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FE lian Sa omer ace I - Cnt an fot See a ae felrerey gg ay As | i eany Pa PALE be ay Ady vie 3 Ie. fy i # brag WGA tide ane ty ipspeip aly Paeiy ui any raf By Hari uid Oye pr eent ee Se Neo ae ee eS a ag ten ‘ey hi i athe tiie rea nt nya yi ae os errs a : sons sy a eta =P hen me® a i. esl te 3333 Abe as Dlr irra tele y Vy Tghd awa AA a aa ae Nyda ESE CAT AR CEP AL ORD ALO REAL EE PETALS AS Pheer ry ih te Lg ge ah yee $us64 2 44324 ye is (ah iste i i te fa i LL ; J iss thee Fe) tpareiv ade 28y 4 Ay ay : . 2 Sst bee aa | seat Peminar, | | PRINCETON, N. J. Buchanan, James, 1804-1870. Faith in God and modern ae atheism BT 1210 .B82 1855 v.2 FAITH IN GOD MODERN ATHEISM COMPARED, IN THEIR ESSENTIAL NATURE, THEORETIC GROUNDS, AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE. BY JAMES BUCHANAN, D.D., LL.D., DIVINITY PROFESSOR IN THE NEW COLLEGE, AND AUTHOR OF ‘‘ COMFORT IN AFFLICTION,” ETC, VOL. IT. EDINBURGH: JAMES BUCHANAN, JUNR., 72 PRINCES STREET. LONDON : GROOMBRIDGE AND SONS. M.DCCC.LY. EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY JOHNSTONE AND HUNTER, HIGH STREET, SECTION III. (CONTINUED. ) MODERN ATHEISM, AND THE THEORIES WHICH HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN SUPPORT OF IT. MODERN ATHEISM, &c. CHAPTER III. THEORIES OF PANTHEISM. Ar the commencement of the present century, Pantheism might have been justly regarded and safely treated as an obsolete and exploded error,—an error which still prevailed, indeed, in the East as one of the hereditary beliefs of Indian superstition, but which, when trans- planted to Western Europe by the daring genius of Spinoza, was found to be an exotic too sickly to take root and grow amidst the fresh and bracing air of modern civilization. But no one who has marked the recent tendencies of speculative thought, and who is acquainted, however slightly, with the character of modern literature, can have failed to discern a remarkable change in this re- spect within the last fifty years. German Philosophy, —always prolific, and often productive of monstrous births,—has given to the world many elaborate systems, physical and metaphysical, whose most prominent feature is the deification of Nature or of Man. France, always alert and lively, has appropriated the ideas of her more ponderous neighbours, and has given them cur~ 6 PANTHEISM— rency through educated Europe on the wings of her lighter literature. And even in England and America, there are not wanting some significant tokens of a dis- position to cherish a kind of speculation which, if it be not formally and avowedly Pantheistic, has much of the same dreamy and mystic character, and little, if any, harmony with definite views of God, or of the relations which He bears to man. | One of the most significant symptoms of a reaction in favour of Pantheism may be seen in the numerous republications and versions of the writings of Spimoza which have recently appeared,—in the public homage which has been paid to his character and genius,—and in the more than philosophic tolerance,—the kindly indulgence which has been shown to his most character- istic principles. He is now recognised by many as the real founder both of the Philosophic and of the Exe- getic Rationalism, which has been applied, with such disastrous effect, to the interpretation alike of the volume of Nature and of the records of Revelation. In Ger- many his works have been edited by Paulus (1803) and by Gfrérer (1830); in France they have been translated by Emile Saisset, Professor of Philosophy in the Royal College ; while a copious account of his life and writings has been published by Amand Saintes, the historian of Rationalism in Germany.* All this might be accounted for by ascribing it simply to the admiration of philoso- phical thinkers for the extraordinary talents of the man, and it might be said that his writings have been re- printed, just as those of Hobbes have been recently repro- duced in England, more as an historical monument of the past, than as a mirror that reflects the sentiments of * Awanp Saintes, “ Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza, Fondateur de l’Exegése et de la Philosophie, Modernes.” ITS PREVALENCE. 7 the present age. But it is more difficult to explain the eulogiums with which the reappearance of Spinoza has been greeted, and the cordiality with which his daring speculations have been received. He has not only been exculpated from the charge of Atheism, but even panegy- rised as a saint and martyr! “That holy and yet outcast man,” exclaimed Schleiermacher,—“ he who was fully penetrated by the universal Spirit,—for whom the In- finite was the beginning and the end, and the Universe his only and everlasting love !—he who, in holy inno- cence and profound peace, delighted to contemplate -himself in the mirror of an eternal world, where doubt- less he saw himself reflected as its most lovely image! he who was full of the sentiment of religion, because he was filled with the Holy Spirit!” “ Instead of accusing Spinoza of Atheism,” says M. Cousin, “he should rather be subjected to the opposite reproach.”* “He has been loudly accused,” says Professor Saisset, “ of Atheism and impiety... .. The truth is that never dida man believe in God with a faith more profound, with a soul more sincere, than Spinoza. Take God from him, and you take from him his system, his thought, his life.” “ Spi- noza, although a Jew,” says the Abbé Sabatier, a member of the Catholic clergy, “always lived as a Christian, and was as well versed in our divine Testament as in the books of the ancient Law. If he ended, as we cannot doubt he did, in embracing Christianity, he ought to be enrolled in the rank of saints, instead of being placed at the head of the enemies of God.” Contrast the language in which Spinoza is now com- pared to Thomas 4 Kempis, and proposed asa fit subject * M. Cousin, “ Cours de l’Histoire de la Philosophie,” 1. 403. See also “Fragmens Philosophiques,” Preface, second edition, p. xxvii.; “ Nou- veaux Fragments,” pp. 9, 160. 8 PANTHEISM— for canonization itself, with the terms in which he was wont to be spoken of by men of former times; and the startling difference will sufficiently dicate a great change in the current of Huropean thought. And if we add to this the contemporaneous reappearance of such writers as Bruno and Vanini, whose works have been reprinted by the active philosophical press of Paris, we may be well assured that it is not by overlooking or despising such speculations, but by boldly confronting and closely grappling with them, that we shall best pro- tect the mind of the thinking community from their insidious and pestilent influence. But we are not left to infer the existence, in many quarters, of a prevailing tendency towards Pantheism, from such facts as have been stated, significant as they are; we have explicit testimonies on the point, in a multitude of writings, philosophical and popular, which have recently issued from the Continental press. Ina report presented to the Academy of Sciences, M. Franck, a member of the Institute, represents Pantheism as the last and greatest of all the Metaphysical systems which have come into collision with Revelation; and describes it as a theory, “ according to which spirit and matter,— thought and extension,—the phenomena of the soul and of the body, are all equally related, either as attributes or modes, to the same substance or being, at once one and many,—finite and infinite; Humanity, Nature, God.” Conceiving that the older forms of error,—Dualism and Materialism,—have all but disappeared; and that Athe- ism, in its gross mechanical form, cannot now, as Broussais himself said, “ find entrance into a well-made head which has seriously meditated on nature,” M. Franck concludes that Pantheism alone, such as has been conceived and developed in Germany, is likely to have the power of ITS PREVALENCE, 9 seducing serious minds, and that it may for a season exert considerable influence as an antagonist to Christi- anity.* M. Javari gives a similar testimony: he tells us that “that great lie which is called Pantheism (ce grand mensonge gqwon appelle le Pantheisme) has dragged German philosophy into an abyss;” that it is fascinating a large number of minds among his own countrymen, and that it is this doctrine, rather than any other, which will soon gather around it all those who do not know, or who reject, the truth.’+ The Biographer of Spinoza, referring to the recent progress and prospective preva- lence of these views, affirms that “the tendency of the age, in matters of Philosophy, Morals, and Religion, seems to incline towards Pantheism;”—that “the time ig come when every one who will not frankly embrace the pure and simple Christianity of the Gospel, will be obliged to acknowledge Spinoza as his chief, unless he be willing to expose himself to ridicule;”—that “ Germany is already saturated with his principles ;”—that “his philosophy domineers over all the contemporary systems, and will continue to govern them until men are brought to believe that word, ‘No man hath seen God at any time, but He who was in the bosom of the Father hath revealed Him ;’”—that it is this “ Pantheistic philosophy, boldly avowed, towards which the majority of those writers who have the talent of commanding public interest are gravitating at the present day ;”—and that “the ulti- mate struggle will be, not between Christianity and Philosophy, but between Christianity and Spinozism, its strongest and most inveterate antagonist.” { And the * M. Ap. Franck, “ De la Certitude,” Preface, Ds XX. t+ M. A. Javart, “De la Certitude,” p. 509. { Amanp Saintxs, “ Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de Spinoza,” pp: 208, 210. 10 PANTHEISM— critical reviewer of Pantheism, whose Essay is said to have been the first effective check to its progress in the philosophical schools of Paris, gives a similar testimony : he tells us that it was his main object to point out “the Pantheistic tendencies of the age;” to show that Germany and France are deeply imbued with its spirit ; that both Philosophy and Poetry have been infected by it; that this is “the veritable heresy of the nineteenth century, and that when the most current beliefs are analysed, they resolve themselves into Pantheism, avowed or disguised.” * A few specimens of this mode of thinking may be added in confirmation of these statements. Lessing, as re- ported by Jacobi, expressed his satisfaction with the poem “ Prometheus,” saying, “This poet’s point of view is my own; the orthodox ideas on the Divinity no longer suit me; I derive no profit from them: & xa zav—(un et tout, the one and the all,)—I know no other.” Schelling, in his earlier writings, while he was Professor at Jena, and before the change of sentiment which he avowed at Berlin, represented God as the one only true and really absolute existence; as nothing more or less than Being, filling the whole sphere of reality; as the infinite Being (Seyn) which is the essence of the Uni- verse, and evolves all things from itself by self-develop- ment. Hegel seeks unity in every thing and everywhere; this unity he discovers in the identity of existence and thought, in the one substance which exists and thinks, in God who manifests and develops himself in many forms, “The Absolute produces all and absorbs all; it is the essence of all things; the life of the Absolute is never * Asse Marst, “ Essai sur le Panthéisme dans les Sociétés Modernes,” pp. 6, 11, 31. ABBE Maret, “Theodicée Chretiénne,” pp. 437, 444, 449, ITS VARIETIES. 11 consummated or complete ; God does not properly exist, but comes into being: ‘Gott ist in werden ’—Deus est wn fiert. With him, God is not a Person but Personality, which realises itself in every human consciousness, as so many thoughts of one eternal Mind... . . Apart from, and out of the world, therefore, there is no God; and so also apart from the universal consciousness of man, there is no Divine consciousness or personality. God is with him the whole process of thought, combining in itself the objective movement as seen in Nature, with the subjec- tive as seen in Logic; and fully realising itself only in —the universal spirit of Humanity.” * We select only two specimens from the recent litera- ture of France,—they might be multiplied indefinitely. Pierre Leroux, the editor of the “Encyclopedie Nouvelle,” says, in his “ Essay on Humanity,” dedicated to the poet Beranger,—“ It is the God, immanent in the Universe, in Humanity, in each Man, that I adore.’ “'The worship of Humanity was the worship of Voltaire.” “What is Humanity considered as comprehending all men? Is it something, or is it nothing but an abstrac- tion of our mind? Is Humanity a collective being, or is it nothing but a series of individual men?” “Being, or the soul, is eternal by its nature. Being, or the soul, is infinite by its nature. Being, or the soul, is permanent and unchangeable by its nature. Being, or the soul, is one by its nature. Being, or the soul, is God by its nature.” “Socrates has proved our eternity and the divinity of our nature.”+ The next specimen is a singular but very instructive one; it is derived from the treatise of M. Crousse, who holds that “intelligence is a property or an effect of matter ;” “that the world is a great body, * Mr Morz t's “ Historical and Critical View,” mu. 104, 153. t Prerre Leroux, “De ’ Humanité,” 1. vi. 3, 295. 12 PANTHEISM— which has sense, spirit, and reason;” that “matter in appearance the most cold and insensible is in reality animated, and capable of engendering thought.” It might be amusing, were it not melancholy, to refer to one of his proofs of this position:—-“ Une horologe mesure le temps; certes, c’est la un effet intellectuel produit par une cause physique!”* His grand principle is the doctrine of what he calls “ Unisubstancisme,” and it ig applied equally to the nature of God and the soul of man. God is admitted, but it is the God of Pan- theism,—Nature, includmg matter and mind, but ex- cluding any higher power. “God is the self-existent Being, which includes all, and beyond which no other can be imagined; the Infinite is identical with the Uni- verse.” “God is and can only be the whole of that which exists. Let us proclaim it aloud, that the echoes may repeat it,—God, the Great Being, is the All, and the All is One. God is every thing that exists; the Universe, that is the supreme Being; in it are life eternal, power, wisdom, knowledge, perfect organization, all the qualities, in a word, that are inseparable from the Divinity. Beyond the universe, or apart from it, there is nothing (meant); above the visible world and its laws there is for man,—nullité.” It is deeply humbling to think that in the light of the nineteenth century, and in the very centre of European civilization, speculations such as these should have found authors to publish, and readers to purchase them. Need we wonder that several Catholic writers on the continent, —conversant with the works which are daily issuing from the press, and familiar with the state of society in which they live,—have publicly expressed their apprehen- * L. D. Crousss, “Des Principes, ou Philosophie Premiére,’”’ 2d Edition, Paris, 1846, ITS VARIETIES. 13 sion that, unless some seasonable and effective check can be given to the progress of this fearful system, we may yet witness the restoration of Polytheistic worship, and the revival of Paganism, in Europe ?* The most cursory review of the history of Pantheismt will serve to convince every reflecting reader, that it must have its origin in some natural, but strangely per- verted, principle of the human mind; and that its recent reappearance in Europe affords an additional, and very unexpected, proof, that, like the weeds which spring up year after year in the best cultivated field, it must have its roots or seeds deep in the soil. In the annals of our race, we find it exhibited in two distinct forms; first, as a Religious doctrine, and, secondly, as a Philosophical sys- tem. It had its birth-place in the Hast, where the gor- geous magnificence of Nature was fitted to arrest the attention and to stimulate the imagination of a subtle, dreamy, and speculative people. The primitive doctrine of Creation was soon supplanted by the pagan theory of Emanation. The Indian Brahm is the first and only Substance,—infinite, absolute, indeterminate Being, from which all is evolved, manifested, developed, and to which | all returns and is re-absorbed. The Vedanta philosophy is based on this fundamental principle, and it has been well described as “the most rigorous system of Pantheism which has ever appeared.” We learn from the writings of Greece that a similar system prevailed in Egypt, different indeed in form, and expressed in other terms, but resting on the same ulti- mate ground; and we know that Christianity found one of its earliest and most formidable antagonists in the * Aspe Maret, “Theodicée Chretienne,” p. 94. + Appi GoscuLer, sur “l’ Histoire du Pantheisme.” Asst Maret, “ Essai,” chap. iv. 14 PANTHEISM— philosophical school of Alexandria, which was deeply imbued with a Pantheistic spirit, and which, perhaps for that reason, has recently become an object of much interest to speculative minds in France and Germany. ‘The Gnostic and the Neoplatonic sects maintained, and the writings of Plotinus and Proclus still exhibit, many prin- ciples the same in substance with those which have been recently revived in Continental Europe. In the earlier, as well as the later, literature of Greece, we tind traces of Pantheism, while the Polytheistic worship, which universally prevailed, was its natural product and appro- priate manifestation. The ancient Orphic doctrines, which were taught in the Mysteries, seem to have been based on the oriental idea of Hmanation. Even in the mascu- line literature of Rome, we find numerous passages which are still quoted, with glowing admiration, by the Pan- theists of modern times.* ‘There is, indeed, but too much reason to believe that the numerous references which occur in the Classics to the existence of One abso- lute and supreme Being, and which Dr Cudworth has so zealously collected with the view of proving “ the natu- rality of the idea of God,” must be interpreted, at least in many instances, in a Pantheistic sense, and that they imply nothing more than the recognition of one parent Substance from which all other beings have been succes- sively developed. : We find some lingering remains of Pantheism in the writings of the middle age. Scot EHrigena, in his work, “ De Divisione Nature,” sums up his theory by saying, “ All is God, and God is All.” Amaury de Chartres * PrerreE Leroux, “De ’Humanité,” 1. 249. M. Crovssg, “ Des Principes,” pp. 199, 211, 296. BAYLE, “ Pensées,” 111. 67. The well-known lines of the sixth Aineid, “ Principio ccelum, ac terras, camposque liquentes,” &c., are thus applied. ITS VARIETIES, 1d made use of similar language. And it must have been more widely diffused in these times than many may be ready to believe, if it be true, as the Abbé Maret affirms, and as M. de Hammer offers to prove, that the Knights of the Order of the Temple were affiliated to secret societies in which the doctrines of Gnosticism and the spirit of Pan- theism were maintained and cherished.* It re-appeared in the philosophical schools of Italy before the dawn, and during the early progress, of the revival of letters and the Reformation of Religion ;+ and even now, after three centuries of scientific progress and social advancement, it is once more rising into formidable strength, and aspiring to universal ascendency. From this rapid survey of the history of the past, it is clear that Pantheism is one of the oldest and most inve- terate forms of error; that in its twofold character as at once a philosophy and a faith, it possesses peculiar attrac- tions for that class of minds which delight to luxuriate in mystic speculation ; and that, in the existing state of society, it may be reasonably regarded as the most for- midable rival to Natural and Revealed Religion. We are far from thinking, indeed, that the old mechanical and materialistic Atheism is so completely worn out or so utterly exploded as some recent writers would have us to believe ;{ for M. Comte and his school still avow that wretched creed, while they profess to despise Pantheism as a system of empty abstractions. We do think, however, that the grand ultimate struggle between Christianity and Atheism will resolve itself into a contest between Christianity and Pantheism. For in the Christian sense, Pantheism is itself Atheistic, since it denies the Divine * Apps Marat, “ Essai,” pp. 152, 156, 221. Tt Dr Mere D’Avsien#, “ History of Reformation,” v. 84. + AnBé Maret, “ Essai,” p. 89; “ Theodicée,” p. 368. 16 PANTHEISM— personality, and ascribes.to the universe those attributes which belong only to the living God: but then, it is a distinct and very peculiar form of Atheism,—much more plausible in its pretensions, more fascinating to the imagination, and less revolting to the reason, than those colder and coarser theories which ascribed the origin of the world to a fortuitous concourse of atoms, or to the mere mechanical laws of matter and motion. It admits much which the Atheism of a former age would have denied ; it recognises the principle of causality, and gives a reason, such as it is, for the existing order of Nature ; it adopts the very language of Theism, and speaks of the Infinite, the Eternal, the Unchangeable One; it may even generate a certain mystic piety, in which elevation of thought may be blended with sensibility of emotion, springing from a warm admiration of Nature ; and it ad- mits of being embellished with the charms of a seductive eloquence, and the graces of a sentimental poetry. It may be regarded, therefore,—not indeed as the only,— but as the most formidable rival of Christian Theism at the present day. We have sometimes thought that the recent discoveries of Chemical Science might have a tendency, at least in the case of superficial minds, to create a prepossession in favour of Pantheism: for what does modern Chemistry exhibit but the spectacle of Nature passing through a series of successive transmutations,—the same substance appearing in different forms, and assuming in every change different properties ; but never annihilated, never destroyed; now existing in the form ‘of solid matter, again in the form of a yielding fluid, again in the form of an elastic gas; now nourishing a plant and entering into its very substance,—now incorporated with an animal, and forming its sinews or its bones,—-now reduced again ITS VARIETIES. 17 to dust and ashes, but only to appear anew and enter once more into other combinations. The facts are cer- tain; and they are sufficiently striking to suggest the question,—May not Nature itself be the one Being whose endless transformations constitute the history of the universe? This question may be naturally suggested, and it may even be lawfully entertained; butit cannot be satisfactorily determined by any theory which leaves the evident marks of Intelligence and Design in the whole’ constitution and course of Nature unaccounted for or unexplained. Influenced by these and similar considerations, many thoughtful men have recently avowed their belief that the two grand alternatives in modern times are—Christianity and Pantheism. The Abbé Maret and Amand Saintes differ only in this,—that by Christianity, the former means Catholicism, the latter means the Gospel, or the religion of the primitive church; but both agree that Pantheism is the only other alternative. Schlegel contrasts the same alternatives in the following impressive terms :—* Here is the decisive point ;—two distinct, opposite, or diverg- ing paths lie before us, and man must choose between them. The clear-seeing spirit, which, in its sentiments, thoughts, and views of life, would be in accordance with itself and would act consistently with them, must in any case take one or the other. Either there is a living God, full of love, even such a One as love seeks and yearns after, to whom faith clings, and in whom all our hopes are centred (and such is the personal God of Revelation), —and on this hypothesis, the world is not God, but is distinct from Him, having had a beginning, and being created out of nothing. Or there is only one supreme form of existence, and the world is eternal, and not dis- tinct from God: there ig absolutely but One, and this VOL. IT. B = ? 18 PANTHEISM— eternal One comprehends all, and is itself all in all; so that there is nowhere any real and essential distinction, and even that which is alleged to exist between evil and good is only a delusion of a narrow-minded system of Bthicss ) 12) ia. Now, the necessity of this choice and determination presses urgently upon our own time, which stands midway between two worlds. Generally, it is between these two paths alone that the decision is to be made.” * We have made the preceding remarks on purpose to show that the distinctive doctrines of Pantheism, as a system different, in some important respects, from the colder forms of Atheism, demand the careful study of the Divines and the Philosophers of the present age: and that any statement of the evidence in favour of the being and perfections of God which overlooks the prevalence of these doctrines, or makes only a cursory reference to them, must be alike defective in itself, and ill adapted to the real exigencies of Huropean society. Let this be our apology for attempting, as we now propose, to exhibit an outline of the Pantheistic system,—to resolve it into its constituent elements and ultimate grounds,—to examine the validity of the reasons on which it rests,—and_ to contrast it with the doctrine of Christian Theism, which speaks of a living personal God, and of a distinct but dependent Creation, the product of His supreme wisdom and almighty power. ‘The task is one of considerable difficulty, —difficulty arising not so much from the nature of the subject, as from the metaphysical and abstruse manner in which it has been treated. We must follow Spinoza through the labyrinth of his Theological Politics * Frep. von ScHLEGEL, “Philosophy of Life,” p. 417. See also Dr THoLvck’s remarks on the same point in the “ Princeton Theological Essays,” 1, 555. SPINOZA. 19 and his Geometrical Ethics; we must follow Schelling and Hegel into the still darker recesses of their Transcen- dental Philosophy; for a philosophy of one kind can only be met and neutralised by a higher and a better, and the first firm step towards the refutation of error ig a thorough comprehension of it. But having an assured faith in those stable laws of thought which are inwoven with the very texture of the human mind, and in the validity and force of that natural evidence to which Theology appeals, we have no fear of the profoundest Metaphysics that can be brought to bear on the question at issue,—provided only they be not altogether unin- telligible. Pantheism has appeared in several different forms ; and it may conduce both to the fulness and the clearness of our exposition, if we offer, in the first instance, a com- prehensive outline of the theory of Spinoza, with a brief criticism on its leading principles; and thereafter advance to the consideration of the twofold development of Pantheism in the hands of Materialists and Idealists respectively, § 1. THE SYSTEM OF SPINOZA, The Pantheistic speculations which have been revived in modern times can scarcely be understood, and still less accounted for or answered, without reference to the system of Spinoza. That system met with little favour from any, and with vigorous opposition from not a few, of the divines and philosophers of the times immediately subsequent to its publication. It was denounced and refuted by Musieus, a judicious and learned professor of 20 PANTHEISM— divinity at Jena,—by Mansvelt, a young but promising professor of philosophy at Utrecht,—by Cuyper of Rotter- dam,—by Wittichius of Leyden,—by Pierre Poiret of Reinsburg,—by Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray,—by Huet, Bishop of Avranches,—by John Howe and Dr Samuel Clarke,—as well 2s by many others,*—whose writings served for atime to preserve the Church from the infection of his most dangerous errors. But graau- ally these views became an object of speculative interest to Metaphysical inquirers, and found favour even with a growing class of Philosophical Divines ; + partly by reason of the strong intellectual energy with which they were conceived and announced; and partly also, there is reason to fear, on account of a prevailing tendency to lower the authority of Scripture, and to exalt the pre- rogatives of reason, in matters of faith. The system of Spinoza, as developed in his “Tractatus Theologico- politicus,” and, still more, in his “ Ethica,”—a posthu- mous publication,—may be said to contain the germs of the whole system both of Theological and Philosophical Rationalism, which was subsequently unfolded,—in the * Musavs, “Tractatus Theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen exami- natus,” 1674. Reever A Mansvett, “ Adversus anonymum Theologico-politicum, Liber singularis,” 1674. Francois Currer, “Arcana Atheismi Revelata,” 1676. JouN BrepENBouRG, “ Enervatio Tractatus Theol.-polit.” Curist. Wirticut, “ Anti-Spinoza, sive Examen,” 1690. Pierre Porret, “Fundamenta Atheismi Eversa, sive Specimen Ab- surditatis Spinozianee.” Feneion, “De )Existence de Dieu,” p. ii. ¢. iii, “Refutation du Spinozisme.” Huet, “La Conformité de la Raison avec la Foi,” 1692. Howe, “Living Temple,” 1. 262. S. OuarKE, “Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God,” pp. 25, 44, 58, 80. + Jan Coxerus, “Vie de Spinoza,” reprinted by Saisset, p. 41. SPINOZA. 21 Church, by Paulus, Wegscheider, and Strauss,—and in the schools, by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. ! Theological Rationalism consists in making Reason the sole arbiter and the supreme judge in matters of faith ;—in setting aside or undermining the authority of Revelation, partly by denying or questioning the plenary inspiration of Scripture, partly by explaining or account- ing for miracles on natural principles, partly by assuming, as Strauss assumes, that whatever is supernatural must necessarily be unhistorical ;—in reducing every article of the creed, by a new method of critical exegesis, to a mere statement of some natural fact or some moral doctrine,—embellished, in the one case, by mythical legends, and accommodated, in the other, to local and temporary prejudices,—but amounting substantially to nothing more than a natural development of human thought, The prolific germs of this N eologian method of the interpretation of Scripture are to be found every- wheve in the writings of Spinoza. Philosophical Rationalism, again, although often, or rather generally, blended with the Theological, is yet in some respects distinct from it. The one has been deve- Joped in the Church, the other in the Schools, The former, cultivated by divines who acknowledged more or less explicitly the authority of Scripture, has directed its efforts mainly to the establishment of a new method of Biblical exegesis and criticism, by which all that is peculiar — to Revelation, as a supernatural scheme, might be ener- vated or explained away ;—the latter, cultivated by Philo- sophic speculators who were not bound by any authority nor fettered by any subscription to articles of faith, has sought, without reference to Revelation, to solve the great problems relating to God, Man, and the Universe, on purely natural principles ; and, after many fruitless yy PANTHEISM— efforts, has taken refuge at last in the Faith of Pantheism and the Philosophy of the Absolute-—The prolific germs of this method of the interpretation of Nature are also to be found in the writings of Spinoza. The circumstance, indeed, which more than any other seems to have commended his system to some of the most inquisitive minds in Europe, is as apparent completeness. It is not a mere theory of Pantheism, nor a mere method of Exegesis, nor a mere code of Ethics, nor a mere scheme of Politics, although all these are comprehended under it; but it is a system founded on a few radical princi- ples which are exhibited in the shape of axioms and de- finitions, and unfolded, by rigorous logical deduction, in a series of propositions, with occasional scholia and corol- laries after the method of Geometry; a system which undertakes to explain the rationale of every part of human knowledge,—to interpret alike the Book of Na- ture and the Book of Revelation,—to determine the character of prophetic inspiration, and to account for apparent miracles on natural principles,—to establish the real foundations of moral duty, and the ultimate grounds of state policy ;—and all this on the strength of a few simple definitions, and a series of necessary deductions from them. It is important to mark this characteristic feature of his system; for while we have directly nothing to do with by far the larger part of his speculations, which relate to questions foreign to our pre- sent inquiry, yet the fact that his ethical and political conclusions are deduced from the same principles on which his Pantheistic theory is founded, serves at once to account for the extensive influence which his writings have exerted on every department of modern speculation, and also to show that, in opposing that system, we are entitled to found on the conclusions which he has him- SPINOZA. 23 self deduced from it, for the purpose of disproving the fundamental principles on which it rests.—For if, on the one hand, the principles which he assumes in his defini- tions and axioms do necessarily involve the conclusions which are propounded in his Ethics and Politics; and if, on the other hand, these conclusions are found to be at variance with the highest views of Morality and Govern- ment,—then the more logical the process by which they have been deduced, the more certain will it be that there is some fundamental flaw in the basis on which the whole superstructure is reared. In other cases, it might be doubtful how far the consequences that may seem to be deducible from a theory could be legitimately urged in argument, especially when these consequences are dis- avowed by the author of it: but in the present case, the consequences are explicitly declared not less than the principles,—they are even exhibited as corollaries rigor= ously deduced from them; and thus the very compre- hensiveness of the system, which gives it so much of the aspect of completeness, and which has fascinated the minds of speculative men, always fond of bold and sweeping generalizations, may be found to afford the most conclu- sive proof of its inherent weakness, and to show that it comes into fatal collision, at all points, not only with the doctrines of Natural and Revealed Religion, but also with the practical duties and political rights of mankind. We may present, in brief compass, a comprehensive summary of the doctrine of Spinoza. The fundamental principle of his whole theory is contained in the assump- tion with which he sets out,—that the entire system of Being consists only of three elements—* Substance, Attri- butes, and Modes,” and in the definitions which are given of these terms respectively, With him, Substance is Being; not this or that particular being, nor even being 94 PANTHEISM— in general, considered in the abstract; but absolute Being,—Being in its plenitude, which comprehends all existences, that can be conceived without requiring the concept of any other thing, and without which no other thing can either exist or be conceived.” By an “ Atiri- bute” he means, not substance, but a manifestation of substance, yet such a manifestation as belongs to its very essence; and by a “ Mode” he means, an affection of substance, or that which exists in another thing and is conceived by means of that thing. These are the three fundamental ideas of his system.