-*Z. % I ^ Mwhyicnt PRINCETON, N. J. ^ BT 15 . R6 1893 Rooke, Thomas George, 1837- 1890 . shdf Inspiration, and other lectures _ » ' ' Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/inspirationotherOOrook INSPIRATION AND OTHER LECTURES PRINTED BY MORRISON AND GIBB, LONDON I FOR T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH. S1MPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT, AND CO. LIMITED. NEW YORK I CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS. TORONTO : THE PRESBYTERIAN NEWS CO. I NSPI RATION Hub otber Hectares BY y T. GEORGE ROOKE, B. A. LATE PRESIDENT OF RAWDON COLLEGE, NEAR LEEDS EDITED BY TWO OF HIS STUDENTS EDINBURGH T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET i893 PREFACE. These lectures are published as a memorial of their author. It was well known among Mr. Eooke’s more intimate friends that it was his intention in a few years to devote himself to the preparation of some of the work he did as theological tutor at Eawdon College for publication. That intention was frustrated by his untimely death. Those who were familiar with Mr. Eooke’s methods cannot doubt that had he lived to carry out his design, these lectures, if he had published them, would have been largely, if not entirely, recast ; for he was constantly revising his work, and bringing it into line with the most recent results of criticism and the latest attitude of thought. It was felt, however, that his work had a value of its own, and was well worthy of preservation in permanent form, although that form might not be such as he himself, if he had lived, would have wished to give it. From his papers as he laid them down after his last class — not dreaming that it was to be his last — these have been selected as specimens of his work. The range of the subjects is wide, but his treatment of them each was such as to win the interest of his students in no ordinary degree. The lectures on Psychology and Inspiration were not delivered in any formal way. They were constantly interrupted by oral explanations and expan¬ sions on the teacher’s part, and by questions from the students. The ground covered at each class varied, in VI PREFACE. consequence, according to the nature of the subject and the freedom of its discussion. It followed, almost necessarily, from such a method of teaching, that Mr. Rooke’s MS. was not divided into formal lectures, etc. ; and thus for the divisions into chapters and sections in the first two parts of the book, the editors are responsible. The lectures on Pastoral Theology were delivered practically as they stand, except that Mr. Rooke illustrated some of his points by extracts which he read from other writers on the subject, many of which the editors do not feel it necessary or desir¬ able to quote. In this part of the book the chapters are divided, and the subjects of them stated by Mr. Eooke’s own hand. These lectures introduced informal conferences on the subjects they discussed. The lectures on Psychology and on Inspiration were intended to prepare students for the examina¬ tion of the Senatus Academicus of Associated Nonconformist Colleges, and in all three cases the circumstances of their delivery to some extent account for their form. Whether this volume meet the fate of most memorial volumes or not, the editors are thankful that they were permitted to undertake the task of preparing the lectures for publication. They feel that their own share in the work is imperfectly done ; but they also feel that the lectures them¬ selves have a value which, quite apart from the interest which students who were educated at Rawdon may feel in them, makes them worthy of the form which they now receive. J. M. W. C. S. IN MEMORIAM. These lines are not intended for a memoir. They are simply an attempt to sketch, in some slight way, the spirit and the methods of a life of singular devotion, and its crowning work. Thomas George Booke had fulfilled a pastorate of fourteen years before he entered upon the presidency of Bawdon College, near Leeds, and to that post he brought a sound and thorough scholarship, of which, if he had lived, he would have left maturer proof than can be given by such unrevised lectures as this book contains. Mr. Booke had all, and more than all, the usual modesty of real scholarship. ISTo one would have known from him — what was yet true — that his name appears probably more frequently than any other in the prize and honours lists of London University. He was content to do such quiet work as he did for Dr. Davies’ Hebrew Lexicon. It was by the side-lights of his talk that one discovered how much he knew, and how thoroughly he knew it. He was a man who constantly surprised companions with his familiarity, even in detail with out-of-the-way subjects. As a linguist, his ability was great. Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic, of Oriental; German, French, Spanish, and Italian, among modern languages, were only some of what he taught. I recollect his telling me, on his return from a tour in south-eastern Europe, that he had spent a few days in a town where five or six different languages were spoken by sections of the people ; but it was only when I asked him if he could speak them all, that he confessed that there was one of which he only knew the alphabet. V1X X IN MEMORIAM. Sunday : “ Outside the inn the village band is playing, and toy mortars are exploding in honour of a local magnate just arrived from a journey; and from the village shooting ground we hear the continuous fire of rifles, for Sunday is the appointed time for every Tyrolese to make himself a marks¬ man pro avis et focis.” These things, he says, make writing difficult ; but he sends this as better than nothing. How much better let the reader judge. “ I do not think that you could have expected a nearer approach to unanimity than has attended the call ; and I would rather hear of a few dissentient voices, such as those you mention, than I would of an unreasoning enthusiasm, in which all semblance of individual opinion is drowned. It is, to me, a good augury that the five who did not join in the first vote withdrew their opposition when they found what the wish of the great majority was. I should not wonder if some of these friends prove by and by to be among your best friends. They have given a good practical evidence of Christian feeling, and they deserve a recognition of the same in those pastoral relations which I hope you mean to culti¬ vate diligently with all the people ; for I am more and more convinced that it is by simple but real and earnest pastoral care that a minister finds his way to the hearts of his people, and establishes himself solidly there. I have few, scarcely any fears, as to your work ; but I should have many, if your own soul were not so strongly affected with the solemnity and difficulty of that which you are about to attempt. Tor your own personal life, which a Christian minister needs to guard so anxiously, and in regard to which so many brilliant preachers have made a miserable shipwreck, I trust very firmly in your father’s God. . . . During all the years you have been with us, I have gained increasing confidence that the well of living water which may sink low, but which can never wholly dry, has been opened within your soul by a touch which no mortal can give. You will never, I think, cease to watch jealously over those ‘ issues of life/ and this all the more because the spiritual health of many others must now grow strong or feeble in sympathy with your own. And I also think that one of those lessons which you say IN MEMORIAM. xi you have learned at college, and which will never fade from your consciousness, is this, that the only way to keep our¬ selves is to let Christ keep us, to yield up ourselves entirely to Him ; to clear out the channels of our life, that His life may flow in unhindered to us, and become the power to which each faculty and member of our frame shall be an obedient instrument. Nor have I any fear as to the doctrinal developments of which you may become the subject ; for if you are the possessor of a life which only the Spirit of God can give, you will not lack that ‘unction from the Holy One 5 by which a Christian ‘ knows all things.’ But, all the same, I shall ever feel truly, and even intensely, interested in the crystallising of your convictions on all the deep and vital matters about which we have so often talked at Bawdon. And you must never think it will be a toil or an unwelcome task to me to read your letters, or to hear your narratives of widening experience, and clearer certainty of all that is most surely believed among us.” The next is to the same student, written just as he entered on the pastorate of the church mentioned in the previous letter. It is a capital bit of pastoral theology, as well as a bright specimen of talk on men and things. “ It was pleasant to see your handwriting this morning, and to learn that you are happily launched into waters which, whether wholly smooth as now, or rough and stormy as they may well be by and by, are hallowed for you by the footsteps of the Master, who Himself has made you a fisher of men. I have thought much and prayerfully about you since Wed¬ nesday, and I take it as a good augury that you entered your first pastorate through the doors of a prayer-meeting. Your own sincere requests, and the petitions of many on your behalf, will certainly be answered. “ To reply to your letter in the order of its contents. I would say as to books, that the only title on your first list about which I am doubtful, is Barrow’s Introduction. If you think of taking a Bible-class through this topic, there could not be a better text-book, but it is too elementary for a student of theology who has got beyond his first or second year; there¬ fore its retention on your list will depend upon the use you Xll IN MEMOKIAM. think to make of it. I notice three books by Stanford on this list. His style of thought and expression is sympathique to your own. Therein lies a ground of warning as well as of congratulation, in view of this apparent liking of yours for him. I daresay you will understand what I mean. We should read authors whose minds are complementary to our own, rather than those whose minds are reflected in ours. James’ Anxious Inquirer is still good and useful ; but modern ‘ inquirers,’ especially of the male sex, are better suited by such books as Bonar’s God’s Way of Peace. Each book has a useful sequel — James’ Christian Progress , Bonar’s God’s Way of Holiness. . . . “ I can have no objection to address your letters 4 Mr.’ rather than ‘ Bev.,’ especially as I quite share the preference which you evidently feel between the two titles. But, if you will let me give you the counsel, don’t stickle for trifles of this kind with people generally, only a few will understand the reason ; and you may get the reputation of being whimsical about small matters, which again often breeds unjust suspicion con- cerniug more important aud fundamental things. Let people know that you don’t care to be called ‘ Beverend,’ and would really rather be * Mr.’ ; but if they vnll follow the custom (as most of them will), let them, without any more ado.” The man who could write so brightly lived much of his life in pain and weakness. Many a time he dragged himself down to his classroom by sheer force of will, and we knew, as we looked at him that, had he been a man with easier ideals, he would have sent a message down to say that he could not meet his classes. That was not his way. His devotion to duty was a rare sight, and was not the least influential of the forces of his life. Idleness was doubly shameful, and carelessness grew more and more impossible to men who lived near him. His work at Bawdon was not always easy work, but he flinched no difficulty ; and when, in in the summer of 1890, his last long illness began on the very day the College session closed, he might have said, what he leaves others to say, that his work there, quiet and un¬ obtrusive as it was, remains his best monument. J. M. CONTENTS PAET I. PSYCHOLOGY. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. SEC. 1. Psychology defined, .... 2. Its History, ..... 3. Its Importance in view of Modern Controversies, 4. Threefold Classification of Facts of Consciousness, 5. Which of the three “Forms” is fundamental? 6. Methods of Research — The Subjective, 7. ,, ,, — The Objective, 8. The True Principle, a Combination of the two, 9. “ Double Self-Consciousness, ” 10. Its Christian Explanation, CHAPTER II. SIMPLE “FORMS” OR “MODES” OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 11. Other iSTames for the “ Forms of Consciousness,” 12. Undue Attention sometimes given to Physical Apparatus, 13. I. The Ideal “Form,” ...... 14. Its Characteristics, ...... 15. Its two Sets of Apparatus, Mental and Corporeal, 16. Sensation and Perception, ..... 17. II. The Emotional “ Form,” . . 18. Characteristics distinguishing it from Thought, 19. Its Apparatus, ...... 20. Combination of the Ideal and the Emotional in the ^Esthetic “Form,” ....... 21. III. The Volitional “Form,”. . 22. Subconscious Activity — Attention, .... 23. Consciousness of Freedom, ..... 24. Consciousness of Duty, ..... 25. Genesis of Conscience, ..... 26. Relation of Will to Desire, ..... 27. Relation of Will to Thought, . . 28. Interdependence of the three “ Forms,” . 29. All three Subject to Development, ..... xiii PAGE 1 2 3 5 6 8 10 11 11 13 15 15 17 17 IS 18 19 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 27 27 28 29 32 XIV CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. SPHERES OF CONSCIOUS PSYCHICAL LIFE. SEC. PAGE 30,31. Definition of Terms — Sphere, Life, . . . .33 32. Theories of Life, ....... 34 33. Organic and Sensitive Life distinguished, . . . .37 34. The three Spheres— Animal, Rational, Spiritual, . . .38 35. Illustrations of this Doctrine, ...... 41 36. Mixed Character of the Phenomena of Consciousness, . . 43 CHAPTER IY. KINDS OF ACTIVITY. 37. (1) Reflex Activity, ....... 45 38. (2) Instinctive Activity, ...... 47 39. Distinguished from Voluntary, . . . .48 40. Instincts classified, ...... 50 41. (3) Voluntary Activity, . . . . . .51 CHAPTER V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS — ANIMAL AND RATIONAL SPHERES. 42. (1) Animal Sphere — Two Grades of Animal Life, . . .53 43. Borderland between the Animal and the Rational, . . 55 44. (2) Rational Sphere — Three Points of Superiority over the Animal, . 56 45. A fourth Point — Double Self-Consciousness, . . .57 46. Plato’s Doctrine as to the three-storied Consciousness, . . 59 47. Plato’s Doctrine as to two Directions in which Superiority is asserted by the Rational Consciousness over the Animal, . . 60 48. 49. Morality defined — Two lower Forms of it, 62, 63 50. Real Morality distinguished from these, . . .64 51. Various Theories concerning the Nature of Duty, . . 65 52. (1) Those regarding Thought as the Centre of the Soul, . 66 53. (2) Those regarding Emotion as Centre, . . .67 54. (3) Those regarding the Practical ‘‘Form as Centre,” . 69 55. Religion and Morality, . . . . . .72 CHAPTER VI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS — SPIRITUAL SPHERE. 56. Characteristics of Life in the Spiritual Sphere, — (1) Instinct after a personal God, . . . . .75 57. (2) Communion with God, . . . . . .76 58. (3) Love — Ambiguity of the Term, . . . .77 59. Three Essentials of perfect Love, . . . .79 60. Above Statement tested by three Examples, . . 81 61. First Objection, ...... 82 62. Second Objection, ...... 83 63. Answered — Examples of tvro kinds of modified Love, . 84 64. Inference as to the Doctrine of the Trinity, . . .87 65. Perfect Love peculiar to the Spiritual Sphere, . . 88 66. (4) Consciousness of Redemption, ..... 91 CONTENTS. xv PAET II. THE AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE AND INSPIRATION. CHAPTER I. the Bible’s claim foe, itself. SEC. PAGE 1. The Subject stated, ....... 95 2. Necessary Assumptions, . . . . .95 3. The Bible’s Claim for itself — Old Testament, . . . .97 4. ,, ,, ,, — New Testament, . . .100 CHAPTER II. THE AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE. 5. Our Claim for the Bible, . . . . . 102 6. How to treat the Bible, ...... 102 7. The Relation between the Form of a Book and our Treatment of it, . 105 8. False and True Methods of treating the Bible, . . .107 9. The True Method justified, ...... 112 10. Reason and Faith, . . . . . . .113 11. Summary of Conclusions, . . . . . .115 CHAPTER III. INSPIRATION. 12. The term Inspiration, . . . . . . .117 13. Scripture Light upon its Meaning, 2 Tim. iii. 16, . . H8 14. ,, ,, ,, 2 Pet. i. 20, 21, . . . 120 15. ,, ,, ,, 1 Cor. ii. 12-16, . . .122 16. Additional Scriptures, . . . . . .124 17. Inspiration and Genius, . . . . . .125 18. Natural and Spiritual Spheres of Consciousness, . . . 127 19. Ascending Spheres of Consciousness the Key to the Problem of Inspiration, . . . . . . .127 20. Argument reviewed, . . . . . . .129 21. Inspiration defined, ....... 130 22. Inspiration and Revelation, . . . . . .131 23. Differences of Inspiration in the Spiritual Sphere, . . . 134 24. The Operations of Inspiration, ..... 