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The Respective Standpoints 
 of Psychology and Logic 
 
 (By ^ 
 
 MA TILDE CASTRO 
 
 PHILOSOPHIC STUDIES 
 
 ISSUED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
 NUMBER 4 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
 Agents 
 
 THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY, New Yotk 
 THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, London and Edinburgh 
 
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 1 
 
 
 The Department of Philosophy of the University of Chicago issues 
 a series of monographs in philosophy, including ethics, logic, and meta¬ 
 physics, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy. The successive 
 monographs are numbered consecutively with a view to their subsequent 
 publication in volumes. These studies are similar to the series of 
 Contributions to Philosophy, but do not contain psychological papers or 
 reprints of articles previously published. 
 
THE RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF 
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
THE RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF 
 PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 MATILDE CASTRO 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
 
Copyright 1913 By 
 The University of Chicago 
 
 All Rights Reserved 
 Published April 1913 
 
 Composed and Printed By 
 The University of Chicago Press 
 Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. 
 
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction.—The Problem. 9 
 
 1. The significance of the problem. 
 
 2. The dependence of the more ultimate metaphysical and epistemological 
 issues upon it. 
 
 3. The coincidence of the problems of metaphysics, epistemology, and 
 logic. 
 
 4. The claim of functional psychology to be identical with instrumental 
 logic. 
 
 5. The difference between the metaphysical corollaries of instrumental logic 
 and those of the traditional psychological standpoint. 
 
 ‘ 6. If continuous with instrumental logic, functional psychology must break 
 with the commonly accepted psychological standpoint. 
 
 7. There are no available definitions of logic and psychology. 
 
 8. A feasible method of determining their interrelationship is to follow psy¬ 
 chology through typical stages of its development to a point where it 
 appears to coincide with instrumental logic; 
 
 9. then, to determine how far it does assume the problem central to this 
 logic; 
 
 10. and, finally, to inquire how far its treatment of the problem yields 
 satisfactory consequences for the instrumentalist’s interpretation of 
 thought and reality. 
 
 Chapter I.—The Premises of Psychology ...... 16 
 
 1. The development of psychology as influenced by the necessity for an 
 account of thought which should make real and valid knowledge possible. 
 
 2. Psychology is now equipped with a cognitive unit which retains all the 
 characteristics of the idea of the associationists while possessing attri¬ 
 butes which give promise of making it an adequate tool of knowledge. 
 
 3. The plausibility of psychology’s claim to be identical with instrumental 
 logic. 
 
 4. If psychology assumes the task of logic it must face problems which it 
 has hitherto deemed out of its province. 
 
 5. To deal with these problems satisfactorily, it must revise its initial 
 premises. 
 
 6 . If the “idea” as the psychologist describes it does not, when put to 
 work in the judgment, yield consequences acceptable to instrumental 
 logic, psychology and this logic are not one. 
 
 5 
 
6 
 
 ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Chapter II. —The Idea in Psychology.28 
 
 1. If psychology is identical with logic it must discuss the relation of the 
 idea to reality. 
 
 2. The psychologist’s distinction of idea into “image” and “meaning” 
 lends itself to this purpose. 
 
 3. The ambiguity in the psychologist’s treatment of “image.” 
 
 4. The “image” is ascribed an indifferent function in the knowledge 
 process. 
 
 5. “Meaning,” in turn, does not aid in revealing the relation of thought 
 to reality. 
 
 6. The limitations of the psychologist’s cognitive unit. 
 
 7. Logic cannot accept the “idea” as the psychologist delivers it. 
 
 8. Logic must reinterpret not only “idea,” but “reality” also. 
 
 Chapter III. —The Locus of the Psychologist’s Standpoint 41 
 
 1. The logical situation from which the psychologist gets his data. 
 
 2. The psychologist’s dualism of thought and thing. 
 
 3. The logician’s interpretation of this dualism. 
 
 4. The judgment as the expression of the existential moment of reality; 
 the objectivity, permanence, and universality of thought. 
 
 5. The psychologist’s view of thought as an inner process reflecting an 
 external reality order. 
 
 6. Thought as a constituent and constitutive part of a single reality- 
 process to be stated only from the standpoint of the logician’s premises 
 and technique. 
 
 Chapter IV. —The Nature of the Psychologist’s “Processes” 53 
 
 1. The realism and idealism of instrumental logic versus the subjective 
 idealism or the naive realism of psychology. 
 
 2. Psychology’s inability to handle thought as a genuine process. 
 
 3. The transitive states, association, etc., not genuine processes for the 
 psychologist. 
 
 4. The place of these processes in the representative phase of the judg¬ 
 mental situation. 
 
 Chapter V. —Typical Statements of the Relationship . . 59 
 
 1. The earlier form of the problem. 
 
 2. The greater or lesser comprehensiveness of logic and psychology. 
 
 3. The art-science distinction. 
 
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 7 
 
 4. Psychology and logic as equally concerned with reflection upon cog¬ 
 nition. 
 
 5. Reflection and introspection—introspection a standpoint, not a method. 
 
 6. The normative-positive distinction—the fallacy common to both 
 disputants. 
 
 7. Psychology as specific and concrete versus logic as general and abstract. 
 
 8. The confusion of “psychical” with “psychological.” 
 
 9. The Psychologisten-Formalisten dispute—the absolutist-pragmatist 
 controversy. 
 
 10. The common fallacy as to the nature of the individual. 
 
 11. The bearing of this reinterpretation of the individual on the pragmatist’s 
 criterion of truth and interpretation of reality. 
 

 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 THE PROBLEM 
 
 The determination of the status of relationship obtaining between 
 logic and psychology is a problem of such vital import to philosophy, 
 in general, that it is hardly possible to consider any phase of it without 
 touching live wires of epistemological and metaphysical controversy. 
 Indeed, it has become the practice of contemporary philosophical 
 criticism to trace back any fundamental divergence of views respecting 
 the more ultimate issues of philosophy to a difference in premise regard¬ 
 ing this relationship. Are we doomed to strain our vision toward an 
 absolute reality, whose lineaments remain forever beyond the threshold 
 of our experiential sensibility, and to grasp after, yet never hold, that 
 eternally elusive cup of Tantalus, Truth, universal and immutable; 
 or may we look into the familiar and homely countenance of reality 
 whenever we face a practical problem, and refresh ourselves with truth 
 at every step of the traveled road ? These two philosophical attitudes 
 represent the extreme limits within which present-day epistemological 
 and metaphysical discussion falls. The logic basal to the latter, the 
 pragmatic, formulation of the nature of truth and reality, asserts that 
 the judgment taken in its concrete everyday setting will reveal, actually 
 operative, now as ever, the formative forces of reality; that only through 
 such a study of reality-in-process-of-formation and of truth-in-operation 
 can the nature of either be discovered. Absolutism, however, insists 
 that this amounts to nothing more than the analysis of a psychological 
 • process, and, as such, can never yield data for an adequate interpreta¬ 
 tion of reality. Thus, pragmatism points the finger of warning at the 
 empty and futile metaphysical consequences which ensue when logic 
 deserts the standpoint of the individual experient, to search for truth 
 in a realm of a never-to-be-experienced reality, and absolutism, in turn, 
 continues to charge pragmatism with building upon a logic so corrupted 
 by its affiliation with psychology that it must forfeit the use of the 
 categories of universality and necessity, and must abandon all hope of 
 exhibiting anything worthy the name of objectivity. 
 
 It is obvious that logic and psychology play leading roles in the 
 philosophical drama of today—that the dispute as to the nature of 
 their interrelation affords the setting, as it were, for the final ‘ confronta¬ 
 tion of forces,’ upon whose resolution hangs the fate of current philo- 
 
 9 
 
lo RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 sophical systems. There is a suggestive concreteness and openness to 
 attack in the reduction of the larger philosophical situation to these 
 comparatively simple terms, but the promised accessibility is somewhat 
 illusory, since both psychology and logic are extending their boundaries 
 to include the so-called more abstract disciplines under their jurisdiction. 
 Thus there is retained all the complexity of the wider controversy, for 
 all of its factors are involved. 
 
 That a psychology which has endeavored to free itself from meta¬ 
 physical leading-strings and which has grown so remarkably under the 
 nurture of natural science should now press its right of dominion even 
 to the very outposts of metaphysics itself, has not a little the effect of a 
 paradox.^ Nevertheless, though this evolution of an ‘empirical’ psy¬ 
 chology into metaphysics may, at first sight, suggest rather an Alice-in- 
 Wonderland metamorphosis than a genuine process of development, 
 the change appears less abrupt, when it is borne in mind that psy¬ 
 chology has but to prove its identity with logic, to accomplish the 
 transformation easily and plausibly; for epistemology and metaphysics 
 are indissolubly one in recent discussion, and logic is their basis of 
 operation. 
 
 Metaphysics and epistemology are today regarded as but two modes 
 of approach to the same problem; the consideration of the nature, 
 source, and function of knowledge involves the determination of the 
 nature of reality and the relation of thought to it. Metaphysics, on 
 the other hand, cannot fix upon Thought, or a Something-Other, as 
 a final and all-inclusive ‘ultimate,’ without showing what disposition 
 is to be made of the other term with reference to it. In other words, 
 the problem of knowledge is no longer that of investigating the forms 
 and activities of pure thought, but is the knowledge-of-reality problem. 
 It is not so evident that logic, especially that known as instrumental, 
 and more vaguely as pragmatic, is thus closely allied with epistemology 
 and metaphysics. Yet it may be said that, despite increasing and 
 seemingly implacable feuds among logicians as to other first principles 
 of logic, there is unanimous agreement, at present, that the judgment 
 is the unit of the knowledge process, and that it can no longer be defined 
 as the predication of one idea of another, either by way of synthesis or 
 analysis. Rather, every judgment is held to have existential import, 
 or is to be defined as the mutual reference of an ideal content, as predicate, 
 
 ^ Angell, “The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy,” 
 University of Chicago Decennial Publications, First Series, Vol. Ill, Part II, pp. 18-21 
 (page reference is to monograph reprint). 
 
THE PROBLEM 
 
 II 
 
 to a reality, as subject. However variously idea and reality may be 
 interpreted by different schools, the judgment so defined brings logic 
 into direct contact with epistemology and metaphysics; for it presents 
 in specific subject-predicate form the problem central to them, namely, 
 the relation of thought to reality. 
 
 Instrumental logic is, then, no less epistemological than the logic 
 of absolutism, against whose particular brand of epistemology it has 
 waged such telling polemic,^ but whereas the latter finds it necessary 
 to transcend the conditions under which thought and reality appear in 
 any concrete instance of judging, in order to discover their true, that 
 is, their unconditioned and absolute, nature, the former accepts the 
 subject-predicate connection there found, as adequately representative 
 of the relation which thought sustains toward reality, anywhere and 
 everywhere. The logic of absolutism, that is, may maintain that the 
 reality which appears as the subject of the judgment is a mutilated 
 fragment, torn and twisted from the reality which lies in its really 
 unassailable entirety and continuity ‘beyond the act’ of judging, and 
 that thought, as it appears in the form of a predicate, suffers from the 
 vicissitudes of temporal circumstance, and therefore falls short of 
 spanning universal and eternal truth. Accordingly, if logic would 
 study thought as the vehicle of truth, absolute, it must abandon its 
 basis in the empirical judgment, and take on a more epistemological 
 character. It must, that is, deal with thought ‘at large’ and reality 
 per se. Instrumental logic, on the contrary, holds that the judgment, 
 in its immediate experiential setting, provides the conditions under 
 which thought and reality always occur or exist, e.g., as comembers 
 of a distinctive phase of experience, and that the characteristics and 
 functions which they there manifest, and these only, are revelations of 
 their true nature. From this point of view, thought ‘at large’ and 
 reality per se are abstractions, and not real values functioning in experi¬ 
 ence. The problem of establishing a relation between them is, con¬ 
 sequently, purely a factitious one. Opponents refuse to concede to 
 this position anything approaching epistemological dignity, but its 
 protagonists assert that the standpoint and the methodology which it 
 implies furnish the only mode of approach to a valid epistemology and 
 a tenable metaphysics. Instrumental logic, indeed, regards itself as 
 a sort of laboratory in which the ‘elements’ of metaphysics may be 
 discovered through experimental observation of the judgment process, 
 and to which, in turn, metaphysical ‘ultimates’ may be returned to 
 
 ^ Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, chaps, i-v. 
 
12 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 be tested for their ‘workability.’^ Instrumental logic thus becomes a 
 terminus ad quern, as well as a point of departure, for metaphysics and 
 epistemology. 
 
 It is with the logic which enters the highway of metaphysics via 
 the judgment in its empirical context that functional psychology claims 
 identity of standpoint.^ But having chosen at the crossroads, psy¬ 
 chology must travel on undaunted even to the Dark Tower of pragma¬ 
 tism. With its record of sober scientific achievement behind it, psy¬ 
 chology may well hesitate to lay itself open to the necessity of meeting 
 the characteristic charges of unstable and irresponsible radicalism so 
 often preferred against pragmatism. Yet once casting its lot with the 
 logic which is presumably basal to the various pragmatic formulations, 
 it cannot hope to leave the road open to any metaphysic, that is, it 
 cannot hold itself a prolegomenon to metaphysics in general, but must 
 commit itself to some specific destination, namely, that which is the 
 outcome of locating the real, and not some mere transcript, or symbol, 
 or minimum sensible, of reality, wholly within experience, and of finding 
 truth, as absolute and eternal as you please, in every successful per¬ 
 formance of the judgment. 
 
 The chief indictment against this metaphysical basis has been that 
 it shuts reality up to subjectivity, and truth to the vagary of particu¬ 
 larity. Instrumental logic has repudiated such metaphysics and func¬ 
 tional psychology would hardly make a point of proclaiming this as 
 its metaphysical destiny; for it has long been an accepted tradition 
 that this is precisely the type of metaphysics which results from the 
 projection of the psychological standpoint into a world-view. Now, 
 psychology is not a little to blame for the circumstantial evidence upon 
 which this accusation continues to be based, for in adopting a new 
 standpoint it has not made clear that it has abandoned the old—if 
 indeed, it has—with reference to which the verdict holds. The psy¬ 
 chology, which interprets consciousness as an adaptive mechanism, 
 viewing it in its objective environment as a process operative among 
 realities which are not themselves ‘states of consciousness,’ and that 
 which deals with reality or experience only as it is transcribed into a 
 structure or process of consciousness—these are held not only compatible 
 but perfectly confluent. This tendency to conciliation is a marked 
 feature of present-day psychological development. Conservative and 
 
 ^ Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, chap. v. 
 
 * Angell, “The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy,” 
 University of Chicago Decennial Publications, First Series, Vol. Ill, Part II, pp. 13-14 
 (page reference is to monograph reprint). 
 
THE PROBLEM 
 
 13 
 
 radical at once, it adds the new as simple supplement to the old. Thus 
 “idea” or “process” psychology, and “self” psychology are regarded 
 as two parts of one whole, although the introspective deliverances of 
 the latter, if not definitely antithetic to the pronouncements of the 
 former, are, at least, facts available only from a distinctly different 
 vantage-point. Functional psychology, which seems at times to desert 
 altogether the standpoint of the spectator of ‘inner consciousness’ for 
 that of the direct experient, offers protective shelter for them all. If 
 it be true, however, that no radical shift in viewpoint, or fundamental 
 change in premise, is necessary in passing from one type of psychology 
 to another, then there is, we take it, a conspicuous break in the continuity 
 between functional psychology and instrumental logic. 
 
 Whatever constructions or misconstructions have been erected upon 
 it, instrumental logic as it appears in the Studies in Logical Theory 
 and free from the subsequent accretion of corollaries, is not one with 
 psychology. The ‘world-picture’ which this logic paints has little in 
 common with the pattern drafted after the ordinarily accepted psycho¬ 
 logical measurements; its individualism, empiricism, and idealism take 
 on a different coloring from an eye which looks upon experience as wider 
 than personal consciousness, and upon the individual as larger than 
 subjectivity. Exponents of this logic have, it is true, acknowledged 
 freely the influence which psychology, in its recent development, has 
 had in shaping logical problems.^ However, the influence has not 
 been one-sided. Logical theory in searching for an interpretation of 
 thought which shall invest it with the function of securing genuine 
 knowledge of reality, and not some copy or representation of it, has 
 been testing the psychologist’s account of the structure and function 
 of consciousness. Taking this description of the mental .machinery, 
 the logician has been asking: “If this is the kind of thing thought is, 
 if it has such characteristics as you study it, what can it do, what is the 
 result of its work, what is it good for, in the world to which I must 
 translate it, the world of active endeavor and first-hand contact with 
 reality ?” By this procedure, it may be contended that logic is finding 
 itself, but that it is at the same time discovering to psychology the 
 fuller intent and import of its own formulations. Psychology, however, 
 admits no such reciprocity of favor, for it now claims to study thought 
 in just these aspects, to pursue it, indeed, to the outermost rim of reality. 
 Psychology’s ‘stream of thought’ threatens to rise from its bed in the 
 states and processes of consciousness, to overflow its embankment, the 
 “as such,” and to inundate the field of reality itself. Will the waters 
 
 * Dewey, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, I, No. 3, 
 p. 60. 
 
14 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 recede, leaving the philosophical soil more fertile and ready for newer 
 and better demarkations, if convenience calls for them, or will the river 
 carry away in its Heraclitean flux of ‘ever-changing’ ‘personal’ states, 
 all landmarks of truth and signposts to reality? Psychology affords 
 assurance of the former, those hostile to the alliance of logic and psy¬ 
 chology prophesy the latter fate. It would seem to be the task of philoso¬ 
 phy to gauge the danger, and to determine whether the embankment 
 can or need be reinforced, and the stream kept to its native bed. 
 
 Obviously there are no available definitions to afford leverage in 
 establishing the respective confines of logic and psychology, since 
 psychology threatens to absorb all of philosophy, and the limits of logic 
 are equally indeterminate. The difficulty is the greater because the 
 terms in which the definitions may be expressed are themselves infected 
 with the ambiguity due to the shifting of old landmarks. From many 
 quarters the complaint concerning the confusion in our present philo¬ 
 sophical terminology continues to gain in force, until we are reminded 
 of Bishop Berkeley’s quaint arraignment of language as the source 
 of all metaphysical ills whatsoever. The ^‘embarass and delusion” of 
 words is still held largely responsible for the “ self-raised ” dust which 
 obscures the philosopher’s vision. ‘Consciousness,’ ‘feeling,’ ‘object,’ 
 ‘subject,’ the ‘real,’ ‘perception,’ ‘image,’ ‘sensation,’ the ' ‘personal 
 pronouns,’ are a few of the items we have been asked to discontinue 
 from our philosophical stock-in-trade pending a thorough investigation 
 of their exact meaning. However, if we could banish all of these terms 
 to the “limbo of unregenerate concepts” and substitute for each, as 
 Titchener advised for ‘sensation,’ a “round dozen of concrete and de¬ 
 scriptive” terms, the philosophical page might appear much simplified, 
 but it is doubtful if the embarass and delusion would be much abated. 
 The difficulty, needless to say, is not one of terminology, primarily, 
 though such appears to be the general attitude toward the problem, 
 judging by the continual plea for a uniform vocabulary. A commonly 
 accepted philosophical terminology, unless truly indicative of a uniform 
 philosophical standpoint, would, at the first attempt at application, 
 shatter into a thousand implications of real difference. Straightway 
 the words which describe the situation concretely for one system become 
 abstract and obscure for another and vice versa. As Stevenson puts 
 it: “The longest and most abstruse flight of a philosopher becomes 
 clear and shallow in the flash of a moment, when we suddenly perceive 
 the aspect and drift of his intention. The longest argument is but a 
 finger pointed; and once wx get our own finger rightly parallel, we see 
 what the man meant, whether it be a new star or an old street lamp.” 
 
THE PROBLEM 
 
 15 
 
 A term, that is, cannot be defined without definite orientation 
 within a context, and the uncertainty in the present usage of terms 
 is a reciprocal phenomenon of the changing of the contours of the 
 philosophical disciplines. Old definitions were acceptable while the 
 old lines of cleavage remained, but now they are often useless. For 
 the purpose of differentiating psychology from the physical sciences 
 the definition of it as ‘the science of the states and processes of con¬ 
 sciousness ’ may be of service, but so wide is the interpretation now given 
 to ‘ consciousness ’ that this definition affords no differentia with respect 
 to other philosophical branches. Indeed, the functional psychologist 
 aims at making his study of the ‘ structure and function of consciousness ’ 
 nothing less than a science of ‘concrete experience.’ Yet no definition 
 could describe more fittingly the task of all philosophy today. For 
 philosophy is avowedly on the alert not to state life in terms of abstract 
 and general formulae, but to feel the pulse of concrete living. But how 
 various the interpretation of the term ‘ concrete ’! It ranges in conno¬ 
 tation from the content of the specious present of ‘pure experience,’ in 
 which is to be found the full-tide of reality in all the “warmth and in¬ 
 timacy” of its immediacy, to the timeless content of an absolute reality, 
 which, packed with the “terrific totals”—to use a phrase of Henry James 
 —of all finite partialities, and the reconciliations of all finite conflicts, 
 may alone be deemed adequate to represent, in its perfect fulness and 
 unbroken homogeneity, complete concreteness. 
 
