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SIEIPIBI  2BW2nL.lI IE 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL    AND    REVEALED, 
 
 TO   THE  CONSTITUTION  AND    COURSE    OF    NATURE. 
 
 TO    WHICH  ARE   ADDED 
 
 TWO    BRIEF   DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 JOSEPH  BUTLER,  IL.D., 
 
 LATE   LORD   BISHOP   OF  DURHAM. 
 
 WITH  AN  INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY, 
 BY  DANIEL  WILSON,  D.D., 
 
 LORIJ  BISHOP   OF  CALCUTTA. 
 
 SIXTH    EDITION. 
 
 GLASGOW: 
 
 WILLIAM    COLLINS,   155,  INGRAM    STREET; 
 
 OLIVER    &•    ROYD,    WM.    WHYTE   &    CO.,    AND   WM.    OLIPHANT   <Sr    SON, 
 
 EDINBURGH;  WM.  CURRY,  JUN.,&  CO.,  DUBLIN;  WHITTAKER  &  CO., 
 HAMILTON,  ADAMS,  &  CO.,  AND  S1MPKIN,  MARSHALL,  &  CO.,  LONDON. 
 
 1837. 
 
Wm.  Collins  &  Co  ,  Printers,  Candlerigg  Court,  Glasgow. 
 
PR0PER7FOf- 
 
 •PENOLOGICAL 
 INTRODUCTORY  ESSAY. 
 
 Bishop  Butler  is  one  of  those  creative  geniuses, 
 who  give  a  character  to  their  times.  His  great  work, 
 "  The  Analogy  of  Religion,"  has  fixed  the  admira- 
 tion of  all  competent  judges  for  nearly  a  century, 
 and  will  continue  to  be  studied  so  long  as  the  lan- 
 guage in  which  he  wrote  endures.  The  mind  of  a 
 master  pervades  it.  The  Author  chose  a  theme  in- 
 finitely important,  and  he  has  treated  it  with  a  skill, 
 a  force,  a  novelty  and  talent,  which  have  left  little 
 for  others  to  do  after  him.  He  opened  the  mine 
 and  exhausted  it  himself.  A  discretion  which  never 
 oversteps  the  line  of  prudence,  is  in  him  united  with 
 a  penetration  which  nothing  can  escape.  There  is 
 in  his  writings  a  vastness  of  idea,  a  reach  and  gener- 
 alization of  reasoning,  a  native  simplicity  and  gran- 
 deur of  thought,  which  command  and  fill  the  mind. 
 At  the  same  time,  his  illustrations  are  so  striking 
 and  familiar  as  to  instruct  as  well  as  persuade.  No- 
 thing is  violent,  nothing  far-fetched,  nothing  pushed 
 beyond  its  fair  limits,  nothing  fanciful  or  weak  :  a 
 masculine  power  of  argument  runs  through  the  whole. 
 All  bespeaks  that  repose  of  mind,  that  tranquillity 
 
VI 
 
 which  springs  from  a  superior  understanding,  and  an 
 intimate  acquaintance  with  every  part  of  his  subject. 
 He  grasps  firmly  his  topic,  and  insensibly  communi- 
 cates to  his  reader  the  calmness  and  conviction  which 
 he  possesses  himself.  He  embraces  with  equal  ease 
 the  greatest  and  the  smallest  points  connected  with 
 his  argument.  He  often  throws  out,  as  he  goes 
 along,  some  general  principle  which  seems  to  cost 
 him  no  labour,  and  yet  which  opens  a  whole  field  of 
 contemplation  before  the  view  of  the  reader. 
 
 Butler  was  a  philosopher  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
 term.  He  searches  for  wisdom  wherever  he  can  dis- 
 cern its  traces.  He  puts  forth  the  keenest  sagacity 
 in  his  pursuit  of  his  great  object,  and  never  turns 
 aside  till  he  reaches,  and  seizes  it.  Patient,  silent, 
 unobtrusive  investigation  was  his  forte.  His  powers 
 of  invention  were  as  fruitful  as  his  judgment  was 
 sound.  Probably  no  book  in  the  compass  of  theology 
 is  so  full  of  the  seeds  of  things,  to  use  the  expression 
 of  a  kindred  genius,  ( Lord  Bacon,)  as  "  the  Analogy." 
 
 He  was  a  man  raised  up  for  the  age  in  which  he 
 lived.  The  wits  and  infidels  of  the  reign  of  our 
 Second  Charles,  (Butler  was  born  in  the  year  1692,) 
 had  deluged  the  land  with  the  most  unfair,  and  yet 
 plausible  writings  against  Christianity.  A  certain 
 fearlessness  as  to  religion  seemed  to  prevail.  There 
 was  a  general  decay  of  piety  and  zeal.  Many  per- 
 sons treated  Christianity  as  if  it  were  an  agreed  point 
 amongst  all  people  of  discernment,  that  it  had  been 
 found  out  to  be  fictitious.  The  method  taken  by 
 these  enemies  of  Christianity,  was  to  magnify  and 
 urge  objections  more  or  less  plausible,  against  par- 
 ticular doctrines  or  precepts,  which  were  represented 
 
Vll 
 
 as  forming  a  part  of  it;  and  which,  to  a  thoughtless 
 mind,  were  easily  made  to  appear  extravagant,  in- 
 credible, and  irrational.  They  professed  to  admit 
 the  Being  and  Attributes  of  the  Almighty;  but  they 
 maintained  that  human  reason  was  sufficient  for  the 
 discovery  and  establishment  of  this  fundamental 
 truth,  as  well  as  for  the  development  of  those  moral 
 precepts,  by  which  the  conduct  of  life  should  be  re- 
 gulated ;  and  they  boldly  asserted,  that  so  many 
 objections  and  difficulties  might  be  urged  against 
 Christianity,  as  to  exclude  it  from  being  admitted  as 
 Divine,  by  any  thoughtful  and  enlightened  person. 
 
 These  assertions  Butler  undertook  to  refute. 
 He  was  a  man  formed  for  such  a  task.  He  knew 
 thoroughly  what  he  was  about.  He  had  a  mind  to 
 weigh  objections,  and  to  trace,  detect,  and  silence 
 cavils.  Accordingly,  he  came  forward  in  all  the  self- 
 possession,  and  dignity,  and  meekness  of  truth,  to 
 meet  the  infidel  on  his  own  ground.  He  takes  the 
 admission  of  the  unbeliever,  that  God  is  the  Creator 
 and  Ruler  of  the  natural  world,  as  a  principle  con- 
 ceded. From  this  point  he  sets  forward,  and  pur- 
 sues a  course  of  argument  so  cautious,  so  solid,  so 
 forcible ;  and  yet  so  diversified,  so  original,  so  con- 
 vincing; as  to  carry  along  with  him,  almost  insensi- 
 bly, those  who  have  once  put  themselves  under  his 
 guidance.  His  insight  into  the  constitution  and 
 course  of  nature  is  almost  intuitive ;  and  the  appli- 
 cation of  his  knowledge  is  so  surprisingly  skilful  and 
 forcible,  as  to  silence  or  to  satisfy  every  fair  antago- 
 nist. He  traces  out  every  objection  with  a  delibera- 
 tion which  nothing  can  disturb;  and  shows  the  fallacies 
 
Vlll 
 
 from  whence  they  spring,  with  a  precision  and  acute- 
 ness  which  overwhelm  and  charm  the  reader. 
 
 Accordingly,  students  of  all  descriptions  have  lone 
 united  in  the  praise  of  Butler.  He  is  amongst  the 
 few  classic  authors  of  the  first  rank  in  modern  litera- 
 ture. He  takes  his  place  with  Bacon,  and  Pascal, 
 and  Newton,  those  mighty  geniuses  who  opened  new 
 sources  of  information  on  the  most  important  subjects, 
 and  commanded  the  love  and  gratitude  of  mankind. 
 If  his  powers  were  not  fully  equal  to  those  of  these 
 most  extraordinary  men,  they  were  only  second  to 
 them.  He  was  in  his  own  line,  nearly  what  they 
 were  in  the  inventions  of  science,  and  the  adaptation 
 of  mathematics  to  philosophy  founded  on  experiment. 
 He  was  of  like  powers  of  mind,  of  similar  calm  and 
 penetrating  sagacity,  of  the  same  patience  and  per- 
 severance in  pursuit,  of  kindred  acuteness  and  pre- 
 cision in  argument,  of  like  force  and  power  in  his 
 conclusions.  His  objects  were  as  great,  his  mind 
 as  simple,  his  perception  of  truth  as  distinct,  his 
 comprehension  of  intellect  nearly  as  vast,  his  aim  as 
 elevated,  his  success  as  surprising. 
 
 "  The  Analogy"  was  the  work  of  Butler's  life* 
 As  early  as  the  year  1713,  when  he  was  a  student 
 of  Divinity  at  Tewkesbury,  and  only  twenty- one 
 years  of  age,  his  powers  of  mind  were  already  directed 
 to  this  and  kindred  subjects.  The  sagacity  and 
 depth  of  thought  displayed  in  his  letters  to  Dr.  S. 
 Clarke,  in  that  year,  attracted,  though  sent  anony- 
 mously, the  Doctor's  particular  notice,  and  brought 
 on  a  friendly,  but  most  acute  discussion,  which  has 
 teen  annexed  to  all  the  subsequent  editions  of  Dr» 
 
IX 
 
 Clarke's  "  Demonstration  of  the  Being  and  Attri- 
 butes of  God."  From  the  year  1718,  when  he  was 
 appointed  preacher  at  the  Roll's  Chapel,  to  the  year 
 1726,  when  he  published  his  Fifteen  Sermons,  the 
 subject  of  "  The  Analogy"  was  apparently  uppermost 
 in  his  mind.  This  volume  contained  in  fact  the 
 germ  of  his  great  work.  At  length,  in  the  year 
 1736,  when  he  had  attained  the  age  of  forty-five, 
 "  The  Analogy"  appeared,  as  the  result  of  his  ma- 
 turest  reflections  during  a  series  of  theological  studies 
 of  between  twenty  and  thirty  years.  In  all  his  sub- 
 sequent writings,  after  his  elevation  to  the  Episcopal 
 Bench  in  1738,  till  his  death  in  1752,  the  like  train 
 of  thought  is  observable;  and  even  in  the  last  of 
 them,  his  charge  to  the  clergy  of  the  diocess  of  Dur- 
 ham in  1751,  the  one  commanding  subject  which 
 had  occupied  his  life  is  still  pursued.  Thus  a  long 
 course  of  forty  years  was  devoted  by  this  surprising 
 man,  with  a  depth  of  knowledge  and  a  strength  of 
 mind,  which  were  exactly  suited  to  so  great  a  theme, 
 — to  the  illustration  of  the  truth  of  Christianity  from 
 the  course  and  order  of  God's  natural  Providence. 
 
 The  consequence  is,  nothing  has  ever  been  ad- 
 vanced against  his  main  argument.  The  infidel  has 
 never  ventured  a  reply.*      It  has  long  been  in  every 
 
 *  An  attempt  was  made  fifteen  years  after  his  death,  to  fix  the 
 charge  of  superstition  on  Bishop  Butler.  It  was  even  insinuated 
 that  he  died  in  the  communion  of  the  Church  of  Rome.  These 
 calumnies  had  no  foundation.  They  were  refuted  at  the  time  by 
 his  friend  Archhishop  Seeker,  to  the  satisfaction  of  every  one. 
 And  when  the  accusation  and  the  reply  to  it  were  recorded  in 
 Butler's  Life,  in  the  Biographia  Britannica,  by  Dr.  Kippis,  Bishop 
 Halifax  took  occasion  to  sift  the  matter  again  to  the  bottom,  and 
 published  the  result  in  his  edition  of  "  The  Analogy,"  in  1787. 
 Tliis  set  the  question  completely  at  rest.  The  decided  opposition 
 A  3 
 
one's  hands ;  and  is  one  of  the  few  works  which  go 
 into  the  elements  of  every  wrell-directed  plan  of  edu- 
 cation. 
 
 It  has,  however,  been  generally  admitted,  that  his 
 argument,  clear  and  convincing  as  it  is  to  a  prepared 
 mind,  is  not  obvious  in  all  its  parts  to  the  young 
 reader,  whose  experience  of  life  being  small,  and  his 
 habits  of  reflection  feeble,  has  not  always  the  furni- 
 ture necessary  for  comprehending  at  first  the  thoughts 
 and  conclusions  of  such  a  mind.  The  difficulty  is 
 increased  by  a  style  not  always  clear  and  accurate. 
 His  language,  indeed,  interests  and  delights  those 
 who  are  accustomed  to  his  manner,  and  seems  to 
 have  flowed  from  him  without  art  or  contrivance. 
 The  familiar  expressions  and  illustrations  which  con- 
 tinually occur,  are  not  without  their  charm.  Even 
 the  colloquial  turn  of  some  of  the  phrases  sits  well 
 upon  the  author.  Still,  as  a  whole,  the  style  is  too 
 close,  too  negligent,  too  obscure,  to  be  suitable  for 
 the  young.  It  is  marked  with  that  carelessness  into 
 which  many  writers  of  the  first-rate  talents  fall, 
 when,  intent  only  on  their  great  theme,  they  pour 
 out  their  thoughts  in  the  words  which  first  present 
 themselves.  More  than  one  attempt  has  therefore 
 been  made  to  aid  the  inexperienced  reader,  by  short 
 analyses  of  Butler's  argument.      That  prefixed  by 
 
 of  Bishop  Butler's  sentiments  to  the  errors  and  corruptions  of  the 
 Church  of  Rome,  is  indeed  apparent  in  all  his  writings ;  and  it  is 
 now  not  worth  while,  in  fact  it  would  he  obviously  unjust,  to 
 enter  into  the  details  of  so  wretched  a  misrepresentation.  This 
 subject  is  very  properly  omitted  altogether  in  the  Oxford  Uni- 
 versity edition  of  1807;  nor  would  it  have  been  alluded  to  here, 
 if  the  charge  against  Bishop  Butler,  as  well  as  its  answer,  had  not 
 been  revived  since,  in  an  article  of  a  widely^circulated  work,  La 
 Biographie  Universale. 
 
XI 
 
 Bishop  Halifax  to  his  edition  of  1787,  is  the  most 
 valuable,  as  it  is  the  best  known.  In  the  following 
 sheets,  a  more  detailed  review,  or  summary,  of  the 
 work  is  attempted,  with  a  similar  design :  with  what 
 success  must  be  left  to  the  judgment  of  the  public. 
 If  it  aids  in  forming  some  idea  of  the  general  rea- 
 soning of  the  work,  it  will  accomplish  all  that  was 
 designed.  It  cannot,  indeed,  for  nothing  can,  give 
 a  just  impression  of  Butler,  but  Butler  himself.  It 
 is  not  intended  to  supersede  the  mighty  master,  whom 
 it  only  introduces. 
 
 But  besides  the  obscurity  which  is  found  in  "  The 
 Analogy"  by  the  youthful  student,  it  has  been  also 
 remarked,  that  Bishop  Butler's  statements  of  Chris- 
 tianity itself,  from  whatever  cause,  are  somewhat  re- 
 stricted. The  impression  is  cold.  The  consolation 
 and  life  of  it  are  absent.  Whether  this  arises  from 
 the  nature  of  his  argument,  and  the  class  of  opponents 
 whom  he  addressed,  or  from  the  turn  of  the  Bishop's 
 mind  to  retired  and  contemplative,  rather  than  vivid 
 and.  popular,  descriptions  of  truth— or  from  some- 
 thing of  the  languor  so  generally  complained  of  in 
 the  Divinity  of  the  era  when  he  wrote — it  is  not  easy 
 to  say.  Certain  it  is,  that  there  seems  some  ground 
 for  the  complaint.  The  full  and  exuberant  grace 
 and  consolation  of  Christianity  in  its  particular  doc- 
 trines, and  its  application  to  the  heart  and  life,  were 
 not,  indeed,  the  topics  of  our  great  Author;  but  the 
 references  which  frequently  occur  to  the  scheme  and 
 end  of  revelation,  would  undoubtedly  have  admitted 
 of  some  observations  on  these  important  points,  which 
 may  now  be  thought  wanting.  Shall  we  be  forgiven, 
 if  we  suggest,  in  the  proper  place,  what  we  intend 
 
xu 
 
 by  this  remark  more  at  length  ?  The  eminent  sta- 
 tion which  Butler  holds,  makes  it  natural  that  we 
 should  offer,  without  fear,  after  an  interval  of  nearly 
 a  century,  such  reflections  as  honestly  occur  to  us. 
 A  classic  may  always  be  commented  upon. 
 
 In  the  following  pages,  therefore,  it  will  be  our 
 design — 
 
 )I.  To  state  the  general  argument  which  Bishop 
 Butler  pursues  in  the  Analogy;  and  to  review  the 
 ^principal  steps  of  his  reasoning. 
 
 II.  To  point  out  the  connection  of  the  argument 
 of  the  Analogy,  with  the  other  main  branches  of  the 
 Evidences  of  Christianity ;  to  notice  its  use  and  im- 
 portance; and  to  offer  some  remarks  on  Butler's  par- 
 ticular view  of  Christianity  itself,  and  on  the  adapta- 
 tion of  his  argument  to  practical  religion  in  all  its 
 |  extent.  Each  of  these  divisions  will  necessarily  draw 
 j  us  into  some  length. 
 
 We  beirin  with  a  statement  of  the  general 
 
 o 
 
 argument  of  tke  Analogy. 
 
 The  chief  design  of  this  great  work  is  to  answer 
 objections  raised  against  Religion,  Natural  and  Re- 
 vealed, and  to  confirm  the  proof  of  it,  by  considering 
 the  analogy  or  likeness  which  that  system  of  religion 
 bears  to  the  constitution  and  course  of  the  world  as 
 ruled  by  God's  ordinary  Providence.  It  compares 
 the  known  state  and  progress  of  things  in  the  natural 
 world,  with  what  religion  teaches  as  to  the  moral 
 world ;  the  acknowledged  dispensations  of  Provi- 
 dence, with  the  appointments  of  religion;  that  go- 
 vernment of  God  which  we  actually  find  ourselves 
 under  here,  with  that  government  of  God  which  re- 
 
Xlll 
 
 licrion  bids  us  to  believe  and  expect  hereafter.     And 
 it  shows  that  these  two  schemes  are  in  many,  very 
 many  respects  alike,  that  they  are  both  vast  and  in- 
 comprehensible as  to  their  whole  compass  and  ex- 
 tent, but  that  still  they  may  both  be  traced  up  to  the 
 same  general  laws,  and  resolved  into  the  same  princi- 
 ples of  Divine  conduct.      It  takes  for  granted  that 
 there  is  an  Intelligent  Governor  of  the  world,  a  su- 
 preme and  perfect  Author  of  nature ;  and  then  argues 
 from  that  part  of  his  works  and  dispensations  which 
 is  known  and  acknowledged,  to  that  part  which  is 
 denied  or  objected  to;  from  the  world  of  nature  to 
 the  world  of  revelation ;  from  the  confessed  order  of 
 Providence  to  the  disputed  appointments  of  Grace; 
 from  Creation  to  Christianity.      Its  proper  design  is 
 not  to  prove  the  truth  of  natural  and  revealed  religion 
 by  their  direct  evidences  of  miracles  and  prophecies. 
 The  Author  of  the  Analogy  takes  other  ground. 
 He  supposes  all  these  usual  proofs  to  remain,  and 
 remain  in  all  their  force ;  and  he  attempts  to  confirm 
 them   in   the  minds  of  considerate  men,  who  mav 
 have  been  staggered  by  objections  and  difficulties, 
 by  taking  up  the  objector  on  his  own  admission  of 
 the  supreme  rule  of  the  Almighty  in  the  world,  and 
 showing  him  that  his  objections  have  no  real  weight, 
 because  they  might  be  raised  against  the  works  of 
 God  in  his  ordinary  and  confessed  government  of 
 the  kingdom  of  nature,  just  as  plausibly  as  against 
 the  government  of  the  same  God  in  the  kingdom 
 of  religion.     This  is  his  line  of  argument.     He  rea- 
 sons from  that  part  of  the  divine  proceedings  which 
 comes  under  our  view  in  the  daily  business  of  life, 
 to  that  larger  and  more  comprehensive  part  of  these 
 
XIV 
 
 proceedings  which  is  beyond  our  view,  and  which  re- 
 ligion reveals.  Thus  he  answers  and  silences  objec- 
 tions. God's  ordering  of  the  affairs  of  men  by  his 
 Providence  is  a  fact  known  and  admitted,  and  present 
 before  our  eyes.  Now  if  it  can  be  shown  that  God's 
 ordering  the  conduct  of  men  by  the  laws  and  motives 
 of  religion  is  analogous  to  this,  and  liable  to  no  more 
 nor  other  objections,  then  we  have  a  probable  argu- 
 ment, in  the  first  instance,  and  independently  of  its 
 direct  evidences,  in  favour  of  the  truth  of  Christianity' 
 Thus  objections  are  satisfactorily  silenced,  if  not  re- 
 moved. The  acknowledgment  of  a  perfect  Creator 
 and  Ruler  of  the  Universe,  connected  with  the  fact 
 that  he  does  such  and  such  things,  acts  by  such 
 and  such  general  laws,  brings  about  such  and  such 
 effects,  attaches  such  and  such  consequences  to  men's 
 actions,  deals  with  them  in  such  and  such  a  manner 
 in  the  daily  and  hourly  appointments  of  his  Provi- 
 dence, gives  us  data  to  proceed  upon  in  answering 
 what  is  objected  against  the  supposed  rule  of  the 
 same  God  in  religion. 
 
 If  men,  indeed,  will  indulge  in  vain  and  idle  spe- 
 culations, and  form  imaginary  models  of  a  universe, 
 and  lay  down  plans  for  ruling  the  world  in  a  way 
 which  they  suppose  better  than  it  is  at  present,  there 
 can  be  no  arguing  with  them.  They  profess  them- 
 selves to  be  wiser  than  God.  They  take  up  with 
 airy  notions  which  have  no  foundation  in  facts.  This 
 is  to  deny  the  natural  government  of  God,  which 
 was  conceded  by  the  hypothesis.  But  if  men  will 
 leave  these  presumptuous  conjectures,  and  come  to 
 facts — to  the  constitution  of  nature,  as  it  is  actually 
 made  known  to  us  by  experience,  and  as  confessedly 
 
XV 
 
 framed  by  an  all-wise  and  gracious  Governor,  they 
 will  find  a  surprising  analogy  between  Nature  and 
 Religion;  they  will  find  the  probability  weigh  down 
 strongly  on  the  side  of  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
 even  prior  to  its  direct  proofs  and  evidences ;  they 
 will  find,  that  the  system  of  Christianity  is  loaded 
 with  no  greater  difficulties  than  the  system  of  nature 
 is,  and  that  it  is  no  safer  to  spurn  at  the  scheme  of 
 religion,  than  to  ridicule  the  constitution  of  the  same 
 infinitely  glorious  God,  in  his  temporal  government 
 of  mankind.  In  short,  our  Author  shows,  that  the 
 dispensations  of  Providence  which  we  are  under 
 now,  as  inhabitants  of  this  lower  world,  and  as  having 
 a  momentary  interest  to  secure  in  it,  are  analogous 
 to,  and,  in  fact,  of  a  piece  with,  that  further  dispen- 
 sation which  relates  to  us  as  designed  for  another 
 world,  in  which  we  have  an  eternal  interest.  The 
 natural  and  moral  world  are  thus  seen  to  be  inti- 
 mately connected  together,  and  to  be  parts  of  one 
 stupendous  whole,  where  our  ignorance  betrays  us 
 the  instant  we  dare  to  speculate  and  imagine  things 
 of  ourselves,  but  where  common  sense  and  common 
 prudence  lead  us  on  securely,  if  we  are  modest,  and 
 practical,  and  sincere.  And  the  chief  objections 
 which  are  urged  against  religion,  are  thus  shown  to 
 be  false  and  frivolous ;  because  they  might  have  been 
 equally  urged  before  experience  had  taught  us, 
 against  the  course  and  constitution  of  nature,  which 
 are  admitted  on  all  hands  to  have  come  from  the 
 ever-blessed  God.  If,  therefore,  they  are  incon- 
 clusive when  raised  against  the  external  and  obvious, 
 and,  as  it  were,  tangible  order  of  things  around  us, 
 much  more  are  they  inconclusive,  when  raised  against 
 
XVI 
 
 the   moral,   and  invisible,   and  mysterious  order  of 
 things  which  Christianity  reveals. 
 
 It  is  true,  this  whole  argument  from  analogy  is 
 only  a  probable  one.  It  does  not  amount  to  demon- 
 stration. But  then,  it  is  a  probable  argument  of  the 
 highest  kind,  and  far  stronger  than  those  by  which 
 men  are  every  day  guided  in  their  most  important 
 concerns.  There  are  very  few  things  indeed  for 
 which  we  have,  or  can  have,  demonstrative  evidence. 
 For  such  feeble  creatures  as  we  are,  probability  is 
 the  guide  of  life.  Every  thing  turns  upon  it.  Even 
 a  single  slight  presumption  may  not  be  without  its 
 weight ;  but  presumptions,  however  slight  in  them- 
 selves, if  frequently  repeated,  often  amount  to  a  moral 
 certainty.  Thus,  if  we  accidentally  observe  for  one 
 day  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide,  the  observation 
 affords  only  some  sort  of  presumption,  and  that  per- 
 haps the  lowest  imaginable,  that  the  same  may  hap- 
 pen again  to-morrow;  but  the  observation  of  this 
 event  for  so  many  days,  and  months,  and  ages  to- 
 gether, as  it  has  been  observed  by  men  in  all  places 
 and  countries,  gives  us  a  full  assurance  that  it  will 
 happen  to-morrow.  No  man  in  his  senses  thinks 
 otherwise.  Thus,  also,  no  one  doubts  but  that  the 
 sun  will  rise  to-morrow,  and  will  be  seen,  if  seen  at 
 all,  in  the  figure  of  a  circle,  and  not  in  that  of  a 
 square.  So  again,  we  conclude  that  there  is  no  kind 
 of  presumption  that  there  will  not  be  frost  in  England 
 any  given  day  in  January  next ;  that  it  is  probable 
 that  there  will  on  some  day  of  that  month,  and  that 
 there  is  almost  a  moral  certainty  of  it  in  some  part  or 
 other  of  the  winter.  In  like  manner,  when  we  ob- 
 serve in  human  affairs  generally,  that  any  thing  does 
 
XV11 
 
 regularly  come  to  pass,  we  infer,  that  other  things 
 which  are  like  to  it,  or  have  an  analogy  with  it,  will 
 also  come  to  pass.  Human  concerns  are  all  carried 
 on  by  this  natural  process  of  reasoning.  And  yet 
 we  have  no  demonstrative  evidence  in  any  such  cases. 
 Thus  we  believe,  that  a  child,  if  it  lives  twenty  years, 
 will  grow  up  to  the  strength  and  stature  of  a  man ; 
 that  food  will  contribute  to  the  preservation  of  its 
 life ;  and  the  want  of  food,  for  a  certain  number  of 
 days,  be  its  certain  destruction.  It  is  thus  men  go 
 on  continually.  They  judge  and  act  by  what  is 
 probable,  and  never  dream  of  asking  for  further  evi- 
 dence. The  rule  of  their  hopes  and  fears ;  of  their 
 calculations  of  success  in  their  pursuits ;  of  their  ex- 
 pectations how  others  will  act  in  such  circumstances ; 
 and  of  their  judgment  that  such  actions  proceed  from 
 such  principles ;  all  these  rest  on  the  argument  from 
 analogy:  that  is,  on  their  having  observed,  before,  the 
 like  things  with  respect  to  themselves  or  others. 
 Especially,  if  any  great  scheme  of  things  is  laid  be- 
 fore men  claiming  to  be  the  plan  of  such  and  such  a 
 person,  and  demanding  certain  efforts  and  duties, 
 they  compare  this  scheme  with  the  acknowledged 
 productions  of  that  person,  and  judge  by  analogy 
 whether  it  is  his  or  not.  They  compare  the  part  of 
 this  person's  designs  which  is  known  and  familiar  to 
 them,  with  the  new  scheme  at  present  unknown,  in 
 order  to  form  a  probable  opinion.  If,  on  considera- 
 tion, they  can  trace  the  same  mind  in  both  plans,  the 
 same  ends,  the  same  sort  of  means,  the  same  general 
 laws,  the  same  benevolence  and  wisdom,  the  same 
 vastness  of  comprehension,  the  same  apparent  per- 
 plexity working  the  same  good  results,  the  same  moral 
 
XVI 11 
 
 characteristics  and  features,  and,  above  all,  a  depend- 
 ence and  connection  between  the  two — they  con- 
 clude that  they  both  proceed  from  the  same  author. 
 And  if  objections  should  be  raised  against  the  new 
 and  unknown  scheme,  which,  on  calm  inquiry,  seem 
 to  lie  equally  against  the  scheme  already  known  and 
 acknowledged  to  come  from  the  same  hand,  these 
 objections  have  no  weight  with  them;  that  is,  they 
 are  answered  by  the  analogy  or  likeness  which  the 
 one  constitution  and  scheme  bears  to  the  other. 
 Persons  who  doubt  of  the  force  of  a  probable  argu- 
 ment in  religion,  should  consider  in  this  way  what 
 evidence  that  is  upon  which  they  act  every  day  with 
 regard  to  their  temporal  interests.  They  act  in  the 
 daily  course  of  life  upon  evidence  much  lower  than 
 what  is  called  probable.  In  questions  of  the  great- 
 est consequence,  a  reasonable  man  marks  the  lowest 
 probabilities,  such  as  amount  to  no  more  than  show- 
 ing that  one  side  of  a  question  is  as  supposable  and 
 credible  as  the  other.  And  any  one  would  be 
 thought  mad  who  did  not  do  so,  in  many  cases. 
 Men  not  only  guard  against  what  they  fully  believe 
 will  happen,  but  also  against  what  they  think  it  pos- 
 sible may  happen  ;  they  often  engage  in  pursuits 
 when  the  probability  is  greatly  against  success;  they 
 make  such  provision  for  themselves  as  it  is  suppos- 
 able they  may  have  occasion  for,  though  the  plain 
 acknowledged  probability  is,  that  they  never  will 
 have  such  occasion. 
 
 Indeed,  it  is  a  real  imperfection  in  the  moral  char- 
 acter, not  to  be  influenced  in  practice  by  any  degree 
 of  evidence,  even  the  lowest,  when  it  is  discovered. 
 Men  are  under  a  formal  and  absolute  obligation  to  act 
 
XIX 
 
 in  practical  matters  on  the  side  of  the  least  prepon- 
 derating probability.  As  when  we  weigh  two  things 
 in  a  pair  of  true  scales,  the  smallest  inclination  of 
 the  beam  enables  us  to  see  which  is  the  heavier,  and 
 binds  us  to  act  on  the  fact  that  it  is  so;  so,  in  mat- 
 ters of  practice,  the  smallest  degree  of  weight  on  one 
 side  more  than  another,  enables  us  to  see  what  is 
 our  duty,  and  binds  us  to  act  accordingly. 
 
 If,  then,  the  analogy  of  nature  only  showed  us 
 that  there  was  the  lowest  presumption  of  the  truth 
 of  religion  notwithstanding  difficulties,  men  would  be 
 formally  and  absolutely  bound  to  believe  and  obey  it. 
 But  if  this  analogy  shows  that  there  is  not  merely  a 
 low  presumption,  but  the  highest  probability  of  its 
 truth,  and  that  the  very  objections  to  it  rest  on  such 
 matters  as  are  apparently  inconclusive,  when  ap- 
 plied to  that  system  of  things  in  providence  which 
 is  acknowledged  to  come  from  an  all-wise  and  al- 
 mighty Creator ;  nay  more,  that  these  very  objections 
 may,  for  any  thing  we  know,  be  really  benefits,  yea, 
 most  important  instances,  upon  the  whole,  of  the 
 divine  goodness,  the  duty  of  obedience  to  it  becomes 
 still  more  imperative.  And  when  it  is  considered 
 that,  besides  this  argument  from  analogy  silencing 
 our  scruples,  the  numerous  direct  evidences  of  Chris- 
 tianity remain  what  they  were  before,  unanswered 
 and  unanswerable,  the  obligation  to  receive  the 
 Christian  doctrine  becomes,  in  fact,  the  first  and  pa- 
 ramount duty  of  a  reasonable  and  accountable  crea- 
 ture; and  the  rashness  and  guilt  of  rejecting  it  be- 
 come criminal  and  absurd,  in  a  degree  which  no 
 words  can  express. 
 
 This,  then,  is  the  general  design  of  Bishop  Butler. 
 
XX 
 
 He  undertakes  to  show,  that  men  cannot  reject 
 Christianity  on  the  footing  of  objections,  without 
 acting  against  those  rules  of  probability  by  which 
 they  have  been  guided  all  their  lives  in  all  their 
 most  important  concerns,  and  by  which  they  are 
 guided  continually,  and  must  be  guided,  however 
 they  may  act  with  regard  to  Christianity.  Thus 
 our  author  leaves  the  unbeliever  without  excuse — 
 condemned  by  his  own  conduct  on  all  like  occasions 
 — condemned  by  the  universal  experience  of  mankind 
 — and  acting  in  the  most  important  of  all  subjects  in 
 an  opposite  manner  to  what  common  sense  and  com- 
 mon prudence  compel  him  to  do  every  day  of  his  life, 
 on  the  most  momentous,  as  well  as  the  slightest  oc- 
 casions. Such  is  the  scope  of  this  celebrated  Trea- 
 tise. If  we  have  dwelt  longer  than  might  seem  ne- 
 cessary in  explaining  it,  let  it  be  remembered,  that 
 it  is  the  key  to  all  that  follows. 
 
 After  this  sketch  of  the  design  of  the  Analogy, 
 let  us  now  proceed  to  give  an  idea,  so  far  as  we 
 
 MAY    BE    ABLE,    OF     THE    SEVERAL     STEPS    OF    OUR 
 
 author's  argument.  We  say,  so  far  as  we  may 
 be  able ;  for  it  is  no  easy  task  to  compress  and  sim- 
 plify a  series  of  close  and  profound  reasoning.  How- 
 ever, some  assistance  may  be  given.  The  reader's 
 patience  is  requested.  Such  an  author  demands  and 
 rewards  the  utmost  attention,  and  cannot  be  under- 
 stood without  it. 
 
 The  whole  Treatise  is  divided  into  Two  Parts. 
 In  the  First,  the  Author  shows,  that  the  things  prin- 
 cipally objected  against  Natural  Religion,  are  analo- 
 gous to  what  is  experienced  in  the  course  of  nature. 
 
XXI 
 
 and  therefore  inconclusive.  In  the  Second,  he  shows 
 the  same  as  to  Christianity,  or  Revealed  Religion. 
 In  the  First  Part,  he  considers,  as  we  shall  presently 
 see  more  at  length,  by  a  separate  review  of  each 
 topic,  that  Natural  Religion  teaches,  1.  That  mankind 
 is  to  live  hereafter  in  a  future  state.  2.  That  there 
 every  one  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished.  3.  That 
 these  rewards  and  punishments  will  be  according  to 
 men's  good  or  evil  behaviour  here.  4.  That  our 
 present  life  is  a  probation  or  trial.  5.  That  it  is  a 
 state  of  moral  discipline  for  a  future  life.  6.  That 
 the  notion  of  necessity  forms  no  valid  objection 
 against  these  truths.  And,  7.  That  as  this  plan  of 
 religion  is  but  very  partially  made  known  to  us  in 
 this  world,  no  objections  against  its  wisdom  and 
 goodness  are  of  any  real  weight.  These  points  we 
 shall  consider  in  seven  separate  chapters. 
 
 From  this  view  of  natural  religion,  we  shall  pro- 
 ceed with  Butler  in  the  Second  Part  of  his  work,  to 
 weigh,  1.  The  importance  of  Christianity;  2.  The 
 objections  raised  against  it,  on  the  ground  of  its  be- 
 ing miraculous ;  and,  3.  Our  incapacity  of  judging 
 what  was  to  be  expected  in  a  revelation,  and  the 
 credibility  that  it  would  contain  things  apparently 
 open  to  objections.  4.  We  shall  next  have  to  con- 
 sider Christianity  as  a  scheme  imperfectly  compre- 
 hended; then,  5.  The  particular  system  itself  of 
 Christianity,  the  appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and 
 the  redemption  of  the  world  by  him ;  and,  6.  The 
 want  of  universality  in  revelation,  and  the  supposed 
 deficiency  in  the  proof  of  it.  After  this,  we  shall 
 have  to  notice,  7.  The  objections  against  the  par- 
 ticular evidence  for  Christianity;  and  lastly,  8.  The 
 
XXII 
 
 objections  which  may  be  made  generally  against  thus 
 arguing  from  the  analogy  of  nature  to  religion.  These 
 will  be  the  heads  of  eight  chapters.  The  following 
 review  will  accordingly  contain  seven  chapters  in  the 
 first  division  of  it,  and  eight  in  the  second. 
 
 The  Author  begins  his  Treatise  (Part  I.  Chap.  I. ) 
 with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of  all  our  hopes 
 and  all  our  fears, — all  our  hopes  and  fears  which  are 
 of  any  consideration, — a  Future  Life.  He  takes 
 for  granted  that  there  is  an  Intelligent  Author  of 
 Nature,  whose  moral  will  and  character  is  just  and 
 good  in  the  very  highest  degree.  This  Author  of 
 Nature  formed  the  universe  as  it  is,  and  carries  on 
 the  course  of  it  as  he  does,  rather  than  in  any  other 
 manner.  Men,  as  rational  creatures,  cannot  but  re- 
 flect on  the  mysterious  scheme  of  things  in  the  midst 
 of  which  they  find  themselves;  and  cannot  but  inquire 
 whence  they  came  and  whither  they  are  going,  and 
 what  will  be  the  end  or  issue  of  the  system  in  which 
 they  are  placed.  Now  it  will  appear,  in  the  first 
 place,  from  considering  the  analogy  of  nature,  that 
 there  is  nothing  improbable  in  what  religion  teaches, 
 that  we  are  to  exist  in  another  life  after  death. 
 There  is,  indeed,  a  confused  suspicion,  that,  in  the 
 great  shock  of  the  unknown  event,  death,  our  living 
 powers  will  be  destroyed.  The  sensible  proof  of  our 
 being  possessed  of  these  powers  is  removed.  Death 
 is  terrible  to  us.  Nature  shrinks  from  it.  Yet, 
 when  we  come  calmly  to  consider  these  apprehen- 
 sions, we  shall  find  them  to  be  groundless. 
 
 1.  For  it  is  clearly  a  general  law  of  nature,  that 
 the  same  creatures  should  exist  here  in  very  different 
 
XX111 
 
 degrees  of  life  and  perception.  We  see  instances 
 of  this  law  in  the  surprising  change  of  worms  into 
 flies,  and  in  birds  and  insects  bursting  their  shell, 
 and  entering  into  a  new  world  furnished  with  new 
 accommodations  for  them.  The  states  also  in  which 
 we  ourselves  existed  formerly  in  the  womb,  and  in 
 the  years  of  infancy,  are  widely  different  from  the 
 state  of  mature  age.  Nothing  can  be  imagined  more 
 different.  Therefore,  that  we  are  to  exist  hereafter 
 in  a  state  as  different  from  our  present,  as  this  is 
 from  our  former  one,  is  only  according  to  the  analogy 
 of  nature 
 
 2.  There  is  a  probability,  in  every  case,  that  all 
 things  will  continue  as  we  now  find  them,  in  all  re- 
 spects, except  those  in  which  we  have  some  positive 
 reason  to  think  they  will  be  altered.  This  is  a  gen- 
 eral law.  Nature  goes  on  as  it  is.  This  seems  our 
 only  reason  for  believing  that  the  course  of  the  world 
 will  continue  to-morrow,  as  it  is  to-day,  and  as  it  has 
 done,  so  far  as  experience  and  history  can  carry  us 
 back.  If  then  our  living  powers  do  not  continue  after 
 death,  there  must  be  some  positive  reason  for  this, 
 either  in  death  itself,  or  in  the  analogy  of  nature. 
 
 But  there  is  no  positive  reason  in  death  itself]  for 
 we  know  not  what  it  is ;  we  only  know  some  of  its 
 effects,  such  as  the  dissolution  of  flesh,  skin,  and 
 bones ;  and  these  effects  in  nowise  appear  to  imply 
 the  destruction  of  the  living  agent.  Sleep,  or  a 
 swoon,  shows  us  that  the  living  powers  may  exist 
 when  there  is  no  present  capacity  of  exercising  them. 
 In  fact  we  know  not  upon  what  the  existence  of  our 
 living  powers  depends. 
 
 Nor  does  the  analogy  of  nature  furnish  any  posi- 
 
XXIV 
 
 tive  reason  to  think  that  death  is  our  destruction. 
 For  we  have  no  faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any 
 thing  beyond,  or  through  death,  to  see  what  be- 
 comes of  those  powers.  Men  were  possessed  of  these 
 powers  up  to  the  period  to  which  we  have  faculties 
 for  tracing  them ;  it  is  probable,  therefore,  that  they 
 retain  them  afterwards. 
 
 3.  For  our  gross  bodies  are  not  ourselves,  and 
 therefore  the  destruction  of  them  may  be  no  destruc- 
 tion of  ourselves.  We  see  that  men  may  lose  their 
 limbs,  their  organs  of  sense,  and  even  the  greatest 
 part  of  their  bodies,  and  yet  remain  the  same  living 
 agents  as  before.  Our  organized  bodies  are  merely 
 large  quantities  of  matter  which  may  be  alienated, 
 and  actually  are  in  a  daily  course  of  succession  and 
 change,  whilst  we  remain  the  same  living,  permanent 
 beings  notwithstanding.  As,  therefore,  we  have 
 already,  several  times  over,  lost  a  great  part  of  oui 
 body,  or  perhaps  the  whole  of  it,  according  to  certain 
 common  established  laws  of  nature ;  so  when  we  shall 
 lose  as  great  a  part,  or  the  whole,  by  another  com- 
 mon established  law  of  nature,  death,  why  may  we 
 not  also  remain  the  same?  That  the  alienation  has 
 been  gradual  in  one  case,  and  will  be  more  at  once 
 in  the  other,  proves  nothing  to  the  contrary. 
 
 4.  But,  more  particularly,  our  bodies  are  clearly 
 only  organs  and  instruments  of  perception  and  mo- 
 tion. Our  use  of  common  optical  instruments  shows 
 that  we  see  with  our  eyes  in  the  same  sense,  and  in 
 no  other,  as  we  see  with  glasses.  These  glasses, 
 which  are  no  part  of  our  body,  convey  objects  towards 
 our  perceiving  power,  just  as  our  bodily  organs  do. 
 And  if  we  see  with  our  eyes  only  in  this  manner, 
 
XXV 
 
 the  like  may  be  concluded  as  to  all  our  other  senses, 
 So  with  regard  to  the  power  of  moving:  upon  the 
 destruction  of  a  limb,  the  active  power  remains ;  and 
 we  can  walk  by  the  help  of  an  artificial  leg,  just  as 
 we  can  make  use  of  a  pole  to  reach  things  beyond 
 the  length  of  the  natural  arm.  We  may  therefore 
 have  no  more  relation  to  our  external  bodily  organs, 
 than  we  have  to  a  microscope  or  a  staff,  or  any  other 
 foreign  matter,  which  we  use  as  instruments  of  per- 
 ception or  motion;  and  the  dissolution  of  these  organs 
 by  death  may  be  no  destruction  of  the  living  agent. 
 
 5.  But  further :  our  powers  of  reflection  do  not, 
 even  now,  depend  on  our  gross  body  in  the  same 
 manner  as  perception  by  the  organs  of  sense  does. 
 In  our  present  condition,  the  organs  of  sense  are  in- 
 deed necessary  for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflect- 
 ing powers,  as  carriages,  and  levers,  and  scaffolds  are 
 in  architecture;  but  when  these  ideas  are  once  brought 
 in,  and  stored  up  in  the  mind,  we  are  capable  of 
 pleasure  and  pain  by  reflection,  without  any  further 
 assistance  from  our  senses.  Mortal  diseases  often 
 do  not  at  all  affect  our  intellectual  powers,  nor  even 
 suspend  them.  We  see  persons  under  those  dis- 
 eases, the  moment  before  death,  discover  apprehen- 
 sion, memory,  reason,  all  entire, — the  utmost  force 
 of  affection,  and  the  highest  mental  enjoyments  and 
 sufferings:  why  then  should  a  disease,  when  come  to 
 a  certain  degree,  be  thought  to  destroy  those  powers, 
 which  do  not  depend  on  the  bodily  senses,  and  which 
 were  not  affected  by  that  disease  quite  up  to  that 
 degree  ? 
 
 6.  Nay,  our  future  existence  may  probably  be  not 
 
 b  17 
 
XXVI 
 
 the  beginning,  properly  speaking,  of  any  thing  new, 
 but  only  the  continuance,  the  going  on  of  our  present 
 life  as  intelligent  agents.  Death  may  only  answer 
 to  our  birth,  which  is  not  a  suspension  of  the  facul- 
 ties we  had  before,  nor  a  total  change  of  the  state  of 
 life  in  which  we  existed  when  in  the  womb,  but  a 
 continuance  of  both,  with  such  and  such  great  altera- 
 tions. And  our  present  relation  to  our  bodily  organs 
 may  be  the  only  natural  hinderance  to  our  existing 
 hereafter  in  a  higher  state  of  being  and  reflection. 
 
 7.  But  even  if  death  suspends  our  living  powers, 
 which  does  not  appear,  yet  a  sleep  or  a  swoon  may 
 teach  us  that  the  suspension  of  a  power  and  the  de- 
 struction of  it,  are  effects  totally  different. 
 
 8.  On  the  whole,  the  analogy  of  nature  makes  it 
 probable,  that  as  we  are  conscious  that  we  are  now 
 living  agents,  so  we  shall  go  on  to  be  such,  notwith- 
 standing the  event  of  death,  which,  it  is  likely,  may 
 only  serve  to  bring  us  into  new  scenes,  and  a  new 
 state  of  life  and  action,  just  as  naturally  as  we  came 
 into  the  present.  This  will  appear  most  probable, 
 if  we  would  only  leave  off  the  delusive  custom  of 
 substituting  imagination  in  the  room  of  experience, 
 and  would  confine  ourselves  to  what  we  really  know 
 and  understand. 
 
 Chap.  II. — A  future  state  being  once  granted, 
 an  unbounded  prospect  is  opened  to  our  hopes  and 
 fears.  The  expectation  of  immortality  is  not  a  mat- 
 ter of  indifference,  but  a  subject  of  the  deepest  im- 
 portance. For  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  shows 
 that  there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the  supposition 
 that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  hereafter  for 
 
xxvn 
 
 their  actions  here.      And  it  is  infinitely  unreasonable 
 in  men  to  act  upon  any  other  supposition. 
 
 1.  For  in  the  present  life,  we  see  that  pleasure 
 and  pain  are  the  consequences  of  our  actions,  and 
 that  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  foreseeing 
 these  consequences,  and  acting  accordingly.  This 
 is  the  constitution  of  the  Author  of  Nature.  By 
 prudence  and  care  we  may  pass  our  days  in  tolerable 
 quiet ;  by  rashness,  passion,  wilfulness,  or  even  by 
 negligence,  (which  is  very  observable,)  we  may  make 
 ourselves  as  miserable  as  we  please.  This  is  the 
 general  course  of  things.  God's  method  as  the 
 Governor  of  the  universe,  is  clearly  to  forewarn  us 
 of  such  and  such  things,  and  to  give  l.s  capacities  of 
 foreseeing,  that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall  have 
 such  and  such  enjoyments  and  sufferings. 
 
 2.  It  is  then  a  simple  matter  of  fact,  that  we  are 
 under  the  dominion  of  God  here,  just  as  we  are 
 under  the  dominion  and  rule  of  civil  magistrates : 
 because  the  annexing  pleasure  to  some  actions,  and 
 pain  to  others,  and  the  giving  notice  of  this  before- 
 hand, is  the  proper  formal  notion  of  government. 
 We  are  thus  compelled  to  admit,  that  the  Author 
 of  Nature  acts  here  as  a  Master  or  Governor;  there 
 can,  therefore,  be  nothing  incredible  in  the  general 
 doctrine  of  religion,  that  God  will  act  thus  hereaftef 
 — that  is,  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their 
 behaviour. 
 
 3.  But  as  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly 
 object  against,  and  are  most  unwilling  to  allow,  it  is 
 important  to  observe,  not  merely  that  there  is  a  great 
 deal  of  misery  in  the  world,  but  that  there  is  a  great 
 
XXV111 
 
 deal  which  men  bring  upon  themselves,  and  which 
 they  might  have  foreseen  and  avoided.  Now,  the 
 circumstances  of  these  natural  punishments  are  such 
 as  these : — They  are  often  the  consequences  of  ac- 
 tions which  procure  many  present  advantages,  and 
 bring  much  present  pleasure.  Again,  they  are  often 
 much  greater  than  the  advantages  or  pleasures  of 
 the  actions  which  they  follow.  They  are  frequently 
 delayed  a  great  while ;  sometimes  till  long  after  the 
 actions  occasioning  them  are  forgot.  They  then 
 come,  after  such  delay,  not  by  degrees,  but  suddenly, 
 with  violence  and  at  once.  They  are  often  not 
 thought  of  during  the  actions  themselves;  yet  still 
 they  inevitably  follow.  Thus  habits  formed  in  youth 
 are  utter  ruin  for  life;  though,  for  the  most  part, 
 this  consequence  is  little  thought  of  at  the  time. 
 
 4.  We  observe  fuither,  that  the  natural  course 
 of  things  gives  us  opportunities,  which,  like  the 
 seed-time,  cannot  be  recalled  if  we  once  neglect  them; 
 and  that,  in  many  cases,  real  repentance  and  refor- 
 mation are  of  no  avail  to  remedy  or  prevent  the 
 miseries  naturally  annexed  to  previous  folly;  that 
 neglects  from  mere  inconsiderateness  and  want  of 
 attention,  are  often  as  fatal  as  from  any  active  mis- 
 conduct :  and  that  many  natural  punishments  are 
 mortal,  and  seem  inflicted  either  to  remove  the  of- 
 fender out  of  the  way  of  being  further  mischievous, 
 or  as  an  example  to  others. 
 
 5.  Now  these  things  are  not  accidental,  but  are 
 matters  of  every  day's  experience,  proceeding  from 
 general  laws  by  which  God  obviously  is  governing 
 the  world;  and  they  are  so  analogous  to  what  reli- 
 gion teaches  us  concerning  the  future  punishment  of 
 
XXIX 
 
 the  wicked,  that  both  may  be  expressed  in  the  very 
 same  words. 
 
 6.  Especially  we  see,  that  after  men's  neglecting 
 repeated  warnings,  and  many  checks,  in  a  course  of 
 vice — after  these  have  been  long  scorned — and  after 
 the  worst  consequences  of  their  follies  have  been 
 delayed  for  a  great  while;  at  length  their  punish- 
 ment breaks  in  upon  them  irresistibly,  like  an  armed 
 force;  repentance  is  too  late  to  relieve  their  misery — 
 the  case  is  desperate ;  and  poverty  and  sickness,  re- 
 morse and  anguish,  infamy  and  death,  overwhelm 
 them,  as  the  effects  of  their  own  behaviour,  beyond 
 the  possibility  of  remedy  or  escape. 
 
 7.  Not  that  men  are  thus  uniformly  punished 
 here  in  proportion  to  their  vices,  but  they  often  are  : 
 very  many  such  cases  occur,  and  dreadful  ones  too — 
 cases  quite  sufficient  to  show  what  the  laws  of  the 
 universe  may  admit,  and  to  answer  all  objections 
 against  future  punishments,  from  the  vain  idea,  that 
 the  frailty  of  nature,  and  the  force  of  temptations, 
 (as  men  sometimes  speak,)  almost  annihilate  the 
 guilt  of  human  vices. 
 
 8.  Thus,  on  the  whole,  the  particular  final  causes 
 of  pleasure  and  pain  distributed  by  Almighty  God 
 here,  prove  that  we  are  under  his  government,  in  the 
 same  way  as  subjects  are  under  the  rule  of  civil  ma- 
 gistrates. And  future  rewards  and  punishments  are 
 but  an  appointment,  analogous  and  of  the  same  sort 
 with  what  we  thus  actually  experience  in  this  world, 
 in  the  regular  course  of  universal  Providence. 
 
 Chap.  III. — But  further :  this  natural  govern- 
 ment of  God,  under  which  we  now  find  ourselves,  is 
 
XXX 
 
 a  moral  or  righteous  government.  It  is  not  merely 
 a  government  by  rewards  and  punishments,  like  that 
 which  a  master  exercises  over  his  servants,  which  in 
 human  affairs  is  often  exercised  tyrannically  and  par- 
 tially, but  one  which  renders  to  men  according  to 
 their  actions,  considered  as  morally  good  or  evil. 
 This  is  the  next  step  in  removing  objections  against 
 natural  religion. 
 
 Men  have  no  ground  whatever  to  assert  that  God 
 is  simply  and  absolutely  benevolent — this  indeed  may 
 be  so  upon  the  whole — but  he  clearly  manifests  him- 
 self unto  us  as  a  righteous  Governor.  This  govern- 
 ment, indeed,  so  far  as  it  is  seen  here,  and  taken 
 alone,  is  not  complete  and  perfect;  but  still  a  right- 
 eous government  is  carried  on  here,  quite  sufficiently 
 to  give  us  the  apprehension  that  it  shall  be  completed 
 in  a  future  life.  We  see  now  the  clear  beginnings, 
 the  rudiments  of  a  moral  government,  notwithstand- 
 ing all  the  confusion  and  disorder  of  the  world.  This 
 is  enough  to  answer  all  objections  against  the  future 
 judgment  which  religion  teaches  us  to  expect. 
 
 1.  For  as  God  is  our  Governor,  no  rule  of  his 
 government  appears  to  creatures  endued  with  a  moral 
 nature  as  we  are,  so  natural,  so  unavoidable,  consider- 
 ing his  infinite  perfections,  as  that  of  distributive 
 justice.  The  expectation  then  of  this  is  not  in  itself 
 absurd  or  chimerical. 
 
 2.  Next,  as  God  has  endued  us  with  capacities  of 
 foreseeing  the  good  and  bad  consequences  of  our 
 behaviour,  and  rewards  and  punishes  prudence  and 
 imprudence  respectively,  this  plainly  implies  some 
 sort  of  moral  government.  Tranquillity  and  satisfac- 
 tion follow  a  prudent  management  of  our  affairs ;  and 
 
XXXI 
 
 rashness  and  negligence  bring  after  them  many  suf- 
 ferings. These  are  instances  of  a  right  constitution 
 of  things  here ;  just  as  the  correction  of  children, 
 when  they  run  into  danger,  or  hurt  themselves,  is  a 
 part  of  right  education. 
 
 3.  Again,  the  Author  of  Nature  has  so  appointed 
 things,  that  vicious  actions,  as  falsehood,  injustice, 
 cruelty,  &c.  must  be  punished,  and  are  punished,  as 
 mischievous  to  society.  He  has  put  mankind  under 
 a  necessity  of  thus  punishing  them,  just  as  he  has 
 put  them  under  a  necessity  of  preserving  their  lives 
 by  food.  Thus  men  are,  in  some  respects,  unavoid- 
 ably under  a  moral  government  here ;  they  are  pun- 
 ished or  rewarded  as  being  mischievous  or  beneficial 
 to  society. 
 
 4.  Again,  we  are  so  formed  that  virtue,  as  such, 
 gives  us  satisfaction,  at  least  in  some  instances;  vice, 
 as  such,  and  on  its  own  account,  in  none.  This  is 
 a  proof  not  only  of  government,  but  of  moral  govern- 
 ment, begun  and  established — moral  in  the  strictest 
 sense,  though  not  in  that  perfection  of  degree  which 
 religion  teaches  us  to  expect.  The  sense  of  well 
 and  ill  doing,  the  presages  of  conscience,  the  love 
 which  men  have  to  good  characters,  and  the  dislike 
 of  bad  ones ;  honour,  shame,  gratitude,  vexation  and 
 remorse,  arising  from  reflecting  on  an  action  done  by 
 us,  as  being  wrong;  disturbance  and  fear,  from  a 
 sense  of  being  blameworthy  :  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
 inward  security  and  peace,  complacency  and  joy  of 
 heart,  accompanying  the  exercise  of  friendship,  com- 
 passion, benevolence; — all  this  shows  that  we  are 
 placed  here  in  a  condition,  in  which  our  moral  nature 
 operates    in    favouring   virtue    and    punishing    vice. 
 
XXXli 
 
 Vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue  cannot  but  be,  fa- 
 voured on  some  occasions,  and  for  its  own  sake,  by 
 ourselves  and  others.  The  one  cannot  but  be  mis- 
 erable ;  the  other  cannot  but  be  happy  in  itself  in 
 some  degree.  And  though  the  wicked  are  at  times 
 prosperous,  in  some  respects  and  externally,  and  the 
 righteous  afflicted,  this  cannot,  and  does  not,  drown 
 the  voice  of  Providence,  plainly  declaring,  in  the 
 course  of  things,  for  virtue  upon  the  whole.  For  it 
 is  clear  that  these  disorders  are  brought  about  by  the 
 perversion  of  passions,  which  were  implanted  in  us  for 
 other,  and  those  very  good  purposes. 
 
 5.  Once  more  :  there  is  in  the  natural  course  of 
 things,  a  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice  to  produce  their 
 good  and  bad  effects  in  a  greater  degree  than  they 
 do  in  fact  produce  them.  This  is  a  very  consider- 
 able thing.  Good  and  bad  men  would  be  much 
 more  rewarded  and  punished  here  as  such,  were  not 
 justice  eluded  by  various  artifices,  were  not  characters 
 unknown,  were  not  many  other  hinderances  presented 
 by  accidental  causes.  But  these  hinderances  may 
 be  removed  in  a  future  state,  and  virtue  enjoy  its 
 proper  and  full  reward.  In  the  meantime,  these 
 tendencies  are  declarations  of  God,  in  his  natural 
 Providence,  in  favour  of  virtue.  To  judge  better  of 
 the  tendency  of  virtue  to  produce  happiness,  let  any 
 one  consider  what  a  nation  would  become,  if  all  its 
 citizens  were  perfectly  virtuous ;  and  that  for  a  suc- 
 cession of  ages.  Wars  would  be  unknown ;  pas- 
 sions would  be  restrained ;  crimes,  factions,  envy, 
 jealousy,  injustice,  would  be  banished;  laws  and  pun- 
 ishments would  be  unnecessary ;  all  would  contribute 
 to  the  public  prosperity,  and  each  would  enjoy  the 
 
XXX111 
 
 fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  United  wisdom  would  plan 
 every  thing,  and  united  strength  execute  it.  Such 
 a  kingdom  would  be  like  heaven  upon  earth.  If  any 
 think  the  tendency  of  virtue  to  produce  these  results 
 to  be  of  little  importance,  I  ask  him  what  he  would 
 think  if  vice  had  essentially  these  advantageous  ten- 
 dencies. 
 
 6.  The  notion,  then,  of  a  moral  righteous  govern- 
 ment is  suggested  by  the  course  of  nature,  and  the 
 execution  of  it  is,  as  we  have  seen,  actually  begun : 
 and  there  is  ground  to  believe  that  virtue  and  vice 
 may  be  rewarded  and  punished  hereafter  in  a  higher 
 degree  than  they  are  here,  because  the  tendencies  to 
 the  perfection  of  this  moral  scheme  are  natural,  whilst 
 the  hinderances  are  only  accidental. 
 
 Chap.  IV. — If  this  be  so — if  there  be  this  moral 
 government,  then  it  implies,  in  the  next  place,  that 
 our  present  life  is  a  state  of  probation;  that  our  future 
 interest  is  appointed  to  depend  on  our  behaviour,  just 
 in  the  same  manner  as  our  temporal  interest  is  ap- 
 pointed to  depend  on  our  behaviour.  And  this  state 
 of  probation  implies,  in  both  cases,  difficulty  in  secur- 
 ing our  happiness,  and  the  danger  of  losing  it. 
 
 1.  For  we  are  clearly  at  present  in  a  state  of  trial 
 as  to  this  world,  under  God's  natural  government. 
 So  far  as  men  are  tempted  to  any  course  of  action, 
 which  will  probably  occasion  them  greater  inconve- 
 nience than  satisfaction,  they  are  in  a  state  of  trial  as 
 to  their  temporal  interests,  and  those  interests  are  in 
 danger  from  themselves.  Now,  from  the  course  of 
 things  around  us,  we  have  innumerable  temptations 
 to  forfeit  and  neglect  these  temporal  interests,  and  to 
 b  3 
 
XXXIV 
 
 run  ourselves  into  misery  and  ruin  :  thence  arises  the 
 difficulty  of  behaving  so  as  to  secure  our  temporal  in- 
 terests, and  the  hazard  of  behaving  so  as  to  miscarry 
 in  them.  And  outward  temptations,  concurring,  as 
 they  always  do,  with  inward  habits  and  passions,  as 
 really  put  men  in  danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing 
 their  temporal  interests,  as  their  future  ones,  and  as 
 raifely  render  self-denial  necessary  to  secure  one  as 
 the  other ;  so  analogous  are  our  states  of  trial  in  our 
 temporal  and  religious  capacities. 
 
 2.  Again,  as  to  both  states,  we  see  that  some  men 
 scarcely  look  beyond  the  passing  day,  so  much  are 
 they  taken  up  with  present  gratifications;  that  others 
 are  carried  away  by  passions  against  their  better 
 judgment,  and  their  feeble  resolutions  of  acting  bet- 
 ter; and  that  some  even  avow  pleasure  to  be  their 
 rule  of  life,  and  go  on  in  vice,  foreseeing  that  it  will 
 be  their  temporal  ruin,  and  apprehending  at  times 
 that  it  may  possibly  be  their  future  ruin  also.  Thus 
 the  dangers  in  both  states  produce  the  same  effects, 
 as  they  proceed  from  the  same  causes ;  that  is,  they 
 are  analogous  and  alike. 
 
 3.  Further,  in  both  states  our  dangers  are  in- 
 creased by  the  ill  behaviour  of  others,  by  wrong  edu- 
 cation, bad  example,  corruption  of  religion,  mistaken 
 notions  concerning  happiness. 
 
 4.  Again,  in  both,  men  by  negligence  and  folly 
 bring  themselves  into  new  difficulties,  no  less  than  by 
 a  course  of  vice ;  and  by  habits  of  indulgence  become 
 less  qualified  to  meet  them.  For  instance,  wrong- 
 behaviour  in  youth  increases  the  difficulty  of  right 
 behaviour  in  mature  age ;  that  is,  puts  us  in  a  more 
 disadvantageous  state  of  trial. 
 
XXXV 
 
 5.  In  both,  also,  we  are  in  a  condition  which  does 
 not  seem  the  most  advantageous  for  securing  our 
 true  interests.  There  are  natural  appearances  of 
 our  being  in  a  state  of  degradation.  Yet  we  have 
 no  ground  of  complaint ;  for  as  men  may  manage 
 their  temporal  affairs  by  prudence,  so  as  to  pass  their 
 days  in  tolerable  ease ;  so,  with  respect  to  religion, 
 no  more  is  required  than  we  must  be  greatly  wanting 
 to  ourselves  if  we  neglect. 
 
 6.  Once  more,  as  thought  and  self-denial,  and 
 things  far  from  agreeable,  are  absolutely  necessary 
 for  securing  our  temporal  interests,  all  presumption 
 against  the  same  being  necessary  for  securing  our 
 higher  interests  is  removed. 
 
 7.  Had  we  not  experience  as  our  guide,  we  might, 
 indeed,  in  speculation,  urge  it  to  be  impossible  that 
 any  thing  of  hazard  should  be  put  upon  us  by  an 
 Infinite  Being,  since  every  thing  which  is  hazardous 
 in  our  conception,  is  now  already  certain  in  his  fore- 
 knowledge. And,  indeed,  this  may  well  be  thought 
 a  difficulty  in  speculation,  and  cannot  but  be  so,  till 
 we  know  the  whole,  or,  however,  much  more  of  the 
 case.  And  if  mankind,  as  inhabitants  of  this  world, 
 really  found  themselves  always  in  a  settled  state  of 
 security,  without  any  solicitude  on  their  part,  and  in 
 no  danger  of  falling  into  distresses  and  miseries,  by 
 carelessness  or  passion,  by  bad  example,  or  the  de- 
 ceitful appearances  of  things, — then  it  would  be  some 
 presumption  against  religion,  that  it  represents  us  in 
 a  state  of  trial  and  danger,  as  to  our  future  happi- 
 ness. But  now  the  whole  course  of  nature  shows 
 us,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  extreme  hazard  as  to  our 
 temporal  interests.      And  this  constitution  of  things 
 
XX  XVI 
 
 is  settled  by  Almighty  God  as  our  natural  Governor. 
 It  is  as  it  is.  This  is  quite  clear.  And  this  is  suf- 
 ficient to  answer  all  objections  against  the  credibility 
 of  our  being  in  a  state  of  trial  and  difficulty,  under 
 the  moral  government  of  the  same  God,  as  to  our 
 future  and  eternal  interests. 
 
 Chap.  V. — If  we  go  on  to  ask,  how  we  came  to 
 be  placed  in  a  probationary  state  of  so  much  diffi- 
 culty and  hazard,  we  have  already  said  that  we  can 
 give  no  complete  answer.  Possibly  it  would  be  be- 
 yond our  faculties,  not  only  to  find  out,  but  even  to 
 understand  the  whole  reason  ;  and  even  if  we  had 
 faculties,  whether  it  would  be  of  service  or  prejudice 
 to  us  to  be  informed  of  it,  it  is  impossible  to  say. 
 Still  another  question  may  be  naturally  put,  to  which 
 a  satisfactory  reply  may  be  given.  If  it  be  asked, 
 What  is  our  main  duty  here,  as  placed  in  this  state 
 of  trial  and  difficulty  ?  analogy  will  help  us  to  answer, 
 For  moral  discipline,  as  preparatory  to  a  future  state 
 of  security  and  happiness.  The  beginning  of  life  in 
 the  present  world,  considered  as  an  education  for 
 mature  age,  appears  plainly,  at  first  sight,  analogous 
 to  this  trial  for  a  future  one. 
 
 1.  For  our  nature  here  corresponds  to  our  exter- 
 nal condition,  and  what  we  call  happiness  is  the  re- 
 sult of  this  nature  and  this  condition.  Now,  as 
 there  are  some  determinate  character  and  qualifica- 
 tions necessary  to  men's  enjoyment  of  the  present 
 life ;  so  analogy  leads  us  to  conclude,  that  there 
 must  be  some  determinate  character  and  qualifications 
 to  render  men  capable  of  the  future  life  of  the  good 
 hereafter.      The  one  is  set  over  against  the  other. 
 
XXXV11 
 
 2.  In  the  next  place,  we  see  that  the  constitution 
 and  faculties  of  men  are  such,  that  they  are  capable 
 of  naturally  becoming  qualified  for  states  of  life  for 
 which  they  were  at  first  wholly  unqualified.  The 
 human  faculties  are  made  for  gradual  enlargement ; 
 habit  gives  us  new  faculties  in  any  kind  of  action, 
 and  produces  secret,  but  settled  and  fixed  alterations 
 in  our  temper  and  character.  As  habits  of  the  body 
 are  produced  by  repeated  acts,  so  habits  of  the  mind 
 are  produced  by  carrying  into  act  inward  principles ; 
 such  as  obedience,  submission  to  authority,  veracity, 
 justice,  charity,  attention,  industry,  self-government. 
 Habit  forms  men  to  these  virtues;  just  as  habit 
 forms  the  archer  to  skill,  the  porter  to  strength  of 
 arm,  the  racer  to  swiftness,  the  artisan  in  every  kind 
 of  manufacture,  to  adroitness  and  precision.  Such  is 
 the  constitution  of  our  nature.  By  accustoming 
 ourselves  to  any  course  of  action,  we  get  an  aptness 
 to  go  on  in  it :  the  inclinations  which  made  us  averse 
 to  it  grow  weaker;  the  real  difficulties  of  it  lessen; 
 the  reasons  for  it  offer  themselves  of  course ;  and  thus 
 a  new  character  may  be  formed,  not  given  us  by  na- 
 ture, but  which  nature  directs  us  to  acquire. 
 
 3.  These  capacities  of  improvement  are  most  im- 
 portant. Man  is  left,  considered  in  his  relation  to 
 this  world  only,  an  unformed,  weak,  unfinished  crea- 
 ture, wholly  unqualified  for  the  mature  state  of  life 
 to  which  he  is  designed.  He  needs  the  acquisitions 
 of  knowledge,  experience,  and  habits,  in  order  at  all 
 to  attain  the  ends  of  his  creation.  And  he  is  placed, 
 in  childhood  and  youth,  in  a  condition  fitted  for  sup- 
 plying his  deficiencies.  Children,  from  their  birth, 
 are  daily  learning  something  necessary  for  them  in 
 
xxxvm 
 
 the  future  scenes  of  their  duty.  The  first  years  of 
 life  are  a  course  of  education  for  the  practice  of  adult 
 age.  We  are  much  assisted  in  it  by  example,  in- 
 struction, and  the  care  of  others,  but  a  great  deal  is 
 left  to  ourselves  to  do;  and  diligence,  care,  the  vo- 
 luntary foregoing  many  things  which  we  desire,  and 
 the  setting  ourselves  to  many  things  to  which  we 
 have  no  inclination,  are  absolutely  necessary  to  our 
 doing  this.  All  this  is  clear.  We  see  it  every  day. 
 In  like  manner,  then,  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of 
 moral  discipline  throughout  this  life,  as  a  state  of 
 education  for  another  world,  is  a  plain  providential 
 order  of  things,  exactly  of  the  same  kind,  and  com- 
 prehended under  one  and  the  same  general  law  of 
 nature. 
 
 4.  Nor  would  it  be  any  objection  against  this 
 view  of  things,  if  we  were  not  able  to  discern  in  what 
 way  the  present  life  could  be  a  preparation  for  an- 
 other ;  for  we  actually  do  not  discern  how  food  and 
 sleep  bring  about  the  growth  of  the  body;  nor  do 
 children  at  all  think  that  their  sports  contribute  to 
 their  health,  nor  that  restraint  and  discipline  are  so 
 necessary,  as  we  know  they  are,  to  fit  them  for  the 
 business  of  mature  age. 
 
 5.  But  we  are,  in  fact,  able  to  discern  how  the 
 present  life  is  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  an- 
 other. If  we  consider  that  God's  government  of  us 
 is  a  moral  one,  and  that  consequently  piety  and  vir- 
 tue are  necessary  qualifications  for  a  future  state, 
 then  we  may  distinctly  see  that  the  present  course 
 of  things  is  adapted  to  improve  us  in  virtue,  and  pre- 
 pare us  for  a  future  world,  just  as  childhood  is  a  na- 
 tural state  of  discipline,  and  a  necessary  preparation 
 
XXXIX 
 
 for  mature  age.  Now,  how  greatly  we  want  moral 
 improvement  by  discipline  is  clear,  from  the  great 
 wickedness  of  the  world,  and  the  imperfections  of  the 
 best  men.      This  every  one  sees. 
 
 6.  But  all  do  not  see  that  mankind,  not  merely 
 as  corrupt,  but  as  finite  creatures,  need  the  habits  of 
 virtue,  which  discipline  goes  to  form,  to  keep  them 
 from  deviating  from  what  is  right.  Men,  from  the 
 very  constitution  of  their  nature,  before  habits  of 
 virtue  are  formed,  are  in  danger.  For  the  natural 
 objects  of  the  affections  continue  to  be  such,  whether 
 they  can  be  obtained  innocently  or  not;  and  such 
 affections  have  a  tendency  to  incline  us  to  venture 
 upon  unlawful  means  of  obtaining  them.  The  prac- 
 tical principle  of  virtue  is  then  the  security  against 
 this  danger :  and  this  principle  is  strengthened  by 
 discipline  and  exercise ;  and  thus  guards  against  the 
 danger  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  particular 
 affections. 
 
 7.  If  such  finite  creatures  as  men,  endued  with 
 particular  affections  and  moral  understanding,  had  all 
 these  several  parts  upright  or  finitely  perfect,  they 
 would  still  be  in  danger  of  falling,  and  would  require 
 experience  and  habits  to  improve  them,  and  place 
 them  in  a  secure  state.  As  these  habits  strengthen, 
 their  dangers  would  lessen,  and  their  security  in- 
 crease. For  virtuous  self-government  is  not  only 
 right  in  itself,  but  improves  the  inward  constitution 
 and  character;  just  as  vicious  indulgence  is  not  only 
 criminal  in  itself,  but  also  weakens  and  depraves  the 
 inward  constitution  and  character.  And  thus  we 
 may  conceive  how  creatures  without  blemish  may  be 
 
xl 
 
 in  danger  of  going  wrong,  and  may  need  the  addi- 
 tional security  of  virtuous  habits. 
 
 8.  But  how  much  more  strongly  must  this  hold 
 with  respect  to  those  who  have  corrupted  their  na- 
 tures !  Upright  creatures  may  want  to  be  improved ; 
 depraved  creatures  want  to  be  renewed.  Discipline 
 is  expedient  for  the  upright ;  but  absolutely  neces- 
 sary for  the  depraved — and  discipline  of  the  severer 
 sort  too. 
 
 9.  Now,  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fitted  to 
 be  a  state  of  discipline  for  this  purpose.  Tempta- 
 tion, experience  of  the  deceits  of  wickedness,  our 
 past  faults,  the  vice  and  disorder  of  the  world — pain, 
 sorrow,  disappointment,  vexation — all  have  a  ten- 
 dency to  bring  us  to  that  moderation  of  temper,  which 
 is  contrary  to  the  violent  bent  to  follow  present  in- 
 clination, which  may  be  observed  in  undisciplined 
 minds.  Such  experience  gives  a  practical  sense  of 
 things.  And  possibly  the  security  of  creatures  in 
 the  highest  state  of  perfection  may,  in  part,  arise 
 from  their  having  had  such  a  sense  of  things  as  this 
 habitually  fixed  within  them  in  a  state  of  probation. 
 Their  having  passed  through  the  present  world  with 
 that  moral  attention  which  a  state  of  discipline  re- 
 quires, may  leave  everlasting  impressions  of  this  sort 
 upon  their  minds.  Now,  when  the  exercise  of  the 
 virtuous  principle  is  continued,  often  repeated  and 
 intense,  as  it  must  be  in  circumstances  of  danger  and 
 temptation,  the  habit  of  virtue  is  proportionably  in- 
 creased. Thus  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fit  to 
 be  a  state  of  discipline,  in  the  same  sense  as  some 
 sciences,  by  requiring  and  engaging  the  attention, 
 not  to  be  sure,  of  such  persons  as  will  not,  but  of 
 
xli 
 
 such  as  will,  set  themselves  to  them,  are  fit  to  form 
 the  mind  to  habits  of  attention. 
 
 10.  Accordingly  we  find  there  are  some  persons 
 who  follow  an  inward  principle  of  piety,  and  to  whom 
 the  present  world  is  an  exercise  of  virtue  peculiarly 
 adapted  to  improve  it, — adapted  to  improve  it,  in 
 some  respects,  even  beyond  what  it  would  be  by  the 
 exercise  of  it  in  a  perfectly  virtuous  society. 
 
 11.  That  the  present  world  does  not  actually  be- 
 come a  state  of  moral  discipline  to  the  generality,  is 
 no  proof  that  it  was  not  intended  to  be  so :  for  out 
 of  the  immense  number  of  seeds  of  vegetables,  and 
 bodies  of  animals,  which  are  adapted  to  improve  to 
 such  and  such  a  point  of  natural  maturity  and  per- 
 fection, we  do  not  see  that  perhaps  one  in  a  thousand 
 does  thus  improve;  yet  no  one  will  deny  that  those 
 seeds  and  bodies  which  do  so  attain  to  that  point  of 
 maturity,  answer  the  end  for  which  they  were  de- 
 signed by  nature,  and  therefore  that  nature  designed 
 them  for  that  perfection.  And  such  an  amazing 
 waste  in  nature,  with  respect  to  these  seeds  and  bo- 
 dies, by  foreign  causes,  is  to  us  as  unaccountable  as, 
 what  is  much  more  terrible,  the  present  and  future 
 ruin  of  so  many  moral  agents  by  themselves,  that  is, 
 by  vice. 
 
 12.  Further,  these  observations  on  the  active  prin- 
 ciple of  obedience  to  God,  are  applicable  to  passive 
 obedience  to  his  will,  or  resignation,  which  is  another 
 essential  part  of  a  right  character.  For  though  we 
 may  have  no  need  of  patience  in  a  future  state,  yet 
 we  may  have  need  of  that  temper  which  patience  has 
 formed;  and  the  proper  discipline  for  patience  and 
 resignation  is  affliction.      This  resignation,  together 
 
xlii 
 
 with  the  active  principle  of  obedience,  makes  up  the 
 temper  which  answers  to  God's  sovereignty,  to  his 
 rightful  authority,  as  supreme  over  all. 
 
 13.  It  cannot  be  objected  to  all  this,  that  the 
 trouble  and  danger  of  this  discipline  might  have  been 
 spared  us  by  our  being  made  at  once  the  characters 
 which  we  were  to  become ;  for  we  see  by  experience, 
 that  what  we  are  to  become  is  to  depend  on  what  we 
 will  do ;  and  that  the  general  law  of  nature  is,  not  to 
 save  us  trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of 
 going  through  it. 
 
 14.  The  world,  further,  as  a  state  of  probation, 
 is  a  theatre  of  action  for  the  manifestation  of  persons' 
 characters,  as  a  means  of  their  being  disposed  of  suit- 
 ably to  those  characters,  and  of  its  being  known  to 
 the  creation  by  way  of  example  that  they  are  so  dis- 
 posed of. 
 
 15.  It  thus  appears  clearly,  on  the  whole,  that  our 
 present  state  of  difficulty  and  trial  is  intended  to  be 
 a  school  of  discipline  for  acquiring  the  qualifications 
 necessary  for  a  future  state  of  safety  and  happiness. 
 
 Chap.  VI. — Nor  does  the  opinion  of  necessity 
 weaken  the  credibility  of  the  general  doctrine  of  re- 
 ligion thus  confirmed  by  analogy.  For  if  any  per- 
 sons consider  the  notion  of  universal  necessity  or  fate 
 to  be  reconcileable  with  the  acknowledged  condition 
 of  men  as  under  God's  natural  government  now,  (and 
 to  such  persons  only  does  this  whole  treatise  address 
 itself,)  they  must  also  consider  it  to  be  reconcileable 
 with  the  scheme  of  religion. 
 
 1.  For  necessity  clearly  does  not  exclude  delibera- 
 tion, choice,  and  the  acting  from  certain  principles 
 
Xilll 
 
 to  certain  ends,  as  to  the  things  of  this  present  world  ; 
 because  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted  experience. 
 For,  if  the  instance  of  a  house  be  taken,  the  Fatalist, 
 as  well  as  others,  would  agree  that  it  was  designed 
 and  built  by  an  architect ;  and  they  would  only  differ 
 upon  the  question,  whether  the  architect  built  it  in 
 the  manner  which  we  call  necessarily,  or  in  the  man- 
 ner which  we  call  freely.  The  idea  of  necessity  does 
 not,  then,  at  all  destroy  the  proof  that  there  is  an 
 intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  nature,  any  more 
 than  that  the  house  was  built  by  an  architect. 
 
 2.  Nor  does  necessity  destroy  at  all  the  scheme  of 
 religion.  For  as  to  the  things  of  this  world,  suppose 
 a  Fatalist  to  bring  up  a  child  in  the  idea  that  he  is 
 not  a  subject  of  blame  or  praise  for  his  actions,  be- 
 cause he  cannot  help  doing  what  he  does.  The 
 child  would  be  vain  and  conceited,  and  go  on  follow- 
 ing his  will  and  passions  till  he  became  first  the 
 plague  of  himself  and  family,  and  then  insupportable 
 to  society ;  and  thus  he  would  soon  do  something, 
 for  which  he  would  be  delivered  over  into  the  hands 
 of  justice.  In  this  way  the  correction  he  would  meet 
 with,  and  the  misery  consequent  upon  it,  would  soon 
 convince  him,  that  either  the  scheme  of  necessity,  in 
 which  he  was  educated,  was  false,  or  that  he  reasoned 
 inconclusively  upon  it,  and  somehow  or  other  misap- 
 plied it  to  practice  and  common  life.  In  like  man- 
 ner, what  the  Fatalist  experiences  of  the  conduct  of 
 Providence  at  present,  ought  in  all  reason  to  convince 
 him,  that  either  his  scheme  of  necessity  is  false,  or 
 that  somehow  or  other  it  is  misapplied,  when  brought 
 to  practical  duty  and  religion  in  common  life.  I ~n- 
 der  the  present  natural  government  of  the  world,  we 
 
xl 
 
 IV 
 
 are  obviously  dealt  with  as  if  we  were  free;  and 
 therefore  the  analogy  of  nature  answers  all  objections 
 to  our  being  dealt  with  as  free,  with  regard  to  another 
 world.  Thus  the  notion  of  necessity,  whether  true 
 or  not  in  speculation,  is  not  applicable  to  practical 
 subjects.  With  respect  to  them  it  is  as  if  it  were 
 not  true. 
 
 3.  Again,  we  find,  by  constant  experience,  that 
 happiness  and  misery  are  not  necessary  here,  in  such 
 a  sense  as  not  to  be  the  consequences  of  our  beha- 
 viour, for  they  are  the  clear  consequences  of  it ;  and 
 God  exercises  over  us  the  same  kind  of  government 
 in  this  world,  as  a  father  does  over  his  children,  and 
 a  civil  magistrate  over  his  subjects.  These  are  mat- 
 ters of  fact,  things  of  experience,  which  cannot  be 
 affected  by  the  opinion  about  necessity.  In  like 
 manner,  God's  moral  government  over  men,  as  taught 
 by  religion,  cannot  be  affected  by  that  opinion. 
 
 4.  Besides,  natural  religion  has  an  external  evi- 
 dence, a  positive  foundation  in  facts  and  data,  which 
 the  mere  opinion  of  necessity  cannot  affect. 
 
 5.  And  if  men  should  say,  that,  Necessity  being 
 true,  it  is  incredible  that  God  should  govern  us  upon 
 a  supposition  of  freedom  which  is  false ;  the  plain 
 answer  is,  that  there  must  be  a  fallacy  somewhere  in 
 this  conclusion ;  for  the  whole  analogy  of  nature 
 proves  that  God  does  govern  us  by  rewards  and 
 punishments  as  free  agents.  And  the  fallacy  lies, 
 supposing  necessity  to  be  true,  in  taking  it  for  granted 
 that  necessary  agents  cannot  be  rewarded  and  pun- 
 ished for  their  behaviour. 
 
 6.  Thus,  the  notion  of  necessity,  supposing  it  can 
 be  reconciled  with  the  constitution  of  things,  and 
 
xlv 
 
 what  we  experience  under  God's  rule  here,  is  equally 
 and  entirely  reconcileable  with  the  scheme  of  religion 
 also. 
 
 Chap.  VII. — Still  objections  may  be  insisted 
 upon  against  the  wisdom,  equity,  and  goodness  of 
 the  divine  government  implied  in  the  notion  of  reli- 
 gion, to  which  analogy  (which  can  only  show  that 
 such  and  such  things  are  credible,  considered  as 
 matters  of  fact)  can  give  no  direct  answer.  But  if 
 analogy  suggests,  that  the  divine  government  is  a 
 scheme  or  system,  as  distinguished  from  a  number  of 
 unconnected  acts  of  justice  and  goodness,  and  a  scheme 
 imperfectly  comprehended,  then  this  gives  a  general, 
 though  indirect  answer,  to  all  objections  against  the 
 justice  and  goodness  of  that  government. 
 
 1.  Now,  in  this  present  world,  and  the  whole 
 natural  government  of  it,  there  is  obviously  a  scheme 
 or  system  carried  on,  whose  parts  correspond  to  each 
 other;  so  that  there  is  no  natural  event  so  single  and 
 unconnected  as  not  to  have  respect  to  some  other 
 actions  or  events ;  just  as  any  work  of  art,  or  any 
 particular  civil  constitution  of  government,  is  a 
 scheme,  and  has  various  correspondent  parts.  Nor 
 can  we  give  the  whole  account  of  any  one  thing 
 whatever  in  nature — of  all  its  causes,  ends,  and  ne- 
 cessary adjuncts,  without  which  it  could  not  have 
 been.  Things  seemingly  the  most  insignificant 
 imaginable,  are  perpetually  discovered  to  be  neces- 
 sary conditions  of  other  things  of  the  greatest  im- 
 portance. 
 
 2.  The  natural  world,  then,  being  such  an  in- 
 comprehensible  scheme — so  incomprehensible,  that  a 
 
xlvi 
 
 man  must  really,  in  the  literal  sense,  know  nothing 
 at  all,  who  is  not  sensible  of  his  ignorance  of  it ;  this 
 strongly  shows  the  credibility  that  the  moral  world 
 may  be  so  too.  Indeed  the  natural  and  moral  world 
 are  so  connected,  as  probably  to  make  up  together 
 but  one  scheme;  and  thus  the  first  may  be  carried 
 on  in  subserviency  to  the  second ;  as  the  vegetable 
 world  is  for  the  animal,  and  the  animal  for  the  ra- 
 tional. 
 
 3.  In  this  way,  every  act  of  Divine  justice  and 
 goodness  may  look  much  beyond  itself,  and  may  have 
 some  reference  to  a  general  moral  system ;  yea,  may 
 have  such  respect  to  all  other  acts,  as  to  make  up 
 altogether  a  whole,  connected  and  related  in  all  its 
 parts,  which  is  as  properly  one  as  the  natural  world 
 is.  And  if  so,  then  it  is  most  clear  that  we  are  not 
 at  all  competent  judges  of  this  vast  scheme,  from  the 
 small  parts  of  it  which  come  within  our  view  in  the 
 present  life,  and  that  objections  against  any  of  these 
 parts  are  utterly  unreasonable.  Yet  this  ignorance, 
 which  is  universally  acknowledged  on  other  like  oc- 
 casions, is,  if  not  denied,  yet  universally  forgotten 
 on  the  subject  of  religion,  where  it  is  most  strikingly 
 applicable.  Even  reasonable  men  do  not  make  al- 
 lowance enough  for  it.  And  this  ignorance  answers 
 all  objections  against  religion ;  because,  if  religion  be 
 a  scheme  incomprehensible  to  us,  some  unknown  re- 
 lation, or  some  unknown  impossibility,  may  render 
 the  very  things  objected  to,  just  and  good;  nay,  just 
 and  good  in  the  highest  practicable  degree. 
 
 4.  But,  more  particularly,  we  see  in  the  natural 
 world,  that  as  no  ends  are  accomplished  without 
 means,  so  means  very  undesirable  are  found  to  bring 
 
xlvii 
 
 about  ends  so  desirable  as  to  overbalance  much  the 
 previous  disagreeableness — means  which,  before  ex- 
 perience, we  should  have  thought  to  have  a  contrary 
 tendency.  Thus,  in  the  moral  world,  things  which 
 we  call  irregularities  may  not  be  so,  but  may  be 
 means  of  accomplishing  wise  and  goojl  ends  more 
 considerable  than  the  apparent  irregularities;  yea, 
 the  only  means  by  which  those  ends  are  canable  of 
 being  accomplished. 
 
 5.  This,  however,  is  no  argument  to  show  that 
 it  is  not  infinitely  obligatory  on  us,  and  beneficial  to 
 abstain  from  what  is  evil.  For  thus,  in  the  wise 
 and  good  constitution  of  the  natural  world,  there  are 
 disorders  which  bring  their  own  cures;  yea,  some 
 diseases  which  are  remedies.  As  many  men  would 
 undoubtedly  have  died  had  it  not  been  for  the  rout 
 or  a  fever ;  yet  it  would  be  thought  madness  to  say 
 that  sickness  is  a  better  state  than  health ;  though 
 men  have  asserted  the  like  absurdity  to  this,  .with 
 regard  to  the  moral  world  and  moral  evil. 
 
 6.  Again,  the  natural  world  is  carried  on  by 
 general  laws,  and  not  by  particular  interpositions  to 
 prevent  or  remedy  irregularities,  as  the  moral  world 
 may  also  be;  and  in  both  there  may  be  the  wisest 
 reasons  for  this  scheme,  for  any  thing  we  know. 
 Perpetual  interposition  would,  for  instance,  clearly 
 encourage  indolence,  and  render  the  rule  of  life  du- 
 bious, which  is  now  ascertained  by  this  very  thing, 
 that  the  course  of  the  world  is  carried  on  by  general 
 laws.  And  if  this  be  the  case,  then  the  not  inter- 
 posing on  every  particular  occasion,  is  so  far  from 
 being  a  ground  of  complaint,  that  it  is  an  instance  of 
 goodness.      This  is  intelligible  and   sufficient ;   and 
 
xlviii 
 
 going  farther  seems  beyond  the  utmost  reach  of  our 
 faculties.  It  is  to  go  on  quite  at  random  and  in  the 
 dark. 
 
 7.  Thus  our  ignorance  answers  all  objections 
 against  the  scheme  of  religion,  as  we  have  shown ; 
 because  it  is  not  a  total  ignorance,  as  some  have  said, 
 of  the  whole  subject,  which  would  preclude  equally 
 all  proof  and  all  objection,  but  a  partial  ignorance, 
 which  allows  us  to  understand  that  the  end  of  the 
 scheme  is  moral,  but  does  not  allow  us  to  compre- 
 hend what  means  are  best  to  accomplish  this  end. 
 Therefore,  our  ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objections 
 against  Providence  in  permitting  irregularities,  as 
 seeming  contradictory  to  this  end.  Analogy  shows 
 that  it  is  not  at  all  incredible,  that  if  we  could  know 
 the  whole,  we  should  find  the  things  objected  to 
 consistent  with  justice  and  goodness,  yea,  instances 
 of  it.  Thus  we  do  not  argue  from  our  ignorance, 
 properly  speaking,  but  from  something  which  analogy 
 shows  us  concerning  that  ignorance.  For  analogy 
 positively  shows  us  that  our  ignorance  of  the  various 
 relations  of  things  in  nature,  makes  us  incompetent 
 judges  in  cases  similar  to  this  of  religion,  in  which 
 we  pretend  to  judge. 
 
 8.  Finally,  we  are  thus  led  to  consider  this  little 
 scene  of  human  life  in  which  we  are  so  busy,  an 
 having  a  reference  to  a  much  larger  plan  of  things. 
 Whether  we  are  related  to  the  more  distant  parts  of 
 the  boundless  universe,  is  altogether  uncertain.  But 
 it  is  evident  that  we  are  placed  in  the  middle  of  a 
 progressive  scheme,  incomprehensible  with  respect 
 to  what  has  been,  what  now  is,  and  what  shall  be 
 hereafter.      Thus  all  short-sighted  objections  against 
 
xlix 
 
 God's  moral  government  are  answered ;  and  it  is  ab- 
 surd— absurd  to  the  degree  of  being  ridiculous,  if 
 the  subject  were  not  of  so  serious  a  kind,  for  men  to 
 lay  any  stress  on  these  objections,  and  think  them- 
 selves secure  in  a  vicious  life,  or  even  in  that  im- 
 moral thoughtlessness  into  which  far  the  greatest 
 part  of  men  are  fallen. 
 
 PART  II. 
 
 Chap.  I. — The  chief  difficulties  against  natural 
 religion,  as  implying  a  moral  government,  and  a  state 
 of  trial  and  discipline  preparatory  for  a  future  world, 
 being  removed,  we  proceed  to  consider  Christianity, 
 and  the  objections  raised  against  it.  And  we  begin 
 by  showing  the  vast  importance  of  Christianity  itself. 
 
 1.  To  say  that  mankind  do  not  want  a  revelation, 
 is  as  extravagant  as  it  would  be  to  say,  that  they  are 
 so  completely  at  ease  and  happy  in  the  present  life, 
 that  their  condition  could  not  be  made  better.  Those 
 who  consider  the  state  of  religion  in  the  heathen 
 world  before  revelation,  and  the  present  state  of  it 
 where  revelation  is  unknown,  cannot  in  seriousness 
 think  revelation  incredible,  upon  pretence  of  its  being 
 unnecessary. 
 
 2.  But  many  admit  Christianity  to  be  true,  but 
 object  to  the  importance  of  it,  on  the  ground,  that  to 
 act  on  the  principles  of  natural  religion  is  enough,  as 
 Christianity  is  only  designed  to  enforce  the  practice 
 of  virtue.  This  is  to  suppose  that  it  is  a  matter  of 
 indifference  whether  we  obey  God's  commands  or  not, 
 of  which  there  may  be  infinite  reasons  with  which 
 we  are  not  acquainted. 
 
 c  17 
 
1 
 
 3.  But  the  high  importance  of  Christianity  will 
 appear,  if  we  consider,  1st,  That  it  is  a  republication 
 of  natural  religion,  teaching  it  in  its  genuine  purity, 
 investing  it  with  the  additional  evidence  and  autho- 
 rity arising  from  miracles  and  prophecy,  affording  a 
 proof  of  God's  general  providence  as  Governor  of  the 
 world,  with  a  degree  of  force  to  which  that  of  nature 
 is  but  mere  feebleness,  erecting  a  visible  church,  as  a 
 standing  memorial  to  the  world  of  its  duty  to  its 
 Maker,  giving  men  the  written  oracles  of  God,  which 
 cast  the  light  of  revelation  on  the  darkness  of  nature, 
 as  to  the  most  important  subjects  ;  and  establishing  a 
 regular  education  of  youth  in  the  principles  and  habits 
 of  piety. 
 
 4.  If  men  object  to  this,  that  Christianity  has 
 been  perverted,  and  has  had  but  little  good  influence, 
 we  answer,  that  the  law  of  nature  has  been  perverted 
 and  rendered  ineffectual  in  the  same  manner;  and  yet 
 this  is  allowed  to  be  from  God.  And  it  may  be  truly 
 said,  that  the  good  effects  of  Christianity  have  not 
 been  small ;  nor  its  supposed  ill  effects,  any  effects  at 
 all  of  it,  properly  speaking.  Perhaps,  too,  the  per- 
 versions themselves  imputed  to  it  have  been  aggra- 
 vated ;  and  if  not,  Christianity  has  often  been  only  a 
 pretence ;  and  the  same  evils  would  have  been  done, 
 in  the  main,  upon  some  other  pretence.  However, 
 they  are  no  arguments  against  Christianity.  For 
 one  cannot  proceed  a  step  in  reasoning  upon  natural 
 religion,  any  more  than  upon  Christianity,  without 
 laying  it  down  as  a  first  principle,  that  the  dispensa- 
 tions of  Providence  are  not  to  be  judged  of  by  their 
 perversions,   but   by  their  genuine  tendencies:  not 
 
li 
 
 from  what  they  actually  effect,  but  from  what  they 
 would  effect,  if  mankind  did  their  part. 
 
 5.  Thus  Christianity  is  most  important,  and  the 
 guilt  of  neglecting  it  is  great,  only  considered  as  a 
 supernatural  aid  to  decayed  natural  religion,  and  a 
 new  promulgation  of  God's  general  providence,  as 
 righteous  Governor  of  the  world.  Especially,  as  this 
 neglect  further  involves  in  it  the  omitting  to  do  what 
 is  expressly  enjoined  us  by  God,  for  continuing  the 
 benefits  of  it  to  the  world,  and  transmitting  them  down 
 to  future  times. 
 
 6.  But,  2dly,  Christianity  contains,  besides,  an 
 account  of  a  dispensation  of  things  not  at  all  discover- 
 able by  reason ;  a  dispensation  carrying  on  by  the 
 Son  of  God  and  the  Holy  Spirit  for  the  recovery  of 
 man,  whom  the  Scriptures  every  where  take  for 
 granted  to  be  in  a  state  of  ruin.  In  consequence  of 
 this,  many  obligations  of  duty,  unknown  before,  are 
 revealed ;  and  these  obligations  of  duty  to  the  Son 
 and  Spirit,  arise  from  the  offices  which  belong  to 
 these  Divine  Persons,  and  from  the  relations  in  which 
 they  stand  to  us  ;  and  are  infinitely  important.  For 
 these  reasons,  we  are  commanded  to  be  baptized  in 
 the  name  of  the  Father,  and  of  the  Son,  and  of  the 
 Holy  Ghost.  By  natural  religion  we  know  the  re- 
 lation in  which  God  the  Father  stands  to  us  ;  and 
 hence  arises  the  bond  of  duty  which  we  are  under  to 
 Him.  In  Scripture  are  revealed  the  relations  in 
 which  the  Son  and  Spirit  stand  to  us ;  and  hence 
 arise  the  bonds  of  duty  which  we  are  under  to  them. 
 It  being  once  admitted  that  God  is  the  Governor  of 
 the  world  upon  the  evidence  of  reason,  and   that 
 
 c  2 
 
Christ  is  the  mediator  between  God  and  man,  and 
 the  Holy  Ghost  our  guide  and  sanctifier,  upon  the 
 evidence  of  revelation,  it  is  no  more  a  question 
 whether  it  be  our  duty  to  obey,  and  be  baptized  into 
 the  name  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  than 
 whether  it  be  our  duty  to  obey,  and  be  baptized  into 
 the  name  of  the  Father. 
 
 7.  The  essence  of  natural  religion  may  be  said  to 
 consist  in  religious  regards  to  God  the  Father;  and 
 the  essence  of  revealed  religion,  in  religious  regards 
 to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  to  whom  reverence, 
 honour,  love,  trust,  gratitude,  fear,  hope,  are  due, 
 from  the  several  relations  in  which  they  stand  to  us. 
 Thus  Christianity  appears  most  important.  It  in- 
 forms us  of  something  wholly  new  in  the  state  of  the 
 world  and  in  the  government  of  it;  of  some  relations 
 in  which  we  stand,  which  could  not  otherwise  have 
 been  known.  And  these  relations  being  real,  the 
 neglect  of  behaving  suitably  to  them  will  be  followed 
 with  the  same  kind  of  consequences  under  God's 
 government,  as  neglecting  to  behave  suitably  to  any 
 other  relations.  If  Christ,  then,  be  our  Mediator, 
 our  Lord,  and  our  Saviour,  the  consequences  not 
 only  of  an  obstinate,  but  of  a  careless  disregard  to 
 him  in  those  high  relations,  may  follow  in  a  future 
 world,  as  surely  in  a  way  of  judicial  punishment,  and 
 even  of  the  natural  consequences  of  vice,  as  those 
 kinds  of  consequences  follow  vice  in  this  world. 
 
 8.  Again,  if  the  nature  of  man  is  corrupt,  and 
 needs  the  assistance  of  God's  Holy  Spirit  to  renew 
 it,  it  cannot  be  a  slight  matter  to  neglect  the  means 
 appointed  of  God  for  obtaining  this  assistance.  All 
 analogy  shows  us,  that  we  cannot  expect  benefits  with- 
 
In. 
 
 out  the  use  of  the  commanded  means — every  thing 
 in  God's  government  being  conducted  by  means. 
 
 9.  The  conclusion  from  all  this  is,  that  Christi- 
 anity being  supposed  credible,  it  is  unspeakable  irre- 
 verence, and  really  the  most  presumptuous  rashness, 
 to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter,  and  unimportant. 
 
 10.  Before  we  go  on  to  the  next  topic,  we  may 
 stop  here  to  point  out  the  distinction  between  what 
 is  positive  and  what  is  moral  in  religion.  Moral 
 precepts  are  those  of  which  we  see  the  reason — 
 positive,  of  which  we  do  not :  moral  arise  out  of  the 
 nature  of  the  case — positive  from  external  command. 
 But  the  mere  manner  in  which  the  reason  of  the 
 precept,  and  the  nature  of  the  case,  are  made  known 
 to  us,  makes  no  difference  in  our  duty.  Gratitude 
 and  love  are  as  much  due  to  Christ  as  moral  precepts, 
 as  they  are  due  to  the  Father;  though  the  first  are 
 derived  from  revelation  making  Christ  known  to  us 
 as  our  Mediator :  the  second,  from  reason  teaching 
 us  that  the  Father  is  our  Creator,  and  the  Fountain 
 of  all  good. 
 
 11.  From  this  distinction  between  positive  and 
 moral  precepts,  we  may  observe,  that  we  see  the 
 ground  of  that  preference  which  the  Scripture  gives 
 to  moral  precepts  over  positive,  if  the  two  are  incom- 
 patible. We  are  to  prefer  the  moral,  because  we  see 
 the  reason  of  them,  and  because  the  positive  are  only 
 means  to  a  moral  end,  and  are  of  no  value,  except  as 
 proceeding  from  a  moral  principle.  Men  are  prone 
 to  place  their  religion  in  positive  rights,  as  an  equi- 
 valent for  moral  duty;  and,  therefore,  the  Scriptures 
 always  lay  the  stress  on  morals,  where  they  are  men- 
 tioned  together  with   positive  rites ;    and  our  Lord 
 
liv 
 
 expresses  the  general  spirit  of  religion  when  he  says, 
 "  I  will  have  mercy,  and  not  sacrifice." 
 
 Still  we  are  not  to  omit  positive  institutions ;  be- 
 cause, when  admitted  to  come  from  God,  they  lay  us 
 under  a  strict  moral  obligation  to  obey  them. 
 
 12.  To  these  remarks  should  be  added,  that  the 
 view  we  have  thus  given  of  Christianity  teaches  us, 
 not  to  determine  beforehand  from  reason  what  the 
 scheme  of  it  must  be,  but  to  search  the  Scriptures 
 for  it ;  for  it  is  no  presumption  against  an  interpreta- 
 tion of  Scripture,  that  it  contains  a  doctrine  which 
 the  light  of  nature  cannot  discover,  or  a  precept  to 
 which  the  law  of  nature  does  not  oblige. 
 
 13.  All  these  considerations  serve  to  heighten  the 
 importance  of  Christianity,  as  not  consisting  of  posi- 
 tive commands  merely,  but  as  revealing  new  duties 
 resting  on  new  relations,  and  being  in  the  strictest 
 sense  moral. 
 
 Chap.  II. — The  importance  of  Christianity  hav- 
 ing been  thus  shown,  let  us  next  inquire  what  pre- 
 sumptions or  objections  there  appear  to  be  against 
 revelation  in  general,  or  at  least  against  miracles,  as 
 if  they  required  stronger  evidence  than  other  matters 
 of  fact  do. 
 
 These  presumptions  must  arise  either  from  Chris- 
 tianity not  being  discoverable  by  reason  and  experi- 
 ence, or  because  it  is  unlike  the  course  of  nature  as 
 it  now  is. 
 
 1.  But  there  is  no  presumption  against  it  because 
 not  discoverable  by  reason :  for  suppose  any  one  to 
 be  acquainted  with  what  is  called  the  system  of  na- 
 tural philosophy  and  natural  religion,  he  would  feel 
 
lv 
 
 that  he  knew  but  a  small  part  of  them,  and  that  there 
 must  be  innumerable  things  of  which  he  was  wholly 
 ignorant.  The  scheme  of  nature  is  vast  beyond  all 
 possible  imagination,  and  what  we  know  of  it  is  but 
 as  a  point  in  comparison  of  the  whole.  Therefore, 
 that  things  lie  beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties  in 
 Christianity,  is  no  sort  of  presumption  against  it,  be- 
 cause it  is  certain  there  are  innumerable  things  in 
 nature  which  do  so. 
 
 2.  Nor  is  there  any  presumption  against  Christi- 
 anity, from  the  present  course  of  nature ;  for  analogy 
 by  no  means  leads  us  to  suppose,  that  the  whole 
 course  of  things  unknown  to  us,  and  every  thing  in 
 it,  is  like  to  any  thing  in  that  course  of  things  which 
 is  known.  Even  in  the  natural  course  of  the  world, 
 we  see  things  extremely  unlike  one  another.  But  the 
 truth  is,  the  scheme  of  Christianity  is  not  wholly  un- 
 like the  scheme  of  nature,  as  we  shall  show  hereafter. 
 
 3.  Nor  is  there  any  presumption  from  analogy 
 against  some  operations  which  we  should  call  miracu- 
 lous, particularly  none  against  a  revelation  at  the  be- 
 ginning of  the  world;  for  then  there  had  been  no 
 course  of  nature,  and  therefore  the  question  of  a  re- 
 velation, at  that  time,  is  only  a  common  question  of 
 fact.  Creation  was  wholly  different  from  the  present 
 course  of  nature ;  and  whether  this  power  stopped 
 after  forming  man,  or  went  on  and  gave  him  a  reve- 
 lation, is  a  question  of  simple  fact. 
 
 4.  Nor  is  there  any  presumption  against  miracles, 
 after  the  settlement  of  the  course  of  nature.  For 
 we  have  no  single  parallel  case  of  a  world  like  our 
 own,  to  deduce  an  argument  from  :  and  if  we  had  a 
 case,   an  argument  from  the  analogy  of  that  single 
 
IVI 
 
 instance  would  have  little  weight.  We  require  the 
 history  of  many  similar  worlds  from  which  to  raise 
 any  thing  like  a  presumption. 
 
 5.  Besides,  we  know  there  is  often  a  presumption 
 against  the  commonest  facts  before  the  proof  of  them, 
 which  yet  almost  any  proof  overcomes.  And  we  are 
 in  such  ignorance,  that  it  is  not  improbable,  that  five 
 or  six  thousand  years  may  have  given  scope  for  ade- 
 quate causes  for  miracles,  even  leaving  out  the  con- 
 sideration of  religion.  But  if  we  take  in  the  con- 
 sideration of  religion,  we  then  see  distinct  reasons  for 
 miracles,  which  give  a  real  credibility  to  them.  At 
 all  events,  miracles  must  not  be  compared  to  common 
 natural  circumstances  and  phenomena,  but  to  the  ex- 
 traordinary phenomena  of  nature — comets,  the  powers 
 of  electricity,  &c.  And  let  any  one  reflect  what  would 
 be  the  presumption,  for  instance,  against  the  powers 
 of  electricity,  in  the  mind  of  one  acquainted  only  with 
 the  common  powers  of  nature. 
 
 6.  There  is,  therefore,  no  such  presumption  against 
 miracles  as  to  render  them  in  anywise  incredible; 
 nay,  there  is  a  positive  credibility  for  them,  where  we 
 discern  reasons  for  them ;  and  there  is  no  presump- 
 tion at  all  from  analogy,  even  in  the  lowest  degree, 
 against  them,  as  distinguished  from  other  extraor- 
 dinary phenomena. 
 
 Chap.  III. — We  come  now  to  consider  objec- 
 tions against  the  Christian  revelation  in  particular,  as 
 distinct  from  objections  against  miracles — objections 
 drawn  from  things  in  it,  appearing  to  men  "  foolish- 
 ness ;"  from  its  containing  matters  of  offence,  leading, 
 as  it  is  alleged,  to  enthusiasm,  superstition,  and  tyr- 
 
Ivn 
 
 anny ;  from  its  not  being  universal ;  and  from  its  evi- 
 dence not  being  so  convincing  as  it  might  have  been. 
 1.  Now  it  is  credible  from  analogy  that  we  should 
 be  incompetent  judges  of  a  revelation  to  a  great  de- 
 gree, and  that  it  would  contain  many  things  appear- 
 ing to  us  liable  to  objection.  There  is  no  more 
 ground  to  expect  that  Christianity  should  appear 
 free  from  objections,  than  that  the  course  of  nature 
 should.  And  the  fact  is,  that  men  fall  into  infinite 
 follies  and  mistakes,  when  they  pretend  to  judge  of 
 the  ordinary  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  and 
 of  what  they  should  expect  it  to  be.  It  is  therefore 
 probable,  that  men  would  err  much  more  when  they 
 pretend  to  judge  of  the  extraordinary  constitution 
 and  scheme  of  Christianity,  and  of  what  they  should 
 expect  it  to  be.  For  if  a  man,  in  the  things  of  this 
 present  world,  is  not  a  competent  judge  of  the  ordi- 
 nary government  of  a  prince;  much  less  would  he 
 be  so  of  any  extraordinary  exigencies  on  which  that 
 prince  should  suspend  his  known  and  ordinary  laws. 
 Thus  objections  against  Christianity  are  really  frivo- 
 lous. If  men  fancy  there  lie  great  objections  against 
 the  scheme  of  Providence  in  the  ordinary  and  old 
 laws  of  nature,  much  more  may  they  fancy  there  lie 
 objections  against  the  scheme  of  Christianity  in  the 
 extraordinary  and  new  laws  of  religion.  Both 
 schemes  are  from  the  same  God.  And  the  objections 
 against  Christianity  go  upon  suppositions,  which, 
 when  applied  to  the  course  of  nature,  experience 
 shows  to  be  inconclusive.  They  mislead  us  to  think 
 that  the  Author  of  nature  would  not  act,  as  we  find 
 by  experience  he  actually  does,  or  would  act  in  such 
 c3 
 
lviii 
 
 and  such  a  manner,  as  we  experience,  in  like  cases, 
 he  does  not. 
 
 2.  For  instance,  we  are  no  sort  of  judges  before- 
 hand, by  what  laws,  in  what  degree,  or  by  what 
 means,  it  were  to  have  been  expected  that  God  would 
 instruct  us  naturally  in  his  ordinary  Providence  ;  how 
 far  he  would  enable  men  to  communicate  it  to  others ; 
 whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain,  highly 
 probable,  or  doubtful;  whether  it  would  be  given 
 with  equal  clearness  to  all;  whether  at  once  or  gra- 
 dually. In  like  manner,  supposing  God  afforded  us 
 an  additional  instruction  by  a  revelation,  we  must  be 
 equally  ignorant  beforehand  whether  the  evidence  of 
 it  would  be  certain,  whether  all  would  have  the  same 
 decree  of  evidence,  whether  it  would  be  revealed  at 
 once  or  gradually,  &c.  Now,  if  we  are  incompetent 
 to  judge  beforehand  of  revelation,  it  is  mere  folly  to 
 object  afterwards  against  its  being  left  in  one  way 
 rather  than  another. 
 
 3.  The  only  fair  question  is,  whether  Christianity 
 be  a  real  revelation,  and  whether  the  book  containing 
 it  be  of  divine  authority;  and  scarcely  at  all  whether 
 it  be  a  revelation,  and  a  book  of  such  and  such  a 
 sort.  So  that,  what  men  object  against  the  Scrip- 
 tures as  being  obscure,  as  written  in  an  inaccurate 
 style,  as  having  various  readings,  and  being  the  sub- 
 ject of  dispute,  has  no  sort  of  force,  unless  it  can  be 
 shown  that  the  sacred  authors  had  promised  that  the 
 book  should  be  secure  from  these  things.  We  are 
 no  judges  whether  it  were  to  have  been  expected 
 that  these  things  should  be  found  in  it  or  not.  In 
 human  writings  we  should  indeed  be  judges,  but  not 
 at  all  in  divine. 
 
lix 
 
 4.  However,  if  men  will  pretend  still  to  judge  of 
 the  Scriptures  and  of  Christianity,  by  previous  ex- 
 pectation, then  the  analogy  of  nature  shows,  that 
 probably  they  will  imagine  they  have  strong  objec- 
 tions against  them.  For  so,  prior  to  experience, 
 they  would  think  they  had  against  the  instruction 
 afforded  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature.  For  in- 
 stance, it  would  have  been  thought  incredible  that 
 men  should  have  been  so  much  more  capable  of  dis- 
 covering, even  to  a  certainty,  the  general  laws  of 
 matter,  and  the  magnitudes  and  revolutions  of  the 
 heavenly  bodies,  than  the  cure  of  diseases,  and  many 
 other  things  in  which  human  life  is  so  much  more 
 nearly  concerned.  The  method  of  invention  again, 
 by  which  men  discover  things  of  the  greatest  mo- 
 ment in  an  instant,  when  perhaps  they  are  thinking 
 of  something  else,  which  they  have  in  vain  been 
 searching  after  for  years,  would  be  thought  most 
 irregular  and  capricious.  So  likewise  the  imper- 
 fections attending  the  only  method  we  have  of  com- 
 municating our  thoughts  to  each  other,  language, 
 would  be  judged  utterly  incredible.  It  is  inadequate, 
 ambiguous,  liable  to  infinite  abuse.  Now  no  objec- 
 tions against  the  manner  in  which  Christianity 
 teaches  in  the  Scriptures,  are  of  greater  weight  than 
 these,  which  analogy  shows  us  to  have  really  no 
 force  at  all. 
 
 5.  To  apply  these  remarks  to  a  particular  instance. 
 The  abuse  of  miraculous  powers  is  made  an  objec- 
 tion against  their  being  really  miracles ;  but  we  see, 
 in  the  natural  course  of  things,  daily,  that  remark- 
 able gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  are  not 
 
1* 
 
 always  conferred  on  persons  who  use  them  with  pru- 
 dence and  propriety. 
 
 6.  Again,  as  in  natural  and  civil  knowledge,  there 
 are  common  and  obvious  rules  of  conduct,  and  parts 
 requiring  very  exact  thought ;  so,  in  Christianity  the 
 necessary  matters  of  faith  and  practice  are  a  plain 
 and  obvious  thing ;  whilst  many  other  parts  demand 
 careful  investigation.  And  as  natural  knowledge  is 
 acquired  by  particular  persons  comparing  and  pursu- 
 ing obscure  hints  dropped  us  by  nature,  as  it  were, 
 accidentally,  or  which  seem  to  come  into  our  minds 
 by  chance ;  so  probably  the  entire  scheme  of  Chris- 
 tianity in  the  Scriptures  will  only  be  gradually  under- 
 stood, by  particular  persons,  attending  to  intimations 
 scattered  up  and  down  in  it,  and  which  most  persons 
 disregard.  Nor  is  it  incredible  that  a  book  so  long; 
 known  should  contain  many  truths  not  yet  completely 
 discovered ;  for  nature  has  been  open  to  the  investi- 
 gation of  man  for  many  thousand  years,  and  yet 
 great  discoveries  are  continually  made. 
 
 7.  And  if  men  object  against  Christianity,  that  it 
 is  not  universally  known,  we  reply,  that  many  most 
 valuable  remedies  for  natural  diseases  were  unknown 
 for  ages,  and  are  known  now  but  to  few ;  that  pro- 
 bably many  are  not  known  yet ;  that  the  application 
 of  them,  when  known,  is  difficult;  that  if  used  amiss, 
 they  often  create  new  diseases;  that  they  are  often 
 not  effectual ;  and  that  the  regimen  required  is  often 
 so  disagreeable  that  men  will  not  submit  to  it,  but 
 satisfy  themselves  with  the  excuse,  that  if  they  did 
 submit,  it  is  not  certain  they  should  be  cured.  These 
 natural  remedies  are  neither  certain,  perfect,  nor 
 universal ;  and  the  principles  of  arguing  which  would 
 
lxi 
 
 lead  us  to  conclude  they  must  be  so,  would  not  only 
 be  contrary  to  fact,  but  would  also  lead  us  to  con- 
 clude that  there  would  be  no  diseases  at  all.  It  is 
 therefore  not  at  all  incredible  that  the  like  things 
 should  be  found  in  the  remedy  for  moral  diseases, 
 Christianity,  if  it  proceeds  from  the  same  divine  hand 
 as  natural  remedies  do. 
 
 Chap.  IV. — The  objections  against  Christianity 
 are  thus  merely  what  we  might  have  expected.  But 
 further,  these  objections  receive  a  full  answer  from 
 the  consideration  that  Christianity  is  a  scheme  im- 
 perfectly comprehended,  in  which  a  system  of  means 
 is  established,  and  which  is  carried  on  by  general 
 laws ;  just  as  objections  against  natural  religion  were 
 shown  to  be  thus  silenced.  For  this  shows  that  the 
 things  objected  to  may,  in  each  case,  not  only  be 
 consistent  with  wisdom  and  goodness,  but  instances 
 of  them. 
 
 1.  Now  Christianity  is  a  scheme  quite  beyond 
 our  comprehension.  It  is  a  mysterious  economy, 
 still  carrying  on  for  the  recovery  of  the  world  by  a 
 divine  person,  the  Messiah,  who,  after  various  prepa- 
 ratory dispensations,  became  incarnate,  and  died  as  a 
 Sacrifice  for  sin.  Parts  likewise  of  this  scheme  are 
 the  miraculous  and  ordinary  mission  of  the  Holy 
 Ghost,  Christ's  invisible  government  over  his  church, 
 and  his  second  advent  to  judgment.  Now  the  Scrip- 
 tures assert  this  to  be  a  mystery;  indeed  what  is 
 revealed  of  it,  leaves  so  much  unrevealed,  that  one 
 cannot  read  a  passage  but  what  it  runs  up  into  some- 
 thing which  shows  us  our  ignorance  about  it ;  so  that 
 to  all  purposes  of  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of  it, 
 
JXll 
 
 as  we  know  of  the  vast  scheme  of  the  natural  world, 
 where  every  step  shows  us  our  ignorance,  short- 
 sightedness, and  incompetence  to  judge. 
 
 2.  In  the  Christian  scheme,  again,  as  in  the 
 course  of  nature,  means  which  appear  foolish,  though 
 they  may  possibly  be  the  very  best,  are  used  to  ac- 
 complish ends ;  and  their  appearing  foolish  is  no 
 presumption  against  them,  in  a  scheme  so  greatly 
 beyond  our  comprehension. 
 
 3.  Christianity  is  also  probably  carried  on  by 
 general  laws.  The  course  of  nature  is  confessedly 
 so ;  and  yet  we  know  but  little  of  these  general  laws. 
 We  know  not  by  what  laws  storms,  famine,  pesti- 
 lence, &c.  destroy  mankind;  nor  why  men  are  born 
 in  such  places  and  times,  and  with  such  talents;  nor 
 how  it  is  that  such  and  such  trains  of  thought  enter 
 the  mind.  We  therefore  call  these  things  acciden- 
 tal ;  though  all  reasonable  men  believe  there  is  no 
 such  thing  as  accident.  We  see  but  a  little  way ; 
 and  it  is  only  from  seeing  that  the  part  of  the  course 
 of  nature  which  is  known  to  us,  is  governed  by  gen- 
 eral laws,  that  we  conclude  the  whole  to  be  so  gov- 
 erned, though  the  laws  of  innumerable  things  are 
 unknown  to  us.  In  like  manner,  that  miraculous 
 powers  should  be  exerted  at  such  occasions,  for  such 
 reasons,  before  such  persons,  under  such  circum- 
 stances, &c.  may  have  been  also  by  general  laws, 
 though  unknown  to  us,  as  the  laws  of  the  things 
 above  instanced  in  nature  are  unknown  to  us.  And 
 there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect,  that  every  exi- 
 gency as  it  arises  should  be  provided  for  by  these 
 general  laws,  than  that  every  exigency  in  nature 
 should. 
 
Xlll 
 
 4.  In  the  next  place,  let  us  see  the  force  of  the 
 common  objection  raised  against  the  whole  scheme  of 
 Christianity,  as  being  what  some  are  pleased  to  call 
 a  round-about  way,  a  perplexed  contrivance  for  the 
 salvation  of  the  world;  as  if  God  was  reduced  to  the 
 necessity  of  using  a  long  series  of  intricate  means  to 
 accomplish  his  ends.  Now  it  is  obvious,  that,  in  the 
 course  of  nature,  God  uses  various  means  which  we 
 think  tedious,  to  arrive  at  his  ends.  Indeed  there 
 is  something  in  this  matter  quite  beyond  our  com- 
 prehension; but  the  mystery  is  as  great  in  nature  as 
 in  Christianity.  Perhaps  many  things  which  we  call 
 means  may  be  ends.  However,  it  is  clear  the  whole 
 natural  world  is  a  progressive  system,  in  which  the 
 operation  of  means  takes  up  a  great  length  of  time. 
 One  state  of  things  is  a  preparation  for  another,  and 
 that  state  the  means  of  attaining  to  another  succeed- 
 ing one.  Men  are  for  precipitating  things ;  but 
 God  in  the  natural  world  appears  ever  deliberate, 
 reaching  his  ends  by  slow  steps.  The  change  of 
 seasons,  the  ripening  the  fruits  of  the  earth,  the 
 growth  of  a  flower,  the  gradual  advances  of  vegetable 
 and  animal  bodies,  and  the  progress  of  knowledge  in 
 men  with  their  growing  faculties  and  powers,  are  in- 
 stances of  this.  Thus,  in  nature,  God  operates  as 
 he  does  in  Christianity,  by  making  one  thing  subser- 
 vient to  another,  through  a  series  of  means  which 
 extends  backward  and  forward  beyond  our  utmost 
 view.  Objections,  therefore,  against  the  whole  plan 
 of  Christianity,  as  intricate,  and  round-about,  and 
 perplexed,  have  no  sort  of  force. 
 
 Chap.  V. — This  general  objection  having  been 
 
IX1V 
 
 answered,  let  us  next  consider  the  particular  one  most 
 urged,  namely,  that  against  the  mediation  of  Christ. 
 
 1.  Now,  in  the  first  place,  the  visible  government 
 of  God  in  nature  is  carried  on  by  the  instrumentality 
 and  mediation  of  others.  Every  comfort  of  life  comes 
 to  us  in  this  way.  God  appoints  men  as  instru- 
 ments, that  is,  mediators  of  good  or  evil  to  us.  So 
 that  there  is  no  presumption  from  analogy  against 
 the  general  notion  of  a  Mediator. 
 
 2.  In  the  next  place,  it  is  supposable  and  credible 
 that  the  punishments  which  God  inflicts  as  a  moral 
 Governor,  may  be  appointed  to  follow  wickedness  in 
 the  way  of  natural  consequence ;  in  a  like  manner  as 
 a  man  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of  natural 
 consequence  falls  down,  and,  without  help,  perishes. 
 
 3.  But  it  is  most  important  to  remark,  that,  in  the 
 course  of  natural  Providence,  provision  is  made  that 
 all  the  natural  bad  consequences  of  men's  actions 
 should  not  always  actually  follow.  We  might,  in- 
 deed, presumptuously  have  thought,  that  the  world 
 would  have  been  so  constituted  as  that  there  should 
 not  have  been  any  such  thing  as  misery  or  evil.  But 
 in  fact  we  find  that  God  permits  it ;  but  that  he  has 
 provided  at  the  same  time  relief,  and  in  many  cases 
 perfect  remedies  for  it,  even  for  that  evil  which  would 
 have  justly  ended  in  our  ruin.  If,  indeed,  all  the 
 consequences  of  bad  conduct  had  always  followed, 
 no  one  could  have  had  a  right  to  object;  no  one  can 
 say  whether  such  a  more  severe  constitution  of  things 
 might  not  yet  have  been  really  good.  But  that,  in- 
 stead of  this,  provision  is  made  by  nature  to  remedy 
 these  consequences,  may  properly  be  called  mercy  or 
 compassion  in  the  original  constitution  of  the  world, 
 
JXV 
 
 as  distinct  from  goodness  in  general.  It  is  agree- 
 able,  then,  to  the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  to  hope 
 that  provision  may  have  been  made  for  remedying 
 the  natural  consequences  of  vice  in  God's  moral  go- 
 vernment, at  least  in  some  cases.  There  is  a  union 
 of  severity  and  indulgence  in  the  course  of  nature ; 
 there  may  possibly  also  be  a  union  of  justice  and 
 compassion  in  the  scheme  of  religion. 
 
 4.  Some  will  wonder  at  this  being  made  a  ques- 
 tion of;  for  they  neglect  and  despise  all  ideas  of 
 future  punishment.  But  as  we  actually  experience 
 ill  consequences  from  wickedness  and  folly  here,  so 
 the  analogy  of  the  cases  teaches  us  to  apprehend 
 worse  evil  consequences  hereafter,  from  disorders  com- 
 mitted by  moral  agents,  presumptuously  introducing 
 confusion  and  misery  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  their 
 Sovereign  Creator.  Nay,  it  is  by  no  means  intui- 
 tively certain  whether  these  consequences  could,  in 
 the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  prevented,  that  is,  con- 
 sistently with  the  eternal  rule  of  right.  The  utmost 
 we  could  hope  for  is,  that  there  would  probably  be 
 some  way  in  God's  universal  government  for  pre- 
 venting the  penal  consequences  of  vice. 
 
 5.  Further,  it  is  not  probable  that  any  thing  we 
 could  do  of  ourselves  would  prevent  these  ill  conse- 
 quences. For  sorrow  and  reformation  will  not  of 
 themselves  prevent  the  natural  consequences  of  our 
 disorders  here,  and  the  assistance  of  others  is  often 
 indispensable  to  such  prevention.  The  like,  then, 
 may  be  the  case  under  God's  moral  government.  In 
 fact,  it  is  contrary  to  all  our  notions  of  government, 
 as  well  as  to  the  course  of  nature,  to  suppose  that 
 doing  well  for  the  future,   should  always  prevent  or 
 
lxvi 
 
 remedy  the  consequences  annexed  to  disobedience. 
 And  though  men  in  the  present  day  boast  of  the 
 efficacy  of  repentance,  yet  the  prevalence  of  propi- 
 tiatory sacrifices  over  the  heathen  world,  shows  that 
 the  general  sense  of  mankind  is  against  the  idea  of 
 repentance  being  sufficient  to  expiate  guilt. 
 
 6.  In  this  darkness,  or  light  of  nature,  call  it 
 which  you  please,  revelation  comes  in,  teaches  us 
 our  state  of  guilt,  confirms  every  fear  as  to  the  future 
 consequences  of  sin,  declares  that  God's  government 
 will  not  pardon  on  mere  repentance;  but  that  still 
 his  government  is  compassionate,  and  that  He  has 
 mercifully  provided  that  there  should  be  an  interpo- 
 sition to  prevent  the  utter  ruin  of  man.  God  so 
 loved  the  world,  that  lie  gave  his  only-begotten  Son, 
 that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should  not  perish  ; 
 gave  his  Son  in  the  same  way  of  goodness  to  the 
 world,  as  he  affords  to  particular  persons  the  friendly 
 assistance  of  their  fellow-creatures;  when,  without  it, 
 their  temporal  ruin  would  be  the  certain  consequence 
 of  their  follies :  in  the  same  way  of  goodness,  I  say, 
 though  in  a  transcendent  and  infinitely  higher  degree. 
 And  the  Son  of  God  loved  us  and  gave  himself  for 
 us,  with  a  love  which  he  compares  to  that  of  human 
 friendship;  though,  in  this  case,  all  comparisons  must 
 fall  infinitely  short  of  the  thing  intended  to  be  illus- 
 trated by  them. 
 
 7.  Now,  if  the  constitution  of  things  had  been 
 such  that  the  whole  creation  must  have  perished,  but 
 for  somewhat  which  God  had  appointed  should  take 
 place  to  prevent  that  ruin,  this  supposition  would  not 
 be  inconsistent,  in  any  degree,  with  perfect  goodness 
 and  compassion,  whatever  men  may  object. 
 
XVI 1 
 
 8.  Nor  can  men  object  to  the  Scriptures  as  repre- 
 senting mankind  by  this  whole  scheme  as  in  a  de- 
 graded state ;  for  it  is  not  Christianity  which  has  put 
 us  in  this  state;  and  all,  even  moralists,  are  com- 
 pelled to  acknowledge  the  extreme  wickedness  and 
 misery  which  are  in  the  world.  And  the  crime  of 
 our  first  parents  bringing  us  into  a  more  disadvantage- 
 ous condition,  is  particularly  agreeable  to  all  analogy. 
 
 9.  The  particular  manner  of  Christ's  mediation  is 
 by  his  becoming  what  the  Scripture  calls  the  Prophet 
 of  mankind,  to  declare  the  Divine  will ;  the  King, 
 by  founding  and  governing  a  church ;  and  the  High 
 Priest,  by  a  propitiatory  sacrifice ;  which  sacrifice,  be 
 it  well  noted,  is  not  spoken  of  merely  in  allusion  to 
 the  Mosaic  sacrifices,  but  as  the  original  and  great 
 sacrifice  itself,  to  which  the  Mosaic  were  themselves 
 only  allusions,  and  of  which  they  were  types.  The 
 Scriptures  declare,  in  all  sorts  of  ways,  an  efficacy  in 
 what  Christ  suffered  for  us  beyond  mere  example  or 
 instruction. 
 
 10.  Further,  as  we  know  not  by  what  means  future 
 punishment  would  have  been  inflicted  on  men,  nor  all 
 the  reasons  why  its  infliction  would  have  been  need- 
 ful, if  it  had  not  been  prevented  by  Christ's  sacrifice  ; 
 it  is  most  evident  we  are  not  judges,  antecedently  to 
 revelation,  whether  a  Mediator  was  or  was  not  ne- 
 cessary to  prevent  that  punishment;  and  upon  the 
 supposition  of  a  Mediator,  we  are  not  judges  before- 
 hand of  what  it  was  fit  to  be  assigned  to  him  to  do, 
 nor  of  the  whole  nature  of  his  office.  To  object, 
 therefore,  to  any  particular  parts  of  this  mediation, 
 because  we  do  not  see  the  expediency  of  them,  is 
 absurd.      And  yet  men  commonly  do  this. 
 
lxviii 
 
 11.  Again;  if  men  object  to  the  satisfaction  of 
 Christ,  that  it  represents  God  as  indifferent  whether 
 he  punishes  the  innocent  or  guilty,  we  answer,  that 
 they  might  equally  object  to  the  daily  course  of  natu- 
 ral Providence,  in  which  innocent  people  are  con- 
 tinually forced  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  the  guilty, 
 and  do  suffer  for  them  in  various  ways ;  whereas 
 Christ's  sufferings  were  undertaken  by  him  volun- 
 tarily. And  though  upon  the  whole,  and  finally, 
 every  one  shall  receive  according  to  his  deserts,  yet 
 during  the  progress,  and  in  order  to  the  completion, 
 of  this  moral  scheme,  punishments  endured  by  the 
 innocent  in  some  way  instead  of  the  guilty,  that  is, 
 vicarious  punishments,  may,  for  aught  we  know,  be 
 fit  and  absolutely  necessary. 
 
 12.  Besides,  there  is  an  apparent  tendency  in  this 
 method  of  our  redemption  by  the  sacrifice  of  Christ, 
 to  vindicate  the  authority  of  God's  law,  and  deter 
 men  from  sin. 
 
 13.  Let  not,  then,  such  poor  creatures  as  we  are, 
 object  against  an  infinite  scheme,  that  we  do  not  see 
 the  usefulness  and  necessity  of  all  its  parts.  The 
 presumption  of  this  kind  of  objections  seems  almost 
 lost  in  the  folly  of  them. 
 
