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 Carson, Alexanc 
 
 ier, ] 
 
 L776- 
 
 
 1844. 
 
 Review of Dr. Brown on the 
 law of Christ resnectina 
 
REVIEW 
 
 OP 
 
 DR. BROWN ON THE LAW OF CHRIST 
 RESPECTING CIVIL OBEDIENCE, 
 
 ESPECIALLY JN THE 
 
 PAYMENT OF TRIBUTE. 
 
 WITH AN 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 RELATIVE TO GRAMMATICAL ACCURACY, AS IT BEARS ON 
 
 THE QUESTION OF THE INSPIRATION OF THE 
 
 SCRIPTURES, IN REPLY TO THE REV. 
 
 MR. MENZIES, THE TRANSLATOR OF 
 
 THOLUCK ON THE EPISTLE 
 
 TO THE ROMANS. 
 
 By ALEXANDER CARSON, A.M. 
 
 LONDON: 
 HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO. 
 
 EDINBURGH : WILLIAM WHYTE AND CO. 
 
 DUBLIN : WILLIAM CARSON, AND 
 
 WILLIAM M'COMBE, BELFAST. 
 
 M.DCCC.XXXVIII- 
 
EDINBURGH: 
 PRINTED BY T. CONSTABLE, THISTLE STREET. 
 
miYc 
 
 * $Q 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 The grounds and extent of the doctrine of 
 obedience to Civil Government are questions of 
 the greatest practical importance to Christians in 
 every country and in every age. Civil rulers de- 
 mand obedience, and if the Law of Christ sus- 
 pends the submission of his people on their con- 
 viction with respect to the quality of the govern- 
 ment, or the purposes of taxation, Christians 
 must, in every country, be often at war with the 
 existing powers. What, then, is the will of God 
 on this subject ? On this subject he has revealed 
 his will in Rom. xiii. 1 — 7, in a strong, clear, 
 full, and precise manner. Yet strong, clear, full, 
 and precise as is the Apostle's language on this 
 duty, his meaning is variously expounded. To 
 ascertain, then, the meaning of this part of the 
 word of God, according to the laws of language, 
 must be of the utmost importance to every 
 
17 PREFACE. 
 
 Christian. Dr. Brown, in his late elaborate ex- 
 position of this passage, finds that, in certain 
 circumstances, it is right to rebel ; and that cer- 
 tain taxes, instead of being conscientiously paid, 
 ought to be refused at the hazard of life and 
 property. In reviewing his Lectures, I have 
 pointed out no fewer than thirty false principles 
 and assumptions, and the work could have af- 
 forded me many others. I have examined his 
 criticism and his reasoning, and have found them 
 equally false as his principles. 
 
REVIEW, &c. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 A MULTITUDE OF FALSE PRINCIPLES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 DETECTED IN DR. BROWN'S WORK. 
 
 It has long been my opinion, that the boasted acqui- 
 sitions of modern Biblical criticism are utterly delu- 
 sive ; and instead of leading with certainty to truth, 
 are only a cover for evasion. Its canons, instead of 
 being self-evident principles, which only could entitle 
 its deductions to be called the Science of Interpreta- 
 tion, are generally nothing but arbitrary rules, many 
 of which have been invented for the very purpose of 
 eluding the meaning of the author, or of bringing out 
 a meaning agreeable to the sentiments of the inter- 
 preter. I was never more struck with this fact, than 
 on reading Dr. Brown's Exposition of the first seven 
 verses of the Thirteenth Chapter of the Epistle to the 
 Romans. I have not observed in any work a greater 
 number of false principles in the same compass. The 
 passage itself is so free from difficulty, and its mean- 
 ing so clearly stated, that its exposition may safely 
 be trusted to a child. Had not the doctrine of the 
 
passage been opposed to the wisdom of this worlds 
 there never could have been a question about it. But 
 by the help of the rales of his art, this learned inter- 
 preter brings out a meaning the very reverse of that 
 of the Holy Spirit ; and instead of obedience, he in- 
 culcates, in certain circumstances, the right and duty 
 of rebellion, — instead of urging the duty of paying 
 taxes without exception, he teaches us to withstand 
 the payment of some taxes even at the hazard of life. 
 As the Pharisees made void the word of God by their 
 traditions, so he makes it void by his canons of inter- 
 pretations. In reviewing this work, then, I shall first 
 attend to his assumptions and principles of exposition. 
 I shall afterwards make some remarks on his criticism 
 and reasoning. 
 
 I. His very title, as applied to his work, contains a 
 false assumption. His work is entitled, " On the Law of 
 Christ respecting Civil Obedience, especially in the Pay- 
 ment of Tribute." Now, where has he found the right 
 to resist civil authority ? Where has he found his limi- 
 tation of the duty of paying tribute ? Where has he 
 found the distinction between general and specific taxes? 
 Is it in the passage expounded ? Is it any where in 
 the Scriptures ? No such thing. These are the doc- 
 trines of erring mortals, founded not even on the pre- 
 tence of an exposition of Scripture words, but on 
 maxims of their own wisdom. They arrogantly assume 
 to limit what the word of God teaches without limita- 
 tion. Is it the Thirteenth Chapter of the Epistle to 
 the Romans that teaches us, that in certain circum- 
 stances we ought to rebel against the government of 
 our country? Is it the precept enjoining to pay tri- 
 
bute, that forbids us to pay certain taxes ? No. It 
 is Milton and Locke,, and Hoadly and Paley, who 
 have taught the law of resistance. It is not the law 
 of God. Were these men inspired with the Spirit of 
 Christ, that their limitation of the law of Christ 
 should be called the law of Christ ? Dr. Brown 
 should have entitled his work, not an exposition 
 of the law of Christ, contained in Rom. xiii. 1 — 
 7, but the law of Christ, Rom. xiii. 1 — 7, limited 
 by Locke and Milton, and Hoadly and Paley. Can 
 that be a law of Christ, which is not contained 
 in his word ? It may be alleged that the excep- 
 tions are consistent with Rom. xiii. 1 — 7 ; but that 
 they are any part of that law, it is absurd to as- 
 sert. Whatever authority Dr. Brown may choose to 
 give to his exceptions, they cannot be the law of 
 Christ, Rom. xiii. 1 — 7, because they are not to be 
 found in that passage. The law of Christ they cannot 
 be, because they are not taught in any part of the 
 Scriptures. If Christians have a right to rebel, if it 
 is a sin to pay certain taxes, certainly they do not 
 find these things in Rom. xiii. 1 — 7. For the know- 
 ledge of this right and of this sin, they must go to 
 the political philosophers, and to the casuistry of Dr. 
 Brown, with respect to the distinction between gene- 
 ral and specific taxes. 
 
 II. The writer states, as an important principle of 
 interpretation, a rule which indeed has received the 
 approbation of Biblical critics, but which is both false 
 and mischievous. " To understand any book," says 
 he, cc not strictly of a scientific kind, thoroughly, it 
 is necessary to be intimately acquainted with the 
 
8 
 
 events of the age and country in which it was writ- 
 ten, and with the customs and habits of thought of the 
 people to whom it was originally addressed." I ut- 
 terly deny the authority of this canon. On what does 
 it rest ? It is a mere assumption. It is not self-evi- 
 dent, and therefore cannot challenge assent. On the 
 contrary, I maintain that it is quite possible to write 
 a book, not on science, which will be intelligible to 
 all who thoroughly understand the language, while 
 the reader has no other acquaintance with the events 
 of the age and country in which it was written, nor 
 of the customs and habits of the people to whom it 
 was originally addressed, than that which the work it- 
 self affords him ; far from such prerequisites being ne- 
 cessary, if a book is not intelligible to those properly 
 acquainted with the language, there must be a fault 
 in the composition. It is a foul calumny on the 
 Scriptures, to represent that the laws of Christ, which 
 are intended to direct his people in every age and in 
 every country, are not intelligible without the know- 
 ledge of other things not contained in the Scriptures. 
 If any law of Christ cannot be understood by his peo- 
 ple, without knowledge which the Scriptures do not 
 afford, the Scriptures are a deficient guide. If they 
 are such a book, they are not a revelation. It is as 
 absurd as it is wicked, to suppose that the Holy Spirit 
 modified his language in recording the laws of Christ, 
 by the customs,and habits of those to whom they were 
 originally addressed. Obedience to civil rulers is per- 
 fectly the same thing to Christians in all ages and 
 countries. The Scriptures are to be interpreted, not 
 from such previous knowledge, nor from " the modes 
 
of thought and feeling" prevalent in the times of the 
 interpreter, but from their own language. The inter- 
 pretation of Rom. xiii. 1 — 7 is perfectly the same 
 thing, whether the interpreter lives in an age and 
 country of the purest barbarism and of the most ty- 
 rannical despotism, or in an age and country of the 
 highest civilization and liberty. Such differenceshave not 
 the smallest effect on the language of the law of Christ, 
 and should not have any on the interpretation of it. 
 
 To the want of the above prerequisites, or inatten- 
 tion to them, Dr. Brown ascribes the opposite expo- 
 sitions of this chapter in former times in this country. 
 But the fact alluded to had no such origin. The op- 
 posite expositions of this part of the word of God were 
 not owing to ignorance of the times in which the epis- 
 tle was written, but to the different inclinations and 
 prepossessions of the interpreters. Each party found 
 their own doctrine on Rom. xiii. 1 — 7, because they 
 wished it to be there. The Apostle taught either the 
 divine right of kings, or the duty of rebellion, accord- 
 ing to the system of his interpreter. 
 
 III. He assumes, p. 5, that what is " present to 
 the mind" of the writer, and st the direct and primary 
 object" of the writing, must be known, not from what 
 is written, but from other sources of information. 
 This is divination, not interpretation. The interpre- 
 ter can lawfully know what was before the mind of 
 the writer, or what was his direct and primary object 
 in writing, only from the writing itself. 
 
 IV. That Christian subjects have a right, in certain 
 circumstances, to rebel, he founds on a principle not 
 contained in Scripture. " On the one hand," says he, 
 
10 
 
 p. 5, "itwasmaintained by Milton and Vane, and Locke 
 and Hoadly, with invincible argument and overwhelm- 
 ing eloquence, that civil government, being an institu- 
 tion intended entirely for promoting the security and 
 welfare of the community at large, whenever that end 
 was obviously not obtained, — when the power which 
 was created for the purpose of protecting life and pro- 
 perty was habitually and notoriously exercised in en- 
 dangering or destroying both, — that it was the right 
 and the duty of every man, by all lawful and consti- 
 tutional means, to have the government so altered as 
 to gain its end ; and if all other methods were found 
 ineffectual to secure the necessary alteration, that the 
 people had the right as well as the power to put down 
 such an intolerable tyranny by force." Here the right 
 of rebellion is founded on reason, without alleging even 
 the colour of Scripture. Can that be a Christian duty 
 which is not taught in Scripture ? If this is a right 
 and duty, it cannot be called a Scripture right and 
 duty ; for it pretends no origin in Scripture. If this is 
 a right and duty, the Scriptures are defective ; for 
 they do not teach it. Are Milton and Yane, and 
 Locke and Hoadly, the depositaries of the Spirit of 
 God on the subject ? If Christians have such a right 
 and duty, the Scripture must teach it, and what the 
 circumstances are in which it exists. But as the 
 Scriptures teach no such thing, no such right and duty 
 can exist. 
 
 V. The principle on which Milton and Vane, and 
 Locke and Hoadly, build their doctrine, is not only 
 not Scriptural, but is in itself false. That civil go- 
 vernment, as an institution of man, ought to be en- 
 
11 
 
 tirely for the promoting of the security and welfare of 
 the community at large, may be true ; but the Apos- 
 tle in this chapter, treats of civil government as the 
 ordinance of God. It is not self-evident, then, that 
 the promoting of the security and welfare of the com- 
 munity is entirely the object of God in the institution 
 of civil government. It is possible that God may 
 have other objects also in view, such as the punishing 
 of wicked nations through tyrannical rulers, and the 
 affording of an opportunity for the manifestation of 
 the cruelty of man in tyranny and oppression. Pailers 
 may serve the great purpose of preserving society, 
 while they are enormously profligate. We know that 
 tyrannical rulers were given to Israel to punish them 
 for their idolatry. The only person in the house of 
 Jeroboam in whom there was any good, was taken 
 away in youth. Righteous rulers sometimes do not 
 answer God's purposes. He can do his work by his 
 enemies as well as by his friends. The great mon- 
 archies to which God gave the world were all savage 
 " beasts ;" and the fiercest of them was in power when 
 the Apostle wrote. We cannot assume what are all 
 God's purposes in the institution of civil govern- 
 ment. The above extract assumes what is false, even 
 with respect to government as a creation of man. It 
 assumes, that every government has originally been 
 created for the purpose of protecting life and property. 
 Of all the governments that ever have existed in the 
 world, this is the case with very few. The implied 
 compact, so much talked of, is a mere phantom. It 
 is unsound, then, to reason from such a compact. 
 VI. It is not self-evident that Christians have a 
 
12 
 
 right to rebel, even when their rulers most flagrantly 
 abuse their power. It is possible that God may have 
 wise reasons for not allowing them to rebel. If this 
 is possible, the contrary cannot be assumed. God's 
 own declaration only can determine the question. 
 And God has determined it. Even when they are 
 persecuted in his own cause, they are forbidden to 
 fight. They may fly ; but they must not resist. 
 
 VII. Another false and most mischievous principle 
 assumed by this interpreter, is, that the peculiar cir- 
 cumstances of the Roman Christians were among the 
 grounds of the obedience inculcated in this paragraph. 
 c< In the agitation of passion," says he, " utterly for- 
 getting, or warped by interest, studiously keeping out 
 of view that the circumstances of the Christians in 
 Rome, — a small body, — chiefly of the lower orders, 
 many of them foreigners, — under a heathen govern- 
 ment essentially absolute, over which they had and 
 could have no control, and the circumstances of the 
 British nation, with few exceptions, making a profes- 
 sion of Christianity, — under a government adminis- 
 tered by men professing Christianity, — essentially 
 free, — on whose management the Constitution gives 
 their subjects the means of making an impression by 
 petition or representation, and whose very existence 
 depended on their will, were by no means parallel, — 
 from the passage before us, they attempted to prove 
 that the existing government was the ordinance of 
 God, its administrators his appointed ministers, and 
 that whoever resisted them violated the law of Christ, 
 and drew down on himself the righteous vengeance 
 of Heaven." 
 
IS 
 
 In what part of the document is it stated that the 
 fact that the Christians at Rome were a small body, 
 was any part of the grounds on which the Apostle 
 urged obedience to civil government ? Does not this 
 give a reason for obedience, not assigned by the Scrip- 
 ture ? Does not the passage rest obedience on a dif- 
 ferent ground ? Is not this to inculcate Scripture duty 
 on grounds of men's own devising ? This is forgery. 
 The Apostle urges obedience on the ground that civil 
 rulers are an ordinance of God. Dr. Brown grounds it 
 on different reasons, that in other circumstances would 
 justify rebellion. The Apostle does not say, obey 
 civil rulers because ye are a small body, mostly of the 
 lower orders, many of you foreigners, but because 
 " there is no power but of God/' Does Dr. Brown 
 think that obedience, in the most unlimited sense, 
 implies that British freemen when they become Chris- 
 tians, must become slaves like the subjects of the 
 Roman Caesars ? This would be to give rulers more 
 than their due. Our rulers are not powers in such a 
 sense. But should a Caesar overturn our constitution, 
 or a mad democracy be by an avenging God let loose 
 on us, we must obey. Even such a government, if 
 it actually holds the reins of empire, is of God. 
 Jehovah-Jesus actually sways the sceptre even when 
 it is in the hands of infidels and tyrants. In this 
 view the Christian may have consolation. The Lord 
 God omnipotent reigneth! The disciples of Christ 
 have no need to unite with his enemies in plots to 
 overturn a wicked and oppressive government. If a 
 wicked government is to be overturned, Jesus has 
 instruments fit for effecting his purpose. He de- 
 
• 14 
 
 grades not the heirs of glory by making them the 
 executioners of his vengeance. If we have grievances, 
 and a right to petition, does unlimited obedience for- 
 bid us to use our right ? If, according to the admira- 
 ble constitution of our government, we have influence, 
 does the duty of unlimited obedience forbid us to use 
 our influence ? 
 
 VIII. Dr. Brown blames those, on his side of the 
 question, in former times, that they did not rest on 
 the fact " that the passage before us has no direct 
 bearing on the limits of civil obedience." This is a 
 false principle. A passage may not speak directly 
 about limits, yet may express a thing in an unlimited 
 sense, unless it is elsewhere limited. Such is the case 
 here. The passage teaches obedience in language that 
 includes every case, except such as are elsewhere ex- 
 empted. But there is no exemption in any part of 
 Scripture with respect of the right of rebellion. The 
 only exception is with respect to things, that God com- 
 mands, or that God forbids. We are not to obey go- 
 vernment when it commands us to do what God for- 
 bids, or to forbear doing what he commands. But in 
 no case are we permitted to take the sword of rebel- 
 lion. This precept is unlimited in its language, as 
 Dr. Brown himself admits. If it is to be limited, it 
 lies on him to produce the limitation from some other 
 part of the Scriptures. This he has not done ; and, 
 therefore, his defence is as invalid as that of his 
 friends in time past. 
 
 IX. Another false and most mischievous principle 
 grounded on by this writer is, that Paul had a certain 
 object in view not discoverable from the passage, but 
 
15 
 
 to be learned from the history of the times. " All 
 this misinterpretation/' says Dr. Brown, f<r might have 
 been avoided by attending to the object which the 
 Apostle had in view in these remarks, and to the 
 mode of thinking prevalent at least among the Jewish 
 converts to Christianity, which rendered the prosecu- 
 tion of this object necessary." How is the object 
 which Paul had in view to be known but by his ex- 
 pression ? What Spirit told Dr. Brown that such was 
 Paul's object in his remarks ? Has he dreamed it ? 
 Or was he with the Witch of Endor ? This ought 
 rather to be called the art of divination than interpre- 
 tation. I trample on such reveries. I refuse to know 
 any object of a writer but from his own expression. 
 This is taking the meaning for granted ; and, on the 
 authority of that assumed meaning, interpreting the 
 words. It directly begs the question. Can the ob- 
 ject of a passage be known before it is interpreted ? 
 But by the art of divination, Dr. Brown ascertains the 
 object of the writer, and then interprets his words by 
 this foreknowledge. What has a mode of thinking 
 prevalent among Jewish converts to do with this ques- 
 tion ? The Apostle is speaking to Christians in gene- 
 ral, not exclusively to Jewish converts. Even were 
 it true that Jewish converts held it unlawful to obey 
 a heathen government, and were he speaking imme- 
 diately to Jewish converts, it does not follow that this 
 was the question. Might not the question and answer 
 relate to obedience in general ? Even had the question 
 been directly asked, it does not follow that the Apostle 
 might not in his answer go beyond the question. Is 
 not this almost always the case when the Apostle an- 
 
16 
 
 swers questions ? He extends his answer to points 
 not included in the query. Nothing can be more 
 silly than this kind of reasoning. It builds without 
 a foundation. " The whole passage/' says Dr. 
 Brown, " is an answer to the question, Are Chris- 
 tians subject to the authority of a government ad- 
 ministered by heathens ?" This is an unfounded as- 
 sumption. I demand the evidence. That it is a 
 mere assumption is sufficient for my purpose. But that 
 it is also a false assumption, the passage itself is the 
 strongest proof. It answers other questions,— that 
 supposed* question it answers only in the answer to 
 others. Not a particle of the paragraph has a peculiar 
 reference to such a question. 
 
 The absurdity of this mode of reasoning is still 
 more extravagant, when it is considered that it is not 
 in evidence that the Jewish converts, either at Rome or 
 any where else, thought it unlawful to obey a heathen 
 government. Dr. Brown, indeed, tells us, that it 
 does not follow of course that Jewish converts' all at 
 once laid aside their prejudices in this matter. And 
 I say, that it does not follow of course that they re- 
 tained theirs on this point. How far they retained 
 their prejudices we can legitimately know only from 
 what is recorded. This is not on record as among 
 their prejudices. Dr. Brown ought to know that 
 " It may be" can be no ground of proof, though it is 
 very sufficient to answer an objection. 
 
 No writer of romance is more extravagant than 
 this Biblical expositor. " It seems highly probable," 
 says he, " though (as Dr. Paley remarks) e< neither 
 
17 
 
 the Scripture nor any subsequent history of the Church, 
 present any direct attestation of the fact,that the notions 
 which have in after ages been repeatedly revived of 
 the freedom of the saints from all secular authority, 
 and their rightful dominion over the rest of mankind, 
 like most other errors, prevailed to a certain extent 
 in primitive times." If this is a genuine foundation 
 for knowledge, ignorance is inexcusable on any sub- 
 ject. But no man of a sound well-regulated mind 
 could admit this fact even as a part of his historical 
 faith, without any reference to Scripture truth. Sir 
 Walter Scott's Novels are true history compared with 
 the romance of this interpreter of the Word of God. 
 He calls on us to admit, as a foundation of his inter- 
 pretation, a fact contained neither in Scripture nor in 
 history. 
 
 But it is asserted that, " to such sentiments the 
 Apostle Peter seems to allude, when he exhorts Chris- 
 tians to conduct themselves as free, and yet not using 
 their liberty as a cloak of maliciousness, (sedition, as 
 Dr. Paley interprets it,) but as the servants of God." 
 Peter seems to allude to no such persons. It is to 
 good works in general that the Apostle, 1 Pet. ii. 15, 
 exhorts Christians ; and in ver, 1 6, they are warned 
 not to make their freedom from the law an occasion 
 of indulging in sin. They are freemen, but they are 
 not free to sin. Dr. Paley utterly mistakes, when he 
 renders the word translated maliciousness by sedition. 
 The word is not to be confined to sedition, but ex- 
 presses wickedness in general. The freedom of 
 Christians would be made a cloak of wickedness, if 
 they would indulge in sin, under pretence of their 
 B 
 
18 
 
 being free from the law. That this is the meaning, 
 is evident, not only from the word, but also from the 
 clause that follows, — " as the servants" (or slaves) 
 " of God." They are made free by Christ, yet their 
 freedom is of such a kind that they remain the slaves 
 of God. 
 
 ee On the supposition," continues Dr. Brown, " cer- 
 tainly a highly probable one, of some such sentiments 
 existing, or on the undoubted fact, that in the former 
 opinions of many of the Christians at Rome, there 
 was a natural source of such sentiments, nothing 
 could be less expected, on the part of the Apostle, 
 than a dissertation on the fundamental principles -of 
 Civil Government, or on the precise limits within 
 which obedience to a government, founded on these 
 principles, should be confined." Here we have a 
 supposition on which we are invited to build our faith 
 — a highly probable supposition, which has not a par- 
 ticle of evidence. If we are perverse, and will not 
 build on the supposition which the learned Doctor has 
 provided for our use, he has a farther resource. What 
 is this ? It is the undoubted fact, that in the former 
 opinions of many of the Christians at Rome, there was 
 a natural source of such sentiments. It might as well 
 be alleged, that the passage must refer to the resur- 
 rection of the dead ; because, as many of the Jewish 
 converts as were previously of the sect of the Saddu- 
 cees, denied that doctrine. It is not certain even 
 that all the unbelieving Jews at Rome held it unlaw- 
 ful to obey a Heathen government. There is no evi- 
 dence that even all the Jews in Judea believed such 
 a sentiment. Besides, all these suppositions might be 
 
19 
 
 true, without affecting the question. This principle 
 builds on a number of suppositions — suppositions 
 false ; and which, though true, would not bear the 
 conclusion rested on them. 
 
 But these suppositions, which, if admitted, will 
 shew us what we are to expect in this paragraph, are 
 viewed in another place as truths not to be questioned^ 
 The writer, p. 5, speaks of the things " which must 
 have been present to the Apostle's mind when he 
 wrote it ; and to meet which, must have been his 
 direct and primary object in writing it." Here sup- 
 positions are converted into certainties. But legerde- 
 main is not logic. 
 
 We need not look for any peculiar error among the 
 Christians at Rome, as the origin of the instructions 
 here given by Paul, though most of his doctrine was 
 called forth by such occasions. The doctrine of Rom. 
 xiii. 1 — 7, is as necessary this day to Christians in 
 Edinburgh, as it could be at that time to the Chris- 
 tians in Rome. 
 
 X. Dr. Brown's exposition of this passage confess- 
 edly founds on what he calls " a great principle of 
 the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures." It seems 
 it is not enough for us to know what Paul teaches the 
 Roman Christians on this subject. We have a second 
 question, and must indirectly ascertain whether the 
 same thing is a duty to us. A more wicked and mis- 
 chievous distinction never was invented for making 
 void the commandments of God. " Our attention," 
 says the writer, " must now be turned to a ques- 
 tion, if possible, of deeper interest and importance. 
 What are these things to us and to Christians gene- 
 
rally, in every country and in every age ?" So, then, 
 when we read that the Apostle commands the Chris- 
 tians at Rome to obey civil government, we do not 
 immediately know that we are commanded to obey 
 civil government ! We must make this out by ex- 
 amining a long train of circumstances. " That we 
 have a concern in them there is no doubt." Very 
 good, indeed ! By similar canons he might have de- 
 prived us of all concern in them. But that we have 
 any concern in them at all, we do not know from the 
 fact that what things are said to them are said to us, 
 but from 2 Tim. iii. 16, and Rom. xv. 4. This dis- 
 tinction will afford us a very convenient expedient to 
 deliver us from any duty inculcated on the first Chris- 
 tians. But it discovers gross ignorance of the man- 
 ner of revelation. Though the Epistle is expressly 
 addressed to the Christians in Rome, it is equally ad- 
 dressed to all Christians. This can be proved in the 
 most convincing manner. The 1st Epistle to the 
 Corinthians is addressed to the Church of God which 
 is at Corinth, and was occasional in its origin, yet in 
 it all Christians are included. It is added, " with all 
 that in every place call upon the name of Jesus 
 Christ/' Now, if all Christians are addressed in Paul's 
 letter to Corinth, all Christians are addressed in his 
 letter to Rome. 
 
