6//i/7r PRINCETON, N. J. y^^ULl^lJ ^U^t^ thus depending en- tirely on his will, is known to him, because he decreed it should be." (Hill.) "Every action and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was ordained of him. "All things come to pass by his ordination and decree." (Calvin.) oiiAi*. II. j god's eternal decrees. 2£» "But, since he forsees future events only in consequence of his decree that they shall happen, it is useless to contend about foreknowledge, while it is evident that all things come to pass rather by ordination and decree." (Calvin's Insti- tutes, vol. i, p. 170.) "Reason and revelation are in perfect unison in assuring us, that God is the supreme, independent, first cause, of whom all secondary and inferior causes are no more than the effects." (Toplady on Predestination, p. 17.) In this, and the following quotations from Toplady, we have also the sentiments of Zanchius, as Toplady but trans- lates Zanchiusp "It may seem absurd to human wisdom, that God should harden, blind, and dehver up some men to a reprobate sense — that he should first deliver them over to evil, and then condemn them for that evil ; but the believing, spiritual man sees no absurdity in all this, knowing that God would be never a whit less good, ei:en though he should destroy all men." (Toplady on Predestination, p. 53.) "Though he [God] may be said to be author of all the actions done by the wicked, yet he is not the author of them, in a moral, compound sense, as they are sinlul, but physically simply, and sensu divisQ, as they are mere actions, abstractly from all consideration of the goodness or badness of them." (lb., p. 54.) "Hence, we see that God does not immediately and ^^^r se infuse iniquity into the wicked, but powerfully excites them to action, and withholds those gracious influences of his Spirit, without which every action is necessarily evil." (lb., p. 55.) "Every action, as such, is undoubtedly good, it being an actual exertion of those operative powers given us by God for that very end. God may, therefore, be the author of all actions, and yet not be the author of evil." (Ib.,^. 66.) "Whatever things God wills or does, are not willed and 3 26 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. (lone by hira, because they were, in their own nature, and previously to his willing them, just and right, or be- cause, from their intrinsic fitness, he ought to will and do them; but they are, therefore, just, right, and proj)er, because he is holiness itself, wills and does them." (lb., p. 63.) "We make God the arbiter and governor of all things, who, in his own wisdom, has, from the remotest eternity, decreed what he would do, and now, by his own poioer^ executes what he has decreed. Whence we assert, that not only the heavens, and the earth, and inanimate crea- tures, but also the deliberations and volitiwis of men, are so governed by his providence as to be directed to the end appointed by it." (Calvin's Institutes, vol. i, p. 191.) " It should be considered as indubitably certain, that all the revolutions visible in the world proceed from the secret exertion of the Divine power. What God decrees must necessarily come to pass." (lb., vol i, p. 194.) "I admit more than this: even that thieves, homicides, and other malefactors, are instruments of Divine providence, whom the Lord uses for the execution of the judgments which he has appointed." (lb., p. 200.) "They consider it absurd [they whose views Calvin opposes] that a man should be blinded by the will and command of God, and afterward be punished for his blindness. They, therefore, evade the difficulty, that it happens only by the permission, and not by the will of God; but God himself, by the most unequivocal declara- tions, rejects this subterfuge. That men, however, can effect nothing, but by the secret will of God, and can deliberate on nothing, but what he has previously decreed, a ad determined by his secret direction, is proved by ex- ])iess and innumerable testimonies." (lb., p. 211.) " "rtie whole may be summed up thus : that, as the will of God is said to be the cause of all things, his providence CHAP. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 27 is establislied as the governor in all the counsels and works of men; so that it not only exerts its power in the elect, who are influenced by the Holy Spirit, but also compels the co?npliance of the reprobates.'^ (lb., p. 215.) *' God's sovereign decree is the first link, his unalterable decree tha second, and his all active providence the third, in the great chain of causes. What his will determined, that his decree established, and his providence, either me- diately or immediately, eflPects. His will was the adorable spring of all, his decree marked out the channel, and his providence directs the stream. If so, it may be objected, that whatever is, is right. Consequences cannot be helped." (Toplady on Predestination, p. 19.) "But does not this doctrine tend to the establishment of fatahty? Supposing it even did, were it not better to be a Christian fatalist, than to avow a set of loose Arminian principles, which, if pushed to their full extent, will inevitably terminate in the rankest Atheism ? For without predestination there can be no providence; and without a providence, no God. After all, what do you mean by fate ? If you mean a regular succession of detennined events, from the beginning to the end of time — an uninterrupted chain, without a single chasm — all depending on the eternal will and continued influence of the great first cause — if this is fate, it must be owned that it and the Scripture predes- tination are, at most, veiy thinly divided, or, rather, entirely coalesce." (lb., p. 22.) "God's foreknow^ledge, taken abstractedly, is not the sole cause of beings and events; but his will and /ore- knowledge toff ether.'' (lb., p. 27.) "Whatever comes to pass, comes to pass by virtue of the absolute, omnipotent will of God, which is the primary and supreme cause of all things." (lb., p. 32.) " The will of God is so the cause of all things as to be itself without cause; for nothing can be the cause of tnat 28 god's eternal decrees. [ciiAr, ji. which is the cause of every thing. So that the Divine will is the ne ^o^ws ultra of all our inquiries. When we ascend to that, we can go no further. Hence, we find every ixiiitter resolved, ultimately, into the mere sovereign pleasure of God, as the spring and occasion of whatsoever is done in heaven and earth. And no wonder that the will of God should be the mainspring that sets all inferior wheels in motion, and should likeAvise be the rule by which he goes in all his dealings with his creatures, since nothing out of God, exterior to himself, can possibly induce him to will or nill one thing rather than another." (lb., p. 34.) "God is a being whose will acknowledges no cause; neither is it for us to prescribe rules to his sovereign pleasure, or call him to account for what he does. He has neither superior nor equal; and his will is the rule of all things. He did not will such and such things, because they were, in themselves, right, and he was bound to v/ill them ; but, therefore, equitable and right, because he wills them." (lb., p. 35.) "Whatever man does he does necessarily, though not w^ith any sensible compulsion ; and that we can only do what God, from eternity, willed and foreknew we should." (lb., p. 41.) "That man fell in consequence of the Divine decree, we prove thus. . . . Surely, if God had not willed the fall, he could, and no doubt would, have prevented it. But he did not prevent it : er(/o, he willed it. And if he willed it, he certainly decreed it; for the decree is nothing else but the seal and ratification of his will. He does nothing hut what he decreed, and he decreed nothing which he did not will ; and both will and decree are absolutely eternal, though the execution of them both be in time." (lb., p. 84.) "Now, it is self-evident, that if he [God] knows sll things beforehand, he either doth approve of tliem, or he doth CHAP. II. J god's eternal decuees. 29 not approve of tliem; that is, he either is willing they should be, or he is not willing they should be. But to will that they should be, is to decree them. ''The Arminians ridicule the distinctions between the secret and revealed will of, or, more properly expressed, between the decree and law of God; because we say he may decree one thing and command another. However, if they Avill call this a contradiction of wills, we know that there is such a thing ; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We know that God willed that Pharoah's heart should be hardened, and yet that the hardness of his heart was sin." (Edwards, vol. v, p. 25.) "All the actions of men, even those which the Scripture holds forth to our abhorrence, are represented as being com- prehended in the great plan of Divine providence. I du not mean merely that all the actions of men are foreseen by God — of this the predictions in Scripture offer evidence which even the Arminians admit to be incontrovertible— but I mean that the actions of men are foreseen by God, not as events independent of his will, but as originating in his determination, and fidfilling his purpose." (Hill, vol. v, p. '71. Any number, almost, of similar quotations might be added to the list, but it is unnecessary : all the standard Calvinistic authors since the days of Augustine, some with greater and others with less caution, express themselves upon this point in about the same manner. We cannot SHy 60 much for their uniformity when it comes to the details of explanation and defense — ^here, indeed, truth constrains us to say, we find what appears to our mind great confusion, perplexity, and contradiction, arising out of the difficulties of the doctrine; and if we should be unfortunate in noi, precisely apprehending it, I hope it will not be ascribed to willful blindness, seeing that its friends differ so much in regard to it. 30 GOD S ETERNAL DECREES. [cHAP. II If I understand the meaning of the above quotations at all —and the language is so plain and unambiguous that it would certainly be difficult to misunderstand, particularly when taken in connection with other parts of the Calvinistic system — it may thus be summed up : 1. Whatsoever comes to pass in time was decreed uncon- ditionally and unalterably before time. 2. Whatsoever comes to pass in time, comes to pass because it was decreed before time. 3. Nothing can be, but what was decreed ; and what was decreed cannot fail to be ; and it cannot fail to be, because decreed. Having defined what we understand to be the doctrine of decrees, as held by Presbyterians — a definition derived from their own Confession of Faith, and numerous Calvin- istic authors of great respectability and authority — I shall now proceed to alledge objections thereto. And, first, I object: it renders the conclusion inevitable that God is the author of sin. I employ the term author in the sense of originator or cause. Do not, I pray you, turn away from this point. I know it has been often urged. I know you have as steadily denied it. I know, indeed, that you have expressly incor* porated your protest in the article of faith itself: "God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; [and now your disclaimer,] yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creature." But this disclaimer by no means relieves my embarrassment — it greatly increases it, by placing you in the attitude, to my mind, of believing a palpable contradiction, namely, that God did cause all things, sin included, yet in such a way that he did not cause sin. It is as though you should say, Lycurgus made all the laws of Sparta, yet in such a way, that there weru CHAP. 11.] god's eternal decrees. 3J many laws of Sparta which Lycurgus did not make. But supposing that the absurdity does not strike your mind with the same force it does mine — or of course you could not embrace it — I shall more particularly present the reasons: and perhaps you can assist me in my conclusions. I reason thus, and the process is exceedingly brief and simple: *'God decreed whatsoever comes to pass;" but sin comes Id pass; therefore, God decreed sin. **What God decrees, must necessarily come to pass;" but he decreed sin ; therefore, sin necessarily comes to pass. " God's decree is the necessity of things;" but sin is something: therefore, God's decree is the necessity, or necessitating cause of sin. God's decree, being from eternity, preceaes all things ; and whatever is in time results from God's de- cree, as its cause ; but sin is in time ; therefore, sin results from God's decree, as its cause. Let me particularize now. The doctrine is, that God decreed, from eternity, whatsoever comes to pass in time — and that according to his own good pleasure — every partic- ular thing, event, and act. I must insist, according to this, that he decreed the sin of every sinful man — nay, each particular sin of each particular man, and all the sins of all men, long before the human race was created ; for if there be any sin which was not decreed, then something has come to pass in time which was not decreed from eternity : but then your system is in eiTor, when it says whatsoever comes to pass in time was decreed from eternity. Do men murder, rob, blaspheme, commit adultery, incest, idolatry ? It was so decreed before they were bom : they CDuM no more avoid it than they could resist the fiat of Omnipotence, or subvert the purposes of the Almighty. Indeed, the decree to create them was connected with a decree, that when, and as certainly as, created, they should commit these sins, and their creation was in order to their sins. 32 god's eternal decrees. [chap. ii. Snail I be told, that, though all things come to pass b'* decree, yet that the decree is not the cause of their occur- rence — not the efficient reason why they occur? Then 1 desire to know precisely what Oalvinists mean by the terms, decree, predestinate, foreordain — whether any thing can, or could possibly come to pass without being decreed — whether, after being decreed, any thing can fail to come to pass — whether decree proceeds upon foreknowledge that certain things will come to pass, and are, therefore, decreed simply as certain because foreknown — whether, in a word, there is any connection between God's decree and the thing decreed, and what that connection is. I understand, from the most respectable Calvinistic authorities, already quoted, that the decree of God, and the event decreed, stand related as cause and effect — that the event necessarily answers the decree — that the whole universe, indeed, including all beings, events, and acts, arises out of the decree or prede- termination of God. This being the case, it will be per- ceived, inevitably, by the simplest process of reasoning, that sin results, g,s an effect, from the Divine decree, as its cause. Shall I be told, that, though God, by his decree,' is the cause of sinful acts, yet he causes not the sin of the act? This seems to be the view of the expositor of the Confes- sion. He says, "The decree of God is either effective or permissive." He does not tell us in what sense he employs the term permissive — a point I should like to have ex- plained — ^but he proceeds to tell what his permissive decree respects. "His effective decree respects all the good thai comes to pass — his permissive decree all ihe evil that h in sinful actions." Now observe: "We must distinguish between actions purely as such, and the sinfulness of the actions. The decree of God is effective (causal) with respect to the action itself, abstractly considered ; it is permissive with respect to the sinfulness of the act as a moral evil." The same sentiment I find in various other CHAT. II.J god's eternal DECREES. 33 autliors; and, indeed, I find it a common and favorite mode of explanation. It is thus stated by Hermin Witsius, a learned German, in an elaborate defense of his favorite tenets : " As these things are universally true, they may be applied to ihose free actions of rational creatures in which there is a moral evil inherent, namely, that creatures may le determined to their actions hy the efficacious infiuence of God, so far as they are actions according to their physical entity.'" (The various quotations from Witsius are, with few excep- tions, from book i, chap, viil, sec.-xii, to the end.) What am I to understand by all this? There is a disci imination between the sinful act and the sin of the act. This is correct : an act and its sinfulness are certainly distinct. Sin resides in the intention, not in the act. A man ruins his friend, or murders his father : the question of his guilt turns upon his intention. Well, then, is this the meaning of our Calvinistic brethren, that, though God's decree is the effi- cient cause of the sinful act, as an act, it is not the cause of its sin? for the sin is in the sinner's intention in com- mitting it. But, then, a question arises right here, Was not the sinner's intention decreed, also, as well as the act? If you answer no, then here is something which comes to pass in time which was not decreed before time. If you answer yes, and the sin was in the intention, then God, who was the author of the intention, was the author of the sin ; for the sin and the intention are the same. Again : did not God decree that certain acts, if committed ^nth certain intentions, should be sinful? but did he not, also, decree that those very acts and intentions should exist? If so, is he not the author of the sin, both with respect • to the act and intention? If not, is not here something coming to pass in time which was not decreed before time ? There may be some way of escape from this difficulty: I cannot myself perceive it, and must wait patiently U'Y further light. 34 god's eternal decrees. [chap. 11, And again : is not intention an essential part of a mora! act? Can there be a moral act without intention, as an element of it ? if not, then God did not decree moral acts, or he decreed the intention, with all else that constitutes them moral acts. If he did not decree all moral acts, then here is a class of acts which he did not decree ; and so your doctrine is in error, when it asserts that he decreed all things. But if he did decree all moral acts, then he decreed all sins, without exceplion, and as sins, essentially with all that constitutes their sin — the sin itself. Still again : am I told that God is not the author of sin, because he cannot sin — he is under no law, and, therefore, he cannot transgress? Is this the idea? I believe some learned Calvinists take this course to escape the difficulty. If this means any thing, it must mean to discriminate be- tween God's proper, personal acts, and those acts which he causes other beings to put forth. In regard to the first, it is not pretended that God breaks the law personally, by himself personally transgressing it; but this is meant, God is the author of sin in this sense : 1 . He makes a law, the transgression of which is sin. 2. He places creatures under the law. 3. He impels them to those acts of transgression which are sinful. Thus he causes sin, by causing his crea- tures to transgress the law under which they were placed. The act of transgression, in this case, is God's own proper, ihough not personal, act; and if there be any sin, he is not only the author of the sin, but the sinner himself. This is so palpable I hesitate to dwell upon it, lest it might seem an imputation upon the good sense of my readers. Will you be so kind, then, dear sir, as to tell me how you escape the conclusion to which I am thus impelled — that God is, in the true and proper sense, the author of sin ? All Calvinistic authors, A\dth whose writinsfs I am con- versant, perceive and admit the liability of their scheme to this objection, and do their utmost to escape it ; and, I will CHAP. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 35 add, they certainly display great genius and skill, in con- tending with the difficulty, and do as much to make error seem like the truth as the most gifted intellects can do. The argument may be summed up thus: Whatsoever comes to pass in time, was unconditionally and unalterably decreed before time. But sin comes to pass in time ; therefore, sin was unconditionally — and of course purely of the pleasure of God, and for its own sake — and unalterably decreed before time. God's decrees are the cause of all things that come to pass in time ; but sin comes to pass in time ; therefore, God's decrees are the cause of sin. What results from a decree as a necessary sequence, results from the author of the decree ; but sin results from the decree of God as a necessary sequence ; therefore, sin results from himself. According to this dogma, no man ever did or ever can do any thing, but what it was ordained he should do from eternity; to avoid which is as impossible as to overthrow the decree of God, and which, if possible, would be rebel- lion against God, punishable with death. When I sin, I am instrumentally doing what God chose should be done before I was born ; the thing I do was his choice, and he made me for no other purpose but to accomplish it — decreed It for me, and me for it. From the foregoing argument I can conceive of no escape, unless it be by one of the following method : 1. A denial of the premise, "God decrees whatsoever comes to pass." Will Dr. Rice deny? 2. A denial that God's decree necessarily procures the thing decreed. Will Dr. Rice deny ? 3. A denial that God is author of that which is solely procured by his decree. Will Dr. Rice deny ? For it is undeniable ; no skill can escape the conclusion. If whatever comes to pass was decreed beforehand, and if this preceding decree was the sole necessitating cause of 36 god's eternal decrees. Fchap. II. things so decreed, then the author of the decree is tlie author of all things included therein; and as all thinp's that occur in time are included in the decree, and caused by it, so sin, which occurs in time, was included in, and caused by, the decree. It is by a process of reasoning of the foregoing description, that we are impelled to the con- clusion, that the Calvinistic system renders God the author of sin. If we have misunderstood the system, will the Doctor point out in what particular? If our reasoning is illogical or unfair, will he show us in what respect? I am only conscious of a desire to ascertain the truth, and Avould not, if I could, resort to unfairness, to criminate the system I oppose. And if I were capable of so un- christian a disposition, I certainly could not do it success- fully, observed as I am. May the great Head of the Church himself give us light, and load us into the unity of the faith, and the truth, as it is in Jesus ! 2. I object to the doctrine of decrees, as held by Cal- vinists, in the second place, because it is inconsistent with, and destructive to the free agency of man. The opposers of Messrs. Wesley and Fletcher violently assailed them on this subject. Mr. South ey informs us, in his Life of Wesley, that the Calvinists called the doctrine of free will "a cursed doctrine" — "the most God-dis- honoring and soul-destroying doctrine" — "one of the prominent features of the beast" — "the enemy of God" — "the offspring of the wicked one" — "the insolent brat cf hell." But if they had nowhere admitted it, but in all cases strongly denied it, as I suppose you do, still the difficulty would remain ; for it grows out of your doctrines inevitably, and is in no sense affected by your admissions or denials. It is to no purpose that you tell me, " God, from eternity, unconditionally and unalterably decreed Avhatsoever comea to pass, yet so as tliereby violence is not offered to tho CUAF. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 37 will of the creature," becciuse this again strikes my mind only in the light of a contradiction. It is as though you told nie God determined what each distinct volition should necessarily be, yet in such a sense that any volition might have been different from what it is — it is necessarily what it is — it is not necessaj'ily what it is. But, not to consume your time with what may be con- sidered my own representations of your views upon this point, let me refer to authorities, high in your esteem, and of unquestionable information. "Neither does God only excite and predetermine the will of men to vicious actions, so far as they are aetions, hut he likewise so excites it, that it is not j^ossible but, thus acted upon, it shall act.'' (Witsius.) ** Moreover, as a second cause cannot act, unless acted upon, and previously moved to act, by the predetermining mfluence of the first, so, in like manner, that influence of the first cause is so efficacious, as that, supposing it, the second cause cannot but act." (Witsius.) It would certainly be very inexcusable to misunderstand these quotations, so clearly and definitely expressed as they are; and scarcely less inexcusable not to admire the sturdy candor of their learned author in so plainly delivering him- self upon such a point. Second causes, among which he reckons the human will, cannot act, unless, and only as acted upon — when acted upon they must act. This was saying much ; but, to let us know that he was fully apprised of the consequences, he goes still further. Not only does God excite the will of men to vicious actions, but, thus excited, it is not possi- ble it shall fail to act— it is under inexorable necessity. In the Old and New Divinity Compared, I read, "For if God does not possess such absolute control over his creatures, that he can govern them according to his pleas- ure, how could he have decreed any thing unconditionally 38 god's eternal decrees. [chap. ii. concerning them, since it might happen, that, in the exercise of their free agency, they would act contrary to the Divine purpose ?" If this paragraph means any thing, it plainly means that unconditional decrees and free agency are irreconcilable; and as all things are unconditionally decreed, according to the system, there can, of course, be no free agency. In the trial of Dr. Beecher, Dr. Beecher accuses Dr. Wilson as follows : '' Dr. Wilson has made a distinct avowal that free agency and moral obligation to obey law, do not ifbclude any ahility of any kind.''^ To which Dr. Wilson replied directly in so many words, "With respect to fallen man I do!" "Now," says Dr. Wilson, "let us look at the doctrine of the Confession with this principle in view, that the state of the man determines the will. The will is always at liberty : choice is an effect always, and not a cause ! It is always produced freely. There is no such thing as bound will. Hence, all do what is good or evil voluntarily, ic view of a motive, and according to the state of mind in which they are. Take man in a state of innocence. God made him upright; in his own image; his choice is free, and he chooses what is right ; but not from any 'power in the will. The will, as I have said, has no power to operate on any thing but the body. His uprightness was in the right state of the affections, and the luminous state of the understanding — in the correct state of the memorj^, and in his entire moral rectitude in the divine image. His will was free to do good while no temptation was presented to it. He had no motive but his accountableness to God, and his love to God. His will operated according to the state of the man. But now look at him in another state — the state of temptation. Motives are now presented to him by the arch tempter, but not to his will at all ; they are presented to his understanding and appetites — to his taste for beauty. ^J'hc fruit is pleasant to the eye; and what was the effect? cnAv. II.] god's eternal decrees. 89 The will was not trapped in any other way than this : the temptation addressed to these powers was so strong, that it overcame the dictates of judgment, and the man chose wrong. Volition moves the body: the mind moves the will; and the mind is moved by that without, which is adapted to its constitution." Now who moved that with- out, and made the constitution? The foregoing is the language of Dr. Wilson, who, for forty years, occupied the First Presbyterian Church in this city, and during his long life a prominent man in the Church of the west: certainly, for ability and oppor- tunity, inferior to none of his school, and therefore as reliable an exponent as any other. But now observe his honest and candid admission, on an occasion when, of all others, he would be most accurate, and on a point where he would be most critically prepared: "Free agency and moral obligation to obey law, [with respect to fallen man,] do not include any ability of any IcindP^ According to this, free agency, as held by Calvinists, does not include ability of any kind. A man is a free agent, though he have no power at all ! He is also responsible to obey law, though he have no ability of any kind to do so ! But he more fully unfolds his view, as above, and no one can read the quotation, it seems to me, without sympa- thizing with the sincere and able author, in the manifest confusion and self-contradictions in which he involves him- self. "The will is always at liberty;" yet its choice is always caused by a foreign agent! "When the mind chooses it always chooses freely;" yet it has no kind of ability whatever, but is ruled by the motives in every case ! "There is no such thing as bound will;" but it is always an effect, and not a cause ! Observe, further, his philoso- phy of the will. Dr. Wilson carries back beyond or behind the fall. Of man, in innocence, he says, "His will was free to do good while no temptation was 2'>'i'€Sinted to it;^* 40 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. but what is implied in this? When temptation came, the will was not free to do good, but bound to do evii, or to yield! This, indeed, he does not leave us to infer, but expressly s'tates that the temptation presented to the first pair was such that it overcame, by its strength, the mmd — " the mind moves the will, and was itself moved by that without;" and thus man fell under the force of a temptation, which he had no power to resist. He fell, therefore, when, under the circumstances, he had no power to stand ! And yet he Avas free in doing what he had no power to avoid ! 1-. The expositor of the Confession, in his notes on the article respecting the will, holds this language: "Accord- ing to Calvinists, the liberty of a moral agent consists in the power of acting according to his choice; and those actions are free Avhich are performed without external compulsion — physical compulsion — in consequence of the determination of his own mind. The necessity of man's willing and acting, according to his apprehension and dis- position, is, in their opinion, fully consistent with the high- est libei'ty which can belong to a rational nature. As nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, the acts of the will are never without necessity — understanding, by necessity, an infallible connection with something fore- going." This I understand to be the doctrine of all Cal- vinists respecting the will of man, as well before as since the fall ; it is often expressed in stronger language. Now, this view of the will utterly discards this idea of liberty — power to choose either of two alternatives. Here is the real point of difference between us and them : with them liberty is necessity to choose one way according to the motive, but not power to make an opposite choice: with us it is a power to choose either of the various alter- natives presented to the mind. Now, upon their doctrine of the will, 1 base an argument that its decisions are CHAP. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 41 necessitated, and not free; a^, hence, that it is absurd for a Calvinist to contend for freedom. Take a man in a state of innocence — for we desire to give the advocates of tlie system the most favorable opportunity to defend themselves — the question is. Was man capacitated with freedom to stand or fall, in the circumstances ? And, ac- cording to the Calvinian system, the answer must be, he was not • for he was so constituted that he must yield to the prevailing disposition or strongest motive. He could not avoid this — it was his nature. He had no control of these motives, and when they came upon him he as neces- sarily was moved by them, as the needle is moved to the pole ; it matters not that he chose to move with the influ- ence ; for the want of liberty and the fact of necessity were found in the circumstance, that he had no control of his choice : he made his choice necessarily. j^ow, I ask Dr. Rice, what does control the choice ? He must answer, whatever goes to constitute the prevailing motive. But then I ask, who controls and governs these motives ? And he must answer, that all things are arranged and governed by God himself : God controls the motives : the motives control the man. He sins, necessitated by the motive. And, now, where do we find the first cause ? Kot in the choice ; for it was an effect : not in the motives ; for they were under the government and control of God. Here, then, we trace the operations of man's will back to God : not as permitted, but procured. If the Calvinists can trace it beyond God, they may free their system from making God the first cause of sin ! Thomas Aquinas, quoted with approval by Witsius, says, *' It is essential to the first principle, that it can act without the assistance and influence of a prior agent; so that, if the human will could produce any action, of which God was not author, the human will would have the nature of a nrst principle. . . . Nor does God only concur with tlie 4 42 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. jictions of second causes, when they act, but, also, mfluences the causes themselves to act." " Calvinists contend that, as nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, the acts of the will are never contin- gent, or without necessity — understanding, by necessity, a necessity of consequence, or an infallible connection Avitli something foregoing." (Expositor of the Confession.) This is plain language. The will never acts but as neces- sitated by a foregoing cause, infalhbly producing the act. That foregoing cause was decreed by the divine Being, to produce that precise volition ; and it produced it with all the certainty of a necessary effect. That is, the will is free to act in agreement with the irresistible bias of a necessi- tating cause. This is the same scheme, if I understand them, taught by Mr. Edwards, and his numerous admirers, in their fruitless effort to reconcile freedom and necessity. " The plain and obvious meaning of the words, freedom and libert}^" says Edwards, "is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases." But he also teaches us thai the vohlion is necessary — his will or particular choice, whatever it may be, is necessarily determined by motive, and the motive is fixed b}^ decree ; so that, though a man do as he pleases, he is not free, because he cannot please to do otherwise, and by necessity, as stern as the most absolute compulsion, chooses as he does. "This doctrine is identical with fatalism, in its worst form. All that fatal- ism ever has maintained, or now maintains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot control or resist, are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but pursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This doctrme never has assumed that in the necessitarian sense men cannot do as they please. All that it maintains is, that they cannot but please to do as they do." "It is altogether futile, then, to talk about free agency riiAP. 11 j god's eternal decrees. 43 under such a constitution ; the very spring of motion to the whole intellectual machinery, is under the influence of a secret, invincible power; and it must move as that power directs, for it is the hand of Omnipotence that urges it on. lie can act as he wills, it is true ; but the whole responsi- bility consists in the volition, and this is the result of God's propelling power. He wills as he is made to will. He chooses as he must choose; for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon him. And can a man, upon the known principles of responsibility, be accountable for such a voli- tion? It is argued, I know, that man is responsible because he feels that he acts freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, that this is a good argument, on our principle, to prove that men are free; but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves that God hath deceived us. He has made us feel that we might do otherwise, but he knows Ave cannot — he has determined we shall not ; so that, in fact, this argument makes the system more objec- tionable. While it does not change the fact in the case, it attributes deception to the Almighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine, that man is not a free agent, and therefore not responsible." "A man chooses what appears to be good," says Mr. Dick, "and he chooses it necessarily, in this sense, that he could not do otherwise. The object of every volition is to please himself; and to suppose a man to have any other object, that is, to will any thing that does not please him in itself, or in its circum- stances, is absurd : it is to suppose him to will and not to W\\\, at the same time. He is perfectly voluntary in his choice; hut his ivillingness is the consequence of the view which his mind takes of the object 2^'>'esented to it, or of his vrevailiny dis2Josition. "Those actions are free which are the effect of volition. In whatever manner the state of mind which gave rise to the volition has been produced, the liberty of the agent is 44 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. neither greater nor less. It is the will alone which is to be considered, and not the means by which it has been deter- mined. If God foreordained certain actions, and placed men in such circumstances that the actions would certainly take place, agreeably to the laws of the mind, men are, nevertheless, moral agents, because they act voluntarily, and are responsible for the actions which consent has made their own. Liberty does not consist in the power of acting 01 not acting, but in acting from choice. The choice is determined by something in the mind itself, or by something external influencing the mind; but whatever is the cause, the choice makes the action free, and the agent accountable. If this definition of liberty be admitted, you will perceive that it is possible to reconcile the freedom of the will with absolute decrees ; but we have not got rid of every difficulty. By this theory, human actions appear to he as necessary as the motions of matter, according to the laios of gravitation and attraction : and man seems to he a machine, conscious of his movements, and consenting to them, hut impelled hy some- thing different from himself.'^ This is the deplorable conclusion to which Mr. Dick himself comes. And his only effort to extricate himself is this: "Upon such a subject no man should be ashamed to acknowledge his ignorance." Several things are remarkable in this paragraph. 1. Liberty and necessity are the same thing. 2. Man is accountable for his actions, though he is a machine, and is under a necessity, as that of matter to obey gravitation. The honesty of the reasoner must be admired, while his sophistry is a matter of marvel. Of the same import is the following, which I quote from an author admired more than any other, perhaps, at the present time — Dr. Chalmers: "Every step of every indi- vidual character receives as de'terminate a character from the hand of God, as every mile of a planet's orbit, or every gust of wind, or every wave of the sea, or every particle CHAP. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 4b of flying dust, or every rivulet of flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions; it is absolute and unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its resistless influences to all the minute and unnoticed diver- sities of existence. It reigns and operates through all the secrecies of the inner man. It ffives birth to every imrjpose ; it gives impulse to every desire ; it gives shape and color to every conception ; it wields an entire ascendency over every attribute of the mind : and the will, and the fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of their hidden and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives move- ment and direction through every point of our pilgrim- age. At no moment of time does it abandon us. It follows us to the hour of death, and it carries us to our place, and to our everlasting destiny in the regions beyond it!" I confess I cannot conceive of a stronger assertion of fatalism, with respect to man and things, than is contained in the foregoing remarkable quotations. All mental and physical processes, from the first Hnk to the end of the chain, are connected together in the relation of cause and effect. No man can choose differently from what he does ; and as he acts from his volitions, he cannot act differently from what he does — it is all fixed by inexorable necessity. Is such a being free? Is this the liberty of man? If this be moderate Calvinism, what must it be in the ultra, high- toned type ? If any thing further should be esteemed necessary upon this point, a few selections from Dr. Emmons, a distin- guished divine of New England, and author of an elaborate work on theology, may supply the demand. He says, ** Since the Scriptures ascribe all the actions of men to God. as well as to themselves, we may justly conclude that the Divine o.gency is as much concerned in their had as their good actions. Many are disposed to make a distinction here, and 46 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. to ascribe only tlie good actions of men to the Divine agency, while they ascribe their bad ones to the Divine permission. But there appears no ground for this distinc- tion in Scripture or reason. Men are no more capable of acting independently of God, in one instance, than another. If they need any kind or degree of Divine agency in doing good, they need precisely the same kind and degree of Divine agency in doing evil. '* But there was no possible way in which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts. And if he pro- duced their bad as well as good vohtions, then his agency was concerned in precisely the same manner in their wrong as in their right actions. His agency in making them act, necessarily connects his agency and theirs together, and lays a solid foundation for ascribing their actions either to him or them, or to both. " But, since mind cannot act any more than matter can move, without a Divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will, to act or not to act, independently of Divine influence. There must, therefore, be the exercise of Divine agency in every human action. " By this invisible agency upon the minds, he governs all their views, all their thoughts, all their determinations, and all their volitions, just as he pleases, and just according to his secret will, which they neither know beforehand, nor can resist, evade, or frustrate." Thus we prove upon the system both that it makes God the author of sin, and destroys the free agency of man. These quotations show v/hat Calvinists themselves teach upon the subject in dispute. They are not our deductions, but their own propositions — not our misrepresentations of their views, but their own carefully-studied and woll-consid- CHAP. