentine Council theologians contented themselves with acknowledging the divinely revealed fact that these graces are supernatural ; it was only after the Council that they began to speculate on the precise character of this super- naturalitas. Some, following the teaching of the Scotist school, ascribed the supernatural character of salutary acts to their free acceptation on the part of God, holding them to be purely natural in their essence and raised to the super- natural sphere merely per denominationem extrinse- cam.*° This view is untenable. For if nature, as such, possessed the intrinsic power to perform salutary acts, irrespective of their acceptation by God, the Fathers and councils would err in teaching that this power is derived from the immediate graces of illumination and strengthening.* 36 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- self with regard to this point cfr. thor of Nature and the Supernatural, P. Minges, O.F.M., Die Gnaden- pp. 186 sqq. lehre des Duns Scotus auf ihren 87 V. supra, pp. 20. angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semi- 38 V. supra, pp. 26 sq. pelagianismus gepriift, Minster 1906. 39 V. supra, pp. 69 sqq. 41 This is true of man even in the 40 On the teaching of Scotus him- exalted state in which he existed in PHE NECHSSIVY) OP VAC TUAL GRACE 95 Others hold that the salutary acts which grace enables man to perform, are supernatural only quoad modum; because while it is the Holy Ghost Himself who incites the natural faculties to salutary thoughts and good re- solves, He does not eo ipso raise these thoughts and re- solves to the supernatural plane. This theory, besides be- ing open to the same objection which we have urged against the first, involves another difficulty. If all salu- tary acts were supernatural only quoad modum, sanctify- ing grace, which is as certainly supernatural in its essence as the beatific vision of God,!2 would cease to have an adequate purpose; for the intrinsic reason for its exist- ence is precisely that it raises the nature of the justified into a permanent supernatural state of being. A third school of theologians tries to solve the difficulty by adding to the natural operation of the intellect and the will some accidental supernatural modus. There are sev- eral such modi, which, though inhering in nature and really distinct therefrom, depend solely on the Holy Ghost, and consequently transcend the natural powers of man, e. g. the duration or intensity of a salutary act. This theory at first blush appears more plausible than the other two, but it cannot be squared with the teaching of Tradition. In the first place, the duration or intensity of a salutary act cannot affect its essence or nature. Then again, every such accidental supernatural modus is produced either by grace alone, or by grace working con- jointly with free-will. In the former hypothesis it would be useless, because it would not render the free salutary act, as such, supernatural; in the latter case it could do no Paradise. It is true also of the 42 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- angels. It is true even of the hu- thor of Nature and the Supernatural, man nature of our Lord Jesus Christ pp. 190 sqq. Himself. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Christ- ology, pp. 221 sqq. 96 ACTUAL GRACE more than aid the will to do what is morally impossible, whereas every salutary act is in matter of fact a physical impossibility, that is, impossible to unaided nature.* There remains a fourth explanation, which ascribes to every salutary act an ontological, substantial, intrinsic supernaturalitas, whereby it is elevated to a higher and essentially different plane of being and operation. This theory is convincingly set forth by Suarez in his treatise on the Necessity of Grace.** It may be asked: If the salutary acts which we perform are supernatural in substance, why are we not conscious of the fact? The answer is not far to seek. Philosophical analysis shows that the intrinsic nature of our psychic operations is no more a subject of immedi- ate consciousness than the substance of the soul itself. Consequently, sanctifying grace cannot reveal its pres- ence through our inner consciousness. Having no in- tuitive knowledge of our own Ego, we are compelled to specify the different acts of the soul by means of their respective objects and their various tendencies (cogni- tion, volition). To our consciousness the supernatural love of God does not present itself as essentially different from the natural.* ARTICLE 3 THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE FOR THE STATES OF UNBELIEF, MORTAL SIN, AND JUSTIFICATION Every adult man, viewed in his relation to actual grace, is in one of three distinct states: 43 Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Ac- 45 On the whole subject of this tuah, p. 184. Article cfr. S. Schiffini, De Gratia 44 Suarez, De Necessitate Gratiae, Divina, pp. 227 sqq.; Rademacher, List 4. Natur und Gnade, M. Gladbach 1908. THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 97 (1) The state of unbelief (status infidelitatis), which may be either negative, as in the case of heathens, or positive, as in the case of apostates and formal heretics; (2) The state of mortal sin (status peccati mortalis), when the sinner has already received, or not yet lost, the grace of faith, which is the beginning of justifica- tion ; (3) The state of justification itself (status iustitiae sive gratiae sanctificantis), in which much remains yet to be done to attain eternal happiness. The question we have now to consider is: Does man need actual grace in every one of these three states, and if so, to what extent? I. SEMIPELAGIANISM.—Semipelagianism is an attempt to effect a compromise between Pelagian- ism and Augustinism by attributing to mere na- ture a somewhat greater importance in matters of salvation than St. Augustine was willing to ad- mit. a) After Augustine had for more than twenty years vigorously combatted and finally defeated Pelagianism, some pious monks of Marseilles,. under the leadership of John Cassian, Abbot of St. Victor,’ tried to find middle ground between his teaching and that of the Pelagians. Cassian’s treatise Collationes Patrum,? and the reports sent to St. Augustine by his disciples Pros- per and Hilary, enable us to form a pretty fair idea of the Semipelagian system. Its principal tenets were the following: 1 Died 432. On his life and works 2 Reproduced in Migne, P.. L., see Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, XLIX, 477-1328. Pp- 515 sqq. 98 ACTUAL GRACE a) There is a distinction between the “ beginning of faith” (initium fide, affectus credulitatis) and “ increase | in faith” (augmentum fide). The former depends en- tirely on the will, while the latter, like faith itself, re-. quires the grace of Christ. ) 8B) Nature can merit grace by its own efforts, though this natural merit (meritum naturae) is founded on equity only (meritum de congruo), and does not confer a right in strict justice, as Pelagius contended. y) Free-will, after justification, can of its own power secure the gift of final perseverance (donum perseve- rantiae) ; which consequently is not a special grace, but a purely natural achievement. 8) The bestowal or denial of baptismal grace in the case of infants, who can have no previous merita de congruo, depends on their hypothetical future merits or demerits as foreseen by God from all eternity.® b) Informed of these errors by his disciples, St. Augustine energetically set to work, and in spite of his advanced age wrote two books against the Semipelagians, entitled respectively, De Praedes- tinatione Sanctorum and De Dono Perseve- rantiae. The new teaching was not yet, however, regarded as formally heretical, and Augustine treated his opponents with great consideration, in fact he humbly acknowledged that he himself 3 This contention is false, but it servarentur vitam, scientia divina has never been proscribed as hereti- praeviderit.”’ On this absurd asser- cal. Prosper says in his Ep. 226, 5: tion see Pohle-Preuss, God: His “Tales aiunt perdi talesque [in- Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, fantes] salvari, quales futuros illos pp. 380 sa. im annis maioribus, st ad activam THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL. GRACE «99 had professed similar errors before his consecra- from (01), 204) .4 After Augustine’s death, Prosper and Hilary went to Rome and interested Pope Celestine in their cause. In a dogmatic letter addressed to the Bishops of Gaul, the Pontiff formally ap- proved the teaching of St. Augustine on grace and original sin, but left open such other “more pro- found and difficult incidental questions” as pre- destination and the manner in which grace ope- rates inthe soul.’ But as this papal letter (called “Indiculus’) was an instruction rather than an ex-cathedra definition, the controversy continued until, nearly a century later (A.D. 529), the Second Council of Orange, convoked by St. Caesarius of Arles, formally condemned the Semi- pelagian heresy. This council, or at least its first eight canons,° received the solemn approbation of Pope Boniface II (A. D. 530) and thus became vested with ecumenical authority.’ 2. [HE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—The Catholic Church teaches the absolute necessity of actual grace for all stages on the way to salva- 4De Praedest. Sanctorum, c. 3, n. 7: “. .. putans fidem, qua in Deum credimus, non esse donum 6Ernst (Werke und Tugenden der Ungliubigen nach Augustinus, Freiburg 1871) contends that the Det, sed a nobis esse in nobis et per tllam nos impetrare Dei dona, quibus temperanter et iuste et pie vivamus in hoc saeculo.’’ 5Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, En- chiridion, n. 128 sqq. x approbation of Boniface II comprised all the canons of this synod. 7 Cfr. F, Worter, Zur Dogmenge- schichte des Semipelagianismus, Miinster 1900, 100 ACTUAL GRACE tion. We shall demonstrate this in five separate theses. . Thesis I: Prevenient grace is absolutely necessary, not only for faith, but for the very beginning of faith. This is de fide. Proof. The Second Council of Orange defined against the Semipelagians: “If any one say that increase in faith, as well as the beginning of faith, and the very impulse by which we are led to be- lieve in Him who justifies the sinner, and by which we obtain the regeneration of holy Baptism, is in us not as a gift of grace, that is to say, through the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, but by nature, . . is an adversary of the dogmatic teaching of theiApostles, 22.5)" a) This is thoroughly Scriptural doctrine, as St. Augustine? and Prosper proved. 5t. Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians had opened the eyes of Augustine, as he himself admits. 1 Gor, IV,:72 .For ‘who: distingnisheth * theer™ Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?’ The Apostle 8 Conc. Arausic. II, can. 5 (Den- zinger-Bannwart, n. 178): “Si quis sicut augmentum, ita etiam initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis affectum, quo in eum credimus qui tustificat impium et ad regenerationem sacri baptismatis pervenimus, non per gratiae donum, i. e. per inspirationem Spiritus S.,... sed naturaliter nobis inesse dicit, apostolicis dogmatibus adversarius approbatur.”’ Cr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 3. (Den- zinger-Bannwart, n. 1791). 9In his treatise De Praedestina- tione Sanctorum. 10In his work Adversus Colla- torem. 11 Discernit, Siaxpiver. THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE io! means tosay: In matters pertaining to salvation no man has any advantage over his fellow men, because all receive of the grace of God without any merits of their own. This statement would be false if any man were able to perform even the smallest salutary act without the aid of grace. With a special view to faith the same Apostle teaches: “For by grace you are saved through faith,? and that not of yourselves,'* for it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory.” 1° This, too, would be false if faith could be traced to a purely natural in- stinct or to some meritum de congruo in the Semi- pelagian sense.*7 Our Lord Himself, in his famous discourse on the Holy Eucharist, unmistakably describes faith and man’s preparation for it as an effect of pre- venient grace. “No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him.” ?8 The meta- phorical expression “come to me,” according to the con- text, means “believe in me;’ whereas the Father’s “drawing” plainly refers to the operation of prevenient grace. Cfr. John VI, 65 sq.: ‘‘ But there are some of you that believe not. ... Therefore did I say to you, that no man can come to me, unless it be given him by the Father.” John VI, 29: “This is the work of God,’ that you believe in him whom he hath sent.” Ac- cording to our Saviour’s own averment, therefore, preaching is of no avail unless grace gives the first impulse leading to faith. 12 Per fidem, Sia wiorews: 17, Cie; Romy thre. Zoi sags Lx. 13 Non ex vobis, odx é& Dav. 75 sqq. 14 Det donum, Oeov Td dapov. 18 John VI, 44: ‘‘ Nemo potest 15 Non ex operibus, ovx é& épyw- venire ad me, nist Pater, qui misit 16 Eph. II, 8 sq. me, traxertt (EXkvon) eum.” 19 Opus Dei, 7d Epyov Tov Qeov- 102 ACTUAL GRACE b) As regards the argument from Tradition, it will suffice to show that the Fathers who wrote before Augustine, ascribed the beginning of faith to prevenient grace. a) In the light of the Augustinian dictum that “ prayer is the surest proof of grace,” ?° it is safe to assume that St. Justin Martyr voiced our dogma when he put into the mouth of a venerable old man the words: “ But thou pray above all that the gates of light may be opened unto thee; for no man is able to understand the words of the prophets [as praeambula fidei] unless God and His Christ have revealed their meaning.” 74 Augustine him- self appeals to SS. Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory of Nazianzus, and then continues: “Such doctors, and so great as these, saying that there is nothing of which we may boast as of our own, which God has not given us; and that our very heart and our thoughts are not in our own power, ... attribute these things to the grace of God, acknowledge them as God’s gifts, testify that they come to us from Him and are not from our- pelviens 1/47 B) Like the Pelagians in their teaching on original sin,?? the Semipelagians in their teaching on grace re- lied mainly on the authority of St. John Chrysostom, from whose writings they loved to quote such perplex- ing passages as this: “ We must first select the good, 20Ep., 177: “ Oratio est clarise stra esse,... haec utique gratiae sima gratiae testificatio.” 21 Dial. c. Tryph. 22 De Dono Persev., c. 19, N. 50: “« Tsti tales tantique doctores dicentes non esse aliquid, de quo tamquam de nostro quod nobis Deus non dederit gloriemur nec ipsum cor nostrum et cogitationes nostras in potestate na- Dei tribuunt, Det munera agnoscunt, ab ipso nobis, non a nobis esse tes- tantur.’— For additional Patristic texts see Palmieri, De Gratia Div. Act., pp. 290 sqq. 23 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- thor of Nature and the Supernat- ural, pp. 239 Sqq. JHE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE ‘102 and then God adds what ‘is of His; He does not forestall our will because He does not wish to destroy our lib- erty. But once we have made our choice, He gives us much help. For while it rests with us to choose and to will antecedently, it lies with him to perfect and bring to ampissue./ To understand St. Chrysostom’s attitude, and that of the Oriental Fathers generally, we must remember that the Eastern Church considered it one of its chief duties to safeguard the dogma of free-will against the Manichaeans, who regarded man as an abject slave of Fate. In such an environment it was of supreme importance to champion the freedom of the will 25 and to insist on the maxim: “Help yourself and God will help you.” If the necessity of prevenient grace was not sufficiently emphasized, the circumstances of the time explain, and to some extent excuse, the mistake. St. Au- gustine himself remarks in his treatise on the Predestina- tion of the Saints: “ What need is there for us to look into the writings of those who, before this heresy sprang up, had no necessity of dwelling on a question so difficult of solution as this, which beyond a doubt they would do if they were compelled to answer such [errors as these] ? Whence it came about that they touched upon what they thought of God’s grace briefly and cursorily in some pas- sages of their writings.” 2° Palmieri remarks 2? that it would be easy to cite a number of similar passages from the writings of the early Latin Fathers before Pelagius, 24 Hom. in Heb., 12, n. 3. 25 V. infra, Ch. III, Sect. 1. 26De Praedest. Sanct., c. 14: * Quid opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quaes- tione versari? Quod procul dubio facerent, si respondere talibus coge- rentur. Unde factum est, ut de gratia Dei quid sentirent breviter quibusdam scriptorum suorum locis et transeunter aitingerent.’’ 27 De Gratia Div. Act., p. 288. 104. ACTUAL. GRACE who certainly cannot be suspected of Semipelagian lean- ings.*® | The orthodoxy of St. Chrysostom established by a twofold argument. the First recommended him as a reliable defender of the Catholic faith against Nestorianism and Pelagian- ‘ism.2® (2) Chrysostom rejected Semipelagianism as it were in advance when he taught: “ Not even faith 1s of ourselves; for if He [God] had not come, if He had not called, how should we have been able to believe?” *° and again when he says in his explanation of the Pau- line phrase dpxyyds 79s wiorews: + “ He Himself hath implanted the faith in us, He Himself hath given the beginning.” *? These utterances are diametrically op- posed to the heretical teaching of the Semipelagians.” can be positively c) The theological argument for our thesis is effectively formulated by Oswald * as follows: “Tt is faith which first leads man from the sphere of nature into a higher domain,—faith is the be- ginning of salutary action. That this beginning must come wholly from God, and that it cannot come from man, goes without saying. By be- ginning we mean the very first beginning. Whether we call this first beginning itself faith, or speak, as the Semipelagians did, of certain pre- (1) Pope Celestine | | 28 Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Super- naturali, 1, I, disp. 17, sect. IT. 29 Ep., 24 (to Maximilian, Pa- triarch of Constantinople): “ Se- quere priorum, a quibus eruditus es et nutritus, exempla pontificum, beatissimi Ioannis scientiam, sanctt Attici in repugnandis haeresibus vigt- lantiam.” 30 Hom. in 1 Cor., XII, n. 2. 31 Hom. in Ep. ad Hebr., XII, 2. 32 A’ros év quiv twiotiy évéOnoer; avros THY apxny Edwker. 33 They are fully explained by Pal- mieri, J. c., pp. 295 sqq. 34 Die Lehre von der Heiligung, p. 161, Paderborn 1885. His NECESSITY OR ACTUAL GRACE 105 ambles of faith,—aspirations, impulses, desires leading to faith (praeambula fidei: conatus, desi- deria, credulitatis affectus), makes no difference. Wherever the supernatural domain of salutary action begins—and it is divided off from the natural by a very sharp line—there it is God who begins and not man, there it is grace which pre- cedes,—gratia praeveniens, as it has come to be _ known by a famous term.” Indeed, if man were able by his own power to merit for himself the first beginnings of grace, then faith it- self, and justification which is based on faith, and the _ beatific vision, would not be strictly graces. As for the precise moment when prevenient grace be- gins its work in the soul, the common Opinion is that the very first judgment which a man forms as to the credibility of divine revelation (iudicium credubilitatis ) is determined by the immediate grace of the intellect,% and that the subsequent affectus credulitatis springs from the strengthening grace of the will. St. Augustine, commenting on 2 Cor. III, 5, demonstrates this as fol- lows: _ “Let them give attention to this, and well weigh these words, who think that the beginning of faith is of ourselves, and the increase of faith is of God. For who cannot see that thinking is prior to believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. . . . Therefore, in what pertains to religion and piety [of which the Apostle was speaking], if we are not capable of thinking anything as of our- selves, but our sufficiency is of God, we are certainly not 35 V. supra, pp. 19 sqq., 27 sq. 106 ACTUAL GRACE capable of believing anything as of ourselves, since we cannot do this without thinking, but our sufficiency, by which we begin to believe, is of God.” *° Thesis II: The sinner, even after he has received the faith, stands in absolute need of prevenient and co- operating grace for every single salutary act required in the process of justification. This proposition also embodies an article of faith. Proof. The Semipelagians ascribed the dispo- sitions necessary for justification to the natural efforts of the will, thereby denying the necessity of prevenient grace. This teaching was con- demned as heretical by the Second Council of Or- ange (A. D. 529),*" and again by the Council of Trent, which defined: “If any one saith that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without His help, man can believe, hope, love, or be penitent as he ought, so that the erace of justification may be bestowed upon him; let him be anathema.” ** 36 De Praedest. Sanct., c. 2, N. 5: “ Attendant hic et verba perpendant, — qui putant ex nobis esse fidet coep- tum et ex Deo esse fidei supplemen- tum. Quis enim non videat prius esse cogitare quam credere? Nullus quippe credit aliquid nist prius cogitaverit esse credendum...- Quod ergo pertinet ad religionem atque pietatem, si non sumus idonet cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismet ipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est, profecto non sumus idonet credere aliquid quasi ex nobismet a ipsis, quod sine cogitatione non possumus, sed sufficientia nostra, qua credere incipiamus, ex Deo est.”’— Cfr., also the seventh canon of the Second Council of Orange (Den- zinger-Bannwart, mn. 180), and Suarez, De Fide, disp. 6, sect. 7 Sq. Ipem, De Gratia, III, 7. 37 Conc. Arausic. II, can. 7. 38 Sess. VI, can. 3: “Si quis dixerit, sine praeveniente Spiritus Sancti inspiratione atque eis adiu- THE NECESSITY OBJ ACTUAL, GRACE 107 a) The Scriptural texts which we have quoted against Pelagianism *° also apply to the semipelas. gian heresy. Our Lord’s dictum: “ Without me you can do noth- ing,” *° proves the necessity of prevenient and co-operat- ing grace, not only at the beginning of every salutary act, but also for its continuation and completion. St. Augustine clearly perceived this. “ That he might tarnish a reply to the future Pelagius,”’ he observes, our Lord does not say: Without me you can with dif- ficulty do anything; but He says: Without me you can do nothing. . . . He does not say: Without me you can perfect nothing, but do nothing. For if He had said perfect, they might say that God’s aid is necessary, not for beginning good, which is of ourselves, but for per- fecting it. . For when the Lord says, Without me you can a6 nie ae in this one word He comprehends both the fernnaay oA the, end://}43 St. Paul expressly ascribes the salvation of man to grace when he says: “... with fear and trembling work out your salvation; for it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish.” 4? The Tridentine Council, as we have seen, designates the four salutary acts of faith, hope, love, and penitence as a preparation for justification. Now St. Paul teaches: difficile potestis facere, sed ait: Sine me nihil potestis facere.... Non torio hominem credere, sperare, di- ligere aut poenitere posse, sicut oportet, ut et iustificationis gratia ait: conferatur, anathema sit.’? (Den- zinger-Bannwart, n. 813.) 89 Supra, pp. 87 sqq. 40 John XV, 5: “Sine me nihil potestis facere.’’ 41 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag., II, 8:° “Dominus ut responderet futuro Pelagio non ait: Sine me sine me nihil potestis perficere, sed facere. Hoc uno verbo initium finemque comprehendit.’’ 42 Phil. II, 12 sqi: “ Cum-metu et tremore vestram salutem (cwrnpiav) operamini; Deus est enim quit operatur in vobis et velle et perficere.”’ 108 ACTUAL: GRACE “The God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in be- lieving, that you may abound in hope and in the power of the Holy Ghost;’** and St. John: “Charity is of God") 4* b) The argument from Tradition is chiefly based on St. Augustine, who in his two treatises against the Semipelagians, and likewise in his earlier writings, inculcates the necessity of grace for all stages on the way to salvation. Thus he writes in his Enchiridion: “Surely, if no Christian will dare to say this: It is not of God that showeth mercy, but of man that willeth, lest he should openly contradict the Apostle, it follows that the true interpretation of the saying (Rom. IX, 16): ‘It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,’ is that the whole work be- longs to God, who both prepares the good will that is to be helped, and assists it when it is prepared. For the good will of man precedes many of God’s gifts, but not all; and it must itself be included among those which it does not precede. We read in Holy Scripture, both ‘ God’s mercy shall prevent me’ (Ps. LVIII, 11), and ‘ Thy mercy will follow me’ (Ps. XXII, 6). It precedes the unwilling to make him willing; it follows the willing to render his will effectual. Why are we taught to pray for our enemies, who are plainly unwilling to lead a holy life, unless it be that God may work willingness in them? And why 48 Rom. XV, 13: “Deus autem Deo est (h dydrn éx Tov Oceov spei repleat vos omni gaudio et pace éortwy).’ Cfr. also John VI, 44 saq., in credendo (éy r@ miorevery), ut which text is fully explained by abundetis in spe (év rq édmld.) et Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 128 virtute Spiritus Sancti.’’ sqq. 447° John IV, 7: “Caritas ex tia ee a ae Rimeatas= SS | | | ) i TAB ONECHSSITY) OF ACTUAL GRACE 109 are we admonished to ask that we may receive, unless it be that He who has created in us the wish, may Him- self satisfy the same? We pray, then, for our enemies, that the mercy of God may precede them, as it has preceded us; we pray for ourselves, that His mercy may follow us.” 4 That grace accompanies us uninterruptedly on the way to Heaven is also the teaching of St. Jerome: “ To will and to run is my own act; but without the constant aid of God, even my own act will not be mine; for Perxpostie says (Phil. Il, 13): “It is God who work. eth in you, both to will and to accomplishy?/ti) tis not sufficient for me that He gave it once, unless He gives it always.” St. Ephraem Syrus prays in the name of the Oriental Church: “T possess nothing, and if I possess anything, Thou [O God] hast given it to me... . I ask only for 45 Enchiridion, c. 32: “Porro si nullus dicere Christianus audebit: Non miserentis est Det, sed volentis est hominis, ne Apostolo apertissime contradicat, restat ut propterea dic- tum intelligatur (Rom. LX Wea 6))i “Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei,’ ut totum Deo detur, qui hominis voluntatem bonam et praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam. Praecedit enim bona voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed non omnia; quae autem non prae- cedit ipsa, in tis est et ipsa. Nam utrumque legitur in sanctis eloquiis: et (Ps. LVIII, 11): ‘ Misericordia eius praeveniet me,’ et (Bs OXOrD 6): ‘ Misericordia eius subseque- tur me.’ Nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit. Cur enim admonemur orare pro inimicis nostris, utique nolentibus pie vivere, nisi ut Deus in illis operetur et velle? Itemque cur admonemur petere ut accipiamus, nisi ut ab illo fiat quod volumus, a quo factum est ut velimus? Ora- mus ergo pro inimicis nostris, ut misericordia Dei praeveniat eos, sicut praevenit et nos; oramus autem pro nobis, ut misericordia eius subsequatur nos.” On this im- portant passage cfr. J. B. Faure, Notae in Enchiridion S, Augustini, c. 32. Similar expressions will be found in Contra Duas Epist. Pelag., II, 9 and De Gratia et Lib. Arb., Clty. i i 46 Ep. ad Ctesiph., 133: “ Velle et currere meum est, sed ipsum meum sine Det semper auxilio non erit meum; dicit enim Apostolus (Phil. IT, 13): ‘Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et perfi- cere”... Non mihi suffcit, quod semel donavit, nisi semper do- naverit.” TIO ACTUAL GRACE grace and acknowledge that I shall be saved through Thee. a4 | The Second Council of Orange summarizes the teach- ing of Tradition on the subject under consideration.” c) The theological argument for our thesis is based on the character of the adoptive sonship re- sulting from the process of justification.*® This sonship (filiatio adoptiva) is essentially supernat- ural, and hence can be attained only by strictly supernatural acts, which unaided nature 1s both morally and physically incapable of perform- ; 50 ing Thesis III: Even in the state of sanctifying grace man is not able to perform salutary acts, unless aided by actual graces. This is likewise de fide. Proof. The faculties of the just man are per- manently kept in the supernatural sphere by sanc- tifying grace and by the habits of faith, hope, and charity. Hence the just man in the performance of salutary acts does not require the same measure of prevenient grace as the unregenerate sinner, 47 Serm, de Pret. Marg. baptismum cum ipsius adiutorio ea, 48 Conc. Arausic. II (A.D. 529); quae sibi sunt placita, implere pos- “ Hoc etiam salubriter profitemur simus.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. et credimus, quod in omni opere 200.) bono non nos incipimus et postea 49 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- per Dei misericordiam adiuvamur, thor of Nature and the Supernat- sed ipse nobis nullis praecedentibus ural, pp. 192 sqq. bonis meritis et fidem et amorem suit 50 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Di- prius inspirat, ut et baptismi sacra- vind, pp. 132 Sd menta fideliter requiramus et post ew escola eae Ae Pigayte fats =o: THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE | tar who lacks all, or at least some, of the habits men- tioned. The question here at issue, therefore, can only be: Is actual grace (as gratia excitans s. vocans, not elevans ) absolutely necessary to enable a man in the state of sanctifying grace to perform salutary acts? The answer is — Yes, and this teaching is so firmly grounded on Sacred Scripture and Tradition, and so emphatically sanctioned by the Church, that we do not hesitate to follow Per- rone in qualifying it as de fide. The councils in their teaching on the necessity of grace, assert that neces- sity alike for the justified and the unjustified. That of Trent expressly declares: ‘“ Whereas Jesus Christ Him- self continually infuses His virtue into the justified,—as the head into the members, and the vine into the branches, —and this virtue always precedes and accompanies and follows their good works, which without it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God, we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justi- med 2 V7? 52 a) Our thesis can be easily proved from Holy Scripture. We have already shown that the Bible and Tradition make no distinction between the different stages on the way to salvation, or between different salutary acts, but indiscrimin- 51 Perrone, De Gratia, n. 203: “ Quaestio haec non ad scholasticas quaestiones pertinet, sed est dogma bona eorum opera semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur et sine ‘qua nullo pacto Deo grata et fidet ab Ecclesia definitum.’’ meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis 52Sess. VI, cap. 16: “Quum iustificatis amplius deesse creden- enim ille ipse Christus Iesus tam- dum est.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, quam caput in membra et tamquam n. 809.) Cfr. Tepe, Institutiones vitis in palmites in ipsos iustificatos tugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus Theologicae, Vol. III, pp. 41 sqq., . Paris 1896, 112 ACTUAL GRACE ately postulate for all the illuminating grace of the intellect and the strengthening grace of the will. It follows that to perform salutary acts the justified no less than the unjustified need actual grace. Our Saviour’s pithy saying: “Without me you can do nothing,” °* was not ad- dressed to unbelievers or sinners, but to His Apos- tles, who were in the state of sanctifying grace.” This interpretation is fully borne out by Tradition. St. Augustine, after laying it down as a general princi- ple that “‘ We can of ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without God either working that we may will, or co-operating when we will,” * says of jus- tied man in particular: “The Heavenly Physician cures our maladies, not only that they may cease to ex- ist, but in order that we may ever afterwards be able to walk aright,—a task to which we should be un- equal, even after our healing, were it not for His con- tinued help. . . . For just as the eye of the body, even when completely sound, is unable to see, unless aided by the brightness of light, so also man, even when fully jus- tified, is unable to lead a holy life, unless he be ‘divinely assisted by the eternal light of righteousness.” °° This agrees with the practice of the Church in ex- 53 John XV, 5. 54 V. supra, pp. 87 sq. Other per- tinent Scriptural texts are: 2 Cor. PED se. Phil ae" sqrt aairsqs Heb. XIII, 21. 55 De Gratia et Lib. Arb., c.' 17: “Sine illo vel operante vel co- operante quum volumus ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus.”’ 56 De Natura et Gratia, c. 26: “Mala nostra non ad hoc solum medicus supernus sanat, ut illa iam non sint, sed ut de cetero recte ambulare possimus, quod quidem etiam sani nonnisi illo adiuvante poterimus. ... Sicut oculus cor- poris etiam plenissime sanus, nist candore lucis adiutus non potest cernere, sic et homo etiam perfec- tissime iustificatus, nisi aeternae luce iustitiae divinitus adiuvetur, recte non potest vivere.” THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 113 horting all men without exception, saints as well as sinners, to pray: -“ Precede, we beseech Thee, O Lord, our actions by Thy holy inspiration, and carry them on by Thy gracious assistance, that every prayer and work of ours may begin always from Thee, and through Thee be happily ended.” °7 b) Some theologians have been led by certain speculative difficulties to deny the necessity of ac- tual grace in the state of justification. Man in the state of justification, they argue, is en- dowed with sanctifying grace, the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity, and the infused moral vir- tues, and consequently possesses all those qualifications which are necessary to enable him to perform salutary acts with the supernatural concurrence of God. Why should the will, thus supernaturally equipped, require the aid of additional actual graces to enable it to per- form strictly supernatural, and therefore salutary, ac- tions ? *8 We reply: The necessity of actual grace in the state of justification is so clearly taught by divine Reve- lation that no theological theory is tenable which denies it. Besides, the objection we have briefly summarized disregards some very essential considerations, e. g.\ that there remains in man, even after justification, concu- piscence, which is accompanied by a certain weakness 57 “ Actiones nostras, quaesumus Domine; aspirando praeveni et adiu- vando prosequere, ut cuncta nostra oratio et operatio a te semper inci- piat et per te coepta finiatur.” (Missale Romanum.) The argu- ment from Tradition is more fully developed by Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 28. 58 Thus Molina (Concord., qu. 14, art. 13 disp. 8), Bellarmine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb., VI, 15), and Thomassin; the question is well treated by Ruiz, De Providentia ‘Divina, disp. 41, sect. 5 sq. 114 ACTUAL GRACE that requires at least the gratia sanans sive medicinalis to heal it.°° Furthermore, a quiescent habitus cannot set itself in motion, but must be determined from with- out; that is to say, in our case, it must be moved by the gratia excitans to elicit supernatural thoughts and to will supernatural acts. Just as a seed cannot sprout without the aid of appropriate stimuli, so sanctifying grace is incapable of bearing fruit unless stimulated by the sunshine and moisture of actual graces. Man may perform purely natural acts even though he be in the supernatural state of grace; hence if any particular act of his is to be truly supernatural and conducive to eter- nal salvation, God must lend His special aid.®° Thesis IV: Except by a special privilege of divine grace, man, even though he be in the state of sanctify- ing grace, is unable to avoid venial sin throughout life. This is likewise de fide. Proof. The Pelagians held that man is able to avoid sin, nay to attain to absolute impecca- bility,°t without supernatural assistance. Against this error the Second Council of Mileve (A. D. 416) defined: “It likewise hath pleased [the holy Synod] that whoever holds that the words of the Our’ Father:': “Forgive us our. tres- passes,’ when pronounced by saintly men, are pronounced in token of humility, but not truth- fully, should be anathema.” ** Still more to the 59 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- 61 Impeccantia, dvapaprnotla. matische Theologie, Vol. VIII, 62“ Item placuit ut quicunque § 399, Mainz 1897. ipsa verba dominicae orationis, ubt 60 Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Super- dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, naturali, disp. 106, sect. 3 sqq. ita volunt a sanctis dici, ut humili- THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 115 point is the following declaration of the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that a man once justified . . . is able, during his whole life, to avoid all sins, even those that are venial, except by a special grace from God, as the Church holds in regard of the Blessed Virgin; let him be fandthema,’’ * To obtain a better understanding of this Tridentine definition it will be well to ponder the following con- siderations: The Council declares that it is impossible for man, even in the state of sanctifying grace, to avoid all sins during his whole life, except by virtue of a special priv-_ ilege such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin’ Mary.* A venial sin is one which, because of the unimportance of the precept involved, or in consequence of incom- plete consent, does not destroy the state of grace. Such a sin may be either deliberate or semi-deliberate, A - semi-deliberate venial sin is one committed in haste or surprise. It is chiefly sins of this kind that the Tridentine Council had in view. For no one would seriously assert that with the aid of divine grace a saint could not avoid at least all deliberate venial sins for a considerable length of time. The phrase “in tota vita” indicates a period of some length, though its limits are rather difficult to determine. Were a man to die im- mediately after justification, the Tridentine canon would ter hoc; non veraciter dicatur, ana- ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemad- thema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, modum de beata virgine tenet Eccle- n. 108.) sia, anathema sit.’ (Denzinger- 63 Sess. VI, can. 23: “Si quis Bannwart, n. 833.) hominem semel iustificatum dixerit 64 On this privilege of our Blessed ++. posse in tota vita peccata Lady see Pohle-Preuss, Mariology, omnia etiam venialia vitare nisi ‘pp. 72 sqq., St. Louis 1914. 116 ACTUAL GRACE per accidens not apply to him. As the Council says in another place that “men, how holy and just soever, at times fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial,”’ * it is safe practically to limit the period of possible freedom from venial sin to one day. Theo- retically, of course, it may be extended much farther. The phrase “ ommia peccata”’ must be interpreted collect- ively, not distributively, for a sin that could not be avoided would cease to be a sin. For the same reason the term “non posse” must be understood of (moral, not physical) disability ; in other words, the difficulty of avoiding sin with the aid of ordinary graces for any considerable length of time, is insuperable even for the just. This moral impossibility of avoiding sin can be removed only by a special privilege, such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin Mary. It may incidentally be asked whether this privilege was also granted to other saints, notably St. Joseph and St. John the Baptist. Suarez lays it down as a theological conclusion that no human be- ing has ever been or ever will be able entirely to avoid venial sin except by a special privilege, which must in each case be proved. Palmieri maintains that the moral impossibility of leading an absolutely sinless life without the special assistance of grace is taught by indirection in the canons of Mileve (416) and Carthage (418), which declare that no such life has ever been led by mortal man without that assistance. a) The Scriptural argument for our thesis was fully developed by the councils just mentioned. Cemensy UNE. Caps. SEs yo cadunt.”” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. quantumvis sancti et iusti in levia saltem et quotidiana, quae etiam venialia dicuntur, peccata quandoque 804.) 66 De Gratia Divina Actuali, p. 236. MBO NECE Soll Y OROACTUAL GRACKH: |), tam The careful student will note, however, that those texts only are strictly conclusive which positively and exclusively refer to venial sins. Thus when St. James says: “In many things we all of- fend,’ *’ he cannot mean that all Christians now and then necessarily commit mortal sin. For St. John expressly declares that ““Whosoever abideth in him [Christ], sinneth not.” ® It follows that not even the just can wheily avoid venial sin. Hence the most devout and pious Christian may truthfully repeat the petition of the Lord’s Prayer which says: “Forgive us our trespasses,’° as we forgive those who trespass against us.” “° Profoundly conscious of the sin- fulness of the entire human race, the author of the Book of Proverbs exclaims: ‘Who can say, _ My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?” 7 Other Scripture texts commonly cited in confirmation of our thesis lack cogency, because they either deal exclusively with mortal sin or do not refer to sin at all. Thus Prov. XXIV, 16: “A just man shall fall seven times and shall rise again,” is meant of temporal adversities.77 Eccles. VII, 21: “ There is no just man 67 Epistle of St. James, III, 2: dicere: Mundum est cor meum, “In multis enim offendimus omnes purus sum a peccato?”? (ro\dd yap mralowev &rayres).” 72 On this text cfr. J. V. Bain- 681 John III, 6: “ Omnis qui in vel, Les Contresens Bibliques des eo [scil. Christo] manet, non Prédicateurs, 2nd ed., Dp. 102 sq:, peccat.” Paris 1906: “... ces chutes sont 69 épeuAnuaTa. ; surtout les souffrances, les tribula- 70 Matth. VI, 12. Cfr. Mark XI, tions. Le contexte Vindique claire- 25. ; . ment: “N’attaquez pas le juste 71 Prov. XX, 9: “Quis potest (15); car Dieu le défend, et sil 118 ACTUAL GRACE upon earth, that doth good and sinneth not,’ can scarcely be understood of venial sin, because the sacred writer continues: “For thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast often spoken evil of others.’ 7* 1 John I, 8: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive our- selves, and the truth is not in us,” 7° would be a splen- did argument for our thesis, could it be shown that the Apostle had in mind only the venial sins com- mitted in the state of justification. This is, however, unlikely, as the term peccatum throughout St. John’s first Epistle “® is obviously employed in the sense of mortal sin.77 b) Tradition is again most effectively voiced by St. Augustine, who writes: ‘There are three points, as you know, which the Catholic Church tombe il se relévera; mais pour Vimpie cest la ruine irréparable,’ Peut-on, comme on le fait dordi- naire, entendre le texte des chutes morales, des péchés vémels? Plu- sieurs commentateurs répondent: non; et ils citent a Vappui saint Augustin: “Septies cadet iustus et resurget, itd est, quotiescumque cediderit, non peribit: quod non de iniquitatibus, sed de tribulationibus ad humilitatem perducentibus intel- high welt) CCivs ADF isxi,\' 31) — Diautres Péres, saint Jéréme par ex- emple, sont moins exclusifs; et de fait, pourquoi la maxime, dans sa plémitude, ne comprendrait-elle pas toutes sortes de chutes, péchés ou afflictions? En tout cas, c’est aller trop loin que de vouloir prouver par la la thése catholique sur V’impossi- bilité morale d’éviter pendant long- temps tout péché de_ fragilité. Lécrivain sacré veut dire autre chose, et mous avons des textes meilleures .. 3” 78 Eccles: VII, 21: °°‘ Non est enim homo iustus in terra, qui faciat bonum et non peccet.’ 74 Ibid., v, 23: “ Scit enim con- scientia tua, quia et tu crebro maledixisti aliis.” 75 rt John -I, 8: “St .dixerimus, quoniam peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus et veritas in nobis non est.”” TUE Gat) John, 1 0,eL ll) Ace he 8, et passim. 77 The Johannine text here under _ consideration does, however, furnish a telling argument against the Pela- gians, in so far as they denied the necessity of the atonement. The passage is effectively employed for this purpose by the Second Council of Mileve (can. 6, quoted in Den- zinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 106). -Cfr. Chr. Pesch, . Praelec- tiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., p- 99 and Al. Wurm, Die Irrlehrer im ersten Johannesbrief, Freiburg 1903. eS Ee a ae HEY NECESSI DY: OM ACTUAL GRACE jag chiefly maintains against them [the Pelagians]. One is, that the grace of God is not given accord- ing to our merits. . . . The second, that no one lives in this corruptible body in righteousness of any degree without sins of any kind. The third, that man is born obnoxious to the first man’s Poe. | bo Pelacius) vobjections . ih all men sin, then the just must die in their sins,” the holy Doctor replies: ‘With all his acuteness he | Pelagius] overlooks the circumstance that even righteous persons pray with good reason: ‘For- give us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.’ . Even if we cannot live without sin, we may yet die without sin, whilst the sin committed in ignor- ance or infirmity is blotted out in merciful for- giveness.”*? In another chapter of the same treatise he says: “If... wecould assemble all the afore-mentioned holy men and women, and ask them whether they lived without sin, would they not all exclaim with one voice: ‘If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and Piceuruth is notin us’ ?’’ °° 78 De Dono Perseverantiae, c. 2, 79 De Natura eét Gratia, c. 35, n. n. 4: “Tria sunt, ut scitis, quae 41: “Ubi parum attendit, quum maxime adversus eos [scil. Pela- sit acutissimus, non frustra etiam gianos| defendit Ecclesia, quorum iustos in oratione dicere: Dimitte est unum, gratiam Dei non secundum nobis debita nostra. ... Etiamsi merita nostra dari. .. Alterum est, hic non vivatur sine peccato, licet in quantacunque iustitia sine quali- mori sine peccato, dum subinde buscunque peccatis in. hoc corrup- veniad deletur, quod subinde igno- tibili corpore neminem vivere. Ter- vrantid vel infirmitate committitur.’” tium est, obnoxium nasci hominem 80 Ibid., c. 36. “Si omnes illos peccato primi hominis.” . sanctos et sanctas, quum hic vive- 120 ACTUAL, GRACE c) Wecome to the theological argument. The moral impossibility of avoiding venial sin for any considerable length of time results partly from the infirmity of human nature (infrmitas na- turae), partly from God’s pre-established plan of salvation (ordo divinae providentiae). a) The infirmity of human nature flows from four separate and distinct sources: (1) concupiscence (fomes peccatt) ; (2) imperfection of the ethical judgment (im- perfectio iudicu) ; (3) inconstancy of the will (incon- stantia voluntatis) ; and (4) the weariness caused by con- tinued resistance to temptation. In view of these agencies and their combined attack upon the will, theologians speak of a necessitas antecedens peccandi;—not as if the will were predestined to succumb to any one temp- tation in particular, but in the sense that it is morally unable to resist the whole series (suppositione dis- wncta). The will simply grows weaker and weaker, and in course of time fails to resist sin with sufficient energy. — , Let us exemplify. The proofsheets of a book are ] scrutinized by several trained readers, yet in spite of the greatest: care and many ingenious devices for the elimination of error, a perfect book, 7. e. one entirely | free from mistakes, is a practical impossibility. How _ much harder must it be for man to avoid moral lapses throughout his whole life, considering that he cannot — choose his own time for meeting temptations, but must rent, congregare possemus et inter- mus, ipsi nos seducimus et veritas rogare, utrum essent sine peccato, in nobis non est? ’’— For other con- - . nonne una voce clamassent: Si firmatory Patristic texts see Suarez, dixerimus quia peccatum non habe- De Gratia, IX, 8. THEO NECESSITY OR VACTUAL GRACKH "rt keep his mind and will under constant control and be prepared to resist the enemy at any moment.*! St. Thomas Aquinas says: “Man cannot avoid all venial sin, because his sensual appetite is depraved. True, reason is able to suppress the individual stirrings of this appetite. In fact, it is on this account that they are voluntary and partake of the nature of sin. But reason is not able to suppress them all [collectively ], because, while it tries to resist one, there perhaps arises another, and, furthermore, reason is not always in a condition to exercise the vigilance necessary to avoid such impulses.” 2 ; It follows that the necessitas peccandi antecedens does not destroy the liberty of the will or the moral imputability of those venial sins which a man actually commits; for it is merely a necessitas indeterminata, which refers not to certain particular instances, but to the one or other indeterminately. It follows further that God does not command the impossible when He insists that we should avoid venial sin, for He does not in each single case command something which is physically or morally impossible,** but merely demands a perfection which in itself is not entirely unattainable hic et nunc with the assistance of ordinary grace.S¢ 8B) The second theological reason for the impossibility of avoiding venial sin for any considerable time is based 81 The above-quoted analogy is taken from Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- matische Theologie, Vol. VIII, p. 81. 82 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 8: “Non potest homo abstinere ab omni peccato veniali propter cor- ruptionem inferioris appetitus sen- sualitatis, cuius motus singulos qui- dem ratio reprimere potest, et ex hoc habent rationem peccati et vo- luntarti, non autem omnes, quia dum uni resistere nititur, fortassis alius insurgit, et etiam quia ratio non potest semper esse pervigil ad huiusmodi motus vitandos.” 83 Sardagna (De Gratia, n. 336) incorrectly asserts this. 84 Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Vol. III, pp. 47 sq. Theolog., 122 ACTUAL GRACE on the eternal scheme of salvation decreed by Divine Providence. This scheme of salvation must not, of course, be conceived as a divine precept to commit venial sins. It is merely a wise toleration of sin and a just re- fusal, on the part of the Almighty, to restore the hu- man race to that entirely unmerited state of freedom from concupiscence with which it was endowed in Para- dise, and which alone could guarantee the moral possi- bility of unspotted innocence. Both factors in their last analysis are based upon the will of God to exercise those whom He has justified in humility and to safe- guard us against pride, which is the deadliest enemy of our salvation.®® In making this wise decree God, of course, infallibly foresaw that no man (with the sole exception of those to whom He might grant a special privilege) would de facto be able to pass through life without committing venial sins. This infallible fore- knowledge is based not alone on the scientia media, but also on the infirmity of human nature. Hence Suarez was entirely justified in rejecting the singular opinion of de Vega,®* that the Tridentine defini- tion does not exclude the possibility of exceptions.*” Nevertheless the faithful are wisely warned against both indifference and despondency. “Let no one say that he is without sin, but let us not for this reason love sin. Let us detest sin, brethren. Though we are not without sins, let us hate them; especially let us “ .. quia si vel in uno homine posset contingere, ut illa duo con- tungerentur, scil. carere specialt privilegio et nihilominus cavere omne peccatum veniale per totam 85 Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Iulian., IV, 3, 28: ‘“‘Ideo factum est in loco infirmitatis, ne superbe viveremus, ut sub quotidiana pecca- torum remissione vivamus.” s6 Andr. de Vega, De Iustifica- vitam, propositio Concilii esset sim- tione Doctrina Universa, 1, XIV, pliciter falsa; nam est absoluta et cap. ult. universalis, ad cuius falsitatem satis 87 Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 8, 14: est quod in uno deficiat.” etree THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 123 avoid grievous sins, and venial sins, too, as much as we mican, °° Thesis V: No man can persevere in righteousness without special help from God. This proposition is also de fide. Proof. The Semipelagians asserted that man is able by his own power to persevere in righteous- ness to the end.*® Against this teaching the Second Council of Orange defined: “Even those who are reborn and holy must implore the help of God, in order that they may be enabled to attain the good end, or to persevere in the good work.” *® This definition was repeated in sub- stance by the Council of Trent: “If any one ‘saith that the justified either is able without the special help of God to persevere in the justice re- _ ceived, or that, with that help, he is not able; let him be anathema.” * Perfect perseverance is the preservation of baptis- mal innocence, or, in a less strict sense, of the state of grace, until death. Imperfect perseverance is a tempor- 88 Aug., Ep., 181, n. 8: “Nemo 90 Conc. Arausic. II, can. 10: itaque dicat, se esse sine peccato, sed non tamen ideo debemus amare peccatum. Oderimus ea, fratres; etsi non sumus sine peccatis, oderi- mus tamen ea, et maxime a crimini- bus nos abstineamus; abstineamus quantum possumus a levibus pecca- tis.’— On the whole subject of this thesis cfr, Schiffini, De Gratia Di- vina, pp. 181 sqq. 89 V. supra, pp. 98 sqq. “ Adiutorium Dei etiam renatis ac sanctis semper est implerandum, ut ad finem bonum perventre vel in bono possint opere perdurare.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 183.) 91 Sess. VI, can, 22: “Si quis dixerit, iustificatum vel sine speciali auxilio Dei in accepta iustitia per- severare posse vel cum eo non posse, anathema _ sit.” (Denzinger-Bann: wart, n. 832.) 124 ACTUAL GRACE ary continuance in grace, e. g. for a month or a year, until the next mortal sin. Imperfect perseverance, ac- cording to the Tridentine Council, requires no special divine assistance (speciale auxilium) .°? Final perseverance is either passive or active, according as the justified dies in the state of grace irrespective of his will (as baptized children and insane adults) ,°* or actively cooperates with grace whenever the state of grace is im- perilled by grievous temptation. The Council of Trent has especially this latter case in view when it speaks of the necessity of a speciale auxilium, because the special help extended by God presupposes cooperation with grace, and man cannot strictly speaking codperate in a happy death. The Council purposely speaks of an auxilium, not a privilegium, because a privilege is by its very nature granted to but few, while the special help of grace extends to all the elect. This aurilium is designated as speciale, because final perseverance is not conferred with sancti- fying grace, nor is it a result of the mere power of perseverance (posse perseverare). The state of sanc- tifying grace simply confers a claim to ordinary graces, while the power of perseverance of itself by no means insures actual perseverance (actu perseverare). The power of perseverance is assured by those merely suffi- cient graces which are constantly at the command of the righteous. Actual perseverance, on the other hand, implies a series of efficacious graces. God is under no obligation to bestow more than sufficient grace on any man; consequently, final perseverance is a special grace, or, more correctly, a continuous series of efficacious graces. 92Sess, VI, cap. 131: “Deus 93 Cfr. Wisd. IV, 11: ‘“ Raptus namque sud gratia semel iustifi- est, ne malitia mutaret intellectum — catos non deserit, nisi ab eis prius eius.” deseratur.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 804.) THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 125 The Council of Trent is therefore of it as “a great gift.” % justified in speaking a) Sacred Scripture represents final persever- ance as the fruit of prayer and as a special gift not included in the bare notion of justification. a) Our Divine Saviour Himself says in His prayer for His disciples, John XVII, 11: “ Holy Father, keep them in thy name whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we also are.” ® St. Payl teaches in his Epistle to the Colossians: “ Epaphras saluteth you . . . who is always solicitous for you in prayers, that you may stand perfect and full in all the will of God 7%¢ Hence the necessity of constantly watching and praying: “Watch ye and pray that ye enter not into temptation.”’ 7 8B) That perseverance is not included in the bare notion of justification appears from such passages as these: Phil. I, 6: “ Being confident of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus.” 8 1 Pet. I, 5: “ Who, by the _ power of God, are kept by faith unto salvation, ready to __ be revealed in the last time.” °° Paseesey VI can, 162)! ©.) 2 ana. fecti (iva ornre rédewor) et pleni g&num ililud usque in finem per- in omni voluntate Dei.” Sseverantiae donum.” On St. Au- 97 Matth, XXVI, 41: “ Vigilate, gustine’s teaching in tegard to the different heads of doctrine defined above, see Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol, V, 3rd ed., pp. 103 sqq. 95 John XVII, tr: “* Pater Sancte, -serva eos in nomine tuo (ripnoov avrods ép T® dvouart gov), quos dedisti mihi, ut sint unum, sicut et nos? — POOR EN oy gas) < Sata sny vOS Epaphras . , . semper sollicitus pro vobis in orationibus, ut stetis per- et orate, ut non intretis in tenta- tionem.”’ 98 Phil. I, 6: ‘**.... confidens hoc ipsum, quia qui coepit in vobis opus bonum, perficiet (émireNéoer) usque in diem Christi Iesu.? OO 2) Ret i Ei ise Mee UR Gagne virtute Dei custodimini per fidem im salutem, paratam revelari in tempore novissimo,’— For Old Testament texts in confirmation of this thesis see Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 198 sq. 126 ACTUAL. GRACE b) The threads of Tradition run together in the hands of St. Augustine, who has written a special treatise On the Gift of Perseverance.*”” His main argument is based on the necessity of prayer. “ Why,” he asks, “is that perseverance asked for from God, if it is not given by God? Is it a mocking peti- tion inasmuch as that is asked of Him which it is known He does not give, but, although He gives it not, is in man’s power? ... Or is not that perseverance, per- chance, asked for from Him? He who says this, is not to be rebuked by my arguments, but must be overwhelmed with the prayers of the saints. Is there indeed one among them who do not ask for themselves from God that they may persevere in Him, when in that very prayer which is called the Lord’s — because the Lord taught it — when- ever it is prayed by the saints, scarcely anything else is un- derstood to be prayed for but perseverance?” *° He then proceeds to show, in accordance with St. Cyprian’s little treatise On the Lord’s Prayer, that the seven petitions of the “ Our Father” are all prayers for perseverance, and concludes as follows: “Truly in this matter let not the Church look for laborious disputations, but con- sider her own daily prayers. She prays that the unbe- 100 De Dono Perseverantiae. An English translation of this treatise may be found in The Anti-Pelagian quod scitur non ipsum dare, sed ipso ‘mon dante esse in hominis pote- state ...2 An ab illo perseve- Works of Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Translated by Peter Holmes and R. E. Wallis, Vol. III, pp. 171 sqq. (Vol. XV of Dods’ translation of the Works of St. Augustine), Edinburg 1876. 101 De Dono Perseverantiae, c. 2, n. 3: “Cur autem perseve- rantia ista poscitur a Deo, si non datur a Deo? An et ista irrisoria petitio est, quum id ab eo petitur rantia ista forte non poscitur? Iam hoc qui dicit, non meis disputationt- bus refellendus, sed sanctorum ora- tionibus onerandus est. An vero quisquam eorum est, qui non sibt poscat a Deo ut perseveret in eo, quum ipsa oratione quae dominica nuncupatur, quia docuit, quando oratur a sanctis, nihil paene aliud quam _ perseverantia posci intelligatur? ” eam Dominus — DOB NECHSSUT YY ORPACTUAL: GRACE 127 lieving may believe; therefore God converts to the faith. She prays that believers may persevere; therefore God gives perseverance to the end.’’#°2 And again: “ For who is there that would groan with a sincere desire to receive what he prays for from the Lord, if he thought that he received it from himself and not from the eordie: tes c) From this teaching flows a corollary of great practical importance, to wit: The grace of final perseverance cannot be merited by good works, but it can be obtained by pious and unre- mitting prayer. “This gift of God,” says St. Augustine, speaking of final perseverance, “may be obtained suppliantly [by prayer], but when it has been given, it cannot be lost con- tumaciously.” *°* And again: “ Since it is manifest that God has prepared some things to be given even to those who do not pray for them, such as the beginning of faith, and other things not to be given except to those who pray for them, such as perseverance unto the end, certainly he who thinks that he has this latter from himself, does not pray to obtain it.’’ 1% 102 Op, cit., c. 7, n. 15: “ Prorsus 104 Op. cit., c 6, n. t0: “Hoc in hac re non operosas disputationes exspectet Ecclesia, sed attendat quotidianas orationes suas. Orat ut increduli credant: Deus ergo convertit ad fidem. Orat ut cre- dentes perseverent; Deus ergo donat berseverantiam usque in finem.” 103 Op. cit., c. 23, n. 63: “ Quis enim veraciter gemat desiderans ac- cipere quod orat a Domino, si hoc a seipso se sumere existimet, non ab illo? ’”? Dei donum suppliciter emereri pot- est, sed quum datum fuerit, amitti contumaciter non potest.’ LOK Op. Cit Ci t6;) Zoe quum constet Deum alia danda etiam non orantibus, sicut initium fidei, alia nonnisi orantibus” prae- barasse, sicut in finem perseve- rantiam, profecto qui ex se ipso se hanc habere putat, non orat ut ha- beat.” 128 ACTUAL GRACE Between merit (meritum) and prayer (oratio, preces) there is this great difference, that merit appeals to God’s justice, prayer to His mercy. If man were able to merit final perseverance by good works (meritum de con- digno), God would be in justice bound to give him this precious grace. But this is plainly incompatible with the Catholic conception of final perseverance. It may be asked: Is God determined by the meritum de congruo inherent in all good works to grant the gift of final perseverance as a rcward to the righteous? Theologians are at variance on this point. Ripalda *°® thinks that this is the case at least with the more con- spicuous good works performed in the state of grace. Suarez modifies this improbable contention somewhat by saying that prayer alone can infallibly guarantee final perseverance.’°? Our prayers are infallibly heard if we address the Father through Jesus Christ, because Christ has promised: “If you ask the Father anything in my name, he will give it you.” 1°° To insure its being infalli- bly heard, prayer for perseverance must be made in the state of grace and unremittingly. True, Christ did not make sanctifying grace a necessary condition of effica- cious prayer. But, as Suarez points out, prayer cannot be infallibly efficacious unless it proceeds from one who is in the state of grace, because the moral conditions that render it efficacious are found only in that state.°° As to meritoriis de congruo, sed tantum orationi; quare ut fructus huius 106 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 045. “SECts 2. 107 Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 38: *‘ Infallibilitas non convenit merito de congruo ratione sui, ut tia dicam, sed vatione impetrationis quae proa- priae soli orationi, ut talis est, re- spondet. Ratio est, quia haec infal- libilitas solum fundatur in promis- sione divina, quae non invenitur facta operibus iustorum quatenus meritt certior sit, adiungenda sem- per est petitio perseverantiae.” 108 John XVI, 23. 109 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 38; sth EA i 6 Quien se orate _ habeat perseverantiam debiiam, per- durare debet cum illis circumstan- tiis moralibus, quas a_ principio habere etiam debuit, ut congrue THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 129 the second point, if we say that prayer for perseverance must be unremitting, we mean, in the words of the same eminent theologian, that it must continue throughout life and must be made with becoming trustfulness and zeal, especially when there is a duty to be fulfilled or a tempta- tion to be overcome. READINGS : — Suarez, De Gratia, 1. I-II.—*Tricassin, O. Cap., De Necessaria ad Salutem Gratia.— Byonius, De Gratiae Auciliis, in Becanus, Theologia Scholastica, Rouen, 1658— Scheeben Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861.— IpEM, Dogmatik, Vol. III, § 292- 2098, Freiburg 1882.—*Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 19-29, Gulpen 1885.— Oswald, Lehre von der Heiligung, § 9-11, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.— Tepe, Institutiones Theologicae, Vol. III, pp. 8-51, Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 306-416, Mainz 1897.— Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Freiburg 1908.— Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, disp. 2, Freiburg 1got. On St. Augustine and his teaching cfr, *J. Ernst, Werke und Tugenden der Ungléubigen nach Augustinus, Freiburg 1871. —F. Worter, Die Geistesentwicklung des hl. Augustinus bis zu seimer Taufe, Paderborn 1898.— Wolfsgruber, Augustinus, Pa- derborn 1898.— Boucat, Theologia Patrum Dogmatico-Scholastico- Positiva, disp. 3, Paris 1718.—*Zaccaria, Dissert. de Adiutorio sine quo non, in the Thesaurus Theol., Vol. V, Venice 1762.—O. _Rottmanner, O. S. B., Geistesfriichte aus der Klosterzelle, Miin- chen 1908.— B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dog- mas, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 306 sqq., 374 sq. fieret; unde eo ipso quod novum more detailed information we must impedimentum ponitur [peccando] refer the reader to Palmieri, De effectui orationis, deficit perseve- Gratia Divina Actuali, thes, 36, n. rantia im orando, saltem debito vi sqq- The theological argu- modo.” ment for our thesis is con- 110 Ibid., n. 17: “ Igitur perse- verantia orationis in tali materia vincingly set forth by Gutberlet in Heinrich’s Dogmatische Theolo- The donum requisita est, ut non semel tantum aut iterum fiat, set ut toto tempore vitae duret, et praesertim ut in Ooccurrentibus occasionibus servandi mandata aut vincendi cum debita fiducia repetatur.’— For tentationes gie, Vol. VIII, § 404. perseverantiae must not be con- founded with the confirmatio in gratia; on this point see Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 197 saa. 130 ACTUAL GRACE On the heresy of Pelagianism cfr. *F. Worter, Der Pelagia- nismus nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre, Freiburg 1874. —.F, Klasen, Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus, Frei- burg 1882— Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II, 2nd ed., § 60 sqq., Freiburg 1895—H. Zimmer, Pelagius in Irland, Berlin 1901. - Warfield, Two Studies in the History of Doctrine, New York 1897— Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris 1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).— Pohle in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, pp. 604-608.— B. J. Otten, S. J.. 4 Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. I, pp. 357 saa. On Semi-Pelagianism cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, Prolegom., V5 sqq.— Livinus Meyer, De Pelag. et Semipelag. Erroribus.— Wig- gers, Geschichte des Semipelagianismus, Hamburg 1835.— A. Hoch, Lehre des Johannes Cassianus von Natur und Gnade, Freiburg 1895.—*A. Koch, Der hl. Faustus, Bischof von Riez, Stuttgart 1895 Fr. Worter, Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semi- pelagianismus, Miinster t1900.— Sublet, Le S emipélagianisme, Namur 1897 Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris 1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).— Pohle in the Catholic — -Encyclopedia, Vol. XIII, pp. 703-706.— B. J. Otten, S. J.. 4 Man- — ual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. 1, pp. 379 sad. af On Jansenism cfr. *Steph. Dechamps, De Haeresi Ianseniana, a Paris 1645.— Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, Vol. 11: “Contra Baium et Baianos,’ Cologne 1648.— Duchesne, Histoire du Baianisme, Douai 1731.—*Linsenmann, Michael Bajus und die Grundlegung des Jansenismus, Titbingen 1867 A. Schill, Die Konstitution Unigenitus, ihre Veranlassung und thre Folgen, Freiburg 1876.— Ingold, Rome et France: La Seconde Phase du Jansénisme, Paris 1901.— P. Minges, O. F. M., Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus auf ihren angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semi- pelagianismus geprift, Minster 1906.— Lafiteau, Histoire de la Constitution Unigenitus, 2 vols., Liege 1738.— Van den Peereboom, Cornelius Jansenius, Septiobme Evéque d’Ypres, Bruges 1882— J. Forget in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, pp. 285-204— B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. I, — Pp. 507 saa. SECTION) 2 THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL: ‘GRACE All grace ex vi termini is a free gift.1 This applies particularly to Christian grace, which is so absolutely gratuitous that its gratuity, together with its necessity, may be called the groundwork of the Catholic religion. I. STATE OF THE QUESTION.—To show what is meant by “gratuity” (gratwitas) we must first explain the technical term “merit.” a) “Merit” (meritum=that which is earned) is that property of a good work which entitles the performer to receive a reward from him to whose advantage the work redounds. a) An analysis of this definition shows that (1) merit is found only in such works as are positively good ; (2) merit and reward are correlative terms which postu- late each other; (3) merit supposes two distinct per- sons, one who deserves and another who awards; (4) the relation between merit and reward is based on justice, not on benevolence or mercy. The last-mentioned de- termination is by far the most important of the four.” 1V. supra, pp. 7 sq. enim merces dicitur quod alicut 2Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., recompensatur pro retributione operis Ia 2ae, qu. 114, art, 1: “* Meritum vel laboris quasi quoddam pretium et merces ad idem referuntur. Id ipsius. Unde sicut teddere iustwm 131 132 ACTUAL GRACE 8) Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign merit,’ which is merit in the strict sense (meritum adaequatum sive de condigno),and (2) congruous merit (meritum in- adaequatum sive de congruo), so called because of the congruity, or fitness, that the claim should be recognized. Condign merit presupposes some proportion between the work done and the reward given in compensation for it (aequalitas s. con- digmitas dati et accepti). It is measured by com- mutative justice and thus confers a real claim to a reward. For example, a conscientious work- man has a strict claim to his wage. Owing to the lack of intrinsic proportion between service and reward, congruous merit can claim a remunera- tion only on grounds of fairness. A. distinction between these two kinds of merit was already made by the Fathers, though not in the terms of present-day theology. It was known to the older Scholastics and emphasized anew by Luther’s famous adversary Johann Eck.* pretium pro re accepta ab aliquo est actus iustitiae, ita etiam recom- pensare mercedem operis vel laboris est actus iustitiae.” Cfr. Taparelli, Saggio Teoretico del Diritto Na- turale, diss. 1, c. 6, n. 130, Palermo 1842. 3“ This word is scarcely used in modern English, except as express- ing that punishment which is fully deserved, a usage originating with the Tudor Parliaments; but it was once commonly used in the language in a wider sense, for whatever had been justly earned, and some at- tempts to revive it have been made in recent times; certainly some word is wanted to express the idea.” (Hunter, Outlines of . Dogmatic Theology, Vol. III, pp. 58 sq.) Cfr. Dr. Murray’s New English Dic- tionary, Vol. II, p. 784, Oxford 1893. 4Eck did not, however, approve the term meritum de condigno; he preferred meritum digni. Cfr. J. THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 133 No relation of strict justice is conceivable be- tween the Creator and His creatures. On the part of God there can only be question of a gra- tuitous promise to reward certain good works,— which promise He is bound to keep because He is veracious and faithful.® b) Two other terms must also be clearly de- fined in order to arrive at a true conception of the gratuity of Christian grace. They are prayer for grace,’ and a capacity or disposition to receive it.’ To pray means to incite God’s liberality or mercy by humble supplication. a) Despite the contrary teaching of Vasquez® and a few other theologians, congruous merit and prayer are really distinct because one can exist without the other. As the angels in Heaven are able to pray for us without earning a meritum de congruo, so conversely, all salutary works are meritorious even without prayer. More- over, humble supplication does not involve any positive service entitled to a reward. There is another important and obvious distinction, viz.: between purely natural prayer (preces naturae) and supernatural prayer inspired by grace (oratio su- pernaturalis ). 