 The Epistles were, no doubt, occasional in their 
 origin ; but did the wisdom of God, in adapting this 
 to all times and circumstances, lie hid from this theo- 
 logian ? These Epistles are the very same thing to us 
 that they were to those expressly named in the ad- 
 
21 
 
 dress. We learn the will of God from the Epistle to 
 the Romans just as the Romans themselves did. It 
 is true that there is an innumerable variety of differ- 
 ence in circumstances ; but this is nothing to the pur- 
 pose. The things taught there, in all circumstances, 
 are duty. The Roman Christians were under a des- 
 potism, and we are under a free government. But obe- 
 dience is the same. The powers are, under both, equally 
 to be obeyed. It is shallow thinking to suppose that this 
 implies that freemen ought to yield the obedience of 
 slaves; for the powers now have no power to command 
 slavery. To throw away our freedom would go be- 
 yond the claims of the powers, as well as of the in- 
 junction of the law of God. The envyings and strife 
 about teachers and gifts in the Church at Corinth, the 
 case of the incestuous person, the charge of going to 
 law with one another before unbelievers, &c, were 
 all peculiar to that Church, yet the Epistle is ex- 
 pressly addressed to " all that every where call on the 
 name of Jesus Christ." This answers every objec- 
 tion that Dr. Brown's ingenuity has alleged in the pre- 
 sent case. There was as much difference of circum- 
 stances between the peculiarities of situation in the 
 Church at Corinth and the rest of believers in the 
 world, as there is now between us and the primitive 
 Christians. Yet the same Epistle, occasional in its 
 origin, and employed about the occurrences that took 
 place among the Corinthian Christians, is addressed 
 to all Christians. The same may be said with respect 
 to the second Epistle to the Corinthians. Notwith- 
 standing that it was a letter directed to Corinth, the 
 Corinthians are in this address expressly associated 
 
" with all the saints that are in Achaia." Where is 
 this wise distinction now ? It may have subtlety ; bnt 
 it has no wisdom. Did the Christians of Achaia need 
 the assistance of an exegetical theologian to teach 
 them how to draw instruction from this letter, which, 
 though addressed to themselves, was peculiarly adapt- 
 ed to the circumstances of Corinth ? Must they have 
 a penitent incestuous person to be restored to their 
 fellowship, before they can learn their duty from what 
 is written on that peculiar subject ? The authority to 
 which I have referred, fully establishes the fact, that 
 an epistle to one Church is an epistle to all. It is 
 not left to theological casuistry to determine what 
 the Epistle to the Romans is to all other churches and 
 to all Christians of all ages. In writing to the Church 
 of the Thessalonians, Paul says, " For this, we say un- 
 to you by the word of the Lord, that we which are 
 alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall 
 not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord 
 himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with 
 the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God. 
 And the dead in Christ shall rise first ; then we which 
 are alive and remain, shall be caught up together with 
 them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air : and 
 and so shall we be ever with the Lord." 1 Thess. iv. 
 15, 16. We which are alive. This shews that Paul 
 includes all Christians of all ages among those ad- 
 dressed by him in his letters to the churches. They 
 who shall be living when Christ shall appear are as- 
 sociated with those to whom Paul immediately wrote. 
 The same peculiarity of manner Paul employs in 
 writing to the church at Corinth, 1 Cor. xv. 51, " Be- 
 
hold, I shew you a mystery, — we shall not all sleep ; 
 but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the 
 twinkling of an eye, at the last trump ; (for the 
 trumpet shall sound ;) and the dead shall be raised 
 incorruptible, and we shall be changed." Here Paul 
 not only includes in his address the whole body of 
 Christians who shall be living at the coming of Christ, 
 but what he speaks is as peculiar to them, as the fact 
 with respect to the incestuous person was peculiar to 
 those then resident at Corinth. The thing asserted 
 would be true only of such Christians as should be 
 living when Christ shall appear. Where is Dr. 
 Brown's wise distinction now? It is given to the 
 winds. A man of God should be ashamed of fram- 
 ing an expedient, which makes void the law of God. 
 Let us see what an exegetical theologian would make 
 of this passage, by the rules of his art. " Our first 
 consideration," says he, " is, what is this to those im- 
 mediately addressed ; and next, what is it to us ? To 
 those immediately addressed, it declares that they 
 were not all to die ; but some of them would remain 
 alive till the coming of Christ, when they should be 
 changed. But from this we are by no means warrant- 
 ed to conclude directly that all the Christians who 
 shall be on earth at the coming of Christ shall then be 
 changed. How far this may be true, we must in- 
 directly make out by a long and arduous process of 
 reasoning. Let us then apply ourselves to this most 
 important part of the duty of exegesis." Christians 
 are called on to admire the wonderful wisdom of the 
 manner of revelation. It is such, that in every in- 
 stance it anticipates the objections of cavillers, and 
 
24 
 
 affords an answer to every perversion. It would ap- 
 pear, then, that the Holy Spirit, by this manner of 
 address, had in view such evasions as that employed 
 by Dr. Brown. It is much to be lamented, that a 
 fact so obvious should lie hid from one whose very 
 profession is to expound the Scriptures, not only to a 
 congregation, but to the students of a large denomina- 
 tion. 
 
 Dr. Brown's distinction, however, is not new. In 
 the institution of the Lord's Supper, Jesus says to 
 those who sat at table, — " Drink ye all of it." Sim- 
 ple Christians ask no better proof that all Christians 
 should partake of the cup. But an exegetical theolo- 
 gian would soon dispose of their proof. " Stop a lit- 
 tle," says the Jesuit, ft We are to consider what that 
 expression is to those immediately addressed, and 
 what it is to us. This was addressed, not to all disci- 
 ples, but only to the Apostles. You cannot, then, on 
 this found the right of all Christians to the cup. Paul, 
 however, anticipates this, and all such sophistry, by 
 shewing us that what was addressed by Christ at the 
 table to those present, was addressed to all Christians. 
 For what Christ addressed to his disciples at table, 
 Paul delivers to the church at Corinth. 1 Cor. xi. 
 23. 
 
 In addressing the Philippian jailor, Paul says, 
 " Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt 
 be saved." On this ground Christians in all ages preach 
 salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. But a late 
 writer in the Edinburgh Review proves that they are 
 but fools. By the help of Dr. Brown's distinction, he 
 first considers what this address was to the jailor, and 
 
25 
 
 then what it is to us. Because an ignorant heathen 
 is to be saved by faith in Christ, does it follow that 
 the same holds true with respect to people in a Chris- 
 tian couniry ? This distinction, then, ought not to be 
 called a principle of the interpretation of the Holy 
 Scriptures., but a canon to deliver Christians from the 
 doctrines and laws of their Lord. 
 
 XL Dr. Brown assumes, that " precepts must be 
 modified in their application to us, by a consideration 
 of the peculiar circumstances in which they were, and 
 we are placed." This is a false assumption. No cir- 
 cumstance can modify a precept, except so far as such 
 precept is essentially grounded on such peculiar cir- 
 cumstance. In that case, the modification is as ap- 
 plicable to those expressly addressed, as it is to us. 
 There is not the slightest difference. A precept 
 founded on a peculiarity of circumstances with respect 
 to those expressly addressed, is applicable to others 
 only in the same peculiarity of circumstances. The 
 precept has always the same extent. But a precept 
 to persons in peculiar circumstances, is not, in its ap- 
 plication to others, to be modified by these peculiar 
 circumstances, unless it is either wholly or in part 
 grounded on such peculiarity. He gives us an exam- 
 ple from the case of slavery ; but it is a very unfor- 
 tunate one. " Statements," says he, " made with 
 regard to the duty of ( servants under the yoke/ must 
 be modified, if applied to servants who are by civil 
 privilege, as well as national right, as free as their 
 masters." This example shews very little perspica- 
 city. It is utterly inapplicable. Does he not perceive 
 
26 
 
 that precepts to slaves in the time of the Apostles, are 
 precepts to slaves in all other times. When the pre- 
 cept to slaves is not fully applied to free servants, 
 there is no modification of the precept ; for the pre- 
 cept does not apply to such. The precept remains 
 unmodified, — as completely applicable to slaves now, 
 as it was to slaves in primitive times. And as to the 
 instruction which the precept to slaves affords to free 
 servants at present, is it not perfectly the same as it 
 was to free servants at that time ? 
 
 The learned expositor tells us, that from this pas- 
 sage we ought to believe that " the powers that were, 
 when the Apostle wrote, were ordained of God." 
 He is willing also to admit, that, in the way of prac- 
 tical instruction, " it naturally enough suggests the 
 thought, along with an irresistible sense of its justice, 
 — if the Roman Christians were called on to yield 
 cheerful obedience to an arbitrary government, at the 
 head of which was a Claudius or a Nero, with what 
 thankful readiness should we perform our duties to a 
 civil government," &c. Now, were it a fact that all 
 that this passage contains is an assertion that the Ro- 
 man government was of God, and as such, ought to be 
 obeyed, it is clear as demonstration, that every other 
 government must also be of God. What reason can be 
 given why the government of Nero was of God, if any 
 government is not of God ? Were any savage beasts, 
 to whom God ever gave power, more savage than the 
 beast of the Roman empire ? But the passage merely 
 suggests a certain thought to this expositor, along with 
 a sense of its justice. His duty he does not learn 
 
27 
 
 from it as a divine precept. Does he wish to deliver 
 Christians from the authority of God in this matter, 
 and leave their duty to a sense of justice? 
 
 XII. Dr. Brown's exposition of this passage as- 
 sumes that the duty of obedience is here taught ex- 
 pressly only with respect to the Roman government 
 at that time. This is a false assumption, though the 
 author errs in this in common with expositors in gene- 
 ral. The passage expressly enjoins obedience to all 
 governments equally. The word rendered " powers," 
 wants the article, and has not an exclusive reference 
 to the Roman government. It comprehends govern- 
 ments universally. Should any of the Roman Chris- 
 tians go beyond the bounds of the empire, the duty of 
 obedience to the government of the country is here as 
 expressly enjoined, as it is to the powers of the em- 
 pire itself. And the foreigners who may have be- 
 longed to countries beyond the limits of the empire, 
 are here taught obedience to the powers of Rome 
 while in the country, and obedience to the powers of 
 their own country, when they should have returned 
 home. The Apostle speaks of " powers" without 
 peculiar reference. This is a fact that cuts the si- 
 news of sophistry. 
 
 The writer supposes that it must be exclusively of 
 the powers of the empire the Apostle speaks, as he 
 speaks to the subjects of the empire. It is not, how- 
 ever, exclusively to the subjects of the empire the 
 Apostle is speaking, but to all Christians in all ages 
 and countries. Besides, even in speaking to one 
 church, or one individual, it is quite possible to ex- 
 press a precept in such terms as to shew that it 
 
equally applies to all Christians. When, in writing to 
 a friend, I say, obey government, for there is no 
 government but of God ; I certainly enjoin obedience 
 to the government under which he is then living ; but 
 as certainly I speak of the duty in terms that equally 
 express it with respect to every government. I speak 
 not exclusively of any government. In like manner, 
 the Apostle here says, ie obey civil authorities, for 
 there is no authority but of God, and the existing au- 
 thorities are ordained of God." The Apostle first 
 states the duty as applicable to all civil rulers. Next, he 
 states the ground on which the command rests, as the 
 reason why he gives the injunction. Every govern- 
 ment is to be obeyed, because there is no government 
 that is not of God. Lastly, he brings it home to the 
 existing governments. " The existing governments 
 are appointed by God." This directly applies to 
 every government of every age and of every country. 
 XIII. Dr. Brown adopts a principle laid down by 
 Paley, which is a mere assumption, and which takes 
 for granted the question at issue. <( The truth, says 
 he, " is very clearly stated, and the grounds of it un- 
 folded by Paley ; so long as the interest of the whole 
 society requires it, — that is, so long as the established 
 government cannot be resisted or changed without 
 public inconvenience, it is the will of God (which will 
 universally determines our duty) that the established 
 government be obeyed, and no longer. This principle 
 being admitted, the justice of any particular case of 
 resistance is reduced to a computation of the quantity 
 of the danger and grievance on the one side, and of 
 the probability and expense of redress on the other." 
 
29 
 
 What is the authority of this oracle ? Has the author 
 received it at Delphi ? Or does he profess to be him- 
 self an oracle of God ? How has he found that obe- 
 dience has such a limit? Has the Scripture any 
 where assigned this limit ? Is it an exception arising 
 from necessary truth ? It is neither. The Scriptures 
 give no such limitation ; necessary truth says nothing 
 on the subject. We have no ground on which we 
 can rest it, but the word of the sage. I utterly de- 
 spise such sayings, as I do the ravings of Johanna 
 Southcott. No sane man can say that it is impossi- 
 ble that God could have good reason to oblige his 
 people to obedience to their rulers, though they should 
 be tyrants and oppressors. I demand where Dr. 
 Paley has found the will of God in this matter. His 
 doctrine is not Scripture ; it is not necessary truth. 
 Did he ascend to heaven and obtain a new revelation ? 
 The figments of philosophers are to be despised 
 equally with the dreams of fanatics. Political philo- 
 sophers have founded their reasonings in support of 
 the limitation of obedience to civil government on 
 mere theory. When Newton gives us a theory of the 
 tides, he does not interfere with the Scriptures, for 
 they are silent on such subjects. But when Dr. 
 Paley grounds obedience to civil government on pub- 
 lic expediency, while others ground on the absurd 
 supposition of implied compacts, promises, or conven- 
 tions, they blasphemously contradict God, and pre- 
 sume to free his people from his laws. They found 
 on a theory that overturns the ground on which obe- 
 dience is rested by the law of God. Can there be a 
 more palpable contradiction between any two writers 
 
so 
 
 than there is between Paul, in this passage, and Dr. 
 Paley, when in limitation of what is said by the 
 Apostle, he impiously asserts that " it may be as 
 much a duty at one time to resist government, as it is 
 at another to obey it." This is not to expound the 
 Apostle, but to contradict him. If on some occa- 
 sions it is as much a duty to resist government, as at 
 others to obey, certainly the Apostle has been very 
 negligent in this matter. He has no where taugbt us 
 such a duty. Perhaps he has left this deficiency to 
 be supplied by Dr. Paley and other political philoso- 
 phers. 
 
 Is it not astonishing that Dr. Brown does not see 
 the inconsistency of an expositor pretending to de- 
 termine the nature and limits of a duty taught in the 
 passage expounded, yet in all his defence of resistance 
 to civil government, he has not a single proof, either 
 from the passage itself, or from any other passage in 
 the Scriptures ? To prove the right of resistance, 
 he is obliged to rest on the authority o v f Paley, and 
 Locke, and Hoadly, as if their reveries were the dic- 
 tates of inspiration. Are Christians to go to the 
 judgment-seat of Christ, pleading exemption from his 
 law on the authority of the dogmas of philosophers ? 
 This is as absurd as it is wicked. 
 
 XIV. Dr. Brown tells us that " the present govern- 
 ment of this country have no right to their places, if 
 these principles are not true." This is a false assump- 
 tion. It confounds the right of the present possessors 
 of power with the means by which that power was 
 originally obtained by their predecessors. The revo- 
 lution might be viewed as a rebellion ; while the 
 
31 
 
 Scripture right of the present professors of power re- 
 mains unaffected. The existing powers are as truly 
 of God, as if the revolution had been effected in obe- 
 dience to an express command of God. None can 
 grasp the sceptre til] it is held out by God. Napoleon 
 and Cromwell were of God, as truly as Jeroboam and 
 Jehu, or even as David and Solomon. Does not Dr. 
 Brown himself assert that the government of a Clau- 
 dius or a Nero was the ordinance of God to the 
 Roman Christians? Does he think that Caesar was 
 justifiable in overturning the republic ? Does not 
 Dr. Paley also assert that " irregularity in the first 
 foundations of a state, or subsequent violence, fraud, 
 or injustice, in getting possession of the supreme 
 power, are not sufficient reasons for resistance, after 
 the government is once peaceably settled ?" 
 
 XV. The principle by which Dr. Brown limits a 
 law expressed in unlimited terms, is either false, or 
 nothing to his purpose. It is admitted, that " it is 
 not necessary that where there are exceptions, these 
 exceptions should be all specifically mentioned." The 
 exceptions may be included in a general law as well 
 as in a specific one. The general law " we ought to 
 obey God rather than man," applies to every specific 
 case in which man commands what God forbids, or 
 forbids what God commands. If Dr. Brown can pro- 
 duce to me a general law in Scripture which warrants 
 rebellion in any instance, I will submit to it as impli- 
 citly as I would to a specific precept. But he has not 
 attempted to produce any such general law from the 
 word of God. The highest source of his exceptions 
 is the authority of the political philosophers. 
 
32 
 
 " In reference to Scriptural precepts/' says he, " it 
 is enough if there are clear, general principles of truth 
 and justice, in a consistency with which all particular 
 precepts must be interpreted ; so that we are war- 
 ranted to say of any particular precept, however clear- 
 ly proved to be a divine one, that any meaning which 
 can be brought out of it, which contradicts those prin- 
 ciples, cannot be the true meaning.'' Here he con- 
 founds general principles of truth and justice, as 
 taught in the Scriptures, with general principles of 
 truth and justice, as ascertained by reason. It is by 
 supposing that what is true of the one is true of the 
 other, that the position has an appearance of truth. 
 If by " general principles of truth and justice," he 
 means general laws or declarations contained in Scrip- 
 ture, the thing is admitted ; but it is nothing to his 
 purpose. It is just the thing that I have illustrated 
 in the general law, " We ought to obey God rather 
 than man." But if by ec general principles of truth 
 and justice," he means the arbitrary positions of his 
 oracle, the philosophers, then it is entirely denied. It 
 is quite obvious that this must be his meaning ; for 
 this is the only light in which the thing asserted can 
 serve him. The grand principles of truth and justice 
 must be the maxims of Milton, of Locke, of Hoadly, 
 and of Paley. We must limit God's law, not by any 
 general distinction of his own word, but by the fancy 
 of the philosophers. God will not be allowed to com- 
 mand any thing beyond the opinion of the sages with 
 respect to justice. If Paley and Locke do not relish 
 the meaning of the precept, that cannot be the true 
 meaning. 
 
" For example." says the writer, " there is a pre- 
 cept in the Jewish law, which, at first sight, seems 
 not merely to authorise, but to require human sacri- 
 fices. (Lev. xxvii. 28, 29.) The passage admits of 
 satisfactory explanation ; but though it did not, the 
 great principles with regard to the divine character 
 and will, so clearly stated in Scripture, would war- 
 rant us to say that any meaning which sanctions 
 human sacrifice cannot be the true meaning." Now 
 if it is true that the Scriptures absolutely forbid 
 human sacrifice by any thing imported in their 
 general declarations with respect to the character 
 and will of God, the case coincides with what I 
 have already explained. But in this sense it is 
 nothing to his purpose. It cannot serve him, un- 
 less the knowledge of the divine character and will, 
 by the authority of which the language of the pre- 
 cept must be explained or limited, is derived solely 
 from reason. Locke and Paley do not ground on any 
 general declaration of Scripture, but on what, inde- 
 pendently of Scripture, they judge to be right. Does 
 Dr. Brown think that human sacrifice is so contrary 
 to the divine character as to render it impossible for 
 God to command human sacrifice ? If this is true, 
 then the greatest instance of faith on record is the 
 greatest instance of folly. Abraham should not have 
 sacrificed his son. Had Abraham acted on this prin- 
 ciple, he would have denied that the command could 
 possibly come from God. It is true that God did not suf- 
 fer him to sacrifice Isaac. But God could not command 
 what it is unworthy of him to receive. And he did 
 receive a human sacrifice, when he accepted the sa- 
 c 
 
crifice of his own Son. It is not safe to say, then, 
 that no language could, in any instance, enjoin a hu- 
 man sacrifice, so clearly as to warrant a man to be- 
 lieve it. God would do man no injustice were he to 
 sacrifice the whole human race* Against human sa- 
 crifice we have not the security of necessary truth. 
 It is enough to say, it is not required, and that there- 
 fore it is murder to offer it. On the authority of such 
 maxims, the infidel denies that God could command 
 or sanction the invasion of Canaan, and the extirpa- 
 tion of the inhabitants. They tell us that it is con- 
 trary to the eternal principles of justice. 
 
 " There may be cases in Scripture," says the writer, 
 fC where the only way of fixing the limits of a pre- 
 cept, expressed without exception, which is yet ob- 
 viously intended not to be universal, is by appealing 
 to such principles, which is just one way of making 
 Scripture its own interpreter." Now, if the princi- 
 ples referred to are general declarations of Scripture, 
 on which supposition only can it be said that Scrip- 
 ture is made its own interpreter, the observation is 
 not to the writer's purpose. Does he make Scripture 
 interpret Scripture when he limits the language of 
 Scripture law by the maxims of Locke and Paley ? 
 Are the writings of the philosophers a part of Scrip- 
 ture ? I have no objection that Scripture should in- 
 terpret Scripture, and that a general law should 
 limit a particular law ; but I will not consent that 
 Locke and Paley shall limit the laws of Jesus Christ. 
 
 I state it as an axiom, that to express a duty with^ 
 out limitation enjoins it without limitation, unless in 
 cases either expressly or necessarily excepted. 
 
35 
 
 XVI. " The second class of limitations to the ob- 
 ligations of civil obedience/' says Dr. Brown, " refer 
 to cases on which the magistrates, of whatever grade, 
 act illegally." Now this assumes what is not true. 
 None of the cases supposed are a limitation of the 
 law in question. If an inferior magistrate acts ille- 
 gally, to refuse obedience is not to resist the exist- 
 ing powers ; for all power ultimately lodges with the 
 supreme authorities, and the supreme authorities do 
 not enjoin obedience to those in office under them, 
 when they go beyond their authority. Paul's con- 
 duct in insisting on his privileges comes under this de- 
 nomination. He had a right not to comply with the 
 request of the Roman governor, and to appeal unto 
 Caesar. Surely, by appealing to Caesar he did not re- 
 sist Caesar. And in limited governments, the highest 
 executive authority is not the only power. Queen 
 Victoria has not power to command by proclamation 
 what the Constitution says ought to be done by the 
 legislature. The two Houses of Parliament are es- 
 sential constituents in the existing powers. But 
 should Victoria, like Caesar, succeed in establishing 
 a despotism, must she not be obeyed like Caesar ? If 
 God in his providence gives her unlimited power, 
 Christians are bound to submit. 
 
 XVII. " The third class of limitations of the ob- 
 ligation of civil obedience embraces all cases in which 
 the magistrate leaves his proper power, and interferes 
 in matters with which, as a magistrate, he has nothing 
 to do." This is a false assumption, and it is mere as- 
 sumption. As far as it is a limitation of the law, it is 
 comprehended in the first class. It coincides entirely 
 
86 
 
 with the limitation that enjoins us to obey God rather 
 than man. The greatest part of what the author says 
 on this class of limitations belongs to the first class. 
 With respect to the rest, that they are exceptions to 
 the obligation of the law, is a gratuitous assumption. 
 Where do the Scriptures teach, that if a government 
 take under its management temporal concerns which, 
 in the view of others, do not belong to its proper pro- 
 vince, subjects are not bound to obey ? This is not 
 among the doctrines of Scripture. And it is not a 
 necessary truth. God may have good reasons for 
 commanding us to submit even to unjust power. 
 Has he not actually done so ? Slaves are commanded 
 to be subject not only to good and gentle masters, 
 but also to the fro ward. They are to " endure grief, 
 suffering wrongfully." Even when they do well and 
 suffer for it, they are to take it patiently. 
 
 How is it that the Scriptures themselves make the 
 first class of exceptions, but that, to prove the third, 
 Dr. Brown must have recourse to the mere sayings 
 of wise men ? If there were other limitations to this 
 duty besides what is included in obeying God rather 
 than man, would not the Scriptures themselves have 
 taught them ? Would this have been left to the spe- 
 culations of Dr. Watts and Mr. Locke on the proper 
 object of civil government ? Is it by the sayings of 
 Watts and Locke that Scripture interprets Scripture ? 
 
 XVIII. In his Note xii., Dr. Brown remarks on 
 the excellence of the Roman law. If this is any thing 
 to his purpose, it assumes that a part of the ground 
 of submission enjoined on the Roman Christians was 
 the excellence of their laws. This is a false assump- 
 
37 
 
 tion, for the Apostle grounds ou the fact, that the 
 powers are of God's appointment. Besides, though 
 the subjects of the empire might be ruled by law, as 
 far as subordinate magistrates were concerned, the 
 rule of the emperor was not bounded by law. He 
 was the absolute master of his subjects both as to life 
 and property. Dr. Brown has not as much power 
 over his clog, as Caesar had over Paul. Dr. Brown 
 could not lawfully torment his dog, nor put him to 
 fight with another dog for the amusement of the 
 mob ; Paul was obliged to fight with wild beasts. 
 
 XIX. Dr. Brown states it as a principle, " that 
 obedience has an alternative" namely, the suffering of 
 the penalty. This is a principle absurdly false. The 
 penalty of a law is no obedience to that law. On the 
 contrary it is punishment for disobedience. The suf- 
 fering- of the penalty does not fulfil the law nor please 
 the lawgiver. No lawgiver, either human or divine, 
 ever viewed the penalty of transgression as an alterna- 
 tive for obedience. The penalty is the sanction of 
 law, not an alternative for obedience. This is un- 
 sound theology. It virtually denies the necessity of 
 Christ's active obedience as a fulfilling of the law on 
 the part of his people. If the suffering of the penalty 
 of transgression is an alternative for obedience to the 
 law, then Christ's passive obedience was all that was 
 necessary. His holy life might be necessary to fit 
 him for suffering the penalty with acceptance, but not 
 as demanded by the law from the people for whom 
 he suffered. Has Dr. Brown swerved so far from the 
 ancient orthodoxv of the Secession ? 
 
88 
 
 XX. Dr. Brown assumes that the penalty of a law, 
 which ought not to be obeyed, ought to be willingly 
 submitted to. This is a false principle. Duty does 
 not require that we should submit willingly to the 
 penalty of a law, which it would be sinful to obey. 
 We have a right to disapprove of the penalty as much 
 as of the law. We are not indeed to resist, but we 
 are not to approve. The suffering of the penalty is 
 against our will, though we are bound to submit. 
 He tells us that he honours the law by submitting to 
 its penalty. He honours a sinful law ! ! Here he 
 goes as far beyond the law of God, as in other things 
 he falls below it. A law that should not be submit- 
 ted to, ought not to be honoured. Nothing can be 
 more absurd than to suppose that a law is worthy of 
 honour which is not worthy of obedience. 
 
 XXI. In his second note, Dr. Brown adopts a false 
 principle from the celebrated Robert Hall. " The 
 principles of freedom ought, in a more especial man- 
 ner, to be cherished by Christians : for they alone can 
 secure that liberty of conscience and freedom of in- 
 quiry which is essential to the proper discharge of 
 the duties of their profession." Legal liberty of con- 
 science is not essential to the proper discharge of the 
 duties of a Christian ; and comparatively in few coun- 
 tries has it ever been perfectly enjoyed. Liberty of 
 conscience is indeed among the most invaluable tem- 
 poral blessings ; but where it is not enjoyed, the 
 Christian has a resource. He is to obey God rather 
 than man. 
 