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 4*1 ered declarations. They are precisely the inferences we should have made from the premise work of their system ; but they have saved us the trouble and responsibihty, by candidly acknowledging themselves. And now the argument stands thus : Man can only will as he is moved by Divine agency; and when moved by Divine agency he cannot but will; so, therefore, when man wills it is not a free, but a necessitated act. What a man wills he wills not freely, but he wills because another, by invisible power, irresistibly compels him to will. It is not his own act, but it is an act of which he is made the passive subject, by another operating through him, and a power entirely separate from himself. He chooses as he does — as necessarily as matter yields to the law of gravitation — and he is no more free in his choice than the earth is in its revolutions. The choice he makes is no more his free act, than the tendency of the needle to the pole is its free act. It makes no difference that choice is supposed in one case and not in the other, because choice is an effect of a cause entirely out of the man, and independent of him, and so, of course, cannot be his act. Doctor, I wish you would help me here. My difficult}^ as you will perceive, is at this point, to know how a man is free in willing, when at the same time his particular exer- cise of will is an effect of which he is the coerced instru- ment. Will you tell me how this is ? 3. I object to the doctrine, in the third place, because it destroys the accountability of man. This proposition is so nearly identical v^itli the former, if not entirely so, that it only requires to be stated. Freedom and liberty, I believe all admit, are essential to account- ability ; and hence the well-grounded apprehension of our Oalvinistic brethren, at the imputation, that their doctrine is destructive to freedom of agency. 48 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. " To conceive of beings deserving praise or blame," says Dr. Fisk, " for volitions or actions, which occurred under circumstances over which they had no control, and under which no other volitions or actions were possible, and in which these could not but happen, is an absolute impossi- bility. To conceive them under obhgation to have given existence, under such circumstances, to different conse- quents, is equally impossible. It is to suppose an agent under obligation to perform an absolute and intrinsic im- possibihty. Let any individual conceive of beings placed by divine Providence in circumstances in which but one act, or series of acts of will, can arise, and these cannot but arise — let him then attempt to conceive of these crea- tures as under obligations, in the same circumstances over which they have no control, to give existence to different and opposite acts, and as deserving of punishment for not doing so. He will find it impossible to pass such a judg- ment — human intelligence is incapable of affirming such contradictions." Thus, by sapping the foundations of free agency, it, at the same time, destroys human accountability, releases man from all obligation, and renders God the only responsible being in the universe. I would not press illegitimate results upon your system, to give you the trouble of examining, and the unpleasant task of refuting and correcting them ; but these, which I present, strike me as so plain and inevitable, and of such force, that you must excuse me for urging them upon your notice. This point — how am I to escape it ? You tell me, that whatever I do, during my whole exist- ence, comes to pass by a decree of God — which decree is the necessitating cause of things. Now, a question here: Am I accountable for doing what, by decree, I am com- pelled to do ? or is the author of the decree accountable ? that is, is the agent or instrument responsible ? It will not CHAP. ii.J god's eternal decrees. 49 do. Doctor, to tell me, that, though the decree must be complied with, yet that I comply freely, inasmuch as I, of choice, do the thing decreed ; because you have told me before, that ray choice is, also, wrought in me, directly or indirectly, by the same great Being whose decree binds me — I am not the author of the choice, but the passive instrument of it. Am I accountable when I do nothing but what I am caused to do, by omnipotent agency exerted upon me ? Do I sin against God when I make the very choice which he works in me? when I do the act which that choice dictates ? And, when I could not have made another choice, or performed another act, to save the universe, must I be damned for ever, for doing a thing I could not help but do? and must I thus be damned by the very being who made me, and necessitated the act for which he thus destroys me ? I desire a plain answer upon these points ? You cannot fail to perceive where my difficulties lie, with respect to your system; and you can easily show, either hoAv they do not bear on the system, or how I may escape the inference, or that the inference is not objectionable. If Dr. Rice denies that God decreed the existence of sin, then he abandons and denies his Confession, which declares that " God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own free will, freely and un- changeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass." If he denies that the decree is the efficient cause of the thing decreed, he antagonizes various authors, quoted in the com- mencement of this chapter, and particularly Calvin, who says, with Augustine, " The decree of God is the necessity, or necessitating cause, of things ;" and, in that case, we hope the Doctor will explain to us what he means by decree — what relation it has to the thing decreed. For the arguments sus- taining this objection against the Calvinistic system, I refer Dr. Rice to my preceding remarks, to which I desire him to 5 60 god's eternal decrees. [chap. It. give n, careful consideration, and then, to point out to me wherein they fail to sustain the conclusion. He admits, equally with mj^self, if the objection is made good, his system is false ; for he alledges precisely the same objec- tion against another system as an insuperable difficulty — as an entirely sufficient reason for discarding it as utterly false. Now, either he and I are at fault, in employing the objec- tion against Universalism, or, if sustained against Dr. Rice*8 system, he is equally bound, with myself, to discard the system so embarrassed ; and if not sustained, he will, by so much as he loves truth and deprecates error, point out in what respect it fails. It will not answer to tell me these things have been often explained, nor yet to deny, or refer to antagonistic pro- fessions and disclaimers — the thing we demand, is to have it pointed out how the system can escape the logical conse- quences we have produced against it. If our logic is good, the system is bad ; if the system is good, our logic is bad. It is a plain point — will the Doctor make his election ? Dr. Rice alledges, as an objection to Universalism, that its advocates " are forced to deny the free agency of man, and to maintain that all his actions are necessary." In proof that this is the case, he quotes from Mr. Ballou, "Man is dependent in all his volitions, and moved by necessity." This he esteems a sufficient objection against Universalism, and I agree with him. But I charge Calvin- ism with including precisely the same doctrine, and refer, for the proof of this charge, to the evidence already ad- duced. Will Dr. Ptice extricate his system ? This same objection he urges against phrenology, in his work upon that subject. He says this system *' denies his [man's] free, moral agency, and makes him alike mcapablo Df virtue or vice." This objection is argued at length, and insisted upon as an insuperable difficulty. He is right. But T charge precisely the same difficulty upon his system — CHAP. II.] GOD S ETERNAL DECREES. 61 both that it " denies free, moral agency," and destro}'^ the distinction between " vice and virtue." He says of man, in the hght of this system, " He is under a physical necessity to act in accordance with the promptings of his cerebral organization, and is incapable of either virtue or vice." Now I charge his system with placing man under a necessity, as stern as that which phrenology teaches ; and, consequently, as certainly destroying both his agency and accountability. I have been astonished to find that free agency is a favorite doctrine with Dr. Rice ; and I now ask him to reconcile it with his system ; and if it cannot be done, admit either that he believes a palpable contradiction, or set aside his system or this doctrine. 4. By destroying the agency and accountability of man, I charge the system further, with destroying the moral character of human acts and volitions — with rendering the terms, vice and virtue, good and bad, as conveying the idea of moral quality — not predicable of man. If the system be true, man is no more a moral being. Do what he may, he is not \^cious — he is incapable to be virtuous. He never sins — he cannot ; nor the opposite. This is so plain to my own mind, that I do not see how it can escape your observation. To argue it, would almost be a reflection upon my readers. It would be to attempt to produce conviction, by argument, of a truth, which I firmly believe no human mind can deny, namely, that a person cannot be worthy of praise or blame, for an act over which he has not, and never had, any control what- ever. Now, sir, I do not believe that any human intelli- gence can affirm such a proposition. Morality supposes agency — the system, by inevitable deduction, denies it; and the two fall together. A greater absurdity can scarcely be imagined, than to affirm a man to be virtuous for an act, the choice and performance of which were coerced upon him — the contrary of which he could not £2 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. have performed, any more than he could usurp the place of the Almighty, and the thing itself he performed only as a passive instrument, operated upon and compelled by Omnipotence. Vice and virtue, which can only be pred- icated of the free original cause, cannot be affirmed of man; but all vice and all virtue, if there be any such thing, according to the system, have God as their centre, or that fate, which the system, as we shall show in due f.ime, more than intimates, is above Jehovah. I find, in casting my eye over Dr. Rice's discussion with Mr. Pingree, several things bearing directly on the points to which I have invited his attention. His fifth article against Universalism is, " That it makes God the author, or cause, of all the sin in the world." He alledges this is a sufficient reason for discarding the system. In this I perfectly agree with him. I also admit that he sustains the objection with unanswerable arguments against Universalism. But now I object precisely the same thing to Dr. Rice's system. I think I have sustained the objection with unanswerable arguments. Will the Doctor show me wherein, if at all, my argument is at fault? And, if not at fault, will he show why he allows the objection to be of sufficient force to set aside one system, and not another equally involved ? The proof he adduces, that Universalism renders God the author of sin, is thus stated : " Universalism maintains that sin proceeds from physical causes, inherent in the human constitution, as it came from the hand of God.** This Dr. Rice denounces "a revolting and blasphemous doctrine." But why so? Why revolting and blasphe- mous? Simply, because it renders God the author of fiin; in this sense, that sin proceeds from physical causes, inherent in the human constitution, which constitution God made. Now, I ask Dr. Rice, does not he maintain that God as CBAP. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 63 ibsolutely created or caused sin as the system lie discards ? That system attributes the authorship of sin to God, by asserting that sin inheres in the nature of man; and God created the nature, and so caused sin. Dr. Rice maintains that God actually decreed the exist- ence of sin, and that his decree was the cause of its exist- ence; so much so, that it could not but be, being decreed, and could not have been without being decreed. Dr. Rice says, "One of the clearest truths in mental philosophy is, that man is a free, moral agent, and, there- fore, an accountable being. It is a truth to which tlie consciousness of every individual bears testimony the most unequivocal." With this sentiment I fully accord; but I charge upon Dr. Rice that he has embraced a system which denies this clearest and most important of truths, to which human consiousness bears unequivocal testimony ; and my reasons for so charging his system have been heretofore presented, (pages 36-48.) Will he show me how to escape the force of these reasons ? I beg the Doctor to believe me -sincere, in asking for light upon these points. I find him discarding two systems of opinions, for the reasons that they make God the author of sin, and that they are inconsistent with the free agency and accountabihty of man. These he esteems sufficient reason for rejecting; so do I. But now I find that he, after all, embraces a system, which I firmly beheve is beset with the same difficulties: my reasons for this belief are already given. If I am right in my view of his system, he Is guilty of inexcusable inconsistency; if I am wrono-, in en-or, my reasonings are incorrect. And now I ask the Doctor to set me right. 5. "I object further: if this doctrine be true, at the final judgment the conscience and intelligence of the uni- verse will and must be on the side of the condemned. ''Suppose that, when the conduct of the wicked sliall 54 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II, be revealed in that day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, namely, that God himself hath placed these beings where but one course of conduct was possible to them, and that course they could not but pursue ; and that, for having pursued this course — the only one possible — they are now to be punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of God and the glory of his power, must not the intelligence of the universe pro- nounce such sentence unjust?" Heaven and hell would equally revolt at it, and all rational beings conspire to execrate the almighty monster capable of such a pro- cedure. Convince the universe that such is the character, and will ultimately be the conduct of God, and he can no more be worshiped, but with hypocrisy, or even con- templated, but with dread, detestation, and abhorrence. I appeal to the consciousness of man — to the philosophy of our nature — to all known processes of thought and feeling — if such would not necessarily be the verdict of humanity. They that enter into heaven, and they that de- part to hell, from a judgment-seat where such a principle determines destiny, must go bearing the same sentiment — the same feeling of disgust and horror of the gigantic tyranny ruling over them. Hell would be a refuge from the presence of such a being — its woes a respite from the deeper alarms of his hated and dreaded intercourse. In the name of Christianity, I protest against a principle involving such blasphemy. It is impossible that the ever- blessed God should be remotely liable, by any thing he has done — by any thing discoverable in his works — by any revelations he has made, either of his character or plans, to such an imputation. Thou glorious Ruler of the uni- verse, what blasphemy of thy blessed name can equal this for enormity — to charge that, for the glory of thy sover- eignty, and to manifest thy power, thou art now damning millions of helpless creatures in hell for ever, for no cause, CHAP. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 55 but doing precisely what thou didst compel them to do, and what they could not possibly avoid ! 6. Nay, more : I charge the doctrine, not only with putting a plea in the sinner's mouth, at the day of judg- ment, but, also, with furnishing him with a plea, when he is brought before earthly courts, to answer for his crimes. These, indeed — earthly courts — if Calvinism is true, are only lesser parts of the stupendous economy of tyranny. What justice is there in any power on earth — what right, to try, condemn, and punish men, for any of their acts, if they could not, by any possibility, avoid them — if they were impelled thereto by almighty fate? You do not condemn the gun for shooting the man — the avalanche for burying the city — the falling tree for crushing the traveler; but, according to Calvinism, in Mr. Dick's own language, man is as merely passive in the hands of over- ruling power. Why punish him for murder, for arson, or any grade of crime? He is the author of no choice — the sovereign of no act; he is but the instrument of an invisible agent — moving as moved upon, without power of resistance. He is the original in no movement of his life, from the cradle to the grave. Why, in the name of humanity, punish him ? '7. I object to the system further, as involving, by in- evitable consequence, a most dreadful aspersion of the character of God. It gives me no pleasure to prefer such a charge as this against a system, many of whose advocates I dearly love and greatly admire ; and, I will Bay, much less does it give me pleasure to find so much evidence that the charge is well founded. But I do so. Doctor, that you may see how other minds view your system, and that you may disabuse them, if in error. (1.) The system holds, as I think has been clearly shown, that God is the sole, original, voluntary author of sin — that he chose its existence when as yet it did not exist, and 66 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. decreed it when, but for his decree, it never could have been — thus declaring that he preferred some sin to universal holiness, if, indeed, his own decree was his choice — thus insulting the purity and holiness of God — making him, not, indeed, the most holy, but the only unholy being in the universe — the cause and source of all impurity, as he is the cause of all creatures. (2.) It asperses the goodness and benevolence of God, and invests him with all the attributes of sheer cruelty and maliciousness; because it holds that he made the universe as it is, and, for his own pleasure and glory, plunged it himself into all the miseries, temporal and eternal, which it endures, or is to endure. It will not do to tell me, that these miseries are the just punishments of sins, for you told me he caused the sins ; and if he caused them, and damns the universe for them, it renders the cruelty more revolting. (3.) It asperses the justice of God; for it tells me, that God will destroy many of his creatures in hell for ever, with unimaginable torments, for not performing absolute impossibilities, and for doing acts which were utterly una- voidable — acts which he himself caused. What would be the difference between consisfninsf innumerable bcinc^s into hell for ever, who had never put forth a wrong volition, or pei-formed a wrong action, and making them, by Omnipotent agency, first perpetrate these wrongs, and then, upon this pretense, damn them, as supposed in the former case ? Can this be just? (4.) The system asperses the truthfulness and sincerity of God — making him to pretend to be of one mind, when he is precisely of an opposite — clothing him with all the lothsorae proofs of trickery, and hypocrisy, and duphcity, for the purpose of deceiving his hapless creatures as to his own character, and the reasons of his conduct in respect to tliem. It arrays his secret and his revealed will in unavoid- ;».ble and open conflict — the one in unmitigated opposition CHAP. II. I GOD*S ETERNAL DECREES. 57 to the other. He commands one thing, and wills precisely another — enjoins upon certain creatures to do those things, which he not only knows 'they cannot do, but, also, what ho does not will they should do — nay, what he wills they should not do. It puts in his mouth the language, " I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth," when, in fact, they die for his pleasure — makes him to plead and remon- strate with them, as if he would dissuade them from their sin and ruin, when, in fact, he is the very being who urges them irresistibly on to sin and ruin. He commands one thing and decrees precisely the contrary. He commands the sinner to repent, but decrees he shall not. Well, now, when he commands the sinner to repent, either he wills that the sinner should obey and repent, or he does not — if he does not, then he commands the sinner to do what he does not will he should, or he commands him to violate his will ; which command, if the sinner were to obey, he would damn him for ever for violating his will, but, if he does not obey, he will damn him for ever for violating his command. But, agfain: if the command indicates the will of God, so, also, does the decree, or it does not — if it does not, then God has decreed, or purposed, or willed, that that should come to pass, which he did not will should come to pass. But, if his decree is his will, and his command is his will, and these are opposite the one to the other, then God has two opposing wills, or a will in opposition to itself. His will is always done ; and why, then, does he punish one and damn another, when both alike and equally accomphshed his will ? What havoc such a theory makes with the character and government of God ! Is this so? "Is God at w^ar with himself, or is he sporting and trifling with his creatures? A character so suspicious, to say the least of it, ought not, without the most unequivocal evidence, to be attributed to the adora- ble Jehovah. In his word we are taught that *he is of one 58 god's eternal decrees. [chap. II. mind ' — that ' his ways are equal ;' and who can doubt it ? We are told, it is true, to relieve the difficulty, that tliis seemhig contradiction is one of -the mysteries of God's incomprehensible nature. But it is not a seeming contra- diction — it is a real one ; not an insolvable mystery, but a palpable absurdity. God j^^ohibits the sinful act — God jjrocures the sinful act — God wills the salvation of the repro- bate, whom he has, from all eternity, irreversible/ ordained to eternal death.''^ "What does this doctrine make of our heavenly Father ? I shudder to follow it out into its legiti- mate bearings. It seems to me, a belief of it is enough to drive one to infidelity, to madness, and to death." What can be said reproachful of God, of his hohness, of his justice, of his veracity, of his goodness, which this system does not warrant — which does not flow from it as an inevita- ble consequence ? A resort to Atheism, to any thing, would be a dehverance from such dire and deplorable conclusions. I rejoice to know that its advocates do not embrace them; but will they tell us how they do — how we may escape them? Until I am thus relieved, I must hold the system guilty, not only of absurdity, but of enormous blasphemy, in fact, though not of purpose. 8. " God, from all eternity, freely and unchangeably fore- ordained whatsoever comes to pass." Now look at this: If true, then God foredetermined, purposed, and appointed, when as yet there was nothing, and when nothing ever could be without his decree, all the events, acts, volitions, and things of every kind, that ever have been, from the foundation of the world, or ever will be throughout eter- nity — all things, great and small, true and false, consistent and absurd, bad and good, pleasant and disgusting. No contradiction, but what he decreed it. He appointed, in a way that the event must answer the decree, and so because decreed, that all the contradictory views extant in the world should be entertained just as they are — that there should CHAP. II.] god's eternal DECREES. 59 be Atheists, Pantheists, Deists, infidels, Jews, Moham- medans, Pagans, all grades of idolaters and errorists, all varieties of Chi-istians, and sects of philosophy. And these cannot but be, because they were decreed from eter- nity. One man was to pray, another blaspheme, another lie, another rob, another murder, another steal, another commit arson, incest, adultery — one deceive, another be deceived, and all because it was decreed from eternity. All thoughts, all words, all desires, all purposes, all voli- tions, all acts, from first to last, were decreed by God, and in such a way that the event must answer the decree. Now, all this is true, or else Calvinism is false ; for Calvin- ism says, " God, from eternity, freely and unchangeably decreed whatsoever comes to pass." Every thing was included in God's plan, and brought about by his decree. Doctor, do you believe this ? 9. I charge upon the system further, that, if gener- ally believed, it is calculated to obliterate the sense of obligation, as well as the theory and fact of it, and, hence, to generate recklessness and universal indifference. By removing the idea of the possibility of reformation, or, mdeed, of any responsible control over the character and actions, it effectually neutralizes every motive thereto, and lay his glory in their condemna- tion. So, when it is related of the sons of Eli, that they listened not to his salutary admonitions, * because the Lord would slay them,' it is not denied that their obstinacy proceeded from their own wickedness, but it is plainly implied, that though the Lord was able to soften their hearts, yet they were left in their obstinacy, because his immutable decree had predestined them to destruction." (Calvin's Institutes, vol. ii, p. 193.) " Term election most commonly signifies, that eternal, sovereign, unconditional, particular, and immutable act of God, whereby he selected some from all mankind, and of every nation under heaven, to be redeemed and everlast- ingly saved by Christ. It sometimes, and more rarely, signifies that gracious and almighty act of the divine Spirit, whereby God actually and visibly separates his elect from the world, by effectual calling." (Zanchius, p. '72.) *' Reprobation denotes either God's eternal pretention of some men, when he chose others to glory, and his predes- tination of them to fill up the measure of their iniquities, and then to receive the just punishment of crimes, even ' destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from tlie glory of his power.' This is the primary, most obvious, and most frequent sense in which the word is used." (lb., p. 74 ) CHAF. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. " 73 Predestination " may be considered as that eternal, most wise, and immutable decree of God, whereby he did, from before all time, determine and ordain to create, dispose of, and direct to some particular end, every person and thing to which he has given, or is yet to give, being; and to make the whole creation subservient to, and declarative of his own glory. Of this decree actual providence is the execution." (lb., p. 11.) "Consider predestination as relating to the elect only, and it is that eternal, unconditional, particular, and irrever- sible act of the Didne will, whereby, in matchless love and adorable sovereignty, God determined within himself, to deliver a certain number of Adam's degenerate offspring out of that sinful and miserable estate into which, by his primitive transgression, they were to fall, and in which sad condition they were equally involved with those who were not chosen ; but being pitched upon and singled out by God the Father, to be vessels of grace and salvation, they were, in time, actually redeemed by Christ — are effectually called by his Spirit, justified, adopted, sanctified, and preserved safe to his heavenly kingdom." (lb., p. 19.) "We assert, that all men universally are not elected to salvation; so neither are all men universally condemned to condemnation. . . . The Deity, from all eternity, and, consequently, at the very time he gives life and being to a reprobate, certainly foreknew, and knows in consequence of his own decree, that such a one would fall short of salvation. Now, if God foreknew this, he must have pre- determined it; because his own will is the foundation of his decrees, and his decrees are the foundation of his prescience; he, therefore, foreknows futurities, because, by his predestination, he hath rendered these futurition certain and inevitable." (lb,, p. 88.) "All things whatever arise from, and depend upon the Divine appointment, whereby it was preordainod who 74 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [ciIAP. II f. should receive the word of hfe, and who should disbe- lieve it — who should be dehvered from their sins, and who should be hardened in them." (lb., p. 89.) "We assert, that the number of the elect, and also of the reprobate, is so fixed and determinate, that neither can be augmented or diminished." (lb.) "As the future faith and good works of the elect were not the cause of their being chosen, so neither were the future sins of the reprobate the cause of their being passed by; but the choice of the former, and the de- cretive omission of the latter, were owing, merely and entirely, to the sovereign and determining pleasure of God." (lb., p. 112.) " Notwithstanding God did, from all eternity, irreversibly choose out and fix upon some to be partakers of salvation by Christ, and rejected the rest, acting in both according to the good pleasure of his own sovereign will, yet he did not herein act an unjust, tyrannical, or cruel part ; nor yet show himself a respecter of persons." (lb., p. 119.) " Now he [Paul] beginneth to ascend higher, namely, to show the reason of this diversity, which he teacheth doth not consist in any thing else than the election of God ; he doth plainly refer the whole cause to the election of God. and the same free, and such as doth not depend upon men ; that, in the salvation of the godly, nothing might be sought for above the goodness of God, and in the destruction, nothing above his just severity. The Lord, in this his free election, is at liberty and free from that necessity, that he should indifferently impart the grace unto all, but, rather, whom he will he passeth over, and whom he will he chooseth." (Calvin, Com., Rom. ix, 11.) " Although the corruption of nature, which is dispersed over all mankind, before it come into action, is available- enough unto condemnation, whereby followeth that Esau was worthily rejected, because naturally he was the son of CHAP, iri.J ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 75 wrath ; yet, lest any doubt should remain, as though, through respect of any fault or sin, his condition loas the luorse, it was necessary as ivell sins as virtues should he excluded. Surely, true it is, that the next cause of reproba- tion is, for that we are all accursed in Adam, yet, to the end we might learn to rest in the bare, simple will of God, Paul did lead us aside from the consideration thereof, for so Jong until he had established this doctrine, namely, that God hath a sufficient, just cause of election and reprobation in his own will or pleasured (lb.) " God hath elected some, and rejected other some, and the cause is nowhere else to be sought for than in his purpose. For if the difference were grounded on the re- spect of works, in vain had Paul moved the question of the righteousness of God, whereof there could be no suspicion, if he handled every one according to his desert. . . . Before men are born, every one hath his lot appointed, by the secret counsel of God." (lb., chap, ix, v. 14.) " There are vessels prepared for destruction ; that is, be- queathed and destinated to destruction: there are also vessels of wrath ; that is, made and formed to this end, that they might be testimonies of the vengeance and wrath of God." (lb., chap, ix, v. 22.) " There is no doubt but the preparation of them both [elect and reprobate] doth depend on the secret counsel of God ; otherwise, Paul had said the reprobates give or cast themselves into destruction ; but now he giveth to wit, that before they are born they are already addicted to their lot." (lb., chap, ix, v. 23.) " God, from all eternity, decreed to leave some of Adam's fallen race in their sins, and to exclude them from the participation of Christ and his benefits." (Toplady on Pre- destination, p. 105.) "Some men were, from all eternity, not only negativelv excepted from a participation of Clirist and salvation, but 76 ELECTION" AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. posithely ordained to continue in their natural blindness and hardness of heart.' (lb., p. 106.) Such is the doctrine of predestination, with respecc to election and reprobation of men, as held by the Presby- terian Church. It would be easy greatly to increase quotations from their authorities upon this point; but the foregoing are sufficient. And from these, together with the former quotations, we deduce the following, as the sum of their faith : 1. God decreed, from eternity, the fall of Adam, and the ruin or fall of his posterity in him. 2. That, regarding man as fallen, he elected some men, whose names and number were designated, unto ever- Vsting life. 3. That those thus predestinated, were so predestinated, unchangeably and unconditionally, without any reference whatever to their works or character 4. That for these, and these only, he provided a Savior, and all the means necessary to procure their salvation, without aiiy conditions on their part. 5. That the persons thus unchangeably designed, cannot possibly perish, do what they may, but will be irresistibly drawn to Christ, and to justification, adoption, and sanc- tification. 6. With Aspect to the rest, whose names and number are also definitely fixed, that he passed them by in their sins, and predestinated them unto destruction. 7. That they were thus passed and predestinated from eternity, and so were ordained to destruction before they were born, of the good pleasure of God, and to the glory of his sovereign justice. 8. That for these he never did provide a Savior, and that consequently they could not be saved, do what they might. 9. That those reprobated in no respect differed from those elected, and the one class were elected, and the other 611AP. III.] ELECTION AND KEPilOBATION, ^^ class reprobated, of the mere sovereign pleasure of God. without any respect to any difference in them whatever. To sum it all up in a few words, we understand the above to teach, that a certain, definite number of the human race are elected, unconditionally and unalterably, without reference to any thing in them, or to be performed by them, and of the mere good pleasure of God, unto ever- lasting life, so that they cannot perish ; that the rest are so predestinated to eternal damnation, that they cannot be «aved, no Savior ever having been provided for them. To the doctrine thus stated I object, generally, all that has been already urged against the doctrine of decrees, and, particularly, much more which I shall now immediatelv proceed to state. 1. I object to the system, that it makes God the author of man's fall from holiness into sin. This is a point I desire all my readers to give particular attention to, as it has important bearings on subsequent reasonings. The argument upon which this deduction is founded is very brief, and exceedingly pJain. It is this : " God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass." (Confession of Faith.) But man's fall came to pass; therefore, God, from all eternity, did ordain man's fall. " The decree of God is the necessity of things." (Calvin , But man's fall is something; therefore, God's decree is the necessity, or necessitating cause, of man's fall. But I need hardly be at the pains of arguing out a conclusion so palpable that a child could not fail to perceive it, and, withal, a conclusion admitted by the great projector of the system I antagonize. " I confess, indeed," says Mr. Calvin, " that all the descendants of Adam fell by the Divine will into that raif.erable condition in which they are now involved; and 78 ELECTION AND REFKOBATION. [cHAP. III. aHIs is what I asserted from the beginning, that we must always return, at last, to the sovereign determination of {.rod's will, the cause of which is liidden in himself." (Institutes.) Having thus delivered himself, and anticipating objections to his candid statement from his opponents, he thus enters his defense and explanations : " For we will answer them thus, in the language of Paul: * man, who art thou, that repliest against God?' " Certainly a most lucid and satisfactory mode of escaping difficulties ! Let it not be pretended that the fall, though ordained, was ordained as foreseen — decreed because it was perceived as an event that would take place — for this would oppose the system to itself, which teaches that things are not de- creed because foreknown, but foreknown because decreed, also, it would oppose the system where it teaches that the decree is itself the cause of all things — the cause without which they could not be. Shall I be told that, though Adam fell, it was freely — by voluntarily eating the inhibited fruit — in the language of the Confession itself, that, " Our first parents being seduced by the subtilty and temptation of Satan, sinned in eating the forbidden fruit. This their sin God was pleased, ac- cording to his wise and holy c©unsel, to permit, having purposed to order it to his own glory." All this seems plausible enough ; but the slightest scrutiny detects a meaning here not discoverable upon the surface. It would seem to represent that man's fall was his own free and unnecessitated act. But that this is not the meaning, will appear in a variety of ways. If you ask, Could he have done otherwise than as he did? they must answer you, No — God had decreed it thus. He could no more avoid taking the forbidden fruit than he could resist the iecree of the Almighty — fall he must, for Omnipotence CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. *19 arged him on to the catastrophe. If you ask thcrt, what, then, they mean by man's falling freely, they -will answer in the language of the Confession again : " Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power tc will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God, but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it." This agaiL is plausible enough, and would seem to teach that our first parents h.' J power to stand or fall ; but a more narix)w and careful examination shows that this is not their meaning ; for they admit that they could not help but fall, or else they believe that they had power to overcome the decree of God — they may select their own alternative. All they mean, when they speak of freedom before or since the fall, is simply the power man has to do as he pleases — to follow his choice. But now observe, they insist that, when man chooses one thing, he has no power to choose its oppo- site ; for his particular choice was fi^xed by decree. Adam, when he chose to take of the forbidden fruit, could not have chosen to decline taking it any more than he could overcome a decree of God which fixed his choice as it was. He was free, I am told, because he did as he pleased. I answer, he had no power to please otherwise — therein is his want of freedom. His choice, according to the S3^stem, was forced upon him, by placing him in circumstances where another choice was impossible. He fell himself, I am told, by his own act, dictated by his own choice. I answer, the act was decreed from eternity ; and the choice which dictated the act w^ also decreed from eternity; and iie circumstances which made the choice necessary were also decreed from eternity ; and the man was created and placed in the circumstances, that the choice and act, and consequent fall, should necessarily take place. Thus, nel^ ther the act, nor the choice, nor the fall, were free, but all necessitated by unavoidable fate, or decree. God's decree was the sole, original cause of man's fall. I may have 80 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [i^HAP. III. occasion to saj more upon this point to show other revolting aspects of it ; but for the present T pass it to the presenta- tion of other consequences and involvements of the system. 