 The attempt will not be made, then, to proceed from even provisional 
 definition, to discover a clue to the nature of the relationship of logic 
 to psychology. Rather, such definition can have meaning only as the 
 nature of the relationship is understood. The method which suggests 
 itself as feasible is that of following psychology through some of its 
 representative aspects to the point where it seems to coincide with the 
 logic which is centered in the judgment, defined as the reference of an 
 ideal content to reality. In this way the specific nature of the claim 
 which psychology makes will be evident. The claim that the two are 
 identical may then be tested by examining the psychologist’s account 
 of the idea and the judgment, to ascertain whether it yields the same 
 consequences as does that of the logician. If the consequences are 
 different, such difference will be considered a proof of their non¬ 
 coincidence. The character of this difference may then be determined 
 more positively, and finally, an interpretation given, in the light of this 
 differentia, of some of the typical statements in regard to the inter¬ 
 relation of logic to psychology. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE PREMISES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 From the earlier to the later associationism, through the various 
 forms of attention psychology, to functional psychology, there has been 
 a progressive revision of psychological Tact,’ in the direction of meeting 
 the demands of philosophy for an account of thought, which should 
 make for the possibility of real and valid knowledge. There have 
 been periods, to be sure, such as that from Locke to Hume, in which a 
 considerable body of information concerning ‘what passes in a man’s 
 understanding when he thinks’ has been amassed concomitantly with 
 an increasing skepticism as to the efficacy of thought in securing knowl¬ 
 edge; but this is precisely the situation which had led psychology, 
 finally, to modify its introspective findings. It is noteworthy that 
 psychology attributes these changes, not to any genuine shift in the 
 angle of observation, but to greater subtlety and accuracy of intro¬ 
 spection. But observation is notoriously under the guidance of hypothe¬ 
 sis, and it is peculiarly difficult in this case to determine how much is 
 relatively bare fact, open to direct introspective detection, and how 
 much is theory “concreted” into fact. It is possible that psychology, 
 its apperception mass enriched by the heritage of epistemological 
 criticism, has read back, as traits native to the ‘stream of consciousness,’ 
 characteristics which could be discovered by studying thought in its 
 logical and epistemological environment only; so that it is now equipped 
 with a descriptive and explanatory account of the states and processes 
 of consciousness, adequate in so many ways to meet the needs of a 
 judgment process which insures real knowledge, that its claim to issue 
 in logic becomes readily comprehensible and easily accredited. 
 
 The usual verdict that Locke’s psychology is sound and his logic 
 at fault has been challenged by Dewey, who interprets this as a rever¬ 
 sal of the facts.^ His interpretation is, in substance, based upon the 
 disparity between Locke’s success in contriving the furnishings of the 
 inner cabinet, and his failure, logically consistent, to find any way to 
 use them in the world of real knowledge. The implication is that his 
 psychological facts are wrong, and the cabinet must be refurnished 
 with a more portable outfit. It is an old story that Locke finds the 
 
 ^ Dewey, unpublished lectures. 
 
 i6 
 
PREMISES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 17 
 
 materials of knowledge given in the simple, discrete units or ideas, 
 which as such may not be called true or false; that thinking or judging 
 is the conjoining of them, and that knowledge is the perception of the 
 various kinds of agreement or disagreement among these ideas. How¬ 
 ever, Locke finally concludes that such knowledge is empty of real 
 content; that thought in connecting ideas produces merely analytical, 
 or trifling and verbal knowledge. The second definition of knowledge, 
 implicit in the Tourth kind of agreement,’ namely, the agreement of 
 the idea with reality, is an admission that the idea must be brought into 
 connection with something outside of itself.^ But the only place where 
 this occurs is in sense-perception, and here Locke finds no function for 
 thought to perform, since the only connecting involved is that of the 
 qualities in the object, and these already “coexist in nature.” We can 
 say at the moment of sense-perception, and with conviction of real 
 knowledge, “This gold melts,” but here the connection is entirely given, 
 and not at all the work of thought. The only function which thought 
 may be said to perform is to record, or duplicate in simple or complex 
 idea form, the reality completely present. However, when we say, 
 “All gold melts,” thought performs its office of connecting two ideas, 
 but gives assurance of nothing beyond the coexistence of two ideas in 
 the mind. In spite of the fact, then, that ideas are the materials of 
 knowledge, they do not, when put together, yield knowledge worthy 
 of the name. Nor has thought the power to refashion or reconstruct 
 the simple idea any more than it has power to influence the ‘constitution, 
 order, or connection of qualities’ in things. Thus, thought, manipu¬ 
 lating such ideas as introspection seems duly to deliver as the units, or 
 materials, of knowledge, is a self-inclosed process, operating futilely 
 within a realm sharply delimited from reality. 
 
 Similarly for Berkeley, real knowledge occurs only at the moment 
 of perception; for only at the moment of experiencing the conjunction 
 of the ‘ideas of sense’ can we be sure of a connection between them. 
 There is no genuine connection between or among them; their order 
 may be changed at any time. Heat is not necessarily connected with 
 fire, and the judgment which joins subject and predicate on the basis of 
 a necessary connection is misleading. Fire and heat may go together 
 as ideas of sense coexistently given in perception, but in that case 
 thought takes no part. Nor can thought in its function of joining ideas 
 
 ^ Cf. Moore, The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge in 
 Locke's Essay (“University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy,” III, No. 1), 
 pp. 48-52. 
 
l8 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 of memory, or of imagination, reach knowledge. Ideas of this sort 
 cannot be connected or synthesized into new logical or knowledge- 
 wholes; nor can they be analyzed, indeed, into constituent elements, 
 since they are already simple and irreducible givens, as irretrievably 
 unique and separate in their occurrence as their prototypes, the ideas 
 of sense. If carried on through the medium of the ^ ideas’ which Berke¬ 
 ley’s introspection vouches for, thinking is an anomalous, if not super¬ 
 fluous, activity of the inner spirit. 
 
 With Hume, the thinking-process, reduced to a series of mental 
 units, passing in rapid panoramic succession, has resolved itself into 
 a continuously flowing stream. There is nothing to be synthesized 
 except ideas, and these flow on, although there is no logical reason for 
 their beginning or ending. There is the gentle force” by which one 
 idea calls another after it, but there is no real connection between them, 
 that is, they form among themselves no logical unity. The mind is a 
 succession of disparate ideas, and there is nothing to mark the beginning 
 or end of association, nor is there any criterion by which to judge what 
 grouping or bundle of associations constitutes a judgment. Hume 
 finds that no ‘combination, collocation or succession’ of ideas results 
 in a valid judgment. His substitute for judgment, belief, demands the 
 joining of idea with impression. In some way thought must get away 
 from mere ideas; the continuity of the self-inclosed process must be 
 invaded. Knowledge constituted by the connection or conjunction of 
 ideas, Hume, with Locke, deems trivial or purely analytical. Knowledge 
 of the “relations of matter of fact” is the only knowledge worth while, 
 but this involves the joining of impression with idea. However, idea 
 may be connected with impression only by a “fiction” of the mind. 
 Immediate perception, finally, in which for Hume there is no inference 
 or work of thought—it, and it alone, affords knowledge. But even 
 here, the object seemingly so completely present to perception is itself 
 only a swift succession of impression units, which the mind by its make- 
 believe blends into a permanent and self-identical whole. Knowledge, 
 then, is confined to the moment of sensory impact, and thought, in 
 rescuing us from the mercy of the passing moment, does so only by a 
 falsification of reality. Thinking as made up of the continuous stream 
 of discrete ideas, for whose existence, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 
 as psychologists, found such convincing introspective evidence, is not 
 only futile but falsificatory, since its only genuine power is that of a 
 make-believe. 
 
 Hume’s failure to square the facts of mind which he found, as 
 
PREMISES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 19 
 
 introspective psychologist, with the work which thought seemed to 
 perform in the world of his backgammon-playing, common-sense expe¬ 
 rience, may be said to have had at least two results historically. On 
 the one hand, this chasm between thought as continuity or narrative 
 by itself, and the world of things, or the continuum of external objects 
 formed a good basis for the independent development of psychology. 
 Logical and epistemological questions as to the possibility and validity 
 of knowledge, and of the relation of the thought-process to reality, 
 could be shelved, and psychology could locate its inquiries strictly 
 within the boundaries of the continuous succession of mental states. 
 Skepticism as to the possibility of knowledge might flourish, but man 
 could at least know what was passing in his own understanding. Intro¬ 
 spection might be difficult, but given the requisite skill and perseverance, 
 the human mind must at last yield to analysis. The long reign of asso- 
 ciationism and the present-day achievement in structural analysis bear 
 witness to the success of this method of introspective isolation. 
 
 The other result of Hume’s separation of thought and reality led 
 to the attempt by Kant to give an account of thought, which the empiri¬ 
 cists by their rigorous introspection had failed to find. Skepticism had 
 been the logical outcome of conceiving the materials of knowledge as 
 completely given to a thought-process which had no power over them. 
 Thus there resulted a thorough internalizing of the thought-activity 
 and a consequent externalizing, to the point of complete alienation, 
 of reality. Though it is the fashion at present to accord Kant small 
 historical influence, it seems undeniable that he stamped in, past the 
 possibility of efiacement, a feeling for the intimate connection of thought 
 and its object. Thought, knowledge, and reality are three terms which, 
 since the time of Kant, it is no longer possible to consider separately. 
 Despite the fact that ultimately he turned awry the current of philosophy 
 from ‘empirical reality’ into transcendental channels, where thought 
 became transfigured into Pure Reason, his insistence that thought organ¬ 
 ized its materials into the very world of reality, which for the empiricists 
 was so completely given and external, and which thought, in its passive 
 internality, faced so futilely, could not but change the mode of conceiving 
 the mental processes. 
 
 The later English associationists as well as the German psychologists 
 show this influence. Some feeling for a genuine thought-activity is 
 evinced, in that there is an attempt to ascribe to thought some construct¬ 
 ive power over its material. The category of attention is coming to 
 the front. Attention makes the idea clearer, more distinct, gives it 
 
20 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 greater duration, but these are not the only changes which it effects. 
 Inasmuch as it holds the idea, that is, secures greater duration for it, 
 it establishes ‘interest,’ and since interest determines the direction and 
 number of associations, attention becomes responsible for, and thus 
 has control over, the train of ideas which follow.* Further, the cognitive 
 unit seems to be no longer the ideas of ‘ simple and uniform appearance’ 
 of the Lockean type, deriving its simplicity and uniformity from its 
 objective prototype. The unity of mental content appears, rather, to 
 be determined by the ‘span’ of attention. The growing emphasis upon 
 the problem concerning the number of objects to which the mind can 
 attend at one time is significant of a marked change in the conception of 
 thought. It is a step in the direction of regarding any moment of con¬ 
 sciousness as unitary, whatever its content, rather than as made up of 
 units, synchronously or successively combined, and further, of according 
 to thought power over its material. For though the later English asso- 
 ciationists continue to explain an object as a complex of ideas, due to 
 inseparably associated impressions, yet the original unification of the 
 impressions into the object is made to depend upon the capacity of 
 attention to select, and organize, and hold within its span, a certain 
 number of impressions. In other words, thought is brought into closer 
 connection with reality through its power of selective control. 
 
 The apparently simple admission of the selective aspect of the mind 
 continues for some time to be a source of difficulty to a psychology 
 which, as a lineal descendant from the psychology of Locke and Hume, 
 is fearful of making the mind an entity over and above its ideas, and 
 of ascribing to it occult faculties which elude introspective verification. - 
 Early attempts to do justice to the attention phenomena led in psy¬ 
 chological practice to a dualism between mind and idea. Attention 
 was treated as a sort of process outside the content of the idea, and 
 as such, was apt to recede upon close scrutiny into the sheltering folds 
 of ‘mind,’ leaving the idea with its traditional passivity. Yet the 
 psychology which equated mind with ideas could no longer regard 
 the idea as merely the passive recipient of its content, however intro¬ 
 spection might be baffled to discover manifestations of activity within 
 it. The bipartite-tripartite controversy as to the existence of activity 
 as a distinguishable element of consciousness followed in the wake of 
 the emphasis on the attention category; for attention as voluntary 
 control was generally regarded as the activity aspect of consciousness. 
 Both bipartitists and tripartitists were ‘structuralists’ in that they 
 
 * James Mill, Analysis of the Human Mind, II, 367-70. 
 
PREMISES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 21 
 
 agreed that activity must reveal itself as an element within, and not a 
 somewhat, mysteriously outside of, the mental content under examina¬ 
 tion. The persistence of the activity quarrel was evidence of the 
 genuineness of the difficulty of discovering such an element by intro¬ 
 spection. The challenge of the bipartitist to find activity as a distinctive 
 element in consciousness was met by the countercharge of the tripartitist 
 that his adversary was guilty of the psychologist’s fallacy. The bipar¬ 
 titist, that is, assumed that the bit of consciousness under examination 
 represented a complete moment of consciousness, when it ought to have 
 been evident that the original activity had, at the moment of introspec¬ 
 tion, shifted its center of gravity to the psychologist as spectator. 
 
 The bipartitist, as rigorous introspectionist, especially as he leaned 
 toward the interpretation of psychology as a science and relegated the 
 problem of activity to metaphysics, seemed to hold the fort. However, 
 even he found it necessary to qualify his position and make concessions. 
 He began to find it convenient to talk in terms of process as well as of 
 content. The fact that the idea changed and shifted under the survey 
 of the introspectionist was finally accepted as evidence of its dynamic, 
 or active, or, according to the earlier usage of the term, its functional 
 character. The dynamic character of the idea, then, was its capacity 
 to change within itself, to wax and wane as idea, and to flow insensibly 
 into the passing stream. With this compromise, thought could be 
 designated as active, and its activity could be regarded as a structural 
 attribute of the idea. But the tripartitist was not content with this 
 disposition of the matter, for he insisted that activity meant something 
 more than the mere structural instability of the idea. 
 
 It is only with the introduction of another conception that the quarrel 
 between the bipartitist and tripartitist bids fair to become adjusted and 
 that is with the characterization of thought as motor. The presence of 
 the idea is attention, but, further, if the idea holds the field, it issues 
 into action. The idea is active, then, but its activity is no longer that 
 of bringing in its train a troop of associates, nor yet is it dynamic merely 
 in the sense allowed by the orthodox structuralists of a ‘process’ of 
 inner change. Idea is motor in tendency; it leads to overt activity. 
 The idea with its motor tendency, finally, is regarded as the cognitive 
 unit, and the activity is no longer a mysterious tertiuni quid of con¬ 
 sciousness, but finds representation within the idea itself. 
 
 The advance from the characterization of the idea as passive, (i) to 
 the description of it as dynamic, with control over its own sequences, 
 and (2) to the conception of it as a selective, adaptive process, which, 
 
22 
 
 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 no longer shut up to internality, issues in overt activity, is of far-reaching 
 consequence not only to psychology but to philosophy. The idea, so 
 conceived, is pointing out of the realm of merely mental states to a 
 world beyond; it gives promise of being an adequate tool for securing 
 knowledge, valid and real—a combination which the idea of the asso- 
 ciationist could never achieve. Further, this tendency to activity is 
 not at random* or uncontrolled; it is not a process supervening, like an 
 arbitrary fiat, upon the idea, but the specific nature and direction of its 
 activity is precisely an intrinsic attribute of the idea itself. Closely 
 connected, that is, with the conception of thought as motor is that of the 
 specifically purposive and adaptive nature of this activity, first in the 
 more palpable biological sense of adapting organism to environment, 
 and then in the more subtle sense of overcoming any obstacle to direct 
 and unimpeded procedure. Thus, thought occurs when an activity, 
 previously operative through the mechanism of habit or instinct, is 
 for some reason inhibited. Its function is to effect such an adjustment 
 that activity may again be resumed. In other words, thought is ‘Teleo¬ 
 logical”—headed toward an end other than itself. 
 
 It is at this point in its history that psychology claims to be one 
 with the logic which finds in any felt inadequacy of experience the 
 occasion for the occurrrence of thought, and which delegates to thought 
 the function of so resolving the doubt or ‘tension’ into which a situa¬ 
 tion has fallen that through its instrumentality experience is recon¬ 
 structed and redintegrated on a new level. This type of logic, moreover, 
 views thought as occupied, not with a reality which lies behind a 
 perpetually retreating horizon line, where it merely appears to meet 
 experience, but with a reality accessible to, and located within, the 
 practical act of judgment, and as concerned with a criterion of truth 
 established within the limits of such reality. But this interpretation 
 of the nature of truth and the function of thought, the psychologist 
 maintains, makes the problem of logic coincident with that of psy¬ 
 chology. Angell says: 
 
 Unless one regards the cognitive function as a mere luxury of the organism, 
 it is difficult to see how one can escape from the view just presented. If the 
 knowledge processes are of value to the organism, it obviously must be because 
 of what they do. No one questions that they serve to reflect and mediate 
 the external world, and this they can only do effectively provided they dis¬ 
 tinguish the true from the false. It would seem fairly clear, therefore, that a 
 functional psychology in any event, however the case may stand with a struc¬ 
 tural psychology, cannot possibly avoid a consideration of this aspect of the 
 
PREMISES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 23 
 
 cognitive activities. But the problem to which this view leads is essentially 
 identical with the accepted problem of logic.^ 
 
 Psychology, indeed, would seem to have the right of way, for it is 
 now equipped with a cognitive unit which can be stated satisfactorily 
 as content or structure, belonging to the inner continuum, or as activity, 
 which goes forth into the world of practice and effects adjustments 
 therein. Thus provided, psychology can without apparent break in 
 the continuity of its development, or essential change in viewpoint, 
 become one with logic. 
 
 The question, obviously, is whether the psychologist can discuss 
 thought as it goes about its business with reality. Can this be done 
 from the standpoint traditionally distinctive of the psychologist, that 
 of viewing thought as “reflecting and mediating an external world,” 
 to which adjustment is to be made? If psychology essays to discuss, 
 under the caption of “right adjustment,” the situation in which thought 
 connects with reality at first hand, several problems confront it which 
 heretofore it has been content to regard as out of its province. It has 
 deemed it sufficient to trace the career of the idea to the point where 
 it dominates in consciousness. Frankly adopting as a working hypothe¬ 
 sis the standpoint of the dualism of thought and thing, its interpreta¬ 
 tion of thought remained within those limits. James says of the 
 psychologist’s attitude: “The dualism of Subject and Object and their 
 pre-established harmony are what the psychologist as such must assume, 
 whatever ulterior monistic philosophy he may, as an individual who has 
 the right also to be a metaphysician, have in reserve.”^ 
 
 The psychologist’s assumption with regard to cognition James 
 states, further, is a thoroughgoing dualism. 
 
 It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and treats 
 them as irreducible. Neither gets out of itself, or into the other, neither in 
 any way is the other, neither makes the other. They just stand face to face 
 in a common world, and one simply knows, or is known unto its counterpart. 
 This singular relation is not to be expressed in any lower terms, or translated 
 into any more intelligible name .... the knowledge is constituted by a new 
 construction that occurs altogether in the mind. The thing remains the same 
 whether known or not.^ 
 
 If psychology is really to assume the task of logic, it can no longer 
 
 ^ “The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy,” 
 University of Chicago Decennial Publications, First Series, Vol. Ill, Part II, p. 13 (page 
 reference is to monograph reprint). 
 
 “ Principles of Psychology, I, 220. ^ Jhid., pp. 218-19. 
 
24 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 leave the idea standing on the brink of such a precipice; it must bridge 
 this chasm to reality. It is at the point at which reality and idea are 
 alleged to stand face to face in a common world, that the logical prob¬ 
 lem becomes crucial. It will not suffice for logic to take for granted 
 that the new construction which “occurs altogether in the mind” holds 
 of reality, or to show thought as a Lady of Shalott’s mirror in which 
 external reality is so reflected by some pre-established harmony that 
 it leads to right adjustment. A logic which professes as its creed a 
 belief in the possibility of knowledge must meet the challenge to show 
 how the idea as predicate can come into relationship with reality, in 
 such a manner that the result is not a merely mental reconstruction, 
 or one which leads to a new adaptation to reality, but is, rather, a recon¬ 
 stitution of reality itself. 
 
 To meet such a demand psychology must make a radical revision 
 of its dualistic premise and so far forth adopt different data. The 
 history of philosophy shows the folly and fallacy of attempting, through 
 any subsequent compromise, to establish the relation between things 
 which by the very definitions adopted at the outset preclude the possi¬ 
 bility of any connection. And the psychologist who bases the possi¬ 
 bility of his science on the assumption of the differentiation of thought 
 and things separates them as irretrievably as did the Cartesians and 
 Occasionalists by explicit definition. Psychology cannot take the idea, 
 characterized and interpreted from the standpoint of an initial dualism, 
 and proceed to establish its relation to reality in a manner satisfactory 
 to instrumental logic. Yet were psychology to attempt to reduce 
 thought and things to a common denominator it would lay itself open 
 to the charge of wantonly interchanging the categories of thought and 
 being, or it would be obliged so to reinterpret its fundamental categories 
 as to imperil its identity with any recognized form of psychological dis¬ 
 cipline. 
 