 XXII. Another false principle is adopted from the 
 
39 
 
 same writer in the following words : — " To die in the 
 cause of Christianity, is the highest honour that can 
 befall any man. To die in the cause of civil liberty 
 is the next." It is here asserted that to die in the 
 cause of civil liberty is the second highest possible ho- 
 nour. On the contrary, it may be very sinful. Though 
 civil liberty is an invaluable blessing, the man who 
 fights for it in opposition to the powers that God has 
 put over him, fights against God. It is only under 
 the powers that a Christian is ever innocent in dying 
 in the cause of civil liberty. Where has Mr. Hall 
 found this sentiment ? Is it treasured up in the 
 Scriptures among the sayings of the Holy Spirit? 
 No, it may be met frequently from the mouth of hea- 
 thens ; but it is not recognised by the word of God. 
 Even when a Christian dies in the cause of civil li- 
 berty, being lawfully called to the field by the powers 
 ordained of God, he has not obtained the second high- 
 est possible honour. On the contrary, to do the 
 smallest service to Christ is infinitely a higher honour 
 than to die for civil liberty in the most righteous 
 cause. Can any thing be more absurd than to sup- 
 pose that all the men who should die in repelling an 
 invasion of the country., would be more highly hon- 
 oured than missionaries, who die peaceably after a 
 course of active labours in converting sinners ? Mr. 
 Hall's wise saying is a foolish heathenish saying. It 
 grates upon the ear, as coming from the wisdom of 
 this world, and sounds harshly from the mouth of a 
 man of God. 
 
 XXIII. Another false principle is adopted by Dr. 
 Brown from the same writer, in the assertion that 
 
40 
 
 Christian ministers " cannot explain or enforce the 
 reasons of submission, without displaying the proper 
 end of government, and the expectations we may na- 
 turally form from it, which, when accurately done, 
 will lead into the very depths of political science." 
 The ground of submission to civil government is God's 
 appointment ; and no tincture of political science is 
 necessary to explain or enforce the duty as it is stated 
 in Scripture. Where ought we to learn the qualifi- 
 cations of a Christian minister ? Is it from Paul or 
 from Robert Hall ? Where do the Scriptures make a 
 knowledge of the very depths of political science ne- 
 cessary to a Christian minister? 
 
 XXIV. In note 6, Dr. Brown adopts the following 
 quotation : — " It is not to the Bible without note or 
 comment, that Protestants," he should have said well- 
 informed Protestants, " appeal as the ultimate stand- 
 ard of religious truth ; but (as their constant practice 
 of interpretation shews) to the Bible, with every note 
 and comment from every quarter, — not from any li- 
 mited set of so called fathers, or rather from certain 
 digests of opinion from them, which pass over their 
 manifold contradictions of each other and of them- 
 selves, but from all those legitimate and necessary 
 helps which are supplied by grammatical, critical, his- 
 torical, moral, and spiritual considerations, and which 
 regulate our interpretation of every other book." This 
 Dr. Brown styles " true principle of Biblical inter- 
 pretation." But it is a position absurdly false. No 
 man worth arguing with, denies the use and import- 
 ance of notes and comments on the Bible. But to say 
 that they form any part of the standard with the 
 
41 
 
 Bible is ridiculous. It is the words of the Bible only 
 that are the standard. Notes and comments may as- 
 sist us in ascertaining the meaning of the book that is 
 the standard ; but it is absurd to say that they are a 
 part of the standard which they assist us to under- 
 stand. A lawyer exhausts every source of evidence 
 to prove the meaning of a will or of a law ; but still 
 he appeals to nothing as a standard but to the words 
 of the will or of the law. The very nature of a stan- 
 dard implies that it is admitted by both the contend- 
 ing parties, while they have opposite notes and com- 
 ments. 
 
 XXV. Dr. Brown assumes, that it must be proved 
 that the Christian Romans were liable to a religious 
 tax, before the precept with respect to the payment 
 of taxes is even capable of the meaning which he op- 
 poses. This is a false principle. Every tax must be 
 included, if no tax is excepted. The words employed 
 to designate taxes have no reference to the object of 
 taxation, or the purposes to which the money is to be 
 converted. It is quite indifferent, in this respect, 
 whether it is to be given for the support or for the 
 persecution of religion. Even were it certain that 
 there had not been previously any direct religious tax, 
 the precept includes such taxes when imposed. It 
 might as well be said that a certain direct civil tax is 
 not included in the precept, because it did not exist 
 at the time of the writing of this epistle. 
 
 XXVI. Dr. Brown assumes, that " the command 
 refers to the existing tributes of the Koman empire." 
 This is a false assumption. The command refers to 
 tribute, without respect to times or countries. Should 
 
42 
 
 any of the Roman Christians pass beyond the limits 
 of the empire, the precept was as directly applicable 
 to them in every country as in Rome itself. Besides, 
 all Christians are virtually included in the address. 
 The precept is as directly applicable now as when it 
 was written. 
 
 XXVII. Dr. Brown assumes that a religious tax 
 is a thing of a different nature from a civil tax. But 
 as to any idea essential to taxation, there is no diffe- 
 rence at all. A command to pay a civil tax, he tells 
 us, is no command to pay a religious tax. Very true. 
 But the precept is not that we should pay civil taxes, 
 but that we should pay taxes. Dr. Brown's strength 
 lies in distinguishing things that are identical, and in 
 confounding things that are essentially different. 
 
 XXVIII. Dr. Brown assumes that the general 
 law, " We must obey God rather than man, limits 
 the precept i( pay tribute." This begs the question, 
 which is not a novel thing with this writer. It takes for 
 granted that God has forbidden the paying of some 
 taxes, or that the paying of some taxes is sinful. Is 
 not this the point to be disputed ? The first law can- 
 not limit the second, unless certain taxes are forbidden 
 by God to be paid by his people. " We must obey 
 God rather than man, applies to every thing in which 
 God has forbidden or commanded any thing. But 
 God has not forbidden us to pay any kind of taxes. 
 On the contrary, he has commanded us to pay taxes, 
 without subjoining any limitation. The general law, 
 then, as well as the particular law, enjoins us to pay 
 all taxes. We cannot disobey God in doing what he 
 commands, 
 
XXIX. Dr. Brown assumes that the paying of a 
 tax for a purpose conscientiously disapproved by him 
 from whom it is exacted is sinful. This is a false 
 assumption, and proceeds on two false principles, 1st, 
 It supposes that the money given in paying the tax is 
 our own, which we have a right to withhold. This 
 is false. It belongs to the powers, and is demanded 
 by them as a debt ; not asked as a boon. When the 
 poweis impose a tax, they appropriate so much of the 
 property of the subject to themselves, and it ceases to 
 be the property of the subject. In this light, all 
 powers consider the matter, and this view this law of 
 God sanctions. We pay taxes as debtors. Our con- 
 sent is neither asked nor implied. Under despotical 
 governments, the lives as well as the property of sub- 
 jects belong to the despot. God gave the world to 
 the four beasts of Daniel. " Thou, king, art a king 
 of kings ; for the God of Heaven hath given thee a 
 kingdom, power, and strength, and glory. And 
 wheresoever the children of men dwell, the beasts of 
 the field, and the fowl of the heaven hath he given 
 into thine hand, and hath made thee ruler over them 
 all." Dan. ii. 37, 38. We see here that it was the 
 God of Heaven w r ho gave Nebuchadnezzar his king- 
 dom, and subjected to him the lives and property of 
 the nations. a thou king, the most high God, gave 
 Nebuchadnezzar, thy father, a kingdom, and majesty, 
 and glory, and honour. And for the majesty that he 
 gave him, all people, nations, and languages, trembled 
 and feared before him ; whom he would he slew ; and 
 whom he would he kept alive ; and whom he would 
 he set up ; and whom he would he put down." Dan. 
 
44 
 
 v. 18, 19. The Roman beast had the same gift con- 
 ferred on him by the God of Heaven. When Chris- 
 tians, then, are commanded to render to Caesar the 
 things that are Caesar's, there is nothing excepted but 
 what belongs to God. If Christians are unjustly called 
 to suffer death, they have no warrant from God to re- 
 sist the powers. They may fly, but they must not 
 fight. To carnal wisdom this seems utterly unreason- 
 able, and the wisdom of the world, even in Christians, 
 rises up against it. It cannot permit Daniel's beasts 
 to have their day. It would willingly break the lease 
 that the Most High God has given them. But this is 
 a Scripture truth, that no sophistry can* evade. And 
 to the Christian, guided by the wisdom that is from 
 above, there is abundant consolation. If God has 
 given his people into the hands even of tyrants, he has 
 these tyrants in his own hands, and can dispose them 
 to use his people as he pleases. We are sure that 
 they will be used in that manner that will be most for 
 their own good and God's glory. This is enough to 
 know, and is a greater security for our peace, than 
 all the raving speculations that rest liberty on the 
 right of rebellion. 
 
 2. This assumption proceeds on the principle, that 
 the paying of a tax recognises its object. This is 
 utterly false. Approbation is neither given nor asked. 
 When the collectors of the Annuity Tax call on Dr. 
 Brown, they will not demand his approbation of the 
 purpose of the tax. " Give us your money, Dr. 
 Brown," they will say, " and keep your conscience to 
 yourself." The powers, instead of demanding appro- 
 bation with respect to the destination of the tax, dis- 
 
45 
 
 own all interference with the rights of conscience. 
 Nor does the public voice put this construction on 
 taxation ; for the great body of society act on the 
 contrary principle. Dr. Brown must have a peculiarly 
 ticklish conscience, when he starts at a tax as imply- 
 ing approbation of purpose — while the imposers of 
 the tax disclaim such a construction of their meaning 
 — while the collectors make no such demand — while 
 general opinion distinguishes between the paying of a 
 tax and approbation of its object ; and while the 
 Scriptures enjoin the paying of taxes without limita- 
 tion. He rests all on his metaphysics, and they are 
 extremely bad metaphysics. For the paying of a tax 
 as a debt, by the authority of the powers, is as widely 
 different from approbation of the purpose of the tax, 
 as heaven is distant from earth. We ought to pay 
 a tax for a purpose which we disapprove, because it 
 is a debt, and our approbation is not implied. We 
 ought not to bestow our contribution for the same pur- 
 pose, because this implies recognition. 
 
 XXX. Dr. Brown's doctrine of tribute rests entirely 
 on the supposed essential distinction between taxes 
 for a general purpose and taxes for a specific purpose. 
 This is a false principle. The distinction is a mere 
 refinement, and not a metaphysical difference. There 
 is no essential difference between general and specific 
 taxes. If it is wrong to pay a specific tax, the pur- 
 pose of which is sinful, it is equally wrong to pay a 
 general tax, one of whose purposes is sinful. The 
 sinful ingredient defiles the whole mass. But Dr. 
 Brown's spiritual chemistry reverses the nature of 
 moral combination ; and, instead of polluting the 
 
46 
 
 whole mixture, he neutralizes, or sanctifies the sinful 
 ingredient by its combination with purposes that are 
 proper. This keystone being picked out, his whole 
 arch tumbles to the ground. Without this, all his 
 machinery is useless. Where do we learn the essen- 
 tial distinction between general and specific taxes ? 
 Do the Scriptures teach it ? No such thing. On this 
 subject they are entirely silent. Can it be possible 
 that the Scriptures enjoin paying of taxes without 
 assigning any limitation, while there is a class of 
 taxes, the paying of which it is the duty of Christians 
 to resist even to imprisonment and death ? If this is 
 a duty, the Scriptures are deficient. 
 
 Is the distinction contended for a necessary truth ? 
 It is not. It is a merely nominal distinction as far as 
 the nature of taxation is concerned. There is nothing 
 that can defile the paying of a specific tax, that will 
 not equally apply to a general tax. If it is said that 
 the sinful specific purpose is known ; I reply, that the 
 sinful part of the general purpose is equally known. 
 Dr. Brown knows as well that a part of the general 
 taxes goes to the support of Maynooth, as he does that 
 the Annuity- Tax goes to the support of the ministers 
 of Edinburgh. If it is said, that the particular appli- 
 cation of a general tax is no concern of ours, that go- 
 vernment only is accountable, I reply, that the same 
 is the case with respect to the specific tax. We are 
 no more accountable for the one than for the other. 
 Why are we not accountable for the bad application 
 of any part of a general tax ? Because we have no 
 control over it ; and our approbation of it is not im- 
 plied. And the same considerations exempt us from 
 
47 
 
 any share in the sinful application of a specific tax. 
 If a specific tax is for a sinful particular purpose, the 
 general tax is for a number of specific purposes, each 
 of which belongs to its nature, and may be as clearly 
 defined as the destiny of the specific tax. If one of the 
 avowed purposes of a general tax is sinful, the ge- 
 neral tax is sinful. In like manner, a specific tax 
 may be general with respect to its specific purposes, 
 and though its general object may be good, the whole 
 may be defiled by one sinful provision. In the Poor- 
 Law contemplated for Ireland, for instance, it is said 
 that there will be a provision for poisoning the souls 
 of the inmates of the poor-house, as well as for sup- 
 porting their bodies. Now, I say, that a Christian 
 legislator should reject the whole law, if it contains 
 the obnoxious provision. A Christian should give 
 his life rather than give it his sanction. Such, I think, 
 is obviously the duty of a Christian legislator, but a 
 Christian subject is to obey the law as soon as it is 
 law. Were I to become a convert to the doctrine of 
 Dr. Brown, I must teach my brethren to go to prison 
 and to the scaffold, rather than pay the poor-law tax, 
 a part of which is destined to support false teachers. 
 
 If it is said that to employ a part of a general tax 
 to sinful purposes, is only a misapplication of the tax, 
 I reply, that this is never applicable, except where 
 taxes are applied to purposes not avowed by the im- 
 posers of them. It can be no misapplication of a tax, 
 to apply it to any and to all of the purposes to which 
 taxation is avowedly destined. If gambling-houses 
 were avowedly supported by the state, it would be no 
 misapplication of a general tax to apply a part of it to 
 
48 
 
 this purpose. This would he one of its legitimate pur- 
 poses, however sinful that purpose might he. This 
 plea can serve in no case, except when the general 
 tax is employed not according to the avowed will of 
 the legislature. In such a case, the legislature is as 
 free from blame as the payer of the tax. This dis- 
 tinction, then, on which Dr. Brown has ventured to 
 limit the law of our Lord Jesus Christ, is a mere fig- 
 ment, as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 DR. BROWN S CRITICISM AND REASONING REFUTED. 
 
 Having detected such a multitude of false princi- 
 ples in this work, I might decline any farther notice 
 of it. For the principles being overturned, the doc- 
 trine is without foundation. I shall, however, attend 
 to the criticism and reasoning. 
 
 The word "power"and "powers" Dr. Brown rightly 
 interprets as signifying rulers ; but with respect to the 
 opinion of those who understand it as denoting " ma- 
 gistracy in the abstract," he says that " it is not won- 
 derful, that among thinking men some should have 
 adopted" this meaning. Now, in this I differ so widely 
 from the writer, that I pronounce the opinion referred 
 
49 
 
 to be void of all accurate thinking. The slightest 
 exercise of thought would shew that it is utterly im- 
 possible to be subject to magistracy in the abstract. 
 " It rids the subject/' he tells us, " of considerable 
 difficulty." Yes ; this is its only recommendation. 
 It enables the mind that is disaffected to the doctrine 
 of the Apostle, to evade his meaning. But the eva- 
 sion is so palpably absurd, that it would be a waste of 
 time to refute it. It is self-evidently false. 
 
 In shewing the beauty of this view, the author 
 resolves " magistracy in the abstract," into " the great 
 eternal principles of truth and justice, and order." 
 But the eternal principles of truth and justice, and 
 order, are not magistracy in the abstract. I notice 
 this, to shew that, if there is such confusion of 
 thought and want of accurate discrimination in his 
 reasoning, when he has truth on his side, it is not 
 wonderful that he can so successfully impose on him- 
 self, in supporting his favourite opinions. There was 
 no need here to rest on a balance of conflicting argu- 
 ments, when the error opposed stands refuted by self- 
 evident truth. We may speak of magistracy in the 
 abstract, but how can we be urged to be subject to 
 an abstract thought ? Yet Dr. Macknight can find 
 no other way to enable him to evade the apostolical 
 command in this paragraph. " The higher powers," 
 he tells us, " must signify, not the persons who pos- 
 sess the supreme authority, but the supreme autho- 
 rity itself." Was ever a greater absurdity put into 
 words ? How could they submit to supreme autho- 
 rity, without submitting to those who held supreme 
 authority ? When sensible men condescend to utter 
 
50 
 
 suck absurdity, it is quite obvious that truth can yield 
 them no resource. This is a distinction which cannot 
 exist. Dr. Macknight falls into the like confusion 
 of thought with Dr. Brown ; for he resolves the su- 
 preme authority into " the form of government, which 
 is established in any country." Supreme authority is 
 not a form of government, and a form of government 
 is not " power." Power may belong to any form of 
 government, but power is not a form of government. 
 Power is the attribute of persons, not of forms. 
 
 I fully agree with Dr. Brown as to the reference of 
 the word translated higher. " The higher powers are 
 just the ruling authorities." Yet I do not rest the 
 conclusion on the same ground with the writer. He 
 tells us very truly that the word itself does not deter- 
 mine the question whether all the authorities, su- 
 preme and subordinate, are referred to, or the higher 
 orders of the magistracy, in contradistinction from the 
 lower. He shews correctly that it is applied, ] Pet. 
 ii. 13, 14, to the first, and 1 Tim. ii. 1 — 3, to the 
 second. How, then, can it be determined which of 
 these is the proper meaning, Rom. xiii. 1 ? Why, 
 after telling us that u it is used by the Apostle Peter 
 to distinguish the king or emperor from inferior magis- 
 trates, when he contrasts the king, as supreme, with 
 governors, as them that are sent by him." Dr. Brown 
 tells us : " Yet it is plain that all that follows in the 
 paragraph, is just the unfolding what is contained in 
 the commencing precept ; and it is equally plain, that 
 in the sequel, the Apostle enjoins obedience, not only 
 to the higher authorities in the empire, but to all au- 
 thorities, down to the despised publican or tax- 
 
51 
 
 gatherer. The term, then, is not distinctive of a 
 species in the class of governors, hut descriptive of the 
 whole class of governors." If in 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14, the 
 word in question distinguishes the king from subor- 
 dinate powers, how can the same passage prove that 
 the word designates all powers ? It is, indeed, very 
 plain, that " what follows in the paragraph, is just the 
 unfolding of what is contained in the commencing 
 precept." But what is the commencing precept ? It 
 is not " submit to the king as supreme," but " submit 
 to every ordinance of man." The king, as supreme, 
 is then the first in the specification. It is also equally 
 plain, " that in the sequel, the Apostle enjoins obe- 
 dience, not only to the higher authorities in the em- 
 pire, but to all authorities ;" but it is as plain, that 
 this is not done on the ground that all the authorities 
 are included in the word translated sujoreme. This 
 word is here exclusively applicable to the emperor. 
 The conclusion, then, from 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14, that the 
 word in question has the signification for which the 
 writer contends, is altogether groundless. On the 
 contrary, if the word has the same reference, Rom. 
 xiii. 1, which he shews it to have, 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14, 
 he has refuted himself. Dr. Brown has here committed 
 suicide. When he concludes, " the term, then, is 
 not distinctive of a species in the class of governors, 
 but descriptive of the whole class of governors," so 
 far from arguing legitimately from the authority which 
 he quotes, he argues against its authority, even as it 
 is explained by himself. If the word is applicable in 
 Rom. xiii. 1, in the sense for which he contends, it is 
 not on the ground that it has that sense, 1 Pet. ii. 1 $. 
 
52 
 
 1 4, but on the ground that it has not that sense. This 
 surely is not a happy specimen of exegesis in so 
 learned a professor of exegetical theology. 
 
 Well, perhaps, his next proof is better. What is 
 it ? It is, that " the Apostle is in this case his own 
 best interpreter." If the Apostle interprets himself, 
 his interpretation is indisputable. But how does he 
 in this case interpret himself? Here is the proof. 
 " In the beginning of the second chapter of his First 
 Epistle to Timothy, he exhorts Christians to make 
 i( supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of 
 thanks, for kings and all that are in authority," zv 
 ufttgoxy 0V7(f}V > a phrase of similar origin and meaning 
 with that under consideration." This is very sufficient 
 proof that the word in question has the signification 
 alleged. But it is no proof that it must have it, Rom. 
 xiii. 1 . If the Apostle uses the same word in one 
 place in the first of the meanings, and in another in 
 the second, it cannot be alleged that in any third pas- 
 sage it must necessarily have the second meaning and 
 not the first. As well might an opponent to Dr. 
 Brown take for granted that in the third passage it 
 must have the first meaning, and not the second. 
 When the Apostle uses the word in both significations 
 at different times, he cannot be his own interpreter in 
 this case. Dr. Brown has truth ; but he fails in shew- 
 ing it to be truth, I can give a criterion that will 
 never fail to fix the application of the word. When- 
 ever it designates higher authorities, as distinguished 
 from subordinate authorities, it must have its refer- 
 ence expressed in the context. Whenever it has no 
 such expressed reference, it must have the most ex- 
 
• 53 
 
 tensive reference of which it is capable, referring to 
 the whole body of the people over whom rulers have 
 superiority. Rulers may be considered either as be- 
 ing over all the people, or some rulers may be con- 
 sidered as over other rulers. When the word in 
 question has this limited reference, the limitation 
 must be fixed by the context. 
 
 In the passage quoted above, Dr. Brown considers 
 publicans and tax-gatherers, as included among rulers 
 or powers. This is an outrage on language. The as- 
 sertion would grate on the ear of the most illiterate. 
 Such officers are not powers or rulers, but merely the 
 instruments employed by the powers. 
 
 " No power," says Dr. Brown, " is just equivalent 
 to ' no civil magistrate.' " Well, if this is correct, it 
 establishes a truth utterly at variance with the author's 
 system. It expressly declares that there is no civil 
 magistrate in existence in any country, that is not of 
 God. To prove this, however, is not Dr. Brown's 
 intention ; and, in order to evade it, he labours and 
 distinguishes without a difference. He supposes the 
 term magistrate to be capable of two meanings. 
 " The term," says he, " may, however, mean, either 
 no individual magistrate, or no magistrate, by what- 
 ever name he may be known, or with whatever mo- 
 dification of civil power he may be invested." Now, 
 here is a distinction without a difference. " No indi- 
 vidual magistrate," is supposed to express a different 
 sense from " no magistrate by whatever name he may 
 be known, or with whatever modification of power he 
 may be invested." But the expressions have the 
 same sense, and relate exactly to the same thing. 
 
54 
 
 The only difference is, that the one expresses it more 
 emphatically than the other. " No magistrate, by 
 whatever name he may he known/' signifies neither 
 more nor less than " no individual magistrate ;" and 
 " no individual magistrate/' signifies fully " no magis- 
 trate, by whatever name he may be known, or what- 
 ever modification of power he may possess." This is 
 just the same kind of criticism, as if we should say 
 that the phrase no man, may signify either no indivi- 
 dual man, or no man of whatever name, rank, posses- 
 sion, country, kindred, complexion, age, size, &c. &c. 
 &c. he may be. Should we exhaust by specification 
 all the varieties in the distinctions among men, still we 
 could make no more of it, than what is contained in 
 ts no individual man" or " no man." This is a strange 
 deficiency in metaphysical acumen, in a writer who 
 ventures to limit the unlimited expression of the Holv 
 Spirit, on the sole authority of his metaphysics. " It 
 seems to me probable," says the writer, " that the 
 Apostle's reference is not so much to an individual 
 magistrate, as to all magistrates, by whatever name 
 or modification of civil power they were characterized." 
 Now, where is the difference ? If a thing is asserted 
 of every individual magistrate, is it not asserted of all 
 "magistrates of all descriptions ? " There is no ma- 
 gistrate but of God," is perfectly identical with " all 
 magistrates are of God," with this difference, that the 
 former is the stronger expression. 
 
 What is the use of this distinction ? It is this. By 
 adding to " all magistrates" the words, by whatever 
 name or modification of civil power they may be cha- 
 racterised/' he contrives to turn it from magistrates 
 
55 
 
 to kinds of magistracy. " It was not so much/' says 
 he, " with the individual magistrate,, as with the kind 
 of magistracy that the Roman Christians were in dan- 
 ger of being dissatisfied. " This is mere Indian jug- 
 gling, not criticism. " No magistrate" is not equiva- 
 lent to " no kind of magistracy," though it includes- 
 magistrates of every kind. By this sleight of hand, 
 the assertion is turned from persons to things, — from 
 the powers themselves, to the form or kind of civil 
 government. But this is only the first stage in the 
 process of converting the moth into a butterfly. The 
 kind of magistracy passes immediately into the differ- 
 ent orders of the Roman government. " And the 
 Apostle's statement," says he, " is, The imperial so- 
 vereign of Rome and his subordinate rulers are as really;, 
 though not in the same sense, e of God,' as David and 
 the elders of Israel." And this assertion of the di- 
 vine appointment of all the subordination in the Ro- 
 man government, is supposed to suit the state of mind 
 that is represented as prejudiced, not against any par- 
 ticular subordination, but prejudiced in favour of a par- 
 ticular family appointed by God — the family of David. 
 " They probably would, at any rate, have preferred a 
 descendant of David to Claudius or Nero ; but still 
 the chief ground of that preference was, the first be- 
 longs to an order of kings of direct divine appoint- 
 ment, the other does not." 
 
 The words <e no power," refer neither to kinds of 
 powers nor orders in government, but necessarily ap- 
 ply to every civil ruler under heaven. No tyrant ever 
 seized power till God gave it him. 
 
 In ascertaining the meaning of the phrase " of 
 
56 
 
 God/' we have a wonderful specimen of exegesis. 
 There is nothing bolder or more arbitrary in the 
 school of the Neologians. One would think that 
 there could be little difficulty in forming a notion of 
 the import of this phrase. What savage is so rude as 
 to need explanation ? What child is so weak, as not 
 to be able to comprehend ? When they are told that 
 rulers are " of God/' will they not understand that 
 rulers are appointed by God ? But a thing must be 
 clear indeed, if sophistry and disaffection cannot per- 
 vert it. The meaning of this phrase comes to be a 
 matter of doubt, because the true meaning is not agree- 
 able to carnal wisdom. " It may be said," says Dr. 
 Brown, " of every magistrate that he is of God, by 
 the permission of his providence ; but this lays no 
 foundation for amoral obligation to obedience." Here 
 he admits that what God permits, may be said to be 
 of God, and rejects this meaning here, only as it does 
 not lay a foundation for a moral obligation. But I 
 deny that mere permission can be so designated. 
 What I permit, is not in any sense of me. Others, 
 he tells us, err by excess, and make magistracy a di- 
 rect divine institution, like the Jewish theocracy. 
 But is there no way in which all rulers can be of 
 God's appointment, though neither of these explana- 
 tions should be admitted ? Cannot God put into 
 power by his providence, as well as by his word? 
 When a ruler has received his power from the provi- 
 vidence of God, is he not of God, as truly as if he had 
 been appointed by an express command, like Saul or 
 David ? Is not God said to put down one and to put 
 up another into power ? How is this done, but by 
 
57 
 
 his providence ? He does it as truly as when he 
 commands the thing to be done. As to God's doing 
 the thing, there is no difference whether he does it in 
 the one way or in the other. There is no power but 
 of God ; because it is God in his providence who con- 
 fers power on every man who holds it. 
 