 14.  It  heightens  the  absurdity  of  these  objections, 
 that  they  are  made  against  those  parts  of  Christ's 
 mediation  which  we  are  not  actively  concerned  in. 
 Now  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  teaches  us,  not  to 
 expect  the  like  information  concerning  the  Divine 
 conduct,  as  concerning  our  duty.  The  objections 
 are  made,  as  we  have  seen,  to  God's  appointment  of 
 a  Mediator,  and  to  the  Mediator's  execution  of  this 
 office;   not  to  what  is  required  of  man  in  consequence 
 
IX1X 
 
 of  this  gracious  dispensation,  which  is  plain  and  ob- 
 vious, and  which  is  all  we  need  to  know.  Thus,  in 
 the  uatural  world,  it  is  almost  an  infinitely  small  part 
 of  natural  Providence  which  men  can  understand,  and 
 yet  they  are  sufficiently  instructed  for  the  common 
 purposes  of  life. 
 
 Chap.  VI. — A  principal  objection  against  Chris- 
 tianity, further,  is,  that  it  is  thought  to  rest  on  doubt- 
 ful evidence,  and  that  its  benefits  are  not  universal  : 
 which,  in  other  words,  is  as  much  as  to  say,  that 
 God  would  not  have  bestowed  upon  us  any  favour  at 
 all,  unless  in  the  degree  which  we  imagine  best,  and 
 that  he  could  not  bestow  a  favour  upon  any,  unless 
 he  bestowed  the  same  on  all, — an  objection  which  the 
 whole  analogy  of  nature  contradicts. 
 
 1.  For  how  doubtful  is  the  evidence  on  which  men 
 act  in  their  most  important  concerns  in  this  world  ! 
 how  difficult  to  balance  nice  probabilities,  to  make 
 due  allowances  for  accidents  and  disappointments,  to 
 see  on  which  side  the  reasons  preponderate  !  How 
 often  do  strong  objections  lie  against  their  schemes, 
 objections  which  cannot  be  removed  or  answered, 
 but  yet  which  seem  overbalanced  by  reasons  on  the 
 other  side  !  And  how  much  are  men  deceived  at 
 last  by  the  falsehood  of  others,  by  the  false  appear- 
 ances of  things,  and  the  strong  bias  from  within  them- 
 selves to  favour  the  deceit  !  And  as  to  revelation 
 not  being  universal,  we  see  the  Author  of  nature 
 perpetually  bestowing  those  gifts  of  health,  prudence, 
 knowledge,  riches,  upon  some,  which  he  docs  not  on 
 others.  Yet,  notwithstanding  these  uncertainties  and 
 varieties,    God  does  exercise  a  natural  government 
 
lxx 
 
 over  the  world,  and  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  pru- 
 dent and  imprudent  course  of  conduct. 
 
 2.  There  have  been  different  degrees  of  evidence 
 to  Jews  and  Christians.  The  first  Christians  had  a 
 higher  evidence  of  miracles  than  we,  and  a  stronger 
 presumption  in  favour  of  Christianity  from  the  lives 
 of  Christians :  and  we,  or  future  ages,  may  have  a 
 higher  evidence  of  the  fulfilment  of  prophecy.  And 
 the  Heathens,  Mahommedans,  Papists,  and  Protes- 
 tants, have  now  different  degrees  of  evidence  of  natu- 
 ral and  revealed  religion,  from  the  faintest  glimmer- 
 ing of  probability,  to  the  clear  light  of  truth  and 
 conviction:  but  all  this  most  obviously  resembles  the 
 constant  order  of  Providence  as  to  our  temporal  affairs. 
 And  we  are  to  remember,  that  each  one  will  be 
 judged  at  last  by  what  he  hath,  and  not  by  what  he 
 hath  not,  so  that  there  is  no  shadow  of  injustice  in 
 this  constitution  of  things,  though  what  is  the  par- 
 ticular reason  of  it,  we  are  altogether  in  the  dark 
 about.  We  know  but  little  even  of  our  own  cases  ; 
 scarcely  any  thing  more  than  is  just  necessary  for 
 practice.  We  are  in  the  greatest  ignorance  as  to 
 what  would  satisfy  our  curiosity.  We  have  only 
 light  to  teach  us  our  duty,  and  encourage  us  in  the 
 discharge  of  it. 
 
 3.  Besides,  if  revelation  were  universal,  men's  dif- 
 ferent understandings,  educations,  tempers,  bodily 
 constitutions,  lengths  of  lives,  external  advantages, 
 would  soon  make  their  situation  perhaps  as  widely 
 different  as  it  is  at  present. 
 
 4.  But  we  may  observe  more  particularly,  that 
 the  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  certain,  may 
 be  the  especial  trial  of  some  men's  characters  and 
 
lxxi 
 
 state  of  mind.  Men  may  be  as  much  in  a  state  of 
 probation  with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  their  under- 
 standing on  the  evidence  of  religion,  as  they  are  with 
 regard  to  their  conduct.  The  same  inward  principle 
 which  leads  men  to  obey  religion  when  convinced  of 
 its  truth,  would  lead  them  to  examine  it  when  they 
 were  first  presented  with  its  evidences.  Negligence 
 about  such  a  serious  matter  as  religion,  is  as  criminal 
 before  distinct  conviction,  as  careless  practice  is  after. 
 That  religious  evidence,  then,  is  not  forced  upon 
 men,  nor  intuitively  true,  but  left  to  be  collected  by 
 a  heedful  attention  to  premises,  may  as  much  consti- 
 tute religious  probation  as  any  thing  else. 
 
 5.  Again,  even  if  Christianity  should  be  supposed 
 to  be  extremely  doubtful  to  some  persons,  yet  it  puts 
 them  in  a  state  of  probation  as  to  character.  For 
 if  Christianity  be  once  supposed  by  them  to  be  pos- 
 sible, this  demands  religious  suspense,  moral  resolu- 
 tion, self-government,  inquiry,  abstinence  from  what 
 would  be  impediments,  readiness  to  receive  fresh 
 light,  care  of  what  use  they  make  of  their  influence 
 and  example  upon  others.  For  doubting  is  not  a 
 positive  argument  against  religion,  but  for  it ;  a  doubt 
 pre-supposes  a  lower  degree  of  evidence,  just  as  much 
 as  belief  does  a  higher.  And  in  proportion  to  the 
 corruption  of  the  heart,  men  acknowledge  no  evi- 
 dence, however  real,  if  it  be  not  overbearing. 
 
 6.  The  difficulties  which  are  said  to  be  found  in 
 the  evidence  of  Christianity,  is  no  more  a  ground  of 
 complaint,  than  difficulties  from  external  temptation 
 as  to  the  practice  of  it.  Such  speculative  difficulties 
 may,  to  persons  of  a  deep  sense,  and  reflecting  minds, 
 and  who  have  small  temptations  to  gross  outward  sins, 
 
XX11 
 
 constitute  the  principal  part  of  their  trial.  For  we 
 see,  in  the  things  of  this  world,  that  the  chief  trial  of 
 some  men  is  not  so  much  the  doing  what  is  right  when 
 it  is  known,  as  the  attention,  suspense,  care,  the  being 
 on  their  guard  against  false  appearances,  the  weigh- 
 ing of  contrary  reasons,  and  informing  themselves  of 
 what  is  really  prudent. 
 
 7.  In  these  remarks  we  have  taken  it  for  granted 
 that  men  are  not  neglecting  the  subject  of  religion 
 altogether,  nor  entertaining  prejudices  against  it. 
 For  if  they  never  examine  it  in  earnest,  if  they  wish 
 it  not  to  be  true,  if  they  attend  more  to  objections 
 than  to  evidence,  if  they  consider  things  with  levity, 
 if  they  indulge  in  ridicule,  and  put  human  errors  in 
 the  place  of  Divine  truth — all  this  will  hinder  men 
 from  seeing  evidence,  just  as  a  like  turn  of  mind  hin- 
 ders them  from  weighing  evidence  in  their  temporal 
 capacities.  And  possibly  the  evidence  of  Christi- 
 anity was  left,  so  as  that  those  who  are  desirous  of 
 evading  moral  obligation  should  not  see  it,  whilst  fair 
 and  candid  persons  should. 
 
 8.  Further,  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  as  they 
 are,  may  be  sufficiently  understood  by  common  men, 
 if  they  will  only  pay  the  same  sort  of  attention  to 
 religion  which  they  pay  to  their  temporal  affairs. 
 But  if  men  will  handle  objections  which  they  have 
 picked  up,  and  discuss  them  without  the  necessary 
 preparation  of  general  knowledge,  they  must  remain 
 in  ignorance  or  doubt,  just  as  men  who  neglect  the 
 means  of  information  in  common  life  do. 
 
 9.  But,  perhaps,  it  will  be  said,  that  a  prince  would 
 take  care  to  give  directions  to  a  servant  which  would 
 be  impossible  to  be  misunderstood  or  disputed.      To 
 
lxxiii 
 
 this  we  answer,  that  it  is  certain  we  cannot  argue 
 thus  as  to  God,  hecause  in  point  of  fact  he  does  not 
 afford  us  such  information  as  to  our  temporal  affairs, 
 as  a  matter  of  course,  without  care  of  our  own.  And 
 if  a  prince  wished  not  merely  to  have  certain  acts 
 done,  but  also  to  prove  the  loyalty  and  obedience  of 
 his  servant,  he  might  not  always  give  his  directions 
 in  the  plainest  possible  manner. 
 
 On  the  whole,  the  analogy  of  nature  refutes  all 
 objections  against  Christianity  as  resting  upon  doubt- 
 ful evidence,  and  as  not  universal. 
 
 Chap.  VII. — The  objections  against  the  parti- 
 cular scheme  of  Christianity  being  removed,  it  re- 
 mains that  we  consider  what  the  analogy  of  nature 
 suggests  as  to  the  positive  evidence  for  it,  and  as  to 
 the  objections  raised  against  that  evidence. 
 
 Now  the  evidence  of  Christianity  embraces  a  long 
 series  of  things,  reaching  from  the  beginning  of  the 
 world  to  the  present  time,  of  great  variety  and  com- 
 pass, and  making  up  one  argument,  the  conviction 
 arising  from  which  is  like  what  we  call  effect  in  archi- 
 tecture, a  result  from  a  great  number  of  things,  so 
 and  so  disposed,  and  taken  into  one  view;  and  this  is 
 the  kind  of  proof  on  which  we  determine  questions  of 
 difficulty,  in  our  most  important  affairs  in  this  world. 
 
 Let  us  then,  1st,  consider  the  direct  proof  of 
 Christianity,  from  Miracles  and  Prophecy;  and  then, 
 2d,  the  general  argument  arising  from  this  proof, 
 together  with  many  collateral  things,  as  making  up 
 one  argument. 
 
 I.  1.  The  Scriptures  of  the  old  and  New  Tes- 
 tament afford  us  the  same  evidence  of  the  miracles 
 i)  17 
 
lxxiv 
 
 wrought  in  attestation  of  revelation,  as  it  does  of  its 
 ordinary  history;  for  these  miracles  are  not  foisted 
 into  it,  but  form  a  part  of  it,  and  are  related  in  the 
 same  unadorned  manner  as  the  rest  of  the  narrative, 
 and  stand  on  the  same  footing  of  historical  evidence. 
 And  some  parts  of  Scripture,  containing  the  account 
 of  miracles,  are  quoted  as  genuine  from  the  very  age 
 in  which  they  were  said  to  have  been  written.  And 
 the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  and  Christian  reli- 
 gions are  just  what  might  have  been  expected,  if 
 such  miracles  were  wrought,  and  can  be  accounted 
 for  on  no  other  supposition.  The  Scripture  history, 
 then,  must  be  considered  as  genuine,  unless  some- 
 thing positive  can  be  alleged  to  invalidate  it.  Mere 
 guesses  can  prove  nothing  against  historical  evidence. 
 
 Further,  the  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  being  addressed 
 to  particular  churches,  carry  in  them  a  greater  evi- 
 dence of  being  genuine,  than  if  they  had  been  merely 
 narratives  addressed  to  the  world  at  large.  And  the 
 first  epistle  to  the  Corinthians  is  quoted  by  Clemens 
 Romanus,  a  contemporary,  in  a  letter  to  the  same 
 church.  And  St.  Paul  mentions,  in  this  espistle,  the 
 miraculous  gifts,  as  possessed  by  the  very  Christians 
 to  whom  he  wrote ;  and  he  mentions  them  inciden- 
 tally, and  in  order  to  depreciate  them,  and  to  reprove 
 the  abuse  of  them.  He  speaks  of  them  in  the  man- 
 ner any  one  would  speak  of  a  thing  familiar,  and 
 known  to  the  persons  he  is  writing  to.  Against  this 
 evidence,  general  doubts  have  no  force  :  because  any 
 fact  of  such  a  kind,  and  of  such  antiquity,  may  have 
 general  doubts  thrown  out  concerning  it,  from  the 
 very  nature  of  human  affairs  and  human  testimony. 
 
 Again,  Christianity  presented  itself  to  mankind  at 
 
Ixxv 
 
 first,  and  was  received,  on  the  footing  of  these  mira- 
 cles, at  the  time  when  they  were  wrought :  which  is 
 the  case  with  no  other  religion.  Mahommedanism 
 was  propagated  by  the  sword ;  and  Popish  and  Ma- 
 hommedan  miracles,  said  to  be  wrought  after  parties 
 were  formed,  and  when  power  and  political  interests 
 supported  them,  are  easily  accounted  for. 
 
 Once  more,  the  reception  of  such  a  doctrine  as 
 Christianity,  demanding  such  a  total  change  of  life, 
 by  such  vast  numbers,  can  only  be  accounted  for  on 
 the  supposition  of  their  belief  in  the  Christian  mira- 
 cles, which  they  were  fully  competent  to  judge  of  as 
 matters  of  fact.  For,  credulous  as  mankind  are,  they 
 are  suspicious,  and  backward  to  believe  and  act  against 
 their  prejudices,  passions,  and  temporal  interests ;  and 
 education,  prejudice,  power,  habits,  laws,  authority, 
 were  all  then  against  Christianity. 
 
 Enthusiasm,  indeed,  may  give  rise  to  opinions, 
 and  to  zeal  in  support  of  them.  But  there  is  a  wide 
 difference  between  opinions  and  facts;  and  testimony, 
 though  no  proof  of  enthusiastic  opinions,  yet  is  al- 
 lowed, in  all  cases,  to  be  a  proof  of  facts ;  and  there 
 is  no  appearance  of  enthusiasm  in  the  conduct  of  the 
 apostles  and  first  Christians,  but  quite  the  contrary. 
 And  if  great  numbers  of  men  of  plain  understandings 
 affirm,  that  they  saw  and  heard  such  and  such  things 
 with  their  eyes  and  ears,  such  testimony  is  the  strong- 
 est evidence  we  can  have  for  any  matter  of  fact. 
 The  mere  vague  charge  of  enthusiasm,  in  such  a  case, 
 is  frivolous. 
 
 However,  as  religion  is  supposed  to  be  peculiarly 
 liable  to  enthusiasm,  let  us  observe  that   prejudices, 
 romance,   affectation,   humour,  party  spirit,  custom, 
 d  2 
 
Ixxvi 
 
 little  competitions,  &c,  influence  men  in  common 
 matters,  just  as  enthusiasm  may  do;  and  yet,  human 
 testimony,  in  common  matters,  is  believed  and  acted 
 on  notwithstanding,  The  fact  is,  mankind  have 
 undoubtedly  a  capacity  of  distinguishing  truth  and 
 falsehood  in  common  matters,  and  have  a  regard  to 
 truth  in  what  they  say,  except  when  prejudised, 
 biassed,  or  deceived.  And,  therefore,  human  testi- 
 mony remains  a  natural  ground  of  assent,  and  this 
 assent  a  natural  principle  of  action,  notwithstanding 
 all  the  error  and  dishonesty  which  are  in  the  world. 
 People,  therefore,  do  not  know  what  they  say,  when 
 they  pretend  that  enthusiasm  destroys  the  evidence 
 for  the  truth  of  Christianity.  It  never  can  be  suffi- 
 cient to  overthrow  direct  historical  testimony,  indo- 
 lently to  say,  Men  are  so  apt  to  deceive  and  be 
 deceived  in  religion,  that  we  know  not  what  to  be- 
 lieve. All  analogy  shows,  that  men  do  not  thus  act 
 in  their  temporal  affairs. 
 
 Besides,  the  vast  importance  of  Christianity,  and 
 the  strong  obligations  to  veracity  which  it  enjoins, 
 strengthen  the  presumption,  that  the  Apostles  could 
 not  either  intend  to  deceive  others,  or  be  deceived 
 themselves.  The  proof  from  miracles,  therefore, 
 remains  untouched;  for  there  is  no  testimony  what- 
 ever contradicting  it,  and  strong  historical  testimony 
 in  its  favour. 
 
 2.  As  to  the  evidence  from  prophecy,  a  few  re- 
 marks may  be  made.  If  some  parts  of  it  are  obscure, 
 this  does  not  lessen  the  proof  of  foresight  from  the 
 fulfilment  of  those  parts  which  are  clear.  Thus,  in 
 a  writing,  if  part  of  it  were  ciphers,  and  other  parts 
 in  words  at  length,  and  if,  in  the  parts  understood, 
 
lxxvii 
 
 many  known  facts  were  related :  no  one  would  ima- 
 gine, that  if  he  could  make  out  the  part  in  cipher, 
 he  should  find  that  the  writer  did  not  know  the  plain 
 facts  which  he  had  related. 
 
 Again,  if,  from  the  deficiency  in  civil  history,  we 
 cannot  make  out  the  minute  fulfilment  of  every  pro- 
 phecy, yet  a  very  strong  proof  of  foresight  may  arise 
 from  a  general  completion  of  prophecy,  as  illustrated 
 by  civil  history ;  perhaps  as  much  proof  as  God  in- 
 tended should  be  afforded  by  such  prophecy. 
 
 Further,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is  naturally 
 applicable  to  such  and  such  events,  this  is,  of  itself, 
 a  presumptive  proof  that  it  was  intended  of  them. 
 Thus,  in  mythological  and  satirical  writings,  we  con- 
 clude that  we  understand  their  concealed  meaning, 
 in  proportion  to  the  number  of  particulars  clearly  ap- 
 plicable in  such  and  such  a  manner. 
 
 Add  to  this,  that  the  Jews  applied  the  prophecies 
 of  Christ  to  the  Messiah  before  his  coming,  in  much 
 the  same  manner  as  Christians  do  now ;  and  the  pri- 
 mitive Christians,  those  of  the  state  of  the  church, 
 and  of  the  world,  in  the  last  ages,  in  much  the  same 
 way  as  we  do  now,  and  as  the  event  seems  to  verify. 
 This  is  important. 
 
 Nor  is  it  any  argument  against  all  this,  if  we  sup- 
 pose the  prophets  to  have  applied  some  of  those  pro 
 phecies,  at  the  time,  to  other  immediate  events ;  for 
 they  were  only  amanuenses,  not  the  original  authors 
 of  their  predictions ;  that  is,  they  merely  wrote  as 
 they  were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost. 
 
 Thus,  the  argument  from  prophecy  has  great 
 weight,  though  we  should  not  be  able  to  satisfy  our- 
 selves on  every  point.      It  is,  indeed,  very  easy  to 
 
Ixxviii 
 
 determine  at  once  with  a  decisive  air,  and  say,  There 
 is  nothing  in  it; — and  this  suits  the  presumption  and 
 wilfulness  of  men.  But  the  true  proof  of  modesty 
 and  fairness  is  to  say,  There  is  certainly  something 
 in  it ;  and  it  shall  have  influence  upon  us  in  propor- 
 tion to  its  apparent  reality  and  weight.  And  this  all 
 analogy  suggests  to  be  the  reasonable  course. 
 
 II.  Let  us  now  consider  this  direct  evidence  of 
 miracles  and  prophecy,  in  connection  with  those  cir- 
 cumstantial and  collateral  proofs,  which  go  to  make 
 up  one  argument.  For  thus  in  daily  life,  we  judge 
 of  things  by  evidence  arising  from  various  coinci- 
 dences, which  confirm  each  other.  And  though 
 each  of  these  things,  separately,  may  have  little 
 weight,  yet  when  they  are  considered  together,  and 
 united  in  one  view,  they  may  have  the  greatest.  The 
 proof  of  revelation  is  not  some  direct  and  express 
 things  only,  but  a  great  variety  of  circumstantial 
 things  also,  in  the  result  of  which  the  proper  force 
 of  the  evidence  consists. 
 
 1.  Nfrw,  revelation  may  be  considered  as  wholly 
 historical;  for  prophecy  is  anticipated  history,  and 
 doctrines  and  precepts  may  be  viewed  as  matters  of 
 fact.  The  general  design  of  this  history,  is  to  give 
 us  an  account  of  the  world,  in  this  one  single  view, 
 as  God's  world ;  and  by  this  it  is  essentially  distin- 
 guished from  all  other  books.  After  the  history  of 
 the  creation,  it  gives  an  account  of  the  world  in  this 
 view,  during  that  state  of  apostacy  and  wickedness 
 which  it  represents  mankind  to  lie  in.  It  considers 
 the  common  affairs  of  men  as  a  scene  of  distraction, 
 and  only  refers  to  them  as  they  affect  religion. 
 
lxxix 
 
 2.  This  narrative,  comprehending  a  period  of 
 nearly  six  thousand  years,  gives  the  utmost  scope  for 
 objections  against  it ;  from  reason,  common  history, 
 or  any  inconsistency  in  its  parts.  And  undoubtedly 
 it  must,  and  would  have  been  confuted,  if  it  had 
 been  false,  as  all  false  religions  have  been  over  and 
 over  again ;  and,  therefore,  that  it  has  not  been  con- 
 futed, nor  pretended  to  have  been  confuted,  during 
 the  lapse  of  so  many  ages,  implies  a  positive  argument 
 that  it  is  true. 
 
 3.  Further,  the  Scriptures  contain  a  particular 
 history  of  the  Jews,  God's  peculiar  people, — the 
 promises  of  the  Messiah,  as  a  Saviour  for  Jews  ami 
 Gentiles, — the  narrative  of  the  birth  of  this  Messiah, 
 at  the  time  foretold, — and  of  the  propagation  of  his 
 religion, — and  of  his  being  rejected  by  the  Jewish 
 people. 
 
 4.  Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  to  read  the 
 Scriptures  thoroughly,  and  remark  these  and  other 
 historical  facts  contained  in  them,  without  knowing 
 whether  it  was  a  real  revelation  from  Heaven  or  not. 
 Then  let  this  person  be  told  to  look  out'into  the 
 world,  and  observe  if  the  state  of  things  seem  at  all  to 
 correspond  with  these  facts.  Let  him  be  informed 
 how  much  of  natural  religion  was  owing  to  this  book, 
 and  how  many  nations  received  it  as  divine,  and 
 under  what  circumstances.  Then  let  him  consider 
 of  what  importance  religion  is  to  mankind ;  and  he 
 would  see  that  this  supposed  revelation  having  had 
 this  influence,  and  having  been  received  in  the  world 
 as  it  was,  is  the  most  conspicuous  event  in  the  history 
 of  mankind;  and  that  a  book  thus  recommended, 
 demands  his  attention  as  by  a  voice  from  Heaven. 
 
ixxx 
 
 5.  Let  such  a  person  be  next  informed,  that  the 
 history  and  chronology  of  this  book  is  not  contra- 
 dicted, but  confirmed,  by  profane  history, — that  the 
 narrative  contains  all  the  internal  marks  of  truth  and 
 simplicity, — and  that  the  New  Testament  in  parti- 
 cular, is  confirmed  in  all  its  chief  facts  by  heathen 
 authors, — and  that  this  credibility  of  the  common 
 history  in  Scripture,  gives  some  credibility  to  its 
 miracles,  as  they  are  interwoven  and  make  up  one 
 narrative. 
 
 6.  Let  him  next  be  told  that  there  was  such  a 
 nation  as  the  Jews,  whose  existence  depended  on  the 
 law  said,  in  this  book,  to  have  been  given  them  by 
 Moses, — that  at  the  time  when  the  prophecies  had 
 led  this  people  to  expect  the  Messiah,  one  claiming 
 to  be  the  Messiah  appeared,  and  was  rejected  by 
 them,  as  foretold, — that  the  religion  was  received  by 
 the  Gentiles  on  the  authority  of  miracles,  and  that 
 the  Jews  remain  as  a  separate  people  to  this  present 
 day,  which  seems  to  look  forward  to  other  prophecies 
 of  ^lieir  future  conversion. 
 
 Let  him,  I  say,  first  gather  his  knowledge  entirely 
 from  Scripture,  and  then  compare  it  fact  by  fact  with 
 the  corresponding  history  of  the  world ;  and  the  joint 
 view  must  appear  to  him  most  surprising. 
 
 7.  All  these  points  make  up  an  argument  from 
 their  united,  not  separated,  force.  Then  add  to  these, 
 the  appearances  of  the  world,  as  answering  still  to 
 the  prophetic  history  and  numerous  other  particulars, 
 and  the  result  of  the  whole  must  be  allowed  to  be  of 
 the  greatest  weight. 
 
 8.  Then  we  should  remember,  that  a  mistake  in 
 rejecting  Christianity,  is  much  more  dangerous  in  its 
 
lxxxi 
 
 consequences  than  one  in  favour  of  it ;  and  that  m 
 temporal  affairs,*  we  always  consider  which  side  is  most 
 safe. 
 
 9.  We  should  also  bear  in  mind  that  the  truth 
 of  Christianity  is  proved,  like  that  of  any  common 
 event,  not  only  if  any  one  of  the  points  adduced 
 clearly  imply  it,  but  if  the  whole  taken  together  do, 
 though  no  one  singly  should.  No  one  who  is  serious 
 can  possibly  think  these  things  to  be  of  little  weight, 
 if  he  consider  the  importance  of  collateral  things, 
 and  less  circumstances,  in  the  evidence  of  probability, 
 as  distinguished  in  nature  from  the  evidence  of 
 demonstration. 
 
 10.  It  should  be  just  observed,  that  the  nature  of 
 this  evidence  gives  a  great  advantage  to  persons  who 
 choose  to  attack  Christianity  in  a  short,  lively  man- 
 ner in  conversation ;  because  an  objection  against 
 particular  points  is  easily  shown,  whereas  the  united 
 force  of  the  whole  argument  requires  much  time  and 
 thought. 
 
 Chap.  VIII. — Lastly,  Some  persons  may  object 
 to  this  whole  argument,  from  the  analogy  of  nature, 
 and  say,  It  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difficulties  in  reve- 
 lation, by  asserting  that  there  are  like  difficulties  in 
 natural  religion. 
 
 1.  Now,  men's  wanting  to  have  all  difficulties 
 cleared  in  revelation,  is  the  same,  for  any  thing  they 
 know,  as  requiring  to  comprehend  the  divine  nature. 
 And  it  is  no  otherwise  a  poor  thing  to  argue  from 
 natural  to  revealed  religion,  than  it  is  a  poor  thing 
 for  a  physician  to  have  so  little  knowledge  in  the  cure 
 of  diseases ;  which  is  yet  so  much  better  than  having 
 d  3 
 
iXXXll 
 
 no  skill  at  all.      Indeed,  the  epithet  poor  may  he 
 applied  as  properly  to  the  whole  of  human  life. 
 
 Further,  it  is  unreasonable  for  men  to  urge  objec- 
 tions against  Christianity  which  are  of  equal  weight 
 against  natural  religion,  whilst  they  profess  to  admit 
 the  truth  of  natural  religion.     This  is  unfair  dealing. 
 
 2.  But  again,  religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  if 
 men  have  the  like  reason  to  believe  the  truth  of  it, 
 as  they  have  in  what  they  do  in  their  temporal  affairs, 
 then  they  are  so  much  the  more  bound  to  act  on  it, 
 as  the  interest  is  infinitely  greater.  This  is  plainly 
 unanswerable.  If  they  believe,  that  taking  care  of 
 their  temporal  interest  will  be  for  their  advantage, 
 then  there  is  equal  reason  for  believing,  that  obeying 
 Christianity,  and  taking  care  of  their  future  interests, 
 will  be  for  their  advantage.  It  is  according  to  the 
 conduct  and  character  of  the  Author  of  nature,  that 
 we  should  act  upon  such  probable  evidence.  All 
 analogy  clearly  shows  this. 
 
 3.  The  design  of  the  Analogical  argument  is  not 
 to  vindicate  the  character  of  God,  but  to  show  the 
 obligations  of  men.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  prove  the 
 reasonableness  of  every  thing  enjoined  us  in  Chris- 
 tianity; the  reasonableness  of  the  practice  of  our 
 duty  is  enough.  And  though  analogy  does  not  pre- 
 tend immediately  to  answer  objections  against  the 
 wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  doctrines  and  precepts 
 of  Christianity,  yet  it  does  this  indirectly,  by  showing 
 that  the  things  objected  against  are  not  incredible. 
 
 4.  It  is  readily  acknowledged,  that  this  treatise 
 is  not  what  is  called  satisfactory — very  far  from  it  ; 
 but  then  no  natural  institution  of  life  would  appear 
 so,  if  reduced  into  a  system  together  with  its  proof. 
 
lxxxiii 
 
 The  unsatisfactory  evidence  with  which  we  put  up  in 
 common  life,  is  not  to  be  expressed.  Yet  men  do 
 not  throw  away  life  on  account  of  this  doubtfulness. 
 And  religion  presupposes,  in  all  who  would  embrace 
 it,  some  integrity  and  honesty,  a  willingness  to  follow 
 the  probability  of  things ;  just  as  speaking  to  a  man 
 supposes  him  to  understand  the  language  in  which 
 you  speak.  The  question  then  is,  not  whether  the 
 evidence  of  Christianity  be  what  is  called  satisfactory, 
 but  whether  it  be  sufficient  to  prove  and  discipline 
 that  virtue  and  integrity  of  mind  which  it  presup- 
 poses, though  it  be  not  sufficient  to  remove  every 
 objection,  or  gratify  curiosity. 
 
 5.  As  to  the  little  influence  which  this  whole 
 argument  may  actually  have  on  men — which  is  made 
 an  objection  to  it — the  true  question  is,  not  how  men 
 will  actually  behave,  but  how  they  ought  to  behave. 
 It  is  no  objection  to  this  argument,  that  it  may  fail 
 of  convincing  men.  Religion,  as  a  probation,  has 
 its  end  on  all  to  whom  it  has  been  proposed  with 
 sufficient  evidence,  let  them  behave  as  they  will  con- 
 cerning it. 
 
 On  the  whole,  the  proof  of  Christianity  is  greatly 
 strengthened  by  these  considerations  from  analogy ; 
 though  it  is  easy  to  cavil  at  them,  and  to  object  that 
 they  are  not  demonstrative,  which  it  was  never  pre- 
 tended they  were,  nor  could  be.  They  are  of  the 
 nature  of  probable  arguments ;  but  then  they  are  so 
 forcible  and  just,  that  it  is  impossible  to  answer  them, 
 or  evade  them  fairly. 
 
 Conclusion. — In  this  treatise  we  have  consi- 
 dered  Christianity  as  a  matter  of  fact  merely,  and 
 
lxxxiv 
 
 have  argued  with  unbelievers  on  their  own  ground. 
 We  have,  therefore,  neither  argued  from  the  liberty 
 of  man,  nor  from  the  moral  fitness  of  things;  both  of 
 which  would  have  strengthened  our  argument,  and 
 both  of  which  we  believe  to  be  true.  But  we  have 
 taken  up  things  on  the  lowest  ground,  and  given 
 every  advantage  we  could  to  our  adversary. 
 
 In  the  first  part,  a  view  has  been  given  of  natural 
 religion,  and  the  chief  difficulties  concerning  this 
 have  been  answered  by  the  analogy  of  God's  govern- 
 ment of  the  universe.  Thus,  the  objections  against 
 a  future  life  of  moral  and  righteous  retribution, 
 wherein  God  will  reward  or  punish  men  according  to 
 their  behaviour  here,  and  for  which  this  world  is  a 
 state  of  discipline  and  preparation,  have  been  silenced 
 or  refuted;  and  the  general  notion  of  religion  has 
 been  shown  to  be  throughout  agreeable  to  the  obvious 
 course  of  things  in  this  present  world. 
 
 For,  indeed,  natural  religion  carries  in  it  much 
 evidence  of  truth,  on  barely  being  proposed  to  our 
 thoughts.  To  an  unprejudiced  mind,  ten  thousand 
 thousand  instances  of  design  cannot  but  prove  a  De- 
 signer. And  it  is  intuitively  manifest,  that  creatures 
 ought  to  live  under  a  dutiful  sense  of  their  Maker ; 
 and  that  justice  and  charity  must  be  his  laws,  to  crea- 
 tures such  as  we  are,  whom  he  has  formed  social,  and 
 placed  in  society.  The  neglect,  therefore,  of  men 
 towards  it,  must  arise  from  objections  against  all  reli- 
 gion generally;  which  objections  have  been  met  in  the 
 first  part  of  this  work.  Natural  religion  has  been 
 there  cleared  of  its  difficulties,  and  its  credibility 
 shown. 
 
 In  the  second  part,  the  particular  scheme  of  Chris- 
 
lxxxv 
 
 tianity  has  been  considered;  and  the  objections  against 
 its  importance,  against  the  miracles  on  which  its  evi- 
 dence rests,  and  against  its  provision  of  a  Mediator, 
 have  been  proved  to  be  invalid.  The  difficulties 
 raised  concerning  it,  because  it  is  not  universal,  and 
 because  its  evidence  is  not  overbearing,  have  also 
 been  removed.  Some  observations  have,  lastly,  been 
 made  on  the  objections  to  the  special  evidence  of 
 Christianity;  as  consisting  of  miracles,  prophecies, 
 and  a  great  many  other  collateral  circumstances  united 
 in  one  argument. 
 
 Thus  we  have  endeavoured  to  strengthen  the  evi- 
 dences  of  Christianity  to  those  who  believe  it  to  be 
 true;  and  to  show  its  probability  to  those  who  do  not 
 believe  it.  The  Treatise  is  especially  addressed  to 
 those  who  imagine,  that  the  evidences  of  natural  and 
 revealed  religion,  if  true,  would  have  been  stronger 
 than  they  are,  or  irresistible ;  and  who  think,  that 
 doubting  about  Christianity  is  in  a  manner  the  same 
 thing  as  being  certain  against  it.  If  these  persons 
 are  not  willing  to  weigh  seriously  the  force  of  the 
 analogical  arguments  we  have  produced,  but  will  still 
 go  on  to  disregard  and  vilify  Christianity,  there  is 
 no  reason  to  think  they  would  alter  their  behaviour 
 to  any  purpose,  though  there  were  a  demonstration, 
 instead  of  what  there  is — a  high  probability  and 
 moral  certainty  of  its  truth. 
 
 Such   are   the   chief   steps   in   the   reasoning   of 
 Bishop  Butler,  in  this  great  work. 
 
 Having  thus  given  a  general  draught  of  the  main 
 argument,  as  well  as  of  the  particular  reasoning  of 
 
lxxxvi 
 
 the  Analogy,  we  come  to  the  second  general  division 
 of  this  Essay,  and  offer,  as  was  proposed,  some  ob- 
 servations 011  THE  CONNECTION  OF  THIS  ARGUMENT 
 WITH  THE  OTHER  BRANCHES  OF  THE  CHRISTIAN 
 EVIDENCE,  AND  ON  ITS  PECULIAR  USE  AND  IMPOR- 
 TANCE ;  AND  ALSO  ON  OUR  AUTHOR'S  VIEW  OF 
 PRACTICAL  CHRISTIANITY,  AND  ON  THE  ADAPTA- 
 TION OF  HIS  ARGUMENT  TO  THE  CHRISTIAN  RELI- 
 GION IN  ALL  ITS  EXTENT. 
 
 I.  We  begin  with  the  connection  of  the  Analogical 
 argument  with  the  other  branches  of  the  Christian 
 evidence,  and  on  its  peculiar  use  and  importance. 
 For  the  argument  from  analogy  does  not  stand  alone. 
 It  is  rather  the  completion,  and,  as  it  were,  the  crown 
 of  all  the  other  evidences  for  the  truth  of  Christianity. 
 It  comes  in  to  remove  objections  after  the  usual 
 proofs  have  been  admitted.  For  the  external, 
 the  internal,  and  what  I  may  call  the  analogical 
 Evidences  of  Christianity,  are  three  distinct  divisions 
 of  one  great  argument.  The  external  evidences 
 are  those  which  should  be  first  studied.  Indeed 
 they  are  the  only  ones  that  can  be  considered  in  the 
 first  instance  as  essential ;  because  they  undertake  to 
 show  the  credentials  of  the  messenger  who  professes 
 to  come  with  a  revelation  from  Heaven.  Christianity 
 claims  a  divine  origin.  I  have  therefore  a  right, 
 indeed  I  am  bound,  soberly  and  impartially  to  inquire 
 what  proofs  she  brings  of  this  high  claim.  And 
 when  she  refers  me  to  the  Holy  Scriptures  as  con- 
 taining all  her  records,  I  have  a  right  to  ask  what 
 evidence  there  is  of  the  genuineness  and  authenticity 
 of  these  books,  and  what  footing  they  place  the  reli- 
 gion upon,  which  they  wish  to  inculcate  on  mankind. 
 
r 
 wri 
 
 lxxxvii 
 
 The  answer  to  all  these  questions  is  found  in  what 
 we  call  the  External  Evidences  of  Christianity. 
 These  show  the  acknowledged  facts  on  which  the 
 eligion  rests.  They  prove  that  the  books  were 
 tten  by  the  persons  whose  names  they  bear,  and 
 do  contain  a  true  and  credible  history.  They  prove 
 that  the  revelation  itself  was  founded  on  unequivocal 
 and  numerous  miracles;  that  it  was  accompanied  (as 
 it  is  accompanied  still)  with  the  distinct  fulfilment  of 
 an  amazing  scheme  of  prophecy,  embracing  all  the 
 chief  events  of  the  world;  and  that  it  was  propagated 
 in  the  face  of  opposition  and  difficulty  with  a  trium- 
 phant success,  which  nothing  but  the  hand  of  God 
 could  have  effected.  These  evidences  also  show  the 
 positive  good  effects  produced  by  this  heavenly  doc- 
 trine, and  which  are  still  being  produced,  in  the 
 melioration  of  society,  and  the  advancement  of  human 
 happiness  and  virtue  in  all  the  nations  where  it  has 
 been  received.  We  have  no  ri^ht  to  o-o  farther  than 
 this  in  the  first  place.  The  moment  the  messenger 
 is  sufficiently  proved  to  have  divine  credentials,  we 
 have  but  one  duty  left,  tbat  of  receiving  and  obeying 
 his  message,  that  of  reading  and  meditating  on  the 
 revelation  itself,  in  order  to  conform  ourselves  to  it 
 with  devout  and  cheerful  submission.  We  have  no 
 right  at  all  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  discoveries, 
 or  doctrines,  or  precepts  of  Christianity,  with  the  view 
 of  determining  whether  they  seem  to  us  becoming 
 the  wisdom  of  God,  and  agreeable  to  the  reason  of 
 man.  It  is  proved  that  the  revelation  is  from  heaven. 
 This  is  enough.  The  infinitely  glorious  Creator 
 and  Sovereign  of  the  universe  has  full  power  to  do 
 what  he  will  with  his  own,  and  to  lay  down  laws  for 
 
Ixxxvm 
 
 his  creatures.  We  have  no  business,  strictly  speak- 
 ing, with  the  contents  and  tenor  of  these  laws,  exceot 
 to  understand  them  and  obey  them. 
 
 Great  mischief  has  been  done  to  the  Christian 
 cause  by  taking  another  method.  Men  have  allowed 
 themselves  to  be  entangled  with  discussions  on  the 
 possibility  and  credibility  of  a  revelation  being  given 
 to  man,  on  the  nature  and  tendency  of  the  Christian 
 doctrine,  on  the  reasonableness  of  its  particular 
 injunctions — questions  every  one  of  them  out  of 
 place  in  examining  the  evidence  of  a  divine  religion. 
 Let  it  fairly  be  made  out  to  come  from  God,  and  it 
 is  enough.  More  than  this  is  injurious.  We  arc 
 sure,  indeed,  that  the  contents  of  it  must  be  most 
 worthy  of  its  perfect  Author;  but  we  are  no  adequate 
 judges  of  what  is  worthy  or  what  is  not  worthy  of 
 an  infinite  Being.  We  have  no  right  to  call  the 
 Almighty  Creator  to  the  bar  of  our  feeble  reason, 
 and  suspend  obedience  to  his  commands  on  the 
 determination  whether  those  commands  are  in  our 
 opinion  just  and  good  or  not.  To  receive  a  revelation 
 on  the  "-round  of  its  proper  credentials,  and  then  to 
 trace  out  with  reverence  the  wisdom  and  goodness 
 of  its  contents,  is  one  thing;  but  to  sit  in  judgment 
 on  those  contents,  previously  to  an  examination  of 
 its  credentials,  and  in  order  to  decide  whether  we 
 shall  receive  the  professed  revelation  or  not,  is  quite 
 another.  We  are  competent  to  understand  the 
 simple  and  commanding  language  of  the  Almighty, 
 attesting  by  miracles  and  prophecy,  and  the  extra- 
 ordinary propagation  of  the  gospel,  and  its  visible 
 good  effects  on  mankind,  the  truth  of  a  supernatural 
 revelation;  and  yet  are  no  competent  judges  whatever 
 
XXXI X 
 
 of  the  particular  things  the  Almighty  may  see  fit  to 
 communicate  in  that  revelation.  Evidences  are  level 
 to  a  candid  and  fair  understanding;  divine  doctrines 
 may  not  be  so.  Evidences  are  addressed  to  man's 
 reason,  and  warrant  the  modest  exercise  of  it;  doc- 
 trines are  addressed  to  faith,  and  demand  not  discus- 
 sion, but  obedience. 
 
 The  danger  of  acting  in  the  way  which  I  am 
 now  venturing  to  condemn,  is  greater,  because  the 
 door  being  once  opened  to  such  reasoning,  it  is  quite 
 certain  that  the  minds  of  men  will  too  often  employ 
 it  amiss.  The  infidel  is  the  person  just  the  least 
 capable  to  act  aright  in  such  a  case.  The  pious 
 well-trained  judgment  of  a  sincere  Christian  might 
 indeed  form  a  better  estimate  of  the  internal  cha- 
 racter of  a  revelation  from  heaven ;  but  the  unsub- 
 dued mind  of  an  unbeliever  can  only  come  to  a  wrong 
 decision  upon  it.  He  wants  all  the  preparation 
 necessary. 
 
 But  although  the  External  proofs  of  Christianity 
 are  thus  all  that,  in  the  first  examination,  is  required, 
 yet  the  internal  evidences  may  afterwards  be 
 profitable — most  profitably  studied.  Christianity 
 shrinks  from  no  scrutiny.  She  courts  the  light. 
 When  the  outward  credentials  of  the  heavenly  mes- 
 senger have  once  been  investigated,  and  the  message 
 been  received  on  this  its  proper  footing;  then  if  it 
 be  asked,  whether  the  contents  of  the  revelation 
 seem  to  confirm  the  proof  of  its  divine  original — 
 whether  the  sincere  believer  will  find  them  adapted 
 to  his  wants — whether  the  morals  inculcated,  the  end 
 proposed,  the  means  enjoined,  are  agreeable  to  man's 
 best  reason  and  the  dictates  of  an  enlightened  under- 
 
xc 
 
 standing  and  conscience — whether  the  character  of 
 Christ  be  worthy  of  his  religion — whether  the  in- 
 fluence of  grace,  said  to  accompany  Christianity,  may 
 be  obtained  by  prayer — whether  the  lives  and  deaths 
 of  Christians,  as   compared  with  those   of  professed 
 Infidels,   illustrate  the    excellency   of  their   faith — 
 whether,    in   short,    the   promises   and   blessings   of 
 Christianity  are  verified  in  those  who  make  a  trial  of 
 them,  by  submitting  to  the  means  appointed  for  their 
 attainment :   when  such  questions  are  put  with  can- 
 dour, by  those  who  have  embraced  Christianity,  we 
 answer  them  by  referring  to  the  Internal  evidences  of 
 Revelation.      These  Internal  evidences  are  now  our 
 appropriate  study.      They  show  us  the  adaptation  of 
 the  religion  to  the  situation  and  wants  of  man ;  the 
 purity  and  sublimity  of  its  doctrines  and  precepts ; 
 the  character  of  its  Founder ;    the   sanctifying  and 
 consoling  effect   of  the  influence  which  accompanies 
 it ;   the  holy  lives  and  happy  deaths  of  its  genuine 
 followers;  and  the   trial  which  every  one  may  make 
 of  its  promises  and  blessings,  by  fulfilling  the  terms 
 on  which   they  are  proposed.      Each  of  these  topics 
 admits  of  lar^e  illustration.      The  whole  of  the  In- 
 ternal    evidences    form    an   argument    in   favour    of 
 Christianity,  as  complete  and  satisfactory  in  its  par- 
 ticular province  as  the  whole  of  the  External.    Indeed 
 they  are,  in  some  respects,  more  persuasive,  though 
 they  come  after  them,  and  are  secondary  to  them. 
 The    External    evidences    enforce    conviction — the 
 Internal   induce  to  love.      The    External  bring  to 
 light  the  potent  remedy,  the  Internal  apply  it  to  the 
 sufferer,   and  produce   the   actual   cure.      The   first- 
 require  an  exercise  of  the  understanding  on  plain 
 
XC1 
 
 facts  stated,  the  second  the  submission  of  the  affec- 
 tions to  a  benefit  conferred.  By  the  one  we  know 
 religion  to  be  true,  by  the  other  we  feel  it  to  be 
 good.  The  External  evidences  awaken  attention  to 
 a  new  doctrine — the  Internal  attract  the  heart  to  an 
 incalculable  blessing. 
 
 Accordingly,  no  class  of  persons  is  excluded  from 
 that  conviction  of  the  truth  of  Christianity  which 
 springs  from  a  perception  of  its  effects  in  themselves 
 and  others.  The  external  evidences  indeed  are  sim- 
 ple as  they  are  majestic;  but  to  the  unpractised  and 
 uneducated  mind,  they  necessarily  lose  much  of  their 
 force.  The  great  body  of  mankind  must  be  indebted 
 to  their  instructors,  in  a  large  measure,  for  their 
 faith  in  the  historical  evidences  of  religion ;  but  they 
 can  feel  it  in  its  sacred  fruits  as  keenly,  and  perhaps 
 even  more  keenly,  than  any  other  description  of 
 persons.  They  are  incapable  of  following  a  train  of 
 reasoning,  or  of  judging  of  distant  and  remote  fact; 
 but  they  are  quite  capable  of  perceiving  the  blessed- 
 ness of  obeying  Christianity,  and  of  relying  on  its 
 promises.  Thus  a  source  of  faith  is  opened  to  them, 
 abundant  in  proportion  as  they  advance  in  piety  and 
 virtue.  And  though,  as  we  have  already  observed, 
 the  unbeliever  has  no  right  to  sit  in  judgment  on 
 the  internal  character  of  Christianity,  but  should,  and 
 must,  in  all  reason,  be  contented  at  first  with  the 
 proper  external  evidences  that  it  really  comes  from 
 God  ;  yet,  when  he  has  once  received  the  Christian 
 doctrine  aright,  and  has  begun  to  be  moulded  into 
 its  form,  and  takes  its  impression,  he  will  discover, 
 to  his  surprise,  new  traces  of  a  divine  hand  daily  in 
 all  its  parts;   he  will  feel  that  it  is  salutary  in  all  its 
 
XC1L 
 
 doctrines  and  in  all  its  precepts,  in  all  its  bearings 
 and  all  its  tendencies,  in  all  its  discoveries  and  de- 
 clarations, in  all  its  effects  and  fruits.  Like  the 
 light  of  the  sun,  it  will  speak  its  author  and  source. 
 The  confirmation  which  the  faith  of  the  sincere 
 believer  thus  receives  is  indescribable.  He  has  now 
 entered  the  temple  of  which  he  had  before  surveyed, 
 from  without,  the  proportions  and  magnificence.  He 
 has  now  partaken  of  the  feast,  of  which  he  had  be- 
 fore heard  the  tidings  and  listened  to  the  invitation. 
 He  has  now  experienced  the  skill  and  tenderness  of 
 the  Physician,  of  whose  fame  and  powers  he  had 
 before  been  convinced  only  by  testimony.  He  has 
 now  shared  the  unspeakable  gift  which  had  before 
 been  offered  to  him.  He  was  well  persuaded,  on  first 
 embracing  Christianity  on  its  due  external  authority, 
 that  every  thing  taught  by  it  would  be  found  most 
 agreeable  to  the  attributes  and  glory  of  its  divine 
 Author.  But  he  has  now  a  conviction  resulting 
 from  the  benefits  conferred,  of  a  kind  higher  in  its 
 degree,  and  more  consoling  in  its  effects,  than  any 
 external  proof  could  communicate,  and  which,  though 
 incapable  of  being  known,  from  the  nature  of  the 
 case,  previously  to  experience,  yet  when  once  known, 
 sways  and  bears  away  the  heart. 
 
 The  two  branches  of  evidence  thus  concurring  to 
 one  result — the  External  proving  the  truth  of  the 
 messenger,  and  the  Internal  confirming  afterwards 
 that  truth  by  an  experience  of  the  excellency  and 
 suitableness  of  the  message  itself — the  Christian  be- 
 liever has  a  continually  growing  conviction  of  the  firm 
 grounds  of  his  faith. 
 
 He  is  now  prepared  for  considering,  to  the  best 
 
XC111 
 
 advantage,  the  third  branch  of  the  evidences  in  favour 
 of  Christianity — that   arising  from   the   analogy 
 
 BETWEEN  THIS  RELIGION,  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION 
 
 and  course  of  nature.      This  brings  us  to  the 
 immediate  subject  of  Butler's  treatise,  of  which  we 
 have  already  given  a  review.      We  have  no  right, 
 indeed,  (for  the  idea  is  too  important  not  to  be  re- 
 peated,) to  call  for  this  species  of  proof  any  more 
 than  we  have  a  right  to  call,  in  the  first  instance,  for 
 an  examination   of  the  internal  character  of  Chris- 
 tianity, or  rather  to  call  for  it  at  all.      All  we  have 
 any  fair  right  to  ask  for,  is  the  credentials  of  the  am  • 
 bassador  who  professes  to  come  to  us  in  the  name  of 
 our  absent  though  ever-present  Sovereign  and  Lord. 
 It  is  perfectly  true,  that  the  analogy  of  nature,  as 
 formed  by  the  same  hand,  will  have  traces  of  the  same 
 system  and  scheme  of  Christianity,  just  as  it  is  true, 
 that  a  revelation  from  heaven  will  possess  every  inter- 
 nal mark  of  holiness  and  goodness  and  truth ;  but 
 we  have  no  right  to  stop,  and  pretend  to  follow  out 
 all  these  matters,  before  we  receive  the  Christian 
 doctrine  as  divine.       Christianity  does  not   submit 
 to  plead  at  such  a  bar.      The   capacity  of  receiving 
 advantage  from  these  auxiliary  evidences,   depends 
 on  our  first  admitting,  on   the  plain  grounds  of  its 
 miracles  and  prophecies,  and  propagation,  and  mighty 
 effects,  the  truth  of  the  revelation  by  which   these 
 additional  proofs  are  to  be  created  and  communicated, 
 and  without  which  they  cannot  be  employed  to  any 
 purpose. 
 
 Still,  after  we  have  sincerely  embraced  the  gospel, 
 we  may  humbly  inquire,  whether  the  difficulties  which 
 are  raised  against  it  by  unbelievers,  or  which  occur  to 
 
XC1V 
 
 our  own  minds,  may  be  relieved  by  an  appeal  to  the 
 works  of  God  in  nature,  and  his  order  and  govern- 
 ment therein.     This  is  the  argument  from  Analogy, 
 which   rises    still   a   step  above   the    two   preceding 
 branches  of  the  subject,  not  as  in  itself  necessary  to 
 the  first   reception   of  Christianity,  but  as  furnish 
 ing  the  subsequent  confirmation  of  it,  and  removing 
 scruples  and  objections  arising  from   the  ignorance 
 and  presumption  of  man.      It  is,  indeed,  a  glorious 
 thing   thus  to   discern  the   harmony  between  Chris- 
 tianity, the  greatest  of  the  Almighty's  works,  and  all 
 the  other  known  productions  of  the  same  divine  Ar- 
 chitect.     To  see  that  the  natural  and  moral  govern- 
 ment  of  God   are  parts  of  one   stupendous  whole, 
 sums   up,   and   finishes,    and   absolves   the   subject. 
 Nothing  more  can  be  said.      All  is,  what  we  might 
 be  sure  it  would  be,  complete  and  adequate.      The 
 force   of   External    evidences   is  to   compel   assent ; 
 the  effect  of  the  Internal  to  produce  love;  the  chief 
 efficacy  of  the  Analogical  to  silence  objections.      By 
 the  first,  a  message  is  proved  to  come  from  heaven ; 
 by  the   second,  the   salutary  effects   of  this  message 
 are  felt  and   understood;  by  the  third,  it  is   shown 
 to  be,  in   itself,   most  agreeable  to   all  the   known 
 dispensations   of  the   divine  Author.      The   first  is 
 the  proper  evidence  which  such  a  case  indispensably 
 demands ;   the  next  confirms,  by  actual  experience, 
 this  satisfactory  ground  of  belief;  the  last  excludes 
 all  contradictory  assertions,  and  creates  a  silence  and 
 repose  of  mind,  when  objections  are  urged  by  others, 
 or  arise  in  our  own  thoughts.      External  evidences, 
 by  their  simple  majesty,  address  the  reason  of  man- 
 kind, and  overwhelm   objections  and  surmises;   In- 
 
xcv 
 
 ternal,  by  the  influences  of  truth  on  the  heart,  indis- 
 pose men  to  listen  to  those  objections;  Analogical, 
 by  showing  that  such  objections  lie  equally  against 
 the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  deprive  them 
 of  all  their  force,  and  turn  them  into  proofs  of  divine 
 goodness  and  power. 
 
 In  thus  assigning  to  the  three  branches  of  evi- 
 dence a  particular  position,  we  are  far  from  insinuat- 
 ing that  they  may  not  be  considered  in  a  different 
 order.  We  merely  wish  to  claim  for  the  external 
 evidences  the  rank  to  which  they  are  entitled  in 
 fair  argument,  and  to  protest  against  the  additional 
 and  auxiliary  evidences  being  improperly  resorted 
 to,  in  the  first  instance,  to  the  neglect  of  the  palpable 
 credentials  of  the  Christian  message.  To  maintain 
 this  is  a  matter  of  real  moment.  It  places  the 
 various  branches  of  the  inquiry  in  their  true  and 
 natural  light.  Still  we  object  not  to  any  part  of 
 them  being  separately  considered,  according  to  the 
 disposition,  age,  talents,  information,  and  circum- 
 stances of  men.  The  Christian  evidence  in  each 
 division,  and  each  subdivision  of  it,  is  so  clear  and 
 convincing  to  a  fair  and  sincere  inquirer,  as  to  admit 
 of  a  distinct  discussion  and  exhibition,* if  it  be  con- 
 ducted with  good  faith.  But  if  men  wish  to  seize 
 what  seems  to  them  a  feeble  part  of  the  Internal  or 
 Analogical  argument,  and  press  this  out  of  its  place, 
 disregarding  the  plain  and  direct  proofs  of  Chris- 
 tianity from  miracles,  prophecy,  &c.s  we  then  recall 
 them  to  the  consideration  of  the  real  state  of  the 
 argument.  We  tell  them  they  are  no  adequate 
 judges  of  what  a  divine  revelation  should  contain. 
 We  appeal  to  the  proper  and  unanswerable  proofs  of 
 
XCV1 
 
 a  divine  religion,  in  the  extraordinary  manifestations 
 of  Almighty  God  in  its  favour.  And  we  bid  them 
 postpone  the  examination  of  the  subsidiary  evidences, 
 till  they  have  weighed  the  primary  ones,  and  received 
 the  religion  which  they  attest.  Thus,  to  a  serious 
 candid  mind,  we  are  willing  to  open  at  once  any  part 
 of  the  wide  subject  of  the  evidences  of  Christianity; 
 whilst  to  a  captious  and  unreasonable  inquirer,  we 
 propose  the  strict  rules  of  debate,  and  demand  the 
 orderly  examination  of  the  credentials  of  the  reli- 
 gion. 
 
 If,  however,  after  all,  men  will  unreasonably  de- 
 mand an  exposition  of  the  internal  character  of 
 Christianity,  in  the  first  place,  or  will  dwell  on  ob- 
 jections raised  against  its  particular  constitution,  we 
 descend  on  the  ground  they  have  chosen,  and  with- 
 out relinquishing  our  right  to  assume  a  higher  posi- 
 tion and  to  insist  only  on  the  direct  proofs  of  it,  we 
 meet  them  where  they  stand,  and  show  them  the 
 inward  excellency  of  our  religion  from  the  Internal 
 evidences,  or  the  weakness  and  inconclusiveness-  of 
 ?,heir  objections  from  the  Analogical.  Thus  Chris- 
 tianity stoops,  so  far  as  it  can,  to  the  fancies  of  men, 
 and  argues  with  them  on  their  own  principles. 
 This  is  particularly  the  case  with  the  evidence  from 
 analogy. 
 
 It  is  indeed  one  of  the  most  valuable  branches  of 
 the  whole  Christian  argument,  because  objections 
 are  the  ground  commonly  taken  by  unbelievers.  For 
 weak  and  inconclusive  as  these  objections  are,  they 
 are  sufficient,  when  listened  to,  to  steel  the  heart 
 against  the  force  of  truth,  and  bar  up  the  first  en- 
 trance to  the  Christian  doctrine.      The  young  and 
 
xcvn 
 
 inexperienced  are  thus  gradually  seduced  and  har- 
 dened. It  is  not  that  men  have  found  out  that  the 
 External  evidences  of  Christianity  are  insufficient, 
 for  they  have  never  studied  them — it  is  not  that 
 they  have  discovered  the  fallacy  of  the  Internal  evi- 
 dences, for  they  have  never  heen  in  a  situation  to 
 judge  of  them.  But  they  have  heard  hold  things 
 flippantly  said  against  Christianity :  things  which 
 they  were  not  sufficiently  informed  on  the  subject  to 
 answer:  these  have  sunk  into  their  memories,  and 
 acquired  force  by  lapse  of  time  ;  and  thus  their  minds 
 became  gradually  tainted  and  poisoned.  Their  pas- 
 sions, impatient  of  the  restraints  of  Christianity, 
 aided  the  delusion.  Their  pride  of  intellect,  ambi- 
 tious of  forsaking  the  common  track,  listened  to  the 
 flattering  tale.  The  opinions  and  example  of  others, 
 as  little  competent  to  judge  as  themselves,  attracted 
 them  onwards.  Ridicule,  unanswerable  ridicule, 
 came  in  to  their  overthrow.  The  love  of  novelty 
 was  not  without  its  force.  They  had  no  inclination 
 to  the  patient  inquiry  which  such  a  subject  as  religion 
 demands ;  whereas  an  objection  was  seized  at  once. 
 Thus,  insensibly,  the  impressions  of  a  pious  education 
 were  effaced,  and  the  unhappy  youth  entered  on  the 
 mazes  of  infidelity,  and  came,  at  last,  to  scoff  at  the 
 very  religion  which  he  once  reverenced  if  he  did  not 
 obey. 
 
 Here,  then,  the  argument  from  Analogy  may  be 
 of  the  greatest  service.  We  insist  not  with  sucli  a 
 youth,  on  an  examination  of  the  External  evidence?, 
 of  religion,  to  which  we  see  he  would  not  attend, 
 and  we  come  at  once  to  Ins  objections.  We  show 
 him,  in  ilie  manner  of  the  preceding  treatise,  that 
 e  17 
 
XCVlll 
 
 ne  may  well  expect  to  find  the  same  sort  of  charac- 
 ter in  a  revelation,  proceeding  from  the  Author  of 
 nature,  as  is  found  in  the  constitution  and  order  of 
 nature  itself;  that  our  ignorance,  with  respect  to 
 natural  things,  is  such,  that  we  cannot  go  on  a  single 
 step,  except  as  facts  and  experiments  lead  us  by  the 
 hand  ;  and,  that  as  this  ignorance  is  the  proper  answer 
 to  presumptions  and  difficulties,  derived  from  our 
 opinion  of  things  beforehand,  so  is  this  much  more 
 the  case  in  religion,  where  we  find  only  the  same 
 kind  of  difficulties  which  meet  us  perpetually  in  the 
 works  of  the  same  hand  in  the  course  of  nature.  So 
 that,  in  short,  he  that  rejects  Christianity,  on  ac- 
 count of  these  difficulties,  may,  for  the  very  same 
 reason,  deny  the  world  to  have  been  formed  by  an 
 intelligent  Creator.  Thus  all  objections  against  the 
 Scriptures,  drawn  from  what  is  similar  or  analogous 
 in  the  order  of  the  world,  which  is  acknowledged  by 
 the  objector  himself  to  proceed  from  an  Almighty 
 Governor,  are  satisfactorily  silenced;  and  the  mind, 
 freed  from  harassing  and  frivolous  objections,  is  at 
 liberty  to  weigh  impartially  the  direct  proof  of  Chris- 
 tianity, and  then  to  seek  the  best  confirmation  of  a 
 wavering  faith,  in  its  salutary  effects  in  pardoning 
 guilt,  tranquillizing  conscience,  subduing  pride,  re- 
 gulating the  affections  and  appetites,  and  changing 
 the  whole  character  from  that  of  a  discontented,  cap- 
 tious, selfish  creature,  to  that  of  a  patient,  docile, 
 thankful,  benevolent  one. 
 
 Thus  all  the  several  branches  of  the  Evidences  of 
 Christianity  are  ultimately  studied,  though  not  in 
 the  order  which  the  strict  rules  of  the  case  would  lay 
 down.      The  great  object  is  gained,  if  the  unbeliever 
 
XC1X 
 
 is  convinced;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  he  refuses  to 
 listen  to  our  argument  from  analogy,  or  professes 
 himself  dissatisfied  with  it,  we  are  still  at  liberty  to 
 remind  him,  that  the  only  proofs  which  he  can  claim 
 in  the  first  instance,  are  the  direct  and  proper  cre- 
 dentials of  miracles  and  prophecy,  and  other  exter- 
 nal evidences ;  and  that  his  paramount  duty  is  to 
 submit  to  the  revelation  thus  attested,  and  not  yield 
 to  objections  and  difficulties  resting  on  mere  concep- 
 tions and  opinions. 
 
 But  the  use  and  importance  of  the  argument  from 
 analogy  may  be  frequently  observed  in  the  case  of 
 the  sincere  Christian.      How  often   is  the  thought- 
 ful  believer  harassed  by  objections  !      The  best  men 
 are  still  weak   and   defective ;  and   notwithstanding 
 the  clearest   deductions    of  reason,  and   the  avowed 
 subjection  of  the  heart  to  the  gospel,  doubts,  and 
 embarrassments,   and  apprehensions,  will  haunt  the 
 mind.      There  are  few  who  have  not  felt  this.      The 
 imagination  roves  on  forbidden  topics — thoughts  the 
 most  unwelcome  intrude — arguments  fail  to  satisfy 
 — exploded  objections  recur.      Especially  if  circum- 
 stances require  a  Christian  to  treat  with  infidels,  and 
 examine  and  refute  their  arguments,  the  infirmity  of 
 his  faith  will  sometimes  be  an  occasion    of  surprise 
 and  distress  to  him.      In  such   seasons,  no  source  of 
 relief  is  more  plenteous  than  that  springing  from  the 
 clear  and  striking  similarity  between   the   objections 
 raised  against   revelation,  and   those    which   may  be 
 raised  against  the  government  and  order  of  God  in 
 natural  providence.      When  the  External  and  In- 
 ternal evidences  of  Christianity  seem  cold,  and  inef- 
 fective, and    barren,    the   analogical   precisely   meet 
 e  2 
 
his  feelings.  The  full  and  adequate  repose  which 
 they  inspire  is  a  calm  after  a  storm.  The  relief  is 
 more  sensible  from  being  unexpected.  For,  some- 
 how or  other,  the  mind,  at  times,  appears  quite 
 hedged  in  with  fears  and  speculations.  The  state  of 
 misery  in  which  the  world  lies — the  prevalence  of 
 moral  evil — the  immense  majority  of  the  human  race 
 sunk  in  pagan  ignorance — the  trials  of  good  men — 
 the  prosperity  of  the  wicked — the  slow  progress  of 
 truth  and  reason;  these,  and  a  thousand  like  matters, 
 perplex,  too  frequently,  the  benevolent  and  reflecting 
 mind  of  the  Christian.  He  is  quite  astonished  that 
 an  all-wise  and  all-gracious  Creator  should  leave  a 
 revelation  with  so  little  efficacy  attending  it.  He 
 thinks  that  he  can  never  obtain  satisfaction  upon 
 these  questions.  He  has  forgotten  the  arguments 
 which  formerly  silenced  his  scruples,  and  his  faith  is 
 ready  to  fail  him.  The  analogical  argument  then 
 occurs  to  his  distracted  thoughts — he  reads  it  as  if 
 he  had  never  read  it  before — it  seems  new,  forcible, 
 conclusive — his  proud  reasonings  sink — faith  re- 
 sumes her  sway — humility  acknowledges  the  igno- 
 rance and  littleness  of  man,  before  the  incomprehen- 
 sible plans  of  the  infinite  God — his  state  of  pro- 
 bation and  discipline  forces  itself  upon  his  notice — 
 the  traces  of  the  same  divine  Governor,  in  the  natu- 
 ral and  moral  world,  are  again  seen  and  recognised 
 — and  the  satisfaction  he  thus  regains  is  more  than 
 can  be  expressed.  In  proportion  as  the  difficulties 
 appeared  insuperable,  is  the  removal  of  them  consol- 
 ing and  vivifying. 
 
 There  is  this  further  to  be  noticed,  as  to  the  im- 
 portance of  the   argument  from   analogy,  that  it  is 
 
CI 
 
 capable  of  indefinite  ramification.  The  fruitfulness 
 of  it  is  such,  that  each  Christian,  throughout  the 
 whole  course  of  life,  may  multiply  his  observation 
 without  exhausting  the  inquiry.  There  is  an  in- 
 herent freshness  and  life  in  it  which  makes  it  always 
 new  and  interesting. 
 
 Indeed,  we  must  observe,  before  we  quit  this 
 topic,  that  the  variety  of  the  Christian  argument 
 generally,  is  one  striking  confirmation  of  its  truth. 
 The  evidences  for  revelation  may  be  truly  said  to  be 
 diversified,  and  extensive  beyond  any  thing  that 
 could  have  been  conceived,  we  do  not  say,  on  a  like 
 subject,  but  on  any  subject  whatever.  If  a  man 
 were  allowed  to  point  out  beforehand,  the  proofs  of 
 a  divine  religion  to  be  addressed  to  a  reasonable  and 
 accountable  being,  he  could  not  name  any  different 
 in  kind  from  those  which  we  possess.  For  what 
 could  a  man  demand,  but  either  the  conspicuous  dis- 
 play of  a  clearly  miraculous  power  in  attestation  of 
 it,  or  the  incontrovertible  fulfilment  of  prophecy — 
 or  the  triumphant  and  supernatural  spread  of  the 
 doctrine  itself — or  the  visible  and  mighty  effects  on 
 all  who  receive  it  ?  And  where  the  revelation  is 
 admitted  and  obeyed,  what  internal  confirmation  of 
 its  truth  could  he  desire,  beyond  the  adaptation  of 
 it  to  the  state  and  wants  of  man — the  purity  and 
 sublimity  of  its  doctrines  and  precepts — the  untainted 
 benevolence  of  its  Founder — the  attendant  influence 
 of  grace — and  the  actual  accomplishment  of  its  pro- 
 mises to  all  who  apply  duly  for  them?  And  if  ob- 
 jections be  afterwards  raised  against  this  scheme, 
 what  could  he  wish  further,  than  to  see  them  ex- 
 tinguished by  considerations  derived  from  the  igno- 
 
cu 
 
 ranee  of  man,  and  the  incomprehensibility  of  God? 
 In  this  diversity  of  proof  all  the  attributes  of  the 
 Almighty  are  pledged,  as  it  were,  to  the  sincere 
 believer.  The  miracles  give  him  the  pledge  of 
 the  sovereign  power  of  God — the  prophecies,  of  his 
 omniscience — the  supernatural  propagation  of  the 
 gospel,  of  his  supreme  providence — the  effects  pro- 
 duced, of  his  fidelity — the  adaptation  to  the  state  of 
 man,  of  his  wisdom — the  purity  of  the  doctrine  and 
 morals,  of  his  holiness — the  character  of  Christ,  of 
 his  condescension — the  accompanying  influence,  of  his 
 grace  and  goodness — the  fulfilment  of  the  promises, 
 of  his  veracity.  Thus  the  evidences  of  Christianity 
 have  an  impression  of  the  divine  glory  irradiating 
 them.* 
 
 But  it  is  not  merely  the  diversity  of  these  topics, 
 but  the  dissimilarity  of  them  from  each  other, 
 which  gives  them  their  incomparable  weight.  They 
 are  not  all  of  a  kind.  The  impostor  who  could  be 
 imagined  to  feign  one  branch  of  them,  would  be  inca- 
 pacitated by  that  very  attempt  from  feigning  the  rest. 
 They  would  each  demand  a  separate  scheme,  distinct 
 powers,  a  new  reach  of  intellect,  different  combina- 
 tions. The  independence  of  these  different  evidences 
 upon  each  other,  indescribably  augments  their  force. 
 In  fact,  the  annals  of  mankind  never  exhibited  such 
 a  region  as  Christianity  surrounded  with  her  creden- 
 tials, nor  any  thing  like  it.  The  systems  of  Heathen- 
 ism and  Mahommedanism  reflect  a  glory  on  revelation 
 
 *  We  are  indebted  for  some  thoughts  in  this  part  of  the  Essay, 
 to  Mr.  Davidson's  admirable  Warburtonian  Lectures— a  work 
 of  deep  research  and  full  of  fine  reflections;  especially  on  the 
 structure  of  prophecy. 
 
cm 
 
 by  the  contrast  which  they  exhibit  in  these  respects, 
 as  well  as  in  every  other. 
 
 And  yet  the  simplicity  of  these  different  evi- 
 dences of  our  religion  is  as  remarkable  as  their  num- 
 ber and  diversity.  For  they  are  level  to  every  un- 
 derstanding. They  address  themselves  to  the  faculty 
 of  judgment  with  which  we  are  endowed.  The  reader 
 of  history,  the  student  of  nature,  the  scholar,  the 
 contemplative  philosopher,  the  uneducated  inquirer, 
 the  candid  mind  of  every  class,  may  find  obvious  and 
 satisfactory  proofs  adapted  to  his  habits  and  capaci- 
 ties. If  there  is  no  bad  faith,  every  one  that  investi- 
 gates this  great  question  will  find  the  satisfaction  he 
 seeks  for. 
 
 We  only  observe,  further,  that  the  proper  force 
 and  strength  of  these  evidences,  lie  in  the  union  of 
 all  the  parts  of  the  argument.  This  Bishop  Butler 
 has  pointed  out,  chiefly  in  respect  of  the  analogical 
 argument;  but  it  is  important  to  be  applied  to  the 
 entire  subject.  One  point  may  more  forcibly  strike 
 the  conviction  of  one  inquirer,  and  another  point  of 
 another;  a  separate  argument  may  be  weakly  stated 
 by  the  Christian  advocate;  mistakes  maybe  made  in 
 deducing  a  particular  historical  proof,  or  alleging  a 
 particular  fact.  But  the  cause  of  Christianity  does 
 not  rest  on  any  one  division  of  the  subject,  but  on  the 
 whole.  Each  separate  branch  is,  indeed,  firm  enough 
 to  sustain  the  entire  edifice;  but  we  are  not  allowed 
 to  let  it  rest  there.  We  must  remind  the  sincere 
 inquirer,  that  it  is  the  combined  effect  of  the  various 
 topics  which  he  is  called  on  to  observe.  And  if  this 
 be  done,  we  fear  not  to  assert,  that  no  such  inquirer 
 shall  fail  of  all  the  satisfaction  which  a  moral  certainty 
 
CIV 
 
 can  produce.  The  infidel  attacks  Christianity  gene- 
 rally on  some  single  isolated  point  of  evidence;  and 
 if  he  can  contrive  to  obscure  the  brightness  of  this, 
 triumphs  as  if  he  had  proved  the  religion  to  be  ficti- 
 tious. And  not  only  so,  but  if  he  can  only  raise  a 
 doubt  about  the  truth  of  this  single,  and  perhaps 
 subordinate  point,  he  turns  this  doubt  into  what  he 
 calls  a  positive  argument  against  Christianity.  But 
 this  is  unfair  and  disingenuous.  Christianity  reposes 
 on  the  entire  structure  of  her  evidences — a  structure 
 which  has  never,  as  yet,  been  fairly  assailed,  much 
 less  weakened  or  destroyed;  and  which  rears  its  front 
 in  undiminished  stability  and  glory,  mocking  at  its 
 feeble  and  discomfited  opponents. 
 
 Having  thus  given  a  view  of  the  connexion  of  the 
 Analogical  argument,  with  the  other  branches  of  the 
 Christian  evidence,  and  of  its  particular  use  and  im- 
 portance, we  now  proceed, 
 
 II.  To  offer  some  remarks  on  Butler' s  particular 
 view  of  Christianity,  and  on  the  adaptation  of  his 
 argument  to  practical  religion  in  all  its  extent.  For 
 the  reader  will  have  observed,  that  the  great  argu- 
 ment of  the  Analogy  is  designed  rather  to  silence 
 objections  than  to  expound  or  defend  the  minute  and 
 interior  topics  of  Christianity,  on  which  the  life  and 
 influence  of  piety,  as  a  practical  principle,  very  much 
 depend.  Indeed  the  end  of  all  treatises  on  the  Evi- 
 dences of  religion,  must  be  the  establishment  of  the 
 truth  of  it  generally,  and  not  the  particular  develop- 
 ment of  its  parts.  Such  treatises  meet  the  unbe- 
 liever, as  much  as  possible,  on  his  own  ground,  and 
 attempt  to  gain  his  assent  to  the  credentials  of  the 
 
Cv 
 
 divine  doctrine,  leaving  the  details  of  that  doctrine 
 to  the  ordinary  teachers  of  Christianity,  or  the  various 
 practical  works  which  treat  professedly  of  them.  The 
 general  features,  therefore,  of  the  Christian  religion, 
 arc  all  that  it  falls  within  the  province  of  the  writer 
 on  Evidences  to  delineate  fully;  taking  care  that  his 
 allusions  to  the  inward  grace  and  power  of  it  be  cal- 
 culated to  lead  the  reader  on  to  adequate  views  of  the 
 whole.  These  features,  Bishop  Butler  has  seized 
 with  a  master's  eye.  The  moral  government  of  God 
 by  rewards  and  punishments,  the  state  of  discipline 
 which  this  world  is  for  a  future  one ;  the  corruption 
 of  man,  the  guilt  of  sin,  the  mediation  of  Christ,  the 
 propitiatory  sacrifice  of  his  death,  and  his  invisible 
 government  of  his  church ;  the  assistance  and  grace 
 of  the  Holy  Spirit;  the  second  advent  of  our  Lord 
 to  judgment;  the  seriousness  of  mind  which  the  sub- 
 ject of  religion  demands — these  commanding  truths 
 are  the  first  elements  and  characteristics  of  Christi- 
 anity, and  are  nobly  defended  and  cleared  from  objec- 
 tions by  our  Author. 
 
 At  the  same  time,  it  cannot,  and  need  not  be  con- 
 cealed, that  the  occasional  hints  which  fall  from  him, 
 on  the  particular  grace  of  the  Christian  religion,  and 
 its  operation  on  the  heart,  are  far  from  being  so  ex- 
 plicit. His  references  to  the  precise  nature  of  our 
 justification  before  God — to  the  extent  of  the  fall  and 
 ruin  of  man  by  sin — to  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
 in  regeneration  and  sanctification — and  to  the  con- 
 solatory, cheering,  vivifying  effects  of  peace  of  con- 
 science, and  communion  with  God,  and  hope  of  rest 
 and  joy  in  heaven,  do  not  correspond  with  the  large- 
 ness of  the  case.  They  are  partial  and  defective. 
 e  3 
 
CV1 
 
 They  might  and  should  have  embraced,  incidentally 
 at  least,  some  intimations  of  the  peculiar  structure  and 
 design  of  spiritual  religion.  The  powerful  argument 
 in  hand  should  at  times  have  been  carried  out  to  its 
 consequences.  The  inexperienced  theological  stu- 
 dent would  not  then  have  been  in  danger  of  drawing 
 erroneous  conclusions,  on  some  practical  points  of 
 great  importance. 
 
 It  is  therefore  to  guard  the  youthful  reader  from 
 error  as  to  the  nature  of  practical  Christianity,  that 
 the  following  reflections  are  offered,  some  of  which 
 will  only  go  to  explain  what  may  be  misapprehended 
 in  our  Author's  language  and  argument;  others  will 
 attempt  to  suggest  some  additional  thoughts  on  topics 
 which  may  appear  deficient.  Some  notice  will  then 
 be  taken  of  the  easv  adaptation  of  his  argument  to  the 
 practice  and  experience  of  religion  in  all  its  extent. 
 
 1.  Let  us  first  suggest  a  hint  on  the  nature  and 
 importance  of  Natural  Religion  as  stated  by  Bishop 
 Butler.  Various  mistakes  have  arisen,  both  as  to 
 what  is  meant  by  this  term,  and  as  to  its  efficacy, 
 independently  of  Christianity.  Nor  have  there  been 
 wanting  those  who  have  denied  altogether  its  exist- 
 ence, and  its  subserviency  to  the  Christian  doctrine. 
 
 By  Natural  Religion,  Bishop  Butler  understands 
 religion  generally,  as  distinguished  from  those  modi- 
 fications of  it  which  revelation  superinduced.  Na- 
 tural religion  is  that  service,  and  those  religious 
 regards  to  Almighty  God,  which  men  owe  to  him 
 as  their  Creator  and  Benefactor,  and  which  arise  out 
 of  the  relations  in  which  they  stand  to  him,  as  the 
 rational  and  accountable  beings  whom  he  formed  for 
 his  glory,  and  governs  by  his  law.      These  primitive 
 
CVll 
 
 obligations  ot  religion  may  plainly  be  distinguished 
 from  Christianity,  which  is  an  additional  dispensation, 
 revealing  the  divine  and  stupendous  scheme  of  the 
 recovery  of  man  from  his  state  of  ruin  and  guilt,  by 
 the  Son  and  Spirit  of  God.  Indeed  Natural  Reli- 
 gion is,  properly  speaking,  distinct  from  those  anti- 
 cipations of  the  Christian  redemption,  which  the  early 
 revelations  to  our  first  parents,  to  the  patriarchs,  and 
 to  the  Jewish  people,  comprised.  The  traditions,  it 
 is  true,  of  these  early  revelations,  mingled  with  the 
 faint  traces  of  man's  moral  nature  which  have  sur- 
 vived the  fall,  constitute  the  religion  of  nature,  as  now 
 seen  in  the  various  heathen  nations,  where  the  bright 
 light  of  the  last  revelation,  the  Christian,  has  not 
 reached.  But  Butler  usually  restrains  the  meaning 
 of  the  term  to  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state,  where 
 every  one  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished  according 
 to  his  deserts;  and  to  those  duties  which  man  owes 
 to  God,  as  his  moral  and  righteous  Creator  and  Go- 
 vernor. 
 
 This  religion  was  originally  impressed  on  the 
 heart  of  man,  as  "  created  in  righteousness  and  true 
 holiness,"  and  consists  of  those  habits  and  acts  of 
 subjection,  obedience,  reverence,  love,  adoration, 
 gratitude,  trust,  prayer,  communion,  resignation,  and 
 praise,  which  an  upright,  but  finite  and  dependent 
 being  owed  to  its  Sovereign  and  its  Benefactor,  and 
 the  reward  consequent  on  which  was  to  be  eternal 
 life.  This  divine  impression  on  the  heart  was  effaced 
 by  the  fall ;  and  now  these  habits  and  affections  are 
 only  to  be  acquired  by  the  light  and  grace  of  Chris- 
 tianity. It  is  this  revelation  which  has  repaired  the 
 ruins  of  the  fall,  brought  in  a  remedy  for  the  apostacy 
 
cviu 
 
 and  wickedness  of  mankind,  restored  the  enfeebled, 
 and  almost  extinguished  powers  of  natural  religion, 
 added  surprising  discoveries  of  divine  wisdom  and 
 mercy,  in  the  sacrifice  of  the  Son  of  God,  and  the 
 mission  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  enjoined  important  cor- 
 respondent duties  and  obligations  ;  and  thus  modified 
 the  original  scheme  of  religion  by  these  new  charac- 
 teristics. 
 
 It  is  therefore  very  fair  for  a  Christian  writer, 
 like  our  Bishop,  to  distinguish,  in  his  course  of  rea- 
 soning, the  two  series  of  habits  and  feelings;  those 
 which  constitute  ♦religion  as  springing  from  our  rela- 
 tion to  God,  as  our  heavenly  Creator  and  Lord,  and 
 those  which  constitute  religion  as  springing  from  our 
 relation  to  Christ,  as  our  Mediator,  and  to  the  Holy 
 Spirit,  as  our  Sanctifier,  and  to  our  heavenly  Father, 
 as  being  the  Father  of  mercies,  and  the  God  of  all 
 consolation.  It  is  thus  the  apostle  Paul  speaks  of 
 the  Gentiles,  which  "  have  not  the  law,  being  a  law 
 unto  themselves,  which  show  the  work  of  the  law 
 written  in  their  hearts."  It  is  thus  the  same  apostle 
 expounds  the  chief  truths  to  be  learned  from  this  law, 
 to  be  "  God's  eternal  power  and  Godhead,  which 
 might  be  clearly  seen  by  the  things  which  were  made ;" 
 and  charges  the  heathens  with  "not  liking  to  retain 
 God  in  their  knowledge,"  and  with  "becoming  fools, 
 while  professing  themselves  to  be  wise ;"  and,  indeed, 
 with  committing,  and  glorying  in  those  vices,  and 
 crimes,  and  passions,  which  "  they  knew  were,  by  the 
 judgment  of  God,  worthy  of  death."  The  same 
 apostle's  argument  at  Athens,  and  his  discourse  to 
 the  Lycaonians,  proceed  on  this  supposition,  that 
 there  was  such  a  thing  as  the  light  and  religion  of 
 
C1X 
 
 nature,  independently,  not  of  revelation  in  the  first 
 instance,  but  of  the  Christian,  or  last  revelation  by 
 the  gospel. 
 
 Accordingly,  in  the  present  age,  as  well  as  in  all 
 preceding  ones,  the  vestiges  of  natural  conscience 
 may  be  traced,  however  corrupted.  Some  notion  of 
 a  Supreme  Being,  and  of  worship  being  due  to  him 
 — some  glimmerings  of  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state 
 — some  idea  of  tbe  efficacy  of  sacrifices — some  ac- 
 knowledgment of  the  obligations  of  veracity  and  jus- 
 tice— some  remains,  in  short,  of  a  moral  sense,  are 
 discovered,  in  greater  or  less  force,  amidst  the  scat- 
 tered fragments  of  the  pagan  superstitions.  There 
 is  every  where  in  man,  the  capacity  of  being  restored 
 to  all  that  Christianity  designs  and  promises. 
 
 All  this  is  clear  and  unembarrassed  ground.  The 
 disputed  territory  lies  beyond.  For  when  we  come 
 to  inquire,  whether  men,  since  the  fall,  ever  discovered 
 these  natural  truths  originally,  or  regained  them 
 when  lost,  or  acted  upon  them  efficiently  in  their 
 conduct,  we  have  a  host  of  assailants  to  contend  with. 
 And  yet,  surely,  no  doubt  can  be  fairly  said  to  rest 
 on  these  questions.  All  experience  declares,  that 
 natural  religion,  unless  illuminated  and  guided  by  the 
 light  of  Christianity,  is  impotent  and  helpless.  All 
 experience  declares,  that  men,  destitute  of  Christi- 
 anity, grow  worse  and  worse.  No  example  has  been 
 ever  produced,  either  of  a  pagan  nation  acting  up  to 
 the  scattered  notices  of  religion  which  it  possessed, 
 or  recovering  the  purity  of  it  when  once  lost  by  the 
 lapse  of  time,  or  tbe  progress  of  vice.  And  the  high 
 probability  is,  (setting  aside,  for  the  sake  of  argument, 
 the  testimony  of  scripture, )  that  the  faint  li^ht  which 
 
ex 
 
 nature  possesses,  was  an  irradiation  from 
 revelation  of  God  to  man- 
 Butler  is  decidedly  of  opinion  that  this  is  the 
 case.  He  says,  "  As  there  is  no  hint  or  intimation 
 in  history,  that  this  system  (of  natural  religion)  was 
 first  reasoned  out ;  so  there  is  express  historical,  or 
 traditional  evidence  as  ancient  as  history,  that  it  was 
 taught  first  by  revelation."  He  seems,  likewise,  to 
 hold  strongly,  that  such  faint  traces  of  this  original 
 revelation  as  remain,  aided  by  the  fragments  of  man's 
 moral  nature,  are  so  inefficient,  from  the  want  of 
 essential  parts,  from  the  absence  of  authority  and 
 sanction,  and  from  the  intermixture  of  gross  errors 
 and  idolatries,  as  rather  to  strengthen  than  curb, 
 much  less  subdue,  the  passions  and  vices  of  man- 
 kind. Those  relics  of  truth,  therefore,  being  thus 
 impotent  of  themselves,  and  being  unaccompanied  by 
 any  assurances  of  pardon,  or  any  promises  of  grace 
 and  assistance,  only  demonstrate,  in  every  age,  and 
 hi  every  quarter  of  the  world,  by  the  state  in  which 
 they  leave  men,  the  indispensable  necessity  and 
 infinite  importance  of  Christianity. 
 
 On  the  whole,  there  appears  no  objection  to  the 
 term  Natural  Religion  in  the  sense  explained.  Whe- 
 ther any  better,  and  more  distinctive  expression  could 
 have  been  devised  to  convey  the  idea  of  essential  and 
 primitive  religion,  as  different  from  revealed  and 
 superinduced  religion,  is  scarcely  worth  the  inquiry. 
 The  use  of  the  present  term  has  prevailed ;  and  it 
 needs  only  to  be  employed  aright,  in  order  to  stand 
 free  from  just  exception. 
 
 Natural  religion,  in  subserviency  to  Christianity, 
 is  of  great  importance.      Jt  is  every  where  taken  for 
 
CXI 
 
 granted  in  Scripture,  and  confirmed  and  strength- 
 ened by  the  manner  in  which  truth  is  addressed  to 
 man.  All  the  evidences  of  revealed  religion  appeal 
 to  our  moral  nature,  and  meet  precisely  the  faculty 
 of  judging  which  we  still  possess ;  and  would  have 
 no  medium  of  proof — and,  therefore,  no  authority  to 
 convince — if  this  moral  sense  should  be  denied. 
 Moreover,  it  becomes  yet  more  important,  in  propor- 
 tion as  the  light  of  Christianity,  diffused  around  it, 
 illuminates,  in  some  faint  degree,  its  grosser  darkness, 
 and  dispels  its  baser  corruptions  and  superstitions. 
 In  Christian  countries,  men  who  reject  Christianity 
 insensibly  repair  the  decayed  and  dilapidated  temple 
 of  nature  with  the  materials  which  it  supplies.  And 
 it  is  with  natural  religion,  in  this  form,  that  we  have 
 chiefly  to  treat  in  this  country.  It  then  serves  to 
 show  men  that  their  consciences  are  bound,  not  only 
 by  the  law  of  Christianity,  which  they  spurn  and  re- 
 ject, but  by  the  law  of  nature,  of  which  they  cannot 
 divest  themselves  ;  not  only  by  the  infinite  benefits 
 and  stupendous  discoveries  of  the  revelation  of  the 
 gospel,  to  which  they  ought  to  bow,  but  by  the  truths 
 impressed  originally  on  the  nature  of  man,  and  sanc- 
 tioned and  enlarged  in  the  primitive  revelations  of 
 the  Creator  to  him — revelations,  of  which  every  glim- 
 mering ray  of  knowledge,  every  feeble  emotion  of 
 conscience,  every  remaining  barrier  between  virtue 
 and  vice,  every  impression  of  the  responsibility  of 
 man,  every  anticipation  of  future  judgment,  every 
 relic  and  trace  of  an  immortal  and  accountable  spirit, 
 are  proofs  and  consequences.  Thus  men  are  re- 
 minded, that  they  do  not  escape  from  moral  govern- 
 ment by  rejecting  Christianity,  but  fall  back  on   a 
 
cxu 
 
 ruined  and  unaided  principle,  which  leaves  them  just 
 as  responsible  to  God,  the  Creator  and  Judge,  as 
 before — only  with  the  accumulated  guilt  of  having 
 spurned  the  only  way  of  pardon  and  grace  which  the 
 infinite  mercy  of  God  had  provided  for  them. 
 
 The  consideration  of  natural  religion  is  also  valu- 
 able, as  it  points  out  the  grounds  of  those  exhorta- 
 tions, warnings,  reproofs,  invitations  and  commands, 
 which  constitute  so  very  large  a  proportion  of  the 
 whole  Scriptures,  and  on  which  revealed  religion 
 proceeds,  and  by  which  it  works.  The  duty  of  man 
 remains  unaltered,  notwithstanding  his  sinfulness  and 
 moral  impotency ;  his  capacity  of  receiving  instruc- 
 tion, and  being  the  subject  of  persuasion  and  alarm, 
 remains  the  same,  though  he  has  fallen  from  his 
 original  rectitude  ;  his  guilt  in  rejecting  the  invita- 
 tions of  mercy,  and  the  remonstrances  of  conscience, 
 remain  undiminished,  though  his  power  of  complying 
 with  them  must  be  sought  for  from  above.  Further, 
 the  use  of  all  the  means  of  grace,  as  adapted  to  his 
 reasonable  and  moral  nature — the  exhibition  and  ap- 
 plication of  all  the  terrors  of  the  law,  and  of  all  the 
 grace  of  the  gospel,  as  the  proper  object  of  his  af- 
 fections, together  with  the  earnestness  and  impor- 
 tunity with  which  these  topics  should  be  enforced — 
 all  rest  on  the  plain  footing,  that  some  remains  of 
 feeling,  and  conscience,  and  light,  rest  with  man,  by 
 which  it  pleases  God  to  work  in  the  dispensation  of 
 his  Spirit. 
 
 Nor  is  the  religion  of  nature  less  important,  as 
 fixing,  in  some  measure,  the  ends,  and  guiding  the 
 course,  of  that  which  is  revealed.  All  the  chief 
 abuses  of  the  scheme  of  grace  in  the  gospel  would 
 
CXlll 
 
 be  guarded  against,  if  not  excluded,  if  natural  reli- 
 gion were  allowed  its  subordinate  influence.  Such 
 abuses  spring  from  the  desire,  often  laudable  in  its 
 apparent  object,  of  carrying  the  doctrines  of  the 
 gospel  to  their  full  measure,  and  applying  them  to 
 the  heart  in  their  exuberant  consolation.  Hence 
 men  come  first  to  deny  natural  religion — then  to 
 object  to  the  practical  exhortations  of  the  gospel ; 
 next  assert,  that  the  state  of  death  in  trespasses 
 and  sins  in  which  men  lie,  makes  all  precepts  con- 
 tradictory, and  all  warnings  fruitless ;  and,  lastly,  to 
 spurn  the  authority  and  obligations  of  the  moral  law 
 of  God,  and  reject  all  the  doctrines  of  Christian 
 morals  and  Christian  obedience.  Tims  an  opening 
 is  made  insensibly  to  the  worst  abuses  of  the  Divine 
 mercy  and  grace — abuses  which  a  more  implicit 
 regard  to  the  Scriptures,  on  the  subject  of  the 
 essential  nature  of  religion,  would  have  prevented. 
 The  end  of  Christianity  is  to  make  us  holy — to  bring 
 us  back  to  the  purity  from  which  we  fell — to  make 
 natural  religion  practicable,  possible,  delightful;  to 
 infuse  into  it  the  humility  which  becomes  a  fallen 
 condition — the  faith  in  the  atonement  which  the 
 sacrifice  of  the  cross  demands — the  gratitude  and  love 
 which  the  benefits  of  that  cross  require — the  depen- 
 dence on  the  blessed  Spirit  which  our  feebleness 
 makes  indispensable — the  joy  which  the  hope  of 
 heaven  warrants  and  bestows.  Thus  Christianity 
 modifies  indeed,  the  essential  religion  first  taught  in 
 the  original  revelation  to  man,  and  impressed  on 
 his  heart ;  but  never  contradicts  it — never  swerves 
 from  the  same  end — never  releases  from  its  main 
 obligations — never  violates  its  primary  principles  and 
 
CX IV 
 
 dictates.  Man  is  only  bound  more  strongly,  by  all 
 the  benefits  of  Christianity,  to  the  obedience  which 
 he  was,  by  nature,  formed  and  designed  to  render  to 
 his  God;  and  the  moment  he  views  those  benefits  in 
 a  manner  to  loosen,  instead  of  confirming,  the  bonds 
 of  this  obedience,  he  may  conclude  he  is  mistaking 
 the  whole  end  and  object  of  the  Christian  revelation. 
 2.  But  this  leads  us  to  make  an  observation  on 
 some  of  our  great  author's  expressions  and  senti- 
 ments, on  the  remains  of  Natural  Religion,  and  on 
 the  grounds  of  our  justification  and  acceptance  with 
 God,  which  seem  open  to  exception.  For  whilst  we 
 thus  claim  for  natural  religion  what  the  Scriptures 
 clearly  imply,  or  rather  inculcate,  and  defend  Butler 
 on  this  point,  we  must  cautiously  avoid  the  danger- 
 ous error  of  attributing  to  it  a  power,  which  in  the 
 fallen  state  of  man,  it  does  not  and  cannot  possess, 
 and  which  may  militate  against  what  the  same  Scrip- 
 tures teach  of  the  extent  of  man's  depravity,  and  the 
 necessity  of  divine  grace,  in  order  to  his  doing  any 
 thing  spiritually  good.  And,  therefore,  the  lan- 
 guage which  occurs  in  some  parts  of  the  Analogy, 
 on  the  nature  and  powers  of  man,  may  appear  to  be 
 too  strong,  too  general,  too  unqualified.  We  speak 
 here  with  hesitation,  because,  considering  the  line  of 
 argument  pursued  by  this  most  able  writer,  and  the 
 class  of  persons  he  addressed,  it  may  be  doubted 
 whether  this  remark  is  applicable  in  fairness  or  not. 
 Still  we  cannot  but  think,  that  he  sometimes  attri- 
 butes too  much  to  the  unaided  nature  of  man,  allows 
 too  much  to  his  moral  sense  and  feeling,  dwells 
 too  largely  on  his  tendencies  to  virtue  and  goodness, 
 and  speaks  too  ambiguously  on   the  ground  of  his 
 
cxv 
 
 justification  before   God.      Such   expressions  as  the 
 following,  considering  the  connexion  in  which  they 
 stand,  are  open  to  abuse :   "  Moral  nature  given  us 
 by  God" — "  Falling  in  with  our  natural  apprehension 
 and  sense  of  things" — "  There  is  nothing    in  the 
 human   mind   contradictory  to  virtue" — "  The  moral 
 law  is  interwoven  in  our  nature" — "  Men  may  curb 
 their  passions,  for  temporal  motives,  in  as  great  a 
 degree  as  piety  commonly  requires" — "  Natural  re- 
 ligion is  the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Chris- 
 tianity"— "  Men's   happiness  and  virtue   are  left   to 
 themselves,  are  put   in  their  own   power" — "  Reli- 
 gion  requires  nothing  which   men   are  not  well  able 
 to  perform" — "  The   relation  in  which  we   stand   to 
 God  the  Father,  is  made  known  to  us  by  reason." 
 Such   language  continually  occurring,   together  with 
 the  terms,  "virtue,  vice,  honest  man,  satisfaction  of 
 virtue,  viciousness  of  the  world,"  &c.  (instead  of  the 
 Scriptural,  terms  "  holiness,  sin,  renewed  man,  peace 
 of   conscience,    corruption    and    wickedness    of  the 
 world,")  may  have  the  tendency  to   exalt  too  highly 
 the  present  fallen  and  corrupted  powers  of  man,  and 
 prevent  that  deep  and  thorough   humiliation  which 
 are  necessary  to  a  due  appreciation  and  reception  of 
 the  grace   of  the  gospel.      They  tend  also  to  lessen 
 the  guilt  of  man  before  God,  and  lower  the  standard 
 of  that  holiness  which  the  Christian  doctrine  requires 
 and   produces.      Some   most   excellent   observations 
 and  statements  are  indeed  made,  in  the  course  of  the 
 work,  on  the  mediation  of  Christ,  and  the  influences 
 of  the  Spirit,  which  go  to  correct   the  misapprehen- 
 sion to  which  I  am  referring ;    but  these  parts  of  the 
 work  bear  but  a  small  proportion  to  the  whole  trea- 
 
CX  VI 
 
 tiso  :  whereas  the  expressions  in  question  occur  per- 
 petually, and  in  every  variety  of  form,  and  under 
 each  division  of  the  argument.  They  form  the 
 staple,  and  enter  into  the  contexture,  and  give  the 
 colour  to  the  entire  fabric.  And  thence  arises  the 
 danger  which  we  venture  to  point  out.  We  do 
 not  dwell  here  on  the  fact,  that  this  light  of  nature 
 is  in  Christian  countries  reflected  from  Christianity, 
 and  is  never  found  where  Christianity  is  unknown. 
 Nor  do  we  stop  to  suggest,  that  natural  religion, 
 in  its  best  and  oldest  times,  confessed  its  weakness, 
 and  sought  for  help  and  aid.  We  are  content  to 
 take  things  in  their  most  favourable  construction  ;  and 
 we  still  profess  our  conviction,  that  all  language  is 
 reprehensible,  which,  by  fair  inference,  leads  men 
 to  think  they  can  repent  and  turn  from  sin  to  God, 
 without  his  special  and  effectual  grace.  And  in  this 
 view,  we  would  caution  the  student  against  affixing 
 too  strong  a  sense  to  the  expressions  which  we  have 
 cited. 
 
 In  connexion  with  this  remark,  we  must  unequi- 
 vocally declare  our  apprehension,  that  the  language 
 used  by  our  Author,  in  speaking  of  the  Almighty 
 finally  rendering  to  every  one  according  to  his  works, 
 and  establishing  the  entire  rights  of  distributive  jus- 
 tice, is  open  to  objection.  Perhaps,  if  taken  alone, 
 it  might  admit  of  a  favourable  interpretation ;  but, 
 when  joined  with  the  overstatements  already  noticed, 
 on  the  powers  of  man  and  the  remains  of  natural 
 religion,  it  becomes  decidedly  dangerous.  The  great 
 doctrine  of  our  justification  before  God,  "  not  by 
 our  own  works  and  deservings,  but  only  for  the 
 merits  of   our    Lord    Jesus   Christ,"  is  too  funda- 
 
e 
 
 .10- 
 e 
 
 CXVU 
 
 mental,  and  too  important,  to  be  undermined,  even 
 incidentally.  We  refer  to  such  expressions  as  the 
 following:  "The  advantages  of  Christianity  will  b 
 bestowed  upon  every  one,  in  proportion  to  the 
 grees  of  his  virtue  " — "  Divine  goodness  may  b 
 a  disposition  to  make  the  good,  the  faithful,  the 
 honest  man  happy" — "  We  have  scope  and  op- 
 portunities here,  for  that  good  and  bad  behaviour 
 which  God  will  reward  and  punish  herafter" — "  Re- 
 ligion teaches  us,  that  we  are  placed  here,  to  qualify 
 us,  by  the  practice  of  virtue,  for  another  state  which 
 is  to  follow  it" — "Our  repentance  is  accepted  to 
 eternal  life."  These,  and  similar  statements,  occur 
 throughout  the  work.  In  the  second  part,  where  the 
 leading  features  of  revealed  religion  are  delineated, 
 they  ought,  by  all  means,  to  have  been  accompanied 
 with  those  modifications  which  the  superinduced 
 scheme  of  the  gospel,  and  the  necessities  of  man, 
 and  the  glory  of  the  cross  of  Christ,  and  the  ends 
 of  self-knowledge  and  humility  require.  We  say 
 they  should  have  been  accompanied  by  such  modifica- 
 tions, because  they  are  so  accompanied  in  the  Holy 
 Scriptures.  The  doctrine,  that  "  every  one  shall 
 receive  the  things  done  in  the  body,"  that  6*  they  that 
 have  done  good  shall  rise  to  the  resurrection  of  life, 
 and  they  that  have  done  evil  to  the  resurrection  of 
 damnation,"  is  most  true  and  most  important.  But 
 the  doctrines  which  accompany  and  modify  this 
 fundamental  truth,  should  never  be  wholly  lost 
 sight  of,  even  in  a  treatise  on  Evidences,  when  any 
 reference  is  made  to  the  subject.  We  are  taught  in 
 the  New  Testament,  that  these  works  must  spring 
 from  faith  and  love  to  our  Saviour  Christ,  and  mu.st  he 
 
CXVlil 
 
 renounced  in  point  of  merit,  on  account  of  the 
 inherent  evil  which  defiles  the  very  best  of  them,  and 
 must  be  accepted  only  through  that  SacriBce  which 
 is  the  real  footing  of  a  sinner's  dealings  with  a  holy 
 God,  and  must  be  regarded  by  those  who  perform 
 them,  with  that  deep  humility,  and  almost  uncon- 
 sciousness of  having  done  them,  which  is  so  strongly 
 marked  in  the  conduct  of  the  righteous,  in  our  Lord's 
 account  of  the  last  day.  Now,  these  modifications 
 are  so  essential,  that  the  language  of  our  Author, 
 however  undesignedly,  becomes  really  dangerous 
 when  stripped  of  them.  And  man  is  so  prone  to 
 pride,  self-confidence,  reliance  on  his  own  merits, 
 and  presumptuous  ignorance  of  his  failings ;  and  the 
 apostle  Paul  insists  so  warmly  on  the  immense 
 importance  of  the  doctrine  of  justification  without 
 works — that  too  much  caution  cannot  be  used  in 
 the  most  incidental  representations  given  on  such 
 subjects. 
 
 It  is  the  more  necessary  to  guard  against  a  false 
 reliance  on  our  own  works  and  deservings,  because 
 a  mistake  here  pervades  and  corrupts  every  other  part 
 of  religion.  The  good  works  of  the  pious  Chris- 
 tian, whose  mind  is  duly  imbued  with  a  becoming 
 sense  of  his  fall  and  corruption,  of  his  unutterable 
 obligations  to  the  great  Propitiation,  and  his  entire 
 dependence  on  the  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  are 
 very  different  from  the  partial,  external,  worldly,  self- 
 ish, proud  performances  of  the  nominal  professor  of 
 Christianity.  The  morality  of  the  nominal  Chris- 
 tian rises  very  little  higher  than  that  of  the  unbe- 
 liever: his  rule  is  fashion;  his  limit,  convenience; 
 his  aim,  to  do  as  little  as  possible  in  religion.      He 
 
CXIX 
 
 performs  some  actions  indeed,  which  agree,  as  to  thwir 
 form  and  external  appearance,  with  the  law  of  God ; 
 but  in  truth,  spring  from  habit,  ambition,  the  Jove 
 of  reputation,  the  regard  to  society,  the  remonstrances 
 of  conscience.  He  soon  fills  up  what  he  concludes 
 to  be  intended  by  a  pious  and  virtuous  life.  He 
 soon  attains  to  his  own  definition  of  a  faithful  honest 
 man.  He  soon  satisfies  himself  that  his  virtues  sur- 
 pass and  overbalance  his  vices,  and  that,  as  he  is  to 
 be  judged  according  to  his  works,  he  has  nothing  to 
 fear  before  the  tribunal  of  Christ.  In  the  mean 
 time,  his  heart  is  alienated  from  God  and  true  obe- 
 dience to  him  ;  faith  and  love  never  visited  his  breast ; 
 and  his  religion  consists  with  prejudice,  perhaps  ha- 
 tred and  exasperation,  against  the  real  system  of  the 
 gospel. 
 
 The  truly  devout  Christian,  on  the  contrary,  aims 
 at  holiness,  and  not  merely  at  what  the  world  calls 
 virtue  ;  endeavours  to  subdue  his  passions,  as  well 
 as  regulate  his  conduct ;  labours  to  serve  God,  and 
 adorn  Christianity,  and  do  good  to  others,  to  the 
 very  utmost  of  his  power;  spends  much  time  and 
 care  in  watching  over  his  motives,  and  cultivating 
 the  inward  principles  of  piety  ;  devotes  a  portion  of 
 the  day  to  the  reading  of  the  Scriptures,  to  the  pub- 
 lic and  private  calls  of  devotion,  to  self-examination, 
 thanksgiving,  and  religious  regards  towards  the  ever- 
 blessed  God,  and  his  Saviour  and  Redeemer,  Christ. 
 And  after  he  has  done  all,  he  accounts  himself  an 
 unprofitable  servant,  renounces  all  merit  in  his  own 
 works,  attributes  every  good  in  them  to  the  divine 
 grace,  and  places  all  his  trust  in  the  vicarious  sacri- 
 fice of  the  Son  of  God.      He  is  the  publican  smiting 
 
cxx 
 
 on  his  breast,  and  saying,  "  God  be  merciful  to  me 
 a  sinner;"  whilst  all  other  men,  however  pure  in  the 
 eyes  of  the  world,  are,  in  fact,  like  the  Pharisee, 
 swollen  with  conceit  and  arrogance,  dwelling  fondly 
 on  their  own  performances,  looking,  perhaps,  with 
 contempt  on  others,  and  placing  no  real  trust  in  the 
 mercy  of  God.  Thus,  even  if  all  the  separate  ex- 
 pressions above  adverted  to  could  be  defended,  yet 
 would  they  still  lead  to  a  wrong  end,  because  unat- 
 tended with  those  explanations  which  the  Scriptures 
 carefully  supply.  We  are  to  be  "judged  according 
 to  our  works,"  and  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished 
 "according  to  the  deeds  done  in  the  body;"  but  in 
 a  high  and  transcendent  sense  in  the  case  of  the 
 righteous,  as  their  works  spring  from  faith,  are  the 
 effects  of  grace,  and  are  accompanied  with  humility 
 and  self-renunciation. 
 
 3.  These  observations  lead  me  to  notice  a  general 
 defect,  as  it  seems  to  me,  in  our  Author's  representa- 
 tion of  the  stupendous  recovery  of  man  provided  in 
 the  Gospel.  For  if  any  doubt  could  be  raised  on 
 the  inexpediency  of  the  above  language,  all  such 
 doubt  would  be  removed,  when  we  find,  on  further 
 examination,  that  our  Bishop's  allusions  to  the  whole 
 doctrine  of  redemption  and  salvation,  as  revealed  in 
 the  New  Testament,  are  not  sufficiently  clear  and 
 comprehensive  to  agree  fully  with  the  scriptural 
 statements  of  our  natural  corruption,  and  of  the  opera- 
 tions of  grace  as  adapted  to  it.  Let  us  not  be  mis- 
 understood. Bishop  Butler  is  far  from  omitting 
 altogether  the  peculiar  scheme  of  the  gospel.  He 
 states  distinctly  the  insufficiency  of  repentance  alone 
 to  restore  us  to  God's  favour.      He  speaks  with  ad- 
 
CXX1 
 
 mirable  clearness  on  the  Mediation  and  Sacrifice  of 
 Christ.  He  quotes  the  passages  in  Scripture,  which 
 teach  the  vicarious  nature  of  Christ's  sufferings,  and 
 insists  on  the  benefit  of  those  sufferings  being  some- 
 thing much  beyond  mere  instruction  or  example. 
 On  these  subjects,  at  least  on  some?  parts  of  them, 
 no  complaint  can  be  alleged  against  his  brief  state- 
 ments ;  they  are  luminous  and  adequate,  for  an  ele- 
 mentary treatise.  Still  the  general  idea  of  the  scheme 
 of  the  gospel  as  a  dispensation  of  grace,  which  would 
 be  gathered  from  the  whole  of  his  representations  and 
 suggestions,  would  be  erroneous.  He  calls  Chris- 
 tianity "  a  moral  system  ;"  he  speaks  of  it  as  teach- 
 ing us  chiefly  "  new  duties,  and  new  relations  in 
 which  we  stand :"  he  describes  it  as  "  an  additional 
 order  of  Providence."  These  expressions  are  cold 
 and  inadequate.  But  we  object  most  of  ail  to  the 
 following  passage :  "  The  doctrine  of  the  gospel  ap- 
 pears to  be,  not  only  that  Christ  taught  the  efficacy 
 of  repentance,  but  rendered  it  of  the  efficacy  which 
 it  is,  by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for  us ;  that  he 
 obtained  for  us  the  benefit  of  having  our  repentance 
 accepted  unto  eternal  life:  not  only  that  he  revealed 
 to  sinners,  that  they  were  in  a  capacity  of  salvation, 
 and  how  they  might  obtain  it ;  but  moreover,  that  he 
 put  them  into  this  capacity  of  salvation,  by  what  he 
 did  and  suffered  for  them;  put  us  ir.to  a  capacity  of 
 escaping  future  punishment,  and  obtaining  future 
 happiness.  And  it  is  our  wisdom  thankfully  to 
 accept  the  benefit,  by  performing  the  conditions 
 upon  which  it  is  offered  on  our  part,  without  disputing 
 how  it  was  procured  on  his."  (Part  II.  Chap.  V.  § 
 vr.) — Surely  this  is  plainly  deficient.  Surely  the 
 f  17 
 
CXX11 
 
 salvation  of  Christ  proceeds  on  a  different  footing, 
 and  includes  much  more  than  this.  Surely  the 
 great  Sacrifice  of  the  cross  not  only  obtained  for  the 
 sincere  believer,  that  his  "  repentance  should  be 
 accepted  to  eternal  life,"  (a  phrase  unscriptural  in 
 its  very  terms,)  not  only  put  him  in  a  capacity  of 
 salvation,  not  only  proposed  certain  conditions  to  be 
 performed  on  his  part, — all  which  places  the  stress 
 of  salvation  upon  ourselves,  makes  the  reception  and 
 application  of  it  to  depend  on  our  own  efforts,  and 
 leaves  to  our  Lord  merely  the  office  of  removing 
 external  hinderances,  affording  us  some  aid  by  his 
 Spirit,  and  supplying  our  deficiencies, — but  pur- 
 chased also  salvation  itself,  in  all  the  amplitude  of  that 
 mighty  blessing ;  procured  pardon,  reconciliation, 
 justification,  adoption,  acceptance,  the  gift  of  the 
 Holy  Spirit,  and  the  promise  of  everlasting  life. 
 Surely  salvation  brings  men  from  darkness  unto  light, 
 reverses  the  sentence  of  condemnation,  and  makes 
 them  "  the  righteousness  of  God  in  Christ  "  it  places 
 them  under  a  new  covenant,  and  confers  the  grace 
 necessary  for  "  repentance  towards  God,  and  faith 
 towards  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ ;"  it  puts  them  on 
 the  footing,  not  of  the  law,  but  of  the  gospel;  not 
 of  works,  but  of  grace;  not  of  obtaining  acceptance 
 for  their  repentance,  but  of  receiving  "  the  gift  of 
 God,  which  is  eternal  life."  Let  Butler's  summary 
 of  the  benefits  of  Christ's  death  be  compared  with 
 such  summaries  as  the  Apostle  gives; — "  We  have 
 redemption  through  his  blood,  even  the  forgiveness 
 of  sins" — "By  grace  are  ye  saved,  through  faith  ; 
 and  that  not  of  yourselves;  it  is  the  gift  of  God; 
 not  of  works,  lest  any  man   should  boast ;  for  we 
 
CXXlll 
 
 are  his  workmanship,  created  in  Christ  Jesus  unto 
 good  works,  which  God  hath  before  ordained,  that 
 we  should  walk  in  them." 
 
 With  this  defective  view  of  the  fruits  of  our  Lord's 
 propitiation,  is  allied  a  correspondent  defect  as  to  the 
 nature  and  importance  of  faith,  by  which  the  benefits 
 of  that  propitiation  are  received  and  applied.      The 
 tendency  of  some  of  Butler's   summary  statements, 
 however  undesigned,  and  arising  perhaps,  in  some 
 measure,  from  his  calmness  in  pursuing  the  particular 
 course  of.  his  argument,  is  to  lead  the  reader  to  sup- 
 pose that  the  effects  of  Christ's  redemption  are  en- 
 joyed by  all  who  profess  the   Christian  religion,  and 
 live  a  moral  life ;  that  is,  by  all  who  have  that  general 
 belief  in  the  doctrine  of  Christianity  which    springs 
 from   education  and  rational  conviction,  if  they  are 
 free  from  gross  sin,  cultivate  virtue,  and  set  a  good 
 example  to   others,  by  a  decent  reputable   conduct. 
 All  these  things  are  indeed  included  in  the  acts  and 
 fruits  of  a  true  and  lively  faith,  but  they  reach  not 
 those  peculiar  effects  and  properties  of  it  which  prove 
 it  to  be  spiritual  and  salutary.      Faith  is  "the  sub- 
 stance of  things  hoped  for,  and  the  evidence  of  things 
 not  seen."      It  is  a  secret,  cordial,  holy  exercise  of 
 the  understanding  and  affections,  in  receiving  God's 
 testimony  concerning  Christ,  and  in  reposing  all  the 
 trust  and  confidence  of  the  soul  on  the  merits  of  that 
 Saviour   for    everlasting  life.      It  is   not   merely  a 
 general,  cold,  historical  assent  to  certain  truths ;  but 
 a    particular    affectionate,  living,  practical   belief  of 
 them,  on  the  authority  of  God,  and  an  acting  fully 
 upon  them,  as  infinitely  good  and  important.      It  is 
 not  simply  a  notion,  a  creed,  an  established  heredi- 
 f  2 
 
CX  XIV 
 
 tary  sentiment ;  but  a  holy  principle,  springing  from 
 a  personal  sense  of  our  lost   condition,   and  appre- 
 hending for  ourselves  the  blessings  of  Christ,  and 
 relying  upon  them  for  everlasting  salvation.      Faith 
 is  the  eye  which  looks  to   Christ  as  the  brazen  ser- 
 pent which   Moses  raised ;  it  is  the  foot  which  flies 
 to  Him,  as  the  man-slayer  fled  to  the  city  of  refuge, 
 that  he  might  escape  the  avenger  of  blood ;  it  is  the 
 hand  which  receives,  as  a  needy  beggar,  the  inesti- 
 mable gift  of  God,  freely  offered  to  him  ;  it  is  the 
 ear  which  hears,  with  eager  solicitude,  the  voice  and 
 invitation  of  mercy,  that  it  may  live;  it  is  the  appe- 
 tite  "which  hungers  and  thirsts"  after  Christ,  and 
 feeds  on  his  flesh,  "  and  drinks  his  blood,"  that  it 
 may  have  eternal  life.      Faith,  like  Noah,  prepares 
 the  ark,  and  enters  it  for  rescue;   faith  builds  on 
 Christ,  the  sure  foundation ;  faith  puts  on  Christ,  as 
 the  robe  of  righteousness,  and  the  garment  of  sal- 
 vation.     Accordingly,  its  effects  correspond  with  its 
 divine  origin,  and  the  matchless  benefits  it  receives. 
 It  "  works  by  love,"  it  "  overcomes    the  world,"  it 
 "  sees  Him  who  is  invisible,"  it  "  glories  in  tribula- 
 tion," it  "purifies  the  heart,"  it  anticipates  heaven, 
 it  "quenches  the  fiery  darts  of  the  wicked  one," 
 it  produces  uniform,  spiritual,  cheerful,  willing  obe- 
 dience.     Let  any  one  read  what  the  Scriptures  assert 
 of  faith,  what  they  ascribe  to  it,  and  the  earnestness 
 with   which  they  enforce  its  necessity,  and  he  will 
 be  convinced,  that  it  is  totally  different  from  that 
 dead,   speculative  assent  to    the   Christian    scheme, 
 which  is  often   confounded  with  it.      Faith  includes, 
 besides  the  general  reception  of  Christianity,  a  par- 
 ticular conviction  of  our  own  sins,  a  particular  appre- 
 
cxxv 
 
 hensiou  of  our  own  lost  estate,  a  personal  application 
 for  ourselves  of  the  offered  blessings  of  the  gospel, 
 and  a  distinct  and  spiritual  reliance  for  our  own 
 salvation,  on  the  death  and  merits  of  our  Saviour 
 Christ ; — and  some  reference  should  have  been  made 
 to  all  this  by  our  Author;  at  least,  no  expression, 
 however  brief,  should  have  been  inconsistent  with  it. 
 4.  All  main  defects  in  our  views  of  practical  Chris- 
 tianity hang  together.  The  same  kind  of  inadequate 
 statements,  therefore,  seem  to  us  to  be  chargeable  on 
 our  Author's  remarks  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy 
 Ghost.  Indeed  we  are  not  sure  if  serious  omissions 
 are  not  to  be  found  here — more  serious  than  on  most 
 of  the  preceding  topics.  Bishop  Butler  allows  in- 
 deed distinctly,  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  our  Sanctifier, 
 and  that  the  recovery  of  mankind  is  a  scheme  carried 
 on  by  the  Son  and  Spirit  of  God.  He  speaks  fre- 
 quently of  the  aid  which  the  Spirit  affords  to  good 
 men.  He  acknowledges  that  man  is  a  depraved 
 creature,  and  wants  not  merely  to  be  improved,  but 
 to  be  renewed;  and  he  quotes  the  striking  text, 
 "  Except  a  man  be  born  of  the  Spirit,  he  cannot 
 enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God."  We  would  wish 
 to  give  the  full  benefit  of  these  admissions  in  favour 
 of  the  Bishop,  and  against  what  we  are  about  to  state. 
 Nor  do  we  doubt,  that  this  remarkable  man  implored 
 the  operation  of  the  Spirit  in  his  own  case,  expe- 
 rienced his  consolations,  and  ascribed  every  thing  to 
 his  grace.  Still  we  conceive  his  general  language 
 in  his  Analogy,  on  this  fundamental  subject,  does 
 not  come  up  to  the  scriptural  standard.  He  does 
 not  give  even  that  prominence  to  it  which  he  does 
 to  the  mediation  of  Christ.      He  speaks  of  the  Spirit 
 
CXXVI 
 
 as  aiding,  but  scarcely  at  all  as  creating  anew;  lie 
 describes  his  assistances,  but  hardly  ever  his  mighty 
 operations  in  changing  the  whole  heart;  he  talks  of 
 his  presence  with  good  men,  but  seldom,  if  at  all,  of 
 his  regeneration  and  conversion  of  the  wicked;  he 
 allows  co-operating,  but  not  preventing  grace — at 
 least,  not  clearly  and  distinctly,  as  the  Scriptures 
 teach,  and  as  the  importance  of  the  case  requires; 
 he  dwells  on  the  help  of  the  Spirit,  in  subduing  our 
 passions,  and  qualifying  us  for  heaven,  but  passes 
 over  slightly  the  illuminating  influences  of  the  Spirit, 
 in  opening  the  understanding,  and  his  transforming 
 power,  in  "taking  away  the  heart  of  stone,  and  giv- 
 ing a  heart  of  flesh."  We  read  little  or  nothing  in 
 our  Author  of  the  Holy  Spirit's  work  in  awakening 
 men,  like  those  asleep;  quickening  them,  as  those 
 dead  in  sin  ;  delivering  them  from  the  power  of  Satan, 
 as  those  enslaved ;  convincing  them  of  sin,  as  those 
 ignorant  and  proud;  creating  in  them  a  new  and 
 contrite  heart,  as  those  obdurate  and  perverse;  and 
 implanting  in  them  the  first  seeds  of  repentance, 
 faith,  love,  and  obedience,  as  those  needing  a  new 
 and  heavenly-  birth.  All  this  is  of  the  greatest 
 importance ;  because,  if  the  foundations  of  true 
 obedience  are  not  laid  in  the  scriptural  doctrine 
 of  an  entire  renewal  of  the  fallen  heart,  the  subse- 
 quent building  must  be  slight  and  insecure.  If 
 men  are  not  taught  the  necessity  of  a  new  creation 
 in  Christ  Jesus,  in  consequence  of  the  blindness  of 
 their  understanding,  as  well  as  the  disorder  of  their 
 affections,  they  must,  and  will  begin,  and  we  find  in 
 fact  they  do  begin,  their  religion  in  a  proud,  self- 
 dependent  temper;  in  ignorance  of  their  own  wants, 
 
CXXV11 
 
 and  of  the  mighty  change  which  must  take  place  in 
 them. 
 
 The  illumination  of  the  Spirit  is  especially  im- 
 portant in  this  view.  It  is  a  doctrine  humiliating, 
 indeed,  to  the  proud  reason  of  man,  but  essential  to 
 any  real  knowledge  of  the  gospel  of  Christ.  Our 
 Lord  places  the  gift  of  the  Spirit  at  the  very  entrance 
 of  the  Christian  life,  and  directs  men  to  pray  for  it, 
 as  the  key  and  summary  of  all  other  blessings :  "  Ask, 
 and  ye  shall  receive ;  seek,  and  ye  shall  find ;  knock, 
 and  it  shall  be  opened  to  you.  If  ye,  being  evil, 
 know  how  to  give  good  gifts  unto  your  children,  how 
 much  more  shall  your  Father  which  is  in  heaven, 
 give  his  Holy  Spirit  to  them  that  ask  him  ?"  It 
 might  have  pleased  God,  for  any  thing  we  know,  to 
 have  given  us  a  revelation  so  framed  as  to  be  intelli- 
 gible to  us  in  all  parts,  without  further  aid ;  or  it 
 might  have  pleased  him  to  have  made  the  under- 
 standing of  it,  in  all  its  parts,  plainly  above  our 
 powers  of  mind,  and  capacities  of  comprehension.  In 
 either  case  we  should  then  have  had  no  need  of  the 
 illumination  of  the  Spirit :  in  the  first,  because  the 
 revelation  would  have  been  wholly  level  to  our  natural 
 powers  ;  in  the  second,  because  it  would  have  been 
 wholly  out  of  the  reach  of  them.  But  it  has  pleased 
 God  to  give  us  a  revelation,  containing  much  that  is 
 plain,  in  its  history,  its  facts,  its  external  duties,  its 
 sacraments,  its  morals ;  and  much  that  is  mysterious 
 and  incomprehensible,  in  its  vast  scheme,  in  the  pur- 
 pose and  will  of  its  divine  Author,  in  the  attributes 
 and  glory  of  the  persons  of  the  Godhead,  in  the 
 miraculous  conception  and  incarnation  of  our  Lord, 
 in  the  wonders  of  tbe  cross,  and  the  operations  of 
 
CXXV1U 
 
 grace.  And,  at  the  same  time,  much  also  that  is  of 
 a  mixed  nature,  being  neither  so  plain  as  to  be  level 
 to  our  unaided  understanding,  nor  so  elevated  as  to 
 be  wholly  placed  above  their  compass  and  capacity; 
 but  requiring  the  special  guidance  and  illumination 
 of  the  Holy  Spirit,  to  be  rightly  apprehended  and 
 employed ; — such  is  the  ruined  state  of  man,  the 
 evil  of  sin,  the  nature  of  true  conversion  to  God,  of 
 faith,  of  love,  of  peace,  of  joy,  of  communion  with 
 God,  of  new  obedience ;  all,  in  short,  that  regards 
 the  application  and  use  of  truth.  These  things 
 cannot  be  understood  by  man  in  his  natural  state, 
 but  must  be  learned  by  the  teaching  of  the  Holy 
 Spirit.  And  thus  the  plan  of.  Christianity  is,  in 
 this  view,  a  further  test  of  men's  characters.  They 
 must  stoop  at  the  very  threshold,  and  sue  for  a  hea- 
 venly light,  and  take  other  measures  of  sin,  and 
 themselves,  and  God,  and  repentance,  and  faith,  and 
 conversion,  and  obedience,  than  nature  can  give,  or 
 they  will  fatally  err.  The  ignorance  and  prejudices 
 of  the  "  evil  heart  of  unbelief,"  will  infallibly  betray 
 them.  Either  no  sense  will  be  put  on  the  parts  of 
 the  Scripture  relating  to  these  subjects,  or  a  forced, 
 low,  insufficient  sense,  which  evades,  and  explains 
 away,  instead  of  implicitly  receiving,  the  real  mean- 
 ing. Not  that  we  claim  an  illumination  of  the  Spirit 
 which  supersedes  at  all  the  use  of  the  human  faculties 
 in  studying  the  Bible,  or  requires  a  new  sense  to  be 
 put  on  ordinary  language  and  construction,  or  com- 
 municates new  truths,  not  already  revealed  in  the 
 written  word  of  God ;  or  encourages  or  warrants  en- 
 thusiasm and  human  fancies;  or  entrenches  on  the 
 miraculous  powers  conferred  on  the  apostles;  or  alters 
 
CXX1X 
 
 the  rule  of  duty,  and  the  obligations  of  man  to  obey 
 it ;  or  acts  in  a  way  of  force  and  compulsion  incon- 
 sistent with  our  reasonable  and  accountable  nature. 
 What  we  maintain  is,  the  necessity  of  the  secret  and 
 imperceptible  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  upon  the 
 understanding,  sought  by  diligent  prayer,  and  com- 
 municated gradually,  in  the  use  of  rational  means  ; 
 by  which  the  mind  is  freed  from  prejudice  and  aversion 
 against  truth,  and  is  opened  to  receive  the  instructions 
 of  the  written  word  of  God,  in  their  full  and  natural 
 signification  and  use. 
 
 But  we  pause.  This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  on 
 a  discussion  of  the  work  of  the  Holy  Ghost  in  man's 
 sanctification.  We  have  said  enough,  if  we  have 
 convinced  the  theological  student  that  the  impression 
 which  Butler  gives  of  this  subject  is  far  too  slight 
 and  superficial.  Let  it  be  well  remembered,  that 
 God  has  given  us  a  revelation  of  his  will,  with  the 
 additional  promise  of  his  Spirit,  to  make  it  effectual 
 to  its  high  purposes.  The  light  of  heaven  is  not 
 more  necessary  to  our  discernment  of  natural  objects 
 and  beauties,  than  the  light  of  the  Spirit  to  our 
 discernment  of  spiritual  objects  and  fitnesses.  The 
 characteristic  of  the  New  dispensation,  is  the  pro- 
 mise of  the  Spirit.  And  with  this  persuasion,  we 
 cannot  dissemble  our  fears,  that  the  language  of 
 Bishop  Butler  may  lead  to  dangerous  mistakes. 
 
 5.  But,  in  truth,  all  these  deficiencies,  if  we  are 
 right  in  our  judgment  about  them,  spring  from  an 
 inadequate  view  of  the  fallen  state  of  man.  We 
 know  the  controversies  on  this  mysterious  subject. 
 We  allow  that  statements  have  too  often  been  made, 
 which  go  to  annihilate  man's  moral  nature,  and  his 
 f  3 
 
CX  XX 
 
 capacity  of  restoration  ;  which  weaken  his  responsi- 
 bility, and  unnerve  the  exhortations  and  invitations 
 which  the  Scriptures  address  to  him  ;  which  extinguish 
 the  faint  light  of  natural  conscience,  and  repress 
 effort  and  watchfulness.  But  we  cannot  but  know, 
 at  the  same  time,  that  the  errors  on  the  side  of 
 extenuating  and  lessening  the  scriptural  account  of 
 man's  spiritual  state  since  the  fall,  are  equally  dan- 
 gerous, and  more  prevalent.  We  cannot  therefore 
 conceal  our  conviction,  that  Butler's  view  of  human 
 depravity  does  not  fully  meet  the  truth  of  the  case, 
 as  delineated  in  the  inspired  writings,  and  confirmed 
 by  uniform  experience.  He  speaks,  we  allow,  oc- 
 casionally of  men  "having  corrupted  their  natures," 
 having  lost  their  "  original  rectitude,"  and  as  having 
 permitted  "their  passions  to  become  excessive  by 
 repeated  violations  of  their  inward  constitution."  He 
 avows  that  mankind  is  in  "  a  state  of  degradation, 
 however  diffcult  it  may  be  to  account  for  it ;  and  that 
 the  crime  of  our  first  parents  was  the  occasion  of  our 
 being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous  condition." 
 Yet,  notwithstanding  these  expressions,  the  sincerity 
 and  importance  of  which,  so  far  as  they  go,  we  do 
 not  for  a  moment  call  in  question,  he  dwells,  in  the 
 course  of  his  work,  so  copiously  on  man's  powers  and 
 capacities — on  his  "favouring  virtue" — on  his  hav- 
 ing within  him  "the  principle  of  amendment" — on 
 "its  being  in  his  own  power  to  take  the  path  of 
 life" — on  "virtue  being  agreeable  to  his  nature" — 
 on  "  vice  never  being  chosen  for  its  own  sake ;"  that 
 we  cannot  but  consider  the  result  as  dangerous.  If 
 these  expressions  were  qualified,  as  they  are  in  Scrip- 
 ture, by  other  and  explanatory  statements,  the  dan- 
 
CXXXl 
 
 ger  would  be  less  ;  but,  standing  as  they  do,  they 
 convey  the  idea  that  man  is  not  that  inconsistent, 
 weak,  corrupt,  perverse,  depraved,  impotent  creature 
 which  the  word  of  God  teaches  us  he  is.  The 
 consequence  of  slight  impressions  of  this  great  truth 
 infallibly  is,  that  men,  not  being  duly  instructed  in 
 their  real  state  before  God,  cannot  feel  that  humility, 
 nor  exercise  that  penitence,  nor  sue  for  that  renewal, 
 which  all  depend  on  the  primary  fact  of  a  total  moral 
 ruin ;  and  which  form  the  adaptation  between  the 
 real  grace  of  the  gospel,  and  the  actual  wants  of 
 man.  Thus  all  the  great  ends  of  Christianity  are 
 missed,  and  inferior  benefits  only  are  derived  from  it. 
 Neither  conversion  on  the  one  hand,  nor  real  obe- 
 dience to  God  on  the  other,  can  be  attained  ;  and  the 
 arch,  deprived  of  its  key-stone  as  it  were,  loses  both 
 its  beauty  and  its  strength. 
 