 Functional psychology characterized thought as motor and adaptive. 
 Inevitably another characteristic arises which must give some pause to 
 the psychologist. Thought is occasional; continual, not continuous. 
 When thought’s work is done, and the specific need for which it is called 
 out is fulfilled, it disappears. If the psychologist accepts this aspect 
 of thought as a corollary of the motor-teleological characterization, he 
 must revise his description of thought as a stream. Must he not, indeed, 
 change his view of thought as subjective continuity ? It is, to be sure, 
 a seven-league stride from the associationists’ account of thought as a 
 stream of mechanically determined sequences of mental events, to the 
 
PREMISES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 25 
 
 conception of thought as a purposive and genuinely developmental 
 continuity, of which Angell gives so forceful a description. 
 
 “Each idea springs out of other ideas, which have gone before, and 
 in turn gives birth to new successors. The connection is not merely 
 one of sequence in time; it is a connection of the genuinely develop¬ 
 mental type, in which one idea is, as it were, unfolded from, and given 
 off by, another.”^ 
 
 Yet, in spite of the difference between these two positions, there is 
 a fundamental similarity, which is doubtless a distinguishing mark of 
 the psychological standpoint. In both cases thought is a continuous 
 realm in itself. It is a process having its own law of ebb and flow, and 
 one which never leaves the level of its own continuity to invade a reality 
 outside of it. This has been shown to be true of associationism, but it 
 is none the less apposite to the more modern conception. For the inter¬ 
 pretation of thought as developmental in this sense, whereby one idea 
 grows out of, and into, another, is a sort of Weissmanian germ-plasm 
 theory of thought. The idea, so to speak, cannot acquire reality charac¬ 
 teristics from its environment, nor can it transmit such characteristics 
 if acquired—development is entirely from within. There is no intention 
 here of urging anything in criticism of this view. It is doubtless a 
 consistent and legitimate reading of the facts from the introspective 
 vantage-point as determined by the psychologist’s premises. But idea, 
 as offspring of this continuity-of-thought plasm, is unfitted by its in¬ 
 heritance, for the service into which logic would press it. The charac¬ 
 teristics with which logic invests the idea betray a different lineage from 
 that accorded to it by the psychologist. 
 
 The conception of thought as a continuity of mental states or pro¬ 
 cesses, inestimably productive of explanatory and descriptive results as it 
 has been, and authentic as it may be from the retro-introspective stand¬ 
 point, must be abandoned as inadequate to explain the function of 
 thought as instrumental logic would portray it. In the interest of a 
 logic which ascribes to thought, not the function of copying, or reflecting, 
 or representing an external reality, but that of penetrating, manipulating, 
 and refashioning reality so that thought is to be regarded as the “charac¬ 
 teristic medium of the activity”^ of reality itself, the existence of thought 
 as inner or subjective continuity must be denied. Thought appears 
 to be one aspect of a larger experience, which only on occasion reduces 
 to a thought experience. Dewey says: “Taking some part of the 
 
 * Psychologyy chap, x, p. 265. 
 
 ^ Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, p. 43, footnote. 
 
26 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 universe of action, of affection, of social construction, under its special 
 charge, and having busied itself therewith sufficiently to meet the special 
 difficulty presented, thought releases that topic and enters upon further 
 more direct experienced’^ 
 
 Nor is the subjective continuity of consciousness to be kept inviolate 
 by translating ‘‘more direct experience” into terms of feeling or emotion, 
 so that the gaps between ‘ thoughts ’ may be filled up. The psychologist, 
 however, reading off all experience in terms of personal consciousness, 
 must make just this translation or be accused of talking nonsense. The 
 interpretation of thought (or consciousness, since all consciousness as 
 adaptive is so far forth cognitive) as forming one beat in the rhythm of 
 experience, whether or not it be the accented one in which all others 
 get representation, offers difficulties to the psychologist, and especially 
 to one who retains the conception of thought as inner continuity. 
 
 Physiological psychology comes to his aid to some extent in making 
 the conception of thought as ‘ occasional ’ a possible one for psychology 
 consistently to hold. The challenge to tell where an idea was when it 
 was no longer ‘in the understanding’ could not be met by earlier psy¬ 
 chology. Physiological psychology has made possible an explanation by 
 giving the idea cortical representation, so that the cells, functionally 
 active in the presence of the idea, conserve the idea when absent, by 
 way of organic habit, and thus make possible its revival. But this 
 hypothesis, beyond explaining the physiological and neural conditions of 
 the phenomena of consciousness, does not meet the situation which the 
 psychologist is forced to face if he undertakes the logical problem. For 
 the psychologist who ventures to discuss thought as something more than 
 a concomitant of physiological and neural conditions, at any rate, for 
 one who attempts to deal with consciousness in its capacity to connect 
 with ‘things’ and effect differences in'them, the fact that thought is 
 one aspect of experience, and not coincident with it, is an awkward 
 affair to handle. To tell what becomes of thought as adaptive con¬ 
 sciousness when it has ceased to operate and to discuss “direct expe¬ 
 rience” in terms other than that of personal habit or consciousness 
 would seem to drive psychology to a study of thought, not from the point 
 of view of finding its origin, and principle of conservation, within an 
 individual’ ^psycho-physical organism,’ hut rather as arising from, and 
 transforming into, reality itself. 
 
 Further to satisfy the demand of logic, psychology must show not 
 only that thought thus connects with things, that is, that it has objective 
 
 ^ Dewey, op. cit., p. 2 (italics mine). 
 
PREMISES OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 27 
 
 validity, but also that the ‘right adjustment,’ which thought brings 
 about, is universally right. In other words, if truth is to be identified 
 with successful adjustment, it must have a validity beyond the individual. 
 But logic can make out no case for the extra-individual validity of the 
 truth which thought achieves, no matter how social the content of that 
 thought may be, if in the first place thought is characterized as always 
 personal—‘your’ thought and ‘my’ thought. Such adjustments as 
 it effects must always be in the field of ‘personal’ behavior or habit 
 toward reality, and such reconstructions as it accomplishes must occur 
 wholly in ‘my’ mind. Yet the conception of thought as personal is 
 certainly a basal assumption of psychology, and to discard it would be 
 to require such a revision of the limits and boundaries of the “individual ” 
 as to make it no longer identifiable with the field of investigation which 
 psychology has heretofore pre-empted. 
 
 Whatever psychology decides as to the possibility or the advisability 
 of re-editing its categories to meet these demands, it seems fairly evident 
 that there are different standpoints involved in the conception of thought 
 as continuous stream with substantive and transitive states, and thought 
 as occasional in occurrence; in thought as ‘personal,’ the possession 
 of the individual as such, and thought as the ‘medium of the activity 
 of reality.’ 
 
 If psychology can give an account of the judgment process which 
 possesses all the perquisites which logic finds necessary in order to make 
 out a case for the possibility of knowledge, then logic and psychology 
 are one, and the name is a matter of indifference. But if the ‘idea,’ 
 as psychology describes it, cannot be put to work in the judgment 
 because the consequences would be fatal to a logic which attempts to 
 show thought as instrumental in securing truth that is not lacking in 
 objectivity, permanence, and universality, then the problems of logic 
 and psychology are not identical. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 THE IDEA IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 If psychology and logic are identical, psychology must make out 
 such a passport for the ‘idea’ that it may travel without obstruction 
 into, and out of, the country of reality. The idea as predicate must 
 so connect with reality as subject that the judgment, in achieving new 
 knowledge, shall achieve new reality; for instrumental logic insists 
 that thought is not a discursive activity operating between two realities 
 as limits and fetching up with a newer approximation to reality. The 
 judgment process as an analytic-synthetic activity must not be an 
 analysis of mere concepts, therefore, nor a synthesis of mere thought- 
 relations. But for psychology to attempt such an exposition of the 
 judgment is to find itself entangled in the antinomies of thought and 
 being, with the reduction of the latter to the former as the inevitable 
 outcome. It is because instrumental logic has been commonly supposed 
 to adopt the ‘idea’ as the psychologist has made it known, that these 
 strictures have been made against its metaphysics. 
 
 The psychologist’s problem, then, of supplying a cognitive element 
 that shall stand as comember with reality in the judgment is met by the 
 differentiation of the idea into two aspects, image and meaning. The 
 distinction between the idea as specific mental content, and as general 
 or abstract notion, is virtually as old as the dispute between nominalism 
 and realism, but the inclusion of the two aspects within one and the same 
 mental state is a compromise, which is to be credited to recent psy¬ 
 chological development. Ideas are no longer classified out of context, 
 as particular or general, abstract or concrete, but every idea is a concept, 
 which as image is a specific mental ‘event’ or ‘existence,’ but which as 
 ‘meaning’ transcends the limits of that particularity. Further, idea 
 as image belongs to the traditional stream of inner happenings; as 
 meaning, it looks beyond the boundaries of that subjectivity. Finally, 
 the idea as image is a fleeting, nonrecurrent existence, but meaning is 
 the permanent and universal thought-content. Meaning, that is, may 
 be invoked by the psychologist to give to the idea the attributes of 
 objectivity, universality, and permanence, thus rescuing it from the sub¬ 
 jectivity, particularity, and instability to which it is doomed by virtue 
 of its habitat in the inner stream. A consideration of the idea as the 
 psychologist differentiates it into image and meaning will lead to the 
 
 28 
 
THE IDEA IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 29 
 
 heart of the problem; it will reveal the nature of the relationship which, 
 according to psychology,* the idea sustains toward reality, and will 
 afford a clue, consequently, to its value as an instrument of knowledge. 
 
 In spite of the recognition of image and meaning as complementary 
 phases of the idea, psychologists do not, as yet, always use the term 
 with rigorous precision to cover both. Idea sometimes designates the 
 image alone, or ‘meaning’ in contradistinction to image. Where the 
 two are specified, however, ‘idea’ signifies a mental state into which 
 both enter as necessary elements; the idea “must include an image, 
 but it must also include whatever notional fringe serves to give the 
 image meaning and significance.”^ Another usage is that which con¬ 
 strues image and meaning, not primarily as constituent parts of one 
 whole, but rather as different aspects which a specified mental content 
 takes on according to the standpoint from which it is viewed. Angell 
 says: “Images and ideas do not refer to two different states of con¬ 
 sciousness, but to one and the same state, looked at now from the side 
 of sensory character and antecedents, now from the side of meaning.”^ 
 
 However, this interpretation may safely be said to be one with that 
 which regards image and meaning as mutually constitutive of the cog¬ 
 nitive moment, for Angell states further that “so far as in our descrip¬ 
 tions we have in mind the sensuous content of a thought, e.g., its visual 
 or auditory character, we use the term image. So far as we wish to 
 emphasize in addition to, or in distinction from, this fact of sensuous 
 constitution the purport, significance, or meaning of the image, we use 
 the term idea.”^ The possession of such a cognitive unit, obviously rich 
 in implication, and flexible of application, is at once a valuable resource 
 and a subtle danger to psychology, inasmuch as it offers cover for 
 ambiguities and inconsistencies. 
 
 Concerning the structural nature of the image there is fairly definite 
 agreement. It is usually characterized as having a content of sensory 
 quotes, which are the centrally aroused counterparts of sensation. It is, 
 moreover, the unique, the peculiarly unsharable, and personal mental 
 state of the psychologist’s individual. ‘Meaning’ is used variously: 
 first, to designate the transitive moment in the stream of thought, the 
 conscious correlative of the process of melting and decay of one image 
 into another—the vague emotional awareness of the whence and whither 
 of the thought movement. As James puts it: 
 
 * Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, article “Notion,” p, 184. 
 
 * Psychology, chap, viii, p. 201, 3 Hid. 
 
30 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 The sense of our meaning is an entirely peculiar element of the thought. 
 It is one of those evanescent and ‘transitive’ facts of mind which introspec¬ 
 tion cannot turn round upon, and isolate and hold up for examination, as an 
 entomologist passes round an insect on a pin. In the (somewhat clumsy) 
 terminology I have used, it pertains to the ‘fringe’ of the subjective state, 
 and is a ‘feeling of tendency,’ whose neural counterpart is undoubtedly a 
 lot of dawning and dying processes too faint and complex to be traced.^ 
 
 Here ‘meaning’ is not for the psychologist a cognitive distinction, how¬ 
 ever he may regard it as the feeling or emotional matrix out of which 
 cognitive distinctions may issue. As something over and above the 
 image, it yet has no distinct reference beyond the stream of mental 
 events. ‘Meaning,’ in a second use of the term, signifies not merely 
 the transitive, onward-flowing, continuum character of thought, but 
 rather its motor aspect, that is, the readiness or tendency to response 
 for which the image stands as specific stimulus. The psychologist, 
 however, classifies this aspect of consciousness, when he has occasion 
 to refer to it specifically, rather under the category of impulse than 
 that of cognition. A third use serves to indicate a distinctively cogni¬ 
 tive content and function, namely, the capacity of the idea to refer 
 to things, or to have object import. Finally, ‘meaning’ may denote 
 the completely organized conceptual content or product of thought’s 
 activity. 
 
 The psychologist finds that, in order to convert the idea into an 
 acceptable logical tool, it is hardly suflicient to afiix to the idea ‘ meaning’ 
 in the first sense, for, although the latter supplies thought with a dynamic 
 attribute, it still keeps it a “subjective state.” For this reason, there 
 is usually coupled with image ‘meaning’ in the sense last enumerated. 
 ‘Meaning’ as the non-temporal content of concepts which remains 
 what it is in spite of the vagaries and idiosyncrasies of the stream of 
 images that think it—here surely is to be located the saving element 
 of thought, which makes for the possibility of universal and permanent 
 truth. At least so runs the argument of absolutistic logic, which severs 
 without compunction just these two aspects of thought, and denies, 
 moreover, the possibility of ever yoking them together in any genuine 
 logical relationship.^ Idea as psychic occurrence, it relegates to psy¬ 
 chology as an irreducible surd, and hands over to logic, as alone relevant 
 and essential to the judgment function, idea in its ‘meaning’ aspect. 
 
 However, the psychologist who does not agree to such a division of 
 
 ^ Principles of Psychology, I, 472. 
 
 2 Bradley, Logic, chap, i, especially pp. i-io. 
 
THE IDEA IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 31 
 
 labor must set about to show how these constituents of the cognitive 
 moment may come into organic connection with each other. Whether 
 he sees fit to work out the details of the explanation or not, he must 
 leave the way open for the exhibition of the close interconnection, 
 intrinsic and internal, of the peculiarly individual with the universal 
 and objective aspect of thought. The psychologist would doubtless 
 find ready answer to such a demand by pointing to his genetic account 
 of the reciprocal growth and contemporaneous development of percept 
 and concept. Yet, even this does not meet the crucial issue. Both 
 percept and concept as mental contents, regarded as the possession of 
 the individual, might still be denied objective validity. To satisfy the 
 demand which instrumental logic means to meet, namely, that thought’s 
 activity must result in objective values, psychology must be in a posi¬ 
 tion to show that ‘meaning’ as objective reference (cf. the third usage 
 enumerated), whether universal or particular, and image, which as 
 unique psychical existence, is that which, for the psychologist, makes 
 thought essentially ‘my’ thought, co-operate in the judgment. Other¬ 
 wise there is danger of leaving the whole machinery of individual thinking 
 unaccounted for in the knowledge content, and logic ends in the cul-de-sac 
 of skepticism—with the insoluble problem of how thinking as ‘purely 
 and simply an inner movement of our own mind’ can claim to issue in 
 knowledge of reality except by way of a pre-established harmony 
 between thought and things. The image thus occupies a strategic 
 position. Some psychologists, to be sure, have denied altogether the 
 necessity of imagery for thought, but this does not affect the question 
 under consideration materially, for we are concerned to find just what 
 the function of the image is, for those psychologists who recognize it as 
 a necessary factor in the cognitive moment. But even if the exponents 
 of imageless thought had not been effectually refuted by psychologists 
 on their own ground, they have what is equivalent, for our purposes, 
 to the psychologist’s general view of the image, e.g., a peculiarly unshar- 
 able mental state, be it a ‘noetic-form’ or a motor ‘attitude’—the 
 machinery in which, and through which, thinking goes on. Among the 
 psychologists who insist on the close connection between image and 
 meaning, we find that to the image is ascribed the lesser functional 
 importance. Thus James says: 
 
 Such an alteration of my meaning has nothing to do with any change in 
 the image I may have in my mental eye, but solely with the vague conscious¬ 
 ness that surrounds the image, of the sphere to which it is intended to apply.^ 
 
 ^ Principles of Psychology, I, 473. 
 
32 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 .... When I use the word man in two different sentences, I may have pre¬ 
 cisely the same sound upon my lips and the same picture in my mental eye, 
 but I may mean, and at the very moment of uttering the word and imagining 
 the picture, know that I mean two entirely different things .... the image, 
 per se, the nucleus, is functionally the least important part of thought.^ 
 
 Not only, then, does James regard the image as of less importance 
 than meaning, but he seems to leave it without intrinsic connection 
 with meaning. One image may be the bearer of two “ entirely different ” 
 meanings. With the change from one meaning to another, the image 
 may remain identically the same. If an image can carry two meanings 
 while it remains the “same,” what is to limit the number of meanings 
 it may carry ? Why may not the meaning get so far ahead of the image 
 as to leave it behind ? If one and the same image will do for two entirely 
 different meanings, why any imagery at all? “The reader sees,” says 
 James, “by this time that it makes little or no difference in what sort 
 of mind-stuff, in what quality of imagery, his thinking goes on.”^ The 
 image thus seems to make no difference in the thought-content; it 
 has therefore no integral function in the knowledge moment. However, 
 though the image seems to have no function in the change or develop¬ 
 ment of meaning, it is noteworthy that meaning changes the image. 
 “This added consciousness” James regards as an “absolutely positive 
 sort of feeling, transforming what would otherwise be mere noise or 
 vision into something understood; and determining the sequel of my 
 thinking, the later words and images, in a perfectly definite way. ”3 
 
 If meaning does “determine the image,” why does not the change 
 in meaning from man to Smith effect some change in the image ? And 
 what intrinsic importance or function can an image, which does not 
 keep tally with the developing meaning, have in the conclusion of the 
 thought? “The only images intrinsically important,” we are told, 
 are “the halting-places, the substantive conclusions, provisional or 
 
 final, of the thought.The parts of the stream that precede 
 
 these substantive conclusions are but the means of the latter’s attain¬ 
 ment.”4 
 
 How, on this account, must the concluding word or phrase be 
 translated into its full sensible-image-value, under penalty of being 
 unrealized and pale? James says of this concluding image: “It need 
 only be added that as the Algebrist, though the sequence of his terms 
 is fixed by their relations rather than their several values, must give a 
 
 ^ Principles of Psychology, I, 472. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 269. 3 Ibid., p. 472. ^ Ibid., pp. 269-70. 
 
THE IDEA IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 33 
 
 real value to the final one he reaches; so the thinker in words must let 
 his concluding word be translated into its full sensible-image-value, 
 under penalty of thought being left unrealized and pale.”^ 
 
 How does the image in the conclusion differ from any other ? Why 
 does not this image go on pointing to still other meanings, why is it alone 
 fitted to overcome the pale cast of thought and bring it into touch with 
 reality. If image is of so little importance in its everyday place in the 
 stream, how does it effect the magical result of such a transformation 
 in the conclusion ? 
 
 Angell makes no explicit statement as to the relative importance 
 of image and meaning. He says of the image: 
 
 It is the psychical device by which we are enabled consciously to focalize 
 upon our acts the lessons of our previous relevant experiences, and through 
 which we forecast the future in the light of the past.^ .... It is the image 
 which affords us the method whereby we shake off the shackles of the world 
 of objects immediately present to sense, and secure the freedom to overstep 
 the limits of space and time as our fancy, or our necessity, may dictate.^ .... 
 If I wish to express some proposition with the greatest force and clearness, 
 I go about it by calling into my mind auditory-motor word images.-* 
 
 The above passages certainly attribute a large place to imagery, 
 but other statements reveal the same tendency, shown in the citations 
 from James, to regard the specific character of the image as indifferent: 
 “But provided that, in our use of an image, we recognize it as really 
 symbolizing the class, and not an individual, and use it, intending it to 
 accomplish this purpose for us, it is a matter of indifference what special 
 kind of imagery we happen to employ. 
 
 Citing further, we find not only that one image may be the bearer 
 of meanings signifying two entirely different things, but also that 
 different images may be bearers of the same meaning. 
 