2. I object to the system, in the second place, that it teaches that, when man was thus involved in the sin and miseries of the fall, by God's own agency, he elected a part of the race, whose names and number were definitely fixed, unto everlasting life, without any respect whatever either to their character or deeds, and reprobated or predestinated the residue, whose names and number were also definitely fixed from eternity, unto eternal damnation, and this, also, without reference to their character or deeds. The one part were decreed to be saved not for any thing in them — the other part were preappointed to damnation, not as being Avicked. But in both cases eternal destiny was fixed, without respect to any thing in the creature. Do not, I pray you. Dr. Rice, turn away from this appalling propo- sition. Do not say, in your haste, it is slanderous. Hear my reasons for attributing it to your system. The argument upon which I base this statement is as follows : "Although God knows whatever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such supposed conditions." (Con- fession of Faith.) This clause, as I understand it, teaches that God's decree, that any event shall come to pass, was entirely without respect to foreknoAvledge that such would be the case, and, also, without respect to conditions as a cause moving to the decree. If I am correct in this, and I think I am, then, when God decreed the salvation of the elect, it was entirely without foresight of faith or good works in them — this yon admit, and your Confession expressly asserts : and so, when he willed the damnation of the rest, it was, also, without CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 81 foresight or consideration of sin as a cause thereto — this you deny, and no doubt you will esteem it a misrepresenta- tion of your system. But, if I am mistaken here, all I ask IS that you will point out the mistake in my reasonings. A disclaimer will do no good, unless you can show that it does not result from your system. First, you tell me that God, from eternity, unconditionally decreed whatsoever comes to pass; but the damnation of the reprobate comes to pass; therefore, the damnation of the reprobate was uncondi- tionally decreed. But if it was unconditionally decreed, then it could not have been decreed because of sin, for , that would make sin the condition ; and so your doctrine / Tvould be found at fault, when it asserts that the decrees •; are unconditional. But it is a necessary conclusion, that the decree of repro- bation is without respect to sin for another reason. To suppose it to be upon the foresight of sin is to abandon your system, which teaches that the decrees of God do not proceed from foreknowledge, but foreknowledge proceeds from decree ; for, if the reprobates are decreed to reproba- tion, because of foreseen sin, then is foreknowledge the ground of decree. But, not to take up the time of our readers in reasonings here, it may be shown by numerous references to Calvin himself that this was his doctrine — that neither the salvation of the elect, nor damnation of the reprobate, were ascribable to any thing in the creature, but equally and both to the mere will and pleasure of God — the one part elected to life, and the other to death, simply because God willed it. He says, and I give one quotation as a specimen : " For this he goeth about to bring to pass among us, that concerning the diversity that is between the elect and repro- bate, our minds might be content with this, namely, that it hath so pleased God to illuminate some unto salvation, and blind other some unto death, and not seek any cause above 82 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [CHAP. 111. his wi\.; for all external things which make to the exceca- lion of the reprobate are the instruments of his wrath ; and Satan himself, which inwardly worketh effectually, is so far forth his minister that he worketh not but at his com- mandment ! "Therefore, that frivolous evasion or refuge, which the schoolmen have of foreknowledge, doth fall down ; for Paul doth not say, that the ruin of the wicked is foreseen of the Lord, but is ordained by his counsel and will : as Solomo» also teacheth, that the destruction of the wicked was noi only foreknown, but that the wicked ones themselves were purposely created that they might perish ! " God hath elected some, and rejected other some, and tlie cause is nowhere else to he sought for than in his purpose; for if the difference were grounded upon the respect of works, in vain had Paul moved the question of the un- righteousness of God, whereof there could be no suspicion, if he handled every one according to his desert." It is manifest that Calvin finds the cause of reprobation, as well as election, in the will of God alone, irrespective of Ts^r^rks. The decree of election involves the decree of reprobation. This is clearly and repeatedly admitted by your own authors, and by your Confession itself. " By the decree of God for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and otiiers foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designated ; and their num- ber is so certain and definite that it canijot be either in- creased or diminished." (Confession of Faith.) I need not reinsert the quotations, full upon this point, given heretofore — it is admitted, and, if not, it is unavoidably involved. There can be no election of a part, without an implied and actual rejection of the other part, not elected. To present the case in the most favorable aspect for CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 82 Calvinism, it stands thus : the human race appear before God as a race of miserable sinners, all under sentence of con- demnation. God so beholding them, selects a portion, say, less than one-half, without any reference to character, or any thing else in them — for they are all precisely alike: these he determines to save, or elects them, unconditionally, unto life — sets them apart for himself. The others he passes by, and makes no provision for them whatever, but leaves them, by his sovereign disposal, to eternal damnation. Now this election of a part is, to all intents and purposes, a rejection of the othei part. I state it in a manner certaini\ the least objectionable to a Calvinist. And now, I object to it, even in this favorable aspect, as involving the divine Being in the grossest injustice and criminal partiality. My reasons for this charge shall be given, in a moment. In the meantime, I hear you say. Had not God a right to extend mercy to a part, without bringing him under ob- ligation to extend it to all ? he might in justice have passed all by: he did those no harm, therefore, whom he passed by, because they deserved it ; and that he saved any was a mere act of grace. I am familiar with your eloquent declamation on this point ; but it falls powerless upon my mind for this reason. How came these miserable creatures in their condition of sin and wretchedness? You must answer me. They were put there by the decree of God. First, he put them all in the consequences of the fall, that he might have an occasion to display his grace, in saving some, and to glorify his justice in damning others! He made them sinners, that he might have a pretense to tor- ment them for ever, to the glory of his sovereign justice If you can reconcile this to justice, I should be happy it have the benefit of your assistance here. Upon this point, Dr. Fisk says, **The doctrine of uncon- ditional election of a part, necessarily implies the uncondi- tional reprobation of the rest. I know some, who hold to 84 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. the former, seem to deny the latter ; for they represent God as reprobating sinners in view of their sins. When all were sinners, they say, God passed by some, and elected others. Hence, they say, the decree of damnation against the reprobate is just, because it is against sinners. But this explanation is virtually giving up the system, inasmuch as it gives up all the principal arguments by which it is sup- ported. In the first place, it makes predestination dependent on foreknowledge ; for God first foresees that they will be sinners, and then predestinates them to punishment. Here is one case, then, in which the argument for Calvinian pre- destination is destroyed by its own supporters. But, again, if God must fix, by his decree, all parts of his plan, in order to prevent disappointment, then he must fix the destiny of the reprobates, and the means that lead to it. But if he did not do this, then the Calvinistic argument in favor of predestination, drawn from the Divine plan, falls to the ground. Once more : this explanation of the decree of reprobation destroys the Scripture arguments, which the Calvinists urofe in favor of unconditional election. The passages, for instance, in Romans ix, which are so often quoted in favor of Calvinian election, are connected with others equally strong, in favor of unconditional reprobation. Now, if these relate to personal election to eternal life, they relate also to personal reprobation to eternal death. But if there is any explanation, by which these are shown not to prove unconditional reprobation to eternal death, the same principle of interpretation will and must show that they do not prove Calvinistic election. But I have not done with this objection yet. Whoever maintains that " God foreordained whatsoever comes to pass," must, also, hold to unconditional reprobation. Does it come to pass that some are lost ? Then, this was ordained. Was sin necessary as a pretense to damn them ? Then, this was ordained. From these and other views of the subject, (IIIAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 85 Calvin was led to say, that "election could not stand witli- out reprobation;" and that it was "quite silly and childish" to attempt to separate them. All, therefore, who hold to the unconditional election of a part of mankind to eternal life, must, to be consistent with tliemselves, take into their creed the "horrible decree of reprobation." They must believe that in the ages of eternity, God determined to create men and angels for the express purpose to damn them eternally ! — that he determined to introduce sin, and harden them in it, that they might be fit subjects of his wrath ! — that, for doing as they are impelled to do by the irresistible decree of Jehovah, they must lie down for ever imder the scalding vials of his vengeance in the pit of hell ! To state this doctrine in its true character is enough to chill one's blood; and we are drawn, by all that is rational within us, to turn away from such a God with horror, as from the presence of an almighty Tyrant. And yet, I charge upon Dr. Rice, and all consistent" Calvinists, this appalling dogma. 3. I object to the decree of election and reprobation, still further, that it at the same time renders God a partial being, and destroys entirely the foundation for the doctrine of grace. If it be true there is no grace in the salvation- of the elect, there is great cruelty in the damnation of the reprobate, and God is a most partial being ; and in all these respects the system is opposed to the Scriptures. " To the reprobates there is certainly no grace or mercy extended. Their very existence, connected as it necessarily is with eternal damnation, is an infinite curse. The temporal bless- ings which they enjoy, the insincere oflfers which are held out to them, and the Gospel privileges with which they are mocked, if they can be termed grace at all, must be called damning grace ; for all this is only fattenmg them for the slaughter, and fitting them to suffer, to a more aggravated extent, the unavoidable pains and torments that await them 86 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. Hence, Calvin's sentiment, 'that God calls the reprobate that they may be more deaf — kindles a light that thev may be more blind — brings his doctrine to them that they may be more ignorant — and applies the remedy to them that they may not be healed,' is an honest avowal of the legitimate principles of the system. Surely no one will pretend that according to this system there is any grace in the reprobate. And perhaps a moment's attention will show that there is little or none for the elect. It is said that God, out of his mere sovereignty, without any thing in the creature to move him thereto, elects sinners to ever- lasting life. But if there is nothing in the creature to move him thereto, how can it be called mercy or compas- sion? He did not determine to elect them because they were miserable, but simply because he pleased to elect them. If misery had been the exciting cause, then, as all were equally miserable, he would have elected them all. Is such a decree of election founded in love to the suffer- ing object, or is it not the result of the most absolute and omnipotent selfishness conceivable? It is the exhibition of a character that sports, most sovereignly and arbitrarily, with his almighty power to create, to damn, and to save." Shall it be insisted that the salvation of miserable, per- ishing sinners, is an act of grace ? then we continue, in the language of Fisk, to ask, "Who made them miserable, perishing sinners? Was not this the effect of God's de- cree? And is there much mercy displayed in placing men under a constitution which necessarily and unavoid- ably involves them in sin and suffering, that God may afterward have the sovereign honor of saving them? Surely the tenderest mercies of this system are cruel — its brightest parts are dark — its boasted mercy hardly comes up to sheer justice even to the elect; since they only receive back what God had deprived them of; and for the want of wliich they had suffered perhaps for years. CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 87 And as to the reprobates, the Gospel is unavoidably a source of death unto death. To them Christ came, that they might have death, and have it more abundantly, to the praise of his glorious justice." In the language of Mr. Wesley, "How is God good or loving, to a reprobate, or one that is not elect? You cannot say he is an object of the love or goodness of God, with regard to his eternal state, whom he created, says Mr. Calvin, plainly and fairly, '' to live a reproach and die ever- lastingly.' Surely no one can dream that the goodness of God is at all concerned with this man's eternal state, how- ever God is good to him in this world. What ! when, by the reason of God's unchangeable decree, it had been good for this man never to have been born ? when his very birth was a curse, not a blessing? 'Well, but he now enjoys many of the gifts of God, both gifts of nature and of providence. He has food, and raiment, and comforts of various kinds ; and are not all these great blessings ?' No, not to him. At the price which he is to pay for them, every one of these is also a curse. Every one of these comforts is, by an eternal decree, to cost him a thousand pangs in hell. For every moment's pleasure which he now enjoys, he is to suffer the torments of more than a thousand years; for the smoke of that pit which is pre- paring for him, ascendeth up for ever and ever. God knew this would be the fruit of whatever he should enjoy, before the vapor of life fled away. He designed it should. It was his very purpose in giving him those enjoyments; so that; by all these, he is in truth and reality only fatten- ing the ox for the slaughter. *Nay, but God gives him grace, too.' Yes, but what kind of grace? Saving grace, you own, he has not; and the common grace he has was not given with any design to save his soul ; nor with any .Vjsign to do him any good at all, but only to restrain him 88 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [CHAP. III. from hurting the elect: so far from doing him good, that this grace also necessarily increases his damnation, "'And God knows this,' you say, 'and designed it should : it was one great end for which he gave it !' Then I desire to know how is God good or loving to this man, either with regard to time or eternity. "Let us suppose a particular instance: here stands a man who is reprobated from all eternity ; or, if you would express it more smoothly, Avho is not elected — whom God ete?^ally decreed to pass by. Thou hast nothing, there- fore, to expect from God after death, but to be cast into the lake of fire, burning with brimstone — God having con- signed thy unborn soul to hell by a decree which cannot pass away. And from the time thou wast born under the irrevocable curse of God, thou canst have no peace; for there is no peace to the wicked, such as thou art doomed to continue, even from thy mother's womb. Accordingly, God giveth thee of this world's goods on purpose to en- hance thy damnation. He giveth thee more substance or friends in order hereafter to heap the more coals of fire on thy head. He filleth thee with good ; he maketh thee fat and Avell-looking, to make thee a more specious sacrifice to his vengeance. Good-nature, generosity, a good under- standing, various knowledge, it may be, or eloquence, are the flowers wherewith he adorneth thee, thou poor victim, before thou art brought to the slaughter. Thou hast grace, too! but what grace? Not saving grace. That is not for thee, but for the elect only. Thine may be termed damning grace; since it is not only such in the event, but in the intention. Thou receivedst it of God for that very end, that thou mightest receive the greater damnation. It was given not to convert thee, but only to convince; not to make thee without sin, but without excuse! not to destroy, but to arm the worm that never CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 89 dieth, and blow up the fire that shall never be quenched. Now, I beseech you, how is God good or loving to this man? Is not this such love as makes your blood run cold?" 4. I object to the doctrine further, that it not only teaches the unconditional reprobation of a part of man- kind, who, in the language of Mr. Calvin, were created for destruction, but it also teaches, in harmony with the foregoing, that Christ never died for the lost — never in any sense made salvation possible. This is not only an inference deducted from the decree of election and repro- bation — though it is unavoidably inferable from that de- cree, because it is manifest, if a man is eternally and unconditionally decreed to be damned, he never had a possibility of salvation. But our proposition is not a mere inference — it is an express statement of Calvinists them- selves. Two authorities will answer upon this point. The Confession of Faith shall be my first reference — it is very explicit. Its language is : " Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, but the elect only.''^ "In this section we are taught," says Mr. Shaw, the expositor of the Confession, in his work revised and pub- lished by the Presbyterian board of publication, and re- ceived as a true exposition of their doctrines, "that Christ died exclusively for the elect, and purchased redemption for them alone; in other words, that Christ made atonement only for the elect, and that in no sense did he die for the rest of the race. Our Confession first asserts, positively, that the elect are redeemed by Christ ; and then negatively that none other are redeemed by Christ but the elect only. If this does not affirm the doctrine of particular redemp- tion, or of a limited atonement, we know not what lan- guage could express that doctrine more explicitly." These authorities are sufficient for my purpose at present, '.hough a large number equally explicit might be adduced, 8 90 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. showing that it is the common opinion of Calvinists, and certainly the only opinion at all consistent with theiir system. Well, now, in view of this doctrine, I alledge the follow- ing objections : (1.) It renders the conclusion unavoidable, that the sin- ner is absolutely damned, not only without the possibility of salvation, but without any fault of his whatever. For, first, it was certain he was involved in guilt, without his consent, by the sin of Adam, thousands of years before he was born. It will not be pretended that he was to blame for this, unless it can be shown that a man is blame- worthy for an act which occurred thousands of years before he had an existence. Well, as he was involved in guilt, without his consent, so no plan was ever devised by which it was possible for him to escape from his guilt. He is therefore shut up to be damned in hell torments for ever on account of guilt which he had no part in procuring to himself, and from which it Avas never possible for him to escape. Sir, is not this dreadful ? (2.) I object to this doctrine further, because it finds the cause of the sinner's reprobation and damnation in his cor- ruption of nature alone. The doctrine is, that mankind were viewed as fallen in Adam, and all of them under condemnation, and deserving of death ; whereupon, God, out of his mere good pleasure, elected a certain definite number to life, and passed by the other definite part, and left them under sentence of death on account of their sin. Of what sin ! why, their sinful estate in Adam. This then was the cause of their repro- bation and damnation — Adam's sin, and not their own ! It will be no relief to this to insist that the reprobates are also punished for their actual transgressions ; for there stands the fact, first, that the sufficient cause of their CflAP. III.J ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 91 reprobation, was their sinful state; and if this was the sufficient cause, they might, they would have been damned, if they had never committed one single actual sin ! They were damned before ever they committed a sinful act themselves! Nay, 1 go a step further, and say that the actual sins of the reprobates forms no juster ground of their damnation than their natufal corruption, even if we should admit that their actual sins were taken into account in their reprobation; for they were brought into existence with a corrupt nature, from which it never was possible for them to free themselves, which they had no consent in bringing upon themselves; and with it their actual sins were absolutely unavoidable, and so could no more consti- tute a just ground of damnation than would their inherited depravity. (3.) And here again let me ask, why shall Calvinists demur when we charge them with holding to infant dam- nation ? The fact is, they hold to no other kind of damna- tion! Every reprobate was reprobated for that which he possessed as soon as he came into the world! He was damned in the purpose of God for his natural depravity, before he was born, and his after actual transgressions were only the fruits of his reprobation! I can see no difference between consigning an infant to hell, as soon as born, and actually sentencing it as soon as born for its then state, and permitting it to live a hundred years to commit actual sins, that a pretense may be actually created for rendering its damnation doubly deep — only that the latter seems worse than the former ! (4.) I object to the doctrine that God really preferred the damnation of a part to the salvation of all — he chose it as more agreeable to himself, not to meet the ends of justice or promote good government, but purely for his own gratification, that a part should be lost to the glory 92 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. of his justice, than that all should have an opportunity ' to be saved ! This is apparent in the fact that Calvinists admit that there was merit enough in the death of Christ to secure the salvation of all ; but God, by a sovereign act, limited it to a part. He could have saved all as well as a part, but he preferred not to do it! It will not do to reply, he must damn some to vindicate his justice, for it is con- tended that the death of Christ was ample, entirely suffi- cient, to satisfy the claims of justice for the whole race: but God, by a sovereign prerogative, chose to limit it to a part. He must therefore have preferred the damnation of a part, the reprobates, or he would at least have made their salvation possible. Can Dr. Rice assign any reason for the damnation of the reprobate, but the mere good pleasure of God ? He could have saved them, but he chose not to do so. And why did he choose not to do so ? Is it answered, on account of their sins? But why on account of their sins ? Could he not have saved all, as well as a part, when there was a sufficient ransom, and the application of it de- pended updn his mere sovereign will ? That the application was not made, therefore, can be ascribed to nothing else but the good pleasure of God, or he damns a large part of mankind simply because he had rather damn them than save them ! Is not this blasphemous ? 5. To the Calvinian doctrine of eternal reprobation I fui'ther object, as being inconsistent with the Scriptures: (1.) To all those passages which teach that "Christ died for all men''' for "the whole world," &c. This class of Scripture texts is quite numerous, and very unequivocal. " Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away ^he sin \ of the world." " God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life." " This is indeed the CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 98 Christ, the Savior of the world." " For the love of Christ constraineth us, because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead." " That he, by the grace of God, i should taste death for every man." " And he is the propi- ' tiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." "Who is the Savior of all men, especially of those that believe." "Who gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time." We give the above as. a selection of texts asserting that the death of Christ was for all men, for every man, for the whole world. The list might be greatly extended ; but, for the present, these are sufficient. (2.) The same fact is clearly taught in all those passages where a parallel is run between the death of Christ and the fall of our first parents. " For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." "But not as the offense, so also is the free gift. For if, through the offense of one, many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. Therefore, as by the oftense of one judgment came upon all men unto condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." (3.) The idea that Christ died for the elect only is con- trary to those Scriptures, which teach that some for whom Christ died may perish. "And through thy knowledge shall thy weak brother perish, for whom Christ died." ** False teachers who privily shall bring in damnable here- sies, even denying the Lord that bought them, iind bring upon themselves swift destruction." " Of how much sorer punishment suppose ye shall he be thought worthy, who has trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the spirit of 94 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. grace." " Destroy not him, with thy meat, for whom Christ died." (4.) A further argument is deducible from those passages which make the offers of the Gospel to all men, and require all men to repent and believe, condemning them to death for rejecting the offer, and refusing to comply. " He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life ; but the wrath of God abideth on him." " But these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through his name." " He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God." ** And said unto them. Go ye into all the world, and preach my Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved ; but he that believeth not, shall be damned." " How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation ?" (5.) In all those passages in which men's failure to obtain salvation is placed to the account of their own will, this doctrine of limited atonement, of election, and reprobation, is disallowed. " How often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not." " And ye will not come to me that ye may have life." "Bringing upon themselves swift destruction." "Whosoever will, let him take the waters of life freely." It is useless to multiply quotations, since the New Testa- ment so constantly exhorts men to come to Christ, reproves them for neglect, and threatens them Avith the penal conse- quences of their own folly, thus uniformly placing the bar of their salvation just where Christ places it in his parable of the supper — in the perversencss of those who, havmg been bidden to the feast, would not come. CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 95 Thus the idea that Christ did not die for all men is con- trary to all those Scriptures, in which the atonement is represented as universal — in which it is contrasted with the fall — in which it is represented as possible for those for whom Christ died to perish — in which all men are required to believe, and condemned for not beheving — in which failure to obtain salvation is charged to the will and folly of the lost — in which invitations are made to sinners, warn- ings given to saints, as though the former might be saved, the latter lost — in which conditions are expressed, the voli- tion of the creature is addressed, and final destiny is sus- pended upon their action, with a great variety of classes of Scriptures needless to mention. 6. If Christ only died for a part of mankind, and if only a definite number may come to him and be saved, I ask Dr. Rice, in the name of all reason and consistency, with what propriety can he invite persons, not of the elect, to come to Christ, to turn that they may have life, to seek the favor of God? &c. Why does he make such invitations? He knows they cannot comply ; that it is absolutely impossible ; that they have no more power to do so than they have to make a world. Is it not mockery, then, to ask them? Are not all such invitations sheer trifling with interests the most awful and tremendous? Invite a sinner to come to Christ when he cannot — when he dare not ! In the name of consistency, how is this to be reconciled with human candor, to say nothing of Divine sincerity ? 7. But again : if Christ only died for the elect, why are reprobates commanded to believe ? What are they required to believe ? Are they required to believe in Christ for sal- vation. If so, they are either able to believe, or they are not. If not able, they are required to perform an absolute impossibility. If they are able, then they may believe ; and as salvation is by faith, a reprobate may be saved ; and if saved, he will be saved by believing a lie — that Christ was 96 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. his Savior, when in fact he was not : he will also be saved without a Sa\dor ; but if he believes and is not saved, he will falsify the Scriptures and the Confession, which teach that whosoever believeth shall be saved. 8. But again : why is the unbelief of the reprobate made the ground of his condemnation — of his final destruc- tion ? He is damned for not believing on Christ ; that is, for not belie\ing a lie. Had he believed on Christ, if tht thing were possible, he would have believed a lie ; but foi not believing a lie, he is damned for ever. Sir, is not this dreadful ! Yet these, and many more such consequences, are the unavoidable results of your system. 9. The sinner's damnation is ascribed to his rejection of Christ — to his resistance of proffered mercy — to his willful distance from God. But, according to this system, he does not reject Christ, for Christ never was offered to him ; he could not accept him ; he did not refuse mercy, for mercy never was held out to his acceptance ; his own will did not keep him in sin, for there never was a way of escape. 10. The Scriptures ascribe the sinner's ruin to his own choice — to his own will ; but, according to this system> his will has nothing whatever to do with it ; for either it was possible for him to will to come to Christ and be saved, or it was not. If it was possible for him to will to come to Christ and be saved, a reprobate might be saved by Christ, who never died for him ; if he could not will to come to Christ, and is damned for not willing it, then he is damned for not performing an impossibility. His destruction is not assignable to the perversity of his own will, but to tha fact that no possible chance of salvation was ever given to him. 11. Why do Calvinists demur and complain of us when we say, the reprobate must be damned, do what he may or can? Do they not know this is true? He cannot be saved ! It is eternally out of the question, and impossible, OlIAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 97 for a cause with which he had no consenting or persona] connection, any more than Gabriel had. 12. Why do Calvinists complain when we say, the elect must bo saved, do what they may or can? Do they not know that this is so ? One of the elect cannot be lost — no sin, in his power, will ever peril his salvation. He cannot, though he exert himself to that end, endanger his soul in the slightest degree. And this Dr. Rice will be compelled to admit. I say not, now, that he will not endanger his salvation, but I say he cannot. He is now saved, and never can be lost. The poor reprobate cannot be saved, do what he may. Tell me not that he might if he would ; it is sin- ning to pretend any thing of the kind. If he willed ever so much, he has no Savior! He is damned without any fault of his, and when escape was impossible. 13. Why remonstrate with the reprobate upon the folly of his course, and about destroying himself? Does not God know that the poor wretch cannot help it ? He help it ! he was damned thousands of years before he was born ! He never had any hand in it originally ! And if he has had since, it was only in this way : He was given an existence, which he was compelled to employ in sin, that a pretense might be furnished infinite cruelty for doubly damning him I Why will you die ? What language to put in the mouth of God concerning the reprobates ! 14. Why expostulate with the elect upon the necessity of watchfulness, the use of means, the danger of coming shgrt of life, and such like? There is no danger to the elect ; he can do nothing more nor less than was decreed ; and if he could do ever so much, his works have nothing to do in regard to his salvation. Is it pretended, that warn- ings are designed to stimulate to duty ? Then, I answer, a deception is attempted to be played off upon the elect, to promote the fruits of the Spirit ! 15. I object to the whole system, that it destroys the 9 98 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. moral government of God, and renders his sovereignty a l:)lind, capricious, and tyrannical sovereignty. The idea of moral government is that of dealing with men according to their deeds; but this system excludes such idea entirely. Men are elected unto life without respect to their deeds, and they are also appointed unto damnation without respect to their dee^s. Let it not be said that their deeds are taken into the account, in their election and reprobation ; for it is previously said, that these — election and reprobation — are unconditional and without foresight, and so can have no respect whatever to character or conduct ; and so, according to Calvinism, there is no such thini^ as dealinor with men according to character or conduct — no moral government. But, even if the system admitted conduct and character as questions in the Divine government, it would not help the case in the slightest degree ; because these, according to the system, are necessitated, without any agency of the creature whatever. The character and conduct are forced upon him, and then he is held to account for them ! All this may be denied, and no doubt will be ; but denials are useless, so long as the system is liable to such logical imputation. According to Calvinism, there is no moral government. When some are admitted to heaven, and others are con- signed to hell, the sole cause of their different destinies is the decree of God, by which the former were elected, and the latter reprobated; and their respective vice or virtue was the fruit of their previously determined fate, not its cause. They are rewarded not according to their wolks, but according to the decree of God. 16. The Calvinian doctrine of election and reprobation, in the place of making the atonement a benefit to the re- probates, makes it an infinite curse, not in its avoidable abuse, but in itself necessarily. So that here is a sovereign scheme of God, intended to be a benefit to some chosen persons, by being, in its very nature, an infinite curse to CHAP. III. I ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 09 others. This must appear in one moment. Let it be re- membered, that the atonement, with respect to reprobates, does not make their salvation possible — they cannot be saved by it. Let it be further remembered, that, while it does not make it possible for them to be saved, it makes their damnation a hundred-fold worse than if it had never been made — it does them no real good — it brings them infinite mischief, and this entirely without respect to any thing in them that was voluntary ; and this their infinitely increased misery is upon a false pretense. They are called to return unto God — to repent — to believe in Christ — to a holy life : no one of which calls could they possibly obey ; and yet, for not obeying, every time they refuse, their damnation is increased. Is not this awful — friohtful! Could Satanic cruelty display greater malevolence than is here supposed? Every mercy, every call, every seeming good, is so arranged as necessarily to sink the poor, misera- ble victim deeper into the quenchless flames of eternal damnation. Thou glorious God of the universe, whose v^ery nature is love, what a representation of thy character ! — holding out to thy hapless, miserable creatures, an empty semblance of good, which it is impossible, in the nature ol things, for them to attain, and then increasing their alread}' dreadful miseries for failing to comply ; and still repeating the impracticable, heartless offer, every day, every hour, that, by their unavoidable rejection, they may go on sinking deeper and deeper yet into torments, beyond the power of mind to conceive, and of eternal continuance ! Dreadful ! dreadful ! dreadful ! Thou great Spirit of the heavens, art thou such a monster as this ! In the language of Mr. Wesley, " This is the blasphemy for which — however I love the persons who assert it — 1 abhor the doctrine of predestination : a doctrine, upon the supposition of which, if one could possibly suppose it for a moment, one might say to our adversary, the devil, * Tliou 100 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [cHAP. III. fool, why dost thou roar about any longer? Thy lying in wait for souls is as needless and useless as our preaching. Hearest thou not that God hath taken thy work out of thy hands ? and that he doth it more effectually ? Thou, with all thy principalities and powers, canst only so assault that we may resist thee. But he can irresistibly destroy both soul and body in hell ! Thou canst only entice. But his unchangeable decree, to leave thousands of souls in death, compels them to continue in sin till they drop into everlast- ing burnings. Thou temptest ; he forceth us to be damned, for we cannot resist his will. Thou fool, why goest thou about any longer, seeking whom thou mayest devour? Hearest thou not that God is the devouring lion — the de- stroyer of souls — the murderer of men? Moloch caused only children to pass through the fire; and that fire whs soon quenched, or, the corruptible body being consumer' , its torments were at an end. But God, thou art told by h^ t eternal decree, fixed before they had done good or evi causes whom he destroys to pass through the fires of hell— the fire which shall never be quenched ; and the body whici is cast thereinto, being now incorruptible and immortal, wil be ever consuming and never consumed, but the smoke of their torment, because it is God's good pleasure, ascendetl up for ever and ever.' " how would the enemy of God and man rejoice tc hear these things were so ! How would he cry aloud and spare not! How would he lift up his voice and say, *Tg your tents, Israel !' Flee from the presence of this God, or ye shall utterly perish ! But whither will ye flee : into heaven? He is there. Down to hell? He is there also. Ye cannot flee from an omnipresent, almighty tyrant. And whether ye flee or stay, I call heaven, his throne, and the earth, his footstool, to witness against you, ye shall perish ; ye shall die eternally. Sing, hell, and rejoice yo that are under the earth ; for God, even the mighty God, hath CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND RLPROBATION. 3 01 spoken, and devoted to death thousands of souls, from the rising of the sun unto the going down thereof. Here, death, is thy sting ! They shall not, cannot escape ; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it. Here, grave, is thy victory ! Nations yet unborn, or ere they had done good or evil, are doomed never to see the light of life, but thou shait gnaw upon them for ever and ever. Let all those morning stars sing together who fell with Lucifer, son of the morning. Let all the sons of hell shout for joy ! For the decree is past, and who shall disannul it !" Do you shudder at this? is your whole soul filled with just horror at the blasphemous intimation? Who, let me ask, is guilty of the enormous blasphemy? Who is it that thus charges God foolishly, nay, wickedly? Reflect, ye that hold to unconditional election and reprobation! how can you escape? In the sight of heaven and earth, are you not guilty ? Have you not aspersed the glorious God, and made wicked men and devils to triumph in your blas- phemies? In the spirit of kindness and love we beseech you to consider these things ; and may God help you ! 17. The doctrine of election and reprobation, if true, renders the condition of mankind far worse than that of devils in hell; for these were, sometime, in a capacity to have stood ; they might have kept their happy estate, but would not ; whereas, many millions of men, according to this doctrine, are tormented for ever, without ever having had the opportunity to be happy ! It renders the fate of human beings worse than the beasts of the field, of whom the master requires no more than they are able to perform ; and if they die, death is to them the end of all sorrow ; whereas, man is in pain without end, for not doing that which he never was able to do. It puts him in a far worse state than Pharaoh put the Israelites ; for though he withheld straw from them, yet they could obtain it by much labor. But this doctrine makes God to withhold from the reprobates 102 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [CHAr. III. all means of salvation, so that they cannot attain it by all their pains. Yea, it places mankind in that condition which the poets feign of Tantalus, who, oppressed with tliirst, stands in water up to the chin, yet can, by no means, reach it Avith his tongue ; and being tormented Avith hiinger, hath fruit hanging at his very lips, yet so as he can never lay hold of it with his teeth ; and these things are so near him, not to nourish him, but torment him. So does this doctrine make God deal with mankind. It makes the outward crea- tion, the work of Providenqe, the smiting of conscience, sufficient to convince the reprobates of sin, but never in- tended to help them to salvation. It makes the preaching of the Gospel, and the offer of salvation by Christ, sufficient to condemn them, serving to beget a seeming faith and vain hopes ; yet, by reason of God's irresistible decree, all these are wholly ineffectual to bring them the least step toward salvation, and do only contribute to make their condem. nation the greater, and their torments the more violent an I intolerable. Truly, if these things be so, may the man with his one talent in the day of final settlement say to the Judge, "I knew thee that thou art a hard man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where t jou hast not strewed." Such is Calvinism — such are som.; of the difficulties of this boasted system, which Dr. Rioe, after proclaiming his readiness, nay even anxiety, to defend for years past, has not even attempted to remove, and, though pledged, I venture to predict, to my readers, he never will attempt to remove, by a direct refutation. Dr. Rice knows very well it cannot be done : he will not hazard a trial of his powers here. With all his fondness for debate — with liis professed conviction that controversy serves the cause of truth, he will never squarely meet these points. But why is this — why will these issues be avoided ? Does any one believe that, if they could be triumphantly met, it w^ould not be done ? Do Presbyterians believe this ? Does rriAP. III.] ELECTION AKD REPROBATION. 