+ The “Substance” of which he speaks is God,—the infinite, self-existent, eternal Being, whose essential na- ture is defined in terms which might seem to be expres- sive of a great truth; for he says, “I understand by God an absolutely infinite Being, that is to say, a Substance constituted by an infinity of Attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.” But on closer inspection we find that the God of whom he speaks is not the Creator and Governor of the world,—not a living personal Being, distinct from Nature and superior to it, —not the Holy One and the Just, possessing infinite moral perfections, and exercising a supreme dominion over His works; but simply absolute Being, the neces- sary self-existent Substance, whose known “ Attributes” are extension.and thought, and whose affections or “Modes” comprehend all the varieties of finite existence ; in short, it is Nature that is God, for every possible existence may be included under the twofold expression of Natura naturans and Natura naturata. Accordingly, the prin- * Spinoza, “ Ethica,” Definitions iii., iv., v. + “Tl construit le systéme entiere des étres avec ees trois seuls elements: la substance, l’attribut, et le mode.” “Voila ’idée merede la metaphy- sique de Spinoza,”—SAIssET. SPINOZA. 25 ciple of Unisubstancisme is broadly avowed, and the very possibility of creation denied. He affirms, and indeed, according to his definition, he is entitled to affirm, that there is not and cannot be more than one substance, for by “Substance” he means a self-existent, necessary, and. eternal Being. And on the same ground he affirms that the creation of such a substance is impossible ; for, having excluded every finite thing, every thing that does not exist of itself, from his definition of Substance, he is warranted in saying that any thing called into being by a creative act of Divine power could not be a “sub- stance,” 7 his sense of that term. He sets himself to prove by a series of propositions, whose logical correct- ness as deductions from his fundamental assumption may be freely and most safely admitted,—that the production of a “substance” is absolutely impossible,—that between two “substances” having different “attributes,” there is nothing in common,—that where two things have nothing in common, the one cannot be the cause of the other,— that two or more distinct things can only be discrimi- nated from each other by the difference of the “ attri- butes” or “affections” of their “substance,” and that, in the nature of things, there cannot be two or more substances of the same kind or possessing the same attri- butes. He holds, of course, that Nature is as necessary as God, or rather that God and Nature are one; there being but one Substance, appearing only in different aspects, as cause and effect, as substance and mode, as infinite and yet finite, as one and yet many, as ever the same and yet infinitely variable. It is only necessary to add that the sole attributes of this Substance which are capable of being known by our limited intelligence, and which are discerned by an im- mediate “intuition of reason,” are two, viz., extension and °6 PANTHEISM— thought. ‘We know nothing, and can know nothing of God beyond this:—He has no will, or his will is mere intelligence or thought; He has no law, or His law is merely his thought embodied in the arrangements of nature; He has no moral properties that are cognisable by the human faculties. It follows that God is not the Creator of the world, for creation implies an act of will, and God has no will;—that He is not the Lawgiver or Governor of the world, for there is no law emanating from a superior, but such only as is created by human compact or agreement, and there is “no natural obligation to obey God,”—no invariable standard of right and wrong. The principles which are thus assumed in regard to the nature of God are afterwards applied to many important questions, relating, first, to the soul of man ; secondly, to the science of Ethics; thirdly, to the doctrine of political right and liberty ; and, fourthly, to the supposed claims of Revelation. And they are carried out, with inexorable logic, into all their most revolting results. Such is a concise, but, as we believe, a correct outline of the leading principles of the system of Spinoza. We shall now offer a few remarks upon it, directed to the object of showing wherein consists the radical fallacy on which it rests, and what are the considerations by which thoughtful men may be most effectually secured against its pernicious influence. It has been well said by Professor Saisset, that the fallacy of this system does not lie in any one proposition of the series, but that it is a vicious circle throughout ; that the paralogism is not in this or that part of the “Ethics,” it is everywhere; and that the germ of the whole is contained in the definitions, which are assumed, but not proved.* Our attention, therefore, must be * Sasser, “Introduction,” p, xxxix. SPINOZA. 27 given, in the first instance, to the fundamental assump- tions on which the whole superstructure is built. 1, It is assumed, without proof, that the entire system of Being may be ranked under the three categories of Substance, Attributes, and Modes. It is assumed, equally without proof, that there can be no substance which is not self-existent, necessary, and eternal, and that every being which does not possess these properties must be only a “mode” or affection of another being to whom they belong. It is further assumed, also without proof, that extension and thought are necessary “attributes” of the one self-existent “substance,” each of the two exhibit- ing only a different aspect of his eternal essence, while both are equally essential and equally infinite. And, finally, it is assumed, still without proof, that Nature comprehends a twofold series of existences, distinct from each other, but developed, as it were, in parallel lines, —Corporeal and Intellectual beings, which correspond respectively to the Divine attributes of extension and thought,—which partake of the essential nature of these attributes, but exhibit them in finite and transient forms, as mere modes or manifestations of the one infinite “sub- stance.” ‘These are some of the fundamental assumptions on which he proceeds; they are not proved, nor even attempted to be proved; for although several are stated in the form of distinct propositions, and accompanied with a formal demonstration, the most cursory inspection of the pretended proof is sufficient to show that it con- sists entirely in a series of deductions from principles pre- viously assumed, and that its validity must ultimately rest on the definitions in which these principles are embodied. Now, let any one examine these “ definitions,” and he will find that they are wholly arbitrary, and that he is not bound by any law of his intellectual nature to admit 28 PANTHEISM-— them, still less entitled on any ground of experience to assume and found upon them, as if they were self-evident or axiomatic truths. It is possible, and it may even be legitimate and useful for the purposes of philosophical speculation, to classify the various objects of human knowledge, by ranging them under the categories of Substance, Attributes, and Modes. But is it a self-evi- dent truth, that there can be no substance in nature excepting such as is self-existent and eternal? Is ita self-evident truth, that man, with his distinct personality and individual consciousness, is a mere “ mode” or affec- tion of another being? Is it a self-evident truth, that the ape, the lizard, and the worm are equally “ modes” of the same substance with the angel and the seraph? Is ita self-evident truth, that extension and thought are equally expressive of the uncreated Essence, and necessary “ at- tributes” of the Eternal? Is it a self-evident truth, that no being can exist in nature otherwise than by development out of the Divine substance, and that the creation of a distinct, but dependent, being is impossible? —In regard to questions such as these, the appeal must he to that common sense, or those laws of thought, which are the heritage of every thinking mind, and which cannot be cramped or fettered by the arbitrary definitions of any philosophical system whatever. These definitions must commend themselves as true, either by their own self-evidencing light, or by their manifest con- formity with experience, before they can be assumed and founded on in any process of reasoning; and we are very sure, that those which have been specified cannot be candidly examined without appearing to be, as they really are, the grossest instances of a petitio principit that have ever been offered to the world. For these “ defi- nitions” constitute the foundation of the whole super- SPINOZA. 29 structure ; they contain the germ which is subsequently expanded and developed in a long series of propositions; and as they are assumed without proof, while they are far from being self-evident, no amount of logical power and no effort of dialectic skill can possibly extract from them any doctrinal results, whether theological, ethical, or political, possessing greater evidence than what be- longs to themselves.—This is our first objection. 2. The philosophical method of Spinoza, as applied to our special subject, is radically vicious. It is not the inductive or experimental method; it is an argument a priort,—a deductive process of reasoning. Now, this method, suitable as it is to a certain class of subjects, such as those of Geometry, in which clear and precise definitions are attainable, is either utterly inapplicable to another class of subjects, such as most of those of which Spinoza treats, or it is peculiarly dangerous, especially in the hands of a daring speculator, since in the absence of adequate definitions he may be tempted to have recourse to such as are purely arbitrary. All the possible pro- perties of a circle may be deduced from the simple defi- nition of it; but it will not follow that all the possible forms of being in nature may be deduced from the defi- nition of “substance.” The reason is clear,—we cannot have such a definition of substance as we may have of a circle. We do not object merely to the geometrical form of his reasoning,—that is a mere accessory, and one which renders the “ Ethica” much more dry and less” attractive than the “Tractatus,” in which he gives free scope to his subtle intellect, unfettered by any such arti- ficial plan; but we object to the essential nature of his system,—to the @ priori and deductive method by which he attempts to solve some of the highest problems of philosophy respecting God, Nature, and Man. Here, if 30 PANTHEISM— anywhere, is a field of inquiry which demands for its due cultivation an enlarged experience, and a patient spirit of induction. Yet with him, the starting-point of philosophy is the highest object of human thought; he begins with the idea of self-existent Being, without which, as he imagines, nothing else can be conceived ; and then, following the line of a descending series, he attempts to deduce from it the philosophy of the whole system of the universe!* His Metaphysics must borrow nothing from experience; his very Psychology must be purely deductive. From the intuitive idea of “ sub- stance,” he deduces the nature and existence of God; from the nature of God, the necessity of a Divine development; from the necessity of a Divine develop- ment, the existence of a universe comprising souls and bodies; and nowhere does he condescend to take notice of the facts of experience except in two of his axioms, in which he assumes that “ man thinks,” and that “ he feels his body to be affected in various ways.” His whole philosophy resolves itself ultimately into an intellectual intuition, whose object is Substance or Being, with its infinite attributes of extension and thought,—an intui- tion which discerns its object directly and immediately, in the light of its own self-evidence, without the aid of any intermediate sign, and which is as superior, in a phi- losophical point of view, to the intimations of sense, as its objects are superior to the fleeting phenomena of Nature. Now, we submit that this method of constructing a philosophy of Nature is radically vicious, and diametri- cally opposed to the only legitimate,—the only possible way of attaining to sound knowledge. He is not con- tent to tell us what is the order of things; he aspires, for- * Sprnoza, “ De Intellectis Emendatione.” This treatise contains the exposition of his method. SPINOZA, 31 sooth, to show what the order of things must be. We have no wish to disparage Metaphysical Science; it has a natural root in human reason, and a legitimate domain in the ample territory of human thought; but we pro- test against any attempt to extend it beyond its proper boundaries, or to apply it to subjects which belong to the province of experience and observation. The schemes which have been recently broached in Germany, and imi- tated in France, for constructing, at one time, a deductive Psychology,—at another, a deductive Physics,—at a third, a deductive Ethics,—at a fourth, a deductive theory of Progress,—at a fifth, a deductive History of Religion, afford more than sufficient evidence that hitherto the spirit of the Baconian philosophy has been little under- stood, and still less appreciated, by our continental neigh- bours; and that the efforts of the highest genius have been sadly frustrated, in attempting the impracticable task of extracting from mere reason that knowledge which can only be acquired in the school of experience, —This is our second objection. 3. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it applies a mere abstraction of the human mind to account for whatever is real and concrete in the universe-—We have no sympathy with those who rail at all abstract ideas, as if they were imaginary essences or mere illusions; we recognise the faculty of abstraction as one of the wisest provisions of Nature, and one of the most useful powers belonging to the mind of man,—a power which comes into action with the first dawn of infant intelligence, and is only matured as reason rises into manhood, till it be- comes the internal spring of all Philosophy and Science. Nor do we hold that an abstract idea is necessarily an unreality, or a mere negation; for, without reviving the controversy between the Nominalists and Realists, og PANTHEISM— or pronouncing any decision on the intricate questions which that controversy involved,—we may say, in gene- ral terms, that the idea of a circle, of a square, or of a triangle is neither unreal nor negative, but a very posi- tive, and, withal, intelligible thing: it is the idea of that which is essential to the nature of each of these fioures respectively, and common to all possible figures of the same class, whatever may be their accidental varie- ties, whether in point of dimension or form. And so the idea of Being or Substance, although it be highly abstract, is not necessarily unreal or negative ;—it 1s the idea of existence, or of that which is common to every thing that is, abstraction being made of every diversity by which one being is distinguished from another. Conscious that we ourselves exist, and ob- serving that other beings exist around us, we strike off the peculiarities which belong to individuals, and form the general idea which includes nothing but what is common to all, and yet contains a positive element, which is the object of one of the strongest convictions of the human mind.* The conception of Infinite Being contains the positive element of deung, abstraction being made of all Limitation or bounds. That this is a real, legitimate, and useful conception, we have no disposition to deny; we cannot divest ourselves of it; it springs up spontaneously from the innermost fountain of thought. But we cannot accept the account which Spinoza has given of its nature and origin, and still less can we assent to the application which he has made of it. He describes it as the idea of absolute, necessary, self-existent, eternal Being; and he traces its origin, not to the combined in- fluence of experience and abstraction, acting under the * M. F. Perron, “Essai d’une Nouvelle Theorie sur les Idées Fonda- mentales,” 1843. SPINOZA. 33 great primitive law of causality, but to an immediate per- ception or direct intuition of reason. Now, we submit that the concept of being, and the concept of absolute self-existent being, are perfectly distinct from each other, and that they spring from different laws of thought. The concept of being applies to every thing that exists, without reference to the cause or manner of its existence ; and this springs simply from experience and abstraction, The concept of self-existent being, which is equally suggested by the laws of our mental constitution, does not apply to every thing that exists, but only to that whose existence is not originated or determined by any other being; and this concept springs also from experience and abstraction, combined, however, with the law or principle of causality, which teaches us that no change can occur in Nature, and that nothing can ever come into being, without a cause, and prompts us to infer from the fact of existence now, the conclusion that something must have existed Srom all eternity. ‘The origin of each of these concepts may thus be naturally accounted for by the known laws of our mental constitution, without having recourse to any faculty of intellectual intuition such as Spinoza describes, —a faculty independent of experience, and superior to it,—a faculty which gazes direct on Absolute Being, and penetrates, without the aid of any intermediate sion or manifestation, into the very essence of God.—Spinoza has not discriminated aright between these two concepts, in respect either of their nature or their origin. He has not overlooked, indeed, the distinction between abstract ideas and the intellectual intuitions, of which he speaks ; but he confounds the concept of being with the concept of self-existent being, as if the two were identical, or as if beng could not be predicated of any thing otherwise than as itis a “mode” or affection of the one only “ sub-~ VOL. II, C 34 PANTHEISM— stance.” A sounder Psychology has taught us that our conception of existence arises, in the first instance, from our own conscious experience ; and that when this con- ception subsequently expands into the idea of Absolute Being, and results in the belief of a necessary, self- existent, and eternal Cause, the new element which is thus added to it may be accounted for by the principle of causality, which constitutes one of the fundamental laws of human thought, and which,—if it may be said to resemble intuition in the rapidity and clearness with which it enables us to discern the truth,—differs essentially from that immediate intuition of which Spinoza speaks, since it is dependent on experience, and instead of gazing direct on Absolute Being, makes use of intermediate signs and manifestations, by which it rises to the knowledge of “the unseen and eternal.” We submit, further, that a system which rests on the mere idea of Being as its sole support, cannot afford any satisfactory explanation of real and concrete existences. The idea of Being is one of our most abstract concep- tions; it is associated, indeed, with an invincible belief in the reality of Being,—a belief which springs up spontaneously, along with the idea itself, from our own conscious experience: it 1s even associated with an invincible belief in necessary, self-existent, and eternal Being,—a belief which springs from the principle of causality, or that law of thought whereby, from the fact that something exists now, we instinctively conclude that something must have existed from all eternity. But neither the simple concept of Being, which is derived from experience and framed by abstraction, nor the addi- tional concept of self-existent Being, which springs from the action of our rational faculties on the data furnished ‘by experience, can afford any explanation of the nature SPINOZA, 35) and origin of the real, concrete existences in the universe. These must be studied in the light of their own appro- priate evidence; they must be interpreted, and not divined; they cannot be inferred deductively from any, even the highest and most abstract, conception of the human mind. Yet the philosophy of Spinoza attempts to explain all the phenomena of the universe by the idea of Absolute Being ; it accounts for the concrete by the abstract 3 it represents all individual beings as mere modes or affections of one universal substance: in other words, it realises the abstract idea of thought and exten- sion, but denies the existence of bodies and souls otherwise than as manifestations of these eternal essences. 4. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because his whole reasoning on the subject of Creation is pervaded by a transparent fallacy. He affirms the impossibility of Crea- tion, and attempts to demonstrate his position ; but how ? By proving that a “ substance” cannot be produced. And why may not “a substance” be produced? Because, by the definition, “a substance” is that which is « self-ex- istent!” In other words,—a self-existent substance can- not be created !—a truism which scarcely required the apparatus of a geometrical proof by means of proposi- tions, scholia, and corollaries, or, as Professor Saisset says with laconic naiveté—* ce quiad peine besoin Wétre de- montré.” But while the only proof that is offered extends no further than to self-existent or uncreated substance, it is afterwards applied to every thing that exists, so as to exclude the creation even of that which is not self- existent; and this, on the convenient assumption that whatever exists must be either a “ substance,” or an “attribute,” or a “mode.” And thus, partly by an ambiguity of language, partly by an arbitrary and gra- tuitous assumption, he excludes the possibility of Creation 36 pANTHEISM— altogether. Surely it might have occurred to him that by proving the necessary existence of an uncreated Being, __a doctrine held by every Christian Theist,—he did not advance one step towards the disproof of the possibility of creation, nor even towards the establishment of his favourite theory of unisubstancisme : for, grant that there is an uncreated and self-existent Being; grant, even, that there can be no more than one,—would it follow that there can be no created and dependent beings, or that they can only exist as “ modes” or “affections” of that absolute Essence? Might they not exist as creatures, as products, as effects, without partaking of the nature of their cause 2* Yet if there be one idea more than another which Spinoza is anxious to extirpate, it is that of crea- tion, and he summons the whole strength both of his logie and sarcasm when he has to deal with the argument from “ final causes.” And no marvel; for the doctrine of a creation would cut up his system by the roots. The radical difference, in fact, between Theism and Pantheism mainly consists in this,—that the former regards creation as distinct from the Oreator,—as the product of His omnipotent and free will,—as the object of His constant providential care,—as the subject of His supreme control and government; whereas the latter represents it as a necessary emanation from the Divine substance, as an eternal development of the uncreated Essence,—the finite, in all its forms, being a “ mode” of the infinite, and the temporary phases of nature, so many transient, but ever renewed, manifestations of the unchangeable and eternal. These two conceptions are diametrically opposed; they * «Tei, a prendre les mots dans le sens ordinaire, il semble qu'il soit demontré qui la Creation est impossible, principe Justement cher au Pan- theisme ; tandis qu’au fond, tout ce qui est demontré, c'est que U Etre en soi est necessatrement incréé,—verité incontestable, dont le Pantheisme n’a rien a tirer’—Pxor. Satsset, Introduction, p. xlil. SPINOZA, 37 cannot aamit of conciliation or compromise ; and hence the daring attempt of Spinoza to prove the impossibility of creation, even when he admits the existence of an Infinite and Eternal Being. 5. ‘The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it involves erroneous conclusions’ respecting both the body and the soul. He denies that they are “ substances ;”” and why ? Because, by the definition, “a substance” is that which is self-existent, and may be conceived without reference to any other being. Be it so. What does this argu- ment amount to? Why, simply to this,—that they are not Gods !—What, then, are they? Created beings ? No:—and why? Because creation is impossible, and also because whatever exists must be either a “ sub- stance,” or an “attribute,” or a “mode.” What then? Clearly not an “attribute,” for the only attributes known to us are extension and thought, and these attributes are as infinite as “ the substance ” to which they belong ; oc they must therefore be “modes” or « affections ” of that “substance.” But in what sense? In the sense of being created, and therefore dependent, existences, whose nature and origin cannot be conceived of or ac- counted for without reference to the Being who pro- duced them at first, and still continues to maintain them ? No; for in that sense, all Theists admit the derivation and dependence of every finite being; but they must be “modes ” or “affections” of the one uncreated essence, —mere phenomenal manifestations of it. The soul, whose essence is thought, is a mere succession of ideas : the body is a mere “mode” of the Divine “ attribute” of extension: and neither the one nor the other can be described as a distinct being ; they are affections, and nothing more, of the one infinite “ substance.” It is important to remark that, according to this 38 PANTHEISM— theory, the distinct personality of man is excluded, not less than fhe distinct personality of God. It 1s not easy, indeed, to explain this part of Spinoza’s theory ; for he has a subtle disquisition on the relation subsisting be- tween the soul and the body, by means of which he at- tempts to explain the phenomena of self-consciousness, and to show that individual personality is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine which represents man as a mere “mode” of the Divine “substance.” But one thing is clear: there is no room in the system of Spinoza for the distinct personality of man, in the ordinary acceptation of that expression. The unity, especially, of the human soul,—its individuality, its self-consciousness, its identity, as a being, dependent indeed on God, but really distinct from Him,—must be sacrificed if the system is to be saved; and no other being can be recognised but the absolute “substance,” with its infinite “attributes ” and its finite “ modes.”-—This consideration appears to us to be fatal to the whole theory. For it shows that the Pantheistic speculations, which are directed against the personality of God, are equally conclusive,—if they be conclusive at all,—against the personality of Man ; that they run counter to the intuitive knowledge of the human mind; and that they cannot be embraced without doing violence to some of our clearest and surest convic- tions. For what clearer or surer conviction can there be than that of my own personal existence, as a distinct, self-conscious, intelligent, active, and responsible being ? and yet the existence of our own bodies and souls is de- nied, except in so far as they are mere “modes” or affections of the one uncreated “substance,” which is known, not by experience or observation, but by a trans- cendental faculty of intuition. And, finally, the system of Spinoza is vicious, because SPINOZA. 39 the exposition of it is replete with the most manifest and glaring self-contradictions, His logical power has been so much admired, and his rigorous geometrical method so highly extolled, that his Philosophy has acquired a certain prestige, which commends it to many ardent, speculative minds: yet there are few philosophical writers who have made a larger number of gratuitous assumptions, or who have abounded more in contradic- tory statements. The “ Antinomies” of Spinoza might make the subject of an amusing, and even instructive, dissertation. Thus, by way of specimen, take the fol- lowing :— —God is extended ; but, nevertheless, incorporeal. —God thinks ; but, nevertheless, has no intelligence. —God is active; but, nevertheless, has no will. —The soul is a “mode” of the Divine thought ; but, nevertheless, there is no analogy between God’s thought and man’s thought. —The love of God is the supreme law of man; but, nevertheless, it is equally lawful for man to live accord- ing to appetite or to reason. —The will of man is in no sense free; but, neverthe- less, there is a science of human ethics. —Man is under no natural obligation to obey God; but, nevertheless, God is his highest good. —God is neither a Lawgiver nor a Governor ; but, nevertheless, a future state is necessary, that every man may have his due. —AMight is Right; and Government has power to restrain “the liberty of Prophesying ; ” but, nevertheless, has no power to restrain “ the liberty of Philosophising.” These are only a few specimens of the gratuitous assumptions and flagrant contradictions with which his writings abound; but they afford a sufficient proof of the 40 PANTHEISM— reckless character of his genius, and of the utter fallacy of the system which he promulgated as a rival, or as a substitute, for Natural and Revealed Religion. On a review of what has been advanced, it must be manifest that the Pantheistic system of Spinoza is founded on principles assumed without proof, and em- bodied in his “ definitions;”—that it is constructed according to a philosophical method which is radically vicious ;—that it abounds in self-contradictory state- ments ;—and that it is opposed, at many points, to some of the clearest lessons of experience, and to some of the surest convictions of reason. It is a system which. is not demonstrated, but merely developed. The: germ of it exists in the “definitions;” deny these, and you destroy his whole philosophy. It cannot, therefore, be held sufficient to foreclose the question respecting the existence of a living, personal God, distinct from Nature and independent of it; nor can Pantheism in this form become the successful rival of Christian Theism, until the human mind has lost the power of discriminating between the different kinds of evidence to which they respectively appeal. § 2—MATERIAL OR HYLOZOIC PANTHEISM., In the system of Spinoza, the two “attributes of ea- tension and thought,” and the corresponding “ modes” of body and soul, were equally recognised, and were em- ployed jointly, in connection with his favourite doctrine of Unisubstancisme. They constituted the opposite poles of his theory, but were both essential to its completeness. But most of his followers, influenced by an excessive desire for simplification, have attempted to blend the MATERIAL. 41 two into one; and have either merged the spiritual in the corporeal, or virtually annihilated the material by resolving it into the mental. Hence two distinct, and even opposite forms of Pantheism,—the material or hy- lozoic, and the ideal or spiritual. | The former was the first in the order of historical deve- lopment, so far as modern Europe is concerned. It was most in accordance with the Sensational Philosophy which prevailed in the school of Condillac,* and which continued to maintain its ascendency until it was assailed by the reviving spirit of Idealism. It was the characteristic feature of the Atheism of the last century, and was fully exhibited in the “Systéme de la Nature.” The recent revival of Idealism has done much to check its progress, but it has not effected its destruction; on the contrary, the theory of Material.or Hylozoic Pantheism is an error as inveterate as it is ancient, and it is continually reappearing even in the light of the intellectual and spiritual Psychology of the nineteenth century. This theory, although it has been propounded as a religious creed, rests mainly on a philosophical dogma,— it is based ultimately on the supposition that nothing exists in the universe except matter and its laws,—that mind is the product of material organization,—and that all the phenomena of thought, of feeling, of conscience, and even of religion, may be accounted for by ascribing them to certain powers inherent in matter, and evolved by certain peculiarities of cerebral structure. This fun- damental assumption, on which the whole theory of Hylozoic Pantheism ultimately rests, will be subjected to examination in the sequel; we think that it may be best discussed separately and apart, for this among other _ reasons, that it stands equally related to the old mecha- * M. ABBE DE ConpiLuac, “ Traité des Sensations,” 2 vols. ? y] 492 PANTHEISM— nical Atheism and the new material Pantheism, and that, in point of fact, it has been applied indifferently to the support of both. Our remarks at present, therefore, will be directed not to the refutation of Materialism, but to the exposition and exposure of the Pantheism which has been founded upon it. It is not easy,—perhaps it might be found on trial to be impossible,—to show that there is any real difference, except in name, between mechanical Atheism and mate- rial Pantheism. Both equally affirm the self-existence and eternity of the Universe; both equally deny the fact of creation, and the doctrine of a living, personal God, distinct from Nature, and superior to it. The only appa- rent difference between the two consists in this,—that the former speaks more of the rude materials, and the cold, hard, unbending laws, which exist in Nature; the latter speaks more of the vital powers, the subtle and ethereal forces which are at work in her bosom, and which may seem to impart warmth and animation to a system that would otherwise be felt to be cold, mert, and death-like. But the mechanical Atheist never denied the vital powers of Nature, he only attempted to account for them without an intelligent first Cause: and the material Pantheist has little, if any, advantage over him, except in this, that he has combined Chemistry with Mechanics in attempting to account for the phenomena of the uni- verse, and has drawn his analogies from the laboratory and the crucible, the process of vegetation, and the laws of reproduction and growth, not less than from the for- mulee of Physical Science. The theory of Material Pantheism runs insensibly into one or other of the forms of naked Atheism to which we have already referred. Ignoring the existence of mind, or of any spiritual Power distinct from Nature and supe- MATERIAL. 43 rior to it, it must necessarily hold the eternal existence of matter; and in this respect it coincides entirely with the Atheistic hypothesis. It may, or it may not, hold also the eternal existence of the present order of Nature, including all the varieties of vegetable and animal life; in the one case, it harmonises with the ancient theory of Atheism, as maintained by Ocellus Lucanus; in the other, it must run into the modern theory of Development, if it makes any attempt to account for the origin of new races as made known by the researches of Geologists. In either case, it is equivalent to Atheism, and dependent on one or other of the various theories which have been applied to the defence of the Atheist’s creed. It is worthy of remark, in this connection, how fre- quently those who are the most daring and decided advocates of Atheism or Pantheism do nevertheless ascribe to Nature many of the attributes which belong to God only. This fact is admirably illustrated by the distinguished founder of the Boyle Lectureship ;* and it is abundantly confirmed by examples which have been furnished by more recent times.——The author of the “System of Nature,” which appeared before the first French Revolution, was an avowed and most reckless Atheist ;+ yet he ascribes to Nature most of the attri- butes which are usually supposed to belong to God,— such as self-existence, eternity, immutability, infinitude, and unity: and if the intellectual and moral attributes may seem to be omitted, as they must be to some extent in any system of Atheism, yet thought, design, and will are expressly ascribed to Nature.t And the only differ- * Tur Hon. Rozert Bortz, “Theological Works,’ 11. 