 But how is it that we can think about the same things when the content 
 
 of our thought is so different ? The content of our thought is, so far at least 
 
 as concerns the knowledge process, always made up of imagery. Today this 
 
 may be largely auditory and verbal, tomorrow largely visual.But pro- 
 
 yided I use the different image to stand for the same meanings on the two days, 
 I shall come out perfectly well and my thought will unquestionably have been 
 about the same object and its relations. Thus it comes to pass that, although 
 we never have literally the same image twice in our consciousness, we never¬ 
 theless can think the same meanings again and again.^ 
 
 ^ Principles of Psychology, I, p. 271. ^ Ibid., p. 219. 
 
 2 Psychology, chap, viii, p. 219. 5 Ibid., chap, x, p. 252. 
 
 i Ibid., 21 T. ^ ^ Ibid.,]). 
 
34 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 Image, the “stable psychic fact which we can hold still and look at 
 as long as we like,” has apparently no intrinsic function in the changing, 
 developing meaning, but just as evidently its specific quality is indif¬ 
 ferent in the realm of unchanging meaning. As mental event it becomes 
 a symbol, albeit an indifferent and not an indigenous one, of meaning. 
 Indeed, it is given Just the status which Bradley accords the idea 
 as a bit of psychical stuff. “Mental event,” he says, “is unique and 
 particular, but meaning in its use is cut off from the existence and from 
 the rest of the fluctuating content. It loses its relation to the particular 
 symbol, it stands as an adjective to be referred to some subject but 
 indifferent in itself to every special subject.”^ But we have pointed out 
 that it is this interpretation of the relation of the image to meaning 
 which opens the way to a clean-cut division between logic and psychology. 
 
 In summary we note, first, the insistence of the psychologist upon 
 the organic relationship between image and meaning, then the gradual 
 stripping-off of the functional significance of the image; with James the 
 image is “functionally of least importance” and the stuff of which it is 
 made is of no consequence; with Angell the image is a symbol but 
 its specific character is a matter of indifference. Further, the image 
 possesses no peculiar characteristic which makes its function unique, 
 that is, which makes it the bearer of this, rather than of that, meaning, 
 for not only does it appear that one image may carry two meanings, 
 but, obviously enough, different images may symbolize the same mean¬ 
 ing. Its structural and anatomical make-up thus has no intimate 
 influence on meaning either as a growing, changing, dynamic thing, 
 or on meaning as realm of organized concepts. The image is thus 
 practically denied a place in the cognitive function. The reasons for 
 this shutting-out of the image from the knowledge function are interest¬ 
 ing. On the one hand, image is the unique, the psychical, the transitory 
 element of thought; it is too unstable to serve as a knowledge tool. 
 Knowledge must be characterized by permanence and objectivity; we 
 must be able to mean eternally the same. Concepts which do not 
 change into each other are the stuff of which knowledge must be made. 
 On the other hand, image is the ‘brute’ existential fact of sensuous 
 content; it stays fixed—you may turn it round on a pin and view it 
 as the entomologist does the transfixed butterfly; it is too inflexible to 
 lend itself to the growing, moving, developing cognitive content. Now, 
 curiously enough, it is the meaning which is the evanescent, the change¬ 
 able and elusive, the diaphanous medium of change and development, 
 
 ^ Bradley, Logic, p. 7 . 
 
THE IDEA IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 35 
 
 and the image, unstable and transitive existence that it was found to be, 
 is too fixed and permanent. The antithesis we have here thrown into 
 high relief doubtless seems forced, but these two attitudes toward the 
 image are unmistakably present in psychological ‘explanation and de¬ 
 scription.’ Each in its own way has a justification, but when combined 
 uncritically, as if tenable from one and the same standpoint, and pressed 
 into the service of logic, the result is an insoluble knowledge problem. 
 
 It is not to be gathered from the letter of any one passage that this 
 robbing of the image of all cognitive dignity is intentional, but the cumu¬ 
 lative effect is undoubtedly that of lessening, to the point of negligibility, 
 the image function. Yet, as if by way of compensation, the image is 
 granted an indispensable role in the account of those cognitive activities 
 which involve a direct attitude toward reality. Sensorial attention, 
 perception, discrimination, simultaneous association are all impossible 
 without the image. Indeed, the image would seem to be the sine qua 
 non of apprehending experience in its form of existential reality, or more 
 simply, of becoming aware of “particular material things present to 
 sense.” In attention, for instance, there is the ideational preparation 
 in the form of an image of what one is expecting to hear, see, etc. The 
 presence of the image, the psychologist tells us, constitutes just the 
 attitude of attention. In discrimination, the image is necessary if I 
 wish to select, to differentiate from its context, to isolate, in short, to 
 make an object stand out as having independent existence as a thing. 
 In these instances the image seems to be present as a fairly explicit 
 form of “figured consciousness.” In perception, too, the image plays 
 a part. In Sully’s words, “perception is that process by which the 
 mind supplements a sense impression by an accompaniment or escort 
 of revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived sen¬ 
 sations being solidified and integrated into the form of a percept.”^ 
 Titchener likewise defines perception as an “interpretation of sensa¬ 
 tion,”^ that is, it is the response through a centrally aroused ideational 
 escort, or imagery, to a given sensorial content. Perception of “particu¬ 
 lar material objects present to sense,” thus, is not a compound, or an 
 aggregate, of given sense qualities, but involves imagery, and from the 
 psychologist’s own account, the amount and kind of imagery marks 
 the difference between correct and illusory perception. But if the psy¬ 
 chologist considers the image an indispensable condition of cognizing 
 reality in its immediate perceptual form, the image equally represents 
 
 * Sully, Outlines of Psychology, chapter on “Perception.” 
 
 2 Titchener, Primer of Psychology, chapter on “Perception.” 
 
36 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 reality when it is ‘absent to sense.’ Angell defines the image as “the 
 consciousness of particular material objects absent to sense.” The 
 image, that is, besides being the precondition of coming into relation 
 with reality present to sense, remains the representative of reality when 
 it is absent. Further, it is the idea as image which the psychologist 
 makes the forerunner or immediate stimulus to an overt response, and 
 is therefore the condition, so to speak, of future connection with reality. 
 The psychologist thus seems to make the image nothing less than the 
 individual’s point of contact with reality, present, past, and to come. 
 Under such circumstances to deny the image a decisive place in the 
 cognitive function would bid fair to leave knowledge without connection 
 with reality. 
 
 If “all consciousness is figured” with this kind of stuff, the logician, 
 at any rate, thinks that the particular pattern of the figure ought to 
 make a pretty vital difference; the subtlest difference in the figure ought 
 to mean a corresponding difference in the relation of the individual to 
 reality and hence to knowledge.^ Yet we pointed out the negligible part 
 the image played in the higher cognitive processes. The image gradually 
 degenerates; from the intimacy of its direct connection with reality, 
 it becomes a substitute or representative of reality. As such it is the 
 stable substantive thing that stays for observation; it is the ‘copy’ 
 image. Then its reality juices are further squeezed from it by making 
 this substitute merely ‘my’ copy of reality. Reduced thus to a mere 
 
 ^ Such paragraphs as those of Angell’s (cf. Psychology, chaps, vi, xx) on per¬ 
 ception as developed habit, and on the growth of voluntary control, which show that 
 pari passu with the experimentation, elimination of unnecessary movements, and 
 reinforcing of successful ones, the idea is undergoing a similar dialectic until the 
 idea, as cue to action, represents on the mental side the organization which the habit 
 does on the physical, is the nearest approach by psychology, that I know of, to just 
 this demand of logic. The problem of how action follows thought is made more 
 manageable for psychology by restating it in these specific terms, rather than by keep¬ 
 ing it in its general form; for if every idea is found to be genetically bound up with 
 this or that specific reaction, the final, or the ‘concluding’ image, is necessarily the 
 precursor of just this response and no other. Every act which follows from an idea, 
 that is, which can be called a conscious act, is in the last analysis ideo-motor; and the 
 motor half of this partnership is the habit, built up genetically of just this idea. How¬ 
 ever, even if psychology were to reinterpret the place and function of the image with 
 reference to the “higher cognitive” processes consistently with the implication of 
 this genetic account, there would be the further problem for logic of how the idea 
 which is bound up with the growth of habit—both with its break-up, or inhibition, 
 and with all stages of its organization—can have validity beyond the personal limits 
 of the habit of the psychologist’s individual. This point is considered in chaps, iii 
 and V. 
 
THE IDEA IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 37 
 
 psychical existence, its only reality is that of a bit of fleeting mental 
 stuff, which by some miracle of survival retains the function of a ‘ symbol ’ 
 of reality meaning. The image is thus given a position somewhat similar 
 to the ‘ sensation ’ of the associationists. According to the associationists 
 an object was an aggregate of sense qualities, and these, as simple and 
 unitary, were discrete impressions. To give them body and to carry 
 them out of the flatland of sense impression into a third dimension of 
 permanence and self-identical ‘thinghood,’ it was necessary to add an 
 ‘unknown somewhat,’ or ‘substance,’ or ‘fiction’ of the imagination. 
 Now the psychologist, although apparently making the image the 
 counterpart of sensation, really does not do so. He places it rather on 
 the level of complexity with perception; he speaks of it as “the con¬ 
 sciousness of particular material objects absent to sense.” There appears 
 to be no such thing as an image of red, or hot, or cold; an image of such 
 a simple sense quality turns out to be a conceptual affair. (The after¬ 
 image is not an image in the sense we have been using it but is rather a 
 sensation.) Perception, we said, the psychologist defined as the ‘inter¬ 
 pretation of sensation’ and not as an aggregate of sense qualities all 
 equally present, and the image as analogue of perception, representing 
 the object absent to sense, is not made up of sensory quotes all given on 
 the level of psychic existences. However, when the image is thus thinned 
 out, ‘meaning’ must in some way be superimposed, in order to direct 
 thought out of the internal panorama of mere “scene and counterfeit” 
 into a world of reality. 
 
 Turn now to the more important role which meaning is alleged to 
 play in the knowledge function. Here, if anywhere, psychology should 
 show how thought deals with reality at first hand—should reveal knowl¬ 
 edge in the making. In the judgment process, psychology should have 
 ample opportunity to exhibit ‘ meaning ’ as that vital element, over and 
 above the image, which makes for valid knowledge. But the psy¬ 
 chologist’s treatment of the judgment—we hold that it is a thoroughly 
 adequate one from his standpoint—at once translates the process into 
 a manipulation of concepts. To quote from Angell’s succinct account: 
 
 In the judgment, “the book is heavy,” we have the concept heavy united 
 with the concept book. On the other hand, in the judgment, “the book is not 
 heavy,” we have the concepts apparently sundered from one another. Even 
 in this case, however, it is obvious that in the mental state, of which the 
 judgment is the expression, the two ideas were together, as truly as in the 
 
 first case.^ 
 
 ^ Psychology, chap, xi, p. 269 (first two italics mine). 
 
38 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 Citing further: 
 
 So far as we predicate anything of an object—for example, “iron is a metal” 
 —it may be said that we have simply dissected the idea of iron (our concept), 
 which was already present to our minds, instead of adding some new idea, i.e., 
 metal. Taken literally, this is a true statement of the facts. It is only false 
 
 by virtue of that which it fails to add.Judgment is, then, in its most 
 
 explicit forms undoubtedly a process in which we synthesize concepts in the 
 course of noting and asserting relations.^ 
 
 In the above passages there is no intention of stressing the fact that 
 the author seems to make judgment subsequent to concept. This he 
 certainly does not do, for he gives a comprehensive account of the 
 genetic relationship of concept and judgment, in which he points out 
 that if genetic priority is insisted upon, it must be accorded the 
 judgment,^ but that judgment and concept develop contemporaneously 
 rather than in serial order. Our concern is with the definition of the 
 judgment as a synthesis and analysis of concepts. Is there a develop¬ 
 ment of knowledge as the result of this synthetic-analytic activity? 
 James says: “No one of them develops into any other. But if two of 
 them are thought at once, their relation may come to consciousness 
 and form matter for a third conception.”^ Similarly Angell states that 
 
 the concepts which we unite are with equal certainty already elements of our 
 stock of knowledge, and we may seem to have made no gain by the judgment, 
 much less have added a new idea to some old idea. But the gain is often very 
 real, because the synthesis may bring out relations which previously were not 
 clearly cognizant. From this point of view judgment is not so much a matter 
 of wholly creating new mental material as it is a matter of ordering our mental 
 equipment in the most efficient manner.-* 
 
 Granting that the judgment thus secures a new ordering of our 
 mental equipment which represents an advance in knowledge, what 
 is the relation between this new arrangement of our mental furniture 
 and reality ? Is this new order which has been secured by the synthesis 
 and analysis of concepts, or of thought-relations, one which holds for 
 reality as well as for thought ? How is this possible, since the process 
 has been confined to the realm of conceptual meanings ? The problem 
 which the psychologist has to face if he turn logician is precisely this, 
 of how purely mediate thought-activity can have valid reference to 
 a reality completely outside of it, especially since during the interim 
 of this manipulation there was not even the pretense of connection with 
 
 * Psychology, chap, xi, pp. 277-78, 3 Principles of Psychology, I, 466. 
 
 * Ihid., pp. 270 f. 4 Psychology, chap, xi, p. 278. 
 
THE IDEA IN PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 39 
 
 reality through the sense quotes of the image. (It is especially with 
 reference to the concept that psychologists are generally agreed that 
 the specific nature of the image is a matter of indifference.) It is 
 from this source that the absolutist logician gets his predicate—the 
 ‘floating adjective,’ the ‘non-temporal meaning, loosed from its relation 
 to any particular symbol’—with which he has so much difficulty when 
 he wishes to refer its ‘ideal content’ to reality. Indeed, it is the logic 
 which repudiates psychological affiliation that has adopted the psy¬ 
 chologist’s data where they are not relevant. We are back again in 
 the conception of thought as a purely mediate, or inner discursive 
 process, except that ‘meanings’ are substituted for the associationist’s 
 atomic ideas. 
 
 Does the psychologist as psychologist rightly ignore the question 
 of this reference of thought to reality as irrelevant, because of his initial 
 h 3 q)othesis of the pre-established connection between thought and 
 things? It is our opinion that the following statement, although it 
 involves for logic a sheer assumption of the correspondence of thought 
 and thing, is a satisfactory statement from the psychologist’s standpoint. 
 
 “This wood is white” is an instance of the analytic judgment. It exhibits 
 a property of the wood which is inherent in it, and may, therefore, be said to 
 involve an analysis of the concept “this wood.” “Wood is combustible” is 
 a synthetic judgment, because it adds to the idea of wood the idea of com¬ 
 bustibility, which is not immediately, nor obviously, implied in it. We shall 
 presently see reason to believe that synthetic and analytic judgments are 
 psychologically really one, and for our present purpose we can at least see 
 that they involve, like all the other cases which we have examined, the mental 
 synthesis of concepts, whose objective union, or separateness, we mentally predicate.'^ 
 
 The psychologist’s account of the judgment, then, is complete when 
 he has secured the conceptual content or idea which is to serve as predi¬ 
 cate of reality. With the nature and the possibility of this predication 
 psychology cannot concern itself; it shows the judgment affirming the 
 idea, a completely determined predicate, of a reality or ‘ thing ’ equally 
 determinate. The gap between idea and reality with which it starts, 
 it bridges with the simple assumption of their agreement. Nor could 
 psychology, by expanding its treatment of the judgment, meet this 
 problem unless it is content to accept the logical skepticism of absolutism 
 as its outcome. Although the psychologist maintains that he is giving 
 an account of thought as genuinely adaptive and reconstructive, the 
 possibility of that adaptation and reconstruction he does not discuss. 
 
 ^ Ibid., chap, xi, p. 270 (italics mine). 
 
40 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 If the image, on the one hand, was left without definite connection with 
 meaning as the permanent and universal and objective phase of thought, 
 meaning, on the other hand, was left without guaranty of anchorage 
 to reality. The distinction of image and meaning as the psychologist 
 employs it does not avail to make the idea such a tool of knowledge as 
 instrumental logic demands. 
 
 It is obvious that instrumental logic cannot stop here; nor can it 
 proceed directly from the point at which psychology leaves off, if it 
 hopes to effect some organic union between thought and reality. On 
 the one hand there is for psychology the reality, the given specific objec¬ 
 tive existence, then there is the image whose reality as psychical stuff 
 must somehow be reckoned with, and finally there is meaning or objec¬ 
 tive significance. I can get a copy of reality and then I have an image; 
 but it is ‘ my ’ copy, that is, my image, and it is not reality, yet has a 
 peculiar reality of its own. The judgment has, then, the task of bringing 
 together a subjective and an objective reality. Shall it do this through 
 ^meaning’ as a half-way house between objective reality, on the one 
 hand, and the subjective reality, on the other ? But meaning has been 
 shown to be a most unsatisfactory go-between. Psychology may assume, 
 but cannot demonstrate, the correspondence of thought and reality. 
 Logic finds it necessary to reinterpret not only idea but reality also. 
 Such a difference in interpretation will give the locus of the psychologist’s 
 standpoint with reference to logic. 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE LOCUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST’S STANDPOINT 
 
 The dualism of thought and thing which for psychology is initial 
 and persistent is for logic derivative and occasional. There is for psy¬ 
 chology a structural and existential discreteness, “washing like an 
 innavigable sea,” between idea and object, whereas for logic this duality 
 is a dichotomy of aspect which reality assumes only under specific 
 circumstance. Logic, that is, traces the career of object and idea— 
 subject and predicate—in two directions. From the dualism in which, 
 ceasing to be “ways of living,”^ they stand forth as explicit existences, 
 it follows them back to their common origin where they were absorp¬ 
 tively integrated in a unity and continuity of actuality. Then it accom¬ 
 panies them forward to a common destiny where they merge their 
 identities in a newer and fuller immediacy, in which reality is neither 
 an external environment of objects, nor an inner continuity of mental 
 states.^ Thus the locus of the psychologist’s standpoint falls within 
 that of the logician’s, and differences in characterization of idea, object, 
 and the individual ensue. 
 
 Psychology takes its point of departure from the polarized situation 
 in which idea and object confront each other. Entering the breach, 
 as it were, psychology fixes upon that function of thought whereby 
 
 ^ Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, p. 49. 
 
 2 The intention throughout this paper is to equate reality not merely with the 
 ‘subject,’ or ‘fact’ or ‘object’ aspect of the judgment, but to identify it with the 
 cosmic unity and continuity within which and out of which the judgment moment 
 comes to pass. It is not the equivalent of ‘experience,’ if that is taken to mean 
 “experience of something foreign supposed to impress us” (James, Principles of Psy¬ 
 chology, II, 619). The ‘external’ or ‘environmental’ characteristic of reality pertains 
 to the ‘subject’ phase of the judgment under certain specific exigencies of function; 
 the term ‘external reality,’ therefore, is used not as applicable to reality as a whole, 
 but as convenient to designate this attribute of ‘givenness’ in the subject phase of the 
 judgmental, or tensional situation, in which reality assumes existential expression. 
 If experience is interpreted, not in the subjective sense of the registration in the 
 individual of an external environment, but is construed rather as envelopmental, 
 i.e.,as embracing within the unity of its process the opposition of object and idea, 
 then reality and experience are interchangeable terms. There is, however, a significant 
 difference between this interpretation of experience, and experience conceived as ‘my ’ 
 experience, and ‘your’ experience. (Cf. chapters following and especially chap, v.) 
 
 41 
 
42 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 it ^represents’^ a reality, hitherto organized and integral, but now in 
 process of disintegration, and in need of reconstruction. For, in the 
 moment when reality, through its inner strife and tension, is precipitated 
 into an obstacle or object resisting immediate control, the idea, locating 
 the disturbance, reviewing, surveying the situation in which the diffi¬ 
 culty arose—in order to select and determine the materials and con¬ 
 ditions within which reorganization can take place—reflects a more 
 or less definitely organized content, and seems to stand over against a 
 world of completely given externality. Seizing the idea at this, its 
 moment of widest differentiation from ‘external’ reality, the psychologist 
 has stopped its further function of healing the breach and initiating 
 the new condition in which both idea and object shall be annulled as 
 existences. The psychologist’s purpose preserves the dualism; the 
 reality which the idea reflects is taken as completely determined and 
 external. The outer world is not indeed sensuous stuff for thought to 
 fashion into ‘ thinghood ’; it is already there. The image in its pristine 
 purity, before it fades into a mere ghost of psychic existence, is a con¬ 
 tent which has precisely a “point for point” correspondence with the 
 particular object absent to sense; that is, the organization of the idea 
 is the reflected organization of the object. Titchener states that “the 
 idea is unitary because it is the conscious representation of a single 
 object or process in the outside world. This view of the equivalence 
 of the inner to the outer order should make of psychology a thoroughly 
 objective science; there should be no objective-subjective problem for 
 it to consider, since the inner as exact counterpart of the outer is a 
 literal translation, through the medium of the psycho-physical organism, 
 of external reality into terms of consciousness. Ideas are images, indeed 
 they are after-images, of objects and events in the external world. There 
 would be no problem of relating the idea to reality except as a matter 
 concerning the efficacy of the psycho-physical machinery. Mead says: 
 
 What we generally refer to when we are speaking of psychical states are 
 elements of objects which are simply abstracted from the objects themselves. 
 I speak of the color red, and in so doing have in mind something that I have 
 abstracted from certain red objects. To get a concrete picture of this, I call 
 to mind the visual picture of the object itself. In either case the object is 
 itself known as objective; for even the picture of the imagination is objective 
 so long as it is dealing with the element of an objective world which is not 
 
 * Cf. Moore, The Functional versus the Representational Theories of Knowledge 
 in Locke’s Essay, p. 57. 
 