103 not Dr. Rice understand his own heart sufficiently well tc know, that his present backwardness proceeds from con- sciousness that he could not make a successful defense? Let him not deceive himself upon this point — let him not suppose he can deceive the public, who are acquainted with the facts in the case — let him not imagine that either silence or evasion w^ill answer under existing circumstances. If the objections alledged can be answered, let him, as a lover of truth and as a teacher of the erring, come to the work. If we are in error, and he can show it with so much ease, he may thereby advance his cherished system, and do good service in the cause of his Redeemer. Will he allow the opportimity to pass? Will he amuse his readers with evasions — mvectives? Or will he come to the work as a candid, magnanimous. Christian disputant? All this is for Dr. Rice to determine. We have expressed a part of the objections we find against decrees in general, and the decree of election and reprobation in particular, as held by Calvinists. We have studied brevity — presented our arguments in the smallest possible limits, even at the hazard, in some instances, of lessening their force; and we have avoided using a great number of additional arguments, because of their seeming severity. The objections we have thus brought against Calvinism, we believe to be legitimate and unavoidable to the system. For the refreshing of our readers, we subjoin a brief recapitulation. 1. We object to the Cahinistic system, that it renders the conclusion unavoidable that God is the responsible author of sin — author in the sense of originator and cause. 2. It is inconsistent with, and destructive of, the free agency of man. 3. It destroys human accountability. 4. It removes moral quality from human actions and voli- tions — renders man incapable of vice or virtue. 104 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [CHAP. III. 5. In the day of judgment it must place the conscience and judgment of the universe on the side of the condemned, and against God. C. It puts a justifying plea in the mouth of the sinner fc r all his crimes while upon earth, and renders all punish- ments, human and divine, essentially unjust and tyrannical. 7. It asperses the character of God in a most dreadful manner, inevitably involving, (1.) His holiness, showing him to be the very centre and author of all impurity. (2.) His benevolence, showing him to be a minister of cruelty. (3.) His justice, showing him to be the direst tyrant. (4.) His truthfulness and sincerity, proving him to be an amalgam of duplicity and falsehood. 8. It makes God self- contradictory, and the author of all the absurdities and contradictions, yea, of all things of what- ever description in the universe. 9. It is calculated to do away all sense of obligation, and to produce recklessness, crime, and despair. 10. It is wholly without foundation, either in reason or Scripture. 11. It makes God the author of man's fall. 12. It teaches that some are elected to life, and others unto death, wholly without respect to their character or conduct, thus leaving sin and virtue entirely out of the question in regard to human destiny. 13. It renders God a partial being, and at the same time entirely destroys the doctrine of grace. 14. It teaches not only unconditional reprobation, but also that for the reprobates Christ did not die in any sense. 15. It is inconsistent with the Scriptures: (1.) Which teach a universal atonement. (2.) Which teach that some, for whom Christ died, may finally perish. CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 105 (3.) Which offer salvation to all men. (4.) In which failure to obtain salvation is ascribed to the perversity of the human will. (5.) In which warnings and expostulations are used toward sinners, and also toward saints. 16. It is inconsistent with all calls and invitations to sin- ners by the ministry of the word. 17. It is inconsistent with commands and exhortations to sinners to believe. 18. It is inconsistent with making the unbehef of the sinner the cause of his condemnation. 19. It is inconsistent with ascribing the sinner's damna- tion to his rejection of Christ. 20. It is inconsistent in making the sinner's own choice the cause of his ruin. 21. It makes it impossible for reprobates to be saved, do what they may or can. 22. It makes it impossible for the elect to be lost, do what they may or can. 23. It renders all remonstrance, exhortation, or entreaty, either to the elect or reprobates, absurd. 24. It makes the atonement, in itself, in its very nature, and necessarily, an infinite curse to milHons of human beings. Such are a part of the objections we bring against this system — all of tuem imavoidably bearing against it, and any one of them sufficient, as we believe, to render it unworthy of all credit and respect. And the most casual reader must perceive that each one of these objections must necessarily bring, in its train, many others equally revolting. How, I ask, in the name of reason, Scripture, humanity, and religion, can a system, so embarrassed, find advocates among rational beings ? The only attempt at reply is contained in a denial, that they are a true representation of Calvinism in 106 ELECTION AND REPROBATION. [CHAP. III. the premises. The argumentation is thus admitted to be sound. No effort has been made to coiTect the misrep- resentations — no authority has been rejected — no specific points named, but simply a blank denial that Calvinists do not believe Avhat is charged against them — no argument sustaining the charges has been refuted — no quotation set aside. What a beautiful defense this ! How creditable to men who have vaunted their readiness for controversy! who have ceased not to disturb sister Churches, who were content with peace, and anxious to maintain it ! What an intellectual, manly, Christian palladium this, when con- sequences unavoidable are proved, to meet them with the rational and lucid reply, "We do not beheve these things!" But if this is the best defense your system is capable of, we must not complain. You have done the best you could ; and as it is not in our creed to hold men accountable for more than they have ability to perform, we must appreciate your effort. You will excuse us, however, for going on to show how unsound your defense is, and for pointing out your mistake, in charging us with misrepresentation. You believe that we are guilty — that the system is not so had as we made appear; but we shall show you that the mistake is your own — that it is precisely what we declared. I have charged upon the system that it makes God the author of sin, and destroys the free agency and account- ability of man. Dr. Rice replied — for he commenced re- plying to my letters, and, for reasons doubtless sufficient in his esteem, abruptly ceased — that the objections had been often refuted, and that no Presbyterian author taught the doctrine which I charged upon them. This last state- ment of the Doctor's I have shown to be an entire mistake, by quoting many authors who unequivocally teach the very things he denies, and for which he says they would be deposed — I suggest to the Doctor that he had better depose CHAP. III.] ELECTION AND REPROBATION. 107 them yet, whether Uving or dead — Calvin, Hill, D wight,. Chalmers, Witsius, Shaw, the Westminster Assembly, Buck, ' ensues, as a necessary consequence, hopeless in- action or reckless licentiousness. With these truths in his mind, what can be said to a sinner as an inducement to attend to his salvation? or, rather, is it not all sheer folly to address him at all on that subject ? Do you exhort him to forsake sin ? He says, " I cannot." To repent? "I cannot, until regenerated. This is God's work, and not mine." Do you warn him of danger, and exhort him to flee ? He smiles at your childish folly, and answers you, "It is all fixed without my agency." Thus the whole man is neutralized, and hopeless recklessness superinduced. 6. But what has now been objected had respect alone to this aspect of the subject: that the salvation of those for whom Christ made atonement, is infallibly certain and unconditional on their part. I now object, further, to the ground upon which salvation is declared. It has two parts : CHAF. IV.] THE ATONEMENT. 153 1. Christ has absolutely paid the debt of liis people, and released them from the obligation. In other words, he took their sins upon himself, and suflfered their penalty in such a way that they cannot be required to suffer them- selves; so that they can commit no sin but what Christ has fully satisfied for it. If this be true, of course the elect must unconditionally escape punishment, because their punishment has already been inflicted upon their substitute, and Divine justice is fully and entirely satisfied. 2. As the elect are thus brought into the enjoyment of unconditional salvation, so far as deliverance from punish- ment is concerned, so, in the second place, they are, by a similar process, made completely righteous; namely, as Christ suffered for them, so, also, he obeyed for them, and his perfect righteousness is imputed to them. He obeyed perfectly, and fulfilled all righteousness, and this is imputed to them, or it is accounted precisely the same as though they had obeyed themselves; and, therefore, they are ac- counted worthy of life, as being righteous in Christ. Thus the elect are brought into the enjoyment of unconditional salvation, by having their sins imputed to Christ, and his righteousness imputed to them. But will it be said, that this imputation does not savingly take place without faith, and, therefore, that faith is a con- dition of salvation — a condition without which the elect are not saved — it is only when they believe that Christ's righteousness is imputed to them? But look, for a mo- ment, at this sheer sophistry and deception — for the lan- guage certainly does mislead. The doctrine is, that the salvation of these persons — the elect — is first determined in the immutable decree of God ; then Christ, to secure it, satisfies and obeys for tliem, which gives them an unconditional title to life ; and then Ite irresistibly regenerates them, and this regeneration ncccs- Harily produces faith. And now shall it be pretended that t64: THE ATONEMENT. [CHAP. IV. this faith, which is itself a necessary effect of irresistible regeneration, is a condition of salvation ! It must, at least, be admitted, that, if it is a condition, the elect is entirely passive in complying vfiih. it; and so his salvation, de- pendent as it is upon this condition, is not dependent upon him, in any sense — upon any thing he can do, or refuse to do ; and so, of course, he has nothing to do but to submit as a passive subject throughout; and this he cannot help but do. To talk about conditions of salvation in such an arrangement — about salvation depending upon faith, must, in all candor, seem like a nonsensical abuse of language. Much more so, to appeal to the sinner to believe, in order that he may be saved, warning him that, if he does not, he must be damned, thus seeming to imply that he has power to perform a condition by which he may be saved, when faith is no more in his power than is the annihilation of the universe ! But, further, if Christ has absolutely paid the debt for his people, so that nothing more is necessary to acquit them from punishment — if the punishment has been in- flicted, and justice satisfied, without any thing further, then it is manifest nothing more can be requisite to free them from punishment; and so their sins cannot be pun- ished, and they cannot, therefore, be in any peril when they sin. v. But if this be true, then it is certain that no motive can be drawn from eternity to enforce virtue, or restrain from vice. None can be drawn for the reprobate ; for his destiny is fixed ; damned he must be, and his sins cannot make it any more certain. None to the elect; for their destiny is also fixed, and no sin, possible to them, can unsettle it. Well, say that I do not know which I am, elect or reprobate; or I do know, it is all the same. Eternity, as it respects destiny, can bring no motive to bear on m}- conduct, because conduct cannot affect my CHAP. IV.] THE ATONEMENT. 155 unconditional salvation or damnation. If Chnst died for me, no sin I can commit can keep me out of heaven. If he did not die for me, nothing that I can do can get me in ; and hence, in either case, my conduct is entirely unim- portant. Will this doctrine do to preach? Is this the doctrine of the Bible? Is it consistent with our views of moral government? What would be thought of a man who should preach it ? Yet such are the unavoidable con-, sequences of Calvinism ! 8. If this be true, then particularly is it impossible for the elect, after they have once received the gift of faith, ever to become guilty ; and yet Calvinists believe that even the elect, after regeneration, and pardon, and adoption, may fall into grievous sins, nay, must continue to sin as long as they live. But now observe the consequence I charge here : if it is true that faith secures the imputation of both Christ's suffering and obedience to the beheving soul, and if this imputation is consequent upon faith — and all this Calvinists believe — then I insist that an}^ sin, committed by the be- liever, cannot either involve him in guilt or condemnation. Not condemnation, for the satisfaction of Christ is imputed : not guilt, for the imputation of Christ's perfect righteous- ness makes him completely righteous, and he cannot, there- fore, have any guilt : so that whatever sin the elect commit, after they have been regenerated and united to Christ by faith, does not involve them in guilt, because, by virtue of their faith, their sins have all been taken from them, and imputed to Christ, and his righteousness has been imputed to them, so that they cannot be less than complete in his righteousness. Whether they sin, therefore, or be holy, it is all one — whether they fall away into grievous delin- quencies, such as would shame even the reprobates, as Calvinists believe they may, or continue faithful, it is no diflference — the question of their final salvation is neither rendered doubtful thereby, nor is the fact of their perfect 156 THE ATONEMENT. [ciIAP. IV. righteousness; for both are infallibly secured b}' virtue of their union with Christ. 9. Finally: I object to the whole Calvinian view of the atonement as dishonorable to that transaction, and its author. It renders it a mere commercial transaction — a thing of bargain and sale — so many souls given for so much blood — so many sins remitted at so much price. The Father agrees •to give the Son so many souls at so much price. The Son agrees to suffer such a quantum for the forgiveness of so many sinners. In the language of another : ** This hypothesis measures the atonement, not only by the number of the elect, but by the intensity and degree of the suffering to be endured for their sin. It adjusts the dimensions of the atonement to a nice mathematical point, and poises its infinite weight of glory even to the small dust of a balance. I need not say that the hand which stretches such lines, and holds such scales, must be a bold one. Such a calcu- lation represents the Son of God as giving so much suffering for so much value received in the souls given to him ; and represents the Father as dispensing so many favors and blessings for so much value received in obedience and suf- ferings. This is the commercial atonement, which sums up the worth of a stupendous moral transaction by arithmetic, and, with its little span, limits what is infinite." Upon this view of the atonement, it was once wittily and truthfully remarked : " God must have loved the devil much more than his Son, for he gave him the larger portion of the human race without any price, charging his Son full price for the meagre share he allotted to him." Further : if this be true, I cannot see any mercy or grace in the Father; and, certainly, there is no such thing as for- giveness. The punishment is fully inflicted, not a particle abated, not, indeed, upon the culprit himself, but upon his substitute. But where, then, is forgiveness ? How are the elect oardoned? Has not their debt been paid to the CHAP. IV.] THE ATONEMENT. 157 utmost farthing ? What remains to be pardoned ? Is there any great clemency in reUnquishing a claim when it has been fully liquidated — paid to the utmost farthing? Is such the mercy of our Lord ? The atonement, regarded in this light, can be nothing short of a stupendous slander of the character of God. So it seems to me. Such are a part of the objections we bring against the Calvinian view of the atonement. It may be proper, briefly, to recapitulate here. The views of the atonement objected to are : First. That it is limited to part of the race. Second. All for whom it was made must be infallibly saved. Third. It consists in actually suffering and obeying for those for whom it was designed. To these views we have objected. 1 . The doctrine of a limited atonement has no foundation in the Scriptures. 2. It is directly contrary to the Scriptures, which teach : (1.) That Christ died for all. (2.) Which contrast the extent of the benefits of Christ's death with the extent of the evils of Adam's sin. (3.) W^hich represent those who are lost as purchased by Christ. (4.) Which offer the benefits of Christ's death to all. (5.) Which require all men to believe in and receive Ohrist. (6.) Which make the sinner's damnation a result of his •ejection of Christ. (7.) Which teach that those who are finally lost might aave been saved. (8.) Which represent God as a being of universal love. (9.) As willing the salvation of those who may come short. (10.) As impartial, etc. It will be perceived in a moment, liow all such Scriptures bear against a limited atonement. 3. It is adverse to all our conceptions of God, converting him rather into a monster of cruelty, than the parent of all. 158 THE ATONEMENT. [CHAP. IV. 4. It renders it impossible that a large part of the human race ever could be saved. 5. It renders it equally impossible for a large part of our race to avoid sin. G. It destroys the obligation to do right, and subverts the obligation to virtue. 7. It renders all punishments for sin unjust and tyrannical. 8. It renders all general invitations to all men to come to Christ, insincere and hypocritical. 9. It renders unbelief, on the part of the reprobates, no sin. 10. It would make belief, on their part, a sin. 11. It renders the damnation of reprobates a damnation for not believing a lie. 12. It commissions all ministers to preach a lie, and makes God the Father and the Son party to it. 13. It renders the requisition upon all men to repent useless and insincere. 14. It makes the damnation of men of the will of God, falsifying his own word. 15. It renders the atonement, in its nature, an eternal curse. 16. It renders it certain that many men were created with an absolute necessity of damnation. 1*7. It renders the strife between the devil and Christ a stupendous folly. 18. It is liable to all the objections, additionally, that were brought against election and reprobation. 19. It renders it unnecessary and impossible for tne elect to do any thing in order to their salvation. 20. It makes it impossible for them to peril their salva- tion. They cannot avoid salvation. 21. It imputes the obedience and suffering of Christ to believers in a manner unknown in the Scriptures. 22. It destroys all the motives, drawn from eternal des- tiny, to influence human conduct. CHAP. IV.] THE ATONEMENT. l59 23. It renders it impossible for the elect ever to become guilty, after regeneration. 24. It dishonors and degrades the atonement into a mere commercial transaction — a thing of barter and sale. To this list of objections many more might be added, any one of which is sufficient alone to damn the system embarrassed with it and its consequences, to unspeakable and irreparable infamy. And, now, may we again appeal to our Calvinistic friends to examine the grounds, and be not angry with us because of our plainness of speech? We have no contention but for the truth. Let us look well to it, that we be not found, m our pride, clinging to prejudice, and rejecting truth, and the God of truth. That we have objected many things against you which you do not believe, we know perfectly- well ; but we show you that these consequences flow from your premises. Now, what will you do? You know the consequences cannot be escaped. Can they ? How ? Will you, then, embrace consequences and all? How can you do this ? But if not, will you discard the premises ? One you must do, or, in the eyes of all reasonable men, of God himself, be found guilty of gross, may I not say ? criminal inconsistency. Why cling to errors so unlovely as those of Calvinism ? What in your nature, in reason, in religion, in God, does not turn away from the horrid compound with lothing, with disgust? 160 EFFECTUAL CALLING. [CHAP. V. CHAPTER V. EFFECTUAL CALLING In harmony with the doctrine of election and reproba- tion, and of a limited atonement, and the unconditional salvation of all those for whom the atonement was made, is the doctrine of effectual calling and its cognates, which we shall now proceed to notice. Upon this point Calvinists deliver themselves with unusual freedom and plenitude. A selection from them will set the matter in a proper light. " All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grac« and salvation by Jesus Christ ; enlightening their minds, spir- itually and savingly, to understand the things of God ; taking away their heai-t of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh ; renewing their wills, and, by his almighty power, de- termining them to that which is good, and effectually draw- ing them to Jesus Christ ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by this grace. This eff'ectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from any thing at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace ofi*ered and conveyed in it." (Confession of Faith, chap, x, sec. i and ii.) " What is effectual calling ? " Effectual calling is the work of God's almighty power and grace, whereby, out of his free and especial love to his elect, and from nothing in them moving him thereunto, he doth, in his accepted time, invite and draw them unto Jesus Clirist by his word and Spirit, savingly enlightening theL-* OHAr. v.] EFFECTUAL CALLING. 161 minds, renewing and powerfully determining their wills, so as they, although in themselves dead in sin, are hereby made wiUing and able freely to answer this call, and to accept and embrace the grace offered and conveyed therein. " Are the elect only effectually called ? "All the elect, and they 07ili/, are effectually called, although others may be, and often are, outwardly called by the ministry of the word, and have common operations of the Spirit, who, for their willful neglect and contempt of the grace offered to them, being justly left in their unbelief, do never truly come to Jesus Christ." (Larger Catechism, ques. 67 and 08.) The expositor of the Confession, in his comments upon the sections above, remarks, " That in this calling the ope- rations of the Holy Spirit are irrevocable." We admit that there are common operations of the Spirit, which do not issue in'the conversion of the sinner; but we maintain that the special operations of the Spirit overcome all opposition, and effectually determine the sinner to embrace Jesus Christ as he is offered in the Gospel. If the special operations of the Spirit were not invincible, but might be effectually re- sisted, then it would be uncertain whether any would believe or not, and consequently possible, that all which Christ had done and suffered in the work of redemption might have been done and suffered in vain. "That in this calling the sinner is altogether passive, until he is quickened and renewed by the Holy Ghost." (P. 143.) " We are made partakers of the benefits which Christ hath procured, by the application of them to us, which is the Avork especially of God the Holy Ghost." *' Redemption is certainly applied, and effectually commu- nicated, to all those for whom Christ hath purchased it." (Larger Catechism, ques. 58 and 59.) «'Iii retjeneration we are passive, and receive from 14 162 EFFECTUAL CALLING. [cHAP. V, God: it is an irresistible, or, rather, an invincible work," (Buck.) " The power of God, exerted in regeneration and conver- sion of sinners, is invincible. Those who speak of irresist- ible grace, mean that it cannot finally be resisted; that it will overcome all the efforts of corrupt nature to counteract its design; and that it will ultimately render sinners obe- dient to the faith. Man must submit in the end to the power of God; and this will be more evident if we con- sider that his power is not only sufficient to compel the most refractory to yield, although with the greatest reluct- ance, but that it can take away the spirit of opposition, and so influence the hearts of men, that this submission shall be voluntary. Were we to say that the grace of God is not invincible, we should he under the necessity of adopting tJie opinion, which ive have already proved to be unscriptural, that there is in man a poiver to comply or not to comply with the call of the Gospel. We should take the work of con- ■sersion out of the hand of God, and commit it to man himself. After God had done all that he could do for our salvation, it would depend upon ourselves whether the intended effect should follow." (Dick.) ** According to the Scriptures, regeneration is a change, effected by Divine grace, in the state of the soul — the super- natural renovation of its faculties — the infusion of a principle of spiritual life. It is evident that if this is a just defini- tion, the sinner is passive." (lb.) " In opposition to all the modifications of error upon this point, we affirm that conversion is effected by the almighty grace of God ; that, although man does not concur in it, he is, in the first instance, passive, and his concurrence is the consequence of supernatural power communicated to him ; and that he does not come to God till he is effectually called, by the operation of the Holy Spirit in his soul." (lb.) (MIA p. V.J EFFECTUAL CALLING. 163 "The first immediate fruit of eternal election, and the principal act of God, by which appointed salvation is applied, is effectual calling. And this calling is that act by which those who are chosen by God, and redeemed by Christ, are sweetly invited and effectually brought from a state of sin to a state of communion with God in Christ, both externally and internally." (Witsius, book iii, chap, v, sec. i.) "But this call is given partly externally, by a persuasive power called moral suasion; partly internally, by a real, supernatm-al efficacy, which changes the heart. The ex- ternal call is, in some measure, published by the word of nature; but more fully by that of supernatural revela- tion, without which every word of nature would be insuffi- cient and ineffectual. The internal comes from the power of the Holy Spirit, working inwardly on the heart; and without this, every external, revealed word, though objec- tively very sufficient, as it clearly discovers every thing to be known, believed, and done, yet is subjectively ineffectual, nor will ever bring any person to the communion of Christ." (lb., sec. vii.) "By that same word, whereby the elect are called to communion with God and his Christ, they are also regen- erated to a far more excellent life." (lb., chap, iv, sec. i.) " Ilegeneration is that supernatural act of God whereby a new and divine life is infused into the elect person spirit- ually dead, and that from the incorruptible seed of the word of God, made fruitful by the infinite power of the Spirit." (lb., sec. iv.) "If we consider this first principle of life, there is not the least doubt but regeneration is accomplished in a mo- ment ; for there is no delay in the transition from death to life. No person can be regenerated so long as he is in the state of spiritual death ; but in the instant he is, he begins to live — he is born again. Wherefore, no intermediate stato IC4 EFFECTUAL CALLING. [cHAP. V. between the regenerate and unregenerate can be imagined^ so much as in thought." (lb., sec. viii.) " Hence, it appears, there are no preparations antecedent to the first beginning of regeneration; because, previous to tliat, nothing but mere death, in the highest degree, is to be found in the person to be regenerated. And, indeed, the Scripture represents man's conversion by such simih- tudes as show that all preparations are entirely excluded." (lb., chap, vi, sec. ix.) "You will say, then, are there no preparatory disposi- tions to the first regeneration? I confessedly answer, there are none — agree with Fulgentius. With respect to the birth of a child, the work of God is previous to any will of the person that comes into the world; so in the spiritual birth, whereby we begin to put oflf the old man." (lb., sec. xiii.) "And this is that regeneration which is so much de- clared in the Scriptures — a new creation — a resurrectioD from the dead — a giving of life, which God, without us, worketh in us. And this is by no means effected by the doctrine alone sounding without, by moral suasion, or by such a mode of working, that, after the operation of God, it should remain in the power of man to he regenerated or not regenerated, converted or not converted, but is manifestly an operation supernatural, at the same time most powerful, and most sweet, wonderful, secret, and infallible in its power, according to the Scriptures, not less than or in- ferior to creation or the resurrection of the dead; so that all those, in whose hearts God works in this admirable manner, are certainly, infallibly, and efficaciously regen- erated, and, in fact, believe. And thus their will, being now renewed, is not only influenced and moved by God, but, being acted on by God, itself acts and moves." (Synod of Dort, chap, iii, sec. xii.) " The power of God exerted in regeneration is invincible. CEIAP. v.] EFFECTUAL CALLING. 165 We do not deny that the grace of God may be re- sisted, not only by the finally impenitent, but by those who ultimately yield to it; but, in the end, man must yield to the power of divine grace; because his power is sufficient to subdue the most stubborn will, to remove all opposition, and to influence the hearts of men, that they, at last, yield voluntary submission, without compulsion or force exerted upon their minds. In regeneration, in the moment of the act, the soul is passive." (HelfFenstein.) "As the child is passive in generation, so is the child of God in regeneration." (Bosten.) "Regeneration is an irresistible, or, rather, an invincible work of grace." (Buck's Theological Dictionary — Regen- eration.) " In regeneration we are passive, and receive from God." (lb) Without multiplying authorities, for the above are suffi- cient for all our purposes, we shall now proceed to deduce a statement of doctrine, and then set forth our objections. And, from the above, we derive as the faith of Cahnn- ists upon the subjects of effectual calling, irresistible grace, and regeneration — (these subjects were blended, because, in the Calvinian system, they constitute essentially but one branch of doctrine, as the above quotations abundantly show. Whatever may be their shades of difference and divers ramifications, they spring from one identical principle and its cognates — to all intents and purposes they are the same :) 1. That, up to the moment of effectual calling — regen- eration — a man cannot cease from sin; he has not the power to do so. 2. None but the elect ever are effectually called — re- generated. 3. When the elect are effectually called, they cannot help but yield ; they have no power to resist. 166 EFFECTUAL CALLING. [cHAP. V. 4. This effectual call is sent upon the elect without any conditions or preparation on their part. Now, to the doctrine thus summed up — and no Calvinisi dare dispute any point included in it — I shall proceed to alledge a number of objections; and it will be with the good sense and candor of my readers, to decide whether they constitute sufficient reasons for discarding the doctrine. 1. I object to this doctrine, that it is anti-scriptural, nowhere taught in the word of God, and contradictory to much that is therein tauofht: as that salvation is condi- tional — that all may seek and fiiid —that they are criminal who do not seek — that many are lost who might have been saved — that the Spirit may be resisted — that repentance and faith precede regeneration — indeed, the doctrine is in palpable conflict with the whole tenor of revelation. This is one objection. 2. But, further, I object, that if regeneration is the work of irresistible grace, wrought without previous conditions, then they who are not regenerated, are not to be condemned for remaining unregenerate. It is attributable to no fault in them, and so cannot render them blameworthy, because it is a matter with which they have nothing whatever to do. It is God's work, and not theirs in any sense; they are passive entirely, from beginning to end; and so, if there be any wrong in their remaining unregenerate, the wrong is not in them, because it is not by their consent. But if it be said the wrong is not in their remaining unregenerate, but in their being so in the first instance, then, I reply, neither are they to blame for this, because it, also, was entirely without their consent. They were born corrupt, and so cannot be guilty for this ; they cannot escape from corruption, and so are not guilty for remaining in it : and, therefore, they have no guilt whatever because of their corruption. From this reasoning there is no escape, but an assumption that men are absolutely and damnably guilty CHAP, v.] EFFECTUAL CALLING. * 167 for that over which they have not now, and never did have, any control. Beheve this who can! but let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth before I can so calumniate the adorable Jehovah ! 3. If the doctrine be true, men are not to be condemned for actual sin, unless they are condemnable for not avoiding that which they never had power to avoid. For they were brought into the world with a corrupt nature, without any consent of theirs, unless they consented before they had an existence; and being thus born, they never could cease from sin without regeneration ; and they never had power to promote or secure regeneration, and so are not to be condemned for the sins they commit prior to regeneration, unless they are to be condemned for an absolute impossibility. 4. If this doctrine be true, then they who are not regen- erate not only are not to be condemned for not being regenerate, and for actual sins committed prior to regenera- tion, but, also, they cannot be required to be holy in heart or in life, unless it is assumed that men may justly be required to do what they never had, and have not, the power to do. If they do not do right, they violate no requirement, but a requirement to perform an impossibility, which is the requirement of an abhorrent despot, and not of the glorious Jehovah. 5. If this doctrine be true, there can be no punishment for either depravity or sin, unless men are punishable for not performing impossibilities. If men are finally punished with eternal torments, then they are punished without any cause on their part, but simply that they did not do what it was eternally impossible for them to do. They are punished for impenitence and unbelief; but impenitence and unbelief - are the unavoidable fruit of a corrupt nature; from this corruption there is no deliverance but by regeneration; man has no power to regenerate himself, and he can do 168 EFFECTUAL CALLING. [cHAP. V notliing to induce God to regenerate him : he is, therefore, damned in hell for ever, for that over which he had no more control than the angel Gabriel. Think of hell ! tlien think of such a fate ! Can God be chargeable with such a government and conduct as this? 6. If the doctrine be true, then men cannot be required to do any thing to promote their salvation ; for their salva- tion is not susceptible of being promoted, as it is uncon- ditional. In salvation man is not a co-agent, but a mere passive subject. Until the work is commenced by irresistible regeneration, he can do nothing but sin. When regenera- tion takes place, all the rest follows as a necessary effect or unavoidable fruit. v. They cannot, with any propriet}^ be invited or exhorted to repent and seek God; for the thing is impossible; and to invite or exhort men to perform an impossibility, is tri- fling — is nonsense. A Calvinistic minister, who believes that up to the moment of regeneration a man cannot repent and turn to God — and who, also, believes that regeneration is a gift of God without conditions, and, also, that when regen- eration is given, men must repent — and yet urges, and in- vites, and implores men to repent and turn to God, must be accounted guilty of the strangest inconsistency, to say the least of it. 8. They cannot, with any propriety, be required to do one thing rather than another, before regeneration, only as one sin is preferable to another ; for whatever they do must be sinful. Nothing that a man can do before regeneration is good ; it is all sin. If he prays for the forgiveness of his sins, it only increases them. If he observes the Sabbath, if he reads the Scriptures, if he goes to the house of God, if he fasts, and mourns, and humbles himself "before God, it is all sin. But, it is said, a man cannot do these things until regenerated: but that is precisely my proposition; he can CHAP, v.] EFFECTUAL CALLING. 160 do nothing but sin, and cannot turn aAvay from it any more than he can create a universe — cannot even try. Why, (hen, ask him or labor with him upon the subject? 9. If this be true, then it must be that God prefers that the elect should commit a great deal of sin before they are regenerated. For their regeneration is his work; he can do it one time as well as another; for it is by irresistible grace, and against the sinner's disposition, whenever it is done ; and that he leaves them unregenerate a long term of years, must be because, on the whole, he prefers that during this period they should be unregenerate and sinful, rather than regenerafe and holy. 10. Yea, more: if this doctrine be true, God must prefer all the impenitence, and unbelief, and sin, that is in the world. For if regeneration is his work alone, independ- ent of all conditions, and if regeneration would produce hohness, then the reason why the world remains unre- generate and unholy must be, that, on the whole, God prefers it. He prefers that it should be as it is, or he would make it otherwise. There is no other reason but his prefer- ence; for a sufficient atonement has been made to remove all impediments out of the way, so far as Divine justice is concerned; and in the creature there is nothing but what might be overcome by irresistible grace. That such grace is not exerted, is of the good pleasure of God alone ; and this good pleasure must arise from the fact, that, in view of all things, God prefers the final impenitence and unhoh ness of some persons to their hohness, and their eternal d )struction to their everlasting salvation. 11. If this doctrine be true, man is not a free agent in consenting to salvation, nor yet in refusing to consent ; be- cause in the former case the will is in-esistibly coerced to its choice ; in the latter it has no ability to make a contrary election. In both cases it acts under an irresistible agency. For if the soul, under the influence of the eflfectual call 15 170 EFFECTUAL CALLING. [CHAP. V. retains its freedom, it has power to resist; but then the call would not be irresistible ; but if it has no power to resist, but must necessarily choose, then it is not free. And if without the effectual call it might choose life, then without the effectual call it might be saved; but if it has not the power, then it is not free. 12. I object to this doctrine, because it antagonizes the doctrine of salvation by faith, and makes faith an involuntary exercise — these both. Is not regeneration salvation from depravity ? and is it not the work of salvation commenced m the soul ? If so, and if regeneration precedes faith, is it not inevitable that faith is not a condition fo salvation to this extent? And if faith is a necessary effect of regen- eration, can it be a voluntary exercise ? And if it is not a voluntary exercise, can it, with any propriety, be called a (iondition of any thing which follows after it? And, par- ticularly, can men be exhorted to its exercise, as though it were a condition to which they are competent ? Can a regenerate person be lost? If not, regeneration itself infallibly secures salvation, with all that is included therein. And if it does secure salvation, how can any thing which comes after it be called a condition of salvation? Must not every thing following after rather be said to be included in salvation? 13. I object to this doctrine, further, that it not only makes salvation an involuntary and unconditional work, but it also does away with repentance entirely. Look at it soberly, and see if it is not a shocking misrepresentation, not only of the particular teachings and general tone of the Bible, but, also, of all experience. There is a man who, up to this moment, is a sinner ; and now, without any convic- tion or turning of heart to God, or any use of means — while his heart is proud, and stubborn, and sinful as ever, he is in one instant, by irresistible grace, born of God; in the i.'j.me instant he is justifi-d; but preceding his justification JHAP. v.] EFFECTUAL CALLING. 171 and succeeding his regeneration, he exercises faith and repentance ! Now, I ask, in the name of reason and rehgion, is this so? Will the world furnish one solitary witness to an experience of this kind ? 14, According to this doctrine, a Christian is no more to be esteemed for his virtues, than a sinner for his sins ; and the latter is no more to be censured than the former; because they are both passive, and only passive, with respect alike to their sins and virtues: the only difference between them is produced by irresistible fate. Indeed, the whole system of Calvinism, in its peculiar tenets, inevitably destroys both the accountability of man, and the distinc- tions between vice and virtue. If one man is irresistibly and invincibly drawn to a holy life, and another man is equally irresistibly drawn to an unholy and sinful conduct, and this without any thing under their control, it must be manifest, that, though there is a difference, it may be both in the character and conduct of the individuals ; yet they are neither commendable nor censurable, or, indeed, in any sense responsible for the difference. Yea, further, does not Calvinism also teach, not only that men are entirely passive in their states and actions, but that, in their sins as much as in their most holy exer- cises, they actually perform the will of God. The will of God, according to their teaching, cannot in any thing be frustrated. Nothing comes to pass but that he willed it. The devil does his will as much as the archangel. Where is the difference? In what is the one more appro vable or censurable than the other? Is this one to be damned? Why ? Did he not do the will of God ? Did he do any thing, more or less, than, in the will of God, was purposed before the foundation of the world? Is he damned for doing the will of God ! He is damned for sinning ; but that very sin was the will of God? God willed him to do, he but complied — accomplished what his Maker wished 1Y2 EFFECTUAL CALLING. [CHAP. '^. Ilim to do — what it was not only impossible he should avoid, but what, if he had avoided, would have been a breach of his Maker's will — the damnable sin ! 