 This, however, does not suit the author's system. 
 He must give a meaning to the phrase that will not 
 so directly discountenance every instance of rebellion. 
 " They are, however, of God," says he, " as they 
 are the result of the principles of the human mind, 
 and the circumstances of nature, which are the work 
 of God, and all of them, so far as they answer the 
 great end of civil government, are the objects of his 
 approbation." Such an exegesis ! Verily, if senses 
 so arbitrary may lawfully be imposed on the Scrip- 
 tures, they are a sealed book to the bulk of Chris- 
 tians. But this explanation is arbitrary and utterly 
 without authority. Is the phrase " of God" ever 
 used in such an acceptation ? WoulgL it ever occur to 
 any writer ? Shew me, Dr. Brown, a single instance 
 in which the phrase in question has such a sense. It 
 is also as absurd as it is arbitrary. On the same prin- 
 ciple, every work of man is a work of God, because 
 man is the creature of God. Besides, he gives a li- 
 mitation to the reason that the power is of God, when 
 the power is said to be of God without exception. 
 There is no power but of God. This applies when 
 the power tyrannizes as much as when he reigns in 
 righteousness. Nebuchadnezzar sinned in doing what 
 God raised him up and appointed him to do. 
 
 In perfect harmony it can be said that a king is ap- 
 
58 
 
 pointed by God, and that he is appointed by man. 
 David was a king by both appointments. There is 
 no difficulty,, then, from the Scripture assertion, that 
 governors are a creation of man. 
 
 Were there any doubt at all with respect to the 
 sense in which the power is of God, it would be en- 
 tirely removed by the next clause of the verse, in 
 which the existing powers are said to be ordained or 
 appointed by God. The power then is of God, in the 
 sense of being ordained or appointed by God. The 4th 
 verse also decides this to be the meaning of the phrase. 
 In this the power is said to be the minister of God. 
 Civil rulers are the ministers of God ; if so, they must 
 be of God's own appointment. Does not God choose 
 his own ministers ? Queen Victoria has been appoint- 
 ed by God as truly as was King Solomon. 
 
 Dr. Brown understands the words, " the powers 
 that be," as in a direct way exclusively descriptive of 
 the existing authorities. For this, however, there is 
 no ground. That the existing Roman authorities are 
 included is most certain ; for what is said of all the 
 existing powers in the world, must be true of the 
 powers of the country in which resided the persons to 
 whom the Apostle wrote. But the words directly 
 refer to all the powers that existed in the whole 
 world. It is " the existing powers," not " the existing 
 powers of Rome." The words are as immediately 
 applicable to Parthia and India as to Italy. Dr. 
 Brown speaks of it as self-evident, that it was the ex- 
 isting powers of Rome. " Surely," says he, " the 
 governors referred to, must be the governors to whom 
 they were subject." Surely, indeed, must the go- 
 
59 
 
 vernors to whom they were subject he included ; 
 but as surely there is no necessity that they should 
 be exclusively referred to. The command may be 
 given in a way that directly includes all governments. 
 And such is the evidence of the expression in the pre- 
 cept. Joseph Wolf will find the command to be the 
 same thing to him in any country of his travels as 
 when he enters the free air of Britain. The Apostle 
 first commands " every soul to be subject to civil 
 authorities." Every soul directly includes every 
 Christian in every country ; for we have seen that the 
 Epistle to the Corinthians,, though addressed by name 
 to the Church at Corinth, was also directly addressed 
 to all " that call on the name of the Lord Jesus." So, 
 likewise must be the Epistle to the Romans. The 
 Apostle speaks not exclusively to the Roman Chris- 
 tians, but to all Christians along with those to whom 
 he immediately wrote. " Higher powers/' are not 
 the higher powers of Rome exclusively, but higher 
 powers without exclusive reference. The ground of 
 this command is then stated, " For there is no power 
 but of God." This is a good reason why the 
 Holy Spirit should enjoin obedience to all civil 
 powers,— every one of them is of God. Then after 
 the negative statement, the same truth is stated par- 
 ticularly with respect to all the existing governments 
 in the world. The thing is very disagreeable to the 
 proud heart of man, and quite contrary to the wisdom 
 of this world, that would rather have obedience to 
 government suspended on conditions of which it 
 should itself be the judge. The Spirit of God, anti- 
 cipating this perverseness, has expressed the doctrine 
 
60 
 
 of obedience in a variety of the strongest forms. No 
 Christian can guiltlessly misunderstand this precept. 
 
 et The powers that be," says Dr. Brown, " have 
 been interpreted by some learned and ingenious men, 
 as equivalent to e the authorities that really are autho- 
 rities/ — the government that deserves the name, — 
 the legitimate power, — the magistrates who possess 
 the qualifications, and prosecute the ends of their 
 office." He justly denies that this can be the mean- 
 ing here, while he admits the signification in other 
 places. I deny most absolutely that ever the parti- 
 ciple of existence, in any connection whatever, signifies 
 legitimate. And when Erasmus Schmidt contends for 
 it, and Raphelius, in certain cases, admits it, there is 
 proof how far learning and ingenuity may be led 
 astray for want of sound principles of interpretation. 
 The examples on which this opinion is founded, are 
 all capable of solution on critical principles, without 
 giving such a signification to the participle of exis- 
 tence. A philosophical acquaintance with language 
 as a science, would have enabled those learned men 
 to see that in such phrases as " authorities that 
 are not authorities," the verb of existence has its 
 usual meaning. Existence is the very thing that is 
 denied to the thing referred to. While they are au- 
 thorities in one view, they are denied as existing in 
 another view. The view on which they do not exist 
 as authorities, may be their want of legitimacy ; but 
 it may be many other things. It might be want of 
 attention, want of awe, want of talents, or want of 
 any thing else, as well as want of title. When we 
 say of a cowardly soldier, that he is not a soldier, we 
 
61 
 
 use the verb of existence in its proper sense. The 
 a iX a ^ ' JZ °' 0<Sa S> then,, of Sophocles, lays a foundation 
 for no such doctrine as that of Smidt. It is from a 
 want of this philosophical acquaintance with the prin- 
 ciples that ascertain the meaning of language, that 
 learned men are so fertile in furnishing a multitude 
 of possible senses for every passage that comes under 
 their criticism. They obtain credit for learning, when 
 they ought to be censured for ignorance. A word or 
 phrase may be ambiguous, but no composition worth 
 a reading can legitimately Jbe capable of a great va- 
 riety of meanings. 
 
 With respect to our translation, " they are ordained 
 of God," Dr. Brown says, " These words are a stftmg 
 translation of the original words, probably as strong a 
 one as the translators, with a due regard to their con- 
 science and scholarship, could give. The words li- 
 terally are, " are arranged or set in order under God." 
 Our version is not a strong translation of the original. 
 A more faithful translation could not possibly be given, 
 according to the common usage of the language. It 
 is mere school-boy criticism to insist that a transla- 
 tion should always trace every feature in the literal 
 meaning of words. Words often lose their original 
 features, and assume others not originally belonging 
 to them. That the word in question is often used to 
 signify to appoint or ordain, cannot be disputed. But 
 I go farther. I tell Dr. Brown, that what he sup- 
 poses, is no part of the most literal meaning of this 
 word. He takes it for granted that the word trans- 
 slated " ordained," always imports the relative ad- 
 justment of parts. But even in its most literal mean- 
 
62 
 
 ing, as applied to external things, arrangement, or the 
 ordering of various parts, is not necessarily implied. 
 The word even as applied to external things, may be 
 applied to the fixing of one thing without any relation 
 to another, as well as to the orderly fixing of a num- 
 ber of different parts with relation to each other. It 
 signifies, as originally applied to external things, to 
 place, or fix in a place, and from this, as applied to 
 objects of mind, to appoint, fix, ordain, &c. It was, 
 indeed, the usual word applied to the arrangement, 
 or drawing up of an army in battle array ; but even 
 in this application, jfce/ft^ or placing, was all that was 
 literally expressed. 
 
 Arrangement or relative fixing of parts was a second- 
 ary idea not originally in the word, but obtained by 
 its application to an army. From this many of its 
 derivatives have the idea, of order, which most literally 
 is not in it. It is unfounded, with many of the lexi- 
 cons, to represent this as a word of military origin. 
 It is not so. It was from its native meaning applied 
 to military placing, and from this, the secondary idea 
 of arrangement has been obtained. In common use, 
 both as to external things, and as to objects of mind, 
 the word is as frequently applied to the fixing of sin- 
 gle objects, as to the orderly fixing of a number in 
 relation. Any one who can glance at a Greek con- 
 cordance will in a moment see the unsoundness of 
 Dr. Brown's criticism. I shall refer only to a few 
 examples from the New Testament. Matt, xxviii. 16, 
 " Then the eleven disciples went into Galilee into a 
 mountain where Jesus had appointed them.'*' What 
 knaves our translators muse have been, who did not 
 
63 
 
 'render it. " where Jesus had arranged them ;" Acts, 
 xxii. 1 0, " Then it shall he told thee of all things 
 which are appointed for thee to do." Here the word 
 applies to God's fixing or ap>pointing of the things 
 that Paul was to do. Acts, xxviii. 23, cc And when 
 they had appointed him a day, there came many to 
 his lodgings," &c. Here the word is applied to the 
 fixing or appointing of a day of meeting. But it is 
 useless to multiply examples, the thing is clear beyond 
 reasonable dispute. Even the very expression is exem- 
 plified by ug v<tt6 tov Qsov nray^zvog s!g ravrrjv rqv jsoj'gav, 
 used by Epictetus in his advice to the person who de- 
 sires to give himself to the study of philosophy. " Con- 
 sider yourself as placed by God in this very situation." 
 Here there is reference to God's appointment or fixing 
 of a man in his employment, and the preposition in 
 question is used in the signification of by. Placed or fixed 
 by God, is not ranged under God. When Dr. Brown, 
 then, arguing from the literal meaning of the 
 terms, asserts that the original imports that the 
 existing Roman magistrates, from the emperor to the 
 aedile, have been arranged, put in order " under God," 
 he employs false criticism. Even literally there is no 
 arrangement in the verb, and by is a very common 
 meaning of the preposition. The Apostle refers to 
 the appointment of the rulers, not to the arrangement 
 of their subordination. 
 
 But has not Dr. Brown himself said, — " We ap- 
 prehend the Apostle's assertion is, the Roman magis- 
 trates are appointed by God to rule over you, and the 
 other subjects of the empire." Is not this the very- 
 idea of our translators, that rulers are appointed by 
 
64 
 
 God to rule over their subjects ? If this is the mean- 
 ing, why is it transformed into " are arranged or set 
 in order under God." Appoint is not to arrange or set 
 in order ; under God is not by God. If the meaning 
 is that rulers " are appointed by God," the meaning 
 cannot be that God has arranged the subordination 
 of rulers. Dr. Brown's exposition is as inconsistent 
 with itself, as it is opposed to truth. He brings the 
 assertion to signify that God has arranged the differ- 
 ent orders of the Roman magistracy, yet he tells us 
 that the Apostle's assertion is, " the Roman magis- 
 trates are appointed by God to rule." 
 
 But if all the subordination of magistrates in the 
 Roman empire was arranged by God, does not this 
 imply that they were appointed by God ? Did he ar- 
 range them without appointing them ? But here 
 we have another mystery. When it is asserted that 
 God arranged this subordination, it does not mean 
 that he arranged it, but that it arose out of cir- 
 cumstances of his arrangement. " They have origi- 
 nated in circumstances of his arranging, and as the 
 best government which, all things considered, the in- 
 habitants of the wide regions included in the Roman 
 empire, can bear," &c. Can truth and sobriety be 
 guilty of such abuse of language ? In this way a man 
 may say and unsay any thing. God appoints and 
 does not appoint, — he arranges and does not arrange ! 
 Human language does not allow us to say that God 
 arranges what merely arises out of circumstances of 
 his arrangement. However, if the author takes away 
 what essentially belongs to the assertion, he makes 
 ample amends by giving us a number of other things 
 
65 
 
 which do not at all belong to it. In what part of the 
 Apostle's assertion has the author found that the Ro- 
 man government was the best, which, all things consi- 
 dered, the subjects could bear? This is apocryphal 
 Scripture. Besides, this apocryphal addition gives a 
 false ground of submission. It grounds on the good- 
 ness of the government ; whereas the Apostle grounds 
 on the fact, that all governors are of God, without re- 
 spect to the quality of their government. All of them, 
 so far, are for the good of society, that they are not a 
 terror to good works, but to the evil. 
 
 Again, Dr. Brown grounds submission, not only on 
 a consideration not mentioned in the passage, but 
 which itself is not a truth. How does it appear that 
 any people could not bear a perfectly wise and right- 
 eous government ? It has often been said that na- 
 tions very licentious in their manners could not bear 
 liberty. This appears to have been swimming through 
 the author's head, when he made the assertion refer- 
 red to. But these .are two very different things. A 
 very licentious^people may not be fit to enjoy liberty. 
 This is a good reason for the existence of single des- 
 potism ; but it is no reason at all that despotism 
 should not be both wise and righteous. A wise and 
 righteous autocrat is surely as fit to govern a nation, 
 in any circumstances whatever, as a foolish and tyran- 
 nical one. So far from being less fit, in every re- 
 spect, he has the advantage. Men may not be able to 
 bear liberty, but they may bear absolute power, wisely 
 and righteously administered. Why then does God 
 send foolish or tyrannical rulers at any time to a na- 
 tion ? For the very purpose of punishing them, not 
 E 
 
66 
 
 because foolish or tyrannical rulers are, in certain cir- 
 cumstances, more for the happiness of the people. A 
 Trajan is better fitted to give happiness to an empire 
 than is a Domitian ; but a Domitian may fit the pur- 
 pose of the Sovereign Ruler of the world better than 
 a Trajan would do. Submission to the Roman govern- 
 ment, then, could not be grounded on the considera- 
 tion that it was as good as the people could bear. It 
 is grounded on the consideration that the government 
 was of God's appointment, though the emperor, 
 whether Claudius or Nero, was both tyrannical and 
 foolish. 
 
 Dr. Brown is equally critical in expounding the 
 compound word rendered '.* resisteth." " Disorders," 
 says he, i{ throws into confusion this arrangement." 
 This is' a most unfortunate criticism. The writer 
 criticises without knowledge, and even without think- 
 ing. Even in military things, the word does not sig- 
 nify to disorder, or throw the enemy's ranks into con- 
 fusion. An army may be drawn- up in line of battle 
 to oppose another army drawn up opposite to it ; 
 when, instead of disordering the enemy, it may itself 
 be disordered and routed. The compound word, in 
 all military application, has no reference to the de- 
 rangement of the opposite army, but to the arrange- 
 ment of the army as drawn up against another army. 
 Instead of denoting the derangement of order, the 
 compound word refers to arrangement as much as the 
 simple verb. The effect of the preposition is not to 
 make the verb imply derangement, but arrangement 
 opposite to some other arrangement. 
 
 What is still more unfortunate, the writer is criti- 
 
67 
 
 cising on the verb in question, but is applying that criti- 
 cism to another word. Any one who opens a Greek 
 Testament will see that the word that corresponds to 
 " resisteth," in the phrase " resisteth the power," is 
 not the same with that which corresponds to it in the 
 phrase " resisteth the ordinance of God." Now, it is 
 the phrase " resisteth the ordinance of God," that the 
 author expounds on the supposition that it contains 
 the other verb. The verb to which the criticism ap- 
 plies can lay no claim to the signification of arrange- 
 ment It is compounded of the preposition signifying 
 opposite, and the verb which signifies to stand or 
 place. There is, then, no room for bringing into the 
 signification of the phrase either arrangement or dis- 
 order. The word signifies to oppose, or resist. Had 
 the criticism been properly applied, the passage would 
 have translated thus : "■ He who deranges the power, 
 resisteth or opposes the ordinance of God." Now, 
 what is the meaning of deranging the power ? Can 
 a single power be deranged ? It may be resisted. 
 Besides, it is only on the ground that riders are or- 
 dained or appointed by God, that to resist them, is to 
 resist the ordinance of God. If God merely made the 
 arrangement without appointing the powers, then the 
 power might be opposed without opposing the arrange- 
 ment. A man might answer, I resist the power, be- 
 cause of its injustice, but I am quite satisfied with 
 the arrangement. The arrangement, then, cannot be 
 the thing said to be appointed by God, as the ap- 
 pointment of it by God makes it resistance of God to 
 resist it. 
 
 Were it necessary, I might trace the word in com- 
 
68 
 
 bination with all the prepositions, to shew that it 
 equally refers to single objects, and to different things 
 in arrangement. Arrangement is not in the word in 
 its most literal acceptation ; and those persons who, 
 in every occurrence of the word, think themselves 
 under obligation to trace in it the idea of order in 
 different parts, have not yet learned to criticise. The 
 very word tax comes from it as denoting a fixed sum 
 appointed as a duty. 
 
 Our unfortunate translators receive an indignant 
 rebuke from our author for the word " damnation." 
 He suspects that they employed this word from 
 courtly complaisance to King James. And I may sup- 
 pose, with as good reason, that it was to please this 
 monarch that they translated the same word in the 
 same way, 1 Cor. xi. 29. Far away be every such 
 insinuation with respect to these good and worthy 
 men, to whom every Christian, who speaks the Eng- 
 lish language, is under so deep obligations. In the 
 latter occurrence, the word, without doubt, refers to 
 those chastisements with which God visited his people, 
 for their abuse of his ordinance. And there is no 
 reason that it should not have the same meaning here. 
 But whatever judgment it may refer to, it is undoubt- 
 edly judgment from God. And^ even though it in- 
 cludes judgment from God through the earthly powers, 
 it is not, as Dr. Brown supposes, to be confined to 
 this. God may punish this sin not only by the magis- 
 trate, but by a thousand other means. I have no 
 doubt that what Dr. Brown suffers from the govern- 
 ment for refusing to pay this tax, will be the least 
 part of his afflictions. God will avenge his own law, 
 
69 
 
 and in one way or other it will be a bitter thing for 
 any of his servants to resist his law, and especially to 
 lead others to resist it. If he shall be called the least 
 in the kingdom of heaven who shall have disannulled 
 one of the least of Christ's commandments, what shall 
 he be called who virtually, by his perverse exegesis, 
 disannuls the grand law of Christ, Rom. xiii. 1 — 7 ? 
 The present turn that politics have taken, has made 
 his doctrine popular. The Reviews and periodical 
 press may fill the land with his praise as a martyr for 
 religious liberty ; but if he is rebelling against God ; 
 and of this there can be no doubt, if the Scriptures 
 are the word of God, he will not with impunity teach 
 the people of the Lord to evade his commandments. 
 His production is a forcing of language from first to 
 last. 
 
 Dr. Brown thinks it highly important, in the expo- 
 sition of this paragraph, to perceive what he calls its 
 logical construction and division. The common view, 
 which he rejects, is, — " Civil government is a divine 
 ordinance," ver. 1, 2 ; civil government is intended 
 for promoting human welfare, ver. 3 ; disobedience 
 will involve in punishment, 4, 5." The true division, 
 according to him, is, — " The command is contained 
 in the first clause. The first ground of obedience is 
 illustrated in the last half of the first verse, and the 
 first half of the second verse. The second ground of 
 obedience is stated in the second half of the second 
 verse ; and its illustration reaches to the end of the 
 fourth verse ; while the fifth verse is a short recapi- 
 tulation of the whole argument." Notwithstanding 
 the authorities which he produces in support of his 
 
70 
 
 view, it does not commend itself to my acceptance. 
 Its condemnation is written on its very forehead. 
 The slightest inspection of the second verse may con- 
 vince any impartial reader, that the latter part of the 
 verse is founded on what immediately precedes, and 
 is, by its phraseology, indissolubly clasped to it. The 
 word avQsgri/iorsg rests on dW&^xsv, " resisteth the ordi- 
 nance of God, and they that resist" This phraseolo- 
 gy binds the verse together by a connexion that eter- 
 nally forbids separation. The latter part is no new 
 ground of the command, but is an observation founded 
 on what immediately precedes, shewing the conse- 
 quence of the resistance mentioned. This is quite de- 
 cisive. But many other reasons forbid this division. 
 The clause beginning ot hs oui6s$7)it6teg is evidently an 
 appendix to what precedes in the verse, as the clause 
 beginning at ds ourfai l^xaicu, is an appendix to what 
 precedes in the first verse. It has no appearance of 
 commencing a new ground of the duty inculcated, co- 
 ordinate with " for there is no power but of God.'* 
 The third verse is not a mere illustration of the last 
 clause of the second. It extends to more than the 
 punishment of resistance or disobedience. The ne- 
 gative assertion, that rulers are not a terror to good 
 works, is different from the positive one, that they are 
 a terror to evil works, and an assertion equally impor- 
 tant. Besides, the assertion that they who do good 
 shall have praise, is still different from both the others. 
 That rulers are ministers of God for good to Chris- 
 tians, is surely as important as that they are ministers 
 to punish what is evil. 
 
 Both this division and the common one appear to 
 
71 
 
 be incorrect, though I set little value on the authority 
 of any mode of dividing, for settling the meaning of 
 the law in question. We must first accurately under* 
 stand the meaning of the separate parts of the para- 
 graph, before we can discover the connexion, depend- 
 ence, and progress of the thoughts of the writer. Be 
 this as it may, the division that appears most obvious 
 is this. The first clause of the first verse contains 
 the law of Christ, enjoining obedience to civil rulers. 
 The rest of the verse in two clauses, gives the ground 
 of this injunction, or shews why God enjoins obe- 
 dience. He enjoins obedience to rulers, because 
 rulers are his own appointment, — an observation na- 
 turally resulting from this follows. If rulers are God's 
 appointment, to oppose them is to oppose the appoint- 
 ment of God. This enforces the duty by the guilt of 
 disobedience. He that opposes civil rulers, not only 
 opposes them, but also opposes God's ordinance. 
 Another observation appended to this, shews the con- 
 sequence of disobeying this ordinance of God. " They 
 who resist shall receive," &c. The third verse com- 
 mences with an observation, exhibiting a fact that 
 proves that rulers are of God, and which anticipates 
 an objection that was likely to occur. Rulers are not 
 a terror to good works but to the evil. The assertion 
 that civil rulers, without any exception, are appointed 
 by God, would appear strange, when it was consi- 
 dered that they were heathens, and tyrants, and per- 
 secutors. But heathens, and tyrants, and persecutors 
 as they were, they are proved to be of >>God by their 
 being a terror not to good works, but to the evil. 
 With all their wickedness, they uphold the great prin* 
 
72 
 
 ciples on which society is founded, and on which only 
 it can subsist. The Christian, then, has no reason to 
 dread them ; for he does not practice the evil works 
 which they punish, and he does the good works 
 which they approve. This verse shews the reasona- 
 bleness of the command of submission to government. 
 As if the Apostle had said, do not think this com- 
 mand a hard saying ; for rulers are not a terror to 
 good i€orks, but to the evil. If you wish to avoid 
 incurring the displeasure of rulers, do that which is 
 good, and then, instead of being punished, you will 
 have commendation from them. 
 
 The fourth versegives an additional reason why Chris- 
 tians should not think civil government a grievance, 
 but a blessing. To the Christian he is the minister of 
 God for good. Instead, then, of submitting with re- 
 luctance, he ought to submit with pleasure and grati- 
 tude. Indeed, civil government is more for the ad- 
 vantage of Christians, than for that of others. They 
 need its protection more than any other class of men. 
 Were it not for the protection of government, Chris- 
 tians could not live even in the countries where there 
 are the proudest boasts of enlargement of mind with 
 respect to civil liberty. 
 
 The remainder of this verse warns the Christian 
 what he may expect from civil rulers, if he does what 
 is evil. The minister of God bears not the sword in 
 vain. Not only have rulers power to punish what is 
 evil, but the providence of God takes care to make 
 this power effectual. It is wonderful to consider how 
 the providence of God defeats the best concerted plans 
 of rebellion, and brings the disturbers of society under 
 
73 
 
 the grasp of the magistrate. Were it not that civil 
 government is an ordinance of God, it is not possible 
 that it could subsist. 
 
 Dr. Brown grounds his division on the necessity of 
 having but two reasons exhibited in the previous con- 
 text, to correspond to the summing up in the fifth 
 verse. But it is not fact, that the fifth verse repre- 
 sents the Apostle as summing up all that he had pre- 
 viously alleged. Indeed, according to Dr. Brown's 
 own division, the fifth verse does not sum up the 
 whole contents of the preceding verses. It entirely 
 omits what is said as to the advantage of civil magis- 
 tracy. However, were it necessary to make the fifth 
 verse sum up every thing contained in the previous 
 context, this could be done more easily according to 
 my division than according to his. The assertion 
 with respect to rulers, as not being a terror to good 
 works, and being a terror to the evil, and their being 
 ministers of God for the good of Christians, would 
 come under conscience, as the rest would come under 
 wrath. But there is no evidence at all that the fifth 
 verse is a summing up of every particular previously 
 brought forward. The two grounds of obedience on 
 which the necessity of submission is rested in the fifth 
 verse are, that governors are God's appointment, and 
 therefore ought, for conscience sake, to be obeyed, 
 and that they will punish the disobedient, and there- 
 fore ought to be obeyed for fear of their wrath. 
 
 The assertion in the beginning of the 4th verse, 
 Dr. Brown makes to refer directly and primarily to 
 the Roman rulers, and to other rulers it is applicable 
 only as far as they act in accordance with their office. 
 
74 
 
 This, however, is a false conclusion from the use 
 of the article. The use of the article here is to mark 
 renewed mention of the subject. It undoubtedly im- 
 plies reference, — reference, however, not to the Ro- 
 man rulers, but rulers as first mentioned in the begin- 
 ning of the chapter. These rulers are rulers inde- 
 finitely, — all rulers in every country where Christians 
 might be. Had the Apostle commenced with the 
 Roman rulers expressly mentioned, then, doubtless, 
 the reference of the article in the 4th verse would 
 have been to them. But in the first mention of civil 
 rulers, the Apostle speaks of them without peculiar 
 reference, as applying equally to all the rulers in the 
 whole world. 
 
 Dr. Brown gives another reason. The Apostle, 
 he says, is stating their duty to their governors, " He 
 is a minister of God to thee," &c. Very true ; it is 
 to their rulers, but it is not exclusively to their rulers 
 at that time and in that country, but includes their 
 rulers, should they go to other countries not in the 
 empire. In Parthia or India would not the rulers be 
 their rulers while in the country ? Besides, as I have 
 shewn from the authority of the inscription of the 1st 
 Epistle to the Corinthians, to thee is not exclusively 
 to thee of the city .of Rome, but to thee of any part of 
 the empire, and to thee in any country under heaven. 
 If to thee confines the address to those mentioned in 
 the inscription, then it is confined, not to the Chris- 
 tians of the empire, but to the Christians of the city 
 of Rome. The subjects in other parts of the empire, 
 or even in other parts of Italy, could not know from 
 this that the Roman government was the minister of 
 
God to them. They must learn this, as Dr. Brown 
 says, we must learn, with respect to our government, 
 indirectly by a consideration of circumstances. When 
 this epistle came into the hands of the other churches, 
 they must learn from circumstances what the Roman 
 government was to them. 
 