 The  scriptural  account  of  man  is,  that  "he  is 
 born  in  sin  and  shapen  in  iniquity" — that  "in  him 
 dwelleth  no  good  thing" — that  "his  heart  is  de- 
 ceitful above  all  things,  and  desperately  wicked" — 
 that  "the  very  imaginations  of  the  thoughts  of  his 
 heart  are  only  evil  continually" — that  "  he  cannot,  of 
 himself,  think  any  thing  that  is  good" — that  "  he 
 is  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins" — that  he  "  is  by 
 nature  a  child  of  wrath," — lost,  enslaved,  miserable, 
 ignorant,  corrupt; — his  heart  "at  enmity  with  God" 
 — his  passions  and  affections  set  on  "  divers  lusts 
 and  pleasures"- — his  whole  moral  nature  "alienated 
 from  the  life  of  God."  This  strong  language  is  not 
 contradictory  to  what  the  Scriptures,  from  which  it 
 is  taken,  teach  of  man's  responsibility — his  remaining 
 sense  of  right  and  wrong — his  conscience — his  fears 
 
CXXX11 
 
 of  judgment — his   duty  and  his  obligations;   but  it 
 plainly  instructs  us,  that   these  relics   and   fragments 
 of  a  former  rectitude,  are   relics   and  fragments,  and 
 nothing  more ;   and  that,  as   to  any  effective  love  of 
 holiness — as   to   any  real  return  to  God — as  to  any 
 positive  efforts  to  recover  or  restore  himself,  he  can 
 do  nothing,  except  as  God  "  worketh  in  him  to  will 
 and   to   do   of  his   good  pleasure."      The  edifice  is 
 decayed   throughout;  it   must   be    taken   down   and 
 re-erected   by  the  divine    Architect.      The  leprosy 
 has  infected  every  part;  it  must  be  levelled  with  the 
 ground  and  built  anew.      Let  this  fundamental  doc- 
 trine  be  understood,  and  produce  its  due  effects,  and 
 all   will   be   easy  and   intelligible   in   the    Christian 
 scheme   of  redemption;   every  thing  will  occupy  its 
 due  place.      The  apostacy  and  fall  of  man  will  prepare 
 for  salvation    by  grace — for  a  free  justification    by 
 the  merits  of  Christ — for  an   entire  renovation   by 
 the  blessed    Spirit — for   a    sincere   and    unreserved 
 obedience.      And  not  only  for  obedience,  but  for  love 
 to  God  and  man — cheerful  dedication  to  the  service 
 of  Christ — a  temper  of   compassion    and    kindness 
 towards  others — a  disinterested,  amiable,  and  active 
 benevolence — a  zeal  for  the  glory  of  God,  and  the 
 good   of  men — and    a    watchfulness    over  the    first 
 risings  of  sinful  passions  and  appetites.      All  this  will 
 be  connected  with  a  "peace  of  God  which   passeth 
 understanding"  —  "joy    in     the    Holy    Ghost"  — 
 "patience  in  tribulation" — delight  in  prayer,  medita- 
 tion, and  the  contemplation  of  God  and  heaven — a 
 sense  of  happiness  and  tranquillity  in  spiritual  things 
 — a  moderation   as   to  all   earthly  concerns — and   a 
 victory  over  the  applause  and  frown  of  the  world. 
 
6.  For  this  is  the  next  thing  we  shall  presume  to 
 mention,  as  defective  in  the  allusions  and  statements 
 of  our  Author — his  standard  of  the  effects  of  Chris- 
 tianity, in  the  hoi?/,  happy  lives  of  real  Christians, 
 is  far  too  low.  It  could  not  indeed  be  otherwise. 
 The  spiritual  life  is  a  whole.  If  the  glory  of  the 
 Saviour,  and  the  operations  of  his  Spirit,  and  the 
 total  ruin  of  man,  as  requiring  both,  are  not  first 
 understood,  it  is  impossible  that  the  blessed  fruits  of 
 all  this,  in  the  new  life  and  happiness  of  the  reno- 
 vated, pardoned,  and  sanctified  heart,  should  be  pro- 
 duced. There  is,  however,  such  a  thing  as  "the 
 love  of  Christ  constraining  a  man  to  live  no  longer 
 to  himself,  but  to  Him  that  died  for  him  and  rose 
 again  ;"  there  is  such  a  thing  as  the  inward  experi- 
 ence of  the  grace  of  Christianity;  there  is  such  a 
 thing  as  a  holy,  happy,  spiritual  life,  which  differs  as 
 much  from  a  merely  rational  and  moral  one,  as  the 
 rational  life  differs  from  the  animal,  and  the  animal 
 from  the  vegetable.  Not  to  have  seized  this  idea, 
 is  to  have  missed  one  peculiar  feature  of  true  Chris- 
 tianity. 
 
 7.  In  short,  the  whole  of  what  we  would  advance 
 amounts  to  this — the  standard  of  Christianity,  as  ap- 
 plied to  the  heart  and  life  of  man,  which  the  readers 
 of  Butler  would  form  from  his  general  language, 
 is  far  below  what  we  conceive  to  be  the  standard  of 
 the  Sacred  Scriptures.  In  our  view  of  the  scriptural 
 standard,  we  may  be  wrong;  but  we  think  every 
 reader  will  perceive  that  the  several  points  on  which 
 we  have  offered  remarks,  hang  together.  If  the 
 view  we  take  of  the  extent  of  the  fall  be  in  the  main 
 correct,  then   the  view  of  justification,   of  the  grace 
 
CXXXIV 
 
 of  the  gospel,  of  faith,  of  the  work  of  the  Holy 
 Ghost,  of  the  peace  and  consolation  of  the  Chris- 
 tian's heart,  and  of  the  zeal  and  spirituality  of  his 
 obedience,  are  probably  correct  also.  They  are 
 links  of  one  chain.  The  connection  is  indispensable. 
 They  rise  or  fall  together. — All  we  entreat  of  the 
 reader,  is  an  impartial  examination  of  the  entire 
 question.  We  beg  only  that  it  may  not  be  deter- 
 mined by  matters  irrelevant — by  fashion,  prejudice, 
 the  spirit  of  party,  temporal  and  subordinate  interests. 
 We  beg  only  that  the  introduction  of  tenets  which 
 we  do  not  hold,  or  of  consequences  which  we  abhor, 
 may  not  be  mixed  up  with  the  discussion.  The 
 simple  question  is — Is  the  system  which  the  language 
 we  have  been  condemning  seems  to  favour,  or  the 
 system  which  we  have  suggested  in  its  stead,  the 
 true  system  of  the  New  Testament  ?  Which  comes 
 nearest  to  the  Bible?  Which  has  the  apparent 
 sanction  of  the  inspired  oracles  of  God?  Which 
 suits  the  expressions  and  sentiments  of  the  sacred 
 writers  in  all  their  parts  ?  Which  takes  in  naturally 
 and  without  effort,  not  only  the  historical  parts  of 
 the  Bible,  not  only  the  moral,  not  only  the  pro- 
 phetical, not  only  the  devotional — for  there  is  here 
 no  dispute — but  the  doctrinal  and  experimental  ?  It 
 is  no  sufficient  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  system  we 
 are  opposing,  that  parts  of  it  agree  with  the  Scrip- 
 tures; for  it  could  not  be  otherwise.  It  would  not 
 be  a  convincing  proof  of  it,  even  if  the  whole  of  its 
 detached  parts  were  to  be  found  separately  in  that 
 perfect  code.  The  question  is,  Does  it  take  in  all 
 that  Scripture  teaches  on  the  several  subjects  ;  does 
 it  adopt,  in  their  obvious  and  unadulterated  meaning, 
 
cxxxv 
 
 all  the  language  and  statements  of  the  Bible  on 
 the  fall  of  man,  on  justification,  and  on  the  other 
 points  in  controversy?  And  here  we  boldly  and 
 fearlessly  appeal  to  facts.  Those  who  preach  and 
 write  in  the  temper  and  on  the  scheme  which  we  are 
 opposing,  do  not  use  naturally  and  habitually  the 
 language  of  St.  Paul  and  the  other  apostles.  This 
 language  does  not  suit  and  fall  in  with  their  system, 
 does  not  express  what  they  mean ;  and,  therefore, 
 except  when  compelled  by  circumstances,  their  theo- 
 logical scheme  avoids  the  scriptural  phraseology,  and 
 is  formed  in  a  different  school.  Our  objection  to 
 Bishop  Butler's  language  is,  that  it  is  not  scriptural. 
 He  substitutes  weaker  and  more  ambiguous  expres- 
 sions. He  lowers  every  thing.  This  one  point  goes 
 far  to  decide  the  question  with  any  candid  mind. 
 The  system  which  admits  with  ease,  and  reposes 
 upon,  the  very  language  and  sentiments  of  the  in- 
 spired writers  in  all  their  instructions  and  exhorta- 
 tions, must,  in  all  probability,  be  the  nearest  to  the 
 truth.  It  is  thus  men  judge  in  every  similar  case. 
 And  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  the  higher  and 
 more  spiritual  system  of  Christianity  takes  in  and 
 embraces  the  lower  one;  whilst  this  lower  one  rises 
 not  to  the  other,  and  thus  reaches  not  the  extent 
 and  end  of  the  Divine  Revelation. 
 
 Once  more,  we  appeal  to  the  hearts  and  con- 
 sciences, to  the  trials  and  conflicts,  to  the  feelings 
 and  wants,  of  the  most  devout  and  sincere  Christians, 
 and  we  ask  which  view  of  truth  comes  nearest  to 
 their  cases,  their  necessities,  their  indigence  ?  Which 
 view  of  the  state  of  man  is  best  descriptive  of  their 
 own  state  ?      Which  view  of  the  method  and  scheme 
 
CXXXV1 
 
 of  pardon  most  adequately  supplies  their  importunate 
 need?  Which  view  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Holy 
 Ghost  affords  the  mighty  aid  which  they  are  con- 
 scious they  require  ?  Which  view  of  the  grace  of 
 Christianity  corresponds  most  exactly  with  their  ex- 
 treme misery?  Which  view  of  the  spiritual  obe- 
 dience and  love  of  the  Christian  life  is  most  closely 
 allied  to  the  object  at  which  they  aim  ?  But  we  will 
 not  press  these  questions.  The  confessions  of  the 
 very  best  and  most  holy  men,  are  the  liveliest  com- 
 ment on  the  language  of  the  divine  writers.  And 
 the  misgivings  and  penitential  acknowledgments,  as 
 death  and  eternity  approach,  of  many  who,  during 
 life,  espoused  the  lower  interpretation,  speak  loudly 
 enough  on  this  subject. 
 
 We  rather  go  on  to  ask  this  question — Which 
 system  of  divinity  produces  in  the  largest  measure 
 those  fruits  and  effects,  which  are  ascribed  to  the 
 gospel  in  the  New  Testament?  Now,  it  will  be 
 conceded  on  all  hands,  that  "by  their  fruits  we  are 
 to  know"  the  true  teachers,  and  distinguish  them 
 from  the  false.  Does,  then,  the  lowering  doctrines 
 of  modern  times  on  the  fall  and  ruin  of  man,  and 
 the  redemption  and  grace  of  Christ,  and  the  kindred 
 topics,  awaken  the  souls  of  sinners,  reclaim  the 
 ungodly,  arouse  the  careless,  revive  religion  where 
 it  has  decayed,  and  preserve  it  where  it  flourishes  ? 
 Does  it  not,  on  the  contrary,  first  leave  those  who 
 preach  it  cold  and  inactive,  and  then  fall  without  effi- 
 cacy on  the  ears  of  the  hearers?  Does  it  not  prove 
 insufficient  for  converting  the  heart,  turning  it  from 
 the  power  of  sin,  and  raising  it  to  the  love  and  obe- 
 dience of  God?      Does  it  not  fail  of  comforting  the 
 
CXXXVll 
 
 afflicted  conscience,  and  inspiring  a  hope  of  heaven  ? 
 Docs  it  not  stop  short  of  all  the  mighty  ends  which 
 primitive  Christianity  produced?  And  is  there  not 
 a  constant  tendency  in  it  to  deteriorate  and  sink 
 lower  and  lower,  till  the  grace  of  the  gospel  is  almost 
 excluded,  and  little  remains  beyond  a  tame  morality 
 and  an  external  form  of  religion  ?  And  does  not  the 
 decay  of  spiritual  religion  go  on,  till,  by  the  mercy 
 of  God,  a  revival  of  the  great  doctrines  of  salvation 
 by  grace,  in  the  plain  language  and  spirit  of  the 
 Scriptures,  takes  place,  and  recalls  man  to  the  true 
 standard  of  faith  and  practice  ? 
 
 The  fact  plainly  is  as  these  inquiries  are  designed 
 to  describe  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  simple  preach- 
 ing of  "Christ  crucified, "  is  still  the  "  power  of 
 God  and  the  wisdom  of  God."  Wherever  the  high 
 standard  of  really  evangelical  truth  is  raised,  and 
 the  Saviour  is  preached  to  a  lost  world,  and  the  re- 
 generating and  sanctifying  operations  of  the  Spirit 
 are  avowed,  and  the  full  consolation  and  joy  of  faith 
 expounded,  and  the  elevated  rule  of  Christian  morals 
 sustained ;  there,  under  whatever  incidental  defects 
 or  disadvantages,  the  effects  of  conversion,  love,  and 
 obedience  are  copiously  produced ;  man  is  indeed 
 turned  from  sin  unto  God,  the  breast  of  the  rebel 
 is  subdued  and  softened,  his  whole  character  is 
 changed,  and  the  zeal  of  God  is  impressed  upon  the 
 declaration  of  his  own  truth,  by  the  displays  of  his 
 own  efficient  grace  and  mercy. 
 
 It  strongly  confirms  the  conclusion  we  thus  come 
 to.  to  consider  that  the  Universal  Church  of  Christ 
 hna  held  these  great  truths  which  are  now  so  much 
 opposed.      Look  to  the  early  Fathers  of  the  Church, 
 
CXXXV111 
 
 and  you  find  the  doctrines  of  man's  total  apostacy, 
 and  his  salvation  by  grace  only,  to  be  the  life  of  all 
 their  instructions.  As  those  mighty  truths  were 
 corrupted  by  human  philosophy,  or  overwhelmed  by 
 superstition,  the  power  of  religion  sunk ;  her  glory 
 in  the  conversion  of  men  was  lost,  and  she  fell  back 
 into  a  cold  controversial  spirit,  which  brought  on  the 
 ages  of  darkness  and  spiritual  tyranny.  What,  we 
 ask,  was  the  doctrine  of  Cyprian  in  the  third  cen- 
 tury, of  Ambrose  in  the  fourth,  and  Augustine  in 
 the  fifth  ?  What  gave  life  to  their  exhortations,  and 
 influence  to  their  labours?  Was  it  not  the  pure 
 evangelical  light,  which,  notwithstanding  many  sub- 
 ordinate errors  and  much  superstition,  shone  forth  in 
 their  laborious  discourses  and  writings?  Even  to 
 the  time  of  Bernard,  the  last  of  the  Fathers,  the 
 name  and  grace  of  Christ,  in  the  full  efficacy  of  his 
 mercy,  pervaded  the  theology,  and  sanctified  the 
 hearts  of  men.  It  was  only  as  this  healing  doctrine 
 was  utterly  lost  under  the  accumulation  of  supersti- 
 tion and  idolatry,  that  the  melancholy  desertion  and 
 apostacy  of  the  visible  Church  in  the  West  took 
 place.  In  the  midst  of  this  thick  darkness,  how- 
 aver,  it  was  the  same  truth  of  grace  which  preserved, 
 among  the  Albigenses  and  Waldenses,  the  life  and 
 influence  of  the  gospel.  And  at  the  Reformation, 
 what  was  it  which  Luther,  and  Melancthon,  and 
 Cranmer,  and  Zuingle,  and  Calvin,  and  Beza,  and 
 Knox  taught?  Did  they  not  revive  the  old  scrip- 
 tural doctrines  of  orignial  sin,  justification  by  faith, 
 salvation  by  grace,  regeneration  and  communion  with 
 God  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  spiritual  obedience,  as 
 the  fruit  of  all  this,  in  the  temper  and  life?      Some 
 
CX  XXIX 
 
 of  these  truths  indeed,  were  held  in  a  general  and 
 loose  manner  by  the  Church  of  Rome,  but  they  were 
 enervated  by  distinctions  and  refinements,  and  over- 
 whelmed by  superstitious  usages  and  rites.  The 
 reformers  boldly  appealed  from  the  erroneous  opinions 
 of  men,  to  the  infallible  word  of  God.  They  set 
 forth  the  ruin  of  the  fall  in  all  its  extent;  they  in- 
 sisted on  the  preventing  grace  of  the  Spirit,  as  neces- 
 sary to  all  true  repentance ;  they  gloried  only  in  the 
 cross  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  and  in  justification 
 by  his  merits;  they  called  men  off  from  works  of 
 external  mortification  and  unauthorized  penance,  to 
 the  good  deeds,  and  virtuous  habits,  and  divine  prin- 
 ciples taught  by  the  sacred  writers.  And  what  was 
 the  effect  ?  In  most  of  the  nations  of  Europe,  thou- 
 sands and  thousands  were  really  converted  to  the 
 service  and  love  of  God.  The  reformed  doctrines 
 spread  with  the  rapidity  of  lightning,  a  pure  form  of 
 Christianity  was  established  in  many  States,  and  the 
 Papacy  was  shaken  to  its  base. 
 
 Let  any  one  impartially  read  the  Confessions  and 
 Articles  of  the  Reformed  churches,  and  those  of  our 
 own  church  amongst  the  very  first;  and  he  will  see 
 that  the  high  standard  of  sentiment  and  practice 
 which  we  espouse,  was  universally  maintained.  What 
 is  the  language  of  these  noble  documents  ?  Does  it 
 resemble  the  enfeebled  and  dubious  strain  of  modern 
 theology;  or  does  it  not  rather  take  the  plain  and 
 strong  ground  of  the  ancient  doctrine  of  the  entire 
 apostacy  of  man,  and  the  efficacious  grace  of  God? 
 And  in  all  the  Protestant  churches  since  the  Re- 
 formation, mark  the  progress  or  decline  of  real  piety 
 and  holiness,  and  you   will  find   them   unifoimlv  to 
 
cxl 
 
 bear  a  relation  to  the  pure  doctrines  of  grace  upheld 
 or  denied.  Where  these  doctrines  have  flourished, 
 the  presence  and  mercy  of  God  in  the  conversion 
 of  men  have  attested  the  truth;  where  a  decay  has 
 taken  place,  and  human  morals,  or  a  low  system  of 
 divinity,  has  usurped  the  place  of  the  unadulterated 
 gospel,  every  thing  has  fallen  in  proportion — men 
 have  remained  dead  and  unmoved  in  their  sins;  the 
 form  has  extinguished  the  power  of  godliness ;  cold 
 and  proud  pretentions  to  orthodoxy  have  been  united 
 with  a  worldly  life;  the  clergy  have  deserted  the 
 lofty  function  of  being  heralds  of  salvation  and  ex- 
 amples to  their  people,  and  have  been  lost  in  secu- 
 lar politics,  in  human  attachments  to  an  established 
 creed,  and  angry  controversies  with  those  who  would 
 point  out  to  them  "  a  more  excellent  way."  Thus 
 things  have  grown  worse  and  worse,  till  God  has 
 granted  a  revival  by  the  secret  guidance  of  his  Spirit. 
 Then  the  old  and  forgotten  tenets  of  human  guilt 
 and  impotency,  and  divine  mercy  and  power,  have 
 been  raised  up  again  as  from  the  grave,  the  old 
 standard  of  truth  again  erected ;  public  opinion  has 
 been  gradually  changed  ;  the  former  state  of  decline 
 admitted  and  deplored ;  and  the  wonted  efficacy 
 of  Christian  doctrine  seen  once  more,  in  its  proper 
 fruits  of  conversion,  holiness,  and  love. 
 
 But  we  are  indulging  ourselves  in  reflections 
 which  carry  us  too  far  from  our  immediate  design. 
 The  Analogy  is  a  treatise  of  Evidences,  and  could 
 only  be  expected  to  allude  generally  to  these  mo- 
 mentous topics.  We  would  not  assume  the  truth 
 of  the  evangelical  system  of  which  we  speak.  We 
 invite   only  to  inquiry;   we    appeal  boldly  to   every 
 
cxli 
 
 kind  of  testimony  which  such  a  case  admits  ;  and 
 we  leave  the  result  with  confidence  to  the  judgment 
 of  every  unbiassed  and  enlightened  theological  stu- 
 dent. One  reason  of  our  venturing  to  dwell  on 
 these  topics  is  the  well-fixed  persuasion,  that  our 
 writers  on  Evidences  have  grievously  mistaken  their 
 own  duty  as  advocates  of  Christianity,  as  well  as  the 
 interests  of  truth  and  religion  generally,  in  not  pre- 
 senting the  fair  and  adequate  account  of  the  doctrines 
 and  morals  of  the  gospel.  We  do  not  mean  that 
 they  should  involve  themselves  in  controversy,  nor 
 even 'enter  on  the  details  of  Christian  doctrines  and 
 morals.  Let  them  keep  to  their  own  province,  the 
 defence  and  establishment  of  Christianity  generally ; 
 but  let  the  references  to  the  contents  and  tenor  of 
 that  religion  be,  so  far  as  they  go,  just  and  complete. 
 Let  the  little  they  do  say,  be  accurate.  Let  what  is 
 given  to  their  readers,  convey  an  idea  of  what  the 
 spirit  and  design  of  the  whole  system  is.  Let  the 
 parts  touched  on,  connect  naturally  with  all  the  rest 
 which  are  not  specifically  treated.  This  conduct 
 becomes  the  magnitude  and  importance  of  the  sub- 
 ject. It  prepares  the  reader  of  evidences  to  submit 
 to  the  yoke  of  Christ.  It  exhibits  religion  attrac- 
 tive, efficacious,  entire.  It  meets  the  feelings  and 
 wants  of  the  sincere  and  humble  inquirer.  It  shuts 
 out  a  thousand  misapprehensions  and  errors.  It  in- 
 sures the  blessing  of  God  in  a  large  measure,  upon 
 the  triumphant  evidences  of  our  faith.  It  is  the 
 most  simple,  upright,  straightforward  course.* 
 
 *   We  cannot  here  withhold  our  tribute  of  admiration  from  the 
 work  of  Mr.  Sumner  on  the  "  Evidence  ot  Christianity,  as  derived 
 
cxlii 
 
 Still  we  are  far,  very  far  from  undervaluing  the 
 labours  of  the  Apologists  and  Defenders  of  Chris- 
 tianity. They  have  performed  excellent  service. 
 Their  acuteness  and  skill,  their  penetrating  observa- 
 tions, their  indefatigable  researches,  the  force  of  their 
 reasonings,  and  the  depth  of  their  knowledge,  have 
 deserved  highly  of  the  sacred  cause.  The  External 
 evidences  have  naturally  been  most  adequately  un- 
 folded, because  the  interior  virtues  and  properties  of 
 the  Christian  scheme  came  less  within  their  scope. 
 But  we  adhere  notwithstanding  to  our  conviction, 
 that  all  the  summaries  of  the  revealed  doctrines, 
 which  even  the  argument  from  external  evidences 
 require,  should  be  a  part  and  parcel,  as  it  were,  of 
 the  entire  possession,  should  resemble  the  apostolic 
 examples,  and  be  expressed  as  nearly  as  possible  in  the 
 apostolic  language.  We  do  not  stop  to  say  how 
 much  more  this  should  be  the  case  in  Treatises  on 
 the  Internal  evidences.  We  rather  go  on  to  observe, 
 that,  in  the  case  immediately  before  us,  the  argu- 
 ment from  Analogy,  a  similar  fidelity  to  the  full 
 demands  of  the  Christian  scheme  would  have  had 
 the  very  best  effect.  That  we  do  not  depreciate  the 
 talents  and  labours  of  Bishop  Butler,  must  have 
 been  obvious  to  every  reader  of  these  pages.  We 
 have  even  expressed  the  hope,  the  rational  hope, 
 springing  from  a  judgment  of  charity,  that  in  his  own 
 mind  he  followed  the  true  doctrine,  and  that  he  was 
 far    from  intending  to  produce  those  consequences 
 
 from  its  reception,  and  from  the  nature  of  its  doctrine  ?"  This 
 masterly  treatise  forms  an  era  in  the  history  of  writings  in  defence 
 of  our  faith. 
 
cxliii 
 
 to  which  his  language  may  lead.  We  have  also 
 fully  admitted  his  correct  and  powerful  defence  of 
 the  scheme  of  Christianity  to  a  certain  extent.  It 
 is  this  very  thing  which  makes  us  the  more  regret, 
 that  he  had  not  carried  his  views  on,  and  given  a 
 more  full  and  accurate  idea,  so  far  as  his  plan  of  argu- 
 ment allowed,  of  all  the  efficacy  and  consolation  of 
 the  gospel.  His  work  is  cold.  He  seems  rather  like 
 a  man  forced  to  be  a  Christian,  than  one  rejoicing 
 in  its  blessings.  It  is  impossible  to  calculate  the 
 additional  good  which  the  Analogy  would  have  ef- 
 fected, if  its  unnumbered  readers  had  been  instructed 
 more  adequately  by  it,  in  the  spiritual  death  and  ruin 
 of  man  in  all  his  powers  by  the  fall,  in  the  inesti- 
 mable constitution  of  special  grace  established  by  the 
 gospel,  in  the  gratuitous  justification  of  the  sincere 
 believer  in  the  sacrifice  of  Christ,  in  the  divine  na- 
 ture and  properties  of  true  faith,  in  the  mighty 
 operations  of  the  Holy  Ghost  in  illuminating  and 
 sanctifying  man,  and  in  the  consolation  and  univer- 
 sal obedience  which  are  the  fruits  of  faith.  Proba- 
 bly there  is  no  student  in  divinity,  during  the  last 
 half  century  or  more,  who  has  not  read,  and  read 
 with  admiration  and  profit,  this  astonishing  work. 
 How  many  of  these  have  been  confirmed  in  a  defec- 
 tive theology,  strengthened  in  prejudices  against 
 truth,  and  persuaded  to  adopt  a  low  system  of  doc- 
 trine in  the  instruction  of  others,  from  the  incidental 
 language,  and  hazardous  expressions  which  occur  in 
 it !  But  so  it  is.  There  are  in  human  life  few 
 things  complete.  What  we  meet  with  in  one  writer, 
 we  miss  in  another.  The  union  of  rare  and  exquisite 
 talent  with  the  highest  tone  of  sacred  feeling  and 
 
cxliv 
 
 doctrine,  was  perhaps  rarely  ever  witnessed  as  it  was 
 in  Pascal.     And  the  good  which  his  masterly  work. 
 though  posthumous,   and  the  writing  of  a  Roman 
 Catholic,  has  produced,  has  been  correspondent  both 
 in  extent  and  in  quality.      The  unexampled  effects 
 of  his  "  Thoughts  on  Religion,  "  attest  the  solidity 
 of  the  main  points  to  which  we   are   now  adverting. 
 Pascal  surpasses  all  other  writers  on   Evidences,  be- 
 cause he  conjoins  the  most  lively  and   acute  genius, 
 and   the  finest   powers   of  reasoning,   with   the  full 
 admission   of  the  great  fundamental   tenets   of  the 
 Christianity  which  he  defends.     The  single  doctrine 
 of  the   entire  corruption  of  man  by  the  fall,  sheds  a 
 light  on  all  his  arguments,  and   meets  the  state  and 
 feelings   of   every  pious   reader,   whilst  it   tends  to 
 instruct  those  who  are  yet  unacquainted  with   this 
 most  important  truth.     It  is  thus  that  Pascal's  great 
 work,  though  not  free  from  many  of  the  errors  of  his 
 church,  remains  unrivalled  in   its.  class.      And  the 
 work  of  Bishop  Butler  would  have  been  little  inferior 
 to  it,  if  it  had  united,  with  its  profound  and  just  views 
 of  the  order  of  God  in  his  natural  government,  and 
 the  correspondence  of  his  moral  and  religious  order 
 in  revelation,  the   full  view  of  human   depravity  and 
 of  divine  grace,  which  that  revelation  opened  before 
 him.      It  is  impossible  not  to   sec  with  what  ease  a 
 writer,  who  has  proceeded  so  far,  and   conducted  us 
 so  securely  to  a  certain  point,  would  have  gone  on  in 
 the  course  he  was  pursuing,  till  he  had  embraced  the 
 vast  compass  of  experimental  and   practical  religion, 
 and  had  thus  left  behind  him  a  monument,  not  only 
 of  triumph  over  objections  against  the  general  scheme 
 of  Christianity,  but  of  victory  over  those  prejudices, 
 
cxlv 
 
 and  that  tame  acquiescence,  which  too  often  obscure 
 the  real  doctrine  of  our  recovery,  as  we  have  ventured 
 to  delineate  it. 
 
 8.  For  this  Is  the  last  topic  on  which  we  shall 
 presume  to  offer  any  remarks.  We  observe,  there- 
 fore, that  the  very  same  arguments  from  the  analogy 
 of  nature  which  silence  the  objections  raised  against 
 Christianity,  as  expounded  by  our  Author  in  a  very 
 mitigated  sense,  would  have  served  to  meet  the  objec- 
 tions raised  against  it,  in  its  full  scriptural  extent. 
 
 1.  For  instance,  the  doctrine  of  the  fall  of  our 
 nature  might  have  been  defended  in  its  genuine  form, 
 quite  as  triumphantly  as  it  now  is.  The  following 
 is  the  conclusion  of  Butler's  argument: — "  Who- 
 ever considers  all  these,  and  some  other  obvious 
 things,  will  think  he  has  little  reason  to  object  against 
 the  Scripture  account,  that  mankind  is  in  a  state  of 
 degradation ;  against  this  being  the  fact,  how  diffi- 
 cult soever  he  may  think  it  to  account  for,  or  even  to 
 form  a  distinct  conception  of  the  occasion  and  circum- 
 stances of  it.  But  that  the  crime  of  our  first  pa- 
 rents was  the  occasion  of  our  being  placed  in  a  more 
 disadvantageous  condition,  is  a  thing  throughout,  and 
 particularly  analogous  to  what  we  see  in  the  daily 
 course  of  natural  Providence."  (Part  II.  Chap.  V. 
 §  v.) — Surely,  if  the  expressions  used  by  the  inspired 
 writers  were  submitted  for  the  defective  ones  of  this 
 passage,  the  argument  would  hold  equally  good. 
 Nay,  it  would  have  more  force,  from  more  exactly 
 corresponding  with  the  facts  of  the  case.  For  men, 
 alas!  are  not  merely  in  "  a  state  of  degradation,"  but 
 of  "  alienation  from  the  life  of  God,  through  the 
 :gnorance  that  is  in  them,  because  of  the  blindness 
 G  17 
 
cxlvi 
 
 of  their  hearts;"  mankind  were  not  only  "placed  in 
 a  more  disadvantageous  condition  by  the  crime  of  our 
 first  parents,"  but  "  by  one  man  sin  entered  into  the 
 world,  and  death  by  sin ;  and  so  death  passed  upon 
 all  men,  for  that  all  have  sinned ;"  as  the  inspired 
 Apostle  declares. 
 
 2.  Again  the  argument  of  our  Author,  from  our 
 confessed  ignorance  of  what  a  revelation  might  be 
 expected  to  contain,  and  of  what  particular  offices 
 and  duties  might  be  assigned  to  a  Divine  Mediator, 
 is  just  as  valid  when  applied  to  the  true  view  of  the 
 mediatorial  grace  of  Christ,  as  we  conceive  it  to  be 
 revealed  in  Scripture,  (always  supposing  we  are  right 
 in  that  view,)  as  to  the  limited  view  to  which  he 
 actually  applies  it.  The  hope  which  the  order  of 
 Providence  suggests  of  the  moral  consequences  of 
 sin  being  in  some  way  remedied  under  God's  govern- 
 ment, remains  as  it  does.  The  inefficacy  of  mere 
 repentance,  and  reformation,  as  apparent  from  the 
 course  of  natural  things,  remains  as  it  does.  The 
 intervention  of  Christ  as  the  great  Mediator,  by  his 
 one  vicarious  propitiation  and  atonement,  remains  as 
 it  does.  If,  then,  the  effects  of  this  mighty  sacrifice 
 are  not  merely  the  "  procuring  our  repentance  to  be 
 accepted,  and  the  putting  us  in  a  capacity  of  salva- 
 tion," but  the  actual  gift  of  pardon,  justification,  and 
 a  title  to  eternal  life  by  faith  only — the  inference  is 
 as  firm,  and  the  analogy  as  clear,  as  in  the  present 
 case.  The  reasoning  is  even  more  close,  if  the  facts, 
 as  we  contend  they  do — that  is,  the  real  state  of  man, 
 the  positive  benefits  received  by  the  sincere  believer, 
 and  the  decisive  testimony  of  Scripture  on  the  subject 
 — bear  us  out. 
 
cxivii 
 
 3.  Nor  can  we  discern  any  gap  in  the  argument, 
 concerning  faith  being  the  instrument  of  receiving 
 Jesus  Christ  as  the  greatest  gift  of  God — if  faith  be 
 interpreted  in  that  higher  and  transcendent  sense  in 
 which  we  have  put  it.  The  reasoning  stands  just  as 
 it  does.  Only  at  present  it  applies  to  a  general  in- 
 discriminate belief  in  the  truths  of  revelation  ;  and,  in 
 the  case  as  we  would  propose  it,  it  would  embrace  a 
 particular,  personal,  holy,  affectionate  obedience  of 
 the  heart  to  the  testimony  of  God,  to  his  Son,  and 
 to  life  in  Him.  If  objections  are  invalid  or  frivolous 
 against  the  first,  much  more  must  they  be  so  against 
 the  second. 
 
 4.  In  like  manner,  the  admirable  reasoning  of 
 our  Author,  from  the  clear  and  particular  analogy  of 
 nature,  that  a  moral  government  is  going  on  in  the 
 world,  and  will  be  completed  in  a  future  life — a 
 government  in  which  every  one  shall  be  punished 
 or  rewarded  according  to  his  works — loses  no  part 
 of  its  force,  if  the  grace  of  God,  and  the  fruits  of 
 faith  flowing  from  it,  are  included  in  the  notion  of 
 the  deeds  of  the  righteous  to  which  the  reward  of 
 endless  life  shall  be  assigned.  All  depends  on  the 
 primary  question — What  is  the  real  doctrine  of 
 Scripture  on  the  point?  Assuming  this,  which  we 
 are  obliged  to  do  for  the  sake  of  argument,  we  must 
 say,  we  can  see  no  different,  or  stronger  objections 
 against  a  moral  and  righteous  government  under  the 
 Christian  dispensation  being  now  carrying  on,  if 
 the  true  view  of  the  character,  and  works,  and  piety, 
 and  humility,  and  other  attendant  virtues  of  the 
 believer  in  Christ  be  taken  into  the  account  of  his 
 general  good  deeds,  than  if  the   historical  faith,  and 
 
 g  2 
 
cxlviii 
 
 feeble  penitence,  and  defective  motives,  and  partial 
 morality  of  the  external  Christian  be  mainly  regarded. 
 On  the  contrary,  the  argument  gains  incomparably  in 
 strength  and  exactness,  if  the  scriptural  hypothesis 
 be  adhered  to. 
 
 5.  Again,  the  full  doctrine  of  the  operations  of 
 the  Holy  Ghost,  in  the  sense  we  have  given  to  it, 
 is  just  as  reconcilable  with  all  we  see  in  the  order  of 
 nature,  and  just  as  free  from  any  valid  objections, 
 as  that  aid  and  assistance  to  good  men  is,  to  which 
 our  Author  chiefly  restricts  it.  It  is  no  more  con- 
 trary to  any  conceptions  or  expectations  we  might 
 have  formed  of  Christianity,  to  find  in  it  a  provision 
 for  restoring  our  corrupted  nature,  by  an  effective 
 renewal,  than  to  aid  it  only  by  less  supplies  of  light, 
 and  strength,  and  consolation.  The  mystery  of  the 
 Spirit's  operations  is  the  same  in  both  cases — the 
 danger  of  enthusiastic  pretensions  the  same — the 
 manner  of  recovering  man  by  the  revelation  of  a 
 Divine  Sanctifier  the  same — the  obligations  we  owe 
 to  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  the  relation  he  stands  in  to  us, 
 the  same.  We  mean  the  same  in  kind — open  to  no 
 other  objections ;  proceeding  on  the  same  sort  of 
 scheme.  Indeed  Butler  actually  uses,  at  times,  as 
 we  have  occasion  to  state,  the  strongest  language 
 that  could  be  required,  and  quotes  once  the  expres- 
 sion of  our  Saviour,  "  Except  a  man  be  born  of  the 
 Spirit,  he  cannot  see  the  kingdom  of  heaven."  He 
 needed  only  to  have  pursued  out  these  admissions, 
 and  incorporated  them  into  his  digest  of  the  Chris- 
 tian code,  in  order  to  have  discharged  the  entire 
 measure  of  his  duty  of  a  theological  instructor. 
 
 (j.    The  observations    also,   excellently  acute    as 
 
cxlix 
 
 they  are,  which  Butler  makes  on  the  system  of  means 
 working  to  various  high  ends,  and  on  the  moral  dis- 
 cipline and  probation  which  the  state  of  things  in 
 this  world  constitutes  to  the  Christian,  would  retain 
 all  their  fitness,  and  would  conclude  as  strongly,  if 
 the  spiritual  nature  of  real  obedience  and  love  to 
 God,  and  of  the  peace  and  consolation  inspired,  as 
 we  conceive,  by  the  gospel,  had  been  in  his  view,  as 
 they  do  now.  The  force  of  habits,  the  progress 
 men  make  from  one  degree  of  character,  and  one 
 capacity  of  excellence  to  another — the  discipline 
 arising  from  the  wickedness  of  the  world,  and  the 
 trials  to  which  piety  and  virtue  are  exposed — the 
 attainment  of  states  of  mind,  and  measures  of  know- 
 ledge and  goodness  by  these  means,  which  could 
 scarcely  have  been  conceived  of  in  the  first  stages  of 
 the  progress — the  preparation  for  future  happiness 
 and  security  thus  gradually  made — the  influence  of 
 our  present  trials  on  our  future  condition,  in  a  way 
 of  natural  consequence — these,  and  many  other  of  our 
 Author's  finest  remarks  will  stand,  whichever  system 
 of  morals  and  consolation  we  adopt.  They  apply, 
 however,  with  double  propriety,  if  we  retain  the  higher 
 standard  of  love,  obedience,  self-denial,  watchfulness, 
 and  peace.  Their  force  is  thus  augmented.  The 
 occasions  for  them  are  more  striking;  whilst  the 
 difficulties  remain  for  substance  the  same. 
 
 7.  The  only  plausible  objection  which  we  can 
 suppose  to  be  offered  to  the  view  of  the  Christian 
 scheme,  as  a  scheme  of  grace,  is,  that  it  presents  the 
 Almighty  as  unequal  in  the  distribution  of  his  gifts. 
 For,  undoubtedly,  if  the  real  corruption  and  disorder 
 of  mankind  by  the  fall,  be  what  we  have  stated — if 
 
cl 
 
 the  remaining  powers  of  natural  religion  be  so  feeble 
 and  inefficient — if  the  operations  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
 be  so  mighty  and  distinguishing — if  the  blessings 
 flowing  from  the  mediation  and  sacrifice  of  Christ  be 
 so  exuberant — if,  finally,  the  standard  of  Christian 
 love  and  holiness  be  so  high — then  it  follows  that 
 man  does  not,  in  fact,  begin  with  God  in  the  applica- 
 tion and  reception  of  the  blessings  of  Christ,  but 
 God  begins  with  man ;  then  it  follows,  that  salvation 
 is  wholly  of  grace,  and  not  of  human  effort  and  choice 
 in  any  degree  ;  and  thus  we  arrive  at  the  necessary 
 confession,  that  there  is,  in  the  gospel,  a  special  gift 
 and  collation  of  effectual  grace,  previous  to  any  sav- 
 ing effects  beino-  derived  from  the  death  of  Christ. 
 And  this  confession  we  scruple  not  to  make.  There 
 is  such  a  thing  as  the  special  and  effectual  grace  of 
 God.  We  do  ascribe  to  Almighty  God  all  the  will 
 and  the  power  which  we  have  to  do  any  thing  that  is 
 good.  We  do  acknowledge,  that  not  only  the  means 
 of  salvation  in  the  sacrifice  of  Christ  are  of  God ; 
 that  not  only  the  offers  of  salvation  in  the  doctrine 
 of  the  gospel  are  of  God ;  but  that  also  the  grace  to 
 accept  these  offers — the  grace  which  illuminates,  and 
 persuades,  and  converts,  and  sanctifies,  and  consoles 
 — is  of  God.  A  mystery  this,  which  we  attempt 
 not  to  fathom ;  but  the  practical  use  of  which  we 
 may  clearly  discern.  For,  as  this  doctrine  is  never 
 so  stated  as  to  lessen  the  responsibility  of  man, 
 supersede  the  use  of  means,  weaken  the  duty  of 
 every  one  who  hears  the  gospel  to  repent  and  obey 
 it;  or  excuse,  in  the  slightest  measure,  the  guilt  of 
 impenitence  and  disobedience :  so  it  manifestly 
 tends  to  deep  humility  of  mind  under  a  sense  of  our 
 
cli 
 
 helplessness  and  misery;  to  entire  renunciation  of 
 our  own  presumptuous  and  unaided  efforts,  and  to 
 simple  dependence  on  the  influences  of  grace,  to 
 enable  us  to  comply  with  the  calls  of  the  gospel  as 
 addressed  to  us.  That  is,  it  puts  us  in  the  attitude 
 of  suppliants.  It  makes  our  feelings  correspond  with 
 our  real  situation.  It  guards  us  against  false  refuges, 
 and  directs  us  to  the  true  one.  And  it  teaches  us 
 to  ascribe  the  glory  of  all  we  do,  where  alone  it  is 
 becoming,  to  the  gracious  will  and  mercy  of  our 
 compassionate  God  and  Father. 
 
 And  surely  the  objection  raised  against  this 
 inequality  of  the  divine  gifts,  may  be  moderated 
 at  least,  and  silenced,  by  the  very  same  arguments 
 which  our  Author  so  solidly  employs  on  similar 
 subjects.  We  obviously  see,  in  the  order  of  natural 
 Providence,  this  inequality ;  that  is,  some  men  have 
 advantages,  opportunities,  instructions,  means  of 
 attaining  benefits,  endowments  of  mind  and  body, 
 facilities  in  their  moral  trial  and  probation,  which 
 others  have  not.  The  diversity  of  cases  is  infinite. 
 The  general  laws  by  which  they  are  produced,  are 
 to  us  unknown.  The  speculative  difficulties  of 
 comprehending  the  scheme  of  things  in  which  they 
 are  found,  are  insuperable.  Still  things  are  as  they 
 are  ;  and  all  thoughts  of  harshness  and  severity  are 
 excluded  by  recollecting,  that  every  one  shall  be 
 judged  at  last  by  an  infinitely  gracious  Creator,  who 
 will  not  require  of  any,  more  than  what  was  committed 
 to  his  trust.  u  Shall  not  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth 
 do  right?'  is  the  question  applicable  to  the  more  pro- 
 found mystery  involved  in  the  scriptural  account  of 
 our  salvation,  as  well  as  to  the  ordinary  irregularities 
 
clii 
 
 of  the  gifts  of  Providence  as  defended  by  our 
 Author.  We  cannot  reasonably  expect  the  same 
 measure  of  information  concerning  God's  proceedings 
 as  concerning  our  own  duty.  The  reasons  of  the 
 collation  of  grace,  are  with  God  ;  the  duty  of  seeking 
 that  grace,  on  the  assured  promise  that  we  shall 
 obtain  it,  is  with  us.  The  inequalities  in  the  divine 
 gifts  is  a  secret  of  the  Almighty;  the  improvement 
 and  right  use  of  the  abundant  measure  of  these  gifts 
 which  we  severally  possess,  is  the  obvious  province  of 
 man.  If  the  statement  of  the  Christian  scheme, 
 which  we  are  defending,  be  scriptural,  the  argument 
 from  analogy  moderates  and  silences  all  objections 
 which  are  made  against  it,  to  every  fair  and  consi- 
 derate mind.  We  say  moderates  and  silences  them  ; 
 for  it  does  not  undertake  to  answer  them.  The 
 case,  for  any  thing  we  know,  admits  not  of  a  satis- 
 factory explanation  to  finite  creatures  like  us,  at  least 
 in  the  very  small  part  of  it  as  yet  revealed. 
 
 8.  Nay,  further,  if  the  profound  and  incompre- 
 hensible subject  of  the  divine  prescience  and  pre- 
 destination should  be  considered  as  springing  from 
 the  topic  which  we  have  just  been  noticing,  as  it 
 undoubtedly  does  in  one  form  or  other,  and  as  the 
 articles  of  the  Reformed  Churches  explicitly  make  it 
 to  do;  the  very  same  arguments  which  Butler  em- 
 ploys to  guard  against  the  fatal  consequences  deduced 
 from  the  doctrine  of  philosophical  necessity,  are  ap- 
 plicable to  any  dangerous  consequences  which  might 
 be  drawn  from  it.  The  scriptural  doctrine  of  pre- 
 destination (without  determining  too  minutely  what 
 that  doctrine  is,  for  which  this  is  not  the  place)  no 
 more  excludes  or  weakens  deliberation  on  our  part, 
 
cliii 
 
 choice,  the  use  of  means,  the  acting  from  certain 
 principles  to  certain  ends,  than  the  opinion  of  necessity 
 does.      If  the  argument  of  analogy,  from  the  facts 
 of  God's  natural  providence  and  government,  silences 
 the  difficulties  or  abuses,  call  them  which  you  please, 
 which   spring  from  the  scheme  of  necessity;  much 
 more  does  it  silence  the  difficulties  which  are  some- 
 times linked  on  the  doctrine   of  predestination — a 
 doctrine,  on  all  interpretations  of  it,  essentially  milder 
 and  more  intelligible  than  necessity,  and  resting  on 
 totally  different  principles.      If,  for  example,  a  child 
 who  should  be  educated  by  a  Necessarian  to  imagine 
 that  he  was  not  a  subject  of  praise  or  blame,  be- 
 cause he  could  not  act  otherwise  than    he  did,  is 
 refuted  by  matter  of  fact,  by  the  inconveniences  he 
 brings  on  himself  and  occasions  others;  and  is  thus 
 taught  by  experience,  that  his  applying  this  scheme 
 of  necessity  to  practice  and  common  life,  is  reasoning 
 inconclusively  from  his   principles,   even    supposing 
 them  to  be  true ;  how  much  more  ought  the  man 
 who    should  deduce  the  like  pernicious    inferences 
 from  the  doctrine  of  predestination,  to  consider  him- 
 self as  refuted  by  matter  of  fact,  and  be  taught  that 
 he  reasoned  inconclusively  in  applying  his  principles 
 to  common  life  !      For  the  Divine  predestination,  as 
 revealed  in  the   Scriptures,  is  not  a  blind  fate,   or 
 necessity;  but  the  prescience  and  foreordination  of 
 events,  according  to  the  infinite  wisdom,  goodness, 
 mercy,  and  power  of  the  Sovereign  Lord  and   Fa- 
 ther of  all.      The  truth  is,  that,  on  either  scheme, 
 the  application  of  the  rule  of  the  divine  will,  to  our 
 duties  in  life,  is  false,  dangerous,  and  contrary  to  the 
 whole  analogy  of  God's  government  over  us,  as  rea- 
 g  3 
 
cliv 
 
 sonable  and  accountable  beings.  On  either  scheme, 
 or  notwithstanding  cither  scheme,  it  remains,  as  our 
 Author  well  observes,  a  fixed  and  fundamental  truth, 
 that  "  God  will  finally,  and  upon  the  whole,  in  his 
 eternal  government,  render  his  creatures  happy  or 
 miserable,  by  some  means  or  other,  as  they  behave 
 well  or  ill." 
 
 9.  The  practical  difficulties  which  still  remain, 
 and  which  must  remain,  on  these  and  similar  points, 
 are,  lastly,  capable  of  being  entirely  relieved  or 
 silenced,  by  carrying  on  the  admirable  arguments  of 
 the  Bishop  on  the  ignorance  of  man,  and  the  incom- 
 prehensibility of  the  vast  scheme  of  the  divine  govern- 
 ment to  him,  in  his  present  state.  Christianity  is 
 obviously  a  plan  only  partially,  very  partially  revealed. 
 We  see  but  a  small  part  of  God's  ways  in  his  na- 
 tural providence,  and  we  see  still  less  of  them  in  his 
 supernatural  and  stupendous  revelation  of  grace. 
 The  very  things  which  we  think  irregularities  and 
 defects,  may,  for  aught  we  know,  be  instances  of 
 surprising  goodness  and  wisdom.  The  relations  of 
 each  circumstance  which  now  puzzles  us,  may  stretch 
 beyond  us  infinitely,  and  be  connected  with  events, 
 past,  present,  and  future,  in  an  endless  series.  The 
 difficulties  which  press  upon  religion,  arise  chiefly 
 from  our  presumption  in  wishing  to  understand  and 
 reconcile  God's  acts  and  will;  not  from  our  inability 
 to  discern  the  path  of  our  own  duty.  Our  obli- 
 gations are  clearly  set  before  us;  it  is  the  divine  go- 
 vernment and  purposes  which  are  not  clear  to  us. 
 And  surely  the  deplorable  and  pitiable  ignorance  in 
 which  we  find  ourselves,  as  to  the  order  of  things 
 
civ 
 
 in  the  natural  world,  may  reconcile  us  to  the  conse- 
 quences of  the  same  ignorance,  as  to  the  order  of 
 things  in  religion.  It  is  one  chief  act  of  faith,  thus 
 to  bow  before  the  majesty  of  God  ;  and  it  is  one 
 distinct  test  of  humility,  to  be  willing  so  to  do. 
 They  offend^  equally  against  both  these  Christian 
 graces,  who,  on  the  one  hand,  deny  or  explain  away 
 the  divine  prescience  and  foreordination,  under  the 
 notion  of  preserving  man's  free  agency  and  responsi- 
 bility;  or  who,  on  the  other,  weaken  or  undermine 
 man's  reasonable  and  accountable  nature,  on  the  plea 
 of  magnifying  the  grace  of  God.  They  offend 
 equally  against  faith  and  humility,  who  either  wholly 
 conceal  the  mysteries  of  religion,  with  the  view  of 
 preventing  the  abuse  of  them,  or  who  obtrude  and 
 overstate  them,  on  the  pretence  of  discharging  the 
 calls  of  gratitude,  and  abating  the  confidence  of 
 man.  The  depth  of  human  ignorance  should  be 
 ever  impressed  on  our  minds,  when  we  advance 
 a  step,  either  in  maintaining  or  impugning  anv 
 doctrines  which  relate  peculiarly  to  the  ever-blessed 
 God.  The  rule  of  Scripture — its  terms,  its  spirit ; 
 the  proportion  in  which  different  truths  are  stated, 
 the  bearings  and  relations  of  them  to  each  other: 
 the  consequences  deduced  from  them ;  the  manner 
 in  which  they  represent  man  ;  and  the  character  and 
 attributes  which  they  ascribe  to  Almighty  God, 
 should  all  be  scrupulously  adhered  to.  Our  ignorance 
 enjoins  this  implicit  submission.  And,  in  this 
 temper,  the  scheme  of  Christianity,  as  we  conceive 
 of  it,  is  open  to  no  more  difficulties  than  the  scheme 
 of  it,  as  stated  by  Bishop  Butler.      The  argument 
 
civi 
 
 from  analogy  covers  either.  And  the  only  question 
 that  fairly  remains,  is,  Which  approaches  the  nearest 
 to  the  Holy  Scriptures  ?  And  on  this  question  we 
 cannot  think  any  douht  would  long  harass  a  candid 
 mind,  if  prejudice  and  prepossession  were  laid  aside, 
 and  the  study  of  the  human  heart,  and  prayer  for 
 divine  illumination,  were  connected  with  the  examina- 
 tion of  the  Sacred  Volume. 
 
 But  it  is  time  for  us  to  draw  to  a  close  this  too 
 much  extended  Essay.  We  are  far  from  flattering 
 ourselves  that  we  shall  succeed  in  persuading  our 
 readers,  generally,  of  the  truth  of  all  we  have  ad- 
 vanced. In  the  first  division  of  the  Essay,  indeed, 
 we  can  anticipate  hut  one  opinion.  The  admiration 
 of  the  genius  of  Butler  is  a  national  sentiment; 
 and  if  we  have  at  all  succeeded  in  expressing,  in  a 
 shorter  compass,  his  main  arguments,  we  shall  not  be 
 thought  to  have  written  unnecessarily,  at  least  for  the 
 young.  On  the  connection,  also,  of  the  argument 
 from  analogy  with  the  other  branches  of  the  Chris- 
 tian evidence,  we  hope  we  have  advanced  nothing 
 which  will  be  thought  open  to  controversy.  It  is  in 
 the  latter  part  of  the  Essay,  where  we  express  our 
 difference  of  opinion  from  our  great  Author,  on 
 the  scheme  and  bearing  of  Christianity,  that  we 
 must  expect  opponents.  The  case  cannot  be  other- 
 wise. Indeed,  fair  and  manly  discussion,  in  the 
 temper  which  Christianity  inspires,  is  far  from  being 
 unfriendly  to  the  interests  of  truth.  A  calm  and 
 unmeaning  acquiescence  is  much  more  so.  Torpor 
 precedes  death.  We  are  exhorted  to  "  contend  ear- 
 nestly for  the  faith  once  delivered  to  the  saints ;"  and 
 
ci 
 
 VII 
 
 this  exhortation  implies  material  differences  of  judg- 
 ment amongst  professed  Christians.  Let  me  only 
 earnestly  recommend  that  moderation  and  charity  on 
 questions  really  doubtful,  and  that  zeal  and  fervour 
 on  points  of  fundamental  import,  which  the  whole 
 tendency  of  the  work,  which  we  have  been  endea- 
 vouring to  illustrate,  strongly  enforces.  We  are 
 placed  in  this  world  in  a  mysterious  and  progressive 
 state  of  things.  Darkness  and  ignorance  hang  over 
 much  of  our  path.  Charity  is  therefore  our  peculiar 
 duty  in  such  circumstances.  Even  the  truths  most 
 directly  practical  and  fundamental,  touch  on  others 
 which  are  less  clearly  revealed.  To  attain  uniformity 
 of  opinion  on  all  subordinate  points,  is  a  hopeless 
 pursuit.  The  education  of  different  men,  their 
 prejudices,  their  various  talents  and  advantages — 
 the  party  spirit,  the  unfavourable  habits,  and  the 
 defective  measures  of  religious  attainments,  which  are 
 found  amongst  them — the  mere  ambiguity  of  lan- 
 guage, will  constantly  occasion  a  diversity,  a  great 
 diversity  of  judgments.  The  only  healing  measures 
 in  the  midst  of  these  disorders,  is  the  spirit  of  love — 
 love  which  rejoices  to  hope  the  best  of  others,  which 
 interprets  favourably  doubtful  matters,  which  seeks 
 the  real  welfare  and  happiness  of  all — love  which 
 bears  and  forbears,  which  reconciles  and  softens, 
 which  unites  and  binds  together,  which  consoles  and 
 blesses,  the  hearts  where  it  reigns.  It  is  by  this 
 divine  principle  that  we  shall  most  dispose  persons 
 of  various  sentiments  to  act  in  concert  with  us.'  It 
 is  this  which  neutralizes  and  disarms  opposition.  It 
 is  this  which   tends  both   to  lessen   the  amount  of 
 
clviii 
 
 our  differences,  and  to  take  away  almost  all  the 
 evil  of  those  which  remain.  Persons  who  cannot 
 altogether  think  alike,  may  join  in  mutual  love 
 and  goodwill — may  act  as  one  in  points  out  of 
 controversy — may  grant  cheerfully  the  freedom  of 
 judgment  which  they  themselves  require — may  aim 
 at  narrowing  instead  of  extending  and  widening, 
 the  grounds  of  separation  ;  and  may  believe  others 
 to  be  guided  by  a  similar  conviction  with  themselves. 
 It  is  surprising  how  rapidly  controversies  would  die 
 away,  if  this  course  were  pursued.  The  questions 
 on  which  real  Christians  substantially  agree,  are 
 infinitely  more  important  to  them,  and  more  clear 
 in  themselves,  than  those  on  which  they  differ.  Let 
 us  then  reserve  our  zeal  and  fervour  for  these  un- 
 contested matters.  They  demand  all  our  concern — 
 all  our  time — all  our  care.  It  is  the  magnifying 
 of  other  points,  beyond  all  reason,  and  beyond 
 Scripture,  which  has  occasioned  the  divisions  in 
 the  church.  Let  it  be  one  effect  of  the  study  of 
 Bishop  Butler,  to  moderate  our  opinion  of  our  own 
 knowledge  and  attainments,  and  to  direct  our  efforts 
 and  zeal  into  their  only  safe  channel.  Humility  is 
 the  proper  effect  of  reading  such  an  Author.  We 
 shall  thus  present  the  fairer  face  of  Christianity  to 
 such  as  doubt  of  its  truth.  The  eloquence  of  a 
 consistent,  benevolent  temper  and  life  is  never 
 without  its  effect.  If  indeed  Christianity  is  robbed 
 of  its  characteristic  glories,  and  its  doctrine  and 
 morals  are  gradually  reduced  to  the  standard  of  a 
 corrupt  world,  there  is  nothing  left  to  contend  about. 
 No  charity  can  hope  well  of  such  a  religion.      But 
 
clix 
 
 when  the  peculiar  truths  of  revelation  are  sincerely 
 retained,  and  the  main  doctrines  and  duties  flowing 
 from  the  sacrifice  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  and  the 
 influences  of  his  Spirit,  are  insisted  on,  then  it  is  that 
 the  correspondent  temper  and  hehaviour  are  natu- 
 rally required,  and  become  so  incomparably  important. 
 The  most  formidable  objection  against  religion,  prac- 
 tically speaking,  is  the  defective  conduct  of  those 
 who  profess  it.  The  light  of  a  holy  example  shines 
 around.  The  infidel  must  be  at  times  struck  with 
 the  contrast  between  the  obvious  benevolence  and 
 friendliness,  the  self-denial  and  activity  of  the  true 
 Christian,  and  the  selfishness,  pride,  and  indolence  of 
 a  worldly  person.  The  amiableness  and  usefulness 
 of  the  one,  is  in  deep  contrast  with  the  repulsive  and 
 self-indulgent  tone  of  the  other.  The  effect  of 
 this  contrast  is  unavoidable.  The  infidel  and  sceptic 
 know  the  human  passions  too  well  not  to  estimate, 
 in  some  measure,  what  must  be  the  force  of  the 
 principles  which  can  overcome  them.  In  this  peaceful 
 victory  of  holiness  and  truth  let  us  persevere.  The 
 acknowledged  excellence  of  our  conduct  will  add 
 incomparably  to  the  evidences  which  we  gather 
 from  Butler  or  other  writers,  when  we  are  called  on 
 to  state  them  in  argument.  The  spirit  of  love  will 
 dispose  an  adversary  to  listen  to  a  calm  defence  of 
 our  faith.  All  arrogance, — all  airs  of  superiority, — 
 all  harshness  of  manner, — all  over-statements,  will  be 
 banished  from  our  friendly  and  affectionate  efforts,  and 
 the  path  of  truth  be  smoothed  and  rendered  inviting. 
 Indeed  all  the  stupendous  doctrines  of  Christianity 
 are  designed  to  form  us  to  that  temper  of  gratitude 
 
CIX 
 
 to  God,  and  of  benevolence  to  man,  from  which  the 
 conduct  we  are  recommending  immediately  flows. 
 And  it  is  one  main  recommendation  of  those  doctrines, 
 in  their  simple  and  native  vigour,  as  we  have  endea- 
 voured to  state  them,  that  they,  and  they  only, 
 produce  the  uniform  Christian  temper.  Without  this 
 seal  and  confirmation  of  the  truth,  all  our  reasonings, 
 however  conclusive,  will  fail  of  convincing.  With 
 it,  the  weakest  and  most  defective  statement  of  the 
 grounds  of  our  faith,  will  often  succeed.  Religion 
 is  not  so  much  a  matter  of  intellectual  effort,  as  of 
 the  obedience  of  the  heart  and  affections.  Chris- 
 tianity, in  all  its  discoveries,  and  duties,  and  promises, 
 is  so  adapted  to  the  state  and  wants  of  man,  that 
 it  can  only  be  rejected  when  there  is  an  inward 
 aversion  to  goodness.  The  form  of  argument  which 
 that  aversion  may  assume,  has  been  sufficiently 
 refuted  a  thousand  times.  The  last  resources  of  it 
 are  cut  off  by  the  process  of  Analogical  reasoning  so 
 admirably  adopted  by  Butler.  Let  this  alienation 
 of  mind  be  overcome,  and  man  falls  prostrate  in  adora- 
 tion at  the  foot  of  the  cross.  The  doctrines  of  the 
 gospel  suit  and  meet  his  feelings  and  necessities. 
 The  evidences  of  it  are  admitted  to  have  their 
 genuine  force.  The  fruits  of  holiness  and  consolation 
 soon  begin  to  appear;  and  these  fruits  in  the  convert 
 to  the  faith,  being  in  harmony  with  the  same  effects 
 in  the  temper  and  spirit  of  his  instructor,  attest  the 
 identity  of  religion,  and  increase  in  both  of  them  the 
 happy  assurance,  that  they  have  found  the  supreme 
 good  of  man — the  real  spring  of  truth  and  felicity — 
 the  undoubted  revelation    of  the    divine  will — the 
 
tix  I 
 
 exuberant  source  of  pardon,  peace,  and  holiness — 
 the  most  amazing  discovery  of  the  mercy  and  grace 
 of  God — the  correspondent  parts  of  that  vast  scheme 
 which  is  impressed  with  the  same  features  in  the 
 works  of  nature  and  of  grace,  and  which  are  the 
 pledge  and  guide  to  the  eternal  rest  and  joy  of  heaven. 
 
 D.  W. 
 
 Iklington,  December,  1824-. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Page 
 
 Advertisement 169 
 
 Introduction, 171 
 
 PART  I. 
 
 OF  NATURAL   RELIGION- 
 
 CHAP.  I.   Of  a  Future  Life,  ......      185- 
 
 CHAP.   II.   Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and 
 Punishments;  arid  particularly  of  the  latter,         .         .     208- 
 
 CHAP.  III.  Of  the  Mora!  Government  of  God,       .         .     223 
 
 CHAP.  IV.  Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  implying  Trial,  Dif- 
 ficulties, and  Danger,  .  253 
 
 CHAP.  V,  Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  for  Moral 
 Discipline  and  Improvement,        .....     263 
 
 CHAP.  VI.  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  in- 
 fluencing Practice,       .  292 
 
 CHAP.  VII.  Of  the  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a 
 Scheme,  or  Constitution,  imperfectly  comprehended,  312 
 
 Conclusion, 326 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART  II. 
 
 OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 
 
 Page 
 CHAP.  I.  Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity,  .         .     733 
 
 CHAP.  II.  Of  the  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Reve- 
 lation, considered  as  Miraculous,         ....     359 
 
 CHAP.  III.  Of  our  Incapacity  of  Judging  what  were  to  be 
 expected  in  a  Revelation;  and  the  credibility,  from  Ana- 
 logy, that  it  must  contain  things  appearing  liable  to  Ob- 
 jections,    . 368 
 
 CHAP.  IV.  Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme,  or 
 Constitution,  imperfectly  comprehended,        ,         .         ,     387 
 
 CHAP.  V.  Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity;  the 
 Appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of  the 
 World  by  him,  .     397 
 
 CHAP.  VI.  Of  the  Want  of  Universality  in  Revelation; 
 and  of  the  supposed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it.  421 
 
 CHAP.  VII.  Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity       445 
 
 CHAP.  VIII  Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made 
 against  arguing  from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion,     490 
 
 Conclusion 506 
 
 TWO  DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 Dissert.  I.  Of  Personal  Identity,  .         .         .        .517 
 
 II.  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue,        .  527 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION. 
 
TO    THE 
 RIGHT    HONOURABLE 
 
 CHARLES,  LORD  TALBOT, 
 
 BARON    OF    HENSOL, 
 LORD    HIGH    CHANCELLOR    OF    GREAT    BRITAIN, 
 
 THE    FOLLOWING 
 
 Creattae 
 
 IS,    WITH    ALL    RESPECT, 
 INSCRIBED, 
 
 IN  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  OF  THE  HIGHEST  OBLIGATIONS 
 TO    THE    LATE 
 
 LORD    BISHOP   OF    DURHAM, 
 
 BY    HIS    LORDSHIPS    MOST    DUTIFUL, 
 MOST    DEVOTED, 
 
 JOSEPH  BUTLER. 
 
ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 If  the  reader  should  meet  here  with  any  thing 
 which  he  had  not  before  attended  to,  it  will  not  be 
 in  the  observations  upon  the  constitution  and  course 
 of  nature,  these  being  all  obvious ;  but  in  the  appli- 
 cation of  them :  in  which,  though  there  is  nothing 
 but  what  appears  to  me  of  some  real  weight,  and 
 therefore  of  great  importance ;  yet  he  will  observe 
 several  things  which  will  appear  to  him  of  very  little, 
 if  he  can  think  things  to  be  of  little  importance, 
 which  are  of  any  real  weight  at  all,  upon  such  a  sub- 
 ject as  religion.  However,  the  proper  force  of  the 
 following  treatise,  lies  in  the  whole  general  analogy 
 considered  together. 
 
 It  is  come,  I  know  not  how,  to  be  taken  for 
 granted,  by  many  persons,  that  Christianity  is  not  so 
 much  as  a  subject  of  inquiry;  but  that  it  is  now,  at 
 length,  discovered  to  be  fictitious.  And  accordingly 
 they  treat  it,  as  if,  in  the  present  age,  this  were  an 
 agreed  point  among  all  people  of  discernment ;  and 
 nothing  remained,  but  to  set  it  up  as  a  principal  sub- 
 ject of  mirth  and  ridicule,  as  it  were  by  way  of  re- 
 prisals, for  its  having  so  long  interrupted  the  plea- 
 sures of  the  world.  On  the  contrary,  thus  much,  at 
 least,  will  be  here  found,  not  taken  for  granted,  but 
 h  17 
 
170 
 
 proved,  that  any  reasonable  man,  who  will  thoroughly 
 consider  the  matter,  may  be  as  much  assured  as  he 
 is  of  his  own  being,  that  it  is  not,  however,  so  clear 
 a  case,  that  there  is  nothing  in  it.  There  is,  I 
 think,  strong  evidence  of  its  truth ;  but  it  is  certain 
 no  one  can,  upon  principles  of  reason,  be  satisfied  of 
 the  contrary.  And  the  practical  consequence  to  be 
 drawn  from  this,  is  not  attended  to,  by  every  one 
 who  is  concerned  in  it. 
 
 Mam  1T3(). 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Probable  evidence  is  essentially  distinguished  from 
 demonstrative  by  this,  that  it  admits  of  degrees ;  and 
 f  all  variety  of  them,  from  the  highest  moral  cer- 
 tainty, to  the  very  lowest  presumption.  We  can- 
 not indeed  say  a  thing  is  probably  true  upon  one  very 
 slight  presumption  for  it ;  because,  as  there  may  be 
 probabilities  on  both  sides  of  a  question,  there  may 
 be  some  against  it :  and  though  there  be  not,  yet  a 
 slight  presumption  does  not  beget  that  degree  of  con- 
 viction, which  is  implied  in  saying  a  thing  is  proba- 
 bly true.  But  that  the  slightest  possible  presump- 
 tion is  of  the  nature  of  a  probability,  appears  from 
 hence,  that  such  low  presumption  often  repeated, 
 will  amount  even  to  moral  certainty.  1  hus  a  man's 
 having  observed  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  to-day, 
 affords  some  sort  of  presumption,  though  the  lowest 
 imaginable,  that  it  may  happen  again  to-morrow. 
 But  the  observation  of  this  event  for  so  many  days, 
 and  months,  and  ages  together,  as  it  has  been  ob- 
 served bv  mankind,  gives  us  a  full  assurance  that  it 
 will. 
 
 That  which  chiefly  constitutes  probability  is  ex- 
 pressed in  the  word  likely,  that  is,  like  some  truth* 
 
 Verisimile. 
 
 ii  2 
 
172 
 
 or  true  event;  like  it,  in  itself,  in  its  evidence,  in 
 some  more  or  fewer  of  its  circumstances.  For  when 
 we  determine  a  thing  to  be  probably  true,  suppose 
 that  an  event  has  or  will  come  to  pass,  it  is  from  the 
 mind  remarking  ia  it  a  likeness  to  some  other 
 event,  which  we  have  observed  has  come  to  pass. 
 And  this  observation  forms,  in  numberless  daily  in- 
 stances, a  presumption,  opinion,  or  full  conviction, 
 that  such  event  has  or  will  come  to  pass ;  according 
 as  the  observation  is,  that  the  like  event  has  some- 
 times, most  commonly,  or  always,  so  far  as  our  ob- 
 servation reaches,  come  to  pass  at  like  distances  of 
 time,  or  place,  or  upon  like  occasions.  Hence 
 arises  the  belief,  that  a  child,  if  it  lives  twenty  years, 
 will  grow  up  to  the  stature  and  strength  of  a  man ; 
 that  food  will  contribute  to  the  preservation  of  its 
 life,  and  the  want  of  it  for  such  a  number  of  days  be 
 its  certain  destruction.  So,  likewise,  the  rule  and 
 measure  of  our  hopes  and  fears  concerning  the  suc- 
 cess of  our  pursuits;  our  expectations  that  others 
 will  act  so  and  so  in  such  circumstances;  and  our 
 judgment  that  such  actions  proceed  from  such  prin- 
 ciples;— all  these  rely  upon  our  having  observed  the 
 like  to  what  we  hope,  fear,  expect,  judge ;  I  say, 
 upon  our  having  observed  the  like,  either  with  re- 
 spect to  others  or  ourselves.  And  thus,  whereas 
 the  prince,*  who  had  always  lived  in  a  warm  cli- 
 mate, naturally  concluded  in  the  way  of  analogy, 
 that  there  was  no  such  thing  as  water  becoming 
 hard,  because  he  had  always  observed  it  to  be  fluid 
 and  yielding:    we,  on  the  contrary,  from  analogy, 
 
 *  Tli?  story  is  told  by  Mr.  Locke,  in  the  chapter  of  Probability. 
 
173 
 
 conclude,  that  there  is  no  presumption  at  all  against 
 this;  that  it  is  supposable  there  may  be  frost  in  Eng- 
 land any  given  day  in  January  next ;  probable,  that 
 there  will  on  some  day  of  the  month;  and  that  there 
 is  a  moral  certainty,  that  is,  ground  for  an  expecta- 
 tion, without  any  doubt  of  it,  in  some  part  or  other 
 of  the  winter. 
 
 Probable  evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but 
 an  imperfect  kind  of  information,  and  is  to  be  con- 
 sidered as  relative  only  to  beings  of  limited  capaci- 
 ties. For  nothing  which  is  the  possible  object  of 
 knowledge,  whether  past,  present,  or  future,  can  be 
 probable  to  an  infinite  Intelligence ;  since  it  cannot 
 but  be  discerned  absolutely,  as  it  is  in  itself,  certainly 
 true,  or  certainly  false.  But,  to  us,  probability  is 
 the  very  guide  of  life. 
 
 From  these  things  it  follows,  that  in  questions  of 
 difficulty,  or  such  as  are  thought  so,  where  more 
 satisfactory  evidence  cannot  be  had,  or  is  not  seen, 
 if  the  result  of  examination  be,  that  there  appears, 
 upon  the  whole,  any  the  lowest  presumption  on  one 
 side,  and  none  on  the  other,  or  a  greater  presump- 
 tion on  one  side,  though  in  the  lowest  degree  greater, 
 this  determines  the  question,  even  in  matters  of 
 speculation;  and,  in  matters  of  practice,  will  lay  us 
 under  an  absolute  and  formal  obligation,  in  point  of 
 prudence  and  of  interest,  to  act  upon  that  presump- 
 tion, or  low  probability,  though  it  be  so  low  as  to 
 leave  the  mind  in  very  great  doubt  which  is  the 
 truth.  For  surely  a  man  is  as  really  bound  in  pru- 
 dence to  do  what  upon  the  whole  appears,  according 
 to  the  best  of  his  judgment,  to  be  for  his  hap- 
 piness, as  what  he  certainly  knows  to  be  so.      Nay, 
 
174 
 
 further,  in  questions  of  great  consequence,  a  rea- 
 sonable man  will  think  it  concerns  him  to  remark 
 lower  probabilities  and  presumptions  than  these; 
 such  as  amount  to  no  more  than  showing  one  side  of 
 a  question  to  be  as  supposable  and  credible  as  the 
 other;  nay,  such  as  but  amount  to  much  less  even  than 
 this.  For  numberless  instances  might  be  mentioned 
 respecting  the  common  pursuits  of  life,  where  a  man 
 would  be  thought,  in  a  literal  sense,  distracted,  who 
 would  not  act,  and  with  great  application  too,  not 
 only  upon  an  even  chance,  but  upon  much  less,  and 
 where  the  probability  or  chance  was  greatly  against 
 his  succeeding.* 
 
 It  is  not  my  design  to  inquire  further  into  the  na- 
 ture, the  foundation,  and  measure  of  probability;  or 
 whence  it  proceeds,  that  likeness  should  beget  that 
 presumption,  opinion,  and  full  conviction,  which  the 
 human  mind  is  formed  to  receive  from  it,  and  which 
 it  does  necessarily  produce  in  every  one ;  or  to  guard 
 against  the  errors  to  which  reasoning  from  analogy 
 is  liable.  This  belongs  to  the  subject  of  logic,  and 
 is  a  part  of  that  subject  which  has  not  yet  been  tho- 
 roughly considered.  Indeed,  I  shall  not  take  upon 
 me  to  say,  how  far  the  extent,  compass,  and  force 
 of  analogical  reasoning,  can  be  reduced  to  general 
 heads  and  rules,  and  the  whole  be  formed  into  a 
 system.  But  though  so  little  in  this  way  has  been 
 attempted  by  those  who  have  treated  of  our  intellec- 
 tual powers,  and  the  exercise  of  them,  this  does  not 
 mnder  but  that  we  may  be,  as  we  unquestionably 
 are,  assured,  that  analogy  is  of  weight,  in  various 
 
 *  See  Chap.  vi.  Part  II. 
 
175 
 
 degrees,  towards  determining  our  judgment,  and  our 
 practice.  Nor  does  it  in  any  wise  cease  to  be  of 
 weight  in  those  cases,  because  persons,  either  given 
 to  dispute,  or  who  require  things  to  be  stated  with 
 greater  exactness  than  our  faculties  appear  to  admit 
 of  in  practical  matters,  may  find  other  cases,  in  wind  i 
 it  is  not  easy  to  say,  whether  it  be,  or  be  not,  of  any 
 weight;  or  instances  of  seeming  analogies,  which 
 are  really  of  none.  It  is  enough  to  the  present  pur- 
 pose to  observe,  that  this  general  way  of  arguing  is 
 evidently  natural,  just,  and  conclusive.  For  there 
 is  no  man  can  make  a  question  but  that  the  sun  will 
 rise  to-morrow,  and  be  seen,  where  it  is  seen  at  all, 
 in  the  figure  of  a  circle,  and  not  in  that  of  a  square. 
 Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reasoning,  Ori- 
 gen *  has  with  singular  sagacity  observed,  that  "he 
 who  believes  the  Scripture  to  have  proceeded  from 
 him  who  is  the  Author  of  Nature,  may  well  expect 
 to  find  the  same  sort  of  difficulties  in  it,  as  are  found 
 in  the  constitution  of  Nature."  And  in  a  like  way 
 of  reflection,  it  may  be  added,  that  he  who  denies 
 the  Scripture  to  have  been  from  God,  upon  account 
 of  these  difficulties,  may,  for  the  very  same  reason, 
 deny  the  world  to  have  been  formed  by  him.  On  the 
 other  hand,  if  there  be  an  analogy,  or  likeness,  be- 
 tween that  system  of  things  and  dispensation  of  Pro- 
 vidence, which  revelation  informs  us  of,  and  that 
 system  of  things  and  dispensation  of  Providence, 
 which  experience,  together  with  reason,  informs  us 
 
 *'  \c/i  f/Av  vol  y-  riv  utol'I  wm^eut\Apt,tV9»  tov  •jrrlvu.vrc;  tov  y.'ie- 
 ficv  iivx:  Tuvras  TV.;  y exacts  TiTi7ff6a.i,  on  ce-a.  tio)  r7,;  XTienus 
 avavrec    tu;     ZriToZei    toy     Vlo\    o:vr7,;    y.iyo'j,     TctZra.    >:u)    tt'.o]    tu 
 
 yoaiuv.     Philocal.  p.  2d.  Ed.  Cant, 
 
176 
 
 of,  that  is,  the  known  course  of  nature;  this  is  a 
 presumption,  that  they  have  both  the  same  author 
 and  cause;  at  least  so  far  as  to  answer  objections 
 against  the  former  being  from  God,  drawn  from  any- 
 thing which  is  analogical  or  similar  to  what  is  in  the 
 latter,  which  is  acknowledged  to  be  from  him;  for 
 an  Author  of  nature  is  here  supposed. 
 
 Forming  our  notions  of  the  constitution  and  go- 
 vernment of  the  world  upon  reasoning,  without 
 foundation  for  the  principles  which  we  assume,  whe- 
 ther from  the  attributes  of  God  or  any  thing  else,  is 
 ouilding  a  world  upon  hypothesis,  like  Descartes. 
 Forming  our  notions  upon  reasoning  from  principles 
 which  are  certain,  but  applied  to  cases  to  which  we 
 have  no  ground  to  apply  them,  (like  those  who  ex- 
 plain the  structure  of  the  human  body,  and  the  na- 
 ture of  diseases  and  medicines,  from  mere  mathema- 
 tics, without  sufficient  data)  is  an  error  much  akin 
 to  the  former:  since  what  is  assumed  in  order  to 
 make  the  reasoning  applicable,  is  hypothesis.  But 
 it  must  be  allowed  just,  to  join  abstract  reasonings 
 with  the  observation  of  facts,  and  argue  from  such 
 facts  as  are  known,  to  others  that  are  like  them: 
 from  that  part  of  the  Divine  government  over  in- 
 telligent creatures,  which  comes  under  our  view,  to 
 that  larger  and  more  general  government  over  them, 
 which  is  beyond  it;  and,  from  what  is  present,  to 
 collect  what  is  likely,  credible,  or  not  incredible, 
 will  be  hereafter. 
 
 This  method,  then,  of  concluding  and  determin- 
 ing, being  practical,  and  what,  if  we  will  act  at  all, 
 we  cannot  but  act  upon  in  the  common  pursuits  of 
 life;  being  evidently  conclusive,  in  various  degrees.* 
 
177 
 
 proportionable  to  the  degree  and  exactness  of  the 
 whole  analogy  or  likeness ;  and  having  so  great  au- 
 thority for  its  introduction  into  the  subject  of  reli- 
 gion, even  revealed  religion,  my  design  is  to  apply  to 
 that  subject  in  general,  both  natural  and  revealed; 
 taking  for  proved  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author 
 of  Nature,  and  natural  Governor  of  the  world.  For 
 as  there  is  no  presumption  against  this  prior  to  the 
 proof  of  it,  so  it  has  been  often  proved  with  accumu- 
 lated evidence ;  from  this  argument  of  analogy  and 
 final  causes;  from  abstract  reasonings;  from  the  most 
 ancient  tradition  and  testimony;  and  from  the  gene- 
 ral consent  of  mankind.  Nor  does  it  appear,  so  far 
 as  I  can  find,  to  be  denied  by  the  generality  of  those 
 who  profess  themselves  dissatisfied  with  the  evidence 
 of  religion. 
 
 As  there  are  some  who,  instead  of  thus  attending 
 to  what  is  in  fact  the  constitution  of  Nature,  form 
 their  notions  of  God's  government  upon  hypothesis; 
 so  there  are  others  who  indulge  themselves  in  vain 
 and  idle  speculations,  how  the  world  might  possibly 
 have  been  framed  otherwise  than  it  is;  and  upon 
 supposition  that  things  might,  in  imagining  that 
 they  should,  have  been  disposed  and  carried  on 
 after  a  better  model,  than  what  appears  in  the  pre- 
 sent disposition  and  conduct  of  them. — Suppose, 
 now,  a  person  of  such  a  turn  of  mind  to  go  on  with 
 his  reveries,  till  he  had  at  length  fixed  upon  some 
 particular  plan  of  Nature,  as  appearing  to  him  the 
 best, — one  shall  scarce  be  thought  guilty  of  detrac- 
 tion against  human  understanding,  if  one  should  say, 
 even  beforehand,  that  the  plan  which  this  speculative 
 person  would  fix  upon,  though  he  were  the  wisest 
 h3 
 
178 
 
 of  the  sons  of  men,  probably  would  not  be  the  very 
 best,  even  according  to  his  own  notions  of  best; 
 whether  he  thought  that  to  be  so,  which  afforded 
 occasions  and  motives  for  the  exercise  of  the  great- 
 est virtue,  or  which  was  productive  of  the  greatest 
 happiness,  or  that  these  two  were  necessarily  con- 
 nected, and  ran  up  into  one  and  the  same  plan. 
 However,  it  may  not  be  amiss,  once  for  all,  to  see 
 what  would  be  the  amount  of  these  emendations  and 
 imaginary  improvements  upon  the  system  of  Nature, 
 or  how  far  they  would  mislead  us.  And  it  seems 
 there  could  be  no  stopping,  till  we  came  to  some 
 such  conclusions  as  these : — That  alt  creatures  should 
 at  first  be  made  as  perfect  and  as  happy,  as  they  were 
 capable  of  ever  being :  that  nothing,  to  be  sure,  of 
 hazard  or  danger  should  be  put  upon  them  to  do, 
 (some  indolent  persons  would  perhaps  think,  nothing 
 at  all) :  or  certainly,  that  effectual  care  should  be  taken 
 that  they  should,  whether  necessarily  or  not,  yet 
 eventually,  and  in  fact,  always  do  what  was  right  and 
 most  conducive  to  happiness,  which  would  be  thought 
 easy  for  infinite  power  to  effect;  either  by  not  giving 
 them  any  principles  which  would  endanger  their  go- 
 ing wrong,  or  by  laying  the  right  motive  of  action, 
 in  every  instance,  before  their  minds  continually  in 
 so  strong  a  manner,  as  would  never  fail  of  inducing 
 them  to  act  conformably  to  it :  and  that  the  whole 
 method  of  government  by  punishments  should  be 
 rejected  as  absurd ;  as  an  awkward  round-about  me- 
 thod of  carrying  things  on ;  nay,  as  contrary  to  a 
 principal  purpose,  for  which  it  would  be  supposed 
 creatures  were  made,  namely,  happiness. 
 
 Now,  without  considering  what  is  to  be  said  in 
 
179 
 
 particular  to  the  several  parts  ot  this  train  of  foliy 
 and  extravagance,  what  has  been  above  intimated  is 
 a  full,  direct,  general  answer  to  it,  namely,  that  we 
 may  see  beforehand  that  we  have  not  faculties  for 
 this  kind  of  speculation.  For  though  it  be  admit- 
 ted, that,  from  the  first  principles  of  our  nature,  we 
 unavoidably  judge  or  determine  some  ends  to  be  ab- 
 solutely in  themselves  preferable  to  others,  and  that 
 the  ends  now  mentioned,  or,  if  they  run  up  into  one, 
 that  this  one  is  absolutely  the  best,  and,  consequently, 
 that  we  must  conclude  the  ultimate  end  designed  in 
 the  constitution  of  Nature  and  conduct  of  Provi- 
 dence, is  the  most  virtue  and  happiness  possible ;  yet 
 we  are  far  from  being  able  to  judge  what  particular 
 disposition  of  things  would  be  most  friendly  and  as- 
 sistant to  virtue,  or  what  means  might  be  absolutely 
 necessary  to  produce  the  most  happiness  in  a  system 
 of  such  extent  as  our  own  world  may  be,  taking  in 
 all  that  is  past  and  to  come,  though  we  should  sup- 
 pose it  detached  from  the  whole  of  things.  Indeed, 
 we  are  so  far  from  being  able  to  judge  of  this,  that 
 we  are  not  judges  what  may  be  the  necessary  means 
 of  raising  and  conducting  one  person  to  the  highest 
 perfection  and  happiness  of  his  nature.  Nay,  even 
 in  the  little  affairs  of  the  present  life,  we  find  men  of 
 different  educations  and  ranks  are  not  competent 
 judges  of  the  conduct  of  each  other.  Our  whole 
 nature  leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to  God, 
 and  to  deny  all  imperfection  of  him.  And  this  will 
 for  ever  be  a  practical  proof  of  his  moral  character, 
 to  such  as  will  consider  what  a  practical  proof  is,  be- 
 cause it  is  the  voice  of  God  speaking  in  us.  And 
 from  hence  we  conclude,   that  virtue  must  be  the 
 
180 
 
 happiness,  and  vice  the  misery,  of  every  creature ;  and 
 that  regularity,  and  order,  and  right,  cannot  but  pre- 
 vail finallv,  in  a  universe  under  his  government. 
 But  we  are  in  no  sort  judges  what  are  the  necessary 
 means  of  accomplishing  this  end. 
 
 Let  us,  then,  instead  of  that  idle  and  not  very 
 innocent  employment  of  forming  imaginary  models 
 of  a  world,  and  schemes  of  governing  it,  turn  our 
 thoughts  to  what  we  experience  to  be  the  conduct 
 of  Nature  with  respect  to  intelligent  creatures;  which 
 may  be  resolved  into  general  laws  or  rules  of  ad- 
 ministration, in  the  same  way  as  many  of  the  laws  of 
 Nature  respecting  inanimate  matter,  may  be  collected 
 from  experiments.  And  let  us  compare  the  known 
 constitution  and  course  of  things,  with  what  is  said 
 to  be  the  moral  system  of  nature,  the  acknowledged 
 dispensations  of  Providence,  or  that  government 
 which  we  find  ourselves  under,  with  what  religion 
 teaches  us  to  believe  and  expect,  and  see  whether 
 they  are  not  analogous,  and  of  a  piece.  And  upon 
 such  a  comparison  it  will,  I  think,  be  found,  that 
 they  are  very  much  so ;  that  both  may  be  traced  up 
 to  the  same  general  laws,  and  resolved  into  the  same 
 principles  of  Divine  conduct. 
 
 The  analogy  here  proposed  to  be  considered,  is  of 
 pretty  large  extent,  and  consists  of  several  parts ;  in 
 some  more,  in  others  less  exact.  In  some  few  in- 
 stances, perhaps,  it  may  amount  to  a  real  practical 
 proof,  in  others  not  so :  yet  in  these  it  is  a  confirma- 
 tion of  what  is  proved  otherwise.  It  will  undeniably 
 show,  what  too  many  want  to  have  shown  them,  that 
 the  system  of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed, 
 considered  only  as  a  system,  and  prior  to  the  proof 
 
181 
 
 of  it.  is  not  a  subject  of  ridicule,  unless  that  of  Na- 
 ture be  so  too.  And  it  will  afford  an  answer  to  al- 
 most all  objections  against  the  system  both  of  natu- 
 ral and  of  revealed  religion,  though  not  perhaps  an 
 answer  in  so  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very  consider- 
 able degree  an  answer,  to  the  objections  against  the 
 evidence  of  it;  for,  objections  against  a  proof,  and 
 objections  against  what  is  said  to  be  proved,  the 
 reader  will  observe,  are  different  things. 
 
 Now,  the  Divine  government  of  the  world,  im- 
 plied in  the  notion  of  religion  in  general,  and  of 
 Christianity,  contains  in  it, — That  mankind  is  ap- 
 pointed to  live  in  a  future  state  ;*  that  there  every 
 one  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished  ;f  rewarded  or 
 punished  respectively  for  all  that  behaviour  here, 
 which  we  comprehend  under  the  words,  virtuous  or 
 vicious,  morally  good  or  evil;  J  that  our  present  life 
 is  a  probation,  a  state  of  trial,  §  and  of  discipline  || 
 for  that  future  one,  notwithstanding  the  objections 
 which  men  may  fancy  they  have,  from  notions  of 
 necessity,  against  there  being  any  such  moral  plan 
 as  this  at  all; if  and  whatever  objections  may  appear 
 to  lie  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  as  it 
 stands  so  imperfectly  made  known  to  us  at  present:** 
 that  this  world  being  in  a  state  of  apostacy  and  wick- 
 edness, and  consequently  of  ruin,  and  the  sense  both 
 of  their  condition  and  duty  being  greatly  corrupted 
 amongst  men,  this  gave  occasion  for  an  additional 
 dispensation  of  Providence,  of  the  utmost  impor- 
 tance, -f~f-  proved  by  miracles,  Xt  Dut  containing  in  it 
 many  things  appearing  to  us  strange,  and  not  to 
 
 *  Ch.  i. 
 
 §  Ch.  iv. 
 
 **  Ch.  vii. 
 
 t  Ch.  ii. 
 ||  Ch.  v. 
 ft  Part  II.  Ch.  i. 
 
 J  Ch.  iii. 
 1"  Ch.  vi. 
 ++  Ch.  ii. 
 
182 
 
 have  been  expected;*  a  dispensation  of  Providence, 
 which  is  a  scheme  or  system  of  things,  f  carried  on 
 by  the  mediation  of  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah,  in 
 order  to  the  recovery  of  the  world  ;f  yet  not  re- 
 vealed to  all  men,  nor  proved  with  the  strongest  pos- 
 sible evidence  to  all  those  to  whom  it  is  revealed ; 
 but  only  to  such  a  part  of  mankind,  and  with  such 
 particular  evidence,  as  the  wisdom  of  God  thought 
 fit.§  The  design,  then,  of  the  following  Treatise 
 will  be  to  show,  that  the  several  parts  principally 
 objected  against  in  this  moral  and  Christian  dispen- 
 sation, including  its  scheme,  its  publication,  and  the 
 proof  which  God  has  afforded  us  of  its  truth ;  that 
 the  particular  parts  principally  objected  against  in 
 this  whole  dispensation,  are  analogous  to  what  is  ex- 
 perienced in  the  constitution  and  course  of  Nature, 
 or  Providence;  that  the  chief  objections  themselves, 
 which  are  alleged  against  the  former,  are  no  other 
 than  what  may  be  alleged  with  like  justness  against 
 the  latter,  where  they  are  found  in  fact  to  be  incon- 
 clusive; and  that  this  argument,  from  analogy,  is  in 
 general  unanswerable,  and  undoubtedly  of  weight 
 on  the  side  of  religion,  ||  notwithstanding  the  objec- 
 tions which  may  seem  to  lie  against  it,  and  the  real 
 ground  which  there  may  be  for  difference  of  opinion, 
 as  to  the  particular  degree  of  weight  which  is  to  be 
 laid  upon  it.  This  is  a  general  account  of  what 
 may  be  looked  for  in  the  following  Treatise.  And 
 I  shall  begin  it  with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of 
 all  our  hopes  and  of  all  our  fears — all  our  hopes 
 and  fears  which  are  of  any  consideration — I  mean 
 a  Future  Life. 
 
 *  CH.  iii.       f  Ch.  iv.       J  Ch.  v.       §  Ch.  vi.  vii.       J!  Ch.  viii. 
 
PART  I. 
 
 OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 
 
PEIHGETOH 
 THEQLQGIC&L 
 
 ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 
 
 PART  I. 
 
 OF   NATURAL   RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP.  I. 
 Of  a  Future  Life. 
 
 Strange  difficulties  have  been  raised  by  some 
 concerning  personal  identity,  or  the  sameness  of  liv- 
 ing agents,  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  existing 
 now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  successive  mo- 
 ments ;  which  whoever  thinks  it  worth  while,  may 
 see  considered  in  the  first  Dissertation  at  the  end  of 
 this  Treatise.  But,  without  regard  to  any  of  them 
 here,  let  us  consider  what  the  analogy  of  Nature, 
 and  the  several  changes  which  we  have  undergone, 
 and  those  which  we  know  we  may  undergo  without 
 being  destroyed,  suggest,  as  to  the  effect  which 
 death  may,  or  may  not,  have  upon  us ;  and  whether 
 it  be  not  from  thence  probable,  that  we  may  survive 
 this  change,  and  exist  in  a  future  state  of  life  and 
 perception. 
 
 I.   From  our  being  born  into  the  present  world 
 
186 
 
 in  the  helpless  imperfect  state  of  infancy,  and  hav- 
 ing arrived  from  thence  to  mature  age,  we  find  it  to 
 he  a  general  law  of  nature  in  our  own  species,  that 
 the  same  creatures,  the  same  individuals,  should 
 exist  in  degrees  of  life  and  perception,  with  capacities 
 of  action,  of  enjoyment  and  suffering,  in  one  period 
 of  their  heing  greatly  different  from  those  appointed 
 them  in  another  period  of  it.  And  in  other  crea- 
 tures the  same  law  holds.  For  the  difference  of 
 their  capacities  and  states  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go 
 no  higher)  and  in  maturity ;  the  change  of  worms 
 into  flies,  and  the  vast  enlargement  of  their  locomo- 
 tive powers  by  such  change ;  and  birds  and  insects 
 bursting  the  shell,  their  habitation,  and  by  this  means 
 entering  into  a  new  world,  furnished  with  new  ac- 
 commodations for  them,  and  finding  a  new  sphere  of 
 action  assigned  them — these  are  instances  of  this 
 general  law  of  nature.  Thus  all  the  various  and 
 wonderful  transformations  of  animals  are  to  be  taken 
 into  consideration  here.  But  the  states  of  life  in 
 which  we  ourselves  existed  formerly  in  the  womb 
 and  in  our  infancy,  are  almost  as  different  from  our 
 present  in  mature  age,  as  it  is  possible  to  conceive 
 any  two  states  or  degrees  of  life  can  be.  There- 
 fore, that  we  are  to  exist  hereafter  in  a  state  as  dif- 
 ferent (suppose)  from  our  present,  as  this  is  from 
 our  former,  is  but  according  to  the  analogy  of  na- 
 ture; according  to  a  natural  order  or  appointment  of 
 the  very  same  kind  with  what  we  have  already  ex- 
 perienced. 
 
 II.  We  know  that  we  are  endued  with  capacities 
 of  action,  of  happiness,  and  misery ;  for  we  are  con- 
 scions  of  acting,  of  enjoying  pleasure,  and  suffering 
 
187 
 
 pain.  Now,  that  we  have  these  powers  and  capaci- 
 ties before  death,  is  a  presumption  that  we  shall  re- 
 tain them  through  and  after  death ;  indeed  a  proba- 
 bility of  it  abundantly  sufficient  to  act  upon,  unless 
 there  be  some  positive  reason  to  think  that  death  is 
 the  destruction  of  those  living  powers :  because  there 
 is  in  every  case  a  probability  that  all  things  will  con- 
 tinue as  we  experience  they  are,  in  all  respects,  ex- 
 cept those  in  which  we  have  some  reason  to  think 
 they  will  be  altered.  This  is  that  kind*  of  presump- 
 tion or  probability  from  analogy,  expressed  in  the 
 very  word  continuance,  which  seems  our  only  natural 
 reason  for  believing  the  course  of  the  world  will  con- 
 tinue to-morrow,  as  it  has  done  so  far  as  our  expe- 
 rience or  knowledge  of  history  can  carry  us  back. 
 Nay  it  seems  our  only  reason  for  believing,  that  any 
 one  substance,  now  existing,  will  continue  to  exist  a 
 moment  longer;  the  Self-existent  Substance  only 
 excepted.  Thus  if  men  were  assured  that  the  un- 
 known event,  death,  was  not  the  destruction  of  our 
 faculties  of  perception  and  of  action,  there  would  be 
 no  apprehension,  that  any  other  power  or  event  un- 
 connected with  this  of  death,  would  destroy  these 
 faculties  just  at  the  instant  of  each  creature's  death; 
 and  therefore  no  doubt  but  that  they  would  remain 
 after  it :  which  shows  the  high  probability  that  our 
 living  powers  will  continue  after  death,  unless  there 
 be  some  ground  to  think  that  death  will  be  their  de- 
 struction^    For  if  it  would  be  in  a  manner  certain 
 
 *  I  say  Kind  of  presumption  or  probability  ;  for  I  do  not  mean 
 to  affirm  that  there  is  the  same  degree  of  conviction,  that  our 
 living  powers  will  continue  after  death,  as  there  is,  that  our  sub- 
 stances will. 
 
 f  Destruction  of  living  powers,  is  a  manner  of  expression  tin- 
 
188 
 
 that  we  should  survive  death,  provided  it  were  cer- 
 tain that  death  would  not  be  our  destruction,  it  must 
 be  highly  probable  that  we  shall  survive  it,  if  there 
 be  no  ground  to  think  death  will  be  our  destruction. 
 
 Now,  though  I  think  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
 that  prior  to  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future 
 life  commonly  insisted  upon,  there  would  arise  a 
 general  confused  suspicion,  that  in  the  great  shock 
 and  alteration  which  we  shall  undergo  by  death,  we, 
 that  is,  our  living  powers,  might  be  wholly  destroyed; 
 yet,  even  prior  to  those  proofs,  there  is  really  no  par- 
 ticular distinct  ground  or  reason  for  this  apprehen- 
 sion at  all,  so  far  as  I  can  find.  If  there  be,  it  must 
 arise  either  from  the  reason  of  the  thing ',  or  from  the 
 analogy  of  Nature. 
 
 But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reason  of  the  thing , 
 that  death  is  the  destruction  of  living  agents,  be- 
 cause we  know  not  at  all  what  death  is  in  itself;  but 
 only  some  of  its  effects,  such  as  the  dissolution  of 
 flesh,  skin,  and  bones.  And  these  effects  do  in  no- 
 wise appear  to  imply  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent. 
 And  besides,  as  we  are  greatly  in  the  dark,  upon 
 what  the  exercise  of  our  living  powers  depends,  so 
 we  are  wholly  ignorant  what  the  powers  themselves 
 
 avoidably  ambiguous  ;  and  may  signify  either  the  destruction  of  a 
 living  being,  so  as  that  the  same  living  being  shall  be  incapable  of 
 ever  perceiving  or  acting  again  at  all ;  or  the  destruction  of  those 
 means  and  instruments  by  which  it  is  capable  of  its  present  life,  of 
 its  present  state  of  perception  and  of  action.  It  is  here  used  in  the 
 former  sense.  When  it  is  used  in  the  latter,  the  epithet  present 
 is  added.  The  loss  of  a  man's  eye  is  a  destruction  of  living 
 powers  in  the  latter  sense.  But  we  have  no  reason  to  think  the 
 destruction  of  living  powers  in  the  former  sense  to  be  possible. 
 We  have  no  more  reason  to  think  a  being  endued  with  living 
 powers  ever  loses  them  during  its  whole  existence,  than  to  be- 
 lieve that  a  stone  ever  acquires  them. 
 
189 
 
 depend  upon;  the  powers  themselves,  as  distin- 
 guished not  only  from  their  actual  exercise,  but  also 
 from  the  present  capacity  of  exercising  them;  and 
 as  opposed  to  their  destruction:  for  sleep,  or  how- 
 ever, a  swoon,  shows  us  not  only  that  these  powers 
 exist  when  they  are  not  exercised,  as  the  passive 
 power  of  motion  does  in  inanimate  matter;  but  shows 
 also  that  they  exist,  when  there  is  no  present  capa- 
 city of  exercising  them;  or  that  the  capacities  of 
 exercising  them  for  the  present,  as  well  as  the  actual 
 exercise  of  them  may  be  suspended,  and  yet  the 
 powers  themselves  remain  undestroyed.  Since  then 
 we  know  not  at  all  upon  what  the  existence  of  our 
 living  powers  depends,  this  shows  further,  there  can 
 no  probability  be  collected  from  the  reason  of  the 
 thing,  that  death  will  be  their  destruction:  because 
 their  existence  may  depend  upon  somewhat  in  no  de- 
 gree affected  by  death;  upon  somewhat  quite  out  of 
 the  reach  of  this  king  of  terrors.  So  that  there  is 
 nothing  more  certain  than  that  the  reason  of  the  thing 
 shows  us  no  connection  between  death  and  the  de- 
 struction of  living  agents.  Nor  can  we  find  any 
 thing  throughout  the  whole  analogy  of  Nature,  to 
 afford  us  even  the  slightest  presumption,  that  ani- 
 mals ever  lose  their  living  powers;  much  less,  if  it 
 were  possible,  that  they  lose  them  by  death;  for  we 
 have  no  faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any  beyond  or 
 through  it,  so  as  to  see  what  becomes  of  them.  This 
 event  removes  them  from  our  view.  It  destrovs  the 
 sensible  proof,  which  we  had  before  their  death,  of 
 their  being  possessed  of  living  powers,  but  does  not 
 appear  to  afford  the  least  reason  to  believe  that  they 
 are  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived  of  them. 
 
190 
 
 And  our  knowing  that  they  were  possessed  of 
 these  powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to  which  we  have 
 faculties  capable  of  tracing  them,  is  itself  a  probabil- 
 ity of  their  retaining  them  beyond  it.  And  this  is 
 confirmed,  and  a  sensible  credibility  is  given  to  it, 
 by  observing  the  very  great  and  astonishing  changes 
 which  we  have  experienced ;  so  great,  that  our  exis- 
 tence in  another  state  of  life,  of  perception  and  of 
 action,  will  be  but  according  to  a  method  of  provi- 
 dential conduct,  the  like  to  which  has  been  already 
 exercised,  even  with  regard  to  ourselves ;  according 
 to  a  course  of  nature,  the  like  to  which  we  have  al- 
 ready gone  through. 
 
 However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  sensible, 
 how  difficult  it  is  to  silence  imagination  enough  to 
 make  the  voice  of  reason  even  distinctly  heard  in  this 
 case ;  as  we  are  accustomed,  from  our  youth  up,  to 
 indulge  that  forward  delusive  faculty,  ever  obtruding 
 beyond  its  sphere ;  of  some  assistance,  indeed,  to  ap- 
 prehension, but  the  author  of  all  error:  as  we  plainly 
 lose  ourselves  in  gross  and  crude  conceptions  of 
 things,  taking  for  granted  that  we  are  acquainted 
 with  what  indeed  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of;  it  may 
 be  proper  to  consider  the  imaginary  presumptions, 
 that  death  will  be  our  destruction,  arising  from  these 
 kinds  of  early  and  lasting  prejudices ;  and  to  show 
 how  little  they  can  really  amount  to,  even  though  we 
 cannot  wholly  divest  ourselves  of  them.      And, 
 
 I.  All  presumption  of  death  being  the  destruc- 
 tion of  living  beings,  must  go  upon  supposition  that 
 they  are  compounded,  and  so  discerptible.  But, 
 since  consciousness  is  a  single  and  indivisible  power, 
 it  should  seem  that  the  subject  in  which  it  resides 
 
191 
 
 must  be  so  too.  For,  were  the  motion  of  any  par- 
 ticle of  matter  absolutely  one  and  indivisible,  so  as 
 that  it  should  imply  a  contradiction  to  suppose  part 
 of  this  motion  to  exist,  and  part  not  to  exist,  that 
 is,  part  of  this  matter  to  move,  and  part  to  be  at 
 rest;  then  its  power  of  motion  would  be  indivisible; 
 and  so  also  would  the  subject  in  which  the  power  in- 
 heres, namely,  the  particle  of  matter:  for,  if  this 
 could  he  divided  into  two,  one  part  might  be  moved 
 and  the  other  at  rest,  which  is  contrary  to  the  sup- 
 position. In  like  manner,  it  has  been  argued,*  and 
 for  any  thing  appearing  to  the  contrary,  justly,  that 
 since  the  perception,  or  consciousness,  which  we  have 
 of  our  own  existence,  is  indivisible,  so  as  that  it  is  a 
 contradiction  to  suppose  one  part  of  it  should  be  here, 
 and  the  other  there;  the  perceptive  power,  or  the 
 power  of  consciousness,  is  indivisible  too ;  and,  con- 
 sequently, the  subject  in  which  it  resides,  that  is, 
 the  conscious  being.  Now,  upon  supposition  that 
 living  agent  each  man  calls  himself,  is  thus  a  single 
 being,  which  there  is  at  least  no  more  difficulty  in 
 conceiving  than  in  conceiving  it  to  be  a  compound, 
 and  of  which  there  is  the  proof  now  mentioned ;  it 
 follows  that  our  organized  bodies  are  no  more  our- 
 selves, or  part  of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter 
 around  us.  And  it  is  as  easy  to  conceive  how  matter, 
 which  is  no  part  of  ourselves,  may  be  appropriated 
 to  us  in  the  manner  which  our  present  bodies  are, 
 as  how  we  can  receive  impression  from,  and  have 
 power  over  any  matter.      It  is  as  easy  to  conceive, 
 
 *  See  Dr.  Clarke's  Letter  to  Mr.   Dodweil,  and  the  Defences 
 of  it. 
 
192 
 
 that  we  may  exist  out  of  bodies,  as  in  them;  that 
 we  might  have  animated  bodies  of  any  other  organs 
 and  senses  wholly  different  from  these  now  given  us, 
 and  that  we  may  hereafter  animate  these  same  or  new 
 bodies  variously  modified  and  organized,  as  to  con- 
 ceive how  we  can  animate  such  bodies  as  our  present. 
 And,  lastly,  the  dissolution  of  all  these  several  or- 
 ganized bodies,  supposing  ourselves  to  have  succes- 
 sively animated  them,  would  have  no  more  conceiv- 
 able tendency  to  destroy  the  living  beings,  ourselves, 
 or  deprive  us  of  living  faculties,  the  faculties  of  per- 
 ception and  of  action,  than  the  dissolution  of  any 
 foreign  matter,  which  we  are  capable  of  receiving 
 impressions  from,  and  making  use  of  for  the  common 
 occasions  of  life. 
 
 II.  The  simplicity  and  absolute  oneness  of  a  liv- 
 ing agent  cannot,  indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the 
 thing,  be  properly  proved  by  experimental  observa- 
 tions. But  as  these  fall  in  with  the  supposition  of 
 its  unity,  so  they  plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  cer- 
 tainly, that  our  gross  organized  bodies,  with  which 
 we  perceive  the  objects  of  sense,  and  with  which  we 
 act,  are  no  part  of  ourselves,  and  therefore  show  us, 
 that  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  their  destruction 
 to  be  ours ;  even  without  determining  whether  our 
 living  substance  be  material  or  immaterial.  For  we 
 see  by  experience  that  men  may  lose  their  limbs, 
 their  organs  of  sense,  and  even  the  greatest  part  of 
 these  bodies,  and  yet  remain  the  same  living  agents  : 
 And  persons  can  trace  up  the  existence  of  themselves 
 to  a  time  when  the  bulk  of  their  bodies  was  extremely 
 small,  in  comparison  of  what  it  is  in  mature  age  :  and 
 we  cannot  but  think  that  they  might  then  have  lost 
 
193 
 
 a  considerable  part  of  that  small  body,  and  yet  have 
 remained  the  same  living  agents,  as  they  may  now 
 lose  great  part  of  their  present  body,  and  remain  so. 
 And  it  is  certain,  that  the  bodies  of  all  animals  are  in 
 a  constant  flux,  from  that  never-ceasing  attrition 
 which  there  is  in  every  part  of  them.  Now,  things 
 of  this  kind  unavoidably  teach  us  to  distinguish  be- 
 tween these  living  agents,  ourselves,  and  large  quan- 
 tities of  matter,  in  which  we  are  very  nearly  inter- 
 ested ;  since  these  may  be  alienated,  and  actually  are 
 in  a  daily  course  of  succession,  and  changing  their 
 owners ;  whilst  we  are  assured  that  each  living  agent 
 remains  one  and  the  same  permanent  being.*  And 
 this  general  observation  leads  us  on  to  the  following 
 ones. 
 
 1.  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  ex- 
 perience, what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living  being 
 each  man  calls  himself;  and  yet,  till  it  be  determined 
 that  it  is  larger  in  bulk  than  the  solid  elementary 
 particles  of  matter,  which  there  is  no  ground  to 
 think  any  natural  power  can  dissolve,  there  is  no  sort 
 of  reason  to  think  death  to  be  the  dissolution  of  it, 
 of  the  living  being,  even  although  it  should  not  be 
 absolutely  indiscerptible. 
 
 2.  From  our  being  so  nearly  related  to,  and  in- 
 terested in  certain  systems  of  matter,  suppose  our 
 flesh  and  bones,  and  afterwards  ceasing  to  be  at  all 
 related  to  them,  the  living  agents,  ourselves,  remain- 
 ing all  this  while  undestroyed,  notwithstanding  such 
 alienation ;  and  consequently  these  systems  of  mat- 
 ter not  being  ourselves ;  it  follows,  further,  that  we 
 
 *  See  Dissertation  I. 
 
 I  17 
 
194 
 
 have  no  ground  to  conclude  any  other,  suppose  in- 
 'jernal  systems  of  matter,  to  be  the  living  agents  our- 
 selves :  because  we  can  have  no  ground  to  conclude 
 this,  but  from  our  relation  to,  and  interest  in,  such 
 other  systems  of  matter;  and  therefore  we  can  have 
 no  reason  to  conclude,  what  befalls  those  systems  of 
 matter  at  death,  to  be  the  destruction  of  the  living 
 agents.  We  have  already,  several  times  over,  lost 
 a  great  part,  or  perhaps  the  whole  of  our  body,  ac- 
 cording to  certain  common  established  laws  of  nature ; 
 yet  we  remain  the  same  living  agents :  when  we  shall 
 lose  as  great  a  part,  or  the  whole,  by  another  com- 
 mon, established  law  of  nature,,  death,  why  may  we 
 not  also  remain  the  same  ?  That  the  alienation  has 
 been  gradual  in  one  case,  and  in  the  other  will  be 
 more  at  once,  does  not  prove  any  thing  to  the  con- 
 trary. We  have  passed  undestroyed  through  those 
 many  and  great  revolutions  of  matter,  so  peculiarly 
 appropriated  to  us  ourselves ;  why  should  we  imagine 
 death  will  be  so  fatal  to  us?  Nor  can  it  be  objected, 
 that  what  is  thus  alienated,  or  lost,  is  no  part  of  our  ori- 
 ginal solid  body,  but  only  adventitious  matter;  because 
 we  may  lose  entire  limbs,  which  must  have  contained 
 many  solid  parts  and  vessels  of  the  original  body:  or 
 if  this  be  not  admitted,  we  have  no  proof  that  any  of 
 these  solid  parts  are  dissolved  or  alienated  by  death : 
 though,  by  the  way,  we  are  very  nearly  related  to 
 that  extraneous  or  adventitious  matter,  whilst  it 
 continues  united  to  and  distending  the  several  parts 
 of  our  solid  body.  But,  after  all,  the  relation  a  per- 
 son bears  to  those  parts  of  his  body  to  which  he  is 
 the  most  nearly  related,  what  does  it  appear  to  amount 
 to  but  this,  that  the  living  agent  and  those  parts  of 
 
195 
 
 the  body  mutually  affect  each  other  ?  And  the  same 
 thing,  the  same  thing  in  kind,  though  not  in  degree, 
 may  be  said  of  all  foreign  matter,  which  gives  us 
 ideas,  and  which  we  have  any  power  over.  From 
 these  observations  the  whole  ground  of  the  imagina- 
 tion is  removed,  that  the  dissolution  of  any  matter  is 
 the  destruction  of  a  living  agent,  from  the  interest  he 
 once  had  in  such  matter. 
 
 3.  If  we  consider  our  body  somewhat  more  dis- 
 tinctly, as  made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of  per- 
 ception and  of  motion,  it  will  bring  us  to  the  same 
 conclusion.  Thus,  the  common  optical  experiments 
 show,  and  even  the  observation  how  sight  is  assisted 
 by  glasses  shows,  that  we  see  with  our  eyes  in  the 
 same  sense  as  we  see  with  glasses.  Nor  is  there  any 
 reason  to  believe,  that  we  see  with  them  in  any  other 
 sense;  any  other,  I  mean,  which  would  lead  us  to 
 think  the  eye  itself  a  percipient.  The  like  is  to  be 
 said  of  hearing :  and  our  feeling  distant  solid  matter 
 by  means  of  somewhat  in  our  hand,  seems  an  instance 
 of  the  like  kind,  as  to  the  subject  we  are  considering. 
 All  these  are  instances  of  foreign  matter,  or  such  as 
 is  no  part  of  our  body,  being  instrumental  in  pre- 
 paring objects  for,  and  conveying  them  to  the  per- 
 ceiving power,  in  a  manner  similar,  or  like  to  the 
 manner  in  which  our  organs  of  sense  prepare  and 
 convey  them.  Both  are,  in  a  like  way,  instruments 
 of  our  receiving  such  ideas  from  external  objects,  as 
 the  Author  of  nature  appointed  those  external  ob- 
 jects to  be  the  occasions  of  exciting  in  us.  However, 
 glasses  are  evidently  instances  of  this;  namely,  of 
 matter,  which  is  no  part  of  our  body,  preparing  ob- 
 jects for,  and  conveying  them  towards  the  perceiving 
 i  2 
 
196 
 
 power,  in  like  manner  as  our  bodily  organs  do.  And 
 if  we  see  with  our  eyes  only,  in  the  same  manner  as 
 we  do  with  glasses,  the  like  may  justly  be  concluded, 
 from  analog)',  of  all  our  other  senses.  It  is  not  in- 
 tended, by  any  thing  here  said,  to  affirm,  that  the 
 whole  apparatus  of  vision,  or  of  perception  by  any 
 other  of  our  senses,  can  be  traced,  through  all  its 
 steps,  quite  up  to  the  living  power  of  seeing,  or  per- 
 ceiving ;  but  that,  so  far  as  it  can  be  traced  by  expe- 
 rimental observations,  so  far  it  appears,  that  our  or- 
 gans of  sense  prepare  and  convey  on  objects,  in  order 
 to  their  being  perceived,  in  like  manner  as  foreign 
 matter  does,  without  affording  any  shadow  of  appear- 
 ance, that  they  themselves  perceive.  And  that  we 
 have  no  reason  to  think  our  organs  of  sense  perci- 
 pients, is  confirmed  by  instances  of  persons  losing 
 some  of  them,  the  living  beings  themselves,  their 
 former  occupiers,  remaining  unimpaired.  It  is  con- 
 firmed also  by  the  experience  of  dreams ;  by  which 
 we  find  we  are  at  present  possessed  of  a  latent,  and 
 what  would  otherwise  be  an  unimagined  unknown 
 power  of  perceiving  sensible  objects,  in  as  strong  and 
 lively  a  manner  without  our  external  organs  of  sense, 
 as  with  them. 
 
 '60  also  with  regard  to  our  power  of  moving,  or 
 directing  motion  by  will  and  choice :  upon  the  de- 
 struction of  a  limb,  this  active  power  remains,  as  it 
 evidently  seems,  unlessened ;  so  as  that  the  living 
 being,  who  has  suffered  this  loss,  would  be  capable 
 of  moving  as  before,  if  it  had  another  limb  to  move 
 with.  It  can  wnlk  by  the  help  of  an  artificial  leg, 
 just  as  it  can  make  use  of  a  pole  or  a  lever,  to  reach 
 towards  itself,  and  to  move  things  beyond  the  length 
 
197 
 
 and  the  power  of  its  natural  arm :  and  tins  last  it 
 does  in  the  same  manner  as  it  reaches  and  moves, 
 with  its  natural  arm,  things  nearer  and  of  less  wr 
 Nor  is  there  so  much  as  any  appearance  of  our  limbs 
 being  endued  with  a  power  of  moving  or  direct  h;; 
 themselves;  though  they  are  adapted,  like  the  several 
 parts  of  a  machine,  to  be  the  instruments  of  motion 
 to  each  other;  and  some  parts  of  the  same  limb,  to 
 be  instruments  of  motion  to  other  parts  of  it. 
 
 Thus,  a  man  determines,  that  he  will  look  at  such 
 mii  object  through  a  microscope;  or,  being  lame, 
 suppose  that  he  will  walk  to  such  a  place  with  a 
 staff,  a  week  hence.  His  eyes  and  his  feet  no 
 more  determine  in  these  cases,  than  the  microscope 
 and  the  staff.  Nor  is  there  any  ground  to  think 
 they  any  more  put  the  determination  in  prac- 
 tice, or  that  his  eyes  are  the  seers  or  his  feet  the 
 movers,  in  any  other  sense  than  as  the  microscope 
 and  the  staff  are.  Upon  the  whole,  then,  our  or- 
 gans of  sense  and  our  limbs  are  certainly  instruments, 
 which  the  living  persons,  ourselves,  make  use  of  to 
 perceive  and  move  with:  there  is  not  any  probability, 
 that  they  are  any  more,  nor,  consequently,  that  we 
 have  any  other  kind  of  relation  to  them,  than  what 
 we  may  have  to  any  other  foreign  matter  formed  into 
 instruments  of  perception  and  motion,  suppose  into  a 
 microscope  or  a  staff  (I  say,  any  other  kind  of  rela- 
 tion, for  I  am  not  speaking  of  the  degree  of  it;)  nor, 
 consequently,  is  there  any  probability,  that  the  alien- 
 ation or  dissolution  of  these  instruments  is  the  de- 
 struction of  the  perceiving  and  moving  agent. 
 
 And  thus,  our  finding,  that  the  dissolution  of 
 matter  in  which  living  beings  were  most  nearly  in- 
 
198 
 
 terested,  is  not  their  dissolution;  and  that  the  de* 
 struction  of  several  of  the  organs  and  instruments  01 
 perception,  and  of  motion  belonging  to  them,  is  not 
 their  destruction ;  shows,  demonstratively,  that  there 
 is  no  ground  to  think,  that  the  dissolution  of  any 
 other  matter,  or  destruction  of  any  other  organs  and 
 instruments,  will  be  the  dissolution  or  destruction  of 
 living  agents,  from  the  like  kind  of  relation.  And 
 we  have  no  reason  to  think  we  stand  in  any  other 
 kind  of  relation  to  any  thing  which  we  find  dissolved 
 by  death. 
 
 But  it  is  said,  these  observations  are  equally  ap- 
 plicable to  brutes ;  and  it  is  thought  an  insuperable 
 difficulty,  that  they  should  be  immortal,  and  by  con- 
 sequence, capable  of  everlasting  happiness.  Now, 
 this  manner  of  expression  is  both  invidious  and  weak ; 
 but  the  thing  intended  by  it,  is  really  no  difficulty  at 
 all,  either  in  the  way  of  natural  or  moral  considera- 
 tion. For,  1st,  Suppose  the  invidious  thing,  de- 
 signed in  such  a  manner  of  expression,  were  really 
 implied,  as  it  is  not  in  the  least,  in  the  natural  im- 
 mortality of  brutes;  namely,  that  they  must  arrive  at 
 great  attainments,  and  become  rational  and  moral 
 agents;  even  this  would  be  no  difficulty,  since  we 
 know  not  what  latent  powers  and  capacities  they  may 
 be  endued  with.  There  was  once,  prior  to  experi- 
 ence, as  great  presumption  against  human  creatures, 
 as  there  is  against  the  brute  creatures,  arriving  at 
 
 that  degree  of  understanding;  which  we  have  in  ma- 
 cs o 
 
 ture  age ;  for  we  can  trace  up  our  own  existence  to 
 the  same  original  with  theirs.  And  we  find  it  to  be 
 a  general  law  of  nature,  that  creatures  endued  with 
 capacities  of  virtue  and  religion,  should  be  placed  in 
 
199 
 
 a  condition  of  being,  in  which  they  are  altogether 
 without  the  use  of  them  for  a  considerable  length  of 
 their  duration,  as  in  infancy  and  childhood.  And 
 great  part  of  the  human  species  go  out  of  the  present 
 world,  before  they  come  to  the  exercise  of  these  ca- 
 pacities in  any  degree  at  all.  But  then,  2dly,  The 
 natural  immortality,  of  brutes  does  not  in  the  least 
 imply,  that  they  are  endued  with  any  latent  capacities 
 of  a  rational  or  moral  nature.  And  the  economy  of 
 the  universe  might  require,  that  there  should  be  liv- 
 ing creatures  without  any  capacities  of  this  kind. 
 And  all  difficulties,  as  to  the  manner  how  they  are  to 
 be  disposed  of,  are  so  apparently  and  wholly  founded 
 on  our  ignorance,  that  it  is  wonderful  they  should 
 be  insisted  upon  by  any,  but  such  as  are  weak  enough 
 to  think  they  are  acquainted  with  the  whole  system 
 of  things.  There  is  then,  absolutely,  nothing  at  all 
 in  this  objection,  which  is  so  rhetorically  urged 
 against  the  greatest  part  of  the  natural  proof  or  pre- 
 sumptions of  the  immortality  of  human  minds:  I  say, 
 the  greatest  part;  for  it  is  less  applicable  to  the  fol- 
 lowing observation,  which  is  more  peculiar  to  man- 
 kind : — 
 
 III.  That  as  it  is  evident  our  present  powers  and 
 capacities  of  reason,  memory,  and  affection,  do  not 
 depend  upon  our  gross  body,  in  the  manner  in  which 
 perception  by  our  organs  of  sense  does ;  so  they  do 
 not  appear  to  depend  upon  it  at  all  in  any  such  manner, 
 as  to  give  ground  to  think,  that  the  dissolution  of 
 this  body  will  be  the  destruction  of  these  our  pre- 
 sent powers  of  reflection,  as  it  will  of  our  powers  of 
 sensation;  or  to  give  ground  to  conclude,  even  that 
 it  will  be  so  much  as  a  suspension  of  the  former. 
 
200 
 
 Human  creatures  exist  at  present  in  two  states  of 
 life  and  perception,  greatly  different  from  each  other  ; 
 each  of  which  has  its  own  peculiar  laws,  and  its  own 
 peculiar  enjoyments  and  sufferings.  When  any  of 
 our  senses  are  affected,  or  appetites  gratified  with 
 the  objects  of  them,  we  may  be  said  to  exist,  or  live, 
 in  a  state  of  sensation.  When  none  of  our  senses 
 are  affected,  or  appetites  gratified,  and  yet  we  per- 
 ceive, and  reason,  and  act,  we  may  be  said  to  exist, 
 or  live,  in  a  state  of  reflection.  Now,  it  is  by  no 
 means  certain,  that  any  thing  which  is  dissolved  by 
 death  is  any  way  necessary  to  the  living  being,  in 
 this  its  state  of  reflection,  after  ideas  are  gained. 
 For  though,  from  our  present  constitution  and  con- 
 dition of  being,  our  external  organs  of  sense  are  ne- 
 cessary for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflecting  pow- 
 ers, as  carriages,  and  levers,  and  scaffolds  are  in  ar- 
 chitecture; yet,  when  these  ideas  are  brought  in,  we 
 are  capable  of  reflecting  in  the  most  intense  degree, 
 and  of  enjoying  the  greatest  pleasure,  and  feeling  the 
 greatest  pain,  by  means  of  that  reflection,  without 
 any  assistance  from  our  senses;  and  without  any  at 
 all,  which  we  know  of,  from  that  body,  which  will  be 
 dissolved  by  death. 
 
 It  does  not  appear,  then,  that  the  relation  of  this 
 gross  body  to  the  reflecting  being  is,  in  any  degree, 
 necessary  to  thinking;  to  our  intellectual  enjoyments 
 or  sufferings :  nor,  consequently,  that  the  dissolution, 
 or  alienation,  of  the  former  by  death,  will  be  the  de- 
 struction of  those  present  powers,  which  render  us 
 capable  of  this  state  of  reflection.  Further,  there 
 are  instances  of  mortal  diseases,  which  do  not  at  all 
 affect  our  present  intellectual  powers,  and  this  af- 
 
201 
 
 fords  a  presumption,  that  those  diseases  will  not  de- 
 stroy these  present  powers.  Indeed,  from  the  ob- 
 servations  made  above,*  it  appears,  that  there  is  no 
 presumption,  from  their  mutually  affecting  each  other, 
 that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of 
 the  living  agent.  And  by  the  same  reasoning  it 
 must  appear,  too,  that  there  is  no  presumption,  from 
 their  mutually  affecting  each  other,  that  the  dissolu- 
 tion of  the  body  is  the  destruction  of  our  present  re- 
 flecting powers ;  but  instances  of  their  not  affecting 
 each  other,  afford  a  presumption  to  the  contrary. 
 Instances  of  mortal  diseases  not  impairing  our  pre- 
 sent reflecting  powers,  evidently  turn  our  thoughts 
 even  from  imagining  such  diseases  to  be  the  destruc- 
 tion of  them.  Several  things,  indeed,  greatly  affect 
 all  our  living  powers,  and  at  length  suspend  the  ex- 
 ercise of  them ;  as,  for  instance,  drowsiness,  increas- 
 ing till  it  end  in  sound  sleep :  and  from  hence  we 
 might  have  imagined  it  would  destroy  them,  till  we 
 found,  by  experience,  the  weakness  of  this  way  of 
 judging.  But,  in  the  diseases  now  mentioned,  there 
 is  not  so  much  as  this  shadow  of  probability,  to  lead 
 us  to  any  such  conclusion,  as  to  the  reflecting  powers 
 which  we  have  at  present;  for,  in  those  diseases,  per- 
 sons, the  moment  before  death,  appear  to  be  in  the 
 highest  vigour  of  life.  They  discover  apprehension, 
 memory,  reason,  all  entire ;  with  the  utmost  force  of 
 affection;  sense  of  a  character,  of  shame  and  honour; 
 and  the  highest  mental  enjoyments  and  sufferings, 
 even  to  the  last  gasp ;  and  these  surely  prove  even 
 greater  vigour   of  life   than  bodily  strength  does. 
 
 Pages  193,  194,  195,  196. 
 
 i  3 
 
202 
 
 Now,  what  pretence  is  there  for  thinking,  that  a  pro- 
 gressive disease,  when  arrived  to  such  a  degree,  I 
 mean  that  degree  which  is  mortal,  will  destroy  those 
 powers,  which  were  not  impaired,  which  were  not  af- 
 fected by  it,  during  its  whole  progress,  quite  up  to 
 that  degree?  And  if  death,  by  diseases  of  this 
 kind,  is  not  the  destruction  of  our  present  reflecting 
 powers,  it  will  scarce  be  thought  that  death  by  any 
 other  means  is. 
 
 It  is  obvious,  that  this  general  observation  may 
 be  carried  on  further :  And  there  appears  so  little 
 connection  between  our  bodily  powers  of  sensation, 
 and  our  present  powers  of  reflection,  that  there  is  no 
 reason  to  conclude  that  death,  which  destroys  the 
 former,  does  so  much  as  suspend  the  exercise  of  the 
 latter,  or  interrupt  our  continuing  to  exist  in  the 
 like  state  of  reflection  which  we  do  now.  For,  sus- 
 pension of  reason,  memory,  and  the  affections  which 
 they  excite,  is  no  part  of  the  idea  of  death,  nor  is 
 implied  in  our  notion  of  it.  And  our  daily  experi- 
 encing these  powers  to  be  exercised,  without  any  as- 
 sistance, that  we  know  of,  from  those  bodies  which 
 will  be  dissolved  by  death;  and  our  finding  often, 
 that  the  exercise  of  them  is  so  lively  to  the  last ; — 
 these  things  afford  a  sensible  apprehension,  that 
 death  may  not  perhaps  be  so  much  as  a  discontinu- 
 ance of  the  exercise  of  these  powers,  nor  of  the  en- 
 joyments and  sufferings  which  it  implies;*  so  that 
 
 *  There  are  three  distinct  questions,  relating  to  a  future  life 
 here  considered  :  Whether  death  be  the  destruction  of  living 
 agents.  If  not,  whether  it  be  the  destruction  of  their  present 
 powers  of  reflection,  as  it  certainly  is  the  destruction  of  their  pre- 
 sent powers  of  sensation  ?  and,  if  not,  Whether  it  be  the  suspen- 
 
203 
 
 our  posthumous  life,  whatever  there  may  be  in  it  ad- 
 ditional to  our  present,  yet  may  not  be  entirely  be- 
 ginning anew,  but  going  on.  Death  may,  in  some 
 sort,  and  in  some  respects,  answer  to  our  birth,  which 
 is  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties  which  we  had  be- 
 fore it,  or  a  total  change  of  the  state  of  life  in  which 
 we  existed  when  in  the  womb,  but  a  continuation  of 
 both,  with  such  and  such  great  alterations. 
 
 Nay,  for  aught  we  know  of  ourselves,  of  our  pre- 
 sent life,  and  of  death,  death  may  immediately,  in  the 
 natural  course  of  things,  put  us  into  a  higher  and 
 more  enlarged  state  of  life,  as  our  birth  does;*  a 
 state  in  which  our  capacities  and  sphere  of  percep- 
 tion, and  of  action,  may  be  much  greater  than  at 
 present.  For,  as  our  relation  to  our  external  organs 
 of  sense  renders  us  capable  of  existing  in  our  pre- 
 sent state  of  sensation,  so  it  may  be  the  only  natural 
 hinderance  to  our  existing,  immediately  and  of  course, 
 in  a  higher  state  of  reflection.  The  truth  is,  reason 
 does  not  at  all  show  us  in  what  state  death  naturally 
 leaves  us.  But  were  we  sure  that  it  would  suspend 
 all  our  perceptive  and  active  powers,  yet  the  sus- 
 pension of  a  power,  and  the  destruction  of  it,  are  ef- 
 fects so  totally  different  in  kind,  as  we  experience 
 
 sion,  or  discontinuance  of  the  exercise,  of  these  present  reflecting 
 powers  ?  Now,  if  there  be  no  reason  to  believe  the  last,  there 
 will  be,  if  that  were  possible,  less  for  the  next,  and  less  still  for 
 the  first. 
 
 *  This,  according  to  Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brahmans  : 
 vofjcl^uv  (Am  ya.£  dh  rov  fjiiv  IvdctoB  ft'iov,  u$  civ  tcKfmv  xuofiivuv  uvur 
 tov  di  Sccvxtov  yiviffiv  lis  rov  o»toj;  fiiov,  x,et)  to*  iv%ac.ifjt.ov  a,  <ro7$  $1X0- 
 ffoiprio-affi.  Lib.  XV.  p.  1039.  Ed.  Anist.  1707.  To  which  opinion, 
 perhaps,  Antoninus  may  allude  in  these  words,  u;  vvv  vr<g</*<vu$, 
 <roTi  s/Avguov  Ik  rn;  yxirr^o;  «j$  yuvamos  aov  i^ixfn,  ovrut  ix%i- 
 X,i<r8a.i  t*j»  ugxv  tv  *i  ro  ^/v^oi^iov  aov  tov  iKvtoov  toutov  IxTztritTai. 
 Lib.  IX.  c.  6. 
 