8) Capacity or disposition, especially when it Greving, Johann Eck als junger His Knowability, Essence, and At- Gelehrier, pp. 153 sqq. Miinster tributes, pp. 455 sqq. ; 1906. 6 Oratio, preces. 5 Cfr. St. Augustine, In Ps., 86: 7 Capacitas, dispositio. “ Debitorem Deus ipse fecit se, non 8 Vasquez, Comment. in S. Theol. accipiendo, sed promittendo.” On S. Thomae Aquin., 1a 2ae, disp. 216, this point consult Pohle-Preuss, God: c. 4. 134 AGTUALSGRACH takes the form of preparation, may be either posi- tive or negative. Positive capacity is defined as “that real mode by which a subject, in itself indif- ferent, becomes apt to receive a new form.” Such a capacity or disposition always entails a claim to its respective form, Positive capacity or disposition differs from both prayer or quasi-merit (meritum de congruo). Quasi- merit is entitled to a reward on the ground of fairness, whereas the capacitas s. dispositio positiva is at most the fulfilment of an expectation based upon purely teleolog- ical considerations. Again, a reward can be bestowed upon some subject other than the one by whom the ser- vice was rendered, whereas the introduction of a new form necessarily supposes a subject disposed for or prepared to receive it. Thus only he who is hungry is disposed for the reception of food and entitled to have his craving satisfied. | _ Negative capacity consists in the absence or re- moval of obstacles that impede the reception of a new form, as when green wood is dried to become fit for burning. c) There arises the important question whether or not divine grace is an object of merit, and if so, to what extent it can be merited by prayer and preparation. It is of faith that the just man, by the performance of supernaturally good deeds, can merit de condigno an in- crease in the state of grace and eternal glory, and that TAB GR ATO YS ORVANCT OAL GRACH: “aac the sinner is able to earn justification de congruo. On the other hand, it is also an article of faith that divine grace is strictly gratuitous.° The two dogmas seem incompatible, but they are not, as will become evident if we consider that the good works of the just and the salutary works of the sinner are entirely rooted in divine grace and consequently the merits which they contain are strictly merits of grace in no wise due to nature.?° When we speak of the absolute gratuity of grace, there- fore, we mean the very first or initial grace (gratia prima vocans), by which the work of salvation is begun. Of this initial grace the Church explicitly teaches that it is absolutely incapable of being merited; whence it fol- lows that all subsequent graces, up to and including justification, are also gratuitous," 7. e. unmerited by na- ture in strict justice, in so far as they are based on the gratia prima. 2. THE GRATUITY OF GRACE PRoveD From REVELATION.—Keeping the above explanation well in mind we now proceed to demonstrate the gratuity of divine grace in five systematic theses. | : 9 Already in the fourth century The dogma was formally defined by the Church emphasized the propo- the Council of Trent: “. .. cuius sition “Gratiam Christi non secun- tanta est erga omnes homines boni- dum merita dari’’ against Pelagius. tas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae 10 Cfr. St. Augustine, Ep. 194 ad sunt ipsius dona.” (Sess. VI, cap. Sixt., n. 19: “ Vita etiam aeterna, 16, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s quam certum est bonis operibus LEnchiridion, n. 809.) debitam reddi, ab Apostolo tamen 11 For ‘further information on this gratia nuncupatur, nec ideo quia point see Palmieri, De Gratia Di- meritis non datur, sed quia data vina Actuali, thes. 35. sunt ipsa merita, quibus datur.” 136 ACTUAL GRACE Thesis I: Mere nature cannot, in strict justice (de condigno), merit initial grace (gratia prima), nor, con- sequently, any of the series of subsequent graces in the order of justification. This proposition embodies an article of faith. Proof. It was one of the fundamental errors of Pelagius that grace can be merited by purely natural acts.‘? When, at the instance of the bish- ops assembled at Diospolis (A. D. 415), he re- tracted his proposition that “the grace of God is given according to our merits,” 1° he employed the term gratia Dei dishonestly for the grace of creation. The Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529) formally defined that grace cannot be mer- ited, but is purely and strictly gratuitous.4* And the Council of Trent declared: ‘In adults the beginning of justification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, with- out any merits existing on their parts, they are called ...”** The non-existence of merits prior to the bestowal of the prima gratia vocans, so positively asserted in this definition, plainly ex- cludes any and all natural merit de condigno. 12V. supra, pp. 83 sqq. 15°, . . ipsius tiustificationis ex- 13 “ Gratiam Dei secundum merita ordium in adultis a Dei per Chri- nostra dari,’’ stum lIesum. praeveniente gratia 14“ Debetur merces bonis operi- sumendum esse, h. e. ab eius vo- bus, si fiant; sed gratia quae non catione, qua nullis eorum existen- a debetur praecedit, ut fiant.” (Ar- tibus meritis vocantur.’’ (Sess. VI, ausic. II, can. 18; see Denzinger- cap. 5. Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.) Bannwart, n. 191.) THE GRATUITY, ORVACTUAL ‘GRACE! 137 a) St. Paul demonstrates in his Epistle to the Romans that justification does not result from obedience to the law, but is a grace freely be- stowed by God. The Apostle regards the merciful dispensations of Providence in favor of the Chosen People, and of the en- tire sinful race of men in general, as so many sheer graces. Rom. IX, 16: “So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth,.but of God that showeth mercy.” ** The gratuity of grace is asserted in terms that almost sound extravagant two verses further down in the same Epistle: “Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth.” 17 The same truth is emphasized in Rom. XI, 6: “And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace.” ** Lest any one should pride himself on having obtained faith, which is the root of justification, by his own merits, St. Paul declares in his Epistle to the Ephesians: “ For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man may glory. For we are his work- manship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them.” 2 These and many similar passages 2° make it plain that grace cannot be merited without supernatural aid. LGM OM EOXCVNN TOs anie Igitur non volentis neque currentis, sed mi- estis salvati per fidem et hoc non ex vobis: Dei enim donum est, non serentis est Dei,’ 17 Rom, IX, 18: “Ergo cuius vult miseretur et quem vult indurat (dpa oty Oéde édeci, 8 Se Oédex ok\npvver).” 18 Rom, XT 6s) $6 .S¢ autem gratia, iam non ex operibus (éé épywr)> alioquin gratia iam non est gratia.” 19 Eph, II, 8-10: “‘ Gratié enim ex operibus, ut ne quis glorietur. Ipsius enim sumus factura (1rol- nua), creati in Christo TIesu in operibus bonis, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in allis ambulemus.” 20.2, g., 2. Cor.: Vj ‘143. Gal. LI, 22; 2 Tim, I, 9; Tit. III, 5; 1 Pet, TS.'33. te John LV 10, 138 ACTUAL’ GRACE b) The leading champion of the dogma of the gratuity of grace among the Fathers is St. Augus- tine, who never tires of repeating that “Grace does not find merits, but causes them,” 7* and substantiates this fundamental principle thus: “Grace has preceded thy merit; not grace by merit, but merit by grace. For if grace is by merit, thou hast bought, not received gratis.” *” c) The theological argument is based (1) on the disproportion between nature and grace and (2) on the absolute necessity of grace for the performance of salutary works. There is no proportion between the natural and the supernatural, and it would be a contradiction to say that mere nature can span the chasm separating the two orders. ‘To assume the existence of a strict meritum naturae for it, would be to deny the gratuity as well as the supernatural character of grace. To deny these would be to deny grace itself and with it the whole super- natural order that forms the groundwork of Christianity. We know, on the other hand,?* that grace is absolutely indispensable for the performance of salutary acts. Hence, to deny the gratuity of grace would be to credit nature with the ability to perform salutary acts by its own power, or at least to merit grace by the performance of naturally good deeds. In the first hypothesis grace would no longer be necessary for salvation ; in the second, 21 Tract. in TIoa., 86: “Gratia Nam si gratia ex merito, emisti. non non invenit, sed efficit merita,” gratis accepisti.”” Other Patristic 22 Serm., 169, c. 2: “Gratia texts quoted by Ripalda, De Ente praecessit meritum tuum, non gratia Supernatural, disp. 15 sqq. ex merito, sed meritum ex gratia. 23V. supra, pp. 50 sqq. Se THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 139 it would be proportionate to natural goodness, and therefore no grace at all. Consequently, the gratuity of grace cannot be consistently denied without at the same time denying its necessity.?4 Thesis II: There is no naturally good work by which unaided nature could acquire even so much as an equitable claim to supernatural grace. This proposition may be technically qualified as fidet proxima saltem. Proof. The Semipelagians held that, though nature cannot merit grace in strict justice, it can merit it at least congruously, 7. ¢. as a matter of fitness or equity.2> This contention was rejected by the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 520), which defined that “God works many good things in man that man does not work, but man works no good deeds that God does not give him the strength to do.” °° And again: “[God] Himself inspires us with faith and charity without any pre- ceding [natural] merits [on our pact | A ite phrase “without any preceding merits” (nullis praecedentibus meritis) excludes both the meri- tum de condigno and the meritum de congruo. 24 For a more extensive treatment of this important point the reader is referred to Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 418, Mainz 1897. 25 V. supra, p. 98. : 26Can. 20: “ Multa Deus facit in homine bona, quae non facit - homo; nulla vero facit homo bona, quae non Deus praestat, ut faciat homo.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 193.) ! 27“ Sed ipse [Deus] nobis nullis praecedentibus bonis meritis [sctl. naturalibus] et fidem et amorem sui prius inspirat.” (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 200.) 140 ACTUAL GRACE a) The Scriptural argument given above for thesis I also covers this thesis. The Semipelagians quoted Matth. XXV, 15 in support of their teaching: “To one he gave five talents, and to another two, and to another one, to every one according to his proper ability.” ?* But this text is too vague to serve as an argument in such an important matter. Not a few exegetes treat it as a kind of rhetorical figure. Others, following the example of the Fathers, take “ tal- ents” to mean purely natural gifts, or gratiae gratis datae, while by “ability” (virtus) they understand the already existing grace of faith or a certain definite meas- ure of initial grace.2® But even if virtus meant natural faculty or talent, it cannot be identical with“ merit.” Considering the common teaching of theologians that the angels were endowed with grace according to the meas- ure of their natural perfection,®° we may well suppose that man receives grace likewise according to his natural constitution (gratia sequitur naturam) — a predisposition or aptitude which God ordained in His infinite wis- dom to be the instrument through which His graces should operate either for personal sanctification or the good of others. perrimsn ais Sy a ee ee a nt ee veer b) St. Augustine and his disciples, in defending ~ the orthodox faith against the Semipelagians, strongly insisted on the gratuity of the grace of faith, and above all of the initial gratia praeve- mens. 28 Matth, XXV, 15: “Et unt 29 Cfr. Maldonatus’ commentary dedit quinque talenta, alii autem on this text. duo, alii vero unum, unicuique 30 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- secundum propriam virtutem thor of Nature and the Supernat- (éxdorw Kara Tiv idiay Stvamey).” ural, p, 326. THE GRATUITY: OF ACTUAL GRACE a) St. Augustine comments on 1 Cor. EN... 9 asy£ol- lows: “Nothing is so opposed to this feeling as for any one to glory concerning his own merits in such a way as if he himself had made them for himself, and not the grace of God,—a grace, however, which makes the good to differ from the wicked, and is not common to the good and the wicked.” + And in another place Beysavss) For. it would) not. dn any sense be the grace of God, were it not in every sense gratuitous.” 3? 8) Certain of the Greek Fathers have been suspected of Semipelagian leanings because they appear to assign the chief rdle in the business of salvation to nature.*% A careful study of their writings, however, shows that these authors had in mind co-operating, not preven- ient grace. The general teaching of the Orientals on the gratuity of grace is sufficiently indicated by the de- mand made at the Council of Lydda (ALD! ars): that Pelagius be compelled to retract the proposition: “ Gra- tiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari.’ The Fathers who have been accused of Semipelagian sympathies merely wished to emphasize free-will and to incite the morally indifferent to co-operate heartily with divine grace. St. Chrysostom, in particular, expressly asserts the absolute gratuity of grace when he says of faith: LAL “That which is a merit of 31 De Praedest. Sanct., 3, 10, 31% “Nihil huic sensui tam contrarium est quam de suis meritis sic quem- quam gloriari, tamquam ipse sibi ea fecerit, non Dei gratia, sed gra- tia quae bonos discernit a malis, non quae communis est bonis et malis,’’ ; 32 De Peccato Orig., c. 245-1, 28: “Non enim gratia Dei erit ulio faith, may not be ascribed modo, nist gratuita fuerit omni modo,” 33 Cyril of Jerusalem (Catech., I, 17), Athanasius (C. Gent., n. 30), Basil (Epist., 294: “ Divinum au- xilium in nostra situm est pote: state’’), Gregory of Nazianzus (Or., 31), and especially Chrysostom (Hom, in Gen., 12; Hom. in Epist, ad Rom., 2). 142 ACTUAL GRACE to us, for it is a free gift of God,’ ** and directly con- tradicts Cassian and the Massilians when he declares: “Thou hast it not of thyself, thou hast received it from God. Hence thou hast received whatever thou hast, not only this or that, but all thou hast. For it is not thine own merit, but the grace of God. Although thou al- legest the faith, thou hast received it by vocation.” *° c) The theological argument for our thesis may be succinctly stated thus: The grace of God is the cause of our merits, and hence cannot be itself merited. Being the cause, it cannot be an effect.*® Thesis III: Nature cannot merit supernatural grace even by natural prayer. This thesis, like the preceding one, maybe tech- nically qualified as fidet proxima saltem. Proof. Let us first clearly establish the state of the question. Our thesis refers to that partic- ular kind of prayer (preces naturae) which by its intrinsic value, so to speak, obliges Almighty God to grant what the petitioner asks for, as is un- doubtedly the case with supernatural prayer, ac- 34 Hom. in Epist. ad Ephes., 4. cadere sub tum sic etiam non potest 35 Hom. in 1 Epist. ad Cor., 12. Cir. Palmieri, Actuali, thes. 33. 3¢Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a z2ae, qu. 114, art. 5: “ Donum gratiae considerart potest dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ra- tionem gratuiti doni, et sic manife- stum est quod omne meritum repu- gnat gratiae, quia ut Rom. XI, 9 Apostolus dicit: ‘Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus.’ Altero modo potest considerari secundum naturam ipsius rei, quae donatur, et De Gratia Divina . merito non habentis gratiam, quia excedit proportionem naturae, tum etiam quia ante gratiam in statu. peccati homo habet impedi- mentum promerendt gratiam, scil. ipsum peccatum. Postquam autem aliquis tam habet gratiam, non pot- est gratia iam habita sub merito cadere, quia merces est terminus operis, gratia autem est principium cuiuslibet boni operis in nobis.” This is equally true of the meritum de condigno and the meritum de congruo. He GRATUITY OF AGTUAL GRACE 143 cording to our Saviour’s own promise: “Ask and ye shall receive.” ** The inefficacy of nat- ural prayer asserted in our thesis, is not, as in the case of merit,** due to any intrinsic impossibility, but to a positive divine decree to grant supernat- ural prayer. The Second Council of Orange defined against the Semipelagians: “If any one says that the grace of God can be obtained by human [/i. e. nat- ural] prayer, and that it is not grace itself which causes us to invoke God, he contradicts the prophet Isaias and the Apostle who say: “TI was found by them that did not seek me; I appeared openly to them that asked not after me.” 9 a) Sacred Scripture teaches that, unless we are inspired by the Holy Ghost, we cannot pray ef- ficaciously. It follows that to be efficacious, prayer must be an effect of prevenient grace. We should not even know for what or how to pray, if the Holy Ghost did not inspire us. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 26: “For we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit him- self asketh for us [inspires us to ask]| with un- speakable groanings.” * 1 Cor. XII, 3: “No 87 John XVI, 24: “Petite et vel Apostolo idem dicenti: Inventus accipietis.”’ sum a non quaerentibus me, palam 38 V, supra, theses I and II. apparut his, qui me non interroga- 39 Si quis ad invocationem bant.’? (Can, 3, Denzinger-Bann- humanam [i. e. naturalem] gratiam wart, n. 176.) _ Dei dicit posse conferri, non autem 40 Rom. VIII, 26: ‘ Quid ore- ipsam gratiam facere, ut invocetur mus, sicut oportet, nescimus, sed a nobis, contradicit Isaiae prophetae ipse Spiritus postulat [postulare 144 ACTUAL GRACE man can say: Lord God, but by the Holy Ghost.” 44 Supernatural union with Christ is an indispensable condition of all efficacious prayer. John XV, 7: “If you abide in me, and my words abide in you, you shall ask whatever you will, and it shall be done unto you.” * b) This is also the teaching of the Fathers. “Who would truly groan, desiring to receive what he prays for from the Lord,” says St. Augus- tine,*? “if he thought that he received it from himself, and not from God? . . . We understand that this is also itself the gift of God, that with a true heart and spiritually we cry to God. Let them, therefore, observe how they are mistaken who think that our seeking, asking, knocking is of ourselves, and is not given to us; and say that this is the case because grace is preceded by our merits; that it follows them when we ask and re- ceive, and seek and find, and it is opened to us when we knock.” ** c) From the theological point of view the in- efficacy of purely natural prayer in matters per- facit] pro nobis gemitibus imenar- rabilibus.” At muCor, (lise 3s dicere Dominus Deus, nisi in Spiritu sancto.” 42 John XV, 7: “Si manseritis in me et verba mea in vobis man- serint, quodcunque volueritis, petetis et fiet vobis.” 43 De Dono Perseverantiae, 23, n. 63 sq.: “ Quis veraciter gemat, de- “Nemo potest” siderans accipere quod orat a Do- mino, si hoc a se ipso sumere exi- stimet, non ab illo? ... Ubi intelligi- mus et hoc ipsum esse donum Det, ut veraci corde et spiritualiter clame- mus ad Deum. Attendant ergo, quo- modo falluntur, qui putant esse a nobis, non dari nobis ut petamus, quaeramus, pulsemus, etc.” 44 Cfr, Palmieri, De Gratia Di- vina Actuali, thes. 32. THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 145 taining to salvation can be demonstrated thus: Revelation tells us that the work of salvation re-. quires for its beginning an initial supernatural grace. Now prayer, that is to say, efficacious prayer, is in itself a salutary act. Consequently, there can be no efficacious prayer without preve- nient grace, and purely natural prayer is ineffica- cious for salvation. Ripalda holds that, in an economy different from the present, natural prayer would have a claim to be heard. This opinion can be defended without prejudice to the dogma of the gratuity of grace. No doubt God might condescend to hear such petitions if He would, though, of course, He is not bound to do so by any intrinsic power inherent in natural prayer. Unlike merit, prayer appeals to the mercy of God, not to His justice. Ri- palda’s theory, however, rests upon an unprovable as- sumption, namely, that man in the state of pure nature would be able to know of the existence, or at least the possibility, of a supernatural order and to strive for the _ beatific vision as his final end.* Thesis IV: Man cannot move God to the bestowal of supernatural grace by any positive disposition or preparation on his part. This thesis may be qualified as propositio certa. Proof. Positive preparation or disposition for _ Stace (capacitas sive praeparatio positiva) is prac- tically on a level with natural prayer. The posi- 45 On this difficult question con- sect. 3, and De Lugo, De Fide, disp. sult Ruiz, De Provid., disp. 18, 12; sect. 35 146 ACTUAL GRACE tive disposition for a natural good sometimes in- cludes a certain demand to satisfaction, as e. g. thirst demands to be quenched. ‘This is still more the case when the disposition has been acquired by a positive preparation for the good in question. Thus a student, by conscientiously preparing him- self for examination, acquires a claim to be ad- mitted to it sooner or later. Can this also be said of grace? Does there exist in man a positive disposition for grace in the sense that the withholding of it would grievously injure and disappoint the soul? Can man, without supernat- ural aid, positively dispose himself for the recep- tion of supernatural grace, confident that God will reward his efforts by bestowing it on him? Both these questions must be answered in the neg- ative. a) If there were something in the natural make-up of man which would move the Almighty to give him grace, the bestowal of grace would no longer be a free act of God. But to assert the consequent would be Semipela- gian, hence the antecedent must be false. b) This truth can easily be deduced from the teach- — ing of the Fathers in the Semipelagian controversy. | They declare, in perfect conformity with St. Paul, that — grace is bestowed gratuitously because God can give or withhold it as He pleases. St. Augustine says ** that the grace of Baptism is granted freely, that is, without re- gard to any positive disposition on the part of the bap- 46 De Praedest. Sanct., c. 12. THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 147 tized infant. It should be remembered, moreover, that nature never existed in its pure form, and is now tainted by original sin.” Surely a nature tainted by sin cannot possibly possess the power of meriting divine grace. c) The contention of the so-called Augustinians, that pure nature needs actual grace to save itself, and conse- quently has a claim to such grace at least ex decentia Creatoris and ex lege iustissimae providentiae, perilously resembles Baius’ condemned proposition that the state of pure nature is impossible.*8 Thesis V: Man may prepare himself negatively for the reception of supernatural grace by not putting any obstacles in its way. This proposition is held by a majority of Cath- olic theologians (sententia commumnior ). Proof. The solution of this question is inti- mately connected with the famous Scholastic axiom: “Facienti quod est in se Deus non dene- gat gratiam,” that is, to the man who does what he can, God does not refuse grace. This axiom is susceptible of three different interpretations. a) It may mean: Facienti quod est in.se cum auxilio gratiae Deus confert ulteriorem gratiam, 1. €., to him who does what he can with the help of supernatural grace, God grants further and more powerful graces up to justification. This is merely another way of stating the indisputable 47 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 226 saq. 48 Op. cit., pp. 228 sq. 148 ACTUAL GRACE truth that, by faithfully codperating with the grace of God, man is able to merit additional graces, and it holds true even of infidels and sinners. The first freely performed salutary act establishes a meritum de congruo towards other acts disposing a man for justification. And since the first as well as all subsequent salutary acts, in this hypothesis, are pure graces, this in- terpretation of our axiom is entirely compatible with the dogma of the gratuity of grace.*° b) Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturali- bus Deus non denegat gratiam (to him who does what he can with his natural moral strength, God does not refuse grace.) This does not mean that, in consequence of the efforts of the natural will, God may not withhold from anyone the first grace of vocation. In this sense the axiom would be Semipelagiam, and has been rejected by a majority of the Schoolmen. It 1s said of Molina that he tried to render it acceptable by the hypothesis that God bound Himself by a contract with Christ to give His grace to all men who would make good use of their natural facul- ties. But how could the existence of this imagin- ary contract be proved? In matter of fact Molina taught, with a large number of other divines,”° that God in the bestowal of His graces freely 49 Further information on _ this 50 Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., head infra, Part II, Ch, III, Viole V519td véd., ppsat7sdG. THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 149 bound Himself to a definite rule, which coincides with His universal will to save all mankind. In the application of this law He pays no re- gard to any positive disposition or preparation, but merely to the presence or absence of obstacles which would prove impediments to grace. In other words, God, generally speaking, is more in- clined to offer His grace to one who puts no obstacles in its way than to one who wallows in sin and neglects to do his share.>! c) Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturae negative se disponendo [1. e. obicem non po- nendo| Deus non denegat gratiam (to the man who does what he can with his natural moral strength, disposing himself negatively [7. e., by not placing any obstacle] God does not deny grace. In this form the axiom is identical with our thesis. The question arises: Can it be made to square with the dogma of the absolute gratuity of grace? Vasquez,°” Glossner,®? and some others answer 51A titre de curiosité we may note the opinion of Ripalda (De Ente Supernat., disp. 17, sect. 1) and Vasquez (Comment. in S. Theol., 1a, disp. 91, c. 10) that some pre-Tridentine theologians as- scribed to nature the ability of positively disposing itself for actual graces and thereby, though in perfect good faith, entertained Semipelagian views. Even St Thomas has been accused of con- - ceding too much to Semipelagian- _ism in two of his earlier works (Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 28, qu. 1, art. 4, and De Veritate, qu. 14, art. 11), though his teaching in the Summa is admit- tedly orthodox. On the extremely doubtful character of such a sum- mary indictment see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 34; Schiffni, De Gratia Divina, pp. 495 sqq., 542 sqq.; Glossner, Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von der Gnade, Mainz 1871. 52 Vasquez, Comment. in S, Theol., 1a, disp. 91, c. 10-11. 53 Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp, 191 sq., Ratisbon 1874, 150 ACTUAL GRACE this question in the negative, whereas the great majority of Catholic theologians hold with Suarez °* and Lessius,” that there is no contra- diction between the two. Though Lessius did not succeed in proving his famous contention that the axiom Facientt quod est in se Deus non dene- gat gratiam, was for three full centuries under- stood in this sense by the schools,’® there is no doubt that many authorities can be cited in favor of his interpretation.”’ The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated thus: The gratuity of grace does not imply that the recipient must have no sort of disposition. It merely means that man is posi- tively unworthy of divine favor. Otherwise the Church could not teach, as she does, that the grace bestowed on the angels and on our first: parents in Paradise was absolutely gratuitous, nor could she hold that the Hypostatic Union of the two natures in Christ, which is the pattern and exemplar of all true grace,’* was a pure grace in respect of the humanity of our Lord. The dogma of the gratuity of grace is in no dan- ger whatever so long as the relation between negative disposition and supernatural grace is conceived as actual (facienti=qui facit), not cau- 54 De Aucxil., III, 2, 3. 57 Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., 55 De Gratia Effic., c. to. Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 119 saq. ) 56 Disproved historically by Pal- 58 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Prae- — mieri. dest. Sancte, \(¢.) 15. oe ae THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 151 sal (facienti=quia facit). The motive for the distribution of grace is to be sought not in the dignity of human nature, but in God’s will to save all men. We must, however, guard against the erroneous notion that grace is bestowed accord- ing to a fixed law or an infallible norm regulating the amount of grace in accordance with the con- dition of the recipient. Sometimes great sin- fers are miraculously converted, while others of fairly good antecedents perish. Yet, again, who could say that to the omniscient and all-wise God the great sinner did not appear better fitted to _Teceive grace than the “decent” but self-sufficient pharisee? REApINGs : — Hurter, C ampendium Theologiae Dogmaticae, Vol. IT, thes. 187.— Oswald, Lehre von der Heitligung, § 8, Pader- born 1885.—*Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, c. 3, Gulpen 1885.— Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 417-420, Mainz 1897.— Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, . Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 105 sqq., Freiburg 1908.— Schiffini, De Gratia - Divina, pp. 468 sqq., Freiburg 1901. SECTION 3 THE UNIVERSALITY OF ACTUAL GRACE The gratuity of grace does not conflict with its universality. Though God distributes His graces freely, He grants them to all men with- out exception, because He wills all to be saved. This divine “will to save” (voluntas Dei salvifica) may be regarded in relation either to the wayfaring state or to the status termint. Regarded from the first-men- tioned point of view it is a merciful will (voluntas misericordiae) and is generally called first or antecedent will (voluntas prima s. antecedens) or God’s salvific will (voluntas Dei salvifica) in the strict sense of the word. Considered in relation to the status termini, it is a just will, as God rewards or punishes each creature according to its deserts. This second or consequent will (voluntas ne ge Fa em secunda s. consequens) is called “ predestination” in so ~ far as it rewards the just, and “ reprobation”” in so far as — it punishes the wicked. God’s ‘‘ will to save”? may therefore be defined as an earnest and sincere desire to justify all men and make b them supernaturally happy. As voluntas antecedens it is i conditional, depending on the free co-operation of man; as voluntas consequens, on the other hand, it is absolute, because God owes it to His justice to reward or punish every man according to his deserts.* 1Cfr. St. Augustine, Tract. in sed primo salvare, postea iudicare, — Ioa., 36, n. 4: “Venit Christus, eos iudicando in poenam, qui salvari 152 GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 153 Hence we shall treat in four distinct articles, (1) Of the universality of God’s will to save; (2) Of the divine voluntas salvifica as the will to give sufficient graces to all adult human beings without exception; (3) Of predestination, and (4) Of reprobation. ARTICLE \1 THE UNIVERSALITY OF GOD’S WILL TO SAVE Although God’s will to save all men is practically iden- tical with His will to redeem all? a formal distinction must be drawn between the two, (a) because there is a difference in the Scriptural proofs by which either is supported, and (b) because the latter involves the fate of the fallen angels, while the former suggests a question peculiar to itself, viz. the fate of unbaptized children. Thesis I: God sincerely wills the salvation, not only of the predestined, but of all the faithful without excep- ~ tion. This proposition embodies an article of faith. Proof. Its chief opponents are the Calvinists and the Jansenists, who heretically maintain that God wills to save none but the predestined. Against Calvin the Tridentine Council defined: “If any one saith that the grace of justification noluerunt, eos perducendo ad vitam, 2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, qui credendo salutem non respue- pp. 75 sqq., St. Louis 1914, runt,” 154 ACTUAL GRACE is attained only by those who are predestined unto life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive not grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him be anathema.”’ ® The teaching of Jansenius that Christ died ex- clusively for the predestined,* was censured as “heretical” by Pope Innocent X. Hence it is of faith that Christ died for others besides the predestined. Who are these “others”? As the Church obliges all her children to pray: “| Christ] descended from heaven for us men and for our salvation,” © it is certain that at least all the faith- ful are included in the saving will of God. We say, “at least all the faithful,’ because in matter of fact the divine voluntas salvifica extends to all the descendants of Adam, as we shall show further on.° a) Holy Scripture positively declares in a number of passages that God wills the salvation of all believers, whether predestined or not. Jesus Himself says in regard to the Jews: Matth. XXIII, 37: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that 3 Sess. VI, can. 17: “St quis sustificationis gratiam nonnist prae- destinatis ad vitam contingere di- 4 Prop. 5, apud Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 1096. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, p. 76. xerit, reliquos vero omnes qui vocan- tur, vocart quidem, sed gratiam non accipere, utpote divinad potestate praedestinatos ad malum, anathema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 827.) 5“ Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem descendit de coelis.” (Credo). 6V. infra, Thesis II. GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 155 are sent unto thee, how often would I (volut) have gathered together thy children, as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not (nolwisti).’ Two facts are stated in this text: (1) Our Lord’s earnest desire to save the Jewish people, anciently through the instrumentality of the prophets, and now in His own person; (2) the refusal of the Jews to be saved. Of those who believe in Christ under the New Covenant we read in the Gospel of St. John (III, 16): “God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him‘ may not perish, but may have life ever- lasting.” However, since many who believe in Christ do actually perish,® the divine voluntas salvifica, in principle, extends not only to the pre- destined, but to all the faithful, 7. e. to all who have received the sacrament of Baptism. b) The teaching of the Fathers can be - gathered from the quotations given under Thesis II, infra. c) The theological argument may be briefly summar- ized as follows: God’s will to save is co-extensive with the grace of adoptive sonship (filiatio adoptiva), which is imparted either by Baptism or by perfect charity. Now, some who were once in the state of grace are _ eternally lost. Consequently, God also wills the salvation Tras 6 micrebwy eis avror, 8 Among them was one of our Lord’s own chosen Apostles, 156 ACTUAL GRACE of those among the faithful who do not actually attain to salvation and who are, therefore, not predestined. Thesis II: God wills to save every human being. This proposition is fidet proxima saltem. Proof. The existence of original sin is no reason why God should exclude some men from the benefits of the atonement, as was alleged by the Calvinistic ‘“Infralapsarians.” Our thesis is so solidly grounded on Scripture and Tradition that some theologians unhesitatingly call 1t an ar- ticle of faith. a) We shall confine the Scriptural demonstra- tion to two classical passages, Wisd. XI, 24 sq. and 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq. a) The Book of Wisdom, after extolling God’s j omnipotence, says of His mercy: “But thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things, — and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of © repentance. For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast : made. ... ., Vhou.,sparest “all; because they are thine, O Lord, who lovest souls.” ® In this text the mercy of God is described as universal. — Misereris omnium, parcis omnibus. This universality is based (1) on His omnipotence (quia ommia potes), — which is unlimited. His mercy, being equally bound- 9 Wisd. XI, 24 sqq.: “Sed mi- quae sunt et nthil odisti eorum quae sereris omnium, quia omnia potes, et _fecisti. . . . Parcis autem omnibus, — dissimulas peccata hominum propter quoniam tua sunt, Domine, qui poenitentiam. Diligis enim omnia amas animas.”’ GOD'S WILL) TO SAVE 157 less, must therefore include all men without exception. The universality of God’s mercy is based (2) on His universal over-lordship and dominion (quoniam tua sunt; diligis omnia quae fecisti). As there is no creature that does not belong to God, so there is no man whom He does not love and to whom He does not show mercy. The universality of God’s mercy in the passage quoted is Paced) (3) on His love for souls (quit amas animas). Wherever there is an immortal soul (be it in child or adult, Christian, pagan or Jew), God is at work to save it. Consequently the divine voluntas salvifica is universal, not only in a moral, but in the physical sense of the term, that is, it embraces all the descendants of Adam. 6) t Tim. I, 2 sqq.: “I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgiv- ings be made for all men. . . . For this is good and ac- ceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all.” 1° The Apostle commands us to pray “for all men,” be- cause this practice is “ good and acceptable in the sight of God.” Why is it good and acceptable? Because God * will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowl- edge of the truth.” In other words, God’s will to save is universal. . The question arises: Is the universality of the divine eye Lim. 1T,.:% sqq.:' “ Obsecro (ds mdvras avOpmmous Oéder ow- igitur primum omnium fieri obsecra- Onvat) et ad agnitionem veritatis tiones, _ orationes, postulationes, venire: unus enim Deus (eis yap gratiarum actiones pro omnibus Oeds), unus et mediator (els Kat hominibus (irép ravrwy avOporwy) fecirns) Dei et hominum homo --. Hoc enim bonum est et ac-_ Christus Tesus, qui dedit redemp- ceptum coram Salvatore. nostro Deo, tionem semetipsum pro omnibus qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri (imép mdvtwy).” 158 ACTUAL GRACE voluntas salvifica, as inculcated by St. Paul, merely moral, or is it physical, admitting of no exceptions? The answer may be found in the threefold reason given by the Apostle: the oneness of God, the mediator- ship of Christ, and the universality of the Redemption. (1) “For there is [but] one God.” 21 As truly, there- fore, as God is the God of all men without exception, is each and every man included in the divine vo- luntas salvifica. (2) “ There is [but] ... of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.” The human nature which Christ assumed in the Incarnation is com- mon to all men. Hence, whoever is a man, has Jesus Christ for his mediator? (3) Christ “gave himself a redemption [i. e. died] for all.” That is to say, God’s will to save is co-extensive with His will to redeem. The latter is universal,’? consequently also the former.” b) The Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers were wont to base their teaching in this matter on the above-quoted texts, and clearly intimated q that they regarded the truth therein set forth as — divinely revealed. Passaglia * has worked out the Patristic argument in detail, quoting no less ‘i than two hundred authorities. a) We must limit ourselves to a few specimen cita- — St. Ambrose declares that God wills to save 4 “He willed all to be His own whom He © tions. all men. 11“ Unus enim Deus.’ Cfr. Rom. one mediator proved in Soteriology, pp. 77 sd4- ip TTA; 207/8a.5 7 2X, | 128 12 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, pp. 77 sqq. 18 Cfr. Matth, XVIII, 11; 2 Cor. V, 18. That God’s will to redeem mankind is universal has been 14 Cfr. on this text Estius, Com- — ment. in Epist. S. Pauli, h. 1. 15In his work De Partitione Vo- us luntatis Divinae in Primam et Se cundam, Rome 1851. fe GOD'S’ WILL TO SAVE 159 established and created. O man, do not flee and hide thyself! He wants even those who flee, and does" not will that those in hiding should perish.’2% St. Gregory of Nazianzus holds God’s voluntas salvifica to be co-extensive in scope with original sin and the atone- ment. “The law, the prophets, and the sufferings of Christ,” he says, “ by which we were redeemed, are com- mon property and admit of no exception: but as all [men] are participators in the same Adam, deceived by the ser- pent and subject to death in consequence of sin, so by the heavenly Adam all are restored to salvation and by the wood of ignominy recalled to the wood of life, from which we had fallen.’*7 St. Prosper concludes that, since all men are in duty bound to pray for their fellow- men, God must needs be willing to save all without excep- tion. “ We must sincerely believe,” he says, “that God wills all men to be saved, since the Apostle solicitously prescribes supplication to be made for all.’18 The question why so many perish, Prosper answers as follows: “ [God] wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth, . . . so that those who are saved, are saved because He wills them to be saved, while those who perish, perish because they deserve to perish.” 1° In his Responsiones ad Capitula Obiectionum Vin- centianarum the same writer energetically defends St. Augustine against the accusation that. his teaching on 16Iu Ps.; 39, mn. 20:3, “lle | siquidem Apostolus sollicite prae- omnes suos vult esse, quos condidit cipit, ut Deo pro omnibus supplice- et creavit. Utinam tu homo non fu- tur.’ gias et te abscondas! Ille etiam 19° OD).-| Cita Can eeauininn qui et _ fugientes requirit et absconditos non omnes vult salvos fieri et ad -agni- vult perire.’’ tionem veritatis venire,... ut et dt Orat,,'' 33) ts. 94 qui salvaniur ideo salvi sint, quia 18 Resp. ad Capitula Gallor., c. 2: illos volwit Deus salvos fieri, et qui _ “ Sincerissime credendum est, Deum pereunt, ideo pereant, quia perire velle ut omnes homines salvi fiant, meruerunt.” 160 ACTUAL GRACE predestination is incompatible with the orthodox doc- trine of the universality of God’s saving will.”° B) St. Augustine aroused suspicion in the camp of the Semipelagians by his general teaching ‘on predes- tination and more particularly by his interpretation of 1 Tim. II, 4. The great Bishop of Hippo interprets this Pauline text in no less than four different ways. In his treatise De Spiritu et Litera he describes the divine voluntas salvifica as strictly universal in the physical sense.2t. In his Enchiridion he restricts it to the pre- destined.22, In his Contra Iulianum he says: “ No one is saved unless God so wills.” 2 In his work De Cor- reptione et Gratia: “ God wills all men to be saved, be- cause He makes us to will this, just as He sent the spirit of His Son [into our hearts], crying: Abba, Father, that is, making us to cry, Abba, Pathet:? 34) How -didviot. Augustine come to interpret this simple text in so many different ways? Some think he chose this method to overwhelm the Pelagians and Semipelagians with Scrip- tural proofs. But this polemical motive can hardly have induced him to becloud an obvious text and invent inter- pretations which never occurred to any other ecclesiasti- cal writer before or after his time. The conundrum can only be solved by the assumption that Augustine believed in a plurality of literal senses in the Bible and held that over and above (or notwithstanding) the sensus obvius 22 Enchiridion, c. 103. 23 Contra Iulian., IV, 8, 42: 20 For further information on this subject consult Ruiz, De Voluntate Dei, disp. 19 sqq.; Petavius, De Deo, X, 4 sq. 21 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 33; n. 58: “Vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis venire; non sic tamen ut iis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes iustissime iudicentur.” “ Nemo salvatur nisi volente Deo.” 24 De Corrept. et Gratia, c. 15, n. 47: “Omnes homines vuli Deus salvos fieri, quoniam nos facit velle, sicut misit Spiritum Filii sui claman- tem: Abba, pater, i. e. nos clamare facientem.” GOD'S WALI FO! SAVE } 161 every exegete is free to read as much truth into any given | passage as possible, and that such interpretation lay with- in the scope of the inspiration of the Holy Ghost quite as much as the sensus obvius. In his Confessions ?® he actually argues in favor of a pluralitas sensuum. He was keen enough to perceive, however, that if a Scrip- tural text is interpreted in different ways, the several con- structions put upon it must not be contradictory. As he was undoubtedly aware of the distinction between vo- luntas antecedens and consequens,* his different inter- pretations of 1 Tim. II, 4 can be reconciled by assum- ing that he conceived God’s voluntas ‘salvifica as antecedens in so far as it is universal, and as consequens in so far as it is particular. St. Thomas solves the dif- ficulty in a similar manner: “The words of the Apos- tle, “God will have all men to be saved, etc.,’ can be un- derstood in three ways: First, by a restricted applica- tion, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says, ‘God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not be- cause there is no man whom he does not wish to be saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will” Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not of every indi- vidual of each class; in which case they mean that ‘ God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition.’ Thirdly, according to the Damascene, they are understood of the antecedent will of God, not of the consequent will. The distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent or consequent; but to the 25 Confessiones, XII, 17 sqq. Notae in Enchiridion S, Augustini, 26 Faure has proved this in his c. 103, Naples 1847, pp. 195 sqq. 162 ACTUAL GRACE things willed. To understand which we must consider that everything, so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its strict sense, and considered absolutely, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional cir- cumstance is taken into account, by a consequent con- sideration may be changed into its contrary. Thus, that men should live is good; and that men should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. If in a particular case it happens that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him becomes good, to let him live an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge that antecedently he wills all men to live, but consequently he wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply in as much as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered ; and this is what is meant by willing conse- quently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified man- ner he would will him to live, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.” *” 27 Summa Theol., ta, qu. 19, att. 51 sq., and, less favorably, Barden- 6, ad 1. On Augustine’s teaching hewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 498 see Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. sqq., Freiburg 1908. GOD'S "WILL TO SAVE 163 Thesis III: The lot of unbaptized infants, though - difficult to reconcile with the universality of God’s sav- ing will, furnishes no argument against it. Proof. The most difficult problem concerning the divine voluntas salvifica—a real crux theolo- gorum—is the fate of unbaptized children. The Church has never uttered a dogmatic definition on this head, and theologians hold widely diver- gent opinions. Bellarmine teaches that infants who die with- out being baptized, are excluded from the divine voluntas salvifica, because, while the non-recep- tion of Baptism is the proximate reason of their damnation, its ultimate reason must be the will of God. a) This rather incautious assertion needs to be carefully restricted. It is an article of faith that God has instituted the sacrament of Baptism as the ordinary means of salvation for all men. On the other hand, it is certain that He expects parents, priests, and relatives, as his representa- tives, to provide conscientiously for its proper and timely administration. Sinful negligence on the part of these responsible agents cannot, therefore, be charged to Divine Providence, but must be laid at the door of those human agents who fail to do their duty. In exceptional cases infants can be saved even by means of the so-called Baptism of blood (baptismus sanguinis), 1. e. death for 164 ACTUAL GRACE Christ’s sake. On the whole it may be said that God has, in principle, provided for the salvation of little children by the institution of infant Bap- tism. b) But there are many cases in which either invinci- ble ignorance or the order of nature precludes the ad- ministration of Baptism. The well-meant opinion of some theologians 7° that the responsibility in all such cases lies not with God, but with men, lacks probability. Does God, then, really will the damnation of these innocents? Some modern writers hold that the physical order of nature is responsible for the misfortune of so many innocent infants; but this hypothesis contributes nothing towards clearing up the awful mystery.” For God is the author of the natural as well as of the supernatural order. To say that He is obliged to remove existing obstacles by means of a miracle would disparage His ordinary providence.®° Klee’s assumption that dying children become conscious long enough to enable them to receive the Baptism of desire (baptismus flaminis), is scarcely compatible with the definition of the Council of Florence that “the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, or only in original sin, forthwith descend to hell.” 3 A still more unsatisfactory supposition is that 28 E. g. Arrubal (Comment. in S. — siastica traditione didicerunt. Nam Theol., 1a, disp. 91, c. 3 sq.) and Kilber (Theol. Wirceburg., De Deo, ~ Gisp, ta pes’ 2,, arta ns). 29 Cfr. Albertus a Bulsano, Theol. Dogmat., ed. Graun, Vol. II, p. 141, Innsbruck 1894. 30 Cfr, Bellarmine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, II, 12: ‘. .. haec vesponsio non videtur digna Chri- tianis, qui providentiam Dei erga homines ex sacris literis et eccle- si non cadit passer in terram sine Patre nostro, qui in coelis est, quanto magis nos apud Deum pluris sumus illis? ” 31 “Definimus illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infer- num descendere.”’ (Decret. Unio- nis, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693.) GOD Si WILE ETO SAVE 165 the prayer of Christian parents acts like a baptism of de- > sire and saves their children from hell. This theory, es- poused by Cardinal Cajetan, was rejected by the Fathers of Trent,*’ and Pope Pius V ordered it to be expunged from the Roman edition of Cajetan’s works.* A way out of the difficulty is suggested by Gutberlet and others, who, holding with St. Thomas that infants that die without Baptism will enjoy a kind of natural beati- tude, think it possible that God, in view of their suffer- ings, may mercifully cleanse them from original sin and thereby place them in a state of innocence.’ This the- ory is based on the assumption that the ultimate fate of unbaptized children is deprivation of the beatific vision of God and therefore a state of real damnation (poena damm, infernum), and that the remission of orig- inal sin has for its object merely to enable these un- fortunate infants to enjoy a perfect natural beatitude, which they could not otherwise attain. It is reasonable to argue that, as these infants are deprived of celestial happiness through no guilt of their own, the Creator can hardly deny them some sort of natural beatitude, to which their very nature seems to entitle them. “Hell” for them probably consists in being deprived of the beatific vision of God, which is a supernatural grace and as such lies outside the sphere of those prerogatives to which hu- man nature has a claim by the fact of creation. This theory would seem to establish at least some manner of salvation for the infants in question, and consequently, to vindicate the divine voluntas salvifica in the same meas- ure. Needless to say, it can claim no more than prob- 32 Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist. Conc. 34 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- rid. TX. ‘8. matische Theologie, Vol. VIII, p. 33 It occurs in his commentary on 295, Mainz 1897. the Summa, 3a, qu. 68, art. 2, 11. 166 | ACTUAL GRACE ability, and we find ourselves constrained to admit, at the conclusion of our survey, that there is no sure and per- fect solution of the difficulty, and theologians therefore do well to confess their ignorance.*° c) The difficulty of which we have spoken does not, of course, in any way impair the certainty of the dogma. The Scriptural passages cited above *° clearly prove that God wills to save all men without exception. In basing the univer- sality of God’s mercy on His omnipotence, His universal dominion, and His love of souls, the Book of Wisdom *’ evidently implies that the un- baptized infants participate in that mercy in all three of these respects. How indeed could Di- vine Omnipotence exert itself more effectively than by conferring grace on those who are in- evitably and without any fault of their own de- prived of Baptism? Who would deny that little children, as creatures, are subject to God’s uni- versal dominion in precisely the same manner as adults? Again, if God loves the souls of men, must He not also love the souls of infants? 1 Tim. II, 4°% applies primarily to adults, because strictly speaking only adults can “come to the knowledge of the truth.” But St. Paul employs certain middle terms which undoubtedly 35 On the probable fate of unbap- 36 Thesis IT. tized infants cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God 37 Quoted supra, p. 156. the Author of Nature and the Su- 88 Quoted supra, p. 157. pernatural, pp, 300 sqq. GOD'S WILE TO SAVE 167 comprise children as well. Thus, if all men have > but ‘one God,” this God must be the God of in-. fants no less than of adults, and His mercy and goodness must include them also. And if Jesus Christ as God-man is the ‘one mediator of God and men,” He must also have assumed the human nature of children, in order to redeem them from original sin. Again, if Christ “gave himself a redemption for all,” it is impossible to assume that millions of infants should be directly excluded from the benefits of the atonement.*? ARAL Bi) 2 GOD’S WILL TO GIVE SUFFICIENT GRACE TO ALL ADULT HUMAN BEINGS IN PARTICULAR In relation to adults, God manifests His saving will by the bestowal of sufficient grace upon all.1| The be- stowal of sufficient grace being evidently an effluence of the universal voluntas salvifica, the granting of such grace to all who have attained the use of reason furnishes an- other proof for the universality of grace. God gives all men sufficient graces. But He is not obliged to give to each efficacious graces, because all that is required to enable man to reach his supernatural des- tiny is codperation with sufficient grace, especially with the gratia prima vocans, which is the beginning of all salutary operation. To prove that God gives sufficient grace to all adult 39 On the whole question consult 1 On the notion and existence of Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 53, sufficient grace see supra, Ch. I, 3rd ed., Rome 1883. Sect. 2, No, 6, 168 ACTUAL GRACE human beings without exception, we must show that He gives sufficient grace (1) to the just, (2) to the sinner, and (3) to the heathen. This we shall do in three dis- tinct theses. Thesis I: God gives to all just men sufficient grace to keep His commandments. This 1s de fide. Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches: “If any one saith that the commandments of God are, -even for one that is justified and constituted in grace, impossible to keep; let him be anathema.” ? A contrary proposition in the writings of Jan- senius * was censured by Pope Innocent the Tenth as “foolhardy, impious, blasphemous, and hereti- cal The Church does not assert that God gives to the just sufficient grace at all times. She merely declares that sufficient grace is at their disposal whenever they are called upon to obey the law (urgente praecepto). Nor need God always bestow a gratia proxime sufficiens; in many instances the grace of prayer (gratia remote sufiiciens) fully serves the purpose.* This dogma is clearly contained in Holy Scripture. We shall quote the most important texts. bus iustis volentibus et conantibus secundum praesentes, quas habent 2Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 18: “ Si quis dixerit, Det praecepta homini etiam iustificato et sub gratia constituto esse ad observandum im- possibilia, anathema sit.” (Den- zinger-Bannwart, n. 828). Céfr. Sess. VI, cap. 11 (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 804). 3“ Aliqua Dei praecepta homini- vires, sunt wnpossibilia: deest quoque illis gratia, qua possibilia fiant.’’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1092.) 4QOn the distinction between gratia proxime sufficiens and gratia remote sufficiens, cfr. supra, pp. 43 sq. GODS; WiLL iO SAVE 169 -a) 1 John V, 3 sq.: “For this is the charity - of God, that we keep his commandments, and his commandments are not heavy. For whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world.”® Ac- cording to this text the “charity of God” mani- fests itself in “keeping his commandments” and “overcoming the world.” This is declared to be an easy task. Our Lord Himself says: “My yoke is sweet and my burden light.”*® Hence it must be possible to keep His commandments, and therefore God does not withhold the abso- lutely necessary graces from the just. St. Paul consoles the Corinthians by telling them that God will not suffer them to be tempted beyond their strength, but will help them to a happy issue, provided they faithfully codperate with His grace. 1 Cor. X,13:. “God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make also with temp- tation issue, that you may be able to bear it.”? As it is impossible even for the just to overcome grievous temptations without supernatural aid,° and as God Himself tells us that we are able to overcome them, it is a necessary inference that He or Jonn), V,\ 3. sq.3 |" Haec est 71 Cor. X, 13: “ Fidelis autem _ caritas Det, ut mandata eius custo- diamus et mandata eius gravia non sunt (ai évrodal avrov Bapetar ovx elgiv): quoniam omne quod natum est ex Deo [= tustus] vincit mundum.” 6 Matth. XI, 30, Deus est, qui non patietur vos ten- tari supra id quod potestis (meipac- Onvat vrép 6 Sivacbe), sed faciet etiam cum tentatione proventum (ExBacw), ut possitis sustinere.” 8 V. supra, pp. 65 sq. 170 ACTUAL GRACE bestows sufficient grace. The context hardly leaves a doubt that St. Paul has in mind the just, for a few lines further up he says: “Therefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall.” ® But there is no exegetical objec- tion to applying the text to all the faithful with- out exception.’® b) This dogma is clearly set forth in the writ- ings of the Fathers. Some of them, it is true, when combating the Pelagians and Semipelagians, defended the proposition that “grace is not given to all men,” * but they meant efficacious grace. a) A typical representative of this group of ecclesias- tical writers is the anonymous author of the work De Vocatione. Omnium Gentium,2 whom Pope Gelasius praised as “ probatus Ecclesiae magister.’ This fifth- century writer, who was highly esteemed by his contem- poraries, discusses the question whether and in what sense all men are called, and why some are not saved. tie begins by drawing a distinction between God’s general and His special providence.* “It so pleased God,” he says, “to give His efficacious grace to many, and to withhold His sufficient grace from none, in order that it might ap- pear from both [actions] that what is conferred upon a portion is not denied to the entire race.” ** 91 Cor. X, 12: “ Itaque qui se existimat stare, videat ne cadat.” 10 V. infra, Thesis II. Cfr. also Ecclus. II, 11 sqq.; John VI, 373 2 Pet I, 10 sq. 11 Gratiam non omnibus dari.’’ 12 Migne, P. L., XVII, 1073 saq- Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrol- OfY, DP» 515. 13 Benignitas Dei generalis — spe- cialis Det misericordia. 14“ Deo autem placuit et hanc [gratiam efficacem] multis tribuere et illam [suficientem] a nemine submovere, ut ex utraque appareat, non negatum universitati, quod col- latum est portioni.” (De b’ocatione Omnium Gentium, II, 25.) For _ further information on the doctrinal GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 171 B) The Jansenists appealed in favor of their teach- ing to such Patristic passages as the following: ‘ After the withdrawal of the divine assistance he [St. Peter] was unable to stand;” ** and: “ He had undertaken more than he was able to do.” *® But the two Fathers from whose writings these passages are taken (SS. Chrysos- tom and Augustine) speak, as the context evinces, of the withdrawal of efficacious and proximately sufficient grace in punishment of Peter’s presumption. Had St. Peter followed our Lord’s advice!” and prayed in- stead of relying on his own strength, he would not have fallen. That this was the mind of St. Augustine clearly appears from the following sentence in his work De Umni- tate Ecclesiae: “Who shall doubt that Judas, had he willed, would not have betrayed Christ, and that Peter, had he willed, would not have thrice denied his Master?” 18 c) The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated as follows: Since the state of grace confers a claim to supernatural happi- ness, it must also confer a claim to those graces which are necessary to attain it. To assert that God denies the just sufficient grace to observe His commandments, to avoid mortal sin, and to persevere in the state of grace, would be to gainsay 17 Matth, XXVI, 41: ‘“ Watch character of this work see Fr. ye and pray that ye enter not into _ Worter, Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semipelagianismus, Miinster 1900. 15 Chrysostom, Hom. in Matth., Say Te 16 Augustine, Serm., 296: ‘ Plus ausus erat, quam eius capacitas sus- tinebat.” temptation.”’ 18 Lib, de Unitate Ecclesiae, 9: “Quis dubitaverit quod Iudas Christum, si voluisset, non utique tradidisset, et Petrus, si voluisset, ter Dominum non negasset?”’ 172 ACTUAL GRACE His solemn promise to His adopted children: “ This is the will of my Father that sent me: that every one who seeth the Son and believeth in him, may have life ever- lasting, and I will raise him up in the last day.” 7": Con- sequently, God owes it to His own fidelity to bestow suf- ficient graces upon the just. Again, according to the plain teaching of Revelation, the just are obliged, under pain of sin, to observe the commandments of God and the precepts of His Church.2° But this is impossible without the aid of grace. Consequently, God grants at least sufficient grace to his servants, for ad impossibile nemo tene- tur. Thesis II: In regard to Christians guilty of mortal sin we must hold: (1) that ordinary sinners always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance; (2) that God never entirely withdraws His grace even from the obdurate. The first part of this thesis embodies a theo- logical conclusion; the second states the common teaching of Catholic theologians. 1. Proof of the First Part. The distinction here drawn between “ordinary” and “obdurate”’ sinners has its basis in revelation and is clearly demanded by the different degrees of certainty attaching to the two parts of our thesis. An “ ordinary ” sinner is a Christian who has lost sanc- tifying grace by a grievous sin. An“ obdurate”’ sinner 19 John VI, 4o. 21 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Di- 20 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, vina, pp. 573 Sdq. can. 19-21. GOD'S WILL TO SAVE 173 is one who, by repeatedly and maliciously transgressing — the laws of God, has dulled his intellect and hardened his will against salutary inspirations. A man may be an habitual sinner (consuetudinarius) and a backslider, with- out being obdurate, or, which comes to the same, impeni- tent. Weakness is not malice, though sinful habits often beget impenitence, which is one of the sins against the . Holy Ghost and the most formidable obstacle in the way of conversion. With regard to ordinary sinners, our thesis asserts that they always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance. a) Experience teaches that a man falls deeper and deeper if he does not hasten to do penance after committing a mortal sin. But this is not the fault of Almighty God, who never withholds His grace; it is wholly the fault of the sinner who fails to cooperate with the proffered supernatural assistance. a) A sufficient Scriptural argument for this part of our thesis is contained in the texts cited in support of Thesis I. If it is true that God suf- fers no one to be tempted beyond his strength,” this must surely apply to Christians who have had the misfortune of committing mortal sin. St. John says that the commandments of God “are not heavy” and that faith is “the victory which overcometh the world.” * Faith in Christ re- mains in the Christian, even though he be guilty Sarit it (Cor, «X23. 231 John V, 3 sq. 174 ACTUAL GRACE of mortal sin, and consequently if he wills, he is able, by the aid of sufficient grace, to overcome the “world,” 7. e. the temptations arising from concupiscence,”* and thus to cease committing mortal sins. B) As for the teaching of Tradition, St. Au- gustine lays down two theological principles which apply to saint and sinner alike. “ God does not enjoin impossibilities,” he says, “ but in His injunctions counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do.” *° It follows that the sinner always receives at least the grace of prayer, which Augustine therefore calls gratia initialis sive parva, and of which he says that its right use en- sures the gratia magna. The second principle is this: “Cum lege comiuncta est gratia, qua lex observari possit.” That is, every divine law, by special ordinance, carries with it the grace by which it may be observed. In other words, the laws of God can always be obeyed because the lawgiver never fails to grant sufficient grace to keep them.” b) That the sinner always receives sufficient grace to be converted, follows from the Scrip- tural injunction of conversion. If conversion to God is a duty, and to comply with this duty is impossible without the aid of grace,” the divine 24 Cfr. 1 John II, 16. .25 De Natura et Gratia, c. 43, n. so: “Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed iubendo admonet, et facere quod possis et petere quod non pos- Oh Neg 7 26 For an explanation of certain difficult passages bearing on this point in the writings of St. Au- gustine, see Schiffini, De Gratia Di- vind, pp. 531 saqq. 27V. supra, pp. 104 sq GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 175 command obviously implies the bestowal of suffi- cient grace. That conversion is a duty follows from such Scriptural texts as these: “As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways!” #8 “The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penarice.’?7° This teaching is faithfully echoed by Tradition. 2. Proof of the Second Part. Obduracy is a serious obstacle to conversion because the ob- durate sinner has confirmed his will in malice *° and by systematic resistance diminished the in- fluence of grace. The question here is whether or not God in such cases eventually withdraws His erace altogether. Some rigorists hold that He does so, with the purpose of sparing the sinner greater tortures in hell.+ Though this assertion cannot be said to contravene the dogma of the universality of God’s salvific will, (its defenders do not deny that He faithfully does His share to save these unfortunate reprobates), we prefer to adopt the sententia 28'Ez. XXXIII, 11: “Vivo ego, dicit Dominus Deus, nolo mortem aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poent- tentiam revertti (un Bovdduevds impit, sed ut convertatur impius a via sua et vivat. Convertimini, converti- Mini a viis vestris pessimis,” 29%2)) Pet, Til, 9:° “Non tardat Dominus promissionem suam, sicut quidam existimant, sed patienter agit (uaxpoOuvpet) propter vos, nolens Tivas admodk€obat, GANA wavras eis peTavoway xwpnoar).” 30'CinwisiiVeleos 31 According to Ruiz (De- Prae- dest., disp. 39, sect. 1), there are but very few divines (valde pauct) who hold this view. 176 | ACTUAL GRACE communis, that God grants even the most obdurate sin- ner — at least now and then, e. g. during a mission or on the occasion of some terrible catastrophe — sufficient grace to be converted. The theological reasons for this opinion, which we hold to be the true one, coincide in their last analysis with those set forth in the first part of our thesis. a) Sacred Scripture, in speaking of the duty of repentance, makes no distinction between ordinary and obdurate sinners. On the contrary, the Book of Wisdom points to one of the most wicked and impenitent of nations, the Canaanites, as a shining object of divine mercy and patience.*? ‘According to St. Paul, God calls especially upon hardened and impenitent sinners to do penance. Rom. II, 4 sq.: “Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and patience, and long suffering ? Knowest thou not that the benignity of God lead- eth thee to penance? But according to thy hard- ness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath, against the day of wrath, and reve- lation of the just judgment of God, who will ren- der to every man according to his works.” * There are some Scriptural passages which seem to imply that God withdraws His grace from those who are 32 Wisd. XII, ro. anra) tuam et impoenitens cor 33 Rom. II, 4 sq.: “An divitias (dmeravonrov Kapdlav) thesaurizas bonitatis cius et patientiae et longa- tibi iram in die irae et revelationts nimitatis contemnis? Ignoras quo- iusti iudicii Dei, qui reddet unicut- niam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam que secundum opera eius.’ Cfr. (els perdvoiay) te adducit? Se- Prov. I, 20 sqq. cundum autem duritiem (oKdnpd- ep Saree GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 177 obdurate, nay, that He Himself hardens their hearts in punishment of sin. Thus the Lord says of Pharao: “I shall harden his heart,’ ** and Moses tells us: “ The Lord hardened Pharao’s heart, and he harkened not unto. them.” *° But it would be wrong to assume that this de- notes a positive action on the part of God. Pharao, as we are told further on, ‘‘ hardened his own heart” (1m- gravavit cor suum).*° The fault in all cases lies with the sinner, who obstinately ‘resists the call of grace. God’s co-operation in the matter is merely indirect. The greater and stronger graces which He grants to ordinary sinners, He withholds from the obdurate in punishment of their malice. This is, however, by no means tanta- mount to a withdrawal of sufficient grace.*” b) The Fathers speak of God’s way of dealing with obdurate sinners in a manner which clearly shows their belief that He never entirely with- draws His mercy. ‘They insist that the light of grace is never extinguished in the present Hie), God, gave jthem jover to. a, reprobate mind,” says St. Augustine, “for such is the blind- ness of the mind. Whosoever is given over thereunto, is shut out from the interior light of God: but not wholly as yet, whilst he is in this life. For there is ‘outer darkness,’ which is un- derstood to belong rather to the day of judg- ment; that he should rather be wholly without 34Ex. VII, 3: “Ego indurabo 36) Boxy AV Lhd ey cor eius.” 87 For the solution of other diffi- 85 Ex. IX, 12: “Induravitque culties see Schiffini, De Gratia Di- _ Dominus cor Pharaonis, etc.’ vind, Pp. 529 Sq. ? 178 ACTUAL GRACE God, whosoever, whilst there is time, refuses cor- rection.” *° It follows that no sinner, how desperate soever his case may appear, need be despaired of. As long as there is life there is hope.*® The Fathers consistently teach that the reason why reprobates are lost is not lack of grace but their own malice. Thus St. Chrysostom comments on Isaias’ prophecy regarding the impenitence of the Jews: “The reason they did not believe was not that Isaias had predicted their unbelief, but his prediction was based on the fact that they would not believe. They were unable to believe, i. e. they had not the will to believe.” ® c) The theological argument for our thesis is well stated by St. Thomas. He distinguishes between ob- stinatio perfecta and obstinatio imperfecta and says: Perfect obstinacy exists only in hell. Imperfect obstinacy is that of a sinner who has his will so firmly set on evil that he is incapable of any but the faintest impulses to- wards virtue, though even these are sufficient to prepare the way for grace.*t “If any one falls into sin after Alon De quocunque quamvis pessimo homine hac in vita consti- 38 St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., VI, n. 8: “ Dedit illos in repro- bum sensum (Rom. 1, 28); nam ea est caecitas mentis. In eam quis- quis datus fuerit, ab interiore Det luce secluditur, sed nondum penitus, quum in hac vita est. Sunt enim tenebrae exteriores, quae magis ad diem iudicit pertinere intelliguntur, ut penitus extra Deum sit, quisquts, dum tempus est, corrigi noluerit.” 39 St. Augustine, Retractationes, tuto non est desperandum.” 