137 25. The Limitations of Inspired Men, ..... 138 26. Inspiration and the Canon, ...... 139 27. Summary of Facts, ....... 142 CHAPTER IY. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION CLASSIFIED. 28. Method of Classification, Partial and Plenary, . . .145 29. Theory of Dictation — Verbal Inspiration, .... 143 30. Theory of Assistance, . . . . . . .152 31. Theory of Illumination, ...... 454 32. Theory of Sufficient Knowledge, ..... 156 XVI CONTENTS. CHAPTER Y. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION TESTED. SEC. PAGE 33. By the Historical Books of the Bible, . . . .160 34. By the Prophetical Books, . . . . . .163 35. By the Doctrinal Parts of Scripture, ..... 164 36. By the Devotional Parts, . . . . . .165 37. By the Ethical Parts, ....... 166 38. The Organic Unity of Scripture, . . . . .167 39. Theories and the Canon, . . . . . .169 CHAPTER VI. DIFFICULTIES OF INSPIRATION. 40. Difficulties as to the Character of Inspired Men, . . .172 41. Difficulties as to the Character of the Record of Inspiration, . . 173 42. The Analogy between the Written and the Living "Word, . .174 43. The Analogy in Relation to Biblical Difficulties, . . . 177 44. The Analogy in Relation to Extra-Logical Conclusions, . . 178 45. The Dangers of the Analogy, ...... 180 PAET III. PASTORAL THEOLOGY. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY: TRANSITION FROM COLLEGE TO A PASTORATE, . 183 CHAPTER II. THE PASTOR’S PRIVATE, SOCIAL, AND SECULAR LIFE, . .194 CHAPTER III. THE PASTOR’S OFFICIAL RELATIONS AND DUTIES, . . . 205 CHAPTER IY. THE PASTOR’S “CURE OF SOULS,” ..... 218 CHAPTER Y. THE PASTOR’S CARE OF THE YOUNG, .... 234 CHAPTER YI. PASTORAL VISITATION — CONCLUSION, .... 246 PART I. LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. XVII LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. ♦ CHAPTEE I. INTRODUCTORY. § 1. Psychology, which literally means “a discussion of matters pertaining to the soul,” may he defined more particu¬ larly as “the science which investigates the essential properties, the states, operations, and laws of the human soul ” ; or, more briefly, “ the science which deals with cdl 'phenomena of Con¬ sciousness” It is clearly distinguished from Metaphysics on one side, and from Anthropology on the other. Metaphysics investigates the problems of Being, Essence, Substance, Cause, and all other transcendental and speculative questions which arise out of the objective relations of the human mind. Another name for Metaphysics is Ontology, which points to this objective character of the science. Psychology, on the other hand, is limited to the subjective facts of the mind or soul. Again, Anthropology deals with all the variations of human nature, the peculiarities which distinguish individual men and women from each other, such as the phenomena of sex, age, temperament, race, etc., and the resultant effects of these in human life. But Psychology deals, not with these variable elements, but with the phenomena of Consciousness, which seem to be common to all mankind, constant and essential under all those circumstances which furnish the ever-changing materials of Anthropology. 2 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. § 2. Psychology is a very old science, though for a very long time it was treated only as a subordinate branch of Philosophy. Aristotle was the first to discuss it separately, having devoted a whole important treatise to “ The Soul ” {Be anima — irepl tyv^r/s) ; and his doctrine is still living and influential, having been quite recently revived under the name of Animism.1 The doctrine was that the Soul is that energy or force which animates a body, the “ Entelechy of the body,” to use Aristotle’s own phrase, i.e. that without which the body could not live. For this famous word Entelechy (eV reAo? e%eiv) means “ that which has its end in itself,” — an actual existence, as opposed to a mere poten¬ tiality, the “ Form ” which gives an indivisible unity to any phenomenon. Aristotle believed that everything which exhibits phenomena of organic life has a soul, c.g. plants and animals ; this soul being inseparable from the body which it quickens. Plato, on the contrary, sharply distinguishes between soul and body. The soul, according to him, was a “ plant of celestial growth ” which had “ fallen ” into the body from a state of pre-existence ; and which migrates from body to body, until it finds its way back to God. This last doctrine is the famous Metempsychosis, which also meets us in all Oriental philosophy, notably in P>rahminism and Buddhism. (See, for Plato’s Psychology, the Phcedrus and Phcedo .) From the days of Aristotle and Plato, nothing new was attempted in regard to Psychology until the seventeenth century, when Descartes began to investigate the hitherto unexplored region of human Consciousness. Wolf, in the nineteenth century, founded an elaborate system, which he called Piational Psychology, but which was a priori and deductive in its methods, and therefore vanished, with much else of the same kind, under the critical assaults of Kant’s Philosophy. Since then, no department of Philosophy has been cultivated more eagerly than Psychology. The two 1 Animism. This word must not be confounded with the same term as used by Spencer, Lubbock, etc., in the modern science of Philosophy of Religion. TFor Aristotle’s use of the term see also below, Chap. III. § 32 (5).] INTRODUCTORY. 3 ancient schools of Aristotle and Plato have reappeared in modern forms. The first (Aristotle’s) has given rise to two divergent doctrines : («) The Sensationalism or Materialism which just now dominates English Psychology, and which has been taught by Cabanis in France, by Moleschott in Germany, and by Bain and Spencer in Britain ; ( b ) The Pantheism of the whole Hegelian school. The second doctrine (Plato’s) has reappeared in the Scotch Philosophy of Stewart and Pieid, whom Hamilton follows, and in the spiritualist school of France, represented by Maine de Biran, Victor Cousin, Janet, Pressense, etc.1 Lotze, in Germany, has laid the foundations of what will probably be the Psychology of the future, in which the chief elements of Hegelianism and Spiritualism will be more or less reconciled and harmonised. § 3. There is no part of the modern field of controversy, either in Ethics or Iielmion, that does not involve a distinct psychological standpoint on the part of the controversialist ; and very much of the hopeless misunderstanding in which these controversies often end, arises from the fact that each disputant has been reasoning from psychological premises which his adversary would utterly deny. The tendency of “modern thought ” (so called) is either towards Pantheism or towards Materialism ; and the psycho¬ logical basis of these systems must be irreconcilable with that of Christian Theism. For the words “Soul,” “Eq;o,” “ Person- ality,” which describe the subject-matter of Psychology, have totally different meanings to a Theist, a Pantheist, or a Materialist respectively. Hence it is a waste of strength and time to discuss doctrines of Beligion and Morals, unless we have ascertained that the disputants are agreed in their answers to such questions as these : What is a soul ? What is meant by Personality ? Does the Ego really exist, or is it a name and nothing more ? i.e. Does the pronoun “ I ” describe a real existence, or only a fictitious and 1 [It is to tlie “ spiritualist ” school of Maine de Biran, etc., tliat the author mainly adheres in these pages.] 4 LECTURES OX PSYCHOLOGY. imaginary conception ? This last-mentioned alternative is the settled opinion of all those philosophers who belong to what is called the Phenomenal School, of which J. S. Mill was the founder, and of which Dr. Bain is a well-known living representative. This school regards what we call the mind or the soul as being merely “ a series of feelings,” or a “ permanent possibility of feeling,” 1 with no original or independent unit of Personality behind them. And the Evolutionist School, represented by Herbert Spencer, in exactly the same way, teaches that it is an “illusion to suppose that the Ego is anything more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas ” which happen at any moment to exist together. Another way in which this fundamental doctrine is expressed by Herbert Spencer’s school, is to say that the Ego is a mere “ bundle of mental states,” or, “ a principle of continuity forming states of consciousness into a whole.” This is not a new doctrine, for the Greek Sophists, against whom Socrates contended, compared the soul to the music of a harp, which is heard only when the strings are moved in a certain harmony, which has no existence apart from those strings, and which, of course, perishes when the strings are taken apart. But against this doctrine, the consciousness of an ordinary man will always protest. For the word “ I ” is meaningless, unless it denotes a conscious unity and causality ; which is the very opposite of that group or succession of nerve stimu¬ lations to which Mill and Spencer reduce the notion of the Soul. And an ordinary man would either fail to under¬ stand this last conception, or else treat it as a madman’s dream. For there is no question but that each Ego is conscious of itself ; and to suppose that a mere “ bundle of mental states ” or series of feelings can be aware of itself, can remember, imagine, compare its past, present, and future, and so forth, is to suggest what is sheer nonsense ; nor can we argue profitably with any one who declares that this is his view of the human soul and of its self- consciousness. 