0, sir, what dreadful work this kind of stuff makes with the character and reputation of God ! Do you find no difficulties upon these points? Then must you be blind indeed! Consult your own experience — interrogate your consciousness ; it will teach you better. You will find, beyond any power to convince you to the contrarj^, that you believe that a change in your character and life was not wrought without your consent — that your consent was not produced by irresistible power. You will find that your recollection of repentance is, that you r( pented long and deeply, with tears and sorrow, before you found forgiveness — that this repentance was attended with a distressing sense of both unpurged corruption and unremoved condemnation. If any man had asked you, then, whether your vile nature was changed — regenerated — or not, what would have been your answer? That you were not only unpardoned, but vile ! A change indeed had been wrought — but not the change of nature — making you a child of God. Such is the testimony of your experience: every step is fresh in your memory; you can never forget it. By some instrument, it matters not what, where, or when, your mind was arrested: truth flashed upon your guilty conscience ; you saAV and admitted it. A simple conviction of your utter sinfulness was the result. You pondered what to do. A struggle, and you deter- mined to seek for life. What next? You now began seriously to reflect — you betook yourself to the Bible, or to some religious friend — you prayed. Your sense of guilt and wretchedness increased. How bitter now was the mingled cup of your sorrow ! You repented before God, did you not ? You struggled on, through doubts and fears. now ready to lay hold by faith, then sinking into deej) despair! At last, in the utmost extremity, forgetting all, CilAP. V.J EFFECTUAL CALLING. 1*73 by a mighty exertion, you embraced the atoning sacrifice — you beheved. Do you not recollect it? Was it not so? Then came rest! Your nature was changed. You saw it — you felt it — you realized it; no earthly power could convince you to the contrary ; believing you were a new man in Christ Jesus, and had now no condemnation. I appeal to every Christian, wa-s it not so? Your experi- ence, then, as well as God's word, and the voice of reason, are against the dogma we here oppose. Much more might be said, to show the danger of the error under examination — how it destroys all sense of obli- gation — how it contents the sinner in his sins — how it neutralizes all efifort — ^how it shields the conscience from all appeals and exhortations ; but all this must be present to the reflecting and considerate reader. In view of them, let him "hesitate ; nay, let him promptly throw from him an un- supported dogma, fraught with such deadly influences. Let no cherished prejudices — no long attachments, cause him to deal compassionately with the dangerous delusion. It deserves no mercy ; let it find none. Let the mind always contemplate it naked ; its deformities will make it sufficiently detestable. It is only when it is cloaked and masked that it has attractions; when seen in its native and real char- acter, with its consorts and relatives, it Avill be sufficiently hideous ; no mind will admit it. It will stand, without, with its kindred errors, equally execrated by reason and religion, by the vohs of God, and the instinct of mankind. Dear reader; may we be guided by the infinite Spirit into all truth ! 174 rERSEVERANCE. [CHAP. VI. CHAPTER VI. PERSEVERANCE. In this chapter we shall treat of the perseverance of the saints — a subject of scarcely inferior importance to those already considered. It falls in at this point natu- rally, and forms an indispensable part of this most won- derful system; for, certainly, whatever else may be said of Calvinism, it must be admitted that it is a complete S3'Stem. Starting out with the radical principle, that all events are jQxed by eternal decree, it infers that those who will be finally saved must be so decreed to salvation — then the means must be fixed — then they must operate infal- libly — then they must accomplish the end ; the elect must be kept to the end. " They whom God hath accepted in his Beloved, efi'ect- ually called, and sanctified by his Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace, but shall cer- tainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved. "This perseverance of the saints depends not upon their own free will, but upon the immutability of the decree of election, flowing from the free and unchangeable love of God the Father, upon the efficacy of the merits and inter- cession of Jesus Christ, the abiding of the Spirit and of the seed of God within them, and the nature of the cove- nant of grace; from all which ariseth, also, the certainty and infallibility thereof. "Nevertheless, they may, through the temptation of Satan and the world, the pre valency of corruption re- maininsr in them, and the nej^lect of the means of their preservation, fall into grievous sins, and for a time con- tinue therein; whereby they incur God's displeasure, and grieve his Holy Spirit, and come to be deprived of some measure of their graces and comforts, have their hearts CHAP. VI.] PERSEVERANCE. iVo hardened, and their consciences wounded, hurt and scan- dahze others, and bring temporal judgments upon them- selves." (Confession of Faith, chap, xvii, sec. i-iii.) " The perseverance of the saints is one of the articles by whicli the creed of the followers of Calvin is distinguished from that of the followers of Arminius. The latter hold, that true believers may fall into sins inconsistent with a state of grace, and may continue in apostasy to the end of life; and, consequently, may finally fall into perdition. In opposition to this tenet, our Confession affirms, that true believers can neither totally nor finally fall away from a state of grace, but shall certainly persevere therein tc the end, and be eternally saved. We affirm, that the total apostasy of believers is impossible, not in the nature of things, but by the Divine constitution; and, consequently, that no man, who has been once received into the Divine favor, can be ultimately deprived of salvation." (Expositor of the Confession, p. 198,) "As the grace of God, which is conceived to derive its efficacy from his power of fulfilling his purpose in those for whom it is destined, overcomes all the opposition with which it is at first received, so it continues to be exerted amidst all the frailty and corruption which adhere to human nature in a present state. It is not exerted to such a degree as to preserve any man from every kind of sin ; for God is pleased to teach Christians humility, by keeping up the remembrance of that state out of which they were delivered, and to quicken their aspirations after higher degrees of goodness, by lea\ang them to struggle frith temptation, and to feel manifold infirmities. But, although no man is enabled, in this life, to attain to per- fection, the grace of God preserves those to whom it is given from drawing back to perdition. The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints flows necessarily from that decree by which they were, from eternity, chosen to 176 PERSEVERANCE. [ciIAP. VI. salvation, and from the manner in which, according to the Calvinistic system, the decree was executed; and all tjie principles of the system must be renounced, before we can believe that any of those for whom Christ died, and who, consequently, became partakers of his grace, can fall from that grace, either finally — by which is meant, they shall not, in the end, be saved—or totally — by which is meant, that they shall, at any period of their lives, commit sins so heinous and presumptuous, and persist in them so obsti- nately, as, at that period, to forfeit entirely the Divine favor." (Hill, p. 640.) " Upon this subject professed Christians are divided in sentiment, as, indeed, they are upon every article of faith. The doctrine of our Church, in which I believe all the reformed Churches concurred, is expressed in the following words: 'They whom God hath accepted in the Beloved, effectually called, and sanctified by his Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace, but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved.'" (Dick, vol. ii, p. 283.) "We assert, then, that true believers cannot fall totally or finally from grace. It may seem that the use of both these words is unnecessary; because^ if they cannot fall totally, it follows that they cannot fall finally; but thej are intended to oppose the doctrine of Arminians, whc afiirm, that although a saint may fall totally from grace, he may be restored by repentance ; but, since this is uncer- tain, and does not always take place, he may, also, fall finally, and die in his sins. Now we aflirm, that the total apostasy of believers is impossible, not in the nature of thmgs, but by the Divine constitution; and, consequently, that no man, who has been once received into the Divine favor, can be ultimately deprived of salvation." (lb., vol. ii, p. 284.) " God doth continue to forgive the sins of those who are CHAP. VI.] PERSEVERANCE. 177 justified ; and, although they can never fall from the state of justification, yet they may, by their sins, fall under God's fatherly displeasure, and not have the light of his counte- nance restored unto them until they humble themselves, confess their sins, beg pardon, and renew their faith and repentance." (Confession of Faith, chap, xii, sec. 5.) "As justification is an act completed at once, so those who are justified cannot come into condemnation. The sins which they afterward commit, cannot revoke the pardon which God has graciously given them ; but they may sub- ject them to his fatherly displeasure and temporary chastise- ment. Here we must revert to the well-known distinction between judicial and fatherly forgiveness. Though God, in the capacity of a judge^ pardons all the sins of believers in the most free and unconditional manner, in the day of their justification, yet that forgiveness, which, as a father, he bestows upon his justified and adopted children, is not in general vouchsafed, without suitable preparation on their part for receiving and improving the privilege [!!] " (Ex- positor of the Confession, p. 158.) "May not true believers, by reason of their imperfections, and the many temptations and sins they are overtaken with, fall aAvay from the state of grace ? " True believers, by reason of the unchangeable love of God, and his decree and covenant to give them perse- verance, their inseparable union with Christ, his continual intercession for them, and the Spirit and seed of God abiding in them, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace, but are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation." (Larger Catechism, ques. 79.) If it should be objected to this statement, that, although Calvinists believe in the necessity of the salvation of those for whom Christ died, yet they believe it is conditional, or is made to depend upon the faith of the believer, I reply, it is admitted that Calvinists teach that faith is a condition 178 I'ERSEVERANCE. [CHAP. VI. of H.'-ilvation ; but now observe, they teach that it is irre- Bistiblv communicated — if it is a condition, it is not a con- dition dependent, in any sense, upon the behever himself, but is an effect wrought in him without his consent. "The covenant of redemption secures the continuance and growth of the principle of grace, until the believer shall be perfected in heaven. In this life he never utterly falls for one moment from grace." (Ely's Contrast, p. 274.) *'The hohness of the Christian continues to the end.'* (Dwight.) Upon this proposition, Dr. Dwight delivers one of his most labored sermons, to prove the necessary final perseverance of the saints. Upon this point it will scarcely be necessary for me to adduce a larger number of quotations. Those already given are full and authoritative. This, indeed, is a poini where less reference to authority is required than almost any other of the Calvinian creed ; here they all harmonize. The final perseverance of the saints, with them, is a frankly- avowed and cherished sentiment. To rob them of this, would be to rob them of one of their gods. If their view of election is true, this is consequentially true ; if their doc- trine of the atonement is true, this cannot be false ; if their doctrine of effectual grace is true, this must follow. So that they are, at least, consistent with themselves in believing and teaching it; they could not do otherwise. It is an integral part of the same great system of fatalism and in'C- sponsibility, which has been examined in this book. The doctrine, as taught in the above quotations, may thus be stated : 1. Persons once regenerated may fall into grievous sins, and continue therein for a time indefinite. 2. They cannot totally fall away, but, however sinful they may become, will continue to be children of God. 3. They cannot finally perish, but must necessarily come to eternal life. CUAP. VI. J PERSEVERANCE. 179 Such is the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church, as taught by their Confession of Faith and standard authors, To it -vve find many and, to us, insuperable objections. Read and judge for yourselves. 1. And first, we object, the doctrine is without warrant from the word of God. It is admitted that passages are found in the Scriptures, which, disconnected from their rela- tions, might alloiv of a construction partly favorable to a doctrine resembling the above. But no passage clearly teaches it ; none necessarily infers it ; no principle of reve- lation sanctions it; if it could be true, its truth never can be derived from the Bible. This, then, is our first ground of objection, and to a Christian it is sufiicient; he need go no further; here he will be content to put an end to his inquiries. It is not of the Bible, it cannot, therefore, be received, will be his reasoning. 2. But second, I object further, and as growing out of the foregoing, not only is this doctrine not taught in the Bible, but, what is more fatal to it, the Bible teaches that it is false, by teaching that precisely what it denies is the truth. It is to be discarded not alone because the Bible does not teach it, but because the Bible asserts its falsehood. Rev- elation is not silent upon the point, but it is expressly, fully, unmistakably against the assumption. The doctrine itself is false, or the Bible. I cannot better express this objec- tion than in the following language of Mr. Wesley, in his tiact on Perseverance. He thus presents the Scripture argument : " For thus saith the Lord : * When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die.' (Ezek. xviii, 24.) " That this is to be understood of eternal death appears from the twenty-sixth verse : * When a righteous man turneth away from his righteousness and committeth iniquity, and 180 PERSEVERANCE. [cHAP. VI. dis^U' * ^ am tiie CHAP. VI.] PERSEVERANCE. 187 true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit, he taketh it away. 1 am the vine ; ye are the branches. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered ; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned.' (John xv, 1-6.) "Here we may observe, 1. The persons spoken of were, in Christ, branches of the true vine. 2. Some of these branches abide not in Christ, but the Father taketh them away. 3. The branches which abide not are cast forth — cast out from Christ and his Church. 4. They are not only cast forth, but withered; consequently, never grafted in again. Nay, 5. They are not only cast forth and withered, but also cast into the fire. And, 6. They are burned. It is not possible for words more strongly to declare, that even those who are now branches in the true vine, may yet so fall as to perish everlastingly. " By this clear, indisputable declaration of our Lord, we may interpret those which might be otherwise liable to dispute; wherein it is certain, whatever he meant beside, he did not mean to contradict liimself. For example: *This is the Father's will, that of all which he hath given me, I should lose nothing.' Most sure ; all that God hath given him, or, as it is expressed in the next verse, 'every one which believeth on him,' namely, to the end, he *will raise up at the last day,' to reign with him for ever. " Again : * I am the living bread : if any man eat of this bread [by faith] he shall live for ever.' (John vi, 51.) True ; if he continue to eat thereof. And who can doubt of it ? "Again: *My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me. And I give unto them eternal life: and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand.' (John x, 27, 28.) " In the preceding text the condition is only implied ; in this, it is plainly expressed. They are mv sheep that hear 188 PERSEVERANCE. [CHAP. VT. my voice, that follow me in all holiness. And 'if ye do those things, ye shall never fall.' None shall 'pluck you out of my hands.' "Again: 'Having loved his own which were in the world, he loved them unto the end.' (John xiii, 1.) 'Hav- ing loved his own,' namely, the apostles — as the very next words, 'which were in the world,' evidently show — 'he loved them unto the end' of his life, and manifested that love to the last. "Once more: 'Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are one.' (John xvii, 11.) "Great stress has been laid upon this text, and it has been hence inferred, that all those whom the Father had given him — a phrase frequently occurring in this chapter — must infallibly persevere to the end. "And yet, in the very next verse, our Lord himself de- clares, that one of those whom the Father had given him, did not persevere unto the end, but perished everlastingly. " His own words are, ' Those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition.' (John xvii, 12.) "So one even of these was finally lost! — a demonstra- tion that the phrase, 'those whom thou hast given me,' signifies here, if not in most other places, too, the twelve apostles, and them only. " On this occasion, I cannot but observe another common instance of begging the question — of taking for granted what ought to be proved. It is usually laid down as an indisputable truth, that whatever our Lord speaks to or of his apostles, is to be applied to all believers. But this cannot be allowed by any who impartially search the Scrip- tures. They cannot allow, without clear and particular proof, that any one of those texts which related primarily to the apostles, as all men grant, belong to any but them. rUAP. VI.] PERSEVERANCE. ISD " Those who so effectually know Christ, as by that knowl- edge to hare escaped the pollutions of the world, may yet fall back into those pollutions, and perish everlastingly. "For thus saith the apostle Peter, *If after they have escaped the pollutions of the world, through the knowl- edge of the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, [the only pos- sible way of escaping them,] they are again entangled therein and overcome, the latter end is worse with them than the beginning. For it had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than, after they have known it, to turn from the holy commandment de- livered unto them.' (2 Peter ii, 20, 21.) "That the knowledge of the way of righteousness, which they had attained, was an inward, experimental knowledge, is evident from that other expression — they had ' escaped the pollutions of the world ;' an expression parallel to that in the preceding chapter, verse 4, 'Having escaped the corruption which is in the world.' And in both chapters, this effect is ascribed to the same cause; termed in the first, 'the knowledge of Him who hath called us to glory and virtue ;' in the second, more explic- itl}^ * the knowledge of the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ.* "And yet they lost that experimental knowledge of Christ and the way of righteousness; they fell back into the same pollutions they had escaped, and were 'again entangled therein and overcome.' They 'turned from the holy commandment dehvered to them,' so that their 'latter end was worse than their beginning.' "Therefore, those who so effectually know Christ, as by that knowledge to have escaped the pollutions of the world, may yet fall back into those pollutions, and perish everlastingly. " And this is perfectly consistent with St. Peter's words, in the fiist chapter of his former epistle : ' Who are kept by the power of God through Mih unto salvation.* 19C PERSEVERANCE. [CHAP. VI. Undoubtedly, so are all tliey who ever attain eternal salva- tion. It is the power of God only, and not our own, by which we are kept one day or one hour. "Those who see the light of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, and who have been made partakers of the Holy Ghost, of the witness, and the fruits of the Spirit, may, nevertheless, so fall from God as to perish everlastingly. "For thus saith the inspired writer to the Hebrews: 'It is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, if they fall away, to renew them again to repentance; seeing they crucify to them- selves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame.' (Hebrews vi, 4, 6.) "Must not every unprejudiced person see, the expres- sions here used are so strong and clear, that they cannot, without gross and palpable Avresting, be understood of any but true believers ? "They 'were once enlightened;' an expression familia, with the apostle, and never by him applied to any but believers. So: 'The God of our Lord Jesus Christ give unto you the spirit of wisdom and revelation: the eyes of your understanding being enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope of his calling, and what is the exceeding greatness of his power, to us- ward that believe.' (Ephesians i, 17-19.) So again: 'God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined into our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.' (2 Corinthians iv, 6.) This is the light which no unbelievers have. They aro utter strangers to such enlightening. 'The God of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ should shine unto them.' (V. 4.) CHAP. VI.] PERSEVERANCE. 191 "*They had tasted of the heavenly gift, [emphatically so called,] and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost.' So St. Peter likewise couples them together : * Be baptized for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost,' (Acts ii, 38,) whereby the love of God was shed abroad in their hearts, with all the other fruits of the Spirit. Yea, it is remarkable that our Lord him- self, in his grand commission to St. Paul, to which the apostle probably alludes in these words, comprises all these three particulars. *I send thee to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, [here contracted into that one expression, ' they were enlightened,'] that they may receive forgiveness of sins, ['the heavenly gift,'] and an inheritance among them which are sanctified,' (Acts xxvi, 18,) which are made * partakers of the Holy Ghost,' of all the sancti- fying influences of the Spirit. "The expression, 'They tasted of the heavenly gift,' is taken from the Psalmist, 'Taste and see that the Lord is good.' (Psalm xxxiv, 8.) As if he had said. Be ye as assured of his love, as of any thing you see with your eyes. And let the assurance thereof be sweet to your soul, as honey is to your tongue. "And yet those who had been thus 'enlightened,' had * tasted' this *gift,' and been thus 'partakers of the Holy Ghost,' so 'fell away' that it was 'impossible to renew them again to repentance.' "'But the apostle makes only a supposition: "If they should fall away." ' "I answer: the apostle makes no supposition at all. There is no if in the original. The words are, ^Ahvvatov tovf artaf ^oi'tiadivtaq, xai rtapaTiECSovta^, that is, in plain English, 'It is impossible to renew again unto repentance those who were once enlightened and have fallen away;* therefore, they must perish everlastingly. 192 PERSEVERANCE. [cHAP. VI. " ' But if SO, then farewell all my comfort. ' ''ITien your comfort depends on a poor foundation. My comfort stands not on any opinion, either that a believer can or cannot fall away — not on the remembrance of any thing wrought in me yesterday, but on what is to-day — on my present knowledge of God in Christ, reconcihng me to himself — on my now beholding the light of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, walking in the light as he is in the light, and having fellowship with the Father and with the Son. My comfort is, that through grace I now believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and that his Spirit doth bear witness with my spirit that I am a child of God. I take comfort in this, and this only, that I see Jesus at the right hand of God — that I personally for myself, and not for another, have a hope full of immor- tality — that I feel the love of God shed abroad in ray heart, being crucified to the world, and the world crucified to me. My rejoicing is this, the testimony of my con- science, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God, I have my conversation in the world. "Go and find, if you can, a more solid joy, a more blissful comfort, on this side heaven. But this comfort is not shaken, be that opinion true or false, whether the saints in general can or cannot fall. "If you take up with any comfort short of this, you lean on the staff of a broken reed, which not only will not bear your weight, but will enter into your hand and pierce you. "Those who live by faith, may yet fall from God, and perish everlastingly. "For thus saith the same inspired writer, 'The just shall live by faith; but if any man draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him.' (Hebrews x, 38.) 'The just [the justified person] shall five by faith;' even now shall he CHAP. VI.] PERSEVERANCE. 103 live the life whicli is hid with Christ in God; and if he endure unto the end, he shall live for ever. 'But if any man draw back,' saith the Lord, 'my soul shall have no pleasure in him;' that is, I will utterly cast him off; and, accordingly, the drawing back here spoken of is termed, in the verse immediately following, * drawing back to perdition.' *"But the person supposed to draw back, is not the same with him that is said to live by faith.' " I answer, 1. Who is it, then ? Can any man draw back from faith who never came to it ? But, " 2. Had the text been fairly translated, there had been no pretense for this objection. For the original runs thus : *0 Stxatoj ix Tti^ttdi ^i^aetat,' xai iav VTio^el^rj'tai. If o Sfcxatoj, 'the just man that lives by faith [so the expres- sion necessarily implie. , there being no other nominative of the verb] draws back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him.' "'But the apostle adds: "We are not of them who draw back unto perdition."' And what will you mfer from thence? This is so far from contradicting what has been observed before, that it manifestly confirms it. It is a farther proof that there are those 'who draw back unto perdition,' although the apostle was not of that number. Therefore, those who live by faith, may yet fall from God and perish everlastingly. "'But does not God say to every one that lives by faith, "I will never leave thee nor forsake thee?'" " The whole sentence runs thus : ' Let your conversation be without covetousness, and be content with such things as ye have ; for He hath said, I will never leave thee nor forsake thee.' True, provided 'your conversation be with- out covetousness,' and ye 'be content with such things as ye have.' Then you may f boldly say, the Lord is my helper, and I will not fear Tfhat man shall do unto rne.' ♦'Po you not see, 1. That this promise, as here recited, '17 ■ ' 194 PERSEVERANCE. [cHAP. VI. relates wholly to temporal things? 2. That, even tlius taken, it is not absolute, but conditional? And, 3. That the condition is expressly mentioned in the very same sentence ? "Those who are sanctified by the blood of the covenant, may so fall from God as to perish everlastingly. "For thus again saith the apostle: 'If we sin willfully, after we haie received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries. He that despised Moses' law, died without mercy under two or three witnesses. Of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an un- holy thing !' (Hebrews x, 26 - 29.) "It is undeniably plain, 1. That the person mentioned here, was once sanctified by the blood of the covenant. 2. That he afterward, by known, willful sin, trod under foot the Son of God. And, 3. That he hereby incun-ed a sorer punishment than death, namely, death everlasting. " Therefore, those who are sanctified by the blood of the covenant, may yet so fall as to perish everlastingly. "'What! Can the blood of Christ burn in hell? or can the purchase of the blood of Christ go thither ? ' " I answer, 1 . The blood of Christ cannot bum in hell, no more than it can be spilled on the earth. The heavens must contain both his flesh and blood until tlie restitution of all things. But, " 2. If the oracles of God are true, one who was purchased by the blood of Christ, may go thither. For he that was sanctified by the blood of Christ, was purchased by the blood of Christ. But one who was sanctified by the blood of Christ, may, nevertheless, go to hell ; may fall under thai fiery indignation which shall for ever devour the adversaries, "'Can a child of God, then, go to hell? or can a mat) CHAP. VI.] PERSEVERANCE. 196 be a child of God to-day, and a child of the devil to- morrow? If God is our Father once, is he not our Father always?' "I answer, 1. A child of God, that is, a true believer — for he that believeth is born of God — while he continues a true behever, cannot go to hell. But, 2. If a believer make shipwreck of the faith, he is no longer a child of God ; and then he may go to hell, yea, and certainly will, if he continues in unbelief. 3. If a believer may make ship- wreck of the faith, then a man that believes now, may be an unbeliever some time hence; yea, very possibly, to- morrow; but, if so, he who is a child of God to-day, may be a child of the devil to-morrow. For, 4. God is the Father of them that believe, so long as they believe. But the devil is the father of them that believe not, whether they did once believe or no. " The sum of all this is : if the Scriptures are true, those who are holy or righteous in the judgment of God himself — those who are endued with the faith that purifies the heart, that produces a good conscience — those who are grafted into the good olive tree, the spiritual, invisible Church — those who are branches of the true vine, of whom Christ says, ' I am the vine, ye are the branches ' — those who so effectually know Christ, as by that knowledge to have escaped the pollutions of the world-^those who see the light of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, and who have been made partakers of the Hply Ghost, of the witness, and of the fruits of the Spirit — those who live by faith in the Son of God — those who are sanctified by the blood of the covenant, may, neyjertheless, so fall from God as to perish everlastingly. "Therefore, let him that standeth take heed lest he fall." I have thus at length presented the argument of Mr. Wesley on this point, because of its Scriptural weight and iipportance. It is sufficient. No candid, unprejudiced 1 96 PERSEVERANCE. [CHAP. VI. reader, it seems to me, can arise from its study without conviction of its truth. But though sufficient, I must ask attention to one or two additional considerations, bearing against the doctrine under examination. Logical conse- quences are fatal to it ; among many instances we select the following : 1. If the doctrine be true, after conversion a man is no lono-er a free agent. In this, as in all respects with the fate and absurdity of the system, he is brought under a neces- sity which he has no power to avoid. He cannot fall away from salvation. It will not do for Calvinists to modify the doctrine by saying he will not; its distinct assumption is, he cannot; he has no sufficient power. Let us look closely at this. Either a man, after conversion, can fall into vicious practices and sins, or he cannot. If he cannot, he is not a free agent in a state of trial. If he can, then he may be lost — finally perish ; or if he does not finally perish, he must either be saved in his sins, or he must be saved from his sins. The former alternative no one em- braces; but if he must be saved from his sins — and this depends upon repentance and faith — the man is not a free agent in these exercises, because he is under an absolute necessity, his salvation being unavoidable; whatever is: necessary thereto is, also, unavoidable; and being so, the man is no longer free, unless a man may, at the same time, be free not to do, and yet under an unavoidable necessity to do, a given thing. Thus it appears that the doctrine of fate or absolute necessity legitimately results. 2. I object, it renders the condition of saints in this life more secure than that of the angels in heaven, and of our first parents in paradise. They, notwithstanding their purity and the favor of an approving Creator, had power to fall and perish. Can it be presumed that frail mortals in this state of trial may not? or, if so, why not? Is the faith- fulness and immutability of God plead ? In what sense do CHAP. VI.] TERSEVERANCE. 197 these secure believers more infallibly than the angels of heaven — than Adam in a state of innocence. 3. If this doctrine is true, it is no difference what a man does after conversion ; he cannot peril his soul — cannot even render his salvation doubtful. Thus it inculcates recklessness and licenses crime. Taken in connection with the doctrine of pre-irresistible regeneration, it must unsettle all ideas of responsibility, and do away with every motive to a holy life. For, first, the man cannot avoid being regenerated ; it is operated upon him, or in him, by irresistible power, and then, being regenerated, he may become during life a devil in sin, but he cannot miss of heaven. Now, what sheer licentiousness is here! what more is requisite to induce unlimited and incurable recklessness? The man is in no danger — it is all one ; let him indulge to the utmost excess ; he is safe, and cannot be less so. Is this Christianity ? Is this iniquitous teaching to be palmed upon the world as God's truth? 4. I object, further, if the doctrine of final perseverance be true, then sin is not so abhorrent in a Christian as it is in a sinner — is not attended with the same consequences. The sins into which a believer may fall are accounted sufficient to damn a sinner, but are not sufficient to make a whit uncertain the salvation of the believer, if committed by him. What strange theology ! Is it not a principle, and a true one, that where much is given much will be required? the greater the obligation, the greater the guilt of delmquency ? But in this case the principle is reversed. A man, because he has been made the subject of distin- guishing grace, may now sin most aggravatedly, but he will only be loved the more ; the greater his crimes, the greater the love manifested in his continual pardon. Is not this teaching that we may sin that grace may abound? 5. The doctrine is not analogous to, or resultant from, or in harmony with, the doctrine of Christianity. This lias 198 PERSEVERANCE. [cHAP. VI. been shown abundantly in the refutation of cognate errors. The grounds upon which it is based are false, and tlie superstructure stands upon emptiness. As conclusions drawn from false premises are worthless and void, so this doctrine vanishes with its foundations, which have been demonstrated to be false. The idea of perseverance, is dependent upon the doctrines of election, commercial atone- ment, sovereign and irresistible grace. No one can think of it separate and apart from these. These being destroyed, therefore, to dream of this is equivalent with supposing a cause without an effect, or a sequence without a premise. 6. It is contrary to the known conviction and conscious- ness of, I venture to say, all Christians. There may be a sense of security in the minds of believers, greater in some than in others; but it is believed that honest and careful scrutiny into the subject, will show that believers universally feel, whatever may be their attainments in grace, that there is a possibility of their coming short of salvation— that they yet have the fearful power to keep themselves out of eternal life. Is not this so? I appeal to the consciousness of every one who may chance to read these pages. Do you not feel the certainty of such a power and possibility? Nay, is there not an undefined uneasiness lest you may come short; and if not this, a sense of the necessity of much diligence, that you may at last enter into life ? Does not God, in his own word, appeal to such a possibility, to stimulate his children to constant and needful exertion ? Is this consciousness false? Is our heavenly Father trifling with us, in his admonitions, exhortations, and expostulations, addressed to us in view of such imminent liability ? 7. I object, that it is contrary to probabihty, if not cer- tainty, with respect to individuals whose history is given in the Scriptures, who at one time were recognized as children of God, and whose final damnation is unquestionable. It is, also, contrary to probability with respect to many persons OUAP. VI.] PERSEVERANCE. 199 known in every age of the Church ; some of whom, I doubt not, will be readily called up to the recollection of my readers — persons who, at one time, gave most indu- bitable evidence of genuine repentance and conversion, and who for many years brought forth all the fruits of a real Christian life, such as it is admitted could not exist without the influence of grace, yet, after all, fell into the most dreadful sins, and died in the very midst of their iniquities, gloating in their shame, and who must have finally perished or entered into life with their sins, or have been made holy after death ! Such are some of the objections we urge against the doctrine under examination. It is without warrant from the Bible. It is contrary to the explicit statements of the Bible. It is opposed to its facts, principles, and implica- tions. It is inharmonious and discordant with its doctrines. Its logical consequences are antagonistic to the reason and nature of man, to the genius of religion, and to the con- sciousness of our species. It is a dangerous doctrine, productive of recklessness, licentiousness, and crime, as its legitimate offspring. All this is objectionable to it, without a single redeeming or apologetic circumstance. To embrace It, is to act in advance of, if not to abandon, common sense ; and to be influenced by it, is to endanger all the interests of sound virtue and true religion, theoretical and practical, so far as these are under the guardianship of Christianity. 200 THE HEATHEN WORLD. [CHAP. VII. CHAPTER VII. THE HEATHEN WORLD. The Calvinistic view of the heathen world, as it is peculiar in itself, and most appalling in its consequences, deserves a brief separate notice. It is thus stated in the Confession of Faith : " Others not elected, although they may be called by the ministry of the word, and may have some common opera- tions of the Spirit, yet they never truly come to Christ, and, therefore, cannot be saved. Much less can men, not pro- fessing the Christian religion., he saved in any other way whatsoever, he they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the light of nature, and the law of that religion they do profess; and to assert and maintain that they may, is very pernicious and to he detested^ (Chap, x, sec. 4.) "Those cannot be saved who are totally destitute of revelation. Though the invitation which nature gives to seek God, be sufficient to render those without excuse who do not comply with it, yet it is not sufficient, even objec- tively, for salvation ; for it does not afford that lively hope which maketh not ashamed, for this is only revealed by the Gospel ; whence the Gentiles are said to have been without hope in the world. It does not show the true way to the enjoyment of God, which is no other than faith in Christ- It does not sufficiently instruct us about the manner in whicl? we ought to worship and please God, and do what is acceptable to him. In short, this call by nature never did, nor is it even possible that it ever can, bring any to the saving knowledge of God; the Gospel alone is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth. We are persuaded there is no salvation without Christ; no commu- nion of adult persons with Christ, but by faith in him ; no faith in Christ without the knowledge of him ; no knowledge CHAP. VII.] THE HEATHEN WORLD. 