79,—“ A Free Inquiry into the Received Notion of Nature.” Tt “Systéme de la Nature,” 11. 75, 110, 115. t “Tout est toujours dans l’ordre rélativement & la Nature, ot tous les 44 PANTHEISM—. ence between the Theist and the Atheist is said to be that the latter ascribes all the phenomena of Nature “to material, natural, sensible, and known causes,” while the former ascribes them to “ spiritual, supernatural, unin- telligible, and unknown causes;” or, in other words, “to an occult cause.”* It is manifestly a matter of indifference whether this method of accounting for the phenomena of Nature be called Atheism or Pantheism ; in either aspect it is essentially the same. The more recent advocates of Atheism or Pantheism have often made use of similar language. M. Crousse affirms that “all nature is animated by an internal force which moves it;” that this is the true spontaneity, the causality, which is the origin of all sensible manifestations, for “mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet ;” that “matter the most cold and indifferent is full of life, cap- able of engendering thought, and containing mind in it at least. potentially ;” and that to every man who has true insight, “the world feels, moves, speaks, and thinks.” + The author of “The Purpose of Existence” makes it his grand object to show that “the evolvement of mind out of matter” is the primary law and final cause of the universe ; that “this process commences with vegetation, extracting from matter the spirit of vitality ;” that “this spirit is preserved amid the decay of vegetables, and transfused into animals,—thus establishing the great working principle of Nature, that spirit is extracted from étres ne font que suivre les loix qui leur sont imposées. II est entré dans son plans que de certaines terres produiroient des fruits delicieux, tandis que d’autres ne fourniroiént que des épines, des vegetaux dangereux. Elle a volu que quelques societés produise des sages,” &.—Vol. 1. 265, also 269. * “Systéme de la Nature,” 11. 102. + M. Crovussn, “Des Principes,” Paris, 1846, pp. 81, 93: “Pour qui sait voir, le Monde sent, se meut, parle, et pense.” MATERIAL 45 matter by organised bodies, and survives their dissolu- tion.” * Of course, if matter have the power of evolving intelligent and even immortal minds by its own inherent properties and established laws, it will not be difficult to find in Nature a sufficient substitute for God. But the most revolting specimen of that material Pantheism which is only another name for absolute Atheism, that has recently appeared, occurs in the Let- ters of Atkinson and Martineau:—“ We require no supernatural causes, when we can recognise adequate natural causes, inherent in the constitution of Nature,” “nor are more causes to be admitted than are sufficient to produce any particular change or effect.” “ Man has his place in Natural History: his nature does not essen- tially differ from that of the lower animals; he is but a fuller development, and varied condition, of the same fundamental nature or cause,—of that which we con- template as matter, and its changes, relations, and pro- perties. Mind is the consequence or product of the material man, its existence depending on the action of the brain.” “Its highest object seems to be, a sense of the infinite and abstract power,—the inherent force and principle of Nature.” + From these specimens it must be evident that what- ever nominal distinction may exist between Material Pantheism and avowed Atheism, they are radically iden- tical, and that, for all practical purposes, they may be treated as one and the same. From the same specimens we may derive some useful hints respecting the essential conditions and the right conduct of the Theistic argu- ment. It is not enough to show that there must be a * “The Purpose of Existence,” pp. 85, 89. London, 1850. + “Letters on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development.” By H. G. ATKINSON and Harriet MARTINEAU. London, 1852. 46 PANTHEISM—— self-existent, eternal, and infinite First Cause, for this is admitted by the advocate of Material Pantheism, who sub- stitutes Nature for God: it is further necessary to show that the actual phenomena of the Universe cannot be accounted for by means of any properties or powers in- herent in itself; and that they must be ascribed to a living, intelligent, and powerful Being, distinct from Nature and superior to it. The theory of Materialism must be discussed on its own proper and peculiar merits, and if we find good cause to reject it, the main pillar of Material Pantheism will fall to the ground. In the meantime we shall only farther observe, that this form of Pantheism cannot be maintained without the help either of the doctrine of the Eternity of Matter or of the Theory of Development, or, rather, without the aid of both; and that if it could be established, Polytheism would be its natural product, if not its inevitable result. § 3—IDEAL PANTHEISM. We have already seen, that the system of Spinoza equally recognised the two “ attributes” of extension and thought, and the two corresponding “ modes” of body and soul, in connection with the one infinite and eternal “Substance.” We have also seen that most of his fol- lowers have taken a one-sided view of the subject, and have either merged the spiritual into the corporeal, so as to educe a Material or Hylozoic Pantheism, or have vir- tually annihilated the material by resolving it into the mental, so as to educe a system of Ideal or Spiritual Pantheism. “Jn Spinoza,” says Mr Morell, “we see the model upon which the modern Idealists of Germany have IDEAL. 44 renewed their search into the absolute ground of all phe- nomena ;” and there can be no doubt that his specula- tions contain the germ of Ideal as well as of Material Pantheism. The historical filiation of modern Pantheism cannot be satisfactorily explained, in either of its two forms, without reference to his writings ; and yet its pre- cise character, as it is developed in more recent systems, demands for its full elucidation some knowledge of the course and progress of philosophical speculation, in the interval which elapsed between the death of Spinoza and the subsequent developments of his theory. We cannot here attempt to trace the history of Ger- man Idealism, from its source in the writings of Leibnitz, through the logical school of Wolfius and his successors, till it reached its culminating point in the philosophy of Hegel :—we shall content ourselves with a brief refer- ence to the fundamental principles of Kant’s system, which may be justly said to have contained the prolific germs, or, at least, to have determined the prevailing character, of all the subsequent speculations of the Ger- man schools. For if modern Pantheism be indebted to Spinoza for its substance, it is equally indebted to Kant for its form; and no intelligible account can be given of the phases which it has successively assumed, without reference to the powerful influence which his Philosophy, in one or other of its constituent elements, has exerted on all his successors in the same field of inquiry. The Philosophy of Kant has a most important bear- ing on the whole question as to the validity of the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God. We shall confine our attention to those parts of his system which give rise to: the speculations that have issued in the recent theories of Ideal or Spiritual Pan- theism. 48 PANTHEISM— In attempting to explain the nature and origin of the whole system of human knowledge, Kant divides our intellectual being into three distinct faculties,—sensation, understanding, and reason. He supposes, that from sensation we derive the whole matter of our knowledge; that from the understanding we derive its form, or the manner in which it is conceived of by us; and that from reason we derive certain general or abstract notions, which are highly useful, since they give a systematic unity to human thought, but which have no objective validity, that is, either no reality in nature that corre- sponds to them, or none at least that can be scientifically demonstrated. From this fundamental principle of his system it follows, that the only part of our knowledge which has any objective reality is that which 1s derived from our sense-perceptions,—all else being purely formal or subjective, and arising solely from the laws of our own mental nature, which determine us to conceive of things in a particular way; and that even that part of our knowledge which is derived from sense-perception is purely phenomenal, since we know nothing of any object around us beyond the bare fact that it exists, and that — it appears to us to be as our senses represent it. Hence the sceptical tendency of Kant’s speculations, in so far as the scientific certainty of our knowledge 1s concerned : the practical utility of that knowledge is not disputed, but its objective reality, or the possibility of proving it, is toa large extent denied. Still he admits a primitive dualism; and a radical distinction between the subject and the object, __between the mind which thinks, and the matter of its thoughts. The matter comes from without, the form from within; and the senses are the channels through which the phenomena of nature are poured into the mould of the human mind. All knowledge implies this IDEAL. 49 combination of matter with form, and ig possible only on the supposition of the concurrent action both of the object and subject ;—not that either of the two is known to us in its essence, or that their real existence can be scien- tifically demonstrated,—for we know the subject only in its relation to the object, and the object only in its relation to the subject; but that this relation necessarily requires the joint acticn of both, by which alone we can acquire the only knowledge of which we are capable, and which is supposed to be purely phenomenal, relative, and subjective. It is true that we are capable of forming certain grand ideas, such as that of God, the universe, and the soul; but these are the pure products of Reason, the mere personifications of our own modes of think. ing, and have no objective reality, at least none that can be scientifically demonstrated. But while “the Specu- lative Reason” is held to be incompetent to prove the existence of God, “the Practical Reason” js appealed to; and in the conscious liberty of the soul, and its sense of incumbent moral duty,—“ the Categorical Imperative,” —Kant finds materials for reconstructing the basis and fabric of a true Theology, not scientifically perfect, but practically sufficient for all the purposes of life. It was scarcely possible that Philosophy could find a permanent resting-place in such a theory as this :—for while it recognised both the “ object ” and the “subject,” as equally indispensable, the one for the matter, the other for the form, of human knowledge, it did not hold the balance even between the two ; 1t assigned so much to the “subject” and so little to the « object,”” and made so large a part of our knowledge merely formal and subjective, that it could neither be regarded as a self- consistent system of Scepticism, nor yet as a satisfactory basis for Scientific Belief, It was almost inevitable that VOL. I. D 50 PANTHEISM— speculative minds, starting from this point, should diverge snto one or other of three courses; either following the line of the “subject” exclusively, and treating the “object ” as a superfiuous incumbrance, so as to reach, as Schulz and Maimon did, a pure Subjective Tdealism akin to utter Scepticism ;—or following the line of the “ object,” and giving it greater prominence than it had in the system of Kant, so as to lay the foundation, as Jacobi and Herbart did, of a system of Objective Certi- tude ;—or keeping both in view, and attempting, as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel did, to blend the two into one, so as to reduce them to systematic unity.* In Kant’s system a dualism was admitted,—a real dis- tinction between the “subject” and “ object” of thought; but he had ascribed so much to the subject, and so little to the object, that Fichte conceived the idea of dispens- ing with the latter altogether, and constructing his whole philosophy on a purely subjective basis, Since Kant had taught that all objects are conceived of either according +o the forms of our sensational faculty, or the categories of our understanding, or the ideas of pure reason, it seemed to be unnecessary to suppose the existence of any object distinct from the mind itself. For if it be the mind which furnishes the form of Space, and gives us the idea of Substance, of Cause, of Being, the mind alone might suffice to account for the whole sum of human knowledge. Fichte was followed by Schelling, and Schel- ling by Hegel, each differing from his predecessor, but all concurring in the attempt to identify “Seyn,” or abso- lute Being, with Thought, and to represent every thing in the universe as a mere mode or manifestation of one Infinite Essence. The identity of Existence and Thought is the fundamental principle of Hegel’s doctrine. With * Mr Morett, “History of Philosophy,” 11. 71. IDEAL. 51 him, Being and the. Idea of being are the same; and Being and Thought are combined in the “ Absolute,” which is at once ideal and real (Vétre and lidée.) With him, the idea of God is that of a logical process of thought “ ever unfolding itself, but never unfolded”—_a dialectic movement rather than a Divine Being, which realises itself, and reaches a state of self-consciousness, in man. God, nature, and man are but one process of thought, considered in different aspects; all finite personalities are only so many thoughts of one eternal mind; God is in man, and man is in God, and the progress of humanity in all its stages is a Divine deve- lopment. This bare outline of these systems must suffice for our present purpose, and we now proceed to offer a few remarks on the doctrine of Ideal, as distinguished from Material, Pantheism. 1. The whole system of « Idealism,” as propounded in the German schools, is utterly baseless, and contradicts the intuitive, the universal convictions of the human mind. For what is Idealism? Reduced to its utmost simplicity, and expressed in the briefest formula, it amounts in sub- stance to this, that the whole universe is to us a mere process of thought, and that nothing exists, or at least can be known by us, beyond the ideas of our own minds. And what is the ground on which it rests? Tt rests entirely on the assumption that since we can know nothing other- wise than through the exercise of our mental faculties, these faculties must be the sole sources of all our know- ledge, and altogether independent of any external object. According to this theory, the mind is not informed or instructed by the universe, but the universe is created by the mind; the objective is developed from the subjective ; and there is no reality anywhere except in the region of 52 PANTHEISM— consciousness. Nature is seen only as it is imaged in the mirror within; and to us it is a mere phantasmagoria,— a, series of phenomena,—a succession of thoughts. “'The sum total,” says Fichte, “is this; there is absolutely nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own. If myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images there are; they constitute all that apparently exists ; and what they know of them- selves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition; that consist, in fact, of the images of images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these images; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream,—into a dream made up only of a dream itself. Perception is a dream; thought,— the source of all existence, and all the reality which I imagine to myself of my existence, of my power, of my destination,—is the dream of that dream.” * The tendency of such speculations as these towards universal Scepticism, or even absolute Nihilism, with the exception only of certain fleeting phenomena of Conscious- ness, is too apparent to require any formal proof; and it must be equally evident that they contradict some of the most universal and deeply-rooted convictions of the human mind. The ultimate ground of every system of Idealism which excludes the knowledge of an external world, must be one or other of these two assumptions, or a combination of both: either, that our knowledge can- not extend beyond the range of consciousness, which takes cognisance only of ideas, or of subjective mental * Srp Wm. Hamitron’s Edition of Dr Retw’s “ Works,” p. 129. IDEAL. 53 states; or, that any attempt to extend it beyond these limits, so as to embrace external objects as really existing, can only be successful on this condition,—that we prove, by reasoning from the subjective to the objective, that there is a necessary logical connection between the state of the one and the reality of the other. Each of these assumptions is equally groundless. It is true that con- sciousness, strictly so called, takes cognisance only of what passes within; it is not true that consciousness, in this restricted sense, is commensurate with our entire knowledge. It is true that we acquire our knowledge only through the exercise of our mental faculties; it is not true that our mental faculties are the only sources of our knowledge, nor even that, without the concurrence of certain objects, they could give us any knowledge at all. It is true that there must be a con- nection between the subjective and the objective; it is not true that this connection must be established by rea- soning, or that we must prove the existence of an external world distinct from the thinking mind, before we are entitled to believe in it. For a great part of our know- ledge is presentative, and we directly perceive the objects of Nature not less than the phenomena of Conscious- ness. When it is said, in the jargon of the modern German philosophy, that “the Ego has no immediate conscious. ness of the Non-Hgo as existing, but that the N on-Hgo is only represented to us in a modification of the self- conscious Ego, and is, in fact, only a phenomenon of the Hgo,”—a plain practical Englishman, little tolerant of these subtle distinctions, might be ready, if not de- terred by the mere sound of the words, to test them by a particular example. What am I to think, he might say, of my own father and mother? they are familiarly 54 PANTHEISM— known to me,—lI have seen them, and talked with them, and loved them as my own soul: I have hitherto believed that they existed, and that they were really a father and mother to me: but now I am taught that they are—mere modifications of my own mind,—that they are nothing more than simple phenomena of the self-conscious Kgo, _—and that so far from being the earthly authors of my existence, they are themselves—the creation and offspring of my own thought. And on what ground am I asked to receive this astonishing discovery ? why, simply because I can be sure of nothing but the facts of consciousness. But how are these facts proved? They “ need no proof; they are self-evident; they are immediately and irresis- tibly believed.” Be it so: I can just as little doubt of the existence of my body, of the distinct personality of my parents, and the reality of an external universe, as of any fact of consciousness. May it not be, whether we can explain it or not, that the one set of facts is as directly presented, and needs as little to be proved, as the other ? 2. The doctrine of “Identity” constitutes a promi- nent and indispensable part of the theory of Idealism, and is the ground-principle of Philosophical Panthe- ism. It amounts, in substance, to the proposition, that Bxistence and Thought are one, that the “subject ” and “ object” of knowledge are one. “If the doctrine of Identity means any thing, it means that Thought and Being are essentially one; that the process of thinking is virtually the same as the process of creating ; that in constructing the universe by logical deduction, we do virtually the same thing as Deity accomplishes in de- veloping himself in all the forms and regions of creation; that every man’s reason, therefore, is really God ; in fine, that Deity is the whole sum of consciousness immanent IDEAL 55 in the world.” * I¢ is through the medium of this doc- trine of Identity that Idealism passes into Pantheism,— not, indeed, the Idealism of Berkeley, which recognised, consistently or otherwise, the existence of the human mind and of the Divine Spirit, while it denied the inde- pendent existence of matter,—but the Idealism of Fichte and others, which resolved mind into a mere process of thought,—a continuous stream or succession of ideas. To such a theory the doctrine of Identity was indispens- able; its advocates were bound to show that nothing existed, or could be proved to exist, in the universe but thought, and that, in every case, the swject and object of thought might be identified as one. We find, accord- ingly, that from the earliest ages down to the present time, the idea of “absolute unity,” or “universal iden- tity,” has been frequently exhibited in connection with the speculations of philosophical Idealists. The dis- ciples of the Eleatic school in ancient Greece, not less than those of the modern schools of Germany, insisted on the identity of thought and its object, and regarded every thing that might seem to be external to the mind as a mere illusion. It may be difficult for the British mind,—familiarised from infancy with the philosophy of common sense,— to grasp the idea which this doctrine involves,—but on the principles of absolute Idealism, it may be easily ex- plained, and may even seem to have some foundation in facts that must be acknowledged by all. There are two cases, particularly, which may serve to illustrate, if they cannot suffice to prove, it. The first is that of the Su- preme Intelligence, conceived as existing before the pro- * Mr Moret, “ History of Philosophy,” m1. 127. M. Maret, “ Essai sur le Pantheisme,” pp. 129, 133, 148, 192, 276. Ibid, “Theodicée,” pp. 5, 123, 192, 199. 56 PANTHEISM— duction of a created universe, when He was himself the sole “subject” and the sole “object” of thought; in other words, the absolute “Subject-Object.” The second is that of the human consciousness, conceived as occu- pied solely with certain subjective mental states, when the mind may be said to be at once the “subject” and the “ object” of its own thought. There are cases, then, in which mind may be regarded as a “subject-object,”— the case of human consciousness, when the mind takes cognisance of its own states or acts,—and the case of the Divine consciousness, while as yet the created uni- verse had not been called into being. But the question is,—whether, in all cases, the “subject ” and “ object ” of thought are the same? or, whether existence and thought are universally identical? An affirmative an- swer to this question would imply, that nothing whatever exists except only in the mind that perceives it; that, according to Bishop Berkeley, “the existence of unthink- ing things without any relation to their being perceived,” is an absurd or impossible supposition ; that “their esse is percipt,” that is, that their being consists in their being perceived or known ;—whence it would follow, as Ber- keley himself admits, that we have no reason to believe in the continued existence of the desk at which we write, after we have left the room in which we see it, excepting such as may arise from the supposition, that if we re- turned to that room we might still see it, or that in our absence it may still be perceived by some other mind ! Existence is identified with thought, and nothing exists save only as it is thought of. Why? Simply because it can become known to us only through the medium of - consciousness, and that, too, in no other character than as a phenomenon of our own minds. That this doctrine is at direct variance with the uni- IDEAL. 57 versal convictions of mankind, is too evident to require the slightest proof. That it is wnphilosophical as well as unpopular, may be made apparent by two very simple considerations. The first is, that it assumes without proof the only point in question, viz., that the objects of our knowledge are nothing but the ideas of our own minds ; whereas it is affirmed on the other side, and surely with at least an equal amount of apparent reason, that we are so constituted as to have a direct perception of external objects as well as of internal mental states. The second is, that the very formula of Idealism, which represents the “ Non-ego” as a mere modification of the conscious “ Ego,” seems to involve a palpable contradic- tion; since it recognises, in a certain sense, the difference between the “ Ego and the Non-ego,” and yet, in the same breath, annihilates that difference, and proclaims their “identity.”* Fichte admits, indeed, that we have the idea of something which is not-self ; but instead of ascrib- ing it to an external object, he accounts for it by a law of our mental nature, which constrains us to create a limit, 50 as to give a determinate character to our thought. The three technical formulz, therefore, which are said+ to express, respectively,—the affirmation of self,—the affirmation of not-self,—and the determination of the one by the other,—are all equally the products of our own mental laws, and do not necessarily require the supposi- tion of any external object; and hence it follows that Self is the one only absolute principle, and that every * Sir Witt1am Hamiuron’s Edition of Rew’s “ Works,” p. 281. Sir Witi1am does not seem to admit that there is a contradiction such as I have noted. t 1. “The ego or moi affirms itself.” 2. “The ego or moi affirms a non-ego or non-moit.” 3. “The ego or moi affirms itself to be determined by the non-ego or non-mot.” 58 PANTHEISM— thing else that is conceived of is constructed out of purely subjective materials—The question whether the “object” be the generative principle of the “idea,” or vice versd, is thus superseded; for there is no longer any distinction between “object” and “ subject ;” existence is identified with thought; the 7go and the Von-ego unite in one absolute existence; and Self becomes the sole Subject-object,—the percipient and the perceived, the knowing and the known. Of course, on this theory, there is no knowledge of God, just as there can be no knowledge of Nature, and no knowledge of our fellow-men, as distinct objective realities : it is a system of pure Idealism, which, if con- sistently followed out, must terminate in utter scepticism in regard to many of the most familiar objects of human knowledge; or rather, in the hands of a thoroughly con- sequent reasoner, it must issue, as Jacobi endeavoured to show, in absolute nihilism; since we can have no better reason for believing in the existence of Self, than we have for believing in the reality of an external world, and the co-existence of our fellow-men. Lach of these beliefs is equally the spontaneous product of certain mental laws, which are just as trustworthy, and need as little to be proved, in the one case as in the other. Fichte seems to have become aware of this fundamental defect of his system; and, at a later period, he attempted to give it a firmer basis by representing self, not as indi- vidual, but as Divine,—that is, as the Absolute manifest- ing itself in Man. He now admitted what, if he had not denied, he had overlooked before,—an essential reality as the substratum both of the Hgo and Won-ego; a reality of which al) things, whether within or without, are only so . many “modes” or manifestations. And it is at this point that his subjective Idealism passes into Pantheism, and IDEAL. 59 that we mark the close affinity between his speculations and those of Spinoza. There is, in some respects, a wide difference between the two ;—Spinoza assumed, Fichte denied, the existence of matter;—the former affirmed Substance to be the absolute and infinite Essence; the latter proclaimed a spiritual universe, whose essence was the infinite reason, or the Divine idea: but still, with these and other points of difference, there existed a real, radical affinity between the two systems,—that of Fichte, not less than that of Spinoza, being based on the identity of existence and thought ; and both systems being directed to show that there is but one Absolute Being, of which all phenomena, whether material or mental, are only so many modes or manifestations. 3. The philosophy of “the absolute,” as applied in support of German Pantheism, depends on the doctrine of “Identity,” and must stand or fall along with it.* The “absolute” is described as being at once ideal and real,—pure being and pure thought,—and as developing itself in a great variety of forms. The philosophy of the “absolute” is represented as the only science, properly so called: it is assumed that there can be no science of the finite, the variable, the contingent, the relative; but only of the absolute, the unchangeable, and the infinite. To constitute this science, the doctrine of “ identity ” is indispensable ; the subject and the object of thought,— knowledge and being,—must be reduced to scientific unity. Realism and Idealism are thus blended together, or rather identified in the philosophy of the “absolute.” The idea of the “ absolute,” in which deing and thought are identical, is the only foundation of science, and the ultimate * M. Marzr, “Essai,” pp. 129, 142, 146, 175, 192, 225, 276. M. Maret, “Theodicée,” pp. 193, 366, 378, 386, 394, Mr Moret, “ History,” 1. 127, 138. 60 PANTHEISM— ground of all certitude. And Pantheism is inferred from this idea; for the “absolute,” in which being and thought are identified, is properly the sole existence, which develops and manifests itself in a great variety of finite forms. We are not disposed to treat the philosophy of the “absolute ” either with levity or with scorn. We feel that it brings us into contact with some of the most pro- found and most deeply mysterious problems of human thought. Finite as we are, we are so constituted that we cannot avoid framing the zdea, although we can never attain to a comprehension, of the Infinite. There are absolute truths, and necessary truths, among the elements of human knowledge. Account for them as we may, their reality cannot be reasonably denied, nor their im- portance disparaged. ‘There is a tendency,—and a most useful one,—in the human mind, to seek unity in all things, to trace effects to causes, to reduce phenomena to laws, to resolve the complex into the simple, and to rise from the contingent to the absolute, from the finite to the infinite. There are few more interesting inquiries in the department of Psychology, than that which seeks to investigate the nature, the origin, and the validity of those ideas which introduce us into the region of absolute, eternal, and immutable Truth; and it were a lamentable result of the erratic speculations of Germany did they serve to cast discredit on this inquiry, or even to excite a prejudice against it, in the more sober, but not less profound, minds of our own countrymen. But there need be little apprehension on this score, if it be clearly under- stood and carefully remembered, that the philosophy of the absolute, as taught in Germany and applied in sup- port of Pantheism, rests ultimately on the theory of Idealism and the doctrine of Identity, by which all is resolved into one absolute “subject-object,” and eaist- IDEAL, 61 ence is identified with thought. This system may be discarded ; and yet there may still remain a sound, wholesome, and innocuous philosophy of the “absolute ;” —a philosophy which does not seek to identify things so generically different as existence and thought, or to reduce mind and matter, the finite and the infinite, to the same category; but which, recognising the differences subsisting between the various objects of thought, seeks merely to investigate the nature and sources of that part of human knowledge which relates to absolute or necessary truths. The former of these rival systems may be favourable to Pantheism, the latter will be found to be in entire accordance with Christian Theism. The fundamental principle of philosophical Pantheism is either, the unity of substance, as taught by Spinoza,— or, the identity of existence and thought, as taught, with some important variations, by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The Absolute is conceived of, not as a living Being to whom a proper personality and certain intelli- gible attributes may be ascribed, but as a vague, indeter- minate somewhat, which has no distinctive character, and of which, in the first instance, or prior to its development, almost nothing can be either affirmed or denied. But this absolute existence, by some unknown, inherent necessity, develops, determines, and limits itself: it be- comes being, and constitutes all being: the infinite passes into the finite, the absolute into the relative, the necessary into the contingent, the one into the many; all other existences are only so many modes or forms of its mani- festation. Here is a theory which, to say the very least, is neither more intelligible, nor less mysterious, than any article of the Christian faith. And what are the proofs to which it appeals,—what the principles on which it rests? Its two fundamental positions are these ;—that 62 PANTHEISM. finite things have no distinct existence as realities in nature,—and that there exists only one Absolute Being, manifesting itself in a variety of forms. And how are they demonstrated? Simply by the affirmation of uni- versal “Identity.” But what if this affirmation be denied? What if, founding on the clearest data of con- sciousness, we refuse to acknowledge that existence is identical with thought ?* What if we continue to believe that there are objects of thought which are distinct from thought itself, and which must be presented to the mind, before they can be represented by the mind? What if, while we recognise the ideas both of the finite and the infinite, the relative and the absolute, the contingent and the necessary, we cannot, by the utmost effort of our reason, obliterate the difference between them, so as to reduce them to one absolute essence? Then the whole superstructure of Pantheism falls along with the Idealism on which it depends; and it is found to be, not a solid and enduring system of truth, but a frail edifice, ingeni- ously constructed out of the mere abstractions of the human mind. The advocates of this system assume that the relations which subsist between beings are the same as the relations which subsist between our zdeas, and infer that logic is sufficient to construct a system of metaphysic. But Pro- fessor Nicolas has well said, that “while it is certain we cannot know things but by the notions which we have of them, and a certain parallelism may thus be established be- tween what exists, and what we think of that which exists, yet from this to the zdentity of being and thought, such as Pantheism requires, there is a vast distance, and we have no ground for believing that the logical relations of * Proressor Nicouas, “Quelques Considerations sur le Pantheisme,” p. 29-31. PANTHEISM. 63 our ideas are identical with the real relations of beings. Speculative Pantheism is wholly built on this assumption. It describes the relations of being according to the logi- cal relations of our thought; and it takes logic for a kind of metaphysic. It confounds the laws of thought with the laws of being. It seeks to solve the question, What is the first Being, and what are its relations to other beings? ‘That Being must necessarily be the condition of all other beings, and must virtually contain them all: nay, it must be capable of becoming all things.