1 See Mill’s Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, chap. xii. INTRODUCTORY. *■» o Most modern Materialists and Pantheists have felt this difficulty, which Herbert Spencer tries to avoid by saying that the bundle of states has come “ by heredity,” and through “ social environment,” to beget a fictitious self, which is always associated with the changing feelings and ideas ; but there is no reality answering to this fiction. Most ordinary persons will fail to see that this explanation of self-consciousness and of the word “ I ” makes the matter at all more intelligible ; and we seem driven back upon the old and common doctrine, that the words “ I,” “ self,” “ soul,” describe a single, independent, self-moving something that is different from all its feelings and ideas, and apart from which these feelings and ideas would be inconceivable. Further than that we can hardly go. The word “ I ” explains itself better than any metaphysical definition could explain it ; and a belief in the real existence of the Ego is the first condition of all thought about the mind or the soul, i.e. of all Psycho¬ logy and all Metaphysics. It is no less a condition of all Theology ; for Theology, as distinct from natural science, implies the belief in God as Personal, i.e. as a single, self- conscious Will, after the analogy of our own self-conscious unity and causality. § 4. Psychological facts seem to arrange themselves under three heads, viz. Feeling, Knowing, and Willing ; whence arises the well-known division of the human soul into Intellect or “ Head,” Emotion or “ Heart,” and Will. The science of mind is nearly always considered nowadays under three corresponding divisions. But this arrangement is quite modern ; for the ancient Greeks and the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages recognised only a twofold division, viz. : (1) In¬ tellect or thought (you?, according to Aristotle) ; (2) Will or desire (opeft?). Pieid, the leader of what is called the Scotch or Common-sense school of Philosophy, adopted the same classification of mind into (1) Intellectual Powers; (2) Active Powers. The firm establishment of the threefold division is chiefly due to Kant in Germany, to Victor Cousin in France, and to Hamilton in Great Britain. Any one can verify for himself its justice and necessity; for the 6 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. phenomena of thinking, feeling, and willing are really and radically dissimilar, and therefore require to be classed separately from one another. But we must carefully guard against supposing or de¬ scribing these three distinct classes of phenomena as separate faculties or parts of the soul. They are rather forms or modes of self-consciousness, in which the whole Ego asserts itself in one or other of three ways or directions. We cannot think without feeling and attending (i.e. willing) ; we cannot feel apart from some phenomena of knowing and will¬ ing ; we cannot will except through intellect and emotion. In other words, every mental state is compounded of these three factors or elements. Yet they cannot all be present in equally well-marked degree. It is an ascertained law of Psychology, that as one of these elements becomes larger in consciousness, the other two tend to become smaller, and to retire into unconsciousness. E.g. strong feeling precludes calm thinking and regulated acts of will ; intense thought deadens emotion and paralyses will in every aspect except that of intellectual attention ; resolute volition silences all thought and all feeling, save that which is necessary as a basis and as a vehicle of itself. The distinctness of these three aspects or sides of mind may be grasped from another point of view ; for if we compare, not different states of the same mind, but the minds of different men, we perceive that souls group themselves into three well-marked classes, according as the Emotional, the Intellectual, or the Active nature is predominant in each. It is an exceed¬ ingly rare thing to find a man in whom all three are perfectly balanced. Many would deny that such a man has ever been seen. § 5. It is a much disputed question, Which of these three forms or modes of self-consciousness deserves to be looked upon as fundamental, i.e. as accounting for and ex¬ plaining the other two ? In other words, in which of the three does Personality centre ? Most British and American Intuitionalists, and all Hegelians, regard intellect or thought as the foundation of the soul. The School of Philosophy called INTRODUCTORY. 7 Sensational, and all modern Materialists, give the primordial place to feeling , which they regard as the root and origin of thought and will. Mystics (of nearly all schools), the German school of Pessimists represented by Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann, and the French spiritualist school founded by Maine de Biran, have fixed upon will as the fundamental aspect of mind. Schopenhauer, of course, means by will mere unconscious desire or striving ; and many Evolutionists (e.g. the English Maudsley1) agree with him in this, ascribing all mental phenomena to a blind “ nisus ” or “ Effort of Evolution.” This form of the doctrine cannot be accepted, of course, by a Christian. But there is the strongest possible reason for accepting the doctrine of Maine de Biran, that the phenomenon of Will is the central and ulti¬ mate fact of personal consciousness, on which the other phenomena of thought and emotion depend.2 3 This principle is of special value in the Biblical and Theo¬ logical developments of Psychology. Delitzsch has discussed it very suggestively in his Biblical Psychology.2, He shows how the Scripture doctrine “ God is Love ” is only another way of saying “ God is Will ” ; for Love and Will seem to melt into identity when each of these indefinable notions is probed to the lowest deep that our consciousness and our powers of thought can reach. Delitzsch’s explanations and illustrations of this point are decidedly mystical, but, for that reason, all the more valuable ; for there is a strong presumption in favour of any conclusion that is reached in common by roads so different as those of Mystics, the French Spiritualists and the German Pessimists. Much light is also thrown upon the deeper speculations of Oriental Philosophy and Theosophy by this explanation of the triplicity of the human Soul centring in Will, and so reflecting the triune existence of the Deity. 1 [ Vide Maudsley’s Body and. Will, especially pp. 190, 191. (London, 1883.)] 2 The theory of Oetinger, the German mystic, is the same as that of Maine de Biran. 3 Vide Delitzsch’s System of Biblical Psychology , pp. 196-208. [2nd English edition, T. & T. Clark, 1879.] 