201 but by the preaching of the Gospel ; no preaching of the Gospel in the works of nature." (Expositor of the Con- fession, p. 145.) From this quotation I learn that the Presbyterian Church believes in the reprobation, and inevitable damnation, of tlie whole heathen world. This they have, as above quoted, made an article of their creed. It is not to be wondered at, that this horrible dogma has been kept as much as pos- sible out of view — only introduced as necessity required It is, however, sufficiently avowed, to inextricably convict the system. Dr. Rice, I find, has committed himself to its support. He says, "Vast multitudes have lived and died in Pagan darkness. Now, of what avail is it to say, that Christ designed, by his atonement, to save all men, when the truth is, that to vast multitudes he has not given the means of availing themselves of the provisions ?" This quotation, if its meaning is at all discernible, teaches that Christ did not die with a design to save all men, and that ^he heathen world were among the number of those to be excluded from the provisions of his atonement. They were first excluded from the death of Christ ; and then, in proof thereof, they were denied the means of making it available. Thus they were reprobated to death, and the mear^s were appointed to secure the end. I suppose there will be no need that additional authorities be referred to, or quota- tions increased. These are sufficient, and it remains simply thai we offer our objections ; if, indeed, the doctrine is not so horrible in itself, as to need no formal statement of its consequences, to render it detestable to all. I object to it, in general, that it is revolting to every sensibility of the soul — to every feeling of humanity — to all that is generous in rehgion and reason. Together with other elements of the Calvinistic faith, it dishonors, it de- monizes the God of the universe ! Look at it. The whole lieathen world inevitably, necessarily damned ! Have you 202 THE HEATHEN WORLD. [cHAP. VII pondered this fearful proposition? What a wholesale destruction is here ! Two-thirds of the human race damned every thirty years, without the possibility of salvation, not including the vast array of reprobates in Christian coun- tries! Not less than seven hundred millions of souls damned every generation! All reprobates! Behold that dreadful column marching forward to the unavoidable doom ! Twenty-one hundred millions — twilie the whole population of the globe every hundred years — damned ! — consigned to the vengeance of eternal fire, to endure the woes of hell for ever! Behold them, as that column sinks away into the mouth of the burning pit — but ever supplied with new recruits at the further end, and thus moving on from age to age — filling the insatiable jaws of the yawning gulf! And, as you see that column move, and hear the roar of the devouring abyss, into whose flaming jaws they plunge, ask the question, why are all these damned ? And you shall be answered by the Calvinist of the nineteenth cen- tury — by Dr. Rice, whom you may imagine as standing upon the verge of the devouring crater — it is the good pleasure of God — they are reprobates! They are damned, not be- cause they are heathen — this is their misfortune, not their crime—but they are reprobates! If they are damned at all, there- never was a time, since God passed his eternal decree, when they might have been saved; for then their doom was fixed, according to the good pleasure of God! Do you ask for a reason for this appalling opinion? you are met with the satisfactory reply, " Who art thou tliat repliest against GodV Add to this melancholy, dreadful procession, all the descendants of Abraham, and all the reprobates in nomi- nally Christian countries. Stay, until your vision takes in the utmost of the slowly-moving column of souls. Behold the cataract of immortal spirits, dashing on perpetually down the steeps of the ever-yawning and insatiable abyss ! G«AP. VII.] THE HEATHEN WORLD. 203 Lo! that river, as it stretches away through ages and generations — a river of immortal beings swallowed up in hell ! And now, pause and consider again, Avho are these ? what is that hell into which they plunge? and why are they so damned? These are God's creatures, made and fashioned by himself! That abyss into which they are cast, is the place of eternal torment! Stop — take in the thought, eternal. Eternal ! No end ! A million years are gone — they suffer on ! As many millions of ages as there are grains of sand in the solid globe have passed — they suffer still ! And still, as many myriads more as atoms in the universe, multiplied by every second that had passed before — and now, their woe is just begun! Not a second, compared with their eternal years, is passed! And now, behold their woe — their death of deaths! To them there^ is no hope ! No light will ever dawn upon their dungeon — no mercy will ever speak peace to their troubled spirits! Stay yet a moment — let us alight on yonder burning crag ! And now, I ask, why these woes — why all these lost? I hear the answer ; it comes from the Calvinists of the nine- teenth century — it comes from Dr. Rice — they are repro- bates — they were made for these flames! There never was a time when they had power to escape them ! They dwell amid these waves of eternal wrath, not for any avoidable fault of theirs, but to the praise of God's glorious power ! My spirit alternately shivers and burns at the horrid impu- tation! What has God done, that his rational creatures should so foully slander his adorable character? Pardon me ; every power of my soul mutinies at the blasphemy. Presbyterians, do you beheve this? It is in your Con- fession, but is it in your hearts? Do you believe that God IS such a being as this ? Such a sentiment, if it were true, it seems to me, is sufficient to shroud the universe in endless mourning, and pervade all intelligences with consternation 204 THE HEATHEN WORLD. [cHAP. VII. and dread. To state it, is to execrate it. Reason, liumanity, religion, turn from it with disgust and detestation. 1. But, particularly, I object to this doctrine; it is nowhere taught in the Scriptures. Net a single passage can be found, warranting even its inference, upon correct principles of interpretation. This, taken in connection with its horrid import, renders its belief, if not a crime against God, a reproach alike to humanity and Christianity. 2. I object to this doctrine, that it is absolutely con- trary to express revelation — to its principles, and its direct teaching. (1.) It is contrary to the principle that is laid down in the parable of the talents, " Where no law is, there is no transgression." (Rom. iv, 15.) "Sin is not imputed where there is no law." (Rom. v, 13.) (2.) To express teaching. "For as many as have sinned without law, shall, also, perish without law," &c. (Rom. ii, 8.) 3. I object to the doctrine: if the whole heathen world are inevitably and necessarily damned, then they are damned without any fault of their own, or they are punished unavoidably — they are placed in circumstances where such damnation is the consequence of that over which they have not, and never did have, any control. Are they damned for being heathen ? But they are not responsible for this. They certainly had no part in electing whether they would be heathen or not. Is a man to be damned because he has the misfortune to be born in one region of the earth — not in another? Is such the law by which men are finally to be judged — such the principle upon which the momentous question of eternal destiny is to be fixed ? Are they to be damned because they have never been favored with the light of revelation ? Are they responsible CHAl'. VII.] THE HEATHEN WORLD. 205 for this? Is it a sufficient reason for casting a man into hell, that he never heard of the existence of a Bible? Is this the ground upon which the God worshiped by Christians determines the fate of his creatures? Are they to be damned because they have not exercised faith in the Son of God ? Could they exercise faith in a being of whom they never heard? Had they power to believe on one they never knew ? Is it sin in a man not to believe in Jesus, if he never heard of any such being — did not, and could not, know any thing respecting him ? If for none of these, for what are the heathen all necessarily damned ? Because they did not live up to the light they had ? But can this be shown, that no heathen over acted according to his best light? But when the con- demnation of the heathen is placed upon the ground that they willfully transgressed the law they have, it abandons the whole Calvinian assumption of their unavoidable damna- tion; for, if they willfully transgressed, they might have obeyed; then they would have been saved, and so their damnation is not unavoidable. Is not the reason of their damnation, according to Cal- vinism, simply this — they are reprobates ? Before they were born, they were assigned their fate : not, indeed, from any foresight of any thing in them; but because it was the sovereign pleasure of God that they should be damned! For some cause, sufficient to infinite Wisdom, but which he has not thought necessary to reveal to the human race, he saw that it would be best that they should be damned, and he, therefore, made them to this end. But, that he might seem to have an excuse for such monstrous cruelty, he first caused the parents of these reprobates to become depraved, and then, for this depravity, consigned them to destruction ; but left them in the world long enough for them to manifest their depravity, and then, for this outward manifestation, executes upon them the vengeance of eternal fire. 206 THE HEATHEN WORLD. [CUA.P. VII And, that the outward manifestation might be infaUibly secured, and so the excuse be certain, and the correspond- ing punishment inflicted, he consigned them to heathenism — a state, in which the Christian virtues were impossible, but in which they might, nay, certainly would, work all manner of uncleanness with greediness, and indulge in the utmost excess of vice; and so heathenism would be the means to justify damnation, as the end purposed of God from eter- nity. What admirable machinery is this! How infinite Malevolence arranged and contrived all, to the accomplish- ment of the appalling aim and end! Eternal damnation of an immortal and unoffending intelligence, the supreme, ultimate object! To secure this, as a next step, the fall of the first man, and so the corruption of his race. Then, all being corrupt, the reprobation of a large number on account thereof. Then, to justify the sentence of reprobation upon these, their consignment to heathenism, that they might, unavoidably, become personally vicious and sinful, that the universe might suppose their damnation to be on account of their sins, and so God escape the odium of cruelty, at the same time that it was all fixed and executed according to his will. Horrid ! horrid ! Heathenism, in order to pre viously appointed damnation ! 4. If this doctrine be true, there is neither justice noi goodness in God. We assert this awful consequence without qualification — without timidity. With us^ no proposition can be more certainly true than this. We must learn to believe black is white, and white is black, when we can believe that God is a just being, at the same time consigning millions of beings to the flames of hell, for that over which they never had, and never could have, any control — for that which was absolutely unavoidable. When I can beheve that a God of goodness is capable of such conduct, I shalj be pi-epared to embrace any absurdity — any contradiction however revolting. No language can express my horror — CHAP. VII. 1 THE HEATHEN WORLD. 207 my detestation of such a sentiment. Yet such is the ineA'i- table consequences of the Calvinistic theory — a consequence, hke a horrid ghost, haunting it at every turn. It flows from reprobation — from hmited atonement — from the sin- ner's inabihty — from the unavoidable damnation of the heathen world. With each, with all of them, the justice and goodness of God is in eternal conflict, if it is unjust and unmerciful to damn a being for ever, for not performing im- possibihties ; which, who, that has the feelings of humanity, not to say the benevolence of a Christian, can doubt? If this doctrine be true, why, then, shall I doubt the damnation of idiots and infants? Is the one more repulsive than the other? If a heathen may justly be damned for not having faith in Christ, of whom he never heard, why may not my innocent, unconscious babe be damned, by the same Moloch, for a similar reason; the injustice, the fiendish cruelty, in the one case would be no greater than in the other. 5. I object to this doctrine, that it claims our belief, not only against evidence the most convincing — evidence derived from the word and principles of revelation, as well as from the reason and common sense of mankind — but, also, without a shadow of proof to support it, derived from any quarter. It ought not to be believed if there were no evidence to the contrary, because there is none in its support; but to ask for it the credence of reasonable and Christian men, under these circumstances, when reason and Christianity equally and absolutely condemn it, and nothing supports it, can be little short of madness; it is preposterous in the extreme. If there was conflicting evi- dence — if any thing could be said in its favor — if any solitary reason could be urged in its support — but to ask of men to believe one of the most revolting and blas- phemous dogmas that falsehood and fanaticism ever in- vented, without any reason, and in opposition to the spon- taneous judgment of the race, and to the word of God. 208 THE HEATHEN WORLD. [CHAP. VEI. and to the nature and fitness of things, is a species of bold- ness which scarcely knows a parallel. 6. If this doctrine is true, involving, as it does, the justice and goodness of God, and clothing him in the oppo- site and dreaded character of cruelty and maliciousness, it must unsettle the confidence of the universe in him, and cause him only to be hated and lothed by every rational being. Let such a sentiment once prevail — let the idea obtain that the Almighty sways such a government, and is actuated by such attributes, and heaven and hell will differ but in name. Dismay and despair, mingled with rage and detestation, will be the universal and only consciousness. Angels will join their curses with devils, and mute nature, if possible, would reverberate the merited anathema from sphere to sphere. Such a conviction must whelm creation in anarchy ; for it removes the only basis of order — confi- dence in the great Parent and Sovereign of all, and persua- sion that his government is established in justice and truth. Let this be removed, and what remains but curses and death? Who could reverence and love — who could adore and worship such a God? None but devils and fiends, who should recognize, in his hated and baleful character, their own abhorred attributes infinitely surpassed. Thus, the doctrine would unavoidably anarchize and subvert the whole government of God. The fact itself would be en- tirely competent to such a result, but, much more so, the principles upon which it is founded, or from which it ema- nated. Let any one be at the pains to study the philosophy of his own nature — of his own mind — and he will not fail to come to the game conclusion. He will see that such a result is legitimate to such a cause with respect to himself, and so wjth respect to all other beings similarly constituted. But why shall I add reasons upon this point? Is it possible that humanity can be so perverted as to require it? Is it not so manifestly detestable, that, at its bare mentit^ CBAP. VII.] THE HEATHEN WORLD. 209 all nature spontaneously rises up to curse it? Where, in the universe, will it find an argument — an advocate ? Let it be stripped naked, and stand forth in its own true char- acter — without meretricious drapery — without mask or vail of any kind. And who shall come from heaven, or earth, or hell, to plead its cause? Who but the father of lies, who lives to blaspheme, and who might dare to assert even this, as the very climax of his infernal blasphemies? But, Presbyterians, you do not believe this. It is in your creed, but you have abandoned it. I charge not the dreadful blasphemy upon you ; if any of you still cling to it, it is without understanding consequences. What I charge you with is, inconsistency in holding on to and supporting such a creed, and so propagating such sentiments. Be careful how you do this ; you see — you cannot but see — the appall- ing consequences. I have named them in candor, with all plainness, but in love. Do consider them in the same spirit ; do not take offense at their frightful and dreadful import; but simply ask, are they true ? and then decide accordingly. And will the Lord help you, and finally bring us where truth will shine as the day, and error disappear for ever! Infant Damnation. — It is deemed proper, in connection with the foregoing, to say something on the subject of infant damnation. This horrible doctrine has, from time imme- morial, been charged upon Calvinists, and, certainly, not without abundant evidence. But it is now so universally disclaimed, that, we suppose, a reformation has been wrought upon this point. This much good has come of the manner in which our fathers exposed the horrors of the system; and, as we delight to see error renounced, we congratulate our friends on so much evidence of their con- version. All dying infants belong to the elect! This is what I suppose them now to believe. But I cannot, to save me, tell how, or why, they believe this; unless it be to escape the odium of avoTving an opposite sentiment. 18 210 THE HEATHEN WOULD. [CHAP. VII. But, now, what I want to bring out distinctly is this, that, in renouncing the doctrine of infant damnation, they have not relieved the system a particle. It still labors under an odium, as horrid and detestable, as though it pro- fessed the old dogma. Though it now believes that no infants are damned, it still believes in what is precisely the same ! Nay, it believes what is transcendently worse and more horrible! Its difficulties are not diminished, they still press it with unabated force. They believe that those who shall finally perish, were reprobated, from eternity, to destruction — that they were passed by in the decree of election, and, as a consequence, consigned to eternal damnation. Now, mark: this reproba- tion took place long ages before! they were born. It excluded them from heaven ; it consigned them to hell — irrevocably, unchangeably ! This, millions of years before they had an existence. As soon as they were conceived, they were damned; when born, they were under irreversible sen- tence — they were virtually destroyed ! And, now, observe, further : the cause of this reprobation and consequent damnation, was their simple, inherited cor- ruption. It was what belonged to them in their concep- tion — what was engendered in the woinb — what was given to them when being was given to them. They were not reprobated for what they would be and do, as foreseen of God ; but he passed them by, or reprobated them, for their inherited corruption alone, or what he saw them to be in Adam. Thus they were reprobated without any actual personal sin. That is, they were consigned to damnation when they were not a span Zow^— unborn infants — and for what belonged to them as such, without reference to what they would be. Is not this infant damnation? Does it not show that every reprobate was damned, in the purpose of God, and inevitably, when, as yet, he was an unborn mfant, and for what he was at that period ? What else i? CZIAF. VII.] THE HEATHEN WORLD. 212 infant damnation? Can any one tell me? In wl^at does this differ from actually casting an infant, gasping its first breath, into the eternal gulf? Eat this, as abundantly shown, all Calvinists are bound to believe; they cannot escape it. But I have said this is worse, in connection with other points of the system, than simple infant damnation. I re- peat it. A moment's attention will show you the correct- ness of the position. The doctrine is, that certain persons were reprobated to certain and unavoidable damnation when they were born — before it. Well, ; .ow, observe, further : they believe that every actual sin will increase the torments of the damned — that for every abuse of mercies enjoyed, blessings offered, their punishment will be enhanced and increased.. Look, for a moment, if you have the moral nerve, at the compound horrors of the system, in the light of these points. Every sin will magnify the torments of the damned. Now, why were they permitted to live to commit personal sins, and thus increase their torments? Why ? Not that they might repent — not that they might turn and live. This was eternally impossible. Why, then, were they permitted to Hve? For this — read it with dis- may — that they might have an opportunity to increase their damnation a million-fold — that they might prepare for themselves a deeper, hotter, more awful hell! It would have been a mercy in God to have sent them to hell when they breathed their first sweet breath upon a mother's bosom! Monster of cruelty that he was, why did he not then, send them out of life to a mitigated per- dition? Why did he offer them mercies, when he knew they could not accept them ? Why did he strive with them early and late? Why did he invite them to life, when he knew it was absolutely impossible for them to comply, and when he also knew that for every such offer rejected then damnation would be greatly magnified ? Why this ? Was 212 THE HEATHEN WORLD, [cHAP. VII. it not cruel in the extreme? Would it not have been an act of transcendent generosity, Godlike compassion, to have actually, as he did in his purpose, sent them ad to hell in their infancy? Thus it appears, that the doctrine of actual infant damnation would greatly reheve, instead of increase the horrors of Calvinism. Is there any possible escape from this conclusion? If there is, I cannot see it. I wish I could. Dear reader, do not turn in anger away from this fearful imputation. Ponder it; see if it is not true. I know it is most dreadful and terrific. I tremble to write it. When I reflect what it makes of the character of God, I shudder! Ye angels, who dwell in light, and see with open vision, is the God of your rap- turous worship such a being as this? Nay, would not such an imputation cover your heavens with dismay, and fill your seraphic bosoms with consternation and dread? Does not the universe, from the seraphim to the worm, pronounce it false and blasphemous ? Sovereignty of God. — This subject, though of sufficient importance to claim a separate and distinct notice, must, for the present, be disposed of by a brief notice, in con- nection with the foregoing. In Calvinism, all things are resolved into sovereignty. No difficulty so great, but the sovereignty of God ex- plains it. No absurdity, or contradiction, or blasphemy so appalling, but here is its defense: "Even so. Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight." "Who art thou that repliest against God?" "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus ?" That God is sovereign, no one disputes. That he has a right to rule, and does rule in heaven and earth, is not even questioned. But we protest, in the name of reason and religion, and for the honor of God, against appeahng to his sovereignty for the purpose of propagating slan- ders against his character — against so understanding and CHAP. VII. I THE HEATHEN WORLD. 21d construing it, as to bring it in conflict with liis justice and other attributes of his nature. He has no rights incon- sistenr, witli his own glorious nature — he has no sovereignty that can act adversely to his glorious perfections. He is a sovereign. But he is a sovereign God, not a sovereign devil. His is not an irresponsible, blind, capricious sover- eignty. His rights and his rule are not resolvable into mere arbitrary acts of will. He rules in righteousness, and wisdom, and truth. And what conflicts with thes**, God claims no right to — he has no right to ; to say to the contrary would be to dishonor him. The sovereignty of God, therefore, never should be quoted in support of, or excuse for, what is manifestly contrary to these. He has no such sovereignty. When any thing is charged to him which requires such a supposition, it is false and slanderous to God. Here is where Calvinism commits one of its greatest practical blunders — a misapprehension of the nature of sovereignty ! It assumes that such and such things are so — revealed in the Bible; and, it matters not how homble the assumption, it holds itself under no obli- gation to consider the consequences, however glaringly false, and inconsistent, and dreadful. It is all referred to God's sovereignty. It is all answered in a breath: ''Even so, Father!" Shame on s ch trifling and profana- tion of holy things! Suppose ye that the God of the universe feels himself honored with such sacrifice? Does he esteem such a defense — a defense which demonizes his character to illustrate his sovereignty? No, no, it is a mistake! God's sovereignty explains no principle that is manifestly wrong — sanctions no fact that is inconsistent with justice. "The Judge of the whole earth will do right;" he cannot do wrong. His sovereignty gives him no such power. 914 THE WILL. [chap. VIII. CHAPTER VIII. THE WILL. In the present chapter we call attention more particu- larly to the Calvinian view of the will. This subject has been involved in former chapters, but it is of such impor- tance as to demand separate and distinct treatment. ' What, then — it immediately becomes an important ques- tion — is the Calvinistic view of the will, and of agency? This will be better understood by reference to their ac- knowledged standards. " God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor, by any absolute ne- cessity of nature, determined to good or evil. " Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God ; but yet, mutably, so that he might fall from it. " Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereto." (Confession, chap, ix, sec. i, ii, iii.) This chapter gives a very inadequate account of the Calvinistic doctrine upon the point in question until its terms are explained, and the views of authors are con- sulted. It will be perfectly understood by the following explanations. In the Old and New Divinity Compared I read, " For if God does not possess such absolute control over his crea- tures, that he can govern them according to his pleasure, how could he have decreed any thing unconditionally con cerning them, since it might happen, that, in the exercise OHAF. VIII.l THE WILL. 215 of their free agency, they would act contrary to the Divine purpose ? " If this paragraph means any thing, it plainly means that unconditional decrees and free agency are irreconcilable; and, as all things are unconditionally decreed, according to the system there can, of course, be no free agency. Thomas Aquinas, quoted with approval by Witsius, says, ** It is essential to the first principle, that it can act without the assistance and influence of a prior agent ; so that, if the human will could produce any action, of which God was not author, the human will would have the nature of a first principle." *' Nor does God only concur with the actions of second causes. When they act, but, also, influences tlie causes themselves to act. . . . Calvinists contend that, as nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, the acts of the will are never contingent, or without necessity — understanding by necessity, a necessity of consequence, or an infallible connection with something foregoing." (Ex- positor of Confession.) "Calvinists conteiid, that a power in the will to de- termine its own determinations, is either unmeaning, or supposes, contrary to the first principles of philosophy, something to arise without a cause; that the idea of the soul exerting an act of choice, or preference, while, at the same time, the will is in a perfect equilibrium, or state of indifierence, is full of absurdity and self-contradiction : and that, as nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, the acts of the will are never contingent, or ivithout necessity — understanding, by necessity, a necessity of consequences, or an infallible connection with something foregoing. Accord- ing to Calvinists, the liberty of a moral agent consists in the power of acting according to his choice; and those actions are free which are performed without any external compulsion or restraint, in consequence of the determinations of his 216 THE WILL. [CIIAP. VIII. own mind. The necessity of a man's willing and acting in conformity to his apprehensions and dispositions, is, in their opinion, fully consistent with all the liberty which can belong to a rational nature. The infinite Being necessarily wills and acts according to the absolute perfection of his nature, yet with the highest liberty. Angels necessarily will according to the perfection of their nature, yet with full liberty ; for this sort of necessity is so far from inter- fering with hberty of will, that the ^perfection of the will's liberty lies in such a necessity.'' (Expositor of Con- fession, p. 136.) "Neither does God only excite and predetermine the will of men to vicious actions, so far as they are actions, but he likewise so excites it, that it is not possible but, thus acted upon, it shall act." (Witsius.) "Moreover, as a second cause cannot act, unless acted .upon, and previously moved to act, by the predetermining influence of the first, so, in like manner, that influence of the first cause is so efficacious, as, that supposing it, the second cause cannot but act." (lb.) "Every step of every individual character, receives as determinate a character from the hand of God, as every mile of a planet's orbit, or every gust of wind, or every wave of the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every rivulet of flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions: it is absolute and unlimited. And, while it embraces the vast, it carries its resistless influences to all the minute and unnoticed diversities of existence. It reigns and operates through all the secrecies of the inner man. It ffives birth to every purpo&e; it gives impulse to every desire; it gives shape and color to every conception; it wields an entire ascendency over every attribute of the mind : and the will, and the fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of their hidden and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives movement and fHAP. VIII.] THE WILL. 217 direction througli every one point of our pilgrimage. At no moment of time does it abandon us. It follows us to the hour of death, and it carries us to our place, and to our everlasting destiny in the regions beyond it," (Dr. Chalmers.) "A man chooses what appears to be good," says Mr. Dick, " and he chooses it necessarily, in this sense, that he could not do otherwise. The object of every volition is to please himself; and to suppose a man to have any other object, that is, to will any thing that does not please him in itself, or in its circumstances, is absurd: it is to suppose him to will and not to wjll at the same time, He is per- fectly voluntary in Ms choice; hut his willingness is the consequence of the view which his mind takes of the object presented to it, or of his prevailing disposition. " Those actions are free which are the effect of volition. In whatever manner the state of mind which gave rise to the volition has been produced, the liberty of the agent is neither greater nor less. It is the will alone which is to be considered, and not the means by which it has been deter- mined. If God foreordained certain actions, and placed men in such circumstances that the actions would certainly take place, agreeably to the laws of the mind, men are, nevertheless, moral agents, because they act voluntarily, and are responsible for the actions which consent has made their own. Liberty does not consist in the power of acting or not acting, but in acting from choice. The choice is determined by something in the mind itself, or by some- thing external influencing the mind; but, whatever is the cause, the choice makes the action free, and the agent accountable. If this definition of hberty be admitted, you will perceive that it is possible to reconcile the freedom of the will with absolute decrees; but we have not got rid of every difficulty. By this theory, human actions appear to he as necessary as the motions of matter, accordin^g to tlie laws 19 218 THE WILL. [chap. VIII. of gravitation and attraction : and man seems to be a jnachine, conscious of his movements, and consenting to (hem, bvt impelled by something different from himself ^^ If any thing further should be esteemed necessary upon this point, a few selections from Dr. Emmons, a distin- cfuished divine of New England, and author of an elaborate work on theology, may supply the demand. He says, "Since the Scriptures ascribe all the actions of men to God, as well as to themselves, we may justly conclude that the Divine agency is as much concerned in the had as their good actions. Many are disposed to make a distinc- tion here, and to ascribe only the good actions of men to the Divine agency, while they ascribe their bad ones to the Divine permission. But there appears no ground for this distinction in Scripture or reason. Men are .no more capa- ble of acting independently of God in one instance than another. If they need any kind or ^ degree of Divine agency in doing good, they need precisely the same kind and degree of Divine agency in doing evil. "But there was no possible way in which he could dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts. And if he pro- duced their bad as well as good volitions, then his agency was concerned in precisely the same manner in their wrong as in their right actions. His agency making them act, necessarily connects his agency and theirs together, and lays a solid foundation for ascribing their actions either to him or them, or to both. " But, since mind cannot act any more than matter can move, without a Divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will, to act i»t not to act, independently of Divine influence. There must, therefore, be the exercise of Divine agency in every human action. " By this invisible agency upon the minds, he governs all CHAP. VIII.j THE WILL. 219 their views, all their thoughts, all their determinations, and all their volitions, just as he pleases, and just according to his secret will, which they neither know beforehand, nor can resist, evade, or frustrate." "The plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in common speech, is the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases ; or, in other words, his being free from hinderances or impedi- ments in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills. And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise. " But one thing more I would observe, concerning what is vulgarly called liberty, namely, that power and oppor- tunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it, without taking into the meaning of the word any thing of the cause of that choice, Or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition — whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal, habitual bias — whether it was deter- mined by some internal, antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause — whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pur- suing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom." (Edwards on the Will, p. 12.) "That every act of the will has some cause, and, con- sequently, has a necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary, a necessity of connection and consequence is evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever is excited by some motive. "But if every act of the will is excited by a motive, then that motive is the cause of the act. If the acts of 220 THE WILL. fCHAP. VIII the "vvill are excited by motives, then motives are the causi of their being excited, or, what is the same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of tlie will is properly the effects of their motives. Motives dc nothing, as motives or inducements, but by their influence ; and so much as is done by their influence is the effecl of them. For that is the motive of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of something else. And if volitions are properly the effects of motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives — every effect and event being, as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition is neces- sary, and is not from any self- determining power in the will; the volition which is caused by previous motive and inducement, is not caused by the will exercising a sovereign power over itself, to cause, determine, and excite volitions in itself." (Edwards on the Will, pp. 26, 27.) The view given in this quotation, is the view elaborately sustained in Mr. Edwards' celebrated work on the will. The whole work is based, for the defense of this view, against Arminian notions of liberty. It will not be neces- sary to quote more largely upon this point, as our simple object, in these quotations, is to learn the view of the authors referred to, without examining their particular merits. " The liberty of a moral agent consists in the power of actino" according to his choice ; and those actions are free which are performed without any external compulsion or restraint, in consequence of the determination of his owti mind. "The various changes upon matter, which are the events of the natural world, arise from a succession of operations, every one of which, being the effect of something previous, becomes, in its turn, the cause of something which follows. CHAP. VIII.] THE WILL. 221 Tlie particular determinations of mind, which may be con- sidered as events arising in the moral world, have their causes, also, which we are accustomed to call motives, that is, inducements to act in a particular manner, which arise from the objects presented to the mind, and the views of those objects A\hich the mind entertains. The causes of the events in the natural world are efficient causes, which act upon matter ; the causes of events in the moral world are final causes, with reference to which the mind, in which the action originates, proceeds voluntarily and deliberately to put forth its own powers. But the direction of the action toward its final cause is not less certain, than the direction of the motion produced in an inert, passive sub- stance, by the form impressed upon it, which is the effi- cient cause of the motion." (Hill, pp. 551, 552.) " It is essential to a soul to have a moral disposition, good or bad, or a mixture of both ; and according to what is the prevaihng moral disposition of the soul must be the moral actings of the will. [Query : How did a holy nature make an unholy volition?] Hence, there is a great difference in regard to the freedom of the will in the different states of man. In the state of innocence, the natural inchnation of man's will was only to good ; but it was liable to change through the influence of temptations, and, therefore, free to choose evil. In his natural corrupt state, man freely chooses evil; and he cannot do otherwise, being under bondage of sin. In the state of grace, he has a free will, partly to good and partly to evil. In this state there is a mixture of two opposite moral dispositions ; and as some- times the one and sometimes the other prevails, so the will sometimes chooses that which is good, and sometimes that which is evil." (Expositor of the Confession, p. 137.) From the above quotations we make the following de- ductions : 1. Calvinists believe that every volition, or choice, is the 222 TfiE WILL. [chap. VIIL necessary result of an influence exerted upon the mind, through the agency of motives. In other words, they be- lieve that such is the constitution of the human mind, that it cannot will at all without a motive, and that, when it does will, it cannot will otherwise under the circumstances, because the particular exercise of will is the necessary effect of the motives then operating upon the mind. 2. They believe that free agency consists, not in the power to originate and govern volitions, but in the power one has to do according to his volitions. AVe insist that this view of the subject involves fatalism, and is entirely inconsistent with the free agency of man. And this must appear with the slightest examination. The doctrine is, that, when a man makes a choice, or puts forth an exercise of will, he cannot, under the circum- stances, make any other choice ; the motives presented to his mind are such as to necessitate this particular choice, and to render any other impossible. ISow, is it not manifest, that this renders man the victim of inexorable necessity. What he chooses he is coerced to choose, without the possibility of an opposite choice, by irresistible power. What matters it, thoiigh you say he acts from choice, or volunlarily, and is, therefore, free? Is it not certain that choice itself is forced upon him, and, hence, that he is not free? I cannot do better here, than to quote from the distin- guished Dr. Beecher : " Choice, in its very nature, implies the possibility of a different, or contrary election, to that which is made. There is always an alternative to that which the mind decides on, with the consciousness of choosing either. In the simplest form of alternative, it is to choose or not to choose, in a given way; but, in most cases, the alternatives he between two or many objects of choice presented to the mind ; and, if you deny to mind this alternative power — if you insist, that, by a constitution CHAP. VIII.J THE WILL. 223 anterior to choice, of the nature of natural cause to its effect, the choice which takes place can come, and cannot but come, into being, and that none other than this can, by any possibility, exist, you have as perfect a fatality of choke as ever Pagan, or Atheist, or Antinomian, conceived. The question of free will is not whether man chooses — this is notorious — none deny it; but whether his choice is free, as opposed to a fatal necessity — as opposed to the laws of instinct and natural causation — whether it is the act of a mind so qualified for choice, as to decide between alterna- tives, uncaused by the energy of a natural cause to its effect — whether it is the act of an agent, who might have abstained from the choice he made, and made one which he did not. To speak of a choice as being free, which is pro- duced by the laws of natural necessity, and which cannot but be when and what it is — more, that the effects of natural causes can govern the time, and manner, and quali- ties of their being — is a perversion of language. " To illustrate the fatality of an agency, in which choice is the unavoidable effect of a natural, constitutional, and coercive causation, let us suppose an extended manufcictory, all whose wheels, like those in Ezekiel's vision, were inspired with intelligence and instinct with life — some crying holy ! holy! as they rolled, and others aloud blaspheming God — all voluntary in their praises and blasphemies; but tlie volitions, like the motions of the wheels themselves, pro- 'duced by the great water-wheel and the various bands, which kept the motion, and the adoration, and the blasphemy agoing: how much accountability would attach to these praises and blasphemies produced by the laws of water- power? and what would it avail to say, as a reason for justifying God in punishing these blasphemies, 0, but they are free, they are voluntary, they choose to blaspheme ? Truly, indeed, they blaspheme voluntarily ; but their choice to do so is necessary in the same sense that the motion of 224 THE WILL. [cIIaP. VIII. the great wheel, which the water, by the power of gravity, turns, is necessary, and just as destitute of accountabihty. " Choice, without the possibihty of other or contrary choice, is the immemorial doctrine of fatalism; the theory of choice, that it is what it is by a natural, constitutional necessity, and that a man cannot help choosing what he does choose, and can b}'- no possibility choose otherwise, is the doctrine of fatalism in all its forms." So writes one of the most venerable and learned living Presbyterian ministers, who has the boldness to think and speak his own