—It must therefore be simple, indeterminate, indifferent, possessing no essential character,—resembling nothing that we ac- tually know. All this is true of our ideas, but not of begs. The highest idea—that which is the logical con- dition of all others, and also the most general, the most abstract, the most indeterminate,—this idea contains all others, and by receiving this or that determination, it becomes this or that particular idea. But what is true of the zdea is not true of the being; no such vague, in- determinate, indifferent being exists: and yet Pantheism confounds the idea with the being, and rests entirely on that confusion of thought.” | In bringing our review of Modern Pantheism to a close, we may offer a few remarks illustrative of its nature and tendency, whether considered as a system of specu- lative thought, or as a substitute for religious belief. In this view, it is important to observe, first of all, that the theory of “Idealism,” and the doctrine of “Identity,” which constitute the groundwork of the more spiritual form of Pantheism, are not more adverse to our belief in the existence and personality of God, than they are to our belief in the reality of an external 64 PANTHEISM. world, or in the existence and personality of man himself. They stand equally related to each of these three topics; and, if they be accepted at all, they must be impartially applied, and consistently carried out into all their legitimate consequences, as the only philo- sophical solution of the whole question of Ontology. Perhaps this is not understood,—certainly, it has not been duly considered by the more superficial Ltterateurs, who have been slightly tinctured with Pantheism ; but it will be acknowledged at once by every consistent Idealist, who understands his own philosophy, and who is honest or bold enough to carry it out into all its practical applications. He knows very well, and, if sufficiently candid, he will frankly confess, that the principles on which he founds, if they be conclusive against the existence of a living, personal God, are equally conclusive against the reality of an external world, and against the doctrine of our own personality or that of our fellow-men. With most minds, this con- sideration would be of itself a powerful counteractive to all that is most dangerous in the theory of Idealism, were it only clearly apprehended and steadily kept in view; for an argument which proves too much is justly held to prove nothing, and that theory which leaves us no right to believe in the existence of Nature, or in the distinct personality of our fellow-men, can scarcely be held sufficient to disprove the existence of God. It may be observed, further, that Ideal Pantheism has a strong tendency to engender a spirit either of Mysticism, on the one hand, or of Scepticism, on the other. It terminates in Mysticism when, seeking to avoid Scepticism, it takes refuge in the doctrine of an “intellectual intuition,” such as gives an im- mediate knowledge of the Absolute: and it terminates PANTHEISM. 65 in Scepticism when, seeking to avoid Mysticism, it rejects the doctrine of “intellectual intuition,” and dis- covers that it has no other and no higher claims to our confidence than such as are equally possessed by any one of our common faculties, whose testimony the Idealist has been taught to distrust and doubt. It is further worthy of remark, that the philosophy of the Absolute, as taught in the German schools, has been applied to the whole circle of the Sciences, not Jess than to Theology,—and that it has given birth to numerous speculative systems, in Physics, in Che- mistry, in Ethics, in History, and in Politics,—all strongly marked by the same characteristic feature— the substitution of &@ priori and deductive speculation, for the more sober and legitimate method of Inductive inquiry. The province of Natural Science, in which, if anywhere, we should be guided by the light of experi- ence and observation, has been rudely invaded by this transcendental philosophy, which offers to construct a theory of universal knowledge on the basis of a certain self-development of the Absolute. We are indebted to Mr Morell for a specimen,* alike amusing and instruc- tive, of Schelling’s speculations on this subject. We shall not attempt to interpret its meaning, for, in sooth, we do not pretend to understand it: but one thing is clear,—the laws of Matter, of Dynamics, of Organic structure and life, the laws of Knowledge, of Action, and of Art, are all exhibited as mere deductions or corollaries from the “idea of the Absolute;” and in the name of Natural Science, not less than on behalf of Theology, we protest against this vicious method of Philosophy, and do most earnestly deprecate the sub- stitution of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in the place of * Mr Moret, “ History of Philosophy,” u. 129. VOU. 1 E 66 PANTHEISM, our own Bacon, and Boyle, and Newton, as models of scientific thought. The practical influence of Pantheism, in so far as its peculiar tendencies are not restrained or counteracted by more salutary beliefs, must be deeply injurious, both to the individual and social welfare of mankind. In its Ideal or Spiritual form, it may be seductive to some ardent, imaginative minds; but it is a wretched creed notwith- standing; and it will be found, when calmly examined, to be fraught with the most serious evils. It has been commended, indeed, in glowing terms, as a creed alike beautiful and beneficent,—as a source of religious life nobler and purer than any that can ever spring from the more gloomy system of Theism: for, on the theory of Pantheism, God is manifest to all, everywhere, and at all times; Nature, too, is aggrandised and glorified, and every thing in Nature is invested with a new dignity and interest ; above all, Man is conclusively freed from all fantastic hopes and superstitious fears, so that his mind can now repose, with tranquil satisfaction, on the bosom of the Absolute, unmoved by the vicissitudes of life, and unscared even by the prospect of death. For what is death? The dissolution of any living organism is but one stage in the process of its further development; and whether it passes into a new form of self-conscious life, or is re-absorbed into the infinite, it still forms an inde- structible element in the vast sum of Being. We may, therefore, or rather we must, leave our future state to be determined by Nature’s inexorable laws, and we need, at least, fear no Being higher than Nature, to whose jus- tice we are amenable, or whose frown we should dread.* * M. Crousssz, “ Des Principes.” M. Maret, “ Essai,” pp. 69, 86,150 ; “ Theodicée,” pp. 311, 314. Varoger, “ Etudes Critiques,” pp. 97, 101, 115, 151, 412. PANTHEISM, 67 But, even as it is thus exhibited by some of its warmest partizans, it appears to us, we own, to be a dreary and cheerless creed, when compared with that faith which teaches us to regard God as our “Father in heaven,” and that “hope which is full of immortality.” It is worse, however, than dreary: it is destructive of all reli- gion and of all morality. If it be an avowed antagonist to Christianity, it is not less hostile to Natural Theology and to Ethical Science. It consecrates error and vice, as being, equally with truth and virtue, necessary and beneficial manifestations of the “infinite.” It isa system of Syncretism, founded on the idea that error ig only an incomplete truth, and maintaining that truth must neces- sarily be developed by error, and virtue by vice. Accord- ing to this fundamental law of “ human progress,” Atheism itself may be providential ; and the axiom of a Fatalistie Optimism—* Whatever is, is best”—must be admitted equally in regard to truth and error, to virtue and vice. It may be further observed, that modern Pantheism, whether in its Material or Ideal form, is nothing else than the revival of some of the earliest and most inve- terate principles of Paganism,—the same Paganism which still flourishes among the “ theosophic” dreamers of India, and which exhibits its practical fruits in the horrors of Hindoo superstition. For Pantheism, although re- peatedly revived and exhibited in new forms, has made no real progress since the time when it was first taught in the Vedanta system, and sublimed in the schools of Alexandria. Christianity, which encountered and tri- umphed over it in her youth, can have nothing to fear from it in her mature age,* provided only that she be * M. Marer, “Essai sur Pantheisme,” p- 107. “ Le Christianisme saura vaincre dans son 4ge mtr l’ennemi qu’il a terrassé en naissant.” 68 PANTHEISM. faithful to herself, and spurn every offered compromise. But there must be no truce, and no attempt at concilia~ tion between the two. The Pantheists of Germany have made the most impudent claims to the virtual sanction of Christianity ; they have even dared to make use of Bible terms in a new sense, and have spoken of Revelation, Inspiration, Incarnation, Redemption, Atone- ment, and Regeneration, in such a way as to adapt them to the Pantheistic hypothesis. Common honesty is out- raged, and the conscience of universal humanity offended, by the conduct of individuals,—some of them wearing the robes of the holy ministry,—who have substituted the dreams of Pantheism for the doctrines of Jesus Christ, and assailed, both from the pulpit and the press, the sacred cause which they had solemnly vowed to main- tain. But even in Germany itself a powerful reaction has commenced; and the learning and labours of such men as Olshausen, and Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, may be hailed as the dawn of a better and brighter day. It may be observed, finally, that Pantheism stands directly opposed to Christian Theism in several distinct respects. The following are the principal points of col- lision between the two :-— 1. Pantheism denies,—Christian Theism affirms, the existence of a living, personal Grod, distinct from Nature, and superior to it. 2. Pantheism supersedes,—Christian Theism reveals, the doctrine of a real creation. 3. Pantheism contests,—Christian Theism confirms, the doctrine of the constant providence and moral go- vernment of God. 4; Pantheism disowns,—Christian Theism declares, the doctrine of a conscious, personal immortality. 5. Pantheism rejects,—Christian Theism receives, the PANTHEISM. 69 whole scheme of Revelation, considered as a supernatural code of Divine truth. The one accounts for its origin on the principle of natural development, the other on that of supernatural interposition. 6. Pantheism has no living, self-conscious, personal God,—no loving Father,—no watchful Providence,—no Hearer of Prayer,—no Object of confiding trust,—no Redeemer,—no Sanctifier,—no Comforter :—It leaves us with nothing higher than Nature as our portion here, and nothing beyond its eternal vicissitudes ag our pro- spect hereafter. 70 MATERIALISM. CHAPTER IV. THEORIES OF MATERIALISM. Tue doctrine of Materialism stands equally related to the “ mechanical” form of Atheism, and to the “hylo- zoic’ form of Pantheism. It is subsumed in both, and is the fundamental postulate on which they respectively depend. It has no natural affinity with the more “ideal” or “spiritual ” form of Pantheism. We must not conclude, however, that it has no historical connection with it. For it is instructive to mark, in tracing the history of philosophic speculation, that its course resembles not so much the uniform current of a stream, as the alternate flowing and ebbing of the tide; or,—if we may change the figure,—that its movement may be likened to the oscillation of a pendulum, which no sooner reaches its highest elevation on the one side, than it acquires a tendency to rush to the opposite extreme on the other. There can be little doubt that the recent revival of speculative “ Idealism ” was the result, at least in part, of a strong reaction against the “sensational” philo- sophy, which had degenerated in the school of Priestley at home, and in that of Condillac abroad, into a system of gross and revolting Materialism. For the same reason, we may now, I think, anticipate a speedy reaction the MATERIALISM. FI] other way,—a reaction against the extravagances of “idealistic” and “transcendental ” speculation, and a tendency towards a more practical and matter-of-fact philosophy. ‘This tendency, if guided by the true spirit of the Baconian method, may give a powerful impulse to Inductive Science in all its departments ; but, if biassed by partial and one-sided views, may issue either in the temporary ascendency of the Positive School, or the par- tial revival of some other form of Materialism. Some such tendency might have been expected to arise as soon as Idealism should have reached its culminating point. For on a comprehensive view of the whole history of speculative thought, we find that there are just four great systems of Metaphysics, which are perpetually recurring, as 1t were, in cycles. The first is the system of Dualism, —not the Dualism of Christian Theology, which speaks of God and nature, the Creator and the creature,—but the Dualism of ancient Paganism, which held Matter and Spirit to be equally uncreated and eternal: the second is Materialism, which resolves all into Matter and its laws: the third is Idealism, which resolves all into Mind and its modifications: and the fourth is Pantheism, which identifies Existence with Thought, and resolves all into the Absolute.* In the present age Idealism is in the ascendant, and has risen to the height of Pantheism; but, by a natural reaction, many are beginning to deside- rate a more substantial and practical philosophy,—while the rapid progress of physical science is directing their thoughts more and more to the wonders of the material world. In these circumstances, there may be a tendency to relapse into the Materialism of the last century, which attempted to explain the whole theory of the universe by the laws of matter and motion; or at least to embrace * M. Ap. Franox, “ Rapport a l'Academie,” Preface, p. xxi. 12 MATERIALISM. some modification of the Positive Philosophy, which excludes all causes, whether efficient or final, from the field of human knowledge, and confines our inquiries to the mere phenomena and laws of material nature. There are not wanting various significant indications of the existence of this tendency at the present day. It is sufficiently indicated, in some quarters, by the mere omission of all reference to Mind or Spirit as distinct from Matter; and, in others, by elaborate attempts to explain all the phenomena of life and thought by means of physical agencies and organic laws. The writings of Comte, Crousse, Cabanis, and Broussais,* afford ample evidence of its growing prevalence in France ; and although it has been said by a recent historian of Philo- sophy that in England there has been no formal avowal, or at least no recognised school, of Materialism, since the publication of Dr Thomas Brown’s reply to Darwin’s Zoonomia, yet there is too much reason to believe that it was all along cherished by nota few private thinkers who had imbibed the spirit of Hobbes and Priestley; and now it is beginning to speak out, in terms too unambi- guous to be misunderstood, in such works as “'The Pur- pose of Existence” and the “ Letters” of Atkinson and Martineau. But apart from the opinions of individual inquirers, it must be remembered that there 1s a tendency in certain studies, when exclusively pursued, to generate a frame of mind which will tempt men either to adopt the theory of Materialism, or at least to attach undue importance to physical agencies and organic laws. This tendency may be observed in the study of Physiology, * M. Comrs, “ Cours,” 1. 44, 89, 141; 1v. 675; v. 45, 303. M. Croussz, “Des Principes,” pp. 16, 20, 84, 88. M. Canants, “Rapports du Phisique et du Moral de Homme,” 3 vols. M. Broussais, “Traité de Physiologie appliquée a la Pathologie,” 1828. DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. 13 especially when it is combined with that of Phrenology and Animal Magnetism: not that there is any neces- sary or strictly logical connection between these studies and Materialism, for some of their ablest expounders,— including Cabanis, Gall, and Spurzheim,—have explicitly disavowed that theory; but simply that, in prosecuting such inquiries, the mind is insensibly led to bestow an undue, if not exclusive, attention on the phenomena and laws of our material organization, so as to become com- paratively unmindful of what is mental, moral, and spiritual in the constitution of man.—For these rea- sons, and considering especially the close connection of Materialism both with the mechanical Atheism of the past, and the hylozoic Pantheism of the present age, we deem it necessary to subject its claims to a rigorous scrutiny, in connection with the subject of our present inquiry. What, then, is the doctrine of Materialism ?—what are the forms in which it has appeared, and what the ground on which it rests? How does it stand related to the question concerning the nature and existence of God, or the constitution and destiny of Man? A brief answer to these questions will be sufficient to show that this theory cannot be safely disregarded in any attempt to construct a comprehensive and conclusive argument on the first prin- ciples of Natural Theology. § 1. DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. The doctrine of Materialism has assumed several dis- tinct phases or forms in the hands of its different advo- cates; and these must be carefully discriminated from each other, if we would either estimate aright their respec- 74 DISTINCT FORMS OF MATERIALISM. tive merits, or do justice to the parties by whom they have been severally maintained. The grossest and most revolting form of Materialism is that which identifies mind with matter, and thought with motion. It denies that there-is any real or radical differ- ence between physical and moral phenomena, and affirms that life and thought are so entirely dependent on mate- rial organization, that the dissolution of the body must necessarily be the destruction of conscious existence, and that death can only be an eternal sleep. This is the doc- trine of Materialism which was taught in a former age, by the author of the “Systéme de la Nature,” and which has recently been revived by M. Comte in France, and by Atkinson and Martineau in England. Scripture.* ‘Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth; they continue this day according to thine ordi- nances, for all are thy servants.” The established constitution and settled order of Na- ture, as well as the “laws,” “decrees,” or “ ordinances” by which it is regulated, are thus explicitly recognised in Scripture itself; and there are several reasons why this * Proverbs vi. 27; Psalm lxviii. 2, Ixxxiii. 14; Jamesiii. 12; Matthew vii. 16; Proverbs viii. 29; Job xxxviii. 11,33; Psalm cxix. 90; J eremiah xXxxi. 35, xxxili. 25, 140 NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. fact should be deliberately considered. Firs, because it seems to have been assumed by our opponents, that the discov ie of “ natural laws,” and the admission of “ second causes,’ must necessarily be adverse, and may ultimately prove fatal, to the cause of Religion ; or, in other words, that Faith must recede just in proportion as Science advances ;—whereas the Bible speaks both of natural ob- jects, possessing peculiar properties and powers, and also of natural laws, as God’s “ordinances” both in the heavens and the earth, but speaks nevertheless of a presiding Fro vidence or governing Will, without ever supposing that the two are incompatible or mutually exclusive. Secondly, because some of the less intelligent members of the Chris- tian community itself seem to 0 influenced, to a certain extent, by the very same error which we ascribe to our opponents; and evince a very groundless jealousy of Science, as if they feared that the progress of physical research might have the effect of weakening the grounds on which they believe in the care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer; whereas the Bible gives no counte- nance to any jealousies or fears of this kind, but affirms God’s providential government and encourages man’s believing prayer, at the very time when it founds upon and appeals to the established constitution and course of Nature.* And thirdly, because a right apprehension of the properties and powers belonging to created beings, and of the laws to which they are severally subject, will be found to conduce largely to a clear and comprehensive view of the relation which God sustains to His works. His Providence, as it is declared and exemplified in Scripture, has a necessary reference to the natural constt- tution of things; and hence the Westminster Confession, in the spirit of the highest philosophy, and with admir- * Dr M‘Cosu, “On the Divine Government,” pp. 126, 129, 149. NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES, 141 able discrimination and accuracy, affirms that “God, the Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern, all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy Providence ;” that “ by the same Providence, He order- eth all things to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;” and that “God in His ordinary Providence maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them at His pleasure.’* “Natural laws” and “second causes” are thus esta- blished by experience, and explicitly recognised in Serip- ture. It is necessary, however, especially with reference to certain modern speculations, to discriminate between the two; and to show that while they are closely related and equally legitimate objects of philosophical inquiry, they are nevertheless radically different, as well as easily distinguishable, from each other, It is the favourite doctrine of the Positive school in France that the know- ledge of “causes” is utterly interdicted to man, and that the only science to which he should aspire consists exclusively in the knowledge of “ phenomena,” and their co-ordination under “ general laws.” M. Comte expli- citly avows this doctrine, and Mr Mill and Mr Lewes give it their implied sanction.t According to their theory, all Science is limited to “the laws of the co-exist- ence and succession of phenomena,” and “causes” are not only unknown, but incapable of being known. And to such an extent is this doctrine carried that M. Comte anticipates the possible ultimate reduction of al/ « pheno- J. 8. Mint, “ Logic,” 1. 397, 417, 422; 11. 109, 471. Lewes, “ Biographical History,” 1. 14; mr. 55; rv. 9, 42. 142 NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. mena” to one all-comprehensive, all-pervading “ law,” as the highest perfection of Science and the decisive extinction of Religion; while Mr Mill, doubtful of this being possible, thinks it conceivable, at least, that there may be worlds, different from our own, in which events occur without causes of any kind, and even without any fixed law. In regard to this theory it might well be asked, how it comes to pass that human language, which is the natural exponent of human thought, should contain, in every one of its multifarious dialects, so many expressions which denote or imply “ causation,” if it be true that all know- ledge of causes is utterly inaccessible to the human faculties? nay, why it is that the axiom of causation needs only to be announced to command the immediate assent of the whole human race? It will be found, we believe, that even in the case of those who contend for this theory, the instinctive and spontaneous belief in “ causation” is not extinguished nor even impaired; but that they seek merely to sub- stitute “laws” for “causes,” or rather to represent the laws of nature as the only efficient causes of all natural phenomena. They thus identify or confound two things which it is of the utmost consequence to discriminate and keep distinct. ‘There is an ambiguity, however, in the common usage of the term “law,” which may seem to give a plausible appearance to their theory, or at least to veil over and conceal its radical fallacy. It denotes sometimes the mere statement of a general fact, or the result of a comprehensive generalization, founded on the observation and comparison of many particular | facts ; it denotes at other times ¢he force or power, what- ever that may be, which produces any given set of phe- nomena. The “law” of gravitation, for example, 1s NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 143 often used to denote nothing more than the general fact, ascertained by experience, that all bodies near the surface of the earth tend to its centre with a velocity proportioned directly to their mass, and inversely to the square of their distance; and when it is employed in this sense, it determines nothing as to the “cause” which is in operation,—it affirms merely a fact, or a fact reduced to a formula, and confirmed by universal expe- rience. But it is often transferred, at least mentally and almost perhaps unconsciously, to denote some “ power” which is instinctively supposed to be in operation when any change is observed,—a “ power” which may be con- ceived of, either as a property inherent in mind or in matter, or as a force, such as the Divine volition, acting upon it ab extra; and it is only in the latter of these two senses, as denoting a “ cause,” properly so called, and not a mere fact or law, that it can be applied to account for any phenomenon. In like manner, the “laws of motion” are merely the generalised results of our experience and observation relative to the direction, velocity, and other phenomena of moving bodies; but “motion,” although it is regulated, is not produced, by these laws; it depends on a “ cause,” whatever that may be, which is not only distinguishable, but different from them all. Yet when we speak of the “laws of motion,” we may imperceptibly include, in our conception of them, that force or power which impels the body, as well as the mere /aw or rule which regulates its movements. It were a mere unprofitable dispute about words, did we entertain and discuss the question, whether the import of the term “law” might not be so extended as to include under it powers, properties, and causes, as well as the rudes and conditions of their operation: for, even were this question answered in the affirmative, there 144. NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. would still be room for a real distinction between the two, and there could be no reason for saying that the knowledge of “causes,” as distinguished from “laws,” is wholly inaccessible to the human faculties. There is thus a real and important distinction between “ laws” considered simply as general facts, and “causes” con- sidered as efficient agents; and the two cannot be reduced to the same category, otherwise than by giving such an extension to the term “law” as shall make it comprehensive of causation ; and even then, the dis- tinction remains between the mere formulas of Science and the actual forces of Nature. “The laws of Nature,” says the sagacious Dr Reid, “are the rules according to which the effects are produced, but there must be a cause which operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation never navigated a ship; the rules of architecture never built a house.” * It might be shown, were it needful for our present purpose, that the object of Science is threefold: first, to ascertain particular facts; secondly, to reduce these facts under general laws; and, ¢hirdly, to investigate the “causes” by which both facts and laws may be accounted for. The exclusion of any one of the three would be fatal to Philosophy as well as Religion; and it is pro- hibited by the “natural laws” of the human mind, which has the capacity not only of observing particular facts, but of comparing and contrasting them so as to deduce from them a knowledge of general laws, and which is also imbued with an instinctive and spontaneous tendency to ascribe every change that is observed to some “power” or “cause” capable of producing such an effect. It might further be shown, that in every instance a “ cause,” pro- * Dr Ret, “ Essays,” 11. 44. Dr M‘Coss, “ Divine Government,” 88, 91, 111, 114. NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES, 145 perly so called, is a substance or being possessing certain properties or powers,—properties which may be called, if you will, the “laws” of that substance, but which neces- sarily include the idea of causation or efficiency ; that in the case of mere physical agency, there must be a plurality of substances so related as that the one shall act on the other in certain conditions which are indis- pensable to their mutual action; and that these require- ments leave ample room for those manifold adjustments and adaptations on which the argument from “ design,” in favour of the Perfections and Providence of God, is founded. The mere recognition of “general laws,” con- sidered simply as the “co-ordination of facts,’ and espe- cially as exclusive of the idea of causation or efficiency, can never satisfy the demands of reason, nor exhaust the legitimate functions of Science. For, in the expressive erds of Sir John Herschell, “It is high time that philo- ae both physical and others, should come to some nearer agreement than seems to prevail, as to the mean- ing they intend to convey in speaking of causes and causation. On the one hand, we are told that the grand object of physical inquiry is to explain the nature of phenomena by referring them to their causes; on the other, that the inquiry into ‘causes’ is altogether vain and futile, and that Science has no concern but with the discovery of ‘laws.’ Which of these is the truth? or are both views of the matter true on a different enterpre- tation of the terms? Whichever view we may take, or whichever interpretation we may adopt, there is one thing certain,—the extreme inconvenience of such a state of language. This can only be reformed by a care- ful analysis of the widest of all human generalizations,— disentangling from one another the innumerable shades of meaning which have got confounded together in its VOL, IL. K 146 NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. progress, and establishing among them a rational classifi- cation and nomenclature. .... A ‘law’ may be a rule of action, but it is not action. The great First Agent may lay down arule of action for himself, and that rule may become known to man by observation of its uniformity; but, constituted as our minds are, and haying that conscious knowledge of causation which is forced upon us by the reality of the distinction between intending a thing, and dotng it, we can never substitute the ‘rule’ for the ‘act.’”* But while the existence of “natural laws” and the ope- ration of “second causes” are equally admitted, and yet duly discriminated, large room is still left for diversities of opinion or of statement in regard to the precise relation which Gtod sustains to His works, and especially in regard to the nature and method of His agency in connection with the use of “second causes.” Hence have arisen the various theories which have appeared successively in the history of Philosophy, and which have had for their avowed object the explanation of the connection between God and Nature, or the conciliation of Theology with Science.+ Hence, first of all, the theory of “ occasional causes,” as taught by Father Malebranche, with the laudable, but, as we think, mistaken, design of vindicating the Divine agency in Providence by virtually superseding every other power in Nature,—a theory which represents physical agencies as the mere occasions, and God as the sole cause of all changes,—which teaches that a healthy eye, with the presence of light, is not the cause of vision, but the occasion only of that Divine interposition by which alone * Sr Jonn Herscuett, “ Address to the British Association,” 1845. + Dr Tuos. Brown, “ Essay on Cause and Effect,” p. 86. Dr Tuos. Reip, “ Essays,” 1. 136. Prerre Poiret, “ De Deo, Anima, et Malo,” NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 147 we are enabled to see,—and that a man’s desire or voli- tion to walk is not the cause of his walking, but the occasion merely of that Divine interposition which alone puts the proper muscles in motion. Hence, secondly, the theory of “pre-established harmony” as taught by Leib- nitz,—a theory which was mainly designed to explain the relation subsisting between the soul and the body, but which involves principles bearing on the general doctrine of cause and effect, and applicable to the relation subsist- ing between God and His works. This theory teaches that mind and body, although closely united, have no real influence on each other,—that each of them acts by its own properties and powers,—and that their respective operations exactly correspond to each other by virtue of “a pre-established harmony” between the two, just as one clock may be so adjusted as to keep time with another, although each has its own moving power, and neither receives any part of its motions from the other. This theory, therefore, denies every thing like causal action between mind and matter; and when it is extended, as it may legitimately be, to the relation between God and the world, it would seem to imply the co-equal existence and independence of both, and the impossibility of any causal relation between the two. The manifest defects of these theories have given rise to a ¢hird, which, in one of its forms, has been generally adopted by Divines,—the theory of “ instrumental causes.” This theory has assumed two distinct and very differ- ent forms. In the first, all natural effects are ascribed to powers ¢mparted to created beings, and inherent in them ; that is, to powers which are supposed to have been conferred at the era of Creation, and to be still sustained by God’s will in Providence, subject, however, to be suspended or revoked according to His pleasure. 148 NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. In the second, which resembles in some respects the doctrine of “occasional causes,” all natural effects are ascribed to powers not zmparted, but ztmpressed,—not belonging to the natural agent, but communicated by impulse ad extra; and God’s will is represented as the only efficient cause in Nature——In both forms of the theory, the agency of God and the instrumentality of natural means are, in a certain sense, acknowledged ; but in the former, second causes are apt to be regarded as if they were self-existent and independent of God; in the /atter, second causes are apt to be virtually an- nulled, and all events to be regarded as the immediate effects of Divine volition. Both extremes are dangerous. For, on the one hand, the operation of second causes cannot be regarded as necessary and independent, with- out severing the tie which connects the created universe with the will of the Supreme; and, on the other hand, the operation of second causes cannot be excluded or denied, without virtually making God’s will the only effici- ent cause, and thereby charging directly and immediately on Him, not only all the physical changes which occur in Nature, but also all the volitions and actions of His creatures. In order to guard against these opposite and equally dangerous extremes, we must hold the real exist- ence and actual operation of “second causes ;” while we are careful, at the same time, to show both that what- ever powers belong to any created being were originally conferred by God, and also that they are still preserved and perpetuated by Him, subject to his control, and liable to be suspended or revoked, according to the plea- sure of His will. We would thus have one First, and MANY SECOND causes; the former supreme, the latter subordinate ; really distinct, but not equally independent, since “second causes” are, from their very nature, sub- NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. 