8 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. Hence there is an increasing tendency, among modern Theologians, to recognise Will as the fundamental fact of Personality, human and Divine, and to make the Divine Will the ultimate explanation of the Universe. Martensen frankly avows this doctrine.1 Dorner more than inclines to it ; though, as a thorough Hegelian, he might have been expected to maintain the primacy of Thought unflinchingly. Dr. Harris, of America, makes a sort of compromise between the two positions, by finding at the back of all phenomena “ Thought which Wills.” It is not a very great step from that conception to the conception of Will which originates Thought ; which is precisely the position of Martensen and Delitzsch, and which seems also to be the Biblical doctrine which explains thought as originating with God and not God as originating from Thought. ( Vide the scriptural idea of the Logos which was in the beginning with God.) Methods of Psychological Research. § 6. The question whether feeling, thought, or will is the most fundamental and original in the soul, like every other question in Psychology, cannot be thoroughly investi¬ gated until we have decided what is the right method of psychological investigation. Two methods are open, the Subjective and the Objective; and each has been, and is, used exclusively by rival schools. The Subjective method, or Introspection, called by Locke Reflection, consists in the turning round of mind upon itself, or the interrogation of self-consciousness. It is the old and favourite method of Metaphysicians ; and as such, is unsparingly reviled and ridiculed by the newer school of Positivists. Their objections to it have a certain plausibility, and mark out real dangers and defects of the method, viz. : (1) All subjective investigation is necessarily isolated and individual ; and from it no one can arrive at any certain 4 [Martensen’s Christian Ethics , p. 76. (T. & T. Clark, 1873.)] INTRODUCTORY. 9 truth in regard to any soul but his own. (2) Even for one’s own soul the results of introspection are untrustworthy; for mental states are always changing. We can never fix any fact of consciousness : it vanishes at the very moment of detection ; we can only remember it as something past, and our remembrance is liable to mistake from all manner of accidental causes. Moreover, introspection is apt to trans¬ form the objects which it seeks to observe;1 for, as before remarked, an emotion always tends to disappear whenever thought is actively exercised. However, to both these objections of the Positivist, there is this fair answer, that exactly the same difficulties attach to all the supposed results of positive science. Eor every such science rests, in the last resort, upon merely subjective phenomena of consciousness which are purely individual and quite open to delusion. I have no guarantee, except my own subjective conviction, that anything exists except my own mind. And if the Positivist is content to build all his science upon that frail foundation, he cannot consistently rail at the Metaphysician for resting his Psychology upon the same ground. The Positivist verifies his physical creed by the consenting testimony of a great many separate men, whose senses have borne the same witness. The Meta¬ physician appeals for his psychological facts to the like consenting witness of a great many souls, to whom intro¬ spection has yielded a common testimony of self-conscious¬ ness. (3) There is, however, a third and more serious objection to the Subjective method in psychology, viz. that some of the deepest questions of this science concern the genesis and origin of facts of consciousness ; and introspection can never solve these, because only the formed and developed soul can observe and interrogate itself. Hence what seem to us original and ultimate facts of consciousness may be artificial products of associated or blended elements, the blending of which was the first condition of our ability to perceive them : e.rj. the very notion of self or Personality, as was noticed 1 E.g. as when we try to analyse the phenomena of love or anger. 10 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. before ; the instinct of Duty ; 1 or any so-called Intuition, i.e. immediate knowledge, or direct perception of what is out of self. The justice of this objection will suggest that the Introspective method should not be used alone, but in combination with the other, or Objective method ; which need not be its rival, though it is so represented by all Positivists. § 7. The Objective method has two main lines. The first is through Biology, and consists in the comparative study of mind as one of the phenomena of life ; a comparative study which is analogous to, though higher than, the study of life in a plant, a cell, an organ, an animal, etc. This is the favourite, and the exclusive method of Materialists like Maudsley, Bain, and the German disciples of Darwin (Carl Vogt, Moleschott, Buchner, etc.), who will admit no other source of knowledge about the soul except the observation of its organ, the body, especially in the minute explanation of the nerves and brain. To them Psychology is only one department of Physiology ; and they set a high value upon the results which are to be gained from the comparative studv of mind in little children and animals, and even in plants ; for they always speak of mind as existing, at least in its rudiments, in all living organisms, even the lowest. The extravagance and repulsiveness of their language on this matter, and the immoral and irreligious tendency of the doctrine (which tendency they scarcely seek to disguise) must not prevent us from discerning a certain truth and value in Biological method of inquiry. It is of high utility, when joined to the Introspective method; and it is one great merit of the newest school of English Psychologists (repre¬ sented by Sully and James Ward), that they employ this double method, checking their conclusions in each line by the facts which the other line discloses. The second line of the Objective method lies in the region of Sociology, or social science ; i.e. the study, not of individual 1 [For the Author’s views on this subject (the development of the in¬ stinct of Duty from composite elements), see below, Chap. II. § 24.] INTRODUCTORY. 11 animals, children, or men, hut of many of these in society, influenced and modified by companionship, education, heredity, and so forth. This method has been pursued by a great modern authority in philosophy — Herbert Spencer. It was also the method of G. H. Lewes, who combined it with the Biological line. It is often called the Anthropological method, and is certainly a true and useful means of acquiring psychological knowledge. But if it is followed alone it will be quite as misleading as any other exclusive method. § 8. The true principle is to start with the Subjective facts supplied by one’s own self-consciousness ; bat to regard all these facts as open to correction and explanation from all well ascertained results of observation, alike of the lower creation of other individual men in all stages of development, and of humanity as a whole. But, on the other hand, all such alleged results of observation outside of self must be scientifi- cally verified — not simply assumed or imagined. This prin¬ ciple will not only allow, but will require self-consciousness to have the last word in all matters which fall within its province ; e.g. whether any act or resolve is really voluntary and self-determined, i.e. originated by our own Ego, as one out of two or more things which it was equally in our power to do. Modern materialistic philosophers require us to look upon such supposed activity of free will as impossible, and impugn the veracity of self-consciousness because it so strenuously contradicts their axiom of Determinism. But if self-con¬ sciousness is not worthy to be believed when it testifies that either of two resolves is equally open to us to choose, and that we choose one rather than the other freely (i.e. uncon¬ strained by any power outside ourselves), it is not to be listened to in any of its testimonies, e.g. in that testimony which lies at the root of all positive science, as to the real existency of a Xot-self. § 9. A still more important matter in which the Subjective method alone must be followed, concerns the very singular phenomenon of a Double self-consciousness, which reveals 12 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. itself to every adult mind clearly, and which begins to reveal itself so early in life that very few children can fix the time when they first distinguished between their two Egos. These two “ seifs ” seem quite naturally to accept the names of a higher, better, or true self, and a lower, worse, or usurping self. This phenomenon deserves the closest possible study, for it probably contains the clue to all the deepest problems of Psychology, especially those by which the science of mind is allied to the practical matters of Ethics and Eeligion. We cannot, of course, prove that the phenomenon is peculiar to mankind, and that it does not reveal itself to any brute ; but we have a strong prepossession that it is so ; and men have always been inclined to find the chief distinction between themselves and brutes in this very thing. When Professor Ferrier denies that brutes have