204 
 
 from  sleep  and  a  swoon,  that  we  cannot  in  anywise 
 argue  from  one  to  the  other;  or  conclude,  even  to  the 
 lowest  degree  of  probability,  that  the  same  kind  of 
 force  which  is  sufficient  to  suspend  our  faculties, 
 though  it  be  increased  ever  so  much,  will  be  sufficient 
 to  destroy  them. 
 
 These  observations  together  may  be  sufficient  to 
 show,  how  little  presumption  there  is  that  death  is 
 the  destruction  of  human  creatures.  However, 
 there  is  the  shadow  of  an  analogy,  which  may  lead 
 us  to  imagine  it  is;  the  supposed  likeness  which  is 
 observed  between  the  decay  of  vegetables  and  living 
 creatures.  And  this  likeness  is  indeed  sufficient  to 
 afford  the  poets  very  apt  allusions  to  the  flowers  of 
 the  field,  in  their  pictures  of  the  frailty  of  our  pre- 
 sent life.  But,  in  reason,  the  analogy  is  so  far 
 from  holding,  that  there  appears  no  ground  even  for 
 the  comparison,  as  to  the  present  question ;  because 
 one  of  the  two  subjects  compared  is  wholly  void  of 
 that,  which  is  the  principal  and  chief  thing  in  the 
 other,  the  power  of  perception  and  of  action;  and 
 which  is  the  only  thing  we  are  inquiring  about  the 
 continuance  of.  So  that  the  destruction  of  a  ve- 
 getable is  an  event  not  similar,  or  analogous,  to  the 
 destruction  of  a  living  agent. 
 
 But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off  the 
 delusive  custom  of  substituting  imagination  in  the 
 room  of  experience,  we  would  confine  ourselves  to 
 what  we  do  know  and  understand ;  if  we  would 
 argue  only  from  that,  and  from  that  form  our  ex- 
 pectations, it  would  appear,  at  first  sight,  that  as 
 no  probability  of  living  beings  ever  ceasing  to  be  so, 
 can  be  concluded  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  so 
 
205 
 
 none  can  be  collected  from  the  analogy  of  Nature ; 
 because  we  cannot  trace  any  living  beings  beyond 
 death.  But  as  we  are  conscious  that  we  are  endued 
 with  capacities  of  perception  and  of  action,  and  are 
 living  persons,  what  we  are  to  go  upon  is,  that  we 
 shall  continue  so  till  we  foresee  some  accident,  or 
 event,  which  will  endanger  those  capacities,  or  be 
 likely  to  destroy  us;  which  death  does  in  nowise 
 appear  to  be. 
 
 And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may 
 oass  into  new  scenes,  and  a  new  state  of  life  and 
 action,  just  as  naturally  as  we  came  into  the  present. 
 And  this  new  state  may  naturally  be  a  social  one. 
 And  the  advantages  of  it,  advantages  of  every  kind, 
 may  naturally  be  bestowed,  according  to  some  fixed 
 general  laws  of  wisdom,  upon  every  one  in  propor- 
 tion to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue.  And  though  the 
 advantages  of  that  future  natural  state  should  not 
 be  bestowed,  as  these  of  the  present  in  some  mea- 
 sure are,  by  the  will  of  the  society,  but  entirely  by 
 his  more  immediate  action,  upon  whom  the  whole 
 frame  of  nature  depends,  yet  this  distribution  may 
 be  just  as  natural,  as  their  being  distributed  here 
 by  the  instrumentality  of  men.  And,  indeed, 
 though  one  were  to  allow  any  confused  undeter- 
 mined sense,  which  people  please  to  put  upon  the 
 word  natural,  it  would  be  a  shortness  of  thought 
 scarce  credible  to  imagine,  that  no  system  or  course 
 of  things  can  be  so,  but  only  what  we  see  at 
 present;*  especially  whilst  the  probability  of  a  fu- 
 ture life,  or  the  natural  immortality  of  the  soul,  is 
 
 •  Sec  Part  ii.   ch.  2.   and  Part  ii.   ch.  3. 
 
206 
 
 admitted  upon  the  evidence  of  reason ;  because  this 
 is  really  both  admitting  and  denying  at  once,  a  state 
 of  being  different  from  the  present  to  be  natural. 
 But  the  only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  is,  stated, 
 fixed,  or  settled;  since  what  is  natural  as  much  re- 
 quires and  presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to  ren- 
 der it  so,  that  is,  to  effect  it  continually,  or  at  stated 
 times,  as  what  is  supernatural  or  miraculous  does 
 to  effect  it  for  once.  And  from  hence  it  must  fol- 
 low, that  persons'  notions  of  what  is  natural  will  be 
 enlarged,  in  proportion  to  their  greater  knowledge 
 of  the  works  of  God,  and  the  dispensations  of  his 
 Providence.  Nor  is  there  any  absurdity  in  suppos- 
 ing, that  there  may  be  beings  in  the  universe,  whose 
 capacities,  and  knowledge,  and  views,  may  be  so 
 extensive,  as  that  the  whole  Christian  dispensation 
 may  to  them  appear  natural ;  that  is,  analagous  or 
 conformable  to  God's  dealings  with  other  parts  of 
 his  creation;  as  natural  as  the  visible  known  course 
 of  things  appears  to  us.  For  there  seems  scarce 
 any  other  possible  sense  to  be  put  upon  the  word, 
 but  that  only  in  which  it  is  here  used:  similar, 
 stated,  or  uniform. 
 
 This  credibility  of  a  future  life,  which  has  been 
 here  insisted  upon,  how  little  soever  it  may  satisfy 
 our  curiosity,  seems  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of 
 religion,  in  like  manner  as  a  demonstrative  proof 
 would.  Indeed,  a  proof,  even  a  demonstrative  one, 
 of  a  future  life,  would  not  be  a  proof  of  religion. 
 For,  that  we  are  to  live  hereafter,  is  just  as  recon- 
 cilable with  the  scheme  of  atheism,  and  as  well  to 
 be  accounted  for  by  it,  as  that  we  are  now  alive  is ; 
 and  therefore  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  to 
 
207 
 
 argue  from  that  scheme,  that  there  can  be  no  future 
 state.  But  as  religion  implies  a  future  state,  any 
 presumption  against  such  a  state  is  a  presumption 
 against  religion.  And  the  foregoing  observations 
 remove  all  presumptions  of  this  sort,  and  prove,  to 
 a  very  considerable  degree  of  probability,  one  fun- 
 damental doctrine  of  religion ;  which,  if  believed, 
 would  greatly  open  and  dispose  the  mind  seriously 
 to  attend  to  the  general  evidence  of  the  whole. 
 
208 
 
 CHAP.  II. 
 
 Of  the  Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Punish- 
 ments, and  particularly  of  the  latter. 
 
 That  which  makes  the  question  concerning  a 
 future  life  to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is  our 
 capacity  of  happiness  and  misery.  And  that  which 
 makes  the  consideration  of  it  to  be  of  so  great  im- 
 portance to  us,  is  the  supposition  of  our  happiness 
 and  misery  hereafter,  depending  upon  our  actions 
 here.  Without  this,  indeed,  curiosity  could  not 
 but  sometimes  bring  a  subject,  in  which  we  may  be 
 so  highly  interested,  to  our  thoughts;  especially 
 upon  the  mortality  of  others,  or  the  near  prospect 
 of  our  own.  But  reasonable  men  would  not  take 
 any  farther  thought  about  hereafter,  than  what 
 should  happen  thus  occasionally  to  rise  in  their  minds, 
 if  it  were  certain,  that  our  future  interest  no  way 
 depended  upon  our  present  behaviour:  whereas, 
 on  the  contrary,  if  there  be  ground,  either  from 
 analogy  or  any  thing  else,  to  think  it  does:  then 
 there  is  reason  also  for  the  most  active  thought  and 
 solicitude,  to  secure  that  interest;  to  behave  so  as 
 that  we  may  escape  that  misery,  and  obtain  that 
 happiness  in  another  life,  which  we  not  only  suppose 
 ourselves  capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend  also 
 is  put  in  our  own  power.  And  whether  there  be 
 ground  for  this  last  apprehension,  certainly  would 
 deserve  to  be  most  seriously  considered,  were  there 
 no  other  proof  of  a  future  life  and  interest,   than 
 
209 
 
 that  presumptive  one,  which  the  foregoing  observa- 
 tions amount  to. 
 
 Now,  in  the  present  state,  all  which  we  enjoy, 
 and  a  great  part  of  what  we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  own 
 power.  For  pleasure  and  pain  are  the  consequences 
 of  our  actions;  and  we  are  endued  by  the  Author 
 of  our  nature  with  capacities  of  foreseeing  these  con- 
 sequences. We  find  by  experience  he  does  not  so 
 much  as  preserve  our  lives,  exclusively  of  our  own 
 care  and  attention,  to  provide  ourselves  with,  and 
 to  make  use  of  that  sustenance,  by  which  he  has 
 appointed  our  lives  shall  be  preserved ;  and  without 
 which,  he  has  appointed,  they  shall  not  be  preserved 
 at  all.  And  in  general  we  foresee,  that  the  exter- 
 nal things,  which  are  the  objects  of  our  various  pas- 
 sions, can  neither  be  obtained  nor  enjoyed,  without 
 exerting  ourselves  in  such  and  such  manners:  but 
 by  thus  exerting  ourselves,  we  obtain  and  enjoy 
 these  objects,  in  which  our  natural  good  consists; 
 or  by  this  means  God  gives  us  the  possession  and 
 enjoyment  of  them.  I  know  not  that  we  have  any 
 one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoyment,  but  by  the  means 
 of  our  own  actions.  And  by  prudence  and  care, 
 we  may,  for  the  most  part,  pass  our  days  in  toler- 
 able ease  and  quiet:  or,  on  the  contrary,  we  may 
 by  rashness,  ungoverned  passion,  wilfulness,  or  even 
 by  negligence,  make  ourselves  as  miserable  as  ever 
 we  please.  And  many  do  please  to  make  themselves 
 extremely  miserable,  that  is,  to  do  what  they  know 
 beforehand  will  render  them  so.  They  follow  those 
 ways,  the  fruit  of  which  they  know,  by  instruction, 
 example,  experience,  will  be  disgrace,  and  poverty, 
 and  sickness,  and  untimely  death.     This  every  one 
 
210 
 
 observes  to  be  the  general  course  of  things ;  though 
 it  is  to  be  allowed,  we  cannot  find  by  experience,  that 
 all  our  sufferings  are  owing  to  our  own  follies. 
 
 Why  the  Author  of  Nature  does  not  give  his 
 creatures  promiscuously  such  and  such  perceptions, 
 without  regard  to  their  behaviour ;  why  he  does  not 
 make  them  happy  without  the  instrumentality  of 
 their  own  actions,  and  prevent  their  bringing  any 
 sufferings  upon  themselves,  is  another  matter.  Per- 
 haps there  may  be  some  impossibilities  in  the  nature 
 of  things  which  we  are  unacquainted  with  :*  or  less 
 happiness,  it  may  be,  would  upon  the  whole  be  pro- 
 duced by  such  a  method  of  conduct,  than  is  by  the 
 present :  or,  perhaps,  Divine  goodness,  with  which, 
 if  I  mistake  not,  we  make  very  free  in  our  specula- 
 tions, may  not  be  a  bare  single  disposition  to  produce 
 happiness;  but  a  disposition  to  make  the  good,  the 
 faithful,  the  honest  man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infi- 
 nitely perfect  Mind  may  be  pleased,  with  seeing  his 
 creatures  behave  suitably  to  the  nature  which  he  has 
 given  them;  to  the  relations  which  he  has  placed 
 them  in  to  each  other;  and  to  that  which  they  stand 
 in  to  himself:  that  relation  to  himself,  which,  dur- 
 ing their  existence,  is  even  necessary,  and  which  is 
 the  most  important  one  of  all.  Perhaps,  I  say,  an  in- 
 finitely perfect  Mind  may  be  pleased  with  this  moral 
 piety  of  moral  agents,  in  and  for  itself,  as  well  as 
 upon  account  of  its  being  essentially  conducive  to 
 the  happiness  of  his  creation.  Or  the  whole  end, 
 for  which  God  made,  and  thus  governs  the  world, 
 may  be  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties : 
 
 *  Part  i.  chap.  7. 
 
211 
 
 there  may  be  somewhat  in  it  as  impossible  for  us  to 
 have  any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind  man  to  have  a 
 conception  of  colours.  But,  however  this  be,  it  is 
 certain  matter  of  universal  experience,  that  the  ge- 
 neral method  of  Divine  administration,  is,  forewarn- 
 ing us,  or  giving  us  capacities  to  foresee,  with  more 
 or  less  clearness,  that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall 
 have  such  enjoyments,  if  so  and  so,  such  sufferings; 
 and  giving  us  those  enjoyments,  and  making  us  feel 
 those  sufferings,  in  consequence  of  our  actions. 
 
 "  But  all  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general 
 course  of  nature."  True.  This  is  the  very  thing 
 which  I  am  observing.  It  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  ge- 
 neral course  of  nature;  that  is,  not  surely  to  the  words 
 or  ideas,  course  of  nature,  but  to  him  who  appointed 
 it,  and  put  things  into  it:  .or  to  a  course  of  opera- 
 tion, from  its  uniformity  or  constancy,  called  natu- 
 ral, *  and  which  necessarily  implies  an  operating 
 agent.  For  when  men  find  themselves  necessitated 
 to  confess  an  Author  of  nature,  or  that  God  is  the 
 natural  Governor  of  the  world,  they  must  not  deny 
 this  again,  because  his  government  is  uniform;  they 
 must  not  deny  that  he  does  all  things  at  all,  because 
 he  does  them  constantly;  because  the  effects  of  his 
 acting  are  permanent,  whether  his  acting  be  so  or 
 not ;  though  there  is  no  reason  to  think  it  is  not.  In 
 short,  every  man,  in  every  thing  he  does,  naturally 
 acts  upon  the  forethought  and  apprehension  of  avoid- 
 ing evil,  or  obtaining  good :  and  if  the  natural  course 
 of  things  be  the  appointment  of  God,  and  our  natu- 
 ral faculties  of  knowledge  and  experience  are  given 
 
 *  Pages  204,  205 
 
212 
 
 us  by  him,  then  the  good  and  bad  consequences  which 
 follow  our  actions  are  his  appointment,  and  our  fore- 
 sight of  those  consequences  is  a  warning  given  us  by 
 him,  how  we  are  to  act. 
 
 "  Is  the  pleasure,  then,  naturally  accompanying 
 every  particular  gratification  of  passion,  intended  to 
 put  us  upon  gratifying  ourselves  in  every  such  par- 
 ticular instance,  and  as  a  reward  to  us  for  so  doing?" 
 No,  certainly.  Nor  is  it  to  be  said,  that  our  eyes 
 were  naturally  intended  to  give  us  the  sight  of  each 
 particular  object  to  which  they  do  or  can  extend; 
 objects  which  are  destructive  of  them,  or  which,  for 
 any  other  reason,  it  may  become  us  to  turn  our  eyes 
 from.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt,  but  that  our  eyes  were 
 intended  for  us  to  see  with.  So  neither  is  there  any 
 doubt,  but  that  the  foreseen  pleasures  and  pains, 
 belonging  to  the  passions,  were  intended,  in  general, 
 to  induce  mankind  to  act  in  such  and  such  manners. 
 
 Now,  from  this  general  observation,  obvious  to 
 every  one,  that  God  has  given  us  to  understand  he 
 has  appointed  satisfaction  and  delight  to  be  the  con- 
 sequence of  our  acting  in  one  manner,  and  pain  and 
 uneasiness  of  our  acting  in  another,  and  of  our  not 
 acting  at  all;  and  that  we  find  the  consequences, 
 which  we  were  beforehand  informed  of,  uniformly  to 
 follow;  we  may  learn,  that  we  are  at  present  actually 
 under  his  government,  in  the  strictest  and  most  pro- 
 per sense ;  in  such  a  sense,  as  that  he  rewards  and 
 punishes  us  for  our  actions.  An  Author  of  Nature 
 being  supposed,  it  is  not  so  much  a  deduction  of 
 reason  as  a  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  thus 
 under  his  government ;  under  his  government,  in  the 
 same  sense  as  we  are  under  the  government  of  civil 
 
213 
 
 magistrates.  Because  the  annexing  pleasure  to  some 
 actions,  and  pain  to  others,  in  our  power  to  do  or 
 forbear,  and  giving  notice  of  this  appointment  be- 
 forehand to  those  whom  it  concerns,  is  the  proper 
 formal  notion  of  government.  Whether  the  plea- 
 sure or  pain  which  thus  follows  upon  our  behaviour, 
 be  owing  to  the  Author  of  Nature  acting  upon  us 
 every  moment  which  we  feel  it,  or  to  his  having  at 
 once  contrived  and  executed  his  own  part  in  the  plan 
 of  the  world,  makes  no  alteration  as  to  the  matter 
 before  us.  For,  if  civil  magistrates  could  make  the 
 sanctions  of  their  laws  take  place,  without  interpos- 
 ing at  all,  after  they  had  passed  them;  without  a 
 trial,  and  the  formalities  of  an  execution:  if  they  were 
 able  to  make  their  laws  execute  themselves,  or  every 
 offender  to  execute  them  upon  himself,  we  should  be 
 just  in  the  same  sense  under  their  government  then, 
 as  we  are  now;  but  in  a  much  higher  degree,  and 
 more  perfect  manner.  Vain  is  the  ridicule  with  which 
 one  sees  some  persons  will  divert  themselves,  upon 
 finding  lesser  pains  considered  as  instances  of  divine 
 punishment.  There  is  no  possibility  of  answering 
 or  evading  the  general  thing  here  intended,  without 
 denying  all  final  causes.  For,  final  causes  being  ad- 
 mitted, the  pleasures  and  pains  now  mentioned  must 
 be  admitted  too,  as  instances  of  them.      And  if  they 
 
 are;  if  Go'd  annexes  delight  to  some  actions  and  mi- 
 tt 
 
 easiness  to  others,  with  an  apparent  design  to  induce 
 us  to  act  so  and  so,  then  he  not  only  dispenses  hap- 
 piness and  misery,  but  also  rewards  and  punishes  ac- 
 tions. If,  for  example,  the  pain  which  we  feel  upon 
 doing  what  tends  to  the  destruction  of  our  bodies, 
 suppose  upon  too  near  approaches  to  fire,  or  upon 
 
214 
 
 wounding  ourselves,  be  appointed  by  the  Author  of 
 Nature  to  prevent  our  doing  what  thus  tends  to  our 
 destruction;  this  is  altogether  as  much  an  instance  of 
 his  punishing  our  actions,  and  consequently  of  our 
 being  under  his  government,  as  declaring,  by  a  voice 
 from  heaven,  that  if  we  acted  so,  he  would  inflict 
 such  pain  upon  us,  and  inflicting  it  whether  it  be 
 greater  or  less. 
 
 Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion  or  conception 
 of  the  Author  of  Nature,  is  that  of  a  master  or  go- 
 vernor, prior  to  the  consideration  of  his  moral  attri- 
 butes. The  fact  of  our  case,  which  we  find  by  ex- 
 perience, is,  that  he  actually  exercises  dominion  or 
 government  over  us  at  present,  by  rewarding  and  pun- 
 ishing us  for  our  actions,  in  as  strict  and  proper  a 
 sense  of  these  words,  and  even  in  the  same  sense  as 
 children,  servants,  subjects,  are  rewarded  and  pun- 
 ished, by  those  who  govern  them. 
 
 And  thus  the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  the  whole 
 
 present  course  of  things,  most  fully  shows,  that  there 
 
 is  nothing  incredible  in  the  general  doctrine  of  reli- 
 cs o 
 
 gion,  that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their 
 actions  hereafter;  nothing  incredible,  I  mean,  arising 
 out  of  the  notion  of  rewarding  and  punishing,  for  the 
 whole  course  of  nature  is  a  present  instance  of  his  ex- 
 ercising that  government  over  us,  which  implies  in  it 
 rewarding  and  punishing. 
 
 But,  as  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly 
 object  against,  and  are  most  unwilling  to  allow,  it 
 may  be  proper  to  mention  some  circumstances  in 
 the  natural  course  of  punishments  at  present,  which 
 
215 
 
 are  analogous  to  what  religion  teaches  us  concerning 
 a  future  state  of  punishment :  indeed,  so  analogous, 
 that  as  they  add  a  farther  credibility  to  it,  so  they 
 cannot  but  raise  a  most  serious  apprehension  of  it  in 
 those  who  will  attend  to  them. 
 
 It  has  been  now  observed,  that  such  and  such 
 miseries  naturally  follow  such  and  such  actions  of 
 imprudence  and  wilfulness,  as  well  as  actions  more 
 commonly  and  more  distinctly  considered  as  vicious ; 
 and  that  these  consequences,  when  they  may  be 
 foreseen,  are  properly  natural  punishments  annexed 
 to  such  actions.  For  the  general  thing  here  insisted 
 upon  is,  not  that  we  see  a  great  deal  of  misery  in  the 
 world,  but  a  great  deal  which  men  bring  upon  them- 
 selves by  their  own  behaviour,  which  they  might 
 have  foreseen  and  avoided.  Now,  the  circumstances 
 of  these  natural  punishments,  particularly  deserving 
 our  attention,  are  such  as  these:  That  oftentimes 
 they  follow,  or  are  inflicted  in  consequence  of  actions 
 which  procure  many  present  advantages,  and  are  ac- 
 companied with  much  present  pleasure ;  for  instance, 
 sickness  and  untimely  death  is  the  consequence  of 
 intemperance,  though  accompanied  with  the  highest 
 mirth  and  jollity:  That  these  punishments  are  often 
 much  greater  than  the  advantages  or  pleasures  ob- 
 tained by  the  actions,  of  which  they  are  the  punish- 
 ments or  consequences:  That  though  we  may  ima- 
 gine a  constitution  of  nature,  in  which  these  natural 
 punishments,  which  are  in  fact  to  follow,  would 
 follow  immediately  upon  such  actions  being  done,  or 
 very  soon  after;  we  find,  on  the  contrary,  in  our 
 world,  that  they  are  often  delayed  a  great  while, 
 sometimes  even  till  long  after  the  actions  occasioning 
 
216 
 
 them  are  forgot;  so  that  the  constitution  of  nature 
 is  such,  that  delay  of  punishment  is  no  sort  nor  de- 
 gree of  presumption  of  final  impunity :  That,  after 
 such  delay,  these  natural  punishments  or  miseries 
 often  come,  not  by  degrees,  but  suddenly,  with  vio- 
 lence, and  at  once — however,  the  chief  misery  often 
 does :  That  as  certainty  of  such  distant  misery  follow- 
 ing such  actions  is  never  afforded  persons,  so,  per- 
 haps, during  the  actions,  they  have  seldom  a  distinct 
 full  expectation  of  its  following:*  and  many  times 
 the  case  is  only  thus,  that  they  see  in  general,  or 
 may  see,  the  credibility,  that  intemperance,  suppose, 
 will  bring  after  it  diseases;  civil  crimes,  civil  punish- 
 ments ;  when  yet  the  real  probability  often  is,  that 
 they  shall  escape :  but  things  notwithstanding  take 
 their  destined  course,  and  the  misery  inevitably  fol- 
 lows at  its  appointed  time,  in  very  many  of  these 
 cases.  Thus,  also,  though  youth  may  be  alleged 
 as  an  excuse  for  rashness  and  folly,  as  being  natu- 
 rally thoughtless,  and  not  clearly  foreseeing  all  the 
 consequences  of  being  untractable  and  profligate ; 
 this  does  not  hinder  but  that  these  consequences  fol- 
 low, and  are  grievously  felt,  throughout  the  whole 
 course  of  mature  life.  Habits  contracted,  even  in 
 that  age,  are  often  utter  ruin:  and  men's  success  in 
 the  world,  not  only  in  the  common  sense  of  worldly 
 success,  but  their  real  happiness  and  misery,  depends 
 in  a  great  degree,  and  in  various  ways,  upon  the 
 manner  in  which  they  pass  their  youth ;  which  con- 
 sequences they,  for  the  most  part,  neglect  to  con- 
 sider, and  perhaps  seldom  can  properly  be  said  to 
 
 *  See  Part  ii.  chap.  6. 
 
•217 
 
 believe  beforehand.  It  requires  also  to  be  mentioned, 
 that,  in  numberless  cases,  the  natural  course  of  things 
 affords  us  opportunities  for  procuring  advantages  to 
 ourselves  at  certain  times,  which  we  cannot  procure 
 when  we  will ;  nor  ever  recal  the  opportunities,  if  we 
 have  neglected  them.  Indeed,  the  o-eneral  course 
 of  nature  is  an  example  of  this.  If,  during  the  op- 
 portunity of  youth,  persons  are  indocile  and  self- 
 willed,  they  inevitably  suffer  in  their  future  life,  for 
 want  of  those  acquirements  which  they  neglected  the 
 natural  season  of  attaining.  If  the  husbandman  lets 
 his  seed-time  pass  without  sowing,  the  whole  year  is 
 lost  to  him  beyond  recovery.  In  like  manner, 
 though  after  men  have  been  guilty  of  folly  and  ex- 
 travagance, up  to  a  certain  degree,  it  is  often  in 
 their  power,  for  instance,  to  retrieve  their  aftairs,  to 
 recover  their  health  and  character,  at  least  in  wood 
 measure ;  yet  real  reformation  is,  in  many  cases,  of 
 no  avail  at  all  towards  preventing  the  miseries,  po- 
 verty, sickness,  infamy,  naturally  annexed  to  foils 
 and  extravagance,  exceeding  that  degree.  There  is 
 a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  misbehaviour, 
 which  being  transgressed,  there  remains  no  place  for 
 repentance  in  the  natural  course  of  things.  It  is, 
 further,  very  much  to  be  remarked,  that  neglects 
 from  inconsiderateness,  want  of  attention,*  not  look- 
 ing about  us  to  see  what  we  have  to  do,  are  often 
 attended  with  consequences  altogether  as  dreadful  as 
 any  active  misbehaviour,  from  the  most  extravagant 
 passion.  And,  lastly,  civil  government  being  natu- 
 ral, the  punishments  of  it  are  so  too;  and  some  of 
 
 Part  ii.  chap.  6. 
 
 K  17 
 
218 
 
 these  punishments  are  capital,  as  the  effects  of  a  dis- 
 solute course  of  pleasure  are  often  mortal.  So  that 
 many  natural  punishments  are  final*  to  him  who  in- 
 curs them,  if  considered  only  in  his  temporal  capa- 
 city; and  seem  inflicted  by  natural  appointment, 
 either  to  remove  the  offender  out  of  the  way  of  being 
 further  mischievous,  or  as  an  example,  though  fre- 
 quently a  disregarded  one,  to  those  who  are  left  be- 
 hind. 
 
 These  things  are  not  what  we  call  accidental,  or 
 to  be  met  with  only  now  and  then;  but  they  are 
 tilings  of  every  day's  experience ;  they  proceed  from 
 general  laws,  very  general  ones,  by  which  God  go- 
 verns the  world,  in  the  natural  course  of  his  provi- 
 dence. And  they  are  so  analogous  to  what  religion 
 teaches  us  concerning  the  future  punishment  of  the 
 
 *  The  general  consideration  of  a  future  state  of  punishment 
 must  evidently  belongs  to  the  subject  of  natural  religion.  But  if 
 any  of  these  reflections  should  be  thought  to  relate  more  pecu- 
 liarly to  this  doctrine  as  taught  in  Scripture;  the  reader  is  de- 
 sired to  observe,  that  Gentile  writers,  both  moralists  and  poets, 
 speak  of  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  both  as  to  the 
 duration  and  degree  of  it,  in  a  like  manner  of  expression  and  of 
 description,  as  the  Scripture  does.  So  that  all  which  can  posi- 
 tively be  asserted  to  be  matter  of  mere  revelation,  with  regard  to 
 this  doctrine,  seems  to  be,  that  the  great  distinction  between  the 
 righteous  and  the  wicked,  shall  be  made  at  the  end  of  this  world  ; 
 that  each  Khali  then  receive  according  to  his  deserts.  Reason  did, 
 as  it  well  might,  conclude  that  it  should,  finally  and  upon  the 
 whole,  be  well  with  the  righteous,  and  ill  with  the  wicked  :  but 
 it  could  not  be  determined,  upon  any  principles  of  reason, 
 whether  human  creatures  might  not  have  been  appointed  to  pass 
 through  other  states  of  life  and  being,  before  that  distributive 
 justice  should,  finally  and  effectually,  take  place.  Revelation 
 teaches  us,  that  the  next  state  of  things  after  the  present,  is  ap- 
 pointed for  the  execution  of  this  justice  ;  that  it  shall  be  no  longer 
 delayed  :  but  the  mystery  of  God,  the  great  mystery  of  his  suffer- 
 ing vice  and  confusion  to  prevail,  shall  the)?  be  finished ;  and  he 
 will  lake,  to  him  his  great  power  and  will  reign,  by  rendering  to 
 every  one  according  to  his  works. 
 
219 
 
 wicked,  so  much  of  a  piece  with  it,  that  both  would 
 naturally  be  expressed  in  the  very  same  words  and 
 manner  of  description.  In  the  book  of  Proverbs, 
 for  instance,  Wisdom  is  introduced  as  frequenting 
 the  most  public  places  of  resort,  and  as  rejected  when 
 she  offers  herself  as  the  natural  appointed  guide  of 
 human  life.  "  How  long,"  speaking  to  those  who 
 are  passing  through  it,  "  how  long,  ye  simple  ones, 
 will  ye  love  folly,  and  the  scorners  delight  in  their 
 scorning,  and  fools  hate  knowledge?  Turn  ye 
 at  my  reproof.  Behold  I  will  pour  out  my  Spirit 
 upon  you,  I  will  make  known  my  words  unto  you." 
 But  upon  being  neglected,  "  Because  I  have  called, 
 and  ye  refused,  I  have  stretched  out  my  hand,  and 
 no  man  regarded ;  but  ye  have  set  at  nought  all  my 
 counsel,  and  would  none  of  my  reproof:  I  also  will 
 laugh  at  your  calamity,  I  will  mock  when  your  fear 
 cometh ;  when  your  fear  cometh  as  a  desolation,  and 
 your  destruction  cometh  as  a  whirlwind ;  when  dis- 
 tress and  anguish  cometh  upon  you.  Then  shall 
 they  call  upon  me,  but  I  will  not  answer ;  they  shall 
 seek  me  early,  but  they  shall  not  find  me."  This 
 passage,  every  one  sees,  is  poetical,  and  some  parts 
 of  it  are  highly  figurative; -but  their  meaning  is  ob- 
 vious. And  the  thing  intended  is  expressed  more 
 literally  in  the  following  words:  "  For  that  they 
 hated  knowledge,  and  did  not  choose  the  fear  of  the 
 Lord;  therefore  shall  they  eat  of  the  fruit  of  their 
 own  way,  and  be  filled  with  their  own  devices.  For 
 the  security  of  the  simple  shall  slay  them,  and  the 
 prosperity  of  fools  shall  destroy  them."  And  the 
 whole  passage  is  so  equally  applicable  to  what  we  ex- 
 perience in  the  present  world,  concerning  the  conse- 
 k2 
 
220 
 
 quences  of  men's  actions,  and  to  what  religion  teaches 
 us  is  to  be  expected  in  another,  that  it  may  be  ques- 
 tioned which  of  the  two  was  principally  intended. 
 
 Indeed,  when  one  has  been  recollecting  the  proper 
 proofs  of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
 nothing,  methinks,  can  give  one  so  sensible  an  ap- 
 prehension of  the  latter,  or  representation  of  it  to 
 the  mind,  as  observing,  that  after  the  many  disre- 
 garded checks,  admonitions,  and  warnings,  which 
 people  meet  with  in  the  ways  of  vice,  and  folly,  and 
 extravagance ;  warnings  from  their  very  nature ;  from 
 the  examples  of  others;  from  the  lesser  inconve- 
 niences which  they  bring  upon  themselves;  from  the 
 instructions  of  wise  and  virtuous  men :  after  these 
 have  been  long  despised,  scorned,  ridiculed;  after  the 
 chief  bad  consequences,  temporal  consequences,  of 
 their  follies,  have  been  delayed  for  a  great  while ;  at 
 length  they  break  in  irresistibly,  like  an  armed  force; 
 repentance  is  too  late  to  relieve,  and  can  serve  only 
 to  aggravate  their  distress :  the  case  is  become  des- 
 
 iDCI 
 
 perate ;  and  poverty  and  sickness,  remorse  and  an- 
 guish, infamy  and  death,  the  effects  of  their  own 
 doings,  overwhelm  them,  beyond  possibility  of  re- 
 medy or  escape.  This  is  an  account  of  what  is  in 
 ikct  the  general  constitution  of  nature. 
 
 It  is  not  in  any  sort  meant,  that  according  to  what 
 appears  at  present  of  the  natural  course  of  things, 
 men  are  always  uniformly  punished  in  proportion  to 
 their  misbehaviour;  but  that  there  are  very  many 
 instances  of  misbehaviour  punished  in  the  several 
 ways  now  mentioned,  and  very  dreadful  instances  too, 
 sufficient  to  show  what  the  laws  of  the  universe  may 
 admit ;  and  if  thoroughly  considered,  sufficient  fully 
 
221 
 
 to  answer  all  objections  against  the  credibility  of  a 
 future  state  of  punishments,  from  any  imaginations, 
 that  the  frailty  of  our  nature  and  external  temptations 
 almost  annihilate  the  guilt  of  human  vices :  as  well  as 
 objections  of  another  sort;  from  necessity;  from  sup- 
 positions that  the  will  of  an  infinite  Being  cannot  be 
 contradicted ;  or  that  he  mnst  be  incapable  of  offence 
 and  provocation.* 
 
 Reflections  of  this  kind  are  not  without  their  ter- 
 rors to  serious  persons,  the  most  free  from  enthusiasm, 
 and  of  the  greatest  strength  of  mind ;  but  it  is  fit 
 things  be  stated  and  considered  as  they  really  are. 
 And  there  is,  in  the  present  age,  a  certain  fearless- 
 ness with  regard  to  what  may  be  hereafter  under  the 
 government  of  God,  which  nothing  but  an  univer- 
 sally acknowledged  demonstration  on  the  side  of 
 atheism  can  justify,  and  which  makes  it  quite  neces- 
 sary that  man  be  reminded,  and,  if  possible,  made  to 
 feel,  that  there  is  no  sort  of  ground  for  being  thus 
 presumptuous,  even  upon  the  most  sceptical  princi- 
 ples. For,  may  it  not  be  said  of  any  person,  upon 
 his  being  born  into  the  world,  he  may  behave  so  as 
 to  be  of  no  service  to  it,  but  by  being  made  an  ex- 
 ample of  the  woeful  effects  of  vice  and  folly:  that  he 
 may,  as  any  one  may,  if  he  will,  incur  an  infamous 
 execution  from  the  hands  of  civil  justice;  or  in  some 
 other  course  of  extravagance  shorten  his  days:  or 
 bring  upon  himself  infamy  and  diseases  worse  th.au 
 death  ?  So  that  it  had  been  better  for  him,  even 
 with  regard  to  the  present  world,  that  he  had  never 
 been  born.    And  is  there  any  pretence  of  reason  for 
 
 *  See  Chap,  iv  and  vi. 
 
222 
 
 people  to  think  themselves  secure,  and  talk  as  if  they 
 had  certain  proof,  that  let  them  act  as  licentiously  as 
 they  will,  there  can  be  nothing  analogous  to  this, 
 with  regard  to  a  future  and  more  general  interest, 
 under  the  providence  and  government  of  the  same 
 God? 
 
223 
 
 CHAR  III. 
 Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God. 
 
 As  the  manifold  appearances  of  design,  and  of 
 final  causes,  in  the  constitution  of  the  world,  prove 
 it  to  be  the  work  of  an  intelligent  Mind,  so  the 
 particular  final  causes  of  pleasure  and  pain,  distri- 
 buted amongst  his  creatures,  prove  that  they  are 
 under  his  government — what  may  be  called,  his  na- 
 tural government  of  creatures  endued  with  sense 
 and  reason.  This,  however,  implies  somewhat  more 
 than  seems  usually  attended  to,  when  we  speak  of 
 God's  natural  government  of  the  world.  It  implies 
 government  of  the  very  same  kind  with  that  which 
 a  master  exercises  over  his  servants,  or  a  civil  ma- 
 gistrate over  his  subjects.  These  latter  instances 
 of  final  causes  as  really  prove  an  intelligent  Go- 
 vernor of  the  world,  in  the  sense  now  mentioned, 
 and  before*  distinctly  treated  of,  as  any  other  in- 
 stances of  final  causes  prove  an  intelligent  Maker 
 of  it. 
 
 But  this  alone  does  not  appear,  at  first  sight,  to 
 determine  any  thing  certainly,  concerning  the  moral 
 character  of  the  Author  of  Nature,  considered  in 
 this  relation  of  governor;  does  not  ascertain  his  go- 
 vernment to  be  moral,  or  prove  that  he  is  the  right- 
 eous Judge  of  the  world.  Moral  government  con- 
 sists, not  barely  in  rewarding  and  punishing  men 
 
 *  Chap.  2. 
 
224 
 
 for  their  actions,  which  the  most  tyrannical  person 
 may  do ;  but  in  rewarding  the  righteous,  and  pun- 
 ishing the  wicked;  in  rendering  to  men  according 
 to  their  actions,  considered  as  good  or  evil.  And 
 the  perfection  of  moral  government  consists  in  do- 
 ing this,  with  regard  to  all  intelligent  creatures,  in 
 an  exact  proportion  to  their  personal  merits  or  de- 
 merits. 
 
 Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  character  of 
 the  Author  of  Nature  to  be  that  of  simple  absolute 
 benevolence.  This,  considered  as  a  principle  of 
 action,  and  infinite  in  degree,  is  a  disposition  to 
 produce  the  greatest  possible  happiness,  without  re- 
 gard to  persons'  behaviour,  otherwise  than  as  such 
 regard  would  produce  higher  degrees  of  it.  And 
 supposing  this  to  be  the  only  character  of  God,  ve- 
 racity and  justice  in  him  would  be  nothing  but  be- 
 nevolence conducted  by  wTisdom.  Now,  surely  this 
 ought  not  to  be  asserted,  unless  it  can  be  proved; 
 for  we  should  speak  with  cautious  reverence  upon 
 such  a  subject.  And  whether  it  can  be  proved  or 
 not,  is  not  the  thing  here  to  be  inquired  into ;  but 
 whether,  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of  the 
 world,  a  righteous  government  be  not  discernibly 
 planned  out ;  which  necessarily  implies  a  righteous 
 governor.  There  may  possibly  be  in  the  creation, 
 beings  to  whom  the  Author  of  Nature  manifests 
 himself  under  this  most  amiable  of  all.  characters, 
 this  of  infinite  absolute  benevolence;  for  it  is  the 
 most  amiable,  supposing  it  not,  as  perhaps  it  is  not, 
 incompatible  with  justice :  but  he  manifests  himself 
 to  us  under  the  character  of  a  righteous  governor. 
 He  may,  consistently  with  this,  be  simply  and  ab- 
 
225 
 
 'solutely  benevolent,  in  the  sense  now  explained; 
 but  he  is,  for  he  has  given  us  a  proof  in  the  consti- 
 tution and  conduct  of  the  world,  that  he  is  a  gover- 
 nor over  servants,  as  he  rewards  and  punishes  us 
 for  our  actions.  And  in  the  constitution  and  con- 
 duct of  it,  he  may  also  have  given,  besides  the  rea- 
 son of  the  thing,  and  the  natural  presages  of  con- 
 science, clear  and  distinct  intimations  that  his  go- 
 vernment is  righteous  or  moral — clear  to  such  as 
 think  the  nature  of  it  deserving  their  attention;  and 
 yet  not  to  every  careless  person  who  casts  a  transient 
 reflection  upon  the  subject.* 
 
 But  it  is  particularly  to  be  observed,  that  the 
 divine  government,  which  we  experience  ourselves 
 under  in  the  present  state,  taken  alone,  is  allowed 
 not  to  be  the  perfection  of  moral  government.  And 
 yet  this  by  no  means  hinders,  but  that  there  may 
 be  somewhat,  be  it  more  or  less,  truly  moral  in  it. 
 A  righteous  government  may  plainly  appear  to  be 
 carried  on  to  some  degree;  enough  to  give  us  the 
 apprehension  that  it  shall  be  completed,  or  carried 
 on  to  that  degree  of  perfection  which  religion  teaches 
 us  it  shall ;  but  which  cannot  appear,  till  much  more 
 of  the  divine  administration  be  seen,  than  can  in  the 
 
 *  The  objections  against  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it  not 
 being  universal,  nor  so  strong  as  might  possibly  have  been,, 
 may  be  urged  against  natural  religion,  as  well  as  against  reveal- 
 ed. And  therefore  the  consideration  of  them  belongs  to  the 
 first  part  of  this  Treatise,  as  well  as  the  second.  But  as  these 
 objections  are  chiefly  urged  against  revealed  religion,  I  chose  to 
 consider  them  in  the  second  Part.  And  the  answer  to  them 
 there,  chap.  vi.  as  urged  against  Christianity,  being  almost 
 equally  applicable  to  them  as  urged  against  the  Religion  of 
 Nature,  to  avoid  repetition,  the  reader  is  referred  to  that 
 chapter. 
 
 k3 
 
226 
 
 present  life.  And  the  design  of  this  chapter  is  to 
 inquire,  how  far  this  is  the  case ;  how  far,  over  and 
 above  the  moral  nature*  which  God  has  given  us, 
 and  our  natural  notion  of  him,  as  righteous  gover- 
 nor of  those  his  creatures  to  whom  he  has  given  this 
 nature  ;f  I  say  how  far,  besides  this,  the  principles 
 and  beginnings  of  a  moral  government  over  the  world 
 may  be  discerned,  notwithstanding  and  amidst  all 
 the  confusion  and  disorder  of  it. 
 
 Now,  one  might  mention  here,  what  has  been 
 often  urged  with  great  force,  that,  in  general,  less 
 uneasiness,  and  more  satisfaction,  are  the  natural 
 consequences^:  of  a  virtuous  than  of  a  vicious  course 
 of  life,  in  the  present  state,  as  an  instance  of  a 
 moral  government  established  in  nature;  an  instance 
 of  it,  collected  from  experience  and  present  matter 
 of  fact.  But  it  must  be  owned  a  thing  of  difficulty 
 to  weigh  and  balance  pleasures  and  uneasiness,  each 
 amongst  themselves,  and  also  against  each  other,  so 
 as  to  make  an  estimate  with  any  exactness,  of  the 
 overplus  of  happiness  on  the  side  of  virtue.  And 
 it  is  not  impossible,  that,  amidst  the  infinite  disor- 
 ders of  the  world,  there  may  be  exceptions  to  the 
 happiness  of  virtue,  even  with  regard  to  those  per- 
 sons, whose  course  of  life,  from  their  youth  up,  has 
 been  blameless ;  and  more  with  regard  to  those  who 
 have  gone  on  for  some  time  in  the  ways  of  vice,  and 
 have  afterwards  reformed.  For  suppose  an  instance 
 of  the  latter  case;  a  person  with  his  passions  in- 
 flamed, his  natural  faculty  of  self-government  im- 
 
 Dissertation  2.  f  Chap.  6. 
 
 See  Lord  Shaftesbury's  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue,  Fart 
 
227 
 
 paired  by  habits  of  indulgence,  and  with  all  his 
 vices  about  him,  like  so  many  harpies,  craving  for 
 their  accustomed  gratification, — who  can  say,  how 
 long  it  might  be  before  such  a  person  would  find 
 more  satisfaction  in  the  reasonableness  and  present 
 good  consequences  of  virtue,  than  difficulties  and 
 self-denial  in  the  restraints  of  it  ?  Experience  also 
 shows,  that  men  can,  to  a  great  degree,  get  over 
 their  sense  of  shame,  so  as  that,  by  professing  them- 
 selves to  be  without  principle,  and  avowing  even 
 direct  villainy,  they  can  support  themselves  against 
 the  infamy  of  it.  But  as  the  ill  actions  of  any  one 
 will  probably  be  more  talked  of,  and  oftener  thrown 
 in  his  way,  upon  his  reformation ;  so  the  infamy  of 
 them  will  be  much  more  felt,  after  the  natural  sense 
 of  virtue  and  of  honour  is  recovered.  Uneasiness 
 of  this  kind  ought  hideed  to  be  put  to  the  account 
 of  former  vices ;  yet  it  will  be  said,  they  are  in  part 
 the  consequences  of  reformation.  Still  I  am  far 
 from  allowing  it  doubtful,  whether  virtue,  upon  the 
 whole,  be  happier  than  vice  in  the  present  world : 
 but  if  it  were,  yet  the  beginnings  of  a  righteous 
 administration  may,  beyond  all  question,  be  found 
 in  nature,  if  we  will  attentively  inquire  after  them. 
 And, 
 
 I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's  mo- 
 ral government  over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if 
 it  did  not  appear  whether  he  were,  in  a  proper  sense, 
 our  governor  at  all ;  yet  when  it  is  certain  matter  of 
 experience,  that  he  does  manifest  himself  to  us  un- 
 der the  character  of  a  governor,  in  the  sense  ex- 
 plained,* it  must  deserve  to  be  considered,  whether 
 
 *  Chap.  2. 
 
228 
 
 there  be  not  reason  to  apprehend,  that  he  may  be 
 a  righteous  or  moral  governor.  Since  it  appears  to 
 be  fact,  that  God  does  govern  mankind  by  the  me- 
 thod of  rewards  and  punishments,  according  to  some 
 settled  rules  of  distribution,  it  is  surely  a  question 
 to  be  asked,  What  presumption  is  there  against  his 
 finally  rewarding  and  punishing  them  according  to 
 this  particular  rule,  namely,  as  they  act  reasonably 
 or  unreasonably,  virtuously  or  viciously?  since  ren- 
 dering man  happy  or  miserable  by  this  rule,  certain- 
 ly falls  in,  much  more  falls  in,  with  our  natural  ap- 
 prehensions and  sense  of  things,  than  doing  so  by 
 any  other  rule  whatever;  since  rewarding  and  pun- 
 ishing actions  by  any  other  rule  would  appear  much 
 harder  to  be  accounted  for  by  minds  formed  as  he 
 has  formed  ours.  Be  the  evidence  of  religion,  then, 
 more  or  less  clear,  the  expectation  which  it  raises 
 in  us,  that  the  righteous  shall,  upon  the  whole,  be 
 happy,  and  the  wicked  miserable,  cannot,  however, 
 possibly  be  considered  as  absurd  or  chimerical;  be- 
 cause it  is  no  more  than  an  expectation,  that  a  me- 
 thod of  government,  already  begun,  shall  be  car- 
 ried on,  the  method  of  rewarding  and  punishing  ac- 
 tions ;  and  shall  be  carried  on  by  a  particular  rule, 
 which  unavoidably  appears  to  us,  at  first  sight,  more 
 natural  than  any  other,  the  rule  which  we  call  dis- 
 tributive justice.      Nor, 
 
 II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  passed  over,  that  tran- 
 quillity, satisfaction,  and  external  advantages,  being 
 the  natural  consequences  of  prudent  management  of 
 ourselves  and  our  affairs;  and  rashness,  profligate 
 negligence,  and  wilful  folly,  bringing  after  them  many 
 inconveniences  and  sufferings ;  these  afford  instances 
 
229 
 
 of  a  right  constitution  of  nature :  as  the  correction 
 of  children,  for  their  own  sakes,  and  by  way  of 
 example,  when  they  run  into  danger  or  hurt  them- 
 selves, is  a  part  of  right  education.  And  thus,  that 
 God  governs  the  world  by  general  fixed  laws ;  that 
 he  has  endued  us  with  capacities  of  reflecting  upon 
 this  constitution  of  things,  and  foreseeing  the  good 
 and  bad  consequences  of  our  behaviour,  plainly  im- 
 plies some  sort  of  moral  government :  since  from 
 such  a  constitution  of  things,  it  cannot  but  follow, 
 that  prudence  and  imprudence,  which  are  of  the  na- 
 ture of  virtue  and  vice,*  must  be,  as  they  are,  re- 
 spectively rewarded  and  punished. 
 
 III.  From  the  natural  course  of  things,  vicious 
 actions  are,  to  a  great  degree,  actually  punished  as 
 mischievous  to  society;  and  besides  punishment 
 actually  inflicted  upon  this  account,  there  is  also  the 
 fear  and  apprehension  of  it  in  those  persons  whose 
 crimes  have  rendered  them  obnoxious  to  it,  in  case 
 of  a  discovery;  this  state  of  fear  being  itself  often  a 
 very  considerable  punishment.  The  natural  fear 
 and  apprehension  of  it  too,  which  restrains  from  such 
 crimes,  is  a  declaration  of  nature  against  them.  It 
 is  necessary  to  the  very  being  of  society,  that  vices 
 destructive  of  it  should  be  punished  as  being  so;  the 
 vices  of  falsehood,  injustice,  cruelty:  which  punish- 
 ment, therefore,  is  as  natural  as  society,  and  so  is 
 an  instance  of  a  kind  of  moral  government,  naturally 
 established,  and  actually  taking  place.  And,  since 
 the  certain  natural  course  of  things  is  the  conduct  of 
 providence,  or  the  government  of  God,  though  carried 
 
 *  See  Dissertation  II. 
 
230 
 
 Dii  by  the  instrumentality  of  men,  the  observation 
 here  made  amounts  to  this,  that  mankind  find  them- 
 selves placed  by  him  in  such  circumstances,  as  that 
 they  are  unavoidably  accountable  for  their  behaviour, 
 and  are  often  punished,  and  sometimes  rewarded, 
 under  his  government,  in  the  view  of  their  being 
 mischievous  or  eminently  beneficial  to  society. 
 
 If  it  be  objected,  that  good  actions,  and  such  as 
 are  beneficial  to  society,  are  often  punished,  as  in 
 the  case  of  persecution,  and  in  other  cases,  and  that 
 ill  and  mischievous  actions  are  often  rewarded;  it 
 may  be  answered  distinctly,  first,  that  this  is  in  no 
 sort  necessary,  and  consequently  not  natural,  in  the 
 sense  in  which  it  is  necessary,  and  therefore  natural, 
 that  ill  or  mischievous  actions  should  be  punished; 
 and,  in  the  next  place,  that  good  actions  are  never 
 punished,  considered  as  beneficial  to  society,  nor  ill 
 actions  rewarded,  under  the  view  of  their  being  hurt- 
 ful to  it.  So  that  it  stands  good,  without  any  thing 
 on  the  side  of  vice  to  be  set  over  against  it,  that  the 
 Author  of  Nature  has  as  truly  directed  that  vicious 
 actions,  considered  as  mischievous  to  society,  should 
 be  punished,  and  put  mankind  under  a'  necessity  of 
 thus  punishing  them,  as  he  has  directed  and  neces- 
 sitated us  to  preserve  our  lives  by  food. 
 
 IV.  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  virtue,  as 
 such,  is  actually  rewarded,  and  vice,  as  such,  punished; 
 which  seems  to  afford  an  instance,  or  example,  not 
 only  of  government,  but  of  moral  government  begun 
 and  established;  moral  in  the  strictest  sense,  though 
 not  in  that  perfection  of  degree  which  religion  teaches 
 us  to  expect.  In  order  to  see  this  more  clearly,  we 
 must  distinguish  between  actions  themselves,   and 
 
231 
 
 that  quality  ascribed  to  them,  which  we  call  virtuous 
 or  vicious.  The  gratification  itself  of  every  natural 
 passion  must  be  attended  with  delight ;  and  acquisi- 
 tions of  fortune,  however  made,  are  acquisitions  of  the 
 means  or  materials  of  enjoyment.  An  action,  then, 
 by  which  any  natural  passion  is  gratified,  or  fortune 
 acquired,  procures  delight  or  advantage,  abstracted 
 from  all  consideration  of  the  morality  of  such  action. 
 Consequently,  the  pleasure  or  advantage  in  this  case, 
 is  gained  by  the  action  itself,  not  by  the  morality, 
 the  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  it,  though  it  be, 
 perhaps,  virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus,  to  say  such  an 
 action  or  course  of  behaviour,  procured  such  pleasure 
 or  advantage,  or  brought  on  such  inconvenience  and 
 pain,  is  quite  a  different  thing  from  saying  that  sucli 
 good  or  bad  effect  was  owing  to  the  virtue  or  vice  of 
 such  action  or  behaviour.  In  one  case,  an  action, 
 abstracted  from  all  moral  consideration,  produced  its 
 effect ;  in  the  other  case,  for  it  will  appear  that  there 
 are  such  cases,  the  morality  of  the  action,  the  action 
 under  a  moral  consideration,  that  is,  the  virtuousness 
 or  viciousness  of  it,  produced  the  effect.  Now,  I 
 say,  virtue,  as  such,  naturally  procures  considerable 
 advantages  to  the  virtuous ;  and  vice,  as  such,  natu- 
 rally occasions  great  inconvenience,  and  even  misery, 
 to  the  vicious,  in  very  many  instances.  The  imme- 
 diate effects  of  virtue  and  vice  upon  the  mind  and 
 temper,  are  to  be  mentioned  as  instances  of  it.  Vice, 
 as  such,  is  naturally  attended  with  some  sort  of  un- 
 easiness, and  not  uncommonly  with  great  disturbance 
 and  apprehension.  That  inward  feeling,  which,  re- 
 specting lesser  matters  and  in  familiar  speech,  we  call 
 being  vexed  with  one's  self,  and  in  matters  of  ini- 
 
232 
 
 portance,  and  in  more  serious  language,  remorse,  is 
 an  uneasiness  naturally  arising  from  an  action  of  a 
 man's  own,  reflected  upon  by  himself  as  wrong,  un- 
 reasonable, faulty,  that  is,  vicious  in  greater  or  less 
 degrees ;  and  this  manifestly  is  a  different  feeling 
 from  that  uneasiness  which  arises  from  a  sense  of 
 mere  loss  or  harm.  What  is  more  common  than  to 
 hear  a  man  lamenting  an  accident  or  event,  and  add- 
 ing— But,  however,  he  has  the  satisfaction  that  he 
 cannot  blame  himself  for  it ;  or,  on  the  contrary,  that 
 he  has  the  uneasiness  of  being  sensible  it  was  his 
 own  doing?  Thus  also,  the  disturbance  and  fear 
 which  often  follow  upon  a  man's  having  done  an  in- 
 jury, arise  from  a  sense  of  his  being  blame-worthy; 
 otherwise  there  would,  in  many  cases,  be  no  ground 
 of  disturbance,  nor  any  reason  to  fear  resentment  or 
 shame.  On  the  other  hand,  inward  security  and 
 peace,  and  a  mind  open  to  the  several  gratifications 
 of  life,  are  the  natural  attendants  of  innocence  and 
 virtue ;  to  which  must  be  added,  the  complacency, 
 satisfaction,  and  even  joy  of  heart,  which  accompany 
 the  exercise,  the  real  exercise  of  gratitude,  friend- 
 ship, benevolence. 
 
 And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned,  the 
 fears  of  future  punishment,  and  peaceful  hopes  of  a 
 better  life,  in  those  who  fully  believe  or  have  any 
 serious  apprehension  of  religion;  because  these  hopes 
 and  fears  are  present  uneasiness  and  satisfaction  to 
 the  mind,  and  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by  great  part  of 
 ihe  world,  even  by  men  who  have  thought  most 
 thoroughly  upon  that  subject  of  religion.  And  no 
 one  can  say  how  considerable  this  uneasiness  and 
 satisfaction  may  be,  or  what,  upon  the  whole,  it  may 
 amount  to. 
 
233 
 
 In  the  next  place  comes  in  the  consideration,  that 
 all  honest  and  good  men  are  disposed  to  befriend  ho- 
 nest and  good  men,  as  such,  and  to  discountenance 
 the  vicious,  as  such,  and  do  so  in  some  degree,  in- 
 deed, in  a  considerable  degree;  from  which  favour 
 and  discouragement  cannot  but  arise  considerable 
 advantage  and  inconvenience.  And  though  the 
 generality  of  the  world  have  little  regard  to  the  mo- 
 rality of  their  own  actions,  and  may  be  supposed  to 
 have  less  to  that  of  others,  when  they  themselves 
 are  not  concerned;  yet,  let  any  one  be  known  to  be 
 a  man  of  virtue,  somehow  or  other  he  will  be  fa- 
 voured, and  good  offices  will  be  done  him  from  regard 
 to  his  character,  without  remote  views,  occasionally, 
 and  in  some  low  degree,  I  think,  by  the  generality 
 of  the  world,  as  it  happens  to  come  in  their  way. 
 Public  honours,  too,  and  advantages,  are  the  natural 
 consequences,  are  sometimes  at  least  the  conse- 
 quences in  fact,  of  virtuous  actions,  of  eminent  jus- 
 tice, fidelity,  charity,  love  to  our  country,  considered 
 iii  the  view  of  being  virtuous.  And  sometimes  even 
 death  itself,  often  infamy  and  external  inconveniences, 
 are  the  public  consequences  of  vice,  as  vice.  For 
 instance,  the  sense  which  mankind  have  of  tyranny, 
 injustice,  oppression,  additional  to  the  mere  feeling 
 or  fear  of  misery,  has  doubtless  been  instrumental  in 
 bringing  about  revolutions,  which  make  a  figure  even 
 in  the  history  of  the  world.  For  it  is  plain,  men 
 resent  injuries  as  implying  faultiness,  and  retaliate, 
 not  merely  under  the  notion  of  having  received  harm, 
 but  of  having  received  wrong;  and  they  have  this 
 resentment  in  behalf  of  others,  as  well  as  of  them- 
 selves.      So,  likewise,   even  the  generality  are,  in 
 
234 
 
 some  degree,  grateful  and  disposed  to  return  good 
 offices,  not  merely  because  such  a  one  has  been  the 
 occasion  of  good  to  them,  but  under  the  view  that 
 such  good  offices  implied  kind  intention  and  good 
 desert  in  the  doer.  To  all  this  may  be  added  two 
 or  three  particular  things,  which  many  persons  will 
 think  frivolous :  but  to  me  nothing  appears  so,  which 
 at  all  comes  in  towards  determining  a  question  of 
 such  importance,  as  whether  there  be  or  be  not  a 
 moral  institution  of  government,  in  the  strictest  sense 
 moral,  visibly  established  and  begun  in  nature.  The 
 particular  things  are  these :  that,  in  domestic  govern- 
 ment, which  is  doubtless  natural,  children,  and  others 
 also,  are  very  generally  punished  for  falsehood,  and 
 injustice,  and  ill  behaviour,  as  such,  and  rewarded 
 for  the  contrary;  which  are  instances  where  veracity, 
 and  justice,  and  right  behaviour,  as  such,  are  natu- 
 rally enforced  by  rewards  and  punishments,  whether 
 more  or  less  considerable  in  degree :  that  though 
 civil  government  be  supposed  to  take  cognizance  of 
 actions  in  no  other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to  socie- 
 ty, without  respect  to  the  immorality  of  them,  yet 
 as  such  actions  are  immoral,  so  the  sense  which  men 
 have  of  the  immorality  of  them  very  greatly  contri- 
 butes, in  different  ways,  to  bring  offenders  to  justice; 
 and  that  entire  absence  of  all  crime  and  guilt,  in  the 
 moral  sense,  when  plainly  appearing,  will  almost  of 
 course  procure,  and  circumstances  of  aggravated  guilt 
 prevent,  a  remission  of  the  penalties  annexed  to  civil 
 crimes,  in  many  cases,  though  by  no  means  in  all. 
 
 Upon  the  whole,  then,  besides  the  good  and  bad 
 effects  of  virtue  and  vice  upon  men's  own  minds,  the 
 course  of  the  world  does,  in  some  measure,  turn  upon 
 
235 
 
 the  approbation  and  disapprobation  of  them,  as  such, 
 in  others.  The  sense  of  well  and  ill-doing,  the  pre- 
 sages of  conscience,  the  love  of  good  characters  and 
 dislike  of  bad  ones,  honor,  shame,  resentment,  gra- 
 titude; all  these,  considered  in  themselves,  and  in 
 their  effects,  do  afford  manifest  real  instances  of  vir- 
 tue, as  such,  naturally  favoured,  and  of  vice,  as  such, 
 discountenanced,  more  or  less,  in  the  daily  course  of 
 human  life ;  in  every  age,  in  every  relation,  in  every 
 general  circumstances  of  it.  That  God  has  given 
 us  a  moral  nature,*  may  most  justly  be  urged  as  a 
 proof  of  our  being  under  his  moral  government;  but 
 that  he  has  placed  us  in  a  condition,  which  gives  this 
 nature,  as  one  may  speak,  scope  to  operate,  and  in 
 which  it  does  unavoidably  operate,  that  is,  influence 
 mankind  to  act,  so  as  thus  to  favour  and  reward  vir- 
 tue, and  discountenance  and  punish  vice ;  this  is  not 
 the  same,  but  a  further  additional  proof  of  his  moral 
 government ;  for  it  is  an  instance  of  it.  The  first  is  a 
 proof,  that  he  will  finally  favour  and  support  virtue 
 effectually;  the  second  is  an  example  of  his  favouring 
 and  supporting  it  at  present,  in  some  degree. 
 
 If  a  more  distinct  inquiry  be  made,  whence  it 
 arises,  that  virtue  as  such,  is  often  rewarded,  and 
 vice,  as  such,  is  punished,  and  this  rule  never  in- 
 verted ;  it  will  be  found  to  proceed,  in  part,  imme- 
 diately from  the  moral  nature  itself  which  God  has 
 given  us;  and  also,  in  part,  from  his  having  given 
 us,  together  with  this  nature,  so  great  a  power  over 
 each  other's  happiness  and  misery.  For,  firsts  it  is 
 certain,  that  peace  and  delight,  in  some  degree  and 
 
 *  See  Dissertation  II. 
 
236 
 
 upon  some  occasions,  is  the  necessary  and  present 
 effect  of  virtuous  practice ;  an  effect  arising  imme- 
 diately from  that  constitution  of  our  nature.  We 
 are  so  made,  that  well-doing,  as  such,  gives  us  satis- 
 faction, at  least,  in  some  instances;  ill-doing,  as 
 such,  in  none.  And,  secondly,  from  our  moral  na- 
 ture, joined  with  God's  having  put  our  happiness 
 and  misery,  in  many  respects,  in  each  other's  power, 
 it  cannot  but  be  that  vice,  as  such,  some  kinds  and 
 instances  of  it  at  least,  will  be  infamous,  and  men 
 will  be  disposed  to  punish  it  as  in  itself  detestable ; 
 and  the  villain  will  by  no  means  be  able  always  to 
 avoid  feeling  that  infamy,  any  more  than  he  will  be 
 able  to  escape  this  further  punishment  which  man- 
 kind will  be  disposed  to  inflict  upon  him,  under  the 
 notion  of  his  deserving  it.  But  there  can  be  nothing 
 on  the  side  of  vice  to  answer  this ;  because  there  is 
 nothing  in  the  human  mind  contradictory,  as  the 
 logicians  speak,  to  virtue.  For  virtue  consists  in  a 
 regard  to  what  is  right  and  reasonable,  as  being  so : 
 in  a  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  charity,  in  tli em- 
 selves  :  and  there  is  surely  no  such  thing  as  a  like 
 natural  regard  to  falsehood,  injustice,  cruelty.  If  it 
 be  thought,  that  there  are  instances  of  an  approba- 
 tion of  vice,  as  such,  in  itself,  and  for  its  own  sake, 
 (though  it  does  not  appear  to  me  that  there  is  any 
 such  thing  at  all ;  but,  supposing  there  be)  it  is  evi- 
 dently monstrous ;  as  much  so  as  the  most  acknow- 
 ledged perversion  of  any  passion  whatever.  Such 
 instances  of  perversion,  then,  being  left  out  as  merely 
 imaginary,  or,  however,  unnatural;  it  must  follow, 
 from  the  frame  of  our  nature,  and  from  our  condi- 
 tion, in  the  respects  now  described,  that  vice  cannot 
 
•23'; 
 
 at  all  be,  and  virtue  cannot  but  be,  favoured,  as  such, 
 by  others,  upon  some  occasions,  and  happy  in  itself, 
 in  some  degree.  For  what  is  here  insisted  upon,  is 
 not  the  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice  are  thus 
 distinguished,  but  only  the  thing  itself,  that  they  are 
 so  in  some  degree;  though  the  whole  good  and  bad 
 effect  of  virtue  and  vice,  as  such,  is  not  inconsider- 
 able in  degree.  But  that  they  must  be  thus  dis- 
 tinguished, in  some  degree,  is  in  a  manner  neces- 
 sary; it  is  matter  of  fact  of  daily  experience,  even  in 
 the  greatest  confusion  of  human  affairs. 
 
 It  is  not  pretended  but  that,  in  the  natural  course 
 of  things,  happiness  and  misery  appear  to  be  distri- 
 buted by  other  rules,  than  only  the  personal  merit 
 and  demerit  of  characters.  They  may  sometimes 
 be  distributed  by  way  of  mere  discipline.  There 
 may  be  the  wisest  and  best  reasons  why  the  world 
 should  be  governed  by  general  laws,  from  whence 
 such  promiscuous  distribution  perhaps  must  follow; 
 and  also  why  our  happiness  and  misery  should  be 
 put  in  each  other's  power,  in  the  degree  which  they 
 are.  And  these  things,  as  in  general  they  contri- 
 bute to  the  rewarding  virtue  and  punishing  vice,  as 
 such ;  so  they  often  contribute  also,  not  to  the  in- 
 version of  this,  which  is  impossible,  but  to  the  ren- 
 dering persons  prosperous  though  wicked,  afflicted 
 though  righteous;  and,  which  is  worse,  to  the  re- 
 warding  some  actions,  though  vicious,  and  punishing 
 other  actions,  though  virtuous.  But  all  this  can- 
 not drown  the  voice  of  nature  in  the  conduct  of  Pro- 
 vidence, plainly  declaring  itself  for  virtue,  by  way  oi 
 distinction  from  vice,  and  preference  to  it.  For, 
 our  being  so  constituted  as  that  virtue  and  vice  are 
 
238 
 
 thus  naturally  favoured  and  discountenanced,  re- 
 warded and  punished  respectively  as  such,  is  an  in- 
 tuitive proof  of  the  intent  of  nature  that  it  should  be 
 so;  otherwise  the  constitution  of  our  mind,  from 
 which  it  thus  immediately  and  directly  proceeds, 
 would  be  absurd.  But  it  cannot  be  said,  because 
 virtuous  actions  are  sometimes  punished,  and  vicious 
 actions  rewarded,  that  nature  intended  it.  For, 
 though  this  great  disorder  is  brought  about,  as  all 
 actions  are  done,  by  means  of  some  natural  passion, 
 yet  this  may  be,  as  it  undoubtedly  is,  brought  about 
 by  the  perversion  of  such  passion,  implanted  in  us 
 for  other,  and  those  very  good  purposes.  And  in- 
 deed these  other  and  good  purposes,  even  of  everv 
 passion,  may  be  clearly  seen. 
 
 We  have  then  a  declaration,  in  some  degree  of 
 present  effect,  from  him  who  is  supreme  in  nature, 
 which  side  he  is  of,  or  what  part  he  takes;  a  de- 
 claration for  virtue  and  against  vice.  So  far,  there- 
 fore, as  a  man  is  true  to  virtue,  to  veracity  and  jus- 
 tice, to  equity  and  charity,  and  the  right  of  the  case, 
 in  whatever  he  is  concerned,  so  far  he  is  on  the  side 
 of  the  divine  administration,  and  co-operates  with  it : 
 and  from  hence,  to  such  a  man,  arises  naturally  a 
 secret  satisfaction  and  sense  of  security,  and  impli- 
 cit hope  of  somewhat  further.      And, 
 
 V.  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  necessary  ten- 
 dencies of  virtue,  which,  though  not  of  present  ef- 
 fect, yet  are  at  present  discernible  in  nature;  and  so 
 afford  an  instance  of  somewhat  moral  in  the  essen- 
 tial constitution  of  it.  There  is,  in  the  nature  of 
 things,  a  tendency  in  virtue  and  vice  to  produce  the 
 good  and  bad  effects  now  mentioned,  in  a  greater 
 
239 
 
 degree  than  they  do  in  fact  produce  them.  For  in- 
 stance, good  and  bad  men  would  be  much  more  re- 
 warded and  punished  as  such,  were  it  not  that  jus- 
 tice is  often  artificially  eluded,  that  characters  are 
 not  known,  and  many  who  would  thus  favour  virtue 
 and  discourage  vice,  are  hindered  from  doing  so  by 
 accidental  causes.  These  tendencies  of  virtue  and 
 vice  are  obvious  with  regard  to  individuals.  But 
 it  may  require  more  particularly  to  be  considered, 
 that  power  in  a  society,  by  being  under  the  direction 
 of  virtue,  naturally  increases,  and  has  a  necessary 
 tendency  to  prevail  over  opposite  power,  not  under 
 the  direction  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as  power,  by  being 
 under  the  direction  of  reason,  increases,  and  has  a 
 tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force.  There  are 
 several  brute  creatures  of  equal,  and  several  of  su- 
 perior strength  to  that  of  men;  and  possibly  the 
 sum  of  the  whole  strength  of  brutes  mav  be  greater 
 than  that  of  mankind :  but  reason  gives  us  the  ad- 
 vantage and  superiority  over  them,  and  thus  man 
 is  the  acknowledged  governing  animal  upon  the 
 earth.  Nor  is  this  superiority  considered  by  any 
 as  accidental;  but  as  what  reason  has  a  tendency,  in 
 the  nature  of  the  thing,  to  obtain.  And  yet,  per- 
 haps, difficulties  may  be  raised  about  the  meaning, 
 as  well  as  the  truth  of  the  assertion,  that  virtue  has 
 the  like  tendency. 
 
 To  obviate  these  difficulties,  let  us  see  more  dis- 
 tinctly how  the  case  stands  with  regard  to  reason, 
 *rhich  is  so  readily  acknowledged  to  have  this  ad- 
 vantageous tendency.  Suppose,  then,  two  or  three 
 men,  of  the  best  and  most  improved  understanding, 
 in  a  desolate  open  plain,  attacked  by  ten  times  the 
 
240 
 
 number  of  beasts  of  prey;  would  their  reason  se- 
 cure them  the  victory  in  this  unequal  combat  ? 
 Power,  then,  though  joined  with  reason,  and  under 
 its  direction,  cannot  be  expected  to  prevail  over  op- 
 posite power,  though  merely  brutal,  unless  the  one 
 bears  some  proportion  to  the  other.  Again,  Put 
 the  imaginary  case,  that  rational  and  irrational  crea- 
 tures were  of  like  external  shape  and  manner ;  it  is 
 certain,  before  there  were  opportunities  for  the  first 
 to  distinguish  each  other,  to  separate  from  their  ad- 
 versaries, and  to  form  an  union  among  themselves, 
 they  might  be  upon  a  level,  or,  in  several  respects, 
 upon  great  disadvantage,  though,  united,  they  might 
 be  vastly  superior;  since  union  is  of  such  efficacy, 
 that  ten  men,  united,  might  be  able  to  accomplish 
 what  ten  thousand  of  the  same  natural  strength  and 
 understanding,  wholly  ununited,  could  not.  In  this 
 case,  then,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain  its 
 ground  against  reason,  for  want  of  union  among  the 
 rational  creatures.  Or  suppose  a  number  of  men  to 
 land  upon  an  island  inhabited  only  by  wild  beasts ; 
 a  number  of  men,  who  by  the  regulations  of  civil 
 government,  the  inventions  of  art,  and  the  expe- 
 rience of  some  years,  could  they  be  preserved  so 
 long,  would  be  really  sufficient  to  subdue  the  wild 
 beasts,  and  to  preserve  themselves  in  security  from 
 them  ;  yet  a  conjuncture  of  accidents  might  give  such 
 advantage  to  the  irrational  animals,  as  that  the\ 
 might  at  once  overpower,  and  even  extirpate,  tin 
 whole  species  of  rational  ones.  Length  of  time, 
 then,  proper  scope  and  opportunities  for  reason  to 
 exert  itself,  may  be  absolutely  necessary  to  its  pre- 
 vailing over  brute  force.      Further  still:  there  are 
 
241 
 
 many  instances  of  brutes  succeeding  in  attempts, 
 which  they  could  not  have  undertaken,  had  not  their 
 irrational  nature  rendered  them  incapable  of  foresee- 
 ing the  danger  of  such  attempts,  or  the  fury  of  pas- 
 sion hindered  their  attending  to  it ;  and  there  are 
 instances  of  reason  and  real  prudence  preventing 
 men's  undertaking  what,  it  hath  appeared  afterwards, 
 thev  might  have  succeeded  in  by  a  lucky  rashness. 
 And  in  certain  conjunctures,  ignorance  and  folly, 
 weakness  and  discord,  may  have  their  advantages. 
 So  that  rational  animals  have  not  necessarily  the  su- 
 periority over  irrational  ones ;  but,  how  improbable 
 soever  it  may  be,  it  is  evidently  possible,  that,  in 
 some  globes,  the  latter  may  be  superior.  And  were 
 the  former  wholly  at  variance  and  disunited,  by  false 
 self-interest  and  envy,  by  treachery  and  injustice, 
 and  consequent  rage  and  malice  against  each  other, 
 whilst  the  latter  were  firmly  united  among  themselves 
 bv  instinct,  this  might  greatly  contribute  to  the  in- 
 troducing such  an  inverted  order  of  things.  For 
 every  one  would  consider  it  as  inverted;  since  reason 
 has,  in  the  nature  of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over 
 brute  force,  notwithstanding  the  possibility  it  may 
 not  prevail,  and  the  necessity  which  there  is  of  many 
 concurrent  circumstances  to  render  it  prevalent. 
 
 Now,  I  say,  virtue  in  a  society  has  a  like  tendency 
 to  procure  superiority  and  additional  power,  whether 
 this  power  be  considered  as  the  means  of  security 
 from  opposite  power,  or  of  obtaining  other  advan- 
 tages. And  it  has  this  tendency,  by  rendering  pub- 
 lic good  an  object  and  end  to  every  member  of  the 
 society :  by  putting  every  one  upon  consideration 
 and  diligence,  recollection  and  self-government,  both 
 l  IT 
 
242 
 
 in  order  to  see  what  is  the  most  effectual  method,  and 
 also  in  order  to  perform  their  proper  part,  for  obtain- 
 ing and  preserving  it ;  by  uniting  a  society  within 
 itself,  and  so  increasing  its  strength,  and,  which  is 
 particularly  to  be  mentioned,  uniting  it  by  means  of 
 veracity  and  justice.  For  as  these  last  are  principal 
 bonds  of  union,  so  benevolence,  or  public  spirit, 
 undirected,  unrestrained  by  them,  is — nobody  knows 
 what. 
 
 And  suppose  the  invisible  world,  and  the  invisi- 
 ble dispensations  of  Providence,  to  be  in  any  sort 
 analogous  to  what  appears;  or,  that  both  together 
 make  up  one  uniform  scheme,  the  two  parts  of  which, 
 the  part  which  we  see,  and  that  which  is  beyond  our 
 observation,  are  analogous  to  each  other;  then,  there 
 must  be  a  like  natural  tendency  in  the  derived 
 power,  throughout  the  universe,  under  the  direction 
 of  virtue,  to  prevail  in  general  over  that  which  is  not 
 under  its  direction ;  as  there  is  in  reason,  derived 
 reason  in  the  universe,  to  prevail  over  brute  force. 
 But  then,  in  order  to  the  prevalence  of  virtue,  or 
 that  it  may  actually  produce  what  it  has  a  tendency 
 to  produce,  the  like  concurrences  are  necessary  as 
 are  to  the  prevalence  of  reason.  There  must  be 
 some  proportion  between  the  natural  power  or  force 
 which  is,  and  that  which  is  not,  under  the  direction 
 of  virtue:  there  must  be  sufficient  length  of  time; 
 for  the  complete  success  of  virtue,  as  of  reason,  can- 
 not, from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  otherwise  than 
 gradual :  there  must  be,  as  one  may  speak,  a  fair 
 field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and  extensive  enough, 
 proper  occasions  and  opportunities  for  the  virtuous 
 to  join  together,  to  exert  themselves  against  lawless 
 
243 
 
 force,  and  to  reap  the  fruit  of  their  united  labours. 
 Now,  indeed,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that  the  disproportion 
 between  the  good  and  the  bad,  even  here  on  earth, 
 is  not  so  great,  but  that  the  former  have  natural 
 power  sufficient  to  their  prevailing  to  a  considerable 
 degree,  if  circumstances  would  permit  this  power  to 
 be  united.  For,  much  less,  very  much  less  power, 
 under  the  direction  of  virtue,  would  prevail  over 
 much  greater,  not  under  the  direction  of  it.  How- 
 ever, good  men  over  the  face  of  the  earth  cannot 
 unite ;  as  for  other  reasons,  so  because  they  cannot 
 be  sufficiently  ascertained  of  each  other's  characters. 
 And  the  known  course  of  human  things,  the  scene 
 we  are  now  passing  through,  particularly  the  short- 
 ness of  life,  denies  to  virtue  its  full  scope  in  several 
 other  respects.  The  natural  tendency  which  we 
 have  been  considering,  though  real,  is  hindered  from 
 being  carried  into  effect  in  the  present  state,  but 
 these  hinderances  may  be  removed  in  a  future  one. 
 Virtue,  to  borrow  the  Christian  allusion,  is  militant 
 here,  and  various  untoward  accidents  contribute  to 
 its  being  often  overborne :  but  it  may  combat  with 
 greater  advantage  hereafter,  and  prevail  completely, 
 and  enjoy  its  consequent  rewards  in  some  future 
 states.  Neglected  as  it  is,  perhaps  unknown,  per- 
 haps despised  and  oppressed  here,  there  may  be 
 scenes  in  eternity,  lasting  enough,  and  in  every  other 
 way  adapted  to  afford  it  a  sufficient  sphere  of  action, 
 and  a  sufficient  sphere  for  the  natural  consequences 
 of  it  to  follow  in  fact.  If  the  soul  be  naturally  im- 
 mortal, and  this  state  be  a  progress  towards  a  future 
 one,  as  childhood  is  towards  mature  age,  good  men 
 may  naturally  unite,  not  only  amongst  themselves, 
 l2 
 
244 
 
 but  also  with  other  orders  of  virtuous  creatures  in 
 that  future  state.  For  virtue,  from  the  very  nature 
 of  it,  is  a  principle  and  bond  of  union,  in  some  de- 
 gree, amongst  all  who  are  endued  with  it,  and  known 
 to  each  other;  so  as  that  by  it  a  good  man  cannot 
 but  recommend  himself  to  the  favour  and  protection 
 of  all  virtuous  beings,  throughout  the  whole  universe, 
 who  can  be  acquainted  with  his  character,  and  can 
 any  way  interpose  in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of  his 
 <lu ration.  And  one  might  add,  that  suppose  all  this 
 advantageous  tendency  of  virtue  to  become  effect 
 amongst  one  or  more  orders  of  creatures,  in  any  dis- 
 tant scenes  and  periods,  and  to  be  seen  by  any  or- 
 ders of  vicious  creatures,  throughout  the  universal 
 kingdom  of  God ;  this  happy  effect  of  virtue  would 
 have  a  tendency,  by  way  of  example,  and  possibly  in 
 other  ways,  to  amend  those  of  them  who  are  capa- 
 ble of  amendment,  and  being  recovered  to  a  just 
 sense  of  virtue.  If  our  notions  of  the  plan  of 
 Providence  were  enlarged,  in  any  sort  proportion- 
 able to  what  late  discoveries  have  enlarged  our  views 
 with  respect  to  the  material  world,  representations 
 of  this  kind  would  not  appear  absurd  or  extravagant. 
 However,  they  are  not  to  be  taken  as  intended  for 
 a  literal  delineation  of  what  is  in  fact  the  particular 
 scheme  of  the  universe,  which  cannot  be  known  with- 
 out revelation ;  for  suppositions  are  not  to  be  looked 
 on  as  true,  because  not  incredible,  but  they  are  men- 
 tioned to  show,  that  our  finding  virtue  to  be  hinder- 
 ed from  procuring  to  itself  such  superiority  and  ad- 
 vantages, is  no  objection  against  its  having,  in  the 
 essential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to  procure 
 them.      And   the   suppositions   now  mentioned   do 
 
245 
 
 plainly  show  this  :  for  they  show,  that  these  hinder- 
 ances  are  so  far  from  being  necessary,  that  we  our- 
 selves can  easily  conceive  how  they  may  be  removed 
 in  future  states,  and  full  scope  be  granted  to  virtue. 
 And  all  these  advantageous  tendencies  of  it  are  to 
 be  considered  as  declarations  of  God  in  its  favour. 
 This,  however,  is  taking  a  pretty  large  compass; 
 though  it  is  certain,  that  as  the  material  world  ap- 
 pears to  be,  in  a  manner,  boundless  and  immense, 
 there  must  be  some  scheme  of  Providence  vast  in 
 proportion  to  it. 
 
 But  let  us  return  to  the  earth,  our  habitation,  and 
 we  shall  see  this  happy  tendency  of  virtue,  by  ima- 
 gining an  instance,  not  so  vast  and  remote ;  by  sup- 
 posing a  kingdom,  or  society  of  men,  upon  it,  per- 
 fectly virtuous,  for  a  succession  of  many  ages;  to 
 which,  if  you  please,  may  be  given  a  situation  advan- 
 tageous for  universal  monarchy.  In  such  a  state 
 there  would  be  no  such  thing  as  faction,  but  men  of 
 the  greatest  capacity  would,  of  course,  all  along,  have 
 the  chief  direction  of  affairs  willingly  yielded  to  them, 
 and  they  would  share  it  among  themselves  without 
 envy.  Each  of  these  woidd  have  the  part  assigned 
 him  to  which  his  genius  was  peculiarly  adapted ;  and 
 others,  who  had  not  any  distinguished  genius,  would 
 be  safe,  and  think  themselves  very  happy,  by  being 
 under  the  protection  and  guidance  of  those  who  had. 
 Public  determinations  would  really  be  the  result  of 
 the  united  wisdom  of  the  community,  and  they  would 
 faithfully  be  executed  by  the  united  strength,  of  it. 
 Some  would  in  a  higher  way  contribute,  but  all  would 
 in  some  way  contribute  to  the  public  prosperity,  and 
 in  it  each  would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue. 
 
246 
 
 And  as  injustice,  whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would 
 be  unknown  among  themselves,  so  they  would  be 
 sufficiently  secured  from  it  in  their  neighbours.  For 
 cunning  and  false  self-interest,  confederacies  in  in- 
 justice, ever  slight,  and  accompanied  with  faction  and 
 intestine  treachery;  these,  on  one  hand,  would  be 
 found  mere  childish  folly  and  weakness,  when  set  in 
 opposition  against  wisdom,  public  spirit,  union  in- 
 violable, and  fidelity  on  the  other,  allowing  both  a 
 sufficient  length  of  years  to  try  their  force.  Add  the 
 general  influence  which  such  a  kingdom  would  have 
 over  the  face  of  the  earth,  by  way  of  example  parti- 
 cularly, and  the  reverence  which  would  be  paid  it. 
 It  would  plainly  be  superior  to  all  others,  and  the 
 world  must  gradually  come  under  its  empire ;  not  by 
 means  of  lawless  violence,  but  partly  by  what  must 
 be  allowed  to  be  just  conquest,  and  partly  by  other 
 kingdoms  submitting  themselves  voluntarily  to  it 
 throughout  a  course  of  ages,  and  claiming  its  pro- 
 tection, one  after  another,  in  successive  exigencies. 
 The  head  of  it  would  be  an  universal  monarch,  in 
 another  sense  than  any  mortal  has  yet  been,  and  the 
 eastern  style  would  be  literally  applicable  to  him,  that 
 all  people,  nations,  and  languages,  should  serve  him. 
 And  though  indeed  our  knowledge  of  human  nature, 
 and  the  whole  history  of  mankind,  show  the  impos- 
 sibility, without  some  miraculous  interposition,  that 
 a  number  of  men  here  on  earth  should  unite  in  one 
 society  of  government,  in  the  fear  of  God,  and  uni- 
 versal practice  of  virtue,  and  that  such  a  government 
 should  continue  so  united  for  a  succession  of  ages ; 
 yet,  admitting  or  supposing  this,  the  effect  would  be 
 as  now  drawn  out.     And  thus,  for  instance,  the  won- 
 
247 
 
 derful  power  and  prosperity  promised  to  the  Jewish 
 nation  in  the  Scripture,  would  be,  in  a  great  mea- 
 sure, the  consequence  of  what  is  predicted  of  them; 
 that  the  "  people  should  be  all  righteous,  and  inhe- 
 rit the  land  for  ever ;"  were  we  to  understand  the  lat- 
 ter phrase  of  a  long  continuance  only,  sufficient  to 
 give  things  time  to  work.  The  predictions  of  this 
 kind,  for  there  are  many  of  them,  cannot  come  to 
 pass  in  the  present  known  course  of  nature;  but  sup- 
 pose them  come  to  pass,  and  then  the  dominion  and 
 pre-eminence  promised,  must  naturally  follow,  to  a 
 very  considerable  degree. 
 
 Consider,  now,  the  general  system  of  religion;  that 
 the  government  of  the  world  is  uniform,  and  one, 
 and  moral ;  that  virtue  and  right  shall  finally  have 
 the  advantage,  and  prevail  over  fraud  and  lawless 
 force,  over  the  deceits  as  well  as  the  violence  of 
 wickedness,  under  the  conduct  of  one  supreme  Go- 
 vernor ;  and  from  the  observations  above  made  it  will 
 appear,  that  God  has,  by  our  reason,  given  us  to 
 see  a  peculiar  connection  in  the  several  parts  of  this 
 scheme,  and  a  tendency  towards  the  completion  of 
 it,  arising  out  of  the  very  nature  of  virtue ;  which 
 tendency  is  to  be  considered  as  somewhat  moral  in 
 the  essential  constitution  of  things.  If  any  one 
 should  think  all  this  to  be  of  little  importance,  I  de- 
 sire him  to  consider  what  he  would  think,  if  vice  had, 
 essentially,  and  in  its  nature,  these  advantageous  ten- 
 dencies, or  if  virtue  had  essentially  the  direct  con- 
 trary ones. 
 
 But  it  may  be  objected,  that  notwithstanding  all 
 these  natural  effects,  and  these  natural  tendencies  of 
 virtue,  yet  things  may  be  now  going  on  throughout 
 
248 
 
 the  universe,  and  may  go  on  hereafter,  in  the  same 
 mixed  way  as  here  at  present  upon  earth;  virtue 
 sometimes  prosperous,  sometimes  depressed;  vice 
 sometimes  punished,  sometimes  successful.  The  an- 
 swer to  which  is,  that  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this 
 chapter,  nor  of  this  treatise,  properly  to  prove  God's 
 perfect  moral  government  over  the  world,  or  the  truth 
 of  religion,  but  to  observe  what  there  is  in  the  con- 
 stitution and  course  of  nature  to  confirm  the  proper 
 proof  of  it,  supposed  to  be  known,  and  that  the  weight 
 of  the  foregoing  observations  to  this  purpose,  may  be 
 thus  distinctly  proved.  Pleasure  and  pain  are  in- 
 deed, to  a  certain  degree,  say  to  a  very  high  degree, 
 distributed  amongst  us,  without  any  apparent  regard 
 to  the  merit  or  demerit  of  characters.  And  were 
 there  nothing  else,  concerning  this  matter,  discerni- 
 ble in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  there 
 would  be  no  ground,  from  the  constitution  and  course 
 of  nature,  to  hope  or  to  fear,  that  men  would  be  re- 
 warded or  punished  hereafter  according  to  their  de- 
 serts ;  which,  however,  it  is  to  be  remarked,  implies, 
 that  even  then  there  would  be  no  ground,  from  ap- 
 pearances, to  think  that  vice,  upon  the  whole,  would 
 have  the  advantage,  rather  than  that  virtue  would. 
 And  thus  the  proof  of  a  future  state  of  retribution 
 would  rest  upon  the  usual  known  arguments  for  it ; 
 which  are,  I  think,  plainly  unanswerable,  and  would 
 be  so,  though  there  were  no  additional  confirmation 
 of  them  from  the  things  above  insisted  on.  But 
 these  things  are  a  very  strong  confirmation  of  them. 
 For, 
 
 1st,  They  show  that  the  Author  of  Nature  is  not 
 indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice.    They  amount  to  a  de- 
 
249 
 
 claration  from  liim,  determinate,  and  not  to  be  evaded, 
 in  favour  of  one,  and  against  the  other;  such  a  de- 
 claration as  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  over  against, 
 or  answer,  on  the  part  of  vice.  So  that  were  a  man, 
 laying  aside  the  proper  proof  of  religion,  to  deter- 
 mine, from  the  course  of  nature  only,  whether  it 
 were  most  probable  that  the  righteous  or  the  wicked 
 would  have  the  advantage  in  a  future  life,  there  can 
 be  no  doubt  but  that  he  would  determine  the  pro- 
 bability to  be,  that  the  former  would.  The  course 
 of  nature,  then,  in  the  view  of  it  now  given,  fur- 
 nishes us  with  a  real  practical  view  of  the  obligations 
 of  religion. 
 
 2dly,  When,  conformably  to  what  religion  teaches 
 us,  God  shall  reward  and  punish  virtue  and  vice,  as 
 such,  so  as  that  every  one  shall,  upon  the  whole,  have 
 his  deserts,  this  distributive  justice  will  not  be  a  thing 
 different  in  kind,  but  only  in  degree,  from  what  we 
 experience  in  his  present  government.  It  will  be 
 that  in  effect,  toward  which  we  now  see  a  tendency. 
 It  will  be  no  more  than  the  completion  of  that  moral 
 government,  the  principles  and  beginning  of  which 
 have  been  shown,  beyond  all  dispute,  discernible  in 
 the  present  constitution  and  course  of  nature.  And 
 from  hence  it  follows, 
 
 3dly,  That  as,  under  the  natural  government  of 
 God,  our  experience  of  those  kinds  and  degrees  of 
 happiness  and  misery,  which  we  do  experience  at  pre- 
 sent, gives  just  ground  to  hope  for  and  to  fear  higher 
 degrees  and  other  kinds  of  both  in  a  future  state, 
 supposing  a  future  state  admitted;  so,  under  his  mo- 
 ral government,  our  experience  that  virtue  and  vice 
 are,  in  the  manners  above-mentioned,  actually  re- 
 l3 
 
250 
 
 warded  and  punished  at  present,  in  a  certain  degree, 
 gives  just  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear,  that  they  may 
 be  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher  degree  here- 
 after. It  is  acknowledged,  indeed,  that  this  alone  is 
 not  sufficient  ground  to  think,  that  they  actually  will 
 be  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  higher  degree,  rather 
 than  in  a  lower :  but  then, 
 
 Lastly,  There  is  sufficient  ground  to  think  so, 
 from  the  good  and  had  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice. 
 For  these  tendencies  are  essential,  and  founded  in 
 the  nature  of  things :  whereas,  the  hinderances  to 
 their  becoming  effect  are,  in  numberless  cases,  not 
 necessary,  but  artificial  only.  Now,  it  may  be  much 
 more  strongly  argued,  that  these  tendencies,  as  well 
 as  the  actual  rewards  and  punishments  of  virtue  and 
 vice,  which  arise  directly  out  of  the  nature  of  things, 
 will  remain  hereafter,  than  that  the  accidental  hin- 
 derances of  them  will.  And  if  these  hinderances  do 
 not  remain,  those  rewards  and  punishments  cannot 
 but  be  carried  on  much  further  towards  the  perfec- 
 tion of  moral  government,  that  is,  the  tendencies  of 
 virtue  and  vice  will  become  effect;  but  when,  or  where, 
 or  in  what  particular  way,  cannot  be  known  at  all,  but 
 by  revelation. 
 
 Upon  the  whole,  there  is  a  kind  of  moral  govern- 
 ment implied  in  God's  natural  government;*  virtue 
 and  vice  are  naturally  rewarded  and  punished  as 
 beneficial  and  mischievous  to  society,  f  and  rewarded 
 and  punished  directly  as  virtue  and  vice4  The  no- 
 tion, then,  of  a  moral  scheme  of  government,  is  not 
 fictitious,   but  natural;    for  it  is  suggested  to  our 
 
 *  Page  228.  f  Page  229.  +  Page  230,  &c. 
 
251 
 
 thoughts,  by  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature ; 
 and  the  execution  of  this  scheme  is  actually  begun, 
 in  the  instances  here  mentioned.  And  these  things 
 are  to  be  considered  as  a  declaration  of  the  Author 
 of  nature,  for  virtue,  and  against  vice;  they  give  a 
 credibility  to  the  supposition  of  their  being  rewarded 
 and  punished  hereafter,  and  also  ground  to  hope  and 
 to  fear,  that  they  may  be  rewarded  and  punished  in 
 higher  degrees  than  they  are  here.  And  as  all  this 
 is  confirmed,  so  the  argument  for  religion,  from  the 
 constitution  and  course  of  nature,  is  carried  on  far- 
 ther, by  observing,  that  there  are  natural  tendencies, 
 and  in  innumerable  cases,  only  artificial  hinderances, 
 to  this  moral  scheme  being  carried  on  much  farther 
 towards  perfection  than  it  is  at  present.*  The  no- 
 tion, then,  of  a  moral  scheme  of  government,  much 
 more  perfect  than  what  is  seen,  is  not  a  fictitious, 
 but  a  natural  notion;  for  it  is  suggested  to  our 
 thoughts  by  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and 
 vice.  And  these  tendencies  are  to  be  considered  as 
 intimations,  as  implicit  promises  and  thieatenings, 
 from  the  Author  of  nature,  of  much  greater  rewards 
 and  punishments  to  follow  virtue  and  vice,  than  do 
 at  present.  And,  indeed,  every  natural  tendency, 
 which  is  to  continue,  but  which  is  hindered  from 
 becoming  effect  by  only  accidental  causes,  affords  a 
 presumption,  that  such  tendency  will,  some  time  or 
 other,  become  effect :  a  presumption  in  degree  pro- 
 portionable to  the  length  of  the  duration  through 
 which  such  tendency  will  continue.  And  from  these 
 things  together  arises  a  real  presumption,  that  the 
 
 *  Page  238,  &c. 
 
252 
 
 moral  scheme  of  government  established  ill  nature, 
 shall  be  carried  on  much  farther  towards  perfection 
 hereafter,  and,  I  think,  a  presumption  that  it  will 
 be  absolutely  completed.  But,  from  these  tilings, 
 joined  with  the  moral  nature  which  God  has  given 
 us,  considered  as  given  us  by  him,  arises  a  practical 
 proof  *  that  it  will  be  completed ;  a  proof  from  fact, 
 and  therefore  a  distinct  one,  from  that  which  is  de- 
 duced from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  relations,  the 
 fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions. 
 
 *  See  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  Chap.  6. 
 
253 
 
 CHAP.  IV. 
 
 Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  implying  Trial,  Diffi- 
 culties and  Danger. 
 
 The  general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  our  present 
 life  is  a  state  of  probation  for  a  future  one,  compre- 
 hends under  it  several  particular  things,  distinct 
 from  each  other.  But  the  first  and  most  common 
 meaning  of  it  seems  to  be,  that  our  future  interest 
 is  now  depending,  and  depending  upon  ourselves; 
 that  we  have  scope  and  opportunities  here  for  that 
 good  and  bad  behaviour,  which  God  will  reward  and 
 punish  hereafter ;  together  with  temptations  to  one, 
 as  well  as  inducements  of  reason  to  the  other.  And 
 this  is,  in  great  measure,  the  same  with  saying, 
 that  we  are  under  the  moral  government  of  God, 
 and  to  give  an  account  of  our  actions  to  him.  For 
 the  notion  of  a  future  account,  and  general  righteous 
 judgment,  implies  some  sort  of  temptations  to  what 
 is  wrong,  otherwise  there  would  be  no  moral  possi- 
 bility of  doing  wrong,  nor  ground  for  judgment  or 
 discrimination.  But  there  is  this  difference,  that 
 the  word  probation  is  more  distinctly  and  particularly 
 expressive  of  allurements  to  wrong,  or  difficulties  in 
 adhering  uniformly  to  what  is  right,  and  of  the  dan- 
 ger of  miscarrying  by  such  temptations,  than  the 
 words  moral  government.  A  state  of  probation, 
 then,  as  thus  particularly  implying  in  it  trial,  diffi- 
 culties, and  danger,  may  require  to  be  considered 
 distinctly  by  itself. 
 
254 
 
 And  as  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  re- 
 ligion teaches  us,  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of 
 trial  with  regard  to  a  future  world ;  so  also  his  natu- 
 ral government  over  us  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state 
 of  trial,  in  the  like  sense,  with  regard  to  the  present 
 world.  Natural  government,  by  rewards  and  punish- 
 ments, as  much  implies  natural  trial,  as  moral 
 government  does  moral  trial.  The  natural  govern- 
 ment of  God  here  meant,*  consists  in  his  annexing 
 pleasure  to  some  actions,  and  pain  to  others,  which 
 are  in  our  power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  in  giving  us 
 notice  of  such  appointment  beforehand.  This  ne- 
 cessarily implies,  that  he  has  made  our  happiness 
 and  misery,  or  our  interest,  to  depend  in  part  upon 
 ourselves.  And  so  far  as  men  have  temptations 
 to  any  course  of  action,  which  will  probably  occa- 
 sion them  greater  temporal  inconvenience  and  un- 
 easiness than  satisfaction,  so  far  their  temporal  in- 
 terest is  in  danger  from  themselves,  or  they  are  in  a 
 state  of  trial  with  respect  to  it.  Now,  people  often 
 blame  others,  and  even  themselves,  for  their  miscon- 
 duct in  their  temporal  concerns.  And  we  find  many 
 are  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  and  miss  of  that 
 natural  happiness  which  they  might  have  obtained 
 in  the  present  life;  perhaps  every  one  does  in  some 
 degree.  But  many  run  themselves  into  great  in- 
 convenience, and  into  extreme  distress  and  misery, 
 not  through  incapacity  of  knowing  better,  and  doing 
 better  for  themselves,  which  would  be  nothing  to 
 the  present  purpose,  but  through  their  own  fault. 
 And  these  things  necessarily  imply  temptation,  and 
 
 *  Chap.  2.  * 
 
255 
 
 danger  of  miscarrying,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree, 
 with  respect  to  our  worldly  interest  or  happiness. 
 Every  one,  too,  without  having  religion  in  his 
 thoughts,  speaks  of  the  hazards  which  young  people 
 run  upon  their  setting  out  in  the  world;  hazards 
 from  other  causes,  than  merely  their  ignorance  and 
 unavoidable  accidents.  And  some  courses  of  vice, 
 at  least,  being  contrary  to  men's  worldly  interest  or 
 good,  temptations  to  these  must  at  the  same  time 
 be  temptations  to  forego  our  present  and  our  future 
 interest.  Thus,  in  our  natural  or  temporal  capacity, 
 we  are  in  a  state  of  trial,  that  is,  of  difficulty  and 
 danger,  analogous  or  like  to  our  moral  and  religious 
 trial. 
 
 This  will  more  distinctly  appear  to  any  one,  who 
 thinks  it  worth  while,  more  distinctly,  to  consider 
 what  it  is  which  constitutes  our  trial  in  both  capa- 
 cities, and  to  observe  how  mankind  behave  under 
 it. 
 
 And  that  which  constitutes  this  our  trial,  in  both 
 these  capacities,  must  be  somewhat  either  in  our 
 external  circumstances,  or  in  our  nature.  For,  on 
 the  one  hand,  persons  may  be  betrayed  into  wrong 
 behaviour  upon  surprise,  or  overcome  upon  any 
 other  very  singular  and  extraordinary  external  oc- 
 casions, who  would,  otherwise,  have  preserved  their 
 character  of  prudence  and  of  virtue  :  in  which  cases, 
 every  one,  in  speaking  of  the  wrong  behaviour  of 
 these  persons,  would  impute  it  to  such  particular 
 external  circumstances.  And,  on  the  other  hand, 
 men  who  have  contracted  habits  of  vice  and  folly  of 
 any  kind,  or  have  some  particular  passions  in  excess, 
 will  seek  opportunities,  and,  as  it  were,  go  out  of 
 
256 
 
 their  way,  to  gratify  themselves  in  these  respects, 
 at  the  expense  of  their  wisdom  and  their  virtue ;  led 
 to  it,  as  every  one  would  say,  not  by  external  temp- 
 tations, but  by  such  habits  and  passions.  And  the 
 account  of  this  last  case  is,  that  particular  passions 
 are  no  more  coincident  with  prudence,  or  that  rea- 
 sonable self-love,  the  end  of  which  is  our  worldly 
 interest,  than  they  are  with  the  principle  of  virtue 
 and  religion,  but  often  draw  contrary  ways  to  one 
 as  well  as  to  the  other ;  and  so  much  particular  pas- 
 sions are  as  much  temptations  to  act  imprudently 
 with  regard  to  our  worldly  interest,  as  to  act 
 viciously.*  However,  as  when  we  say,  men  are 
 misled  by  external  circumstances  of  temptation,  it 
 cannot  but  be  understood,  that  there  is  somewhat 
 within  themselves  to  render  those  circumstances 
 temptations,  or  to  render  them  susceptible  of  im- 
 pressions from  them;  so,  when  we  say,  they  are 
 misled  by  passions,  it  is  always  supposed,  that  there 
 are  occasions,  circumstances,  and  objects,  exciting 
 these  passions,  and  affording  means  for  gratifying 
 them.  And,  therefore,  temptations  from  within, 
 and  from  without,  coincide,  and  mutually  imply  each 
 other.  Now,  the  several  external  objects  of  the 
 appetites,  passions,  and  affections,  being  present  to 
 the  senses,  or  offering  themselves  to  the  mind,  and 
 so  exciting  emotions  suitable  to  their  nature,  not 
 only  in  cases  where  they  can  be  gratified  consistently 
 with  innocence  and  prudence,  but  also  in  cases  where 
 they  cannot,   and  yet  can  be  gratified  imprudently 
 
 *  See  Sermons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  1726,   2d.  Ed.   205,   &c. 
 Pref.  p.  25,  &c.  Serin,  p.  21,  &c. 
 
257 
 
 and  viciously ;  this  as  really  puts  them  in  danger  of 
 voluntarily  foregoing  their  present  interest  or  good, 
 as  their  future,  and  as  really  renders  self-denial  ne- 
 cessary to  secure  one  as  the  other;  that  is,  we  are 
 in  a  like  state  of  trial  with  respect  to  both,  by  the 
 very  same  passions  excited  by  the  very  same  means. 
 Thus  mankind  having  a  temporal  interest  depending 
 upon  themselves,  and  a  prudent  course  of  behaviour 
 being  necessary  to  secure  it,  passions  inordinately 
 excited,  whether  by  means  of  example  or  by  any 
 other  external  circumstance,  towards  such  objects, 
 at  such  times,  or  in  such  degrees,  as  that  they  can- 
 not be  gratified  consistently  with  worldly  prudence, 
 are  temptations  dangerous,  and  too  often  successful 
 temptations,  to  forego  a  greater  temporal  good  for  a 
 less;  that  is,  to  forego  what  is,  upon  the  whole, 
 our  temporal  interest,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  gra- 
 tification. This  is  a  description  of  our  state  of  trial 
 in  our  temporal  capacity.  Substitute  now  the  word 
 future  for  temporal,  and  virtue  for  prudence,  and 
 it  will  be  just  as  proper  a  description  of  our  state  of 
 trial  in  our  religious  capacity;  so  analogous  are  they 
 to  each  other. 
 
 If,  from  consideration  of  this  our  like  state  of 
 trial  in  both  capacities,  we  go  on  to  observe  farther, 
 how  mankind  behave  under  it,  we  shall  find  there 
 are  some  who  have  so  little  sense  of  it,  that  they 
 scarce  look  beyond  the  passing  day;  they  are  so 
 taken  up  with  present  gratifications,  as  to  have,  in 
 a  manner,  no  feeling  of  consequences,  no  regard  to 
 their  future  ease  or  fortune  in  this  fife,  any  more 
 than  to  their  happiness  in  another.  Some  appear 
 to  be  blinded  and  deceived  by  inordinate  passion  in 
 
258 
 
 their  worldly  concerns,  as  much  as  in  religion. 
 Others  are  not  deceived,  but,  as  it  were,  forcibly 
 carried  away  by  the  like  passions,  against  their  bet- 
 ter judgment,  and  feeble  resolutions  too,  of  acting 
 better.  And  there  are  men,  and  truly  they  are  not 
 a  few,  who  shamelessly  avow,  not  their  interest, 
 but  their  mere  will  and  pleasure,  to  be  their  law  of 
 life ;  and  who,  in  open  defiance  of  every  thing  that 
 is  reasonable,  will  go  on  in  a  course  of  vicious  ex- 
 travagance, foreseeing,  with  no  remorse,  and  little 
 fear,  that  it  will  be  their  temporal  ruin;  and  some 
 of  them,  under  the  apprehension  of  the  consequen- 
 ces of  wickedness  in  another  state :  And,  to  speak 
 in  the  most  moderate  way,  human  creatures  are  not 
 only  continually  liable  to  go  wrong  voluntarily,  but 
 we  see  likewise  that  they  often  actually  do  so,  with 
 respect  to  their  temporal  interests,  as  well  as  with 
 respect  to  religion. 
 
 Thus,  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  our  trials 
 in  our  temporal  and  our  religious  capacity,  as  they 
 proceed  from  the  same  causes,  and  have  the  same 
 effect  upon  men's  behaviour,  are  evidently  analogous, 
 and  of  the  same  kind. 
 
 It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and  dan- 
 gers of  miscarrying  in  our  religious  state  of  trial  are 
 greatly  increased,  and,  one  is  ready  to  think,  in  a 
 manner  wholly  made,  by  the  ill  behaviour  of  others ; 
 by  a  wrong  education,  wrong  in  a  moral  sense,  some- 
 times positively  vicious;  by  general  bad  example; 
 by  the  dishonest  artifices  which  are  got  into  business 
 of  all  kinds ;  and,  in  very  many  parts  of  the  world, 
 by  religion  being  corrupted  into  superstitions  which 
 indulge  men  in  their  vices ;   so,  in  like  manner,  the 
 
259 
 
 difficulties  of  conducting  ourselves  prudently  in  re- 
 spect to  our  present  interest,  and  our  danger  of  be- 
 ing led  aside  from  pursuing  it,  are  greatly  increased 
 by  a  foolish  education,  and,  after  we  come  to  ma- 
 ture age,  by  the  extravagance  and  carelessness  of 
 others,  whom  we  have  intercourse  with;  and  by 
 mistaken  notions,  very  generally  prevalent,  and  ta- 
 ken up  from  common  opinion,  concerning  temporal 
 happiness,  and  wherein  it  consists.  And  persons, 
 by  their  own  negligence  and  folly  in  their  temporal 
 affairs,  no  less  than  by  a  course  of  vice,  bring  them- 
 selves into  new  difficulties,  and,  by  habits  of  indul- 
 gence, become  less  qualified  to  go  through  them; 
 and  one  irregularity  after  another  embarrasses  things 
 to  such  a  degree,  that  they  know  not  whereabout 
 they  are,  and  often  makes  the  path  of  conduct  so 
 intricate  and  perplexed,  that  it  is  difficult  to  trace  it 
 out;  difficult  even  to  determine  what  is  the  prudent 
 or  the  moral  part.  Thus,  for  instance,  wrong  be- 
 haviour in  one  stage  of  life,  youth;  wrong,  I  mean, 
 considering  ourselves  only  in  our  temporal  capacity, 
 without  taking  in  religion ;  this,  in  several  ways,  in- 
 creases the  difficulties  of  right  behaviour  in  mature 
 age;  that  is,  puts  us  into  a  more  disadvantageous 
 state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  capacity. 
 
 We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God : 
 there  are  natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state 
 of  degradation;*  and  we  certainly  are  in  a  condi- 
 tion which  does  not  seem,  by  any  means,  the  most 
 advantageous  we  could  imagine  or  desire,  cither  in 
 our   natural  or  moral  capacity,   for   securing   either 
 
 •  Tart  II.  Chap.  5. 
 
260 
 
 our  present  or  our  future  interest.  However,  this 
 condition,  low,  and  careful,  and  uncertain  as  it  is, 
 does  not  afford  any  just  ground  of  complaint.  For, 
 as  men  may  manage  their  temporal  affairs  with  pru- 
 dence, and  so  pass  their  days  here  on  earth  in  toler- 
 able ease  and  satisfaction,  by  a  moderate  degree  of 
 care ;  so,  likewise,  with  regard  to  religion,  there  is 
 no  more  required  than  what  they  are  well  able  to 
 do,  and  what  they  must  be  greatly  wanting  to  them- 
 selves if  they  neglect.  And  for  persons  to  have 
 that  put  upon  them  which  they  are  well  able  to  go 
 through,  and  no  more,  we  naturally  consider  as  an 
 equitable  thing,  supposing  it  done  by  proper  autho- 
 rity. Nor  have  we  any  more  reason  to  complain  of 
 it,  with  regard  to  the  Author  of  nature,  than  of  his 
 not  having  given  us  other  advantages,  belonging  to 
 other  orders  of  creatures. 
 
 But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  the 
 state  of  trial  which  religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  is 
 rendered  credible,  by  its  being  throughout  uniform 
 and  of  a  piece  with  the  general  conduct  of  Provi- 
 dence towards  us,  in  all  other  respects  within  the 
 compass  of  our  knowledge.  Indeed,  if  mankind, 
 considered  in  their  natural  capacity  as  inhabitants  of 
 this  world  only,  found  themselves,  from  their  birth 
 to  their  death,  in  a  settled  state  of  security  and 
 happiness,  without  any  solicitude  or  thought  of 
 their  own ;  or,  if  they  were  in  no  danger  of  being 
 brought  into  inconvenience  and  distress  by  careless- 
 ness, or  the  folly  of  passion,  through  bad  exam- 
 ple, the  treachery  of  others,  or  the  deceitful  ap- 
 pearances of  things;  were  this  our  natural  condi- 
 tion, then  it  might  seem  strange,  and  be  some  pre- 
 
261 
 
 sumption  against  the  truth  of  religion,  that  it  re- 
 presents our  future  and  more  general  interest,  as  not 
 secure  of  course,  but  as  depending  upon  our  beha- 
 viour, and  requiring  recollection  and  self-govern- 
 ment to  obtain  it.  For  it  might  be  alleged,  "  What 
 you  say  is  our  condition  in  one  respect,  is  not  in 
 any  wise  of  a  sort  with  what  we  find,  by  experi- 
 ence, our  condition  is  in  another.  Our  whole  pre- 
 sent interest  is  secured  to  our  hands,  without  any 
 solicitude  of  ours,  and  why  should  not  our  future 
 interest,  if  we  have  any  such,  be  so  too?  But 
 since,  on  the  contrary,  thought  and  consideration, 
 the  voluntary  denying  ourselves  many  things  wdiich 
 we  desire,  and  a  course  of  behaviour  far  from  being 
 always  agreeable  to  us,  are  absolutely  necessary  to 
 our  acting  even  a  common  decent  and  common  pru- 
 dent part,  so  as  to  pass  with  any  satisfaction  through 
 the  present  world,  and  be  received  upon  any  tole- 
 rable good  terms  in  it;  since  this  is  the  case,  all 
 presumption  against  self-denial  and  attention  being 
 necessary  to  secure  our  higher  interest  is  removed. 
 Had  we  not  experience,  it  might,  perhaps,  speci- 
 ously be  urged,  that  it  is  improbable  any  thing  of 
 hazard  and  danger  should  be  put  upon  us  by  an  in- 
 finite Being,  when  every  thing  which  is  hazard  and 
 danger  in  our  manner  of  conception,  and  will  end 
 in  error,  confusion,  and  misery,  is  now  already  cer- 
 tain in  his  foreknowledge.  And,  indeed,  why  any 
 tiling  of  hazard  and  danger  should  be  put  upon  such 
 trail  creatures  as  we  are,  may  well  be  thought  a  dif- 
 ficulty in  specidation ;  and  cannot  but  be  so,  till  we 
 know  the  whole,  or,  however,  much  more  of  the 
 case.      But  still  the  constitution  of  nature  is  as  it 
 
262 
 
 is.  Our  happiness  and  misery  are  trusted  to  our 
 conduct,  and  made  to  depend  upon  it.  Somewhat, 
 and,  in  many  circumstances,  a  great  deal  too,  is  put 
 upon  us,  either  to  do  or  to  suffer,  as  we  choose. 
 And  all  the  various  miseries  of  life,  which  people 
 bring  upon  themselves  by  negligence  and  folly,  and 
 might  have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are  instances  of 
 this ;  which  miseries  are,  beforehand,  just  as  contin- 
 gent and  undetermined  as  their  conduct,  and  left  to 
 be  determined  by  it." 
 
 These  observations  are  an  answer  to  the  objec- 
 tions against  the  credibility  of  a  state  of  trial,  as  im- 
 plying temptations,  and  real  danger  of  miscarrying 
 with  regard  to  our  general  interest,  under  the  moral 
 government  of  God ;  and  they  show,  that,  if  we  are 
 at  all  to  be  considered  in  such  a  capacity,  and  as 
 having  such  an  interest,  the  general  analogy  of  Pro- 
 vidence must  lead  us  to  apprehend  ourselves  in  dan- 
 ger of  miscarrying,  in  different  degrees,  as  to  this 
 interest,  by  our  neglecting  to  act  the  proper  part  be- 
 longing to  us  in  that  capacity.  For  we  have  a  pre- 
 sent interest,  under  the  government  of  God  which 
 we  experience  here  upon  earth.  And  this  interest, 
 as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us,  so  neither  is  it  offered  to 
 our  acceptance,  but  to  our  acquisition ;  in  such  sort, 
 as  that  we  are  in  danger  of  missing  it,  by  means  of 
 temptations  to  neglect  or  act  contrary  to  it ;  and 
 without  attention  and  self-denial,  must  and  do  miss 
 of  it.  It  is  then  perfectly  credible,  that  this  may 
 be  our  case  with  respect  to  that  chief  and  final  good 
 which  religion  proposes  to  us. 
 
263 
 
 CHAP.  V. 
 
 Of  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  for  Moral 
 Discipline  and  Improvement. 
 
 From  the  consideration  of  our  being  in  a  proba- 
 tion-state, of  so  much  difficulty  and  hazard,  natu- 
 rally arises  the  question,  how  we  came  to  be  placed  in 
 it.  But  such  a  general  inquiry  as  this  would  be 
 found  involved  in  insuperable  difficulties.  For, 
 though  some  of  these  difficulties  would  be  lessened  by 
 observing,  that  all  wickedness  is  voluntary,  as  is  im- 
 plied in  its  very  notion,  and  that  many  of  the  miseries 
 of  life  have  apparent  good  effects,  yet  when  we  con- 
 sider other  circumstances  belonging  to  both,  and 
 what  must  be  the  consequence  of  the  former  in  a  life 
 to  come,  it  cannot  but  be  acknowledged  plain  folly 
 and  presumption,  to  pretend  to  give  an  account  of 
 the  whole  reasons  of  this  matter ;  the  whole  reasons 
 of  our  being  allotted  a  condition,  out  of  which  so 
 much  wickedness  and  misery,  so  circumstanced, 
 would  in  fact  arise.  Whether  it  be  not  beyond  our 
 faculties,  not  only  to  find  out,  but  even  to  under- 
 stand, the  whole  account  of  this;  or,  though  we 
 should  be  supposed  capable  of  understanding  it,  yet, 
 whether  it  would  be  of  sendee  or  prejudice  to  us  to 
 be  informed  of  it,  is  impossible  to  say.  But  as  our 
 present  condition  can  in  nowise  be  shown  inconsis- 
 tent with  the  perfect  moral  government  of  God ;  so 
 religion  teaches  us  we  were  placed  in  it,  that  we 
 might  qualify  ourselves,  by  the  practice  of  virtue,  fur 
 
264 
 
 another  state,  which  is  to  follow  it'.  And  this, 
 though  hut  a  partial  answer,  a  very  partial  one  in- 
 deed, to  the  inquiry  now  mentioned,  yet  is  a  more 
 satisfactory  answer  to  another,  which  is  of  real,  and 
 of  the  utmost  importance  to  us  to  have  answered — 
 the  inquiry,  What  is  our  business  here?  The 
 known  end,  then,  why  we  are  placed  in  a  state  of 
 so  much  affliction,  hazard,  and  difficulty,  is,  our  im- 
 provement in  virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requisite  quali- 
 fication for  a  future  state  of  security  and  happiness. 
 
 Now,  the  beginning  of  life,  considered  as  an  edu- 
 cation for  mature  age  in  the  present  world,  appears 
 plainly,  at  first  sight,  analogous  to  this  our  trial  for 
 a  future  one;  the  former  being,  in  our  temporal 
 capacity,  what  the  latter  is  in  our  religious  capacity. 
 But  some  observations  common  to  both  of  them,  and 
 a  more  distinct  consideration  of  each,  will  more  dis- 
 tinctly show  the  extent  and  force  of  the  analogy  be- 
 tween them;  and  the  credibility,  which  arises  from 
 hence,  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  that 
 the  present  life  was  intended  to  be  a  state  of  disci- 
 pline for  a  future  one. 
 
 I.  Every  species  of  creatures  is,  we  see,  designed 
 for  a  particular  way  of  life,  to  which  the  nature,  the 
 capacities,  temper,  and  qualifications,  of  each  species, 
 are  as  necessary  as  their  external  circumstances. 
 Both  come  into  the  notion  of  such  state,  or  particu- 
 lar way  of  life,  and  are  constituent  parts  of  it. 
 Change  a  man's  capacities  or  character  to  the  degree 
 in  which  it  is  conceivable  they  may  be  changed,  and 
 he  would  be  altogether  incapable  of  a  human  course 
 of  life  and  human  happiness ;  as  incapable,  as  if,  his 
 nature  continuing  unchanged,  he  were  placed  in  a 
 
265 
 
 world  where  he  had  no  sphere  of  action,  nor  any  ob- 
 jects to  answer  his  appetites,  passions,  and  affections 
 of  any  sort.  One  thing  is  set  over  against  another, 
 as  an  ancient  writer  expresses  it.  Our  nature  cor- 
 responds to  our  external  condition.  Without  this 
 correspondence,  there  would  be  no  possibility  of  any 
 such  thing  as  human  life  and  human  happiness ; 
 which  life  and  happiness  are,  therefore,  a  result  from 
 our  nature  and  condition  jointly;  meaning  by  human 
 life,  not  living  in  the  literal  sense,  but  the  whole 
 complex  notion  commonly  understood  by  those  words. 
 So  that,  without  determining  what  will  be  the  em- 
 ployment and  happiness,  the  particular  life  of  good 
 men  hereafter,  there  must  be  some  determinate  ca- 
 pacities, some  necessary  character  and  qualifications, 
 without  which  persons  cannot  but  be  utterly  incap- 
 able of  it;  in  like  manner  as  there  must  be  some, 
 without  which  men  would  be  incapable  of  their  pre- 
 sent state  of  life.      NowT, 
 
 II.  The  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  in- 
 deed of  all  creatures  which  come  under  our  notice, 
 is  such,  as  that  they  are  capable  of  naturally  becom- 
 ing qualified  for  states  of  life,  for  which  they  were 
 once  wholly  unqualified.  In  imagination,  we  may 
 indeed  conceive  of  creatures,  as  incapable  of  having 
 any  of  their  faculties  naturally  enlarged,  or  as  being 
 unable  naturally  to  acquire  any  new  qualifications ; 
 but  the  faculties  of  every  species  known  to  us  are 
 made  for  enlargement,  for  acquirements  of  experience 
 and  habits.  We  find  ourselves,  in  particular,  en- 
 dued with  capacities,  not  only  of  perceiving  ideas, 
 and  of  knowledge  or  perceiving  truth,  but  also  of 
 storing  up  our  ideas  and  knowledge  by  memory. 
 M  17 
 
266 
 
 We  are  capable,  not  only  of  acting,  and  of  having 
 different  momentary  impressions  made  upon  us,  but 
 of  getting  a  new  facility  in  any  kind  of  action,  and 
 of  settled  alterations  in  our  temper  or  character.  The 
 power  of  the  two  last  is  the  power  of  habits.  But 
 neither  the  perception  of  ideas,  nor  knowledge  of 
 any  sort,  are  habits,  though  absolutely  necessary  to 
 the  forming  of  them.  However,  apprehension,  rea- 
 son, memory,  which  are  the  capacities  of  acquiring 
 knowledge,  are  greatly  improved  by  exercise.  Whe- 
 ther the  word  habit  is  applicable  to  all  these  improve- 
 ments, and,  in  particular,  how  far  the  powers  of 
 memory  and  of  habits  may  be  powers  of  the  same 
 nature,  I  shall  not  inquire.  But  that  perceptions 
 come  into  our  minds  readily  and  of  course,  by  means 
 of  their  having  been  there  before,  seems  a  thing  of 
 the  same  sort,  as  readiness  in  any  particular  kind  of 
 action,  proceeding  from  being  accustomed  to  it. 
 And  aptness  to  recollect  practical  observations  of 
 service  in  our  conduct,  is  plainly  habit  in  many  cases. 
 There  are  habits  of  perception,  and  habits  of  action. 
 An  instance  of  the  former,  is  our  constant  and  even 
 involuntary  readiness  in  correcting  the  impressions 
 of  our  sight  concerning  magnitudes  and  distances, 
 so  as  to  substitute  judgment  in  the  room  of  sensa- 
 tion, imperceptibly,  to  ourselves.  And  it  seems  as 
 if  all  other  associations  of  ideas,  not  naturally  con- 
 nected, might  be  called  passive  habits,  as  properly 
 as  our  readiness  in  understanding  languages  upon 
 sight,  or  hearing  of  words.  And  our  readiness  in 
 speaking  and  writing  them  is  an  instance  of  the  lat- 
 ter, of  active  habits.  For  distinctness,  we  may  con- 
 sider habits  as  belonging  to  the  body  or  the  mind, 
 
267 
 
 and  the  latter  will  be  explained  by  the  former.  Un- 
 der the  former  are  comprehended  all  bodily  activities 
 or  motions,  whether  graceful  or  unbecoming,  which 
 are  owing  to  use;  under  the  latter,  general  habits 
 of  life  and  conduct,  such  as  those  of  obedience  and 
 submission  to  authority,  or  to  any  particular  person ; 
 those  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity;  those  of  at- 
 tention, industry,  self-government,  envy,  revenge. 
 And  habits  of  this  latter  kind  seem  produced  by  re- 
 peated acts,  as  well  as  the  former.  And  in  like 
 manner,  as  habits  belonging  to  the  body  are  produced 
 by  external  acts,  so  habits  of  the  mind  are  produced 
 by  the  exertion  of  inward  practical  principles ;  that 
 is,  by  carrying  them  into  act,  or  acting  upon  them, 
 the  principles  of  obedience,  of  veracity,  justice,  and 
 charity.  Nor  can  those  habits  be  formed  by  any 
 external  course  of  action,  otherwise  than  as  it  pro- 
 ceeds from  these  principles ;  because  it  is  only  these 
 inward  principles  exerted,  which  are  strictly  acts  of 
 obedience,  of  veracity,  of  justice,  and  of  charity. 
 So,  likewise,  habits  of  attention,  industry,  self-go- 
 vernment, are,  in  the  same  manner,  acquired  by  ex- 
 ercise; and  habits  of  envy  and  revenge  by  indul- 
 gence, whether  in  outward  act  or  in  thought  and  in- 
 tention, that  is,  inward  act ;  for  such  intention  is  an 
 act.  Resolutions  also  to  do  well  are  properly  acts. 
 And  endeavouring  to  enforce  upon  our  own  minds 
 a  practical  sense  of  virtue,  or  to  beget  in  others  that 
 practical  sense  of  it  which  a  man  really  has  himself, 
 is  a  virtuous  act.  All  these,  therefore,  may  and 
 will  contribute  towards  forming  good  habits.  But, 
 going  over  the  theory  of  virtue  in  one's  thoughts, 
 talking  well,  and  drawing  fine  pictures  of  it,  this  is 
 M  2 
 
268 
 
 so  far  from  necessarily  or  certainly  conducing  to  form 
 i  habit  of  it  in  him  who  thus  employs  himself,  that 
 it  may  harden  the  mind  in  a  contraiy  course,  and 
 render  it  gradually  more  insensible,  that  is,  form  a 
 habit  of  insensibility  to  all  moral  considerations. 
 For,  from  our  very  faculty  of  habits,  passive  impres- 
 sions, by  being  repeated,  grow  weaker.  Thoughts, 
 by  often  passing  through  the  mind,  are  felt  less  sen- 
 sibly; being  accustomed  to  danger,  begets  intrepid- 
 ity, that  is,  lessens  fear ;  to  distress,  lessens  the  pas- 
 sion of  pity ;  to  instances  of  others'  mortality,  lessens 
 the  sensible  apprehension  of  our  own.  And  from 
 these  two  observations  together,  that  practical  habits 
 are  formed  and  strengthened  by  repeated  acts,  and 
 that  passive  impressions  grow  weaker  by  being  re- 
 peated upon  us,  it  must  follow,  that  active  habits 
 may  be  gradually  forming  and  strengthening,  by  a 
 course  of  acting  upon  such  and  such  motives  and  ex- 
 citements, whilst  these  motives  and  excitements 
 themselves  are,  by  proportionable  degrees,  growing 
 less  sensible ;  that  is,  are  continually  less  and  less 
 sensibly  felt,  even  as  the  active  habits  strengthen. 
 And  experience  confirms  this;  for  active  principles, 
 at  the  very  time  that  they  are  less  lively  in  percep- 
 tion than  they  were,  are  found  to  be  some  how 
 wrought  more  thoroughly  into  the  temper  and  char- 
 acter, and  become  more  effectual  in  influencing  our 
 practice.  The  three  things  just  mentioned  may  af- 
 ford instances  of  it.  Perception  of  danger  is  a  natu- 
 ral excitement  of  passive  fear  and  active  caution ;  and 
 by  being  inured  to  danger,  habits  of  the  latter  are 
 gradually  wrought,  at  the  same  time  that  the  former 
 gradually  lessens.     Perception  of  distress  in  others 
 
269 
 
 is  a  natural  excitement,  passively  to  pity,  and  actively 
 to  relieve  it ;  but  let  a  man  set  himself  to  attend  to. 
 inquire  out,  and  relieve  distressed  persons,  and  he 
 cannot  but  grow  less  and  less  sensibly  affected  with 
 the  various  miseries  of  life,  with  which  he  must  be- 
 come acquainted;  when  yet,  at  the  same  time,  bene- 
 volence, considered  not  as  a  passion,  but  as  a  prac- 
 tical principle  of  action,  will  strengthen ;  and  whilst 
 he  passively  compassionates  the  distressed  less,  he 
 will  acquire  a  greater  aptitude  actively  to  assist  and 
 befriend  them.  So  also,  at  the  same  time  that  the 
 daily  instances  of  men  dying  around  us  give  us 
 daily  a  less  sensible  passive  feeling  or  apprehension 
 of  our  own  mortality,  such  instances  greatly  contri- 
 bute to  the  strengthening  a  practical  regard  to  it  in 
 serious  men ;  that  is,  to  forming  a  habit  of  acting 
 with  a  constant  view  to  it.  And  this  seems  again 
 further  to  show,  that  passive  impressions  made  upon 
 our  minds  by  admonition,  experience,  example, 
 though  they  may  have  a  remote  efficacy,  and  a  very 
 great  one,  towards  forming  active  habits,  yet  can 
 have  this  efficacy  no  otherwise  than  by  inducing  us 
 to  such  a  course  of  action;  and  that  it  is,  not  being 
 affected  so  and  so,  but  acting,  which  forms  those 
 habits;  only  it  must  be  always  remembered,  that 
 real  endeavours  to  enforce  good  impressions  upon 
 ourselves,  are  a  species  of  virtuous  action.  Nor  do 
 we  know  how  far  it  is  possible,  in  the  nature  of 
 things,  that  effects  should  be  wrought  in  us  at  once 
 equivalent  to  habits,  that  is,  what  is  wrought  by  use 
 and  exercise.  However,  the  thing  insisted  upon  is, 
 not  what  may  be  possible,  but  what  is  in  fact  the  ap- 
 pointment of  nature,  which  is,  that  active  habits  are 
 
270 
 
 to  be  formed  by  exercise.  Their  progress  may  be 
 so  gradual  as  to  be  imperceptible  of  its  steps;  it  may 
 be  hard  to  explain  the  faculty  by  which  we  are  cap- 
 able of  habits,  throughout  its  several  parts,  and  to 
 trace  it  up  to  its  original,  so  as  to  distinguish  it  from 
 all  others  in  our  mind;  and  it  seems  as  if  contrary 
 effects  were  to  be  ascribed  to  it.  But  the  thing  in 
 general,  that  our  nature  is  formed  to  yield,  in  some 
 such  manner  as  this,  to  use  and  exercise,  is  matter 
 of  certain  experience. 
 
 Thus,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course  of 
 action,  we  get  an  aptness  to  go  on,  a  facility,  readi- 
 ness, and  often  pleasure  in  it.  The  inclinations 
 which  rendered  us  averse  to  it  grow  weaker;  the 
 difficulties  in  it,  not  only  the  imaginary  but  the  real 
 ones,  lessen;  the  reasons  for  it  offer  themselves  of 
 course  to  our  thoughts  upon  all  occasions ;  and  the 
 least  glimpse  of  them  is  sufficient  to  make  us  go  on 
 in  a  course  of  action  to  which  we  have  been  accus- 
 tomed. And  practical  principles  appear  to  grow 
 stronger,  absolutely  in  themselves,  by  exercise,  as 
 well  as  relatively,  with  regard  to  contrary  principles ; 
 which  by  being  accustomed  to  submit,  do  so  habitu- 
 ally, and  of  course.  And  thus  a  new  character,  in 
 several  respects,  may  be  formed ;  and  many  habitudes 
 of  life,  not  given  by  nature,  but  which  nature  directs 
 us  to  acquire. 
 
 III.  Indeed  we  may  be  assured,  that  we  should 
 ){  never  have  had  these  capacities  of  improving  by  ex- 
 perience, acquired  knowledge  and  habits,  had  they 
 not  been  necessary,  and  intended  to  be  made  use  of. 
 And,  accordingly,  we  find  them  so  necessary,  and  so 
 much  intended,  that  without  them  we  should  be  ut- 
 
2?1 
 
 tcrly  incapable  of  that  which  was  the  end  for  which 
 we  were  made,  considered  in  our  temporal  capacity 
 only ;  the  employments  and  satisfactions  of  our  ma- 
 ture state  of  life. 
 