149 ject to the dominion and control of that Omniscient Mind which called them into being, and which knows how to overrule them all for the accomplishment of His great designs. We are aware that some are unwilling to acknowledge the efficiency of any “ second causes,” and seek to resolve all events, even such as are brought about by the voli- tions of men, into the will of God, as the only Agent in Nature. Others, again, admitting the existence of created spirits, and their operation as real causes, are unwilling to acknowledge any active powers in matter, and are anxious to show that mind, and mind only, can be an efficient cause. We see no reason for this extreme jealousy of “second causes” either in the mental or the material world. In the mental world, they cannot be denied as distinct, although subordinate and dependent, agencies, without virtually making God’s will the only cause in Nature, and thereby representing Him as the cause of sin, if sin, indeed, could exist on that supposi- tion,—or without destroying the distinct individuality and personal responsibility of man. Man must be re- garded as a distinct, though dependent, agent, and, as such, a real, though subordinate, cause ; otherwise every action, whether good or evil, must be ascribed directly and immediately to the efficiency of the Divine will, and to that alone—And in the material world, “second causes ” can as little be dispensed with; for every theory, even the most meagre, must acknowledge the existence of some power or property in matter, were it only the passive power or vis inertie on which all the laws of motion depend. And if this can be admitted as a power inherent in matter and inseparable from it, we cannot see why the existence of other powers, not incompatible with this, should be deemed a whit more derogatory to 150 NATURAL LAWS AND SECOND CAUSES. the dominion and providence of God. Ina certain sense, indeed, God’s will may be said to be the First, the Supreme Cause of all, since nothing can happen without His permission or appointment: but, in this sense, the existence of “natural laws” and the operation of “second causes” are by no means excluded; they are only held to have been originated at first, and ever afterwards sus- tained by the Divine Will,—the latter being supreme, the former subordinate. It may also be said, in a cer- tain sense, that Mind only is active : * for all the proper- ties and powers of matter are the results of the Divine volition, and their mode of action is regulated and deter- mined by “laws” which God has imposed ; but it were unphilosophical, as well as unscriptural, to infer from this that He is the only Agent in the Universe; it is enough to say that He created the system of Nature, and that He still upholds and governs it by His Providence. It must be evident that the speculations to which we have referred have a close connection with the argument, founded on natural evidence, for the being, perfections, and providence of God. That argument, in so far as it depends on the mutual adaptations between natural objects and the nice adjustments of natural laws, might be seriously impaired by supposing that there is really only one cause in Nature; whereas the ascription of certain properties and powers to created beings, whether mental or material, can have no effect in diminishing its force, since the evidence depends not so much on the phenomena of physical, as on those of moral causation. On the whole, we conclude that the existence of “ natural laws” and the operation of “second causes” are recognised alike by the sacred writers and by sound * Dr Tuomas Brown, “Essay on Cause and Effect,” pp. 74, 83, 93, 108, 191. THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN, 151 philosophy; and that neither the one nor the other ought to be regarded as adverse to any doctrine which, as Christian Theists, we are concerned to defend. § 2. THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, “The Constitution of Man considered in Relation to External Objects,” *—such is the title of a popular, and, in some respects, instructive work, which has obtained, partly through the aid of an endowment, extensive circu- lation among the reading class of artizans and tradesmen. Written in a lucid style, and illustrated by numerous facts in Natural History and Philosophy, it is skilfully adapted to the capacities and tastes of common readers, and it is not wonderful that it should have exerted con- siderable influence on the public mind. The character of that influence, and its tendency to induce a religious or irreligious frame of spirit, has been made a matter of controversial discussion. On the one hand, Mr Combe tells us that “* The Constitution of Man’ not only admits the existence of God, but is throughout devoted to the object of expounding and proving that He exercises a real, practical, and intelligible government of this world, —rewarding virtue with physical and moral well-being, and punishing vice with want and suffering.” On the other hand, it is manifest, beyond the possibility of doubt or denial, that if his professed Theism has subjected him to the charge of being an inconsequent thinker in some ofthe organs of avowed Atheism,+ his favourite arguments * GEORGE ComBE, Esa. + “Reasoner,” xii. 21, 23. 152 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— in support of “ government by natural law” have been applied by himself, and eagerly welcomed by others, as conclusive objections to the doctrine of a special Provi- dence and the efficacy of Prayer. We do not object to the limitation of his inquiry to the one point of the relation subsisting between “the Constitution of Man and External Objects,”—that is a perfectly legitimate, and might be a highly instructive field of investigation; but we do object to his utter for- getfulness of that limitation in the progress of his work, and to his attempt to introduce a variety of other topics which are manifestly alien from his professed design. If he meant to discuss merely the relation between the con- stitution of man and external objects, he had nothing whatever to do with the far higher and more comprehen- sive doctrine respecting the relation between the consti- tution of man and the government of God, and, least of all, with the revealed doctrines of a special Providence,— of a fall into a state of sin,—of death as its wages,—and of “spiritual influences” by which the ruin occasioned by the fall may be redressed; and yet these topics, foreign as they are to the professed design of his work, are all introduced, and treated, too, in a way that is fitted, if not designed, to shake the confidence of his readers in what have hitherto been regarded as important articles of the Christian faith—It has received this significant testimony, “‘Combe’s Constitution of Man’ would be worth a hundred New Testaments on the banks of the Ganges.” * There are two points, especially, on which he comes more directly into collision with our present argu- ment :-— 1. He speaks as if God governed the universe only by * Hotyoake, “ Grant and Holyoake’s Discussion,” p. 40. ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 153 “natural laws,” so as to exclude any other dispensation of Providence. 2. He speaks as if the “physical and organic” laws of Nature possessed the same authority and imposed the same obligation as the “ moral” laws of Conscience and Revelation ; and as if the breach or neglect of the former were punishable in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the transgression of the latter. Next to the omission of all reference to a future state, and the total exclusion of the connection which subsists between the temporal and the eternal under the Divine government, we hold these ¢wo to be the capital defects of his treatise ; and it may be useful, in the present state of public opinion, to offer a few remarks upon each of them. In regard to the first, we need not repeat what we have already explicitly declared,—that God does govern the world zz part by means of “natural laws” and “second causes;” but, not content with this concession, Mr Combe speaks as if He governed the world only by these means, to the exclusion of every thing like a “special Providence,” or “ Divine influences.”—It is not so much in his dogmatic statements as in his illustrative examples that the real tendency of his theory becomes apparent. Thus he speaks of “the most pious and benevolent mis- sionaries sailing to civilise and Christianise the heathen, but, embarking in an unsound ship, they are drowned by their disobeying a physical law, without their destruction being averted by their morality ;” and, on the other hand, of “the greatest monsters of iniquity” embarking in a staunch and strong ship, and escaping drowning “in circumstances exactly similar to those which would send the missionaries to the bottom.”—Thus, again, he speaks of plague, fever, and ague, as resulting from the neglect 154 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— of “organic laws,” and as resulting from it so necessarily that they could be averted neither by Providence nor by Prayer; and he illustrates his views by the mental dis- tress of the wife of Ebenezer Erskine, and the recorded experience of Mrs Hannah More.* It cannot be doubted, we think, that in all these cases he speaks as if God governed the world only by natural laws; and that he does not recognise any special Providence or any answer to Prayer, but resolves all events into the operation of these “ laws.” Now, there are evidently ¢wo suppositions that may be entertained on this subject: either, that God orders all events to fall out according to “natural laws” and by means of “second causes;” or, that while He generally makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Provi- dence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interpos- ing directly and immediately, when He sees cause, for the accomplishment of His sovereign will. ‘These two suppositions seem to exhaust the only possible alternatives in a question of this kind; and, strange as it may at first sight appear to be, it is nevertheless true that neither the one nor the other is necessarily adverse to the doctrine for which we now contend. Even on the first supposition, —that God orders all events to fall out according to “natural laws” and by means of “second causes,”—there might still be room, not, indeed, for miraculous interpo- sition, but for the exercise of a special Providence and even for an answer to prayer; for it should never be forgotten that, among the “second causes” created and governed by the Supreme Will, there are other agencies besides those that are purely physical,—there are intelli- gent beings, belonging both to the visible and invisible * GzorcEe Comps, “Constitution of Man,” pp. 150, 155, 163, 165, 234, 343, 358. ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 155 worlds, who may be employed, for ought we know to the contrary, as “ ministers in fulfilling His will,” and whose agency may, without any miraculous interference with the established order of Nature, bring about tmportant practical results,—just as man’s own agency is admitted to have the power of arranging, modifying, and directing the elements of Nature, while it has no power to suspend or reverse any “natural law.” And if God is ordinarily pleased to make use of means, why should it be thought incredible that He may make use of the ministry of intelligent beings,—whether they be men or angels,—for the accomplishment of His designs ?—But on the second supposition,—that while He generally makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and imme- diately when He sees cause,—the doctrine of a special Providence, including every interposition, natural or supernatural, is at once established; and we cannot see how Mr Combe, as a professed believer in Revelation, which must of course be regarded as a supernatural effect of “ Divine influence,” can consistently deny God's direct and immediate agency in Providence, since he is compelled to admit it at least on ¢wo great occasions, viz., the Creation of the world, and the promulgation of His revealed will. In regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his system, it may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or fails at least duly to discriminate, two things which are radically different, when he speaks as if the “ physical and organic laws” of Nature had the same authority, and imposed the same obligations, as the “moral laws” of Conscience and Revelation,—and as if the breach or neglect of the former were punishable, in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the trans- gression of the latter. 156 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— The declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to illustrate the relation subsisting between the “ natural laws” and the “constitution of man;” and, secondly, to prove the independent operation of these laws, as a hey to the explanation of the Divine government. In illustrating the relation between the “ natural laws” and the “con- stitution of man,” he attempts to show that the natural laws require obedience not less than the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience:—“The pecu- liarity of the new doctrine is that these (the physical, organic, and moral laws) operate independently of each other; that each requires obedience to itself; that each, in its own specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience ; and that human beings are happy in proportion to the extent to which they place them- selves in accordance with all of these Divine institu- tions.” In regard to these “natural laws,”—including the physical, the organic, the intellectual, and the moral,—four positions are laid down: first, that they are independent of each other; secondly, that obedience or disobedience to each of them is followed by reward or punishment ; ¢hirdly, that they are universal and invari- able; and, fourthly, that they are in harmony with the “ constitution of man.” * Now, in this theory of “natural laws,” especially as it is applied to the doctrines of Providence and Prayer, there seem to be ¢hree radical defects :— 1. Mr Combe speaks of obedience and disobedience to the “physical and organic” laws, as if they could be obeyed or disobeyed in the same sense and in the same way as the “moral” laws, and as if they imposed an obligation on man which it would be sinful to disregard. He has not duly considered that the moral law differs * Mr Comps, “Constitution of Man,” vi, ix., 25, 39, 41. ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 157 from the physical and organic laws of Nature in two important respects :—/irst, that while the former may, the latter cannot, be broken or violated by man; and secondly, that while the former does impose an impera- tive obligation which is felt by every conscience, the latter have either no relation to the conscience at all, or, if they have, it is collateral and indirect only, and arises not from the mere existence of such laws, but from the felt obligation of a moral law belonging to our own nature, which prescribes prudence as a duty with reference to our personal conduct in the circumstances in which we are placed. That the “physical and organic” laws cannot be broken or violated in the same sense in which the “moral law” may be transgressed, is evident from the simple consideration that the violation of a natural law, were it possible, would be not a sin, but a miracle! And that these laws impose no real obligation on the conscience is further manifest, because we hold it to be perfectly lawful to counteract, so far as we can, the ope- ration of one physical or organic law by employing the agency of another,—as in the appliances of Mechanics, the experiments of Chemistry, and the art of N aviga- tion. When the aeronaut inflates his balloon with a gas specifically lighter than atmospheric air, or the shipbuilder constructs vessels of wood or iron, so that when filled with air they shall be lighter than water, and float with their cargo on its surface, each is at- tempting to counteract the law of gravitation by the application of certain other related laws: but no one ever dreams of their disobeying God in thus availing themselves of one physical agent to counterpoise another. The “ moral law,” however, cannot be treated in the same way, and that simply because it is generically different. 158 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— It is true, that indirectly the laws of Nature, when known, may and ought to regulate our practical conduct; not, however, by virtue of any obligation imposed by them on our conscience, but solely by virtue of that law of moral prudence which springs from conscience itself, and which teaches us that we ought so to act with reference to outward objects as to secure, so far as we can, our own safety and happiness, and the welfare of our fellow- men. But there can be no greater blunder than to con- found the laws of natural objects with the law of human conduct ; and into this deplorable blunder Mr Combe has allowed himself to fall. Throughout the whole of his statements respecting the “natural laws,” there are two things included under one name, which are perfectly dis- tinct and separate from each other. In the first place, there are the laws which belong to the constitution of natural objects, and which regulate their mutual action on one another: in the second place, there are, in the words of a late sagacious layman, “rules which the intel- lect of man is able to deduce for the regulation of his own conduct, by means of his knowledge of those laws which govern the phenomena of Nature. ‘These last are perfectly distinct from the former; and it is a monstrous confusion of ideas to mix them up together... . . The true state of the case is this,—it is for our interest to study these natural arrangements, and to accommodate our conduct to them, as far as we know them; and in doing so, we obey, not those laws of Nature, physical and organic, but the laws of prudence and good sense, arising from a due use of our moral and intellectual faculties.”* Another acute writer,+ who states the substance of the * Mr Scort, “ Harmony of Phrenology with Scripture,” pp. 82, 97. + Civizen Kennepy, “ Nature and Revelation Harmonious,” pp. 70, 122, 124, 131, ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 159 argument in very few words, has shown that the theory of “natural laws,” as taught by Mr Combe, is true in one sense and false in another :—* It is true, first, that the Creator has bestowed constitutions on physical objects ; in other words, the constitutions which physical objects possess were given them—given during His pleasure; secondly, that the constitutions of physical objects are definite,—that is, they are distinct, individual, and incap- able of transmutation by natural causes ; thirdly, that no power but the power of the Creator can vary their con- stitutions. But it is not true, first, that any mode of action of a physical object is otherwise inherent in it, than as it is the will of God that that object should now present that mode of action. Nor is it true, secondly, that it is beyond the power of God to vary, when He pleases, either temporarily or permanently, the constitu- tion of physical objects."—He further shows that, on Mr Combe’s principle of “natural laws” being all equally Divine institutions which must be obeyed, “human obe- dience is a very complicated and perplexing affair,—go complicated and so perplexing as to involve positive con- tradictions ;” that “the very same act is required by one law, and forbidden by.another, both laws being equally Divine ;” and that “we sometimes cannot obey both the ‘organic’ and the ‘moral’ laws.’ He concludes that “physical laws ought not to be confounded with laws of human conduct ;” that “these we always must obey, and those we may often, without deserving blame, boldly dis- regard ;” and that “by commingling distinct classes of ‘natural laws,’ Mr Combe introduces into his system dangerous error and gross absurdity.” 2. Another radical defect in this theory of “ natural laws” consists in its representing the consequences of our ignorance or neglect of them as punishments in the same 160 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— sense in which moral delinquencies are said to be followed by penal inflictions. There is something here which 1s totally at variance with the instinctive feelings and moral convictions of mankind. Mr Combe affirms that each of the three great classes of “ natural laws” requires obe- dience to itself, and that each, in its own specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience. And he gives, as one example, the case of the most pious and benevolent missionaries sailing to civilise and Christianise the heathen, but embarking in an unsound ship, and being drowned by disobeying a “ natural law;’—as another, the case of “a child or an aged person, stumbling into the fire, through mere lack of physical strength to keep out of it ;’—as another, the case of “an ignorant child, grop- ing about for something to eat and drink, and stumbling on a phial of laudanum, drinking it and dying ;”—and as another, the case of “a slater slipping from the roof of a high building, in consequence of a stone of the ridge havy- ing given way as he walked upright along it.”* In all these cases, the accident or misfortune which befalls the individual is represented as the punishment connected with the neglect or transgression of a “natural law,” just as remorse, shame, conviction, and condemnation may be the punishment for a moral offence. In other words, a child who ignorantly drinks laudanum is punished with death, in the same sense, and for the same reason, that the murderer is punished with death for shedding the blood of a fellow-creature ;—and the poor slater who misses his foot, and falls, most unwillingly, from a roof or parapet, is punished with death, just as a man would be who threw himself over with the intention of committing sui- cide! Surely there is some grave error here,—an error opposed to the surest dictates of our moral nature, and * Mr Comsz, “ Constitution of Man,” pp. 25, 53, 306, 364. ' ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 161 one that cannot be glossed over by any apologue, how- ever ingeniously constructed, to show the evil effects which would follow from a suspension of the general laws of Nature. For, in the words of Mr Scott, it is only where “ the law is previously known,”—and not only so, but where “the circumstances which determine the effect might be foreseen,”—that “the pleasures or pains annexed to actions can properly be termed rewards and punish- ments ;” for “these have reference to the state of mind of the party who is to be rewarded or punished,—it is the intention or disposition of the mind, and not the mere act of the body, that is ever considered as obedience or dis- obedience, or thought worthy, in a moral sense, of either reward or punishment.” And as the theory is thus sub- versive of all our ideas of moral retribution, so it demands of man a kind of obedience which it is empossible for him to render, since all the laws of Nature, and ail the states of particular things at a given time, cannot possibly be known by the ignorant many, nor even by the philoso- phic few. The philosopher, not less than the peasant, may perish through the explosion of a steam-engine, or the unsoundness of a ship, or the casual ignition of his dwelling; and that, too, without blame or punishment being involved in either case. On Mr Combe’s theory, it would seem to be necessary that every one should be aman of science, if he would avoid sin and punishment ; and yet, unfortunately, the ablest man of science is not exempt, in the present state of his knowledge, from the same calamities which befall his less enlightened, but not less virtuous, neighbours. These views are strikingly confirmed by the remarks of a writer in “The Reasoner,” who blames Mr Combe for complicating his argument unnecessarily and uselessly with some of the truths of Theism, and who thinks that VOL. II. L 162 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— the doctrine of “natural laws” can only be consistently maintained on the ground of Atheism. “If the system of Nature,” he says, “be viewed by itself, without any reference to a Divine Author or all-perfect Creator,— merely as an isolated system of facts,—no comparison could be made, no reconciliation would be necessary, and the system of Nature would be regarded as the result of some unknown cause,—a combination of good and evil, and no more to be censured or wondered at for being what it is, than any single substance or fact in Nature excites censure or surprise on account of its peculiar constitution, ... - The assumption of a Supernatural Being as the author and director of the laws of Nature appears to me to be attended with several mischievous results, First, you make every infringement of the laws of Nature an offence against the supposed Divine Legis- lator, which, to a pious and conscientious mind, must give rise to distressing remorse... . . Again, under this view, the penalties incurred will often be very unjust, oppressive, and cruel; as where persons are placed in circumstances that compel them to violate the laws of Nature,—as when they are obliged to pursue some un- wholesome employment which injures their health and shortens their lives; or where the penalty is incurred by an accident,—as when a person breaks a leg or an arm, or is killed by a fall; or where a person is materially or fatally injured in endeavouring to save another person from injury or death. In such cases as these, to repre- gent the unavoidable pain or death incurred or under- gone for an act of beneficence, as a punishment inflicted for a transgression of the laws of God the Divine Legis- lator, is to violate all our notions of justice and right, to say nothing of goodness or mercy, and to represent the Divine Being as grossly unjust and cruelly vindictive. ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 163 .... Again, if all suffering, however unavoidably in- curred, is to be regarded as a punishment from the Divine Legislator, to attempt to alleviate or remove the suffering thus incurred would be to fly in the face of the Divine authority, by endeavouring to set aside the punishment it had inflicted ; just as it would be an oppo- sition to the authority of human laws to rescue a prisoner from custody, or deliver a culprit from punishment.” * 3. We deem it another radical defect in Mr Combe’s theory of “natural laws,” that he represents the distinct existence and independent action of these laws as “ the key to the Divine government,”—as the one principle which explains all apparent irregularities, and accounts satis- factorily for the casualties and calamities of human life. —We cannot doubt, indeed, either the wisdom or the benevolence of that constitution of things under which we live, nor dispute the value and importance of those laws according to which the world is ordinarily governed. We admit that the suspension of any one of these laws, except perhaps on some signal occasion of miraculous interposition, would go far to unsettle and derange the existing economy. But “natural laws,”—whether viewed individually or collectively, and whether considered as acting independently of each other, or as mutually related and interdependent,—cannot afford of themselves any key to the Divine government, or any solution of the difficulties of Providence. We must rise to a far higher platform if we would survey the whole scheme of the Divine administration: we must consider, not merely the independent operation of the several classes of “natural laws,” but also their mutual relations, as distinct but con- nected parts of one vast system, in which the “ physical and organic ” laws are made subordinate and subservient * F. B, Barron, “The Reasoner,” x1. 24, 373. 164 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— to the “moral,” under the superintendence of that Supreme Intelligence which makes the things that are “seen and temporal” to minister to those things which are “unseen and eternal;” we must carefully discrimi- nate, as Bishop Butler has done, between the mere “natural government” which is common to man with the inferior and irresponsible creation, and the higher « moral government ” which is peculiar to intelligent and accountable agents; and we must seek to know how far, —the reality of both being admitted,—the former is auxiliary or subservient to the latter, and whether, on the whole, the system is fitted to generate that frame. of mind, and to inculeate those lessons of truth, which are appropriate to the condition of man, as a subject of moral discipline in a state of probation and trial.— Nothing short of this will suffice for the explanation of the Divine government, or for the satisfaction of the human mind. It is felt to be a mere insult to the understandings, and a bitter mockery to the feelings, of men, to talk only of “natural laws,” or even of their “independent action” in such a case,—to tell a weeping mother that her child died, and died too as the trans- oressor of a wise and salutary “ natural law” which establishes a certain relation between opium and the nervous system: for, grant that the law is wise and salutary,—grant that evil would result from its abolition, —erant even that it acts independently of any other law, physical or moral,—still the profounder question remains, whether such an event as the death of a tender child, through the operation of a law of which that child was necessarily ignorant, can properly be regarded as a punishment inflicted by Divine justice ? and whether a theory of this kind can afford “a key to the government of God?” ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 165 Such are some of the radical and incurable defects of Mr Combe’s theory of “ natural laws.” We ascribe it to him simply because he has been the most recent and the most popular expounder of it. But it is not original, nor in any sense peculiar to him alone. He acknowledges his obligations in this respect to a manu- script work of Dr Spurzheim, entitled, “ A Sketch of the Natural Laws of Man;” and he refers, somewhat inci- dentally, to Volney’s “ Law of Nature,” published origi- nally as a Catechism, and afterwards reprinted under the title, “La Loi Naturelle; ou, Principes Physiques de la Morale.” The same theory, in substance, had been broached in the “ Systéme dela Nature,” and there it was applied in support of the atheistic conclusions of that remarkable treatise. But it may be said to have been methodised by Volney ; and in his treatise it is exhibited in a form adapted to popular instruction.* There is a striking resemblance between his speculations and those of Mr Combe. He, too, acknowledges the existence of God; but virtually supersedes His Providence by the substitution of “natural laws.” The “law of Nature” is defined as “the constant order by which God governs the world,” and is represented as the most universal “rule of action.” That law is supposed to be a com- mand or a prohibition to act in certain cases, accompanied with the natural sanction of reward and punishment. After giving several examples of “natural laws,’—which are all merely general facts or the generalised results of experi- ence,—he describes man’s relation to these laws almost in the words of Mr Combe. “Since all these, and similar facts,” he says, “are unchangeable, constant, and regu- lar, there result for man as many true laws to which he * Vouney, “La Loi Naturelle,” which has been translated, and is usually appended to his “ Ruins of Empires.” 166 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— must conform, with the express clause of a penalty at- _ tached to their infraction, or of a benefit attached to their observance,—so that if a man shall pretend to see well in the dark, if he acts in opposition to the course of the seasons or the action of the elements, if he pretends to live under water without being drowned, or to touch fire without being burned, or to deprive himself of air with- out being suffocated, or to drink poison without being destroyed, he receives for each of these infractions of the ‘natural laws’ a corporal punishment, and one that is proportioned to his offence; while, on the contrary, if he observes and obeys every one of these laws, in their exact and regular relations to him, he will preserve his existence, and make it as happy as it can be.” This code of “natural laws” is then described by Volney as possessing no fewer than ten peculiar charac- teristics, which give it a decided pre-eminence over every other moral system, whether human or Divine,—as being primitive, immediate, universal, invariable, evident, reasonable, just, peaceful, beneficial, and alone suffictent. But it is so only when viewed in connection with the miserably low and meagre system of morals with which it is avowedly associated. For when morals are described as a mere physical science, founded on man’s organiza- tion, his interests and passions,—when the treatise, according to its second title, is professedly an attempt to expound the physical principles of morals,—and when, in pursuance of this plan, all the principles of Ethics are rigorously reduced to one, viz., the principle of self-pre- servation, which is enforced, as a duty, by the only sanctions of pleasure and pain,—it is not wonderful that, for such an end, the “natural laws” might be held sufli- cient: but it is wonderful that any mind capable of a moment’s reflection should not have perceived that, in ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 167 such a system, the cardinal idea of Deity is altogether omitted, or left unaccounted for, in the case of Man,— and that no attempt is made to explain or to account for any thing that is properly moral in the government of God. “On a review of these speculations, it is important to bear in mind that the existence of natural laws is notneces- sarily exclusive of a superintending Providence. Their operation, on the contrary, may afford some of the strongest proofs of its reality. For, whether considered as a scheme of provision or as a system of government, Divine Providence rests on a strong body of natural evidence. In the one aspect, it upholds and preserves all things; in the other, it controls and overrules all things for the accomplishment of the Divine will. Con- sidered as a scheme of government, it is either natural or moral. ‘To the former, all created beings without excep- tion are subject; to the latter, only some orders of being, —such, viz., as are intelligent, voluntary, and responsible agents. In the case of man, constituted as he is, the Physical, Organic, Intellectual, and Moral laws are all combined; and he is subject, therefore, both to a natural government, which is common to him with all other material and organised beings, and also to a moral government, which is peculiar to himself as a free and accountable agent. The natural government of God extends to all his creatures, and includes man considered simply as one of them; and its reality is proved, first, by the daws to which all created things are subject, and which they have no power to alter or resist,—secondly, by the final causes or beneficial ends which are obviously - contemplated in the arrangements of Nature, and the great purposes which are actually served by them,—and, 168 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— thirdly, by the necessary dependence of all created things on the will of Him to whom they owe alike the com- mencement and the continuance of their being. But the natural government of God, which extends to all His creatures, does not exhaust or complete the doctrine of His Providence: it includes also a scheme of moral go- vernment, adapted to the nature, and designed for the regulation, of His intelligent, voluntary, and responsible subjects. And the reality of a moral government may be proved, first, by the moral faculty, which is a consti- tuent part of human nature, and which makes man “a law to himself ;” secondly, by the essential nature of virtuous and vicious dispositions, as being inherently pleasant or painful; thirdly, by the natural consequences of our actions, which indicate a sure connection between moral and physical evil; and, fourthly, by the moral at- mosphere in which we are placed, as being members of a community in which the distinction between right and wrong is universally acknowledged, and applied in the way of approbation or censure.