self-consciousness, he really means that they have not this Double self-consciousness, this ability to pass mental and moral judgments upon their own states of soul, and to distinguish between two Egos that use precisely the same forms of consciousness and activity, but which belong to different spheres of life, one manifestly superior to the other. The phenomenon itself may be, and is, very differently explained.1 Plato and Aristotle believed that two distinct souls really dwell together within a man. Some Christian thinkers hold that the higher self reveals the separate existence of a spirit which is distinct from soul. Hegelians, who in this matter follow the Stoics, hold that the phe¬ nomenon results from the opposition within our imperfectly developed souls of two principles — the universal, or Divine ; and the particular, or Individual — which are always antagon¬ istic in any finite or imperfect personality. Others again, with Kant, hold that our Higher self-cousciousness belongs to a rational or moral nature, and our Lower self-consciousness to a merelv animal nature ; and that both these natures are combined in every man, though he may not be spiritual in the Christian sense of the word. This last-mentioned is probably the truest account of the matter. Herbert Spencer 1 [See further, Chap. Y. § 45.] INTRODUCTORY. 13 would explain the higher consciousness as being only an artificial and fictitious notion,1 belonging not to a man, but to his ancestry and environment; and he calls it the empirical, tribal consciousness. Positivists and Materialists would in like manner explain away the mystery. But on such a point Self-consciousness must be allowed to speak for itself; and its testimony is, for most men, clear in affirming the existence of two distinct selves within each single soul. § 10. Christian ethics alone furnishes a satisfactory solu¬ tion of this mystery, in its doctrine of the Pall, by which the original unity of man’s soul, made in the image of God, was broken ; so that the “ likeness of Adam,” in which all his descendants have since been born, becomes something different from, and inferior to, the “ likeness of God ” in Adam, wherein alone we find the ideal and perfect type of man. Ever since the Fall, men have lived in two spheres simultaneously, with the possibility of either sinking or rising so as to pass out of one into the other exclusively. And what we call our F better self ” 2 is the ideal or perfect man which we ought to be, and which Christians certainly shall be at the end of their life of faith ; whilst our “ lower self ” is the degraded ego that tends to the level of mere brutish consciousness, and that may sink permanently to that level if the life that is in Christ only be finally rejected. The phenomenon of double consciousness is, no doubt, one that belongs to fallen and sinful intelligences only, and to those only during their state of probation and possible redemp¬ tion. For when we are entirely redeemed, and body, soul, and spirit are all changed into the image of Christ, we shall no more know the strife between a higher and a lower self, but the lower self will have entered into unity with the Ideal Man. And, in like manner, the souls that are finally lost will have “ died eternally,” in the total destruction of that unity, and in the withdrawal of that Higher self-consciousness 1 [See Spencer’s Psychology , vol. ii. pp. 571-577. (2nd edition, 1870.)] 2 [The Author was wont to cpiote Luke xv. 17 (“And when he came to himself,” etc.) as an instance of the recognition in Scripture of this phenomenon of Double self-consciousness.] 14 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. which bore witness concerning it. Their future life will be in the spheres of animal and sensuous existence only ; and it is quite possible that they will be no more conscious of God or of moral obligations, though they may retain all those mental capacities and faculties which (when separated from morality) constitute a nature that is called devilish. This explanation of the mystery of Double self-conscious¬ ness, on the principles of Christian ethics, may be very profitably compared with the Hegelian explanation, which is the only one that approaches it in philosophic completeness and plausibility. The comparison will bring out very strikingly the cheerlessness and vagueness of the highest hopes of Pantheism, and the infinite grandeur and solemnity with which Christian Theism clothes the prospect of eternity, alike for weal and woe. CHAPTEE II. SIMPLE “ FORMS ” OR “ MODES ” OF CONSCIOUSNESS. §11. Most books of Psychology direct attention first, and in considerable detail, to the threefold division of soul which Bain prefers to call its “ functions,” but which the older books described as — (1) Faculties of the Intellect, (2) Emotional capacities, (3) Active powers. The student is generally re¬ quired to analyse and classify the phenomena of consciousness under those three main divisions. E.g. he is bidden to dis¬ tinguish and to trace the relationships of such intellectual phenomena as Sensation, Perception, Imagination, Memory, etc. etc. ; to describe and explain such feelings as Anger, Terror, Sympathy, Love, etc. ; and to ponder the origin and action of Volitions, and the mysterious power of Choice. § 12. Modern text-books, faithful to the prevalent fashion of Biological investigation, precede and accompany these subjective inquiries by elaborate examination of our bodily sense organs and the changes in nerve and in brain, which somehow stand connected with the phenomena of Conscious¬ ness. A modern Psychologist is expected to be familiar with Anatomy and Physiology so far as the nervous system of men is concerned, and he is too often led to believe that when he has learned the co-ordinated laws of body and mind, he has done all that can be done in fathoming the secrets of the soul. 15 16 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. Whereas, in truth, he has not touched the real or pure science of Psychology, hut has busied himself about its Mechanics. Sense organs, nerve tissues, classified faculties, capacities, and powers are merely the outward and inward machinery of consciousness ; the apparatus by which the soul of a man reveals itself. But we desire, if possible, to know the soul itself, and not simply how it works. We are impelled by an urgent and righteous necessity of our nature to ask certain questions which modem Positivism forbids us ever to broach, viz., What am I ? Whence do I come ? What outfit I to he ? Whither am I tending ? Why am I self-conscious ? For what end ? and for what cause ? Some of these ques¬ tions belong to Ethics, others to Metaphysics, others to Theology ; but all of them depend for their successful investi¬ gation upon a previous clear conception of the purely psychological problem, What is the soul of man ? We have already decided, on the authority of self-consciousness, that our soul manifests to us a real independent, self-moving unit, which we call the Ego, or our individual personality.1 But, having fixed that starting-point, we can discern at least four distinct lines of inquiry in which we may pursue the mysterious subject. Of these four, the favourite modern line, viz. that which concerns mere apparatus or machinery, is the least fruitful in itself. We can very well subordinate it to another of the four, viz. the simple forms or modes in which self-conscious¬ ness reveals itself subjectively. This is the first branch of detailed Psychological inquiry. The second concerns the Spheres, or graded realms of consciousness in which our soul can live, i.e. can exercise harmonious functional activity.2 The third branch concerns the different Kinds of activity by which, within each and all of these spheres of life, self- consciousness can assert itself, under each and all of the modes or forms which we have distinguished and correlated in our first inquiry.3 1 [See above, Cliap. I. § 3.J 3 [See below, Chap. IV.] 2 [See below, Chap. III.] SIMPLE “FORMS” OR “MODES” OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 17 § 13. The simple Forms or modes in which self-con¬ sciousness reveals itself are three — the Ideal (or Thought), the Emotional, and the Practical. I. In the first, or Ideal form, we are conscious of ourselves as thinking persons ; we recognise something as not self ; we distinguish differences and agreements in the phenomena both of self and not-self ; and we combine these “ perceptions,” as they are called, in a complex and continued play of thought. This play of thought has certain