"*■'■.«■' 
 
 ■ 
 
COLLECTION OF PURITAN AND 
 ENGLISH THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE 
 
 I 
 
 LIBRARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 
 
 PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 
 
 ' •■: ~'i 
 
 33S» at G3 Si ,£^, S3, ^r 
 
 OF TBX 
 LI 
 
 PRINC ETON, N.J. 
 
 DON ITIOSI « » !■• 
 
 S.\ M l I E L \ ( I N EW, 
 
 (i r I' SI LA I> E 1.1' 11 I A . P 
 
 
 - . 
 
Animadverfions 
 
 UPON 
 
 Dr. SHER 1 CKs Book, 
 
 E N T I T U L E D 
 
 A Vindication of the Holy and Ever- 
 Blejj'ed (Trinity, &c. 
 
 TOGETHER 
 
 With a more Neceffary Vindication of that 
 Sacred, and Prime Article of the Chriftian 
 Faith from his New Notions, and Fa lie 
 Explications of it. 
 
 Humbly offered to His Admirers, and to 
 Himfelf the Chief of them. 
 
 £ 
 
 By a Divine of the Church of England. 
 
 LONDON, 
 Printed for Randal Taylor, near Stationers-Hall 
 
 MDCXCHI 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2013 with funding from 
 
 Princeton Theological Seminary Library 
 
 http://archive.org/details/animaOOsout 
 
A 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 O R, 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 To the following 
 
 antmatfoetCions. 
 
 TO be Impugned from without y and Betrayed from 
 within, is certainly the worji Condition that either 
 Church or State can fall into ; and the bell of 
 Churches, the Church 0/* England, has had ex- 
 perience of Both. It had been to be wished, and (one would 
 think) might very reafonably have been expected, That, when 
 Providence had took the Work of dejlroying the Church of 
 England out of the Papifts Hands, fome would have been 
 contented with her Preferments, without either attempting 
 to give up her Rites and Liturgy, or deferting her DoQxine. 
 But it has proved much otherwij'e. And amongfl thofe, who 
 are jujl/y chargeable with the latter, I know none, who has 
 faced the World, and defied the Church with fo bold a Front, 
 as the Author of Two very Heterodox Books; the first 
 
 A 2 Entituled* 
 
II The PREFACE. 
 
 Entituled, A Difcourfe concerning the Knowledge of 
 Jefus Chrift, &c. Published in the Tear, 1674. Andthe 
 "other 1 A Vindication of the Do&rine of the Holy and 
 ever-Bleffed Trinity, &c. Publijhed in the Tear 1690. 
 And (as one would think) Wrote purpofely, to let the 
 World fee that the Truth cannot be Jo much Jh ah en by a di- 
 rect Opposition ; . as by- a Treacherous, and Falfe De- 
 fence.. 1 [Jjall in this Vrdimma.vy Addrefi to tire Rea- 
 der, pafs Jome brief Remarks upon both thefe Books. But 
 firjl upon this, which I have here undertook to Animadvert 
 upon. It is now of about Three Tears (landing in the World, 
 and I have wondered, even to AHoniJhment, that a Book fo 
 fullofFd.Y2idoXQS,andthofefiopofitively,as well as abfurdlx -de- 
 livered, could pafs Unanfwered for fo long a time. For the 
 Author, having therein adjuanced a Notion immediately and 
 unavoidably inferring Three Gods, has yet had the Confi- 
 dence not only to AJfert it, but to Declare it Herefie and 
 Nonfence to think, or hold otherwife ; thai is y in other 
 Words, to call the whole Chriftian Church, in all Ages 
 and Places, Fools and Hereticks. For I do here averr, 
 and will undertake to prove it, (as far as a Negative may be 
 proved) That no Church (known to us by Hifiory, or other- 
 wife) ever held this Notion of the Trinity before. And 
 mufi we then be all Fools and Hereticks, who will not ac- 
 knowledge the Three Perfbns of the BleiTed Trinity to be 
 Three diftin& Infinite Minds, or Spirits, that is 7 in other 
 Terms, to be Three Gods ? Andean fo Learned, and every 
 way Excellent a Clergy bear this f For if they could not, 
 whence is it that fome Writers among fi them, while they are 
 declaring their difiike of his Opinions, yet do it with fo foft 
 an Air, and fo gentle a Touch, as if they were afraid either 
 to Condemn the Opinion, or /<?. Attack the Author ? Nay, 
 and fome I find creeping under his Feet with ihe Title of 'Ve- 
 ry Reverend, while they are charging him with finch Quali- 
 C J and Humours,, as none can ve, jujlly, chargeable with. 
 
 and 
 
The PREFAC K. Ill 
 
 4^^ defer vc Reverence too. For my own part, I franckly 
 own, That I neither Reverence, nor Fear him; that is, I 
 Reverence none, who gives whole Communities and 
 Churches (uch Words, nor hear any One, who Writes fuch 
 Things, and in fuch a manner. For even thofe Mean Spi- 
 rits, who can both Court, and Cenfure him in the fame 
 Breath,complain,' That he gives no Qua rter avhere he fuppofes 
 he has his Adverfary upon the leajl Advantage. And if this 
 he his Way and 'Temper never to give Quarter, / am fare 
 he has no caufe to expect any, whatsoever he may find. But 
 (lill, methrnks, I can hardly believe my Eyes, while I read 
 fuch a Pettit Novellift Charging the Whole Church as 
 Fools and Hereticks, for not Subfcribing to a Silly, Here- 
 tical Notion folely of his own Invention. For does he, or 
 can he think to Live and Ccnverfe in the World upon theje 
 Terms ? and to throw his Scurrility at High, and Low, At 
 all About him, Above him, and Below him (if there be 
 any fuch) at this infuff er able rate* Does he, (I would fa:; i 
 know) in this J peak his Judgment, or his Breeding ? Was 
 it the School, the Univerfity, or Gravel-Lane, that taught 
 him this Language ? Or does he never reflect upon himfelf, 
 nor confider, That though he does not, others affuredly will ? 
 One would think by his Words and Carriage that he had in- 
 groffed all Reafon and Learning to Himfelf: But on the con- ■ 
 trary, that this his f corn ful looking down upon all the World 
 be fides, is not from his ftanding upon any higher ground of 
 Learning, and Sufficiency, than the re f of the World', and 
 that he Huffs and Di&ates at a much 7nore command* , 
 than he Reafbns, the perufal of my Ninth ^ Tenth, ana 
 Eleventh Chapters will, or (I am jure) may jajficicntly inform 
 the Impartial Reader ; andjhew him how many things there 
 are in this our Authors Vindication, which too much need 
 Another, but admit none. In the mean lime, I do, and mufl de- 
 dare both to himfelf, and to all other s'.Fhat the fcrementione-d- 
 CJjarge of Hereiie /tndNonihncc (as he has laid it) is fi- 
 nery 
 
IV The PREFACE. 
 
 very Rude, Scandalous, ^WProvoking, that it is imfof- 
 
 fible for the Tongue, of Pen of Man to reply any Thing fo 
 
 <n him , which the foulncfs of the J aid Expreffon 
 
 'I not abundantly v: arrant both the Speaking and the Writ- 
 tng of. 
 
 The Church of England is certainly very Merciful ; 
 Juftice^jercifiil (as a Great Judge once [aid of K^ Charles II.) 
 even to a Fault. For who, by her file nee upon what this 
 Bold Man has Wrote, and the Encouragement he has fince 
 received, would not be (hrewdly induced after fome confidera- 
 ble number of Tears (if his fluff (bould live fo long) to be- 
 lieve, that his Notions were the Current Doftrine of our 
 Church, or, at leaf, of our Church-men at that time ? 
 None then oppofing them, mofl over-looking them, and fome 
 countenancing and advancing the Author of them ; and, per- 
 haps, for them too. This is truly the Cafe ; and I hope to do 
 the Church of England /<? much Service at leaH, as to 
 break the Univerfality both of the Silence, and the prefumed 
 Acceptance, by one plain, refolute and full Negative/?///- in 
 again fl it. For upon a due Confederation of the Things 
 vented by this Author, and comparing them with the Pro- 
 ceedings and Zeal of the Primitive Church in its Councils , 
 J do from my Heart believe, That had he lived and publ/Jh- 
 ' d this Book in thofe Days, and Jfjerted, That the Three 
 Divine Perfbns in the Trinity were Three diftinft Infi- 
 nite Minds, or Spirits. And that Their Perfbnal di- 
 itinction confifted only in Self-Confcioufhefs, and their 
 Unity only in Mutual-Confcioufhefs. Andwithall, That 
 the Terms Effence, Nature, Subftance, Perfbn, and Hy- 
 pc/lafis, or Subfiftence, &c. applyed to the Godhead and 
 the "Oivine Perfbns, ferved only to perplex, obfeure, and 
 confound Me rPs ApprehenPionsfl/V/^w ; and for that caufe 
 ought lobs laid afide \ I fay, I do not in the least que fl ion, 
 but that all and every one of thefle Propofitio.ns, would have 
 
 been 
 
The P R E F A C E. V 
 
 been Publicity and folemnly Condemned in Council, and the 
 Autnor of them (as high as be now carries his Head, like 
 another Abbot Joachim) fever ely dealt with for Averting 
 them ; and that upon great Reafon. Forafmucb, as the 
 Two chief of tbofe Terms, viz. bV/cc and v'sroeraurit, Sub- 
 ftancc and SuhfmciKQ, wtreeqaall) with tin oy.oi<riov it J 
 oppofed by thofe I )ro grand Aria 1 1 
 
 Hcvcticks and Furw/s Disturb- Having firft reje&ed 
 
 m of the Church, Urfacius und ofnoia-iov in thofe Words. To 
 
 Valens, who with their Actont- \j.\v oy-oiiiov ^ to ojxowc-io? wc- 
 
 plices vehemently contended to /3aAAof/!yj ws aAAoTg/tor t^v 
 
 have them all wholly fuppreffed and y&ttfocv- All' a. i. 
 
 difufed. So that as for the a'cricc An mini & Selaxix>, Tom* i. 
 
 of the Father and the Son, they P. 904. Edit. Colon. 16S6. In 
 
 would have 7ravtzXus vPefxlttv the next place^.906. they pro- 
 
 fAVTijjLYiv, no mention at all to be ceed to cafeier the Terms wl 
 
 made of any fuch Thing', and as atld ti&Qipaurii, iri the followi 
 
 for the v<ur6c?a(rii it ought iSct- Words. Tc 3 oio^ct <? v a iocs, 
 
 fLCcios oVojota^g^at 0<)J? _/fl much as 07rep oLirXic^i^pv xiro twV 7rccTg- 
 
 to be named concerning any of the poov Iri&fydSvoifJLepov q tq?s Aao?; 
 
 Three Perfons. Jnd,as one Rea- c-jtaVcTaAoy efepe, fioli fjuifl 
 
 f on for this, they a/ledged the fat is- at y&Kpct] tSto Te^/Li^vctv^peae 
 
 fatltion ^Tender Conferences. 7rg£*a//?gGSra/, $ iroivJehouis uvfe- 
 
 Which (hews,That Tender Con- plcc* fxvny.y\v tS Xoiwv ybe&at. 
 
 fciences are fuch Things, as may, 'EireiMirtp 3 a J $r£ou y&,<f<u 
 
 fome time or other, put the *£*[*£* ifjLvYiy.ovWGavTre&Lbcrla,; 
 
 Church, not only to part with Fa7ep> 9 JiS, $ y! bV« c>yV/xv 
 
 a* Liturgy, Rites, /iW Cere- vvro<ra<rn ?n?e* TrcJeps 9 Si* 9 
 
 monies, but its very Faith *//<? a>/y wvevfjial©* wjAaJQe&tti. 
 
 for their fake.^ But right, or For this ice alio AY.v.r. < . 
 
 0*W£, thofe Two Arian Incen- //A. 2. f*/>. 29. and 7. 
 
 Amies preffed hard for the ylbo- Histor. lib. 2. f#. 18. C~ 2.1. 
 
 htion of thefe Two Words; ^ #• $o%mm*s Ht&or. lib. 4 
 
 f/w Author <*//<? jfow /'* rfe te ^. 1 8. 
 
 Vindication ; 
 
 C9*. 
 
VI The PREFACE. 
 
 V'mdicatioir,treading hereby exactly in thefteps ofthofe Blef- 
 fed Leaders ; who, no doubt, underfloodthe Interefl of their 
 bafe Caufe well enough, and were both Self-Confcious, and 
 Mutually-Confcious, how much they ferved the defign, they 
 drove at, by what they did. An d,f nee Things were fo in former 
 days j what hinders, but that in thefe latter Days likewife^ 
 the fame ) if not prevented, may happen again? And, that 
 One, who, (though he carries him felf, its if he were able to 
 teach the whole World. yet, for forne certain Re/ifons,profejfes 
 *See his himfelf a * Learner frill) having already exploded the 
 [J c f Ci \- t0 rTerms Subftance and Subfiftence,^ not to be ufed about the 
 Aiiegi- Trinity, may, upon the winning pro fpect offome Approach- 
 ance, p. <$. j n g Advantage, (as, where Advantage is the Teacher, fome 
 ; '" 7 ' IS ' care not how long they continue Learners) be very eafily pre- 
 vailed upon to jend the ofjioiaiov packing after its Fellows, 
 and to abandon and cast off that too? For, though fuch an 
 One Jhould give the Church his Oath to the contrary, there is 
 no fecurity from the nee , but that a Perpetual Learner (by 
 a due waiting upon Providence) may, all in convenient time^ 
 Learn to forget it too : And a Self-Contradi£tor having 
 freely allowed a Thing at one time , as freely and fully difown 
 it at another. 
 
 Wherefore it iva<s, no doubt ^ upon a most feriom confide- 
 ration of the force of Words in Conjunction with the 
 Tempers of Men, That the Sixth General Council (and 
 Third of Conitantinople) was fo jealoufly concerned, and 
 jo remarkably ftrici to fence againfl all Hereticall Mifchief 
 from that Quarter \ as appears from the Concluding Arti- 
 cle of the Synodical Sentence pronounced by the faid Coun- 
 cil againfl the Monothelites, as we find it thu* fet down in 
 
 the Afts thereof. Thefe Things 
 
 TeT&>j/ toIwv fjiilx ttxms 7roi^oc- therefore, being thus with the 
 
 ■gfew a*e43«*s ?g 5 IfjLfjLeh&cLs utmoft care and exa&nefs, on 
 
 rap »jjtfS ficZlv&uMflar, 0&- all fides, formed and drawn up 
 
 by 
 
fhe PREFA CE, 
 
 VII 
 
 by it, We De 
 
 That it {hall not be lawful for 
 
 any one to i rite, 
 
 lpofe, ( .:, or Tc 
 
 another this in any 
 
 other way, or manner. But 
 as for thole v. ho fhall prefume 
 to Compofe, or Contrive ano- 
 ther Faith, orPublifh, Teach, 
 or deliver forth another Creed, 
 to Inch as fhall be ready to 
 come over to the .Acknowledg- 
 ment of the Truth from Hea- 
 fehenifin, or Judaifme, or any 
 ether Seel: whatfbever, or fhall 
 introduce any unufual way of 
 t peaking , or new Invented 
 
 y>JJLtP eie.ijty TTlc^iv fJ.Yl$Z\\ c|- 
 
 €4ioci *nrgp<fifeiv , rty'dv fjvy)py.^eiv 
 
 6T€pM\ T»S Q TO/.'/: 
 
 TlZ'-VXL TTIC^LV tTi^jAV W T£P* U.I' 
 \C-iV *l S 1$ Ot.rjy.CiV 71 7TaL£$)L$ d'G-.CLi 
 
 eTe&v G\)up>o?.ov roTi &iXwif 
 
 Sclkjij.k 7])vv l& alpirjeoo; c 
 
 *J iLcLivo^fjivicLv titoi Xtcitoi efeo* 
 
 peaiy Tn^pi cci cct £pirbj] c.viyzw 
 
 TOOf W\\ 7TCtp Yljjjfif &IOQ/JL 
 T8TW5 €i fj.h bTr.GXOTTQl C-itV, J 
 
 9 
 
 jferwj, as tending to Subvert r X es e fev * Aaixoi ^u^uaTr 
 all that has been defined by us, fy&ai oiv T i;. ConciL 6. . 
 if they be Bifhops, or in Cle- Attione 17. feu ultima^ circa 
 rical Orders, we decree, That ftnem. 
 they fhall be deprived of their 
 
 Bifhopricks, or faid Orders ; or if they be Monks, or 
 Lay-men, that they fhall be Anathematized. So th 
 we have here a clear and full Declaration of a General 
 Council, agamft all teaching, not only hs&v ti, but alfo 
 tTipu; ; that is, not only agamft delk eri another 1 
 but again ft delivering the fame in another way -, or ma ner y 
 than the Council had filled, and againft the ufe 
 Invented Terms, all 7t*ivo<pwvU 9 or ifevpean r Atfewf, 
 (Self-Confciouinefs, and Mutual-Confcioufiiefs them* 
 felves not excepted) as in the Judgmei : of the Co 
 slrucirje in their conference to the Faith declared ; and all 
 this upon pain of Deprivation, or Anathematization, 
 
 a the 
 
VIII The PREFACE. 
 
 the Quality of the Perfons concerned, jhould happen to be. de- 
 cor ding to the rigour of which Sentence, and the Proceeding 
 of the Church in thofe Ages fit able to it, Deprivation, or 
 
 fpenfion, would, no doubt, have attended this Author, 
 
 I he then lived and produced his new Terms, in defiance 
 and reproach of the former received ones. And if fuch a 
 punijhment had actually befallen him, he would have found, 
 that in thofe Days, Men were not wont either to be Suspend- 
 ed, or Deprived in order to their Promotion. 
 
 / know indeed, that in the Apology lately put out by him 
 for Writing againft the Socinians, he utters fome Things 
 contrary to what he had Afferted in this his Vindication of 
 the Trinity. But this the Reader ought not at all to be fur- 
 prized at ; it being as Natural to fome Men to Write as to 
 Breath, and to Contradifl: themfelves as to Write : And 
 no Man of Sence, who knows this Author, will reckon that 
 he knows his Judgment, or Opinion from any Book Wrote by 
 Him, any longer 7 than till he Writes another ; nor from that 
 neither, till he has Wrote his last. 
 
 Having given the Reader this fhort Prelibation, or 
 Tafte of the Book, which 1 fh all more particularly and fully 
 examine prefently, I think fit to remark fomethmg alfo upon 
 that other Piece mentioned by me, and Entituled, A Di- 
 fcourfe concerning the Knowledge of Jefus Chrift, &c. 
 A Book fraught with fuch Vile and Scandalous Reflexions 
 upon God's Juftice, with reference to Chrift's Satisfa&ion, 
 that it may defervedly pafs for a Blafphemous Libel upon 
 both. And I do ferioufly think, that never was any Boot 
 Licenfed, Publifhed, andfujfered to pafs Uncontrolled, 
 more to the Dilgrace of the Church of England than this, 
 which the Reader will quickly fee upon his Reading fome Paf- 
 fages of it , which, I am fur e, if he be but Chriltianly di- 
 fpofed, he cannot do, but with extreme Horrour. But be* 
 fore IdirecJ the Reader to his Blafphemies, I {hall lay before 
 
 him 
 
The PREFAC IX 
 
 him one Gr \tes 
 
 and Overthrows the whole Doftrinc of Free Grace, and 
 the Redemption of Mankind thereby ; at 
 Conference , the whole Occonomy of the Chriftian Reli- 
 gion. 
 
 And it is that Wonderful AJJertion concerning the Good- 
 neisof God, in Page 44. of his Knowledge of Chrift, 
 viz. That it is not poffible to underftand what Good- 
 nefs is, without Pardoning Grace. A 7 ow it is y 
 that Natural Reafon, by its own light, is able from the 
 Common Works of God's Providence, to collect the 
 Knowledge of God's Goodnefs ; as St. Paul exprefly told 
 thofe Heathens of Lycaonia, A£fs 14. 17. and therefore, 
 if the Knowledge of God's Goodnefs, necejjarily implies 
 
 >., the Knowledge*?/ Pardoning Grace, it will follow. 
 That the Heathens by underflanding one from the Works of 
 Providence, must needs under fland and know the other a'- 
 fo\ and confequently, that the Knowledge 0/* Pardoning 
 Grace is not owing to Revelation, nor the Gofpel necejfary 
 to make a Difcovery of it to Mankind. A Blejj d Princi- 
 pie y and Foundation, no doubt, i,o efiablifh the New-de- 
 figned Scheme of a Natural Religion upon! For it is not 
 unknown, what Projects were on foot arnongH fome, when 
 this Book was Wrote, though the Author had the ill luck to 
 be left in the Lurch, and not feconded in the Attempt. 
 
 But in opposition to this Paganifh Affertion, I do ; 
 affirm, That if God may be Good, and that, both as to 
 the Effential Attribute of his Goodnefs, and as to the 
 aftual Excrcife of the fame, without the Pardon of Sin, 
 then it is not impoffible to under f and the Goodnefs of God 
 without Pardoning Grace. The Confequence is evident. 
 For whatfoever any Thing is, it is capable of being under- 
 flood to be. Antecedent, that is m.. 
 
 n thefe Confide/ at ions. 
 
 a 2 rft, 
 
X The P REF ACE. 
 
 Firft, That God was Good, and exerted Acts of Good- 
 
 oefs, before there was any Sin*/? the World, and therefore 
 
 '■:cd!ywas, understood both as good, 
 
 and as exerciftng bis Goodnefs, by the Angels before the Fall 
 
 ■•.-./, and for that reafon before Pardon of Sin 
 
 t t - Id come in to Confederation, 
 
 In the next Place, God had been Good, and had exerci- 
 fed his Goodnefs, had Men and Angels been Created Im- 
 peccable ; andy 1 am jure, it is no Contradiction to hold, 
 
 at they might have been Originally made fuch, as all Glo- 
 rified Spirits now actually are. 
 
 And Laftly, God is and may be underftoodto be Good, 
 even in refpeft ofthofe, ivhofe Sins /ball never be pardoned. 
 And therefore that Affertion of this Author, That it is not 
 poflihle to underftand what Goodnefs is without Par- 
 doning Grace, is apparently falfe and abfurd\ as drawing 
 after it One of thefe Two Confluences. 
 
 Firft, That either we cannot under ft and the Creation and 
 Support of Angels, and of thisvifible World, and partial- 
 larly of Mankind, to have been Acts and Inflames of the 
 Divine Goodnefs {which yet ? no doubt, were very great 
 ones.) Or, 
 
 Secondly, That we cannot under fl and them as fuch, but 
 by under ft anding them alfo to imply in them Pardoning 
 Grace. And if fo, then, ftippofwg the Creation of Man, 
 and his Sin after his Creation, and the Goodnefs of God 
 remaining ft ill entire, notwithftanding Man's Sin, (as it 
 artainly did) it will follow, that Pardoning Grace, having 
 (according to the forementioned Principle) a necejfary Con- 
 nexion with, or refult from the faid Goodnefs, mufi haz>e 
 fallen in of courfe, and by nee effary conference from thence.. 
 And then, Where could be the Freedom of this Grace ? Nay, 
 Where could be this Grace it felf? For the very Nature of 
 Grace con ft ft s tn this, that it be an AtJ perfectly Free ; fo 
 
 for, 
 
The PREFACE. XI 
 
 free, that God might have chojen, after Man had fumed, 
 
 have offered him any Conditions of 
 F.i re! on, orno\ And if he bad not, Men mighty notwith- 
 standing that, haft ! y known and under flood the 
 Goodnefs \of (Joel, by f * other Acts and Instances, in 
 which it had jujjici: . So that the forego- 
 ing Affertion is nothing tut a grofs Paradox, and a Scurvy 
 Blow at all Revealed Religion hefides, ///^Knowledge 
 of Pardoning Grace could, or may be had without it. 
 
 And now after this Abfurdity prcfented to the Reader'.? 
 Examination ; IJhall point out to himfome of the Blaiphe- 
 mies alfo that occurr in the fame Book. Such as are thefe 
 that follow. The Juftice of God 'fays he) having glin- 
 ted it (elf with Revenge on Sin in the Death of Chrift., 
 henceforward we may be fure he will be very kind, as 
 a Revengeful Man is, when his Paffion is over. K^/iow- 
 ledge of Chrif, P. 46. Again, The Sum of the Mat- 
 ter is, That God is all Love and Patience, when he has 
 taken his fill of Revenge ; as others ufe to fay, That the 
 Devil himfelf is very good when he is pleafed, P. 47. 
 Again, The Death of Chrift {fays he J difecvers the 
 Naturalnefs of Juftice to God ; that is, That he is fb 
 Juft, that he has not one Dram of Goodnefs in him, till 
 his Rage and Vengeance be fatisfied ; which, Iconfeft, 
 is a glorious kind of Juftice. Andprefently after. Now 
 the Juftice and Vengeance of God having their Aftings 
 afTigned them to the full, being glutted and fatiated 
 with the Blood of Chrift, God may pardon as many 
 and great Sins as he pleafes, P. 59. And fit able to this, 
 helikewife calls the Method of GocVs favt upon a 
 
 Previous Satisfaction made to his Justice^ as neceffary for 
 the Remiffion of Sin, God's Trucking , I Bartering 
 with Sin, and the Devil for his Glory, P. 52. Concern- 
 which and the like Expreflions uttered, by this Great- 
 Good 
 
XII The PREFACE. 
 
 Good Man (as a cert din poor Wretch calls him) I ca,. 
 out of a due Zjal, and concern for that Eternal Truth, by 
 which , I hope to be Saved, declare , That the Tongue that 
 iliould Speak fuch things, deferves to Speak no more; 
 and the Hand that fhould Write them, to Write no 
 more. And great pity it is, that at this time, and in this 
 cafealfo, his Afcendant had not tyed up his Hands from 
 Writing. For fee, how one of the Leading Diflenters fo- 
 ; . fults over our Church, upon occafwn of thefe Horrid Paffa- 
 oiTagainfl . es - Is this (fays he) Language becoming a Son of the 
 J*, p. 47, Church of England? Ought it not more juftly to have 
 4%, &. b eeil expected from a Jew, or a Mahometan ? From Ser- 
 ve* us, oxSocinm, (from whom alfb it was borrowed) 
 than from a Son of the Church, in a Book publifhed by 
 Licence and Authority ? And thus he goes on^ equally Cha- 
 (lijeing his Arrogance, and Expofing his Ignorance ; the poor 
 Church'/ Reputation all the while paying the Scores of both. 
 As to the Licenft,/g of which Book, here fo fever ely reflected 
 upon, it did indeed meet with a Perfon (as it were) framed for 
 the very purpofe. For none certainly could be fo fit to ft amp 
 an Imprimatur upon a Book Wrote again ft Chrift'/ Satis- 
 faction, as One, who while he was Eating the Bread, 
 ^W Wearing the Honours of the Church, could flab the 
 Doctrine of it to the Heart, by Writing for Tranfubftan- 
 tiation. And then in the next place, for its faffing Uncon- 
 trolled, it had really been to be wished, That the Clergy in 
 Convocation, in the la ft ef feci ally (in which fo many of 
 them acquitted themfelves jo exceeding worthily upon other 
 Accounts) would have vouch fifed to wipe oft this grofs Blot 
 from the Church by a due C en fire pajjed upon the for erne nti- 
 oned P oft ions ; fo reproachful to that, and fo Contumelious 
 to our Common Christianity. For what vaft advantage the 
 DiiTenters have taken from hence to Scandalize and Befpat- 
 tcr the Government and Governours of our Church, is but 
 
 too 
 
The PREFACE. XIII 
 
 too well known, and cann\ ' Lamented; and J 
 
 . . 7 a Scandal only Taken, a 
 
 ■ do If t his as a Work \ 
 
 ;/;/>Autho 
 
 ' ich ' ' <t * Convocation can 
 
 , t r work 
 
 i i ■>// lhai R sader a Specimen of the Do- 
 
 ftrinc ' Two Books of his. lnthefor- v '^ % 
 
 s /0 ^ //./? SocinianV bumble Servant y 
 b, R Gg ChriiiV Satisfaction of God'jr 
 
 (tice ; ... ' fa />/ effeit) the whole JSly fiery of the Gofpcl : 
 And in the latter he pretends to oppoje them by fitch a. Vindi- 
 cation of the Trinity, and of Chrift's Incarnation, as one 
 would think, were Wrote by themfel'ues. But rvhatfoever it 
 is, that he either pretends, or intends (as it is hard to knew 
 the latter by the former) this Character I /ball give of him 
 as a Writer, That there is hardly any one Subject which 
 has Wrote upon {that of Popery only excepted) but he has 
 Wrote both for it and againfr. it too : Not that I fay, that 
 he has Printed all which be has Jo Wrote ; not 
 
 the only way of Publication ; and this I will faybefides, That 
 where he has not Printed; he has Afted/V;. h a Witnefs. 
 sUid \ei even for P ; could a be Wrote and 
 
 Printed more jharp and bitter againfl the Diflenten 
 what this Man \\ , to*- 1 Proteftant Re- 
 
 conciler ? And ye kly (or ra \ fulfo, uly) does 
 
 he open both his At ice the?a his Sefmoi Preach- 
 
 ed before the Lord Mayor, on Nov. . 16 ?ugh I 
 
 dare fi\. That the Diflenters tben. t ire of that Con- 
 fancy as to own, Tu... they were of ti ? fame P in 
 
 88, that !■ of in 85. .-, Old . 
 
 (hips cannot be fo eafily for 1 . an Observati- 
 
 on modi by Jon. \ 1 any on .rfi 
 
 tainted with a Conventicle, ' 
 
XIV The P R E F A C E. 
 
 after cure ; but th i 'on every crofs Turn of Affairs a- 
 
 gain ft the Church, the irrefifiible Mi ' the Good 
 
 Old C. t) wouL raw him 
 
 i of the Good Old Way. ; Cat once 
 
 turned into a Woman, but then' :.. ife quick- 
 
 ly diffolved the Met amor fhofis, c aft? it \ t and. re- 
 
 stored the Brute. Andfome Virtuofi (skilled in the U feful 
 Philofbphy of Alterations) have thought her much agaim r 
 by the Utter change ; there being Jo many unlucky turns in the 
 World, in which it is not half fo Jafe and at rjous to 
 
 Walk Upright, as to be able to fall always upon one's 
 Legs. 
 
 But not to hold the Reader too long in the Entrance of the 
 Work, which I am about toprefent him with, I do here affure 
 him, That, in the following Animadverfions, I have f nelly 
 fur f tied this Author in every fart of his new Hypothefis, J 
 have anfwered all his Argument s> not omi* i ing fo much as 
 one, or any Thing that looks like one. And if I have thought 
 fitfometimes in ajhort Remark or two, here and there to re- 
 frefhthe Reader and my fe If by expofing his Bold and Blind 
 fide together ; yet this has fill been my method, throuqhly to 
 diffatch the Argument fief ore I offer to divert upon the Author. 
 
 As for that part of his Book, which feculiarly concerns 
 the Socinians, / leave him and them to fight it out. My bu- 
 finefs is to fljew. That the Doftrine of our Church is abfo- 
 Intely a fir anger to his Novel and Beloved Notions : It 
 knows them not : It owns them not ; nor ought we to look 
 upon him, fo far as he Averts and Maintains them, to be any 
 True and Genuine Son of it : And confequently, whether he 
 worries the Socinians, or (which is much the more likely) 
 the Socinians worry him, the Church of England is not at 
 all concerned. 
 
 THE 
 
THE 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 O F T H E 
 
 CHAPTERS 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 REprefenting the Sence and Signification of the Word 
 • ftery ; as alfo a Vindication of the Ufe and Ap- 
 lication of it to fome of the mo ft Difficult and Sublime 
 Truths of the Gofpel ; and lajtlu a full Proof That the 
 Account given by this of his Explication of the 
 
 Art he Trinky, is wholly inconfifient with the My- 
 
 fteriouincis of it ; together with fome Remarks upon his 
 needlefs Apologv/ar Writing againfl the Socinians. 
 'CHAP. II. 
 Containing an Account of fever al Terms commonly made ufe 
 of in dafcourfing of the Divine Nature, and Perfbns, and 
 particularly fb.ving the Propriety of Applying the Words 
 Effence, Siibftance, Nature, Infinity, andthelike, to 
 this great SubjeEt J and iajlly, proving th- rSs Ex- 
 
 ceptions against the ufe of them about the fame, Falfe y 
 Groundiejs and Impert:. With fome further Remarks 
 
 upon his foremtntioned ApoiOgy. 
 
 b CHAP. 
 
The CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 in which this Author** New Notion of Self-Confcioufhefs 
 and Mutual-Confcioufnefs is briefly declared, ; Self-Con- 
 fcioufnefs made by him the formal Constituent Reason of 
 Perfbnality in all Perfons, both Create and Increate ', 
 and on the contrary proved against him in the frfl place. 
 That it is not fo in Perfons Create. 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 In which is proved again fi this Author, That neither is Self- 
 Confcioufhefs the Formal Constituent Reafon of Perfb- 
 nality in the Three Perfons of the Bleffed Trinity ; 
 nor Mutual-Confcioufnefs the Reafon of their Unity in 
 one and the fame Nature. 
 
 C H A F. V. 
 
 In which is proved againfi this Author, That the Three 
 Perfons of the BleiTed Trinity are not Three diftinft 
 Infinite Minds, or Spirits. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 In which is confidered, what this Author pretends to from 
 the Authority of the Fathers and the Schoolmen, in be- 
 half of his New Hypothefis ; and, in the first place, 
 /hewn, That neither do the Fathers own the Three Di- 
 vine Perfons to be Three diftinQ: Infinite Minds ; nor 
 Self-Confcioufnefs to be the formal Reafin of their 
 Diftinclion. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 In which is Jhewn, That the PaJJages alledged by this Author 
 out of the Fathers, do not prove Mutual-Confcioufnefs 
 to be that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the 
 Three Perfons of the BleiTed Trinity does confifi ; but 
 that the Fathers place it in fomething elfe. 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 in which is jet down the Ancient and Generally received Do- 
 tfrine of the Church concerning the Article of the Blef- 
 fed 
 
The CONTENTS. 
 
 fed Trinity, as it is delivered by Councils, Fathers, 
 School-men, and other later Divines ; together with a 
 Vindication of the f aid Do£trine/<9 explained from thu 
 Author'/ Exceptions. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 In which this Author' J- Paradoxes, both Philofbphical and 
 Theological, as they occurr in this Dijcourje, are drawn- 
 together , Examined, and Confuted. 
 C H A P. X. 
 In which this Author'.*- Grammatical Sand other fuch like) 
 Mijlakes, as they are found here^and there in his H yitirigs^ 
 are fet down and remarked upon. 
 
 C H A P. XL 
 /// which is given forne Account of this Author V Temper, 
 and Info lent way of Writing, as well in Extolling himjelf' y 
 as in Depr effing and Scorning his J dv erf tries \ in both 
 which he has not his Parallel. 
 
 C H A P. XII. 
 Containing a Brief Review , and Conclufwn of the whole. 
 
 Some of the mofl con fider able Errata of the Prefs, are thus 
 to be Corrected. 
 
 PReface, Vi*. V. lin. '9. Marg. foriiuvH{Jvev<rctvre2(}ttJLvnuoviV(;*v. Book, 
 p. 2. 1. 7.for1?nDD readHinbb, the laft Letter, which (hculd be a 
 $efh, ininoft Copies difappean. p. ?. \. 29. for quod v. quod, p. 7.1. 19. and 26. 
 p. 8.1. S. for inadequate r inadequate p,i8 1. 16. tfpajfim. for Arriamv. Arians. 
 p. 15.I. jo. for pUincfsr. plainncfs. p. 41. 1. if. for Snbflance r. Subftancc. p. 61. 
 1. 1$. for it fdf r. berfclf. p 106. laft line, for confei- r. mofl. p.m. 1. 13. for 
 communicated to r. in common belonging *o. p. 119. 1, 26. fore* tm Qi'qtjti r. 
 itQt'oTiiTi. p. 123.I. 6. for lotb. Boo)^ r. 1)?. Tsooli p.i?i. 1. 13. for JW 
 Mj/uuvTi r. ^la^pj^Lcoyii. p. 1 5 5 .laft line, for ir/ufa r. irfA/;. p. i6<. 1 18. for 
 'PVcVfWTZf/A'gt r. vyiVf^aTi/buf.^t. p. 17$. 1. 1 $. for Vnityt. Unity or Sittguhritj* 
 p. 177. laft line, (or ofxauvio-mi r. oftQWio-ms. p. 196. 1. 5. Marg. for tvifyiioLi '. 
 tYi?yt<ct, and afcer ^/a put a Colon, f6i4. p. 196. 1. 7. for etc* r.c?!^/. p. 20 <. 
 
 p, . 
 
I. 6. Marg for \v \c(Ap r. \y itrjufy forcy, «/2, o/ r.cjrf{a^ i£i4. p. 109. 1. 2. 
 Marg. forcjufdemqucr. tjUfdemq c p. 210. 1. 5 . Marg. foreadfinquer cademquc. 
 p. 113. 1. i. Marg or propria, r, prifrii^ for divir.aquc r. diyi1nta$u, ibid. p. 21 ?, 
 1. i. Marg, fo. tuturd r.natu Z p. 228. 1. 23. for purple r. purpo ; €. p. 2*1. 
 irg. for dppiflQ- r.Zpp){j@-, p. 2? 2. 1.4. Marg. for &cj'/x« r. £*£#* p.- 34. 
 1, 18 Marg. fortpfir. i/>^. p. 256. 1.2. Marg. forfoiuwiaw^r. ^jja £r#. p.*c?. 
 1.4. and 6. for j) r. J. p. 25^. I. 8. ^ p. 257. I.i8. for yb &h r ja' f s$yr. p.260. 
 1. 1. for Totivp r. roiiuy. p. 2,60. I. 12. lor -^wq^Ltw r vq^wcV^tt^. p. 262. 1. 27. 
 for vsroyacf r. vsro'fctTJ J. p. 26^ 1. 16. for ltd r. ii£, p 264. I. 26. fbr,>{u;jflj 
 r. S;iruus. for d'JJimuLis r.dtjfimilis. ibid. p. 166. 1. 1 6. for audie rant read i«i/V- 
 rj«t. p. 268. 1. 9 for qiumv.quAm. p. 268. 1. 10. fomuontmqit? r. tjuume que, 
 p. 272. 1. 2$. for focr. hoc p. 274. 1. 5 for cmot r. tf«-7i. p 176 I. 7 rr# 
 
 fine p 276. 1. 10 forT^Trw r. t^?V<w. p. 276.1.31. for e/jfc « £r. '- 43. 
 
 1. j . Marg. for sj/cted-jur. ivZ&td* p. 289. 1. 10. Marg, for v u 
 ^Ti^yl<7ctn'o 7rw. p 5O4.L 3?. fordireStf r. direUor. p jn 
 ScnfibU. p. 525.1.10,11. for oftbeltteranr. of Z*ter<*».p v.. 
 pag,. 358.I.1. in ftead r r, , 01 . ;\ 361.1. 6. tor aa 
 For ideoque r. ideeque, 1. 27. for c«w r, lkw, 1. 29. for _ 
 1. 30. for jttegye r. gae, p. 362. 1. 20. for a?itequ am r. ~ 
 terifrnmsi andfuch like Words occur, let them be r 
 of an «. 
 
 If the Reader chance to meet with any more fuch Far 1 . 
 defiredtoCorreft, or Excufethem :> together with all 
 in Books of any length are commonly too many to be particularly and exaftly 
 fet down. 
 
 Animad- 
 
Animadveriions , &c\ 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Reprefenting to ns the Sence and Signification of 
 the Word Myftery, as alfo a Vindication of the 
 Vfc and Application of it^ to fome of the raofi 
 difficult and fublime Truths of the Gofpel; and^ 
 laftly., a full Proof That the Account given by 
 this Authour^ of the Explication of the Article of 
 the Trinity, U wholly inconjifient with the My- 
 fterioufnefs of it, 
 
 IN Order to the better Examination of what this 
 Authour has wrote about the Holy Trinity, I 
 think it requifite to premife iomething concern- 
 ing the Signification, Sence, and Nature of a My- 
 ftery. For certainly the Unity of One and the 
 tame undivided God-head , in a Trinity of dift incfc 
 Perfbns, is one of the greateft Myfleries, if not abfb- 
 Intel) the greateft in our Chriftian Religion. Now a 
 Myftery, according to the common Ggnification of the 
 word, is derived either fiom the Greek word ftvioj, 
 which fignifies to initiate , or enter one into Sacred Rites, 
 or Doctrines , or from /wJw, another Greek word ( and 
 that in the judgment of fyftathiut and Stephanas, more 
 
 B regularly 
 
AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 uhvly and naturally) fignifying to font or *&/£ up 9 
 and moft commonly apply M to the fhutting of the eyes 
 or mouth, the fblemn pofture of the ^vifj^joi , or Initiate 
 in die Rites of the Gentile Worfhip. And, Lftly, one 
 of no finall Note for Critical as well as other Learn- 
 ing, will needs run it up even to a Hebrew Original, de- 
 riving it from "MnDO, which fignifies res abfcondita attt 
 $4i,fecretum. Concerning which, it muft be confefTed, That 
 there is a more than ordinary agreement between theHe- 
 brew and Greek word both as to Sound and Signifi- 
 cation. But whether this be not wholly accidental, is 
 left to the Criticks in thefe Languages to determine. In 
 the mean time, moft account (juw&tov a word purely 
 and perfectly Greek : and the Original of it lies fo ma- 
 nifeftly in one of the two fore-mentioned Greek words, 
 that it feems a needlefs Curiofity, or rather a meer 
 Fancy to feek for it elfewhere. But whatfbever the 
 Origination of the word is, it always imports fomething 
 hidden or conceded , efpecially with reference to Sacred 
 or Religious Matters ; And in this Sence it occurs fre- 
 quently, if not always , in prophane Writers ; from 
 whence the Holy Pen-men of the New Teftament feem 
 to have borrow'd and apply'd it to (bme of the Great 
 and Arduous Truths of Chriftianity, fuch as human 
 Reafon cannot give a clear and explicit Account of. 
 
 This therefore being the undoubted Notation and 
 Signification of the Word, I fhall deliver the Nature 
 of the thing it felf in this Definition , viz. That a 
 Myflery is a Truth reveaPd by God, above the Power of 
 natural Reafon to find out or comprehend,. This, I take, 
 to be a full and proper Definition of a Myftcry. And 
 accordingly I fhall confider the feveral Parts of it di- 
 ftin&ly. As, 
 
 Firft, 
 
C H A P T E R I. 
 
 Fir ft ^ TIj.tt it * x Truth. By which v. : 
 
 ry thing from being a Myftery that is abfiird or con- 
 tradictious ; iincc a Truth can by no means I. \nd 
 confequentlv hereby ftand excluded alio the Foole 
 and Falfities of all other Religions, how Mj fterious ib~ 
 ever they mav be pretended to be, and with how much 
 Solemnity and Confidence fbever delivered. 
 
 Y, The next Qualification is, That it be revea- 
 led by God, viz* as to its Exijlence, That there is fuch 
 a thine* For otherwiie, as to the Nature of the thing it 
 lelf,and (everal other refpe£ts,in which it may be known, 
 the Revelation of it is not fuppos'd to extend lb far. 
 In a Word, as a Myftery implies fbme Revelation of 
 a Thing ; lb it follows, That all Revelation does not 
 overthrow the Myilerioufhefs of it: but only fiich a 
 plenary and entire Revelation of it, as leaves nothing 
 in the Nature of it abftrufe or undifcovered. But 
 now, though Revelation be a neceflary Ingredient in 
 this Definition, yet it is not fufficient ; ibmething more 
 being fti!l required. Since nothing hinders, but that 
 the lame thing may be both revealed by God , and 
 known upon other accounts, too. As the Moral Law 
 was revealed by God to his People , and may be drawn 
 and demonftratcd from Principles of Natural Reafbn 
 alfb. And therefore, the 
 
 Third Property of a Myftery is, That it furpafs 
 all the Power of Natural Reafon to iifcover or find it 
 out. And that not only as to the Quid fir , or parti- 
 cular Nature, but alfb as to the Quod fit of it too. 
 For that there are or fhould be fuch or fuch tilings, 
 ( to confider only the bare Exiilence of them ) no Prin- 
 ciple of human Reafbn, by its own natural or impro- 
 \ cd Light, could ever have found out , as might be ea- 
 (ily Ihewn by Induction, through the feveral Myfteries 
 
 B 2 
 
.j. Ariimadverjiws\ &c. 
 
 of our Religion, fiich as are the Trinity ',thz Incarnation, 
 the My [heal Union of Chrifl with the Church, the Re func- 
 tion of the Body, and the like ; of all, and each of which, 
 meer Reafbn could never have made a difcovery. 
 
 Fourthly, The fourth and laft Condition of a Myfte- 
 ry, exprefs'd in the foregoing Definition of it, is,. That 
 it be fuch a Thing, as hare Natural Reafbn (even after 
 it is difcovered ) cannot comprehend. I lay comprehend, 
 that is, know it perfectly, and as far as it is capable of 
 being known. I do not fay, That it is, or ought to be 
 wholly Unintelligible. For fome knowledge (no doubt) 
 may be had of it. As, firft, we may know the Sig- 
 nification and Meaning of the Words or Terms, in 
 which it is delivered or revealed to us. Likewife as 
 to the thing it felf, we may have fome imperfefl:, de- 
 fective knowledge of that too. Such as the Apoftle 
 Paul calls a knowing in part, and feeing as through a glafs 
 darkly, i Cor. 13. 12. which words manifeftly and na- 
 turally import, That fbmething is known, though in 
 a very imperfeft manner and degree, and that fbme- 
 thing alfb remains ftill unknown, which fliall hereafter 
 be clearly and fully difcovered, and made known unto 
 us. So that I think nothing could give us a truer, and 
 more fatisfaflory account of the Nature of an Evange- 
 lical Myftery, than this Scripture, viz. That it is a 
 Truth,of which we know fbmething, at prefent, though 
 very imperfeftly ; but are ignorant of a great deal 
 more belonging to it. And this <n> ayvcogw, this 
 obfeure and abftrufe part of it , is that which pro- 
 perly conftitutes and denominates a Sacred Truth a My- 
 ftery ; and confequently we may reckon the Account 
 given us of a My fiery by St. Chryfofiome , a true and 
 cxafl: Defcription of it by its principal Property, viz. 
 Ti anzfrmv <t d-jj>nc/.wv <& dyvoif^joy y Homily 7. on the 
 
 2 Corinth, 
 
Chapter I. ■ 
 
 2 Qorim i 19. on tbe E 
 
 Where I defire the Reader ftill to oMerve, that I do not 
 affirm, Th laft Acception of the Word is either 
 
 the Original Sence of it, or that the Heathen Write 
 ufed it in this Si] ion; all that they intended to 
 
 fignifie by the Word Myfterium^ feeming to have be 
 onlv that it was, Quid fac >:. But this 
 
 I affirm, That the Fathers and Writersof theChriftian 
 Church generally ufed it in the Sence fpecified ; that is, 
 They affixM a farther Sence to it of their own ; but ftill 
 fuch an one as carried with it fom^thing of Analogy and 
 Cognation to the firft, whereby it fignify'd only ibme- 
 thing obfeure ox occult infacred Matters.So that now, if any 
 one fhould argue, That in the Writers of the Chriftian 
 Church, Myjterium fignified onlv, Qgid farum & ft 
 tam, becaule it fignified no more in the Heathen Wri- 
 ters, from whom they borrowed it, this would be v( 
 inconfequent and ridiculous ; and all one, as if, becaufe 
 Sdcramentum in the Heathen Writers fignified only a Mi- 
 litary Oath : therefore in the Ancient Chriftian Writ 
 it muft fignifie lb too. For the Chriftian Writers apply 
 it, to fignifie thofe two great Rites of Chriftianity, 
 Baptifm'znd the Holy Eucharijt; though ftill (in this 
 inftance as well as in the former ) with fbme Analogy, 
 Reference, and Affinity to the firft ufe of the Word, 
 z /c. That as by this Military Oath, Soldiers did fblemn- 
 ly devote themfelves to their Emperor^ Service, f 
 thefe two Religious Rites Men do much mere fblemnlv 
 devote and bind themfelves oyer to the Obedience and 
 Service of Chrift, according to all the Rules and Pre- 
 cepts of his Holy Religion. 
 
 I conclude therefore, by a Parity of the Cafe, 1 
 Myftermm, according to the Chriftian Ufe of the Word, 
 imports not. only , Quid in facris / , by reafbn of 
 
 an 
 
AnimadverfionS) &c. 
 
 an a&ual Concealment of the fame, but moreover fbme- 
 thing, that is fb much a Secretum in Religion, as to tran- 
 lcend and furpafs all Humane Comprelienfion. And it is 
 the Authority of the Ancient Writers ufing the word thus, 
 which I Prate this Sence of it upon, as abundantly fiiffici- 
 ent to enfranchise and render it Authentick in the 
 Church. Though, I confefs, as to the Adverfary whom 
 T am to deal with, my purpofe would be fufficiehtly 
 fervM againft him, even by the firft and narrowed Sig- 
 nification of the Word, as it imports only fbmething in 
 Religion a&ually lecret, hidden, and not open to a com- 
 mon view or perception. 
 
 I have now given the Notation^ Signification, and De- 
 finition of the word Myftery. But after all, there is a 
 new Light fprung lately into the World, which tells us, 
 the ufe of the Word in Scripture determines the Cafe 
 count of quite another way ; for that the Scripture knows no f iicli 
 the word fignification of the word, as we have infifted upon ; nor 
 icls taken t ' lat an y thing that is Incomprehenfible, is, or ought to 
 in thcHoiy be accounted, a Myftery. The Affertef of this (as we 
 scripture. ma y we jj perceive) is a bold Man, but being at prefent 
 engaged with a much bolder, I fhall only fay thus much 
 of this Sociman Traft here, viz. That as to the Argu- 
 ment which the Author would raife againft the Trinita- 
 rians (as he calls them) from the Sence of the Word 
 Bifhop Myftery, as he has there ftated it, it has been throughly 
 ;, er _ baffled and overthrown by a Learned Perfbn, in a fhort 
 i n Difcourfe in Vindication of the Myfieries of the Chrijlian 
 the i Tim. Faith, &rc. And when this Anti-Trinitarian lias an- 
 Printed fwer'd that Learned Perfbn, if there appears need of any 
 i5pi. further anfwer to the foremention'd piece, he may, all 
 in good time,receiveone in a diftinffc Difcourfe by it felf. 
 And fb I immediately addrefs my felf to the Author 
 undertook by me, who by pretending to defend the great 
 
 Article 
 
CHAPTER i. 
 
 Article of the Trinity, has given the Adverlary thofe 
 great Ad vanta [ainftit, which the bare Article left 
 
 to defend itielf, (as the Faith is generallj its own 
 Defender*) could never have given him. The Socinians 
 charge it with Paradox, and downright Contradiction. 
 For the repelling and Having off w liich Charge from this 
 DoCtrine, our Author has thought fit to give us fome 
 Rules to judge of a Contradiction by, and in io doing, 
 has laid down this Remarkable Affertion, viz. That it is 
 a vain and. fumption, to fay, what is , or o 
 
 not nC i , when v:e confefs we d-. 4erJta#d 9 or 
 
 comprehend the thing we /peak of p. 4. This, I fa}', 
 very remarkable Aifertion, and the firft thing remarJ 
 ble in it, is, That (according to a Cuftom, very ufual 
 with him) he promifcuoufly joyns together words, as if 
 they were of the fame Import and Extent of Significati- 
 on, when really they are very different. For to under- 
 ft and a thing, is to know it in any refpeCt , or degree, in 
 which it is knowable , and to comprehend a thing, is to 
 know it in every refpeCt in which it is knowable. And 
 as it is certain,that we cannot know God this latter way ; 
 io it is as certain, that we may know him the former : 
 For we do, and may know him by inadequate and im- 
 peded, and uncommenfurate Conceptions ; as that he 
 is Jufi;, Wife, Good, and the like ; which are feveral In- 
 adequate ways of reprefenting him to our mind. But 
 now, if this Author's AiTertion fhould take place, viz. 
 That we cannot fay what is, or what is not a Contradi- 
 ction, when we confefs we do not comprehend the thing 
 we (peak of, then we cannot pronounce thelePropo: 
 ons, Jupiter Olympuis is the Supreme God, the Sun is the 
 Supreme God, or the World is the Supreme God, to be 
 Contradictions : forafmuch as it is certain, that f pea King 
 hereof God, we do not comprehend the tiling we \\ 
 
g AnimadverfionS) &c. 
 
 And yet fince Jupiter Olympius, the Sun, and the 
 World are all of them finite Material Beings, and God 
 both Infinite and Immaterial : I doubt not but that to 
 affirm one of the other, is a real and manifeft Contradi- 
 ction. And to fhew that it is fo, this Author fhould do 
 well to confider, That a Contradiction is not properly 
 (or univerfally at leaft) opposed to the complex and a- 
 daequate knowledge of a thing, but to the true know- 
 ledge of it. And we may have a true know edge even 
 by filch inadequate, imperfe£t, incomplete Conceptions 
 of it, as we have mentioned. For he who knows God 
 to be Juft, though he cannot comprehend everyway and 
 refpeflt in which he is, or may be fb, and much left all 
 his other Perfections, has thereby a true knowledge of 
 God, though an Imperfect one. That is, he knows and 
 understands, though he does not comprehend him. But 
 according to this Author's AfTertion, we cannot fay, that 
 any thing is a Contradiction, with reference to God, fince 
 it is certain and evident, that we neither do nor can com- 
 prehend him. And what abfiird, and infiifferable Con- 
 sequences, this muff needs draw after it in our Difcour- 
 fes of God, I leave to any one but the Author of this Af- 
 fertion to judge. 
 
 But the Confequences of it, as bad as they are, do not 
 flop in God. For in the 7th Page, our Author proceeds 
 farther, and affirms, That it is fb far from being a won- 
 der to meet with any thing, whofe nature (or rather the 
 Nature of which) we do not perfectly underfland, that he 
 knows nothing in the World which we do perfectly under fl and, 
 or, in his other word, comprehend, (for to under [land a 
 thing perftcrly^nd to comprehnd it J take to be the fame.) 
 And now let us apply his former Rule, viz. That we can- 
 not fay what is , or is not a Contradiction, when we confefs 
 m do not comprehend the thing we fpeak of I fay,let us apply 
 
 this 
 
Chapter. I. m 
 
 this Rule here alio ; and fince lie pofitively avers, That 
 
 there fs nothing in the World which wc do comprehend,ov 
 
 perfectly under ft and : it muft rou: How, That there 
 
 ;; be no iiich thing as a Contradiction ; fince whatfbe- 
 
 ver is fo, is, and muft be a Contradiction to fbmething 
 orother. Now for the Truth and Reafon of his AlTer- 
 tion, I cannot undertake, but certainly tlie Prudence i 
 Forecaft of it is admirable, as being like to do him 
 Knight's Service (as I fhall fhew hereafter) at mar 
 turn, and, next to a Convocation-Book, help him out at a 
 dead Lift, 
 
 In the mean time, letus fee how our Author m 
 good this ftrange and loofe Proportion, x/c That there 
 is nothing in the World, that we perfectly under jLi,.d. And 
 in order to this, Let us bring and lay together what he 
 Afferts in feveral places. And here firft in Page 7. line 
 2Q.&C. It is agreed by all M.cn,That the Effences of things 
 cannot be known, but only theirProperties and Qualities ; and 
 that the World is divided into Matter and Spirit ; and that 
 iv e know no more what the jubilance of Matter, than what 
 the fub fiance of Spirit is : and then he enumerates fbme 
 of the Eifential Properties of each, and owns that we 
 know them (in Confirmation, I fuppofe, of his fore-going 
 AiTertion, that we know nothing.} After which, in Page 8. 
 line 1 5. he adds , As for the Efjential Properties, Ope- 
 rations, and Powers of Matter, Sence, Experience, andOb- 
 fervatton will tell us what they are. And then I hope we 
 may know alfb what they are, when Sence and Experience 
 has told us. So that we fee here what our Author afferts ; 
 but may we rely upon it, and hold him to his Word ? 
 Alas! That, I fear, may prove fomething hard and un- 
 kind. For a Man, to whom a whole Convocation has 
 given a large [cope and liberty of thinking, and who has 
 given himielf as large an one for (peaking; loves not, of 
 
 C all 
 
i o Ammadverfions, Sec. 
 
 . . 1 things in the World,to be held too ftriftly to what he 
 fays. For in Page 4. line 2 5. reckoning up fbme'of the 
 Abfurdities, and Contradictions attending the Doftrine 
 of Tranfiibftantiation, he tells us, That we know them to 
 fo ; becaufe we know the Nature of a Body (and this 
 6 we muft fuppofe laid in further Confirmation of his 
 other AiTertion, that we know not the Nature of any 
 thing) and moreover, That we know that fitch things (as 
 he there mentions) are a Contradiction to the Ejfential 
 Properties of a Body, line 26. All this he fays here,and that 
 in very plain terms. But in the 7th Page (in which it is 
 high time for a Man to forget what he faid in the 4th.) 
 He tells US, That the Ejjences of things cannot be known ; 
 and conf equently one would think, That the EiTence of 
 a Body could not be known : And yet for one to know the 
 nature of a Body, (which in the 4th Page he lays we do) 
 without knowing the Ejfence of it ; (which in- the 7th Page 
 he fays, we cannot know) is, I conceive, a way of know- 
 ledge peculiar to this Author. In the next place, as for 
 tie property of things, he tells us very pofitively in Page 
 8. line }}, 34. That the Properties and Operations both of Bo- 
 dies and Spirits, are great Secret s, and Myfteries in Nature, 
 which we under ft and nothing 0/",&x. And yet in Page 7. ff.J2. 
 he tells us, That we know the Ejfential Properties of a 
 Spirit , that it is a thinking fubftance with the Faculties of 
 "Under (landing and Will, &c. Now to know the Ejfential 
 Properties of a Spirit ; And yet for thefe Properties to be 
 fuch Secrets and Myfteries in Nature, that we under (land no- 
 thing of them, (both which this Author cxprefly affirms 
 in the compafs of two Pages) is another lort of know- 
 ledge, which ought in all reafbn to be reckoned peculiar 
 to himfelf. And thus having confidcr'd fbmc of his AP 
 fertions in Contradiction to one another (if there be any 
 fuch thing as a Contradiction) I will confider fbme of 
 them feverally by themfelves. And 
 
Chapter! m 
 
 And here, as I have already fhewn, That he fays po- 
 sitively P<ff* 4. line 28. That we 
 prehenfive Notion of a : So he adds in the n 
 
 words, That it is impoflible to know what is contrary to 
 
 of A Spirit^ i, we know not ivhxt the Nature of t 
 S i.e. Comprehensively, as he mull Hill mean. 
 But this, by his favour, I very much queition, and de- 
 fire him to tell me, Whether we may not know, That 
 it is contrary to the Nature of a Spirit to be Material, to be 
 extended, and to be compounded of the Elements, &c. 
 Thcie things I take to be iuch as are contra rv to the Ma- 
 ture of a Spirit, and fiich as may be certainly known to 
 be lb, and consequently fuch as may lafcly, rationallv, 
 and eonibnantiy to all Principles of Philofbphy, be pro- 
 nounced to be 16 : And therefore this Author's AfTertion, 
 
 : , That it is impoiTible to know what is contrary to the 
 Nature of a Spirit, if we have not a clear, comprehenfiz'e 
 Notion of the Nature of a Spirit, is apparently Falfe, Ab- 
 furd, and Ridiculous. 
 
 But to proceed, This Author having laid, That he 
 knows nothing in the World that we do perfectly under If and : 
 And for the proof of it alledged, That the Effences 
 
 . hings cannot he known ; and for the farther proof 
 of that, affirm'd, That the whole World is adequately di- 
 vided into Matter and Spirit \ the Natures of which (as he 
 lays) are wholly unknown to us: Suppofe now, I fhouJ • 
 (as I do) deny this wiiole Argument, and affirm, Tftat 
 there is a third forf of Beings, which are neither Mat: 
 nor Spirit ; which yet (as to lome of them, at leaf!) 
 
 . be perfe£My underltood and known by us ; and 
 thefe are Accidents, which, according to the ablelf Phi- 
 lofbphers hitherto, do together with jubfrance, make a 
 much better, and more comprehenlive Divihon of the 
 whole World, than Matter and Spirit. For certain it is, 
 
 C 2 That 
 
1 1 Ariimadverjtons^ &c. 
 
 That Accidents^ as contradiftin£t to Subjlance, are real 
 Beings, and have their refpeftiveEffences and Properties 
 belonging to them, and fuch as may be matter of De- 
 monftration ; which kind of Argument is known to be 
 the proving of any Property, or proper Attribute of its 
 Subject, by a third things or Principle, bearing an EC- 
 jential Connexion with both. And amongft Accidents, 
 I do particularly affirm this of Numbers , Figures, and 
 Proportions, that they are liich things as may beperfeft- 
 . Iv under flood by us in the ltrength of Natural Reafbn. 
 For I think it may be perfeftly, and comprehenfively 
 known, That two and two make four ; and that a Cir- 
 cle is a Figure, every part of the Circumference whereof 
 is equidiftant from tne Centre ; and a thoufand more fuch 
 things, all which are capable of being Scientifically made 
 out to us by Demonftration : And this indeed to "fuch an 
 height, that as fbme will admit of no Demonftrations, 
 but in the Mathematicks, viz. in Numbers, Figures, 
 and Proportions : fb there are few, or none, but readily 
 grant, That the Demonftrations about thefe Matters, 
 are the Cleareft, the moft Scientifick, and Convincing of 
 all other Demonftrations whatfoever. From all which 
 I conclude, That what this Author has affirmed, viz. 
 That there is nothing in the World, hut Matter and Spirit, 
 and withal, That there is nothing which we do perfectly tinder- 
 fiand, is not only a crude, Joo'fe, unwary, but really, 
 and, in ftrifrnefs of truth, a very falfe Affeftion. 
 
 And therefore, though this Author pleafeth liim- 
 felf with a fanciful Harangue about our Ignorance of 
 the Philofbphy ; How the Fire burns, and the Waters 
 Are condens d (as lie calls it) into Ice ? How Stones fall 
 to the Ground, and Vapours afcend and thicken in Clouds, 
 and fall down again to the Earth in gentle Showres, &rc. 
 ( for it muft be granted , That it is much eafier 
 
 to 
 
Chapter L 13 
 
 to change like the Weather, than to under ftar.d it ) 
 and moreover , though he is pleated to fay, That he who 
 u thinks he under (lands theft matters, would make a Man 
 u que (Hon, Whether be has any fenfe at all? (which is his 
 ufiial Complement to mod: whom he deals with) yet all 
 this confident Talk will neither clear him from the Ab- 
 furdity and Paradox of the forementioned General Por- 
 tion laid down by him; nor convince fuch as are con- 
 verfant in the experimental part of Natural Philofbphv, 
 but that a very true, rational, and fatisfaftory Account 
 may be given of all the fore-mentioned Phenomena in 
 Nature, which this Man, with lb much Confidence, or 
 rather lnfblence, fays, No Max of unquefiiorfd Sence\v\\\ 
 pretend to give the Reajon y or Phtlojophy of. Accordingly 
 I will dircft him to feme who took the boldnefs to give 
 a Philolbphical Account of his Vmefolvable Problems. 
 As for inftance , That of the congealing of Water by 
 Cold, into fiich alblidBodyas Ice, he will find excel- 
 lently, and rationally accounted for, by the Learned 
 Mr. Boyl, in his Treatifeof Cold, containing new Expe- 
 riments, and Qbfervations touching it, and an Experi- 
 mental Hiitory of it begun. Likewife a reaibn of the 
 fame given by thote Learned French-men, the Authors 
 of 'the Philofophia Vet us & Nova, commonly called, the 
 Colbertine Philofbphv, in the 2 Vol. p. 213, 214, 215, 
 216. And then, for the Defcent of heavy Bodies, or Ston 
 falling to the Ground ; he will find the caute of it afligned 
 by Galileo, in his Syfiema Co/micum, Collai. 1. & 2. And 
 fince by Gafftndur, in his Accurate Traci^V motu trnpreffo 
 amoton tranflato. As alfo, an Account of the Gravita- 
 tion, or Defccijt of fuch Bodies, judicioufly given by 
 Clauajud Berigardus) Profeflbrof Philolbphy firlt in Pija, 
 and then in Padtfa, in his Ctr cuius Pifanus jd part, and 
 the 6. Dial. p. 291, 29-, in the Perfon of Jrtftxus. And 
 
 lait 
 
Ammadwrfions, &c. 
 
 laft of all, in the Caufes of Gravitation briefly, butrin- 
 genioufly given by Ifaac Voffius, ii N ii$ Obftrvat: 
 vsridy p. 201 , &c In like manner he 11 find a Philofb- 
 phical, and Hiftorical Account of Wi i >, by that great 
 Man, the Lord Bacon, in his Treatife upon that Subject ; 
 which, I am fure, is as difficult an one, a ny mentioned 
 by this Author. And as for what he here s of the Jfcent 
 of J 7 amours (which is eafily accounted for from the Sun 
 and other Celeftial Bodies) and their hi cent tgtin tn 
 Shonres ; (which might eafily be ftated upon their own 
 Gravity, being combined into bigger Bod as is lively 
 exemplified in an Alembick) thisAut 1 is, feems 
 
 to give us fbine Philofbphical Account c nd con- 
 
 fequently for prefuming fb to do, ought K) be his fhare 
 in the fame Reproach, which upon the like account he 
 hath fo infblently faftned upon others. Bur as touching 
 Rain and Vapours, Snow and Froft, and innumerable 
 more fiich Subjefts ; there is not a Natural Philofbpher, 
 whether Peripatetic!?, Gaffendian, or Cartefian of any note, 
 but profeffeth to give a Philofbphical Reafbn of the Na- 
 ture of them, both as to what they are, and how, and 
 by what means they are caufed. Concerning all which, 
 Learned Men, who have avowedly travelled, and im- 
 ployed themfelves in fuch Studies, and that with great 
 Applaufe of all the Learned World ; I defire his Haugh- 
 tmefs to fpeak out, and declare freely, whether he taketh 
 them to have been fuch Perfbns, as a Man would que ft ion ^ 
 Whether they had any Senfe, or no ? For as thefe famous 
 Men were far from denying their Senfes, in Complement to 
 their Under (landing ; fb they were as far from parting fuch 
 a Complement upon their Senfcs, as to own, That their 
 Underftanding could look no farther, and that where 
 Senfe had ftarted the Game, Reafon might not follow it, 
 and by a diligent, and fagacious purf uit, at length over- 
 take 
 
Chapter I. 
 
 take it. The Things treated of by theft mighty Searc 
 ers into Nature, I acknowledge to be very difficult ; but 
 every thing that is difficult, is not therefore impoflible, 
 even* to him that thinks it fb. And therefore, as to the 
 ignorance of fuch like matters, let our Author (in God's 
 
 me) and others like him, pronounce each Man for 
 himiclf, and not undertake for others. For there may 
 be feveral things, which one Man may not know, and 
 yet others may : As for inftanee, It may fometimes lb fall 
 out, That a Man may not know him fe/f, and yet others 
 may kmm him very well : which is an Obfervation, I con- 
 
 e, not unworthy of this Author's Remark. 
 But to go on : Whereas he is very pofitive, and de- 
 cretory, That the Effences of things cannot be known : I 
 very much queftion, (and allow him, if he pleafes, to 
 queftion my Senfe alio, for fb doing) whether this be ab- 
 folutely true ? For a thing may be known more ways 
 than one; and if it be perfe&ly known, any one way, 
 according to the utmoft extent of that way, it cannot be 
 truly laid , not to be known. Now, if by knowing, -he 
 means the knowledge of a thing, by a dire£t dpprehen- 
 fion, and Intuition of it, fb as to have an exaft Idea, or 
 refemb lance of it thereby imprinted upon the mind : I 
 pretend not that the Effences of things are by any Humane 
 InteIIe£t fb known. But then, this is ftill but one way 
 of knowledge ; and what is not known one way, may 
 (for all that) be very well known another. But if on 
 the other fide, by knotting a thing be meant, the know- 
 ing it to be of Rich, or fuch a Nature, by fuch peculiar 
 Properties, Rich peculiar Eflfefts, and Operations, as -di- 
 scriminate it from other-things, and that, to know it 
 thus, be truly to know it : Then I affirm, That the I\ 
 
 r, or Effences of things may be tn. . (one way at 
 
 leaft) perfectly known "And accordingly, 1 think it a 
 
 very 
 
i 6 AmniaclverjwnS) &c. 
 
 ood Account of the Eilence of any thing, to fay, 
 That it is fuch a thing as always, and necefTarily has 
 fi . h Properties, fuch Operations, and produces fuch Ef- 
 ts, For this is an Anfwer, not only to iha. Queftion, 
 that enquires, Whether there be fuch a thing, or b.j fence, 
 or no ? But alio, and much more properly to the Quefri- 
 on, that enquires, What kind of Nature, or EJJence fuch a 
 thing is off For wlien that is askt, to fey, in reply to it, 
 That the EfTence, or Nature of that tiling is a certain 
 'Principle, always attended with fuch Properties, and al- 
 ways, or generally operating in fuch a manner, and pro- 
 ducing fuch eflecls, is a full, and fatisfa&ory Anfwer to 
 that Queftion. 
 
 If now this Author replys hcre,that he grants,That the 
 Properties of things may kc known ; I Anfwer, That fbme- 
 times indeed he grants it, and fbmetimes again lie posi- 
 tively denies it, as I have fhewn. But if in the ilTue he 
 will Hand by the Conceflion of it, then hemuft Hand by 
 the Confequence of that Conceflion too, and grant, That 
 Properties are declaratory of the Quality of the Eilence 
 they flow from, and belong to. For, I hope, he will 
 grant, that the efteft declares the Nature of the Caufe : 
 And consequently that the Nature of the Caufe may be 
 known by it ; not by way of fimple and immediate ap- 
 prehenfwn of the Caufe it felf , I confefs, but by way of 
 Inference and Difcourfe, collecting one thing from ano- 
 ther ; which is one lure Way of knowing. And therefore 
 I do here affirm, and own to this Confident, AfTuming 
 Man, That to afTert abfolutely (as he does) That the 
 EJJences of things cannot be known, is, by no means, a jufti- 
 fiable Propofition ; or, in the Latitude it is laid down in, 
 to be admitted : But is really that fallacy, that concludes 
 a dicio fecundnm quid ad dictum [implicit er. 
 
 Well, 
 
Chapter!. 17 
 
 Well, but fincc this Author has concluded the whole 
 World in Ignorance (himfelf, I fbppofe, frill excepted 
 from 16 general a Doom) What muft we do in io (ad a 
 Condition? Muft we all take up in Scepticifm, and ac- 
 knowledge, that nothing is to be known ? What then 
 will that old Principle of Nature, wa'yTes cpey^aj rs 
 etftvcu, ferve for, but to tantalize and torment us ? For 
 mult we thus think, and thirft, and defire to know, and, 
 after all, rind nothing to be known with any thing of 
 plainneis, evidence, and dcmonftnition? Why, Yes ; to 
 comfort us under this Cimmerian darknefs, and to fhew, 
 that God has not given us our Intellectual Faculties whol- 
 ly in vain : There is one certain thing in the World, viz* 
 The Doctrine of the Trinity ; That is, to fay, of three di- 
 fiinci Perjons, til united in one and the fame nnmeric.il Di- 
 vine Nature 7 which is wonderfully plain, eafie, and obvious 
 to be known : Though ftill, thanks to our Author for it, 
 who by a New-found Expofition, and Explication of it, 
 has bellowed this piece of Charity upon the World as to 
 render it lb. For thus, in Page 58. line 2. of his Book, 
 Explaining the Union of the three Pcrions in the God- 
 head, by Self-Con fct on fnefs, and Mutual-Con fcioufnefs, 
 (which words fhall be throughly confidered in their due 
 place) he fays, That this is very plain, and intelligible, and 
 makes the three Perfrns to be as much one, as every Man is 
 one with himfelf. And certainly it is hardly poffible for 
 any thing to be more plain and clear, more evident and 
 intelligible, than that every Man is one with himfelf. (Ex- 
 cept it be only when ho, contradicts himfelf.) Again in 
 Page 6 5. line 3 1 . he tells us, That his Notion of Self Con- 
 fcioujnefs, and Mutual-Confciou fnefs, feerns to him to make 
 a Trinity in Unity as intelligible, as the Notion of one Gad 
 a. And in Page 66. line 2, 3. That it gives a plain, and 
 intelligible Solution to all the Dijfi 'cult tes, and feeming Contra- 
 il dictions 
 
1 8 AmmadxcrfionS) Sec. 
 
 dictions in the Doctrine of the Trinity. And furely that 
 thing, from which all difficulties are removed, and about 
 Which, all Contradictions are folved, cannot be imagined 
 to have any difficulty remaining in it at all. And again, in 
 Page 68. line 26. he roundly tells us, That the Explication 
 given by him of a Trinity in Vnity, is a very plain and in- 
 telligible Account of this great and venerable My fiery ; as 
 plain and intelligible as the Notion of one God, or of one 
 P erf on in the Godhead. 
 
 And in good earnefr, -the Notion of one firft Caufe of 
 all things, and of one Supreme Being, and confequently 
 of one God, is fb eafily demonftrated,or rather, with fuch 
 a broad light, ftares all Mankind in the Face, even with- 
 out any demonftration , that if the Trinity in Vnity be as 
 plain as this is, it is hardly poffible for any thing to the 
 Reafbn of Man to be plainer : and the Arrians, andiW- 
 nians are ten times more inexcufable, than ever I thought 
 them before. Again, in Pagej^. Hue 11. having affirm- 
 ed, The Trinity to be a mofi Sacred and Venerable My fiery ; 
 within 6 or 7 Lines after, he fays, If Men would but con- 
 fder it according to his Hypothecs (which he there fets 
 down) then a Trinity in Vnity is a very plain, intelligible 
 Notion. Again, in Page 74. line 9. There will appear (fays 
 he) no difficulty y or abfurdity in the effential Union of Three 
 Minds by a mutual Confcioufnefs to each other. But will this 
 Man conclude, That where there is no Abfurdity, there 
 is therefore no Difficulty neither ? So that, that which re- 
 moves one, muft needs remove the other too ? It is 
 ftrange to me, That any one who pretends to argue clofe- 
 ly, fhould place two words fb vaftly different up- 
 on the fame level. But again, in Page 82. line jo. 
 he tells us, That this gives an intelligible account of 
 one of the mofi difficult Problems in all School-Divi- 
 mty y viz. That the whole Trinity is not greater than 
 
 any 
 
Chapter]. 19 
 
 any one Perfon in the Trinity. And again, in Pagi 85, 
 line 14. This Notion (fay S be) gives a plain account too of 
 that Mix: >ne of the Schools, That all the Operations of the 
 Trinity, ad extra, are common to all the 'Three Per fins. So 
 that by this time we ice here all things relating to the 
 Trinity, made plain, eafie , and intelligible ; and that, 
 fince this Man has Jhewed his skill upon it, all knots and 
 difficulties are wholly cleared off; io that now none are 
 to be found, though a Man ihould beat his Brains as much 
 to find them, as Divines did heretofore to fblve them. 
 And therefore well may he magnifie the Kxploitsof fuch 
 a Triumphant Hypothefis,ashcdoes, firlt in his Preface, 
 Page 1 .line 1 3. (which though it be always placed firlt in 
 Books, vet is generally written lait) Having told us, 
 That his Original Defign was to vindicate the Doctrines of 
 the Trinity, and Incarnation, from thole pretended Abfurdt- 
 ties, and Contradictions which were fo confidently charged on 
 them : He adds thefe words, This (fays he) / am fire I 
 have done ; for I have given a very eafie and intelligible A 7 o- 
 tton of a Trinity in '"unity. If he has, 'tis well. But 
 (how great fbever the aifurance is, which lie utters tliis 
 with, as he had always a very great ftock of it) I dare 
 aver, That he has here laid more of himlelf, than any 
 Divine of Note, fince Christianity came into the World, 
 ever durft lay, He was fare of, before. But as high as 
 this founds, in Page 85. line 27. he raifes his Voice Some- 
 thing higher, or at lean: is more particular in the Hnco- 
 miums he beftows upon this his Performance in theft 
 words : Thm (fays lie) / have endeavoured to explain 
 this great And venerable My fiery of a 'Trinity in Unity. And 
 this I may Jay, That I have given not only a very pojjible, 
 and a very intelligible Notion of it, but fuch alfo, <ts is 1 
 agreeable to the Phraje, and ExpreJJions of Scripture, fuch 
 preferves the Majefiy of the Article, and fives all the dijfi- 
 
 D 2 culth 1 
 
dmmadverfionS) &c. 
 
 cutties of it. By which account, as we fee that our Au- 
 thor is not wanting to the Commendation of his own 
 Hypothefis (as it is pitty but SelfConfcioufnefs, and Self- 
 Commendation fhould go together) fb we lee alio, that he 
 does it upon three diftincT: Heads, or Topicks, which, 
 therefore, by his good leave, we will as diftinftly confi- 
 der. 
 
 And Firft, for it's being fo agreeable to the Pbrafe and 
 Expreffions of Scripture, I hope amongft thefe, fbme confi- 
 deration ought to be had of fiich Texts of Scripture , As 
 that forementioned one in the i Corinth. 13. 12. Where 
 (no doubt, with reference to the Myfteries of the Go- 
 fpel, of which this is one of the chief ) we are [aid to fee 
 but as through a glafs darkly , and to know but in part, &c. 
 neither of which, can I perfwade my (elf to think, is 
 only another ExprefTion for knowing a thing plainly \ eafily, 
 and intelligibly, and without any difficulty. The like may 
 be faid of that place in iPet.i. 12. where the Apoftle 
 f peaking to the Saints, he wrote to, of the things reported 
 to them by fuch as had preached the Gofpel (amongft 
 which,this Doctrine, doubtlefs, had it's place, or an equal 
 difficulty at leaft) he adds, That they were fuch things as 
 the Angels defire to look into. The Greek w r ord is g%i- 
 yuj\auf, which all Interpreters lay a peculiar weight 
 and Emphafis upon ; as importing both the earneft in- 
 tention of the Infpeftor, and the difficulty of the object 
 infpetted, from the Pofture of flich as ufe to ftoop down 
 for the better decerning of fuch things as cannot other- 
 w r ife be well perceived, or look'd into. And now, is not 
 this (think we) a mo ft proper and fit pofture for fiich as 
 view and look into things very plain, obvious, and intel- 
 ligible ? And yet,I doubt not,but the Angels, who are faid 
 to ufcit,could very eafily give us the Philofbphy of Ran?, 
 Snow, and Ice, of the Fires burning, and the defcent of 
 
 Stones, 
 
H A P T E II 
 
 I. 
 
 Stones, and other k .?: ; BeMes, which yet this Author v 
 allow no Man of fenfe andrtafon (without forfeiting the 
 
 reputation of both) to prciume to give a Philofophical 
 Account of : Whereas, in the meantime, the Trit , is 
 declared to be a very plain, eajie, and intelligible Notion, 
 
 even to fiich Perfbns as can give no fiicli Account of the 
 other. And thus much for the Agreement of his Hypothe- 
 cs with the Phrafe and Expre/Jions of Serif tun . 
 
 The next head of its commendation is, That it pre- 
 ferves the Majefiy of this great Article (as he words it : ) 
 But in much the lame ienle, I fuppofe, as Ills Re fifing the 
 Oathy preserved the Majefiy of KingfVilliam, and his ta- 
 king it, the Majefiy of K. James: But, that it pre ferves 
 it jo, as to have a fwguLir virtue to encreafe Men's Veh- 
 tion of it , this I very much queftion , and demur to : 
 forafmuchas that old Obfervation that Familiarity breeds 
 Contempt, holds too frequently, as well as undefervedly, 
 no lefs in Things than in Perrons; which we are more apt 
 to venerate at a distance, than upon a clear, plain, and 
 full knowledge of them. I do not fay, That Men 
 ought to do thus ; but liich is the prefent ftate of Na- 
 ture, that thus they ufe to do. And it is worth our 
 marking ; That where a Man is (aid to know a thing 
 perfectly, he is Hi id To be Mafier of it ; and Maferjhip 
 (one would think) is not naturally apt to create in the 
 mind, any great awe for the thing, it is thus Mailer of. 
 But be it, as it may ; this I am lure of, That as the 
 Scripture tells us, That things revealed belong to us, lb the 
 fame Scripture tells us alfb, That there are fecret things, 
 which (by a kind of facred enclofure) belong only to God, 
 Dent. 29. 29. And till God lhall think lit to reveal to 
 us the Nature of the Trinity, I, for my part, fhall 
 reckon it amongfr thofe Secret things : And, accord- 
 ingly , with all the Pious fubmiilion of an humble 
 
 Reaiba 
 
1 z Anhnad r ccrfionS) &c. 
 
 Reafon falling down before it , adore and admire it at a 
 diftarice ; not dcv.bting,but tliat for this very caufe/That 
 
 Men fhould do fb,God in hisInfiniteWifdom thought fit 
 to Iprcad fiich a Cloud and Veil over it. And therefore I 
 cannot but thin k,that thatManexprefled the due meafures 
 of our behaviour to this,and the likeMyfteries,extremely 
 well; who being preffed in the Schools with an Argu- 
 ment from the Trinity, in oppofition to the Queftion held 
 by him, gave it no other Anfwer but this : Magi ft er, hoc 
 Myjlerium Trinitatis ex quo argument arts, eft pot/ us flexis 
 genibtis adorandum , qnam curio fa nimis indagine ventilan- 
 dum. The Refpondent who made this Reply, had the 
 Repute of a Learned and Eloquent Man ; and I think 
 this Reply reprefents him a very Pious, and Difcreet 
 one too. 
 
 And therefore, as for the third and laft Topick, upon 
 which our Author would recommend his Hypothecs a- 
 bout the Trinity, viz. That it folves all the difficulties of 
 it. I fear, from what hath been laft faid, that it will 
 prove as far from being a Commendation, as it is from 
 being a Truth ; efpecially when the Author himfelf, af- 
 ter his faying Co^mpage 85. immediately adds, and that in 
 the very next words, Page 86. line 1. That there may be 
 a great deal more in this Myftery than we can fathom, &c. 
 But now, if our Author will in this manner utter one 
 Affertion, and immediately after it fiibjoyn another 
 which quite overthrows it, who can help this ? For that 
 a great deal more ftjould remain in this Myftery than we can 
 fathom , or that there can be any thing unfathomable in 
 tlvdt y inivhich there is nothing difficult ; or that any thing can 
 be difficult, after fiich an Explication given of it, vtSjwves 
 all the difficulties of it (for that is his very word in Page 
 85. the laft Line) I muft freely confefs, fiirpalTes my 
 Underftanding, to conceive; and God blefs his Under- 
 standing, if it can. It 
 
C H A PTER I I J 
 
 It muff be confefTed indeed (cis I hinted before in my 
 Preface) that in a fhort Treatife lately Publifhed by 
 him, and entituled, An Apology for Writing again ft the 
 Socinians, he feems to deny the Notion of a 'trinity to be 
 comprehenfble and c -fie, Pai;ei«;. telling us, " That there Some Re- 
 u m if ft be infinite d-gras ({knowledge, where the Object is marks 
 a Infinite', and tl.it ti'ery new degree is more perfect than Apology, 
 a that below it : wd )ct no Creature can attain the highejl 
 u degree of alt, is a ferft ct Comprehension \ fo that the 
 
 11 knowledg- ..}.■•■■ ■ everyday, and Men ?nay 
 
 u write plaint r and plainer about thefe ynxttevs ez-ery day, 
 u wtthout pretending to make all that is in God, cz'en a Tri- 
 a mty in Unity, c ompr then fib le andeafie, which he calls, a 
 u Spightful and Scandalous Imputation. By which angry 
 words it is manifeii, that he would fain ridhimieif from 
 thole Inconveniences w hich his former unwary, and ab- 
 furd AiTertions had involved him in. But by his favour, 
 thzTrutb of the Gliarge fhall take off the Scandal from 
 fiich as make it, wherelbever elicit may fix it. For I 
 have fully fhewn, That in this his Vindication, &rc. he 
 has frequently (and as clearly as words can exprefs a 
 tiling) affirmed, a Trinity in Unity to be a plain, eafie, in- 
 telligible Notion : Where, by Plain muft be underltood 
 either if!: fuch a Plainnefs, as excludes all Doubts and 
 Difficulties whatfoever : In which fenle alone a thing 
 can be faid to be fimply and abfblutcly plain : And in this 
 fence alfb it can admit of none, and much leis of Infinite 
 degrees of plainer and plainer ; fince that, which excludes 
 all doubts , certainly can exclude no more. Or idly, The 
 word may be taken in a Lax, Popular, and Improper 
 fenfe ; for that which is fb Plain, as to have no coniide- 
 rable doubt , or difficulty remaining about it. But, 
 now, the Notion which Men have of God, or of . 
 Trinity, can never be truly laid to.be Plain, in either of 
 
 the. 
 
1^ Animadverjiom, &c. 
 
 thefe Senfes, and therefore not at all. For in the 
 firft, to be fure, it cannot : No, nor yet in the fe- 
 cond. For let Men know never fb much of any Ob- 
 jeft, yet if there remains more of that Object afhially 
 unknown, than either is, or can be known of it, iiich 
 a knowledge can never render, or denominate the No- 
 tion of that Objefl: (even in the common fenfe of the 
 word) Plain. And fo, I hope, our Author will allow 
 it to be in the knowledge, Men have of God, and the 
 BltffedTrinity. And, whereas he lays no fmall ftrefs 
 upon this, That Men may write plainer and plainer of thefe 
 matters every day : I muft here remind him, That the 
 word Plainer in the Comparative Degree does not couch 
 under it the pofitive fignification of Plain , but denotes 
 only a lefs degree of difficulty, and fignifies no more 
 than, That a Thing, or Notion, is not quite fb difficult, 
 or obfcure, as it was before ; which it may very well 
 not be, and yet be far from being Plain, in either of the 
 two foregoing fenfes, laid down by us. And there- 
 fore, though' we fhould admit, That Men might write 
 plainer and plainer of the Trinity every day ; yet I affirm 
 notwithftanding, that the Notion of a Trinity in Vnity, 
 can in no fenfe be truly faid to be plain and eafie, and 
 much lefs, very plain and eafie, as this Author has exprefly 
 affirmed it. So that if this be a Scandalous Imputation, it 
 is eafie to judge, to whom the Scandal of it muft belong. 
 But befides all this, I fee no caufe to grant this Au- 
 thor that, which he lb freely takes for granted, (for I 
 think it very qucftionable) viz. That Men may write 
 plainer and plainer of the Trinity every day. For, fb far as 
 the Writers of the Church have informed us about this 
 great Myftery, the Catholick Church for above thefe 
 1 200. Years paft , has not only had, and held the fame 
 Notion of a Trinity, but has alfb exprefTed it in the fame 
 
 way 
 
Chap t er 1 25 
 
 way and words, with the Church at this very day. And 
 for fo much of this M> ftery, as Di\ ines could give no 
 Account of then, neither have they given any cfeai 
 Account of it ever fince ; nor has the Church hithci 
 advanced one ftep further in this Subject : which is an 
 evident demonftrat ion, that it has already proceeded as 
 fir in it,as the Reafbn of Man could,or can go. And as for 
 any further Difcoveries of it, which this Author pretends 
 to "from two Phantaftkk words, found out by himfelf, it 
 will not be long, before they i ball be throughly weighed m 
 the Balance, and found as incon(idtrao!e as the Dull of it. 
 
 But there is one thing more, which I muff not pafso- 
 ver ; and it is this: That in the Tallage, I transcribed 
 from him, he lays down that for a certain Principle, 
 which is indeed an Intolerable Abfurdity, viz. That 
 where the Object is infinite, there muft be infinite degrees of 
 'knowledge. Now it is moft true, That nothing but fagf- 
 nite knowledge can adequately comprehend an infinite Object. 
 For which reafbn, God alone can comprehend himfelf, 
 and he does it by one fimple, indivifible aft, uncapable 
 of Parts, or Degrees. But as for Degrees of any fort, 
 whether of knowledge, or an)' thing elfe, nothing but a 
 Finite Being is capable of them ; and therefore for this 
 Man to ajjert infinite degrees of knowledge, when Uncrea- 
 ted knowledge is uncapable of Degrees, and Created 
 knowledge uncapable of Infinite Degrees, is a grofs thick 
 piece of Ignorance, in the firfc, and commoneff Rudi- 
 ments of Philofbphy." 
 
 But to return to his Abfurdities about the plainefs y 
 and eafinefs of the Notion of a 'Trinity in Unity, and there- 
 in to be as fhort with him as I can, I fhall only demand 
 of him, Whether he does in this Apology retracl and re- 
 nounce all that in his Vindication he has Afferted quite 
 contrary to what he has fince delivered in his Apology. 
 
 E ^\( 
 
z6 Animadverfionsi Sec. 
 
 If he does, let him declare fo much,and I have done ; but 
 till then, no regard at all ought to be had to his apology ; 
 as ferving for nothing elfe, but to fhew, That according 
 to his accuftomed way, and known Chara&er, he lias • 
 denyed fome things in one of his Books, which he had 
 pofitively, and exprefly affirmed in another; and confe- 
 quently proving, That the Apology jvhich denies a Trinity in 
 Unity to be comprehensible and eafie, and the Vindication, 
 which forty times over affirms it to be plain and eafie ; na\ , 
 'very plain and eafie, ought to pafs for the genuine, un- 
 doubted Works of this Author, though they had never 
 born his Name. 
 
 Wherefore upon the Refiilt of all, what fhall we, or 
 what can we fay to the fore-cited Particulars, which 
 with fo much pofitivenefs over and over aflert the 
 platnefs, and intelligibility of the Notion of a Trinity ! 
 Which yet has hitherto amazed and nonplusM the whole * 
 Chriftian Church. For if it be really fb plain and intel- 
 ligible, as this Author tells us, it mud to my Apprehenfi- 
 on unavoidably follow, either that a Myftery is a very 
 plain intelligible Notion, or that the Trinity is no Myftery. 
 I fhall not here prefume to take this Author's beloved 
 word out of his Mouth, and cry Nonfence, and Contradi- 
 ction. But certainly if the Trinity be a Myftery, and a 
 Myftery in the nature of it imports fome thing hidden, ab- 
 ftrufe, and by bare reafon not to be under food ; then to fay, 
 we may have a plain, as well as an intelligible Notion of it ; 
 nay, plain even to a demonflration \ this, to fay no more, is 
 as like a Contradiction, as ever it can look. 
 
 But really our Author lias ihewn himfelf very kind 
 and communicative to the World : For as in the begin- 
 ning of his Book he has vouchlafed to inltruft us how 
 to judge o( Contradictions ; fb in the Progrefs of his 
 Work lie has condefcended to teach us (if we will but 
 
 learn) 
 
C[I APTE M I. 2,7 
 
 n) ho\\ to fpeak and write Contra v too. There 
 
 remains therefore only one favour more, viz. That he 
 would vouehfefe to teach us how to reconcile theni alio. 
 
 Fori, for my own part, think it every whit as hard a 
 task to reconcile Contradiction^, as to reconcile Prot&- 
 ftants ; and, 1 hope, much harder. And yet this latter 
 he has endeavoured to prove in a c 13ook, wrote v 
 
 by him in the Year 1685, a thing not to be done. But the ; 
 whether it can, or no, I am hare, he has hardly publifh- ' 
 ed any Book fince,but what manifeftly proves,That there chap. 3/ 
 is great need of lbme Reconciler to do the other. 
 
 But why do I (peak of reconciling Contradictions ? It 
 would be a very troublefbme work, it" it could be done ; 
 and a very uncomfortable one, when it could not : And 
 therefore our Author (to give him his due) has attemp- 
 ted a much finer, and more compendious way of clear- 
 ing himfelf of this imputation, than filch a long and te- 
 dious way of reconciling inconfiftent Proportions, could 
 poflibly have been. For having Aiferted, That ire can- 
 not ytftly charge a Contradiction^ where ire cannot compre- 
 hend the Nature cf the thing J aid to be contradicted , and 
 that, in the next place, there is nothing in the World, 
 (which he know el h of j the Nature of which xve can throughly 
 under/land, or comprehend : I hope it follows, That,whe; e 
 nothing can or ought to be contradicted, none can be 
 guilty of a Contradiction. And this, I fuppole, none 
 will deny to be an Expedient, every way anfwerable, 
 and equal to our Author's Occafions : For otherwife 1 
 cannot fee what can (land between him and the charge 
 of many Scurvy, Contradictory Aflertions; but that 
 which mall effectually prove, and make out to us, Th 
 indeed there neither is, nor can be any fitch thing as a Con- 
 tradiction. 
 
 E 2 CHAP. 
 
zS jlmm.idverJionS) &c. 
 
 CHAP. U. 
 
 Containing an Account of fevered Terms ^ commonly 
 made ufe of in Difcourfing of the Divine Nature 
 andPerfons; and particularly /hewing the Pro- 
 priety of applying the K^ni^Eflence, Subftance, 
 Nature, Infinity, and the like, to thh great 
 Subjeff ; and laftly proving thU Author s Ex- 
 ceptions againfr the ufe of them about the fame y 
 falfe, groundless , and impertinent. 
 
 OUR Author feems fo defirous to advance nothing 
 upon this fublime Subjeft, but what fhallbe per- 
 fectly new, that in order to the making way for his par- 
 ticular Novelties, he Quarrels with almoft all the old 
 words, which Divines, in their Difcourfes about the 
 Divine Nature, and Perfons, were heretofore accuftomed 
 to make ufe of. He can by no means approve of the 
 words Effence, Subftance, Nature, Subfiflence, and fiich 
 like ; as reckoning them the Caufes of all the Difficulties, 
 and feeming Abfurdities, that are apt to perplex Mens 
 minds in their Speculations of the Deity, and the Trini- 
 ty, qSect. p. 68, 69, 70. and therefore they muft be laid 
 afidtej and made to give way to other Terms, which he 
 judges properer, and more accommodate to thole Theo- 
 ries, To which purpofe, though our Author has fixed 
 upon two purely of his own Invention, (which are to do 
 
 fiich 
 
Chapter II. 29 
 
 filch wonderful feats upon this Subjeft, as in all pa ft Ages 
 
 were never yet feen nor heard of before, and which I 
 therefore referve in due place to be confidered of parti- 
 cularly by themfelves) yet at prefent the Author feems 
 
 moil: concerned to remove, and cafhier the fore-mentio- 
 ned ufelefs, cumberfome words, and to fubftitutc fbme 
 better, and more ufeful, in their room : Such as Eternal 
 Truth and W if dem, Goodnefs and Power, Mind and Spirit, 
 &x. which being once admitted, and applyedtoall Di- 
 fputes about the Divine Nature (and an Jcf of Exclusion 
 paft upon the other) the way will become prefently 
 finooth and open before us, and all things relating to the 
 Myftery of the Trinity (according to our Author's own 
 excellent words) be made very p/a in, eafie, and intelligi- 
 ble. Never thelefs, as I may fo fpeak (to borrow ano- 
 ther of our Author's Elegancies) let not him that put tit!) 
 on his Armour bo aft as he that putteth it off. A great Pro- 
 mtffor, with a great Hiatus, being much better at raifing 
 an expectation, than at anfwering it. And hitherto I 
 can fee nothing but words, and vapour : Though after 
 all, it is Performance, and the ifTue of things alone that 
 muft fihew the ftrength and reafbn of the biggeft Pre- 
 tences. 
 
 Now for the clearer, and more diftindT: difcuffion of 
 the matter in hand, I fhall endeavour to do thefe 4 things, 
 
 I. I fhall fhew, That the ground upon which this 
 Author excepts againft the ufe of the Terms, Nature^ 
 Effence, Subjlance, Sr.bfiflence, &rc in this Subject, is falfc 
 and miftaken. 
 
 II. I fhall fhew, That the fame Difficulties arife from 
 the Terms, Truth, JV/fdom, Goodnefs, Power, &c. ufed 
 for the Explication of the Divine Being, that are object- 
 ed againft Effence, Subfianu, Nature, and the like. 
 
 IIT 
 
2 
 5 J 
 
 AnimfldverJiQnS) 6cc. 
 
 III. Ifhallfhew, That thefe Terms do better, and 
 more naturally explain the Deity, or Divine Being, than 
 thofe other or Truth, JVifdom, Goodnejs, &x. And, 
 
 IV. And Laftly, I fliall (hew, That the Difficulty 
 of our Conceiving rightly of the Deity, and the Divine 
 Perlbns, does really proceed from other Caufes. 
 
 Thefe four things, I fay, I will give fome brief Ac- 
 count of. 
 
 But becaufe the Subjeft, I am about to engage in, is 
 of that Nature, that moll of the Metaphjfual, and School- 
 Terms, hitherto made ufe of by Divines upon this occa- 
 sion, will naturally, and necelfarily fall in with it, I 
 think it will contribute not a little to our more peripicu 
 ous proceeding in this Difpute, to ftate the Import and 
 Signification of thefe Terms, Ejfcnce, Subftance, Exigence, 
 Subfifience, Nature and P&rfomlity 7 with fuch others, as 
 will, of courfe, come in our way, while we are treating 
 of, and explaining thefe. And here, firft of all, ac- 
 cording to the old Peripatetick Philofbphy, which, for 
 ought I fee, (as to the main Body of it at leaft) has 
 flood it's ground hitherto againft all Affaults : I look up- 
 on the Divifion of Ens, ov Being (a fummary word for 
 all things) into Subjtance and Accident, as the Primary, 
 and moll Comprehenfive (as we hinted before in our 
 firft Chapter.) But that I ma}- fix the fenfe and fignifi- 
 cation of thefe Terms, all along as I go, by giving them 
 their refpeftive Definitions, or at leaft Defcriptions, 
 where the former cannot be had, I look upon Ens, or 
 Being, to be truly and well defined, That which is; tho, 
 I muft confefs, it is not lb much a perfect Definition, as 
 a Notation of the word from the original Verb efl. For 
 to define it by the Term Ejfence, by laying, That Ens, or 
 Being, is that which has an EJJence, though it be a true 
 
 Propofi- 
 
HAPT ER II. 3 I 
 
 Propofition, yet I believe itnot lo exa&ly proper a V 
 nirion ; ftnee the Terms of a Definition ought to 
 
 be rather more known than the tiling defined : Which 
 in the fore-mentioned Cafe isotherwife. As for Sub- 
 fiance, I define that to be a Being not inhering in mother ; 
 that is to fay, fo exifting by it felf, as not to be fiibje&ed 
 in it, or (upported, this way, by it. Accident, I define, 
 a Being inherent in another, as in a SubjeQ: (upporting it, 
 and without which it cannot exift, or fupport itlelf. 
 Wliich Divifion being made by Terms contradi&ory, 
 viz. Inhering in another, and not inhering in another, mull 
 needs be adequate, and perfect, and fully comprehen- 
 fi\ e of the whole that is divided thereby. 
 
 But now, befides thefe two Terms of Sub fiance and 
 Accident, there is another affigned by Logicians, Meta- 
 phyficians, and School-men, called, a Mode of Being, 
 viz. fiich a thing, as being added to another, does not 
 make any addition of another Being, or degree of Being 
 to it, but only reftrains, and determines it ; and may be 
 defined an Affection of a things or Being, by which the 
 Nature of it, otherwife indeterminate and indifferent, is 
 determined to fome certain reflect, ft ate, or con dm 
 Thus, whereas the Nature of a thing may be consider- 
 ed either as yet in it's Caufes, or as a&ually produced, 
 and exifting out of them, cither of thefe is a Mode of 
 that Nature ; the firft rendring it only Potential, the 
 other Actual: \ov is this a mcer Ens Rationis, forafhuich 
 as it affefts the Being of a tiling antecedently to any O- 
 perationof the mind palling upon it. And the Reafon 
 affigned by fome Logicians for the allowing and averting 
 thefe Modes, is this: That fome things muft neceffarily 
 be admitteel to belong to B< h are not Beings 
 
 thcmfelves, to prevent an Infinite p> 1 .'' , For 
 
 fince every thing is capable of t .fined, or defcri- 
 
 bed, 
 
- 2 dnimadverJtonS) Sec. 
 
 bed, and yet nothing can be defined merely by it felf, 
 (an Identical Propolition being no Definition) itmuft 
 needs be defined by fbme thing or other, diftin£t from it 
 felf ; but now if that be alio a Being, tlien that likewife 
 muft be defined by another Being, and that by another, 
 andfbon/# infinitum ; which would be moll abfurd : 
 whereas, if this definition, or defcription of a thing be 
 made by fbme Modus of it, which is not ftriclly and pro- 
 perly a Being it felf, the thing prefently flops here, with- 
 out any neceifity of proceeding to any more Beings. But 
 perhaps it will be here {aid, if tliefe Modes are not fb ma- 
 ny meer Nothings, or Entia Rationis, what order, or 
 rank fliall they be placed in ? Since thofe ten heads of 
 Being, which we call Predicaments, cannot feem the pro- 
 per Receptacles of things, which we own not to be pro- 
 perly, or formally, Beings. I Anfwer. That though 
 they are not Beings, properly fb called, and fb not direct- 
 ly, and upon their own Account, placeable under any of 
 the Ten fore-mentioned Heads of Being ; yet fince they 
 are Appendages of Being, as cleaving to it, and depend- 
 ing upon it, they are accounted under, and reduced 
 to thofe refpeclive Heads, ov genera oi Being, to which 
 the Beings modified by them, do directly belong. Now 
 the Nature of thefe Modi being thus accounted for, we 
 are, in the next place, to take notice of the difference 
 ref ulting from them, which we call Modal', and that is 
 either between two, or more, fiich Modes differing from 
 one another ; as the Perfbnalities belonging to feveral 
 Perfbns, differ amongft thcmfelves ; or when a thing, or 
 Being, differs from the Mode affe&ing it ; or Lafilv, 
 when feveral things thus modified, .or aftefted, do by 
 vertuc of thofjp Modes differ from one another ; and thus 
 the Perfbns in the Bleffed 'Trinity may belaid to differ a- 
 monglr themfelves. 
 