 Again, Dr. Brown makes this absolutely and un- 
 conditionally apply to the Roman power, and to all 
 others only so far as they act in accordance with their 
 office. But, according to his doctrine, even with re- 
 spect to the Roman powers, this is a voucher for the 
 present moment only. The next day, " the powers" 
 might act in such a manner as not at all to be con- 
 sidered the minister of God. Even from the time 
 that the Apostle's letter was written and the time 
 that it was received, the character of the government 
 might have been so changed, that it might have been 
 the duty of Christians to rebel instead of submitting 
 with gratitude as to the ordinance of God. There is 
 no end to the absurdities contained in this doctrine. 
 
 The assertion, however, does not apply peculiarly 
 to the Roman government, but is applicable to every 
 government. The greatest despot on earth is the 
 minister of God for good to Christians. The go- 
 vernment of Rome was a cruel despotism, yet Paul 
 often experienced that it was to him the minister of 
 God for good. Even had the assertion been made di- 
 rectly with respect to the Roman powers, it must 
 equally apply to all others. A more cruel despotism 
 can never arise. I may be told of the excellence of 
 the laws. I admit the fact. But the emperor was 
 
76 
 
 bound by no law. He was a furious wild beast tbat 
 preyed upon every thing that his caprice demanded. 
 
 " The only way/' says Dr. Brown's paraphrase of 
 the Apostle's words, " in which you can expect to 
 live safely under such a government as the Roman, is, 
 by quietly submitting to the laws." What a com- 
 ment ! Suck a government as the Roman ! What in- 
 genuity can extract this meaning from the words, 
 " the rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the 
 evil ?" What daring forgery is this ! To make the 
 duty of submission rest on a prudential consideration 
 of the strength of the empire, is as truly forgery as it 
 would be to pass a one pound note for a hundred pounds. 
 Every government has power to be a terror to evil 
 works. If a kingdom were of no greater extent than 
 a parish, it would have equal power to punish diso- 
 bedient subjects as the Roman empire had. What 
 sort of morality is this that is put into the mouth of 
 the Apostle Paul ? It is morality worthy only of the 
 school of Loyola and the Jesuits. Obey, because the 
 government is strong. Does it not follow, disobey 
 when you can do so with impunity. 
 
 To the law of submission to civil rulers, Dr. Brown 
 makes three classes of exceptions. In exposing his 
 first principles, I have shewn that his two last classes 
 are not proper exceptions. I now observe, that in la- 
 bouring to prove his first class, he labours to prove a 
 self-evident truth, which neither needs nor admits 
 proof by reasoning. That God cannot command his 
 people to disobey himself, is a necessary truth, the 
 contrary of which is a contradiction ; for it implies 
 
77 
 
 that God commands and forbids the same thing. It 
 cannot be made clearer than it is in the bare state- 
 ment. Yet Dr. Brown labours this point with the 
 whole strength of his metaphysics. The other two 
 classes that need proof, he fails in proving. This 
 class, which neither needs nor admits proof, he 
 darkens by spurious metaphysical refinement. cc The 
 relation," says he, " which subsists between man and 
 God is earlier, and closer, and more permanent than 
 that which can exist between subjects and magis- 
 trates." If any one is so dull as not to comprehend 
 the ground on which God is to be obeyed rather than 
 man, surely this reasoning will enlighten him. It 
 seems the author has adopted this splendid reasoning 
 from the celebrated Robert Hall, whom he quotes in 
 a note. " The relation," says that great man, 
 " which subsists between man and his Maker is prior 
 to the relation between magistrates and subjects. It 
 is a more important relation, since all the good a crea- 
 ture can enjoy is derived from it. It differs, too, 
 from every other, in that it is immutable, perpetual, 
 eternal. A man may or may not be the member of a 
 civil community, but he is always the creature of God. 
 For these reasons, political duties, or those which re- 
 sult from the relations of the subject to the prince, 
 must, in their nature, be subservient to the religious. 
 When the commands of a civil superior interfere 
 with those which we conscientiously believe to be the laws 
 of God, submission to the former must be criminal ; 
 for the two obligations are not equipollent, but the 
 former is eternal, invariable, and paramount to every 
 other. ( Whether it be right/ said the Apostles, ' to 
 
78 
 
 obey God or man, judge ye.' " What is all this re- 
 finement, but a splendid way of saying nothing. Had 
 I been quoting it, all the celebrity of the great author 
 could not have restrained me from calling it a fine 
 specimen of metaphysical rant. All this pile of rea- 
 soning is a mountain of froth. It is an attempt learn- 
 edly to prove what is self-evident, and which is clearer 
 in the statement, than it possibly can be in any sup- 
 posed arguments. The Apostles, instead of labouring 
 to prove this truth by reasoning, barely submit it, as 
 self-evident, to the understanding of their hearers. 
 " Whether it is right to obey God or man, judge ye." 
 But this loose declamation of the Apostles will not 
 satisfy Robert Hall and Dr. Brown. They will give 
 us solid work. They will shew us that it is " for 
 these reasons" we ought to obey God rather than man. 
 They Avail give us proof for axioms. Like Descartes, 
 they will not believe their own existence, till they can 
 prove it by a train of reasoning. Well, what is the 
 proof proposed to establish this axiom ? " The rela- 
 tion which subsists betwixt man and his Maker is prior 
 to the civil relation between magistrate and subjects." 
 Surely they must be obstinate unbelievers who do not 
 yield to this proof. Does any one, in apprehending 
 the evidence of the assertion, that we ought to obey 
 God rather than man, ever think on the fact of this 
 priority ? Has it any thing at all to do in producing 
 the conviction ? Besides, is every prior relation ne- 
 cessarily inferior to every subsequent one ? The re- 
 lation of a man to his parents, is prior to his relation to 
 his wife ; yet he must leave father and mother, and 
 cleave to his wife. The relation of a daughter to her 
 
79 
 
 parents, is prior to her relation to her husband ; yet 
 she must obey her husband rather than her father. 
 
 It is also, we are told, a more important relation. 
 The relation of a son to his father is more important 
 than his relation to his master ; yet a slave, or even a 
 free servant, must obey his master rather than his fa- 
 ther. The mere fact of receiving more good from one 
 than from another, is no proof that we ought to obey 
 him from whom we have received the greater good. 
 The man who commands us to do wrong, may have 
 done us more good than the man who urges us to do 
 what is rio;ht. Are we then to do the wron» ? The 
 Creator has a right to the obedience of his creatures, 
 independently of the good which he bestows on them. 
 
 There is still another reason : " It differs, too, from 
 every other, in that it is immutable, perpetual, eter- 
 nal." Yes, and he might have added, in the language 
 of another sage, "and itis separated from itbythe whole 
 diameter of being." Does any man ever think of this, 
 when he is weighing the evidence of the truth that we 
 ought to obey God rather than man ? Does he ever 
 think of putting such metaphysics into the balance ? Does 
 his mind balance between conviction and doubt till he 
 thinks of the eternity of the relation between him and 
 God ? But the ground of the obligation does not entirely 
 rest even on the eternity of this relation. Were God 
 about to annihilate any of his creatures, it would be 
 their duty to obey him as long as their existence is 
 continued. This profound reasoning, then, is nothing 
 but learned nonsense. It is very possible to speak pomp- 
 ously in proof of self-evident truth, but it is not possible 
 to avoid speaking foolishly. Were there no better proof 
 
80 
 
 for obeying God rather than the civil magistrate, than 
 that which is alleged by Robert Hall and Dr. Brown, 
 the duty would remain unproved for ever. If, ac- 
 cording to Dr. D wight, as quoted by Dr. Brown, 
 " whether we should obey God rather than man, can 
 never be seriously made a question by common sense 
 any more than by piety," why do these men labour in 
 proving what common sense cannot doubt ? 
 
 When the Apostles were called in question for dis- 
 obeying the command of man, opposed to the com- 
 mand of God, they offered no proof by argument ; 
 but left the matter as self-evident to the judgment of 
 their hearers. But Mr. Hall and Dr. Brown will go 
 to the bottom of truth, and will prove by reasoning, 
 that which is self-evident. — " For these reasons," &c. 
 " The two obligations," we are told, " are not equi- 
 pollent." Very sounding phraseology certainty, and 
 very edifyiDg. The man who is utterly at a loss to 
 feel the force of the evidence in the Apostle's state- 
 ment, " Whether it is right to obey God or man, 
 judge ye," will have his darkness dispelled, when he 
 is told that " the two obligations are not equipollent," 
 This, I suppose, is an example of ff well-interpreted 
 Scripture." But in such a case, instead of there be- 
 ing two obligations differing in power, there is but 
 one obligation. There is no obligation at all to obey 
 man, when he commands us to disobey God. There is 
 no need to have recourse to the balance, to determine 
 the weight of contrary obligations. 
 
 Dr. Brown justly observes, that though the verb 
 translated "pay ye," may grammatically be translated, 
 " ye pay/' yet that translation is an unnatural one. 
 
81 
 
 Indeed, it is preposterous to suppose that the Apos- 
 tle first alleges as a reason for rendering personal obe- 
 dience, that they were already in the habit of con- 
 scientiously paying tribute, when in the subsequent 
 verse he enjoins the duty of tribute as specifically as 
 he did the duty of obedience. Besides, " for this 
 cause ye pay tribute also" takes it for granted that 
 they were already in the habit of rendering both tri- 
 bute and obedience for the same reason, instead of urg- 
 ing obedience on the foundation that they already, for 
 that reason, paid tribute. If even is chosen as the 
 translation of the Greek particle, instead of also, this 
 supposes that tribute is much worse, as a grievance, 
 than is personal obedience, the contrary of which is 
 quite obvious. Some critics appear to value them- 
 selves in proportion as they can plausibly deviate from 
 the common translation. Every deviation appears to 
 them an excellence. If ever criticism becomes a sci- 
 ence, the labours of such men will be held in the 
 most perfect contempt. True learning and true cri- 
 ticism seldom find reason to differ materially from the 
 common version, or from the common reader ; and 
 their aim is not so much to discover truth, as to refute 
 the evasions of sophistry. The aim of modern criti- 
 cism seems to be, to try how many different meanings 
 may possibly or plausibly be taken out of the same 
 passage, and its chief glory lies in creating confusion. 
 The next point to settle is, the reference of the 
 phrase translated " for this cause." For what cause ? 
 Dr. Brown refers it to what immediately precedes, 
 namely, " not only for wrath, but for conscience sake." 
 It is not necessary, however, that the aspect of the 
 
phrase should be towards what immediately precedes. 
 The reference is often found a good distance in the van. 
 The reference here is evidently to the second verse. 
 They are enjoined to pay tribute for the same cause 
 that they are enjoined to render obedience ; and that 
 cause is, " the powers are of God." If God has ap- 
 pointed them, they must be obeyed in the imposition 
 of taxes, as well as in personal submission. To this 
 it is absolutely confined by what follows. The words 
 which succeed, give the same reason in other expres- 
 sions : " For they are the ministers of God." We 
 have a quite similar instance in 1 Cor. vii. 6. " I 
 speak this," &c. What, did he speak by permission 
 and not by commandment ? Not what immediately 
 precedes the sixth verse, but what is contained in the 
 second verse. " Let every man have his own wife." 
 This, in the sixth verse, looks back to the second 
 verse for its antecedent, and the thing permitted, but 
 not commanded, is marriage. 
 
 Dr. Brown gives a learned dissertation on Roman 
 taxation ; but, on this subject, it is learning thrown 
 away. We have nothing to do with the peculiarity 
 of Roman taxes in expounding this passage. The 
 Apostle speaks not exclusively of the taxes of the 
 Roman empire, but of taxes without peculiar reference 
 to place or time. As being in the empire, it was a 
 command to those addressed, to pay the taxes of the 
 empire ; but the command is contained in such 
 phraseology, that, should they afterwards live in 
 countries beyond the limits of the empire, it is equally 
 applicable. And it was not a command merely to 
 the Christians of Rome, but a command to all that 
 
m 
 
 call on the name of the Lord Jesus. The Apostle 
 does not say : " For this cause, pay ye the taxes of 
 the empire ;" but, " pay ye taxes," which applies to 
 Britain and to China as directly as to Rome. He 
 afterwards divides taxes into two classes, which is 
 equally applicable to Rome, and to other countries. 
 However, had the Apostle spoken directly and ex- 
 clusively of the Roman taxes, could any simple-minded 
 Christian need any other authority to enjoin him to 
 pay the taxes of his own country ? 
 
 The " ministers of God" here, Dr. Brown makes 
 either " the magistrates who imposed the taxes, or 
 the officers who collected the taxes." They can be 
 neither. Must they not be " the powers." " The 
 rulers," of whom he is speaking in the previous con- 
 text ? The text can admit no other nominative case 
 to the substantive verb, than the " rulers," of whom 
 the writer is treating. All others are intruders, and 
 none of them must be allowed to set a foot on this 
 preoccupied ground. Should the verb be obliged to 
 look for its nominative case altogether out of the 
 text, when the text itself so clearly supplies it with 
 one most appropriate ? Was not the " power" pre- 
 viously called ©sou diuKovog; why then should he not be 
 the person who is here called Xs/rxgyog Qsou ? Can 
 any one be at a loss to recognise the same man under 
 these different names ? 
 
 What is the "very thing" in which the persons spoken 
 of are said to be continually employed ? It is obvi- 
 ously the ministry of God in civil rule. The ante- 
 cedent to which avrb rxro refers, is ministry of 
 God, taken, as grammarians would say, out of " mi- 
 
84 
 
 nisters of God." Though grammarians have made a 
 rule that seems to justify this kind of syntax, I con- 
 sider it a blemish in composition. It is, however, 
 very common ; and the Holy Spirit never aiFects the 
 elegancies of fine writing. 
 
 " This very thing/' Dr. Brown says, " was the 
 collection of tribute, and God's ministers attending on 
 this very thing were the officers employed in the col- 
 lections." But no syntax can bring out this interpre- 
 tation. The text knows nothing either of tax-collec- 
 tors, or of the collection of taxes. The antecedent 
 must be found in " ministers of God." The "ministers 
 of God" are evidently the " powers" of whom the 
 Apostle was treating. The very thing, then, to which 
 they constantly attend, is not the collection of the 
 taxes, but the ministry of God in the affairs of go- 
 vernment. " The very thing" must be something 
 either mentioned, or necessarily implied in the text. 
 But this can be no other than the ministry of the mi- 
 nisters mentioned. Besides, Dr. Brown's interpreta- 
 tion supposes that all the taxes were for the behoof 
 of the tax-collectors. 
 
 " This interpretation," says Dr. Brown, " is sup- 
 ported by the fact, that in the following verse the dif- 
 ferent orders of magistrates are specified ; and the 
 Christians are required to give what, by the arrange- 
 ment of the constitution, are due to each of them." 
 Slender support indeed ! There is no such fact. The 
 following verse does not specify the different orders 
 of magistrates. 
 
 Dr. Tholuck mentions Koppe's way of confining 
 the word to tax-gatherers. Koppe understands the 
 
85 
 
 word translated " ministers" in the narrow sense of 
 tax-gatherers. " Tax-gatherers are divinely appoint- 
 ed ; and it is for this very business that they are 
 made." With respect to this translation. Dr. Tholuck 
 observes, that " much may be said in its favour." Yet 
 as Xsirxgyog, without farther addition, cannot well be 
 equivalent to rsXojvrig, he prefers the common transla- 
 tion. Dr. Tholuck in this has truth, but he has very 
 weakly defended it. He ought to have said — not 
 that the word cannot well have such a signification, 
 but that it cannot at all have it. The word Xsirxgyog 
 cannot designate a tax-gatherer more than it design 
 nates a hangman. Even granting that tax-gatherers 
 could properly be called ©sou Xsinsgyoi, public ministers 
 of God, in the predicate, they could not be so called 
 in the subject of a proposition. Had they been men- 
 tioned by an appropriate name in the subject, any 
 thing whatever may grammatically be asserted of 
 them in the predicate. But when mentioned as the 
 subject of the proposition, they must be designated 
 by their appropriate name. Even the high powers 
 of whom the Apostle is treating, could not be desig- 
 nated by this term in the subject, though they are so 
 in the predicate. " The powers" are ministers of 
 God, but the term the yninisters of God could not be 
 employed to designate ce the powers," because this is 
 not one of their appropriate names ; and because it 
 belongs more commonly to other ministers of God. If, 
 as Koppe supposes, "hsirsgyog, is to be taken as the 
 subject, and " of God," as the predicate, the former 
 must appropriately designate tax-gatherers. Instead 
 of there being much in favour of such an exposition, 
 
86 
 
 no man acquainted with the philosophy of language 
 could ever have suggested it. It is in this way that 
 the word of God is torn and ahused by the ignorance 
 of met, under the character of eminently learned 
 critics. No meaning can he so clear that criticism 
 of this stamp may not find an evasion — no meaning 
 can he so absurd or forced, but it may make preten- 
 sions to be the dictate of the Spirit. Modern criticism 
 can find nothing definite in its text. Its ambition is 
 to shew how many meanings may legitimately be ex- 
 tracted by ingenuity. A small superiority of proba- 
 bility is all that the meaning preferred can claim over 
 its numerous rivals ; and it would be arrogant to ex- 
 press confidence of conviction. In fact, to the ques- 
 tion, What is Biblical criticism ? The answer may 
 be, — It is the art of expounding the words of the 
 Hoi)' - Spirit, so as to evade his meaning in every thing 
 offensive to human wisdom. 
 
 In the precept, " render therefore to all their dues," 
 ** the term all," says Dr. Brown, " is to be under- 
 stood as expressive of a limited universality." He 
 might as well speak of an unlimited twenty. There 
 is no limited universality, more than there is a uni- 
 versal particularity. If he means that the term all, 
 applied to persons, does not always imply that every 
 one of the whole human race is referred to, he has 
 not expressed his thought ; and had he expressed it, 
 it would have been nothing to his purpose. The refe- 
 rence of the term must always be ascertained by its 
 situation ; bat it is as truly universal in its reference, 
 when it refers to ten, as when it refers to every indivi- 
 dual of the human race. When the Apostle says, 
 
87 
 
 :< These all died in faith ;" the assertion is as really 
 universal, as when he says, u All have sinned." Even 
 in Dr. Brown's own exposition, the word all is taken 
 in its whole extent. When he makes magistrates its 
 substantive, he applies it to magistrates universally. 
 Its extent of application is known by its substantive, 
 not by its own meaning. 
 
 How, then, are we to determine what is the proper 
 substantive to which all refers ? Dr. Brown says, " It 
 is plain the Apostle is here speaking of duties to ma~ 
 gistrates ; and that he refers to all magistrates of 
 whatever order, and whatever rights they possessed." 
 I answer this by saying, it is plain he is not speaking 
 exclusively of duties to magistrates, but 01 duties to 
 men universally, of which he specifies a certain num- 
 ber. Of different orders of magistrates, or of magis- 
 trates as possessing by the constitution different rights, 
 the verse and the paragraph say nothing. 
 
 " In perfect conformity with the idiom of the ori- 
 ginal," says Dr. Brown, " it might be rendered,— 
 Render to them all their dues, Indeed, had it been 
 the Apostle's object to have expressed the more ge- 
 neral sentiment, it is likely he would have employed 
 another expression, (roig <xa<st, instead of Taov.") I 
 assert directly the contrary. In conformity with the 
 idiom of the original the translation could not be them 
 all. Instead of nasi, denoting them all, and ron ira<si, 
 all without reference, roig naffi would be them all, or 
 all with reference to the persons of whom the writer 
 was speaking. And had the Apostle intended to 
 speak of " the powers," he would undoubtedly in this 
 renewed mention of them, have used the article. 
 
88 
 
 When all is used without any thing to restrain it, or to 
 direct its bearing to a particular object, it must have 
 the most general substantive that it can admit. All, 
 then, must here be all men. " Haffi," says Dr. Tholuck, 
 tc is not to be referred to all sorts of magistrates, as 
 Melancthon, Grotius, and others, will have it, but to 
 all sorts of men." 
 
 But even could the syntax of the passage permit it, 
 the word all cannot here refer to magistrates, because 
 this proceeds on the footing that taxes are paid to the 
 assessors and collectors of them as a debt due to them- 
 selves as their own right. Now this is both false and 
 absurd. The tax is in no sense due to the magistrate 
 who assesses it on the subjects of a government. He 
 does not receive nor enjoy the tax as his right. To 
 him the duty can have no reference. If tax collectors 
 are supposed to be referred to, then they are not 
 among " the powers," and the taxes are not for their 
 benefit. There is a sense, I admit, in which the tax 
 may be said to be due to the tax collector ; but the 
 sense in which Dr. Brown supposes it to be due, is, 
 that it is his own, — his own right conferred on him 
 by the constitution, and to be given him because he 
 is continually employed in collecting taxes, — his own 
 as much as honour is personally due to another. Dr. 
 Brown first brings in the tax assessors as magistrates, 
 and under the cloak of those assessors he has con- 
 trived to pass the tax collectors, even to the very 
 lowest of the order. The substantive, then, to all 
 is evidently men. " Render then to all men their 
 dues." After this he gives a specification of such 
 dues as would be least likely to be considered as dues, 
 
89 
 
 or to be conscientiously paid as such,, namely, taxes, 
 fear, honour. Many Christians to this hour, who 
 would put away with abhorrence the thought of 
 evading an ordinary debt, think it no evil to evade the 
 taxes, and to withhold that honour and fear that is 
 due to men in authority. " To him to whom ye owe 
 tribute give tribute : to him to whom ye owe custom 
 give custom : to him to whom ye owe fear give fear : 
 to him to whom ye owe honour give honour." As if 
 he had said, " Not only pay your ordinary debts, but 
 those debts also that in general are not conscientiously 
 paid as debts." This is the only view that can give 
 meaning to the particle then or therefore. The spirit 
 of the passage is to this purpose. Obedience and 
 taxes are due to civil rulers ; pay these dues then as 
 well as others. It is quite obvious that the Apostle 
 specifies only such debts as would be most likely to 
 be overlooked. 
 
 The phraseology, with respect to taxation, instead 
 of describing different orders of magistrates, is here 
 admirably fitted to obviate by anticipation every eva- 
 sion. The precept is so worded, that it equally ap- 
 plies, whether the tax is considered as belonging to 
 supreme power, or whether the supreme power has 
 appropriated it to certain persons or purposes; or 
 whether it is held in farm by contract. Strictly 
 speaking, taxes are the property of the supreme power, 
 but they are in another view the property of those on 
 whom the supreme power has conferred them, and of 
 those to whom the supreme power has sold them. 
 There is a sense also in which, as I have observed. 
 
90 
 
 we may be said to owe taxes to the collector. In 
 whatever light these taxes are considered, they are 
 enjoined to be paid. 
 
 Should it be objected that, if the duty of paying taxes 
 is grounded on the fact that rulers are ministers of God, 
 continually employed in the public service, then it will 
 follow, that no taxes are enjoined to be paid but 
 such as are for the public service, I reply, that the de- 
 duction is not sound. It may be a fact that the ground 
 on which God enjoins the paying of taxes to govern- 
 ment, is, that government is his own appointment for 
 the good of his people, without implying that they are 
 not to pay any tax but what they judge to be for the 
 public good. He may make " the powers" the judge 
 of what is proper to be paid, and may, in cases of op- 
 pression, give no redress to his people but from him- 
 self. The security of the Lord's people may be, that 
 the Lord overrules the rulers, and their consolation, 
 that even oppressive taxation may serve his purpose 
 in trying the righteous and in punishing the wicked. 
 Such is actually the case. Both tyranny and oppres- 
 sion serve the purposes of the Most High ; and when 
 they are not for his glory and the good of his people, 
 he can remove them, and replace them with a sceptre 
 of righteousness. A loving father may enjoin his child 
 to yield respect and submission to a teacher, on the 
 ground that this is for the child's advantage, without 
 making any exceptions for cases in which the teacher 
 may not deserve respect and submission. It is quite 
 enough that he can dismiss the teacher when he finds 
 him to act in a manner not deserving of respect and 
 
91 
 
 submission. But as Jong as the child is under him, 
 he considers it for its advantage to render unlimited 
 respect and obedience. 
 
 That the precept in the seventh verse respects all 
 men, is confirmed by the eighth verse, which repeats 
 it in a negative form, in order to shew the duty of 
 love to be a debt that never can be fully paid off. " Owe 
 no man any thing, but to love one another." The 
 love of the brethren is a debt that never can be fully 
 discharged. As " no one" here, is not no magistrate, 
 but no man, so in the former verse, all is not all ma- 
 gistrates, but all men. 
 
 In expounding the word fear, Dr. Brown thus ex- 
 presses the meaning of the precept. " It is as if the 
 Apostle had said, Reverence the emperor, fear the 
 preetor, respect the quaestor, and beware of treating 
 with contempt even the despised publican. Just as 
 we would say, Reverence the sovereign, fear the 
 judges, respect the high court of parliament, honour 
 the municipal or local authorities, and beware of treat- 
 ing with contempt even the bailiff or the constable." 
 Is the bailiff or the constable among " the powers V 
 Is the despised publican among the powers ? Has 
 not Dr. Brown confined the precept to magistrates ? 
 Are bailiffs and constables magistrates ? By what 
 process does he bring such persons into this place ? 
 And when these bailiffs and constables are placed on 
 the benches of the magistrates, they are not to be 
 feared or honoured with the least degree of fear and 
 honour. They are merely not to be treated with con- 
 tempt. If they are not to be feared and honoured 
 with the magistrates, why are they ranked with 
 
92 
 
 them ? If they are not to he feared and honoured 
 with the magistrates, let them keep their own place. 
 Rank them not with the magistrates. But how do we 
 know that they are not to he feared and honoured as 
 the text commands ? Is it not only of such as are 
 worthy of fear and honour that the text speaks ? 
 Why, I suppose, as the bailiffs and constables are not 
 worthy of honour and jfow, we must not give them 
 more than they deserve, let the text say what it may. 
 The text says, /ear and honour, Dr. Brown says, treat 
 not with contempt. Now, is it possible to extract such 
 a meaning from fear or honour, as treat not with 
 contempt ? This indeed is an admirable specimen of 
 exegesis. A nobleman fears or honours his footman, 
 when he does not treat him with contempt. What 
 is it that may not be made out of the Scriptures by 
 such lawless exposition ! 
 
 " Such," says the author, " appears to me the 
 meaning of these words of the Apostle. They are a 
 strong assertion and enforcement of the duty of pay- 
 ment of tribute on the Christian Romans. They are 
 a reply to the question, are Christians bound to pay 
 tribute to a government administered by heathens ? 
 And that reply is a very strong affirmative." There 
 is no such question implied ; there is no such ques- 
 tion answered. There is not a line nor a word in the 
 xvhole paragraph, that has any reference to the ques- 
 tion of heathenism. There is not a single observa- 
 tion that in the remotest manner glances at a scruple 
 or prejudice peculiar to Jews. The whole is as im- 
 mediately applicable to Gentile Christians as to Jew- 
 ish, and to Edinburgh in the nineteenth century, as to 
 
93 
 
 Rome in the first. Even the very existence of such a 
 prejudice is not known from any part of the whole 
 Epistle, nor from any part of the Bible. I can find no 
 language strong enough to express my abhorrence of 
 such a monstrous figment. 
 