40 Tract. in Ioa., XII, 39. Simi- larly ibid., LIII, n. 6. For a com- plete exposition of St. Augustine’s teaching on this point consult De- champs, De Haeresi Ianseniana, III, 6 sqq., and Palmieri, De Gra- tia Divina Actuali, thes. 4o. 41 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, qu. 24, art. 11: “ Haec est ob- GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 179 having received Baptism,” says the Fourth Lateran Coun- cil, “he can always be restored by sincere penance.” * As the power of the keys comprises all sins, even those against the Holy Ghost, so divine grace is held out to all sinners. The Montanistic doctrine of the unforgivable- ness of the “three capital sins” (apostasy, murder, and adultery) was already condemned as heretical during the life-time of Tertullian. The sinner can obtain forgiveness only by receiving the sacrament of Penance or making an act of perfect contrition.*? Justly, therefore, does the Church regard despair of God’s mercy as an additional grievous sin. If the rigorists were right in asserting that God in the end absolutely abandons the sinner, there could be no hope of forgiveness, and despair would be justified. Thesis III: The heathens, too, receive sufficient graces for salvation. This proposition may be qualified as certa. Proof. The “heathens” are those whom the Gospel has not yet reached. They are called in- fideles negativi in contradistinction to the infideles positivt, 1. e. apostates and formal heretics who have fallen away from the faith. We assert that God gives to the heathens sufficient grace to know the truth and be saved. Pope Alexander VIII, stinatio imperfecta, qua aliquis potest 42 Conc. Lateran. IV (1215), cap. esse obstinatus in statu viae, dum “ Firmiter’’: “Et st post suscep- scilicet habet aliquis ita firmatam tionem baptismt quisquam prolapsus voluntatem in peccato, quod non sur- fuerit in peccatum, per veram potest gunt motus ad bonum nisi debiles. semper. poenitentiam reparart.” Quia tamen aliqui surgunt, ex tis (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 430.) _datur via, ut praeparentur ad gra- 43 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. tiam.” : T43 Sess. AAV caper. 180 ACTUAL GRACE on December 7, 1690, condemned Arnauld’s Jan- senistic proposition that “pagans, Jews, heretics, and others of the same kind experience no influ- ence whatever from Christ, and it may therefore be rightly inferred that there is in them a nude and helpless will, lacking sufficient grace.” “* a We ol iras) dus 24, arts 1-3; and Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogma- tische Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 435. 194. ACTUAL GRACE says St. Augustine, “that no one can either be added to or taken from them.’ ?4 We must dis- tinguish between the absolute and the relative number of the predestined. God, being omniscient, knows not only the abstract number of the elect, but every individual predestined to Heaven. To us the number of the elect is wrapped in impenetrable mystery. St. Thomas justly observes: “Some say that as many men will be saved as angels fell: some, so many as there were angels left; others, in fine, so many as the number of angels who fell, added to that of all the angels created by God. It is, how- ever, better to say that ‘God alone knows the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness,’ as the prayer for the living and the dead expresses ite Wet nee God will round out the number of the elect by suddenly precipitating the end of the world or by a sort of “ natu- ral selection,” is an open question. To assume the latter could hardly be reconciled with the dogma of the universality of His saving will. St. Augustine seems to favor the former.”* As regards the relative number of the elect, some writers (e. g. Massillon) represent it as so infinitesimally runt et insuper tot quot fuerunt angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur 21 De Corrept. et Grat., c. 13: “ . . quorum ita certus est nume- rus, ut nec addatur eis quisquam mec minuatur ex eis.” 22) Si Pheole,) Las, (ile) S3araliee tas “De numero omnium praedestina- torum hominum quis sit, dicunt qui- dam quod tot ex hominibus salvabun- tur, quot angeli ceciderunt; quidam vero, quod tot ex hominibus salva- buntur, quot angeli remanserunt; quidam vero, quod tot ex homini- bus salvabuntur, quot angeli cecide- quod soli Deo est cognitus nume- _yus electorum in superna felicitate locandus, ut habet collecta pro vivis et defunctis.”” 23De Bono Viduitatis, n. 28: ““ Quasi propter aliud retardetur hoc saeculum, nisi ut impleatur prae- destinatus numerus ille sanctorum, quo citius impleto profecto nec ter- minus saeculi differetur.” PREDESTINATION 195 small that it would almost drive a saint to despair,—“ as if the Church had been established for the express pur- pose of populating hell.” ** Even St. Thomas held that relatively few are saved.?®> But the arguments adduced in support of this contention are by no means convinc- ing.® Recently, the Jesuit Father Castelein®’ im- pugned the rigorist theory with weighty arguments. He was sharply attacked by the Redemptorist Godts,?* who marshalled a great number of authorities in favor of the sterner view. The controversy cannot be decided either on Scriptural or traditional grounds. In our pessimistic age it is more grateful and consoling to assume that the majority of Christians, especially Catholics, will be saved.2® If we add to this number not a few Jews, Mohammedans, and heathens, it is probably safe to estimate the number of the elect as at least equal to that of the reprobates. Were it smaller, “it could be said to the shame and offense of the divine majesty and mercy, that the [future] kingdom of Satan is larger than the kingdom of Christ.” °° 3. THE Motive oF PREDESTINATION.—The efficient cause of predestination is God; its instru- 24 Dieringer, Epistelbuch, ‘* Fest 29 Cfr. 1 Tim. -IV, 10: owrip Allerheiligen.” BEOSE TMEDL., tas, Ai. 235, atts: 7» ad 3: “Pauciores sunt qui sal- vantur.” 26 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- mat. Theol., Vol. VIII, pp. 363 sqq., and W. Schneider, Das andere Leben, oth ed., pp. 476 sqq., Pader- born 1908. 27 Le Rigorisme, le Nombre des Elus et la Doctrine du Salut, 2nd ed., Bruxelles 1899. 28De Paucitate quid Docuerunt Bruxelles 1899. Salvandorum Sancti, 3d ed., ravrev avOpwrwv, pmadioTa Te orav. This opinion is convincingly defended by the Spanish theologian Genér (Theol. Dogmat. Scholast., II, 342 saq., Rome 1767.) ‘Timid souls may profitably ponder what Thomas a Kempis says in the Imitation, I, Be 7 30 Genér, Theol. Dogmat. Scho- last., II® 342: “... ne dici possit cum dedecore et iniuria divinae maie- statis et clementiae, maius esse im- perium daemonis quam Christi.” 196 ACTUAL GRACE mental cause, grace; its final cause, the divine glory; its primary meritorious cause, the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. On these points all theologians are agreed. Not so as to the motive that induced God to predestine certain individuals to the exclusion of others. The ques- tion narrows itself down to this: What influ- ence, if any, do the merits of a man exert on the eternal decree of predestination?—and may be formulated in three different ways. a) What influence do the merits of a man ex- ert on his predestination to the initial grace of vocation? Recalling the dogma of the absolute gratuity of grace, our answer must be: None. For whatever merits one may have acquired before he receives the initial grace of voca- tion, must be purely natural, and consequently worthless in the eyes of God for supernatural predestination. ‘To assume,” says St. Thomas, “that there is on our part some merit, the fore- knowledge of which [on the part of God] would be the cause [motive] of our predestination, would be to assume that grace is given to us [as a reward] of our [natural] merits.” °** b) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to grace and glory? 31 Lect. in Ep. ad Rom., VIII, 6: motivum] praedestinationis, nihil est “Unde ponere quod aliquod meri- aliud quam supponere gratiam dart tum ex parte nostra praesupponatur, ex meritis nostris [scil. natwrals- cuius praescientia sit ratio [scil bus].” V. supra, Ch. II, Sect. 2. a A as CE a ca i — —— ——— CSAS SS SS Set Se ao a aa ns a = a Py PREDESTINATION 197 Catholic theologians are unanimous in hold- ing that, since grace is absolutely gratuitous and inseparably connected with glory as its effect, the union of both can no more be based upon natural merit than the initial grace of vocation itself, which transmits the quality of gratuitousness to each and every one of the graces that follow in its wake, up to and including justification and eternal beatitude. Those among the Fathers who defended the gratuity of predestination against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, really aimed at safeguarding the gratuity of initial grace, in or- der not to be constrained to say with Pelagius that “the grace of God is given as a reward of merit.” °2 “What compelled me in this work of mine [De Dono Perseverantiae| to defend more abundantly and clearly those passages of Scrip- ture in which predestination is commended,” says St. Augustine, “if not the Pelagian assertion that God’s grace is given according to our [natural] merits?” °* Obviously these Fathers did not have in view the praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum, as the champions of the praedestinatio ante praevisa merita mistakenly assert, but what they meant was that complete predestination 32 Gratiam Dei secundum merita mendata est, copiosius et enucleatius dari.”’ isto nostro labore defendi, nisi quod 33 De Dono Perseverant., n. 53: Pelagiani dicunt, gratiam Dei secun- “ Quid autem coegit loca Scriptura- dum merita nostra [naturalia] dari?” rum, quibus praedestinatio com- 198 ACTUAL GRACE which comprises grace and glory as one whole. Similarly, the early Schoolmen, when they speak of the “gratuity of predestination,” usually mean complete predestination.** D’Argentré’s _ re- searches show how necessary it is to draw sharp distinctions and carefully to establish the real state of the question before claiming the common teaching of the Scholastics in favor of any partic- ular theory of predestination. c) What inflitence do the supernatural merits of a man exert on his predestination to glory as such? Here the controversy begins. Predes- tination may be considered either as the cause of supernatural merit or as its effect. If it is con- sidered as the cause, the problem takes this shape: Did God, by an absolute decree, and without any regard to their future supernatural merits, eter- nally predestine certain men to the glory of heaven, and only subsequently decide to give them the efficacious graces necessary to reach that end, par- ticularly final perseverance? If, on the other hand, predestination be considered as an effect of supernatural merit, the question will be: Did God predestine certain men to the glory of Heaven by a merely hypothetical decree, making His will 34 Charles Du Plessis d’Argentré gratiam et ad gloriam praecipue (d. 1740), after a careful study of agebant. Ideo nolebant eam esse all Scholastic works written between ex praevisis meritis, quia gratia, quae 1120 and 1708, concluded: “ Ve- in ea includitur, non datur nec proin teres Scholastici de causa praede- praedestinatur ob praevisa merita.” stinationis omnino considerate et ad (De Praedest., c. 10, § 1). ee ree, PREDESTINATION 199 to save them dependent on His infallible fore- knowledge of their supernatural merits? The lack of decisive Scriptural and Patristic texts on this subject has led to a division of Catholic opin- ion, some theologians favoring absolute predesti- nation ante praevisa merita, others hypothetical predestination post praevisa merita. Without concealing our conviction that absolute pre- destination is untenable, we shall set forth both theories impartially and examine the arguments on which they rely: 4. ORTHODOX PREDESTINATIONISM, OR THE THEORY OF PREDESTINATION ANTE PRAEVISA Merita.—Some theologians conceive the divine scheme of salvation in this wise: (a) Jn ordine intentionis, God, by an absolute decree, first pre- destines certain men to eternal salvation, and then, in consequence of this decree, decides to give them all the graces necessary to be saved; (b) in time, however, or in ordine executions, He observes the reverse order, that is to say, He first bestows the pre-appointed graces and subse- quently the glory of heaven as a reward of super- natural merit acquired by the aid of those graces. This theory reverses the relation of grace and glory. While it correctly *° represents glory as the fruit and reward of supernatural merit in the order of execu- ‘tion, it wrongly represents it in the order of intention as 35 V. infra, Part II, Ch. III, Sect. 3. 200 ACTUAL GRACE Ms the cause of supernatural merit, whereas it is merely an effect. This opinion is championed by most Thomists,** some Augustinians,” and a few Molinists.** Their argu- ments may be sketched as follows: a) In innumerable passages of Sacred Scrip- ture predestination to eternal happiness is repre- sented as a work of pure mercy, nay, even as an arbitrary act of God. Take, e. g., Matth. XXIV, 22 sqq.: “And unless those days had been short- ened, no flesh should be saved: but for the sake of the elect those days shall be shortened. . . . For there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders, inso- much as to deceive (if possible) even the elect.” *° Here, it is claimed, the elect are represented as so thoroughly confirmed in faith and in good works as to be proof against error. This conclusion is unwarranted. The phrase “those days” manifestly refers either to the destruction of Jeru- salem or to the end of the world. If it refers to the de- struction of Jerusalem, the “ elect,” according to Biblical usage,’ are the faithful Christian inhabitants of the Holy City, for whose sake God promises to shorten the terrible siege. If it referred to the end of the world, electi would indeed stand for praedestinati, but the context would not 36 FE. g., Banez, Alvarez, Lemos, Gonet, Contenson, Goudin, 37 E. g., Berti and Norisius. 88 BE. g., Suarez, Ruiz, De Lugo, Bellarmine, 39 “ Nist breviati fuissent dies illi, non fieret salva omnis caro, sed propter electos (Sia robs éxXexrovs) breviabunitur dies ill, ... Surgent enim pseudochristi,... ita ut im errorem inducantur, si fiert potest, etiam electi,’’ £0'C Er. Col.. DL nes a rPetleere PREDESTINATION 201 forbid us to interpret their predestination hypothetically, as merely indicating the immutability of the divine decree, which is not denied by the opponents of the theory. Another text quoted in favor of absolute predesti- nation ante praevisa merita, is Acts XIII, 48: “ As many as were ordained (praeordinati, reraypévor) to life ever- lasting, believed.” Here, we are told, predestination to eternal life is given as the motive why many believed. But the text really says nothing at all about predestination. Teraypevo. is not synonymous with poteraypévo. oF mpowpiopevot. The more probable explanation is the fol- lowing: As many believed as were disposed to receive the faith. It is wellnigh impossible to assume that all who received the faith at that time were predestined, while those that refused to be converted were without exception reprobates. But even if praeordinati were synonymous with praedestinati, the text would merely say that certain predestined souls embraced the faith, without affording any clue as to the relation between conversion and predestination. | | The ninth chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans is the main reliance of the advocates of absolute pre- destinationism, though the passage is unfit to serve as a locus classicus because of its obscurity. Let us exam- ine a few of the verses most frequently quoted. Rom. IX, 13: “Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated,” is alleged to prove the absolute predestination of Jacob and the negative reprobation of Esau. But many theo- logians hold that Esau was saved, and, besides, the Apostle is not dealing with predestination to glory, but with Jacob’s vocation to be the progenitor of the Mes- sias.- Esau, who was not an Israelite but an Idumaean, was simply passed over in this choice (odio habere = 202 ACTUAL GRACE minus diligere; cfr. Matth. X, 37). If the passage is interpreted typically, it should be done in harmony with the context, that is to say, as referring to the gratu- ity of grace, not to predestination. The same may be said of Rom. IX, 16 and 18: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. . . . He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.” * The strongest text alleged by the advocates of absolute predestination is Rom. IX, 20 sq.: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and an- other unto dishonor?” Here the Apostle really seems to have thought of predestination. But the simile must not be pressed, lest we arrive at the Calvinistic blasphemy that God positively predestined some men to heaven and others to hell. The tertiwm comparationis is not the act of the Divine Artificer, but the willingness of man to yield his will to God like clay in the hands of a potter. Nor is it admissible to read into the Apostle’s thought even a negative reprobation of certain men. For the primary intention of the Epistle to the Romans is to insist on the gratuity of man’s vocation to Christianity and to reject the presumption that the Mosaic law and yen 2a Z a Sia _ - .. —= — en Naren = wy . their bodily descent from Abraham gave the Jews prefer- ence over the heathens. The Epistle to the Romans has no bearing whatever on the speculative question whether or not the free vocation of grace is a necessary result of eternal predestination to glory. 41 Non volentis neque currentis, durat.” On the meaning of this’ ae sed miserentis est Dei... Cuius text v. supra, pp. 137, 177. vult miseretur, et quem vult in- 42Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, PREDESTINATION 203 b) Among the Fathers the only one to whom the advocates of absolute predestinationism can appeal with some show of justice is St. Augus- thes. tine, who, with the possible exception of Prosper. and Fulgentius, was the most rigorous among early ecclesiastical writers,—so rigorous, in fact, that Oswald does not hesitate to call him ‘‘the head and front of all rigorists in the Church.” * However, this is saying too much. Augustine’s genu- ‘ine teaching is still in dispute among our ablest theo- _ logians. Some ** deny that he broke with the almost unanimous teaching of his predecessors, while others _ think that in the treatises De Dono Perseverantiae and De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, and in several of his letters, the Saint frankly taught absolute predestinationism. The latter group of writers is split into two classes. A num- ber of Thomists and Cardinal Bellarmine not only assert that Augustine taught absolute predestination, but boldly adopt his supposed teaching. Petavius, Maldonatus, _Cercia, Oswald, and others censure this view. Fran- zelin *° undoubtedly strikes the right note when he says: “Tf there were a manifest discrepancy between Augus- 65; Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- Lessius, Gregory of Valentia, Fran- “Val. mat. Theol., Vol. VIII, pp. 345 saq.3 Chr. Pesch, Prael. Dogmat., Vol, II, 3rd ed., pp. 212 sqq., Freiburg 1906; Weber, Kritische Geschichte der Exegese des 9. Kapitels des Roémerbriefes, Wiirzburg 1889. 43 Die Lehre von der Heiligung, Pp. 242, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885. 44F, g., Petrus de Comitibus, O. S$. A. (De Praedest. et Reprobat., idisp.. “3, ‘art. i 4 saqq.), Tricassinus (De Praedest.), and the Jesuits zelin, and Schrader. 45 De Deo Uno, p. 677: “ Si vero dissensus esset manifestus, ut prudenter [cum ceteris patribus] conciliart non posset; tum sane non dubitarem, cum Pighio, Catharino, Osorio, Camerario, Maldonato, Toleto, Petavio, reverenter ab Au- gustino discedere, quum haec non posset esse nist privata eius Sen- tentia,” 204 ACTUAL GRACE tine’s teaching and that of the other Fathers, I should not hesitate to follow Pighius, Catharinus, Osorius, Came- rarius, Maldonatus,** Toletus, #7 and Petavius *° in rever- ently departing from his doctrine, because in that case we should be dealing merely with a private opinion.” ® Under these circumstances the Patristic argument for the theory of absolute predestination evidently lacks con- vincingness.”° c) It was probably because they felt its weak- ness that some of the later champions of the theory attempted to prove absolute predestination ante praevisa merita by philosophical arguments. Gonet reasons as follows: ‘He who proceeds in an orderly way, wills the end before he wills the means necessary to attain it. But God proceeds in an orderly way. Therefore he wills the end before the means. Now, glory is an end, and merits are means to attain that end. Conse- quently, God wills glory before He wills merits, — and a man’s preélection to glory cannot be based ~ 99 51 on foreknowledge of his merits. 46 De Praedest., qu. 4. 47 Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thomae Aqu., I, qu. 23, art. 5, con- clus. 2. 48 De Deo, X, col. 9. 49 A careful analysis of the Au- gustinian texts bearing on this ques- tion will be found in the Theol. Wirceburg., De Deo Uno, n. 231 sqq., and Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 53. 50 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- This argu- | mat. Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 351 sqq GSD. 4625 i, 8 Sp | ett 20 dinate vult, prius vult finem quam media ad finem. Sed Deus ordinate — vult. Ergo prius vult finem quam media ad illum. Atqui gloria est finis et merita sunt media ad illum conducentia. riam quam merita, et consequenter 51 Clypeus Thomist., De Praedest., ; “Qui ore = ate Ergo prius vult glo- electio ad gloriam non potest esse ex praevisione meritorum.” PREDESTINATION 205 ment, if it proved anything, would prove the logical impossibility of conditional predestination. But it overshoots the mark and consequently proves nothing at all. Qui nimium probat, nihil probat. Gonet moreover assumes what he sets out to prove, namely, that God voluntate antecedente decreed the glory of certain men to the exclusion of others. This petitio principii vitiates the entire polysyllogism. God’s will to save is universal. He wills the eternal hap- piness of all men antecedenter, and the reprobation of some only consequenter; hence eternal predestination is not absolute, but hypothetical, that is, it depends on merit. That the divine scheme of grace can take a different course in ordine intentionis from that in ordine executionis is a mere fiction. If eternal salvation in the order of temporal execution is given only as a reward of merit, it must be a reward of merit also in the order of inten- tion. In both cases predestination depends upon a future condition. Perhaps the worst feature of the theory of absolute pre- destination is the fact that it involves the absolute repro- bation of those not predestined to glory. “If it could be validly argued,” says Gutberlet, “that, since the end must be willed before the means, salvation must be decreed before the means to its attainment (i. e. merits ), the argument would be applicable also to the damned. If God voluntate antecedente wills to lead only a few to salvation, and if this intention must precede every other, then He must likewise voluntate antecedente have in view the end of the reprobates, which is His own glorification through the manifestation of His justice and mercy. 206 ACTUAL GRACE Hence He must also decree the means necessary to obtain this end, i. e. He must cause these unfortunate creatures to sin, in order that they may reach the end for which He has predestined them; in other words, He must pre-ordain them to sin and eternal damnation,” ®? which is what Cal- vin teaches. The advocates of the theory naturally shrink from adopting such a blasphemous conclusion, and fall back upon the theory of negative reprobation, which, how- ever, amounts practically to the same thing.”® 5. THe THrEory OF HyPpoTHETICAL PREDES- TINATION POST PRAEVISA Merita.—Predestina- tion, like God’s will to save all men, is based on a hypothetical decree. Those only are pre- destined to eternal happiness who shall merit it asareward. It is solely by reason of His infalli- ble foreknowledge of these merits that God’s hy- pothetical decree of predestination becomes abso- lute. Or, as Becanus puts it, “God first prepared the gifts of grace, and then elected to eternal life those whose good use of the gifts He fore- Sawn ay This view, which strongly appeals to us for the reason that it sets aside the cruel theory of “negative reproba- tion,” was defended by such earlier Scholastics as Alexan- der of Hales and Albertus Magnus, and by many eminent later writers, e. g. Toletus, Lessius, Frassen, Stapleton, 52Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- BLO rE WP raed... Ca) | Tel Degas mat. Theol,, Vol. VIII, p. 330. “ Deus primo praeparavit dona gra- 53 V. Art. 4, No. 2, infra. The tiae ac deinde eos, quos praevidebat opposite opinion is defended by bene usuros eiusmodi donis, elegit Billuart (De Deo, diss. 9, art. 4, ad vitam aeternam.” § 3 (ed. Lequette, p. 386). Se Te OE ee a ee oS bs [= nee er ein a eS See —s aa = siete — Se ie Ea Ses : ahs eS oa alanis vy dpa = cose Loe PREDESTINATION 207 Tournely, and is held to-day by nearly all theologians out- side the Thomist school. What gave it special authority in modern times was the recommendation of St. Francis de Sales, who, in a letter to Lessius (Aug. 26, 1618) described the theory of conditional predestination post praevisa merita as “ more in harmony with the mercy and grace of God, truer and more attractive.” °° This view has a solid basis both in Scripture and Tradition. a) Holy Scripture clearly teaches the univer- sality of God’s saving will. Now 1f God volun- tate antecedente wills the eternal salvation of all men without exception,°® He cannot possibly in- tend that only some shall be saved. It is further to be noted that the Bible makes not only the temporal realization but likewise the eternal promise of glory dependent on the performance of good works. St. Paul, whose Epistle to the Romans is cited as a locus classicus by the advocates of the theory,’ wrote towards the end of his life to Timothy: “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day.”** In writing these lines the Apos- tle no doubt had in mind the sentence of the Universal 55“, . . sententiam illam anti- quitate, suavitate ac Scripturarum 57V. supra, No. 4. 582 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “ Bonum nativa auctoritate nobilissimam .de praedestinatione ad gloriam post praevisa merita semper ut Det mise- ricordiae ac gratiae magis consen- taneam, veriorem ac amabiliorem exi- stimaui.”” (Cfr. Traité de Amour de Dieu, IIl, 5). 56 V. supra, pp. 153 sqq. certamen certavi, cursum consum- mavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo re- posita est (daréxetrat=praeparata ab aeterno) mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet (amrodwcer) mhi Dominus in illa die, wstus tudex.’ Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 24 saqq.; Apoc. II, 7, 26. 208 ACTUAL ‘GRACE Judge: “ Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world,” °®— which may with far greater reason be termed a “classical” text than the obscure ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. To prepare for men the kingdom of heaven from the foundation (1. e. beginning) of the world, is to predestine them to eternal happiness. Now, God has “ prepared” the kingdom of heaven for men in view of their foreseen merits, that is to say, conditionally. The causal conjunction enim in the sentence following the one just quoted (Matth. XXVI, 25): “ Esurivi enim et dedistis mihi manducare, etc.,” refers to the entire pre- ceding sentence, not only to the possidete in time, but also to the paratum in eternity. Consequently, the eternal decree of predestination itself, like its temporal execution, depends on good works or merit. This inter- pretation of Matth. XXV, 34-36 is confirmed by the sentence pronounced upon the reprobates, Matth. XXV, AI sqq.: “ Depart from me, you cursed, into everlast- ing fire, which was prepared for the devil and his an- gels. For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc.” The “everlasting fire” is manifestly decreed from all eternity in the same sense in which it is in- flicted in time, namely, propter et post praevisa merita. Billuart’s contention ®° that hell has been prepared solely for “the devil and his angels” is untenable, because in several other Scriptural passages 6t the reprobates are expressly classed among the followers of Satan. If we add to this that our Divine Lord, in foretelling the last judgment, had naturally to formulate his prediction so as 59 Matth. XXV, 34 saq.: “ Ve- 60 De Deo, ed. Lequette, p. 391. nite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete 61 For instance, John VIII, 44; x paratum vobis regnum a constitu- John III, 8; Acts XIII, 10. tione mundi,” PREDESTINATION 209 not only to show its absolute justice but likewise to inti- mate that, had they so willed, the damned might have had. their place on the right hand of the Great Judge, we must admit that the theory of predestination post praevisa merita has a solid foundation in Scripture.® es b) The Greek Fathers unanimously favor hy- pothetical predestination, which fact has caused the theory to be commonly referred to as “sen- tentia Graecorum.” °° Thus St. Chrysostom interprets the judgment of the Son of Man as follows: “Possess ye the king- dom [of heaven] as your own by heredity, as a paternal heritage, as a gift long due to you; for it was pre- pared and arranged for you before you came into exist- ence, because I knew beforehand that you would be what you are.” ** Theodoret says: “ He did not sim- __ ply predestine [men], but He predestined them because He foreknew [their merits].” The Latin Fathers before St. Augustine all with- out exception taught hypothetical predestination. St. Hilary says: “ Many are called, but few are chosenuiie. Hence election is not a matter of indiscriminate choice, but a selection based on merit.”®* And St. Ambrose: 62 Cfr. Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. quam enim existeretis, haec vobis III, pp. 289 sqq., Paris 1896; Hein- rich-Gutberlet, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. VIII, § 430. 63 Lessius, Antapol., prop. 8: “Tenent hanc sententiam omnes - Patres Graeci, adeo ut communiter dicatur esse sententia Graecorum.” 64 Hom. in Matth., 80, n, 2: ** Haereditate possidete regnum quasi proprium, quasi paternum et ve- strum, iam olim vobis debitum; prius- parata erant et disposita, quia ego vos tales futuros esse praescivi.” 65In Rom., VIII, 29 (Migne, P. G., LXXXII, 142): “Non sim- pliciter praedestinavit, sed quum praescivisset, praedestinavit.” 66 In Ps., 64,n. 3: “ Multi vocati sunt, sed pauci electi.... Itaque non res indiscreti indicii est electio, sed ex meriti delectw facta discretio est,” 210 ACTUAL GRACE “Therefore the Apostle says: ‘Whom he foreknew he also predestined’ (Rom. VIII, 29) ; for He did not pre- destine before He foreknew, but He predestined a reward to those whose merits He foresaw.” ® | The question cannot, as Bellarmine contends,®* be decided on the sole authority of St. Augustine, because he is claimed by both parties to the controversy.®° On account of the existing differences of opinion it is impossible to establish the theory of hypothetical pre- destination on the basis of Scholastic teaching.”° The opinion of St. Thomas is in dispute; 7 likewise that of St. Bonaventure. Scotus in his controversy with Henry of Ghent shows a disposition to favor absolute predesti- nation, but leaves the question open. ‘Let every one,’ he says,’? “choose whichever opinion suits him best, without prejudice to the divine liberty, which must be safeguarded against injustice, and to the other truths that are to be held in respect of God.” ™* 6. A ComMproMIsE THEORY.—For the sake of completeness we will add a few words on a theory which takes middle ground between the two just 67 De Fide, V, 6, 83: “‘ Unde et Apostolus ait: quos praescivit, et 70 V. supra, pp. 200 sqq., 216 sqq. 71 Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, praedestinavit (Rom. VIII, 29); non enim ante praedestinavit quam prae- scivit, sed quorum merita praescivit, eorum praemia praedestinavit.’”’ Cir. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 59; Lessius, De Praedest. prob., sect. 2, n. 7 sqq. 68 De Gratia, II, 11. 69 Cfr. O, Rottmanner, O. S. B., Der Augustinismus, Miinchen 1892; O. Pfulf, S. J., “Zur Priadestina- tionslehre des hl. Augustinus’’ in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift fiir kath, » Theologie, 1893, pp. 483 sqq. et Re- - thes. 64. 72 Comment. in IV Libros Sent., 1, dist. 41: “ Eligatur [ea sen- tentia] quae magis placet, dum tamen salvetur libertas divina sine aliqua iniustitia et alia quae sal- — vanda sunt circa Deum.’ 73 Many Scholastic utterances bearing on this subject have been collected by Lessius, De Praedest. et Reprob., sect. 2, n. 7 (Opusc. II, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1878). PREDESTINATION 2i1 reviewed, holding that, while the common run of humanity is predestined hypothetically, a few exceptionally favored Saints enjoy the privilege of absolute predestination. | ie ‘6 Among the champions of this “eclectic”? theory may be mentioned: Ockam,™ Gabriel Biel,7> Ysambert,’® and Ambrosius Catharinus.”7 The Saints regarded by these writers as absolutely predestined to eternal glory are: the Blessed Virgin Mary, the prophets and Apostles, St. Jo- seph, St. Aloysius, and a few others, as well as all infants dying in the grace of Baptism. Billuart,7* Dominicus Soto, and certain other divines attack this theory on the ground that it makes the salvation of the great majority of the elect a matter of chance and thereby imperils the dogmatic teaching of the Church. This objection is un- founded. For though the “ eclectic” theory has little or no support either in Revelation or in reason, it sufficiently safeguards the dogma of predestination by admitting that voluntate consequente none but the predestined can attain to eternal beatitude. , Only with regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary are we inclined to make an exception. It is probable that she was predestined to eternal glory ante praevisa merita, be- cause, in the words of Lessius, the privileges she enjoyed “exceed all measure and must not be extended to any other human being.” 7° 74 Comment. in Quatuor Libros tione, dedicated to the Council of Werriaits) distal 4 ty) dus i. 75 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., 1, dist. 41, art. 2. 76)S.)/dineot., \ta,). qui 23, disp. 3, art. 4, 77In his treatise De Praedestina- Trent. ; 78 De Deo, disp. 9, art. 3. 79 De Praedest. et Reprob., Paris edition of the Opuscula, 1878, p. 412: “... privilegia eius omnem modum superant et ad nullum alium sunt extendenda,” 212 ACTUAL GRACE ARTICLE 4 THE REPROBATION OF THE DAMNED The reprobation of the damned is sometimes called praedestinatio ad gehennam, though, as we have re- marked, the term “ predestination” should properly be restricted to the blessed. There can be no absolute and positive predestina- tion to eternal punishment, and the pains of hell can be threatened only in view of mortal sin. Hence repro- bation may be defined, in the words of Peter Lombard, as’ “God’s foreknowledge of the wickedness of some crea- tures and the preparation of their damnation.” * A distinction must, however, be made (at least in the- ory), between positive and negative reprobation. To teach positive reprobation would be heretical. Negative reprobation, on the other hand, is defended by all those Catholic theologians who advocate the theory of absolute predestination ante praevisa merita.” 1. HERETICAL PREDESTINARIANISM OR THE THEORY OF THE POSITIVE REPROBATION OF THE Damnep.—Heretical Predestinarianism was taught by Lucidus, Gottschalk, Wiclif, Hus, the younger Jansenius, and especially by Calvin. The latter asserted that the salvation of the elect and the damnation of the reprobate are the effects of an unconditional divine decree.” 1Sent., 1, dist. go: “... est 3 Calvin’s teaching in his Inst., praescientia iniquitatis quorundam AW det es. an, 240 Om Arminianism et pracparatio damnationis eorum- see J. F. Loughlin in the Catholic dem.” Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 740 sda 2 Supra, Art. 3, No. 4. REPROBATION 213 According to this abominable heresy, the sin of Adam and the spiritual ruin which it entailed upon his descend- ants are attributable solely to the will of God. God pro- duces in the reprobate a “semblance of faith,’ only to make them all the more deserving of damnation. In the beginning of the seventeenth century Arminius and a few other theologians of the Dutch Reformed Church, repelled by Calvin’s decretum horribile, ascribed the positive rep- robation of the damned to original sin (Japsus). These writers, called Infralapsarians or Postlapsarians, were opposed by the strict school of Calvinist divines under the leadership of Gomarus. The great Calvinist Synod of Dordrecht (1618-1619) condemned the principles of Ar- minius, and subsequently his adherents were driven from Holland. The Catholic Church condemned Predestinar- ianism as early as 529 at the Second Council of Orange, which among other things declared: “We not only refuse to believe that some men are by divine power predestined to evil, but i there be any who hold such a wicked thing, we condemn them with utter detestation.” * The Tridentine Council defined against Calvin: “Tf any one saith that the grace of justification is attained to only by those who are predestined unto life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive not grace, as being by 4“ Aliquos vero ad malum divina lint, cum omni detestatione illis potestate praedestinatos esse non anathema dicimus.” (Denzinger- solum non credimus, sed etiam, si Bannwart, n. 200.) sunt qui tantum malum credere ve- 214 ACTUAL GRACE divine power predestined unto evil; let him be anathema.” ° Calvinism, both supra- and infra-lapsarian, is easily refuted from Revelation and Tradition. a) It runs counter to all those texts of the Bible which assert the universality of God’s saving will,° the bestowal of sufficient grace on all sinners,’ and the divine attribute of holli- ness.° Calvin endeavored to prove his blasphemous doctrine chiefly from the ninth chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans.® His disciple Beza relied mainly on 1 Pet. II, 7 sq.: “ But to them that believe not, the stone which the builders rejected, the same is made the head of the corner: and a stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal, to them who stumble at the word, neither do believe, whereunto also they are set,” 1° 7. e., according to Beza, predestined not to believe. But this interpretation is obviously wrong. For we know from Is. VIII, 14” and Matth. XXI, 44," that those who fall on this stone 5Sess. VI, can. 17: “Si quis fensionis... qui offendunt verbo iustificationis gratiam nonnisi prae- destinatis ad vitam contingere dixerit, reliquos vero omnes qui vocantur, vocari quidem, sed gratiam non ac- cipere, utpote divinad potestate prae- destinatos ad malum, anathema sit,” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 827.) 6 V. supra, Art. 1. 7 V. supra, Art. 2, Thesis II. 8 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attri- butes, pp. 251 sqq. 9V. supra, pp. 201 sqq. 101 Pet. II, 7 sq.: ‘“‘ Non creden- tibus autem [Christus] ... lapis of- nec credunt, in quo (eis 6) et positt sunt.” 11 “In hoc positi, 1 e. praede- stinatt sunt, ut non credant.”’ 12 ‘* And he shall be a sanctifica- tion to you. But for a stone of . stumbling and for a rock of offense to the two houses of Israel, for a snare and a ruin to the inhabitants of Jerusalem,” 13 And whosoever shall fall on this stone, shall be broken: but on whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder,” REPROBATION 21s are ground to powder as a punishment for the sin of un- Helier .1¢ b) The Fathers, especially those of the East, are unanimous in upholding the orthodox teach-. ing of the Church. The only one whom adher- ents of Predestinarianism have dared to claim is St. Augustine. ‘ Yet the “ Doctor of Grace” expressly teaches: “ God is good, God is just. He can deliver some without merits because He is good; but He cannot damn any one without demerits, because He is just.” 1° St. Prosper re- echoes this teaching when he says of the reprobates: “ Of their own will they went out; of their own will they fell; and because their fall was foreknown, they were not predestined. They would, however, be predestined if they were to return and persevere in holiness ; hence God’s predestination is for many the cause of perseverance, for none the cause of falling away.” 7* St. Fulgentius ex- presses himself in similar language.*’ 2. THe THEORY oF “NEGATIVE REPROBATION.” —Negative reprobation is defined by its defend- ers as an eternal decree by which God excludes 14 Cfr. Oecumen., in h, 1: “ Ad quod positi sunt, non dicitur, quasi a Deo ad hoc essent destinati; nulla enim causa perditionis ministratur ab e0, qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri.’’ 15 Contr. Iulian., III, 18, 35: “Bonus est Deus, iustus est Deus: potest -aliquos sine bonis meritis h- berare, quia bonus est; non potest quemquam sine malis meritis dam- nare, quia iustus est.” 16 Resp. ad XII Object. Vincent.: Voluntate exierunt, voluntate ceci- derunt, et quia praesciti sunt casuri, non sunt praedestinati; essent autem praedestinati, si essent reversuri et in sanctitate remansuri, ac per hoc praedestinatio Dei multis est causa standi, nemini est causa labendi.” 17 Ad ‘Monims ie. Cire i Peta- vius, De Deo, X, 7 sqq. 216 ACTUAL GRACE from Heaven those not absolutely predestined, in other words, determines not to save them. | a) Gonet explains the difference between negative and positive reprobation in Scholastic terminology as follows: “. .. quod haec [1. e. positiva] habet non solum terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria, sed etiam terminum ad quem, scil. poenam sive damni sive sensus; illa vero [1. e. negativa] solum habet terminum a quo, nempe ex- clusionem a gloria ut beneficio indebito, non vero termi- num ad quem, quia ex vi exclusionis ut sic praecise et ut habet rationem purae negationis, non intelligitur reprobus esse damnandus aut ulli poenae sive damni sive sensus deputandus.” 18 | The general principle laid down in this quotation is variously developed by Thomist theologians. The rigorists (Alvarez, John a S. Thoma, Estius, Syl- viuis) assign as the motive of reprobation the sovereign will of God. God, they say, without taking into account possible sins and demerits, determined a priori to exclude from Heaven those who are not predestined. De Lemos, Gotti, Gonet, Gazzaniga, and others condemn this view as incompatible with the teaching of St. Thomas, and, ap- pealing to St. Augustine’s doctrine of the massa dam- nata, find the ultimate reason for the exclusion of the reprobates from heaven in original sin, in which God, without being unjust, could leave as many as He saw fit. Goudin, Graveson, Billuart, and others assume that the reprobates are not directly excluded from eternal glory but merely from “ effective election ” thereunto, God sim- ply having decreed ante praevisa merita to leave them to their weakness.?° 18 Clypeus Thomist., Vol. II, tr..5, Innsbruck Zeitschrift fiir kath. disp. 5, art. 2, n. 23. Theologie, 1879, pp. 203 sqq. 19\Girs) Limbourg)S. J,;) an) the REPROBATION 217 While the Thomists found no difficulty in harmoniz-. ing this view with their theory of physical premo- tion, the few Molinists who espoused it were hard put in trying to square it with the scientia media.”® On the whole these Molinists endorse the third and mild- est of the above-quoted opinions, which differs only theoretically from the rigoristic view described in the first place. Practically it makes no difference whether God directly excludes a man from heaven or refuses to give him the graces necessary to attain it. Surveying all three of the theories under considera- tion we cannot but regard the first and third as heart- less and cruel, because they attribute eternal reprobation to a positive decree that takes effect independently of sin; the second, (which ascribes reprobation to original sin), is open to the serious dogmatic objection that it con- tradicts the teaching of St. Paul and the Tridentine dec- laration that “there is no condemnation (mhil damna- tionis) in those who are truly buried together with Christ by baptism into death.” 7 b) Negative reprobation is rightly regarded as the logical counterpart of absolute predestina- tion.” If Almighty God, by an absolute decree, without regard to any possible merits, merely to reveal His divine attributes and to “embellish the universe,” had determined that only those could enter the “Heavenly Jerusalem” who were ante- cedently predestined thereto, it would inevitably follow that the unfortunate remainder of human- 20 Cfr. Suarez, De Praedest., V, 22 Which explains why both the- 4 sqq. ories have the same defenders. V. 21 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5. supra, Art. 3, No. 4. 218 | ACTUAL GRACE ity by the very same decree were “passed over,” “omitted,” ‘“‘overlooked,”’ “not elected,’ or, as Gonet honestly admits, “excluded from Heaven,” which is the same thing as being negatively con- demned to hell. The logical distinction between positive and negative reprobation, therefore, consists mainly in this, that the former signifies absolute damnation to hell, the latter (equally absolute) non-election to Heaven. To protect the Catholic champions of negative reprobation against unjust aspersions, however, it is necessary to point out certain fundamental differences between their theory and the heresy of Calvin. Calvin and the Jansenists openly deny the universality both of God’s saving will and of the atonement; they re- fuse to admit the actual bestowal of sufficient grace upon those fore-ordained to eternal damnation; and claim that the human will loses its freedom under the predom- inance of efficacious grace or concupiscence. The Cath- olic defenders of negative reprobation indignantly reject the charge that their position logically leads to any such heretical implications. c) The theory of negative reprobation can be sufficiently refuted by showing that it is incom- patible with the universality of God’s will to save all men. For if God willed absolutely and ante- cedently to ‘exclude some men from Heaven,” as Gonet asserts, or ‘not to elect them to eternal glory,” as Suarez contends, then it would be His absolute will that they perish. REPROBATION 219 a) For one thus negatively reprobated it is metaphys- ically impossible to attain eternal salvation. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to assuming that an essentially absolute decree of God can be frustrated. © This consideration led certain Thomists ** to describe the divine voluntas salvifica as rather an ineffectual velleitas.?* But this conflicts with the obvious teaching of Revela- tion.”” Suarez labors in vain to reconcile the sincerity of God’s salvific will with the theory of negative reprobation. The two are absolutely irreconcilable. How could God sincerely will the salvation of all men if it were true, as Suarez says, that “it is not in man’s power to work out his eternal salvation in case he falls under non-election, non-predestination, or, which amounts to the same thing, negative reprobation ”’? ?¢ B) The cruel absurdity of the theory of negative reprobation becomes fully apparent when we consider the attitude it ascribes to God. Gonet writes: “ Fore- seeing that the whole human race would be depraved by original sin, God, in view of the merits of Christ who was to come, elected some men to glory and, in punish- ment of original sin and to show His justice towards them and His greater mercy towards the elect, permitted others to miss the attainment of beatitude, in other words, He positively willed that they should not attain it... . In virtue of this efficacious intention He devised appro- priate means for the attainment of His purpose, and see- ing that some would miss beatitude by simply being left 23 Bafiez, Alvarez, Gonet. 24“ Deus non serio vult, sed vellet -salvare etiam reprobos, nisi per hoc impediretur pulchritudo universi.’’ 25 V. supra, Art. t and 2. 26 De Praedest., V, 8, 8: ‘Non est in potestate hominis, cum non- electione seu cum non-praedestina- tione aut, quod idem est, cum re- probatione negativa actu ponere seu componere suam aeternam salutem.” Cfr, Franzelin, De Deo Uno, p. 583, 3rd ed., Rome 1888, 220 ACTUAL GRACE in the state of original sin, and others by being permitted to fall into actual sins and to persevere therein, He formally decreed this permission, and finally... bya command of His intellect ordained these means towards the attainment of the aforesaid end.” 2” Translated into plain every-day language this can only mean that God tries with all His might to prevent the reprobate from attain- ing eternal salvation and sees to it that they die in the state of sin. Suarez is perfectly right in characterizing Gonet’s teaching as “incompatible with sound doc- trine.’ 28 But his own teaching is equally unsound and cruel. For he, too, is compelled to assert: “ Predestina- tion to glory is the motive for which efficacious or infalli- ble means towards attaining that end are bestowed. Hence to refuse to predestine a man for glory is to deny him the means which are recognized as fit and certain to attain that end.” ° Holy Scripture fortunately speaks a different language. It describes God as a loving Father, who “wills not that any should perish, but that all should return to penance.” *° 27“ Deus ex omnibus hominibus, quos infectos originali peccato prae- vidit, efficaciter ex meritis Christi severent, has permissiones per sub- sequentem electionem approbavit. Et tandem... per actum imperit venturi quosdam elegit ad gloriam, et alios in poenam eiusdem origi- nalis peccati et ad ostensionem suae iustitiae erga illos et matoris miseri- cordiae erga electos voluit permit- tere, ut deficerent a consecutione gloriae seu positive eis non voluit gloriam.... Ex vi huius inten- tionis efficacis excogitavit media apta ad consecutionem talis finis, et vt dens in aliquibus hominibus esse aptum medium in solo originali peccato eos relinquere, in aliis vero permittere, ut cadant in haec. vel illa peccata actualia ac in illis per- sui intellectus haec media ad prae- dictum finem ordinavit.” Clyp. Tho- mist., Vol. II, disp. 5, art. 4, MN. 155. 28 De Reprob., c. 3, n. 6. 29 De Praedest., V, 7, 14: “‘ Elec- tio ad finem est ratio dandi media efficacia seu infallibilia ad illum ; ergo negatio illius electionis erit suo modo ratio non dandi media, quae cognoscuntur congrua et in- fallibilia ad illum finem consequen- dum.” 302 Pet. III, 9: “... nolens aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poent- tentiam reverti.” REPROBATION Bar y) Practically it makes no difference whether a man is positively condemned to eternal damnation, as Calvin and the Jansenists assert, or negatively excluded from Heaven, as held by the orthodox theologians whom we have just quoted. The alleged distinction between positive and negative reprobation is “a distinction without a dif- ference.” For an adult to be excluded from Heaven sim- ply means that he is damned. There is no such thing as a middle state or a purely natural beatitude. Lessius justly says that to one reprobated by God it would be all the same whether his reprobation was positive or negative, because in either case he would be inevitably lost. READINGS : —*Ruiz, De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione, Lyons 1628.— Ramirez, De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione, 2 vols., Alcala 1702.—*Lessius, De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis, XIV, 2.—*Ipem, De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione (Opusce., Vol. II, Paris 1878).— Tournely, De Deo, qu. 22 sqq.— Schrader, Commentarii, I-II, De Praedestinatione, Vienna 1865.—J. P. Baltzer, Des hl. Augustinus Lehre iiber Pridestination und Re- probation, Vienna 1871— Mannens, De Voluntate Dei Salvifica et Praedestinatione, Louvain 1883 O. Rottmanner, O. S. B.,. Der Augustinismus, Miinchen 1892— O. Pfiilf, S. J., “Zur Pradesti- nationslehre des hl. Augustinus,’ in the Innsbruck Z ettschrift fir kath. Theologie, 1893, pp. 483 sqq.— B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 281, 378, 382 sqq. 31De Praedest., sect. 2, n. 13: “ Secundum communem aestimatio- nem hominum paria videntur, Deum velle ut pereas et nolle te ponere in electorum suorum numero neque gratiam congruam et perseverantiam censeret sibi esse indifferens, utrum eligatur, quum utrumque ante prae- visionem operum sit conceptum.’ The teaching of St. Augustine and that of St; Thomas on this point is in dispute. See Chr. Pesch, dare; aeque enim infallibiliter ex huiusmodi decretis sequeretur dam- natio. Et si alterutrum horum de- cretorum esset subeundum, quivis Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. II, 3rd ed., Ppp. 230 sqq., and Heinrich-Gutber- let, Dogmatische Theol., Vol. VIII, § 433. ; CHAPTER ALM GRACE IN ITS RELATION TO FREE-WILL When we speak of the relation of grace to free-will, we mean efficacious grace; merely suf- ficient grace, as such, does not involve consent. The Protestant reformers and the Jansenists denied the freedom of the human will under the influence of efficacious grace. Catholic theologians have always staunchly up- held both the freedom of the will and the efficacy of grace, but they disagree in explaining the mutual relations between grace and free-will. 222 SECTION: 5 PE EVERESY OF CHE PROTESTANT REFORMERS AND THE JANSENISTS 1. THE HERETICAL Errors OF LUTHER, CAL- VIN, AND JANSENIUS CoNTRASTED WITH THE OR- THODOX TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—Luther and Calvin asserted that the freedom of the will was irretrievably lost by original sin. Jansenius taught that the will is overcome by efficacious grace in exactly the same way as it is overpowered by concupiscence in the absence of grace. Against both these heresies the Church has always main- tained that the will remains free under the influ- ence of efficacious grace. a) Luther taught? that original sin has so completely annihilated man’s free-will that he resembles a horse com- pelled to go in whatever direction it is driven (according as “ God or the devil rides him’’),? and that the grace of Christ, far from restoring man’s liberty, compels him to act with intestine necessity. | 7 Calvin ® carried this teaching to its logical conclusions by asserting: (1) that the will of our first parents was 4 In his treatise De Servo Arbi- ium in der ersten Picecbiine| Vol. trio. J, Mainz 1904. 2 Cir. Denifle, Luther und Luther- 3 Instit. Christ. Religionis, 1, II. 223 "224 ACTUAL GRACE free in Paradise, but lost its freedom by original sin; (2) that we cannot be delivered from the slavery of Satan except by the grace of Christ, which does not, however, restore liberty, but simply compels the will to do good; (3) that, though the will under the influence of grace iS passive, and must needs follow the impulse to which it is subjected, yet its acts are vital and spontaneous." Against these heresies the Council of Trent maintained the existence of free-will both in the state of original sin® and under the influence of efficacious grace: “If any one saith that man’s free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, . . . cannot refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something in- animate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive: let him be anathema.” ° b) Jansenius differed from Luther and Calvin mainly in drawing a sharper distinction between freedom from external constraint (libertas a coactione) and freedom from internal compulsion (libertas a necessitate), and maintaining that the will, when under the influence of grace, is exempt from external constraint, though not from in- terior compulsion, and that the libertas a coactione 4 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 378 saqq. 5 Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- thor of Nature and the Supernat- ural, pp. 291 sdq. 6Sess.. VI; ‘can. 4! “St quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo vocantt . neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere mereque passive sé habere, anathema sit.” (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 814.) ~ GRACE AND FREE-WILL 225 is entirely sufficient to gain merit or demerit in| the fallen state.’ The Jansenist teaching on the subject of grace may be outlined as follows: (1) By original sin man lost the moral liberty which he had enjoyed in Paradise and became subject to a twofold delectation — delectatio coelestis victrix and delectatio terrena sive carnalis victrix. (2) These two delectations are continually contending for the mastery; the stronger always de- feats the weaker, (3) and the will, unable to offer resistance, is alternately overpowered now by the one and then by the other. (4) In each case the delec- tatio coelestis is either stronger than the delectatio terrena, or it is weaker, or it is of equal strength. When it is stronger, the will is overcome by grace, which in that case becomes efficax or irresistibilis. When it is weaker, the will simply must sin, because the delectatio coelestis is too weak to overcome the delectatio terrena. The grace given to a man under such conditions is called by the Jansenists gratia parva sive sufficiens. When the two delectations are equally strong, the will finds itself un- able to come to a definite decision. This false teaching inspired the famous “five propo- sitions ” of Jansenius, to-wit: (1) Man is unable to keep some of God’s commandments for want of grace; (2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace; (3) To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature it is sufficient to be free from external constraint; (4) The Semipelagian heresy consisted in as- 7 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, op. cit. (note Gal., n. 49: “Quod amphus nos 5), PP. 295 sq. delectat, secundum id operemur 8In support of this contention mnecesse est.” Jansenius quoted St. Augustine, In A 226 ACTUAL GRACE suming the existence of a grace which man may either obey or resist; and (5) Christ did not die for all men, but solely for the predestined. | | These propositions were condemned as heret- ical by Pope Innocent X in his dogmatic Bull “Cum occasione,’ of May 31, 1653. All five are implicitly contained in the second, viz.: In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior race: || bt This tr we that fallen man never resists © interior grace (second proposition), it follows that a just man who violates a commandment of God has not had the grace to observe it, that he therefore transgressed it through inability to ful- fil it (first proposition). If, however, he has sinned and thus incurred demerit, it is clear that the liberty of indifference is not a requisite con- _ dition of demerit, and what is said of demerit is likewise true of its correlative, merit (third proposition). On the other hand, if grace is wanting to the just whenever they fall, it is want- ing still more to sinners; it is therefore impossible to maintain that the death of Jesus Christ assured to every man the graces necessary for salvation (fifth proposition). As a further consequence, the Semipelagians were in error in admitting the universal distribution of a grace which may be resisted (fourth proposition ).”’ ° 9J. Forget in the Catholic Ency- On Jansenism see Hergenrother, clopedia, Vol. VIII, pp. 288 saq- Kirchengeschichte, 4th ed., ed. by J. GRACE AND FREE-WILL B27 2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH PROVED rrom REVELATION.—Far from favoring the de- terminism of the Reformers and of Jansenius, the Bible and Tradition positively contradict the con- tention that free-will is overpowered by grace. a) The operation of grace and the liberty of the will never appear in Sacred Scripture as mu- tually exclusive, but invariably as cooperating fac- tors, though sometimes the one is emphasized, and sometimes the other, according to the purpose the sacred writer happens to have in view. The Council of Trent expressly calls attention to this: 2° “‘ When it is said in the sacred writings, ‘Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you,’ 14 we are admonished of our liberty; and when we answer: ‘Convert us, O God, to thee, and we shall be converted,’ 1* we confess that we are forestalled by the grace of God.” St. Paul, it is true, asks: “ Who resisteth his [God’s] will?” 28 But he also admonishes his favorite disciple Timothy: ‘Exercise thyself unto godliness.” ** St. Stephen testifies that the grace of the Holy Ghost does not compel the will. “You always resist the Holy Ghost,” he tells the Jews; “as your fathers did, so do you also.” +> Our Lord Himself teaches that grace exerts Po Karsch, «Vols ItT, pp. 386 saq-, 466 sqq., Freiburg 1909. 10 Sess. VI, cap. 5: “ Unde in sacris literis quum dicitur: ‘ Con- vertimini ad me et ego convertar ad vos, libertatis nostrae admonemur; quum respondemus: ‘ Converte nos, Domine, ad te et convertemur, Dei nos gratia praevenirt confitemur.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.) Cfr. Oswald, Die Lehre von der Heili- gung, 3rd ed., pp. 186 sq. Zach) Lt anoen 13° Jer., XAT, 20. 13 Rom. LX; 19: “ Voluntatt enim ems quis resistit?”’ 144° Tim, (EV. 72.° Exerce au- tem teipsum (yiuvate 6€ ceauTov) ad pietatem.” 15 Acts VII, 51: “‘ Vos semper 228 ACTUAL GRACE no interior compulsion but invites free coopera- tion: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the command- ments.” The exhortations, promises, and threats ut- tered in various portions of Holy Writ would be mean- ingless if it were true that grace destroys free-will.”” b) As regards Tradition, the Greek Fathers who wrote before St. Augustine defended the freedom of the will so energetically that they were subsequently accused of harboring Pelagian | and Semipelagian errors.** Calvin himself ad- mits that with but one exception the Fathers are unanimously opposed to his teaching.” The one exception noted is St. Augustine, to whom both Calvin and Jansenius appeal with great confidence. It should be noted, however, that the point which chiefly concerned St. Augustine in his controversies with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, was the necessity and gratuity of grace, not its relation to free-will. Where he incidentally touches upon the latter, he shows by the man- ner in which he formulates his sentences that he regards the relation of grace to free-will as a great mystery. But he does not try to solve this mystery in the manner in Spiritui Sancto resistitis (Cdvrumt- arere), sicut patres vestri, ita et vos.” 16 Matth. XIX, 17: “Sit autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva man- data.) Cir Apoc. LV, ).20%)) |" Bece sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis au- dierit vocem meam et aperuerit mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum.” 17 Cfr. the Scriptural argument for the existence of sufficient grace, supra, pp. 45 sq. 18 V. supra, pp. 102 Sq., 141 sq. RO TASHE., V1. ATC) 5/9," ‘sect. | 10s i “ Voluntatem movet [gratia Christi], non qualiter multis saeculis tradi- tum est et creditum, ut nostrae postea sit electionis, motioni aut obtemperare aut refragari, sed tllam eficaciter afficiendo. Illud ergo to- ties a Chrysostomo repetitum repu- diarit necesse est: ‘Quem trahit, vo- lentem trahit.” Many Patristic texts of similar tenor have been gathered and explained by Cardinal Bellarmine in his treatise De Gra- tia et Libero Arbitrio, VI, 11. GRACE AND FREE-WILL 229 which Alexander the Great cut the Gordian knot. He does not declare: Grace is everything, free-will is noth- ing. If the power of grace destroyed the freedom of the human will, their mutual relation would be no problem.”° Possibly St. Augustine in the heat of controversy now and then expressed himself in language open to misinterpretation, as when he said: “ Therefore aid was brought to the infirmity of the human will, so that it might be unchangeably and invincibly influenced by di- vine grace.” *4_ But this and similar phrases admit of a perfectly orthodox interpretation. As the context shows, Augustine merely wished to assert the hegemony of grace in all things pertaining to salvation, and to empha- size the fact that free-will, strengthened by grace, is able to resist even the most grievous temptations.22. At no period of his life did the Saint deny the freedom of the will under the influence of grace. We will quote but two out of many available passages in proof of this statement. “To yield consent or to withhold it, when- ever God calls, is the function of one’s own will.’ 28 “For the freedom of the will is not destroyed because the will is aided; but it is aided precisely for the rea- 20 Cfr. De Gratia Christi, c. 47: conemur, non quasi ut non velimus. “Tsia quaestio, ubi de arbitrio volun- tatis et Det gratia disputatur, ita est ad discernendum difficilis, ut quando defenditur liberum arbitrium, negari Dei gratia videatur; quando autem asseritur Dei gratia, liberum arbi- trium putetur auferri.’”’ 21 De Corrept. et Gratia, XII, 38: * Subventum est infirmitati volunta- tis humanae, ut divind gratia inde- clinabiliter et insuperabiliter agere- tur.” 22 Cfr. his Sermones, 163, c. 11, n. 13: “‘ Totum ex Deo, non tamen quasi dormientes, non quasi ut non Sine voluntate tua non erit in te tustitia Dei. Voluntas quidem non est nisi tua, iustitia non est nist Dei... Sine te fecit te Deus. Non enim adhibuisti aliquem con- sensum, ut te faceret Deus. Quo- modo consentiebas, qui non eras? Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te iustificat sine te. Ergo fecit ne- scientem, iustificat volentem. Tamen ipse tustificat, ne sit iustitia tua.” 23 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 34: “ Consentire vocationi Dei-vel ab ipsa dissentire propriae voluntatis est.”” 230 ACTUAL GRACE son that it remains free.” ** St. Bernard of Clairvaux echoes this teaching when, in his own ingenious way, he summarizes the Catholic dogma as follows: “Take away free will and there will be nothing left to save; take away grace and there will be no means left of sal- VAtIONy i (05 Reapincs: —*Bellarmine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (Opera Omnia, ed. Févre, Vols. V and VI, Paris 1873) .—*Dechamps, S. J.. De Haeresi Ianseniana, Paris 1645.— F. Worter, Die christ- liche Lehre tiber das Verhéltnis von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf Augustinus, Freiburg 1856.—*Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 39-48, Gulpen 1885.— S. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 387 sqq., 377 sdq., Freiburg 1901—B. J. Otten, S. J. A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 507 saqq. erit, quod salvetur; tolle gratiam et non erit, unde salvetur.” On other 24 Ep., 187, 2, 10: “ Neque enim voluntatis arbitriunm ideo tollitur, quia iuvatur; sed ideo iuvatur, quia non tollitur.’ (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 677). 25 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, I, 2: “ Tolle liberum arbitrium et non difficult passages in the writings of St. Augustine cfr. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, Vol. II, pp. 208 sqq., Freiburg 1909. SECTION: 2 THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS ‘DEVISED TO HARMONIZE THE DOGMAS OF GRACE AND FREE-WILL The relation of grace to free-will may be re- garded from a twofold point of view. We may take grace as the primary factor and trace it in its action on the human will; or, starting from the latter, we may endeavor to ascertain how free- will is affected by grace. The first-mentioned method has given birth to two closely related theological systems, Thomism and Augus- tinianism; the latter to Molinism and Congruism, which are almost identical in substance. Besides these there is a fifth theory, which tries to reconcile the two extremes and may therefore be called eclectic. That the human will is free, yet subject to the influ- ence of grace, is an article of faith unhesitatingly accepted by all Catholic theologians. It is in trying to explain how grace and free-will codperate, that the above-mentioned schools differ. Pe In approaching this extremely difficult and obscure problem we consider it our duty to warn the student against preconceived opinions and to remind him that the different systems which we are about to examine are all tolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more ~ 231 232. 4 ACTUAL GRACE important things are at stake and the faith is viciously assailed from without, the ancient controversy between Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance. ARTIC Bs THOMISM AND AUGUSTINIANISM Thomism and Augustinianism both hinge on the concept of gratia efficax ab intrinseco s. per se, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not admit even the existence of such a grace. 1. THE THomistTic THEORY OF GRACE.—The true founder of the Thomistic system is not St. Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the Molinists, but the learned Dominican theologian Bafiez (1528-1604). His teaching may be summarized as follows: a) God is-the First Cause (causa prima) and Prime Mover (motor primus) of all things, and all created or secondary causes (causae secundae) derive their being and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any creature could act independently of God, God would cease to be causa prima and motor primus.* The influence of the First Cause is universal, that is to say, it produces all creatural acts without exception, —necessary and free, good and bad,— because no sec- ondary cause has power to act unless it is set in motion by the motor primus. In influencing His creatures, however, God adapts 1Cfr. Bafiez, Comment. in S. nisi sit efficaciter determinata a Thelo\2) py gu. t4) art. 3233 prima.” * Nulla secunda causa potest operari, THOMISM 233 himself to the peculiar nature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the free causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode of action.? The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His determining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not moved. b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which God exerts on His rational creatures is irresistible be- cause it proceeds from an absolute and omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What God wills infallibly happens.? Nevertheless, God is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform an act; but He does not move Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of sin derives solely from the free will of man.‘ c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, God’s concurrence with creatural causes (concursus generalis) must be conceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by mov- ing the will from potentiality to actuality.» Consequently, the causal influence which the Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere motio, but a praemotio,— and not 2Cfr, Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, art. 4: “ Movet nempe Deus non solum ad substantiam actus, sed etiam ad modum eius, qui est liber- tas.” 3Cfr. Alvarez, De Auxiliis, disp. 83, n. 9: “ Quando agens infinitae virtutis movet aliquod subiectum, tale subiectum infallibiliter movetur, quia tunc resistentia passi non su- perat nec adaequat virtutem agentis. Sed Deus est agens infinitae virtutis. Ergo motio Dei efficax respectu cu- quscumque hominis in quibuslibet circumstantus positi erit medium congruum et aptum, ut infallibiliter inducat effectum, ad quem ex Dei intentione datur.” 4Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, art. 5: ‘‘ Restat ergo tertia sen- tentia, scilicet Deum praemovere physice ad entitatem peccati et sic se effecturum definivisse decreto positivo et effectivo; operatur enim omnia secundum consilium volun- tatis suae.”’ 5 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- thor of Nature and the Supernat- ural, pp. 73 sqq. 234 ACTUAL GRACE merely moral, but physical (praemotio physica).® It is by physical premotion that God’s prevenient influence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to their assent.’ Free-will is predetermined by God be- fore it determines itself.* d) If we analyse God’s physical predeterminations in so far as they are created entities, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and execution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the praedeterminatio physica. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called praemotio physica. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a temporal praemotio, but of an eternal prae- determinatio, in fact the terms are often used synony- mously.® ; | Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to determine itself. Since God has from all eternity made absolute and conditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination without regard to the free consent of His creatures, phys- 6 Cfr. De Lemos, Acta Congr. de Auxr., p. 1065: “Illa praepositio Deo debet determinari, quia scil. indifferens sit eaque indifferentia non ‘prae’ nihil aliud denotat aut deno- tare potest quam Deum esse priorem et primam causam, prius natura et causalitate moventem, applicaniem, inclinantem et determinantem volun- tatem, quam ipsa voluntas se de- terminet.” 7 Cfr. Gonet, Clypeus Theol. Thomist., disp. 11, art. 5: “ Haec divina motio in creatura recepta a Thomistis ‘ physica’ appellatur,... quia ex propria essentia et ab in- trinseco est efficax, independenter a quocumque creato consensu.”’ sCfr, Graveson, Epist. Theol. Polem.,.t. I, ep. 11: “ Voluntas creata priusquam se determinet, a solvatur quam per praeviam Dei motioneme’ |. Cfr. “Alvarez, De) Au- wiliis, disp. 28: “‘ Liberum arbi- trium, quia creatum est, licet de- terminet sibi actum, illum tamen determinat praedeterminatum a Deo.” 9 Cfr. Reginald., De Novit. Anti- quit. Nominis Praedeterm. Phys., 1. II, c. 36: “ Quum Deus hanc mo- tionem det causis sciens et volens atque adeo cum [aeterna] cognitione et intentione certa cuiusdam deter- minati effectus, alias haec essent a casu respectu Dei: consequitur illam praemotionem physicam esse prae- determinationem.” — —" il ae si ae ‘icciienint tei toe THOMISM 235 ical predetermination constitutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow their future free actions, _and hence there is no need of a scientia media. If God knows His own will, He must also know the free de- terminations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very foundation of His foreknowledge. This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thom- istic system. Its champions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as follows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the super- natural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation." e) To physical predetermination or premotion in the order of nature, there corresponds in the supernatural sphere the gratia efficax, which predetermines man to perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts freely but at the same time with metaphysical necessity (necessitate consequentiae, not consequentis). It would be a contra- diction to say that efficacious grace given for the pur- pose of eliciting consent may co-exist with non-consent, 1. e., may fail to elicit consent.1? The will freely assents to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved thereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does not derive its efficacy from the consent of the will; it is efficacious of itself and intrinsically (gratia efficar ab intrinseco sive per se). 10 Cfr. Nazarius, Comment. in S. et Cordis, 1, Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 22, art. ais 4: “ Sublaté a Deo physicae prae- motionis efficacitate nulla relinquitur VIII, diss. 2, specul. ““Generalem praemotionem ideo » solum adstruimus, ut per eam ad gratiam per se efficacem uberius alia in Deo sufficiens causalitas re- spectu determinationis liberorum actuum et consequenter neque in Deo esse poterit talium praescientia futurorum.”’ See also Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Aitributes, pp. 383 sqq., 400 sqq. 11 Cfr. Contenson, Theol. Mentis fortiusque stabiliendam viam muni- amus ad eamque propugnandam serviat etiam philosophia.? 12 Cfr. Alvarez, De Ausxiliis, disp. 92, n. 6: “ Repugnant ad invicem auxilium efficax ad consentiendum et actualis dissensus,” 13 Cfr, Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 122 ? 236 ACTUAL GRACE It follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as a praedeterminatio ad unum.™ f) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature inseparably bound up with the consent of the will, it must differ essentially from merely sufficient grace (gratia mere sufficiens), which confers only the power to act (posse operari), not the act itself (actu operari). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, in- cludes the free consent of the will, while merely sufh- cient grace lacks that consent, because with it, it would cease to be merely sufficient and would become effica- cious. Here the question naturally arises: How, in this hy- pothesis, can sufficient grace be called truly sufficient ? The Thomists answer this question in different ways. Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers the power to perform a good deed, but that something more is re- quired for the deed itself.° De Lemos ascribes the inef- ficacy of merely sufficient grace to a defect of the will.” n. 16: “Eficacia auxilii praeveni- thomistice sufficiens ita ex natura entis gratiae et connexio eius in- fallibilis cum libera cooperatione ar- bitrii tota fundatur et deswmitur, tamquam ex prima radice, ex omni- potentia Dei atque ex absoluto et efficaci decreto voluntatis eius volen- tis, ut homo quem movet conver- tatur et pie operetur, nec huiusmodi eficacia ullo modo dependet etiam, tamquam «a conditione sine qua non, ex futura cooperatione arbitrit creati.” 14 Cfr. Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 19, n. 7: “Praedictum auxilium ac- tuale determinat liberum arbitrium ad unam numero actionem, non subditur libero arbitrio quantum ad usum,” 15 Cfr. Graveson, Epist. Polen baie hp) ) PeDee ic £7 Theol. “ Gratia sua essentialiter distinguitur a gratia thomistice efficaci, ut numquam et in nullo casu gratia thomistice suffi- ciens evadere possit gratia efficax thomistice nec umquam ponatur actus secundus, nist accesserit gra- tia efficax thomistice.” 16 Prael. Theol., disp. 5, ¢. 6: “In gratia sufficiente totum id con- tinetur quod ad potentiam bene operandi exigitur, non autem totum id quod ulterius requiritur ad actum; certum est enim in omni causa agente aliquid plus ad actum quam ad potentiam requiri.” 17 Panoplia, t. IV, p. 2, tr. 3, & 2: © Auxilium sufficiens ita sufficientiam tribuit ad operandum, si homo velit, quod defectus operationis nullo modo provenit ex insufficientia THOMISM 237 If the will did not resist, God would promptly add | efficacious grace.18 CriticAL EsTIMATE OF THE THOMISTIC THEORY.—The Thomistic system undoubtedly has its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts divine grace as the prime factor in the business of salvation, and magnificently works out the con- cept of God as causa prima and motor primus both in the natural and the supernatural order. But Thomism also has its weak points. A. The Thomistic conception of efficacious grace is open to two serious theological difficulties. (1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial dis- tinction between efficacious and merely sufficient grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace. (2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. Though in theory the Thomists defend the sufficiency of grace and the freedom of the will as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their attempts at squaring these dogmas with the fundamental principles of their system. a) Sufficient grace, as conceived by the Thom- ists, is not truly sufficient to enable a man to per- form a salutary act, because ex vi notionis it con- fers merely the power to act, postulating for aliqua ipsius auxilit, sed tantum zeichnung der thomistischen- Gna- ex defectu arbitrii, quod ei resistit denlehre’’ in the Innsbruck Zeit- et impedimentum ponit.”? Schrift fiir kath, Theologie, 1877, 18 Cfr, Limbourg, S.-J., “ Selbst- 238 ACTUAL GRACE the act itself a substantially new grace (gratia eficax). A grace which requires to be entita- tively supplemented by another, in order to enable a man to perform a salutary act, is clearly not sufficient for the performance of that act. ‘Tobe truly sufficient for something” and “to require to be complemented by something else” are mu- tually exclusive notions, and hence “sufficient grace’ as conceived by Thomists is in reality in- sufficient. Many subtle explanations have been devised to obviate this difficulty. Billuart and nearly all the later Thomists say that if any one who has received sufficient grace (in the Thomistic sense of the term) is denied the gratia eficax, it must be attributed to a sinful resistance of the will® But this explanation is incompatible with the Thomistic teaching that together with the gratia sufh- ciens there: co-exists in the soul of the sinner an irre- sistible and inevitable praemotio physica to the entity of sin, with which entity formal sin is inseparably bound up.2° If this be true, how can the will of man be held responsible so long as God denies him the gratia ab intrinseco efficax? Speaking in the abstract, the will may assume one of three distinct attitudes toward sufficient grace. It may consent, it may resist, or it may remain neutral. It can- not consent except with the aid of a predetermining 19 Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, art. creata infallibiliter deficiet circa 45583: quamcumque materiam virtutis, nist 20 Cfr. Bafiez, Comment. in S. efficaciter determinetur a _ divina Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 14, art. voluntate ad bene opéerandum.” 13, concl 14: “‘ Nam _ voluntas THOMISM 239 gratia efficax, to merit which is beyond its power. If it withstands, it eo ipso renders itself unworthy of the gratia eficax. If it takes a neutral attitude, (which may in itself be a sinful act), and awaits efficacious grace, of what use is sufficient grace? To resist sufficient grace involves an abuse of liberty. Now, where does the right use of liberty come in? If co- operation with sufficient grace moves God to bestow the gratia per se eficax, as the Thomists contend, then the right use of liberty must lie somewhere between the gratia sufficiens and the gratia efficax per se. But there is ab- solutely no place for it in the Thomistic system. The right use of liberty for the purpose of obtaining effica- cious grace is attributable either to grace or to unaided na- ture. To assert that it is the work of unaided nature would lead to Semipelagianism. To hold that it is owing to grace would be moving in a vicious circle, thus: “ Be- cause the will offers no resistance, it is efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act; that it offers no sinful resistance is owing to the fact that it is efficaciously moved to per- form a salutary act.” 7} It is impossible to devise any satisfactory solution of this difficulty which will not at the same time upset the very foundation on which the Thomistic system rests, viz.: “ Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit effica- citer determinata a prima [scil. per applicationem poten- tiae ad actum],” that is to say, no secondary cause can act unless it be efficaciously determined by the First Cause by an application of the latter to the former as of potency to act. 21 Other evasions are treated by sufficient grace, v., Ch. I, Sect. 2, Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 400 No. 6, supra. A sqq. On the true notion of merely 240 ACTUAL GRACE b) The Thomistic gratia efficax, conceived as a praedeterminatio ad unum, inevitably destroys free-will. a) It is important to state the question clearly: Not physical premotion as such,” but the implied connotation of praevia determanatio ad umum, is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. The freedom of the will does not consist in the pure contingency of an act, or in a merely passive indifference, but in active indifference either to will or not to will, to will thus or otherwise. Consequently every physical predetermination, in so far as it is a determinatio ad unum, must necessarily be de- | structive of free-will. Self-determination and physical predetermination by an extraneous will are mutually ex- clusive. Now the Thomists hold that the gratia per se efficax operates in the manner of a supernatural praedeter- minatio ad unum. If this were true, the will under the influence of efficacious grace would no longer be free. To perceive the full force of this argument it is neces- sary to keep in mind the Thomistic definition of prae- motio physica as “actio Dei, qua voluntatem humanam, | priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet insuper- abili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus cum ila praemotione coniungere.’?? That is to say: As the non-performance of an act by the will is owing simply and solely to the absence of the respective prae- motio physica, so conversely, the performance of an act is conditioned simply and solely by the presence of a divine premotion; the will itself can neither obtain nor prevent 22 The Molinists also regard su- Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 145 pernatural grace as a praemotio sq, Freiburg 1908. physica; cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. 23 Gonet, Clypeus Theol. Thomist., dispi'9;) artis; SvBe THOMISM 241 such a premotion, because this would require a new pre-’ motion, which again depends entirely on the divine pleas- | ure. If the will of man were thus inevitably predeter- mined by God, it could not in any sense of the term be called truly free. 8B) The Thomists meet this argument with mere eva- sions. They make a distinction between necessitas con- sequentis (antecedens), which really necessitates, and necessitas consequentiae (subsequens), which does not. A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical premotion, but it is not on that account in itself necessary. But, we answer, a determinatio ad unum, which precedes a free act and is independent of the will, is more than a necessitas consequentiae — it is a necessitas consequentis destructive of free-will. The Thomists reply: Considered as a created entity, physical premo- tion may indeed be incompatible with free-will; not so if regarded as an act of God, who, being almighty, is able to predetermine the will without prejudice to its freedom." The obvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic con- tradiction cannot be solved by an appeal to the divine omnipotence, because even God Himself cannot do what is intrinsically impossible.2* He can no more change a determinatio ad unum into a libertas ad utrumque than He can create a square circle, because the two notions involve an intrinsic contradiction. Furthermore, if the Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to perform 24 Cfr, Alvarez, De Auviliis, disp. dum actum in particulari, non solum 22, n. 39: “‘“Solus Deus propter ‘secundum substantiam, sed etiam suam infinitatem et omntipotentiam, secundum modum libertatis, quod quia. est auctor voluntatis creatae, tamen non potest alia causa creata.’’ potest illam immutare conformiter 25 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His ad suam naturam et movere effica- Knowability, Essence, and Attri- citer atque applicare ad producen- butes, pp. 282 sqq. 242 ACTUAL sGRACE some definite act, would He not choose precisely that praemotio physica which, the Thomists claim, also pro- duces free acts? Not so, replies Alvarez; “ for the will remains free so long as the intellect represents to it an object as indifferent.” °° That is to say: Liberty remains as long as its root, 7. e. an indifferent judgment, is pres- ent. But this new rejoinder, far from solving the rid- dle, simply begs the question. Liberty of choice resides formaliter in the will, not in the intellect, and conse- quently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless it possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not to act. This imdifferentia activa ad utrumlibet, as it is technically termed, is absolutely incompatible with the Thomistic praemotio ad unum. What would it avail the will to enjoy the indifferentia iudicii if it had to sub- mit to compulsion from some other quarter? y) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort to the famous distinction between the sensus compositus and the sensus divisus. The Molinists argue: “ Liberum arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia. non potest dissentire; ergo non est liberum.’ The Thomists re- ply: “ Distinguo:—non potest dissentire in sensu di- viso, nego; non potest dissentire in sensu composito, concedo.” ‘They explain this distinction by certain well- known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart says: “Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in sensu composito, quod possit sedere simul et stare; ... im sensu diviso, quod sedens sub sessione retinet po- tentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem cum sessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat po- tentiam simultaneitatis, sensus divisus simultaneitatem 26 Alvarez, De Auziliis, disp. 22, tus tli repraesentat obiectum cum n. 19: “ Nam tamdiu manet liber- indifferentia.’’ tas in voluntate, quamdiu intellec- THOMISM 243 potentiae.” *" As one who sits cannot at the same time — stand (sensus compositus), although he is free to rise (sensus divisus), so the consent of the will effected by efficacious grace, cannot become dissent (sensus com- positus), though the will retains the power to dissent in- stead of consenting (sensus divisus), and this is sufficient to safeguard its freedom. Is the distinction between sensus compositus and sensus divisus correctly applied here? Can the will, under the predetermining influence of the gratia efticax, change its consent into dissent at any time and as easily as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby demonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? Alvarez ** describes the Thomistic potentia dissentiendi as a faculty which can never under any circumstances be- come active. But such a potentia is really no potentia at all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand ; his ‘nat- ural potentia standi is neutralized by external restraint. Similarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic gratia efficax, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, and the alleged potentia resistendi, by which the Thom- ists claim to save free-will, is a chimera. 6) It is at this decisive point in the controversy that the Molinists triumphantly bring in the declaration of the Council of Trent that “man... while he receives that inspiration [7. e. efficacious grace], ... is also able to reject it’ And again: “If any one saith that man’s free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, does in no wise codperate to- wards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the 27 De Deo, diss, 8, art. 4, § 2. tentia ad dissentiendum, quamvis 28De Auvxiliis, disp. 92, n, 11: nulla sit potentia ad coniungendum “Etiam posito auxilio efficaci in actualem dissensum cum auxilio voluntate componitur cum illo po- efficaci [not: cum actuali consensu].’’ 244 ACTUAL GRACE grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be an- athema.” 2° To adjust their system to this important dogmatic decision, the older Thomists claimed that the Tridentine Council had in mind merely the gratia sufi- ciens, to which the will can refuse its consent. But this interpretation is untenable. The Council plainly refers to that grace with which the will cooperates by giv- ing its consent (cooperatur assentiendo) and which it can render inefficacious by withdrawing its consent, in other words, with the grace which disposes and prepares a sin- ner for justification, and under the influence of which, according to Luther and Calvin, the will remains inani- mate and merely passive. This can only be the gratia eficax. Other Thomist theologians, not daring to contra- dict the obvious sense of the Tridentine decree, assert that the Council intentionally chose the term dissentire (sensus divisus) rather than resistere (sensus compositus), in order to indicate that under the predetermining influence of grace it is possible for the will to refuse its consent (posse dissentire) but not to offer resistance (posse re- sistere).®° This interpretation is no longer tenable since the Vatican Council has defined that ‘“‘ Faith, even 29 Sess. VI, cap. 5: “ Homo .. « inspirationem illam [gratiam effica- cem] recipiens ... illam et abiicere potest.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. rom) Sega, vids cael. (Tas et quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbt- trium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo ex- citanti atque vocanti, quo ad obti- nendam iustificationis gratiam se dis- ponat ac praeparet, neque posse dis- sentire, si velit, sed velut imanime quoddam mhil omnino agere mere- que passive se habere, anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.) 30 Thus’ Alvarez, De Auvilis, disp. 93, art. 1: “Nunc autem dicimus Concilium Tridentinum... numquam usum fuisse verbo illo “resistere, sed verbo ‘ dissentire’ et ‘abticere, ut insinuaret non esse idem formaliter resistere seu posse resistere auxilio efficaci et posse dis- sentire seu abticere gratiam voca- tionis. ... Unde licet arbitrium motum auxilio efficact ad consen- THOMISM 245 when it does not work by charity, is in itself a gift of God, and the act of faith is a work appertaining to salvation, by which man yields voluntary obedience to God Himself, by assenting to and cooperating with His grace, which he is able to resist.” *4 If efficacious grace can be successfully resisted, it can not possess that “ ir- resistible ” influence which the Thomists ascribe to it.2? B. The Thomistic system is open to two seri- ous objections also from the philosophical point of view. One of these concerns the medium by which God foreknows the future free acts of His rational creatures; the other, His relation to sin. a) In regard to the first-mentioned point we do not, of course, underestimate the immense difficulties involved in the problem of God’s fore- knowledge of the free acts of the future. | The Molinistic theory also has its difficulties, and they are sO numerous and weighty that in our treatise on God ** we made no attempt to demonstrate the scientia media by stringent arguments, but merely accepted it as a working hypothesis which supplies some sort of tiendum possit dissentire, si velit, non tamen potest Deo resistere vel auxilio eius efficact, secundum quod est instrumentum voluntatis di- vinae.”’ 31 Sess, III, cap. 3: “ Quare fides ipsa in se, etiamsi per carita- tem non operetur, donum Dei est et actus eius est opus ad salutem pertinens, quo homo liberam prae- stet tpst Deo obedientiam, gratiae eius cui resistere possit consentiendo et cooperando.” (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 1791.) : 32 Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 74 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Wok, 3rd ed., pp. 140 sqq., Freiburg 1908; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 405 sqq., Freiburg 1901. On the teach- ing of St. Augustine see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 50; on that of St. Thomas, L. de San, S. J., De Deo Uno, t. I: De Mente SS. Thomae circa Praedetermina- tiones Physicas, Louvain 1894. 83 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attri- butes, pp. 383 sqq., 400 sqq. 246 ACTUAL GRACE scientific basis for the dogmas of divine omnipotence and free-will in both the natural and the supernatural order. b) A more serious objection than the one just adverted to is that the Thomistic hypothe- sis involves the blasphemous inference that God predetermines men to sin. a) Under a rigorous application of the Thomistic prin- ciples God would have to be acknowledged as the cause of sin. As the predetermination of the will to justifica- tion can take no other form than the gratia per se efficax, so sin, considered as an act, necessarily postulates the predetermining influence of the motor primus. With- out this assumption it would be impossible in the Thom- istic system to find in the absolute will of God an infalli- ble medium by which He can foreknow future sins. Bafiez says on this point: ‘God knows sin with an in- tuitive knowledge, because His will is the cause of the sinful act, as act, at the same time permitting free-will to concur in that act by failing to observe the law.” Though the Thomists refuse to admit that God Himself is the immediate author of sin, the conclusion is inevitable from their premises. And this for two reasons. First, because the alleged praemotio ad malum is as irresistible as the praemotio ad bonum; and secondly, because the material element of sin must be inseparable from its for- 34“ Quidquid entitatis reperitur in 385 Cfr. Bafiez, Comment. in S. quocumque actu peccati, etiamsi alias sit intrinsece malus, debet reduci in Deum tamquam in primam causam praemoventem et praedeterminantem actuali motione voluntatem creatam ad talem actum, inquantum actus est, secundum quod est ens.’ Alvarez, De Auxil., disp. 24, n. 15. Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 23, art. 3, dub. 2, conclus. 2: “ Deus co- gnoscit cognitione intuitiva peccatum. quatenus Det voluntas est causa en- titatis actus peccati et simul per- mittens, quod ad eundem actum concurrat liberum arbitrium defi- ciendo a regula.” THOMISM 247 mal element; otherwise God would foreknow sin merely matertaliter as an act but not formaliter as a sin. The teaching of the Church on this point was clearly defined by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Him- self, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.” °° If the rational creature were compelled to perform a sinful act, as act, resistance would be impossible. And if it were true that the malice of an act practically can- not be separated from its physical entity, then in the Tho- mistic hypothesis God would be the author not only of the entitas but likewise of the malitia peccati. The devil tempts us only by moral means, 7. e. by suggestion; are we to assume that God tempts us physically by induc- ing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the prae- motio ad bonum, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? This consideration may be supplemented by another. So-called “sins of malice” are comparatively rare. Most sins are committed for the sake of some pleasure or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral theology in forbidding sin forbids its physical . entity. How gladly would not those who are addicted to impurity, for instance, separate the malice from the entity of their sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their passion without offending God! B) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist theologians defend themselves by a simile. The soul of a lame man, they say, enables him indeed to move his dis- 86 Sess, VI, can. 6. _Cfr. Pohle- sence, and Attributes, pp. 253 saq., Preuss, God: His Knowability, Es- 442 sqq. 248 ACTUAL GRACE abled limb ; however, the cause of limping is not the soul but a crooked shinbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes of such reasoning as follows: “ The will of Adam be- fore the fall was not a crooked shinbone, but it was abso- lutely straight, and became crooked through physical pre- motion.” 37 Another and more plausible contention of the Thomist school is that Molinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin somehow to God. “It is impossible for a man to sin unless God lends His cooperation. Do not, therefore, the Molinists also make God the author of sin?” Those who argue in this wise overlook the fact that there is a very large distinction between the concursus simultaneus of the Molinists and the praemotio physica of the Thom- ists. The praemotio physica predetermines the sinful act without regard to the circumstance whether or not the will is able to offer resistance. The concursus simulta- neus, on the other hand, begins as a mere concursus oblatus, which is in itself indifferent and awaits as it were the free consent of the will before it cooperates with the sinner as concursus collatus in the performance of the sin- ful act.28 For this reason the distinction between actus and malitia has a well-defined place in the Molinistic system, whereas it is meaningless in that of the Thom- iste:?* 2. AUGUSTINIANISM.—This system, so called because its defenders pretend to base it on the 37 “ Voluntas Adami ante pecca- tum non erat tibia curva, sed omnino recta, facta autem est curva ex pro- motione physica.’ Praelect. Dog- mat., Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 137. 88 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- thor of Nature and the Supernat- unal, pp. 72 sqq 39 Cfr. on this subject Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 41; T. Papagni, O. P., La Mente di S. Tommaso intorno alla Mozione Di- vina nelle Creature, p, 44, Benevento I9OI. AUGUSTINIANISM 249 authority of St. Augustine, has some points of similarity with Thomism but differs from the latter in more than one respect, especially in this that the Augustinians,*® though they speak with great deference of the gratia per se efficax, hold that the will is not physically but only morally predetermined in its free acts. Hence Augustin- ianism may fitly be described as the system of the praedeterminatio moralis. Its most eminent de- fender is Lawrence Berti, O. S. A. (1696-1766), who in a voluminous work De Theologicis Dis- ciplinis ** so vigorously championed the Augustin- ian theory that Archbishop Jean d’Yse de Saléon, of Vienne,*” and other contemporary theologians combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. Pope Benedict XIV instituted an official investi- gation, which resulted in a decree permitting Augustinianism to be freely held and taught. a) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of causa prima and motor primus, Augustinianism is based on the notion of delectatio coelestis or caritas. Berti holds three principles in common with Jansenius: (1) Actual grace consists essentially in the infusion of celes- tial delectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (i. e. grace) causally precedes free-will in such wise that its relative intensity in every instance constitutes the law and standard of the will’s disposition to do good. 40 The principal representatives of 42Cfr. his work Le Bajanisme Augustinianism are Berti, Bellelli, et le Jansénisme Resuscités dans les and Bertieri. Livres de Bellelli et Berti, s. 1., _ 41 Published at Rome in 1739 sqq. 1745. 250 ACTUAL GRACE (3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concu- piscence (delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia) is doing its work in fallen man, and the two powers constantly con- tend for the mastery. So long as celestial delectation (i. e. grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with, con- cupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salu- tary act to which it is invited by the former. It is only when the delectatio coelestis overcomes concupis- cence (delectatio coelestis victrix) that free-will can per- form the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth prin- ciple, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which brings out the essential difference between Augustinian- ism and Jansenism, viz.: the delectatio coelestis never overpowers the will but leaves it free to choose between good and evil.** b) The relation between merely sufficient and effica- cious grace in the Augustinian system, therefore, may be described as follows: Merely sufficient grace imparts to the will the posse but not the velle, or at best only such a weak velle that it requires the delectatio victrix (gratia efficax) to become effective. Efficacious grace (delectatio coelestis victrix), on the other hand, impels the will ac- tually to perform the good deed. Hence there is between the two an essential and specific difference, and the efficacy of that grace which leads to the performance of salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on the delectatio coelestis, which must consequently be conceived as gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se.™* c) Nevertheless, the necessity of the gratia efficax ab 43 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Di- est Thomistarum et Augustinensium vind, pp. 419 sqq. omnium afirmantium, gratiam effi- 44 Cfr, Berti, De Theol. Disci- cacem esse se ipsa, non talem reddi _ plinis, XIV, 9, n. 6: “ Sententia aut cooperatione liberi arbitrit aut AUGUSTINIANISM 251 mtrinseco, according to the Augustinian theory, is not due to the subordination of the causa secunda to the causa prima, as the Thomists contend, but to a consti- tutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this that its evil impulses can be overcome solely by the delectatio coelestis victrix (gratia efficax, adiutorium quo). The case was different before the Fall, when the gratia versatilis (gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine quo non) sufficed for the performance of salutary acts.> d) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jan- senists, that the delectatio coelestis (1. e. efficacious grace) does not intrinsically compel the will, but acts merely as a praemotio moralis, and that while the will obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (infallibiliter) it does not do so necessarily (non necessario). With equal certainty, though not necessarily, the will, when equipped solely with sufficient grace, succumbs to concupiscence. The ultimate reason for the freedom of the will is to be found in the indifferentia iudicii.° By way of exempli- fication the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man who, though physically free and able to do so, would never turn summersaults on a public thoroughfare or gouge out his own eyes. ex circumstantiis congruis, atque certissime et infallibiliter cum ef- fectu coniunctam esse.’ 45 Cfr. Berti, op. cit., XIV, 11: “In aequali gradu concupiscentiae Dei praemotione est liberi ‘arbitrii sani et robusti, non autem infirmi.”? 46 Cfr. Berti, De Theol, | Disci. blinis, XIV, 8, n.-18: “ Quamvis sit haec efficar gratia antecedens et et gratiae gratia concupiscentiae, non concupiscentia gratiae succumbet, quia homo etiam cum aequali vir. tute maiorem habet ad malum quam ad bonum inclinationem. .. . Agere et non agere in aequilibrio virium et determinare seipsum absque efficact Deus sine nobis faciat ut velimus, nihilo tamen minus per illam non proponitur nobis bonum sub ratione omnis boni, quemadmodum propont- tur beatis per lumen gloriae, ideoque remanet indifferentia iudicii et vera libertas,”” 252 ACTUAL /GRAGE CriticAL EsTIMATE OF AUGUSTINIANISM.— On account of its uncritical methods Augustin- ianism has found but few defenders and deserves notice only in so far as it claims to base its teach- ing on St. Augustine. Like the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have been quoted in support of many contradictory systems.** If the use of Augustinian terms guaranteed the possession of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have a strong claim to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. Yet how widely does not the “ Augustinus Iprensis,” as he has been called, differ from the “ Augustinus Hippon- ensis”! Augustinianism, too, utterly misconceives the terms which it employs. Space permits us to call atten- tion to one or two points only. a) Inthe first place Augustinianism labors un- der an absolutely false conception of sufficient erace. How can that grace be sufficient for justification which is first described in glowing colors as parva et invalida and then in the same breath is declared to be insufficient except when reinforced by a gratia magna in the shape of delec- tatio victrir? What kind of “grace” can that be which in its very nature is so constituted that the will, under the prevailing influence of conctupiscence, infallibly does the opposite of that to which it is supernaturally im- pelled? It is quite true that the distinction between gratia parva and gratia magna ** is found in St. Augus- 47 Calvinism, Bajanism, Jansen- 48 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. ism—Thomism, Augustinianism, Mo- 17. linism, and Congruism. AUGUSTINIANISM 253 tine. However, he understands by gratia parva not suf- ficient grace, but the grace of prayer (gratia remote suf- ficiens), and by gratia magna, not efficacious grace as such, but grace sufficient to perform a good act (gratia proxime sufficiens) .*° b) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its theory of a praemotio moralis with the dogma of free-will. Under the Augustinian system the influence of effica- cious grace can be conceived in but two ways. Either it is so strong that the will is physically unable to with- hold its consent; or it is only strong enough that the consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral certainty. In the former alternative we have a prevenient necessity which determines the will ad unum and conse- quently destroys its freedom. In the latter, there can be no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of ra- tional creatures on the part of God, because the Augus- tinians reject the scientia media of the Molinists and ex- pressly admit that the same grace which proves effective in one man remains ineffective in another because of the condition of his heart.® c) Finally, the three fundamental principles of the Augustinian system are false and have no warrant in the writings of St. Augustine. It is not true that pleasure (delectatio) is the font and well-spring of all supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds may also be inspired by hatred, fear, sorrow, etc.°! With 49 Cfr, Palmieri, De Gratia Divina differentia iudicii to preserve free- Aciuali, pp. 433 sqq. | will, v. supra, p. 242, 50 On the insufficiency of the in- 51 Conc. Trid., Sess. Wis Caps. 6: 254 ACTUAL GRACE many men the fear of God or a sense of duty is as strong an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of treading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard “ celestial delectation ” as the essential mark of efficacious grace, nor concupiscence as the characteristic note of sin.” . The second and third principles of the Augustinian sys- tem are likewise false. If delectation is only one mo- tive among many, its varying intensity cannot be the stan- dard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that the will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the rela- tively stronger as against the weaker delectation; for any necessitation that does not depend on the free will ex- cludes the Libertas a coactione, but not that libertas a ne- cessitate which constitutes the notion of liberty. There can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to resist delectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth principle of the Augustinians, by which they pretend to uphold free-will, is also false.>* READINGS: — The literature on the different systems of grace is enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works. On the Thomist side: *Bafiez, O. P., Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom., Salamanca 1584 saq.-—tAlvarez, Ou: P:, De Auxiliis Gratiae et Humani Arbitrii Viribus, Rome 1610.— IpEM, Respon- sionum Libri Quatuor, Louvain 1622.— Ledesma, O. P., De Di- vinae Gratiae Auxiliis, Salamanca 1611.—*Gonet, O. P., Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69.— Contenson, O. P., Theologia Mentis et Cordis, Lyons 1673— De Lemos, O. P., Panoplia Divinae Gratiae, 4 vols. Liége 1676.— Goudin, O. P., De Scientia et Voluntate ‘Dei, new ed., Louvain 1874.— *Gotti, O. P., Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem facias bene, amas Deum et times scans ~ 52 ** Proponitur praemium ut pecces, 1. e@. quod te delectat,’ he says; “... Terreris minis, facis propter quod times. .«- Si cupiditas non valuit, forte timor valebit ut pecces.... Itaque ad omne recte factum amor et timor ducit. Ut Deum: ut autem facias male, amas mundum et times mundum.” In Ps2)79, es -13% 53 Cfr, Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 422 sqq.; Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actual, thes. 54. OE ir epee I PB AS PREC RIC D Bie* See haa aes MOLINISM 255 Divi Thomae, Venice 1750.— Gazzaniga, O. P., Theologia Dog- matica in Systema Redacta, 2 vols., Vienne 1776.—*Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 5 (ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.).—Ipem, Le Thomisme Triomphant, Paris 1725.—*Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., Die Lehre des hl. Thomas iiber die Willensfrethett, Prague 1890.— Ipem, in Commer’s Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, 18904 sqq.—*Dummermuth, O. P., S. Thomas et Doc- trina Praemotionis Physicae, Paris 1886—I. A. Manser, Possi- bilitas Praemotionis Physicae Thomisticae, Fribourg (Switzer- land) 1895.— Joh. Ude, Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus V oluntatis Humanae, Graz 1905.— Del Prado, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 3 vols., Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.— P. Garrigou-La- grange, S. Thomas et le Néomolinisme, Paris 1917. On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, Vindiciae Augu- stinianae, Padua 1677.—*Berti, De Theologicis Disciplinis, 8 vols., Rome 1739 sqq.— Bellelli, Mens Augustini de Modo Reparationis Humanae Naturae, 2 vols. Rome 1773.—L. de Thomassin, Mémoires sur la Grace, etc., Louvain 1668. For a list of Molinistic and Congruistic authors see pp. 269 sq. ARTI ChE? MOLINISM AND CONGRUISM The point in which these two systems meet, and in regard to which they differ from Thomism and Augustinianism, is the definition of effica- cious grace as efficax ab extrinseco sive per ac- cidens. This conception was violently attacked by the Span- ish Dominican Bafiez and other divines. About 1594, the controversy between the followers of Bafiez and the Molinists waxed so hot that Pope Clement VIII ap- pointed a special commission to settle it. This was the famous Congregatio de Auxilus, consisting of picked theologians from both the Dominican and the Jesuit or- 256 ACTUAL GRACE ders. It debated the matter for nine full years without arriving at a decision. Finally Pope Paul V, at the sug- gestion of St. Francis de Sales, declared both systems to be orthodox and defensible, and strictly forbade the con- tending parties to denounce each other as heretical.’ While Thomism devoted its efforts mainly to the de- fense of grace, Molinism made it its chief business to champion the dogma of free-will. 1. Mottntsm.—Molinism takes its name from the Jesuit Luis de Molina, who published a famous treatise under the title Concordia Liber Arbitru cum Gratiae Donis at Lisbon, in 1588. His teaching may be outlined as follows: a) In actu primo there is no intrinsic and ontological but merely an extrinsic and accidental distinction between efficacious and sufficient grace, based upon their respective effects. Sufficient grace becomes efficacious by the con- sent of the will; if the will resists, grace remains ineffica- cious (ineficax) and merely sufficient (gratia mere siuf- ficiens). Consequently, one and the same grace may be efficacious in one case and inefficacious in another. It all depends on the will.’ lia praevenientis atque adiuvantis gratiae... pendere a libero con- sensu et cooperatione liberi arbitru nostri cum illis atque adeo in libera 1On the Congregatio de Auxilis, so called because the principal question under discussion was the help (ausxilia) afforded by grace, see Astrain, S. J., in the Catholic En- cyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 238 Sq: and Schneemann, S. J., Die Entstehung und weitere Entwicklung der tho- mistisch-molinistischen Controverse, Freiburg 1879; also in a Latin translation, Freiburg 1881. ; 2Cfr. Molina, Concordia Libert Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, qu. 14, art. 13, dip. 38: “ Asserimus auxi- potestate nostra esse, vel illa effica- cia reddere consentiendo et coope- rando cum illis ad actus, quibus ad iustificationem disponimur, vel in- eficacia illa reddere continendo con- sensum et cooperationem nostram aut etiam eliciendo contrarium con- sensum.” Ibid., disp. 12: “ Quare fieri potest, ut duorum qui aequali auxilio interius a Deo vocantur, unus MOLINISM 257 b) This theory involves no denial of the priority and superior dignity of grace in the work of salvation. The will, considered as a mere faculty, and in actu primo, is raised to the supernatural order by prevenient grace (gratia praeveniens), which imparts to it all the moral and physical power necessary to perform free salutary acts. Neither can the actus secundus be regarded as a product of the unaided will; it is the result of grace co- operating with free-will.* Consequently, the will by giv- ing its consent does not increase the power of grace, but it is grace which makes possible, prepares, and aids the will in performing free acts. To say that the influence of grace goes farther than this would be to assert that it acts independently of the will, and would thereby deny the freedom of the latter.* c) The infallibility with which efficacious grace works its effects is to be explained not by God’s absolute will, but by His infallible foreknowledge through the scientia media,— a Molinistic postulate which was first defined and scientifically demonstrated by Father Fonseca, S.J., the teacher of Suarez.° God foreknows not only the absolutely free acts (futura) of His rational creatures pro libertate sui arbitrii convertatur arbitrium enim et influxus noster et alter infidelitate permaneat.”’ 3“ Auxilium gratiae praevenien- tis,’ says Molina, “ est influxus Dei in liberum arbitrium, quo illud movet et excitat potensque reddit, ut eo pacto motum tamquam habens tam in se ipso principium efficiens actuum supernaturalium simul influ- endo ulterius eos producat.”’ Molina, op. cit., qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 41. 4 Cfr. Molina, op. cit., qu. 23, art. 4, disp. 1: ‘“‘ Quando audis consen- sum nostrum efficacia reddere auxi- lia gratiae, non ita id intelligas, quasi arbitrium nostrum vim aliquam seu efficacitatem tribuat auxiliis ipsis; nullam vim conferunt gratiae auxi- luis, sed potius auxilia vim et pro- pensionem arbitrio tribuunt ad con- sensum eliciendum.” Ibid., Appen- dix ad obi. 3 (ed. Paris., 1876, p. 595): “Solum significare volumus, auxilium illud liberum nobis relin- quere consensum nostrum ad con- versionem, nec tale esse, ut nullam necessitatem, etiam consequentiae, ar- bitrio ad talem consensum aut con- versionem ponat,” 5 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Knowability, Essence, butes, pp. 383 saq. God: His and Attria 258 ACTUAL GRACE by the scientia visionis, but likewise their hypothetically free acts (futuribilia) by means of the scientia media, and hence He infallibly knows from all eternity what attitude the free-will of man would assume in each case if grace were given him. Consequently, when God, in the light of this eternal foreknowledge, actually be- stows a grace, this grace will prove efficacious or inefficacious according as He has foreknown whether the will will give or withhold its consent. Thus can the infallibility of efficacious grace be reconciled with the dogma of free-will without prejudice to such other dog- mas as final perseverance and the predestination of the elect, because God by virtue of the scientia media has it absolutely in His power to give or withhold His graces in each individual case.® CriticAL Estrmate oF Morinism.—Even the most determined opponents of Molinism admit that this system possesses three important ad- vantages. a) First, it gives a satisfactory account of the ee al 6 Cfr. Molina, op. cit., qu. 19, art. 6, disp. 2: “‘ Hac ratione Deus O. M. vult omnia bona, quae per ar- bitrium nostrum sunt futura, non solum voluntate conditionali, si nos quoque ea velimus, sed etiam volun- tate absoluta, quatenus ipsi praevi- denti ea futura placent eademque di- vina eius ac singularis bonitas per arbitrium nostrum intendit ac vult. Quod autem haec etiam absoluta voluntas semper impleatur, ex eo est manifestum, quia nititur certitudine praescientiae divinae, quod ita res futura sit per nostrum arbitrium.” —oalbed,,: id, )23). art. 4, disp.” .3: “ Quoniam quod Deus elegerit eum rerum ordinem, circumstantiarum et auxiliorum, sive maiorum sive mino- rum, in quo praevidebat eos pro sua libertate salvandos, qui electione eius ordinis eo ipso praedestinati sunt vitamque aeternam pro sua libertate consequuntur, potius quam alium ex _infinitis, in quo res aliter pro eadem ipsorum libertate habuisset, non futt ex nobis aut pro meritorum et co- operationis nostrae qualitate, sed ex sola misericordia Dei.” Cfr. G. Schneemann, Historia Controversia- rum de Divinae Gratiae Liberique Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progres- sus, Freiburg 1881, pp. 38 sqq. MOLINISM 4280 sufficiency of “merely sufficient grace,’ which in its physical nature does not differ essentially from efficacious grace. Second, Molinism safeguards free-will by deny- ing that efficacious grace either physically or mor- ally predetermines the will to one course of action. Third, Molinism explains in a fairly satis- factory manner why efficacious grace is infallibly eficacious. God in virtue of the scientia media knows with metaphysical certainty from all eternity which graces in each individual case will prove efficacious through the free consent of the will and which will remain inefficacious, and is thereby enabled to bestow or withhold grace according to His absolute decrees. | b) The question may justly be raised, how- ever, whether, in endeavoring to safeguard free- will, the Molinists do not undervalue grace, which is after all the primary and decisive factor in the work of salvation. There is something incongruous in the notion that the efficacy or inefficacy of divine grace should depend on the arbitrary pleasure of a created will. If sufficient grace does not become efficacious except by the consent of the will, how can the resultant salutary act be said to be an effect of grace? St. Paul, St. Augustine, and the coun- cils of the Church do not say: “ Deus facit, si volumus,” but they declare: “Deus facit, wut faciamus,” “Deus ipse dat ipsum velle et facere et perficere,” and so forth. What can this mean if not: Divine grace need not 260 ACTUAL GRACE concern itself with external circumstances, occasions, humors, etc., but it takes hold of the sinner and actually converts him, without regard to anything except the de- cree of the Divine Will. On account of this and similar difficulties Cardinal Bellarmine, who was a champion and protector of P. Molina, seems to have rejected Molinism * in favor of Congruism.*® c) The same reasons that induced Bellarmine to embrace Congruism probably led the Jesuit General Claudius Aquaviva, in 1613, to order all teachers of theology in the Society to lay greater emphasis on the Congruistic element in 7Cfr. his treatise De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, I, 12 (ed. Févre, toms Ny Vp eB27en obaskis.\ (1873)! “Pyima opinio eorum est, qui gra- tiam efficacem constituunt in assensu et cooperatione humana, ita ut ab eventu dicatur gratia efficax, quia vi- delicet sortitur effectum et ideo sorti- tur effectum, quia voluntas humana cooperatur. Itaque existimant hi au- tores, in potestate hominis esse ut gratiam faciat esse efficacem, quae alioquin ex se non esset nisi suffi- ciens.’ Bellarmine treats this opin- jon as the extreme counterpart of Thomism (which he also combats) and disposes of it thus: “ Haec opinio aliena est omnino a sententia b. Augustini et, quantum ego exi- stimo, a sententia etiam Scripturarum divinarum.” (1. c.) Among the Scriptural texts which he quotes in support of this view are John VI, 45, rT Gon V, 7, Romy, me 8 The learned Cardinal de- scribes the difference between Congruism and extreme Molin- ism (which latter, it may be re- marked, was not defended by Mo- illa discrepare. lina himself) as follows: “ Neque enim intelligi potest, quo pacto gratia efficax consistat in illa interna sua- sione, quae per liberum arbitrium respui potest, et tamen infallibilem effectum habeat, nisi addamus, Deum tis quos efficaciter et infallibiliter irahere decrevit, eam suasionem ad- hibere quam videt congruere ingenio eorum et quam certo novit ab eis non contemnendam.” (Op. cit., p. 531.) The objection that this explanation eventually resolves itself into the Molinistic theory which he had cen- sured, Bellarmine meets as follows: “ Respondeo sententiam nostram, quam S. Augustini esse demonstra- vimus, aliqua in re cum prima illa opinione convenire, sed in multis ab Convenit enim in eo quod utraque. sententia gratiam suf- ficentem et efficacem ponit in auxilio excitante potissimum, non in adiu- vante. Sed discrepant inter se, quod prima opinio vult efficaciam gratiae pendere a voluntate humana, nostra vero pendere vult a voluntate Dei.” Cie }icapsii3s) MOLINISM 261 the notion of efficacious grace. This measure was quite in harmony with the principles de- fended by the Jesuit members of the Congregatio de Auxiltis before Clement VIII and Paul V. Aquaviva’s order is of sufficient importance to deserve a place in the text of this volume: “Nostrt in posterum omnino doceant, inter eam gratiam quae effectum re ipsa habet atque efficax dicitur, et eam quam sufficientem nominant, non tantum discrimen esse in actu secundo, quia ex usu libert arbitru etiam cooperantem gratiam habentts effectum sortiatur, altera non item; sed in tpso actu primo, quod posita scientia conditionalium [scientia media] ex efficact Det proposito atque intentione efficiendt certissime in nobis boni, de industria tpse ea media seligit atque eo modo et tempore confert, quo videt effectum, infallibiliter habitura, alus usurus, st haec inethcacia praevidis- set. Quare semper moraliter et in ratione bene- fic. plus aliquid in efficaci, quam in. sufficienti gratia est, in actu primo continert: atque hac ra- tione efiicere Deum, ut re ipsa faciamus, non tan- tum quia dat gratiam qua facere possimus. Quod wdem dicendum est de perseverantia, quae procul dubio donum est.” This modified, or perhaps we had better say, more sharply determined form of Molinism is called Congruism.°® 2. CONGRUISM.—The system thus recom- 9 Further details in Schneemann, Hist. Controv., pp. 302 sqq. 262 ACTUAL GRACE mended by Aquaviva in its fundamental principles really originated with Molina himself. It was developed by the great Jesuit theologians Suarez, Vasquez, and Lessius, and became the official system of the Society of Jesus under Muzio Vitelleschi (d. 1645) and Piccolomini (d. 1651). a) The distinction between gratia congrua and gratia incongrua is founded on the writings of St. Augustine, who speaks of the elect as “ congruenter vocati.” *° ‘The Congruists maintain against the extreme Molinists that the efficacy of grace is not attributable solely to a free de- termination of the will, but, at least in part, to the fact that grace is bestowed under circumstances favorable to its operation, 7. e. “ congruous ” in that sense. When the circumstances are comparatively adverse (tcon- grua), grace remains merely sufficient. A prudent father who knows how to govern his children without phys- ical force will speak the right word to each at the proper time. Similarly God adapts His grace, if it is to prove efficacious, to the circumstances of each individual case, thereby attaining His purpose without fail. Thus the reckless youth on the city streets needs more powerful graces than the pious nun in her secluded convent cell, because he is exposed to stronger temptations and his 10 Cfr. Ad Simplician., I, qu. 2, n. 13: “Si vellet [Deus] etiam ip- sorum misereri, posset ita vocare, quomodo illis aptum esset, ut et mo- verentur et intelligerent et sequeren- tur. Verum est ergo: Multi vocati, pauci electi. Illi enim electi, qui congruenter vocati; wl autem qui mon congruebant neque contempera- bantur vocationi, non electi, quia non secuti, quamvis vocati, Item verum est: Neque volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Det, quta etiamsi multos vocet, eorum tamen miseretur, quos ita vocat, quomodo tis vocart aptum est ut sequantur. Falsum est autem, si quis dicit: Igitur non miserentis Det, sed volen- tis atque currentis est hominis, quia nullius Deus frustra miseretur, Cuius autem miseretur, sic eum vo- cat quomodo scit ei congruere, ut vocantem non respuat.” CONGRUISM 263 environment is unfavorable to religious influences. Since grace is conferred with a wise regard to tempera- ment, character, inclinations, prejudices, time and place, there exists between it and free-will a sort of intrinsic affinity, which in the hands of God becomes an infallible means of executing His decrees."* b) The actual bestowal of congruous grace, consid- ered in actu primo, is undoubtedly a special gift of God, and hence the gratia congrua possesses a higher value than the gratia incongrua sive ineficax. An entitatively weaker impulse of grace, if conferred under compara- tively favorable conditions, is more precious than a stronger impulse which fails in its purpose by reason of unfavorable circumstances created by inclination, train- ing, or environment. Little David accomplished more with a handful of pebbles in his scrip than had he been heavily armed.” c) Congruism assigns a far more important réle to: grace than extreme Molinism. It makes the will depend on efficacious grace, not the efficacy of grace upon the will. Bellarmine illustrates this difference by the exam- aliCfr.jouarez, De Aurx., V, 25: “Vocatio efficax illa est, quae... includit congruitatem quandam re- spectu personae, cui datur, ut sit ili proportionata et accommodata, sicut oportet, ut in tali persona, in tali tempore et occasione infallibiliter ef- fectum habeat, et per hoc habet illa vocatio quod congrua et efficax sit.’ 121 Kings XVII, 38 sqq.— Cfr.. Lessius, De Praedest. et Reprob., sect. 5, n. 106: ‘“‘ Ex qui- bus patet, gratiam efficacem, si physice spectetur, non semper esse maius -beneficium, quum saepenu- mero eda, quae effectu caret, secun- dum suam entitatem longe sit prae- stantior. Sit tamen spectetur mo- raliter, nimirum ut subest praescien- tiae infallibit effectus, sic semper maius est beneficium, etiam ut prae- cisa ab actuali effectu et gratia co- operante seu ut prior actuali suo influxu in opus, quum Deus, qui non caeco modo operatur, ex mero suo beneplacito et inscrutabili iudicio seligat pro quibusdam gratias illas quas effectum habituras videt, non solum ut gratiae quaedam sunt, sed etiam formaliter, ut effectum habi- turae sunt. ... Ex quibus constat, quo sensu distinctio gratiae congruae et non congruae admittenda sit, quam numquam reieci, sed totis ant- mis et sensu et praxi semper sum amplexus.” 264 ACTUAL GRACE ple of a sermon which, under an entirely equal distribu- tion of internal grace, converts one sinner while it leaves another untouched.** CRITICAL EsTIMATE OF CoNGRUISM.—Among the different systems devised for the purpose of harmonizing the dogmas of grace and free-will, Congruism probably comes nearest the truth. It strikes a golden mean between the two extremes of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism on the one hand, and Calvinism and Jansenism on the other, and its principal theses can be supported by clear and unmistakable passages from the writings of St. Augustine. a) Other points in its favor are the following: _ “Sufficient grace,” in the Congruist hypothesis, is truly sufficient so far as God is concerned, be- cause its inefficaciousness is attributable solely to the human will. That free-will is prop- erly safeguarded under the influence of efficacious grace (gratia congrua) is admitted even by theologians of the opposing schools. True, Con- gruism does not regard the will as an abstract notion, but as a factor closely interwoven with the concrete circumstances of daily life. As favor- able circumstances (education, association, tem- perament) merely influence the will but do not compel it, so supernatural grace (gratia con- grua s. efficax) may soften the will and occasion- 18 De Grat. et Lib. Arbiir., ed. Févre, t. V, p. 533. CONGRUISM 265 ally even break down its resistance, but (rare cases excepted) ** will never compel it to do good. Congruism marks a distinct advance over extreme Molinism also in this, that it bases the difference between gratia efficax (congrua) and gratia nefficax not entirely on the will of man, but likewise on the will of God, whereby it is able to explain such formulas as “Deus facit, ut facia- mus,” “Deus est, qui discermit,”’ etc., in a manner see: compatible ae the eae teaching of the Church.*? The modus operandi of the gratia congrua (effi- cacious grace) is explained by Congruism, in common with Molinism, as follows: There is a threefold efficacy: the efficacy of power (efficacia virtutis), the efficacy of union (efficacia con- nexioms), and the efficacy of infallible success (eficacia infallibtlhtatis). Grace (both effica- cious and sufficient) does not derive its efficacia virtutis from the free-will of man, nor from the knowledge of God (scientia media), but from itself. The efficacia connexionis (of union be- tween act and grace) on the other hand, depends entirely on the free-will, since, according to the Council of Trent as well as that of the Vatican, efficacious grace does not operate irresistibly but can be “cast off.” The efficacia infallibilitatis 14V. supra, p. 16. tion see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina 15 For the proofs of this asser- Actuali, thes. 50. 266 ACTUAL GRACE springs from God’s certain foreknowledge (scientia media), which cannot be deceived.” b) Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to contend that Congruism solves all difficulties. The mystery sur- rounding both the unequal distribution of efficacious grace and the scientia media still remains. Moreover, the theory that God adjusts himself slavishly to all the circum- stances of His creatures, can hardly be reconciled with His dignity and omnipotence. It would no doubt be far worthier of His majesty to seize upon the free will of man and compel it to perform the salutary act which He wishes it to perform. Whoever has studied the lives of saints and eminent converts knows that the sudden and seemingly unaccountable changes of heart which many of them have experienced can hardly be regarded as miracles in the strict sense, though on the other hand it seems cer- tain that grace worked in them with little or no regard to the “congruity” of circumstances. Again, it is one of the highest and most sublime missions of grace not to be balked by unfavorable circumstances but to re-shape them by changing a man’s temperament, dulling con- cupiscence, weakening the power of temptation, and so forth. In other words, grace does not depend on but controls and fashions the circumstances of the re- cipient. After all is said, therefore, the relation of grace and free-will still remains an unsolved mystery.*? mat. Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 447. On the various interpretations of 16 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, V, 9, 4: “ Quod [voluntates] facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae, quia facturas ille praescivit, CuUS praescientia falli non potest.” 17 On Congruism cfr. Chr. Pesch, Prael. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 167 sqq.; Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- the praedefinitio actuum salutarium, within as well as without the Jesuit Order, see Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 93 sqq., Paris 1896, and es- pecially Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 458 sqq. SYNCRETISM 267 3. SYNCRETISM.—Seeing that each of the dif- ferent systems which we so far reviewed contains grains of truth, some theologians ** have adopted the good points of all four and combined them into a fifth, called Syncretism. These authors begin by assuming the existence of two quite distinct sorts of efficacious grace, the (Thomistic- Augustinian) gratia efficar ab intrinseco, and the (Molin- istic-Congruistic) gratia efficax ab extrinseco. The for- mer, they contend, is bestowed for the performance of more difficult good works, such as resisting grievous temp- tations, observing onerous precepts, exercising patience in severe tribulation, etc.; while the latter enables man to accomplish less difficult acts, such as short prayers, slight mortifications, etc. The connecting link between the two is prayer, which has been instituted for the pur- pose of enabling man to obtain that gratia efficax ab in- trinseco which is necessary for the performance of the more difficult works of salvation. Sacred Scripture teaches that prayer originates in grace, that it is binding upon all men, and that it accomplishes its purpose infalli- bly7? CriTicAL EstimMaTE oF Syncretism.—The outstanding characteristic of Syncretism is its insistence on prayer as a highly important, not to say the most important, factor in the work of salvation. a) In this the Syncretistic school is undoubt- 18 Chief among them Ysambert, 19 For a more detailed account Tournely, St. Alphonsus de’ Liguori, see Tournely, De Gratia Christi, qu, Albert Knoll, and more recently 7, art. 4, concl. 5; Katschthaler, De Cardinal Katschthaler, Gratia, pp. 173 sqq., Ratisbon 1880. ' 268 ACTUAL iGRAGE edly right. Sacred Scripture and Tradition both strongly emphasize the importance and necessity of prayer, so much so that one naturally expects to find prayer playing an essential and indispen- sable role in every complete and orthodox system of grace. ‘The present economy of grace is essentially and intrinsically an economy of prayer,’ is a theological axiom which cannot be too strongly insisted upon. To have brought out this great truth forcibly and luminously i is the merit of Syncretism. b) We do not mean to intimate, however, that the Syncretistic theory has solved the problem of the relation between free-will and grace. On the contrary, by adopt- ing two such heterogeneous concepts as gratia efficax ab intrinseco and gratia efficax ab extrinseco it has actually increased the difficulties found in the other systems. For now we are put before the dilemma:—the Tho- mistic gratia efficax either supposes free-will or it does not: if it does, there is no reason to limit this grace to the more difficult works of salvation; if it does not, then the gratia efficax can be of novassistance in the performance of more difficult works, because these too, to be meritorious, require the cooperation of free-will. The Syncretists try.to evade this dilemma by contend- ing that prayer, as the connecting link, communicates its own liberty and meritoriousness to the salutary acts per- formed through its agency, in other words, that these acts are the effect of prayer (effectus orationis). But aside from the fact that prayer itself is quite often a difficult act, the more arduous works of salvation would SYNCRETISM 269 in the Syncretist hypothesis be stripped of their meri- toriousness and degraded to the level of a volun- tartum in causa, which is an untenable assumption.?° Finally, there is something illogical and unsatisfactory in admitting on equal terms, as it were, two such incom- patible notions as the Thomistic cognitio Dei in decretis praedeterminantibus and the Molinistic scientia media. Thus in the end all attempts to harmonize the dogmas of grace and free-will fail to solve the mystery, and we are compelled to exclaim with St. Paul: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His ways!” 24 READINGS: — Molinistic and Congruistic works of importance are: *Molina, S. J., Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Dons, Lisbon 1588 (repr. Paris 1876) .— Platel, S. J., Auctoritas contra Praedeterminationem Physicam pro Scientia Media, Douai 1669. — Henao, S. J., Scientia Media Historice Propugnata, Lyons > 1655.— Inem, Scientia Media Theologice Defensa, Lyons 1674-6. — De Aranda, S. J., De Deo Sciente, Praedestinante et Auxiliante seu Schola Scientiae Mediae, Saragossa 1693.—*Suarez, S. J., De Concursu, Motione et Auxilio Dei, new ed., Paris 1856.— Inem, De Ausxilio Efficaci, Paris ed., 1856, t. XIL— IpEM, De Vera Intelli- gentia Auxilii Efficacis (Op. Posthum., t. X, Appendix ).—*Les- sius, S. J., De Gratia Efficact (Opusc., t. II, Paris 1878).— Sar- dagna, S. J., Theologia Dogmatico-Polemica, Ratisbon 1771,— Wirceburgenses (Kilber, S. J.), De Gratia, new ed., Paris 1853.— Murray, De Gratia, Dublin 1877.— B. Jungmann, S. J., De Gratia, 6th ed., Ratisbon 1896.—Th. de Régnon, S. J., Batiez et Molina, flistoire, Doctrines, Critique, Métaphysique, Paris 1883.— Card. Mazzella, S. J., De Gratia Christi, 3rd ed., Rome 1882,— Palmieri, S. J. De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 49-58, Gulpen 1885.—*V. Frins, S. J., S. Thomae Doctrina de Cooperatione Dei cum Omni 20 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, V, 20, Dogmat. Specialis, ed. by Gottfried 3 a Graun, O. M. Cap., tom. II, pp. 21 Rom. XI, 33. On Syncretism 193 sqq., Innsbruck 1894. efr, Alb. a Bulsano, Inst. Theol. 2 270 ACTUAL GRACE Natura Creata, Praesertim Libera, seu S. Thomas Praedetermina- tionis Physicae Adversarius, Paris 1890.—*Schiffini, S. J., De Gratia Divina, disp. 5, Freiburg 1901.— Card: "Billot, 1S: J. De Gratia Christi et Libero Hominis Arbitrio, 1, Rome 1908.— Lim- bourg, S. J. “ Selbstzeichnung der thomistischen Gnadenlehre,” in _the Innsbruck Zeitschrift fiir kath. Theologie, 1877.— B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 493 Saq. Among the theologians who have tried to harmonize Thomism and Molinism we may mention, besides Ysambert and St. Alphon- sus de’ Liguori, *Tournely, De Gratia, Venice 1755.— Card. Jos. Pecci, Sentenza di S. Tommaso circa l Influsso di Dio sulle Aziom delle Creature Ragionevoli e sulla Scienza Media, Rome 1885.— A. Adeodatus, J. Pecci’s Schrift: Lehre des hl. Thomas tiber den Einfluss Gottes, etc., analysiert, Mainz 1888.— C. Krogh-Tonning, De Gratia Christi et de Libero Arbitrio S. Thomae Doctrina, Christiania 1898—J. Herrmann, C. SS. R., De. Divina Gratia, Rome 1904. The history of the great controversy between Thomism and Molinism can be studied in H. Serry, O. P., Historia Congrega- tionum de Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae, Louvain 1700 and Antwerp 1709.— Livinus de Meyer, S. J., Historia Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae Auxiliis, Antwerp 1705.—*Schneemann, Sida Entstehung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse, Freiburg 1879.—*Ipem, Weitere Entwicklung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse, Freiburg 1880.—*IDEM, Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae Liberique Arbitru Concordia Initia et Progressus, Frei- burg 1881. PART II SANCTIFYING GRACE The grace of justification, commonly called sanctifying grace, is related to actual grace as an end to its means. Actual grace introduces the state of sanctifying grace or preserves and aug- ments it where it already exists. This fact makes it advisable to consider the genesis of sanctifying grace before studying its nature and effects. | We shall therefore treat in three chapters: (1) of the Process of Justification (iustificatio in fiert); (2) of the State of Justification (iustifica- tio in esse), and (3) of the Fruits of Justification (1ustificatio in fdcto esse), or the Merit of Good Works. ‘ga CHAPTER. I THE GENESIS OF SANCTIFYING GRACE, OR THE PROCESS OF JUSTIFICATION The justification of an adult human being does not take place suddenly, but runs through certain well-defined stages, which in their totality are called the process of justification. : Being a “regeneration in God,” justification bears a striking resemblance to the development of the foetus in the maternal womb. Like phys- ical birth, spiritual regeneration is preceded by travailing, i. e. fear and painful contrition. The dogmatic teaching of the Catholic Church on justification is formally defined by the Triden- tine Council, whose decrees? contain a masterly analysis of this most interesting of psychological processes. The holy Synod puts faith at the be- ginning. “Faith,” it says, “is the beginning of © human salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification.” ? The nature of faith and the part it plays in justification were the chief points 1 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 5: 2Sess. VI, cap. 8: “Fides est — “De Necessitate Praeparationis,’ humanae salutis initium, fundamen- — and cap. 6: “De Modo Praepara- tum et radix omnis iustificationis.” — tionis.” 272 JUSTIFICATION 273 in dispute between the Church and the so-called Reformers. Luther and his followers denatured the traditional Catholic teaching by basing justi- fication solely on faith, which they falsely defined as mere confidence or trust in the mercy of God. SECTION 1 THE NECESSITY OF FAITH FOR JUSTIFICATION 1. Tue LUTHERAN HERESY VS. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—The Protestant Reformers, notably Luther and Calvin, did not deny that justification is wrought by faith, but they defined justifying faith in a manner altogether foreign to the mind of the Church. a) They distinguished three kinds of faith: (1) belief in the existence of God and the historical fact that Christ has come on earth, suffered, and ascended (fides historica) ; (2) the sort of trust which is required for exercising the gift of miracles (fides miraculorum) ; and (3) faith in the divine promises with regard to the re- mission of sin (fides promissionum). The last-men- tioned species of faith they subdivided into general and particular. Fides generalis is that by which we believe that the righteousness of Christ “ covers” (but does not wipe out) our sins. Fides specialis or fiduciary faith (fiducia) is that by which a man applies to himself the righteousness of the Redeemer, firmly trusting that his sins are for Christ’s sake not imputed to him. Thus the Reformers erroneously transferred the seat of justify- ing faith from the intellect to the will and completely subverted the Catholic notion of faith as an intellectual assent to revealed truth. b) To this fundamental error the Fathers of 274 JUSTIFICATION 275 Trent opposed the orthodox doctrine that (adults) ‘‘are disposed unto justice when, excited and assisted by divine grace, receiving faith by hearing, they are freely moved towards God, be- lieving those things to be true which God has re- vealed and promised, .. .’’° and they solemnly anathematized those who assert “that justifying faith is nothing else but confidence in the divine mercy which remits sin for Christ’s sake, or that this confidence alone is that whereby we are justi- Hed: Hence it is de fide that the faith whereby man is justified, is not a confident persuasion of being esteemed righteous in the sight of God, but a dogmatic or theoretical belief in the truths of Divine Revelation. 2, REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN DOCTRINE oF FipuctAryY FairH.—Whenever Sacred Scrip- ture and Tradition speak of justifying faith, they mean a dogmatic belief in the truths of Revela- tion,—that faith which the Protestants call fides historica. a) Christ Himself solemnly commanded His 3Sess. VI, cap. 6: “‘ Disponun- tur autem ad ipsam iustitiam, dum aliud esse quam fiduciam divinae misericordwe peccata remittentis excitati divinG gratia et adiuti fidem ex auditu concipientes libere moven- tur in Deum, credentes vera esse - quae divinitus revelata et promissa sunt.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 798). PiSess iN Es ean fai) Se \ gets dixerit, fidem iustificantem nihil propter Christum, vel eam fiduciam solam esse, qua iustificamur, anathe- ma sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 822.) Cfr. Conc. Vatic.,. Sess. III, cap. 3, “De Fide” (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 1789). 276 SANCTIFYING GRACE Apostles and their successors to preach the Gospel to all nations, and before baptizing them to con- vert them to a firm belief in certain specified truths which no man may reject except at the peril of his eternal salvation. a) Mark XVI, 15 sq.: “Go ye into the whole world, and preach the gospel® to every creature: He that be- lieveth [%. e. in the Gospel] and is baptized, shall be saved: but he that believeth not shall be condemned.” Agreeable to this injunction St. John declares it to be the object of his Gospel “that you may believe that® Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believ- ing, you may have life in his name.”