 Nature  does  in  nowise  qualify  us  wholly,  much 
 less  at  once,  for  this  mature  state  of  life.  Even 
 maturity  of  understanding  and  bodily  strength  are 
 not  only  arrived  to  gradually,  but  are  also  very  much 
 owing  to  the  continued  exercise  of  our  powers  of 
 body  and  mind  from  infancy.  But  if  we  suppose  a 
 person  brought  into  the  world  with  both  these  in 
 maturity,  as  far  as  this  is  conceivable,  he  would 
 plainly  at  first  be  as  unqualified  for  the  human  life 
 of  mature  age,  as  an  idiot.  He  would  be  in  a  man- 
 ner distracted  with  astonishment,  and  apprehension, 
 and  curiosity,  and  suspense ;  nor  can  one  guess  how 
 long  it  would  be  before  he  would  be  familiarized  to 
 himself,  and  the  objects  about  him,  enough  even  to 
 set  himself  to  any  thing.  It  may  be  questioned  too, 
 whether  the  natural  information  of  his  sight  and 
 hearing  would  be  of  any  manner  of  use  at  all  to  him 
 in  acting,  before  experience.  And  it  seems  that 
 men  would  be  strangely  headstrong  and  self-willed, 
 and  disposed  to  exert  themselves  with  an  impetuosity 
 which  would  render  society  insupportable,  and  the 
 living  in  it  impracticable,  were  it  not  for  some  ac- 
 quired moderation  and  self-government,  some  apti- 
 tude and  readiness  in  restraining  themselves,  and 
 concealing  their  sense  of  things.  Want  of  every 
 thing  of  this  kind  which  is  learned,  would  render  a 
 man  as  incapable  of  society  as  want  of  language 
 would ;  or  as  his  natural  ignorance  of  any  of  the  par- 
 ticular employments  of  life,  would  render  him  in- 
 
272 
 
 capable  of  providing  himself  with  the  common  con- 
 veniences, or  supplying  the  necessary  wants  of  it. 
 In  these  respects,  and  probably  in  many  more,  of 
 which  we  have  no  particular  notion,  mankind  is  left 
 by  nature  an  unformed,  unfinished  creature,  utterly 
 deficient  and  unqualified,  before  the  acquirement  of 
 knowledge,  experience,  and  habits,  for  that  mature 
 state  of  life,  which  was  the  end  of  his  creation,  con- 
 sidering him  as  related  only  to  this  world. 
 
 But  then,  as  nature  has  endued  us  with  a  power 
 of  supplying  those  deficiencies,  by  acquired  know- 
 ledge, experience,  and  habits;  so,  likewise,  we  are 
 placed  in  a  condition,  in  infancy,  childhood,  and 
 youth,  fitted  for  it;  fitted  for  our  acquiring  those 
 qualifications  of  all  sorts,  which  we  stand  in  need  of 
 in  mature  age.  Hence  children,  from  their  very 
 birth,  are  daily  growing  acquainted  with  the  objects 
 about  them,  with  the  scene  in  which  they  are  placed, 
 and  to  have  a  future  part;  and  learning  somewhat  or 
 other,  necessary  to  the  performance  of  it.  The 
 subordinations,  to  which  they  are  accustomed  in 
 domestic  life,  teach  them  self-government  in  com- 
 mon behaviour  abroad,  and  prepare  them  for  sub- 
 jection and  obedience  to  civil  authority.  What 
 passes  before  their  eyes,  and  daily  happens  to  them, 
 gives  them  experience,  caution  against  treachery 
 and  deceit,  together  with  numberless  little  rules  of 
 action  and  conduct,  which  we  could  not  five  without, 
 and  which  are  learned  so  insensibly  and  so  perfectly, 
 as  to  be  mistaken  perhaps  for  instinct ;  though  they 
 are  the  effect  of  long  experience  and  exercise;  as 
 much  so  as  language,  or  knowledge  in  particular 
 business,  or  the  qualifications  and  behaviour  belong- 
 
273 
 
 ing  to  the  several  ranks  and  professions.  Thus, 
 the  beginning  of  our  days  is  adapted  to  be,  and  is, 
 a  state  of  education  in  the  theory  and  practice  ot 
 mature  life.  We  are  much  assisted  in  it  by  example, 
 instruction,  and  the  care  of  others ;  but  a  great  deal 
 is  left  to  ourselves  to  do.  And  of  this,  as  part  is 
 done  easily  and  of  course,  so  part  requires  diligence 
 and  care,  the  voluntary  foregoing  many  things  which 
 we  desire,  and  setting  ourselves  to  what  we  should 
 have  no  inclination  to,  but  for  the  necessity  or  ex- 
 pedience of  it.  For,  that  labour  and  industry  which 
 the  station  of  so  many  absolutely  requires,  they 
 would  be  greatly  unqualified  for  in  maturity,  as  those 
 in  other  stations  would  be  for  any  other  sorts  of  ap- 
 plication, if  both  were  not  accustomed  to  them  in 
 their  youth.  And  according  as  persons  behave 
 themselves,  in  the  general  education  which  all  go 
 through,  and  in  the  particular  ones  adapted  to  par- 
 ticular employments,  their  character  is  formed,  and 
 made  appear ;  they  recommend  themselves  more  or 
 less;  and  are  capable  of,  and  placed  in,  different 
 stations  in  the  society  of  mankind. 
 
 The  former  part  of  life,  then,  is  to  be  considered 
 as  an  important  opportunity,  which  nature  puts  into 
 our  hands,  and  which,  when  lost,  is  not  to  be  re- 
 covered. And  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  dis- 
 cipline throughout  this  life,  for  another  world,  is  a 
 providential  disposition  of  things,  exactly  of  the 
 same  kind  as  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  disci- 
 pline during  childhood,  for  mature  age.  Our  con- 
 dition in  both  respects  is  uniform  and  of  a  piece, 
 and  comprehended  under  one  and  the  same  general 
 law  of  nature. 
 
 M  3 
 
K 
 
 274 
 
 And  if  we  are  not  able  at  all  to  discern,  how  or 
 in  what  way  the  present  life  could  be  our  preparation 
 for  another,  this  would  be  no  objection  against  the 
 credibility  of  its  being  so.  For  we  do  not  discern 
 how  food  and  sleep  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the 
 body,  nor  could  have  any  thought  that  they  would, 
 before  we  had  experience.  Nor  do  children  at  all 
 think,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  sports  and  exer- 
 cises, to  which  they  are  so  much  addicted,  contri- 
 bute to  their  health  and  growth;  nor,  on  the  other, 
 of  the  necessity  which  there  is  for  their  being  re- 
 strained in  them;  nor  are  they  capable  of  under- 
 standing the  use  of  many  parts  of  discipline,  which 
 nevertheless  they  must  be  made  to  go  through,  in 
 order  to  qualify  them  for  the  business  of  mature 
 age.  Were  we  not  able,  then,  to  discover  in  what 
 respects  the  present  life  could  form  us  for  a  future 
 one,  yet  nothing  would  be  more  supposable  than 
 that  it  might,  in  some  respects  or  other,  from  the 
 general  analogy  of  Providence.  And  this,  for 
 aught  I  see,  might  reasonably  be  said,  even  though 
 we  should  not  take  in  the  consideration  of  God's 
 moral  government  over  the  world.     But, 
 
 IV.  Take  in  this  consideration,  and  consequent- 
 ly, that  the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  neces- 
 sary qualification  for  the  future  state,  and  then  we 
 may  distinctly  see  how,  and  in  what  respects,  the 
 present  life  may  be  a  preparation  for  it;  since  we 
 want,  and  are  capable  of,  improvement  in  that  cha- 
 racter, by  moral  and  religious  habits  ;  and  the  pre- 
 sent life  is  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  such  im- 
 provement;  in  like  manner,  as  we  have  already  ob- 
 served, how  and  in  what  respects,  infancy,  child- 
 
275 
 
 hood  and  youth,  are  a  necessary  preparation,  and 
 a  natural  state  of  discipline,  for  mature  age. 
 
 Nothing  which  we  at  present  see  would  lead  us 
 to  the  thought  of  a  solitary  inactive  state  hereafter ; 
 but,  if  we  judge  at  all  from  the  analogy  of  nature, 
 we  must  suppose,  according  to  the  Scripture  account 
 of  it,  that  it  will  be  a  community.  And  there  is 
 no  shadow  of  any  thing  unreasonable  in  conceiving, 
 though  there  be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this  com- 
 munity will  be,  as  the  Scripture  represents  it,  under 
 the  more  immediate,  or,  if  such  an  expression  may 
 be  used,  the  more  sensible  government  of  God. 
 Nor  is  our  ignorance,  what  will  be  the  employments 
 of  this  happy  community,  nor  our  consequent  igno- 
 rance, what  particular  scope  or  occasion  there  will 
 be  for  the  exercise  of  veracity,  justice,  and  charity, 
 amongst  the  members  of  it  with  regard  to  each  other, 
 any  proof  that  there  will  be  no  sphere  of  exercise 
 for  those  virtues.  Much  less,  if  that  were  possible, 
 is  our  ignorance  any  proof  that  there  will  be  no  oc- 
 casion for  that  frame  of  mind,  or  character,  which 
 is  formed  by  the  daily  practice  of  those  particular 
 virtues  here,  and  which  is  a  result  from  it.  This 
 at  least  must  be  owned  in  general,  that  as  the  go- 
 vernment established  in  the  universe  is  moral,  the 
 character  of  virtue  and  piety  must,  in  some  way  or 
 other,  be  the  condition  of  our  happiness,  or  the  qua- 
 lification for  it. 
 
 Now,  from  what  is  above  observed  concerniii"" 
 our  natural  power  of  habits,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that 
 we  are  capable  of  moral  improvement  by  discipline. 
 And  how  greatly  we  want  it,  need  not  be  proved  to 
 any  one  who  is  acquainted  with  the  great  wicked- 
 
276 
 
 ness  of  mankind,  or  even  with  those  imperfections 
 which  the  best  are  conscious  of.  But  it  is  not  per- 
 haps distinctly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the 
 occasion  which  human  creatures  have  for  discipline, 
 to  improve  in  them  this  character  of  virtue  and  pi- 
 ety, is  to  be  traced  up  higher  than  to  excess  in  the 
 passions,  by  indulgence  and  habits  of  vice.  Man- 
 kind, and  perhaps  all  finite  creatures,  from  the  very 
 constitution  of  their  nature,  before  habits  of  virtue, 
 are  deficient,  and  in  danger  of  deviating  from  what 
 is  right,  and  therefore  stand  in  need  of  virtuous  ha- 
 bits, for  a  security  against  this  danger.  For,  toge- 
 ther with  the  general  principle  of  moral  understand- 
 ing, we  have  in  our  inward  frame  various  affections 
 towards  particular  external  objects.  These  affec- 
 tions are  naturally  and  of  right,  subject  to  the  go- 
 vernment of  the  moral  principle,  as  to  the  occasions 
 on  which  they  may  be  gratified,  as  to  the  times,  de- 
 grees, and  manner,  in  which  the  objects  of  them 
 may  be  pursued;  but  then  the  principle  of  virtue 
 can  neither  excite  them,  nor  prevent  their  being 
 excited.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  naturally  felt, 
 when  the  objects  of  them  are  present  to  the  mind, 
 not  only  before  all  consideration,  whether  they  can 
 be  obtained  by  lawful  means,  but  after  it  is  found 
 they  cannot.  For  the  natural  objects  of  affection 
 continue  so ;  the  necessaries,  conveniences,  and 
 pleasures  of  life,  remain  naturally  desirable,  though 
 they  cannot  be  obtained  innocently,  nay,  though 
 they  cannot  possibly  be  obtained  at  all.  And  when 
 the  objects  of  any  affection  whatever  cannot  be  ob- 
 tained without  unlawful  means,  but  may  be  obtain- 
 ed by  them,  such  affection,  though  its  being  excited, 
 
2/7 
 
 and  its  continuing  some  time  in  the  mind,  be  as 
 innocent  as  it  is  natural  and  necessary,  yet  cannot 
 but  be  conceived  to  have  a  tendency  to  incline  per- 
 sons to  venture  upon  such  unlawful  means,  and 
 therefore  must  be  conceived  as  putting  them  in  some 
 danger  of  it.  Now,  what  is  the  general  security 
 against  this  danger,  against  their  actually  deviating 
 from  right?  As  the  danger  is,  so  also  must  the 
 security  be  from  within,  from  the  practical  principle 
 of  virtue.*  And  the  strengthening  or  improving 
 this  principle,  considered  as  practical,  or  as  a  prin- 
 ciple of  action,  will  lessen  the  danger  or  increase 
 the  security  against  it.  And  this  moral  principle  is 
 capable  of  improvement,  by  proper  discipline  and 
 exercise;  by  recollecting  the  practical  impressions 
 which  example  and  experience  have  made  upon  us ; 
 and,  instead  of  following  humour  and  mere  inclina- 
 tion, by  continually  attending  to   the   equity   and 
 
 *  It  may  be  thought,  that  a  sense  of  interest  would  as  effec- 
 tually restrain  creatures  from  doing  wrong.  But  if  by  a  sense  of 
 interest,  is  meant,  a  speculative  conviction  or  belief  that  such 
 and  such  indulgence  would  occasion  them  greater  uneasiness, 
 upon  the  whole,  than  satisfaction,  it  is  contrary  to  present  ex- 
 perience to  say,  that  this  sense  of  interest  is  sufficient  to  restrain 
 them  from  thus  indulging  themselves.  And  if  by  a  sense  of  in- 
 terest, is  meant,  a  practical  regard  to  what  is  upon  the  whole 
 our  happiness,  this  is  not  only  coincident  with  the  principle  of 
 virtue  or  moral  rectitude,  but  is  a  part  of  the  idea  itself.  And,  it 
 is  evident,  this  reasonable  self-love  wants  to  be  improved,  as 
 really  as  any  principle  in  our  nature.  For  we  daily  see  it  over- 
 matched, not  only  by  the  more  boisterous  passions,  but  by  cu- 
 riosity, shame,  love  of  imitation,  by  any  thing,  even  indolence  : 
 especially  if  the  interest,  the  temporal  interest,  suppose,  which 
 is  the  end  of  such  self-love,  be  at  a  distance.  So  greatly  are 
 profligate  men  mistaken,  when  they  affirm  they  are  wholly 
 governed  by  interestedness  and  self-love;  and  so  little  cause 
 is  there  for  moralists  to  disclaim  this  principle.  See  pp.  255, 
 250. 
 
278 
 
 right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  we  are  engaged,  be 
 it  in  greater  or  less  matters,  and  accustoming  our- 
 selves always  to  act  upon  it,  as  being  itself  the  just 
 and  natural  motive  of  action;  and  as  this  moral 
 course  of  behaviour  must  necessarily,  under  divine 
 government,  be  our  final  interest.  Thus  the  prin- 
 ciple of  virtue,  improved  into  a  habit,  of  which  im- 
 provement we  are  thus  capable,  will  plainly  be,  in 
 proportion  to  the  strength  of  it,  a  security  againsi 
 the  danger  which  finite  creatures  are  in,  from  tin 
 very  nature  of  propension,  or  particular  affections. 
 This  way  of  putting  the  matter,  supposes  particular 
 affections  to  remain  in  a  future  state,  which  it  is 
 scarce  possible  to  avoid  supposing.  And  if  the'> 
 do,  we  clearly  see,  that  acquired  habits  of  virtue 
 and  self-government  may  be  necessary  for  the  regu- 
 lation of  them.  However,  though  we  were  not 
 distinctly  to  take  in  this  supposition,  but  to  speak 
 only  in  general,  the  thing  really  comes  to  the  same. 
 For  habits  of  virtue,  thus  acquired  by  discipline,  are 
 improvement  in  virtue;  and  improvement  in  virtue 
 must  be  advancement  in  happiness,  if  the  govern- 
 ment of  the  universe  be  moral. 
 
 From  these  things  we  may  observe,  and  it  will 
 farther  show  this  our  natural  and  original  need  of 
 being  improved  by  discipline,  how  it  comes  to  pass, 
 that  creatures,  made  upright,  fall;  and  that  those 
 who  preserve  their  uprightness,  by  so  doing,  raise 
 themselves  to  a  more  secure  state  of  virtue.  To 
 say  that  the  former  is  accounted  for  by  the  nature 
 of  liberty,  is  to  say  no  more  than  that  an  event 
 actually  happening  is  accounted  for  by  a  mere  pos- 
 sibility of  its  happening.      But  it  seems  distinctly 
 
279 
 
 conceivable  from  the  very  nature  of  particular  affec- 
 tions or  propensions.  For,  suppose  creatures  in- 
 tended for  such  a  particular  state  of  life,  for  which 
 such  propensions  were  necessary;  suppose  them  en- 
 dued with  such  propensions,  together  with  moral 
 understanding,  as  well  including  a  practical  sense  of 
 virtue  as  a  speculative  perception  of  it;  and  that 
 all  these  several  principles,  both  natural  and  moral, 
 tormina"  an  inward  constitution  of  mind,  were  in  the 
 most  exact  proportion  possible;  that  is,  in  a  propor- 
 tion the  most  exactly  adapted  to  their  intended  state 
 of  life;  such  creatures  would  be  made  upright,  or 
 finitely  perfect.  Now,  particular  propensions,  from 
 their  very  nature,  must  be  felt,  the  objects  of  them 
 being  present,  though  they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all, 
 or  not  with  the  allowance  of  the  moral  principle.  But 
 if  they  can  be  gratified  without  its  allowance,  or  by 
 contradicting  it,  then  they  must  be  conceived  to  have 
 some  tendency,  in  how  low  a  degree  soever,  yet 
 some  tendency,  to  induce  persons  to  such  forbidden 
 gratification.  This  tendency,  in  some  one  particular 
 propension,  may  be  increased,  by  the  greater  fre- 
 quency of  occasions  naturally  exciting  it,  than  of  occa- 
 sions exciting  others.  The  least  voluntary  indulgence 
 in  forbidden  circumstances,  though  but  in  thought, 
 will  increase  this  wrong  tendency,  and  may  increase 
 it  further,  till,  peculiar  conjunctures  perhaps  con- 
 spiring, it  becomes  effect ;  and  danger  of  deviating 
 from  right,  ends  in  actual  deviation  from  it :  a  dan- 
 ger necessarily  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  pro- 
 pension,  and  which,  therefore,  could  not  have  been 
 prevented,  though  it  might  have  been  escaped,  or 
 got  innocently  through.     The  case  would  be,  as  if 
 
280 
 
 we  were  to  suppose  a  strait  path  marked  out  for  a 
 person,  in  which  such  a  degree  of  attention  would 
 keep  him  steady;  but  if  he  would  not  attend  in  this 
 degree,  any  one  of  a  thousand  objects  catching  his 
 eye,  might  lead  him  out  of  it.  Now,  it  is  impos- 
 sible to  say,  how  much  even  the  first  full  overt  act 
 of  irregularity  might  disorder  the  inward  constitu- 
 tion, unsettle  the  adjustments,  and  alter  the  propor- 
 tions which  formed  it,  and  in  which  the  uprightness 
 of  its  make  consisted.  But  repetition  of  irregulari- 
 ties would  produce  habits:  and  thus  the  constitu- 
 tion would  be  spoiled,  and  creatures,  made  upright, 
 become  corrupt  and  depraved  in  their  settled  charac- 
 ter, proportionably  to  their  repeated  irregularities  in 
 occasional  acts.  But,  on  the  contrary,  these  crea- 
 tures might  have  improved  and  raised  themselves  to 
 a  higher  and  more  secure  state  of  virtue,  by  the 
 contrary  behaviour,  by  steadily  following  the  moral 
 principle,  supposed  to  be  one  part  of  their  nature, 
 and  thus  withstanding  that  unavoidable  danger  of 
 defection,  which  necessarily  arose  from  propension, 
 the  other  part  of  it.  For,  by  thus  preserving  their 
 integrity  for  some  time,  their  danger  would  lessen, 
 since  propensions,  by  being  inured  to  submit,  would 
 do  it  more  easily  and  of  course;  and  their  security 
 against  this  lessening  danger  would  increase,  since 
 the  moral  principle  would  gain  additional  strength 
 by  exercise;  both  which  things  are  implied  in  the 
 notion  of  virtuous  habits.  Thus,  then,  vicious  in- 
 dulgence is  not  only  criminal  in  itself,  but  also  de- 
 praves the  inward  constitution  and  character.  And 
 virtuous  self-government  is  not  only  right  in  itself, 
 but  also  improves  the  inward  constitution  or  charac- 
 
281 
 
 ter;  and  may  improve  it  to  such  a  degree,  that 
 though  we  should  suppose  it  impossible  for  particu- 
 lar affections  to  be  absolutely  coincident  with  the 
 moral  principle,  and  consequently  should  allow,  that 
 such  creatures  as  have  been  above  supposed  would 
 for  ever  remain  defectible ;  yet  their  danger  of  actu- 
 ally deviating  from  right  may  be  almost  infinitely 
 lessened,  and  they  fully  fortified  against  what  remains 
 of  it ;  if  that  may  be  called  danger,  against  which 
 there  is  an  adequate  effectual  security.  But  still, 
 this  their  higher  perfection  may  continue  to  consist 
 in  habits  of  virtue  formed  in  a  state  of  discipline, 
 and  this  their  more  complete  security  remain  to  pro- 
 ceed from  them.  And  thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable, 
 that  creatures  without  blemish,  as  they  came  out  of 
 the  hands  of  God,  may  be  in  danger  of  going  wrong, 
 and  so  may  stand  in  need  of  the  security  of  virtuous 
 habits  additional  to  the  moral  principle  wrought  into 
 their  natures  by  him  That  which  is  the  ground 
 of  their  danger,  or  their  want  of  security,  may  be 
 considered  as  a  deficiency  in  them,  to  which  virtuous 
 habits  are  the  natural  supply  And  as  they  are 
 naturally  capable  of  being  raised  and  improved  by 
 discipline,  it  may  be  a  thing  fit  and  requisite,  that 
 they  should  be  placed  in  circumstances  with  an  eye  to 
 it ;  in  circumstances  peculiarly  fitted  to  be,  to  them, 
 a  state  of  discipline  for  their  improvement  in  virtue. 
 But  how  much  more  strongly  must  this  hold  with 
 respect  to  those  who  have  corrupted  their  natures, 
 are  fallen  from  their  original  rectitude,  and  whose 
 passions  are  become  excessive  by  repeated  violations 
 of  their  inward  constitution  ?  Upright  creatures  may 
 want  to  be  improved ;  depraved  creatures  want  to  be 
 
282 
 
 renewed.  Education  and  discipline,  which  may  be 
 in  all  degrees  and  sorts  of  gentleness  and  severity,  is 
 expedient  for  those,  but  must  be  absolutely  neces- 
 sary for  these.  For  these,  discipline,  of  the  severer 
 sort  too,  and  in  the  higher  degrees  of  it,  must  be 
 necessary,  in  order  to  wear  out  vicious  habits;  to 
 recover  their  primitive  strength  of  self-government, 
 which  indulgence  must  have  weakened;  to  repair,  as 
 well  as  to  raise  into  a  habit,  the  moral  principle,  in 
 order  to  their  arriving  at  a  secure  state  of  virtuous 
 happiness. 
 
 Now,  whoever  will  consider  the  thing  may  clearly 
 see,  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  Jit  to  be  a 
 state  of  discipline  for  this  purpose,  to  such  as  will  set 
 themselves  to  amend  and  improve.  For,  the  various 
 temptations  with  which  we  are  surrounded;  our  ex- 
 perience of  the  deceits  of  wickedness ;  having  been 
 in  many  instances  led  wrong  ourselves;  the  great 
 viciousness  of  the  world ;  the  infinite  disorders  con- 
 sequent upon  it;  our  being  made  acquainted  with 
 pain  and  sorrow,  either  from  our  own  feeling  of  it, 
 or  from  the  sight  of  it  in  others;  these  things,  though 
 some  of  them  may  indeed  produce  wrong  effects 
 upon  our  minds,  yet  when  duly  reflected  upon,  have 
 all  of  them  a  direct  tendency  to  bring  us  to  a  set- 
 tled moderation  and  reasonableness  of  temper ;  the 
 contrary  both  to  thoughtless  levity,  and  also  to  that 
 unrestrained  self-will,  and  violent  bent  to  follow  pre- 
 sent inclination,  which  may  be  observed  in  undisci- 
 plined minds.  Such  experience,  as  the  present  state 
 affords,  of  the  frailty  of  our  nature,  of  the  boundless 
 extravagance  of  ungoverned  passion,  of  the  power 
 which  an  infinite  Being  has  over  us,  by  the  various 
 
283 
 
 capacities  of  misery  which  he  has  given  us;  in  short, 
 that  kind  and  degree  of  experience  which  the  present 
 state  affords  us,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is 
 such,  as  to  admit  the  possibility,  the  danger,  and  the 
 actual  event  of  creatures  losing  their  innocence  and 
 happiness,  and  becoming  vicious  and  wretched;  hath 
 a  tendency  to  give  us  a  practical  sense  of  things  very 
 different  from  a  mere  speculative  knowledge,  that  we 
 are  liable  to  vice,  and  capable  of  misery.  And  who 
 knows,  whether  the  security  of  creatures  in  the  high- 
 est and  most  settled  state  of  perfection,  may  not,  in 
 part,  arise  from  their  having  had  such  a  sense  of 
 things  as  this,  formed,  and  habitually  fixed  within 
 them,  in  some  state  of  probation  ?  And  passing 
 through  the  present  world  with  that  moral  attention 
 which  is  necessary  to  the  acting  a  right  part  in  it, 
 may  leave  everlasting  impressions  of  this  sort  upon 
 our  minds.  But  to  be  a  little  more  distinct :  allure- 
 ments tu  what  is  wrong ;  difficulties  in  the  discharge 
 of  our  duty;  our  not  being  able  to  act  a  uniform  right 
 part  without  some  thought  and  care ;  and  the  oppor- 
 tunities which  we  have,  or  imagine  we  have,  of  avoid- 
 ing what  we  dislike,  or  obtaining  what  we  desire,  by 
 unlawful  means,  when  we  either  cannot  do  it  at  all, 
 or  at  least  not  so  easily,  by  lawful  ones;  these  things, 
 that  is,  the  snares  and  temptations  of  vice,  are  what 
 render  the  present  world  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state 
 of  discipline  to  those  who  will  preserve  their  integrity : 
 because  they  render  being  upon  our  guard,  resolu- 
 tion, and  the  denial  of  our  passions,  necessary  in 
 order  to  that  end.  And  the  exercise  of  such  parti- 
 cular recollection,  intention  of  mind,  and  self-govern- 
 ment, in  the  practice  of  virtue,  has,  from  the  make 
 
284 
 
 of  our  nature,  a  peculiar  tendency  to  form  habits  of 
 virtue,  as  implying  not  only  a  real,  but  also  a  more 
 continued,  and  a  more  intense  exercise  of  the  virtu- 
 ous principle ;  or  a  more  constant  and  a  stronger  ef- 
 fort of  virtue  exerted  into  act.  Thus,  suppose  a 
 person  to  know  himself  to  be  in  particular  danger, 
 for  some  time,  of  doing  any  thing  wrong,  which  yet 
 he  fully  resolves  not  to  do ;  continued  recollection, 
 and  keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  order  to  make  good 
 his  resolution,  is  a  continued  exerting  of  that  act  of 
 virtue  in  a  high  degree,  which  need  have  been,  and 
 perhaps  would  have  been,  only  instantaneous  and 
 weak,  had  the  temptation  been  so.  It  is  indeed 
 ridiculous  to  assert,  that  self-denial  is  essential  to 
 virtue  and  piety;  but  it  would  have  been  nearer  the 
 truth,  though  not  strictly  the  truth  itself,  to  have 
 said,  that  it  is  essential  to  discipline  and  improvement. 
 For,  though  actions  materially  virtuous,  which  have 
 no  sort  of  difficulty,  but  are  perfectly  agreeable  to 
 our  particular  inclinations,  may  possibly  be  done  only 
 from  these  particular  inclinations,  and  so  may  not  be 
 any  exercise  of  the  principle  of  virtue,  that  is,  not 
 be  virtuous  actions  at  all ;  yet,  on  the  contrary,  they 
 may  be  an  exercise  of  that  principle,  and,  when  they 
 are,  they  have  a  tendency  to  form  and  fix  the  habit 
 of  virtue.  But  when  the  exercise  of  the  virtuous 
 principle  is  more  continued,  oftener  repeated,  and 
 more  intense,  as  it  must  be  in  circumstances  of  dan- 
 ger, temptation,  and  difficulty,  of  any  kind  and  in 
 any  degree,  this  tendency  is  increased  proportionally, 
 and  a  more  confirmed  habit  is  the  consequence. 
 
 This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length,  but 
 how  far  it  may  hold,  I  know  not.     Neither  our  in- 
 
285 
 
 tellectual  powers,  nor  our  bodily  strength,  can  be  im- 
 proved beyond  such  a  degree;  and  both  may  be  over- 
 wrought. Possibly  there  may  be  somewhat  analo- 
 gous to  this,  with  respect  to  the  moral  character; 
 which  is  scarce  worth  considering.  And  I  mention 
 it  only,  lest  it  should  come  into  some  persons' 
 thoughts,  not  as  an  exception  to  the  foregoing  ob- 
 servations, which  perhaps  it  is,  but  as  a  confutation 
 of  them,  which  it  is  not.  And  there  may  be  seve- 
 ral other  exceptions.  Observations  of  this  kind 
 cannot  be  supposed  to  hold  minutely,  and  in  every 
 case.  It  is  enough  that  they  hold  in  general.  And 
 these  plainly  hold  so  far,  as  that  from  them  may  be 
 seen  distinctly,  which  is  all  that  is  intended  by  them, 
 that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state 
 of  discipline  for  our  improvement  in  virtue  and 
 piety ;  in  the  same  sense  as  some  sciences,  by  re- 
 quiring and  engaging  the  attention,  not  to  be  sure 
 of  such  persons  as  will  not,  but  of  such  as  will,  set 
 themselves  to  them,  are  fit  to  form  the  mind  to  habits 
 of  attention. 
 
 Indeed,  the  present  state  is  so  far  from  proving, 
 in  event,  a  discipline  of  virtue  to  the  generality  of 
 men,  that  on  the  contrary,  they  seem  to  make  it  a 
 discipline  of  vice.  And  the  viciousness  of  the  world 
 is,  in  different  ways,  the  great  temptation  which  ren- 
 ders it  a  state  of  virtuous  discipline,  in  the  degree  it 
 is  to  good  men.  The  whole  end,  and  the  whole  oc- 
 casion, of  mankind  being  placed  in  such  a  state  as 
 the  present,  is  not  pretended  to  be  accounted  for. 
 That  which  appears  amidst  the  general  corruption 
 is,  that  there  are  some  persons,  who,  having  within 
 jthem  the  principle  of  amendment  and  recovery,  at- 
 
286 
 
 tend  to  and  follow  the  notices  of  virtue  and  religion, 
 be  they  more  clear  or  more  obscure,  which  are  afforded 
 them ;  and  that  the  present  world  is,  not  only  an  ex- 
 ercise of  virtue  in  these  persons,  but  an  exercise  of  it 
 in  ways  and  degrees  peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it ;  apt 
 to  improve  it,  in  some  respects,  even  beyond  what 
 would  be,  by  the  exercise  of  it  required  in  a  perfectly 
 virtuous  society,  or  in  a  society  of  equally  imperfect 
 virtue  with  themselves.  But  that  the  present  world 
 does  not  actually  become  a  state  of  moral  discipline  to 
 many,  even  to  the  generality,  that  is,  that  they  do  not 
 improve  or  grow  better  in  it,  cannot  be  urged  as  a 
 proof  that  it  was  not  intended  for  moral  discipline, 
 by  any  who  at  all  observe  the  analogy  of  nature. 
 For,  of  the  numerous  seeds  of  vegetables  and  bodies 
 of  animals,  which  are  adapted  and  put  in  the  way,  to 
 improve  to  such  a  point  or  state  of  natural  maturity 
 and  perfection,  we  do  not  see  perhaps  that  one  in  a 
 million  actually  does.  Far  the  greatest  part  of  them 
 decay  before  they  are  improved  to  it,  and  appear  to 
 be  absolutely  destroyed.  Yet  no  one,  who  does  not 
 deny  all  final  causes,  will  deny,  that  those  seeds  and 
 bodies  which  do  attain  to  that  point  of  maturity  and 
 perfection,  answer  the  end  for  which  they  were  reaEy 
 designed  by  nature ;  and  therefore  that  nature  de- 
 signed them  for  such  perfection.  And  I  cannot  forbear 
 adding,  though  it  is  not  to  the  present  purpose,  that 
 the  appearance  of  such  an  amazing  waste  in  nature, 
 with  respect  to  these  seeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign 
 causes,  is  to  us  as  unaccountable,  as,  what  is  much 
 more  terrible,  the  present  and  future  ruin  of  so  many 
 moral  agents  by  themselves,  that  is,  by  vice. 
 
 Against  this  whole  notion  of  moral  discipline  »t 
 
287 
 
 may  be  objected,  in  another  way,  that  so  far  as  a 
 course  of  behaviour,  materially  virtuous,  proceeds 
 from  hope  and  fear,  so  far  it  is  only  a  discipline  and 
 strengthening  of  self-love.  But  doing  what  God 
 commands,  because  he  commands  it,  is  obedience, 
 though  it  proceeds  from  hope  or  fear.  And  a  course 
 of  such  obedience  will  form  habits  of  it :  and  a  con- 
 stant regard  to  veracity,  justice,  and  charity,  may 
 form  distinct  habits  of  these  particular  virtues,  and 
 will  certainly  form  habits  of  self-government,  and  of 
 denying  our  inclinations,  whenever  veracity,  justice, 
 or  charity  requires  it.  Nor  is  there  any  foundation 
 for  this  great  nicety,  with  which  some  affect  to  dis- 
 tinguish in  this  case,  in  order  to  depreciate  all  reli- 
 gion proceeding  from  hope  or  fear.  For  veracity, 
 justice  and  charity,  regard  to  God's  authority,  and 
 to  our  own  chief  interest,  are  not  only  all  three  coin- 
 cident, but  each  of  them  is,  in  itself,  a  just  and  na- 
 tural motive  or  principle  of  action.  And  he  who 
 begins  a  good  life  from  any  one  of  them,  and  perse- 
 veres in  it,  as  he  is  already  in  some  degree,  so  he 
 cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more  of  that  cha- 
 racter, which  is  correspondent  to  the  constitution  of 
 nature  as  moral,  and  to  the  relation  which  God 
 stands  in  to  us  as  moral  governor  of  it :  nor  conse- 
 quently, can  he  fail  of  obtaining  that  happiness, 
 which  this  constitution  and  relation  necessarily  sup- 
 pose connected  with  that  character. 
 
 These  several  observations,  concerning  the  active 
 principle  of  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  commands, 
 are  applicable  to  passive  submission  or  resignation  to 
 his  will ;  which  is  another  essential  part  of  a  right 
 character,  connected  with  the  former,  and  very  much 
 
288 
 
 in  our  power  to  form  ourselves  to.  It  may  be  ima- 
 gined, that  nothing  but  afflictions  can  give  occasion 
 for  or  require  this  virtue;  that  it  can  have  no  respect 
 to,  nor  be  any  way  necessary  to  qualify  for  a  state 
 of  perfect  happiness;  but  it  is  not  experience  which 
 can  make  us  think  thus.  Prosperity  itself,  whilst 
 any  thing  supposed  desirable  is  not  ours,  begets  ex- 
 travagant and  unbounded  thoughts.  Imagination  is 
 altogether  as  much  a  source  of  discontent  as  any  thing 
 in  our  external  condition.  It  is  indeed  true  that 
 there  can  be  no  scope  for  patience,  when  sorrow  shall 
 be  no  more ;  but  there  may  be  need  of  a  temper  of 
 mind,  which  shall  have  been  formed  by  patience. 
 For  though  self-love,  considered  merely  as  an  active 
 principle  leading  us  to  pursue  our  chief  interest,  can- 
 not but  be  uniformly  coincident  with  the  principle  of 
 obedience  to  God's  commands,  our  interest  being 
 rightly  understood ;  because  this  obedience,  and  the 
 pursuit  of  our  own  chief  interest,  must  be  in  every 
 case  one  and  the  same  thing ;  yet  it  may  be  ques- 
 tioned, whether  self-love,  considered  merely  as  the 
 desire  of  our  own  interest  or  happiness,  can,  from  its 
 nature,  be  thus  absolutely  and  uniformly  coincident 
 with  the  will  of  God,  any  more  than  particular  affec- 
 tions can  ;*  coincident  in  such  sort,  as  not  to  be  lia- 
 ble to  be  excited  upon  occasions  and  in  degrees, 
 impossible  to  be  gratified  consistently  with  the  con- 
 stitution of  things,  or  the  divine  appointments.  So 
 that  habits  of  resignation  may,  upon  this  account,  be 
 requisite  for  all  creatures ;  habits,  I  say,  which  sig- 
 nify what  is  formed  by  use.      However,  in  general. 
 
 *  Page  260. 
 
289 
 
 it  is  obvious,  that  both  self-love  and  particular  af- 
 fections in  human  creatures,  considered  only  as  pas- 
 sive feelings,  distort  and  rend  the  mind,  and  there- 
 fore stand  in  need  of  discipline.  Now,  denial  of 
 those  particular  affections,  in  a  course  of  active  vir- 
 tue and  obedience  to  God's  will,  has  a  tendency  to 
 moderate  them,  and  seems  also  to  have  a  tendency 
 to  habituate  the  mind  to  be  easy  and  satisfied  with 
 that  degree  of  happiness  which  is  allotted  us,  that  is, 
 to  moderate  self-love.  But  the  proper  discipline  for 
 resignation  is  affliction.  For  a  right  behaviour  un- 
 der that  trial,  recollecting  ourselves  so  as  to  consider 
 it  in  the  view  in  which  religion  teaches  us  to  consider 
 it,  as  from  the  hand  of  God ;  receiving  it  as  what  he 
 appoints,  or  thinks  proper  to  permit,  in  his  world, 
 and  under  his  government,  this  will  habituate  the 
 mind  to  a  dutiful  submission ;  and  such  submission, 
 together  with  the  active  principle  of  obedience,  make 
 up  the  temper  and  character  in  us  which  answers  to 
 his  sovereignty,  and  which  absolutely  belongs  to  the 
 condition  of  our  being,  as  dependent  creatures.  Nor 
 can  it  be  said,  that  this  is  only  breaking  the  mind  to 
 a  submission  to  mere  power ;  for  mere  power  may  be 
 accidental,  and  precarious,  and  usurped;  but  it  is 
 forming  within  ourselves  the  temper  of  resignation 
 to  his  rightful  authority,  who  is,  by  nature,  supreme 
 over  all. 
 
 Upon  the  whole,  such  a  character,  and  such  qua- 
 lifications, are  necessary  for  a  mature  state  of  life  in 
 the  present  world,  as  nature  alone  does  in  nowise  be- 
 stow, but  has  put  it  upon  us  in  great  part  to  acquire, 
 in  our  progress  from  one  stage  of  life  to  another, 
 from  childhood  to  mature  age;  put  it  upon  us  to  ac- 
 N  17 
 
290 
 
 quire  them,  by  giving  us  capacities  of  doing  it,  and 
 by  placing  us,  in  the  beginning  of  life,  in  a  condition 
 fit  for  it.  And  this  is  a  general  analogy  to  our  con- 
 dition in  the  present  world,  as  in  a  state  of  moral  dis- 
 cipline for  another.  It  is  in  vain,  then,  to  object 
 against  the  credibility  of  the  present  life  being  in- 
 tended for  this  purpose,  that  all  the  trouble  and  the 
 danger  unavoidably  accompanying  such  discipline 
 might  have  been  saved  us,  by  our  being  made  at 
 once  the  creatures  and  the  characters  which  we  were 
 to  be.  For  we  experience,  that  what  we  were  to  be, 
 was  to  be  the  effect  of  what  we  would  do ;  and  that 
 the  general  conduct  of  nature  is,  not  to  save  us 
 trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of  going 
 through  them,  and  to  put  it  upon  us  to  do  so.  Ac- 
 quirements of  our  own  experience  and  habits,  are  the 
 natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies,  and  security  against 
 our  dangers;  since  it  is  plainly  natural  to  set  ourselves 
 to  acquire  the  qualifications,  as  the  external  things 
 which  we  stand  in  need  of.  In  particular,  it  is  as 
 plainly  a  general  law  of  nature,  that  we  should,  with 
 regard  to  our  temporal  interest,  form  and  cultivate 
 practical  principles  within  us,  by  attention,  use,  and 
 discipline,  as  any  thing  whatever  is  a  natural  law ; 
 chiefly  in  the  beginning  of  life,  but  also  throughout 
 the  whole  course  of  it.  And  the  alternative  is  left 
 to  our  choice,  either  to  improve  ourselves,  and  bet- 
 ter our  condition,  or,  in  default  of  such  improvement, 
 to  remain  deficient  and  wretched.  It  is,  therefore, 
 perfectly  credible,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  that 
 the  same  may  be  our  case,  with  respect  to  the  hap- 
 piness of  a  future  state,  and  the  qualifications  neces- 
 sary for  it. 
 
291 
 
 There  is  a  third  thing,  which  may  seem  implied 
 in  the  present  world  being  a  state  of  probation,  that 
 it  is  a  theatre  of  action  for  the  manifestation  of  per- 
 sons' characters,  with  respect  to  a  future  one ;  not,  to 
 be  sure,  to  an  all-knowing  being,  but  to  his  creation, 
 or  part  of  it.  This  may,  perhaps,  be  only  a  conse- 
 quence of  our  being  in  a  state  of  probation  in  the 
 other  senses.  However,  it  is  not  impossible  that 
 men's  showing  and  making  manifest  what  is  in  their 
 heart,  what  their  real  character  is,  may  have  respect 
 to  a  future  life,  in  ways  and  manners  which  we  are 
 not  acquainted  with ;  particularly  it  may  be  a  means, 
 for  the  Author  of  Nature  does  not  appear  to  do  any 
 thing  without  means,  of  their  being  disposed  of  suita- 
 bly to  their  characters,  and  of  its  being  known  to  the 
 creation,  by  way  of  example,  that  they  are  thus  dis- 
 posed of.  But  not  to  enter  upon  any  conjectural  ac- 
 count of  this,  one  may  just  mention,  that  the  mani- 
 festation of  persons'  characters  contributes  very  much 
 in  various  ways,  to  the  carrying  on  a  great  part  of 
 that  general  course  of  nature  respecting  mankind, 
 which  comes  under  our  observation  at  present.  I 
 shall  only  add,  that  probation,  in  both  these  senses, 
 as  well  as  in  that  treated  of  in  the  preceding  chapter, 
 is  implied  in  moral  government;  since  by  persons' 
 behaviour  under  it,  their  characters  cannot  but  be  ma- 
 nifested, and,  if  they  behave  well,  improved. 
 
 n2 
 
292 
 
 CHAP.  VI. 
 
 Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  influ- 
 encing Practice. 
 
 Throughout  the  foregoing  Treatise  it  appears, 
 that  the  condition  of  mankind,  considered  as  inhabi- 
 tants of  this  world  only,  and  under  the  government 
 of  God  which  we  experience,  is  greatly  analogous 
 to  our  condition,  as  designed  for  another  world,  or 
 under  that  farther  government  which  religion  teaches 
 us.  If,  therefore,  any  assert,  as  a  fatalist  must,  that 
 the  opinion  of  universal  necessity  is  reconcileable  with 
 the  former,  there  immediately  arises  a  question  in  the 
 way  of  analogy;  whether  he  must  not  also  own  it  to 
 be  reconcileable  with  the  latter,  that  is,  with  the  sys- 
 tem of  religion  itself,  and  the  proof  of  it.  The 
 reader,  then,  will  observe,  that  the  question  now  be- 
 fore us  is  not  absolute,  whether  the  opinion  of  fate  be 
 reconcileable  with  religion;  but  hypothetical,  whether, 
 upon  supposition  of  its  being  reconcileable  with  the 
 constitution  of  nature,  it  be  not  reconcileable  with 
 religion  also  ?  or,  what  pretence  a  fatalist — not  other 
 persons,  but  a  fatalist — has  to  conclude,  from  his 
 opinion,  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  religion  ? 
 And  as  the  puzzle  and  obscurity,  which  must  un- 
 avoidably arise  from  arguing  upon  so  absurd  a  suppo- 
 sition as  that  of  universal  necessity,  will,  I  fear,  eas- 
 ily be  seen,  it  will,  I  hope,  as  easily  be  excused. 
 
 But,  since  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for  granted, 
 as  a  thing  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author 
 
293 
 
 of  Nature,  or  natural  Governor  of  the  world;  and 
 since  an  objection  may  be  made  against  the  proof  of 
 this,  from  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity,  as  it 
 may  be  supposed  that  such  necessity  will  itself  ac- 
 count for  the  origin  and  preservation  of  all  things,  it 
 is  requisite  that  this  objection  be  distinctly  answered: 
 or  that  it  be  shown,  that  a  fatality,  supposed  consis- 
 tent with  what  we  certainly  experience,  does  not  de- 
 stroy the  proof  of  an  intelligent  Author  and  Gover- 
 nor of  Nature,  before  we  proceed  to  consider,  whe- 
 ther it  destroys  the  proof  of  a  moral  governor  of  it, 
 or  of  our  being  in  a  state  of  religion. 
 
 Now,  when  it  is  said  by  a  fatalist,  that  the  whole 
 constitution  of  nature,  and  the  actions  of  men,  that 
 every  thing,  and  every  mode  and  circumstance  of 
 every  thing,  is  necessary,  and  could  not  possibly 
 have  been  otherwise,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  this 
 necessity  does  not  exclude  deliberation,  choice,  pre- 
 ference, and  acting  from  certain  principles,  and  to 
 certain  ends;  because  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted 
 experience,  acknowledged  by  all,  and  what  every  man 
 may,  every  moment,  be  conscious  of.  And  from 
 hence  it  follows,  that  necessity,  alone  and  of  itself, 
 is  in  no  sort  an  account  of  the  constitution  of  nature, 
 and  how  things  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  they 
 are ;  but  only  an  account  of  this  circumstance  relat- 
 ing to  their  origin  and  continuance,  that  they  could 
 not  have  been  otherwise  than  they  are  and  have  been. 
 The  assertion,  that  every  thing  is  by  necessity  of  na- 
 ture, is  not  an  answer  to  the  question,  Whether  the 
 world  came  into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  intelligent 
 Agent  forming  it  thus,  or  not,  but  to  quite  another 
 question,  Whether  it  came  into  being  as  it  is,  in  that 
 
294 
 
 way  and  manner  which  we  call  necessarily,  or  in  that 
 way  and  manner  which  we  call  freely.  For,  suppose 
 farther,  that  one,  who  was  a  fatalist,  and  one,  who 
 kept  to  his  natural  sense  of  things,  and  believed  him- 
 self a  free  agent,  were  disputing  together,  and  vindi- 
 cating their  respective  opinions,  and  they  should  hap- 
 pen to  instance  in  a  house,  they  would  agree  that  it  was 
 built  by  an  architect.  Their  difference  concerning  ne- 
 cessity and  freedom,  would  occasion  no  difference  of 
 judgment  concerning  this,  but  only  concerning  another 
 matter,  whether  the  architect  built  it  necessarily  or 
 freely.  Suppose,  then,  they  should  proceed  to  inquire 
 concerning  the  constitution  of  nature:  in  a  lax  way  of 
 speaking,  one  of  them  might  say,  it  was  by  necessity, 
 and  the  other  by  freedom;  but  if  they  had  any  meaning 
 to  their  words,  as  the  latter  must  mean  a  free  agent, 
 so  the  former  must  at  length  be  reduced  to  mean  an 
 agent,  whether  he  would  say  one  or  more,  acting  by 
 necessity;  for  abstract  notions  can  do  nothing.  In- 
 deed, we  ascribe  to  God  a  necessary  existence,  un- 
 caused by  any  agent.  For  we  find  within  ourselves 
 the  idea  of  infinity,  that  is,  immensity,  and  eternity, 
 impossible,  even  in  imagination,  to  be  removed  out 
 of  being.  We  seem  to  discern,  intuitively,  that 
 there  must,  and  cannot  but  be,  somewhat,  external 
 to  ourselves,  answering  this  idea,  or  the  archetype  of 
 it.  And  from  hence  (for  this  abstract,  as  much  as 
 any  other,  implies  a  concrete)  we  conclude,  that  there 
 is,  and  cannot  but  be,  an  infinite  and  immense  eter- 
 nal Being  existing,  prior  to  all  design  contributing 
 to  his  existence,  and  exclusive  of  it.  And  from  the 
 scantiness  of  language,  a  manner  of  speaking  has  been 
 introduced,  that  necessity  is  the  foundation,  the  rea- 
 
295 
 
 son,  the  account  of  the  existence  of  God.  But  it  is 
 not  alleged,  nor  cannot  be  at  all  intended,  that  every 
 thing  exists  as  it  does  by  this  kind  of  necessity,  a 
 necessity  antecedent  in  nature  to  design;  it  cannot, 
 I  say,  be  meant,  that  every  thing  exists  as  it  does, 
 by  this  kind  of  necessity,  upon  several  accounts;  and 
 particularly,  because  it  is  admitted  that  design,  in  the 
 actions  of  men,  contributes  to  many  alterations  in  na- 
 ture. For,  if  any  deny  this,  I  shall  not  pretend  to 
 reason  with  them. 
 
 From  these  things  it  follows,  1st,  That  when  a 
 fatalist  asserts  that  every  thing  is  by  necessity,  he 
 must  mean,  by  an  agent  acting  necessarily :  he  must, 
 I  say,  mean  this;  for  I  am  very  sensible  he  would 
 not  choose  to  mean  it :  And,  2dly,  That  the  neces- 
 sity, by  which  such  an  agent  is  supposed  to  act,  does 
 not  exclude  intelligence  and  design.  So  that,  were 
 the  system  of  fatality  admitted,  it  would  just  as  much 
 account  for  the  formation  of  the  world,  as  for  the 
 structure  of  a  house,  and  no  more.  Necessity  as 
 much  requires  and  supposes  a  necessary  agent,  as 
 freedom  requires  and  supposes  a  free  agent  to  be  the 
 lormer  of  the  world.  And  the  appearances  of  design 
 and  of  final  causes  in  the  constitution  of  nature,  as 
 really  prove  this  acting  agent  to  be  an  intelligent  de- 
 signer, or  to  act  from  choice,  upon  the  scheme  of  ne- 
 cessity, supposed  possible,  as  upon  that  of  freedom. 
 
 It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  necessity  does 
 not  destroy  the  proof,  that  there  is  an  intelligent 
 Author  of  nature  and  natural  Governor  of  the 
 world,  the  present  question,  which  the  analogy  be- 
 fore-mentioned*   suggests,  and  which,   I  think,    it 
 
 *  Page  292- 
 
296 
 
 will  answer,  is  this :  W  hether  the  opinion  of  ne~ 
 eessity,  supposed  consistent  with  possibility,  with  the 
 constitution  of  the  world,  and  the  natural  govern- 
 ment which  we  experienced  exercised  over  it,  de- 
 stroys all  reasonable  ground  of  belief,  that  we  are 
 in  a  state  of  religion;  or  whether  that  opinion  be 
 reconcileable  with  religion,  with  the  system  and  the 
 proof  of  it. 
 
 Suppose,  then,  a  fatalist  to  educate  any  one,  from 
 his  youth  up,  in  his  own  principles ;  that  the  child 
 should  reason  upon  them,  and  conclude,  that  since 
 he  cannot  possibly  behave  otherwise  than  he  does, 
 he  is  not  a  subject  of  blame  or  commendation,  nor 
 can  deserve  to  be  rewarded  or  punished;  imagine 
 him  to  eradicate  the  very  perceptions  of  blame  and 
 commendation  out  of  his  mind  by  means  of  this  sys- 
 tem ;  to  form  his  temper,  and  character,  and  beha- 
 viour to  it;  and  from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment  he 
 was  to  expect,  say,  from  reasonable  men,  upon  his 
 coming  abroad  into  the  world ;  as  the  fatalist  judges 
 from  this  system,  what  he  is  to  expect  from  the  Au- 
 thor of  nature,  and  with  regard  to  a  future  state; 
 I  cannot  forbear  stopping  here  to  ask,  whether  any 
 one  of  common  sense  would  think  fit,  that  a  child 
 should  be  put  upon  these  speculations,  and  be  left 
 to  apply  them  to  practice?  And  a  man  has  little 
 pretence  to  reason,  who  is  not  sensible  that  we  are 
 all  children  in  speculations  of  this  kind.  However, 
 the  child  would  doubtless  be  highly  delighted  to  find 
 himself  freed  from  the  restraints  of  fear  and  shame, 
 with  which  his  playfellows  were  fettered  and  embar- 
 rassed; and  highly  conceited  in  his  superior  know- 
 ledge, so  far  beyond  his  years.  But  conceit  and 
 vanity  would  be  the  least  bad  part  of  the  influence 
 
297 
 
 which  these  principles  must  have,  when  thus  reason- 
 ed and  acted  upon,  during  the  course  of  his  educa- 
 tion. He  must  either  be  allowed  to  go  on,  and  be 
 the  plague  of  all  about  him,  and  himself  too,  even 
 to  his  own  destruction,  or  else  correction  must  be 
 continually  made  use  of,  to  supply  the  want  of  those 
 natural  perceptions  of  blame  and  commendation, 
 which  we  have  supposed  to  be  removed,  and  to  give 
 him  a  practical  impression  of  what  he  had  reasoned 
 himself  out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  was,  in  fact, 
 an  accountable  child,  and  to  be  punished  for  doing 
 what  he  was  forbid.  It  is  therefore  in  reality  im- 
 possible, but  that  the  correction  which  he  must  meet 
 with,  in  the  course  of  his  education,  must  convince 
 him,  that  if  the  scheme  he  was  instructed  in  were 
 not  false,  yet  that  he  reasoned  inconclusively  upon 
 it,  and,  somehow  or  other,  misapplied  it  to  practice 
 and  common  life;  as  what  the  fatalist  experiences  of 
 the  conduct  of  Providence  at  present  ought,  in  all 
 reason,  to  convince  him,  that  his  scheme  is  misap- 
 plied, when  applied  to  the  subject  of  religion.*  But, 
 supposing  the  child's  temper  could  remain  still 
 formed  to  the  system,  and  his  expectation  of  the 
 treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the  world  be  regulated 
 by  it,  so  as  to  expect  that  no  reasonable  man  would 
 blame  or  punish  him  for  any  thing  he  should  do, 
 because  he  could  not  help  doing  it ;  upon  this  sup- 
 position, it  is  manifest  he  would,  upon  his  coming 
 abroad  into  the  world,  be  insupportable  to  society, 
 and  the  treatment  which  he  would  receive  from  it, 
 would  render  it  so  to  him;  and  he  could  not  fail  of 
 doing  somewhat  very  soon,  for  which  he  would  be 
 
 *  Page  2S9. 
 
 n3 
 
298 
 
 delivered  over  into  the  hands  of  civil  justice.  And 
 thus,  in  the  end,  he  would  be  convinced  of  the  ob- 
 ligations he  was  under  to  his  wise  instructor.  Or 
 suppose  this  scheme  of  fatality,  in  any  other  way, 
 applied  to  practice,  such  practical  application  of  it 
 will  be  found  equally  absurd,  equally  fallacious,  in 
 a  practical  sense  :  For  instance,  that  if  a  man  be  des- 
 tined to  live  such  a  time,  he  shall  live  to  it,  though 
 he  take  no  care  of  his  own  preservation ;  or  if  he  be 
 destined  to  die  before  that  time,  no  care  can  prevent  it ; 
 therefore  all  care  about  preserving  one's  life  is  to  be 
 neglected :  which  is  the  fallacy  instanced  in  by  the 
 ancients.  But  now,  on  the  contrary,  none  of  these 
 practical  absurdities  can  be  drawn,  from  reasoning 
 upon  the  supposition,  that  we  are  free ;  but  all  such 
 reasoning,  with  regard  to  the  common  affairs  of  life, 
 is  justified  by  experience.  And,  therefore,  though 
 it  were  admitted  that  this  opinion  of  necessity  were 
 speculatively  true,  yet,  with  regard  to  practice,  it  is 
 as  if  it  were  false,  so  far  as  our  experience  reaches ; 
 that  is,  to  the  whole  of  our  present  life.  For,  the 
 constitution  of  the  present  world,  and  the  condition 
 in  which  we  are  actually  placed,  is  as  if  we  were  free. 
 And  it  may  perhaps  justly  be  concluded,  that  since 
 the  whole  process  of  action,  through  every  step  of 
 it,  suspense,  deliberation,  inclining  one  way,  deter- 
 mining, and  at  last  doing  as  we  determine,  is  as  if 
 we  were  free,  therefore  we  are  so.  But  the  thing 
 here  insisted  upon  is,  that  under  the  present  natural 
 government  of  the  world,  we  find  we  are  treated  and 
 dealt  with  as  if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all  considera- 
 tion whether  we  are  or  not.  Were  this  opinion,  there- 
 fore, of  necessity,  admitted  to  be  ever  so  true,  yet 
 such  is  in  fact  our  condition  and  the  natural  course 
 
299 
 
 of  things,  that,  whenever  we  apply  it  to  life  and 
 practice,  this  application  always  misleads  us,  and 
 cannot  but  mislead  us,  in  a  most  dreadful  manner, 
 with  regard  to  our  present  interest.  And  how  can 
 people  think  themselves  so  very  secure  then,  that 
 the  same  application  of  the  same  opinion  may  not 
 mislead  them  also,  in  some  analogous  manner,  with 
 respect  to  a  future,  a  more  general,  and  more  im- 
 portant interest  ?  For,  religion  being  a  practical  sub- 
 ject, and  the  analogy  of  nature  showing  us,  that  we 
 have  not  faculties  to  apply  this  opinion,  were  it  a 
 true  one,  to  practical  subjects ;  whenever  we  do  ap- 
 ply it  to  the  subject  of  religion,  and  thence  conclude, 
 that  we  are  free  from  its  obligations,  it  is  plain  this 
 conclusion  cannot  be  depended  upon.  There  will 
 still  remain  just  reason  to  think,  whatever  appear- 
 ances are,  that  we  deceive  ourselves;  in  somewhat 
 of  a  like  manner  as  when  people  fancy  they  can 
 chaw  contradictory  conclusions  from  the  idea  of  in- 
 Inity. 
 
 From  these  things  together,  the  attentive  reader 
 will  see,  it  follows,  that  if,  upon  supposition  of  free- 
 dom, the  evidence  of  religion  be  conclusive,  it  re 
 mains  so,  upon  supposition  of  necessity;  because  the 
 notion  of  necessity  is  not  applicable  to  practical  sub- 
 jects ;  that  is,  with  respect  to  them,  is  as  if  it  were 
 not  true.  Nor  does  this  contain  any  reflection  upon 
 reason,  but  only  upon  what  is  unreasonable.  For, 
 to  pretend  to  act  upon  reason,  in  opposition  to  prac- 
 tical principles  which  the  Author  of  our  nature  gave 
 us  to  act  upon,  and  to  pretend  to  apply  our  reason 
 to  subjects,  with  regard  to  which  our  own  short 
 views,  and  even  our  experience,  will  show  us  it  can- 
 
300 
 
 not  be  depended  upon, — and  such,  at  best,  the  sub- 
 ject of  necessity  must  be, — this  is  vanity,  conceit, 
 and  unreasonableness. 
 
 But  this  is  not  all.  For  we  find  within  ourselves 
 a  will,  and  are  conscious  of  a  character.  Now,  if 
 this,  in  us,  be  reconcileable  with  fate,  it  is  reconcile- 
 able  with  it  in  the  Author  of  nature.  And,  besides, 
 natural  government  and  final  causes  imply  a  charac- 
 ter and  a  will  in  the  Governor  and  Designer;*  a  will 
 concerning  the  creatures  whom  he  governs.  The 
 Author  of  nature,  then,  being  certainly  of  some 
 character  or  other,  notwithstanding  necessity,  it  is 
 evident  this  necessity  is  as  reconcileable  with  the 
 particular  character  of  benevolence,  veracity,  and 
 justice  in  him,  which  attributes  are  the  foundation 
 of  religion,  as  with  any  other  character;  since  we 
 find  this  necessity  no  more  hinders  men  from  being 
 benevolent  than  cruel;  true,  than  faithless;  just, 
 than  unjust ;  or,  if  the  fatalist  pleases,  what  we  call 
 unjust.  For  it  is  said,  indeed,  that  what,  upon  sup- 
 position of  freedom,  would  be  just  punishment,  upon 
 supposition  of  necessity,  becomes  manifestly  unjust ; 
 because  it  is  punishment  inflicted  for  doing  that 
 which  persons  could  not  avoid  doing.  As  if  the 
 necessity,  which  is  supposed  to  destroy  the  injustice 
 of  murder,  for  instance,  would  not  also  destroy  the 
 injustice  of  punishing  it.  However,  as  little  to  the 
 purpose  as  this  objection  is  in  itself,  it  is  very  much 
 
 *  By  will  and  character  is  meant  that,  which,  in  speaking  of 
 men,  we  should  express,  not  only  by  these  words,  but  also  by 
 the  words  temper,  taste,  dispositions,  practical  principles ;  that  ivhole 
 frame  of  mind,  from,  whence  we  act  in  one  manner  rather  than  an- 
 other. 
 
301 
 
 to  the  purpose  to  observe  from  it,  how  the  notions 
 of  justice  and  injustice  remain,  even  whilst  we  en- 
 deavour to  suppose  them  removed ;  how  they  force 
 themselves  upon  the  mind,  even  whilst  we  are  mak- 
 ing suppositions  destructive  of  them :  for  there  is  not, 
 perhaps,  a  man  in  the  world,  but  would  be  ready  to 
 make  this  objection  at  first  thought. 
 
 But  though  it  is  most  evident,  that  universal  ne- 
 cessity, if  it  be  reconcileable  with  any  thing,  is  re- 
 concileable  with  that  character  in  the  Author  of  na- 
 ture, which  is  the  foundation  of  religion;  "yet, 
 does  it  not  plainly  destroy  the  proof,  that  he  is  of 
 that  character,  and  consequently  the  proof  of  reli- 
 gion ?"  By  no  means.  For  we  find  that  happiness 
 and  miseiy  are  not  our  fate  in  any  such  sense  as  not 
 to  be  the  consequences  of  our  behaviour,  but  that 
 they  are  the  consequences  of  it.*  We  find  God 
 exercises  the  same  kind  of  government  over  us,  with 
 that  which  a  father  exercises  over  his  children,  and 
 a  civil  magistrate  over  his  subjects.  Now,  whatever 
 becomes  of  abstract  questions  concerning  liberty  and 
 necessity,  it  evidently  appears  to  us,  that  veracity 
 and  justice  must  be  the  natural  rule  and  measure  of 
 exercising  this  authority,  or  government,  to  a  Being, 
 who  can  have  no  competitions,  or  interfering  of  inter- 
 ests, with  his  creatures  and  his  subjects. 
 
 But  as  the  doctrine  of  liberty,  though  we  expe- 
 rience its  truth,  may  be  perplexed  with  difficulties 
 which  run  up  into  the  most  abstruse  of  all  specula- 
 tions, and  as  the  opinion  of  necessity  seems  to  be  the 
 very  basis  upon  which  infidelity  grounds  itself,  it 
 
 *  Chap.  II. 
 
302 
 
 may  be  of  some  use  to  offer  a  more  particular  proof 
 of  the  obligations  of  religion,  which  may  distinctly 
 be  shown  not  to  be  destroyed  by  this  opinion. 
 
 The  proof,  from  final  causes,  of  an  intelligent 
 Author  of  nature,  is  not  affected  by  the  opinion  of 
 necessity ;  supposing  necessity  a  thing  possible  in  it- 
 self, and  reconcileable  with  the  constitution  of  things.* 
 And  it  is  a  matter  of  fact,  independent  on  this  or 
 any  other  speculation,  that  he  governs  the  world  by 
 the  method  of  rewards  and  punishments;-]-  and  also 
 that  he  hath  given  us  a  moral  faculty,  by  which  we 
 distinguish  between  actions,  and  approve  some  as 
 virtuous  and  of  good  desert,  and  disapprove  others 
 as  vicious  and  of  ill  desert.f  Now,  this  moral  dis- 
 cernment implies,  in  the  notion  of  it,  a  rule  of  action, 
 and  a  rule  of  a  very  peculiar  kind ;  for  it  carries  in 
 it  authority  and  a  right  of  direction;  authority  in 
 such  a  sense,  as  that  we  cannot  depart  from  it  with- 
 out being  self-condemned.  §  And  that  the  dictates 
 of  this  moral  faculty,  which  are  by  nature  a  rule  to 
 us,  are  moreover  the  laws  of  God,  laws  in  a  sense 
 including  sanctions,  may  be  thus  proved.  Con- 
 sciousness of  a  rule  or  guide  of  action,  in  creatures 
 who  are  capable  of  considering  it  as  given  them  by 
 their  Maker,  not  only  raises  immediately  a  sense  of 
 duty,  but  also  a  sense  of  security  in  following  it,  and 
 of  danger  in  deviating  from  it.  A  direction  of  the 
 Author  of  nature,  given  to  creatures  capable  of  look- 
 ing upon  it  as  such,  is  plainly  a  command  from  him : 
 and  a  command  from  him  necessarily  includes  in  it, 
 
 *  Page  292,  &e.  f  Chap.  II. 
 
 t  Dissertation  II.  §  Sermon  II.  at  the  Roll- 
 
303 
 
 at  least,  an  implicit  promise  in  case  of  obedience,  or 
 threatening  in  case  of  disobedience.  But  then  the 
 sense  or  perception  of  good  and  ill  desert,*  which  is 
 contained  in  the  moral  discernment,  renders  the  sanc- 
 tion explicit,  and  makes  it  appear,  as  one  may  say, 
 expressed.  For,  since  his  method  of  government  is 
 to  reward  and  punish  actions,  his  having  annexed  to 
 some  actions  an  inseparable  sense  of  good  desert,  and 
 to  others  of  ill,  this  surely  amounts  to  declaring  upon 
 whom  his  punishments  shall  be  inflicted,  and  his  re- 
 wards be  bestowed.  For  he  must  have  given  us  this 
 discernment  and  sense  of  things,  as  a  presentiment 
 of  what  is  to  be  hereafter ;  that  is,  by  way  of  infor- 
 mation before-hand,  what  we  are  finally  to  expect  in 
 this  world.  There  is,  then,  most  evident  ground  to 
 think,  that  the  government  of  God,  upon  the  whole, 
 will  be  found  to  correspond  to  the  nature  which  he. 
 has  given  us,  and  that,  in  the  upshot  and  issue  of 
 things,  happiness  and  misery  shall,  in  fact  and  event, 
 be  made  to  follow  virtue  and  vice  respectively ;  as  he 
 has  already,  in  so  peculiar  a  manner,  associated  the 
 ideas  of  them  in  our  minds.  And  from  hence  might 
 easily  be  deduced  the  obligations  of  religious  wor- 
 ship, were  it  only  to  be  considered  as  a  means  of 
 preserving  upon  our  minds  a  sense  of  this  moral  go- 
 vernment of  God,  and  securing  our  obedience  to  it ; 
 which  yet  is  an  extremely  imperfect  view  of  that  most 
 important  duty. 
 
 Now,  I  say,  no  objection  from  necessity  can  lie 
 against  this  general  proof  of  religion :  none  against 
 the  proposition  reasoned  upon,  that  we  have  such  a 
 
 *  Dissertation  II. 
 
304 
 
 moral  faculty  and  discernment;  because  this  is  a 
 mere  matter  of  fact,  a  thing  of  experience,  that  hu- 
 man kind  is  thus  constituted :  none  against  the  con- 
 clusion; because  it  is  immediate,  and  wholly  from 
 this  fact.  For  the  conclusion  that  God  will  finally 
 reward  the  righteous  and  punish  the  wicked,  is  not 
 here  drawn,  from  its  appearing  to  us  fit*  that  he 
 should,  but  from  its  appearing,  that  he  has  told  us  he 
 will.  And  this  he  hath  certainly  told  us,  in  the 
 promise  and  threatening,  which,  it  hath  been  ob- 
 served, the  notion  of  a  command  impiies,  and  the 
 sense  of  good  and  ill  desert,  which  he  has  given  us, 
 more  distinctly  expresses.  And  this  reasoning  from 
 fact  is  confirmed,  and,  in  some  degree,  even  verified, 
 by  other  facts ;  by  the  natural  tendencies  of  virtue 
 and  of  vice  ;f  and  by  this,  that  God,  in  the  natural 
 course  of  his  providence,  punishes  vicious  actions, 
 as  mischievous  to  society,  and  also  vicious  actions, 
 as  such,  in  the  strictest  sense.J      So  that  the  gene- 
 
 *  However  I  am  far  from  intending  to  deny,  that  the  will  of 
 God  is  determined  by  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and  reason  of  the 
 case  ;  though  one  chooses  to  decline  matters  of  such  abstract 
 speculation,  and  to  speak  with  caution  when  one  does  speak  of 
 them.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to  say,  that  it  is  Jit  and  reasonable 
 for  every  one  to  consult  las  own  happiness,  then  fitness  of  action,  or 
 the  rigid  and  reason  of  the  case,  is  an  intelligible  manner  of  speak- 
 ing. And  it  seems  as  inconceivable,  to  suppose  God  to  approve 
 one  course  of  action,  or  one  end,  preferably  to  another,  which  yet 
 his  acting  at  all  from  design  implies  that  he  does,  without  sup- 
 posing somewhat  prior  in  that  end,  to  be  the  ground  of  the  pre- 
 ference ;  as  to  suppose  him  to  discez'n  an  abstract  proposition  to 
 be  true,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  to  it  to  be  the  ground 
 of  the  discernment.  It  doth  not,  therefore,  appear,  that  moral 
 right  is  any  more  relative  to  perception  than  abstract  truth  is  ;  or 
 that  it  is  any  more  improper  to  speak  of  the  fitness  and  Tightness 
 of  actions  and  ends,  as  founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  than  to 
 speak  of  abstract  truth  as  thus  founded. 
 
 t  Page  23S.  J  Page  230,  &c. 
 
305 
 
 ral  proof  of  religion  is  unanswerably  real,  even  upon 
 the  wild  supposition  which  we  are  arguing  upon. 
 
 It  must  likewise  be  observed  farther,  that  natural 
 religion  hath,  besides  this,  an  external  evidence, 
 which  the  doctrine  of  necessity,  if  it  could  be  true, 
 would  not  affect.  For,  suppose  a  person,  by  the 
 observations  and  reasoning  above,  or  by  any  other, 
 convinced  of  the  truth  of  religion ;  that  there  is  a 
 God,  who  made  the  world,  who  is  the  moral  Gover- 
 nor and  Judge  of  mankind,  and  will,  upon  the  whole, 
 deal  with  every  one  according  to  his  works ;  I  say, 
 suppose  a  person  convinced  of  this  by  reason,  but 
 to  know  nothing  at  all  of  antiquity,  or  the  present 
 state  of  mankind,  it  would  be  natural  for  such  a  one 
 to  be  inquisitive,  what  was  the  history  of  this  system 
 of  doctrine ;  at  what  time,  and  in  what  manner,  it 
 came  first  into  the  world ;  and  whether  it  were  be- 
 lieved by  any  considerable  part  of  it.  And  were  he 
 upon  inquiry  to  find,  that  a  particular  person,  in  a 
 late  age,  first  of  all  proposed  it  as  a  deduction  of 
 reason,  and  that  mankind  were  before  wholly  igno- 
 rant of  it;  then,  though  its  evidence  from  reason 
 would  remain,  there  would  be  no  additional  proba- 
 bility of  its  truth,  from  the  account  of  its  discovery. 
 But,  instead  of  this  being  the  fact  of  the  case,  on 
 the  contrary,  he  would  find  what  could  not  but  af- 
 ford him  a  very  strong  confirmation  of  its  truth  : 
 Fir  sty  That  somewhat  of  this  system,  with  more  or 
 fewer  additions  and  alterations,  hath  been  professed 
 in  all  ages  and  countries  of  which  we  have  any  cer- 
 tain information  relating  to  this  matter.  Secondly, 
 That  it  is  certain  historical  fact,  so  far  as  we  can 
 trace  tilings  up,  that  this  whole  system  of  belief, 
 
30fi 
 
 that  there  is  one  God,  the  Creator  and  moral  Go- 
 vernor of  the  world,  and  that  mankind  is  in  a  state 
 of  religion,  was  received  in  the  first  ages.  And, 
 thirdly.  That  as  there  is  no  hint  or  intimation  in 
 history,  that  this  system  was  first  reasoned  out;  so 
 there  is  express  historical  or  traditional  evidence,  as 
 ancient  as  history,  that  it  was  taught  first  by  reve- 
 lation. Now,  these  things  must  be  allowed  to  be 
 of  great  weight.  The  first  of  them,  general  con- 
 sent, shows  this  system  to  be  conformable  to  the 
 common  sense  of  mankind.  The  second,  namely, 
 that  religion  was  believed  in  the  first  ages  of  the 
 world,  especially  as  it  does  not  appear  that  there 
 were  then  any  superstitious  or  false  additions  to  it, 
 cannot  but  be  a  farther  confirmation  of  its  truth. 
 For  it  is  a  proof  of  this  alternative ;  either  that  it 
 came  into  the  world  by  revelation,  or  that  it  is  natu- 
 ral, obvious,  and  forces  itself  upon  the  mind.  The 
 former  of  these  is  the  conclusion  of  learned  men. 
 And  whoever  will  consider,  how  unapt  for  specula- 
 tion rude  and  uncultivated  minds  are,  will,  perhaps 
 from  hence  alone,  be  strongly  inclined  to  believe  it 
 the  truth.  And  as  it  is  shown  in  the  second  part* 
 of  this  Treatise,  that  there  is  nothing  of  such  pe- 
 culiar presumption  against  a  revelation  in  the  be- 
 ginning of  the  world,  as  there  is  supposed  to  be 
 against  subsequent  ones;  a  sceptic  could  not,  I 
 think,  give  any  account,  which  would  appear  more 
 probable  even  to  himself,  of  the  early  pretences  to 
 revelation,  than  by  supposing  some  real  original  one, 
 from   whence   they  were    copied.      And    the    third 
 
 *  Chap.  2. 
 
307 
 
 thing  above-mentioned,  that  there  is  express  histo- 
 rical or  traditional  evidence,  as  ancient  as  history, 
 of  the  system  of  religion  being  taught  mankind  by 
 revelation;  this  must  be  admitted  as  some  degree  of 
 real  proof,  that  it  was  so  taught.  For  why  should 
 not  the  most  ancient  tradition  be  admitted  as  some 
 additional  proof  of  a  fact,  against  which  there  is  no 
 presumption?  And  this  proof  is  mentioned  here, 
 because  it  has  its  weight  to  show,  that  religion  came 
 into  the  world  by  revelation,  prior  to  all  considera- 
 tion, of  the  proper  authority  of  any  book  supposed 
 to  contain  it;  and  even  prior  to  all  consideration, 
 whether  the  revelation  itself  be  uncorruptly  handed 
 down  and  related,  or  mixed  and  darkened  with  fables. 
 Thus  the  historical  account  which  we  have,  of  the 
 origin  of  religion,  taking  in  all  circumstances,  is  a 
 real  confirmation  of  its  truth,  no  way  affected  by  the 
 opinion  of  necessity.  And  the  external  evidence, 
 even  of  natural  religion,  is  by  no  means  inconsider- 
 able. 
 
 But  it  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to 
 be  recollected  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion, 
 which  are  only  general,  that  as  speculative  reason 
 may  be  neglected,  prejudiced,  and  deceived,  so 
 also  may  our  moral  understanding  be  impaired 
 and  perverted,  and  the  dictates  of  it  not  impar- 
 tially attended  to.  This,  indeed,  proves  nothing 
 ligainst  the  reality  of  our  speculative  or  practical 
 faculties  of  perception ;  against  their  being  intended 
 by  nature  to  inform  us  in  the  theory  of  things,  and 
 instruct  us  how  we  are  to  behave,  and  what  we  are 
 to  expect,  in  consequence  of  our  behaviour.  Yet 
 our  liableness,  in  the  degree  we  are  liable,  to  preju- 
 
308 
 
 dice  and  perversion,  is  a  most  serious  admonition  to 
 us  to  be  upon  our  guard,  with  respect  to  what  is  of 
 such  consequence,  as  our  determinations  concerning 
 virtue  and  religion;  and  particularly,  not  to  take 
 custom,  and  fashion,  and  slight  notions  of  honour, 
 or  imaginations  of  present  ease,  use,  and  conveni- 
 ence to  mankind,  for  the  only  moral  rule.* 
 
 The  foregoing  observations,  drawn  from  the  na- 
 ture of  the  thing,  and  the  history  of  religion, 
 amount,  when  taken  together,  to  a  real  practical 
 proof  of  it,  not  to  be  confuted;  such  a  proof  as, 
 considering  the  infinite  importance  of  the  thing,  I 
 apprehend,  would  be  admitted  fully  sufficient,  in 
 reason,  to  influence  the  actions  of  men,  who  act 
 upon  thought  and  reflection;  if  it  were  admitted 
 that  there  is  no  proof  of  the  contrary.  But  it  may 
 be  said,  "  There  are  many  probabilities,  which  can- 
 not indeed  be  confuted;  that  is,  shown  to  be  no 
 probabilities,  and  yet  may  be  overbalanced  by  greater 
 probabilities  on  the  other  side;  much  more  by  de- 
 monstration. And  there  is  no  occasion  to  object 
 against  particular  arguments  alleged  for  an  opinion, 
 when  the  opinion  itself  may  be  clearly  shown  to  be 
 false,  without  meddling  with  such  arguments  at  all, 
 but  leaving  them  just  as  they  are.f  Now,  the 
 method  of  government  by  rewards  and  punishments, 
 and  especially  rewarding  and  punishing  good  and  ill 
 desert,  as  such,  respectively,  must  go  upon  suppo- 
 sition, that  we  are  free,  and  not  necessary  agents. 
 And  it  is  incredible,  that  the  Author  of  nature 
 should  govern  us  upon  a  supposition  as  true,  which 
 
 *  Dissertation  2.  f  Page  171,  180. 
 
309 
 
 he  knows  to  be  false ;  and  therefore  absurd  to  think 
 lie  will  reward  or  punish  us  for  our  actions  here- 
 after ;  especially  that  he  will  do  it  under  the  notion, 
 that  they  are  of  good  or  ill  desert."  Here,  then, 
 the  matter  is  brought  to  a  point.  And  the  answer 
 to  all  this  is  full,  and  not  to  be  evaded:  that  the 
 whole  constitution  and  course  of  things,  the  whole 
 analogy  of  providence  shows,  beyond  possibility  of 
 doubt,  that  the  conclusion  from  this  reasoning-  is 
 false,  wherever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine  of 
 freedom,  indeed,  clearly  shows  where — in  supposing 
 ourselves  necessary,  when  in  truth  we  are  free 
 agents.  But,  upon  the  supposition  of  necessity? 
 the  fallacy  lies  in  taking  for  granted,  that  it  is  in- 
 credible necessary  agents  should  be  rewarded  and 
 punished.  But,  that,  somehow  or  other,  the  con- 
 clusion now  mentioned  is  false,  is  most  certain. 
 For  it  is  fact,  that  God  does  govern  even  brute 
 creatures  by  the  method  of  rewards  and  punish- 
 ments, in  the  natural  course  of  things.  And  men 
 are  rewarded  and  punished  for  their  actions,  punish- 
 ed for  actions  mischievous  to  society  as  being  so, 
 punished  for  vicious  actions  as  such,  bv  the  natural 
 instrumentality  of  each  other,  under  the  present 
 conduct  of  Providence.  Nay,  even  the  affection 
 of  gratitude,  and  the  passion  of  resentment,  and 
 the  rewards  and  punishments  following  from  them, 
 which  in  general  are  to  be  considered  as  natural. 
 that  is,  from  the  Author  of  nature  :  these  rewards 
 and  punishments,  being  naturally*  annexed  to  ac- 
 tions considered  as  implying  good  intention  and  good 
 
 •Sermon  8fli,  at  the  R 
 
310 
 
 desert,  ill  intention  and  ill  desert ;  these  natural  re- 
 wards and  punishments,  I  say,  are  as  much  a  con- 
 tradiction to  the  conclusion  above,  and  show  its 
 falsehood,  as  a  more  exact  and  complete  rewarding 
 and  punishing  of  good  and  ill  desert,  as  such.  So 
 that,  if  it  be  incredible  that  necessary  agents  should 
 be  thus  rewarded  and  punished,  then  men  are  not 
 necessary,  but  free ;  since  it  is  matter  of  fact  that 
 they  are  thus  rewarded  and  punished.  But  if,  on 
 the  contrary,  which  is  the  supposition  we  have  been 
 arguing  upon,  it  be  insisted,  that  men  are  necessary 
 agents,  then  there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the  far- 
 ther  supposition  of  necessary  agents  being  thus  re- 
 warded and  punished;  since  we  ourselves  are  thus 
 dealt  with. 
 
 From  the  whole,  therefore,  it  must  follow,  that 
 a  necessity  supposed  possible,  and  reconcileable  with 
 the  constitution  of  things,  does  in  no  sort  prove, 
 that  the  Author  of  nature  will  not,  nor  destroy  the 
 proof  that  he  will,  finally,  and  upon  the  whole,  in 
 his  eternal  government,  render  his  creatures  happy 
 or  miserable,  by  some  means  or  other,  as  they  be- 
 have well  or  ill.  Or,  to  express  this  conclusion  in 
 words  conformable  to  the  title  of  the  chapter,  the 
 analogy  of  nature  shows  us,  that  the  opinion  of  ne- 
 cessity, considered  as  practical,  is  false.  And  if 
 necessity,  upon  the  supposition  above-mentioned, 
 doth  not  destroy  the  proof  of  natural  religion,  it 
 evidently  makes  no  alteration  in  the  proof  of  re- 
 vealed. 
 
 From  these  things,  likewise,  we  may  learn  in 
 what  sense  to  understand  that  general  assertion, 
 that  the  opinion  of  necessity  is  essentially  destruc- 
 
311 
 
 tivc  of  all  religion.  First,  In  a  practical  sense; 
 that  by  this  notion  atheistical  men  pretend  to  satisfy 
 and  encourage  themselves  in  vice,  and  justify  to 
 others  their  disregard  to  all  religion.  And,  secondly, 
 In  the  strictest  sense ;  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to 
 the  whole  constitution  of  nature,  and  to  what  we 
 may  every  moment  experience  in  ourselves,  and  so 
 overturns  every  thing.  But  by  no  means  is  this 
 assertion  to  be  understood,  as  if  necessity,  suppos- 
 ing it  could  possibly  be  reconciled  with  the  consti- 
 tution of  things,  and  with  what  we  experience,  were 
 not  also  reconcileable  with  religion  *  for  upon  this 
 supposition  it  demonstrably  is  so. 
 
312 
 
 CHAP.  VII. 
 
 Of  the  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a  Scheme, 
 or  Constitution,  imperfectly  comprehended. 
 
 Though  it  be,  as  it  cannot  but  be,  acknowledged, 
 that  the  analogy  of  nature  gives  a  strong  credibility 
 to  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  and  to  the  several 
 particular  things  contained  in  it,  considered  as  so 
 many  matters  of  fact;  and  likewise  that  it  shows  this 
 credibility  not  to  be  destroyed  by  any  notions  of  ne- 
 cessity; yet  still,  objections  may  be  insisted  upon 
 against  the  wisdom,  equity,  and  goodness  of  the 
 divine  government,  implied  in  the  notion  of  religion, 
 and  against  the  method  by  which  this  government  is 
 conducted,  to  which  objections  analogy  can  be  no 
 direct  answer.  For  the  credibility,  or  the  certain 
 truth,  of  a  matter  of  fact,  does  not  immediately  prove 
 any  thing  concerning  the  wisdom  or  goodness  of  it ; 
 and  analogy  can  do  no  more,  immediately  or  directly, 
 than  show  such  and  such  things  to  be  true  or  cre- 
 dible, considered  only  as  matters  of  fact,  But  still, 
 if,  upon  supposition  of  a  moral  constitution  of  nature 
 and  a  moral  government  over  it,  analogy  suggests 
 and  makes  it  credible,  that  this  government  must  be 
 a  scheme,  system  or  constitution  of  government,  as 
 distinguished  from  a  number  of  single  unconnected 
 acts  of  distributive  justice  and  goodness ;  and  like- 
 wise that  it  must  be  a  scheme,  so  imperfectly  com- 
 prehended, and  of  such  a  sort  in  other  respects,  as 
 to  afford  a  direct   general  answer  to   all  objections 
 
313 
 
 against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  it;  then  analogy 
 is,  remotely,  of  great  service  in  answering  those  ob- 
 jections, both  by  suggesting  the  answer,  and  show- 
 ing it  to  be  a  credible  one. 
 
 Now,  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the 
 case.  For,  first,  Upon  supposition  that  God  exer- 
 cises a  moral  government  over  the  world,  the  ana- 
 logy of  his  natural  government  suggests,  and  makes 
 it  credible,  that  his  moral  government  must  be  a 
 scheme  quite  beyond  our  comprehension;  and  this 
 affords  a  general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the 
 justice  and  goodness  of  it.  And,  secondly,  A  more 
 distinct  observation  of  some  particular  things  con- 
 tained in  God's  scheme  of  natural  government,  the 
 like  things  being  supposed,  by  analogy,  to  be  con- 
 tained in  his  moral  government,  will  farther  show  how 
 little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  these  objections. 
 
 I.  Upon  supposition  that  God  exercises  a  moral 
 government  over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natu- 
 ral government  suggests  and  makes  it  credible,  that 
 his  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme  quite  be- 
 yond our  comprehension :  and  this  affords  a  general 
 answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  good- 
 ness of  it.  It  is  most  obvious,  analogy  renders  it 
 highly  credible,  that  upon  supposition  of  a  moral 
 government  it  must  be  a  scheme, — for  the  world, 
 and  the  whole  natural  government  of  it,  appears  to 
 be  so — to  be  a  scheme,  system,  or  constitution, 
 whose  parts  correspond  to  each  other,  and  to  a  whole, 
 as  really  as  any  work  of  art,  or  as  any  particular  mo- 
 del of  a  civil  constitution  and  government.  In  this 
 great  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  individuals  have 
 various  peculiar  relations  to  other  individuals  of  their 
 o  17 
 
314 
 
 own  species.  And  whole  species  are,  we  find,  vari- 
 ously related  to  other  species,  upon  this  earth.  Nor 
 do  we  know  how  much  farther  these  kinds  of  rela- 
 tions may  extend.  And  as  there  is  not  any  action,  or 
 uatural  event,  which  we  are  acquainted  with,  so  single 
 and  unconnected  as  not  to  have  a  respect  to  some  other 
 actions  and  events ;  so,  possibly,  each  of  them  when 
 it  has  not  an  immediate,  may  yet  have  a  remote 
 natural  relation  to  other  actions  and  events,  much 
 beyond  the  compass  of  this  present  world.  There 
 seems,  indeed,  nothing  from  whence  we  can  so  much 
 as  make  a  conjecture,  whether  all  creatures,  actions, 
 and  events,  throughout  the  whole  of  nature,  have  re- 
 lations to  each  other.  But,  as  it  is  obvious  that  all 
 events  have  future  unknown  consequences,  so,  if  we 
 trace  any,  as  far  as  we  can  go,  into  what  is  con- 
 nected with  it,  we  shall  find,  that  if  such  event  were 
 not  connected  with  somewhat  farther  in  nature  un- 
 known to  us,  somewhat  both  past  and  present,  such 
 event  could  not  possibly  have  been  at  all.  Nor  can 
 we  give  the  whole  account  of  any  one  thing  what- 
 ever ;  of  all  its  causes,  ends,  and  necessary  adjuncts ; 
 those  adjuncts,  I  mean,  without  which  it  could  not 
 have  been.  By  this  most  astonishing  connection, 
 these  reciprocal  correspondencies  and  mutual  rela- 
 tions, every  thing  which  we  see  in  the  course  of  na- 
 ture, is  actually  brought  about.  And  things,  seem- 
 ingly the  most  insignificant  imaginable,  are  perpe- 
 tually observed  to  be  necessary  conditions  to  other 
 things  of  the  greatest  importance ;  so  that  any  one 
 thing  whatever  may,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  con- 
 trary, be  a  necessary  condition  to  any  other.  The 
 natural  world,  then,  and  natural  government  of  it, 
 
315 
 
 being  such  an  incomprehensible  scheme ;  so  incom- 
 prehensible, that  a  man  must  really,  in  the  literal 
 sense,  know  nothing  at  all,  who  is  not  sensible  of 
 his  ignorance  in  it :  this  immediately  suggests,  and 
 strongly  shows  the  credibility,  that  the  moral  world 
 and  government  of  it  may  be  so  too.  Indeed,  the  na- 
 tural and  moral  constitution  and  government  of  the 
 world  are  so  connected,  as  to  make  up  together  but 
 one  scheme :  and  it  is  highly  probable,  that  the  first 
 is  formed  and  carried  on  merely  in  subserviency  to 
 the  latter,  as  the  vegetable  world  is  for  the  ani- 
 mal, and  organized  bodies  for  minds.  But  the 
 thing  intended  here  is,  without  inquiring  how  far 
 the  administration  of  the  natural  world  is  subordinate 
 to  that  of  the  moral,  only  to  observe  the  credibility, 
 that  one  should  be  analogous  or  similar  to  the  other: 
 that,  therefore,  every  act  of  divine  justice  and  good- 
 ness may  be  supposed  to  look  much  beyond  itself 
 and  its  immediate  object;  may  have  some  reference 
 to  other  parts  of  God's  moral  administration,  and  to 
 a  general  moral  plan;  and  that  every  circumstance  of 
 this  his  moral  government  may  be  adjusted  before- 
 hand with  a  view  to  the  whole  of  it.  Thus,  for  ex- 
 ample :  the  determined  length  of  time,  and  the  de- 
 grees and  ways  in  which  virtue  is  to  remain  in  a  state 
 of  warfare  and  discipline,  and  in  which  wickedness 
 is  permitted  to  have  its  progress;  the  times  appointed 
 for  the  execution  of  justice ;  the  appointed  instru- 
 ments of  it ;  the  kinds  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
 and  the  manners  of  their  distribution ;  all  particular 
 instances  of  divine  justice  and  goodness,  and  every 
 circumstance  of  them,  may  have  such  respects  to 
 each  other,  as  to  make  up  altogether  a  whole,  con- 
 o  2 
 
316 
 
 nected  and  related  in  all  its  parts ;  a  scheme,  or  sys- 
 tem, which  is  as  properly  one  as  the  natural  world 
 is,  and  of  the  like  kind.  And  supposing  this  to  he 
 the  case,  it  is  most  evident  that  we  are  not  compe- 
 tent judges  of  this  scheme,  from  the  small  parts  of 
 it  which  come  within  our  view  in  the  present  life ; 
 and  therefore  no  objections  against  any  of  these  parts 
 can  be  insisted  upon  by  reasonable  men. 
 
 This  our  ignorance,  and  the  consequence  here 
 drawn  from  it,  are  universally  acknowledged  upon 
 other  occasions ;  and,  though  scarce  denied,  yet  are 
 universally  forgot,  when  persons  come  to  argue 
 against  religion.  And  it  is  not  perhaps  easy,  even 
 for  the  most  reasonable  men,  always  to  bear  in  mind 
 the  degree  of  our  ignorance,  and  make  due  allowances 
 for  it.  Upon  these  accounts,  it  may  not  be  useless 
 to  go  on  a  little  farther,  in  order  to  show  more  dis- 
 tinctly, how  just  an  answer  our  ignorance  is,  to  ob- 
 jections against  the  scheme  of  Providence.  Suppose, 
 then,  a  person  boldly  to  assert,  that  the  things  com- 
 plained of,  the  origin  and  continuance  of  evil,  might 
 easily  have  been  prevented  by  repeated  interposi- 
 tions;* interpositions  so  guarded  and  circumstanced, 
 as  would  preclude  all  mischief  arising  from  them :  or, 
 if  this  were  impracticable,  that  a  scheme  of  govern- 
 ment is  itself  an  imperfection;  since  more  good  might 
 have  been  produced  without  any  scheme,  system,  or 
 constitution  at  all,  by  continued  single  unrelated  acts 
 of  distributive  justice  and  goodness ;  because  these 
 would  have  occasioned  no  irregularities.  And  far- 
 ther than  this,  it  is  presumed,  the  objections  will 
 
 *  S*w  pages  320,  321. 
 
317 
 
 not  be  carried.  Yet  the  answer  is  obvious;  that, 
 were  these  assertions  true,  still  the  observations 
 above,  concerning  our  ignorance  in  the  scheme  of 
 divine  government,  and  the  consequence  drawn  from 
 it,  would  hold  in  great  measure,  enough  to  vindicate 
 religion  against  all  objections  from  the  disorders  ot 
 the  present  state.  Were  these  assertions  true,  yet 
 the  government  of  the  world  might  be  just  and  good 
 notwithstanding :  for,  at  the  most,  they  would  infer 
 nothing  more,  than  that  it  might  have  been  better. 
 But,  indeed,  they  are  mere  arbitrary  assertions ;  no 
 man  being  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the  possibilities 
 of  things,  to  bring  any  proof  of  them  to  the  lowest 
 degree  of  probability.  For,  however  possible  what 
 is  asserted  may  seem,  yet  many  instances  may  be 
 alleged,  in  things  much  less  out  of  our  reach,  of 
 suppositions  absolutely  impossible,  and  reducible  to 
 the  most  palpable  self-contradictions,  which  not  every 
 one  by  any  means  would  perceive  to  be  such,  nor 
 perhaps  any  one  at  first  sight  suspect.  From  these 
 things  it  is  easy  to  see  distinctly,  how  our  ignorance, 
 as  it  is  the  common,  is  really  a  satisfactory  answer  to 
 all  objections  against  the  justice  and  goodness  of 
 Providence.  If  a  man,  contemplating  any  one  pro- 
 vidential dispensation,  which  had  no  relation  to  any 
 others,  should  object,  that  he  discerned  in  it  a  disre- 
 gard to  justice,  or  a  deficiency  of  goodness,  nothing 
 would  be  less  an  answer  to  such  objection,  than  our 
 ignorance  in  other  parts  of  Providence,  or  in  the 
 possibilities  of  things,  no  way  related  to  what  he  was 
 contemplating.  But  when  we  know  not  but  the 
 parts  objected  against  may  be  relative  to  other  parts 
 unknown  to  us,  and  when  we  are  unacquainted  with 
 
318 
 
 what  is,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  practicable  in  the 
 case  before  us,  then  our  ignorance  is  a  satisfactory 
 answer;  because  some  unknown  relation,  or  some  un- 
 known impossibility,  may  render  what  is  objected 
 against  just  and  good;  nay,  good  in  the  highest 
 practicable  degree. 
 
 II.  And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  such 
 objections  will  further  appear,  by  a  more  distinct  ob- 
 servation of  some  particular  things  contained  in  the 
 natural  government  of  God,  the  like  to  which  may 
 be  supposed,  from  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his 
 moral  government. 
 
 1st,  As,  in  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world,  no 
 ends  appear  to  be  accomplished  without  means ;  so  we 
 find  that  means  very  undesirable  often  conduce  to 
 bring  about  ends,  in  such  a  measure  desirable,  as 
 greatly  to  overbalance  the  disagreeableness  of  the 
 means.  And  in  cases  where  such  means  are  condu- 
 cive to  such  ends,  it  is  not  reason,  but  experience, 
 which  shows  us  that  they  are  thus  conducive.  Ex- 
 perience also  shows  many  means  to  be  conducive  and 
 necessary  to  accomplish  ends,  which  means,  before 
 experience,  we  should  have  thought  would  have  had 
 even  a  contrary  tendency.  Now,  from  these  obser- 
 vations relating  to  the  natural  scheme  of  the  world, 
 the  moral  being  supposed  analogous  to  it,  arises  a 
 great  credibility,  that  the  putting  our  misery  in  each 
 other's  power  to  the  degree  it  is,  and  making  men 
 liable  to  vice,  to  the  degree  we  are ;  and  in  general, 
 that  those  things  which  are  objected  against  the  moral 
 scheme  of  Providence,  may  be,  upon  the  whole, 
 friendly  and  assistant  to  virtue,  and  productive  of  an 
 over-balance  of  happiness;  that  is,  the  things  ob- 
 
319 
 
 jected  against,  may  be  means  by  which  an  overbal- 
 ance of  good,  will,  in  the  end,  be  found  produced. 
 And,  from  the  same  observations,  it  appears  to  be  no 
 presumption  against  this,  that  we  do  not,  if  indeed 
 we  do  not,  see  those  means  to  have  any  such  ten- 
 dency, or  that  they  seem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary 
 one.  Thus,  those  things  which  we  call  irregulari- 
 ties, may  not  be  so  at  all;  because  they  may  be 
 means  of  accomplishing  wise  and  good  ends  more  con- 
 siderable. And  it  may  be  added,  as  above,  that 
 they  may  also  be  the  only  means  by  which  these  wise 
 and  good  ends  are  capable  of  being  accomplished. 
 
 After  these  observations  it  may  be  proper  to  add, 
 in  order  to  obviate  an  absurd  and  wicked  conclusion 
 from  any  of  them,  that  though  the  constitution  of 
 our  nature,  from  whence  we  are  capable  of  vice  and 
 misery,  may,  as  it  undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to 
 the  perfection  and  happiness  of  the  world;  and  though 
 the  actual  permission  of  evil  may  be  beneficial  to  it, 
 (that  is,  it  would  have  been  more  mischievous,  not 
 that  a  wicked  person  had  himself  abstained  from  his 
 own  wickedness,  but  that  any  one  had  forcibly  pre- 
 vented it,  than  that  it  was  permitted) ;  yet,  notwith- 
 standing, it  might  have  been  much  better  for  the 
 world  if  this  very  evil  had  never  been  done.  Nay, 
 it  is  most  clearly  conceivable,  that  the  very  commis- 
 sion of  wickedness  may  be  beneficial  to  the  world, 
 and  yet  that  it  would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial  for 
 men  to  refrain  from  it.  For  thus,  in  the  wise  and 
 good  constitution  of  the  natural  world,  there  are  dis- 
 orders which  bring  their  own  cures ;  diseases,  which 
 are  themselves  remedies.  Many  a  man  would  have 
 died,  had  it  not  been  for  the  gout  or  a  fever :  yet  it 
 
320 
 
 would  be  thought  madness  to  assert,  that  sickness  is 
 a  better  or  more  perfect  state  than  health;  though 
 the  like,  with  regard  to  the  moral  world,  has  been 
 asserted.      But, 
 
 2d,  The  natural  government  of  the  world  is  car- 
 ried on  by  general  laws.  For  this  there  may  be  wise 
 and  good  reasons  :  the  wisest  and  best,  for  aught  we 
 know  to  the  contrary.  And  that  there  are  such  rea- 
 sons, is  suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the  analogy  of 
 nature ;  by  our  being  made  to  experience  good  ends 
 to  be  accomplished,  as  indeed  all  the  good  which  we 
 enjoy  is  accomplished,  by  this  means,  that  the  laws  by 
 which  the  world  is  governed,  are  general.  For  we 
 have  scarce  any  kind  of  enjoyments,  but  what  we 
 are,  in  some  way  or  other,  instrumental  in  procuring 
 ourselves,  by  acting  in  a  manner  which  we  foresee 
 likely  to  procure  them :  now  this  foresight  could  not 
 be  at  all,  were  not  the  government  of  the  world  car- 
 ried on  by  general  laws.  And  though,  for  aught  we 
 know  to  the  contrary,  every  single  case  may  be,  at 
 length,  found  to  have  been  provided  for  even  by 
 these;  yet,  to  prevent  all  irregularities,  or  remedy 
 them  as  they  arise,  by  the  wisest  and  best  general 
 laws,  may  be  impossible  in  the  nature  of  things,  as 
 we  see  it  is  absolutely  impossible  in  civil  government. 
 But  then  we  are  ready  to  think,  that  the  constitution 
 of  nature  remaining  as  it  is,  and  the  course  of  things 
 being  permitted  to  go  on,  in  other  respects,  as  it 
 does,  there  might  be  interpositions  to  prevent  irre- 
 gularities, though  they  could  not  have  been  pre- 
 vented or  remedied  by  any  general  laws.  And  there 
 would  indeed  be  reason  to  wish — which,  by  the  way, 
 is  very  different  from  a  right  to  claim — that  all  irre- 
 
321 
 
 gularities  were  prevented  or  remedied  by  present 
 interpositions,  if  these  interpositions  would  have  no 
 other  effect  than  this.  But  it  is  plain  they  would 
 have  some  visible  and  immediate  bad  effects ;  for  in- 
 stance, they  would  encourage  idleness  and  negligence, 
 and  they  woidd  render  doubtful  the  natural  rule  of 
 life,  which  is  ascertained  by  this  very  thing,  that  the 
 course  of  the  world  is  carried  on  by  general  laws. 
 And  farther,  it  is  certain  they  would  have  distant  ef- 
 fects, and  very  great  ones  too,  by  means  of  the 
 wonderful  connexions  before-mentioned.*  So  that 
 we  cannot  so  much  as  guess  what  would  be  the  whole 
 result  of  the  interpositions  desired.  It  may  be  said, 
 any  bad  result  might  be  prevented  by  farther  inter- 
 positions, whenever  there  was  occasion  for  them ;  but 
 this  again  is  talking  quite  at  random,  and  in  the 
 dark.f  Upon  the  whole,  then,  we  see  wise  reasons 
 why  the  course  of  the  world  should  be  carried  on  by 
 general  laws,  and  good  ends  accomplished  by  this 
 means ;  and  for  aught  we  know,  there  may  be  the 
 wisest  reasons  for  it,  and  the  best  ends  accomplished 
 by  it.  We  have  no  ground  to  believe,  that  all  irre- 
 gularities could  be  remedied  as  they  arise,  or  could 
 have  been  precluded  by  general  laws.  We  find  that 
 interpositions  would  produce  evil,  and  prevent  good; 
 and  for  aught  we  know,  they  would  produce  greater 
 evil  than  they  would  prevent,  and  prevent  greater 
 good  than  they  would  produce.  And  if  this  be  the 
 case,  then  the  not  interposing  is  so  far  from  being  a 
 ground  of  complaint,  that  it  is  an  instance  of  good- 
 ness.    This  is  intelligible  and  sufficient;  and  going 
 
 *  Page  313,  &c.  f  Page  316,  317. 
 
 o3 
 
322 
 
 farther  seems  beyond  the  utmost  reach  of  our  facul- 
 ties. 
 
 But  it  may  be  said,  "  that  after  all,  these  sup- 
 posed impossibilities  and  relations  are  what  we  are 
 unacquainted  with ;  and  we  must  judge  of  religion, 
 as  of  other  things,  by  what  we  do  know,  and  look 
 upon  the  rest  as  nothing ;  or,  however,  that  the  an- 
 swers here  given  to  what  is  objected  against  religion, 
 may  equally  be  made  use  of  to  invalidate  the  proof 
 of  it,  since  their  stress  lies  so  very  much  upon  our 
 ignorance."      But, 
 
 First,  Though  total  ignorance,  in  any  matter, 
 does  indeed  equally  destroy,  or  rather  preclude,  all 
 proof  concerning  it,  and  objections  against  it,  yet 
 partial  ignorance  does  not.  For  we  may  in  any  de- 
 gree be  convinced,  that  a  person  is  of  such  a  charac- 
 ter, and  consequently  will  pursue  such  ends,  though 
 we  are  greatly  ignorant  what  is  the  proper  way  of 
 acting,  in  order  the  most  effectually  to  obtain  those 
 ends ;  and  in  this  case,  objections  against  his  man- 
 ner of  acting,  as  seemingly  not  conducive  to  obtain 
 them,  might  be  answered  by  our  ignorance,  though 
 the  proof  that  such  ends  were  intended,  might  not 
 at  all  be  invalidated  by  it.  Thus  the  proof  of  re- 
 ligion is  a  proof  of  the  moral  character  of  God,  and, 
 consequently,  that  his  government  is  moral,  and  that 
 every  one,  upon  the  whole,  shall  receive  according  to 
 his  deserts ;  a  proof  that  this  is  the  designed  end  of 
 his  government.  But  we  are  not  competent  judges 
 what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the  most 
 effectually  to  accomplish  this  end.*     Therefore  our 
 
 *  Page  178,  179. 
 
323 
 
 ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objections  against  the 
 conduct  of  Providence,  in  permitting  irregularities, 
 as  seeming  contradictory  to  this  end.  Now,  since  it 
 is  so  obvious  that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  satisfactory 
 answer  to  objections  against  a  thing,  and  yet  not  af- 
 fect the  proof  of  it ;  till  it  can  be  shown,  it  is  fri- 
 volous to  assert,  that  our  ignorance  invalidates  the 
 proof  of  religion,  as  it  does  the  objections  against 
 it. 
 
 Secondly,  Suppose  unknown  impossibilities,  and 
 unknown  relations,  might  justly  be  urged  to  invali- 
 date the  proof  of  religion,  as  well  as  to  answer  ob- 
 jections against  it,  and  that,  in  consequence  of  this, 
 the  proof  of  it  were  doubtful;  yet  still,  let  the  as- 
 sertion be  despised,  or  let  it  be  ridiculed,  it  is  unde- 
 niably true,  that  moral  obligations  would  remain  cer- 
 tain, though  it  were  not  certain  what  would,  upon 
 the  whole,  be  the  consequences  of  observing  or  vio- 
 lating them.  For  these  obligations  arise  immediately 
 and  necessarily  from  the  judgment  of  our  own  mind, 
 unless  perverted,  which  we  cannot  violate  without 
 being  self-condemned.  And  they  would  be  certain, 
 too,  from  considerations  of  interest.  For,  though  it 
 were  doubtful  what  will  be  the  future  consequences  of 
 virtue  and  vice,  yet  it  is  however  credible  that  they 
 may  have  those  consequences  which  religion  teaches 
 us  they  will ;  and  this  credibility  is  a  certain*  obliga- 
 tion in  point  of  prudence,  to  abstain  from  all  wick- 
 edness, and  to  live  in  the  conscientious  practice  of 
 all  that  is  good.     But, 
 
 Thirdly,  The  answers  above  given  to  the  objec- 
 
 *  Page  173,  and  Part  II.  chap.  vi. 
 
324 
 
 tions  against  religion,  cannot  equally  be  made  use  of 
 to  invalidate  the  proof  of  it.  For,  upon  the  sup- 
 position that  God  exercises  a  moral  government  over 
 the  world,  analogy  does  most  strongly  lead  us  to 
 conclude,  that  this  moral  government  must  be  a 
 scheme,  or  constitution,  beyond  our  comprehension. 
 And  a  thousand  particular  analogies  show  us,  that 
 parts  of  such  a  scheme,  from  their  relation  to  other 
 parts,  may  conduce  to  accomplish  ends,  which  we 
 should  have  thought  they  had  no  tendency  at  all  to 
 accomplish ;  nay,  ends,  which,  before  experience,  we 
 should  have  thought  such  parts  were  contradictory 
 to,  and  had  a  tendency  to  prevent.  And,  therefore, 
 all  these  analogies  show,  that  the  way  of  arguing 
 made  use  of  in  objecting  against  religion,  is  delusive; 
 because  they  show  it  is  not  at  all  incredible,  that, 
 could  we  comprehend  the  whole,  we  should  find  the 
 permission  of  the  disorders  objected  against,  to  be 
 consistent  with  justice  and  goodness,  and  even  to 
 be  instances  of  them.  Now  this  is  not  applicable  to 
 the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  is  to  the  objections  against 
 it;*  and  therefore  cannot  invalidate  that  proof,  as  it 
 does  these  objections. 
 
 Lastly,  From  the  observations  now  made,  it  is 
 easy  to  see,  that  the  answers  above  given  to  the  ob- 
 jections against  Providence,  though,  in  a  general 
 way  of  speaking,  they  may  be  said  to  be  taken  from 
 our  ignorance,  yet  are  by  no  means  taken  merely 
 from  that,  but  from  somewhat  which  analogy  shows 
 us  concerning  it.  For  analogy  shows  us  positively, 
 that  our  ignorance  in  the  possibilities  of  things,  and 
 
 *  Sermon  at  the  Rolls,  p.  312,  2d  Edit. 
 
325 
 
 the  various  relations  in  nature,  renders  us  incompe- 
 tent judges,  and  leads  us  to  false  conclusions,  in 
 cases  similar  to  this,  in  which  we  pretend  to  judge 
 and  to  object.  So  that  the  things  above  insisted 
 upon,  are  not  mere  suppositions  of  unknown  impos- 
 sibilities and  relations;  but  they  are  suggested  to 
 our  thoughts,  and  even  forced  upon  the  observation 
 of  serious  men,  and  rendered  credible  too,  by  the 
 analogy  of  nature.  And,  therefore,  to  take  these 
 tilings  into  the  account,  is  to  judge  by  experience, 
 and  what  we  do  know;  and  it  is  not  judging  so,  to 
 take  no  notice  of  them. 
 
326 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The  observations  of  the  last  chapter  lead  us  to 
 consider  this  little  scene  of  human  life,  in  which  we 
 are  so  busily  engaged,  as  having  a  reference,  of  some 
 sort  or  other,  to  a  much  larger  plan  of  things.  Whe- 
 ther we  are  any  way  related  to  the  more  distant 
 parts  of  the  boundless  universe  into  which  we  are 
 brought,  is  altogether  uncertain.  But  it  is  evident, 
 that  the  course  of  things,  which  comes  within  our 
 view,  is  connected  with  somewhat  past,  present,  and 
 future,  beyond  it.*  So  that  we  are  placed,  as  one 
 may  speak,  in  the  middle  of  a  scheme,  not  a  fixed, 
 but  a  progressive  one,  every  way  incomprehensible ; 
 incomprehensible  in  a  manner,  equally  with  respect 
 to  what  has  been,  what  now  is,  and  what  shall  be 
 hereafter.  And  this  sheme  cannot  but  contain  in 
 it  somewhat  as  wonderful,  and  as  much  beyond  our 
 thought  and  conception,f  as  any  thing  in  that  of  re- 
 ligion. For,  will  any  man  in  his  senses  say,  that  it 
 is  less  difficult  to  conceive  how  the  world  came  to  be, 
 and  to  continue  as  it  is,  without,  than  with,  an  intelli- 
 gent Author  and  Governor  of  it?  or,  admitting  an 
 intelligent  Governor  of  it,  that  there  is  some  other 
 rule  of  government  more  natural,  and  of  easier  con- 
 ception, than  that  which  we  call  moral?  Indeed, 
 without  an  intelligent  Author  and  Governor  of  na- 
 ture,  no  account  at  all  can  be  given,  how  this  uni- 
 verse, or  the  part   of  it  particularly  in  which  we 
 
 *  Page  314.  f  See  Part  ii.  Chap.  2. 
 
327 
 
 are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and  the  course  of  it 
 to  be  carried  on  as  it  is;  nor  any  of  its  general  end 
 and  design,  without  a  moral  Governor  of  it.  That 
 there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  and  na- 
 tural Governor  of  the  world,  is  a  principle  gone 
 upon  in  the  foregoing  treatise,  as  proved,  and  ge- 
 nerally known  and  confessed  to  be  proved.  And 
 the  very  notion  of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature, 
 proved  by  particular  final  causes,  implies  a  will  and 
 a  character.*  Now,  as  our  whole  nature,  the  na- 
 ture which  he  has  given  us,  leads  us  to  conclude 
 his  will  and  character  to  be  moral,  just,  and  good; 
 so  we  can  scarce  in  imagination  conceive  what  it 
 can  be  otherwise.  However,  in  consequence  of  this 
 his  will  and  character,  whatever  it  be,  he  formed  the 
 universe  as  it  is,  and  carries  on  the  course  of  it  as 
 he  does,  rather  than  in  any  other  manner;  and  has 
 assigned  to  us,  and  to  all  living  creatures,  a  part 
 and  a  lot  in  it.  Irrational  creatures  act  this  their 
 part,  and  enjoy  and  undergo  the  pleasures  and  the 
 pains  allotted  them,  without  any  reflection.  But 
 one  would  think  it  impossible,  that  creatures  endued 
 with  reason  could  avoid  reflecting  sometimes  upon 
 all  this;  reflecting,  if  not  from  whence  we  came, 
 yet  at  least,  whither  we  are  going,  and  what  the 
 mysterious  scheme  in  the  midst  of  which  we  find 
 ourselves,  will  at  length  come  out  and  produce;  a 
 scheme  in  which  it  is  certain  we  are  highly  inter- 
 ested, and  in  which  we  may  be  interested  even  be- 
 yond conception.  For  many  things  prove  it  palpa- 
 bly absurd  to  conclude,  that  we  shall  cease  to  be  at 
 
 *  Page  300. 
 
328 
 
 death.  Particular  analogies  do  most  sensibly  show 
 us,  that  there  is-  nothing  to  be  thought  strange  in 
 our  being  to  exist  in  another  state  of  life.  And 
 that  we  are  now  living  beings,  affords  a  strong 
 probability  that  we  shall  continue  so;  unless  there 
 be  some  positive  ground,  and  there  is  none  from 
 reason  or  analogy,  to  think  death  will  destroy  us. 
 Were  a  persuasion  of  this  kind  ever  so  well 
 grounded,  there  would  surely  be  little  reason  to 
 take  pleasure  in  it.  But,  indeed,  it  can  have  no 
 other  ground  than  some  such  imagination,  as  that 
 of  our  gross  bodies  being  ourselves ;  which  is  con- 
 trary to  experience.  Experience,  too,  most  clearly 
 shows  us  the  folly  of  concluding,  from  the  body 
 and  the  living  agent  affecting  each  other  mutu- 
 ally, that  the  dissolution  of  the  former  is  the  de- 
 struction of  the  latter.  And  there  are  remarkable 
 instances  of  their  not  affecting  each  other,  which 
 lead  us  to  a  contrary  conclusion.  The  supposition, 
 then,  which  in  all  reason  we  are  to  go  upon,  is,  that 
 our  living  nature  will  continue  after  death.  And  it 
 is  infinitely  unreasonable,  to  form  an  institution  of 
 life,  or  to  act  upon  any  other  supposition.  Now, 
 all  expectation  of  immortality,  whether  more  or  less 
 certain,  opens  an  unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes 
 and  our  fears ;  since  we  see  the  constitution  of  na- 
 ture is  such  as  to  admit  of  misery,  as  well  as  to  be 
 productive  of  happiness,  and  experience  ourselves 
 to  partake  of  both  in  some  degree;  and  since  we 
 cannot  but  know  what  higher  degrees  of  both  we 
 are  capable  of.  And  there  is  no  presumption 
 against  believing  farther,  that  our  future  interest 
 depends  upon  our  present  behaviour;    for  we  see 
 
329 
 
 our  present  interest  doth ;  and  that  the  happiness 
 and  misery,  which  are  naturally  annexed  to  our  ac- 
 tions, very  frequently  do  not  follow  till  long  after 
 the  actions  are  done  to  which  they  are  respectively 
 annexed.  So  that,  were  speculation  to  leave  us 
 uncertain,  whether  it  were  likely  that  the  Author 
 of  Nature,  in  giving  happiness  and  misery  to  his 
 creatures,  hath  regard  to  their  actions  or  not ;  yet, 
 since  we  find  by  experience  that  he  hath  such  re- 
 gard, the  whole  sense  of  things  which  he  has  given 
 us,  plainly  leads  us  at  once,  and  without  any  elabo- 
 rate inquiries,  to  think  that  it  may,  indeed  must,  be 
 to  good  actions  chiefly  that  he  hath  annexed  happi- 
 ness, and  to  bad  actions  misery;  or  that  he  will, 
 upon  the  whole,  reward  those  who  do  well,  and 
 punish  those  who  do  evil.  To  confirm  this  from 
 the  constitution  of  the  world,  it  has  been  observed, 
 that  some  sort  of  moral  government  is  necessarily 
 implied  in  that  natural  government  of  God  which 
 we  experience  ourselves  under;  that  good  and  bad 
 actions,  at  present,  are  naturally  rewarded  and  pun- 
 ished, not  only  as  beneficial  and  mischievous  to  so- 
 ciety, but  also  as  virtuous  and  vicious;  and  that 
 there  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tenden- 
 cy to  their  being  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  much 
 higher  degree  than  they  are  at  present.  And 
 though  this  higher  degree  of  distributive  justice, 
 which  nature  thus  points  out  and  leads  towards,  is 
 prevented  for  a  time  from  taking  place,  it  is  by  ob- 
 stacles which  the  state  of  this  world  unhappily 
 throws  in  its  way,  and  which,  therefore,  are  in  their 
 nature  temporary.  Now,  as  these  things,  in  the 
 natural  conduct  of   Providence,    are    observable   on 
 
330 
 
 the  side  of  virtue,  so  there  is  nothing  to  be  set 
 against  them  on  the  side  of  vice.  A  moral  scheme 
 of  government,  then,  is  visibly  established,  and  in 
 some  degree  carried  into  execution;  and  this,  to- 
 gether with  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and 
 vice  duly  considered,  naturally  raise  in  us  an  appre- 
 hension, that  it  will  be  carried  on  farther  towards 
 perfection  in  a  future  state,  and  that  every  one  shall 
 there  receive  according  to  his  deserts.  And  if  this 
 be  so,  then  our  future  and  general  interest,  under 
 the  moral  government  of  God,  is  appointed  to  de- 
 pend upon  our  behaviour,  notwithstanding  the  dif- 
 ficulty which  this  may  occasion  of  securing  it,  and 
 the  danger  of  losing  it;  just  in  the  same  manner  as 
 our  temporal  interest,  under  his  natural  govern- 
 ment, is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our  behaviour, 
 notwithstanding  the  like  difficulty  and  danger.  For, 
 from  our  original  constitution,  and  that  of  the 
 world  which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally  trusted 
 with  ourselves,  with  our  own  conduct,  and  our  own 
 interest.  And  from  the  same  constitution  of  nature, 
 especially  joined  with  that  course  of  things  which  is 
 owing  to  men,  we  have  temptations  to  be  unfaithful 
 in  this  trust,  to  forfeit  this  interest,  to  neglect  it, 
 and  run  ourselves  into  misery  and  ruin.  From  these 
 temptations  arise  the  difficulties  of  behaving  so  as 
 to  secure  our  temporal  interest,  and  the  hazard  of 
 behaving  so  as  to  miscarry  in  it.  There  is,  there- 
 fore, nothing  incredible  in  supposing,  there  may 
 be  the  like  difficulty  and  hazard  with  regard  to  that 
 chief  and  final  good  which  religion  lays  before  us. 
 Indeed,  the  whole  account  how  it  came  to  pass  that 
 we  were  placed  in  such  a  condition  as  this,  must  be 
 
331 
 
 beyond  our  comprehension.  But  it  is  in  part  ac- 
 counted for  by  what  religion  teaches  us,  that  the 
 character  of  virtue  and  piety  must  be  a  necessary 
 qualification  for  a  future  state  of  security  and  happi- 
 ness, under  the  moral  government  of  God ;  in  like 
 manner,  as  some  certain  qualifications  or  other  are 
 necessary  for  every  particular  condition  of  life,  under 
 his  natural  government ;  and  that  the  present  state 
 was  intended  to  be  a  school  of  discipline,  for  improv- 
 ing in  ourselves  that  character.  Now,  this  inten- 
 tion of  nature  is  rendered  highly  credible  by  observ- 
 ing, that  we  are  plainly  made  for  improvement  of  all 
 kinds ;  that  it  is  a  general  appointment  of  Provi- 
 dence, that  we  cultivate  practical  principles,  and 
 form  within  ourselves  habits  of  action,  in  order  to 
 become  fit  for  what  we  were  wholly  unfit  for  before : 
 that,  in  particular,  childhood  and  youth  is  naturally 
 appointed  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  mature  age : 
 and  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  fitted  for  a 
 state  of  moral  discipline.  And,  whereas  objections 
 are  urged  against  the  whole  notion  of  moral  govern- 
 ment and  a  probation-state,  from  the  opinion  of  ne- 
 cessity, it  has  been  shown,  that  God  has  given  us 
 the  evidence,  as  it  were  of  experience,  that  all  ob- 
 jections against  religion  on  this  head  are  vain  and 
 delusive.  He  lias  also,  in  his  natural  government, 
 suggested  an  answer  to  all  our  short-sighted  objec- 
 tions against  the  equity  and  goodness  of  his  moral 
 government,  and,  in  general,  he  has  exemplified  to 
 us  the  latter  by  the  former. 
 
 These  things,  which,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are 
 matters  of  fact,  ought  in  all  common  sense,  to  awaken 
 mankind,  to  induce  them  to  consider,  in  earnest,  their 
 
332 
 
 condition,  and  what  they  have  to  do.  It  is  absurd — 
 absurd  to  the  degree  of  being  ridiculous,  if  the  sub- 
 ject were  not  of  so  serious  a  kind,  for  men  to  think 
 themselves  secure  in  a  vicious  life,  or  even  in  that 
 immoral  thoughtlessness  which  far  the  greatest  part 
 of  tli em  are  fallen  into.  And  the  credibility  of  re- 
 ligion, arising  from  experience  and  facts  here  consi- 
 dered, is  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  engage  them 
 to  live  in  the  general  practice  of  all  virtue  and  piety: 
 under  the  serious  apprehension,  though  it  should  be 
 mixed  with  some  doubt,*  of  a  righteous  administra- 
 tion established  in  nature,  and  a  future  judgment  in 
 consequence  of  it;  especially  when  we  consider,  how 
 very  questionable  it  is  whether  any  thing  at  all  can 
 be  gained  by  vice;f  how  unquestionably  little,  as 
 well  as  precarious,  the  pleasures  and  profits  of  it  are 
 at  the  best;  and  how  soon  they  must  be  parted  with 
 at  the  longest.  For,  in  the  deliberations  of  reason, 
 concerning  what  we  are  to  pursue  and  what  to  avoid, 
 as  temptations  to  any  thing  from  mere  passion  are 
 supposed  out  of  the  case ;  so  inducements  to  vice, 
 from  cool  expectations  of  pleasure  and  interest,  so 
 small,  and  uncertain,  and  short,  are  really  so  insig- 
 nificant, as,  in  the  view  of  reason,  to  be  almost  no- 
 thing in  themselves,  and,  in  comparison  with  the  im- 
 portance of  religion,  they  quite  disappear  and  are 
 lost.  Mere  passion,  indeed,  may  be  alleged,  though 
 not  as  a  reason,  yet  as  an  excuse  for  a  vicious  course 
 of  life.  And  how  sorry  an  excuse  it  is  will  be  ma- 
 nifest by  observing,  that  we  are  placed  in  a  condi- 
 tion in  which  we  are  unavoidably  inured  to  govern 
 
 *  Part  II.   Chap   G.  f  ^age  22G- 
 
333 
 
 our  passions,  by  being  necessitated  to  govern  them ; 
 and  to  lay  ourselves  under  the  same  kind  of  restraints, 
 and  as  great  ones  too,  from  temporal  regards,  as  vir- 
 tue and  piety,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  re- 
 quire. The  plea  of  ungovernable  passion,  then,  on 
 the  side  of  vice,  is  the  poorest  of  all  things;  for  it  is 
 no  reason,  and  but  a  poor  excuse.  But  the  proper 
 motives  to  religion,  are  the  proper  proofs  of  it,  from 
 our  moral  nature,  from  the  presages  of  conscience, 
 and  our  natural  apprehension  of  God,  under  the  cha- 
 racter of  a  righteous  Governor  and  Judge ;  a  nature, 
 and  conscience,  and  apprehension  given  us  by  him ; 
 and  from  the  confirmation  of  the  dictates  of  reason, 
 by  life  and  immortality  brought  to  light  by  the  gos- 
 pel;  and  the  wrath  of  God  revealed  from  heaven, 
 against  all  ungodliness  cmd  unriglde.ovmess  of  'men. 
 
PART  II. 
 
 OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 
 
 PART  II. 
 
 OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP.  I. 
 
 Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity. 
 
 Some  persons,  upon  pretence  of  the  sufficiency  of 
 the  light  of  nature,  avowedly  reject  all  revelation,  as, 
 in  its  very  notion,  incredible,  and  what  must  be  fic- 
 titious. And,  indeed,  it  is  certain,  no  revelation 
 would  have  been  given,  had  the  light  of  nature  been 
 sufficient  in  such  a  sense,  as  to  render  one  not  want- 
 ing and  useless.  But  no  man  in  seriousness  and 
 simplicity  of  mind,  can  possibly  think  it  so,  who  con- 
 siders the  state  of  religion  in  the  heathen  world  be- 
 fore revelation,  and  its  present  state  in  those  places 
 which  have  borrowed  no  light  from  it;  particularly 
 the  doubtfulness  of  some  of  the  greatest  men  con- 
 cerning things  of  the  utmost  importance,  as  well  as 
 the  natural  inattention  and  ignorance  of  mankind  in 
 general.  It  is  impossible  to  say  who  would  have 
 been  able  to  have  reasoned  out  that  whole  system, 
 p  17 
 
388 
 
 which  we  call  natural  religion,  in  its  genuine  simpli- 
 city, clear  of  superstition ;  but  there  is  certainly  no 
 ground  to  affirm  that  the  generality  could :  if  they 
 could,  there  is  no  sort  of  probability  that  they  would. 
 Admitting  there  were,  they  would  highly  want  a 
 standing  admonition,  to  remind  them  of  it,  and  in- 
 culcate it  upon  them.  And  farther  still,  were  they 
 as  much  disposed  to  attend  to  religion  as  the  bettei 
 sort  of  men  are,  yet,  even  upon  this  supposition, 
 there  would  be  various  occasions  for  supernatural 
 instruction  and  assistance,  and  the  greatest  advan- 
 tages might  be  afforded  by  them.  So  that  to  say, 
 revelation  is  a  thing  superfluous,  what  there  is  no 
 need  of,  and  what  can  be  of  no  service,  is,  I  think, 
 to  talk  quite  wildly  and  at  random.  Nor  would  it 
 be  more  extravagant  to  affirm,  that  mankind  is  so 
 entirely  at  ease  in  the  present  state,  and  life  so  com- 
 pletely happy,  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  suppose 
 our  condition  capable  of  being  in  any  respect  better. 
 There  are  other  persons,  not  to  be  ranked  with 
 these,  who  seem  to  be  getting  into  a  way  of  neglect- 
 ing, and,  as  it  were,  overlooking  revelation,  as  of 
 small  importance,  provided  natural  religion  be  kept 
 to.  With  little  regard,  either  to  the  evidence  of 
 the  former,  or  to  the  objections  against  it,  and  even 
 upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  "The  only  design  of 
 it,"  say  they,  "must  be  to  establish  a  belief  of  the 
 moral  system  of  nature,  and  to  enforce  the  practice 
 of  natural  piety  and  virtue.  The  belief  and  prac- 
 tice of  these  things  were,  perhaps,  much  promoted 
 by  the  first  publication  of  Christianity ;  but  whether 
 they  are  believed  and  practised,  upon  the  evidence 
 and  motives  of  nature  or  of  revelation,  is  no  great 
 
339 
 
 matter."*  This  way  of  considering  revelation, 
 though  it  is  not  the  same  with  the  former,  yet  bor- 
 ders nearly  upon  it,  and  very  much,  at  length,  runs 
 up  into  it,  and  requires  to  be  particularly  considered, 
 with  regard  to  the  persons  who  seem  to  be  getting 
 into  this  way.  The  consideration  of  it  will,  like- 
 wise, farther  show  the  extravagance  of  the  former 
 opinion,  and  the  truth  of  the  observations  in  answer 
 to  it,  just  mentioned.  And  an  inquiry  into  the  Im- 
 portance of  Christianity,  cannot  be  an  improper  in- 
 troduction to  a  treatise  concerning  the  credibility  of 
 it. 
 
 Now,  if  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  mankind, 
 and  commanded  those  things  which  are  commanded 
 in  Christianity,  it  is  evident,  at  first  sight,  that  it 
 cannot  in  anywise  be  an  indifferent  matter,  whether 
 we  obey  or  disobey  those  commands,  unless  we  are 
 certainly  assured,  that  we  know  all  the  reasons  for 
 them,  and  that  all  those  reasons  are  now  ceased,  with 
 regard  to  mankind  in  general,  or  to  ourselves  in  par- 
 ticular. And  it  is  absolutely  impossible  we  can  be 
 assured  of  this ;  for  our  ignorance  of  these  reasons 
 proves  nothing  in  the  case,  since  the  whole  analogy 
 of  nature  shows,  what  is  indeed  in  itself  evident,  that 
 there  may  be  infinite  reasons  for  things,  with  which 
 we  are  not  acquainted. 
 
 *   Invenos    multos propterea    nolli    fieri    Christianos,    quia 
 
 quasi  sufiiciunt  sibi  de  bona  vita  sua.  Bene  vivere  opus  est,  ait. 
 Quid  mini  praicepturus  est  Christus  ?  Ut  bene  vivam  ?  Jam 
 bene  vivo.  Quid  mihi  neeessarius  est  Christus  1  Nullum  homi- 
 cidium,  nullum  furtum,  nullam  rapinam  facio,  res  alienas  non 
 concupisco,  nullo  adulterio  contaminor.  Nam  inveniatur  in  vita 
 mea  aliquid  quod  reprehendatur,  et  qui  reprehenderit  faciat  Chris- 
 tianum. — Aug.  in  Psal.  xxxi. 
 
 p2 
 
340 
 
 But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more  dis- 
 tinctly appear,  by  considering  it  more  distinctly : 
 1st,  As  a  republication,  and  external  institution,  of 
 natural  or  essential  religion,  adapted  to  the  present 
 circumstances  of  mankind,  and  intended  to  promote 
 natural  piety  and  virtue ;  and,  2dly,  As  containing 
 an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things,  not  discover- 
 able by  reason,  in  consequence  of  which  several  dis- 
 tinct precepts  are  enjoined  us.  For,  though  natural 
 religion  is  the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Chris- 
 tianity, it  is  not  in  any  sense  the  whole  of  it. 
 