 With respect to the limitation of the precept about 
 tribute, Dr. Brown observes : — " Still, however, we 
 do not deny, that the precept as to tribute-paying may 
 be without limit. All we say here is, this does not 
 prove it to be so." Well ; but does he not see that 
 if the precept is, as he admits, unlimited in expres- 
 sion, it must be unlimited in application, except a li- 
 mitation is proved ? Does he need to be informed, 
 that proof lies upon him ? If we have proved the 
 rule, must not he prove the exception ? When we 
 hctve proved that the precept enjoins the paying of 
 taxes, in language that includes all taxes, w r e have 
 done all that our cause requires, till he produce a li- 
 mitation from the same authority that gave the pre- 
 cept. " If it be unlimited," says he, " which certain- 
 ly is a very improbable hypothesis, this must arise not 
 out of its general nature, as civil obedience, but out 
 of something peculiar to it, as tribute-paying." The 
 precept is unlimited ; yet this does not arise out of 
 any thing peculiar to it as tribute- paying, more than 
 its general nature as civil obedience. Its being with- 
 out limitation in its application, is the necessary re- 
 sult of its being expressed without limitation, which is 
 common to it with all similarly expressed precepts. 
 Every precept expressed in unlimited language, must 
 be applied without limitation, except limitation is 
 proved from the same authority. We claim no more 
 
94 
 
 for this precept, than we do for every other precept. 
 Is Dr. Brown so little acquainted with the nature of 
 critical evidence, as to suppose that " a distinct de- 
 claration of the lawgiver" is necessary to prove that 
 a precept unlimited in its expression, is unlimited in 
 its application ? Does he not know that " a distinct 
 declaration of the lawgiver" is necessary to prove that 
 any thing is excepted from a precept expressed with- 
 out limitation ? With such principles of interpreta- 
 tion he is ill fitted for the duties of Professor of Exe- 
 getical Theology. He demands a law to assert that a 
 law extends to every thing contained in its expression ! 
 It is idle to talk of laying incense on a heathen 
 altar, or contributing a faggot to burn a maityr, as the 
 same in nature with the payment of a tax for a pur- 
 pose not approved of by the payer. There is an es- 
 sential difference — a difference that any unprejudiced 
 understanding cannot fail to discover. The one im- 
 plies participation, the other implies no degree of ap- 
 probation or participation. A Christian is command- 
 ed to burn incense to the idol, as a test of his Chris- 
 tianity, implying avowedly that the action is worship. 
 He is commanded to pay his tax merely for the sake 
 of the money. The burning of the incense is his own 
 act of worship. The giving of the tax is the giving 
 up of something that belonged to him, but now, by 
 the authority of " the powers," belongs to others. He 
 has no concern with the object to which it is appro- 
 priated, more than he has with the appropriation of 
 the money which he pays in rent. The one is the 
 property of c ' the powers," as well as the other is of 
 the landlord. 
 
95 
 
 Should any government impose a tax for a sinful 
 purpose, declaring at the same time, that the paying 
 of the tax will be considered as an approval of the 
 object, T think every Christian should refuse payment 
 at the hazard of his life. But the tax which Dr. 
 Brown and his friends refuse, is not a tax, in the ob- 
 ject of which he is required to acquiesce. His pay- 
 ment will be accepted, and the law fully obeyed by it, 
 though he should publicly denounce the object. 
 What perverseness, then, does it manifest, to refuse 
 payment on the ground that there is no difference be- 
 tween paying money as a tax, and contributing money, 
 as a voluntary offering ! 
 
 With respect to the doctrine, that it is sinful to pay 
 a tax " for an immoral or improper purpose, or gene- 
 rally for a purpose conscientiously disapproved of by 
 him from whom it is exacted," Dr. Brown thus ex- 
 presses himself : — " There is something absolutely re- 
 volting to our moral perceptions and feelings, which 
 lie at the very bottom, which form the imafundamina 
 of our spiritual nature, in maintaining the opposite 
 opinion. It is monstrous to suppose that, by any 
 mere human arrangement, not only what was not 
 duty becomes duty, and what was not sin becomes 
 sin ; but what was sin becomes duty, and what was 
 duty becomes sin." This is a sublime burst of indig- 
 nant metaphysics. And what can stand against the 
 indignation of metaphysics ? Who can hold up his 
 face to vindicate what violates the very essence of spi- 
 ritual nature? But stop a little, Dr. Brown. Let 
 me have a word or two with you on this subject, 
 before we are condemned as monsters, on the 
 
96 ■ 
 
 evidence of first principles. This is metaphysics ; 
 but it is metaphysics without metaphysical acu- 
 men. Its whole force consists in confounding 
 things that are essentially different. It is not 
 mere human arrangement that makes it a duty to pay 
 any tax. Human appointment imposes the tax ; it is 
 God's appointment that makes it a duty to pay it. 
 And in this, what was sin before does not become 
 duty. Before the giving of this precept, it was not 
 sinful in the Roman Christians to pay any tax in the 
 empire. The distinction between a tax to govern- 
 ment and a voluntary contribution exists in nature, and 
 had God given no law about it, it would not have im- 
 plied participation in the object of the tax, to pay it 
 in order to avoid wrath. In that case, they would 
 not have paid an obnoxious tax for conscience sake 
 with respect to the commandment of God, but they 
 would have paid it for wrath's sake. Dr. Brown in his 
 usual manner takes for granted the very thing to be 
 proved, namely, that to pay a tax for a specific pur- 
 pose not approved by the payer, is in its own nature 
 sinful. He supposes that the doctrine which he op- 
 poses pretends to turn sin into duty by human ar- 
 rangement. Does not this assume, as a first princi- 
 ple, that to pay a specific tax for a sinful purpose is 
 essentially sinful ? Is not this the very point that is 
 disputed ? Take away from the writer this assumed 
 principle, and you destroy the very ima fundamina 
 of his lofty metaphysics. 
 
 A second limitation to the law of tribute, according 
 to this writer, respects the legality of the imposition and 
 collection of tribute. " They were not moral! v bound/' 
 
97 
 
 says he, " to pay any taxes not imposed by the au- 
 thority, to whose province, according to the constitu- 
 tion of the Roman imperial government, this depart- 
 ment of administration belonged, nor to pay taxes to 
 any persons but those appointed for the purpose." 
 There is a great want of discrimination in this ob- 
 servation. This is no limitation of the law of tribute ; 
 for the law of tribute supposes that the taxes are im- 
 posed by the powers, and collected by their authority. 
 If inferior magistrates impose taxes not sanctioned by 
 supreme power, they are not taxes at all in the sense 
 of the paragraph : If they levy taxes without war- 
 rant from " the powers," it is not disobedience to 
 " the powers" to refuse payment. There is an appeal 
 to Caesar as to taxes, as well as with respect to life. 
 To refuse the exactions of piracy, is no exception to 
 the payment of the taxes of government. 
 
 A third limitation, according to this writer, is, when 
 civil rulers go beyond the proper bounds of their pro- 
 vince. Does he mean the bounds of their province, 
 as ascertained by the constitution of the country ? 
 Tell me, Dr. Brown, what are the bounds of the pro- 
 vince of Caesar, according to the constitution of the 
 Roman empire ? What is it to which the province of 
 Nero did not extend ? What limited his power with 
 respect to either life or property ? 
 
 In free governments, if the supreme executive ex- 
 ceeds its province, there are " powers" to restrain it. 
 The Queen, with us, cannot impose taxes by preroga- 
 tive, for she must have, in the imposition of taxes, 
 the co-operation of the two other branches of " the 
 powers." But should the two Houses of Parliament 
 
98 
 
 unite with the Sovereign in giving her the power of 
 imposing taxes hy prerogative, I know no law of 
 Christ to deliver us from the taxes so imposed. Under 
 a pure despotism, there is nothing which does not 
 come within its province, and the Christian has no 
 right to disobey, except in things that are sinful. 
 God only is his protection against oppression and 
 tyranny. And is he not a sufficient protector ? 
 
 But it is obvious that, in ascertaining the bounds of 
 the province of civil rulers, Dr. Brown does not confine 
 himself to the constitution of any civil government. He 
 determines principally, as his quotations shew, from 
 the end of civil government, as ascertained by self-evi- 
 dent first principles. According to this, let the consti- 
 tution say what it will, a government has no right to be 
 conscientiously obeyed, when it legislates beyond the 
 boundaries that reason prescribes. Now, this is in 
 direct opposition to the paragraph which the author 
 pretends to expound, is not warranted by any other 
 passage of Scripture, and is not a necessary truth. It 
 is quite possible that God may enjoin on his people 
 obedience to their rulers, even when they exceed 
 their proper province in things temporal. I admit 
 that there is a proper province for legislation, and that 
 legislators should not exceed this. But it is a diffe- 
 rent question, if legislators exceed this, are they to be 
 obeyed by Christians? I believe that our legislators often 
 dabble in matters as foreign to their proper province, 
 as it would be to attempt to regulate the rising of the 
 moon by legislation. Were I a legislator, I would 
 think myself obliged to keep within the just province 
 of legislation ; but as a subject, I obey the foolish 
 
.99 
 
 laws as well as the wise. Laws that are not sinful, 
 must be obeyed, though they should be grievances. 
 The God who rules the world has an object in the 
 determination of legislators, and he rules in the midst 
 of his very enemies. The madness of legislation 
 fulfils his purpose as well as its wisdom. Dr. Brown 
 has great advantage in my admissions. He appears 
 to have grounded his hopes of success, in recurring 
 to extreme cases. It is extreme cases only that I 
 notice. He thought to frighten his opponents with 
 Juggernaut ; but I admit more than he has demanded. 
 The rulers of this world, in all their folly, as well as 
 in all their wisdom, are fulfilling the purposes of my 
 God. 
 
 Dr. Brown supports the limitation of the law of 
 tribute, by the opinion of eminent Christian moralists. 
 They may be Christian men ; but so far as this sub- 
 ject is concerned, they are infidel moralists. For they 
 contradict Scripture, on the authority of their own 
 speculations. Bishop Jeremy Taylor makes it essen- 
 tial to the obligation of payment, that the authority 
 imposing the tax " be supreme, that the cause be 
 just, that the end be public, that the good be general, 
 that the people receive advantage." None of these re- 
 quirements are essential but the first ; and if the first 
 does not exist, the tax does not exist. The supremacy 
 of the imposing power is essential to the existence of 
 the tax, not a limitation of the duty of payment. The 
 other requisites ought to guide the imposers of a tax ; 
 but they have nothing to do with the obligation of the 
 payment of the tax imposed. The good Bishop con- 
 founds the duty of the imposers of a tax, with the duty 
 
100< 
 
 of the payers of the tax. These two things are as 
 widely asunder, as heaven is distant from the earth. 
 Where does the Bishop and Dr. Brown find their li- 
 mitations ? Do the Scriptures require these prere- 
 quisites in a tax, before it is obligatory on Christians ? 
 If not, is it Christian morality that limits the laws of 
 Christ, by the fancies of men ? This is saying, not 
 proving. It is free speaking, not free inquiry. It 
 makes free to contradict God. <e Bishop Jeremy Tay- 
 lor," the writer tells us, " will scarcely be accused of 
 being too lax a casuist on questions of this kind." I 
 accuse not the worthy Bishop of lax morality in this 
 matter, but I charge him with utter incompetency as 
 a casuist on this question. He confounds the duty of 
 " the powers/' with the duty of the subjects. By this 
 want of discrimination, he virtually sets the Christian 
 loose from the authority of this precept as a law of 
 God, and by making every subject the judge how far 
 he is bound to pay the taxes of his government, lays 
 a foundation for disorder and anarchy. It is very 
 strange with what reverence Dr. Brown submits his 
 understanding to the sayings of wise men, while he 
 has unbounded boldness in modifying the decisions of 
 the Spirit of God. Now, the mere sayings of the first 
 men that ever existed are to me no more than the 
 sayings of an idiot, if they contradict the word of God. 
 To God I delight to bow my understanding, but to 
 mortal man I will never yield. When man teaches 
 me, he must prove. Are the mere sayings of Bishop 
 Jeremy Taylor, President Dwight, Mr. Brown of Had- 
 dington, and John Knox, to be received as self-evi- 
 dent truths, sufficient to cancel or limit the command 
 
101 
 
 of God ? Venerable as these men are, their autho- 
 rity can have no weight, when they rashly presume 
 to oppose their own wisdom to the express authority 
 of the Most High. But why did Dr. Brown class 
 Theodoret among those who hold that paying tribute 
 is not of unlimited obligation ? The quotation speaks 
 directly the contrary. " It is not our duty," says 
 Theodoret, " to obey the magistrate in every thing ; 
 but while we are bound to pay tax and tribute, and 
 to render honour to them who deserve it, should they 
 require any thing sinful, we must determinedly gain- 
 say them." Does this say that the payment of a tax 
 has limitation ? Does it not say that tax and tribute 
 are to be paid, without giving any limitation ? Is not 
 the exception made by Theodoret the very same that 
 we make. Rulers are not to be obeyed when they 
 enjoin any thing sinful. 
 
 To prove that the payment of a tax for an object 
 not approved by the payer is sinful, Dr. Brown asks 
 with indignant astonishment, " Is there no difference 
 in my giving my property for what I consider one of 
 the most important of sublunary things, the mainte- 
 nance of regular civil government, and my giving my 
 property for one of the worst of sublunary evil things, 
 the desecration of religion, and the perdition of souls." 
 Yes, Dr. Brown, a very great difference between your 
 giving and your paying. But the ministers of Edin- 
 burgh do not ask a gift of you ; they demand a debt. 
 To bestow your money for a bad purpose is a sin ; 
 to pay a debt is a duty, to whatever purpose the 
 money may be applied. Throughout his whole 
 work, Dr. Brown errs by considering the tax as a 
 
102 
 
 contribution or gift, which he may give or withhold 
 at his pleasure. If it is not a debt, it must be 
 a gift. But the paragraph which he professes to 
 expound considers taxes as debts. If taxes are 
 debts, then the payment of them no more implies 
 approbation of their object than the payment of any 
 other debt involves approbation of the purpose to which 
 it is applied. When a tax is imposed, there is so 
 much of the property of the subject taken from him 
 and appropriated to something else. It ceases to be 
 his as much as the thing which he has sold. The go- 
 vernment is lord paramount of all the property in the 
 empire. Dr. Brown is not accountable for the appli- 
 cation of the Annuity Tax more than he is for the 
 rent of his house. It may be said, that the rent of a 
 house is appropriated to a good general purpose, the 
 support of the proprietor. But will it make any es- 
 sential difference, should the landlord appropriate the 
 rent of the house to the support of a pack of hounds, 
 or even to assist a society formed to oppose the Gos- 
 pel ? Would Dr. Brown refuse to pay his rent on 
 such a specific appropriation ? He has no more to do 
 with the appropriation of the tax, than with the ap- 
 propriation of the rent. The money given, in neither 
 case is his. It is debt. The rent is due to the land- 
 lord, or to whomsoever the landlord has appropriated 
 it. The tax belongs to the government, or to whom- 
 soever the government has appropriated it. When 
 Dr. Brown takes his house, he is told that it owes 
 three pounds ten shillings annually to the ministers of 
 the city of Edinburgh, and so much to the proprietor. 
 It may be said that the cases are not parallel ; that 
 the house is the property of the landlord, and he has a 
 
103 
 
 right to appropriate the rent to whatever purpose he 
 pleases. And I say the same thing with respect to 
 this tax. It is the property of " the powers/' and 
 they may appropriate it as they please. Does not our 
 Lord's command " render to Caesar the things that 
 are Caesar's/' imply that the things rendered to Caesar 
 are his own ? 
 
 " Eating flesh/' says Dr. Brown, " even though 
 offered in sacrifice, if the individual was unaware of 
 this, was quite lawful." The author entirely mistakes 
 the nature of this fact. It is not because he knows 
 that the flesh was offered to an idol, that he is to ab- 
 stain from it. He might know this and eat it, if no 
 person was likely to be stumbled by his conduct. 
 Neither the devil nor the idol had any right to the 
 flesh. " The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness there- 
 of;" and neither the devil nor the idol could make 
 the flesh unfit for the use of God's people. But they 
 are not to eat it in any circumstances likely to stum- 
 ble those who had not their knowledge. " The earth 
 is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof/' and therefore 
 he has a right to forbid them to use what is lawful, in 
 circumstances that would injure others. They are 
 never to eat it in the idol's temple, in fellowship with 
 idolaters ; for though the flesh was still uninjured, 
 yet this use of it implies fellowship with the idol as 
 much as eating the sacrifices implied fellowship with 
 the Jewish altar, as eating the bread in the Lord's 
 Supper implies fellowship with Christ. The sin, then, 
 of eating the flesh did not consist in knowing to what 
 purpose it had been previously used ; for it is per- 
 mitted to be used with the knowledge of that abuse. 
 
104 
 
 The lawfulness of eating it, does not consist in igno- 
 rance of its previous abuse, but in the fact that it was 
 created by God to be used by his people, and could 
 not be rendered unfit for this purpose by any idola- 
 trous abuses. What has this fact to do with Dr. 
 Brown's purpose ? 
 
 Besides, even on Dr. Brown's own view of this 
 fact, it does not apply to his purpose. He knows 
 that a part of the general tax is applied to the obnox- 
 ious purpose, just as well as he knows that the speci- 
 fic tax is so applied. The support of Maynooth is as 
 well known to Dr. Brown to proceed from the gene- 
 ral taxes, as the support of the Edinburgh ministers 
 from the Annuity-Tax. This illustration, then, radi- 
 cally fails ; first, because the thing to be illustrated is 
 supposed to be in its own nature essentially sinful. 
 The thing by which it is illustrated is in its own na- 
 ture essentially lawful. Secondly, because the sin in 
 this illustration, is not in the supposed knowledge, 
 but in the stumbling of others. Thirdly, because 
 there is equal knowledge of the obnoxious object, in 
 the payment of the general tax, that there is in the 
 payment of the specific tax. General taxes would not 
 serve Dr. Brown more than specific taxes, except 
 every avowed particular object of this general tax was 
 approved by him. He might then allege, that all the 
 professed objects of the general taxes being proper, he 
 is not accountable for their misapplication to purposes 
 not avowed by the government. But to support May- 
 nooth is not a misapplication of any part of the gene- 
 ral taxes. It is a legitimate and avowed application, 
 according to the law of the country. He cannot plead 
 
105 
 
 ignorance here. Why then does he pay general taxes, 
 seeing he knows that they are partly avowedly em- 
 ployed to sinful objects ? Suppose a society existed 
 for promoting the circulation of the Scriptures, em- 
 bracing also one sinful ingredient among its good pur- 
 poses, would Dr. Brown support such a society ? 
 Why then will he induce men to pay general taxes, 
 that are partly employed for sinful purposes, just as 
 he would induce rats to eat arsenic, by mixing it with 
 things that are palatable ? This is miserable casuistry. 
 If it is sinful to pay a specific tax for a sinful purpose, 
 it is equally sinful to pay general taxes, a part of 
 which is for sinful purposes. 
 
 Besides, even if all the avowed objects of general 
 taxes were proper, his casuistry cannot save his con- 
 science, if in any instance the misapplication of any 
 part of them is known to him. If the money de- 
 manded by the taxes is his own, which he may justly 
 withhold according to his conviction of the propriety 
 of its destined application, he ought to withhold it, 
 whenever he knows that any part of it is appropriated 
 to a sinful purpose. If a society, disowning every 
 improper object, and avowing nothing but what is 
 highly laudable, is known to misapply its funds to 
 sinful purposes, is it to be supported by men of 
 God? 
 
 If it is said that he has no control over the appli- 
 cation of taxes ; and therefore, that he cannot be 
 accountable for their abuse, the same is true with re- 
 spect to the money demanded by the tax. The con- 
 stable and the bailiff will not ask his liberty to arrest for 
 the Annuity Tax. And he has the same alternative 
 
106 
 
 in both cases — confiscation, imprisonment, and the 
 scaffold. 
 
 " I cannot see," says Dr. Brown, " how any man 
 can conscientiously pay taxes levied avowedly for the 
 support of an unjust war ; and I am sure, a very 
 great part of the subjects of any government are ill 
 fitted to form a true judgment with respect to the cha- 
 racter of a particular war." This is a suicidal argu- 
 ment. I also am sure that the generality of Chris- 
 tians are ill fitted to determine such questions. But 
 for this very reason, I the more admire that law of 
 Christ that frees them from the necessity of such 
 judgment. Were it a duty to be convinced of the 
 propriety of the object of every tax, before they could 
 conscientiously pay it, the Lord would have given 
 them qualifications for the discharge of the duty im- 
 posed on them. 
 
 Dr. Brown seems to hope for success to his argu- 
 ment, not only by alleging extreme cases, but cases 
 that have never actually occurred, nor are likely ever 
 to occur. Well, I do not object even to this. I will 
 accept every case that can fairly be said to be purely 
 of the nature of a tax. I reject, as unfair, every case 
 that is framed as implying approbation or acknow- 
 ledgment of purpose. A thing so framed is not sim- 
 ply a tax, which merely demands money, but no re- 
 cognition of object. He parades with great ostenta- 
 tion the case put by Dr. Watts. Yet the hideous 
 consequences which he draws from it, do not deter 
 me from answering in the affirmative. " If a heathen 
 prince," says Dr. Watts, u impose a tenth penny on 
 all his subjects, as a tax to maintain heathen worship, 
 
107 
 
 would a Christian willingly pay it, and think himself 
 bound in conscience to do it." Most decidedly, yes. 
 I pay the tax as a debt, according to this law of 
 Christ, announced by the Apostle Paul. With the 
 object of the tax I have no concern. Dr. Watts was 
 a great logician ; yet his question originates in want 
 of metaphysical discrimination. It confounds a debt 
 with a gift, and supposes that the paying of taxes im- 
 plies recognition of their object. 
 
 Of the two cases with respect to the conduct of our 
 Lord in the paying of tribute, Dr. Brown has not suc- 
 cessfully disposed. The particular case, Matt. xxii. 
 16-22, does not, indeed, refer to a sinful tax: But 
 the answer, " render to Cassar the things that are 
 Caesar's," includes all possible taxes. Every thing 
 belonged to Csesar that did not belong to God. Now, 
 we know that God gave the whole Roman world to 
 Caesar. Did he not give him all that belonged to 
 Daniel's fourth beast ? Did he not give him man and 
 beast as he had formerly given to Nebuchadnezzar ? 
 Whatever tax, then, Caesar thought fit to impose, be- 
 longed to his grant from the ruler of the world. 
 In paying the tax, we give not what is ours, we 
 merely give Caesar his own. Dr. Brown, indeed, sup- 
 poses that " the second part of our Lord's precept is 
 equivalent to a distinct prohibition to pay any such 
 tax ; for that would have been to have rendered to 
 Caesar the things which are God's." But this pro- 
 ceeds upon a false principle. It is grounded on the 
 principle that all things are God's, and on this footing 
 Caesar could have nothing. It is indeed true, that in 
 one sense all things are God's, but not in the sense of 
 
108 
 
 our Lord's precept. For this divides things between 
 God and Caesar. All things are God's, but God has 
 given to Csesar some part of what belongs to himself. 
 All worldly things God has given to Csesar ; all things 
 that relate to conscience God has reserved for himself. 
 From God's gift to Daniel's beasts, we see that all 
 worldly property is given to Caesar. And when our 
 Lord commands us to give to Caesar all that belongs 
 to him, we cannot withhold any worldly property that 
 he demands. If it is said that God requires us to 
 honour him with our substance, I reply, that our sub- 
 stance can be only that which Caesar choose to leave 
 with us. If he takes it all to himself we have no 
 substance to give to the Lord, and are required to give 
 none. God has made Caesar our lord, and we have 
 no property but such as the laws of the country make 
 ours. With this we are to honour the Lord. 
 
 Our Lord's answer fixes another point of great im- 
 portance. It shews that what is paid in taxes is con- 
 sidered by the Lord as the property of the govern- 
 ment which imposes the tax. " The things that are 
 Caesar's." The things given to Caesar are not ours, 
 but his. Let Dr. Brown justly consider the import of 
 this phrase, and it will relieve him from his qualms of 
 conscience in paying the Annuity Tax. Matt. xvii. 
 24-27, determines that Christians ought to pay even 
 an unjust tax rather than offend the government. 
 Our Lord was under no obligation to pay the tax 
 demanded of him, yet he submitted to it. 
 
 Dr. Brown adopts the language of Bishop Hoadly 
 in the following passage : " All that I have now at- 
 tempted is to explain what an inspired person wrote ; 
 
109 
 
 and if the explanation be just, the censure must light 
 at last on the Apostle himself." There is here either 
 an uncommon want of accuracy of thought or of can- 
 dour. Even admitting that Bishop Hoadly and Dr. 
 Brown have been successful in showing that the Apos- 
 tle's language is capable of limitation with respect to 
 civil obedience and the payment of tribute, still it is 
 most certain that the Apostle himself does not here 
 give any such limitation. How, then, can the doctrine 
 of the one be the exposition of the doctrine of the 
 other ? Paul teaches submission to government with- 
 out assigning any limitation. Is the doctrine that 
 teaches the right of rebellion an exposition of Paul's 
 doctrine? Paul enjoins the payment of taxes with- 
 out excepting any kind of taxes. Is the doctrine that 
 forbids us to pay certain taxes by all the authority of 
 our allegiance to the Lord Jesus Christ, and com- 
 mands us to suffer confiscation, imprisonment, and 
 death, rather than to yield, the same doctrine with that 
 of the Apostle ? Even if they are consistent doctrines, 
 they are not the same. Has not Dr. Brown himself 
 admitted that the language of the Apostle is without 
 limitation ? How then does the Apostle come in for 
 a share of the censure that falls upon the Bishop and 
 the Doctor on account of their presumptuous limita- 
 tions of the Apostle's doctrine ? Bad enough, indeed, 
 if the Apostle must first submit to the arbitrary limi- 
 tation of those writers, and afterwards relieve them 
 of the odium of limitation by taking it on himself. 
 No, no, gentlemen, if you will mutilate the Apostle, 
 you shall not be allowed to make him afelo dese } and 
 bring in a verdict against him of self-murder. Paul 
 
110 
 
 has not limited civil obedience in temporal things. Paul 
 has not limited the duty of paying taxes. This is the 
 work of presumptuous men, who will not submit to 
 the decision of the Apostle. 
 