—By such proofs, the Providence of God may be shown to be a scheme both of natural and moral government,—two aspects of the same system which are equally real, yet widely different. But the distinction between the two, although founded on a real and radical difference, is not such as to imply that they have no relation to each other, or no mutual influence, as distinct but connected parts of the same comprehensive scheme. They are not isolated, but inter- penetrating ; they come into contact at many points, and the natural is made subordinate and subservient to the moral. For there is a beautiful gradation in the order of the established laws of Nature. The physical laws are made subordinate and subservient to the organic; both the physical and organic are subservient to the intellec- ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 169 tual; the physical, organic, and intellectual are subser- vient to the moral; and the intellectual and moral are subservient to our preparation for the spiritual and eternal. In the words of Bishop Butler, “The natural and moral constitution and government of the world are so connected as to make up together but one scheme; and it is highly probable that the first is formed and carried on merely in swbserviency to the latter,—as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organised bodies for minds.” * Every instance of pleasure or pain arising from the voluntary actions of men, is a proof that a relation of some kind has been established between all the distinct, but independent, provinces of Nature; and the invari- able connection between moral and physical evil shows how the lower are made subservient to the higher depart- ments of the Divine government. Apart from a scheme of moral discipline, there is no reason discernible, a priori, why pain should be the accompaniment or consequent of one mode of action rather than another; and the relations which have been established, in the natural constitution of things, between sin and misery, affords a strong proof not only of the reality of a moral government, but of the subordination of physical and organic agencies to its great designs. This relation between the natural and the moral govern- ment of God is admirably illustrated by Bishop War- burton :—*“ The application of natural events to moral government, in the common course of Providence, connects the character of Lord and Governor of the intellectual world with that of Creator and Preserver of the mate- tl en are The doctrine of the pre-established harmony, —the direction of natural events to moral government,— * Buturr’s “ Analogy,” part 1, @ vii. 8Y, Pp ; 170 THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN— obviates all irreligious suspicions, and not only satisfies us that there is but one governor of both systems, but that both systems are conducted by one scheme of Pro- vidence. ‘To form the constitution of Nature in such a manner that, without controlling or suspending its laws, it should continue, throughout a long succession of ages, to produce its physical revolutions as they best contri- bute to the preservation and order of its own system, just at those precise periods of time when their effects, whether salutary or hurtful to many, may serve as instru- ments for the government of the moral world: for exam- ple, that a foreign enemy, amidst our intestine broils, should desolate all the flourishing works of rural industry, —that warring elements, in the stated order of natural government, should depopulate and tear in pieces a highly-viced city, just in those very moments when moral government required a warning and example to be held out to a careless world,—is giving us the noblest as well as the most astonishing idea of God’s goodness and: justice.® 205 |: When He made the world, the free determinations of the human will, and the necessary effects of laws physical, were so fitted and accommodated to one another, that a sincere repentance in the moral world should be sure to avert an impending desolation in the natural,—not by any present alteration or suspension of its established laws, but by originally adjusting all their operations to all the foreseen circumstances of moral agency.” * Viewed in this light, the course of Providence 1s won- derfully adapted to the constitution of human nature,— since it affords as much certainty in regard to some things as is sufficient to lay a foundation for forethought, pru- dence, and diligence in the use of means,—and yet leaves * Warpurton’s “ Works,” x. p. 8. ITS RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 171 so much remaining uncertainty in regard to other things as should impress us with a sense of constant dependence on Him “in whom we live, and move, and have our being.” The constitution of Nature and the course of Providence in the present state seem mainly intended to teach these two lessons,—first, of diligence in the use of means, and, secondly, of dependence on a Higher Power: for there is sufficient regularity in the course of events to encourage human industry in every department of labour; and yet there is as much uncertainty, arising from the endless complication of causes and the limited range of human knowledge, as should impress us with a sense of our utter helplessness. The wisdom of God in the government of the world may be equally manifested in the regular order which He has established, and which, within certain limits, man may be able to ascertain and reckon on as a ground of hopeful activity; and in the apparent casualty and inscrutable mystery of many things which can neither be divined by human wisdom, nor con- trolled by human power. It matters not whether the remaining uncertainty is supposed to arise from some classes of events not being subject to regular laws, or from our ignorance of these laws, and the variety of their manifold combinations. In either case, it is certain that, in our actual experience, and, so far as we can judge, in the experience of every creature not possessed of omni- scient knowledge, these two elements are and must be combined,—such a measure of certainty as should encour- age industry in the use of means,—and such a measure of remaining uncertainty as should keep them mindful that they are not, and never can be, independent of God. Le THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. § 8. THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. The doctrine of Providence lays a firm foundation for the duty of Prayer. In the case of all intelligent, moral, and responsible beings, the mere existence of a Divine government to which they are subject, would seem to imply an obligation to own and acknowledge it; and this obligation is best fulfilled by the exercise of prayer, which is a practical testimony alike to man’s dependence and to God's dominion. Prayer, in its widest sense, includes the whole homage which man is capable of rendering to God as the sole ob- ject of religious worship; and it implies the recognition of all His supreme perfections and prerogatives as the Creator and Governor of the world. It is usually de- scribed* as consisting, first, in “adoration,”—in which we express our sense of His rightful supremacy and ab- solute perfection, and do homage to Him for what He is in himself; secondly, in “thanksgiving,’—in which we express our sense of gratitude for all His kindness and care, and do homage to Him for the benefits which He has bestowed ; thirdly, in “ confession,”—in which we ex- press our sense of sin in having transgressed His law, and do homage to Him as our moral Governor and Judge; and, fourthly, in “petition,’—in which we ex- press our sense of dependence alike on His providence and grace, and do homage to Him as the “ Father of lights, from whom cometh down every good and perfect gift.” Of these, the three first are so evidently reason- able and becoming,—so necessarily involved in the sim- plest idea which we can form of our relations to God and of the obligations which result from them,—that few, if * Dr Price’s “ Dissertations,” p. 198. THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. iW ipa any, of those who admit the existence and providence of the Supreme Being, will deny that the sentiments them- selves are appropriate to our condition, however they may doubt the necessity or the duty of giving formal utterance to them in the language of religious worship. But in regard to the fourth, which, if it be not the most sublime or elevated, is yet the most urgent motive to the exercise of devotion, many difficulties have been raised and many objections urged, which do not apply, at least in the same measure, to the other parts of Prayer, and which, in so far as they prevail with reflecting minds, would soon lead to the practical neglect of all religious worship. The practice of offering up “ petitions ” either for ourselves or others, with the view of thereby obtain- ing any benefit, whether of a temporal or spiritual kind, has been denounced, and even ridiculed, as an unphilo- sophical attempt to alter the established course of Nature, or the pre-ordained sequences of events. The supposi- tion of its “efficacy” has been represented as a flagrant instance of superstitious ignorance, worthy only of the dark ages, and even as a presumptuous blasphemy, de- rogatory to the unchangeable character of the Supreme. Some have held, indeed, that while prayer can have no real efficacy either in averting evil or procuring good, it may nevertheless be both legitimate and useful, by reason of the wholesome reflex influence which it is fitted to exert on the mind of the worshipper; and they have recom- mended the continuance of the practice on this ground, —as if men, once convinced of its utter inefficacy, would or could continue, with any fervency, to offer up their re- quests to God, merely for the sake of impressing their own minds through the medium of a sort of conscious hypocrisy! We are told that David Hume, “after hear- ing a sermon preached by Dr Leechman, in which he me hye | THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. dwelt on the power of prayer to render the wishes it ex- pressed more ardent and passionate, remarked with great justice, that ‘we can make use of no expression, or even thought, in prayers and entreaties, which does not imply that these prayers have an influence.’” This interme- diate ground, therefore, is plainly untenable, and we are shut up to one or other of two alternatives: either there as an “efficacy” in prayer as a means of averting evil and procuring good, such as may warrant, and should en- courage, us in offering up our requests unto God; or, there is no such efficacy in it, and no reason why it should be observed by any of God’s intelligent creatures, whether on earth or in heaven. The principles which are applicable to the ieeien of this important question may be best explained, after ad- verting briefly to some of the particular objections which have been urged against the “ efficacy of prayer.” Se- veral of these objections evidently proceed on an erro- neous view of the nature and object of prayer.— When it is said, for example, that God, being omniscient, does not need to be informed either of the wants or the wishes of any of His creatures, the objection involves a great and important truth,—a truth which was explicitly recognised by our Lord when He said, * Your heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have need of before ye ask Him;” but that truth is grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that prayer is either superfluous or ineffectual, since the objection virtually assumes that the object of prayer is ¢o inform God of what He did not know before, and that His omniscience is of itself sufficient to show that prayer from men or angels must needs be unavailing, When it is said, again, that God being immutable, His will cannot be affected or altered by the “petitions” of His creatures, this objection, THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 175 like the former one, involves a great and important truth,—a truth which is also explicitly recognised in Scripture when it is said that “He is without variable ness or the least shadow of turning;” but this truth, too, is grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that there can be no efficacy in prayer, since it might as well be said that the Divine dispensations must be in- variably the same whatever may be the conduct of His creatures i other respects, as that they must be the same whether men do or do not pray; or, that His pro- cedure as a Moral Governor has no reference whatever either to the character or conduct of his subjects. But, in the words of Dr Price, “ God’s unchangeableness, when considered in relation to the exertion of His attri- butes in the government of the world, consists, not in always acting in the same manner however cases and circumstances alter, but in always doing what is right, and varying His conduct according to the various actions, characters, and dispositions of beings. Tf, then, prayer makes an alteration in the case of the suppliant, as being the discharge of an indispensable duty, what would in truth infer changeableness in Him would be, not His re- garding and answering it, but His mot doing this.” * When it is said, again, that there can be no “ efficacy in prayer,” because there is an established constitution and regular course of Nature, by which all events, whether prosperous or adverse, are invariably determined, and which cannot be altered or modified without a miracle, this objection, like each of the two former, involves an important truth,—a truth which is also explicitly recog- nised in Scripture when it speaks of “the ordinances of the heavens and the earth,” and of the peculiar laws and properties of all created things; but this truth is * Dr Pricer, “ Dissertations,” pp. 208, 219. 176 THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, also grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that God’s will has no efficient control over natural events, or that He has no agencies at His disposal by which He can accomplish the desires of them that seek Him.—In all these objections there is an apparent truth, but there is also a latent error; and the false conclusion is founded on an erroneous supposition in re- gard to the nature and object of prayer. For this reason, we shall endeavour to separate the truth from the error, and to lay down a few positions which may be established both by reason and Scripture, and which will be sufficient to show that the doctrine which affirms the efficacy of prayer is not only credible, but true. 1. Prayer, in the restricted sense in which we now speak of it, as denoting “ petition” or “ supplication,” consists in offering up “the desires of the heart to God for things agreeable to His will.” It is not a mere formal, outward homage, such as might be rendered by words or ceremo- nies ;—it is a spiritual service, in which the mind and heart of man come into immediate converse with God Himself. It is offered to Him personally, as to the invi- sible but ever-present “Searcher of hearts,” who “ hears the desire of the humble,” and whose “ ear is attentive to the voice of their supplications.” This implies the recog- nition of His omnipresence and omniscience, but these perfections of His nature do not supersede the expres- sion of our desires in prayer, just because prayer is de- signed, not to increase His knowledge, but to declare our sense of dependence on His will, and to procure His grace to help us in every time of need, Our petitions, too, are always bounded within certain limits, and subject to at least one indispensable condition ; they are offered only “ for things agreeable to His will;” and when our own THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 177 will is thus, in the very act of prayer, expressly subordi- nated to that which is alone unerring and supreme, we acknowledge at once His rightful sovereignty and our dutiful subjection, and we are not justly chargeable with the presumption of dictating to God the course of pro- cedure which He should pursue towards us. We are protected, too, against the evils which our own errors in prayer might otherwise entail on us, for “we know not what things to pray for as we ought;” and we have an infallible security that, in the best and highest sense,— that which is most in accordance with our real welfare,— our prayers must be answered, since our wills are resolved into His will; and His will, being omnipotent, cannot be resisted or frustrated in any of its designs. Our assur- ance of the certain efficacy of our prayers is so much the greater, in proportion as we have reason to believe that the things for which we pray are agreeable to His will; and hence we are more confident in asking spiritual than temporal gifts; for the former we know to be always agreeable to His will and conducive to our own welfare, while the latter may, or may not, be good for us in our present circumstances, and must be left at the sovereign disposal of Him who knows what is in man, and what is best for each of His children. 2. Considering the relation in which we stand to God as His creatures and subjects, it is natural, fit, and pro- per that we should make known our requests to Him, and supplicate the aids both of His providence and grace ;— and if it be our duty to pray, it is reasonable to believe that God will have some respect to our prayers in His methods of dealing with us; in other words, that, as a righteous moral governor, he will make a difference between the godly and the ungodly,—the men who do, and the men who do not, pray. VOL. I. M 178 THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. In this position it 1s assumed that there are certain relations, natural or revealed, subsisting betwixt us and God, in virtue of which it is our duty to acknowledge His dominion and our dependence, by supplicating the aids of His providence and grace. That such relations do subsist between God and man, is evinced alike by the light of Nature and of Revelation ; and they cannot be discerned or realised without immediately suggesting the idea of certain corresponding obligations and duties. Every one whose conscience has not been utterly seared must instinctively feel the force of that appeal, “If I be a Father, where is mine honour,—and if I be a Master, where is my fear?” For, considering God in the very simplest aspect of His character as the Creator and Governor of the world, He stands related to us as the Author and Preserver of our being,—as our rightful Proprietor and constant Benefactor,—as our supreme Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge ;—and these natural relations, apart altogether from the supernatural which are revealed in Scripture, are sufficient to lay a solid groundwork for “the duty of prayer” in the case of every intelligent being who is capable of knowing God, and acknowledging his dependence on the Divine will. In such a case, prayer is felt to be a natural, fit, and be- coming expression of what is known to be true, and what ought, as a matter of duty, to be practically avowed. Now, this is the grand design of prayer; and in its real design, when that is rightly apprehended, it finds its noblest vindication. The object of prayer is,—neither to inform God, as if He were not omniscient,—nor to alter His eternal purposes, as if He were not unchange- able,—nor to unsettle the established course of Nature, as if He were not “a God of order;” but simply to acknowledge His dominion and our dependence, and to THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 179 obtain from Him, in the way of His own appointment, the blessings of which we stand in need. It is not unreasonable to believe that God, as the Governor of the world, will have some regard to the dispositions and actions of His responsible creatures, as a reason for dealing differently with those who own, and those who disown, His supremacy; and that He may require the use of certain means, such as the exercise of prayer, with the view of our obtaining from Him, in a way the most beneficial to ourselves, the blessings, whether temporal or spiritual, of which we stand in need. For if we really be the creatures of God, and, as such, dependent on His providential bounty, and subject to His righteous government, it is self-evidently natural and right that we should, as intelligent and responsible beings, acknowledge His supreme dominion and our absolute dependence by supplicating the aids both of His providence and grace. This is our duty, con- sidering the relations which He sustains towards us; and if it be fit and proper that we should pray to God, —if it be, in our circumstances, a duty which we owe to Him,—then it is most reasonable to believe that it is equally fit and proper in God to have some re- spect to our prayers, and to deal with us differently according as we either observe or neglect this religious duty. Prayer may be regarded in one or other of two distinct aspects,—either as a duty, the observance or neglect of which must be followed, under a system of moral govern- ment, with different results; or simply as a means, the use of which is productive of certain effects which are made to depend on this special instrumentality. And in either view, its “ efficacy” may be affirmed on the same grounds on which we are wont to vindicate the 180 THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. use of all other means, and to enforce the observance of all other duties, in connection with the system of the Divine government. 3. The efficacy of prayer, so far from being incon- sistent with, is founded on, the immutability of the Divine purposes and the faithfulness of the Divine promises. God’s purposes are justly held, in all other cases, to include the means as well as the ends ; and they are often fulfilled through the instrumentality of “second causes.” His purpose to provide for the wants of man and beast has reference not merely to the harvest which is the result, but also to the agricultural labour by which. instrumentally, the harvest 1s prepared. May not “prayer” be also a means ordained by God in the original constitution of the world,—a means towards certain ends which are made dependent on its use? If it be such a means, then its “ efficacy ” is established, in the only sense in which we are concerned to contend for it,—while it is shown to be no more inconsistent with the immutability of the Divine purposes, than any other system of means or instruments that may be employed as subordinate agencies in the government of the world. This important view is strikingly illustrated in Scripture. For some of the purposes of God, which might have been undiscoverable in the mere light of Nature, are there explicitly declared,—nay, they are thrown into the form of express promises, to which the Divine faithfulness is solemnly pledged; and yet the exercise of prayer, so far from being superseded by these promises, 18 rather stimulated and encouraged by them; and the believer pleads with increased fervour and confidence when he simply converts God’s promises into his own petitions. He feels that in doing so he is taking God at his word; and that his own prayer, in so far as it is warranted by a Ti i i THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 181 His promise, cannot be ineffectual any more than God’s faithfulness can fail. Thus Daniel “ understood by books the number of the years whereof the word of the Lord came to Jeremjah the prophet, that He would accomplish seventy years in the desolation of Jerusalem.” He knew the Lord’s promise, and that the time for its fulfilment was at hand ; yet so far from regarding either the immutability of the Divine purpose, or even the infallible certainty of the Divine promise, as a reason for neglecting prayer, as if that exer- cise were superfluous or vain, he was stimulated and en- couraged to pray just because “he knew the word of the Lord.”—* And I set my face,” he says, “ unto the Lord God, to seek by prayer and supplications, with fasting, sackcloth, and ashes;” and I prayed unto the Lord my God and said, “O Lord! hear ; O Lord! forgive; O Lord! hearken and do; defer not, for thine own sake, O my God!” *—Thus, again, when the Lord gave certain great and precious promises to His ancient people, assur- ing them that “ He would sprinkle clean water upon them, and give them a new heart and a right spirit,” it is added, “I will yet for this be inquired of by the house of Israel to do it for them.”+ Thus, again, when the Saviour himself gave to His disciples that promise, which is emphatically called. “the promise of the Father,” assuring them that they should be « baptised with the Holy Ghost not many days hence,” and directing them to “ wait at Jerusalem until they should be endued with power from above,” the apostles, so far from regarding that “ promise” as superseding the exercise of “ prayer,” betook themselves immediately to an upper room, and “all continued with one accord in prayer and supplica- * Daniel ix. 2, 19, t+ Ezekiel xxxvi. 37, 182 THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. tion ;” and, at the appointed time, God’s promise was ful- filled, and their prayer answered, when “ they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance.”-—These ex- amples are abundantly sufficient to show that prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is founded on, the immu- tability of the Divine purposes, and the faithfulness of the Divine promises. 4, Our next position is, that the method in which God answers the prayers of His people may be, in many re- spects, mysterious or even inscrutable ; but no objection to “the efficacy of prayer,” which is founded on our ignorance of His infinite resources, can have any weight, especially when there are several hypothetical solutions, any one of which is sufficient to neutralise its force, An omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty Being, pre- siding over the affairs of His own world, as the author, upholder, and governor of all things, may well be conceived to have infinite resources at His command,—such as we can never fully estimate,—by which he can give effect to prayer in ways that may be to us inscrutable. But our ignorance of the mode is no reason for doubting the reality of His interposition in answer to prayer; and even if we were unable to decide on the comparative merits of the various explanations of it which have been proposed, the mere fact that there are several solutions, at once conceivable and credible, any one of which may be sufficient, as a hypothetical explanation, to neutralise every adverse presumption, should be held tantamount to a proof that no valid or conclusive objection can be urged against it. Dr Chalmers has frequently illustrated the legitimate and important uses of “hypothetical solu- tions” in Theology; and has conclusively shown that even where they leave us at a loss to determine which of THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 183 various methods of solving a difficulty is the truest or the best, they yet serve a great purpose, if they merely neutralise an objection, by showing that the difficulty in question might be satisfactorily accounted for, were our knowledge more extensive or more precise.* Now, with regard to “the efficacy of prayer,” there are four distinct solutions, or rather four different methods of disposing of the difficulty, any one of which is sufficient to vindicate the claims of the doctrine on our faith. We shall not discuss the respective merits of these various solutions in detail, but shall merely state them, with the view of showing that there are several methods of accounting for “the efficacy of prayer” in perfect consistency with the established order of Nature. The first is the theory of those who hold that there is the same relation between prayer and the answer to prayer, as between cause and effect in any other sequence of Nature. Prayer is supposed to be the cause, and the answer the effect ; and this by an invariable law, established in the original constitution, and manifested in the uniform course, of the world. ‘To this solution Dr Chalmers seems to refer when he says, that “the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer but introduces a new sequence to the notice of the mind,”—that “it may add another law of Nature to those which have been formerly observed,”— and that “the general truth may be preserved, that the same result always follows in the same circumstances, although it should be discovered that prayer is one of those influential circumstances by which the result is liable to be modified.” + Now, if it be meant merely to affirm that, in the administration of His providential govern- ment, God has respect to the prayers of men as a con- * Dr Cuaumers, “ Works,” 11. 286, + Ibid, 325, 184 THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. sideration which affects their relation to Him and His treatment of them, and that this rule is as invariable as any other law of Nature, the principle that is involved in this solution may be admitted as sound and valid; but if it be further meant, that prayer and the answer to prayer are in all respects similar to any other instance of cause and effect, it must be remembered that the answer is not the effect of the prayer, at least directly and immediately, but the effect of the Divine will; and then the question suggested by Dr M‘Cosh, whether causality can properly be ascribed to our prayers with reference to the Divine will? would claim our serious consideration. But in the former sense, as implying nothing more than that, in the original constitution and the ordinary course of Providence, the same effect is given to our prayers as to any other moral cause or condi- tion, 1t seems to be exempt from all reasonable objection, and to afford a sufficient explanation of the difficulty. The second “hypothetical solution” is that of those who hold that while God, in answering the prayers of men, does not ordinarily disturb the known or discover- able sequences of the natural world, yet His interference may be alike real and efficacious though it should take place at a point in the series of natural causes far removed beyond the limits of our experience and obser- vation ; and thus “the answer to prayer may be effec- tually given without any infringement on the known regularities of Nature.” Dr Chalmers adverts to this second solution in replying to an objection which might possibly be raised against the /ist,—viz., that “we see no evidence of the constancy of visible nature giving way to that invisible agency, the interposition of which it is the express object of prayer to obtain;” and he suggests that, in the vast scale of natural sequences, THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 185 which constitute one connected chain, the responsive touch from the finger of the Almighty may be given “either at a higher or a lower place in the progression,” —and that if it be supposed to be “ given far enough back,” it might originate a new sequence, but without doing violence to any ascertained law, since it occurs beyond the reach of our experience and observation. This solution we hold to be not so much an effective argument in favour of the efficacy of prayer, as a con- clusive answer to a particular objection against it. It is sufficient to show that, with our very limited knowledge, we act presumptuously in deciding against the possi- bility of an answer to prayer such as may leave the established course of Nature unaltered; but there is no necessity, and no reason, for supposing that the respon- sive touch can only be given at a point to which our knowledge does not extend, or that, were our knowledge extended, we would have less difficulty in admitting it there, than in holding it to be possible at any lower term in the scale of sequences. The third “hypothetical solution” is that of those who hold that a Divine answer to prayer may be con- veyed through the ministry of angels, or the agency of ‘intelligent, voluntary, and active beings, employed by God, in subordination to His Providence, for the accom- plishment of His great designs. The existence of such an order, or rather hierarchy, of created intelligences is clearly revealed in Scripture; and it is rendered credible, or even probable, by the analogy of Nature, since we ob- serve on earth a regular gradation of animal life from the insect up to man, and we have no reason to suppose that the gradation is suddenly arrested just at the point where the animal and the spiritual are combined. But not only their existence,—their active agency also, as 186 THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. “ministers fulfilling His will,” as “ ministering spirits sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs of sal- vation,” is explicitly and frequently declared as well as exemplified in Scripture; and this, too, would be, on the supposition of their existence, in strict accordance with the analogy of Nature, which shows that the lower orders of being are placed under the care and control of the higher. Mr Boyle, accordingly, makes frequent refer- ence, in his Theological treatises, to the ministry of angels, as subordinate agents, through whose instru- mentality many of the designs of Providence may be carried into effect; and President Edwards enlarges on the same theme.* The fourth “hypothetical solution” is that of those who hold that God has so arranged His Providence from the beginning as to provide for particular events as well as for general results, and especially to provide an answer to the prayers of His intelligent creatures. This solution is more general than any of the ¢hree former, and may even be comprehensive of them all. It regards prayer as an element which was taken into account at the original constitution of the world, and for which an answer was provided, as the result of natural laws or of angelic agency, employed for this express end by the omniscient foreknowledge and wisdom of God. It is the solution that has obtained the sanction of some of the highest names in Science and Theology. “JT begin,” says Euler, “ with considering an objection which almost all the Philosophical Systems have started against prayer. Religion prescribes this as our duty, with an assurance that God will hear and answer our vows and prayers, provided they are conformable to the * Hon. Ros. Boye, “Theolog. Works,’ 11. 96, 111. 230, PRESIDENT Epwarps, “ Works,” x. 1, THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 187 precepts which He hath given us. Philosophy, on the other hand, instructs us that all events take place in strict conformity to the course of Nature, established from the beginning, and that our prayers can effect no change ~ whatever, unless we pretend to expect that God should be continually working miracles in compliance with our prayers. This objection has the greater weight, that Religion itself teaches the doctrine of God’s having established the course of all events, and that nothing can come to pass but what God foresaw from all eternity. Is it credible, say the objectors, that God should think of altering this settled course, in compliance with any prayers which men might address to Him?