 I.  Christianity  is  a  republication  of  natural  reli- 
 gion. It  instructs  mankind  in  the  moral  system  of 
 the  world  :  that  it  is  the  work  of  an  infinitely  perfect 
 Being,  and  under  his  government;  that  virtue  is  his 
 law ;  and  that  he  will  finally  judge  mankind  in  righ- 
 teousness, and  render  to  all  according  to  their  works, 
 in  a  future  state.  And,  which  is  very  material,  it 
 teaches  natural  religion  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  free 
 from  those  superstitions  with  which  it  was  totally 
 corrupted,  and  under  which  it  was  in  a  manner  lost. 
 
 Revelation  is,  further,  an  authoritative  publication 
 of  natural  religion,  and  so  affords  the  evidence  of 
 testimony  for  the  truth  of  it.  Indeed  the  miracles 
 and  prophecies  recorded  in  Scripture,  were  intended 
 to  prove  a  particular  dispensation  of  Providence— 
 the  redemption  of  the  world  by  the  Messiah ;  but 
 this  does  not  hinder  but  that  they  may  also  prove 
 God's  general  providence  over  the  world,  as  our 
 moral  Governor  and  Judge.  And  thev  evidently 
 do  prove  it;  because  this  character  of  the  Author  of 
 nature  is  necessarily  connected  with,  and  implied  in 
 that  particular  revealed  dispensation  of  things :  it  is 
 
341 
 
 likewise  continually  taught  expressly,  and  insisted 
 upon  by  those  persons  who  wrought  the  miracles  and 
 delivered  the  prophecies.  So  that,  indeed,  natural 
 religion  seems  as  much  proved  by  the  Scripture  re- 
 velation, as  it  would  have  been,  had  the  design  of 
 revelation  been  nothing  else  than  to  prove  it. 
 
 But  it  may  possibly  be  disputed,  how  far  miracles 
 can  prove  natural  religion ;  and  notable  objections 
 may  be  urged  against  this  proof  of  it,  considered  as  a 
 matter  of  speculation :  but,  considered  as  a  practical 
 thing,  there  can  be  none.  For,  suppose  a  person  to 
 teach  natural  religion  to  a  nation,  who  had  lived  in 
 total  ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of  it,  and  to  declare 
 he  was  commissioned  by  God  so  to  do ;  suppose  him, 
 in  proof  of  his  commission,  to  foretell  things  future, 
 which  no  human  foresight  could  have  guessed  at; 
 to  divide  the  sea  with  a  word ;  feed  great  multitudes 
 with  bread  from  heaven ;  cure  all  manner  of  diseases  : 
 and  raise  the  dead  even  himself,  to  life :  would  not 
 this  give  additional  credibility  to  his  teaching,  a  cre- 
 dibility beyond  what  that  of  a  common  man  would 
 have,  and  be  an  authoritative  publication  of  the  law 
 of  nature,  that  is,  a  new  proof  of  it  ?  It  would  be 
 a  practical  one,  of  the  strongest  kind,  perhaps,  which 
 human  creatures  are  capable  of  having  given  them. 
 The  law  of  Moses,  then,  and  the  gospel  of  Christ, 
 are  authoritative  publications  of  the  religion  of  nature: 
 they  afford  a  proof  of  God's  general  providence,  as 
 moral  Governor  of  the  world,  as  well  as  of  his  par- 
 ticular dispensations  of  providence  towards  sinful 
 creatures,  revealed  in  the  law  and  the  gospel.  As 
 they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the  latter,  so  they  are 
 an  additional  evidence  of  the  former. 
 
342 
 
 To  show  this  farther,  let  us  suppose  a  man  of  the 
 greatest  and  most  improved  capacity,  who  had  never 
 heard  of  revelation,  convinced  upon  the  whole,  not- 
 withstanding the  disorders  of  the  world,  that  it  was 
 under  the  direction  and  moral  government  of  an  infi- 
 nitely perfect  Being,  but  ready  to  question,  whether 
 he  were  not  got  beyond  the  reach  of  his  faculties ; 
 suppose  him  brought,  by  this  suspicion,  into  great 
 danger  of  being  carried  away  by  the  universal  bad 
 example  of  almost  every  one  around  him,  who  ap- 
 peared to  have  no  sense,  no  practical  sense  at  least, 
 of  these  things ;  and  this,  perhaps,  would  be  as  ad- 
 vantageous a  situation,  with  regard  to  religion,  as 
 nature  alone  ever  placed  any  man  in.  What  a  con- 
 firmation now  must  it  be  to  such  a  person,  all  at  once 
 to  find,  that  this  moral  system  of  things  was  revealed 
 to  mankind,  in  the  name  of  that  infinite  Being, 
 whom  he  had,  from  principles  of  reason,  believed  in  ; 
 and  that  the  publishers  of  the  revelation  proved  their 
 commission  from  him  by  making  it  appear,  that  he 
 had  intrusted  them  with  a  power  of  suspending  and 
 changing  the  general  laws  of  nature. 
 
 Nor  must  it,  by  any  means,  be  omitted,  for  it  is 
 a  thing  of  the  utmost  importance,  that  life  and  im- 
 mortality are  eminently  brought  to  light  by  the  gos- 
 pel. The  great  doctrines  of  a  future  state,  the  dan- 
 ger of  a  course  of  wickedness,  and  the  efficacy  of  re- 
 pentance, are  not  only  confirmed  in  the  gospel,  but 
 are  taught,  especially  the  last  is,  with  a  degree  of 
 light,  to  which  that  of  nature  is  but  darkness. 
 
 Farther:  As  Christianity  served  these  ends  and 
 purposes,  when  it  was  first  published,  by  the  miracu- 
 lous publication  itself;  so  it  was  intended  to  serve 
 
343 
 
 the  same  purposes,  in  future  ages,  by  means  of  the 
 settlement  of  a  visible  church ;  of  a  society,  distin- 
 guished from  common  ones,  and  from  the  rest  of  the 
 world,  by  peculiar  religious  institutions ;  by  an  insti- 
 tuted method  of  instruction,  and  an  instituted  form 
 of  external  religion.  Miraculous  powers  were  given 
 to  the  first  preachers  of  Christianity,  in  order  to  their 
 introducing  it  into  the  world :  a  visible  church  was 
 established,  in  order  to  continue  it,  and  carry  it  on 
 successively  throughout  all  ages.  Had  Moses  and 
 the  Prophets,  Christ  and  his  Apostles,  only  taught, 
 and  by  miracles  proved,  religion  to  their  contempo- 
 raries, the  benefits  of  their  instructions  would  have 
 reached  but  to  a  small  part  of  mankind.  Christian- 
 ity must  have  been,  in  a  great  degree,  sunk  and  for- 
 got in  a  very  few  ages.  To  prevent  this,  appears  to 
 have  been  one  reason  why  a  visible  church  was  insti- 
 tuted ;  to  be,  like  a  city  upon  a  hill,  a  standing  me- 
 morial to  the  world,  of  the  duty  which  we  owe  our 
 Maker;  to  call  men  continually,  both  by  example 
 and  instruction,  to  attend  to  it,  and,  by  the  form  of 
 religion  ever  before  their  eyes,  remind  them  of  the 
 reality ;  to  be  the  repository  of  the  oracles  of  God ; 
 to  hold  up  the  light  of  revelation  in  aid  to  that  of 
 nature,  and  propagate  it  throughout  all  generations 
 to  the  end  of  the  world — the  light  of  revelation,  con- 
 sidered here  in  no  other  view,  than  as  designed  to 
 enforce  natural  religion.  And,  in  proportion  as 
 Christianity  is  professed  and  taught  in  the  world, 
 religion,  natural  or  essential  religion,  is  thus  dis- 
 tinctly and  advantageously  laid  before  mankind,  and 
 brought  again  and  again  to  their  thoughts,  as  a  mat- 
 ter of  infinite  importance.      A  visible    church  has 
 
344 
 
 also  a  farther  tendency  to  promote  natural  religion, 
 as  being  an  instituted  method  of  education,  originally 
 intended  to  be  of  more  peculiar  advantage  to  those 
 who  would  conform  to  it.  For  one  end  of  the  in- 
 stitution was,  that,  by  admonition  and  reproof,  as 
 well  as  instruction ;  by  a  general  regular  discipline, 
 and  public  exercises  of  religion,  the  body  of  Christ, 
 as  the  Scripture  speaks,  should  be  edified ;  that  is, 
 trained  up  in  piety  and  virtue,  for  a  higher  and  bet- 
 ter state.  This  settlement,  then,  appearing  thus 
 beneficial ;  tending,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to 
 answer,  and,  in  some  degree  actually  answering, 
 those  ends;  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  the  very 
 notion  of  it  implies  positive  institutions :  for  the  visi- 
 bility of  the  church  consists  in  them.  Take  away 
 every  thing  of  this  kind,  and  you  lose  the  very  no- 
 tion itself.  So  that,  if  the  things  now  mentioned 
 are  advantages,  the  reason  and  importance  of  positive 
 institutions  in  general  is  most  obvious;  since,  with- 
 out them,  these  advantages  could  not  be  secured  to 
 the  world.  And  it  is  mere  idle  wantonness,  to  in- 
 sist upon  knowing  the  reasons  why  such  particular 
 ones  were  fixed  upon,  rather  than  others. 
 
 The  benefit  arising  from  this  supernatural  assist- 
 ance, which  Christianity  affords  to  natural  religion, 
 is  what  some  persons  are  very  slow  in  apprehending : 
 and  yet  it  is  a  thing  distinct  in  itself,  and  a  very  plain 
 obvious  one.  For  will  any,  in  good  earnest,  really 
 say,  that  the  bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen  world 
 were  in  as  advantageous  a  situation,  with  regard  to 
 natural  religion,  as  they  are  now  amongst  us  ?  that  it 
 was  laid  before  them,  and  enforced  upon  them,  in  a 
 manner  as  distinct,  and  as  much  tending  to  influence 
 their  practice  ? 
 
345 
 
 The  objections  against  all  this,  from  the  perver- 
 sion of  Christianity,  and  from  the  supposition  of  its 
 having  had  but  little  good  influence,  however  in- 
 nocently they  may  be  proposed,  yet  cannot  be  in- 
 sisted upon  as  conclusive,  upon  any  principles  but 
 such  as  lead  to  downright  atheism ;  because  the  ma- 
 nifestation of  the  law  of  nature  by  reason,  which,  up- 
 on all  principles  of  theism,  must  have  been  from  God, 
 has  been  perverted  and  rendered  ineffectual  in  the 
 same  manner.  It  may  indeed,  I  think,  truly  be  said, 
 that  the  good  effects  of  Christianity  have  not  been 
 small;  nor  its  supposed  ill  effects,  any  effects  at  all 
 of  it,  properly  speaking.  Perhaps,  too,  the  things 
 themselves  done  have  been  aggravated;  and  if  not, 
 Christianity  hath  been  often  only  a  pretence ;  and 
 the  same  evils,  in  the  main,  would  have  been  done 
 upon  some  other  pretence.  However,  great  and 
 shocking  as  the  corruptions  and  abuses  of  it  have 
 really  been,  they  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  argu- 
 ments against  it,  upon  principles  of  theism.  For 
 one  cannot  proceed  one  step  in  reasoning  upon  natu- 
 ral religion,  any  more  than  upon  Christianity,  with- 
 out laying  it  down  as  a  first  principle,  that  the  dis- 
 pensations of  Providence  are  not  to  be  judged  of  by 
 their  perversions,  but  by  their  genuine  tendencies ; 
 not  by  what  they  do  actually  seem  to  effect,  but  by 
 what  they  would  effect  if  mankind  did  their  part ; 
 that  part  which  is  justly  put  and  left  upon  them.  It 
 is  altogether  as  much  the  language  of  one,  as  of  the 
 other :  "  He  that  is  unjust,  let  him  be  unjust  still ; 
 and  he  that  is  holy,  let  him  be  holy  still."  Rev.  xxii. 
 11.  The  light  of  reason  does  not,  any  more  than 
 that  of  revelation,  force  men  to  submit  to  its  autho- 
 
 P      O 
 
346 
 
 rity :  both  admonish  them  of  what  they  ought  to  do 
 and  avoid,  together  with  the  consequences  of  each ; 
 and  after  this  leave  them  at  full  liberty  to  act  just  as 
 they  please,  till  the  appointed  time  of  judgment. 
 Every  moment's  experience  shows  that  this  is  God's 
 general  rule  of  government. 
 
 To  return,  then;  Christianity  being  a  promulga- 
 tion of  the  law  of  nature ;  being,  moreover,  an  au- 
 thoritative promulgation  of  it,  with  new  light,  and 
 other  circumstances  of  peculiar  advantage,  adapted  to 
 the  wants  of  mankind;  these  things  fully  show  its 
 importance.  And  it  is  to  be  observed  farther,  that 
 as  the  nature  of  the  case  requires,  so  all  Christians 
 are  commanded  to  contribute,  by  their  profession  of 
 Christianity,  to  preserve  it  in  the  world,  and  render 
 it  such  a  promulgation  and  enforcement  of  religion. 
 For  it  is  the  very  scheme  of  the  gospel,  that  each 
 Christian  should,  in  his  degree,  contribute  towards 
 continuing  and  carrying  it  on ;  all  by  uniting  in  the 
 public  profession,  and  external  practice  of  Christi- 
 anity ;  some  by  instructing,  by  having  the  oversight, 
 and  taking  care  of  this  religious  community — the 
 church  of  God.  Now  this  farther  shows  the  im- 
 portance of  Christianity,  and,  which  is  what  I  chiefly 
 intend,  its  importance  in  a  practical  sense,  or  the  high 
 obligations  we  are  under,  to  take  it  into  our  most  se- 
 rious consideration ;  and  the  danger  there  must  ne- 
 cessarily be,  not  only  in  treating  it  despitefully,  which 
 I  am  not  now  speaking  of,  but  in  disregarding  and 
 neglecting  it.  For  this  is  neglecting  to  do  what  is 
 expressly  enjoined  us,  for  continuing  those  benefits 
 to  the  world,  and  transmitting  them  down  to  future 
 times.      And  all  this  holds,  even  though  the  only 
 
347 
 
 thing  to  be  considered  in  Christianity  were,  its  sub- 
 serviency to  natural  religion.      But, 
 
 II.  Christianity  is  to  be  considered  in  a  further 
 view,  as  containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of 
 things,  not  at  all  discoverable  by  reason,  in  conse- 
 quence of  which  several  distinct  precepts  are  enjoined 
 us.  Christianity  is  not  only  an  external  institution 
 of  natural  religion,  and  a  new  promulgation  of  God's 
 general  providence,  as  righteous  Governor  and  Judge 
 of  the  world;  but  it  contains  also  a  revelation  of  a 
 particular  dispensation  of  providence,  carrying  on  by 
 his  Son  and  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  salvation  of 
 mankind,  who  are  represented  in  Scripture,  to  be  in 
 a  state  of  ruin.  And,  in  consequence  of  this  reve- 
 lation being  made,  we  are  commanded  to  be  baptized, 
 not  only  in  the  name  of  the  Father ',  but  also  of  the 
 Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost ;  and  other  obligations 
 of  duty,  unknown  before,  to  the  Son  and  the  Holy 
 Ghost,  are  revealed.  Now,  the  importance  of  these 
 duties  may  be  judged  of,  by  observing  that  they 
 arise,  not  from  positive  command  merely,  but  also 
 from  the  offices  which  appear,  from  Scripture,  to  be- 
 long to  those  divine  persons  in  the  gospel  dispensa- 
 tion, or  from  the  relations  which,  we  are  there  in- 
 formed, they  stand  in  to  us.  By  reason  is  revealed 
 the  relation  which  God  the  Father  stands  in  to  us. 
 Hence  arises  the  obligation  of  duty  which  we  are 
 under  to  him.  In  Scripture  are  revealed  the  rela- 
 tions which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  stand  in  to  us. 
 Hence  arise  the  obligations  of  duty  which  we  are 
 under  to  them.  The  truth  of  the  case,  as  one  may 
 speak,  in  each  of  these  three  respects,  being  admit- 
 ted, that  God  is  the  Governor  of  the  world,  upon 
 
348 
 
 the  evidence  of  reason ;  that  Christ  is  the  Mediator 
 between  God  and  man ;  and  the  Holy  Ghost  our 
 Guide  and  Sanctifler,  upon  the  evidence  of  revela- 
 tion :  the  truth  of  the  case,  I  say,  in  each  of  these 
 respects,  being  admitted,  it  is  no  more  a  question, 
 why  it  should  be  commanded  that  we  be  baptized  in 
 the  name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  than 
 that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father. 
 This  matter  seems  to  require  to  be  more  fully 
 stated.* 
 
 Let  it  be  remembered,  then,  that  religion  comes 
 under  the  twofold  consideration  of  internal  and  ex- 
 ternal ;  for  the  latter  is  as  real  a  part  of  religion,  of 
 true  religion,  as  the  former.  Now,  when  religion 
 is  considered  under  the  first  notion,  as  an  inward 
 principle,  to  be  exerted  in  such  and  such  inward 
 acts  of  the  mind  and  heart,  the  essence  of  natural 
 religion  may  be  said  to  consist  in  religious  regards 
 to  God  the  Father  Almighty  ;  and  the  essence  of 
 revealed  religion,  as  distinguished  from  natural,  to 
 consist  in  religious  regards  to  the  Son  and  to  the 
 Holy  Ghost.  And  the  obligation  we  are  under,  of 
 paying  these  religious  regards  to  each  of  these  Di- 
 vine persons  respectively,  arises  from  the  respective 
 relations  which  they  each  stand  in  to  us.  How 
 these  relations  are  made  known,  whether  by  reason 
 or  revelation,  makes  no  alteration  in  the  case;  be- 
 cause the  duties  arise  out  of  the  relations  themselves, 
 not  out  of  the  manner  in  which  we  are  informed  of 
 them.     The  Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper 
 
 *  See  "  The  Nature,  Obligation,  and  Efficacy,  of  the  Christ- 
 ian Sacraments,"  &c.  and  Colliber  of  Revealed  Religion,  as  there 
 quoted. 
 
349 
 
 office  in  that  great  dispensation  of  Providence,  the 
 redemption  of  the  world:  the  one  our  Mediator, 
 the  other  our  Sanctifier.  Does  not,  then,  the 
 duty  of  religious  regards  to  both  these  divine  per- 
 sons, as  immediately  arise  to  the  view  of  reason, 
 out  of  the  very  nature  of  these  offices  and  relations, 
 as  the  inward  good- will  and  kind  intention,  which 
 we  owe  to  our  fellow-creatures,  arise  out  of  the 
 common  relations  between  us  and  them?  But  it 
 will  be  asked,  "  What  are  the  inward  religious  re- 
 gards, appearing  thus  obviously  due  to  the  Son  and 
 Holy  Spirit,  as  arising,  not  merely  from  command 
 in  Scripture,  but  from  the  very  nature  of  the  re- 
 vealed relations  which  they  stand  in  to  us?"  I 
 answer,  the  religious  regards  of  reverence,  honour, 
 love,  trust,  gratitude,  fear,  hope.  In  what  exter- 
 nal manner  this  inward  worship  is  to  be  expressed, 
 is  a  matter  of  pure  revealed  command ;  as,  perhaps, 
 the  external  manner  in  which  God  the  Father  is  to 
 be  worshipped,  may  be  more  so  than  we  are  ready 
 to  think ;  but  the  worship,  the  internal  worship  it- 
 self, to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  is  no  farther 
 matter  of  pure  revealed  command,  than  as  the  rela- 
 tions they  stand  in  to  us,  are  matter  of  pure  revela- 
 tion ;  for  the  relations  being  known,  the  obligations 
 to  such  internal  worship  are  obligations  of  reason, 
 arising  out  of  those  relations  themselves.  In  short, 
 the  history  of  the  gospel  as  immediately  shows  us 
 the  reason  of  these  obligations,  as  it  shows  us  the 
 meaning  of  the  words,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost. 
 
 If  this  account  of  the  Christian  religion  be  just, 
 those  persons  who  can  speak  lightly  of  it,  as  of  lit- 
 tle  consequence,  provided  natural  religion  be  kept 
 
350 
 
 to,  plainly  forget,  that  Christianity,  even  what  is 
 peculiarly  so  called,  as  distinguished  from  natural 
 religion,  has  yet  somewhat  very  important,  even 
 of  a  moral  nature.  For  the  office  of  our  Lord 
 being  made  known,  and  the  relation  he  stands  in  to 
 us,  the  obligation  of  religious  regards  to  him  is 
 plainly  moral,  as  much  as  charity  to  mankind  is; 
 since  this  obligation  arises,  before  external  com- 
 mand, immediately  out  of  that  his  office  and  rela- 
 tion itself.  These  persons  appear  to  forget,  that 
 revelation  is  to  be  considered  as  informing  us  of 
 somewhat  new  in  the  state  of  mankind,  and  in  the 
 government  of  the  world;  as  acquainting  us  with 
 some  relations  we  stand  in,  which  could  not  other- 
 wise have  been  known.  And  these  relations  being 
 real,  (though  before  revelation  we  could  be  under 
 no  obligations  from  them,  yet  upon  their  being  re- 
 vealed,) there  is  no  reason  to  think,  but  that  ne- 
 glect of  behaving  suitably  to  them,  will  be  attended 
 with  the  same  kind  of  consequences  under  God's 
 government,  as  neglecting  to  behave  suitably  to  any 
 other  relations  made  known  to  us  by  reason.  And 
 ignorance,  whether  unavoidable  or  voluntary,  so  far 
 as  we  can  possibly  see,  will,  just  as  much,  and  just 
 as  little,  excuse  in  one  case  as  in  the  other :  the 
 ignorance  being  supposed  equally  unavoidable,  or 
 equally  voluntary,  in  both  cases. 
 
 If,  therefore,  Christ  be  indeed  the  Mediator  be- 
 tween God  and  man;  that  is,  if  Christianity  be 
 true;  if  he  be  indeed  our  Lord,  our  Saviour,  and 
 our  God,  no  one  can  say  what  may  follow,  not  only 
 the  obstinate,  but  the  careless  disregard  to  him  in 
 those  high  relations.     Nay,  no  one  can  say  what 
 
351 
 
 may  follow  such  disregard,  even  in  the  way  of  na- 
 tural consequence.*  For,  as  the  natural  conse- 
 quences of  vice  in  this  life,  are  doubtless  to  be  con- 
 sidered as  judicial  punishments  inflicted  by  God ;  so 
 likewise,  for  aught  we  know,  the  judicial  punish- 
 ments of  the  future  life  may  be,  in  a  like  way,  or  a 
 like  sense,  the  natural  consequence  of  vice;f  of 
 men's  violating  or  disregarding  the  relations  which 
 God  has  placed  them  in  here,  and  made  known  to 
 them. 
 
 Again,  If  mankind  are  corrupted  and  depraved 
 in  their  moral  character,  and  so  are  unfit  for  that 
 state  which  Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disci- 
 ples ;  and,  if  the  assistance  of  God's  Spirit  be  ne- 
 cessary to  renew  their  nature,  in  the  degree  requi- 
 site to  their  being  qualified  for  that  state ;  all  which 
 is  implied  in  the  express,  though  figurative,  decla- 
 ration, Except  a  man  be  born  of  the  Spirit,  he  can- 
 not enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God :  supposing  this, 
 is  it  possible  any  serious  person  can  think  it  a  slight 
 matter,  whether  or  not  he  makes  use  of  the  means 
 expressly  commanded  by  God,  for  obtaining  this 
 divine  assistance  ;  especially  since  the  whole  analogy 
 of  nature  shows,  that  we  are  not  to  expect  any  be- 
 nefits, without  making  use  of  the  appointed  means 
 for  obtaining  or  enjoying  them.  Now,  reason 
 shows  us  nothing  of  the  particular  immediate  means 
 of  obtaining  either  temporal  or  spiritual  benefits. 
 This,  therefore,  we  must  learn,  either  from  experi- 
 ence or  revelation.  And  experience,  the  present 
 case  does  not  admit  of. 
 
 *  Page  205,  2<M$;  &c  f  Chap.  5. 
 
352 
 
 The  conclusion  from  all  this  evidently  is,  that 
 Christianity  being  supposed  either  true  or  credible, 
 it  is  unspeakable  irreverence,  and  really  the  most 
 presumptuous  rashness,  to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter. 
 It  can  never  justly  be  esteemed  of  little  conse- 
 quence, till  it  be  positively  supposed  false.  Nor 
 do  I  know  a  higher  and  more  important  obligation 
 which  we  are  under,  than  that  of  examining  most 
 seriously  into  the  evidence  of  it,  supposing  its  cre- 
 dibility; and  of  embracing  it,  upon  supposition  of 
 its  truth. 
 
 The  two  following  deductions  may  be  proper  to 
 be  added,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  obser- 
 vations, and  to  prevent  their  being  mistaken. 
 
 1.  Hence  we  may  clearly  see,  where  lies  the  dis- 
 tinction between  what  is  positive  and  what  is  moral 
 in  religion.  Moral  precepts  are  precepts,  the  rea- 
 sons of  which  we  see;  positive  precepts  are  pre- 
 cepts, the  reasons  of  which  we  do  not  see.*  Mo- 
 ral duties  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case  itself, 
 prior  to  external  command.  Positive  duties  do  not 
 arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  case,  but  from  exter- 
 nal command;  nor  would  they  be  duties  at  all,  were 
 it  not  for  such  command  received  from  him,  whose 
 creatures  and  subjects  we  are.  But  the  manner  in 
 which  the  nature  of  the  case,  or  the  fact  of  the  re- 
 
 *  This  is  the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts, 
 considered  respectively  as  such.  But  yet,  since  the  latter  have 
 somewhat  of  a  moral  nature,  we  may  see  the  reason  of  them 
 considered  in  this  view.  Moral  and  positive  precepts  are  in 
 some  respects  alike,  in  other  respects  different.  So  far  as  they 
 are  alike,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  both  ;  so  far  as  they  are  dif- 
 ferent, we  discern  the  reasons  of  the  former,  but  not  of  the  latter. 
 See  p.  342,  &c.  and  p.  353. 
 
353 
 
 lation,  is  made  known,  this  doth  not  denominate 
 any  duty,  either  positive  or  moral.  That  we  be 
 baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  is  as  much  a 
 positive  duty  as  that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of 
 the  Son;  because  both  arise  equally  from  revealed 
 command;  though  the  relation  which  we  stand  in 
 to  God  the  Father,  is  made  known  to  us  by  rea- 
 son ;  the  relation  we  stand  in  to  Christ,  by  revela- 
 tion only.  On  the  other  hand,  the  dispensation  of 
 the  gospel  admitted,  gratitude  as  immediately  be- 
 comes due  to  Christ,  from  his  being  the  voluntary 
 minister  of  this  dispensation,  as  it  is  due  to  God  the 
 Father,  from  his  being  the  fountain  of  all  good ; 
 though  the  first  is  made  known  to  us  by  revelation 
 only,  the  second  by  reason.  Hence  also  we  may 
 see,  and,  for  distinctness  sake,  it  may  be  worth 
 mentioning,  that  positive  institutions  come  under  a 
 twofold  consideration :  They  are  either  institutions 
 founded  on  natural  religion,  as  baptism  in  the  name 
 of  the  Father;  though  this  has  also  a  particular  re- 
 ference to  the  gospel  dispensation,  for  it  is  in  the 
 name  of  God,  as  the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
 Christ ;  or  they  are  external  institutions  founded  on 
 revealed  religion,  as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Son, 
 and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 
 
 2.  From  the  distinction  between  what  is  moral 
 and  what  is  positive  in  religion,  appears  the  ground 
 of  that  peculiar  preference,  which  the  Scripture 
 teaches  us  to  be  due  to  the  former. 
 
 The  reason  of  positive  institutions  in  general  is 
 very  obvious,  though  we  should  not  see  the  reason 
 why  such  particular  ones  are  pitched  upon,  rather 
 than  others.     Whoever,  therefore,   instead  of  ca- 
 
354 
 
 villing  at  words,  will  attend  to  the  thing  itself,  may 
 clearly  see,  that  positive  institutions  in  general,  as 
 distinguished  from  this  or  that  particular  one,  have 
 the  nature  of  moral  commands ;  since  the  reasons  of 
 them  appear.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  external 
 worship  of  God  is  a  moral  duty,  though  no  particu- 
 lar mode  of  it  be  so.  Care  then  is  to  be  taken, 
 when  a  comparison  is  made  between  positive  and 
 moral  duties,  that  they  be  compared  no  farther  than 
 as  they  are  different ;  no  farther  than  as  the  former 
 are  positive,  or  arise  out  of  mere  external  command, 
 the  reasons  of  which  we  are  not  acquainted  with  ; 
 and  as  the  latter  are  moral,  or  arise  out  of  the  ap- 
 parent reason  of  the  case,  without  such  external 
 command.  Unless  this  caution  be  observed,  we 
 shall  run  into  endless  confusion. 
 
 Now,  this  being  premised,  suppose  two  standing 
 precepts  enjoined  by  the  same  authority;  that  in 
 certain  conjunctures,  it  is  impossible  to  obey  both  ; 
 that  the  former  is  moral,  that  is,  a  precept  of  which 
 we  see  the  reasons,  and  that  they  hold  in  the  par- 
 ticular case  before  us;  but  that  the  latter  is  positive, 
 that  is,  a  precept  of  which  we  do  not  see  the  reasons  : 
 it  is  indisputable  that  our  obligations  are  to  obey  the 
 former,  because  there  is  an  apparent  reason  for  this 
 preference,  and  none  against  it.  Farther,  positive 
 institutions,  I  suppose  all  those  which  Christianity 
 enjoins,  are  means  to  a  moral  end;  and  the  end 
 must  be  acknowledged  more  excellent  than  the 
 means.  Nor  is  observance  of  these  institutions  any 
 religious  obedience  at  all,  or  of  any  value,  otherwise 
 than  as  it  proceeds  from  a  moral  principle.  This 
 seems  to  be  the  strict  logical  way  of  stating  and  de- 
 
355 
 
 termining  this  matter;  but  will,  perhaps,  be  found 
 less  applicable  to  practice  than  may  be  thought  at 
 first  sight. 
 
 And,  therefore,  in  a  more  practical,  though  more 
 lax  way  of  consideration,  and  taking  the  words 
 moral  law  and  positive  institutions,  in  the  popular 
 sense ;  I  add,  that  the  whole  moral  law,  is  as  much 
 matter  of  revealed  command,  as  positive  institutions 
 are;  for  the  Scripture  enjoins  every  mortal  virtue. 
 In  this  respect,  then,  they  are  both  upon  a  level. 
 But  the  moral  law  is,  moreover,  written  upon  our 
 hearts ;  interwoven  into  our  very  nature.  And  this 
 is  a  plain  intimation  of  the  Author  of  it,  which  is  to 
 be  preferred,  when  they  interfere. 
 
 But  there  is  not  altogether  so  much  necessity  for 
 the  determination  of  this  question,  as  some  persons 
 seem  to  think.  Nor  are  we  left  to  reason  alone  to 
 determine  it.  For,  first,  Though  mankind  have, 
 in  all  ages,  been  greatly  prone  to  place  their  religion 
 in  peculiar  positive  rites,  by  way  of  equivalent  for 
 obedience  to  moral  precepts;  yet,  without  making 
 any  comparison  at  all  between  them,  and  conse- 
 quently without  determining  which  is  to  have  the 
 preference,  the  nature  of  the  thing  abundantly  shows 
 all  notions  of  that  kind  to  be  utterly  subversive  of 
 true  religion;  as  they  are,  moreover,  contrary  to 
 the  whole  general  tenor  of  Scripture,  and  likewise 
 to  the  most  express  particular  declarations  of  it,  that 
 nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of  God,  without 
 moral  virtue.  Secondly,  Upon  the  occasion  of  men- 
 tioning together  positive  and  moral  duties,  the  Scrip- 
 ture always  puts  the  stress  of  religion  upon  the  latter, 
 and  never  upon  the  former;  which,  though  no  sort 
 
 i 
 
356 
 
 of  allowance  to  neglect  the  former,  when  they  do  not 
 interfere  with  the  latter,  yet  is  a  plain  intimation, 
 that  when  they  do,  the  latter  are  to  be  preferred. 
 And,  farther,  as  mankind  are  for  placing  the  stress 
 of  their  religion  any  where,  rather  than  upon  virtue, 
 lest  both  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  general 
 spirit  of  Christianity,  appearing  in  the  intimation  now 
 mentioned,  should  be  ineffectual  against  this  preva- 
 lent folly;  our  Lord  himself,  from  whose  command 
 alone  the  obligation  of  positive  institution  arises,  has 
 taken  occasion  to  make  the  comparison  between  them 
 and  moral  precepts,  when  the  Pharisees  censured  him 
 for  eating  with  publicans  and  sinners  ;  and  also  when 
 they  censured  his  disciples  for  plucking  the  ears  of 
 corn  on  the  Sabbath-day.  Upon  this  comparison  he 
 has  determined  expressly,  and  in  form,  which  shall 
 have  the  preference  when  they  interfere.  And  by 
 delivering  his  authoritative  determination  in  a  pro- 
 verbial manner  of  expression,  he  has  made  it  gene- 
 ral, I  will  have  mercy,  and  not  sacrifice.*  The 
 propriety  of  the  word  proverbial  is  not  the  thing  in- 
 sisted upon,  though,  I  think,  the  manner  of  speak- 
 ing is  to  be  called  so.  But  that  the  manner  of  speak- 
 ing very  remarkably  renders  the  determination  ge- 
 neral, is  surely  indisputable.  For,  had  it,  in  the 
 latter  case,  been  said  only,  that  God  preferred  mercy 
 to  the  rigid  observance  of  the  Sabbath,  even  then, 
 by  parity  of  reason,  most  justly  might  we  have  ar- 
 gued, that  he  preferred  mercy,  likewise,  to  the  ob- 
 servance of  other  ritual  institutions,  and,  in  general, 
 moral  duties  to  positive  ones.     And  thus  the  deter- 
 
 *  Matt.  ix.  13.  xii.  7. 
 
357 
 
 ruination  would  have  been  general,  though  its  being 
 so  were  inferred,  and  not  expressed.  But  as  the 
 passage  really  stands  in  the  gospel,  it  is  much 
 stronger;  for  the  sense,  and  the  very  literal  words 
 of  our  Lord's  answer,  are  as  applicable  to  any  other 
 instance  of  a  comparison  between  positive  and  moral 
 duties,  as  to  this  upon  which  they  were  spoken.  And 
 if,  in  case  of  competition,  mercy  is  to  be  preferred  to 
 positive  institutions,  it  will  scarce  be  thought,  that 
 justice  is  to  give  place  to  them.  It  is  remarkable, 
 too,  that,  as  the  words  are  a  quotation  from  the  Old 
 Testament,  they  are  introduced,  on  both  the  fore- 
 mentioned  occasions,  with  a  declaration,  that  the  Pha- 
 risees did  not  understand  the  meaning  of  them. 
 This,  I  say,  is  very  remarkable ;  for,  since  it  is  scarce 
 possible  for  the  most  ignorant  person  not  to  under- 
 stand the  literal  sense  of  the  passage  in  the  Prophet,* 
 and  since  understanding  the  literal  sense  would  not 
 have  prevented  their  condemning  the  guiltless^  it  can 
 hardly  be  doubted,  that  the  thing  which  our  Lord 
 really  intended  in  that  declaration  was,  that  the  Pha- 
 risees had  not  learned  from  it,  as  they  might,  wherein 
 the  general  spirit  of  religion  consists ;  that  it  consists 
 in  moral  piety  and  virtue,  as  distinguished  from  forms 
 and  ritual  observances.  However,  it  is  certain  we 
 may  learn  this  from  his  divine  application  of  the  pas- 
 sage in  the  gospel. 
 
 But,  as  it  is  one  of  the  peculiar  weaknesses  of 
 j human  nature,  when,  upon  a  comparison  of  two 
 things,  one  is  found  to  be  of  greater  importance  than 
 the  other,  to  consider  this  other  as  of  scarce  any  im- 
 
 *  Rosea  vi.  \  Matt  xii.  7. 
 
358 
 
 portance  at  all ;  it  is  highly  necessary  that  we  remind 
 ourselves,  how  great  presumption  it  is  to  make  light 
 of  any  institutions  of  divine  appointment ;  that  our 
 obligations  to  obey  all  God's  commands  whatever, 
 are  absolute  and  indispensable;  and  that  commands 
 merely  positive,  admitted  to  be  from  him,  lay  us  un- 
 der a  moral  obligation  to  obey  them;  an  obligation 
 moral  in  the  strictest  and  most  proper  sense. 
 
 To  these  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the 
 account  now  given  of  Christianity,  most  strongly 
 shows  and  enforces  upon  us  the  obligation  of  search- 
 ing the  Scriptures,  in  order  to  see  what  the  scheme 
 of  revelation  really  is,  instead  of  determining  before- 
 hand, from  reason,  what  the  scheme  of  it  must  be.* 
 Indeed,  if  in  revelation  there  be  found  any  passages, 
 the  seeming  meaning  of  which  is  contrary  to  natural 
 religion,  we  may  most  certainly  conclude  such  seem- 
 ing meaning  not  to  be  the  real  one.  But  it  is  not 
 any  degree  of  a  presumption  against  an  interpreta- 
 tion of  Scripture,  that  such  interpretation  contains  a 
 doctrine  which  the  light  of  nature  cannot  discover, f 
 or  a  precept,  which  the  law  of  nature  does  not 
 oblige  to. 
 
 *  Chap.  3.  f  Tages  360,  361 
 
359 
 
 CHAP.  II. 
 
 Of  the  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revelation, 
 considered  as  miraculous. 
 
 Having  shown  the  importance  of  the  Christian 
 revelation,  and  the  obligations  which  we  are  under 
 seriously  to  attend  to  it,  upon  supposition  of  its 
 truth  or  its  credibility ;  the  next  thing  in  order  is,  to 
 consider  the  supposed  presumptions  against  revela- 
 tion in  general;  which  shall  be  the  subject  of  this 
 chapter;  and  the  objections  against  the  Christian  in 
 particular,  which  shall  be  the  subject  of  some  follow- 
 ing ones.*  For  it  seems  the  most  natural  method 
 to  remove  these  prejudices  against  Christianity,  be- 
 fore we  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  the  positive 
 evidence  for  it,  and  the  objections  against  that  evi- 
 dence.f 
 
 It  is,  I  think,  commonly  supposed,  that  there  is 
 some  peculiar  presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  na- 
 ture, against  the  Christian  scheme  of  things,  at  least 
 against  miracles ;  so  as  that  stronger  evidence  is  ne- 
 cessary to  prove  the  truth  and  reality  of  them,  than 
 would  be  sufficient  to  convince  us  of  other  events  or 
 matters  of  fact.  Indeed,  the  consideration  of  this 
 supposed  presumption  cannot  but  be  thought  very 
 insignificant  by  many  persons;  yet  as  it  belongs  to 
 the  subject  of  this  treatise,  so  it  may  tend  to  open 
 the    mind,    and   remove    some   prejudices,   however 
 
 *  Chap.  3,  4,  5.  G  t  Chap.  7. 
 
360 
 
 needless  the  consideration  of  it  be,  upon  its  own  ac- 
 count. 
 
 I.  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  presumption,  from 
 the  analogy  of  nature,  against  the  general  scheme  of 
 Christianity,  that  God  created  and  invisibly  governs 
 the  world  by  Jesus  Christ,  and  by  him  also  will 
 hereafter  judge  it  in  righteousness,  that  is,  render  to 
 every  one  according  to  his  works;  and  that  good  men 
 are  under  the  secret  influence  of  his  Spirit.  Whether 
 these  things  are,  or  are  not,  to  be  called  miraculous, 
 is,  perhaps,  only  a  question  about  words ;  or,  how- 
 ever, is  of  no  moment  in  the  case.  If  the  analogy 
 of  nature  raises  any  presumption  against  this  general 
 scheme  of  Christianity,  it  must  be,  either  because  it 
 is  not  discoverable  by  reason  or  experience,  or  else 
 because  it  is  unlike  that  course  of  nature,  which  is. 
 But  analogy  raises  no  presumption  against  the  truth 
 of  this  scheme,  upon  either  of  these  accounts. 
 
 1st,  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy, 
 against  the  truth  of  it,  upon  account  of  its  not  being 
 discoverable  by  reason  or  experience.  For,  suppose 
 one  who  never  heard  of  revelation,  of  the  most  im- 
 proved understanding,  and  acquainted  with  our  whole 
 system  of  natural  philosophy  and  natural  religion, 
 such  a  one  could  not  but  be  sensible,  that  it  was  but 
 a  very  small  part  of  the  natural  and  moral  system  of 
 the  universe,  which  he  was  acquainted  with.  He 
 could  not  but  be  sensible,  that  there  must  be  innu- 
 merable things  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence 
 past,  in  the  invisible  government  over  the  world  at 
 present  carrying  on,  and  in  what  is  to  come,  of  which 
 he  was  wholly  ignorant,*  and  which  could  not  be 
 
 *  Pages  313,  314. 
 
361 
 
 discovered  without  revelation.  Whether  the  scheme 
 of  nature  be,  in  the  strictest  sense,  infinite  or  not,  it 
 is  evidently  vast,  even  beyond  all  possible  imagina- 
 tion. And,  doubtless,  that  part  of  it  which  is  open 
 to  our  view,  is  but  as  a  point  in  comparison  of  the 
 whole  plan  of  Providence,  reaching  throughout  eter- 
 nity, past  and  future ;  in  comparison  of  what  is  even 
 now  going  on  in  the  remote  parts  of  the  boundless 
 universe  :  nay,  in  comparison  of  the  whole  scheme  of 
 this  world.  And,  therefore,  that  things  he  beyond 
 the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties,  is  no  sort  of  pre- 
 sumption against  the  truth  and  reality  of  them ;  be- 
 cause it  is  certain,  there  are  innumerable  things,  in 
 the  constitution  and  government  of  the  universe, 
 which  are  thus  beyond  the  natural  reach  of  our  facul- 
 ties. 2d,  Analogy  raises  no  presumption  against 
 any  of  the  things  contained  in  this  general  doctrine 
 of  Scripture  now  mentioned,  upon  account  of  their 
 being  unlike  the  known  course  of  nature.  For  there 
 is  no  presumption  at  all,  from  analogy,  that  the  whole 
 course  of  things,  or  divine  government,  naturally  un- 
 known to  us,  and  every  thing  in  it,  is  like  to  any 
 thing  in  that  which  is  known ;  and  therefore  no  pe- 
 culiar presumption  against  any  thing  in  the  former, 
 upon  account  of  its  being  unlike  to  any  thing  in  the 
 latter.  And  in  the  constitution  and  natural  govern- 
 ment of  the  world,  as  well  as  in  the  moral  government 
 of  it,  we  see  things,  in  a  great  degree,  unlike  one 
 another ;  and  therefore  ought  not  to  wonder  at  such 
 unlikeness  between  things  visible  and  invisible. 
 However,  the  scheme  of  Christianity  is  by  no  means 
 entirely  unlike  the  scheme  of  nature ;  as  will  appear 
 in  the  following  part  of  this  treatise. 
 
 2  1" 
 
362 
 
 The  notion  of  a  miracle,  considered  as  a  proof  of 
 a  divine  mission,  has  been  stated  with  great  exact- 
 ness by  divines ;  and  is,  I  think,  sufficiently  under- 
 stood by  every  one.  There  are  also  invisible  mira- 
 cles :  the  incarnation  of  Christ,  for  instance,  which, 
 being  secret,  cannot  be  alleged  as  a  proof  of  such  a 
 mission;  but  require  themselves  to  be  proved  by 
 visible  miracles.  Revelation  itself,  too,  is  miracu- 
 lous, and  miracles  are  the  proof  of  it ;  and  the  sup- 
 posed presumption  against  these  shall  presently  be 
 considered.  All  which  I  have  been  observing  here 
 is,  that,  whether  we  choose  to  call  eveiy  thing  in 
 the  dispensations  of  Providence,  not  discoverable 
 without  revelation,  nor  like  the  known  course  of 
 things,  miraculous ;  and  whether  the  general  Chris- 
 tian dispensation  now  mentioned,  is  to  be  called  so, 
 or  not ;  the  foregoing  observations  seem  certainly  to 
 show,  that  there  is  no  presumption  against  it,  from 
 the  analogy  of  nature. 
 
 II.  There  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
 some  operations,  which  we  should  now  call  miracu- 
 lous; particularly,  none  against  a  revelation,  at  the 
 beginning  of  the  world ;  nothing  of  such  presumption 
 against  it,  as  is  supposed  to  be  implied  or  expressed 
 in  the  word  miraculous.  For  a  miracle,  in  its  very 
 notion,  is  relative  to  a  course  of  nature ;  and  implies 
 somewhat  different  from  it,  considered  as  being  so. 
 Now,  either  there  was  no  course  of  nature  at  the 
 time  which  we  are  speaking  of;  or,  if  there  were, 
 we  are  not  acquainted  what  the  course  of  nature  is 
 upon  the  first  peopling  of  worlds.  And  therefore 
 the  question,  whether  mankind  had  a  revelation  made 
 to  them  at  that  time,  is  to  be  considered,  not  as  a 
 
303 
 
 question  concerning  a  miracle,  but  as  a  common 
 question  of  fact.  And  we  have  the  like  reason,  be 
 it  more  or  less,  to  admit  the  report  of  tradition,  con- 
 cerning this  question,  and  concerning  common  mat- 
 ters of  fact  of  the  same  antiquity ;  for  instance,  what 
 part  of  the  earth  was  first  peopled. 
 
 Or  thus :  When  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this 
 state,  there  was  a  power  exerted,  totally  different 
 from  the  present  course  of  nature.  Now,  whether 
 this  power,  thus  wholly  different  from  the  present 
 course  of  nature,  for  we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it 
 the  word  miraculous;  whether  this  power  stopped 
 immediately  after  it  had  made  man,  or  went  on,  and 
 exerted  itself  farther  in  giving  him  a  revelation,  is  a 
 question  of  the  same  kind,  as  whether  an  ordinary 
 power  exerted  itself  in  such  a  particular  degree  and 
 manner,  or  not. 
 
 Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of 
 the  world,  be  considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather,  be 
 called  by  that  name,  the  case  will  not  be  different ; 
 since  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  such  a  power 
 was  exerted.  For,  supposing  it  acknowledged  that 
 our  Saviour  spent  some  years  in  a  course  of  working 
 miracles ;  there  is  no  more  presumption,  worth  men- 
 tioning, against  his  having  exerted  this  miraculous 
 power,  in  a  certain  degree  greater,  than  in  a  certain 
 degree  less;  in  one  or  two  more  instances,  than  in 
 one  or  two  fewer ;  in  this,  than  in  another  manner. 
 
 It  is  evident,  then,  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar 
 presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against 
 supposing  a  revelation,  when  man  was  first  placed 
 ipon  the  earth. 
 
 Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  least  Ultima- 
 22 
 
,364 
 
 tion  in  history  or  tradition,  that  religion  was  first 
 reasoned  out ;  but  the  whole  of  history  and  tradition 
 makes  for  the  other  side,  that  it  came  into  the  world 
 by  revelation.  Indeed,  the  state  of  religion  in  the 
 first  ages,  of  which  we  have  any  account,  seems  to 
 suppose  and  imply,  that  this  was  the  original  of  it 
 amongst  mankind.  And  these  reflections,  together, 
 without  taking  in  the  peculiar  authority  of  Scripture, 
 amount  to  real  and  a  very  material  degree  of  evi- 
 dence, that  there  was  a  revelation  at  the  beginning 
 of  the  world.  Now  this,  as  it  is  a  confirmation  of 
 natural  religion,  and  therefore  mentioned  in  the  for- 
 mer part  of  this  treatise;*  so,  likewise,  it  has  a  ten- 
 dency to  remove  any  prejudices  against  a  subsequent 
 revelation. 
 
 III.  But  still  it  may  be  objected,  that  there  is 
 some  peculiar  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
 miracles;  particularly  against  revelation,  after  the 
 settlement  and  during  the  continuance  of  a  course  of 
 nature. 
 
 Now,  with  regard  to  this  supposed  presumption, 
 it  is  to  be  observed  in  general,  that  before  we  can 
 have  ground  for  raising  what  can,  with  any  propriety, 
 be  called  an  argument  from  analogy,  for  or  against 
 revelation  considered  as  somewhat  miraculous,  we 
 must  be  acquainted  with  a  similar  or  parallel  case. 
 But  the  history  of  some  other  world,  seemingly  in 
 like  circumstances  with  our  own,  is  no  more  than  a 
 parallel  case ;  and  therefore  nothing  short  of  this  can 
 be  so.  Yet,  could  we  come  at  a  presumptive  proof, 
 for  or  against   a   revelation,    from   being    informed 
 
 Page  304,  &c. 
 
365 
 
 whether  such  world  had  one,  or  not ;  such  a  proof, 
 being  drawn  from  one  single  instance  only,  must  be 
 infinitely  precarious.  More  particularly:  First  of 
 all,  There  is  a  very  strong  presumption  against  com- 
 mon speculative  truths,  and  against  the  most  ordi- 
 nary facts,  before  the  proof  of  them ;  which  yet  is 
 overcome  by  almost  any  proof.  There  is  a  presump- 
 tion of  millions  to  one,  against  the  story  of  Ccesar,  or 
 of  any  other  man.  For  suppose  a  number  of  common 
 facts  so  and  so  circumstanced,  of  which  one  had  no 
 kind  of  proof,  should  happen  to  come  into  one's 
 thoughts;  every  one  would,  without  any  possible 
 doubt,  conclude  them  to  be  false.  And  the  like 
 may  be  said  of  a  single  common  fact.  And  from 
 hence  it  appears,  that  the  question  of  importance,  as 
 to  the  matter  before  us,  is,  concerning  the  degree  of 
 the  peculiar  presumption  supposed  against  miracles ; 
 not  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all 
 against  them.  For,  if  there  be  the  presumption  of 
 millions  to  one,  against  the  most  common  facts,  what 
 can  a  small  presumption,  additional  to  this,  amount 
 to,  though  it  be  peculiar  ?  It  cannot  be  estimated, 
 and  is  as  nothing.  The  only  material  question  is, 
 whether  there  be  any  such  presumption  against  mira- 
 cles, as  to  render  them  in  any  sort  incredible? 
 Secondly,  if  we  leave  out  the  consideration  of  religion, 
 we  are  in  such  total  darkness,  upon  what  causes,  oc- 
 casions, reasons,  or  circumstances,  the  present  course 
 of  nature  depends,  that  there  does  not  appear  any 
 improbability  for  or  against  supposing,  that  five  or 
 six  thousand  years  may  have  given  scope  for  causes, 
 occasions,  reasons  or  circumstances,  from  whence 
 miraculous   interpositions   may  have   arisen.       And 
 
366 
 
 from  this,  joined  with  the  foregoing  observation,  it 
 will  follow,  that  there  must  be  a  presumption,  be- 
 yond all  comparison  greater,  against  the  particular 
 common  facts  just  now  instanced  in,  than  against 
 miracles  in  general;  before  any  evidence  of  either. 
 But,  thirdly,  Take  in  the  consideration  of  religion, 
 or  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  and  then  we  see 
 distinct  particular  reasons  for  miracles;  to  afford 
 mankind  instruction  additional  to  that  of  nature,  and 
 to  attest  the  truth  of  it.  And  this  gives  a  real  cre- 
 dibility to  the  supposition,  that  it  might  be  part  of 
 the  original  plan  of  things,  that  there  should  be 
 miraculous  interpositions.  Then,  lastly.  Miracles 
 must  not  be  compared  to  common  natural  events;  or, 
 to  events  which,  though  uncommon,  are  similar  to 
 what  we  daily  experience;  but  to  the  extraordinary 
 phenomena  of  nature.  And  then  the  comparison  will 
 be  between  the  presumption  against  miracles,  and 
 the  presumption  against  such  uncommon  appear- 
 ances, suppose,  as  comets,  and  against  their  being 
 any  such  powers  in  nature  as  magnetism  and  elec- 
 tricity, so  contrary  to  the  properties  of  other  bodies 
 not  endued  with  these  powers.  And  before  any 
 one  can  determine,  whether  there  be  any  peculiar 
 presumption  against  miracles,  more  than  against 
 other  extraordinary  things,  he  must  consider,  what, 
 upon  first  hearing,  would  be  the  presumption  against 
 the  last-mentioned  appearances  and  powers,  to  a  per- 
 son acquainted  only  with  the  daily,  monthly,  and 
 annual  course  of  nature  respecting  this  earth,  and 
 with  those  common  powers  of  matter  which  we  every 
 day  see. 
 
 Upon  all  this  I  conclude,  That  there  certainly  is 
 
367 
 
 no  such  presumption  against  miracles,  as  to  render 
 them  in  anywise  incredible;  that,  on  the  contrary, 
 our  being  able  to  discern  reasons  for  them,  gives  a 
 positive  credibility  to  the  history  of  them,  in  cases 
 where  those  reasons  hold ;  and  that  it  is  by  no  means 
 certain,  that  there  is  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all, 
 from  analogy,  even  in  the  lowest  degree,  against  mi- 
 racles, as  distinguished  from  other  extraordinary  phe- 
 nomena ;  though  it  is  not  worth  while  to  perplex  the 
 reader  with  inquiries  into  the  abstract  nature  of  evi- 
 dence, in  order  to  determine  a  question,  which, 
 without  such  inquiries,  we  see*  is  of  no  impor- 
 tance. 
 
 *  Page  337,  &c. 
 
368 
 
 CHAP.  III. 
 
 Of  our  incapacity  of  judging,  what  were  to  be  ex- 
 pected in  a  revelation ;  and  the  credibility,  from 
 analogy,  that  it  must  contain  things  appearing 
 liable  to  objections. 
 
 Besides  the  objections  against  the  evidence  for 
 Christianity,  many  are  alleged  against  the  scheme 
 of  it ;  against  the  whole  manner  in  which  it  is  put 
 and  left  with  the  world,  as  well  as  against  several 
 particular  relations  in  Scripture :  objections  drawn 
 from  the  deficiencies  of  revelation;  from  things  in 
 it  appearing  to  men  foolishness  :*  from  its  contain- 
 ing matters  of  offence,  which  have  led,  and  it  must 
 have  been  foreseen  would  lead,  into  strange  enthu- 
 siasm and  superstition,  and  be  made  to  serve  the 
 purposes  of  tyranny  and  wickedness;  from  its  not 
 being  universal ;  and,  which  is  a  thing  of  the  same 
 kind,  from  its  evidence  not  being  so  convincing  and 
 satisfactory  as  it  might  have  been;  for  this  last  is 
 sometimes  turned  into  a  positive  argument  against 
 its  truth.f  It  would  be  tedious,  indeed  impossible, 
 to  enumerate  the  several  particulars  comprehended 
 under  the  objections  here  referred  to,  they  being  so 
 various  according  to  the  different  fancies  of  men. 
 There  are  persons  who  think  it  a  strong  objection 
 against  the  authority  of  Scripture,  that  it  is  not 
 composed  by  rules  of  art,   agreed  upon  by  critics, 
 
 *  1  Cor.  i.  28.  t  Chap.  6. 
 
369 
 
 for  polite  and  correct  writing.  And  the  scorn  is 
 inexpressible,  with  which  some  of  the  prophetic  parts 
 of  Scripture  are  treated;  partly  through  the  rash- 
 ness of  interpreters,  but  very  much  also  on  account 
 of  the  hieroglyphical  and  figurative  language  in 
 which  they  are  left  us.  Some  of  the  principal 
 things  of  this  sort  shall  be  particularly  considered  in 
 the  following  Chapters.  But  my  design  at  present 
 is  to  observe,  in  general,  with  respect  to  this  whole 
 way  of  arguing,  that,  upon  supposition  of  a  revela- 
 tion, it  is  highly  credible  beforehand,  we  should  be 
 incompetent  judges  of  it,  to  a  great  degree;  and 
 that  it  would  contain  many  things  appearing  to  us 
 liable  to  great  objections,  in  case  we  judge  of  it  other- 
 wise than  by  the  analogy  of  nature.  And,  there- 
 fore, though  objections  against  the  evidence  of 
 Christianity  are  most  seriously  to  be  considered,  yet 
 objections  against  Christianity  itself  are,  in  a  great 
 measure,  frivolous;  almost  all  objections  against  it, 
 excepting  those  which  are  alleged  against  the  par- 
 ticular proofs  of  its  coming  from  God.  I  express 
 myself  with  caution,  lest  I  should  be  mistaken  to 
 vilify  reason,  which  is  indeed  the  only  faculty  we 
 have  wherewith  to  judge  concerning  any  thing,  even 
 revelation  itself;  or  be  misunderstood  to  assert,  that 
 a  supposed  revelation  cannot  be  proved  false  from 
 internal  characters.  For,  it  may  contain  clear  im- 
 moralities or  contradictions;  and  either  of  these 
 would  prove  it  false.  Nor  will  I  take  upon  me  to 
 affirm,  that  nothing  else  can  possibly  render  any 
 supposed  revelation  incredible.  Yet  still  the  obser- 
 vation above  is,  I  think,  true  beyond  doubt,  that 
 objections  against  Christianity,  as  distinguished  from 
 23 
 
370 
 
 objections  against  its  evidence,  are  frivolous.  To 
 make  out  this,  is  the  general  design  of  the  present 
 Chapter.  And,  with  regard  to  the  whole  of  it,  I 
 cannot  but  particularly  wish,  that  the  proofs  might 
 be  attended  to,  rather  than  the  assertions  cavilled  at, 
 upon  account  of  any  unacceptable  consequences, 
 whether  real  or  supposed,  which  may  be  drawn  from 
 them.  For,  after  all,  that  which  is  true,  must  be 
 admitted;  though  it  should  show  us  the  shortness  of 
 our  faculties,  and  that  we  are  in  nowise  judges  of 
 many  things,  of  which  we  are  apt  to  think  ourselves 
 very  competent  ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any  objec- 
 tion with  reasonable  men;  at  least,  upon  secona 
 thought,  it  will  not  be  any  objection  with  such, 
 against  the  justness  of  the  following  observations : — 
 As  God  governs  the  world,  and  instructs  his  crea- 
 tures, according  to  certain  laws  or  rules,  in  the 
 known  course  of  nature,  known  by  reason  together 
 with  experience;  so  the  Scripture  informs  us  of  a 
 scheme  of  divine  Providence,  additional  to  this.  It 
 relates,  that  God  has,  by  revelation,  instructed  men 
 in  things  concerning  his  government,  which  they 
 could  not  otherwise  have  known,  and  reminded  them 
 of  things  which  they  might  otherwise  know;  and  at- 
 tested the  truth  of  the  whole  by  miracles.  Now, 
 if  the  natural  and  the  revealed  dispensation  of  things 
 are  both  from  God,  if  they  coincide  with  each  other, 
 and  together  make  up  one  scheme  of  Providence, 
 our  being  incompetent  judges  of  one,  must  render 
 it  credible  that  we  may  be  incompetent  judges  also 
 of  the  other.  Since,  upon  experience,  the  acknow- 
 ledged constitution  and  course  of  nature  is  found  to 
 be  greatly  different  from  what,  before  experience, 
 
371 
 
 would  have  been  expected ;  and  such  as,  men  fancy, 
 there  lie  great  objections  against.  This  renders  it 
 beforehand  highly  credible,  that  they  may  find  the 
 revealed  dispensation  likewise,  if  they  judge  of  it  as 
 they  do  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  very  different 
 from  expectations  formed  beforehand ;  and  liable,  in 
 appearance,  to  great  objections;  objections  against 
 the  scheme  itself,  and  against  the  degrees  and  man- 
 ners of  the  miraculous  interpositions  by  which  it  was 
 attested  and  carried  on.  Thus,  suppose  a  prince 
 to  govern  his  dominions  in  the  wisest  manner  pos- 
 sible, by  common  known  laws;  and  that  upon  some 
 exigencies  he  should  suspend  these  laws,  and  govern, 
 in  several  instances,  in  a  different  manner :  If  one 
 of  his  subjects  were  not  a  competent  judge  before- 
 hand, by  what  common  rules  the  government  should 
 or  would  be  carried  on,  it  could  not  be  expected, 
 that  the  same  person  would  be  a  competent  judge, 
 in  what  exigencies,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to  what 
 degree,  those  laws  commonly  observed  would  be  sus- 
 pended or  deviated  from.  If  he  were  not  a  judge 
 of  the  wisdom  of  the  ordinary  administration,  there 
 is  no  reason  to  think  he  would  be  a  judge  of  the 
 wisdom  of  the  extraordinary.  If  he  thought  he 
 had  objections  against  the  former,  doubtless,  it  is 
 highly  supposable,  he  might  think  also,  that  he  had 
 objections  against  the  latter.  And  thus,  as  we  fall 
 into  infinite  follies  and  mistakes,  whenever  we  pre- 
 tend, otherwise  than  from  experience  and  analogy, 
 to  judge  of  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature, 
 it  is  evidently  supposable  beforehand,  that  we  should 
 fall  into  as  great,  in  pretending  to  judge,  in  like 
 manner,  concerning  revelation.      Nor  is  there  any 
 
372 
 
 more  ground  to  expect  that  this  latter  should  appear 
 to  us  clear  of  objections,  than  that  the  former 
 should. 
 
 These  observations  relating  to  the  whole  of  Chris- 
 tianity, are  applicable  to  inspiration  in  particular. 
 As  we  are  in  no  sort  judges  beforehand,  by  what 
 laws  or  rules,  in  what  degree,  or  by  what  means,  it 
 were  to  have  been  expected  that  God  would  natu- 
 rally instruct  us ;  so,  upon  supposition  of  his  afford- 
 ing us  light  and  instruction  by  revelation,  additional 
 to  what  he  has  afforded  us  by  reason  and  experience, 
 we  are  in  no  sort  judges,  by  what  methods,  and  in 
 what  proportion,  it  were  to  be  expected,  that  this 
 supernatural  light  and  instruction  would  be  afforded 
 us.  We  know  not  beforehand,  what  degree  or  kind 
 of  natural  information,  it  were  to  be  expected  God 
 would  afford  men,  each  by  his  own  reason  and  ex- 
 perience ;  nor  how  far  he  would  enable,  and  effectu- 
 ally dispose  them  to  communicate  it,  whatever  it 
 should  be,  to  each  other ;  nor  whether  the  evidence 
 of  it  would  be  certain,  highly  probable,  or  doubtful ; 
 nor  whether  it  would  be  given  with  equal  clearness 
 and  conviction  to  all.  Nor  could  we  guess,  upon 
 any  good  ground,  I  mean,  whether  natural  know- 
 ledge, or  even  the  faculty  itself  by  which  we  are  ca- 
 pable of  attaining  it,  reason,  would  be  given  us  at 
 once,  or  gradually.  In  like  manner,  we  are  wholly 
 ignorant  what  degree  of  new  knowledge,  it  were  to 
 be  expected,  God  would  give  mankind  by  revelation, 
 upon  supposition  of  his  affording  one ;  or  how  far, 
 or  in  what  way,  he  would  interpose  miraculously,  to 
 qualify  them,  to  whom  he  should  originally  make  the 
 revelation,  for  communicating  the  knowledge  given 
 
373 
 
 by  it;  and  to  secure  their  doing  it  to  the  age  in 
 which  they  should  live;  and  to  secure  its  being 
 transmitted  to  posterity.  We  are  equally  ignorant, 
 whether  the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain,  or  highly 
 probable,  or  doubtful;*  or  whether  all  who  should 
 have  any  degree  of  instruction  from  it,  and  any  de- 
 gree of  evidence  of  its  truth,  would  have  the  same:  or 
 whether  the  scheme  would  be  revealed  at  once,  or  un- 
 folded gradually.  Nay,  we  are  not  in  any  sort  able  to 
 judge,  whether  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  that 
 the  revelation  should  have  been  committed  to  writ- 
 ing; or  left  to  be  handed  down,  and  consequently 
 corrupted  by  verbal  tradition,  and  at  length  sunk 
 under  it,  if  mankind  so  pleased,  and  during  such 
 time  as  they  are  permitted,  in  the  degree  they  evi- 
 dently are,  to  act  as  they  will. 
 
 But  it  may  be  said,  "  that  a  revelation  in  some  of 
 the  above-mentioned  circumstances,  one,  for  instance, 
 which  was  not  committed  to  writing,  and  thus  se- 
 cured against  danger  of  corruption,  would  not  have 
 answered  its  purpose."  I  ask,  what  purpose?  It 
 would  not  have  answered  all  the  purposes  which  it 
 has  now  answered,  and  in  the  same  degree ;  but  it 
 would  have  answered  others,  or  the  same  in  different 
 degrees.  And  which  of  these  were  the  purposes  of 
 God,  and  best  fell  in  with  his  general  government, 
 we  could  not  at  all  have  determined  beforehand. 
 
 Now,  since  it  has  been  shown,  that  we  have  no 
 principles  of  reason  upon  which  to  judge  before- 
 hand, how  it  were  to  be  expected  revelation  should 
 have  been  left,  or  what  was  most  suitable  to  the 
 
 *  See  Chap.  G. 
 
374 
 
 divine  plan  of  government,  in  any  of  the  fore-men- 
 tioned respects ;  it  must  be  quite  frivolous  to  object 
 afterwards  as  to  any  of  them,  against  its  being  left 
 in  one  way  rather  than  another ;  for  this  would  be  to 
 object  against  things,  upon  account  of  their  being 
 different  from  expectations,  which  have  been  shown 
 to  be  without  reason.  And  thus  we  see,  that  the 
 only  question  concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity 
 is,  whether  it  be  a  real  revelation;  not  whether  it 
 be  attended  with  every  circumstance  which  we  should 
 have  looked  for:  and  concerning  the  authority  of 
 Scripture,  whether  it  be  what  it  claims  to  be;  not 
 whether  it  be  a  book  of  such  sort,  and  so  promulged, 
 as  weak  men  are  apt  to  fancy  a  book  containing  a 
 divine  revelation  should.  And  therefore,  neither 
 obscurity,  nor  seeming  inaccuracy  of  style,  nor  vari- 
 ous readings,  nor  early  disputes  about  the  authors 
 of  particular  parts,  nor  any  other  things  of  the  like 
 kind,  though  they  had  been  much  more  considerable 
 in  degree  than  they  are,  could  overthrow  the  autho- 
 rity of  the  Scripture ;  unless  the  Prophets,  Apostles, 
 or  our  Lord,  had  promised,  that  the  book,  contain- 
 ing the  divine  revelation,  should  be  secure  from 
 those  things.  Nor  indeed  can  any  objections  over- 
 throw such  a  kind  of  revelation  as  the  Christian 
 claims  to  be,  since  there  are  no  objections  against 
 the  morality  of  it,*  but  such  as  can  show,  that  there 
 is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought  originally  in  attesta- 
 tion of  it;  no  appearance  of  any  thing  miraculous  in 
 its  obtaining  in  the  world;  nor  any  of  prophecy, 
 that  is,  of  events  foretold,  which   human  sagacity 
 
 *  Pase  380,  &c. 
 
375 
 
 could  not  foresee.  If  it  can  be  shown,  that  the 
 proof  alleged  for  all  these,  is  absolutely  none  at  all, 
 then  is  revelation  overturned.  But  were  it  allowed, 
 that  the  proof  of  any  one,  or  all  of  them,  is  lower 
 than  is  allowed;  yet,  whilst  any  proof  of  them  re- 
 mains, revelation  will  stand  upon  much  the  same  foot- 
 ing it  does  at  present,  as  to  all  the  purposes  of  life 
 and  practice,  and  ought  to  have  the  like  influence 
 upon  our  behaviour. 
 
 From  the  foregoing  observations,  too,  it  will  fol- 
 low, and  those  who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  re- 
 velation will  find  it  worth  remarking,  that  there  are 
 several  ways  of  arguing,  which,  though  just  with  re- 
 gard to  other  writings,  are  not  applicable  to  Scrip- 
 ture; at  least  not  to  the  prophetic  parts  of  it.  We 
 cannot  argue,  for  instance,  that  this  cannot  be  the 
 sense  or  intent  of  such  a  passage  of  Scripture,  for  if 
 it  had,  it  would  have  been  expressed  more  plainly, 
 or  have  been  represented  under  a  more  apt  figure  or 
 hieroglyphic ;  yet  we  may  justly  argue  thus,  with 
 respect  to  common  books.  And  the  reason  of  this 
 difference  is  very  evident;  that  in  Scripture  we  are 
 not  competent  judges,  as  we  are  in  common  books, 
 how  plainly  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  what  is 
 the  true  sense  should  have  been  expressed,  or  under 
 how  apt  an  image  figured.  The  only  question  is, 
 what  appearance  there  is  that  this  is  the  sense?  and 
 scarce  at  all,  how  much  more  determinately  or  accu- 
 rately it  might  have  been  expressed  or  figured  ? 
 
 "  But  is  it  not  self-evident,  that  internal  impro- 
 babilities of  all  kinds,  weaken  external  probable 
 proof?"  Doubtless.  But  to  what  practical  pur- 
 pose  can   this  be   alleged  here,  wThen  it  has  been 
 
376 
 
 proved  before,*'  that  real  internal  improbabilities, 
 which  rise  even  to  moral  certainty,  are  overcome  by 
 the  most  ordinary  testimony?  and  when  it  now  has 
 been  made  appear,  that  we  scarce  know  what  are  im- 
 probabilities, as  to  the  matter  we  are  here  consider- 
 ing ?  as  will  farther  appear  from  what  follows. 
 
 For  though,  from  the  observations  above  made, 
 it  is  manifest,  that  we  are  not  in  any  sort  competent 
 judges,  what  supernatural  instruction  were  to  have 
 been  expected;  and  though  it  is  self-evident,  that 
 the  objections  of  an  incompetent  judgment,  must  be 
 frivolous ;  yet  it  may  be  proper  to  go  one  step  far- 
 ther, and  observe,  that  if  men  will  be  regardless  of 
 these  things,  and  pretend  to  judge  of  the  Scriptures 
 by  preconceived  expectations,  the  analogy  of  nature 
 shows  beforehand,  not  only  that  it  is  highly  credible 
 they  may,  but  also  probable  that  they  will,  imagine 
 they  have  strong  objections  against  it,  however  really 
 unexceptionable:  for  so,  prior  to  experience,  they 
 would  think  they  had,  against  the  circumstances,  and 
 degrees,  and  the  whole  manner  of  that  instruction, 
 which  is  afforded  by  the  ordinary  course  of  nature. 
 Were  the  instruction  which  God  affords  to  brute 
 creatures  by  instincts  and  mere  propensions,  and  to 
 mankind  by  these  together  with  reason,  matter  of 
 probable  proof,  and  not  of  certain  observation,  it 
 would  be  rejected  as  incredible,  in  many  instances  of 
 it,  only  upon  account  of  the  means  by  which  this  in- 
 struction is  given,  the  seeming  disproportions,  the 
 limitations,  necessary  conditions,  and  circumstances, 
 of  it.  For  instance :  would  it  not  have  been  thought 
 highly  improbable,  that  men  should  have  been  so 
 
 *  Page  3G4,  dec. 
 
377 
 
 much  more  capable  of  discovering,  even  to  certainty, 
 the  general  laws  of  matter,  and  the  magnitudes, 
 paths,  and  revolutions  of  the  heavenly  bodies;  than 
 the  occasions  and  cures  of  distempers,  and  many  other 
 things,  in  which  human  life  seems  so  much  more 
 nearly  concerned,  than  in  astronomy?  How  capri- 
 cious and  irregular  a  way  of  information,  would  it 
 be  said,  is  that  of  invention,  by  means  of  which  na- 
 ture instructs  us  in  matters  of  science,  and  in  many 
 things  upon  which  the  affairs  of  the  world  greatly 
 depend ;  that  a  man  should,  by  this  faculty,  be  made 
 acquainted  with  a  thing  in  an  instant,  when,  perhaps, 
 he  is  thinking  of  somewhat  else,  which  he  has  in 
 vain  been  searching  after,  it  may  be,  for  years.  So 
 likewise  the  imperfections  attending  the  only  method, 
 by  which  nature  enables  and  directs  us  to  communi- 
 cate our  thoughts  to  each  other,  are  innumerable. 
 Language  is  in  its  very  nature,  inadequate,  ambigu- 
 ous, liable  to  infinite  abuse,  even  from  negligence; 
 and  so  liable  to  it  from  design,  that  every  man  can 
 deceive  and  betray  by  it.  And,  to  mention  but  one 
 instance  more,  that  brutes  without  reason,  should 
 act,  in  many  respects,  with  a  sagacity  and  foresight 
 vastly  greater  than  what  men  have  in  those  respects, 
 would  be  thought  impossible.  Yet  it  is  certain  they 
 do  act  with  such  superior  foresight :  whether  it  be 
 their  own,  indeed,  is  another  question.  From  these 
 things  it  is  highly  credible  beforehand,  that  upon 
 supposition  God  should  afford  men  some  additional 
 instruction  by  revelation,  it  would  be  with  circum- 
 stances in  manners,  degrees,  and  respects  which  we 
 should  be  apt  to  fancy  we  had  great  objections  against 
 the  credibility  of.      Nor  are  the  objections  against 
 
378 
 
 the  Scripture,  nor  against  Christianity  in  general, 
 at  all  more  or  greater  than  the  analogy  of  nature 
 would  beforehand, — not  perhaps  give  ground  to 
 expect;  for  this  analogy  may  not  be  sufficient,  in 
 some  cases,  to  ground  an  expectation  upon; — but  no 
 more  nor  greater,  than  analogy  would  show  it,  be- 
 forehand, to  be  supposable  and  credible,  that  there 
 might  seem  to  lie  against  revelation. 
 
 By  applying  these  general  observations  to  a  par- 
 ticular objection,  it  will  be  more  distinctly  seen,  how 
 they  are  applicable  to  others  of  the  like  kind ;  and 
 indeed  to  almost  all  objections  against  Christianity, 
 as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its  evidence. 
 It  appears  from  Scripture,  that  as  it  was  not  unusual, 
 in  the  apostolic  age,  for  persons,  upon  their  conver- 
 sion to  Christianity,  to  be  endued  with  miraculous 
 gifts;  so,  some  of  those  persons  exercised  these  gifts 
 in  a  strangely  irregular  and  disorderly  manner:  and 
 this  is  made  an  objection  against  their  being  really 
 miraculous.  Now  the  foregoing  observations  quite 
 remove  this  objection,  how  considerable  soever  it  may 
 appear  at  first  sight.  For,  consider  a  person  en- 
 dued with  any  of  these  gifts,  for  instance,  that  of 
 tongues;  it  is  to  be  supposed  that  he  had  the  same 
 power  over  this  miraculous  gift  as  he  would  have  had 
 over  it,  had  it  been  the  effect  of  habit,  of  study,  and 
 use,  as  it  ordinarily  is ;  or  the  same  power  over  it, 
 as  he  had  over  any  other  natural  endowment.  Con- 
 sequently, he  would  use  it  in  the  same  manner  he 
 did  any  other;  either  regularly  and  upon  proper  oc- 
 casions only,  or  irregularly  and  upon  improper  ones; 
 according  to  his  sense  of  decency,  and  his  character 
 of  prudence.     Where,  then,  is  the  objection?  Why, 
 
379 
 
 if  this  miraculous  power  was  indeed  given  to  the 
 world  to  propagate  Christianity,  and  attest  the  truth  of 
 it,  we  might,  it  seems,  have  expected,  that  other  sort 
 of  persons  should  have  been  chosen  to  be  invested 
 with  it ;  or  that  these  should  at  the  same  time,  have 
 been  endued  with  prudence;  or,  that  they  should 
 have  been  continually  restrained,  and  directed  in  the 
 exercise  of  it:  that  is,  that  God  should  have  miracu- 
 lously interposed,  if  at  all,  in  a  different  manner  or 
 higher  degree.  But,  from  the  observations  made 
 above,  it  is  undeniably  evident,  that  we  are  not  judges 
 in  what  degrees  and  manners  it  were  to  have  been 
 expected  he  should  miraculously  interpose;  upon 
 supposition  of  his  doing  it  in  some  degree  and  man- 
 ner. Nor,  in  the  natural  course  of  Providence,  are 
 superior  gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  and 
 other  talents  of  great  influence,  conferred  only  on 
 persons  of  prudence  and  decency,  or  such  as  are  dis- 
 posed to  make  the  properest  use  of  them.  Nor  is 
 the  instruction  and  admonition  naturally  afforded  us 
 for  the  conduct  of  life,  particularly  in  our  education, 
 commonly  given  in  a  manner  the  most  suited  to  re- 
 commend it;  but  often  with  circumstances  apt  to 
 prejudice  us  against  such  instruction. 
 
 One  might  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a  great  re- 
 semblance between  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revela- 
 tion, in  several  other  respects.  Practical  Christian- 
 ity, or  that  faith  and  behaviour  which  renders  a  man 
 a  Christian,  is  a  plain  and  obvious  thing;  like  the  com- 
 mon rules  of  conduct,  with  respect  to  our  ordinary 
 temporal  affairs.  The  more  distinct  and  particular 
 knowledge  of  those  things,  the  study  of  which  the 
 apostle   calls  "  going   on   unto   perfection,"   and   of 
 
380 
 
 the  prophetic  parts  of  revelation,  like  many  parts  of 
 natural  and  even  civil  knowledge,  may  require  very 
 exact  thought  and  careful  consideration.  The  hin- 
 drances, too,  of  natural  and  of  supernatural  light  and 
 knowledge,  have  been  of  the  same  kind.  And  as  it 
 is  owned,  the  whole  scheme  of  Scripture  is  not  yet 
 understood,  so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  understood  be- 
 fore the  "  restitution  of  all  things,"  and  without 
 miraculous  interpositions,  it  must  be  in  the  same  way 
 as  natural  knowledge  is  come  at;  by  the  continu- 
 ance and  progress  of  learning  and  of  liberty,  and  by 
 particular  persons  attending  to,  comparing,  and  pur- 
 suing, intimations  scattered  up  and  down  it,  which 
 are  overlooked  and  disregarded  by  the  generality  of 
 the  world.  For  this  is  the  way  in  which  all  im- 
 provements are  made ;  by  thoughtful  men  tracing  on 
 obscure  hints,  as  it  were,  dropped  us  by  nature  acci- 
 dentally, or  which  seem  to  come  into  our  minds  by 
 chance.  Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible,  that  a  book 
 which  has  been  so  long  in  the  possession  of  mankind, 
 should  contain  many  truths  as  yet  undiscovered. 
 For,  all  the  same  phenomena,  and  the  same  faculties 
 of  investigation,  from  which  such  great  discoveries 
 in  natural  knowledge  have  been  made  in  the  present 
 and  last  age,  were  equally  in  the  possession  of  man- 
 kind several  thousand  years  before.  And  possibly 
 it  might  be  intended,  that  events,  as  they  come  to 
 pass,  should  open  and  ascertain  the  meaning  of  seve- 
 ral parts  of  Scripture. 
 
 It  may  be  objected,  that  this  analogy  fails  in  a 
 material  respect;  for  that  natural  knowledge  is  of 
 little  or  no  consequence.  But  I  have  been  speak- 
 ing of  the  general  instruction,  which  nature  does  or 
 
381 
 
 does  not  afford  us.  And,  besides,  some  parts  of 
 natural  knowledge,  in  the  more  common  restrained 
 sense  of  the  words,  are  of  the  greatest  consequence 
 to  the  ease  and  convenience  of  life.  But  suppose 
 the  analogy  did,  as  it  does  not,  fail  in  this  respect, 
 yet  it  might  be  abundantly  supplied  from  the  whole 
 constitution  and  course  of  nature ;  which  shows  that 
 God  does  not  dispense  his  gifts  according  to  our  no- 
 tions of  the  advantage  and  consequence  they  would 
 be  of  to  us.  And  this  in  general,  with  his  method 
 of  dispensing  knowledge  in  particular,  would  together 
 make  out  an  analogy  full  to  the  point  before  us. 
 
 But  it  may  be  objected  still  farther,  and  more 
 generally — "  The  Scripture  represents  the  world  as 
 in  a  state  of  ruin,  and  Christianity  as  an  expedient 
 to  recover  it,  to  help  in  these  respects  where  nature 
 fails;  in  particular,  to  supply  the  deficiencies  of  na- 
 tural light.  Is  it  credible,  then,  that  so  many  ages 
 should  have  been  let  pass,  before  a  matter  of  such  a 
 sort,  of  so  great  and  so  general  importance,  was  made 
 known  to  mankind;  and  then  that  it  should  be  made 
 known  to  so  small  a  part  of  them?  Is  it  conceiv- 
 able, that  this  supply  should  be  so  very  deficient, 
 should  have  the  like  obscurity  and  doubtfulness,  be 
 liable  to  the  like  perversions;  in  short,  lie  open  to  all 
 the  like  objections,  as  the  light  of  nature  itself?"' 
 Without  determining  how  far  this  in  fact  is  so,  I 
 answer,  it  is  by  no  means  incredible  that  it  might  be 
 so,  if  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revelation  be  from 
 the  same  hand.  Men  are  naturally  liable  to  dis- 
 eases ;  for  which  God,  in  his  good  providence,  has 
 provided  natural  remedies.f  But  remedies  existing 
 *  Chap.  6  |  Chap.  j. 
 
382 
 
 in  nature  have  been  unknown  to  mankind  for  many 
 ages;  are  known  but  to  few  now;  probably  many 
 valuable  ones  are  not  known  yet.  Great  has  been, 
 and  is,  the  obscurity  and  difficulty,  in  the  nature  and 
 application  of  them.  Circumstances  seem  often  to 
 make  them  very  improper,  where  they  are  absolutely 
 necessary.  It  is  after  long  labour  and  study,  and 
 many  unsuccessful  endeavours,  that  they  are  brought 
 to  be  as  useful  as  they  are;  after  high  contempt  and 
 absolute  rejection  of  the  most  useful  we  have;  and 
 after  disputes  and  doubts,  which  have  seemed  to  be 
 endless.  The  best  remedies,  too,  when  unskilfully, 
 much  more  if  dishonestly,  applied,  may  produce  new 
 diseases;  and,  with  the  rightest  application,  the 
 success  of  them  is  often  doubtful.  In  many  cases, 
 they  are  not  at  all  effectual;  where  they  are,  it  is 
 often  very  slowly :  and  the  application  of  them,  and 
 the  necessary  regimen  accompanying  it,  is,  not  un- 
 commonly, so  disagreeable,  that  some  will  not  sub- 
 mit to  them;  and  satisfy  themselves  with  the  excuse, 
 that  if  they  would,  it  is  not  certain  whether  it  would 
 be  successful.  And  many  persons,  who  labour  un- 
 der diseases,  for  which  there  are  known  natural  re- 
 medies, are  not  so  happy  as  to  be  always,  if  ever, 
 in  the  way  of  them.  In  a  word,  the  remedies  which 
 nature  has  provided  for  diseases,  are  neither  certain, 
 perfect,  nor  universal.  And  indeed  the  same  prin- 
 ciples of  arguing,  which  would  lead  us  to  conclude, 
 that  they  must  be  so,  would  lead  us  likewise  to  con- 
 clude, that  there  could  be  no  occasion  for  them; 
 that  is,  that  there  could  be  no  diseases  at  all.  And, 
 therefore,  our  experience  that  there  are  diseases, 
 shows,  that  it  is  credible  beforehand,  upon  supposi- 
 
383 
 
 tion  nature  has  provided  remedies  for  them,  that 
 these  remedies  may  be,  as  by  experience  we  find 
 they  are,  not  certain,  nor  perfect,  nor  universal : 
 because  it  shows,  that  the  principles  upon  which  we 
 should  expect  the  contrary  are  fallacious. 
 
 And  now,  what  is  the  just  consequence  from  all 
 these  tilings  ?  Not  that  reason  is  no  judge  of  what 
 is  offered  to  us  as  being  of  divine  revelation.  For, 
 this  would  be  to  infer,  that  we  are  unable  to  judge 
 of  any  thing,  because  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  all 
 things.  Reason  can,  and  it  ought  to  judge,  not 
 only  of  the  meaning,  but  also  of  the  morality  and 
 the  evidence,  of  revelation.  First,  It  is  the  pro- 
 vince of  reason  to  judge  of  the  morality  of  the  Scrip- 
 ture ;  that  is,  not  whether  it  contains  things  differ- 
 ent from  what  we  should  have  expected  from  a  wise, 
 just,  and  good  Being;  for  objections  from  hence 
 have  been  now  obviated;  but  whether  it  contains 
 things  plainly  contradictory  to  wisdom,  justice,  or 
 goodness ;  to  what  the  light  of  nature  teaches  us  of 
 God.  And  I  know  nothing  of  this  sort  objected 
 against  Scripture,  excepting  such  objections  as  are 
 formed  upon  suppositions,  which  would  equally  con- 
 clude, that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  contradic- 
 tory to  wisdom,  justice,  or  goodness;  which  most 
 certainly  it  is  not.  Indeed,  there  are  some  particu- 
 lar precepts  in  Scripture,  given  to  particular  persons, 
 requiring  actions  winch  would  be  immoral  and  vicious, 
 were  it  not  for  such  precepts.  But  it  is  easy  to  see, 
 that  all  these  are  of  such  a  kind  as  that  the  precept 
 changes  the  whole  nature  of  the  case  and  of  the 
 action ;  and  both  constitutes  and  shows  that  not  to 
 be  unjust  or  immoral,  which,  prior  to  the  precept, 
 
384 
 
 must  have  appeared  and  really  have  been  so :  which 
 may  well  be,  since  none  of  these  precepts  are  con- 
 trary to  immutable  morality.  If  it  were  commanded, 
 to  cultivate  the  principles,  and  act  from  the  spirit  of 
 treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty ;  the  command  would 
 not  alter  the  nature  of  the  case,  or  of  the  action,  in 
 any  of  these  instances.  But  it  is  quite  otherwise  in 
 precepts,  which  require  only  the  doing  an  external 
 action ;  for  instance,  taking  away  the  property  or 
 life  of  any.  For  men  have  no  right  to  either  life 
 or  property,  but  what  arises  solely  from  the  grant 
 of  God :  when  this  grant  is  revoked,  they  cease  to 
 have  any  right  at  all  in  either;  and  when  this  revo- 
 cation is  made  known,  as  surely  it  is  possible  it  may 
 be,  it  must  cease  to  be  unjust  to  deprive  them  of 
 either.  And  though  a  course  of  external  acts, 
 which  without  command  would  be  immoral,  must 
 make  an  immoral  habit,  yet  a  few  detached  com- 
 mands have  no  such  natural  tendency.  I  thought 
 proper  to  say  thus  much  of  the  few  Scripture  pre- 
 cepts, which  require  not  vicious  actions,  but  actions 
 which  would  have  been  vicious  had  it  not  been  for 
 such  precepts;  because  they  are  sometimes  weakly 
 urged  as  immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon  ob- 
 jections drawn  from  them.  But  to  me  there  seems 
 no  difficulty  at  all  in  these  precepts,  but  what  arises 
 from  their  being  offences;  that  is,  from  their  being 
 liable  to  be  perverted,  as  indeed  they  are,  by  wicked 
 designing  men,  to  serve  the  most  horrid  purposes, 
 and,  perhaps,  to  mislead  the  weak  and  enthusiastic. 
 And  objections  from  this  head,  are  not  objections 
 against  revelation,  but  against  the  whole  notion  of 
 religion,  as  a  trial;    and  against  the  general  consti- 
 
385 
 
 tution  of  nature.  Secondly,  Reason  is  able  to  judge, 
 and  must,  of  the  evidence  of  revelation,  and  of  the 
 objections  urged  against  that  evidence;  which  shall 
 be  the  subject  of  a  following  Chapter.* 
 
 But  the  consequence  of  the  foregoing  observa- 
 tions is,  that  the  question  upon  which  the  truth  of 
 Christianity  depends,  is  scarce  at  all,  what  objec- 
 tions there  are  against  its  scheme,  since  there  are 
 none  against  the  morality  of  it;  but  what  objections 
 there  are  against  its  evidence :  or,  what  proof  there 
 remains  of  it,  after  due  allowances  made  for  the  ob- 
 jections against  that  proof:  because  it  has  been 
 shown,  that  the  objections  against  Christianity,  as 
 distinguished  from  objections  against  its  evidence, 
 are  frivolous.  For  surely  very  little  weight,  if  any 
 at  all,  is  to  be  laid  upon  a  way  of  arguing  and  ob- 
 jecting, which,  when  applied  to  the  general  consti- 
 tution of  nature,  experience  shows  not  to  be  conclu- 
 sive: and  such,  I  think,  is  the  whole  way  of  ob- 
 jecting treated  of  throughout  this  chapter.  It  is 
 resolvable  into  principles,  and  goes  upon  suppositions, 
 which  mislead  us  to  think,  that  the  Author  of  nature 
 would  not  act,  as  we  experience  he  does;  or  would 
 act,  in  such  and  such  cases,  as  we  experience  he 
 does  not  in  like  cases.  But  the  unreasonableness 
 of  this  way  of  objecting  will  appear  yet  more  evi- 
 dently from  hence,  that  the  chief  things  thus  ob- 
 jected against,  are  justified,  as  shall  be  farther 
 shown,-)*  by  distinct,  particular,  and  full  analogies, 
 in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature. 
 
 But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  as  frivolous  as 
 
 *  Chap.  7.  f  Chap.  4,  latter  part ;  and  5,  6. 
 
 K  17 
 
386 
 
 objections  of  the  foregoing  sort  against  revelation 
 are,  yet,  when  a  supposed  revelation  is  more  con- 
 sistent with  itself,  and  has  a  more  general  and  uni- 
 form tendency  to  promote  virtue,  than,  all  circum- 
 stances considered,  could  have  been  expected  from 
 enthusiasm,  and  political  views;  this  is  a  presump- 
 tive proof  of  its  not  proceeding  from  them,  and  so 
 of  its  truth;  because  we  are  competent  judges,  what 
 might  have  been  expected  from  enthusiasm  and  po- 
 litical views. 
 
387 
 
 CHAP.  IV 
 
 Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Consti- 
 tution, imperfectly  comprehended. 
 
 It  hath  been  now  shown,*  that  the  analogy  of 
 nature  renders  it  highly  credible  beforehand,  that, 
 supposing  a  revelation  to  be  made,  it  must  contain 
 many  things  very  different  from  what  we  should  have 
 expected,  and  such  as  appear  open  to  great  objec- 
 tions; and  that  this  observation,  in  good  measure, 
 takes  off  the  force  of  those  objections,  or  rather 
 precludes  them.  But  it  may  be  alleged,  that  this 
 is  a  very  partial  answer  to  such  objections,  or  a  very 
 unsatisfactory  way  of  obviating  them :  because  it 
 doth  not  show  at  all,  that  the  things  objected  against 
 can  be  wise,  just,  and  good;  much  less,  that  it  is 
 credible  they  are  so.  It  will  therefore  be  proper  to 
 show  this  distinctly,  by  applying  to  these  objections 
 against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of  Chris- 
 tianity, the  answer  above f  given  to  the  like  objections 
 against  the  constitution  of  nature;  before  we  con- 
 sider the  particular  analogies  in  the  latter,  to  the 
 particular  things  objected  against  in  the  former. 
 Now,  that  which  affords  a  sufficient  answer  to  ob- 
 jections against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness  of 
 the  constitution  of  nature,  is  its  being  a  constitution, 
 a  system,  or  scheme,  imperfectly  comprehended:    a 
 
 •  In  the  foregoing  Chapter. 
 
 f  Part.  i.  Chap.  7.  to  which  this  all  along  refers. 
 
 r2 
 
388 
 
 scheme,  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to  accom- 
 plish ends ;  and  which  is  carried  on  by  general  laws. 
 For,  from  these  things  it  has  been  proved,  not  only 
 to  be  possible,  but  also  to  be  credible,  that  those 
 things  which  are  objected  against,  may  be  consistent 
 with  wisdom,  justice,  and  goodness;  nay,  may  be 
 instances  of  them :  and  even  that  the  constitution 
 and  government  of  nature  may  be  perfect  in  the 
 highest  possible  degree.  If  Christianity,  then,  be 
 a  scheme,  and  of  the  like  kind,  it  is  evident,  the 
 like  objections  against  it  must  admit  of  the  like 
 answer.       And, 
 
 1.  Christianity  is  a  scheme  quite  beyond  our 
 comprehension.  The  moral  government  of  God  is 
 exercised,  by  gradually  conducting  things  so  in  the 
 course  of  his  providence,  that  every  one,  at  length, 
 and  upon  the  whole,  shall  receive  according  to  his 
 deserts ;  and  neither  fraud  nor  violence,  but  truth 
 and  right,  shall  finally  prevail.  Christianity  is  a 
 particular  scheme  under  this  general  plan  of  provi- 
 dence, and  a  part  of  it,  conducive  to  its  completion, 
 with  regard  to  mankind :  consisting  itself  also  of 
 various  parts,  and  a  mysterious  economy,  which  has 
 been  carrying  on  from  the  time  the  world  came  into 
 its  present  wretched  state,  and  is  still  carrying  on, 
 for  its  recovery,  by  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah ; 
 "  who  is  to  gather  together  in  one,  the  children  of 
 God  that  are  scattered  abroad,"  and  establish  «  an 
 everlasting  kingdom,  wherein  dwelleth  righteous- 
 ness." And  in  order  to  it,  after  various  manifesta- 
 tions of  things,  relating  to  this  great  and  general 
 scheme  of  Providence,  through  a  succession  of  many 
 ages ; — ("  for  the  Spirit  of  Christ,  which  was   in 
 
389 
 
 the  prophets,  testified  beforehand  his  sufferings, 
 and  the  glory  that  should  follow:  unto  whom  it  was 
 revealed,  that  not  unto  themselves,  but  unto  us, 
 they  did  minister  the  things  which  are  now  reported 
 unto  us  by  them  which  have  preached  the  gospel; 
 which  things  the  angels  desire  to  look  into:") — 
 after  various  dispensations,  looking  forward  and  pre- 
 paratory to  this  final  salvation,  "  in  the  fulness  of 
 time,"  when  infinite  Wisdom  thought  fit,  He, 
 "  being  in  the  form  of  God,  made  himself  of  no  re- 
 putation, and  took  upon  him  the  form  of  a  servant, 
 and  was  made  in  the  likeness  of  men ;  and  being 
 found  in  fashion  as  a  man,  he  humbled  himself,  and 
 became  obedient  to  death,  even  the  death  of  the 
 cross :  wherefore  God  also  hath  highly  exalted  him, 
 and  given  him  a  name  which  is  above  every  name: 
 that  at  the  name  of  Jesus  every  knee  should  bow, 
 of  things  in  heaven,  and  things  in  earth,  and  things 
 under  the  earth ;  and  that  every  tongue  should  con- 
 fess, that  Jesus  Christ  is  Lord,  to  the  glory  of 
 God  the  Father."  Parts  likewise  of  this  economy, 
 are  the  miraculous  mission  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and 
 his  ordinary  assistances  given  to  good  men ;  the  in- 
 visible government  which  Christ  at  present  exercises 
 over  his  church ;  that  which  he  himself  refers  to  in 
 these  words,  "  In  my  Father's  house  are  many  man- 
 sions— I  go  to  prepare  a  place  for  you;"  and  his 
 future  return  to  "judge  the  world  in  righteousness," 
 and  completely  re-establish  the  kingdom  of  God. 
 "  For  the  Father  judgeth  no  man;  but  hath  com- 
 mitted all  judgment  unto  the  Son :  that  all  men 
 should  honour  the  Son,  even  as  they  honour  the 
 Father."      "  All  power  is  given  unto  him  in  heaven 
 
390 
 
 and  in  earth."  "  And  he  must  reign,  till  he  hath 
 put  all  enemies  under  his  feet.  Then  cometh  the 
 end,  when  he  shall  have  delivered  up  the  kingdom 
 to  God,  even  the  Father;  when  he  shall  have 
 put  down  all  rule,  and  all  authority,  and  power. 
 And  when  all  things  shall  be  subdued  unto  him, 
 then  shall  the  Son  also  himself  be  subject  unto  him, 
 that  put  all  things  under  him,  that  God  may  be  all 
 in  all."  Now  little,  surely,  need  be  said  to  show, 
 that  this  system,  or  scheme  of  things,  is  but  im- 
 perfectly comprehended  by  us.  The  Scripture  ex- 
 pressly asserts  it  to  be  so.  And  indeed  one  cannot 
 read  a  passage  relating  to  this  "great  mystery  of 
 godliness,"  but  what  immediately  runs  up  into 
 something  which  shows  us  our  ignorance  in  it,  as 
 every  thing  in  nature  shows  us  our  ignorance  in  the 
 constitution  of  nature.  And  whoever  will  seriously 
 consider  that  part  of  the  Christian  scheme  which  is 
 revealed  in  Scripture,  will  find  so  much  more  unre- 
 vealed,  as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the  pur- 
 poses of  judging  and  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of 
 it,  as  of  the  constitution  of  nature.  Our  ignorance, 
 therefore,  is  as  much  an  answer  to  our  objections 
 against  the  perfection  of  one,  as  against  the  perfec- 
 tion of  the  other.*' 
 
 II.  It  is  obvious,  too,  that  in  the  Christian  dis- 
 pensation, as  much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of 
 things,  means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends. 
 And  the  observation  of  this  furnishes  us  with  the 
 same  answer,  to  objections  against  the  perfection 
 of  Christianity,  as  to  objections  of  the  like  kind, 
 
 *  Page  307,  &c. 
 
391 
 
 against  the  constitution  of  nature.  It  shows  the 
 credibility,  that  the  things  objected  against,  how 
 foolish*  soever  they  appear  to  men,  may  be  the  very 
 best  means  of  accomplishing  the  very  best  ends. 
 And  their  appearing  foolishness  is  no  presumption 
 against  this,  in  a  scheme  so  greatly  beyond  our 
 comprehension.f 
 
 III.  The  credibility,  that  the  Christian  dispen- 
 sation may  have  been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  ge- 
 neral laws,:}:  no  less  than  the  course  of  nature,  may 
 require  to  be  more  distinctly  made  out.  Consider, 
 then,  upon  what  ground  it  is  we  say,  that  the  whole 
 common  course  of  nature  is  carried  on  according  to 
 general  fore-ordained  laws.  We  know,  indeed,  se- 
 veral of  the  general  laws  of  matter;  and  a  great 
 part  of  the  natural  behaviour  of  living  agents  is  re- 
 ducible to  general  laws.  But  we  know,  in  a  man- 
 ner, nothing,  by  what  laws  storms  and  tempests, 
 earthquakes,  famine,  pestilence,  become  the  instru- 
 ments of  destruction  to  mankind.  And  the  laws, 
 by  which  persons  born  into  the  world  at  such  a  time 
 and  place,  are  of  such  capacities,  geniuses,  tempers; 
 the  laws,  by  which  thoughts  come  into  our  mind,  in 
 a  multitude  of  cases;  and  by  which  innumerable 
 things  happen,  of  the  greatest  influence  upon  the 
 affairs  and  state  of  the  world;  these  laws  arc  so 
 wholly  unknown  to  us,  that  we  call  the  events  which 
 come  to  pass  by  them,  accidental;  though  all  rea- 
 sonable men  know  certainly,  that  there  cannot,  in 
 reality,  be  any  such  thing  as  chance;  and  conclude, 
 that  the  things  which  have  this  appearance,  are  the 
 
 *  1  Cor.  i.         t  rage  312.  J  Pages  313,  314. 
 
result  of  general  laws,  and  may  be  reduced  into 
 them.  It  is  then  but  an  exceeding  little  way,  and 
 in  but  a  very  few  respects,  that  we  can  trace  up  the 
 natural  course  of  tilings  before  us,  to  general  laws. 
 And  it  is  only  from  analogy,  that  we  conclude  the 
 whole  of  it  to  be  capable  of  being  reduced  into 
 them ;  only  from  our  seeing,  that  part  is  so.  It  is 
 from  our  finding,  that  the  course  of  nature,  in  some 
 respects  and  so  far,  goes  on  by  general  laws,  that 
 we  conclude  this  of  the  rest.  And  if  that  be  a  just 
 ground  for  such  a  conclusion,  it  is  a  just  ground 
 also,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  apprehend,  to  ren- 
 der it  supposable  and  credible,  which  is  sufficient  for 
 answering  objections,  that  God's  miraculous  inter- 
 positions may  have  been,  all  along,  in  like  manner, 
 by  general  laws  of  wisdom.  Thus,  that  miraculous 
 powers  should  be  exerted  at  such  times,  upon  such 
 occasions,  in  such  degrees  and  manners,  and  with 
 regard  to  such  persons,  rather  than  others;  that  the 
 affairs  of  the  world  being  permitted  to  go  on  in  their 
 natural  course  so  far,  should  just  at  such  a  point, 
 have  a  new  direction  given  them  by  miraculous  in- 
 terpositions; that  these  interpositions  should  be  ex- 
 actly in  such  degrees  and  respects  only;  all  this  may 
 have  been  by  general  laws.  These  laws  are  un- 
 known, indeed,  to  us;  but  no  more  unknown  than 
 the  laws  from  whence  it  is,  that  some  die  as  soon 
 as  they  are  born,  and  others  live  to  extreme  old  age, 
 that  one  man  is  so  superior  to  another  in  under- 
 standing; with  innumerable  more  things,  which,  as 
 was  before  observed,  we  cannot  reduce  to  any  laws 
 or  rules  at  all;  though  it  is  taken  for  granted,  they 
 are  as  much  reducible  to  general  ones  as  gravitation. 
 
393 
 
 Now,  if  the  revealed  dispensations  of  Providence, 
 and  miraculous  interpositions,  be  by  general  laws, 
 as  well  as  God's  ordinary  government  in  the  course 
 of  nature,  made  known  by  reason  and  experience; 
 there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect,  that  every  exi- 
 gence, as  it  arises,  should  be  provided  for  by  these 
 general  laws  of  miraculous  interpositions,  than  that 
 every  exigence  in  nature  should,  by  the  general 
 laws  of  nature :  yet  there  might  be  wise  and  good 
 reasons,  that  miraculous  interpositions  should  be  by 
 general  laws;  and  that  these  laws  should  not  be 
 broken  in  upon,  or  deviated  from,  by  other  mira- 
 cles. 
 
 Upon  the  whole,  then,  the  appearance  of  defi- 
 ciencies and  irregularities  in  nature,  is  owing  to  its 
 being  a  scheme  but  in  part  made  known,  and  of 
 such  a  certain  particular  kind  in  other  respects. 
 Now  we  see  no  more  reason,  why  the  frame  and 
 course  of  nature  should  be  such  a  scheme,  than  why 
 Christianity  should.  And  that  the  former  is  such 
 a  scheme,  renders  it  credible,  that  the  latter,  upon 
 supposition  of  its  truth,  may  be  so  too.  And  as  it 
 is  manifest,  that  Christianity  is  a  scheme  revealed 
 but  in  part,  and  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made 
 use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  like  to  that  of  nature; 
 so  the  credibility,  that  it  may  have  been  all  along 
 carried  on  by  general  laws,  no  less  than  the  course 
 of  nature,  has  been  distinctly  proved.  And  from 
 all  this  it  is  beforehand  credible  that  there  might,  I 
 think  probable  that  there  would,  be  the  like  appear- 
 ance of  deficiencies  and  irregularities  in  Christian- 
 ity, as  in  nature;  that  is,  that  Christianity  would 
 be  liable  to  the  like  objections,  as  the  frame  of  na- 
 il 3 
 
394 
 
 ture.  And  these  objections  are  answered  by  these 
 observations  concerning  Christianity;  as  the  like 
 objections  against  the  frame  of  nature,  are  answer- 
 ed by  the  like  observations  concerning  the  frame  of 
 nature. 
 
 The  objections  against  Christianity,  considered 
 as  a  matter  of  fact,*  having,  in  general,  been  obvi- 
 ated in  the  preceding  chapter;  and  the  same  consi- 
 dered as  made  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of 
 it,  having  been  obviated  in  this;  the  next  thing, 
 according  to  the  method  proposed,  is  to  show,  that 
 the  principal  objections,  in  particular,  against  Chris- 
 tianity, may  be  answered  by  particular  and  full  ana- 
 logies in  nature.  And  as  one  of  them  is  made 
 against  the  whole  scheme  of  it  together,  as  just 
 now  described,  I  choose  to  consider  it  here,  rather 
 than  in  a  distinct  chapter  by  itself.  The  thing  ob- 
 jected against  this  scheme  of  the  gospel,  is,  "  That 
 it  seems  to  suppose,  God  was  reduced  to  the  neces- 
 sity of  a  long  series  of  intricate  means,  in  order  to 
 accomplish  his  ends,  the  recovery  and  salvation  of 
 the  world ;  in  like  sort  as  men,  for  want  of  under- 
 standing, or  power,  not  being  able  to  come  at  their 
 ends  directly,  are  forced  to  go  round-about  ways, 
 and  make  use  of  many  perplexed  contrivances  to  ar- 
 rive at  them."  Now,  every  thing  which  we  see 
 shows  the  folly  of  this,  considered  as  an  objection 
 against  the  truth  of  Christianity.  For,  according 
 to  our  manner  of  conception,  God  makes  use  of  va- 
 
 *  Page  312. 
 
395 
 
 riety  of  means,  what  we  often  think  tedious  ones, 
 in  the  natural  course  of  providence,  for  the  accom- 
 plishment of  all  his  ends.  Indeed,  it  is  certain, 
 there  is  somewhat  in  this  matter  quite  beyond  our 
 comprehension;  but  the  mystery  is  as  great  in  na- 
 ture as  in  Christianity.  We  know  what  we  our- 
 selves aim  at  as  final  ends;  and  what  courses  we 
 take,  merely  as  means  conducing  to  those  ends. 
 But  we  are  greatly  ignorant  how  far  things  are  con- 
 sidered by  the  Author  of  nature,  under  the  single 
 notion  of  means  and  ends;  so  as  that  it  may  be  said, 
 this  is  merely  an  end,  and  that  merely  means,  in  his 
 regard.  And  whether  there  be  not  some  peculiar 
 absurdity  in  our  very  manner  of  conception,  con- 
 cerning this  matter,  somewhat  contradictory,  aris- 
 ing from  our  extremely  imperfect  views  of  things,  it 
 is  impossible  to  say.  However,  thus  much  is  ma- 
 nifest, that  the  whole  natural  world  and  government 
 of  it,  is  a  scheme,  or  system;  not  a  fixed,  but  a 
 progressive  one :  a  scheme,  in  which  the  operation 
 of  various  means  takes  up  a  great  length  of  time, 
 before  the  ends  they  tend  to  can  be  attained.  The 
 change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of  the  fruits  of  the 
 earth,  the  very  history  of  a  flower,  is  an  instance 
 of  this;  and  so  is  human  life.  Thus  vegetable  bo- 
 dies, and  those  of  animals,  though  possibly  formed 
 at  once,  yet  grow  up  by  degrees  to  a  mature  state. 
 And  thus  rational  agents  who  animate  these  latter 
 bodies,  are  naturally  directed  to  form,  each  his  own 
 manners  and  character,  by  the  gradual  gaining  of 
 knowledge  and  experience,  and  by  a  long  course  of 
 action.  Our  existence  is  not  only  successive,  as  it 
 must  be  of  necessity,  but  one  state  of  our  life  and 
 
396 
 
 being  is  appointed  by  God  to  be  a  preparation  for 
 another;  and  that,  to  be  the  means  of  attaining  to 
 another  succeeding  one :  Infancy  to  childhood ; 
 childhood  to  youth;  youth  to  mature  age.  Men 
 are  impatient,  and  for  precipitating  things;  but  the 
 Author  of  nature  appears  deliberate  throughout  his 
 operations;  accomplishing  his  natural  ends  by  slow 
 successive  steps.  And  there  is  a  plan  of  things  be- 
 forehand laid  out,  which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  re- 
 quires various  systems  of  means,  as  well  as  length 
 of  time,  in  order  to  the  carrying  on  its  several  parts 
 into  execution.  Thus,  in  the  daily  course  of  na- 
 tural providence,  God  operates  in  the  very  same 
 manner,  as  in  the  dispensation  of  Christianity, 
 making  one  thing  subservient  to  another;  this  to 
 somewhat  farther ;  and  so  on,  through  a  progressive 
 series  of  means,  which  extend,  both  backward  and 
 forward,  beyond  our  utmost  view.  Of  this  manner 
 of  operation,  every  thing  we  see  in  the  course  of 
 nature,  is  as  much  an  instance,  as  any  part  of  the 
 Christian  dispensation. 
 
397 
 
 CHAP.  V. 
 
 Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity  ;  the  ap- 
 pointment of  a  Mediator ',  and  the  Redemption  of 
 the  World  by  him. 
 
 There  is  not,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to 
 Christianity  which  has  been  more  objected  against 
 than  the  mediation  of  Christ,  in  some  or  other  of 
 its  parts.  Yet,  upon  thorough  consideration,  there 
 seems  nothing  less  justly  liable  to  it.      For, 
 
 I.  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  ima- 
 gined presumption  against  the  general  notion  of  "  a 
 Mediator  between  God  and  man."  For  we  find, 
 all  living  creatures  are  brought  into  the  world,  and 
 their  life  in  infancy  is  preserved,  by  the  instrumen- 
 tality of  others ;  and  every  satisfaction  of  it,  some 
 way  or  other,  is  bestowed  by  the  like  means.  So 
 that  the  visible  government  which  God  exercises 
 over  the  world,  is  by  the  instrumentality  and  media- 
 tion of  others.  And  how  far  his  invisible  govern- 
 ment be,  or  be  not  so,  it  is  impossible  to  determine 
 at  all  by  reason.  And  the  supposition,  that  part  of 
 it  is  so,  appears,  to  say  the  least,  altogether  as  cre- 
 dible as  the  contrary.  There  is  then  no  sort  of  ob- 
 jection, from  the  light  of  nature,  against  the  general 
 notion  of  a  mediator  between  God  and  man,  con- 
 sidered as  a  doctrine  of  Christianity,  or  as  an  ap- 
 pointment in  this  dispensation;  since,  we  find  by  ex- 
 perience, that  God  does  appoint  mediators,  to  be  the 
 instruments  of  good  and  evil  to  us,  the  instruments 
 
f<: 
 
 98 
 
 of  his  justice  and  his  mercy.  And  the  objection 
 here  referred  to  is  urged,  not  against  mediation  in 
 that  high,  eminent,  and  peculiar  sense,  in  which 
 Christ  is  our  mediator;  but  absolutely  against  the 
 whole  notion  itself  of  a  mediator  at  all. 
 
 II.  As  we  must  suppose  that  the  world  is  under 
 the  proper  moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  state 
 of  religion,  before  we  can  enter  into  consideration  of 
 the  revealed  doctrine  concerning  the  redemption  of 
 it  by  Christ ;  so  that  supposition  is  here  to  be  dis- 
 tinctly taken  notice  of.  Now,  the  divine  moral  go- 
 vernment which  religion  teaches  us,  implies,  that  the 
 consequence  of  vice  shall  be  misery,  in  some  future 
 state,  by  the  righteous  judgment  of  God.  That 
 such  consequent  punishment  shall  take  effect  by  his 
 appointment,  is  necessarily  implied.  But  as  it  is 
 not  in  any  sort  to  be  supposed  that  we  are  made  ac- 
 quainted with  all  the  ends  or  reasons  for  which  it  is 
 fit  future  punishments  should  be  inflicted,  or  why 
 God  has  appointed  such  and  such  consequent  misery 
 should  follow  vice ;  and  as  we  are  altogether  in  the 
 dark,  how  or  in  what  manner  it  shall  follow,  by  what 
 immediate  occasions,  or  by  the  instrumentality  of 
 what  means ;  there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing,  it 
 may  follow  in  a  way  analogous  to  that,  in  which 
 many  miseries  follow  such  and  such  courses  of  ac- 
 tion at  present ;  poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  untimely 
 death  by  diseases,  death  from  the  hands  of  civil  jus- 
 tice. There  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  future 
 punishment  may  follow  wickedness  of  course,  as  we 
 speak,  or  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  from 
 God's  original  constitution  of  the  world ;  from  the 
 nature  he  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in 
 
399 
 
 which  he  places  us;  or,  in  a  like  manner,  as  a  per- 
 son rashly  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  in  the  way  of 
 natural  consequence,  fails  down;  in  the  way  of  na- 
 tural consequence,  breaks  his  limbs,  suppose ;  in 
 the  way  of  natural  consequence  of  this,  without  help, 
 perishes. 
 
 Some  good  men  may,  perhaps,  be  offended  with 
 hearing  it  spoken  of  as  a  supposable  thing,  that  the 
 future  punishments  of  wickedness  may  be  in  the  way 
 of  natural  consequence ;  as  if  this  were  taking  the 
 execution  of  justice  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and 
 giving  it  to  nature.  But  they  should  remember,  that 
 when  things  come  to  pass  according  to  the  course  of 
 nature,  this  does  not  hinder  them  from  being  his  do- 
 ing, who  is  the  God  of  nature;  and  that  the  Scrip- 
 ture ascribes  those  punishments  to  divine  justice, 
 which  are  known  to  be  natural;  and  which  must  be 
 called  so,  when  distinguished  from  such  as  are  mira- 
 culous. But,  after  all,  this  supposition,  or  rather 
 this  way  of  speaking,  is  here  made  use  of  only  by 
 way  of  illustration  of  the  subject  before  us.  For, 
 since  it  must  be  admitted,  that  the  future  punish- 
 ment of  wickedness  is  not  a  matter  of  arbitrary  ap- 
 pointment, but  of  reason,  equity,  and  justice;  it 
 comes,  for  aught  I  see,  to  the  same  thing,  whether 
 it  is  supposed  to  be  inflicted  in  a  way  analogous  to 
 that  in  which  the  temporal  punishments  of  vice  and 
 folly  are  inflicted,  or  in  any  other  way.  And  though 
 there  were  a  difference,  it  is  allowable  in  the  present 
 case,  to  make  this  supposition,  plainly  not  an  in- 
 credible one,  That  future  punishment  may  follow 
 wickedness  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  or  ac- 
 cording to  some  general  laws  of  government  already 
 established  in  the  universe. 
 
400 
 
 III.  Upon  this  supposition,  or  even  without  it, 
 we  may  observe  somewhat,  much  to  the  present  pur- 
 pose, in  the  constitution  of  nature,  or  appointments 
 of  Providence :  the  provision  which  is  made,  that  all 
 the  bad  natural  consequences  of  men's  actions  should 
 not  always  actually  follow ;  or,  that  such  bad  conse- 
 quences, as,  according  to  the  settled  course  of  things, 
 would  inevitably  have  followed,  if  not  prevented, 
 should,  in  certain  degrees,  be  prevented.  We  are 
 apt,  presumptuously,  to  imagine,  that  the  world 
 might  have  been  so  constituted,  as  that  there  would 
 not  have  been  any  such  thing  as  misery  or  evil.  On 
 the  contrary,  we  find  the  Author  of  nature  permits 
 it.  But  then,  he  has  provided  reliefs,  and,  in  many 
 cases,  perfect  remedies  for  it,  after  some  pains  and 
 difficulties ;  reliefs  and  remedies  even  for  that  evil, 
 which  is  the  fruit  of  our  own  misconduct;  and  which, 
 in  the  course  of  nature,  would  have  continued,  and 
 ended  in  our  destruction,  but  for  such  remedies. 
 And  this  is  an  instance  both  of  severity  and  of  in- 
 dulgence, in  the  constitution  of  nature.  Thus,  all 
 the  bad  consequences,  now  mentioned,  of  a  man 
 trifling  upon  a  precipice,  might  be  prevented.  And, 
 though  all  were  not,  yet  some  of  them  might,  by 
 proper  interposition,  if  not  rejected;  by  another  com- 
 ing to  the  rash  man's  relief,  with  his  own  laying 
 hold  on  that  relief,  in  such  sort  as  the  case  required. 
 Persons  may  do  a  great  deal  themselves  towards  pre- 
 venting the  bad  consequences  of  their  follies;  and 
 more  may  be  done  by  themselves,  together  with  the 
 assistance  of  others,  their  fellow-creatures;  which 
 assistance  nature  requires  and  prompts  us  to.  This 
 is  the  general  constitution  of  the  world.     Now,  sup- 
 
401 
 
 pose  it  had  been  so  constituted,  that  after  such  ac- 
 tions were  done,  as  were  foreseen  naturally  to  draw 
 after  them  misery  to  the  doer,  it  should  have  been 
 no  more  in  human  power  to  have  prevented  that  na- 
 tural consequent  misery,  in  any  instance,  than  it  is 
 in  all ;  no  one  can  say,  whether  such  a  more  severe 
 constitution  of  things  might  not  yet  have  been  really 
 good.  But  that,  on  the  contrary,  provision  is  made 
 by  nature,  that  we  may  and  do,  to  so  great  degree, 
 prevent  the  bad  natural  effects  of  our  follies;  this 
 may  be  called  mercy,  or  compassion,  in  the  original 
 constitution  of  the  world;  compassion  as  distin- 
 guished from  goodness  in  general.  And,  the  whole 
 known  constitution  and  course  of  things  affording  us 
 instances  of  such  compassion,  it  would  be  according 
 to  the  analogy  of  nature  to  hope,  that,  however  ru- 
 inous the  natural  consequences  of  vice  might  be, 
 from  the  general  laws  of  God's  government  over  the 
 universe,  yet  provision  might  be  made,  possibly 
 might  have  been  originally  made,  for  preventing 
 those  ruinous  consequences  from  inevitably  follow- 
 ing; at  least  from  following  universally,  and  in  all 
 cases. 
 
 Many,  I  am  sensible,  will  wonder  at  finding  this 
 made  a  question,  or  spoken  of  as  in  any  degree 
 doubtful.  The  generality  of  mankind  are  so  far 
 from  having  that  awful  sense  of  things,  which  the 
 present  state  of  vice  and  misery,  and  darkness,  seems 
 to  make  but  reasonable,  that  they  have  scarce  any 
 apprehension,  or  thought  at  all,  about  this  matter, 
 any  way ;  and  some  serious  persons  may  have  spoken 
 unadvisedly  concerning  it.  But  let  us  observe, 
 what  we  experience  to  be,  and  what,  from  the  very 
 
402 
 
 constitution  of  nature,  cannot  but  be,  the  conse- 
 quences of  irregular  and  disorderly  behaviour ;  even 
 of  such  rashness,  wilfulness,  neglects,  as  we  scarce 
 call  vicious.  Now,  it  is  natural  to  apprehend,  that 
 the  bad  consequences  of  irregularity  will  be  greater, 
 in  proportion  as  the  irregularity  is  so.  And  there 
 is  no  comparison  between  these  irregularities,  and 
 the  greater  instances  of  vice,  or  a  dissolute  profligate 
 disregard  to  all  religion ;  if  there  be  any  thing  at  all 
 in  religion.  For,  consider  what  it  is  for  creatures, 
 moral  agents,  presumptuously  to  introduce  that  con- 
 fusion and  misery  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  which 
 mankind  have,  in  fact,  introduced ;  to  blaspheme  the 
 sovereign  Lord  of  all ;  to  contemn  his  authority ;  to 
 be  injurious  to  the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fellow 
 creatures,  the  creatures  of  God.  Add,  that  the  ef- 
 fects of  vice,  in  the  present  world,  are  often  extreme 
 misery,  irretrievable  ruin,  and  even  death :  and, 
 upon  putting  all  this  together,  it  will  appear,  that  as 
 no  one  can  say,  in  what  degree  fatal  the  unprevented 
 consequences  of  vice  may  be,  according  to  the  gen- 
 eral rule  of  Divine  government ;  so  it  is  by  no  means 
 intuitively  certain,  how  far  these  consequences  could 
 possibly,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  prevented, 
 consistently  with  the  eternal  rule  of  right,  or  with 
 what  is,  in  fact,  the  moral  constitution  of  nature. 
 However,  there  would  be  large  ground  to  hope,  that 
 the  universal  government  was  not  so  severely  strict, 
 but  that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or  for  having 
 those  penal  consequences  prevented.     Yet, 
 
 IV.  There  seems  no  probability,  that  any  thing 
 we  could  do,  would  alone,  and  of  itself,  prevent 
 them;    prevent  their  following,  or  being  inflicted. 
 
403 
 
 Hut  one  would  think,  at  least,  it  were  impossible 
 that  the  contrary  should  be  thought  certain.  For 
 we  are  not  acquainted  with  the  whole  of  the  case. 
 We  are  not  informed  of  all  the  reasons,  which  len- 
 der it  fit  that  future  punishments  should  be  inflicted : 
 and,  therefore,  cannot  know,  whether  any  thing  we 
 could  do  would  make  such  an  alteration,  as  to  render 
 it  fit  that  they  should  be  remitted.  We  do  not 
 know,  what  the  whole  natural,  or  appointed  conse- 
 quences of  vice  are,  nor  in  what  way  they  would 
 follow,  if  not  prevented;  and,  therefore,  can  in  no 
 sort  say,  whether  we  could  do  any  thing,  which 
 would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  them.  Our  ignorance 
 being  thus  manifest,  let  us  recollect  the  analogy  ol 
 nature,  or  providence.  For  though  this  may  be  but 
 a  slight  ground  to  raise  a  positive  opinion  upon,  in 
 this  matter,  yet  it  is  sufficient  to  answer  a  mere  ar- 
 bitrary assertion,  without  any  kind  of  evidence  urged 
 by  way  of  objection  against  a  doctrine,  the  proof  of 
 which  is  not  reason,  but  revelation.  Consider,  then, 
 people  ruin  their  fortunes  by  extravagance;  they 
 bring  diseases  upon  themselves  by  excess ;  they  incur 
 the  penalties  of  civil  laws,  and  surely  civil  govern- 
 ment is  natural;  will  sorrow  for  these  follies  past, 
 and  behaving  well  for  the  future,  alone  and  of  itself, 
 prevent  the  natural  consequences  of  them  ?  On  the 
 contrary,  men's  natural  abilities  of  helping  them- 
 selves are  often  impaired;  or,  if  not,  yet  they  are 
 forced  to  be  beholden  to  the  assistance  of  others, 
 upon  several  accounts,  and  in  different  ways :  assis- 
 tance which  they  would  have  had  no  occasion  for, 
 had  it  not  been  for  their  misconduct ;  but  which,  in 
 the   disadvantageous   condition   thev  have    reduced 
 
404 
 
 themselves  to,  is  absolutely  necessary  to  their  re 
 covery,  and  retrieving  their  affairs.  Now,  since  this 
 is  our  case,  considering  ourselves  merely  as  inhabi- 
 tants of  this  world,  and  as  having  a  temporal  interest 
 here,  under  the  natural  government  of  God,  which, 
 however,  has  a  great  deal  moral  in  it ;  why  is  it  not 
 supposable,  that  this  may  be  our  case  also,  in  our 
 more  important  capacity,  as  under  his  perfect  moral 
 government,  and  having  a  more  general  and  future 
 interest  depending  ?  If  we  have  misbehaved  in  this 
 higher  capacity,  and  rendered  ourselves  obnoxious  to 
 the  future  punishment  which  God  has  annexed  to 
 vice;  it  is  plainly  credible,  that  behaving  well  for 
 the  time  to  come,  may  be — not  useless,  God  forbid 
 — but  wholly  insufficient,  alone  and  of  itself,  to 
 prevent  that  punishment ;  or  to  put  us  in  the  condi- 
 tion which  we  should  have  been  in,  had  we  pre- 
 served our  innocence. 
 
 And,  though  we  ought  to  reason  with  all  reve- 
 rence, whenever  we  reason  concerning  the  Divine 
 conduct,  yet  it  may  be  added,  that  it  is  clearly  con- 
 trary to  all  our  notions  of  government,  as  well  as 
 to  what  is,  in  fact,  the  general  constitution  of  na- 
 ture, to  suppose  that  doing  well  for  the  future, 
 should,  in  all  cases,  prevent  all  the  judicial  bad  con- 
 sequences of  having  done  evil,  or  all  the  punish- 
 ment annexed  to  disobedience.  And  we  have  ma- 
 nifestly nothing  from  whence  to  determine,  in  what 
 degree,  and  in  what  cases,  reformation  would  pre- 
 vent this  punishment,  even  supposing  that  it  would 
 in  some.  And,  though  the  efficacy  of  repentance 
 itself  alone,  to  prevent  what  mankind  had  rendered 
 themselves  obnoxious  to,  and  recover  what  they  had 
 
405 
 
 forfeited,  is  now  insisted  upon,  in  opposition  to 
 Christianity ;  yet,  by  the  general  prevalence  of  pro- 
 pitiatory sacrifices  over  the  heathen  world,  this  no- 
 tion, of  repentance  alone  being  sufficient  to  expiate 
 guilt,  appears  to  be  contraiy  to  the  general  sense  of 
 mankind. 
 
 Upon  the  whole,  then,  had  the  laws,  the  general 
 laws  of  God's  government,  been  permitted  to  ope- 
 rate, without  any  interposition  in  our  behalf,  the 
 future  punishment,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  con- 
 traiy, or  have  any  reason  to  think,  must  inevitably 
 '  have  followed,  notwithstanding  any  thing  we  could 
 have  done  to  prevent  it.      Now, 
 
 V.  In  this  darkness,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call 
 it  which  you  please,  revelation  comes  in;  confirms 
 every  doubting  fear  which  could  enter  into  the  heart 
 of  man  concerning  the  future  unprevented  conse- 
 quence of  wickedness ;  supposes  the  world  to  be  in 
 a  state  of  ruin,  (a  supposition  which  seems  the  very 
 ground  of  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  which,  if 
 not  proveable  by  reason,  yet  it  is  in  nowise  contrary 
 to  it) ;  teaches  us,  too,  that  the  rules  of  divine  go- 
 vernment are  such,  as  not  to  admit  of  pardon  im- 
 mediately and  directly  upon  repentance,  or  by  the 
 sole  efficacy  of  it;  but  then  teaches  at  the  same 
 time,  what  nature  might  justly  have  hoped,  that  the 
 moral  government  of  the  universe  was  not  so  rigid, 
 but  that  there  was  room  for  an  interposition  to  avert 
 the  fatal  consequences  of  vice ;  which,  therefore,  by 
 this  means,  does  admit  of  pardon.  Revelation 
 teaches  us,  that  the  unknown  laws  of  God's  more 
 general  government,  no  less  than  the  particular  laws 
 by  which  we  experience  he  governs  us  at  present, 
 
408 
 
 are  compassionate,*  as  well  as  good,  in  the  more 
 general  notion  of  goodness ;  and  that  he  hath  mer- 
 cifully provided,  that  there  should  be  an  interposi- 
 tion to  prevent  the  destruction  of  human  kind,  what- 
 ever that  destruction  unprevented  would  have  been. 
 "  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only 
 begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  beiieveth,"  not,  to 
 be  sure,  in  a  speculative,  but  in  a  practical  sense, 
 "  that  whosoever  beiieveth  in  him  should  not  pe- 
 rish ;"  gave  his  Son  in  the  same  way  of  goodness 
 to  the  world,  as  he  affords  particular  persons  the 
 friendly  assistance  of  their  fellow-creatures,  when, 
 without  it,  their  temporal  ruin  would  be  the  certain 
 consequence  of  their  follies;  in  the  same  way  of 
 goodness,  I  say,  though  in  a  transcendent  and  in- 
 finitely higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God 
 "  loved  us,  and  gave  himself  for  us,"  with  a  love 
 which  he  himself  compares  to  that  of  human  friend- 
 ship; though,  in  this  case,  all  comparisons  must 
 fall  infinitely  short  of  the  thing  intended  to  be  illus- 
 trated by  them.  He  interposed  in  such  a  manner, 
 as  was  necessary  and  effectual  to  prevent  that  exe- 
 cution of  justice  upon  sinners,  which  God  had  ap- 
 pointed should  otherwise  have  been  executed  upon 
 them ;  or  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  prevent  that  pun- 
 ishment from  actually  following,  which,  according 
 to  the  general  laws  of  divine  government,  must  have 
 followed  the  sins  of  the  world,  had  it  not  been  for 
 such  interposition.f 
 
 *  Page  400,  &c. 
 
 +  It  cannot,  I  suppose,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  most  cur- 
 sory reader,  that  it  is,  in  any  sort,  affirmed,  or  implied,  in  any 
 thing  said  in  this  Chapter,  that  none  can  have  the  benefit  of  the 
 
407 
 
 If  any  thing  here  said  should  appear,  upon  first 
 thought,  inconsistent  with  Divine  goodness,  a  se- 
 cond, I  am  persuaded,  will  entirely  remove  that  ap- 
 pearance. For,  were  we  to  suppose  the  constitu- 
 tion of  things  to  he  such,  as  that  the  whole  crea- 
 tion must  have  perished,  had  it  not  been  for  some- 
 what which  God  had  appointed  should  be,  in  order 
 to  prevent  that  ruin;  even  this  supposition  would 
 not  be  inconsistent,  in  any  degree,  with  the  most 
 absolutely  perfect  goodness.  But  still  it  may  be 
 thought,  that  this  whole  manner  of  treating  the 
 subject  before  us,  supposes  mankind  to  be  naturally 
 in  a  very  strange  state.  And  truly  so  it  does.  But 
 it  is  not  Christianity  which  has  put  us  into  this 
 state.  Whoever  will  consider  the  manifold  mise- 
 ries, and  the  extreme  wickedness  of  the  world; 
 that  the  best  have  great  wrongnesses  within  them- 
 selves, which  they  complain  of,   and  endeavour  to 
 
 general  redemption,  but  such  as  have  the  advantage  of  being 
 made  acquainted  with  it  in  the  present  life.  But,  it  may  be 
 needful  to  mention,  that  several  questions,  which  have  been 
 brought  into  the  subject  before  us,  and  determined,  are  not  in 
 the  least  entered  into  here  ;  questions  which  have  been,  I  fear, 
 rashly  determined,  and,  perhaps,  with  equal  rashness,  contrary 
 ways.  For  instance  :  Whether  God  could  have  saved  the  world 
 by  other  means  than  the  death  of  Christ,  consistently  with  the 
 general  laws  of  his  government  ?  And,  had  not  Christ  come  in- 
 to the  world,  what  would  have  been  the  future  condition  of  the 
 better  sort  of  men  ;  those  just  persons  over  the  face  of  the 
 earth,  for  whom  Manasses,  in  his  prayer,  asserts  repentance 
 was  not  appointed  ?  The  meaning  of  the  first  of  these  ques- 
 tions is  greatly  ambiguous  ;  and  neither  of  them  can  properly  be 
 answered,  without  going  upon  that  infinitely  absurd  supposition, 
 that  we  know  the  whole  of  the  case.  And,  perhaps,  the  very 
 inquiry,  What  would  have  followed,  if  God  had  not  done  as  he 
 has?  may  have  in  it  some  very  great  impropriety;  and  ought 
 not  to  be  carried  on  any  farther,  than  is  necessary  to  help  our 
 partial  and  inadequate  conception  of  things. 
 