sentiments. He sustains this view with an amount of learning worthy of himself and the subject. The same point has been thus stated by Jouffroy, a dis- tinguished French writer: **The principal propositions the supporters of this system, are as follows: in the first place, they assert as a fact, that every volition has a motive ; in the second place, they say, that if the motive which acts upon the vnW is a simple and single one, the motive will necessarily determine it ; but if there are several motives operating at the same time, the strongest will determine it. Such, gentlemen, is the argument of the friends of this system." (P. 96.) I have riot thought it necessary, in this connection, to refer to the use of a variety of terms commonly incorpo- rated in the controversy about the will. The only point we have deemed important to particularize, we find in the proposition, that " motives are causes of which volitions are effects." Upon this simple proposition, the whole contro- versy turns. If it is true, the Calvinian view of the will is true. If it is false, the Calvinian view of the will is false. ]t forms the direct issue. It is presumed upon this point there will be no quibbling — no equivocation. We have already shown that the view thus stated, results consequentially from the doctrine of decrees, by showing that, if God decreed whatsoever comes CHAP. VIII.] THE WILL. 225 i,o pass, he must have decreed what each distinct volition should be; and his decree being the necessity or necessi- tating cause of the thing decreed, it was, therefore, the cause of volitions. This we have shown before conse- quentially ; and now, from a more direct examination of the doctrine of will, Ave learn that what was then a logical deduction, is, in fact, a matter of faith; the volition is determined by the force of motives — motives are arranged by the providence of God — and so the decree of God, with respect to volitions, is executed, or brought about by his providence. This view is given as the most moderate and least objec- tionable. Many Calvinists have, indeed, asserted that voli tions are produced by the direct agency of God, and it might be shown that such is a legitimate consequence of other points of the system; but we select this as the explanation of the more moderate school, and the now prevailing sentiment of Calvinistic Churches. Calvinists become angry with us when we accuse them of denying the free agency of man. Now, that there may be no mistake here, we call attention to this point. Calvin- ists do believe in free agency, according to their definition : that is, " the power or opportunity any one has to do as he pleases." They do beheve that a man can do as he pleases when he is not prevented ; but they do not believe that a mar has any control over his choices— they do not believe that he is able to choose differently from what he does — they do not think that such a power is necessary to constitute free agency. Now, we shall show that all the consequences of sheer fatalism are included in their doctrine and definition of freedom ; that, though they believe in what they are pleased to call free agency, yet they do not, in fact, include the idea of actual liberty therein, but leave it embarrassed with inexorable necessity. That I have stated their views in the least objectionable 226 THE WILL. [chap. VIIJ. form, in the most moderate tone, I think must be admitted by all candid judges: it only remains, therefore, that I proceed to point out consequences, and then it will be for my readers to decide, whether the consequences thus de- duced do actually flow or not. 1. And, first, I object to this doctrine of the will, that it is directly opposed to the consciousness of mankind. Here, again, I will employ the language of the venerable Dr. Beecher: * Of nothing are men more thoroughly informed, or more competent to judge unerringly, than in respect to their voluntary action, as coerced or free. Testimony may mislead, and the sense, by disease, may deceive, but con- sciousness is the end of all controversy ; its evidence cannot be increased, and, if it be distrusted, there is no alternative but imiversal skepticism. Our consciousness of the mode of mental action in choice, as uncoerced and free, equals our consciousness of existence itself; and the man who doubts either, gives indications of needing medical treat- ment, instead of argument. When a man does wrong, and then reflects upon the act, he feels that he was free, and is responsible ; and so when he looks forward to a future action. "And because this consciousness is in men, you never can reason them out of a sense of their accoimtability. Many have tried it, but none have eflectually, or for any length of time, succeeded ; and the reason is plain, there is nothing which the mind is more conscious of, than the fact of its own voluntary action with the power of acting right or wrong : the mind sees, and knows, and regrets, when it has done wrong. Take away this consciousness, and there is no remorse. You cannot produce remorse, as long as a man feels that his act was not his own — that it was not voluntary, but the efl'ect of compulsion : he may dread the consequences, but you never can make him feel remorse for the act on its own account. This is the reason why men who have reasoned away the existence of God, and argued CHAP. VIII."] THE WILL. 227 to prove that the soul is nothing but matter, know, as soon as the}' reflect, that all their reasoning is false. There is a lamp within they cannot extinguish; and, after all their metaphysics, they are conscious that they act freely, and that there is a God to whom they are accountable; and hence it is, that when they cross the ocean, and a storm comes on, and they expect to go to the bottom, they begin straightway to pray to God and confess their sins. "The natural impossibihty of choosing otherwise than we do choose, is contrary, then, not only to the common sense and intuitive perceptions of men, but contrary to their internal consciousness. There is a deep and universal consciousness in all men, as to the freedom of choice ; and in denying this, you reverse God's constitution of man — you assume that God gave a deceptive constitution to mind, or a deceptive consciousness." Upon this point, Mahan, in his excellent little work on the will — a complete refutation of Edwards — says, "We may pile demonstration upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of necessity, still, as the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations of its own intelligence, it finds, in the depths of its inner being, a higher demonstration of the fact, that that doctrine is, and must be, false — that man is not the agent which that doctrine affirms him to be." It is still more elegantly expressed by JoufFroy : he says, ** If there is one familiar feeling of which we are distinctly and vividly conscious, it surely is that which we experience when we make a choice. Whatever the force of the motive which we obey, we yet perceive a wide distinction between the influence of this motive, and any thing which can be called constraint. Indeed, we feel distinctly, that in yield- ing to this motive, that is to say, in resolving in conformity with it, we are entirely able not to form this resolve. If, for instance, when standing at a window, I determine not to throw myself into the street, I feel that it depends wholly 228 T5IE WILL. [chap. VIH. upon myself to form an opposite determination; only, I say, I should then be a fool ; and being rational, I remain where I am. But that I am free to be a fool, and to throw myself down, is to me most evident. If any of my audi- ence are capable of confounding in their minds the fact, that a bilHard ball on a table is put in motion by a stroke, with the fact, that a volition is produced in my mind when I seek to know what is my reasonable course of conduct, and think I discover it — if there are any here, who can see a sim- ilarity between the action of one ball on another, and the in- fluence of a motive on my volition, then have I nothing more to say. But no one can imagine a similarity between the two ; at least, no one who has not taken sides on the ques- tion, and given up his mind to some system, of which it consequence that some necessity must control our volition and acts, can confound two facts in their nature so dissimilar, as the action of one ball upon another, and the influence of a motive on the determinations of my will. The whole question — and I beg you again to remark it — depends upon the fact, whether you know that the influence which the motive exercises over the will is a constraining force or not. For myself, I say, that my inward feeling answers in the negative, and that, under the influence of all motives, I retain, in every case, a distinct consciousness of a power of acting in opposition to what they advise and direct. ** When I attempt thus to bring argument for the sake of proving that we are free, and that motives do not exer- cise a controlling force over us, I feel as uncomfortable as if I were answering one who should deny our power of movmg or walking. To employ argument in refuting such an opinion, seems like some game of logic; for I have to oppose to this opinion a plain, decisive fact — a fact, the consciousness of which I can never lose, and which is m accordance with common forms of speech in all languages, with the universal faith, and with the established practices CHAP, VIII.j THE WILL. 229 of mankind : and I smile to think, that when I can utterly destroy the system of necessity, by merely bringing it in conflict with this fact, I should be seeking superfluous trains of reasoning to oppose it with. This fact, which we cannot escape from, is one which consciousness bears wit- ness to, when placed under the influence of the strongest possible motive, say, self-preservation. I feel, distinctly, that it depends upon myself, and only upon myself, whether I shall yield to or I'esist this motive, and do or refrain from what it recommends. I can conceive, indeed, that a man may deny this evident fact ; for to what length of delusion will not the spirit of theory and system carry us ? But I will ask him, am I not justified in not admitting this pecu- liar opinion of a small body of men, when I see that tven they act and speak as if they agreed in my opinion — when I see the most logical among them form a scheme of ethics, and give rules for conduct — when I find in every tongue the words, right and wrong, punishment and reward, merit and demerit — when the whole human race agree in being indignant against him who does wrong, and in admiring him who does right — when, indeed, there is not an event in human life which does not imply, necessarily, and in a thousand diff'erent ways, this very freedom of will of which I feel so sensibly and deeply conscious ? I have certainly 8orae right to feel strengthened in my opinion by so many testimonies to its truth, and by its perfect accordance with what I see about me. And were there no stronger objections against the doctrine which denies human free- dom, than this universal contradiction which it off"ers to all human belief, conduct, and language, to. all judgments and feelings, it would, even then, be more completely answered than it deserves." Thus we see that the Calvinian view of the will is op- posed to the consciousness of mankind. When it is stated, every man feels within himself the consciousness that it is 230 THE WILL. [chap. VIIl. false — that it is not in accordance with his constitution. It may be mystified and drowned with bewildering terms, and encumbered with intricate speculations, and burdened with senseless distinctions, but deep beneath it all, the plain man and the scholar, all men alike, feel a consciousness that the will is essentially free — that vohtions are not necessitated. This consciousness of mankind is not only detected by each man in his own bosom, but it is out- wardly manifested and expressed, involuntarily and, in a great variety of ways, constantly by others ; as, for mstance, in the universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of conduct might have been different from what is. I will venture to affirm, that there is not a person on earth who has not this conviction resting upon his mind, in respect to his own past life. It is important to analyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon our present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that, if our circumstances had been different, we might have acted differently from what we did; but a firm persuasion, that, under precisely the same circum- stances, our volition and act might have been the precise contrary of what they were. This conviction, that, with- out any change of circumstances, our past course of life might have been different from what it was, rests upon every mind on earth, in which the remembrance of the past dwells. Now this universal conviction is totally false — and when, then, can consciousness be trusted ? — if the doctrine of necessity is true. The doctrine of the liberty of the will must be true, or the universal intelligence is a perpetual falsehood. In reference to all deliberate determinations of the will in time past, the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most positive, that, in the same identical circumstances, determinations precisely opposite •night have been originated. Let any one recall any such CHAP, VIII.J THE WILt,. 231 determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined differently, will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He cannot be more sm-e that he has willed at all, than he will be that he might have willed dif- ferently. But all these affirmations of consciousness are false, if the doctrine of liberty is not true. The existence of such a consciousness is further evinced in the condemnation or approbation we exercise with re- spect to other men, in view of their determinations and acts. These are always accompanied with the conviction, arising from the consciousness of human freedom, that they might, under the circumstances, have acted and de- termined differently. And if this conviction could be dis- placed, we would no more condemn or approve them than we do an avalanche or earthquake, rain or sunshine. But, further : not only with respect to the past, but with respect to the present, also, we are now distinctly con- scious, that, with regard to the particular object submitteil to our minds, under the identical circumstances existing, any one of a number of different determinations is equall}^ or as certainly possible. Every man is as conscious of this as he is of his existence. 2. I object to this doctrine of the will, further, that it involves sheer fatalism — universal necessity. This point is thus expressed by Mahan: "If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evident, that in no instance, real or sup- posable, have men any power whatever, to will or to act differently from what they do. The connection between the determinations of the will and their consequents, ex- ternal and internal, is absolutely necessary. Constituted as T now am, if I will, for example, a particular motion of my hand or arm, no other movement, in the circumstances, was possible, and this movement could not but take place. The same holds true of all consequents, external or in- terna] of all acts of the will. Let us now suppose that 232 THE WILL. [chap. VIII. tliese acts of the will are themselves the necessary conse- quenis of the circumstances in which they originate. In wha* conceivable sense, then, have men, in the circum- stances in which Providence places them, power either to Avill or to act differently from what they do ? Here, then, is absolute, universal necessity. The motive must produce the volition ; the volition must produce the act ; and all the circumstances taken together constitute the motive." Well, now, the creature can have no control of the motives; that is, he cannot prearrange motives to produce in him certain volitions ; because, to determine to make Ruch a prearrangement is a volition, and this volition cannot take place without a motive to produce it; so he is utterly, and without mitigation, doomed to the despotism of such motives as exist, bringing in their train, as cause produces effects, other motives, and these producing their legitimate exercises of will. Fate runs through all. Every determination and act is immediately connected with a cause foregoing, which produces it as a necessary effect. 3. It follows from this system, not only that all things are necessary, but, also, that each individual thing is the best possible in its place and relations. God is the first mover — the first link in this endless chain of causation. From him, ultimately, all motion proceeds. All volitions and acts, therefore, have for their ultimate cause infinite Wisdom. All that has been, all that is, all that will be, are connected by an absolute necessity with the same great Source. There may be a million intermediate, transmitting links, but, through all, they trace back to the First Cause. It would be the height of absurdity to suppose it possible for any thing to be different from what it is, or to suppose that any change could make any thing better than what it is; for all that is, is by absolute necessity; and all that is, is just what and when infinite Wisdom has made it and dis- posed of it. No difference what it is, therefore — whether CHAr. VIII. THE WILL. 233 rnui-der, incest, idolatry, or wliat not — it is the best thing in that place, or the great First Cause is at fault. If thai which we call evil in reality be evil, then it must be both necessary evil, and evil having its origin in infinite Wisdom. It is vain to say that man is the agent, in the strict accepta- tion of the word ; he is — he can be no more than one of the links through which causation is traced back to God. Is not this fearful ? 4. If this doctrine be true, man cannot be responsible or accountable for either his volitions or acts — cannot be subject of praise or blame. God himself is the only re- sponsible being in the universe, as all causation — agency proper — terminates in him. This is so manifest, it is ques- tionable whether any man, in the possession of his rea- son, can sincerely doubt it. The idea of obligation, of merit and demerit, and of the consequent propriety of rewards and punishments, are chimeras. To conceive of a being deserving praise or blame for volitions or actions, which occurred under circumstances in which none other were possible, and in which these could not possibly but be, is absolutely impossible. The human mind has not power to entertain such a conception. Let any one under- take it, and he will find it as impossible as to conceive of the annihilation of space, or of an event occurring without a cause. Human intelligence, as the consciousness of every one of my readers will attest, is incapable of aflirming such a contradiction. The ground of blameworthiness is not only the percep- tion of the difference between right and wrong, and the conviction that the right ought to be done, but the posses- sion of a power to do the right, and refrain from the v/rong. But if every volition is fixed by absolute necessity, then neither can the individual be supposed to have power t.o do otherwise than he actually does, nor, all things con- sidered, can it be, supposed there could have been, at that 20 234 THE WILL. [chap. VIIl. present moment any other volition. The voHtion is fixed, and fixed by infinite Wisdom. We cannot escape from this difficulty, by perpetually ringing the changes of, "He can if he will," "he could if he would;" the thing is, he cannot, will — he has no power competent to do the very thing which is required, and, hence, cannot be responsible. Shall it be said, " that, in looking for the ground of ac- countability, men never go beyond the fact of voluntariness ; they look not for the cause of volitions themselves; if the deed, whether good or evil, be voluntary, that satisfies? This is, no doubt, true; we are satisfied that men are accountable for acts which are voluntary; but this is be- cause all men include, unfailingly, both in their theory and consciousness, the supposition of powers of agency unhin- dered and uncoerced by any fatal necessity. But convince them that choice is an eflfect, over which mind has no more control than over drops of rain, and the common sense of the world would revolt against the accountability of choice, merely because it was choice." The view of the will here offered, is, beyond all question, as diametrically opposed to accountability as it is to freedom ; indeed, by the common consent of mankind — a consent founded in consciousness itself — these must stand or fall together, and cannot exist separately. 5. But if the foregoing be true, then men cannot be required to do difi'erently from what they do ; for to require this, is to require an absolute impossibility. Any law or lawgiver making such requirement, is the perfection of tyranny. There can be no cruelty, no oppression, more unreasonable, more unjust, thaii this. To imagine it, is blas- phemously to cast inconceivable odium on the character of God. Dr. Beecher has well said upon this point, " God re- quires of his subjects only conformity to himself — to his own moral excellences — but he admits of no obligation on him- self to work impossibilities ; and does he impose obligations OHAP. VIII.] THE WILL. 236 on his subjects which he himself refuses to assume ? He does not regard it as an excellence in himself to work impossibilities ; does he command it as a virtue in his sub- jects? He has no desire to work impossibilities himself, why should he desire it in his creatures? He has never tried, and never will try, to work an impossibility ; and why should he command his creatures to do what he neither desires nor tries to accomplish? He cannot work impossi- bilities ; and how can it be thought that he will require of his creatures that which he himself cannot do?'^ Such is one of the fearful consequences to which this scheme inev- itably leads. Either God cannot require men to do differ- ently from what they do, and, if this be so, then he does not require them to obey his laws; for these laws en- join a different conduct : or, if God does require men to do differently, then he requires them to do what is absolutely impossible — to do what Omnipotence cannot do — nay, to resist and overcome Omnipotence; for it is the causation emanating from Omnipotence which he is required to resist. Can a God of justice make such a requisition as this? But if such a requirement cannot be made — if the idea is startling blasphemy — and who can think it is less — what must be our amazement to learn, not only that such require- ments are made, but additionally for non-compliance, the wretch, who may be found guilty, is to be punished in hell throughout an endless eternity! Think of such a doom, and answer yourself the question, can God be a monster capable of such appalling ferocity? The devil that would torment his victim in flames through millions of years, for not annihilating the universe, with only power sufficient to crush a moth, would be the impersonation of mercy and loveliness compared with such a being as this. If this doctrine is true, at the final judgment the con- science and intelligence of the universe must be on the side of the condemned. Suppose that when the conduct of the 236 THE WILL. [CIIAP. VIII. wicked shall be revealed at that day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, namely, that Gpd himself had placed, these beings where but one course of conduct was open to them, and that course they could not but pursue — namely, the course which they did pursue — and that, having pursued this course, the only one possible, they are now to be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of God and the glory of his power, must not the intelligence of the universe pronounce such a sen- tence unjust ? Yet all this must be true, or the necessity false. Who can believe that the pillars of God's eternal government rest upon such a doctrine ? A resort to blank Atheism, to hopeless death, would be a refuge from an existence under the inconceivable misrule and tormenting despotism of such a God. 6. I object, further, if this doctrine be true, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might, with the same propriety, represent the specimens in the laboratory of the chemist as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary result of the circumstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What must intelligent beings think of pro- bation for a state of eternal retribution, based on such principles ? Is it not a mockery ? v. I object, if this doctrine be true, all the exhortations and persuasions which call upon the man to bestir himself — to think, to plan, to act — are inconsistent and absurd. In all such persuasions, the man is urged to will or put forth volitions, as if he were the author or determiner of volitions. It may be replied, that the man does will, that the volitions are his volitions. But, allowing them to be his in a certain sense, the point of difficulty is here : they are made his, by being wrought in him as a passive subject; they are not his in the sense of his being their prime cause. You exhort and persuade him to arouse himself to activity; but what is his real condition, according to this system? The CHAr. VIII. J THE WILL. 237 exliortations and persuasions do themselves contain the mo- live power ; and, instead of arousing himself to action — the thing exhorted — he is absolutely and necessarily passive un- der the motive you present. If he does not act, he is not at fault, but the motive ; the defect is in the motive, not in the man. He cannot act without a sufficient motive ; and that he does not act, is proof that the motive is not suffi- cient. To blame him, therefore, is to blame him for not performing an impossibility. Whether he be moved or not as truly and as absolutely depends upon the motives you present, as the removing of any material mass depends upon the power or labor applied. When I bring motives before the minds of my fellow-beings in the proper relation, the volition is necessarily produced ; but let me not forget, that, in bringing these motives, I put forth volitions, and that, of course — according to the system — I am myself moved under the necessity of some antecedent motive. My persuasions and exhortations are necessary sequents, as well as necessary antecedents. The water must run through the water course ; the wheel must turn under the force of the current. I must exhort and persuade when motives determine me; the mind I address must yield, when the motives are properly selected and applied to it ! Was there ever a more admirable system of fatalism than this ? All volitions and actions, linked together in one endless chain of causation, reaching back to the first great Mover, as the sole and only cause ! The connection between the volition and the strongest motive, is as absolute and necessary as the connection between any cause and its efi'ect. The movements of mind, as a consequence of this system, are as absolutely fixed and rigidly necessary, as the movements of the material creation under the forces which cause its changes. How utterly absurd, therefore, to address exhor- tations, advices, and reproofs to men, with respect to their 238 THE WILL. [CIIAP. VIll. purposes and actions ! Just with tne same propriety might we urge and entreat the water-wheel to reverse its motion, and roll round against the current — the norve to convey no sensation, under the most painful operation —.the eye to look upon the full, blazing sun, without inconvenience — the earth itself to stand still, when Omnipotence urges it forward the advice would be as proper in one case as the other. If it is manifestly absurd in the latter case, it is no more so than in the former. A mind, every one of whose deter- minations is absolutely fixed by the force of motives, can no more of itself make different determinations, than matter can, of itself, act contrary to the force which impels it. Therefore, if causation is in the motive, so is responsibility ; and men would act wisely no more to exhort, advise, or reprove each other, but address themselves to the consid- eration alone of external causes. But is this so? Is man the thing here represented? the mere sport of outward influence, without power, without agency? He is, or Cal- vinism is radically false. 8. I object, further, to this doctrine, in the language of Tappan, "It is another consequence, that there can be nothing evil in itself. If infinite wisdom and goodness are the highest form of moral perfection, as, indeed, their very names imply, then all the necessary consequences of these must partake of their nature. Infinite wisdom and good- ness, as principles, can only envelop parts of themselves. It would be the destruction of logic to deny this. It would annihilate every conclusion that has ever been drawn. If it be said, that infinite Wisdom has promulged a law which defines clearly what is essentially right, and that it is a fcict that volitions do transgress this law, still this cannot affect what is said above. The promulgation of the law was but a necessary development of infinite Wisdom; and the volition which transgresses it, is a development of CHAP. VIII.] THE WILL. 239 the same nature. If this seems contradictory, I cannot help it. It is drawn from the system, and the system alone is responsible for its conclusions." 9. I object to the doctrine, that it is as fatal to freedom in the Divine as well as the human mind. I cannot better express this point than by substituting the language of Fisk : " It is argued, that to maintain the doctrine of spon- taneous volition, independent of the control of motives, involves the absurdity, that *our volitions are excited without any intelligent reason whatever, and as the effect, consequently, of nothing better than a mere brute or senseless mechanism.' Now, if this has any bearing on the question, it relates not to human mind and human voli- tions merely, hut to mind in general, and must apply to the Divine mind. The same may be said, in fact, of most of the arguments that are brought in favor of this doc- trine. Calvinists are convinced of this; and, hence, this, also, is a part of their creed. It was defended by Ed- wards, and is thus avowed by Upham in his system of Mental Philosophy. Speaking of the control of motives, he says : ' Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essen- tially the same with that of the supreme Being himself; he is inevitably governed in all his doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and best.' Thus, the divine Being is, according to this theory, and by the express showing of the leading advocates of the theory, * inevitably ' made a subordinate to a superior. It is believed there is no avoiding this conclusion ; and, what then ? Why, then, the doctrine makes Clod a necessary agent, and leads to Athe- ism! It is nearl}^, if not exactly, the same as the old heathen doctrine of fate. The ancient heathen supposed that Jupiter himself, the omnipotent father of the gods and men, must yield to fate. Modern Christians teach that ';here is a certain fitness of things, certain constitutional relations, existing independent of the Divine will, which 240 THE WILL. [chap. VIII. God himself cannot supersede, but to which he must yield. How does this sink at once both the natural and moral perfections of God! The exercises of his wisdom and goodness, are nothing more than the result of certain fixed and irresistible influences. Fixed, not by God himself, for that' would be to give up the doctrine ; for, in that case, in the order of cause and effect, the Divine mind must have acted without control of motives, if this law of motive influence did not exist until the Divine volition willed it into being; and if he could once act independent of this con- trol, he might so act for ever, and the argument, built on the absurdity of volition without an intelligent reason, would be contradicted. But if that argument has any weight, it fixes, in the order of cause and effect, a para- mount influence eternally antecedent to the exercise of the Divine mind, and controlling that mind with irresistible sAvay. This is fate ! this is Atheism ! Once set up an influ- ence that controls the Divine mind, call that influence what you please — fitness of things, fate, energy of nature, or necessary relation — and that moment you make God a subordinate ; you hurl him from his throne of sovereignty, and make him the instrument of a superior. Of what use is such a Deity? Might we not as well have none? nay, better, as it seems to me, if, under the control of his own motive influence, he is led to create beings susceptible of suffering, and fix the relations of those beings to the motives around them such, that, by a law of their nature, they are 'inevitably' led to sin and endless woe? Is it to be wondered at, that many Calvinists have become infidels? 'J'his doctrine of motives is the very essence of the system of Spinoza, whose deity was the energy of nature. The supreme, controlling power of Dr. Edwards and his fol- lowers, is the energy of motives, which exist in the nature of things, anterior to the will of God. Can any one point out m essential difference between the two systems?" CHAP. VIII.] THE WILL. 241 1 0. Fisk continues : "Another argument against the Cal- vinistic doctrine of motives, is that it leads to materialism. The doctrine, it will be recollected, is this : when the mind is brought into connection with objects of choice, it is inevitably led, by a law of its nature, to the selection of one rather than of the other, unless there is a perfect equality between them ; in which case I suppose, of course, the mind must remain in equilibrium; for it moves only by the influence of motives, and to the sameidegree, and in the same direction, with motive influences; of course, when it is equally attracted in opposite directions, it must be at rest ! It is on this ground that Leibnitz maintained that God could not make two particles of matter in all respects alike; because, in that case, being 'inevitably* governed by motives in his decisions, he could not deter- mine where to place them, both having the same influence on his mind for a location in the same place ! The same writer represents this motive influence, also, as frequently imperceptible, but not the less eflectual, and not the less voluntary; and, to illustrate it, makes the following com- parison: * It is as if a needle, touched with a loadstone, were sensible of, and pleased with, its turning to the north ; for it would believe that it turned itself independent of any other cause, not perceiving the insensible motives of the magnetic power.' This statement of Leibnitz, who had paid great attention to this philosophical theory, is impor tant in several respects. It is, in the first place, an acknowl- (vdgment that consciousness is against the doctrine ; and it IB, also, a concession that the mind is imposed upon in this matter by the Creator. But, with respfsct tq the argument that this doctrine leads tp materialism, this quotation is important, because it shows that one of the most philo- sophical, if not one of the most evangelical, of the defenders of this doctrine, considered the law of motive influence similar to the law of magnetic attraction, difiering only in 21 242 THE WILL. I CHAP. VIII. ]>eing accompanied by sensation and a deceptive conscious- ness. And what says its great evangelical champion in this country, Dr. Edwards ? He compares our volitions to the vibrations of a scale-beam, the different ends of which are respectively elevated or depressed, as the opposite weights may chance to vary. What is this, but teaching that motions of mind are governed by the same fixed laws as those of matter, and that volitions are perfectly me- chanical states of mind? What the advocates of this doctrine charge on the opposite theory, belongs, by their own showing, to their own system. They, not we, make choice the result of animal instinct. If the attractive power of motives over the mind is any thing different from the law of gravitation, or magnetic attraction, what is that difference? Should any one say, I cannot tell, I ask, then, how does he know but it is that very power for which Arminians contend ? Most probably it is that power. Or will it be said the difference between motive influence and gravity is consciousness? I reply, consciousness is no part of the relation between motives and the power of choice. I see not, indeed, how it affects that relation at all. Look at the flowing stream; it hastens on most freely, and by the law of its own nature, down the gentle declivities or more precipitous slopes of its meandering channel. Sup- pose, now, that Omnipotence should impart consciousness to the particles of the continuous current, it would then wake up to perceir.e the action, and feel the pleasure of its own delightful motions. It Avould roll on still by the law of its own nature, and would feel that it was free to move according to its own inclination and voluntary tendency, for its will would, of course, be in the direction of its mo- tive, or, in other woi'ds, its gravitating influence. But could it turn its course, and roll back its waters to their fountain ? It could, if it was so inclined. But its present inclination is toward the bottom of the vallej^ or the bosom of the Vn\P. VIII.] THE WILL. 243 ocean; and thither, by the rehition which exists between its particles and the gravitating- influence of the earth, it lolls on with the utmost freedom, though with the utter impossibiUty of changing its own course, without the inver- sion of the gravitating power. Let the hand of Omnipotence invert the slope of the mountain, and, lo ! with the same free- dom these very same waters roll back again to their original fountains ! Thus it is with the human mind : it is conscious of being free to move in the direction of its inclinations, but require it to turn its course, and move in the current of its volitions in an opposite direction, and it would be utterly impossible, until Omnipotence himself should change the motive influence. ' God is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of choice,' " We see, therefore, that this doctrine of motive influence leads to materialism; for it makes the analogy between mental and material action so complete, that it destroys alh idea of intellectual power. Philosophically speaking, there is no power in the laws of nature. What we express by the power of attraction, repulsion, or decomposition, is nothing more than the uniformity of the Divine agency." The power of motives to excite volitions, is nothing else but the Divine energy operating through that mode to the accomplishment of a given end. God is the all-directing agent; mind, the passive recipient. From the theory, inertia becomes the law of mind as well as of matter; materialism is the unavoidable consequence. Free agency, responsibility, and kindred vital doctrines, vanish before this theory, as mists before the sun. God be comes the sole and universal doer: all physical, intellectual, and moral results, emanate -from and return to him. Human volitions are as really the effiects of Divine agency, as the rising of the stars, the flight of the lightning, the tumult of the waters, or the light, which spreads itself like a 244 THE WILL. [chap. VIII. garment over creation. Every volition of created mind is God's act, as really as any other effect in nature. We have seen how every volition is connected with its motive — how the motive lies in a preconstitution — how the series oi antecedents and sequents necessarily runs back, and con- nects itself with the infinite wisdom. God's wisdom is his own act; the effect immediately produced by that vCiitioE is his own deed. Let that effect be the creation of man: the man, in all his powers and susceptibilities, is God's work; the objects around him are God's work; the corre- lation of the objects with the sensibility of man is God's work; the volition, which necessarily takes place as the result of this correlation, is God's work. The volition of the man is as strictly attributable to God, as, according to our common apprehensions, the blow which I give with the axe is attributable to me. What is true of the first man, is equally true of man removed to a thousand generations, for the intermediate links are all ordained of G od, and form but so many parts of the same necessity. God is really the sole doer — the only efficient cause : all beings and things, all motions and volitions, are absolutely resolved into Divine volitions. God is the author of all beings, things, motions, and Volitions, and as much the author of any one of these as any other, and the author of all in the same way, and in the same sense. All things exist in necessity ; that necessity centres either in God, or in some- thing which is above God ; God himself is all and only, or he, like all things else, is but a link in the stupendous chain, which attaches to the blind fate Avhich governs and directs him, together with the rest. 11. I object, further, to this doctrine, that it is not only contradictory to the reason and consciousness of mankind, but, also, to the word and revelation of God. It finds no favor in the Bible: every precept, exhortation, invitaiion. rnAP. VIII. I THE WILL. 245 entreaty, remonstrance of that book, is opposed to it : it is anti-Bible. This might be shown with the utmost ease, but it is so palpable as to need no such manifestation. 