 To carnal wisdom the doctrine of unlimited sub- 
 mission to civil government in temporal things, ap- 
 pears a hard saying. Who can hear it ? If this sen- 
 timent prevails, it may be said, rulers may tyrannize 
 as they please. They who speak thus do greatly err, 
 not knowing the Scripture, neither the power of God 
 in the ruling of the world. It would be a hard thing, 
 indeed, if God did not rule the rulers. But the 
 Christian has nothing to fear, when he considers that 
 every plan and proceeding of government is overruled 
 and directed by his God. If he puts his children into 
 the hands of men, he retains these men in his own 
 hand, and they can injure them in nothing without 
 his permission. So far, then, from being a doctrine 
 that fills the mind with discomfort, it is the only view 
 that gives peace. Have I not more security for my 
 safety in the care of my Almighty Father, than in a 
 permission given by him to defend myself against the 
 oppression of rulers. I have peace whatever party 
 gets into power, because I know that in every thing 
 God fulfils his purposes by them. God rules on earth, 
 even in the councils of his enemies, as completely as 
 he rules in heaven. 
 
 When God chooses to overturn the empire of ty- 
 rants, he is at no loss for instruments. He is not 
 obliged to employ the heirs of glory in such scenes of 
 blood. He uses the wicked to overturn the wicked. 
 A hangman fills a very useful office, but the Queen 
 
Ill 
 
 would not choose to appoint one of her royal uncles 
 to the situation. The Sovereign of the world is not 
 obliged to employ his own children as the execu- 
 tioners of his vengeance, w r hen he overturns the 
 thrones of tyrants. 
 
 Dr. Brown labours to throw odium on this doc- 
 trine, by identifying it with that of those courtly 
 spaniels who formerly taught the divine right of 
 kings. But it is not akin to it in the remotest de- 
 gree. It looks with no more favour towards the 
 throne of kings than to the empire of republics. It 
 always recognises the persons as God's ministers, who 
 actually possess the power, without any respect to 
 the form of government, or even the quality of go- 
 vernment. Wicked rulers are God's appointment, as 
 well as righteous rulers. But shew me an instance 
 in which a righteous nation ever had an unrighteous 
 Sovereign. When nations are sunk in wickedness, 
 even if righteous and wise persons are in power, God 
 will blast their purposes for the good of his people, or 
 he will make even wise men mad. 
 
 Those statesmen and rulers who would unsettle 
 the " existing powers" in foreign countries, on the 
 pretence of supporting legitimacy, find no sanction 
 in this law of God, more than they who would 
 assist in overturning legitimacy for the establish- 
 ment of free government. Let those who in any 
 country actually hold the reins of empire, be acknow- 
 ledged by Christians as long as God retains them 
 in their place. When he changes them, let them sub- 
 mit to the change, " for there is no power but of God." 
 Louis Philip is as legitimate, according to the law of 
 
112 
 
 God, as was Charles X. ; and Napoleon was as legiti- 
 mate as either. Shall the world be filled with confu- 
 sion and blood for the sake of the fanciful rights of a 
 particular family, when God has removed them from 
 power ? Can there be a more legitimate heir to power 
 than the heir to whom God has given the possession ? 
 
 That baseness of spirit which is ever ready to natter 
 power, to palliate its vices, and justify or excuse its 
 tyranny, can claim no kindred with the doctrine of 
 this passage. Christians ought to let it be seen that 
 they respect those in power as God's ordinance, but 
 that they do not respect vice or the abuse of power in 
 any quarter. On the other hand, they ought to avoid 
 bringing into contempt the rulers of the country, even 
 when their measures do not please them. This tends 
 to shake the very foundations of society. 
 
 If in any country government shall refuse to grant 
 to Christians complete liberty of conscience, they 
 must act on their allegiance to Christ. It is right to 
 obey God rather than man. Should they be called to 
 suffer for their obedience to God, he can enable them 
 to glorify him, by bearing what is inflicted. Here, 
 with a good conscience, we may call on our brethren 
 to submit to confiscation, imprisonment, or death. 
 This limitation is not left to be assigned by Locke, or 
 Milton, or Paley, but is given them by God himself. 
 
 Let it be observed that, as the doctrine of this pas- 
 sage does not identify itself with politics, so my object 
 has no political bearing. It is the law of Christ only 
 that I expound. To the law of Christ only do I urge 
 the obedience of Christians ; and this I urge equally 
 on all, without respect to political views, on their alle- 
 
113 
 
 giance to the Son of God, the King of kings and Lord 
 of lords. My doctrine has no partiality for a particu- 
 lar party or particular measures : it disturbs not such 
 partiality where it exists. In all circumstances it 
 forbids rebellion, and enjoins obedience in all tempo- 
 ral things ; but it forbids no man to have his prefer- 
 ences as to forms of government, as well as measures of 
 policy, or to co-operate in any legal effort to obtain a 
 civil constitution, with every excellence that wisdom 
 can bestow. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance that Christians in 
 every country understand their duty to civil govern- 
 ment. In this way they will most effectually com- 
 mend the Gospel to the world, and remove some of 
 the most powerful obstacles that impede its progress. 
 While they shew that they fear not man, when he 
 commands what is contrary to the commandments of 
 God, they ought likewise to shew that obedience to 
 God obliges them to submission to rulers in all tem- 
 poral things. If they act according to the instruc- 
 tions of their great king, no government could ever 
 have ground to suspect them, or a pretence to im- 
 pede their efforts. In the cross itself there is enough 
 of offence; we should not add to it by any con- 
 tumacy of our own. 
 
 Were Christians in this country to compare the 
 blessings of their situation, with that of those on the 
 continent of Europe, instead of charging persecution 
 on the government on account of disagreeable taxes, 
 they would see the most abundant grounds of thank- 
 fulness. We have the most unbounded liberty of 
 conscience ; but on the Continent Christians may suf- 
 
114 
 
 fer imprisonment and confiscation for preaching the 
 Gospel of Christ. We will give a bad lesson to the 
 rulers of Europe with respect to religious liberty, if 
 we shew them that the use we have made of 
 ours, is to embolden us to refuse the taxes that all 
 others are required to pay. No tax can be justly 
 charged with persecution, which equally bears on all 
 subjects. Our concern for the religious liberty of our 
 brethren in France, Germany, Denmark, and Rus- 
 sia, ought to incite us to make the most prudent use 
 of our own liberty. Were all Christians in Great 
 Britain to manifest proper gratitude for the blessings 
 of religious liberty, it might encourage the rulers of 
 the Continent to communicate the same blessings to 
 their subjects. 
 
 The Scripture doctrine of obedience to civil go- 
 vernment in temporal things, though, like the Gos- 
 pel itself, foolish in the estimation of the wisdom 
 of this world, is in reality the wisdom of God. The 
 cross of Christ is offensive to the carnal heart of all 
 men, and the rudest as well as the most civilized na- 
 tions are inclined not only to reject, but also to per- 
 secute it. If in addition to this, the Gospel had in- 
 termeddled with the civil concerns of the world, and 
 enjoined its followers to resist whatever they did not 
 approve, the whole world would be shut against it by 
 the civil rulers. On this principle, nothing could be 
 expected but confusion wherever the Gospel came. 
 But in the wisdom of God the heralds of salvation in- 
 terfere not with the powers that rule the nations, and 
 instead of sounding the tocsin of rebellion, they en- 
 join obedience to every government in the world, as 
 
115 
 
 being an ordinance of God, so long as his providence 
 preserves its existence. Rulers, then, can have no 
 plausible pretext for persecution, and where they per- 
 secute, it is manifest that it is from hatred to the Gos- 
 pel itself, and not from any just fear of the dangerous 
 tendency of Christianity with respect to the stability 
 of government. This feature in the Gospel revela- 
 tion is evidently in the divine wisdom intended to 
 display the greatness of the natural enmity of the 
 human heart to the character of God. The salvation 
 of Christ is published in all nations, accompanied with 
 a grand law of the kingdom of Christ, which, so far 
 from trenching on the authority of rulers, holds them 
 forth as God's ordinance, and enjoins obedience to 
 them, as a part of that obedience which is due to 
 God himself. True policy, then, ought to induce civil 
 rulers in every country to countenance the entrance of 
 the Gospel among their subjects. But such is the ut- 
 ter depravity of man, such is his rooted hatred of 
 God, such is his aversion to the divine plan of saving 
 sinners, not by any righteousness of their own, but by 
 the righteousness of Christ imputed through faith in 
 his name, that rulers, instead of hailing its entrance 
 into their dominions, are inclined to shut it out as a 
 pestilence. How important, then, is it for Christians 
 to remove every pretext for opposition, and make it 
 manifest that enmity to the Gospel itself, and not any 
 fear of its consequences in temporal things, influences 
 its enemies ! That the depravity of human nature is 
 as great as the Scriptures represent it, is irresistibly 
 proved by the fact, that though they enjoin unreserved 
 obedience to civil rulers, the Gospel has been perse- 
 
116 
 
 euted in almost all nations. This is one of the strongest 
 internal evidences of the truth of the Gospel. This pe- 
 culiarity in the doctrine of Christ cannot have been 
 a human device, for it is opposed to human wisdom ; 
 and though it is calculated to serve the interests of 
 civil rulers, their natural aversion to the truth often 
 overcomes their concern for their temporal interests. 
 They will rather fight Christianity than reign peace- 
 ably through the authority of its injunctions. The doc- 
 trine of obedience to civil government, then, as taught 
 in the New Testament, is a self-evident proof of the 
 truth of Christianity ; and Christians who do not sub- 
 mit to this doctrine, or who do not avow it, do all in 
 their power to hide this evidence of the truth of the 
 Gospel. 
 
 Not the least of the evils of such a perversion of 
 Scripture on this subject, as that which is exempli- 
 fied by Dr. Brown, is the foundation which it lays 
 for overturning, by the laws of a spurious exegesis, 
 the most important doctrines of Christianity. In look- 
 ing into a late treatise of Mr. Blanco White in favour 
 of Socinianism, I was much struck with the coin- 
 cidence of one of the canons by the help of which he 
 would degrade the Son of God, with one of the canons 
 of Dr. Brown, by which he would relieve himself 
 from an obnoxious tax. And assuredly this is the 
 legitimate result of false criticism and false canons in 
 every instance. They cannot be kept at the fixed 
 point to which they were designed by their au- 
 thors to apply, nor restrained from giving their au- 
 thority to instances not only not contemplated by 
 theii authors, but which they would reject with ab- 
 
117 
 
 horrence. This is a fact that heightens the guilt of 
 Dr. Brown. His canons and his criticism would lend 
 their aid to every error. The same canons and criti- 
 cism issuing from the pen of a Socinian would be 
 comparatively harmless. Every Christian would be 
 on his guard against them. But when canons and 
 criticism calculated to introduce universal disorder 
 into the interpretation of language, calculated to 
 overturn every revealed truth, are ushered into the 
 world by a professor of theology in one of the 
 most orthodox denominations, the poison will be 
 drunk without suspicion ; and in the issue the 
 whole system of truth will be corrupted. If the 
 body of the Secession approves of Dr. Brown's canons 
 and criticism, and remain for half a century longer to 
 be distinguished for their attachment to ancient or- 
 thodoxy, it will be a kind of miracle. A spurious liber- 
 ality is more likely to take the place of that earnest 
 contending for the faith that was manifested by those 
 men of God who founded the Secession. I think I 
 see symptoms of a spurious liberality in Dr. Brown 
 himself. I set no bounds to that liberality that ought 
 to exist among all the friends of a pure gospel. But 
 would an Erskine have styled Mr. Locke " an excel- 
 lent divine" ? This expression grated upon my ear, 
 and I bitterly lamented it as affording evidence that 
 the Seceders of Scotland are not what their fathers 
 were. That Mr. Locke was an excellent philoso- 
 pher, and in many respects a worthy man, no 
 man will question. But no man who respects the 
 standards of the Church of Scotland can consistently 
 call him " an excellent divine." His svstem of re- 
 
118 
 
 ligion unfolded in his work on the Epistle to the Ro- 
 mans, is the very core of Arminianisn, and affords 
 the most plausible expedients to the opposers of truth 
 to evade its evidence. Let there be the most un- 
 bounded liberality with respect to the friends of the 
 gospel of God. Let its very enemies get justice. 
 But if an angel from heaven should dare to arraign 
 the gospel, let us not fear to say with an Apostle, 
 11 Let him be accursed." To speak of Mr. Locke as 
 an " excellent divine" is to authenticate, not his criti- 
 cism merely, but his errors. 
 
 I think myself the more obliged to bear my testi- 
 mony against this spurious liberality because it has 
 for some time been in vogue among those who, pro- 
 fessing orthodoxy, would willingly lower its pre- 
 tensions. It is this that has induced me to lift up 
 my voice against the works of Mr. Stuart of Ame- 
 rica. Under a profession of orthodoxy, this M'riter 
 has vitiated the fundamental principles of the Gos- 
 pel, and his admirers in this country have caught 
 the infection from his example. There are com- 
 paratively few in any denomination, that are now 
 found to take their stand for ancient orthodoxy in 
 its full extent. The example of Mr. Stuart is most 
 pernicious in this respect. He has lowered the tone 
 of doctrine ; and even, in many cases, what he vindi- 
 cates, is vindicated only as the most probable among 
 doubtful conclusions. His manner is most disimre- 
 nuous ; for, while he virtually undermines a doctrine, 
 he affects to consider that he is only removing certain 
 foundations on which it is usually placed, while he 
 leaves others undisturbed. I proclaim open undis- 
 
119 
 
 guised warfare against all such modes of interpreting 
 the Scriptures. I call on the friends of Scriptural 
 truth to avow it and defend it, in its own heavenly- 
 light, without any alloy from the wisdom of this 
 world. The principles and criticism that deliver us 
 from submission to rulers in temporal things, will de- 
 liver us from the most important of the doctrines 
 of Scripture. Let us endeavour to adorn the doc- 
 trine of God our Saviour in all things. 
 
 Let Christians remember that, if they are com 
 manded to submit to the rulers of this world in all 
 temporal things, they have the consolation to reflect, 
 that these rulers are in the hands of their God. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 REMARKS ON A REVIEW IN THE UNITED SECESSION 
 MAGAZINE. 
 
 Since the preceding part of this work went to 
 press, I have seen in the United Secession Magazine, 
 which has just made its appearance, the review of 
 Mr. Haldane's Letters to Dr. Brown, on which I 
 think it right to make a few observations. The re- 
 viewer commences with a representation of facts that 
 
120 
 
 altogether astounds me. " It is not a little strange/' 
 says he, " that in the nineteenth century of the Chris- 
 tian era, under a government styling itself Christian, 
 occasion should be furnished for acting on the prin- 
 ciple, WE SHOULD OBEY GOD RATHER THAN MAN ; it IS 
 
 still more strange, that the necessity should exist, in 
 opposition to the published sentiments of Christian 
 men and Christian ministers, of defending that prin- 
 ciple ; it is most strange of all, that excellent men and 
 ministers of Christ, for acting on it and defending it, 
 should be branded by their neighbours, with more 
 than Jewish virulence, as pestilent fellows, and movers 
 of sedition, and ringleaders of the rebellious. Is this 
 to be regarded as a doctrine of doubtful casuistry," 
 &c. 
 
 Is it possible that truth and candour could make 
 such a representation of the grounds of this contro- 
 versy ? Does Mr. Haldane make it a matter of con- 
 troversy whether we should obey God rather than 
 man ? Has he called Dr. Brown to account for act- 
 ing on this principle ? Has he laid him under the 
 necessity of defending this principle ? Has he brand- 
 ed his antagonist for acting on it and defending it ? 
 He has not. This is a common principle, as fully re- 
 cognised by Mr. Haldane, as it is vindicated by Dr. 
 Brown. He has not regarded this doctrine as one of 
 doubtful casuistry. The reviewer, like Dr. Brown 
 himself, begs the question at issue, and takes it for 
 granted that the paying of a specific tax for a purpose 
 disapproved by the payer, is sinful ; therefore, it is 
 obeying man rather than God. So far from proceeding 
 on the principle, that obedience to the law of God 
 
121 
 
 may be set aside by the law of man, the Letters re- 
 ferred to, from beginning to end, proceed on the 
 ground that the duty of paying taxes rests solely on 
 the authority of God. The question to be discussed 
 is not, whether in any instance, we are not to obev 
 God rather than man, but whether the paying of a 
 tax avows approbation of its purpose. If Dr. Brown 
 or the reviewer can convince me, that to pay a tax 
 necessarily implies approbation of its object, I will 
 unite with him in calling loudly on all Christians to 
 go to the scaffold rather than pay a tax, whose object 
 they consider sinful. Let us then fight the battle fairly, 
 without any mean attempt to carry the ignorant with us, 
 by misrepresenting the grounds of the controversy. If 
 he shews me any truth which I have not yet seen, 
 I am not afraid to vindicate it against all the churches 
 in existence. I stand up in defence of the law of 
 Christ. I write to benefit the very persons against 
 whom I write. If I have faithfully expounded the 
 law of Christ on this most important subject, it is the 
 interest, as well as the duty, of every Christian to re- 
 ceive it. No temptation, then, shall induce me to 
 discuss this subject, in any degree, with a bearing on 
 political subjects. I am aware of the odium that I 
 am likely to incur by defending a doctrine at present 
 so unpopular. But I have counted the cost. If God 
 is for me, who can be against me ? Relying on the 
 power of the God of truth, I do not despair of con- 
 vincing some of the Lord's people, that their views on 
 this subject are in opposition to the word of God. 
 
 What can be the object of this reviewer in proving 
 from an enumeration of Scripture examples that it 
 
122 
 
 is right to obey God rather than man? Does any 
 Christian dispute this ? If he thinks that this is the 
 question at issue, he must he so utterly void of dis- 
 cernment, as to be unfit for judging on any question. 
 If he knows that this is not the question at issue, 
 but affects to believe it, in order to carry the ig- 
 norance of his brethren with him, it is most foully 
 dishonest. Give me a law of Christ, and I imme- 
 diately submit. The extent of my allegiance is 
 bounded by the law of God. It is a most disen- 
 genuous thing to endeavour to enlist prejudice on either 
 side of this controversy. Let the question be deter- 
 mined solely by its own merits. 
 
 On the same ground the reviewer perceives a want 
 of appropriate application in the illustrations in the 
 Letters to Dr. Brown from the mutiny of the fleet 
 at the Nore, &c, and exclaims, " beautiful logic !" 
 Having disposed the premises to suit his purpose, he 
 concludes for his opponent, " therefore non-com- 
 pliance with the impious and illegal commands of the 
 rulers of the earth is active rebellion against both di- 
 vine and human law, and shall certainly not escape 
 the vengeance of heaven ! To obey God rather than 
 man, is to resist both God and man ! \" Here the bad 
 logic is all with the reviewer. The object in the pas- 
 sage referred to is to prove the unsoundness of the 
 distinction between what is called active and passive 
 resistance. And are not the illustrations quite in 
 point ? They are most appropriate for the purpose 
 for which they are employed. But the writer does 
 not, as the reviewer represents, employ these illustra- 
 tions to prove that it is rebellion against God not 
 
123 
 
 to pay taxes. Whether it is rebellion against God 
 not to pay a particular tax, depends upon the fact, 
 whether God has commanded his people to pay taxes 
 without exception. Let the reviewer then affix an- 
 other mark of admiration to his observation. But let 
 him not forget to warn his reader that it is pointed at 
 his own want of discrimination. 
 
 I need not run over all the instances of fearful con- 
 sequences that the reviewer draws from his opponent's 
 illustrations. They are not legitimately drawn. 
 " Who does not perceive/' says the reviewer, " that 
 the above passage obliterates the distinction between 
 Divine and human government, elevates the edicts of 
 the potsherds of the earth to an equality with those 
 of the eternal, and prostrates with one blow the pre- 
 rogatives of conscience and of God V What bombast ! 
 What emptiness ! What folly ! If Mr. Haldane has 
 done so much at one blow, a second blow, I think, 
 must have destroyed the very universe. But the il- 
 lustration from the mutiny, and the fact with regard 
 to Saul's sparing Agag, bear only on the point with 
 respect to the futility of the distinction between 
 active and passive resistance. They have no aspect 
 towards the distinction between Divine and human 
 government. As far as these illustrations are con- 
 cerned, the writer might teach that it is sinful to pay 
 a tax when its object is sinful. This reviewer is ex- 
 ceedingly obtuse in his intellect. Yet it is most amus- 
 ing to see how he affects the philosopher. He plunges 
 into the very depths of metaphysics. But I will not 
 suffer him to emerge. I will drown him in the whirl- 
 pool of his own metaphysical distinctions. " Mr. Hal- 
 
1U 
 
 dane's disposition/' says he, " to blend divine and 
 human authority, occasionally leads him even into 
 wilder extravagances than the above passage con- 
 tains. In one passage, for instance, he shews that 
 he is incapable of seeing a difference between the 
 united disposition of a people to set aside or change 
 their existing government, and the general disposition 
 manifested by the French nation at the Revolution, 
 to set aside the fourth commandment. In Mr. Hal- 
 dane's code of morals these occupy the same category 
 of rebellion against God ! ! !" Here are three marks 
 of admiration. Let them be increased five hun- 
 dred times, and I will affix them all to this remark of 
 the reviewer. There is no extravagance here. There 
 is no essential difference between setting aside the 
 fourth commandment in Exodus xx. 8-11, and the 
 commandment in Rom. xiii. 1-7. If God enjoins on 
 every soul obedience to the existing powers in Rom. 
 xiii. 1-7, to set aside that law and justify rebellion, 
 is as truly contrary to God's authority, as it would be 
 to abolish the Sabbath. Attempts may be made to 
 reconcile Rom. xiii. 1-7 with the right and duty of 
 rebellion. Equally plausible attempts have been 
 made to show that the Sabbath is only a Jewish in- 
 stitution. What has the united disposition of a na- 
 tion to do with the authority of the law of Christ ? 
 Can the united disposition of the French nation justify 
 a breach of the law Rom. xiii. 1-7 ? Saying is one 
 thing, and proving is another. The reviewer may, 
 in his lack of proof, call out extravagance, and make 
 a copious use of marks of admiration. But this can 
 succeed only with those who do not think. 
 
125 
 
 Throughout the whole, the reviewer proceeds on a 
 mistake or a misrepresentation of the question at issue. 
 " How any individual/' says he, " who knpws his 
 right hand from his left, can persuade himself that to 
 countenance and support sin by the payment of mo- 
 ney, is less a subject of moral responsibility than to 
 do so by any other means, is beyond our ability to 
 explain. Does the law of God, which takes cogni- 
 zance of thoughts, words, and actions, exclude the 
 use of our property alone from its domain ?" Re- 
 marks of this kind are beneath criticism. Does any 
 man maintain that it is right, in any circumstances, to 
 countenance sin? Do the letters contain any such 
 sentiment ? T ask the reviewer, who it is that teaches 
 that Christians are not responsible for the use of their 
 money ? Is there no end to his misrepresentation ? 
 We hold that a Christian is responsible for the use of 
 every shilling which he possesses. Who is this ano- 
 nymous calumniator, then, who represents the con- 
 trary ? Does any man urge the paying of taxes, on 
 the supposition, that in many instances the paying of 
 them countenances sin ? Do we not expressly de- 
 clare that we justify the paying of all taxes, because 
 it is the divine commandment, and the paying of them 
 does not imply approbation of their object. If our op- 
 ponents will not receive this, but will eternally repeat 
 their slander, we must regard them as devoid of prin- 
 ciple and candour. Cease, then, to misrepresent and 
 to argue the matter on grounds that we do not hold. 
 The lengthened proof that the reviewer gives of the 
 truth, that we are accountable for the use of property, 
 is no more to the purpose than a calculation in algebra. 
 
126 
 
 The Letters having admitted that it is not sinful 
 for a Christian to pay a tax for Juggernaut, while they 
 teach that it would be sinful to fire a salute in honour 
 of the idol, or to employ the hands in dragging the 
 idol-car, the reviewer draws the following conclusion : 
 *' A Christian, it seems, may do what he pleases with 
 his money, provided, he keeps his hands from sinning." 
 Is this honest ? Is the conclusion legitimate ? Who 
 teaches that a Christian may do what he pleases with 
 his money ? The ground of the distinction referred 
 to is, that the payment of a tax implies no approba- 
 tion of its object, but to assist in the worship of an 
 idol is idolatry. 
 
 " Let us examine for a moment," says the re- 
 viewer, " this great discovery in Christian morals. A 
 tax for a specific purpose being one of which the pur- 
 pose is specified, and avowed and proclaimed in the 
 law by which it is ordained, it necessarily follows, 
 that that purpose must be known to all from whom 
 it is exacted ; the very terms of the demand describe 
 the purpose of the tax ; yet, says this modem Solo- 
 mon, the law of God absolves the Christian from any 
 inquiry into that purpose." Where is- the incon- 
 sistency here ? The reviewer takes it for granted 
 that the purpose of the tax being known, it must be 
 sinful to pay it. Does not this take for granted the 
 thing to be proved ? He states his doctrine as a self- 
 evident truth. We aver that the knowledge of the 
 sinful purpose of a tax does not hinder us from pay- 
 ing the tax. If our doctrine is wrong, let this be 
 proved. Its falsehood is not to be taken for granted, 
 or the opposite forced on us by marks of admiration. 
 
127 
 
 The contrary has been proved, and has not been re- 
 butted. 
 
 But the reviewer proceeds : — " In other words/' 
 says he, " God tells his people that they should ask 
 no questions about the destination of the tax ; and 
 though they know all about it without asking, yet, as 
 they can easily pretend to be ignorant, they should 
 just pay, and say nothing about it." Pretend to be 
 ignorant. Have the Letters said, that when we pay 
 an obnoxious tax, we ought to pretend to be ignorant 
 of its object. Does not the reviewer know that we 
 defend the paying of a tax, with the fullest knowledge 
 of its obnoxious purpose ? 
 
 " Mr. Haldane," says the reviewer, " further con- 
 tends, thafr the government requires from its subjects 
 no sanction of the purposes for which a specific tax is 
 exacted, or to which it is applied. This is not true." 
 Why is it not true. I assert, it is true. Now, let us 
 come to the grapple. The reviewer, however, has 
 proof at hand. " Laws," says he, f ' usually contain 
 preambles, setting forth the necessity, or importance, 
 or excellence of the purposes for which they are made." 
 But does a preamble, setting forth the necessity, or 
 importance, or excellence of the purpose of a law, de- 
 mand that all who obey such a law, should acknoAv- 
 ledge the necessity, or the importance, or the excel- 
 lence of the law ? It does not. The reviewer con- 
 founds things as different as light and darkness. The 
 preamble contains the view of the purpose of the law, 
 in the estimation of those who make it, but does not 
 imply that this is the estimation of those who submit 
 to it. But he tells us, that " these preambles are 
 
128 
 
 addressed to rational beings, and must therefore be 
 designed to receive the approbation and sanction of 
 the subject to the purposes in view." Very true. 
 No doubt this is their design. But a design to pro- 
 duce a certain opinion in men, and to require the pro- 
 fession of a certain opinion, are things as different as 
 anv two things in nature. The least decree of discri- 
 mination will discern this distinction. Nothing can be 
 more easy than to put this question to an infallible test. 
 Will Dr. Brown be allowed to pay the Annuity Tax, 
 and at the same time protest against its object ? If 
 any tax for a purpose disapproved, is so imposed, as 
 to imply approbation, I consent that it shall be resist- 
 ed. In such cases, it is not purely of the nature of a 
 tax, which is satisfied with payment, but is designed 
 as a snare to test principle. 
 