 I pro- 
 
Chapter II. 
 
 I proceed now to thofe other Terms of EffeHce, I 
 fence, Nature, Suhpftence^ and Per finality. And fir ft 
 for Ejfence : as I ihewed, that Ens, or Being, might be 
 truly defined , That which is ; ib Ejfence may be 
 as truly and properly defined, That by which 
 it is ; that is to lav, by which it is Conftituted in fiich a 
 kind, or order of Being : And this difference I take to be 
 founded in the different ground, upon which we conceive 
 of the fame thing. Accordingly the EJJence of a thing, 
 no leis than the thing it felf, maybe confidered, either 
 as yet in the Power of its Caufes, and only producible by 
 them, or as attmally exifting, and produced by them. By 
 which we fee, that an Ejfence, as fiich, may be indiffe- 
 rent to exift, or not exift ; and that from hence fprings 
 the difference between EJJence and Exiftence. There is 
 indeed a Reality afcribed to it, even without Exiftence : 
 But that is not properly a reality in the thing it (elf, but 
 partly in refpect of the power of its Caufes enabling 
 them to produce it ; and partly, becaufe it is properly 
 the Subject of Sa nd capable of having true Pro- 
 
 pofitions formed of it, and Demonftrations built upon 
 i 1 " : Aswcmav form as true Proportions of a Role in 
 Winter, and demonftrate all the Properties of it, as of 
 their proper Subjeft, by their proper refpective Princi- 
 ples, as well, as while it is aftually flourifhing upon the 
 Tree. And this is all the reality which I think can be 
 afcribed to Ejfence, in its feparation from Exiftence. As 
 for Exiftenceit felf, it may be defined, that Mode, or 
 J (feci ion of Beings by which a thing ft ands actually produ- 
 ced out of the power of its Caufes ; or, atleaft, not actual- 
 ly included in any,. Caufe; in whichfenfe God himfelf 
 does exift. From whence it appears, That in Created 
 Beings, Ejfence bears no fiich neceflary Connexion with 
 Exiftence^ fincc it is not neceffarily included in the Na- 
 
 F ture 
 
i AnimadverjimSy Sec. 
 
 ture of any finite Being, that it muft needs be produced, 
 or actually Exift. But it muft be confeffed, That Exi- 
 gence being a perfection, and, in God efpecially, a very 
 great one, muft of neceffity be included in his very Ef 
 fence, as containing in it (formally, or eminent!}') all 
 forts, or degrees of perfection. The next Term is Sub* 
 (ijhuce, which is a Mode of Being, by which a thing ex- 
 ills by it felf, without exifting in another, either as a 
 part in the whole, or an Adjunct in the Subject. I fay 
 an Adjunct, not an Accident, for a Subftance may be an 
 Adjunft. And, I think, if we would aiTign a way, by 
 which the humane Nature of Chrift exifts in the Perfon 
 of the ;\£>©s we fhall hardly find out a fitter, than 
 to fay, That it exifts in it, as an Adjimft in the Subjeft. 
 For it is certain, That it does not exift in it, as a part in 
 the whole ; fince by this means, the fecond Perlbn in the 
 Trinity, muft, till his Incarnation, have wanted one 
 part of his Perfon. But I fhall not be pofitive in the Ap- 
 plication of this Term here. In the mean time it muft 
 be obferved,That Effence and Subfifience realty differ, (fb far 
 as a Modal difference is reduced to a Real) not only in 
 Created Beings, but alfb in Uncreate. In Created," it is 
 evident; forafmuchasa part divided from the whole, 
 lofes the Subfiftence which it had from thence, but ftill 
 continues its Exiftence, as being ftill a Subftance actu- 
 ally fiibfifting by it felf, and not inhering in any Subjefr, 
 as Accidents do. Nor is it lefs evident in the Deity it 
 felf, and the Divine Perfbns belonging to it. For one 
 and the fame undivided Exiftence, as well as one and the 
 fame Effence or Nature belongs to all the three Perfbns 
 equally, whereas yet every Perfon has his own proper 
 diftinft Sabfijtencehy himfelf ; which muft make as great 
 a difference between Exiftence and Subfiftence, as that 
 which unites feveral Perfbns into one Nature, and that 
 
 which 
 
C H A P T E R II. 3 5 
 
 which perfonally diftii from one anotl 
 
 And then alfb for Chrifrs Perfon, \ referen I 
 humanity; though this fubh 
 
 /\9>©^yet ir do's not properly 
 (fince every diftinfl Nature mult I >owndifi 
 
 Exijtence) which fhews, Th Oeconomyof 
 
 this Divine Perfon, Exijtence and Subfijtence muft be con* 
 fidered as formally different ; fince Something, \\ e fee, 
 may relate to, and be affirmed of one, which cannot be 
 affirmed of, or bear the fame relation to the other. Now, 
 whatfbever Being, or Nature, this Mode of Subfijhnce 
 does belong to, that is properly called a S/tppofitum ; as 
 being a thing, which by no means exifts in any other, 
 but as a Balis, or foundation, fupports fiich tilings, 
 Beings, as exift in it ; from which alfb it receives its 
 Name of i><pKa$uoK. And the Confequence of this is, 
 That asSubfijtence makes a thing, or Being, a Supfofttum ; 
 fo fuppofitality makes it incommunicable ; fince that which 
 makes it uncapable of exift ing in another, muft alfb hin- 
 der it from being Communicated to another. And ano- 
 ther Confequence of the lame is, That every Suppofuum y 
 or Being, thus Subfifting by it felf is a compleat Being ; 
 that is, fiich an one as is not made for the Completion of 
 any other : For whatfbever is lb, mu ft naturally exift in it, 
 as a part does in the whole, or at leaft be originally de- 
 figned fo to do. This Account being given of Subpfience^ 
 and of a Suppofitum^ which is Conftituted flicli by it, it, 
 will be eafie to give an Account alfb what a Perfonls ; 
 which is properly defined SuppoCitum Rationale, or Inte/li- 
 s* So that as a Suppofuum is fubftantia finguUrU com- 
 pleta per fe ftbfijlens ; fb the Ratio )ntdl:ctn\t, being ad- 
 ded to this, makes it a Perfon, which is a farther perfecti- 
 on of Suppofitality , and the utmoft perfection of Subfi- 
 ftence, as Subfiftence and Suppo/itality is the utmoft 
 
 1 ; 2 IJouud 
 
3 6 JnimadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 Bound and Perfection of Exiftence in all Beings not In- 
 telligent. 
 
 If it be here now asked : Whether Stibfijlence, or 
 SuPpofn.iht) added to bare Nature, does not make a Com^ 
 pofition ? I Anfwer,That in Created finite Perlbns it does, 
 but not in Uncreated and Infinite : And the reafbn is, 
 Becaufe though all Compofition implys Union-; yet all 
 Union, is not therefore a Compofition, but fomething 
 higher and transcendental ; fo that in the Divine Perfbns 
 of the Trinity, the Divine Nature, and the Perfbnal 
 Subfiilence coalefce into one, by an Incomprehenfible, 
 Ineffable kind of Union and Conjun&ion. And if this 
 does not fatisfie, (as I think it rationally may) I muit 
 needs profefs, That my Thoughts and Words can nei- 
 ther rife higher, nor reach further- 
 Having thus flated and fixed the Signification of the 
 fore-mentioned Terms, I cannot but remark thefe two 
 things of the Term, or Word, Efjevce. As, 
 
 i. That it.is fbmetimes taken not only for the Ratia 
 formalis entis, but fimply and abfolutely for an entire En- 
 tity, or Being it felf And 
 
 2. That thofe two other Terms, Nature and Form, 
 are for the rnofr. part ufed as Terms equipollent, and of 
 the fame Signification with it : Nature being the EJfence 
 of a thing considered as an Active, Productive Principle ; 
 and Form being the Effevce, or Nature of a thing, as it is 
 the chief Principle, giving Being and Perfection to it, in 
 the w r ay of Compofition. Neverthelefs it is fbmetimes 
 alfo apply ed to fimple imcompounded Natures promifcu- 
 oufly with the other. So that w T e fee here, That Effe?2ce y 
 Form, and Nature, generally taken, are only three for- 
 mally diftincl Confiderations of one and the fame thing ; 
 which I thought fit to take notice of, to prevent all 
 til, or miftake about the ufe of thefe Terms. 
 
 I 
 
C H A P T E R IL 37 
 
 Xluve now gone over, and fevcraiiy given an Account 
 rftheNptions of Beings Subflance, Accident, Modes of 
 Being, Ejfence, Form, Nature, Subfijlence ztiA Perfonalityi 
 
 and herein', I hope, laid fome foundation for our clearer, 
 and more mtell ; difcourfing of the great Article we 
 have undertook to refcue from a felfe Vindication : There 
 being hardly any one of all the foregoing Terms, of 
 which a clear and diftinfr Notion is not highly requihte 
 te a clear, explicite, and diftinft confideration of the 
 Subject now before us. Concerning which, I think fit 
 to note this, That (fb far as I can nidge) the thing now 
 in difpute is not, what fully and exactly cxpreiTes, or re- 
 prefects the Nature of God ( for nothing can do that : ) 
 But what is our beft and moft rational way of conceiving 
 and fpeaking of hirti, and iubjeQ: to feweft Inconveni- 
 ences ; and for this, we fhall debate it, whether this 
 Author, or we take the beft courfe. 
 
 Thefe things being thus premifed, and laid down, wc 
 fhall now refume the four Heads fir ft propofed to be 
 fpoken of by. us, and Difcourfe of them feverally: 
 And, 
 
 i. I fhall fhew, That die Ground upon which this 
 Author excepts againft the life of the Terms Subfiance y 
 Ejfence, Subfifience, &rc. in treating of this Subject, is 
 falfe, and miftaken. His Exceptions againft them we 
 find in rage 68, 69, and 70. of his Book. u The great 
 u difficulty (fays he) of conceiving a Trinity of Perfbns 
 u in one Infinite And undivided EJfence, or Sub fiance, arifei 
 tC from thofe grofs and material Ideas, we hive of Ejfence 
 u and Subjtance, when we (peak of the Effence, or Suvjlance 
 • 4 of Goa\ or Created Spirits. We can form no Idea of Sub 
 " ftance,but what we have from matter ; that isfometh 
 u extended in a triple dimenfion of length, breadth, a 
 u depth y which is the Subject of thofe Qualities, which . 
 
 " her; 
 
a 8 jfrumacherJionS} &c 
 
 3 
 
 " for* /*W ///£///? ;* />. ^#a! therefore, as matter is the 
 " Subject of all fenftble Qualities, fo we conceive fome fitch 
 " St 'Tmd, or Spirit, which is the Subjeft of 
 
 " Will arid Understanding, Thoughts and Paffions) and 
 " then jve fnd it imfoffihle to conceive how there fljould be 
 u three Divine Peri 'on s, which are all Infinite without three 
 u distinct Infinite Substances, each distinct Infinite Per Jon- 
 a having a distinct Infinite Substance of his own : And if 
 " we grant this, it feems a plain Contradiction to fay, That 
 " thefe three distinct Infinite Substances are but one Ntemcri- 
 u cat Infinite Substance, &x. Thus far our Author : And 
 I freely grant, That this does not onlyfcem (as he fays) 
 but really is a Contradiction. And, before I have done 
 with him, I will prove to him alfb, That to fay, That 
 three distinct Infinite Minds are bat one Numerical Infinile 
 Mind, (which fhall be effe&ually laid at his Door) or, 
 That three distinct Infinite Minds, are not three distinct In- 
 finite Substances, or EJfences, are as grofs, and palpable 
 Contradictions as the other. But he goes on in the fame* 
 Page a little lower. " We know nothing (fays he) of the 
 " Divine Ejfence, but that God is an Infinite Mind ; and if 
 u we feek for any other Ejfence, or Substance in God, but an 
 u Infinite Mind ; that is, Infinite Wifdom, Power \ and 
 Goodnefs, the Ejfence of God, though confidered but as 
 u one Numerical P erf on is as perfectly unintelligible to us, as 
 a the one Numerical Ejfence, or Substance of three Divine 
 a Perfons in the ever-bltjfed Trinity. In which words, I 
 think this Author guilty of a double Abfurdity. One, 
 That he fiippofes a Mind not to be an Ejfence, or Sub- 
 fiance; and it is manifeft, that he does fb, fince he finds 
 fault with Substance, and puts Mind in the room of it : 
 Whereas a Mind is really a Substance, or Nothing ; not 
 that there is nothing in the World befides Subflance y but 
 nothing elie which a Mind can be properly laid to be. 
 
 His 
 
 (<, 
 
C H A PT E R IT. y) 
 
 His other Abfiirdity is,his fuppofing MindJVifdom,Po 
 
 I Goodnefs, to be the fame; whereas vVifdom and 
 Gt . are not properly a Vf/W, but the Aftefti< 
 
 or Attributesof a Mini. And here let not our Author 
 tell me, That they are all one and the lame tiling in God : 
 For that is no News ; yet nevertheleft, Mind, vVifdom, 
 Power, Goodnefs y &c. are formally diflinct from one ano- 
 ther, and fb not affirmable of one another : And in 
 (peaking of things, the /^rw.t/ differences of them muft 
 flill be attended to : God's Justice and his Mercy are one 
 pure fimple Aft in Him ; but he that fays, His Justice is 
 1 is Met y, (peaks abfurdly for all that: And lie who 
 (a j sj That a Mind is Wifaom y or Gvodnefs, or Power, &rc. 
 f peaks juft at the fame rate. 
 
 But again in Pagejo. u It is this grofs and material 
 u imagination (fays he) about the EJfence and Substance of 
 " the Deity, which occafions all the difficulties about the No 
 " tion of one God, as well as of a Trinity in Unity. For 
 iC we cannot imagine how any Substance Jbotild be wit I) out a, 
 u beginning, how it fhould be prefent in all places without 
 u farts and without extenfion, how Substance, Effence, I 
 u istence, and all Divine Attributes and Powers {which are 
 u diHinlt things in Created Spirits) fhould be all the fa 
 " and one fimple Act in God, &c. From all which we 
 are (according to this Author) to conclude, That t 
 Terms Subftance, EJfence, and Existence, ought to 
 laidafideinallDifcourfes of the Deity; as fervin 
 nothing but to caufe in us thofe falfe Notions of it. Nor 
 are thofe only excepted againft, but alfb all Di i tri- 
 
 butes and Potters \ for in his laft words (newly quoted) 
 he equally joyns and puts them all together. And what 
 monftrous work this mull needs make in our Concepti- 
 ons andDifcourfes of God, fhall, I hope, in the procefs 
 of this Difpute, be made to appe \ 
 
 la 
 
d.o jfnimadverjwns, &c. 
 
 In order to which, I do here firft of all in oppofition to 
 what this Author has AiTerted about Substance and Mat- 
 ter, lay down this Proposition, viz. That Subftance in 
 the proper Nature, and Notion of it, includes no Com- 
 munication with, or refpect to Matter at all. And this 
 I prove to him by one plain Argument, before I proceed 
 to any thing that is Metaphyiical, viz. That there was 
 Suhltance in the World before ever there was Matter ; and 
 therefore the Notion of the former does not effentially 
 include in it the Notion of the latter : For, fiirely, if the 
 Being of one might be without the Being of the other, the 
 Notion of the one may be no lefs without the Notion of 
 the other too. Now that there w r as Subftance in the 
 World before Matter, I prove from this , That there 
 was a Being exifling by it fetf, in the World, before Mat- 
 ter, and therefore there was Subftance : Fortius is the 
 very definition of Subftance, That it is a Being exifling by 
 it felf, and conlequently they muft reciprocally infer one 
 another, as the definition and the thing defined by it al- 
 ways do. And then, that there was a Being thus exi- 
 fling by it felfy before Matter, is proved from hence, 
 That there was a Being which produced Matter, which 
 nothing but a Being exifting by it jfelf could do. And 
 now I would fain know of our Author, Whether we 
 may not have a clear and diftinfr Conception of filch a 
 Being, without ib much as thinking of Matter. And if 
 we may, (as I fee nothing to hinder us) then it is falfe, 
 that the Notion of Subftance does neceflarily engage our 
 thoughts in, or confound them with the Idea of Matter. 
 Befides, all the World does, and muft allow, that we 
 may have a full and perfect Conception of" a Genns, or 
 Generical Nature of a thing, without confidering any of 
 its Species. And withall, that it is impofTible, that fucli a 
 Generical Nature fljould include in it any one of the Spe- 
 
 cinck 
 
C H A P T E R II. 4. 1 
 
 uiickDhlcrenccsof the things, which it is Communr 
 bleto, and which are contained under it ; for if io, tl; 1 
 one Species would include in it the Specikck difference oi 
 the other oppofite Species; forafinuch as including in it 
 the Gcnerical Nature, it tnuft include all that is included 
 in that Nature too : Which would be infinitely abfiird. 
 But now Subftance is a Gcnerical Nature, equally com- 
 municable both to Material and Immaterial Subftancc.s, 
 as to two diftinQ: Species ; and confequently in its Pre- 
 cipe Conception, implys nothing of Materiality in it ; 
 and for that caufe may be conceived and known, and di- 
 ftiaftly reprefented to our minds without it. Nay, and 
 to fhew further the difference between Subfiance, and 
 Matter in the proper Notions of each, This Propofition, 
 Subftance is not Matter, is certainly true ; true, I fay, 
 ■particularly though not univerfally ; that is, with reference 
 to all thole Subftances, the Nature of which excludes all 
 Matter, as the Nature of Angels, and of the Souls of 
 Men, confefledly does. But now, if the general Na- 
 ture of Subftance eiTentially implyed in it Matter, it 
 could not be truly (aid of any one particular Subftance 
 in the World, That it is not Matter. Mr. Hobbs I know, 
 makes Sub/lance and Matter Commenfurate, or rather 
 the fame. But methinks, though fbme have lately wrote 
 after him in his lewd Politicks,no Divine Ihould venture to 
 fall in with him in his Natural Philofbphy too, for fear of 
 fome certain Confequences, which, it is too well known, 
 muft follow from it. In a word, the firft thing to be 
 conceived in God, is, That be is a Being ; the next, That 
 he is aBeing exifting by it felf; that is, in other word v. 
 He is a Subftance : And therefore, I hope, w r e may both 
 form an Idea of Subftance, and afterwards apply it to 
 God, without plunging our felves into the grofs Imagi- 
 
 G nations 
 
12 Animadverjions, Sec. 
 
 nations of Matter. And fo far do all other Divines, and 
 Philofbphers differ from this Man, that they affirm the 
 word Subjlartce much more properly, and really applica- 
 ble to God, than to any of the Creatures ; which certain- 
 ly it could never be, if it implyed any fiich effential cog- 
 nation to Matter, cither in the Nature, or Notion 
 of it. 
 
 It is evident therefore, That there is no neceffity from 
 the thing it felf to juftifie this Author's Obje&iom And 
 as for thole grofs and Material Imaginations of Subftancc, 
 taken up and borrowed from Material Corporeal things 
 nothing can be inferred from thence to his purpofe. For 
 is it good arguing to conclude, That 'became 'i thing is 
 a&ually thus or thus, it cannot poffiblybe otherwife? 
 Do not fome form to themfelves grols and abfiird Imagi- 
 nations of God the Fathcr,frcn 'xpreflion of thcAn- 
 ctent ^/D^-f,Dan.7.9.reprefentir g Hi n to thei i thoughts, 
 as an Old Man fitting in Heaven ? E it may not others 
 therefore, who are wifer, concei /e mor : worthily of him, 
 without laying afide that Scripturc-cxpreffion ? If it 
 be a good Argument (as it is all Diif Author brings) 
 that Terms,which may occafion grofs and Material Ima- 
 ginations in the minds of Men, oughi not to be applyed 
 to God ; then I hope it is as much an Argument in one 
 thing as in another. And accordingly I defire to know 
 of him, Whether the Terms Begetting, and being beo t y 
 Father and Son, are not very fitly applyed to, and ufed 
 about the Divine Perfbns ? And if fo, Whether they 
 are not altogether as hard to be abftrafted from material 
 Imaginations, as the Notions of EJfence, or Sabftmce 
 are, or rather, indeed, much harder ? I believe all 
 thinking Men will conclude they arc. Nay, and I fihall 
 venture to tell him further, That thele two words, part- 
 ly through their Corporeal fignification, and partly 
 
 through 
 
C H A P T E It II. 4.3 
 
 through the wcakneis of Men\ minds, have occafioned 
 more difficulties about the Notion of a Deity, and alWi 
 
 »/'/y too, than ever the words Effence 9 or Suhjlance did, 
 or perhaps could do r And yet, for all that, the Spirit of 
 God has thought lit to make uie of them to exprefi ib 
 (acred a Myitery by. But this Man lhould have remem- 
 brcd,That how grols and Material lbever the Reprelen- 
 cations of things are, which our finfes firllmaketo us, 
 there is a judicium Correct iv urn inReaibn,asthefliperiour 
 faculty, which is to confider and feparate what is grols 
 and Material in them, from what is othcrwife, till at 
 length by rejefting ibme Notions, and retaining others, 
 it finds out fbmething even in the moil Material things, 
 which may truly, properly, and becomingly be applyed 
 to the pureft and moft Immaterial. But to give a fuller 
 Account of this matter, we jnuft obferve, That the Idea 
 of Subflance may be faid to be taken from Matter two 
 ways. 
 
 i. Remotely and Occafwnally ; as the Obfervation of 
 Material Things may firft fit Reafbn to work, which in 
 the ftrength of its q vn Difcourfe may draw from thence 
 the knowledge of lmmaterials, astheApoftletellsus in 
 Rom. i. 20. That die Invisible th>, 70s of God, from the 
 Creation, were clearly feen and under /food from the th'ags 
 that are made, viz. Such vifible fenfibleObjc£te 3 as Men 
 daily converfe witli : And if ib, then furely thele do 
 not neceffarily difpofe the mind of Man to grofs and 
 Material Imaginations of the things ib apprehended 
 by it. But 
 
 2. The Idea of SubPiance may be laid to be taken 
 from Matter immediately and exemplar/ ly, as when the I- 
 magination does, (as it were) tranicribe and copy one 
 from the other, and take one for the reprefentation of 
 the other - 7 and this, I confefs, mull needs imprint a ve- 
 
 G 2 ry 
 
4^ JnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 ry grofs Idea of Sub fiance upon the Imagination : And to 
 this way may be referred all thofe grofs and Material 
 Ideas of Subftance, which this Author fb much exclaims 
 againft. But then, all this is from the negleft of the Per- 
 fon, in not imploying hisReafbn to correft and refine 
 the firlt reports of Sence, as it might and ought to have 
 done ; and if from hence we conclude an utter Incapa- 
 city in the thing it felf to be improved and heightened 
 into Immaterial Reprefentations, and thereupon to be 
 conceived and fpoken of agreeably to them, we mnft 
 even expeQ: a Teacher to be fent down from Heaven to 
 furnifh us with a new Language, or we muft fhut up 
 our Mouths, and put up our Pens, and not fpeak, or 
 write of Divine matters at all. 
 
 And therefore whereas this Author further adds, in 
 Page 70. That we cannot imagine how any fubjlance jhould 
 be without a Beginnings and how it jhould be Pre fent in all 
 y laces. I tell him, This is not the Point in Controverfie, 
 Whether we can imagine it, or no ? But I tell him with- 
 al, That it is as eafie for the mind of Man to conceive 
 all this of Subjlance, as of any thing elfe whatfbever. 
 For, Why not a Subjtance without a Beginning, as well as 
 Truth, or Wifdom, or Goodnefs 7 without a Beginning ? I 
 fay, Let him fhew me fbme fblid Reafbn why. In the 
 mean time, I can tell him, That of the two, it fhould 
 feem lefs difficult to imagine the Eternal Exiftence of 
 Subjlance, than of Truth ; fince Subftance is in order of 
 Nature before it ; as the Subjeft muft needs be before 
 that which affefts it. Though in very deed, the main 
 difficulty here, is not fb much to find out which of thole 
 Perfe&ions may be the moft eafily conceived to have 
 been without a Beginning, as it is to bring the mind to 
 a full and clear Conception, How any thing at all is fb ? 
 while it finds it felf wholly at a loft in running up its 
 
 thoughts 
 
C H AFTER II. z}-5 
 
 thoughts (fall higher and higher, without any bound or 
 ftint to determine them. And this it is, and not the par- 
 ticular Nature of Effence, or Suhftance, that nonpIufTes 
 and confounds our Reafon in theie unlimited Speculati- 
 ons. And whereas he goes on in the next words, and 
 tells us, That w r e cannot imagine, How Subflance, Exi- 
 fence, and all the Divine Attributes and Powers fljoitld be 
 all one and the fame fimple Aci in God ? I Anfwer. What 
 if we cannot ? Muft nothing be applyed to God, but 
 what (hail let us into the full knowledge of all that is 
 difficult and myfterious in the Divine Nature ? Or will 
 this Man fay, That the Application of the Terms Ef 
 fence and Subjlance to God, is the truecaufe and reafon, 
 why we cannot apprehend, How Subfiance and Exi fence ^ 
 and all the Divine Attributes and Powers, are one and the 
 fame fimfle Aci in God ? For this is the thing that he has 
 been profeffedly driving at, and therefore ought to prove. 
 And befides, as what he has here alledged, is nothing to 
 his purpofe, without the proof of that, fo it is a 11 but 
 a meer fallacy, a fallacy of the Accident : For albeit, we 
 cannot apprehend how all thefe Attributes are one and 
 the fame fimple Aci in God, yet furely it will not follow 
 hence, that we cannot apprehend them fingly and feve- 
 rally by themfelves, and as we fb apprehend them, ap- 
 ply them properly and fitly to God. And here I cannot 
 but take notice of a way of Arguing ufiial with this Au- 
 thor, as, I cannot conceive , and I cannot under f and, and / 
 cannot imagine, &rc. After which, as if he had laid down 
 irrefragable Premifes, he concludes, That the thing it 
 felf is not to be conceived, underfood, or imagined. But 
 for my part, I muft be exeufed, that I cannot allow this 
 Man's fingle Judgment (or prenid ice rather) for the u- 
 niverfal Standard, or meaiure of humane Reafon ; or 
 that fuch a way of difcourfing proves any thing but the. 
 
 ajfluming 
 
+<f 
 
 AnlmadvcrJionS) &c 
 
 affuming humour of him who ufes it ; and one Arrange- 
 ly full of Himfelf, inftead of better things. 
 
 In conclufion therefore, I do here affert, That the 
 grois and Material Imaginations wliich Men form to 
 themielvesof Snbfldrxi, proceed not from the thing it 
 felf, but from the groflhefs and fault of the Perfbns who 
 take up thefe Imaginations. And accordingly I affirm 
 to this Author, That that AiTertion of his in Page 6g. 
 That we can form no Idea, of Sub fiance, but what we have 
 from Matter, is falfe, and manifeftly proved to be fb. 
 And moreover, That it is not only as poffible, but as ea- 
 fie to form in the mind, a conception of a Sitl fiance, or 
 Being Exifting by it [elf (which is all one) as abftraflied 
 from, and ftripM of all conception of Matter and Cor- 
 poreity, as it is to frame to our felves a conception of 
 Truth, or Wifdom, or of a Being eternally 1 rue and 
 Wife, feparate from all thofe grois Qualifications : And 
 confcquently that the word Subftance, with others of the 
 like import, may be moil fitly and fignificantly apply ed 
 to the Divine Nature and the Perfbns of the Holy Trini- 
 ty, which was the thing to be proved. 
 
 But becaufe our Author avers, in Page 70. That tf 
 we conjider God as Truth and Wifdom, which is his true Na- 
 ture and Effence,without confounding our mind with fome ma- 
 terial conceptions of his Sub fiance (as he had already af- 
 firmed all conceptions of Subftance mull needs be) then 
 thefe things (viz,, the Difficulties before-mentioned con- 
 cerning our Apprehenfions of God) are all plain and eafie. 
 Where, by the way it is obfervable, That he calls Truth 
 and Wifdom the true Nature and EfTence of God ; whereas 
 in this very Page, as well as in 68. he had excepted a- 
 gainft the Term Effence, no lefs than that of Subftance, 
 as (by reafbn of the grofs Material Ideas raifed by it m 
 the mind) very unfit to be applyed to God, So happy 
 
 is 
 
Chapter II. 
 
 js this Author above other Men, that he can rettific the 
 moil: improper words and cxprefTions barely by his own 
 ufing them. 
 
 But becaufe lie is fo pofitive in making the Terms 
 Truth and VVifdom an effectual Remedy againft all 
 the Inconveniences alledged from the Terms Effence and 
 Subfttnce, asapplyed to the Deity, this brings us to 
 our fecend Propofttion, viz-. That the fame Objection 
 lies againft the Terms Truth) Wifdom, Goodnej's, &c. as 
 applicable to the Deity, that are made againft Effence, 
 SubjLwce, Extftence, and the like. In order to the pro- 
 ving of which, I fhall obferve, That Truth may be ta- 
 ken in a three-fold fenfe. 
 
 Firftj For the truth of Propofitions, which is called 
 Logical. 
 
 Secondly, For an Affection of Being, which is Truth 
 Metaphyseal. And 
 
 Thirdly and Laftly, As it is a Qualification of Men's 
 Words and Actions, and confifts properly in an Agree- 
 ment of the mind with both. 
 
 Concerning all which I obferve, That the Truth of 
 Proportions is no further eternal, than as it exifts in the 
 mind of God. That the Metaphyfical Truth of Things 
 is eternal, or not eternal, as the Being, or Thing it be- 
 jongsto, is, or is not fo. And for the Moral Truth of 
 Men's Words and Aftions, it is no more eternal than 
 the faid Words and Affions, the proper Subject of them, 
 can be faid to be. This premifed, I would here ask our 
 Author, Whether the firfl Notions we actuallv qptffin* 
 tain of Truth and fViCdom, arc not drawn from ( ,T o- 
 fentetioriS we make of theie tilings in Wen ; that is, in 
 Beings Icnfiblc and Material, and confifrmg of Body as 
 well as Soul, and accordingly cloathed with fenfible Ac- 
 cidents and Circumftanccs 7 I cannot imagine that he 
 
 will 
 
 M 
 
4_$ rfnimadver/toty, &c. 
 
 will deny this, fincewedo not fpeak immediately, or 
 converfe vifibly with God, or Angels ; and I fuppofe 
 alfb, that he now (peaks of Truth, Wijaom, Good- 
 
 , &c. not as they are exhibited to us in Books, or 
 Fropofitions, but as they aftually exift and occurr in per- 
 fons, and confequently as they are firft apprehended by 
 us in Concretion, or Conjunction with Men ; that is, 
 with Beings fo Compounded, Qualified, and Circum- 
 ftantiatcd, as above exprelTed , and as we find, fee and 
 obferve them, in Men's Words and Aftions, in what 
 they fpeak, and what they do ; and thefe are certainly 
 very fenfible things, and fuch as incurr into, and aftedt 
 the fence as much as Matter it felf can do. And if ib, I 
 defire to hear fbme fatisfaftory Reafbn, Why the Ob- 
 fervation of Subflance in Material Beings, and our firft 
 Occajional collection of it from thence, fhould fb necef- 
 farily pervert,and caufe luch a groffnefs in our Concepti- 
 ons of it, as to make it hardly (if at all) poffible to con- 
 ceive of Subfiance, without the grofs Conception of 
 Matter ; and yet that the fame confideration and caule 
 fhould not equally take place ill Truth and Wijdom, and 
 equally pervert and thicken our Apprehenfions of them, 
 when they are equally drawn from fenfible, grofs, and 
 Material Objects, viz. the Words and Aftions of Men, 
 which they both Exift in, and Converfe about ? For I 
 can fee no ground why the fame Reafbn fhould not in- 
 fer the very fame thing, and the fame Antecedents draw 
 after them the fame Confequents, whatfbever they are 
 apply ed to. For the Argument a Quraenm ad omne, &rc. 
 is certain and infallible. 
 
 If it be here faid, That Truth and Wifdom in the pro- 
 per Notion and Conception of them, imply no Commu- 
 nication at all with Matter : I Anfwer, That as the No- 
 tion of them is Abftra&ed, and gathered up by the 
 
 Difcourfes 
 
Chapter II. 49 
 
 Dilcourfes of Reafbn it docs not; but io neither doe, 
 that of Subjl liter fiich an Act of the Mind has 
 
 palled upon it. So that hitherto the Cafe is much the 
 lame in both. 
 
 But to carry the matter a little further. Truth and 
 Wifiom as obierved in and amongft Men, are certainly 
 finite Tilings. For whatibever exilts in a finite Subject 
 (whatsoever the Object be which it converfes about, or 
 is terminated upon) is certainly itlelf finite alio. And 
 here I would have this Author tell me, Why a Notion 
 drawn off, and borrowed from finite Things, lhould 
 not be as apt to perplex and confound our Minds, when 
 applyed to an Infinite Being ; as a Notion abftracted 
 from a Material Being, can be to diflract and confound 
 our Thoughts when applyed to an Immaterial ? I mull 
 confefs, I can fee nothing alleageable for one,which may 
 not be as ftrongly alledged for the other. All that can 
 be (aid, is what has been mentioned already, viz. That 
 Reafbn may,and docs,extra£l fbme Notions from a finite 
 Being, that may be properly applicable to an Infinite, 
 due allowance made for the difproportion between both; 
 and in like manner I affirm, That it can and does draw 
 Notions from a thing endued with Matter, which may 
 as well agree to Things Spiritual and Immaterial. So 
 that I cannot perceive, that TVW;, Wifdom^ov Goodnefe, 
 have upon this Account any Freheminence, or Advan- 
 tage over Effence, Substance, Existence, and the like 
 Terms at all, but the one may be applyed to the Di- 
 vine Nature as well and properly as the other. 
 
 But this is not all; for I affirm in the jd PlaceJThatRf- 
 fence y Subjtance y i\ T A?i>re,Ex/ftence,and othei Terms equipol- 
 lent to Being, confidered precilely in and by diemfelves, 
 are naturally fitter to exprefs the Deity by/ than thole o- 
 ther TevmsfTrtttbJ'VifdQm and GoodneJ s,contQndcd for by 
 
 H our 
 
50 AnimadnjcrftonSy Sec. 
 
 our Author. This is our Third Propofition ; and for 
 the proof of it I firft appeal to that high and glorious 
 Account, which God himfelf gave of his own Nature, 
 when Mofes defired to be informed of it, viz. I am that 
 I aw, Exod. 3.14. In which he defcribes himfelf only 
 from his Being and Stibftance, which indeed rendered 
 Iiim more eminently, and even more J lib ft ant -tally , and 
 truly a Being or Subflancej than all other Beings, or Sub- 
 fiances whatfbever, which, in companion of him, can 
 hardly be fb much as faid to Exift, or Be. And I amper- 
 f waded, that God knew his own Name and Nature, 
 and withal, how to give the beft and moft proper De- 
 claration of Both, as well as the Author of Self-Confci- 
 oufm{$,and Mutual-Co?. ■fcie^fnefs does or can pretend to do. 
 And indeed this leems to have been the very Charafter 
 by which God would be then known to all the World, 
 viz. All the Rational part of the Creation ; for it was 
 fent to his People, then living under, and with a Hea- 
 then Prince, to anfwer them and him even in thofe No- 
 tions of a God, which meer Nature fuggefted to all 
 Mankind ; and consequently were lb known and recei- 
 ved by them, that they could not eafily queftion, or de- 
 ny them. For otherwife we know God addrelfed him- 
 felf to the fame People afterwards id a Character ex- 
 treamly different, and more peculiar, viz. A God Mer- 
 ciful and Gracious, Long-fujfering, abundant in Goodnefs 
 and Truth, and pardoning Iniquity, Tranjgreffion, and Sw> 
 Exod. 34. 6, 7. Which, it leems, was the Opening a 
 Particular Attribute to them, which the bare Account 
 of his Being (as known as it was) could not fufficiently 
 inform the World of before. 
 
 But to proceed to other Confiderations, vaftly 
 indeed inferiour to this, but yet of fingular ufc in their 
 degree, to direft our Speculations about thefe Matters, 
 
 Mi 
 
C H A P T E II II. 5 J 
 
 I have Tome other Things to oiler in behalf of the Pi 
 pofition laid down by us. 
 
 As Firft, That all Divines hitherto have looked up 
 and pro felled !y treated of the Dhm i e and ' 
 
 bates, as different and diitintt from one another; ffill 
 conlidering the firft as the Subject, and the other as the 
 Adjuncts of it ; or, at leaft, as Analogous to thcle Terms 
 as they Hand properly appfyed to other Things. Ac- 
 cording to which Notion, as the Subject, or that which 
 is Analogous to it, naturally both precedes and fupporrs 
 the Adjuncts ; lb all Notions importing the Divine A'.z- 
 ture, Being* or Sub fiance, are to be accounted as the Sub- 
 ject, in reipect of all God's other Attributes, or Perfe- 
 ctions, whether they be Truth, Wifdom, Goodnefs, Power, 
 Eternity, 0?nnijaence, or any other whatfbever. Which 
 being lb, I do here affirm, That the Terms Effence, Sub- 
 fiance, Ex/Jlence, and others Synonymous to them, ought 
 to have the Precedence of the other Divine Perfections, 
 commonly called Attributes^ their Application to God, 
 and that upon a three-fold Account, viz , 
 
 I . Of Priority. 
 
 •j. Of Simplicity. 
 
 3. OfComprehenfivenefs. Of each of which Overall)'. 
 
 1. For that of Priority. As we have a] eady ob- 
 ferved. That the firft thing in order of Nature Con- 
 ceivable of God, is, That he is a Being ; and the next to it, 
 That he is a Being exifting by it f el fox (in anotl e, word).* 
 Substance ; fb the lame is yet further evidenced hem this, 
 That the Notion of Being, or Subfhince, is tlu t, which 
 fully anfwers and determines the laft Quel Hen and En- 
 quiry, which can be made concerning God. For if we 
 Oefcribe his Nature by any particular Attribute, or Per- 
 il 2 fe&ion, 
 
51 Ammad r cerfionS) Sec, 
 
 fe£tion, and be thereupon asked, What that is ? And ha- 
 ving given an Anfwer to that Queftion, be afterwards 
 urged with another, and perhaps another ; and accord- 
 ingly, after an Anfwer given to thofealfo, the Enquiry- 
 be ft ill continued, till at length we Anfwer, That God is 
 a Bei??g ; a Being exi fling by it felf that is, a Substance. 
 Then we muft of neceffity ftop, and can go no further ; 
 which makes it idem even to a Demonstration, That 
 this is the G ft and Original Notion which we have, or 
 can i . of God. Fjrafmuch as that which anfwers 
 the laffeEnqiriry, or Queftion,naturally made concerning 
 any dung, is certainly the firft Thing into which the 
 Being, or Reafonof that Thing is refblved. And thus 
 much for Priority. 
 
 Pafs we now to the Second Thing, which is the Sim- 
 plicity of thefe Terms. For Primum in omni genere fm- 
 flicijjimum. So that when we fay, God is a Being exifl- 
 ing by it felf, viz. A Substance ; this includes in it no 
 refpefl: to, and much lefs any Conjunction with any o- 
 ther Thing or Notion whatsoever : But on the contra^- 
 ry, Truth, Goodnefs, Power, &x. are all AffeCtions of 
 Being, or Subftance, and fb connote a Relation to, and 
 a Conjunction with it, as their Subject. So that to give 
 you the fame thing in words at length, Truth and Good- 
 nefs are nothing elfe but Being, or Substance, with thefe 
 Qualifications, or Being and Subftance under fuch cer- 
 tain refpefts formally determining them to fuch a condi- 
 tion, viz-, either of Conformity to the Understanding, as 
 Truth determines them, or of Conformity to the Will, as 
 Goodnefs does. So that in thefe, and all other the like 
 Attributes, Being or Substance do, as it were, pafs from 
 their abfblute and Original Simplicity by the Acceffion 
 of the fore-mentioned Perfections fuperadded to them. 
 
 And 
 
C H A P T E R IT. 5 3 
 
 And then in the Third and lafi place.Vov the Comprettett- 
 
 fhenefs of Being, orSubllancc, above any one, or mors 
 of the Divine Attributes, This alio is evident ; foraf 
 much as it runs through and contains them all, which no 
 other particular Attribute does, or can be laid to do. 
 And certainly that which fignifies Being in the whole 
 compafs and perfection of it, fhould be much more pro- 
 perly applicable to God ; than that, which fignifies B e- 
 tng onlv under fbme certain and particular determination 
 of it, as every one of his Attributes does, anc 1 no more. 
 For we cannot fay, That God's JuJtdce, . I ft re, ] / ' . V 7,7, 
 Holinefs and Power, are properly contained 1 ier, and 
 formally attributable to his Truth, but they are all con- 
 tained under, deducible from, and refenble to his Be- 
 ing or Sub fiance. So that it may properly be faid, That 
 God is an Infinitely True, Wife, Good, Holy, Omnipotent} 
 Omnipresent Being or Substance. But we cannot with 
 any propriety of Speech pitch upon any one of the other 
 Divine Attributes, and in like manner affirm all the reft 
 of that one. As to fay that God is an Infinitely Wife, 
 Good, Eternal, Omnipotent, Omniprefent Truth. This 
 (I fay) cannot be equally faid : For though the Thing 
 be fundamentally true, yet the ExpreiTion^is neither Pro- 
 per, nor Natural : Forafmuch as Goodnefs, Justice, Om- 
 nipotence, Omnipre fence, and the like, are not the proper 
 Affeftions of Truth, but they are. properly ib of Sub- 
 fiance, or Being. And moreover, Whereas this Author 
 will needs have the Terms Subfiance, Effence and Ext 
 Hence difcarded, and the Terms Truth, Wtfdom and 
 Goodnefs put in their room, when we (peak of the Di- 
 vine Nature ; I defirehirn to give me fome.good Rea- 
 fon, why he pitches wpon Truth, Wtfdom And Goodnefs, 
 rather than upon Eternity, Orn,. MndOmniprefence. 
 
 For thefe, in their proportion, exprefs the DJvine.:Ndr 
 
 twrt 
 
5zj- Animadverjions^ &c. 
 
 ture as much as the other ; but neither the one nor the 
 other can grafp in the whole Compafs of the Divine 
 Perfections, fb as to be properly denominable from all 
 and every one of them, as Sub/lance, and EJJence, and 
 fiich other Terms as barely import Beinv, are found to 
 be. I conclude therefore, that in our Diicourfes of God, 
 Effence, Sub fiance, Nature, and the like, are fb far from 
 being neceffary to be laid afide, as difpofing our Minds 
 to grofs and unfit Apprchenfions of the Deity ; that they 
 are much fitter to exprefs and guide our thoughts about 
 this great Subject, thanTrutb, Wifdom, or Power, or all 
 of them together, as importing in them both a Priority, 
 and a greater Simplicity, and larger Comprehenfivenefs of 
 Notion, than belong to any of them ; and thefe fiirely 
 are Confiderations moft peculiarly futed to, and worthy 
 of the Perfections of the Divine Nature. 
 
 I have now done with my Third Proportion, and fb 
 proceed to the Fourth and last, viz. That the Difficulty of 
 our Conceiving rightly of the Deity and the Divine Persons, 
 does really proceed from other caufes, than thofe a/ledged by 
 this Author. I fhall aflign three : As, 
 
 Firft, The Spirituality of the Divine Nature. For God 
 is a Spirit, Joh. 4. 14. And it is certain that we have 
 no clear, explicit and diftinfl: Idea of a Spirit. And if 
 fb, mi 1 ft we not needs find a great difficulty in knowing 
 it ? For we know things dire&ly by the Ideas, the 
 Species Inte/ligibiles, or Refemblances of them, imprint- 
 ed upon the Intel left, and thefe are refined and drawn 
 off from the Species Senfibiles, and fenfible Refemblances 
 of the fame imprinted upon the Imagination. And how 
 can a Spirit incurr direftly into that ? Indeed not at all. 
 For we can have no knowledge of a Spirit by any direft 
 Apprehenfion, or Intuition of it ; but all that wc know 
 of fuch Beings, is what we gather by Inference, 
 
 Di- 
 
C H A P T E R IT- 5 5 
 
 Difcourfe, and Ratiocination : And that is diffident. 
 But 
 
 2. The Second Rcafbn of our Short and Imper- 
 fect Notions of the Deity, is, The Infinity of it. For 
 this we mult Obierve, That we can perfectly know and 
 comprehend nothing, but as it is represented to us under 
 fome certain Bounds and Limitations. And therefore 
 one of the chief Instruments of our knowledge of a 
 Thing, is the Definition of it. And what does that 
 fignifie, but the bringing, or reprefenting a Thing under 
 certain Bounds and Limitations, as the Greek Word 
 Siog/o-juys manifestly imports. Upon which Account, 
 what a loft muft we needs be at, in understanding or 
 knowing the Divine Nature , when the very way of our 
 knowing Seems to carry in it Something oppofite to the 
 thing known ? For the way of knowing, is by Define- 
 ing, limiting and determining ; and the Thing known 
 is that,of which there neither are nor can be any Bounds, 
 Limits, Definitions, or Determinations. And this, I 
 think, is not only a Sufficient, but Something more than 
 a Sufficient Rcafbn, why weStumbleand fail, when we 
 w r ould either have, or give a diftindt Account of the 
 Deity. 
 
 -]. A Third Reafon of the fame, eSpecially with re- 
 ference to the Trinity of Perfbns belonging to the D/- 
 'vine Nature, is, The utter want of all Instances and Ex- * 
 ample s of this kind. For when a long and conftant courfe 
 of Obfervation has Still took notice that every numeri- 
 cally diStinft Perfon, and every Suppofuum lias a numeri- 
 cally diftinfl: Nature appropriate to it, and Religion 
 comes. afterwards, and calls upon us to apprehend the 
 Same Numerical Nature, as fiibfifting in three Nume- 
 rically diStinfr Perfbns ; w . are cxtreamly at a lofs how 
 to conform our Notions to it, and to conceive how that 
 
 can 
 
56 AnimadverhonS) &c, 
 
 can be in three Perfons, which we never faw before, or 
 in any thing elfe, ro be but only in One. For humane 
 Nature, which originally proceeds by the Obfervations 
 of fenle, does very hardly frame to it felf any Notions, 
 or Conceptions of things, but what it has drawn from 
 thence. Nay, I am of Opinion, That the Mind is 16 
 far governed by what it fees and obferves, that I verily 
 believe, that had we never actually feen the beginning 
 or end of any thing, the Generality of Men would 
 hardly fb much as have imagined, That the World had 
 ever had any beginning at all : Since with the greateit 
 part of Mankind what appears, and what does not ap- 
 pear, determines what can^ and what cannot be, in their 
 Opinion. 
 
 And thus I have fhewn three Caufes (which I take 
 to be the True Caufes) why we are fo much to feek in 
 our Apprehenfions of, and Difcourfes about the Divine 
 Nature, and the three Glorious Perfons belonging to it. 
 And the Reafbn of them all is founded upon the Eifential 
 Difparity which the Mind of Man bears to fb difpro- 
 portionate, and fb tranfeendent an Objeft. So that it is 
 a vain thing to Quarrel at Words and Terms, efpecially 
 fiich as the beft Reafbn of Mankind has pitched upon as 
 the fitteft, and propereft, and moft fignificant to exprefs 
 thefe great things by. And I queftion not, but in the 
 Iflue of all, Wife Men will find, That it is not the de- 
 feft of the Terms we ufe, but the vaft incomprehenfi- 
 bility of the thing we apply them to, which is the True 
 Caufe of all our Failures, as to a clear and diftinft Ap- 
 prehenfion and Declaration of what relates to the God- 
 head. 
 
 'From all which I conclude, That the Terms, Ejfence^ 
 Substance, Nature, &c. have had nothing yet objected 
 ugainit them, but that they may itill claim the place, and 
 
 continue 
 
Chapt e r II. 57 
 
 continue in the ufe, which the Learned'ff Men I 
 Chrifiian Church has hitl \e allotted them 
 
 in all their Difcourfes and Difputes about the Divine 
 Nature, andtheDivineP ;h are confefledly 
 
 the greateft and moil Sacred ; in the Cliriftian 
 
 Religion. But as in my rime, I have obferved ir a ;v - 
 clice at Court, That when any one is turned cut of a 
 confiderable Place there, it is always firft refblved (and 
 that out of merit foremen, no doubt) who fhall fucceed 
 him in it : So all this ado in di (mounting the Terms Ef 
 fence, SubjLwce, Nature, 8rc. from their ancient Poll:, I 
 perceive, is only to make way for theie two ib highly 
 ufeful and wonder-working Terms, SelfConfcioujneJSj 
 and Mutual-Confcioufnefs. And therefore let us, with all 
 due and aweful Reverence (as becomes us) expect: their 
 Auguft appearance, and for a while fiifter the Mountain 
 to (well, and heave up its Belly, and look big upon us, and 
 all in good time, no doubt, we fhall have the happinefs 
 to fee and admire, and take our meafures of the 
 Moufe. 
 
 But before I clofe this Chapter, to fhew how like a 
 Judge upon Life and Death, this Man fits over all the 
 formerly received Terms, by which Men were wont to 
 difcourle of God, Sentencing and Condemning them as 
 he pleafes ; not content to have cafhiered the words Ef- 
 face, Substance and Nature from being ufed about this 
 Subject, he has as great, or greater a Quarrel at the 
 word Infinite fis applycd to Gc^and I fhall here give his 
 Exceptions againft it in his own words, being fuch, as I 
 believe few would dare to utter but himfeif, and ap- 
 proaching ib near, or rather quite coming up to Blalphe- 
 my, that it may be truly (aid, That he has not fipektseems 
 more blafphemoufly of God's Vindiftive Juflice in his Pi 
 Book of the knowledge of Chrift , than he has fpoken 
 
 I of 
 
5 8 Animadverfioni) Sec. 
 
 of God's Infinity in this : For in the 77, 78, 79. Pages he 
 expreffes his thoughts of it thus. The truth is (fays he) 
 this very word Infinite confounds our Notions of God, and 
 makes the mo ft perfect and excellent Being the mofl perfectly 
 unknown to m. For Infinite is only a Negative Term, and 
 ftgnifes that which has no end, no bounds, no meafure, and 
 therefore no pofitive and determined Nature, and therefore is 
 Nothing (mark that) and withal, That an Infinite Be- 
 ing, h.zd not Vfe and Cuftom reconciled us to that expreffion, 
 would he thought N on fence and Contradiction. Which I 
 am fb far from granting him, that I affirm, if there had 
 never been any thing in the World befides God alone, it 
 had yet been moft True and Rational. But he goes on. 
 For (fays he) every Real Being has a certain and determi- 
 ned Nature, and therefore is not infinite in this Jence, which 
 is fo far from being a Perfection, that it fignifies Nothing 
 Real. Thus he difcourfes : And yet this word Infinite 
 has been univerfally received and applyed to the Divine 
 Nature, by Learned Men in all Places and Ages ; and I 
 defire this Man to tell me, How, if this word Infinite 
 were fb liable to be thought Nonfence and Contradiction, 
 this could poffibly come to pafs. For what he fpeaks of 
 ufe and cuflom reconciling us to this Expreffion, is Imperti- 
 nent, and begs the Thing in difpute. For flill I would 
 know of him, how a word fo utterly unfit to exprefs 
 the thing it was applyed to, could ever pafs into Vfe and 
 Cuflom, fb as to be took up, approved, and made ufe of 
 by all Mankind. Let him prevail with the whole World 
 to fpeak Nonfence , and to ufe words that fignifie no- 
 thing, if he can. But this Man, before he played the 
 Ariflarchus at this rate, fhould have done well to have 
 confidered, That every Term is not Negative, which 
 has a Negative Particle in the Compofition of it. Of 
 which, innumerable Inftanccs may be given.. And if 
 
 lie 
 
Ch apt e r II. 59 
 
 he docs nor know this , for all his flirting at his Soeimsn 
 Ad. if he h -her Greek nor Latin, P. 95. 
 
 it is a fcurvv fign that he is not *6 over-ftocked with ci- 
 ther of I as to have any to (pare. 
 
 And therefore, whereas he 'goes on in Page 78. and 
 tends there to explain this word Infinite, he might 
 have kept his explication to himfelf. For no body ever 
 ufed it otherwife, but 10 as to figniiie a Positive Perfecti- 
 on by it, but yet withal connoting an Illimitation be- 
 longing to it. It figniiies, I fay, a Thing Real, Abfo- 
 lute and Pofitive, but frill with a Connotation of fbme- 
 thing, which is to be removed from it, and denied of it ; 
 iiich as are ail bounds and limits in relpecl: of that Subftan- 
 tial, all-comprehending perfection of the Divine Nature. 
 In a word, the thing principally fignified by this Term, 
 is Pofitive, the Tiling Confignified, or Connoted (which 
 is but Secondary and Confequential) is a Negation. And 
 this fufficiently overturns all his odd Defcants upon it. 
 But if, after all, our Minds cannot fully mailer this No- 
 tion, Perlbns, as thinking as he can be, know and ac- 
 knowledge, that it is not the word' Infinite, but the Thing 
 Infinite, that renders them fo fhort and defective in this 
 matter. 
 
 But it is pleafant to fee him take his Turns backwards 
 and forwards in fpeaking of this Thing. There is ( fays 
 he) Page 78, a meajure of the most Ab folate and (in this 
 fenfe) Infinite Perfections ; and if fiich a meafire there 
 be, then I hope there is as much Nonfence and Contradi- 
 ction in the w r ord Inrmtnfe, as in the word . ; and 
 withal, if there is even in the molt Abfblute 'and Infinite 
 Perfections, a ne flits ultra, and an tilt 1 mum a nod fie (as 
 the School-men, who were never bred at St. MtryOve- 
 ries, are apt to fpeak) then I confute, That an Infinite, 
 with all thele Qualifications about it, mull needs (ac- 
 
 I 2 cording 
 
dnimacherjiom, &c. 
 
 cording to his beloved Dialefl:) be Nonfence and Contra- 
 diction ; and that of the highert rank. And again, P. 7 9. 
 We know not (fays he) How far Infinite Wifdom, and 
 Power, and Goodnefs reaches^ (and thus much is very true) 
 but then (fays he again) we certainly knew that they have 
 their Bounds, and that the Divine Nature is the utmofl 
 Bounds of them* By which words if he means, That 
 they h tve their I ixed determinate Notions,whereby they 
 are formally diftinguifhed among themfelves, as well as 
 from ctlu 1 >, it is right. For the Notion of Irfi- 
 
 ni:t Wifdom is lb bounded, that it cannot be laid to be 
 Infinite Power, or Infinite Power to be infinite Goodnefs^ 
 or the like ; but ftillthe Thing couched under all thefe 
 is Infinite, and neither has nor can have any Bounds fet: 
 to its Being. And if he fhould here reply, That then 
 the Notion of Infinite Wifdom, Power, and the like, are 
 falfe. Notions, as not anfwering the Things they are 
 applyed to. I Anfwer , That they are indeed im- 
 perfect and inadequate, as not fully anfwering the 
 Thing it felf, but they cannot be faid to bo, falfe 
 for all that. But on the contrary, if he will needs 
 have the thing hereby fignified to have any Real Bounds 
 or Limits of it's Being ; then it will and muft follow, 
 That in the forecited words he has with Accurate and 
 Profound Speculation p relented to us An Infinite with 
 Bounds, and the Divine Nature (which has no Bounds) 
 made the Bounds of it. Thefe are the very words he ufes ; 
 and withal delivered by him with fiich a Magifterial 
 Air and Contempt of the whole World befides, who 
 have hitherto approved and made life of thefe Expreffi- 
 ons (and that in a fen fc and fignification not to be born 
 down by every felf Opiniator, after fb long and univerfal 
 a Prelcription) that fb much Confidence cannot be fuffi- 
 ciendy wondrcd at, nor too fevcrely rebuked. 
 
 Ajnd 
 
Ghapte r II. 6 1 
 
 And therefore to review a little the foregoing parr: 
 lars, and thereby to take feme eftimate of the Man ; 
 Where mall we find Rich another Inftance of xte 
 
 , who in the Communion, or rather in the ve- 
 ry B )f lb pure and Orthodox a Church, as this our 
 Ghurch of England, ever before durft, in fb great an Ar- 
 ticle of the Cnrifiian Faith, draw his Pen ; gainft all tl 
 Writers of the Church Ancient and Modern, Fathers 
 and School-men, and with one dafh of it explode and 
 ftrike off all thole received Terms by which they con- 
 ftandy explained this Myftery, as not onlyufelefs, but 
 milchievous in all Dilcourfes about it ? Whereas (nor 
 to anticipate -what I intend more particularly and fullv 
 upon this Head in my eighth Chapter) I fhall 
 only affirm thus much at prefent ; That the Greek 
 Writers in expreffing the God-head, or Divine Nd- 
 tare, whenfbever they do not Life the words, ©fc'™;, or 
 7p ©t^or, conftantly exprefs it by <pvas and iaxx,, and fbme- 
 times by \zoi&.<7is, while voi& and \Wsa*K were common- 
 lv ufed in the fame fenfe. And likewife the Latiries, 
 where the} exprefs not the fame by Deltas, or Dfoinitas, 
 do as constantly exprefs it by Natura and Sabftantia ; 
 which words fhmd now particularly condemned by this 
 Prefiiming Man ; and that, not only in defiance of all 
 the Ancients, but alfb of the Church of England it felf, 
 which has let her Authorizing ftamp upon thofe two 
 words Subftance and Perfon, by applying them to this 
 Subject both in her Articles and Liturgy. In the firft of 
 :hem teaching us, That in the Unity of the Godhead th- 
 are three Perlbns, of one Subftance, Power \ rnity. 
 Artie i. And in her LitwgjMrendring the Athanafian 
 vdby the fame words , Neither confounding the Per- 
 fons,nor dividing the Subftance. As likewife that Paflage 
 in the Nmne Creed, by the Son's being of one Subftance- 
 
 Wit I 
 
6z AnimacfoerJionS) &c. 
 
 with the Father. And again in the Doxology at the Com- 
 munion on Trinity Sunday, it gives us thefe full and nota- 
 ble words, One God, one Lord, not one only Perfbn, but 
 s in one Subitance. After all which, with what 
 face can this ftrange, Anomalar Son of the Church 
 (while he is. fucking her Breafts, and at the fame time 
 poyfoningthe Milk, with which fhe fliould feed her 
 Children) I fay, with what face can he aver to the 
 World, That nils word Subfiance thus embraced, own- 
 ed and ufed by her, ought to be thrown away, as the 
 Direfr Caufe of all the Errours Men are apt to fall into, 
 about this great Myftery ? and that we can have no No- 
 tion of Substance, but what implys in it fomething grofs 
 and material ? Which, w^ere it fb, can any one imagine, 
 that the Church of England would ever have made ufe of 
 fiich a word, as could lerve for nothing, but a Snare and 
 a Trap to betray the Under ftandings and Confciences of 
 Men,intofuch Errours as may coft them their SoulsrThis 
 is fb fouly Reflexive upon her, that I would have any 
 Man living give me a good Reafon, Why this Author 
 fhould not be calPd upon by Publick Authority to give 
 the Church fatisfa&ion for the fcandal given to all the 
 Orthodox Members of it, by the Contumely and Re- 
 proach which he has pa fled upon thofe Terms and Words 
 which fhe has thought fit fo fblemnly to exprefs her Faith 
 and her Devotions by. But fbmeMen,(fiich is the Regard 
 had to her Laws and Difcipline) will venture to utter 
 and write any Thing, that the Bookfeller will pay them 
 for, though they throw their Confidence and Religion 
 into die Bargain. 
 ^omc fur- But G^himfelf, rvho rcfijleth the Proud, feems to have 
 *J r k R „' t0 °k the Matter into his own Hands, and (to fhew his 
 on Ws a- Controlling Providence over the Minds and Hearts of t 
 pology. Men) has at length brought this Scornful Man to cat his 
 
 own 
 
Chapter II. 
 
 own words (thehardeft Diet certainly that a proud Perfbil 
 can be put to) and after all the black Dirt thrown by 
 Him upon the School-men and their Terms , to lick it off 
 again with his own Tongue. So that after he had pal- 
 led fuch a Terrible killing Doom upon thele words, Ef 
 fence, Subjlance, Sub fife nee, Suppojitum, Per fan, and the 
 Jike, here in his }' r indication, all on a fuddain, in a re- 
 lenting fit, he graciouily reaches out his Golden Scepter 
 of Self-Contradiction, and reftores them to Life again, 
 in his Apology. And that the Reader may behold both 
 /ides of the Contradiction the more clearly, I think it 
 the belt and faireif way to give him the fenfe of this 
 Author (if it may be lb call'd) in his own words, 
 
 Vindication. Apology. 
 
 u X Have not troubled * T TE (viz.) the me 
 
 " JL m y Reader with the " mTjL ^ wc ^ }0 h Slander 
 
 u different fignirkation of u ^7, is very angry with 
 
 EJfence, Hypofiafis, Sub ft- " the School-Doftors, as 
 
 me- 
 
 " fence, Perfins, Exigence, H worfe Enemies to Chri- 
 
 " Nature, &c. which are u ftianity, than either Hea- 
 
 " Terms very differently "then Philofbphers , or 
 
 u ufed by the Greek and " Perfecuting Emperours, 
 
 u Latin Fathers, and have " Tray what hurt have 
 
 a very much objured this Do- a they done ? I fnppole he 
 
 u Chine inftead of explain- u means the corruption of 
 
 u ingit, P. ioi.l. 12. u Qiriftianity, with thole 
 
 " The School-men have a Barbarous Terms of Per- 
 
 H no Authority v. herethey u fon> Nature, l : fence, Sub- 
 
 u leave the Fathers; ( GJfencr, Conflfantiatity, 
 
 "fenfe they fometimes feem u &C. which will not fuffer 
 
 "to mi fake, or to cl " Hereticks to lie concealed 
 
u 
 
 a 
 
 6^ Animadvo 
 
 u pith fame peculiar Niceties 
 u and Difiii ?f their 
 
 "own, P. 1j8.-L.28. 
 
 u The Truth is, that 
 u which has confounded 
 " this Myfiery (viz,, of the 
 U Trinity) has been the 
 " vain endeavour to reduce 
 " it to Terms of Art, fiich 
 " as Nature, EJfen€e y Sub- 
 fiance, Subfifience, Hypo- 
 fiafis,and the like, P. 1 38. 
 " 1. the laft, and p. 139. 
 "1. 1. 
 
 And {peaking of the 
 AncientFathers in the fame 
 Page, lie tells us : " They 
 " nicely diftinguifhed be- 
 u tween Perfon and Hypo- 
 u fiafis, and Nature, and 
 " Ejfence, and Sub fiance ; 
 " that they were three Per- 
 u fons, but one Nature, Ef- 
 " fence and Sub fiance : But 
 u that when Men curioiifly 
 "examined the fignificati- 
 u on of thele words, they 
 cC found that upon fbme ac- 
 u count or other, They were 
 u very unapplicable to this 
 u Mystery. 
 
 Hereupon he asks the 
 following Queftions in an 
 upbraiding manner, viz. 
 
 /tons. 
 
 &c. 
 
 " under Scripiure-Phrxjes, 
 u But why ?nufi the School- 
 " men bear all the blame of 
 u this ? Why does he not 
 " accufe the Ancient Fa- 
 u thers, and Councils, from 
 u whom the School-men 
 il learnt thefe Terms, Why 
 u does he let St. Aufkin e- 
 " fcape, from whom the 
 a Matter of the Sentences 
 u borrowed moft of his 
 " Diftinctions and Subtle- 
 " ties ? But luppofe, thefe 
 " unlucky Wits had ufed 
 u fbme new Terms, have 
 " they taught any new 
 " Faith about the Trinity 
 " in Unity , which the 
 " Church did not teach ? 
 u And if they have only 
 "guarded the ChrifHan 
 " Faith with an Hedge of 
 " Thorns y which difguifed 
 " Hereticks cannot break 
 u through, is this to wound 
 " Chrfltianity in its very 
 " Vitals ? No, no : They 
 u will only prick the Fin- 
 " gers of Hereticks, and fe- 
 a cure Cirri fli an ity from be- 
 u ing wounded ; and this 
 " is one great Caule, why 
 u fbme Men are fb angry 
 
Chapter IL 65 
 
 « What is the Subftance and " with the School-Dolors; 
 sec chefc U Mature of ~God ? u though the more General 
 empty u How tun three u Caufe is, becatife they 
 
 dtttoSi* u ^^ P«y&w " ^ e not Induftry enough 
 anfwered " for* to <?;?<? " to Read, or understand 
 
 in my 7th. V Numerical Sub- u them. Apology, P. 4, 5. 
 0*f<r. a ^^ ? And ^ j ]iave ^ tQ prevem a jj 
 
 u What is the Dijl motion be- Exceptions) given the Rea- 
 " tween EJfence, and Perfo- der the whole Paragraph ; 
 
 * nality, and Subjijlence ? in which the laft Claufe 
 
 And Laftlv, at the end fhikts Home indeed ; tho* 
 
 of the fame Page, " He in Rich Gales, fbme think 
 
 * confefTes, that fome to- this Author would do welt 
 " lerable Account of the to take heed of ftriking too 
 u School-Terms and Di- Home and Hard, for fear 
 u ftinftions might be gi- the Blow fhould rebound 
 u ven, but that it would be back again, and do execu- 
 a a. work of more difficulty tion where he leaft intend- 
 u than ufe. ed it. 
 
 Now here the Reader is defired to obferve the Sove- 
 raign ufefulnefs afcribed by our Author to thofe School- 
 Terms : Perfon,Nature,Ejfence,Subfifencc/'o fubflantialitj y 
 &rc. As, That they will not fnffer Hereticks to lie concealed 
 under Scripture-Phrafes. That the Schools ! arned all thefe 
 Terms of the Ancient Fathers. That they have guarded 
 the Christian Faith with an Hedge of Thorns^ which c.tf 
 guifed Hereticks cannot break through. That inflead of 
 wounding Chriftianity in its Vitals, they only prick the 
 Fingers of Hereticks, andfecure Chriftianity from be;. 
 wounded. All thefe great and good things he tells us 
 have been done in behalf of Chriftianity by the School- 
 men, and their fore-mentioned Terms, here in this Afo- 
 logy \ and now if the Reader will but look back into die 
 
 K V indie ^ 
 
66 Anitnadnjcrfions^ &c. 
 
 Vindication too, our Author will there tell him alfb, 
 How, and by what Way and means the faid School-men and 
 their Terms liave Atchieved all thefe worthy Feats, viz. 
 By i Leir obf: s/i/.g inftead of explaining the Doctrine of the 
 1 ri:i;i\ . By their rniflaktng the meaning of the Fathers, or 
 etc ' with peculiar Niceties of their own. Alio by 
 
 co; g the Mystery of the Trinity, through a -vain en- 
 
 fervour to reduce ft to fitch Terms of Art, as Eifence, 
 Subftance, Subfiftence, Nature, Perfon, and the i 
 As likewife by the jaidTerms being found very unaf.plkable 
 to this LUHery. And laftly, Becaufe though fome tolerable 
 Account might poffibly be given of their meaning, yet that it 
 would be of little or no ufe to give any fuch Account , or 
 Explication of them : So ufful (it feems) does lie ac- 
 count 'them, to fecure Chrifrianity againft Hereticks, 
 that it is of ?w ufe at all to explain them. And now, 
 I hope, when the Reader has confidered, what this 
 Author has faid on both fides, he will acknowledge, 
 that Hand and Glove cannot more exaftly agree, than 
 the Vindication and the Atpology. And as for that Me- 
 lancholy Stander-by, upon whole Account this Apology is 
 pretended to have been written, if he will but read 
 and compare the Apology and Vindication together, I 
 dare undertake, that lie will not be half ib Melancholy as 
 he was before. 
 
 But does this Author, in fober fadnefs, think that this 
 is the way to Confute Htreticks, thus to play backwards 
 and forwards, to fay, and unfay, and only to fet two 
 Books together by the Ears ? Let me tell him, That 
 God is not mocked, nor the World neither ; and that he 
 owes an Account, of what he lias wrote, to both. For 
 my own part, fo far as my Converfe reaches, I meet 
 with no ferious and judicious Perfbn, who does not 
 reckon, that this Author, by his Defultorious, Inconfi- 
 
Chap t e r II. 61 
 
 (lent, but withal Impofing way of writing, will in all 
 likelihood make twenty Hereticks } before lie Confiit . 
 one. 
 
 It is indeed an amazing Thing to confider, That any 
 one Man fliould grfftme to Brow-beat all the World at 
 fiich a rate ; and we may well wonder at the force of 
 Confidence and Self-Conceit, that it fliould be able to 
 raife any one to fiich a pitch. But Naturalists have 
 obferved, That Blindnefs in fbme Animals, is a very 
 great Help and Inftigacion to Boldnefs. And amongft 
 Men, as Ignorant* is commonly laid to be the Mother of 
 Devotion, Jo in accounting for the Birth and Defccnt of 
 Confidence too, ( whatfbever other Caufe fbme may 
 derive it from) yet, certainly, He who makes Ignorance 
 the Mother of this alfb ; reckons its Pedigree by the 
 furer fide. 
 
 K 2 CHAP. 
 
6 8 Ammadverjions, &c. 
 
 CHAP. IIL 
 
 In which the Author's New Notion of Self-Con- 
 fcioufnefs and Mutual-Confcioufnefs-, Is 
 briefly declared, Self-Confcioufnefs made by 
 him the formal Conflituent Reafon of Perfona- 
 lity in all Pcrfons^ both Create and Vncreate ; 
 and on the contrary^ proved againft him in 
 the -fir ft places That it U not fo in Perfons 
 Create. 
 
 OUR Author not being fatisfied with the Account 
 given of the Myftery of the Blefled Trinity by 
 the Schools, nor with thofe Notions about it, which 
 have hitherto obtained in the World,, till. he came into 
 it (no doubt as a Perfbn peculiarly fent and qualified to 
 reftifie all thofe Imperfe&,and Improper Notions/which 
 had been formerly received by Divines.) He, I fay, 
 with a Lofty Undertaking Mind, and a Reach beyond 
 all before, and indeed be fide him, and (as the Iffueis like 
 to prove) as much above him too, undertakes to give 
 the World a much better, and more fatisfattory Expli- 
 cation of this great Myftery, and that by two new 
 Terms, or Notions (purely and fblely of his own in- 
 vention) called, Self-Conjcioufnefs, and Mutud-Confci- 
 oufnefs ; which, though frill joyned together by our Au- 
 thor in liis Explication of the Bkjjed Trinity, have 
 
 yet 
 
Chapter III. 69 
 
 yet very different Effefts , as we fliall prefently 
 fee. 
 
 For by Self-Confcioufnefs, he means, a Mind's, or 
 Spirit's being Confcious to its own Thoughts, Reafbn- 
 ings and Afteftions (and I fuppofe all other Internal 
 Motions too) which no other finite Spirit is, or can be 
 naturally Confcious to, but it felf. And this (he (ays) 
 makes a finite Spirit Numerically one, or one with it 
 felf (for he ufes both Expreflions) and withal feparatcs 
 and diftinguifhes it from all other Spirits ; Co that here- 
 by every Spirit feels only its own Thoughts, Paffions, 
 or Motions, but is not Confcious to the Thoughts, Paf- 
 fions, or Motions of any other. And this (fb far as 
 his own words import) he means by Self-Confci- 
 mfnefs. 
 
 As for Mutual-Confcioufnefs. That takes place, when 
 two or more Spirits, or Minds know all that of one 
 another, which each Mind, or Spirit knows of it felf, 
 by a particular Self-Confcioufnefs of its own. And this, 
 I conceive to be a juft Account of what this Man means 
 by Mutud-Qonfcioufnefs. 
 
 Now the Effefts of thefe two (as I.noted before) 
 are very different. 
 
 For Self-Confcioufnefs (according to him) is the Con- 
 ftituent Principle, or formal Reafbn of Perfbnality. So 
 that Self-Confcioufnefs properly Conftitutes, or makes a 
 Perfbn, and 16 many Self-Confcioufncjfes make fb many 
 diftinft Pcrfbns. 
 
 But Mutud-Confcioufmfs, fb far as it extends, makes 
 an Unity,not of Pcrfbns, (for Perfbnality as fuch imports 
 diftin&ion, and fomething perfonally Incommunicable;) 
 but an Unity of Nature in Pcrfbns. So that after Self- 
 Confcieufnefs has made feveral diftinft Perfbns, in comes 
 MutuaPQtofcioufnefS) and .lets them all at one again; and; 
 
 gives 
 
7 Aniiuadverjiom, 6cc. 
 
 gives them all but one and the lame Nature,which they 
 
 I e amongft themfelves, as well as they can. 
 
 And this is a True and ftrict Account of this Author's 
 
 ■\v H\ pothefis ; and fiicb, as I fuppofe, he will not 
 except agaiitft, becaufe juftly, I am fiire, he cannot ; 
 howfoever I may have exprdted the Novel Whimfey 
 ibmething for the Reader's D-vcrfion. 
 
 Now, by what has been laid, it is evident, that the 
 Author afligns Self-Confcioufnefs as the formal Reafbn of 
 Perfbnality, in allPcrfons Univeifally, whether Finite, 
 or Infinite, Create, or Uncreate. For having firft fta- 
 ted it fb in Finite and Created Spirits, P^e $.lim 26.&C 
 He afterwards applys it to Infinite and Uncreate, viz. 
 the three Perfbns of the God-bead. 
 
 And therefore, that we may proceed fairly, and 
 without any ground of Exception in the Cafe, we will 
 examine, 
 
 I. Whether or no Self-Confcioufnefs be the Reafbn 
 of Perfbnality in Finite Perfbns ? And, 
 
 II. Whether it be fb in Infinite f 
 
 AndFirft, For Finite, or Created Spirits. I deny 
 Self-Confaoufnefs to be the formal Reafon of Perfbnality 
 inthefe. And before I give my Reafbns againft it, I 
 (hall premife this one Confideration, ttiz* Thatwhere- 
 fbever the formal Reafbn of Perfbnality is, there is Per- 
 fbnality. And again, That wherefbever Perfbnality is, 
 there is the formal Reafbn of Perfbnality, viz. That 
 they exift Convertibly, and that one Mutually and Efc 
 fentially infers the other* 
 
 Now this premifed and laid down, my Reafbns, why 
 I deny Self-Confcioufoefs to be the formal Reafbn of Per- 
 fbnality in Finite, or Created Beings, are thefe. 
 
 I. Argument. 
 
Chapter III. 71 
 
 1 . Alrgumtnt. According txx the natural order ofThings, 
 f-Confcioufnefs inPerfbns,pre-fuppofes thcirPcrfonalirw, 
 
 and therefore is nor,cannot he the Reafbn of it. TheAr- 
 
 gument, I conceive, is very plain. For whatfbever pro 
 Jupj>oiLs a Thing, is in order of Nature Pofterior and 
 Subfequent to the Thing to pre-fiippoied by it ; and a- 
 gain on the other hand the formal Reafbn of any Thing 
 is in Order of Nature precedent to that thing, ofwh 
 it is the Reafbn. We will therefore prove the Major 
 Propofirion. Arid we do it thus. I lity ist 
 
 Ground and Principle of all Action, wherefoevei it is. 
 For where there is a Supj;o(i<tm?, whether it be Rational 
 (which is another word for Perfbn) or not , ftill it is 
 the whole Suppofitu??^ which Afts. So that there muft 
 be a Perfbn before there can be an Aft, or Aftion pro- 
 ceeding from, or Attributable to a Perfbn. In a word, 
 there mm! be a Perfbn in Being, before any Aftion iiTues 
 from him ; and therefore the Act muft elTcntially and 
 necdlarily pre-fuppofe the Perfbn for the Agent. But 
 now Sdp-Cv*fihufrufs does not only do this ; but 
 (which is more) it alfb pre-fiippofes another Aft Ante- 
 cedent to it (elf. For it is properly and formally a Reflex 
 Act upon the Acts, PafTions, or Motions of the Perfbn 
 whom it belongs to. So that according to the Nature 
 of the Thing, there is not only a Perfon, but alio an 
 Aftion (which is, and muft be'fubfequent to a Perfbn^) 
 that is Antecedent to Self-Confcioufaefs ; which being; a 
 Reflex Act, muft needs in order of Nature be Pc- 
 fteriqur to the Aft rciicfted upon by it. And therefore 
 Self^onfciotifnefS) which is by two degrees Pofterior to 
 Perfbnality, cannot poffibly be the formal Rt \ifou of it. 
 This I look upon as a Demonftration oi: the Point. And 
 I leave it to our Author (who is better a great deal at 
 
 icon:; 
 
7 z AnimadverfionS) &c 
 
 fcorning the Schools, than at confuting them) to anfwer 
 and overthrow it at bis lei fare. 
 
 2. Our Second Argument is this. The Humanity, or 
 Humane Nature of Chrift, is perfectly Confcious to it 
 felf of all the Internal Ails, whether of Knowledge, 
 Volition, Paffion, or Defire, that pafs in it, or belong to 
 it ; and yet the Humanity, or Humane Nature of Chrift 
 is not a Perfbn, and confequently Self-Confcwujhefs is not 
 the proper formal Reafbn of Perfbnality ; forafmuch as 
 it may be in that, which is no Perfbn. That the Hu- 
 mane Nature of Chrift is thus Self-Confciow, is evident, 
 fince it has all the Principles and Powers of Self-reflexi- 
 on upon its own Ails, whereby it intimately knows it 
 felf to do what it does, and to be what it is, which are 
 in any particular Man whatsoever ; fb that if any Man 
 be Qa&fcious to himfelf of thefe things, the Humane 
 Nature of Chrift, which has the fame Operative Pow- 
 ers in perfeftion (and thofe effentially proper to, and in- 
 feparable from it felf) which the reft of Mankind are 
 endued with, muft needs be fb too. And then, as for 
 the AfTumption, That the Humane Nature of Chrift is not 
 a Perfon, is no lefs evident. Since it is taken into, and 
 fubfifts in and by the Perfbnality of the fecond Perfbn of 
 the Trinity, and therefore can have no diftinQ: Perfbna- 
 lity of its own ; unlefs we will with Neftarim aflert two 
 Perfbns in Chrift, an Humane, and a Divine. And the 
 Truth is, If Sclf-Confcwufnefs were the formal Reafbn 
 of Perfbnality, fince there are two diftinft Self-Confci- 
 oufnejfes in Chrift, no lefs than two diftinQ: Wills, an 
 Humane, and a Divine, viz* One in each Nature, I 
 cannot fee how, upon this Author's Hypothefis, to keep 
 off the Aflertion of Ne(loriits y That there are Two di- 
 ftintt Per fans in him alio. 
 
 J, My 
 
Chapter III. 73 
 
 3. My Third Jr \ againft the Tunc fhall be Li- 
 
 ken from the Sou! of Man in a (late of feparation 
 Body. And it is this: The Soul in its (eparate Eftate 
 is Confcious to itfelf of all its own Internal A£h, or 
 Motions, whether of Knowledge, PaiTion, or Defire, 
 and yet the Soul in fuch an Eftate is not a Perlbn : And 
 therefore SelfConfcioufnefs is not the formal Reafon of 
 Perlbnality ; for if it were, it would and mull confti- 
 tute a Perlbn, wherefbever it was. Now, that the 
 Soul, in its (eparate Eftate, is thus Self r Confciow, I flip- 
 pole no body will pretend so deny, but fiich as hold a 
 iTychopannvchiime,r/c.fuch a dormantEftate,as renders 
 it void of all Vital Motion or Action, during its feparati- 
 on from the Body. But this being an errour which few 
 now a-days think worth owning, neither fhall I think 
 worth the difproving. 
 
 But for the Minor Proportion, That the Soul in its [e- 
 Parate Eftate is not a Per [on. In this I expect to find 
 fbme Adverfaries, and particularly our Author himfelf, 
 who exprefly affirms, That the Soul in fuch a j eparate 
 ftate is a Perfbn, Page 262. A Soul (lays he) without a 
 I r /tal Union to an Humane Body, is a Per [on. Nor does he 
 befhrw the Name and Nature of a Perfbn upon the Soul 
 only as feparate from, butalfb (as fhall be afterwards 
 made appear) as it is joyned with the Bod v ; which Af- 
 fertionof his, together with fbme others of near affini- 
 ty with ir, fhall in due place be examined by them- 
 felves. 
 
 At prefent in Confirmation of my Argument L , I Ilia 11 
 produce my Reafons againft the Personality of the Soul, 
 held by this Author, and in order to it, fhall lay down 
 this Conclufion in direct oppolition to his, viz* That 
 
 L the 
 
jjl ArurnadverjionS) Sec. 
 
 the Soul of Man is not a Perfon. And fince (as we have 
 noted) lie holds, that it is fb, both in its Conjun&ion 
 with the Body, and its reparation from it, I fhall bring 
 tny Arguments againft tJie Perfbnality of it in both. 
 
 And Firft , I fhall prove, That the Soul while joyned 
 to, and continuing in the Body, is not a Perfbn ; and as 
 a ground-work of the Proof thereof, I fliall only pre - 
 miJfe this one Thing, as a Truth acknowledged on all 
 Hands, viz. That the Soul and Body together confiitute the 
 Perfon of a Man : The fame being plainly afferted in the 
 Athmafian Creed, where it tells us, That the Reafonable 
 Soul and Fief j, is one Man, [or one Human Perfbn] for 
 both fignifie but the fame Thing ; which being thus laid 
 down, as a Thing certain and confeiTed, I Argue thus : 
 If the Soul and Body in Conjun&ion conftitute the Per- 
 fbn of a Man, then the Soul in fuch a Conjunction fe 
 not a Perfbn. But the former is true, and therefore the 
 latter muft be fb too. The Propofition is proved thus, 
 Nothing which, together with the Body, Conftitutes a 
 Perfbn, is, or can be it felf a Perfbn. For if it be, then 
 the Body muft be joyned to it, either by being afTumed 
 into the Perfbnal Subfiftence of the Soul, as the Hu- 
 mane Nature of Chrift is afTumed into the Perfbnal Sub- 
 fiftence of the ;\p>©*. Whereupon the Composition and 
 Conflttution of a Man, will be an Hypoftatick Union 
 between Soul and Body ; which, I fuppofe, no Body 
 will be either fb bold, or abfurd as to affirm ; all Di- 
 vines accounting an Hypoftatical Union fb peculiar to 
 Chrift's Perfon, as not to be admitted in any other Per- 
 fbn or Being whatfbever. Ov y 
 
 Secondly, The Body muft be joyned with the Soul, 
 is one part, joyntly concurring with another, to the 
 
 Com- 
 
Chapter III. 75 
 
 Compofitionof the whole Peribn. And iffb, tl 
 Soul bdng a Part,cannot poflfibly be a P . ucli 
 
 as a r.Di is an Jncomplet( , and therefore, in 1 
 
 very Nature of it, being defigned fix the Com] 
 
 lomething clfe, mull (ubfift in and by the Sub: of 
 
 the whole. But a Perfon imports the moll compk 
 [ode of Being, as fttbfifting whollj 
 
 lelf, and not in or by any other, either as a Subject of 
 Inherence, or Dependence. So that it is a direct: Con- 
 tradiction to the very Definition and Nature of the 
 Thin.;, for the fame ]>eing to be a Part and a Perfon too. 
 And consequently that which makes the Soul the former, 
 does irrefragably prove it not to be the other. 
 
 Jkfides, if the Soul in the Compofition of a Man's 
 Perfon, were an entire peribn it lelf, and, as fiich, con- 
 curred with the Body towards the Constitution of the 
 Man; then a Man would be an Imperfeft, Accidental, 
 and not a Perfect, Natural Compound. He would be 
 that which Philoibphy calls Vnnrn fer Accidexs, that is, 
 a thing made up of two fuch Beings, as cannot perfect- 
 ly coalelce and unite into one. For a Complete Being 
 (as every Peribn eifentially is) having received the ut- 
 mofl degree of Subfillence, which its Nature can give 
 it, if it comes afterward to be compounded with ano- 
 ther Being, whether Complete, or Incomplete, it mufl 
 neccifarily make fuch a Iooie,unnatural Union and Com* 
 pofition. But to afleit, That the Perfon of a Man is 
 tuch a compound, would be exploded by all who undc 
 Hood any thing of Natural Philoibphy. So that it would 
 be a verv idle thing to attempt any farther Confutation 
 of it. Let this Author overthrow thefe 
 liipport Ills Aifcrtion agaiiifl them if he an. 
 
 L 2 
 
v6 AmmadverfionS) &c. 
 
 But having thus difproved the Perfbnality of the Soul 
 while in Coniun&ion with the Body, I go on to difprove 
 it alfo while in a ftate of Separation from it: Which I 
 do thus. If the Soul in fiich a ftate be a Perfbn, then it 
 is either the fame Perfon, which the Man himfelf was, 
 while he was living and in the Body ; or it is another 
 Perfbn : But to AfTert either of them, is extreamly Ab- 
 furd, and therefore equally Abfurd, that the Soul in 
 fuch a ftate fhould be a Perfon. 
 
 And Firft, It is Abfurd to affirm it to be the fame 
 Perfbn. For a Perfbn compounded of Soul and Body, as a 
 Man is, and a fimple uncompounded Perfbn, as the Soul 
 (if a Perfbn atali) muft needs be, can never be numeri- 
 cally one and the Lane. For that, differing from one a- 
 HOtlier as Simple and Compound, they differ as two things, 
 whereof one implys a Contradiftion and Negation of 
 the other. A Compound, as fuch, including in it feve- 
 ral parts compounding it And a fimple Being utterly 
 excluding all Parts and Compofition. So that if a Man, 
 while alive, be one Perfbn, and His Soul after his Death 
 be a perfbn too, it is impoffible for the Soul to be one 
 and the fame Perfbn with the Man. 
 
 And then for the other part of the Disjunction. To 
 AfTert, That they are two diftinfl: Perfbns, is as Abfurd 
 as the other, as drawing after it this Confequence, viz. 
 That it is one Perfon who lives well or ill in this World, 
 to wit, The Man Himfelf while he was perfbnally in 
 the Body ; and another Perfbn, who paffes out of the 
 Body into Heaven, or Hell, there to be rewarded, or 
 punifhed (at leaft till the Refiirreftion) for what that 
 other Perfbn had done w r ell or ill here upon Earth. And 
 Joes not this look mightily agreeable to all the Principles 
 of Reafbn and Divinity ? Neverthelefs fb much is cer- 
 tain, 
 
Chapter III. 77 
 
 tain, That wherefbever there are two diftinS Perlbns, 
 
 we do, and mull by all the Rules of Grammar and Lo- 
 gick, lav, That one of them is not the other ; and, 
 where one is not the other, we cannot in Truth, or Ju- 
 ftice fay, That one ought to account for what was done, 
 or not done by the other. But then, if it be intolerably 
 Abfurd, (as no doubt it is) That the Soul in the other 
 World fhould not be refponfible for what the Man him- 
 felf in Perfbn had done in this, then it is altogether as 
 Ablurd and Intolerable, for any one to reprefent and 
 (peak of theft Things under fuch Terms and Notions, 
 as muif neeelfanly throw all Difeourft and Reafbning 
 about them, into Paradox and Confufion. 
 
 But 'tis needlefs to infiftany longer upon a thing fb clear, 
 or to add any other Arguments in lb plain a Cafe. And 
 indeed to me, the SouPs thus changing its ftate forwards 
 and backwards, from one manner of Subfifting to ano- 
 ther, looks very odd and unnatural. As, that from an 
 Incomplete ftate in the Body, it fhould pais to a Perfonal 
 gnd Complete ftate out of the Body, (which ftate is yet 
 preternatural to it) and then fall back into an Incomplete 
 ftate again by its re-union to the Body at the Refurre- 
 clion (which yet,one would think, fhould rather improve 
 our principal parts, in all refpefts, not merely relating to 
 the Animal Life ; as the bare Si :e of them, I am 
 
 fore, does not.) Theft Thing . , leem very uncouth 
 
 and improbable, and fuch as ought not, without mani- 
 feft Neceffity, to be allowed of; which here does not 
 appear; fince ill this enience may be avoided, by 
 
 holding, Tha tinuesbut t Part of the wl 
 
 Per/on, and no mo . all its Conditions, 
 
 And thus ha v tedour. I n againft the Per- 
 
 sonality of the S ', Whether in i be Body, or out of it", 
 let us now fee what may he appofed to it. 
 
 And 
 
78 Animacherjiom^ &:c. 
 
 And here, I fuppofe, fome will object, That the Soul 
 inaftateof Separation, is rot properly a Part, for 
 
 uch as it exifts not in any Compound, nor goes to the 
 C •mpofidon of it. To which I Anfwer, That an 
 Actual Inexiftence in a Compound, is not the only Con- 
 ion which makes a Thing a part, but its Eflential Re- 
 lation to a Compound ; which Relation is founded part- 
 ly upon its Qrigiikd Defignation, and pa ^cn its Na- 
 tl Aptitude to be an Ingredient in the Conftitution of 
 a Compound. And this Relation to the Compound, I 
 affirm the Soul to retain, even while it is feparated from 
 it ; as is evident from what both Philosophers and Di- 
 vines hold concerning the Soul, viz. That even in its 
 Separation and Disjunftion from the Body, it yet retains 
 a ftrong Appetite and Inclination (as well as an Eifential 
 Aptitude) to return and be re-united to it : Which Re- 
 union alio we know will be effected at the great and laft 
 Day. 
 
 But you will fay, Does not the Scripture, in Heb. 12. 
 23. (peaking of BlelTed Souls in a ftate of Separation 
 from the Body, call them, The Spirits of Just Men made 
 perfect^ Ylvdu^Tac <P$J dyioov 7roA«&>|uiV'Wj/ '•> And if thole 
 Juft Men were made Perfect, muft it not have been in 
 refpect of the Perfection of their Souls, fince their Bodies 
 were then Rotting, or (rather) rotten under ground? 
 And if they derived this Perfection from their Souls, 
 muft not their Souls have been eminent!}' perfect them- 
 f elves, which rend red them fo ? And if perfect, can we 
 deny them the perfection of Pcrfonality, which (as we 
 have fhewn)in Rational Beings,carrics ink the greateft 
 Natural Perfection ? 
 
 To all which I Anfwer, That the Perfection here 
 Ijxjkuiof, is not Natural, but Supernatural ; and relates 
 only to the Confummation of their Graces^nd not 10 the 
 
 manner 
 
Chapter IN. 79 
 
 manner of their . Which being the on 
 
 Thing now in difpute, This Scripture , which (pea 
 only of the former , can make nothing at all to the pre- 
 
 fenr Purpofc. 
 
 Having thus evinced, That the Soul, notwithftand- 
 ing its Self-Conftiotfitefs is neither during its Conjuncti- 
 on with the Body, nor its S< n from it, properly 
 a Perfon ; and having withal [hewn the grounds and 
 Realbns upon which I conclude it impoffible to he io , I 
 fliLi U however think it worth while (bmething mon f •- 
 ticularly to examine (as T promifed) this Author's ex* 
 traordinaty and pe Notions of and Perfoi 
 liry , as he applies them to the Soul , even while it is 
 joined with the Body alfb. And firft in die 268th Page, 
 lie difcourfes of it in this manner. AH the Stiffen, 
 ((ayes he) and Aci "ig, 7/ of the Body , are attributed to the 
 Afa#, though the Soul ts the Perfon, bec--;fe it is the Superi- 
 ors and Governing Power, and Conftitutes the Ptrfo 
 Thefe are his words, and they contain a very pleafant 
 way of arguing, though wholly contrary to the con 
 mon known Rules ot Philofophy. For according to 
 thefe, one would, and mufr have concluded, That for 
 this very Rcafbn, That alt the Actions .? d Sufferings of the 
 Body (and he ought to have added of the Soul too) are 
 afenbed to the Man., therefore the Man himfelf, to whom 
 thefe Perfbnal Afrs are afenbed, muft indeed he the 
 Perfon, and that for the fame reafbn alio, the Soul can- 
 not be fb. But our Author has a way of Reafoning by 
 himfelf. For (fays he) The Soul is the Perfon, becMMji 
 /lutes the Perfon. But for th ( . i lav ' i- 
 The Soul is not the Perfon, For whatsoever Conftitul 
 a Perfon, muft do it either efficiently, or formall) . Thar 
 is, either as a Principle producing it, cv a Principle 
 compounding it. As for the firft Con- 
 
 ftitutej 
 
8 o JtnimadverfionS) Sec. 
 
 ftitutes a perfon efficiently, muft do it either by Creati- 
 on, or Generation ; but this the Soul (as much a Supe- 
 riour Power as it is) is not able to do. For will any one 
 lay, That the Soul can either Create or Generate the 
 Perfon, or (to fpeak more plainly) the Man who is the 
 Perfon ? And then, for the other way, by which it may 
 be faid to Conftitute a Perfon, to wit, formally. This 
 it can do no otherwife than as it is a Constituent Part, and 
 therefore only as a Partial, and not a Total Adequate 
 Caufe of the Conftitution. That is, in other words, 
 the Soul, as the Form, muft concur with the Body as 
 the Matter, to the Conftitution of the whole Perfon of 
 the Man. But then for that very Reafbn again, the 
 Soul cannot poflibly be a Perfon, fince it contributes to 
 the Conftitution of the Perfon only as a Part ; which, 
 by reafbn of its Incomplete Being, can upon no Principle 
 of Philofbphy be a Person. And I would fain have this 
 profound Philofopher give me but one allowed Inftance, 
 where one Perfon is the conftituent Principle of ano- 
 ther. 
 
 But to examine the forementioned AfTertionyet more 
 particularly, fince this Man fb peremptorily fays, That 
 the Soul is the Perfon, becaufe it is the Super i our Power, and 
 Constitutes the Perfon. I muft tell him, That the Sup e- 
 riour Power is not therefore the fble Power, and confe- 
 quently cannot fblely Conftitute the Perfon, which yet 
 this Author pretends it does. If indeed he had faid, 
 That the Soul as the Super war Power bears the chief and 
 principal part in the Conftitution of a perfon, this had 
 been fence, but by no means fiifficient for his purpofe ; 
 for ftill this would not prove the Soul to be a Perfon, 
 (which he contends for) but on the contrary, by pro- 
 ving it to concur thereto only as a Part, demonftrate it, 
 upon the fame Account not to be a Perfon. 
 
 But 
 
Chapteii III. 8 i 
 
 But this is not all, forinP*£* 169. he calls theM/wJ 
 of Man a Per/on, and thus Difcourfes about it. 1 
 cultics, (lays he) Virtues and Powers have Perjonal Aits 
 and Offices afcrihed to them only upon the Account of their 
 S venefs with the mind in which they are, which 
 , and Acts by them. Now this alio is verv 
 odd and ftrange (could any thing in this Author, which 
 is odd, be Hrange too ; ) For the thing Afferted by 
 him amounts to neither more nor lets than this, That 
 Powers, Faculties, and Vettues have Perfonal Acls afcri- 
 hed to them upon the account of their Unity and Same* 
 nefs with that, which it (elf neither is, nov can be a 
 Per/on ; as we have abundantly proved, That the Mind 
 of Man, (taking it in his lenfe for the Soul) cannot be. 
 And for his further Conviction, I could tell him of fbme- 
 thing which has perfonal Afts very remarkably afcribed 
 to it ; and vet neither for being it felf a Perfon, nor 
 for its Unity and Same nefs with the Mind, in which it is, 
 and which fbmetimes acts by it. And that, if he plea- 
 iesto turn to 1 Corinth* 13. he will find to be that 
 notable Grace and Virtue, called Charity, which, being 
 but an Accident, I believe, that even this Author hinifelf 
 will not affirm to be a Perfon ; and, Iamiure, as little 
 can be laid for any Unity ox Samenefs that it has with the 
 Mind, which it is lodged in : Since, tKbugh it fhould be 
 utterly loft, the Mind would ne retain all the 
 
 EfTentials of a Mind, and continue as truly a Mind, as it 
 was before : Which, I think, is but an ill Arg of 
 
 any Unity or Samenefs between the Mind and that; 
 and this being indubitably true,all that this Author here 
 difcourfes about perfonal Acls being afcribed to the 
 Mind, and about their Identity with the Mind, as the 
 Reafbn of it, is with equal miftake and impertinence al- 
 lcdgcd by him in this caie. For he might and fhould 
 
 M have 
 
AnimadverfionS) &c. 
 
 have known, That pergonal A&sare often afcribed to 
 Fact* Lies, Verities, *nd Graces, not in ftrift propriety of 
 Philofophical fpeaking, but Tropically and Figuratively, 
 by a Figure (which he (hall hear further of hereafter) ca I- 
 ifaria ; which reprefents Things, that are not 
 Per fans, fpeaking and doing as if they were fb. 
 
 But befides this, there are here two Things which 
 this Author takes for granted, which yet Inch dull 
 Mortals as my felf will be apt a little to demurr to. 
 
 As Firft, That he takes the Mind and the AW of Man 
 for one and the fame Thing;whereas very Learned Men t 
 both Grammarians and Phiiofophers hold, That in Men 
 there is a great difference between Animus and Anima ; 
 and that as Anima imports the Spiritual Subftancc 
 which we call the Soul, fb Animus fignifies only 
 a Power or Faculty, viz. The Supreme Intelleftu- 
 al, Reafoning, Governing Faculty of the Soul, or at 
 leaft, the Soul it felf confidered, as exerting the fore- 
 mentioned A&s. But whether it be one or the other, 
 
 e have Efficiently proved againft this Authour, That 
 neither of them can be a Perfbn. 
 
 The other Thing here fuppofed by him, is the Unity 
 or Samenefs of the Powers or Faculties of the Soul, with 
 the Soul it felf; which yet the Perifixteticks generally ,and 
 mofl of the School-men with Thomas Aquinas in the 
 Head of them do pofitively deny, and think they 
 give very good Reafbn for fuch their Denial. For if 
 Subftahces and Accidents are Beings really diftinft, and 
 if Qualities be Accidents, and the Powers and Faculties 
 of the Soul come under the fecond Species of Quality, 
 as Ariftotle reckons them, then it is manifeft , that they 
 are really diftinguifhed, and that there is no Identity 
 bctw een therm Nor docs there want a further Reafbn 
 for the fame. For, fince the bare Sub il a nee or Ejtence 
 
C H A P T E R III. 8 3 
 
 of the Soul, confidcrcd nakedly in it (elf, m 
 
 ly be fiippofed undetermined, andtl : 
 
 to all thole Ads or Actions that nati >m 
 
 it; atad fince withal, bare Obje&s can of thej 
 
 ther enable nor dil it to exert < 
 
 there iecms a Nee . . ing the In. of 
 
 Ibme Third Thing diftinft from both, which may thus 
 
 enable, diipofe, and determine the Soul i i \ [elf in 
 
 fueh a particular u ay of acting rather than another^iil 
 
 to the feveralObje&s which fhallcome beforeit;which 
 thin Quality redding in the Soul, 
 
 r. And this to me fi -true 
 
 Philofbphy of the matter. But I need not here pre 
 the Deciiion of the Cafe one way or 
 Gtly ing the Point in debate between us. Only I 
 
 thought fit to fuggeft thefe Remarks, to check this 
 Aui f way of di&ating and affirming ia 
 
 things.' dubious, and to remind him how 
 
 and concerns one that _-, Ccntro* 
 veil nore libera! in his Proofs, and lei s in 
 
 Bui before I quit this Point about the P 
 
 Sou/. Since this Authour has fo ablblut [y 
 
 affirmed. That the Soul, ■ "lis a I rid 
 
 given this for the] of it, Thai -» r 
 
 Governing Power in Man, it does, as Inch, C the 
 
 Ptrfb/7, over and above the Arguments ■ e 
 
 been already brought for the Confutation of it, I 
 to leave with him two or three Queftions, which feent 
 
 naturally to rife from this Wonderful Politico. As> 
 
 Firft, \yhether the Sail, o I of Man be on* 
 
 Per/on, and the Manhimfelf Another f 
 
 M 2 Secondly, 
 
8-j- JnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 Secondly, Whether the afferting of the Soul to be a 
 Ptrfon, becaufe it Confiitutesthe Perfon, does not infer lb 
 much, viz. That the Soul is the Perfon that Constitutes, 
 \ nd the Man the Perfon that is Constituted ; unlefs we will 
 lay, That the Soul Constitutes it felfa Perfon ? And then, 
 
 Thirdly, Whether to fay, or aflert this, does not in- 
 fer Two Aiflintt Personalities in the lame Soul, one ill or- 
 der of Nature before the other, viz. That, by which 
 it is it felf formally a Perfon, and that other, which by 
 its Conftituting it felf a I • fbn, is Confitutedznd ctufed 
 by it f 
 
 But fince it is too hard ; Task to drain any one Ab- 
 furdity (efpecially a very great one) fo, as to draw 
 forth and reprefentall its naturally defending Confc- 
 quences, I defire the Author with the utmoft (if Im- 
 partial; ftri&nefs to compare the foregoing Queftions 
 with his own Affertion and to fee, Firft, Whether they 
 do not direftly fpring from it : And next, Whether the 
 Matter couched under the laid Queftions, if drawn out 
 into fb many Pofitive Propofitions, would not afford as 
 many Intolerable Defiances to Common Senfe, Reafbn 
 and Philofbphy. But thus it is, when Men will be Wri- 
 ting at Thirty, and fcarce Thinking till Three (core. 
 