* The Gospel is written “that we may believe.” What must we believe? That “ Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God.” This is a revealed truth by firmly believing which we shall be saved. When the treasurer of Queen Candace begged to be baptized, Philip the deacon said to him: “If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest.” The eunuch replied: “I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God,” whereupon Philip baptized him.® 8) St. Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians eloquently insists on the necessity of faith, not a mere fides fiducialis, but a believing ac- ceptance of Divine Revelation. Cfr. Rom. X, 9 sq.: ‘For if thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but Sknpvéare TO evayyérLoy. % Tohny kk ats 6 iva miorevonte Ort. 8 Acts VIII, 37. JUSTIFICATION 277 with the mouth confession is made unto salva- tion.” ° We must confess with the mouth and be- lieve with the heart. External profession and in- ternal faith go together and have for their com- mon object a certain truth open to our knowledge, uig.: the resurrection of Christ—a dogma in which the whole teaching of the atonement lies imbedded. The character of justifying faith is still more plainly evident from Heb. XI,6: “Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God [he that is to be justified], must believe that He is [the existence of God], and is a re- warder to them that seek Him.” *° The Apostle here clearly asserts both the necessity of justifying faith and the minimum of doctrine to be explicitly “believed,” vizg.: the existence of God and eternal retribution.** y) The Lutherans appeal chiefly to Matth. IX, 2, Luke Sevit to.) Rom. TV, 5;, and Heb. XU) Ty: (Butinot) a single one of these texts represents fiduciary faith as the instrumental cause of justification. The word ziotis occurs no less than eighty times in the Synoptic Gos- pels and in St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, but there are 9 Rom. X, 9 sq.: “ Quia si con- impossibile est placere Deo; credere fitearis in ore tuo Dominum Iesum et in corde tuo credideris quod Deus illum suscitaverit a mortuis, saluus eris. Corde enim creditur ad iusti- tiam, ore autem confessio fit ad sa- lutem.” 10 Heb, XI, 6: “ Sine fide autem enim oportet accedentem ad Deum [i. e. iustificandum] quia est [= exi- stentia Dei] et inquirentibus se remunerator sit.” x 11 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, PP. 39 Sq. 278 SANCTIFYING GRACE only six passages in which it could possibly be construed as synonymous with fiducia, and in none of these is the interpretation entirely certain. Not once does the New Testament employ ions in the sense of “ fiduciary faith,” ¢. e. a confident persuasion of one’s own righteous- ness.*? b) Tradition is in such perfect agreement with Scripture on this point that the Reformers did not venture to deny that their doctrine ran counter to the time-honored teaching of the Church. The Fathers unanimously insist on the necessity of dogmatic faith as a requisite of justification. a) St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, who is regarded as “ the best theologian of his time” (468-533),"* in his golden booklet De Fide seu de Regula Verae Fidei ad Petrum, says: “I rejoice that you take care to preserve the true faith without which conversion is useless, nay, im- possible. Apostolic authority tells us that we cannot please God without faith. For faith is the foundation of all good [works]; it is the beginning of human sal- vation, and without it no one can obtain a place among the children of God, because without it no one can ob- tain the grace of justification in this world or possess eternal life in the next.” 14 St. Fulgentius was a faith- esse conversio. Apostolica quippe dicit auctoritas, quia sine fide im- possibile est placere Deo. Fides 12 Murray, De Gratia, disp. 10, n. 18. Cfr. Becanus, De Gratia Habi- tuali, c. I, qu. 7, art. 6 sq.; Bel- larmine, De Justificatione, I, 5 saqq. 13 Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Pa- trology, p. 616, Freiburg and St. Louis 1908. 14 Prologus: ‘‘ Gaudeo quod pro fide vera sine ullo perfidiae vitio custodienda sollicitudinem geris, sine gua nulla potest prodesse, imo nec namque est bonorum omnium fun- damentum. Fides est humanae sa- lutis initium. Sine hac fide nemo ad filiorum Dei numerum potest per- venire, quia sine ipsa nec in hoc saeculo quisquam wustificationis gra- tiam consequitur nec in futuro possidebit vitam aeternam.” JUSTIFICATION 279 ful disciple of St. Augustine, and the whole trend of his treatise shows that by vera fides he understands not the Lutheran fiducia propriae «ustificationis, but Catholic belief in revealed truth. 8) This teaching is corroborated by the ancient practice of instructing the catechumens in the truths of revelation and requiring them to make a - public profession of faith before Baptism. It was because they believed and professed the true faith that the early Christians, who knew nothing of the Lutheran fides fiducialis, were called “faithful” (fideles, moro), to distinguish them from false believers or heretics (haeretici, aipytuot, from aipeiofar, to choose), who denied some portion or other of the orthodox creed. c) In analyzing the notions of fides and neces- sitas theologians distinguish between fides ex- plicita and fides implicita, and between necessitas medu and necessitas praecepti. Fides explicita is an express and fully developed be- lief in the truths of revelation ; fides implicita, a virtual be- lief in whatever may be contained in a dogma explicitly professed. I make an act of implicit faith when I say, for instance: “I believe whatever the Church teaches,” or: “I heartily accept whatever God has revealed.” The necessitas medii is based on the objective rela- tion of means to an end, and consequently binds all men, 15 On the traditional concepts of ldndischen Schriftausleger bis Luther “faith” and ‘‘justification’” as ber die Iustitia Dei und Iustificatio, held in the Church before Luther’s Mainz 1905. time, see Denifle, O. P., Die abend- 280 SANCTIFYING GRACE , even the ignorant and those who are in error without their own fault. Such, for example, is the necessity of the eye for seeing, of wings for flying, of grace for per- forming salutary acts, of the lumen gloriae for the beatific vision. The necessitas praeceptit, on the other hand, is founded entirely on the will of God, who posi- tively commands or forbids under pain of grievous sin, but is willing to condone non-compliance with his pre- cepts when it is owing to guiltless ignorance. This ap- plies to all positive divine precepts, e.g. the law of fasting and abstinence. It is to be noted that the necessitas medu always involves the necessitas praecepti, because God must needs will and impose upon us by positive precept whatever is objectively necessary as a means of salva- tion. a) The first question that arises with regard to this twofold faith and necessity is: Are sinners preparing for justification, and the faithful in gen- eral, obliged by necessity of precept to believe ex- plicitly all revealed truths? The answer is, No; because this is practically impossible, and God does not demand the impossible. Generally speaking, it is sufficient to have an explicit knowledge of, and give one’s firm assent to, the more important dogmas and moral precepts —the twelve ar- ticles of the Apostles’ Creed, the Commandments of God and the Church, the Sacraments (as needed), and the Our Father. All other revealed truths need be held only fide implicita.* More is of course demanded of educated 16 Cfr. Mark XVI, 15 sq.; Gal. I, 6 sqq.; Tit. III, 10 sq. . JUSTIFICATION 281 persons and those who are in duty bound to instruct others, such as priests and teachers.17 8) A more important and more difficult ques- tion is this: Are there any dogmas, and if so how many, which must be believed by all men fide explicita and necessitate medii? St. Paul says: “Without faith it is impossible to please God, for he that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” #8 With but few exceptions,?® Catholic theologians main- tain that the Apostle in this passage means theological faith, based upon supernatural motives. This interpre- tation is borne out by the context, by such parallel texts as John IIT, 11 sqq., 32 sqq., 2 Tim. I, 12, 1 John V, 9 sq., and by the decisions of several councils.2° There can be no reasonable doubt that all men, to be justified and saved, must have an explicit belief in at least two dogmas, viz.: the existence of God and eternal retribution. Pope Innocent XI condemned the Jansenist proposition that ex- plicit belief in divine retribution is not necessary for salvation.?+ 17 Cfr, St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 7: “ Post tem- pus autem gratiae revelatae tam maiores quam minores tenentur [necessitate praecepti] habere fidem explicitam de mysteriis Christi, prae- cipue quantum ad ea, quae com- muniter in Ecclesia solemnizantur et bublice proponuntur, sicut sunt arti- culi Incarnationis, . , . Alias autem subtiles considerationes circa Incar- nationis ‘articulos tenentur aliqui magis vel minus explicite credere, secundum quod convenit statui et officio uniuscuiusque.” This point is well developed by Ballerini, Opus Theologicum Morale, ed. D. Pal- mieri, Vol. II, grd ed., pp. 9 saq., Prati 1898. 18 Heb. XI, 6. 19 Chiefly Andrew Vega, Ripalda, and some modern -writers, 20 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 6; Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 3, V. supra, pp. 182 sqaq. 21“ Nonnisi fides unius Ded ne- cessaria videtur necessitate medii, non autem explicita remuneratoris.” Prop. Damn. ab Innocenti XI., prop. 22, in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. HEyze 282 SANCTIFYING GRACE Are there any other dogmas which must be explicitly believed necessitate medii? The only dogmas which might come in question are: the Trinity, the Incarnation, the immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The last-mentioned two may be omitted from the list, be- cause St. Paul does not mention them,”? and for the addi- tional reason that belief in immortality is included in the dogma of eternal retribution, while the necessity of grace is inseparably bound up with the dogma of Divine Provi- dence, which in its turn is but a particular aspect of eternal retribution.22 Hence the only two dogmas in re- gard to which the question at the beginning of this para- graph can reasonably be asked, are the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation. Theologians are divided in the matter. Some main- tain that no human being can or could ever be saved without explicit belief in both the Trinity and the Incarna- tion. Others24 hold that this necessitas medu did not exist under the Old Covenant. A third school * avers that no such necessity can be proved either for the Old or the New Dispensation. The first of these three opinions is excessively rigorous and intrinsically improbable. The Jews had no clearly re- vealed knowledge of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and consequently were under no obligation to believe them. As the divinely constituted guardians of the Messianic prophecies, they were bound to believe in the Redeemer, 22 Heb. XI, 6. 23 Cfr, Wirceburg., De Gratia, n. 120: “Quia tamen qui credit et sperat remuneratorem supernatu- ralem, satis hoc ipso etiam credit ani- mae perpetuitatem et necessitatem auxilii melioris ad salutem, fides horum explicita et per distinctos conceptus non semper in re et ac- tualiter necessaria existimatur.” 24 Gregory of Valentia, Becanus, Thomas Sanchez, and many Thom- ists, number of other theologians. 25 Suarez, De Lugo, and a large Ni JUSTIFICATION 283 though only necessitate praeceptt. The gentiles were dis- pensed even from this. The second opinion, which limits the necessitas medit to the New Testament, lacks solid proof. The Scrip- ture texts cited in its support merely prove the effica- ciousness of belief in Christ,’ or the duty of embrac- ing that belief on the strength of the Apostolic preach- ing,*” or, finally, the impossibility of redemption except through the mediation of Jesus; ?&—all truths which in themselves have nothing to do with the question under discussion. The third and most probable opinion is that even un- der the New Covenant, explicit faith in Christ, and a fortiori in the Divine Trinity, cannot be regarded as an indispensable medium of justification and salvation, (1) because St. Paul does not mention these two dogmas in the decisive passage, Heb. XI, 6; and (2) because a supernatural act of justifying love and contrition may be | inspired by belief in the existence of God and divine retribution; and (3) because this latter belief implicitly, by way of desire (fides in voto), includes belief in Christ and the Trinity.2® Nevertheless it must be held that an adult who desires to be received into the Church and is baptized in the name of the Most Holy Trinity, is bound to believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation by more than a mere necessitas praecepti, namely, by what is tech- nically called necessitas medii per accidens, a necessity from which God dispenses only in exceptional cases, 26 Cfr. Rom. III, 22, salvatt absque fide mediatoris, quia, 27 Cfr. John III, 18. etsi non habuerunt fidem explicitam, 28 Cfr, Acts IV, 12. habuerunt tamen fidem implicitam 29 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., in divina providentia, credentes 2a z2a€, qu. 2, art. 7, ad 3: “St Deum esse liberatorem hominum se- qui salvati fuerunt, quibus reve- cundum modos sibi placitos,”’ Jatio non fuit facta, non fuerunt 284 SANCTIFYING GRACE when it is either physically or morally impossible to elicit an act of explicit faith *° It is for this reason that the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office decided, February 28, 1703, that missionaries are bound to explain a to all adult converts who have the use of reason, even though they be near death, those mysteries of the faith which are necessary for salvation necessitate medi, espe- cially the Trinity and the Incarnation.** 80 The practical bearing of this question on the heathens is treated supra, pp. 179 sad. 31 Missionarium teneri adulto etiam moribundo, qui incapax omnino non sit, explicare fidei mysteria, quae sunt necessaria necessitate medii, ut sunt praecipue mysteria Trinitatis et Incarnationis.” Cfr, Prop. Damn. ab Innocentio XI. a. 1679, prop. 64 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1214). For a full explanation — of the topics treated in the present Section consult Suarez, De Fide, disp. 12, sect. 4; De Lugo, De Fide, ag disp. 12, sect. 4 sq.; W. Liese, Der heilsnotwendige Glaube, Freiburg 1902, SECTION 2 THE NECESSITY OF OTHER PREPARATORY ACTS BESIDES FAITH I, HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHurRcH.—Martin Luther, to quiet his con- science, evolved the notion that faith alone justi- fies and that the Catholic doctrine of the necessity of good works is pharisaical and derogatory to the merits of Jesus Christ. This teaching was incorporated into the symbolic books of the Lu- therans* and adopted by Calvin. It has been called one of the two basic errors of Pro- testantism. The Tridentine Council solemnly condemns it as follows: “If anyone saith that by faith alone the impious is justified, in such wise as to mean that nothing else is required to cooperate in order to obtain the grace of justification, and that it is not in any way necessary that he be pre- pared and disposed by the movement of his own a Ctr Sold. Deéclar., art. .-3: Neque contritio neque dilectio neque ulia virtus, sed sola fides [= fiducia] est medium et instru- 2 Instit., III, 11, § 19: ‘“* Dicimus hominem solaé fide iustificari.”? For a classic exposition of the Lutheran mentum, quo gratiam Dei, merita Christi et remissionem peccatorum apprehendere possumus.” and Calvinistic views of faith, see Mohler, Symbolik, § 16; English tr. by James Burton Robertson, 5th ed., London 1906, pp. 124 sqq. 285 286 SANCTIFYING GRACE will; let him be anathema.” * Other acts that — dispose or prepare the soul for justification, ac- — cording to the same Council, are: the fear of divine justice; hope in God’s mercy; charity, which is the font of all righteousness; detestation of sin, and penitence.* } 2. REFUTATION OF THE SOLA FIDES THEORY.— — The Lutheran theory involves an open rupture 4 with the traditional teaching of the Church and — is positively unscriptural. Luther himself felt : this, as appears from his interpolation of the word q “alone” in Rom. III, 28 and his rejection of the — entire canonical Epistle of St. James.° 4 a) The teaching of the Bible in regard to the 4 role played by good works in the process of justi- — fication may be summarized as follows: _ (1) A man may believe all that the Church — teaches and yet be lost for want of good works or because he has not the love of God; conse- — quently, faith alone does not justify or insure | eternal salvation. Our Divine Saviour Himself — declares: ‘‘Not every one that saith to me, Lord, | Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but — he that doeth the will of my Father who is in 3Sess. VI, can. 9: “Si quis anathema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bann- dixerit, sola fide impium iustificari, wart, n. 819.) : - ita ut intelligat nihil aliud requirt 4 Sess. VI, cap. 6. The passage quod ad iustificationis gratiam con- is quoted infra, p. 296. q sequendam cooperetur et nulla ex 5 He contemptuously called it “ em — parte necesse esse, eum suae volun- stroherne Epistel,”’ a letter of straw. © tatis motu praeparari atque dispont, y JUSTIFICATION 287 heaven, he shall enter into the kingdom of Heaven. -*° St. James sayss..° Do. you mot -see that by works a man is justified, and not by faith Only?) Andyst-Pauly lt) should: have-all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.” § (2) Besides faith, justification requires certain other preparatory or dispositive acts. There is, for example, the fear of divine justice. Cfr. Ecclus. I, 28: ‘He that is without fear cannot be justified.” ° Also, hope in God’s mercy. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 24: “For we are saved by hope.” *° eavcain, ~Charity. “Cir. Luke VII, 47:0 “Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much.” ** Furthermore, contrition or penitence. Cir. Luke XIII, 3: “Unless you shall do pen- ance, you shall all likewise perish.” *? Finally, good works in general. Cfr. St. James II, 17: “So faith also, if it have not works, is dead in itself.” ** ‘No one who ponders these and similar 6 Matth. VII, 21: ‘Non omnis, (dydrnv) autem non habuero, nihil qui dicit mihi, Domine, Domine, in- trabit in regnum caelorum: sed qui facit voluntatem Patris mei, qui in caelis est, ipse intrabit in regnum caelorum.” 7 Jas. II, 24: “ Videtis quoniam ex operibus tustificatur homo, et non ex fide tantum (é& Epywv Sixarovrat dvOpwros, Kal ovK ék mlarews povov).”. 81 Cor. XIII, 2: “ Et si habuero omnem fidem (rdcoav rhv lori), ita ut montes transferam, caritatem sum,” 9 Ecclus. I, 28: “ Qui sine timore est, non poterit imustificari.”’ 10 Rom. VIII, 24: “Spe enim salut factt sumus,” 11 Luke VII, 47: ei peccata mutta, dilexit multum.”’ 12 Luke XIII, 3: “Nist poeni- tentiam habueritis, omnes similiter peribitis.’”’ 18 Jac. IJ, 17: “ Fides, si non habet opera, mortua est in semet- ipso.” © Remittuntur quoniam § (rt) 288 SANCTIFYING GRACE texts can maintain, as Calvin and Melanchthon did, that the good works mentioned merely ace a company justification, for they are unmistakably — described as causes which dispose and prepare the — sinner for it. q (3) Itis not faith alone that justifies, but faith | informed and actuated by charity. Cfr. Gal. V, 6: “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth | anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that — worketh by charity.” * The Greek text shows a that the word operatur in the Vulgate must be 4 taken passively, so that a more correct translation | would be: “. . . but faith effected or formed by : charity.” But even if évepyounémm were used as a de-_ ponent (évepyeiofu—agere, operart) the meaning — would be substantially the same, i. e. a dead faith, — without charity, avails nothing. Cfr. St. James II, 26: “For even as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead,” *=aam In Rom. III, 28: ‘ For we account a man to be jus-— tified by faith, without the works of the law,” *® Luther deliberately inserted the word “ alone.’ The context shows that this is a falsification. The Apostle contrasts | justifying faith, not with those preparatory acts of salva- tion which spring from it, but with the sterile “ works of 14Gal. V, 6: “In Christo Iesu pus sine spiritu mortuum est, tta et neque circumcisio aliquid valet fides sine operibus mortwa est.” . neque praeputium, sed fides quae per 16 Rom. III, 28: “ Arbitramur— caritatem operatur (mloris OV aryd- enim hominem iustificarit per fidem ans évepyouuern).”’ sine operibus legis.” 15 Jac. Il, 26: “ Sicut enim cor- JUSTIFICATION 289 the law” (7. e. the Old Testament), which, as such, possessed no more power to justify than the good works of the heathen. Keeping this contrast in mind, it would not be incorrect to say, and St. Paul might well have said, that “ supernatural faith alone (i. e. only) jus- tifies, while the works of the law do not.” But if faith be taken in contradistinction to the other acts operative in the process of justification, such as fear, hope, contrition, love,— and this is the sense in which Luther takes it,— then it is false and contrary to the mind of St. Paul to say: “Faith alone justifies, nothing else is required.” For in this sense faith is merely the beginning, the foundation, the root of justification and cannot justify the sinner until it has absorbed the other preparatory acts re- quired by Holy Scripture and transformed them into per- fect love. This fact was already pointed out by St. Au- gustine. ‘“ Unintelligent persons,” he says, “ with regard to the Apostle’s statement: ‘We conclude that a man is justified by faith without the works of the law,’ have thought him to mean that faith is sufficient for a man, even if he leads a bad life and has no good deeds to al- lege. It is impossible that such a character should be deemed ‘a vessel of election’ by the Apostle, who, after — declaring that ‘in Christ Jesus neither circumcision avail- eth anything nor uncircumcision,’ adds the important remark: ‘but faith that worketh by charity.’ It is such faith which separates the faithful children of God from unclean devils,— for even these ‘ believe and tremble,’ as the Apostle James says, but they do no good works. Therefore they possess not the faith by which the just man lives,—the faith which operates through love in such wise that God recompenses it according to its works with eternal life.” 17 17 De Fide et Lib. Arbitrio, c. 7, n. 18. j 290 SANCTIFYING GRACE There is another sense in which faith alone may be said to justify, viz.: if the term be taken to include all those things which God has ordained for our salvation, that is to say, the sum-total of “ revelation “or othe true religion”? as opposed to “ heresy.” The term ziotis (fides) is sometimes employed in this sense by the Fa-- thers, but never in Sacred Scripture.” b) There is a unanimous and unbroken tradi- tion in favor of the Catholic doctrine. St. Poly- 4 carp writes in his Epistle to the Philippians: — “the faith (mons) given you, which is — the mother of us all when hope (és) fol- — lows and love (éy4™) goes before.” St. Au- : gustine teaches that while faith is per se separable - . from hope and love, it is ineffective without them. 4 “Man begins with faith, but the demons, too, be- lieve and tremble; to faith, therefore, must be-3 added hope, and to hope, love.” ** And again: “Without love, faith can indeed exist, but it avail-"@ St. Gregory the Great, para- _ phrasing St. James, says: “Perhaps some one will — say to himself: I have believed, I shall be saved. — He speaks truly if he sustains faith by works. For that is true faith which does not contradict by _ deeds what it asserts in words. | 99 21 eth nothing. 18On the misinterpretation of other Scripture texts by the Reform- ers see Bellarmine, De Iustificatione, I, 19-24. 19 Ep. ad Philipp., 3. 20 Serm., XVI, c. 6: “A fide incipit homo, sed et daemones cre- 92 22 dunt et contremiscunt; adde ergo — fidei spem speique ipsi adde carita- — tem.” - a 21 De Trinit., XXV, 18: “Sine caritate quippe fides potest quidem — esse, sed non et prodesse.” 22 Hom. in. Evang. 29: “Pomme JUSTIFICATION 291 c) This teaching is in perfect conformity with reason. a) No supernatural enlightenment is needed to perceive the intrinsic propriety of a moral prep- aration for justification. Not only must the sin- ner learn to know God as His supernatural end and the source of all righteousness, but he must also be persuaded that it is his duty, with the help of sufficient grace, to direct his will towards this final end. Every tendency or movement presupposes a terminus a quo, from which it starts, and a terminus ad quem, to which it tends. The movement of the will in the process of justification, besides faith, demands a volun- tary withdrawal from sin (contrition, good resolutions ) and an approach to righteousness (hope, love, desire) .”* This argument would have made no impression on Luther, since he bluntly denied free-will in the moral or- der and regarded human nature as so radically depraved by original sin as to be incapable of codperating with di- vine grace. In fact he compared man to a “log, stick or stone.” This view was shared by Amsdorf, Flacius, statu. peccati in statum iustitiae. ... Unde oportet quod mens hu- tasse unusquisque apud semetipsum dicat: Ego iam credidi, salvus ero. Verum dicit, si fidem operibus tenet. Vera etenim fides est, quae in hoc quod verbis dicit moribus non con- tradicit.? As to the sense in which some of the Fathers speak of faith as the only thing that can save men, cfr. Bellarmine De Iustificat., I, 26. 23 Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum- moa-Eheol., 1a 2ae, qu. 113, \art. 5: “ Tustificatio impu est quidam motus, quo humana mens movetur a Deo a mana, dum iustificatur, per motum liberi arbitrit recedat a peccato et ac- cedat ad wstitiam. Recessus autem et accessus in motu liberi arbitru accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium. , . . Oportet igitur quod in iustificatione impit sit motus liberi arbitrii duplex: unus quo per desi- derium tendat in Dei iustitiam, et alius quo detestetur peccatum.” 202 SANCTIFYING GRACE and others, whereas Osiander and Butzer admitted that “inherent righteousness ”’ is at least a partial factor in jus- tification. Melanchthon, in an endeavor to reconcile the contradictions of this discordant system, unwittingly gave rise to the so-called Synergist dispute. When Pfef- finger °4 undertook the defence of free-will, many Luth- eran theologians, especially of the University of Jena, boldly attacked the log-stick-and-stone theory * and tried to force their adversaries to admit that man is able to codperate with grace. The “ Half-Melanchthonians,’ — as they were called, succeeded in smuggling Synergism & into the “ Book of Torgau;”?* but before the “ For- mulary of Concord” was finally printed in the monastery al of Bergen, near Magdeburg. (A. D..1577),. the - stricta Lutherans had eliminated that article as heterodox and _ substituted for it the log-stick-and-stone theory as it — appears in the official symbols of the Lutheran Church. ~ In the Syncretist dispute, and through the efforts of ~ the Pietists, this harsh teaching was afterwards mod-° _ erated. But .what probably contributed most to the crumbling of the system was the rapid growth of So- cinianism and Rationalism among the Lutherans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To-day, with the — exception of a small band of “orthodox” Lutherans in _ Saxony and the United States, Protestants no longer hold — the log-stick-and-stone theory. The school of Luther pro- _ claimed it as the distinguishing tenet of Protestantism, as — “the criterion of a standing or falling church,” ?7— and by this criterion the Lutheran Church has indeed fallen. Common sense has led modern Protestants to admit that — 24De Libertate Voluntatis Hu- 26“ Das Torgische Buch,’ A.D. | 4 manae, Leipzig 1555. 1576, 25. “ Klotz-, Stock- und Stein- 27° Articulus stantis et cadentis theorie.”’ ecclesiae.”’” Cfr. Newman, Lectures on Justification, p. 113. JUSTIFICATION 203 contrition and penance are quite as necessary for justifi- cation as faith, an opinion which, in the words of Dor- ner,28 “ comes dangerously near the Catholic system.” In Scandinavia, according to Dr. Krogh-Tonning,”® the Luth- eran Church has experienced a “ quiet reformation” and now unconsciously defends the Catholic doctrine of jus- tification.*° B) As the sufficiency of the Bible without Tradition is the formal principle of “orthodox”’ Protestantism, so justification by faith alone may be said to be its material principle. The ab- surdity of the Lutheran position is evident from the fact that these two principles are mutually destructive. So far from teaching justification by faith alone, the Bible inculcates the exact con- trary, while its sufficiency as the source of faith could be proved from its own pages, if at all, only by a vicious circle.** Thus the whole Protestant system is based on contradiction. The sola fides theory is open to serious objection also from the ethical point of view. It cannot be put into practice without grave danger. “Sin lustily,” writes Luther, “but be yet more lusty in faith.’*? The first 28 Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, p. 583, Miinchen 1867. »29 Die Gnadenlehre und die stille Reformation, Christiania 1894. Not long after writing this book Dr. Krogh-Tonning became a Catholic. 30 How Luther came to adopt the sola fides theory is exhaustively explained by H. Grisar, S. J., Luther, Vol. I, Freiburg 1911; Eng- lish tr., Vols, I and Il, London 1913. Cfr, also F. Hettinger, Die Krisis des Christentums, pp. 72 saq., Frei- burg 1881. - 31 Cfr. Pohle, art. on ‘“* Tradi- tion’? in Herder’s Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed., Vol. XI, 1933 sqq., Frei- burg 1899. F 32 “ Pecca fortiter, crede fortius.” Cfr, Mohler, Symbolism (English tis. Pitgo)s 204 SANCTIFYING GRACE part at least of this injunction was promptly obeyed by his followers, and the rapid deterioration of morals which followed was but a natural sequel of the sola fides theory. If faith alone were sufficient for justification, it would make no difference what kind of life a man led, for unbelief, 7. ¢. the loss of fiduciary faith, would be the only sin. No wonder this ethical antinomism of the Lutheran system, so radically opposed to the teaching of St. James, was rejected by Hugo Grotius, George Buller, and other honest Protestants. Another weighty objection against the Lutheran theory of justification is that it disregards the law of causation. According to Luther a man is justified by the firm be- lief and trust that his sins are forgiven. This “ belief ” is either true or false. If it is false, I can have no certainty with regard to my salvation, but am deceiving ; myself. If true, it presupposes that which it is to ef- fect, in other words, it puts the cause before the effect. An orthodox Lutheran theologian of the old school would probably retort: My sins are actually forgiven by virtue of the atonement, because all men without exception are re- deemed through the merits of Jesus Christ. If this be, true, then why not be consistent and say: All men are justified because all are redeemed, consequently there is no need of faith and sacraments, and keeping the commandments is a matter of indifference! It is at this point that the incompatibility of Luther’s teaching with the Bible and sound ethics becomes most glaringly ap- parent. True, Luther himself at times emphasized the ne- cessity of good works; but this merely proves that he had lucid intervals when his honest nature rebelled against the _ inconsistency of his teaching.** | iN 33 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- §455, Mainz 1899. The ** ortho- matische Theologie, Vol. VIII, dox” Lutheran teaching is strongly JUSTIFICATION 295 3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE. —The Council of Trent assigned to faith its proper place in the process of justification,®* and gave a luminous and profound analysis of the process itself.’? Scholastic theology, in elaborat- ing the teaching of Scripture and Tradition, drew a distinction between fides formata, which truly justifies, and fides informis, which falls short of justification. a) As regards the intrinsic relation of (dogmatic) faith to other preparatory acts in the process of jus- tification, the Tridentine Council declares: ‘‘ Faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and the root of all justification.” °° Supernatural faith, therefore, is the beginning of salvation, and not, as Harnack makes Luther say, “at once the beginning, the middle, and the. end,” because no man can be converted unless he has believingly embraced God as his final goal. This faith is preceded by certain preliminary conditions, of which the first is an illumination of the intellect and a strengthening of the will, which results in the affectus credulitatis (imtia fidet). For justifying faith does not flash forth suddenly, like a deus ex machina, but requires time for its development, as the history of many conversions proves.*? Faith is called the ‘“ foundation” of justification be- cause it not only marks its beginning, but constitutes the basis upon which all subsequent stages of the process rest. stated by the famous convert Dr. 85 Sess. VI, cap. 6. Edw. Preuss in his work, still re- 86 Sess. VI, cap. 8: “ Fides est garded as a classic by “orthodox” humanae salutis initium, fundamen- Lutherans, Die Rechtfertigung des tum et radix omnis iustificationis.” Siinders vor Gott, Berlin 1868. (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 801.) 84 Sess. VI, cap. 8. - 37 V. supra, pp. 100 sq. 2096 SANCTIFYING GRACE To exclude the mistaken notion that the process of justification is a series of mechanical and disconnected acts, the Council calls faith the “root” of justification, from which the other preparatory acts spring organically, as the trunk of a tree from its root. The psychological description of the whole process given by the Tridentine Fathers, which even Harnack ad- mits to be “a masterly piece of work,” runs as follows: “ Now they [adults] are disposed unto justice when, ex- cited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith by _ hearing, they are freely moved towards God, believing _ those things to be true which God has revealed and — promised,— and this especially, that God justifies the im- Bo pious by His grace through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ; and when, understanding themselves to be sinners, they, by turning themselves from the fear of # divine justice, whereby they are profitably agitated, to consider the mercy of God, are raised unto hope, con-- - fiding that God will be propitious to them for Christ's @& sake; and they begin to love Him as the fountain of all _ justice, and are therefore moved against sins by a cer-am tain hatred and detestation, to wit: by that penitence — which must be performed before Baptism; lastly, when _ they purpose to receive Baptism, to begin a new life, and 7 to keep the commandments of God. . . 38 Sess. VI, cap. 6: “ Disponun- tur autem ad ipsam iustitiam, dum excitati divind gratia et adiuti, idem ex auditu concipientes, libere moven- tur in Deum, credentes vera esse, quae divinitus revelata et promissa sunt, atque illud in primis, a Deo justificari impium per gratiam eius, per vredemptionem, quae est in Christo Iesu, et dum peccatores sé | esse intelligentes, a divinae iustitiae timore, quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad 2788 The fourm considerandam Dei misericordiam se convertendo, in spem eriguntur fiden- tes, Deum sibi propter Christum propitium fore, illumque tamquam omnis iustitiae fontem diligere inct- piunt: ac propterea moventur ad-— versus peccata per odium aliquod et detestationem, hoc est, per eam poent- tentiam, quam ante baptismum agi oportet: denique dum proponunt sus- cipere baptismum, inchoare novam — vitam et servare divina mandata.” JUSTIFICATION 207 ordinary stages in the process of justification, therefore, are: (1) From faith to fear of divine justice; (2) from fear to hope; (3) from hope to initial love;*® (4) from initial love to contrition and a firm purpose of amendment.*” If contrition is dictated and transfused by perfect love,** and the sinner has an explicit or at least implicit desire for the Sacrament,*? justification takes place at once. If, on the other hand, the sinner’s sorrow is imperfect (attritio), he attains justification only by actual reception of the Sacrament (Baptism or Pen- ance) .*3 b) Does conversion always follow this conciliary schema? No. The Council did not mean to define that these acts must follow one another in strict sequence or that they are one and all absolutely indispensable for jus- tification. It is certain, however, that the process invar- jably begins with faith and ends with contrition accom- panied by a firm purpose of amendment. In exceptional cases (@. g. the Prodigal Son, Mary Magdalen) per- fect charity seems immediately to follow faith, and may then be said virtually to include the intermediate stages of fear, hope, and contrition. Yet this is not the usual way. Ordinarily faith elicits fear, which in turn produces two kinds of hope — hope of forgiveness (spes veniae) and hope in God (spes theologica), which marks the beginning of charity (amor concupiscentiae). Con- trition is always a conditio sine qua non, because there can be no forgiveness of sin without sorrow for it.44 It 44 Cfr, Ez, XVIII, 30; Joel IL, 12; Luke XHI,° 33-Acts. TI,, 38. Cir. Conc. Trid., Sess. XIV, cap. 4: 39“ Diligere incipiunt.” ibid.) _ 40 Contritio cum proposito novae vitae, 41 Contritio caritate perfecta. 42 Votum sacramenti, sacramentum in voto. 43 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 4 and 14, “ Gontritio, quae primum locum inter dictos poenitentis actus habet, animi dolor ac detestatio est de peccato commisso cum proposito non pec- candi de cetero, Fuit autem quovis 298 SANCTIFYING GRACE is for this reason that, according to St. Thomas, explicit 4 contrition for mortal sins is necessary for justification even when there is perfect charity, and the sufficiency of the so-called poenitentia virtualis is limited to venial of- fenses and such grievous sins as cannot be remembered.*® Fear, while not absolutely indispensable, is seldom absent. Holy Scripture tells us that “the fear of God is the be- ginning of wisdom,” and it is natural for the sinner seek- ing forgiveness to detest his sins out of fear of divine © justice before he attains to the motive of perfect char- 4 MY c) Certain utterances of Scripture and the Fathers with regard to the possibility of a “dead” faith have led. # theologians to distinguish between fides informis and fides formata. Fides informis is a dead faith, devoid of char- — ity, and without justifying power. The only faith that can justify a man is that which is animated by charity and productive of good works.** This is the fides formata of — the Schoolmen, which includes all the preparatory acts enumerated by the Tridentine Council, from fear to per- : fect charity. These acts, however, though united in the — fides formata, retain their respective independence, and — can disappear singly, one after another, as they came. — Zwingli’s assertion that faith, hope, and charity are iden- | tical, or at least inseparable, has been expressly con- © tempore ad impetrandam veniam pec- catorum hic contritionis motus ne- cessarius.” 45 Cfr. Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 87, art. 1: “ Exigitur autem ad remis- sionem peccati mortalis perfectior poenitentia, ut scil. homo actualiter peccatum mortale commissum dete- stetur, quantum in ipso est, ut scil, diligentiam adhibeat ad memorandum singula peccata mortalia, ut singula detestetur. Sed hoc non requiritur ad -remissionem venialium peccato- — rum. ... Unde sequitur quod requi- — ratur quaedam virtualis displicentia, — .. quod tamen non sufficit ad re- — missionem peccati mortalis, nisi — quantum ad peccata oblita post dili- — gentem inquisitionem.” 46 Cfr, Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. TII, pp. 204 sqq., Paris 1896. 47 Fides mortua in contradistinc- — tion to fides viva. 48 Gal. V, 6. JUSTIFICATION 299 demned by the Tridentine Council : “ If any one saith that, grace being lost through sin, faith also is always lost with it; or that the faith which remains, though it be no live faith, is not a true faith; or that he who has faith without charity is not a Christian; let him be anathema.” 4° READINGS : — Besides the respective chapters in the various text-books, the student may consult: * A, Vega, De Iustificatione Doctrina Universa Libris XV Absolute Tradita, Venice 1548 (reprinted at Cologne, 1572),—* Bellarmine, De Iustificatione Impu, 1. V (ed. Feévre, Vol. VI, PP. 149 sqq. Paris 1873).— *Suarez, De Gratia, 1. VI sqq.— Becanus, Theol. Scholast., “ De Gratia Habituali,’? Rouen 1658.—L. Nussbaum, Die Lehre der kath. Kirche tiber die Rechtfertigung, Minchen 1837.—C. von Schatzler, Neue Untersuchungen iiber das Dogma von der Gnade und das Wesen des christl. Glaubens, Mainz 1867.— Oswald, Die Lehre von der Heiligung, § 5, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.— B. Bart- mann, St. Paulus und St. Jakobus und die Rechtfertigung, Frei- burg 1897— L. Galey, La Foi et les Oeuvres, Montauban 1902.— W. Liese, Der heilsnotwendige Glaube, sein Begriff und Inhalt, Freiburg 1902.—Card. Newman, Lectures on the Doctrine of Jus- tification, 8th impression, London 1900.— Hugh Pope, O. P., art. “Faith” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V.— J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists (tr. by A. M. Bu- chanan), pp. 150 sqq., New York 1914.— L. Labauche, S. S., God and Man, pp. 203 sqq., N. Y. Ig16, : On the teaching of the Reformers cfr. * Mohler, Symbolik, § 18 sqq., 11th ed. Mainz 1890 (English tr. by James Burton Robertson, pp. 82 sqq., 5th ed., London 1906); Ad. Harnack, _ Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, Vol. III, 4th ed., Freiburg 1910; Denifle-Weiss, O. P., Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Ent- wicklung, Vol. II, Mainz 1909; H. Grisar, S. J., Luther, Vol. I, Freiburg 1911 (English tr., Vols. I and II, London 1913). 49 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 28: non esse Christianum, anathema sit,” “Si quis dixerit, amissé per pec- (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 838.) The catum gratia simul et fidem semper Scriptural argument for this thesis amitti aut fidem, quae remanet, non is developed by Bellarmine, De esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva, Iustificatione, I, 15, aut eum qui fidem sine caritate habet, CHAPTER. II THE STATE OF JUSTIFICATION Though the term “ justification” may be extended to the preparatory acts that lead up to the state of justice, 4 strictly speaking it signifies only that decisive moment in which the sinner is cleansed from mortal sin by an infu- sion of sanctifying grace. Hence a careful distinction _ must be made between justification as an act (actus iustifi- cationis) and justification as an habitual state (habitus — iustificationis s. status gratiae sanctificantis). The tran- sient act introduces a permanent state, just as the Sacra- ment of Holy Orders constitutes a man in the sacerdotal state or priesthood. = Both as an act and as a state justification possesses — three distinct properties; it is uncertain, unequal, and — capable of being lost. This gives us the basis for a division of the — present Chapter into three Sections: (1) On ~ the Nature of Justification, (2) On Justifying, 7. e. Sanctifying Grace, and (3) On the Properties of that Grace. ; 300 SECTION? THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION Justification in the active sense (iustificatio, dixatwors) is defined by the Tridentine Council as “a translation from that state wherein man is born a child of the first Adam, to the state of grace and of the adoption of the sons of God through the sec- ond Adam, Jesus Christ, our Saviour.” ? Justification, therefore, has both a negative and a positive element. The positive element is interior sanc- tification through the merits of Jesus Christ. The nega- tive element consists in the forgiveness of sin. Though these elements are objectively inseparable, the forgive- ness of sin being practically an effect of interior sanctifica- tion, yet we must treat them separately in order to be able to refute more effectively the Lutheran heresy that sin is not wiped out but merely “ covered,” and that justi- fication consists in an external “ imputation ” of the right- eousness of Christ. 1 Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 4: et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secun- “ Iustificatio impii [est] translatio dum Adam Iesum Christum Salva- ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur torem nostrum.”’ (Denzinger-Bann- filius primi Adae, in statum gratiae wart, n. 796.) ~ 301 302 SANCTIFYING GRACE ARTICLE Rod THE NEGATIVE ELEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION | I. THE HERESY OF THE PROTESTANT REFORM- ERS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—LUt- ther held that human nature was radically de- praved by original sin ? and that justification con- sists in this, that sin (original and mortal) is no longer “imputed” to the sinner; that is to say, it is not blotted out but merely “covered” by the - merits of Christ. 4 a) Forgiveness of sins, therefore, according to Luther, consists simply in their being no longer imputed.* This _ heresy was incorporated in the Formula of Concord and i* other symbolical books of the Lutheran Church, and sub- sequently adopted by Calvin.® . b) The Catholic Church has always maintained — | that justification is a renewal of the soul by which 2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- thor of Nature and the Supernat- ural, pp. 221 sq. 8 Cfr. the second on “the list of Lutheran propositions condemned by Leo.uX, : A.D. 15207. In puero post baptismum negare remanens peccatum est Paulum et Christum simul conculcare.”’ (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 742.) 4:Porn.. Cones, . peo 2y~ Coes “ Quando autem docemus, quod per operationem Spiritus Sancti regene- ramur et iustificamur, non ita acci- piendum est quod iustificatis et rena- tis nulla prorsus iniustitia substan- tiae ipsorum et conversation adhae- reat, sed quod Christus perfectissima — obedientiad sud omnia ipsorum pec- — cata tegat, quae quidem in natura infixa haerent. ipsa Nihilominus tamen per fidem propter obedientiam Christi boni et insti pronuntiantur et reputantur, etiamsi ratione cor- — ruptae naturae suae sint maneantque y peccatores, dum mortale hoc or’ circumferunt.” 5 Antid. Conc. Trid., ad Sess. V: “Manet vere peccatum in nobis neque per baptismum statim uno die — extinguitur.” Cfr. Mohler, Symbo- — lik, §14 (Robertson’s translation, — sth ed., pp. 110 sqq.). JUSTIFICATION 303 a man’s sins are blotted out and he becomes truly just. This applies first of all to original sin. “If,” says the Council of Trent, “anyone denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only raised or not imputed, let him be anathema.” *® What it here defines in regard to original sin, the Council else- where reaffirms in respect of mortal sin.’ 2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY.— The theory thus solemnly condemned by the Tri- dentine Fathers is unscriptural and opposed to Catholic Tradition. | a) The teaching of the Bible on this point may be reduced to four distinct heads. _. (1) The remission of sin granted in the process of justification is a real annihilation of guilt; that is to say, the sins remitted cease to exist in the moral (though not, of course, in the historical) order. Cfr. Ps. L, 3: “ Have mercy on me, O God, according to thy great mercy; and according to the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my iniquity.”* Is. XLIII, 25: “I am tantum. radi aut non imputari, ana- thema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, 6 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 5: “Si quis per Iesu Christi D. N. gratiam, quae in baptismate confer- tur, reatum originalis peccati remitti negat aut etiam asserit, non tolli totum id quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet, sed illud dicit n. 792.) 7 Sess. VI, cap.. 14; Sess. XIV, cap. 2. See Pohle-Preuss, The Sac- raments, Vol. II, Penance. 8“ Dele iniquitatem meam,” 304 SANCTIFYING GRACE he that blot out thy iniquities.’® After God has blotted out a sin, it no longer exists. Cfr. Is. XLIV, 22: “1 have blotted out thy iniquities as a cloud, and thy sins as a mist.”2° Acts III, 19: “Be penitent, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.” * Elsewhere God is said to “take away” sin. Cir. 2 Kings XII, 13: “The Lord also hath taken away thy sin.” 2 1 Paral. XXI, 8: “I beseech thee, take away the iniquity of thy servant.’** When He takes away sin, it is really and truly blotted out. Cfr. Mich. VII, 18 sq.: “ Who is a God like to thee, who takest away in- iquity? .. . He will put away our iniquities, and he will | cast all our sins into the bottom of the sea.’** Ps. X,_ 15: “ His sin shall be sought, and shall not be found.” * Ps Cli, 12s As farvas the east is irom the west, so far hath he removed our iniquities from us.” ** Conse-— quently, when our Divine Saviour said of Mary Mag- — dalen: “ Many sins are forgiven her,” *’ He meant that her sins were completely blotted out and taken away. — (2) Justification washes the soul from iniquity and © purifies the heart. Cfr. Ps. L, 4: “ Wash me yet more . from my iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin;s See 16: “ Wash yourselves, be clean.” 1° After one’s sins are 9Is, XLIII, 25: “ Ego sum ipse, quitates nostras et proticiet im pro- qui deleo iniquitates tuas.” 10Is, XLIV, 22: “Delevi ut nubem iniquitates tuas et quasi nebulam peccata tua.” 41 Acts III, 19: “ Poenitemini igitur et convertimini, ut deleantur peccata vestra.” 122 Kings XII, 13: “ Dominus quoque transtulit peccatum tuum.” 181 Paral. XXI, 8: ““ Obsecro, aufer iniquitatem servi tui.” 14 Mich. VII, 18 sq.: “ Quis, Deus, similis tui, qui aufers ini- quitatem? ... Deponet [Deus] int- fundum maris omnia peccata no- stra.” 1) Sah 1 Sis tum illius, et non invenietur.” - 16 Ps, CII, 12: “ Quantum distat ortus ab occidente, longe fecit a nobis iniquitates nostras.” “7 Ruke Webl 47: ei peccata multa.” 18 Ps, L, 4: “ Amplius lava me ab iniquitate mea et a. peccato — meo munda me.” — 181s... .06's estote.” “ LTavamini, mundi — “ Quaeretur pecca- “ Remittuntur JUSTIFICATION 305 washed away, the heart is clean and pure. Cfr. Ez. XXXVI, 25 sq.: “ And I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness, .. . and I will give you a new heart.”?° 1 Cor, VI, 11: “And such [fornicators, etc.] some of you were; but you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are justified.” ° Spotless purity takes the place of the im- purity that previously defiled the soul of the sinner. Cfr. Ps. L, 9: “ Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, and I shall be cleansed: thou shalt wash me, and I shall be nade whiter than snow.’ 2? Is. I, 18: “If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made as white as snow: and if they be red as crimson, they shall be white as wool.” 23 No trace of sin remains in the soul after it has been washed in the Precious Blood of Christ. Apoc. I, 5°... Jesus Christ, . ... hath loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood.” 24 1 Johncl, ye ia. the blood of Jesus ‘Christ . .. cleanséth us from allasiny )2° (3) Justification is an awakening of the sinner from death to life, a transition from darkness to light: Cir I John III, 14: “ We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren ; he that loveth not, abideth in death.” Col. II, 13: “ And you, when 20 Ez. XXXVI, 25 sq.: “Effun- vestra ut coccinum, quasi nix deal- dam super vos aquam mundam et babuntur, et si fuerint rubra quasi mundabiminit ab omnibus inquina- vermiculus, velut lana alba erunt.” mentis vestris.... Et dabo vobis 24Apoc. I, 5: “. .. dilexit ‘nos cor novum.” et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in san- 2iz2- ‘Cor, VI, 31: “Et haec guine suo.’ ~ quidam [fornicarii etc.] fuistis, sed 251 John I, 7: “Sanguis Iesu abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis, sed Christi... emundat nos ab omni iustificati estis.” peccato.” 22 Ps. L, 9: “ Asperges me hys- 261 John III, 14: “ Translati sopo et mundabor, lavabis me et su- sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam per nivem dealbabor.” diligimus fratres: qui non diligit, 23qs, I, 18: “Si fuevint peccata manet in morte,” 306 SANCTIFYING GRACE you were dead in your sins, . . . he hath quickened to- gether with him, forgiving you all offences.” *7 Eph. V, — . 8: “ For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lords ay 4 | (4) Baptism, in particular, completely removes all — guilt. Cfr. Acts XXII, 16: “Rise up, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins.’ ?° Hence, though concupis- a cence remains, the soul has no longer in it anything damnable, 7. e. any trace of original or mortal sin. Cfr. — Rom. VIII, 1: “ There is now therefore no condemna- y tion to them that are in Christ Jesus.” °° It requires no special acuteness to perceive that this Biblical teaching is irreconcilably opposed to — the Protestant theory of non-imputation. If, as a the Lutherans allege, God merely declared the be- liever just, justification would not blot out or = take away sin, nor could it be truthfully said — that light and life take the place of death and 4 darkness; something deserving of condemnation — would still remain in those that are in Christ Jesus.** There are a few Scriptural texts that seem to favor — the Lutheran view, but they must be interpreted in con- — formity with the general teaching of the Bible as out- ~ g0Rom. VIII, 1: “Nihil ergo nunc damnationis est tis, qui sunt in Christo Iesu.” Cfr, on this point — 27 Col. II, 13: “ Et vos, quum mortui essetis in delictis, .. ..con- vivificavit cum illo donans vobis omnia delicta.” 28Eph. V, 8: “ Eratis enim ali- quando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in Domino,” 29 Acts XXII, 16: “Exsurge et baptizare et ablue peccata tua.” the dogmatic treatise on the Sacra- — ment of Baptism. 31 Cfr. Becanus, Theol. Scholast., — P. TI, te §, Cap. Ty que: Zs i JUSTEBICA TION 307 lined above. Among these texts is Ps. XXXI, 1 sq.: “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin, and in whose spirit there is no guile.” ** The parallelism apparent in this verse allows us to conclude that “covered” is used in the sense of “remitted” and that “he to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin” is identical with the man “in whose spirit there is no guile.” The text manifestly refers to a real forgiveness of sins, for any sin that God “covers” and ceases to “ impute,’ must be blotted out and swept away, because “all things are naked and open to the eyes” of the omniscient Creator.** Another favorite text of the Lutheran theologians is Rom. VII, 17: “ Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.”’** This passage clearly re- fers to concupiscence, which remains in the sinner after justification, but, according to Rom. VIII, 1 and James I, 14 sq., is not truly and properly sin but merely called “sin” *> by metonymy, “ because,’ in the words of the Tridentine Council, “ it is of sin and inclines to sin.” 34 S2.Psiy AMX, ©. Sq.:. “ Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates et quorum tecta sunt peccata; beatus vir cut non imputavit Dominus pec- catum nec est in spiritu eius dolus.’’ 33 Heb. IV, 13. Cfr. St. Augus- tine,. Enarr, im Ps., II, 31, n.° 12: “ Deus tegat vulnera, noli tu. Nam si tu tegere volueris erubescens, medicus non curabit. Medicus tegat et curet; emplastro enim tegit. Sub tegmine medici curatur vulnus, sub tegmine vulnerati celatur vulnus.’’ 84 Rom. VII, 17: “ Nunc autem tam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum.” 35 Peccatum, duapria. Binoesss5 “Vjin Cat. Bs. 6°.) eg peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat.” Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, Pp. 242 sqq., 261 sqq. On Jas, I, 14 sq.. St. Augustine observes: “Profecto in his verbis partus a pariente discernitur, Pariens enim est concupiscentia, partus peccatum. Sed concupiscentia non parit nisi conceperit, nec concipit nisi illexerit, h. e. ad malum. perpetrandum ob- tinuerit volentis assensum. Quod ergo adversus eam dimicamur, hoc agitur, ne concipiat pariatque pecca- tum.’ (Contra Iulian., VI, 15, 47.) For a more exhaustive discussion of this subject see Bellarmine, De Justf., LI, ‘gs 308 - SANCTIFYING GRACE b) The Fathers of the Church, both Greek and — Latin, unanimously teach that justification effects the forgiveness of sins. | St. Justin Martyr says: “ By doing penance, all who desire it can obtain mercy from God, and Scripture calls them blessed in saying: ‘ Blessed is he to whom God hath not imputed sin,’ which means that he receives forgive- ness of his sins from God, not as you, deceiving your- selves, and others like you aver, that God does not im- J pute [their]: sin to them, though they are [still] sinners.” *” Clement of Alexandria likens Baptism to “a bath in — which sins are washed off.” °8 St. Gregory Nazianzen says: “It is called Baptism [Bamropds, from Bdrrew, to immerse] because the sin is buried in water, ... and a bath (Aourpdv), because it washes off.” * St. Augustine — indignantly opposes the erroneous opinion of the Pe- lagians that Baptism does not take away sins but merely © 4 “trims them off.” “Who but an unbeliever,” he ex- claims, “can affirm this against the Pelagians? We say, © r therefore, that Baptism gives remission of all sins and takes away crimes, not merely trims them off (radere) in such wise that the roots of all sins may be preserved in an evil flesh, as of hair trimmed on the head, when the sins cut down may grow again.’*° Pope St. Gregory the Great seems almost to have foreseen the heresy of the Protestant Reformers, for he says: “ But if there are any who say that in Baptism sins are for- 87 Dial. c. Tryph., n. 141. indulgentiam peccatorum et auferre — 38 Strom., 1. II. crimina, non radere; nec ut omnium 89 Or., 40. peccatorum radices in mala carne 40 Contra Duas Epistolas Pela- teneantur, quasi rasorum in capite gian., I, 13, 26: “ Quis hoc adver- capillorum, unde crescunt iterum — sus Pelagianos nisi infidelis afirmet? resecanda peccata,” Dicimus ergo baptisma dare omnium JUSTIFICATION 309 given as to outward appearance only, what can be more un-Catholic than such preaching? . . . He who says that sins are not completely forgiven in Baptism might as well say that the Egyptians did not perish in the Red Sea. But if he admits that the Egyptians actually died [in the Red Sea], let him also admit that of necessity sins completely die in Baptism.” # c) The theological argument may be briefly formu- lated as follows: We can imagine but two reasons why God should not truly forgive us our sins in the process of justification: inability and unwillingness. To say that He is unable to forgive us our sins would be to assert that the remission of sin involves a metaphysical im- possibility. This no Protestant will admit, because all believe that “nothing defiled shall enter into heaven.” *? To assert that God is unwilling to forgive our sins would be to contradict the plain teaching of Scripture, as set forth above. Consequently there is no reason whatever for assuming that God does not truly forgive us our sins in the process of justification. Furthermore, it would be incompatible with His veracity and holiness to assume that He merely declares the sinner to be “ free from sin,” without actually cleansing his soul. It would be a con- tradiction to assert that a man whom the truthful and all- holy God has declared free from sin, remains steeped in iniquity. Cir. Prov. XVII, 15: “ He that justifieth the 41Ep., 1, 11, ep. 48: “Si qui tismate funditus mori.’ Other con- vero sunt qui dicunt, peccata in firmatory texts apud Alb. a Bul- baptismate superficie tenus dimitti, sano, Instit. Theol. Dogmat. Spe- quid est hac praedicatione infi- cialis, ed. P. Gottfr. a Graun, O. delius? ... Qui dicit peccata in Cap., Vol. II, pp. 226 sq., Inns- baptismate funditus non dimitti, bruck 18094. dicat in mari rubro Aegyptios non 42 Apoc.. XXI, 27: “Non. in- veraciter mortuos. Si autem fate- trabit in coelum aliquod coinqui- tur, Aegyptios veraciter mortuos, fa- natum,” teatur necesse est, peccata in bap- 310 SANCTIFYING GRACE wicked [i. e. absolves him from his sins], and he that con- _ demneth the just, both are abominable before God.” According to Revelation the justification of the sinner a is not a mere change, with a privation for its terminus a quo ** and an indifferent form for its terminus ad quem, but involves a movement from extreme to extreme, and hence the genesis of the one extreme must coincide with | the destruction of the other. Sin, being in contrary oppo- sition to righteousness, must depart when righteousness enters the soul,*4 AR LICE THE POSITIVE ELEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION 1. HERETICAL. ERRORS: AND THE .CHURCH:— Calvin held that justification consists essentially | and exclusively in the remission of sins.’ The other “Reformers” maintained that there must also be a positive element in the process, but — differed in determining its nature. a) The ambiguous language employed by Luther and Melanchthon gave rise to many different opinions, which agreed only in one point, that is, in holding, contrary to Catholic teaching, that the positive ele- ment of justification is not inward sanctification or in- | herent righteousness (7. e. sanctifying grace). Prob- | ably the view most common among the supporters of the Augsburg Confession was that the sinner, by a “fiduciary apprehension ” of God’s mercy, as proclaimed — 48 Privatio, orépnots. 1Cfr. Bellarmine, De Iustifica- 4 44 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, tione, II, 1 and 6, qu. 28, art. 1 sqq.; Ipem, Summa Theol., 1a seae;, qu. 113, art. “2. JUSTIFICATION 311 in the Gospel, “apprehends” the extrinsic justice of Christ, and with it covers his sins, which are there- upon no longer “imputed” to him. In other words, he is outwardly accounted and declared righteous in the sight of God, though inwardly he remains a sinner. With the exception of “ sola fides” there was probably no shibboleth in the sixteenth century so _ persistently dinned into the ears of Catholics and Protestants alike as “iustitia Christi extra nos?’ It is found in the Apologia written in defence of the Augsburg Confession ?- and recurs in the Formula of Concord.’ According to the “orthodox” Lutheran view, therefore, justification on its positive side is a purely forensic and outward imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which the sinner seizes with the arm of faith and puts on like a cloak to hide the wounds of his soul.* b) Against this dismal heresy the Tridentine Council solemnly declared that “Justification . . . 1s not remission of sins merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man through the voluntary reception of the grace and of the gifts,’® and anathematized all those 2Apol. Confess. August., c. 3, 4 The Lutheran doctrine is fully art. 6: “ Iustificare vero hoc loco and lucidly set forth by Dr. Edward (Rom. VIII, 1) forensi consuetu- Preuss in his work, Die Rechtferti- dine significat reum absolvere et pronuntiare iustum, sed propter alienam iustitiam, videl. Christi, quae aliena iustitia nobis communicatur per fidem,’”’ 8 Solida Declar., III, “De Fide Tustif.,” § 11: “Vocabulum iusti- gung des Siinders vor Gott (Berlin 1868), which he retracted at his conversion, in 1872, Cfr. also New- man’s Lectures on Justification, Lec- ture I (8th impression, London 1900). 5 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “ Iustificatio ficationis in hoc negotio significat iustum ‘pronuntiare, a peccatis et aeternis peccatorum supplictis absol- vere propter iustitiam Christi, quae a Deo fidei imputatur.” non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio in- terioris hominis per voluntariam sus- ceptionem gratiae et donorum,..” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799.) 312 _ SANCTIFYING GRACE who say that “men are justified either by © the sole imputation of the justice of Christ or by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion. of the grace and the charity which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Ghost and is inherent in them, or even that the grace whereby we are justified is only the favor of God.” ® In thus defining the doctrine of the Church, the Coun- cil did not, however, mean to deny that the sinner is 7 in a true sense “ justified by the justice of Christ,’—in _ so far namely, as our Lord has merited for us the — grace of justification. He merely wished to emphasize the _ fact that a sinner is not formaliter justified by the imputa- tion of Christ’s justice. For the sake of greater clearness _ the various “causes” of justification are enumerated as follows: “Of this justification the causes are these: _ the final cause indeed is the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, and life everlasting; while the efficient cause is — a merciful God, who washes and sanctifies gratuitously; . . . but the meritorious cause is His most beloved only- | begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, who ... merited © justification for us by His most holy Passion on the ~ wood of the Cross; ... the instrumental cause is the © Sacrament of Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, — without which no man was ever justified; lastly, the | sole formal cause is the justice of God, not that where- — by He Himself is just, but that whereby He maketh us | just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed are re-_ 6@Sess. VI, can. rr: “Si quis per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur dixerit, homines iustificari vel solé atque illis inhaereat, aut etiam gra- imputatione iustitiae Christi vel sold tiam qua iustificamur esse tantum — peccatorum remissione, exclusé gratia favorem Dei, anathema sit.” (Den- et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum zinger-Bannwart, n. 821.) pUS TIFICATION 313 newed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only reputed, but are truly called, and are, just.” 7 So important did the distinction between the causa meritoria and the causa formalis of justification appear to the Fathers of Trent, that they made it the subject of a separate canon, to wit: “If anyone saith that men are just without the justice of Christ, whereby He merited for us to be justified; or that it is by that jus- tice itself that they are formally just; let him be anath- ema.” ° Justification in the Catholic sense, therefore, is not a mere outward imputation of the justice of Christ, but a true inward renewal and sanctification wrought by a grace intrinsically inhering in the soul. This grace theologians call the “ grace of justification.” 2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY OF IMPUTATION.—Nothing is so foreign to both the spirit and the letter of Holy Scripture as the idea that justification merely covers a man’s sins with a cloak of justice and leaves him unsanctified within. Justification is described in the Bible not only as a remission of sins,° but likewise as the begin- 7Sess. VI, cap. 7: “ Huius iu- Stificationis causae sunt: formalis quidem gloria Dei et Christi ac vita aeterna; efficiens vero misericors Deus, qui gratuito abluit et sanctifi- cat; ... meritoria autem dilectissi- mus Unigenitus suus D. N. TIesus Christus, qui... sud sanctissima passione in ligno crucis nobis iusti- ficationem meruit; . .. instrumen- talis item sacramentum baptismi, quod est sacramentum fidei, sine qua nullt unquam contigit _tustificatio ; demum unica formalis causa est iustitia Dei, non qua ipse iustus est, sed qua@ nos iustos facit, qua videl. ab eo donati renovamur spiritu men- tks nostrae et non modo reputamur, sed vere iusti nominamur et su- mus.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799). 8 Sess. VI, can. 10: “Si quis dixerit, homines sine Christi iustitia, per quam nobis merutt iustificari aut ber eam ipsam formaliter iustos_ esse, anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 820.) 9V. supra, Article 1, 314 SANCTIFYING GRACE ning of a new life,!° a renewal of the spirit,* a new creation,’? a regeneration,*® a supernatural — likeness of God,'* etc. All these similes point to_ a permanent state of sanctity in the soul of the just. a) The Lutheran theory of imputation can be most of effectively refuted by an analysis of the Scriptural term “regeneration” (regeneratio, dvayévvyos, madvyye- “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost,” says our Divine Lord, “he cannot _ enter into the kingdom of God.” * This spiritual rebirth. 7 wipes out sin and inwardly sanctifies the soul. The re- | generate sinner receives a new and godlike nature. That vecia ) . this nature can be conceived in no other way than asa state of sanctity and justice appears clearly from Tit. III, — 5 sqq.: “ Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy, He saved us, by the laver of — 4 regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, whom he ~ t hath poured forth upon us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour: that, being justified by His grace, we — may be heirs, according to the hope of life everlasting.” *° Both text and context show that the Apostle is here speak- — ing of the justification of adult sinners in Baptism, which — he describes as a “ laver of regeneration and renovation” — 10\Cfr.’ Eph; TI, 53Gok \1fia35 2 John III, 14. ‘ 14-Cfr, Eph. FV,.2374sq. 42 Cfir2 Cor. .V,973Gak: VI; 8: Jas lous Ber ba. earule a 48:Cfr:fohn 111,55; Tit TIES. 14:‘Cfr; “Rom. VAIIl; 29; 2 Cor, TD eS a 52h Pet. jh. lake 15:John ATT, 5; A6-Mit. o LLL; 8 saq?: os) Newose™: operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit (€swoev huas) per bkavacrum regenerationis et reno- vationis (dua AvTpov madvyyeve clas Kal dvakawwwocews) Spiritus — Sancti, quem effudit (é&éyeev) im nos abunde per Iesum Christum Sal- | vatorem nostrum, ut ‘iustificatt — (SixawwOévres) gratia ipsius haeredes — simus secundum spem vitae aeter-— nae.” JUSTIFICATION 315 resulting in an “ outpouring of the Holy Ghost.” These phrases plainly denote a positive quality of the soul as well as a permanent interior grace. Regeneration consists in the remission of sin through Baptism, and also, more particularly, in man being made like God, 7. e. becom- ing a child of God,’’ while “ renovation” means “ put- ting off the old man” ?® and “ putting on the new.” ? The “outpouring of the Holy Ghost” effected by Bap- tism is not, of course, an outpouring of the Hypostasis of the Third Person of the Trinity, but of created grace, which re-forms the sinner and makes him just.*° This justifying grace must not be conceived as an actual grace, much less as a series of actual graces, for it is not given us merely as an aid in the performance of some particular act, but as a new nature. Regenera- tion and renovation denote a state of being, as we can plainly see in the case of baptized infants. It is for this reason that the Apostle speaks of it as a lasting state ; — that which theologians call the status gratiae sanctifi- cantis,?4 Closely akin to the notion of “regeneration” is that of “re-creation.” Justification renews the sinner inwardly and makes of him, so to speak, a new creature, which has sloughed off sin and become just and holy in the sight of God. Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 17: “If then any be in Christ a new creature, the old things are passed away, behold all things are made new.” 2? This is all the more true since re-creation effects an “incorporation of man 17 Cfr. John I, 12 sq.; Rom, VIII, eration” in the Catholic Encyclope- 16; Gal. III, 7; IV, 6sq.; 1 John dia, Vol. XII, and A. Rademacher, TEP Ty, Die iibernatirliche Lebensordnung 18 Cir. Eph, ‘IV, 22 .sqa. nach der paulinischen und johannei- 19 Cir. (Cols) TIE, 9 :éq. schen Theologie, pp. 41 sqq., Frei- 20 Cfr. Acts II, 38; X, 45 sqq.; burg 1903. Om.) V5.8: 222 Cor. V, 17: “Si qua ergo 21 Cfr. J. Pohle, article “Regen- in Christo nova creatura (kawn 316 SANCTIFYING GRACE with Christ,” and is closely connected with “regenera- tion of God.” Cfr. James I, 18: “ For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth, that we might be some beginning of his creature.’’?* A comparison with Gal. VI, 15 and Gal. V, 6 fully establishes it as a Biblical truth that in the process of justification the sin- ner, through faith informed by charity, is changed into a new creature. “ For in Christ Jesus,’ says St. Paul, — “neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircum- a cision, but a new creature.’24 And again: “In Christ — Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncir- cumcision, but faith that worketh by charity.” ?° In both 4 these texts the Jewish rite of circumcision is rejected a as useless and contrasted with justification, which by means of the fides formata gives birth to a “new crea- — ture.” This is incompatible with the Protestant notion — that a man is justified by being declared righteous in the , sight of God, though he remains inwardly unchanged.** — 8B) The Lutherans vainly appeal to the fact that — Holy Scripture employs the word “justify” ** for — the purpose of declaring a man to be just in a — purely forensic sense, as in Is. V, 23: “Who jus- i tify the wicked for gifts.” This proves nothing — ““Nam in Christo — xrlow); vetera transierunt; ecce 26: Gals, 6% facta sunt omnia nova.’ Cfr. Eph. JTesw neque circumcisio aliquid valet — LE ero neque praeputium, sed fides quae 23 Jac. I, 18: “ Voluntarie enim per caritatem M dalhitewo (rloris 50 genuit (amextnoev) nos verbo veri- tatis, ut simus initium aliquod crea- turae eius.”’ 24Gal. VI, 15: “In Christo enim Tesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque praeputium, sed nova crea- iura (kawwh xriots).” aydrns évepyoupevn).” i 26 On the argument from Rom V, 15 sqq. cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God — the Author of Nature and the Sun i pernatural, pp. 247 sqq. ” 27 Iustificare, diKarovy. JUSTIFICATION 317 tirely on texts that exclude the judicial meaning of the term and plainly refer to inward sanctifica- tion.”