—But I remark, first, that when God established the course of the universe, and arranged all the events that must come to pass in it, He paid attention to all the circumstances which should accompany each event, and, particularly, to the disposi- tions, desires, and prayers of every intelligent being; and that the arrangement of all events was disposed in perfect harmony with all these circumstances. When, therefore, a man addresses to God a prayer worthy to be heard, that prayer was already heard from all eternity, and the Father of mercies arranged the world expressly in favour of that prayer, so that the accomplishment should be a consequence of the natural course of events. It is thus that God answers the prayers of men without working a miracle.” * “ Tt is not impossible,” says Dr Wollaston, “ that such laws of Nature, and such a series of causes and effects, may be originally designed that not only general provi- sions may be made for the several species of beings, but even particular cases, at least many of them, may also be provided for, without innovations or alterations in the * Ever, “Letters to a German Princess,” 1. 271. 188 THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER, course of Nature. It is true this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all things to come are, as it were, com- prehended under one view, estimated and laid together : ~ but when I consider what a mass of wonders the universe is in other regards,—what a Being God is, incomprehen- sibly great and perfect,—that He cannot be lonorant of any thing, no not of the future wants and deportments of particular men,—and that all things which derive from Him, as their First Cause, must do this so as to be con- sistent with one another, and in such a manner as to make one compact system, befitting so great an Author; when I consider this, I cannot deny such an adjustment of things to be within His power. The order of events, proceeding from the settlement of Nature, may be as compatible with the due and reasonable success of my endeavours and prayers (as inconsiderable a part of the world as I am) as with any other thing or phenomenon how great soever..... And thus the prayers which good men offer to the all-knowing God, and the neglects of others, may find fitting effects, already forecasted in the course of Nature, which possibly may be extended to the /abours of men and their dehaviour in general.” * “If ever there was a future event,” says Dr Gordon, “which might have been reckoned on with absolute certainty, and one, therefore, in the accomplishment of which it might appear that prayer could have no room or efficacy, it was just the restoration of the Jewish captives to the land and city of their fathers. And yet, so far from supposing that there was no place for prayer to occupy, among the various means that were employed to bring about that event, it was just his firm belief in the nearness and certainty of it that set Daniel upon fervent and persevering supplications for its accomplish- * Dr Wottasroy, “ Religion of Nature,” p. 103. THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 189 ment... .. With regard to the rank which Daniel’s prayer occupied among the various means or agencies that were to be employed in bringing about the object of it, he had good reason to believe that it was neither without a definite place, nor in itself devoid of efficacy. . . .. He had been honoured to vindicate the power and assert the supremacy of the Lord God of Israel; by the wisdom of his counsels and the weight of his persona character, he had paved the way for that decision in favour of the people of God to which the King of Persia was soon to be brought; and the whole business of his active and most laborious life was made to bear on the interests and the liberation of his afflicted brethren. And if God had thus assigned to the outward actions of His servant an important place in carrying into effect His thoughts of peace toward his penitent people, is it conceivable that He had no place in that scheme for the holy and spiritual efforts of the same servant? or that the aspirations of a sanctified spirit, the travailing of a soul intent upon the accomplishment of the Divine will and the manifestation of the Divine glory, should be less efficient or less essential in the execution of the Divine counsels, than the outward and ordinary agency of human actions? The whole tenor and the most explicit decla- rations of Scripture stand opposed to such a supposition ; nor can I understand how a devout mind should have any difficulty in conceiving that it must be so. The agency of prayer is, indeed, a less obvious and palpable thing than that outward co-operation whereby mankind are rendered subservient to the accomplishment of the Divine purposes. But is it not an agency of an unspeak- ably loftier character? Is it not the co-operation of an immortal spirit, bearing the impress of the Divine image, and at the moment acting in unison with the Divine 190 THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. will? Is it not befitting the character of God to set upon that co-operation a special mark of His holy appro- bation, by assigning to it a more elevated place among the secondary causes which He is pleased to employ ? And must there not be provision made, therefore, in the general principles of His administration, for fulfilling the special promise of His word, “The Lord is nigh to all that call upon Him, to all that call upon him in prarth 22% | “We should blush,” says Bishop Warburton, “to be thought so uninstructed in the nature of prayer, as to fancy that it can work any temporary change in the dis- positions of the Deity, who is ‘ the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.’ Yet we are not ashamed to maintain that God, in the chain of causes and effects, which not only sustains each system, but connects them all with one another, hath so wonderfully contrived, that the tempo- rary endeavours of pious men shall procure good and avert evil, by means of that “pre-established harmony ’ which He hath willed to exist between moral actions and natural events.” “ But should some frigid sceptic, therefore, dare To doubt the all-prevailing power of prayer; As if ’t were ours, with impious zeal, to try To shake the purposes of Deity; Pause, cold philosopher, nor snatch away The last, the best, the wretched’s surest stay. Look round on life, and trace its chequered plan, The griefs, the joys, the hopes, the fears of man; Tell me, if each deliverance, each success, Each transient golden dream of happiness, Each palm that genius in the race acquires, Each thrilling rapture virtuous pride inspires, Tell me, if each and all were not combined In the great purpose of the Eternal Mind ? ~€ e ° ° * Dr Rosr. Gorpon, “Sermons,” p. 369. THE EFFICACY OF PRAYER. 191 Thus while we humbly own the vast decree, Formed in the bosom of Eternity, And know all secondary causes tend Each to contribute to one mighty end; Yet while these causes firmly fixed remain— Links quite unbroken in the endless chain, So that could one be snapped, the whole must fail, And wide confusion o’er the world prevail; Why may not our petitions, which arise In humble adoration to the skies, Be fore-ordained the causes, whence shall flow Our purest pleasures in this vale of woe ? Not that they move the purpose that hath stood By time unchanged, immeasurably good, But that the event and prayer alike may be Onited objects of the same decree.” * On the whole, we feel ourselves warranted, and even constrained, to conclude that the theory of “ government by natural law” is defective in so far as it excludes the superintendence and control of God over all the events of human life, and that neither the existence of second causes nor the operation of physical laws should diminish our confidence in the care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer. * It is with melancholy pleasure that the author recalls and reproduces, after an interval of thirty years, the lines of his early college companion, —Wiuiam Frienp Duranr,—a young man of high promise, removed, like his distinguished fellow-student, Ropert Poutocg, by what might seem a premature death, but for the prospect of immortality, 192 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, CHAPTER VI. THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. Wuen we survey the actual course of God’s Providence, by which the eternal purposes of the Divine Mind are carried into effect, we discern immediately a marked dif- ference between two great classes of events. The one comprehends a multitude of events which are so regular, stable, and constant, that we feel ourselves warranted in reckoning on their invariable recurrence, in the same circumstances in which they have been observed,—they seem to be governed by an unchangeable, or at least an established law. The other comprehends a different set of events, which are so irregular and variable that they occur quite unexpectedly, and cannot be reduced to any rule of rational computation ; they appear,—perhaps from our ignorance,—to be purely accidental or fortui- tous, In exact accordance with this difference between the two great classes of Providential events, there is a similar difference in our internal views or sentiments in regard to them. We are conscious of two totally dissimilar feel- ings in contemplating them respectively. We have a feeling of certainty, confidence, or assurance in regard to the one; and a feeling of uncertainty, anxiety, and help- lessness in regard to the other ;—while for an inter- THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, 193 mediate class of events, there is also an intermediate state of mind, equally removed from entire certainty and abso- lute doubt, arising from the various degrees of proba- bility that may seem to belong to them. These are at once natural and legitimate sentiments in the circum- stances in which we are placed ; for unquestionably there is much in these circumstances that is fitted to produce and cherish them all; and when they are combined,— especially when they are duly proportioned, in the case of any individual, they induce a habit or frame of mind most favourable to the recognition of God’s Providence, and most conducive to our welfare, by impressing us with a sense both of our dependence on His supreme will, and of our duty to be diligent in the use of all appointed means. But when either of the two classes of events is exclusively considered, or the sentiments appropriate to them inordinately cherished, there will be a tendency, in the absence of an enlightened belief in Providence, towards one or other of two opposite extremes,—the ex- treme, on the one hand, of resolving all events into results of physical agencies and mechanical laws, acting with the blind force of « destiny,” and leaving no room for the interposition of an intelligent Moral Ruler,—and the extreme, on the other hand, of ascribing all events to accidental or fortuitous influences, equally exempt from His control. The former is the theory of “ Fate,’—the latter is the theory of “ Chance;” and both are equally opposed to the doctrine which affirms the eternal pur- pose and the actual providence of an omniscient and all-controlling Mind. It matters little, with reference to our present purpose, whether or not every department of Nature be supposed to be equally subject to “natural laws ;” for even were it so, still if these laws were either in part unknown and VOL. IL, N 194 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, undiscoverable by us, or so related to each other that the results of their manifold possible combinations could not be calculated or reckoned on by human wisdom or fore- sight, ample room would be left for the exercise of dili- gence within the limits of our ascertained knowledge, and yet for a sense of dependence on a power which we feel ourselves unable either to comprehend or control. On the ground of analogy, we think it highly probable that every department of Nature is subject to regular and stable laws; and on the same ground we may anticipate that, in the progressive advance of human knowledge, many new fields will yet be conquered, and added to the domain of Science. But suppose every law were dis- covered,—suppose even that every individual event. should be shown to depend on some natural cause,— there would still remain at least two considerations which should remind us of our dependence. The first is our ignorance of the whole combination of causes which may at any time be brought into action, and of the results which may flow from them in circumstances such as we ean neither foresee nor provide against. The second is our ignorance, equally unavoidable and profound, of the intelligent and voluntary agencies which may be at work, modifying, disposing, and directing that combination of causes, so as to accomplish the purposes of the Omni- scient Mind. Our want of knowledge in either case is a, reason for uncertainty ; and our uncertainty in regard to events in which we may be deeply concerned is fitted to teach us our dependence on a higher Power. Let it not be thought, however, that our argument for God’s Providence is drawn merely from man’s 2gnorance, or that its strength must diminish in proportion as his knowledge of Nature is extended; on the contrary, it rests on the assumption that man knows enough to be THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 195 aware that he cannot know all, and that as long as he is not omniscient, he must be dependent on Him who alone “knows the end from the beginning,” and “who ruleth among the armies of heaven” as well as “ among the inhabitants of this earth.” It is in the invariable combination and marvellous mutual adjustment of these two elements,—the regular and the variable, the constant and the casual, the certain and the uncertain,—that we best discern the wisdom of that vast scheme of Providence, which is designed at once to secure our diligence in the use of means, and to impress us with a sense of our dependence on a higher Power. And the same remark may be equally applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the revealed constitution of things, since Scripture itself exhibits certain definite truths surrounded with a margin of mystery like “lights shining in a dark place,”’—and while it prescribes and encourages diligence in the use of means, teaches us at the same time our de- pendence on the Divine blessing which alone can render our efforts effectual. Both elements, therefore, must be taken into account and kept steadily in view, if we would form a comprehensive conception of the method of the Divine government, or a correct estimate of the wisdom with which it is adapted to the case of created and de- pendent, but intelligent, active, and responsible beings. But when the one is either dissevered from the other, or viewed apart and exclusively by itself,—when the mind dwells on either, to the neglect of what is equally a part of the same comprehensive scheme,—then we are in danger of adopting a partial and one-sided view of Pro~ vidence, and of lapsing into one or other of the opposite extremes,—the theory of “Chance” or the theory of “Fate.” | A few remarks on each of these theories may be neither 196 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, unseasonable nor useless, if they serve to illustrate the different kinds of Atheism which have sprung from them, and to place in a clear and strong light the radical difference which subsists between both, and the doc- trine of Providence, as it is taught and exemplified in Scripture. 1. The theory of “Chance,” which was once the strong- hold of Atheism, is now all but abandoned by speculative thinkers, and exists only, if at all, in the vague beliefs of uneducated and unreflecting men. This result has been brought about, not so much by the Metaphysical or even the Theological considerations which were urged against the theory, as by the steady advance of Science, and the slow but progressive growth of a belief in “law” and “order” as existing in every department of Nature. It has been undeniably the effect of scientific inquiry to banish the idea of Chance, at least from as much of the domain as has been successfully explored, and to afford a strong presumption that the same result would follow were our researches extended beyond the limits within which they are yet confined. To this extent there is truth in the reasonings of M. Comte as applied to Chance, while they have no validity or value as applied to Provi- dence; and we deem it a noble tribute to Science when it can be said of her with truth, that she has been an effective auxiliary to Religion in overthrowing the once vaunted empire of that blind power. At one time some ascribed all the works both of Crea- tion and Providence to Chance, and spoke of a fortuitous concourse of atoms in the one case, and of a fortuitous concurrence of events in the other. The Atomic theory, which, as a mere physiological hypothesis, is far from being necessarily Atheistic, and which has been adopted and defended by such writers as Gassendus and Dr THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 197 Goode,* was applied by Epicurus and Lucretius to ac- count for the fortuitous origin of existing beings, and also for the fortuitous course of human affairs. No one now, in the present advanced state of science, would seriously propose to account either for the creation of the world, or for the events of the world’s history, by ascribing them to the operation of Chance: the current is flowing in another direction ; it has set in, like a returning tide, towards the universal recognition of “ general laws” and natural causes,” such as, from their invariable regularity and uniformity, are utterly exclusive of every thing like chance or accident in any department of Nature. Instead of ascribing the creation of the world to a fortuitous con- course of atoms, modern speculation would refer it to “a law of development ” such as is able of itself to insure the production of astral systems in the firmament, and also of vegetable and animal races on the earth, without any direct or immediate interposition of a higher power ; and instead of ascribing the events of history and the “ pro- gress” of humanity to a fortuitous or accidental origin, modern speculation would refer them to “a law of social or historical development,” such as makes every succeed- ing state the natural, and, indeed, necessary product of a prior one, and places the whole order of sequences,— whether physical, moral, political, or religious, —under the government of “ natural law,” as contradistinguished from that of a “ supernatural will.” There is thus a manifest tendency to resile from the old theory of Chance, and to take refuge in the new asylum of Law, Order, or Destiny. There is, apparently, a wide difference between the two contrasted systems; and yet the difference may be, after * Dr Cupworrtu, “ Intellectual System,” 1. 75, 82, 106, 151; 11. 77, 334, GassENDI, “ Syntagma.” Dr J. M. Goong, “ Lucretius,’ Preface. 198 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. all, more seeming than real: for both the old doctrine of “chance” and the new theory of “ development” are compelled to assume certain conditions or qualities as belonging to the primordial elements of matter, without which it is felt that neither Chance nor Fate can afford a satisfactory account of the works either of Creation or Providence. The one party spoke more of “ Chance,” the other speaks more of “Law;” but both were compelled to feel that neither Chance nor Law could of themselves account for the established order of Nature, without presupposing certain conditions, adjustments, and dis- positions of matter, sucli as could only be satisfactorily explained by ascribing them to a wise, foreseeing, and designing Mind. In the present state of philosophical speculation, which evinces so strong a tendency to reduce every thing to the dominion of “Law,” it may seem unnecessary to refer to the doctrine of “Chance” at all; but believing as we do that there are, and ever must be, certain events in the course of life, and certain facts in the complex experience of man, which will irresistibly suggest the idea of it, even where the doctrine is theoretically dis- owned, we think it right to lay down a distinct and definite position on this subject, such as may serve, if duly established, at once to neutralise whatever is false and noxious in the doctrine of Chance, and at the same time to preserve whatever is true and wholesome in it, as having a tendency to illustrate the actual scheme of Divine Providence. And the position which we are disposed to state and prepared to establish is this,— that, with reference to God, as an omniscient Being, there is, and there can be, no such thing as “ Chance ;” while, with reference alike to men and angels, many events may be fortuitous or accidental,—not as being THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, 199 independent of causes,—but as depending on causes unknown, or on combinations of causes whose joint operation may result in effects absolutely undiscoverable by our limited intelligence. This position consists of ¢wo parts. It affirms that with reference to God and His omniscient knowledge, there can be nothing that is fortuitous, accidental, or unexpected. It affirms, with reference to man and all created intelligences, that there may, or even must, be much uncertainty in regard to the products of natural causes, especially when they act in combination, and come into play in circumstances which we cannot foresee or control. Many events may thus be casual, accidental, or unexpected to men, which are not so to the supreme governing Intelligence. The fist part of the position is proved by the general evidence which warrants us in ascribing omniscience, and especially an unerring pre- science, to the Divine Mind; and it cannot be denied, without virtually ascribing ignorance to God. The second part of the position is established by some of the most familiar facts of experience. We know and feel that however certain all events are to the omniscient know- ledge of the Most High, many of them are entirely beyond the reach of our limited foresight,—and_ this because they are either dependent on individual causes which are unknown to us, or on acombination of various causes, too complex to admit of any rational computa- tion in regard to their results. The “calculation of chances” has been reduced to something like scientific accuracy; * and it has been applied, with beneficial effect, to the insurance of life and property on land and at sea. Even the casual events of human history may be said, in a certain sense, to be * La Piacez, “Des Probabilities,’ 200 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, governed by fixed laws. The aggregate result in such cases may be tolerably certain, while the individual cases are very much the reverse; and hence human wisdom, proceeding on a well-ascertained body of statistics, may construct a scheme for securing some against the evils to which they would otherwise have been liable, by means of the sacrifices of others, who would not have been in fact, although they might have been, for ought they know, liable to the same. But what is this, if it be not a practical acknowledgment of the uncertainty in which all are placed in regard to some of the most important interests of the present life? or how can it be said that chance or accident is altogether, and in every sense, exploded, when large bodies of men are found to com- bine, and that, too, at a considerable personal sacrifice, for the express purpose of protecting themselves, so far as they can, from the hazards to which they are indivi- dually exposed ? In the sense above explained, we cannot consent to discard “Chance” altogether, either at the bidding of those who resolve every thing into “natural laws,” or even in deference to the authority of others who ascribe all events to Divine Providence. It may be true that all events, however apparently casual or fortuitous, are governed by “natural laws;” it may be equally true that all events are determined, directed, or controlled by Divine Providence: but as long as some events depend on causes which are certainly known, and other events on causes which are not known, or on a combination of causes whose results cannot be foreseen, so long will there be room for the distinction between the regular and the accidental phenomena of human experience. This distinction, indeed, is explicitly recognised in Scripture itself; for while it speaks of all events as being infallibly THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, 201 known to God, it speaks of some events that are acci- dental with reference to man.* The unknown, unfore- seen, and unexpected incidents of life, which constitute all that is apparently casual or accidental, may be, and we believe they are, really subject both to natural laws and to God’s providential will; but they are removed far beyond our comprehension or control; and being so, they are admirably fitted, as a part of the complex scheme of His natural and moral government, to serve one of the most important practical ends for which it is designed, by impressing us with a sense of constant dependence on a higher Power, and of dutiful subjection to a superior Will. But while, in this sense and to this extent, the doctrine of “Chance” is retained, it must be utterly rejected as a means of accounting either for the creation or govern- ment of the world. For, on the supposition of a Supreme Being, there can be no chance with reference to Him ; and without such a supposition, we cannot account for the regularity which prevails in the course of Nature, and which indicates a presiding Intelligence and a controlling Will. 2. But this very regularity of Nature,—when viewed apart from the cross accidents of life,—is apt to engender the opposite idea of “ Fate” or “ Destiny,” as if all events were determined by laws alike necessary and invariable, inherent in the constitution of Nature, and independent of the concurrence or the control of the Divine will. We are not sure, indeed, that the idea of Fate or Des- tiny is suggested solely, or even mainly, by the regular sequences of the natural world; we rather think that it is more frequently derived from those unexpected and crushing calamities which occur in spite of every precau- * Eccles. ix. 11; Luke x. 31; Deut. xix. 5. 202 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. tion of human foresight and prudence, and that thus it may be identified, in a great measure, with the doctrine of Chance, or, at least, the one may run into and blend with the other. But if any attempt were made to establish it by proof, recourse would be had to the estab- lished order and regular sequences of Nature, as affording its most plausible verification, although they afford no real sanction to it, in so far as it differs from the Chris- tian doctrine of Providence. Dr Cudworth discusses this subject at great length, and makes mention of ¢hree distinct forms of Fatalism. The jis¢, which is variously designated as the Democritic, the Physiological, or the Atheistic Fate, is that which teaches the material or physical necessity of all things, and ascribes all natural phenomena to the mechanical laws of matter and motion. The second, which is de- scribed as a species of Divine or Theistic Fate, is that which admits the existence and agency of God, but teaches that He both decrees and does,—purposes and performs all things, whether good or evil,—as if He were the only real agent in the universe, or as if He had no moral character, and were, as Cudworth graphically expresses it, “mere arbitrary will omnipotent:” this he describes as a “ Divine Fate immoral and violent.” The third, which is also designated as a species of Divine or Theistic Fate, is that which recognises both the exist- ence of God, and the agency of other beings in Nature, together with the radical distinction between moral good and evil,—but teaches that men are so far under necessity as to be incapable of moral and responsible action, and unfit subjects of praise or blame, of reward or punishment: this he describes as “Divine Fate moral and natural.” These ¢hree are all justly held to be erroneous or defective views of the Divine govern- THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. eG5 ment, and, as such, they are strenuously and success- fully opposed.* But there is room for a fourth doctrine, which may be designated as the Christian doctrine of Providence, and which combines in itself all the great fundamental truths for which Dr Cudworth contends, while it leaves open, or, at least, does not necessarily determine, some of the collateral questions on which he might have differed from many of its defenders. This doctrine affirms, first, the existence and attributes of God, as a holy and righteous Moral Governor; secondly, the real existence and actual operation of “second causes,” distinct from, but not in- dependent of, “the First Cause ;” thirdly, the operation of these causes according to their several natures, so that, under God’s Providence, events fall out “either neces- sarily, freely, or contingently,” according to the kind of intermediate agency by which they are brought to pass; and, fourthly, that in the case of intelligent and moral agents, ample room is left for responsible action, and for the consequent sentence of praise or blame, reward or punishment, notwithstanding the eternal decree of God, and the constant control which He exercises over all His creatures and all their actions. These four positions may be all harmoniously combined in one self-consistent and comprehensive statement; and, in point of fact, they are all included in the Christian doctrine of Providence, as that has been usually explained and defended by the various sections of the Catholic Church. Not one of them is omitted or denied.t They seem fairly to mect, or rather fully to exhaust, the demands of Dr Cudworth * Dr Cupworty, “ Intellectual System,” 1. 33. American Edition. + Dr Joun Cotiinass, “On Providence.” Dr Price, “ Dissertations.” SamuEeL RurHerForD, “ De Providentia Dei.” Dr Cuarnock, “On Providence.” 204 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATR, himself, when he says—* These three things are, as we conceive, the fundamentals or essentials of true religion, Jirst, that all things in the world do not float without a head or governor, but that there is a God, an omnipotent understanding Being, presiding over all; secondly, that this God being essentially good and just, there is some- thing in its own nature immutably and eternally just and unjust, and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only ; and Jastly, that there is something ¢9° #u., or that we are so far forth principals or masters of our own ac- tions as to be accountable to Justice for them, or to make us guilty or blameworthy for what we do amiss, and to deserve punishment accordingly.” All these fundamen- tals of true religion are explicitly recognised in the Chris- tian doctrine of Providence, which stands out, therefore, in striking contrast with the Atheistic, and even Theistic, theories of Fate which he condemns; and they are as zealously maintained (whether with the same consistency is a different question) by Edwards, Chalmers, and Woods, on the one side, as they ever were by Cudworth, Clarke, and Tappan, on the other. It may be said, however, that the doctrine of Proyj- dence, especially when taught in connection with that of Predestination, does unavoidably imply some kind of necessity, incompatible with free moral agency, and that, to all practical intents, it amounts substantially to Fate or Destiny. But we are prepared to show that there is neither the same kind of necessity in the one scheme which is implied in the other, nor the same reason for denying moral and responsible agency in the case of in- telligent beings. In doing so, we must carefully discri- minate, in the first instance, between the various senses in which the term necessity is used. Dr Waterland has given a comprehensive division of “ necessity ” into four THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, 205 kinds, denominated respectively, the Logical, the Moral, the Physical, and the Metaphysical. “Logical necessity” exists wherever the contrary of what is affirmed would imply a contradiction; and in this sense we call it a necessary truth that two and two make four,—that a whole is greater than any of its parts,—and that a circle neither is nor can be a square. It amounts to nothing more than the affirmation, that the same idea or thing 7s what it 7s; and it relates solely to the connection between one idea and another, or be- tween one proposition and another, or between subject and predicate. This is “logical necessity,”’—-we cannot, with our present laws of thought, conceive the thing to be otherwise without implying a contradiction. “Moral necessity,” again, denotes a connection, not between one idea and another, or between the subject and predicate of a proposition, but between means and ends. \t is not necessary absolutely that any man should continue to live; but it is necessary morally that, if he would continue to live, he should eat and sleep,— food and rest being, according to the established consti- tution of Nature, a necessary condition or indispensable means for the support of life. There is in like manner a “moral necessity” that we should be virtuous and obedient, if we would be truly happy,—virtue and obe- dience being, according to the established constitution of Nature, an indispensable means of true and permanent happiness. This is “ moral necessity,” which has refer- ence solely to the connection between means and ends, but that connection, being ordained, is immutable and invariable, “ Physical necessity,” again, exists wherever there is either a causal connection between antecedents and con- sequents in the material world, or even a co-active and 206. THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, compulsory constraint in the moral world. It is physi- cally necessary that fire should burn substances that are combustible,—that water and other fluids should flow down a declivity, and rise again but only to a certain level; and there is the like kind of necessity, wherever a moral agent is forced to act under irresistible compul- sion,—as when the assassin seizes hold of another’s arm, and thrusting a deadly weapon into his hand, directs it, by his own overmastering will, to the brain or heart of his victim. In this latter case, the unwilling instrument of his revenge or malice is not held to be the guilty party, but the more powerful agent by whom. that in- strument was employed. This is “ physical necessity,” which relates solely to the connection between cause and effect in the material world, and, in the moral, to the compulsory action of one agent on another. “ Metaphysical necessity,” again, can be predicated of God only, and denotes the peculiar property or pre- rogative of His being, as existing necessarily, immut- ably, and eternally,—or, to use a scholastic phrase, the necessary connection in His case between essence and existence, . Omitting the last, which does not fall properly within the limits of our present inquiry, we may say with regard to the three first, that each of them may exist, and that each of them does really operate, in the present constitution of Nature. We are subject, un- questionably, to certain “laws of thought,” which we can neither repeal nor resist, and which impose upon us a logical necessity to conceive, to reason, and to infer, not according to our own whim or caprice, but accord- ing to established rules. We are equally subject to certain “conditions of existence,’—arising partly from our own constitution, partly from the constitution of THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE, 207 external objects and the relations subsisting between the two,—which lay us under a moral necessity of using suitable means for the accomplishment of our purposes and plans. And we are still further subject to “ physi- cal necessity,” in so far as our material frame is liable to be affected by external influences,—and even our muscular powers may be overmastered and subordinated by a more vigorous or resolute will than our own. These three kinds of “necessity” exist; they are all consti- tuent parts of that vast scheme of government under which we are placed; and the question arises, Whether, when the existence of these necessary laws is admitted, we can still maintain the doctrine which affirms the providential government of God and the moral agency of man; or whether we must not resolve the whole series of events, both in the natural and moral worlds, into the blind and inexorable dominion of Destiny or Fate? We answer, first, that there is nothing in any one of these three kinds of necessity, nor in all of them com- bined, which, when rightly understood, should either exclude the idea of Divine Providence, or impair our sense of moral and responsible agency. We may not be so free, nor so totally exempt from the operation of esta- blished laws, as some of the advocates of human liberty have supposed: but we may be free enough, notwith- standing, to be regarded and treated as moral and accountable beings. We may be subject to certain “laws of thought,” and yet may be responsible for our opinions and beliefs, in so far as these depend on our voluntary acts,—on our attention or inattention to the truth and its evidence,—on our use or neglect of the appropriate means,—on our love or our hatred to the hight. And so we may be subject to certain other laws, in various departments of our complex experience, with- 208 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. out being either restrained or impelled by such external co-action as alone can exempt creatures, constituted as we know and feel ourselves to be, from the righteous re- tributions of God. We answer, secondly, that the doctrine of Providence, even when it is combined with that of Predestination, represents all events as “falling out according to the nature of second causes, necessarily, contingently, or freely;” nay, as falling out so “that no violence is offered to the will of the creature, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.” It follows that if there be either on earth or in heaven any free cause, or any moral and respon- sible agent, his nature is not changed, nor is the character of his agency altered, by that providential government which God exercises over all His creatures and all their actions;—he still continues to develop, within certain limits imposed by unalterable laws, his own proper individuality, or his personal character, in its relation to the law and government of God. We answer, ¢hirdly, that the moral and responsible agency of man cannot be justly held to be incompatible with the Providence and Supremacy of God, unless it can be shown that, in the exercise of the latter, God acts in the way of physical co-action or irresistible con- straint, and further, that man is not only controlled and governed in his actions, but compelled to act in opposi- tion to hisown will. But no enlightened advocate either of Providence or Predestination will affirm that there is any “physical necessity,” imposed by the Divine will, which constrains men to commit sin, or that God is “the author of sin.” “Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth He any man, But THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATR. 209 every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lusts and enticed.”