 But to proceed and fhew, That it is noi only the Soul, 
 or Mind of Man which our Authour dignifies with the 
 Name and Nature of a Perfon ; but that he has almoft: 
 as free an hand in making every thing he meets with a 
 Perfon, as K. Charles the Second had m making almoft e^ 
 very Perfon he met with, a Kjiight ; (So that it was ve- 
 ry dangerous for any one who had an Aver/ion to 
 Knighthood, to come in his way, ) our Author, out of 
 he like Over-flowing Communicative Goodncfs and Li- 
 bera-- 
 
Chapter III. 85 
 
 fcerality, is gracioufly pleafed, to take even the Beafii 
 themfelves into the Rank and Order of Perfbns ; in 
 fome imitation, Ifuppofe, of the Difcreet and Humble 
 
 Caligula, fo famous in Hiftory for making his Horfe Con- 
 fuL And fortius, Let us call our Eves upon page 262. 
 where he has theft words, worthy (in fempiternam ret 
 morion) to he wrote in Letters of Gold, A Beafi 
 (fays he) which has no Rational Soul, but only an Animal 
 Life (as a Man has together with an Humane Soul) is x 
 P ;/'<;/, or Suppofitum, or what you will pleafe to call it: 
 pour favour, Good Sir, the Matter is not fo 
 ' ; iov Pt rfon and Suppoftum^rc by nomeans the 
 le Thing; andlpityyou with all my heart, that 
 yon fhould think fo. For any fingle Complete Nature 
 aftually (ubfifting by it felf, is properly a Suppofitum, but 
 not therefore a Per/on. For as Subfjience fuperadded to 
 Native, Conftitutes a Supfofitum, ib Rationality added to 
 Supjpofttality, Conftitutes a Perfon ; which is therefore 
 properly defined Suppofitum Rationale, or Intelligens, as 
 we have fufficiently (hewn already in our Second Chap- 
 ter : So that to call a Beafi a Perfon, is all one as to call 
 it a Rational Brute : Which this Author, who can fb ea- 
 fily reconcile Contradictions, or (which may ierve him 
 as well) fvallow them, may do, if he nleafes ; and fo 
 Hand alone by himfelf in this, as well as (he fays) he had 
 done in fome other Things. But others, who think 
 themfelves obliged to ufc Philofbpliical Terms only as 
 Philofbphers intended them. u,wc not venture to fpeafc 
 thus, for fear An foile rhoul 1 bring an . of Paiie,y 
 
 againft them ; who certainly h; . to break as well 
 
 zsPrifcian, and is a- e, how pati- 
 
 ently fbeve: he has took it to at this Author's 
 
 hands. But togivethe lue, he is not 
 
 ib much a Slave to his word, as to fpeak the fame Thing 
 
 1 
 
8 6 ArumadverfionS) &c. 
 
 in all places of his Book. For, to quote his own Au- 
 thority (though of little value, but when brought a- 
 gainft hirtifelf ) m page 62. of this very Tract, he has 
 theft Words. A Perj'on (fays he) and an Intelligent Sub* 
 Glance are Reciprocal 2 erms. And, are they fb ? Why, 
 how then ccmes a Be aft, in page 269. to be a Perfon ? Is 
 a Beafr an \ gent Subfiance ? Or, can a Beajt be a 
 Perfon, and yet not an Intelligent Subfiance, when lie af- 
 firms, That they are Terms Reciprocal ? If I have not 
 quoted this Author fairly and juftly, let the Advantage 
 be his, and the fhame mine. But if I have, then let all 
 the Learned and Impartial World f which I appeal to) 
 judge, whether one who talks thus Ignorantly and Self- 
 Contradiftioufly about the Nature of a Perfon, be lit to 
 prefcribe to the whole Church New Terms and Mo- 
 dels never heard of before, to explicate the Ptrfom of 
 the Sacred Trinity by. But the Truth is, the diftance 
 between the 69. and the 262. pages, was fb great, and 
 the Contradiftions which paffed within that compafs fb 
 Numerous, that how grofs and bulky fbever this one 
 might be, yet with the help of a little good luck, it 
 might well efcape the Author's Eye in fuch a Crowd. 
 And perhaps, it had been never the worfe luck for 
 the Author Himfelf, if it could as eafily have efcaped 
 the Reader's Eye too. 
 
 And now, tofum up in fhort, the Chief Heads of 
 what has been treated of in this Chapter , i have pro- 
 ved againft this Authour, That Self-Confcioafnefs is not 
 the formal Reafbn of Perfbnality in Created Beings. 
 And that firft by an Argument drawn from the very Na- 
 ture of the Thing ; For that, Self-Confcioi prefup* 
 j^ofes Perfbnality, and therefore cannot be the formal 
 Reafbn of it. As alfb from two Notable Inftances, 
 One of the Humanity, or Humane Nature of Chrift. 
 
 The 
 
Chapter III. Sy 
 
 The other of the Soul o! a its ftatc of Separation 
 
 from tl : Both of which i have lliiwn to I 
 
 of all the Internal Afts, Motions 
 d raflions refpe&ively belonging to each of them; 
 
 were, neither of them, Perfons. And 
 
 .I", I have, by clear, and folic! 
 
 Realbns overthrown the pretended Perfbnality of the 
 
 Soul,both i f Conjun&ion with the Boay^and of 
 
 junftion from it; which in both i by this 
 
 thor, \amined his Abliira Un- 
 
 phiJ ions about thefe Mat! in one 
 
 whereof, he aicribes a Perfbnalit even to - . 
 
 (elves. By all which, it is but too maj is 
 
 Affuming big-talking Man, that, as loftily as he carries 
 
 it, vet iii very Deed and Truth he does not underftand 
 
 what thofe Terms Sitppofitum and Subfisience, Per/on and 
 
 Perjbfiatit) mean. So fit is he (as I have laid) to feat 
 
 of the Divine Per fans of the God-bead ; whom yet he has 
 
 made fb bold with. 
 
 And here I fhould judge it high time to conclude this 
 Chapter ; but that, methinks, it is pity to leave this 
 line Trim Notion of Self-Confcioufnefs fo ; without ta- 
 king a little further View of the Curious Artifice and 
 admirable Contrivance of fb rare a production. For 
 it were not fuch, could this Authour vaunt of it at fiich 
 a rate as he does, pleafing liimfelf, and proclaiming his 
 'Evpn^, euprntp,, as upon, an Invention (forfboth) 
 which all Antiquitv before him could never yet reach 
 to ? 
 
 I clearly and plainly amongll 
 Friends, filch a C 
 
 pe&ation aiiially pro ' thcie Pom 
 
 Shews, and Gloriole 
 
 L'o/.fcto/ifnejs, ufhered in with twenty Encom (al 
 
 •'0 
 
8 8 Animacherffons^ &c. 
 
 teaft) like fo many Heralds, or Tip-ftaves, or (rather) 
 Yeomen of thi Guard marching before it; yet, in Truth, 
 after all this noife, it is, /like an Owl ftripp'd of 
 its Feathers; but a very Mean, Meagre, Ordinary 
 Thing ; being, in down-right Terms, neither more 
 nor lels than only one Property of a Rational, or Intelligent 
 Being ; bv vcrtue whereof, the Soul is fas the Schools 
 exprefs it) Supra fe Refiexiva, that is to fay, Able by 
 a Reflex Act of Knowledge, intimately to know and 
 confider it (elf, and its own Being, together with its own 
 Acts, Motions, and Operations. This is the Sum To- 
 tal of the Matter, and all that Self-Confcioufnefs is, or 
 can truly pretend to be* 
 
 And, (which is yet a further Diminution to it) as 
 poor and mean a Notion as it is, it is Borrowed too. But 
 you will fay, From whom ? Why ? Even from Ho- 
 neft Des ^Cartes, and his Cogito ergo fum. Only with 
 this unhappy difference in the Application of it, That 
 this Proposition, which Des Cartes fays as the Bafis and 
 Ground-work of his Philofbphy, our Author places with 
 its Heels upwards in his Divinity. For whereas Des 
 Cartes mutts upon Cogitation, only to prove and infer 
 Being, as one would prove a Caufefrom its Effefts, or 
 rather an Antecedent from its Consequent : our Author 
 on the contrary, makes Cogitation the very Caufe and 
 Principle of Being and Subfiftence, by making it the 
 formal Conftitucnt Rcafonof Perfbnality in the Perfbn 
 who Thinks, or Reflects ; than which nothing can be 
 morefalfe, and ridiculous. 
 
 And tins, according to the Trueft, and .moft Philofb- 
 phical Account of the Thing, is the very utmoft which 
 this New, and fb much bragg'd of Notion amounts to. 
 And I do hereupon Challenge this Author to prove theft 
 two 'Filings if lie can, 
 
 Rrfli 
 
Chapter III. $9 
 
 Firft, That the Self-Confcioufnefs hitherto fpoken of 
 
 by him is any Tiling more than a bare Property of an 
 Intelligent Being, whereby it reflects upon it lelf, and 
 its own Thoughts and Afhon 
 
 And in the next -place, Thatfucha Property does, or 
 can Cbnftitute the Being or Nature which it flows from, 
 and belongs to, properly a Perfon. 
 
 Thefe two things, I fay, I call upon him to prove; 
 and if he does not by dint of . nt make them good, 
 
 he expoles a poor, fencelefs, infant Hypothefis to the 
 wide World, and then very unmercifully leaves it to 
 fhift for it (elf; In line, I cannot but again and again 
 own my Amazement at the Confidence of fbme bold 
 prefiiming Men, who fet up for Enlightners of the 
 Church, and new Modellers of Divinity in the ftrengtb 
 of fbme odd upftart Notions, which yet are not able to 
 acquit, orfiipport themfelves ufon^ and much lefsagawft 
 the very firft Elements and Principles of a long tryed, 
 and never yet baffled Philofbplw. 
 
 N CHAP 
 
po Animadverjfom'i Sec. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 In which U proved againft thus Author, That neither 
 is Self-Con fcioufnefs the formal Reafon of 
 Perfonality in the three Perfons of the Bleffdd 
 Trinity ; nor Mutual-Confcioufnefs the Rea- 
 fon of their Vnity in one and the fame Na- 
 ture. 
 
 TTAving thus examined, and ( as I think ) over- 
 Xjl throw 11 0llr Author's Notion of 'Self "-Cot. 'fcioufnefs, 
 with reference to Created and Finite Perfons , f fhall 
 now proceed to the Confideration of what he fays of it 
 with reference to the three Perfons in the Glorious God- 
 head. And this I fhall do under thefe following 
 Heads, which fhall be the Subjefts of five diftinft 
 Chapters. As, 
 
 Firft, I fhall treat of his two new Notions, viz. of 
 Self-Confcioufnefs, and ]\ Lit ual-Confciou fief, and fhew, 
 That Self-Confcioufnefs is not the formal Reafon of Perfo- 
 nality in the three Divine Perfons^ nor Mutual+Confciouf 
 
 nefs the Reafon of their Unity in one and the fame Na- 
 ture. And this we have here allotted for the bufinefs 
 and Subjeft of this 4th Chapter. 
 
 oiidly, I fhall prove, That the Three Divine Per* 
 
 > of the Godhead, arc nor Three Diflmct, Infinite 
 ■///...., or Spirits, in the 5th Chapter. 
 
 Thin3 
 
Chapter IV. 9 1 
 
 Thirdly, I fhall Confidcr, what this Author pretends 
 to from the Authority of the , in 
 
 behalf of his New invented Hypothecs, and fhew, That 
 they (peak nothing at all for it, or towards it: And this 
 fhall make the 6th and 7th Chapters. 
 
 Fourthly, I fhall fet down the Ancient and generally 
 received Doctrine of the Church and Schools concerning 
 the Article of the Trinity, and Vindicate it from this 
 Author's Exceptions, in the 8th Chapter. 
 
 And when I fhall have difcuffed and gone over thefe 
 Particulars, I cannot imagine what can be found Confi- 
 derable in this his Book (fb jfar as T have undertook it) 
 but what will have received hereby a full and fufficient 
 Anfwer. 
 
 Though, when all is done, I confefs I have fbme fur- 
 ther Complements to make to this Author upon fbme 0- 
 ther Accounts (though Hill occafioned by this Work of 
 his) which, I fhoukl be extremely wanting both to him 
 and the Caufe now before me, Jhould I not, with all 
 due Addrefs, pafs upon him. And this will add three 
 or four Chapters more to the former, and fb conch 
 this Work. 
 
 And'Firft, To begin with the firft of thefe, I fhall' 
 endeavour to prove, That Self-Confcioufnefs is not . 
 formal Reafon of Perfonality in the Three Divine Per- 
 fons. 
 
 In order to which, I fhall prciiL Jay down 
 
 thefe following Confederations* 
 
 Confederation 1 . That although the Di\ . * 
 be one Pure, Simple, Indi our Con 
 
 N cc 1 
 
9 2 AnimadverfionS) Sec. 
 
 ceptions of it (which arc always inadequate to it) there 
 is a Natural Order of Prius and Pofteriw founded in the 
 Univerfal Reafon of Things (according to which, the 
 Conception of one Thing prefiippofes, and depends 
 upon the Conception of another) which, though it can 
 make no Prim and PoBerim in the Divine Nature, vet is 
 
 7 J 
 
 by no means to be contradicted, or confounded in our 
 difcourfing of God; forafmuch as without our admit- 
 ting this Rule it is impoflible for any Humane Under- 
 ftanding either to Conceive, or Difcourfe confidently, 
 or intelligibly of Him at all. 
 
 Confideration 2. (Which, I think, affords us a Pviilc 
 lafely and univerfally to be relied upon) is this, That 
 in Things having a dependence between them, where 
 we may form to our felves a clear and diftinfl: Conce- 
 ption of one Thing, without implying, or involving in 
 it the Conception of any other Thing, there that Thing 
 is in Order of Nature precedent to all thofe Things 
 which are not ellentially included in the Conception of 
 it. Thus, for inftance, we may have a clear and di- 
 ftinft Conception of Entity and Being, and of Vnity too, 
 without entertaining in our Mind, at the fame time, any 
 Notion, or Conception of know/edge at all ; and there- 
 fore the Rat/o Entitativa of any Thing mud: needs in 
 Nature precede the Ratio Cognitive or rather Cognofcibi- 
 lis of the fame. 
 
 Confideration 3. We mud diftinguifh between the 
 Affections, or Modes of Being (as they are ftri&Iy ib 
 called) and between the Attributes of it. The firft fort 
 are reckoned of the fame Order with Being it lelf, and 
 ib precede whatfoever is confequent upon it, as the At- 
 tributes of it ai\: accounted to be; which relate to the 
 
 Being 
 
Chapter IV. 5? 3 
 
 Being or Subjeft tl slongto, as tilings in Order of 
 Nature / ; ro it. Accordingly in the firft rank 
 
 are Exijhnce , Subfijtence, Vex ■;, &c. and in t 
 
 cond arc all Afts iffuing from S (b Sub- 
 
 fifting; whether they be of Knowledge, Volition, Power, 
 Dt 6r the like : The D*a ms derived from 
 
 which, are properly called Attributes. 
 
 n 4. Though there can be no Accident-; 
 inhering in God, yet there may be Accidental Predicati- 
 ons belonging to him. Ana I call thole Accidental, 
 which are not Neceffary, or Ejfential. Such as are all 
 Ext rin fecal Denominations of him founded on fiich Afts 
 of God, as were perfectly free for him to do, or not to 
 do ; nothing in the Divine Nature obliging him thereto. 
 Of which number are the Denominations, or Predicates 
 of Creatour, Redeemer, and the like : Since there was 
 nothing in God that made it neceffary for him to be fo. 
 
 Confederation 5. When the Terms [Caufe, For. 
 Reafon, Confiituent^ cr productive Principle, and the like] 
 are ufed about the Divine Nature, and Perfons, they are 
 not to be undcrftood as applicable to them in the ftri£fc 
 and proper fignification of the laid Terms, but only by 
 way of Analogy ; as really meaning no more than a Can* 
 lal, or Neceffary Dependence of one Notion, or ( 
 ceptus objectives upon another ; fo that it is impoflible 
 for the Mind to Conceive diftinftly of the one, but as 
 depending upon, or proceeding from theoth 
 
 Confederation 6. That the Divine Nature may with 
 
 all fair Accord to the Rules of Divinity and PhiJofbp] 
 be Confidered as Prefcinding, or Ab fir oiling (though not 
 as divided) from the Divine Perfons. 
 
 Confid 
 
(?4- . Animadverjions, &c. 
 
 Got 'on 7. That whatfbever is EfTentially in- 
 
 cluded in the Divine Nature thus Confidered, is equal- 
 ly Common and Communicable to all the Divine Per- 
 fons. 
 
 Conflagration 8. That whatfbever is the proper For- 
 mal Reafon of Perfonality, is utterly Incommunicable to 
 any Thing, or Per [on beyond, or befide the Perfon to 
 whom it belongs. 
 
 Confederation 9. That for any Abfblute Perfection ef- 
 lentially included,or implyed in the Divine Nature to be 
 multiplyed in the Three Perfons belonging to it, is a mani- 
 feft Multiplication of the Divine Nature it felf in the 
 laid Perfons. By which we are given to underftand the 
 difference between the Multiplication, and the Communi- 
 cation of the Divine Nature to thofe Perfons. 
 
 Thefe Rules, I thought fit to draw up and lay down 
 before-hand, in order to the ufe which we fhall have of 
 them in the enfuing Difputation. 
 
 And fb I proceed to my Arguments againft this Au- 
 thor's New Notion of Self -Con fcwufnefs, with reference 
 to the Perfons of the Blejfed Trinity. And the Firft is 
 This : 
 
 Argument I. No Perfonal Ad: can be the formal Rea- 
 fon of Perfonality in the Perfon, whole Aft it is. But 
 Self-Confcioufnefs is a Perfonal Aft , and therefore Self- 
 Confcic:if//cfs cannot be the formal Reafon of Perfonality 
 in the Per fen, whole Aft it is, and to whom per (anally it 
 belongs. The Minor, I fuppofe, neither our Author 
 Himfclf, nor any one elfe, can deny. For if Self-Con- 
 
 jClOllfr I 
 
Chapter IV. <? 5 
 
 xl Aft, let anyoneaffign what 
 
 nlyan .' 
 
 ofKno- m- 
 
 rhp 
 
 • Propofition the \ istobeproved 
 
 \l Act can be die forma] Reafbn 
 in the I ift it is. And I prove it thus : 1 
 
 mal Realbn of every Thing, is in order of N be- 
 
 - the Thing of which it is the formal Reafbn ; but no 
 xl Aft is, in order of Nat fore the Perfo 
 
 • )fe Ac in- 
 
 formal Reafbn of his J . The Major 
 
 lent. And as for the Minor , That no Perph 
 ASt is before the Perfondity of the Perfon whofe . 
 - i alio is manifelt ; Becaufe fiicli an Aft cannot 
 be before the Perfon himfelf , and therefore not before 
 his Perfondity : For as much as his Perfondity is that by 
 which he is formally a Perfon; fb that it is impoflible to 
 be t the one without being before the other too. 
 
 An\ now, that it cannot be before the Perfon himfelf, is 
 manifelt from hence, that as every P. Aft in ge- 
 
 neral bears a Relation of Pofieriority to the Perfon to 
 whom it belongs, as to the Caufe or Productive Princi- 
 ple of all the Acts proceeding from Him; fb this parti- 
 cular Aft of Self*ConfcioufnefS) bears a Treble Relation 
 of Pofieriority to the Perfon whofe Aft it is, viz. as to 
 the Agent or Principle producing it. 2. As to the 
 
 Recipient of it, and fuftaining it. And Thirdly and 
 Laftly, As to the Objetf which it is terminated to. All 
 ch Refpefl tains, not barely as it i but 
 
 partly as it is an Jm t Acf and partly 
 
 .' 
 
 In the fir ft place therefore, every Perfon fcx 
 ;nt, or Productive Caufe of all the 
 
96 Animadver lions ) Sec. 
 
 ing from Him, he muft upon that Account, in Order of 
 Nature, precede-the (aid Afts \ and confequently every 
 Divine Per [on mult in Nature be before that Aft of Self 
 • '}, which perfona/ly belongs to him. And more- 
 over fincc it is likewifean Immanent Aft, it relates to 
 him, as the Subject in which it is, as well as the Caufe from 
 which it is, and upon that Account alfb, muft bear a Na- 
 il Pofteriority to Him. And then laftly, as it is alfo 
 a Reflex Jet, by which the P erf on knows himfelf to be 
 a P erf on j and is Confcious to Himfelf, what he is, and 
 what he does, it terminates upon him as its Objeft alio* 
 So that the Caufe, the Subject, and the Object of this Aft 
 being the fame Perfon, in this laft refpeft, no left than 
 in the two former, it bears another and third Relation 
 of Poferiority to Him ; fince every Aft, not produftive 
 of fbmething befides, and without the Agent, is in 
 Order of Nature Pofierior to the Object it terminates 
 upon. 
 
 From all which I conclude, That that Aft of Self- 
 Confcioufnefs, by which each Divine Perfon knows, or is 
 Confciom to Himfelf of his own. Perfonality, cannot be 
 the Formal Reafon of the laid Perfonality, without being,, 
 in Order of Nature, both before it, and after it too, viz. 
 Before it, as it is the Formal Reafon of it, and jet Poste- 
 rior to it, as it is an Aft proceeding from, lodged and re- 
 ceived in, and laftly, Terminated upon the fame Perfon. 
 
 All which is fb very plain, that hardly can any Thing 
 be plainer : And indeed, the very word SelfConfciouf- 
 nefs contradifts and overthrows its being the ground, or 
 rmal Reafon of Perfonality. For ftili Self muft be 
 before Confcioufnefs ; and Self imports Perfonality ; as 
 being that, by which a Perfon is laid to be, what he is ; 
 am! they both ftand united in this one Word, as the Act 
 and the Object, and therefore Confcioufnefs cannot be the 
 
 Reafon. 
 
Chapter. IV. yj 
 
 Reafonofit* Ortoexprefs the fan other 
 
 Terms, Self-Subfiftence muft precede ' 
 and Self-Szhfiftence here implys P. 
 fore Personality, upon the fame Account, muft in N 
 ture precede SelfA ft, and confequently cannot 
 
 be the formal 1 ' , or Refult of it. For, fi ;c- 
 
 cording to the moft EiTential Order of Things, a I 
 w//// £*? h'/a^ /;? //, before he can know what t. 
 
 And this Argument, I con fe is, being fi , upon 
 
 the Priority of Subfiftence to all Acts, and particularly to 
 thole of h ] every Pet nfciotis, does, 
 
 and muft Univenally run through all Inftances, in which 
 PerfonalityandSe/f-Confcioufnefs, with reference to one 
 another, come to be treated of. And as it afft If. 
 
 Confcioufnefs, fo it will equally take place in M on- 
 
 fcioufitefs too. 
 
 What Allowances are to be here made for the abfb- 
 lute Simplicity? Eternity, and Pure Actuality of the Di- 
 17/. . (when thefe Notions are ap- 
 
 plyed to them) we have already obferved, in the firft 
 of thole Preliminary Confide tioned in this 
 
 Chapter. The proper ufe and defign of all which No- 
 tions, is to lead, guide, and direct our Apprehenfions 
 about that Great Object, fo much too big for our Nar- 
 row Faculties ; lb that tatradifts the Natu- 
 ral Order of thefe Ap] tight upon no grond 
 of Reafbn to be admitted in our Difcoi of the Di- 
 * Nature, how much ioever it may and does tran- 
 fcend the laid Apprehen/ions. And this muft be allow- 
 ed us, or we muft fink under the vaft DKproportion of 
 the thing before us, and not difcourfe of it at all. For 
 I cannot think, that the Word i fs has 
 brouglit the Deity one )Ot lower to us, or raifed our 
 Underftandings one degree higher and nearer to that. 
 
 O 
 
98 Animadvcrfwm, Sec. 
 
 Argument II. My Second Argument againft Self Con- 
 fcioufnefs being the Formal Reafon of Perfonality in the 
 Divine Perfons, is this : Nothing in the Nature of it 
 Abfolute and Irrelative can be the Formal Re afon of Per- 
 finality in the Perfons of the Bleffed Trinity ; but Self- 
 Confcioufnefs is in the Nature of it Abfolute and Irrelative ; 
 and therefore it cannot be the Reafbn of ferfo'nality in 
 any of the faid Perfons. 
 
 Now the Major Propofition is proved thus. Nothing 
 in the Nature of it Abfolute can be the Fonnal Reafon 
 of any Thing in the Nature of it purely and perfealy 
 Relative. But the Perfonality of every one of the Di- 
 vine Perfons is purely and perfectly Relative ; and there- 
 fore Nothing Abfolute can be the Formal Conftituent 
 Reafon of their Perfonality. The Major of which Syl- 
 Icgifm is alfomanifeft. For Things EiTentially different, 
 and thereby uncapable of being affirmed of one another, 
 cannot poffibly be the Formal Reafon of one another. And, 
 that the Perfons in the Bleffed Trinity are purely Relative 
 to one another, and confequently, that their Perfbnali- 
 ties are fb many Relations , is no lefs evident from this, 
 That Two of them relate to one another , as Father and 
 Son y and the Third to Both , as proceeding from Both ; 
 and it is impoffible for one Thing to proceed from ano- 
 ther, efpecially by a Continual Aft of Proceffion, with- 
 out Importing a Relation to that from which it fb pro- 
 ceeds ; fb that the very ferfonal Subfijlence of thefe Per- 
 fons implys and carries in it a Formal Relation. For 
 the Father Subfifts perfbnaliy as a Father, by that Eter- 
 nal Communication of Ills Nature to his Son ; which 
 Act, as proceeding from him, is called Generation, and 
 renders him Formally a Father, and as Terminated in 
 the Son, is called Filiation, and Conftitutes him For- 
 mally 
 
Chapte r IV. 99 
 
 maity a Son; and in like manner the Holy Gholt Sub- 
 flits peribnally by that Aft of Proccjjion, by which h 
 proceeds from, and relates to both the Father and the 
 Son. So that, that proper Mode of Suhfifience (by which 
 
 in Conjunction with the Divine Effence always included 
 in it, each of them is rendred a Perjon) is wholly Rela- 
 tive, and fo belongs to one of them, that it alfb bears a 
 Ncccflary reference to another. From all which, it 
 undeniably follows, That the Three Perfons in the Mif- 
 fed Trinity, are in the Formal Conftitution of them Re- 
 lative to one another ; and confequently, That the 
 Three Perfondities, by which they become Formally 
 Three Perfons, and are fo denominated, are Three Eter- 
 nal Relations. 
 
 But now, for the Minor Proposition in the firft Syllo- 
 gifin, viz. That SelfConJcioufneJs is a Thing in the Na- 
 ture of it Ab folate and Irrelative, that,T think,can need but 
 little Proof; it being that Aft by which each Perfon in- 
 timately knows, and is c us to Iiimfelf of ills own 
 Being, Acts, Motion^ and every Tiling perfon ally be- 
 longing to liim ; ib that, as fuch, it terminates within, 
 and looks no further than that on e Perfon, whom it is an 
 Entire Survey and Comprehenfion of. And as it is an 
 Abfolute and Irrelative Term, lb it may be Conceived di- 
 ftinftly and fully without Conceiving, or implying the 
 Conception of any Thing, or Perfon befides. And 
 now, what Relation does or can fiich an Aft of Self- 
 Confcioufnefs imply in it ? It is indeed on the contrary, 
 a direct Contradiction to all that is Relative. For it 
 inclofes the Perfon wholly within himfelf; neither 
 pointing nor looking further, nor referring to any one 
 elfe. 
 
 2 If 
 
ioo Animacherjtons') &c. 
 
 If it be here faid, That each Perfon, by an Aft of 
 Self Con fcioufnefs, intimately knows the Relation which 
 he ft and s in to the other Two Perfons. 
 
 To this, I Anfwer Two Things. 
 
 i . That to know a Thing or Perfon to be Relative, or 
 to be Confcious of the Relation belonging to it or him, 
 does not make that Aft of Knowledge to be either a 
 Relation, or of a Relative Nature. 
 
 2. I Anfwer , That this very Thing proves SeifCon- 
 fcioufnefs not to be the Conftituent Reafbn of P erj 'onality. 
 For, if the Father knows himfelf to be a Father by an 
 Aft of Self-Confciottfnefs, it is evident, That Self-Confci- 
 oufnefs did not make him fo : but that he was a Father, 
 and had the Relation of a Father, and thereby a Perfo- 
 nality belonging to him as fuch, in Order of Nature An- 
 tecedent to this Aft of SelfConfcioufnefs ; and therefore 
 that this Self-Confcioufnefs cannot be the Reafbn of the 
 Relation,nor of the P erj onality implyed in it. Forafinuch 
 as it is in feveral refpefts Pofterior to the Ferfbn whom 
 it belongs to,as in the foregoing Argument we have abun- 
 dantly fhewn. 
 
 But to take a particular and diftinft Account of this 
 Notion,, in the feveral Perfons of the Trinity ; Does 
 the Far her become a father by being Confcious to himfelf jj 
 that he is fb, or rather by that Aft by which he Com- 
 municates his Nature to,' and thereby generates a Son ? 
 Or docs the Son's Relation to the Father confift in his be- 
 ing ConfaoM to himfelf of this Relation r Or Laftly, 
 does the Holy Ghoft proceed from the Father and the Son, 
 and foperfonally relate to both by that Aft of Self-Confci- 
 
 frefs, by which he is Confcious to himfelf of this Pro- 
 
 j'lcn •' All this is Abfurd, ''Unnatural, and lmpojfible. Foi 
 
 no 
 
C H A P T E R IV. I O I 
 
 noPerfon is related toanother by that Aft of Self-Con- 
 
 />, by \\ hich he Knows and reflects Perfonally up- 
 on himielf. And vet it is certain, That to be a Father, is 
 a Relative ! and to be a Son depending upon 
 
 the Father by an Eternal A£fc of Generation perpetu- 
 ally begetting him, is alio to have a Reh iubjiftence ; 
 andLaftly, to be El 'an Ally proceeding from Both, as the 
 HolyGholt is, mud likewife import a IV Ay or Mode of 
 SubfiftinQ Altogether as Relative as the Two former. In 
 which threeways of Subfittence confift the Perfbnalities 
 of the Three Perfbns refpe&ively ; and upon thefe «S 
 Confcioufnefs can have no Conftituting Influence at all \ 
 as being an A£l quite of another Nature ; to wit, Abfo- 
 luteand Irrelative , and refting wholly within thePeribn, 
 whom it belongs to. 
 
 From all which, I conclude, That SelfConfcioufnefs 
 neither is, nor can be the Formal Reafon of 1 '/ty 
 
 in the Three Perfons of the BleJJ'ed Trinity. And this 
 Argument I take to have the force and clearnefs of a De- 
 mon sir At ion. 
 
 Argument HI. The Third Argument is this. If Self 
 Confcioufnefs be the Formal ReAfon of Perfondity in : 
 Three Divine Perfons, then there is no Repugnancy in 
 the Nature and Reafon of the Thing it felf, but that there 
 might be Three Thoufand Perfons in the Deity as well 
 as Three. But this is Abfurd, and therefore Co muil 
 that be likewife from which it follows/The Confequcnce 
 appears from this, That there is no Repugnancy but 
 
 i there might be lb many SetfConfcioufi 
 Con) tout Minds or s, for the Deity to Communicate 
 
 it (elf to : And therefore, if Self Confcioufnefs be the 
 Formal Reafon of Perfanality, there is no Repugnancy, 
 but that there might be Three Thouiand Ferfons in the 
 .1 head, asweflasThi Tl 
 
i o z JnimadverjionSy &c. 
 
 The Propofition is proved thus. Becaufe this Repug- 
 nancy (if there be any) muft be either from the. iVa- 
 ture of Sdf-Confcionfmfs, in the feveral Self-Confciom 
 Minds or Spirits it belongs to, or from the Nature of the 
 God-he Ad, which is to be Communicated to them. But 
 it is from neither of them, For 
 
 Firft,there is nothing in the N'dtuveofSelf-Confcioufnefs 
 to hinder its Multiplication into never fb great a Num- 
 ber of Particulars ; but that there may be Three Thou- 
 fand, or Three Millions of Self-Corfcions Minds or Spi- 
 rits ps well as Three. Nor, in the next placets there any 
 Repugnancy on the Part of the God-head, That Three 
 7 houfand Self-Confcious Spirits fhould fubfift in it any 
 more than that Three fhould: For the Godhead considered 
 precifely and abftra&edly in it felf (and not as actually 
 included in any Perfbn) is as able to Communicate it 
 felf to the greateft Number as to the fmalleft. 
 
 If it be here faid, That the Three Perfons are not on- 
 ly Three Self-Confctons Spirits , but alio Three di- 
 rt inct Infinite Self-Confcious Spirits ( as our Authour 
 fays they are, and of which, more in the next Chapter.) 
 I Anfwer, That there may be as well Three Thoufand 
 diftin£t Infinite Spirits as Three. For Infinity is as much 
 mconfiftent with the lea ft Plurality of Infinites, as with 
 the greateft ; and therefore if it be no Repugnancy, that 
 there fhould be Three diftin£l Infinite 71 linds, neither is 
 there that there fhould be Three Thoufand. So that if 
 Self-Confcioufnefs be the Formal Reafon of Perfonalitj, 
 there appears no Repugnancy cither from the Nature of 
 Self-Confcioufnefs, or the Number of the Spirits endued 
 u ith it, nor from the [fuppofed] Infinity of the laid 
 Spirits, no nor yet from the Nature of the God-head it 
 felf, but that there might be Three Thoufand Per fori s in 
 it as well as Three. 
 
 But 
 
HAPTEIl IV. I O ^ 
 
 But how then comes there to be only Three ? 
 upon thefe grounds no other Reafbn can be affigned 
 it, but only that it was God's free Determination that 
 there fhould be Three and no more. And then the 7W- 
 mty of fvr font mull be an EtfecT: of God\ Will, and not 
 a Necellary Condition of the Divine Nature ; and the 
 further Confequenee of this mult be, that the three Per- 
 fons are Three Created Beings , as proceeding from the 
 free Refults of God's Will , by vertue whereof they 
 equally might, or might not have been. 
 
 But on the contrary our Author himfelf holds Page 
 129. line 1 j. That the Three Persons arc Effential to the 
 Divine Nature, and fb Eifential to it, that they nccef- 
 farily belong to it in this number , and can be mi} 
 more nor fewer than Three. And if this be fb, I am 
 fiire it is a Contradiction that it fhould be otherwife : for 
 it is a Contradiction, that that fhould not be, which ne- 
 ccilarily is, and cannot but be. But now I have proved, 
 that there is no Repugnancy or Contradiction to the Na- 
 ture of Tilings confklered barely according to their Na- 
 ture, that three thoufand Self-Conjcious Minds or Spirits 
 fhould fubfift in the Godhead any more than that three 
 fiich Spirits fhould fb fubfift. And therefore if it be Ab- 
 fiird, and ImpofTible , (as undoubtedly it is) that lb 
 many Perfons fhould belong to the Divine Nature , then 
 muft the Reafbn of this Abfurdity be fetched from (bme 
 other Thing, than either from SelfiConfcioufoefs, with 
 reference to the Divine Nature, or from the />:. 
 Nature, ( confklered in it felf abftrackdly from all 
 Aftual Perfonalitj : ) for theie, as we have ihewn. 
 afford no (ufficient Proof of this Abfurdity. And 
 therefore, I lay, fbme other Renfan muft be found 
 out, and affigned againft it. And accordingly, let this 
 Author produce fiich an one (whatsoever it be) as fhall 
 
 folidh 
 
1 04- AnimadverftonSy &c. 
 
 fblidly and conclufively prove, That there cannot be 
 Three Thoufand Self-Confciou* Perfons belonging to the 
 Godhead, and that from the Nature of the Thing it feif 
 (as feveral fiich Reafons may be brought) and I will un- 
 dertake to him to prove , by the very fame Reafon and 
 Argument as Conclufively, That SelfConfcioufnefs is not, 
 cannot be the Formal Reafon of Perfonality in the Three 
 Divine Perfons of the Trinity, In the mean time, by 
 that kind of Arguing, which is called Deduciio ad Ab- 
 furdum , I have fufficiently difproved it, by fhewing 
 what an Intolerable Abfurdity niuft follow the Afferting- 
 it. 
 
 Argument IV. The Fourth and Laft Argument fhall 
 proceed thus. If Three diftinft SelfConfcioufnejfes For- 
 mally Conflitute Three diftinft Perfonalities,ihen Three 
 diftinft Self-Complacencies will Conflitute Three diftin£t 
 Perfonalities too. But our Author, I fuppofe, will not 
 allow of the latter, and therefore neither ought he to af- 
 lert the former. 
 
 The Confequence is plain. Becaufe there is no Rea- 
 fon alleagable (according to our Author's HypothefisJ 
 why Self Complacency may not found a Personality as 
 well as SelfConfcioufnefs. 
 
 For they are both of them equally diftinct Tntt 
 A£ts in the Perion whom they belong to ; and as to the 
 Formal Fffeft of each, an Aft of Self-Complacency feems 
 to have the Preheminence \ fince it is a greater Perfefl ion 
 to be United to an Infinite Good, that is, to the Deity, by 
 way of Love and. Adhefwn, than barely by way of know- 
 ledge and Intelle&ion. And Self-Complacency is the for- 
 mer, whereas Self-Confcioufnefs riles no higher than the 
 latter. And consequently fince Self-Complacency is the 
 more pcricciiye Aft of the two (knowledge of good 
 
 being 
 
C H A P T e n IV. I c 5 
 
 being ftill in order to the Love of it) and fmcc withal! 
 
 Perjonality is the moflrperfeft way of Subfifting^ which 
 any Nature is capable of, it fcems moft rational to derive 
 the perfefteft way of £ to an Intelli- 
 
 gent Bemgyfrom the moft Perfeftive Aft of that Brag ; if 
 from any AH at all. 
 
 And now if this Author fiiould Objeft, That v , 
 
 in Order of Nature Subiequent to Self* 
 Conjcioufnefs ' 7 and fb, that tin _• cannot be the lame 
 ground to make it the V (rmi.il Re tfon o\ " ality, that 
 there is, to maJseSelfCoi isi'o. 
 
 IAnfwer, That, according to my Principle, where- 
 by I deny SelfConfcioufnefs to be the Reafon of Perfona- 
 lit), becaulc it is poifnate to Self Sub ft fence, it is, indeed, 
 a good Reafbn ; "but according to our Author's Hypo- 
 thefis, it is none at all. For if the Priority of Self Sub- 
 fiftence to SelfConfcioufnefs (according to him) hinders 
 not but that SelfConfcioufnefs may nevertheless be the 
 Principle ov Reafon of Perfonality, why fiiould the pre- 
 cedency?of Self-Confa to Self-ComfUcency^ hinder 
 
 SelfComfUcency from being as proper a Reafbn or Princ i 
 pie to found Per tonality upon, as the other. 
 
 All this Ialledgeonly as an Argument ad Hvrmnem) 
 and defire this Author to confider, if -any one fiiould 
 borrow fbme of that Boldnefs of him, by which he dif 
 lents from all Antiquity, and confidently averr, That 
 Self-Complacency U the Proper forma! oj Pi rfonali- 
 
 ty in each and every one of the Divine PerjonsJL would ha\ 
 him, I fay, connder by what Reafon or Argument, 
 confident with his New Opinion he could Confute this 
 other New Ailertion. 
 
 For my own part, fince I think as much may be 1 
 for the one as for the other, I am ready to let up for 
 Self Complacency againii: his SelfConfcioufnefs, when he 
 
 P pie 
 
i oo AntmadverJtom 9 Sec, 
 
 pleafes ; and will undertake to give as good Reafons for 
 my Notion, as he can for his, and perhaps better; Jet 
 him begin and enter into the Difpute, as fbon as he will. 
 And as I fhall oppofe my Self-Complacency to Ins Self-Con- 
 ic/, fo I mail find out a Mutual-Cow;-. roVye 
 ttal-Confcioufnefs too. And if any one 
 fhould here Object, Thatthisand the like Difputes are 
 of that Nature, that the World is not like to be much 
 Edified by them ; I, perhaps, think fb as much as he : 
 But that is no great matter;fmce our Author is of fb very 
 Benign a Temper, That he does not always Write o 
 for the Readers Edification, but fbmetimes for his Dh 
 fion too. 
 
 Having thus given my Reafons againft this Author's 
 New Notion of Self-Confaoufnefs, both with reference 
 toPerfbns Create and Uncreate, and proved, That it 
 neither is, nor can be the Formal Rcafion of Perfon.:. 
 in either of them : I fhall now pafs to his other New 
 Notion of Mutual-Confcioufnefs, whereby thofe Perfons, 
 who w r ere diftinguifhed from one another by their re- 
 fpe&ive Self-Confcioufnejjes , are United and made one in 
 Nature by vertue of this Mutnal-Confaoufnefs. Con- 
 cerning which Notion alfo, I muft profefs my felf in the 
 number of thofe who are by no means fatisfied with it, 
 as of any fuch peculiar Efficacy to the ufeand purpofeit 
 is here brought for. 
 
 And there are fufficient Reafons againft: it. In giving 
 of which, as I muft acknowledge, That that one Co n- 
 fidcration of the Priority of Being (whether Effentially, 
 or Perfonally confidered) together with the firft Modes 
 and Affections of it, to any ACl of Knowledge Attributa- 
 ble to the faid Beixg, is the Fundamental Principle upon 
 which I impugn this Author's New Hypothecs; fb it ■ 
 does and muft (as I have noted) run through all, or 
 
 Confci- 
 
Cm ap i E r IV. i oy 
 
 moft of the parts of this Deputation, both abov: 
 Con ' too. 
 
 ■ 
 
 Argum ' | KjkmL 
 
 of an U nit\' \ >f Nature in the Per jo,: • of the Ble ff\ d I ru 
 : .- ikit am A 6t of Mat ud-Confcioufh 
 re; Aiv • ire no Aft of MatiuU^Confik n 
 
 be t hi of an Unity of Nature in the Three 
 
 Perfons. The -Major I prove thus, E - 
 fappofes t!ie Unity of a Tiling, 01 
 
 im which that Act flows, as Antecedent to :,. 
 therefore cannot be the Formal Rtajon of the (aid Bet; 
 For ftill I affirm, that Being, and confequentlv Lb i 
 Being (which is the firft Affection of it) mult in Order 
 of Nature precede I^nowLdgc, and all other the like At- 
 tributes of Being, And if fb, no Attribute Sublequenr 
 to a Thing, can be the Formal Reafon of that Thing, 
 which it is thus, in Order of Nature, Subfequent to. 
 For neither can Onmifcienoe it felf (one of the greatefr. 
 and moft acknowledged Attributes of the Divine Na* 
 turt) be laid to be the Realbn either of me Being, or of 
 the Unify of the faid Nature : And therefore neither can 
 any Act of Kjw.vledge whatsoever be fb. This is nay firft 
 Argument, which I think fufficient fairly to propofe, 
 without any farther Amplification. 
 
 II. If Unity of Nature u 
 Ptrfons betheCaufc, Realbn, or Principle o. 
 
 fs in the (aid Perfbns, then I ..?/- 
 
 i ; not the Caufe or Reafbn of the Unitv of 
 their A But the former is true, and the: 
 
 er is (b too. 
 
 V 
 
jo8 AhimadverfionS) Sec. 
 
 As for the Confequence of the Major Propofition, it 
 is evident, as, that Nothing can be the.Caufe and Ef- 
 ie& of the lame Thing. 
 
 And for the Minor, That Unity of Nature, or Effence 
 w the Divine Perfons is the Caufe, Reafon, or Principle of 
 Mutual-Con fcioufnefs, is proved from this, That we can 
 no otherwiie conceive of Mntual-Confcioufnefs, than as 
 of an Effential Property equally belonging to all the 
 Three Perfons : And all Properties, or Internal Attri- 
 butes, are accounted to ilTue and refult from the Effence 
 or Nature of the Things which they belong to ; and 
 therefore can have no Antecedent Caufal Influx upon the 
 laid Nature, fb as to Conftitute either the Beings or the 
 Unity thereof. But the Divine Nature or Effence being 
 one and the fame in all the Three Perfons, there is, upon 
 this Account, one and the £m\^ Knowledge in them alio. 
 And they are not one in Nature, by vertue of their Mu- 
 tual-Confcioufnefs ; but they are therefore Mutually Ccnfci- 
 oas, becaufe the perfect Unity and Identity of their Na* 
 ture y makes them fb. And to Aflert the contrary, is of 
 the like import (ftill allowing, for the Difproportion of 
 an Infinite and a Finite Nature} as if we fhould make Ri- 
 fibility in a Man, the Principle of his Individuation, and 
 affirm, That Peter's having this Property, is that which 
 Conftitutes him this particular Individual Man ; which 
 is egregioufly abfurd in all the Philofbphy I ever yet 
 met with, whatfbever it may be in this Author's, 
 
 Argument III. To affirm Mutual-Confcioufnefs to be 
 the Caufe of the Union of the Three Divine Perfons, in 
 the lame Nature } is to confound the Union and Commu- 
 niondi thefaid Perfons together : But fuch a confufiou 
 ought by no means to be allowed of: and therefore nei- 
 ther ought that to be AfTerted, from whence it follows, 
 
 Now 
 
Chapte r IV. 109 
 
 Now certain it is, That all Afts of (everal Ferfbns 1. 
 on one another(as all that are Mutual muft needs be) are 
 properly Afts of C wo*, by which the (aid Perfbns 
 
 have an Intercourfe amongft themfelves, as acting inter- 
 changeably one upon the other. But then, no doubt, 
 both" their Ejjence and Per fondity muft ftill go before 
 this Mutud-Gonfcioufnefs) fince the Three Perfons muft 
 needs be really one in Nature before they can know 
 themfelves to be fa And therefore Union of Kjiorvlec 
 (as I think Mutud-Confcioufnefs may properly be called ) 
 cannot give an Union of Nature, It may indeed fuppofc 
 it, it may refult from it, and upon the fame Account 
 may infer and prove it, but it can n^vcv give or caufe it, 
 nor be that Thing or Aft, wherein an Unity of Nature 
 does properly confift, whatsoever this Author AiTertsto 
 the contrary. 
 
 But the Truth is, all that he has faid both of Self- 
 Confcioufnefs and Mutud-Confcioufnefs fand he has no 
 more than laid it, as never offering at the Proof of any 
 Tiling; is founded in a manifeft Perverfion of that. Na- 
 tural Order, in which Humane Reafbn Conceives and 
 Difcourfes of Things : Which Order (to give an Ii- 
 fiance of it in our difcourfing of any particular Perfbn, 
 or Complete Being) proceeds by theie fteps. Firft we 
 conceive of this Perfbn as pofTeifedofa certain Effet 
 or Nature Conftituting 01* rendring him what he is. 
 Then we conceive of this Nature as one, which is the 
 firft Afteftion reflilting from B< Alter this we con- 
 
 (IderthisJB ls ftepping fort] ting«it (elfin 
 
 . whether of Intellects 
 'the like. In which whole procefs theOrder ofthefe 
 Conceptions is fiich. That it cannot, w ith any Accord to 
 
 Reafon, be tranfpofed, fo as to have theJecond or third 
 
 nit into the place of the firft. 
 
i i o Jn'unaciverjionS) &cc. 
 
 But now let us fee how contrary to this Order 
 Authof's Hypothefis proceeds. For whereas Natur 
 1 be , Vr.ny next, and the Acts tj]/ 
 
 ni thence obtain ik&TkirdfUce, and then thofe Acts 
 •ftand in tlieir due Order amongft themfelves. This 
 Author, on the contrary, makes Matrnt^CoPifitoufnefsj 
 which is by two Degrees,or Removes pofterior to Unity 
 of Nature (in thePerfons whom it belongs to) to be 
 the Caufe or Formal Reafon of the f.tid Vmty. For firft 
 Se/f-Confaoufnefs is pofterior to this Vnit% and then Mi>- 
 ttial-Confcwitjhefs is pofterior to Self-Confcwufnefs, as be- 
 ing an At\ liipervening upon it. For Mutnal-Confciov.f- 
 fs is that A£t by which each Per/on comprehends, oi- 
 ls Confcious of the Self-Confcionfncfs of the other two ; 
 and therefore muft needs prefuppole them, as the Aft 
 muft needs do its Object. And therefore to make (as 
 this Author does) Mutual-Confcioufnefs the Conftituent 
 Reafon of the Unity of the Three Fcrfins, when this 
 Vmty is by two degrees, in Order of Nature, before it, 
 runsfo plainly counter to all the Methods of true Rea- 
 fbning, that it would be but time loft topurfueit with 
 *ny further Confutation. 
 
 Argument I V.Our 4th and \s&Argument proceeds equal- 
 again ft Mtituxl-QonfcioujV'cfs and Se!f-Confcioi:fncfs too ; 
 
 iiul is taken from that known Maxime in Philofbphy, 
 
 That Entities, or Beings, are not to be multiplied without 
 nifest Nt'ci'jjhy : That is, we are not to admit of New 
 
 Things/ nor to coin new Notions, where Rich as are 
 jwn and long received are fiifficient to give us a true 
 d full Account of the Nature of the Tilings we di- 
 
 fcourfeof, andtoanfwer all the Ends and Furpofes of 
 nation, 
 
 .Accordingly 
 
Chapter IV. 1 1 1 
 
 Accordingly I affirm, That the Notions ( I 
 Confiiemfntj fs in the Subje&now I 
 
 fore us ought I jjefted not only as New and Sufj 
 
 eious, but as \ is. For what can be figni- 
 
 fied by thofc, whicn is not fully, , and abundant- 
 
 ly fignified by that one plain Word, and known Attri- 
 bute, the Divine Omnifcience? And what are MuIha 
 Confcionfnefi and Self-Confcioufnefs clfe (if they are any 
 thing) but one and the fame Omnifcience exerting it felf 
 feveral ways, and upon feveral Okje&s f As to apply it 
 to the Matter befc - doc J n .: every one of the Dt- 
 
 I Lie of the Divine Nature, and of 
 this Omnifcience therewith Communicated to him, Per- 
 fectly , Intimately , and Intirely know himfelf as a 
 Perjbr/j and all the Aciic and every thing 
 
 elfe belonging to him ? No doubt he does ; for that o- 
 therwife he could not be Omnifcient. And does not the 
 fame Per [on again, by the very fame Omnifcience^ know 
 all that is known by the other Two Perfons, and the o- 
 ther Two Perfonj by the lame Mutually know all that 
 is known by him ? No doubi may and do: ForaP 
 
 much as Omnifcience knows all tilings that areknowable, 
 and confequently all that is or can be known of, or in 
 any one or all of the C Perfons joyntly or federally 
 
 confidered. 
 
 But to argue the Matter yet mc ricularly. Ei- 
 
 ther Self-Confcioufnefs and Mutoal-i 
 and the lame with the Divine Omnifcience^ or they ai 
 diftin£fc forts of knowledge from it. If they are the 
 lame, then they are ufi s md fiiperfluous Notions, a* 
 we affirm th. e ; bur if import diftinft 
 
 forts of knowledge, then theft two Things will fol 
 
 
 
I II 
 
 Aninutdvcrfton^ &c. 
 
 ■ i. That in every one of the Divine Perfons there are 
 three diftinft forts of Knowledge, viz. A Knowledge of 
 Omniscience, a Knowledge of Self-Confcioufnefs, and a 
 Knowledge of ' Mutual-ConfcioufNefitoo ; which, I think, 
 is vei and ridiculous. 
 
 2. And in the next place: If we affirm them to be 
 diftinft forts of Knowledge from that of Omnifcience, 
 then they muft alfbhave Objects diftincl from, and not 
 included in the Object of Omnifcience ; fince all fiich dif- 
 ference, either of forts or Aftsof Knowledge is found- 
 ed upon the difference of their Objects. But this is im- 
 pofTible ; fince the Object of Omnifcience comprehends in 
 -it all that is knowable ; and confequently if Mutud- 
 Confcioujnefs and Self-Confcionfnejs have Objects diftinft 
 from, and not included in the Object of Omnifcience^ 
 thofe Objects muft be fomething that is not knowable ; 
 for that Omnifcience (as we have fhewn) claims all that 
 is knowable, or pofTible to be known, for its own Object. 
 From all which it follows, That Se/fConfcioifncf and 
 Mittiial-Confciotfnefs confidered as diftinft from Omnifci- 
 ence are two empty Chimerical Words, without any 
 diftin£t Senfe, or Signification. 
 
 In a word, Every Perfon in the Trinity, by one and 
 the fame Aft of Ommfcience, knows all the Internal 
 Afrs, Motions, and Relations proper both to himlelf, 
 and to the other Two Perfons beiides. And if fo, what 
 
 ployment or ufe can there be for Self-Confcioi'jnefs, or 
 Mutud-Confcioufnefs, which Omnifcience (that takes in 
 the Objefts of both) has not fully anfwered and dif. 
 charged already? 
 
 If it be here laid, That Omnifcience cannot give Per- 
 
 . } ; forafmuch as the Perfonality of each Per (on di- 
 
 kinguiikes him from the other two ; which Ommfcie*ce 
 
 (being common to them all) cannot do. This I grant, 
 
 and 
 
Chapter IV. 1 1 3 
 
 and own it impoflible for any Thing Effentially involved 
 in the Divine Nature, to give a Perioral Diftin&ion to 
 
 any of the Three Perfons; but then I add alio, That 
 we have equally proved, that neither was Self-Confciouf- 
 
 nefs the Formal Reafon of this Per fond Diftinftion, by 
 ieveral Arguments ; and more efpecially, becaufe that 
 Self-Ccnfcwufnefs being a Thing Ablblute and Irrelative, 
 could not be the For?nal Reafon of any thing in the Nature 
 of it perfectly Relative, as the Divine Perfons certainly 
 
 ;. For this is a received Maxime in the Schools, with 
 reference to the Divine Nature and Ptrfons, Repugn at in 
 D iv in is dari Abfolutum IncommunieahiIe 9 Greg, de Valen. 
 1 Tom. p. 874. And it is a fure Rule, whereby wc 
 may diftinguifh in every one of the Divine Perfons } 
 what is EJjential, from what is Per fond. For every At- 
 tribute that is Abfolute, is Communicable, and confe- 
 quently Effential, and every one that is purely Relatiye, 
 is Incommunicable, and therefore purely Perfbnal, and 
 ib e converfo : Upon which Account Self-Confcioufnefs y 
 which is a Thing Abfolute and Irrelative, cannot be In- 
 communicable, nor confequently the Formal Reafon of 
 Perjonditj In any of the Perfons of the B/effed Trinity ; 
 as we have aire idy at large demonftrated. 
 
 So that ftill pur Affertion Hands good, That all that 
 can be truly afcribed tc >elf-Confcioufnefs and Mutual- 
 Confctoufnefs with reference to the L\ i re and 
 
 Perfons., may be fully and fairly accounted for from that 
 one known Attribute, the Divine ice. And 
 
 therefore, that there is no ufe at all either of the Term 
 Self-Confcioujnefs or Mutual-Confcioufnefs, to contribute 
 to the plainer or fuller Explication of the B I rinity ; 
 
 as this Author, with great flufter of Oftentation pre- 
 tends, but has not yet by fo much as one fblid Argument 
 proved. 
 
 Q^ But 
 
1 1 4. Ammadverjionsj &c. 
 
 But w hen I confidcr how wonderfully pleafed the Man 
 iswiththefetwonew-ftarted Terms fb high in &und,and 
 fb empty offence, inftead of onefubftantial word, which 
 gives us all that can be pretended ufeful in them, with 
 ft overplus and advantagc\andeven fwallowsthemup, 
 as Mojish Rod did thofe pitiful Tools of the Magicians ; 
 This ( I lay ) brings to my Mind ( whether I will or 
 noj a certain Story of a Grave Perfon, who Riding in 
 the Road with his Servant, and finding himfelf fome- 
 thing uneafie in his Saddle, befpoke his Servant thus. 
 John flays he) a-light ; and firjt take off the Saddle that 
 is upon my Horfe, and then take off the Saddle that is upon 
 your Horfe ; and rvhen you have done this, put the Saddle 
 that iv as upon my Horfe, upon your Horfe, and put the Sad- 
 dle that was upon your Horfe upon my Horje : Whereupon 
 the Man, who had not ttudied the Philofbphy of Sad- 
 dle (whether Ambling or Trotting) fb exa&ly, as his 
 Matter, replys fomething fhort upon him ; Lord ! Ma- 
 fier, What needs all thefe words i Could you not as well have 
 faid, Let us change Saddles ? Now I mutt confefs, I 
 think the Servant was much in the right ; though the 
 Matter having a Rational Head of his own, and being 
 withal willing to make the Notion of changing Saddles 
 more plain, cafe, and intelligible, and to give a clearer 
 Explication of that word, (which his Fore-Fathers, 
 3iow good Horfe-men fcevcr they might have been, yet 
 were not equally happy in the explaining of) was pleafed to 
 fit it forth by that more full and accurate Circumlocu- 
 tion. 
 
 And here it is not unlikely but that this Author, who, 
 
 with a fpight equally Malicious and Ridiculous, has re- 
 
 fec chap- fleeted upon one of his Antagonifts, and that for no 
 
 tcrI( - Caufe, or Provocation that appears (unlefs for having 
 
 Baffled him) may tax me alio, as one Drolling upon 
 
 Thing \ 
 
Chapter IV. 1 I 5 
 
 Things fdcredf for bnting the vanity of hi po- 
 
 thefisbythe forementioned Example and Comparifoi 
 I hope the World will give mc 
 
 between Things , and his Abfurd Phantaft 
 
 way of treating of them; which, lean, by no means 
 look upon as Sdcred, nor indeed any Thing elfeinhis 
 whole Book, but the bare Subject it treats of, and the 
 Scriptures there quoted by him. For to (peak my thoug? 
 plainly, I believe this Sacred Myftery of the 7 
 was never lb ridiculed and expoied to the Contempt of 
 the Profane Scoffers at it, as it has been by this New- 
 fafhioned Defence of it. 
 
 And fb I difmifs his two lb much Admired Terms (bv 
 himielf I mean) as in no degree anfwering the Expect- 
 ation he raifed of them. For I cannot find, That they 
 have either heightned or ftrength'ned Men's Intellectu- 
 al Faculties, or caft a greater light and clearneis upon 
 that ObjecT: which lias fb long exercifed them ; but that 
 a Trinity in "unity is as Myfterious as ever ; and the Mind 
 of Man as unable to grafp and comprehend it, as it 
 has been from the beginning of Chriftianity to this day. 
 In a \vov(\,Self-Confcioufncfs andA//// i<-i!-Conjcioufne[s have 
 rendred nothing about the Divine Nature and Perfons, 
 f inner ^ eajier, and more Intelligible ; nor indeed, after 
 fuch a mighty ftrefs fb irrationally laid upon two flight 
 empty words, have they made any thing (but the Au- 
 thor himfelf ) better undcrftood than it was before. ' 
 
 Q 2 CHAP 
 
i 1 6 AnimadverjionS) &c. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 In which h proved againfi this Author , That the 
 Three Peribns of the Bleffed Trinity, are 
 not Three Diflinff Infinite Minds, or Spi- 
 rits. 
 
 i 
 
 T being certain both from Pbilofopby and Rel/gion,thdt 
 there is but one only God fir God-bead^'m which Cbrijli- 
 w Religion has taught us, That there are Three Perfons ; 
 Many Eminent Profcir i s of it have attempted to {new, 
 how one and the fame. Nature might Subfift in Three 
 Perfons^ and how the (aid Thre^ Perfons might meet in 
 one, and make no more than one fimple, undivided Na+ 
 ture. It had been to be wifhed,I confefs,that Divines had 
 refted in the bare ExprefTions delivered in Scripture con- 
 cerning this Myftery, and ventured no further by any 
 particular, and bold Explications of it. But fince the 
 Nature, or rather Humour of Man has been ftill too 
 ftrong for his Duty, and his Curiofity (efpecially in 
 things Sacred) been apt to carry him. too far; thofq 
 however, have been all along the mod pardonable, who 
 have ventured leaft, and proceeded upon the fureft 
 grounds both of Scripture it felf, and of Realbn difeour- 
 finguponit. Andfuch I affirm the Ancient Writers 
 unci Fathers of the Church, and after them the School- 
 men to have been ; who with ail their Faults (or rather 
 Infelicities, caufed by the limes and Circumftances 
 
 they 
 
Chapter V. 117 
 
 they lived in) are better Divines, and Soberer Reafon- 
 ers than any of thofe Pert, Confident, Raw Men, who 
 are much better at Defpifingand Carping at them, than 
 at Reading and Understanding them: Though Wife Men 
 Defpife nothing,but they will know it firft ; and for that 
 Caufe very rationally defpife them. 
 
 But among thofe, who leaving the Common Road of 
 the Church have took a By-way to themfelves, none 
 (of late Years efpecially) have ventured fb boldly and 
 ib fir as this Author ; who pretending to be more happy 
 (forfooth) in his Explication of tins Myftery than all be- 
 fore him (as who would not believe a Man in his own 
 Commendation ? ) and to give a more fatisfaftory Ac- 
 count of this long received, and Revered Article by 
 Terms perfefriy New, and peculiarly his own, has ad- 
 vanced quite different Notions about this Myftery, from 
 any that our Church was ever yet acquainted with; 
 Affirming, (as he does)- That the Three Persons in the 
 God-head, are Three Dill i net Infinite Minds*, or Spirits, as 
 will appear from the feveral places of his Book, where 
 he declares his Thoughts upon this great SubjeQ:. As 9 > 
 Firft in Page 50. he fays, The Three Divine Perfons, 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft, are Three Infinite Minds 
 really di ft met from each other. Again, in Page 66. The' 
 Perfons (fays he) are perfectly di ftinft ; for they are 
 Three diflinct and Infinite Minds, and therefore Three di- 
 (tinct Perfons : For a Per fan is an Intelligent Bi ing \ and to 
 fay, they are Three Divine Perfons tot Three difiincl 
 
 Infinite Minds y U b nh Herefie and A .For which ex- 
 
 traordinary Complement palTed upon the whole Body of 
 the Church of England, and perhaps all the Churches of 
 GhriHendom befid have paid him part of my thanks 
 
 already, (b I will not fail yet further to account with 
 him before I put an end to this Chapter. la the mean 
 
 time 
 
i i 8 Animadverfions^ & 
 
 
 time, he goes on, in Page 102. / fUmfy affert (favs 
 he) 7 Eternal ami Infinite Mind, fo 
 
 the Son is an . Und diftinff ft 
 
 Cfd the A&/fi G/;.'// is an Eternal and L "mi 
 
 I Son: Adding withall thefe 
 words; Which (fays he) every Body can iinA?rH*h£\vith- 
 oi'.: Logkkj or Metaphyficks. And this, I con- 
 
 fefs, is moil truly and feafbnably remarked by him : For 
 the want of this Qualification is 16 far from being any 
 hindrance in the Cafe mentioned, that I dare undertake, 
 that nothing but want of skill in Logick and Metaphyficks, 
 can bring any Man living, who acknowledges the 7W- 
 nUfo to own this AfTertion. I need repeat no more of his 
 Expreffions to this purpofe ; thefe being diffident to de- 
 clare his Opinion ; fave only that in Page 119. where 
 (he (ays) That Three Minds, or Spirits, which have no 
 other difference, are jet iiflinguiftpi by Self Con fcionfnefs, 
 and are Three dittinct Spirits. And that other in Page 258. 
 where (peaking of the Three Perfops, I grant (fays he) 
 that they are Three Holy Spirits. By the fame Token, 
 that he there very Learnedly dittinguifhes between 
 Ghofl and Spirit, allowing the faid Three Perfons (as we 
 have fnewn) to be Three Holy Spirits, but at the fame 
 time denying them to be Three Holy Ghofls,znd this with 
 great fcorn of thofe who fhould hold,or fpeak otherwife. 
 To which at prefent I (hall fay no more but this,That he 
 wGuld do well to turn thefe two Propofitions into Greek, 
 or Latin ; and that will prefently (hew him what diffe- 
 rence and diftin&ion there is between a Ghosl and a Spi- 
 rited why the very fame things which are affirmed of 
 the one (notwithftanding the difference of thofe words in 
 Engl/Jb) may not, with the fame Truth, be affirmed of 
 the other alio. • But the Examination of this odd Afler- 
 tion will fall in more naturally towards the latter end of 
 
 this 
 
C H AFTER V, zip 
 
 this Chapter, where it fhall be particularly confi- 
 dered. 
 
 I hav r e now fhewn this Author's Judgment in the 
 Point, and in oppofition to what he has fb boldly Affert- 
 ed, and laid down, I do here deny, Thai the Three Per- 
 fons in the BleJJed Trinity y are 'Three dtflinct Infinite Minds 
 or Three difttm . e Spirits. And to overthrow his 
 
 Affertion, and evince the Truth of mine, I fhall trou- 
 ble neither my Reader nor my (elf, with many Argu- 
 But of thole, which I lhall make ufe of, the firft 
 i>this. 
 
 umentl. Thru d/fiincl Infinite Minds , or Spin 
 
 are Three dijiincf Gods. 
 But the Three Perfons of the B/eJfed Trinity, are not 
 
 Three d'tfiinci Gods. 
 And therefore the Three perfons of the Blejfed Trinity », 
 
 are not Three dijinici Infinite Minds, or Spirits. 
 
 The Minor, I fuppofe, this Author will readily con- 
 cur with me in ; howbeit his Hypothecs (as fhall be 
 fhewn) in the certain Confequences of it Contradifts it, 
 and, if it fhould ftand, would effe&ually overturn it. 
 For by that he Aflerts a perfe£t Tritheifme, though I 
 have fb much Charity for him, as to believe, that he 
 does not know it. 
 
 The Major Propofition therefore is that which mull 
 be debated between us. This Author holds it in the 
 Negative, and I in the Affirmative : and my Reafbn for 
 what I affirm, viz* That Three difiinci Infinite Minds, 
 or Spirits, are Three d . , is this, That Gci and 
 
 Infinite Mmd, or Spirit^ are Terms Equipollent, and 
 Convertible. God being truly and properly an Infinite 
 Mind, or Spirit, and an Infinite Mind or Spirit being as 
 
 truly 
 
1 2 c Animaclver/ions, Sec. 
 
 truly and properly God. And to fhew this Convertibi- 
 lity and Commenfiiration between them yet further : 
 Whatfbever may be affirmed or denied of the one, may 
 with equal Truth and Propriety be affirmed or denied of 
 th: : other. And to give an laftance of this with refe- 
 rence to the Three Perfons of the Blejfed Trinity ; As it 
 is true, that one and the fame God, or God-head is 
 Common to, and Subfifts in all and every one of the 
 Three Perfons ; fb is it true, That one and the fame Infinite 
 Mind, or Spirit , is Common to, and Subfifts in 
 the (aid Three Perfons : And confequently, as it is falfe, 
 That one and the fame God, or God-head, by being Com- 
 mon to, and Subfifting in the Three Perfons, be- 
 comes Three Gods, or Three God-heads ; fb is it equally 
 falfe, That one and the fame Infinite Mind, or Spirit, by 
 being Common to , and Subfifting in the {aid 
 Three Perfons, becomes Three Infinite Minds or Spirits 
 This is clear Argumentation, and craves no Mercy at 
 our Author's Hands. 
 
 If it be here Obje&ed, That we allow of Three di- 
 flinct Perfons in the God-head, of which every one is In- 
 finite, without admitting them to be Three diftinft Gods ; 
 and therefore, why may we not as well allow of Three 
 diHinci Infinite Minds or Spirits in the fame God-head 
 without any neceffity of inferring from thence, That 
 they are Three diftintt Gods ? 
 
 I Anfwer, That the Cafe is very different, and the 
 Reafbn of the difference is this, Becaufe Three Infinite 
 Minds, or Spirits are Three Abfblute, Simple Beings, or 
 Ejjences, and fb ftand diftinguifhed from one another, by 
 their whole Beings or Natures. But the Divine Per Jons 
 are Three Relatives, (or one fimple Being, or EJfence, 
 under three diftinfl: Relations) and confequently differ 
 'from one another, not wholly, and by all that is in 
 
 them. 
 
Chapter V. i : i 
 
 them, but only by fome certain Mode, orrefpeltpeculh 
 to each, and upon that Account caufing their Diftin- 
 ftion* And therefore to Argue from a Per [on to a Spirit 
 here is manifeftly Sophiftical, and that which is callc 
 TaHaaa Accident is > or (lince feveral Fallacies may con- 
 cur in the fame Proposition) it may be alio a ditto fecun- 
 dum quid ad durum fmpliciter. For 16 it is to conclude. 
 That Three Perfons are Three diflinci Gods ; fince tl 
 difference of Perfons is only from a diverfe refpeft be 
 tween them ; but Three Gods import Three absolutely 
 di(tinc~t Natures or Subftances. And whereas we fay. 
 That the Three Perfons are all and ever\' one of them 
 Infinite, yet it is but from one and the fame Numerical 
 Nature Common to them all that they are fb, the 
 Ternary Number all the while not belonging to their 
 Infinity, but only to their Perfonalities. The Cafe there- 
 fore between a Mind, or Spirit, and a Perfon, is by no 
 means the fame. Forafinuch as [Perfon'] here imports 
 Only a Relation, or Mode of SubfiHence in Conjun&i- 
 on with the Nature it belongs to : And therefore a Mul- 
 tiplication of Perfons (of it felf) imports only a Mul- 
 tiplication of iuch Modes, ox Relations, without any ne- 
 celfary Multiplication of the Nature it felf to which 
 they adhere. Forafinuch as one and the fame Nature 
 may fuftain feveral diftinft Relations, or Modes of Sub- 
 licence. But now on the other fide, a Mind, or Spirit, 
 is not a Relation, or Mode of Subfijlence, but it is an 
 Abfblute Beings Nature, or Subjtance ; and confequently 
 cannot be multiplyed without a Multiplication of it into 
 fo many Numerical Abfblute Beings, Natures, or Sub- 
 jHnces ; there being nothing in it to be muliiplyed but ir 
 felf. So that Three Minds, or Spirits, are Three Ab- 
 ibluieBeings, Natures, or Sabflances, and Three difrwc? 
 Infinite Mtnds, or Spirits, are accordingly Three distinct 
 
 R Infi 
 
i it Animadverjtom, &c. 
 
 Infinite Absolute Beings , Natures, or Subjlances. That is. 
 in other words, They are Three Gods ; which was the 
 Thing to be proved ; and let this Author ward off the 
 Proorof it as he is able. 
 
 Argument II. My Second Argument againft the Three 
 Perfons in the BleffedTrinity being Three distinct Infinite 
 Minds ', or Spirits, is this. 
 
 Three diftinct Minds, or Spirits are Three diftinct 
 
 Subjlances. 
 But the Three Perfons in the Bleffed Trinity are not 
 
 Three diftinct Subjlances. 
 And therefore they are not Three diftinct Minds, or 
 
 Spirits. 
 
 The Major Propofition is proved from the Definition 
 of a Mind, or Spirit, That it is Substantia Incorporea In- 
 telligens, an Intelligent, Incorporeal, [or Immaterial] 
 Subftance ; and therefore Three diftinct Minds, or Spi- 
 rits, muft be Three fiich diftinct Substances. And De- 
 fides, if a Mind, or Spirit, were not a Subftance, what 
 could it be elfe ? If it be any Thing, it muft be either 
 an Accident, or Mode of Being. But not an Accident, 
 fince no Accident can be in God; nor yet a Mode of Being, 
 fince a Spirit (not defigned to concur as a part towards 
 any Compound) is an Abfblute, Entire, Complete Be- 
 ing of it felf, and has it's proper Mode of Subfiftence 
 belonging to it ; and therefore cannot be a Mode it felf. 
 From whence it follows, That a Spirit is, and muft be 
 a Subftance, and can be nothing elfe. 
 
 As for the Minor, viz. That the Three Perfons in the 
 Blejfed Trinity are not Three diftinct Subjlances ; this is 
 evident both from Authority, and from Reafbn. 
 
 And 
 
Chapter V. \^^ 
 
 And firft for Authority, 3 • againfl P 
 
 affirms SemfermDi uha > t. And Si in 
 
 his Epiftle to j 
 
 prddicdbit? AndSt. J/ijiti in hi 5th Book de y, 
 
 Chap. 9. and in Book 7. Chap. j. And Rnjfinw in tl 
 10th Book of his Hiftory, Chap. 29. AH affirm O 
 Subftancc in God, and deny Three, and yet the fame 
 Writers una'himoufly hold Three Perfons, which fhew 
 Thatthej did not account thefe Three Perfans^ Thn 
 SubHdntes. And Anfelmus in his Book <i? fa 
 Chap. 3. (ays, That the Father and the Son may be (aid 
 to be Two Beings, provided that by Beings we under- 
 Hand Relations not Subftaiux>. And . j 
 Writer Orthodox enough in thefe points, and of unque- 
 ftionable Learning otherwiie, in his 2d Towe, page 348. 
 about the end, fays, That to aflert, that the Father and 
 the Son differ in Subftance,is Ar'tamfm : And yet if they 
 were Two diftinct Substances, for them not to differ id 
 Subftance, would be impoffible. And as for the Greek 
 Writers, they never admit of Three iaiq in the Deity, 
 but where una is uied to iignifie the fame with &&***, 
 as fometimes it was ufed : And by reafbn of this Ambi- 
 guity it was, that the Latine Church was fb long fearful 
 of ufing the word Hypoftafis, and ufed only that of Per- 
 fona , anfwering to the Greek Y\&)7tomv , Jell they 
 fliould hereby be thought to admit of Three Substances, 
 as well as Three Perfons in the God-head. 
 
 Nor, in the next place, is the fame lefs evident from 
 Reafbn, than we have [hewn it to be from Authority. 
 For if the Three Perfons be Three d 
 then Two d> find Su(>Ji will concur in, and belong to 
 
 \\ Perfbn ; to wit, 
 EJJence, and fb is Communicable or Common to all 
 the PerfoflSj and;/;.*/- SubFi which Conftitutes each 
 
 R 2 Perfon, 
 
2 4. Ammadverjions y &c. 
 
 Ferfon, and thereby is fb peculiar to him as to diftin- 
 guifh him from the other, and confequently to be in- 
 communicable to any befides him to whom it belongs : 
 Since for one and the fame Subftance to be Common to 
 all Three Perfons, and withal to belong incommunicably 
 to each of the Three, and thereby to diftinguifh them 
 from one another, is Contradi&ious and ImpofTible; 
 And yet on the other fide to affert Two difiinS Subft an- 
 tes in each Perfon, is altogether as Abfurd ; and that, as 
 upon many other Accounts, fb particularly upon this, 
 That it muft infer fuch a Composition in the Divine 
 Perfons, as is utterly Incompatible with the Abfblute 
 Simplicity, and Infinite Perfeftion of the Divine Na- 
 ture. And therefore the Three Perfons in the Blejfed 
 Trinity, can by no means be faid to be Three diflinci 
 Substances, but only one Infinite Subftance, equally Com- 
 mon to, and SubfifHng in them all, and diverfified by 
 their refpe&ive Relations. And moreover, fince Three 
 diHincl Minds y or Spirits are Eflentially Three diftinti 
 Sub fiances, neither can the Three Perfons of the Trinity 
 be laid to be Three diflintt Minds, cr Spirits \ which \\ as 
 the Point to be made out. 
 
 Argument III. My Third Argument againft the fame 
 (hall proceed thus. . 
 
 If it be truly faid, That one and the feme Infinite Mind-, 
 or Spirit is Father, Son, and Holy G ho ft, (/ mean 
 all Three taken together) and it cannot be truly faid. 
 That one and the fame Infinite Mind, or Spirit is 
 Three distwcl L Infinite Minds, or Spirits ; then it 
 follows, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft are not 
 Three diftinii Infinite Minds, or Spirits, 
 
 But 
 
Chapter V. i z 5 
 
 But it may be truly f aid, That one ana the fame Infinite 
 Mind, or Spirit is Father, Son, and Holy Ghofl ; 
 and it cannot be truly fa id, That one and the fame 
 
 Infinite Mind, or Spirit is Three diflincl Infinite 
 Minds, or Spirits. 
 Therefore the Three Perfons in the Trinity, viz. Fa- 
 ther, Son, and Holy Ghofl are not Three diflincl 
 Infinite JS Finds, or Spirits, 
 
 This is the Argument. . 
 
 Now the Confequence of the Major appears from 
 this, That the fame Thing, or Things, at the lame 
 time, and in the fame refpeeT, cannot be truly affirmed 
 and denied of the fame Subject : And therefore fince 
 [Father, Son, and Holy Ghofl, taken joyntly together] 
 are truly predicated of one and the fame Infinite Mind \ 
 and [Three diflincl Infinite Minds, or Spirits] cannot be 
 truly affirmed or predicated, and confequently may be 
 truly denied cf the fame ; it follows, That [Father, 
 Son, and Hbfy Ghofl] and [Three distinct Infinite Minds, 
 or Spirits'] neither are, nor can be accounted the fame; 
 nor be truly affirmable of one another. 
 
 As for the Minor, it confifts of two parts, and ac- 
 cordingly muft be proved feverally in each of them. 
 
 And Firfr, That it is, and may be truly faid, Th.it 
 one and the fame Infinite Mind is f Atber ' 3 Son, and hi 
 Ghofl (viz,, joyntly taken) as I noted before. This, I 
 fay, may be proved from hence, That God is truly laid 
 to be Father, Son, and Holy Ghofl (ftiil lb taken.) And it ' 
 having been already evinced, That [one Infinite Mmd, 
 or Spirit] and [one God] are terms convertible and equi- 
 pollent, it follows, That whatfbever is truly affirmed 
 or denied of the one, may be as truly affirmed or denied 
 of the other. And this is too evident to need any fur- 
 ther proof* ad 
 
i 2 6 JnimadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 And therefore in the next place, for the proof of the 
 other part of the Minor, viz. That one and the fame Infi- 
 . or Spirit , cannot he truly [aid to he Three difiincl 
 Infinite Minds, or Spirits) This is no lefs evident than 
 the former, becaufe in fiich a Proposition both Subje£t 
 and Predicate imply a Mutual Negation of, and Cor/ 
 diftion to one and another ; and where it is fb, it is im- 
 poffible for one to be truly affirmed, or predicated of 
 th.Q other. 
 
 And now, after this plain proof given both of the Ma- 
 jor and the Minor Propofition, and this alfo drawn into 
 fb little a compafs, I hope this Author will not bear him- 
 felf fb much above all the Rules which other Mortals 
 proceed by, as, after the Premiles proved, to deny the 
 Conclufion, viz. That the Three Perfons in the Blejfed 
 Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not Three di- 
 flintt Infinite Minds, or Spirits. The Affirmation of 
 which, is that which I undertook to confute. 
 
 But before I difmifs this Argument ■, I cannot but take 
 notice, That the fame Terms, with a bare Tranfpofiti- 
 on of them, viz. byfhifting place between the Predi- 
 cate and the Subjefl: (which in Adequate and Commen- 
 furate Predications, may very well be done) will as ef- 
 feftually conclude to the fame Purpofe, as they did in 
 the way in which we have already propofed them. And 
 fb the Argument will proceed thus. 
 
 If it he truly and properly faid, That: the Three Per- 
 fons in the Blejfed Trinity, are one Numerical Infi- 
 nite Mind, or Spirit ; then they cannot he truly f aid 
 to he 'Three difiinci Infinite Minds, or Spirits. 
 
 But they are truly and properly j aid to be one Numerical 
 Infinite Mmd, or Spirit. 
 
 And 
 
Chapter V. i zy 
 
 And therefore they neither are, nor can be truly pad to 
 hi 1 breediHinSt Infinite M : nds, or Spirits. 
 
 The Confequente of the firft Proportion is manifeft, 
 becaufe (as we have fhewn before) one and, the fame /,.- 
 finite Mind cannot be Three difih ct Infinite Mi ads with- 
 out a Contradiction in the Terms. 
 
 And for the Minor, viz. That the Three Perfons are 
 ly faid to be one Infinite Mind, or Spirit ; That alio is 
 proved by this, That all and every one of them, are tru- 
 ly and properly f aid to be God ; and God is . >;d pro- 
 perly one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit : And there- 
 fore if the Three Perfons are laid to be the Firft, they 
 muft be (aid to be this Latter alfb ; and that (as I fhew 
 before) becaufe of the Reciprocal Predication of thofe 
 Terms. But as to the Matter before us, That God is 
 truly and properly one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit, 
 even this Author himfelf allows, who in Page 69, pofi- 
 tively lavs, That ire know nothing of the Divine EJfenc , 
 but that God is an Infinite Mind. Very well ; and if he 
 grant him to be an Infinite Mind, let him prove this b 
 nite Mind to be three diftintf Infinite Minds, if he can. 
 The Truth is [Infinite Mind or Spirit'] is an Effential 
 Attribute of the Divine Nature, and Convertible with 
 it, and whatfbever is Co, belongs equally to all the Three 
 Perfons, and confequently cannot be afcribed to them 
 plurau'y any more than the Deity it felf ; it being as un~ 
 capable, as that, of being multiplied. Upon which 
 Account, if the Three Perfons are with equal Truth faid 
 to be [one Infinite Mini, or Spirit] and to he [one God} 
 they can no more be (aid to be Three dfln.ct Infinite 
 Minds, than they can be faid to be Three difinci 
 Gods. 
 
 So 
 
i 28 Animcidvcrfions, &c. 
 
 So that which way foever the Argument be propofed, 
 either, That one Infinite Mind is Father ; Son, And Holy 
 Ghofl ; or, T)ta/ Father, Son, and Holy Ghofi, are one In- 
 finite Mind, it ftill overthrows this Author's Hypothdfis, 
 "That the laid Three Perfons are Three diflinct Infinite 
 Minds, or Spirits. 
 
 Argument IV. My Fourth -and Laft Argument againft 
 the fame, fhall be this. 
 
 What fewer Attribute may be ■■Truly predicated of all 
 
 and each of the Divine Perfons in the Athanafian 
 
 Form, fo belongs to them all in Common, that it 
 
 can belong to none of them under any Term of di- 
 
 flinclion from the refi. 
 
 •But the Attribute [Infinite Mind, or Spirit] may be 
 truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Fer- 
 'fons in and according to the Athanafian Form. 
 
 And therefore it can belong to none of them under any 
 Term of diflinBion from the rejl. 
 
 The Major is as evident ; as that no Attribute can be 
 Common to feveral Subjeds, and yet peculiar and ap- 
 propriate to each of them. 
 
 And the Minor is proved by Inftance thus ; The Fa- 
 ther is an Infinite Mind, the Son is an Infinite Mind, and 
 the Holy Ghofl is an Infinite Mind ; and yet they are not 
 Three Infinite Minds., but one Infinite Mind. 
 
 And this I affirm to be as good Divinity as any part 
 in the Athanafian Creed, and fuch as I fhall abide 
 by, both againft this Author, and any other what- 
 soever. 
 
 But now let us fee how his Affcrtion caft into the 
 Athanafian Model, fhews it fclf, as thus. 
 
 The 
 
HAPTER V. I ' 
 
 The Father is a diJUnit / Son is a t 
 
 Hil . d the Holy Ghojr is a 
 
 ftt vet ! : and yet they are not Three 
 
 distinct Infinite Minds, but one dijlinct Infinite 
 find. 
 And this is fb far from being true, that it is in- 
 deed neither Truth nor Sence. For what Truth can I 
 be in denying, That Three Perfons, of which every one 
 is fa id to be a diftinci Infinite Mind, are Three dijlinct ln- 
 finii Is? And what fence can the affirming,or 
 
 fa\ ing 9 That i) i ; are but One* i//W?Where- 
 
 theTerni [kijtincf] is never properly ufed or appli- 
 ed, but with refpeft had to feveral Particulars each di- 
 fcriminated from the other ; but by no means whe 
 there is mention made only of one Thing and no more, 
 as it is here in this Propofition. 
 
 But to make what allowances the Cafe will bear, and 
 for that purpofe to remit fbmething of the ftriftnefs of 
 the Athanafian Form, by r out the word [_diflincT\ 
 
 in the laft and illative Claufe, v. then fee that 
 
 Author's Hypothefis will proceed tli 
 
 The Father is a d'flinct Infinite Mind, the Son is a di- 
 stinct I : /f wd 9 ana the Holy Ghofl is a d/ ft in cl 
 Infinii fa / . 
 Minds , bm 
 Thus, I lay, it muft proceed in the A:h.i, 
 :h the word [difiincf] left out of the Concluiion. \ T e- 
 verthelefs even fb, thelnferena ! i manifeftly aj 
 grofly falfe in both the branches of it. For it is abiolur 
 falfe [That I hr\ 
 finite Minds j and altogethe 
 Minds, are bat ( 
 
 The Author's Hypothefis put t tli * 
 
 Model, muft nc . 
 
 S 
 
1 2 o Animacherfionf) &c. 
 
 urged againft us by the Socinians, viz. The F/tf/w £r a 
 Per [on, the Sou a Per/on, and the Holy Ghofi a Per [on, and 
 yet they are not Three Perjons, hut one Per [on ; which is 
 manif eftly Sophiftical, by arguing ah imparibus tanquam 
 paribus, viz. Concluding that of an Attribute Relative, 
 and Multifile Me, which can be concluded only of fuch 
 as are not So. 
 
 For the Athanafian Inference holds only in Attri- 
 butes Ejfential and Common to all the Three Per- 
 jons joyntly, or feverally taken, and not in fuch as are 
 Proper, Pergonal, and Peculiar to each. As alio in fuch 
 as are Abfolute (as the Attribute of Mind, or Spirit with- 
 out the word [_M(tinct~\ is) and not In flich as are Relative. 
 For thofe Attributes, which agree to the Divine Per fens, 
 Perfbnally, Peculiarly, and Relatively, can never Unite, 
 or Coincide into one in the Inference , or Conclufion. 
 In a word [Infinite Mind, or Spirit^ is a Predicate per- 
 fectly Effential , and fo in its Numerical Unity Com- 
 mon to all the Three Divine Perjons, and for that caufe 
 not to be affirmed of, or afcribed to, either all or any of 
 them with the Term [di{iincT~\ added to it, or joyned 
 with it. For that would ?mdtiply an Attribute that can- 
 not be multiplyed. 
 
 And now, what I have here difcourfed upon, and 
 drawn from the Jthanafian Creed w r ith refpeft to this 
 particular Subjcft, I leave to our Author's ftrifteft Exa- 
 mination. For my own part, I rely upon this Creed, as 
 a fere Teit, or Rule to difcover the falfhood of his Hy- 
 pothefis by. So that as long as it is true, that God is one 
 numerical Infinite Mind or Spirited as long as the Jtba- 
 ndftan Form duely applied is a firm and good way of 
 Reafbning, thisAuthor's Aften\on,That the Three Divine 
 Perfons , are Three diftinct Infinite M/nds 7 or Spirits, is 
 thereby irrefragably overthrown. 
 
 And 
 
C H A P T E R V. 13 
 
 And therefore I (hall not concern my fclf to produce 
 any more Arguments againft it. Only by way of Over- 
 plus to* and lllufir&ion of thofe, which have already 
 been alledged , I cannot but obferve the Concurrent Opi- 
 nion of the Philofbphcrs,and moft Learned Men amongft 
 the Heathens dbowtGod 1 s beingOne Infinite Minder Spirit, 
 as a neceffary deduction (no doubt,) made by Natural Rea- 
 fbn from the Principles thereof concerning the Divine 
 Nature. For moil of thofe Philofbphers looked upon 
 God as the Soul of the World, as One Infinite Mind, or Spi- 
 rit, that animated and preiided over the Univerfe. For 
 fb held Pythagoras, as Cicero in his firft Book, de Natxra. 
 Deorum, and Latfantius in his Book de ira Dei, tells us, 
 Pythagoras qttoque tinum Deum confttetur die ens Incorporc. 
 ejfe mentem qit* per cmnem Naturam dijfufa & intent a vi- 
 talem fenfum tribuit. In like manner the Great Hermes 
 being asked, What God was, anfwered, c^oAwi/^:u- 
 *f*p% <jo<p wtk/7©- pvs (c aiS\& y The Maker of all Things, 
 a moft Wife and Eternal Mind. Thales called him, v£r 
 TVTyo-fjLvOtGv, God, the Mind of the World. Diogenes, 
 C leant hes, and Oempides, r t? nyrfjLv -\v^Lulj^ The Soul 
 of the World. Plato in Phcedone, fays of God, That 
 he is vSt ^fyn&rpdti ts (£ nvivfoov ouL©*, a Mind that is 
 die Caufe and orderer of all Things. And Plato the 
 Son of Art ft on fays, i *j 0go\' v *t : fh tS '4907^, God is 
 the Mind of the World. And Lactantins gives this Te- 
 stimony of Ariftotle, That, Quamvzs fecum ipfe ditfideat, 
 ac repugnantia (ibi & dicat,& fentiat, (by which one would 
 think our Author better acquainted with him than he is) 
 in fummumtxmen ttnam mcnte?n mundo prxeffe teflatur.'L'dQ, 
 de falfa Relig. Lib. 1. Cap. 5. Agreeably to all which, Se- 
 neca in the Preface to his Natural Questions, putting the 
 Queftion, Qiudcjl Dens ? What is God ? Anlwers, Mens 
 Vwverfi, The Mind of the Univerfe- As the Learned 
 
 S 2 Empen 
 
i ^z Arum rfions i Sec. 
 
 Emperour A- after him, expreffes God the lame 
 
 by the fame word itiGreek, b t5 oA« vv;, Lib.^. 
 
 p. \ . Incl that PalTage in Virgil\G. ALneid 
 
 v. here fpeakingof God,asthe GreatSoulof the 
 
 , running through ail the Parts of that vail Body, 
 
 lie* C in thole known Vcrfe > : 
 
 Caelum, ac Terras, Campofq\ liquem 
 
 Lucentemq', Globum Lun£, Titaniaq\ AJtra, 
 Spiritus mtus alit, totamq\ infufa per art us 
 Mens agitat molem, & magnofe corporemifcet: 
 
 And the fame was the Opinion of Cato before him, a 
 great Man, though but a fmall Author, who tells us 
 from the Ancient Poets (who were accounted the Philo- 
 fophers of the firft Ages) That Deiis est animus, God is 
 a Mind, or Spirit. 
 
 And the Truth is, I reckon that thefe Learned Men, 
 all along, by an Infinite Mind, or Spirit, underftood as 
 truly and certainly One Infinite Mind, or Spirit, as if the 
 Term of Unity had been added by them. For befides 
 that the Particles a, or the, (which we ufe in tranilating 
 any fingle word into our own Language) import fo 
 much, the very condition alfb of the Subieft fpoken of, 
 as being Infinite , muft needs infer the fame. So that 
 we fee here how the Judgment of Natural Realbn in thefe 
 Eminent Philofophers amongft the Heathens falls in 
 with what God himfelf revealed by the Mouth of our 
 Saviour concerning his own Nature, in John 4. 24. viz. 
 That God is a Spirit. For we have them exprefling him by 
 thefe words, Animus, Mens, & Spirit us. So that had 
 they all lived after St. John, (as one of them did,) their 
 Sentences might have palled for ib many Paraphrafes 
 
 upon 
 
Chapter V. i : 5 
 
 upon the Text, all declai ing God to be Om 
 Mind) or Spirit. 
 
 But perhaps our Author will here fay, What is 
 to the purpofe, fince we found our know : 
 Three Divine Perfons, wholly upoi And I 
 
 grant, wedofo; Yet nevertnelefs I fhall, 
 favour, fhew , That what I have alledged is 
 much to the purpofe. And to tills end, pfemifing he 
 what we have already prove . That to I b f- 
 
 vi te Mi,; a, and to be Three diflintt Infinite Minds, v 
 in them a Mutual Negation of, and Contradi&ion to 
 one another : (Forafmuch as to be Vnum, is to be 1 - - 
 fe ; that is to fay, Indivisible into more thing , 
 yW;asitfelf.) This, I fay, premifed, 
 
 Firif, I defire this Author to produce that Revelation, 
 which declares the Three Perfons of the B/eJfed Trinity, to 
 be Three diftinci Infinite Minds, or Sprits. For I deny 
 that there is any fuch. 
 
 Secondly, I affirm, That whatsoever is a Truth in 
 Natural Reaion, cannot be contradicted by any other 
 Truth declared by Revelation ; fince it is impoflible for 
 any one Truth to contradi£i another. 
 
 Upon which grounds, I here ask our Author, Is it a 
 Contradiction /#r One God to be One Infinite Mind, or Spi- 
 rit, and to be alfo Three Infinite Minds, or Spirits ? If he 
 grant this (as I have proved it, whether he does or no) 
 then I ask him in the next place, Whether it be a Pro- 
 position true in Natural Reafon, {That God is one Infinite 
 Mind, or Spirit ? ] If he grants this alfb, then I inter, 
 That it cannot be proved true from Revelation, {That 
 God is Three In fin. >r Spirits,'] fince the certain 
 
 Truth of the firft Propoiition fiippofed and admitted 
 muft needs difprove the Truth of that Revelation,wbkh 
 pretends to eftablilh the fecond. 
 
i 3 4. Aninudverjiom, &c. 
 
 But fbmc again may perhaps ask, Suppofeit were re- 
 vealed in cxprefs Terms j [That God is Three distinct Infi- 
 nite Minis, or Spirits,"] would you in this cafe throw a- 
 fide this Revelation in fubmiflion to the former Proposi- 
 tion declared by Natural Reafon ? I Anfwer, No : But 
 if the Revelation were exprefs and undeniable, I would 
 adhere to it; but at the fame time, while I did fb, I 
 would quit the former Fropofition, and conclude, That 
 Natural Reafon had not difcourfed right when it con- 
 cluded, That God was one Infinite Mind, or Spirit : But 
 to hold both Propofitions to be True, and to affent to 
 them both as fuch, This the Mind of Man can never 
 do. 
 
 So that, in a word, I conclude, That if it be certain- 
 ly true from Reafon, That God is One Infinite Mind, or 
 Spirit. No Revelation can, or ought to be pleaded, 
 7 hat he is Three dijtinct Infinite Minds, or Spirits : And if 
 Revelation cannot, or ought not to be pleaded for it ? 
 I am fure, we have no ground to believe it, And yet at 
 the fame time I own and affert a Revelation of the truth 
 of this Propofition, [That God is Three Perfons,'] or, which 
 is all one, [That God is Father, Son, and Holy Gho(l,~] 
 fince it does not at all contradift the forementioned Pro- 
 pofitions founded upon Natural Reafon, [viz. That God 
 is One Infinite Mind, or Spirit, ~\ nor could it yet ever be 
 proved to do fb, either by Arrians, or Sccmians. But 
 on the contrary, thele two Propofitions, viz. [God is 
 One Infinite Minder Spirit] and that other, [God u Three 
 diflinlt Infinite Minds, or Spirits'] (which he muft be ; if the 
 Three Divine Perfons are Three dijtinct Infinite Minds, or 
 Spirits') areGrofs, Palpable, and Irreconcileable Con- 
 tradictions. And becaufe they are fb, it is demonftra- 
 tively certain, That the fiaid Three Perfons are not Three 
 drjltnct Infinite Minds, or Spirits \ As tills Author againft 
 
 all. 
 
CHAPTER V. I ^ s 
 
 all Principles of Philofbphy and Divinity has moft er« 
 roneoufly affirmed them to be. 
 
 I have (aid enough, I hope, upon this Subject. I 
 before I quit it, it will not be amifs to obferve what 
 work this Man makes with the Perjbms of the II 
 Trimty, (as indeed lie feldom almoft turns his Pen, but lie 
 gives fbme {curvy ftrokc at it or other,) particularly in 
 FageScj. he affirms, That the FxprefTiQn of [the 0,. c 
 true God, and the only true God] can not properly be attri- 
 buted to the Son, nor to the Holy Ghojl. From whence I 
 infer, That then neither can the Expreffion of [God, or 
 the True God] be properly attributed to the Son, or to 
 the Holy Ghost. Forafmuch as the Terms [One God] 
 and [One True God, or one only True God] are equivalent. 
 The Term [One God] including in it every whit as 
 much as the Term [One True God, or One only True God] 
 and the Term [One True God, or One only True God] in- 
 cluding in it no more than the Term [One God',] and 
 confequently if he aflerts, That thefe Terms cannot 
 with equal Propriety be attributed to, and predicated of 
 the Son and the Holy Ghoft, we have him both Arrun 
 and Macedonian together in this Affertion-. 
 
 And I believe his Adverfary the Author of the Notes 
 could hardly have defircd a greater Advantage againft 
 him, than his calling it (as he does) a Corruption of the 
 Athanafian Creed, to joyn the Term [One True God] to 
 every Perfon of the Trinity \ adding w ithal, That upon 
 the doing fb, it would Jound pretty like a Contradict ion to 
 jay in the clofe [That there nws but One True God.] Thele 
 are our Author's words, but much fitter to have pro- 
 ceeded from a Socinian.tlun from one p ig a belief, 
 and (which is more) a defence of tl . But in 
 anfwer to them, I tell him, That the repeated Attribu- 
 tion of [The One True God, or only True God] to each of 
 
 the 
 
i 2 6 Animad'verfwrfs^ Sec. 
 
 the Three Perfons is no Corruption of that Creed at a If. 
 Forafmuch as thefe Terms [The One True God, and the 
 only True God'] import, an Attribute purely EfTential,and 
 fo equally, and in Common belonging to all the Three 
 Perfons, and not an Attribute properly Perfonal, and fo 
 appropriate to fbme one or other of the faid Perfons. And 
 if this Author would have duly diftinguifhed between 
 Ejfential and Per fond Attributes, he could not have diP- 
 courfed of thefe Matters at fb odd a rate, as here he does. 
 And therefore I deny it to be any Contradiction (let it 
 found in his Ears how it will) to conclude, That the 
 faid Three Perfons (notwithftanding this Repetition) 
 are not Three True Gods, but only One True God. But he 
 fays, That fuch a Repeated Application implies as if each 
 Perfon confidered as diftinguifhed andfeparatedfrom the other 
 were the One True God. To which I Anfwer, 
 
 i. That to imply as if a thing were fo, and to imply, 
 that really it is fb, makes a very great difference in the 
 cafe ; indeed fo great, that this Author muft not think 
 from words implying only the former to conclude the 
 latter ; which yet muft be done,or what he here alledges 
 is nothing to his purpofe. But 
 
 2. I Anfwer yet farther, That the forementioned 
 words do indeed imply, and (which is more) plainly 
 declare, That the Three Perfons who are faid to be {the 
 One, or only True God] are,while they fliftain that Attri- 
 bute, really diftinft from one another, but it does not 
 imply, That this is faid of them under that peculiar For- 
 ?nality, as they are difiinct , and much lefs, as feparated; 
 which latter they neither are, nor can be. THe truth is, 
 what lie has laid againft the repeated Application of this 
 Verm to every one of the Three Perfons, may be equally 
 
 objefkd 
 
Chapter V. 157 
 
 objected againit all the repeated Predications in tlie Ail 
 nafian Cvccd ; but to as little purpofe, oneastheother ; 
 fince, albeit all thefe Predications do agree to Perfons 
 
 really difiinct, vet tliey agree not to them under that (or- 
 mai and precife consideration as diftintt ; For nothing but 
 their refpe&ive Perfona] Relations agree to them under 
 
 that Capacity ; and this effectually clears off this Ob- 
 jection. 
 