® The word “ justification” also occurs in two other meanings in the Bible. Ps. CXVIII, 8 and 26 it stands in the plural for the “law”: “I will keep thy justifica- tions;” °° and “Teach me thy justifications.” ®° Apoc. XXII, 11 and in a few other passages it signifies “growth” in interior holiness, which theologians call tustificatio secunda.** The Lutherans are equally unfortunate in maintain- ing that St. Paul countenances their theory when he speaks) Of)” putting. on* Christ.) Cir. Gal) TL): 27: “ For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ.”*? The Apostle in employing this simile does not mean to say that justification consists in putting on an outward cloak of grace to cover sins which inwardly endure, but precisely the contrary, vig.: that the sinner by being justified is inwardly cleansed from sin and becomes a new creature and a child of God. This interpretation is supported by various parallel texts % and by the staple of St. Paul’s teaching. Another passage which the Lutherans cite in their favor is 1 Cor. I, 30: “. . . who [Christ Jesus] of God is made unto us wisdom, and justice, and sanctifica- tion, and redemption.” ** Christ is made unto us jus- 28. EB. -g., Rom. V3. 15 -sqq... and Gal. III, 8 sqq. 29) Ps. CX VIL, 82 tiones tuas custodiam.” 30) PSK iC XVILI (26 '9))2)6 me iustificationes tuas,’? 31 Apoc. XXII, 11: “ Qui tustus est, tustificetur adhuc, et sanctus sanctificetur adhuc.” On the dif- [ustifica- aeaoce / ferent meanings of the term justi- fication in Scripture see Bellarmine, De \fastificg TS ay eFi Aes 32 Gal. Ti, 275 enim in Christo Christum induistis.’ 83 Cfr. Eph. IV, 22 sqq.; Col. III, 8 sqq. 84.1 Cor, I; 30: * Quicunque baptizati estis, “Qui factus est 318 SANCTIFYING GRACE tice and sanctification, in what sense? Manifestly in the same sense in which He is made unto us wisdom of God, that is to say, in so far as He imparts to us wisdom, which thereupon becomes our own, but not in the sense that the wisdom of Christ is outwardly im- puted to us. Note that St. Paul in this and many other passages of his Epistles merely wishes to emphasize the gratuity of the Redemption and of grace to the exclusion of all natural merit on the part of man.* b) As regards the teaching of the Fathers, the “Reformers” themselves admitted that it was against them.*° We read in the Epistle of Barnabas, which was probably composed about A.D. 100:*" “Since then He made us new by the remission of sins, he made us another type, that we should have the soul of children, as though He were creating us afresh.” . The reason why St. Paul calls Baptism the “laver of regeneration” rather than the laver of forgiveness, is explained by St. John Chrysos- _ tom *8 as follows: “Because it [Baptism] not — only remits our sins and wipes out our misdeeds, but accomplishes all this in such a way as if we ~ nobis sapientia a Deo et iustitia ad sanctificationem refert, qua in (Stxaoctvn) et sanctificatio (arye aguds) et redemptio.” 35 Other objections are refuted by Bellarmine, De Iustif., II, 9 saa. 36 Cfr. Calvin, Instit., III, 11, § 15: “Ac nec Augustini quidem sententia recipienda est, qui gratiam vitae novitatem per Spiritum Sane- tum regeneramur.” a 37 On the Epistle of Barnabas _ see Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, — p. 24. The passage quoted will be | found Ep. Barn., VI, 11. 4 38 Hom. ad Illumin., I, n. 3. JUSTIFICATION 310 were born anew; °° for it entirely re-creates and re-forms us.” *° St. Ambrose regards innocence as the positive element of justification: “After this [2. e. Bap- tism] you received a white robe, to indicate that you stripped off the vesture of sin and put on the chaste garments of innocence.” *? Harnack claims that St. Augustine first stemmed the current dogmatic tradition and reshaped it by going back to St. Paul. Bellarmine *? refuted this audacious assertion long before it was rehashed by the German rationalist. The Council of Trent was so thoroughly imbued with the teaching of Augustine that its decrees and canons on justification read as though they were lifted bodily from his writings. The great “Doctor of Grace” flatly contradicts the Protestant theory of imputa- tion in stich utterances as these: “He [St. Paul] does not say, ‘the righteousness of man,’ ... but ‘ the righteousness of God,— meaning not that whereby He is Himself righteous, but that with which He endows man when, He justifies the ungodly. . . . The righteous- ness of God is by faith of Jesus Christ, that is, by the faith wherewith one believes in Christ. For here is not meant the faith with which Christ Himself believes, just as there was not meant the righteousness whereby God is Himself righteous. Both no doubt are ours; but yet they are called [in one case] God’s, and [in the other] Christ’s, because it is by their bounty that these 39 ws av el dvwhev éyerviOnuev. post baptismum], ut sint indicium 40 Kat yap dvwhev Huds Snut- quod exueris involucrum peccati, in- oupyel Kal KaTaoKevdter. dueris innocentiae casta velamina.” 41De Myst., c 7:3 “ Accepisti 42 De Iustific., II, 8. post haec vestimenta candida [scil. 320 SANCTIFYING GRACE gifts are bestowed upon man.” ** Again: “ When righteousness is given to us, it is not called our own righteousness, but God’s, because it becomes ours only so that we have it from God.” ** Again: “The grace of God is called the righteousness of God through our Lord Jesus Christ, not that by which the Lord is just, but that by which He justifies those whom from un- righteous He makes righteous.” ** Again: “The love of God! is said to be shed abroad in our hearts, not be- cause He loves us, but because He makes us lovers of Himself; just as the righteousness of God is used in the sense of our being made righteous by His gift.’*° Ac- cording to St. Augustine, therefore, justification culmi- nates in a true sanctification of the soul. “‘ When he [St. Paul] says: ‘We are transformed into the same image,’ he assuredly means to speak of the image of God; and by calling it ‘the same,’ he means that very image which we see in the glass, . . . and that we pass from a form that is obscure to a form that is bright, . .. and this [human] nature, being the most excellent among things — created, is changed from a form that is defaced into a form that is beautiful, when it is justified by its Creator from ungodliness.” 47 43 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 9, i. 1s: “Non dicit iustitia hominis, sed iustitia Dei, non qua Deus justus est; sed qua induit hominem, quum iustificat impium. . . Iustitia autem Dei per fidem eee Christi, hoc est, per fidem qua creditur im Christum. Sicut autem ista fides Christi dicta est, non qua credtt Christus, sic et illa iustitia Det, non qué iustus est Deus. Utrumque enim nostrum est; sed ideo Det et Christi dicuntur, quod eius nobis largitate donatur.” 44 De Gratia Christi, c. 13: “ St data est nobis iustitia, non dicitur justitia nostra, sed Dei, quia sic fit nostra, ut sit nobis ex Deo.” 45 Serm., 131: “‘ Dei gratia per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum iustitia Dei dicitur, non quad iustus est Dominus, sed qua iustificat eos, quos ex imptis iustos facit.” f 46 De Spir. et Lit., c. 32, n. 5627 “Caritas Dei dicta est diffundi in — cordibus nostris, non qua ipse nos — diligit, sed qué nos facit dilectores — suos, sicut iustitia Dei, qua nos insti i eius munere efficimur.” 47 De Trinit., XV, 8, 14: = ae Quod 2 JUSTIFICATION 321 The Augustinian passages which we have quoted (and they are not by any means all that could be quoted) enumerate the distinguishing marks of sanctifying grace in so far as it is the formal cause of justification.** c) The argument from Revelation can be rein- forced by certain philosophical considerations which show the absurdity of the imputation theory from the standpoint of common sense. A man outwardly justified but inwardly a sinner would be a moral monster, and Almighty God would be guilty of an intrinsic contradiction were He to re- gard and treat such a one as just. This contradiction is not removed but rather intensified by the Lutheran ap- peal to the extraneous justice of Christ.‘ The incongruity of the Lutheran doctrine of justifica- tion becomes fully apparent from the consequences. which it involves, to wit: (1) all Christians without distinction would possess exactly the same degree of sanctity and justice; (2) justification once obtained by fiduciary faith could not be lost except by the sin of unbelief; and (3) children would not be justified by Baptism because they are not sufficiently advanced in the use of reason to enable them to “apprehend” the external righteousness of Christ. The first of these in- vero att: (2 Cor. III, 18): ‘In eandem imaginem transformamur,’ utique imaginem Dei vult intellegi, eandem dicens istam ipsam, scil., quam speculamur ... atque transi- 48 Other Patristic texts can be seen in Ripalda, De Ente Supernat., disp. 132, sect. .7; Petavius, De Trinit., VIII, 4-7; Bellarmine, De Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio, I, 4. mus de forma obscura in formam lucidam. ... Quae = natura [hu- mana] in rebus creatis excellentis- sima, quum a suo Creatore ab impi- etate iustificatur, a deformi forma formosam transfertur in formam.” 49 For a more detailed treatment of this point we must refer the reader to Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- mat, Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 537 sqq. 322 ~~ +SANCTIFYING GRACE ferences runs counter to common sense and experience. The second, which Luther clothed in the shameful exhor- tation, “ Pecca fortiter et crede fortius et mhil nocebunt centum homicidia et mille stupra,” °° is repugnant to the | ; teaching of Scripture and destructive of morality.** The third consistently led to the rejection of infant baptism by the Anabaptists, the Mennonites, and other Protestant Sects, 3. SANCTIFYING GRACE THE SOLE ForMAL — Cause oF JustiFIcATion.—In declaring that “in- — herent grace” is the “sole formal cause of justifi- — cation,’ the Council of Trent °’ defined it as an q article of faith that sanctifying grace of itself is — able to produce all the formal effects of justifica- _ tion, e. g. forgiveness of sins, the sanctification of 3 the sinner, his adoption by God, etc.,’’ and con- — sequently requires no supplementary or contribu- — tory causes. In other words, justification is _ wholly and fully accomplished by the infusion of — sanctifying grace. a) It appears from the discussions preceding its sixth — session that the Tridentine Council not only meant — to condemn the heretical contention of Butzer that “in-_ herent grace’? must be supplemented by the “ imputed — justice of Christ ” as the really essential factor of justifi- cation,®+ but also wished to reject the view of divers con-_ temporary Catholic theologians ** that “ intrinsic right-_ 50 Quoted by De Wette, II, 37. 54 Cfr. Bellarmine, De Iustific., 51V. infra, Section 3. i iy ya | 52 Sess. IV, cap. 7. 55 Seripando, Albertus Pighius, | 583 V, infra, Sect. 2, Art. 2. Gropper, and others. #4 JUSTIFICATION a3 eousness”’ is inadequate to effect justification without a special favor Dei externus.®® In this the Fathers of the Council were on Scriptural ground. The principal effects of justification,— forgiveness of sins and internal sancti- fication,— are both produced by sanctifying grace. Sa- cred Scripture is perfectly clear on this point. It repre- sents sin as opposed to grace in the same way in which darkness is opposed to light,*" life to death,°* the new man to the old.5®° The one necessarily excludes the other. Sanctifying grace and sin cannot co-exist in the same subject. Internal sanctification may be defined as a permanent, vital union with God, by which the soul becomes right- eous and holy in His sight and obtains a claim to Heaven. That this is also a function of sanctifying grace appears from those Scriptural texts which treat of the positive element of justification.°° With this doctrine Tradition is in perfect accord, and consequently the Fathers of Trent were right in teaching as they did, in fact they could not have taught otherwise.*? b) While all Catholic theologians admit the in- compatibility of grace and sin in the same subject, they differ as to the kind and degree of opposi- tion existing between the two. Some hold that ‘this opposition is purely moral, others that it is physical, again others that it is metaphysical. 56 On the discussion referred to 59 Eph. IV, 22 sqq.; Col. III, 9. in the text see Pallavicini, Hist. 60 V. supra, No. 2. Conc, Trad. Nie hit) 12s Aug, 61 On the history of the Triden- Theiner, Acta Genuina Concil. tine decree regarding justification Trid., tom. I, pp. 222 sqq., Leipzig cfr. J. Hefner, Die Entstehungs- 1874. geschichte des Trienter Rechtferti- Sip phi So i2n, Cory bw 14, 58'Col, 3) 13; 2 John ‘EI, 14. gungsdekretes, Paderborn 1909. 324 - SANCTIFYING GRACE a) Nominalists ® and Scotists® before the Triden- tine decision maintained that the distinction between sanctifying grace and (original or mortal) sin is based on a free decree of the Almighty, and therefore purely moral. God, they held, by a favor externus superad- ditus, externally supplies what sanctifying grace inter- nally lacks, just as a government’s stamp raises the value of a coin beyond the intrinsic worth of the bullion. Followed to its legitimate conclusions, this shallow theory means that sanctifying grace is of itself insuf- ficient to wipe out sin, and that, but for the super- added divine favor, grace and sin might co-exist in the soul. This is tantamount to saying that justification requires a twofold formal cause, vig.: sanctifying grace | and a favor Dei superadditus,— which runs counter to the teaching of Trent. Henno tries to escape this objec- tion by explaining that the favor Dei acceptans appertains not to the formal but merely to the efficient cause of justification. But this contention is manifestly untenable. Sanctifying grace is either able to wipe out sin, or it is unable: if it is unable to produce this effect, the favor Dei acceptans must be part of the causa formals of justification, and then, in Henno’s hypothesis, we should have a duplex causa formalis, which contradicts the Tridentine decree. If, on the other hand, sanctify- ing grace is able to wipe out sin without any favor su- peradditus, then the Scotistic theory has no raison d’étre. 8) From what we have said it follows that there must be at least a physical contrariety between grace and sin. The difference between physical and metaphysical opposition may be illustrated by the example of fire and water. These two elements are incompatible by a 62 Ockam, Gabriel Biel, e¢ al. 63 Henno, Mastrius, ef. al. JUSTIFICATION 325 law of nature. But as there is no metaphysical contra- diction between them, Almighty God could conceivably bring them together. It is this physical kind of opposi- tion that Suarez and a few of his followers assume to exist between grace and sin. Absolutely speaking, they say, there is no intrinsic contradiction in the assump- tion that God could preserve the physical entity of sanc- tifying grace in a soul guilty of mortal sin.** In so far as this school admits the existence of an internal opposition, which actually prevents original or mortal sin from ever co-existing in the soul with justifying grace, its teach- ing may be said to be acceptable to all Catholic theologians. The Scotistic view, on account of its incompatibility with the teaching of the Tridentine Council, is no longer held. It may be questioned, however, whether Suarez goes far enough in this matter, and whether the opposition between grace and sin could really be overcome by a miracle. The simultaneous co-existence of grace and sin seems to involve an absolute, 7. e. metaphysical, contra- diction. y) This is what the Thomists maintain with the ma- jority of Jesuit theologians.** As some subtle objections have been raised against this view, it cannot be accepted as theologically certain; but it undoubtedly corresponds better than its opposite to the spirit and letter of Scrip- ture. The Bible, as we have already pointed out, likens the opposition existing between grace and sin to that between life and death,®* justice and injustice, 64 Suarez, De Gratia, 1. VII, c. tiam im e0, qui peccavit, non re- 20, n 7: “... non obstante ill@ mittendo illi peccatum.’ oppositione et repugnantia connatu- 65 Vasquez, Sardagna, Antoine, vali potest Deus de su@ absoluté po- Mazzella, Tepe, et al. tentiG eam vincere et conservare gra- 66 Col. II, 13; 1 John III, 14. 326 SANCTIFYING GRACE Christ and Belial, God and an idol.®’ But these are contradictories, ergo.°§ The same conclusion can be reached by arguing from the character of sanctifying grace as a participatio divinae naturae.®® If grace is a participation in the divine nature, it must be opposed to sin in the same way in which God Himself is opposed to it. Now God as the All-Holy One is metaphysically op- posed to sin; consequently, the same kind of opposition must exist between sanctifying grace and sin. It is alleged against this teaching that between habitual grace and habitual sin there is merely a disparate oppo- sition, 1. e. that of a physical to a moral form, the con- cepts of which are not mutually exclusive. But sancti- fying grace is more than a physical ornament of the soul; it is an ethical form which has for its essential function to render the soul holy and righteous in the | sight of God."° READINGS: — St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 113, and the commentators, especially Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 7, art. 1 sqq.; *Bellarmine, De Justificatione, 1. Il (Opera Ommia, ed. Févre, Vol. VI, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1873). Besides the current text-books cfr. *Jos. Wieser, S. Pauli Apostoli Doctrina de Iustificatione, Trent 1874; H. Th. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, and ed., § 33 sqq. Freiburg 1883. On the Protestant notion of justification cfr. Mohler, Sym- 67 2 Cor. VI, 14 sqq. 68 Cfr. 1 John III, 9: “ Omnis, qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius (orép- ie avrou) 1% eo manet et non potest peccare (ob Stvarar amapTa- yew), quoniam ex Deo natus est.” 69 V, infra, Sect. 2, Art. 1. 70 For the solution of other dif- ficulties consult Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol sovill spp. whole subject of this subdivision cfr. Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 7, art. 2 152 sqq. On the sq. On certain incidental questions, é. g. whether justification takes place in instanti, whether the infu- sion of sanctifying grace in ordine naturae precedes or follows the for- giveness of sins, whether justifica- tion is the greatest of God’s works, whether it is to be regarded as a miracle, etc., see St. Thomas, Sum- ma Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 113, art. 7-103 cfr. also Scheeben, Die Mysterien des Christentums, 3rd ed., pp. 543 sqq., Freiburg 1912. JUSTIFICATION 327 bolik, $10 sqq., Mainz 1800 (Robertson’s translation, pp. 82 sqq., 5th ed., London 1906) ; Realenzyklopadie fiir prot. Theologie, Vol. XVI, 3rd ed., pp. 482 sqq., Leipzig 1905 (summarized in Eng- lish in the New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowl- edge, Vol. VI, pp. 275 sqq., New York 1910); Card. Newman, Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification, 8th impression, London 1900; J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, New York 1914, pp. 150 sqq.— B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 246 sqq., 464 sq., 470 sqq. SiG TION 2 JUSTIFYING OR SANCTIFYING GRACE Sanctifying grace is defined by Deharbe as “ an unmerited, supernatural gift, imparted to the soul by the Holy Ghost, by which we are made just, children of God, and heirs of Heaven.” As it — makes sinners just, sanctifying grace is also called justifying, though this appellation can not be applied to the sanctification of our first parents in Paradise or to that of the angels and the sinless soul of Christ. Justification, as we have shown, consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace, and hence it is important that we obtain a correct idea of the latter. We will therefore consider (1) The Nature of Sanctifying Grace, (2) Its Effects in the Soul, and (3) Its Supernatural Concom1- TATLES. | ayia | ARTICLE) 1 THE NATURE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE 1. SANCTIFYING GRACE A “PERMANENT QUAL- _ ITY” OF THE SoUL.—Having no intuitive knowl- — edge of sanctifying grace, we are obliged, inorder — 328 7 ITS NATURE 320 to obtain an idea of its true nature, to study its effects, as made known to us by Revelation. Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Church do, however, enable us to form certain well-de- fined conclusions, of which the most important is that sanctifying grace must be conceived as a per- manent quality (qualitas permanens) of the soul. If it is a permanent quality, sanctifying grace cannot be identical with actual grace or with “un- created grace,” 7. e. the Person of the Holy Ghost. a) In conformity with such Biblical expressions as “the new life,” “renovation of the spirit,” “ regenera- tion,” “divine sonship,” etc., the Council of Trent de- fines justifying grace as a supernatural something “ in- fused” into and “inherent” in the soul. Both ideas de- note a permanent state, not a mere transient act or the result of such acts. “ The charity of God is poured forth by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those that are justified, and is inherent therein.” + “ That justice which is called ours, because we are justified from its being inherent in us, that same is (the justice of God) because it is infused into us by God, through the merit of Christ.”2 “If any one saith that men are justified . . . to the exclusion of the grace and the charity which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Ghost and is inherent in them, . let him be anathema.”’* Hence Justification is defined by 1Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 7: “Per spiritum sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui iustificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 800.) 2 Sess. VI, cap. 16: “ Quae enim tustitia nostra dicitur, quia per eam nobis inhaerentem iustificamur, illa eadem Dei est, quia a Deo nobis in- funditur per Christi meritum.”? (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 809.) 8 Sess, Vij. cahsintr dt 1199) leaps dixerit, homines iustificari ... ex- clusG gratia et caritate, quae in cordi- 330 SANCTIFYING GRACE the Fathers of Trent as “a translation . . . to the state of grace and adoption of the sons of God.” # Before the Tridentine Council a number of theo- logians held that sanctifying grace consists in some par- ticular actual grace or in a consecutive series of actual graces. This view is incompatible with the definition just quoted; in fact Suarez, Bellarmine, Ripalda, and others regard it as positively heretical or at least intolerably rash. During the preliminary debates at Trent some of the Fathers asked for an express declaration of the Coun- cil to the effect that justification is wrought by the instru- mentality of an infused habit; but their request was set aside on the ground that the nature of justifying grace as a stable habit is sufficiently indicated by the word “im- haeret.” ® That sanctifying grace is a permanent state of the soul may also be inferred from the Catholic teaching that the grace which Baptism imparts to children does not differ essentially from that which it imparts to adults. True, this teaching was not always regarded as certain;® but bus eorum per Spiritum sanctum diffundatur atque in illis inhaereat, ... anathema sit.” (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 821.) ; 4 Sess. VI, cap. 4: “ [Iustificatio est] translatio ... in statum gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei.” (Den- zinger-Bannwart, n. 796.) 5 Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist. Cone. Trid., VIII, 14, 3: “ Postubantt- bus quibusdam, ut expressius decla- raretur fiert iustitiam per habitum infusum, delecti Patres ad id re- sponderunt, id satis explicart per vocem ‘inhaeret, quae stabilitatem significat et habitibus congruit, non actibus.’ It was on the same ground that Pius V censured the forty-second proposition of Baius, vig.: “Lustitia quad tiustificatur per fidem impius, consistit formaliter in obedientia mandatorum, quae est operum iustitia; non autem in gratia aliqua animae infusa, qua adoptatur homo in filium Dei, et secundum interiorem hominem renovatur ac divinae naturae consors efficitur.’’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 1042.) 6 Cfr. the Cap. Maiores of Pope Innocent III (Decret., 1. 3, tit. 42, De Bapt.): ‘“ Aliis asserentibus, per virtutem baptismi parvulis qui- dem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non conferri; nonnullis dicentibus, di- mitti peccatum et virtutes infundt quantum ad habitum, non quoad usum.” ee ITS NATURE 331 at the Ecumenical Council of Vienne, A.D. 1311, Pope Clement V declared it to be ‘the more probable opin- ion,’ * and it was rendered absolutely certain by the Tri- dentine decision that infant Baptism results not only in the remission of sins, but likewise in an infusion of sanc- tifying grace. This being so, there can be no essential difference between the justification of children and that of adults. Now it cannot be actual grace which renders children righteous in the sight of God, for they are unable to avail themselves of actual grace on account of the undeveloped state of their intellect. The grace that Bap- tism imparts to them is consequently a gratia inhaerens et informans, that is, a permanent state of grace; and it must be the same in adults.® Peter Lombard ® identified sanctifying grace with the gratia increata, i. e. the Person of the Holy Ghost. This notion was combatted by St. Thomas? and im- plicitly rejected by the Tridentine Council when it declared that sanctifying grace inheres in the soul and may be increased by good works.**_ To say that the Holy Ghost is poured forth in the hearts of men, or that He may be 7De Summa Trinit. et Fide modernorum theologorum magis con- Cath: “ Quanium ad effectum sonam et conformem sacro appro- baptismi in parvulis reperiuntur bante concilio duximus eligendam.” doctores quidam theologi opiniones contrarias habuisse, quibusdam ex 8 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 4; Sess. VII, can. 13. For a fuller ipsis dicentibus, per virtutem baptis- mt parvulis quidem culpam remittt, sed gratiam non conferri, aliis e contra asserentibus, quod et culpa eisdem in baptismo remittitur et virtutes ac informans gratia in- funduntur quoad habitum, etsi non pro illo tempore quoad usum. Nos attendentes generalem efficaciam mortis Christi, quae per baptisma applicatur pariter omnibus baptiza- tis, opinionem secundam tamquam probabiliorem et dictis sanctorum et treatment consult Suarez, De Gratia, VI, 3; Vasquez, Comment, in S. Lh.) F525) disp) 204, cap. 6, The false views of Hermes and Hirscher are refuted by Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, and ed., pp. 254-343, Minster 1872, 9 Libri Quatuor Sent., I, dist, £75 § 18, 10 Summa Theol., 2a 2a¢, qu. 23, Bhta2. 11 Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, can, 24. 232 SANCTIFYING GRACE increased by good works, would evidently savor of Pan- theism. The Holy Ghost pours forth sanctifying grace and is consequently not the formal but the efficient cause of justification.” b) The gratia inhaerens permanens is not a mere rela- tion or denominatio extrinseca, but a positive entity pro- ductive of real effects,* and must consequently be con- ceived either as a substance or as an accident. We have shown that it is not identical with the uncreated substance of the Holy Ghost. Neither can it be a created substance. The idea of an intrinsically supernatural created substance involves a contradiction.1* Moreover, sanctifying grace in its nature and purpose is not an entity independently co-existing with the soul but something physically inherent init. Now, a thing which has its existence by inhering in some other thing is in philosophic parlance an “ accident.” St. Thomas expressly teaches that, “since it transcends human nature, grace cannot be a substance nor a substan- tial form, but is an accidental form of the soul itself.” Agreeable to this conception is the further Thomistic teaching that sanctifying grace is not directly created by God, but drawn (educta) from the potentia obedientialis of the soul.® Not even the Scotists, though they held grace to be created out of nothing" claimed that it was a new substance. 12 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, Ppp. 263 sq. 18 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa hheoli' va Y2aes qui; 210, (art. nr; Summa contra Gentiles, III, 150. 14 Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- thor of Nature and the Supernat- ural, p. 193. 15 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. I10, art, 2, ad 2: “ Omnis substantia vel est ipsa natura rei, cuius est substantia, vel est pars naturae, secundum quem modum materia vel forma substantia dicitur. Et quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis, sed est forma accidentalis ipsius animae. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo, accidentaliter fit in anima partici- pante divinam bonitatem.” 16 Cfr. Billuart, De Gratia, diss. G;vart. 2: 17 This theory was based on such ITS NATURE 333 An accident that inheres in a substance permanently and physically is called a quality (qualitas, morys). Consequently, sanctifying grace must be defined as a supernatural quality of the soul. This is the express teaching of the Roman Catechism: “Grace... is a divine quality inherent in the soul, and, as it were, a certain splendor and light that effaces all the stains of our souls and renders the souls themselves brighter and more beautiful.” 18 2. SANCTIFYING GRACE AN INFUSED Hasit.— Sanctifying grace may more specifically, though with a lesser degree of certainty, be described as a habit (habitus). Being entitatively super- natural, this habit must be infused or “drawn out” by the Holy Ghost. a) Aristotle * distinguishes four different sets of quali- ties: (1) habit and disposition ; (2) power and incapacity ; (3) passio (the power of causing sensations) and patibilis qualitas (result of the modification of sense) ; (4) figure and circumscribing form (of extended bodies). As sanctifying grace manifestly cannot come under one of the three last-mentioned heads, it must be either a habit or a disposition. Habit denotes a permanent and compara- tively stable quality, by which a substance, considered as to its nature or operation, is well or ill adapted to its natural end.” As a permanently inhering quality, sanctifying texts as Ps. L., 12: “Cor mundum chriores et splendidiores reddit.’’ crea in me.” 18 Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 2 de Bapt., qu. 49: “Est autem gratia . divina qualitas in anima inhaerens ac veluti splendor quidam et lux, quae animarum nostrarum maculas omnes delet ipsasque animas pul- On the supernatural character of sanctifying grace see Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp, 191 sqq. 19 Categ., 6. 20°... qualitas difficile mobilis, secundum quam res bene vel male 334 SANCTIFYING GRACE grace must be a habit. Hence its other name, “ habitual grace.’ The Scholastics draw a distinction between entitative and operative habits. An operative habit (habitus operativus) gives not only the power (potentia) to act, but also a certain facility, and may be either good, bad, or indifferent. An entitative habit (habitus entita- -tivus) is an inherent quality by which a substance is rendered permanently good or bad, e. g. beauty, ugliness, health, disease.’ Philosophy knows only operative habits. But sanctify- ing grace affects the very substance of the soul. Hence the supplementary theological category of entitative habits. ‘‘ Grace,’ says St. Thomas, “ belongs to the first species of quality, though it cannot properly be called a habit, because it is not immediately ordained to action, but to a kind of spiritual being, which it produces in the soul.” 24. There is another reason why grace cannot be called a habit in the philosophical sense of the term: — it supplies no acquired facility to act. This consideration led Suarez to abstain altogether from the use of the term “habit” in connection with grace,”? and induced Cardinal Bellarmine to describe sanctifying grace as a qualitas per modum habitus,2 by which phrase he wished to indicate that it imparts a supernatural perfection of being rather se habet in ordine ad swam naturam — ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam et ad operationem vel finem eius.” Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 19, att '23).0S., Sehithni, Principia Philosophica ad Mentem Aquinatis, pp. 574 sqq., Turin 1886; A. Lehmen, Lehrbuch der Philoso- phie auf aristotélisch-thomistischer Grundlage, Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 398 sqq., Freiburg 1904. 21 De Veritate, qu. 27, art. 2, ad 7: “Gratia est in prima qualitatis, quamvis non proprie possit dict habitus, quia non immediate specie esse spiritale, quod in anima facit.” 22 De Gratia, VI, 4, 1: “‘ Abstinu- imus ab hac voce, quia per habitum solet wmtelligi principium actus; quamvis, si vox illa latius sumatur, pro quacumque qualitate perficiente animam, quae non sit actus secun- dus, eadem certitudine, qua ostendi- mus dari gratiam permanentem, con- cluditur esse qualitatem habitualem.”’ 23 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, I, Be ifs NATURE 335 than a facility to act. To obviate these and similar sub- tleties the Council of Trent defined sanctifying grace sim- ply as a permanent quality. Nevertheless scientific theology employs the term habitus because it has no other philosophical category ready to hand. This defect in the Aristotelian system is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that besides the supernatural, there are distinctly natural qual- ities which “belong to the first species,” though they impart no facility to act but merely a disposition to certain modes of being, e. g. beauty, health, etc. There is also a positive reason which justifies the defi- nition of sanctifying grace as a habit. It is that grace imparts to the soul, if not the facility, at least the power to perform supernaturally meritorious acts, so that it is really more than a habitus entitativus, namely, a habitus (at least remotely) operativus.?+ b) The Scholastic distinction between native and ac- quired habits does not apply in the supernatural domain, because the supernatural by its very definition can never be either a part or an acquisition of mere nature2° It follows from this that supernatural habits, both entitative and operative, can be imparted to the human soul in no other way than by infusion (or excitation) from above. Hence the name habitus infusus. When the Holy Ghost infuses sanctifying grace, the habitus entitativus imparts to the soul a supernatural principle of being, while the habitus operativus confers upon it a supernatural power, which by faithful codperation with (actual) grace may be 24Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Super- naturali, disp. 30. Under these cir- sanctificantem esse habitum, licet esse temere dictum, non posset cumstances Suarez was justified in Saying, in regard to the degree of certitude to be attributed to this teaching: “Si quis negaret gratiam tamen ut haereticum damnari,’ 25 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- thor of Nature and the Supernatu- ral, pp. 190 sqq. 336 SANCTIFYING GRACE developed into a facility to perform salutary acts. Hence, if we adopt the division of habits into entitative and op- erative, sanctifying grace must be defined first as an en- titative habit (habitus entitatiwwus), because it forms the groundwork of permanent righteousness, sanctity, divine sonship, etc.; and, secondly, as an infused habit, because it is not born in the soul and cannot be acquired by practice. This view is in accord with Sacred Scripture, which de- scribes the grace of justification as a divine seed abiding in man,?* a treasure carried in earthen vessels,?’ a regen- eration by which the soul becomes the abode of God” and a temple of the Holy Ghost.” 3. THE CoNTROVERSY REGARDING THE AL- LEGED IDENTITY OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND CuHarity.—As justifying grace and theological love (charity) are both infused habits, the ques- tion arises as to their objective identity. The © answer will depend on the solution of the problem, just treated, whether sanctifying grace is pri- marily an entitative or an operative habit. Of theological love we know that it is essentially an operative habit, being one, and indeed the chief 26 Cir, 1 ‘John, “11, 9: iy oTrépp.a avrov [scil. Qeot] év adr@ pévet.” 27 Cire 2a? Cor, LV 7 Sy eo) the- saurum in vasis fictilibus.” 28 Cir) Johny ex1V.,) 23): sionem apud eum faciemus.” 29 Cfr. 1 Cor. III, 16.—On the subtle question whether ha- bitual grace is to be regarded as a real or merely as a modal accident V, 3rd ed., pp. 181 sqq., Freiburg 1908. An extreme and altogether unacceptable view is that of Billu- art (De Gratia, diss. 6, art. 2), who regards sanctifying grace as an ab- solute accident, 7. e. one which the omnipotence of God could miracu- lously sustain if the soul ceased to exist. Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, VII, 15; Schiffni, De Gratia Divina, p. * Man- of the soul, see Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 154 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, Prael. Dogmat., Vol. 289; Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 164 sqq. ITS NATURE 337 of the “three theological virtues.” What we have said in the preceding paragraph will enable the reader to perceive, at the outset, that there is a real distinction between grace and charity, and that consequently the two can not be identi- cal. | a) Nevertheless there is an imposing school of theologians who maintain the identity of grace with charity. They are Scotus *° and his follow- ers,°* Cardinal Bellarmine,®? Molina, Lessius, Sal- meron, Vasquez, Sardagna, Tournely, and others. Their principal argument is that Holy Scripture ascribes active justification indiscriminately to theological love and sanctifying grace, and that some of the Fathers follow this example. Here are a few of the Scriptural texts quoted in favor of this opinion. Luke VII, 47: “Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much.” * I Pet. IV, 8: “Charity covereth a multitude of sins. °° “I John [V, 7: . “Every one that loveth is born of God.” *° St. Augustine seems to iden- tify the two habits in such passages as the follow- ing: “Inchoate love, therefore, is inchoate righteousness; . . . great love is great righteous- 30 Comment. in Quatuor Libros ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit Sent., II, dist. 27. : (nydmrnoev) multum.” 31 E. g., Mastrius, De Iustif., disp. 341 Pet. IV, 8: “ Caritas (dyd- 7, qu. 6. : 7) operit multitudinem pecca- 32 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, torum.” iLONS, 851 John IV, 7: “Omnis qui 33 Luke VII, 47: “ Remittuntur diligit (mas 6 dyamrwyv) ex Deo natus est.” i838 SANCTIFYING GRACE ness; perfect love is perfect righteousness.” °° According to the Tridentine Council, “the justifi- cation of the impious’ takes place when “‘the char- ity of God is poured forth . . . in the hearts of those that are justified, and is inherent therein.” #7 It is argued that, if charity and grace produce the same effects, they must be identical as causes, and there can be at most a virtual distinction be- tween them. This argument is strengthened by the observation that sanctifying grace and theo- logical love constitute the supernatural life of the soul and the loss of either entails spiritual death. These arguments prove that grace and charity are in- separable, but nothing more. All the Scriptural and Pa- tristic passages cited can be explained without recourse to the hypothesis that they are identical. Charity is not su- perfluous alongside of sanctifying grace, because the pri- mary object-of grace is to impart supernatural being, whereas charity confers a special faculty which enables the intellect and the will to elicit supernatural salutary acts. b) The majority of Catholic theologians ** hold with St. Thomas °° and his school that grace and charity, while inseparable, are really distinct, sanctifying grace as a habitus entitativus impart- 36 De Natura et Gratia, c. 70, n. 84: “ Caritas ergo inchoata, in- choata tustitia est,.. fecta, perfecta iustitia est.’’ 87 Conc. .Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 7: “. .. dum caritas Dei diffundiiur . Caritas ma- gna, magna iustitia est, caritas per- in cordibus.eorum qui iustificantur atque ipsis inhaeret.” 38 Preéminently Suarez, Tanner, Ripalda. 39 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. I10, art. 3.sq.; De Veritate, qu. 27, art. 2. ITS. NATURE ao ing to the soul a supernatural being, whereas charity, being purely a habitus operativus, confers a supernatural power. Let us put the matter somewhat differently. Grace inheres in the substance of the soul, while charity has its seat in one of its several faculties. Inhering in the very substance of the soul, grace, by a physical or moral power, produces the three theological virtues — faith, hope, and love. “As the soul’s powers, which are the wellsprings of its acts, flow from its essence,” says the Angelic Doc- tor, ‘so the theological virtues flow from grace into the faculties of the soul and move them to act.’ *® And St. Augustine: ‘ Grace precedes charity.” * This is a more plausible view than the one we have examined a little farther up, and it can claim the authority of Scripture, which, though it occa- sionally identifies the effects of grace and charity, always clearly distinguishes the underlying habits. Giana Cor NIL G3). he erace ot our ford Jesus Christ and the charity of God.” * 1 Tim. I 14: “The grace of our Lord hath abounded ex- ceedingly with faith and love.” ** Furthermore, “regeneration” and “‘new-creation” in Biblical us- age affect not only the faculties of the soul, but its 40 Summa Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 110, art. 4, ad 1: “ Sicut ab essen- tia animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia, ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes [theologicae] in potentias animae, per quas [virtutes] potentiae moven- tur ad actus.” 41 De Dono Perseverantiae, c. 16, n. 41: “‘Gratia praevenit carita- tem.”’ ; 42 2 Cor. XIII, 13: “ Gratia Do: mint nostri Iesu Christi et caritas Dei.’ 431 Tim. I, 14: “ Superabunda- vit autem gratia Domini nostri cum fide et dilectione.” 340 SANCTIFYING GRACE substance. Finally, many councils consistently distinguish between gratia and caritas (dona, vir- tutes )—a distinction which has almost the force of a proof that grace and charity are not the same thing.** These councils cannot have had in mind a purely virtual distinction, because theological love presupposes sanctifying grace in exactly the same manner as a faculty presupposes a substance or nature in which it exists. The Roman Cate- chism expressly designates the theological virtues as “concomitants of grace.” * The question nevertheless remains an open one, as neither party can fully establish its claim, and the Church has never rendered an official decision either one way or the other, * 4. SANCTIFYING GRACE A PARTICIPATION OF THE SOUL IN THE Divine Nature.—tThe highest and at the same time the most profound concep- tion of sanctifying grace is that it is a real, though of course only accidental and analogical, participation of the soul in the nature of God. That sanctifying grace makes us “partakers of 44 Cfr. Conc. Viennense, A.D. Ente Supernaturali, disp. 132, n. 1311: “. .. gratiam informantem 132, n. 53): “ Haec controversia et virtutes.” Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, olim celebris fuit. Nunc facile diri- cap. 7: “. .. per voluntariam sus- mitur, quum iam constiterit nullius ceptionem gratiae et donorum.’ partis argumenta plane convincere.”’ Sess. VI, can. 11: “. .. exclusG@ On the theological aspects of Her- gratia et caritate.” bart’s philosophy, which denies the 45 For a fuller treatment of this existence of qualities and faculties topic consult Billuart, De Gratia, in the soul, see Heinrich-Gutber- diss.64,art.-4. let, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 46 Ripalda justly observes (De _ VIII, p. 560, Mainz 1897. Se ee a ITSyNATURE 341 the divine nature” is of faith, but the manner in which it effects this participation admits of differ- ent explanations. a) The fact itself can be proved from Sacred Scripture, Cir. 2) Pets la: By whom | Christ] He [the Father] hath given us great and precious promises: that by these you may be made partak- ers of the divine nature.” *” To this text may be added all those which affirm the regeneration of the soul in God, because regeneration, being a new birth, must needs impart to the regenerate the na- ture of his spiritual progenitor. Cfr. John I, 2: ) (Who are born; not jot bloody).),. bat ot God? )*3.\John) Ths) “Unless aman) bes bor again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven.” *” St. James I, 18: “For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth.” °° 1 John ITI, 9: “Whoso- ever is born of God, committeth no sin.” °? The Fathers of the Church again and again extol the deification (deificatio, Oetwors) of man effected by sanctify- ing grace and compare the union of the soul with God to the commingling of water with wine, the penetration Gi ALOI DY, Ares, etc. AT 2)\Pet. I, 43. °..0\.. per. quem [i. e. Christum] maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut per haec eficiamini divinae consortes naturae (Oelas Kowvwvot picews).” 48 John I, 13: “..... qui non ex sanguinibus,... sed ex Deo nati sunt.” Sr Athanasius *? begins his 49 John III, 5: ‘“ Nist quis rena- tus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, non potest introire in regnum Det,’ 50 Jac. I, 18: ‘ Voluntarie enim genuit nos verbo veritatis.” 511 John III, 9: “ Omnis qui na- tus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit.”’ 52 Or, contr. Arian., I, 39. 342 SANCTIFYING GRACE Christological teaching with the declaration: ‘“ He was not, therefore, first man and then God, but first God and then man, in order that He might rather deify us.” °° St. Augustine describes the process of deification as fol- lows: “ He justifies who is just of Himself, not from another; and He deifies who is God of Himself, not by participation in another. But He who justifies also deifies, because He makes [men] sons of God through justification. . . . We have been made sons of God and gods; but this is a grace of the adopting [God], not the nature of the progenitor. The Son of God alone is God; ... the others who are made gods are made gods by His grace; they are not born of His substance, so as to become that which He is, but in order that they may come to Him by favor and become co-heirs with Christ.” °* The idea underlying this passage has found its way into the liturgy of the Mass,°® and Ripalda is justified in declaring that it cannot be denied without rashness.*° b) In trying to explain in what manner grace enables us to partake of the divine nature, it 53 tya maddov nuas Oeoroijon- 54In Psalmos, 49, n. 2: “ Ille iustificat, qui per seipsum, non ex alio wustus est; et ille deificat qui per seipsum non alterius participa- tione Deus est. Qui autem wisti- ficat, ipse deificat, quia iustificando filios Det facit.... Fili Dei facts sumus et du facti sumus; sed hoc gratia est adoptantis, non natura generantis. Unicum enim Dei Filius Deus, ... ceteri qui dit fiunt, gratia ipsius fiunt, non de substantia ipsius nascuntur, ut hoc sint quod ille, sed ut per beneficium perveniant ad eum et sint cohaeredes Christi.’ Many other cognate Patristic texts in Ri- ‘naturali, disp. 132, sect. 7: palda, De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 132, sect. 7-9. 55 See, e. g., the Offertory and Preface for the festival of the As- cension of our Lord and the Secreta for the fourth Sunday after Easter. 56 Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Super- Ber gratiam vero habitualem fieri ho- minem participem divinae naturae ideoque gratiam esse participationem deitatis, adeo frequens est et con- stans theologorum assertum, ut absque temeritate negari non possit.”” On the teaching of St. Thomas and the Thomists see Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 4, art. 3. Se i a a ee ITS NATURE 343 is well to keep in view the absolutely supernatural character of sanctifying grace and the impossi- bility of any deification of the creature in the strict sense of the term. ‘The truth lies between these two extremes. A few medieval mystics®*’ and modern Quietists °® were guilty of exaggeration when they taught that grace transforms the human soul into the substance of the Godhead, thus completely merging the creature in its Creator. This contention ®® leads to Pantheism. How can the soul be merged in the Creator, since it con- tinues to be subject to concupiscence? ‘‘ We have therefore,” says St. Augustine, ‘even now begun to be like Him, as we have the first-fruits of the Spirit; but yet even now we are unlike Him, by reason of the old nature which leaves its remains in us. In as far, then, as we are like Him, in so far are we, by the regenerating Spirit, sons of God; but in as far as we are unlike Him, in so far are we the children of the flesh and of this world,’’ °° On the other hand it would be underestimating the power of grace to say that it effects a merely external and moral participation of the soul in the divine nature, similar to that by which those who embraced the faith of 57 Cir. Prop. Ekkardi a. 1329 °&2sana.”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. damn. a Ioanne XXII, prop. 10, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s En- chiridion, n. 510. 58 Cir. Prop. Mich. de Molinos a 1687 damn. ab Innocentio XI, prop. 5, in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1225, 59 The Fourth Council of the Lateran (A, D. 1218) calls it “ doc- trina non tam haeretica quam in- 433-) 60 St. Augustine, De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, II, 8, 10: “Nunc ergo et similes esse iam coepimus primitias spiritus habentes, et adhuc dissimiles sumus per re- liquias vetustatis. Proinde inquan- © tum similes, in tantum regenerante Spiritu filii Dei; inquantum autem dissimiles, in tantum filit carnis et saeculi,”’ 344 SANCTIFYING GRACE Abraham were called “ children of Abraham,” and those who commit heinous crimes are called “sons of the devil.” According to the Fathers *! and theologians, to “partake of the divine nature” means to become inter- nally and physically like God and to receive from Him truly divine gifts, 7. e. such as are proper to God alone and absolutely transcend the order of nature.*? Being self- existing, absolutely independent, and infinite, God cannot, of course, be regarded as the formal cause of created sanctity; yet the strictly supernatural gifts which He confers on His creatures, especially the beatific vision and sanctifying grace, can be conceived only per modum causae formalis (not informantis), because through them God gives Himself to the creature in such an intimate way that the creature is raised up to and transfigured by Him.®* Consequently, the so-called deificatio of the soul by grace is not a real deification, but an assimilation of the creature to God.** c) Which one of God’s numerous attributes forms the basis of the supernatural communica- tion made to the soul in the bestowal of grace, is a question on which theologians differ widely. The so-called incommunicable attributes, (self- existence, immensity, eternity, etc.), of course, 61 Quoted by Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 132, sect. 9. 63 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 62 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Ta.2ae qu, 12, art. 1:' “Donum autem gratiae excedit omnem facul- tatem naturae creatae, quum nihil aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae excedit omnem aliam naturam.”’ butes, pp. 165 sqq.; Christology, pp. 85 sqq. 64 Cfr. St. John of Damascus, De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 12 “ [&vOpw- mov] Oeovmevoy Sé weToXH THS Oelas E\AduWews Kal ovK els THv Oelav peOrorduevoy ovcoliar.” ITS NATURE 345 cannot be imparted to the creature except by way of a hypostatic union.*° Gonet °° misses the point at issue, therefore, when He declares the essential characteristic of deification to be the communication to the creature of the divine attributes of self-existence and infinity. Self-existence is absolutely incommunicable.** Somewhat more plausible, though hardly acceptable, is Ripalda’s opinion that deification formally consists in the participation of the creature in the holiness of the Creator, particularly in the supernatural vital communion of the soul with God in faith, hope, and charity, thus making sanctifying grace the radix totius honestatis moralis.6® While it is perfectly true that the supernatural life of the soul is a life in and through God, and that the very concept of sanctifying grace involves a peculiar and special relation of the soul to God, the Bibli- cal term xowwvia Oeias dicews points to a still deeper prin- ciple of the sanctifying vita deiformis. This principle, as some of the Fathers intimate, and St. Thomas ex- pressly teaches,® is the absolute intellectuality of God. Hence the object of sanctifying grace is to impart to the soul in a supernatural manner such a degree of intellec- tuality as is necessary to perceive the absolute Spirit — here on earth in the obscurity of faith, and in the life be- yond by the lumen’ gloriae.” This view is to a God: His 70 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, VII, and Atiri- 1, 30: ‘Vera ergo excellentia gra- 65 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Knowability, Essence, butes, pp. 165 sqq. 66 Clyp. Thomist., tom, VI, disp. 2, S) They, (the yusppibe= come the friends of God.” ?* John XV, 14 sq.: “T will not now call you servants, . . . but I have called you friends.” ** This friendship is some- times compared to a mystic marriage. Cfr. Matth. IX,15: “And Jesus said to them: Can the children of the bridegroom mourn, as long as the bridegroom is with them?’ ** Apoc. XIX, 7: 20 Sess. VI, cap. 773.5%. 0. wnde 23 John XV, 14 Sq: “lam non homo ex iniusto fit iustus et ex dicam vos servos,...vos autem inimico amicus.” dixt amicos.” 21 ‘Sess. V1; ceap.i. 102) “* Ste) exgzo 24 Matth. IX, 15: “ Numquid iustificati et amici Dei ac domestici possunt filit sponsi lugere, quamdiu ZACH IES cum illis est sponsus?”’ 22 Wisd. VII, 14: “ Participes facti sunt amicitiae Det.” OTS ERFECTS 353 “The marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife hath prepared herself.” * a) Friendship (¢iAéa), according to Aristotle,?° is “ the conscious love of benevolence of two persons for each other.”” Hence, to constitute friendship, there must be (1) two or more distinct persons; (2) pure love of be- nevolence (amor benevolentiae, not concupiscentiae), be- cause only unselfish love can truly unite hearts; (3) mutual consciousness of affection, because without a consciousness of the existing relation on both sides there would be merely one-sided benevolence, not friend- ship. It follows that true friendship is based on virtue and that a relation not based on virtue can be called friendship in a qualified or metaphorical sense only (amicitia utilis, delectabilis). From what we have said it is easy to deduce the essen- tial characteristics of true friendship. They are: (1) benevolence; (2) love consciously entertained by both parties ; (3) a mutual exchange of goods or community of life; (4) equality of rank or station. The first condition is based on the fact that a true friend will not seek his own interest, but that of his friend. It is to be noted, however, that one’s joy at the presence or prosperity of a friend must not be inspired by selfishness or sensual de- sire, for in that case there would be no true friendship.’ The second condition is based on the necessity of friend- 25 Apoc. XIX, 7: ‘“ Venerunt 27 Cfr. St. Thomas, Comment. in nuptiae Agni et uxor eius praepara- Mi sSeouncite, ohne il an2gs.. Eph; Vis 23uSdd.s ce Comm wily ais Cant, Liv, 1 sqq.; Ps. XLIV, 22 sqq. On the teaching of the Fathers see Corne- lius a Lapide, Comment. in 2 Cor., DG ee 26 Eth. ad Nichom., VIII sq. Quatuor Libros Sent., III, dist. 27, Gus..25. :artieer, srady (peas Amicitia vera desiderat videre amicum et colloquits mutuis gaudere facit, ad quem principaliter est amicitia; non autem ita, quod delectatio ex amici vistione et perfruitione, finis anricitiae ponatur,” 354 SANCTIFYING GRACE ship being mutual love, for friendship is not a one-sided affection, nor does it spend itself in mutual admiration. The third condition is necessary for the reason that love, if it is to be more than “ Platonic,” must result in acts of benevolence and good will.2® Of the fourth condi- tion St. Jerome says: “Friendship finds men equal or makes them equal.” 7° b) All these conditions are found in the friendship with which Almighty God deigns to honor those who are in the state of sanctifying grace. (1) That God loves the just man with a love of pure benevolence and eagerly seeks his companionship, is proved by the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Holy Bucharist. ..Cir, Prov. VIII) 31: “ And my delight: [1s] to be with the children of men.” *° (2) The just man is enabled to return God’s love by the habit of theological charity, which is inseparably bound up with and spontaneously flows from sanctifying grace.*t God’s consciousness of this mutual love is, of course, based on certain knowledge, whereas man can have merely a probable conjecture.*? This, however, suf- fices to establish a true friendship, as the example of hu- man friends shows.** 28 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theo- 80 Prov. VIII, 31: “ Deliciae logicd, 1a zae, qu. 28, art. 1: meae esse cum filis hominum.” “ Quum aliquis amat aliquem amore 31 V. supra, Art. 1, No. 3. amicitiae, vult et bonum, sicut et 82 V. infra, Sect. III, No. x. sibit vult bonum, unde apprehendit 33 Cir. St. Thomas, Comment. in eum ut alterum se, inquantum scil. Quatuor Libros Sent., III, dist. 37, et vult bonum, sicut et sibi vult qu. 2, art. 1, ad 10: “ Amicitia bonum. Et inde est, quod amicus dicitur esse non latens, non quod dicitur esse alter ipse. Et Augu- per certitudinem amor amici co- stinus dicit in l. 4 Confess.: Bene gnoscatur, sed quia per signa proba- quidam dixit de amico suo, ‘dimi- bilia amor mutuus habentium -col- dium animae meae’.” ligitur. Et talis manifestatio potest 29“ Amicitia pares aut invenit aut esse de caritate, inquantum per factt.”’” In Mich., 7. aliqua signa potest aliquis probabili- ter aestimare se habere caritatem.” PES EE GTS 355 (3) There is also community of life and property be- tween God and man when the latter is in the state of sanc-. tifying grace; for not only is he indebted to God for his very nature and all natural favors which he enjoys, but likewise and especially for the supernatural blessings be- stowed upon him.** On his own part, it is true, he can- not give his Benefactor anything in return which that Benefactor does not already possess; but the just man is ever eager to further God’s external glorification, agree- able to the first petition of the Our Father: ‘‘ Hallowed by Thy name.’ *° God has furthermore given him a kind of substitute for operative charity in the love of his neigh- bor, which has precisely the same formal object as the fove ot Gods) Ciricl John Tl, 17.2) .% He that hathithe substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?” * (4) There can be no real equality between God and the human soul, but God in His infinite goodness, elevat- ing the soul to a higher plane and allowing it to participate in His own nature,*” makes possible an amicitia excel- lentiae s. eminentiae, which is sufficient to constitute a true relation of friendship. Without this elevation of the soul by grace there could be no friendship between God and man.*§ 34 Cfr. Ecclus. XXXIV, 14 saqq. ¢0, quomodo caritas Dei (h ayarn 85 Cfr. St. Thomas, op. cit., III, ice v2e, Gu.) 1, abe. 3) ad) at Se esset possibile, quod ex nostris operi- bus aliquid Deo accresceret, habens caritatem mulio plura faceret prop- ter beatitudinem ei conservandam, quam propter eam sibi adipiscen- dam,”’. 861 John III, 17: “Quit ha- buerit substantiam huius mundi et widerit fratrem suum necessitatem habere et clauserit viscera sua ab Tov Ocov) manet in ea?” a7 V. supra, Art. 1, No. 4. 38 The singular opinion of Ri- palda (De Caritate, disp. 33), that such a relation would be possible even in the state of pure nature, is rejected by Suarez as incorrect (De Caritate, disp. 3, sect. 5, n. 4). On the whole question cfr. Schif- fini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 305 sqq. 356 SANCTIFYING GRACE 4. ADOPTIVE SoNSHIP.—The formal effects of sanctifying grace culminate in the elevation of man to the rank of an adopted child of God (filius Dei adoptivus), with a claim to the paternal in- heritance, 7. e. the beatific visionin Heaven. This truth is so clearly stated in Scripture and Tra- dition that its denial would be heretical. The Tri- dentine Council summarily describes justification as “the state of grace and of the adoption of the sons of God.” °° The teaching of Holy Scripture can be gathered from such texts as the following. Rom. VIII, 15 sqq.: “. .. You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). For the spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God. And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ.” *#° 1 John III, 1 sq.: “Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. . . . Dearly beloved, we are ‘now! the ‘sons of God’ = “Gal, EV; "5s cea. that owe ‘might receive the® adoption of sons.” ** That the just become the adopted 89 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 4: “. ,. status gratiae et adop- tionis filiorum Det.” 40'Rom. “VIII, 15. sqq:: “ Ac: cepistis .. . spiritum adoptionis fili- orum, in quo clamamus Abba, Pater; ipse enim Spiritus testi- monium reddit spiritut nostro, quod sumus filii Dei; si autem flu, et - haeredes: haeredes quidem Dei, co- haeredes autem Christi.’’ 441 John - IIT, *9\'sq.3) “ Videte; qualem caritatem dedit nobis Pater, ut filu Det nominemur et simus -.. Carissum, nunc filu Det su- mus.” 42Gal. IV, 5: “... ut adoptio- nem filiorum reciperemus.” PRS Re PEC TS 357 sons of God follows likewise as a corollary from the doctrine of regeneration so _ fre- quently taught by Scripture. This regeneration is not a procession of the soul from the divine essence, but a kind of accidental and analogical procreation substantially identical with adoption (filiatio adoptiva, viobesia), Cfr. John I, 12 sq.: “. . He gave them power to be made the sons en Godeme... whoare born. 1)! of Goda. a) St. Thomas defines adoption as “ the gratuitous ac- ceptance of a child of other parents to be the same as one’s own child and heir.” *4 Adoption implies (1) that the adopted child be a stranger to the adopting father; (2) that it have no legal claim to adoption; (3) that it give its consent to being adopted; (4) that it be received by the adopting father with parental love and affection. All these elements are present, in a far higher and more perfect form, in the adoption of a soul by God. (1) The rational creature, as such, is not a “son” but merely a “servant of God,’ * and, if he be in the state of mortal sin, His enemy. (2) That adoption is a gratuitous favor on the part of the Almighty, follows from the fact that the adopted creature is His enemy and that grace is a free super- natural gift, to which no creature has a natural claim. Adoption furthermore implies the right of inheritance.*® 43 John I, 12 sq.: “... dedit eis neae in filium et haeredem gratuita potestatem filios Dei fieri, qui... assumptio.” ex Deo nati sunt (€wKkev avrots 45 Cfr. Gal. IV, 7: ‘‘ Itaque tam éfougiay Tréxva Oeovd yevécOat, Tois non est servus, sed filius; quod si - €k Ocov éyeryHiOnoar).” filius, et haeres per Deum,” 44 Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 23, art. 46 CfirssRom.) VILI, 17; Galv. 1V57: 1: “ Adoptio est personae extra- 358 SANCTIFYING GRACE The heritage of the children of God is a purely spiritual possession which can be enjoyed simultaneously by many, and consequently excels every natural heritage. Men, as a rule, do not distribute their property during life, while, after their death, it is usually divided up among several heirs.** (3) Whereas adoption among men owes its existence to the desire of offspring on the part of childless parents, the adoption of the soul by God springs from pure be- nevolence and unselfish love, and for this reason pre- supposes (in the case of adults) the free consent of the adopted. No one can become an adopted son of God against his will.*® (4) Whereas human adoption supposes substantial equality between father and child, and therefore at best amounts to no more than a legal acceptance, adoption by God elevates the soul to a higher level by allowing it to participate in the Divine Nature, and consequently is a true (even though merely an accidental and analogical) re- generation in God. b) From what we have said it follows—and this is a truth of considerable speculative importance—that there are essential points of difference as well as of resemblance between Jesus Christ, the true Son of God, and the justi- fied sinner adopted by the Heavenly Father. a) The difference between the “ natural Son of God” and an “adopted son” is exactly like that between God and creature. The Logos-Son, engendered by eternal generation from the divine substance, is the true nat- ural Son of the Father, the Second Person of the Di- vine Trinity, and Himself God.*® The just man, on the 47 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., susceptionem gratiae et donorum.” Ba; ai. 43, atte) 1s ads. . 49 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 48 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, Trinity, pp. 49 sqq. cap. Raat TEpen voluntariam ITS EREECTS 359 other hand, is a child of God merely by the posses- sion of sanctifying grace,°® which can be lost by mortal sin and consequently is founded upon a free relation that may be terminated by man as freely as it was entered into between himself and God. Intimately related to this distinction is another: — Christ is the Son of the Father alone, the just man is an adopted child of the whole Trinity. This fact does not, however, prevent us from “appropriating ’”’ adop- tive sonship to each of the three Divine Persons ac- cording to His peculiar hypostatic character: — the Father as its author, the Son as its pattern, and the Holy Ghost as its conveyor.®? Now, if Christ, as the true Son of God, is the efficient cause (causa efficiens) of that adoptive sonship of which, as God, He is also the pattern- exemplar (causa exemplaris), it follows that He cannot be an adopted son of God. “ Christus est incapax adop- tionis,” as Suarez puts it.6? To say that He is both the natural and an adopted Son of God would be heretical.®+ Consequently, sanctifying grace, in Him, did not exercise one of the functions it invariably exercises in the souls of men, 1. e. it did not make Him an adopted son of God. B) It is to be noted, however, that the unique posi- tion enjoyed by our Lord gives rise, not only to essential distinctions but also to an equal number of analogies be- tween the Only-begotten Son of God and His adopted 60. Cfrs John IIT, 5\'sq.; ‘2 Cor. OTT 133 Tit) ITI, 's‘sqaq. 51 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theo- pogied, ).34;5 qu.'| (23, art. 2, (ad. 2: “For He [God the Father] is Christ’s father by natural genera- tion; and this is proper to him: whereas He is our Father by a vol- untary operation, which is common to Him and to the Son and the Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we are.” 52 Cfr, St.. Thomas, J. c., ad 2. 53 Suarez, De Incarnatione, disp. 49, (Sects 2, rs. 54 This heresy is called Adop- tionism; for a refutation of it see Pohle-Preuss, Christology, pp. 196 sqq. 360 } SANCTIFYING GRACE sons. The first and most fundamental of these analogies is the attribution of the common appellation “son of God” both to Christ and to the just. Though Christ is the only true Son of God, the Heavenly Father has nevertheless charitably “bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be, the sons of God.” ®= Ac- cording to John I, 13, Christ “ gave power to be made the sons of God” to them “who are born... of God.” Hence divine sonship formally consists in an impression of the hypostatic likeness of the Only-begotten Son of God, by which the soul in a mysterious manner becomes an image of the Trinity, and especially of the Only-be- gotten Son of God, who is the archetype and pattern- exemplar of adoptive sonship. This hypostatic propriety and exemplariness was the reason why the Second Per- son of the Trinity became man.** That the soul of the justified is transformed into “an image of the Son of God” is expressly taught by the Greek Fathers. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria says: “Christ is truly formed in us, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost impresses on us a certain divine likeness by means of sanctity and justice. . . . But if any one is formed in Christ, he is formed into a child of God.” *7 These considerations also explain the points of resem- blance between the adoptive sonship of God and the Holy Eucharist. Being our Father by adoption, God is bound to provide us with food worthy of a divine progenitor. The food He gives us (the Holy Eucharist) corresponds to our dignity as His children, sustains us in this sublime relation, and at the same time constitutes the pledge of a glorious resurrection and an eternal beatitude. 551 John III, r. 56 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, pp. 15 sqq. &7'Or. anIs.° TI, 4. See ee ITS EFFECTS 361 c) Is the adoptive sonship of the children of God con- stituted entirely by sanctifying grace, or does it require for its full development the personal indwelling in the soul of the Holy Ghost?*®* This subtle question formed the subject of an interesting controversy between Joseph Scheeben and Theodore Granderath, S. J. Father Granderath claimed on the authority of the Tridentine Council that divine sonship is an inseparable function of sanctifying grace, and through that grace alone, without the inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti, constitutes the unica causa formalis of justification.°® Against this theory Dr. Scheeben maintained with great acumen and, we think, successfully, that sanctifying grace of itself alone, with- out the aid of any other factor, not only completely justi- fies the sinner but raises him to the rank of an adopted son of God, though there is nothing to prevent us from holding that the indwelling of the Holy Ghost forms the climax of the process, and develops and perfects the already existing filiatio adoptiva. Petavius had contended * that the ae men of the Old Testament, though in the state of sanctifying grace, were not adopted children of God, because the filiatio adoptiva is an exclusive privilege of those living under the Chris- tian Dispensation. This theory became untenable when the Tridentine Council defined sanctity and adoptive son- ship as inseparable formal effects of sanctifying grace. There can no longer be any doubt, therefore, that the patriarchs, together with sanctifying grace also enjoyed 58V. infra, Art. 3, No. 4, sqq., 610 sqq.; Granderath, ‘'Kon- 59 V. supra, Sect. 1, Art. 2, No. 4. troverse tiber die Gotteskindschaft,” 60 Cfr. J. Scheeben, “ Kontroverse in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift fur uber die Formalursache der Kind- kath. Theologie, 1881, pp. 283 sqq., schaft Gottes,” in the Katholik, of 1883, Pp. 491 sqq., 593 saqq., 1884, _ Mayence, 1883, I, pp. 142 sqq., II, pp. 545 sqq. PP. 561 sqq.; 1884, I, 18 sqq. II, 465 61 De Trinitate, VIII, 4 sqq. 362 SANCTIFYING GRACE the privilege of adoptive sonship, though, as Suarez ob- serves,°” adoptive sonship under the Old Covenant de- pended both as to origin and value upon the adoptive son- ship of the New Testament, and therefore was inferior to it in both respects.** READINGS : — Scheeben, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 168 sqq., Freiburg 1878.— J. Kirschkamp, Gnade und Glorie in ihrem mneren Zusammenhang, Wiirzburg 1878.— P. Hagg, Die Reich- tumer der gottlichen Gnade und die Schwere ihres V erlustes, Ratisbon 1889.— Card. Katschthaler, De Gratia Sanctificante, 3rd ed., Salzburg 1886.— P. Einig, De Gratia Divina, Part II, Treves 1896.— Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 575 sqq., Mainz 1897.— Scheeben, Die Herrlichkeiten der géttlichen Gnade, 8th ed., by A. M. Weiss, O. P., Freiburg 1908 (English translation, The Glories of Divine Grace, 3rd ed., New York s. a.).— Th. Bourges, O. P., L’Ordre Surnaturel et le Devoir Chrétien, Paris 1901.—* B. Terrien, La Grace et la Gloire ou la Filiation’ Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu Etudiée dans sa Réalité, ses Principes, son Perfectionnement et son Couronnement Final, 2 vols., Paris 1897—*P. Villada, De Effectibus Formalibus Gratiae Habitualis, Valladolid 1899—-L. Hubert, De Gratia Sanctificante, Paris 1902. ARTICLE 3 THE SUPERNATURAL CONCOMITANTS OF SANCTIFYING GRACE Besides producing the effects described in the preceding Article, sanctifying grace also confers certain supernatural privileges, which, though not 62 Comment. in S. Theol., 3a, qu. consult A. Rademacher, Die iiber- 23) Kart, natirliche Lebensordnung nach der 63 Cfr. Gal. IV, 7. On the sub- paulinischen und johanneischen ject of the adoptive sonship of Theologie, pp. 97 sqq., Freiburg the just the student may profitably 1903. Se eg a een a ee ee a rh a ee ITS CONCOMITANTS 363 of the essence of grace, are, in the present econ- omy at least, inseparably connected with it and may therefore be regarded as its regular concomi- tants. The existence of these privileges is established by the fact that certain councils (e. g. those of Vienne and Trent), couple “grace and gifts” in their official definitions. The doctrine is clearly stated by the Roman Catechism as follows: ‘To this [sanctifying grace] is added a most noble ac- companiment of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace.” ° We will treat of the supernatural concomitants of sanctifying grace in four theses. Thesis I: The three divine virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused into the soul simultaneously with sanctifying grace. Some theologians (notably Suarez, Ripalda, and De Lugo) declare this thesis to be de fide, while others (Dom. Soto, Melchior Cano, and Vasquez) hold it merely as certain. Under the circumstances it will be safest to take middle ground by characterizing it as fdei proxima. Proof. The Council of Trent teaches: “Man through Jesus Christ, in whom he is ingrafted, re- ceives, in the said justification, together with the -1V. supra, p. 340. ditur nobilissimus omnium virtu- 2Cat. Rom., P, II, c. 1, m 51: tum comitatus, quae in animam “Huic ([gratiae sanctificanti] ad- cum gratia divinitus infunduntur.” . 