408 
 
 amend;  but  that  the  generality  grow  more  profli- 
 gate and  corrupt  with  age;  that  heathen  moralists 
 thought  the  present  state  to  be  a  state  of  punish- 
 ment; and,  what  might  be  added,  that  the  earth 
 our  habitation,  has  the  appearance  of  being  a  ruin ; 
 whoever,  I  say,  will  consider  all  these,  and  some 
 other  obvious  things,  will  think  he  has  little  reason 
 to  object  against  the  Scripture  account,  that  man- 
 kind is  in  a  state  of  degradation;  against  this  be- 
 ing the  fact :  how  difficult  soever  he  may  think  it 
 to  account  for,  or  even  to  form  a  distinct  concep- 
 tion of,  the  occasions  and  circumstances  of  it.  But 
 that  the  crime  of  our  first  parents  was  the  occasion 
 of  our  being  placed  in  a  more  disadvantageous  con- 
 dition, is  a  thing  throughout,  and  particularly  ana- 
 logous to  what  we  see,  in  the  daily  course  of  natu- 
 ral providence ;  as  the  recovery  of  the  world,  by  the 
 interposition  of  Christ,  has  been  shown  to  be  so  in 
 general. 
 
 VI.  The  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  in- 
 terposed in  the  redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office 
 as  Mediator,  in  the  largest  sense,  between  God  and 
 man,  is  thus  represented  to  us  in  the  Scripture: 
 "  He  is  the  light  of  the  world;"  the  revealer  of  the 
 will  of  God  in  the  most  eminent  sense :  he  is  a  pro- 
 pitiatory sacrifice;*  the  "Lamb  of  God;"  and  as 
 he  voluntarily  offered  himself  up,  he  is,  throughout 
 the  epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  styled  our  High-priest. 
 And,  which  seems  of  peculiar  weight,  he  is  de- 
 scribed beforehand,  in  the  Old  Testament,  under 
 
 *  Rom.   iii.    25.   and  v.    11.        1   Cor.    v.    7.       Ephes. 
 1  John  ii.  2.     Matth.  xxvi.  28. 
 
409 
 
 the  same  characters  of  a  priest,  and  an  expiatory 
 victim.*  And  whereas  it  is  objected,  that  all  this 
 is  merely  by  way  of  allusion  to  the  sacrifices  of  the 
 Mosaic  law,  the  apostle,  on  the  contrary,  affirms, 
 that  "  the  law  was  a  shadow  of  good  things  to 
 come,  and  not  the  very  image  of  the  things ;"  and 
 that  the  priests  that  offer  gifts  according  to  the  law — 
 serve  unto  the  example  and  shadow  of  heavenly 
 things,  as  Moses  was  admonished  of  God,  when 
 he  was  about  to  make  the  tabernacle.  "  For  see," 
 saith  he,  "  that  thou  make  all  things  according  to 
 the  pattern  showed  to  thee  in  the  mount;"  that  is, 
 the  Levitical  priesthood  was  a  shadow  of  the  priest- 
 hood of  Christ,  in  like  manner  as  the  tabernacle 
 made  by  Moses  was  according  to  that  showed  him 
 in  the  mount.  The  priesthood  of  Christ,  and  the 
 tabernacle  in  the  mount,  were  the  originals :  of  the 
 former  of  which,  the  Levitical  priesthood  was  a  type ; 
 and  of  the  latter,  the  tabernacle  made  by  Moses 
 was  a  copy.  The  doctrine  of  this  epistle,  then, 
 plainly  is,  that  the  legal  sacrifices  were  allusions  to 
 the  great  and  final  atonement  to  be  made  by  the 
 blood  of  Christ;  and  not  that  this  was  an  allusion 
 to  those.  Nor  can  any  thing  be  more  express  and 
 determinate,  than  the  following  passage :  "  It  is 
 not  possible  that  the  blood  of  bulls  and  of  goats 
 should  take  away  sin.  Wherefore,  when  he  cometh 
 into  the  world,  he  saith,  Sacrifice  and  offering." 
 that  is,  of  bulls  and  of  goats,  "  thou  wouldst  not,  but 
 a  body  hast  thou  prepared  me — Lo,  I  come  to  do 
 thy  will,  O  God. — By  which  will  we  are  sanctified, 
 
 *  Isa.  liii.     Dan.  ix.  24.     Psal.  ex.  4. 
 
 S  IT 
 
410 
 
 through  the  offering  of  the  body  of  Jesus  Christ 
 once  for  all."  And  to  add  one  passage  more  of 
 the  like  kind :  "  Christ  was  once  offered  to  bear 
 the  sins  of  many ;  and  unto  them  that  look  for  him 
 shall  he  appear  the  second  time,  without  sin;"  that  is, 
 without  bearing  sin,  as  he  did  at  his  first  coming, 
 by  being  an  offering  for  it ;  without  having  our 
 iniquities  again  laid  upon  him,  without  being  any 
 more  a  sin-offering :  "  Unto  them  that  look  for 
 him  shall  he  appear  the  second  time,  without  sin 
 unto  salvation."  Nor  do  the  inspired  writers  at  all 
 confine  themselves  to  this  manner  of  speaking  con- 
 cerning the  satisfaction  of  Christ,  but  declare  an 
 efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  suffered  for  us,  addi- 
 tional to,  and  beyond  mere  instruction,  example, 
 and  government,  in  great  variety  of  expression : 
 "  That  Jesus  should  die  for  that  nation,"  the  Jews; 
 "  and  not  for  that  nation  only,  but  that  also,"  plainly 
 by  the  efficacy  of  his  death,  u  he  should  gather 
 together  in  one  the  children  of  God  that  were 
 scattered  abroad :"  that  "  he  suffered  for  sins,  the 
 just  for  the  unjust :"  that  "  he  gave  his  life,  him- 
 self a  ransom  :"*  that  "  we  are  bought,  bought  with 
 a  price  :"f  that  "  he  redeemed  us  with  his  blood : 
 redeemed  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law,  being  made 
 -i  curse  for  us :"{  that  "  he  is  our  advocate,  inter- 
 cessor, and  propitiation  :"§  that  "  he  was  made  per- 
 fect (or  consummate)  through  sufferings ;  and  being 
 thus  made  perfect,  he  became  the  author  of  salva- 
 
 *  Matt.  xx.  28.     Mark  x.  45.      1  Tim.  ii.  6. 
 
 f  2  Pet.  ii.  1.     Rev.  xiv.  4.      1  Cor.  vi.  20. 
 
 %  1  Pet.  i.  19.     Rev.  v.  9.     Gal.  iii.  13. 
 
 §  Heb.  vii.  25.     1  John  ii.  1,  2. 
 
411 
 
 tion  :"*  that  "  God  was  in  Christ,  reconciHng  the 
 world  to  himself,  by  the  death  of  his  Son  by  the 
 cross ;  not  imputing  their  trespasses  unto  them  :"f 
 and,  lastly,  that  "  through  death  he  destroyed  him 
 that  had  the  power  of  death.":j:  Christ,  then, 
 having  thus  "  humbled  himself,  and  become  obe- 
 dient to  death,  even  the  death  of  the  cross,  God 
 also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name 
 which  is  above  every  name ;  hath  given  all  things 
 into  his  hands ;  hath  committed  all  judgment  unto 
 him ;  that  all  men  should  honour  the  Son,  even  as 
 they  honour  the  Father."§  For,  "  worthy  is  the 
 Lamb  that  was  slain,  to  receive  power,  and  riches, 
 and  wisdom,  and  strength,  and  honour,  and  glory, 
 and  blessing !  And  every  creature  which  is  in 
 heaven,  and  on  the  earth,  heard  I  saying,  Blessing, 
 and  honour,  and  glory,  and  power,  be  unto  him 
 that  sitteth  upon  the  throne,  and  unto  the  Lamb, 
 for  ever  and  ever  !" 
 
 These  passages  of  Scripture  seem  to  comprehend 
 and  express  the  chief  parts  of  Christ's  office,  as 
 mediator  between  God  and  man,  so  far,  I  mean,  as 
 the  nature  of  this  his  office  is  revealed;  and  it  is 
 usually  treated  of  by  divines  under  three  heads. 
 
 First,  He  was,  by  way  of  eminence,  the  Pro- 
 phet :  "  that  Prophet  that  should  come  into  the 
 world,"  to  declare  the  divine  will.  He  published 
 anew  the  law  of  nature  which  men  had  corrupted ; 
 
 *  Heb.  ii.  10.  v.  9. 
 
 t  2  Cor.  v.  19.     Rom.  v.  10.     Eph.  ii.  16. 
 %  Heb.  ii.  14.      See  also  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  book  of 
 Job,  xxxiii.  24. 
 
 §  Phil.  ii.  8,  9.     John  Hi.  35,  and  v.  22,  23. 
 
 S2 
 
412 
 
 and  the  very  knowledge  of  which,  to  some  degree, 
 was  lost  among  them.  He  taught  mankind,  taught 
 us  authoritatively,  to  "  live  soberly,  righteously, 
 and  godly,  in  this  present  world,"  in  expectation  of 
 the  future  judgment  of  God.  He  confirmed  the 
 truth  of  this  moral  system  of  nature,  and  gave  us 
 additional  evidence  of  it,  the  evidence  of  testimo- 
 ny.* He  distinctly  revealed  the  manner  in  which 
 God  would  be  worshipped,  the  efficacy  of  repent- 
 ance, and  the  rewards  and  punishments  of  a  future 
 life.  Thus  he  was  a  prophet,  in  a  sense  in  which 
 no  other  ever  was.  To  which  is  to  be  added,  that 
 he  set  us  a  perfect  "  example,  that  we  should  follow 
 his  steps." 
 
 Secondly,  He  has  a  "  kingdom,  which  is  not  of 
 this  world."  He  founded  a  church,  to  be  to  man- 
 kind a  standing  memorial  of  religion,  and  invitation 
 to  it;  which  lie  promised  to  be  with  always,  even 
 to  the  end.  He  exercises  an  invisible  government 
 over  it,  himself,  and  by  his  Spirit;  over  that  part 
 of  it  which  is  militant  here  on  earth,  a  government 
 of  discipline,  "  for  the  perfecting  of  the  saints,  for 
 the  edifying  his  body ;  till  we  all  come  in  the  unity 
 of  the  faith,  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son  of 
 God,  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the 
 stature  of  the  fulness  of  Christ."  Of  this  church, 
 all  persons  scattered  over  the  world,  who  live  in 
 obedience  to  his  laws,  are  members.  For  these  he 
 is  "gone  to  prepare  a  place,  and  will  come  again 
 to  receive  them  unto  himself,  that  where  he  is, 
 there  they  may  be  also;    and  reign  with  him  for 
 
 *  Page  340,  &c. 
 
413 
 
 ever  and  ever;"  and  likewise  "  to  take  vengeance 
 on  them  that  know  not  God,  and  obey  not  his  gos- 
 pel." 
 
 Against  these  parts  of  Christ's  office,  I  find  no 
 objections  bnt  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  begin- 
 ning of  this  chapter. 
 
 Lastly,  Christ  offered  himself  a  propitiatory  sa- 
 crifice, and  made  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the 
 world ;  which  is  mentioned  last,  in  regard  to  what 
 is  objected  against  it.  Sacrifices  of  expiation  were 
 commanded  the  Jews,  and  obtained  amongst  most 
 other  nations,  from  tradition,  whose  original  pro- 
 bably was  revelation.  And  they  were  continually 
 repeated,  both  occasionally,  and  at  the  returns  of 
 stated  times ;  and  made  up  great  part  of  the  exter- 
 nal religion  of  mankind.  "  But  now  once  in  the 
 end  of  the  world  Christ  appeared,  to  put  away  sin 
 by  the  sacrifice  of  himself."  And  this  sacrifice  was 
 in  the  highest  degree,  and  with  the  most  extensive 
 influence,  of  that  efficacy  for  obtaining  pardon  of 
 sin,  which  the  heathens  may  be  supposed  to  have 
 thought  their  sacrifices  to  have  been,  and  which  the 
 Jewish  sacrifices  really  were  in  some  degree,  and 
 with  regard  to  some  persons. 
 
 How,  and  in  what  particular  way,  it  had  this  ef- 
 ficacy, there  are  not  wanting  persons  who  have  en- 
 deavoured to  explain;  but  I  cannot  find  that  the 
 Scripture  has  explained  it.  We  seem  to  be  very 
 much  in  the  dark,  concerning  the  manner  in  which 
 the  ancients  understood  atonement  to  be  made,  that 
 is,  pardon  to  be  obtained  by  sacrifices.  And  if  the 
 Scripture  has,  as  surely  it  has,  left  this  matter  of* 
 satisfaction  of  Chri-t  mysterious,  left  somewhat 
 
414 
 
 in  it  unrevealed,  all  conjectures  about  it  must  be,  if 
 not  evidently  absurd,  yet  at  least  uncertain.  Nor 
 has  any  one  reason  to  complain  for  want  of  farther 
 information,  unless  he  can  show  his  claim  to  it. 
 
 Some  have  endeavoured  to  explain  the  efficacy  of 
 what  Christ  has  done  and  suffered  for  us,  beyond 
 what  the  Scripture  has  authorized;  others,  proba- 
 bly, because  they  could  not  explain  it,  have  been 
 for  taking  it  away,  and  confining  his  office  as  Re- 
 deemer of  the  world,  to  his  instruction,  example, 
 and  government  of  the  church ;  whereas,  the  doc- 
 trine of  the  gospel  appears  to  be,  not  only  that  he 
 taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but  rendered  it  ot 
 the  efficacy  which  it  is,  by  what  he  did  and  suffered 
 for  us :  that  he  obtained  for  us  the  benefit  of  hav- 
 ing our  repentance  accepted  unto  eternal  life:  not 
 only  that  he  revealed  to  sinners,  that  they  were  in 
 a  capacity  of  salvation,  and  how  they  might  obtain 
 it;  but,  moreover,  that  he  put  them  into  this  capa- 
 city of  salvation,  by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for 
 them ;  put  us  into  a  capacity  of  escaping  future  pun- 
 ishment, and  obtaining  future  happiness.  And  it  is 
 our  wisdom  thankfully  to  accept  the  benefit,  by  per- 
 forming the  conditions  upon  which  it  is  offered  on 
 our  part,  without  disputing  how  it  was  procured  on 
 his.      For, 
 
 VII.  Since  we  neither  know  by  what  means  pun- 
 ishment in  a  future  state  would  have  followed  wicked- 
 ness in  this  ;  nor  in  what  manner  it  would  have  been 
 inflicted,  had  it  not  been  prevented ;  nor  all  the  rea- 
 sons why  its  infliction  would  have  been  needful ;  nor 
 the  particular  nature  of  that  state  of  happiness  which 
 Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples ;  and  since 
 
415 
 
 we  are  ignorant  how  far  any  thing  we  could  do,  would, 
 alone  and  of  itself,  have  been  effectual  to  prevent 
 that  punishment  to  which  we  were  obnoxious,  and 
 recover  that  happiness  which  we  had  forfeited;  it  is 
 most  evident  we  are  not  judges,  antecedently  to  re- 
 velation, whether  a  mediator  was  or  was  not  neces- 
 sary to  obtain  those  ends;  to  prevent  that  future 
 punishment,  and  bring  mankind  to  the  final  happi- 
 ness of  their  nature.  And  for  the  very  same  rea- 
 sons, upon  supposition  of  the  necessity  of  a  media- 
 tor, we  are  no  more  judges,  antecedently  to  revela- 
 tion, of  the  whole  nature  of  his  office,  or  the  several 
 parts  of  which  it  consists :  of  what  was  fit  and  re- 
 quisite to  be  assigned  him,  in  order  to  accomplish 
 the  ends  of  divine  Providence  in  the  appointment. 
 And  from  hence  it  follows,  that  to  object  against  the 
 expediency  or  usefulness  of  particular  things  revealed 
 to  have  been  done  or  suffered  by  him,  because  we 
 do  not  see  how  they  were  conducive  to  those  ends, 
 is  highly  absurd.  Yet  nothing  is  more  common  to 
 be  met  with  than  this  absurdity.  But  if  it  be  ac- 
 knowledged beforehand,  that  we  are  not  judges  in 
 the  case,  it  is  evident  that  no  objection  can,  with  any 
 shadow  of  reason,  be  urged  against  any  particular 
 part  of  Christ's  mediatorial  office  revealed  in  Scrip- 
 ture, till  it  can  be  shown  positively,  not  to  be  requi- 
 site, or  conducive,  to  the  ends  proposed  to  be  accom- 
 plished ;  or  that  it  is  in  itself  unreasonable. 
 
 And  there  is  one  objection  made  against  the  satis- 
 faction of  Christ,  which  looks  to  be  of  this  positive 
 kind :  that  the  doctrine  of  his  being  appointed  to 
 suffer  for  the  sins  of  the  world,  represents  God  as  be- 
 ing indifferent  whether  he  punished  the  innocent  or 
 
416 
 
 the  guilty.  Now,  from  the  foregoing  observations, 
 we  may  see  the  extreme  slightness  of  all  such  ob- 
 jections and  (though  it  is  most  certain  all  who  make 
 them  do  not  see  the  consequence)  that  they  conclude 
 altogether  as  much  against  God's  whole  original  con- 
 stitution of  nature,  and  whole  daily  course  of  divine 
 Providence,  in  the  government  of  the  world,  that  is, 
 against  the  whole  scheme  of  theism  and  the  whole 
 notion  of  religion,  as  against  Christianity.  For  the 
 world  is  a  constitution,  or  system,  whose  parts  have 
 a  mutual  reference  to  each  other;  and  there  is  a 
 scheme  of  things  gradually  carrying  on,  called  the 
 course  of  nature,  to  the  carrying  on  of  which  God 
 has  appointed  us,  in  various  ways  to  contribute. 
 And  when,  in  the  daily  course  of  natural  providence, 
 it  is  appointed  that  innocent  people  should  suffer  for 
 the  faults  of  the  guilty,  this  is  liable  to  the  very 
 same  objection  as  the  instance  we  are  now  consider- 
 ing. The  infinitely  greater  importance  of  that  ap- 
 pointment of  Christianity  which  is  objected  against, 
 does  not  hinder  but  it  may  be,  as  it  plainly  is,  an  ap- 
 pointment of  the  very  same  kind  with  what  the  world 
 affords  us  daily  examples  of.  Nay,  if  there  were  any 
 force  at  all  in  the  objection,  it  would  be  stronger,  in 
 one  respect,  against  natural  providence,  than  against 
 Christianity;  because  under  the  former,  we  are  in 
 many  cases  commanded,  and  even  necessitated,  whe- 
 ther we  will  or  not,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  others; 
 whereas  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  voluntary. 
 The  world's  being  under  the  righteous  government 
 of  God,  does,  indeed,  imply,  that  finally,  and  upon 
 the  whole,  every  one  shall  receive  according  to  his 
 personal  deserts :    and  the  general  doctrine  of  the 
 
417 
 
 whole  Scripture  is,  that  this  shall  be  the  completion 
 of  the  divine  government.      But,  during  the  pro- 
 gress, and,  for  aught  we  know,  even  in  order  to  the 
 completion  of  this  moral  scheme,  vicarious  punish- 
 ments may  be  fit,  and  absolutely  necessary.     Men, 
 bv  their  follies,  run  themselves  into  extreme  distress; 
 into  difficulties  which  would  be  absolutely  fatal  to 
 them,  were  it  not  for  the  interposition  and  assistance 
 of  others.      God  commands  by  the  law  of  nature  that 
 we  afford  them  this  assistance,  in  manv  cases  where 
 we  cannot  do  it  without  very  great  pains,  and  labour, 
 and  sufferings  to  ourselves.     And  we  see  in  what 
 variety  of  ways  one  person's  sufferings  contribute  to 
 the  relief  of  another ;  and  how,  or  by  what  particular 
 means,  this  comes  to  pass,  or  follows,  from  the  con- 
 stitution and  laws  of  nature,  which  come  under  our 
 notice :    and  being  familiarized  to  it,  men  are  not 
 shocked  with  it.      So  that  the  reason  of  their  insist- 
 ing upon  objections  of  the  foregoing  kind,  against 
 the  satisfaction  of  Christ,  is  either  that  they  do  not 
 consider  God's  settled  and  uniform  appointments  as 
 his  appointments  at  all,  or  else  they  forget  that  vica- 
 rious punishment  is  a  providential   appointment  of 
 every  day's  experience :    and  then,  from  their  being 
 unacquainted  with  the  more  general  laws  of  nature, 
 or  divine  government  over  the  world,  and  not  seeing 
 how  the  sufferings  of  Christ  could  contribute  to  the 
 redemption  of  it,  unless  by  arbitrary  and  tyrannical 
 will,  they  conclude  his  sufferings  could  not  contri- 
 bute to  it  any  other  way.     And  yet,  what  has  been 
 often  alleged  in  justification  of  this  doctrine,  even 
 from  the  apparent  natural  tendency  of  this  method 
 of  our   redemption — its   tendency  to  vindicate   the 
 s3 
 
418 
 
 authority  of  God's  laws,  and  deter  his  creatures  from 
 sin;  this  has  never  yet  been  answered,  and  is,  I 
 think,  plainly  unanswerable :  though  I  am  far  from 
 thinking  it  an  account  of  the  whole  of  the  case. 
 But  without  taking  this  into  consideration,  it  abun- 
 dantly appears,  from  the  observations  above  made, 
 that  this  objection  is  not  an  objection  against  Chris- 
 tianity, but  against  the  whole  general  constitution  of 
 nature.  And  if  it  were  to  be  considered  as  an  ob- 
 jection against  Christianity,  or,  considering  it  as  it 
 is,  an  objection  against  the  constitution  of  nature,  it 
 amounts  to  no  more  in  conclusion  than  this,  That  a 
 divine  appointment  cannot  be  necessary,  or  expedient, 
 because  the  objector  does  not  discern  it  to  be  so; 
 though  he  must  own  that  the  nature  of  the  case  is 
 such,  as  renders  him  incapable  of  judging  whether  it 
 be  so  or  not ;  or  of  seeing  it  to  be  necessary,  though 
 it  were  so. 
 
 It  is,  indeed,  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reason- 
 able men,  to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner, 
 objecting  against  the  credibility  of  such  particular 
 things  revealed  in  Scripture,  that  they  do  not  see 
 the  necessity  or  expediency  of  them.  For,  though 
 it  is  highly  right,  and  the  most  pious  exercise  of  our 
 understanding,  to  inquire  with  due  reverence  into 
 the  ends  and  reasons  of  God's  dispensations;  yet, 
 when  those  reasons  are  concealed,  to  argue  from 
 our  ignorance,  that  such  dispensations  cannot  be 
 from  God,  is  infinitely  absurd.  The  presumption  of 
 this  kind  of  objections  seems  almost  lost  in  the  folly 
 of  them.  And  the  folly  of  them  is  yet  greater, 
 when  they  are  urged,  as  usually  they  are,  against 
 tilings   in  Christianity  analogous,  or  like   to  those 
 
419 
 
 natural  dispensations  of  Providence,  which  are  mat- 
 ter of  experience.  Let  reason  be  kept  to ;  and,  it* 
 any  part  of  the  Scripture  account  of  the  redemption 
 of  the  world  by  Christ,  can  be  shown  to  be  really 
 contrary  to  it,  let  the  Scripture,  in  the  name  of 
 God,  be  given  up :  but  let  not  such  poor  creatures 
 as  we  go  on  objecting  against  an  infinite  scheme, 
 that  we  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  usefulness  of  all 
 its  parts,  and  call  this  reasoning;  and,  which  still 
 farther  heightens  the  absurdity  in  the  present  case, 
 parts  which  we  are  not  actively  concerned  in.  For, 
 it  may  be  worth  mentioning, 
 
 Lastly,  That  not  only  the  reason  of  the  thing, 
 but  the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  should  teach  us, 
 not  to  expect  to  have  the  like  information  concern- 
 ing the  divine  conduct,  as  concerning  our  own  duty. 
 God  instructs  us  by  experience,  (for  it  is  not  rea- 
 son, but  experience,  which  instructs  us,)  what  good 
 or  bad  consequences  will  follow  from  our  acting  in 
 such  and  such  manners;  and  by  this  he  directs  us 
 how  we  are  to  behave  ourselves.  But,  though  we 
 are  sufficiently  instructed  for  the  common  purposes 
 of  life,  yet  it  is  but  an  almost  infinitely  small  part  of 
 natural  providence  which  we  are  at  all  let  into. 
 The  case  is  the  same  with  regard  to  revelation. 
 The  doctrine  of  a  Mediator  between  God  and  man, 
 against  which  it  is  objected,  that  the  expediency  of 
 some  things  in  it  is  not  understood,  relates  only  to 
 what  was  done  on  God's  part  in  the  appointment, 
 and  on  the  Mediator's  in  the  execution  of  it.  For 
 what  is  required  of  us,  in  consequence  of  this  gra- 
 cious dispensation,  is  another  subject,  in  which  none 
 
420 
 
 can  complain  for  want  of  information.  The  consti- 
 tution of  the  world,  and  God's  natural  government 
 over  it,  is  all  mystery,  as  much  as  the  Christian 
 dispensation.  Yet,  under  the  first,  he  has  given  men 
 all  things  pertaining  to  life;  and  under  the  other, 
 all  things  pertaining  unto  godliness.  And,  it  may 
 be  added,  that  there  is  nothing  hard  to  be  account- 
 ed for,  in  any  of  the  common  precepts  of  Christi- 
 anity ;  though,  if  there  were,  surely  a  Divine  com- 
 mand is  abundantly  sufficient  to  lay  us  under  the 
 strongest  obligations  to  obedience.  But  the  fact  is, 
 that  the  reasons  of  all  the  Christian  precepts  are 
 evident.  Positive  institutions  are  manifestly  neces- 
 sary to  keep  up  and  propagate  religion  amongst 
 mankind.  And  our  duty  to  Christ,  the  internal 
 and  external  worship  of  him,  this  part  of  the  reli- 
 gion of  the  gospel  manifestly  arises  out  of  what  he 
 has  done  and  suffered,  his  authority  and  dominion, 
 and  the  relation  which  he  is  revealed  to  stand  in 
 to  us.* 
 
 *  Page  275,  &c. 
 
421 
 
 CHAP.  VI. 
 
 Of  the  Want  of  Universality  in  Revelation  ;   and 
 of  the  supposed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it. 
 
 It  has  been  thought  by  some  persons,  that  if 
 the  evidence  of  revelation  appears  doubtful,  this  it- 
 self turns  into  a  positive  argument  against  it;  be- 
 cause it  cannot  be  supposed,  that,  if  it  were  true, 
 it  would  be  left  to  subsist  upon  doubtful  evidence. 
 And  the  objection  against  revelation,  from  its  not 
 being  universal,  is  often  insisted  upon,  as  of  great 
 weight. 
 
 Now,  the  weakness  of  these  opinions  may  be 
 shown,  by  observing  the  suppositions  on  which  they 
 are  founded,  which  are  really  such  as  these : — that 
 it  cannot  be  thought  God  would  have  bestowed  any 
 favour  at  all  upon  us,  unless  in  the  degree  which 
 we  think  he  might,  and  which,  we  imagine,  would 
 be  most  to  our  particular  advantage ;  and  also,  that 
 it  cannot  be  thought  he  would  bestow  a  favour  upon 
 any,  unless  he  bestowed  the  same  upon  all :  suppo- 
 sitions which  we  find  contradicted,  not  by  a  few  in- 
 stances in  God's  natural  government  of  the  world, 
 but  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature  together. 
 
 Persons  who  speak  of  the  evidence  of  religion  as 
 doubtful,  and  of  this  supposed  doubtfulness  as  a 
 positive  argument  against  it,  should  be  put  upon 
 considering,  what  that  evidence  indeed  is,  which 
 they  act  upon  with  regard  to  their  temporal  inter- 
 ests.     For,  it  is  not  only  extremely  difficult,  but, 
 
422 
 
 in  many  cases,  absolutely  impossible,  to  balance 
 pleasure  and  pain,  satisfaction  and  uneasiness,  so  as 
 to  be  able  to  say  on  which  side  the  overplus  is. 
 There  are  the  like  difficulties  and  impossibilities,  in 
 making  the  due  allowances  for  a  change  of  temper 
 and  taste,  for  satiety,  disgust,  ill  health;  any  of 
 which  render  men  incapable  of  enjoying,  after  they 
 have  obtained,  what  they  most  eagerly  desired. 
 Numberless,  too,  are  the  accidents,  besides  that  one 
 of  untimely  death,  which  may  even  probably  disap- 
 point the  best  concerted  schemes;  and  strong  ob- 
 jections are  often  seen  to  lie  against  them,  not  to 
 be  removed  or  answered,  but  which  seem  overbal- 
 anced by  reason  on  the  other  side;  so  as  that  the 
 certain  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the  pursuit  are, 
 by  every  one,  thought  justly  disregarded,  upon  ac- 
 count of  the  appearing  greater  advantages  in  case  of 
 success,  though  there  be  but  little  probability  of  it. 
 Lastly,  Every  one  observes  our  liableness,  if  we  be 
 not  upon  our  guard,  to  be  deceived  by  the  false- 
 hood of  men,  and  the  false  appearances  of  things; 
 and  this  danger  must  be  greatly  increased,  if  there 
 be  a  strong  bias  within,  suppose  from  indulged  pas- 
 sion, to  favour  the  deceit.  Hence  arises  that  great 
 uncertainty  and  doubtfulness  of  proof,  wherein  our 
 temporal  interest  really  consists ;  what  are  the  most 
 probable  means  of  attaining  it ;  and  whether  those 
 means  will  eventually  be  successful.  And  number- 
 less instances  there  are,  in  the  daily  course  of  life, 
 in  which  all  men  think  it  reasonable  to  engage  in 
 pursuits,  though  the  probability  is  greatly  against 
 succeeding;  and  to  make  such  provision  for  them- 
 selves, as  it  is  supposable  they  may  have  occasion 
 
423 
 
 for,  though  the  plain  acknowledged  probability  is, 
 that  they  never  shall.  Then  those  who  think  the 
 objection  against  revelation,  from  its  light  not  being 
 universal,  to  be  of  weight,  should  observe,  that  the 
 Author  of  nature,  in  numberless  instances,  bestows 
 that  upon  some,  which  he  does  not  upon  others, 
 who  seem  equally  to  stand  in  need  of  it.  Indeed, 
 he  appears  to  bestow  all  his  gifts,  with  the  most  pro- 
 miscuous variety,  among  creatures  of  the  same  spe- 
 cies :  health  and  strength,  capacities  of  prudence 
 and  of  knowledge,  means  of  improvement,  riches, 
 and  all  external  advantages.  And  as  there  are  not 
 any  two  men  found  of  exactly  like  shape  and  fea- 
 tures, so,  it  is  probable,  there  are  not  any  two  of 
 an  exactly  like  constitution,  temper,  and  situation, 
 with  regard  to  the  goods  and  evils  of  life.  Yet, 
 notwithstanding  these  uncertainties  and  varieties, 
 God  does  exercise  a  natural  government  over  the 
 world ;  and  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  prudent  and 
 imprudent  institution  of  life,  with  regard  to  our 
 health  and  our  affairs,  under  that  his  natural  govern- 
 ment. 
 
 As  neither  the  Jewish  nor  Christian  revelation 
 have  been  universal,  and  as  they  have  been  afforded  to 
 a  greater  or  less  part  of  the  world,  at  different  times, 
 so,  likewise  at  different  times,  both  revelations  have 
 had  different  degrees  of  evidence.  The  Jews  who 
 lived  during  the  succession  of  prophets,  that  is,  from 
 Moses  till  after  the  Captivity,  had  higher  evidence 
 of  the  truth  of  their  religion,  than  those  had  who 
 lived  in  the  interval  between  the  last-mentioned  pe- 
 riod and  the  coming  of  Christ.  And  the  first  Chris- 
 tians had  higher  evidence  of  the  miracles  wrought  in 
 
424 
 
 attestation  of  Christianity  than  what  we  have  now. 
 They  had  also  a  strong  presumptive  proof  of  the  truth 
 of  it,  perhaps  of  much  greater  force  in  way  of  argu- 
 ment, than  many  think,  of  which  we  have  very  little 
 remaining;  I  mean,  the  presumptive  proof  of  its  truth, 
 from  the  influence  which  it  had  upon  the  lives  of  the 
 generality  of  its  professors.  And  we,  or  future  ages, 
 may  possibly  have  a  proof  of  it,  which  they  could  not 
 have,  from  the  conformity  between  the  prophetic  his- 
 tory, and  the  state  of  the  world,  and  of  Christianity. 
 And  farther:  if  we  were  to  suppose  the  evidence  which 
 some  have  of  religion,  to  amount  to  little  more  than 
 seeing  that  it  may  be  true,  but  that  they  remain  in 
 great  doubts  and  uncertainties  about  both  its  evidence 
 and  its  nature,  and  great  perplexities  concerning  the 
 rule  of  life ;  others  to  have  a  full  conviction  of  the 
 truth  of  religion,  with  a  distinct  knowledge  of  their 
 duty ;  and  others  severally  to  have  all  the  interme- 
 diate decrees  of  religious  light  and  evidence,  which 
 lie  between  these  two. — If  we  put  the  case,  that  for 
 the  present  it  was  intended  revelation  should  be  no 
 more  than  a  small  light,  in  the  midst  of  a  world 
 greatly  overspread,  notwithstanding  it,  with  igno- 
 rance and  darkness;  that  certain  glimmerings  of  this 
 light  should  extend,  and  be  directed,  to  remote  dis- 
 tances, in  such  a  manner  as  that  those  who  really 
 partook  of  it  should  not  discern  from  whence  it  ori- 
 ginally came ;  that  some,  in  a  nearer  situation  to  it, 
 should  have  its  light  obscured,  and,  in  different  ways 
 and  degrees,  intercepted ;  and  that  others  should  be 
 placed  within  its  clearer  influence,  and  be  much  more 
 enlivened,  cheered,  and  directed  by  it ;  but  yet,  that 
 even  to  these  it  should  be  no  more  than  "  a  light 
 
425 
 
 shining  in  a  dark  place :"  all  this  would  be  perfectly 
 uniform,  and  of  a  piece  with  the  conduct  of  Provi- 
 dence, in  the  distribution  of  its  other  blessings.  If 
 the  fact  of  the  case  really  were,  that  some  have  re- 
 ceived no  light  at  all  from  the  Scripture;  as  many 
 ages  and  countries  in  the  heathen  world:  that  others, 
 though  they  have,  by  means  of  it,  had  essential  or 
 natural  religion  enforced  upon  their  consciences,  yet 
 have  never  had  the  genuine  Scripture  revelation, 
 with  its  real  evidence,  proposed  to  their  considera- 
 tion ;  and  the  ancient  Persians  and  modern  Maho- 
 metans may  possibly  be  instances  of  people  in  a  si- 
 tuation somewhat  like  to  this :  that  others,  though 
 they  have  had  the  Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of 
 divine  revelation,  yet  have  had  it  with  the  system 
 and  evidence  of  Christianity  so  interpolated,  the 
 system  so  corrupted,  the  evidence  so  blended  with 
 false  miracles,  as  to  leave  the  mind  in  the  utmost 
 doubtfulness  and  uncertainty  about  the  whole; 
 which  may  be  the  state  of  some  thoughtful  men  in 
 most  of  those  nations  who  call  themselves  Christian : 
 and,  lastly,  that  others  have  had  Christianity  offered 
 to  them  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  and  with  its  proper 
 evidence,  as  persons  in  countries  and  churches  of  civil 
 and  of  Christian  liberty;  but,  however,  that  even 
 these  persons  are  left  in  great  ignorance  in  many 
 respects,  and  have  by  no  means  light  afforded  them 
 enough  to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  but  only  to  regu- 
 late their  life,  to  teach  them  their  duty,  and  en- 
 courage them  in  the  careful  discharge  of  it :  I  say, 
 if  we  were  to  suppose  this  somewhat  of  a  gene- 
 ral true  account  of  the  degrees  of  moral  and  reli- 
 gious light  and  evidence,   which  were  intended  to 
 
426 
 
 be  afforded  mankind,  and  of  what  has  actually  been 
 and  is  their  situation  in  their  moral  and  religious  ca- 
 pacity, there  would  be  nothing  in  all  this  ignorance, 
 doubtfulness,  and  uncertainty,  in  all  these  varieties 
 and  supposed  disadvantages  of  some  in  comparison  of 
 others,  respecting  religion,  but  may  be  paralleled  by 
 manifest  analogies  in  the  natural  dispensations  of 
 Providence  at  present,  and  considering  ourselves 
 merely  in  our  temporal  capacity. 
 
 Nor  is  there  any  thing  shocking  in  all  this,  or 
 which  would  seem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  ad- 
 ministration in  nature,  if  we  would  really  keep  in 
 mind,  that  every  one  shall  be  dealt  equitably  with ; 
 instead  of  forgetting  this,  or  explaining  it  away,  af- 
 ter it  is  acknowledged  in  words.  All  shadow  of  in- 
 justice, and  indeed  all  harsh  appearances,  in  this  va- 
 rious economy  of  Providence,  would  be  lost,  if  we 
 would  keep  in  mind,  that  every  merciful  allowance 
 shall  be  made,  and  no  more  be  required  of  any  one, 
 than  what  might  have  been  equitably  expected  of 
 him,  from  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed; 
 and  not  what  might  have  been  expected,  had  he  been 
 placed  in  other  circumstances;  that  is,  in  Scripture 
 language,  that  every  man  shall  be  accepted  "  accord- 
 ing to  what  he  hath,  not  according  to  what  he  hath 
 not."  This  however,  doth  not  by  any  means  im- 
 ply, that  all  persons'  condition  here  is  equally  advan- 
 tageous with  respect  to  futurity.  And  Providence 
 designing  to  place  some  in  greater  darkness  with  re- 
 spect to  religious  knowledge,  is  no  more  a  reason 
 why  they  should  not  endeavour  to  get  out  of  that 
 darkness,  and  others  to  bring  them  out  of  it,  than 
 why  ignorant  and  slow  people,  in  matters  of  other 
 
427 
 
 knowledge,  should  not  endeavour  to  learn,  or  should 
 not  be  instructed. 
 
 It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  the  same 
 wise  and  good  principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  dis- 
 posed the  Author  of  nature  to  make  different  kinds 
 and  orders  of  creatures,  disposed  him  also  to  place 
 creatures  of  like  kinds  in  different  situations ;  and 
 that  the  same  principle  which  disposed  him  to  make 
 creatures  of  different  moral  capacities,  disposed  him 
 also  to  place  creatures  of  like  moral  capacities  in  dif- 
 ferent religious  situations :  and  even  the  same  crea- 
 tures, in  different  periods  of  their  being.  And  the  ac- 
 count or  reason  of  this,  is  also  most  probably  the  ac- 
 count, why  the  constitution  of  things  is  such,  as  that 
 creatures  of  moral  natures  or  capacities,  for  a  consider- 
 able part  of  that  duration  in  which  they  are  living 
 agents,  are  not  at  all  subjects  of  morality  and  religion; 
 but  grow  up  to  be  so,  and  grow  up  to  be  so  more 
 and  more,  gradually  from  childhood  to  mature  age. 
 
 What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  reason  of 
 these  things,  we  must  be  greatly  in  the  dark,  were 
 it  only  that  we  know  so  very  little  even  of  our  own 
 case.  Our  present  state  may  possibly  be  the  con- 
 sequence of  somewhat  past,  which  we  are  wholly  ig- 
 norant of;  as  it  has  a  reference  to  somewhat  to 
 come,  of  which  we  know  scarce  any  more  than  is 
 necessary  for  practice.  A  system  or  constitution, 
 in  its  notion,  implies  variety :  and  so  complicated  an 
 one  as  this  world,  very  great  variety.  So  that  were 
 revelation  universal,  yet  from  men's  different  capa- 
 cities of  understanding,  from  the  different  lengths 
 of  their  lives,  their  different  educations,  and  other 
 external  circumstances,  and  from  their  difference  of 
 
428 
 
 temper  and  bodily  constitution;  their  religious  situa- 
 tions would  be  widely  different,  and  the  disadvantage 
 of  some  in  comparison  of  others,  perhaps,  altogether 
 as  much  as  at  present.  And  the  true  account, 
 whatever  it  be,  why  mankind,  or  such  a  part  of  man- 
 kind, are  placed  in  this  condition  of  ignorance,  must 
 be  supposed  also  the  true  account  of  our  farther  ig- 
 norance, in  not  knowing  the  reasons  why,  or  whence 
 it  is,  that  they  are  placed  in  this  condition.  But 
 the  following  practical  reflections  may  deserve  the 
 serious  consideration  of  those  persons,  who  think  the 
 circumstances  of  mankind,  or  their  own,  in  the  fore- 
 mentioned  respects,  a  ground  of  complaint. 
 
 First,  The  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  ob- 
 vious, may  constitute  one  particular  part  of  some 
 men's  trial  in  the  religious  sense :  as  it  gives  scope 
 for  a  virtuous  exercise,  or  vicious  neglect,  of  their 
 understanding,  in  examining  or  not  examining  into 
 that  evidence.  There  seems  no  possible  reason  to  be 
 given,  why  we  may  not  be  in  a  state  of  moral  pro- 
 bation, with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  our  under- 
 standing upon  the  subject  of  religion,  as  we  are 
 with  regard  to  our  behaviour  in  common  affairs. 
 The  former  is  as  much  a  thing  within  our  power  and 
 choice  as  the  latter.  And  I  suppose  it  is  to  be  laid 
 down  for  certain,  that  the  same  character,  the  same 
 inward  principle,  which,  after  a  man  is  convinced  of 
 the  truth  of  religion,  renders  him  obedient  to  the 
 precepts  of  it,  would,  were  he  not  thus  convinced, 
 set  him  about  an  examination  of  it,  upon  its  system 
 and  evidence  being  offered  to  his  thoughts;  and  that 
 in  the  latter  state,  his  examination  would  be  with  an 
 impartiality,  seriousness,  and  solicitude,  proportion- 
 
429 
 
 able  to  what  his  obedience  is  in  the  former.  And  as 
 inattention,  negligence,  want  of  all  serious  concern, 
 about  a  matter  of  such  a  nature  and  such  importance, 
 when  offered  to  men's  consideration,  is,  before  a  dis- 
 tinct conviction  of  its  truth,  as  real  immoral  depra- 
 vity and  dissoluteness,  as  neglect  of  religious  prac- 
 tice after  such  conviction:  so  active  solicitude  about 
 it,  and  fair  impartial  consideration  of  its  evidence 
 before  such  conviction,  is  as  really  an  exercise  of  a 
 morally  right  temper,  as  is  religious  practice  after. 
 Thus,  that  religion  is  not  intuitively  true,  but  a  mat- 
 ter of  deduction  and  inference ;  that  a  conviction  of 
 its  truth  is  not  forced  upon  every  one,  but  left  to  be, 
 by  some,  collected  with  heedful  attention  to  premi- 
 ses :  this  as  much  constitutes  religious  probation,  as 
 much  affords  sphere,  scope,  opportunity,  for  right 
 and  wrong  behaviour,  as  any  thing  whatever  does. 
 And  their  manner  of  treating  this  subject,  when 
 laid  before  them,  shows  what  is  in  their  heart,  and 
 is  an  exertion  of  it. 
 
 Secondly,  It  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident, 
 though  it  is  not  so  much  attended  to,  that  if,  upon 
 consideration  of  religion,  the  evidence  of  it  should 
 seem  to  any  persons  doubtful,  in  the  highest  sup- 
 posable  degree,  even  this  doubtful  evidence  will, 
 however,  put  them  into  a  general  siaie  of  probation, 
 in  the  moral  and  religious  sense.  For,  suppose  a  man 
 to  be  really  in  doubt,  whether  such  a  person  had  not 
 done  him  the  greatest  favour;  or,  whether  his  whole 
 temporal  interest  did  not  depend  upon  that  person; 
 no  one,  who  had  any  sense  of  gratitude  and  of  pru- 
 dence, could  possibly  consider  himself  in  the  same 
 situation,  with  regard  to  such  person,  as  if  he  had 
 
430 
 
 no  such  doubt.  In  truth,  it  is  as  just  to  say,  that 
 certainty  and  doubt  are  the  same,  as  to  say,  the  si- 
 tuations now  mentioned  would  leave  a  man  as  en- 
 tirely at  liberty,  in  point  of  gratitude  or  prudence, 
 as  he  would  be,  were  he  certain  he  had  received  no 
 favour  from  such  person,  or  that  he  no  way  depend- 
 ed upon  him.  And  thus,  though  the  evidence  of 
 religion  which  is  afforded  to  some  men,  should  be 
 little  more  than  that  they  are  given  to  see  the  sys- 
 tem of  Christianity,  or  religion  in  general,  to  be 
 supposable  and  credible,  this  ought  in  all  reason  to 
 beget  a  serious  practical  apprehension  that  it  may  be 
 true.  And  even  this  will  afford  matter  of  exercise, 
 for  religious  suspense  and  deliberation,  for  moral  re- 
 solution and  self-government ;  because  the  appre- 
 hension that  religion  may  be  true,  does  as  really  lay 
 men  under  obligations,  as  a  full  conviction  that  it  is 
 tine.  It  gives  occasion  and  motives  to  consider 
 farther  the  important  subject;  to  preserve  attentively 
 upon  their  minds  a  general  implicit  sense  that  they 
 may  be  under  divine  moral  government,  an  awful  so- 
 licitude about  religion,  whether  natural  or  revealed. 
 Such  apprehension  ought  to  turn  men's  eyes  to  ev- 
 ery degree  of  new  light  which  may  be  had,  from 
 whatever  side  it  comes,  and  induce  them  to  refrain, 
 in  the  mean  time,  from  all  immoralities,  and  live  in 
 the  conscientious  practice  of  every  common  virtue. 
 Especially  are  they  bound  to  keep  at  the  greatest  dis- 
 tance from  all  dissolute  profaneness;  for  this  the 
 very  nature  of  the  case  forbids ;  and  to  treat  with 
 highest  reverence  a  matter  upon  which  their  own 
 whole  interest  and  being,  and  the  fate  of  nature  de- 
 pends.    This  behaviour,  and  an  active  endeavour  to 
 
431 
 
 maintain  within  themselves  this  temper,  is  the  busi- 
 ness, the  duty,  and  the  wisdom  of  those  persons, 
 who  complain  of  the  doubtfulness  of  religion;  is 
 what  they  are  under  the  most  proper  obligations  to : 
 And  such  behaviour  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  ten- 
 dency to  improve  in  them,  that  character,  which  the 
 practice  of  all  the  several  duties  of  religion,  from  a 
 full  conviction  of  its  truth,  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has 
 a  tendency  to  improve  in  others;  others,  I  say,  to 
 whom  God  has  afforded  such  conviction.  Nay,  con- 
 sidering the  infinite  importance  of  religion,  revealed 
 as  well  as  natural,  I  think  it  may  be  said  in  general, 
 that  whoever  will  weigh  the  matter  thoroughly,  may 
 see  there  is  not  near  so  much  difference,  as  is  com- 
 monly imagined,  between  what  ought  in  reason  to 
 be  the  rule  of  life,  to  those  persons  who  are  fully 
 convinced  of  its  truth,  and  to  those  who  have  only 
 a  serious  doubting  apprehension  that  it  may  be  true. 
 Their  hopes,  and  fears,  and  obligations,  will  be  in 
 various  degrees;  but,  as  the  subject-matter  of  their 
 hopes  and  fears  is  the  same,  so  the  subject-matter 
 of  their  obligations,  what  they  are  bound  to  do  and 
 to  refrain  from,  is  not  so  very  unlike. 
 
 It  is  to  be  observed  farther,  that,  from  a  charac- 
 ter of  understanding,  or  a  situation  of  influence  in 
 the  world,  some  persons  have  it  in  their  power  to  do 
 infinitely  more  harm  or  good,  by  setting  an  example 
 of  profaneness  and  avowed  disregard  to  all  religion  ; 
 or,  on  the  contrary,  of  a  serious,  though  perhaps 
 doubting,  apprehension  of  its  truth,  and  of  a  rever- 
 end regard  to  it  under  this  doubtfulness,  than  they 
 can  do  by  acting  well  or  ill  in  all  the  common  inter- 
 courses amongst  mankind;    and  consequently  they 
 
432 
 
 are  most  highly  accountable  for  a  behaviour,  which, 
 they  may  easily  foresee,  is  of  such  importance,  and 
 in  which  there  is  most  plainly  a  right  and  a  wrong ; 
 even  admitting  the  evidence  of  religion  to  be  as 
 doubtful  as  is  pretended. 
 
 The  ground  of  these  observations,  and  that  which 
 renders  them  just  and  true,  is,  that  doubting  neces- 
 sarily implies  some  degree  of  evidence  for  that  of 
 which  we  doubt.  For  no  person  would  be  in  doubt 
 concerning  the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts  so  and  so 
 circumstanced,  which  should  accidentally  come  into 
 his  thoughts,  and  of  which  he  had  no  evidence  at 
 all.  And  though  in  the  case  of  an  even  chance,  and 
 where  consequently  we  were  in  doubt,  we  should  in 
 common  language  say,  that  we  had  no  evidence  at 
 all  for  either  side;  yet  that  situation  of  things,  which 
 renders  it  an  even  chance  and  no  more,  that  such  an 
 event  will  happen,  renders  this  case  equivalent  to  all 
 others,  where  there  is  such  evidence  on  both  sides 
 of  a  question,*  as  leaves  the  mind  in  doubt  concern- 
 ing the  truth.  Indeed,  in  all  these  cases,  there 
 is  no  more  evidence  on  the  one  side  than  on  the 
 other;  but  there  is  (what  is  equivalent  to)  much 
 more  for  either,  than  for  the  truth  of  a  number  of 
 facts  which  come  into  one's  thoughts  at  random. 
 And  thus,  in  all  these  cases,  doubt  as  much  presup- 
 poses evidence,  lower  degrees  of  evidence,  as  belief 
 presupposes  higher,  and  certainty  higher  still.  Any 
 one,  who  will  a  little  attend  to  the  nature  of  evi- 
 dence, will  easily  carry  this  observation  on,  and  see, 
 that  between  no  evidence  at  all,  and  that  degree  of 
 
 *  Introduction. 
 
433 
 
 it  which  affords  ground  of  doubt,  there  are  as  n 
 intermediate  degrees,  as  there  are  between  that  de- 
 gree which  is  the  ground  of  doubt,  and  demonstra- 
 tion. And,  though  we  have  not  faculties  to  dis- 
 tinguish these  degrees  of  evidence,  with  any  sort  of 
 exactness,  yet,  in  proportion  as  they  are  discerned, 
 they  ought  to  influence  our  practice.  For  it  is  as 
 real  an  imperfection  in  the  moral  character,  not  to 
 be  influenced  in  practice  by  a  lower  degree  of  evi- 
 dence when  discerned,  as  it  is  in  the  understanding, 
 not  to  discern  it.  And  as,  in  all  subjects  which 
 men  consider,  they  discern  the  lower  as  well  as 
 higher  degrees  of  evidence,  proportionally  to  their 
 capacity  of  understanding ;  so,  in  practical  subjects, 
 they  are  influenced  in  practice,  by  the  lower  as  well 
 as  higher  degrees  of  it,  proportionably  to  their  fair- 
 ness and  honesty.  And  as,  in  proportion  to  defects 
 in  the  understanding,  men  are  unapt  to  see  lower 
 degrees  of  evidence,  are  in  danger  of  overlooking 
 evidence  when  it  is  not  glaring,  and  are  easily  im- 
 posed upon  in  such  cases ;  so,  in  proportion  to  the 
 corruption  of  the  heart,  they  seem  capable  of  satis- 
 fying themselves  with  having  no  regard  in  practice 
 to  evidence  acknowledged  real,  if  it  be  not  over- 
 bearing. From  these  things  it  must  follow,  that 
 doubting  concerning  religion  implies  such  a  degree 
 of  evidence  for  it,  as,  joined  with  the  consideration 
 of  its  importance,  unquestionably  lays  men  under 
 the  obligations  before-mentioned,  to  have  a  dutiful 
 regard  to  it  in  all  their  behaviour. 
 
 Thirdly,  The  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence 
 of  religion  is  involved,  which  some  complain  of,  is 
 no  more  a  just  ground  of  complaint,  than  the  ex- 
 t  IT 
 
434 
 
 teraal  circumstances  of  temptation,  which  others  are 
 placed  in ;  or  than  difficulties  in  the  practice  of  it, 
 after  a  full  conviction  of  its  truth.  Temptations 
 render  our  state  a  more  improving  state  of  discip- 
 line,* than  it  would  be  otherwise;  as  they  give  oc- 
 casion for  a  more  attentive  exercise  of  the  virtuous 
 principle,  which  confirms  and  strengthens  it  more 
 than  an  easier  or  less  attentive  exercise  of  it  could. 
 Now,  speculative  difficulties  are,  in  this  respect,  of 
 the  very  same  nature  with  these  external  tempta- 
 tions. For  the  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing 
 obvious,  is,  to  some  persons,  a  temptation  to  reject 
 it,  without  any  consideration  at  all;  and  therefore 
 requires  such  an  attentive  exercise  of  the  virtuous 
 principle,  seriously  to  consider  that  evidence,  as 
 there  would  be  no  occasion  for,  but  for  such  temp- 
 tation. And  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  its  evi- 
 dence, after  it  has  been  in  some  sort  considered, 
 affords  opportunity  to  an  unfair  mind,  of  explaining 
 away,  and  deceitfully  hiding  from  itself,  that  evi- 
 dence which  it  might  see :  and  also  for  men's  en- 
 couraging  themselves  in  vice,  from  hopes  of  impu- 
 nity, though  they  do  clearly  see  thus  much  at  least, 
 that  these  hopes  are  uncertain:  in  like  manner  as 
 the  common  temptation  to  many  instances  of  folly, 
 which  end  in  temporal  infamy  and  ruin,  is  the 
 ground  for  hope  of  not  being  detected,  and  of  escap- 
 ing with  impunity ;  that  is,  the  doubtfulness  of  the 
 proof  beforehand,  that  such  foolish  behaviour  will 
 thus  end  in  infamy  and  ruin.  On  the  contrary, 
 supposed   doubtfulness  in  the   evidence  of  religion 
 
 *  Part  i.  chap.  5. 
 
435 
 
 calls  for  a  more  careful  and  attentive  exercise  c  I 
 virtuous  principle,  in  fairly  yielding  themselves  up 
 to  the  proper  influence  of  any  real  evidence,  though 
 doubtful;  and  in  practising  conscientiously  all  vir- 
 tue, though  under  some  uncertainty,  whether  the 
 government  in  the  universe  may  not  possibly  be 
 such,  as  that  vice  may  escape  with  impunity.  And, 
 in  general,  temptation,  meaning  by  this  word  the 
 lesser  allurements  to  wrong,  and  difficulties  in  the 
 discharge  of  our  dutv,  as  well  as  the  greater  ones : 
 temptation,  I  say,  as  such,  and  of  every  kind  and 
 degree,  as  it  calls  forth  some  virtuous  efforts,  addi- 
 tional to  what  would  otherwise  have  been  wanting, 
 cannot  but  be  an  additional  discipline  and  improve- 
 ment of  virtue,  as  well  as  probation  of  it,  in  the 
 other  senses  of  that  word.*  So  that  the  very  same 
 account  is  to  be  given,  why  the  evidence  of  religion 
 should  be  left  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  require,  in 
 some,  an  attentive,  solicitous,  perhaps  painful,  ex- 
 ercise of  their  understanding  about  it ;  as  why 
 others  should  be  placed  in  such  circumstances,  as 
 that  the  practice  of  its  common  duties,  after  a  full 
 conviction  of  the  truth  of  it,  should  require  atten- 
 tion, solicitude,  and  pains ;  or  why  appearing  doubt- 
 fulness should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of 
 temptation  to  some;  as  why  external  difficulties  and 
 allurements  should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of 
 temptation  to  others.  The  same  account  also  is  to 
 be  given,  why  some  should  be  exercised  with  temp- 
 tations of  both  these  kinds,  as  why  others  should  be 
 exercised  with  the  latter  in  such  very  high  degrees, 
 
 *  Part  i.  chap.  4.  and  page  291. 
 
436 
 
 as    some   have   been,    particularly  as    the   primitive 
 Christians  were. 
 
 Nor  does  there  appear  any  absurdity  in  suppos- 
 ing, that  the  speculative  difficulties  in  which  the 
 evidence  of  religion  is  involved,  may  make  even  the 
 principal  part  of  some  persons'  trial.  For,  as  the 
 chief  temptations  of  the  generality  of  the  world,  are 
 the  ordinary  motives  to  .injustice  or  unrestrained 
 pleasure ;  or  to  live  in  the  neglect  of  religion,  from 
 that  frame  of  mind,  which  renders  many  persons  al- 
 most without  feeling  as  to  any  thing  distant,  or 
 which  is  not  the  object  of  their  senses ;  so  there  are 
 other  persons  without  this  shallowness  of  temper, 
 persons  of  a  deeper  sense  as  to  what  is  invisible  and 
 future,  who  not  only  see,  but  have  a  general  prac- 
 tical feeling,  that  what  is  to  come  will  be  present, 
 and  that  things  are  not  less  real,  for  their  not  being 
 the  objects  of  sense;  and  who,  from  their  natural 
 constitution  of  body  and  of  temper,  and  from  their 
 external  condition,  may  have  small  temptations  to 
 behave  ill,  small  difficulty  in  behaving  well,  in  the 
 common  course  of  life.  Now,  when  these  latter 
 persons  have  a  distinct,  full  conviction  of  the  truth 
 of  religion,  without  any  possible  doubts  or  difficul- 
 ties, the  practice  of  it  is  to  them  unavoidable,  un- 
 less they  will  do  a  constant  violence  to  their  own 
 minds ;  and  religion  is  scarce  any  more  a  discipline 
 to  them,  than  it  is  to  creatures  in  a  state  of  perfec- 
 tion. Yet  these  persons  may  possibly  stand  in 
 need  of  moral  discipline  and  exercise  in  a  higher 
 degree  than  they  would  have  by  such  an  easy  prac- 
 tice of  religion.  Or  it  may  be  requisite,  for  rea- 
 sons unknown  to  us,  that   they  should   give  some 
 
437 
 
 further  manifestation*  what  is  their  moral  charac- 
 ter, to  the  creation  of  God,  than  such  a  practice  of 
 it  would  be.  Thus,  in  the  great  variety  of  religious 
 situations  in  which  men  are  placed,  what  constitutes, 
 what  chiefly  and  peculiarly  constitutes  the  probation, 
 in  all  senses,  of  some  persons,  may  be  the  difficul- 
 ties in  which  the  evidence  of  religion  is  involved: 
 and  their  principal  and  distinguished  trial  may  be, 
 how  they  will  behave  under  and  with  respect  to 
 these  difficulties.  Circumstances  in  men's  situation 
 in  their  temporal  capacity,  analogous  in  good  mea- 
 sure to  this,  respecting  religion,  are  to  be  ob- 
 served. We  find,  some  persons  are  placed  in  such 
 a  situation  in  the  world,  as  that  their  chief  diffi- 
 culty, with  regard  to  conduct,  is  not  the  doing  what 
 is  prudent  when  it  is  known ;  for  this,  in  number- 
 less cases,  is  as  easy  as  the  contrary :  but  to  some, 
 the  principal  exercise  is,  recollection,  and  being 
 upon  their  guard  against  deceits,  the  deceits,  sup- 
 pose, of  those  about  them  ;  against  false  appearances 
 of  reason  and  prudence.  To  persons  in  some  situ- 
 ations, the  principal  exercise,  with  respect  to  con- 
 duct, is  attention,  in  order  to  inform  themselves 
 what  is  proper,  what  is  really  the  reasonable  and 
 prudent  part  to  act. 
 
 But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  supposition, 
 that  men's  dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  reli- 
 gion, is  not  owing  to  their  neglects  or  prejudices; 
 it  must  be  added,  on  the  other  hand,  in  all  common 
 reason,  and  as  what  the  truth  of  the  case  plainly  re- 
 quires should  be  added,  that  such  dissatisfaction  pos- 
 
 *  Page  291. 
 
438 
 
 sibly  may  be  owing  to  those,  possibly  may  be  men's 
 own  fault.      For, 
 
 If  there  are  any  persons  who  never  set  them- 
 selves heartily,  and  in  earnest,  to  be  informed  in 
 religion;  if  there  are  any,  wrho  secretly  wish  it  may 
 not  prove  true,  and  are  less  attentive  to  evidence 
 than  to  difficulties,  and  more  to  objections,  than  to 
 what  is  said  in  answer  to  them ;  these  persons  will 
 scarce  be  thought  in  a  likely  way  of  seeing  the  evi- 
 dence of  religion,  though  it  were  most  certainly 
 true,  and  capable  of  being  ever  so  fully  proved. 
 If  any  accustom  themselves  to  consider  this  subject 
 usually  in  the  way  of  mirth  and  sport;  if  they  at- 
 tend to  forms  and  representations,  and  inadequate 
 manners  of  expression,  instead  of  the  real  things 
 intended  by  them,  (for  signs  often  can  be  no  more 
 than  inadequately  expressive  of  the  things  signi- 
 fied); or,  if  they  substitute  human  errors  in  the 
 room  of  divine  truth;  why  may  not  all,  or  any  of 
 these  things,  hinder  some  men  from  seeing  that  evi- 
 dence, which  really  is  seen  by  others;  as  a  like 
 turn  of  mind,  with  respect  to  matters  of  common 
 speculation  and  practice,  does,  we  find  by  experi- 
 ence, hinder  them  from  attaining  that  knowledge 
 and  right  understanding,  in  matters  of  common  spe- 
 culation and  practice,  which  more  fair  and  attentive 
 minds  attain  to?  And  the  effect  will  be  the  same, 
 whether  their  neglect  of  seriously  considering  the 
 evidence  of  religion,  and  their  indirect  behaviour 
 with  regard  to  it,  proceed  from  mere  carelessness, 
 or  from  the  grosser  vices ;  or  whether  it  be  owing 
 to  this,  that  forms,  and  figurative  manners  of  ex- 
 pression, as  well  as  errors,  administer  occasions  of 
 
489 
 
 ridicule,  when  the  things  intended,  and  the  truth 
 itself,  would  not.  Men  may  indulge  a  ludicrous 
 turn  so  far,  as  to  lose  all  sense  of  conduct  and  pru- 
 dence in  worldly  affairs,  and  even,  as  it  seems,  to 
 impair  their  faculty  of  reason.  And  in  general,  le- 
 vity, carelessness,  passion,  and  prejudice,  do  hinder 
 us  from  being  rightly  informed  with  respect  to  com- 
 mon things;  and  they  may,  in  like  manner,  and 
 perhaps  in  some  farther  providential  manner,  with 
 respect  to  moral  and  religious  subjects ;  may  hinder 
 evidence  from  being  laid  before  us,  and  from  being- 
 seen  when  it  is.  The  Scripture*  does  declare, 
 "that  every  one  shall  not  understand/'  And  it 
 makes  no  difference  by  what  providential  conduct 
 this  comes  to  pass ;  whether  the  evidence  of  Chris- 
 tianity was,  originally  and  with  design,  put  and  left 
 so,  as  that  those  wTho  are  desirous  of  evading  moral 
 obligations,  should  not  see  it,  and  that  honest-mind- 
 ed persons  should;  or  whether  it  comes  to  pass  by 
 any  other  means. 
 
 Farther:  the  general  proof  of  natural  religion  and 
 of  Christianity,  does,  I  think,  he  level  to  common 
 men :  even  those,  the  greatest  part  of  whose  time, 
 from  childhood  to  old  age,  is  taken  up  with  provid- 
 
 *  Dan.  xii.  10.  See  also  Isaiah  xxix.  13,  14.  Matt.  vi.  2;:, 
 and  xi.  25.  and  xiii.  11,  12.  John  iii.  19.  and  v.  44.  1  Cor. 
 ii.  14.  and  2  Cor.  iv.  4.  2  Tim.  iii.  13.  and  that  affectionate, 
 as  well  as  authoritative  admonition,  so  very  many  times  incul- 
 cated, "  He  that  hath  ears  to  hear,  let  him  hear."  Grotius  saw 
 so  strongly  the  thing  intended  in  these  and  other  passages  of 
 .Scripture  of  the  like  sense,  as  to  say,  that  the  proof  given  us  of 
 Christianity  was  less  than  it  might  have  been,  lor  this  very  pur- 
 pose :  Ut  ita  sermo  Evangelii  lanquam  lapis  esset  Lydius  ad  quern 
 ingenia  sanabilia  explorarentur.  De  Ver.  R.  C.  lib.  2.  towards 
 the  end. 
 
440 
 
 ing,  for  themselves  and  their  families,  the  common 
 conveniences,  perhaps  necessaries,  of  life ;  those,  I 
 mean,  of  this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all  of  asking 
 after  proof,  or  attending  to  it.  Common  men,  were 
 they  as  much  in  earnest  about  religion  as  about  their 
 temporal  affairs,  are  capable  of  being  convinced  upon 
 real  evidence,  that  there  is  a  God  who  governs  the 
 world ;  and  they  feel  themselves  to  be  of  a  moral 
 nature,  and  accountable  creatures.  And  as  Chris- 
 tianity entirely  falls  in  with  this  their  natural  sense 
 of  things,  so  they  are  capable,  not  only  of  being 
 persuaded,  but  of  being  made  to  see,  that  there 
 is  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation  of  it, 
 and  many  appearing  completions  of  prophecy.  But 
 though  this  proof  is  real  and  conclusive,  yet  it  is 
 liable  to  objections,  and  may  be  run  up  into  diffi- 
 culties; which,  however,  persons  who  are  capable, 
 not  only  of  talking  of,  but  of  really  seeing,  are 
 capable  also  of  seeing  through  ;  that  is,  not  of  clear- 
 ing up  and  answering  them,  so  as  to  satisfy  their 
 curiosity,  for  of  such  knowledge  we  are  not  capable 
 with  respect  to  any  one  thing  in  nature;  but  capable 
 of  seeing  that  the  proof  is  not  lost  in  these  difficul- 
 ties, or  destroyed  by  these  objections.  But  then  a 
 thorough  examination  into  religion,  with  regard  to 
 these  objections,  which  cannot  be  the  business  of 
 every  man,  is  a  matter  of  pretty  large  compass,  and, 
 from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  some  knowledge, 
 as  well  as  time  and  attention,  to  see  how  the  evi- 
 dence comes  out,  upon  balancing  one  thing  with 
 another,  and  what,  upon  the  whole,  is  the  amount 
 of  it.  Now,  if  persons  who  have  picked  up  these 
 objections  from  others,  and  take  for  granted  they 
 
441 
 
 are  of  weight,  upon  the  word  of  those  from  whom 
 they  received  them,  or,  by  often  retailing  of  them, 
 come  to  see,  or  fancy  they  see,  them  to  be  of  weight, 
 will  not  prepare  themselves  for  such  an  examination, 
 with  a  competent  degree  of  knowledge;  or  will  not 
 give  that  time  and  attention  to  the  subject,  which, 
 from  the  nature  of  it,  is  necessary  for  attaining  such 
 information:  in  this  case,  they  must  remain  in  doubt- 
 fulness, ignorance,  or  error;  in  the  same  way  as 
 they  must  with  regard  to  common  sciences,  and 
 matters  of  common  life,  if  they  neglect  the  neces- 
 sary means  of  being  informed  in  them. 
 
 But  still,  perhaps,  it  will  be  objected,  that  if  a 
 prince  or  common  master  were  to  send  directions  to 
 a  servant,  he  would  take  care  that  they  should  al- 
 ways bear  the  certain  marks  who  they  came  from, 
 and  that  their  sense  should  be  always  plain;  so  as 
 that  there  should  be  no  possible  doubt,  if  he  could 
 help  it,  concerning  the  authority  or  meaning  of  them. 
 Now,  the  proper  answer  to  all  this  kind  of  objections 
 is,  that,  wherever  the  fallacy  lies,  it  is  even  certain 
 we  cannot  argue  thus  with  respect  to  him  who  is  the 
 governor  of  the  world;  and  particularly,  that  he 
 does  not  afford  us  such  information,  with  respect  to 
 our  temporal  affairs  and  interests,  as  experience 
 abundantly  shows.  However,  there  is  a  full  answer 
 to  this  objection,  from  the  very  nature  of  religion. 
 For  the  reason  why  a  prince  would  give  his  direc- 
 tions in  this  plain  manner,  is  that  he  absolutely 
 desires  such  an  external  action  should  be  done,  with- 
 out concerning  himself  with  the  motive  or  principle 
 upon  which  it  is  done ;  that  is,  he  regards  only  the 
 external  event,  or  the  thing  being  done,  and  not 
 t3 
 
442 
 
 at  all,  properly  speaking,  the  doing  of  it,  or  the 
 action.  Whereas,  the  whole  of  morality  and  reli- 
 gion consisting  merely  in  action  itself,  there  is  no 
 sort  of  parallel  between  the  cases.  But  if  the  prince 
 be  supposed  to  regard  only  tl\e  action;  that  is,  only 
 to  desire  to  exercise,  or  in  any  sense  prove,  the  un- 
 derstanding or  loyalty  of  a  servant,  he  would  not 
 always  give  his  orders  in  such  a  plain  manner.  It 
 may  be  proper  to  add,  that  the  will  of  God,  respect- 
 ing morality  and  religion,  may  be  considered,  either 
 as  absolute,  or  as  only  conditional.  If  it  be  abso- 
 lute, it  can  only  be  thus,  that  we  should  act  virtu- 
 ously in  such  given  circumstances;  not  that  we  should 
 be  brought  to  act  so,  by  his  changing  of  our  cir- 
 cumstances. And  if  God's  will  be  thus  absolute, 
 then  it  is  in  our  power,  in  the  highest  and  strictest 
 sense,  to  do  or  to  contradict  his  will;  which  is  a 
 most  weighty  consideration.  Or  his  will  may  be 
 considered  only  as  conditional, — that  if  we  act  so  and 
 so,  we  shall  be  rewarded ;  if  otherwise,  punished :  of 
 which  conditional  will  of  the  Author  of  nature,  the 
 whole  constitution  of  it  affords  most  certain  instances. 
 Upon  the  whole :  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  reli- 
 gion necessarily  implies,  that  we  are  in  a  state  of 
 probation :  and  the  credibility  of  our  being  at  all  in 
 such  a  state  being  admitted,  there  seems  no  peculiar 
 difficulty  in  supposing  our  probation  to  be,  just  as 
 it  is,  in  those  respects  which  are  above  objected 
 against.  There  seems  no  pretence,  from  the  reason 
 of  the  thing^  to  say,  that  the  trial  cannot  equitably 
 be  any  thing,  but  whether  persons  will  act  suitably 
 to  certain  information,  or  such  as  admits  no  room 
 for  doubt ;  so  as  that  there  can  be  no  danger  of  mis- 
 
443 
 
 carriage,  but  either  from  their  not  attending  to  what 
 they  certainly  know,  or  from  overhearing  passion 
 hurrying  them  on  to  act  contrary  to  it.  For,  since 
 ignorance  and  doubt  afford  scope  for  probation  in  all 
 senses,  as  really  as  intuitive  conviction  or  certainty; 
 and  since  the  two  former  are  to  be  put  to  the  same 
 account,  as  difficulties  in  practice ;  men's  moral  pro- 
 bation may  also  be,  whether  they  will  take  due  care 
 to  inform  themselves  by  impartial  consideration,  and 
 afterwards  whether  they  will  act  as  the  case  requires, 
 upon  the  evidence  which  they  have,  however  doubt- 
 ful. And  this,  we  find  by  experience^  is  frequently 
 our  probation,*  in  our  temporal  capacity.  For  the 
 information  which  we  want,  with  regard  to  our 
 worldly  interests,  is  by  no  means  always  given  us  of 
 course,  without  any  care  of  our  own.  And  we  are 
 greatly  liable  to  self-deceit  from  inward  secret  pre- 
 judices ;  and  also  to  the  deceit  of  others.  So  that 
 to  be  able  to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part,  often 
 requires  much  and  difficult  consideration.  Then, 
 after  we  have  judged  the  very  best  we  can,  the  evi- 
 dence upon  which  we  must  act,  if  we  will  live  and 
 act  at  all,  is  perpetually  doubtful  to  a  very  high 
 degree.  And  the  constitution  and  course  of  the 
 world  in  fact  is  such,  as  that  want  of  impartial  con- 
 sideration what  we  have  to  do,  and  venturing  upon 
 extravagant  courses,  because  it  is  doubtful  what  will 
 be  the  consequences,  are  often  naturally,  that  is, 
 providentially,  altogether  as  fatal,  as  misconduct 
 occasioned  by  heedless  inattention  to  what  we  cer- 
 
 *  Pages  216,  433,  436,  438. 
 
444 
 
 tainly  know,   or   disregarding   it  from   overbearing 
 passion. 
 
 Several  of  the  observations  here  made  may  well 
 seem  strange,  perhaps  unintelligible  to  many  good 
 men.  But  if  the  persons  for  whose  sake  they  are 
 made,  think  so;  persons  who  object  as  above,  and 
 throw  off  all  regard  to  religion  under  pretence  of 
 want  of  evidence ;  I  desire  them  to  consider  again, 
 whether  their  thinking  so,  be  owing  to  any  thing 
 unintelligible  in  these  observations,  or  to  their  own 
 not  having  such  a  sense  of  religion,  and  serious  so- 
 licitude about  it,  as  even  their  state  of  scepticism 
 does  in  all  reason  require?  It  ought  to  be  forced 
 upon  the  reflection  of  these  persons,  that  our  nature 
 and  condition  necessarily  require  us,  in  the  daily 
 course  of  life,  to  act  upon  evidence  much  lower  than 
 what  is  commonly  called  probable;  to  guard  not  only 
 against  what  we  fully  believe  will,  but  also  against 
 what  we  think  it  supposable  may,  happen;  and  to 
 engage  in  pursuits  when  the  probability  is  greatly 
 against  success,  if  it  be  credible  that  possibly  we 
 may  succeed  in  them. 
 
445 
 
 CHAP.  VII. 
 
 Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity. 
 
 The  presumptions  against  revelation,  and  objec- 
 tions against  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and 
 particular  things  relating  to  it,  being  removed,  there 
 remains  to  be  considered,  what  positive  evidence  we 
 have  for  the  truth  of  it :  chiefly  in  order  to  see,  what 
 the  analogy  of  nature  suggests  with  regard  to  that 
 evidence,  and  the  objections  against  it;  or  to  see 
 what  is,  and  is  allowed  to  be,  the  plain  natural  rule 
 of  judgment  and  of  action  in  our  temporal  concerns, 
 in  cases  where  we  have  the  same  kind  of  evidence, 
 and  the  same  kind  of  objections  against  it,  that  we 
 have  in  the  case  before  us. 
 
 Now,  in  the  evidence  of  Christianity,  there  seems 
 to  be  several  things  of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to 
 the  head,  cither  of  miracles,  or  the  completion  of 
 prophecy,  in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  words. 
 But  these  two  are  its  direct  and  fundamental  proofs; 
 and  those  other  things,  however  considerable  they 
 are,  yet  ought  never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its  di- 
 rect proofs ;  but  always  to  be  joined  with  them. 
 Thus  the  evidence  of  Christianity  will  be  a  long 
 .scries  of  tilings,  reaching,  as  it  seems,  from  the  be- 
 ginning of  the  world  to  the  present  time,  of  great 
 variety  and  compass,  taking  in  both  the  direct,  and 
 also  the  collateral  proofs,  and  making  up,  all  of  them 
 together,  one  argument ;  the  conviction  arising  from 
 which  kind  of  proof  may  be  compared  to  what  they 
 
446 
 
 call  the  effect  in  architecture  or  other  works  of  art*, 
 a  result  from  a  great  number  of  things  so  and  so 
 disposed,  and  taken  into  one  view.  I  shall  therefore, 
 first,  make  some  observations  relating  to  miracles, 
 and  the  appearing  completions  of  prophecy;  and  con- 
 sider what  analogy  suggests,  in  answer  to  the  objec- 
 tions brought  against  this  evidence.  And,  secondly, 
 I  shall  endeavour  to  give  some  account  of  the  gene- 
 ral argument  now  mentioned,  consisting  both  of  the 
 direct  and  collateral  evidence,  considered  as  making 
 up  one  argument :  this  being  the  kind  of  proof,  up- 
 on which  we  determine  most  questions  of  difficulty 
 concerning  common  facts,  alleged  to  have  happened, 
 or  seeming  likely  to  happen;  especially  questions 
 relating  to  conduct. 
 
 First,  I  shall  make  some  observations  upon  the 
 direct  proof  of  Christianity  from  miracles  and  pro- 
 phecy, and  upon  the  objections  alleged  against  it. 
 
 I.  Now,  the  following  observations,  relating  to 
 the  historical  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attesta- 
 tion  of  Christianity,  appear  to  be  of  great  weight. 
 
 I.  The  Old  Testament  affords  us  the  same  his- 
 torical evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the 
 prophets,  as  of  the  common  civil  history  of  Moses 
 and  the  kings  of  Israel ;  or,  as  of  the  affairs  of  the 
 Jewish  nation.  And  the  Gospels  and  the  Acts  af- 
 ford us  the  same  historical  evidence  of  the  miracles 
 of  Christ  and  the  Apostles,  as  of  the  common  mat- 
 ters related  in  them.  This,  indeed,  could  not  have 
 been  affirmed  by  any  reasonable  man,  if  the  authors 
 of  these  books,  like  many  other  historians,  had  ap- 
 peared to  make  an  entertaining  manner  of  writing 
 their  aim ;  though  they  had  interspersed  miracles  in 
 
447 
 
 their  works,  at  proper  distances,  and  upon  proper 
 occasions.  These  might  have  animated  a  dull  rela- 
 tion, amused  the  reader,  and  engaged  his  attention. 
 And  the  same  account  would  naturally  have  been 
 given  of  them,  as  of  the  speeches  and  descriptions 
 of  such  authors ;  the  same  account,  in  a  manner,  as 
 is  to  be  given,  why  the  poets  make  use  of  wonders 
 and  prodigies.  But  the  facts,  both  miraculous  and 
 natural,  in  Scripture,  are  related  in  plain  unadorned 
 narratives  :  and  both  of  them  appear,  in  all  respects, 
 to  stand  upon  the  same  footing  of  historical  evidence. 
 Farther :  some  parts  of  Scripture,  containing  an  ac- 
 count of  miracles  fully  sufficient  to  prove  the  truth 
 of  Christianity,  are  quoted  as  genuine,  from  the  age 
 in  which  they  are  said  to  be  written,  down  to  the 
 present :  and  no  other  parts  of  them,  material  in  the 
 present  question,  are  omitted  to  be  quoted  in  such 
 manner,  as  to  afford  any  sort  of  proof  of  their  not 
 being  genuine.  And,  as  common  history,  when 
 called  in  question  in  any  instance,  may  often  be 
 greatly  confirmed  by  contemporary  or  subsequent 
 events  more  known  and  acknowledged;  and  as  the 
 common  Scripture  history,  like  many  others,  is  thus 
 confirmed;  so  likewise  is  the  miraculous  history  of 
 it,  not  only  in  particular  instances,  but  in  general. 
 For,  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  and  Christian 
 religions,  which  were  events  contemporary  with  the 
 miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in  attestation  of  both, 
 or  subsequent  to  them,  these  events  are  just 
 we  should  have  expected,  upon  supposition  such  mi- 
 racles were  really  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  those 
 religions.  These  miracles  are  a  satisfactory  account 
 of  those  events,  of  which  no  other  satisfactory  ac- 
 
448 
 
 count  can  be  given,  nor  any  account  at  all,  but  what 
 is  imaginary  merely  and  invented.  It  is  to  be  ad- 
 ded, that  the  most  obvious,  the  most  easy  and  direct 
 account  of  this  history,  how  it  came  to  be  written, 
 and  to  be  received  in  the  world  as  a  true  history,  is, 
 that  it  really  is  so ;  nor  can  any  other  account  of  it 
 be  easy  and  direct.  Now,  though  an  account,  not 
 at  all  obvious,  but  very  far-fetched  and  indirect,  may 
 indeed  be,  and  often  is,  the  true  account  of  a  mat- 
 ter; yet,  it  cannot  be  admitted  on  the  authority  of 
 its  being  asserted.  Mere  guess,  supposition,  and 
 possibility,  when  opposed  to  historical  evidence,  prove 
 nothing,  but  that  historical  evidence  is  not  demon- 
 strative. 
 
 Now,  the  just  consequence  from  all  this,  I  think, 
 is,  that  the  Scripture  history,  in  general,  is  to  be  ad- 
 mitted as  an  authentic  genuine  history,  till  somewhat 
 positive  be  alleged  sufficient  to  invalidate  it.  But 
 no  man  will  deny  the  consequence  to  be,  that  it  can- 
 not be  rejected,  or  thrown  by  as  of  no  authority, 
 till  it  can  be  proved  to  be  of  none ;  even  though  the 
 evidence  now  mentioned  for  its  authority  were  doubt- 
 ful. This  evidence  may  be  confronted  by  historical 
 evidence  on  the  other  side,  if  there  be  any;  or  gen- 
 eral incredibility  in  the  things  related,  or  inconsis- 
 tence in  the  general  turn  of  the  history,  would  prove 
 it  to  be  of  no  authority.  But  since,  upon  the  face 
 of  the  matter,  upon  a  first  and  general  view,  the  ap- 
 pearance is,  that  it  is  an  authentic  history,  it  cannot 
 be  determined  to  be  fictitious  without  some  proof  that 
 it  is  so.  And  the  following  observations,  in  support 
 of  these,  and  coincident  with  them,  will  greatly  con- 
 firm the  historical  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Chris- 
 tianity. 
 
44V 
 
 2.  The  Epistles  of  St.  Paul,  from  the  nature  of 
 epistolary  writing,  and  moreover,  from  several  of 
 them  being  written,  not  to  particular  persons,  but  to 
 churches,  carry  in  them  evidences  of  their  being 
 genuine,  beyond  what  can  be,  in  a  mere  historical 
 narrative,  left  to  the  world  at  large.  This  evidence, 
 joined  with  that  which  they  have  in  common  with 
 the  rest  of  the  New  Testament,  seems  not  to  leave 
 so  much  as  any  particular  pretence  for  denying  their 
 genuineness,  considered  as  an  ordinary  matter  of 
 fact,  or  of  criticism.  I  say,  particular  pretence  for 
 denying  it ;  because  any  single  fact  of  such  a  kind 
 and  such  antiquity,  may  have  general  doubts  raised 
 concerning  it,  from  the  very  nature  of  human  af- 
 fairs and  human  testimony.  There  is  also  to  be 
 mentioned,  a  distinct  and  particular  evidence  of  the 
 genuineness  of  the  epistle  chiefly  referred  to  here, 
 the  first  to  the  Corinthians :  from  the  manner  in 
 which  it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Romanus,  in  an  epis- 
 tle of  his  own  to  that  Church.*  Now,  these  epis- 
 tles afford  a  proof  of  Christianity,  detached  from  all 
 others,  which  is,  I  think,  a  thing  of  weight ;  and  al- 
 so a  proof  of  a  nature  and  kind  peculiar  to  itself. 
 For, 
 
 In  them  the  author  declares,  that  he  received  the 
 gospel  in  general,  and  the  institution  of  the  commu- 
 nion in  particular,  not  from  the  rest  of  the  apostles, 
 or  jointly  together  with  them,  but  alone,  from  Christ 
 himself;  whom  he  declares,  likewise,  conformably  to 
 the  history  in  the  Acts,  that  lie  saw  after  his  ascen- 
 sion.f     So  that  the  testimony  of  St.  Paul  is  to  be 
 
 *  Clem.  Rom.  Ep.  I.  ch.  47. 
 
 +  Gal.  i.      1  Cor.  xi.  23,  &c      1  Or.  xv.  S. 
 
450 
 
 considered  as  detached  from  that  of  the  rest  of  the 
 apostles. 
 
 And  he  declares  farther,  that  he  was  endued  with 
 a  power  of  working  miracles,  as  what  was  publicly 
 known  to  this  very  people;  speaks  of  frequent  and 
 great  variety  of  miraculous  gifts,  as  then  subsisting, 
 in  those  very  churches  to  which  he  was  writing  ; 
 which  he  was  reproving  for  several  irregularities,  and 
 where  he  had  personal  opposers :  he  mentions  these 
 gifts  incidentally,  in  the  most  easy  manner,  and  with- 
 out effort ;  by  way  of  reproof  to  those  who  had  them, 
 for  their  indecent  use  of  them ;  and  by  way  of  depre- 
 ciating them,  in  comparison  of  moral  virtues.  In 
 short,  he  speaks  to  these  churches,  of  these  miracu- 
 lous powers,  in  the  manner  any  one  would  speak  to 
 another  of  a  thing,  which  was  as  familiar,  and  as 
 much  known  in  common  to  them  both,  as  any  thing 
 in  the  world.*  And  this,  as  hath  been  observed  by 
 several  persons,  is  surely  a  very  considerable  thing. 
 
 3.  It  is  an  acknowledged  historical  fact,  that  Chris- 
 tianity offered  itself  to  the  world,  and  demanded  to 
 be  received,  upon  the  allegation,  that  is,  as  unbe- 
 lievers would  speak,  upon  the  pretence  of  miracles, 
 publicly  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  it  in  such  an 
 age;  and  that  it  was  actually  received  by  great  numbers 
 in  that  very  age,  and  upon  the  professed  belief  of  the 
 reality  of  these  miracles.  And  Christianity,  includ- 
 ing the  dispensation  of  the  Old  Testament,  seems 
 distinguished  by  this  from  all  other  religions.  I 
 mean  that  this  does  not  appear  to  be  the  case  with 
 
 *  Rom.  xv.  19.  1  Cor.  xii.  8,  9,  10— 2S,  &c.  and  chap.  xiii. 
 1,  2,  8.  and  the  whole  xivth  chap.  2  Cor.  xii.  12,  13.  Gal. 
 iii.  2,  5. 
 
451 
 
 regard  to  any  other.  For  surely  it  will  not  be  sup- 
 posed to  lie  upon  any  person,  to  prove,  by  positive 
 historical  evidence,  that  it  was  not.  It  does  in  no 
 sort  appear  that  Mahometanism  was  first  received  in 
 the  world  upon  the  footing  of  supposed  miracles,*  that 
 is,  public  ones :  for,  as  revelation  is  itself  miraculous, 
 all  pretence  to  it  must  necessarily  imply  some  pre- 
 tence of  miracles.  And  it  is  a  known  fact,  that  it- 
 was  immediately,  at  the  very  first,  propagated  by 
 other  means.  And  as  particular  institutions,  whe- 
 ther in  paganism  or  popery,  said  to  be  confirmed  by 
 miracles,  after  those  institutions  had  obtained,  are  not 
 to  the  purpose ;  so,  were  there  what  might  be  called 
 historical  proof,  that  any  of  them  were  introduced  by 
 a  supposed  divine  command,  believed  to  be  attested 
 by  miracles,  these  would  not  be  in  any  wise  parallel. 
 For  single  things  of  this  sort  are  easy  to  be  account- 
 ed for,  after  parties  are  formed,  and  have  power  in 
 their  hands;  and  the  leaders  of  them  are  in  venera- 
 tion with  the  multitude ;  and  political  interests  are 
 blended  with  religious  claims,  and  religious  distinc- 
 tions. But  before  any  thing  of  this  kind,  for  a  few 
 persons,  and  those  of  the  lowest  rank,  all  at  once,  to 
 bring  over  such  great  numbers  to  a  new  religion,  and 
 get  it  to  be  received  upon  the  particular  evidence  of 
 miracles;  this  is  quite  another  thing.  And  I  think 
 it  will  be  allowed  by  any  fair  adversary,  that  the  fact 
 now  mentioned,  taking  in  all  the  circumstances  of  it, 
 is  peculiar  to  the  Christian  religion.  However,  the 
 fact  itself  is  allowed,  that  Christianity  obtained,  that 
 is,  was  professed  to  be  received  in  the  world,  upon 
 
 *  See  the  Koran,  chap.  xiii.  and  chap.  xvii. 
 
452 
 
 the  belief  of  miracles,  immediately  in  the  age  in  which 
 it  is  said  those  miracles  were  wrought :  or  that  this  is 
 what  its  first  converts  would  have  alleged,  as  the 
 reason  for  their  embracing  it.  Now,  certainly  it  is 
 not  to  be  supposed,  that  such  numbers  of  men,  in  the 
 most  distant  parts  of  the  world,  should  forsake  the 
 religion  of  their  country,  in  which  they  had  been 
 educated;  separate  themselves  from  their  friends, 
 particularly  in  their  festival  shows  and  solemnities,  to 
 which  the  common  people  are  so  greatly  addicted,  and 
 which  were  of  a  nature  to  engage  them  much  more 
 than  any  thing  of  that  sort  amongst  us ;  and  embrace 
 a  religion,  which  could  not  but  expose  them  to  many 
 inconveniences,  and  indeed  must  have  been  a  giving  up 
 the  world  in  a  great  degree,  even  from  the  very  first, 
 and  before  the  empire  engaged  in  form  against  them: 
 it  cannot  be  supposed,  that  such  numbers  should  make 
 so  great,  and,  to  say  the  least,  so  inconvenient  a 
 change  in  their  whole  institution  of  life,  unless  they 
 were  really  convinced  of  the  truth  of  those  miracles, 
 upon  the  knowledge  or  belief  of  which  they  pro- 
 fessed to  make  it.  And  it  will,  I  suppose,  readily 
 be  acknowledged,  that  the  generality  of  the  first  con- 
 verts to  Christianity  must  have  believed  them ;  that 
 as,  by  becoming  Christians,  they  declared  to  the 
 world  they  were  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  those  mira- 
 cles, so  this  declaration  was  to  be  credited.  And 
 this  their  testimony  is  the  same  kind  of  evidence  for 
 those  miracles,  as  if  they  had  put  it  in  writing,  and 
 these  writings  had  come  down  to  us.  And  it  is  real 
 evidence,  because  it  is  of  facts,  which  they  had 
 capacity  and  full  opportunity  to  inform  themselves 
 of.     It  is  also  distinct  from  the  direct  or  express 
 
453 
 
 historical  evidence,  though  it  is  of  the  same  kind; 
 and  it  would  be  allowed  to  be  distinct  in  all  cases. 
 For,  were  a  fact  expressly  related  by  one  or  more 
 ancient  historians,  and  disputed  in  after  ages;  that 
 this  fact  is  acknowledged  to  have  been  believed,  by 
 Great  numbers  of  the  age  in  which  the  historian 
 says  it  was  done,  would  be  allowed  an  additional 
 proof  of  such  fact,  quite  distinct  from  the  express 
 testimony  of  the  historian.  The  credulity  of  man- 
 kind is  acknowledged,  and  the  suspicions  of  mankind 
 ought  to  be  acknowledged  too ;  and  their  backward- 
 ness even  to  believe,  and  greater  still  to  practise, 
 what  makes  against  their  interest.  And  it  must 
 particularly  be  remembered,  that  education,  and  pre- 
 judice, and  authority,  were  against  Christianity,  in 
 the  age  I  am  speaking  of.  So  that  the  immediate 
 conversion  of  such  numbers,  is  a  real  presumption  of 
 somewhat  more  than  human  in  this  matter :  I  say 
 presumption,  for  it  is  not  alleged  as  a  proof,  alone 
 and  by  itself.  Nor  need  any  one  of  the  things  men- 
 tioned in  this  Chapter  be  considered  as  a  proof  by 
 itself;  and  yet  all  of  them  together  may  be  one  of 
 the  strongest. 
 
 Upon  the  whole  :  As  there  is  large  historical  evi- 
 dence, both  direct  and  circumstantial,  of  miracles 
 wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  collected  by 
 those  who  have  writ  upon  the  subject,  it  lies  upon 
 unbelievers  to  show,  why  this  evidence  is  not  to  be 
 credited.  This  way  of  speaking  is,  I  think,  just, 
 and  what  persons  who  write  in  defence  of  religion 
 naturally  fall  into.  Yet  in  a  matter  of  such  un- 
 speakable importance,  the  proper  question  is,  not 
 whom  it  lies  upon,  according  to  the  rules  of  argu- 
 
454 
 
 ment,  to  maintain  or  confute  objections;  but  whether 
 there  really  are  any,  against  this  evidence,  sufficient 
 in  reason,  to  destroy  the  credit  of  it?    However, 
 unbelievers  seem  to  take  upon   them  the  part  of 
 showing  that  there  are. 
 
 They  allege,  that  numberless  enthusiastic  people, 
 in  different  ages  and  countries,  expose  themselves  to 
 the  same  difficulties  which  the  primitive  Christians 
 did;  and  are  ready  to  give  up  their  lives,  for  the 
 most  idle  follies  imaginable.  But  it  is  not  very 
 clear,  to  what  purpose  this  objection  is  brought.  For 
 every  one,  surely,  in  every  case,  must  distinguish 
 between  opinions  and  facts.  And  though  testimony 
 is  no  proof  of  enthusiastic  opinions,  or  of  any  opi- 
 nions at  all;  yet  it  is  allowed,  in  all  other  cases,  to 
 be  a  proof  of  facts.  And  a  person  laying  down  his 
 life  in  attestation  of  facts,  or  of  opinions,  is  the  strong- 
 est proof  of  his  believing  them.  And  if  the  apos- 
 tles and  their  contemporaries  did  believe  the  facts,  in 
 attestation  of  which  they  exposed  themselves  to  suf- 
 ferings and  death,  this  their  belief,  or  rather  know- 
 ledge, must  be  a  proof  of  those  facts ;  for  they  were 
 such  as  came  under  the  observation  of  their  senses. 
 And  though  it  is  not  of  equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of 
 weight,  that  the  martyrs  of  the  next  age,  notwith- 
 standing they  were  not  eye-witnesses  of  those  facts, 
 as  were  the  apostles  and  their  contemporaries,  had, 
 however,  full  opportunity  to  inform  themselves,  whe- 
 ther they  were  true  or  not,  and  give  equal  proof  of 
 their  believing  them  to  be  true. 
 
 But  enthusiasm,  it  is  said,  greatly  weakens  the 
 evidence  of  testimony,  even  for  facts,  in  matters  re- 
 lating to  religion ;  some  seem  to  think,  it  totally  and 
 
455 
 
 absolutely  destroys  the  evidence  of  testimony  upon 
 this  subject.      And,  indeed,  the  powers  of  enthu- 
 siasm, and  of  diseases,  too,  which  operate  in  a  like 
 manner,  are  very  wonderful,  in  particular  instances. 
 But  if  great  numbers  of  men,  not  appearing  in  any 
 peculiar  degree  weak,  nor  under  any  peculiar  sus- 
 picion of  negligence,  affirm  that  they  saw  and  heard 
 such  things  plainly  with  their  eyes  and  their  ears, 
 and  are  admitted  to  be  in  earnest ;  such  testimony  is 
 evidence  of  the  strongest  kind  we  can  have,  for  any 
 matter  of  fact.     Yet,  possibly  it  may  be  overcome, 
 strong  as  it  is,  by  incredibility  in  the  things  thus 
 attested,  or  by  contrary  testimony.      And  in  an  in- 
 stance where   one  thought   it  was  so  overcome,   it 
 might   be  just  to  consider,  how  far  such  evidence 
 could  be  accounted  for  by  enthusiasm :  for  it  seems 
 as  if  no  other  imaginable  account  were  to  be  given 
 of  it.      But  till  such  incredibility  be  shown,  or  con- 
 trary testimony  produced,   it  cannot  surely  be  ex- 
 pected, that  so  far-fetched,  so  indirect  and  wonder- 
 ful an  account  of  such  testimony,  as  that  of  enthu- 
 siasm must  be;    an   account   so   strange,   that  the 
 generality  of  mankind  can  scarce  be  made  to  under- 
 stand what  is  meant  by  it;  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  ex- 
 pected, that  such  account  will  be  admitted  of  such 
 evidence,  when  there  is  this  direct,  easy,  and  obvious 
 account  of  it,  that   people  really  saw  and  heard  a 
 thing  not   incredible,   which  they  affirm   sincerely, 
 and  with  full   assurance,   they  did    see    and    hear. 
 Granting,   then,    that   enthusiasm    is    not    (strictly 
 speaking)  an  absurd,  but  a  possible  account  of  such 
 testimony,  it  is  manifest  that  the  very  mention  of  it 
 goes  upon  the  previous  supposition,  that  the  things 
 
456 
 
 so  attested  are  incredible;  and  therefore  need  not  be 
 considered,  till  they  are  shown  to  be  so.  Much  less 
 need  it  be  considered,  after  the  contrary  has  been 
 proved.  And  I  think  it  has  been  proved,  to  full 
 satisfaction,  that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  revela- 
 tion, in  general,  or  in  such  a  one  as  the  Christian, 
 in  particular.  However,  as  religion  is  supposed  pe- 
 culiarly liable  to  enthusiasm,  it  may  just  be  observed, 
 that  prejudices  almost  without  number,  and  without 
 name,  romance,  affectation,  humour,  a  desire  to  en- 
 gage attention  or  to  surprise,  the  party-spirit,  cus- 
 tom, little  competitions,  unaccountable  likings  and 
 dislikings ;  these  influence  men  strongly  in  common 
 matters.  And  as  these  prejudices  are  often  scarce 
 known  or  reflected  upon  by  the  persons  themselves 
 who  are  influenced  by  them,  they  are  to  be  consi- 
 dered as  influences  of  a  like  kind  to  enthusiasm. 
 Yet  human  testimony  in  common  matters  is  natu- 
 rally and  justly  believed  notwithstanding, 
 
 It  is  intimated  farther,  in  a  more  refined  way  of 
 observation,  that  though  it  should  be  proved,  that 
 the  apostles  and  first  Christians,  could  not,  in  some 
 respects,  be  deceived  themselves,  and,  in  other  re- 
 spects, cannot  be  thought  to  have  intended  to  im- 
 pose upon  the  world,  yet,  it  will  not  follow,  that 
 their  general  testimony  is  to  be  believed,  though 
 truly  handed  down  to  us ;  because  they  might  still 
 in  part,  that  is,  in  other  respects,  be  deceived  them- 
 selves, and  in  part  also  designedly  impose  upon 
 others ;  which,  it  is  added,  is  a  thing  very  credible, 
 from  that  mixture  of  real  enthusiasm,  and  real  kna- 
 very, to  be  met  with  in  the  same  characters.  And, 
 I  must  confess,  I  think  the  matter  of  fact  contained 
 
457 
 
 in  this  observation  upon  mankind,  is  not  to  be  de- 
 nied; and  that  somewhat  very  much  a-kin  to  it,  is 
 often  supposed  in  Scripture,  as  a  very  common  case, 
 and  most  severely  reproved.  But  it  were  to  have 
 been  expected,  that  persons  capable  of  applying 
 this  observation,  as  applied  in  the  objection,  might 
 also  frequently  have  met  with  the  like  mixed  char- 
 acter, in  instances  where  religion  was  quite  out  of 
 the  case.  The  thing  plainly  is,  that  mankind  are 
 naturally  endued  with  reason,  or  a  capacity  of  dis- 
 tinguishing between  truth  and  falsehood;  and  as 
 naturally  they  are  endued  with  veracity,  or  a  re- 
 gard to  truth  in  what  they  say :  but  from  many 
 occasions,  they  are  liable  to  be  prejudiced,  and 
 biassed,  and  deceived  themselves,  and  capable  of  in- 
 tending to  deceive  others,  in  every  different  degree ; 
 insomuch  that,  as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  deceived 
 by  prejudice,  so  likewise  it  seems  to  be  not  an  un- 
 common thing,  for  persons  who,  from  their  regard 
 to  truth,  would  not  invent  a  He  entirely  without  any 
 foundation  at  all,  to  propagate  it  with  heightening 
 circumstances,  after  it  is  once  invented,  and  set 
 a-going.  And  others,  though  they  would  not  pro- 
 pagate a  he,  yet,  which  is  a  lower  degree  of  false- 
 hood, will  let  it  pass  without  contradiction.  But, 
 notwithstanding  all  this,  human  testimony  remains 
 still  a  natural  ground  of  assent ;  and  this  assent,  a 
 natural  principle  of  action. 
 
 It  is  objected  farther,  that  however  it  has  hap- 
 pened, the  fact  is,  that  mankind  have,  in  different 
 rages,  been  strangely  deluded  with  pretences  to  mir- 
 
 Nacles  and  wonders.      But  it  is  by  no  means  to  be 
 idmitted,  that  they  have  been  oftener,  or  are  at  all 
 u  17 
 
458 
 
 more  liable  to  be  deceived  by  these  pretences,  than 
 by  others. 
 
 It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  very  considerable  de- 
 gree of  historical  evidence  for  miracles,  which  are 
 on  all  hands,  acknowledged  to  be  fabulous.  But 
 suppose  that  there  were  even  the  like  historical  evi- 
 dence for  these,  to  what  there  is  for  those  alleged 
 in  proof  of  Christianity,  which  yet  is  in  nowise  al- 
 lowed, but  suppose  this;  the  consequence  would 
 not  be,  that  the  evidence  of  the  latter  is  not  to  be 
 admitted.  Nor  is  there  a  man  in  the  world  who, 
 in  common  cases,  would  conclude  thus.  For  what 
 would  such  a  conclusion  really  amount  to  but  this, 
 that  evidence  confuted  by  contrary  evidence,  or  any 
 way  overbalanced,  destroys  the  credibility  of  other 
 evidence,  neither  confuted,  nor  overbalanced?  To 
 argue,  that  because  there  is,  if  there  were,  like  evi- 
 dence from  testimony,  for  miracles  acknowledged 
 false,  as  for  those  in  attestation  of  Christianity, 
 therefore  the  evidence  in  the  latter  case  is  not  to  be 
 credited;  this  is  the  same  as  to  argue,  that  if  two 
 men  of  equally  good  reputation  had  given  evidence 
 in  different  cases  no  way  connected,  and  one  of  them 
 had  been  convicted  of  perjury,  this  confuted  the  tes- 
 timony of  the  other. 
 
 Upon  the  whole,  then,  the  general  observation 
 that  human  creatures  are  so  liable  to  be  deceived, 
 from  enthusiasm  in  religion,  and  principles  equiva- 
 lent to  enthusiasm  in  common  matters,  and  in  both 
 from  negligence;  and  that  they  are  so  capable  of 
 dishonestly  endeavouring  to  deceive  others;  this\ 
 does  indeed  weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  all 
 cases,  but  does  not  destroy  it  in  any.      And  these 
 
459 
 
 things  will  appear  to  different  men  to  weaken  the 
 evidence  of  testimony  in  different  degrees ;  in  de- 
 grees proportionable  to  the  observations  they  have 
 made,  or  the  notions  they  have  any  way  taken  up, 
 concerning  the  weakness,  and  negligence,  and  dis- 
 honesty of  mankind;  or  concerning  the  powers  of 
 enthusiasm,  and  prejudices  equivalent  to  it.  But  it 
 seems  to  me,  that  people  do  not  know  what  they  say, 
 who  affirm  these  things  to  destroy  the  evidence  from 
 testimony,  which  we  have  of  the  truth  of  Christianity. 
 Nothing  can  destroy  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  any 
 case,  but  a  proof  or  probability,  that  persons  are 
 not  competent  judges  of  the  facts  to  which  they  give 
 testimony ;  or  that  they  are  actually  under  some  in- 
 direct influence  in  giving  it,  in  such  particular  case, 
 Till  this  be  made  out,  the  natural  laws  of  human 
 actions  require  that  testimony  be  admitted.  It  can 
 never  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  direct  historical  evi- 
 dence, indolently  to  say,  that  there  are  so  many  prin- 
 ciples, from  whence  men  are  liable  to  be  deceived 
 themselves  and  disposed  to  deceive  others,  especially 
 in  matters  of  religion,  that  one  knows  not  what  to 
 believe.  And  it  is  surprising  persons  can  help  re- 
 flecting, that  this  very  manner  of  speaking  supposes, 
 they  are  not  satisfied  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  evi- 
 dence, of  which  they  speak  thus ;  or  that  they  can 
 avoid  observing,  if  they  do  make  this  reflection,  that 
 it  is,  on  such  a  subject,  a  very  material  one.* 
 
 And  over  against  all  these  objections,  is  to  be  set 
 the  importance  of  Christianity,  as  what  must  have 
 engaged  the  attention  of  its  first  converts,  so  as  to 
 
 See  the  foregoing  Chapter. 
 
 v2 
 
460 
 
 have  rendered  them  less  liable  to  be  deceived  from 
 carelessness,  than  they  would  in  common  matters; 
 and  likewise  the  strong  obligations  to  veracity,  which 
 their  religion  laid  them  under :  so  that  the  first  and 
 most  obvious  presumption  is,  that  they  could  not  be 
 deceived  themselves,  nor  would  deceive  others.  And 
 this  presumption,  in  this  degree,  is  peculiar  to  the 
 testimony  we  have  been  considering. 
 
 In  argument,  assertions  are  nothing  in  them- 
 selves, and  have  an  air  of  positiveness,  which  some- 
 times is  not  very  easy :  yet  they  are  necessary,  and 
 necessary  to  be  repeated,  in  order  to  connect  a  dis- 
 course, and  distinctly  to  lay  before  the  view  of  the 
 reader,  what  is  proposed  to  be  proved,  and  what  is 
 left  as  proved.  Now,  the  conclusion  from  the  fore- 
 going observations  is,  I  think,  beyond  all  doubt  this : 
 that  unbelievers  must  be  forced  to  admit  the  exter- 
 nal evidence  for  Christianity,  that  is,  the  proof  of 
 miracles  wrought  to  attest  it,  to  be  of  real  weight 
 and  very  considerable ;  though  they  cannot  allow  it 
 to  be  sufficient,  to  convince  them  of  the  reality  of 
 those  miracles.  And  as  they  must,  in  all  reason, 
 admit  this,  so  it  seems  to  me,  that  upon  considera- 
 tion they  would,  in  fact,  admit  it ;  those  of  them,  I 
 mean,  who  know  any  thing  at  all  of  the  matter :  in 
 like  manner  as  persons,  in  many  cases,  own,  they 
 see  strong  evidence  from  testimony,  for  the  truth  of 
 tilings,  which  yet  they  cannot  be  convinced  are  true; 
 cases,  suppose,  where  there  is  contrary  testimony, 
 or  things  which  they  think,  whether  with  or  without 
 reason,  to  be  credible.  But  there  is  no  testimony 
 contrary  to  that  which  we  have  been  considering; 
 and  it  has  been  fully  proved,  that  there  is  no  incre- 
 
461 
 
 dibility  in   Christianity  in  general,  or  in  any  part 
 of  it. 
 
 II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from  pro- 
 phecy, I  shall  only  make  some  few  general  observa- 
 tions, which  are  suggested  by  the  analogy  of  nature ; 
 that  is,  by  the  acknowledged  natural  rules  of  judging 
 in  common  matters   concerning  evidence  of  a  like 
 
 o 
 
 kind  to  this  from  prophecy. 
 
 1.  The  obscurity  or  unintelligibleness  of  one  part 
 of  a  prophecy,  does  not  in  any  degree,  invalidate  the 
 proof  of  foresight,  arising  from  the  appearing  com- 
 pletion of  those  other  parts  which  are  understood. 
 For  the  case  is  evidently  the  same,  as  if  those  parts 
 which  are  not  understood,  were  lost,  or  not  written 
 at  all,  or  written  in  an  unknown  tongue.  Whe- 
 ther this  observation  be  commonly  attended  to  or 
 not,  it  is  so  evident,  that  one  can  scarce  bring  one's 
 self  to  set  down  an  instance  in  common  matters,  to 
 exemplify  it.  However,  suppose  a  writing,  partly 
 in  cypher,  and  partly  in  plain  words  at  length,  and 
 that  in  the  part  one  understood,  there  appeared  men- 
 tion of  several  known  facts ;  it  would  never  come  into 
 any  man's  thoughts  to  imagine,  that  if  he  understood 
 the  whole,  perhaps  he  might  find,  that  those  facts 
 were  not  in  reality  known  by  the  writer.  Indeed, 
 both  in  this  example,  and  the  thing  intended  to  be 
 exemplified  by  it,  our  not  understanding  the  whole 
 (the  whole,  suppose,  of  a  sentence  or  a  paragraph) 
 might  sometimes  occasion  a  doubt,  whether  one  un- 
 derstood the  literal  meaning  of  such  a  part;  but  this 
 comes  under  another  consideration. 
 
 For  the  same  reason,  though  a  man  should  be  in- 
 capable, for  want  of  learning,  or   opportunities   of 
 
462 
 
 inquiry,  or  from  not  having  turned  bis  studies  this 
 way,  even  so  much  as  to  judge,  whether  particular 
 prophecies  have  been  throughout  completely  fulfilled; 
 yet  he  may  see,  in  general,  that  they  have  been 
 fulfilled  to  such  a  degree,  as,  upon  very  good 
 ground,  to  be  convinced  of  foresight  more  than 
 human  in  such  prophecies,  and  of  such  events  being 
 intended  by  them.  For  the  same  reason  also,  though 
 by  means  of  the  deficiencies  in  civil  history,  and  the 
 different  accounts  of  historians,  the  most  learned 
 should  not  be  able  to  make  out  to  satisfaction,  that 
 such  parts  of  the  prophetic  history  have  been  mi- 
 nutely and  throughout  fulfilled ;  yet,  a  very  strong 
 proof  of  foresight  may  arise,  from  that  general  com- 
 pletion of  them  which  is  made  out:  as  much  proof 
 of  foresight,  perhaps,  as  the  Giver  of  prophecy  in- 
 tended should  ever  be  afforded  by  such  parts  of 
 prophecy. 
 
 2.  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to 
 such  and  such  events,  is  itself  a  proof,  that  it  was 
 intended  of  them;  as  the  rules  by  which  we  natu- 
 rally judge  and  determine,  in  common  cases  parallel 
 to  this,  will  show.  This  observation  I  make  in  an- 
 swer to  the  common  objection  against  the  application 
 of  the  prophecies,  that  considering  each  of  them  dis- 
 tinctly by  itself,  it  does  not  at  all  appear,  that  they 
 were  intended  of  those  particular  events  to  which 
 they  are  applied  by  Christians;  and  therefore  it  is 
 to  be  supposed,  that,  if  they  meant  any  thing,  they 
 were  intended  of  other  events  unknown  to  us,  and 
 not  of  these  at  all. 
 
 Now,  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing,  which  bear 
 a  great  resemblance  to  prophecy^  with  respect  to  the 
 
463 
 
 matter  before  us ;  the  mythological  and  the  satirical, 
 where  the  satire  is,  to  a  certain  degree,  concealed. 
 And  a  man  might  be  assured,  that  he  understood 
 what  an  author  intended  by  a  fable  or  parable,  related 
 without  any  application  or  moral,  merely  from  seeing 
 it  to  be  easily  capable  of  such  application,  and  that 
 such  a  moral  might  naturally  be  deduced  from  it. 
 And  he  might  be  fully  assured,  that  such  persons 
 and  events  were  intended  in  a  satirical  writing,  mere- 
 ly from  its  being  applicable  to  them.      And,  agree- 
 ably to  the  last  observation,  he  might  be  in  a  good 
 measure  satisfied  of  it,  though  he  were  not  enough 
 informed  in  affairs  or  in  the  story  of  such  persons, 
 to  understand  half  the  satire.      For,  his  satisfaction, 
 that  he  understood  the  meaning,  the  intended  mean- 
 ing, of  these  writings,  would  be  greater  or  less,  in 
 proportion  as  he  saw  the  general  turn  of  them  to  be 
 capable  of  such  application,  and  in  proportion  to  the 
 number  of  particular  things  capable  of  it.    And  thus, 
 if  a  long  series  of  prophecy  is  applicable  to  the  pre- 
 sent state  of  the  church,  and  to  the  political  situa- 
 tions of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world,  some  thousand 
 years  after  these  prophecies  were  delivered,   and  a 
 long  series  of  prophecy  delivered  before  the  coming 
 of  Christ  is  applicable  to  him;  these  things  are  in 
 themselves  a  proof,  that  the  prophetic  history  was 
 intended  of  him,  and  of  those  events;   in  propor- 
 tion as  the  general  turn  of  it   is  capable  of  such 
 application,  and  to  the  number  and  variety  of  parti- 
 cular prophecies  capable  of  it.     And,  though  in  all 
 just  way  of  consideration,  the  appearing  completion 
 of  prophecies  is  to  be  allowed  to  be  thus  explanatory 
 of,  and  to  determine  their  meaning;  yet  it  is  to  be 
 
464 
 
 remembered  farther,  that  the  ancient  Jews  applied 
 the  prophecies  to  a  Messiah  before  his  coming,  in 
 
 much  the  same  manner  as  Christians  do  now;  and 
 that  the  primitive  Christians  interpreted  the  prophe- 
 cies respecting  the  state  of  the  church  and  of  the 
 world,  in  the  last  ages,  in  the  sense  which  the  event 
 seems  to  confirm  and  verify.  And  from  these  things 
 it  may  be  made  to  appear, 
 
 3.  That  the  showing,  even  to  a  high  probability,  if 
 that  could  be,  that  the  prophets  thought  of  some 
 other  events,  in  such  and  such  predictions,  and  not 
 those  at  all  which  Christians  allege  to  be  completions 
 of  those  predictions ;  or  that  such  and  such  prophe- 
 cies are  capable  of  being  applied  to  other  events  than 
 those  to  which  Christians  apply  them — that  this 
 would  not  confute  or  destroy  the  force  of  the  argu- 
 ment from  prophecy,  even  with  regard  to  those  very 
 instances.  For,  observe  how  this  matter  really  is. 
 If  one  knew  such  a  person  to  be  the  sole  author  of 
 such  a  book,  and  was  certainly  assured,  or  satisfied 
 to  any  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole  of  what  he 
 intended  in  it,  one  should  be  assured  or  satisfied  to 
 such  a  degree,  that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of 
 that  book ;  for  the  meaning  of  a  book  is  nothing  but 
 the  meaning  of  the  author.  But  if  one  knew  a  per- 
 son to  have  compiled  a  book  out  of  memoirs,  which 
 he  received  from  another,  of  vastly  superior  know- 
 ledge in  the  subject  of  it,  especially  if  it  were  a  book 
 full  of  great  intricacies  and  difficulties,  it  would  in 
 nowise  follow,  that  one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of 
 the  book,  from  knowing  the  whole  meaning  of  the 
 compiler;  for  the  original  memoirs,  that  is,  the  au- 
 thor of  them,  might  have,  and  there  would  be  no 
 
465 
 
 degree  of  presumption,  in  many  cases,  against  sup- 
 posing him  to  have,  some  farther  meaning  than  the 
 compiler  saw.  To  say,  then,  that  the  Scriptures 
 and  the  things  contained  in  them  can  have  no  other 
 or  farther  meaning,  than  those  persons  thought  or 
 had,  who  first  recited  or  wrote  them,  is  evidently 
 saying,  that  those  persons  were  the  original,  proper, 
 and  sole  authors  of  those  books,  that  is,  that  they 
 are  not  inspired ;  which  is  absurd,  whilst  the  autho- 
 rity of  these  books  is  under  examination,  that  is, 
 till  you  have  determined  they  are  of  no  divine  au- 
 thority at  all.  Till  this  be  determined,  it  must  in  all 
 reason  be  supposed,  not  indeed  that  they  have,  for 
 this  is  taking  for  granted  that  they  are  inspired,  but 
 that  they  may  have  some  farther  meaning  than  what 
 the  compilers  saw  or  understood.  And,  upon  this 
 supposition,  it  is  supposable  also,  that  this  farther 
 meaning  may  be  fulfilled.  Now,  events  correspond- 
 ing to  prophecies,  interpreted  in  a  different  meaning 
 from  that  in  which  the  prophets  are  supposed  to  have 
 understood  them;  this  affords,  in  a  manner,  the 
 same  proof  that  this  different  sense  was  originally 
 intended,  as  it  would  have  afforded,  if  the  prophets 
 had  not  understood  their  predictions  in  the  sense  it 
 is  supposed  they  did ;  because  there  is  no  presump- 
 tion of  their  sense  of  them  being  the  whole  sense  or 
 them.  And  it  has  been  already  shown,  that  the 
 apparent  completions  of  prophecy  must  be  allowed 
 to  be  explanatory  of  its  meaning.  So  that  the  ques- 
 tion is,  whether  a  series  of  prophecy  has  been  ful- 
 filled, in  a  natural  or  proper,  that  is,  in  any  real, 
 sense  of  the  words  of  it.  For  such  completion  is 
 equally  a  proof  of  foresight  more  than  human,  whe- 
 u3 
 
466 
 
 ther  the  prophets  are,  01  are  not,  supposed  to  have 
 understood  it  in  a  different  sense.  I  say,  supposed; 
 for  though  I  think  it  clear,  that  the  prophets  did 
 not  understand  the  full  meaning  of  their  predictions, 
 it  is  another  question,  how  far  they  thought  they 
 did,  and  in  what  sense  they  understood  them. 
 
 Hence  may  be  seen,  to  how  little  purpose  those 
 persons  busy  themselves,  who  endeavour  to  prove 
 that  the  prophetic  history  is  applicable  to  events  of 
 the  age  in  which  it  was  written,  or  of  ages  before  it. 
 Indeed,  to  have  proved  this  before  there  was  any 
 appearance  of  a  further  completion  of  it,  might  have 
 answered  some  purpose ;  for  it  might  have  prevented 
 the  expectation  of  any  such  farther  completion. 
 Thus,  could  Porphyry  have  shown,  that  some  prin- 
 cipal parts  of  the  book  of  Daniel,  for  instance,  the 
 seventh  verse  of  the  seventh  chapter,  which  the 
 Christians  interpreted  of  the  latter  ages,  was  appli- 
 cable to  events  which  happened  before  or  about  the 
 age  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes ;  this  might  have  pre- 
 vented them  from  expecting  any  farther  completion 
 of  it.  And  unless  there  was  then,  as  I  think  there 
 must  have  been,  external  evidence  concerning  that 
 book,  more  than  is  come  down  to  us,  such  a  dis- 
 covery might  have  been  a  stumbling-block  in  the 
 way  of  Christianity  itself;  considering  the  authority 
 which  our  Saviour  has  given  to  the  book  of  Daniel, 
 and  how  much  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity 
 presupposes  the  truth  of  it.  But  even  this  dis- 
 covery, had  there  been  any  such,*  would  be  of  very 
 
 •  It  appears,  that  Porphyry  did  nothing  worth  mentioning  in 
 this  way.  For  Jerome  on  the  place  says :  Duas  posteriores  bestias — 
 in  una  Macedorum  regno  ponit.     And  as  to  the  ten  kings  :    Decern 
 
467 
 
 little  weight  with  reasonable  men  now ;  if  this  pas- 
 sage, thus  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of 
 Porphyry,  appears  to  be  applicable  also  to  events 
 which  succeeded  the  dissolution  of  the  Roman  em- 
 pire. I  mention  this,  not  at  all  as  intending  to  in- 
 sinuate, that  the  division  of  this  empire  into  ten 
 parts,  for  it  was  plainly  divided  into  about  that  num- 
 ber, were,  alone,  and  by  itself,  of  any  moment  in 
 verifying  the  prophetic  history;  but  only  as  an  ex- 
 ample of  the  thing  I  am  speaking  of.  And  thus, 
 upon  the  whole,  the  matter  of  inquiry  evidently 
 must  be,  as  above  put,  Whether  the  prophecies  are 
 applicable  to  Christ,  and  to  the  present  state  of  the 
 world  and  of  the  church:  applicable  in  such  a  degree, 
 as  to  imply  foresight :  not  whether  they  are  capable 
 of  any  other  application ;  though  I  know  no  pretence 
 for  saying,  the  general  turn  of  them  is  capable  of 
 any  other. 
 
 These  observations  are,  I  think,  just,  and  the 
 evidence  referred  to  in  them,  real ;  though  there 
 may  be  people  who  will  not  accept  of  such  imperfect 
 information  from  Scripture.  Some  too  have  not 
 integrity  and  regard  enough  to  truth,  to  attend  to 
 evidence,  which  keeps  the  mind  in  doubt,  perhaps 
 perplexity,  and  which  is  much  of  a  different  sort 
 from  what  they  expected.  And  it  plainly  requires 
 a  degree  of  modesty  and  fairness,  beyond  what  every 
 one  has,  for  a  man  to  say,  not  to  the  world,  but  to 
 himself,  that  there  is  a  real  appearance  of  somewhat 
 
 reges  enumerat,  qui,  fuerunt  soevissbni ;  ipsosque  rtges  -non  u?iius 
 punit  regni,  verbi  gratia,  Macedonia,  Syria,  Asia,  et  Egypti;  sed 
 de  diversis  regnis  union  efficit  regum  ordinem.  And  in  this  way  of 
 interpretation,  any  thing  may  be  made  of  any  thing. 
 
468 
 
 of  great  weight  in  this  matter,  though  he  is  not 
 able  thoroughly  to  satisfy  himself  about  it;  but  it 
 shall  have  its  influence  upon  him,  in  proportion  to 
 its  appearing  reality  and  weight.  It  is  much  more 
 easy,  and  more  falls  in  with  the  negligence,  presump- 
 tion, and  wilfulness  of  the  generality,  to  determine 
 at  once,  with  a  decisive  air,  there  is  nothing  in  it. 
 The  prejudices  arising  from  that  absolute  contempt 
 and  scorn,  with  which  this  evidence  is  treated  in  the 
 world,  I  do  not  mention.  For  what  indeed  can  be 
 said  to  persons,  who  are  weak  enough  in  their  un- 
 derstandings to  think  this  any  presumption  against 
 it ;  or,  if  they  do  not,  are  yet  weak  enough  in  their 
 temper  to  be  influenced  by  such  prejudices,  upon 
 such  a  subject. 
 
 1  shall  now,  secondly,  Endeavour  to  give  some 
 account  of  the  general  argument  for  the  truth  of 
 Christianity,  consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  cir- 
 cumstantial evidence,  considered  as  making  up  one 
 argument.  Indeed,  to  state  and  examine  this  armi- 
 ment  fully,  would  be  a  work  much  beyond  the  com- 
 pass of  this  whole  treatise ;  nor  is  so  much  as  a  pro- 
 per abridgment  of  it  to  be  expected  here.  Yet  the 
 present  subject  requires  to  have  some  brief  account 
 of  it  given.  For  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence  upon 
 which  most  questions  of  difficulty,  in  common  prac- 
 tice, are  determined;  evidence  arising  from  various 
 coincidences,  which  support  and  confirm  each  other, 
 and  in  this  manner  prove,  with  more  or  less  certainty, 
 the  point  under  consideration.  And  I  choose  to  do  it 
 also,  first,  Because  it  seems  to  be  of  the  greatest  im- 
 portance, and  not  duly  attended  to  by  every  one,  that 
 the  proof  of  revelation  is,  not  some  direct  and  express 
 
469 
 
 things  only,  but  a  great  variety  of  circumstantial 
 things  also;  and  that  though  each  of  these  direct  and 
 circumstantial  things  is  indeed  to  be  considered  sepa- 
 rately, yet  they  are  afterwards  to  be  joined  together; 
 for  that  the  proper  force  of  the  evidence  consists  in  the 
 result  of  those  several  things,  considered  in  their  re- 
 spects to  each  other,  and  united  into  one  view;  and, 
 in  the  next  place,  Because  it  seems  to  me,  that  the 
 matters  of  facts  here  set  down,  which  are  acknow- 
 ledged by  unbelievers,  must  be  acknowledged  by  them 
 also  to  contain  together  a  degree  of  evidence  of  great 
 weight,  if  they  could  be  brought  to  lay  these  several 
 things  before  themselves  distinctly,  and  then  with 
 attention  consider  them  together;  instead  of  that 
 cursory  thought  of  them,  to  which  we  are  familiar- 
 ized. For  being  familiarized  to  the  cursory  thought 
 of  things,  as  really  hinders  the  weight  of  them  from 
 being  seen,  as  from  having  its  due  influence  upon 
 practice. 
 
 The  thing  asserted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to 
 be  inquired  into,  is  this :  that  over  and  above  our 
 reason  and  affections,  which  God  has  given  us  for 
 the  information  of  our  judgment  and  the  conduct  of 
 our  lives,  he  has  also,  by  external  revelation,  given 
 us  an  account  of  himself  and  his  moral  government 
 over  the  world,  implying  a  future  state  of  rewards 
 and  punishments ;  that  is,  hath  revealed  the  system 
 of  natural  religion ;  for  natural  religion  may  be  ex- 
 ternally* revealed  by  God,  as  the  ignorant  may  be 
 taught  it  by  mankind,  their  fellow-creatures — that 
 God,  I  say,  has  given  us  the  evidence  of  revelation, 
 as  well  as  the  evidence  of  reason,  to  ascertain  this 
 
 *  Pa?e  33S,  fcc. 
 
470 
 
 moral  system ;  together  with  an  account  of  a  parti- 
 cular dispensation  of  Providence,  which  reason  could 
 no  way  have  discovered,  and  a  particular  institution 
 of  religion  founded  on  it,  for  the  recovery  of  man- 
 kind out  of  their  present  wretched  condition,  and 
 raising  them  to  the  perfection  and  final  happiness  of 
 their  nature. 
 
 This  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may  be 
 considered  as  wholly  historical.  For  prophecy  is 
 nothing  but  the  history  of  events  before  they  come 
 to  pass  :  doctrines  also  are  matters  of  fact :  and  pre- 
 cepts come  under  the  same  notion.  And  the  general 
 design  of  Scripture,  which  contains  in  it  this  reve- 
 lation, thus  considered  as  historical,  may  be  said  to 
 be,  to  give  us  an  account  of  the  world,  in  this  one 
 single  view,  as  God's  world ;  by  which  it  appears  es- 
 sentially distinguished  from  all  other  books,  so  far  as 
 I  have  found,  except  such  as  are  copied  from  it.  It 
 begins  with  an  account  of  God's  creation  of  the 
 world,  in  order  to  ascertain  and  distinguish  from  all 
 others,  who  is  the  object  of  our  worship,  by  what  he 
 has  done ;  in  order  to  ascertain  who  he  is,  concerning 
 whose  providence,  commands,  promises,  and  threat- 
 enings,  this  sacred  book  all  along  treats;  the  Maker 
 and  Proprietor  of  the  world,  he  whose  creatures  we 
 are,  the  God  of  nature :  in  order  likewise  to  distin- 
 guish him  from  the  idols  of  the  nations,  which  are 
 either  imaginary  beings,  that  is,  no  beings  at  all; 
 or  else  part  of  that  creation,  the  historical  relation  of 
 which  is  here  given.  And  St.  John,  not  improbably 
 with  an  eye  to  this  Mosaic  account  of  the  creation, 
 begins  his  gospel  with  an  account  of  our  Saviour's 
 pre-existence,  and  that  "all  things  were  made  by 
 
471     • 
 
 him,  and  without  him  was  not  any  thing  made  that 
 was  made;"  agreeably  to  the  doctrine  of  St.  Paul, 
 that   "  God   created   all   things  by  Jesus    Christ." 
 This  being  premised,  the  Scripture,  taken  together, 
 seems  to  profess  to  contain  a  kind  of  an  abridgment 
 of  the  history  of  the  world,  in  the  view  just  now 
 mentioned ;  that  is,  a  general  account  of  the  condi- 
 tion of  religion  and  its  professors,  during  the  conti- 
 nuance of  that  apostacy  from  God,  and  state  of  wick- 
 edness, which  it  every  where  supposes  the  world  to 
 lie  in.     And  this  account  of  the  state  of  religion 
 carries  with  it  some  brief  account  of  the  political  state 
 of  things,  as  religion  is  affected  by  it.      Revelation, 
 indeed,  considers  the  common  affairs  of  this  world, 
 and  what  is  going  on  in  it,  as  a  mere  scene  of  dis- 
 traction, and  cannot  be  supposed  to  concern  itself 
 with  foretelling  at  what  time  Rome,  or  Babylon,  or 
 Greece,  or  any  particular  place,  should  be  the  most 
 conspicuous  seat  of  that  tyranny  and  dissoluteness, 
 which  all  places  equally  aspire  to  be ;    cannot,  I  ray, 
 be  supposed  to  give  any  account  of  this  wild  scene 
 for  its  own  sake.     But  it  seems  to  contain  some  very 
 general  account  of  the  chief  governments  of  the  world, 
 as  the  general  state  of  religion  has  been,  is,  or  shall 
 be,  affected  by  them,  from  the  first  transgression,  and 
 during  the  whole  interval  of  the  world's  continuing 
 in  its  present  state,  to  a  certain  future  period,  spoken 
 of  both  in  the  Old  and  New  Testament,  very  dis- 
 tinctly, and  in  great  variety  of  expression :    "  The 
 times  of  the  restitution  of  all  things :"   when  "  the 
 mystery  of  God  shall  be  finished,  as  he  hath  declared 
 to  his  servants  the  prophets ;"    when  "  the  God  of 
 heaven  shall  set  up  a  kingdom  which  shall  never  be 
 
472 
 
 destroyed;  and  the  kingdom  shall  not  be  left  to  other 
 people,"  as  it  is  represented  to  be  during  this  apos* 
 tacy,  but  "judgment  shall  be  given  to  the  saints,"* 
 and  "  they  shall  reign  ;"f  "  and  the  kingdom  and 
 dominion,  and  the  greatness  of  the  kingdom  under 
 the  whole  heaven,  shall  be  given  to  the  people  of  the 
 saints  of  the  Most  High.";}: 
 
 Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture,  I  would 
 remark,  how  great  a  length  of  time  the  whole  rela- 
 tion takes  up,  near  six  thousand  years  of  which  are 
 past :  and  how  great  a  variety  of  things  it  treats  of; 
 the  natural  and  moral  system  or  history  of  the  world, 
 including  the  time  when  it  was  formed,  all  contained 
 in  the  very  first  book,  and  evidently  written  in  a  rude 
 and  unlearned  age;  and  in  subsequent  books,  the 
 various  common  and  prophetic  history,  and  the  par- 
 ticular dispensation  of  Christianity.  Now,  all  this 
 together  gives  the  largest  scope  for  criticism;  and 
 for  confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being  confuted, 
 either  from  reason,  or  from  common  history,  or  from 
 any  inconsistence  in  its  several  parts.  And  it  is  a 
 thing  which  deserves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that 
 whereas  some  imagine,  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of 
 the  evidence  for  revelation  implies  a  positive  argu- 
 ment that  it  is  not  true;  it  appears,  on  the  contrary,  to 
 imply  a  positive  argument  that  it  is  true.  For,  could 
 any  common  relation,  of  such  antiquity,  extent,  and 
 variety,  (for  in  these  things  the  stress  of  what  I  am 
 now  observing  lies)  be  proposed  to  the  examination 
 of  the  world ;  that  it  could  not,  in  any  age  of  know- 
 ledge and  liberty,  be  confuted,  or  shown  to  have  no- 
 
 *  Dan.  vii.  22.  f  Rev.  J  Dan.  vii. 
 