 But here I cannot but wonder, that this Man fhould 
 nimble together thefe two Terms [diHinguifbed and fe- 
 parated] as he does twice here in the compafs of eight 
 Lines; when the fignification of them, as itisapplyed 
 to the Three Divine Perfons, is fb vaftly different, that 
 one of thefe Terms [viz. difinguifhed] neccflarily be- 
 longs to them, and the other which is [feparated] neither 
 does nor can take place amongfl them : Nay, and 
 when this Author himfelf has fb earneftly and frequently 
 contended for the difference of them ; as all along aflert- 
 ing the distinction of Perfons , and as often denying 
 their feparation. 
 
 But he proceeds, and fays, That this ExprefTion of 
 [The One [or on If] True God] is never (that he knows of) 
 Attributed to Son, or Holy Ghofl, either in Scripture, or 
 Any Catholick Writer. Which words, methinks, (as I can- 
 not but obferve again) do not look, as if a Man were 
 writing againft the Socinians. Neverthelefs admitting 
 the Truth of his Allegation, That this Term [the One 
 True God] is not to be found exprefly attributed to the Son y 
 or the Holy Ghof, will he infer from hence, that there- 
 fore it neither can, nor ought to be ib ? For if that be 
 attributed to them both in Scripture and Gatholick Wri 
 tcrs , which neceffarily and effentially implys [The one 
 True God] and does, and mult fignifie the very fame 
 Thing, is it not all one, as if in Termiws it had been 
 
 T alcribed 
 
n g itmadverfionS) &c. 
 
 afcribed to them ? Doubtlefs there are feveral other Ex- 
 preflions in the Jthanafian Creed, as hardly (as this) to 
 be found elfewhere : However, the Thing being certain 
 from other words equivalent, this exception is of no 
 force at all ; nor by any one, who underftands theft 
 Matters, is, or ought to be accounted lb ; and much 
 lefs can I lee to what end it fhould be infilled upon by 
 any one, while he is encountring the Socimans : And 
 therefore, whereas he fays, This Attribute, or Title, 
 viz. [The One True God] cannot fo properly be afcribed to 
 any one Perfon , but only to the father ; (whom, he tells 
 us , the Fathers call the Fountain of the Deity) what 
 he here defigns by the words fo properly (which feem to 
 import degrees of Propriety) I cannot well tell : But 
 this I ask, in fhort, May it be properly attributed to 
 the Son, and tod Holy Ghoft, or may it not ? If not ; 
 then they are not properly [The One True God] nor con- 
 fequently are they properly [The True God : ] For what- 
 fbever any one pre r >■ is % that he may be properly faid to 
 be. 
 
 And as for [the Father's being the Fountain of the 
 Deity,] I hope he looks upon this Expreflion only as Me- 
 taphorical, and iiich as ought otto be llretched to the 
 utmoft of its Native Sence, for fear the Confequences of 
 it may engage him too far, to be able to make an hand- 
 fbme Retreat ; which I allure him, if he does not take 
 heed, they certainly will. But, in a word, I demand 
 of him, Whether [the Father 1 , be/n% the Fount tun of the 
 Deity'] does appropriate and reffcam the Thing expreC 
 fed by the [One True God] to the Father in contra-di- 
 ftin&ion to the other Two Perfons, or not ? If it does, 
 then the lame Abfurdity recurs,?^. [That neither u the 
 Son, nor the Holy Ghofi , the One True God] and con- 
 femently, neither fimply, realty and effentially [God.] 
 
 But 
 
Chapter V. 139 
 
 But on the other fide, if [the Fathers being the 
 tif the Deity] docs not appropriate the Thing fignified 
 by [the One True God] to the Father, then it leaves it 
 common to the other Two Perfbns with Himfelf, and to 
 each of them. And whatfbever is fb, may with the 
 lame Propriety and Truth of Speceh be aferiocd to, 
 affirmed of them, as it is ( ribed to, and affirmed 
 
 of the Father Himfelf. The Truth is, this Man's ad- 
 venturous and unwary way of cxpreffing himfelf in this 
 (acred and arduous Sub jeft, (to give it no \\ orle word, 
 whatfbever it may deferve) affords the A and Soci- 
 
 mansno imall Advantages againft this Doftrine ; fhould 
 it lfand upon the ftrength of His Defence, as (thanks be 
 to God) it does not. 
 
 But I muft not here omit that PafTage, which, in the 
 former part of this Chapter J promifedmore particularly 
 to'confider ; a PaiTage, which indeed looks fbmething 
 irrangely. It is that in P. 2 58. line 27. where he tells us, 
 that he allows, That in the Blejfed Trinity there are Three 
 Holy Spirits, but denys, That there are Three Holy Ghofls ; 
 (b natural is it for falfc Opinions to force Men to abfurd 
 ■Expreffions.But my Anfwer to him is fhort and pofitive, 
 That neither are there Three Holy Spirits nor Three Holy 
 Ghofls in the Blcjfed Trinity in any fenfe properly belong- 
 ing to thefe words. However , the Thing meant by 
 him (fb far as it is reducible to Truth and Reafon) is, 
 and muft be this, v z. That when the Third Perfon 
 of the Trinity is called the HolyGhofl-, there the word 
 Holy GhoH (which otherwife (ignifies flic fame 
 Holy Spirit ) mull be 'nkca Perl arc! conse- 
 
 quently hicommunicably ; but when the father, or Son, 
 is laid to be a Spirit, or I fit , there Spirit muft 
 
 be underftood EJfentiaHy , for that , Spiri- 
 
 tual, and Divine Nature , which is common to, and 
 
 T 2 Predicable 
 
jao Jnimadverjtons, &c. 
 
 Predicable of all the Divine Perfons. All which is 
 moft true. But then, for this very Reafon, I mufr tel! 
 our Author withal, That as UofyGhoft taken Per fondly 
 is but Numerically one ; fb Spirit, or Holy Spirit ; as it is 
 under/food Rffentixtty, is but Numerically one too. And 
 therefore, though the Father may be called a Spirit, or 
 //0/y Spirit^ and the two other Perfons may each of them 
 be called fo likewife, yet they are not therefore Three di~ 
 (Unci Spirits, or Holy Spirits, nor can be truly fb called 
 (as this Author pretends they ought to be, and we have 
 fufficiently difproved) but they are all one and the fame 
 Holy Spirit Ejfentially taken ; and which fb taken, is as 
 much as one and the fame God. And moreover, though 
 Spirit underftood Perfonally diftinguifhes the Third Per- 
 fon from the other two, yet taken Effent tally, it fpeaks 
 him one and the farm Spirit, as w T ell as one and the fame 
 God with them, and can by no means diftinguifh hifn 
 from them, any more than the Divine Effence, or Nature, 
 (which Spirit, in this fence, is only another word for) 
 can diicriminate the Three Perfons from one another. So 
 that upon the whole Matter, it is equally falfe and im~ 
 poffible, That in the Bleffed Trinity there fhould be • 
 Three Holy Spirits, or Holy Gholts, (Terms perfectly 
 Synonymous) either upon a Perfonal, or an Effential ac- 
 count ; and confequently that there fhould be fb at all. 
 For, as the word Spirit imports a peculiar Mode o>$ Sub- 
 sistence, by way of Spiration from the Father and the 
 Son ? fb it is Perfonal and Incommunicable ; but as it im- 
 ports the Immaterial Substance of the Deity, fb indeed (as 
 being the. fame with the Deity it felf ) it is equally Com- 
 mon to all the Three Perfons ; but ftili, for all that, re- 
 mains Numerically one and no more ; as all mufr acknow- 
 ledge the Deity to be. And this is the true ftate of the 
 Cafe. But to ftate the difference between the Holy Ghost, 
 
 and 
 
Chapter V. 1 4. i 
 
 and the other Two Perfons, upon fomething fignificd by 
 Holy Ghost , which is not fignified by Holy Spirit, 
 (as the words of this Author manireftly do ; while he 
 affirms 2 hree Holy Spirits, but denies Three Holy Ghosts) 
 this is not only & playing with words (which he pretends 
 to (corn) but a taking of words for things ; which, lam 
 fure, is very ridiculous. 
 
 And now, before I conclude this Chapter, (having a 
 Debt upon me declared at the beginning of it) I leave 
 it ro the Impartial and Difcrcet Reader to judge, what 
 is to be thought or laid of that Man, who in (uch an 
 Tnfolent, Decretorious manner, fhaJl irr filch a point as 
 this before us, charge Nonjence and Herefie, (two very 
 vile words) upon all that Subicribe not to this his New 
 (and before unheard of) Opinion. I muft profefs, I ne- 
 ver met with the like in any Sober Author, and hardly 
 in the moll: Licentious Libeller : The Nature of the Sub- 
 ject, I have, according to mv poor Abilities, difculTed, 
 and finding my felf thereupon extremely to dilTentfrom 
 this Author, am yet by no means willing to pals for a 
 Nonlenfical Heretick for my pains. For mull: it be Non- 
 fence not to own Contradictions ? viz. That One Infinite 
 Spirit is Three diflinct Infinite Spirits ? Or muft it be 
 Herefie not to Subfcribe to Tritheifme, as the beft and 
 moft Orthodox Explication of the Article of the Trinity ? 
 As for Non-fence, it muft certainly imply the aflerting of 
 fomething for true concerning the Subjeft dilcourled of, 
 which yet in Truth is contradictory to it (fince there 
 can be no Non4ence but what contradicts iome Truth.) 
 And whereas this Author has elfewhcre, viz. P. 4. de- 
 clared it tinreajonable to charge a contr.idtction in am 
 Thing, where the Nature of the Thing difcow fed cf is not 
 throughly comprehended and under flood, I defire to know 
 of him, whether lie throughly understands and compre- 
 hends 
 
^z AnhnadverfionS) Sec. 
 
 hends the Article and My fiery of the Trinity ? If he fays, 
 he does, I need no other Demonftration of his unfitness 
 to write about it. But if he owns that he doesnot,let him 
 only flick to his own Rule, and then he may keep the 
 Charge of Non-fence to himfelf. 
 
 But what fhall we fay to the Charge of Herefie, (in 
 which St. Auflin would have no Perfbn, who i 
 ed to be filent ? ) Why, in the firft place we muft fearch 
 and enquire, whether it be fb, or no ? And here, if my 
 Life lay upon it , I cannot find either in Jren&ws advtrsus 
 HwefeSy or in Tertulliarfs Prefcriptions contra Hxreticos, 
 Cap. 49. Nor in Philaflriush Catalogue, nor in Epipha- 
 mus, nor in St. Auftin, nor in Tbeodortt, nor in Johannes 
 Damafcenus^s Book de H<erefibus ; nor in the latter H.ere/io- 
 logifls, fuch as Alphonfus a Caflro & Prateolus, with feve- 
 ral others: I cannot, I fay, find in all, or in any one of 
 thefe the Herefie of not averting the Three Perfons of the 
 B/eJfed Trinity to be Three difiinct Infinite Minds, or Spi- 
 rits ; no, nor yet the Herefie of denying them to be fo. 
 But where then may we find it ? Why, in this Author's 
 Book. And therefore look no further ; it is enough, 
 that fo great a Majler has faid it ; whofe Authority in 
 faying a Thing,is as good as another Man's in proving it, 
 at any time : And he fays it (as we fee) positively, and 
 perhaps (if need be) will be ready to take his Corporal 
 Oath upon it, That fuch as deny his Hypothefis are Ht- 
 reticks. 
 
 Now in this cafe our Condition is, in good earneft, ve- 
 ry fad ; and I know nothing to comfort us, but that the 
 
 tute de Haretico comb ur en do is Repealed. And well 
 
 t for the Poor Clergy and Church of England, that it 
 is fb ; for otherwife this Man would have kindled fuch a 
 Fire for them, as would have torrified them with a ven- 
 geance. But as he has Hocked the Church with fuch 
 
 plenty 
 
Chapter V. i ± 
 
 plenty of New Hereticks (and all of his own making) fo 
 could he, by a ("way of Power, as Arbitrary as his Divi- 
 nity, provide for them alio (iich a Furnace as that ofA.- 
 buchadnezjcar (whom in his Imperious Meen and Hu- 
 mour he fo much refembles) yet he muft not think, 
 That the Sound and Jingle of Self-Confcioufhefs and Mu- 
 tual-Confcioufnefs ( how melodioufly fbever they may 
 tinkle in his own Ears) will ever be able to Charm Men 
 over to the Worfliip of his Idol ; or make them Sacrifice 
 their Reafbn and Religion either to Him, or to the New 
 Notions which he has Jet up. And indeed I cannot but 
 here further declare, t!i it to me it feems one of the mod 
 prepoiterous and unreafbnable things in Nature, for any 
 one hrit to allert Three Gods, and when he has fo well 
 furniihed the World with Deities, to expect that all 
 Mankind fhould fall down and Worfliip Him. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
i ^ Ammadverfiom, Sec. 
 
 CHAP. VI 
 
 In which it Conjidered, what this Author pretends 
 to from the Authority of the Fathers and 
 School-men, in behalf of his Hypothecs ; 
 and/hewn^ in the fir ft place ^ That neither do the 
 Fathers own the Three Divine Peribns to be 
 Three Diftinff Infinite Minds , nor Self- 
 Conicioufnefs to be the Formal Reafon of their 
 Diftinciion. 
 
 "T Have in the foregoing Chapters debated the Point 
 ± with this Author, upon the Reafon and Nature of 
 the Thing it felf. But that is not all, which he pre- 
 tends to defend his Caufe by ; endeavouring to counte- 
 nance it alfb with great Authorities ; and that in thele 
 pofitive and remarkable words. 
 
 This is no New Notion (fays he) but the con ft ant Do- 
 ctrine both of the fathers and the Schools, Page i o i . 
 
 Thefe are his very words ; and I defire the Reader 
 carefully to confider, and carry them along with him in 
 his Memory. For as they are as pofitive , as Confi- 
 dence can make them : fb if they are not made good to 
 the utmoft, they ought feverely to recoil upon any 
 one , who fhall prefiime to exprels himfelf at fuch a 
 Rate, 
 
 And 
 
Chapter VI. 1J.5 
 
 And now, that we may do him all the right that may- 
 be, The way to know, whether this Author's Hypo- 
 thesis be the Conftant Doctrine of the Fathers and 
 Schools, is in the firft place truly and fairly to let down, 
 what this Author's Do&rine is, and wherein it does 
 confift ; as we fhall declare, what the received Do- 
 ftrine of the Fathers and Schools is, in our Eighth 
 Chapter. 
 
 Now we fhall find, That the whole Do&rine deli- 
 vered by him concerning the Bkffed Trinity is compre- 
 hended under, and reducible to thefe four Heads. 
 
 Firft, That the Three Perfons in the Blejfed Trinity 
 are Three diflinci Infinite Minds \ or Spirits. 
 
 Secondly, That Self-Confcioufnefs is the Formal Rea- 
 [on of Personality ; and confequently that each of the 
 Divine Perfons is filch by a diflinci Self-Confcioufnefs pro- 
 perl)' and peculiarly belonging to him. 
 
 Thirdly, That the Three Divine Perfons being thus 
 diftinguifhed from one another by a diftwet Self-Confci- 
 oufnefs proper to each of them, are all United in one and 
 the lame Nature, by one Mutual-Confcioufnefs Common 
 to them all. And 
 
 Fourthly and Laftly, That a Trinity in Vnity and an 
 Unity in Trinity, by this Explication and Account given 
 of it, is a very Plain^ Eafie and Intelligible Notion. 
 
 Thefe four Heads, or Particulars, I fay, contain in 
 them a full and fair representation of this Author's 
 whole Hypothecs concerning the Oeconomy of the Blef 
 fedTrinity: And lam well allured, That the knowing 
 and impartial Reader, neither will, nor can deny, that 
 they do 16. 
 
 U In 
 
i a 6 AnimacfoerjionS) &c. 
 
 In the next place therefore, that we may fee how far 
 our Author makes good all the faid Particulars by the 
 Authority of the Fathers, as he has peremptorily promi- 
 fed and undertook to do, I think it requifite to confider, 
 how the Fathers expreffed themfelves upon this Subjeft, 
 and how this Author brings the faid Expreffions to his 
 purpofe. For furely the natural way of knowing any 
 Writer's Mind is by the Words and Expreflions, which 
 he pretends to deliver his Mind by. But concerning 
 thefe we have our Author declaring, 
 
 Firft, That he has not troubled his Reader with the 
 figniftpation of Ej[e?;ce y Hypoflafis, Subftance, Sulfiflence, 
 Per fen, Exiftence, Nature, &rc. Fag. 101. and feme of 
 his Readers could give him a very good Reafbn why, 
 though I fear too true for him to be pleafed with. But 
 the Reafbns which he himfelf alledges for his not trou- 
 bling his Readers either with thefe Terms, or the Ex- 
 plication of them, are, 
 
 Firft, That they were very differently ttfed by the Fathers 
 themfelves , Page 101. And be it fb ; yet ftill for all that, 
 ttfed by them they were ; and that not fb very differently 
 neither; the chief difference having been about the 
 words ience and -im^ensy which yet was fairly accorded, 
 and well nigh fetled between the Greek* and the Latines, 
 before the end of the 6th Century, as ihall be further 
 made to appear in our Eighth Chapter. And his next 
 Reafbn for his not troubling his Reader (for(both) with 
 thefe Terms is, Becaufe they have (as he tells us) very 
 muth obfeured the Doffrine of the Trinity, infead of explain- 
 ingit, Pageioi. which being one of the Chief Things, 
 which, he might conclude, would afluredly be difputed 
 with Hub; for Him thus to pre! time it, before he had 
 proved it, is manifeftly to beg the Queftion. In the 
 mean time, certain it is, That thefe, and thefe only 
 
 were. 
 
Chapter VI. 1 4.7 
 
 were the Terms which the Fathers ufbA in their Difputes 
 about the Trinity, and by which they mannaged them ; 
 andconfequcntlv, were they never fo Airibtgmm, Faulty, 
 
 or Improper (as they are much the contrary) yet, who- 
 \ er will pretend to give the Scixe of the Fathers, 
 n 'W haverecourfe to them, and do it by them , and to 
 ;le would be todifpute at Rovers, or (as the 
 v> rd is) to ffeak without Book ; which may much bet- 
 ter become our Author in the Pulpit, than in the man- 
 agement of fuch a Controverlle. 
 
 And now let the Reader (whom lie is fo fearful of 
 troubling with any Thing that is to the Purpofe, 1 judge, 
 Whether this Man has not took a moll extraordinary 
 way of Wowing hit Doctrine the very fame with the Fathers. 
 For neither in the firft place does he fht down, what the 
 Doftrine of the Fathers concerning the Trinity was ; 
 which vet, one would have thought, was abfblutely ne- 
 celTary for the (hewing how his own Doctrine agreed 
 with it, which he profefled to be his deiign : Nor, in 
 the next place, does he either ufe, or regard, or offer to 
 explain thofe Terms, which die Fathers all along deli- 
 vered that their Doctrine in ; but is (b far from it, Thai- 
 he reproaches, explodes, and utterly rejects them, asferving 
 only to obfeure this Doctrine ', instead of explaining it : 
 Which, in my poor Judgment, is fuch a way of pro- 
 ving the Fathers on his fide, as perhaps the World never 
 heard of before, and w ill be amazed at now. But it is 
 his way, and it will not be long before we find him be- 
 ftowing a like caft of his kindnefs upon the School-; 
 too. 
 
 But fince, notwithstanding all this, He allows the 
 Fathers (good Men) to have meant we and taught 
 right ; albeit, by i eafan of a certain Infelicity and *\\vk- 
 wardnefs they nad in reprefenting what they meant, by 
 
 U 2 
 
i zj.8 AnimadverJionSy &c. 
 
 what they wrote, their meaning ought, by no means, to be 
 gathered from their own words (as, poftibly alio for the 
 introducing a new and laudable Cuftom amongft the Fa- 
 thers and Sons of the Church, that the Sons muft teach 
 the Fathers to fpeak) our Author has, for thefe and the 
 likeReafbns, in great Charity and Compaffion to their 
 Infirmities, provided two other and better words of his 
 own Invention, viz.. Self-Cor/fcioufnefs, and Mutual- 
 Confaoufnefs, by which alone the True Senfe and Do- 
 Qxme of the Fathers, in all their Writings about this 
 Article of the Trinity, may, or can be underftood. 
 
 Neverthelefs how kind loever this defign of his may 
 be, yet to me it feems very unreafbnable. For, in the 
 firft place, it is, (upon the mod allowed grounds of 
 Reafbn) a juft, and a fufficient Prefumption, that the 
 Fathers were wholly Strangers to what our Author in- 
 tends by thefe two words, for that they never fo much 
 as mention, or make ufe of the words themfelves : 
 Whereas, to be Self-Confcio^s, and Mutually-Confcious y 
 were things (no doubt) eafie enough, not only for the 
 Fathers -, but for any Man clle of Common Senfe to find 
 out and underftand ; and they might alfb, without much 
 difficulty, have been applyed to the Divine Nature, as 
 well as other Afts of Knowledge ; and therefore fince the 
 Fathers never ufed them in this cafe, it is but too plain, 
 that they never thought them fit, or proper for this pur- 
 pofe. For the Arrian Controverfie was then, viz. in 
 the 4th and 5th Centuries (in which alio the moft Emi- 
 nent of the Fathers wrote againfr it) at the Higheftv 
 Among which Writers, Gregory Nyffen (whom this. 
 Author fb often quotes) has a PaiTage, which, in this 
 cafe, is to me very remarkable, and a Rational ground 
 to conclude, that he knew nothing of Mmual-Conjcio.'f- 
 nefs y as it is here applyed by this Auchor, For that, 
 
 fpeak- 
 
Chapter VL 14.9 
 
 fpcaking of the Unity of the Divine Per Jons, in refpeft 
 
 of one Common (though Single) Nature, he expreffes 
 
 it by tyivc<m k$ r icfop, inftead of which, certainly he 
 
 could not have chofen a more appofite and proper place 
 
 to have exprefled the fame by a ^o'ir>- x$! 
 
 ¥ Guitffopi* ' lac ^ t ' lat Fstber had the lame — ^i&f^SL 
 
 Notion of it, which this Author fo much J^^fe* 
 
 contends for. But it ieems, he was either Greg. Nyfle* dc di&ren- 
 
 lefs Happy, or more judicious in this Parti- ?? *"**' ^^ffEf' 
 
 J \ * ji ri 11 i- • • n. Tom. 2. P. 435. htlit. Ma- 
 
 cular. And befidcs all this, it is molr wor- r if. 1515. 
 
 thy to be Noted, That the very Terms in 
 which the Orthodox Writers expreffed themfelves about 
 the Trinity, and whatfoevcr related to it, were (everely 
 canvafed and examined, and Ibmeof them fettled by 
 Councils ; which is a fair Proof, that the faid Terms 
 were fixed and authentick, and exclufive of all others, 
 and confequently of thofe of this Author, as well as of 
 the Notion fignified by, and couched under them, which 
 he would here with fuch Confidence obtrude upon the 
 World, by and from the Credit of the Fathers, tho' their 
 Writings demonftrate, that they were wholly uncon- 
 cerned, both as to his Do&rines, and his Expreflions. 
 
 Nor can any Want, or Penury of words be here 
 pleaded for their filence in this Matter, fince the Greek 
 being fb happy, above all other Languages, in joyning 
 and compounding words together ; in all probability 
 had the Fortunes of Greece (as the word is) been con- 
 cerned in the cafe, we might have heard of lome fuch 
 words, as, eyJ/T&G-&uyfl£>i<7j<,and wvovwueihm- Or fince moft 
 fuch words, as in Engltfb terminate in -nefs, ufually in 
 the Greek terminate in 7^', poflibly we might have met 
 with fbme fuch made-words, as, cuWtww^c-^*, and 
 x^ivoavuuei^afjsh fi ncc ths& do more properly import 
 Cor/fcioiifnefs than the former ; which rather fignifie Self* 
 
 Qonfcitm 
 
i 5 o AmntadverfionS) &c. 
 
 Conscience and Mutual-Confcience, and fo in, ftriclne^ of 
 Speech, differ fbmething from the other. But lie ho 
 fecks in the Greek Fathers for thefe words, or any tiling 
 like them (as apply ed to the Trinity) may feck longer 
 than his Eyes can fee. 
 
 Nor will his Inqueft fucceed at all better amongft the 
 Latines. For although that Language be extremely Ids 
 copious than the other, and (b affords no one Latine 
 word either for Self-Confcioufnefs, or Mut ual-Confciouf- 
 nefsj but what we muft firft make, and being made would 
 found very barbaroufly ; yct,no doubt, there were ways 
 and words enough to have otherwife expreffed the fame 
 tiling, had they found it the fitted: and beft Notion to 
 have expreffed this great Article by. But no fiich thing 
 or word occurs in any of their Writings. 
 
 But why do I fpeakof the Greek and Latine Fathers ? 
 When the very School-men, the boldeft Framers and In- 
 ventors of Words and Terms, of all others, where they 
 think them neceffary to exprefs their Conceptions by, 
 notwithftandingall their Quiddities, Hxcceities, and Per- 
 feities, and the like, have yet no word for Self-Confciouf- 
 nefs and Mutual-Confcioufnefs : which is a flifficient De- 
 monftration, that either the thing it felf never came in- 
 to their Heads ; or (which is moll: likely) that they ne- 
 ver thought it of any ufe for the explication of this My- 
 ftery, which yet they venture further at, than any other 
 Writers whatfbever. 
 
 But after all ; though this Author is very much con- 
 cerned toward off the charge of Novelty and Singulari- 
 ty from his Notions, (for which I cannot blame him ; 
 this being a charge fiifficient to confound and crufh any 
 fiich Notion applyed to fb Sacred and received an Article 
 as the Trinity) and fortius caufc is not a little defirous 
 to flicker it with the Authority of the Fathers ; yet I af- 
 
 fiire 
 
Chapter VI. 1 5 1 
 
 fure the Reader, That he is no Ids careful and concerned 
 to keep the Glory of the Invention wholly to him(ulf,and 
 would take it very ill either of Fathers, School-men, or 
 any one elfe, fhould they offer to claim the leaft (hare in 
 it. For he roundly tells us, That the Fathers were not fo 
 happy as to hit upon his way of explaining this M\ fiery, Page 
 1 26. Line 5. nay, and that, how right a Judgment fbc- 
 ver they might have of it, yet in down-right Terms, 
 That they knew not how to explain it, Page 1 26. Line 18. 
 which, I confefs, is no fma 11 Complement paffed upon 
 himielf (a thing which he is feldom or never failing in) 
 but, in good earned, a very courfe one upon the Fa- 
 thers. In fhort, he would appropriate the Credit of the 
 New Invention entirely to himielf, but with admirable, 
 and more than Metaphyfical Abftra&ion, at the fame 
 time clear himfelf of the Novelty of it ; and fo,in a word, 
 prove it of at leaft 1 2 or 1 } hundred years ftanding in 
 the World ; when yet the Author of it was Born fince 
 Conventicles began in England, as is well known. But 
 I frankly yield him the Invention, as pcrfe&Iy his own ; 
 and fuel] an one too, as he is more like to be known by, 
 than ever admired for ; and fo, much happinefs attend 
 him with it. 
 
 But as little fuccefs as we have had in feeking for his 
 Darling and peculiar Notion of Self-Confcwufnefs and 
 Miiti'al-Confcionfnefs, in the Ancient Writers of the 
 Church, we are like to find no more in feeking for his 
 other equally efpoufed Notion and Opinion there, viz. 
 That the Three Per fans of the Blefjed Trimly are Three 
 diftinfit Infinite Minds, or Spirits : We find indeed the 
 Terms ogpfaMRL; voDwaf) ib&vmsi ywgjL-ujirnx,, & r c. but 
 not one Tittle of t^x o^I/^ttx, or rp$t imcif , except 
 where wi* (as I hinted before) is fbmctimes ufed in the 
 l and nullification with vsrosasK. And in this 
 
 cafe 
 
AnimacherfionS) &c. 
 
 [ ic (I am fiire) no difficulty of framing Words, or 
 Terilis (as might poffibly in iome meaiure be pretend- 
 ed in the Gale of Se/f-Confcioujhefs) can with any colour 
 of Realbn be alledged for our not finding this Notion in 
 the Fathers, had the thing it f elf been at all there. For 
 can there be any words more Obvious, and Familiar 
 than Tgix cji'^jt^TBo, or Tpa* Nog.-, in the Greek, or than 
 Tres Sprit us, or tres Mentes, in the Latine ? But neither 
 one nor the other are to be met with any where amongft 
 them, as applved to the Subjefl: now before us. 
 
 But in Anfwer to this, I expe£t that our Author will 
 reply, That they are not the words [Three diftinct Infi- 
 nit? Minds, or Spirits'] or thofe other [q£ Sclf-Confciouf 
 nefs and Mutud-Confcioufnefs~\ but the Things meant and 
 fignified by them, which he affirms to be found in the 
 Fathers. But this is the very Thing which I irrfift upon 
 againft him, vizi. That the Non-ufage of thefe words, 
 (nor any other equivalent to them) in the Works of thofe 
 Ancient Writers, (while they were fb particularly, and 
 nicely difputing this Matter) is a folid Argument, That 
 neither are the things themfelves there.For that all thofe 
 Great and Acute Men fhould mean the very fame thing 
 with this Author, and not one of them ever light upon 
 the fame words, is not rationally to be imagined. For, 
 What Reafbn can be given of this ? Was either the 
 Thing it felf (as I noted before) of fuch deep, or Rib- 
 lime Speculation, as not to be reached by them ? Or the 
 Language, they wrote in, too fcanty to exprefs their Spe- 
 culations by ? Or can we think that the Fathers wrote 
 Things without Words, as fbme do but too often write 
 Words without Things ? So that to me it is evident to a 
 Demonftration, That the Fathers never judged, nor held 
 in this Matter, as this Author pretends they did : And 
 be/ides all this, there is yet one Conlideration more, and 
 
 that 
 
Chapter VI. 1 5 } 
 
 -that of greater weigKt with me^ thanall that lias Ik 
 •or can be obje&ed againft this Man's pretenfions, viz t 
 That it feems to me, and I queftion not but to all S 
 ber Perfbns elfe, (and that upon good reafbn) wholly 
 imputable to -the wtfe and good Method of 
 dence, That a clear Difcovery of iuch a Principal Myfte- 
 ry of the ChrijtUn Religion, as the Trinity is, jliould n< 
 at length be owing to the Invention, or kicky Hit of 
 one Man's (ingle Mind, or Fancy ; which io many Pi- 
 ous, Humble, as well as Excellently Learned Perfbns, 
 with long and tedious iearch, and the harden: ftudy, 
 (and thefe, no doubt, joyned with frequent and fervent 
 Prayers to God, to enlighten and direct them in that 
 iearch) have been continually breathing after, but could 
 never attain to for above Sixteen Hundred Years toge- 
 ther. This, I freely own and declare, That I judge it 
 morally impoffiblefor any ferious, thinking Perfbn, ever 
 to bring himiclf to the belief of ; and much lefs for any 
 one, not Intoxicated with intolerable Pride, to arrogate 
 to Himfelf. To which fort of Perfbns God never reveals 
 any thing extraordinary for the good of the World, or 
 of themlelves either. 
 
 But , finee I am now upon Difpnt.it ion , which 
 lias its proper Laws, and that this Author may have 
 no ground of Exception, I will proceed to exam: 
 his Quotations out of the Fdthers, and try whether his 
 Hjpothefis may be found there, where, it is certain, that 
 we can find none of his Terms. 
 
 And here, he firft begins with the Diftin&ion of the 
 Divine Perfons, where I mull remind him, That it Is 
 not the bare proving a Di function of Perfpns (which 
 none, who acknowledges a Trinity, either doubts of, oi 
 much lels, denies) which will hereferve his turn; but 
 He muft prove alio, That they Hand diftinguifhed as 
 
 X Three 
 
I 54. Anlmadverfiom , Sec. 
 
 Three difiinci Infinite Minds, or S fir its, and that this Di- 
 ftinftion is owing to Three difiinci Self-Confciouf 
 neffes belonging to them ; otherwife all his Proofs will 
 fall befide his Hypothecs. 
 
 Tliis premifed, I will confider whathealledges. And 
 in the firft place he pofitivcly tells us, Page 10 1. That no 
 Man who acknowledges a Trinity of Perfons, ever denied y 
 That the Son and Holy Spirit were Intelligent Minds, or Be- 
 ings. To which I Anllver, 
 
 Firft, That it is not fiifficient for him,who advances a 
 Controverted Propofition, that none can be produced^ 
 who before denied it; but it lies upon him the Advancer 
 of it, to produce fbme who have affirmed it. Foras- 
 much as a bare non-denial of a Thing, never before af- 
 firmed, can of it felf neither prove nor difprove any 
 Thing. But 
 
 Secondly, I Anfwer further, That if none of the An- 
 cient Writers did ever, in exprefs Terms, deny this, it 
 was becaule none had before in exprefs Terms aflerted 
 it. But then I add alfb, That the Ancients have exprefly 
 aflerted that, which irrefragably infers a Negation of 
 the faid Propofition : For they have affirmed, That the 
 Son and Holy Spirit are one Jingle Intelligent Mind, and 
 confequently that being fo, they cannot poffibly be more. 
 And this is a full Anfwer to this forry fhift ; for an Ar- 
 gument, Iamfiire, it deferves not to be called. 
 
 But he proceeds from Negatives to Pofitives, and tells 
 us, Page 1 01. That it is the Conflant Language cf the Fa-* 
 thers (for it feems, he has read them all) That the Son 
 is the Substantial Word and Wifdom of the Father, and 
 that this can be nothing elfe, but to fay, That he is an Intel- 
 ligent Being, or Infinite Mind. And he is fb, I confefs* 
 But does this infer, That He is therefore a difiinct Intel- 
 ligent Mind, or Being from the Father ? This we deny y 
 
 and 
 
C H A P T E R VI. T 5 5 
 
 and it is the very Thing, which he ought to prove. And 
 it is not come to'that pals yet, that we fhould take his 
 bare affirmation for a Proof of what he affirms. 
 
 He comes now to Particulars, and tells us, That Gre 
 gory Nyfjcn (though fince he neither mentions Book nor 
 Page, this ought not to pafs for a Quotation) calls the 
 Son vozzpv t: xfa&, which this Author renders Mind, or 
 Intellect'. And I will not deny, but that it may, by con- 
 fequence, import fb much ; but I am Pure it docs not by 
 direft Signification. Nogg^V •wvpS/^j fignifies proper- 
 ly, Res qtudam Intellectual, or Intellect u prxdita : And 
 fince nothing is fo, but a Mind, or Spirit, it may (as I 
 have Paid) imply a Mind, but it does not dire&ly fignific 
 it. But admitting that it does both ; does this expreflion 
 prove, That the Son is a voe&v t/ %f$Hsh diftincl from the 
 Father ? By no means : For not only the Son, but the 
 Father may be called, 'Noe^pv ti %pnn&, and the Holy 
 Ghost, Noepjv on x?*^-* anc * ) et t ' ie y are not Th ree 
 Nos&i ^p^iis/LTTt, but h vot£pv xfiwy- And the Reafbn 
 of this is, becaufe Noe&v x?*l49"> * s an ^ffential Attribute 
 following the Divine Nature, and therefore common to 
 all the Three Perfons, and not a Perfonal Attribute pecu- 
 liar to any one of them. So that granting the Son to 
 be as truly and properly m&p tt ^, as this Author 
 would have him, yet we abfblutely deny, That he is a 
 difiinct voeepv wWSh from the Father. And this Ex- 
 prefTion, I am lure, is far enough from proving him to 
 bePo. 
 
 From Nyffen, he pa (Pes to St. Athanafms, who (he 
 tells us) oblerves out of thefe words of our Saviour, 
 John 10. }o. lylt <& T^tiip h Ig$j, that our Savioui 
 does not fay, \y» ^ <m<7rp h elfju, but h eo-^j, and that, 
 by fb Ppeaking, he gave us a perfect Duality ofPofons in 
 the word ie$j, ancl ixwVnity of Nature in the word h. 
 
 X 2 All 
 
5 6 AnimadverjiotiS) &c. 
 
 All which is very true, and that this diftin&ion of Per* 
 fens overthrows the Here fie of Sabellim ; and the Unity 
 of their Nature, the Herefie of : Jrius. But then this is 
 alfb as true, that all this is nothing at all to our Author's 
 Purpofe. For how does this prove, either that the 
 Three Divine Perfons are Three distinct Infinite Minds, or 
 Sprits ? Or 7 that Self Con fcioufnefs is the proper ground, 
 or Reafon of their diftinftion? Why, yes, (fays He) 
 If the Father be an Eternal Mind and Wifdom, then the Son 
 is alfo an Eternal, but begotten Mind and Wifdom. Very 
 true ; but frill I deny, that it follows hence, That the 
 Eternal Mind, or Wifdorn, Begetting, and the Eternal 
 Mind, or Wifdom Begotten, are Tiro diflinct Minds, or 
 Wifdoms, but only one and the fame Mind, or Wifdom, 
 under thefe Two diflinct Modifications of Begetting and be- 
 ing Begot, 
 
 But he pretends to explain and confirm his Notion of 
 a distinct Mind, or Wifdom, out of thofe words of the 
 Nicene Creed, in wliich the Son is faid to be God of God, 
 Light of Light, very God of very God. 
 
 By which woids, I cannot imagine, how this Author 
 thinks to ferve his turn ; Unlefs that by Light muft be 
 meant Infinite Wifdom, or Infinitely Wife Mind, and that 
 this muft alfb infer the Lather and Son to be Two diflinct 
 Infinitely wife Minds, or Wifdoms, one ilTuing from the 
 other. 
 
 But if fb ; then the fame words will, and muft infer 
 them alio to be Two diflinct Gods, and very Gods. For 
 all thefe words ftand upon the fame level in the fame 
 Sentence ;. and then, if we do but joyn the Term [D;- 
 ItincT] equally with every one of them, we fhall fee 
 what Monftrous Blafphemous Stuff will be drawn out of 
 this Creed. 
 
 In 
 
Chapter VI. 1 5 7 
 
 In the mean time let this Author know once For all, 
 Thai Light of Light imports not here 1 wo distinct Lights ; 
 but one Infinite Light under Two different ways ofSubfift- 
 
 , viz. either <?/ and fromitfelf as it does in the Fa- 
 ther, or of and from another, as it does in the Son. All 
 which is plainly and full}- imported in and h\ the Particle 
 [ °f~] Signifying properly Derivation, or Communication 
 in the thing which it is applyed to. And this is the clear 
 undoubted ilnCc of the Word, as it is ufed here. In 
 the mean time, I hope the Arrians and Socinians will 
 joyn in a 1 .ctter of Thanks to this Author, for making 
 inch an Inference from the Nicene Creed. 
 
 In the next place, he comes to St. Aujtin ; where, 
 though I am equally at a lofs to find how he proves his 
 Point by him, any more than by thofe whom he has al- 
 ready produced ; yet I will tranferibe the whole Quota- Q$* rjci3 ' 
 tion into the Margin, that fb both the Reader may have id?ogk,ut 
 it under his Eye, and the Author have no caufe to com* dicamus 
 plain, that he is not fairly dealt with, Deum p * 
 
 * ' J trem non 
 
 eifefupien* 
 tern nifihabendofapicntiamquamgenuit non exiftendo per fe pater fapientia. Deinde ft 
 ica eft, Filiusquoque ipfc, ficut diritur, Dens de Dei, Lumen de /.amine, videndum eft 
 utrum voiYu S.ipientia de S'jpientii did, fi non eft Dcus pater ipfa fapientia, led tantum Ge- 
 nitor lapicntii. Quod ft tenemus, cur non & magnitudes fuae, & bonitatis, & zteraitatis, 
 & omn'potcnticE fua? Generator fit ? ut non ipfefit fua magnicudo, & fua bonitas,& fua iter- 
 nitas, & fua Omnipotent, fed eamagnitudine magnusfit, quam genuit, & cii bonkate bo- 
 nus, Sec. Aug. Tom. 3. Lib. 6, de Truncate. 
 
 Now that which he would infer from thence, feems to 
 be this, That God the Father is Infinite!) / 1 r ife, by a Wii- 
 dom of his own diftinct from that Wifclom by which the 
 Son is called The Wifdom of the Father ; and confequent- 
 Iy, that thev are Two diflrnct Infinite Wifdoms, or Infi- 
 j Wife Minds. This, I lay, is that, which he would 
 infer, and argue from St. Aujtin, or I know not what 
 elfe it can be. 
 
 But 
 
i 5 8 jfmmadverfions, Sec. 
 
 I But this is by no means deducible from his words:for the 
 Father is wife by one and the fame Infinite Wifdom equal- 
 ly belonging both to the Father and the Son, but not by 
 ir under that peculiar Formality, as it belongs to the Son, 
 For it belongs to the Son, as Communicated to Him ; 
 v hereas it belongs to the Father, as Originally in and from 
 Himfelf. 
 
 And whereas it is obje&ed, That if the Father Jhould 
 he Wife by the Wifdom which he Begot, then he could not be 
 {kid to be Wife by a Wifdom of his arm, but only by a Begot- 
 ten Wifdom proper to the Son. I Anfwer, That neither 
 does this follow ; fince it is but one and the fame Ejfen- 
 tial Wifdom in both, viz. in him who Begets, and in 
 him who is Begotten : Though [ai\ it is in him who is 
 Begotten, it is not after the f me way in Him who Begets : 
 So that it is this determining Particle [as, or Quatcnus] 
 which by importing a diftinftion of the manner •, caufes a 
 quite different application of the Term, while the Thing 
 is ftill the fame. For the Father himfelf is not denomina- 
 ted Wife, even by that very Wifdom that is Ejfential to 
 /f/w,confidered as Perfonally determined to the Son ; for fo 
 it muft be confidered as Derivedand Communicated,d.nd no 
 Divine Perfection can agree to the Father under the For- 
 mal Confideration of [Derived and Communicated'] albeit 
 the Thing it felf, which is Derived and Communicated, 
 abfblutely confidered, may and does. In a word, the 
 Father is Wife by one and the fame Wifdom, which is 
 both in himfelf and in his Son, but not by it, as it is in 
 the Son. 
 
 But, by the way, it is worth obferving, That this 
 Man who here in the 102 and 103 Pages denies the Fa- 
 ther to be Wife by this Begotten Wifdom, which the Son is 
 here called (and which, in the Senfe we have now given 
 ofir,isvery true) and alledges St, Juftinznd Lombard to 
 
 abett 
 
Chapter VI. i 59 
 
 abet* him in ir. This very Man, I fay, Pdge i 3 1 . Lint 
 24. affirms, That the Son is thatfVifdom and Knowledge, 
 
 wherewith his Father knows himfelf. Where, If for the 
 Father to be Wife arid to know himfelf be formally the fame 
 Aft, and as much the fame as his Wifdom and Kjww* 
 e can be, as it is manifefr, they are; then, I leave it 
 to this Author to tell us, which of thefe two AiTertions 
 is falfe ; for both of them, I am fure, cannot be true. But 
 he who makes nothing to contradift himfelf within the 
 compafs of two or three Pages (and fbmetimes as many 
 Lines) may do it cum Privilegio at the diifance of near 
 Thirty. 
 
 And whereas it is urged again from the fame place in 
 St. Austin, That if we fay the Father begets his own JV/fJow, 
 we may as well fay, That he Begets his own Goodnefs, Great- 
 nefs, Eternity, &c. 
 
 IAnfwer, No doubt but we may fay one as well as 
 the other, but that in Truth and Propriety of Speech, 
 we can fay neither. For God cannot properly be laid to 
 beget Wifdom, and much lefs his own Wifdom, nor indeed 
 any of his other Attributes, or Perfections Effenti ally ta- 
 ken and confidered ; he may indeed be faid to Commu- 
 nicate them, and by fuch Communication to Bigot a Son. 
 But ftill, though thefe are thus faid to be Communicated, 
 it is the Perfon only, who is, or can be properly faid to 
 be Begotten. 
 
 But our Author tells us, Page 103. out of the next 
 Chapter of St.Juftin(the words of which he Ihould have 
 done well to have quoted) that he there calls God the 
 Father, Sapientia Inge nit a, and the Son, SdfiieHtM Genita, 
 and are not thefe Two dtftinct Infinite Wifdoms ? 
 
 I Anfwei\No : For that the Wifdom here fpoken of,is 
 not taken Jbfolutely and Ejfentialf, but only Per finally : 
 That is, for Wifdom under two feveral Modifications; 
 
 which 
 
1 60 AnimadverfionS) &c. 
 
 which Modifications, thou. and JiHin* 
 
 guijb the Thing they belong to, yet do not multiply it. 
 Forftill it is one arid the fame Wifdom, which is both 
 Gemta, and/ , though as it is one, it is not the 
 
 . Sapientia, or Wifdom, confidered Abfolute/y and 
 EJfentia/ly in it felf, belongs in Common to all the Three 
 Perfons ; but with the Term Geniu, or Ingemta joyned 
 with it, it imports a peculiar Mode of Subfjlence, which 
 determines it to a particular Perfonality : So that Sapien- 
 tia quatenus Genita properly and only denotes the Per- 
 fon of the Son. In like manner when the Third Perfon 
 of the Trinity is called the Spirit, The Term Spirit is 
 not there taken Effentially for that Infinite Immaterial In- 
 corporeal Nature, Abfolutely confidered (for fb it is com- 
 mon to all the Three Perfons} but for that Infinite Incor- 
 poreal Nature, Quatenm procedens aut fpirata, and under 
 that peculiar Mode of Subfijlence, it belongs not to the 
 other Two Perfons, but ftands appropriate only to the 
 Third. Neverthelefs this makes them not Three difiinci 
 Infinite Spirits (as we have already fhewn) but only one 
 Infinite Spirit under Three distinct Modalities. Accord- 
 ingly, when the Son is here called the Wifdom of the Fa- 
 ther, that very Term [of the Father'] imports a Modifi- 
 cation of it peculiar to the Son, but yet this Modificati- 
 on does not make it another Wifdom, from that which is 
 in the Father ; fince one and the fame Wifdom may fu- 
 ftain feveral determining Modes. 
 
 Our Author's next Quotation is out of Peter Lombard, 
 Page 10 j. whom (for the Credit of what he Quotes 
 from him) he ftyles the Oracle of the Schools (though he, 
 who fhall read Lambert us Dan^t/s upon the firft Book of 
 his Sentences, will quickly find what a Doughty Oracle 
 he is.) The PafTage quoted, proceeds upon the fame 
 Notion which we find in the foregoing Citation out of 
 
 St. Aujli// } 
 
Chapter VI. 161 
 
 St. Auflin, whom he alfb alledges for it. Neverthelefs, 
 I fhall Tranicribe this alfb, as I di<f the other, both 
 for the Choice Stuff contained in it, as alio that the 
 Reader may have it before him, and thereby lee, what — $cd 
 ufe our Author is able to make of it for his purpofe. * bl ' 
 
 11 fit; [viz. 
 
 / tt tnc 
 Father foouldbe wife only b) the Wifdom he Begets'] quia fi hoc eft il>i ejfe quod fape \ n r\ 
 perillam fapientiamquam genuic lapiens dickur Pacer, alioquin non ipfaab iilo fed illc ab 
 ipsa eft. Si enim apiemia quam genuic caufa eft iili uc lapiens fie, etiam i:c fit ipia till 
 caufa eft $ quod fieri non poteft nifi gignendo eum, auc taciendo : Scd ncc genicricem nee 
 condkricem rams ullo modo quifquam dixeric ftpientiani. Quid enim infcnius ? fee. 
 Lib. i.Dift. 32. Cap. 5. 
 
 Firft of all then, he tells us, That in God to be, and to 
 be Wife, is the fame thing. And I grant it, with refpett 
 to the Abfolute Simplicity of the Divine Nature : but, 
 for all that, I muft tell him, That to Be, and to be Wife, 
 fall under two formally diftinQ: Conceptions, of which 
 the former does not include the latter ; and that for this 
 Reafbn, fiich as treat Scholaftically of thefe Matters, 
 do always allow a formal difference between them, and 
 never treat of them, but as lb confidered. And let me 
 tell him alfb, that this Consideration looks yet fbme- 
 thing further ; as inferring, That Things formally di- 
 ftinfr, muft have formally diftinfl: Effefts ; fb that the 
 formal effeft of one cannot be afcribed to the other. 
 And moreover, that it is a very grofs Abfurdity to con- 
 found the Formal Caufe with the Efficient, and lb, to ar- 
 gue from one, as you would do from the other. 
 
 Which Obfervations being thus laid down, let us fee 
 how this Man and his Oracle argue in the Cafe. And it 
 is thus. 
 
 If the Wifdom which He [viz. God the Father] Begets, 
 be the caufe of his being wife, then it is the caufe a/Jo of his 
 very Being. 
 
 Y tn 
 
j 5 2 AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 In Anfwer to which, I deny the Confequence. For 
 that, Wifdom is the caufc of one's being Wife only by a 
 formal Caufdity, viz. by Exifting in Him, and affefting 
 him in filch a particular way ; and this it does without 
 being the Came alfb of his Exiflence, that being a Thing 
 formally diftinft from his Being Wife: And therefore, 
 though Wifdom, I grant,muft prefuppofe the Exiftence 
 of the Sub j eft, where it has this effeft : Yet it does not 
 formally caufe it ; or rather indeed, for this very reafbn, 
 cannot poffibly do fb. 
 
 But he proceeds and argues further, viz, Thatfuppofng 
 the Wifdom Begotten by the Father were the Caufe both of his 
 Being, and of his being Wife, then it mufl be fo either by 
 Begetting, or Creating him (for fb I Interpret Conditri- 
 cem) but for one to fay, That Wifdom is any way the Be- 
 getter, or Maker of the Father, would be the height h of 
 Madnefs. 
 
 It would be fb indeed. And fb on the ether fide to 
 attempt to prove the Father and the Son to be Two di- 
 ftinct Infinite Minds by fuch ftrange, odd, uncouth No- 
 tions as thefe, which St. Austin himfelf (particularly 
 treating of them in his 7 and 1 5 Books de TrimtateJ con- 
 fefles to be Qu^fliones inextricablies, this, I fay, (what- 
 focver may be the height of Madnefs is certainly not the 
 height of Difcretion. Nevertheleis, as to the Argument 
 it felf, I deny the Confequence. And that becaufc the 
 Begetting, or any otherwife Producing a Thing imports 
 1 Caufe operating by a proper Efficiency, or Caufality ; 
 whereas Wifdom, being only the formal Caufe of one's 
 being Wife, (as it would be no other, could it be the 
 Caufe of one's very Being alfo) operates only by an In- 
 ternal, Improper Caufality, viz. in a word, Wifdom 
 one Wife, as Whitenefs makes a Thing White, 
 not by producing any Thing in him, but by Exifting in 
 
HAPTER VI. i 6 5 
 
 him, and afle&ing him by it felf, after (uch I in 
 
 manner, and thereby giving him filch a certain Deno- 
 mination. 
 
 Now from hence let any one judge how forcibly and 
 Philofophically this Man Diiputes ; the Truth is, were 
 the whole Argument Conclusive, it were nothing to I 
 purpofe. But I was willing to fhew, That his way of 
 arguing is as defective, as the Thing he Argues for is 
 Abfiird. 
 
 Neverthelcfs let us fee, what the main Conclufion is, 
 which he would draw from the Premiiles. Why, it is 
 this, That the Father is Eternal Wifdom, or Mind, and the 
 d Wifdom and Mind, I give you his very 
 Terms. And who denies this ? Or what does it conclude 
 for him ? For ftilJ I ask, Does he who lays. That the 
 Father is Eternal Wifdom, or Mind, and the Son Eternal 
 Wifdom and Mind, by faying fo, affirm, That the Fa- 
 ther and the Son are Two dijlmcl Eternal Wifdoms, or 
 Minds'? Any more than he; who fays, That the Father 
 is God, and the Son God, affirms them to be Two diftinlt 
 Gods ? Let him fay it if he can ; and he fhall not fail 
 of a through Confutation as foon as it can be Printed 
 off. 
 
 But to give the Reader an Account of the whole mat- 
 ter in fhort. This Author has efpoufed a very Hetero- 
 dox and dangerous Notion, viz. That the Three Per fons 
 of the Blejfea Trinity, are Three diftintt Infinite M is, or 
 Spirits ; and, in order to the proof of this, would per- 
 fwade us, That tl cTwovliJlintt Wifdoms, one in 
 
 the Father, and the other in the & ' it, 
 
 Reafin: Becaufe the Father, who is - tally Wife, 
 cannot be (kid to beWife by that begotten Wifdom. which 
 is in the S**falbeit the Sox be d to be the J i ifdom of 
 
 the Father) but that the mull have one dijth 
 
 Y 2 Ifdom 
 
1 6^ Animadverjions, &c. 
 
 TVifdom of his own, and the Son another diflinEl Wifi 
 i m of his own. This, I am fure, is the full Account of 
 his Argument from top to bottom. In Anfwer to which, 
 I have plainly and undeniably fhewn, That the Father 
 is Wife by one and the fame EJfential Wifdom, common 
 to Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft, though not under that 
 particular Modification, as it Subfifts in the other Two 
 Perfons, but by that peculiar Modification, by which it 
 is appropriated to, and Subfifts in his own. And that 
 thofe different Modifications do not, for all that, make 
 it any more than one fingle Numerical Wifdom, but on- 
 ly one and the fame under fo many difimct Modes of Sub- 
 fiflence, determining it to ib many difiincl Per finali- 
 ties. 
 
 This is the Sum both of his Opinion and of mine, and 
 I refer it to the Judicious Reader to arbitrate the Cafe 
 between us, with this profeflion and promife, that if 
 in all, or any one of the Quotations alledged by him he 
 can fhew, That it is either exprefly affirmed, or necefc 
 farily implyed,77^ the Father and the Son are Trvo distinct 
 Infinite Minds , I will, without further proof of any 
 fort, forthwith yield him the Caufe,and withal renounce 
 all my poor fhare in Common Senfe and Reafbn ; nay, 
 and all belief of my own Eyes for the future. 
 
 But there is one Claufe more, which he brings in as 
 one part of his main Conclufion, Page i o 3 . Line 3 3 . viz. 
 That if we confefs this of the Father and the Son, to wit, 
 That they are each of them Eternal Mind, or Wifdom, 
 there can be no difpute about the Holy Ghost who is Et ernal 
 Mind, and Wifdom , diftintt both fiom Father and Son. 
 
 Now this is per fe&ly gratis dictum, without either 
 proof, or pretence of proof; and that whether we re- 
 fpeft the Orthodox, or the Heterodox and Heretical. 
 And; 
 
 Firft, 
 
Chapter VI. 161 
 
 Firft, For the Orthodox, they utterly deny the Holy 
 Ghost to be ?si Eternal Mind) or Wifdom diftinft both 
 from the Father and the Son ; and I challenge this Au- 
 thor to produce me but one reputed Orthodox Writer^ 
 who affirms it. In the mean time, it argues no final! 
 Confidence (to give it the mildeft Term) in this Man 
 to AfTert that a* certain, and without Difpute, which is 
 neither granted on one fide, nor fb much as pretended to 
 be proved on the other. But 
 
 Secondly, If we refpeft the Heterodox and Heretical, 
 who (no doubt) can difpute as much as others, will this 
 Man fay, That thefe alfb grant this his AiTertion about 
 the Holy Ghofi without any difpute ? No, it is certain, that 
 they neither do, nor will. For this Author may be 
 pleafed to obferve, That as fbme in the Primitive Times, 
 allowed the Son to be only like the Father ; fb they made 
 the Holy Ghofl a downright Creature, and an inferiour 
 Agent to Both. Such were the Uv^v^qIo^^ql under 
 their Head and Leader Macedonius ; as we fee in 
 St. Auftin de Hxrefibus, Cap. 52. hereby placing him as 
 much below the Son, as they had placed the Son be- 
 low the Father ; or rather more. Whereupon, I appeal 
 even to this Author Himfelf,whether thofe, who did fo, 
 would without all difpute have allowed the Holy Ghofl to 
 be an Eternal Infinite Mind, or JV/fdom, diftinfl: both 
 from the Father and the Son ; and, upon that Account, 
 EfTentially and Neceflarily equal to them Both ? Let this 
 Author rub his Fore-head, and affirm this if he can ; and 
 for the future take notice, That it becomes a True and 
 Solid Reafbner, where a Thing is difputed, fairly to 
 prove it, and not boldly and barely to prefume it. 
 
 In the laft place he alledges the Judgment of all the 
 Father s indefinitely in the Cafe. And truly where he 
 cannot cite fo much as one of them to the purpofe, I 
 
 think 
 
i 66 Ammadvcrjion^ &c. 
 
 think he does extremely well to make fhort work of it, 
 and with one bold Impertinent ftroke to alledge them 
 all together. 
 
 His Allegation is this, That it is ufual with the Fathers 
 the 1 lore Perfons in the Bleffed Trinity as di- 
 ■i as Peter, James, and John. Well; and what 
 then ? Why ; That then the [aid Three Perfons are Three 
 difiirul Infinite Minds, or Spirits. I deny the Confe- 
 quence, and to give a particular Anfwer to his general 
 Allegation, I tell him, That it is a Fallacy of the Ho* 
 mommy of the Word, and that the Term [as difincT} 
 is Ambiguous. For it may either fignifie, 
 
 i. As Real. Or, 
 
 2. As Great a Diftinftion. 
 
 As for the firft, I grant, That the Three Perfons in the 
 Bleffed Trinity differ as really as Peter, James, and John ; 
 Forafmuch as they differ by fbmething in the Thing it 
 felf or, ex parte rei, antecedent to, and independent up- 
 on any Apprehenfion, or Operation of the Mind about 
 it ; which is a Real difference, and whatfoever is fb, is 
 altogether as Real as the Difference between one Man 
 
 .1 another can be. But, 
 
 Secondly, If by .Re*/diftin£tion be meant as great a, 
 difiinction, fb^we utterly deny that the Three Divine 
 Perfons differ as much as Peter, and James, and John do, 
 or that the fathers ever thought they did fb. For this 
 would infer a greater difference, or diftinftion between 
 them, than even our Author himfelf will allow of; even 
 filch a difference, as reaches to a Divifwn, or Separation of 
 the Perfons fo differing. And fince it is impoflible for 
 the Perfons of the Trinity to differ fb, it is hard to in 
 gine upon what bottom of Rcafbn our Author fliould 
 meafiire the Diftin&ion, or Difference of the Three Di- 
 vine Perfons, by the Diltin£tibn, or Difference, that is 
 
 betwet 
 
Chapter VI. i6y 
 
 between Pei , - ad John* I 
 
 Di: yet ir in, that th 
 
 do not d . Bi (1 - I alledged only 
 
 as an Illuftration of the Cafe, this Man is pleafed to 
 
 make a direct pi oof of his Point ; which, by his favour, 
 is to ft retch ita little too far: For, if he would make 
 
 the foregoing Example a Parallel Inltance to the Thing 
 which he applies it to, ir would prove a great deal too 
 much,(as has been (hewn) and therefore.as to the Thing, 
 which it is brought for, does indeed prove nothing at 
 all. Now the Thine it is brought to prove, is, 7 
 tht Three Divine Per Jons are Three distinct b finite Minds, 
 or Spirits ; but iince we have fhewn, That a Real Diffe- 
 rence, or Diffraction, may be much fhort of fiich an one 
 as is between two or more Minds, or Spirits, (which \. 
 own to be as great, as between two or more Men) it 
 follows, That the Real Difference, which is between the 
 Three Divine Per fons, cannot prove them tobefc 
 dijlinct Minds, or Spirits. In fhort, our Author's whole 
 Argument amounts to no more but this (which, though 
 it may Lund fomething jocularly, is really and ftritt- 
 Jy true) viz,. That becaufe Peter, "James, and John are 
 Jo many Men, therefore Father, Son, and Holy Qhoft 
 fo many Minds. A pleafant way of Arguing certain Iv. 
 
 I have now examined all, that this Author has alledg- 
 ed about the distinction of the Three Divine Per fons, and 
 I have done it particularly and exa£lly, not omitting any- 
 one of his Quotations. But how comes it to pals all 
 this while, that we have not fb much as one Sj liable 
 out of the fathers, or School-men, in behalf of Self- 
 Confcioufnefs ? Winch being, according to this Author, 
 the Confiiiuent Reafon of the Per and Perfonal Di 
 
 fiinciionof the Three Divine Pcrfons, will he pretend to 
 prove die Diftinction it felf from the lathers, and at l 
 
 • 
 
i 6 8 AnimadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 feme time not fpeak one Tittle of the Principle, or Rea- 
 ion of this Diftin&ion ? Or will he profefs to prove his 
 whole Hypothefis by the Authority of the Fathers, and 
 yet be filent of Self-Confcioufnefs,\vhich he himfelf makes 
 one grand and principal part of the faid Hypothefis ? 
 Certainly, one would think, that the very fhame of the 
 World, and that Common Awe and regard of Truth, 
 which Nature has imprinted upon the Minds of Men, 
 fhould keep any one from offering to impofe upon Men 
 in fb grofs and fhamelefs a manner, as to venture to call 
 a Notion or Opinion, the Confiant Doctrine both of the 
 Fathers and the Schools ; nay, and to profefs to make it 
 . out and (lie w it to be fb, and while he is fb doing, not 
 to produce one Father, or School-man, I fay again, not 
 fb much as one of either in behalf of that, which he fb 
 confidently and exprefly avows to be the joynt Sentiment 
 of Both. This furely is a way of proving, or rather 
 of impofwg peculiar to Himfelf. But we have {ken how 
 extremely fond he is of this new Invented Term and 
 Notion : And therefore fince he will needs have the 
 Reputation of being the fble Father and Begetter of the 
 Hopeful Ijfue, there is no Reafbn in the World thai; An- 
 tiquity fhould find other Fathers to maintain it. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Chapter VII. 1 6p 
 
 C H A P. VII. 
 
 fowhicb is Jbewn, That the Pajfages alledged by 
 this Author out of the Fathers do not prove 
 Mutual-Confcioulheis to be that^ wherein the 
 Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three 
 Perfons of the Blefled Trinity does Confift : 
 But that the Fathers place it in fome thing 
 elfe. 
 
 OU R Author having undertook to make good his 
 Do&rine about the Bleffed Trinity, from the Fa- 
 thers ; and that both as to the Diftinftion of the Divine 
 VtrfonSy and alfo as to their Unity in the fame Nature ; 
 And having faid what he could from thofe Ancient Wri- 
 ters, for that new fort of Diftinftion which he afcribes 
 to the faid Perfons, in the former part of his 4th Section, 
 which I have confuted in the preceding Chapter ; he 
 proceeds now, in the following, and much longer part 
 of the fame Seftion, to prove the Unity of the Three 
 Perfons in one and the fame Nature, according ro his 
 own Hypothefis. 
 
 And the Proofs of this we fhall reduce under thefe 
 Two following Heads, as containing all that is alledged 
 by him upon this point of his Difcourfe, viz. 
 
 Z FtrlK 
 
1 70 AmnmfocrjionS) &c, 
 
 Fir ft, That it is one and the fame Numerical Divine 
 Nature, which belongs to all the Three Divine Perjons, 
 And, 
 
 Secondly, That the Thing, wherein this Numerical 
 Unity of "the Divine Nature does confift, is that Mutual- 
 Conjcioitfnefs, hy which all the Three Perjons are inti- 
 mately Confcious to one another of all that is known by, 
 or belongs to each of them in particular. 
 
 And here the Authority of the Fathers is pleaded by 
 him for both of thefe, and I readily grant it for the 
 firft, but however fhall examine what this Author pro- 
 duces for the one, as well as for the other. 
 
 But before I do this, Imuft obferveto him, That if 
 that Diftin&ion Aflerted by him between the Divi 
 Perfons, whereby they ftand diftinguifhed as Three In- 
 finite Minds - y or Spirits, holds good, ail his proofs of the 
 Unity of their Nature will come much too late. For 
 he has thereby already deftroyed the very Subject of his 
 Difcourfe ; and it is in vain to feek, wherein the Nume- 
 rical Unity of the Divine Nature (as it belongs to the 
 Three Perfons) does Confift, after he has affirmed that, 
 which makes fuch an Unity utterly impoflible. And it 
 has been fufficiently proved againft him in our 5 th Chap- 
 ter, That Three Infinite Minds, or i can never be 
 one Numerical Infinite Mind, or Spirit , nor confequently 
 one God. Three distinct Spirits can never be otherwife 
 Oney than by being United into one Compound, or 
 Collective Beingy which, (could fuch a Thing be acl- 
 
 itted here) might be called indeed . ion y 
 
 Ihnty properly it could not. And hereup- 
 on I cannot but obferve alfb, That this Author 
 • ufes thele Terms promifcuouily, as if Vu 
 
 and 
 
Chapter VII. 1 7 1 
 
 and Vm One, a> fl- 
 
 ed the very fame Thing ; whereas, i o- 
 
 priety of Speech, whatsoever Things are V 
 
 , cannot be Originally One ; and t C v h 
 
 fbevcr is Original cannot be fb, by 
 
 into One : For as ! explains the were!, & 
 
 jbf&Q&iiv Qwut til Tzep.ytwnb) that is to fay, C 
 
 0/1 is fb called from the preflfing [or thrnffing] tog ' 
 feveral Things into one. But our Author, who 
 great profoundnefs,tells us of the 
 ilincl Perfons being United into One \ 
 God-head, Page 118. Lines 9, 10. has ce . 
 rent Notion of Vnion from all the World ! 
 how one and the fame Nature (though in never fb ma- 
 ny diflinct Perfons ; fince it is ftill flippofed the lame in 
 all) can be faid to be United into any one Thing, I be- 
 lieve furpaffes all Humane Apprehenfion to conceive ; 
 
 /in the very Nature of it, being of fever aI Thii 
 -not of one andthefAme. I defirethe Reader to confult the 
 place, and to extraft the beft fenfe out of it that he 
 can. 
 
 And thus having prefented our Author with this Pre- 
 liminary Obfervation, I fhall now proceed to confid 
 how he acquits himfelf in the firtt Thing undertook by 
 him, viz. The proving a Numeric aI Unity of . in 
 
 : Three Divine Perfons, out of the f 'others ; which tl 
 I do as readily grant, and as firmly believe, as this Au- 
 thc or can ; yet I think it worth while to (hew, 
 
 with what Skill, Decency, and Relpeft he Trej 
 Fathers upon this Subject. 
 
 And here in tl .lace h his Reader, 7 
 
 r being a Myftery fo 
 
 ', it is no wonder if the FAthei Txry to life 
 
 feveral ExAmpleSy and to allude to fever aI kinds of 
 
 Z 2 
 
i yi AnimadverJionS} &c. 
 
 to foxyn an adequate Notion of the Vnity of the God-head. 
 And withal, That they take feveral fteps towards the 
 Explication of this great Mystery, viz. of an Unity of Na- 
 ture in a Trinity of Perfons, Page 106. In our Exami- 
 nation of which Paffages (referving his former words 
 to be confidered elfewhere) we will firft confidei the 
 Heps which (he fays) the Fathers made towards the 
 Explication of this Myftery. 
 
 And thefe, he tells us, are Two. 
 
 Firft, The S J/^^or^or ojicoyjiiTvi^ (/. f.) theCoeflen- 
 tiality of the Divine Perfons, whereby all the Three Per- 
 fons of the God-head have the fame Nature, Page 106. 
 
 Secondly, The other is a Numerical Unity of the Di- 
 vine Effence, or Nature, Page 121. Line 6. which (to 
 anfwer one Greek word with another) we may call the 
 tdsV, orthelroW $ 'dcnoA, or cpuctoos, St. Cyril Authorizing 
 the Expreffion, whom we find {peaking of an li/oWpu- 
 ovm (£ undoes ov id mu. tet (c ij£ <& mvdifj&Ti oLytoj, as Ammo- 
 mns Cites him in his Catena upon ^0/;/? 17. 1 1, 21. 
 
 Now as this o/jjicnov, or Samenefs of Nature, and this 
 Numerical Unity of Nature, lying fifteen whole Pages, in 
 this Author's Book, diftant from one another, muft be 
 confeffed to make a very large flride ; jfb, for all that, 
 they will be found to make but an infignificant fhp ; as 
 letting a Man not one jot further than he was before. 
 For as touching thofe Words and Terms, which the Fa- 
 thers ufed to exprefs the Unity of the Divine Nature by, 
 I do here, without any demur, affirm to this Author, 
 That Coejfentialily, Samenefs of Nature, and Samenefs of 
 EJfence, all fignified by the 2> o^io-iov, or o^aaicms, as 
 alfb, Unity of Nature, and Unity of EJfence, expreffed by 
 the '6 ivy or w<w ? yVw, or cvww, do all of them, in 
 
 tht 
 
Chapter VII 1 7 3 
 
 the fenfe of the Fathers, denote but one and tA fame 
 Thing, viz. A Numerical Unity of the Din re, 
 
 only, Iconfefs, with fome Circumfhintial Difference, as 
 to the way, or manner of their fignification. For, 
 
 1. TheSo^faV/or, fignifies Unity of Nature, with a 
 Connotation of fome Things, or Perfons to whom it 
 belongs. Upon which Account it is, that St. Ambrofe 
 (whom this Author cites) {peaking of this word in his 
 3d Book, Chap. 7. tells us, That c^o-lov aliudalii, non 
 ipfum eft fib 1 : Nor indeed is any Thing {aid to be the 
 fame, but with refpect to fome Thing, or Circumftance 
 befidesit {elf. And therefore no wonder if the 'jyvwiov 
 was anciently rejected, fince the g j^vov, relating to the 
 Per/on, whom the idut belongs to, muft import an Unity 
 in Personality, as well as in EJjence, which would be con- 
 trary to the Catbolick Faith. But, 
 
 2. The 2^, or the homs $ vcnaA, ox $£&**$, fignifies 
 Unity of Nature, or EJJence, without Connotation of any 
 to whom it belongs : Not but that it does really and in- 
 deed belong to the Three Divine Perfons, but that ac- 
 cording to the ftrift and proper fignification and force of 
 the word, it does not connote, or imply them, but a 
 ftrafts, or prefcinds from them. 
 
 And this is a true Account of thefe words,by which the 
 Fathers (without making more fteps than one) intend- 
 ed and meant the fame Thing, viz,* a 
 of the Divine Nature belonging to aH the Three Perfons, 
 only with this difference, That the Qfjywio'm fignifies 
 the Unity o£ the Di with a Connotation of 
 
 the Perfons in whom it is ; which alio gives it the Deno- 
 mination of s orthe fooW, 
 fignifies the Unit) of th< c abfblutely andab- 
 ifraftedly, without implying, or co-fignifying zny re- 
 fpeftto thofe in whom it is, and to whom it belongs. 
 
7^j. A foerJionS) &c. 
 
 So that thcfe words (as much Two as they arc) yet in 
 the fenfe and meaning of the Fathers, import but one 
 and the fame Vnity. 
 
 Our .Anther tells us, That though indeed the Fa- 
 thers own - in the Divine Perfi ns, yet, 
 
 is B. Specif ck, . ; as a Numerical < 
 
 the Diipute is here, which of thefe two 'Unities we fhai! 
 affign to the Divine Nature, with reference to the 1 
 vine Pcrfons. 
 
 And for this ; He tells us, That Petavltts and Dr. Cud* 
 
 :h have abundantly proved, That the Nicene Fathers 
 did not under ft and the word Qugwitms of a Numerical, 
 of a Specifical Samenels of Nature, or the agreement of 
 Things Numerically different from one another in the fame 
 Common Nature. Pa^e ic6. about the end. 
 
 In Anfwertowhichjmuftconfefsmyfelf very unfit to 
 take fiich Great and Truly Learned Perfons to task, and 
 that upon comparing this Author and Petavius together 
 (if there can be any companion between them) I find 
 much more Reafon to believe that he miftook themean- 
 of Petavius, than that Petavius could miftake the 
 meaning of the Fathers. 
 
 Yam however, I fhall lay down this as a Conclufion, 
 which I take to be undoubtedly true, viz* That the . I 
 cient Fathers, as well the Nicene, as thofe after them, 
 held onlv a Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature in the 
 Perfons of the Bleffed Trinity : That is, in other words, 
 They held and acknowledged one Numerical God, and 
 no more. This Conclusion I hold, and have good re < 
 (on to believe, That neither Petavms, nor Dr. ( rth 
 fhall be able to wreft it from me. For the chief Reafon 
 of fbme Men's charging the fathers with holding d.Spe+ 
 cifit ,- of N amongft the L . is 
 
 ;\vji from this, That Ibme of them, and particularly 
 
 Maxim 
 
Chapte r VII. i 75 
 
 Ma:, ► Author) feem to ar- 
 
 gue from that S is found in 
 
 levcral Individual .7 of the L 
 
 111 the P lllejfed 7 , . 
 
 To which 1 A That the Fathi rs never ufed the 
 
 Example of Three or more In I Men, agreeing 
 
 in the fame A". a Parallel Inftance of the fame fort, 
 
 or degree of Z ith that which is in the Three Di- 
 
 s ; but always alledged it, one, or (perhaps 
 fbmetimes) both of theft two wj 
 
 Firft, By way of Allufion, or Illuftration (as II: 
 already noted in the foregoing Chapter) and as it is r 
 neareft Refemblance of, and Approach to this Divine 
 
 ty of an)" that could be found in Crt For 
 
 frill their Argument proceeds only by the 01©- and the 
 *«>con the one fide, and the vtws on the other, (as ap- 
 pears from that place quoted out of Ma , P. 107.) 
 which Terms furely do not of neceffity import an lien- 
 
 of the Cafe, but only fbme Similii 1 the parts 
 
 of the Companion. 
 
 Secondly, The Fathers ufed the forementioned Exam- 
 ple as an Argument antinoreadma .. That if le- 
 veral Individual Men could net properly be faid to have 
 more than one Nature (upon which Ayjferfs whole Ar- 
 
 nent turns) much lefs could this be laid of the 77 
 
 r, Forafmuch as it is not only certain, but. 
 evident, That Perfons merely diftinguifhed from one 
 another and no more, mi XsxVnity of A 
 
 , thanfuch 1 not on .<', but alio di- 
 
 led from one an by a fep ftence. A 
 
 let any one ftretch this Argument ol 
 if he can, 
 
i j 6 AnimadverfionS) &c. 
 
 I do not in the leaft deny, but feveral Expreffions may 
 Iropped from the Fathers, which, if we look'd no 
 further, might be drawn to a very inconvenient fenfe. 
 But then alio it is as little to be denied, That the fame 
 s profefTedly and defigncdly treating of the fame 
 Points, have declared themfelves in fuch Terms, as are 
 very hardly, if at all reconcileable to thole Occafional 
 and Accidental Expreffions. And therefore fince their 
 meaning cannot be taken from Both, it ought much ra- 
 ther to be taken from what was Afferted by them de- 
 fignedly, than what was Aiferted only occasionally. 
 
 To which I fhall add this further Remark, That a 
 due confideration of the Circum fiances, under which 
 thofe Fathers wrote, may very well Apologize for the 
 Defefts of fbme of their Arguments. For the Grand 
 Controverfie which exercifed the Orthodox Writers of the 
 fourth and part of the fifth Century, was that with the 
 Arrians. So that we have the lefs caufe to wonder if 
 fbme of their Reafbnings about the Trinity feem to look 
 no further than the Proof of a Specific/: Unity of Nature 
 in the Divine Perfons, while they had to deal with Ad- 
 verfaries who would not allow fo much as this between 
 the Father and the Son, but inftead of an o^aiov, or 
 Samenefs y held only an oygivo-iov, or Likenefs of Nature 
 between them ; which, together with the foregoing 
 Confiderations, may ferve as a Key to let us into the true 
 Explication of feveral Paffages of the Fathers ; about 
 the meaning of which- we might otherwife poflibly be 
 fbmething at a lofs. And the fame likewife may ferve 
 to give a fair Account of what has been alledged by p e - 
 taz'///<, and miftook by this Author upon the prefent 
 Subject. For to traverfe and examine all Petavius's Al- 
 legations particularly would require a full anddiftinft 
 Work by it felf. 
 
 Bur 
 
Chapter VII. 177 
 
 But ftill our Author feems extremely let upon making 
 good his firft ftep of a Sfeeifick Unity of the Divine No* 
 tare from the Withers ; and to that purpofe lie tells us, 
 P*ge 107. Line 2 J. That one Thing wherein the Fathers 
 place the Unity of the God-bead is, that all the Three Perfons 
 have the fame Nature, by which he means (as (hall be 
 ftiewn prefently) Specifically the lame Nature-, and a 
 few Lines after, he tells us again, That fome of the Fa 
 thcrs went further than this, and flu 1 a the EJfential Unity 
 of the Divine Nature in the Samenefs of Efjence, Lines 
 jo, jij J2. of the lame Page. 
 
 Now here I would defire this Author to inform me of 
 Two Things. 
 
 Firft, By what rule of (peaking, or upon what Prin- 
 ciple of Divinity, lx)gick, or Philofbphy, Samenefs of 
 Nature ought to fignifie one Thing, and Samenefs of Ef 
 fence to fignifie another ; and withal to be (b contra-di- 
 ftinguifhed to each other, that in the degrees of Unity \ 
 this latter muft be a ftep beyond the former ? For the 
 Fathers, I am fure, make no fuch Diftinction, but u(e 
 the words S anient fs of Nature, and Samenefs ofEffence, as 
 well as the words boixand quarts themfelves promi(cuou£ 
 ly ; (b that neither by their Native fignification, nor \ et 
 by their ufe, do they import any more than one fort 
 Unity. 
 
 Secondly, Whereas in Page 106. Lines 23, 24. he 
 makes the firft Hep towards this I ro confift in 
 
 the oy^atzTt);, or Coejfentiality, (which alfo in the next 
 Page, Line 2 3. &x\ he explains by Samenefs 0/ / 
 And whereas,in Page 121. he makes a A 
 the Divine Effence, the next fiep (introducing it with 
 the word Secondly) and telling us, That die Fathers ad- 
 ded it to the o^ovn oir\s , which he had bciore made the 
 
 A a firft 
 
j -78 Jrtimadverjtons, &c. 
 
 firfi ftep) And whereas, notwithstanding this, having 
 m Page 107. told us, That Samenefs of Nature was one 
 Thing wherein the Fathers -placed the Unity of the Divine 
 Nature, within lev eii Lines after, he tells us, That fome 
 of the Fathers went further, and placed it in the Samenefs of 
 Effence, (which* yet it is manifeft all along, that he rec- 
 kons not the lame thing withNumcrical Unity of EJJence,) 
 I defire to know of him, whether there be Two fecond 
 flips in this Unity ? or, whether there be one between the 
 fir jl and the fecond? For he makes o^ac-^W, or Same- 
 nefs of Nature one Hep, Page 106, 107. AndSamenefs of 
 Ejjence a further flep, Page 107. Line 30. &c. And then 
 NumericalUmty of Nature another flep, calling it alfb the 
 Second, Pa$e 121. Line f. Thefe Things, Imuilcon- 
 ,, I am utterly unable to give any Confiftent Account 
 of, and I fhrewdly fufpefi, that our Author himfelf 'v> 
 not able to give a much better. But it is ftill his way to 
 orget in one place what he has (aid in another; and how 
 kind fbever he may be to himfelf, I fhould think ir very 
 hard for another Man to forget himfelf fb often, and to 
 forgive himfelf too. 
 
 Nevertheless our Author, without mincing the Mat- 
 ter, roundly Aflerts a Specif ck Unity of Nature in the D/- 
 vmePerjons, telling us, Line 25. arc of the fore-cited 
 Page 107. That this is abfolutely neceffary to ?nake the Three 
 Perjons one God, and that it is impojjible that they fljould be 
 (0 without it ; where it is evident, that lie means a Speci- 
 fic!-: Unity, both from this, that it was the Subject, which 
 he had been tl-ei e treating of, as alfb from this, that im- 
 mediately after he mentions another fort, or degree of 
 Umty , as a fief further than this ; which, fince nothing 
 can be but a Numerical Unity, it follows, That that which 
 was 0/n« flep fhortof a Numerical, mull needs be a Spe- 
 cified And now is it not ftrangc, that in Page 109. 
 
 ' which 
 
Chaptfh VII. 17P 
 
 which is but the next feve one after this,this Man fhould 
 positively fay,(as he doc&)That t> ■ s never fo much & 
 
 Drear*? d of a Specif ck Unity of Nature in the Divine Per. 
 fons, having here in Pa?/ 107. affirmed it to be no kfs than 
 ahl'olittel't neeeffary to make the Three Perfons one God? And 
 that certainly is a neceffity with a witnefi. But he, who 
 cxa&sof this Author a confiftenc) with himfelf for five 
 Pages together, deals very feverely with him. 
 
 And accordingly, the more I confider of this Matter, 
 I cannot but think, That what he fays of the t\ :e> 
 ¥ at hers holding aSpecifick Unity of Nature in the I 
 Perfons, Page 106. And his affirming that Gregory l\ 
 
 } St.CyriM, Maxima s and Damafien never fo much u 
 DreanPd of any fuch Unity, Page 109. Line 22. will by 
 no means confift together. 
 
 For Firft, If by the Nicene Fathers be meant not on- 
 ly thofe who were prcfent at that Council, but thofe 
 Fathers alfb, who about thofe Times held the fame Faith 
 which was Eftablifhed in that Council, then his two 
 fore-cited PalTages contain a grofs, manifeft, fulfbmc 
 Contradiction ; even as grofs as the pofitive averting of 
 a thing , and the fo much as or earning of it, can 
 
 import. But if by the Nicene latins lie means 
 only thofe who fat and a£led in that Council, he will 
 hardly however perfwade any underftanding Man,That 
 Gregory Kyffen, who Wl Ote and flourifhed between fifty 
 ana Sixty x ears after the Council, and . ; at 
 
 Sixtv, and St. CyriSzbout N could be fo groliv ig- 
 
 norant of, and Str rs to the Sentiments of thofe . 
 thers, as not fo much .is to Dream oj herein they had 
 
 placed the Unity of tht ( id. This to mc fcemslncredi- 
 
 ble and morally ImpofTibL : ' not to be imagin 
 
 that Nyjfeny CyriSj aniMaxm :outd fo foon for. 
 or knowingly dare to relinqtrifh the Doftrinc of 
 
 A a 2 foremen- 
 
i So Animadverjions, &c. 
 
 fore-mentioned Fathers, whofe Authority was fb great 
 and Sacred all the Chriflian World over. And therefore 
 fiface this Author allows thefe Fathers not to have 
 Dreamt of a Specific!: Unity of the Divine Nature ; I 
 conclude, That neither did the Nicene Fathers Dream of 
 it any more than they, howfoever they might exprefs 
 themfelves upon fbme occafions. 
 
 And thus having (as well as he could) made his firjl 
 flep, by AfTerting a Specific!: Unity, or Samenefs of Na- 
 ture in the Three Divine Perfons from the Fathers, that is 
 to lay,partly from whstPetavius andDr.CWnwrZ/had told 
 him of the Nicene Fathers holding fuch a Specific!: Unity 
 between them, and partly from the other Fathers never fo 
 much a* dreaming of it, he proceeds now to his other ftep,ov 
 rather Counter-ftep ; which is to flicw , That the Unity 
 between the Divine Perfons, held by the Fathers, was 
 no other than a Numerical Unity of Nature, or Effenct 
 belonging to them : For fince to be one only Specifically, 
 and to be one only Numerically, are by no means confident 
 with" one another, in refpett of the fame Perfons, what 
 can this be fa truly and properly called as a Counter-fiep 
 to that which he had made before ? His Method being 
 plainly this. Firft he tells us, That, the Nicene Fathers 
 by the o/jyvaii'm undcrftood only a Specific!' Unity, or 
 Samenefs of Nature in the Divine Perfons, Page io6. 
 And then, that the Fathers [mentioning them indefi- 
 nite!}] held this Samenefs of N 'at ure abfblutely neceifary 
 to make the laid Three Perfons one God, Page 107. And 
 now at length he tells us, Page 121. Lines 27, .28, 29. 
 That though fever al of the Fathers attempted fever al ways of 
 explaining that "Unify of Nature that is in the Divine Per- 
 .}, yet they all agree in the Things That Father, Son, and 
 Holy (theft, Three diflincl Divine Perfons are united in one. 
 . ' iture and EJfenct. So that the Sum of all 
 
 nnift . 
 
Chapter VII. 1 8 i 
 
 mull be this (as appears alfb from his own words in the 
 latter end of Page 1 20. and the four firft Lines of the 
 121.) that, according to him, the Fathers held a Spect- 
 acle Unity of Nature neceffary to make the Three Divine 
 PerfoMS one God, but not fuffieient without the Comple- 
 tion of it by a NumertcaiVnity fuperadded to it. 
 
 This, I lay, is the Sum of what he delivers ; and in 
 dirett oppofition to which, I do here deny, That there 
 is any fuch Thing as a Specific!: Unity of Nature belong- 
 ing to the Divine Perfons, or that the Fathers ever held, 
 that there was. 
 
 And to prove this, I fhall premife this AiTertion both 
 as certain in it (elf, and withall affirmed by this Author 
 in thofe fore-cited words, viz. That all the Fathers heli y 
 That Father, Son, and Holy Ghof y Three diflinci Per (on s 
 are Vmtedin (or rather are One, by) One Numencal Vk- - 
 ture and EJJence. 
 
 Which being fo premifed, I have thefe Confiderations 
 to oppofe to the Admiilion of any Specific!: Unity in the 
 Divine Nature as it belongs to the Divine Perfons. 
 As, 
 
 Firft, 1 1 \ umeri&alUnity in the fame Divine Nature 
 be fuffieient to make the Three Divine Perfons to whom 
 it belongs, One God, then a Specific!: Unity of the lame is 
 not neceffary ; but a Numerical Unity in the fame Divine 
 Nature is fuffieient to make the fa id 7 '/.wr Perfons (> 
 God, and therefore /; is not aeceflary. The 
 
 Confequen . ident, becaule nothing can be neceffary 
 
 to aity Thi b&, beyond, or befde what is iff 
 
 fyient fort! letnis would imply a ipamfeft 
 
 Contradiction, by making the fame Tiling, in the lame 
 
 cct, be 1 >t fuffieient. And as for the 
 
 Minor, That an A jreementin one and the fame Nume* 
 
 rical 
 
i 8 2 AnimadverfionS) Sec. 
 
 rical Divine Nature is fjfficient to make the Perfons fba- 
 grecing One God. I fuppcfe this carries with it lb much 
 Self-Evidence, that no Man of Reafon will pretend to 
 doubt of, and much left to deny it. 
 
 Second lv, A greater degree of limiy^ and a lefi de- 
 gree of Unity are not to be admitted in the Divine A 
 twe* But a Numerical Unity and a Specif cat Unity, are a 
 greater and a left degree of Unity, and therefore they 
 are not both to be admitted in the Divine Nature. The 
 Major is proved thus, Becaufe two fuch Unities would 
 overthrow the fimplicity of the Divine Nature \ foraf- 
 inuch as they muft be either two degrees of the fame 
 kind of Unity, or they muft be two different kinds of 
 Unity : Either of which would infer a Composition by 
 no means to be endured in the Divine Nature. As for 
 the Minor, it is evident in it Self, and needs no Proof. 
 
 Thirdly, Such a degree, or fort of Unity of Nature, 
 as may agree to Ten Thouf and Individuals, neither can 
 nor ought to be admitted in the Divine Nature, with re- 
 ference to the Divine Perfons. But a Specif 'ck Unity of 
 Nature may agree to Ten Thoufand Individuals, as well 
 as to Two or Three; Since (upon a Specif ck Account) it 
 has no Stint or Limitation, but may be every whit as 
 well and properly in the former Number, as in the lat- 
 ter ; and therefore it neither can nor ought to be admit- 
 ted in the Divine Nature. 
 
 Fourthly, Such an Unity as is principally, if not ab- 
 solutely Notional and depends upon the Operation of the 
 Intclleft drawing one common Notion from the agree- 
 ment, which it obferves in Several Individuals, is bv no 
 means iiecelfary to make the Three Divine Perfons One 
 God, nor can any way properly belong to them. But a 
 Specif ck Unity is fuch an one. And therefore it neither is, 
 
 nor 
 
Chapter VII. 1 3 2 
 
 nor can be neceiTary to the making thcThree Dizine Per- 
 fonsOne God; as this Author moll abfiirdIyAiTerts,P. 107. 
 Line 2] y 24. The Major is evident. For that, if Rich 
 an Vmiy could be neceiTary upon that Account, then 
 there would be fbmc fort or degree of Vxit) in the Di- 
 
 . N.u.rreib depending upon the Operation of fome 
 Intellect, or other (forming one common Notion out of 
 feveral Particulars,") that, had not fuch an Operation pal- 
 led upon the faid Particulars, fuch an Vmiy could not 
 have been ; nor confequently could the Three Divine 
 Perfons have been one God without it ; which to affirm, 
 would certainly be both a Monftrous and Blafphemous 
 Ailertion. 
 
 Fifthly and Laftly, IfaSpecifick Vnity of 'Nature con- 
 fifts with, and indeed implys a Multiplication of the faid 
 Nature, in every one of the Particulars, to which it be- 
 longs ; then fuch a S fee; tick Vmty can by no means be ad- 
 mitted in the Divine Nature. But a Specifick Unity of Na- 
 ture imports a Multiplication of the faid Nature in everv 
 one of the Particubrs to which it belongs ; And there- 
 fore (uc! 1 an Vmty cannot be admitted in the Dizine Na- 
 ture. The Reafbn of theConfequence is evident ; becauie 
 the Divine Nature is uncapable of anv Multiplication : 
 And herein confifts the difference of the Divine Native's 
 belonging to the Divine Perfons, and of any Other Na- 
 ture's belonging 10 its propei Individuals ; That this lat- 
 ter is by a Multiplier.*. . i r fe/f in them, and the other 
 by a bare Cowrm n of it feif to them, fb as that 
 the fame Numerical Nature 1 , id beco 
 thereby common to all the Ti ti Petfens. 
 the Minor Proportion , That a A Van,- of .\..- 
 ture confifts With and implies a : cat ion erf the 
 
 d Nature in the feveral Individual > which it belong* I 
 
 I 
 
S-j. AmmadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 I refer him to all the Logicians and Metaphydcians wlio 
 have wrote of Species^nd Specif ck Unity, of Idem, & Di- 
 verfum, whether they do not give this Account of 
 it. 
 
 But I fancy this Author has a reach of Cunning (tho* 
 but a fhort one) in the cafe. For that having made the 
 Three Divine Perfons Three difiinB Infinii e Minds, or Spi- 
 rits, which can never be One by a Numerical Unity ; he 
 is willing to provide them a Specified Unity, and to lee 
 whether that will lerve the turn ; but as the A 7 u are of t he 
 Thing unhappily falls out to be, that will no: do it nei- 
 ther. 
 
 Thefe are the Confiderations which I thought fit to ad- 
 vance againft the Admiffion of a Specifick Unity in the 
 Divine Nature, with reference to the Divine Perfons. 
 And the Conclufion, which I draw from them all,is this. 
 That fince the Fathers (and.that even by this Author's 
 own ConfeiTion) held a Numerical Unity of Nature in the 
 Three Divine Perfons, we can by no means grant that 
 the faid Fathers admitted alfb a Specif ck Unity in the 
 fame, without making them guilty of a grofs Abfurdity 
 and Contradiction. Forafmuch as thefe Two forts, or 
 degrees of Unity are utterly incompatible in the Divine 
 Nature. ■ 
 
 I hope by this time the Judicious Reader fees how fit 
 this Man is to be milled with the Fathers, whole Judg- 
 ment about fb weighty an Article he dares mifreprefent 
 in fuch a manner. Fortofum up briefly what he has 
 laid upon this Point. 
 
 Firfl, he tells us , That the Fathers agree very well in 
 the Account they give of a Trinity in Vmty, Page 106. and 
 the four firfl lines. Next he tells us , That the Nicene 
 Fathers afjerted a Specif ck Unity of the Divine Nature in 
 
 >■ 
 
Chapter VII. i S 5 
 
 the Verfons of the Bleffed Trinity y and m 
 of fiich an Vl 
 
 106. andthefive laft Lines. And ! hirdlj 
 Specifick I •;• Samenefs of Nature, was ahfol. 
 
 Neteffary to make the Three i Pet -God, 
 
 t it was impojfible the} (bould be fo without it, \ 07. 
 
 Lines 2 j, 24. And Fourthly, That the other Fath • 
 (of which he there names four) \ Co much as I ! 
 of I y of the Divine A tture. Page 109.LL 
 
 22, 2 J. And Laftly, That the Far hers do not Hop in this 
 Spt i Identity of Nature, but proceed to {hew 
 
 how the ofjyio-tov proves a true Numerical and EfJ: 
 cf the God-head in the 'Three Divine PerJ'ons, Page 114. 
 lines jo, 2i, 22, j j. 
 
 From all which AfTertions, which lie plain and open 
 in the forecited Pages, I defire this Author to refblve me 
 thefe following Queries. 
 
 1. Whether thofe Fathers who Aflerta Spec if ck Unity 
 of the Divine N it tire, and thofe who never Dreamt of fuch 
 an Unity; And thofe again, who by the o^idiov under- 
 ftood only a Specific/;, and not a Numerical Unity of Na- 
 ture ; and thofe who by the fame ofjgio-iov proceed to 
 prove a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine Perfons, 
 can be f lid to agree fb very well in the Account they give 
 of a Trinity in Unity ? 
 
 2. Whether thofe could give a true and right Account 
 of a Trinity in Unity, who never fb much as Dreamt of 
 that, which was fo abfblutely neceffary to make the Three 
 Div;n>> Perfons One God, that thev could notpoflibly be 
 fb without it ? 
 
 3. Whether a Specif ck Unity, or Si of Nature 
 in feveral Perfons, is or can be a direft and proper proof 
 of a Numerical Unity and Identity of Nature in the (aid 
 
 Perfc 
 
 ons 
 
 ? 
 
 B b Thefe 
 
, s<$ Jmmadverjionsj Sec. 
 
 Thefe Qncftions, I fay, being the Natural and Im- 
 mediate Refults of this Author's Pofitions, I hope he will 
 cioufly vouchfafe, fometime or other, to give the 
 World a Satisfactory Refolution of. 
 
 In the meantime I will tell him what it was, that 
 impofed upon him to, as to make him talk thus Abfurd- 
 iy and Unphilolbphically of a Specific!: Unity of the Di- 
 nar, , and traduce the Fathers alio, as if they held 
 . And that in one w r ord is, That in the Subject 
 us,he takes Speeifick Nature and Common Nature to 
 fignifi-J one and the fame Thing ; whereas, though every 
 Speeifick Nature be a Common Nature, yet every Common 
 Nature is not a Specif 'ck Nature (no nor a Genertcalnti* 
 ther.) And that this was his miftake appears from 
 thofe words of his in Page 106. where he fays, That 
 Petavius and Dr. Cudworth have abundantly proved, That 
 the Nicene Fathers did not understand the word oj^gigv of a 
 Numerical, hut of a Specifical Samenefs of Nature, or the 
 Agreement of Things Numerically differing from one another, 
 in the fame Common Nature.~\ In which words it is evi- 
 dent, That he makes Speeifick Sa?nenefs of Nature, and 
 the shy re went of Things numerically different, in one and 
 i Common Nature, to fignifie Convertibly the 
 tame-Thing ; and when he has done fo, he oppofes them 
 Both to a Numerical Samenefs of Nature ; as appears from 
 the Adverfative Particle [But~] placed between them. 
 In which, let me tell him he is guilty of a very great 
 miftake, both by making thofc Things the lame, which 
 arc not the fame, and by making an Oppofition where 
 ihere is a real Coincidence. For, by his favour, one and 
 tfjefa?nr Numerical Divine Nature is a Common Nature too ; 
 forafimich as without any Divifion, or Multiplication of 
 fell, it bt longs in Common to the Three Divine Per Jons, 
 I he Term r 'Dew] indeed is neither a Genus, nor a Spe- 
 cies. 
 
Chapter VII. > 187 
 
 ties. Neverthelefs all Divines arid School-men allow it ' 
 to be a Terminus Communis, as properly predicable of. 
 
 and Common to Either, Son, and Holy Ghofl ; sftid in 
 this very Thing confifts the Myftery of the Trinity^ 
 1'hat one and the fame Numerical Nature fhould be 
 Common to, and Exi it in Three Numerically diftinct Per- 
 fons. And therefore for one (who pretends to teach 
 the whole World Divinity) while he is Difcourfing of 
 the Divine Nature and Perjbns y to oppofe Common Na- 
 ture, to Nature Numerically One, and from the Common- 
 nefs of it, to make the Fathers Argue againft its Numeric 
 calnejs (whereas the fame Divine Nature imp be, and 
 really is both) it is a fhrewd fign of the want of fbme 
 thing or other in that Man, that muft needs render him 
 extremely unfit to prefcribe,and diftate in thefe Matters. 
 In fine, the fole Point driven at all along by the Fa- 
 thers, as to the Queftion about the Unity of the Divine 
 Nature (for their Arguments to prove the Coequality of 
 the Three Divine Per fons againft the Arrians are not 
 now before ns) is an AfTertion of a Real Numerical Ex- 
 ifting 'Unity of the faid Nature in the faid Per fons. I fay, 
 a Numerical Unity, without making any more Heps, or 
 degrees in it than One^ov owning any difKn&ion between 
 Samenefs of Nature, and Samenefs of Ejfence. And much 
 lefs by making (as this Author does) a Specif ck Same- 
 nefs of Nature, one thing wherein they place the Unity 
 of the Divine Nature, and then making Samenefs of F.f 
 fence another and further degree in the Unity of the faid 
 Nature ; and when they have done fb, by a return back 
 explaining this Samenefs of Efjence, by the Somen fs cf 
 Nature newly mentioned ; as, he fays, they do, in thefe 
 words, immediately following (by way of Exegefis of 
 the former) viz. That there is but one God, kecauje all th 
 Three Divine Per fons have the fame Nature, Pa^e 1 07. and 
 
 B b 2 *" the 
 
1 8 8 Ammadverjiom, Sec. 
 
 the two laft Lines. All which is a Ridiculous Circle, 
 and a Contradiftion to boot, making Samenefs of Nature 
 one /?*/>, and Samnefs of EJfence another, and then ma- 
 king tnis<5 Q of Effence no more than a Samenefs 
 i ; lb that according to him the Fathers 
 in lift be laid to go further, by refting in the very fame 
 Itcp w hich they firft made : Which way of Reafbning, 
 I confefs, may ierve well enough for one, who can forget 
 in one Page, what he had {aid in the other juft before, 
 But (by his favour) the Fathers were a little more Con- 
 fiftent, and underftood themfelves better than to run 
 Divifions in fuch a fenlelefi manner upon a Thing that 
 admitted none. 
 
 And thus having fhewn how he has dealt with the 
 / others in the Account given by him of their Opinion a- 
 bout the Vyity of the Divine Nature in the Performs of the 
 Bleffed Trinity, (which was the fir ft Head, under which 
 I reduced his Allegations from them,) I come now 
 in the 
 
 2d Place,to the other and Principal Head;under which 
 he undertakes to prove the chief and more peculiar part 
 DfhisHypothefis from the laid Father s,viz.That theVmty 
 and Identity of Nature belonging to the Three Divine Per* 
 fons, con ft fi sin the Mutual-Confcioufnefs which is between 
 them, That is in Truth, That they are therefore One 
 God, becaulethey are Confcious to themfelves, that they 
 are fb. 
 
 And here I fhall begin with fhewing how this Author 
 overthrows the Point undertook by him before lie pro- 
 duces any Arguments from the Fathers for it. And to 
 this Purpofe I fhall refume thofe words of his before ci- 
 ted by me out of Page 106. In which he reminds his 
 Reader, That Trinity in Unity being fo great a JSIy fiery, 
 
 ■ f which we have no Example in Nature, it is no u 
 
 der 
 
Chapter VII. iS? 
 
 derif it cannot be 
 
 on, andth i ■ : ; ■ 
 
 pies, And to alii \ il kinds of 1* . to form an a 
 
 f the "Cuty of the ( i . Now here, 
 
 fince our Author's Notion, and the I'm hers too (as he 
 fays) of this is nothing elfe but MutuaUConfciouf 
 
 mfs 9 I defire to Learn of him, what neceflity there w 
 or is of fifing jevcral Examples, and alluding to / 
 kinds of Union to explain, or form an adequate notion of 
 that ? And I wonder what kind of Thing he would make 
 of his Mutual-Confcioufnefs, fhould he come to explain 
 and dcfcribe it by ieveral Examples, and feveral Kinds 
 of Union ? But this is not all, for he tells us likewife 
 (as we alfb obferved before; that there are Ieveral Heps 
 to be taken towards the Explication of this Myflery. 
 Whereupon I would again learn- of him how many fiefs. 
 are necelTary to explain Mutual-Confcioufnefs ; for 
 one would imagine one fingle fiep fufficient to 
 reprefent and declare a Thing which every Body under- 
 flands. This Author indeed confidently enough Afferts, 
 That the Fathers give no other Account of a Trinity in 
 Unity y than the fame which he gives of it, Page 101. 
 Line 2. But certainly if the Fathers thought fever al Exam- 
 ples, Steps and Kjnds of Union abfolutely necejfary to explain 
 the Notion they had of this Unity, and if thefe cannot be ne- 
 celTary to explain the Notion of Mutual-Confcioufnefs, 
 then it mull follow, That the Fathers neither did, nor 
 poffibly could by that Vnity mean Mutud-Confcu 
 oufnefs. And if this Author doubts of the force of this 
 Reafoning, let him try his skill, and lee what Learned 
 ftuffhe is like to make of it when he comes to explain 
 his Notion of Mutual-Confcioufnefs by fever al Examples, 
 Steps, and Sorts of tall to form om ade- 
 
 quate Notion of this fo muchadmired 2 hing< Whei efbre 
 
i p o Animadverjiom, Sec. 
 