364 SANCTIFYING GRACE remission of sins, all these [gifts] infused at once —faith, hope, and charity.” 3 | a) That theological charity, as a habit, is in- fused together with sanctifying grace can be con- vincingly demonstrated from Holy Scripture. Gir Won. eV Whe hb jee then charity aniGodnis poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.”* In connection with charity, Holy Scripture frequently mentions faith. Cfr. 1 Cor AT nek And atid Shodan in ice faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.’ ® All three of the theological virtues are expressly enumerated in I Cor. XI, 13%) “And now. there remain ‘faith; hope, and charity, these three: but the greatest of these is charity.’ ® Unlike certain other texts, the one last quoted leaves no doubt that faith, 8 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 7: “Unde in ipsa iustificatione cum vemissione peccatorum haec omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Te- sum Christum, cui inseritur, fidem, spem et caritatem.” (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 800.) The question whether the three theological virtues are genuine habitus operativi, must be answered in the affirmative; but its denial incurs no censure so long as the distinction existing between these habitual virtues and actual grace is left intact. It is of faith that habitual charity is infused si- multaneously with habitual grace. Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. tr: “ Si quis dixerit, homines iusti- ficari... exclusG gratia et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spi- - Spiritum Sanctum, ritum Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat, anathema sit.” On the bearing of this definition see Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 178 sq., Paris 1896; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 315 sqq., Frei- burg 1901. 4 Rom.'\\V3) ss Caritess. (Dest ( dyarn rov Oceov) diffusa est (éxxéxutat) in cordibus nostris per qui datus est nobis.” 51 Cor. XIII, 2: “ Et si habuero omnem ftidem, ita ut montes trans- feram, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum.” 61 Cor, XIII, 13: “ Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas (mloris, édmis, ayanrn), tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas.’ ITS CONCOMITANTS 365 hope, and charity are to be conceived as dona “inhaerentia, 1. e. habits or qualities inherent in the soul. This interpretation is approved by the Fa- thers and Scholastics. b) St. Thomas proves the necessity of the three theo- logical virtues for salvation as follows: “In order that we be properly moved towards our end [God], that end must be both known and desired. Desire of an end in- cludes two things: first, hope of attaining it, because no prudent man will aspire to that which he cannot attain; and secondly, love, because nothing is desired that is not loved. And hence there are three theological virtues,— faith, by which we know God; hope, by which we trust to obtain Him; and charity, by which we love Him.” ? When are the three theological virtues infused into the soul? This is an open question so far as faith and hope are concerned. Of charity we know that it is always in- fused with habitual grace. Suarez contends that, when the soul is properly disposed, faith and hope are infused before justification proper, that is to say, in the pro- cess leading up to it. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, hold that faith and hope, like charity, are infused at the moment when justification actually takes place in the soul. This last-mentioned opinion is favored by the Tridentine Council.® Mortal sin first destroys sanctifying grace together with the habit of charity that is inseparable from it. Faith 7 Quaestiones Disputatae de Vir- tutibus in Communi, art. 12: “Ad hoc autem, quod moveamur recite in finem [scil. Deum], oportet finem esse et cognitum et desideratum. Desiderium autem finis duo exigit, scil. fiduciam de fine obtinendo, quia nullus sapiens movetur ad id quod consequi non potest; et amorem finis, quia non desideratur nist amatum. Et ideo virtutes theologicae sunt tres, scil. fides qué Deum cognosci- mus, spes qua ipsum nos obtenturos esse speramus, et caritas qua eum diligimus.”” & Sess. | ViEj capsl igs 366 SANCTIFYING GRACE and hope may continue to exist in the soul, and if hope, too, departs, faith may remain alone. But the loss of : faith invariably entails the destruction of hope and charity. Thesis II: Together with sanctifying grace there are also infused the supernatural moral virtues. This proposition may be characterized as sententia communior et probabilior. Though denied by some the- ologians, it can claim a high degree of probability.® Proof. The infused moral virtues (virtutes morales infusae) differ from the theological vir- tues in that they have for their immediate formal object, not God Himself, but the creature in its relation to the moral law. The moral virtues may be reduced to four, wiz.: pru- dence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These are called the “cardinal” virtues; first, because they perfect the principal faculties of the soul; secondly, because all the other virtues may, be scientifically deduced from them.’® In the supernatural order the infusion of the cardinal virtues and of the other virtues subordinate to them has for its object the government of intellect and will in their relation towards created things and the guidance of these faculties to their supernatural end. a) The existence of supernaturally infused 9 This thesis is not, however, so 10Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa certain that it would be wrong to Theol, 1a’ 2ae; ‘qu. 57 sqq. ‘hat contradict it, as has actually been the cardinal virtues are four in done by Scotus, Durandus, and number, St. Thomas proves as fol- others. Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, VI, lows: ‘‘[Bonum_ rationis] potest O5ir2% dupliciter considerari: uno modo, ITS CONCOMITANTS 367 moral virtues is intimated in Wis. VIII, 7: “And if a man love justice: her labors have great vir- tues; for she teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.’’ 1 The teacher of the three cardinal virtues here mentioned is “Divine Wisdom,” 7. e. God Him- self, and we may assume that He inculcates them by the same method which He employs in infusing the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Another relevant text is Ezechiel XI, 19 sq.: . . and I will take away the stony heart out of their flesh, and give them a heart of flesh, that they may walk in my commandments, and keep my judgments.” ’* Here Yahweh promises to give the just men of the New Covenant a “heart of flesh” as opposed to the “stony heart” of the Jews. The meaning evidently is that a disposition to do good will be a characteristic of the New Tes- tament Christians in contradistinction to the hard- 6é prout habet vationem consiliabilis et eligibilis, secundum quam ratio circa illud operatur et sic est prudentia, quae est media inter intellectuales et morales; ... alio modo, secun- dum quod habet rationem boni appe- tibilis. Ad appetitum autem duo per- tinent, scil. actio et passio; passio autem est in irascibili et concupisct- bili. Circa actiones ergo est iustitia, circa. passiones irascibiles est forti- tudo, circa passiones concupiscibiles est temperantia. Et sic sunt qua- tuor virtutes cardinales.” (Com- ment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., III, dist. 33, qu. 2, art. 1, solut. 3.) 11 Wis. VIII, 7: “Et si. iusti- tiam quis diligit, labores huius magnas habent virtutes; sobrietatem enim et prudentiam docet [Deus] et iustitiam et virtutem, quibus uti- linus nihil est in vita hominibus.” 12 Ez. XI, 19 sq.: “‘ Et auferam cor lapideum de carne eorum et dabo eis cor carneum, ut in praeceptis meis ambulent et iudicia mea custo- diant.”’ 368 SANCTIFYING GRACE hearted Old Testament Jews. He who has a “heart of flesh” will walk in God’s commandments and keep His judgments. Hence “heart” sig- nifies the sum-total of all those habits which impel and enable a man to lead a good life. Since it is God Himself who gives the “heart of flesh,” 7. e. the moral virtues, it follows that they are super- naturally infused. b) Some of the Fathers ascribe the moral vir- tues directly to divine infusion. Thus St. Augustine observes that the cardinal virtues “are given to us through the grace of God.” * And St. Gregory the Great says that the Holy Ghost does “ not desert the hearts of those who are perfect in faith, hope, and charity, and in those other goods without which no man can attain:to) the, heavenly) fatherland.7)" St: Thomas shows the theological reason for this by pointing to the parallel that exists between nature and the super- natural. “ Effects,” he says, “must always be propor- tionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, which we acquire by our acts, pro- ceed from certain natural principles preéxisting in us. .. . In lieu of these natural principles God confers on us the theological virtues, by which we are directed to a supernatural end. ... Hence there must correspond to these theological virtues, proportionally, other habits caused in us by God, and which bear the same relation to 18 Cfr. Jer. XXXI, 33; Col. I, 10 “In fide enim, spe atque caritate, Sdistlonn Lyla, et in aliis bonis, sine quibus ad 14JIn Ps., 83: “‘Istae virtutes coelestem patriam non potest per- nune in convalle plorationis per veniri,... perfectorum corda [Spi- gratiam Dei donantur nobis.” ritus Sanctus] non deserit.” 16 Hom, ‘tn’ Beech, 1,5; Ns) It? ITS CONCOMITANTS 369 the theological virtues that the moral and intellectual vir- tues bear to the natural principles of virtue.” *° Thesis III: The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are also infused with sanctifying grace. This proposition may be qualified as “ probabilis.” Proof. The Church’s teaching with regard to the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost is based on Isaias XI, 2 sq.: “ And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge, and of godliness. And he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord.” Four of these supernatural gifts (wisdom, un- derstanding, counsel, and knowledge) perfect the intellect in matters pertaining to salvation, while the remaining three (fortitude, godliness, and the fear of the Lord) direct the will to its supernatural end. Are these seven gifts, (or some of them), really distinct from the infused moral virtues? Are they habits or habitual dispositions, or merely transient impulses or inspirations? What are their mutual relations and how can they be divided off from one another? These and similar questions are in dispute among theologians. The prevailing opinion is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused habitual dis- 16 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 63, art. 3: “ Oportet effectus esse suis causis et principis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellec- tuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principtis in nobis praeexistentibus ... Loco quorum naturalium principiorum conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem. ... Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus theologicis proportionahiter respon- deant alu habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habent ad virtutes theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et inteliectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum.’ For further information on this subject consult Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische The- ologie, Vol. VIII, § 471, Mainz 18973; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, Pp. 319 saqq., Freiburg 1901; Van Noort, De Gratia Christi, pp. 161 sqq., Amsterdam 1908, 370 SANCTIFYING GRACE positions, realiter distinct from the theological and moral virtues, by which the soul is endowed with a supernatural capacity for receiving the inspirations of the Holy Ghost and a supernatural readiness to obey His impulses in all important matters pertaining to salvation.27 That the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused into the soul simultaneously with sanctifying grace, can be demonstrated as follows: Christ, as the mystical head, is the pattern of justification for the members of His spir- itual body, who are united to Him by sanctifying grace.18 Now the Holy Ghost dwelled in Christ with all His gifts as permanent -habits.*° Consequently, these gifts are im- parted by infusion to those who receive the grace of jus- tification. This is manifestly the belief of the Church, for she prays in the “Veni Sancte Spiritus” “Shed upon thy faithful fold, By unbounded hope controlled, Thy seven gifts.” 2° Thesis IV: The process of justification reaches its climax in the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul of the just. This thesis embodies what is technically called a propo- sitio certa. 17 Cfr. Gregory of Valentia, Com- Freiburg 1899; Van Noort, De ment. in S. Theol., 1a 2ae, disp. 5, Gratia Christi, pp. 174 sqq. qu. 8, p..1: “ Dona Spiritus S..po- 18 Rom. VIII, 9 sqq. tentias animae perficiunt ad actiones 19, Ctr.) Ts.) ly 2 sqo.s LX ia. quasdam heroicas,... quad ratione -Luke IV, 18. pecuhiariter procedunt ex divino 20“ Da tuts fidelibus, in te con- quodam Spiritus S. instinctu, quo fitentibus, sacrum septenariwm.” mens nostra plerumque mirabiliter (Missale Rom., Sequence for Whit solet agi et impelli ad quaedam opera Sunday.) For a more detailed praestantia et rara.... Atque ita treatment of the subject dealt with in usu donorum homo potius agitur, in Thesis III consult J. Kleutgen, in usu autem virtutum se habet Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd potius ut agens.” Cfr. Simar, Dog- ed., pp. 365 sqq., Miinster 1872; C. matik, Vol, II, 4th ed., pp. 641 sqq., Weiss, S. Thomae Aquinatis de Sep- —— a ITS CONCOMITANTS 371 Proof. There are two ways in which God may dwell in the soul, either by virtue of His created grace (inhabitatio per dona acci- dentalia, évoixnos kar’ évépyeav) or by virtue of His | uncreated substance (inhabitatio substantialis sive personalis, évotxnows Kar’ ovoiay), The personal in- dwelling of the Holy Ghost, therefore, may consist in a twofold grace: gratia creata and gratia in- creata, of which the former is the groundwork and necessary condition of the latter, while the latter may be described as the climax and consum- mation of the former.?* The indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just is taught by Holy Scripture and attested by the Fathers. a) Holy Scripture draws a clear-cut distinction between the accidental and the substantial in- dwelling of the Holy Ghost. | a) Our Lord Himself, in addition to the’charis- mata, promised His Apostles the Holy Ghost imeerson, ~ John XPV; 16:8qis.. the Father . }. Shall give you another Paraclete, that he tem Donis Spiritus S. Doctrina, also consult Suarez, De Gratia, VI, Vienne 1895; J. Regler, Die sieben Gaben des HI. Geistes in ihrer Bedeutung fiir das christliche Leben, Ratisbon 1899; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 337 sqq., Freiburg root. On the connection of the gifts of the Holy Ghost with the beatitudes (cir, Matth, V, 3 saq.) and the “twelve fruits of the Holy Ghost” ictrinnGaly Vi. 022. sq), see St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 69 and 7o. The student may 10, and Vasquez, Comment. in S. Theol., III, disp. 44, cap. 2. 21 Cfr. St. Bonaventure, Compen- dium Theol. Verit., I, 9: “‘ In tusti- ficatione duplex caritas nobis datur, scil. creata et increata: illa qua diligimus, et illa qué diligimur. . Ex his colligitur, quod licet Deus sit in omnibus per essentiam, prae- sentiam et potentiam, non tamen habetur ab omnibus per gratiam.” 372 SANCTIFYING GRACE may abide with you for ever, . . . but you shall know him, because he shall abide with you, and shall be in you.’ ** This promise was made to ath the staithiulseiine Rom el gue i TN anit charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.” ** Hence the Holy Ghost abides in the just and sets up His throne ‘un’ their’) soulesy Cin Rent) Vidi) or “And if the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mor- tal bodies, because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you.” ?* By His indwelling our souls become temples of God. 1 Cor. III, 16sq.: “Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? . . . For the tem- ple of God is holy, which you are.” ?° 1 Cor. VI, 19: “Or know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in you, whom you have from God; and you are not your own?” * 22 John XIV, 16 sq.: “... alium a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia Paraclitum, dabit vobis, ut maneat vobiscum in aeternum.... Vos au- tem cognoscetis eum, quia apud vos manebit et in vobis (év byiv) erit.” 23\Romi Wess) |" Caritas’) Det diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis.” 24 Rom. VILE 11: “ Quodst Spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, habitat in vobis (oixet év dui), qui suscitavit Iesum Chrisium corpora vestra propter imhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis (dia Tov é€votkouvTos avTov mveluaTos ev tuiy).” 25 “ Nescitis, quia templum Dei (vabs Qeov) estis et Spiritus Det habitat in vobis (oixei év Duty) ? ~.- Lemplum enim Det sanctum est, quod estis vos.” 261 Cor. 6, 19: '\ An nescttis, quoniam membra vestra templum sunt Spiritus S., qui in vobis est, NS aa ee ae ITS CONCOMITANTS 373 B) Agreeable to this teaching of Scripture the Fathers, especially those of the East, assert the substantial indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just. The fact that no one but God can dwell substantially and personally in a creature was cited by the Greek Fa- thers in their controversies with the Pneumatomachians to prove the divinity of the Holy Ghost. St. Athanasius writes to Serapion:27 “If we by receiving the Holy Ghost are allowed to participate in the Divine Nature, no one but a fool will assert that the Holy Ghost is not of divine but of human nature. For all those in whom He abides become deified 28 for no other reason. But if He constitutes them gods, there can be no doubt that His nature is divine.” St. Basil comments as follows on Ps. LXXXI, 6 (Ego dixi, dit estis): “ But the Spirit that causes the gods to be gods, must be divine, and from God, _ and God.” 2® St. Cyril of Alexandria *° glowingly describes the soul inhabited by the Holy Ghost as inlaid with gold, transfused by fire, filled with the sweet odor of balsam, and so forth. The Latin Fathers, with one exception, are less defi- nite on this point. St. Augustine says that the Holy Ghost “is given as a gift of God in such a way that He Himself also gives Himself as being God,” ** and that “the grace of God is a gift of God, but the greatest gift is the Holy Spirit Himself, who therefore is called a grace.” *? Again: “. .. the Holy Spirit is the gift of quem habetis a Deo et non estis 80 Dialog., VII, per totum. vestri?’”’? Cfr. Rom. VIII, 9; Gal. 31 De Trinitate, XV, n. 36: “Ita TV,;' 6; 2 Cor. VI, 16. enim datur sicut donum_ Det, ut 27 Ep. ad Serap., I, n. 24. etiam seipsum det sicut Deus.” 28 PeorrolovvTal. 32Serm., 144, ¢. 1: “ Gratia 29 Contra Eunom., 1. Vs quippe Dei donum Dei est; donum 374 SANCTIFYING GRACE God, the gift being Himself indeed equal to the giver, and therefore the Holy Ghost also is God, not eon to the Father and the Son.” * b) While theologians are unanimous in ac- cepting the doctrine of the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the just as clearly contained in Sacred Scripture and Tradition, they differ in ex- plaining the manner in which He dwells in the soul. a) The great majority hold that the Holy Ghost can not dwell in the soul, as the human soul dwells in the body, per modum informationis, nor yet by a hypostatic union, as godhead and manhood dwell together in the Person of Christ ; and that consequently His indwelling is objectively an indwelling of the whole Trinity, which is appropriated to the Third Person merely because the Holy Ghost is “hypostatic holiness” or “personal love.’ This view is based on what is called “the fundamental law of the Trinity,” viz.: “In God all things are one except where there is opposition of relation.” ** Sacred Scrip- ture speaks of the personal indwelling of the Father and the Son as well as of the Holy Ghost. Cfr. John XIV, 23: “If any one love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and will make our abode with him.” ** St. Athanasius autem maximum ipse Spiritus Sane- tate, 1, VIII, cap. 4 sq.: Franzelin, tus est, et ideo gratia dicitur.” De Deo Trino, thes. 43; J. Kleut- 83 Enchiridion, c. 37: “‘ Et utique gen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, Spiritus Sanctus Dei donum est, 2nd ed., pp. 369 sqq. quod quidem et ipsum est aequale 84 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine donanti; et ideo Deus est etiam Trinity, pp. 230 sqq. Spiritus Sanctus, Patre Filioque non so John XEVi) 235 St (Giis ates minor.” Additional Patristic texts ligit me, sermonem meum servabit, et of like tenor in Petavius, De Trini- Pater meus diliget eum, et ad eum ITS CONCOMITANTS 375 concludes from these words that “the energia of the Trinity is one. . . . Indeed when the Lord says: I and the Father will come, the Spirit also comes, to dwell in us in precisely the same manner in which the Son dwells in us.”2¢ And St. Augustine teaches: “Love, therefore, which is of God and is God, is properly the Holy Spirit, by whom the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts,— that love by which the whole Trinity dwells in us.” *7 Accordingly, the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost consists in the state of grace as bearing a special relation to the Third Person of the Trinity; the “higher nature” which sanctifying grace imparts to the soul is not an absolute but a relative form (ocxéos), by which the soul is mysteriously united with the Three Divine Per- sons and, by appropriation, with the Holy Ghost, thereby becoming a throne and temple of God. It is in this sense that the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul is called the climax of justification.*® | | B) Other eminent theologians (Petavius, Passaglia, Schrader, Scheeben, Hurter, et al.) regard the explana- tion just given as unsatisfactory. They contend that the Fathers, especially those of the East, conceived the in- dwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just, not as an indwelling (évolkyow) of the Trinity, appropriated to the Holy Ghost, but as a union (éwos) of the Holy Ghost Himself with the soul.*® This union, they say, is veniemus et mansionem (uovnv) apud eum faciemus.” 36 Ep. 1 ad Serap., n. 30: “Ex his una Trinitatis évépyera ostendi- tur... profecto quum Dominus ait: Veniemus ego et Pater, simul venit Spiritus, non alio modo quam ut Filius in nobis habitaturus.” 37 De Trinit., XV, 18, 32: “ Di- lectio igitur, quae ex Deo est et Deus est, proprie Spiritus S. est, per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris Dei caritas, per quam nos tota inhabitat Trinitas.” 38 For a more detailed treatment see Franzelin, De Deo Trino, thes. 43-48, Rome 1881, 39 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionys, Areop., De Hier. Eccl., 1, §3 (Migne,-P. G., III, 376): ‘H 6€ Odwais éorw F mpos Qedv adouolwcis re Kar EVWCTLSs 376 SANCTIFYING GRACE neither physical nor hypostatic, but an altogether unique and inexplicable relation by which the soul is morally, ac- cidentally, and actively united to the person of the Holy Ghost.*° y) Unfortunately this exalted and mystic theory can- not be squared with the theological principles underlying the Catholic teaching on the Trinity, especially that por- tion of it which concerns the appropriations and missions of the three Divine Persons.*! It is true that sanctifying grace culminates in a communication of the Divine Nature, and that this Getwors is effected by imprinting upon the soul an image of the divine processes of generation and spiration,— the first by adoptive filiation, the second by an indwelling of the Holy Ghost.4? In fact all the Trinitarian relations are reflected in the justification of the sinner. Thus regeneration corresponds to the generation of the Logos by the Father; adoptive sonship and the’ accompanying participation of the soul in the Divine Na- ture corresponds to our Lord’s natural sonship and his consubstantiality with the Father; the indwelling of the Holy Ghost and His union with the soul, on the other hand, corresponds to the divine process of Spiration, in- asmuch as it is preéminently a supernatural union of love and effects a sort of mutual inexistence or perichoresis of the soul in the Holy Ghost or the three Divine Per- sons respectively.** Since, however, this union of the 40 Cfr. Petavius, De Trinit., VIII, 7, 12: “Ostendimus enim non semel, coniunctionem illam Spiritus S. neque dvoikny neque sroorate Knv esse, h. e@ neque naturalem neque personalem, quasi una fiat ex ambobus natura vel persona. Non enim quia et illti per adoptionis gra- tiam filii Dei sunt, ait Augustinus (In Ps. 67), ideo quisquam illorum est unigenitus. Neque enim ex per- sonarum duarum copulatione unum aliquid per sese, sed xard ovpBe- Bnxés potest effici.’’ 41 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 244 sqq. 42 Cfr. Scheeben, Die Mysterien des Christentums, 2nd ed., p. 165, Freiburg 1808. 43 Cfr, John XIV, 23; XVII, 20 sqq. el ITS CONCOMITANTS B77 soul with the substance of the three Divine Persons in general, and the Holy Ghost in particular, is not a sub- stantial and physical but only an accidental and moral union, the regeneration of the sinner must be conceived as generation in a metaphorical sense only, divine son- ship as adoptive sonship, the deification of man as a weak imitation of the divine homoousia, and the indwell- ing of the Holy Spirit in the soul as a shadowy analogue of the Divine Perichoresis.“ READINGS: — Deharbe, Die vollkommene Liebe Goties nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin, Ratisbon 1856— Marchant, Die theolo- gischen Tugenden, Ratisbon 1864.— Mazzella, De Virtutibus In- fusis, 4th ed., Rome 1894.—G. Lahousse, S. J., De Virtutibus Theologicis, Louvain 1890.—S. Schiffini, S. J., Tractatus de Virtutibus Infusis, Freiburg 1904.— J. Kirschkamp, Der Geist des Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe, Paderborn 1804. C. Weiss, S. Thomae Aquinatis de Septem Donis Spiritus Sancti Doctrina Proposita et Explicata, Vienna 1895. On the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just see A. Scholz, De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti, Wirzburg 1856. —* Franzelin, De Deo Trino, pp. 625 sqq., Rome 1881.— Ober- dorffer, De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti im Animabus Iustorum, Tournai 1890.—* B. Froget, O. P., De I’Inhabitation du S. Esprit dans les Ames Justes d’aprées la ents de S. Thomas @Aquin, Paris 1901.— De Bellevue, LOeuvre du S. Esprit ou la Sanec- tification des Ames, Paris 1901. On the historic development of the dogma see Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vol. II, § 56-75, Freiburg 1895. 44 Gutberlet takes middle ground macher, Die iibernatiirliche Lebens- between the two theories and tries to ordnung nach der paulinischen und reconcile them. Cfr. Heinrich-Gut- johanneischen Theologie, pp. 193 berlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. — sqq., Freiburg 1903. VIII, §468. See also A, Rade- SECTION 3 THE: PROPERTIES OF SANCTIFYING GRACE By a property (proprium, ‘8ov) we understand a quality which, though not part of the essence of a thing, necessarily flows from that essence by some sort of causation and is consequently found in all individuals of the same species.t A prop- erty, as such, is opposed to an accident (accidens, ovpBeByxos), which is neither part of, nor neces- sarily attached to, the essence, but may or may not be present in the individual. Thus the ability to laugh is a property of human nature, whereas the color of the skin is an accident. How do the properties of grace differ from its formal effects, and from its supernatural concomi- tants? The formal effects of grace, as we have seen, are the elements constituting its nature, the properties are determinations necessarily flowing from that nature, while the supernatural concomi- tants are free gifts superadded by God. According to the Protestant theory, justification is abso- lutely certain, equal in all men, and incapable of being lost. The Catholic Church, on the contrary, teaches that justi- 1 Cir. RoR Clarke S. J, Logic, puts 4s 378 LS) PROP Th Rane S 379 fication is (1) uncertain, (2) unequal, and (3) amissible. We will explain this teaching in three theses. Thesis I: No man knows with certainty of faith whether he is justified or not. | This proposition is de fide. Proof: The Tridentine Council rejected’ the “fiduciary faith” ? of Luther as “an empty hereti- cal confidence,” * and in three distinct canons de- nied the properties attributed to faith by the early Protestant dogmaticians.! a) Holy Scripure again and again warns us that we can never be sure of our salvation. St. Paul, though himself “a vessel of election,” freely admits: “I am not conscious to myself of any thing, yet I am not hereby justified; but he that judgeth me is the Lord,” ® and declares: “I chas- tise my body and bring it into subjection, lest per- haps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway.” °® He exhorts the faithful to work out their salvation “with fear and trembling.” * 2° Fides fiducialis,” v. supra, pp. 255 sdq- 3 Sess. VI, cap. 9; Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 684, 4 Sess. VI, can, 13-15; Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 823 sqq. 51 Cor. IV, 4: “ Nihil enim mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc iusti- ficatus: sum; qui autem iudicat me, Dominus est.’ 61 Cor. IX, 27: ‘“‘ Castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo, ne forte, quum altis praedicaverim, ipse rveprobus (adéximos) efficiar.” 7 Phil. II, 12: “Cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini.”’ Other Scriptural texts in Bellarmine, De Iustificatione, III, 4 sqq. For the solution of certain exegetical difficulties see the same author, op. cit., III, 9, and Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 210 sqq., Paris 1896. 380 SANCTIFYING GRACE b) The Fathers also teach the uncertainty of justification in the individual, and attribute it to the fact that, while we know that God pardons penitent sinners, no man can be entirely certain that he has complied with all the conditions nec- essary for justification. “Our fate,’ says St. Chrysostom, “‘is uncertain for a number of reasons, one of which is that many of our own works are hidden from us.”® St. Jerome, comment- ing on Eccles. IX, 1 sq.,° observes: “In the future they will know all, and all- things are manifest to them, that is to say, the knowledge of this matter will precede them when they depart this life, because then the judgment will be pronounced, while now we are still battling, and it is now uncertain whether those who bear adversities, bear them for the love of God, like Job, or because they hate Him, as do many sinners.” *° Pope St. Gregory the Great said to a noble matron who asked him whether she could be sure of her salvation: ‘ You ask me something which is both useless and difficult [to answer] ; difficult, because I am unworthy to receive a revelation; useless, because it is better that you be uncertain with regard to your sins, lest in your last hour you should be unable to repent.” *4 8 Hom. in I. Epist. ad Cor, 2. o'Hethesy | IX, ut) isq.2../ 1 Nesci homo, utrum amore an odio dignus, plurimi peccatores, nunc habetur incertum.” Tee pe WD aes “Rem et inuti- . etc.” 10 Hieronymus in h. 1. (Migne, P. LA RXTMT, 1080) 2% In 2 futuro igitur scient omnia et in vultu eorum sunt omnia, 1. @. antecedet eos, quum de hac vita decesserint, notitia istius rei quia tune est iudicum et nune certamen. Et quicunque adversa sustinent, utrum per amorem Det sustineant, ut Iob, an per odium, ut lem et difficilem postulasti: difficilem quidem, quia ego indignus sum, cut revelatio fiert debeat; inutilem vero, quia secura de peccatis tuis fieri non debes, nist quum iam in die vitae tuae ultimo plangere eadem peccata mi- nime valebis.” The Patristic argu- ment is more fully developed by Bellarmine, De Iustif., III, 7. SS ee Se ne oe ee eae ee ITS PROPERTIES | 381 c) We now proceed to the theological explana- tion of the dogma embodied in our thesis. a) The purpose of this dogma is not, as Harnack *? thinks, “‘ partly to assuage and partly to excite the restless- ness that still remains, by means of the sacraments, indul- gences, liturgical worship and ecclesiastical encouragement of mystical and monkish practices,” but to prevent undue security and careless assurance. What the Church con- demns, in accordance with Sacred Scripture and Tradi- tion, is the certitudo fidet, that vain confidence which leads men to feel certain that they are in the state of grace (inanis fiducia), not the certitudo spet, 1. e. humble trust in God’s abundant mercy. “As no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments,” says the Tridentine Council, “ even so each one, when he regards himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may have fear and apprehension touching his own grace; see- ing that no one can know with a certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace Greode . One needs but to apply to theology the epistemological principles and criteria furnished by philosophy to perceive that the Catholic dogma is as reasonable as the Protestant theory is absurd. The Protestant syllogism: “I know with a certainty of faith that the penitent sinner who does his share, is justified through the grace of Christ; 12 Dogmengeschichte, Vol. III, p. suamque propriam infirmitatem e¢ 617. indispositionem respicit, de sua gratia 13 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. formidare et timere potest, quum 9: “ Sicut nemo pius de Dei mi- nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei, sericordia, de Christi merito deque cui non potest subesse falsum, se sacramentorum efficacia dubitare gratiam Dei esse consecutum.,” debet, sic quilibet, dum seipsum (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 802.) 382 SANCTIFYING GRACE now, I, who am a penitent sinner, know with a certainty of faith that I have done my share; therefore, I know with a certainty of faith that I am justified,” may be formally correct, but the minor premise embodies a ma- terial error, because no man knows with a certainty of faith that he has done his share, unless it be specially revealed to him by God. No matter how sure I may feel of my own goodness, I have no certainty of faith, such as that which Mary Magdalen had, or that which was vouchsafed to the penitent thief on the cross, that I am justified. It is one of the approved rules of syllogistic reasoning that “the conclusion must follow the weaker premiss.” ** Hence, in the above syllogism the certainty cannot be of faith, but human and moral only. We do not mean to deny that God may grant to this or that indi- vidual a certainty of faith with regard to his justification ; in fact theologians expressly teach that in such a rare and exceptional case the privileged person would be obliged to believe in his own justification, fide divina.® B) Can any one, without a special revelation, be theo- logically certain that he is justified? Theological cer- tainty (certitudo theologica) is the result of a syllogism — which embodies an article of faith in one of its premises and an obvious truth of reason in the other. Ambrosius Catharinus '° stands alone among Catholic theologians in holding that there are rare cases in which men do have a theological certainty as to their justification with- out a private revelation. All other writers deny the 14“ Peirorem sequitur semper et infallibili certitudine dixerit, nist conclusio partem.” Cfr. Clarke, hoc speciali revelatione didicerit, Logic, p. 322. anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bann- 15 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, wart, n, 826.) can. 16: “Si quis magnum illud 16 In his little treatise De Certi- usque in finem perseverantiae tudine Gratiae. donum se certo habiturum absoluta ae a. ee ee ITS PROPERTIES 383 possibility: (1) because Scripture and Tradition do not countenance the proposition; (2) because there are no criteria available for such certainty outside of private revelation, and (3) because the Tridentine Council cen- sured the assertion “that they who are truly justified must needs, without any doubt whatever, settle within themselves that they are justified.” *” y) For precisely the same reasons no man can be metaphysically certain of his own justification. Hence there remains only moral certainty. Moral certainty admits of varying degrees. The highest degree of moral certainty concerning justification can be had in the case of baptized infants, though, of course, we can never be metaphysically certain even in regard to them, because there is always room for doubt as to the intention of the minister and the validity of the matter and form employed in the administration of the sacrament. In the case of adults, certainty regarding justification varies in proportion to the measure in which it can be ascertained whether one has complied with all the requirements de- manded by God. However, certainty may be so great as to exclude all reasonable doubt. St. Paul says: “Iam sure that neither death nor life . . . shall be able to sepa- rate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.” 18 And St. Augustine: “ What do we know? We know that we have passed from death to life. Whence do we know this?. Because we love our breth- ren. Let no oneask another. Let each question his own heart; if he there finds fraternal charity, let him be sure that he has passed from death to life.’ *® This teaching ce ° 17 Sess. VI, cap. 9: .. msti- sum enim (réreomat = persuasum ficatos absque ulla dubitatione apud habeo), quia neque mors neque vita semetipsos statwere, se esse tustifica- ... poterit nos separare a caritate FOSv Dei, quae est in Christo Iesu.” 18 Rom. VIII, 38 sq: “‘ Cerius Lo Track int loa Lwsanrse ns 10S 384. SANCTIFYING GRACE has led theologians to set up certain criteria by which the faithful may be relieved of unreasonable anxiety and obtain some sort of assurance as to the condition of their souls. Such criteria are: a taste for things spirit- ual; contempt of earthly pleasures ; zeal and perseverance in doing good; love of prayer and pious meditation; pa- tience in suffering and adversity; a fervent devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary; frequent reception of the sac- raments, etc.?° Thesis II: Sanctifying grace admits of degrees and therefore can be increased by good works. Both propositions contained in this thesis are de fide. Proof. The Protestant contention that the erace of justification is shared in an equal meas- ure by all the justified, was a logical deduction from Luther’s false principle that men are justified by faith alone through the external justice of Christ. If this were true, good works would be superfluous, and all Christians would enjoy an equal measure of grace. Luther formally as- serted this in his sermon on the nativity of the Blessed Virgin: ‘All we who are Christians are equally great and holy with the Mother of God.” *? Thomas a Kempis, III, 54 sqq. On “Quid nos scimus? Quia transivi- mus de morte ad vitam. Unde the whole subject of this subdivision scimus? Quia diligimus fratres. the student may profitably consult Nemo interroget hominem, redeat the Summa _ Theologica of St. unusquisque ad cor suum; si ibi Thomas, 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 5; invenerit caritatem fraternam, secu- Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 9-11, and rus sit, quia transiit a morte ad vitam.” 20 Cfr. the Imitation of Christ by Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 6, art. 4. 21 Serm. de WNativitate Mariae: “Omnes Christiani aeque magni ae a tO a eee ITS PROPERTIES 385 The Catholic Church rejects this teaching. She holds that justification is an intrinsic process by which the justice and holiness of Christ becomes our own through sanctifying grace, and that con- sequently sanctifying grace may be present in the soul in a greater or less degree, according to the liberality of God and the disposition of the indi- vidual Christian, and those who are in the state of grace may augment it by good works. The Coun- cil of Trent formally defines these truths when it says: “[We receive] justice within us, each one according to his own measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and ac- cording to each one’s proper disposition and co- operation.” 2? And: “[The justified], faith co- operating with good works, increase in that justice which they have received through the grace of Christ, and are still further justi- fied...’ 2% The second and more important of these truths is re-iterated and emphasized in the canons of Session VI: “If anyone saith that the justice received is not preserved and also increased before God through good works, but that those works are merely the fruits and signs of justi- sumus sicut mater Dei, et aeque tionem.” (Dénzinger-Bannwart, n. sancti sicut ipsa.” 22 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “ Iustitiam in nobis recipientes, unusquisque suam secundum mensuram, quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis prout vult, et secundum propriam cuiusque dispositionem et coopera- 799.) 23 Sess. VI, cap. 10: “ Iustif- catt ... in ipsa iustitia per Christi gratiam accepta, cooperante fide bonis operibus crescunt atque magis qustificantur.” (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n, 803.) 386 SANCTIFYING GRACE fication obtained, but not a cause of the increase thereof: let him be anathema.” * a) The Tridentine Fathers base their teaching on a number of Scriptural texts which either ex- pressly declare or presuppose that grace is capable of being increased in the soul after justification. Thus we read in Prov. IV, 18: “The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards and increaseth even) |) to. perfect day? iecins: XVID) 2220 “Let! nothing: hinder thee “trom praying always, and be not afraid to be justified even to death: for the reward of God continueth fon every) 2Pet. TL 18s 4) Grow anvorace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christan 2rCor, sxe ros, 7 od as increase the growth of the fruits of your jus- tice 8 Eph IV 572.5, But toevery- one OF tists given grace, according to the measure of the giv- Ing vot Christ eoApoe. Xk XO VL asc) ethos that is just, let him be justified still; and he that is holy, let him be sanctified still. Behold, I come pediaris ovare semper et ne verearis usque ad mortem iustificari, quo- 24 Sess. VI, can. 24: “*Si quis dixerit, iustitiam acceptam non con- servari atque etiam augeri coram Deo per bona opera, sed opera ipsa fructus solummodo et signa esse iustificationis adeptae, non autem ipsius augendae causam, anathema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 834.) 25 Prov. IV, 18: “ Iustorum au- tem semita quasi lux splendens pro- cedit et crescit usque ad perfectam diem.” 26 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “‘ Non im- niam merces Det manet in aeter- num.” 272 Pet. III, 18: ‘“‘ Crescite vero in gratia et in cognitione Domini nostri et Salvatoris Iesu Christi.” 28 2 Cor. IX, ro: “ [Deus] auge- bit incrementa frugum iustitiae vestrae.” 29 Eph. IV, 7: “‘ Unicuique au- tem nostrum data est gratia secun- dum mensuram donationis Christi.” a, hl a — ITS: PROPERTIES 387 quickly, and my reward is with me, to render to every man according to his works.” * Such texts could easily be multiplied. b) Tradition found definite utterance as early as the fourth century. When Jovinian attempted to revive the Stoic theory of the absolute equality of all virtues and vices, he met with strenuous opposition on the part of St. Jerome, who wrote a special treatise Contra Iovinianum, in which he said: “Each of us receives grace according to the measure of the grace of Christ (Eph. IV, 7) ; not as if the measure of Christ were unequal, but so much of His grace is infused into us as we are capable of re- ceiving.” * St. Augustine teaches that the just are as unequal as the sinners. “ The saints are clad with j ustice (Job XXIX, 14), some more, some less; and no one on this earth lives without sin, some more, some less: but the best is he who has least.” ®2 But, we are told, life as such is not capable of being increased; how then can there be an increase of spiritual life? St. Thomas an- swers this objection as follows: ‘“‘ The natural life per- tains to the substance of man, and therefore can be neither augmented nor diminished; but in the life of grace man participates accidentaliter, and consequently he can pos- sess it in a larger or smaller degree.” °° 30 Apoc. XXII, 11 sq.: “Qui non quod mensura Christi diversa justus est, iustificetur adhuc, et sit, sed tantum gratiae eius infundi- sanctus sanctificetur adhuc. Ecce tur, quantum valemus haurire.” venio cito et merces mea mecum 32 Ep., 167, n. 13: “ Induti sunt est. reddere wunicuique secundum sancti iustitia (Job 29, 14), alius opera sua.’ Cfr. Bellarmine, De magis, alius minus; et nemo hic vivit Iustific., III, 16. sine peccato et hoc alius magis, alius 31 Contra Iovin., II, n. 23: minus: optimus autem est qui mini- “ Unicuique nostrum data est gratia iuxta mensunam gratiae (Eph. 4, 7)3 mum.” 33 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 112, 388 SANCTIFYING GRACE c) From what we have said it is easy to under- stand the distinction which theologians make be- tween justification as gratia prima and justifica- tion as gratia secunda. The latter is merely an- other term for an increase of grace after justifica- tion, a) Such an increase may be effected either ex opere operantts, that is, by good works, or ex opere operato, through the sacraments, and is called jus- tification (iustificatio, SKaiwos) partly because Sacred Scripture refers to it by that name ** and partly because “to become just” (iustum fieri) and “to become more just” (iustiorem fieri) both imply true sanctification. In this connection the question may be raised whether sanctifying grace is diminished by venial sin. Venial sin does not destroy the state of grace and consequently cannot augment or diminish grace. To assume that it could, would lead to the absurd conclusion that a definite number of venial sins might eventually grow into a mortal sin, or that repeated venial sins gradually diminish grace until finally it disappears. The first-mentioned assump- tion is impossible because venial differs generically from mortal sin, and a transition from the one to the other would be a perdBaois eis dXXo yévos. The second assump- tion would entail the heretical inference that the state of art. 4, ad 3: “Vita naturalis per- the teaching of Tradition cfr. Alb. tinet ad substantiam hominis, et a Bulsano, Instit. Theol. Dogmat., ideo non recipit magis et minus; ed. G, a Graun, O. Cap., Vol. II, sed vitam gratiae participat homo p. 254, Innsbruck 1894. accidentaliter, et ideo eam potest 34 Ecclus. XVIII, 22; ° Apoc. homo magis vel minus habere.’ On XXII, 11. Se bo nae ne a ITS PROPERTIES 389 grace can be lost without mortal sin.** No doubt venial sin influences the state of grace unfavorably ; but this evil influence must be conceived as indirect — by committing venial sins man weakens his will-power, and temptation eventually grows so strong as to make mortal sin inevi- table. ‘He that contemneth small things, shall fall little by little4°* | B) If we inquire how sanctifying grace in- creases in the soul, we find that the process must be conceived as a growing intensity analogous to that of light and heat in the physical order. Gratia prima, as we have seen in a previous chapter, is a supernatural physical quality.87. Hence its increase, 4. e. gratia secunda, must be an increase of physical quality. Such an increase is called in Scholastic parlance intensio.** In what does this process consist? Certain Thom- ists ° describe it as a maior radicatio in subiecto, while the majority of theologians hold that it is simply an additio gradus ad gradum. This latter explanation is probably the correct one. Sanctifying grace is either capable of gradual increase, or it is not. If it is, there is no reason why God should deny such an increase under certain conditions. If it is not, Luther would have been right in contending that a newly baptized infant enjoys the same measure of holiness as the Blessed Virgin Mary 35 Cfr. Vasquez, Comment. im 37 V. supra, pp. 328 sqq. Summam Theol., 1a 2ae, disp. 221, 38 Cfr. Suarez, Disp. Metaph., 1. Caps Owais 7,7.6 II, disp. 16. 86 Ecclus. XIX, 1: “ Quit sper- 39 The authority of St. Thomas nit modica, paulatim decidet.” For himself can be invoked by neither a fuller treatment of this subject we party to this controversy. Cfr. refer the student to St. Thomas, Sylvius, Comment. in S. Theol., 2a Summa Theol., 2a 2a€, qu. 24, art. 2ae, dui 2qjvart.) 3) Io, 390 SANCTIFYING GRACE or the human soul of our Divine Lord. It is impossi- ble to imagine how grace could produce a quantitatively higher holiness by simply striking its roots deeper into the soul.*? y) A question of greater practical importance is this: Is the increase of sanctifying grace ac- companied by a corresponding increase of the in- fused virtues, and vice versa? Every increase or decrease of sanctifying grace must eo ipso entail a corresponding increase or decrease, re- spectively, of theological charity. Charity is either identical with grace or it is not.*! If it is, an increase of the one implies an increase of the other; if it is not, the one cannot increase without an increase of the other, be- cause they are inseparable and related to each other as nature to faculty, or root to blossom. Moreover, the degree of heavenly glory enjoyed by a soul will be com- mensurate with the measure of charity which it possessed at death. Now grace and glory bear a proportional relation to each other. Consequently, grace is aug- mented as charity increases, and vice versa. The same argument applies to the infused moral virtues. The case is different, however, with the theological virtues of faith and hope. These may continue to exist in the soul after charity has departed, and hence are not inseparable from sanctifying grace and charity, nor from the moral virtues. This consideration led Suarez to infer that, as the theological virtues of faith and hope may be infused into the soul independently of charity and before 40 For a fuller treatment of this topic see Tepe, Instit, Theol., Vol. III, pp. 217 sqq. 41 V. supra, pp. 336 sqaq. a ; a 4 f LES ‘PROPERTIES 391 justification, they must be susceptible of increase in the course of justification without regard to the existing state of grace and charity.t2 This is true of the sinner. In the justified, as Suarez himself admits, an increase of grace (or charity) probably always entails an increase of faith and hope,**— a proposition which finds strong sup- port in the decree of Trent which says: “ This increase of justification Holy Church begs, when she prays: ‘ Give unto us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope, and char- yee hee 8) A final question forces itself upon the en- quiring mind, viz.: Is sanctifying grace capable of an indefinite increase, or is there a limit beyond which it cannot grow? In trying to find an answer to this question we must draw a careful distinction between the absolute and the ordinary power of God. There is no intrinsic contradiction in the assumption that grace can be indefinitely augmented. True, it can never become actually infinite, as this would involve an absurdity.*° But if we regard the power of God as He sees fit to exercise it in the present economy (potentia Dei ordinaia), we find that it is limited by two sublime ideals of holiness to which neither man nor angel can attain, viz.: the overflowing measure of sanctifying grace in the human. soul of our Lord Jesus Christ *® and the “fulness of grace” granted to His Mother.*7 Though 42 Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 2, 13. 43 Suarez, op. cit., IX, 4, 15. 44 Sess. VI, cap. 10: “ Hoc vero iustitiae incrementum petit sancta Ecclesia, quum orat: Da nobis, Do- mine, fidei, spei et caritatis augmen- tum.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 803), Cfr. De Lugo, De Fide, disp. 16, sect. 2. 45 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol. a2as2ne dusjyecaw artes. 46 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Christology, Pp. 231 sqq. 47 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Pp. 24 sqq. Mariology, 392 SANCTIFYING GRACE these ideals are beyond our reach, we must not be dis- couraged, but try to approach them as nearly as possi- ble. | Thesis III: Sanctifying grace is lost by mortal sin. This thesis also embodies an article of faith. Proof. Calvin asserted that neither justifica- tion nor faith can be lost by those who are pre- destined to salvation, and that the unpredestined are never truly justified. Luther held that jus- tifying grace is lost solely through the sin of infi- delity. Against the former the Council of Trent declared: “If anyone saith that a man once jus- tied can sin no more, nor lose grace, and that therefore he that falls and sins was never truly justified; ... lethim be anathema.” * Against the latter the same council defined: “If anyone saith that there is no mortal sin but that of infidel- ity, or that grace once received is not lost by any other sin, however grievous and enormous, save by that of infidelity, let him be anathema.” °° At the same time, however, the Holy Synod expressly declared that venial sin does not destroy the state 48 For a more elaborate treatment isse iustificatum; ... anathema sit.” the reader is referred to Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 6, 11, and Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 570 sq., Frei- burg 1901. 49 Sess. VI,. can. 23: “Si quis hominem semel iustificatum dixerit amplius peccare non posse neque gratiam amittere atque ideo eum, qui labitur et peccat, numquam vere fu- (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 833.) 50'Sess. VI, can. 27:3) “Si quis dixerit, nullum esse mortale pecca- tum nisi infidelitatis, aut nullo alio quantumvis gravi et enormi praeter- quam infidelitatis peccato semel ac- ceptam gratiam amitti, anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 837). ITS PROPERTIES 393 of grace: “For although during this mortal life, men, how holy and just soever, at times fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial, they do not therefore cease to be just.” °* a) This teaching is so obviously in accord with Sacred Scripture that we confine ourselves to quoting three or four passages. Ezechiel says that sanctifying grace may be irretrievably lost: “Tf the just man turn himself away from his jus- tice, and do iniquity according to all the abomina- tions which the wicked man useth to work, shall - helive? All his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered; in the prevarication, by which he hath prevaricated, and in his sin, which he hath committed, in them he shall die.” °? Our Lord Himself admonishes His Apostles: “Watch ye and pray, that ye enter not into temptation.” °° St. Paul not only warns the faithful in general terms: “He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall; °* but expressly des- ignates certain mortal sins as a bar to Heaven: “Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulter- 51 Sess. VI, cap. 11: ‘“‘Licet in pius, numquid vivet? Omnes iusti- hac mortali vita quantumvis sancti et iustt in levia saltem et quotidiana, quae etiam venialia dicuntur, peccata quandoque cadant, non propterea desinunt esse iusti.” D2 EZ NOUV TD ie sabe oS, averterit se iustus a iustitia sua, et fecerit iniquitatem secundum omnes abominationes, quas operart solet im- autem tiae eius, quas fecerat, non recorda- buntur; im’ praevaricatione, qua praevaricatus-est, et in peccato suo, quod peccavit, in ipsis morietur.” 53 Matth, XXVI, 41: “ Vigilate et orate, ut non intretis in tenta- tionem.” f 541 Cor, X, 12: ..° Qut se. exi- stimat stare, videat ne cadat.” 304 SANCTIFYING GRACE ers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor railers, nor extortioners, shall possess the king- dom of God.” *° b) The teaching of Tradition was brought out clearly in the fight against Jovinian. That wily heretic claimed the authority of St. John for the assertion that the grace of Baptism can never be lost. The Johannean passage in question reads: ‘‘ Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin: for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.’ 54 St. Jerome in his reply paraphrases the passage as follows: “ Therefore I tell you, my little children, whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, in order that you may not sin and that you may know that you will remain sons of God so long as you refrain from sin.” 5” St. Augustine teaches: “If a man, being regenerate and justified, relapses of his own will into an evil life, as- suredly he cannot say: ‘I have not received,’ because of his own free choice of evil he has lost the grace of God that he has received.” °*. And St. Gregory the Great: 551 Cor. VI, 9 sq.: “ Nolite terea scribo vobis, filioli mei, omnis errare, neque fornicari neque idolis servientes neque adulteri neque molles neque masculorum concu- bitores neque fures neque avari neque ebriosi neque maledici neque rapaces regnum Dei possidebunt.” Cir. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 15 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 808). 561 John III, 9: “ Omnis, qut natus est ex Deo, peccatum non fa- cit: quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet, et non potest peccare, quo- niam ex Deo natus est.’ 57 Contra Iovin., 1. II: “ Prop- qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat, ut non peccetis et tamdiu sciatis vos in generatione Domini permanere, quamdiu non peccaveritis.” On the different interpretations of 1 John III, 9, an admittedly difficult text, see Bellarmine, De Iustific., III, 15. 58 De Corrept. et Gratia, c. VI, n, 9: “Si iam regeneratus et iustt- ficatus in malam vitam sua voluntate relabitur, certe iste mon potest dicere: Non accepi, quia acceptam gratiam Det suo in malum libero amisit arbitrio.’ ITS PROPERTIES 395 *“ As he who falls away from the faith is an apostate, so he who returns to an evil deed is regarded by Almighty God as an apostate, even though he may seem to retain the faith; for the one without the other can be of no use, because faith availeth nought without [good] works, nor [good] works without faith.” °® The penitential dis- cipline of the primitive Church furnishes additional proofs for the doctrine under consideration. If grace could be lost in no other way than by unbelief, the Sacra- ment of Penance would be useless.*° c) In connection with this subject theologians are wont to discuss the question whether or not the forfeiture of sanctifying grace involves the loss of its supernatural concomitants. Theological love or charity is substantially identical with sanctifying grace, or at least inseparable from it, and hence both are gained and lost together. This is an article of faith. To lose sanctifying grace, therefore, is to lose theological love. On the other hand, it is equally de fide that theological faith (habitus fider) is not destroyed by mortal sin; *? it can be lost only by the sin of unbelief.*2 The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of theo- 59 Hom. in Ez., 9, 1: “ Sicutt Penance in the First Six Centuries, qui a fide recedit, apostata est, ita qui ad perversum opus, quod dese- ruerit, redit, ab omnipotente Deo apostata deputatur, etiamsi fidem tenere videatur; unum enim sine altero nil prodesse valet, quia nec fides sine operibus nec opera adiu- vant sine fide.”’ 60 For the solution of certain diffi- culties see Schiffini, De Gratia Di- vind, pp. 591 sqq. On the peniten- tial discipline of the early Church efr, G, Rauschen, Eucharist and pp. 152 sqq., St. Louis 1913. 61 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can, 28: “ Si quis dixerit, amissé per peccatum gratia simul et fidem semper amitti, aut fidem quae re- manet non esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva, aut eum qui fidem sine caritate habet, non esse Christianum, anathema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 838.) 8 62 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 15: “Non modo infideltate, per quam et ipsa fides amittitur, sed 306 SANCTIFYING GRACE logical hope. True, the Church has not definitely de- clared her mind with regard to hope, but it may be set down as her teaching that hope is not lost with grace and charity but.survives like faith.°* The two contrary op- posites of hope are desperation and presumption, con- cerning which theologians commonly hold that the former destroys hope, while the latter probably does not. But even if hope and charity are lost, faith may remain in the soul like a solitary root, from which, under more favorable conditions, new life is apt to spring. As re- gards the infused moral virtues and the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost (and, a fortiori, His personal indwelling in the soul),®* it is the unanimous teaching that these disappear with sanctifying grace and charity, even though faith and hope survive. The reason is that these virtues and gifts are merely supernatural adjuncts of sanctifying grace and cannot persist without it. “ Ac- cessorium sequitur principale.” © etiam quocunque alio mortali pec- amor Dei.” cato, quamvis non amittatur fides, Nn. 1407.) acceptam tustificationis gratiam 64V. supra, Section 2, (Denzinger-Bannwart, amitti.”’ 63 Cfr, Prop. Quesnelli damn. a Clemente XI, prop. 57: “ Totum deest peccatori, quando ei deest spes, et non est spes in Deo, ubi non est 65 The questions discussed in this subdivision of our treatise are more fully treated by Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 128, sect. 4, and by Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 3 saq. CHART HR Ett THE FRUITS OF JUSTIFICATION, OR THE MERIT OF GOOD WORKS The principal fruit of justification, according to the Tridentine Council, is the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state of sancti- fying grace. Merit (meritum), as we have explained in the first part of this treatise,” is that property of a good work which entitles the doer to a reward (praemium, merces). Ethics and theology distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign merit or merit in the strict sense of the term (meritum adaequatum sive de condigno), and (2) congruous merit or quasi- merit (meritum inadaequatum sive de congruo). Condign merit supposes an equality between ser- vice and return. It is measured by commutative justice and confers a strict claim to a reward. Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the lack of strict proportion between service and recompense, confers no such claim except on grounds of equity.* . 1Sess, VI, cap. 16. 2V. supra, p.°131. 3V. supra, pp. 132 sqq. 397 398 SANCTIFYING GRACE In this treatise we are concerned with merit only in the theological sense of the term, 7. e. supernatural merit. We shall consider (1) its Existence,* (2) its Requisites,? and (3) its Objects.° 4 Realitas sive existentia meriti. 6 Obiecta meriti. 5 Conditiones meriti. a yer SECTION 1 THE EXISTENCE OF MERIT 1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—a) The medieval Beguins and Beghards held that man is able to attain such a perfect state of holiness here below as no longer to require an increase of grace or good works.’ Luther, holding that justification con- sists in the covering up of sin and the external im- putation of the justice of Christ, consistently though falsely asserted that “the just man sins in every good work,” ® that “a good work, no matter how well performed, is a venial sin,” ° and that “every work of the just deserves damnation and is mortally sinful, if it be consid- ered as it really is in the judgment of God.” ” Calvin rejected good works as “impurities and de- filements,” *? which God covers with the cloak of the merits of Jesus Christ and which He some- times rewards with temporal blessings but never 7Cfr. Conc. Viennense, A.D. 9“ Opus bonum optime factum 1311 (Clementin,, 1. V, tit. 3: “De est veniale peccatum.” Prop. 32, J. Haereticis”) in Denzinger-Bann- c., n. 772. wart, mn. 471 sqq. 10“ Omne opus iusti damnabile 8“In omni opere bono iustus est et peccatum mortale, si iudicio peccat.” Prop. Luthert Damnatae A.D. 1520 a Leone X, prop. 31 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 771). Dei iudicetur.”’ 11“ Inquinamenta et insite VT; 1234s sordes,”’ 399 400 SANCTIFYING GRACE with eternal life. Modern Protestantism has given up or at least attenuated these harsh doc- trines.”” | b) The Church had defined her teaching on this point centuries before the time of the ‘“‘Re- formers.” Thus the Second Council of Orange declared as early as 529: “Good works, when performed, deserve a reward; but grace, which is a free gift, precedes good works and is a neces- sary condition of them.” ** The Fourth Lateran Council reiterated this doctrine: ‘Not only vir- gins and those who practice continence, but the married also, who please God by having the right faith and performing good works, deserve to ob- tain eternal happiness.” ** The Tridentine Coun- cil goes into the matter at length in the sixteenth Chapter of its Sixth Session, where we read inter alia: ‘‘And for this reason life eternal is to be proposed to those working well unto the end and hoping in God, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward which is according to the promise of God Himself to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits.” *” 12 Quietism (Michael de Molinos et al.) denied the meritoriousness of good works performed in the “state of passive repose” (quies). 13 “ Debetur merces bonis operi- bus, si fiant; sed gratia, quae non debetur, praecedit ut fant.’ Can, 18 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 191.) 14 Cap. “ Firmiter”: “ Non solum autem virgines et continentes, verum etiam coniugati per rectam fidem et operationem bonam placen- tes Deo ad aeternam merentur bea- — titudinem pervenire,’ (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 430.) 15 Sess. VI, cap. 16: “ Atque SUPERNATURAL MERIT 401 The same Council formally condemned the Lutheran position as heretical: “If anyone saith that in every good work the just man sins at least venially, or, which is more intolerable still, mortally, and consequently deserves eternal punishments; and that for this cause only he is not damned that God does not impute those works unto salvation; let him be anathema.” *° The positive teach- ing of the Church may be gathered from the following condemnation: “If anyone saith that the just ought not, for their good works done in God, to expect and hope for eternal recompense from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if so be that they persevere to the end in well-doing and in keeping the commandments ; let him be anathema.” +” The existence of merit in the true and proper sense of the term is specially emphasized as follows: .“If anyone saith that . . . the justified, by the good works which he performs through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he ts, does not truly merit increase of grace .. .; let him be anathema.” ‘* The quietistic errors of Michael de Mo- ideo bene operantibus usque in finem 17 Sess. Vij). cani 126: 1) 4S7 quits et in Deo sperantibus proponenda est vita aeterna et tamquam gratia filiis Det per Christum Iesum miseri- corditer promissa et tamquam mer- ces ex ipsius Dei promissione bonis ipsorum operibus et meritis fideliter reddenda.”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.) TONS ESS VL CA 28 ah Ot QULS in quolibet bono opere iustum saltem venialiter peccare dixerit, aut quod intolerabilius est, mortaliter atque ideo poenas aeternas mereri, tantum- que ob id non damnari quia Deus ea opera non wmputat ad damnationem, anathema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 835.) dixerit, iustos non debere pro bonis operibus, quae in Deo fuerint facta, . exspectare et sperare aeternam retri- butionem a Deo per eius misericor- diam et Iesu Christi meritum, si bene agendo et divina mandata cu- stodiendo usque in finem persevera- verint, anathema sit.’ (Denzinger- Bannwart, n. 836.) 18 Sess, VI, .cans 3225) “ Si guis dixerit, .... ipsum iustificatuin bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam et [esu Christi meritum, cuius vivum membrum est, fiunt, non vere mereri augmentum gratiae,... anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 842.) 402 SANCTIFYING GRACE linos were condemned by Pope Innocent XI, Nov. 20, T0077" 2. THE MERITORIOUSNESS OF Goop Works DEMONSTRATED FROM SCRIPTURE AND TRADI- TION.—Both Holy Scripture and Tradition em- ploy opus bonum and meritum as reciprocal or correlative terms. | a) In the Old Testament the good deeds of the just are often declared to be meritorious in the sight of God. Cfr. Wisd. V, 16: “But the just shall live for evermore, and their reward is with the Lord.” Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “Be not afraid to be justified even to death, for the reward of God continueth for ever.” 7+ The New Testament teaching culminates in the “eight beatitudes,” each of which is accompanied by a special reward. After enumerating them all, with the promises attached to each, our Divine Saviour significantly adds: “Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is very great in heaven.” 7? St. Paul, who so strongly insists on the absolute gratui- tousness of Christian grace, nevertheless acknowledges the existence of merits to which a reward is due from God. Cfr. Rom. IT, 6sq.: “ [God] will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who accord- 19 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, n. aris usque ad mortem iustificart, I22I sqq. quoniam merces Dei manet in aeter- 20 Wisd. V, 16: “Iusti autem in num.” Cfr. Gen. XV, 1. perpetuum vivent et apud Dominum 22 Matth. V, 12: ‘“‘Gaudete et est merces eorum.’’ exultate, quoniam merces vestra 21 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “Ne vere- copiosa est in caelis.’ OO nn aS Cn ee SUPERNATURAL MERIT 403 ing to patience in good work, seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.” 2° 2Tim.IV,7sq.: “Ihave fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day, and not only to me, but to them also that love. his coming.” 74-1 ‘Cor; TIL8:% Every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labore?) Col, LL) 23) sa-0 Whatsoever you) do) doit from the heart, as to the Lord, and not to men, knowing that you shall receive of the Lord the reward of inheri- tance.” 2° The most eloquent exponent of the necessity of good works is St. James, who also insists on their meri- toriousness: ‘‘ Blessed is the man that endureth tempta- tion; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.”27 In the Apocalypse Jesus says: “ Be thou faithful until death, and I will give thee the crown of hie. ae. b) The teaching of the Fathers is an effective ,commentary on the Scriptural doctrine just ex- BsuRomi leon O San \nney «ey Qe veddet wunicuique secundum opera eius, tis quidem, qui secundum pa- tientiam boni operis gloriam et hono- rem et incorruptionem quaerunt, vitam aeternam,” 242 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “ Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consum- mavi, fidem servavi. In reliquo re- posita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet mihi Dominus in illa die w- stus itudex; non solum autem mihi, sed et ws qui diligunt adventum eins Clr a Cor. TX25) 251 Cor. III, 8: “ Unusquisque autem propriam mercedem accipiet, secundum suum laborem.” 26 Col. III, 23 sq.: “ Quodcunque facitis, ex animo operamini sicut Domino et non hominibus, scientes quod a Domino accipietis retributio- nem haereditatis.”’ 27 Tac. I, 12: “ Beatus vir, qut suffert tentationem, quoniam, quum probatus fuerit, accipiet coronam vitae, quam repromisit Deus diligen- tibus se.” 28 Apoc:' II, 10: “Esto fidelis usque ad mortem, et dabo tibi coro- nam vitae.’ For additional Scrip- ture texts see Bellarmine, De Iusti- ficatione, V, 3, 5» 404 SANCTIFYING GRACE pounded, as may be seen from their homilies re- produced in the Roman Breviary. St. Ignatius of Antioch says: “ Surfer me to be eaten by the beasts, through whom I can attain to God.” 2 St. Irenzeus: “ Precious should be to us the crown which we gain in battle, ... and the more we obtain it by combat, the more precious it is.”®° St. Ambrose: “Ts it not evident that the reward and punishment of merits endure after death?” St. Augustine: “ Eter- nal life contains the whole reward in the promise of which we rejoice; nor can the reward precede desert, nor be given to a man before he is worthy of it. What can be more unjust than this, and what is more just than God? We should not then demand the réward before we de- serve to get it.” °° Andagain: “ As death is given, so to speak, to reward the merit of sin, so eternal life is given to reward the merit of justice, . . . and hence it is also called reward in many Scriptural passages.” 33 c) Theologically the meritoriousness of good works is based on the providence of God. There must be some sort of sanction to enforce the divine laws,—not only the natural law (lex naturae), 29 Ep. ad Rom., IV, 1. 80 Adv, Haer., IV, 37. 88. Bp. ad Sist.z> 194). ne v2 31 De Offic., I, 15, 57: “* Nonne evidens est, meritorum aut praemia aut supplicia post mortem manere?” 