 2 Titchener, Outlines of Psychology, p. 183. 
 
LOCUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST’S STANDPOINT 
 
 43 
 
 questioned, however fantastically it is put together. Elements of conscious¬ 
 ness are not as such elements of a psychical character.^ 
 
 The ‘objects’ with which psychology deals are, then, as tangible 
 and measurable as the objects of physical science. Yet we noted above 
 how the idea was reduced to ‘subjectivity’ with the subsequent attempt 
 to cram objectivity into it. It is only by occupying two positions at 
 once that such a situation arises for psychology—only as psychology 
 views idea as at once authoritative version of reality as it comes through 
 the instrumentality of the psycho-physical organism, and yet as mere 
 representation of that reality in the original. There is, thus, the per¬ 
 manent dualism between percept and object perceived; between idea 
 and object. The idea which as presentation is itself an object becomes 
 merely a mode of apprehending a reality outside of itself. The ascrip¬ 
 tion of ‘subjectivity’ to the idea is not a consequence of reducing the 
 object to equivalent conscious elements, but is rather the result of 
 generalizing both poles of the dichotomized situation. When the object- 
 pole is universalized into an external environment, the idea-pole is 
 universalized into a subjective ideality; when ‘things’ constitute an 
 impersonal and external environment, ‘thought’ must be personal and 
 internal. 
 
 Instrumental logic accepts the realism of psychology which makes the 
 idea a factual existence and content—a form which reality manifests 
 under certain conditions—but it rejects the subjectivism which makes it 
 stand as a representation of an absent reality. The idea has for logic as 
 real a status as the psychologist chooses to give it, and yet it may mark 
 the subjectivity of experience in a way that the idea for psychology 
 cannot. Logic finds the subjectivity of the situation in which the idea 
 occurs, not in that reality is absent to sense, but just in the fact that 
 reality is present in ‘objective j i.e., ambiguous form. For logic there is no 
 reality already fixed and organized from which, as object antecedently 
 present to sense, the image is derived, and which it represents in complete 
 perceptual-like wholeness when it is absent to sense. In any genuine 
 tensional situation, reality is not present as completely determined. 
 Reality is particularized and objectified as present to sense, only as it 
 is in process of disorganization, and in need of reorganization. The 
 image, moreover, reflects not an external reality, but reality in process 
 of becoming externalized, dismembered, disrupted—reality as partial 
 and incomplete. The image is not the reflection of the object previously 
 present to sense but now absent; it is rather the consciousness of the 
 
 ^ Mead, Philosophical Review, IX (1900), lo-ii. 
 
44 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 absence, that is, the projection or reflection, of that which will so har¬ 
 monize and complete the ‘present to sense’ that it will pass from the 
 partiality of its givenness as objectified existence into a new totality in 
 which the particularity of this ‘objectivity’ will be annulled. 
 
 In tracing the idea and object back of the dualism, logic finds that 
 they do not exist apart and complete, each in itself, awaiting the 
 judgment to effect their connection and agreement. They exist only in 
 and during the judgment moment. It is at once the function of the 
 judgment (i) to particularize reality into objectivity, for the purpose of 
 further control, and (2) to overcome that particularity in order to inaugu¬ 
 rate a new continuity. There is no problem of predicating existence ofi 
 the idea, or of qualifying reality by an ideal content; the idea-object 
 duality is the content of reality expressed in existential form. The pres¬ 
 ence of the idea or image is a sign that reality has become epitomized— 
 on the one hand analyzed, on the other synthesized—into existence. But 
 it is only when a content—part and parcel of the very constitution of 
 reality—resists inclusion within the present trend of activity that it is 
 thus objectified; and by virtue of this detachment, the direction or course 
 which reality is taking also becomes explicit, as idea. The object is not 
 real existence and the idea negation of real existence; the object is the 
 outcome of past organization, the idea the outpost of reorganization. 
 Together they define the status of reality in the present, as being of this or 
 that kind, as necessary to suffer this or that reconstruction, before it may 
 leave this stage, and enter upon a new level of development. The differ¬ 
 entiation between idea and object is not successive, but simultaneous and 
 progressive. Idea and object, in process of reciprocal dialectic, constitute 
 the existential moment of reality. 
 
 There is, further, no fixed line of cleavage between object and idea, 
 as between that which is present in the form of sensory immediacy, and 
 that which is not. In the moment of conflict when some content becomes 
 detached as object, reality appears to be identified with just this aspect 
 of the situation so immediately and compellingly present to sense—so 
 irretrievably there, and external. But what is thus present is entirely 
 relative to the context of the situation; it is by virtue of its character 
 as given, or sufficiently organized that reality takes on the character of 
 sensory immediacy, and not vice versa. Lest the psychologist regard 
 this as taking an unwarrantable liberty with the absoluteness and the 
 stability of sensory experience, it is well to remind him that even he 
 offers no intrinsic differentia between what is perceived and what is 
 imaged or remembered. To quote Titchener: 
 
LOCUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS STANDPOINT 
 
 45 
 
 There is no fundamental psychological difference between the perception 
 
 and the idea.Hence although we might be tempted for convenience 
 
 sake to follow the common usage—to employ ‘perception’ to denote what 
 is now before us, and ‘idea’ to denote what is remembered or imagined—we 
 should be obliged constantly to remind ourselves that, in principle the two 
 processes are the same. And the danger of forgetting this far outweighs, 
 in psychology, the convenience of separating the terms.^ 
 
 Again, for the psychologist, the particular material object present 
 to sense turns out to be not immediately present in its entirety, but 
 only partly present as sensorial nucleus, and partly imaged or remem¬ 
 bered. Under analysis, the sensorial nucleus breaks up again into a 
 given and a supplied, and the psychologist is led into an infinite regress— 
 until indeed he comes full circle into the concept—when he attempts 
 to find a sensory quale as a fixed ultimate, irrespective of the particular 
 situation in which it may happen to function as an element, that is, 
 as the sufficiently elemental and given. Sensory quales as the irreducible 
 ultimates of the psychologist are methodological abstractions, not 
 because they do not occur ‘pure’ or alone, but because the very existence 
 of a sensory nucleus is the existence of reality in the form of a focal 
 point of relationship. Logic regards sensory quales not as intrusions 
 from an external environment, but as the more or less stable centers 
 into which reality has become organized with reference to typically 
 recurrent situations where they function as adequate bases for the further 
 development of reality. They are the points of contact in the clash 
 of conflicting situations; they are the residuum which rolls out as the 
 common element between “colliding contents,”^ and which may be 
 accepted as “there,” since they are the common denominator between 
 the situation just past and the situation not yet consummated. They 
 are, therefore, not discrete ‘pin-points’ of contact with a reality, which 
 as a continuous whole lies beyond them, but are, so to speak, the nodes 
 of reality, which mark at once the break in the homogeneity of reality, 
 and the basis for a new continuity. 
 
 The psychologist, to be sure, has not a little to say about the rela¬ 
 tivity of sensation. He explains how its specific nature depends upon 
 circumstance, for example, upon contrast, expectation, attention, pre¬ 
 vious activity, etc. Yet, these possible variations of intensity, duration, 
 and characteristic tang are regarded as more or less accidental and 
 individual differences in registering the presence of a sensuous stuff, 
 
 ^ Outlines of Psychology, p. 149. 
 
 ^ Dewey, Studies hi Logical Theory, p. 60, footnote. 
 
46 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 which, for the psychologist, is determined and external. It is as the 
 apprehension of a simple fixed quality that the psychologist interprets 
 sensation as ultimate and elemental; there is always an external stimulus 
 forcing itself upon the experient by means of sensation. The psy¬ 
 chologist’s definition of perception as the interpretation of sensation 
 illustrates this twofold attitude of viewing the sensory quales as them¬ 
 selves determined by the context in which they occur and, on the other 
 hand, of being fixed functions of the object. In the experiment cited 
 by James of stripping off the context of a word by repeating it many 
 times, the actual sense quales are said to change.^ Illusions, too, show 
 that subsequent interpretation produces a marked change in charac¬ 
 teristic qualey intensity, and extensity of sensation. Yet the sensorial 
 nucleus itself is regarded as a fixed element, or function of the object, 
 and the supplied factor, or interpretation, as the variable factor. So 
 psychology may justly be said to hold to the externality of reality as 
 sensory environment. 
 
 Logic maintains that reality takes on the character of an environ¬ 
 ment of sensory immediacy when it stands as the sufficiently simple or 
 elemental residuum to which a given situation may be reduced, pending 
 its reconstruction. What is sensorial, that is, varies from one situation 
 to another; anything which functions as adequate basis for further 
 procedure—groups of objects, whole landscapes, so to speak, ‘systems 
 of concepts’—may be foreshortened into a simple real on the level of 
 sensory immediacy. It is thus that logic gets rid of the conception 
 of the pure mediacy of thought. Thought is never a merely mediate 
 affair—a discursive process busied with manipulating, analyzing, 
 synthesizing conceptual contents which must subsequently be referred 
 to reality—but deals with reality in the form of sensory immediacy, 
 always. Reality as sensory immediacy, that is, is always present as 
 one member of the tensional or genuine judgmental situation. The 
 problem, to be sure, is often to find just what this reality is;^ for the real 
 is the fixed, the hard and fast, the static, the absolutely given, only 
 within the limits of each particular crisis in reality. The task is to 
 determine how much is irresistible impact, immovable externality—how 
 much, and what, reality is “ there,” as adequate basis for further advance. 
 In other words, the reality which at the first moment of conflict is 
 precipitated as an existence so obtrusively given and present to sense 
 must be analyzed, broken up, so that it shall stand no longer in its present 
 
 ^ James, Principles of Psychology, II, 80-81. 
 
 ^ Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, chap, iii, especially p. 61. 
 
LOCUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS STANDPOINT 
 
 47 
 
 stubborn concreteness as resisting obstacle, but shall yield to refashion¬ 
 ing in order that it may fit flexibly into a new context. But this cannot 
 be accomplished by dissection pure and simple. It can be effected only 
 by a kind of experimentation in which it must be abstracted from the 
 setting into which it has been consolidated or crystallized by past 
 constructions. It must be severed from what, for the particular situa¬ 
 tion in question, are the accidents of its previous concomitants. It 
 can be pried from its context only as it is used tentatively as a basis now 
 for this reconstruction and now for that; and with each tentative recon¬ 
 stituting of the given, its reality as sensory immediacy is changing. 
 The medium in and through which reality is experimentally fitted 
 into various contexts is the idea as representative, that is, the image. 
 The viewing of present reality as finding fulfilment in a perspective of 
 projected totality is the imaging of reality. The whole process of ex¬ 
 perimentation, or using the given as a carrier for a shifting series of 
 tentative projections, is the conceptualizing of reality. Image, that is, 
 does not re-present or reiterate a reality already organized, nor yet does 
 it falsify or distort it; it is rather the experimental projection of reality 
 as transformed and reconstituted by virtue of its status in a new context. 
 This holds true of the so-called “memory” image as well as of that 
 designated “anticipatory.” The memory image is not a re-call or 
 reproduction of reality even approximately as it occurred, but is a calling 
 into existential form an experience not in that form originally. In the 
 words of Dewey, remembering is “re-membering.”^ The image is not 
 a negation of reality but is always a copartner of reality-as-datum; it 
 supplies it, so to speak, with a fore and after setting; it is a sort of 
 coefficient which, showing how the datum is “to be taken” at any 
 moment, constitutes, with it, the existential presence of reality. 
 
 During the process of experimentation, image, as the projected end 
 or totality, has served as guide to determine the area within which the 
 subject as immediately given reality was confined. Reality, as subject 
 on the other hand, as providing the given means and conditions under 
 which redintegration must take place, is reciprocally determinative of 
 the limits of image, as end or purpose. Bradley’s position that reality 
 as the subject of the judgment is too rich in its infinite connections to 
 submit itself to predication—that one can go on indefinitely tracing out 
 the luxuriant ramifications of its relationships, so that it is impossible 
 to include it under the compass of any specified ideal contend—is in 
 
 * Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 252. 
 
 2 Bradley, Logic; cf. chapters on “Inference.” 
 
48 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 keeping with a failure to view the given sensorial content, which expresses 
 reality in its subject relation, as definitely determined and restricted 
 within the boundaries of the ideal or projected end. On the other 
 hand, the conception of thought as purely mediate, with an infinite 
 ‘self-representative’ activity, and having nothing to mark the limits 
 within which it is mediate, is consistent with a failure to view the ideal 
 content as initiated, and checked, with reference to the real as immediate 
 sensory existence. 
 
 How much representation, how much imagery is needed before the 
 datum is fully determined depends upon the extent to which the real, 
 as resisting obstacle, retains the characteristic of externality, and refuses 
 to suffer incorporation into a new unity. If the imagery is reduced to a 
 ‘fragment,’ so is the external reality—there is a minimum amount of 
 tension in the developmental movement of reality, and it is, therefore, 
 not expressed in existential or objective form. It is often asserted that 
 an image worn down and faded may be the carrier of rich and significant 
 meaning. From what standpoint is the image worn and faded; what 
 is the criterion of its ‘ wholeness ’ and ‘ completeness ’ ? The case is 
 rather that the completer and fuller the imagery, the surer the indications 
 that reality is in its existential and relatively static stage of development. 
 When the image is much “worn down” and meager, it is because there 
 is a comparatively ready passage from the tensional moment into the 
 redintegrated situation. 
 
 When the datum has been finally determined, and reality, carrying 
 within it the fulness of former immediacies, has been telescoped into 
 a real, functioning on the level of sensory immediacy, that is, as a stimulus 
 initiating a direct response, reality becomes again integral and homo¬ 
 geneous. So thoroughly do ideal and given flow together that there is 
 no distinction between percept and object perceived, between sensori¬ 
 motor and ideo-motor activity; between stimulus and response; between 
 experience and experient. It is the situation which is not knowledge, 
 but is something more than knowledge, into which knowledge leads, and 
 out of which reality may again be born twofold. The account which 
 the psychologist can give of such a moment as this, in so far as he looks 
 upon all experience as ‘my’ experience, and equates all experience with 
 my consciousness of something outside, is one approaching an emotional 
 status, in which there is a minimum of cognitive awareness. But 
 emotion, whatever it may be besides, is usually regarded by the psy¬ 
 chologist as a category of subjectivity; it is the peculiar state of the 
 individual experient as distinguishable from the object of his experience. 
 
LOCUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST’S STANDPOINT 
 
 49 
 
 Interpreted in this wise, emotion would not properly designate the con¬ 
 dition of reality in which there is annulled the distinction between 
 thinker and object, doer and deed, obstacle and aim. This moment 
 in which reality, enriched by the mediation or harmony of the erstwhile 
 warring elements within it, sweeps on in the full-tide of a more intensive 
 homogeneity and immediacy may suggest, rather, what has sometimes 
 been called the aesthetic moment—the moment in which, as it were, 
 reality, functioning now as so direct a provocative to response that the 
 objective-subjective bifurcation of reality does not take place, had yet 
 within the psycho-physical organism broken up into stimuli represent¬ 
 ing all the originally distinct and unmediated values, and which, calling 
 forth correspondingly manifold responses, mutually inhibiting and 
 reinforcing each other, gives rise to the organic reverberation of the 
 “stimulation-in-repose” equilibrium,^ characteristic of the moment of 
 “appreciation.” But if the aesthetic moment is conceived as falling 
 within the individual, it can furnish only a suggestive analogue, and 
 not a real name for the mediated-immediacy-situation which recurs 
 as a characteristic epoch of the evolution of reality. This situation 
 is not located within the individual; the individual falls within the 
 situation. 
 
 Subjectivity, logic holds, is a category pertinent only to the situa¬ 
 tion in which the dialectic of mutual determination of idea and object 
 takes place. It is not, however, to be ascribed to the idea or image in 
 contradistinction to the object; subjectivity is just the tentative aspecb* 
 of the whole movement. As equivalent to the ‘personal,’ the ‘uniquely 
 individual,’ subjectivity indicates the occurrence of just this crisis in 
 reality which has never occurred before, and will never be again. For 
 logic, that is, the individual is but one of these tensional points in expe¬ 
 rience. He exists only at moments when reality is in process of recon¬ 
 struction; he is the center of conflicting forces; the registration of stress 
 and strain of contending elements. He comes into existence from a 
 matrix of not merely social—if social signifies only a larger interrelation¬ 
 ship among individuals as such—but of cosmic relations and conditions. 
 Idea and object serve to bound the area within which the individual 
 appears, but they are themselves functions of cosmic organization. 
 Idea does not occur as the exclusive, inner possession of an individual; 
 it belongs no more to the individual as such than to the situation as a 
 whole. The interruption of habit which it registers is the interruption 
 
 1 Cf. Puffer, The Psychology of Beauty, chap. iii. 
 
 2 Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, p. 53. 
 
50 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 of the habit of the cosmic community. Nor is the object, as forming 
 the other boundary within which the individual occurs, a particular 
 reality, or portion, torn from a larger context, but is rather the whole 
 universe of reality focused into just this here-and-now aspect. The 
 judgment process—the idea-object dialectic—as we pointed out earlier, 
 is at once a synthesis of reality into concrete particularity, and an 
 analysis revealing the fundamentals or universal elements of its organi¬ 
 zation. For the real, as precipitated obstacle, is a crystallization or 
 embodiment of the principles of the organization of reality; and on 
 the other hand, during the interim in which the datum is receiving 
 determination, such organization is falling apart and revealing the 
 universal and permanent elements which may be incorporated into a 
 fresh reorganization. The real, now as obstacle to the furtherance of 
 former organization, now as point of departure for reorganization, 
 betrays the common or universal element that runs through the pattern 
 of reality. 
 
 The judgment then, even though concerned with thought and 
 reality as specific occurrence, and not ‘at large,’ or per se, may thus 
 secure such universality as is involved in the make-up of reality itself. 
 Furthermore, the judgment is not a process of creation out of nothing; 
 it is not a ‘transmutation’ of reality. The reconstructions which it 
 effects are not the making and unmaking of reality without regard to 
 the “stubborn grain in things.” Although reality is never externality 
 and objectivity in general, yet the real as residuum of past constructions 
 is there, rigorously to set the limits and conditions within which recon¬ 
 structions can take place. Thus, the judgment may secure such per¬ 
 manence of truth, and objective validity as characterize reality itself. 
 
 As predicate such an idea, intimately bound up with the existence 
 of the object; as subject such a real, permeated to the core with ideality— 
 and the fruit of the judgment, says logic, must be universality, per¬ 
 manence, objectivity of truth. But, thought is “personal,” suggests 
 psychology: 
 
 In this room—this lecture-room, say—there are a multitude of thoughts, 
 yours and mine, some of which cohere mutually, and some not. They are as 
 little each-for-itself and reciprocally independent as they are all-belonging- 
 
 together. They are neither.Whether anywhere in the room there be 
 
 a mere thought, we have no means of ascertaining, for we have no experience 
 of its like. The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal with are 
 found in personal consciousnesses, minds, selves, concrete particular I’s and 
 you’s.It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not thought, or 
 
LOCUS OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS STANDPOINT 
 
 51 
 
 this or that thought, but my thought, every thought being owned .On these 
 
 terms the personal self might be treated as the immediate datum in psychology.* 
 
 If thought is thus personal, the possession of the individual merely, 
 what boots its close connection with the object? This connection 
 infects the object with subjectivity, but does not make the idea objec¬ 
 tively valid. And this is a fair contention from the psychologist’s 
 standpoint, although his discussion of thought as personal is not, strictly 
 speaking, equivalent to an account of it as ‘subjective.’ The antithesis 
 of ‘my’ thought versus ‘your’ thought is as purely a matter of objective 
 distribution as a division of property into mine and yours. It belongs 
 to this or that psycho-physical organism, which is one with itself, and 
 different from all others. Psychology takes as its datum a self, which, 
 however social its content, is insulated as an existence from other selves, 
 and from an external environment. The idea which is the possession 
 of this individual, though it mark the break-up of habit and lead to 
 its reconstruction, that is, though it be intimately connected with the 
 ‘overt’ activity of the organism, yet travels within the bounds of a 
 certain fixed center of responses, initially marked off, and persistently 
 integral and unitary. The idea as issuing from this individual can get 
 extra-individual import only by the assumption of a pre-established 
 harmony between other insulated individuals and itself. Logic finds 
 it necessary to place the psychologist’s interpretation of the individual 
 with reference to a wider perspective. Like the dualism of object and 
 idea, the individual occurs only at certain times and is then, so to speak, 
 an eruption into existence of a whole system of relations. No response, 
 no idea, is merely ‘ my ’ reaction, or merely ‘ my ’ idea. I as a person, as 
 this person, and not that, am just one of these decisive points in the 
 growth and reconstruction of reality. 
 