well-marked features of its own which discriminate it from each of the other forms of self-consciousness. § 14. (1.) It is calm and, so to speak, cold. In mere thinking our personality is not moved, agitated, or excited in any way. Nay, the absence of agitation and excitement is indispensable for the highest and successful exercise of the ideal form. (2.) Thought is under a certain necessity; i.e. although we need not think at all, unless we will to do so, yet when we do think, we must think under certain conditions and laws, the study of which gives rise to two sciences, Logic and Metaphysics. Exj. we can think only under the conditions of Time and Space, the laws of Contradiction, Excluded Middle, Association, etc. (3.) The ideal mode is self-contained, i.e. it does not tend to produce any other and different mode of self-consciousness, nor does it provoke the soul to any excursion towards the realm of not-self. Our thinking self could always and for ever be satisfied with thinking alone, and easily loses itself in pure intellectual abstraction. This comparative simplicity and self-containedness of the ideal form entitles it to the first place in any analysis of the soul, though it is not first either in real importance or in order of temporal emergence. For the primacy in our soul belongs to Will, not to Thought, and self-consciousness is always waked up first by Feeling. But this last fact may be due to our present bodily condition, which makes us dependent upon the world without, and upon our senses for the first stimulation of the world within. In another state of being we may be very differently situated, 18 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. and Thought may take the lead of Feeling, not only in dignity, but also in time ; i.e. we may perceive without the help or the stimulus of any previous sensation. § 15. The apparatus or machinery by which self-conscious¬ ness works in the Ideal form is twofold. One set is purely mental, and belongs to Thought alone. We call it by a collective name, the Intellect, and the old-fashioned Psy¬ chology discussed it under the heads of many separate “ Faculties,” such as Perception, Memory, Judgment, Abstrac¬ tion, etc. Hew-fasliioned Psychology reduces all the activities of Intellect to mere variations and combinations of three laws or principles : viz. Difference, Agreement, and Associa¬ tion. The other set of apparatus is corporeal, and belongs in common to Thought and to Feeling. It is called Sensation, and has been most minutely examined and described by modern psychologists, who have immensely enlarged the old enumeration of five senses. E.g. they classify the sensations of organic life, such as heat, cold, hunger, sex, etc. etc. ; and muscular sensations, such as cramp, fatigue, resistance, etc. It is the special set of five senses, however, which is chiefly important as machinery for awaking and sustaining Thought ; the organic or systemic senses having more to do with the emotional form of consciousness. And amongst the five senses themselves, two are especially connected with the intellect, viz. touch and sight ; and are often called the Objective or Intellectual senses, because they seem intended to give us objective knowledge, rather than subjective pleasure or pain. Two others, taste and smell, are chiefly emotional and sub¬ jective in their characteristics. The fifth sense, hearing, occupies a middle place between these two pairs, and is about equally divided between Thought and Feeling in its ministry and its effects. § 16. Psychologists have long been engaged in discussing the terms Sensation and Perception, and the relation between the two things which they denote. The Intuitionist’s account of the matter is that Perception proper is the consciousness SIMPLE “FORMS” OR “MODES” OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 19 through the senses of the qualities of an object known as different from self. Sensation proper is the consciousness of subjective affection of pleasure or pain which accompanies the act of knowledge. Perception is, therefore, the objective element in the complex state, the element which gives birth to knowledge ; and Sensation is the subjective element, the element of feeling. There is a well-known law concerning these related phenomena, viz. that both of them are always present in every fact of consciousness, but always in an inverse ratio. Psychologists of the school of Bain regard Perception as only a modification of Sensation, i.e. some affection of our body transformed by being localised, or projected outside of ourselves ; and (according to these Psychologists) the great instrument by wTiich this localisation and projection are accom¬ plished is movement. The chance experience of some activity of our motor nerves is enough to turn a sensation into a per¬ ception ; and in this way, Mill tells us, we get our only notion of space, which is purely empirical and borrowed from another empirical notion — time. The latest and mediating school of Psychology recognises a real distinction between Perception as a mental activity and Sensation as a corporeal affection ; but it agrees in many points with the account which Phenomenalists give of the change of Sensation into Perception. Perception, when complete, is said to be the result of three processes — 1st, Assimilation of many separate impressions; 2nd, Localisa¬ tion of these impressions ; 3rd, Intuition of things as real and as outside of oneself. According to this newer school, space and time may well be what Kant describes them to be, viz. necessary forms of thought. § 17. II. Feeling is not a good name for the second Simple form of consciousness ; for it does not express either the vdiole or the chief part of its contents. The word Emotion does suggest the real fact ; viz. that we are conscious of our¬ selves as subjectively “ moved,” excited, agitated. This move¬ ment or vibration of self - consciousness usually oscillates between two poles, which we call pleasure and pain. Almost every different psychologist gives a different classification of the .emotions. Some reduce them to a very 20 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. few primary instincts, pleasures, and pains : e.g. fear, self¬ conservation, desire to propagate the species. Others (and among them Dr. Bain) multiply the list inordinately. A favourite threefold classification is: 1st, The Individual or Personal emotions, — such as fear, hope, avarice, envy, anger, love of dominion, love of approbation, self - esteem ; 2nd, Sympathetic emotions, — such as benevolence and pity ; 3rd, Sentiments, — such as love of knowledge, wonder, curiosity. A very good fourfold division (Martensen’s) is into: 1st, Appetites, — such as fleshly lust, covetousness, love of power, etc. ; 2nd, Passions, — such as anger, fear, suspicion, male¬ volence ; 3rd, Affections, — such as love, sympathy, pity, benevolence ; 4th, Sentiments, — such as wonder, admiration, reverence, pride. Very few of our emotions are wholly subjective, i.e. bounded by the circle of self: melancholy and self-complacency are among the few exceptions. Most of them involve a very clear consciousness of what is not self; and whenever this is the case, the Emotional form is not pure or single, but mixed more or less with the Ideal form. In other words, we rarely feel unless we also perceive. We think about something, and are moved or excited in exact proportion as we think. § 18. Yet we can always distinguish between our Thought and our Emotion; and the two Forms of Consciousness differ in every one of the three particulars which have been already noted in regard to the Ideal Form.1 Eor (1.) Emotion is never calm or cold; its very essence lies in the opposite of these qualities. (2.) Whereas Thought is volitional at its beginning, but when once begun must proceed under absolute, necessary laws, Emotion shows the exact reverse of these conditions. Our Will has no control over the origin of emotions ; we cannot help being moved ; nor can we deny the reality of an emotion, as we can deny the reality of a notion or idea. Yet, when emotions have arisen, they come under the direct control of our Will for direction and modification. We 1 [See above, § 14.] SIMPLE “FORMS” OR “MODES” OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 21 are conscious that we can control, direct, and modify them as ice will. They do not impose themselves necessarily upon us as a logical train of thought does ; but we can even separate ourselves in Will from their continued activity, though we may remain conscious