82 De Moribus Ecclesiae, I, 2:5: “Vita aeterna est totum praemium, culus promissione gaudemus, nec praemium potest praecedere merita priusque homini dari, quam dignus est. Quid enim hoc iniustius et quid iustins Deo? Non ergo debe- mus poscere praemia, antequam mereamur accipere,”’ “ Sicut merito peccati tamquam sti- pendium redditur mors, ita merito iustitiae tamquam stipendium vita aeterna ... Unde etiam et merces appellatur plurimis s. Scripturarum locis.”” Other Patristic texts incul- cating the meritoriousness of good works performed in the state of grace can be found in Bellarmine, De Iustif., V, 4, 6. For the solu tion of objections raised against the Patristic argument consult Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 609 sqq. DN cat SUPERNATURAL MERIT 405 but, a fortiori, the “law of grace” (lex gratiae), as the supernatural order is so much more impor- tant than the natural. a) By the good works which he performs in the state of sanctifying grace, and with the aid of actual graces (i gratia et ex gratia), man acquires a twofold merit,— he helps to execute the divine plan of governance in regard to his fellow-creatures and assists in furthering the ex- ternal glory of God, which is the ultimate purpose of crea- tion. For this he is entitled to a double reward, just as the sinner is deserving of a double punishment for the in- jury he does to his fellowmen and the dishonor he reflects upon his Creator.** It is objected against this argument that our supernatu- ral merits, being finite, are in no proportion to the pos- session and enjoyment of an Infinite Good. This objec- tion vanishes in the light of the following considerations: (1) Sanctifying grace is a kind of deificatio, which raises man above himself to a quasi-divine dignity that colors all his actions.2®> (2) The ability of the justified to perform supernaturally good works is based entirely upon the infinite merits of Jesus Christ.** (3) The Infinite Good is possessed by the creature, not in an infinite but in a merely finite manner. Hence there is a due pro- portion between good works and merit.*” 34 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Tanzae, (Gus ets att.) 4. 35 Cfr. Prop. Bait damn. a.Pio V, 13 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1013): “ Opera bona a filits adoptionis facta non accipiunt rationem meriti ex eo, quod fiunt per Spiritum adop- tionis inhabitantem corda filiorum Dei, sed tantum ex eo, quod sunt conformia legi quodque per ea prae- statur obedientia legi.” 36 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 16: “ Absit, ut Christianus homo in se ipso vel confidat vel glorietur, et non in Domino, cuius tanta est erga homines bomitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae sunt ipsius dona.’ 87 Cfr. Conc.. Florent., A. D. 1439, (apud Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 693): “et intuert clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est, pro meri- 400 SANCTIFYING GRACE One difficulty still remains, viz.: By what title do in- fants who die in the state of baptismal innocence attain to eternal beatitude, which they have been unable to merit? We answer: The just man has two distinct claims to Heaven, one as a child of God,?% and another as a laborer in His vineyard. Baptized infants who have not yet arrived at the use of reason, possess only the first claim, while adult Christians who lead a good life enjoy also the titulus mercedis and consequently are entitled to a richer reward. Both claims ultimately rest on the mer- its of Jesus Christ.3® B) What we have said is sufficient to disprove the groundless assertion that the Catholic doctrine concerning the meritoriousness of good’ works derogates from the merits of Christ and fosters “ self-righteousness.” Would it not be far more derogatory to the honor of our Saviour to assume that He failed to obtain for those for whom He suffered and died, a limited capacity for gain- ing merits? Does it in any way impair the dignity of God as the causa prima to assume that He communicates to His creatures a limited causality, by which they are en- abled to act as true causae secundae, instead of being mere causae occasionales, as the Occasionalists assert? 4° As regards the other charge, no true Catholic is guilty of “ self-righteousness ” because he regards his good works forum tamen diversitate alium alio a Patre.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. perfectius.”’ 904.) 88 V. supra, pp. 356 sqq. 39 Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, cap. 8: “Ita non habet homo, unde glo- rietur, sed omnis gloriatio nostra in Christo est, in quo vivimus, in quo movemur, in quo satisfacimus facientes fructus dignos poenitentiae, qui ex illo vim habent, ab illo offe- runtur Patri et per illum acceptantur 40 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 33: “ Si quis dixerit, per hanc doctrinam catholicam de iustifica- tione, a s. Synodo hoc praesenti de- creto expressam, aliqué ex parte gloriae Det vel meritis Iesu Christi D. N. derogari, et non potius verita- tem fidei nostrae, Dei denique ac Christi Iesu gloriam illustrari, ana- thema sit.” en aes SUPERNATURAL MERIT 407 as “ fruits of justification,” owing purely to grace. The “ self-righteousness”” of which Luther speaks is. incom- patible with the virtue of humility. The faithful Chris- tian, according to St. Paul, may safely rejoice over his merits, because the uncertainty of justification and the consciousness that his good works are but limited at best, are a sufficient protection against self-righteousness and presumption.** 3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE. —Though the Tridentine Council merely defined in general terms that all good works performed in the state of sanctifying grace are meritorious,”* it is theologically certain that the merit due to good works is the merit of condignity. a) According to Pallavicini*? the Fathers of Trent without exception were convinced that the merit inherent in good works is a meritum de condigno, based upon di- vine justice, and they purposely employed the term vere to exclude that quasi-merit which in the technical terminology of the Schools is called meritum de con- gruo.## They refrained from expressly employing the term meritum de condigno, because meritum verum is a plain and adequate term, and for this additional reason that they wished to avoid certain theological controversies 41 Cfr. Bellarmine, De LIustifica- ficationem peractis adeoque diving tione, V, 7. See also the article gratia informatis redditisque ob on “Merit” in the Catholic En- merita Christi potentioribus, cuius cyclopedia, Vol. X. vivum membrum est is qui ea per- 42Sess. VI, cap. 16: “vere agit, omnes concedebant rationem promeruisse;” Sess, VI, can, 32: meriti condigni ad conservandam “vere mereri.” augendamque eandem gratiam aeter- 43 Hist. Conc. Trident., VIII, 4. naeque felicitatis consequendam.” 44“ Operibus post acceptam iusti- (Pallavicini, J. c.) 408 SANCTIFYING GRACE regarding the nature of the meritum de condigno and its requisites.*° b) We need not enter into these controversies to understand that condign merit supposes an equality be- tween service and reward. The proposition can be proved from Sacred Scripture by an indirect argument. The meritum de condigno is based on a strict claim of justice, not on mere equity. Now the Bible leaves no doubt that God meant to make himself a debtor to man in strict jus- tice. Cfr. Heb. VI, 10: ‘ For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work.” #° 2 Tim. IV,8: “. .. there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming.” #7 James I, 12: “ Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.” 48 That there must be a condignitas between service and reward is clearly apparent from such texts as these: — Wis. III, 5: “... God hath tried them and found them worthy onihimsel {74902 Ptiessi ny A-sqicee Sein) all your per- secutions and tribulations, which you endure, for an ex- ample [as a token] of the just judgment of God, that you may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which also you suffer.” °° Apoc. III, 4: “. . . they shall walk with me in white, because they are worthy.” *! Not merely as their benefactor but as the just judge, Christ will say 49 Wisd. III, 5: “ Deus tentavit eos et invenit illos dignos se.’ 502 Thess. I, 4 sq.: “In omni- 45 V. infra, Sect. 2. 46 Heb. VI, 10: “Non enim in- iustus est Deus, ut obliviscatur operis vestri.” S72 TMs EVE Oth ele ve FEPOSIEG est mihi,” etc. See note 24, supra, Pp. 403. 48 Tac. I, 12: suffert tentationem, note 27, p. 403. “ Beatus vir, qui ’ etc. V. supra, bus persecutionibus vestris et tribu- lationibus, quas sustinetis in exem- plum iusti inudicti Dei, ut digni habeamini in regno Dei, pro quo et patimini.” 51 Apoc, III, 4: “ Ambulabunt mecum in albis, quia digni sunt.’ SUPERNATURAL MERIT 409 to the elect on judgment day: “Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me to eat... .”°* Justly therefore is sanctifying grace, as the principium dignificativum operum, called the “seed of God,” ®* because it contains a celestial reward even as an acorn contains the oak. True, St. Thomas, to whom we are indebted for this simile,>* in another part of the Summa®> defends the theological axiom: “ Deus punt circa condignum et remunerat ultra condignum,”’ but he does not mean to deny the equality between service and reward, but merely to exalt the generosity that prompts God to bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than they deserve. Cfr. Luke VI, 38: “Give, and it shall be given to you: good measure and pressed down and shaken together and running over shall they give into your bosom.” °° 52 Matth. XXV, 34 sq.: Venite, 1014): “* Opera bona tustorum non benedicti Patris met, possidete para- tum vobis regnum a_ constitutione mundi; esurivi enim et dedistis mihi manducare ...” 531 John III, 9. 54 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 3, ad 3: “ Gratia Spiritus S.., quam im praesentt habemus, etst non sit aequalis gloriae in actu, est tamen aequalis in virtute, sicut se- men arboris, in quo est virtus ad totam arborem. Et similiter per gratiam inhabitat hominem Spiritus S., qui est sufficiens causa vitae aeternae, unde et dicitur esse pignus hereditatis nostrae.” 55 Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 21, art. Amica cnte be Luke WVil,.38: “Date, et das bitur vobis: mensuram bonam, et confectam, et coagitatam, et super- efiluentem dabunt in sinum vestrum.” Cir. Prop. Batti damn. A.D. 1567 a Pio V, 14 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. accipient in die iudicit extremi mer- cedem ampliorem, quam iusto Det tudicio mereantur accipere.’ For further information on this topic consult Bellarmine, De _ Iustifica- tione, V, 19; De Lugo, De Poeni- tentia, disp. 24, nm. 10. The Tho- mistic axiom, “ Deus punit citra con- dignum et remunerat ultra con- dignum’’ and Baius’ condemned proposition are interpreted some- what differently than we have ex- plained them by Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 31, 14. On the general argu- ment of this Section the student may profitably consult St. Bonaven- ture, Breviloquium, P. V, § 12; Bil- duant,, Der Gratia)~ disss.8;)varts13i Tepe, Instut. Theol” Vols Ill.) pp. 226 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., Pp. |. 218) *"saqq., ‘Breiburg).. 1908's Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 614 sqq., Freiburg t1gor. SELON THE REQUISITES OF MERIT As we are dealing with the “ fruits of justification,” it becomes necessary to ascertain the requisites or condi- tions of true merit. There are seven such; four have reference to the meritorious work itself, two to the agent who performs it, and one to God who gives the reward. I. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE Meritorious Work.—A work, to be meritorious, must be morally good, free, performed with the assistance of actual grace, and inspired by a supernatural motive. a) As every evil deed implies demerit and is deserving of punishment, so the notion of merit supposes a morally good work (opus honestum). Cir. Eph. VI, 8: “ Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man shall do, the same shall he receive from the Lord.” + 2 Cor. V, 10: “We must all be mani- fested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.”? There are no morally indifferent works in individuo, 7. e. practically ; and if there were, they could be neither meritorious nor 1 Eph. VI, 8: “ Scientes, quoniam nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal unusquisque, quodcunque fecerit Christi, ut referat unusquisque pro- bonum, hoc recipiet a Domino,” pria corporis, prout gessit, sive bo- 22 Cor. V, 10: “Omnes enim num sive malum.” 410 SUPERNATURAL MERIT 411 demeritorious, but would become meritorious in propor- tion as they are made morally good by means of a “ good intention.” It would be absolutely wrong to ascribe merit only to the more perfect works of supererogation (opera supererogatoria), such as the vow of perpetual chastity, excluding all works of mere obligation, such as the faithful observance of the commandments. Being morally good, the works of obligation are also meritori- ous, because goodness and meritoriousness are correla- tive terms. Whether the mere omission of an evil act is in itself meritorious, is doubtful. But most theologians are agreed in holding that the external work, as such, adds no merit to the internal act, except in so far as it reacts on the will and sustains and intensifies its opera- tion. This and similar questions properly belong to moral theology. b) The second requisite of merit is moral lib- erty (libertas indifferens ad actum), that is to say, freedom from both external and internal compul- sion. This has been dogmatically defined against Jansenius.° That there can be no merit without liberty is clearly inculcated by Sacred Scripture. Cir. 1 Cor. IX, 17: “For if I do this willingly, I have reward,’ *® Matth. XIX,.17:) “Ui. thow wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.” * 3 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., Eareae. au vita, art... 1, adit; lHo- mo, in quantum propria voluntate facit illud quod debet, meretur; alio- quin actus iustitiae, quo quis reddit debitum, non esset meritorius.” 4Cfr. Suarez, De. Gratia, », Gee 5 Sdq- 5 Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- thor of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 291 sqq. 61 Cores EX ters Sh Sie emien volens hoc ago, mercedem habeo.” 7 Matthy XIX, 17: “Sst! autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva man- data.”’ 412 SANCTIFYING GRACE “Where there is compulsion,” says St. Jerome, “there is neither a crown nor damnation.” ®* The morality of an act depends entirely on its being an actus humanus. Now no act is truly “human” unless it be freely performed. Consequently, freedom of choice is an indispensable condition of moral goodness and therefore also of merit. What kind of liberty is necessary to enable the will to acquire merit? Theologians answer by saying that it is libertas contradictionis sive exer- citu. If I doa good deed which I am free to do or not to do, I perform a morally good and therefore meritorious work. As regards the libertas speci- fications, (that freedom by which a person may act thus or otherwise, e. g. give alms to one applicant in preference to another, or mortify himself in this or that particular manner), there can be no doubt that, whatever the choice made, the action is always good and meritorious. How- ever, theologians have excogitated a hypothetical case in which an action may be physically free without being meritorious. It is when one is compelled to do a certain thing and is free only in so far as he is able to choose between two ac- tions exactly equal in moral worth. This would be the case, for instance, if he had to pay a debt of ten dollars and were left free to pay it either in 8 Contra Jovin., 1, Il, n. 3: “ Ubi necessitas est, nec corona nec damna- tio est.” SUPERNATURAL MERIT A413 coin or in currency. The more common opinion is that in a case of this kind there would be a lack of that liberty which is necessary to render an act morally good and therefore meritorious? _ c) The third requisite of merit is actual grace. Its necessity is evident from the fact that, to be meritorious, an act must be supernatural and con- sequently cannot be performed without the aid of prevenient and codperating grace.” d) Merit further requires a supernatural mo- tive, for the reason that every good work must be supernatural, both as regards object and cir- cumstances (ex obiecto et circumstantiis), and the end for which it is performed (ex fine). In determining the necessary qualities of this motive, however, theologians differ widely. a) A considerable number, mostly of the Thomist per- suasion, demand the motive of theological charity, and consequently regard the state of charity (caritas habi- tualis ‘sive status caritatis et gratiae) as essential for the meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state of grace, even if they are performed from some other, truly supernatural though inferior motive, such as obedience, the fear of God, etc. This rigorous school is constrained to raise the question whether every sin- gle good work, to be supernaturally meritorious, must proceed from an act of divine charity (toties quoties), or 9 For a more extensive treat- De Incarnatione, disp. 26, sect. 10, ment of this and allied questions ii.) 126) sde consult Ripalda, De Ente Superna- 10 V, supra, pp. 82 saq. turali, disp. 74, sect. 3; De Lugo, 414 SANCTIFYING GRACE whether the virtual influence of one act is sufficient to en- dow a series of subsequent acts with meritoriousness. Only a few Thomist theologians t defend the first-men- tioned theory. The majority’? hold that the influxus virtualis caritatis,is sufficient. This view is vigorously defended by Cardinal Bellarmine, who says: “It is not enough to make a general good intention at the beginning of a year, or month, or day, by which all future actions are referred to God; but it is necessary to refer each particular act to God before it is performed.” ** The advocates of this theory base their opinion on cer- tain Scriptural and Patristic texts, and especially on St. Thomas, whose teaching they misunderstand. The dogmatic question whether good works can be meritorious without being inspired by supernatural char- ity, has nothing to do with the moral problem whether there is an obligation to make an act of charity from time to time, except in so far as habitual charity,—7. e. the state of charity, which is always required for merit, nay even for the preservation of sanctifying grace,— cannot be permanently sustained unless renewed from time to time and effectuated by a fresh act of that virtue.> St. 11 Especially Bafiez (Comment. in vitae aeternae primo pertinet ad S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 6, caritatem, ad alias autem virtutes dub. 6). This view is also taken by secundario, secundum quod earum the so-called Augustinians. actus a caritate imperantur.’’ And 12 Notably Billuart; see his treat- again, 1. c., ad 3: ‘“‘ Similiter etiam ise De Gratia, diss. 8, art. 4. actus patientiae et fortitudinis non 13 De Tustificatione, V, 15: est meritorius, nisi aliquis ex cari- “Non sufficere, si quis ad initium ‘tate haec operetur.’’ On the true anni vel mensis vel etiam diet gene- sense of these passages cfr. Schiffini, rai quadam intentione’ referat De Gratia Divina, pp. 647 saqq. omnia sua futura opera in Deum, 15 Cfr. Prop. damn. ab Innocentio sed necesse esse ut illud ipsum opus XI, prop. 6 (Denzinger-Bannwart, particulare referatur in Deum, quod nn. 1156): ‘‘ Probabile est, ne sin- postea faciendum est,” gulis quidem rigorose quinquennus 14 Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. per se obligare praeceptum caritatis © 114, art. 4: “Et ideo meritum erga Deum,’ SUPERNATURAL MERIT A415 Alphonsus teaches that every man is obliged to make an act of charity at least once a month, but he is contra- dicted by other eminent moralists. In practice it is well to insist on frequent acts of charity because such acts not only confirm and preserve the state of grace, but render our good works incomparably more meritorious in the sight of God. Hence, too, the importance of making a “good intention” every morning before beginning the day’s work.*® 8B) There is a second group of very eminent theolo- gians, including Suarez,’7 Vasquez,1® De Lugo, and Bal- lerini, who hold that, to be meritorious, the good works of a just man, who has habitual charity, need only con- form to the divine law, no special motive being re- quired. These writers base their teaching on the Tri- dentine decree which says: “For this is that crown of justice which the Apostle declared was, after his fight and course, laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the Just Judge, and not only to him, but also to all that love His coming. For, whereas Jesus Christ Himself continually infuses His virtue into the said justified as the head into the members and the vine into the branches,— and this virtue always precedes, and accompanies, and follows their good works, which with- out it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God (can. 2), we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified to prevent their being accounted to have, by those very works which have been done in God, fully satisfied the divine law according to the state of this life, and to have truly merited eternal life, 16 Cfr. J. Ernst, Die Notwendigkett 17 De Gratia, IX, 3. ’ der guten Meinung. Untersuchungen 18 Comment, in S, Theol., 1a 2ae, tiber die Gottesliebe als Prinzip der disp. 220. Sittlichkeit und Verdienstlichkeit, Freiburg 1905. 416 SANCTIFYING GRACE to be obtained also in its [due] time, if so be, however, that they depart in grace.’’*® This teaching is in harmony with Scripture. The Bible nowhere requires an act of charity to make good works meritorious for Heaven. In the “eight beatitudes ”*° our Lord Himself promises eternal glory for works which are not all works of charity, nor even dictated by charity, either formal or virtual. When He was asked: ‘“ Master, what good shall I do that I may have life everlasting?” 24 he did not answer with Bellarmine: ‘“ Steep all thy works in the motive of charity,’ but declared: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.” ?? And when requested to specify, He simply cited the ordinary precepts of the Deca- logue.** We also know that at the Last Judgment He will receive the elect into the “kingdom of His Father ” solely in consideration of the works of mercy they have Hone: Theological reasoning lends its support to this view. If good works performed without the motive of charity were not supernaturally meritorious, this would be at- tributable to one of three causes. Either the just would 19 Concilium Trident., cap. 16: “ Haec _.est » enim illa corona tustitiae, quam post suum certamen et cursum repositam sibi esse atebat Apostolus a tusto indice sibi reddendam, non solum autem Sess. VI, Deo [= per Deum; v. Sess. VI, can. 26, 32] sunt facta, divinae legi pro huius vitae statu satisfecisse et vitam aeternam suo etiam tempore, st tamen in gratia decesserint, conse- quendam vere promeruisse censean- sibi, sed, et omnibus qui diligunt tur.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.) adventum eius. Quum enim ille ipse 20 Cfr. Matth. V, 2 sqa. Christus Iesus tamquam caput in 21 Matth. XIX, 16: “ Quid boni membra et tamquam vitis in palmites in ipsos wstificatos iugiter virtu- tem influat, quae virtus bona eorum opera semper antecedit et comitatur et subsequitur et sine qua nullo pacto Deo grata et meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis wstificatis amplius deesse credendum est, quominus plene illis quidem operibus, quae in faciam, ut habeam vitam aeternam? ” 22 Matth. XIX, 17: “Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva man- data.” 23 Cir. Matth. XIX, 18 sqq. 24 The Scriptural argument is more fully developed by Tepe, Jnsi. Theat. Vol, til sppy233o saa; SUPERNATURAL MERIT 417 sin by doing good; or good works performed without charity would not be deserving of eternal beatitude; or, finally, there would be no strict equality between service and reward. All three of these suppositions are un- tenable. The first would lead to Bajanism or Jansen- ism.2> The second and third overlook the fact that the requisite proportion (condignitas) between service and reward is furnished by sanctifying grace or habitual char- ity, which, as deificatio, adoptive sonship, and union with the Holy Ghost, actually supplies that for which the motwum caritatis is demanded. We might ask the advocates of the more rigorous opin- ion, whence the act of charity which they demand for every meritorious work, derives its peculiar proportion- ality or condignitas with the beatific vision. Surely not from itself, because as an act it is merely primus inter pares, without in any essential respect excelling other motives. There is no alternative but to attribute it to that quasi-divine dignity which is imparted to the just man and his works by sanctifying grace. For these reasons present-day theology regards the second theory as sufficiently well established and the faith- ful are largely guided by it in practice.” 2. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE AGENT wHo Merits.—The agent who merits must be a wayfarer and in the state of sanctifying grace. | a) The wayfaring state (status viae) is merely another name for life on earth. Death as the 25 V. supra, pp. 73 sqq- mat., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 225 sqq., 26On a similar controversy re- and Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. garding the necessity of the motive 649 sqq. of faith, see Pesch, Praelect. Dog- 418 SANCTIFYING GRACE natural, though not essentially necessary limit of life, closes the time of meriting. Nothing is more clearly taught in Holy Scripture than that we must sow in this world if we desire to reap in the mext:s/ b) The second requisite is the state of sancti- fying grace. Only the just can be “‘sons of God” ancl eins Or heaven: (the) Ponti Wi) os “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abidepin/mme. jc7) (Rom) Vallis. \Andituons. heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ.” %° Does the degree of sanctifying grace existing in the soul exert a decisive influence on the amount of merit due to the good works performed? This question can be easily solved on the theological principle that the super- natural dignity of the soul increases in proportion to its growth in sanctifying grace. Vasquez holds that, other things being equal, one who is holier gains no greater merit by performing a given work than one who is less 27 The Scriptural proof for this proposition will be found in the dogmatic treatise on Eschatology. On the absurdity of the semi-Pela- gian hypothesis of merita sub condi- tione futura see Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 375 sq. 28 Cfr. Prop. Bait damn. 1567 a Pio V, prop. 17 (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 1017): “ Sentiunt cum Pelagio, qui dicunt esse necessarium ad rationem meriti, ut homo per gratiam adoptionis sublimetur ad statum deificum.’”’ 29 John XV, 4: “ Sicut palmes ‘non potest ferre fructum a semet- ipso, nisi manserit in vite, sic nec vos, nist in me manseritis.” 30 Rom. VIII, 17: “Si autem filtt, et haeredes; haeredes quidem Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi.’ Additional Biblical texts in Bellar- mine, De Iustificatione, V, 12 sq. SUPERNATURAL MERIT 419 holy.** All other theologians *? hold with St. Thomas *° that the meritoriousness of a good deed is larger in pro- portion to the godlike dignity of the agent, which in turn is measured by the degree of sanctifying grace in the soul. This explains why God, in consideration of the greater holiness of some saints who are especially dear to Him, often deigns through their intercession to grant favors which He refuses to others.** 3. THE REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF Gop.—Merit requires but one thing on the part of God, vizg.: that He accept the good work 1 actu secundo as deserving of reward. Since, however, theologians are not agreed on this point, we are dealing merely with a more or less well-founded opinion. Though the good works of the just derive a special intrinsic value from the godlike dignity of adoptive son- ship, and, consequently, in actu primo, are truly meritor- ious prior to and apart from their acceptance by God, yet human service and divine remuneration are separated by such a wide gulf that, in order to make a good deed meritorious im actu secundo, the divine accept- ance and promise of reward must be expressly super- added. In regard to the relation between service and reward Catholic theologians are divided into three schools. The Scotists #° hold that the condignitas of a good work © 81 Comment. in S. Theol., 3a, 38 Comment. in Sent., II, dist. 29, disp. 6, cap. 4. Cts) esr art.\-4) 32 Suarez (De Gratia, XII, 22), 84 Citi Jobi XLIl) 8s) Dany 11D, 3'5. Ripalda (De Ente Supernatural, 35 Cfr. Scotus, Comment. in Sent., disp. 81), De Lugo (De Incarna- I, dist. 17, qu. 2. tione, disp. 6, sect. 2, n. 37)- 420 SANCTIFYING GRACE rests entirely on God’s gratuitous promise and free ac- ceptance, without which even the most heroic act would be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it even natu- rally good works may become meritorious. This rather shallow theory almost completely loses sight of the god- like dignity peculiar to the just in their capacity of “adopted children of God” and “temples of the Holy Ghost,” and is unable to account for such important Bib- lical terms as “crown of justice,’ “ prize of victory,” “just judge,” etc. Suarez and his school contend that there is such a perfectly balanced equality between merit and reward that God is obliged in strict justice (ex obligatione iusti- tiae), prior to and apart from any formal act of accept- ance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the beatific vision. This view is scarcely tenable because there is no common basis on which to construe a relation of strict justice between the Creator and His creatures,*® and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that ‘“‘ The suf- ferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come.” ®” Hence we prefer to hold with Lessius,* Vasquez,®® and De Lugo *° that the condignitas or equality existing be- tween merit and reward, owes its origin both to the in- trinsic value of the good work itself and to the free ac- ceptance and gratuitous promise of God. This solution duly respects the intrinsic value of merit im actu primo, without derogating from the sublime dignity of God, who rewards good works not because He is obliged to do so 86 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 88 De Perfect. Divin., XIII, 2. Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 39 Comment. in S. Theol., ta 2ae, Ppp. 456 sq. disp. 214, 223. 87 Rom. VIII, 18: “‘ Non sunt 40 De Incarnatione, disp. 3, sect. condignae passiones huius temporis 1 sq. ad futuram gloriam.” SUPERNATURAL MERIT A421 by the merits of a mere creature, but solely because He is bound by His own truthfulness and fidelity. Thus God’s justice towards His creatures is placed upon a free basis, and there is no violation of justice (imuria) on His part. ‘From the fact that our actions have no merit except on the supposition that God so ordained,” says St. Thomas, “ it does not follow that God is simply our debtor ; He is His own debtor, 7. e. He owes it to Him- self to see that His commands are obeyed.’ ** This teaching can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cir. James I, 12: “ He shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him.” * It is re- echoed by St. Augustine: “God is made our debtor, not by receiving anything from us, but because it pleased Him to promise us something. For it is in a different sense that we say toa man: You are indebted to me because I have given you something, and: ‘You owe this to me because you have promised it. To God we never say: Give back to me because I have given to Thee. What have we given to God, since it is from Him that we have received whatever we are and whatever good we possess? We have therefore given Him nothing. . . . In this man- ner, therefore, may we demand of God, by saying: Give me what Thou hast promised, because we have done what Thou didst command, and it is Thyself that hast done it because Thou hast aided our labors.’ *® The Triden- 41 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, vitae [St. Paul says: 6 rhs duKato- art. 1, ad 3: “Dicendum quod, otyns orépavosl, quam rvepromisit quia actio nostra non habet rationem (émnyyeldato) Deus diligentibus +, meriti nisi ex praesuppositione di- sé, vinae ordinationis, non sequitur 43 Serm., 158, c 2, n. 2: “ Debi- quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter debi- tor factus est Deus non aliquid c tor nobis, sed sibi ipsi, inquanium nobis accipiendo, sed quod et placuit debitum est, ut sua ordinatio implea- promittendo. Aliter enim dicimus tur.’ homini: Debes mihi, quia dedi tibt; 42lac. I, 12: “Accipiet coronam et aliter dicimus: Debes mihi, quia 422 SANCTIFYING GRACE tine Council seems to endorse this view when it says: “Life eternal is to be proposed to those . . . hoping in God . . . as a reward which is, according to the promise of God Himself, to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits.” * promisisti mihi. Deo autem nun- quam dicimus: Redde mihi, quia dedi tibi. Quid dedimus Deo, quan- do totum quod sumus et quod habe- mus boni, ab illo habemus? Nihil ergo ei dedimus. .. . Illo ergo modo possumus exigere Dominum nostrum ut dicamus: Redde, quod promisistt, quia fecimus quod iussisti, et hoc tu fecisti, quia laborantes iuvisti.” 44 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 16: “In Deo sperantibus propo- nenda est vita aeterna... tam- quam merces ex ipsius Dei promis- sione bonis ipsorum operibus et me- ritis fideliter [i. e. ex fidelitate] red- denda.” Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 416 sqq. SECTION: 2 THE OBJECTS OF MERIT After defining the existence of merit the Tri- dentine Council enumerates its objects as fol- lows: “If anyone saith that the justified, by the good works which he performs, . . . does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life,—if it be so, how- ever, that he depart in grace,—and also an in- crease of glory: let him be anathema.’’* Hence merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an in- crease of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; and (3) an increase of that glory. The expres- sion “vere mereri”’ shows that all three of these objects can be merited in the true and strict sense of the term (de condigno). ‘This is, however, no more than a theologically certain conclusion. I. INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GraAcE.—The first grace of justification (gratia prima) can never be merited;? hence the meaning of the above-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be increased by good works. ‘This increase is tech- 1Sess. VI, can. 32: “Si quis serit, consecutionem atque etiam dixerit, iustificatum bonis operibus gloriae augmentum, anathema sit.” . non vere mereri augmentum gra- 2See the article on “ Merit” in tiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius vitae the Catholic Encyclopedia. aeternae, st tamen in gratia deces- 423 424 SANCTIFYING GRACE nically called gratia secunda. All Scriptural texts which assert that sanctifying grace is un- equal in different individuals, also prove that it _ can be increased or augmented by the Der toni: ance of meritorious works.’ _a) No adult person can merit the first grace of assist- ance (gratia prima actualis), nor any one of the series of actual graces which follow it, and by which justification ultimately comes to pass. They are all purely gratuitous. Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (gratia prima habitualis) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner preparing for justification. This is the express teaching of Trent: “But we are therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things which precede justification — whether faith or works — merit the grace itself of justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now by works; otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace.”* To deny this would not only imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace (because if the first grace given before active justification could be strictly merited, this would necessarily involve the gratia prima actualis), but it would also start a vicious circle (because the gratia prima habitualis is an indispensable condition of merit). This explains why St. Paul and St. Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both of the first grace of assistance and the grace of justifica- tion proper.’ “ This grace of Christ,” says St. Augustine, “without which neither infants nor adults can be saved, 3 V. supra, Ch. II, Sect. 3, Thesis ipsam iustificationis gratiam pro- II. 4Sess. VI, cap. 8:. “Gratis autem iustificari ideo dicimur, quia nihil eorum quae _ iustificationem praecedunt, sive fides, sive opera, meretur; st enim gratia est, iam non ex operibus, alioquin, ut idem Apo- Stolus inquit, gratia iam non est gra- tia.”’ 5 V. supra, Sect. 2, No. 2, r SUPERNATURAL MERIT 428 if is not bestowed for any merits, but is given freely, on account of which it is also called grace. ‘ Being justi- fied,’ says the Apostle, ‘ freely through His blood.’ ” ® In the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the question, raised by Vasquez, whether perfect contrition justifies the sinner merely per modum dispositionis or per modum causae formalis. Both contrition and charity, be they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose the soul for justification.” Hence, no matter how perfect, neither is capable of effecting justification itself by way of merit (merendo), nay, of entering even partially, as Vasquez would have it, into the formal cause of justifica- tion, because, according to the Tridentine Council, sanc- tifying grace and not perfect contrition is the unica causa formalis of justification.® b) In connection with the dogma just explained theolo- gians discuss the question whether a just man may strictly (de condigno) merit the actual graces which God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish between merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theo- logians commonly hold® that merely sufficient graces may be merited de condigno, not so efficacious graces, because the right to efficacious graces would necessarily include a strict right to final perseverance (donum perse- 9 See, for example, Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 26: “De auxilis suf- 6 De Natura et Gratia, c. 4, n. 4: ‘“‘ Haec Christi gratia, sine qua nec infantes nec aetate grandes salvi fiert possunt, non meritis redditur, sed gratis datur, propter quod et gratia nominatur. LTustificati, inquit (Rom. IIT, 24; V, 4), gratis per sanguinem ipsius.” 7 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 6; Sess. VI, can. 3; Sess. XIV, cap. 4; supra, pp. 286 sqq. 8 For a more exhaustive treatment of this topic consult Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol, III, pp. 158 saq. ficientibus et necessariis, quae post aliquod meritum de condigno aug- menti gratiae dantur, vel offeruntur, probabile est. concomitanter cadere sub idem meritum de condigno aug- mentt gratiae; nam qui meretur de condigno aliquam formam, meretur quidquid connaturaliter sequitur ex tali forma vel et connaturaliter de- betur.” On the actual distribution of sufficient grace, v. supra, pp. 167 sqq. 426 SANCTIFYING GRACE verantiae), which lies outside the sphere of condign merit. Assuming that the justified could by good works strictly merit the prima gratia efficax (an impossible hy- pothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious grace), this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, fourth grace — and ultimately to the final grace of perse- verance, which, in matter of fact, no man can merit. Not even heroic acts of virtue give a strict right to infallibly efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest he lapse from righteousness.’ For this reason the Tri- dentine Council mentions neither final perseverance nor efficacious graces among the objects of merit." 2. ETERNAL LIFE oR HEAVENLY GLORY.— The second object of merit is eternal life. The dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given above.’* Eternal life is described by the Triden- tine Council ** both as a grace and as a reward. a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Sec- tion the same Council * enumerates four apparently sep- arate and distinct objects of merit, wiz.: increase of grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, and in- crease of glory. Why the distinction between “ eternal life” and the “attainment of eternal life”? Does this imply a twofold reward, and consequently a twofold object of merit? Theologians deny that such was the intention of the Council, because the right to a reward evidently coincides with the right to the payment of the 10V. supra, pp. 392 sqq. 12V. supra, Sect. 1, 11 For a fuller treatment cfr. 13 Sess. VI, cap. 16; v. supra, pp. Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 258 400 sq. sqq., and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- 14 Sess. VI, can. 32. mat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 237 sqq. SUPERNATURAL MERIT 427 same. An unattainable eternal life would be a chimera.® Nevertheless, the distinction is not superflu- ous, since the attainment of eternal life does not co- incide with the gaining of merit but must be put off until death, and even then depends upon the condition of the soul: “ si tamen in gratia decesserit”’ (provided he depart in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod also wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of sanctifying grace ipso facto entails the forfeiture of all previously acquired merits. Even the greatest saint, were he to die in the state of mortal sin, would enter eternity with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would require a new justification.*® b) A close analysis of the Tridentine canon under re- view gives rise to another difficulty. Can the gloria prima be merited? In defining the gratia secunda as an ob- ject of strict merit, the Council expressly excludes the gratia prima. It makes no such distinction in regard to glory, but names both “eternal life” (gloria prima) and “increase of glory” (gloria secunda) as objects of merit. This naturally suggests the query: Why and to what extent can the just man merit the gloria prima, seeing that he is unable to merit the gratia prima? Some theolo- gians ‘7 contend that the justified are entitled to the gloria prima only as a heritage (titulo haereditatis), never as a reward (titulo mercedis). Because of its intimate causal connection with the gratia prima, which is beyond see the treatise on the Sacrament of Penance, Vol. X of this series; 15 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 29: “Dicendum vitam aeternam et vitae aeternae consecutionem non esse duo praemia distincta, quia merert mercedem et solutionem mer- cedis non sunt duae mercedes.” 16 On the reviviscentia meritorum cfr. also Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 661 sqq. i7E. g. Ripalda (De Ente Super- nat., disp. 89, sect. 1) and De Lugo (De Incarnatione, disp. 3, n. 59). 428 SANCTIFYING GRACE the reach of merit, the gloria prima, they argue, cannot be regarded as an object of merit except on the assumption that the merits which precede justification confer a claim to the gloria prima. This assumption is false, because without sanctifying grace no condign merits can be acquired.*® In spite of this difficulty, however, most theo- logians * hold that, unlike the gratia prima, the gloria prima may under certain conditions be an object of strict merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is not a necessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good works, while the state of grace is, the former may positis ponendis be an effect of the meritum de congruo, though the latter may not. A mere statement of the problem shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we dis- tinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of two distinct hypotheses. It is generally agreed that in- fants dying in the state of baptismal grace owe that grace, and the state of glory which they enjoy in Heaven, solely to God’s mercy and have no claim to beatitude other than that of heredity (titulus hereditatis).. Adults who preserve their baptismal innocence until death, manifestly cannot merit the gloria prima by their good works, because they already possess a legal title to it through Baptism.?° It follows that their good works increase, but do not merit, the gloria prima, to which these souls are already entitled titulo haereditatis. The case is quite different with catechumens and Christians guilty of mortal sin, who are justified by an act of perfect contrition before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament of Pen- ance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contra- diction, that they merit for themselves de condigno, not 18 V. supra, Sect. 2, No. 2. Theol., ta. 2ae, disp. 219, c. 2. 19 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, XII; 20 Despite Bellarmine’s contradic- 28, and Vasquez, Comment. in S. tion (De LIustificatione, V, 20.) a ee SUPERNATURAL MERIT 429 indeed the first grace of justification, but the gloria prima, because perfect contrition, being an opus operans, at the very moment of its infusion becomes an opus meritorium entitled to eternal glory.21 As regards the great majority of adult Catholics who, because of de- fective preparation, never get beyond imperfect contrition (attritio), and therefore are not justified until they ac- tually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe whatever grace they possess and whatever glory they have a claim to, entirely to the opus operatum of the Sacra- Tene. 3. INCREASE OF HEAVENLY GLory.—The third object of merit, according to the Tridentine Coun- cil, is “increase of glory.” This must evidently correspond to an increase of grace, which in its turn is conditioned upon the performance of ad- ditional good works. That there is a causal con- nection between meritorious works performed on earth and the glory enjoyed in Heaven is clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. XVI, 27: “For the Son of man shall . . . render to every man according to his works.” *° 1 Cor. III, 8: “And every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labor.” ** A 21 Cfr, St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 23 Matth. XVI, 27: “Et tunc Ia 2ae, qu. 122, art. 2, ad 1: wreddet unicuique secundum opera “ Praeparatio hominis ad gratiam eius (xara Thy mpagiy avrov).” habendam quaedam est simul cum 241 Cor. III, 8: “ Unusquisque ipsa infusione gratiae; et talis ope- autem propriam mercedem (rop ratio est quidem meritoria, sed non idcov uroOdv) accipiet secundum gratiae quae iam habetur, sed gloriae suum laborem (kara Tov tdioy quae nondum habetur.”’ KOTrov).” 22 Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 266 sqq. 430 SANCTIFYING GRACE further argument may be derived from the un- equal apportionment of glory to the elect in Heaven.” This inequality is based on inequal- ity of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact that grace can be augmented by good works. Consequently, the inequality of glory depends ulti- mately on good works.” 4. NoTtE oN THE MeERITUM DE CoNGRUO. —Congruous, as distinguished from condign merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a quasi- iain based on equity (ex quadam aequi- tate, congruentia, decentia). Hence congruous merit and condign merit are not species of the same genus, but merely analogous terms. Because of the ambiguity of the word “ equity ” Domini- cus Soto, Becanus, and a few other Scholastics rejected the use of the term meritum de congruo in theology. But this was a mistake. The Fathers engaged in the Semi- pelagian controversy, notably St. Augustine,?* did not assert that the justifying faith of the sinner is entirely without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are identical with those of condign merit 8 in all respects ex- cept one,— the meritum de congruo does not require the state of grace. a) According to the common opinion, from which but few theologians dissent,?® a Christian in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment he 25 See Eschatology. 28V. supra, Sect. 2. 26 Cir. St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum- 29 Prominent among the dissenters ma Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 8. is Billuart (De Gratia, diss. 8, 27 De Praed. Sanctorum, c. 2. ATt.5)). SUPERNATURAL MERIT 430 begins to cooperate with supernatural grace, merit de congruo by good works, and obtain by prayer the dispositions necessary for justification, and ultimately justification itself. “Prayer relies on mercy,” says St. Thomas, “ condign merit on justice. And therefore man obtains from the divine mercy many things by prayer which he does not merit in strict justice.” °° This teaching is based partly on Holy Scripture and partly on the writings of St. Augus- tine, and is confirmed by certain utterances of the Council of Trent. By conscientiously preparing himself with the aid of actual grace, the sinner probably merits an additional claim (in equity) to justification. Cfr. Ps. L, 19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a con- trite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.” ** Dan. IV, 24: “Redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor: perhaps he [God] will forgive thy offences.” °? St. Augustine says: “ The remission of sins itself is not without some merit, if faith asks for it. Nor is that faith entirely unmeritorious by which the publican was moved to say: ‘God, be merciful to me, a sinner,’ and then went away justified through the merit 80 Summa Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 114, art. 6,‘ad 2: ‘“ Impetratio orationis innititur misericordiae, meritum au- tem condignt innititur iustitiae. Et a1deo multa orando impetrat homo ex divina misericordia, quae tamen non meretur secundum itustitiam.” 31 Ps. L, 19: “ Cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non despicies.” 82 Dan. IV, 24: “Peccata tua eleemosynis redime et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum; forsitan _. tgnoscet delictis tuts.’’ of faithful humility.” % SSE DF Gd Stitt LOAN Conan Ne Oe “Sed nec ipsa remissio peccatorum sine aliquo merito est, st fides hanc impetret. Neque enim nullum est meritum fidei, qua fide tlle dicebat: Deus propitius esto mihi peccatori, et descendit iustificatus merito fidelis humilitatis.’” Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 7 (Denzinger-Bann- wart, n. 799): “ Hanc dispositionem seu praeparationem iustificatio ipsa consequitur.” For a fuller treat- ment cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 37. 432 SANCTIFYING GRACE b) By good works the just may merit for them- selves, not in strict justice (de condigno), but as a matter of equity (de congrua), final persever- ance, conversion from mortal sin, spiritual favors for others, and also such temporal blessings as may be conducive to eternal salvation. a) It is a theologically certain conclusion, accepted by all theologians without exception, that the grace of final perseverance (donum perseverantiae) cannot be merited in the strict sense (de condigno). Most authors hold, however, that it can be merited de congruo. This meritum is technically called meritum de congruo fallibili. Those who deny that it can be merited at all, admit that it can be infallibly obtained by fervent and unremitting prayer.* 8) It is impossible to answer with anything like cer- tainty the question whether the just man is able to merit for himself in advance the grace of conversion against the eventuality of a future lapse into mortal sin. Follow- ing the lead of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas takes a negative view,°° on the ground that mortal sin interrupts the state of grace and annihilates all former merits. In another passage of his writings, however, the Angelic Doctor says: “There are two kinds of merit, one based on justice, and this is called condign; and another based solely upon mercy, and this is called congruous. Of the latter St. Paul says that it is just, 7. e. congruous, that a man who has performed many good works should merit. . . . And in this wise God does not forget our work and 84V. supra, pp. 123 sqq. The art. 7: “ Respondeo dicendum quod student may also consult Tepe, In- nullus potest sibi mereri repara- stit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 258 sqq., tionem post lapsum futurum neque and Bellarmine, De Iustific., V, 22. merito condigni neque merito con- 35 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, grui.” SUPERNATURAL MERIT 433 love.” °° Scotus,*” Bonaventure,*® and Suarez *® regard this as “a pious and probable opinion,” well supported by Holy Scripture. . The prophet Jehu said to Josaphat, King of Juda: “ Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord; but good works are found in thee.’ *° To this argument add the following consideration: If previous mortal sin does not prevent those acts whereby man is disposed for justification from being at least to a limited extent meritorious, there is no reason to assume that merits cancelled by subsequent mortal sin will not be im- puted to the sinner, with due regard, of course, to a cer- tain proportion between past merits and future sins.* To pray for the grace of conversion against the eventu- ality of future mortal sin, is always good and useful,* because it cannot but please God to know that we sin- cerely desire to be restored to His friendship if we should ever have the misfortune of losing it.** y) The just man may congruously merit for others 36 Lect. in Hebr., III, -6, 10: “ Duplex est meritum. Unum quod baris; sed bona opera inventa sunt in te.” innititur iustitiae et istud est meri- tum condigni; aliud quod soli miseri- cordiae innititur, quod dicitur meri- tum congrui. Et de isto dicit [Paulus], quod iustum est, i. e. con- gruum, quod homo, qui mulia bona fecit, mereatur. ... Et isto modo non obliviscitur Deus operis nostri et dilectionis.”” 37 Comment, in Sent., IV, dist. 2, Quist ant. 2. 38 Comment. in Sent., II, dist. 28, dub. 2. 39 De Gratia, XII, 38, 6. 402 Paral. XIX, 2 sq.: “Impio praebes auxilium et his, qui oderunt Dominum, amicitia iungeris et id- circo iram quidem Domini mere- 41 Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 38, 7: “ Possunt enim praecedentia merita esse tam pauca et tot peccata postea multiplicata, ut omnino obruant merita et efficiant, ut nullo modo Deum ad misericordiam provocent; secus vero erit, st e contrario merita magna fuerint et peccatum subse- quens et rarum sit et excusationem aliquam ex ignorantia vel infirmitate habeat.” 42 Ps, LXX, 9: “ Quum defece- vit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me.’’ 48 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. i114, art. 7, ad 1: “ Desiderium, quo quis desiderat reparationem post lapsum, iustum dicitur; et similiter oratio, qua petit 434 SANCTIFYING GRACE whatever he is able to merit for himself, e. g. the grace of conversion, final perseverance, and also the first prevenient grace (gratia prima praeveniens), which no man in the state of original sin is able to merit for him- self.** The reason for this, according to St. Thomas, is the intimate relation of friendship which sanctifying grace establishes between the just man and God.*® How- ever, as Sylvius rightly observes, it is not in the power of the just to obtain by this friendship favors which would involve the abrogation of the divinely established order of salvation. Such a favor would be, for example, the jus- tification of a sinner without the medium of grace, or of a child without the agency of Baptism. An unreason- able petition deserves no consideration, even if made by a friend. What may be obtained by the merit of good works may be even more effectively obtained by prayer for others. The Apostle St. James teaches: ‘“ Pray for one another that you may be saved; for the continual prayer of a just man availeth much.” ** This consoling truth is confirmed by the dogma of the Communion of Saints, by many illustrious examples from the Bible * and ecclesiastical history,** and by the traditional practice of the Church in praying God to give strength and per- severance to the faithful and the grace of conversion to the heathen and the sinner.*® eiusmodi reparationem, dicitur iusta, quia tendit ad iustitiam; non tamen ita quod iustitiae innitatur per mo- dum meriti, sed solum misericordiae.” Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 687 sq. 44V, supra, pp. 136 sqa. 45 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 6: ‘‘ Quia enim homo in gratia constitutus implet Dei voluntatem, congruum est secundum amicitiae proportionem ut Deus impleat ho- minis voluntatem in salvatione alte- rius, licet quandoque possit habere impedimentum ex parte illius, cuius aliquis sanctus iustificationem desi- derat.”’ 46 Tac. V, 16: “ Orate pro in- vicem, ut salvemini; mulitum enim valet deprecatio iusti assidua.” 47 E. g. Abraham, Job, St. Ste- phen. 48 EF. g. St. Augustine and his mother St. Monica. 49 Cfr, Suarez, De Gratia, XII, SOs ST. SUPERNATURAL MERIT 435 8) A final question remains to be answered: Can the just congruously merit such temporal blessings as good health, a comfortable living, and success in business? They can, but only in so far as these favors are conducive to eternal salvation; for otherwise they would not be graces. St. Thomas seems to go even further than this by describing temporal favors as objects of condign merit when they are conducive to salvation, and of con- gruous merit when they bear no relation to that end.°° We have no space left to enter into an argument on this point, but in conclusion wish to call attention to two im- portant facts: first, that prayer is more effective than good works in obtaining temporal as well as spiritual favors; and secondly, that we should not strive with too much anxiety for earthly goods, but direct our thoughts, de- sires, prayers, and actions to God, the Infinite Good, who has promised to be our “ exceeding great reward.” ** READINGS: — St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, ta 2ae, qu. 114, art. 1 sqq.— Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 8, art. 1-5.—* Bellarmine, De Iustificatione, V, 1-22—* Suarez, Opusc. de Divina Iustitia.— Ipem, De Gratia, 1. XII, cap. 1 sqq.— Oswald, Lehre von der Heili- gung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnadenwahl, §7, 3rd ‘ed, Paderborn 1885.— Tepe, Institutiones Theologicae, Vol. III, pp. 223 sqq., Paris 1896.—* Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theolo- gie, Vol. VIII, § 473 sqq., Mainz 1897.— Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 215 sqq., Freiburg 1908.— 50 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 10: “‘ Dicendum est quod, st temporalia bona considerentur, prout sunt utilia ad opera virtutum, quibus perducimur in vitam aeternam, se- cundum hoc directe et simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sicut et augmen- tum grate et omnia illa, quibus homo adiuvatur ad perveniendum in beatitudinem post primam gratiam. +. Sti autem considerentur hwuius- modi temporalia bona secundum se, sic non sunt simpliciter bona homu- nis, sed secundum quid, et tta non simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sed secundum quid, inquantum scil. ho- mines moventur a Deo ad aliqua tem- poraliter agenda, quibus suum pro- positum consequuntur Deo favente.” BLiGensiNVy, brs) (TBO i. ste Mer- ces tua magna nimis,” 436 SANCTIFYING GRACE S. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 504 sqq., Freiburg 1901.— Kneib, Die Lohnsucht der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904.—I. J. Remler, C. M., Supernatural Merit, St. Louis 1914.— A. Devine, C. P., The Sacraments Explained, 3rd ed., London 1905, pp. 74-80. —L. Labauche, S. S., God and Man, pp. 254-270, N. Y. 1016. (On merit in general see M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Dublin 1909, pp. 544 sqq.) —B. J. Otten, S. J.. A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 249 sqq. On the Protestant idea of the fruits of justification see Mohler, Symbolik, § 21 sqq. (English edition, pp. 157 sqq.). INDEX A ACCEPTANCE of good works by God, 419 sqq. Actual Grace, 3 sqq.; Its na- ture, 5 sqq.; Its relation to habitual»; Grace, 14, sqq-; Definition of, 15; Its two- fold causality, 15 sqq.; Di- vision of, 19 sqq.; Proper- ties of, 49 sqq.; Necessity of, 50 sqq.; Gratuity of, 131 sqq.; Universality of, 152 sqq.; Its relation to free- will, 222 sqq.; As a requisite of supernatural merit, 413 sqqd. Actus humanus, 412. Adoption, 357. Adoptive sonship, 155, 356 sqq. ; Adults, all receive sufficient grace, 167 sqq. Affectus credulitatis, 105. Albertus Magnus, 206, 432. Alexander VIII, 179 sq. Alexander of Hales, 206 Aloysius, St., 211. Alphonsus, St., 415. Alvarez, 30, 216, 242, 243. Ambrose, St., 69, 102, 158, 209, 319, 349, 404. Amor afrectivus et effectiwus, Amsdorf, 291. Anabaptists, 322. Aquaviva, 260, 262. Aristotle, 26, 31, 333, 353: Arnauld, 180. Athanasius, St) 441'- sq. 373, 374- Attributes, Divine, 344 sq. “Auctorem Fidei,’ Bull, 74 sq. Augustine, St.°7;) 8, Qi 17 3020 22, 23, 24 Sq., 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 30,’ 37.39, 42) 43, 47; 59; 59 sqq., 66, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, OI, 92, 97,08, ° £00, 102,\ L034 .\iL05; 107, 108 sq., 112, 118 sq., 126, 127, 138, 140, 141, 144, 146, 159 sqq., 171, 174, 177, 188, 189 sq. I9I sq. 194, 197, 203 Sq., 210, 215, 228 saq., 249, 252, 253, 254, 259, 262, 204, 289, 308, 319 sq., 337 Sq., 342, 343, 350, 368, 373 Sq., 375, 383, 387, 394, 404, A2I, 424 Sq., 430, 431. Augustinianism, 147, 200, 232 sqq. B Barus AND BaAJANISM, 55, 56, 60,. 61, 62,: 07, JO, 074 SAG. 147, 417. Ballerini, 415. Bafiez, 232 sqq., 246, 255. Baptism, 163 sqq. 279, 306, 308 sq., 314, 315, 318, 319, 330 Sq., 394, 428, 434. Barnabas, Epistle of, 318. Basil, St., 346, 349, 373. Beatitudes, 402, 416. Beauty, Supernatural, an ef- fect of sanctifying grace, 349 sdqq. Becanus, 200. 437 438 INDEX Beghards, 399. Beguins, 399. Bellarmine, 163, 203, 210, 260, 203, 319, 330, 334, 337, 414. Benedict XIV, 240. meaty | Sty37,"/ 220. Berti, 249. Beza, 214. Biel, Gabriel, 63, 211. Billuart,!'31)) 2T1,\216,; 238, | 242: Bonaventure, St., 210, 365, 433. Boniface II, go. Book of Life, The, 192 sq. Book of Torgau, 292. Butzer, 292, 322. C C2SARIUS OF ARLES, ST., 99. Cajetan, 165. Calvin and Calvinism, 44, 153, 1561200, 212/218, 214) 210; B24) 233 1s, 228) /285,.)302, 310, 392, 300. Camerarius, 204. Cano, Melchior, 363. Capacity for grace, 133 sqq., 145 sqq. Capacity of nature, 50 sqq. Carthage, Councils of, 25, 28, 85, 116. Cassian, John, 97, 142. Castelein, 195. Catharinus, 204, 211, 382. Causality of Grace, I5 sqq. Celestine I, St. 89, 90, 99, 104. Celestius, 83, 85, 86. Cercia, 203. Certainty regarding justifica- tion, 379 sad. Charismata, I3. Charity, 29, 56, 60, 67 sqq., 78, 336 sqq., 352, 363 sqq., 390, 305, 413 sdq., 417. Children, see Infants. Christ, The Grace of, 10, 70, 226. Chrysostom, St., 9I, 102 sqq., TALOIZ Le (DIS) LOL) 200)- 8315, 349, 380. ‘Clement of Alexandria, 308. Clement of Rome, 181. Clement V, 331. Clement VIII, 255, 261.: Clement XI, 74, 180. Cogitatio congrua, 69 sqq., 94. Concupiscence, 64, 120. Condignitas (equality) be- tween merit and _ reward, 417. 8Oq2 OK) Condign Merit, 132 sq., 307 sq., 407 sqq. ih ree ie de Auxiliis, 255, 201. Congruism, 261 sqq. Congruous Grace, 262 sqq. Congruous Merit, 132, 397, 407 sqq., 430 sqq. Conversion, 174 sqq., 207, 432 sq. Cooperating Grace, 32 sqq. Cyprian, . St., 102, :126. Cyr of y Alexandria) 'St.))3490; 360, 373. D D’ARGENTRE, I098. Definition of Grace, 5 sqq. Deharbe, 328. Deification of man, 341 sq., 405. ‘ Delectatio victrix, 27, 225, 249 sqq. De Lemos, 216, 236 De Lugo, 72, 363, 415, 420. Despair, 179. “De Vocatione Omnium Gen- tium,’ 170, 182. Diospolis, Council of, 8, 85, 136, I4I. Dordrecht, Synod of, 213. Dorner, 2093. Durandus, 63. ie Eck,’ Johann,:.132. Efficacious Grace, 41 sqq. Efficacy, Threefold, 265 sq. Elect, Number of the, 194 sq. INDEX ee Ecumenical Council of, 86. Ephrem, St., 109 Estius, 216. Eternal life, 426 sqq. Eucharist, The Holy, 360. External and Internal Grace, Bi, Sac: F FACIENTI quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam, 147 sqq. Path a62;)) 73.) 100) sqq., 272, 274) sqq., 298 saqq., 363 sq., 390 Sq-, 395- Fides explicita—implicita, 184 ad.) 270.) Fiduciary faith, 274 sqq., 310 sq. Filiatio adoptiva, tio. Final perseverance, see Per- severance. Flacius, 201. Florence, Council of, 164. Fonseca, 257. Francis de Sales, St., 207, 256. Franzelin, 203. Frassen, 200. Freedom a requisite of merit, A4II sqq. Free-will, 32 sqq.; How Grace codperates with, 4o sq.; Its relation to Grace, 222 sqq. Friendship, 353. Friendship of God, an effect of sanctifying grace, 351 sqq. Pileentiis, St. 23,. 182, 215, 278. G GAZZANIGA, 216, 2a) Gelasius, Pope, 17 Gifts of the ay, ‘Ghost, 369 Sq. Glory, 426 saq. Glossner, 149. - God, The Grace of, I0. 439 Godts, 195. Gomarus, 213. Gonet, 204 sq., 216, 218, 219 $05) 3450 Good intention, 411, 414. Good works, Merit of, 397 sqq. Gotti, 30, 185, 216. Gottschalk, 212. Goudin, 2106. Grace of justification, 313. Granderath, 361. Gratia antecedens—concomi- tans, 35. Gratia congrua—incongrua, 262 sqq. Gratia efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens, 255 sqq., 268. Gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se, 232 sqq., 267, 2 Gratia est in nobis, sed sine nobis, 37. Gratia gratis data, 12 sqq. Gratia gratum faciens, 12 sqq. Gratia inspirations, 23. Gratia magna, 252 sq. Gratia orationis, 43. Gratia parva (of Jansenius) 44, 252 sq. Gratia prima, 136 sqq., 388 sqq., 424, 427 sqq. Gratia sanans s. medicinalts, 16, OI, I14. Gratia secunda, 388 sqq. Gratia vocans, 32, 35, IIl. Gratuity of Grace, 131 sqq. Graveson, 216. Gregory of Nazianzus, 159, 308. Gregory the Great, St., 38, 290, 308, 368, 380, 304. Grotius, Hugo, 294. Gutberlet, 165, 205. H 102, HapitTs, 333 sqq. “Falf-Melanchthonians,” 292. Harnack, 295, 296, 319, 381. Heathens, The, receive suffi- 440 cient grace for salvation, 179 sqq. Henno, 324. Henry of Ghent, 2to. Hilary, St., 97, 99, 209. Holy Ghost, 331 sq., 335, 346, 361 sq., 368, 369 sq. Hope, 363 sqq., 390, 396. Hurter, 375. FAsss;) 273) Hypostatic Union, 12, 150, 345. I IGNATIUS oF ANTIOCH, St: 404. : Illuminating grace of the in- tellect, 19 sqq. Imputation, Lutheran theory of, 313 sqq. Incarnation, Dogma of. the, 282 sqq. Incompatibility of Grace and sin, 323 sqq. Increase of glory, 429 sq. Increase of sanctifying grace, 384 sdq., 423 sqq., 420. “Tndiculus,” go. Infants, Unbaptized, 163 sqq., Baptized, 406. Infralapsarians, 156, 213. Inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti, 361 sq., 370 sqq. Innocent I, 8, 9, 85, 154. Innocent X, 168, 226. Innocent XI, 73, 183, 281, 402. Intensio gratiae, 380. Irenzus, St., 47, 90, 404. Isaias, 178. J JAcoB AND ESAU, 201 sq. James, St., 286, 287, 288, 280, 204, 403, 434. Jansenius and Jansenism, 44, 52, 55, 62, 74, 77, 79, 80, 153 Sq) 168.) 170. 16.272) Mars) 221, 222, 223, 224 sqq., 240, 252, 281, 41I, 417. INDEX Jehu, 433. Jerome, St., 58, 109, 354, 380, 387, 304, 412. Jews, 1375 055; 6 307. John a S. Thoma, 216. John the Baptist, St. 116. Joseph, St., 116, 211. Jovinian, 387, 304. Julian of Eclanum, 83, 8s. Justification, 36, 73, 97, 113 sq., 136 sqq.; Process of, 272 sqq.; Necessity of faith for, 274 sqq.; Necessity of other preparatory acts, 285 sqq.; The state of, 300 sqq.; The nature of, 301 sqq.; Negative element, 302 sqq.; Positive element, 310 sqq.; Sanctify- ing Grace the sole formal cause of, 322 sqq.; Qualities of, 378 sqq.; Increase of Grace, 388; Fruits of, 3097 195, 282, sqq. Justin Martyr, St., 102, 308. K KLEE, 164. Kowwvia, Jeias dicews, 345. Krogh-Tonning, 293. L LATERAN, FourtH CouNCIL OF THE, 179, 400. Law of grace, 405. Lessius, 150, 206, 211, 221, 262, 337, 420. Liberty, see Freedom. Liebermann, 8o. Logos, The Divine, 358, 359 sq. Log - stick - and-stone theory, 207) 202) Lucidus, 212. Lumen gloriae, 345. Lather, 52774,\132) )223)3a8e. 288, 291, 293, 205, 302, 310, 322, 384, 380, 392, 399, 407. - INDEX M MALDONATUS, 203, 204. Mary, B. V., 64, 116, 211, 384, 389, 391. Massillon, 194. Melanchthon, 292, 310. Mennonites, 322. Mercy, Works of, 416. Merely sufficient Grace, AI sqq. Merit, 128, 131 sqq., 307 saqq., 430. Meritum de congruo, 430 sqq. Meritum naturae, 138. Mezzofanti, Cardinal, 54. Mileve, Council of, 85, 116. Modernism, 54. Molina and Molinism, 65, 148, ~_ 200, 217, 255 Sdq., 337. Molinos, M. de, 401. Moral virtues, Infused, 114, 366 Sqqiy) Mortal sin, 97, 106 sqq., 392 sqq. N NABUCHODONOSOR, 58. Natural and Supernatural Grace, 7 sqq. Nature, Capacity of, 50 sqq. Necessitas antecedens peccatt, 120 sqq. Necessitas 279 sqq. medii—praece ptt, O OBDURACY, 175 Sq. Objects of merit, 423 sqq. Obstinacy, 178 sq. Occasionalists, 406. Ockam, 211. Bo steriliter bona, 57, 81 Bene Second Council of, 20, 44, 86, 92, 99, 100, 106, 110, 123, 136, 139, 143, 213, 400. Origen, 77. 441 Original sin, 303, 434. Orosius, 182. Osiander, 2092. Osorius, 204. Oswald, 104, 203. P PALMIERI, 61, 72, 103, 116. Pantheism, 343. Passaglia, 158, 375. Passions, The, 28. Paul St.2'iai'1316) onoowen: 57; 64, 65, 68, 88, 100''sq., 105, 107, 125, 137, 146, 157 $q-4'':$00; 9; 160i7 Sq.4/ VTSO;(h Foo) POEM ZO Sas), (207 hue2a 7 isa. 250); -260,." 270,277,280) sd, 283, 288 sq., 314, 316, 317, 318, 319 sq., 351, 383, 393, 402, 407, 420, 424. Pah Vio250)) 265, Pelagius and Pelagianism, 56, 64, 66, 71, 79, 82 sqq., 89, 97, 103, 114, I19, 136, 141, 170, 190, 197, 228, 308 Penance, Sacrament of, 395, 428.5. Perrone, 18. Perseverance, Final, 123 sqq., 425 sq., 432 sqq. Pesch, Chr., 68, 72, 248. Petavius, 203)\"'204," 361, 13754 Peter Lombard, 331. Peter Sty 17h 104s Pfeffinger, 292. Piccolomini, 262. Pighius, 204. IIiotis, 277 Sq., 290. Pistoia, Council of, 71, 74. Pius V, 165. Pius Vie 7t.5 73. Platel). 72." Plato, 350. Pneumatomachians, 373. Polycarp, /Sts).200: Pomponazzi, 52. Postlapsarians, 213. Potentia obedientialis, 19, 30, 40. Praeambula fidet, 52, 102, 105. 442 INDEX Praemotio moralis, 249, 253. Praemotio physica, 233 sqq., 248. Prayer,'\43, OI," 127 \-saq.,//133, 142 sqq., 266 sqq., 431, 433, Bonn Predestinarianism, 212: Predestination, 152, 187 sqq.; ante praevisa merita, 199 sqq.; post praevisa merita, 206 sqq. Predestinationism, Orthodox, 199 sqq. Prevenient Grace, 32 sqq. Priesthood, 13. Properties of Grace, 378 saqq. Prosper; St. 725) (37,50, 773/97, 99, 100, 159, 182, 192, 215. Protagoras, 350. Q QUALITATES FLUENTES, 29 sqq. Qualities, 333 sq. Quasi-Merit, 134. Quesnel, 53, 72, 74 sqq., 180. Quietists, 343, 4oI. Wie RE-CREATION, 315, 330. Regeneration, 314 sq., 320, 339, 341, 346. Repentance, 176. Reprobation, 152, 178, 212 sqq. Requisites of supernatural merit, 410 sqq. Ripalda,. 65, 60,. 71 sqq., 128, 145, 149, 330, 342, 345, 363. Roman Catechism, 333, 340, 349, 363. Heretical, sanctifying 5 SAINTS ABSOLUTELY PREDES- TINED, 211; Favored by God, 419. Salmeron, 337. Salutary acts, 82 sqq. Sanctification, Internal, 323, 347, 348. Sanctifying Grace, 271 sqq.; Genesis of, 272 sqq.; The sole formal cause of justi- fication, 322 sqq.; Nature of, 328 sqq.; A permanent qual- ity of the soul, 328 sqq.; An infused habit, 333 sqq.; Not identical with charity, 336 sqq.; A participation of the’ soul in the divine nature, 340 sqq.; The effects of, 347 sqq-; Sanctity, 347 sqq; Supernatural beauty, 349 sqq.; Divine friendship, 351 sqq.; Adoptive sonship, 356 sqq.; Supernatural concom- itants, 302 sqq.; Properties of, 378 sqq.; Admits of de- grees and therefore can be increased, 384 sqq.; Lost by mortal sin, 392 sqq.; Fruits of, 397 sqq.; As a requisite of merit, 418 sq.; Increased by merit, 424 sqq. Sanctity, an effect of sancti- fying Grace, 347 sqq. Sardagna, 337. Scheeben, 361, 375. Schrader, 375. Scientia media, 245, 253, 257 sq., 266. Scotus and the Scotists, 10, 63,)'07;; 04; "210," 325.) 332,) 337, 419, 433. “Seed of God,” Why grace is called the, 409. Self-righteousness, 406 sq. Semipelagianism, 97 sqq., 139 sqq., 146, 148, 170, 190, 197, 220, 228, '230. Sensitive sphere, ' the, 26 sqq. Sinners, Ordinary and obdu- rate, i172 .saq. Sin, Incompatible with Grace, 323 +sqq.; Is _ sanctifying Grace diminished by venial sin? 388 sq. Sins of malice, 247. Society of Jesus, 260 sqq., 325. Socinianism, 292. Graces. of te ih a Ae INDEX Socrates, 25. Sola fides theory, 286 sqq. Soto, Dominicus, 211, 363, 430. Stapleton, 206. Stoics, 64, 387. Strengthening will, 23 sqq. Suarez, 603,00.» 116," 122)" 128, 150;) 216, '210, 257, 202) ,.325, 330, 334, 346, 359, 362, 363, 365, 390 Sq., 415, 420, 433. Sufficient Grace, 4I sqq., 167 Grace of the sqq. Supererogation, Works of, All. Supernatural character of merit, 413 sqq. Sylvius, 216, 434. Syncretism, 267 sqq. Synergist dispute, 292. 7. TEMPORAL BLESSINGS, 435. Temptations, 65 sqq. Tepe, 68, 72, 81. Tertullian, 179. @ciwors, 341, 376. Theodoret, 209. Theological systems devised to harmonize the dogmas of grace and free-will, 231 saqi;. Thomism, 232 sqq.; Augustinianism, 248 sqq.; Molinism, 255 sqq.; Con- gruism, 261 sqq.; Syncret- ism, 267 sqq. Thomas, St., 27, 32, 34, 52, 53, 62, 70,03) 121, 140, 161, 165, 178, 185, 194, 210, 232, 298, B31 332s 334) 338; 339,345, 349, 357, 365, 368 sq., 387, 409, 414, 419, 421, 431, 432, 435. Thomism and the Thomists, 11, 29,, 200, 203, 216, 219, 232 sqq., 325, 332, 389, 413, 414. Toletus, 204, 2 Tournely, 207, 337. Traditionalism, 52. Trent, Council Obs 134.) 350 430; 443 38, 45, 74, 86, 94, 106, 107, ELT, It5 SQ), ¢l22Z; oiZ23. has $25 i) F300" 153; FOG. LOG, boa, TOS) 2035) 2245 227, 2420 Sa, 247, 205, 272, 275, 285, 205 Sqq., 303, 307, 311 sqq., 319, 322 Sq., 324, 325, 320 sq., 331, 335, 338, 352, 361, 363, 365, 383, 385, 391, 392, 400, AOI, 407 Sq., 415, 421 sq., 423, 425, 426, sqq., 431. Trinity, Dogma of the, 282 sqq. U ULtricur1A, NICHOLAS DE, 52. Unbelief, 97. “Unigenitus,” Constitution, 74. V VASQUEZ, 69 sqq., 72, 94, 133; 149, 262, 337, 363, 415, 418, 420, 425. Vatican Council, [sh Mineay ces Mave fe 183, 244 sq., 26s. Vega, 122. Venial sin, Possibility of avoiding, 117 sqq.; Is sanc- tifying Grace diminished by? 388 sq Neon “Council Of 33T 303 Vital acts of the soul, 27 \Sach Vitelleschi, 262. Vocation, The grace of, 190, 196. Voluntas salvifica Det, 152 sqq. W WICLIF, 212. Will to save, God’s, 152 sqq. yi YSAMBERT, 21I. Z ZOSIMUS, 85. Zwingli, 298. iit Apt Che Date Due I IN U. S.A. PRINTED ca% vee = » i) ll ll MI |