 By way of summary, we may say that for psychology, cognition is 
 an inner process which reflects a world outside of it. “Psychology,” 
 says Angell, “professes to investigate primarily the mere facts of cogni¬ 
 tion, the nature of the knowledge process taken at its face value,” i.e., 
 a “process reflecting in some manner a world outside itself.”"* What¬ 
 ever investigation psychology may see fit to make beyond the “mere 
 facts of cognition” taken at face value, it seems clear that it must do so 
 on the basis of a representational theory of knowledge, which though 
 
 * James, Principles of Psychology, I, 225-26. 
 
 2 Angell, “The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy,” 
 University of Chicago Decennial Publications, First Series, Vol. Ill, Part II, p. 13 (page 
 reference is to monograph reprint). 
 
52 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 unquestionably consistent with its own premises leads, if accepted with¬ 
 out reinterpretation by logic, to all the baffling contradictions brought 
 out with such convincing finality in the Studies in Logical Theory. 
 Psychology may demonstrate the effectiveness of the judgment as an 
 instrument of adaptive behavior, nevertheless the adaptation secured 
 by means of the report which the psychological idea gives of reality is 
 to a reality which is unaffected by it. Thought, if efficient in attaining 
 knowledge, is so by way of learning new facts about a reality which is 
 entirely independent of it. The judgment, to repeat, is a psychical 
 act whose reconstructions occur entirely in the mind. Logic, on the 
 other hand, makes of the judgment, not an inner act, but the dissolution- 
 resolution process by which reality itself is active, changes, and develops. 
 The psychologist views thought at its point of widest differentiation 
 from an external reality; thought as a constituent, and constitutive, 
 part of a single reality process can be stated only from the standpoint 
 of the logician’s premises and technique. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE NATURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST’S “PROCESSES” 
 
 The psychologist, then, cannot project his standpoint into a satis¬ 
 factory world-view. As has been indicated, he is dependent for his 
 material upon the polarized situation in which reality becomes differen¬ 
 tiated into two conflicting elements—elements in the sense that they 
 are for the time being ultimate and irreducible, each to each. When 
 such episodic ultimateness and irreducibility are universalized into a 
 permanent status, there result the abstractions, idea and object. Fur¬ 
 ther, when the elementary character of these two aspects is not kept 
 strictly within the limits of the several sciences or disciplines (the 
 physical sciences, on the one hand, and psychology, on the other) for 
 the special purpose or interest of which the abstractions may afford 
 convenient working-bases, there are created all the thought-reality 
 antinomies indigenous to a representational epistemology. The psy¬ 
 chologist, however, is undisturbed by these antinomies in so far as he 
 consistently translates ‘external’ reality into states-of-consciousness 
 equivalents, for the duality of the conflicting elements then falls within 
 the ‘mental state.’ There is something within it which is idea, and 
 something which is object. Reducing the original reality-dilemma to 
 these equivalences, it is easy to ignore the process of reduction by which 
 they were obtained, and consequently, to take the next step to subjective 
 idealism. The problematic situation thus is one only to thought; the 
 obstacle one only for thought; the disruption one only in thought. 
 Hence, thought, in resolving the conflict, in healing the dualism, heals 
 only a schism within itself. It is equally possible to pass from an ideal¬ 
 ism of this sort to naive realism. If thought can be thus occupied only 
 with its own discursive activity, the object remains wholly impervious 
 to thought’s futile industry. 
 
 However, this is neither the idealism nor the realism of instrumen¬ 
 talism, which insists that the duality of elements is no more a condition 
 existing merely for thought than the unity out of which it arises is one 
 merely for, or in, or to, thought. On the contrary, the realism of 
 instrumental logic is stubborn and insistent. The unity of the reality- 
 process, it maintains, is not one of which the individual has merely 
 ‘consciousness’ or knowledge. Rather is he woven warp and woof 
 
 S 3 
 
54 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 into the texture and pattern of the reality fabric, and his awareness of 
 the reality-unity is not some inner experience of a reality whose content 
 he may know but never be. His awareness of the oneness and immediacy 
 of reality is the aliveness of the reality-process in and to itself. So, too, 
 the duality of elements within the reality-process is part and parcel of 
 its warm and intimate existential immediacy. Indeed, it is precisely 
 the existential immediacy of both aspects which constitutes the very 
 reality-dilemma.^ Holding these elements thus co-ordinate in actuality 
 and immediacy, instrumentalism can exhibit its realism as the necessary 
 complement of its idealism and, vice versa, can show its idealism to be 
 the indispensable counterpart of its realism. 
 
 It is not possible for psychology, which perforce reduces the three- 
 dimensional, duality-in-unity character of reality to the linear dimensions 
 of an ‘inner continuity,’ to handle the dialectic between the elements 
 in conflict (idea and object) as a process of reality-reconstruction- 
 and-reconstitution. This the psychologist may be ready to admit and 
 yet may demur at the consequence which seems to follow, namely, 
 that psychology cannot discuss thought as a genuine process at all. 
 What becomes of the transitive states, the onward-flowing character 
 of the stream, the process of association, the busy thoroughfare between 
 idea and idea in the judgment process ? The answer, in part at least, 
 would seem to be that the transitive states, the more or less will-o’-the- 
 wisp affairs which elude the alert introspection of the psychologist, are 
 a methodological fiction. There are no connections between substan¬ 
 tive states, for such states are abstractions, and connections between 
 them cannot be made by inserting a series of other states which move 
 swiftly by. The difficulty is not that of catching the flitting, tran¬ 
 sitive things which, within our grasp, “melt like snowflakes on the 
 river”; the so-called transitive states are the psychologist’s attempt 
 to translate the passage from integral to integrated situation, and do 
 not mark a transition from idea to idea. Further, other cognitive 
 processes, thinking for instance, as exemplified in the association of 
 ideas, must be denied to be processes in the sense of operating among 
 the psychologist’s ideas. 
 
 Ideas, we pointed out, are genuine stages in the judgment moment 
 (the dissolution-resolution process) which the psychologist arrests and 
 takes from their respective settings. Nor is this abstraction of the idea 
 from its setting of the sort to wdiich every psychologist calls attention, 
 namely, the dissection out of a larger complex of consciousness. The 
 abstraction referred to here is not from a consciousness complex, but 
 
 ^ Cf. chap. iii. 
 
NATURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS ‘‘PROCESSES” 
 
 55 
 
 from a reality-situation in which the idea occurs as a genuine phenome¬ 
 non. As containing within themselves the reflection of a certain organi¬ 
 zation of what is for the time being ‘external’ environment, ideas are 
 complete structural units—for psychology the substantive states, for 
 logic arrested stages in the judgment. No magic can set up organic 
 relations among them; there is no question of continuity or discontinuity 
 between them; each is unique and has relationship only with the reality- 
 situation in which it occurred. On the other hand, there is no more 
 genuine relationship between the abstracted ‘objects’ than between the 
 ideas—the continuity is no more ‘external’ than it is ‘internal.’ Were 
 there a continuity of externality, psychology might well claim to secure 
 a continuity of internality by the simple process of representation or 
 reflection. The continuity, however, is one of the reality-process itself, 
 and psychology in setting up a continuity between ideas has a somewhat 
 extraordinary task on its hands. The externality aspect of reality the 
 idea may report through representation, but since the continuity of 
 reality is not located in its externality, psychology can only supply it 
 at first hand, and this it does by vitalizing ideas into working relations 
 with each other. Thus it constitutes them a reality-process of their 
 own order. 
 
 Miinsterberg affords an admirable, because extreme, instance of this 
 procedure of the psychologist. He starts out by making the idea as it is 
 for the psychologist, not only an abstraction, as it is held to be from the 
 point of view here presented, but indeed, an artificial construct; that is, 
 he does not regard the idea as a genuine phenomenon which actually 
 occurs, and which the psychologist arrests in its functioning, but looks 
 upon it as the psychologist’s artefact. This idea is never “born” in the 
 actual thinking process; it is an existence which never occurs as such, 
 but is the result wholly of the psychologist’s peculiar occupation.^ This 
 idea, furthermore, has no meaning with reference to a world of reality 
 values. (This position differs somewhat from that of Bradley and Taylor. 
 Bradley regards the idea, as psychology deals with it, as a natural oc¬ 
 currence, but since it is a mere psychical existence^ it can, at best, have 
 only symbolic connection with a world of logical meanings.^ Taylor 
 agrees with Miinsterberg as to the origin of the idea, that is, he makes 
 it a deliberate construct of the psychologist, but ultimately he gives 
 it a symbolic function with reference to a world of reality meanings.^ 
 In so far as he does this, he illustrates the same type of procedure which 
 we charge against Miinsterberg.) The meaning of the idea is merely, 
 
 ^ Munsterberg, GrundzUge der Psychologic, I, 163 f. " Bradley, Logic, pp. i-io. 
 
 3 Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, Book IV, chap, i, pp. 298-301. 
 
56 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 then, the fact of its existence in the stream of consciousness which the 
 psychologist studies; it has a place in that stream, certain antecedents, 
 certain consequents, and beyond this, it means nothing. However, if 
 these ideas, these “psychical existences,” are to be ascribed entirely to 
 the psychologist’s enterprise, we are the more surprised to find them 
 setting up in business for themselves and constituting a bona-fide pro¬ 
 cess. “ Psychologisch bedeutet das Wissen, das sich auf die Vorstellung 
 stiitzt, somit zunachst nur gewisse Einfliisse der Vorstellung auf den 
 iibrigen Bewusstseinsinhalt; Associationen und Hemmungen treten ein, 
 Symbole und Zeichen, Worte und Schriftbilder bedeuten uns mehr als 
 sie sind, well sie anderes miterwecken . 
 
 How in a realm of abstractions can one abstraction have “influence” 
 upon another? Miinsterberg says that these ideas do not leave the 
 level of their own plane of existence to connect with a world of values 
 beyond, but even so, can they enter into relationship with other deni¬ 
 zens of their shadow world? If they can and do, have we not here 
 an actual process, a genuine occurrence, and have we not given the 
 “psychologist’s” idea full title to reality? If there can be associations, 
 inhibitions, mutual reference, and influence among these ideas, is this 
 not a genuine thought-activity of some kind ? Is not the abstractness, 
 rather artificiality, of the ideas canceled in the very concreteness of 
 the enterprise among themselves ? Then we are caught again in the 
 traditional unbroken continuity of the inner stream. But what a thing 
 of shreds and patches, what a motley garb of reality and abstractions 
 this inner continuity must be, if such is its genesis! 
 
 It is largely through the category of association that the stream- 
 of-thought conception has endured so long, and has been imported into 
 contexts to which it is not applicable. Yet it is fair to say that the 
 doctrine of association, as the psychologist expounds it, is still far from 
 being ‘crystal-clear.’ Through its agency the psychologist secures the 
 integrity of the stream, for he thereby links thought to thought, that 
 is, makes of ideas a closed series in which each idea conditions the 
 sequence of another. The law of association binds idea to idea, fore 
 -and aft, so that no hiatus is suffered to occur between them. Reading 
 forward, the law says that “whenever two images or ideas have been 
 juxtaposed in the mind, there is a tendency when one recurs for the 
 other to come with it.”^ Reading backward, it states that no idea or 
 image may at any moment be in the foreground of consciousness unless 
 it is connected with its immediate predecessor.^ Here, then, is a closed 
 
 ^ Miinsterberg, op. cit., p. 162 (italics mine). 
 
 2 Angell, Psychology, chap, viii, p. 206. 3 Ihid., p. 207. 
 
NATURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS PROCESSES'^ 
 
 57 
 
 circuit of mechanically determined sequences. This unbroken, closed- 
 from-behind continuity is precisely the sort of thing which instru¬ 
 mentalism finds so unwieldy and useless. The psychologist, moreover, 
 is not unaware of the difficulties of this account, even as more imme¬ 
 diately applicable within the field of psychology itself, and offers the 
 very significant suggestion that association occurs not among ideas 
 but among objects, that is, he refers it as a process to the externality 
 aspect of reality.^ Association would, accordingly, be a methodological 
 abstraction or device whereby the psychologist handles ideas from a 
 perspective (the introspective viewpoint) which marshals them into a 
 swiftly moving procession. Like Berkeley and Hume, however, the 
 modern psychologist shall search in vain for a genuine bond of connection 
 between ideas. Association by similarity, the type of so-called ‘inter¬ 
 nal” association, in which ideas are said to be not merely successive, 
 but bound to each other by a core of inner connection (according to 
 the second aspect of the law of association all association of ideas betrays 
 this inner nexus), either is not a process occurring among ideas, or it is 
 anything but the selective, adaptive, projective activity which, as the 
 basis of reasoning, it is purported to be. Similarity, the psychologist 
 tells us, is not a causal principle determining the sequence of ideas,* 
 but ideas may be pronounced similar after association, operative from 
 behind by habit, recency, vividness, etc., has precipitated just this 
 particular sequence, which then, in an ex post facto manner, may be 
 adjudged ‘similar’ to its predecessor. Reasoning as the reconstructive 
 activity which goes forth in search of the similar, i.e., which seeks to 
 find a common principle of organization, or a ‘ middle term ’ between two 
 situations that resist each other in their mutual concreteness—this is 
 not a process occurring among ideas, or else it is a process which must 
 forfeit all claim to projective control over its own sequences, i.e., it 
 is a mechanical and not a teleological procedure. 
 
 If association cannot be pressed into service to guarantee a vital 
 process-connection between ideas, no more can the judgment combine 
 ideas into real unions. As registering a definite status quo of the reality- 
 dilemma when they are arrested in their functioning, they are complete 
 structural units. Why should they be joined together? Into what 
 could they be synthesized—a fresh abstraction? What the need of 
 analysis and how can they be analyzed ? What the number, and where 
 the cleavage of parts in a completely unitary content, such as the 
 psychologist assures us any idea must really be ? If ideas are the stuff 
 which the judgment must manipulate, it is small wonder that the logician 
 
 ^ James, Principles of Psychology, I, 604. * Ibid., p. 591. 
 
58 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 is torn between deciding whether the process is one of analysis or of 
 synthesis. On this basis, the problem of the synthetic judgment offers 
 no more difficulties than does that of the analytical judgment. The 
 psychologist, indeed, has scarcely disentangled himself from the intri¬ 
 cacies of the mystery of how “psychological analysis” of a unitary 
 mental content is possible. James, for instance, reduces all analysis 
 of presentations or ideas to the analysis of objective facts which are 
 known by them.^ On the level of ideas, there is no answer as to whether 
 the judgment is analytic or synthetic, and Kant’s searching scrutiny 
 of the synthetic judgment is no more pertinent than the query: “How 
 are analytical judgments possible?” 
 
 The psychologist’s ‘higher cognitive’ processes, i.e., all operations 
 which seem to have self-sustained continuity as they ply between idea 
 and idea, belong to the representative phase of the judgment situation. 
 But this representative aspect occurs within definite limits; it does not 
 go on unceasingly, and is itself nothing more than the search for mutually 
 relevant responses and stimuli, or datum and ideatum, or subject and 
 predicate.^ Those which are found relevant to the same end or purpose 
 are thereby said to be associated by similarity. Such association does 
 not continue indefinitely, but is to be located wholly within the region of 
 search for appropriate subjects or predicates. There may be a somewhat 
 extended rehearsing of possibilities before the representative function 
 is complete, and the so-called association process may be said to be 
 coincident with this rehearsal. Association appears, then, to be a con¬ 
 venient method for viewing ideas abstracted from the situations in 
 which they function, and for regarding them as existences which sustain 
 relations to each other. Nevertheless, the logician has found it difficult 
 to escape from the bondage of the doctrine of association and its near 
 of kin. It seems a fact so easily verifiable through introspection that 
 it has been difficult to recognize that it is only from the introspective 
 point of view that thought takes on this character. The custom of thus 
 viewing thought has grown almost into the pertinacity and obstinacy of 
 an instinct, and the tenacity of its hold makes it well-nigh impossible to 
 venture far enough from the conception of thinking as a self-feeding, self- 
 perpetuating mechanism, living on its own meanings and making its own 
 relations, to give open-minded hospitality to the contention that thought 
 proceeds from, and ends in, a concrete reality-situation, where, however, 
 it is not spontaneously generated, nor does it “commit suicide,” but it 
 is reborn, rather, into a new reality-status. 
 
 ^ Principles of Psychology, I, chap, xiii, especially p. 523, footnote. 
 
 “ Cf. chap. iii. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 TYPICAL STATEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
 In the earlier form of the problem in which interest was directed 
 more specifically to the two disciplines in question, the discussion of the 
 relation of psychology to logic took on the guise of a debate as to which 
 was the more comprehensive of the two. The argument savors of a 
 scholastic exercise in determining the intension and extension of concepts, 
 and runs in a circle of futile reiteration because no common standard 
 or criterion is suggested with reference to which the greater or lesser 
 generality may be measured. The argument, in schematic form, has 
 been that psychology as the science of mind includes the study of all 
 the conscious processes, whereas logic deals with only one portion of 
 the field, and that only under the aspect of correct or incorrect reasoning. 
 Thus logic is the less comprehensive of the two and must surrender its 
 independence, for it is related to psychology as part to the whole. Logic 
 retorts that it is the most general of all sciences; that it formulates laws 
 which are prescriptive universally, and treats of those forms and prin¬ 
 ciples of thought which must be employed in every branch of knowledge. 
 Hence psychology, in gathering its data, classifying, systematizing, and 
 drawing conclusions about them, must use the logical forms which are 
 fundamental to,all thought. The psychologist as reasoner, then, con¬ 
 stitutes only one instance of the procedure which the logician investi¬ 
 gates. In this sense logic maintains that it is not dependent upon the 
 field mapped out by the psychologist, and that as the methodology of 
 all the sciences it may be said to be wider and not narrower in scope 
 than psychology. The psychologist replies that the logician must use 
 as the raw stuff of his investigation the elements which the psychologist 
 provides as constituents of the reasoning process. Moreover, psychology 
 can, with its introspective gaze, sweep the whole horizon, and include 
 in the survey the very procedure of the logician as a mental process 
 falling within the psychological domain. Logic is thus a psychological 
 discipline. The following statement of Lipps expresses the general 
 spirit of this view: “Die Logik ist eine psychologische Dizciplin, so 
 gewiss das Erkennen nur in der Psyche vorkommt und das Denken, das 
 in ihm sich vollendet, ein psychisches Geschehen ist.”' 
 
 * Lipps, Grundziige der Logik, pp. 1-2. 
 
 59 
 
6o RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 If all thinking or knowing is a ‘‘psychical” process which takes 
 place within the inner sanctum of the psyche, the settlement of this 
 dispute would indeed be an incomparably more difficult feat than that 
 which the serpent undertakes in attempting to swallow its tail. Fur¬ 
 thermore, this claim of psychology overreaches itself, since, if consistently 
 held to, not only all so-called mental sciences, but all physical sciences 
 too, may be included in psychology. Consonant with this viewpoint, 
 that is, existence of any kind is first of all only for consciousness, then 
 in consciousness, and psychology, in the end, deals with all existence, 
 and issues naturally and simply in subjective idealism. In practice, 
 however, the psychologists who have claimed logic to be a branch of 
 psychology have usually been content with a division of labor, concern¬ 
 ing themselves generally with the processes of cognition, and leaving 
 to logic the investigation of the products of reasoning and their inter¬ 
 relations. 
 
 Another turn of the argument which had vogue in connection with 
 the part-whole controversy was that which designated logic as an art 
 and psychology as a science. Logic, on this view, formulates rules 
 for the correct procedure of reason, whereas psychology studies the essen¬ 
 tial nature of the reasoning process. When this separation between 
 art and science is made, logic retorts pertinently that it is rather the 
 science of an art, or in the words of Locke, “ God has not been so sparing 
 to men as to make them barely two-legged animals and left it to Aris¬ 
 totle to make them rational.” Logic, that is, meets this issue by 
 showing that it depends upon the previous activity of the knowing 
 process, and is the science of the laws of that activity; that only in 
 so far as it is a science does it make possible a conscious application of 
 these laws. So far, then, as the art-science distinction is concerned, 
 logic denies that it is less inclusive than psychology. 
 
 To make one science dependent upon another by way of a part-to- 
 whole relation is to make neither independent; either they form one 
 homogeneous whole and are indistinguishable, or each must have dis¬ 
 tinctive characteristics. It is a comparatively recent interpretation' 
 which, once establishing the dependence of logic upon psychology, seeks 
 to obliterate all theoretical distinctions between the two. If they are 
 held to be distinguishable, however, the question has sooner or later to 
 be faced as to what the nature of this part-to-whole relationship is. Is 
 it a difference in method, material, standpoint? (From the point of 
 view of this paper there is no such part-to-whole continuity but the 
 locus of the psychologist’s standpoint falls within that of the “logical 
 situation.” Cf. chap, iii.) 
 