 <: But though it were true," continues the reviewer, 
 " that government does not require the subject to 
 sanction the destination of a specific tax, is the con- 
 science of the subject thereby relieved V What has 
 brought the conscience into jeopardy in paying a tax, 
 if approbation of it is not implied in the paying of 
 it ? And how can approbation be necessarily implied 
 in the paying of it, if approbation is not demanded ? 
 if even disapprobation may be expressed ? " Will 
 government," ashs the reviewer, " answer for him 
 before the bar of God, for doing an action which his 
 conscience condemns V Is not this a begging of the 
 question ? Why does his conscience condemn this 
 action ? Docs not this take the sinfulness of the ac- 
 tion for granted ? 
 
 " Or has the law of God," continues the reviewer, 
 
129 
 
 not merely absolved him from inquiry into the 
 moral character of certain actions,, but absolved him 
 also from consistency, and warranted him to do what 
 he esteems sinful, merely because he is not required 
 to approve of his conduct V There is a host of errors 
 here. God's command to pay a tax without respect 
 to its purpose, does not imply that we are not to form 
 our judgment of the moral character of its purpose. 
 What does the writer mean by being absolved from 
 consistency ? Does he suppose that we teach that a 
 man should pay a tax while he believes that it is sin- 
 ful to pay it ? We teach no such thing. We abhor 
 the sentiment. What does the reviewer mean by not 
 being required to approve his own deed? The ap- 
 probation in question respects not his deed ; for of 
 his own deed his approbation is necessarily implied. 
 It respects the purpose of the tax, of which the payer 
 may disapprove. 
 
 On the distinction between general and specific 
 taxes, the reviewer observes : — " A general tax, every 
 one knows, who knows the meaning of the English 
 language, is avowedly raised for one purpose, and 
 that a good purpose, the general support of civil go- 
 vernment." This is a mere quibbling on words. 
 The purpose of a general tax is one, merely as a 
 whole, consisting of different parts. A general tax is 
 for every purpose to which it is avowedly applied. 
 I presume I have said in the preceding work, what 
 is fully sufficient to convince any impartial reader on 
 this subject. 
 
 " If, then," continues the reviewer, " the rulers 
 apply it to any other particular purposes than those 
 
130 
 
 which are comprehended within the legitimate sphere 
 of civil authority, they misapply both the money and 
 the tax." Is it a misapplication of a general tax, to 
 apply it to any of the avowed purposes for which it 
 is raised ? But even if it is misapplied, why is the 
 general tax to be paid after its application to sinful 
 purposes is known ? If it is our money and not a 
 debt, why do we continue to give it, after it is known 
 to be misapplied ? Would we do so, were it a con- 
 tribution ? And if we pay a general tax because we 
 are compelled, why may we not pay a specific tax for 
 the same reason ? 
 
 " But what if this law," asks the reviewer, " by 
 which a tax has been imposed, be a profane usurpa- 
 tion of the prerogatives of God ?" I answer, if it is, 
 let it be disobeyed. " What," the reviewer continues 
 to ask, " if it be a direct violation of the prior and 
 paramount law of the Creator, which no legislature, 
 therefore, has a right to make, and to which no hu- 
 man being has a right to consent V I answer, if it 
 is, let it be disobeyed. We must obey God rather 
 than man. But I humbly ask the sage reviewer, 
 what is the authority on which we should believe 
 that taxes of any kind are of this hideous nature ? 
 Has not the contrary of this been proved in the Let- 
 ters ? But I need not ask the question. He has al- 
 ready given the answer most precisely. He has given 
 us his solemn word for the truth of the opinion. et Yet 
 this," says he, u is the just character of every tax ex- 
 acted specifically for a sinful purpose." If saying is 
 proving, there never was a more convincing writer 
 than Dr. Brown and this reviewer. He speaks of the 
 
131 
 
 analogy between a tax and a debt. He might as well 
 speak of the analogy that the structure of the parts of 
 one horse has to that of another horse. A tax is a 
 debt in the true sense of the word. Does not the 
 Apostle say, — " Render then to all their dues/' and 
 in exemplification adds, — " Tribute to whom tribute, 
 custom to whom custom ?" 
 
 The reviewer closes his examination of the Letters 
 with some observations on the censure of Dr. Brown's 
 canon with respect to the necessity of certain kinds of 
 previous knowledge, in order to be able to understand 
 any portion of Scripture. The Letters assert that 
 no circumstances, in reference to Rom. xiii. 1 — J } 
 " are to be taken into account in applying the duty 
 to times and places." How does the reviewer rebut 
 this ? Why, he contents himself with asking, if Mr. 
 Haldane, in writing his Commentary on the Epistle to 
 the Romans, divested his mind of all knowledge, but 
 that which he acquired from the Bible : if the know- 
 ledge of the original and the mother tongue is in- 
 cluded in the censure, &c. This is mere trifling. 
 Are these things among the prerequisites specified by 
 Dr. Brown ? There is almost no kind of knowledge 
 that may not be useful to an expositor of Scripture, 
 for illustration, confirmation, &c. &c. But this is 
 quite a different thing from making a knowledge of 
 antiquity, not afforded by the Bible, essential to 
 the understanding of what it reveals. In fact, the 
 canon referred to makes the Bible a sealed book, not 
 only to the illiterate, but also to the learned ; and not 
 only the Bible, but every book of every age, except 
 fche one in which we live. On this principle, 1 can- 
 
I, 
 
 not, for instance, understand one of the most perspi- 
 cuous books ever written, the papers of Addison in 
 the Spectator. Why do I not understand them? 
 Because I have not a knowledge of the age in which 
 they were written. And why have I not this know- 
 ledge ? Is it not to be obtained from books ? But 
 without the prerequisite knowledge, I cannot under- 
 stand these books. All the books must be equally 
 unintelligible, till I bring with me the prerequisite 
 knowledge. Where, then, am I to get it ? I say 
 nothing at all as to the means by which we must 
 understand Moses. To what antiquarian shall we 
 have recourse to illuminate the darkness of this primi- 
 tive writer ? 
 
 Upon the whole, this review has utterly failed in 
 relieving Dr. Brown. It has not delivered him from 
 one of his difficulties. It is one of the most dis- 
 ingenuous productions on which I ever set my eyes. 
 From first to last, it proceeds on the supposition that 
 Dr. Brown's opponent contends that Christians ought 
 to obey man rather than God. Can he be ignorant 
 that this is a foul calumny ? If he does not mean to 
 deceive the people, why does he prove what his op- 
 ponents hold as firmly as he does himself, and which, 
 in its nature, is a self-evident truth ? " That the 
 principle of obeying God rather than man," says the 
 reviewer in the April number, Ci and conduct clearly 
 founded on this principle, should have, first of all, 
 furnished ground of heinous offence to a man who 
 ever published, and never retracted, such sentiments 
 as follow, was truly an approach to something new 
 under the sun. e Civil government cannot be a Divine 
 
183 
 
 ordinance to regulate men in matters of religion and 
 conscience, — with these it has nothing at all to do.' " 
 " When the laws of men run counter to the laws of 
 God, they cease from that moment, in so far as they do 
 so, to be binding ; and with the Apostles Peter and 
 John, we may appeal to all rulers, elders, scribes, and 
 priests, whether it be right, in the sight of God, to 
 hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye." 
 Was ever any calumny more groundless than this ? 
 Can any thing but a malignant disposition find any 
 inconsistency between the sentiments referred to, and 
 opposition to Dr. Brown's views on the doctrine of 
 obedience to civil government ? Does Dr. Brown's 
 opponent now renounce the sentiments referred to ? 
 Does he now hold that, instead of obeying God rather 
 than man, we should obey man rather than God'? 
 Does he now hold that civil rulers have a right to 
 direct Christians in the worship of God ? Has he ex- 
 pressed any thing like this in his Letters to Dr. 
 Brown ? Does he not hold as strongly as Dr. Brown, 
 or, as language can express the sentiment, that no 
 government is to be obeyed when it commands what 
 God forbids, or forbids what God commands ? Shall 
 we ; then, have no end to this calumnious mode of de- 
 fending Dr. Brown ? Can our opponents more clearly 
 manifest their own sense of the weakness of their 
 cause, than by their constant endeavours to uphold 
 it, not by argument, but by misrepresentation, and 
 virulent personalities? The reviewer would have 
 done Dr. Brown and his cause more service, if, in- 
 stead of misrepresenting his opponent, he had been 
 able to defend his positions. But this he has not 
 
134 
 
 done in a single instance. This he has not, in 
 many instances, even attempted. Why, for instance, 
 has he not attempted to defend the use which Dr. 
 Brown has made of the circumstances of the Roman 
 Christians as a small body, many of them foreigners, 
 &c. which has heen so powerfully assaulted in his 
 opponent's Letters. Has not this been shewn in them 
 to be " the very sum and substance of all the statements 
 of the Rationalists" ? The substance of these Let- 
 ters the reviewer has not met at all. 
 
 Why has not the reviewer attempted to vindicate 
 that impious canon of Dr. Brown, by which he teaches 
 that the Epistles of the Apostles are one thing to 
 those addressed by name, and another thing to us ? 
 Can ingenuity devise a more effectual plan to make 
 void every part of the Word of God ? Does it not 
 overlook a most striking peculiarity in the manner of 
 revelation ? The law was immediately given to the 
 generation of the Israelites who were with Moses in 
 the wilderness. Yet it was equally addressed to all 
 generations of them as they appeared in the world. 
 " The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee & prophet 
 from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me ; 
 unto him ye shall hearken." Deut. xviii. 15. Here 
 we see that the whole house of Israel is considered as 
 one body ; and in addressing those present he speaks 
 what applies to the Israelites in the time of Christ. 
 " Unto thee," — " from the midst of thee," — " unto him 
 ye shall hearken." That generation was commanded to 
 hearken to him, but the things of which he speaks were 
 to be verified in a very distant generation. In the same 
 peculiar manner our Lord addresses the Jews of his 
 
135 
 
 time as addressed in what was immediately spoken 
 to Moses. " Jesus answered and said unto them, 
 Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power 
 of God. For in the resurrection they neither marry, 
 nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of 
 God in heaven. But as touching the resurrection of 
 the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken 
 unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, 
 and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. God is 
 not the God of the dead but of the living." Matt, 
 xxii. 29-31. Here what was immediately spoken to 
 Moses is said by our Lord to be spoken to those whom 
 he addressed. " That which was spoken unto you" 
 How awful, then, is it for Dr. Brown to invent a dis- 
 tinction in the application of the law of Christ with 
 respect to the first Christians, and those of all other 
 generations ! 
 
 If the discussion of this subject is to be continued, let 
 us hereafter discuss it on its own merits, without any 
 mean artifices to misrepresent the grounds of the con- 
 troversy, or to mislead the simplicity of the people. 
 Let us employ every eiFort to expound the law in 
 question faithfully according to the laws of language, 
 and not according to the traditions of the fathers. 
 But it is not by anonymous squibs in a Magazine 
 that this question can be settled. It is one of great im- 
 portance, and demands the fullest consideration. It is 
 a question of awful moment, as it respects obedience 
 to God, and for the peace of the world. Let the con- 
 troversy then be conducted on both sides with the 
 deepest impression of our responsibility before the 
 Son of God. If the mode of attack exemplified in 
 
136 
 
 this review is continued, and if anonymous misrepre- 
 sentation and personality is to be substituted for ar- 
 gument, we shall hold the editor of the Magazine re- 
 sponsible, and answer him as the author by name. 
 
 I have examined Dr. Brown's principles of interpre- 
 tation, with his criticism and reasoning. Let me be 
 met, then, upon every point, and let my opponent, 
 step by step, defend what I have attacked. I have 
 no object but to ascertain truth, and bring all my 
 Christian brethren to obey this most important law of 
 our common Lord. Again and again, I beseech my 
 brethren to consider, that it is the law of Christ for 
 which I contend, and that it is the interest of all Chris- 
 tians to hear and obey it. 
 
 Dr. Brown has incurred a fearful responsibility in 
 this matter. If he is wrong, he is guilty in no ordi- 
 nary degree. What would be the consequence if all 
 dissenters should act upon his doctrine ? Should I be- 
 come his convert, instead of teaching my brethren in 
 Ireland to pay tithe as they do other debts, I must 
 teach them to suffer confiscation of goods and im- 
 prisonment of person rather than submit. What 
 would be the consequence if Dr. Brown's brethren of 
 the Irish Secession should become his converts ? On 
 his principle it would be impossible for a Christian to 
 live in a heathen country. Is it a light thing to fill 
 the world with confusion, by acting on a sentiment 
 which is not warranted by Scripture ? It is a serious 
 thing to disturb the government of a country ; it is a 
 serious thing to involve the people of God in perse- 
 cution by an ignorance of his law. I entreat my 
 brethren, then, to pause and reflect and thoroughly 
 
137 
 
 examine the question in the light of Scripture evi- 
 dence, before they lend their names to the disturbers 
 of the repose of the world. Shew me a law of Christ, 
 and I will risk all consequences. But I cannot court 
 popularity by trampling on the most express authority 
 of the Lord Jesus Christ. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Mr. Menzies, in defending himself as the trans- 
 lator of Tholuck's work on the Epistle to the Ro- 
 mans, alleges my authority, with that of several others, 
 in extenuation of the guilt of his author in charging 
 error on the writers of Scripture. The most careless 
 reader, however, may perceive, that in the passage to 
 which he refers in my work on the Principles of Bib- 
 lical Interpretation, it is an occasional want of con- 
 formity to the usual rules of syntax, according to the 
 best use of the language, that I admit to be exempli- 
 fied in the inspired writers. But while certain forms 
 of speech found in Scripture are admitted to be devia- 
 tions from the rules of syntax, according to the best 
 use, they are recognised by me, without exception, as 
 the words of the Holy Spirit, intentionally employed 
 in the divine wisdom. I ascribe such forms of speech, 
 when employed in the Scriptures, as much to the in- 
 spiration of God, as I do the finest instances of sub- 
 limity- And I find equally in both a manifestation of 
 the divine wisdom. 
 
189 
 
 Human wisdom naturally concludes, that if God 
 would communicate a revelation to men, the book 
 that contains it would he the very perfection of elo- 
 quence, according to the highest requirements of art 
 The wisdom of the heathen world alleged that if 
 Jupiter would speak to men, he would use the style 
 of Plato ; and many have demanded the perfection of 
 the art of eloquence in the Sible. While some have 
 thought themselves entitled to reject the Scriptures as 
 a revelation from God, from the imperfections in their 
 style ; others have thought they were serving the 
 cause of Christ, when they endeavoured to defend 
 the grammatical accuracy and rhetorical perfection of 
 every thing contained in Scripture. God has poured 
 contempt on human wisdom ; and whilst in some of 
 the perfections of style, the Scriptures immensely ex- 
 ceed any human writing, they want others that art 
 demands. 
 
 While I have, on several occasions, defended the 
 doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures, without 
 the exception of a single word in the original, I am 
 in the habit, as often as an occasion offers, of strongly 
 stating, that this does not imply the invariable perfec- 
 tion of Scripture style, according to the rules of art 
 I do so, because instead of considering the deviations 
 from grammatical or rhetorical rules, an objection to 
 the inspiration of Scripture, I am convinced that it is 
 only on the ground that grammatical and rhetorical 
 perfection is not necessary in the words of the Holy 
 Spirit, that inspiration can be vindicated. Some per- 
 sons are startled when they hear any kind of imper- 
 fection to be admitted in the language of Scripture. 
 
140 
 
 I am glad to find such jealousy for the honour of the 
 word of God. Yet these fears are unfounded, and 
 their wisdom betrays the very cause they would de- 
 fend. They are guilty of the very error that they 
 condemn in those who deny verbal inspiration. They 
 who deny verbal inspiration, rest on the theory that 
 such inspiration is not necessary ; and therefore, that 
 such inspiration was not given. They who labour to 
 vindicate every expression of Scripture as being con- 
 formable to the rules of grammar and rhetoric, do so 
 on the supposition that the Scripture, if it is verbally 
 inspired, must have every perfection of style. Now, 
 whether the style of Scripture is perfect or imperfect, 
 with respect to the rules of art, can never be lawfully 
 determined by a theory, but must be ascertained as a 
 matter of fact. The man, then, who admits that the 
 doctrine of inspiration implies that the language of 
 Scripture must be faultless as to the rules of art, be- 
 trays the book of God into the hands of its enemies, 
 and enables the infidel to reject it on good grounds, 
 as well as the opponent of verbal inspiration to deny 
 its verbal inspiration. In these circumstances, every 
 instance that can be pointed out, in which a Scripture 
 expression does not manifest conformity to the laws 
 of syntax or rhetoric, is fatal to the doctrine of verbal 
 inspiration. 
 
 But if the subject is viewed in the light in which 
 I have always held it forth, the defender of verbal in- 
 spiration is not disturbed with any number of instances 
 which deviate from grammatical or rhetorical rules. 
 Our first principle is, that language may be inspired 
 by the Holy Spirit, which does not perfectly observe 
 
141 
 
 the rules of grammar and rhetoric. The fact is as 
 clear as the light of heaven, and no competent judge 
 will deny it, that the rules of human art are not al- 
 ways observed in the compositions of Scripture. If, 
 then, we cannot hold verbal inspiration, consistently 
 with this fact, we must be obliged to give it up. The 
 view which I have given of this matter leaves no diffi- 
 culty on the .subject ; and I am glad that Mr. Menzies 
 has given me an opportunity to explain my view fully 
 on a point so necessary to be understood. 
 
 With respect to the extent of the existence of 
 Hebraisms in the New Testament, I have never pledg- 
 ed myself. But if ever I shall have time to finish the 
 work on the Principles of Biblical Interpretation, from 
 which Mr. Menzies quotes, I must discuss that sub- 
 ject, as it has been made by Scripture interpreters a 
 source of interpretation. 
 
 As some have thought that an inspired language 
 must be the very perfection of art, so others have re- 
 presented barbarism as its essential characteristic. 
 This was the doctrine of the celebrated Dr. Warbur- 
 ton, who was fully refuted by Dr. Leland of Dublin 
 College. The great error on both sides is, that men 
 judge from theory and not from an actual examination 
 of the facts. Dr. Warburton's theory is absurdly false, 
 and his proofs are a most violent distortion of facts. 
 Judging from the Bible itself, my verdict is, that in 
 every excellence of style that is founded on the con- 
 stitution of man, the Bible goes immeasurably beyond 
 all writings. In simplicity, in sublimity, in vehe- 
 mence, in energy, in pathos, in tenderness, &c. &c. 
 no human writings can be compared with the bool: 
 
142 
 
 of God. In these things, compared with Scripture, 
 Homer and Milton are hut vulgar authors. But in 
 excellencies merely conventional, the language of the 
 Holy Spirit does not deign to court admiration. This 
 criterion will harmonize every deviation from the rules 
 of human art that may be pointed out in the book of 
 God, with that majesty of diction, that awful elo- 
 quence, which is to be found in the Bible, and no 
 where else but in the Bible. 
 
 " Mr. Carson," says Mr. Menzies, " admits the ex- 
 istence of deviations from the laws of grammar, accord- 
 ing to the best use," of " literary blemish," of " in- 
 accuracies of phraseology that may be found in the 
 carelessness of human composition." Yes, Mr. Car- 
 son admits all this ; but he holds that these " devia- 
 tions from the laws of grammar," these " literary 
 blemishes," these et inaccuracies of phraseology," are 
 all the work of the Holy Spirit, that they are used in 
 the most perfect wisdom, and that they serve God's 
 purpose better than conformity to the rules of art 
 would have done. Is there any thing in this that will 
 countenance the bold blasphemy of Dr. Tholuck, who 
 admits " errors of the pen, forgetfulness," &c. in an 
 Apostle ? No, no, I have no sympathy with Dr. Tho- 
 luck in the numerous passages in which he speaks in 
 a disparaging manner of the Word of God. 
 
 " He (Mr. Carson) speaks of the Bible being above 
 attention to minute accuracies, and laughs at the offi- 
 cious zeal of the critics in pointing out means of dig- 
 nifying its grammatical inaccuracies with the honours 
 of their art." Yes, I do so. But does this admit 
 error in an inspired writer ? Is this in the most dis- 
 
143 
 
 tant degree akin to what we blame in Dr. Thoiuck ? 
 " Luke i. 64," says Mr. Menzies, " is spoken of as 
 merely an instance of careless composition into which 
 even the most accurate and attentive writers will fall, 
 when they do not frequently revise their composition." 
 Look again, Mr. Menzies, and you will see that I 
 have not said that Luke i. 64, is an instance of care- 
 less composition ; but that " the deviation from rule," 
 of which Luke i. 64 is an example, is an instance of 
 careless composition. Speaking of the form of ex- 
 pression in general, of which Luke i. 64 is an exam- 
 ple, and asserting that it is not a figure of any kind, 
 I say, " The deviation from rule is not intentionally 
 for ornament. It is merely an instance," &c. It is 
 then the deviation from rule of which the assertion is 
 made. I mean the form of expression in general, 
 without intending to apply it to Luke i. 64. The 
 form of expression in human writings has such an 
 origin. But instead of ascribing such an origin to it 
 in Luke i. 64, I expressly say, " There is no reason, 
 then, why the Holy Spirit should not imitate a style 
 so perfectly natural ?" Do not I here expressly assert 
 that in Luke i. 64, this form of expression is inten- 
 tionally adopted by the Spirit of God ? Does not this 
 imply that the preceding observation refers to the de- 
 viation from rule in general, and not to the example 
 in Luke i. 64 ? How could other writers be liable to 
 fall into that particular example of this deviation from 
 rule ? It is into that particular deviation from rule, 
 and not into that particular example of it, that the 
 most accurate and attentive writers are liable to fall. 
 My meaning is not that an error in the grammatical 
 
144 
 
 construction, Luke i. 64, was committed through haste 
 or carelessness in the inspired writer, but that the in- 
 spired writer, uttering the words of the Holy Spirit, 
 used a form of expression which in human writings is 
 an instance of deviation from rule occasioned by haste 
 or carelessness even in the most accurate judges of 
 the correctness and elegancies of composition. 
 
 " The same passage," says Mr. Menzies, " is after- 
 wards spoken of as an oversight," &c. Look again, 
 Mr. Menzies. I have not said, and I do not mean, 
 that Luke i, 64 is an oversight ; but that the " devia- 
 tion from rule" exemplified in that passage is an over- 
 sight. In hasty composition the deviation will easily 
 escape the notice of the most accurate judge of com- 
 position. But I do not mean that the particular in- 
 stance of deviation in Luke i. 64, is the result of haste 
 or carelessness. I am speaking of the deviation as a 
 mode of speech. When I say, " This is an oversight," 
 &c, let the preceding context be examined, and it 
 will be found that the antecedent to this is not the pas- 
 sage, Luke i. 64 ; but " the deviation from rule." 
 Indeed, when in my writings on the doctrine of inspi- 
 ration, I have so expressly extended it to every word 
 originally in the Scriptures, I could not be supposed, 
 without the most reckless inconsistency, to find in 
 them any deficiency from human weakness. Had Mr. 
 Menzies been as careful in ascertaining the meaning 
 of my expression by my explicitly avowed sentiments, 
 as he has been with respect to Dr. Tholuck, he would 
 not have perceived any shadow of sanction in me for 
 the unhallowed freedom of his author in treating the 
 word of the living God. I cannot read Dr. Tho- 
 
145 
 
 luck's work on the Epistle to the Romans without 
 unmingled abhorrence of the manner in which he 
 treats the words of the Spirit of God. 
 
 When examples of deviation from rule, then, are 
 found in the Scriptures, my practice is, not to seek a 
 sanction for them in the barbarous terms of art that 
 have been invented to explain them as figures of 
 speech, but to shew that the Holy Spirit pours con- 
 tempt on that which is highest in the estimation of 
 human wisdom. I admire in them also the divine 
 wisdom that makes them a gin and a snare to human 
 wisdom. God sends his word to the world in a plain 
 garb, and the world will not receive it, because it 
 comes not bedizzened with all the tinselled ornaments 
 of art. I have a sovereign contempt for the under- 
 standing of any man that rejects revelation, because 
 it speaks not always in accordance with human 
 rules of eloquence. The wisdom of heaven is in its 
 eloquence, and the wisdom of heaven is in its " rude- 
 ness of speech" But in these statements have I any 
 fellowship with the flippancy and irreverence with re- 
 spect to Scripture language manifested by Dr. Tho- 
 luck ? Does not Dr. Tholuck censure and amend the 
 style of Scripture as freely as any reviewer would the 
 writing of a human author ? Not only does he take 
 the liberty of questioning the propriety of the language 
 of Scripture, he makes equally free with the matter. 
 I have no hostile feelings towards this eminent Ger- 
 man. I recognise him as a man of learning, and re- 
 joice to find him so strongly opposed to the Neologians. 
 But I believe that Mr. Haldane's discipline is more for 
 his advantage than is Mr. Menzies' praise. Were Dr. 
 Tholuck to receive correct views of divine truth, he 
 
146 
 
 might indeed be a second Luther to Germany. But 
 as far as I have examined any of his writings, there 
 is a lamentable deficiency in his knowledge of divine 
 truth, and a disgusting remainder of Neological phrase- 
 ology, not as yet completely purged out of his consti- 
 tution. I hope he will go forward ; and then I shall 
 joyfully bid him God speed. It is not, however, as a 
 commentator, that I think Dr. Tholuck is ever likely 
 to be a benefit to the church of God. Independ- 
 ently of his errors, I do not at all agree with the ge- 
 neral opinion that he is a great critic. Had I any ob- 
 ject in the assertion, I would not scruple to say that 
 his criticism is as faulty as his sentiments. I can find 
 no light in him ; and I have met several ministers of 
 the Gospel, who, looking upon him as an eminent- 
 ly learned man and profound critic, confess that they 
 can receive little instruction from his works. He is 
 very willing to give his help to the Apostles in correct- 
 ing their style ; but his own style is as dark as that of 
 an oracle. He is a mere book manufacturer. He 
 feasts us continually with the Fathers, with a dessert 
 from the Apocrypha, the Talmuds, and the Koran. 
 But whatever may be thought with respect to his 
 learning and talents, it is utterly impossible to free 
 him from the charge of treating the Scriptures with a 
 profane boldness. 
 
 By tlie same Author. 
 
 Examination of the Principles of Biblical Interpretation of 
 Ernesti, Amnion, Stuart, and other Philologists, 12mo. 1836. 
 
 Refutation of Dr. Henderson on Inspiration. With a Criti- 
 cal Discussion on 2 Tim. iii. 1 6. &c. &c. 
 
 PRICE TWO SHILLINGS. 
 
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