of their presence. We can repudiate and disown them, and so neutralise their influence upon our personality, though we cannot by any act of will destroy them. Or, on the other hand, if we please, we can intensify and perpetuate them, and make them the abiding springs of thought and action, bringing our Personality under the pre¬ dominant rule of one or more of them, according as we choose to experiment with them. This peculiarity of Emotion is of the utmost importance to the Moral Philosopher ; and one of the most valuable results of Psychology to him, and to the moral educator and teacher, is the discovery of the real relations which subsist between Emotion, Thought, and Will. There are great secrets of self- control which every educator and teacher should expound, and which can neutralise those involuntary excitements of feeling to which any one may be exposed through heredity or environment, (3.) Self-consciousness in the Emotional Porm finds no satisfaction in the simple continuance of any appetite, passion, affection, or sentiment. Our thinking self can always be satisfied with thinking. It is not so with our Emotional self, which craves a restoration of its disturbed equilibrium that can be brought about only in one of two ways — (i.) By some reaction between self and not - self, as when Love seeks reciprocation from the beloved object, or as when an Appetite desires to be assuaged in its appropriate food from the outer world ; or (ii.) by means of another mode of self-conscious¬ ness being awakened, e.g, by a new Thought or a fresh Practical Impulse. Hence, whilst pure Thought addresses no stimulus to our Will, and leaves our Personality in undis¬ turbed repose, every emotion makes a direct appeal to our Will, and arouses our entire Personality to some co-ordinated action or reaction. § 19. The apparatus or machinery of Emotion is certainly twofold, like the apparatus of Thought. For we become con- 22 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. scions of all the higher affections and sentiments, and we express these to ourselves by a set of machinery which is purely Psychical, and which does not depend upon our nervous system. If we were without bodies, we are sure that we should still be able to love, pity, wonder, admire, etc. But we know very little of this inner mechanism of emotion ; and all the tendency of modern science is to investigate only the corporeal machinery of Sensation, already referred to. Materialistic Psychologists do not scruple to refer every emotion, without exception, to a material origin in some state of our bodily organism. They have even laid profane hands on Love itself, which Bain boldly affirms to be merely a result of glandular excitement. § 20. The Ideal Form of Consciousness combines with the Emotional to form a very important branch of the soul’s receptivity of impressions from the outer world, viz. all those impressions which we call beautiful. A special sense or faculty seems to be developed for the use of this compound form of consciousness — :the /Esthetic sense or faculty, popu¬ larly known as Taste. The Beautiful is its peculiar object ; beauty being something which appeals to our Ideal consciousness of the true, the fit, or the useful, and also to our Emotional consciousness of pleasure. The Sublime is only another phrase or mode of the beautiful, in which the emotional element is compounded with Fear, yet without becoming painful ; and the Ludicrous is also generally classed with the beautiful and the sublime as a special object of our aesthetic sense. Sight and hearing are the chief corporeal apparatus by which this compound form of consciousness is exercised and subserved. There is a large mass of literature concerning the Theory of the Beautiful ; a question which has occupied philosophers from Socrates to Herbert Spencer. It is, however, only of late years that the term ^Esthetic has been appropriated to this special branch of Psychological science. The ancient Greeks meant by aesthetic “ anything which has to do with perception by the senses.” Kant also keeps to this old nomenclature in his discussion of “ Transcendental /Esthetic, ” SIMPLE “FORMS” OR “MODES” OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 23 i.e. of the a priori principles of all sensuous knowledge. Now, however, the term is almost invariably restricted to the Science of the Beautiful, and the Theory of what are called the Fine Arts ; matters which pertain equally to the province of Thought and the province of Emotion. § 21. III. The third simple Form of Consciousness is the Practical or Yolitional. In it we are conscious of ourselves as acting. We assert ourselves as the centre and the source of Free Power, which we really put forth : whether it be in resisting or accepting some impression of the world outside, or some emotion that has arisen within our own soul ; or in originating some train of thought or action ; or stopping or diverting the same. Neither of the other two Forms of Consciousness can be exercised apart from such self-assertion ; and this is why Personality is said to have its seat in the Will rather than in Thought or Emotion. The mere utterance of the word “ I,” implies that a Yolitional Self-Consciousness has arisen ; in other words, that Personality is now complete. Until this full development of Consciousness has taken place, Thought is a mere vague dream, and Emotion is an unrealised and unlocalised disturbance of something that is not recognised as a true Self. Therefore the centre of Personality is correctly traced to Will, which, by its conscious effort, causes the soul for the first time to say, “ I think,” “ I feel.” § 22. This consideration opens up a very interesting and very difficult field of inquiry, i.e. into the sub-conscious or obscure phenomena of the soul ; a matter that has of late attracted considerable notice from Psychologists of the Sen¬ sational and Associational schools. But their conclusions, which tend to the ignoring of a true Will, and the explanation of everything by chance or fate, are not nearly so satisfactory as those arrived at three-quarters of a century ago (1811) by the French philosopher Maine de Biran, who traced the rise of Self-consciousness out of the chaos of confused impressions which seemed to make up the earliest period of human existence, so far as we can judge from observation of infants, 24 LECTURES ON PSYCHOLOGY. and from reflecting on our own mental history. We see in infants spontaneous movements, which, in all likelihood, the child does not recognise as its own, though they undoubtedly originate in that nervous machinery through which, in the full-grown man, Volition works. But sooner or later the infant becomes conscious of itself in the effort of its Will to overcome some resistance of its own body, which, though linked to the soul is not the soul, but a part of the Non-Ego, the external world. This is the emerging point of Personality, and a manifestation of all its three Forms. But it would be very wrong to say, with modern Sensationalists, that it is the occasion of a purely fictitious and artificial faculty which we call Will, but which is really nothing more than “ an adhesive growth through which feeling can afterwards com¬ mand movement ” (Bain). On the contrary, the experience described is the clear revelation of a real Power and originat¬ ing Cause, under which Feeling, more than any other Form of Consciousness, ranges itself as a servant under its natural lord. This conscious effort of Will, by which the Ego is clearly distinguished from the Non-Ego, and the soul from its mate¬ rial dwelling-place and organ, the body, is well known to every one under the name of Attention. Attention is the active self-direction of the mind to any object, or the focussing of consciousness on some definite and restricted area. True Thought is impossible except as the result of such attention ; and Emotion never rises into real consciousness apart from a voluntary recognition of it. Hence we are brought again to the conclusion that Will is the primary centre of the soul. § 23. We know nothing as to the purely psychical appara¬ tus by which the Volitional Form of Consciousness makes itself manifest. Nor does Physiology give us any help in tracing the link which connects a Volition with that nervous system of machinery to which an anatomist gives the name Motor, and by which we give bodily expression to our thoughts, feel¬ ings, and resolves. But there are two great facts of which we are beyond all question conscious in regard to our Will, and SIMPLE “ FORMS” OR