 I conclude, and, I think, unanswerably, That the 
 Fathers by this Vmty between the Divine Perfons, 
 n one Thing, and this Man quite another ; and con- 
 (equently that they have given a very different Account 
 of it, from what he gives, contrary to his equally bold 
 an 1 falfe Aflevenftion, affirming it to be the very 
 
 And now I am ready to fee what he has to offer us 
 from the Fathers in behalf of his Mutual-Con fcioufnefs ; 
 but becaufe I am extremely defirous, that the Reader 
 Ihould keep himclofe to the Point, and not liiffer him to 
 wander from it (which, in difpute, he is as apt to do as 
 any Man living) I fhall prefiime to hint this to him, 
 That the Point to be proved by this Author, is not that 
 the Three Divine Perfons have one and the fame Numeri- 
 cal Nature, or Ejfence, nor that they are Mutually Covin- 
 ous to one another of whatfbever each of them is, or 
 knows ; no, nor yet that this Mutual-Confcioufnefs infers 
 an Unity of Nature in them, as a Thing infeparable from 
 it. But he is to prove, That this Unity of Nature, and 
 this Mutual-Confcwufnefs are Convertibly one and the 
 lame Thing, or that this latter is to the former what the 
 Ejfence, or Form of any Thing is to that Thing : That 
 is to fa) , That the Unity of the Divine Nature formally 
 Confisis in, and is, what it is, by that Mulnal-Confciouf 
 wefs which belongs to the Three Divine Perfons. This, 
 J fey, is the Thing to be proved by Him. 
 
 And fb I proceed to his Arguments (which I affaire 
 
 the Reader, he fhall find very ftrangeones) neverthelefs 
 
 give him aseafie and diftinft a view of them, as I 
 
 , i will let down the feveral Heads of them before I 
 
 particularly difcufs them. 
 
 i . The Firfl of them is from the fAoc arepy&a, afcribed, 
 : he Fathers, to all the Three Divine Perfons ioyntlv. 
 
 2. The 
 
Chapter VII. 1 9 1 
 
 2. The Second from the fAx wnau (t S^ty* ^m ^5 
 
 3. The Third from the «%cj^pjfoxf, or Circumincefc 
 fion attributed likewife by the barbers to them. 
 
 4. The Fourth from the Representation, which 
 St. Auftin makes of the Trinity, by the Mind, and 
 Three, diflrnct Facilities of Under flan ding, Memory, ami 
 Will. And, 
 
 5. The Fifth and laft from the Unity of the Original 
 Principle, or Fountain of the Deity, or rather (fay I) of 
 the fecond and third Perfbns of the Trinity. 
 
 All which I fhall examine diftin£tly,and in their order. 
 But before I do fb, I think fit to give the Reader an Ac- 
 count in one word of this Author's whole defign in all 
 the Particulars above fpecified* And that is, to prove, 
 That the Unity of the Divine Nature confifts in Unity of 
 Operation, and then to fuppofe (for he does not fb much 
 as go about to prove it) that this Unity of Operation U 
 Mutual-Confcioufnefs. This is the Sum Total of the 
 Bufinefs ; but I now come to Particulars. And 
 
 Firft, For the jAx ovepyncL, quoted by him out of Greg. 
 Nyffen. Where, before we fee how far it may be formed 
 into an Argument , I think it requifite to give fbme Ac- 
 count how this Author Difcourfes of it. I muft confeft, I 
 have fbmetimes wondred, what defign he could have in 
 ib zealoufly exploding thofe commonly received Terms 
 of Substance, EJJence and Nature from any application of 
 them to God : which here he docs again afrefh, telling 
 as in PageUp, lines 24,2' 7. That it confound* 
 
 our minds when we talk of tin rgCdl Unity of tijt God- 
 
 head to have the least Conception w Thought the Di 
 
 ft motion and Union of Natures tyd Effentes. And that 
 therefore we are to fpeak of God only in words impoi t 
 Energy or Operation : And accord: ugly for this 
 
iyi Animack ns, Sec. 
 
 God by ©saw and i<pop&, words 
 nor figj e or Effence , but only S/jA* and fo- 
 
 id this Author has gone a ftep much be- 
 plain fig us, That the Father and the Son 
 
 ,</. Page i j 2. 1 ine i j. And *fo/ Ak- 
 > ^ the fame in God,l\i] j.E.20. and confe- 
 quently. That we are to entertain 110 other Conception 
 of God > but as of a pure fimple Operation. And thus, when 
 we have degraded the Divine Nature'tirom Substance to 
 Opera: ion, it is but one ftep more to degrade it to bare 
 Notion. This conceit of this Author , I fay, at firft I 
 could not but wonder at, but am fince pretty well aware 
 of what he drives at by it. And that is in fhort, That 
 lie thinks it a much eafier Matter to make Action, or 0- 
 n> than Substance *, EJJence, or Nature pafs for Mu- 
 il-Confcioufnefs : And this upon good Reaion, Iamfa- 
 tisfied, is the Thing he defigns : But I believe he will 
 fall fhortof fetching hti Mutual-Confcioufnefs out of ei- 
 ther of them. And therefore firft to Correct that Crude 
 Notion of his, That wt mufl not [peak of God in Terms im- 
 porting Nature, but Operation',! defire this Bold Man (as I 
 urged before in Chap. 2.) to tell me whether the Names 
 of J ah and Jehovah, and / am that I am, by which God, 
 revealed himfelfto his People, were not Names of Nature 
 and Effence ? and w hether God revealed them for any other 
 purpofe than that he might be known and understood by 
 them ? But for all this he will have us to know from Gr. 
 Nyffen, That the Divine Nature is quid ccxociwvofjia^ou 
 $ ci<fe5t>c?ov, a Thing above Name or Expreflion. And it 
 . is lb, I confefs, as to an adequate complete Conception or 
 Defcription of it. But then, I ask him, are not the Di- 
 vine Opi r. it ions fo too ? Are we able to comprehend them 
 perfectly, and to the utmoft of what, and how they are ? 
 When the Pfalmift tells US, that God has put darknefs un- 
 
 dtr 
 
Chapter VIL i 9 
 
 ■ . P&I.18. 9. and ' lotBeps ire no 
 
 Pfe] 77.19. And the Apoftle in Rom.u. 33. T 
 
 jud u , and his way nding out. 
 
 And are not \ in /Account of his /> :'.v.-. 
 
 and i in. the Government of the World ? And 
 
 yetfurely, notwithstanding all this, we may havefbme 
 true, though imperfeft Conceptions both of his Nature 
 and of bis Operations 2Mb : And I defire tiiis AiTuming 
 Man to inform me, What fhould hinder, but that (6 
 much as we Conceive of God, we may like wife exprefs, 
 and (what is more) prove too ? For though G 
 Nyffen has told us, That the Divine Nat tire is unexpreflt- 
 ble, yet, I hope, a Thing may be proved, though the 
 Nature of it cannot always be throughly expreiled. But 
 the Truth is, he makes this Father Argue at a very odd 
 rate. For he tells us, Page 115. That one way,by which 
 Gregory Nyffen undertakes to prove, That the o/jyvaizy, 
 or Specif ck Samenefs of Nature, (as this Man understands 
 it) proves a Numerical Unity of Nature in the Divine 
 Per funs, is, becaufe the Name [ God ] does not fb pro- 
 perly figni fie the Divine Nature as fome thing relating to 
 it : Which is a rare Proof indeed ; it being as much as 
 to fay, That the o^imovy or Samenefs of Nature, proves 
 one God, becaufe [God"] does not figni f.e Nature. But 
 St. Gregory is for from arguing To (which, befides the 
 Abfiiroity of it, is only denying inftead of froving) but 
 he proves Samenefs and Unity of Nature, by Samenejs, 
 Unity of Operation, and that furely he might very well 
 do, without making Unity of Nature only an U 
 Operation. And no lefs abfiird is it, to reprefent St.G 
 gory making Unity of Operation one way, whereby the 
 lyLovjiov, or Specif ck Samenefs of Nature^ proves & Nume- 
 rical Unity of Nature : For though Unity of Operation it 
 
 C c felf 
 
 1 
 
ip± JnirnadverJtonS) &c. 
 
 felf proves this, vet furcly it is not a Medium, whereby 
 a Specific!: Vnity of the laid Nature, does, or can prove 
 it. 
 
 But to proceed, That AiTertion of this Author, [Thai 
 - Energy, or Operation'] contains in it more 
 For firfthet i and 
 
 n for t! c Thing ; whereas hipy**, is propei 
 
 ion is only the hepyna-is, or actual 
 Exercife of that vis, or Power. But whether it fignifies 
 one or both, it is certain, that Gad is properly neither of 
 them. For (as I have (hewn before) we muff (peak of 
 God as we are able to conceive of him ; and we conceive 
 of God, not as of an Action, but as of an Agent ; that is, 
 as of zSub (lance acting, or txerting it felf ; and upon this 
 Account I do here tell this Author, that it is impoffiblc 
 for Humane Reafbn to conceive of j. I'd "ion, or Operation, 
 as founded in Subjlance ;and that nothing would more 
 confound and overturn all the Methods, Ways, and 
 Notions of Men's Minds, than to endeavour to conceive 
 of it otherwife. And therefore if God is fbmetimes cal- 
 led ivipy&ctj or Action, it is by a Metonymy of the Ad- 
 junct for the Subject, or the Effect for die 'Caufe ; for 
 truly and properly he is not fb. And now, if this Au- 
 thor fhall think to take Sanctuary in that known Expref 
 fionof Gad, 'That he is apure fimplc Act, he ma\ pleafe to 
 take notice, that the Term Act is Ambiguous ; ami 
 fbmetimes fignifies an Actus Entitativus, which is no 
 more than the Entity, or Being of a Thing, and fbme- 
 times an AEtus PbyficHs, which is the Operation, or Z:.v- 
 ertionoi Tome A. Power. And it is in the former 
 fenfe only in which God is laid to be a pine fimp/e Act, 
 ] the latter. And, by this Author's Favour, 
 i ' or Nature isfuch an Act, which 
 
 quite 
 
Chapter VII. 1 9 5 
 
 quite fpoils all his fine Notion about 
 bv Terms n 9 in excli tl 
 
 of / . This Ii to 
 
 prcmifl tfi owi g up the very foundation of all I 
 [uments, and indeed of his whole If efis. 
 
 And ib I come to his Argument, the Sum ol 
 is this. 
 
 That the Divine Nature is Divine Energy, or 
 tion ; And therefore, That the 
 tiony is of Divine Nature ; And Laftly, I h > 
 
 Unity f& Divin Nature is MntuatrConfcioufn 
 
 Now it is certain, That there is not one of all t. 
 Three Proportions true ; but that is no fault of mine: 
 fince if they werecaft into a Syllogifm, that vj not 
 mend the Matter ; for the Syllogifm mull proceed 
 thus. 
 
 I y of I < - Energy, or Operation is M. 
 Conjcioufn 
 
 Nature tiUnity of Divine Em 
 . 
 And tn :, Vnity of Divine Nai s M 
 
 Co. 
 Every one of which Proportions is frill falfe. And 
 yet I I ' s it to this Author himfelf, or to any one, 
 
 who has Pvead and Confidered his Book, to f: I let- 
 
 ter Ari-irnent from what he lias laid of a y.la. hepyact, 
 with reference to the prefent Subjeft, if lie can. 
 
 [eft whetner it be an Argument, or no Ar- 
 gumen dfwer to his Allegatioi l& hip- 
 
 yax with relation to the Unity cfti :} 
 
 to Mutt tfafei i s thus. 
 
 tt it is one Thing to be ?. Proof of a Thing, 
 and another to be that wherein the A 
 proved, does confiit. Thus actual Ratiocination i 
 
 C c 2 certain 
 
1 9 6 Jmmadverjidns, &c. 
 
 certain Proof of a Principle of Reafon, yet neverthelefs 
 it is not that wherein a Principle of Reafon does confift- 
 finee that may be and continue when aftual Ratiocinati- 
 on ceafes. In like manner I will allow the pi* Ivipyenety 
 to be a Proof of the fxlet valet. But I abfblutely deny, 
 ThattheSyoWof the Energy, is that wherein tneiwT)j$ 
 of the Nature is, or ought to be placed ; or that the Fa* 
 thers ever accounted it 'b, how truly and ftrongly fbever 
 it might, in their judgment, infer it. 
 
 Wiiat the fathers d< :igned to prove by Vnity of Ope- 
 ration in ti we Perfons, is evident from the 
 
 following Paffages; (to which Twenty times as ma- 
 ny might be added.) Gregory 
 *&*$ » l/ttw«MU g h <pi-n< *<irmt » A / > J 7^tellsus,T>W//^.^;r^ / ^ 
 
 ujt,\ \ tvtuv ftfy. Grig. Xfifrn m Grii. Dom. v '~' . » } , J . / 
 
 a&t.j, Fntrgyisthe \ame, have their 
 
 T o.v aj axjTetl atitfiau TK7W j^nxjioLiuia: Nature altogether the J 
 
 opoikx vow*?* & Wia /ma tklt&s K, q» . 2* »^e thejame Operations, have 
 fiUibi. contra Euwmhm. U ** h -* cHf>M*tt 4//S Me /W EflWe Tor Sub- 
 
 AiKPwne*jpatTi4*ri*<d'**t<t»iAK r iov.Bafil itance.J ii^ /,;<? Operation 
 Epift, ad Eujlitbiwu. Non potdt opcratio effe [or Energy] o^V/v Father and, 
 
 diverfa ubi non folum vequalis. vcruin ctiain in- ,/,„ c>„ -j __„ 
 dUcrctaNatura. A*^. Serm. dc Krbo Dem. 'f ^ ti one, as appears tn 
 6$. Cat. a that txpref/wn, Let us make 
 
 Man. ..4,7^ .^///AVhatfbever 
 
 the Father docs, that likewife dees the Son, and therefore 
 
 there is but one EJJcnce of the I ather and the Son. And a- 
 
 gairi^ The Samenefs cf Operation in the Father, Son, and 
 
 HolyGboJr, evidently fbeavs. That there is no difference in 
 
 ir FJfence, or Subjlance. . And accordingly St. Aufln?, 
 
 7 he Opt ration cannot be diver fc, where the Nature is not only 
 
 hut a/Jo undivided. From all which, it is melt 
 
 ear, ThattJie Fathers alledge tbu&Vnity of Operation 
 
 only as a Proof or Argument of this Vnitj of Nature, or 
 
 c Ijfna : And therefore, fince nothing can be a Proof of 
 
 it 
 
Chapter VII. tpj 
 
 it fclf. That they did not take Unity of Operation, and 
 Unit) of Nature for one and the fame Thing. But, 
 
 Stcondly, Suppoling (but not granting) that it were 
 fb, viz* lhatVnity of Operation, did not only prove, 
 but really was it (elf this Unity of Nature, or Effena ; 
 yet how will this Author prove, that Unity of Nature^ 
 or Unity of Operation is properly Mutud-Confcioufnefs ? 
 Is there fb much as one Tittle in the Fathers cxpreffing, 
 or neceffarily implying, that it is fb ? And as to the Rci- 
 lon of the Thing it felt; Will any one fay, That there 
 is no other hipyeict, belonging to the Divine Nature, but 
 Mutual-Confctoufnefs ? Or that this htpy&oL in the whole 
 Latitude and Compafs of it extends no further ? Nay, 
 on the contrary, does it not Exert it (elfin Infinite other 
 A£ts ? And, what is yet more, does it not more pro- 
 perly belong to any other of the Divine Jtfs, than to an 
 Jclof Knowledge ? (bare Knowledge, as fuch being of it 
 felf unoperative) arid Mutudl-Confcioufnefs is but an Act 
 of Kjtoxvledge. I proteft / am ashamed to difpute ferioufly 
 againft fuch Stuff'. 
 
 2. His next Argument to prove, That Mutual-Confci- 
 oufnefs is formally that "Unity of Nature which is in the Three 
 Divine Perjbns, is taken from another Expreffion of the 
 iaid Gregory Nyjfen ; viz. That there is amongft the D/- 
 vine Perfons, jxiol xlvwis a£ fi&KoafjLYiais t5 ctyctSrS /2yA?r- 
 ^toT©«, Concerning which, this Author has the bold- 
 nefs to appeal to any one to judge, whether this ^U xl- 
 won (ZvKifJLct!®*, this (ingle Motion of the Will, which 
 at the fameinftant, is in Father, Son, and Holy Ghofl, 
 car. (ignifie any thing but Mutual-Confciouftiefs^ which 
 makes them Numerically One, Page 117. Lines S, 9, 10. 
 &C. And he adds, That it is impoffible they fliould 
 have fuch a fingle Motion of Will puffing through them 
 • !!, without -this MutualrConfcioufnefs, Page 124. Lines 
 
 joj , 
 
i pS Anirnadverjiom^ Sec. 
 
 jo, ji. .And -urn of his Argument from the 
 
 IftAnfWerto Which, before I addrefs my felf to his 
 
 anient, I will givefortie Account of the Quotation. 
 
 In which, by his Favour, we arc to take the ienfe of 
 
 the Father's " from the Father hhnfelf, and not 
 
 1 1 1 m the T he who Quotes them, thinks 
 
 fit to(' mthefti (how good fbever he may be at 
 
 ow, what 8t< Gregory nieans by them, 
 
 appears plainly by Iiis manner of Reafoning. TheQue- 
 
 . him WasJVhei 'ee Divide Perfonsnterb 
 
 thy PWhichSt.Gf ndamongft other 
 
 Proofs,fays,ThatG<?rfis the Name of Energypnd from the 
 lV.'.m i yfth.zDeity 9 mdtho.t Three 
 
 . butonc(/W beeaufethe(' t\ leifi 
 
 ;i!i. To this he raifes an Objection from the Saprenefs of 
 / i uh \ , OjfiteflT Operation amongft Mcn,as Geo;, ?s, 
 
 //, Orators, whole Office^Bujinejs and Operations, 
 (in their refpeftive way) are the lame ; which yet does 
 not hinder, but that they are (fill Three or more feveral 
 Men. To which he Anfwcrs, That thefeacl feparately 
 and by themfelves; but that it is not {bin theDJw 
 
 ; no Perfon, in the H */Vy, doing any Thing 
 
 by liimfelf on!y,or aflting feparatdy from the other Two, 
 
 but rhat thcu and t!;e fafrtC Mi of- 
 
 n of Will paffittg from the / i her, through the Son, 
 
 rothc Hoi) This is the force of St. Gregory's Rea- 
 
 tng, and the plain meaning of it is no more but this, 
 
 That Three Men acting the fame Thing, areftill Three 
 
 Men, : \ they act fcparatclv and by themfeli es : 
 
 that the 2 hr\ . l\ tfons in the Trinity,axt but One God, 
 
 becaufe they do not act I ly, but that there is the 
 
 fam . r. ifition of 11'// in all the Thrto 
 
 thecoritfary, Three Men's not having 
 
 cue 
 
Chapter VII. 199 
 
 one anci the fame Mi.. W \ ©q ally proves, Tl 
 
 are not One^ but ; fevera] Mui ; and aficond- 
 kigly mafa renoe between Three Men 
 
 acting the g, and the Operation of the Three 
 
 Perfbns in die Blejfed 'J ; which is the Sum of 
 
 St. v. to the iorementioned Objeftion, 
 
 And now, what does all this prove ? Why truly neither 
 of thofe Two Things, which this Author mull prove, or 
 he proves nothing, viz. That this 'Unity of Motion, .:■ 
 Dtfpofition of WiU 3 is pre I formally Unity of Dir 
 
 .! next, Thai thk Ui : , < 
 rover I) . l^Confcioufm / r. The fe Two Thin | \ 
 
 I fay, it is incumbent upon him to prove : But how it 
 can be done from the fore-mentioned Words, or Argu- 
 ment of Gregory Nyffw, I believe will pofe the Learncdft 
 Man alive to ihew. 
 
 The proper Anfwer therefore to this Argument will 
 be much the lame with that juft before given to the Ar- 
 gument drawn from the pla. ovepy&a, (of which this 
 Ikicl *bwu jSaArfuoT®! is but a Branch) and it proceeds 
 thus. 
 
 Firft, I deny the ^,/<x kiWb /3yA^oT©«, to be any 
 more than a proof of the Unity of the Divine Nature ; 
 juft as either the Effect, or the Caufality is a fure proof 
 of the G*///?; but for ail that, is not the Caufe : or as a 
 Consequent proves its Antecedent without being the 
 Antecedent, or that \. i the Nature of the .Antece- 
 
 dent does confift. 
 
 Secondly, In the next place I deny that fj.la x*Wa 
 /3tfAn,ua7®u, is formally and properly the fame wit ■ ■ - 
 tuaUConfa •'...■ , v. morethan an Aft, or Motion of 
 the Will, is formally the ith an Act of the I 
 
 \ng.: And before this Author t . for granted, 
 
 (which is his conftant of proving tilings) le: 
 
 that 
 
200 AnimacfoerjionS) &c. 
 
 that he make it appear, That |3J;w/xa, or (Zv^yhtu, and 
 jtapif, or yvStns, fignifie formally one and the fame 
 Thing: And it was boldly done of him (to fay the 
 leaft) to appeal to his Reader about ^Tiling, in which, 
 [fheunderftood the difference between an\ . Voli- 
 tion, and cin Ad tof ^Intellection, he muft cert j udge 
 againft him. 
 
 But it may bereplyed, That this pi* (ZvXwis does at 
 lea ft infer a /tx/ct ypooan, erenow, or autelfnG-is. I grant it 
 may: But affirm, that this is nothing to his Purpofe ; 
 unlefsit could follow from hence, that that which in- 
 fers, or proves a Thing, is the very Thing which it in- 
 fers and proves ; which it neither is, nor, for that Rea- 
 fbn, can be. 
 
 As for what he adds, That this /u,/a xlvwu |3yA>f/utaT©« 
 cannot be in the Three Divine Perjons, without fitch a Mm- 
 tual-Confcioufnefs : I do readily grant this alfo. But in 
 the mean time, is not this Dictator yet old enough to di- 
 ftinguifh between the Caufa fine qua nan, or rather the 
 Condition of a Thing , and the Ratio forma/is, or A J a- 
 ttire of that Tiling) Between That, without which a 
 Tiling cannot be, and that, which that Thing properly 
 is ? There can be no fuch Thing as Sight, without a due 
 Circulation of the Blood and Spirits: But isfiich a Circu- 
 lation, therefore, properly an A£t of Sight ? Or an Aft 
 of Sight fuch a Circulation? To difpute this further, 
 would be but to abufe the Reader's Patience. 
 
 And laft of all, if this Author fhould take advantage t 
 of thole words from Gregory Nyffen, That God is the 
 Name of Energy* Befides, that it is not the bare Nota- 
 tion, but ufe of the Word, that muft govern its fignifica- 
 tion : I would have this Author know, That God may 
 have many Names, by which his Nature is not flgnifi- 
 ed ; as well as leveral others by which it is, and may be. 
 
 But 
 
C H A PTER VII. 2 I 
 
 But I muft confefs, it is a very pleafant Thing (as was 
 
 in fbmemeafure hinted before) to prove the Divine I 
 ture to be Energy , becaufe the Name [God'] does not 
 fig m fit N alter i , but Energy ) or Operation ; whereas in Truth 
 (if it proves any thing) it proves th&tNature and Energy 
 (applyed to Godjdo by no means figniHe the fameThing. 
 And fo I have done with his Argument from the /&/«, 
 y.ivYiaii |3«A»i/xa7©-, and effectually demonftrated, That 
 there is not fb much as the leaft fhew, or femblance of 
 any proof from this, That Mutual-Confcioufnefs is properly 
 that wherein the Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three 
 Persons of the BleJJed Trinity does conjifi. 
 
 j. His Third Argument is from the Word n-gg^apH- 
 vis, commonly Tranflated Circuminceffion, and fignify- 
 inga Mutual-lnexiftence, or In-dwelling of each Per fan in 
 the other Two. The Word was firft ufed in this fenfe 
 (lb far as I can find) by Damafcen, a Father of the 8th 
 Century. But the Tiling meant by it, is contained in 
 thofe words of our Saviour in John 14. 11. 21. Bel/tie 
 me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me, which, 
 I confefs, are a folid and fufficient proof of the Unity and 
 Identity of the Divine Nature, both in the Father and the 
 Son ; and withal a very happy and fignificant ExprefTion 
 of the fame. 
 
 But what is this to our Authors Purpofe ? And how 
 does he prove this 7re£i%wp>i<7(s to be Mutual-Confciouf- 
 nefs ? Why truly, by no Argument, or Reafbn produ- 
 ced, or fb much as offered at by him, but only by a con- 
 fident, Over-bearing Affirmation, That there is no other 
 Account to be given of that Matual-bi-being of I he Divine 
 Perfons in each other, ( which the Father S call irZQ/.yju~ 
 f»i<ns) but by Mutual-Cwfcioufnefs , Page 125. Lines 
 6, 7, 8. 
 
 D d But, 
 
2 j0umadverJionS) &c. 
 
 But, by his leave, Imuft debate the cafe a little with 
 him, before he carries it vttib. And in order to this, I 
 mull tell him in the firft place, That the Queftion is not 
 whether MutualA fnejs befi explains this 7re^A^ooprr 
 
 am, but whether it be the Trt&xolpwu it felf,and that 7rg- 
 e/X^? mi " ^ c t ' lc Unity of the Divine Nature in the Three 
 Pt rfons ? And in the next place, I demand of him, 
 Whether our Saviour's Words do not plainly and ex- 
 prefly fignifie the Mutual-In-being, or ln-exiftence of the 
 Perfons in one another, without any fignification of their 
 Mutual-Confcioufne.fs at all ? And if ib ; let me hear a 
 Reafon, Why we fhould not take our Saviour's mean- 
 ing from the Native fignification of liis own Words, ra- 
 ther than from thole of this Author. For will he ven- 
 ture to affirm, That the Father cannot be in the So?\ 
 and the Son in the Father by a Mutual-Inexiflence in one 
 another, but only by a Mutual-Kjiow ledge of 'one another ? 
 Let him take heed what he fays, and how he ventures 
 beyond his Depth. Or will he fay, That our Saviour 
 meant the fame Thing with himfelf, but was not fo hap- 
 in exprejjlng it ? For no other Reafon, but one of tliefe 
 Two can be affigned, That when our Saviour exprelles 
 himfelf in Terms importing Mutual-ln-exiftence, this 
 Man (hall dare to fay, That he means nothing by them 
 but Mutual-Confcioujnefs. I refer it to the Serious and 
 Impartial Reader to judge of the Horrible Boldnefs of 
 this Man : and withal, to obferve how extremely he 
 varies from himfelf about this Tre&xopms and Mutual- 
 Confcioufnefs. For 
 
 Firft, He fometimes fays, That Mutual-Confcioufnefs 
 i he only Thing wherein both the Unity of the Divine Na- 
 ni this Mutual-Indwelling of the Three Divine Per- 
 % \ does Confisl, Page 1 24. Lines 4, 5. And 
 
 Second 
 
Chapter VII. 2 
 
 Secondly, He fays, That Mutual-Confi the 
 
 only thing th.il c.\n explain, or give an Account of th\ 
 
 tud-Iu-dwdiwg, cr vre&xolfYHTi:, Page 12 <. .Lines 6, 7. 
 To which! Anlwer, That when lie (peaks of giving 
 
 an Account of this Trgg^Jpwo-i;, if he means only m . 
 
 nt tb.it there is fitch a Thing belonging to the I) v 
 fans , Our Saviour's Words have given a fufficicnt Ac- 
 count of that already. But, 
 
 Secondly, If he means fiich an Account of it, as 
 plains and makes clear to us the Nature of it, by (hew- 
 ing what it is, and how it is. I deny that any iuch Ac- 
 count can be given (or perhaps underftood) by Humane 
 Reafbn ; and much left, that his MutuaUQonfcioufh 
 does or can give it. 
 
 Concerning which, I fliall ask him this one Queftion, 
 , Whether the Three Perfons of the Blejfed Trinity are 
 not Mutually-Con fcious to one another of their Mutual- 
 In-exiflence in one another ? I fuppofe he will not (be- 
 caufene dares not) deny it. And if he grants it, then 
 it manifefHy follows, That their Mutual-ln-exiftence in 
 one another, is in Order of Nature before t :/- 
 
 Confcioufnefs ; and confequently cannot be the fame with 
 it, nor Confift in it. For certainly thofe Divine Perfons 
 muft Ext ft Mutually m one another, before they a 
 know , or be Confciom to themfelves that they do 
 
 So that we fee here, that nothing is, or can be conclu- 
 ded from this Tgg^k'pwo-js for his Mi 
 whether we confider the '"Cfe of the Word, or the / 
 of the Tiling. But let us fee, how he 5 good I 
 
 Point from the Authority of the I s, which was the 
 grand Thing undertook by him in this his 4th Section. 
 And here as for the F , he both Defpifes and Re- 
 proaches them, and that -oily too. For firft ' 
 
 Dd 2 Is 
 
lo a ArumadverfionSi &c. 
 
 tells us, That fitch an Union amongft the Divine Perfons 
 (as is exprefled by the word ir$&%iipiims) they all agre* 
 in, but how to explain it they knew not, Page 125. Lines 
 17, 18. And why then, in the Name of God, does he 
 refer to the Fathers to juftifie his Explanation of that, 
 which in the very fame Breath he fays , They knew 
 not how to Explain? And the Truth is, the Fathers never 
 owned themfelves able to explain it ; and that for a very 
 good Reafbn ; viz. becaufe they held it unexplicable 
 and unconceivable ; and not for that Scandalous Reafbn 
 given by him , viz. That they had grofs Material Con- 
 ceptions of the Deity , by conceiving of it as of a Sub- 
 fiance, Page 125. Lines 27, 28, For, fays he, within 
 Two Lines after, Had they Contemplated God as a pure 
 Mind, it had been eafie to explain this 7Tf£ji%a)p)i<Tis, or In- 
 dwelling of the Divine Perfons in each other. Good God ! 
 That any Profe/for of Divinity fhould call that eafie to ex- 
 plain, which the Reaftyi of all Mankind has hitherto 
 bent under, as a Thing too great, and myfterious for it 
 to comprehend, or to grapple with ! So that if ever we 
 have caufe to cry out <3 /3a^©«, it is here : Or that he 
 fhould tax all thofe, who own themfelves at a lofs about 
 it, for not Contemplating God as a pure Mind ! But to him, 
 f confefs, who can Conceive of fuch a Pure Mini, as vs 
 no Sub fiance ; - that is to fay, in other words, No Being. 
 (For I am fiire he will not fo much as pretend it to be 
 an Accident) to Him, I fay, 1 cannot wonder, if nothing 
 feem difficult, or myfterious. In the mean time, it is 
 fhamelefi and infufterable in this Man to fay, as he does 
 Page 100, 1 01, That his Explication of the Trinity is not . 
 ncw,but the fame with that of the Father ^,and afterwards 
 fri purfuance of this Aflertion, to fay, That the Fathers 
 Knew not how to explain it, and to give this as a Reafbn of 
 their not knowing how to do fb, viz. That they had fuch 
 
 orojs- 
 
Chapter VII. 
 
 grofs Notions of God, th.it they could not conceive rightly cf 
 this Myjlery. For this he has roundly affirmed ; and 
 therefore ought in all Reafbn,either to prove this Charge 
 upon the Father s 9 or to give the World, and the Church 
 of England in particular , fatisfa£tioh for fpeaking 10 
 faJfely and fcandaloufly of fiich glorious Lights and 
 principal Pillars of the Christian Church ; and fuch as , 1 
 dare fay, never Preached nor Prayed in any Conventicle. 
 But what the Dodlrine of the Fathers is concerning 
 this 7re&xvpwis, and how they underftood thole words 
 of our Saviour (expreiled by this Term) is manifefc 
 from the Teilimony of two or three of them, which 1 
 fhall let down, as (in fb known a cafe) abundantly fiif- 
 ficient. St. Cyrill of Alex- 
 andria, fays exprefly, ChriJPs 
 faying,tlmt he is in theFather, 
 and the Father in him, (hews 
 the Identity of the Deity, and 
 the Unity of the Sttbjtance, or 
 Ejfence. And fb hkewife 
 Athanafius : Accordingly there- 
 fore (fays he) Chrijl having 
 faid before, I and my Father 
 are one : He adds , I am in 
 the Father,and the Father in 
 me, that he might jbeiv both 
 l he Identity of the Divinity, 
 and the Unity of Ejfence. And 
 fb again St. Hilary : The Fa- 
 ther is in the Son, and the Son 
 m the Father, by the Unity of 
 an injef arable [VndividedJ Nature. By which Paffages, I 
 fuppoie any Man of fenfe will perceh e. That the Thing 
 which the Fathers meanrand gathered from thofe words 
 
 of 
 
 205 
 
 i *<rU< %VQT>fl*, 
 p. 10?. 
 
 c/tf£>;, Qril. TUftur. /tfu*. 
 
 Aid wro $> x) stxJTvf i}(nto< ©eM^r. 
 'EyJ xj 9 Kern}? h ijfdfS, i7myd}i7o y Eyj> «♦* 
 7$ T&TeJi *) Henif iv, 'E/4,0/ ha, r <aV 
 
 7(W7l7>f}cL f 06O7?/]©-, T 3 MTh\* $ WldL^ 
 
 Aify,Atkanajiiti OrtuoncqiitrUiOttri Arianos. 
 
 Pater in filio eft & filius in Fatre per [».* 
 fcparabilis Naturae Unitatem, ffihriui it Tn- 
 
 n>tutc,lib. 8. 
 
zo 6 AnimadverjionS) Sec. 
 
 of our Saviour (finceexprefled by this 7rty.%®$wii) was 
 no I wfcioufnefs (which they never men- 
 
 tion) but an Vnity of Effence, or Nature (which they 
 exp iid conftantly do.; Nor does this very Author 
 
 ny it, as appears from his own words, though he 
 quite p the fence of the Fathers, by a vcryfence- 
 
 'k upon them, Page 125. Lines 20,21. 1 
 
 San [or Unity] of Nature ((ays hej might be the 
 
 Cm on [in the Divine Perfons^ Viz. by a 
 
 *"££/;£ wp»o-i>, but not explain what this Intimate "Onion is. 
 
 Now this Author has been already told, That the Que- 
 
 ff ion here is not, what explains this Union, but what this 
 
 Union is ? But befides this his miftake of theQueftion, I 
 
 defire him to declare, what he means by the Caufe of this 
 
 Union? (as he hcrcexpref.es himfelf.) For will he make 
 
 an Vnioh (as lie calls an Vnity) in the Divine Perfons by 
 
 Samenefs of Nature a Caufe of their Intimate Union by a, 
 
 we&XupwU) or Mutual-ln-being of them in each other , 
 
 and affirm alfb this 7ree/x^P na ' 15 t0 be the fame Thing 
 
 with Mutual-Con fcioufnefs ? If he does fb, he makes the 
 
 ne Tiling the Caufe of it felf. For the Samenefs of 
 
 in the Three Perfons, and their Mutual~ln-being, or 
 
 fa - . , .', are the very fame Thing, and the fame Unity, 
 
 though differently cxpreffed. But however, if we take 
 
 him at his own word, it will effectually overthrow his 
 
 Hypothefis. For if the Samenefs of the Divine Native 
 
 in the Three Perfons, be (as he fays) the caufe of this 
 
 ve&xoipvicrisy and this Te£A%oopn(ris be the fame with Mu- 
 
 <>n fcioujnefs ', it will and mu ft follow, That this 
 
 5 / , or Unity of Nature can no more confiif in Mu~ 
 
 ;oufnefs, than the Caufi c:.n confift in its Ejftff, 
 or the Antecedent in its Confequent. And this Inference 
 
 Hands firm and unanfwcrable againft him. 
 
 But 
 
Chapte r VIL 207 
 
 But as to the TfUtb of the Thing it Iclf, though v. »c 
 allow and grant i , of the Divine Nature in the 
 
 Three Perfons^ and// tlln-bting, or In-dwelling of 
 
 the laid Perjbns in each other, to be the lame Tiling, 
 yet we deny, That this their Mutual In-being is the fame 
 with their Mutual-Confcimtfnefs* But that their Mutual- 
 Confcioufnefs follows and refits from /7,and for that caufe 
 cannot be formally the fame with it. And lb I have done 
 with his jd Argument, which he has drawn from the 
 7re&xa>pY\<ris 9 and is indeed nothing elle, but a bold down- 
 right Perverfwn of Scripture, and a grofs Abule of the 
 Fathers. 
 
 4. His fourth Argument is from an Allegation out of 
 St. AuftWy who, though he does not (as our Author 
 confefies) Name this Mutual-Confcioufnejs, yet he explains 
 a Trinity in 'Unity (as lie would perf wade us) by Exam- 
 ples of Mutital-Confcioufnefs ; particularly by the Unity of 
 the Three Facilities of Undcrffanding, Memory and Will 
 in the fame S onfall of them Miitna/lyCon/ciof/s to one another 
 of the fever al Acts hi longing to each of them. And his 
 9th Book is (pent upon this Argument ; In which he 
 makes the Mind, confidered with its knowledge of it J elf 
 and its love of it felf (all three of them (as he fays) but- 
 one and the lame Thing) a faint Refemblance of theTri 
 nity in Unity. And this is, what he Argues from 
 St. Auflin. 
 
 To which I Anfwer. 
 
 Firff, That Faint Refemblance s are far from being fo 
 iid Proofs of any Thing ; and that, although fimilitud 
 may ferve to illuftrate a Thing otherwife proved, yet 
 they prove and conclude nothing. The Fathers indeed 
 are full of them both upon this and ievcral other Subjects, 
 but frill they ufe them for Illuftration only, and nothing 
 :H<\ And it is a fcurvy fign that Proofs and Argument 1 
 
2 og Jnimadverjiom, &c. 
 
 run very low with this Authoiywhen he paffes over thofe 
 Principal Places in which the Fathers have plainly, open- 
 ly and profeffedly declared their Judgment upon this 
 great Article and endeavours to gather their fence of it 
 only from Similitudes and Allufions ; which looks like a 
 defignof putting his Reader off With fomething like an 
 Argument, and not an Argument \ and of which the Tail 
 /lands where the Headjhoutd : For according to the True 
 Method of proving Things, the Reafon fhould always 
 go firff , and the Similitude come after ; but by no means 
 ought the Similitude ever to be put inftead of the Reafon. 
 But 
 
 Secondly, To make it yet clearer, how unconclufive 
 this Author's Allegation from St. Auflin is, I fhall de- 
 monftrate, That this Father does not here make ufe of 
 an Example of Mutual-Con fcioufnefs, by (lie wing the great 
 difparity between the Thing alledged, and the Thing 
 which it is applved to, and that, as to the very Cafe, 
 which it is alledged for. For we muft obferve, That 
 the Mutual-Confcioufnefs of the Perfons of the BleJJed Tri» 
 nity is fuch , as is fully and entirely in each Perfon, fb 
 that by vertue thereof every one of them is truly and 
 properly Confcious of all that belongs to the other Two. 
 But it is by no means fo in thofe three Faculties of the 
 Soul, Understanding, Memory, andWilL For though the 
 Understanding indeed be Confcioits to all that paffes in the 
 Will, yet I deny the Will to be Confciom to any Thing, 
 or Aft that paffes either in the Underftanding, or the 
 Memory, and it is impoiTible it fhould be fb, without 
 exerting an A3: of Knowledge, or Intelle&ioii ; which 
 to afcribe to the Faculty of the Willy would be infinitely 
 abfurd. It is true indeed, That one and the fame Soul 
 is Confciosts to it felf of the ACts of all thefe Three Fa- 
 culties : But ftill it is by vertue of its Intelleftual Faculty- 
 alone, 
 
Chapte r VII. 209 
 
 alone, that ir is fb. And the like is to be faid of its 
 Knowledge and of its hove of it felf : For though it be 
 the fame Soul which both Knows and Loves' it felf, yet 
 it neither Knows it felf by an Act of Love, nor Loves it 
 felf by an Aft of /(now/edge any more, than it can Will 
 by an Aft of the Memory, or Remember by an Aft of 
 the Will ; which is impoflible : and amongft other proofs 
 that it is fb, it feems to me a very confiderable one, that, 
 if a Man could remember by his Will, this Author in all 
 likelyhood, would not forget himfelf fb often as he does. 
 It is clear therefore on the one fide, That the Ads of 
 Under fianding, Memory, and Will, neither are nor can be 
 Acts of Mutual-Confcioufnejs ; and on the other, that 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do every one of them Exert 
 Acts of Mutual-Confcwufnefs upon one another, andcon- 
 fequently, that, as to this thing, there is a total entire 
 difference between both fides of the Comparifbn. For 
 which caufe it is to be hoped, that this Author himfelf 
 will henceforth Confult the Credit of his own Reafbn fb 
 far, as to give over proving, That the Unity of the Divine 
 Nature in the Three Bleffed Per Jons con fifes wholly andfolely 
 inthe Mutiial-Confcioufnefs of the faid Per fons, by Exam- 
 ples taken from fiich Created Things as are by no means 
 Mutually-Confciotts to one another. 
 
 But to manifeft yet further the Vanity of this his Al- 
 legation out of St. Auflin, I fhall plainly fhew, where- 
 in this Father placed the Unity of the Three Divine Per- 
 fons. And that, in fhort, is in the U&ity of their Nature, 
 EJJence, and Sub/lance. This 
 
 is the Catholick Faith (fays Patrcm v[Vmm & SpIrilum Sai itf 
 he) that roe believe lather, ejufdemque Subitantue, Lib. u d 
 Son, and Holy Gho/l to be of c ^4? 
 one and the fame Subfeance. 
 
 E e And 
 
^ i o jfaimacfyerjwns, &c. 
 
 And again, Let us believe in 
 
 rgo in Pattern &Fitium&Spi- the Father, Son, and Holy 
 
 nfl m Hacc aeternalutit & incommu- /^/ n n^i r t-> . J . 
 
 unus Dcus Unius Subftanti*, Gho J L 1 h t e J e are Vernal and 
 
 litas aetcrna- Ibid. 'Unchangeable, that is, One 
 
 God, of One Subftance, the 
 Eternal Trinity. And moreover, fpeaking of fuch as 
 would have Three Gods to be Worshipped, he adds, 
 
 That they know not what is the 
 \ ': ntcnim quid fit Una eademque Sub- meaning of One and the fame 
 , &d lib. de Agonc chifiuno. Subftance, and are deceived by 
 
 their own Fancies ; and, he- 
 caufe they fee Three Bodies feparate in Three Places, t 
 think the Subftance of God is fo to be under flood. 
 
 I think it very needlefs to add the like Teftimonies 
 from other Fathers (how numerous and full fbever they 
 may be) for our Author having here quoted only 
 St. Auftin, I fhall confine my Anfwer to his Quotation, 
 and think it enough for me to over-rule an Inference 
 from a Similitude taken out of St. Auftin by a Plain, 
 Literal, "Unexceptionable Declaration of St. Auftin^s 
 Opinion. 
 
 The Sum of the whole Matter is this,That the Thing 
 to be proved by this Author, is, 1 hat the Three Divine 
 Per Jons are One, only by an Unity of Mui ual-Confcioufnefs : 
 And to prove this, he produces only a Similitude out of 
 St. Austin , and that alio, a Similitude taken from Things, 
 in which no fuch Thing as Mutual-Con fcioufnefs is to be 
 found. By which it appears, That his Argument is 
 manifeftly Lame of both Legs, and, as Rich, I leave it 
 tojhift for it felf 
 
 5, In the fifth and laft place, He tells us, That ihe 
 Vat hers alfo rcfolvedthe Unity of the God-head in the Three 
 Divine Perfons into the Unity of Principle; meaning there- 
 1 hat though there be Three Divine Perfons in the God- 
 heads 
 
Chapter VII. : : i 
 
 bead. Father', Sen and Holy Gk the Father is 
 
 Original and Fount mu of the Deity, who begets th* Son of 
 his o»H Substance \ and from whom, and the So»j ; 
 Holy Gho/t eternal!) proceeds of the fame Sub stance with the 
 Father and Son ; jo that there is but one Principle ana i 
 +ain of the Deity, and therefore but one God, Page 128. 
 Line 6. 
 
 Now all this is very true ; but how will our Author 
 bring it to his purpofe ? Why, thus, or not at all, 1 . 
 That the Numerical "Cutty of Nat are in the Th\ 1 
 Perjons, by being founded in, and rclblved into thi > C 
 ty of Principle, does therefore properly confift in Mutual- 
 Conjcwufnefs. This, I lay, mull be his Inference, and 
 it is a large (lep, I confeft, and larger than any of the 
 Fathers ever made : Neverthelefs without making it, 
 this Author muft fit down fhort of his Point. And yet! 
 if he really thinks, that his Point may be concluded 
 from hence ; why, in the Name of Sence and Rcafbn 
 might he not as well have argued from Gen.i. 1. That 
 God Created the Heavens and the Earth, arid that the 
 fore thcThree Divine Perjons are and muft be one, only 
 by an Unity of Mut ual-Confcioufnefs ? For it would have 
 followed every whit as well from this as from the other. 
 But, fince the Creation of boih, I believe, never Man 
 difputed as this Man does, while he pretends to prove 
 his Mut ual-Confcioufnefs from the %fyity of Principle in the 
 Oeconomy of the Dizi : And yet, if he does 
 
 not defign to prove it from thence, to what purpofe is 
 this Vmty of Principle \\i dged, where the only 
 
 Point to be proved is, That the Verity of the D \ .1- 
 
 ture in the Three Perjons is only an Cn. ty ol d-Cvu- 
 
 fcioujnej's ? 
 
 But to come a little clofer to him. If this Author can 
 make it out, That the Father Communicates his Sub- 
 
 E e ftaiiu- 
 
2 i 2 rfnirnadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 ftance to the So*, and the Father and the SW together 
 Communicate the fame to the Holy Ghofl by one Eternal 
 Art of Mutual-Confcioufnefs, Common to all Three Per- 
 [o?i$, then his Argument from Unity of Principle to an 
 Unity of Nature, con(i fling in Mutual-Confcioufnefs, may 
 fignifie and conclude fomething ; but this he attempts* 
 not, nor if he fhould, would he or any Man living be 
 ever able to prove it. 
 
 But he is for coming over this Argument again, and 
 tells us, That (as Petavius well obferves) it does not of it 
 prove the Unity (that is to fay, the Numerical Unity) 
 of the God4oead y but only the ofjyvcnGTYis, or Samenejs of Na- 
 ture, i. e. as he elfewhere explains himfelf [the Specif ck 
 Samenefs of ' Nature J\ And that therefore the Fathers thought 
 fit to add, That God begets a Son, not without, but 
 within Himfelf, Page 12%. Line 17, &c. 
 
 In Anfwer to which Obfervation, though it affefts 
 the Point of Mutual-Confcioufnefs (the only Thing now 
 in hand)no more than what lie had alledged before : yet 
 in vindication both of the Fathers and of Petavius him- 
 felf, I muft needs tell this Author, That it is equally an 
 Abufe to both. For as to the Fathers ; it has been f iiffi- 
 ciently proved to him, That neither is there any fiich 
 Tiling as a Sped fie k Unity, or Samenefs of Nature in the 
 Divine Perfons, nor that the Father* ever owned any 
 fuch, but ftill by the o^aiov held only a Numerical V- 
 mty of Nature, and no other ; fb that their laying, That 
 God begot a Son within himfelf, was rather a further Ex- 
 plication of the Qfjyifnovy than any Addition at all to it. 
 And as for Petavim, whereas this Man fays, That he 
 has obicvvcd,That this Argumentation of the Fathers, does 
 not of it felf prove the Numerical Unity of the God-ht ad in 
 the Three Perfons ; Iaverr, That Petavius obferves no 
 Rich Thing. He fays indeed ; If this Reafoning (viz* 
 
 from 
 
Chapter VII. z 1 3 
 
 from Unity of Principle) were confidereA Absolutely and 
 
 r Omver folly y it would prove rather a Specific!: than a Numeri- 
 cal "duty of Nature, and gives a Reafon for it from Hu* 
 mane Generation : But then lie does by no means fay, 
 That the lathers Arguments in this Cafe ought to be ib 
 confidered, but plainly limits 
 
 them to the Divine General i- :l Dignitatis divinaeque Genera- 
 
 te ^r q npmlior IrtnH tionis Conditione ac natiira 
 on y as 01 a pecunai Hinu, gumentationis iftius petitur, • non 
 
 dirlering from all others, qualemcunque ^Jentiae Unit; 
 And thereupon no lefs plain- la, ,V n ^ x \ 
 
 1 , cr K->r 11 r? colligit. Tetav. Dog. 
 
 lyAflerts, lhat when the fa- c>. 15. 
 
 ther begets the Sow, he Com- 
 municates to him the fame Numerical Substance and A T a- 
 ture, and fays expreily, That the force and Strength of 
 the Fathers Argumentation is taken from the proper Con- 
 dition and Nature of the Divinity, and the Divine Genera- 
 tion, from -whence they collect, not any kind of Unity of Ef- 
 fence , but only a Singular and Numerical Unity in the Three 
 Divine Perfons : Which he makes good by Inftances 
 from St. Athanafms and St. Hilary. And this is the true 
 Rate of the Cafe, and (hews, That Petavitts tmderftodd 
 the Fathers ; whether he, who takes upon him to be his 
 Corrector and Confuter, docs or no. In the mea n time 
 it is fhamelefs to infinuate in this manner, that Pet 
 reprefented thefe Arguments of the Fathers, as proving 
 only the [Specifi lck~] Samenefs of Nature, and not the Nu- 
 merical Vnity of the God-head, when he plainly fhews, 
 That they defigned thereby to prove a Numerical 
 of Ejfencc in the Divine Peyfws, and nothing elfe. 
 
 But this Author feems to alfurne to himfelf a peculiai 
 Priviledge of faying what he will, and of whom he will. In 
 which nevertheless I cannot but commend his Conduct, 
 as little as I like his Arguing. Forthat, as he make 
 lb bold with fo Learned ajad Renowned aPerfbn as Pet .-- 
 
i ^ Jbumadver/tonS} Sec. 
 
 viiis ; So he wifely does it now that he is laid faft in his 
 Grave. For had Petavius been living, and this Man 
 Wrote his Book in the fame Language in which Petdvim 
 wrote his (which, for a certain Realbn, I ana pretty 
 well Satisfied he never would) there is no doubt but Pe- 
 tdvius would have tolled him and his New Nrtitn of 
 Three diflinci Infinite Spirits, long fince, in j et, 
 
 and effe&ually taught him the difference of Inlultiiig 
 
 er a Great Man when his Head is low, and wh$ji he 
 is able to defend himfelf. 
 
 We have feen how little our Author has been able to 
 ferve himfelf of the fore-mentioned Refolution of the V- 
 nity of the Divine Nature, into an Unity of Principle, by 
 way of Argument in belialf of his Mutual-Con fcioujnejs. 
 NeveitheleTs, though it fails him, as an Argument, yet, 
 that he may not wholly lofe it, he feems defirous to cul- 
 tivate it as a Notion ; and upon that fcore tells us, That 
 it needs fomething further both to Complete and Explain 
 it, (which, with reference to his own Apprehenfions of 
 it, I eafily believe) but however, I fhall take fbme Ac- 
 count of what he fays, both, as to the Completion, and 
 Explication of it. And 
 
 Hrft,For the Completion. He tells us, That Father, Son, 
 ami Holy GhoH,are Effential to OneGod,znd that upon this 
 Account there mu ft be neceffarily Three Perfons in the V- 
 nity of l he Godhead, and can be no 'more. As to which laft 
 Claufc he muft give me leave to tell him, That it is not 
 the hare Ejfentiality of the Three Perfons to the God-head, 
 which proves that there can be no more than Three be- 
 longing to it : but it is the Peculiar Condition of the Per- 
 
 . which proves this ; without which the Efjentiality 
 
 would no more hinder the Efjentiality of a 
 
 Fourth or /'////.', than the Efjentiality of Two could take 
 
 .'Ualiiy of a Third. And therefore though 
 
 the 
 
Chapter VII. 2, 1 5 
 
 the Propofition laid down by him be true, yet his R 
 fbnforit will not hold. 
 
 But one choice Paffage quoted by him out of a great 
 Father, I muft by no means omit, viz. That upon Ac- 
 count of this Vnit) of Principle, St. AuHin calls the 7V/- 
 mty, Vnam quondam fitmmam Rem, Page 123. Line 8. 
 Concerning which, I defireany Man living (except this 
 Author) to declare freely, whether he thinks that 
 St. Austin, or any one elfe of Sence and Learning would 
 call Three distinct Infinite Minis, or Sprits (which arc 
 neither Numerically, nor Specifically, nor ib much as Col- 
 lectively One) Vnam quondam jummam Rem. But in 
 the 
 
 Second Place : As for his Explication of the (aid No- 
 tion, he tells us, That he (ball proceed by fever al jleps, and 
 thole (as he would perfwade us) very plain, and Vni- 
 v erf ally acknowledged by all, Page 126. Lines 16, i*j y &c. 
 
 Ncvcrthelcfs, by his good leave, I fhall and muft de- 
 mur to Two of them, as by no means fit to be acknow- 
 ledged by an)', and much left fuch as are acknowledged by 
 all. And they are the Third and Fourth. In which he 
 tells US, That, in the firft place, Original Mind and JVif 
 
 ., and inthefecond, That knowledge of it flf, and 
 laftly, Love of it felf are all of them dfiinct ylcls, and 
 fo dijlinct, that they can never be one Simple Individual Act. 
 And withal, that thefe Afts being thus diftinft, muft be 
 Three Subjlantial Acts in God, That is to fay, Three Si 
 fisting Perfnns: By which Three Substantial Acts lie muft 
 
 neceflity mean Three fitfh A& vi- 
 
 ces. Foraimuch as he adds in the vuy next words. 
 That there is nothing but Effent 
 Page 1 30. Lines 7, 8, 9. to the middle of the Page. 
 
 Now againft thefe ftrange Portions I Argue thus 
 
 
1 1 6 Arumadverjtons^ Sec. 
 
 Firft, If the Three fore-mentioned Acts are fb di- 
 in God, that they can never be One Simple Indivi 
 t£t 9 then I infer, That the (aid Three Acts cannot 
 poflibly be One God. Forafinuch as to be One God, is to 
 
 One Pure Simple Indivisible Act. And thus we fee 
 how at one Jlcp, or ftroke, lie has Vngodded the Three 
 s of the Blefjed Trinity. For tbeje Three A&s (he 
 tells us) are the Three Perfons in the Godhead. Though 
 I believe no Divine before him, ever affirmed a Per J on 
 to be an Act, or an Act a Per [on ; with how great Confi- 
 dence foever (and fbmething elfe) this Man affirms it 
 here. 
 
 Secondly, If thofe Three Acts in the God-head are 
 Three distinct Infinite Subfiances (as he plainly fays they 
 are, by telling us, Page 130. Line 19. That there is no* 
 thing but Efifence and Subjlance in God) then in the God- 
 head there are and muft be Three dijlinci Gods, or GocU 
 heads. Forafinuch as an Infinite SubHance being properly 
 God, every difiinct infinite Subjlance, is and muft be a 
 dijlinti God. 
 
 Thefe I affirm to be the direft unavoidable Confe- 
 quences of thofe two fhort Paragraphs in Page 130. 
 which he makes his Third and Fourth Explanatory 
 Steps. 
 
 But becaufc he may here probably bear himfelf upon 
 t licit Maxim, That there is nothing but EJJence and Subjlance 
 in God, (which yet by the way might better become 
 anyone to plead than himfelf ) let me tell him, That 
 that Proportion is not abfolutely, and in all Sences true. 
 If indeed he means by it, That there is no Being, whe- 
 ther Sub fiance, or Accident in God, befides his own molt 
 Pure, Simple, Indivifible Substance,- ox EJfence, (which is 
 the commonly received fence of it) it is moil true. But 
 if he therefore affirms, That neither are there any 
 
 Modes, 
 
Chapter VII. 2 17 
 
 Modes, or Relations in (7^/, this will not be grant 
 him. For in G^, befides Effence, or Subfianc e , we af 
 fert, That there is that, which we call Mufc, Habitude, 
 and Relation : And by one or other of thele in Conjun&i- 
 on with EJfence, or Subfiance, we give account of aH the 
 Arts, Attributes, and Perfonalities belonging to the D/- 
 i;/^ Nature^ or Godhead. This is the confront, unani- 
 moufly received Doctrine of Divines, School-wen, and 
 'MttafhjftcianSy in their Difcourfes upon G^, and with- 
 out which, it is impoffibleto Dilcourfe intelligibly of the 
 Divine Ails, Attributes, or Perjons. And as it ftands 
 upon a firm bottom, lo it may well be defended : And 
 if this Author has ought to except againft it, I fhall be 
 ready to undertake the defence of it againft him at any 
 time. 
 
 But ftill, that he may keep up that Glorious, (landing 
 Character of Self-Contradiction, (which, one would 
 think to be the very Ratio formalts ; or, at leaft, the 
 Perfonal Property of the Man.) Having here, in Page 
 i jo. made a very bold Hep, by AiTerting the Three Di- 
 vine Perjons, to be Three dijlinrt A els, and fo diftincf, 
 that they can never be one Simple, Individual Art. In the 
 very next Page but one, viz. 132. Line 13. he roundly 
 affirms, That the Father and the Son are one Jingle Energy 
 and Operation. Now, how fafe and happy is this Man, 
 that no Abfurdities,or Contradictions can ever hurt him ! 
 Or at leaft, that he never feels them, let them -finch ne- 
 ver fb clofe and hard. 
 
 What remains, is chiefly a Dilcourfe about the diffe- 
 rent way of theAWs itluin^ from tin. Father, and the 
 Hofy Ghosfs iffuing from both : As that the former is 
 called Generation, becaule the Son iilues from the / athi f 
 by a Reflex Art, and the latter termed Proceffion, becaule 
 the Holy Ghost iffues from both by a direct Art. But 
 
 F f why 
 
z 1 8 Jhimadverfions, &c. 
 
 why d Reflex Act muft needs be termed properly a Gene- 
 , and a A>*# ^'<f/ not be capable of being properly 
 16 accounted, this our Acute Author very difcreetly fays 
 nothing at all to ; though (under favour) all that he 
 foysbefides, leaves us as much in the Dark as we were 
 before. And for my own part, I cannot think my felf 
 concerned to clear up a Point wholly foreign to that, 
 which alone I have undertook the Difcuffion of. 
 
 And thus I have finifhed my Difpute with Him, con- 
 cerning the Authorities of the Fathers alledged in behalf 
 of his Notion of Mutual-Confeio/fnefs, as that, where- 
 in he places t - ■ * of the Divine Nature belonging to 
 the Tbne Lleffed Perfons. The Sum of which whole 
 Difpute is relblved into this fingle Queftion, viz. In what 
 the Fathers placed the Unity in Trinity ? And if they pla- 
 
 I it in the Samewfs, or "Unity of Nature, Substance, or 
 Ejjence, (words applyed by them to this Subject at leaft 
 a Thoufand Times, and ftill ufed to fignifie one and the 
 fame T . :hen it is plain that they did not place it in 
 an Unity , ual-Confcioufnefs. For, I fuppofe, no 
 
 Man (this Author himfelf not excepted) will fay, That 
 Effencc, or SubHance, and Muiual-Confcioufnefs are Terms 
 Synonymous, and of the fame fignification. And as the 
 whole Difpute turns upon this fingle Queftion ; fb in the 
 management of it, on my part, I have with great par- 
 ticularity gone over all the Proofs by which this Author 
 pretends to have evinced his Doftrine from the Fathers. 
 The utmoft of which Proofs amounts to this, That the 
 Fathers proved an Unity of Nature in the Divine Perfons y 
 from the (jlIol mpy&a,, the /x/ct xlvYiarts /3yA>i//.a[©* 1 and 
 the 'ireyLxuprio-is Common to them all : And moreover, 
 Ibmetimes llluftrated the faid Unity by the Three Facul- 
 the Vnderflandixgj Memory, and Will being one 
 . the Soul which they belonged to. And Laftly, 
 
 That 
 
HAPTER VII. 2 I<? 
 
 That they refolved th Trinity into d> 
 
 cf Principle} the ing upon that account fty] 
 
 Princr > Communicating the Bii 
 
 Subflan:: to theoi?* and together with the Son to the fle^ 
 
 GhojL And what of all this.. I pray ? Do all, or any of the 
 fore-mentioned Terms fignifie M*tual*Gonfcioufnefs ? 
 
 Why, No : But this Author with a non ohjlante both to 
 the proper fignification and common ufe of them all, by 
 abfblute Pi tive declares them to mean Mutuant 
 
 fs : And fo his Point is proved, viz. That Mutual- 
 tfcioufnefs is not only an Argument inferring the Unity of 
 the Divine Nature in the Three Blejfed Perfons, (which, 
 yet was all, that the Fathers ufed the fore-mentioned 
 Terms for) but, (which is more) That it is that very 
 Thing wherein this Unity does Confjl. This, I fay, is a 
 True, though a fhort Account of all his Arguments upon 
 this Subject ; and (according to my cuftom) I refer it 
 to the Judicious Reader, to judge impartially, whether 
 it be not fb, and withal to improve and carry on the a- 
 forefaid Arguments in his behalf to all further advantage 
 that they may be Capable of. 
 
 But in the ifTue, methinks the Author himfelf feems 
 to review them with much lefs Confidence of their Puifc 
 fance, than when at firft he produced them. For if we 
 look back upon the Triumphant Flag hung out by him 
 at his Entrance upon this part of his Work (the only 
 proper time for him to Triumph in) and when he de- 
 clared, That his Explication of the Trinii 
 Doffrine of the Fathers and the Schools, Page ioi. Li: 
 24, 25. who could have imagined but that he then fore- 
 faw, that he fhould prove his Point with all the ftrength 
 and evidence which his own Heart could defire ? And 
 yet alas! Such, for the moil part, is the vaft differ 
 between Promifes and Performances, that we have him 
 
 F f 2 bring; 
 
220 Ahimacherjions, (See. 
 
 bringing up the Rear of all with this fneaking Conchi- 
 fion, Page 138. Line 22, &x. hmufl be confeffed, (fays 
 he) That the Ancient fathers did not exprefs their fence in 
 the fame Terms that I have done. But I leave it to any In- 
 different and Impartial Reader, whether they do -not feem 
 to have intended the fame Explication which I have givr. of 
 y.ible Myftery. Thefe are his words; and ] do 
 very particularly recommend them to the Reader, ps de- 
 ferring his peculiar Notice. For is this now the Upfhot 
 and Refult of (b daring a Boaft, and fb confident an Un- 
 dertaking, to prove his Opinion the Ccnfimt Doctrine of 
 the Fathers ? viz. That though the Fathers fpeak not one 
 word of it ; nay, though they knew not how to exprefs them- 
 felves about it, Page 125. Line 1 8. Vet that to an Jndif 
 ferenl Reader (and a very indifferent one indeed he mult 
 needs be in the worft fenced the}' mzyjeem to intend the 
 fame Explication he had given of it ? So that the Sum of 
 his whole Proof and Argument amounts to this and no 
 more, viz. That to fbme Perfcns videtur quod fie, and 
 to others, videtur quod non. For fee, how low he finks 
 ih the iffue. Firfr of all from the Fathers pofltive faying., 
 or hi riding what he does, it is brought down to their In- 
 tending it ; and from their Intending it, it falls at laft to 
 their feeming to Intend it ; and that is all. And now, is 
 not this a worthy Proof of fo high a Point ? And may it 
 not juftly fiibjcQ: this Author to the fame Sarcafticallrop) 
 which he paifed upon his Socinian AAuerfary ? Page 92. 
 Line 17, &c. Right, very Right, Sir, a plain Demon- 
 fir at ion ! 
 
 But frill there is one half of his Promifc to be yet 
 counted for, viz. The proving his Opinion to have been the 
 confianl Doltrine of the Schools, And how does he acquit 
 bimfelf as to this ? Why, in a very extraordinary naan- 
 QBttoo. For, frfr, inltead of alledgingthe Author 
 
Chapter VII. m 
 
 of the School-wet/, he tells us, Page i$8. That the) 
 no Authority it ill, but as they fall in with the Withers. And 
 withal, That inftead of doing fb, They ufe to mistake, 
 ana clog the fence of the Fathers with Tome peculiar Niceties 
 and Di/linctions of their own. And that, the Truth is, the 
 vim Endeavours of reducing thisMyltery to Terms of Art, 
 fuch as Nature, Ejfence, Subjlance, Subfiflence, Hjpojlafts, 
 Perfon, and the like, (which (he fays) fome of the Fa- 
 thers ufed in a very different ft nee from each other J hive 
 wholly confounded this H if fiery. 
 
 And here I cannot but defire the Reader to judge, 
 whether this be not a new and wonderful way of procu- 
 ring Credit to an Hypothefis, upon the (core of its being 
 the constant Doctrine of the Schools, by telling the World 
 (as this Man here does) that the School-men are a Com- 
 pany of Impertinent Fellows, of little or no Authority in 
 themfelves, and who have by their ufelefs abfiird Nice- 
 ties, confounded this whole Myftery ? For if they are 
 of no Authority but what they derive frojn the Fathers, 
 (as he avers) why does he quote fchem upon the fame le- 
 vel with the Fathers, and plead them both as two difiinil 
 Authorities? And if they do nothing but pervert and 
 confound this Myftery, \\ In , inftead of alledging them, 
 does he notearneftly caution his Reader againft them, 
 and diffwade him from having any Thing to c\o with 
 their dangerous and abfurd Writings ? This certainly is 
 a way of proving a Point by Tefiim ny and Auth< rity, lb 
 beyond all Example ridiculous, that unlefs the Reader 
 will vouchfafe to read thefe Paffages in the Author him- 
 feJf, and fb take his Conviction [torn his own Eyes, I 
 can hardly blame him, if he refufes to believe m . 
 Affirmation in a Thing (b [ncredible* 
 
 As for the 'J''. - fence, Per- 
 
 fop, and the like, which he ; lodes, I ] ope I h; 
 
 i 
 
2 2 z AnimadverfionSy Sec. 
 
 given my Reader a fatisfactory Account both of their 
 Ufeftilnefs, and of the ufelefhefs of fiich as this Author 
 would Subititute in their room, in Chap. 2. at large, to 
 which I refer him. And whereas he fays, Page 139. 
 Line25.&:C. Th.it the Deity is above Nature, and above 
 Terms of Art \ and that there is nothing like this Myfterious 
 Dijlinciion and Unity ; and therefore, no wonder, if we 
 want proper words to exprefs it by ; at leaf, that juch Names 
 as figmfie the Di fit notion and Unity of Creatures, jh on Id not 
 reach it. If by all this he means, That there are no 
 Terms of Art Comprehenfive, and fully expreflive of 
 the Divine Nature, and the Mysterious Dijlinciion and V- 
 nity of the Perfons belonging to it , none that I know of 
 thinks otherwife. But if he means that no Terms of 
 t can beof any ufe to aid us in our inadequate imper- 
 fect Conceptions of thofe great Things, fb as thereby 
 we may conceive of them in fome better degree, and 
 clearer manner, than we could without fiich Terms^ 
 pray then, of what ufe are his SelfConfcioufnefs and 
 Mutual-Confcioufnefs in this Matter ? For I fuppofe he 
 will allow thefe to be Terms of Art too ; and fiich (I am 
 fure) as he has promifed the World no frnall Wonders 
 from. But if he will allow any Ufefulnefs in thofe two 
 Terms of Art (of "his own Inventing) towards our better 
 Apprehcnfion of the Divine Nature and Perfons, the 
 fame and greater has theconltantufeof all Church-Wri- 
 ters proved to be in the T-erms EJfence, Sub fiance, Hypo- 
 flafis, Perfon, &c. as the propereft and moil fignificant, 
 the fitteft and molt accommodate to help and methodize 
 Men's Thoughts in difcourfing of God, and Immaterial 
 Bi ings, of all or any other Terms of Art, which the Wit 
 of Man ever yet invented, or pitched upon for that pur- 
 pofc. And I hope, the known avowed ufe and experi- 
 ence of fuel] great Men, and thole in fb great a number, 
 
 is 
 
Chapter VII. n^ 
 
 is an abundant overpoife to the contrary Affirmation of 
 this, or any other Novel Author whatfoever. 
 
 But all this (it teems) he endeavours to overthrow 
 and dafli with Three Terrible Confounding Queftions, 
 Page 139. Lines 22, 2 j, &c. Wliich yet I can by no 
 means think fo very formidable, but that they may be 
 very lately Encountered, and fairly Anfwered too. 
 As, 
 
 Qu. 1. What (fays our Author) is the Substance, or 
 Nature of God? 
 
 I Anfwer. It is a Being exifting of, and by it felf, In- 
 corporeal, Infinite, Eternal, Omnifcient, Omnipotent, 
 &c. 
 
 Qu. 2. How can Three diftrnct Perfons have but One 
 Numerical Substance t 
 
 I Anfwer. Every whit as well as they can be faid to 
 have but one Numerical Godhead, or Divine Nature ; or 
 as they can have one Numerical Mutual-Confcionfnefs com- 
 mon to them all. 
 
 Qu. }. What is the Dijlinction between EJfence, and Per- 
 fonality, and Subfi (fence ? 
 
 I Anfwer. Trie fame, that is between a Thing, or 
 Being, and the Modes of it. And he, who neither knows, 
 nor admits of a difference between thefe, is much fitter 
 to go to School himfelf, than to fit and pafs judgment 
 upon the School-men. And as for the Terms Subfiftence 
 and Per/h/ taUty, they import the laft and utmoft Com- 
 pletion of the Exiftence of Things, byvertue whereof, 
 they exift by themfelves 10, as neither to be Supported 
 by, nor Communicable to any Subject. Of which Two 
 Modes, Perfonality belongs only to Intelligent Beings, but 
 nee to all others* to whom thearorefaid Defini- 
 tion does agree. And this is the True, Proper Dif- 
 ference and Diftinction between thele Two. And 
 
 t!V 
 
2 2 ± AnmadverJionS) &c 
 
 this Author may take Notice cf it, if he plea- 
 fks. 
 
 However, having thus anfwered his Queftions (tho' 
 to what purpofe he propoled them, I cannot imagine) 
 yet that he may fee how ambitious I am to follow his 
 great Example, I {hall, in requital of his Three Questi- 
 ons, propoie thefe Four to him : As 
 
 Firft, Since in Page 139. lie affirms the Deity to be a- 
 bove Nature, and all Terms of Art ; fo that rve want proper 
 J I 'ords and Names to exprefs the Dijlinction and "Unity of the 
 Divine P-effons by, and that'fuchj a* figmfie the Dijlinction 
 and 'Unity of Creatures, cannot reach it. I defire to know 
 of him upon what ground of Reafbn it is, That {peak- 
 ing of this fame Myfleriom Unity and Dijlwtfion in Page 
 106. Lines 11, i2,&x. He fays, That the Fathers ujcd 
 fever al Examples, and alluded to fever al kinds of Union, 
 thereby to form an adequate Notion of the Unity of the God- 
 head? For if the Deity be lb far above Nature and ali 
 Terms of Art, that there is an utter want' of words, or 
 Names to exprefs the Unity of it by, How could any Ex- 
 amples, or Allufwns drawn from Nature (though never lb 
 manyj form in us an Adequate Notion thereof? Hitherto 
 both Divines and Philofophers have judged the Divine 
 Nature abfblutely Incomprehenfible by any Adequate, or 
 Complete Conception of 'it. And for my own part, lac- 
 count the Unity of it in 'Trinity, much lels capable of ha- 
 ving an Adequate Notion formed of it, than the Deity 
 con/idered barely in it felf is, and conlequently that it is 
 as much as Humane Reafbn can reach to, to have a / 
 and certain Notion of it, though very Imperfect and Ina-* 
 dequate. But as for an Adequate Notion of the Unity of the 
 Godhead in Three Divine Perjons, if this Author can form 
 to himfelf Rich an one, let him enjoy it as a Priviledge 
 peculiar to himfelf) and not obtainable by any other 
 
 .Mortal 
 
Chap t e ft VII. 
 
 Mortal Man v. h iribetfer. And this is*not the firfl 
 flance of his mifreprefenting the / . 
 
 Secondly, Whereas rli is Audio; 
 
 jfcijfi, and the beginning of 
 
 srfns fiffe nee, & 
 &c. as Mjhlefs Nicei 
 
 fiery of the Trinity ; and yet ne \ ertheleis in Line'i 2 
 of. Page 139. acknowledges, Ti ryTerm 
 
 fouji ufe of to encounter the Here fie 0/Sabe 
 
 . who had turned this Sacred Myfteryintoa 7 
 
 . or, at moil, of Offices ; I defire to know of 
 him, what greater Proof he could have given of the ex- 
 ceeding Ulefulnels and Importance of thefe Terms, than 
 by thus deriving the Invention and Ufe of them from 
 fuch an Occaiion ? And efpecially when, notwithftand- 
 ing all the Curious Examination fince faffed upon them, 
 whereby (he fays) they were found in fome refpeB or oil 
 defect we(as what Terms are not whenapplyed to God?) 
 experience yet fhews, that they have maintained their 
 Ufe and Credit from that Age all along to this very Da 
 Certainly it is ,1 great Unhappinels, when a Man can 
 neither forbear Writing, nor yet know when he Writes 
 for a JMng) and when againft it. 
 
 Thirdly, I defire to know of this Author, whether 
 in the very fame place, z'iz. Page 130. in which he pro- 
 felTes to explain an Unity in Trinity by an Vnitj 
 pie, he does well to tell us in Line 19. of the laid Pa 
 Thai 1 here is nothing but Efjence and Sub fiance in God, ha- 
 ving fo oftc I fo pofitively declared. Thai 1 
 fen to obfeure and confound , G 
 
 And whether he accounts fuch Terms.as ferve onlv thus 
 to confound Men's Thoughts and Not it • 
 
 and the Unity thereof, the fitteft to explain t ( V 
 
 G g 
 
z 1 6 Jmmidvcrfwiu, &c. 
 
 the (aid Godhead, with reference to the Divine Per Jons r 
 Which is //'f Xft/Ag ///tvt' promiied and undertaken by 
 Hii 
 
 Fourd . Laftly, Since this Author has condemn- 
 
 ed all the iorementioned Terms both as ulelefs, and fit 
 only tool id ■;.W,inftead of explaiwng,the Do- 
 
 ctrine of the Trinity , I defire to know of him, why he 
 tells US at the dole of Page 139. That lie does not think 
 it impoffibde (which is only a Figure called, a pa aw, 
 ring, that it is very poffible and eafie) to give a Tole- 
 ble Account of the pud Scbool-Tev/ns and Distinctions ? 
 For fince by a Tolerable he mult mean (if he means any 
 Thing to the Purpofe) fuch an Account of them, as fhc 
 them to have a Rational fence and meaning under them, I 
 defire him to tell me whether every Rational Sence is 1 
 Lsfuch) alio a True one? And if True, whether 
 ^/;can any more obfeure, perplex, and confound, than 
 it can Contradict another Truth ? Which being invinciblv 
 idem, as to the Negative, I defire this Author in the 
 laft place to tell me, whether it does, or can becom 
 Man Confiftent with himfelf, to pafs fo Reproachful a 
 Character upon the Terms of the Schools, in the begin- 
 ning of Pane i^9 and afterwards to give fb contrary 
 i commendatory an Account of the laid Terrns in the 
 . , end of the very lame Page ? 
 J hope the Reader will be pteafed to take this Nota- 
 ble Inlhinccalfbof this Author's Conliltcncy with him- 
 \i (Jo fo\- as Stif-Lpntrnditf ion may be lb called) into 
 ( Bderation. 
 
 And lb thele are the hour Oucsiions, or @ik . i* ' -ich 
 
 .vould have him relblve mc, or rather the World, in ; 
 
 for I am iurc it concerns Him and his Credit, lb to 
 
 Having 
 
C H A P T L 11 VII. 2 Z 7 
 
 Having thus followed this Authoi botl . 
 
 ingsandQuotations ; and found him equally Impertinent 
 both, 1 mull again define my Reader to joj n with me in 
 admiring the ftrange Confidence of the Man. 3 haveal 
 
 ready noted, w ith what a daring Affurancehe vouched 
 his New Opinion/^ the constant Dottrim both of the Fa 
 thers and, the Schools, Page ioi. Line 24. t ifter 
 
 which Peremptory Alfeveration, who could h . 
 peeled, but that he would have appeared in the Head 
 Thirty, or Twenty Fathers at leall (G and Lai 
 together) to have refcued his beloved Hyfpthefts from 
 the Imputation and Charge and Novclt 
 fbde/irous to Ward oft? P. 100. L. 22. And that befi 
 Gr. Nyjfen, Athanafius, Maximums, Naxianztn, Damafcen 
 'and thefe for the mofl part quoted upon an Account- 
 not at all relating to his Hjpothejis) and St. Cyril/, (who 
 is not lb much as Quoted, but only Named; we fhould 
 have had Jufiin Martyr, Tremms, Origen, ( 
 anc doret, Epiphanuts, with feveral 
 
 more,all behalf? Andamongtl the Latins 
 
 that we fhould befides St . -.-, whom alone he quotes, 
 
 and St. Ambpoji , whom he only mentions about the o^b- 
 triopy Page 107. Line 10. have heard alio of Tertullian, 
 Lactantius, St. Cyprian, St. Jerome, and St. Hii ith 
 
 a great many others ? And then laflly for the School- 
 men, who could have expected fewer of them alfb, th 
 Ten, or Twenty ? And that we .fhould have lien Al 1 
 cicr Alenfis fthe firft who Commented upon the ( < 1 
 with / ', J qui /his, Scot us, Major . B 
 
 Jquez, Cajetan, Gr.deV&lentii, EBias, and many more 
 of the Scholajiick Tribe, all drawn forth in Ran 
 File, to have fought his Battels ? But v. all, 
 
 none but poor Peter Lombard comes forth like 
 Captain, with none to follow him, this mcthinks lo< 
 
 G g 2 moi 
 
z i g rfmmadverfionS) &c. 
 
 more like the Defpair ofaCaufq, than the Defence of 
 
 though our Author calls Peter Lombard tin- 0- 
 
 and all know his Sentences to be 
 
 ■ te ■ ext which the School-men undertake to Explain and 
 
 upon : Yet Experience has told us, That the 
 
 well as of thofe he 
 
 ad his Followers expour em cne wdv, 
 
 and Sc id liis Difciples under! tanding them ano- 
 
 ther ; and feveral, (amongft whom L and Greg. 
 
 at way frpm both. So t 
 netimes there.is but too much need of a good Interpret 
 to fix the fence of this Oracle, (as great a Veneration 
 "ols may have for him. ) And therefore fincc 
 his Text is not always lb very plain and eafie as to make 
 .j.ticn oi it fuperfluous , this Author having 
 quoted Peter Lombard in fuclu or fiich a fence, ought; in 
 all Reafon to have produced the Major and more emi- 
 nent part of the School-men and Writers upon him, and 
 fhewn their Unanimous Concurrence in the lame Sence 
 J Notion, which he took him in, and quoted him for. 
 indeed would have been to his Purpule, and 
 look'd like proving his Opinion to have been the Doci, 
 Schools. Otherwife 1 cannot Ice how the M 
 si ■■■ cm be called, or pafs for all the Sck 
 ; more than the M ipleczn pats tor ah I 
 
 oi the Church of England. Unl< (liould 
 
 ill! i this PcKr Lombard had by a kind < 
 
 ■I onfeioufnefs gathered all his Numerous Brood into 
 Himfelf, and Co United them all into one Author. 
 tthe Sum of all isthis, That this Author, havi 
 :• Opinion, .the contt&nt Do 
 
 Schools, to make his words good, lias 
 it Three -or Four Greek 1 and I 
 
Chapter VII. :i<? 
 
 Latin ren thefe no in oirpofe than if 
 
 he had quoted Dad an i - @# f 
 
 out of iftl y, One Sente 
 
 r. Which if it be allowed to pafi for a good 
 
 and fufficient Proof of any Gont ( 
 
 or the future^by all means, for this our A 
 be anEftablifl lie in Logick from a Particular to 
 
 id now that Iambrin toward 
 
 Chapter, Imuftaefire him to! 
 
 little back towards the bej i of the foregoing 'Chap- 
 
 ter, wherein, upon this Man's Confident Affirmation, 
 That his Opinion was the Confiant Dottnne both of the Fa- 
 ')€ Schools, I thought it neceflary to ftate what 
 liis Opinion was, and accordingly I fhewM, that it Con- 
 firmed of Four Heads. 
 
 1 ft. That the Three Perfons of the Blcffed Trinity were 
 Three diflinff Info ids, or Spirits', which how far 
 
 he was from being able to prove from the Authority of 
 any of the Fathers cited by him, w iciently fhewri 
 
 by us in the pr r , Chapter. 1 he 
 
 2d. Was, Thi ■< the formal Reafon 
 
 of Perfonality in ti ree Perfons, and c ntly 
 
 rely they were diftinguifbed from 1 
 (in the fame Chapter) I ihew\l he r from pro- 
 
 ving from the Authority of thole And -, that 
 
 lie did not alledge one Tittle out of any of them for it, 
 nor indeed (b much as mention it in te Quotati- 
 
 ons there made by him. And 
 
 3d. Memberofhis (aid I 
 of the Dk / / 
 
 1 u 1 ■' 
 ; :e Examined n this CI. 
 
 But ftUl th 
 
* n 
 
 , Sec. 
 
 l. And i a it to be >, as completing his 
 
 le Hvpothcfis and ig, by direct Confe- 
 
 { from the Other Three, viz. That a Trinity in 
 
 ., and! Tied by the Three fore- 
 
 , ...-",' - >7 /;/<?/>/, fif/Jp, *;*{ 
 
 . . . ing been in a moff Confi- 
 
 .. Peremptory manner, affirmed by him all along, 
 (as I fhewin Chap', i.) and upon that Score, making lb 
 C a part of his Hypothecs, ought in all reafbn to be 
 be proved to have been the Sence and Doctrine of the 
 Fathers concerning this Article.But not one word does he 
 produce upon this Head neither. Nor, for my own 
 part, do I expect, ever to find the leaft Sentence or Syllable 
 in any Ancient Writer tending this way. And I chal- 
 lenge this Author to produce fb much as one to this pur- 
 pole. 
 
 In the mean time, how, and with what kind of words 
 
 f find thefe Ancient Writers expreiling themfelves about 
 
 this Venerable Myftery, I flia.il here fet down. Only I 
 
 fhall premife a Sentence or two out of this Author him- 
 
 felf ; and which I have had occafion to quote more than 
 
 once before, from Page 106. Line 7. viz. That the Unity 
 
 in 7 r f m [ \ I , \g (as he confeifes) fo great a Mystery, that 
 
 1 imp le of it in Nature, it is no wonder if it 
 
 \ ainedby any one kind of Natural Union ; and 
 
 herefore it was neceffary to ufe fever al Examples, and 
 
 to all '■ t ~> fever al Kjnds of Union, to form an Adequate 
 
 ion of the Godhead ; and moreover, Page 139. 
 
 Line 26. 8fC. That there is nothing like this Mysterious 
 
 Distinction and Unity, and that we want proper words to ex- 
 
 frefs it by. 
 
 All which i'affages lying clear, open, and exprefs in 
 the fore-cited places of this Author, I mull needs ask 
 him, Whether all thefe are uicd by Him to prove 
 
 U, 
 
Chapte r VII. i 3 1 
 
 it) in Tt and InitUigii 
 
 has frequently eifewhere aflerted it to be :' A , to go 
 
 over each of the Particulars ; 
 
 Firft, Whether u e mufl account it P . rcaufe he 
 
 (ays, It is a Great ., f which nfle 
 
 m Nature ? And 
 
 Secondly, Whether we mult e 
 lays, That it cannot he Exi Natu- 
 
 ral Union , £*/ flfctf /. . 
 cd^-.r/ farts of Union allud- * And 
 
 LalHy, Whether it mull pals for /.. V, I "caufe 
 
 he tells us, Tb.it we want proper words to it !{,, that 
 
 . in other Terms, to make it Intelligible ? fince to 
 prefs a Thing, and to make it Intelligible, I take to be 
 Terms equivalent. 
 
 In fine, I here appeal to the Reader, Whether we 
 ought from the forementioned Tallages of this Author, 
 to take the Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unit) for a 
 plain, eafie, Intelligible Xotion, according to the lame 
 Author's affirmation (b frequently inculcated in fbfflai 
 Parts of his Book ? 
 
 But I ihall now proceed to fhew, (as I promifed) 
 how the 1 {peak and declare themielves up- 
 
 on this great Point. And 
 here we will begin firft Moia^ ov ?£<a . 
 
 A Sib* al or fjypekfo yva&fyibtj. Kecj 
 or Z . -. he) tStd 5 foe&lav W a »^p- 
 
 ;d by us, and a In- u'jjj, .; *jEgtt/&* ht, 
 
 nity in V - ftzfofj* 
 
 >' can I i^t- {c< . ' 
 
 perfu . i . ok" 
 
 dy'' \h, feffione. Pag.^-jy. Edit. Colon. 
 
 ■?t a Declaration of fuch i6 v 
 
2 3 1 An rfionS) &c. 
 
 ©. Ineffable : . . And again, 
 
 ^7 ©* 3tyW*« fp^king of the Oeconomy of the 
 
 p. .; 8 1 . Bluffed Trinity, The Nature and 
 
 s he) of this D**0- 
 . And yet again, tig of this 
 
 as one 
 of the greate of the 
 
 ■rijy,, In CI h : 1 cry out (fays 
 
 , .ve# ^- he) wonderful I Tor that 
 
 rrri- , - J7 ?ooi tcc y\\xk- Principles and Articles of our Re* 
 
 ■', ibid. p. 1 8 7, l/gion furpafs, and traqfcend the 
 
 Vnderjlanding, Rea/bn, and Cow- 
 
 prehension of a Created Nature. 
 
 T&cu V5^@. £ vs#.S*©-. In the next place, Dionyfius the 
 
 Ireopag. Areopagite for fonie very ^W- 
 
 . r. pag. 271. «fr Writer under that Name; 
 
 . 1615. calls it the Trajtfcendent, 67/- 
 
 pereffential , and Superlatively 
 
 "App/;iT3? to 3 dt&™,?w7?t<& Divine Trinity. In like manner 
 
 ... j^TO^ijLtfaj^iaj 6 £ Gregory Nyffen^ We apprehend 
 
 ml* & * Sy&*eju*h & ' c - (hyshc) in tfjefe (viz. the Three 
 
 Greg. JVyffen. Pag.465. Tom.2. Divine Per fans) a certain Inex- 
 
 Edit. Pi . 1615. 7//X/f, Inconceivable Unity (or 
 
 Communication) and Dijlincti- 
 on, Skc. St. £rf///alfb> Writing againft fuch as would 
 derogate from the Equality of the Divine / 
 
 i peaks of the Trinity t] 
 
 ' H y; a w7T>i TiH^a>^ to appwiBo, Etf far /*# ffa/* Inexprefjlhl :<Tbi>.gs 
 
 t\ ouotGt&s a^ifywwfiw mayo,, fa J W€^ ^ 7^^/- 
 
 ■ libro de SpirituSancload ou fly and i \gly Reprefehted. 
 
 Amfhilochiunt) cap. 1 8. p. 352. And again,in aDifcourfe againft 
 
 001. 2. Rfif, Par//] 1637. fuch as ufed Contumelious 
 
 Words of the Trinity, (peaking 
 there of the Holy GhoH as Effentialfy one with the 1^- 
 
 rfar 
 
Chapter. VII. 
 
 *H 
 
 T?7J jS, 0HL$tO1\ 
 
 f/w and the&w,he il\ys,The Inti- 
 mate Conjunction between him and 
 them is hm s.bythe 
 
 i there quoted by him, 
 I applyed to them,) but the 
 
 ler 0/7;w Subfisience hereby Inviolab 
 ved. So that ftill fwe fee/ with this Father the Oecono- 
 c the Three Divine Petfom in the Blejfed ■ 
 Thing Ineffable, and above all Defcription, or Ex- 
 preffion* . ' Jlbfpeaks 
 
 the Trinity underthefe Epi- 
 the 7W- 
 
 Lbove, and before the 
 World, before all Time, of 
 the feme Majefty, of the lame 
 Glory, Increate, and Invifible, 
 our Reach, and Incom- 
 henfible. And the fame E- 
 jpithetes iven it by Nicephgrtss' Patriarch of 
 
 Constantinople, m the Acts of the Council of Epheftts, 
 declaring the Trinity to be of 
 One and the fame E (fence, 
 Tranfcendent in its Subjtance , 
 Invifible , and L ible. 
 
 And Laftly, Eulogtus, Arch- 
 biihop ot Alexandria, fets it 
 forth thus. /.' not 
 
 fyJaKfi;. a / 5%tAwSf®-. Gr. £. A ;~ 
 zUnzen.Qvatione 12. P. 204. 
 Edition, Parifenf Anno Bom. 
 1630. 
 
 ^7©,,a j^^Ah tt;©». Nicephorus 
 Confl ant inopolit anus in Jet is Sy 
 nodi Ephe(in&, Pag. 307, E*#- 
 t ion is I.- I 59 1 ' 
 
 /fr\*# thfrVnity ; fetf/fl Ajfert this 
 
 ffays hej fof ft K«6^^H^Jj * ^ eicufe, %[&osmy$p, 
 
 ct/V.XT)i GtVity /.'j: o . 
 
 W Cum? 
 
 evpneiv cpvQgji^Qi'ns. Eulogius Arch . /'V?- 
 
 tbecaPbotii. Cod. .2 30. Pag. 86 5. B&thamtgi Anno Dom. t6 5 j, 
 
 H li 
 
2 3+ 
 
 AnimacherJionS) &c. 
 
 V,uiy, man Eternal Singularity, as to afcribe the fame to 
 Three diftinct Hypojlajes ; by no means fub jetting things a- 
 boveoilf Understanding, to Human Reafonings, nor by an 
 Over-car ions Search undervaluing Things jo much above all 
 Search, or Difcovery. 
 
 Having given this Specimen of what the Greek Fathers 
 and Writers thought and fpoke of the Trinity, let us 
 
 now pais to the Latines. And a- 
 Trinitatis Myfterium eft im- mongft thefe,we have in the firft 
 men! um,& Incomprehenfibile, place, St. Hilary expreffing him- 
 extra fignificantiam fermonis, felf thus. The Myftery of the 
 extra fensus intentionem, Im- Trinity is Immenfe and Incompre- 
 perfpicabile, Lumen occsecat, henfible, not to be expreftd by 
 Intclligentise Capacitatem ex- Words, nor reached by Seme, Im- 
 cedit. Ego nefcio ; fed confb- perceivable, it blinds our Sight, it 
 
 labor me tamen : Angeli ne- 
 fciunt, faccula non tenent, A- 
 poftolus non interrogavit, Fi- 
 lius ipfe non edidit. Ceffet er- 
 
 exceeds the Capacity of our Vnder- 
 ftanding. I underfland it not. 
 Neverthelefs, I will comfort my 
 felf in this, That neither do the 
 
 go dolor querclarum, &rc. San- Angels know it, nor Ages appre 
 Hi! arias Libro fecundo de hend it, nor have the Apoflles en- 
 ■lit fit e. quired of it) nor the Son him felf 
 
 declared it. Let us therefore leave 
 off complaining, 8cc. 
 
 After him,let us hear St. Am- 
 brofe, The Divinity of the Holy 
 Trinity flays he^ is to be believed 
 by us to be without beginning or 
 end', albeit, hardly pojfible to be 
 gru^ dicitur quod hoc folum ex comprehended by the ]\lind of Man. 
 
 ..omprehendimus, quia pror- 
 liis comprehend! non poteft. Ambroftus Traff.in Symbolum Apoflo- 
 
 Abfque ullo Principio aut 
 
 fioe credenda eft Sanftse Tri- 
 
 s Divinkas. Licet huma- 
 
 reilt menti ipia comprehenfi- 
 
 diificilis. Undenonincon- 
 
 fom.4. p. 43. col. 1, Edit^Colon. 16 id 
 
 Upon 
 
Chapter VII. 2 : 5 
 
 Upon which Account it may be not improperly laid con- 
 cerning it, That we comprehend this only of it, That 
 in truth it cannot be comprehended. 
 
 To St. Ambrofe fucceeds T ..,,—,. . n * . . 
 a-.**- 1.1 t • ■* ,r In ilia 1 rinitate, Irinitas 
 
 St. Austin, In this 1 rimty f lays ^ j /' • n. 
 
 -.u- t a i7^!^ . . fin unus Deus, quod lane eit m: 
 
 this Learned Father J * *///■ 0#* , ... . ^ u l. . . a 
 
 ^ , /•/• • j j j r n biliter lnerrabile, vel liietfabili- 
 
 God. which is indeed wonderfully A . , ., / , ^ . . 
 
 n? l li j r* i ii ter mirabile, Aus. ae JrmitaU 
 
 unjpeakable, and unjpeakably won- T ., f ^ 
 
 To the fame purpofe Fulgen- Sola (quantum arbitrorj im- 
 
 tms. So fir as I can judge, only mutabilis ilia fempiternitas Tri- 
 the Eternal and Unchangeable nitatis reperietur Incomprchen- 
 Trinity ought to be looked upon by fibilitatis digna miraculo,qusefic 
 us, as worthy to be efleemed Incom- excedit omne quod cogitare vel 
 prehenfib/y Miraculous ; and as fapere polTumus, ficut fuperat 
 much exceeding all that we can omne quod fumus. Rdgentius ad 
 think or imagine of it, as it fur- Thr af m unduwRegem, lib. 2. czp.i. 
 mounts all that we are. 
 
 After him we fhall produce Hormifda Bifhop of 
 Rome, m a Letter to Jullinian the Empcrour, about 
 the beginning of the Sixth 
 
 Century, fpeaking thus. The Unum eft Sanfta Trini 
 Holy Trinity ( fays hej is but One, non multiplicatur Numero, non 
 It is not multiplyed by Number, crefcit Augmento ; nee potefl 
 nor grows by any Addition, or atlt Intelligent^ comprehendi, 
 Encreafe : A r or can it either be aut lioc quod Deus ell di icretio- 
 comprehended by our Understand- nefejungi. Ac Paulo pofl. Ado- 
 ing, nor inrefpe'cl of its Divini- remus Patrem U Filium & £ 
 ty be at all Divided. And a lit- ritum Sanflum Iftdiftin&um di- 
 tle after. Let us Worship Father, ftinfte Incomprehenfibilem 8c 
 Son, and Holy Ghoft, dijliiici in inenarrabilem iubftantiam Tri 
 
 nitatis. At que iterant, Mag- 
 num eft fan£to 8c incomprehenfibile Mvfterium Trinitatis,Cr4^. 
 ConciL Tom. i.Pag. 10 34, 10 j 5. 
 
 H h 2 then 
 
: (5 JnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 but with one indiflincl )Vorjbip, That is to (a 
 The Incomprehensible and Unutterable Sub fiance of the Tri- 
 nity. And prefently again, Great and, Incomprenfiblc is 
 of the Holy Trinity. 
 
 In the laft place St. Btrnard 
 iidenterdixerim.uernambe- delivers himfelf upon the fame 
 atamquS Trinitatem, quamnon Subject thus. / confidently ajfirm 
 :!igo, credo, & fide teneo, ffays he; that the Eternal and 
 quod lion capio mente, Bernar- Blej[edTrin-ty y which I do not un- 
 fas "6. fv per C antic, derjland,. I do yt believe \and em- 
 
 brace with' my Faith, what I can* 
 9t comprehend with my \ lind. 
 
 I have here, as I laid, given a Specimen of what the 
 Ancient \' r ritcrs of the Church, both Greek and Latin, 
 thought aid laid of the Ble fi t .:. ^,and it is, Iconfeftj 
 but a Specimen ; fince I think that enough for an Unw 
 owledgi V and never before contradifted 
 Proportion : Where ls had it but in the leaft feemed a 
 Novelty, (as this Author's Hypothefis not onlyfeems, but 
 unqueftionablvirj I fliould have thought my felf obliged 
 to have brought as many Quotations for it from Antiqui- 
 ty, as would have filled a much larger Book than I in* 
 tend this fhall be. 
 
 But as for thofe which I have here produced, I do fo- 
 lemnly appeal to any Man living, Chrifti f &n y or not Cbri- 
 flian (who does but underftand thefe Languages) whe- 
 ther the En hers now Quoted by me (and all the rfcft up- 
 on the fame Subject fpeak agreeably to them) looked 
 upon Trinity in Unity, andVn/y in Trinity, as a Plain, 
 eligible Notion ? So that i£ the Judgment: 
 of the Fathers, and of this Author, be in this point one 
 andthefme, it mull unavoidably follow, That either 
 the Fsthet » have not yet declared their Judgment and 
 Bo&rine, or that this Author has not yet declared his : 
 
 Si 
 
C H A P T E FL VII. 2 IJ 
 
 Since fo much as has been declared on the one fide, is a 
 direct and grofi Contrddiition to what lias been Ailerted 
 on the other. 
 
 And moreover the fore-alledged Tellimonies of the 
 I'm hers are filch, that we are not put to draw what we 
 contend for, by remote, far fetched Confluences from 
 them, but it lies plain, open, and manifeft in them ; in 
 words too clear and full to be denyed, and too convin- 
 cing to be evaded. So that we are ft re both of their 
 Words and ExpreffipHS, and of the common fence of all 
 Mankind to expound and underftand them by. And will 
 
 is bold over-Bearing Man, after all this, Claim thw 
 ! to be tlh fa ne with his ? What his meaning is, he 
 ha told us forty times over, viz. That Unity in 7 . 
 &c- is (b far from being an Unintelligible Notion, that it 
 b not ) nuch asdifficult) how muchfbever the dull mi- 
 fraken JVbrld has for near 1700 Years thought other- 
 wife. 
 
 And now if this be the True Account and ftate of this 
 "latter, that when the / fay of the 7^5, or 
 
 1 inity, that it is ippjJTl©^ c^^fX^©*, oc^^votH^y 
 
 vi^ ai\ cp 7.. ■ i p^yiGfJLhi (c \h$ evpyiaty : That isto fay, In' 
 effabUy Inconceivable^ Unintelligible^ Incowprehenfible, and 
 (if poJ]ibie y ■ the very Notion of the i • 
 
 felf, above all Hun and Reafon, l)i\ • 
 
 and Scrutiny, I fay, if by all this, lie can prove that 
 the Fathes 
 
 [firming that thofe who ufed all 
 the! : i\ Rons) m ■ does 
 
 and muft affirm; or fay, That they kj not their 
 ownmeani ;, or at!. exprefs it, but 
 
 in words quil onti to it;) I mufti own the 
 
 Fathers to h,r ; appj in t 
 
238 AnimadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 fehes about this Myftery, than this Author (as with 
 great Modefty and Deference to them, he often tells us 
 they were) but, which is yet much worfe, that they 
 were the moft wretchedly unhappy in wording their 
 own Notions of all Men, who ever yet fet Pen to Paper. 
 And as for this Author, if Unutterable, Unconceivable 
 nndVnintelifoibld can pafs with him for Plain, Eafie, and 
 Intelligible, it is high Time for me to leave offdifputing 
 with him, and either to have no more to do with him , 
 or, without any further demurr,to profefs my felf as rea- 
 dy to believe and grant Contradictions, as lie is, or can 
 be, to Write them. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
Chapter VIII 
 
 *]9 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 In which is fet down the Ancient, and generally re* 
 ceived Doctrine of the Church, concerning 
 the Article of the Bleffed Trinity, as it is De- 
 livered and Explained by Councils, Fathers, 
 School-men, and other later Divines; toge- 
 ther with a Vindication of the faid Dodlrine 
 fo Explained from this Author'/ Excep- 
 tions. 
 
 r I ^Hough I cannot think that the Nature and De- 
 JL fign of the Work undertook by me f which was 
 only to Animadvert upon, and Confute this Author's 
 Novell Heterodox Notions about the Trinity) does, or 
 can direftly engage me to proceed any further ; or lay 
 any Neceffity upon me to give a pofitive Account of the 
 Doctrine and Sence of the Church about this great Ar- 
 ticle ; yet fince this Author in afferting his own Opinion, 
 could not be content to do it without reproaching and 
 refle&ing uponthofe Ancient Terms, which the Church 
 has been fb long in polTeflion of, and has ltill thought fit 
 to ufe in declaring it felf upon this Subjeft, fas if inftead 
 of Explaining, they ihved only to perplex, obfeure, and 
 confound it) and fince the Reafonableneis, or Unrealbn- 
 ablenefs of either Hypot hefts, is moft likely to appear by 
 fairly fetting down one, as well as the other, and (hew- 
 ing 
 
: ^.o AniwadverfionSi Sec. 
 
 ing what this ( i ne off from, as well as what 
 
 , ' ither improper, nor un- 
 
 church has hitlicrto held 
 it Article of the Tri- 
 ind it iq Cpuncils\ . /, School* 
 
 , and Ancient and Modern. 
 