473 
 
 thing  in  it,  to  the  satisfaction  of  reasonable  men  ; 
 this  would  be  thought  a  strong  presumptive  proof  of 
 its  truth.  And  indeed,  it  must  be  a  proof  of  it,  just 
 in  proportion  to  the  probability,  that  if  it  were  false, 
 it  might  be  shown  to  be  so ;  and  this,  I  think,  is 
 scarce  pretended  to  be  shown,  but  upon  principles 
 and  in  ways  of  arguing  which  have  been  clearly  ob- 
 viated.* Nor  does  it  at  all  appear,  that  any  set  of 
 men  who  believe  natural  religion,  are  of  the  opinion, 
 that  Christianity  has  been  thus  confuted.  But  to 
 proceed  : 
 
 Together  with  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  the 
 Old  Testament  contains  a  chronological  account  of 
 the  beginning  of  it,  and  from  thence,  an  unbroken 
 genealogy  of  mankind  for  many  ages  before  common 
 history  begins;  and  carried  on  as  much  farther,  as  to 
 make  up  a  continued  thread  of  history,  of  the  length 
 of  between  three  and  four  thousand  years.  It  con- 
 tains an  account  of  God's  making  a  covenant  with  a 
 particular  nation,  that  they  should  be  his  people, 
 and  he  would  be  their  God,  in  a  peculiar  sense; 
 of  his  often  interposing  miraculously  in  their  affairs ; 
 giving  them  the  promise,  and,  long  after,  the  pos- 
 session, of  a  particular  country;  assuring  them  of  the 
 greatest  national  prosperity  in  it,  if  they  would  wor- 
 ship him,  in  opposition  to  the  idols  which  the  rest  of 
 the  world  worshipped,  and  obey  his  commands,  and 
 threatening  them  with  unexampled  punishments,  if 
 they  disobeyed  him,  and  fell  into  the  general  idola- 
 try ;  insomuch,  that  this  one  nation  should  continue 
 to  be  the  observation  and  the  wonder  of  all  the  world. 
 
 *  Chap.  2,  3,  &c. 
 
474 
 
 It  declares  particularly,  that  "  God  would  scatter 
 them  among  all  people,  from  one  end  of  the  earth 
 unto  the  other;"  but  that  "when  they  should  return 
 unto  the  Lord  their  God,  he  would  have  compassion 
 upon  them,  and  gather  them,  from  all  the  nations 
 whether  he  had  scattered  them;  that  "Israel  should 
 be  saved  in  the  Lord,  with  an  everlasting  salvation, 
 and  not  be  ashamed  or  confounded,  world  without 
 end."  And  as  some  of  those  promises  are  condi- 
 tional, others  are  as  absolute  as  any  thing  can  be  ex- 
 pressed, that  the  time  should  come,  when  "the  peo- 
 ple should  be  all  righteous,  and  inherit  the  land  for 
 ever;"  that  "though  God  would  make  a  full  end  of 
 all  nations  whither  he  had  scattered  them,  yet  would 
 he  not  make  a  full  end  of  them :"  that  "  he  would 
 bring  again  the  captivity  of  his  people  Israel,  and 
 plant  them  upon  their  land,  and  they  should  be  no 
 more  pulled  out  of  their  land:"  that  "the  seed  of 
 Israel  should  not  cease  from  being  a  nation  for 
 ever."*  It  foretels,  that  God  would  raise  them  up 
 a  particular  person,  in  whom  all  his  promises  should 
 finally  be  fulfilled ;  the  Messiah,  who  should  be,  in 
 a  high  and  eminent  sense,  their  anointed  Prince  and 
 Saviour.  This  was  foretold  in  such  a  manner,  as 
 raised  a  general  expectation  of  such  a  person  in  the 
 nation,  as  appears  from  the  New  Testament,  and  is 
 an  acknowledged  fact ;  an  expectation  of  his  coming 
 at  such  a  particular  time,  before  any  one  appeared, 
 claiming  to  be  that  person,  and  when  there  was  no 
 ground  for  such  an  expectation  but  from  the  pro- 
 
 *  Deut.  xxviii.  64.     Ch.  xxx.  2,  3.     Isa.  xlv.  17.     Ch.  lx.  21. 
 Jer.  xxx.  11.     Ch.  xlvi.  28.     Amos  ix.  15.     Jer.  xxxi.  86. 
 
475 
 
 phecies;  which  expectation,  therefore,  must  in  all 
 reason  be  presumed  to  be  explanatory  of  those  pro- 
 phecies, if  there  were  any  doubt  about  their  mean- 
 ing. It  seems  moreover  to  foretel,  that  this  person 
 should  be  rejected  by  that  nation,  to  whom  he  had 
 been  so  long  promised,  and  though  he  was  so  much 
 desired  by  them.*  And  it  expressly  foretels,  that 
 he  should  be  the  Saviour  of  the  Gentiles ;  and  even 
 that  the  completion  of  the  scheme  contained  in  this 
 book,  and  then  begun  and  in  its  progress,  should  be 
 somewhat  so  great,  that,  in  comparison  with  it,  the 
 restoration  of  the  Jews  alone  would  be  but  of  small 
 account :  "  It  is  a  light  thing  that  thou  shouldst  be 
 my  servant  to  raise  up  the  tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to  re- 
 store the  preserved  of  Israel :  I  will  also  give  thee 
 for  a  light  to  the  Gentiles,  that  thou  mayest  be  foi 
 salvation  unto  the  end  of  the  earth."  And,  "  In 
 the  last  days,  the  mountain  of  the  Lord's  house 
 shall  be  established  in  the  top  of  the  mountains,  and 
 shall  be  exalted  above  the  hills;  and  all  nations  shall 
 flow  into  it — for  out  of  Zion  shall  go  forth  the  law, 
 and  the  word  of  the  Lord  from  Jerusalem.  And  he 
 shall  judge  among  the  nations — and  the  Lord  alone 
 shall  be  exalted  in  that  day,  and  the  idols  he  shall 
 utterly  abolish."f  The  Scripture  farther  contains 
 an  account,  that  at  the  time  the  Messiah  was  ex- 
 pected, a  person  rose  up,  in  this  nation,  claiming  to 
 
 *  Isa.  viii.  14,  15.  Ch.  xlix.  b.  Ch.  liii.  Mat  i.  10,  11.  and 
 Ch.  iii. 
 
 f  Isa.  xlix.  6.  Ch.  ii.  Ch.  xi.  Ch.  hi.  7.  Mai.  i.  11.— To 
 which  must  be  added,  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind. 
 several  in  the  New  Testament,  and  very  many  in  the  Old,  which 
 describe  what  shall  be  the  completion  of  the  revealed  plan  of 
 Providence. 
 
476 
 
 be  that  Messiah,  to  be  the  person  whom  all  the  pro- 
 phecies referred  to,  and  in  whom  they  should  centre; 
 that  he  spent  some  years  in  a  continued  course  of 
 miraculous  works,  and  endued  his  immediate  dis- 
 ciples and  followers  with  a  power  of  doing  the  same, 
 as  a  proof  of  the  truth  of  that  religion  which  he 
 commissioned  them  to  publish ;  that,  invested  with 
 this  authority  and  power,  they  made  numerous  con- 
 verts in  the  remotest  countries,  and  settled  and  estab- 
 lished his  religion  in  the  world ;  to  the  end  of  which, 
 the  Scripture  professes  to  give  a  prophetic  account  of 
 the  state  of  this  religion  amongst  mankind. 
 
 Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  utterly  ignorant  of 
 history,  to  have  all  this  related  to  him,  out  of  the 
 Scripture.  Or,  suppose  such  a  one,  having  the 
 Scripture  put  into  his  hands,  to  remark  these  things 
 in  it,  not  knowing  but  that  the  whole,  even  its  civil 
 history,  as  well  as  the  other  parts  of  it,  might  be, 
 from  beginning  to  end,  an  entire  invention;  and  to 
 ask,  What  truth  was  in  it,  and  whether  the  revela- 
 tion here  related  was  real,  or  a  fiction?  And,  in- 
 stead of  a  direct  answer,  suppose  him,  all  at  once,  to 
 be  told  the  following  confessed  facts ;  and  then  to 
 unite  them  into  one  view. 
 
 Let  him  first  be  told,  in  how  great  a  degree  the 
 profession  and  establishment  of  natural  religion,  the 
 belief  that  there  is  one  God  to  be  worshipped,  that 
 virtue  is  his  law,  and  that  mankind  shall  be  rewarded 
 and  punished  hereafter,  as  they  obey  and  disobey  it 
 here;  in  how  very  great  a  degree,  I  say,  the  profes- 
 sion and  establishment  of  this  moral  system  in  the 
 world,  is  owing  to  the  revelation,  whether  real  or 
 supposed,  contained  in  this  book ;  the  establishment 
 
477 
 
 of  this  moral  system,  even  in  those  countries  which 
 do  not  acknowledge  the  proper  authority  of  the  Scrip- 
 ture.* Let  him  he  told  also  what  number  of  na- 
 tions do  acknowledge  its  proper  authority.  Let  him 
 then  take  in  the  consideration,  of  what  importance 
 religion  is  to  mankind.  And  upon  these  things,  he 
 might,  I  think,  truly  observe,  that  this  supposed  re- 
 velation obtaining  and  being  received  in  the  world, 
 with  all  the  circumstances  and  effects  of  it,  considered 
 together  as  one  event,  is  the  most  conspicuous  and 
 important  event  in  the  story  of  mankind:  that  a 
 book  of  this  nature,  and  thus  promulged  and  re- 
 commended to  our  consideration,  demands,  as  if  by 
 a  voice  from  heaven,  to  have  its  claims  most  seriously 
 examined  into ;  and  that,  before  such  examination, 
 to  treat  it  with  any  kind  of  scoffing  and  ridicule  is 
 au  offence  against  natural  piety.  But  it  is  to  be 
 remembered,  that  how  much  soever  the  establish- 
 ment of  natural  religion  in  the  world  is  owing  to  the 
 Scripture  revelation,  this  does  not  destroy  the  proof 
 of  religion  from  reason ;  any  more  than  the  proof  of 
 Euclid's  Elements  is  destroyed,  by  a  man's  knowing 
 or  thinking,  that  he  should  never  have  seen  the  truth 
 of  the  several  propositions  contained  in  it,  nor  had 
 those  propositions  come  into  his  thoughts,  but  for 
 that  mathematician. 
 
 Let  such  a  person  as  we  are  speaking  of,  be,  in 
 the  next  place,  informed  of  the  acknowledged  anti- 
 quity of  the  first  parts  of  this  book;  and  that  its 
 chronology,  its  account  of  the  time  when  the  earth, 
 and  the  several  parts  of  it,  were  first  peopled  with 
 
 *  Pase424. 
 
478 
 
 human  creatures,  is  no  way  contradicted,  but  is  real- 
 ly confirmed,  by  the  natural  and  civil  history  of  the 
 world,  collected  from  common  historians,  from  the 
 state  of  the  earth,  and  from  the  late  invention  of 
 arts  and  sciences.  And,  as  the  Scripture  contains 
 an  unbroken  thread  of  common  and  civil  history, 
 from  the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for  between  three 
 and  four  thousand  years:  let  the  person  we  are 
 speaking  of  be  told,  in  the  next  place,  that  this 
 general  history,  as  it  is  not  contradicted,  but  is  con- 
 firmed by  profane  history,  as  much  as  there  would 
 be  reason  to  expect,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth; 
 so  there  is  nothing  in  the  whole  history  itself  to  give 
 any  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion  of  its  not  being, 
 in  the  general,  a  faithful  and  literally  true  genealo- 
 gy of  men,  and  series  of  things.  I  speak  here  only 
 of  the  common  Scripture  history,  or  of  the  course  of 
 ordinary  events  related  in  it,  as  distinguished-  from 
 miracles,  and  from  the  prophetic  history.  In  all 
 the  Scripture  narrations  of  this  kind,  following 
 events  arise  out  of  foregoing  ones,  as  in  all  other 
 histories.  There  appears  nothing  related  as  done 
 in  any  age,  nor  conformable  to  the  manners  of  that 
 age :  nothing  in  the  account  of  a  succeeding  age, 
 which  one  would  say  could  not  be  true,  or  was  im- 
 probable, from  the  account  of  things  in  the  preced- 
 ing one.  There  is  nothing  in  the  characters  which 
 would  raise  a  thought  of  their  being  feigned;  but  all 
 the  internal  marks  imaginable  of  their  being  real. 
 It  is  to  be  added  also,  that  mere  genealogies,  bare 
 narratives  of  the  number  of  years  which  persons  cal- 
 led by  such  and  such  names  lived,  do  not  carry  the 
 face  of  fiction ;  perhaps  do  carry  some  presumption 
 
479 
 
 of  veracity:  and  all  unadorned  narratives,  which  have 
 nothing  to  surprise,  may  be  thought  to  carry  some- 
 what of  the  like  presumption  too.     And  the  domes- 
 tic and  the  political  history  is  plainly  credible.    There 
 may  be  incidents  in  Scripture,  which,  taken  alone  in 
 the  naked  way  they  are  told,  may  appear  strange, 
 especially  to  persons  of  other  manners,  temper,  edu- 
 cation;  but  there  are  also   incidents  of  undoubted 
 truth,  in  many  of  most  persons'  lives,  which,  in  the 
 same   circumstances,   would    appear  to   the  full    as 
 strange.      There  may  be  mistakes  of  transcribers, 
 there  may  be  other  real  or  seeming  mistakes,  not 
 easy  to  be  particularly  accounted  for;  but  there  are 
 certainly  no  more  things  of  this  kind  in  the  Scrip- 
 ture, than  what  were  to  have  been  expected  in  books 
 of  such  antiquity;  and  nothing,  in  any  wise,  suffi- 
 cient to  discredit  the  general  narrative.      Now,  that 
 a  history,  claiming  to  commence  from  the  creation, 
 and  extending  in  one  continued  series,  through  so 
 great  a  length  of  time,  and  variety  of  events,  should 
 have  such  appearances  of  reality  and  truth  in  its 
 whole  contexture,   is  surely  a  very  remarkable  cir- 
 cumstance in  its  favour.      And  as  all  this  is  appli- 
 cable to  the  common  history  of  the  New  Testament, 
 so  there  is  a  farther  credibility,  and  a  very  high  one, 
 given  to  it  by  profane  authors ;  many  of  these  writ- 
 ing of  the  same  times,  and  confirming  the  truth  of 
 customs  and  events,  which  are  incidentally,  as  well 
 as  more  purposely  mentioned  in  it.     And  this  credi- 
 bility of  the  common   Scripture  history  gives  some 
 credibility  to   its  miraculous  history:    especially  as 
 this  is  interwoven  with  the  common,  so  as  that  they 
 imply  each  other,  and  both  together  make  up  one 
 relation. 
 
480 
 
 Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  observed  to  this 
 person,  that  it  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of  fact, 
 which  is  indeed  implied  in  the  foregoing  observation, 
 that  there  was  such  a  nation  as  the  Jews,  of  the 
 greatest  antiquity,  whose  government  and  general 
 polity  was  founded  on  the  law,  here  related  to  be 
 given  them  by  Moses  as  from  heaven :  that  natural 
 religion,  though  with  rites  additional,  yet  no  way 
 contrary  to  it,  was  their  established  religion,  which 
 cannot  be  said  of  the  Gentile  world ;  and  that  their 
 very  being,  as  a  nation,  depended  upon  their  ac- 
 knowledgment of  one  God,  the  God  of  the  uni- 
 verse. For  suppose,  in  their  captivity  in  Babylon, 
 they  had  gone  over  to  the  religion  of  their  conquer- 
 ors, there  would  have  remained  no  bond  of  union, 
 to  keep  them  a  distinct  people.  And  whilst  they 
 were  under  their  own  kings  in  their  own  country,  a 
 total  apostacy  from  God  would  have  been  the  disso- 
 lution of  their  whole  government.  They,  in  such 
 a  sense,  nationally  acknowledged  and  worshipped  the 
 Maker  of  heaven  and  earth,  when  the  rest  of  the 
 world  were  sunk  in  idolatry,  as  rendered  them,  in 
 fact,  the  peculiar  people  of  God.  And  this,  so  re- 
 markable an  establishment  and  preservation  of  natu- 
 ral religion  amongst  them,  seems  to  add  some  pecu- 
 liar credibility  to  the  historical  evidence  for  the  mi- 
 racles of  Moses  and  the  prophets;  because  these 
 miracles  are  a  full  satisfactory  account  of  this  event' 
 which  plainly  wants  to  be  accounted  for,  and  cannot 
 otherwise. 
 
 Let  this  person,  supposed  wholly  ignorant  of  his- 
 tory, be  acquainted  farther,  that  one  claiming  to  be 
 the  Messiah,  of  Jewish  extraction,  rose  up  at  the 
 
48! 
 
 time  when  this  nation,  from  the  prophecies  above- 
 mentioned,  expected  the  Messiah :  that  he  was  re- 
 jected, as  it  seemed  to  have  been  foretold  he  should, 
 by  the  body  of  the  people,  under  the  direction  of 
 their  rulers :  that  in  the  course  of  a  very  few  years 
 he  was  believed  on,  and  acknowledged  as  the  pro- 
 mised Messiah,  by  great  numbers  among  the  Gen- 
 tiles, agreeable  to  the  prophecies  of  Scripture,  yet 
 not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles,* 
 of  which  miracles  we  also  have  strong  historical  evi- 
 dence; (by  which  I  mean  here  no  more  than  must 
 be  acknowledged  by  unbelievers;  for  let  pious  frauds 
 and  follies  be  admitted  to  weaken,  it  is  absurd  to  say 
 they  destroy,  our  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in 
 proof  of  Christianity  ;f)  that  this  religion  approv- 
 ing itself  to  the  reason  of  mankind,  and  carrying  its 
 own  evidence  with  it,  so  far  as  reason  is  a  judge  of 
 its  system,  and  being  no  way  contrary  to  reason  in 
 those  parts  of  it  which  require  to  be  believed  upon 
 the  mere  authority  of  its  Author;  that  this  religion, 
 I  say,  gradually  spread  and  supported  itself,  for  some 
 hundred  years,  not  only  without  any  assistance  from 
 temporal  power,  but  under  constant  discouragements, 
 and  often  the  bitterest  persecutions  from  it,  and  then 
 became  the  religion  of  the  world :  that  in  the  menu 
 time,  the  Jewish  nation  and  government  were  de- 
 stroyed in  a  very  remarkable  manner,  and  the  peo- 
 ple carried  away  captive  and  dispersed  through  the 
 most  distant  countries ;  in  which  state  of  dispersion 
 they  have  remained  fifteen  hundred  years :  and  that 
 they  remain   a  numerous    people,    united   amongst 
 
 Page  450,  &c.  1   Page  459,  &c. 
 
 x  17 
 
482 
 
 themselves,  and  distinguished  from  the  rest  of  the 
 world,  as  they  were  in  the  days  of  Moses,  by  the 
 profession  of  his  law :  and  every  where  looked  upon 
 in  a  manner,  which  one  scarce  knows  how  distinctly 
 to  express,  but  in  the  words  of  the  prophetic  account 
 of  it,  given  so  many  ages  before  it  came  to  pass  : 
 u  Thou  shalt  become  an  astonishment,  a  proverb 
 and  a  by-word,  among  all  nations  whither  the  Lord 
 shall  lead  thee."* 
 
 The  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in  the 
 Jews  remaining  a  distinct  people  in  their  disper- 
 sion, and  the  confirmation  which  this  event  appears 
 to  give  to  the  truth  of  revelation,  may  be  thought 
 to  be  answered  by  their  religion  forbidding  them 
 intermarriages  with  those  of  any  other,  and  pre- 
 scribing them  a  great  many  peculiarities  in  their 
 food,  by  which  they  are  debarred  from  the  means  of 
 incorporating  with  the  people  in  whose  countries 
 they  live.  This  is  not,  I  think,  a  satisfactory  ac- 
 count of  that  which  it  pretends  to  account  for. 
 But  what  does  it  pretend  to  account  for?  The 
 correspondence  between  this  event  and  the  prophe- 
 cies; or  the  coincidence  of  both,  with  a  long  dis- 
 pensation of  Providence  of  a  peculiar  nature, 
 towards  that  people  formerly  ?  No.  It  is  only  the 
 event  itself  which  is  offered  to  be  thus  accounted 
 for ;  which  single  event  taken  alone,  abstracted  from 
 all  such  correspondence  and  coincidence,  perhaps 
 would  not  have  appeared  miraculous;  but  that  cor- 
 respondence and  coincidence  may  be  so,  though  the 
 event  itself  be  supposed  not.     Thus,  the  concur- 
 
 *  Deut.  xxviii.  37. 
 
483 
 
 rence  of  our  Saviour  being  born  at  Bethlehem, 
 with  a  long  foregoing  series  of  prophecy,  and  other 
 coincidences,  is  doubtless  miraculous — the  series  of 
 prophecy,  and  other  coincidences,  and  the  event  be- 
 ing admitted:  though  the  event  itself,  his  birth  at 
 that  place,  appears  to  have  been  brought  about  in  a 
 natural  way;  of  which,  however,  no  one  can  be 
 certain. 
 
 And  as  several  of  these  events  seem,  in  some 
 degree  expressly,  to  have  verified  the  prophetic  his- 
 tory already;  so  likewise,  they  may  be  considered 
 farther,  as  having  a  peculiar  aspect  towards  the  full 
 completion  of  it;  as  affording  some  presumption 
 that  the  whole  of  it  shall  one  time  or  other  be  ful- 
 filled. Thus,  that  the  Jews  have  been  so  wonder- 
 fully preserved  in  their  long  and  wide  dispersion ; 
 which  is  indeed  the  direct  fulfilling  of  some  pro- 
 phecies, but  is  now  mentioned  only  as  looking  for- 
 ward to  somewhat  yet  to  come ;  that  natural  religion 
 come  forth  from  Judea,  and  spread  in  the  degree 
 it  has  done  over  the  world,  before  lost  in  idolatry ; 
 which,  together  with  some  other  things,  have  dis- 
 tinguished that  very  place,  in  like  manner  as  the 
 people  of  it  are  distinguished :  that  this  great 
 change  of  religion  over  the  earth  was  brought  about 
 under  the  profession  and  acknowledgment,  that  Je- 
 sus was  the  promised  Messiah :  things  of  this  kind 
 naturally  turn  the  thoughts  of  serious  men  towards 
 the  full  completion  of  the  prophetic  history,  con- 
 cerning the  final  restoration  of  that  people;  con- 
 cerning the  establishment  of  the  everlasting  king- 
 dom among  them,  the  kingdom  of  the  Messiah; 
 and  the  future  state  of  the  world,  under  this  sa- 
 x2 
 
484 
 
 cred  government.  Such  circumstances  and  events 
 compared  with  these  prophecies,  though  no  comple- 
 tions of  them,  yet  would  not,  I  think,  be  spoken 
 of  as  nothing  in  the  argument,  by  a  person  upon 
 his  first  being  informed  of  them.  They  fall  in 
 with  the  prophetic  history  of  things  still  future, 
 give  it  some  additional  credibility,  have  the  appear- 
 ance of  being  somewhat  in  order  to  the  full  comple- 
 tion of  it. 
 
 Indeed,  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge, 
 and  great  calmness  and  consideration,  to  be  able  to 
 judge  thoroughly  of  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of 
 Christianity,  from  that  part  of  the  prophetic  his- 
 tory which  relates  to  the  situation  of  the  kingdoms 
 of  the  world,  and  to  the  state  of  the  church,  from 
 the  establishment  of  Christianity  to  the  present 
 time.  But  it  appears,  from  a  general  view  of  it,  to 
 be  very  material.  And  those  persons  who  have 
 thoroughly  examined  it,  and  some  of  them  were 
 men  of  the  coolest  tempers,  greatest  capacities,  and 
 least  liable  to  imputations  of  prejudice,  insist  upon 
 it  as  determinately  conclusive. 
 
 Suppose  now  a  person  quite  ignorant  of  history, 
 first  to  recollect  the  passages  above-mentioned  out 
 of  Scripture  without  knowing  but  what  the  whole 
 was  a  late  fiction,  then  to  be  informed  of  the  corre- 
 spondent facts  now  mentioned,  and  to  unite  them 
 all  into  one  view:  that  the  profession  and  establish- 
 ment of  natural  religion  in  the  world,  is  greatly 
 owing,  in  different  ways,  to  this  book,  and  the  sup- 
 posed revelation  which  it  contains;  that  it  is  ac- 
 knowledged to  be  of  the  earliest  antiquity ;  that  its 
 chronology  and  common  history  are  entirely  credi- 
 
485 
 
 ble ;  that  this  ancient  nation,  the  Jews,  of  whom  it 
 chiefly  treats,  appear  to  have  been,  in  fact,  the  peo- 
 ple of  God,  in  a  distinguished  sense;  that,  as 
 there  was  a  national  expectation  amongst  them, 
 raised  from  the  prophecies,  of  a  Messiah  to  appear 
 at  such  a  time,  so  one  at  this  time  appeared  claim- 
 ing to  be  that  Messiah;  that  he  was  rejected  by 
 this  nation,  but  received  by  the  Gentiles,  not  upon 
 the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but  of  miracles ;  that  the 
 religion  he  taught  supported  itself  under  the  great- 
 est difficulties,  gained  ground,  and  at  length  became 
 the  religion  of  the  world;  that  in  the  mean  time, 
 the  Jewish  polity  was  utterly  destroyed,  and  the  na- 
 tion dispersed  over  the  face  of  the  earth ;  that,  not- 
 withstanding this,  they  have  remained  a  distinct  and 
 numerous  people  for  so  many  centuries,  even  to  this 
 day ;  which  not  only  appears  to  be  the  express  com- 
 pletion of  several  prophecies  concerning  them,  but 
 also  renders  it,  as  one  may  speak,  a  visible  and  easy 
 possibility,  that  the  promises  made  to  them  as  a  na- 
 tion, may  yet  be  fulfilled.  And  to  these  acknow- 
 ledged truths,  let  the  person  we  have  been  suppos- 
 ing add,  as  I  think  he  ought,  whether  every  one 
 will  allow  it  or  not,  the  obvious  appearances  which 
 there  are  of  the  state  of  the  world,  in  other  respects 
 besides  what  relates  to  the  Jews,  and  of  the  Chris- 
 tian church,  having  so  long  answered,  and  still  an- 
 swering to  the  prophetic  history.  Suppose,  I  say, 
 these  facts  set  over  against  the  things  before-men- 
 tioned  out  of  the  Scripture,  and  seriously  compared 
 with  them ;  the  joint  view  of  both  together,  must, 
 I  think,  appear  of  very  great  weight  to  a  conside- 
 rate  reasonable   person;    of  much  greater,  indeed, 
 
486 
 
 upon  having  them  first  laid  before  him,  than  is 
 easy  for  us,  who  are  so  familiarized  to  them,  to  con- 
 ceive, without  some  particular  attention  for  that 
 purpose. 
 
 All  these  things,  and  the  several  particulars  con- 
 tained under  them,  require  to  be  distinctly  and  most 
 thoroughly  examined  into ;  that  the  weight  of  each 
 may  be  judged  of,  upon  such  examination,  and  such 
 conclusion  drawn  as  results  from  their  united  force. 
 But  this  has  not  been  attempted  here.  I  have  gone 
 no  farther  than  to  show,  that  the  general  imperfect 
 view  of  them  now  given,  the  confessed  historical 
 evidence  for  miracles,  and  the  many  obvious  appear- 
 ing completions  of  prophecy,  together  with  the  col- 
 lateral things*  here  mentioned,  and  there  are  seve- 
 ral others  of  the  like  sort;  that  all  this  together, 
 which,  being  fact,  must  be  acknowledged  by  unbe- 
 lievers, amounts  to  real  evidence  of  somewhat  more 
 than  human  in  this  matter;  evidence  much  more 
 important  than  careless  men,  who  have  been  accus- 
 tomed only  to  transient  and  partial  views  of  it,  can 
 imagine;  and  indeed  abundantly  sufficient  to  act 
 upon.  And  these  things,  I  apprehend,  must  be 
 acknowledged  by  unbelievers.  For,  though  they 
 may  say,  that  the  historical  evidence  of  miracles, 
 wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  is  not  suffi- 
 cient to  convince  them  that  such  miracles  were 
 really  wrought,  they  cannot  deny  that  there  is  such 
 historical  evidence,  it  being  a  known  matter  of  fact 
 
 *  All  the  particular  things  mentioned  in  this  Chapter,  not  re- 
 ducible to  the  head  of  certain  miracles,  or  determinate  comple- 
 tions of  prophecy.     See  pages  445,  446. 
 
487 
 
 that  there  is.  They  may  say,  the  conformity  be- 
 tween the  prophecies  and  events  is  by  accident ;  but 
 there  are  many  instances  in  which  such  conformity 
 itself  cannot  be  denied.  They  may  say,  with  re- 
 gard to  such  kind  of  collateral  things  as  those 
 above-mentioned,  that  any  odd  accidental  events, 
 without  meaning,  will  have  a  meaning  found  in 
 them  by  fanciful  people;  and  that  such  as  are  fan- 
 ciful in  any  one  certain  way,  will  make  out  a  thou- 
 sand coincidences,  which  seem  to  favour  their  pecu- 
 liar follies.  Men,  I  say,  may  talk  thus;  but  no 
 one  who  is  serious,  can  possibly  think  these  things 
 to  be  nothing,  if  he  considers  the  importance  of 
 collateral  things,  and  even  of  lesser  circumstances, 
 in  the  evidence  of  probability,  as  distinguished,  in 
 nature,  from  the  evidence  of  demonstration.  In 
 many  cases,  indeed,  it  seems  to  require  the  truest 
 judgment,  to  determine  with  exactness  the  weight 
 of  circumstantial  evidence ;  but  it  is  very  often  alto- 
 gether as  convincing  as  that  which  is  the  most  ex- 
 press  and  direct. 
 
 This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for  Christian- 
 ity,  considered  as  making  one  argument,  may  also 
 serve  to  recommend  to  serious  persons,  to  set  down 
 every  thing  which  they  think  may  be  of  any  real 
 weight  at  all  in  proof  of  it,  and  particularly  the  ma- 
 ny seeming  completions  of  prophecy;  and  they  will 
 find,  that,  judging  by  the  natural  rules  by  which 
 we  judge  of  probable  evidence  in  common  matters, 
 they  amount  to  a  much  higher  degree  of  proof,  up- 
 on such  a  joint  review,  than  could  be  supposed  up- 
 on considering  them  separately,  at  different  times, 
 how  strong  soever  the  proof  might  before  appear  to 
 
488 
 
 them,  upon  such  separate  views  of  it.  For  proba- 
 ble proofs,  by  being  added,  not  only  increase  the 
 evidence,  but  multiply  it.  Nor  should  I  dissuade 
 any  one  from  setting  down  what  he  thought  made 
 for  the  contrary  side.  But  then  it  is  to  be  remem- 
 bered, not  in  order  to  influence  his  judgment,  but 
 his  practice,  that  a  mistake  on  one  side  may  be,  in 
 its  consequences,  much  more  dangerous  than  a  mis- 
 take on  the  other.  And  what  course  is  most  safe, 
 and  what  most  dangerous,  is  a  consideration  thought 
 very  material,  when  we  deliberate,  not  concerning 
 events,  but  concerning  conduct  in  our  temporal  af- 
 fairs. To  be  influenced  by  this  consideration  in 
 our  judgment,  to  believe  or  disbelieve  upon  it,  is 
 indeed  as  much  prejudice  as  any  thing  whatever. 
 And,  like  other  prejudices,  it  operates  contrary  ways 
 in  different  men.  For  some  are  inclined  to  believe 
 what  they  hope;  and  others  what  they  fear.  And 
 it  is  manifest  unreasonableness,  to  apply  to  men's 
 passions,  in  order  to  gain  their  assent.  But  in  de- 
 liberations concerning  conduct,  there  is  nothing 
 which  reason  more  requires  to  be  taken  into  the  ac- 
 count, than  the  importance  of  it.  For,  suppose  it 
 doubtful  what  would  be  the  consequence  of  acting 
 in  this,  or  in  a  contrary  manner;  still,  that  taking 
 one  side  could  be  attended  with  little  or  no  bad  con- 
 sequences, and  taking  the  other  might  be  attended 
 with  the- greatest,  must  appear  to  unprejudiced  rea- 
 son, of  the  highest  moment  towards  determining 
 how  we  are  to  act.  But  the  truth  of  our  religion, 
 like  the  truth  of  common  matters,  is  to  be  judged 
 of  by  all  the  evidence  taken  together.  And  unless 
 the  whole  series  of  things  which  may  be  alleged  in 
 
489 
 
 this  argument,  and  every  particular  thing  in  it, 
 can  reasonably  be  supposed  to  have  been  by  acci- 
 dent, (for  here  the  stress  of  the  argument  for  Chris- 
 tianity lies,)  then  is  the  truth  of  it  proved;  in  like 
 manner,  as  if  in  any  common  case,  numerous  events 
 acknowledged,  were  to  be  alleged  in  proof  of  any 
 other  event  disputed;  the  truth  of  the  disputed  event 
 would  be  proved,  not  only  if  any  one  of  the  ac- 
 knowledged ones  did  of  itself  clearly  imply  it,  but 
 though  no  one  of  them  singly  did  so,  if  the  whole 
 of  the  acknowledged  events  taken  together,  could 
 not  in  reason  be  supposed  to  have  happened,  unless 
 the  disputed  one  were  true. 
 
 It  is  obvious,  how  much  advantage  the  nature  of 
 this  evidence  gives  to  those  persons  who  attack 
 Christianity,  especially  in  conversation.  For  it  is 
 easy  to  show,  in  a  short  and  lively  manner,  that 
 such  and  such  things  are  liable  to  objection,  that  this 
 and  another  thing  is  of  little  weight  in  itself;  but 
 impossible  to  show,  in  like  manner,  the  united  force 
 of  the  whole  argument  in  one  view. 
 
 However,  lastly,  as  it  has  been  made  appear, 
 that  there  is  no  presumption  against  a  revelation  as 
 miraculous ;  that  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity, 
 and  the  principal  parts  of  it,  are  conformable  to  the 
 experienced  constitution  of  things,  and  the  whole 
 perfectly  credible ;  so  the  account  now  given  of  the 
 positive  evidence  for  it,  shows  that  this  evidence  is 
 such  as,  from  the  nature  of  it,  cannot  be  destroyed, 
 though  it  should  be  lessened. 
 
 x3 
 
490 
 
 CHAP.  VIII. 
 
 Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made  against  argu- 
 ing from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion. 
 
 If  every  one  would  consider,  with  such  attention 
 as  they  are  bound,  even  in  point  of  morality,  to 
 consider,  what  they  judge  and  give  characters  of, 
 the  occasion  of  this  chapter  would  be,  in  some  good 
 measure  at  least,  superseded.  But  since  this  is  not 
 to  be  expected;  for  some,  we  find,  do  not  concern 
 themselves  to  understand  even  what  they  write 
 against :  since  this  treatise,  in  common  with  most 
 others,  lies  open  to  objections,  which  may  appear 
 very  material  to  thoughtful  men  at  first  sight ;  and, 
 besides,  that  seems  peculiarly  liable  to  the  objec- 
 tions of  such  as  can  judge  without  thinking,  and  of 
 such  as  can  censure  without  judging ;  it  may  not  be 
 amiss  to  set  down  the  chief  of  these  objections  which 
 occur  to  me,  and  consider  them  to  their  hands. 
 And  they  are  such  as  these: — 
 
 "  That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difficulties  in 
 revelation,  by  saying  that  there  are  the  same  in  na- 
 tural religion ;  when  what  is  wanting  is  to  clear  both 
 of  them,  of  these  their  common,  as  well  as  other 
 their  respective  difficulties :  but  that  it  is  a  strange 
 way  indeed  of  convincing  men  of  the  obligations  of 
 religion,  to  show  them,  that  they  have  as  little  rea- 
 son for  their  worldly  pursuits ;  and  a  strange  way  of 
 vindicating  the  justice  and  goodness  of  the  Author 
 of  nature,  and  of  removing  the   objections  against 
 
491 
 
 both,  to  which  the  system  of  religion  lies  open,  to 
 show,  that  the  like  objections  lie  against  natural 
 providence ;  a  way  of  answering  objections  against 
 religion,  without  so  much  as  pretending  to  make  out, 
 that  the  system  of  it,  or  the  particular  things  in  it 
 objected  against,  are  reasonable — especially,  per- 
 haps, some  may  be  inattentive  enough  to  add,  must 
 this  be  thought  strange,  when  it  is  confessed,  that 
 analogy  is  no  answer  to  such  objections ;  that  when 
 this  sort  of  reasoning  is  carried  to  the  utmost  length 
 it  can  be  imagined  capable  of,  it  will  yet  leave  the 
 mind  in  a  very  unsatisfied  state;  and  that  it  must 
 be  unaccountable  ignorance  of  mankind,  to  imagine 
 they  will  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their  present 
 interests  and  pleasures,  from  regard  to  religion,  upon 
 doubtful  evidence." 
 
 Now,  as  plausible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  ap- 
 pear, that  appearance  will  be  found  in  a  great  mea- 
 sure owing  to  half  views,  which  show  but  part  of 
 an  object,  yet  show  that  indistinctly ;  and  to  unde- 
 terminate  language.  By  these  means  weak  men 
 are  often  deceived  by  others,  and  ludicrous  men  by 
 themselves.  And  even  those  who  are  serious  and 
 considerate,  cannot  always  readily  disentangle,  and 
 at  once  clearly  see  through  the  perplexities  in  which 
 subjects  themselves  are  involved;  and  which  are 
 heightened  by  the  deficiencies  and  the  abuse  of 
 words.  To  this  latter  sort  of  persons,  the  following 
 reply  to  each  part  of  this  objection  severally,  may 
 be  of  some  assistance;  as  it  may  also  tend  a  little 
 to  stop  and  silence  others. 
 
 First,  The  thing  wanted,  that  is,  what  men  re- 
 . quire,  is  to  have  all  difficulties   cleared.      And  tins 
 
492 
 
 is,  or  at  least,  for  any  thing  we  know  to  the  con- 
 trary, it  may  be,  the  same,  as  requiring  to  compre- 
 hend the  Divine  nature,  and  the  whole  plan  of  Pro- 
 vidence from  everlasting  to  everlasting.  But  it  hath 
 always  been  allowed  to  argue,  from  what  is  acknow- 
 ledged to  what  is  disputed.  And  it  is  in  no  other 
 sense  a  poor  thing,  to  argue  from  natural  religion 
 to  revealed,  in  the  manner  found  fault  with,  than  it 
 is  to  argue  in  numberless  other  ways  of  probable  de- 
 duction and  inference,  in  matters  of  conduct,  which 
 we  are  continually  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  doing. 
 Indeed  the  epithet  poor  may  be  applied,  I  fear,  as 
 properly  to  great  part,  or  the  whole,  of  human  life, 
 as  it  is  to  the  things  mentioned  in  the  objection. 
 Is  it  not  a  poor  thing  for  a  physician  to  have  so  little 
 knowledge  in  the  cure  of  diseases,  as  even  the  most 
 eminent  have?  to  act  upon  conjecture  and  guess, 
 where  the  life  of  man  is  concerned  ?  Undoubtedly 
 it  is  :  but  not  in  comparison  of  having  no  skill  at  all 
 in  that  useful  art,  and  being  obliged  to  act  wholly 
 in  the  dark. 
 
 Further :  since  it  is  as  unreasonable,  as  it  is  com- 
 mon, to  urge  objections  against  revelation,  which 
 are  of  equal  weight  against  natural  religion;  and 
 those  who  do  this,  if  they  are  not  confuted  them- 
 selves, deal  unfairly  with  others,  in  making  it  seem 
 that  they  are  arguing  only  against  revelation,  or 
 particular  doctrines  of  it,  when  in  reality  they  are 
 arguing  against  moral  Providence :  it  is  a  thing  of 
 consequence  to  show,  that  such  objections  are  as 
 much  levelled  against  natural  religion,  as  against 
 revealed.  And  objections,  which  are  equally  appli- 
 cable   to    both,    are,    properly    speaking,  answered, 
 
493 
 
 by  its  being  shown  that  they  are  so,  provided  the 
 former  be  admitted  to  be  true.  And  without  taking 
 in  the  consideration,  how  distinctly  this  is  admitted, 
 it  is  plainly  very  material  to  observe,  that  as  the 
 things  objected  against  in  natural  religion,  are  of 
 the  same  kind  with  what  is  certain  matter  of  expe- 
 rience in  the  course  of  providence,  and  in  the  infor- 
 mation which  God  affords  us  concerning  our  temporal 
 interest  under  his  government;  so  the  objections 
 against  the  system  of  Christianity  and  the  evidence 
 of  it,  are  of  the  very  same  kind  with  those  which 
 are  made  against  the  system  and  evidence  of  natural 
 religion.  However,  the  reader  upon  review  may 
 see,  that  most  of  the  analogies  insisted  upon,  even 
 in  the  latter  part  of  this  treatise,  do  not  necessarily 
 require  to  have  more  taken  for  granted  than  is  in  the 
 former;  that  there  is  an  Author  of  nature,  or  na- 
 tural Governor  of  the  world :  and  Christianity  is  vin- 
 dicated, not  from  its  analogy  to  natural  religion,  but 
 chiefly,  from  its  analogy  to  the  experienced  consti- 
 tution of  nature. 
 
 Secondly ',  Religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  con- 
 sists in  such  a  determinate  course  of  life ;  as  being 
 what,  there  is  reason  to  think,  is  commanded  by 
 the  Author  of  nature,  and  will,  upon  the  whole,  be 
 our  happiness  under  his  government.  Now,  if  men 
 can  be  convinced,  that  they  have  the  like  reason  to 
 believe  this,  as  to  believe,  that  taking  care  of  their 
 temporal  affairs  will  be  to  their  advantage;  such 
 conviction  cannot  but  be  an  argument  to  them  for 
 the  practice  of  religion.  And  if  there  be  really  any 
 reason  for  believing  one  of  these,  and  endeavouring 
 to  preserve  life,  and  secure  ourselves  the  necessaries 
 
494 
 
 and  conveniences  of  it;  then  there  is  reason  also  for 
 believing  the  other,  and  endeavouring  to  secure  the 
 interest  it  proposes  to  us.  And  if  the  interest 
 which  religion  proposes  to  us,  be  infinitely  great- 
 er than  our  whole  temporal  interest,  then  there 
 must  be  proportionably  greater  reason  for  endeavour- 
 ing to  secure  one  than  the  other :  since,  by  the  sup- 
 position, the  probability  of  our  securing  one,  is  equal 
 to  the  probability  of  our  securing  the  other.  This 
 seems  plainly  unanswerable;  and  has  a  tendency  to 
 influence  fair  minds,  who  consider  what  our  condi- 
 tion really  is,  or  upon  what  evidence  we  are  naturally 
 appointed  to  act;  and  who  are  disposed  to  acquiesce 
 in  the  terms  upon  which  we  live,  and  attend  to  and 
 follow  that  practical  instruction,  whatever  it  be, 
 which  is  afforded  us. 
 
 But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument 
 referred  to  in  the  objection,  lies  in  another  place. 
 For  it  is  said,  that  the  proof  of  religion  is  involved 
 in  such  inextricable  difficulties,  as  to  render  it  doubt- 
 ful ;  and  that  it  cannot  be  supposed,  that,  if  it  were 
 true,  it  would  be  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.  Here, 
 then,  over  and  above  the  force  of  each  particular 
 difficulty  or  objection,  these  difficulties  and  objec- 
 tions taken  together,  are  turned  into  a  positive  ar- 
 gument against  the  truth  of  religion ;  which  argu- 
 ment would  stand  thus. — If  religion  were  true,  it 
 would  not  be  left  doubtful,  and  open  to  objections  to 
 the  degree  in  which  it  is :  therefore,  that  it  is  thus 
 left,  not  only  renders  the  evidence  of  it  weak,  and 
 lessens  its  force  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  such 
 obsections ;  but  also  shows  it  to  be  false,  or  is  a  ge- 
 neral presumption  of  its  being  so.     Now  the  obser- 
 
495 
 
 vation,  that  from  the  natural  constitution  and  course 
 of  things,  we  must  in  our  temporal  concerns,  almost 
 continually,  and  in  matters  of  great  consequence, 
 act  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind  and  degree  to  the 
 evidence  of  religion,  is  an  answer  to  this  argument; 
 because  it  shows,  that  it  is  according  to  the  conduct 
 and  character  of  the  Author  of  nature,  to  appoint 
 we  should  act  upon  evidence  like  to  that,  which  this 
 argument  presumes  he  cannot  be  supposed  to  appoint 
 we  should  act  upon:  it  is  an  instance,  a  general  one 
 made  up  of  numerous  particular  ones,  of  somewhat 
 in  his  dealing  with  us,  similar  to  what  is  said  to  be 
 incredible.  And  as  the  force  of  this  answer  lies 
 merely  in  the  parallel  which  there  is  between  the 
 evidence  for  religion  and  for  our  temporal  conduct, 
 the  answer  is  equally  just  and  conclusive ;  whether 
 the  parallel  be  made  out,  by  showing  the  evidence 
 of  the  former  to  be  higher,  or  the  evidence  of  the 
 latter  to  be  lower. 
 
 Thirdly,  The  design  of  this  treatise  is  not  to 
 vindicate  the  character  of  God,  but  to  show  the  ob- 
 ligations of  men :  it  is  not  to  justify  his  providence, 
 but  to  show  what  belongs  to  us  to  do.  These  are 
 two  subjects,  and  ought  not  to  be  confounded.  And 
 though  they  may  at  length  run  up  into  each  other, 
 yet  observations  may  immediately  tend  to  make  out 
 the  latter,  which  do  not  appear,  by  any  immediate 
 connexion,  to  the  purpose  of  the  former;  which  is 
 less  our  concern  than  many  seem  to  think.  For, 
 1st,  It  is  not  necessary  we  should  justify  the  dispen- 
 sations of  Providence  against  objections,  any  farther 
 than  to  show,  that  the  things  objected  against  may, 
 for  aught  we  know,  be  consistent  with  justice  and 
 
496 
 
 goodness.  Suppose,  then,  that  there  are  things  in 
 the  system  of  this  world,  and  plan  of  Providence 
 relating  to  it,  which  taken  alone  would  be  unjust; 
 yet  it  has  been  shown  unanswerably,  that  if  we  could 
 take  in  the  reference  which  these  things  may  have, 
 to  other  things  present,  past  and  to  come ;  to  the 
 whole  scheme,  which  the  things  objected  against  are 
 parts  of;  these  very  things  might,  for  aught  we 
 know,  be  found  to  be,  not  only  consistent  with  jus- 
 tice, but  instances  of  it.  Indeed  it  has  been  shown, 
 by  the  analogy  of  what  we  see,  not  only  possible 
 that  this  may  be  the  case,  but  credible  that  it  is. 
 And  thus  objections,  drawn  from  such  things,  are 
 answered,  and  Providence  is  vindicated,  as  far  as  re- 
 ligion makes  its  vindication  necessary.  Hence  it 
 appears,  2dly,  That  objections  against  the  divine 
 justice  and  goodness  are  not  endeavoured  to  be  re- 
 moved, by  showing  that  the  like  objections,  allowed 
 to  be  really  conclusive,  lie  against  natural  providence; 
 but  those  objections  being  supposed,  and  shown  not 
 to  be  conclusive,  the  things  objected  against,  con- 
 sidered as  matters  of  fact,  are  farther  shown  to  be 
 credible,  from  their  conformity  to  the  constitution  of 
 nature ;  for  instance,  that  God  will  reward  and  pun- 
 ish men  for  their  actions  hereafter,  from  the  obser- 
 vation, that  he  does  reward  and  punish  them  for 
 their  actions  here.  And  this,  I  apprehend,  is  of 
 weight.  And  I  add,  Sdly,  It  would  be  of  weight, 
 even  though  those  objections  were  not  answered. 
 For,  there  being  the  proof  of  religion  above  set 
 down,  and  religion  implying  several  facts;  for  in- 
 stance again,  the  fact  last  mentioned,  that  God  will 
 reward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions  hereafter; 
 
4<J7 
 
 the  observation  that  his  present  method  of  govern- 
 ment is  by  rewards  and  punishments,  shows  that  fu- 
 ture fact  not  to  be  incredible :  whatever  objections 
 men  may  think  they  have  against  it,  as  unjust  or 
 unmerciful,  according  to  their  notions  of  justice  and 
 mercy ;  or  as  improbable  from  then  belief  of  neces- 
 sity. I  say,  as  improbable,  for  it  is  evident  no  ob- 
 jection against  it,  as  unjust,  can  be  urged  from  ne- 
 cessity ;  since  this  notion  as  much  destroys  injustice, 
 as  it  does  justice.  Then,  Uhly,  Though  objections 
 against  the  reasonableness  of  the  system  of  religion, 
 cannot  indeed  be  answered  without  entering  into 
 consideration  of  its  reasonableness,  yet  objections 
 against  the  credibility  or  truth  of  it,  may :  Because 
 the  system  of  it  is  reducible  into  what  is  properly 
 matter  of  fact;  and  the  truth,  the  probable  truth, 
 of  facts,  may  be  shown  without  consideration  of  their 
 reasonableness.  Nor  is  it  necessary,  though  in  some 
 cases  and  respects,  it  is  highly  useful  and  proper, 
 yet  it  is  not  necessary,  to  give  a  proof  of  the  rea- 
 sonableness of  every  precept  enjoined  us,  and  of 
 every  particular  dispensation  of  Providence  which 
 comes  into  the  system  of  religion.  Indeed,  the 
 more  thoroughly  a  person  of  a  right  disposition  is 
 convinced  of  the  perfection  of  the  Divine  nature 
 and  conduct,  the  farther  he  will  advance  towards 
 that  perfection  of  religion  which  St.  John*  speaks 
 of.  But  the  general  obligations  of  religion  are  ful- 
 ly made  out,  by  proving  the  reasonableness  of  the 
 practice  of  it.  And,  that  the  practice  of  religion 
 is  reasonable,  may  be  shown,  though  no  more  could 
 
 •   1  John  iv.  18. 
 
498 
 
 be  proved  than  that  the  system  of  it  may  be  so,  fir 
 aught  we  know  to  the  contrary;  and  even  without 
 entering  into  the  distinct  consideration  of  this.  And 
 from  hence,  bthly,  It  is  easy  to  see,  that  though  the 
 analogy  of  nature  is  not  an  immediate  answer  to  ob- 
 jections against  the  wisdom,  the  justice,  or  goodness, 
 of  any  doctrine  or  precept  of  religion,  yet  it  may  be, 
 as  it  is,  an  immediate  and  direct  answer  to  what  is 
 really  intended  by  such  objections;  which  is  to  show, 
 that  the  things  objected  against  are  incredible. 
 
 Fourthly,  It  is  mostly  readily  acknowledged,  that 
 the  foregoing  treatise  is  by  no  means  satisfactory; 
 very  far  indeed  from  it:  but  so  would  any  natural 
 institution  of  life  appear,  if  reduced  into  a  system, 
 together  with  its  evidence.  Leaving  religion  out  of 
 the  case,  men  are  divided  in  their  opinions,  whether 
 our  pleasures  overbalance  our  pains ;  and  whether  it 
 be,  or  be  not,  eligible  to  live  in  this  world.  And 
 were  all  such  controversies  settled,  which  perhaps, 
 in  speculation,  would  be  found  involved  in  great  dif- 
 ficulties ;  and  were  it  determined,  upon  the  evidence 
 of  reason,  as  nature  has  determined  it  to  our  hands, 
 that  life  is  to  be  preserved ;  yet,  still,  the  rules  which 
 God  has  been  pleased  to  afford  us,  for  escaping  the 
 miseries  of  it,  and  obtaining  its  satisfactions,  the 
 rules,  for  instance,  of  preserving  health,  and  reco- 
 vering it  when  lost,  are  not  only  fallible  and  preca- 
 rious, but  very  far  from  being  exact.  Nor  are  we 
 informed  by  nature,  in  future  contingencies  and  ac- 
 cidents, so  as  to  render  it  at  all  certain,  what  is  the 
 best  method  of  managing  our  affairs.  What  will  be 
 the  success  of  our  temporal  pursuits,  in  the  common 
 sense  of  the  word  success,  is  highly  doubtful.     And 
 
499 
 
 what  will  be  the  success  of  them,  in  the  proper  sense 
 of  the  word ;  that  is,  what  happiness  or  enjoyment 
 we  shall  obtain  by  them,  is  doubtful  in  a  much  higher 
 degree.  Indeed,  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the 
 evidence,  with  which  we  are  obliged  to  take  up,  in 
 the  daily  course  of  life,  is  scarce  to  be  expressed. 
 Yet  men  do  not  throw  away  life,  or  disregard  the  in- 
 terest of  it,  upon  account  of  this  doubtfulness.  The 
 evidence  of  religion  then  being  admitted  real,  those 
 who  object  against  it,  as  not  satisfactory,  that  is,  as 
 not  being  what  they  wish  it,  plainly  forget  the  very 
 condition  of  our  being:  for  satisfaction,  in  this  sense, 
 does  not  belong  to  such  a  creature  as  man.  And, 
 which  is  more  material,  they  forget  also  the  very  na- 
 ture of  religion.  For,  religion  presupposes,  in  all 
 those  who  will  embrace  it,  a  certain  degree  of  in- 
 tegrity and  honesty ;  which  it  was  intended  to  try 
 whether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  exercise,  in  such 
 as  have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement.  Religion 
 presupposes  this  as  much,  and  in  the  same  sense,  as 
 speaking  to  a  man  presupposes  he  understands  the 
 language  in  which  you  speak ;  or  as  warning  a  man 
 of  any  danger,  presupposes  that  he  hath  such  a  re- 
 gard to  himself  as  that  he  will  endeavour  to  avoid 
 it.  And  therefore,  the  question  is  not  at  all,  Whe- 
 ther the  evidence  of  religion  be  satisfactory :  but, 
 Whether  it  be,  in  reason,  sufficient  to  prove  and 
 discipline  that  virtue  which  it  presupposes  ?  Now 
 the  evidence  of  it  is  fully  sufficient  for  all  those  pur- 
 poses of  probation ;  how  far  soever  it  is  from  being 
 satisfactory,  as  to  the  purposes  of  curiosity,  or  any 
 other:  and  indeed  it  answers  the  purposes  of  the 
 former  in  several  respects,  which  it  would  not  do,  if 
 
500 
 
 it  were  as  overbearing  as  is  required.  One  might 
 add  farther,  that  whether  the  motives,  or  the  evi- 
 dence of  any  course  of  action,  be  satisfactory, 
 meaning  here  by  that  word,  what  satisfies  a  man,  that 
 such  a  course  of  action  will  in  event  be  for  his  good ; 
 this  need  never  be,  and  I  think,  strictly  speaking, 
 never  is,  the  practical  question  in  common  matters. 
 But  the  practical  question,  in  all  cases,  is,  Whether 
 the  evidence  for  a  course  of  action  be  such,  as  tak- 
 ing in  all  circumstances,  makes  the  faculty  within  us 
 which  is  the  guide  and  judge  of  conduct,*  determine 
 that  course  of  action  to  be  prudent  ?  Indeed,  satis- 
 faction that  it  will  be  for  our  interest  or  happiness, 
 abundantly  determines  an  action  to  be  prudent ;  but 
 evidence,  almost  infinitely  lower  than  this,  deter- 
 mines actions  to  be  so  too,  even  in  the  conduct  of 
 every  day. 
 
 Fifthly,  As  to  the  objection  concerning  the  influ- 
 ence which  this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may  or 
 may  not  be  expected  to  have  upon. men,  I  observe, 
 as  above,  that  religion  beino;  intended  for  a  trial  and 
 exercise  of  the  morality  of  every  person's  character, 
 who  is  a  subject  of  it;  and  there  being,  as  I  have 
 shown,  such  evidence  for  it,  as  is  sufficient  in  rea- 
 son, to  influence  men  to  embrace  it ;  to  object,  that 
 it  is  not  to  be  imagined  mankind  will  be  influenced 
 by  such  evidence,  is  nothing  to  the  purpose  of  the 
 foregoing  treatise.  For  the  purpose  of  it  is  not  to 
 inquire,  What  sort  of  creatures  mankind  are ;  but, 
 What  the  light  and  knowledge,  which  is  afforded 
 them,  requires  they  should  be?  to  show  how,  in  rea- 
 
 *  See  Dissertation  li. 
 
501 
 
 son,  they  ought  to  behave;  hot  how,  in  fact,  they 
 will  behave.  This  depends  upon  themselves,  and  is 
 their  own  concern;  the  personal  concern  of  each  man 
 in  particular.  And  how  little  regard  the  generality 
 have  to  it,  experience,  indeed,  does  too  fully  show. 
 But  religion,  considered  as  a  probation,  has  had  its 
 ends  upon  all  persons,  to  whom  it  has  been  pronoBR 
 with  evidence  sufficient  in  reason  to  influence  their 
 practice ;  for  by  this  means  they  have  been  put  into 
 a  state  of  probation,  let  them  behave  as  they  will  in 
 it.  And  thus,  not  only  revelation,  but  reason  also, 
 teaches  us,  that  by  the  evidence  of  religion  being 
 laid  before  men,  the  designs  of  providence  are  carry- 
 ing on,  not  only  with  regard  to  those  who  will,  but 
 likewise  with  regard  to  those  who  will  not,  be 
 influenced  by  it.  However,  lastly,  the  objection 
 here  referred  to,  allows  the  things  insisted  upon  in 
 this  treatise  to  be  of  some  weight ;  and  if  so,  it  may 
 be  hoped  it  will  have  some  influence.  And  if  there 
 be  a  probability  that  it  will  have  any  at  all,  there  is 
 the  same  reason  in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to 
 lay  it  before  men,  as  there  would  be,  if  it  were  likely 
 to  have  a  greater  influence. 
 
 And  farther,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered,  with 
 respect  to  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  objections,  that 
 in  this  treatise  I  have  argued  upon  the  principles  of 
 others,*  not  my  own:  and  have  omitted  what  I  think 
 true,  and  of  the  utmost  importance,  because  by  others 
 thought  unintelligible,  or  not  true.      Thus  I  have 
 
 *  By  arguing  upon  the  principles  of  others,  the  reader  will  ob- 
 serve is  meant,  not  proving  any  thing  from  those  principles,  but 
 notwithstanding  them.  Thus  religion  is  proved,  not  from  the 
 opinion  of  necessity,  which  is  absurd,  but  notwithstanding,  or  even 
 though,  that  opinion  were  admitted  to  be  true. 
 
502 
 
 argued  upon  the  principles  of  the  Fatalists,  which  I 
 do  not  believe ;  and  have  omitted  a  thing  of  the  ut- 
 most importance,  which  I  do  believe — the  moral  fit- 
 ness and  unfitness  of  actions,  prior  to  all  will  what- 
 ever: which  I  apprehend  as  certainly  to  determine 
 the  Divine  conduct,  as  speculative  truth  and  false- 
 hogjk  necessarily  determine  the  Divine  judgment. 
 Indeed,  the  principle  of  liberty,  and  that  of  moral 
 fitness,  so  force  themselves  upon  the  mind,  that  mo- 
 ralists, the  ancients  as  well  as  moderns,  have  formed 
 their  language  upon  it.  And  probably  it  may  ap- 
 pear in  mine,  though  I  have  endeavoured  to  avoid 
 it;  and,  in  order  to  avoid  it,  have  sometimes  been 
 obliged  to  express  myself  in  a  manner  which  will  ap- 
 pear strange  to  such  as  do  not  observe  the  reason  for 
 it;  but  the  general  argument  here  pursued,  does  not 
 at  all  suppose,  or  proceed  upon,  these  principles. 
 Now,  these  two  abstract  principles  of  liberty  and  mo- 
 ral fitness  being  omitted,  religion  can  be  considered 
 in  no  other  view  than  merely  as  a  question  of  fact; 
 and  in  this  view  it  is  here  considered.  It  is  obvious 
 that  Christianity,  and  the  proof  of  it,  are  both  his- 
 torical. And  even  natural  religion  is  properly  a 
 matter  of  fact.  For,  that  there  is  a  righteous  Go- 
 vernor of  the  world,  is  so ;  and  this  proposition  con- 
 tains the  general  system  of  natural  religion.  But 
 then,  several  abstract  truths,  and  in  particular  those 
 two  principles,  are  usually  taken  into  consideration 
 in  the  proof  of  it ;  whereas  it  is  here  treated  of  only 
 as  a  matter  of  fact.  To  explain  this :  that  the  three 
 angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  ones,  is  an 
 abstract  truth;  but  that  they  appear  so  to  our  mind, 
 is  only  a  matter  of  fact.      And  this  last  must  have 
 
503 
 
 been  admitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  those  ancient 
 sceptics,  who  would  not  have  admitted  the  former ; 
 but  pretended  to  doubt,  Whether  there  were  any 
 such  thing  as  truth;  or,  Whether  we  could  cer- 
 tainly depend  upon  our  faculties  of  understanding  for 
 the  knowledge  of  it  in  any  case.  So  likewise,  that 
 there  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  an  original  stan- 
 dard of  right  and  wrong  in  actions,  independent 
 upon  all  will,  but  which  unalterably  determines  the 
 will  of  God,  to  exercise  that  moral  government  over 
 the  world  which  religion  teaches,  that  is,  finally  and 
 upon  the  whole  to  reward  and  punish  men  respec- 
 tively as  they  act  right  or  wrong ;  this  assertion  con- 
 tains an  abstract  truth,  as  well  as  matter  of  fact. 
 But  suppose,  in  the  present  state,  every  man,  with- 
 out exception,  was  rewarded  and  punished,  in  exact 
 proportion  as  he  followed  or  transgressed  that  sense 
 of  right  and  wrong,  which  God  has  implanted  in  the 
 nature  of  every  man;  this  would  not  be  at  all  an  ab- 
 stract truth,  but  only  a  matter  of  fact.  And  though 
 this  fact  were  acknowledged  by  every  one,  yet  the 
 very  same  difficulties  might  be  raised,  as  are  now, 
 concerning  the  abstract  questions  of  liberty  and  mo- 
 ral fitness:  and  we  should  have  a  proof,  even  the 
 certain  one  of  experience,  that  the  government  of 
 the  world  was  perfectly  moral,  without  taking  in  the 
 consideration  of  those  questions:  and  this  proof 
 would  remain,  in  what  way  soever  they  were  deter- 
 mined. And  thus,  God  having  given  mankind  a 
 moral  faculty,  the  object  of  which  is  actions,  and 
 which  naturally  approves  some  actions  as  right  and 
 of  good  desert,  and  condemns  others  as  wrong  and 
 of   ill   desert;    that   he  will,  finally  and  upon  the 
 
504 
 
 whole,  reward  the  former,  and  punish  the  latter,  is 
 not  an  assertion  of  an  abstract  truth,  but  of  what  is 
 as  mere  a  fact,  as  his  doing  so  at  present  would  be. 
 This  future  fact  I  have  not  indeed  proved  with  the 
 force  with  which  it  might  be  proved,  from  the  prin- 
 ciples of  liberty  and  moral  fitness;  but  without  them, 
 have  given  a  really  conclusive  practical  proof  of  it, 
 which  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the  general  ana- 
 logy of  nature;  a  proof  easily  cavilled  at,  easily 
 shown  not  to  be  demonstrative,  for  it  is  not  offered 
 as  such;  but  impossible,  I  think,  to  be  evaded  or 
 answered.  And  thus  the  obligations  of  religion  are 
 made  out,  exclusively  of  the  questions  concerning 
 liberty  and  moral  fitness;  which  have  been  perplexed 
 with  difficulties  and  abstruse  reasonings,  as  every 
 thing  may. 
 
 Hence,  therefore,  may  be  observed  distinctly, 
 what  is  the  force  of  this  treatise.  It  will  be,  to  such 
 as  are  convinced  of  religion,  upon  the  proof  arising 
 out  of  the  two  last-mentioned  principles,  an  addi- 
 tional proof  and  a  confirmation  of  it :  to  such  as  do 
 not  admit  those  principles,  an  original  proof  of  it,* 
 and  a  confirmation  of  that  proof.  Those  who  be- 
 lieve, will  here  find  the  scheme  of  Christianity 
 cleared  of  objections,  and  the  evidence  of  it  in  a  pecu- 
 liar manner  strengthened:  those  who  do  not  believe, 
 will  at  least  be  shown  the  absurdity  of  all  attempts  to 
 prove  Christianity  false ;  the  plain  undoubted  credi- 
 bility of  it ;  and,  I  hope,  a  good  deal  more. 
 
 And  thus,  though  some  perhaps  may  seriously 
 think,  that  analogy,  as  here  urged,  has  too  great 
 
 *  Pages  302,  303,  &c. 
 
505 
 
 stress  laid  upon  it ;  and  ridicule,  unanswerable  ridi- 
 cule, may  be  applied,  to  show  the  argument  from  it 
 in  a  disadvantageous  light;  yet  there  can  be  no 
 question  but  that  it  is  a  real  one.  For  religion, 
 both  natural  and  revealed,  implying  in  it  numerous 
 facts;  analogy,  being  a  confirmation  of  all  facts  to 
 which  it  can  be  applied,  as  it  is  the  only  proof  of 
 most,  cannot  but  be  admitted  by  every  one  to  be  u 
 material  thing,  and  truly  of  weight  on  the  side  of 
 religion,  both  natural  and  revealed ;  and  it  ought  to 
 be  particularly  regarded  by  such  as  profess  to  follow 
 nature,  and  to  be  less  satisfied  with  abstract  reason- 
 ings. 
 
 17 
 
506 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Whatever  account  may  be  given  of  the  strange 
 inattention  and  disregard,  in  some  ages  and  coun- 
 tries, to  a  matter  of  such  importance  as  religion,  it 
 would,  before  experience,  be  incredible,  that  there 
 should  be  the  like  disregard  in  those,  who  have  had 
 the  moral  system  of  the  world  laid  before  them,  as 
 it  is  by  Christianity,  and  often  inculcated  upon 
 them;  because  this  moral  system  carries  in  it  a  good 
 degree  of  evidence  for  its  truth,  upon  its  being 
 barely  proposed  to  our  thoughts.  There  is  no  need 
 of  abstruse  reasoning's  and  distinctions  to  convince 
 an  unprejudiced  understanding,  that  there  is  a  God 
 who  made  and  governs  the  world,  and  will  judge  it 
 in  righteousness ;  though  they  may  be  necessary  to 
 answer  abstruse  difficulties,  when  once  such  are 
 raised;  when  the  very  meaning  of  those  words, 
 which  express  most  intelligibly  the  general  doctrine 
 of  religion,  is  pretended  to  be  uncertain,  and  the 
 clear  truth  of  the  thing  itself  is  obscured  by  the  in- 
 tricacies of  speculation.  But  to  an  unprejudiced 
 mind,  ten  thousand  thousand  instances  of  design, 
 cannot  but  prove  a  Designer.  And  it  is  intuitively 
 manifest,  that  creatures  ought  to  live  under  a  duti- 
 ful sense  of  their  Maker;  and  that  justice  and 
 charity  must  be  his  laws,  to  creatures  whom  he  has 
 made  social,  and  placed  in  society.  Indeed,  the 
 truth  of  revealed  religion,  peculiarly  so  called,  is 
 not  self-evident,  but  requires  external  proof,  in  order 
 to  its  being  received.      Yet  inattention,  among  us, 
 
507 
 
 to  revealed  religion,  will  be  found  to  imply  the  same 
 dissolute  immoral  temper  of  mind,  as  inattention  to 
 natural  religion ;  because,  when  both  are  laid  before 
 us,  in  the  manner  they  are  in  Christian  countries  of 
 liberty,  our  obligations  to  inquire  into  both,  and  to 
 embrace  both  upon  supposition  of  their  truth,  are 
 obligations  of  the  same  nature.  For,  revelation 
 claims  to  be  the  voice  of  God;  and  our  obligation  to 
 attend  to  his  voice,  is  surely  moral  in  all  cases. 
 And  as  it  is  insisted,  that  its  evidence  is  conclusive, 
 upon  thorough  consideration  of  it ;  so  it  offers  itself 
 to  us  with  manifest  obvious  appearances  of  having 
 something  more  than  human  in  it,  and  therefore  in 
 all  reason  requires,  to  have  its  claims  most  seriously 
 examined  into.  It  is  to  be  added,  that  though 
 light  and  knowledge,  in  what  manner  soever  afforded 
 us,  is  equally  from  God;  yet  a  miraculous  revela- 
 tion has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the  first  principles 
 of  our  nature,  to  awaken  mankind,  and  inspire  them 
 with  reverence  and  awe :  and  this  is  a  peculiar  obli- 
 gation, to  attend  to  what  claims  to  be  so  with  such 
 appearances  of  truth.  It  is  therefore  most  certain, 
 that  our  obligations  to  inquire  seriously  into  the 
 evidence  of  Christianity,  and,  upon  supposition  of 
 its  truth,  to  embrace  it,  are  of  the  utmost  impor- 
 tance, and  moral  in  the  highest  and  most  proper 
 sense.  Let  us  then  suppose,  that  the  evidence  of 
 religion  in  general,  and  of  Christianity,  has  been 
 seriously  inquired  into,  by  all  reasonable  men  among 
 us.  Yet  we  find  many  professedly  to  reject  both, 
 upon  speculative  principles  of  infidelity.  And  all 
 of  them  do  not  content  themselves  with  a  bare  ne- 
 glect of  religion,  and  enjoying  their  imaginary  free- 
 y2 
 
508 
 
 (iom  from  its  restraints.  Some  go  much  beyond 
 this.  They  deride  God's  moral  government  over 
 the  world :  they  renounce  his  protection,  and  de- 
 fy his  justice:  they  ridicule  and  vilify  Christianity, 
 and  blaspheme  the  Author  of  it ;  and  take  all  occa- 
 sions to  manifest  a  scorn  and  contempt  of  revelation. 
 This  amounts  to  an  active  setting  themselves  against 
 religion ;  to  what  may  be  considered  as  a  positive 
 principle  of  irreligion;  which  they  cultivate  within 
 themselves,  and,  whether  they  intend  this  effect  or 
 not,  render  habitual,  as  a  good  man  does  the  con- 
 trary principle.  And  others,  who  are  not  charge- 
 able with  all  this  profligateness,  yet  are  in  avowed 
 opposition  to  religion,  as  if  discovered  to  be  ground- 
 less. Now  admitting,  which  is  the  supposition  we 
 go  upon,  that  these  persons  act  upon  what  they 
 think  principles  of  reason,  and  otherwise  they  are 
 not  to  be  argued  with;  it  is  really  inconceivable, 
 that  they  should  imagine  they  clearly  see  the  whole 
 evidence  of  it,  considered  in  itself,  to  be  nothing 
 at  all;  nor  do  they  pretend  this.  They  are  far  in- 
 deed from  having  a  just  notion  of  its  evidence;  but 
 they  would  not  say  its  evidence  was  nothing,  if  they 
 thought  the  system  of  it,  with  all  its  circumstances, 
 were  credible,  like  other  matters  of  science  or  his- 
 tory. So  that  their  manner  of  treating  it  must  pro- 
 ceed, either  from  such  kind  of  objections  against  all 
 religion,  as  have  been  answered  or  obviated  in  the 
 former  part  of  this  treatise;  or  else  from  objections 
 and  difficulties,  supposed  more  peculiar  to  Christi- 
 anity. Thus,  they  entertain  prejudices  against  the 
 whole  notion  of  a  revelation  and  miraculous  interposi- 
 tions.     They  find  things  in  Scripture,  whether  in 
 
509 
 
 incidental  passages  or  in  the  general  scheme  of  it, 
 which  appear  to  them  unreasonable.  They  take 
 for  granted,  that  if  Christianity  were  true,  the  light 
 of  it  must  have  been  more  general,  and  the  evidence 
 of  it  more  satisfactory,  or  rather  overbearing;  that 
 it  must  and  would  have  been,  in  some  way,  other- 
 wise put  and  left,  than  it  is.  Now,  this  is  not 
 imagining  they  see  the  evidence  itself  to  be  nothing, 
 or  inconsiderable;  but  quite  another  thing.  It  is 
 being  fortified  against  the  evidence,  in  some  degree 
 acknowledged,  by  thinking  they  see  the  system  of 
 Christianity  or  somewhat  which  appears  to  them  ne- 
 cessarily connected  with  it,  to  be  incredible  or  false: 
 fortified  against  that  evidence,  which  might  other- 
 wise make  great  impression  upon  them.  Or,  lastly, 
 if  any  of  these  persons  are,  upon  the  whole,  in  doubt 
 concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity;  their  behaviour 
 seems  owing  to  their  taking  for  granted,  through 
 strange  inattention,  that  such  doubting  is  in  a  man- 
 ner the  same  thing,  as  being  certain  against  it. 
 
 To  these  persons,  and  to  this  state  of  opinion 
 concerning  religion,  the  foregoing  treatise  is  adapted. 
 For,  all  the  general  objections  against  the  moral 
 system  of  nature  having  been  obviated,  it  is  shown, 
 that  there  is  not  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all 
 against  Christianity,  either  considered  as  not  dis- 
 coverable by  reason,  or  as  unlike  to  what  is  so  dis- 
 covered; nor  any  worth  mentioning,  against  it  as 
 miraculous,  if  any  at  all ;  none  certainly,  which  can 
 render  it  in  the  least  incredible.  It  is  shown,  that 
 upon  supposition  of  a  divine  revelation,  the  analogy 
 of  nature  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible,  I 
 think  probable,  that  many  things  in  it  must  appear 
 
510 
 
 liable  to  great  objections;  and  that  we  must  be  in- 
 competent judges  of  it,  to  a  great  degree.  This 
 observation  is,  I  think,  unquestionably  true,  and  oi 
 the  very  utmost  importance:  but  it  is  urged,  as  I 
 hope  it  will  be  understood,  with  great  caution  of  not 
 vilifying  the  faculty  of  reason,  which  is  "  the  candle 
 of  the  Lord  within  us;"  though  it  can  afford  no 
 light,  where  it  does  not  shine ;  nor  judge,  where  it 
 has  no  principles  to  judge  upon.  The  objections 
 here  spoken  of,  being  first  answered  in  the  view  of 
 objections  against  Christianity  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
 are  in  the  next  place  considered  as  urged,  more  im- 
 mediately, against  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  good- 
 ness of  the  Christian  dispensation.  And  it  is  fully 
 made  out,  that  they  admit  of  exactly  the  like  answer, 
 in  every  respect,  to  what  the  like  objections  against 
 the  constitution  of  nature  admit  of:  that,  as  partial 
 views  give  the  appearance  of  wrong  to  things,  which, 
 upon  farther  consideration  and  knowledge  of  their 
 relations  to  other  things,  are  found  just  and  good; 
 so  it  is  perfectly  credible,  that  the  things  objected 
 against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Christian 
 dispensation,  may  be  rendered  instances  of  wisdom 
 and  goodness  by  their  reference  to  other  things  be- 
 yond our  view ;  because  Christianity  is  a  scheme  as 
 much  above  our  comprehension,  as  that  of  nature; 
 and,  like  that,  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made 
 use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  and  which,  as  is  most 
 credible,  may  be  carried  on  by  general  laws.  And 
 it  ought  to  be  attended  to,  that  this  is  not  an  answer 
 taken  merely  or  chiefly  from  our  ignorance;  but  from 
 somewhat  positive,  which  our  observation  shows  us. 
 For,  to  like  objections,  the  like  answer  is  experi- 
 
511 
 
 enced  to  be  just,  in  numberless  parallel  cases.  The 
 objections  against  the  Christian  dispensation,  and  the 
 method  by  which  it  is  carried  on,  having  been  thus  ob- 
 viated, in  general  and  together;  the  chief  of  them  are 
 considered  distinctly,  and  the  particular  things  object- 
 ed to  are  shown  credible,  by  their  perfect  analogy,  each 
 apart,  to  the  constitution  of  nature.  Thus,  if  man 
 be  fallen  from  his  primitive  state,  and  to  be  restored, 
 and  infinite  wisdom  and  power  engages  in  accomplish- 
 ing our  recovery;  it  were  to  have  been  expected,  it 
 is  said,  that  this  should  have  been  effected  at  once, 
 and  not  by  such  a  long  series  of  means,  and  such  a 
 various  economy  of  persons  and  things ;  one  dispen- 
 sation preparatory  to  another,  this  to  a  farther  one, 
 and  so  on  through  an  indefinite  number  of  ages,  be- 
 fore the  end  of  the  scheme  proposed  can  be  com- 
 pletely accomplished;  a  scheme  conducted  by  infi- 
 nite wisdom,  and  executed  by  almighty  power. 
 But  now,  on  the  contrary,  our  finding  that  every 
 thing  in  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature  is 
 thus  carried  on,  shows  such  expectations  concerning 
 revelation  to  be  highly  unreasonable;  and  is  a  sa- 
 tisfactory answer  to  them,  when  urged  as  objections 
 against  the  credibility,  that  the  great  scheme  of 
 Providence  in  the  redemption  of  the  world  may  be 
 of  this  kind,  and  to  be  accomplished  in  this  man- 
 ner. As  to  the  particular  method  of  our  redemp- 
 tion, the  appointment  of  a  Mediator  between  God 
 and  man;  this  has  been  shown  to  be  most  obviously 
 analogous  to  the  general  conduct  of  nature,  that  is, 
 the  God  of  nature,  in  appointing  others  to  be  the 
 instruments  of  his  mercy,  as  we  experience  in  the 
 daily  course  of  Providence.     The  condition  of  this 
 
512 
 
 world,  which  the  doctrine  of  our  redemption  by 
 Christ  presupposes,  so  much  falls  in  with  natural 
 appearances,  that  heathen  moralists  inferred  it  from 
 those  appearances;  inferred,  that  human  nature  was 
 fallen  from  its  original  rectitude,  and,  in  conse- 
 quence of  this,  degraded  from  its  primitive  happi- 
 ness. Or,  however  this  opinion  came  into  the 
 world,  these  appearances  must  have  kept  up  the  tra- 
 dition, and  confirmed  the  belief  of  it.  And  as  it 
 was  the  general  opinion,  under  the  light  of  nature, 
 that  repentance  and  reformation,  alone  and  by  it- 
 self, was  not  sufficient  to  do  away  sin,  and  procure 
 a  full  remission  of  the  penalties  annexed  to  it ;  and 
 as  the  reason  of  the  thing  does  not  at  all  lead  to  any 
 such  conclusion;  so  every  day's  experience  shows 
 us,  that  reformation  is  not,  in  any  sort,  sufficient 
 to  prevent  the  present  disadvantages  and  miseries, 
 which,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  God  has  an- 
 nexed to  folly  and  extravagance.  Yet  there  may 
 be  ground  to  think,  that  the  punishments,  which, 
 by  the  general  laws  of  divine  government,  are  an- 
 nexed to  vice,  may  be  prevented;  that  provision 
 may  have  been  even  originally  made,  that  they 
 should  be  prevented  by  some  means  or  other,  though 
 they  could  not  by  reformation  alone.  For  we  have 
 daily  instances  of  such  mercy,  in  the  general  con- 
 duct of  nature;  compassion  provided  for  misery,* 
 medicines  for  diseases,  friends  against  enemies. 
 There  is  provision  made,  in  the  original  constitu- 
 tion of  the  world,  that  much  of  the  natural  bad 
 consequences   of  our  follies,   which   persons  them- 
 
 *  Sermon  6th,  at  the  Rolls. 
 
513 
 
 selves  alone  cannot  prevent,  may  be  prevented  by 
 the  assistance  of  others;  assistance,  which  nature 
 enables,  and  disposes,  and  appoints  them  to  afford. 
 By  a  method  of  goodness  analogous  to  this,  when 
 the  world  lay  in  wickedness,  and  consequently,  in 
 ruin,  "  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his 
 only  begotten  Son,"  to  save  it ;  and,  "  he  being 
 made  perfect  by  suffering,  became  the  author  of 
 eternal  salvation  to  all  them  that  obey  him."*  In- 
 deed, neither  reason  nor  analogy  would  lead  us  to 
 think,  in  particular,  that  the  interposition  of  Christ, 
 in  the  manner  in  which  he  did  interpose,  would  be 
 of  that  efficacy  for  recovery  of  the  world,  which  the 
 Scripture  teaches  us  it  was :  but  neither  would  rea- 
 son nor  analogy  lead  us  to  think,  that  other  parti- 
 cular means  would  be  of  the  efficacy,  which  experi- 
 ence shows  they  are,  in  numberless  instances.  And 
 therefore,  as  the  case  before  us  does  not  admit  of 
 experience ;  so,  that  neither  reason  nor  analogy  can 
 show,  how,  or  in  what  particular  way,  the  interpo- 
 sition of  Christ,  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  is  of  that 
 efficacy  which  it  is  there  represented  to  be ;  this  is 
 no  kind  or  degree  of  presumption  against  its  being 
 really  of  that  efficacy.  Farther:  the  objections 
 against  Christianity,  from  the  light  of  it  not  being 
 universal,  nor  its  evidence  so  strong  as  might  pos- 
 sibly be  given  us,  have  been  answered  by  the  ge- 
 neral analogy  of  nature.  That  God  has  made  such 
 variety  of  creatures,  is  indeed  an  answer  to  the  for- 
 mer; but  that  he  dispenses  his  gifts  in  such  vari- 
 ety, both  of  degrees  and  kinds,  amongst  creatures 
 
 John  iii.  1G.     Heb.  v.  9. 
 
 y3 
 
514 
 
 of  the  same  species,  and  even  to  the  same  indivi- 
 duals at  different  times,  is  a  more  obvious  and  full 
 answer  to  it.  And  it  is  so  far  from  being  the  me- 
 thod of  Providence,  in  other  cases,  to  afford  us 
 such  overbearing  evidence,  as  some  require  in  proof 
 of  Christianity,  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  evidence 
 upon  which  we  are  naturally  appointed  to  act,  in 
 common  matters,  throughout  a  very  great  part  of 
 life,  is  doubtful  in  a  high  degree.  And,  admitting 
 the  fact,  that  God  has  afforded  to  some,  no  more 
 than  doubtful  evidence  of  religion,  the  same  account 
 may  be  given  of  it,  as  of  difficulties  and  temptations 
 with  regard  to  practice.  But  as  it  is  not  impossi- 
 ble,* surely,  that  this  alleged  doubtfulness  may  be 
 men's  own  fault,  it  deserves  their  most  serious  con- 
 sideration, whether  it  be  not  so.  However,  it  is 
 certain,  that  doubting  implies  a  degree  of  evidence 
 for  that  of  which  we  doubt;  and  that  this  degree  of 
 evidence  as  really  lays  us  under  obligations,  as  de- 
 monstrative evidence. 
 
 The  whole,  then,  of  religion  is  throughout  cre- 
 dible ;  nor  is  there,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to 
 the  revealed  dispensation  of  things  more  different 
 from  the  experienced  constitution  and  course  of  na- 
 ture, than  some  parts  of  the  constitution  of  nature 
 are  from  other  parts  of  it.  And  if  so,  the  only 
 question  which  remains,  is,  What  positive  evidence 
 can  be  alleged  for  the  truth  of  Christianity  ?  This 
 too,  in  general,  has  been  considered,  and  the  ob- 
 jections against  it  estimated.  Deduct,  therefore, 
 what  is  to  be  deducted  from  that  evidence,  upon  ac- 
 
 *  Fage  439,  &c. 
 
515 
 
 count  of  any  weight  which  may  be  thought  to  re- 
 main in  these  objections,  after  what  the  analogy  of 
 nature  has  suggested  in  answer  to  them ;  and  then 
 consider,  what  are  the  practical  consequences  from 
 all  this,  upon  the  most  sceptical  principles  one  can 
 argue  upon,  (for  I  am  writing  to  persons  who  en- 
 tertain these  principles ;)  and,  upon  such  considera- 
 tion, it  will  be  obvious,  that  immorality,  as  little 
 excuse  as  it  admits  of  in  itself,  is  greatly  aggravat- 
 ed, in  persons  who  have  been  made  acquainted  with 
 Christianity,  whether  they  believe  it  or  not;  be- 
 cause the  moral  system  of  nature,  or  natural  reli- 
 gion, which  Christianity  lays  before  us,  approves 
 itself,  almost  intuitively,  to  a  reasonable  mind,  upon 
 seeing  it  proposed.  In  the  next  place,  with  regard 
 to  Christianity,  it  will  be  observed,  that  there  is  a 
 middle,  between  a  full  satisfaction  of  the  truth  of 
 it,  and  a  satisfaction  of  the  contrary.  The  middle 
 state  of  mind  between  these  two,  consists  in  a  seri- 
 ous apprehension,  that  it  may  be  true,  joined  with 
 doubt,  whether  it  be  so.  And  this,  upon  the  best 
 judgment  I  am  able  to  make,  is  as  far  towards  spe- 
 culative infidelity,  as  any  sceptic  can  at  all  be  sup- 
 posed to  go,  who  has  had  true  Christianity,  with 
 the  proper  evidence  of  it,  laid  before  him,  and  has 
 in  any  tolerable  measure  considered  them.  For  I 
 would  not  be  mistaken  to  comprehend  all  who  have 
 ever  heard  of  it ;  because  it  seems  evident,  that  in 
 many  countries  called  Christian,  neither  Christian- 
 ity, nor  its  evidence,  are  fairly  laid  before  men. 
 And  in  places  where  both  are,  there  appear  to  be 
 some  who  have  very  little  attended  to  cither,  and 
 who  reject  Christianity  with  a  scorn  proportionate  to. 
 
516 
 
 their  inattention ;  and  yet  are  by  no  means  without 
 understanding  in  other  matters.  Now,  it  has  been 
 shown,  that  a  serious  apprehension  that  Christian- 
 ity may  be  true,  lays  persons  under  the  strictest 
 obligations  of  a  serious  regard  to  it,  throughout  the 
 whole  of"  their  life ;  a  regard,  not  the  same  exactly, 
 but  in  many  respects  nearly  the  same,  with  what  a 
 full  conviction  of  its  truth  would  lay  them  under. 
 Lastly,  It  will  appear,  that  blasphemy  and  profane- 
 ness,  I  mean  with  regard  to  Christianity,  are  abso- 
 lutely without  excuse.  For  there  is  no  temptation 
 to  it,  but  from  the  wantonness  of  vanity  or  mirth; 
 and  these,  considering  the  infinite  importance  of  the 
 subject,  are  no  such  temptations  as  to  afford  any  ex- 
 cuse for  it.  If  this  be  a  just  account  of  things,  and 
 yet  men  can  go  on  to  vilify  or  disregard  Christianity, 
 which  is  to  talk  and  act  as  if  they  had  a  demonstra- 
 tion of  its  falsehood;  there  is  no  reason  to  think 
 they  would  alter  their  behaviour  to  any  purpose, 
 though  there  were  a  demonstration  of  its  truth. 
 
TWO   dissertations: 
 
 OF  PERSONAL  IDENTITY, 
 
 AND 
 
 OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 
 DISSERT.  I. 
 
 OF    PERSONAL    IDENTITY. 
 
 Whether  we  are  to  live  in  a  future  state,  as  it  is 
 the  most  important  question  which  can  possibly  be 
 risked,  so  it  is  the  most  intelligible  one  which  can  be 
 expressed  in  language.  Yet  strange  perplexities 
 have  been  raised  about  the  meaning  of  that  identity, 
 or  sameness  of  person,  which  is  implied  in  the  no- 
 tion of  our  living  now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two 
 successive  moments.  And  the  solution  of  these 
 difficulties  hath  been  stranger  than  the  difficulties 
 themselves.  For,  personal  identity  has  been  ex- 
 plained so  by  some,  as  to  render  the  inquiry  con- 
 cerning a  future  life  of  no  consequence  at  all  to  us, 
 the  persons  who  are  making  it.  And  though  few 
 men  can  be  misled  by  such  subtleties,  yet  it  may  be 
 proper  a  little  to  consider  them. 
 
 Now,  when  it  is  asked  wherein  personal  identity 
 consists,  the  answer  should  be  the  same  as  if  it  were 
 asked,  wherein  consists  similitude  or  equality:  that 
 all  attempts  to  define,  would  but  perplex  it.      Yet 
 
518 
 
 there  is  no  difficulty  at  all  in  ascertaining  the  idea. 
 For  as,  upon  two  triangles  being  compared  or  viewed 
 together,  there  arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  simi- 
 litude; or  upon  twice  two  and  four,  the  idea  of 
 equality:  so  likewise,  upon  comparing  the  conscious- 
 ness of  one's  self,  or  one's  own  existence  in  any  two 
 moments,  there  as  immediately  arises  to  the  mind  the 
 idea  of  personal  identity.  And  as  the  two  former 
 comparisons  not  only  give  us  the  ideas  of  similitude 
 and  equality,  but  also  show  us,  that  two  triangles 
 are  alike,  and  twice  two  and  four  are  equal;  so  the 
 latter  comparison  not  only  gives  us  the  idea  of  per- 
 sonal identity,  but  also  shows  us  the  identity  of  our- 
 selves in  those  two  moments ;  the  present  suppose, 
 and  that  immediately  past ;  or  the  present,  and  that 
 a  month,  a  year,  or  twenty  years  past.  Or,  in  other 
 words,  by  reflecting  upon  that,  which  is  myself  now, 
 and  that  which  was  myself  twenty  years  ago,  I  dis- 
 cern they  are  not  two,  but  one  and  the  same  self. 
 
 But  though  consciousness  of  what  is  past  does 
 thus  ascertain  our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet, 
 to  say  that  it  makes  personal  identity,  or  is  neces- 
 sary to  our  being  the  same  persons,  is  to  say,  that 
 a  person  has  not  existed  a  single  moment,  nor  done 
 one  action,  but  what  he  can  remember;  indeed  none 
 but  what  he  reflects  upon.  And  one  should  really 
 think  it  self-evident,  that  consciousness  of  personal 
 identity  presupposes,  and  therefore  cannot  consti- 
 tute personal  identity,  any  more  than  knowledge,  in 
 any  other  case,  can  constitute  truth,  which  it  pre- 
 supposes. 
 
 This  wonderful  mistake  may  possibly  have  arisen 
 from  hence,  that  to  be  endued  with  consciousness,  is 
 
519 
 
 inseparable  from  the  idea  of  a  person,  or  intelligent 
 being.  For  this  might  be  expressed  inaccurately 
 thus — that  consciousness  makes  personality;  and 
 from  hence  it  might  be  concluded  to  make  personal 
 identity.  But  though  present  consciousness  of  what 
 we  at  present  do  and  feel,  is  necessary  to  our  being 
 the  persons  we  now  are;  yet  present  consciousness 
 of  past  actions,  or  feelings,  is  not  necessary  to  our 
 being  the  same  persons  who  performed  those  actions, 
 or  had  those  feelings. 
 
 The  inquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  same  in 
 the  common  acceptation  of  the  word,  does  not  ap- 
 pear to  have  any  relation  to  this  of  personal  identity ; 
 because  the  word  same,  when  applied  to  them  and  to 
 person,  is  not  only  applied  to  different  subjects,  but 
 it  is  also  used  in  different  senses.  For  when  a  man 
 swears  to  the  same  tree,  as  having  stood  fifty  years 
 in  the  same  place,  he  means  only  the  same  as  to  all 
 the  purposes  of  property  and  uses  of  common  life, 
 and  not  that  the  tree  has  been  all  that  time  the  same 
 in  the  strict  philosophical  sense  of  the  word.  For 
 he  does  not  know,  whether  any  one  particle  of  the 
 present  tree  be  the  same  with  any  one  particle  of  the 
 tree  which  stood  in  the  same  place  fifty  years  ago 
 And  if  they  have  not  one  common  particle  of  mat- 
 ter, they  cannot  be  the  same  tree  in  the  proper  phi- 
 losophic sense  of  the  word  same;  it  being  evidently 
 a  contradiction  in  terms,  to  say  they  are,  when  no 
 part  of  their  substance,  and  no  one  of  their  proper- 
 ties, is  the  same :  no  part  of  their  substance  by  the 
 supposition;  no  one  of  their  properties,  because  it 
 is  allowed,  that  the  same  property  cannot  be  trans- 
 ferred from  one  substance  to  another.      And  there- 
 
520 
 
 fore,  when  we  say  the  identity,  or  sameness,  of  a 
 plant  consists  in  a  continuation  of  the  same  life, 
 communicated  under  the  same  organization,  to  a 
 number  of  particles  of  matter,  whether  the  same  or 
 not,  the  word  same,  when  applied  to  life  and  to  or- 
 ganization, cannot  possibly  be  understood  to  signify, 
 what  it  signifies  in  this  very  sentence,  when  applied 
 to  matter.  In  a  loose  and  popular  sense,  then,  the 
 life,  and  the  organization,  and  the  plant,  are  justly 
 said  to  be  the  same,  notwithstanding  the  perpetual 
 change  of  the  parts.  But  in  a  strict  and  philoso- 
 phical manner  of  speech,  no  man,  no  being,  no  mode 
 of  being,  no  any-thing,  can  be  the  same  with  that, 
 with  which  it  hath  indeed  nothing  the  same.  Now, 
 sameness  is  used  in  this  latter  sense  when  applied  to 
 persons.  The  identity  of  these,  therefore,  cannot 
 subsist  with  diversity  of  substance. 
 
 The  thing  here  considered,  and  demonstratively, 
 as  I  think,  determined,  is  proposed  by  Mr.  Locke 
 in  these  words,  Whether  it,  that  is,  the  same  self  or 
 person,  be  the  same  identical  substance?  And  he 
 has  suggested  what  is  a  much  better  answer  to  the 
 question,  than  that  which  he  gives  it  in  form.  For 
 he  defines  person,  a  thinking,  intelligent  being,  &c. 
 and  personal  identity,  the  sameness  of  a  rational  be- 
 ing* The  question  then  is,  whether  the  same  ra- 
 tional being  is  the  same  substance;  which  needs  no 
 answer,  because  being  and  substance,  in  this  place, 
 stand  for  the  same  idea.  The  ground  of  the  doubt, 
 whether  the  same  person  be  the  same  substance, 
 is   said  to  be  this:    that  the   consciousness  of  our 
 
 *  Locke's  Works,  vol.  i.  p.  146. 
 
521 
 
 own  existence,  in  youth  and  in  old  age,  or  in  any 
 two  joint  successive  moments,  is  not  the  same  indi- 
 vidual action*  that  is,  not  the  same  consciousness, 
 but  different  successive  consciousnesses.  Now,  it  is 
 strange  that  this  should  have  occasioned  such  per- 
 plexities. For  it  is  surely  conceivable,  that  a  per- 
 son may  have  a  capacity  of  knowing  some  object  or 
 other  to  be  the  same  now,  which  it  was  when  he 
 contemplated  it  formerly;  yet  in  this  case,  where, 
 by  the  supposition,  the  object  is  perceived  to  be  the 
 same,  the  perception  of  it  in  any  two  moments,  can- 
 not be  one  and  the  same  perception.  And  thus, 
 though  the  successive  consciousnesses  which  we  have 
 of  our  own  existence  are  not  the  same,  yet  are 
 they  consciousnesses  of  one  and  the  same  thing  or  ob- 
 ject; of  the  same  person,  self,  or  living  agent.  The 
 person,  of  whose  .  existence  the  consciousness  is  felt 
 now,  and  was  felt  an  hour  or  a  year  ago,  is  discerned 
 to  be,  not  two  persons,  but  one  and  the  same  person; 
 and  therefore  is  one  and  the  same. 
 
 Mr.  Locke's  observations  upon  this  subject  ap- 
 pear hasty ;  and  he  seems  to  profess  himself  dissat- 
 isfied with  suppositions  which  he  has  made  relating 
 to  it.f  But  some  of  those  hasty  observations  have 
 been  carried  to  a  strange  length  by  others;  whose 
 notion,  when  traced  and  examined  to  the  bottom, 
 amounts,  I  think,  to  this: J  «  That  personality  is  not 
 a  permanent,  but  a  transient  thing;  that  it  lives  and 
 dies,  begins  and  ends,  continually:  that  no  one  can 
 any  more  remain  one  and  the  same  person  two  mo- 
 
 *  Locke,  pp.  14G,  147.  \  Locke,  p.  152. 
 
 %  See  an  answer  to  Dr.  Clarke's  third  defence  of  his  letter  lo 
 Mr.  Dodwell,  2d  edit.  pp.  44,  56,  &c. 
 
522 
 
 ments  together,  than  two  successive  moments  can  be 
 one  and  the  same  moment:  that  our  substance  is  in- 
 deed continually  changing ;  but  whether  this  be  so 
 or  not,  is,  it  seems,  nothing  to  the  purpose;  since 
 it  is  not  substance,  but  consciousness,  alone,  which 
 constitutes  personality;  which  consciousness  being 
 successive,  cannot  be  the  same  in  any  two  moments, 
 nor  consequently  the  personality  constituted  by  it." 
 And  from  hence  it  must  follow,  that  it  is  a  fallacy 
 upon  ourselves,  to  charge  our  present  selves  with 
 any  thing  we  did,  or  to  imagine  our  present  selves 
 interested  in  any  thing  which  befell  us  yester- 
 day, or  that  our  present  self  will  be  interested  in 
 what  will  befall  us  to-morrow:  since  our  present 
 self  is  not,  in  reality,  the  same  with  the  self  of 
 yesterday,  but  another  like  self  or  person  coming 
 in  its  room,  and  mistaken  for  it ;  to  which  another 
 self  will  succeed  to-morrow.  This,  I  say,  must  fol- 
 low :  for  if  the  self  or  person  of  to-day,  and  that 
 of  to-morrow,  are  not  the  same,  but  only  like  per- 
 sons, the  person  of  to-day  is  really  no  more  inter- 
 ested in  what  will  befall  the  person  of  to-morrow, 
 than  in  what  will  befall  any  other  person.  It  may 
 be  thought,  perhaps,  that  this  is  not  a  just  represen- 
 tation of  the  opinion  we  are  speaking  of;  because 
 those  who  maintain  it  allow,  that  a  person  is  the 
 same  as  far  back  as  his  remembrance  reaches.  And, 
 indeed,  they  do  use  the  words  identity  and  same 
 person.  Nor  will  language  permit  these  words  to 
 be  laid  aside:  since,  if  they  were,  there  must  be, 
 I  know  not  what  ridiculous  periphrasis  substituted  in 
 the  room  of  them.  But  they  cannot,  consistently 
 with  themselves,  mean,  that  the  person  is  really  the 
 
523 
 
 same.  For  it  is  self-evident,  that  the  personality 
 cannot  be  really  the  same,  if,  as  they  expressly  as- 
 sert, that  in  which  it  consists  is  not  the  same.  And 
 as,  consistently  with  themselves,  they  cannot,  so,  I 
 think,  it  appears  they  do  not  mean,  that  the  person 
 is  really  the  same,  but  only  that  he  is  so  in  a  ficti- 
 tious sense  :  in  such  a  sense  only  as  they  assert;  for 
 this  they  do  assert,  that  any  number  of  persons  what- 
 ever may  be  the  same  person.  The  bare  unfolding 
 this  notion,  and  laying  it  thus  naked  and  open, 
 seems  the  best  confutation  of  it.  However,  since 
 great  stress  is  said  to  be  put  upon  it,  I  add  the  fol- 
 lowing things : 
 
 First,  This  notion  is  absolutely  contradictory  to 
 that  certain  conviction,  which  necessarily  and  every 
 moment  rises  within  us,  when  we  turn  our  thoughts 
 upon  ourselves :  when  we  reflect  upon  what  is 
 past,  and  look  forward  upon  what  is  to  come. 
 All  imagination  of  a  daily  change  of  that  living 
 agent  which  each  man  calls  himself,  for  another, 
 or  of  any  such  change  throughout  our  whole  present 
 life,  is  entirely  borne  down  by  our  natural  sense 
 of  things.  Nor  is  it  possible  for  a  person  in  his 
 wits  to  alter  his  conduct,  with  regard  to  his 
 health  or  affairs,  from  a  suspicion,  that  though  he 
 should  live  to-morrow,  he  should  not,  however,  be 
 the  same  person  he  is  to-day.  And  yet,  if  it  be 
 reasonable  to  act,  with  respect  to  a  future  life,  upon 
 this  notion,  that  personality  is  transient;  it  is  rea- 
 sonable to  act  upon  it,  with  respect  to  the  present. 
 Here  then  is  a  notion  equally  applicable  to  religion 
 and  to  our  temporal  concerns ;  and  every  one  sees 
 and  feels  the  inexpressible  absurdity  of  it  in  the  lat- 
 
524 
 
 ter  case.  If,  therefore,  any  can  take  up  with  it  in 
 the  former,  this  cannot  proceed  from  the  reason  of 
 the  thing,  but  must  be  owing  to  an  inward  unfair- 
 ness, and  secret  corruption  of  heart. 
 
 Secondly,  It  is  not  an  idea,  or  abstract  notion,  or 
 (Juality,  but  a  being  only,  which  is  capable  of  life 
 and  action,  of  happiness  and  misery.  Now  all  be- 
 ings confessedly  continue  the  same,  during  the 
 whole  time  of  their  existence.  Consider  then  a 
 living  being  now  existing,  and  which  has  existed  for 
 any  time  alive :  this  living  being  must  have  done  and 
 suffered  and  enjoyed,  what  it  has  done  and  suffered 
 and  enjoyed  formerly  (this  living  being,  I  say,  and 
 not  another)  as  really  as  it  does  and  suffers  and  en- 
 joys, what  it  does,  and  suffers,  and  enjoys,  this  in- 
 stant. All  these  successive  actions,  enjoyments,  and 
 sufferings,  are  actions,  enjoyments,  and  sufferings, 
 of  the  same  living  being.  And  they  are  so,  prior 
 to  all  consideration  of  its  remembering  or  forgetting; 
 since  remembering  or  forgetting  can  make  no  altera- 
 tion in  the  truth  of  past  matter  of  fact.  And  sup- 
 pose this  being  endued  with  limited  powers  of  know- 
 ledge and  memory,  there  is  no  more  difficulty  in 
 conceiving  it  to  have  a  power  of  knowing  itself  to  be 
 the  same  living  being  which  it  was  some  time  ago, 
 of  remembering  some  of  its  actions,  sufferings,  and 
 enjoyments,  and  forgetting  others,  than  in  conceiv- 
 ing it  to  know,  or  remember,  or  forget,  any  thing 
 else. 
 
 Thirdly,  Every  person  is  conscious  that  he  is  now 
 the  same  person  or  self  he  was,  as  far  back  as  his 
 remembrance  reaches:  since,  when  any  one  reflects 
 upon  a  past  action  of  his  own,  he  is  just  as  certain 
 
525 
 
 of  the  person  who  did  that  action,  namely,  himself, 
 the  person  who  now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is  certain 
 that  the  action  was  at  all  done.  Nay,  very  often  a 
 person's  assurance  of  an  action  having  been  done,  of 
 which  he  is  absolutely  assured,  arises  wholly  from 
 the  consciousness  that  he  himself  did  it.  And  this 
 he,  person,  or  self,  must  either  be  a  substance,  or  the 
 property  of  some  substance.  If  he,  if  person,  be  a 
 substance;  then  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same 
 person,  is  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same  substance. 
 If  the  person,  or  he,  be  the  property  of  a  substance  ; 
 still  consciousness  that  he  is  the  same  property,  is  as 
 certain  a  proof  that  his  substance  remains  the  same, 
 as  consciousness  that  he  remains  the  same  substance 
 would  be;  since  the  same  property  cannot  be  trans- 
 ferred from  one  substance  to  another. 
 
 But  though  we  are  thus  certain  that  we  are  the 
 same  agents,  living  beings,  or  substances,  now, 
 which  we  were  as  far  back  as  our  remembrance 
 reaches ;  yet  it  is  asked,  Whether  we  may  not  pos- 
 sibly be  deceived  in  it?  And  this  question  may 
 be  asked  at  the  end  of  any  demonstration  whatever; 
 because  it  is  a  question  concerning  the  truth  of  per- 
 ception by  memory.  And  he  who  can  doubt,  whe- 
 ther perception  by  memory  can  in  this  case  be  depend- 
 ed upon,  may  doubt  also,  whether  perception  by  de- 
 duction and  reasoning,  which  also  include  memory, 
 or,  indeed,  whether  intuitive  perception  can.  Here, 
 then  we  can  go  no  farther.  For  it  is  ridiculous  to 
 attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  those  perceptions, 
 whose  truth  we  can  no  otherwise  prove,  than  bv 
 other  perceptions  of  exactly  the  same  kind  with 
 them,  and  which  there  is  just  the  same  ground  to 
 
526 
 
 suspect;  or  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  our  fa- 
 culties, which  can  no  otherwise  be  proved,  than  by 
 the  use  or  means  of  those  very  suspected  faculties 
 themselves. 
 
DISSERT.  II. 
 
 OF  THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 
 
 That  which  renders  beings  capable  of  moral  go- 
 vernment, is  their  having  a  moral  nature,  and  moral 
 faculties  of  perception  and  of  action.  Brute  crea- 
 tures are  impressed  and  actuated  by  various  instincts 
 and  propensions  :  so  also  are  we.  But,  additional  to 
 this,  we  have  a  capacity  of  reflecting  upon  actions 
 and  characters,  and  making  them  an  object  to  our 
 thought :  and  on  doing  this,  we  naturally  and  un- 
 avoidably approve  some  actions,  under  the  peculiar 
 view  of  their  being  virtuous,  and  of  good-desert: 
 and  disapprove  others,  as  vicious  and  of  ill-desert- 
 That  we  have  this  moral  approving  and  disapprov- 
 ing* faculty,  is  certain  from  our  experiencing  it 
 in  ourselves,  and  recocmizincr  it  in  each  other.  It 
 appears  from  our  exercising  it  unavoidably,  in  the 
 approbation  and  disapprobation  even  of  feigned  cha- 
 racters :    from  the  words,  right  and  wrong,  odious 
 
 *  This  way  of  speaking  is  taken  from  Epictetus,*  and  is  made 
 use  of.  as  seeming  the  most  full,  and  least  liable  to  cavil.  And 
 the  moral  faculty  may  be  understood  to  have  these  two  epithets, 
 doKifcaffriKt}  and  uvroboxip.a.ffrixb ,  upon  a  double  account;  because, 
 upon  a  survey  of  actions,  whether  before  or  after  they  are  done, 
 it  determines  them  to  be  good  or  evil ;  and  also  because  it  deter- 
 mines itself  to  be  the  guide  of  action  and  of  life,  in  contradistinc- 
 tion from  all  other  faculties,  or  natural  principles  of  action  :  in 
 the  very  same  manner,  as  speculative  reason  directly  and  naturally 
 judges  of  speculative  truth  and  falsehood :  and,  at  the  same  time, 
 is  attended  with  a  consciousness  upon  reflection,  that  the  natural 
 right  to  judge  of  them  belongs  to  it. 
 
 *  Arr.  Epict.  lib.  i.  cap.  I. 
 
528 
 
 and  amiable,  base  and  worthy,  with  many  others  of 
 like  signification  in  all  languages,  applied  to  actions 
 and  characters;  from  the  many  written  systems  of 
 morals  which  suppose  it;  since  it  cannot  be  imagined, 
 that  all  these  authors,  throughout  all  these  treatises, 
 had  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to  their  words,  or  a 
 meaning  merely  chimerical :  from  our  natural  sense 
 of  gratitude,  which  implies  a  distinction  between 
 merely  being  the  instrument  of  good  and  intending 
 it;  from  the  like  distinction,  every  one  makes,  be- 
 tween injury  and  mere  harm,  which,  Hobbes  says,  is 
 peculiar  to  mankind;  and  between  injury  and  just 
 punishment,  a  distinction  plainly  natural,  prior  to  the 
 consideration  of  human  laws.  It  is  manifest,  great 
 part  of  common  language,  and  of  common  behaviour 
 over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  supposition  of  such  a 
 moral  faculty ;  whether  called  conscience,  moral  rea- 
 son, moral  sense,  or  divine  reason;  whether  consi- 
 dered as  a  sentiment  of  the  understanding,  or  as  a 
 perception  of  the  heart,  or,  which  seems  the  truth,  as 
 including  both.  Nor  is  it  at  all  doubtful  in  gene- 
 ral, what  course  of  action  this  faculty,  or  practical 
 discerning  power  within  us,  approves,  and  what  it 
 disapproves.  For,  as  much  as  it  has  been  disputed 
 wherein  virtue  consists,  or  whatever  ground  for  doubt 
 there  may  be  about  particulars,  yet,  in  general,  there 
 is  in  reality  an  universally  acknowledged  standard  of 
 it.  It  is  that  which  all  ages  and  all  countries  have 
 made  profession  of  in  public;  it  is  that  which  every 
 man  you  meet,  puts  on  the  show  of;  it  is  that  which 
 the  primary  and  fundamental  laws  of  all  civil  consti- 
 tutions, over  the  face  of  the  earth,  make  it  their 
 business  and  endeavour  to   enforce  the  practice  of 
 
529 
 
 upon  mankind ;  namely,  justice,  veracity,  and  regard 
 to  common  good.  It  being  manifest,  then,  in  gene- 
 ral, that  we  have  such  a  faculty,  or  discernment  as 
 this,  it  may  be  of  use  to  remark  some  things,  more 
 distinctly,  concerning  it. 
 
 First,  It  ought  to  be  observed,  that  the  object  of 
 this  faculty  is  actions,*  comprehending  under  that 
 name,  active  or  practical  principles ;  those  principles 
 from  which  men  would  act,  if  occasions  and  circum- 
 stances gave  them  power;  and  which,  when  fixed 
 and  habitual  in  any  person,  we  call,  his  character.  It 
 does  not  appear,  that  brutes  have  the  least  reflex 
 sense  of  actions,  as  distinguished  from  events;  or 
 that  will  and  design,  which  constitute  the  very  na- 
 ture of  actions  as  such,  are  at  all  an  object  to  their 
 perception.  But  to  ours  they  are ;  and  they  are  the 
 object,  and  the  only  one,  of  the  approving  and  dis- 
 approving faculty.  Acting,  conduct,  behaviour,  ab- 
 stracted from  all  regard  to  what  is,  in  fact  and  event, 
 the  consequence  of  it,  is  itself  the  natural  object  of 
 the  moral  discernment,  as  speculative  truth  and 
 falsehood  is  of  speculative  reason.  Intention  of  such 
 and  such  consequences,  indeed,  is  always  included ; 
 for  it  is  part  of  the  action  itself:  but  though  the 
 intended  good  or  bad  consequences  do  not  follow,  we 
 have  exactly  the  same  sense  of  the  action,  as  if  they 
 did.  In  like  manner,  we  think  well  or  ill  of  cha- 
 racters, abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the  good 
 or  the  evil  which  persons  of  such  characters  have  it 
 actually  in  their  power  to  do.     We  never,  in  the 
 
 *  olTi  h  uotTtt  x,a)  xccxia. — Iv  xuau,  uXXa,  hi^yila.  M.  Anton. 
 lib.  9.  lfi. — Virtutis  laus  omnis  in  actione  consistit.  Cic.  Offic. 
 lib.  1.  c.  6. 
 
 z  17 
 
530 
 
 moral  way,  applaud  or  blame  either  ourselves  or 
 others,  for  what  we  enjoy  or  what  we  suffer,  or,  for 
 having  impressions  made  upon  us  which  we  consider 
 as  altogether  out  of  our  power ;  but  only  for  what 
 we  do  or  would  have  done,  had  it  been  in  our 
 power;  or  for  what  we  leave  undone  which  we  might 
 have  done,  or  would  have  left  undone  though  we 
 could  have  done  it. 
 
 Secondly,  Our  sense  or  discernment  of  actions,  as 
 morally  good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  discern- 
 ment of  them  as  of  good  or  ill  desert.  It  may  be 
 difficult  to  explain  this  perception,  so  as  to  answer 
 all  the  questions  which  might  be  asked  concerning 
 it ;  but  every  one  speaks  of  such  actions  as  deserving 
 punishment;  and  it  is  not,  I  suppose,  pretended, 
 that  they  have  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to  the 
 expression.  Now,  the  meaning  plainly  is  not,  that 
 we  conceive  it  for  the  good  of  society,  that  the  doer 
 of  such  actions  should  be  made  to  suffer.  For  if 
 unhappily  it  were  resolved,  that  a  man  who,  by  some 
 innocent  action,  was  infected  with  the  plague,  should 
 be  left  to  perish,  lest,  by  other  people  coming  near 
 him,  the  infection  should  spread ;  no  one  would  say, 
 he  deserved  this  treatment.  Innocence  and  ill  de- 
 sert are  inconsistent  ideas.  Ill  desert  always  sup- 
 poses guilt;  and  if  one  be  not  part  of  the  other,  yet 
 they  are  evidently  and  naturally  connected  in  our 
 mind.  The  sight  of  a  man  in  misery  raises  our 
 compassion  towards  him ;  and,  if  this  misery  be  in- 
 flicted on  him  by  another,  our  indignation  against 
 the  author  of  it.  But  when  we  are  informed,  that 
 the  sufferer  is  a  villain,  and  is  punished  only  for  his 
 treachery  or   cruelty,    our    compassion    exceedingly 
 
531 
 
 lessens,  and,  in  many  instances,  our  indignation 
 wholly  subsides.  Now,  what  produces  this  effect, 
 is  the  conception  of  that  in  the  sufferer,  which  we 
 call  ill  desert.  Upon  considering,  then,  or  viewing 
 together,  our  notion  of  vice  and  that  of  misery, 
 there  results  a  third,  that  of  ill  desert.  And  thus 
 there  is  in  human  creatures  an  association  of  the 
 two  ideas,  natural  and  moral  evil,  wickedness  and 
 punishment.  If  this  association  were  merely  arti- 
 ficial or  accidental,  it  were  nothing ;  but  being  most 
 unquestionably  natural,  it  greatly  concerns  us  to  at- 
 tend to  it,  instead  of  endeavouring  to  explain  it 
 away. 
 
 It  may  be  observed  farther,  concerning  our  percep- 
 tion of  good  and  of  ill  desert,  that  the  former  is  very 
 weak  with  respect  to  common  instances  of  virtue. 
 One  reason  of  which  may  be,  that  it  does  not  appear 
 to  a  spectator,  how  far  such  instances  of  virtue  pro- 
 ceed from  a  virtuous  principle,  or  in  what  degree  this 
 principle  is  prevalent ;  since  a  very  weak  regard  to 
 virtue  may  be  sufficient  to  make  men  act  well  in 
 many  common  instances.  And,  on  the  other  hand, 
 our  perception  of  ill  desert  in  vicious  actions  lessens, 
 in  proportion  to  the  temptations  men  are  thought  to 
 have  had  to  such  vices.  For,  vice  in  human  crea- 
 tures consisting  chiefly  in  the  absence  or  want  of  the 
 virtuous  principle,  though  a  man  be  overcome,  sup- 
 pose, by  tortures,  it  does  not  from  thence  appear,  to 
 what  degree  the  virtuous  principle  was  wanting. 
 All  that  appears  is,  that  he  had  it  not  in  such  a  de- 
 gree, as  to  prevail  over  the  temptation ;  but  possibly 
 he  had  it  in  a  degree,  which  would  have  rendered  him 
 proof  against  common  temptations. 
 z2 
 
532 
 
 Thirdly,  Our  perception  of  vice  and  ill  desert 
 arises  from,  and  is  the  result  of,  a  comparison  of  ac- 
 tions with  the  nature  and  capacities  of  the  agent.  For 
 the  mere  neglect  of  doing  what  we  ought  to  do,  would, 
 in  many  cases,  be  determined  by  all  men  to  be  in 
 the  highest  degree  vicious.  And  this  determination 
 must  arise  from  such  comparison,  and  be  the  result 
 of  it ;  because  such  neglect  would  not  be  vicious  in 
 creatures  of  other  natures  and  capacities,  as  brutes. 
 And  it  is  the  same  also  with  respect  to  positive  vices, 
 or  such  as  consist  in  doing  what  we  ought  not.  For, 
 every  one  has  a  different  sense  of  harm  done  by  an 
 idiot,  madman,  or  child,  and  by  one  of  mature  and 
 common  understanding ;  though  the  action  of  both, 
 including  the  intention,  which  is  part  of  the  action, 
 be  the  same;  as  it  may  be,  since  idiots  and  madmen, 
 as  well  as  children,  are  capable,  not  only  of  doing 
 mischief,  but  also  of  intending  it.  Now,  this  dif- 
 ference must  arise  from  somewhat  discerned  in  the 
 nature  or  capacities  of  one,  which  renders  the  action 
 vicious;  and  the  want  of  which  in  the  other,  renders 
 the  same  action  innocent,  or  less  vicious;  and  this 
 plainly  supposes  a  comparison,  whether  reflected  up- 
 on or  not,  between  the  action  and  capacities  of  the 
 agent,  previous  to  our  determining  an  action  to  be 
 vicious.  And  hence  arises  a  proper  application  of 
 the  epithets,  incongruous,  unsuitable,  disproportion- 
 ate, unfit,  to  actions  which  our  moral  faculty  deter- 
 mines to  be  vicious. 
 
 Fourthly,  It  deserves  to  be  considered,  whether 
 men  are  more  at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make 
 themselves  miserable  without  reason,  than  to  make 
 other  people  so ;   or  dissolutely  to  neglect  their  own 
 
533 
 
 greater  good,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  lesser  grati- 
 fication, than  they  are  to  neglect  the  good  of  others, 
 whom  nature  has  committed  to  their  care.  It  should 
 seem,  that  a  due  concern  about  our  own  interest  or 
 happiness,  and  a  reasonable  endeavour  to  secure  and 
 promote  it,  which  is,  I  think,  very  much  the  mean- 
 ing of  the  word  prudence  in  our  language ;  it  should 
 seem,  that  this  is  virtue,  and  the  contrary  behaviour 
 faulty  and  blameable :  since,  in  the  calmest  way  of 
 reflection,  we  approve  of  the  first,  and  condemn  the 
 other  conduct,  both  in  ourselves  and  others.  This 
 approbation  and  disapprobation  are  altogether  differ- 
 ent from  mere  desire  of  our  own,  or  of  their  happi- 
 ness, and  from  sorrow  upon  missing  it.  For  the 
 object  or  occasion  of  this  last  kind  of  perception,  is 
 satisfaction  or  uneasiness;  whereas  the  object  of  the 
 first  is  active  behaviour.  In  one  case,  what  our 
 thoughts  fix  upon,  is  our  condition;  in  the  other, 
 our  conduct.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  nature  has  not 
 given  us  so  sensible  a  disapprobation  of  imprudence 
 and  folly  either  in  ourselves  or  others,  as  of  false- 
 hood, injustice,  and  cruelty;  I  suppose,  because  that 
 constant  habitual  sense  of  private  interest  and  good, 
 which  we  always  carry  about  with  us,  renders  such 
 sensible  disapprobation  less  necessary,  less  wanting, 
 to  keep  us  from  imprudently  neglecting  our  own 
 happiness,  and  foolishly  injuring  ourselves,  than  it 
 is  necessary  and  wanting  to  keep  us  from  injuring 
 others,  to  whose  good  we  cannot  have  so  strong  and 
 constant  a  regard;  and  also  because  imprudence  and 
 folly,  appearing  to  bring  its  own  punishment  more 
 immediately  and  constantly  than  injurious  behaviour, 
 it  less  needs  the  additional  punishment,  which  would 
 z3 
 
534 
 
 be  inflicted  upon  it  by  others,  had  they  the  same 
 sensible  indignation  against  it,  as  against  injustice 
 and  fraud  and  cruelty.  Besides,  unhappiness  being 
 in  itself  the  natural  object  of  compassion,  the  unhap- 
 piness which  people  bring  upon  themselves,  though 
 it  be  wilfully,  excites  in  us  some  pity  for  them ;  and 
 this,  of  course,  lessens  our  displeasure  against  them. 
 But  still  it  is  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  formed 
 so,  as  to  reflect  very  severely  upon  the  greater  in- 
 stances of  imprudent  neglects  and  foolish  rashness, 
 both  in  ourselves  and  others.  In  instances  of  this 
 kind,  men  often  say  of  themselves  with  remorse,  and 
 of  others  with  some  indignation,  that  they  deserved 
 to  suffer  such  calamities,  because  they  brought  them 
 upon  themselves,  and  would  not  take  warning. 
 Particularly,  when  persons  come  to  poverty  and  dis- 
 tress by  a  long  course  of  extravagance,  and  after 
 frequent  admonitions,  though  without  falsehood  or 
 injustice;  we  plainly  do  not  regard  such  people  as 
 alike  objects  of  compassion,  with  those  who  are 
 brought  into  the  same  condition  by  unavoidable  ac- 
 cidents. From  these  things  it  appears,  that  pru- 
 dence is  a  species  of  virtue,  and  folly  of  vice :  mean- 
 ing by  folly,  somewhat  quite  different  from  mere  in- 
 capacity; a  thoughtless  want  of  that  regard  and  at- 
 tention to  our  own  happiness,  which  we  had  capacity 
 for.  And  this  the  word  properly  includes,  and  as  it 
 seems,  in  its  usual  acceptation ;  for  we  scarce  apply 
 it  to  brute  creatures. 
 
 However,  if  any  person  be  disposed  to  dispute 
 the  matter,  I  shall  very  willingly  give  him  up  the 
 words  virtue  and  wee,  as  not  applicable  to  prudence  and 
 folly ;   but  must  beg  leave  to  insist,  that  the  faculty 
 
535 
 
 within  us,  which  is  the  judge  of  actions,  approves 
 of  prudent  actions,  and  disapproves  imprudent 
 ones;  I  say,  prudent  and  imprudent  actions  as  such, 
 and  considered  distinctly  from  the  happiness  or 
 misery  which  they  occasion.  And  by  the  way,  this 
 observation  may  help  to  determine,  what  justness 
 there  is  in  that  objection  against  religion,  that  it 
 teaches  us  to  be  interested  and  selfish. 
 
 Fifthly,  Without  inquiring  how  far,  and  in  what 
 sense,  virtue  is  resolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice 
 into  the  want  of  it;  it  may  be  proper  to  observe,  that 
 benevolence,  and  the  want  of  it,  singly  considered, 
 are  in  no  sort  the  whole  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  if 
 this  were  the  case,  in  the  review  of  one's  own  char- 
 acter, or  that  of  others,  our  moral  understanding,  and 
 moral  sense  would  be  indifferent  to  every  thing,  but 
 the  degrees  in  which  benevolence  prevailedr  and  the 
 degrees  in  which  it  was  wanting^  That  is,  we 
 should  neither  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  per- 
 sons rather  than  to  others,  nor  disapprove  injustice 
 and  falsehood  upon  any  other  account,  than  merely 
 as  an  overbalance  of  happiness  was  foreseen  likely  to 
 be  produced  by  the  first,  and  of  misery  by  the  second. 
 But  now,  on  the  contrary,  suppose  two  men  com- 
 petitors for  any  thing  whatever,  which  would  be  of 
 equal  advantage  to  each  of  them;  though  nothing 
 indeed  would  be  more  impertinent,  than  for  a  stran- 
 ger to  busy  himself  to  get  one  of  them  preferred  to 
 the  other;  yet  such  endeavour  would  be  virtue,  in 
 behalf  of  a  friend  or  benefactor,  abstracted  from  all 
 consideration  of  distant  consequences:  as  that  ex- 
 amples of  gratitude  and  the  cultivation  of  friendship, 
 would  be  of  general  good  to  the  world.      Again, 
 
536 
 
 suppose  one  man  should,  by  fraud  or  violence,  take 
 from  another  the  fruit  of  his  labour,  with  intent  to 
 give  it  to  a  third,  who,  he  thought,  would  have  as 
 much  pleasure  from  it,  as  would  balance  the  pleasure 
 which  the  first  possessor  would  have  had  in  the  en- 
 joyment, and  his  vexation  in  the  loss  of  it;  suppose 
 also  that  no  bad  consequences  would  follow;  yet 
 such  an  action  would  surely  be  vicious.  Nay,  far- 
 ther, were  treachery.,  violence,  and  injustice,  no 
 otherwise  vicious,  than  as  foreseen  likely  to  produce 
 an  overbalance  of  misery  to  society;  then,  if  in  any 
 case  a  man  could  procure  to  himself  as  great  advan- 
 tage by  an  act  of  injustice,  as  the  whole  foreseen  in- 
 convenience, likely  to  be  brought  upon  others  by  it, 
 would  amount  to,  such  a  piece  of  injustice  would  not 
 be  faulty  or  vicious  at  all,  because  it  would  be  no 
 more  than,  in  any  other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his 
 own  satisfaction  to  another's  in  equal  degrees.  The 
 fact  then  appears  to  be,  that  we  are  constituted  so, 
 as  to  condemn  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  in- 
 justice, and  to  approve  of  benevolence  to  some  pre- 
 ferably to  others,  abstracted  from  all  consideration, 
 which  conduct  is  likeliest  to  produce  an  overbalance 
 of  happiness  or  misery.  And  therefore,  were  the 
 Author  of  nature  to  propose  nothing  to  himself  as 
 an  end  but  the  production  of  happiness,  were  his  moral 
 character  merely  that  of  benevolence;  yet  ours  is  not 
 so.  Upon  that  supposition,  indeed,  the  only  reason 
 of  his  giving  us  the  above-mentioned  approbation  of 
 benevolence  to  some  persons  rather  than  others,  and 
 disapprobation  of  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence, 
 and  injustice,  must  be,  that  he  foresaw  this  consti- 
 tution of  our  nature  would  produce  more  happiness, 
 
537 
 
 than  forming  us  with  a  temper  of  mere  general  be- 
 nevolence. But  still,  since  this  is  our  constitution, 
 falsehood,  violence,  injustice,  must  be  vice  in  us,  and 
 benevolence,  to  some  preferably  to  others,  virtue, 
 abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the  overbalance 
 of  evil  or  good,  which  they  may  appear  likely  to  pro- 
 duce. 
 
 Now,  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a 
 moral  nature  as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a 
 moral  faculty,  the  natural  object  of  which  is  actions; 
 moral  government  must  consist  in  rendering  them 
 happy  and  unhappy,  in  rewarding  and  punishing 
 them,  as  they  follow,  neglect,  or  depart  from,  the 
 moral  rule  of  action  interwoven  in  their  nature,  or 
 suggested  and  enforced  by  this  moral  faculty;*  in 
 rewarding  and  punishing  them  upon  account  of  their 
 so  doing. 
 
 I  am  not  sensible  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  obser- 
 vation, contradicted  what  any  author  designed  to  as- 
 sert. But  some  of  great  and  distinguished  merit 
 have,  I  think,  expressed  themselves  in  a  manner 
 which  may  occasion  some  danger  to  careless  readers, 
 of  imagining  the  whole  of  virtue  to  consist  in  singly 
 aiming,  according  to  the  best  of  their  judgment,  at 
 promoting  the  happiness  of  mankind  in  the  present 
 state ;  and  the  whole  of  vice,  in  doing  what  they 
 foresee,  or  might  foresee,  is  likely  to  produce  an 
 overbalance  of  unhappiness  in  it ;  than  which  mis- 
 takes, none  can  be  conceived  more  terrible.  For  it 
 is  certain,  that  some  of  the  most  shocking  instances 
 of  injustice,  adultery,  murder,  perjury,  and  even  of 
 
 *  Part  i.  chap.  6.  p.  308. 
 
538 
 
 persecution,  may,  in  many  supposable  cases,  not 
 have  the  appearance  of  being  likely  to  produce  an 
 overbalance  of  misery  in  the  present  state ;  perhaps 
 sometimes  may  have  the  contrary  appearance.  For 
 this  reflection  might  easily  be  carried  on;  but  I  for- 
 bear.— The  happiness  of  the  world  is  the  concern  of 
 him  who  is  the  Lord  and  the  Proprietor  of  it ;  nor 
 do  we  know  what  we  are  about,  when  we  endeavour 
 to  promote  the  good  of  mankind  in  any  ways,  but 
 those  which  he  has  directed;  that  is,  indeed,  in  all 
 ways  not  contrary  to  veracity  and  justice.  I  speak 
 thus  upon  supposition  of  persons  really  endeavouring, 
 in  some  sort,  to  do  good  without  regard  to  these. 
 But  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  such  supposed  en- 
 deavours proceed,  almost  always,  from  ambition,  the 
 spirit  of  party,  or  some  indirect  principle,  concealed, 
 perhaps,  in  great  measure  from  persons  themselves. 
 And  though  it  is  our  business  and  our  duty  to  en- 
 deavour, within  the  bounds  of  veracity  and  justice, 
 to  contribute  to  the  ease,  convenience,  and  even 
 cheerfulness  and  diversion  of  our  fellow-creatures; 
 yet  from  our  short  views,  it  is  greatly  uncertain  whe- 
 ther this  endeavour  will,  in  particular  instances,  pro- 
 duce an  overbalance  of  happiness  upon  the  whole; 
 since  so  many  and  distant  things  must  come  into  the 
 account.  And  that  which  makes  it  our  duty,  is, 
 that  there  is  some  appearance  that  it  will,  and  no 
 positive  appearance  sufficient  to  balance  this,  on  the 
 contrary  side;  and  also,  that  such  benevolent  en- 
 deavour is  a  cultivation  of  that  most  excellent  of  all 
 virtuous  principles,  the  active  principle  of  benevo- 
 lence. 
 
 However,  though  veracity,  as  well  as  justice,.*s  tc 
 
539 
 
 be  our  rule  of  life;  it  must  be  added,  otherwise  a 
 snare  will  be  laid  in  the  way  of  some  plain  men,  that 
 the  use  of  common  forms  of  speech  generally  under- 
 stood, cannot  be  falsehood,  and,  in  general  that  there 
 can  be  no  designed  falsehood  without  designing  to  de- 
 ceive. It  must  likewise  be  observed,  that  in  num- 
 berless cases,  a  man  may  be  under  the  strictest  obli- 
 gations to  what  he  foresees  will  deceive,  without  his 
 intending  it.  For  it  is  impossible  not  to  foresee, 
 that  the  words  and  actions  of  men  in  different  ranks 
 and  employments,  and  of  different  educations,  will 
 perpetually  be  mistaken  by  each  other;  and  it  can- 
 not but  be  so,  whilst  they  will  judge  with  the  ut- 
 most carelessness,  as  they  daily  do,  of  what  they  are 
 not,  perhaps,  enough  informed  to  be  competent 
 judges  of,  even  though  they  considered  it  with  great 
 attention. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 Printed  by  V,'.  Collins  &  Co. 
 
 Glasgow.