TYPICAL STATEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
 6i 
 
 The attempt to determine the relationship of logic to psychology on 
 the ground of relative comprehensiveness, though proper to the tradi¬ 
 tional opening of the argument, was usually followed by the more 
 fruitful discussions of the respective aims and functions of the two 
 disciplines. Logic and psychology, as theory or science, appear equally 
 to be concerned with reflection upon thought. James says: “A mind 
 which has become conscious of its own cognitive function plays what 
 wx call the psychologist upon it.”^ He suggests further that “if to 
 have feelings or thoughts in their immediacy were enough, babies in 
 their cradles would be psychologists, and infallible ones.”^ But logic, 
 also, appears to be “conscious of its own cognitive function,” and the 
 babe in his cradle who has a certain “natural” logic, or logica utens, 
 as the schoolmen might call it, is no better logician than psychologist. 
 The problem, then, is to discover how the reflection which logic turns 
 upon thought differs from the introspective procedure of psychology, 
 granting, for the time being, the assumption that psychology and logic 
 examine the same thought-pro cesses. Palagyi offers what he terms a 
 “new proof” of the distinction between logic and psychology based on 
 this assumption of the coincidence of material. He says that psy¬ 
 chology hopes from its investigation of, or reflection upon, thought 
 (he deprecates the use of the word introspection as a misleading meta¬ 
 phor) to secure nothing more than an accurate report of the psychical 
 or mental processes. He points out that the psychologist complains 
 that these processes change under such reflection or observation, whereas 
 what he desires is a faithful copy or reinstatement of them: “Fur diesen 
 letzteren namlich ist es von grdsster Wichtigkeit, dass der psychische 
 Vorgang, auf den er reflektiert, durch diese Reflexion auf denselben, 
 moglichst unverandert bleibe. Ist es ja eine ewige Klage der Psy- 
 chologen, dass durch das Belauschen der psychischen Vorgange, wie 
 etwa der Freude, der Trauer, etc., diese selbst irgendwelche Veranderung 
 erleiden.”^ 
 
 The logician, on the other hand, reflects upon thought in order to 
 effect changes in it—to make it more efficient: “Im vollen Gegensatz 
 zum Psychologen reflektiert der Logiker auf die Erkenntnissthatigkeit 
 nur deshalb, weil er dieselbe modifizieren, d.h. lautern, kraftigen, 
 verteifen, sagen wir kurz; potenzieren will.”"* 
 
 It is somewhat difficult to determine from Palagyi’s exposition 
 whether he means that, in the case of logic, reflection upon thought or 
 
 ^ James, Principles of Psychology, I, 272. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 189. 
 
 3 Paldgyi, Die Streit der Formalisten, p. 68. 
 
 4 Ibid., p. 69. 
 
62 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 thinking is for the purpose of making the thinking process a more efficient 
 tool for knowledge generally, or whether he means that the logician 
 “turns back” upon thought for the purpose of getting, upon a specific 
 occasion, “more certain,” “clearer,” and “more potent” knowledge. 
 On the whole he seems to have in mind the former. To this the psy¬ 
 chologist may well make answer that psychology hopes ultimately 
 by the study of the thinking process to point out ways for the better 
 development of mind and control of thought, making it a surer, more 
 effective instrument of knowledge. 
 
 There is a distinction worth maintaining in the conception of logic 
 as a study of thought for the purpose of more effective control. The 
 distinction, however, is rather different from that which the above 
 passages indicate, for they reveal the traditional ‘inner-process’ inter¬ 
 pretation of thought; it is this thinking process which as such, by reflec¬ 
 tion upon itself, is to be improved. According to Dewey, thought is 
 called forth only upon a specific occasion in the event of a specific 
 problem or need.^ It is only when thought is continually baffled in its 
 attempt to effect a reconstruction, only as it is held apart from pass¬ 
 ing into more direct experience, that thought itself is made an object. 
 It is at this moment that the logician is born. His purpose is to dis¬ 
 cover why thought fails of its accomplishment, or why reconstruction 
 of the dilemma-situation fails to take place, but in studying thought 
 he does not make of it an inner process. Rather, he studies it always 
 as the problematical aspect of a situation. It is with reference to the 
 whole situation that some content or element is to be set aside as merely 
 “psychical,” and some regarded as objective.^ In this sense, the logician 
 may discover the marks of the ‘psychical,’ or merely subjective, and 
 therefore determine what in this particular instance may be set aside 
 or eliminated as such. Thus the logician returns to his immediate 
 problem with enriched and more effective control, but the control is 
 not of a mere thinking process—it is not the control of thought as mere 
 thought. The logician or theorist does on a larger scale what the 
 occasional thinker does whenever, baffled in his attempt to secure the 
 result he desired, he ‘turns back’ to examine his procedure. Nor is 
 the reflection of the logician any more mediate. Once again, he is not 
 reflecting upon thought as an inner process, but is examining it as an 
 immediate reality-activity. He is not introspecting as logician. 
 
 ^ Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, chap. ii. 
 
 2 Dewey, Studies of Logical Theory, p. 54, note. Cf. also Mead, “The Definition 
 of the Psychical,” University of Chicago Decennial Publications, First Series, Vol. Ill, 
 Part II, especially pp. 28-29 (page reference is to monograph reprint). 
 
TYPICAL STATEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
 63 
 
 There is not a little ambiguity in the connotation of the word ‘intro¬ 
 spection.’ In popular usage, anyone who thinks, meditates, deliberates, 
 etc., is said to be ‘introspective.’ But even the psychologist who uses the 
 term widely would hardly admit this usage; for instance, he would not 
 call memory introspection. Yet so strongly is the introspective squint 
 developed, that we apply the term to anything connected in any way 
 with a thought-activity, and it is difficult to conceive of any occupation 
 or reflection upon thought which is not introspective. However, intro¬ 
 spection is not a method of dealing with thought, it is a standpoint, 
 and its assumption results in characteristic changes in the material 
 thus viewed. The psychologist, however, first defines his attitude as 
 introspective, and then speaks of introspection as a method, indeed, 
 one method among several other methods. The methods of psychology 
 are not the distinctive features of the science. It is distinguished rather 
 by its standpoint. If, under cover of retaining introspection merely 
 as one of its methods, it shifts its standpoint from that of the spectator 
 of a process which “mediates and reflects an outer world,” there is of 
 course no limit to the transformation it may undergo. Logic, in reflect¬ 
 ing upon the cognitive process, may or may not adopt the introspective 
 standpoint of the psychologist. As shown in a previous chapter, it is 
 the intellectualistic type of logic, whose basal assumption is the repre¬ 
 sentative function of thought, which holds to the psychologist’s intro¬ 
 spective standpoint to the bitter end of skepticism.^ The logician who 
 views thought and reality as reciprocally determinative does not adopt 
 the introspective point of view. For him the line between thought and 
 reality is a problematic, a shifting one. He cannot abstract it bodily 
 from its context and look at it as does the psychologist his inner process. 
 It is part of his problem, as thinker, to find out what in the situation 
 is the so-called thought side and what the reality aspect. Thinking, 
 to repeat, is for the logician a process of reality-in-manipulation, the 
 medium through which reality is in process of development. When 
 he introspects, becomes a spectator of, that is, considers this or that 
 aspect of the situation as inner, he turns psychologist. 
 
 A prevalent view as to the relation of psychology to logic is that 
 which regards psychology as a positive and logic as a normative science. 
 This is common to so many schools of logic and to such various types 
 of psychology that citations may be made without direct reference to 
 the contexts in which they occur. Stout makes the distinction as follows: 
 
 Logic is a normative science; it is preoccupied with the distinction between 
 truth and error. It has to show how thought must proceed to represent its 
 
 * Cf. chap. hi. 
 
64 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 object correctly. Psychology, on the contrary, deals with laws that govern 
 the cognitive process as it actually takes place. The principles which it lays 
 down account equally for correct and incorrect thinking.^ 
 
 Stratton’s account is similar and somewhat more explicit: 
 
 Logic and psychology deal with the same material within certain limits. 
 But in working up the materials there is in each one of these sciences a different 
 
 end in view and a different mode of procedure.Psychology is an effort 
 
 to state the natural causes of various mental occurrences.The main 
 
 question is entirely regarding matters of fact. What is the actual causal 
 order or connection in mental life ? 
 
 Logic is not an attempt to search for the causes of mental occurrences 
 but an attempt to develop a principle of criticism. In logic we assume the 
 facts of reasoning, and proceed not to explain, in a scientific sense, but to set 
 forth the abstract marks which distinguish the consistent from the inconsistent. 
 .... In logic we do not ask what the causes are which actually produce 
 conclusions; nor as to what various influences are that give some mental 
 facts one character and to others another. 
 
 The two sciences thus present different and distinct standards of worth. 
 For logic those combinations are good, the parts of which are related in accord¬ 
 ance with what we call logical norms. For psychology those combinations are 
 good, the parts of which are causally connected. The whole machinery of 
 psychology is contrived for the purpose of explanation, while the aim of logic 
 is to present a critical canon.^ 
 
 The above citations make emphatic that the function of logic is to 
 supply a norm or criterion for correct reasoning. This norm, however, 
 is not to be merely a standard by which to measure thought, but is 
 to operate as a control over thought. Sigwart says: 
 
 Since, then, actual Thought can and does miss its aim, we have need of 
 a discipline which shall teach us to avoid error and dispute, and to conduct 
 Thought in such a manner that the judgments may be true—that is, necessary 
 and certain—that is, accompanied by a consciousness of their necessity, and 
 therefore universally valid. 
 
 Reference to this aim distinguishes the logical from the psychological 
 treatment of Thought. The latter is concerned with the knowledge of Thought 
 as it actually is, and hence seeks the laws according to which, under certain 
 conditions, a certain thought appears in just one way and no other. Its task 
 is to explain all actual Thought according to the general laws of psychical 
 activity, and as arising from the particular conditions of the individual instance, 
 thus dealing with all Thought alike, whether erroneous and disputable, or true 
 
 ^ Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. 3. 
 
 ^ Stratton, Psychological Review, III, 313, 314-20. 
 
TYPICAL STATEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 65 
 
 and generally accepted. The antithesis of the true and the false is no more a 
 psychological one than is the antithesis of good and bad in human action.^ 
 
 Lotze presents the normative-positive distinction in the form of an 
 antithesis between thought as a mechanism and thought as controlled 
 and affected by logical norms. 
 
 We may suppose the existence of all of these things, of perceptions, ideas, 
 and their connections according to the laws of a psychical mechanism, but 
 logic only begins with a conviction that the matter cannot end here; the 
 conviction that between the combination of ideas, however they may have 
 originated, there is a difference of truth and untruth, and that there are forms 
 to which the combinations ought to answer and laws which they ought to obey.^ 
 
 Trenchant criticism of this normative-positive distinction is not 
 lacking. Mackenzie gives tersely the main trend of the criticism. 
 
 Logic is said to be concerned with correct thinking; but there is a very 
 true sense in which it may be held that incorrect thinking is not thought; 
 so that, from this point of view. Logic may be said to be concerned with the 
 
 principles of thought as thought.It [the distinction between positive 
 
 and normative sciences] is one of those convenient distinctions (like that 
 between sense and thought, knowing and willing, matter and spirit, etc.) which 
 require to be drawn at the outset, but which may be gradually superseded.3 
 
 In similar vein Mellone says: 
 
 It is usually said that Logic is a regulative or normative science, showing 
 how we “ought” to reason; it treats of the “ideal,” while Psychology treats 
 of the “actual,” showing how we do reason. This distinction seems to me 
 worse than useless; it obscures the whole matter by introducing the compli¬ 
 cated metaphysical problem of what is the true relation and contrast between 
 the ideal and the actual, the “ought ” and the “is.” In the first place, we must 
 ask, what exactly is meant by saying that Logic shows us how we ought to 
 reason. Surely that it shows us what the true nature of reasoning w .... it 
 shows us the essential differentia, which is simply the nature of the process 
 itself. So far as any process of thought is fallacious or false reasoning, it is 
 not reasoning; its limbo must be more or less non-rational in character, being 
 determined by the force of feeling, of custom or habit, or “authority,” or other 
 processes which it is the business of psychology to investigate. Unless, then, 
 it can be denied that reasoning is an actual process of the mind, we must admit 
 that it is the business of Psychology to show us what reasoning is, since Psy¬ 
 chology has to deal with the mental processes.^ 
 
 ^ Sigwart, Logic, p. 9. 
 
 2 Lotze, Logic, p. 10. 
 
 3 Mackenzie, Outline of Ethics, p. 20. 
 
 4 Mellone, Philosophical Criticism and Construction, p. 41. 
 
66 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 Lipps, too, shows the coincidence of the positive with the normative 
 aspect of science: 
 
 Die Frage, was man thun solle, ist immer zuriickfuhrbar auf die Frage, 
 was man thun miisse, wenn ein bestimmtes Ziel erreicht werden solle; und 
 diese Frage wiederum ist gleichbedeutend mit der Frage, wie das Ziel that- 
 sachlich erreicht werde.^ 
 
 Obviously these quotations represent somewhat different viewpoints 
 as to the nature of psychology and logic, and doubtless the sharpness 
 of the antithesis would be lessened not a little if full justice were done 
 to the contexts of the positions represented. Yet, selecting two writers 
 whose positions show more points of agreement than of difference, we 
 find the distinction held by one and repudiated by the other. Schiller 
 maintains that it is practically impossible to exaggerate the intimacy 
 of the relationship between logic and psychology, that they are “per¬ 
 fectly inseparable” yet “perfectly distinct.” 
 
 As it is, the natural process has to be regulated and controlled, and so 
 falls a prey to two sciences. The same cognitive values occur twice over, 
 first in Psychology as so many facts, then in Logic, as subjects for critical 
 evaluation. Nor is it difficult to understand how two sciences can work over 
 the same ground: they cultivate it with a different purpose, and so raise 
 different crops. 
 
 It is manifest, moreover, that the two sciences must work together hand 
 in glove. Logic requires trustworthy descriptions of cognitive happenings 
 before it can evaluate them with safety; for these it should be able to rely 
 on the co-operation of Psychology. In other words, the collection and prepa¬ 
 ration of the material which the logician proposes to use is essentially a psy¬ 
 chological function, alike whether it is performed by a psychologist who bears 
 in mind the need of Logic and the needs of Logic, or whether the logician is 
 enough of a psychologist to do it himself. In the latter case he resembles a 
 painter who, like those of old, makes and mixes his own colors; the logician, 
 on the other hand who proposes to dispense with the aid of Psychology is 
 like a painter who will not use anything so gross as colors wherewithal to paint 
 his ‘ ideal ’ pictures.^ 
 
 Psychology, however, like the Little Red Hen, refuses to prepare 
 the flour and bake the bread and get none of the substantial benefit. 
 Angell says: 
 
 If psychology is permitted to discuss function at all—and we saw that 
 without being arbitrarily truncated it cannot avoid so doing—the truth or 
 
 * Lipps, Logik, pp. 1-2. 
 
 ^ Schiller, Studies in Humanism, pp. 78-79. 
 
TYPICAL STATEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
 67 
 
 falsehood of the cognitive processes cannot be a matter alien to its boundaries, 
 because such truth and falsehood are simply impressive names for relatively 
 complete (i.e., successful) operations and relatively incomplete (i.e., unsuccess¬ 
 ful) operations of adaptation.^ 
 
 It is apparent that the normative-positive distinction is at best a* 
 difficult one. The problem at this level of what thought actually does 
 versus what thought ought to do resolves itself into a question as to 
 whether thought can avail itself of the prescriptions which logic makes. 
 If logic can set up a norm which thought ought to follow in order to 
 insure consistency or truth, and thought can thus be guided and regu¬ 
 lated, then does not this very procedure, as norm-directed and norm- 
 obeying, constitute a “natural,” or “actual,” or “factual” procedure? 
 That is, must not psychology describe and explain this very peculiarity 
 of thought’s behavior? Now if psychology shows thought to be sub¬ 
 ject to control or direction through norms, it must be ready to discuss 
 fully the nature of the norm. It must be able without leaving its own 
 field (i) to supply a norm, (2) to show that the norm can actually 
 operate as an end at which thought aims, that is, that it can have con¬ 
 trol or regulative power, and (3) that it can be used as a standard whereby 
 to determine the truth or falsity of the thought-process. If it can do 
 this, it has gone far toward making good its claim that psychology and 
 logic are one. 
 
 Taking up the question of the nature of the norm which psychology 
 can erect, we find that it is a norm for correct thinking—thinking taken 
 in the sense of an inner activity with certain elements, characteristics, 
 and laws of its own procedure. Thought is from the psychologist’s 
 standpoint, as we have frequently pointed out, legitimately a stream, 
 a continuity, an uninterrupted sequence. From the standpoint of 
 introspection, each portion of the stream is determined as psychical 
 event or existence. Whatever psychology may say descriptively, the 
 type of explanation used by the psychology which allies itself to natural 
 science is a mechanistic one, which regards each psychical event as a 
 resultant of previous processes or causes. The problem, then, which 
 psychology has on its hands is to show how a norm could in any way act 
 as end or aim for this process, how it could interrupt the closed series, 
 deflect, control it. The problem of the control of thought has indeed 
 been long a stumbling-block to logic just because it has accepted 
 
 I “The Relations of Structural and Functional Psychology to Philosophy,” Uni¬ 
 versity of Chicago Decennial Publications, First Series, Vol. Ill, Part II, p. 13 (page 
 reference is to monograph reprint). 
 
68 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 psychology’s account of thought unreservedly and then attempted to 
 impose upon it the requirements of the logical situation. Lotze, for 
 instance, affords a striking example of the dilemma which psychology, 
 upon assuming the responsibility of logic, must import into her own 
 domain. Adapting the analysis of Lotze’s position, as it is given in the 
 Studies in Logical Theory,^ to the point at issue in our context, we note 
 that Lotze gives an account of thought as a series of impressions and 
 ideas, following each other, ‘coincidently.’ They form the stuff or raw 
 material which must be shaped and finally transformed by logic into a 
 ‘coherent’ series in order that the condition of knowledge may result. 
 But Lotze finds that logical procedure can make no difference in the 
 impressions and ideas if logical relations do not already exist within and 
 between them. He says: “The possibility and the success of thought’s 
 procedure depends upon this original constitution and organization of 
 the whole world of ideas, a constitution which, though not necessary in 
 thought, is all the more necessary to make thinking possible.”^ 
 
 Yet if ideas and impressions are already so organized into logical 
 coherences, have within them what will constitute them knowledge, 
 logic has nothing to do. We should say that Lotze is discussing ‘ impres¬ 
 sions ’ and ‘ideas,’ not as they occur, but as they are to the introspective 
 psychologist. As the psychologist has transfixed them, they are arrested 
 stages in the judgment moment, and either are, or are not, already 
 logically organized meanings. With reference to each other as ideas, 
 they stand forever, ‘coincident’ or contiguous, and can never be made 
 to ‘cohere’ with each other. (Cf. chap, iv.) The stream of thought, 
 made up of these existences, cannot be directed or controlled. As the 
 psychologist welds these ideas into a continuity, he must needs look at 
 them as determined from behind. Teleology and mechanism are not 
 merely incompatible here; there is no meaning to the term teleology 
 as applied to this inner process, for it is a methodological fiction, and not 
 a genuine process at all. The preconception common to both of the 
 normative-positive disputants is that of thought as an inner continuity. 
 Psychology is not called upon to discuss this thought-process as directed 
 and controlled; the problem is not pertinent. 
 
 Again both parties to the controversy conceive of the norm as a 
 norm for a thinking process of this character. Psychology has full 
 right to discuss such a norm. But what can correct or incorrect thinking 
 mean on the basis of the stream-of-thought conception ? Surely, that 
 there is something inherent in the process itself which proclaims it at 
 
 * Cf. Studies in Logical Theory, chap. ii. ^ Lotze, Logic, 1 , 36. 
 
TYPICAL STATEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
 69 
 
 once a case of genuine thinking, distinguishing it, for instance, from 
 memory, imitation, emotion, impulse. In this sense, psychology means 
 by correct reasoning a genuine case of reasoning—that this or that is 
 really an instance or example of reasoning and not of something else. 
 It can pronounce dogmatically, then, that incorrect reasoning is not 
 really reasoning, but belongs, rather, to som^e other phase of conscious¬ 
 ness. If, for instance, a conclusion is arrived at through suggestion, 
 imitation, memory, etc., psychology can pronounce that such a sequence 
 cannot be designated thinking, or reasoning. Psychology, indeed, 
 makes clear demarkations between the cognitive and affective side of 
 consciousness, teaching that the cognitive and affective aspects are 
 present in inverse proportion. It is a curious fact that it is logic^ 
 which now tends to insist that feeling and emotion be included in the 
 cognitive activity, and that the lines of demarkation be softened, if not 
 obliterated. 
 
 If, then, psychology claims to be able to measure the truth or falsity 
 of the cognitive process because it tells an exhaustive story and cannot 
 stop short of the outcome, we must ask if the outcome is not something 
 to be located in the stream itself. If it is without the process as an 
 inner continuity, we are outside the boundaries of psychology. Truth 
 or falsity, for psychology, consistency or inconsistency, must be a matter 
 referring to the thought-process as an inner activity. And psychology 
 has every right then to decide what differentiae certain aspects of the 
 stream must possess in order to be called reasoning; it can rule out all 
 cases of reasoning which do not measure up, and assign them to other 
 psychological categories. 
 