 And in this alio I mult be ag Lin content to entertain mj 
 Reade^only with a Taft, or Specimen out of 10 vaft a 
 ftorc ; which yet I do, with very good Reaibn, judge 
 both fatisfaftory and fufficient, in a Point of Divinity 
 p owned, teceived, and embraced ; and fun- 
 lefs by fiicli as rejeEl: an I deny the Trinity it felfj never 
 Impugned, or Contradicted before. 
 
 Now the commonly received D \ . rch 
 
 and Schools, concerning die Bl si 
 
 can judge, but frill with die ' umbleft S r;, lie 
 
 Judgment of the Church of Engl Cale) is this, 
 
 That the Chrijlian Faithhzvmg laid this fire J ion, 
 
 That there is but One God ; and that there is nothing//.?. 
 no Bofifivfi Real Being ftvi&ly. and properly fb called) in 
 God y b } it what is God,'<md laftly,Thattherecanbe no Corn- 
 .'/on in the Deity w r ith any fuch Pofitivc Rex 1 Being di- 
 ,cl from the Deity it felf ; and yet the Church rinding in 
 Scripture mention of T^r^tjQwhqm diltinQlythcGW/;^ 
 decs belong,it has by warrant of the fame Scripture, Heb, 
 i . \. L\prdled thele Thret by the Name of Pcrfons ; and 
 ;cd their PerJbnaliliesuponThreedijlmct Modes of Subfi- 
 net allotcd to( V' and the {ameGewfltao^andthefe alfbdi- 
 iringuiilied from one another by Three distinct Relations. 
 Concerning which, we mult obfervc, That albeit, ac- 
 cording to the Reality of the '1'hmg, the Suhfifience and 
 elation of each Per fon make but One Single I Uvifible 
 Modi of Beings yet according to the Natural Order of 
 Conceiving Things, we mult Conceive of the Subfjjlence 
 
 as 
 
HAPTER VIII. 2-J. 
 
 as precedent to the Relation: Forafmuch as Humane 
 Reafbn confiders Things limply as Subftfting, before it 
 can confider them as Relating to one another. 
 
 But for the further Explication of the Point before us, 
 it will here be neceifary to premile what is properly 
 Mode of Being. And this the School-Divines do not al- 
 low to be either a Sub fiance, or an Accident (which j 
 makes the adequate Divifion of Red Beings ; fince there 
 is no inch Being but what is contained under one of themj 
 but a Modi is properly a certain Habitude of fome Beings 
 Effence, or Thing, whereby the laid Ejjence, or B 
 determined to fome particular State, or Condition , 
 which, barely of it (elf, it would not be determined to. 
 And according to this account of it, a Mode in Things 
 Spiritual and Immaterial feems to have much the like re- 
 ference to Rich kind of Beings, that a Pofture has to a 
 Body, to which it gives fome difference, or diftin&ion, 
 without fiiperadding any new Entity, or Being to it. In 
 a word, a Mode is not properly a Being, either Sub fiance, 
 Or Accident, but a certain arledion cleaving to it, and 
 determining it from its common general Nature and indif- 
 ference to fomething more particular, as we have juft 
 now explained. As for Inftance, in Created Beings, De- 
 pendence is a Mode determining the general Nature of Be- 
 ing to that particular State, or Condition, by vertue 
 whereof it proceeds from, and is fupported by another ; 
 and the like may be (aid of Mutability, Prefence, Abfence, 
 Inherence, Ad , and Inch like, viz. That the) are 
 
 not Beings, but Modes, or Affections of Being, and infe- 
 parable from it fo far, that they can have no F.xiilence 
 of their own, after a ieparation, or divifion from the 
 Tilings, or Beings to which they do belong. 
 
 And thus having explained, in General, what a Mode 
 is, we are to know, That the Per finalities, by which 
 
 I i the 
 
Uli AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 the Deity ftands diverfified into Three diftintf Perfons, 
 are by the Generality of Divines, both Ancient and Mo- 
 dem, called and accounted Modes, or at leaft fbmething 
 Analogous to them (fince no one Thing can agree both 
 to God and the Creature, by a perfeft Vnivocation.) And 
 moreover, as every Mode EJJentia/ly includes in it the 
 Thing, or Being of which it is the Mode, fb every Per- 
 [on of the Blejfcd Trinity, by vertue of its proper Mode 
 of Subfiftence, includes in it the Godhead it felf, and is 
 properly the Godhead as ftb fisting with and under fitch a 
 certain Mode, or Relation. And this I affirm to be the 
 Current Doftrine both of the Fathers and the Schools, 
 concerning the Perfom of the Blejftd Trinity, and the 
 conftantly received Account given by them of a Dk 
 Perfon, fo far as they pretend to Explain what fuch a 
 Perfon is. 
 
 And accordingly, as thefe Relations are Three, and but 
 Three, fb the Perfons of the Godhead, to whom they be- 
 long, are fb too, viz. Father, Son, and Holy Ghofl. But 
 then, we muft obferve alfb, That the Relations which 
 the Godhead may fuftain, are of Two forts. 
 
 i ft. Extrin fecal, and founded upon fbme External Ac~i 
 ifluing from God ; of which fort are the Relations of Cre- 
 ator, Preferver, Governor, and the like, to the Things 
 Created, Preferved, and Governedby him. Which,though 
 they leave a real effeft upon the Things them (elves, yet 
 derive only an External Habitude, and denomination 
 confequent from it upon the Deity it felf. The 
 
 2d. Sort of Relation, is lntrinfecal y and founded upon 
 thofe Internal Jets, by which one Perfon produces ano- 
 ther, or proceeds from another : For to produce and to 
 proceed (whether by Generation, or Spiration) is that 
 which makes, or Conftitutes a Plurality of Perfons m the 
 Godhead. 
 
 From 
 
Chapter VIII. 24.3 
 
 From all which it follows, That the Relation, by 
 which Gfatt as a Cractar, or Preferv$r, refpects his Crea- 
 tures, is extremely different from that by which Godasj 
 Father relpects his Son. The former adding only to 
 the Deity an Extrmfecal denomination, but the latter lea- 
 ving upon it an Internal Incommunicable Character, Fjjenti- 
 ally Injeparable from the Deity. So that although it may 
 well enough be faid, That God might never have been a 
 Creator, yet it cannot be faid of Him, That he might 
 never have been a Father ; the former being only an 
 efteft of his Will, but this latter the Neceflary Reliilt of 
 his Nature. 
 
 Now theft Internal Acts, upon which the Divine 
 Relations are founded, and from which they flow, 
 are, 
 
 Firft, That Eternal Act, by which the Father Com- 
 municates his Divine Nature to the Son, which accord- 
 ingly is called Generation. 
 
 And that by which the Son receives his Divine Nature 
 from the Father, which is called Filiation. And 
 
 Third!}', The Act of Spiral ion, by which the Father 
 and the Son together, eternally breath forth the Holy 
 Spirit. And, 
 
 Laftly, The Act of Vroceffwn, by which the Holy Gho/t 
 proceeds, and receives his Divine Nature, joyntly from 
 them both. Thefe, I fay, arc thofe Internal, Incommu- 
 nicable and diftinguijbin« Afts, from which the Ferfonal 
 Relations belonging to the Three Divine Perfons are de- 
 rived. 
 
 But you will fay : Does not this infer Fo*r P< rfotL i ; 
 the Godhead ? viz. That as Generation and 
 make two, fo Spiration and Proce/Jwn fliould make two 
 more ? 
 
 Ii 2 I Anfwer, 
 
: aq, Jhimadverjions, &c. 
 
 J Anfwcr, No : Becaufe the fame Perfon may fuftahi 
 fevcrzl Perfonal Relations, and Exert, and receive feve- 
 ral Per fort al Acts, where thofe Acts, or Relations are not 
 oppofite to, or inconfiftent with one another in the fame 
 Subjeft. As for inftance, The Perfon of the Father may 
 Exert both an Act of Generation and of Spiration , and 
 fo fuftain the Relations rcfulting from both without any 
 Multiplication of his Perfon ; and the Son likewife may 
 receive and fuftain the Act of Filiation, and withal Exert 
 an Act of Spiration, without any Multiplication of Per- 
 fonality. And this, becaufe neither are the Acts of Ge- 
 neration and Spiration inconfiftent in the Father y nor the 
 Ac'ts of Filiation and Spiration, incompatible in the Son. 
 Though indeed the Acts of Generation and Filiation, 
 and the Relations fpringing therefrom, would be utterly 
 inconfiftent (becaufe oppofite) in any one Perfon, as 
 likewife upon the fame Account would the Acts of Spi- 
 ration and Proceffion. 
 
 From whence by plain and undeniable Confequenee it 
 follows, That Generation and Filiation, Spiration and 
 ProceJ/bn Conftitute only Three Perfons in the Eternal 
 Godhead and no more. For Relations merely di [par ate, 
 do not Conftitute feveral diftinQ: Perfons, unlefs they be 
 oppofite too. That Maxime of the Schools being moft 
 rruc, That Sola Oppofitio multiplicat in Divinis. So that 
 albeit, Filiation and Spiration are Terms oppofite to their 
 refpe&ive Correlates, yet being only difparate with re- 
 ference to one another, and as both of them meet and 
 arc lodged in one and the fame Subject, (viz,, the Perfon 
 of the Son j they neither caufe, nor infer in him any 
 more than one Single Perfonality. 
 
 But now if anyone fhould ask me, What this Gene- 
 ration and Filiation, this Spiration and Proceffion are ? 
 
 T Anfwer. 
 
Chapter VIII. 2^5 
 
 I Anfwer, That herein confifts the Myftery ; and 
 fince fuch Myfteries exceed the Comprehenfion of Hu- 
 man Reafbn, I am not in the lea II afhamed, moft readi- 
 ly to own my ignorance thereof, in that known Anthem 
 ufed in the Church. 
 
 Quid fit Gigni, quid Proceffus, 
 Me nefcire fum prof eft us. 
 
 For though the Author whom I have been Difputing 
 with, by the help and vertue of Two Wonder-work- 
 ing Words (able to make one, who is no Conjurer, do 
 ftrange things) undertakes to make this greateft of My- 
 fteries Plain, Eafie, and Intelligible ; and when he has 
 done this, (as he lays he has) owns it neverthelefs for a 
 Myftery ft ill : yet in the Judgment of other Mortals, to 
 acknowledge a Thing Inexplicable , and in the fame 
 Breath to offer an Explication of it too, will be thought 
 a little too much for one of an ordinary pitch of Sence 
 and Reafbn to pretend to ; and therefore, for my own 
 part, I dare not look fo high. 
 
 Upon the whole matter, in difcourfing of the Trinity, 
 Two Things are abfblutely neceflary to be held ana in- 
 filled upon. One, That each, and every Per [on of the 
 Blejfed Trinity, entirely contains and includes in himfelf 
 the whole Divine Nature. The other, That each Pet 
 fon is Incommunicably different and disiincl from the 
 other. 
 
 And here if it fhould be asked. How they differ, and 
 whether it be by any real Diftinclion between the Per fon s ? 
 
 I Anfwer, Yes : But for the better explaining of my 
 Anfwer, we muft diftinguifh of Two forts of Real 
 DiftiiiGtions. 
 
 j. The 
 
2 ±6 Aninudverjtons ', &c. 
 
 f. The firft greater, via. When Two Things, or 
 , differ from one another. 
 I lie other lefler ; as when the difference is between 
 l ; or real Being on the one fide, and the Mode of 
 
 it on the other : Or between Two or more Modes of the 
 fame Being. And this Diftin&ion, or Difference is cal- 
 led Real in oppofition tQ that wliich is wholly founded 
 upon the Apprehenfion, or Operation of the Intellect, 
 and lias of it felf no Exiftence without it. But a Being, 
 and the Mode adhering to it differ, whether the Mind 
 ever apprehends and thinks of them, or no. And thus 
 we affirm, That the Divine Perfons really differ, and 
 are diftinguiflied from one another, viz. by a Modal, or 
 lejjer fort of Real Difference ; according to which, the 
 Divine Nature Subsisting under, and being determined 
 by fuch a certain Mode, perfbnally differs from it felf, as 
 Si'lfiftivg under, and determined by another. Foras- 
 much as the Divine Nature, or Godhead lb Subfiflrng and 
 determined is properly a Per/on. Nor ought this fmall- 
 nefs of difference between the Divine Perfons to be any 
 preemption againft the Truth of what we have deli- 
 vered concerning the Oeconomy of the Blejfed Trinity, as 
 fhall be more particularly fhewn in Anfwer to one of 
 this Author's Obje&ions againft it, before we come to a 
 conclufion of this Chapter. 
 
 In the mean time to fum up the foregoing Particulars, 
 the Reader may pleale to take what I aver to be the Do- 
 ctrine of the Catbolick Church about this great Article, in 
 this following Account of it, viz. That there is one, and 
 but one Self-ExiHing, Infinite, Eternal, &rc. Being, Na- 
 ture , or Subjlance, wliich we call God. And that this In- 
 t , Eternal, Self-existing Being, or Nature, Exifts in, 
 and is common to Three diftinct Perfons, Father, Son and 
 t (olj Gt, • ;/. Of which the Son eternally iflues from the 
 
 Father 
 
Chapter VIII. 24.7 
 
 Father by way o{ Generation, and the #0^ Qhoft joyntly 
 from both, bj way of Serration \ which Three Divine 
 Perfbns (iiperadd to this D/z/j \ ure, ox Deity, Three 
 different Modes of Suhfistence, founding lb many differ i i 
 Relations ; each of them belonging to each Perfon in a 
 peculiar Unccmmunicable manner ; fb that by vertue 
 thereof, eadi Perfon refpefti vely differs and ftands diftia- 
 gui filed from the other Two : And yet by reafbn of one 
 and the fame Numerical Divine Nature, or Godhead equal- 
 ly Exifting in, and common to all the Three Perfons, they 
 are all but One and the fame Godjvho is Bleffedfor Ever. 
 
 This I reckon to be a True and Juft Reprefentation of 
 the Doctrine of the Caiholick Church, fb far as it has 
 thought fit to declare it felf upon this Great and Sacred 
 My fiery. Not that I think this fets the Point clear from 
 all Difficulties and ObjeSions. For the Nature and 
 Condition of the Thing will not have it fb, nor have the 
 Able ft Divines ever thought it fb, (for where then were 
 the Myftery f) But that it gives us the faireft and mod 
 confifteiiL Account of this Article, both with reference 
 to Scripture and Reafbn, and liable to the fewefr Excep- 
 tions againft it, of any other Hjpothefis, or Explication of 
 it whatfbever. 
 
 And the fame will appear yet further from thofe 
 Terms which the Writers of the Church have all along u- 
 fed in exprefTing themfelves upon this Subjeft. And 
 that both with refpe£t 
 
 Firft, To the Unity and Agreement of the Three Divine 
 Ptrfons in one and the fame Nature. And 
 
 Secondly, To their Per fond di ft met ion from one ano- 
 ther. 
 
 And firft, For their Unity and Agreement in one and 
 the fame Nature. The Greeks expidled this by the 
 Terms ^t^W, or o/^wnoy, TauJims, and iyojns. And 
 
 the 
 
z ^8 AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 the L/ttinesby Confubflantialttas and Coefftntialitas. By 
 all which I affirm, That they underftood an Agreement 
 in one and the fame Numerical Nature, or EJfence. For, 
 though this Author has affirmed, That the Nicene Fa- 
 thers underfcood no more by the ouovaioh;-, than a Spect- 
 acle Vnit) cfNattre, this Matter has been iuffieiently ac- 
 counted for, and his AiTertion effe&ually confuted in the 
 foregoing Chapter. 
 
 In the next place. As for the Terms expreffing the 
 Diftinftion and Difference of the Divine Per fans from 
 one another, the Greeks make ule of thefe, Tyicls Tri- 
 nity, TT£p<rwni Perfons, v7roc?cc<r€{$ Subfijtences, or Per- 
 forts, T£piroi vToip^eu); Modes of Subfistence, IfioTviJes Pro- 
 perties, %cLesi3*pts Marks of Dijtinciion, ;£ae#>cT>7£/<pxa 
 iS'icofj.oilcc Di&ingttifbing Properties, yvcogjiafJLcLloc, Notes of 
 Signification, And agreeably to them, the Las ites alio 
 make ufe of the following Terms, Trinitas, Perfon<e y 
 Subfistenti*, Modi Subfiflendi, Proprtetates, Relatione s, 
 and Not tones feu Notionalia. By which laft the School- 
 men mean fiich Terms and Expreffions, as ferve to noti- 
 fie and declare to us the proper and peculiar diftinftion 
 of the Divine Perfons. And they reckon four of them, 
 viz,, the above-mentioned Pat emit as, ¥ that to, Spiratio 
 & Proce/fo ; all of them importing Relation. To which 
 fome add a fifth, which the Greeks call oLyepvnaicc, or to 
 dyiwiikv ' and the Lattnes, tnnafcibilitas ; a Term not 
 importing in it any Positive Relation, but onlv a meet" 
 Negation of all Producibility, by any Superiour Principle, 
 and upon that account peculiar to the Father, who alone, 
 of all the Perfons of the Bleffed Trinity, is without Pro- 
 duction. Touching all which Terms, I cannot think it 
 neceflary to enlarge any further, in a particular and 
 more diitinft Explication of them ; fince, how differing 
 fbeverthev may be in their refpeftive Signitications,they 
 
 all 
 
Chapter VI1L i\<) 
 
 all concur in the fame ufe and defign; which is to cx- 
 prefs fbmething proper and peculiar to the D. Per- 
 is, whereby they are rendred diftinft from, and In- 
 communicable to one another. 
 
 But theft .neral Remarks I think fit to lay down- 
 
 concerning them. As, 
 
 i. That albeit moll of thefc Terms,as to the Form of 
 the Word,run Abjtracfivelj 7 yet tliey arc for the moil part 
 to be underflood Concretively, and not as fimple Forms, 
 but as Forms in Conjunction with the Subjeft, whi 
 they belong to. In the former abliracted fence the) i 
 properly Perfonalities, or Perfonal Properties, viz. Thole 
 Modes, or Forms by which the Perfons, whom they ap- 
 pertain to, arc formally constituted and denominated 
 what they are ; but in the Fatter and Concrete Sencc, 
 they fignifie the Perfons themlelves. 
 
 2. The Second Thing, which I would obierve, is. 
 That there has been in the firft Ages of the Church fbme 
 Ambiguity in the ufe of the words yV/a. and JtoV**«*j 
 n&GWjQ:, or Perfona* For neither would the Latines 
 at rirft admit of Three Hjpoflafes in God, as taking ualcc 
 and vTrocfGLai; for the fame Thing ; for that they had no 
 other Latin Word,to Tranflate vwd^ccan by, but Subfian* 
 tia, by which alfb they Tranflated iaicx, ; (the Word Sub- 
 ftHentia being then looked upon by them as Barbarous, 
 and not in ufe) fb that they refilled the Term vpn; viro- 
 c^d(T€ii , for fear of admitting of Three diftintt Subjfan- 
 nces'm the Trinity, which t! zw would 
 
 lead them into the Frrour of Arms. Nor on the other 
 fide would the Greeks acquiefcein a fxla utto^o&is, nor 
 admit of the wepcrcoTrct, for i ear of falling therebj into 
 the contrary Errour of Saheilim\ for that they thought 
 the Word ir&Gw^ov imported no red I 'e, 
 
 but only a difference of Name, or Attribute, or at molt 
 
 K k 
 
250 JnmadverJiouS) Sec. 
 
 of Office ; and for them to allow no more than fuch an 
 one amOHgft the Divine Perfons, they knew was SabelU- 
 anifme. And this Controverfie of Words excrciied the 
 Church for a confiderable time ; to appeafe and compofe 
 *vhich (amongif other Matters) a Council was called 
 and held at Alexandria about the Year of Chrijl, 362. in 
 which amongfl many other Bifhops Convened from It*- 
 Ij, Arabia, &gyft and Lybia, was prefent alfb Athan* 
 himfelf. And in this Council both fides having been ful- 
 ly heard, and found to agree in fence, though they dif- 
 fered in words, it was ordained, That they fhould 
 thenceforth Mutually acknowledge one another for Or- 
 thodox, and for the future ceafe contending about thefe 
 words to the difturbance of the Church. By which 
 means r and especially by the Explication given of thefe 
 words by Athanafiut, (whereby (as Gregory Nazianzen 
 tells us in his Panegyrick upon him) he fatisfied and re- 
 conciled both Greeks and Latines to the indifferent ufe of 
 them, and indeed that Oration made by Nazianzen 
 himfelf in the Council of Constantinople (viz, the fe- 
 cond General) before 1 50 Bifhops, not a little contri- 
 buting to the fame ; ) the fence of thefe Terms from that 
 time forward came generally to be fixed, and the Am- 
 biguity of them removed, and To the Controverfie by 
 degrees ceafed between the Greeks and Latines, and the 
 Words i^Vwja, or Perjorix, and u7ro<r*<rf<>-, or Subfi- 
 
 ntU grew at length to be promifcuoully ufed without 
 any Jealoufie or Sufpicion, and to be accepted on all 
 hands (though not prefently ) in the fame figniiica- 
 rion> 
 
 3. The Third Thing which I would obferve, is, That 
 
 fbmeof the forementioned Terms fignifie Caufalfy 7 and 
 
 Hie only Declaratively, that is to fay, fbme import the 
 
 Qround and Reafon of the Diflinttion of the Divine 
 
 Verfonsy 
 
Chapt e r VIII. 2 5 r 
 
 Perfons, and fbme import only Mj, 
 of fuch a Diftinction. Qf the fifft fort amongft 
 Greeks, arc uVc^a-j^;, T^p*zzror] £wxp%€a I ?^joT>iTfiS : 
 
 and amongft the Latines, SuifiHentU, Modi Sub 
 
 Proprieties & Relatione*. OF the Latter fort amor. 
 the Greeks are ^apaxTSrpgs and yiue/o-fjLctJx : and amongft 
 the Ldtinesj A nhms. But tor the fuller and further il- 
 luftration and improvement of this Note, I cannot bi.t 
 add the Obfervation of the lblid and exactly Learned 
 ForbefiL's^ viz. That of theft Modes, called by the 
 Greeks, r T ^< mQi uVa/^ew;, there is a four-fold Ufe, or 
 Effec~f, as they fuftain four feveral Confidcrations. vit< 
 That 
 
 Firft, A<i Modes of Subfiftence, they Conjiitute the Per- 
 fons. And 
 
 Secondly, That by the Relations, which they imply 
 and include, they caule the (aid Per fons to be referred to 
 one another. And 
 
 Thirdly, That as they are Properties they diftinguifh 
 the Perfbns from each other. And 
 
 Laftly, That, as Notions, they are Means, and (as 
 it were) Inftruments whereby we are enabled in fbme 
 meaiure to apprehend and conceive of the Divine Per- 
 fons. Porbefms Injirucl. Hist. Theolog. Lib. i. Cap. 35. 
 Seft. 16. 
 
 By all which it appears, That the feveral forementio- 
 ned Terms do really import but one and the fame 
 Thing, differently confidefed, according to the feveral 
 Ufes and fleets afcribed to it, in refpecl of the economy 
 of thc7VW Divine Perfons amongft themfclves. 
 
 4. In the Fourth and Laft place, we may obfervc. 
 That the words molt common lv and frequently ufed h\ 
 Writers in treating of the Divine Pwfim\ are the fore- 
 mentioned oVo^ccVft;, TCfiisoi uVaf^gw;, and Ifiiwfmi n- 
 
 K k 2 moi 
 
2 5 % JnimadverJionSy Sec. 
 
 mongft the Greeks. And the Terms Perfon<z, Relatio- 
 ns, Proprietates, and (in the latter Ages efpecially) 
 Subfifientia, and Modi SubfiHendi amongft the La- 
 tines* 
 
 Thefe Obfervations I thought fit to lay down for our 
 clearer and readier Apprehenfion of the Expreffions u- 
 fed by the Fathers, and other Church-Writers in their 
 Difcourfes about this great Article of the Chriflian 
 Faith. 
 
 And fb I proceed now to my Authorities, fhewing 
 both from the Ancient and Modern ufe of the Terms 
 aforefaid, and more efpecially of the vTro^da^ and 
 veptiroi V7rctP%eoos 7 the Subfistenti* & Modi Subfiflendi, that 
 the Church has all along placed the refpe&ive Per fina- 
 lities of the Three Divine Perfons in Three diflintt Modes 
 of Subfiftence, according to the Dodtrine Afferted by us. 
 And here I fhall begin with the Greek Writers, letting 
 them down according to the Order and Age in which 
 they Lived. 
 $ tt ftin And firft with Juftin Martyr, who in his IfcSwis $ tt!~ 
 
 '"• reus, or Expofition of Faith, fpeaksthus. 'OuTauJoV t<£ 
 
 TTOLlgjL VLOS Xj TO 7TVeVfJLCL CCyiQV, OTl TO JU^J olySW7}TOV Xj 
 
 yevvVTov Xf oKiropsvlov 4k ialcts ovo^oiloL aAAct T£pWo* *? 
 vjrcLpfyoos. The Son (fays he) and the Holy Ghost, are 
 not the fame with the Father ; for the Terms Vnbegotten r 
 Begotten,, and Proceeding, are not the Names of Effence, 
 hut Modes of Subfiflence, Jufin. Expofition. fdei. p. 37 3, 
 Colon, Edition. 1686. Again, fpeaking of the fame 
 Terms, he tells us, That they are not vcrlccs J^Awtjkcs, 
 but G))\j,cLv\iKoi t?$S vTrorolaewv, that is to fay> not deno- 
 ting the Effence, but fgnifying the Hypoflafes, or Subfi- 
 fences', adding withal, IkclvcI ^ 7\fjuv £ia,Kgjlv&v toL <&£?- 
 
 GtoTTCl, Xj ¥ 7T<XT£P>' Xj VlS, Xj olyiv 7TveVfAc£\@* ItPlOL^OvJwS 
 
 dunyueiv viffQcfacrty, That they are fujficient for m to di~ 
 
 Jtinguiflj 
 
Chapter VIII. 2 5 3 
 
 ftinguijh the Perfons, and to (hew the proper and peculiar 
 Subfiflence of Father ^ Son, and Holy Ghost by. Pag. 374. 
 And again, "Epoc, <Beov "urepcrnKtv o^oXoySv ct> Trargjl $ 
 
 Vl<2, Kj TTvBOfJLCCTl CtyiOJ yvW£At^O$JQl' P Yl f*W 7TXTr)p Xj VlQ> 9 iCj 
 
 7rviV{A.ct ciyiov $ pits 0gOT>57©* rols V'&Qcr'oL<7eiS yvtogji^QvlxSy 
 Y) Q 0£o> to tcolt vcrlctv KQipov <tfS vwoq^daecoy roSylccs. That 
 is, we ought to own, or Confers One God, exprejfed to us in 
 Father, Son, and Holy GhoU, hereby acknowledging, as 
 they are Father, Son and Holy Ghoft, Three Subfijlences of 
 one and the fame Godhead \ but as they are God, under- 
 JlandJng thereby one EJJence, or Substance common to all 
 the Subfijlences, p. 379. ibid. By all which Expreffions 
 we fee Perfonality ftated upon Subfifience. 
 
 Our next Teftimony fliall be from Athanafius, who Ashanofm* 
 in his Treatife de Sanctiffima Virgine Deipara, gives this 
 Account of his Faith. Ficr-evQjjfy &s Parepcc, y viov, $ 
 
 tPictlfeaiv, ^ r hasviv davy^uTov. That is> We believe in 
 Father, Son, and Holy Ghoft, a Trinity of Hypoftafes, or 
 Perfons y having amongft them fitch a Difiintiion, as ad- 
 mits of no Divifwn, and fuch an Union > or Unity, as is 
 without all Confufion. Athan. Tom. 1. p. 1029. Colon 9 
 Edit. 1 6 86. 
 
 The Author called Dionyfim the Areopagite (though -Dionyfim 
 by a falfe Title, for the Areopagite lived in the firft Gen-^Ws*'?- " 
 tury, but this Writer in the fourth) in his Book de Divi- 
 nis Nominibus cap. 1. fets forth the Trinity thus. Treses 
 3 £1% r toj-gutsq^^qv rF oixrepvcrlv yoviftQ7$®* zntpctvcriy.- 
 The Trinity (fb called) becauf of its manifeftation of a 
 Divine, or Superlative Fecundity fhewn in Three Subfi- 
 jlences, or Perfons, 
 
 . Epiphanies alfo in the 6 2d. Herefie,and"jd. Paragraph, i_ 
 gives the like account of the fame, T&«x> ag^ta^a 
 P&Ttpo $ vtflh % TrvtvfiCL&yiQV) «% 00s hri tfyvw ovo(Acccnv 
 
2 5^L Jnimadverfions, &c, 
 
 KSxAtf'/gJ'o:',xAA aAwS'w; ii?&cl tx qvo(jlclix ? t£a&<xi O'Erofa- 
 a a.. The Trinity is nta-.'lrcd by F#tber 9 Son, and Holy 
 not as one Thing called only by Three Names, but m 
 ..:, /'// t ,- pcrfa' S< :.ces, [or Periods] as 
 
 perfect Names. 
 In like manner Gregory N 7 az Ipcraks much the 
 
 fame Thing in his 29th Oration. X/>5? ^ t iva Oeov o-wpaV 
 *) Taw Tf>ea vwo^xaea ofj.ohoy&v, bt wi T^a 7r^pcra)wcCy 
 xaS-' lx.cc<?Y)i> per* f IPiotviI©*. fFie flsgitf (fays he) /r> 
 /Wa! <?/?? Gtfd, ^W ta confefs Three Subfifrences, or Three 
 Perjons, each with his refpective Property according to 
 his Subfijlence, Greg. Nazi an z. 'Torn. 1. P. 490. Ed/>. 
 P^r//.' 1630. 
 
 Gregory Nyffen, upon thole words in the firft of Gene- 
 fis 9 Let us make Man, exprefles himlelf thus. 'Evolva-ey 
 
 q"alar&s,i£ia yb u^ujc^uan Fai^j, i<T/a o/« x) 7TVrOcta7©» 03/ jy. 
 
 God (fays he) w^rfe ikfe (laying the ftrefs upon the 
 Word lirohato of the Singular Number) that you may 
 reckon y or account the Godhead to be but One: Put not 
 fo the Subfifhnces \ for there is a proper Subfijlence of the 
 Father, a proper Subfijlence of the Son, and a proper Sub- 
 fijlence of the Holy Ghojl. Greg. NyJJen Tom. 1. p. 141. 
 Edit. Par if. 161 5. 
 St BtfiL St. Bajilm his Book de SpirituSanclo, Chap. 18. (peaks 
 thus of the Second Per Jon of the Trinity. AguVgeP^ '5 
 Oeov »J tTzw X} TTi/jLeepv dx,wto(t$j. ©gov qS eft ©ga 7r^p- 
 o")toySr7g$ ^ to i Jia^ov tw^ o , wo<pxo"£ft>j/ o^toAo^fcjmfyj j2 pho- 
 fjfyj S^i *f fjLQvccp%i<xs. We (fays hej #6*z^r /# fte £>/*/ 
 ird of a Second God; but Worshipping the Son as God 
 of God, we both acknowledge the Property of the Hy- 
 poslajes [ or Perfons ] and infijl upon one Supreme Go- 
 . rnor, or Lord of all Things. Baf. Tom, 2. p. 332. Edit, 
 Par if. 1637. 
 
 Likewife 
 
Chapter VIII. 255 
 
 Likewife St. CyriS of Alexandria declares himfel] 
 much the fame way in his third Dialogue de Trinitate. 
 
 "Evg^-t yb Q |J«p TO Of jtA/a T>7 3-gGT/M T&L'SrXuV KCLV VTZTLfU.- 
 
 wit. We mayobferve (lavs hej /// 0#* /^t/7/, .1 Terna- 
 ry, or Trip!/ city Act or ding to [_or in rejpefl of] Subp- 
 jtence. 
 
 The fame we find alfb in Ifidonts Pelupota, Lib. i.ffitontre- 
 Ep/fr. 247. M/flt $ £?ir £ ©eoW, rpeti Q ai VTvofaLfrai ' '" 
 
 tSto T^gf, tSto v^/g. !Tfer* & (fays lie) OneGoSead, 
 
 but Three Hypoftafes^ or Subp fences. Tins keep , /7;/V 
 
 /W^, &TC. 
 
 Theodoret alfb fpeaks very fully upon the fame Subje&j 
 in his firft Dialogue contr. Anomsos. Ta ply f *V/<xs i'^/os 
 
 TO 3 Pfl6TTJp « KOIVQV, QvK apcC $ Bc/flCS i'cf/OJ/ TO FctTTip, 
 
 aAAa "f tf&ofttattfff) « 3 aAAo *? VTATO^oicreoji to i'JW :$ 
 
 aXXoc £ valets iJ\&)//a7a 3 o tuvtov t}i UYi^JiCLivo^jov valet Kj 
 
 x)TnQ<?oL(ii;. That is to fay, AW; Things as belong pro- 
 perly to the [Divine] Effence, or Subjtance y /ire in like 
 manner common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghojl. But 
 the Term [Father] is not common to them) and there- 
 fore [Father] is no Property of the Effence, but of the 
 Sulfijlence, or Per [on : But now, if one Thing be proper to 
 the Hypofafis, or Subfifieme, and there be otht r Proper, 
 of the Effence, it follows, That Effence and Hypojtafis 
 not figmfie one and the fame thing. And again, a little after : 
 
 d^raLvoH©^,ofJLOiui; acp^apT©*, oftoiooi ciylot ^ ofxcioo, oiya&n, 
 ^ Aid TttTo Myofyj fjiiocv vaiotv, TP«* v^jo^oiaeis, That IS, 
 the Ejjencc, or Subfiance 
 
 the Holy Ghost is common, being equally and alike In 
 mortal, Incorruptible, Holy and ( And for this Rea 
 
 [on we affirm One E; md Three Hypo (i 
 
 umfiveTom. ^.Theodoret. p. 2S6, Edit* Ptvrif 168.1. C 
 
 tainlv 
 
z*)6 AmniddverfimSfi Sec. 
 
 illy nothing could, with greater Evidence, ltate the 
 
 Son, and Holy Ghofi upon Three 
 
 .1 the Words here quoted out d 
 
 tli: And I qu( n out of him, though 1. 
 
 Dialogues are inferted into A 
 Works; but lam convinc the reafbns 
 
 the Learned Editor of this Au&arium, that the 
 fiid Dial annot belong to Athanafius. 
 
 Next to him let us hear Bafdius Seleucienfs (peaking 
 
 • the fame Thing in his firft Oration, upon the firft Verie 
 
 of the firft Chapter of Gcnefis, where, upon thefe words, 
 
 Letusmak Image and Likertefs 9 hedi{coWi- 
 
 ie^ thus. M/at fjiiv &X00V fi TActjlQuevy, v% iros $ 7r^aoown 
 
 JJLyifAYI, dA?\CL T£/Jr V'WCq'XO-ewV ' KQIVQV$ *f ©£0T>?7©* S Y\- 
 
 *JLivpyvf/.a to TAaTToju^-oj', T£,ix.fct fjiiv euCfctiva r tt?. t'-.'- 
 veev, plat q &kg:cc r TgjiaJ ©vVTrapxpacLV) a jj juice *t T£/a- 
 <T©* t] &X.UV jj. let rav Vuroq*ctc-€ctiv ri (fvaii. To y> Tctvtov T 
 valets 7] f fi'xc'r®. Ivotiis Knpv-rlei. That is to lay, The I- 
 mage here formed is but One 7 but the menti 
 
 not of One Hypoftafis, or Perfon only, but of Th 
 ■■ the Thing formed being the common Work of the 
 ' ole Deity, (hews the Trinity to have been the Former 
 thereof and fo gives us one Image, or RefembUnce of 
 But if the Image of the Trinity be but One, 
 ' ' the Hjfojlafes [or Per fans] mufi be ( ' 
 ( . Vnity of the Image* proclaims the L\ 
 the Sub fiance, or Eft nee. BaJiL Selucienf Or at. i. 
 5. Printed at Paris with Gregorius Thaumaturgus, &c. 
 
 i 22. 
 
 Zj Sirnamed Scholafiicus^ and fometime Me- 
 
 of Mit (of the Sixth Century) in his 
 
 Difputati( , infe the Philofofhers who held the Etcr- 
 
 to a certain Philofofher, asking him, 
 
 ] 1 ins could acknowledge the lame botli a 
 
 1 rim l : 
 
Chapter VIIL i 5 7 
 
 Inity and an .00 ? Makes this Anfa er. T^xJa. 
 
 ff CCUSV it) O0 JULOlOiS'l Kj fJLOVX^t CI/ T^X^/j TW VOLS fJLtVVWQ 
 <?cl(j€il Tp&i it), r jj »V/«* fJLQvlw, I hut IS, // ' £ 
 
 r« Vnitj) and an Unity in Trinity j 1 
 
 Subfifiences [or Per fins] to be 
 fine \b fiance to be only One. 
 
 Damafeenus, a Writer of the Eighth Cen- Dm 
 turv, in his third Book de Or the p. 11. 
 
 bout the end of it fpeaksthus. Bearm y.h )S poVip el 
 A:; 5 to Q nrx r xrp r vwoq^xo-iv^ WGrep dvSrposwoTM r C'jgiv, 
 PiT£p*J) r v:u-s<pa<nr. @go*Q *. to kqivqp f (pvcreotea'tifjLairei, 
 
 ^ if tKCtq",}; TftSV V-ZuOC^CClSoov TZtIcTCU 7T CC p b) l"J fJL CO 1. 1 llClt 
 
 is, The G declares the Nature ) but th Term | i - 
 
 J ///e' Sub as Humanity does the Humane 1\ 
 
 tun, but Peter the Subfifience^ or Per for?. For i ?n 
 
 \_God~] denotes the Dr imon, and equally 
 
 den , or is afiribed to each of the i tfes y or 
 
 Subfish . . Damafien. Page 207. Edit. P. ?/, ; 
 
 I fhali dole upthefe particul ■ mieswith I 
 
 Paffages in the Creed, common] / ; Cl " • 
 
 which I place ih low, becaufeit is manifeft, that A , 
 nafius was not the Author of it, it being not 16 much as 
 mentioned in any Ancient h Witer (as the vei v i ear] ' 
 D 1 ' Cave affirms) till it occurs in TheodulfhusAm 
 who lived about the latter end of the Eighth Q 
 Now the Paffages are tliele , MwtJ av^iovUi rdi u«ro- 
 extras (in fbme Copies 7TQpacozcxf) unl ¥ ialxv fioupw- 
 
 Tgi, a.?? v y^ bpv fi 78 tczt&); vurac^x(ris^ <zA?.r) r UiS, K) ci? /.* 
 iS vr&VfjLou®* t§ dylv, aAAx Po-t^; -2 Ufa .£< 7rygu'f<ia7©* 
 rtfjKia 0go7»s, C^V, That is 3 
 
 afes [ox Per fins] nord . . . Vot 
 
 there is one Hypostafis of the Vat her. be Son, 
 
 an.' r of the Holy Ghofr, but the Godhead oft 
 
 ) Ghofi is , &c, And \ \ 
 LI 
 
a 5 8 'himadverjionS) Sec. 
 
 \aiai 7 pas uvroi^etaets aurS Lxiccrl^va'ai iauTajs&ffj^ icai. 
 
 Tliat is, The whole Three Hyfofiajes [or Per fans'] are Coe- 
 
 ther, and Coequal. Theft PafTagcs are full 
 
 and | rid the Creed it (elf may well claim the 
 
 Antiquity atleaft of the Eighth Century. 
 
 My next Authorities f hall be thole of the Councils. But 
 before I pais to them, I cannot but obferve and own to 
 the Reader concerning fbme of the firft of my Quotati- 
 ons, viz. thofeout of JuHin Martyr ', and that out of 
 St. Athanafiusi that it has been very much queftioned 
 by fbme Learned Men, Whether thofe Books, from 
 whence they are taken, do really belong to the Authors 
 to whom they are axribed, and among whole Works 
 they are inferted, or no. This, I fay, I was not igno- 
 rant of, neverthelefs I thought fit to quote them by the 
 Names under which I found them placed ; fince many 
 very Learned Perfbns, and much more acquainted with 
 the Writings of the Ancients than I pretend to be, have 
 upon feveral Occafions done fb before me. And the (aid 
 Trafts are certainly of a very early date, and though the 
 Authors of them fhould fall a Century or two lower,yet 
 they ftill retain Antiquity enough to make good the 
 int for which I alledged them. Neverthelefs I muft 
 and do confefs it very probable, That the more diftinft 
 and exaft life of the Terms ina-o<r<*Va;, and tcp^qi vwdp- 
 I***, asapplyed to Khz Divine Perfons, did not general- 
 ly and commonly take place, but as by degrees the Dif- 
 culTion of the Arian and other the like Controvert 
 through frequent Difputes, grew to ftill a greater and 
 greater Maturity. And that the ufe of theft Terms did 
 obtain then, and upon that Account, I think a very con- 
 fiderable Argument to authorize, and recommend them 
 ad Judicious Minds. 
 
 And 
 
Chapt er VIII. 259 
 
 I pals to the Tcilimonies of Councils conee 
 ing the fame. Amonglt which, v. sre, ini 
 
 firft pi j Council of ( 
 
 fion, or Declaration of their 
 
 of our ! , and that,both as t( ite un- 
 
 \dedVnityof his Perfon, andastothe . 
 Diffinftion of his Tv •, 'part* 
 
 (1011 runs thus. e Ofj.o?.oyZ$j h-cc ^ - InaZv X#e<r 
 
 XvgfopjViov [AOVOy&Hj cv 6 vo fpvaeai dav) yjii w^a. t ^iT'/jii.xo i- 
 £ix(£q£pcs ccvYprtfJiivvis £ix r tjrww, HooCofMvm Q ijlclX?.zv r 
 
 iflOTlil©* eKOCTfpaisCpVG'iCtiS) Xj Cii iV TT£p(IWUTQV %j fJLlAV VW 
 
 q'ctair d'JvTpe^o-yn. That is, We eonfefs One and the 
 
 e Lord j Chrifiy the only Begotten Son of God in 
 
 TtSy without Conftifion, &x. the difference of 
 
 the J.t/d Natures , being by no means defhoyed by their 
 
 •"//, but rather the Property of each Natun 
 thereby pr< oth concurring to [or meet; 
 
 tn~] One Pc /-'//, or Hyt>o<ta(is. This Account of the ( 
 fwfe#*Coirfeffion Mte have in th 
 towards the latter end of the 4th Chapter ; and a live 
 Tnftance it is of the Counc. the 1 'ity 
 
 of Chrifl by, and itating it upon, Subjijhnce. 
 
 In the next place, upon an's calling thefecond 
 
 Council of Constantinople (being the Fifth General one 
 in the Year 553, for Condemning of the Tria (.'.; 
 we have a large and Noble ( i m of Faith m; 
 
 that Emperor, and owned and applauded by all l 
 Council, and in tiongft < . of it : And in 
 
 this we have the Thri ex- 
 
 prefled by fb many 6wot^el ff€iS i asa Tc to 
 
 Tejarwurx, and ind lporting U theP 
 
 or / : and that lb fully and 
 
 plainly, thatnoth nlfl 3 ore more lb. c Oy.o- 
 
 L 1 2 Xoy-d j - 
 
:,6o JtnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 toyvp.Wroirvp irifevav «s Paripx, ^ Tior, ^ ccyiov Fr€tj- 
 /xa, Tg/acfa, ifioiaiop} fxioiv 0goTwTa 5 rnoicpuaiv ^ aV/ar, 
 ^ fvvcL/JLiv 9 in l^cricLv cvi-gjL(j\v h-ajoq'&'jZO'iVy riTOiTr^paoowoiSy 
 Js|x^c;Tg;, dv. That is, W? profefs to Believe One Fa- 
 ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, Glorifying thereby a Confub- 
 ft ant in I Trinity, One Deity, or Nature, or Effence, and 
 Power a/,d Authority in Three Subfisfences, or Per Jons. And 
 ;ain to the fame purpofe, Mora^Ta £v t&xPixj t&cLPol 
 
 hooaiv, fjiovd^eL \Av xoltx t *f tfV/cts riyvv ©SaT/jl©* "hoyov, 
 
 VQJLcLb<X $ KX7CL TXS l^LQTYllxi 7\yMV V7TOq*OL(T&S 11701 TT^pdOOTTa, 
 
 We Worjbip (fays he) an Unity in Trinity, and a Tri- 
 nity in Unity, having both a f range a-nd wonderful Di- 
 stinction and Union, that is to fav, an Union, or Singu- 
 larity in refpeff of the Sub fiance or Godhead, an da Trinity in 
 ■hut of Properties, Sublicences, or Perfons ; with fever aL 
 inore fiich Paffages to the fame Purppfe andSigniiication. 
 And then, asTor the Council it felf,the rirft Canon of it 
 {peaks thus ; "Ei n; i% c^oKoyS. Uclt&>>, wj, *j <lyl\i imA- 
 
 /y.a7©« \KiCLv (pvcriv, titoi valocv, ^ fxlccv ^vvcctAiv, Kjl^alccVy 
 
 au7roi; 7repaxvvmm-, tqivt©* 'Apo^rs/xa. e<?u. That is, If 
 I one Confefs not One Nature, or Subjlance, One Power 
 and Authority of Father, Sen, and Holy Ghojl, a Coeffen- 
 tial 'Trinity, and One Deity to be Worfbipped in Three 
 (iftenceS) or Perfons, Let fuch an one be Accui 
 Sixth In the next place, we have the Sixth General Council, 
 and the Third of Conftantinople, called by Conftdntinm 
 Pogon&tw againft the Monotmlite* in the Year 6 8 1. In 
 ."Is of which Council, Article 6. we have the Coun- 
 cil owning the lame Thing, and in the lame words, 
 hich a little before we quoted out of the Council q£ 
 Ch. ■ And moreover -in the Tenth Article, the 
 
 •b it fclf thus. Toy M&oy Ti[jtfS'h<rvyXe/- 
 
 era 
 
Chapter VIII. z 6 i 
 
 q*lv t y.?vlri:QV &€qi TTt^evoviii fa.ctgi' cTuo cturd TOM ^OT€u 
 
 oj> Ty ft ice clvtV J toLh<x,fjL7rv(rci; vT0~cL<ret) &C % I hat is 
 
 /Tt believing out Lord j r CAi /// ro £c //^ Trite G<^, *& 
 n him Two Diftinct A - /^^ w (^ 
 
 SubfifieHce, orPerfbt . 
 
 Agreeably to this, the Council immediately followi 
 called by the Greeks, ^,-J©* irevSrU-ni, and by the L*-^ 
 .<■, Concilium QuiniSextum, Confifting chiefly of the; 
 fame Perfonswith the former, and called bj the lame 
 Conftantine about Ten Years after, for the making of 
 Canons about Difcipline, by way of Supplement to the 
 Fifth and Sixth Councils, which had made none. This 
 Council, I lav, in the firft of its Canons, which is as a kind 
 of Preface, owns and applauds the Nicene fathers, for 
 that, with an Unanimous Agreement and content of 
 Faith, they had declared and cleared up one Confubftan* 
 tUlity in the Three Hyfo ftafes, or Subjijtences of the D/- 
 v/ne Nature. Oliy cfJLofvoo[Aoavvv *? 7ri<^eoj; to ofJLovaiop 
 £jcwi> 'On twv rgjLoov *? Qeotp%i->oi> (pvazoj; hiro^xaewv ccTreKci- 
 ?:j-\>civ\i *) S ieT£5ivoocra,v,Crc. 
 
 And Laftly in the Florentine Council, held in the Fif- The Cow 
 teenth Century, in which the Greeks, with their Empe- a 
 ror Johannes PaUologus met the Latines in order to an 
 Accord between them, touching that ib much contro- 
 verted Article about the Procefjion of the Holy Ghoff. In 
 this Council, I fay, we have the Greeks alfo expreffing 
 the Per finality of ths Holy Ghofl, by the to J7ro<raTi>tQV. 
 For whereas the Latines affirmed, that the HolyGhofi 
 the to cLyiovweSfjLci did aVa^Ac^y cv. tSuiS* That i 
 
 fay, stream, or flow from the Son *, the Greeks defired them 
 to explain what they meant by that Expreflion, diafiAv 
 l^&v on tS JiS, and whether they underftood, that he de- 
 rived both his Ejfence and /V>y rom him, and thai 
 in thefe words very fignificant to our Purpole , 'Ei 
 
 » • 
 
 •i r 
 WlO, V 
 
z6% AirimadverfionS) Sec, 
 
 idictv \l t: iwof cctltlzv it) iyj\ Tg *j hafJL@%v€i \% au t» w uwf. 
 
 By m hich en with thele Afoi fo alio 
 
 the faV/x and the to Jfl'o<raTi*aVj which is all one with the 
 Arc and Perfon ym 2S applyed to the 
 
 e XlejjedTri . flijl. Comet . in 
 
 i Chapter, and Qut ftion eftioo S. Fag. 2. 
 
 : forth by Or. Creyghpon^ \66o. 
 I cannot think it requifite to quote any Thing more 
 from the Greeks upon this Subject it being as clear as the 
 v, that both Fathers and Councils ftated the Per [on all- 
 's oi Father, Son, and Holy G hop, upon Three difiinft 
 Hypostafes, or Subfijtences of one and the fame Godhead, 
 fence, or Subftance, diflinguifhed thereby into Three 
 Pcrjons. 
 
 And fo I pafs from the Greeks to the Latims, whom 
 find giving an Account of the fame, partly by 
 Sub fist ences and Modes of Subfifience, and partly by Rela- 
 tions. But not equally by both in all Ages of the Church. 
 For we have before fhewn, That there was a long and 
 fharp Conteft between the Greeks and the Latims about 
 the Word Hjpojhfis, and that the Latims dreaded the 
 ufe of it, as knowing no other Latin Word to render it 
 by, but Subjtantia, which, they could by no means afcribe 
 flurally to God ; and as for the Word Sm a, that 
 
 was not then accounted properly Latin ; and it was but 
 upon this occafion, and to fc jainft the Ambiguity 
 
 of the Word uTcg-a^ that it came at length into ufe 
 among ft the Latines. And even after all, it muft be yet 
 further confeifed, That notwithstanding that fair foun- 
 dation of Accord between the Greeks and Latines laid by 
 the ttioned Council of Alex , and the hear- 
 
 ty Endeavours both of Athanafius and of Gregory Nazi- 
 am erhim, to accommodate the bufineis between 
 
 them, \\vc Latims \\ ere not lb ready to come over to the 
 
 Greeks. 
 
Chapter VIII. 16^ 
 
 Greeks, in the free life of the Word Hypofiaji 
 
 G> *e to comply with the Lath rintheufe of the 
 
 Word tt^pgutcV) anfwering to their r And 
 
 therefore in vain would any one feek for an Explication 
 of the I in the 7 by the Terms Subfi- 
 
 ttU, or Modi S ubft earlier i rs, 
 
 liich as TertnUian about the latter end of the feeond Cen- 
 tury, and St. Cyprian about the middle of the Tliird, a 
 Lattantius about the latter end of the f I d - be- 
 
 ginning of the Fourth. Neverthelefs find it we do, in 
 the Writers of the following Ages ; And how, and in 
 what fence it was ufed by them, (hall be new confi- 
 dered. 
 
 And here we will begin with St. Ambrofe, who is full St. Am, 
 and clear in the cafe, in his Book in tymbolum Afofiolicum 
 Cap. 2. Tom. 2. in theft Words. It a ergo rectum , 
 Catholicum eft, ut & unum Deum fecundkm Unit at em Sub- 
 flantiafateamury drPatrem^ & Filium, & Spirit um San- 
 Sum in fi/a qtemque Subiillentia fentiamus, A Paflage (o 
 very plain, that nothing certainly could more effe&ually 
 declare, That this Father reckoned the Perjonalities of 
 the Three Divide Perfons to confift in their feveral and re- 
 fpeftive Subfijlences. 
 
 The next whom we fhall alledge, is St. Hilary », who . 
 flourifhed in the Fourth Century, and wrote i 
 Books of the Trinity, and fbme other Tra&s up< 
 feme Subject againft th w. He, I C( ofe 
 
 quently,and particularly in Book 4. 
 Edit* 1570. calls the 1 } 
 
 tids\ but it is evident, that he took in the 
 
 fame fence with <! 
 
 he elfewhere often affirm ' mufl ol 
 
 infer this to be his meaning. As for inftance, in his 
 Bookie Synodis contra , Page 22-3. he tells 
 
 Tl 
 
2 6.i AnimadverfionS) &c. 
 
 That i ; diverfitatem ant dijfimilitudinem ad 
 
 < ffentia. And again, That there is 
 
 mtatis fiibftantia, p. 224. 
 
 And EjfientU difcreta Natura, ibid. And 
 
 -,- (ubfiantis ^0^/14;, ibid. And that there 
 
 is! i them / EffentU, p. 225. None 
 
 of all which Propofitions could poflibly be true, if I 
 
 e Perfons were Three d/jlinct Sub fiances according to 
 the proper fence and Ggnification of the Word Sub fiance* 
 And therefore the Learned Forbefiusm \\isHijlorico-Tbc- 
 ological Infir unions , Book 1. Chap. 2. quoting the afo re- 
 fa id PaiTagc, after the Words Tres fubftantias, fiibjoyns 
 thefe of his own, Eo [nempe'] fenju quo Grsci dicebant 
 <rpa$ virocroio-as. And accordingly St. Hilary explain 
 himfelf further, in his fore-cited Book de Synods* cox 
 tanas, p. 226. fays, That though between 1 e 
 r and the Son there was nulla diverfitas Effentix, yet 
 the\ T did refpuere Perjbnalium Nominum r Onionem^ ne V 
 Subfiftens///, qui & Pater dicatur & Filius : Which 
 Words manifeftly infer, That the Father is [aid to be a 
 Father j and the Son to be a Son, by a diflinct Subfifience 
 proper to each of them. And again, fpeaking of thole 
 f rs who oppofed the Herefie of Sabellius, fays of 
 them: Idcirco Tres Subfrantias ejfe dixerunt, Subfiften- 
 . m Perfonas per Subftantias edocentes , non fiibftantiam 
 P Filiiy & Spirit is Sancli, diver) ulis 
 
 ejfentU feparantes, p. 228. By which Words, hefpea 
 
 that the Greeks meant by woVaowj or th&Latines of 
 the following Times, by SubfiHentia. For which reafbn 
 ir is, that the Learned Collator and Editor of this I 1 
 
 iiom and then, to fuch Paflages as thefe to 
 .: an Explicatory Marginal Note to this purpofe ; as in 
 
 iic puts in the Margin, 
 ymo^dtreiiy and in this Book ie 
 
 nodi: 
 
Chapter VIII. 16 5 
 
 ncdis, &rc. p. 227. he remarks in the fide, Trina in Divi- 
 nis i-ujo^oLon ; which manifeftly (hews, what the Judg- 
 ment of I earned Men was concerning St. Hilary's fence 
 in the ule of the words Tres Substantia with reference 
 to the Divine Per] 
 
 From St. Hilar) we pais to St. Jerome ; who indeed st&rem 
 fcrupled the ule of the Word Hypoftaps, (as applyed to 
 the Divine Perfons) in Epiftle 57. to Pope' Damafus. But 
 that he did only fcruple it, and not ablblutely itftufe, or 
 rejeft it, is evident from feveral other PafTages in that 
 Epiftle; which fhewed his Judgment to be, that there 
 was nothing of it lelf ill and hurtful in the ule of it. 
 For, had he ludged otherwife, furely he would not have 
 told Damafus, that he was ready to own the Expreffion 
 of Tres Perfonas Subfijlentes : And moreover, That if 
 Damafa would command the ule of the Term Hypojlafis, 
 he would ule it. But his Exception againft it (for it was 
 not the Word Perfon, as a great Man millakes it, but 
 the Word HyPcftafis, which St. Jerome demurred to the^^Ser- 
 ufe of) was built upon thele Two grounds, both expref mons on 
 fed in the fame Epiltle. ! 3 ohn ■* 
 
 Firft, That Hereticks abufed, or made an ill ule of printed 
 this Term , to deceive and impofe upon the Minds of l6 9^- 
 Weak, and Unwary Perlbns. And, in good earneft, 
 that muft be a very extraordinary Word indeed, which 
 is uncapable of being one way or other abufed by fbme, 
 and mifunderftood by others. 
 
 Secondly, The other ground (which, as there is great 
 reafon to believe, was the main and principal caule of 
 St. Jerome's diflike of this Term) was its being impoled 
 by an Incompetent Authority, viz. That fbme of the 
 Greek Church would need > command him (and him a 
 very warm Man too J who was of the Latin Communion, 
 to the ufe of that, which the Latin Church had not obli- 
 
 M m ged 
 
6 ArrimadverfionSt Sec. 
 
 ged him to.And Calvin jn Lil.\. Ch.tp.i^. of hislnftituti- 
 on . 5. ihrewdly intimates the peculiar Pique, 
 
 which St. Jerome bore to the Eaftern Bifhops, to have 
 been the chief, if not the fble caufe of his Exception a- 
 gainft tills Word ; adding withal, that it was not fairly 
 done of him (which Calvin was a very Competent Judge 
 of) to AiTert (as in that Epiftle he does; that in 0? 
 
 ' Scholis, vala was nihil alittd quam Hypoftafis ; which 
 Calvin Irfiere fays, Communi tri toque ufu pafftm re fell/. 
 But after all, it feems, St. Jerome could relent from his 
 ftiffnefs, and reconcile himfelf to this fo much fcrupled 
 Expreflion.* For in his Epiftle, or Difcourfe ad Par 
 & Eufiochium de ajfumptione Beat£ Maria, fpeaking of our 
 Saviour's exercifing Two diftin£t kinds of Operation, ac- 
 cording to his Two A .: ares combining in one Perfon, 
 has the le Words, Per hoc, quod audi er ant, quodvidtr 
 
 .'arant (\'yl. Apoftoli) verbitm vitx erat, & nihil 
 aliudex duabns Naturis, quamVnum juxia Subfiftentiam 
 ve I Perfbnam. Hieronym.Tom.g. p. 115. Edit. Par if. a- 
 pud Nivelliwm, 1 579. So that I am in good hopes, that 
 for the future St. Jerome's Authority will not be alledg- 
 ed againft expreffing the Divine Perfons by Hypoflafes ; 
 till it be proved,that there cannot be a Greek and a Latin 
 Word for one and the fame Thing : For,what utzroVac-;* 
 (ignifies in theGreek, That, it is certain, Subfijhntia fig- 
 nirics and declares to us in the Latin. 
 3c Au ?// . As for St. Auflin, though he looks upon the Word 
 Hypoftafis, or Subfiftentia, as new and ftrange to thel.*- 
 tmes, in the fence, in which it wasufedby the Greeks, 
 vc r he is fo far from abridging the Greeks in their way of 
 
 eaking, that he very amicably allows even of thofe 
 / 1 1 fo, who chofe to follow the Greek ExprefTion, 
 
 to tins Particular, in his 5th Book de Trm. Chap. 8, 9. 
 wl 1 Qjii hxc tract ant Grxco eloqtno die tint 
 
C H A FT E R VIII. l6l 
 
 ulctv Ma-lav, Tf>cH$ v^Tc^oiaas. Latinc ifta t 
 
 aIihui , 
 
 verbis, die tint Unam Eflentiam vet Stibffantiam, Tres 
 intern Pferfonas, ilul. By which this Father manifeftly 
 fhews, That the Latines indeed underfrood the ver 
 fame Thing by Perfona, which the Greeks did by 0V0- 
 <rotai; , and thattHey really rendred one by the oth. 
 though they were not generally to ready to ufe 
 Term.AndhercI (uppofethe Reader will eafily perceive, 
 that my Intent is not to efhibliih the ufe of the I 
 
 tierto pleaded for, upon the Authority of St. 
 
 - the Cafe needs it not) but only to fnew, That al- 
 beit this r does both particularly confide id 
 prefly (peak of the (aid Terms, yet he does not in the 
 leaft rejecl, or difallow of them. But however, in the 
 fame Book he proceeds to another Topick very much to 
 •our prefent pur pole, viz. his (rating the Divine Perfc- 
 nali ties upon Rd.it ion, in thefe Words, /// Deo nihil fe- 
 cunduyn Accidei i nihil eft mtttabile. N 
 tnmen omne quod dicitur, Jecundjim Subftantiam dicitur, fed 
 fecundumRi \ >d tmien Relativum Acci- 
 dens y quia non eft mut. .bile \ ut fffius dicitur Re Lit rue ad 
 Partem, &rc. Whereby (as we have laid) founding 
 Perfona//y'm ? a.nd upon fomething Relative, hefuffici- 
 ently proves, That the fame neither is, nor can be pi - 
 ced in Self-Confcioufnefs ;this being a Term, in the import 
 of it, perfeclly Abfolute, and containing nothing Rc/a- 
 
 NexttoSt. Auftin, we will produc i Writer 
 
 of the 4th Century, and flourifhing about the latter end 
 of it ; who, in the fhort Account he gives m of what 
 was done in the fbrementioned Sync for 
 
 the Peace of the Church, and the doling up the Divi- 
 fion between the Greeks and the Latines about the Words 
 
 Mm 2 ifftcc 
 
z 6 8 AnimadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 vale*, and oVcVao-is, in C/a*/>. 29. of the firft Book of his 
 Hiftory, tells us, That although fome thought that both 
 thefe Words were Synonymous, and confequently that 
 as Three Subfiances were by no means to be admitted in 
 the ., fo neither ought we to acknowledge Three 
 
 SubfiHences therein, yet that others, and thole much 
 the greater, and more prevailing part, judged quite o- 
 therwiie; in thefe Words, Alii verb quibus longe aliud 
 Substantia qua?n SubfiRentia. fignif care vtdebatur, dtcebant 
 gv/W Subftantia ret alicnfts Natv.ram rationemque, qua con- 
 fiat, defignet ; Subfiftentia autem uniufcujufque Perfo- 
 na hoc if jam quod extat &fubfiHit, oftendat \ ideoque Prop- 
 ter Sabellii Hare fin tres efj'e Subfiftentias conftendas, quod 
 quafi Tres Subjijlentes Perfona* Jignificare viderentur , ne 
 fujpicionem daremus tanquam tfiiu-s fdei feci at ores effem/ts, 
 qua Trinitatem in Nominibus tantum, ac non in Rebus, ac 
 Subfiftentiis confitetur. So that we fee here a full, and 
 clear Account both of the Sence of this Word, and of 
 the Reafbn, Why the Church thought fit to eftablilh the 
 ufe of it with reference to the Perfons of the B/eJJed 
 Trinity* 
 %etim. Another Teftimony {hall be from Boetim who flouri- 
 shed about the beginning of the 6th Century, He in 
 Chap. 2. of his Book de duabus Naturis in una PerfonA 
 Chrifti, firft gives us this Definition of a Perfon, that it 
 is RationabiUs A alura individua Subfiftentia, (according to 
 which, our Author's War-Horfe is like to fall from his Per fond 
 Digmt).) And afterwards, having difcourfed about the 
 dinerenceT)f «V/cc,ttV/Wi«, and uVoVao-j5,he concludes the 
 fa id Chapter thus. Hac omnia idcirco funt dicta, ut differen- 
 tia™ N alura at que Perjona, idefi ialaa at que vwo^oiaeoo^ 
 monflraremus : pup verb nomine unumquodque oporteat appel- 
 lariy Ecclejiastica fit hcuiionis Arbttrium J ut tamen hoc in- 
 terim con si ct, quod inter Nat ur am Perfonamque differ re pra- 
 
 diximus. 
 
C H A P T E R VIII. l6p 
 
 diximus. By all which he gives us a very Plain, Rational, 
 and Scholaftick Account of this Matte 
 
 The next, whom I (hall produce to Vouch the fame 
 Thing, is RuHicus D , who lived and flourifhed^ 
 
 about the middle of the Sixth Century. • He in Chap. 6. 
 of his Book contra Acephalos ; tells the Nefiorian H re- 
 tick, (whom he is there by way of Dialogue difputing 
 with) That Subfijtentia u i Perfbnam pgnificat.n 
 
 nquam verb Subftantiam. And accordingly, that the 
 Council of Ephefus diftinguifhed in our Saviour, aliud Ik 
 aliud, viz. in refpeft of his Two Natures, but not alium 
 &- alium in refpeft of his Per/ox, which was but One : 
 And this quite contrary to what weobferve in the Tri- 
 nity, lllic enim alius & alius, ne SubfiHentias confundamus ; 
 non verb aliud & aliud. Vnum enim Triii & idem Deitaie. 
 To which Words of the Synod, this Author fuhjoyns 
 thefe of his own. Ecce manifefiiffiml Synod/ Universalis 
 Author it as Subfifrentias pro Perfbnis fufcepit atquelauda* 
 vit. This alfb, I think, is very full and fatisfaftory. 
 
 I fhalJ clofe thefe particular Teftimonies with Two,, 
 railages in the Appendix to the Breviary or Liberates v, 
 the Deacon, who alio lived about the middle of the 
 Sixth Century, as I find it in Crabb J s Collection of the 
 Councils, Tom. 2. P. 126. Col. 2. and which the very 
 Learned Dr. Cave obferves, is the only Edition of the 
 Councils, where it is to be found. The firft Tallage is 
 this. Idem Natura dr Subttantia, quod commune, nonpro- 
 prinm Jignijicat, & idem Perfona & i ttia, quod prt- 
 
 prium, o* non commune declarat. And the other follows a- 
 bout Ten Lines after in the fame Column. Sancla 1 rgo 
 Trinitatss una quid Natura atque Substantia, Com- 
 
 munis eft enimTrium Substantia, non out em una Subfiften- 
 tia, feu Perfona Trium, viz. Pax P Mi, & Spirit us 
 
 Sanftiyfed Tres SubfiHentU funt. In \v Inch certainly we 
 
 have 
 
270 AmmddverfionSy Sec. 
 
 have fb very clear and pregnant a Declaration of the 
 Thing Contended for by us, that a clearer cannot poffi- 
 bly be given, nor reafonably defired. 
 
 And therefore to add no more Private, or Single Au- 
 thorities, I mall conclude all with that of a Council \ not 
 ral one indeed, but that Lateran hdd under Pope 
 Martin the firft of 105 Bifhops about the Year 649, 
 01*^50, and byway of Preparation for the Sixth Gene- 
 ral one, and of Constantinople the third; called (as we 
 have already fhewn) by Gonjtantimts Povonatu*, and 
 held the following Year againft the Monotbelites. The 
 firft Decree of which faid Lateran Synod, is this : Siquis 
 fecundum Sanclos Patres non confitetur proprie & veraciter 
 V at rem, V ilium, & Spirit urn SancfumJTrinitatem in Unit ate 
 
 Unit at em in Trim late, hoc efl y untim Dertm in T rib us 
 Subfiftentiis conjubjlantialibus, squalls gloria, tin am, ean- 
 demque Trium Deitatem,Naturam,Substantiam,& Virt li- 
 tem, &x. fit condemnatu*. Now this does as manifeftly 
 place the Three Divine Per Jons in Three diftinciSubfiftences^ 
 
 it is pofliblc for Words to exprefs. For it is evident, 
 that by Subfiftentiis cannot be here meant Substantias ; 
 forafmuch as[<S 'ub ft ant u t 'is confubst 'ant 1 'alibis'] would neither 
 be Truth, nor Scnce. 
 
 And now,all that I pretend to from the foregoing Te- 
 stimonies and Quotations, is not to prove, that the La- 
 tin Church has alway made uie of the Terms HjpoHafes, 
 Subfijhntm, & Modi Subfijlendi, about the Explication of 
 the Trinity^ (for I own it to have been othcrwife,) but 
 1 hat from the Fourth Century downward, thofe of that 
 Communion were not Strangers to, and unacquainted 
 with theft Words; many great and Eminent Writers 
 ■ from time to time more or lefs applved them to 
 this Purpofe. But the main Proof of the Point driven 
 
 I ftate upon the Latter Ages of the Catholick Church. 
 
 Concerning 
 
Chapter VIII. 271 
 
 Concerning which I dare end do affirm, That far the 
 e or Six laft Centuries, the (aid Terms have been U- 
 niverlalK received and ufed by Divines in their Wri- 
 tings anu Difcourfes about the Trinity ; all Hating the 
 Peri r'and UBinSion of the D/i i fons upon 
 
 fb maoy disirnct SubfifienceSyOx Modes of Subfiftence ; there- 
 in following the Greek Fathers, who were much mc 
 verfed in this Controverfie, and mannaged it much bet- 
 ter and more exactly than the Ancient Latines did. 
 
 Accordingly, I fhall proceed now to the Schools 
 amongft whom I fhall begin with the Father of them, 
 Lombard, who in Book i. of his Sentences, 
 Diftinet. 25. and Point, ovStcLg. {peaks thus. Cum di- 
 al ur alia eft Perfona Patris, alia li Hi, alia Spirit us San. 
 jttique id fine intelligi pot eft, ut fit fenfw talis ; Alia eft 
 Suufiftentia, vel Hjpoftafis Patris, alia Subfijienlia Filii, 
 alia Subfiftent'ia Spiritus Sancli ; &" alia Sub; Pater, 
 
 alia Flints, alia Spiritus Santias. By which flirely it is 
 plain, That heftatcs the Divine Ft ■ id their Perfa- 
 
 nalities upon Subfiftence, if any thing can be fb. 
 
 Next to T *, I fhall produce Alen(is,\v\\o in Vol. i . 
 
 and Book i. de Divinis nominibm infpecia'li, has thefe Pal- ^ 
 fages. In Divinis non dicitur una fubf/ftentia, ft cut / 
 fubftantia. Quaeft. 57. Memb. 3. And Tres jv.m FUpo- 
 ftajls unius Effenti^j Quae ft. 58. Memb. 2. And / ; 
 eft Hypofta.fi s preprint ate fua dflincia, Quajft.58. Memb. 4. 
 By all which he manifefHy Afferts the tiling here con- 
 tended for. 
 
 After him, let us lee what Dursndtu fays, who un ; , 
 dertaking to give the fi unification of \.////. .mtia, S . 
 ftentia, EflentiaandP , with reference to God^ in 
 order to the Explication of the Term SttbfiftentiA, firft 
 tells us, What it is to Subfift, in thele W >rd >. Subfiftere 
 die it deltrminatum effendi modu/n. eft 
 
zyz Animadnjerfions, Sec. 
 
 Ems per ll\ & non in alio. A little after which, lie tells 
 us, That Nomen Perfbnd dicit fuppofitum Intellectualis A 7 a- 
 ria Predict a convent unt, fcil. Effect it, Sub- 
 i . By which he gives us a moft exafr 
 Account and Definition of a Perfon \ which (in Intelli- 
 \ is nothing elfe but an Effence, or Subftanc? 
 (Terms Svnonvmous in God) under a Sub >(i ft ence peculiarly 
 belonging to it. And in the end of this Queftion, he fur- 
 ther explains the Perfonalities of the Divine Perfons by 
 fo many diftinct Relations, in thefe Words. Perfonx, 
 altiplicatur in Divinis, includit in eo, de quo dicitur, 
 alt quid, quod non eft omnino idem fecund im rem vel ex n at li- 
 ra rei cum EJfentia vel Sub ft ant u, fcilicet Relationem ; ra~ 
 tione cuji/s plurificatur Perfona in Divinis, & non efjcntix. 
 DurandusLib. i. Diftinft. 23. Qua'fh 2. 
 
 Thomas Aquinas alfo we fhall find giving his Judg- 
 ment to the fame purpofe , and that very fully 
 and clearly. Dicendum ( fays he ) quod quamvts hoc 
 Nomen [_Subftantia~\ in Latino refpondere vide at ur huic 
 Xomini [Hypoftafis'] in Gr£co, non tamen omnino idem 
 figmfic.it fecundum ufum utriufque lingux. Nam hoc nomen 
 \J~iypoftafis~] apud Grxcos fignificat tantum S ubft ant 1 am par- 
 ticular em qu£ eft [ubft ant 1 a prima ; fed Latini utuntur No- 
 ; antt£ tarn pro primu quarn pro fecund.l.Subftantia 
 dutem par lie id arts nihil al/udvidetur, quiim quid diftinclum 
 Subfifttns, dim ergo in Divinis tnvenitur alt quid diftin- 
 ciumfubfiftens, recti ibi Nomen [Hypofbifis] diet pot eft, 
 (idT fecundum quod Divina verbis humanis figniHcari contin- 
 git. And again, Dicendum quod hoc Nomen [Perfona~\ non 
 dijfert ab hoc nomine \_H\poftafis~] nifi quod addtt deterrnina- 
 : am Nat warn ; quod patet ex hoc, quod Hypoftafis eft Indi- 
 ./.?. Perfons verb Individuajubftantia Ratio- 
 A . ■ >x. Hjpojt.zfis ergo in Rationali Naturi accept a 
 ihil altitd eft, qui a Animal turn Rationali 
 
 4£tu 
 
Chapter VIII. 273 
 
 Aclu nihil tli ltd eft quhn Horn). Unde cum D 
 fit Rati . (largo modo acct Rationale pro quolibet 
 
 tnt -t quod Hypostasis Divtna fit idem quod 
 
 Perfona Divina. And prefently after, as to the Relatr 
 N&tvn of this Hjpojlafis, he adds this at the end of the 
 Article. Si cut ergo hoc Somen \_Perfona~] in Divimsjig- 
 nificat Relationem per modtnn ret Subfijlentis, fie & hoc A 
 
 n [_H\poHd(is.~] Thomas in Scripto 2. in Sentent. Lib.i. 
 Diftinft. 26. Quacif. 1. Artie. 1, 2. And again in I 
 Comment upon the Epiftle to the Romans, Cap. 1. Ni- 
 hil all tide (I Perfona qulim Hjpojlafis aut fuppofitum Ratio- 
 nalis Ndtu) 
 
 Next to Thomas, let us hear Caftan, one of the motto,-.-. 
 Eminent Commentators upon him, who defending Bo- 
 naventure againft Scopus, (peaks thus as to this particular. 
 Subjlantia dup lie iter jumitur, & pro Effentia & pro Hy~ 
 postafi (i. e.) Sttbfi stent ia. At que hoc fee undo modo Sub- 
 Jlantia, id eft, Hjpojlafis dicitur formaliter de Perfona Di- 
 vina, & quod fimui ac feme I Perfona Divina est Hjpojlafis 
 & tamen Relatio. Adding thefe Words immediately 
 hereupon. Hec omnia communia junt omnibus Theologis. 
 Caietan in i m Thomae, Quaeft. 40. Artie. 2. 
 
 From Caftan I (hall pa(s to Greg, de Valentia, who Greg, de 
 diicourfesof the Divine Per fons and Perfonalities thus. ukmu - 
 Ex hoc conjequenter apparet, debere concedi in Divinis Tres 
 Sub fife sit 1 t is refpectivas, non foliim ut Subfistentia accipitur 
 pro Tola Per [on), tit deftnitio Ecc/efi.e declarat ; fedetiam ut 
 accipitur pro gradu illo ultimo Subflantiali confiit ttente Per- 
 fonam & reddente illam incommttnicabilem, quern Theologi 
 appellare folent Subfijtentiam, & est ipfa Perfonalifas. G. de 
 Valentia Tom.i. Difputat. generali 2. Quxtt.3. Artie. 2. 
 
 P- 74 1 - 
 
 'Yo Gregory de J'alentia, we will lubjoin Efiitis, who ■' 
 
 (peaking of the Words Perfona and Hjpojlafis as they 
 
 N n were 
 
274- Arum rjionS) &c. 
 
 wereufed by the Greeks 'dndLatwes, and of the fence or 
 the 1 a '" rs about them, fpeaks thus. Horum Authorita- 
 tem ;\> G;wc/ n>) funt fecuti, ut Hjpoftafim in Di- 
 
 tellig&nt) quam quod Latini Per fonam v o- 
 c.v;f, maximi cum intromftu non ejfet aliudVocabulum, quo 
 Subfiflentiam ill am perfonalew^qua inter fe dijlinguuntur Pa- 
 ter, & Fi/i/v, & Spiritu-s Sanctu-s, commode at que inofjl i 
 exprimerent. Eftius in fentent. lib. i. Diftinft. 23. Arti- 
 culo $. By which Words it appears, That according 
 to this Author, it is this Personalis Subpftentia, by which 
 the Three Divine Perfons are diftinguifhed, and confe- 
 quently in which the proper Perfonality of each of them 
 does confift. 
 
 After Eftius let us caft our Eye upon Suarez, (peaking 
 much the lame Thing with thofe before mentioned. Ad- 
 vertendum eft (fays he) hoc nomen {Subfisteniia~\ apud 
 Ant 1 quo s Pat res frequent i us accipi in Vi concreti ad jignifi- 
 can dam Hypoflafim feu P erf on am. In quo fcnfu nulla eft 
 Quaftio inter Catholicos, nam de fide eft, dari in Trinitate 
 Tres Subfifientias realiter diftincitis, id eft Tres Hypoftafes. 
 Suarez in i m Thomae de Trinitatis Myfterio lib.}, cap.4. 
 And then again for the Relative Nature of the faid Sub- 
 fiftences, he gives this Account of the Divine Perfons and 
 their Perfona/ities. Ex his qud h act cms diximtx, &c. con- 
 cluditur Relationem Perfonalem effe etiam proprietatem con- 
 ft /tuenl em Perfonam \_feu qua conftituitur PerfbmsJ^ De 
 Trink. lib. 7. cap. 7. in the beginning. 
 ■■■'/*. To all which I fhall add, Martinez. Ripalda, afhort, 
 but Judicious Writer upon the Sentences, (peaking of 
 the Term [_Hjpoftafis~\ in thefe Words. Htretici : (fays 
 he) refer ente Hieronymo, ea voce abut cb ant ur ad decipien- 
 dum fid ■ -m e.i fignifc antes EJJentiam, jam P erf on all- 
 
 tat em & inco?nmunic obi tern Subfiflentiam. By which la ft 
 Exprcflion this Author manitcltly fhews, That he takes 
 
 Perfonality 
 
Chapt k k VI1L 27 5 
 
 Perfonality and Int nicable Subfiftence for Words Sy- 
 nonymous ; and confequently that fuch a Subft fence is 
 and ninit be that, by which a Divine Per fan is constitu- 
 ted formally, what he is. 
 
 I cannot think it necefTary to quote any inorc of this 
 fort of Writers, nor am I fbllicitous to alledge many 
 them, becaufe I am well affured (according to the foi 1 
 cited Saying of Caftan) that tbefe are the Terms, and 
 this the Language of them all upon this Subject. Only 1 
 think fit to remark this : That, whereas I have alledged 
 fbme of the School-men (and particularly Durandits, Tho- 
 , and Suarez.) expreffing the Divine Per fonalities by 
 Re/.. ell as by Hypoftafes, or Subfiftences 7 as they 
 
 do in both thefe mean but one and the fame Thing, vi 
 a Relative Siibf fence, or a Subftfting Relation', fb by both 
 of them they equally overthrow this Author's Hypothefis, 
 deriving the Divine Perfona/ities from Self-Con) cioitfnefs. 
 Forafmuch as Subfiftence is in Nature before it, and Rela- 
 tion is oppofite to it ; it having been demonftrated by me 
 in Chap. 4. That SelfConfctoufnefs is a Thing wholly 
 Abfolute and Irrelative, and therefore cannot poffibly be 
 the Formal Reafon of that which is EJJenl tally Relative. 
 In a word, Self-Confcioufnefs is neither an Hyfoftafis, nor 
 a Relation ; and therefore can have nothing to do here, 
 whatfoevcr other Employment this Author may have 
 for it. 
 
 And now I fhall at laft defcend to the Teftimony of 
 feveral Modem Divines, and all of them Men of Note in 
 the Times in which they lived. And amongft thefe, let 
 us firfr. hear Philip M n in his common place 
 
 fpeaking thus upon this Head. Satis con ft at (fiys lie) 
 vet ere s Script ores EccL os !\-:c d 
 
 vaiccv & vTvocfKo-iv, & did w ejfe valav, id eft, £/«- 
 
 Nn 2 
 
276 jhii:<)iad r ccrfionS) Sec. 
 
 fentiam dternam Patris, & Ft Hi, & Spirit us Sanffi, fed 
 
 tres V7ro^da€i>. 
 
 From him we will pafs to Chemnitim who Wrote up- 
 on Melanffhonh Common Places : He in the rirft Chap- 
 ter of his Rook de duabtu in Chrifto Naturis, gives his O- 
 pinion thus. Hjpoftafes feu Perfon.e Trinitatis omnes h- 
 num funt propter Identitatem EJJenti* f/£, at que adeb 
 differ unt Effentialiter, nee feparatim una extra all am & fine 
 altl fubfiftit. And prefently after this, Relatione autem 
 fep Tgp<&to vwdp^ew, ntodo fcilicet Subfiftendi realiter dif- 
 fer unt. 
 Calvin. After Chemnitius let us confider what Calvin fays ; 
 
 in Book i . of his Inftitutions, Chap. 1 3 . Seel. 2. F ilium 
 Dei Apoftolitt char afferent Hypoftafeos Patris nominans, 
 hand dubie aliquant Patri Subfiftentiam ajfignat in qui dijfe- 
 rat a Filio. Nam pro Effentia ace i per e (ficuti fee er unt qut- 
 dam InterpreteSy &rc.) non durum modo fed abfurdum quoquc 
 ejfet. And again in Serf. 6. of the fame Chapter. Per- 
 Jonam uoco Subfijlentiam in Dei effentia ^ qua ad alios relata 
 proprietate incommumcabili diflinguitur. Subfijlentix no- 
 mine aliud quiddam intelligi volumus quam Effentiam. 
 Peter Mar- In the next place Peter Martyr gives us the fame Ac- 
 er* count of the fame Subject. Multo reffius (favs he) & 
 njeriks intelligemus ex iflo loco fnempe 2 Samuelis Cap. 7. 
 Commate 23.) Tres Perfonas in Una Natura Divina, Pa- 
 trem 7 inquam, Filium & Spirit tint Sanctum, qua cum fint 
 Tres HypoJlafeSytamen concluduntur in Unam Effentiam. Pe- 
 trus Martyr Loc. Com. p. 50. col. 2. Loco de Dei Attri- 
 butis Sc Sacro-Sanfta Trinitate. 
 m ifc Likewife Wolfgangu* Mufculus in his Common Places 
 MufuUs. under the particular Head or common Place de Deo, de- 
 clares the Matter thus. Ejc itaque Dem EJfentid Vnus 
 emadmodum & Natura cr Divinitate,Hypoffafi veroTri- 
 nns. And a little after, Hec fun mamfeftb fide tenert 
 
 Dcurn. 
 
Chapter VIII. 277 
 
 Deum, viz. EJfe Vnum Ejjemi'j, Naturi, Divinitate, i 
 tent i&y mot tone ,& Operatione 9 Trinum verb Tribus Perjom , 
 
 quarum fingulis jua efl HfpofiuGs & Proprietors. Mufc. Loc. 
 Comm. cap. 6. p. 7. And a little before (peaking of 
 the difference of aV/a, and J'aroVatn**, and in what fence 
 the Ancients underftood thefe Words. Voce EffentU 
 (fays he) id exprejjerunt (nempe Veteres) quod commune 
 efl in Sacra Triade : per Hjpoflafim verb quod Vnicuique 
 Pt/'fonx propri um in iui eft, figntfearunt . p. 6. ibid. 
 
 Pifcator alfb in his Theological Thefes, fpeaks after the &ft*tor.. 
 fame manner. Quum igitur Ao'^©- femper fuerit fill us 
 Dei, qui* non videt Xoyov de quo loquitur Johannes, femper 
 fuifje Perfbnam feu Hypojtafm, rem fcilicet per fe Subfi- 
 flentem, Loc. 2.deDeo. p. 57, 58. 
 
 Agreeably to this, Tilenus an Eminent Divine expref- Tilenm*. 
 fes himfelf in his Body of Divinity, v^oq-xaen (fays 
 he) five Pcrfonx funt ilia ipfa icrloc qua infrngulis Perfonis 
 efl lota ; ipfe verb ReJationibus five Propria at i bus •£«,- 
 ££t)CTtf£/<p)ta?; [ ll ' fit distinct x. And again, Simp licit er 
 dicimus Proprietates iftas S^ixk^ltikols ejje diver fos 7&>tt\h 
 virdffycos hoc eft, modos Subj'iHendi. Tilen. Svntag. par.i. 
 cap. 20. p. 129. 
 
 The Learned Vrfinus in his Theological Treat 1 fes under 
 the Head De tribus Perfonis in Una Dei t ate declares the 
 lame. Tenendum efl, nequaquam eandem ejje Pair is, Filii 
 & Spin: its Sancti P erf on am ; fedTres ejje Perfonas feu bi\- 
 pojiafes Dii ipsadijii, lures nee pauciort , 
 
 Urfini Open Theol. Quaere. 4. Thefi 2. By which \ 
 fee that this great Divine reckons Subfiftence to be fb 
 much the Ground and Reafbn of Personality, that he 
 ufes Perfona and Hjpoftajis as Terms perfectly equiv 
 lent. 
 
 But there would be no end of Particulars fhould I . . 
 quote ail that might be quoted, and therefore I Ihall 
 
 conclude 
 
178 — &c. 
 
 ^ thi . - 1 
 Divir... 
 
 - ■ 
 
 etk .1. Loco 5. 
 
 Qs? • 
 
 nfirmt rimonies ot parti- 
 
 :ncunv 
 . : "whole 1 the .1 ihall 
 
 - . 
 
 7"; do- 
 
 - 
 
 . - 
 
 . Conft 
 
 C ::fefiion de- 
 - daring the lining of it. 
 
 ■ 
 .This Con- 
 :h in the Year 1552. 
 Likewife inches in their Con- 
 
 . IX. end in 
 . declare the 
 
 - 
 
 .an. 
 
C H A P T E R VIIL 
 
 A(' ( 
 
 appro'.' . 
 in if 
 
 thus. 
 non efficit ut Den. inl 
 
 docet P/rtrem, Vilium^ 'S 
 flinclzm ha 
 Wore ; full. 
 
 But as touchi; 
 not in Reafon to E - that I p _ of 
 
 them to the p . (out of thole 
 
 arc : fince in ftill the C ftoni I rod 
 
 Churches to draw up tl . Confefl 
 
 in set wid : 
 
 them as are Explicate: 
 
 And n 
 me, I would de; 
 here difputin^ to loo!, 
 
 ned G/ 
 
 Emine- 
 ( of whole Conxtrejs and 
 
 Unanimo; xlaring : 
 vowed 
 M to look 
 
 I to tell them, 
 tbe whole World with f - 
 
 I . 
 
 he (ays) import] 
 
 fer r nothing elfe but to obfemre^ 
 
 di!> ig of th 
 
 ..-/;. This, I . 
 
So jfnimacfoerjiom, &c. 
 
 what he has lb exprefly, peremptorily, and Magifteri- 
 
 ed all along in his Book, to do ; if his Heart 
 
 J will ferve him for it. 
 
 mean rime I have here delivered in all the Te- 
 
 both Greek and Latin, Ancient and Modern, 
 
 [link fit to offer in behalf of the Point pleaded 
 
 hough, fhould I have reprefented all that oc- 
 
 currs in the fore-cited Authors (befides many others not 
 
 itioned) to the fame pur pole, I fhould not lb much 
 
 voted, as (upon the Matter) Tranfcribedxhtm. 
 And now, if any one fhould ask me, Whether I look 
 upon thefe Teftimonies as fufficiently reprefenting the 
 Doftrine of the Catholic!: Church upon this Head of D/- 
 
 7 - ? 
 IAnfwcr, That barely by way of Induction they do 
 
 not ; fince an Induction ought to confift of a greater Col- 
 lection of Particulars. Nevertheleis I avouch this num- 
 ber of Teftimonies to be a full and fufficient Reprefenta- 
 tion of the fence of the Church herein, if we confider 
 them as joyned with, and fupported by thefe Three fol- 
 lowing Confiderations. As 
 
 Firil, That it is morally impoflible, that the Perfons 
 above quoted,being of fiich Eminent Note in the Church, 
 both for Orthodoxy and Learning, and Living (moftof 
 them) at fiich great diftance both of Time and Place, 
 frendring all Communication between them imprafti- 
 cable) fhould, or could preiume to exprefs themfelves 
 upon fo Sacred an Article, and fb Tender a Point, but in 
 fiich Terms as were generally received, ufed, and ap- 
 proved of by the Church. 
 
 Secondly, That thefe Terms were never yet Con- 
 demned, nor the Ufers of them Ccnfiired by any Church) 
 or Council, accounted Orthodox ; which in fb great, and 
 ih revered an Article they would infallibly have been, 
 
 had 
 
Ch APT E R VIII. 28l 
 
 had they been judged unfit for, or unapplicahle to, the 
 Things to which they were actually applyed, as this 
 bold Author with great Confidence affirms them to 
 be. 
 
 Thirdly and T .nftly, That hardly any Church-Writer 
 of confiderable Remark and Name can be produced, 
 whoever treated of this great Subject in any otherTerms 
 than thole expreffed by us, or particularly made ufc of 
 the Terms Self-Confcicwfnefs ana Mntual-Conjcioufnefs to 
 explain it by. All being wholly filent of them in all 
 thofe Writings in which they do molt particularly and 
 exactly defign a DifcufTion of thefe Matters, 
 
 Thefe Three Confiderations, I fay, added to the 
 fore-alledged Quotations irrefragably prove them to be a 
 true, juft, and iufficient Reprelentation of the Sence 
 and Doctrine of the Catholick Church in this Matter ; and 
 that it is utterly inconfiftcnt with the Common Reafbn, 
 Principles and Pra&ice of Mankind, that it Ihould be o- 
 therwife. And as for what concerns this Author, whom 
 I am dif puting with, I dare affirm yet further, that any 
 one or two of thcPaflages quoted by me, are more full 
 and clear to the pnrpofe I quote them for, than all that 
 he has produced from the feveral Fathers alledged by 
 him for his Self-Confcioujnejs zn&Miitual-Confcionfnifs put 
 together; and much more than his forlorn vos&v n xfina. 
 cited out of Gr. Nyffen to prove the Son an Infinite Mind 
 diftinStfrom the Father, Page 102. That is to fay, than 
 Three vagrant Words applyed by him , to be knows not 
 tvhat, and to be found (for ought appears) he knows >. 
 where. 
 
 All which being manifeftly fb, I defire any Sober Per- 
 fon to iliew me fbmething but like a Reafon to prove, 
 J'hat the Fathtrs and other («/ arch*) I (from whom 
 
 all thefe Quotations were drawn) placed the Per fond 
 
 O O D/j: 
 
z 8 1 h&iadverjhnsi &c. 
 
 Distinction of the Divine Per Jons in Self Con fcioufnefs, and 
 
 their Unity only in Mutttal-Conjcioufnej). On the contrary, 
 as theft Words were never lb much as mentioned by 
 them, lb I affirm, That, whenfbever, in (peaking of 
 
 the Trinity they proceed beyond the bare Word and 
 Name of Per Jon, fo as to give any Account of the Thing 
 fignified thereby, and the Reaibn thereof, they do it 
 conftantly by Subf fences, Modes of Subsistence, and Re- 
 Utions. This I am pofitive in ; and withal, that, as 
 they never mention the Terms SelfConfcioufnefs and Mu- 
 tual-C on fcioufnefs upon this Subject, fb I averr moreover, 
 That when they ufe the Words SubfiHences, Modes of 
 Subjijlence and Relations on the one fide, and of Unity, or 
 Identity of Nature, EJfence, or Subjlance on the other, 
 (which they always do) they neither do, nor can mean 
 Self Corfcwujnejs by the former, nor Mutual-Conjcioufnejs 
 by the latter, nor yet the Things fignified by either of 
 theft Terms. And that for thefe Reafbns. 
 
 Firfr, Becaufe all Modes of Being importing Extjlence, 
 are in Order of Nature antecedent to the other Attributes 
 of Being ; fuch as are Kjiowledge, Wifdom, Power, and 
 the like. And Sclf-Confcioufnefs is no more ; as being 
 but a branch, or fort of Kjiowledge, and nothing elfe. 
 And 
 
 Secondly, Becaufe nothing Abjblute can give Diflin- 
 clion and Incommunicability to the Divine Pcrfons, the 
 Rule of the Schools being undeniably true, Non dari in 
 Divtnis Abfolutum Incommunicabile, Gr. V a lent. Tom. i. 
 Pag. 874. But fuch a Thing I affirm Self-Conjcioufnefs 
 to be, and in Chap. 4. have abundantly proved it fb. So 
 that it is evident, That all the Fathers and Ancient Wri- 
 ters in all the Terms which they ufed to exprefs the Tri- 
 nity and Divine Perjons by, had no regard to Self- 
 Conjcioujncjs, either Name or Thing, and confequent- 
 
 'y 
 
Chaptf.r VI11. 283 
 
 ly that it is a Term wholly foreign and inapplicable 
 to this purpofe. And what is (aid of their filence about 
 Y<~Confcioufnefs extends to Mutu.t'- 1 nlmfs too. 
 And the Truth is, the other forementioned Terms ai : 
 ferted by us againft this Innovator, are to be looked up- 
 on by all Sober Intelligent Men as a let of ftated Words, 
 or Forms of Expreflion firft pitched upon by the Ableft 
 Divines and Writers of the Church, then countenanced 
 and owned by Councils, and laftly eftablifhed bv a bind 
 of Prefcription founded upon a long continued ufe of the 
 lame throughout the feveral Ages of the Church, as the 
 bell: and fitteft helps to guide Men in their Conceptions 
 of, and Difcourfes about this great Myfterv ; and fuch 
 as the Churchy in treating of 16 arduous a Point, never 
 yet would, nordurft go beyond. So that the Queftiou 
 now is, Whether they ought to be abandoned and made 
 to give place to a New, Mufhrom, unheard of Notion, 
 let up by one Confident Man preferring himfelf before 
 all Antiquity ? A Notion, (no doubt) long before lie 
 was Born, throughly confidered, canvafed and laid a- 
 fide, as not only infufficient, but Impertinent to give any 
 tolerable Account of the Trinity by. 
 
 Well ; but having declared this for the Catholick, Or- 
 thodox, and Received Doctrine about the BleJJed Trinity, 
 viz. That it is one and the fame Divine Nature, Effence, or 
 Sub fiance diversified into Three d'fiinct Per Jons by Three di- 
 stinct Modes of Subfifience, or Relations, jo that by vertue 
 thereof God is truly and properly (aid to be Three Perjons, 
 and Three Perfons to be One God. Having, I fay, vouch- 
 ed this for the Doctrine of the Church, let us in the iaft 
 place fee what this Author has to object againft it. And 
 here his 
 
 Firft Realon (to put it into Form for him for once) 
 may run thus : Whatsoever conftitutes and diftinguifhes 
 
 Oo 2 the 
 
z8.}- AnirdatkcrjwnS) &c. 
 
 the Divine Perfons, is really and truly in God, but 
 Modes of Subfifience are not really and trul] in God, and 
 therefore Modes of Subftftence do not conftitute, or di~ 
 ftinguifh the Divine Per fans. The Major is evident, and 
 fhall be readily granted him. And the Minor he pofi- 
 tiveiy aflerts , by denying to be in God, 
 
 particularly in Pat - Words, All 
 
 (fays he) that there are no Accidents, Qualities, or Modes 
 in God. And again, Pag. 84. There are no Modes, no 
 more than the Qualities and Accidents in the De 
 
 So that we fee here what this Author holds concerning 
 all M \ ith reft .ice to God. 
 
 In Anfwer to winch Argument , as I have formed it 
 (and I challenge him to (hew that I have at all wronged 
 him in it, if he can,) I deny the Minor, viz. That Modes 
 of Subfiftence are not in God : And as for his Two fore- 
 cited general AiTertions : That Modes are no more to be 
 allowed in Godthan Qualities and Accidents (which by the 
 way are (b put together, as if Qualities were not Acci- 
 dents) I have thefe Two Things to remark upon thofe 
 Two Affertions fb pofitively laid down by him. 
 
 Firlf, That it is a grofs Abfurdity, and no (mall proof 
 cf Ignorance, to reckon things (o vaftly different as 
 Modes and Accidents are, upon the fame Range, or Le- 
 vel, and then to argue and affirm the fame thing of both. 
 And therefore 1 do here with the fame Pofitivenefi tell 
 him, That Modes and Accidents do extremely defer ; and 
 that none of any skill either in Logick, or Metaphyficks e- 
 ver accounted them the fame. For an Accident affefts 
 theSubjc&, it belongs to, fo, that it is al(b a difiinS Ber 
 ing it felf. But a Mode aflefls it fb, that it is not a dMinfit 
 Being it felf. I will not deny but Accidents may ibmcr 
 times in a large and loofe fence be called Modes: But I 
 deny. That ModesarQ either Accidents, or ever fo called, 
 
 where 
 
Chapter VIII. 285 
 
 where they are particularly and diftinftly . of by 
 
 then ' and MetAfhyficidns may (peak 
 
 very differently of Modes when they mention them occs- 
 (tonally, and when they difcourfe of them , and 
 
 under, a certain and peculiar Head. And whenfbever 
 they do fb, if this Author can bring me any one Logici- 
 an., or Sci v.'lio takes nts 
 and Modes promifcuoufly for the fame Things, I dare 
 undertake to forfeit to him a greater Sum, than ever yet 
 he received for Copy-money in his Life. 
 
 Secondly, My next Remark upon his foregoing At 
 fction is this : That a^s it is grofiy abfiird to confound 
 Modes of Being with Accidents ; fb it is equally abfiird to 
 deny Modes of Being to belong to God. And this I fhall 
 prove both from the manifeft Reafbn of the Thing, and 
 from Unqueftionable Authority. And 
 
 Firft, For the Reafbn of the Thing. If Modes of 
 Being fhoukl not be allowed in God, then I affirm it to 
 beimpoflible for any Diftincl: ion, and confequently for 
 any Per fons to be in God. Which I prove thus. If there 
 beany diftinftion in God, or the Deity, it mull be either 
 from fbme diftincl Substance, or fome Accident, or fbme 
 Mode of Being, (fori defie him or any Mortal breathing 
 toafligna fourth Thing befides thefe.) But it cannot 
 be from any diftincl; Subfrance, for that would make a 
 manifeft Compofition in die 1 ; nor yet 
 
 from any Accident, for that would make a a orfe Com- 
 pofition: And therefore it follows, That this J i 
 muft unavoidably proceed from one or more dijhnJ 
 Modes of Being. This I affirm, and (according to my 
 promife made to this Author in the foregoing Chapter) 
 I fhall be ready to defend the Truth of this Ailcr tion a- 
 gainfthim, whenfbever he ftalLthinkiit to engage in 
 die Difpute^ 
 
 Secondly, 
 
2 3 6 Antmddverjionsj Sec. 
 
 Secondly, In the next place, for the proof of this 
 from Authority, I affirm, that all Metaphyficians^ School- 
 
 n and Divines (at Ieaft, all that I have yet met with) 
 do unanimoufly concurr in thefe Two Things. 
 
 i. That they utterly deny any Accidents in God. 
 And 
 
 2. Thai" they do as universally affirm Modes of Being 
 to be in God, and to belong to him. Nay, and (which 
 is more) That they do in thefe very Modes ftatc the 
 Ground and Reafonof the Perfonalities, and the diftin- 
 ction thereof refpeftively belonging to the Three Perfons 
 of the Godhead. 
 
 And for a further proof of what I have here affirmed, 
 and withal to fhew how unable this Man's Memory is 
 to keep pace with his Confidence, whereas in the fore- 
 mentioned page 47. he affirms, That all Men (mark this 
 Word^ deny Accide?its, Qualities and Modes to be in God. 
 He himfelf afterwards, in page 48. owns, That the 
 School-men hold thefe different Modos SubfiHendi in the 
 Godhead, and accordingly there fets himfelf (as well as 
 he is able) to confute them for it. Now how fhall we 
 reconcile thefe blind AlTertions, that fb cruelly butt and 
 run their Heads againft one another? For will he fay, 
 That the School-men do not grant fiich Modes to be in God, 
 after he himfelf has done his poor utmoft to confute them 
 for holding it ? Or having laid, That all Men deny thefe 
 Modes to be in God, and yet that the School-men grant and 
 hold it, will he fay, That the School-men are not Men, 
 md fb come not under that Univerfal Appellative? 
 What the School-men hold and affert in this Matter, has 
 been diffidently (hewn already .But I muft needs tell this 
 Author upon this occafion, That he feems to have fbmc- 
 thinga bad Memory, and withal to have more than or- 
 dinary need of a very good one. 
 