* We answer, fourthly, that when a “ moral necessity ” or moral inability is spoken of by divines as making sin certain and inevitable in the case of man, we must care- fully distinguish between the constitution and the state of human nature,—its constitution as it was originally created, and its state as it at present exists. There might be nothing in the original constitution of human nature which could interfere in any way with the freedom of man as an intelligent, moral, and responsible being ; and yet, in consequence of the introduction of sin, his state may now be so far changed as to have become a state of moral bondage. But the constitution of his nature, in virtue of which he was at the first, and must ever continue to be, a moral and accountable being, remains unreversed ; —trom being holy, he has become depraved, but he has not ceased to be a subject of moral government,—and the evils that are incident to his present position must be ascribed, not to God’s creative will, but, in the first instance, to man’s voluntary disobedience, and, in the second, to a Divine judicial sentence following thereupon. And finally, we answer that the theory which ascribes all events, both in the natural and moral worlds, to the blind and inexorable dominion of Destiny or Fate, leaves altogether unexplained many of the most certain and familiar facts of human experience. There are two large classes of facts which no theory of Fate can possibly explain. The first comprises all those manifest indica- tions of provident forethought, intelligent design, and moral purpose, which appear in the course of Nature, and which cannot be accounted for by a blind, unintelli- gent, undesigning cause. The second comprises all those * James i. 13,14. See M‘Laurin’s profound discourse on this text, VOL. II. O 210 THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. facts of consciousness which bear witness to the moral nature and responsible agency of man, as the subject of a government which rewards and punishes his actions, in some measure, even here, and which irresistibly sug- gests the idea of a future reckoning and retribution, These two classes of facts must either be ignored, or left as insoluble, by any theory which advocates blind Fate or Destiny, in opposition to the overruling Providence and moral government of God. These answers are sufficient, if not to remove all mys- tery from the methods of the Divine administration (for who would undertake to fathom the counsels of Him “whose judgments are unsearchable and His ways past finding out?’”), yet to show at least that a Divine Pro- vidence is more credible in itself, and better supported by evidence, than any theory of Destiny or Fate; that the facts to which the latter appeals may be explained consistently with the former,—while the facts on which the former is founded must either be left altogether out of view, or at least left unexplained, if the doctrine of Fate be substituted for that of Providence. We have thus far compared the two theories of Chance and Fate, by which some have attempted to explain the system of the universe, and have contrasted both with the Christian doctrine of Providence. On a review of the whole discussion, we think it must be evident that the latter combines whatever is true and valuable in each of these opposite theories, while it eliminates and rejects whatever is unsound or noxious in either. It may seem strange that we should speak as if any thing, either true or valuable, could be involved in the theories of Chance and Destiny; and, unquestionably, considered as theories designed to explain the system of the world, and to super- sede the doctrine of Providence, they are, in all their THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. 211 distinctive peculiarities, utterly false and worthless. But it seldom, if ever, happens that any theory obtains a wide-spread and permanent influence, which does not stand connected with some partial truth, or which cannot appeal to some apparent natural evidence. We have already seen that there are two distinct classes of events in Nature, and two corresponding classes of sentiments and feelings in the human mind; that the latter point, respectively, to the constant and the variable,—the cer- tain and the doubtful,—the causal and the casual; and that were either of the two to acquire an absolute ascend- ancy over us, it would naturally lead to one or other of two opposite extremes—the theory of Chance, or the theory of Fate. Now, the doctrine of Providence takes account of both these classes of phenomena and feelings, so as to combine whatever is true and useful in each of the two rival theories, while it strikes out and rejects whatever is false in either, by placing all things under the government and control of a living, intelligent, per- sonal God. Tt is scarcely necessary to add that the views and sentiments which the Christian doctrine of Providence inspires are widely different from those which must be generated by a belief either in Chance or in Fate, as the supreme arbiter of our destiny. The doctrine which teaches us to look up and to say, with childlike confi- dence, “Our Faruzr which art in heaven,” is worth more than all the philosophy in the world! Could we only realise it as a truth, and have habitual recourse to it in all our anxieties and straits, we should feel that, if it be a deeply serious and solemn fact that “the Lord reign- eth,” it is also, to all his trusting and obedient children, alike cheering and consolatory ; and he who can relish the sweetness of our Lord’s words when he spake of il be THEORIES OF CHANCE AND FATE. “ the birds of the air” and the “ flowers of the field,” will see at once that Stoicism is immeasurably inferior, both as a philosophy and a faith, to Christian Theism.* * MicuELET has presented a graphic portrait of a Stoic :—“ L’individu sous la forme du Stoicisme,—ramassé en soi,—appuyé sur soi,—ne de- mandant rien aux dieux,—ne les accusant point,—ne daignant pas méme les ner.” —“ Introduction al Historie Universelle.” THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. 2138 CHAPTER VII. THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. Tue Eclectic method of Philosophy, which was first ex- emplified in the celebrated School of Alexandria, and which has been recently revived under the auspices of M. Cousin in the Schools of Paris, may be regarded, in one of its aspects, as the most legitimate, and, indeed, as the only practicable course of successful intellectual research. If by “ eclecticism” we were to understand the habit of culling from every system that portion or fragment of truth which may be contained in it, and of rejecting the error with which it may have been associated or alloyed, —in other words, the art of “ sifting the wheat from the chaff,” so as to preserve the former, while the latter is dissipated and dispersed,—there could be no valid objec- tion to it which would not equally apply to every method of Inductive Inquiry. But this is not the sense in which “eclecticism” has been adopted and eulogised by the Parisian School. For, not content with affirming that the same system may contain both truth and error, and that it is our duty to separate the one from the other,— which is the only rational “ eclecticism,’—M. Cousin maintains that error itself is only a partial or incomplete truth; that if it be an evil, it is a necessary evil, and an eventual good, since it is a means, according to a funda- 214 THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM, mental law of human development, of evolving truth and advancing philosophy,—and that thus the grossest errors may exert a salutary influence, insomuch that Atheism itself may be regarded as providential.* In this form, Kclecticism becomes a huge and heterogeneous system of SyncreEtism, including all varieties of opinion, whether true or false; and it has a natural and inevitable ten- dency to issue in a spirit of Inpirrerence to the claims of truth, which may assume the form either of Philoso- phical Scepticism or of Religious Liberalism, according to the taste and temperament of the individual who embraces it. In the form of Religious Liberalism, it has often been exemplified in our own country by those who, averse from definite articles of faith, and prone to latitudinarian license, have studiously set themselves to disparage the importance of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, and even to obliterate the distinction between the various forms of Religion, natural and revealed, by representing them all as so many varieties of the same religious senti- ment,—so many diverse, but not antagonistic, embodi- ments of the same radical principle. In the writings of Pope, several expressions occur which are easily suscep- tible of this construction, and which have often been quoted and applied in defence of Religious Liberalism, notwithstanding his explicit disavowal of it in his letter to the younger Racine, prefixed to the collected edition of his works. But on the continent of Europe, Syncret- ism has been much more fully developed, and fearlessly applied to every department of human thought. Pushed to its ultimate consequences, it obliterates the distinction not only between truth and error, but also between virtue * M. Cousin, “ Introduction,’’ 1. 318, 391, 405, 419; 11. 134. Ibid, “ Fragmens Philosophiques.” Preface, vii. a teal > p ee ee THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. 215 and vice, nay even between Religion and Atheism; and represents them all as constituent parts of a scheme, which is developed under a law of “ fatal necessity,” but which is described also as a scheme of “optimism.” Its range is supposed to be unlimited: for it has been applied to the History of Philosophy, by Cousin,—to the theory of the Passions, by Fourier,—to the doctrines of Christi- anity, by Quinet and Michelet,—and to the Philosophy of Religion, by Benjamin Constant. The practical result of such speculations is a growing scepticism or indifference in regard to the distinction between truth and error, and a very faint impression of the difference between good and evil.* The speculations of Pierre Leroux, the head, if not the founder, of the Humanitarian School, are strongly tinged with this spirit: they amount to a justification of evil,—an apotheosis of man.f We do not class these speculations among the formal systems of Atheism, although they have often been asso- ciated with it; but we advert to them as specimens of that style of thinking which has a natural tendency to induce an atheistic frame of mind.{ The profession of such sentiments is a symptom rather of incipient danger, than of confirmed disease. But that danger is far from being either doubtful or insignificant. or should the distinction between “truth and error” be obliterated or even feebly discerned,—should it come to be regarded as a matter of comparative indifference whether our beliefs be true or false,—should it, above all, become our pre- vailing habit to “call good evil, and evil good,”’—we can scarcely fail, in such circumstances, to fall into a course * Vaurocer, “Etudes Critiques,” pp. 115, 126, 151, 308, 316. Marest, “Essai sur Pantheisme,” p. 249. + P. Leroux, “Sur PHumanité,” 2 vols. { Buppzvus, “De Atheismo et Superstitione,” pp. 184, 212. 216 THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM, of practical Atheism ; and this, as all experience testifies, will leave us an easy prey, especially in seasons of peculiar temptation and trial, to any form of speculative Infidelity that may happen to acquire a temporary ascendancy. If there be no dogmatic Atheism involved in this state of mind, there is at least the germ of scepticism, which may soon grow and ripen into the open and avowed denial of religious truth. At the very least, it will issue in that heartless indifference to all creeds and all definite articles of faith, which, under the plausible but surreptitious dis- guise of “freethinking ” and “liberalism,” is the nearest practical approximation to utter Infidelity.* The system which is known under the name of Relic, gious Liberalism or Indifference has been recently avowed in our own country with a frankness and bold- ness which can leave no room for doubt in regard to its ultimate tendency. The late Blanco White avowed it as his mature conviction, that “to declare any one unworthy of the name of Christian because he does not agree with your belief, is to fall into the intolerance of the articled Churches,—that the moment the name Christian is made necessarily to contain in its significa- tion belief in certain historical or metaphysical proposi- tions, that moment the name itself becomes a creed,—the length of that creed is of little consequence.” + This is the extreme on one side, and it plainly implies that no * Ricnarp Bentwey, “On Freethinking,” Boyle Lectures. VILLEMANDY, “Scepticismus Debellatus,” iii. His words are remark- able :—“ Passim haec, aliaque generis ejusdem, placita disseminantur,— neque verum neque bonum, qualia sunt in seipsis, posse dignosci; hinc que adeo sectandam esse duntaxat cim veri, tum boni, similitudinem; quz si stent ac valeant,—illud omne erit verum, illud omne zequum,— illud omne pium et religiosum,—illud omne utile, quod ewiguam tale videatur; privatam cujusque conscientiam supremam esse agendorum, vel non agendorum, normam.” . +t James Marrineau, “ Rationale of Religious Inquiry,” p. 108. THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. 217 one article of faith is necessary, and that a man may be a Christian who neither acknowledges an_ historical Christ, nor believes a single doctrine which He taught ! But there is an extreme also on the other side, which is exemplified in the singularly eloquent, but equally unsatisfactory, treatise of the Abbé Lamennais,* in which, as then an ardent and somewhat arrogant advocate of the Romish Church, he attempts to fasten the charge of Indifference or Liberalism on the Protestant system, and to prove that there can be no true faith, and of course no salvation, beyond the Catholic pale. The chief interest of his treatise depends on his peculiar “ theory of certitude,” to which we shall have occasion to advert in the sequel; in the meantime, we may notice briefly the grievous error into which he has fallen in treating of the faith which is necessary to salvation. He overstaies the case as much, at least, as it has been understated by the abettors of Liberalism. The latter deny the neces- sity of any articles of faith; the former demands the unplicit reception of every doctrine propounded by the Romish Church. He repudiates the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in Religion, and insists that, as every truth is declared by the same infallible authority, so every truth must be received with the same unquestioning faith. He forgets that while all the truths of Scripture ought to be believed by reason of the Divine authority on which they rest, yet some truths are more directly connected with our salvation than others, as well as more clearly and explicitly revealed. Nor are we justly liable to the charge of “ Indifference ” or “ Liberalism” when we tolerate a difference of opinion, on some points, among men who are, in all important * F. pe Lamennais, “Essai sur l’ Indifference en matiere de la Religion,” 4 vols. Paris, 1844, 218 THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. respects, substantially agreed: for true toleration is the fruit, not of unbelief or indifference, but of charity and candour ; and it is sanctioned in Scripture, which enjoins that we should “receive those who are weak in the faith, but not to doubtful disputations,” and that “every man should be fully persuaded in his own mind.” * But it is not so much in its relation to the articles of the Christian faith, as in its bearing on the different forms of true and false religion, that the theory of Liberalism comes into collision with the cause of Theism, and evinces its infidel tendency. If any one can regard with the same complacency, or with the same apathetic indifference, all the varieties of religious or superstitious belief and worship; if he can discern no radical or important difference between Monotheism and Polytheism, or between the Protestant and Popish systems; if he be disposed to treat each of these as equally true or equally false, as alike beneficial or injuri- ous in their practical influence,—then this may be regarded as a sufficient proof that he is ignorant of the evidence, and blind to the claims, of truth,—a mere sceptical dreamer, if not a speculative Atheist. An attempt has recently been made to place the theory of Religious Liberalism on a philosophical basis, by re- presenting religion as a mere sentiment, which may be equally elicited and exemplified in various forms of be- lief and worship. Several writers, following in the wake of Schleiermacher, who gave such a powerful impulse to the mind of Germany, have made Religion to consist either in a sense of dependence, or in a consciousness of the infinite; and this sentiment, as well as the spontaneous intuitions of reason with which it is associated, is said to be alike natural, universal, and invariable,—the essential * Romans xiv. 1, 5. THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM, 219 principle of all Religion,—the root whence have sprung all the various forms of belief and worship. These varie- ties are supposed to be more or less rational and salu- tary, according to the conception which they respectively exhibit of the nature and character of God,—a concep- tion which may be endlessly diversified by the intellect, or the imagination, or the passions of different men; while all the forms of belief are radically identical, since they all spring from the same ground-principle, and are only so many distinct manifestations of it. Thus Mr Parker tells us that, stripping the “religious senti- ment” in man “of all accidental circumstances peculiar to the age, nation, sect, or individual, and pursuing a sharp and final analysis till the subject and predicate can no longer be separated, we find as the ultimate fact, that the religious sentiment is this,—‘a sense of dependence.’ This sentiment does not itself disclose the character, and still less the nature and essence, of the object on which it depends, no more than the senses declare the nature of their objects. Like them it acts spontaneously and unconsciously, as soon as the outward occasion offers, with no effort of will, forethought, or. making up the mind. But the religious sentiment implies its object; . and there is but one religion, though many theologies.” * There is, as it appears to us, a mixture of some truth with much grave and dangerous error, in these and simi- lar speculations. It is an impor tant truth, and one which has been too often overlooked in treating the evidences of Natural Theology, that the sentiments of the human mind, not less than its intuitive perceptions or logical processes, have a close relation to the subject of inquiry ; * Turoporr Parker, “Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion,” pp: 14, 17. 220 THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. but it is an error to suppose that all the sentiments having a religious tendency can be reduced to one, whether it be called “a sense of dependence ” or “a consciousness of the infinite,”—for there are other senti- ments besides these which are equally subservient to the uses of Religion, such as the sense of moral obligation, of the true, of the ideal, of the sublime, and of the beau- tiful. It is also an important truth, that there are spon- taneous “intuitions of reason,” or fundamental and jn- variable “laws of thought,” which come into action at the first dawn of experience, and which have a close connec- tion with the proof of the being and perfections of God; but it is an error to suppose that the proof depends exclusively on these, or that it could be made out irre- spective of the evidence afforded by the works of Crea- tion and Providence. It is further an important truth, that the religious sentiment, or religious tendency, is natural to man, and that it may appear either in the form of Religion or Superstition: but it is an error to suppose that “there is but one religion, although many theologies ;” for these theologies must spring from funda- mentally different conceptions of God,’”—and what are these conceptions, in their ultimate analysis, but so many beliefs, doctrines, or dogmas, which, whether formally defined or not in articles of faith, have in them the self- same essence which is supposed to belong only to the bigotry of “articled churches?” But the fundamental, the fatal error of all these speculations, is the denial of any stable and permanent standard of objective truth. Truth is made purely subjective, and, of course, it must also be progressive, insomuch that the truth of a former age may be an error in the present, and the supposed truth of the present age may become obsolete hereafter. So that there is really nothing certain in human know- THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM. 221 ledge; and “truth” may be justly described as never existing, but only decoming,—as never possessed, though ever pursued,—it is a verité mobile, a truth not in esse, but in fiert. Hence we read in recent speculations of a “new Christianity,” of a “new Gospel,” and of “ the Church of the Future,”—as if there could be any other Christianity than that of the New Testament, any other Gospel than that of Jesus Christ, or any other Church than that of apostolic times. I have adverted to this theory, because, while it is of little value in a speculative point of view, it is often found to exert a powerful practical influence, especially on “men of affairs,"-—men who have travelled in various countries, or who have been employed in the arts of diplomacy and government; and who, finding religious worship every- where, but clothed in different forms, and marking its subserviency to social and political interests, have been too prone to place all the varieties of belief in the same category, if not precisely on the same level, and to regard with indifference, perhaps even with indulgence, the grossest corruptions both of Natural and Revealed Reli- gion. The world is surely old enough, and its history sufficiently instructive, to prove, even to the most indiffer- ent statesmen, that truth is always salutray, and error noxious, to the commonwealth, and that nowhere is society more safe, orderly, or stable, than in those coun- tries which are blessed with “ pure and undefiled religion.” But let the opinion spread from the prince to the peasant —-from the aristocracy to the artizans,—from the philo- sopher to the public,—that there is either no difference, or only a slight and trivial one, between truth and error, —that it matters little what a man believes, or whether he believes at all: let the general mind of the commu- nity become indoctrinated with such lessons, and it needs 222 THEORY OF RELIGIOUS LIBERALISM, no prophetic foresight to predict a crisis of unprecedented peril,—an era of reckless revolution. A philosophic dreamer may affect a calm indifference, a bland and be- nignant Liberalism; but a nation, a community, cannot be neutral or inert in regard to matters of faith: it must and will be either religious or irreligious,—it must either love the truth or hate it: it is too sharp-sighted, and too much guided by homely common sense, to believe that systems so opposite as Paganism and Christianity, or Popery and Protestantism, are harmonious manifestations of the same religious principle, or equally beneficial to the State. THE THEORY OF SECULARISM. 928 CHAPTER VIII. THE THEORY OF SECULARISM.—G. J. HOLYOAKE. Sucu is the new name under which Atheism has recently appeared among not a few of the tradesmen and artizans of the metropolis and provincial towns of Great Britain. In literature, it is represented by Mr G. J. Holyoake, the author of an answer to Paley, the editor of “The Reasoner,” and a popular lecturer and controversialist, whose public discussions are duly reported in that peri- odical, and occasionally reprinted in a separate form.* The extensive circulation which these and similar tracts have already obtained,—the number of affiliated societies which have been formed in many of the chief centres of manufactures and commerce,—the zeal and boldness of popular itinerant lecturers,—and the urgent demands which have been incessantly made for the extension of their machinery by means of a propaganda fund,—are all indications of a tendency, in some quarters, towards a form of unbelief, less speculative and more practical,— * GrorcE Jacop HoiyoaKeE, “Paley Refuted in his own Words,” Third Edition. London, 1850. Towntey AND Hotyoaxz, “A Public Discussion on the Being of a God,” Third Thousand. London, 1852. Grant AnD Hotyoaxs, “Christianity and Secularism; a Public Dis-_ eussion held on six successive Thursday evenings,” Seventh Thousand. London, 1853, 234 THE THEORY OF SECULARISM. but only on that account more attractive to the English mind, and neither less insidious nor less dangerous than any of the philosophical theories of Atheism. We have often thought, indeed, that should Atheism ever threaten to become prevalent in England, this is the form which it is most likely to assume. The English mind is eminently practical; it has little sympathy with the profundity of German or the subtlety of French speculation on such subjects. A few speculative spirits may be influenced for a time by the reasonings of Comte, or the representations of “The Vestiges;” but the general mind of the community will desiderate something more solid and substantial ;—not content with any scientific theory, however ingenious, it will demand a practical system. And we are not sure that “Secularism” may not be made to appear, in the view of some, to be just such a system, since it dismisses or refuses to pronounce on many of the highest problems of human thought,— insists on the necessary limitation of the human faculties, —and seeks to confine both our aspirations and our thoughts to the interests and the duties of the present life. In estimating the probable influence of such a sys- tem on the public mind, we must not forget the large amount of practical irreligion which exists even in Eng- land,—the strong temptation which is felt by many to escape from their occasional feelings of remorse and fear by embracing some plausible pretext for the neglect of prayer and other religious observances,—and the disposi- tion, natural and almost irresistible in such circumstances, to lend a willing ear to any doctrine which promises to relieve them of all responsibility with relation to God and a future state. The theory of Secularism is adapted to this state of mind,—it chimes in with the instinctive tendencies of every ungodly mind,—and it is the likeliest THE THEORY OF SECULARISM. 225 medium through which practical Atheism may pass into speculative Infidelity. Mr Holyoake, it is true, abjures the name both of an Atheist and Infidel. We admire the prudence of his policy, but cannot subscribe to the correctness of his reasons for doing so.—“ Mr Southwell,” he says, “ has taken an objection to the term Atheism. We are glad he has. We have disused it a long time..... We disuse it, because Atheist is a worn-out word. Both the ancients and the moderns have understood by it one without God, and also without morality. Thus the term connotes more than any well-informed and earnest person accepting it ever included in it; that is, the word carries with it associations of immorality, which have been re- pudiated by the Atheist as seriously as by the Christian. Non-theism is a term less open to the same misunder- standing, as it implies the simple non-acceptance of the Theist’s explanation of the origin and government of the world.” * But “ Non-theism” was afterwards exchanged for “Secularism,” as a term less liable to misconstruction, and more correctly descriptive of the real import of the theory. “ Secularists was, perhaps, the proper designa- tion of all who dissented extremely from the religious opinions of the day.” “ Freethinking is the Secular sphere ;—drawing its line of demarcation between time and eternity, it works for the welfare of men in this world.” “The Secularist is the larger and more com- prehensive designation of the Atheist.”+ With all this * “The Reasoner,” New Series, No. vit. 115. Of this serial it is said (XII. 6, 81), “The Reasoner, which was established in 1846, has come to be re- garded as the accredited organ of Freethinking in Great Britain. Indeed, for a long time, it has been the principal professed exponent of these views, addressed to the working and thinking classes.” t “The Reasoner,” x1, 15, 222 ; x11. 4, 6, 49, 81. VOL. Il. FP 226 THE THEORY OF SECULARISM, coyness and fastidiousness about names, there can be no doubt that the character of the system is essentially atheistic :—“ We refuse to employ the term God, not having any definite idea of it which we can explain to others,—not knowing any theory of such an existence as will enable us to defend that dogma to others. We therefore prefer the honest, though unusual designation of Atheist,—not using it in the sense in which it is com- monly employed, as signifying one without morality, but in its stricter sense of describing those without any deter- minate knowledge of Deity.” * “That the Atheist does consider matter to be eternal is perfectly correct; and for this reason, no Atheist could make use of sucha term as that matter originally possessed, or originally was; whatever is eternal has no origin, beginning, or end..... Organised plants and animals,—man also with his noble intellect, are not now at least produced by supernatural causes ; and the Atheist, without positively asserting that there must have been a beginning to life in this earth, argues that if a plant, an animal, or a man, can be pro- duced at this time without supernatural interference, so also a first plant, a first animal, or a first man, may have been naturally produced in this earth under the right circumstances,—circumstances which probably cannot occur in the present condition of our globe. Our dith- culties and our ignorance are not in the least dispelled, but on the contrary complicated and increased, by the adoption of the ancient belief in a Supernatural Con- _ triver and Maker, who, after existing from eternity in absolute void and solitude, suddenly proceeded to create the universe out of nothing or out of himself.’+ The editor thinks “the course to be taken is to use the term Secularists as indicating general views, and accept the * “ The Reasoner,” x11. 4, 50. + Ibid, x1. 18, 271. THE THEORY OF SECULARISM. eb <5 | term Atheist at the point at which Ethics declines alliance with Theology ; always, however, explaining the term Atheist to mean ‘not seeing God,’ visually or inferentially, —never suffering it to be taken (as Chalmers, Foster, and many others represent it) for Anti-theism, that is, hating God, denying God, as hating implies personal knowledge as the ground of dislike, and denying implies infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof.” * These extracts are sufficient to illustrate the peculiar character of this popular form of Infidelity. It is not a philosophical system, although philosophical terms are often employed by its advocates; it does not even profess to solve, as the theory of Development does, any of the great problems of Nature. We shall offer a brief state- ment of its distinctive peculiarities, as it is developed by Mr Holyoake, and suggest some considerations which should be seriously pondered by those who may be tempted to exchange Christianity for Secularism. 1. The theory of Secularism is a form, not of dogmatic, but of sceptical, Atheism ; it is dogmatic only in denying the sufficiency of the evidence for the being and perfections of God. It does not deny, it only does not believe, His existence. There may be a God notwithstanding,—there may even be sufficient evidence of His being, although some men cannot, or will not, see it. “They do not deny the existence of God, but only assert that they have not sufficient proof of His existence.” + “The Non-theist takes this ground. He affirms that natural reason has not yet attained to (evidence of) Supernatural Being. He does not deny that it may do so, because the capacity of natural reason in the pursuit of evidence of Super- natural Being is not, so far as he is aware, fixed.” The * “The Reasoner,” Xi. 15, 232. t Ibid, x11. 24, 376. 928 THE THEORY OF SECULARISM. power of reason is yet a growth. To deny its power absolutely would be hazardous; and in the case of a speculative question, not to admit that the opposite views may in some sense be tenable, is to assume your own in- fallibility,—a piece of arrogance the public always punish by disbelieving you when you are in the right.”*