 The attempt has sometimes been made to distinguish logic, as deal¬ 
 ing with thought as general and abstract, from psychology as treating 
 of thought as specific and concrete. Taking this distinction at face 
 value, it is possible to collect as formidable a row of antitheses as the 
 list of Kantian antinomies. A few citations will suggest the lack of a 
 common denominator in the discussion. Baldwin says: 
 
 It is especially to be noted that psychology does not deal with abstractions 
 as its distinctive subject-matter. Logic, when it treats of judgments, has in 
 view only the abstract form of connection between subject and predicate, 
 not the concrete judging as it takes place in the individual mind. But it is 
 just this concrete process with which psychology is concerned.^ 
 
 * Schiller, Studies in Humanism, chap. iii. 
 
 3 Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, article “Psychology,” 
 Vol. II, p. 383- 
 
70 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 This statement may be balanced by the following: 
 
 That Psychology, like all descriptive science, deals throughout with data 
 which are not concrete experience-realities, but artificial products of a process 
 of abstraction and reconstruction, should be sufficiently clear from the very 
 consideration that, like other sciences, it is a body of general descriptions of 
 t5^ical situations. 
 
 An actual process of knowing or acting, like every actual event, is always 
 individual and because of its individuality defies adequate description. It is 
 only in so far as a situation admits of being generalized by the selection of certain 
 of its aspects or qualities as representative of its whole reality that it is capable 
 
 of being described at all.It [psychology] provides us with general 
 
 formulae, which are or should be valuable as affording a means of describing 
 certain universal features of the process of willing and knowing which it is 
 desirable to study in isolation, but it is of itself as incapable of following the 
 actual course of a real process of willing or thinking, as mechanics is of follow¬ 
 ing the actual course of a real individual process in “external” nature.^ 
 
 In answer to the contention that logic treats of the intellect per se, 
 investigating knowledge only, as it were, sub specie aeternitatis, as the 
 possession of the mind in general, Mellone says: 
 
 Now all Psychology may be said to deal with the ^mind in general’ in 
 the sense that it is not biography nor a record of personal peculiarities, but 
 deals with the normal mind.^ 
 
 As to the non-abstract character of logic, Dewey says: 
 
 So far from this point of view the various types and modes of conceiving, 
 judging, and inference are treated not as qualifications of thought per se or 
 at large, but of thought engaged in its specific, most economic, effective response 
 to its particular occasion; they are adaptations for control of stimuli.^ 
 
 But says Baldwin: 
 
 All logic is, and is admitted to be, formal in one sense—as having to deal 
 with the general laws and modes of thinking by which knowledge is con¬ 
 structed, and not with the special character which determines each type of 
 concrete knowledge. On the recognition of such a distinction logic is based 
 and it constitutes the common element in all conceptions of logic.^ 
 
 The view adopted in this paper, namely, that there is no activity 
 of thought in general, but that logic deals with thought as a specific 
 manifestation in a concrete situation, places our decision in this matter. 
 
 ^ Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, p. 296. 
 
 * Mellone, Philosophical Criticism and Construction, p. 42. 
 
 3 Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, p. 8. 
 
 4 Baldwin, Diet. Phil, and Psych., article “Formal Logic,” Vol. I, p. 392. 
 
TYPICAL STATEMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
 71 
 
 However, as a formulation, as a statement of theory, it, like any science, 
 gives an account of typical instances. 
 
 While eliminating the particular material of particular practical and 
 scientific pursuits, (i) it may strive to hit upon the common denominator in 
 the various situations which are antecedent or primary to thought and which 
 evoke it; (2) it may attempt to show how typical features in the specific 
 antecedents of thought call out to diverse typical modes of thought-reaction; 
 (3) it may attempt to state the nature of specific consequences in which thought 
 fulfils its career.^ 
 
 In the same way we should designate psychology ‘‘general” in 
 that it deals not with this or that individual but with typical conditions 
 and performances of an individual. However, as far as the cognitive 
 process, at any rate, is concerned, psychology deals with abstractions; 
 especially is this true of the psychology which holds to the “mental 
 existence” character of thought, i.e., to the inner continuity of the 
 thought-process. It is, at best, however, a blind procedure to discuss 
 particularity and generality, abstractness and concreteness, without a 
 definition of the standpoint from which these distinctions are made; 
 for these terms are obviously not absolute, but relative to context. 
 The question may be discussed more profitably, therefore, with reference 
 to the more specific form of the problem which is next to be reviewed. 
 
 In spite of the immediate acquiescence of the psychologist that the 
 retro-introspective standpoint differs from that of the experient, there 
 is not only the tendency to put back into working relations the idea 
 of the psychologist, but when the adjective “psychological” is used, 
 all caution to preserve the distinction between the experient’s stand¬ 
 point, or, as it is sometimes designated, the “psychical,” and the “psy¬ 
 chological” is abandoned. The “psychological” tends in popular 
 employment of the term, and in looser technical usage, to be applicable 
 to whatever is intimately connected with the first-hand experiences of 
 an agent. It is not seen that such a discussion as the relation between 
 the “psychological” and the “logical” aspects of a situation is usually 
 conducted on the basis of the difference between the “psychical” and 
 the “logical.” It is this ambiguity which makes well-nigh irrefutable 
 so many of the psychologist’s claims to cover the whole field of con¬ 
 crete experience, inasmuch as every process, interest, desire, purpose, 
 etc., is called forthwith “psychological,” i.e., not merely capable of being 
 considered from the psychological standpoint, but is designated “psycho¬ 
 logical ’ ’ outright. Schiller is an arch-offender in this particular. He says: 
 
 * Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, p. 7* 
 
72 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 Thus it is commonly asserted that Psychology does not recognize values, 
 nor Logic care about psychical existence. Yet if so, how could values enter 
 human minds, and how could truths ever become facts? ^ 
 
 He continues with the same confusion in mind when he states; 
 
 We shall do well therefore to show (i) that without processes which are 
 admittedly psychological the occurrence of cognition and even of thinking is 
 impossible; (2) that all the processes, which are regarded as essentially and 
 peculiarly “logical,” have a well-marked psychological side to them, and that 
 their logical treatment develops continuously out of their psychological nature.^ 
 
 Further: 
 
 All actual thinking appears to be inherently conditioned throughout by 
 processes which even the most grasping logician must conceive as specifically 
 psychological. It is difficult to see, therefore, on what principle logic has any 
 business to ignore them, and to claim to be “independent” of what must 
 influence its own structure in every fiber .3 
 
 The following passage carries on the same identification of the psy¬ 
 chological with the psychical and the word psychical is obviously used 
 as a completely satisfactory synonym. 
 
 At any rate, the onus prohandi would seem to lie on those who aflirm that 
 these correlated and interpenetrating processes do not influence each other and 
 that, therefore, their psychical nature may be treated as logically irrelevant. 
 Without, however, standing on ceremony, let us show by examples that our 
 thinking depends for its very existence on the presence in it of {a) interest, 
 {h) purpose, (c) emotion, {d) satisfaction, and that the word Thought’ would 
 cease to convey any meaning if these were really and rigidly abstracted from .4 
 
 Several other passages show unmistakably that these terms are used 
 as completely interchangeable, for he says that ‘‘nowhere can we dis¬ 
 cover anything deserving the name of thought which is not actuated 
 by psychological interest.” Finally he sums up the situation with the 
 following: 
 
 It seems clear, therefore, that without these psychological conditions which 
 have been mentioned, thinking disappears, and with it, presumably. Logic. 
 They cannot, therefore, be dispensed with. Purpose, interest, desire, emotion, 
 satisfaction, are more essential to thinking than steam is to a steam-engine.s 
 
 Schiller’s aim is primarily to point out that logic cannot be “de¬ 
 personalized,” that the logician cannot, contrary to the contention of 
 
 * Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 76. 
 
 ^ Ibid, p. 80 (italics mine). 4 Ibid., p. 81 (last italics mine). 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 80 (italics mine). s Ibid., p, 83 (italics mine). 
 
NATURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS ^‘PROCESSES” 
 
 73 
 
 the absolutists, ignore the concomitants of actual thinking, and with 
 that immediate purpose in mind the interchange of the words ‘ psychical ’ 
 and ‘psychological’ seems of little, if any, consequence. The issue with 
 which Schiller is concerned is whether logic can abstract from such 
 influences and conditions as that of the individual’s purpose, desire, 
 interest, etc. But granted he has carried his assumption, however 
 heartily we may agree that “purpose, desire, emotion, satisfaction are 
 more essential to thinking than steam is to a steam-engine,” we may still 
 fail to see how he has established the relation between logic and psy¬ 
 chology, and may, furthermore, refuse to regard purpose, desire, emotion, 
 satisfaction, as “psychological” processes. If these processes are 
 “psychological” per se, because, as Schiller says, “the whole concrete 
 personality goes to making up any assertion,” then he can hardly 
 maintain that logic and psychology are even distinguishable. By the 
 same reasoning, the judgment is itself simply and wholly a “psycho¬ 
 logical” process. However, if psychology thus swallows up logic it 
 must confess to a double standpoint within its own boundaries and the 
 question has been merely restated, for with the coincidence of the 
 ‘psychical’ (as Schiller has been using it) and the psychological, the 
 introspective standpoint and that of the direct experient coincide, and 
 there is no psychologist’s fallacy; thought knows its object and intro¬ 
 spects its own behavior at the same moment. Now the consequences 
 of designating every process which expresses the conscious life of an 
 individual “psychological” are more far-reaching than at first appears. 
 Certainly there is more at stake than the narrower issue of just the 
 proper pigeonholing of these two disciplines, for if emotion, desire, 
 purpose, satisfaction are designated psychological processes, there are 
 sure to attach to them all the attributes which they receive at the hands 
 of the psychologist who has studied them from the traditional intro¬ 
 spective standpoint. They are the conscious processes of an individual’s 
 mind, the expression of a concrete personality, to be sure, but psychology 
 has its own peculiar and distinctive viewpoint of the individual. Viewed 
 introspectively the individual is a complete integer, having relations 
 with other individuals but after all a unit, definitely isolable from other 
 units or selves. As referable to this individual, emotion and feeling 
 are subjective, satisfaction is the satisfaction of a need of this or that 
 particular and peculiar psycho-physical organism, desire is an inner 
 attitude, thinking or judging is an inner process coming somehow to 
 fruit in an overt act which means a right or wrong adjustment of this 
 individual. As “psycho-” this individual has a consciousness insulated 
 
74 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 from others, as “physical” it has a body defining itself over against this 
 consciousness. 
 
 It is precisely because the psychologist’s reading of the individual 
 is so generally adopted that logicians find the individual an inadequate 
 mechanism for securing truth. Schiller’s humanism has precisely this 
 difiiculty to contend with, for it starts from “experience”—^from ‘your’ 
 experience and ‘my’ experience, from an experience definitely owned 
 and marked ofi at the start as the peculiar and private possession of 
 just such an individual as the psychologist presents to us. Small 
 wonder that the logicians refuse to grant that this individual’s subjective 
 prepossessions and prejudices and desires can have anything to do with 
 universally valid truth. On the contrary, they maintain that psychology 
 may deal with thought as it is valid for the individual in circumstances 
 local and specific, but not with thought in its aspect of universality 
 and necessity. Eternal truths have nothing to do with the subjectivity 
 and vagary of the individual. Judgments which have their basis in 
 individual perceptions, observations, memories, expectations, are the 
 province of psychology, but logic deals only with the conditions of uni¬ 
 versally valid thought. Jerusalem distinguishes logic from psychology 
 on this ground. 
 
 Man konnte demnach die Logik auch bestimmen als die Lehre von den 
 
 allgemeinen Bedingungen des richtigen Urtheilens.Aber nicht an alien 
 
 Urtheilen sind solche allgemeine Bedingungen ihrer Richtigkeit festzustellen. 
 Eine grosse Zahl von Urtheilen dient dazu, individuelle Wahrnehmungen, 
 Errinnerungen, Erwartungen zu formalieren und auszudrucken. Alle solche 
 Urtheile, ich nenne sie Urtheile der Anschauung, haben ihrer Natur nach 
 nur subjective Gewissheit und geben daher zu logischer Priifung keinen Anlass. 
 Eine solche Priifung kann nur Urtheilen vorgenommen werden, welche nicht 
 individuell bestimmte und individuell gefarbte Thatsachen bezeichnen, sondern 
 vielmehr ein Ausdruck sind fiir Gesetze des Geschehens. Solche Urtheile 
 nennen wir Begrilfsurtheile, und nur diese konnen Gegenstand logischer 
 Priifung werden.^ 
 
 Once this distinction is made between judgments which are merely 
 individual and those which are objective and hold universally, it is easy 
 to sever process and product and to hold that eternally valid truths exist 
 without reference to the judging individual. The process of judging, 
 and, indeed, the specific meaning of the judgment moment, may be 
 dealt with by psychology, but absolute and unconditioned truth only 
 logic may discuss. Husserl, who states that psychology has to do with 
 
 ^ Jerusalem, Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 31. 
 
NATURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST’S “PROCESSES” 
 
 75 
 
 the individual,, the contingent, the fact existing in time and space, dis¬ 
 tinguishes truth from facts. Truth, that is, is not factual; it has no 
 existence in time and space. Facts are contingent, individual existences, 
 which come and go, but truth is eternal and timeless, and has, finally, 
 no dependence on the individual who judges. 
 
 Keine Wahrheit ist eine Thatsache, d.i. ein zeitlich Bestimmtes. Fine 
 Wahrheit kann freilich die Bedeutung haben, dass ein Ding ist, ein Zustand 
 besteht, eine Verandening von Statten geht u. dgl. Aber die Wahrheit selbst 
 ist fiber alle Zeitlichkeit erhaben, d.h. es hat keinen Sinn, ihr zeitliches Sein, 
 Entstehen, oder Vergehen zuzuschreiben .... immer wieder werden wir 
 sehen, dass dieser Unterschied ffir die Streitfragen zwischen psychologistischer 
 und reiner Logik entscheidend ist.^ 
 
 Husserl thus, in a manner not unlike Bradley’s exposition, separates 
 the logical content from the act of judgment.^ The content which 
 is cut loose from the idea as psychical existence stands for the Wahrheit, 
 or the eternal universal. The realm of Wahrheiten which Husserl 
 describes suggests, too, Bosanquet’s world of meanings which are inde¬ 
 pendent of the acts of judging by which they are expressed.^ As he 
 puts it: “Man vermenge nicht das Urtheil als Urtheilsinhalt, d.i. als 
 die ideale Einheit mit dem einzelnen realen Urtheilsakt.” 
 
 Were the content of the judgment dependent upon the judging 
 process, were truth, that is, dependent upon the judging activity of 
 the individual, it would be hopelessly relative; indeed knowledge 
 would be impossible. Husserl maintains that the case is little better 
 if the individual is regarded as socially conditioned, or even if we regard 
 him as expressing the constitution of the human species. Other species, 
 other truths, he proclaims. Nay, the species may die out but truth 
 remains inextinguishable, and invulnerable to the activities of the 
 individual, or of the species. The realm of Wahrheiten exists eternally 
 whether the human species ever enters into its possession or not. 
 
 Thatsachen sind “zufallig”, sie konnten ebensogut auch nicht sein, sie 
 konnten anders sein. Also “andere” Thatsachen, andere logische Gesetze; 
 auch diese waren also zufallig, sie waren nur relativ zu den sie begrfindenden 
 Thatsachen.4 
 
 Hat (im Sinne des Anthropologismus) alle Wahrheit ihre ausschliessliche 
 Quelle in der allgemein menschlichen Constitution, so gilt, dass wenn keine 
 solche Constitution bestande, auch keine Wahrheit bestande.s 
 
 * Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, I, 76-77. 
 
 2 Bradley, Logic, chap. i. ^ Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, I, 122. 
 
 3 Bosanquet, Logic, I, 5 f. ® Ibid., p. 119. 
 
76 RESPECTIVE STANDPOINTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC 
 
 The Formalisten-Psychologisten debate is analogous to the con¬ 
 troversy between the absolutists and the humanist-pragmatists as to 
 ^‘whether logic can abstract from the psychological conditions of 
 thinking.”^ Husserhs scholarly and voluminous work anticipates and 
 attempts to meet some of the more recent claims and arguments of the 
 humanists. The “ Psychologisten ” and the humanists are agreed, in 
 substance, that there is a close and vital connection between the judging 
 individual—his concrete setting of interest, emotion, purposes, and biases 
 —and the meaning or content of the judgment. On the one hand, the 
 controversy runs, truths which are removed from the individual’s needs, 
 interests, and desires, and which are in no way determined by these, are 
 meaningless. On the other hand, the absolutists and the formalists join 
 forces in maintaining that truth, which is dependent upon the indivi¬ 
 dual’s wants, and whose validity rests upon the degree in which it fulfils 
 them, is hopelessly relative, for it has no applicability beyond the area 
 of individual caprice. 
 
 Each party is guilty of the same fallacy. Both sides view the indi¬ 
 vidual as the isolated individual of the psychologist’s introspective 
 standpoint. Husserl is right in implying that the social nature of the 
 individual cannot avail to extend the validity of his judgment to uni¬ 
 versality; it can at best give it a little wider generality. For society, 
 with the psychologist’s individual as the unit of structure, could be 
 simply a multiple or aggregate of particulars. The humanist may insist 
 as much as he pleases that the whole concrete personality enters as a 
 determining factor into the content of the judgment, but the absolutist, 
 accepting the psychologist’s account of personality, hesitates the more 
 to read truth, absolute, eternal, and necessary, as the fulfilment, or 
 satisfaction, of this individual. Accordingly if truth is the'satisfaction 
 of a need, it is doomed at least twofold to particularity and subjectivity; 
 for the need belongs to this peculiar and particular psycho-physical 
 organism, and the satisfaction is merely a registration of its fulfilment, 
 which may vary from day to day. Thus truths may be many and fickle, 
 contingent not necessary, particular not universal, subjective not 
 objective; in short, truth would be, to quote a familiar refrain from the 
 critics of pragmatism, mere “individual expediency.” 
 
 It is largely in the interest of establishing the claim for the soundness 
 of the pragmatist’s criterion of truth that a distinction be made between 
 logic and psychology, especially to the end that it may become evident 
 that instrumental logic views the “whole concrete personality” in a 
 setting very different from that of the psychologist. There ought, 
 
 ^ Schiller, Studies in Humanism^ chap. iii. 
 
NATURE OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS PROCESSES^’ 
 
 77 
 
 thus, to be a different interpretation of ^satisfaction,’ and of ‘need,’ 
 if there is a different interpretation of the individual. 
 
 The particularity and isolatedness of the individual, which psy¬ 
 chology construes into a sort of permanent subjectivity, occurs only at 
 certain crises in the evolution of reality. In the tensional moment, 
 when idea and object stand apart, and reality is, so to speak, uncertain 
 of itself, the individual as particular is born; reality is thrown back on 
 its own uniqueness. It is at this moment that the logical need appears— 
 the need to overcome this ‘subjectivity,’ this inclosedness of idea to 
 idea, but at the same time the necessity for overcoming the isolation, 
 the non-sharability of the opposing ‘external reality.’ The partiality, 
 or fragmentariness, which characterizes reality as individual is precisely 
 the cause of the birth of this need—the individual’s need of finding 
 himself by losing himself in a wider cosmic continuity. Though expressed 
 through the mechanism of what the psychologist calls the psycho¬ 
 physical organism, this need is of the logical and not of the psychological 
 individual; it is the need of the individual as emerging from a reality 
 matrix, and as issuing again into a new individuality, i.e., into fuller 
 consistency with a new social and cosmic environment, which, indeed, 
 has been instituted through his agency. It is because the individual 
 is conceived as particular, initially, that satisfactions of his needs are 
 made to pertain wholly to the domain of his particularity; but the satis¬ 
 faction of the logical need is that which will make him consistent with 
 reality. Consistency, truth, will be that which will enable him to ‘go 
 along with’ the sequential, onward, unimpeded passage of reality from 
 one level to another. Thus the satisfaction of the need is not merely a 
 subjective registration that a certain state of consciousness has been 
 achieved, but it is a satisfaction, a fulfilling, of ajffairs. It means that 
 reality and personality are become one; the individual is most, because 
 he is least. It means that the individual has become impersonal, and 
 that reality has been personalized. 
 
 These moments in which the individual exists are, so to speak, 
 the attention moments of the whole cosmic habit. They are the occa¬ 
 sions of the reconstructions of old cosmic habits, and the reorganization 
 of new ones. As media of control and development, they cannot sever 
 themselves from the ‘stubborn grain of things,’ and circulate purely 
 subjective judgments.* Hence a judgment which really satisfies, 
 i.e., has as its consequences the union of reality and idea into a new 
 status that makes possible the fluent passage into other levels of expe¬ 
 rience, has in so far forth achieved truth—universal, necessary, objective. 
 
 ^ Cf. chap. iii.