 There 
 
Chapter VIII ZS7 
 
 There is one Thing more which I think fit to obferve, 
 and it is fomething pleafant, yiz. That our Author ha- 
 ving exploded all Modes Subfijiendi in God, and Chafti- 
 
 fed the School-wen for holding them, even to a forfeiture 
 of their very Humanity ; he vet vouchlafes afterwards, 
 by a kind of Correftory Explication, to allow them in 
 this fence, viz. That the fame Numerical EJfence is whole 
 and entire in each Divine Perfon y bat in a different Manner, 
 P. 84. Lines 12, 1 3, 14. By which Words it appearing 
 that he grants that of the Manner, which he had before 
 denied of the Modus, it is a fhrewd Temptation to me 
 to think, That certainly this Acute Author takes Modtu 
 for one Thing, and Manner for another. 
 
 In fine, I appeal to the Judicious and Impartial * Rea- 
 der^ Whether a Man could well give a more convincing 
 Argument of his utter Unacquaintance with the True 
 Principles of Philolbphy and Theology, than by a Con- 
 fident AlTertion of thefe Two Pofitions. 
 
 1. That Ac:i dt nts and Modes of Being are the fame. 
 Things. And 
 
 2. That fiich Modes are not at all to be allowed of, or 
 admitted in God. 
 
 Secondly, His Second Objection againft our flating 
 the diftincl'ion of the Divine Perfons upon Three different 
 Modes of Subfifience, is, That thefe Modes are little better- 
 than Three Names of One God. Which was the Herein 
 of Sabellins. P. S J. 
 
 To which, I Anfwer Two Things. 
 
 Firft, In dirc£t and abfolute Contradiction to what. 
 heaiTerts, I affirm, That the difference between Tbne 
 Modes of Subfislence in the Godhead, and only Thru de- 
 fine! Names applyed to it, is very great. For Names 
 and Words depend only upon the \\ ill and Pleafure of 
 thelmpofer, and not upon the Nature of the Thing it 
 
 felfV 
 
288 Jninhidverjions, Sec. 
 
 felf, upon which tliey are impofed, and for that caufe 
 r do nor can Internally affeQ: it. But on the con- 
 trary, all Modes of Subfijlence fpring from the Nature of 
 , or Being, which they affeft, both antece- 
 dei I nd (by confequence) independently upon 
 
 pprehenfion, or Will of any one. So that altho' 
 neither Man nor Angel had ever confidered, or thought 
 . or fb much as known that there were fuch or fiich 
 et the Modes of Subfsience proper to them, 
 would have belonged to them, as really and as much as 
 they do now. And if this Author cannot by this lee a 
 vail difference between thefe, and fb many bare Names, 
 (thanks be to God) others can both fee, and defend it 
 too. But 
 
 Secondly, Whereas he fays, That thefe Three Modes 
 are but little better than Three Names. I Anfwer , That 
 his very faying fb is a Conceffion that they are fbme- 
 thing at leaft more and better. To which, I add fur- 
 ther, That this fomething (as fmall a Difference as it 
 makes) is yet fufficient to difcriminate things, which 
 are only Dijlingtiifbable, and no more. For feparable, 
 or divisible from one another, I am fure they are not. 
 Nay, this is fo far from being a juft and rational Excep- 
 tion againft placing the difference of the Divine Perfons 
 in fb many different Modes of Subfisience, that, in the 
 Judgment of very Great and Learned Men, it is no 
 
 finall Argument for it : For 
 'Ofj.ova-iov rolvvv r$ ®e$ $ St. Cyril fays, That the difference 
 7rongji tvv mop cfjLoKoySvres u- between the Divine Perfons (by 
 TToipx&v Iv iflare v-sjo^xGei gv- reafon of the perfect 'Unity of 
 va/poti Te oLfjLOL £ £ LtoyLaplv ox their An ure (ask were) blot- 
 IvaSrai (pafjLtv'To'i, i igcutotyit©* tirigOUt, or taking away all Di- 
 Aoyoii avoLyy.oaoTu.Tas tv fj.d^cc verfity between them) is fo very 
 Gui'OL7ffovTis lav 7T£pGa7rav titoi final] as but jujl to dijlinguijb 
 
 them. 
 
Chapter VIII. 289 
 
 them, and no more ; and to caufe t«V diorxdrojv £iaq'o\Lu> y r lav 
 that One of them cannot be called insjo^aiaim IrgepTflTa, ^ «* ^ 
 f ^ # A*r ; the Father not the Son, Pxt&c 9 ww ' zai at/fo ^i ti/T/ ^ 
 nor the Son, upon any Ac count, the fjiovov !voc ju,ti tolvtt); vaicts cU irlv 
 Father fac. I thought fit toTran- 6tw e^qeph;,*} to koHcL t<x a'JTa ^ 
 fcribcthc whole PaiTage, tho' «VauTw» %%ov aVaeptAAcMcfai; lr 
 the latter part, s/iz. from the tctw FoT^t^Tw vi$ 9 xa7aAg- 
 Words /W ju.11 nravins, &C % is a/i/i r^pirov Tivoi r <Piac(po&cv *} 
 moll immediately and direftly ^uo-^iolkqjlIqv ttofufii to xra,jjLi- 
 to the Purpofe,which I here al- eps 1'<JW IxoT^k xa7y>>*crai7<? 
 ledge the whole for. ttoh/O /lu*> 58 ^ F<xT?ip 9 «£ uioV 
 And Thomas Aquino* tells 3 aS Jxos 9 st* 7r« FaTifp. &c. 
 us, 77^ f/;? Divine Perfons Cyril. Dial, 1. deTrinit. p. 4c 9. 
 0/g/tf r<9 ^ distinguifbedby that, Edit. Lutet. 1638. 
 Hw/V/7 ofccfci * /;* /&*/? diflinction. Diftin&io Perfbnarum non 
 In like manner Durandix af- debet efTe nifi per id, quod mi- 
 firms, That the firH InHance of nimiim diftinguit, hoc eft 7 per 
 Plurality [or remove from U- Relationem. Aquin. prima parte. 
 nity] ought to be the lea ft. And Qu#s~t. 40. Articulo 2. prope f- 
 therefore that the diflinction of nem. 
 
 the Divine Perfons, fince it is the Prima pluralitas debet efTe 
 
 first, ought to be by diftinct Re- minima ; & ideo diftin&io Per- 
 
 lations compatible in the fame fbnarum, quse eft prima, debet 
 
 Effence : Which for that caufe, efle per Relationes compoflibi- 
 
 is a lefs distinction than any that les in eadem Eflentia : Et ob 
 can be made by Things Ab/blute. hoc, eft minor alia quacunque 
 And Lzttly, Be/larmine averrs diftinftione, quae fit per Abfb- 
 pofitively, That the distinction luta. Dtirandns Lib. 1. Di- 
 of the Divine Perfons ought to stind. 16. Qutft. 1. in fine. 
 be the leaf: that ispoffible. Sup- Diftinctio inter Divinas Per- 
 pofing all along, that it muft fonas debet elTe minima. Bel- 
 ftill be Real, and not barely terminus Tom. 1. P. 337. Lu* 
 Nominal y or Imaginary. This tetix Parif 
 was the Judgment of thefe 
 
 P p 1 .earned 
 
2<?o AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 Learned Men ; who as they were far from being Sabe/- 
 Hans, fo they very well knew both what to aflert and 
 how to exprefs themfelves without giving any ground 
 for their being thought fb. 
 
 From all which it follows, That for this very caufe, 
 that Modes of Subf fence import the leaft Real difference 
 that can be, they are therefore the fitted: to ftate the D/- 
 flinctwn of the Divine Per fans upon. So that our Au- 
 thor here relapfes into a fault which he has been guilty 
 of more than once, viz,, in alledging that as an Argu- 
 ment againft a Thing, which is indeed a moft Effectual 
 Reafon for it. And fb I come to his 
 
 Third and Laft Objeftion againfr. our making thefe 
 Modes of Subsistence the ground, or Formd Reafon of the 
 Diftintf'on between the Perfons of the Bleffed Trinity, 
 which is, That it makes the Three Divine Perfons only 
 Three Modes of the Deity, or only Modally difinguifjjed ; 
 whereas (according to his Do£trine) there are no 
 Modes in the Deity, and much lefs can a Mode be God. 
 And that, As all muft grant, that the Father is not a. 
 Mode of the Deity, but EJJentia/ly God ; fo no Man can think 
 
 .it the Father begot only a Modus, and called it his Son : 
 whereas a Son fignifes a Real Perfon of the fame Nature, but 
 diflinct from the Father. Thus he difcourfes, fag. 8 3, 84. 
 And is not this clofe and profound reafbning ? But as 
 profound as it is, if it be at all to his Purpofe, his Argu- 
 ment muft lie in this, That all the forementioned Ab- 
 fiirdities unavoidably follow from deriving the D/JlincJi- 
 on of the Three Divine Perfons from Three diflintt Modes 
 of Subfistence belonging to one and the fame Divine Na- 
 ture But this confequence I utterly deny, and to make 
 out the Reafon of this denial, I fhall confider what he 
 lias faid particularly. 
 
 And 
 
Chapter VIII. zpi 
 
 And here, firft of all, T v. ould fain know, Whetl 
 this Man will never leave confounding things perfe&Iy 
 different, and taking thei lie very fame? For to 
 
 affirm the Three D/: r to be only T ies 
 
 of the Deity is one Thing ; and to affirm them to be on- 
 ly \ dijlinguijbed, is quite another. The former 
 we abfolutely deny, and as pofitively hold the latter. 
 And yet this wretched Fallacj would he impofe upon his 
 Reader all along, viz. That the Alienors of the 
 Modes of SubfiHence intht :y y make a Perfon to be 
 only a Modus Sub fijtendi. But that is his own Blunder. 
 For we do not lay, That a Perfon is only i .-.<-, but 
 that it is the Divine Natm e, or ( ; Subfiiring under 
 fuch a Modus ; lb that the Godhead is ftill included in it, 
 joyned to it, and diftinguifhed by it. This is what we 
 affirm and abide by, and what fufficiently overthrows 
 his pitiful Objection. 
 
 And as for his Abfiird Denial of all Modes mGod, 
 that has been throughly confuted already ; fb that we 
 have nothing more to do, but to admire that Invincible 
 and Glorious Ratiocination of his in rhefe Words, p. 84. 
 No Mm (fays he) can think . ' e Father begot only a. 
 
 Modus, and called it his Son. No, good Sir, No ; £9ne 
 that I know of is in any danger of thinking, or laying 
 fb ; no more, than that Socrates begot only the Shape 
 and Figure of a Man, and then called it his Son ; or (to 
 turn your own blunt Weapon upon your felf ) no more 
 than God the father begot another Self ..-.. ,. be- 
 
 fideshisown, and called that his Son. Neverthelefs I 
 hope it will be granted me, That Socrates might beg 
 one of fiich a Shape and Figure, and (by this Author^ 
 and Xantippth good leave) call that Ins Son ; and that 
 God the Fdther might beget a.Pe) endued with fuch a 
 SclfConJcioufnefs (amongir other Attributes) and call 
 
 P p 2 that 
 
2 9 z Atiimadverfions, &c. 
 
 that his Son too. But I perceive this Author and the 
 Fallacy of the Accident are fuch fa ft Friends, that it is 
 in vain to think of parting them. 
 
 In the mean time, as I told him what we do not hold 
 concerning the Fathers Generation of the Son, fb for his 
 better Information I (hall tell him, what the AlTertors 
 of thefe Modes of Subfifience do hold concerning it, vijt. 
 x > e do hold and affirm, That the Father Communicates 
 Iiis Nature under a different Mode of Subftjling ,from what 
 it has in himfelf, to another, and that fuch a Communica- 
 tion of ir,in fuch a peculiar way, is properly called his be- 
 getting of a Son. In which we do not fay, That the Father 
 begets a Modus, no nor yet an Effence, or Nature, but that 
 he Communicates his own Effence.pv Nature under fuch a 
 dittincl Modus to another, and by fb doing begets a Per- 
 [on, which Perfon is properly his Son. This, Sir, is the 
 true Account of what the Aitertors of the Perfonal Modes 
 of Subfifience hold concerning the Eternal Generation. 
 And if you have any thing to except againft it, produce 
 your Exceptions, and they fhall not fail of an Anfwer. 
 
 I am now come to a clofe of this Chapter, and indeed 
 of the whole Argument undertook by me againft this 
 Author. In which I have AlTerted the commonly re- 
 ceived Doftrine about this great Article of the Trinity, 
 both from the Ancient Writers of theChurch, and againft 
 this Author's particular Obje&ions ; and in both fully 
 fhewn, That the Three Perfons of the Blejfed Trinity are 
 one and the fame undivided Effence, Nature, or Godhead, 
 divcrfified only by Three distintl Modes of Subfijlence, 
 which are fbmetimes called Properties, and fbmetimes 
 Relations. So that a Divine Perfon is formally and proper- 
 ly the Divine Nature, Effence, or Godhead with, and under 
 fuch adiflincl Mode, Property, or Relation. And this I 
 avcrr to be the common, current, generally received 
 
 Dottrine 
 
Chapter VIII 293 
 
 Do&rine of the Church concerning the Trinity. For 
 
 Councils and Fathers hold it, the School-men teach it, the 
 ConfefTions of Churches (where they are any thing 
 particular upon this Subject) declare it ; and all Divines 
 both Pap/stand Protejlant, in the leveral Bodies of Di- 
 vinity wrote by them, do AfTert it ; only this Author, 
 who yet (forfooth) owns himfelf a Proteflxnt of the 
 Church of England, denies and explodes it. To whom 
 therefore (if he were not too great in his own Eyes to 
 be Counfelled and Advifed) I would give this Charita- 
 ble piece of Counfel for once, viz. That for the future 
 he would not pre fume at fuch a rate to contradict the whole 
 World, till he has learned not to contradict himfelf 
 
 CHAP. 
 
2 oi AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 : II A P. P 
 
 In which this Authors Paradoxes, both Philoib- 
 phical and Theological, <u they orcurr in thk 
 bis Difcourfe^ are drawn together, Examined, 
 
 and Confute > 
 
 I Am fenfible, that I am now engaged in a SubjeQ: 
 that would threaten the Reader with a very long 
 Chapter, fhould I follow it, as far as it would cany me : 
 7 ; or I am entered into a large Field, viz,* this Author's 
 Paradoxical AJfertwns : In the traverfing of which, I 
 fhall obferve no other Method, but juft to take them in 
 that order in whichthey offer themfelves throughout his 
 Book; lave only, that I fhall give my Reafler this pre- 
 monition, That fuch of them as I have particularly ex- 
 amined, and laid open in the foregoing Animadverfi- 
 ons, I fhall now letdown without any further De- 
 ttj or Enlargement upon them, or at leaft with very 
 little. 
 
 But as for thofe, which I there palled over without 
 in) Notice, or Remark, (as I did it all along with full 
 purpofe to treat of them by themfelves, fo) I fhall par- 
 ticularly infift upon them now. And the Reader may 
 •le ro take them as they follow. 
 P A R A D O X. 
 
 rrogant frefumption (fays this Author) 
 , What not .1 Contradiction, when m 
 
 confefs 
 
Chapter IX. zy 5 
 
 wnfefs we ao not un nd> or comprehend 
 ffeak of p. 4. And again, I know nothing in the World 
 perfe&ly underftand, p. 7. line 1 
 
 Anfwer. According to thefe Two AlTertions taken 
 
 together, I affirm, That though a Alan difcourfes ne\ 
 fo falfly and inconfiftently of God, or indeed of any 
 thing in the World befides, yet lie cannot juftly be 
 charged as guilty of a Contradiction. And moreover,'fince 
 this Author affirms, page 97, That for any one to i ' 
 That Three Divine Per Jons who arc divided and fefara 
 from each other, are each of them God, ai 
 not Three Gods, but one God, is a direct Contradiction; I 
 defireto know of him, Whether he comprehends 
 Godhead, and what /he Divine Perfons are ? And if not. 
 Whether (according to his own Rule) it is not a vain . 
 arrogant Vrefumftionin him to fay what is a Contradiction, 
 when he profejfes bimfelf not to comprehend the thing he is 
 fpeaking of, and about which the Contradiction is f aid to be ? 
 PARADOX, 
 This Author having declared the Intimate and Ej 
 I :ty between the father and the Son from thole 
 Words of our Saviour, John 14th. Chap. 10th. Ver, . 
 I am in the Father, and the Father in me : Sub joy ns, 
 That this Onenefs between them is juch an Union, as there is 
 nothing in Nature like it ; and we cannot long doul. 
 kindrf'Vnion i his is, if we conjider that there is but one pofTi- 
 ble way to be thus "united, and that is by this Mutual-Confci- 
 oufnefs, p. 57. 
 
 Anfwer. Thefe Words I charge with Contradiction-, 
 and confequently with Abfurdity upon two Accounts. 
 
 Firft, becaufe they Contradict our Saviour's Words. 
 And 
 
 Secondly, Becaufe they Contradict the Author's own 
 Words. 
 
 1 Am 
 
2 p 6 AnimacherJionS) &c. 
 
 i . And firft concerning thofe of our Saviour. Where- 
 as this Author (ays, TW flte Onenefs between the father 
 Son, /V Inch an Union, as there is nothing in Na- 
 ■: .Our Saviourin John Ch.if. (where this whole 
 RafTage is repeated twice)affirms (bmething to fe //& // ; 
 ■: v -. in •: ->r. 1 1. where he prays to his ' . for, 77a?/ they 
 Believers) m*ybeOne y as We (viz. his Father and 
 Himfelf) are One: And again, ver. 21. 'i hat they may be 
 as thou Father art in me, and I in thee. So that Olir 
 Saviour exprefly affertsa Likenefs of f bmething /■<? flte 
 Union on the one fide ; and this Author as exprefly de- 
 nies it on the other. In which (according to his blun- 
 dering, undiftinguifhing way) he confounds [Likenefs j 
 and [Samenefs ofkind~\ as all One ; as fhall prefently be 
 further fhewn. 
 
 In the next place, our Saviour (as plainly as Words 
 can exprefs a Thing) fays, That he and his Father are 
 One, by a Mutual In-being, or In-exiflence in one another. 
 And this Man as exprefly fays, That there is -no potfible 
 way for them to be one but by Mutual-Confcioufnefs. But I 
 on the contrary deny, That Mutual-Confcioujnefs isMu- 
 tual-Inexifience, or Mutual-Inexiflence Mutual-Confcioufnefs, 
 any more, than that Being, or Existence is properly 
 Confcioufnefs, or knowledge ; and therefore if they cannot 
 pojjibly be one, but by Mutual-Confcioufnefs, it is certain 
 that they are not fb by Mutual-Fnexiftence ; which yet 
 our Saviour, in Words properly and naturally fignifying 
 Inexi/lence, affirms that they are. 
 
 And the more intolerable is this AfTertion in this Au- 
 thor, for that in Pag. 56. he affirms, that thefe Words 
 of our Saviour ought to be under flood properly ; and if fb, 
 J hope they do not only exclude Metaphors, but all other 
 Trofes and Figures alio ; for [Proper] is not, adequate- 
 ly oppoled to Metaphorical, but to Figurative, whatlbc- 
 
 ver 
 
Chapter IX- 297 
 
 ver the Figure be. And I do here affirm, That if our 
 Saviour's Words be underftood of Mutual-Confcioufnefs, 
 they do not fignifie Properly but Figuratively ; and the 
 Fjgure is a Metonymy of the Subject for the Adjunct ; for- 
 afmuch as in God, Being , or Jnexi stence are to be look'd 
 upon as the Subject ; and Knowledge, and the like Attri- 
 butes as the Adjuncts. And therefore I do here tell this 
 bold Man again, that for him to fay, as he does, that 
 the forementioned Words of our Saviour ought to be un- 
 derftood property, and yet to interpret them to a fence 
 not Proper, but Figurative (which, by interpreting 
 them of Mutual-Confcioujnejs, he evidently does) is 
 both an Abfurdity and a Prefiimption, equally infuffera- 
 •blc. But in the 
 
 2d. Place I charge the forecited Paflage of this Au- 
 thor with the fame Abfurdity, for being as Contradicto- 
 ry to his own words, as it was to thofe of our Saviour. 
 For whereas he here fays, 
 
 Firft, That this Onenefs between the Father and the Son, 
 exprefled in thofe Words, I am in the Father, and the Fa- 
 ther in me, can be no other kind of Union, than an Union 
 by Mutual-Confcioufhefs. And 
 
 Secondly, That it isfuch an one, that there is nothing in 
 . V .it tire like it. 
 
 I defire him to turn to Page io6.of his Book, where 
 he tells us, That the Fathers ufe fever al Examples, and al- 
 lude to fever al forts of Union, thereby to form a Notion of 
 the Unity of the Godhead in the Three Divine Perfbns. J .et 
 him, I fay, read this, and tell me, Whether thofe Ex 
 ample s and All 'ufions could be of any uie to form a No.. 
 of that Unity to which they bore no RefembUnce at all ? 
 Fori, for my part, ever thought, that there can be no- 
 Allufion of one thing to another without fome fimilitude 
 between them, and that a fimilitude is always on both 
 
 Q^q fie] 
 
zp8 AnimadverJtonS) Sec. 
 
 fides ; it being not poffible for Peter to be like John, but 
 'John muft be like Peter too. And if this Man does not 
 yet blufh at liich Contradictory AiTertions, let him turn 
 a little further to Page 126, 127. where he tells us par- 
 ticularly, that St. Auftin explains this Unity by Exam- 
 ples of Mutual-Confaoufnefs, and by feveral Similitudes 
 (mark the words,) of which the Unity of ~C rider funding, 
 Memory, and Will with the Soul of Man is alledged by 
 him for One ; and that a notable one too, for that tbefe 
 Faculties (as he there fays) are Mutually in one another ; 
 and the Example of Lave and Kjiow ledge in the fame 
 Mind, is alledged by him as another fuch a Simile, 
 affirming them in like manner to be Mutually in one 
 another. Now, I fay, after all this, ought not the 
 Reader to Hand amazed, when he reads the Man 
 firft affirming that the Unity between the Father and the 
 Son Mutually exiHing in one another by virtue of the 
 Mutual-Confcwufnefs between them has nothing like it in 
 Nature, nor has any Example, Metaphor, or Similitude y 
 btfides it [elf to allude to ; and yet afterwards producing 
 feveral Similitudes, Allufwns, and Metaphors out of the 
 Fathers, to explain both this In-being, and this Mutual- 
 Confcioufnefs by ? God give him a better Memory ; for 
 as thefe things reprefent him, no Man living (would he 
 but impart his skill) could be fb fit to teach the Art of 
 Forgetful nefs as himfelf. 
 
 But after all, I muft not omit to give the Reader no- 
 tice of another of his Abfurdities, though of a lower 
 rate, viz. That all along Page 57. he takes a Pattern, 
 or Example, and a Similitude, or Metaphor for Terms e~ 
 quivalent: whereas a Partem, or Example imports a 
 perfeQ entire Refcmblance between it felf and the thing 
 of which it is the Pattern, and indeed approaches next 
 DO a Parallel InHance ; while, on the other fide, an A 
 
 grcc 
 
Chapter IX. ir>y 
 
 grcemcnt in any one refpccl, or degree, is fiifficicnt to 
 found a Metaphor,ov SimiUtfttk upon. And therefore tho 
 it may eafily be granted this Author, That there is no 
 Patter?? j or Example of fuch an Unw; as is between the 
 Father and the So?? ; yet that does not infer, that there 
 is nothing in Nature that bears any fimilitude to it ; iinee 
 this may very well be without the other, as that place 
 in John 17. 11. and 21. has already proved. 
 
 And now I fhould here have finillied my Remarks 
 upon this particular Head, but that there is a certain 
 Paifage in order to his proving that there is nothing in 
 Nature like the Unity between the Father and the Son, and 
 it is this, That inSubfiantial Unions, that which compre- 
 hends, is greater than that which is comprehended : So 
 that if Two Subftances fhould be United by a Mutual- 
 Comprehension of one another, the fame would be both 
 greater and lefler than the other, i>/c. greater as it com- 
 prehended it, and left, as it was comprehended by it, P. 57. 
 Now this Proportion I will neither note as Paradoxical, 
 nor abfblutely affirm to be falfe. But 16 much I will 
 affirm, viz. That it is nothing at all to his Purpofe ; 
 and that he can never prove it to be True. For befides, 
 that he frill confounds an Example, or Parallel Cafe with 
 a Similitude, I would have him take notice, 
 
 Firfr, That this Maxime, Omne continens eft majits 
 contento, upon which he founds a majority of the thing 
 comprehending to the rhing comprehended^ wholly drawn 
 from, and founded upon the Obfervations made by the 
 Mind of Man abc ( rpored Sub fiances, endued with 
 Quantity and Dimenfions ; in which the Subflance Com- 
 prehending is, and mu.ft be of a greater Dimenfion than 
 the Subfiance Comprehended. But what is this to Spiritual 
 Subftances ? Concerning which, I demand of this Author 
 a fblid Reafbn, Why Two fuch Sdfian.es may not be 
 
 Q^q 2 inti- 
 
3 oo Jnimadverjtom^ &c. 
 
 intimately United by a Mutual-Permeation, or Penetrati- 
 on of one another ? For all that can hinder fucha Pene- 
 tration, or Permeation (as far as we know) is Quantity ; 
 which in Spiritual Subfances has no place ; and then, if 
 fuch a Mutual-Penetration be admitted, thefe Substances 
 will be Mutually in one another, and United to one ano- 
 ther, not indeed by a Comprehension of one another, (of 
 which there is no need, if fuch a thing could be) but 
 by a Mutual- Adequation, or exact Coequation of one to 
 the other ; fo that nothing of one Subfiance fhall exiH,ov 
 reach beyond, or without the other, but the whole of both 
 by fuch a Permeation, Mutually Exijl in each other. This, 
 I fay, I neither do, nor will affirm to be actually fo, but 
 I challenge this Author to prove that it cannot be fo ; and, 
 till he can, it may become him to be lefs confident. 
 
 In the next place, I have one thing more to fugged to 
 him about Subflantial "Onions, which he talks fo much 
 of, viz. That the Term is Ambiguous, and may figni- 
 fie either, 
 
 Firft, The Union of Two or more Subftances together, 
 and fb the Father and the Son, who are not Two Sub/lan- 
 ces, but only Two Perfons (as has been fhewn in the fore- 
 going Chapter) can never be Substantially United. 
 Or, 
 
 Secondly, It may fignifie the Union of Two, or more 
 Perfons in one and the fame Subjlance ; which is truly 
 and properly the Union of the Perfons of the Bleffed Tri- 
 nity. 
 
 And thus, though there is no Inftance in Nature of 
 Persons fo United, yet by way of Allufion and Simili- 
 tude, the Union ot the three fore-mentioned Faculties 
 of Under (landing, Memory and Will, in one and ihe fame 
 Soul, (alledged by St. Auftin) may pafs for a finall, or 
 (as this Author himfelf calls it) Page 126- Line 28. A 
 
 faint 
 
Chapter IX. 2 o 1 
 
 funt Refemblance of the "Onion of the (aid Three Divine 
 Perfons in the fame Nature, or Substance ; which, accord- 
 ing to his Excellent Talent of Self-Contradiction, lie po- 
 sitively denies here in Psge 57. and as pofitivelyaffirms 
 in that other now pointed at. In fine, this AiTertion, 
 That the Father and the Son cannot poffibly be One, or 
 in One another ( which is here the fame) but by Mu- 
 tual-Con fcioufnefs, Page 57. Line 23, 24, 25. una- 
 voidably infers, and implys, That they are not One by 
 Unity 01 Sub (lance, Unity of EJ fence, or Unity of Nature. 
 For I am fure neither Subfiancs, EJfence, or Nature, are 
 Mutual-Confcioufnefs. And if the Church will endure a 
 Man afTerting this, I can but deplore its Condition, 
 PARADOX. 
 
 If rve feek for any other Ejfence, or Substance in God f 
 (fays this Author; but Infinite Wifdom, Power and Good- 
 nejs, the EJfence of God, though confidered but as one A5h 
 merica! Perfon^is a* per felly unintelligible to us, as one Nu- 
 merical EJfence j or Substance of Three Per fans in the B I effect 
 Trinity, Page 69, 70. 
 
 An fixer % This Proportion is falfe and Abfurd, and to 
 prove it lb, I fhall lay down tliefe following AfTer- 
 tions. 
 
 Firft, That it is certainly much eaficr for Humane 
 Reafbn to conceive one and the fame Divine Nature, 01 
 Deity , as Sub fifing in one Single Perfon^ than in Three 
 difimct Perfons, 
 
 Secondly, That Efjence, Wifck -, P 
 
 and Goodnefs are in the Divine Nature (which is a pure 
 limple Act) all but one ajid the fame '1 hing, or Being* 
 
 Thirdly, That, notwithstanding this, EJJt-nce, or Sub 
 fiance, andWifdcn, Power and Good*/ efs are formally di 
 ftinft from one another. That is to lay, The Concepts 
 Objectives, or proper Effential Conception of one does nor 
 
 imply. 
 
302 
 
 Animadverfions, &c. 
 
 imply, or involve in it the proper Conception of the 
 other : Upon which Account one of them cannot pro- 
 perly be faid to be the other. 
 
 Now thefe Three Things thus laid down, it is rea- 
 dily granted to this Man, That Effenie^ or Subjla??cc,Wif 
 dom, Power and Goodnejs are really one and the fame Being, 
 and that therefore it is vain and foolifh to feck for any 
 Efface, or Sub fiance in God, which is not alfo Wifdom y 
 V over and Goodnefs. But this, by his favour, is not the 
 point. For if he will neverthelefs fay, That the Divine 
 iX at ure exprejfed by one Infinite Ejfence, or Sub fiance Sub- 
 (ifiing in One Per Jon, is its unintelligible, as the fame Sub fi- 
 lling in Three difiinct Perfons \ Nay, that One and the 
 fame Numerical Wifdom, Power and Goodnefs confidered, 
 as Subfifling only in one Per/on, is not more Intelligible 
 than the fame, as Subfifiing under Three ; This is ma- 
 nifeftly falfe, and contrary to common Experience, and 
 without any further arguing the cafe, I appeal to the 
 Reafbn of all Mankind, Whether it be not 16 ? 
 PARADOX. 
 
 What is Intellectual Love (fays this Author) but the 
 True Kjiorv ledge, or Efiimation of Things ? What is fifiice 
 and Goodnefs but an equal Difiribution of, or a true and wife 
 Proportion of Rewards and Puni foments ? What is perfect 
 Power, but perfect Truth and Wifdom which can do whatso- 
 ever it knows t Pag. 71, 72. 
 
 Anfwer. We have here a whole Knot, or Clutter of 
 Paradoxes, but I fhall take them afunder, and confider 
 them feverally : And becaufe they run all in the way of 
 Interrogations, I fhall take them out of their Interroga- 
 tive Form, and caft them into fo many Categorical JJJer- 
 tions. The firft of which is, 
 
 That In t dh clual Love is nothing elfe but the true Know- 
 ledge and Efiimation of Things. 
 
 This 
 
Chapter IX. 
 
 This is falfc and Abfurd. For Love is one Thing, 
 and Kjumkdge another ; each of them diftinguifhed by 
 Effent tally different Jets and Objects, Knowledge importing 
 no more than a bare Speculation, or Apprehenfion of 
 the Object ; whereas Love is properly an Adhefio.u to it ; 
 Love Ejjentially prefuppofes the Knowledge of the Thing 
 Loved ; but Kjwwledge cannot prefuppoie it felf. Know- 
 ledge is the firft Jet of an Intelligent Mind, Love the fe- 
 cond. And I would fain know, Whether this Man of 
 Paradox, will affirm, That God Loves every Thing 
 which he has a true Knowledge and Efiimation of? But 
 to give him one Argument for all, are not the Eternal 
 Diftinguifhing Charafters of Two Perfons of the Bleffed 
 Trinity founded in the diftinftion of Love and Knowledge 
 in God, the Son iiTuing from the Father by way of Know- 
 ledge, and the Spirit ilfuing from both by way of Love t 
 
 In the next place he affirms JuHice and Goodnefs to be 
 the fame Thing, and to confift both of them in a true and 
 wife Proportion of Rewards and Punijhments. 
 
 But this alio is falfe. Thefe Two being as properly 
 and formally diftinguifhed by their Jets and Objects, as 
 the Two former. And I do' here tell this Author, Thai 
 God J s Goodnefs is the proper Qualification of his own 
 Aftions, without referring necelfarily to any other be- 
 fides ; but that his Juftice bears an Ejfential Relation to 
 the Aft ions of others, viz,, as Rewardable, or Punifha- 
 ble. And confequently God might have exerted innu- 
 merable Jets of his Goodnefs, though there had never 
 been any Object for him to hav e cei ted (b much as one 
 Jff of his Juftice upon. Ai ive him one Tnlhnce 
 
 that may Convince any Man ol fenceofthe vaft diffe- 
 rence of thefe two Attributes ; i of Creatk i 
 by which God firft Created the Vbrld, an Jet of his 
 JufticePOr did that Jet confift in a /» '/fe proportion oj 
 
 is 
 
 3°? 
 
1 
 
 o^ ArAikadvfrjionsi Sec, 
 
 wd Punifljments, before there was any Aft of the 
 Creature to be Rewarded, or Punifhed ? But I am furc 
 tn Aft of the Divine Goodnefs, whereby G^ com- 
 municated much of the Perfe&ion of Being to fbmet!' ng 
 
 hotithimfelf. Again, is Pardon of S'm an Ejfe i 
 Jet of God's \\nftice ? But I am fure it is an Act c his 
 Goodnefs. Certainly this Man neither knows, nor cares 
 what he (ays. 
 
 His Third Afiertion is, That perfect Power is nothing 
 elfe, but perfe d Truth and Wifdom. 
 
 But this alio is a grofs Paradox, and as falfe, as that 
 Omnipotence and Omnifcience are not Two distinct Attri- 
 butes of 'God. God\ Power a£ts by and under the direct- 
 ion of God's Wifdom, and therefore neither is, nor can 
 be formally the fame with it. And befides this, all Acts 
 of Wifdom and Truth proceed from God by a Neceflity 
 of Nature, but the Acts and Exercile of his Power, 
 by a free determination of his Will. For in fpeaking of 
 God, no - Man fays, That God is Wife, Knowing, or True, 
 or Acts according to thefe Perfections, becaufe he will do fo ; 
 for he can neither be, nor Aft otherwife ; but we truly 
 and properly fay, That God does this or that, becaufe he 
 mil do if, for if he had pleafed, lie might have chofe, 
 whether he would do it, or no. From all which, I 
 conclude, That nothing could be more improperly and 
 abfurdly affirmed than, That the Divine Power is nothing 
 elfe but the Divine Truth and Wifdom. 
 PARADOX. 
 
 In Men (fays he) it is only Knowledge that is Power ; 
 Humane Power , and Humane Kjiow ledge, as that fignifies a 
 Kjicw ledge how to do any Thing, are Com men J r urate ; fo that 
 every Man can do what he knows how to do. iVrf/, Know ledge, 
 is not only the Dire ft or ofTowzr,but it is that very Power 
 which we call force, Page 72. 
 
 Anfwer* 
 
Chapter IX. ; o 
 
 Anfw. This is 16 grofsa Paradox, that, I think, it can 
 need no other Confutation than to oppofethe ferife of all 
 Mankind to it, neverthelefs I fhall oner this one Consi- 
 deration towards the disproving the Identity of Kj$ow~ 
 nd Power, viz. That a Alan's Knowledge and 
 Skill about the doing any Work of Art, may increaic, 
 as his power of Execution for the Aftual doing the laid 
 i may decreafe , nay, wholly ceale, and there- 
 fore thev cannot be the fame. For liippofe a Carpenter 
 difablea by Age, or Accident, that he cannot ftrike a 
 ftroke towards the building an Houfe; does he therefore 
 ! J to know how to build it, while another fhall build 
 it wholly by the direction of his Skill and Knowledge ? 
 This Man may as well prove his Head and his Hands 
 to be one and the fame Tiling, -as J\j/owledge and Power 
 to be 16. But I fhall go no further than this very Au- 
 thor, to confute this Author's Affertion, who has told 
 us in P. 9. /. 3,4. That we understand nothing of the Secrets 
 and Mjjleries of Nature ; nor are concerned to under/land 
 them % any more than it is our Bufinefs to under ft and how to 
 make either a Body, or a Spirit, which we have no power to 
 do, ( mark that) if we did underfrand it, and there- 
 fore it would be an ufelefs piece of Knowledge. Now I be- 
 feech the Reader to let thefe Two Affertions together, 
 viz, that in Page 72. That to know how to do a Thing is to 
 be able to do it, and that other in the Page 9. 1 iz. I )at 
 though we understood how to make a Body, or a ,S. 1 . . yet 
 we have no Power to do it. I fay let thele Two Proporti- 
 ons be compared ; and then I hope that for the future, 
 Knowledge how to do a thing, and Power to do //, oiHit 
 not, even according to this very Author, to pals for the 
 fame thing. In the mean time we lee how one of his 
 Affertions contains a grols Abiurdity, and the other 
 completes it with as grols a Contradiction. 
 
 R r PARADOX 
 
 1 
 
3 o6 JnimadwrJionS) &c. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 This Word Infinite (fays lie) confounds our Notions of 
 God, p. 77. 
 
 J// fn-er. This is falfe. The Thing indeed fignified 
 by the Word Infinite, exceeds and tranfcends our Noti- 
 ons, but the Word Infinite does not confound them. And 
 I would have this Man take notice,that for an ObjeQ: to 
 furpafs and be above our Thoughts, and to diforder and 
 confound them, are very different Tilings. And more- 
 over, that it is the height of Impudence and Ignorance 
 too, to fay, That that Word confounds our Thoughts, No- 
 tions and Conceptions of ^God ; which all Divines and Phi- 
 /ofophers in all Places and Ages have conftantly expreffed 
 the Nature of God by : And which, after the Notion of 
 his bare Exiftence, does, next in order, offer it felf to 
 the Mind of Man, in its Speculations of this Great 
 Objeft. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 
 We know not (fays he) how far Infinite Wifdom and 
 Goodnefs, and Power reaches ; but then we certainly know, 
 that they have their Bounds, and that the Divine Nature is 
 the utmost Bounds of them, p. 79. 
 
 To which I Anfwer, That for an Infinite Wifdom to 
 have Bounds , and the Bounds of it to be the Divine Na- 
 ture (which it felf has no Bounds) is in ipfis Terminis 
 an exprefs,downright,and fhamelefs Contradiction. See. 
 this further laid open in my 2d Chapter. 
 PARADOX. 
 
 This Creed (fays he, fpeakingof the Athanafianj does 
 not fpeak of the Three Divine Perfons as dijiinguijhed from 
 one another, P. 88. Line 21. 
 
 In reply to which, I am amazed to read an AfTcrtion 
 fomanifeftly falfe, and yet lb pofitively uttered. For 
 will this Author put out the Eyes of his Reader ? He 
 
 tells 
 
HAPTER IX. 5O7 
 
 tells us here that Atbanafuts (or whofoever eiie might 
 
 be the Author of this Creed) does not herein ffeak of the 
 
 Three Drvi*e Pirfons as diftiaguif bed from one another. But 
 
 I demand of him, does Athandfim here (peak of them 
 
 as of Three Perfans, or no? IF the fir 11 ; then he does 
 
 and muft fpeak of them as dijiingujbed from 
 
 one another , for that without fucli a diftinftion 
 
 thev are not lb much as Three. But if he does not (peak 
 
 of them, * of Three, and as of Three thus di/lingu/Jbed. 
 
 What then mean thole Words of the Creed ? There it 
 
 one Perfon of the Father, another of the Son, and another of 
 
 the Holy Ghojl ? Do thele Words fj>eak of theft Perfbns 
 
 as dijtingnifbed, or do they not? If they do ; then what 
 
 this Man lias here laid of the Creed, is fhamelefly falfe ; 
 
 and if they do not exprefs the fa id Per fans as dijlincl, I 
 
 defie all tlie Wit of Man to find out any Words that 
 
 can. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 He tells us, That the Title of the one Only true God can- 
 not be fo properly attributed to any one Perfon, but only to 
 the Father, p. 89. 
 
 Anfver. This I have already fliewn in Chap. K.f. 1 37. 
 to be both falfe and dangerous ; as by direft confequen.ee 
 either making feveral forts of Gods, or excluding both 
 the Son and the Holy Ghost from the one true Godhead. 
 At prefent I fliall only fay thus much, That [the One 
 only true God~] and [the true God~] are Terms perfectly 
 equivalcnt,and not only Commenfurate but Identical in 
 their fignification ; and withal, That this vuy Author 
 himfelf affirms Page 186. Ltne the lalf, That the Son 
 mufl be included in the Character of the only TnoGod: 
 which how he can be, without having this Charafter 
 properly affirmed and predicated of him, and bis lu- 
 ll r 2 framing 
 
3 o 8 rfiiunadvcrjions, & 
 
 &* 
 c 
 
 ftaining thereby the Denomination of the onlyTrue God, 
 let this Confident, Self-contradi£Hng Man declare if he 
 can. In the mean time let me tell him further, That 
 thefe Terms [the Trite God'] and [the only True God'] do 
 both of them import an Attribute, or Denomination 
 purely Efjential, and by no means Perfonal, or Oeconc* 
 mical : And moreover that every fiich Attribute does and 
 muft agree to all the Three Perfons equally, and whatfo- 
 ever equally agrees to them all, may with equal 
 Propriety be affirmed of all and each of them, and con- 
 fequently that the Title of [the One only True God] may 
 every whit as truly and properly be attributed to the Son 
 and Holy Ghofl, as to the Father himfelf. See more of 
 this in my forementioned Chapter. 
 PARADOX. 
 
 / affirm (fays he) that the Glory and MajeHy and all the 
 other perfections of the Three Divine Perfons are as distinct 
 as their Perfons are. And again, Thefe perfections are as 
 dijti net as the Perfons, and yet as Numerically one and the 
 fame as the Godhead is, p. 91,. 
 
 Anfver. The firft part of thefe Aflertions is utter I y 
 inconfiftent with, and wholly overthrows the laft. And 
 it is indeed very horrid, as by inevitable confequence 
 inferring a Tritheifme. For if the Effential Perfections 
 of God (which in Truth are only the Divine EJJence un- 
 der feverd Conceptions and Denominations) arc asjfc- 
 flineT; as the Perfons, whom the Church acknowledges 
 to be really diflinet, then it will and muft follow, That in 
 the Trinity there are Three really diflinet EJJences, or God- 
 heads, as well as Three really difinet Perfons : And if they 
 are thus diftinQ:, it is impofTible that the Three Perfons 
 ftiould by vertue thereof, either be, or be truly laid to 
 be, really one ; lb that this Author, we fee, has herein. 
 
 all cited 
 
Chapter IX. 509 
 
 aliened a Trinity with a Witnefi ; bur as for any U/f/(j in 
 it, } look. 
 
 But I perceive he was driven to this falfe andabfiird 
 Aflertion by that Argument of his Socman Adverfary 
 urging him, That if the EJfential Glory andMajefty in 
 / a: her, Son and Holy Chop be but One, then it cannot 
 be (aid that their Glory is equal, their Ma jelly co-eter- 
 nal ; forafmuch as Unity is not capable of Equality ; 
 which mult of neceflity be between two or more. This, 
 I fay, no doubt drove him to this Inconvenience. 
 
 InAnfwer to which Obie&ion, (though I owe nor 
 this Author ib much Service) as I ihanreadily grant. 
 That where there is an Equality, there mult be alio a 
 Plurality, of fbme fort or other, whatsoever it be : So 
 I fliall obferve, That the Divine EJJence, Glory, or Ma* 
 jejty, (which I ftill affirm to be but different Names of 
 the fame thing falling under divers Conceptions) and 
 every other EJfential per feci ion of the Godhead, may be 
 conlidered two ways. 
 
 Firft, Abfblutely and Abftracledlv in it (elf, and as 
 prefcinding from all Perfonal Detemi ,.. in which 
 
 fence the Divine Nature, t knee (and every Effi ttial 
 Attribute included in it) is, and always muft be taken, 
 whenfbever, in Difcourfe, it is fpoken of, either as 
 compared with, or contra-dijlinguifbed to all, or any of the 
 Perfons. And accordingly, in this fence being absolutely 
 One, it is. incapable, of any Relation of Equality* Fon - 
 much as one 1 him conlidered but as One y cannot be : 
 to be equal to it (elf. Or, 
 
 Secondly, This Glory, Majefty, or a 
 perfection of the Godhead, maybe considered as Luftain- 
 ing Three fever al Modes of Subfiftence in Th\ 
 Perfons] which fad M : inda Vim 
 
 tins EJJjential Glory 1*i e fyy (though by nom< . 
 
5 1 o AnimadverfionS) &c. 
 
 K) this Plurality' founds a Capacity of Equality; by 
 virtue whereof, the fame Glory according to its pecu- 
 \fiHim ill the Fatbtr, may be (aid to be 
 fcqual co it fetf as Subfifting after another way in the AW, 
 and after a third in the Holy Ghoft ; io that immediately 
 and ftri&lythisJ > is between the Three feveral 
 
 Modes tf Subjljlence, which this Efential Glory, or Mt- 
 j>//)/ fuftains, or (it you will) belongs to the f aid G lor 7, 
 for and by reaibn of them. And this is the true Anfwer 
 to this Sociraan Objection, which by a manifeft fallacy 
 proceeds a dicto fecundum quid ad dictum fimpliciter, viz. 
 That becaufe Equality cannot belong to the Effential Glo- 
 ry , or Majefy of the Godhead confidered abftractedl) 
 from the Divide Perfons, therefore neither can it agree 
 to the fame Glory, or Majejly, upon any other Account 
 whatfoever, which is utterly falfe ; forafmuch as confi- 
 dered according to the Three different ways of its Subfi- 
 (tence in the Three Perfons, it may, as Snbfijling under 
 any one of them be faid to be equal to it felf, as Subfijt- 
 ing under the other Two. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 
 This Author reprefents Gregory NylTen as firjl ajj'er- 
 tixg a Specif ck Samenefs, or Unity of Nature, in the 
 Divine Perfons (which alj'o he makes all along to be AKr- 
 nified by the ofJioyatorYiO ay ^ t ^ )m averting that this Speci- 
 fuk Sameneis, or Unity of Nature, makes the faid 
 Three Perfons Numerically One, Page 118. the latter 
 end. 
 
 Anfwer. This is too great an Abfurdity for fo Learn- 
 ed a Father to be guilty of, and therefore ought to lie at 
 this Author's own Door ; for that a Sptcifick Samenefs, or 
 unity of Nature, fhould make any Things or Perfon, Nu- 
 merically One, (any more than a Generic al Unity can make 
 
 'filings 
 
Chapter IX. 5 1 1 
 
 Things Specif ca/i) One is beyond meafure fencelefs and 
 illogical. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 Though the Fit her s ( fays he ) affert the fwgulsrity of 
 
 the Godhead, or the Numerical 'Unity of the Divine Ef- 
 >ce ; yet they do not affert fitch a Numerical Unity, as 
 
 where there is but one P erf on as well as one Ef~ 
 ■ "te, but fuch a Numerical Unity as there is I 
 
 three, who are ifnoitnoi , of the very fame Nature, 
 but are not merely united by a fpecifick Unity, but by 
 effential Union ; and therefore are Three and One, Pag. 
 
 121. Line 15. 
 
 Anfver. In thefe Words there are feveral Abfurdi- 
 ties, which he falfly charges upon the Fathers, but ought 
 in all Reafbn to take to himfelf. As, 
 
 1. He fuppofes a Specif ck Unit >,and an EffentUlVmty 
 to be diHrncl Unities : whereas every Specif ck "Unity, or 
 Union, (call it, at prefent, which you will) is alio an 
 Effential Unity, or Union. For a Specific!: Unity is one 
 fort of an Effential Unity (which in its whole comp lis 
 contains the Generical, the Specif cal, and the Num ricdj 
 and therefore thus to contra-dtjlinguijh a Species to its Gi - 
 nus, is fit for none but fuch a Logician as this Author ; it 
 being all one, as if one fhould fay of Peter, That he is 
 notonly a Man, but alfb a Living Creature. 
 
 2. The fecond Abfurdity is, That he owns a S 
 Unity of Nature in the Divine Ptrfom (which fort of 
 Unity I have abundantly proved in Chap. 7. the Drvh 
 Nature not to be capable of; for he fays here of the /);- 
 vine Perfons^That they are not meerly United by a Sfecifi 
 Unity : which Words mult imply, that however, Co 
 United they are. 
 
 3. He makes Two forts of Nu?nencal Unity, contrary 
 to all Rules of Logick^ viz. One, where there arc ftv< 
 
3 I z AnimidvcrjionS) &c. 
 
 ral Perfons of One Nature, as here in the Trinity ; and 
 the other, where there is but One Per [on, as well as One 
 let me here tell him, ThattheD/rw 
 
 tun is evcr\' whit as -A .-.?//) O/rc 1 iii the Th i 
 
 as if there were but one Perfon in the Godhead, and no 
 more. Andin this very Thing (as has been fhewn) 
 does the Myfterioufhefi of an Unity in Trinity cotdiA. I 
 
 •, The Divine Nature is as Numeric ally One in the 
 Three Perfons, as the Humane Nature was Numerically ( I 
 
 Adim, while there was no other Perfbn in the World 
 but himfelf; nay, much more fo , fince it is not 
 multiflicable , as that was. And to affirm , That 
 the Numerical Unity of the Godhead is not lb perfect, or 
 is not the very fame, Subfijling in Three diHinff Per fans, 
 as if we could imagine it to Subfift but in One, Subverts 
 and Overthrows filch an Unity in Trinity, as the Church 
 in all Ages hitherto has maintained. 
 PARADOX. 
 
 Having told us, That the Fathers umv erf ally acknow- 
 ledged, the Operation of the whole Trinity ad Extra to be 
 hut One, and from thence concluded the Unity of the Di- 
 z ine Nature and Effence ; for that every Nature has a 
 Virtue and Energy of its own ; (Nature being a Principle 
 cf Action^) and if the Energy and Operation be but One, 
 there can be but One Nature. He adds within four Lines 
 after, That this is certainly True, but gives no Accom 
 how Three diftinci Perfons come to have but One Will, One 
 Energy, Power and Operation ; nor that any Account (that 
 he knows ofj can be given of it but by Mutual-Confeiouf- 
 nefs. Page 124. Line 7, &c. 
 
 Anfwer. Were I not acquainted with this Man's way 
 of Writing, I fhould be amazed to fee him in lofmalla 
 compafs fo flatly contradict himfelf. For will lie, in 
 the firft place, affert, in the 'Three Divine Perfons a Nu- 
 merical 
 
C H A P T E ft IX. 3 I 5 
 
 merical Unity of Nature? And in the next, affertalib, 
 that this Unity of Nature is proved by Unify of Energy 
 snd Operation? And after this tell us, That this lives no 
 Account at all, how Three diflinct Per Ions come to have but 
 one Will and Energy^ Power and Operation ? For does not 
 Unity of Nature in thele Three distinct Perfons prove this 
 While the (aid Unity of Nature proves Unity of Operati- 
 on, as the Caufe proves its Eftecl, and Unity of Operati- 
 on again proves Unity of Nature, as the efre&i proves its 
 cauie? This, any one of fence would think, is a fair, 
 full, and iiifficient Account how Three diflinct Perfons, 
 having all but One Nature, come thereby all to hare but One 
 ) \ \'ll, Energy and Operation. And fhould any one elle ar 
 gue otherwise, I fhould think him befide himfetf; but 
 this Author in this diicourfes like himfelf 
 PARADOX. 
 
 Jynowledge, Self-reflection, and hove are diflinct Powers 
 end E acuities in Men, and Jo diflinct, that they can never be 
 the fame ', Knowledge is not Self- Refuel ion, nor hove either 
 Kjiowledge, or Self-Reflection ; though they are infeparably 
 United, they are diflinct, Pag. Ijo; Line 11,12, &c. 
 
 Anfwer. Here alfb is another knot of Abliirdities.For, 
 
 Firft, Knowledge, Self Reflection, a'^d hove are not in 
 Men diflinc~l Powers and Facultie • (as this unfledged Phi- 
 losopher calls them) but only difiincl Acts. 
 
 Secondly, Admitting that Knowledge were a F acuity 
 (as it is not) yet I deny that Knowledge and Sslf-R? fi- 
 ction would make Two diflinct Faculties, forafinuch as 
 it is one and the lame Intellectual Faculty, which both 
 exerts an Act of Knowledge, and an Act of Reflection up- 
 on that Act of Knowledge, or upon it (elf as producing 
 the laid Act. For which Caufe it is (as has been obler- 
 \ ed before) that Philofophers hold that the Under/landing 
 is Eacultas fupra/e Rtflexiva ; all of them allowing both 
 
 S f the 
 
3 1 4. JnimadverfwiiS) &c. 
 
 the direil and the Rp/?t\x Atfs of Kjtorvledge to iffue from 
 the fame Faculty. 
 
 Thirdly, He fays, That albeit the forementioned 
 AEts are diflinct, yet they are infefarahly United. But this 
 alio is falie ; for (whether an Aft of Knowledge maybe 
 without an Act of Self-Reflexion, as fbme, not without 
 Reafbn, think it may) I am (lire in Men (of whom a- 
 !one we now fpeak) both an Act of Kjiowkdge and of 
 Self-Reflexion too may be without an Act of Love con- 
 fequent thereupon r And if the former may be without 
 the latter, then they are not infeparably United, as this 
 Author here fays they are. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 
 He fays, That Love is a diHinci AEl, and therefore in 
 God must be a Perfon, P. 1 33. 
 
 An fiver. If this be a true and good confequence, then 
 the Ground and Reafbn of it muft be This, That every 
 diflinct Act in God, is, and muft be a diftintl Perfon. And 
 if fb, then every Decree in God, whether it be his De- 
 cree of Election, or of Reprobation (if there be fuch an 
 one) or of creating the World, and fending Chrifi into 
 it, and at laft of deftroying it, and the like, are each of 
 them fb many Perfons.Vov every Divine Decree is an Alt 
 ofGod^nd an Immanent Act toofis refting within him,and 
 (as fitch) not pafftng forth to any Thing without Him ; 
 that Maxime of the Schools being moft true, that De- 
 creta nihil ponunt in effc. Nor is this all, but moft of the 
 Divine Acts are free alio ; fb that there was nothing in 
 the Nature of them to hinder, but that they equally 
 wight y or might not have been ; which apply ed to the 
 Divine Perfons, would make ftrange work in Divinity. 
 In the mean time if this Author will maintain this Do- 
 ftrine, viz,. That Acts and Perfons, are the fame in 
 God, (as, I think, he ought in all Reafbn to maintain the 
 
 immedi- 
 
HAF'i E R IX. I I 5 
 
 immediate confluences of his own AlTertion) I dace 
 undertake that here he will {(and Alone again ; and that 
 lie is the only Divine who ever owned, or defended fiich 
 wrcteJied Stuff. 
 
 P A R A D O X. 
 
 Theft Tbrtt / of Vnderfanding, Self Reflexion, 
 
 and Self -Love are One Mind, viz. in Created Spirits ; of 
 which alone he here fipeaks, adding in the very next 
 words, What are mttr Faculties and Powers in Crea. 
 Spirits, are Perfons intheGodljead, &x. Page i J 5. at the 
 latter end. 
 
 uhjfrer. This is a very grofs Abfiirdity, and to make 
 it appear lb, I do here tell him, That the Three fore- 
 mentioned Powers are no more One Mindfhan Three Qua- 
 lities are One Substance ; and that verv Term [Powers'] 
 might have taught him as much ; Potentia and Impoten- 
 tia making one Species of Quality ; under which all 
 Powers and Faculties are placed. So that his Three Pow- 
 ers of Under (landings Self Reflexion, and Self Love are 
 One only Vnitate Subject^ as being Subjected in One 
 and the fame Mind ; but not Vnitate Ejfentis, as Effenti- 
 ally differing both from one another, and from the Mind 
 it felf too, in which they are. Certainly if this Man 
 did not look upon himfelf as above all Rules of Logick 
 and Philofophy, he would never venture upon fiich Ab- 
 furd Aflertions. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 
 He tells us, That the Son and Holy Ghost Will and AQ: 
 with the Father ; not the Father with the Son and the Holy 
 Gboft, Pag. 169. Line 1^,14, dhr. 
 
 Anfwer. This is a dircft Contradiclion : For if the Son 
 
 ind Holy Ghoft Will and Ail with the Fatber;tb& Father 
 
 muft \Y ill and Acl; with the Son and the Holy Ghojl.And 
 
 he who can find a diilincl ience in thefe Two Prop:' >'- 
 
 S f 2 ons % 
 
3 1 6 slfumadverjionS) Sec. 
 
 vns, and much more, affirm the firft, and deny the lat- 
 ter, has a better Faculty at diftinguifhing than any Mor- 
 tal Man, ufing his Sence and Reafbn, will pretend to. 
 It being all one, as if Ifhould fay, I/aw Thomas, Wil- 
 liam and John together ; of whom William and John were 
 in the Company of Thomas, but Thomas was not in the 
 Company of William and John. And I challenge any 
 fenfible thinking Man to make better fence of this Au- 
 thor's fore-mentioned AfTertion if he can. But this muft 
 not go alone without a further caft of his Nature, by 
 heightning it with another Contradi&ion too, which 
 you fhall find by comparing it with Page 188. Line 4. 
 where he affirms^ That Father, Son, and Holy Ghofl Act 
 together, having before exprefly told us here, That the 
 Father does not Will and Act with the Son and Holy Ghofl ; 
 which very AfTertion alfb, (to fhew him the further fa- 
 tal Confluences of it) abfblutely blows up and destroys 
 his whole Hypothefis of Mutual Confcioufnefs, by ck> 
 ftroying that upon which he had built it. For if the Fa* 
 ther may and does Will and Act without the Son and Holy 
 Ghofl, then farewel to the pla mfy&a,, and the plaint- 
 vvian /SyArf^aT©^ for they muft never be alledged in this 
 Caufe more. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 
 Nothing can make God vifible but a Perfonal Union to a> 
 nfible Nature, Page 2 J4. Line 22, 2 3. 
 
 Anfwer. 7'his is a mod falfe AfTertion, and direftly 
 contrary to Scripture. And to prove it fb, I fhall Jay- 
 down theft Four Concluf ions. 
 
 Firft, That the Godhead, or Divine Nature, neither 
 is nor can be vifible to a Corporeal Eye, by an Immedi- 
 ate fight, or Intuition of the Godhead it fcl'f. 
 
 Secondly, That God is vifible to fiich an Eye only by 
 - the Ipecial Signs, or S/mbolsofhisPrelence. 
 
 Thirdly, 
 
Chapter IX. 3 1 7 
 
 Thiully, 'YkiC God is vifible by a Body Pcrfonally 
 United to him, onlv as the laid Body is fiich-a Sign, or 
 Symbol of his peculiar Prefence. And 
 
 Fourthly and Laftly, That a Body a£hially affumed 
 by God for a Time, is during that Time as true, and 
 vifible a Symbol of his Prefence, as a Body, or Nature 
 per fondly United to him can be. 
 
 And thus it was, that God appeared vifibly to the Pa- 
 triarchs in Old Time, and particularly to Abraham, to 
 Gideon, and to the Father and Mother of Sampfon, who 
 thereupon thought that they ffjould Die for having feen 
 God Face to Fase. For generally all Interpreters hold 
 the Perfon who thus appeared, to have been the Second- 
 Perfon of the Blejjed Trinity, the Eternal Son of the Far- 
 ther ; though iometimes called (imply the Angel, and 
 fbmetimes the Angel of the Covenant, from the Office he 
 was then aftually imployed in by his Father, as the 
 Extraordinary Meflenger and Reporter of his Mind to 
 Holy Men upon fome great Occafions. 
 
 This (uppofed, I defire this bold Author to tell me, 
 Whether the Second Perfon of the Trinity (God equal 
 Wkh the Father) was perfon ally United to the IW^whicU 
 he theft appeared in, or not ? If not ; then the fore- 
 mentioned Aflertion, That nothing can make God- vi jib It. 
 but a Perfonal Union to a Vifible Nature, falls fhame fully 
 to the Ground, as utterly falfe. But if he was Perjo- 
 nally United to it, then thefe Paradoses mull follow, 
 
 1 . That he either laid down that Affumed Body aftei - 
 wards, or he did nor: if he did, then an Hypojlatical 
 Union with God may be dillblved ; and not o:>ly fb, bur 
 there may be alio a Thoufand Perfonal Unions one after 
 another,(if G^lhall think fit to Aiflume a Body, and ajv 
 pear in it lb often;) which would becontrary to th&Sence 
 
 cf. 
 
T 3 AnimadverfionS) Sec. 
 
 of all Divines, and to all Principles of found Divm- 
 which own but one Hypofiatical Union and no more Or, 
 2. He ftill retains an Union to that d(Jn;wid Bod?, and 
 rhen there is a double HjpofiaticalUmon, vis. Qhe to the 
 
 ■ 'ibleBody Affumed by him, in which he appeared of 
 Old, and the other to that Body which he was Born with 
 in the World. All which Portions are horrid and mon- 
 frrous, but unavoidably eonfequent from the foregoing 
 Ailertion. But for the further illuftration of the cafe I 
 do here affirm to this Author, That God is as Vifible in 
 an AJfumed Body, whether of Air, or blither, or what- 
 fbever other Materials it might be formed of, as in a 
 Body of Flefh and Blood Personally United to him : I fay, 
 as Vifible. For notwithftanding the great difference of 
 thefe Bodies, and the difference of their Union and Rela- 
 tion to God, One being by a Temporary JJfumptzon, and 
 the other by a Perjonal Incarnation ; yet no Corporeal 
 Eye could difcern this Difference, during the Appear- 
 ance, but that one was, for the time, as Vifible as the 
 other ; and therefore fince both of them \vere truly Sym 
 bols of God's peculiar Pretence (the only way by which 
 the Divine Nature becomes vifible to a Mortal Eye) it 
 ckmonftratively overthrows that pofitive, falfe Aifertion 
 of this Author, That nothing can make God Vifible, but a 
 Perfonal Union to a Vifible Nature. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 All the Cir cum fiances of our Saviour's Birth, and Life, 
 
 . d Death, were Jo punctually foretold by the Prophets, and 
 fo peremptorily decreed by God, that after he ivas come into 
 the IV or Id, there rva4 no place for his Choice and Eleftion 
 And he could not Jbeiv either his Love, or his Humility l\ 
 shooting Poverty, Death, &x. Page 242. Line 5. 
 
 Anjwtr. This is Falfe, Abfurd, and Dangerous, and 
 :.ideed next toBlafphemous ; as overthrowing the whole 
 
 Ui con 
 
Chapter IX. 
 
 Oeconomy of Man's Redemption by the Merits of (.'/< 
 For that which leaves no place for Choice, leaves no pcrf- 
 fibility for Merit. For all Merit is founded in freedom 
 Action, and that in Choice. And if ChriH, after liis 
 Incarnation, had not this, he could not Merit. And 
 whereas the Author fays, Thai ChriH chofe all this as 
 
 : Per for? of the Trinity antecedently lo hit Incar. i 
 [ Anfwer, That this is indeed true, but reaches not the 
 prefent Cafe. For what lie did before he was Incarnate, 
 was the Jet of him purely as God', but a Meritorious 
 Action muft ftili be an Humane Action ; which could not 
 proceed from the Second Per [on before his Aflumption of 
 an Humane Nature. I readily grant and hold, That the 
 Aftions of ChnjPs Humane Nature received a peculiar 
 Worth and Value from its "Onion with his Divine Po i , 
 yet ftill I affirm, that this Worth and Value was Sub- 
 letted and Inherent in his Humane Actions, as fuch ; and 
 thereby qualified them with fb high a degree of Merit. 
 So that, whencefbever this Merit might flow, they were 
 only his Humane Act ions y viz. iiich as proceedeq from 
 him as a Man, that were properly and formally Meri- 
 torious. 
 
 And whereas this Author ftates the Reafon of this 
 his horrid AfTertion upon the Predictions of the Prof Lets, 
 and the Peremptory Decrees of God concerning all that 
 belonged to, or befell Chnji, I do here tell him, That 
 neither Predictions nor Decrees, though never fb pun- 
 ctual and peremptory, do, or can infringe, or take a 
 way the freedom of Man's Choice, or feleftion about 
 the Things fb Decreed, or foretold; how difficult foe- 
 ver it may be for Humane Reafon to reconcile them ; and 
 if this Man will affirm the contrary, he muft either ba- 
 nifh allC/wo'and Freedom of .Action, or ali certain Pre- 
 dictions and peremptory Decrees out of the World : let 
 
 him. 
 
3 zo 'AnimadverfionS) Sec. 
 
 him choofe which of thefe Two Rocks he will run him« 
 felfagainft, for he will be a (lured ly fplit upon either. 
 This vile Aflertion really deierves the Cenfure of a Con- 
 vocation, and it is pity, for the Churches fake, but in due 
 time it fhould find it. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 
 Concerning Perfon and Perfonality he has thefe fol- 
 lowing Aflcrtions, which I have here drawn together 
 from feveral parts of his Book, viz. The Mind is a Per- 
 fon, Page 191. Line 21,22. A Soul without a Vital Union 
 to a Body, is a Perfon, Page 262. Line 1 7. And the Soul 
 ts the Perfon, becaufe it is the Superiour governing power, 
 and Constitutes the Perfon, Page 268. Line 28. A Be aft 
 which h^is no Reafonable Soul, but only an Animal Life, is 
 a Perfon, &"C. Page 262. Line i8> 19, 20. And again, 
 We may find the Reafonable and Animal Life Subfi fling *- 
 fart, and when they do fo, They are Two[Perfons~\and but One 
 [Perfon'] when United, Page the fame, at the end of 
 it. And iaftly, One Agent is One Perfon, Page 268. 
 Line 2. 
 
 Anfwer. In all thefe Prof ofit ions, fo confidently laid 
 down by this Man, there are almoft as many Abfurdi- 
 ties and Falfities as there are Words. I have already 
 fhewn this of fbme of them in Chap. 3. and therefore I 
 flball be the briefer in my Remarks upon them here. 
 
 And firft for that Aflertion, That the Mind is a Per- 
 fon. To this I Anfwer, That the Mind may be taken 
 Two ways. 
 
 Firft, Either for that* Intellectual Power, or Faculty, 
 bv which the Soul underftands and Reafbns. Or, 
 
 Secondly, For the Rational Soul it ielf. 
 
 In the former fence, it is but an Accident, and par- 
 ticularly a Quality : Inthefecond it is an EJj'ential part 
 of the Whole Man ; and therefore upon neither of 
 
 theft 
 
HAPTER IX. 5 2 
 
 thefe Accounts can be a Per fon. For neither an AcciJ, 
 nor a P-art can be a Per/on ; which (as fuch) muft be- 
 both a Sub/lance, and a Complete Sub fiance too. 
 
 And fecondly, Whereas, he fa\ s, That a Soul without 
 a I'ltalVnion to the Body is a Perfon \ I tell him, That 
 the Soul without fuch an Vnion^ is 1HI1 ail Incomplete Be- 
 ing ; as being Originally and Naturally defigned tor the 
 Completion and Compaction of the Whole Man, and there- 
 fore for that reafbn, cannot be a Perfon. 
 
 And then Thirdly, Whereas he adds, That the Soul 
 is the Perfon, becaufe it is the Super lour Governing Power, 
 and Confiitutes the Perfon. I Anfwer, That it is the for- 
 mer, and does the latter, only as it is the prime Efjential 
 part of the whole Man ; and for that very caufe is an fa) 
 complete Being, (as every part is and muit be) and con- 
 fequently cannot be a Perfon. 
 
 In the next place, For an Anfwer to his faying, That 
 a Bea/i is a Perfon. I refer him to his own pofitive Af- 
 firmation, Page 69. Line 18. That a Perfon, and an In- 
 telligent Sub fiance, are reciprocal Terms : And the fame 
 may ferve for an Anfwer to his next Abfiirdity, That 
 when the Re.ifonable and the Animal Life Jubfifi apart, they 
 are Two Perjons. For the Animal Life feparate from the 
 Rational, is void of all Reafbn, and the very Definition 
 of a Perfon is, That it is Siippofitum Rationale, attt Intel- 
 ligens. 
 
 In the laft place, By his faying, That One Agent is 
 One Perfon, (which, I am fure, he affirms univerfally 
 of every finglc Agent) he makes every Living Creature 
 under Heaven, a Perfon : For every fuch Creature is 
 endued with a Principle of Life and Action, and accord- 
 ingly Afts by it, and by fo A&ing, is properly an Agent : 
 From all which it follows, That this Author (as great 
 as his Retinue may be) has many more Perfons in his 
 
 T t Family 
 
3 2 2 AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 Family,than he is aware of; there being not fb much as 
 a Rat or a Moufc within the Walls of his Deanry, but, 
 according to this AiTertion of his, is as truly and proper- 
 ly a Per/on as himfelf. So that although he feldom (as 
 lie fays) makes Vifits, yet he is fure never to want Com- 
 pany. 
 
 PARADOX, 
 
 He AfTerts, Thdt tvery Man has Two diflinci Reafons, 
 and Two diflinci Wills, and thofe as distinct as if he bad Two 
 Souls, Page 267. Line 7, 8, 9. 
 
 Anfwer. This AiTertion, and the Abfurdity of it are 
 perfectly his own. For certainly Two Reafons and 
 Two Wills, and thofe as diftinQ: in each Man, as if he 
 had Two diflinci Souls, were never Aflerted to be in any 
 One [meer] Man, by any Perfbn of Sence and Learn- 
 ing before : It has indeed been difputed by Philofbphers, 
 Whether there be Three Souls in the fame Man, viz. A Ra- 
 tional, a Senfitive, and a Vegetative ? And it has been ge- 
 nerally concluded in the Negative, and that the Grades 
 Intellective, Senfitive, & Vegetative were only Three 
 diflinci Powers, or Faculties lodged in one and the fame 
 Soul : But as for Two diflinci Reafons and Two diflinci 
 Wills in one Soul, none that I ever met with, affirmed 
 it. And in Anfwer to it, it were enough to overwhelm 
 the AlTertor of it with the Univerfal Judgment of all 
 Philofbphers holding the contrary, viz,. That in each In- 
 dividual Perfon there is only One Individual Reafbn and 
 Will, and no more. 
 
 But I fhall difcourfe the Matter a little further with 
 this Author ; though yet as briefly as I can. 
 
 And firft of all, I lay down this as certainly true, That 
 if One fingle Reafbn, and One flngle Will are fufficient to 
 give an Account of all the A£te, Offices, and Operations 
 belonging to the Nature of Man y then it is fuperfluoe, and 
 
 confc^uently 
 
Chapter XX. 3 2, 3 
 
 conjequenily Abfurd to Affert any more. But the former is 
 undoubtedly true. And to fhew that it is fb, we are to 
 confidcr what Human Rcafbn, and the Offices of it pro 
 pcrly are ; and lb for the Humane Will, and the proper 
 Afts and Fun&ions of that. Now they are both of them 
 Intellectual Faculties, and thereby diftinguifhed from, and 
 Superiour to all Afts of Senfation, whether External, or 
 Internal, and all Afts of Defire and Appetition, proceed- 
 ing from the Senfitive Appetite. And as they are fupe- 
 riour to them, fb it is the proper Office of Reafon to Ar- 
 bitrate upon, Judge of, andDire&all the Apprehenfi- 
 ons and Reports of the Senfes, and upon fucli a Judg- 
 ment paffed upon them, to declare authoritatively, What 
 ought, or ought not to be done ; and in the like manner the 
 Will is to Govern and Control all the Inferiour Appetites, 
 Defires, and Inclinations, by an effectual difpofal of 
 them, to what fijall, or jh all not be done. And this is the 
 Order and Oeconomy of all the Rational and Senfitive 
 Powers and Faculties of the Soul of Man, and of the Fun- 
 ctions and Operations refpe&ively belonging to them. 
 And now I defire any one to fhew me, what life there is 
 of a fecond Reafon, and a fecond Witty and what are 
 thofe particular, proper Acts proceeding from them, 
 which are neither Intellectual, nor Senfitive. For if they 
 are either of thefe, all fuch Acts have been fully accoun- 
 ted for, from the Intellectual and Senfitive Principles al- 
 ready mentioned, and therefore mult needs be Superflu- 
 ous. Again, I would know, whether thefe Two Rea- 
 fbns are Subordinate, fb that one is fubjc£t to and govern- 
 ed by the other, or Co-ordinate and Equal, and neither of 
 them Subjefl: to, or Governed by the other ? If they 
 are Subordinate, the Inferiour is ulelefs, fince the Acts 
 proceeding from both, being equally Acts of Reafon, the 
 Superiour can and may diftate all that the Inferiour can 
 
 Tt 2 fuggeft 
 
^i± AnimadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 fuggeft immediately by it felf, and without the Subor- 
 dinate Operation of the other; and what I have fa id of 
 an Humane Reafon, will proportionally hold in an H«- 
 maneWill: But if, on the other fide, there we Two Co- 
 ordinate Reafons, and 7 n^ Co-ordinate Wills, neither of 
 them fubject to, or governed by the other, then, in the 
 Direction and Difpolalof Mens A£tions,they either fug- 
 geft the very fame Directions and Commands, or fuch 
 as are quite different, and fbmetimes perhaps contrary. 
 If the very fame, then One of the Reajbns and One of the 
 Wills are again fnperfluous : For what need can there be- 
 of Two to fuggeft the very fame things ? But if thefe 
 Two Reafbnsluggett different, or contrary Directions, 
 and thefe Two Wills exert Two different, or contrary In- 
 fluences upon the Inferiour and Senfitive part, then the 
 Soul mull be diffracted between both, and not able to 
 proceed determinately to Action ; but the Two Reafon $ 
 muft difpute the Matter, and the Two Wills muft fight if 
 out. And this will be the admirable Harmony and 
 State of an Humane SouL 
 
 If it be here Objected, That we fbmetimes find men-% 
 tion in Scripture of a Senfual, or Carnal Reafon, and of a 
 SenfualWill\ and that therefore Two Reajbns, and Two* 
 Wills mult be admitted in each Man. 
 
 I Anfwcr, That we Read in Scripture of the Old Man 
 and the New Man, in Perfons Regenerate, and yet 1 can- 
 not from hence infer, That Two dijlinct Men do, or can 
 Subfift in One Perfon. And therefore as to that Objection 
 of a Carnal, Scnfual Will and Reafon, 
 
 I Anf\vei\That Reafon is called Senfuafwhen it directs • 
 
 I prefcribes according to the Exorbitant Inclinations - 
 and Defires of the Sen ft we Part ; and the I T/ll is called 
 fo likewife, when it does not interpofe its Sway and Au- 
 thoritv, but iuffers the 6' enforce Appetites to take their 
 
 own 
 
Chapter IX. 325 
 
 own courfc without control : So that this Term Senfual y 
 or Carnal applycd cither to Reafon, or WiI/ 9 does not 
 import, or itiferr another Reafon, or another Will, but 
 
 the fame Rcafon and Will under different, and ibmetimes 
 contrary Qualifications, and otherwife acting and beha- 
 ving themfelves, than, according to their Natural Pre- 
 rogative and Office in the Soul, they ought to do. It 
 is indeed a divifion Subje&t in Accidentia. And this is 
 all that can be drawn irom thence. 
 
 In fine, I think a ftranger and a fillier Paradox could 
 not well be advanced ; and it is great pit}- but the Au- 
 thor of it fhould be Known by this Glorious CharaSier^ 
 That this is that great Philohpher and Divine, who af- 
 firms and holds, That there are Three diftinci Infinite 
 Minds in One God: And Twq diftinci Reajons, and Two 
 dijli?xt Wills in One and the fame JSLvi. And long may 
 he live to have the fame of fiich Afleiiions ringing in 
 both his Ears ; and when he is Dead, 1 doubt not but 
 lie will be remembred by them, though they be never 
 writ upon his Tomb: For certainly he who affirms 
 Two Reafons in the lame Man, hardly difeourfes at the 
 rate of One. 
 
 PARADOX. 
 He AfTerts, That the Body moves at the Command of the 
 Willy and is fo far Confcious to its Commands, Pag. 269, . 
 Lin. 18, 19. 
 
 In An fiver to which, I affirm it to be abfblutely falfe, 
 and extremely abfurd, to fhy, That the Bod) is at all Con- 
 fcious to the Commands of the Will. Forafinuch as Confci- - 
 oufnefs is an Act of Intellection, and fo mult iifue from an 
 Intellective Faculty, which the Body is not endued with., 
 and therefore cannot aft by ; and witliall, every Act of . 
 the Will is only an Intelligible^ and not a Sensitive Object 
 and confequently cannot be othcrwiie apprehended and 
 perceived than Intellectual!) And as for the Command* of '" 
 
:> 2 6 AnimadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 it; a Command operates and moves only by way of 
 Moral CaufatiWyvizJyy being firft known by the Thing, 
 or Agent which it is directed to, which thereupon by 
 fuch a Knowledge of it, is induced to move, or Act ac- 
 cordingly. But now, the Will does not thus Act upon 
 the Body,thc Body having no Principle whereby to know, 
 or underftand what it Commands. And therefore, when 
 we fay, That the Will Commands the Body, in ftrifrnels 
 of Truth, it is only a Metaphorical Expreflion. For 
 the Willy or Soul exerting an Act of Volition, moves the 
 Body, not by Command, but by Phypcal Impulfe : That 
 is to fay, It does by its Native force, Energy, and Acti- 
 vity, firft move and impell the Spirits, and. by the In- 
 ftrumental Mediation of them ib moved and impelled, 
 it moves and impells the Body, and this, by as real an 
 Ihipulfe, as when I pufh, or thruft a thing with my 
 hand. For though indeed a Material Thing cannot act- 
 ively, or efficiently move, or work upon an Immate- 
 rial, yet Philofophers grant that an Immaterial (as being 
 of the nobler and more aftive Nature) can move, im- 
 pell, or work upon a Material ; and if we cannot form 
 in our Minds an Idea of the Mechanifm of this Motion, 
 it is becaufe neither can we form in our Minds an Idea 
 of a Spirit : But neverthelels Reafbn and Difcourfe will 
 Evince, That the Thing muft be fb. 
 PARADOX. 
 
 He tells us, That the Humane Nature of Chr ijl may be 
 Ignorant offome things, notwithjlandin^ its perfonal Union 
 to the Divine Word ; becaufe it is an Inferiour and Subject 
 Nature, Page 270. Line 12, 1$, 14. 
 
 Anfver. Thefe Words alio are both abfurd and 
 falfe. And 
 
 Firft, They are Abfurd, becaufe no Rules of Speak- 
 ing, or Arguing, permit us to lay of any Thing, or 
 
 Perfon, 
 
Chapter IX. 327 
 
 Perfbn, That it may be fo, or fo ; when neceffmly it is, 
 andmuft befb. For the Term [may] imports an fo- 
 difference, or at lcaft, a poffibility to both lides of I 
 Contradiftion : So that when a Man fays, That a 
 Thing [may be thus, or thus] he does by COnfequence 
 fayalfo, [That it may not be thus, or thus.] And there- 
 fore to fay, That the Humane Nature of Chrifl:, notwu 
 fianding its Perfonal Union to the Word,may be ignorant of 
 fame Things, when it cannot but be ignorant of fome \ 
 nay, of very many Things, is Abfurd. 
 
 And in the next place alfb, To make the Subjection of 
 the Humane Nature to the Divine, the proper Caufe of this 
 Ignorance is falfe, and the Affignation of a non caufa pro 
 causa : It being all one, as if I fhould fay, That fetch an 
 one cannot be a good Difputant, bee ait je he has a blemi\h in 
 his Eye, For it is not this Subjection of it to the Divine 
 Nature, that makes it ignorant of many Things known 
 by that Nature ; but the vaft difparity that is between 
 thefe Two Natures, viz. That one of them is Infinite, 
 the other Finite, which makes it impoflible for the Infi- 
 nite to Communicate its whole Kjwwledg e to the Finite. 
 Forafmuch as fuch a Knowledge exceeds its Capacity, and 
 cannot be received into it, fb as to exift, or abide in it, 
 any more than Omnipotence, or Omniprefence, or any o- 
 ther Infinite Divine Perfection can be lodged in a Finn- 
 Being. 
 
 And befides this, this very Jut/ c>, in the immediate- 
 ly foregoing Page, had not only allowed but affirmed, 
 That the Body (which certainly is both United to the 
 Soul, and of a Nature Subject and Infer i our to it) was 
 yolConfcioits to the Dictates and Commands of the Sou/. 
 Wherefore where Two Natures are United, the bare Sub- 
 jection of one to the other, is not the proper Caufe, that 
 the Nature which is Subject, is ignorant of what is 
 
 known 
 
528 Anmad-cerjiom^ Sec. 
 
 known by the Nature which it is fubjeel to. For if 
 Subjection were the (ble and proper Caufe of this Igno- 
 ranee, the Lifer tour Nature would be equally ignorant of 
 every Thing known by the Super iour\ which yet,accord- 
 ing to this Man's ownDo&rine of the Conjczoufnefs of 
 the Body to the Soul, is not fb. This Confideration I al- 
 ledge only as an Argument ad hominem, having already, 
 by the former Argument, fuificiently proved the falfe- 
 nefs of his Affertion. 
 
 But I fhall detain my Reader no longer upon this Sub- 
 ject ; though I muft aiTure him, that I have given him 
 but a Modicum, and (as it were) an handful or two out 
 of that full heap which I had before me ; and from 
 which I had aftually collected feveral more Particulars, 
 which I have not here prefented him with, being un- 
 willing to fwell my Work to too great a Bulk. Never- 
 thelefs I look upon this Head of Difcourfe, as fb very 
 ufeful to place this Author in a true Light, that if I might 
 be fb bold with my Render, I could wifh, that he would 
 vouchfafe this Chapter (of all the reft) a fecond Peru- 
 lal ; upon which I dare undertake, that it will leave in 
 him fuch Impreffions concerning this Man's fitnefs to 
 Write about the Trinity ; as will not wear out of his 
 Mind in hafte. And yet after all this, I will not pre- 
 fume to derogate from this Authors Abilities, how infb- 
 lently ibever he has trampled upon other Mens ; but 
 content my felf, that I have fairly laid that before the 
 Reader, by which he may take a juft, and true meaflire 
 of them. And lb I fhall conclude this Chapter with an 
 Obfervation, which I have, upon feveral occafions, had 
 caufe to make, viz. That Divinity and Philofbphy are 
 certainly the rvorfl Things in the World, for any One to be 
 Magifterial in y who does not understand them. 
 
 CHAT. 
 
Chapter X. 32,9 
 
 c: H A P. X. 
 
 In which the Author s Grammatical, {and fuch 
 like) Miftakes, as they are found here^ and there 
 in his Writings^ are fet dovon^ and remark 
 upon. 
 
 COuld this Author have carried himfelf with any 
 ordinary degree of Candor and Civility towards 
 thof e,whom he wrote againft,he had never had the leaft 
 Trouble given him by me upon this Head of Difcourfe. 
 But when I find him treating Learned Men with fo 
 much Difdain and Infolence, and much liker a rough, 
 ill-bred Scbool-Mafter domineering over his Boys, than a 
 fair Opponent entring the Lifts with an Ingenuous Ant ago- 
 nift, Imuftconfefs, I cannot think myself obliged to 
 treat him upon fuch Terms, as I would an Adverfary 
 of a contrary Temper and Behaviour. One Man (and 
 a very Learned one too) he flirts at, as if he could not 
 diftinguifh between Conjunctive and Disjunctive Parti- 
 cles ; Vindication of his Cafe of Allegiance, fag. 76. the 
 Two laft I incs. Another he Scoffs y or rather Spits at, 
 as neither understanding Greek nor Latine. Vindic. Trin. 
 Pag. 95. Lin. 25. and thereby, I fiippole, would bear 
 himfelf to the World as no fmall Critick in both. As for 
 the Socinians (of which number this latter is) I do 
 from my Heart Condemn their Opinions, as falfe, and 
 deftruciive, not only of the Christian, but (in feveral 
 
 U u Inftan< 
 
; ; o JmmadverJionS) Sec. 
 
 Inftances) even of Natural Theology and Religion it {elf. 
 Nevetthelefs I do not find, that thele Men ufe to be re- 
 proached/ir want of Greek, or La tine, or for any No- 
 table Defe£t of Parts, either Natural, or Acquired. 
 Faujlus Socinus was a Perfon undoubtedly of great Wit 
 and Strength of Mind, and of Competent, though not 
 very deep Learning ; but his Uncle L&lins Socinus be- 
 fore him, and Crellms who lived fome time after him, 
 were Perfbns very well ftocked with both ; and fb have 
 been many more (indeed too many) befides thefe. And 
 where the Cafe ftands thus, I think, what the Poet faid 
 of * Probity and Integrity, may very well be faid of Learn- 
 ing alfb, viz. That it is Commendable even in an Enemy, 
 how much fbever we may blame him for the ill ufe of 
 it. But this Author fpares neither Friend nor Foe, but 
 comes like a kind of Hurricano upon his Adverfary, not 
 vouchfafing him fb much as one grain of Allowance, 
 wherefbever he finds (or rather thinks he finds) him 
 Tripping. And therefore, let him not, of all Men, 
 complain that he is hardly dealt with, if with the fame 
 meafure, with which he has hitherto meted to others, it be 
 meafured to him again. 
 
 Accordingly, I fhall in this Chapter proceed to exa- 
 mine his Grammatical, Vocabular Miftakes. And that I 
 may do this juftly, and without the leaft fhadow of un- 
 fair dealing, I will firft fet down the Table he gives us 
 of the Typographical Errata, in the firft Edition of his 
 Book ; that fb we may diftinguifh, what ought to 
 be laid at the Printers Door, and what at the Au- 
 thor's. 
 
 Th 
 
Chapter X. 3-1 
 
 'f he Table 0^ Errata prefixed to the Firfl Edition of the 
 Vindication of the Blcfled Trinity, Sec. is as fol- 
 lows. 
 
 PAge 50. Line 2. read Ttt&L%tafwit, P. 51. L. 15, fo* 
 Corinthm read Cerinthu*. P. 9 j. L. 26. for/} read 
 if. P. 95. L. J2. for Am read Tw. P. 96. L. 2, for 
 
 Per Jims read Per fori x, and L. 50. for r/;f read Three. 
 P. 105. Line 5. for whence v&Awhen. P. 155. Line jj. 
 for J0 read /m Pag. 203. L. 15. for ire read He. P. 2 14. 
 L. 29. for CorrviU read Convinft. P. 227. L. ic. for 
 HV/y read M W. P. 238. L. 18. dele />. P. 249.L.18. 
 read Challenged. 
 
 This is a true and exaft Tranfcript of the Table of the 
 Errata prefixed to that Book. (Whether the faid Table 
 be True, or no ) concerning which, I cannot but ob- 
 ferve, 'J 'hat moftof thefe Errata are much more eafily 
 Corrigible by an Ordinary Reader (without any Ad- 
 monition) than thofe that I fhall mention, and remaris 
 upon. And I fhall add further, That, had he but faid 
 [That thefe and the like Errata the Reader is de fired to Cor- 
 reel 06 he {hall meet with them] he fhould have heard of 
 none of them from me; though lam pretty well fatis- 
 fied, and fb will any Judicious Reader be too, that as 
 none of them in any probability are, fb fbme of them 
 (as they ftand here placed in this Book) neither arc, nor 
 could be any one's but hi 3 own. But fince he has laid in 
 no fuch A'.*/r0, and thisftandsas a full Account of the 
 Errata ; and not only fb, but fince in the Second Edition 
 fome Faults not mentioned in this Table, are Correal- 
 ed, while others remain the fame, or as bad, as in the 
 Firft Edition, there is all the Reafon in the World, that 
 
 U u 2 the 
 
2 3 % AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 the Author fhould be charged with that, from which 
 he himfelf has thus difcharged the Printer. And be- 
 fides, in the Second Edition of his Book, the Reader is 
 defircd to take Notice, that there is no Table of Err at* 
 at all ; by which we may juflly conclude, That he reck- 
 oned it fb Correct, as to need no further Correction. So 
 that what I find there, I judge my felf, to have all the 
 right that can be, to Account with him for. 
 
 And the rather, for that Ten Years ago he publickly 
 Inus^'i. declared in Print, That be was refolved in what he fbouti 
 Printed pibtijjj for the future , to Correct the Prefs himfelf \ though, 
 '- J< on my Conference, it was one of the unfitteft Employ- 
 ments (next to the Writing of Vindications) that he could 
 take to \ as, I doubt not, but this Chapter will pretty 
 well fhew. 
 
 Now the Words, which I intend to Remark upon, 
 fhall be of thefe Two forts. 
 
 Firft, Such as may be confidered fingly in themfelves. 
 And 
 
 Secondly, Such as muft be confidered in Conjunction 
 with other Words, in Sentences and Forms of Speak- 
 
 ing. 
 
 Of the firft fort the Reader may pleafe to take notice 
 of thefe that follow. 
 
 As in Page \6. Line 2 ?. I find an extraordinary word 
 called Ixiropeoifjia-e©* : the meaning of which I would 
 gladly know : For I can no more find it in any Lexicon, 
 than I can in the Table of the Errata : And yet certainly 
 it muft be fbme excellent Word, as having ftood its 
 ground in both Editions of his Book. I confefs I have 
 been apt to think it ftands for iKTropwdfjuev©* \ but why 
 it fhould do fb, the Author (who, no doubt, isaGra/- 
 an in his Heart) may poffibly give us a good Reafbn; 
 but I, for my part, cannot. 
 
 Such 
 
C H A P T E R X. ; : : 
 
 Such another Word we have cloathed indeed in G 
 Characters, bur, bv no means, of Gr ttraftion ; 
 
 and that is axctTwr^T^s Pig. ii<;. Linl n. I ha\e 
 read, I confefs, of' a>ccxToro//a<roi/, fignifying itonomind- 
 biU, or quod nomh fotefi ; and I do not deny but 
 
 that I find iy.on^\ou.a^ov alfb ; and that not only in the 
 place here cited out of Greg. Nyffen, but twice alfb in 
 St. BaJiP$ Hexaemeron (from whence I quoted it fb 
 written,C//.7. />.i92.)But 1 very muchquefr;on,Whcthcr 
 the Word be (b wrote in other and Ancientcr Copies of 
 thofe Father's Works ; and that for thefe Two Reaibns. 
 
 Firft, Becaufe it muft be derived from the Preterper- 
 feci Tenfe uvq^ol^oli ; and if fb, then according to the 
 Rule of GraMma? in fuch Verbal Derivatives, the Aug- 
 ment muft be thrown away, and the Original Letter re- 
 tained ; as in iytpais Ob riyepjcu, ofjiahicrfJLOS ab wvAAkjuloli, 
 and confequently ovoixar©* ah ajvofjLctfcLL* And that 
 ovofjLur©* with znOmicron is the Regular and proper 
 Word, appears from thofe Cognate Words fb common 
 amongft the Grammarians ^ oVo/xoupxn & cropacfixov. 
 Neverthelefs if wpotAxr© 4 be admitted, it mult be by 
 the Attick DiaJetf; which very often (efpeciallv in 
 Compounds) puts an w for an o ; as in aWjuaA©* and 
 dvcowfjL©*) and feveral other like Words. 
 
 But my Second R ea/b;/, why I think the Anciei 
 Editions of St. Bafil have it axaW ( ua<r©* ^ itli an 0- 
 micYon, is, becaufe I find thofe I rapbers who write 
 
 it fo, quote this Word out of that very place of St. B*- 
 (iPs H: where now it frauds wrote dxencovi- 
 
 fMctcrov', which lurcly piv I found u nut t: ere 
 
 fb wrote then, when they quoted it from i But 
 
 admitting that it may be fo wrote, viz. with an w s 
 well as with an g. it does,or can this make for our 
 
 Author's new-coined dx^wvofjn^ I or till ri 
 
 be 
 
2 X A Jnimaciver/wns^ &c, 
 
 be found fuch GwA Words as oVo/t*i£<w and cro^I^oyoct 
 to derive it from (which none ever yet met with} nor 
 ever will) in vain fhall we feek for ttTcocTmoui^ov any 
 \\ here but in this Author. 
 
 Jn the next place, to pais from Greek Words to Latine, 
 or fiich at leaft as are Latimzed, I would gladly know, 
 who thofe Anti-Nicene Fathers were, who are mention- 
 ed by him, Pag. 24. Lin. 5. And whether they were 
 Avians, or Novations ; who ( as I take it ) were the 
 great Oppofers of the Nicene Council. But that, I find, 
 cannot be, fince our Author tells us, That the Perjons, 
 fpokenof by him, were of the fame Faith with the Nicene 
 Fathers. So that upon that Account, I fhould think, it 
 ought to be the Ante-Nicene Fathers. And if fb, I think 
 the Author would do well to take notice, that there is 
 a great difference between Anti-Niceneand Ante-Nicene, 
 between fuch as lived before the Council, and fuch as 
 were againfl it. And the more particular and exaft no- 
 tice ought he to take of it here, fince (though the dif- 
 ference be only in an lota) he yet knows what a Diftur- 
 bance this little Letter made in the Homooufian and Ho- 
 woioufian Controverfie, even fb great as to occafion the 
 Convening of this Famous Council. Neverthelefs, that 
 this word Anti-Nicene pafied for good and current with 
 this Author, is evident from hence, that it is (as well 
 
 fbme others) free of both Editions of this extraordi- 
 nary Book. 
 
 Again in Page 105. Line 8. we are told of the Fa- 
 vourites of fbme Opinions. As to which, I had thought, 
 that Men ufe to favour and countenance Opinions, and 
 not to be countenanced and favoured by them. And yet 
 the Word Favourite fignifies paffhrlj* and lb mull be 
 taken for one who receives favour, and not actively for 
 one who fbt m it. And therefore if to reprelent any one 
 
 as 
 
HAPTER X. 535 
 
 as the Favour ue of an Opinion be not good fence, I know 
 noway, but by irriking it out, and putting Favourer m 
 the room of it, to make it better. 
 
 In Page 106. Line 16. 1 read hit en lion ufed in the fame 
 fence with Intention, or Purpo/e ; and 1 mull declare, 
 that I never found it fo ufed before. 
 
 And in Page 1 08. Line 3 1 . I am told of the Council of 
 Later an ; and I wondered a good while, what Coun- 
 cil it fhould be ; for though I had heard of fever al 
 Lateran Councils, yet I never heard of the Council of the 
 Lateran, till I met with it here. 
 
 Like wife I find an Extraordinary Perfbn hi Page 43.. 
 Line 1. named Lucifer Car olit anus, and was thereupon 
 in fbme thoughts with my felf, whether there might 
 have been any place called in former times Carolina, or 
 by fome Name like it. But then out comes the Second 
 Edition and alters it into Caralitanus ; which (in my 
 poor Opinion) looks very fufpicioufly, as if fbme Body 
 had a mind to Correct it, but knew not how. As for 
 Lucifer Calarttanm fb called from Calaris, now Ca^liarz^ 
 the Metropolis of Sardinia, I have heard much of* him ; 
 but I will fuppofe our Author had fome Body elfe in his 
 Eye. And upon this occafion, I cannot but take notice 
 of fbme other Writers quoted by him, whom the World 
 feems as much unacquainted with, as with this Carolita- 
 nits. As for infhnce St. Hillary in his slpoL P. 15. at 
 the latter end. And Albafpimtt in his Defence of Dr. Stil- 
 lingjket, Pag. 165. Lin. 22. And A' onn as in his f\ji ow- 
 ledge of Chrisi, Pag. 2.18. Now St. Hilary indeed, a 
 Famous Father of the Church, and Bifhop of PoicJiers, 
 and Albaftintus Archbifhopof Orleans, Eminent for his 
 Learned Works, and Nonnm who Wrote a Paraphrafe 
 upon St. John's Gofpel, in Greek Verfc, are every one of 
 them known and celebrated by all. But as for St. Hit- 
 
 lory, 
 
3 5 6 Animadwrjionsy Sec. 
 
 /.;; . us and Aw;«^, I never heard of them till 
 
 i Author was pleated to blefs the World with thefe 
 
 for Einmiom inftead of Erroneous, and dysciooavrn 
 initeadof dyiuo-vvfi, they are fmall things, and ought 
 to: g no difference amongft Friends, though I have 
 
 own many a poor Scbool-boj forced to Water bis P Lints 
 iov a idsMiitake. 
 
 But there is a Word of Angular note, which I have 
 met with at leaft fix or (even times in this Book, and 
 four times in one Page, viz. 227. and it is Profopopta, 
 which alio, as well as its Companions has given the Ca- 
 talogue of Errata the flip, and fb, weathered it out in 
 Two Editions : But what to make of it, I cannot tell. 
 There is indeed a certain Figure in Rhetor ick, called Pro- 
 fopopa/ia, which I know well enough, but Profopopta I 
 am wholly a Stranger to : And furely this Author could 
 not mean the Figure 7re?0"«ffwoii*; forafmuch as the 
 ftri£l Literal fignification of that is ficiio Perfon*. And 
 I cannot imagine how this Author fhould miftake about 
 this Word (of all others) having had fb Excellent an 
 Hand at the Thing signified by it ; as having, I dare fay, 
 made more Perfons than ever God thought fit to furnifh 
 the World with. 
 
 And to fliew the Reader that our Author's ftore ex- 
 tends much further than one Book, I will prefent him 
 with fbme more of the like Rarities out of fome of his 
 other Pieces. 
 
 As firft in Page 6^. of his Anfwer to the Protefiant 
 Reconciler , he makes mention of Exorcifme, Chryfom, 
 Vntfio# 9 Dipping, Trine Immerfion y &c as rejected by 
 the Church of England. And here I was extremely at a 
 iols to learn what Chryfom was ; and after all my fearch, 
 
 1 Lexicon could inform me, till at laft I hit upon a cer- 
 
 rain 
 
Chapter X, 337 
 
 tain little Lexicon, called, The Will of Mortal'h, and 
 there I found a Word very near it, as differing from it 
 but by one Letter, which was Chrifom, fignifj 
 Child that dies prefentl) \ it is Born : But then con- 
 fidering again, that the I I did not de- 
 
 clare her lelf to reieft fiich, Iwasasmuch at a lofi 
 ever ; till at length letting my GuefTing Faculty on 
 work, I concluded, that certainly it fhould be Chriji 
 which is a Greek Word for "Cnction, as Immerfion is a. 
 iMine one for Dipping. .And this our Author fliould 
 have taken notice of, for though he quotes it out of the 
 Reconciler, vet fince he neither reftiHes it, nor r 
 upon him for it, we may very reafonably fuppofe, that 
 he took it for good Payment; and really thought, that 
 it ought to be Chryfom as he found it. Otherwife he who 
 had been ib quick and fharp upon him at other turns, 
 would, no doubt, have took him upon fuch an advan- 
 tage, and well-favouredly expofed him for fo foul a 
 Blunder. 
 
 But to go on. In Page 209. Line 15. of the fame 
 Book, I find mention of the Quadrigefimal Fafi. And 
 this put me as much to a fhmd, as the other, to imagine 
 what kind of FaH this fliould be. For the neareft and 
 likeft Word I could derive it from, was Quadriga, figni- 
 fying a Coach, Can, or Waggon. And accordingly as 
 the 'Jews had their Yeisi of Weeks, and of Tabernacles^ 
 fb I did not know, but the Papifls, or feme Chrij 
 like them, might have feme Fafi, called, The fafi of 
 Coaches, or Waggons ; and might poflibly give it that 
 Name from ks being carried on with the Difcipline of 
 the Whip and the Lafh, as ( fed to 
 
 be. This Conjecture, I lay, I made with my felf. For 
 I concluded, that this Author could not mean it of the 
 Fafl ; for that is called j , or Jej 
 
 J2 
 
« :>S AnimadverJionS) &c. 
 
 Quadrageftmale, and ifTiies from the Numeral Quadra- 
 ginta, and fo is quite another Thing from this Quadri- 
 gefimal-Faft ; which I cannot find in all the Kubrick of 
 our Church ; though perhaps when thofe Excellent Per* 
 fons fpoken of, Apology, P. 5. Lin. 20. have finifhed their 
 Intended Alterations of our Kubrick, we fhall find it 
 there too. 
 
 In the next place, let us pafs to Rich of his Words as 
 fcand conjoyned with others in Sentences, or Forms of 
 Speaking. And here let us firft of all confider his abfiird 
 life of that form of Expreflion [as I may fo [peak'] which 
 he has at lean: Twenty times in this one Book : Now the 
 proper ufe of thefe Words, is to befpeak excufe for that 
 which they are joyned to, as for fbmething that is lege* 
 du, enia^ and containing in it a kind of Catacbrefis, 
 
 or at lean: fome Inequality, fome DefeQ: or other in the 
 
 preflion, with Reference to the Thing defigned to 
 be expreffed by it. And this, I am fiire, is all the true 
 and proper Reafbn affignable for the ufe of thefe Words 
 7 may fo fpeakJ} But this Author applies and ufes 
 them, even when he pretends to give the propereft and 
 moft Literal Account and Explication of Things, and 
 fuch an one, as is not only better than all others, but e- 
 ven exclufive of them alio, as the I rue Account that 
 
 can be given of them. As for inftance, where he a£ 
 firms Self-Confciottfnefs to be the True and only Formal 
 Reafon of Perfonahty, and Mutual-Confci to be 
 
 the fame of the Unity of the. Divine Nature in the 
 
 ree Perfons, he lifhers it in with thofe Words 
 
 I may fo fpeak] Page 56. Line 6, 7, 8, &c. which 
 
 (according to what he hold, about thefe Two 
 
 Terras) is all one, as if I fhouldfajf, Gndis ah Infinite 
 
 Eternal, Almighty Being (as I may fo /peak J and God is 
 
 l Creator and Governor of the World (as 1 may fo 
 
 •h) and Man is a Rational Creature., having I 
 
 Ey 
 
Chapter X. 339 
 
 Eyes, Two Anns, and Two li - J may fo fpeak) 
 
 all which is egregioufly Abfiird and Ridiculous. And 
 the more fo ; for that this very Author 
 of his Adver&ries (wherii or 
 
 the Reconciler, I cannot at prefent remember, but the 
 Thing I perfectly do) for ufing the like Exprei ion \d* 
 
 I may fo fay,] with great feoff and fcorn, telling 1; 
 thereupon, That certainly no Man had ever m of 
 
 Lf° fiffO ^ hi?l b* t ja d* Now for my own part, I thii 
 this Author's \_fo [peaks'] are every whit as bad and con 
 temptible as his Adverfary's [_fo fays] unlefs he can per- 
 fwade the World, That a Man may fpeak an Abfiird 
 thing much more excufably than he can faj 
 
 To this we may add fbmc more fiich Abfiird Exprefli- 
 ons. As for inftance, that in P. 5 5. Lin. 16. where he 
 fays, That the Three Divine Perjons are fo United to each 
 other ^ as every Man is to himfelf. In which Words, be- 
 fides the falfenefs of the Propofition ; it being impofli- 
 ble for the Three Divine Perfons to be 10 United to each 
 other, as to be but One Per/on, which yet every Man is, 
 we ought to note alfb the Abfurdity of the Expreffion. 
 ¥ovBUUnion y orVnition 9 is EJfentially between two things 
 at lea ft ; fb that unlefs the Man be One thing, and himfelf 
 another, He cannot be (aid to be United to Himfelf. He 
 may, perhaps, be properly enough faid to be One with 
 Himfelf ; but to fi bat he is United to himfelf is un- 
 pardonable Nonfence. e 85. LineS. He 
 tells us, 2 ifdom which is Father ', 
 Son ^ and Holy Ghofl, is [Identically the fame] which is 
 much as to fay, That a Man is J I r tfely Wife, Honejlly Ho- 
 
 t, Learnedly Learned, and the lite : For though I 
 know what it is to be perfectly, or abfol 'e, yet 
 
 to affirm any Thing, or Perfbn to be Ida.:. 
 is an Idle, and a Xaufeous Tautology. Llkewifein 
 
 X x 2 
 
y±Q Jnimadverjtons, &a 
 
 Page l$2. Line 19. He tells us, That God intercedes with 
 ?w Body but himfelf. Concerning which Form of Speak- 
 ing, I muft obferve, That when the Term [But] is u- 
 fea as a Particle of Exception, it implys the Tiling, or, 
 Perfbn excepted from others, to be of the fame kind, or 
 at teaftjcondttion with the reft,from which it was except- 
 ed. And therefore, unlefs God were a Body, it can with 
 no Congruity of Speech be faid, That God intercedes with 
 no Body but himfelf. So that this alfb mull: pais for ano- 
 ther Blunder. With the like Abfurdity he tells us in 
 Page 124. Line 15. Where there are Two diftinci and divi- 
 ded Operations, if any of them can act alone without the other, 
 there muft be Two divided Natures. Now it is a Maxima 
 in Philofbphy, and that fueh an one, as, I think, ought 
 to take place in Grammar too, That Actioms -non dstttn 
 Actio. And accordingly if the Reafon of Things ought 
 to h r tht Rule of Words, then to fay, That** Operation 
 Ads, or Operates, is ttremely Sencelefs and Ridiculous. 
 
 But to proceed, he has away of promifcuoufly ap- 
 plying fiich Words to Things as are properly applicable 
 to Perfons only, fuch as are [who] and [whoje.] As 
 for inftance, he tells us of the Being of a Thing [whofe^ 
 Nature we cannot conceive, Page 6. Line 11. And in 
 the fame Page, Line 2J, Wi (lays he) thai 
 
 theta are a great many things [yphofe] Nature and Pr 
 ties we cannot conceive. And in Page 7. Line 18. It is fo 
 far from being a wonder to meet with any Thing [whofe Na* 
 ture~] we do not under ft and, 8rc. But is this Scnce, or 
 Grammar* Or does any Man fay, Reach me thai Book, 
 [y/ho lies there] or that Chair [who stands there ? ] No^ 
 certainly, none who underftands what proper fpeaking 
 is, would cxprefs himfelf fb. And moreover (to fhew 
 that he can (peak of Perfons in a Dialed belonging on 1 / 
 ro bare 7 / vc r as well as fiQ did oibdrt Things, 111 w 
 
X.F 
 
 LHAPTtR A, 3-J. 
 
 proper only to Perfonsj he tells us of a Son produced out 
 of the Subflance of [its Parent] inftead of his Parent , 
 Page 257. Line 19. which is a way of (peaking every 
 whit as improper and ablurd as the other. In the next 
 place he lias a cuftom of joyning a Verb of the Singular 
 Number with a Noun of the Plural, and fb vice versa. 
 As there is Three Gods, inftead of, there are Three Gods, 
 Page 2. Line 9. And the Nature ofmost things [are] very 
 dark and obfeure, inftead of \_isfo~] Page 6. Line 20. 
 which alfb is fb Ungrammatical that it would not be en- 
 dured in a School-Boy \ it being as arrant a Solecifm in 
 Englijh, as Homines currit, or Socrates iiffutant would 
 be in Latine. Likewife he often ufes the Patticle [the?*] 
 inftead of [than] as, The Scripture teaches more [then J 
 Natural Reafon does. Pag. 148. Line 19. And a more 
 Glorious Authority [then] he exercifes himfelf] Page 17?^ 
 Line 28. This, I fay, is familiar with him, but with- 
 al exceedingly Ablurd, Improper, and not Engl/fh. For 
 [fhen] is a Xote of 'Lime, but [than] is a Note of Com- 
 panion, importing a greater or leiler degree of that 
 Thing wherein the Companion is made ; and is com- 
 monly joyned with the VJov&s fooner y or rather, but al- 
 ways with ibme word or other, denoting the Compara- 
 tive Degree of a Thing. As, fuch an one lias more or lefs 
 Strength, or Wilclom [than] another. And I will Die 
 fooner, or rather [than] I will do fuch a Thing, or t' 
 like. But no Man who Speaks, or Writes true Engfife 
 will ufe thele two words indifferently. But I mult not 
 omit that Notable Paflage, Pageng. Li,,< 25, wIil 
 he tellsus, That there is pirn 9 urea* /xwrg mpy^oM t>?z$ 
 PicLtpoesiv i? t*! ©goTWTi. Thefe are the \ :d 
 
 is they ftand^though in conjunction with Two or Th; 
 y(fj Words to complete the S. 1) do in my 
 
 nion, parry much of the Air of a Solecifin upon tl - 
 
ijlz AnimadverfionS) &c. 
 
 (b that according to the Conftruftion of them here, if it 
 had been for my Life, inftead of faying, There is ?ivcL 
 ficctpo&lv, I would have (aid, There is tU fixtpo&tj and 
 16 have joyned true Greek and Engl/fh together. 
 
 And thus I have prefented the Reader with fome of 
 tliis Author's Ways and Forms of Expreffion, which 
 Grammarians call Loquendi Genera. From all which, 
 according to the lingular skill he has (hewn in this fort 
 of Learning, it is to be hoped, that as he has already 
 bleft the World with a New Divinity and Philofbphy, 
 fb he will in due time oblige it with a new Grammar 
 too. 
 
 And great need (as we fhall prefently fee) there 
 feems to be of Rich an one.In order to which,I fhall men- 
 tion but one more of this Author's Pieces. And that is 
 a Hook, Intituled, A Defence of Dr. Stillingfleet, &c. 
 
 In the beginning of which, there is a Table of Errata 
 prefixed, that fills almoft a whole Page ; fo that I ve- 
 rily thought, that it had fb clearly carried off the whole 
 Crop, as to leave no Gleanings behind. Nevcrthelefe 
 I fhall prelent the Reader with this fmall Sficilegium of 
 what I gathered up after it ; not mentioning any one 
 Word that ftands Corrected there. 
 
 In Page 5}. therefore, and Line 10. He tells us of a 
 Counterfeit Epithite ; but what that is, I do not know. 
 I have indeed often heard of an Epithet e from the Greek 
 23i3*gf©. and 'QnSrilov, fignifying quid affo fit urn aut adje- 
 
 m, and imports properly, an Adje&ive joyned to a 
 Subftantive, and giving the Subftantive a Denomination 
 accordingly. But as for this Author's Epithtte, it may, 
 for ought appears, fignifie fomething to flop Boi. 
 For as for any other Signification (that I know of) it has 
 none 
 
 In 
 
Chapter X. 
 
 In the next place, P.^64,65. he quotes Baxter for 
 an Expreflion ufed by him, viz, of fuch People as 
 through aWindm on tht WeH-end of Moore-Fields ; and 
 calls it Mr. Beer's Elegant Paraphrafes for Madmen. 
 But here (befides the tmftake of Paraphrafes for Para* 
 pbrajis, which is only one Number put for another) our 
 Learned Author mull: give me leave to tell him, That 
 by this Tallage, he feems not to underftand what a Pa- 
 rajis means. For a Paraphrafis, or Paraphrafe (to 
 put it into Englifb for his fake) fignifies properly a Tran- 
 ilation of fome Writings with Additions and Enlarge- 
 ments to Illurtrate and Explain the fence of them, and is 
 therefore ufually called Liberior Tranjlatio. In which fence 
 we read of this or that Paraphrafe upon the Pf alms, and 
 Erafmkfs Paraphrafe upon the New Teftarnent, and the 
 like. So that unlets the Mad-men here fpoken of, were 
 a certain Book, or Writing, and Mr. Baxter's Words 
 concerning them, an Explicatory Translation of the laid 
 Writings this Great-Good Man could not pro] 
 call them a Paraphrafe. But what muft we call them 
 then? Why truly the forementioned Words might be 
 properlv enough called a Periphrafts^ or Circumlocution 
 (which, being lb like the word P fis, might eafily 
 
 deceive a Man who cares not what he Writes)and when 
 it is fb taken, it is a certain Figure in Speech, whereby 
 we exprefs a Thing by federal Words, which otherwise 
 might, and, for the moil: part, isexpreiTed by oik*. As 
 Sofhronifci {Mm, i i s for Socrates, and the 
 
 red P01 rear, is a P< 
 
 • \r \ and ib to le to 
 
 Mr. Baxter's Inftance ; that ffion 
 
 1 talk through ihi H 
 Moore-Fields, is a proper P triply, . But 
 
 \&for&Parapbr . ' . it to this won- 
 
 3 1 -> 
 
2 ±4- AilmadvcrJionSy &£C. 
 
 derful Perfon, to make a Paraphrafe upon any Man, 
 (whether Mad or Sober) if he can. 
 
 Likewifein Page 112. and the laft Line, he tells us, 
 cut oi Bpiftles of a Public* praam formula. 
 
 Conarning which, though I fliilft confefs, that I do by 
 noniuinsafpireto.be one of the Number of this Au- 
 thor's Excellent Perfons y who were for altering our Li- 
 turgy, or Publick Form of Prayer. Yet, if it were ex- 
 prefTed by Public* pracum formula, I fhould be one of the 
 foremoft who fhould defire that Pracum might be alter- 
 ed into Precum. In the mean time, why fhould any one 
 who had read but a Page in Calvin, quote him for fuch a 
 word as could not pofTibly drop from fb Learned a Pen ? 
 
 But it would be endlels to defcant particularly upon 
 all this Author's Newfound, Latine, and Proprieties of 
 Speech. And therefore to.fet them down briefly as 
 they offer themfelves. In Page 1 22. in the Quotation in 
 the Margin, the Reader will find a moft choice word, 
 viz. Confaonator, not to be met with in any fuch puny 
 Author as w r e commonly call Claffick, but cited by him 
 inftead of Concionator out of the 57th Canon of our 
 Church ; which, I muft tell him, is not an ordinary flip, 
 but a foul fumble, attended with Two more in the fame 
 Quotation, viz,. Sique for S/qul, and a teller one, which 
 is \)trum> iovVirum, for that is no greater than the dif- 
 ference of a Noun from an Adverb, which, we know, 
 
 below a Perfbn,Paramount to all rule,to take notice of. 
 Though by his good leave the Church of England both 
 Writes and Teaches better Latine to fuch as are difpofed 
 to learn it. 
 
 ;ain in Page 139. in the Quotation on the fide, we 
 have thefe Words cited out of the third Book of Opt at us 
 Mihvila,ius. Recordami„i quomodb a vobis jamdudum 
 
 '■air is Ecclefu membra diftrtSta junt, non enim \fOnmm 
 
 quan/que 
 
Chapte r j_ 5 
 
 emamqut demum] feme I I e da: ere p. . . Of which PaP 
 lage I muft confeft I could ra 
 
 mar, till cohfiiltiflff the Author hiir.lelf of Ah 's 
 
 Edition, infteadoJ t, [found it 1h 
 
 ntmtnutocpie C - which, no doubt, is an admirable 
 
 Various Leftion (of which this Author ought to have 
 the Glory) upon the Text of fuch a father. But this is 
 not all the Blunders which this fruitful Sentence affords 
 us : et another, viz. recedit for refedit ; and 
 
 that fuch an one as utterly perverts the fence of the Au- 
 thor, who f peaks hereof fome who /V/r, andfbmewho 
 remained in the Communion of the Church, oppoiing them 
 in this refpecf. to one another ; as, Ant ivit uxor, ant re- 
 fedit mxritm, dut Parent es feducii funt & filii jeqt:i nolnc- 
 rantj out jhtit ft dter migrante for ore, &C. Thus the 1 
 tiier here i j but, prayywhat oppofition could l 
 
 be betv, tt ivit uxor rut rccedit mar it us, any more 
 
 than there is be and departing ? Befides, 
 
 that all the reft of the Verbs running in the Pretax 
 Te/.'fc, this muft needs do fb too, or make a very grois 
 fault in the Conft. notion : So that this is an Illiterate 
 Perverfion of ice of this Father. Upon which, as 
 
 well as cai-ons, I look upon this as the on- 
 
 ly fiire Rule of deeding with this Author's Quotations, 
 
 -. To truft i hem <no farther than one ca*f&tb£m in 
 their Originals. 
 
 In like 178; in the place there quoted 
 
 he Mar t or St. ( 'and not 
 
 Lithor then ieh 
 
 the. ■ Corfo Ecc/c- 
 
 wcrd in St. is 
 
 (as it ought to be) defer . : ; : il off; 
 
 bet yhich,and the < lbythisAutlv 
 
 re is a wide difference, defcifcerei being a moil pr 
 
 Y y 
 
:^6 AmmadverjionS) &c 
 
 per Latn/e Word, but difcifferit ib far from Proper, that 
 it is not fo much as Latin** 
 
 And in Page 187. Line the laft, we find <y ofAoviia 
 for evofjLotoicL, which makes the whole Period neither 
 Sence nor Greek, Again, Page 188. Line the Jail bur 
 one we have thisPaiTage, Videte anrwn dicanmr matures, 
 liquid [A hum] die 1 mereantur ; which being there 
 put for AliuA) is a downright Solecif in. And lartly, in 
 Page 198. in the Quotation in the Margin, we have thofc 
 remarkable words, Simiarum more, [qui] cum homines 
 non (int, homines t amen imit ant ur . ? Which is another So- 
 lecifm every whit as bad and fcandalous a : . brmer. 
 
 Now all thefe words and Paffages, I allure the Rea- 
 der, as they ftand in the Authors, from whence they are 
 quoted, carry a very different face, from what this Wri- 
 ter has given them ; which fhews, that whenfoever the 
 words of the Fathers are tranferibed into any of his 
 .Books, they are quite out of their Element. For amongft 
 them (as they ftand here) there are fbme fuch vile faults, 
 or rather fuch clamorous fins in Grammar, that fhould a 
 School-Boy tender an Exercife to his Mafter with but 
 Two or Three fuch in it, he would foon find himfelf ve- 
 ry roundly and feverely took up for them ; and that per- 
 haps more ways than one. But Hands that can reflore dif- 
 poffeffed Princes, may Write any Thing, and Authorize 
 what they have Wrote, by their very Writing it. For 
 otherwife, the Truth is, the Latine, which the foreci- 
 ted PafTages are dreffed up in, feems a fort of Providen- 
 tial Latine, as being above all Rules and Laws of Speak- 
 ing and Writing whatfoever. 
 
 As for faults about Accents,(iich as are voeepy ti %fi^au 
 for voeepv tj, &c. Vind. P. 102. Line 3. And avy^oopa 
 for o-l»>^wj5«, Page ri 3. Line 2. of the Quotation in the 
 Margin, and the like, they are too numerous for me to 
 
 trouble 
 
Chapter X. 3^7 
 
 trouble the Reader with. But this I defire him to take 
 notice of, upon the whole that has been produced by 
 me, That as none of the forementioned Faults are in the 
 Table of t\\&Emta\ (b fbmeof themin the firft Edi- 
 tion of his / 'ir/d. Trin, ftand Corrected in the fecond ; as 
 felvvSrai, Page 1 1 5. Line 1. of the Quotation in the Mar- 
 gin of the firft is Corrected into feixvuSrctt in the fecond : 
 And ofjLovalvy Page 12 1. Line 21. in the former, is chan- 
 ged into oy.ovcrioi, m the latter. And therefore accord- 
 ing to the old Maxime, That Exceptio firmat Regulam 
 in non Except is f it is to me a fufficient proof, That fince 
 this Author Correfted fbme PalTages and not others, 
 which yet need correfting as much, if not more, it 
 was, becauie His A cutencp did not fee, that thefe laft 
 needed any Correction at all: And in fiich a cafe fome 
 are of Opinion that where the Words efcape it, the Au- 
 thor himielf ought to have it. 
 
 But I fhali hold my Reader no longer upon this Sub- 
 ject, how diverting foever it may be ; this being enough 
 to fatisfie any Rational Perfon, how unfit this Man is to 
 upbraid any ontmth want ^Greek, or Latine : Though 
 had I in my firft perufal of his feveral Pieces forefeen 
 this my Engagement with him, I might and would have 
 prefented my Reader with a more complete Collection 
 of his Greek and Latine Elegancies. For I had nor gone 
 far in the Pveadingof him, but I found the Blows come 
 ib thick and faft upon poor Prifcian, that, to prevent 
 downright Blood-fhed, fhilas I drew near to a Latine 
 Quotation of any length, I prclently advifed him as a 
 Enend to get out of the way as faft as he could. 
 
 And now, if either he, or any one elfe for him, fhal! 
 pretend to flight and defpife this charge, and tell me that 
 the Faults and Miftakes here alledged by me, are fmall 
 Things ; fb, fay I, is the point of a Dagger too ; but 
 
 Y y 2 tor 
 
2 ± S AirimadvtrJionS) &c. 
 
 for all that, it may (fab a Man to the Heart ; and, I 
 think, it matters not how fmall the Thing is, which 
 wounds a Man's Credit, if it chance to bleed to Death 
 of the Wound. But there are fome Things in' the 
 World, the Kjiowledge of which feems but {mall, but 
 the Ig of them is not fo. And certainly of all Men 
 
 living, fuch as will be Writers, efpecially provoking, 
 Inf lilting Writers, are concerned to tread tenderly, and 
 to take every ftep with the utnioft Caption, where they 
 do not find a Grammatical Bottom Rnw t iiem. For 
 
 my own part, I dare account nothing {mall, or defpica- 
 ble, which may either do a Man a great mifchief, or is 
 neceffary to prevent one. The fir A'ocnt 
 
 may be reckoned but a low and am , neverthe- 
 
 s there is no getting to the top As the 
 
 Great h.Baj himfelf tells us* 
 
 %tS"€voi v7T2£pw\£qv tok chst7iv T> at nothing is • d. or 
 
 y\ ooai v eicrccyofj^joLSy m cl th i £v def piped by fuch as are • i (tru- 
 
 7rpC$)TQ0V <?Ql%€lct)V COS CfJLlKpOdV $ed Ar. c of 
 
 v7repl£oi) -Trove i£v rehelwv *? cro- Things. For if a Man (lays 
 qicLi eviction ; Baflius in Libro he) looks upon 
 ad Amp hi loch i urn de Spiritu San- as [fmall inconfi:. rable Things] 
 fa, Tom. 2. p. 292. Edit. Par if. (the word by which feme are 
 c6j7. pleafed to call the Rites and 
 
 Ceremonies of our Chun. 
 when will fuch a One be able to attain to the Perfection of 
 Wifdom and Learning ? 
 
 And fo I fhall dole up the prefent Subject with this 
 Vote, That St.PauPs School is certainly an Excellent 
 School, and St. Paul\ Church a moil Noble Church ; 
 and therefore, I think, that he dire&s hi$ Courfe very 
 prudently, and happily too, who in his Paifage to fuch 
 a Cathedral, takes iuch a School in his way. 
 
 CHAR XI 
 
Chapter XI. 
 
 m 
 
 C H A I\ XL 
 
 ]n which U given fame Account of this Author 1 * 
 
 Temper and iafolent way of Writings as well 
 
 in extolling himfelf at in depr effing and 
 
 [corning hk Adversaries; in both which he 
 
 has not hi* Parallel. 
 
 T Hough in all Contefts and Controverfies, how 
 fharp foever on both fides, and juft on one, 
 there is ftill a duty, which every Man ows both to De- 
 cency and to Himfelf,alw2ys obligeinghim to utter only 
 fuch things, as may become him to ipeak, whatfoever 
 his Adverfary may deferve to hear ; yet, as to the 
 Adverfary himfelf, it is, no doubt, a courle juftitiable 
 beyond all exception, to take ones meafures of Treat- 
 ing him, from the meafures he has allowed himfelf of 
 dealing with others. And, as I hope, for my own, 
 and the Churches fake, to acquit my felf as to the for- 
 mer part of the Rule, lb let my Adverfary take his lot 
 as to the other. For I doubt not but to (atisfie the 
 World, (were it'noc fuperabundantly, from his own 
 Writings , fatisfied already ) That he is a Perfbn 
 of fuch an infafferable Infolence both of Style and Tem- 
 per, that all, that he has met with in the foregoing 
 Chapters, has by no means piid ori iiis Scores. In all his 
 expreffiens concerning his Amagonifts, he is infinitely 
 
 Z z fcornful *, 
 
554 Animadvrrfions, Sec. 
 
 fcornful ; and not only Co, but very often alfo^xtrcme- 
 ly fpiteful and malicious. For what but the height of 
 lpight could make him in his Vindication of his Cafe of 
 - Allegiance tax his Learned Adverfary, as an Epicurean 
 and an Atheifitcal Ridiculer of Providence , only for 
 maintaining, that the PafTages and Events cf Provi- 
 dence are not the Rule, which God will have us govern 
 our Adtions by ; but the Precepts and Prohibitions of 
 his Law ? And what, but the fame malice, could make 
 him infinuate that the fame Author was inclined to Po- 
 pery and an Infallible Interpreter, only for faying that 
 one Text of Scripture was obfeure and much controver- 
 fea[?which yet St. Peter had iaidof many PaJfagesofSt. 
 Paul\ Epiflles,! Pet. }. i6.andyetwithout giving any wife 
 man the leaft occafion from thence to think that he was 
 v'mX c r l ^ en P rov ^' n g an Argument for the Infallibility of 
 4%. in/tbam his fuppo&d Succejfor. And Lailly 4 what but the bit- 
 hfi lines. tereft Rancour could make him charge his Adverfary, 
 as if he had compared the (wearing Allegiance toK. W. 
 and Q. M. for the great and notorious Impiety of it, 
 with the Villanies foretold by the Prophet of Hazael; 
 only, becaufe he had told Him, that as Hazael had 
 changed his mind ; ( notwithftanding his confident O- 
 'pinion of himfclf to the contrary;) fo had this Author 
 too? Por who but one of equal Virulence and Ignorance 
 ,. would have ftretched the companion, which refpe&ed 
 only the changing of Minds, to a Comparifbn as to the 
 merits oftheCaufe, which it had no relation to at all? 
 Indeed no more than that Reply of Hazael, Is thy Ser- 
 vant a Dog? was defign'd to convince the Prophet, 
 had not four Leggs ,and not rather only to clear 
 himfelf from fuch a currifh and belluine temper of 
 mind, as thofe Actions foretold of him mult needs 
 imply? And Ifuppote, when a certain Perlbn f peaking 
 
 cf 
 
Chapter XL ^55 
 
 of the New Oath to a certain Bifhop, (aid, My Lord, 1b. k. 
 rvill be Crucified before 1 will take this Oath, His meaning 
 was not, that he thought the taking it more Painful 
 and Tormenting than a Crucifixion^ but that he had 
 a greater unwillingnefs to take the one, than to under- 
 go the other. And yet this was this Author's way of 
 Treating a very Worthy Man , an old Acquaintance, 
 and a lair Adversary. I am not at ail concerned to 
 efpoufe or abett the Caufe defended by that Learned 
 Pcrfon. But this I do and ever ihill averr, That 
 there is a Jus Belli, in thele Controversies well as in 
 Military Confli&s, and conlequently an obligation to 
 Truth and Juftice and common Ingenuity even in ti 
 exercife of the greateft Hoftilities. But this Man's 
 uiage ofhisforementioned Adverfary is not more Senfe- 
 iefs and Illogical , than Difingenuous, Barbarous, and 
 UnchrilHan. And ib let the Reader take this as 
 Specimen of his impotent ipleen and malice. After 
 which , let us fliew him in his next good Quali- 
 ty, his In/olence ; and firft in that Branch of it, which 
 concerns his wonderful Opinion and Applaufe of 
 Himfelf. 
 
 As to which, we fhatl firft of all fee him ( as we have 
 in fome degree fhewn him before ) preferring himfelf 
 before all the Fathers, as much happier in giving an expli- 
 cation of the Trinnj than they were ; and this, infijeh 
 a fleering fcoptical way, (fcoptical I mean as to the Fa- 
 thers, hue highly Commendatory of himieli ) that it 
 would even turn ones Itomach to read his fulfom ex- 
 preflions. I : or he tells us, ( and that with the moll 
 profound humility, no doubt) p. 101. /. i. kc. If 
 that explication which I have given, be very confident with, 
 n*y, be the true Interpretation of that account the Antu 
 ■f a Crinity in Unity % I hope it will not be 
 Z z 2 thought 
 
356 Aninuukerfwns^ 3c c. 
 
 thotmht an unpardonoble Novelty, if I have expreffed the 
 fame thing in other Words , which give us a more clear and 
 Aifiir.cl apprehenfon of it , &c. And again/?. 126. /. 2. 
 I hope this is no fault neither, to give an Intelligible ex- 
 plication of that, which all the Fathers taught ? but 
 
 ve not equally happy in their 'explication- of it. ;\ 
 for his comfort, do ; to excell and outdo ail ihe Fa- 
 thers (if a man can doit) can be no fault at all. 
 Eut before this be allow'd him,I do here [require him to 
 name and produce me but one ( who acknowledges a 
 Trinity) in the whole World, befides bis own modeft 
 felf whoever preferr'd his explication of the Trinity 
 for the Happinefs and Intelligibility of it, before tfut gi- 
 ven by the Fathers. I fay, let him produce me lb much 
 as one affirming this, if he can. So that, in fhorr, the 
 Comparifonhere (lands between the Fathers, and this 
 Author : andwe fee the Preheminence given him above 
 all the Fathers by the (ble and (ingle [judgment of one 
 Doctor, and that Dotlor is Himfelf: nay, and ( which 
 is more ) to put the matter pad all Companion between 
 him and them for the future, He tells us ( as was- al- 
 io obferved before in my 7th. Chapter ) That the Fa* 
 thers neither knew how to fpeak their own Thoughts of the 
 Trinity, nor indeed fo much as to conceive of it aright \ 
 by reafon of the grofsnefs of their Imaginations : whereas, 
 if they had ( as he adds ) but conceived of it, and expref- 
 fed themfelves about it % as he has done, all would have been 
 plain, eafe, and intelligible. And as for Gregory Nyf- 
 fen, ( from whom he had Quoted more than from all the 
 re(l of the Fathers together) he gives him a cad of his 
 Temper at lad,/'. 119, /. 5. and lends him away with 
 this rap over the Pat:, That he could not tell what to 
 make of him and his Reafonings ; (or that, in his judg- 
 ment fie deciroyed all Principles of Individuation. And 
 
 i:i 
 
Ch a p t e r XL 
 
 in this manner we have him Pluming himfi I 
 his V ' , and crowing overall the Fathers; 
 which and his quarrelfome domineeri Nature toj 
 ther, moft think, it i> high time, that his Comb 
 xvtrt c;>:. 
 
 In the next place, let us fee what Elogies he fcx ftc 
 upon himfelf tor his Atchievements in theSocinian Con- 
 troverfie. Concerning which he tells the Men 
 that Perluafion , That after his Vindication 
 the Trinity He believes they will talk more fparingj 
 Absurdities and Contradictions for the future, p. 1 5 J. B 
 why I pray ? Is it becaufe this Author has got the Mo- 
 nopoly of them, and engroffed them all to himfelf? 
 and that therefore the Laws will be- very fevere upon 
 fuch as invade his Property ? For, as for any other 
 Realon, they have none, that I know of, to talk mere 
 fparingly of Abfurdities and Contradictions, than th£y 
 ufed to do, having fo many more, out of his Writings, 
 to talk of,than ever they had before.Buthe proceeds,and 
 cloies his Work with this Triumph over his Antago- 
 nift(and j n him, I fuppofe,over al! the reft of that Tribe") 
 p. 272. That he is pretty confident % that he will never bs 
 able to reafonto any purpofe in this c an fe again. As for 
 his confdence,nor\Q doubts of it; but as for his Predicti- 
 on, if he proves no better a Prophet in what he here 
 foretells oi his Socinian Opponent, than in what he fo 
 told of that Learned Perlbn, ered both ! 
 
 Cafe of Alhgiana^w^ his I h it. viz. That ify\ tt j m CA r e p 
 
 he^vouldbut well eximine his A fi\r the lafk, 
 
 edthem, he fjjould expect to hear no n\ and 
 
 if withail this Socinian be but able to hi at 
 
 fuch aRate.a^ that 
 
 take for him, that he fhall go cut of the Wor; 
 moft baffled Perlon, that sver lived in it. But wl 
 
 
358 Animadverjions, &c. 
 
 fer God's fake murt the Socinians Reafbning Abi- 
 sce bis f<w lities ( which his great Lord and Patron has gi- 
 ^ven lb high, (b figoal, and lb peculiar an Encomium 
 7i.°72. I4 ' P, of') ail ot a fuddain fail them, upon this Author's 
 Publication of his book? what can the meaning of 
 this be? Why the meaning of it is this. Hie, vir t hie 
 tft % 6rc. according to the words by which Vifgil point* 
 ed out Augttflu* C*far. This fL his js the Man.T. fiis is that 
 incompai able, mighty, and irrefragable Divine, who 
 has wrote more convincingly and efte&ually againft 
 the Socitians, (if you will believe him) than all, that 
 ever wrote againft them before,put together. For not- 
 withstanding all that has been wrote by thofe great 
 Men, who from time to time have appear'd in this 
 Controverfie, the Controverfie is ftill alive, and the 
 Socinians continue writing and reafbning ftill: and even 
 by this Author's confeffion ( once at leaft ) to forne 
 Purpofe. For otherwife how could he fay of his boci- 
 man Adverfary, That he would never be able to reafon 
 to any purpofe in this caufe again, it he had never reaib- 
 ned fo at ail ? But fo far are the Socinians from being 
 put out of Countenance, and much lei's out of Heart, by 
 what this man has wrote againft them, That I allure 
 him, they look upon him as an Opponent according 
 to their hearts denre ; as having pi ay 1 J a fairer Game 
 into i heir hands than ever was dealt into them';before:fo 
 that next to their wifihing all the World their Friends, 
 they willi they may always have GichJdvetfdrics.Aad 
 therefore if they fhculd relblve to reaft nfi him no 
 
 more, he w ill have great caule to thank either their In- 
 advertency for overlooking the great advantage given 
 them, or their good Nature fox not taking it. For the 
 <-:d by him aV in die at in?? of the trinity, is cer- 
 tainly like a k\ij of Pot or Veffel with handles quite 
 
 round 
 
Chapter XI. 
 
 round it ; turn it which way you will, you arc furc 
 to find (bmething to take hold of it by. 
 
 And the truth is, upon a ftri£k impartial comparing 
 of things together, I cannot fee any new Advani 
 
 that he has got over the Socinians, unlcfs it be That he 
 thinks his Three Gods will be too hard for their One. 
 And perhaps it is upon Preemption of this, That he 
 difcharges that clap of Thunder .t them in his Preface, 
 where he tells us; That h • ng dipf'd his Pen tn the 
 Vindication oj fo glorious a Cauftyby the grace of God he will 
 never dtfert it , while he can hold Pen in hand. In 
 which words, methinks I fee him ready Armed and 
 Mounted (with his face towaids the Weft) and bran- 
 difhing his $ word aloft, all wreaking with Socinian 
 blood, and with the very darts of his Eyes looking his 
 poor forgotten Friends through and through. For ia 
 good earned the Words found very terribly to thefe 
 Men ; but mod terribly of all to the Article icfeif: 
 ( which is like to fuffcr moft by his Vindication ) : for 
 thus to threaten that he will never leave off vexing it 
 as long as he can hold Pen in hand 1 ( which, I dare lay, 
 will be as long as he can tell Mony with it) This, I 
 fay again, founds very dreadfully. 
 
 Neverthelefs,as fierce and formidable as thefe words 
 may reprefenthim, he has yet, like a merciful Enemy, 
 very great referves of companion. For other wile ! »w 
 comefo many Socinian Pieces wrote againft him to lye 
 fjlongunanfwcredPHe has indeed lately wrote znApolo* 
 gjfor writing againft the SocinUns;but where is the Apo- 
 logy for writing in fuch a prevaricating way againft 
 them at firft, and fo r never writing againft them fince? 
 For has he loll his g r o is Polemick Pea ? or has 
 he loft the ufe of h id? or has he run him* 
 
 lelf out of Breath? If this lafl: be his cafe ( as by (brae 
 Asthrnatick fjmftoms one would think it is ) he will 
 
 do 
 
 359 
 
3 $ Animjckerjiom^ &c. 
 
 do well to call in his old Friend, and Defender, the 
 vMUm Gils Footman, to fecond him : tipecially (ince the contention, 
 fometimes of which now lams molt likely to be, is, who fhall run 
 Jr:e - fafteft from the Enemv , and keep furtheft from 
 im. 
 In the mean time I wonder that in the mannage of 
 tlrisdifputation, he dees not take the fame courle that 
 other Learned Men in the like cafes ufe to do. For he 
 frequently taxes his Adverfary with Fallacies ; telling 
 him that this is a Fallacy and that is a FalLtcy:\Zut why- 
 does he not exprefs to his Reader, what the particular 
 Fallacy is ? there being noSophifmor Fallacy incident 
 to Speech or Argumentation, but what falls under one 
 of the Thirteen reckoned up by Ariftotle. Moreover, 
 while he is Animadverting upon the Hiltory of the 
 Unitarians, he will, I believe, hardly get clear of a 
 fcurvy lapleinthat Hiftoiy himfelf. For concerning 
 the expofition given by the Socinians of that Text in 
 the i John 15. where our Saviour tells the Jews,T/u? 
 he came down from Htsven, He writes thus: Did So- 
 cinus find it Jo eafie a 1 hing to reconcile this Text to his 
 Darling Opinion, when he was forced to Fad and Pray for 
 it, and to pretend Revelation becaufe he wanted Reafon 
 tofapport it ? viz. That Chrift before he entrtd on his Pro- 
 phttick Office, was taken into Heaven to be inftructed in 
 the Gofpel, and then came down from Heave?} again to 
 publtfb it to the World, p. 143. 1. icj.&c. Now, the 
 Perfon here fpoken of, and intended by this Author, 
 mu ft needs have been Fauftm Socinns, and I believe he 
 will not pretend that he meant any other ; which be- 
 ing fuppofed , This Remark of his Will appear to 
 have been a vay great miilake. For neither was this 
 the Text, about which this Praying and Pretence of Re- 
 velation was, ( for Fafiing is a word of this Author's 
 
 putting 
 
Chapter XI. ;6i 
 
 putting in : ) nor was Fauftu* Socimts the Perfcn who 
 did any ot thefe Things upon this occafion. Buc the 
 Text was that in the 8 John 58. n&v 'AjS^wt/* y 
 vyietfu. And the Perfon of whom this was pretend- 
 ed, was Ldlim Socinus the Unklc ot Fanftus, who in- 
 terpreted this Text to this fcnee, Antequam Abra- 
 mas fatfus fuertt Abrahamus ; that is, from the Father .. 
 of the Faithful enclofed within the Church of the M ^ crfmed 
 Jews, fhould become the Father of the Faithful diftu- tyty.Pearfon 
 ibd through many Nations, Chrift was to preach his 2^ 
 Gofpel to the World ; and by Co doing enlarge the cretd. p. 219, 
 Church from the limits of one People , to all Nations 22o.&c»m 
 throughout the World. So that to the v\ ords \y* eifju ¥ °' 
 you are a to -,-1 3 to fupply the. words <poSi yjo --xv, impor- 
 ting Chrift' * Enlightntng the World by the Puolication 
 of his Do&rine. This was Lalias's Interpretation of 
 this Text, which together with the Interpretation of 
 the firft Chapter of St.John were the Two Scriptures, 
 which he firit fet up with, for the founding of his new 
 Hypothefis. Which explication of the Text (as it 
 was in leed very forced and unnatural Co ) Erafmus 
 Jobannis, in his Deputation with Faujlns , cryed 
 ihame of it in thefe Words, Fateor me per omnemvi- 
 tam non magis contort Am Scripture Interpret at tonem au* 
 divijfe ; idebqve earn penitus improbo. To which Fau- 
 fius, who had a much different Opinion of it, replies. 
 Cum primltm [fatendi ] z>trbum in tuts Scriptis awmid- 
 verti , fperabam tepotius faffurum nulUm in tua vit.i 
 Scripture Interpretattonem audivijje qua hac fit aut 
 acutior aut veriur, qu^qut maois divinum quid jap! at , 
 & a Deo ipfo pattfaciam fuijfe pr<efe ftrat. Ego q'tidem 
 eerie non leves con'yclur. as habeo, ilium [ VIZ. Ldlinm~\ 
 qui primus estate noftra earn in luctm protulit [ hie autem 
 is fait 9 qui primus quoque ftntenttam de Chrift 1 Orioine, 
 
 A a a fHdm 
 
262 AnimadverfwnS) Sec. 
 
 quam ego con ft ant er defendo, renovavit ) Precibus mid- 
 tisabipfo Chriflo impetraffe. Hcc prof tclh affirm are art- 
 fim y cum Dens Mi viro permulta aliis tunc tempcris in- 
 cognita patefscerit, vix quicquim inter ilia, oiinia ejfe> 
 quod Interpret atione hac divinius videri que at. Socinus 
 in Refutation Jrg. 4. Erafmi Joban.p.^05 Col. 2 Edit. 
 Fratrum Polonor. Tom. 2- 
 
 But as this may fatisfie the Reader that the foremen- 
 tioned place in the 8 John 58. was the Text, for which 
 this Praying and Pretence of Revelation is fold to have 
 been, and confequently may fuffice to (hew this Au- 
 thor's Blunder; ib I fhall yet further fhew, that the 
 other Text in the 5. John and the 13. Concerning 
 Cbrijl's coming down from Heaven was not account- 
 ed by Socinus of fo difficult an Interpretation, as to 
 need thofe peculiar Methods ot Prayer and Revelation 
 for the Difcovery of ir, as this Author has been plea- 
 fed to affirm. And this will appear from thefe words 
 of Socinus concerning it. P oft quam ex Maria natus eft, 
 in coehy antequam ntoreretur , revet a ejfe potuit ; necfo- 
 turn potuit) fed ( ut ita dicamus ) debuit. Si enim homo 
 ille Paulus Chrifti frvus adTertium ufque Ccelum ante 
 mortem raptus eft y nullo patio nobis veriftmile eft Chri- 
 (lumipfum ante mortem in ccelo nonfuifft. And, a few 
 lines after, fpeaking of the fame again with reference 
 to St. PauPs having been taken up into the third Hea- 
 ven, he thusdifcourfes. Certe Chriftus {in quo fine uU 
 men fur a rerum omnium Divinarinncognitio, utjfuit, 
 fie effe debuit^ quin ibi {viz. in carlo) per aliquodTtm- 
 pus antequam munus or left i doctrina homines imbuendt fwi 
 
 Pdtre mandatum pub lice fufciperet, v erf at us j 'utrit, mil- 
 lo modo dubitandum videtur, Socinus in fiefponjiane 
 Priore ad Partnefim Andre* I^oUniTtmo 2do. fratrum 
 Polon. p. ^80. Col. 2. By all which we lee that Soci- 
 nus 
 
Chapter XI. 363 
 
 nus was fo far from apprehending any difficulty in 
 Hnding out this expofirion of the Text, That he af- 
 firms it was nullo paclo verifimile, There was no like- 
 lyhood that it fhould be otherwile, & nullo modo dubi- 
 tandum, that no doubt could be made, but it was and 
 ought to be lb. Which furely are not forms of ex- 
 preffion, to fliew the difficulty of conceiving, or find- 
 ing out how the (aid Thing could be fb So that this is 
 a manilell miftake in this Author; and let him fet it 
 oft' with never fo much brow and confidence, yet no 
 doubt his Socinian Adverfaries defpife him for it fufti- 
 cicntly. And the Truth is, one would in all Reafon 
 imagine,that to the Aniwering xhtHfjhry of theVnita- 
 nans, a little more knowledge of their Hiitory would 
 have done no hurt. 
 
 But after the many ample and extraordinary Elo- 
 gieshehas pa (Ted upon himfelf for his Writings, me- 
 thinks it is (bmething Pleafant to fee him in hisContinu- 
 at ion of the Defence of Dr. Stillingfleet,/>. 121. /. the 4. 
 8rc. ftrutting himielf in thele words, / am no Arch- 
 bi(bop yet. Which fhewes what his moil earlv 
 thoughts ran upon, and what his Mode fly would be at 
 fiom the very Firft. For othcrwiic,the purpofeof the 
 place, where this comes in, had been fully ferved by 
 laying, I for my part am no Arch-bi{Jjop, nor exptel to be 
 one. But the addition of that little word yet was very 
 fignificant, and (hews that out of the Abundance of his 
 heart his mouth [poke. For though indeed he prefently 
 adds, And I very much fufptct I fjjxll never be one, yet 
 thoie words were put in only ad frangendam invidiam, 
 and to qualific the fulfome arrogance of the firft ex« 
 predion. How be't in that he (poke his mind, in this he 
 fences againft an Inconvenience ; id that we have an 
 account of his Nature, in this only a Copy of his Coun- 
 
 A a a 2 tenance. 
 
2 64 Animadverjions, &c. 
 
 unmet. And I queftion not, but by this time his 
 pretended fufpicion is pafled into a contrary expecta- 
 tion, and that the Deanry of PWs begins to make him 
 think himfelf Heir apparent to Canterbury. And there- 
 fore no wonder, if while big with fuch Thoughts, 
 fpeaking in his Apology of Di. Wallis, and Himfelf, 
 hefets himfelf before Him. p. 29. in thefe words. He 
 ( viz. The Melancholy flander-by ) concludes with an hea- 
 vy charge upon rny ft If \ and Dr. Wallis. By which, I 
 fuppok, he would have Dr. Wallis know h;s proper 
 place. Though I mult cell him, that not only com- 
 mon Modeftf, but alfo the common Cuftom of the 
 World makes wife Men, whenfoever they mention 
 themlelves with others, place themfelveslaft. And lb 
 it might have become this Author too, efpecially fpea- 
 king of himfelf in conjunction with fuch an one, as 
 Dr. Wallis, u ho was a Perfon of Fame and eminence, 
 while this Man was learning his Grammar ; if ever 
 he was lb. 
 
 But to proceed, and pifs from his applauding himfelf 
 to the other Branch of his Arrogance, in his lcornful 
 undervaluing all fuch as write againft him, or differ 
 from him, ( though yet no more, nor in any other 
 Tiling, than in what his Worfhip had differed from 
 himfelf). We have him in the 4th. page o( his Preface 
 to his Cafe of Allegiance , calling fuch as in their Wri- 
 tings could not fall in with his lafi fentiments about 
 the New Oath, Little Writers. Concerning whom I 
 muft tell him, that it is often with Writers, as it is 
 with Books ; Amongft which there are many Little 
 ones, that exceed the worth/ind outlive the Reputati- 
 on of much Greater. If indeed number of Pamphlets 
 makes a great writer, this Author is in no danger of 
 being accounted a Little One. But as there is fuch a 
 Thing, as mult urn in parvo, lb there is alio Parvum in 
 
 mulio : 
 
Chapter XL 365 
 
 multo ; and He who will digeft the trouble of Rea J ing 
 this Authors Writings, will need no other Argument 
 to prove it lb. But as tor thofe excellent Perfons, 
 whom he rir(t flights, then challenges, and afterwards 
 flyts from, by never repl) ing upon them, I would have 
 him know, that the World has already part: it's judg- 
 ment both upon them and him too:and therefore I would 
 advile his Haughtinefs for the future to forbear calling 
 his Antagonilts Little Writers, till by his Anfwers he 
 has made them fo. 
 
 A further difcovery of his rude, undecent way of 
 treating fuch as he writes againrt, is the Language he 
 has beliow'd upon a certain Writer, a Nonconformifi 
 indeed, but yetaMan of Learning (as a much greater 
 Man than this Author his found by experience) whom^ AIfo 
 he calls a Trifling Scribltr, who underftands little more 
 than Quibbles and Jejls; Charging him withal with 
 Pertnefs and Folly to complete his Character, p. i 5. of 
 his Preface to his Defence of Dr. Stilltngfleet. And in 
 the 1 2. page of the Book itlclf, and the five fir It lines, 
 He jeprdents him under the name of the Inquirer, as 
 one, who cannot under (land flam and familiar ftn ft ; nor 
 parry the Connexion of three or four Sentences together. 
 Very civil Language indeed, becoming a Scholar, a 
 Divine, and a well-bred Man, to a Perfon who had 
 not in the leaft provok'd Him. For my own part,I have 
 no knowledge of the Man , but from his Writings; 
 and upon the Stock of that knowledge have often 
 wondred, that one (o able to humble this Reviler, 
 would take fuch grofs Reproaches at his hands. 
 
 But the Truth is, when I confider ( as I noted fifft 
 in my Preface) how patiently our whole Clergy lias 
 hitherto differed him to call them Fools and HeretUks, 
 by charging all thofe, as fuch, who concur not with 
 him in holding the Three Divine Perions to be Three 
 
 dtjlinci 
 
266 AmmjJrveruom, 8c< 
 
 diftincl Infinite Minis or Spirits (which, I dare fay, 
 not one or them held at the time of his uttering this 
 Lewd Reproach ) Hay, when I confider this, I have 
 caufe to furceafe all wonder, that any Private Man 
 fliould indurethis infolent Huff to infiilt over him in 
 iiich a manner. But I fhall infill no further upon this 
 malter-piece of his fcurrility, having in fbme meafure 
 accounted with him for it already. Only I (hall add 
 this, That as it is beyond example marvellous that 
 any one fingle member of a Church fhould prefume to 
 load all the reft with luch a charge, fo it is yet a great- 
 er marvel that all fliould bear it. 
 
 It would beendlefs to fet down all the dirty fluff 
 that has flowed from his Billingfgate Pen. But to re- 
 peat and bring together fo m ich as we have taken no- 
 tice of, the Reader may be pleafed to bear away in his 
 memory fuch Exprellions , and Appellaiions as thefe. 
 viz. Epicurean, and Ridiculer of Providence^ Popifhly 
 inclined, and looking towards an Infallible Interpreter, 
 DtJ affected to, and a Jlandtrer of the Government , Little 
 Writers, Fools and Hereticks, errant Fopp , Trifling 
 Scribler, foam? fully Ignorant and Impudent , Fit to be 
 fent to School again, One that undtrftands little elfe but 
 J efts and Quibbles, One that cannot under Hand plain and 
 familiar fenfe, One that undtrftands neither Greek nor 
 Latine, and the like. Tiieic are the choice Embellifh- 
 mentsof hisStyle.But above all, that beloved word, AW 
 fenfe, is always ready at li ich him; and out it 
 
 flies at all Pcrfons and upon all Occafions. And hardly 
 can he write three or four Pages together, but, right 
 or wrong, he throws it in his Adverfaries face. One 
 would think tint he was Born with the Word in his 
 Mouth, and that it grew up with him from his Infan- 
 cy, and that in his very Cradle htCryed Xonfenfe, be- 
 fore he could fpeak it. 
 
 But 
 
C H A P T E K XL 367 
 
 Bat to check this ungovern'd humour of his, in thus 
 nfing this word at all Adventure; Let me tell him, 
 that it is both a very rude, unmannerly Word\ and 
 moit commonly, as applyed by him, a very falft 
 Charge. As for the rudenefs of it, fincehe owns him- 
 felf a Son of the Church of England, I chink he would 
 be much his own friend, if he would remember the 
 Reprimand given him by his old Acquaintance and An 
 tagonifi Doctor Q\ven\ who in his Vindication, &C. p. 
 72. having , upon occafion of fbme or' his profane 
 Scoffs, called him Goodly Son of the Church of England! 
 immediately fubjoyns, That he intended it not as a Re- 
 flexion upon the Church it ft If, but only to remind this 
 Man of his Relation to that Church. IVhtcb t {he there 
 fays) to his Kjiowkdge, taught better learning and better 
 Manners. In the next place, as for thefalfenefs of the 
 Charge in his ufual application of this W ord, I would 
 have him know, That the Charge of Nonfenfe does 
 not properly lye againft every one who alTerts a filfe 
 Propofition, or is guilty of a miftake. For Nonfenfe 
 is not properlv oppofed to ftri£t Truth, but to fuch 
 plain and manifefl: Truth as is obvious to Common fenfe. 
 For Truth oftentimes lyes deep, and abftrule, and re- 
 quires a more than ordinary fagacity to reach and fetch 
 it out ; which that low Pitch of Reifbn, which we call 
 Common fenfe, cannor always do. For in difcoirfe a 
 Man may be fometimts miftaken in laying hisFoua- 
 dation or Principle, and yet be very Clear an J R , 
 nalinthe Conlequences he draws from it; and fbme- 
 times he ma in drawing Confequences from a 
 
 True and well-laid Principle ; in bo:h which 
 whole difcourfe is certainly falfe and In 
 STeverthelefs t according to the common acception of 
 the Word ' this cannot be call jcI Nonfenfe. Ir may 
 indeed be c ill [iftake ; which is a wei le- 
 
 nds 
 
2 63 Animadversions i &c. 
 
 nefs cleaving tooclofc ro Human Nature, for any one 
 of the lame Nature to reproach another for ir. But en 
 the contrary, if every Thing, that is not llrift Demon* 
 ftration and certain Truth, mult pafs for Nor.ftnfe, I 
 fear, it would overlay whole Volume?, and not only 
 prevent the 2d jd. and 4th. Editions oi many Books, 
 butfhrevvdly alfb endanger the Sde of the Firji • Eipe- 
 cially if 2d. and jd.by the unlucky efcapeof ibme fcat- 
 tering Copies, fhould chance all to appear in the fpace 
 of Three or Four Dayes, As in the firft Publication of 
 a certain Book Entituled TbeCafe of Allegiance, &c. it 
 fell out.But great, no doubr, is the Art of Bcftov* ing fe- 
 veral Title-Pages, importing a/z/erj E^///^i r upon Books 
 of one and the fame Impre(Iiqn:and may ferve co teach 
 the World, what a fruitful Trcing the PreG is, when 
 impregnated by the Prolifick Genius of ibme Writers; 
 and that ( when it is for the credit of any extraordina- 
 ry Book and it's Author ) it can bring forth four, five % 
 or fix Editions of it at the fame time. Which certainly 
 is a mod Ingenious Contrivance; but whether it were 
 the Author's or the Bookfellefs, is a Queftion; though, 
 ibme think, it ufesto be done by a kind of mutual-Con- 
 fcioufnefs between both. 
 
 But to return to the Point in hand. According to 
 the common ufe of the Word N on fen ft, He, who DiP 
 courfes of Things obvious to the ordinary Apprehenfi- 
 ons of Men, withgrofs and palpable contradictions of 
 one thing to another, or with a plain, manifeft Inco- 
 herence of one part of his Difcourfe with the other, 
 that Man is properly and juftly chargeable with Non- 
 ftnfe. And let thofe ( in the NameofSe/y/e and Rea- 
 [on ) take it to themfelvcs, who have moft claim 
 to it. 
 But becaule the beft way of Illuftrating Things is 
 
 by 
 
Chapter XL \ty 
 
 by example. I fliall alfb take this cotirfe here. Thui 
 tor inftance. For any one to own a Thing for a great 
 and facred Myflery (the very Notion and life of the 
 woxdMjJlery importing (bmcthing Hidden andslbjlrufe) 
 and at the lame time to affirm it to be very Plain, Eajfe 
 and Intelligible, is Nonfenfe. To fay, That in Men 
 KjiowUdge and Power are Ccmmenfurate\ nay That 
 tdge is Power ; fo that whatfbever a Man knows 
 bow to do, he is by vertue thereof alfo able to do it , ii» 
 comraiy to the Common &#/e of all Mankind, and con- 
 fequently Nonfenfe. To fay, ABeaflis a Perfon. and 
 yet to fay withall , That a Perfon and an Intelligent fub- 
 ftance are Terms reciprocal, is both Nonfenfe, and Con- 
 tradiction too, with a Witnefs. To affirm, That a fpe- 
 cifical Unity can make any Thing or Perfon Numerically 
 One, is Nonfenfe. To affirm, That there are two dt- 
 Jiintl Reafons and two dtJlwcJ Wills in each Man, and 
 thofe as really diflincl, as if the fame Man h&dT wo di- 
 flincl; Soulsj'xs Nonfenfe. And to affirm, That the Body 
 ( which is utterly void of any Intelk&ual Power v or 
 Faculty) is confeious to all the Dictates and Commands of 
 the Will, is grots and inexcufable Nonfenfe. So thac 
 whereas this Author (according to his mannerly way) 
 charges his Adverfary with unintelligible Nonfenfe. p. 
 227.L6.it muft needs be granted, that he has much the 
 advantage of him in this Particular ; fince all mull ac- 
 knowledge that his own Non fenfe is very Intelligible. 
 And here I could eafily direct him where he may be 
 fupplyed with feveral more fuch Inftances, as thofe 
 aewly alledged ; but thac I think thefe may fufficefor 
 the Purpofe they are produced for. In the mean time I 
 would advife him for the future to ufe th ; s rude Word 
 more fparingly, and cautioufly ; an i to apply it only 
 where the generally received way of (peaking applies 
 
 B b b it; 
 
5 jo AniimdverfwnS) &c. 
 
 it : And now and then alfo to caft his eye upon his own 
 Writings. Theft things,l fayj would advife him to ; 
 and to confider withal, how unreafcnable and unjuft it 
 is, for him to beftow about the Word fo freely upon 
 others, while he keeps the Thing to himfelf. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
Chapt e r XII- 37 1 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 Containing a Brief Review, and Conclufion 
 of the whole Work. 
 
 I A M at length come to a clofe of that Work, which I 
 fhould much more gladly have been Prevented,than 
 cngag'd in, by being a Reader^zihzr than the Author ot 
 a Reply to this Man's ftrange, unjuftifiable Innovations 
 upon this great Article of oar Religion. But it is now 
 a considerable Time that the Book, here Animadverted 
 upon, has walked about the World, without any Pub- 
 lick Controll;And though in private Diicourfe general- 
 ly cenfurM by all, yet, ( as to the Point undertook by 
 me) hitherto Anfwered by none; which may well 
 be Matter of Melancholy Confi deration to all Hearty 
 Lovers of our Church, and Ancient Chriftianity.Where- 
 as, I dare fay , had this Heterodox Piece been wrote 
 and publifhed in a Language underftood by Foreigners, 
 we fhould long fince have had feveralConfutationsof it 
 fent us t'rom abroad; and probably not without tome fe- 
 vere Reflexions upon the £^/{/Z^Church,and Clergy,for 
 their filence in a Caufe, which fb loudly called for their 
 Defence. To take off therefore this Reproach from 
 our Church (in lome degree at Icaft) I have ( while 
 
 Bbb 2 others, 
 
^j2 Animadverfwm^ &c. 
 
 others, tar more able to Defend it, chute rather to fie 
 ftill and enjoy it ) ventur'd to fet my weak Hand to the 
 Vindication ofa Pj incipal Article of her Faith, againft 
 the rude Attacks of this bold Undertaker. In which, 
 though I freely own, that all, that has been done by 
 me in it, is exttehi&ly b^low the Dignity of the Subjeft, 
 which I have emploj e J my felf in, yet I am well allu- 
 red that I have fully and etfe&ually anfwered this 
 Man; and if it fhoulJ prove otherwife, Irauft alcribe 
 it to a peculiar Misfortune attending me ; fince none 
 befides, lias hitherto wrote againlt him, but has con- 
 iuted him. In the Work I have here prefented the 
 Reader with, I have examined and gone over all that, 
 I conceive, requires either Anfwer or Remark ; and 
 that according to the following Method and Order, 
 which I fhall here briefly fctdown. 
 
 I have, in the firft place, laid my Foundation in the 
 Explication and State of the Senfe of the VfoxdMy fiery, 
 which Ifhew, in General, fignifies fomething Concea- 
 led , Hidden, or Abftrufe in Religious Matters ; and a- 
 mongft Chriftian Writers not only that, but fomething 
 alfb neither Dif cover able nor Comprehenftble by bare Rea- 
 lon : According to which, Ifhew, that this Author's 
 frequent affirming , that his Hypothefis and Explication 
 of the Trinity rendrcd the Notion thereof very Plain, 
 Eajie, and Intelligible, v*as utterly incompatible with 
 the Myfterioufnefs of the fame. I fhew alfb upon what 
 abfurd Grounds he ftaccd the Nature ofa Contradiclion; 
 according to which, joyned with another of his Afler- 
 tions, I (hew, That no Man could be juftly charged 
 with Contradiction, though he difcourfed never lb 
 incoherently and falfely upon any Subjett whatfoever. 
 From hence I pioceded to coofider the Ancient Terms 
 constantly received and ufed by Councils, Fathers and 
 
 Sckoelmtfff 
 
Chapter Xll. 973 
 
 Schoolmen, in fpc iking of the God-bead and Trinity, 
 which this Author in his Book lud confidently an 1 a- 
 vowedly condemned , as obfeurtng and confounding 
 Men's N'otions about thefe great Matters ; and upon a 
 diftmft Explication of each of them, I (hew the Pro- 
 priety and lingular uierulnefs of them, both a gain ft all 
 his exceptions, and above fhofe other Terms, which 
 he would needs (u&ftitute in their Room: and an !, .r 
 the fame Head, I laid open the Contradi&ion of his 
 i'lndication and his iate Apology to one another, as I had 
 done before in my Difcourfe ab i it the Nature of a My* 
 flcry. From hence I paifed to his New Notions of 
 &UfCo>/fciof(fnefs&ndMut/MlCo.f'>'.nfjji/s.m the ftrength 
 of which two Terms he pretended to make a Trinity in 
 'Unity a plain, eafie,and intelligible Notion ; nay Co very %s 
 flat*) as to fulve all Difficulties about it ; thefe being his 
 very words. And as he pretended StlfConfcioufmfs 
 to be the formal conjt intent Rcafon of Perfonality lint- 
 verfally, both in Beings Create and Uncreatc. I rirft 
 Demonftrated the contrary in Created Beings ; and that 
 both from the general Reafbn of Things, and from Two 
 manifeft Inftances; and withal examined and confuted 
 feveral extremely abfurd Propofitions, and AlTtftions 
 advanced by him concerning Perfonality. From this I 
 pa (fed on, and proved that neither could this Self-Con- 
 fctoufnefs be the formal Reafbn of Perfonality in the 
 Divine Perfons, (hewing the impoffibility thereof by 
 leveral clear and unqueftionable Arguments. And in 
 the next place,with the fame Evidence of Reafbn I pro- 
 ved, That mutual Confcioufmfs could not be the ground 
 or Reafbn of the Unity or Coalefcence of t fee 
 
 Divine Perfons in one and the fame Divine N ad 
 
 all this upon known , allowed Principles ol 
 
 ph 
 
574 AnimadverfionSi &c. 
 
 phy,as well as Divinity. And To I Naturally went on to 
 the examination of that monftrous AfTertion of his,by 
 which he holds and affirms the Three Divine Perfons 
 to be Three diftifl: Infinite Minis or Spirits ; which I 
 fhew unavoidably and irrefragably inferred them to be 
 Three Gods ; Ic being impoffible for the God head, 
 which is effentially One fingle infinite Mind or Spirit , 
 to be multiplyed into three diftinft Infinite Minds or 
 Spirits, without being mukiplyed into as many Gods. 
 This Opinionof his, I fhew, was eafie enough to be 
 confuted; But tor all that, I rauft here add further, 
 that for the infufterable Scandal of it, it is much fitter 
 to be cenfuredby & Convocation, though even he him- 
 felf fihould be Prolocutor of it. After this, fince he had 
 the Confidence to vouch his Hypothefis for the conflant 
 Doclrine cf the Fathers and the Schools ', I fir ft proved 
 it quite othervvife in the Point o[SelfConfc?oufnefs t and 
 in his AfTertion of Three diftincl infinite Minds ; For 
 the latter of which lie quoted Three or Four Fathers, 
 and One Sentence out or one Schoolman, viz. P. Lorn- 
 hard ( which, one would think, was far from prove- 
 ing it the con ft Ant Doctrine either of the Fathers, or, the 
 Schools ) and yet even thei'e very Quotations, I fhew 
 were no more to his Purpole, than it he had alledgcd 
 them to prove that Twice Three makes Twenty. And 
 as for Self Con feint fiefs, which is one of the Two main 
 Branches, or members of his Hypothefis, he does not 
 produce, nor ib much as mention one Father or School- 
 man in the behalf of it ; fo exa£l is he in proving his 
 Doftrinetht very fame with Theirs. And then, in the 
 next place , for *the proof of his mutual Co nfciou fiefs 
 irom the Fathers and Schoolmen, I have diftinftly 
 confidered his allegations for it, and forming them into 
 
 Argti- 
 
Chapter XII. 375 
 
 Arguments ( fuch as the matter would afford ) found 
 them thefeddeft wofullcit things to be called by that 
 Name, that perhaps ever appeared in the World, fince 
 Argumentation was in life. And to complete his excel- 
 tenc and peculiar way of Arguing from the Fathers 
 (for not fb much as one Schoolman is cited in favour 
 qH mutual Confcio^fne/'s) His whole bufineis, I (hew, wjs 
 to reproach the Fstherszs n;ithcr aLU to cone 
 rightlyof the Trinity, nor yet txprtfs themfelyes Pro* 
 perly and Intelligibly about the i ime ; and all this, be- 
 caufe they neither conceived o it, norexpreflfed it, ac- 
 cording to his Terms and Hypothefi , which yet he 
 affiim.J to be the Conftant Avowed Sentiments of tbofe 
 very Fathers ; though ( Go J help them, poor M;n ) 
 they were not (b happy, as to know it. And this, I 
 hope all the World will acknowledge, to be a molt ex* 
 traordinary way of proving a Thing from the Autho- 
 rity of the Fathers, by thus reprelenting them as a Com- 
 pany of Dolts, who neither knew how tothinkox Jpe.ik, 
 as they fhould, upon the fubjeft which they were pro- 
 feffedly treating of. Upon which Head having finifhed 
 my Anfwer as to the main Point I firft engaged in, I 
 proceeded to mirk out, and Animadvert upon feveral 
 of his Paradoxical Abfurd AiTenions, both in Divinirv 
 an 1 Philolophy. And I did not only allege them lor 
 luch, but alio by the mod commonly received and cur- 
 rent Principles of both, etfe&ually proved them fuch ; 
 and I referr it to any Man of clear and impartial Senie, 
 upon a furvey of the Particulars there diftin&ly exa- 
 mined and remarked upon, to pats as Judge between 
 this Author and my fclf, whether the Proof falls at all 
 fhort of the Charge. Next to which, becauie of his 
 Infolent Reflexions upon fome Learned Men, I took 
 into confideration alfo his vocabular Sins, a*nd manifold 
 
 Trsnf* 
 
yj6 Animadverfions, &c. 
 
 'Iran far (jjtons of the Laws of Grammar and Philology : 
 anJ whereas he had vilified his Adverfary as having 
 netthtr Greek nor Latin?, I fhew, that albeit the Charge 
 had been never fo true, yetthu he was one of theun. 
 ticceft Perfons living to make it, for feme certain Rea- 
 fbns fairly preiented to him in that Chapter. And laft- 
 1 y to bring up the Rear of all, I thought it expedient 
 to lay open the Temper of the Man, and his way of 
 Writing ; His Immoderate applaufes of himfelf above 
 all before him, or about him, together with his difdain- 
 ful Treatment of all that come in his way, as if they 
 were not worthy to carry his Books after him. Though 
 ( by what fome of them have Wrote againft him ) it 
 appears,that they have made too good ufe of their own 
 Books , to be fit to carry his. In fine I have, in my 
 Perufal of this Man's Writings, with the utmoft ex* 
 a£tnefs I was able, obferved his way of fpeaking both 
 of himfelf, and others ; and upon the refult of all do 
 moftferiouflyand fmcerely affirm, That never did I 
 ( nor perhaps any one elfe ) meet with fb much con* 
 fidence with (b thin a Bottom to fupport it ; and yet 
 furely that Man ought to (land upon a very broad 
 and firm Bottom indeed , who ventures to defie all 
 the World. 
 
 And thus,to relieve the Readers memory, I have gi- 
 ven him this brief draught or Scheme of the whole 
 Work. In which, as it is this Author alone, whom I 
 have undertook, fo I think fit to declare, that if any 
 one befides him, fhall attempt an anfwer to this Dil- 
 courfe, I fhall not in the leaft trouble or concern my 
 felf about him, whofoever he be ; but if this Author 
 himfelf fhall be difpofed to defend his New Notions 
 and Hypothefis by a juft and Scholaftick Reply to 
 what I have here offered againft them, I will not fail 
 
 (God 
 
Chapter XII. 377 
 
 ( Go J affording me fuch a mcafurc of Health and 
 Strength as may enable me for Scu^iy y to attend his 
 Motions upon this Subject, as Toon, and as often as he 
 pleads For lean hardly perfwade my lei f that I have 
 yet paid him all, that I owe him. Neverthelefs I muft 
 leave this Admonition with him, 7 hat I neither can, 
 nor fhall account fuch a Pamphlet, as his late Apology, 
 a juft and (ufficiei t Anfuer to thefe Animadvtr* 
 Jions. 
 
 In the mean time, fince the Reverend Dr. J. IV. 
 ( fpoken of in the precedeing Chapter) in his Letters 
 about the Trinity, and W. I. another very Learned 
 Perfbn, in his 2d. Letter to the [aid Do&or, upon the 
 fame fubjett, have both of them been plealed to com- 
 mend this Author for fever aI excellent 'I kings in this 
 Book, I do with the greateft: earneftnefs of Entreaty, £££&**' 
 as well as with the profoundeft deference of Refpedt to Lurnd Do- 
 their great Judgments beg of them, that they would a ° r - J- vv - 
 by a kind or charitable Benefa&icn to fuch low, and M W * L 
 mean Underftandingsas mine, vouchfafe to point out 
 in Particular, what thofe excellent Things are, and in 
 what Part of his Book they may be found ; and whe- 
 ther I have hit upon any of them in my Three immedi- 
 ately foregoing Chapters. For I have read the Book- 
 over and over; as Rafter I had took up Thoughts of Ao- 
 fwering it ) it concerned me, in all Reaibn, to do. 
 And I do thereupon folemnly profefc, that, according 
 to the btft of my poor Judgment, and that ordinary 
 Mea(ure of Learning which God has vouchfafed me, [ 
 can hardly find throughout the whole Work( unlefe 
 perhaps, here and there a Pa'lage or two agiind the 
 SociniansJ fo much as one True, Through ftroke either 
 in Divinity, or Philofophy, or Logic i, or even in Gram- 
 mar ; and I confidently appeal to the ingenuous, and 
 
 C c c unbyafi 
 
278 AnhmdverfionS) &c. 
 
 unbyafs'd Reader, whether I have not in the foregoing 
 Anim&dvtrjions given very pregnant and particular 
 Inltances of this Author's grofs Defe&s in every one 
 of theft. And therefore my poor Opinion and Ad- 
 vice is,That if thefe two Learned Mep are refolved to 
 perfift in their Commendations of this Author ( as 
 there is nothing by which they can oblige him more ) 
 and withal to commend him upon fare, undenyable 
 Grounds, they would hereafter wave all the fore- 
 mentioned Topicks of Commendation, and pitch up- 
 on his true excellency by commending him for his 
 Preferment ; lor that certainly is very commen- 
 dable. 
 
 And now , that I ara taking my Leave of my Rea- 
 der, ( for this time at lead ) that I may not leave him 
 with any juft Diftaft or Grudg in his Mind againft me, 
 as if I had treated this Man too feverely, I do allure 
 him, that nothing has been here utter'd by Chance, 
 or in the heat of any prelent Paflion, but upon a due, 
 calm, and iedate Confideration of what he had (aid 
 falfly of others, as a Warrant for what was to be truly 
 (aid of him. And I do further allure the Reader, that 
 I would by no means have treated a Candid, Civil and 
 v/cll-bred Adverfary, at the Rate, I have treated him, 
 who has fhewn nofign of any one of thefe Qualificati- 
 ons, either in his Writings or Behaviour. And there- 
 fore though to accept Perfons be a Fault in the Sight of 
 God and Man , yet certainly to diflingnifh them is 
 none. I have ufed him, as I found him; and for what 
 I found him, he may thank himlelf. 
 
 The Truth is, he has carryed on an offenfive War 
 with moft that have Wiote ; and there are very fcw 9 
 whom he has not, one way or other, ftruck at and 
 Defied. So that the Matter being in eftedt brought to 
 
 this 
 
C H A P T E R XII. 
 
 this Point, whether He fhall be too hard for the World, 
 or the World for Him, I hope it will not be long de- 
 ciding. He has for a great while, and in a very auda- 
 cious manner been Preying , and Privateering upon 
 many a Worthy and good Name, and as far as he was 
 able made prize of the Reputation of Men better 
 than Himfelf : And therefore it is now high 
 time for fuch to think of repaying the good 
 Turns done them, and for the injured World to re- 
 taliate upon the lawlefs Aggrtffor. For this is, and 
 has been the Cttflom of Nations ; and all mull grant it 
 to be a mod juft, equal, and allowed courfe ; and fince 
 it is (b, 'tis to be hop'd, that this is not the lail Repri- 
 fal that will be made upon him. 
 
 To the mo ft Holy and Blejfed Trinity, Three Glorious 
 Perfons in one and the fame Undivided God-head, 
 be rendred and afcribtd all Honour and Praife , 
 Thankfgiving and Adoration 7 now and for ever- 
 more. Amen. 
 
 379 
 
 THE END. 
 
A TABLE of the Additions and 
 Alterations made in the Second Edi- 
 tion of the Animadverfions upon 
 Dr. Sherlock's Book of the Trinity. 
 
 PReface, Page 3. over against Line 22. this P^ffage is 
 added in the Margin, [Dr. Owen in his Vindication of 
 Himfe If againfi this Author, gives him the Character of a 
 Scoffer, and a Cenfurer of other Mens Labours, Judg- 
 ments, and ExpreJTions. Which Witnefs of his is True ; 
 and fince it isfo, Whether he^ of whom it is True, dejerves 
 a Rebuke, or no, is left to the World to judge. OwenV 
 Vindic. againfi: 6V;. p. 129.] 
 
 Preface, p. 5. line 4. This Pdjfage in the fir (I Edition, 
 which fljt iv s. That Tender Conlciences are liich Things 
 as may fome time or other put the Church not only to 
 part with its Liturgy, Rites and Ceremonies, but its ve- 
 ry Faith alfo for their fake, is thus altered in the Second 
 Edition ; [which lhews, That there arc fbme f uch Ten- 
 der Conferences in the World , as (when opportunity 
 fervesj may put the Church not only to part with its Li- 
 turgy, Rites and Ceremonies , but its very Creed alio lor 
 their fake.] 
 
 Preface, p. 1 2. 1. 26. after the words paying the Scores 
 of both, this Difcourfe follows in the Second Edition. 
 
 [But now if either He himjelfor any for himfhallplead,That 
 it was not fairly done to charge him with thofe Blafphemies, 
 
 A which 
 
..ij (and perhaps :loes) pretend to have been utter- 
 ed by Him in the Perfon of his Adverfary,and as the ge- 
 nui ; ces of theDo&rine maintained by him. 
 
 To this TA\ fiver, Fsrft, That he, 'bo pretends to j'peak 
 in thi Peribn of another ^ ought ^ according to all juftice and 
 Decorum, to fpi ak only fuch Things as that other, whom 
 he jperfbnateSj ujes to /peak, and conformant to his known. 
 Avowed Sence. But did his Adverfary, Dr. Owen, ever 
 ('peak jo ? Or ttfe the Exprejjions here uttered by this Author ? 
 Whereas he declares hirnfelf concerning the J aid Expreffions 
 thus, viz-. That he cannot mention them without beg- 
 ging Pardon for repeating fiich horrid and defperate 
 Blaiphemies. Owen'j Vindication againjl Sherlock, p. 46. 
 That they were fitter for a ''Jew, or a Mahometan, for 
 Servetus, or Socinus, than a Son of this Church, p. 47. 
 That he abhorred the Rehearfal of fuch horrid Profane- 
 nefs, p. 49. That they were odious Satanical Exprobra- 
 tions of the Truth of Chrift's Satisfaftion, ibid. And 
 now can this Man pretend to /peak thefe Things in the Per- 
 fon of one who thus Abhors, Abominates, and Detefts 
 them ? The Truth is, his whole Book is fuch a lewd Mtfre- 
 presentation both of the Words and Sence of his Adverfa- 
 ry, that if he has any Bloud in his Body, it muft needs fly 
 in his Face, and bid him Blufh for fuch Unconfcionable 
 Fabrications. 
 
 But Secondly ', If he charges thefe After tions as Confe- 
 quences of the Doftrine maintained by his Adverfary, / 
 must put him in mind of thefe two Things. 
 
 1 . That to thejufi charging of any Man with the Confe- 
 quences of his Dodtrine, or Opinion, the Things jo char- 
 ged, ought to be not only the Real, but alfo the Plain, Di- 
 reft, and Immediate Confequences of that Opinion. For- 
 ajmuch as no Man ought in reajon to be charged with the Re- 
 mote jar-fetched Confequences of any Propofition held by 
 
 him 'y 
 
/;/>;;; ft nee he may in all Equity (if he di [claims them) be 
 fuppofed ignorant of thc?n, and that inculpably too. 
 
 2. This Author is to knew, Thai to the just charging of 
 even any Doctrine, or Opinion, with juch and fuch Confe- 
 quences, though they follow never jo really and truly from it y 
 yet if they aljo lie any thing remote, and at fome defiance from 
 the fame , they ought fufl by clear undeniable Arguments 
 to be proved to follow from thence , befit e t hey can jujily and 
 fairly be charged to do fo. 
 
 /»' 'kick two Obfervations ihus premifed\ that I may lay 
 the whole Matter before the Reader more particularly ; he is 
 to take Notice, That the Doftrine, which /////Author loads 
 with thefe Bhfphcmous Confluences ; /V,That of theNc- 
 ceffity of a Satisfaction to be paid toGodYjuftice in order 
 to the Pardon of Sin, and the Justification of Sinners. 
 And this I affirm to have been the received Doctrine of the 
 Church, and the General Opinion of Divines in the Cafe ; 
 all afferting the Ncceifity of fuch a Satisfaction ; though 
 not All) I confeJs y upon the fame ground. 
 
 For Firft , Some found this Neccflity upon the Nc- 
 ceffary Egrefs of God's Vindictive Juftice , naturally 
 aclinv and exerting it felf where it meets with a Proper 
 Objett. 
 
 But Secondly, Others ft Me this Neccflity upon the De- 
 cree or Pur pole ^God, refolving to take this courfe for the 
 Pardon of Sin, and no other. Which Decree and Purpofe, 
 though made freely, yet being actually pajjed and declared, it 
 was net free for God to baulk, the execution of it. His fe- 
 rae ity, Wijdom and Honour , as Supreme Govemour of the 
 World, not fufiri, g him, to let the Violation of his L' 
 pajs without a due J at; 'de to his Jufice. 
 
 this has been the Opinion of. most Divines in ihii ; 
 
 Kev<rthcle\sf whether upon cither of thefe grounds. or fc#K 
 other) it is certain, that the Ne ceffity of a Satisfaction wa i ft 11 
 
 A 2 *UL 
 
he Id, and owned by the Church : And jet uponfuppofal 0/this 
 NecefTity alone it is, (rvhatfoever ground it be fiated upon) 
 that this Author jets God forth in a mo ft Profane wanner, as 
 au Impotent Man venting his Rage and Paffion without 
 any fufficient Ground orReafbn fork. For, lam fure, 
 no other Consideration can Anjwer , or come up to the Im- 
 piety of the fore cited ExpreJ/ions. And I freely appeal to 
 the Learned , and UnbyaiTed Reader, Whether the f aid 
 Parages can be placed to any other Account rvhatfoever. 
 
 And if they cannot, I ask with what Confcience could this 
 Man y of his own Head, invent fuch Hideout, Abominable 
 Words, and then thruft them into his Adverfary's Mouth, 
 whether he would, or no ? Or charge them as the neceffary - 
 Confequences of his Doftrine, without proving, or by any 
 formed Argument fo much as offering to prove them fo ? 
 For furely he ought to have done this in the first place, and 
 (fince he knew that the Learned AfTertors of this Do&rine, 
 did and would deny thefe to be the Conferences of it to the 
 very Death) he fhouldby clear andfolid Ratiocination have 
 proved again ft them, (in fpight of their Denial) that thefe 
 were indeed the True and Natural Confequences of the f aid 
 DoQrine, before he reproached them as fuch. But, it Jeems 
 he was for doing execution firft , and for proceeding to 
 Tryal afterwards ', though, as hafty as he was in the former, 
 he has not yet done the latter, nor, I believe, ever will. 
 
 Upon the whole Matter it is manifeft , That it was not 
 fo much any thing Perfonal in Dr. Owen (how bitter 
 foever he was againH him) as the Do&rine of ChrifPs 
 Satisfaction ajferted by the faid Doftor , in common with 
 the whole Chriftian Church , which this Author fa 
 vilely refieSted upon j and difcharged all thofe Blafphemoics 
 Scoffs at, in that Book of his ) and confequently fo far as 
 he was the Author both of the Book and the Scoffs in 
 k, he was as ft a P erf on to have joyned in the Addrefr 
 
 tt 
 
.viurocco Ambaffador, as d#) Man in England 
 
 I do, 1 conffs, chargt this Author with Afftrt ingThrcc 
 Gods (though He does not in Terttiinis e xfrefs it) becaufe 
 of bis Affertmg Three diftinft Infinite Minds, or Spirits ; 
 but the/i the L nji litre on my part is quite different from what 
 tt was on his. tor in this, the Confcquence of Three Gods 
 from Three diilincl: Infinite Spirits, // Direct, Mamf^-ft, 
 and Immediate 9 orrdtber^ inTruth, hmt fopfoperl) a 
 Confluence, or one Aflertion following from another, 
 as one and the very lame thing expreffed in other words, 
 which is the true account of this Matter : For the Words 
 [Infinite Mind, or Spirit] are but a Periphrafis of t\. 
 Thhtg figmfied by the Term [God :j And heir per feci equi- 
 valence jball be fully demonfi rated in my Fifth Chapter. 
 
 From all which I conclude, That fiace there are (beyond all 
 pretence of denial) fever al Horrid Blafphcmous ExprelTi- 
 ons in this Author's forewent toned Book, which muft and 
 ought to be charged fbmewhere ; and fince his Adverfary 
 utterly difowns them all, both as to Words and Sence ; and 
 fince the Doftrine it felf, maintained by him, infers nofuch 
 Thing, nor has this Author proved that it does jo ', but that 
 the f aid Reprefentations of it are peculiarly his own, and oc- 
 cur ?io where but in his Book (except po/fibly in the Writings 
 offome of his old Friends the Socinians, and thofe fuch as 
 the Tranfilvanian Mini- 
 
 flers) it follow?, that ac- See a moft Virulent and Blafphe- 
 cordrng to the fir id eft Laws mous Book Wrote by thefe Men, 
 of fair and j uft Quotation, and entituled , Prtmonitiones Chri- 
 all the black Dirt of thofe fti & Apojlolorum de abolendo vero 
 Impious and foul Paff.tges Chrifto per Antichrijtum. 
 which I have Cited from 
 
 him, and charged upon hi' ., ought to lie wholly at his Door> 
 and let him (and his For ter) jbovel it away thence as they 
 are able. As 
 
i what < >nteYns the Licenftng this Book, fo fever ely 
 - fo juftlj - Von by Dr. Owen, it did (it muft be 
 
 me ' .. ) >. \ts it were) framed for the 
 
 j.j 
 
 .'•, p. 24. between /. 12. and 27. of the Firft 
 Edition, this Addition" and Alteration is made in the 
 Second. 
 
 [/ muft, here remind him of Two Things. 
 
 Firft, That he would be pleafed to tell u<: how Men 
 van Write plainer and plainer of the Trinity every Day af- 
 ter his New Notion of it has folved all the Difficulties a* 
 bout it i as in the forecited p. 85; /. 27. he pofitively 
 tells us, it does. For (as I take it) where there remains 
 710 Difficulty, there muft be then tmoft degree of plain- 
 nefs ; and withal, when Men are a me to the utmoft of 
 any Thing, they can then go no farther 
 
 Secondly, I muft remind him ai ; \ That the word 
 Plainer in the Comparative Degree, does not couch under 
 it the pofitive fignification of rimn] &x\ And much left 
 very plain and eafie : [Nay, lb very plain as to have all the 
 difficulties of it folved, as tli is Author has cxprefly af* 
 firmed]. So that if this be a Scandalous Imputation, it is 
 cafie to lee to whom the Scandal of it mnf belong, &c. 
 
 P. 27. /. 25. after the word Contradicted, this Paren- 
 thefis is inferted in the Second Edition (as nothing ought 
 to be, which cannot be comprehended.) 
 
 F.74* /.jo. after tftfe word whatfo, : v^threcLines from 
 bottom in the Firft Edition, this following Paren* 
 thefe is iniertcd in the Second. (For an Hypoftatick Union 
 ciirl an Hypqftatick 'hion^viz. Such an one as makes 
 
 a Compound Hypoftafis,are quite different things : And 
 this \Author (ball in due time be taught fo much, if he 
 has any thing to object againft it J Or, &c. 
 
 Page 
 
Page 291. overagainft him 12. of theFirft Edition, 
 the following / Quotation is added in the Margin 
 of the Second. Q* is in Deo modos t&ntjlmtnecio ex- 
 
 iftendi$i \ T£pmv> uwiftym i jfe d/cunt, /of a?/; Deitdtem m - 
 quaquam txdudknt, ift <futi conveniunt \ Sed nihil 
 wlunt^ quhm Exi fiend; m A in quo differ urtt. 
 
 Pa.'cr von cH modus tAi 1 1 i //r//ti/, fed Dt us t Jt } ■':. 
 
 modum cr cater & Pirjon.e, verttm DeuseH cum cert- 
 exijlendi, qui neque tiiio conventt, neqm Spirit ui Sanlfo. 
 Sic &. Fi/ius Dens tJtjnon modus i 
 
 ejl cum cert modo Exijicnd.^ qualis mque Patri convenit^ 
 neque Spirit ui Sancto. Ad mndem modum di(cri>, inil y C 
 Spirit us Sanctis Dens ejl, Hon modus e xtjlendi ta- . u m \ Sed 
 deu<s eji cum certomodo existendi, qualis nee Pah nit 
 
 neque hilio. Sum ma ejf, Per jo this in Deo von differre eff\ ..- 
 tidj quia /tint unm Dew, jedPropnetate & modo Subfisten- 
 di. Tmifu6 in Refponfione ad Armmii Prafationem in ex- 
 trema Pag. Lin* 20. edit ion is Amjlelodamenjis apudjanjj'- 
 nium anno 16 3 2. 
 
 Page 342. after thefe words [joyned true Greek and 
 Englifh iogethvr~] in the 4th Line, this following DiP 
 courfe is to be inferted. 
 
 [But there is an extraordinary Paflage in his Book of 
 Judgment, Chap. 2. Sect. 1. p. 164. of the laft Edition, 
 (which Ihould be the moft correct) and I was doubting, 
 whether I fhraild charge it upon his Ignorance, or his 
 Infolence ; hut both or them play their Parts very re- 
 markably in it. Forfirfthe makes a moftfaife, illite- 
 rate, ai cm of a Vcrle, or rather part 
 of a Ver'e in the NevvTefl tment, and then reproaches 
 thereo: vj i •" ■■ ;ion as wrong, and very faulty, for 
 rendrin _•; it e te place is in 2 Pet. c. 2. v. 4. 
 
 & yo Sreo- 'tyytAooy hx, efptHTxfo X/\?\% G&gpAi £o<f>tf tclpiol- 
 fWVQLi 'GTuLptS'OM.fV «S X£A<IIV TgTwp JJfjtyjtfS. III Which he COI1- 
 
 fiders 
 
Gders o.:Iy the words aa^ui ^Q<p* reffUfwmt^ dividing 
 t!icm from the reft of die Sentence, viz,. Txrccpi^ooxtr a: 
 Kgjiaiy TtlnpnfJLh'Vi, and by that means from the I erb in 
 this Utter part oijt, which fhould govern the Afau* in 
 the frrma ; thereby making G&&U* to be governed not 
 by -arapg'JWev (as it ought to be) but molt talfely and 
 Ungrammatically by Top/a^ wc-a*, and lb he renders ©■*- 
 Cjui ^d<fa TccflctpwG-ccty caji t ;-g them, viz. the Apoftate 
 Angels, down into Chains of darinejs, x \nd this interpre- 
 tation he builds partly upon the pretended Reafbn of the 
 Thing here difcourfed of, and partly upon the fignifica- 
 tion of the word raflafiv, but upon both of them very 
 abfiirdly. From the Rcafon of the Thing he argues, 
 that if Top/opeJo-aj fhould fignific roe Apoftate Angels 
 being cast down into Hell, how could they be (aid upon 
 Sentence palled upon them at the lau Judgment, to be 
 then caft into Hell, if they were there before ? To 
 which the Anfwer is very eafie and obvious, That im- 
 mediately upon their fin they were cafi down into, and 
 kept in thole lower Regions called T*p7<*f ©*, or He/i lo- 
 cally, but not call \\\K.oHeli-T orients, till the laft Judg- 
 ment has palTed upon them ; fo that with full accord 
 both to Scripture and Reafbn we are to diftinguilh the 
 place of Hell \ where they now are, from the Judicial pe- 
 nal Torments of Hell, which they fhall be adjudged to, 
 and endure in that place hereafter ; as we diftinguilh 
 the Prifbn wherein Malefactors are kept, from the exe- 
 cution which they are there kept for ; As indeed this 
 Text with great lignificance alludes to both : So that 
 his Argument from hence falls to nothing. His other 
 Reafbn is from the fignification of the word raflcipSv, 
 which he affirms to fignifie only to cajl down. But on the 
 contrary, I muft here tell him firft, That rccflapSv docs 
 not only import the A6t of calling down, 6ll (being 
 
 derived 
 
derived from Ta/fep©.) fignifies alio the Term ad quern, 
 or the Place, into which this cafting down is. And I 
 refer him to all the Creek Lexicographers (not one of 
 them excepted) whether they do not render Taflcc^pco 
 by in Tart.tr tan detrudaj dejic/o, or pr.ecipito ; and if lb, 
 ho\V can c«e^"> poflibly here agree with Tct/TapcoWi ; for 
 if T<tfloLp& be the Term ad quem of the Att, how can 
 G&ejtAi be 16 too ; fince one fingle Aft can have but one 
 Ultimate Term ad quem? And even this Man himfelf 
 does not allow rdftap®* and cr&ejut to be one and the 
 lame thing. And belides this, 1 mutt-fell him further, 
 That if tretest-H imported the Term, Thtfig^ ok ¥ I ace, in- 
 to which God caft down the Apottate Angels, it ought 
 not to have been g&zsus Tctflccpuo-cts 9 but eis a&i^s, for- 
 afmuch as the motion of Calling down, importing a Lo- 
 cal defcent to fbmething, the Dative Cafe cannot in true 
 (jrammar anfwer it. 
 
 And therefore the old Latine Verfion makes <j&esu> to 
 import, not the Term to which, but the Inftruments or 
 means by which thefe Angels were thus brought down, 
 rendring the Text thus, Rudentibtu Infer ni det ratios in 
 Tart arum trait dit, &rc. which, as it is not ftrictly a Tran- 
 Jlation, but an arbitrary Parapbrafe, fo it is a very for- 
 ced and unnatural one too ; as importing not a .cafting 
 but a drawing down thefe Angels into Hell. In which cafe, 
 who n\uft-be the Perfbn drawing them ? For fince God 
 (to whom rccflxpoio-cci does and mutt here agree) ought 
 to be considered by us as in the Higheft Heaven, how 
 can this drawing down be applied to him, which, in the 
 Nature of it, fuppofes the Peribn drawing to be in that 
 lower place, to which he is drawing others? For all 
 Traction is a motion of the Agent forcibly bringing fbme- 
 thing to himfelf, but Trafwn amotion by which he re- 
 moves or forces Ibmething from himfelf, 
 
 B It 
 
It is clear therefore, that according to all the Rules 
 of Grammatical Conftru&ion, and proper fpeaking, *«- 
 ££?* cannot be governed by ra.pla.pwacts • and that, there- 
 tore fbmething elfe mutt be fought for to govern it, 
 which can be nothing befides utLpifrmtv. And then 
 the whole Sentence will be properly and plainly tranfla- 
 ted thus. Taflctpttivus [God] having cafi or thrufl them 
 [viz. the Jpofiate Angels'] down into Hell [or the Lower 
 Regions'] izrapiPwKtv &&£$£$ £o'f <*» de liver ed, or put them in- 
 to Chains ofdarknefs, TtinpinfyHti «> rtg/<nr, kept, or refer* 
 vedto [or for] Judgment. And this is fence and pro- 
 priety of Speech, agreeable both to the Natural Signify 
 cation, and the Grammatical Syntax of the Words. But 
 the Tranflation fb imperioufly and ignorantly given by 
 this Man (in corre&ion of that of the Church) is agree- 
 able to neither. For it both divides one part of the Sen- 
 tence from the other, from which it muft not be divid- 
 ed, and then makes c-«g$tM to be governed by la/fcpa- 
 eras, which cannot govern it, and quite cutts it off 
 from irapifuKev, which alone can. 
 
 And nuw, ought it not to be matter of Amazement 
 to all Men of Senfe and Sobriety, to fee a Puny, who is 
 not able to matter three words of Greek, prefume to con- 
 troul fiich great Matters of that Language, as the Tran- 
 slators of the New Teftament into Engli/h undoubtedly 
 were ? Nay, and thereby to reflefl: upon the Churcn 
 her felf, which has received and owned this Tranflati- 
 on, and to whofe Judgment and Authority (if he be fb 
 nearly related to her, as he pretends) he ows fb great 
 and filial a Deference ? Let him rather inftead of corre- 
 cting the Englijh Tranflation (a Work which he was 
 never born for) thank God, and the Tranflators for it ; 
 there being few Men living more beholden to it than 
 himfelf. And therefore leaving his forlorn Criticifme 
 
 (as 
 
fas new every whit as hi^ Divinity) to fluft for it felf ; 1, 
 for my part, like my EngliR* Bible, for his diflikc of a- 
 ny part of it, better than before. For I can by no means 
 fee any force or confequence in this Argument, viz,. That 
 becaufe this Author is much better at quoting a Greek Sen- 
 tence than at construing it \ therefore the Englifo Tran- 
 flation of this Text in St. Peter is a very bad Tranjlatwn ; 
 I fay, I cannot admit, or yield to this Confequence.] 
 
 Page 347. of the Firft Edition after this Sentence 
 [In Jucb a Cafe fome are of Opinion, that where the words 
 efcape it, the Author himfelf ought to have if\ the following 
 Dilcourfe comes in P. $51. Lw.8. of the Second Edition 
 beginning with theft words. 
 
 [But becaufe fome perhaps will hardly be fatisfied 
 with fb General a Charge without an Allegation of 
 more Particulars, I fhall here give the Reader a Cata- 
 logue of this Author's Greek Errata in the Second Edition 
 of his Vindication' of the Trinity (which fhould in 
 Reafbn be thought the moft correft) together with their 
 Correction confronting them. 
 
 Greek Errata. Correction. 
 
 Not&v Tt %fif*>*> Noegpv ri Xf*l** iMg. 102. 
 
 et7T€V iiTTiV uout, 
 
 Pun&um intcrrogationis poft la^v pro Semicok 
 
 'Opoiitnovlfw 'OfjLovo-iov'Qtv Pag- 
 
 o<rixi vcias 
 
 B g iv^fwir®* 
 
Greek Errata. 
 
 Corretfion. 
 
 ctv$rpto7T©« \^iv 
 
 CCv3rpCt)7TQ$ Qxv 
 
 avyiAv 
 
 ccyytAa 
 
 
 \ 
 
 ayyeX®* t<?iv 
 
 etyyehis %£iv 
 
 Pun&ura intcrrog; 
 
 nionis poft %£iv pro SemicoL 
 
 Pag. 107, ®gos ic^lv 
 
 ©go's '6}tv 
 
 1. 14. Taul* vq-iqv 
 
 TCtv1v(7lQP 
 
 Pag. 11c. 2,weu,uivvs 
 
 XvwfJLuiyvs 
 
 0110:.... ~ ' 
 
 avpYiSr&cc, 
 
 l r J bis . 
 
 ?- 
 
 TTpSiS 
 
 7MS 
 
 V7rQC?CL(?Gl$ 
 
 WOrfj-xW* 
 
 QeolriTcc. 
 
 ©gOTjJTat 
 
 Sag. in-'Eei 
 
 "£r« 
 
 ^ uotat ' xoA^/as 
 
 TToAy^ffas 
 
 TrcLpYtlwctla 
 
 7rap jjTiioroTa 
 
 /xi t)s 
 
 /U.J? T<5 
 
 *o/ju<S-«jj 
 
 F©^U<£-«)J 
 
 2:1 Quot. evyycipei 
 
 ibid. 
 
 cri^^&ya 
 
 7r&>fJLy3rv[Ji,evn 
 
 TTQpfj.rii'Srv^ivvi 
 
 &ict(QopVt 
 
 Sicttyopv; 
 
 MGICL', 
 
 hCTlCLS 
 
 7rhvSroflixrl 
 
 TrAnSvvliKYJI 
 
 Pag. u'r'YVo twos 
 
 'Ttto Tir©. 
 
 (<niot.it:, , , 
 
 aAAoc- ti 
 
 ccAAx ti 
 
 T ^'' l6 -KcL&:ectflQV 
 
 Ka^ ictuTop 
 
 C^uotat. e , 
 
 « 1 
 
 «ca<j~y 
 
 *XC6<J-fc 
 
 €vepy&cL 
 
 tvipy&a. 
 
 ovoua^ovloa 
 
 oyofjLu^ovloLi 
 
 Pag. na-'H^'ccTi 
 
 *H 6«a Tg 
 
 C^llUtilC. - 
 
 
 a Trap- 
 
Greek Frr.ttx. 
 
 Correct 
 
 ion. 
 
 
 <*7r«pprAAa.*i>3« 
 
 cc7T* gp A Act xT©* 
 
 Pafc. tio. 
 
 S^j^Jif 
 
 <T/a(po^cV 
 
 
 Pag. 12'-. 
 1. 26*. 
 
 fJLl^lV TUCt 
 
 ffciffK Tira 
 
 
 I.27. 
 
 
 c 
 
 If 
 
 
 . 121. 
 
 ;,25. 
 
 ctVa ppx A Amtf©* 
 
 a7rag5tAAa' 
 
 >c7©# 
 
 . 122. 
 
 L27. 
 
 1 A JLt tJ y 
 
 
 
 ibid. 
 Pa^. 
 
 AO7/O0 
 
 T^oycti 
 
 
 QgOl 
 
 ctAATiActi^ 
 
 c&AAnAatft 
 
 
 
 «fdo 
 
 <fuo 
 
 
 
 atdirclKiv 
 
 ara.TaAiK 
 
 
 
 
 • 
 
 
 
 &lt T€ 
 
 <f*x re 
 
 
 
 cuvaifiov 
 
 CVVOi'i^LOf 
 
 
 
 tyiv re 
 
 rriv re 
 
 
 
 CUU.7TV0lCLy 
 
 GVfJLTTVQlOLP 
 
 
 
 €%yai&s 
 
 e%y vices 
 
 
 
 SrvvxfjLtcas 
 
 £v acuta s 
 
 
 
 Punftum interrogationis port TaJfoTnTa pro Semicol, 
 
 ctAA^Aaij aAA77Actif 
 
 ofAQVo-iolns 
 
 CtJ ICLftTWS 
 
 o^ovaiornc 
 
 P^g. 12<. 
 
 Quo at, 
 
 pag. 123. 
 R19. 
 
 Quota:*. 
 
 tLTT^VV 
 
Greek Errata, Correction* 
 
 ). 6, - • 
 
 I ag, 2oa q ^gi- ^2 o 3^o\' fjw <J dW* ^y, o Sriis /x«. 
 
 Now all thc&Enratt, qjic would think, make up a 
 jolly Company to rendezvous together in the compafsof 
 lefs than half a dozen Pages of an English Book ; a Com- 
 pany fit for our Author to m^rch Triumphantly i# the 
 Head of. 
 
 Page 360. After [William Giles fbme time of Mark* 
 Lane] in the Firft Edition irrthe Margin, is added in the 
 Margin of the Second \wlo Wrote (forfootb) in defence of 
 our Author againfl the Papiih.] 
 
 Page 574. Lines 12, 13,14. ThatPaflage [It ifftwih 
 jitter to be Cenjured by a Convocation, though even He Him- 
 felf fljould be Prolocutor of [if] is altered in Page 37 7. 
 
 Line 9. thus [Though even He Himfelf (jince John 
 
 Goodwin and Hugh Peters are gone off J jhould be Prolocu- 
 tor of it.] 
 
 And now, upon the iffue of the whole Matter, I 
 hope all Ingenuous, and Impartial Readers, all True 
 Friends of our Engliflj Church and Old Divinity will 
 allow , that I have treated an Infblent, Impofing In- 
 novator, no otherwise than he has deferved \ or ra* 
 ther indeed much fhort of it ; and that None will 
 Tax, or Cenfure me for what I have Wrote, but 
 Rich as can think it reafonable for one Man to Tram- 
 ple upon, and Infult over his whole ProfefTion , and to 
 be Applauded,or at leaft endured in fuch a Prcliimption* 
 
 For 
 
For my own part, I can by no means judge fb ; 
 and as I ab'ior fuch Pride in others ; fb, I hope, I 
 fholl never be guilty of the leaft degree of it my 
 fclf. I thank God, I account not the meaneft of my 
 own Profeflion my Inferiour ; and i( I fhould be 
 tempted to think any one Below me, it fhould be on- 
 ly fuch an one as thinks himfelf Above all the World 
 befides. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
- • 
 
 VI 11 
 

 ft