12. I object: it is contrary to the opinion of the early Christians. I refer my readers, for proof of this and the former point, given at length, to Beechor's Views in The- ology, Tomlins' Refutation of Calvinism, Whitby on the Five Points, (fee. 13. I object, that the whole theory of motive influence is without support, and depends upon vicious reasoning, or reasoning in a circle, for its proof. It asks to be believed upon unsound argumentation, and against the most over- whelming and conclusive evidence of its utter falsehood. When, for instance, we ask what determines the will, we are directly answered, it is the strongest motive ; but when we ask what constitutes the strongest motive, we are answered, that which determines the will. The whole theory is reducible to this vicious circle — this absurd as- sumption. Edwards' celebrated work revolves in it from the beginning to the end. An unsupported assertion is made the basis of the whole, and upon the strength of this we are required to yield credence, against the testimony of consciousness, of reason, of nature itself, of the Bible, and of every fhing else, within and without us, entitled to respect. For a more extensive examination of this point, I must refer my readers to the following works: Dr. Beecher's Views in Theology, Mahan on the Will, Tappan's Review of Edwards, Bledsoe on the Will, Fisk, Jouffroy, &c. I take pleasure in acknowledging my obligations to these authors, as aids to the preparation of the pi-esent brief chapter. Had it been possible, I should gladly have made still more copious extracts from them. Let the studious inquirer refer to them, and he will find the subject thor- oughly and sufficiently discussed. Had it been our purpose 246 Tiiii WILL. [ciiAr. VIII. to write a treatise on the will, a more particular examination of th*^ theory here objected to would have been made ; such was not our plan, bu* simply to state the grounds or prin- ciples of the system, and name some of the many insuper- able difficulties investing it. We leave the subject here : ii will be for our readers to determine upon the question in debate. Is the view Ave have antagonized true or false? What is the answer? Let not prejudice make up the decis- ion. What says reason — consciousness — the word of God ? What says the language of mankind — the common, every day, and everyw^here sentiments of the species? Does not every thing with which we are conversant — all law, all usnge, all organizations of human society, all rational methods of government and influence — proceed upon the assumption that man is a free, voluntary agent, having power to determine his own choices, as well as actions ? Such, it seems to me, must be the spontaneous response of mankind — of human- ity, unbiased by prejudice, unfettered by false philosophy. APPENDIX. It will be proper to say, at this point, that what is heic presented as an Appendix, is the substance of Dr. aRice's i-ephes to my letters, with my rejoinders thereto. It will be seen by the reader, that our rejoinders are confined strictly to the points at issue between us. The reasons for this will be obvious. Had we permitted ourselves to be decoyed into irrelevant matters, we, and our readers, would have become bewildered and lost in the mazes of endless logomachy. This would, doubtless, have pleased our friend, as it would have served to divert attention from his system ; but it did not suit us. NUMBER I. I am happy to be able to lay Dr. Rice's reply to my first and second letters before my readers. In its general tone and spirit it accords well with my expectations; and if ii fails in argument, I find an apology in the circumstances of the case. The Doctor will make up for this hereafter. *' Letters on Calvinism. — We are decidedly of opinion, after reading two of Mr. Foster's Letters on Calvinism, that he really needs the assistance which, in his first letter, he so warmly invoked. His second letter urges the old objection, a thousand times made, and as often refuted, that the doctrine of decrees makes God the author of sin. This hackneyed objection is founded upon the idea, that * God's decree is the necessity or necessitating cause of sin.' Now, inasmuch as Presbyterians hold no such view, and would really depose any one of their ministers who should teach it, the objection is utterly without force. No Pres- byterian holds, that God ever purposed or decreed to dispose or influence any man or angel to sin. If Mr. 241 248 , APPENDIX. Foster had taken the trouble to read the sixth chaptei of the Westminster Confession of Faith, he would have found the following language concerning the fall of our first parents: 'This their sin God was pleased, according to his wise and holy counsel, to permit, having purposed to order it to his own glory/ He will scarcely assert, that God *d not permit their sin, nor that by permitting it he forced them to it, and thus became the author of it. Nor, we presume, will he pretend, that God's purpose to order this sin to his own glory — to bring good out of evil — ^made him the author of sin. And yet this is precisely the doc- trine of our Confession — that God purposed to permit the sins of men and angels, and so to bound, control, and order them, that his own wise plans shall be accomplished by their means. Any harm in this ? Does not the Bible say, * Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee : the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain?' (Psalm Ixxvi, 10.) Does it not say, that Jesus Christ was delivered to crucifixion, *by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God?' (Acts ii, 23.) Come back, brother Foster, and start right, or your work will all be lost. "There is another great defect in these letters. The real points of difference between Methodists and Presby- terians are not stated. One might conclude from all that Mr. Foster has yet said, that, according to Methodism, God has no purposes at all, certainly none that relate to men. What is the Methodist doctrine on this subject? Wherein, precisely, do they differ? The very first thing necessary to a satisfactory discussion of this subject, is a clear statement of the difference between the faith of Methodists and that of Presbyterians. "We venture to suggest, whether it would not be well for Mr. Foster to let his first two letters go for nothing, as the boys say, and begin anew." To so much of the above as purports to be an answer to APPENDIX, 249 my letters, I now call atK^tion. Irrelevant portions I must be excused from noticing. "His second letter," he says, "urges the old objection, a thousand times made, and as often refuted, that the doctrine of decrees makes God the author of sin." Now, Doctor, why did you not tell me how that old objection was refuted ? That is precisely the thing I desire to know ; and if it has been done so often, you, of course, will find it perfectly convenient to repeat it for my edification. Attend to this, if you please, as soon as you find leisure, by taking up and refuting my arguments. "This hackneyed objection is founded upon the idea, that God's decree is the necessity or necessitating cause of sin. Now, inasmuch as Presbyterians hold no such views, and would really depose any one of their ministers who should teach it, the objection is utterly without force. No Presbyterian holds, that God ever purposed or decreed to influence any man or angel to sin. If Mr. Foster had taken the trouble to read the sixth chapter of the West- minster Confession of Faith, he would have found the fol- lowing language concerning the fall of our first parents: * This their sin God was pleased, according to his wise and holy counsel, to permit, having purposed to order it to his own glory.' " This language I can assure Dr. Rice I have often read, and much more to the same import, from various Calvinistic authors. But, as said in my second letter, this only convinces me that the different parts of the system clash, and they who embrace it em- brace contradictions. It is certainly in vain to demur against a clear, logical conclusion. What the Doctor must do, is to point out where my logic is at fault, not to array disclaimers. His present course will only help me to another chapter of objections against his system; that is, that it is self- contradictory, which, in due time, I expect to prove. 250 APPENDIX. But now to the question of fadl. Dr. Rice asserts, thai *•' no Presbyterian holds that God's decree is the necessity or necessitating cause of sin" — that "they would depose a minister who should teach it" — that "no Presbyterian holds^ that God ever purposed or decreed to dispose or influence any man or angel to sin." Right upon this point 1 jom issue with Dr. Rice. My reasons for making the charge are contained in my second letter, and his assertion must stand unsupported until these reasons are answered, and taken away. Will the Doctor remove them? Mean- time we submit additional proofs upon this point. 1. This is the doctrine of the Confession itself, contained in the following language : " God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such supposed conditions." Here is a witness I introduce to the respectful attention of Dr Rice : it is the Presbyterian Confession of Faith. It testifies three things concerning God's decrees: 1. He decreed whatsoever comes to pass. 2. His decree was made from eternity. 3. His decree was unconditional — absolute. Sin, then, as it has come to pass, was decreed to come to pass, from eternity, and without conditions. But that which is decreed to come to pass without conditions, can- not be said to be merely permitted, as it is manifest that to permit a thing supposes conditions, or reasons in the thing for so permitting it. 2. The expositor of the Confession says, "The fore- knowledge of God will necessarily infer a decree; for God could not foreknow that things would be unless he had decreed they should be'' — not might be. Now, APPENDIX. 251 according to this, either God did not know sin would be, or he decreed it should he. To deny the former is to deny the •Divine oraniscience-^to admit, is to admit that he decreea sin should be. But the expositor of the Confession tells us explicitly, that the efficient cause of sinful actions is the decree of God. If the decree causes the act, does it not cause the sin? 3. Herman Witsius says, " The human will can produce no action of which God is not the author." Does sin reside in the will? Then God, who is the author of every act of the will, is author of every sin. With him agree Hill, Dick, Chalmers, and others, quoted in my third letter. I request my readers to refer to the numerous quotations contained in that letter upon this point. 4. " The will of the supreme Being is the cause of every thing that now exists, or is to exist at any future time." (Hill.) Does sin exist? Then, according to Hill, God's decrees caused it. "The supreme Being selects those single objects and combinations of objects, which he chooses to bring into existence; and every circumstance in the manner of the existence of that which is to be, thus depending entirely on his will, is known to him because he decreed it should be" — not might be. "The Divine decree is the determina- tion to produce the universe, that is, the whole series of heings and events'^ (lb.) Is it causing a thing to produce li-'-ereate it? Then the Divine decree, Mr. Hill says, caused sin. 5. " I say with Augustine, that the Lord created those who he certainly foreknew would fall into destruction, and that this was actually so because he willed it." (Calvin.) " I confess with Augustine, that God's decree is the neces- sity of things." (lb.) Is sin something? Then Calvin says, God's decree is the necessity of it. "They further object, [we Arminians,] were they not, by the decree dI' 252 APPENDIX. God antecedently predestinated to that corruption, which is now stated as the cause of condemnation? When they perish in their corruption therefor, they only suffer the punishment of that misery into which, in consequence of his predestination, Adam fell, and precipitated his posterity with him. I confess, indeed, that the descendants of Adam fell by the Divine will; and this is what I said at the begin- ning, that we must always return, at last, to the sovereign determination of God's will." (lb.) " Nor should it be thought absurd to affirm, that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and the ruin of his posterity in him, but also arranged all by the determination of his will." (lb.) ** It should be considered as indubitably certain, that all the revolutions in the world proceed from the secret exertion of the Divine power. What God decrees, must necessarily come to pass." (lb.) Does this look like permission. Doc- tor? "It is not probable that man procured his own de- struction, by the mere permission, and without the appoint- ment of God." (lb.) Not much favor for your idea of permission here. Doctor. " We make God the arbiter and governor of all things, who, in his own wisdom, has, from the remotest eternity, decreed what he would do, and now by his own power executes what he has decreed. Whence we assert, that not only the heavens, and earth, and inan- imate creatures, but also the deliberations and volitions of men are so governed by his providence, as to be directed to the end appointed by it.'' (lb.) ''They therefore evade the difficulty, by alledging that it happens only by the per- mission, and not by the will of God ; but God himself, by the most unequivocal declarations, rejects this subterfuge." (lb.) It would seem. Doctor, that Calvin was not well pleased with your subterfuge of permission. "The whole may be summed up thus : that, as the will of God is said to be the cause of all things, his providence is established as the governor in all the counsels and works of men, so APPENDIX. 25S that it not only exerts its power in the elect, who are influ- enced by the Holy Spirit, but also compels the compliance of the reprobate. . . . For the first man fell, because the Lord had determined that it was so expedient." (lb.) I commend these quotations from Calvin especially to the attention of Dr. Rice. Will he give us light upon them ? 6. To Dr. Rice's retreat from my arguments, under the pretense that Presbyterians do not attach the idea of ne- cessity to decree, but bare permission, I object, further, that it is not only contrary to the teaching of those dis- tinguished Calvinists already referred to, but it is also absurd in itself, and antagonistic to the whole system essentially. It is contrary to the signification of the terms employed. Decree, purpose, predestinate, ordain, predetermine, and such terms, exclusively used, do not contain the idea of permission, but are precisely the opposite of such idea, and contain alone the idea of appointment, establishment, fixedness, to set, to appoint, to establish, to prepurpose, to procure by edict, by authority; and with no consistency whatever, can that which is barely permitted be said to be decreed. Is it said the decree was to permit sin ; that is, God ap- pointed, fixed in purpose, decreed, that he would permit sin? I answer, such a construction shows clearly that he did not decree sin, but only decreed what his own action would be in respect to it, should it be about to occur : he decreed that in such a case he would not prevent it — he would allow it to take place. Is this decreeing sin ? The decree did not respect the sin, but simply himself; so that, if God simply permitted sin to exist, he did not decree its existence. But then Dr. Rice is reduced to this dilemma. If he says God simply permitted sin, he admits that he did not decree it; and so he admits that his Confession is in 2o4 APPENDIX. error, "when it says God decreed whatsoever comes to pass. If he says God decreed sin, he retreats from the position lie has already made, that he simply permits it. T. But I object, f mother, to Dr. Rice, that, when he says God did not procure sin by his decree, he antagonizes his system in another particular. It is contended by all Cal- vinists, that God's foreknowledge is consequent upon his decree ; he foreknows things will be, because he has decreed they shall be. How can this be, if the occurrence of the thing is not somehow dependent upon the decree? If it mio^ht occur without beinof decreed, mie^ht it not be known to an omniscient God ? If it could not occur by any pos- sibility without being decreed, then is not the intervention of decree supposed to be the essential thing in order to its occurrence, or the cause of it? 8. I object, further, to Dr. Rice's doctrine of permission, that it is contrary to his doctrine of the will. He does not believe that the human will can act of itself — he will admit this — he cannot deny. The will, he believes, always and necessariiy acts from the force of motives. The strongest motive must prevail. The will must accord with the stiongest motive, as the needle must turn to the pole — as. the scale must descend with the preponderating weight. He believes that these motives, whatever they may be, are all arranged of God, and brought to bear upon the will, by a decree as old as eternity. But how now, if he has made the action of the will subject to motives, and if he has ap- pointed all the motives, can it be said he permits the action of the will ? Is it not manifest that he causes it, as directly as though he controlled it by positive agency ? The foregoing reasons, together with the quotations and arguments previously given, I assign as sustaining the charge made in my second letter, that Calvinism makeg God the author of sin. Will the Doctor point out in what particular they fail to sustain the charge? To APPENDIX. 255 these, a variety of additional quotations from other au- thors and arguments, will be submitted as occasion may require. NUMBER II. Dr. Rice thus notices my letters, after reading the fourth : " The first objection urged by Mr. Foster, of the Methodist Church, against the Calvinistic doctrine of Divine deeree, is that it makes God the author of sin, by making him the necessitating cause of sin; the second is, that it destroys the free agency of man ; and the third, that it destroys the accountability of man. These three objections are so nearly identical, that they properly make but one, and they are all based upon a view of the doctrine not taught in the West- minster Confession of Faith, and not held by any Presby- terian. The whole of his arguments, therefore, are nothing more nor less than an entire misrepresentation of the doc- trme. This being the case, no particular notice need be taken of them." I am here charged with misrepresenting Calvinism. Upon this ground the Doctor . declines noticing my letters further. The charge that I have misrepresented Calvinism, to me seems strange. Why, I have not represented it at all — I have only presented it. I have quoted only from their own standards. If they are misrepresented, they have mis- represented themselves. I have drawn inferences from their authors quoted, it is true, and deduced consequences. If in this I have been unfair or illogical — if I have misun- derstood the authors cited, I can assure the Doctor it has been unintentional, and I only ask him to correct my honest and sincere misapprehensions. My sole object, in address- ing these letters to Dr. Rice, was that I might have the benefit of his explanations. Now, why does he decline? He cannot think I have been unkind — he cannot look upon the matter with indifference — he cannot plead disinclination '2r>6 APPENDIX. to such controversies. Why, then, will he at this point ab ruptly leave me under all the misapprehensions and conse- quent difficulties of mind I experience in regard to his system? I was in hopes, and still am, that explanations could be made, which would discover that we are not so wide apart as we sometimes have thought. I have stated my views of the system, always giving the authorities upon which they were founded, and then raised my objections to the system as I understood it, on purpose that such expla- nations might be made, expecting that Dr. Rice would — particularly after pledging himself to my aid — point out my mistakes, and lead me to a better view. And now he stops still, and meets me with the blank reply, that my " letters are an entire misrepresentation." Is this mag- nanimous ? I wall not say it is not. Dr. Rice will perceive the propriety of a second thought, and will return to my aid — particularly as he will have the opportunity of cor- recting the erroneous views of at least 40,000 readers of the Advocate, with respect to his system. Dr. Rice says that I misrepresent Calvinism on this point — that it renders the decree of God "the necessitating cause of sin." Now, if I had made that charge in so many words, on my own authority, it would be sufficient for Dr. Rice to deny. This would satisfy our readers. But'I have stated my reasons for making the charge. These reasons are either good or bad : if good, they sustain the charge, and the system is liable; if bad, it can be made to appear. The Doctor says no Presbyterian believes the doctrine! I quote his own Confession and many authors — standard with his Church — against him, and sustaining my charge. Now, these quotations sustain my charge, or they do not. Jf they do, I have not misrepresented Calvinism; if they do not, it can be shown. The Doctor has made the issue with me himself upon this point. Why now does he decline it? He certainly APPENDIX. 257 Tttnnot suppose that his bare denial will be sufficient in this Rase. I will not complain of the Doctor, that he charges me of misrepresenting Calvinism to thousands of his readers, without letting me be heard — thereby producing the impres- sion that I have done them a great wrong. I make no complaint. It may be right to hold a man up as a false accuser, without giving the particulars of his accusation. If the Doctor was under no obligation to notice these letters in the first instance — having made an issue with us volun- tarily — he must certainly see the propriety of sustaining his own issue. After all that has appeared from Dr. Rice's pen, and in his columns, it must seem strange for him to retire at this juncture. We, however, leave him to pursue his own pleasure ; and, having commenced, we shall go on with our letters, exposing what we conceive to be the errors of Calvinism. Whenever Dr. Rice shall redeem his pledge, we shall be glad to treat him with due courtesy; but whether or not, we shall proceed in the same good spirit to perfect the work we have undertaken. That Calvinists are inextricably involved in the doctrine of necessity, as charged, and so liable to all the objections urged against them, particularly the three expressly dis- claimed by Dr. Rice, will appear still further by the follow- ing considerations : ]. The expositor of the Confession, in his notes on the article respecting the will, holds this language : " According to Calvinists, the liberty of a, moral agent consists in the power of acting according to his choice ; and those actions are free which are performed without external compulsion — physical compulsion — in consequence of the determination of his own mind. The necessity of man's willing and act- mg, according to his apprehension and disposition, is, in their opinion, fully consistent with the highest liberty whicli can belong to a rational nature. . . .As nothins^ can 22 258 APPENDIX. ever come to pass without a cause, the acts of the will are never without necessity; understanding, by necessity, an infallible connection with something foregoing." This 1 understand to be the doctrine of all Calvinists respecting the will of man, as well before as since the fall ; it is often expressed in stronger language. Now, this view of the will utterly discards this idea of liberty — power to choose either of two alternatives. Here is the real point of difference between us and them: with them liberty is necessity to choose one way according to the motive, but not power to make an opposite choice: with us it is the power to choose either of the various alter- natives presented to the mind. Now, upon their doctrine of the will, I base an argument that its decisions are neces- sitated, and not free; and, hence, that it is absurd for a Calvinist to contend for freedom. Take man in a state of innocence — for we desire to give the advocates of the system the most favorable opportunity to defend them- selves — the question is, Was man capacitated with freedom to stand or fall, in the circumstances? And, according to the Calvinian system, the answer must be, he was not; for he was so constituted that he must )^ield to the prevailing disposition or strongest motive. He could not avoid this; it was his nature. He had no control of these motives, and when they came upon him he as necessarily was moved by them, as the needle is moved to the pole; it matters not that he chose to move with the influence ; for the want of liberty and the fact of necessity were found in the circum- stance, that he had no control of his choice : he made his choice necessarily. Now, I ask Dr. Rice, what does control the choice ? He must answei., whatever goes to constitute the prevailing motive. But, then, I ask, who controls and governs these motives? And he must answer, that all things are ar- ranged and governed by God himself: God controls the APPENDIX. 259 motives; the motives control the man. He sins, neces- sitated by the motive. And, now, where do we find the first cause ? Not in the choice ; for it was an effect : not in the motives ; for they were under the government and con- trol of God. Here, then, we trace the operations of man's will back to God : not as permitted, but procured. If the Calvinists can trace it beyond God, they may free their system from making God the first cause of sin ! 2. I derive an argument from the Calvinian view of providence. Two things are included in the notion of providence — the preservation and the government of all things. " God governs all things by directing and disposing them to ihe end for which he designed them. . . . The providence of God extends to all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least." This is the doctrine of providence, taught by the expositor of the Confession. According to it, God's providence extends to all actions, from the greatest to the least; and while it regards all actions, it consists in directing all to the end for which he designed them, so that all actions come to the very end for which God designed. Are any sinful, he de- signed them as such ; and, by his providence, disposed and directed them in their causes and development. "To solve the difficulty connected with this point," says Mr. Shaw, "theologians distinguish between an action and its quality. The action, abstractly considered, is from God, for no action can be performed without the concurrence of Providence ; but the sinfulness of the action proceeds entirely from the creature." The first part of this sentence declares the faith of Calvinists ; the second part disclaims a consequence of their faith. It is for us to see whether such a disclaimer is rational and consistent, or the contrary. The proposition is, that the action, abstractly considered, is from God — God is its author — for the reason that no action can be performed without his concurrence or agency. Now, I insist that the 260 APPENDIX. proposition positively asserts, that, just so far as sins arft actions, God is their author. There can be no controversy here. The act of murder and adultery, and what not, is God's act, so far forth as it is an act. Now, if the act is his, I leave it to the metaphysics of Calvinists to determine whose is the sin. For more particular argumentation upon this point, I refer to my second letter. 3. The same conclusion is inferred from the Calvinian doctrine of a Divine plan. "The whole universe derives the reason of its existence from the will of its Creator, and every particular being and event in the universe has that connection with something going before it, by which it forms a part of the plan of Providence." If sin is an event, Mr. Hill thus asserts tliat it derives the reason or cause of its existence from the will of God. Its cause is in God's will, and yet is not God its author. Every event in the universe lias connection with something before it — it is an effect; and, as such, forms a part of the plan of Providence ; which plan is the cause of all, or that some- thing goir^ before all, and emanating from the Divine will, which is the only cause. In accordance with this view, all things are directly and repeatedly ascribed to the necessary operations of God's plan by Calvinists even the reprobation and damnation of sinners, with the causes leading thereto. "Whom God passes by, therefore, he reprobates, and for no other cause than his determination to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his children." (Calvin.) How explicit this language ! how impossible to misunderstand it ! Whom God passes by— does not include in the decree of election — he reprobates. Not because of their sins — not for any thing he foresees in them; but for no other cause than his determination to exclude them from the inheritance of his children. Thus honest John Calvin — and with him agree many authors quoted — scorns to seek APPENDIX. 263 any otlier cause for the reprobation and consequent damna- tion of some men, than the sovereign purpose of God How absurd and ridiculous for his followers to attempt to deny and demur, when we charge this consequence upon them — when it is thus explicitly declared and ex- tensively elaborated by their great leader — in the con- clusion of which argument he says, "Whence it follows that the cause of hardening — the sinner in his sins, or working his sins in him as an occasion of damnation — is the secret counsel of God ! " First, the sinner is reprobated for no other cause but the purpose of God. Thus repro- bated, he is established in sin by the secret will of God, operating to that purpose ; and then he is damned, because of his previous reprobation and hardening. Hear Calvin again: "That the reprobates obey not the word of God when made known to them, is justly imputed to the wickedness and depravity of their hearts, provided it be at the same time stated that they are abandoned to this depravity, because they have been raised up, by a just but inscrutable judgment of God, to display his glory in their condemnation." Observe this passage. The disobedi- ence of the reprobates may be attributed to their depravity, but their depravity is attributable to the fact that God raised them up, fitted them for destruction; so both their actual disobedience and natural depravity is ascribable to God's purpose in raising them up, even their eternal de- struction. Presbyterians of the nineteenth century, do you believe this? Can you believe a system necessarily involving it? Yet I show you that such is the miserable doctrine of your Confession, and your standard authors — a consequence from which there is no escape, but by a total abandonment of the whole. And will you be content, when you see, by fair logical deductions, such consequences fastened upon you — consequences at which your reason and piety equally 262 APPENDIX. revolt? Will you be content, when the only reply at tempted by your leaders to fair and unavoidable argu ments and proofs, is, "We don't believe it?" Will this mode of defense satisfy Presbyterians? Is your Con- fession capable of no better a support? And still will you cling to a system, beset and encompassed with conse- quences, at the announcement of which you are stunned — which I do not marvel that you spurn with indignant vehemence? But why shall you cling to premises, neces- sarily involving such conclusions ? 4. That God necessitates the sinful acts of men, is un- avoidable upon the Calvinian view of foreknowledge. Gal- rinists hold that God cannot foreknow any event as future, only as he perceives it connected with some other thing as a cause infallibly and necessarily to produce it — all future things are foreknown as effects springing from a first cause by successive links of attachment, or as a succession of causes and effects. According to this, it is manifest that the first cause is the actual and real cause of every suc- cessive link. But each sin is a link, and therefore the first cause is the actual cause of each sin.«^ It matters not though they be separated by ten thousand intervening links, scattered through as many ages. 5. The same fact is deducible from the reasonings of Calvinists, in regard to the Arminian doctrine, that the mind originates its own volitions. It is said by Edwards, and it is common to Calvinists to say so, that such a view renders the vohtions of men an efiect without a cause. By which they deny the mind of man to possess the nature of a cause ; or, in other words, they thus deny its agency, and assert its mere passivity. All its motions are mere effects, of which it is the passive instrument : it causes no volition itself. Where is the cause? It is not in mind. It is finally in God! But if God causes the motion, and the motion is sinful, who causes the sin ? APPENDIX. 263 " If the determinations of moral agents are thus certainly directed by motives, it is plain that the Almighty, whose will gave existence to the universe, and by whose pleasure every cause operates, and every effect is produced, gives their origin to these determinations, by the execution of the great plan of his providence ; for as there entered into his plan, all those efficient causes, whose successive operations produce the motions and changes of the material world, so there are brought forward in succession, by the execution of his plan, all those objects which present themselves to the mind as final causes." (Hill.) This quotation first assumes that the determinations of moral agents are created by motives, as final causes. It is then assumed that the Almighty, by whose will all such final causes operate, causes the determinations produced by them ; and this efficiently, inasmuch as all such motives — final causes — are brought forward by the execution or direct operation of his providence. Well, now, are these determinations sinful? If so, and God caused the deter- mination, who caused the sin? "For according 'to the view of the Divine foreknowledge, which is essential to the Calvinistic system, all things are brought into being by the execution of the Divine decree, so that no circumstance, in the manner of the existence of any individual, can depend upon the conduct of that indi- vidual; but all that distinguishes him from others, must originate in the mind that formed the decree.^^ (Hill.) Every thing peculiar in the conduct or character of the individual— of each and every individual — originates in the mind that formed the decree. If he is sinful, therefore this originated with God ! In the trial of Dr. Beecher, Dr. Beecher accuses Dr. Wilson as follows: "Dr. Wilson has made a distinct avowal, that free agency and moral obligation to obey law, do not include any ability of any kind.'' To which 26'i APPENDIX. Dr. Wilson replied directly in so many words, "With, respect to fallen man I do!" "Now," says Di. Wilson, *' let us look at the doctrine of the Confession with this principle in view, that the state of the man determines the will. The will is dlwaijs at liberty: choice is an effect always, and not a cause! It is always produced freely. When the mind chooses, it always chooses freely. There is no such thing as bound will. Hence, all do what is good or evil voluntarily, in view of a motive, and according to the state of mind in which they are. Take man in a state of innocence. God made him upright; in his own image; his choice is free, and he chooses what is right; but not from any poiver in the will. The will, as I have said, has no power to operate on any thing but the body. His uprightness was in the right state of the affections, and the luminous state of the understanding, in the correct state of the memory, and in his entire moral rectitude in the Divine image. His will was free to do good ivhile no temptation was presented to it. He had no motive but his accountableness to God, and his love to God^ His will operated according to the state of the man. But now look at him in another state — the state of temptation. Motives ai'e now presented to him by the arch tempter, but not to his will at all; they are presented to his under- standing and appetites — to his taste for beauty. The fruit is pleasant to the eye ; and what was the effect ? The will was not trapped in any other Avay than this : the tempta- tion addressed to these powers was so strong, that it over- came the dictates of judgment, and the man chose wrcng. Volition moves the body: the mind moves the will; and the mind is moved by that without, which is adapted to its constitution." Now who moved that without, and made the constitution? The foregoing is the language of Dr. Wilson, who, for forty years, occupied the First Presbyterian Church in this AITENDIX. 265 city, and during his long life a prominent man in the Church in the west: certainly, for ability and opportunity, inferior to none of his school, and therefore as reliable an exponent as any other. But now observe his honest and candid admission, on an occasion when, of all others, he would be most accurate, and on a point where he would be most critically prepared : " Free agency and moral obli- gation to obey law, with respect to fallen man, do not include any ability of any hindP' According to this, free agency, as held by Calvinists, does not include ability of any kind. A man is a free agent, though he have no power at all ! He is also responsible to obey law, though he have no ability of any kind to do so ! But he more fully unfolds his view, as above; and no one can read the quotation, it seems to me, without sympa- thizing with the sincere and able author, in the manifest confusion and self-contradiction in which he involves him- self. "The will is always at liberty;" yet its choice is always caused by a foreign agent! "When the mind chooses, it always chooses freely;" yet it has no kind of ability whatever, but is ruled by the motives in every case ! "There is no such thing as bound will;" but it is always an effect, and not a cause! Observe, further, his phi- losophy of the will Dr. AVilson carries back beyond or behind the fall. Of man, in innocence, he says, " His will was free to do good, while no temptation was presented to it;'' but what is implied in this ? When temptation came, the will was not free to do good, but bound to do evil, or to yield. This, indeed, he does not leave us to infer, but expressly states that the temptation presented to the first pair was such that it overcame, by its strength, the mind — "the mind moves the will, and was itself moved by that without; and thus man fell under the force of a tempta- tion which he had no power to resist. He fell, therefore, when, under the circumstances, he had no power to stand I 23 266 APPENDIX. And 3^et he was free in doing what he had no power U avoid ! Dr. Twisse, the Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly, in conformity to whose views the Confession of Faith was formed, holds the followinor lancruage: "All things come to pass by the efficacious and irresistible will of God." Again: "It is impossible that any thing should ever he done hut that to tohich God impels the ivill of manr Again: " God is the author of that action which is sinful, by his irresistible will." Piscator: "God made Adam and Eve to this very pur- pose, that they might be tempted and led into sin ; and by force of his decree, it could not otherwise be but they must sin." Again : " God foresees nothing but what he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge." Again : " For we neither can do more good than we do, nor less evil than we do, because God, from eternity, has precisely decreed that both the good and the evil should be so done." Again : " God procures adultery, cursing, lyings." Again : "The reprobates who were predestinated to damnation, and the causes of damnation, are created to that end, that they may live wickedly, and be vessels full of the dregs of sin." Peter Martyr: "God cannot be termed the author of sin, though he is the cause of those actions which are sins. ... He supplies wicked men with opportunities of sinning, and inclines their hearts thereto. He blinds, deceives, and seduces them. He, by his working on their hearts, bends and stirs them up to do evil." Zanchius: " God's first constitution was, that some should be destined to eternal ruin ; and to this end their sins were ordained, and denial of grace in order to their sins. Both the elect and the reprobates were foreordained to sin, IS sin, that the glory of God might be declared thereby." APPENDIX. 267 Zuinglius: "When God makes angels or men sin, he :\oes not sin himself, because he does not break any law." VVitsius, in summing up his reasonings, uses the follow- ing language: "If all these truths thus demonstrated be joined and linked together, they will produce that conclu- sion which we laid down — namely, from all this may be inferred, by plain consequence, that man could not hut fall on account of the infallibility of the Divine prescience, and of that necessity which they call a necessity of conse- quences. For it is inconsistent with the divine perfection, that any decree of God should be rendered void, or that the event should not be answerable to it. For if all creatures depend on God in acting — if he not only con- curs with them when they act, but excites them to act — if that excitation he so powerful as that on supposing it the effect cannot hut follow — if God, with that same efficac7j, influences vicious actions so far as they are physical — if the creature cannot give its actions their due moral good- ness without God, it infallibly follows that Adam, God himself moving him to understand, will, and eat, could not hut understand, ivill, and eat, and God not giving goodness to those actions, man could not understand, ivill, and eat in a right manner.'" Honest Witsius! worthy of imitation! He, you see, does not hesitate, with Calvin, his illustrious model, to confess that, in regard to the first, as well as all other vicious acts, man acts only as coerced by Divine influence. How, in the face of all these declarations, and the many others cited in foregoing letters, can Calvinists, with any candor, accuse us of misrepresenting them, or attempt themselves to frame an escape by a resort to the doctrine of permissive decrees ? I confess I am at a loss to under- stand how good men reconcile their conduct on this point; but the wrong I must believe is not in the heart, however difficult it may be to ascribe it to the head. L'OS APPENDIX. NUMBER III. In the Presbyterian of the West, Dr. Rice honors mc with a notice, Avhich I herewith subjoin. It is all given, bill in paragraphs, followed by replies, to render the answer more direct. ''Foster on Calvinism. — We have not intended to enter into a regular discussion with Mr. Foster on Calvinism. The reasons are obvious. We were previously engaged in a discussion with Dr. Simpson, on some other points of difference between Methodists and Presbyterians; and we considered Mr. Foster's letters simply as a plan to divert attention from the weak points of his faith we are exposing. We do not choose to permit the plan to succeed." Doctor, you must excuse us for smiling at this. It is impolite, I know ; but nature will out. " A plan to divert attention from the weak points of our faith you are ex- posing!'' Truly, we have great need to be alarmed Your assault is so potent, and your success is so signal! " If Mr. Foster desired a discussion with us, courtesy, as we think, would have required him to wait till we were through with Dr. Simpson. Besides, if he desired a dis- cussion with us, he would have proposed it, and allowed us to have some hand in arranging preliminaries; and have made an arrangement to have both sides published in both papers. Having thrust himself forward, whilst a discussion with Dr. Simpson was pending, and without making any of thg usual arrangement of preliminaries, it is rather sur- prising with what confidence and with what vaunting- he has claimed our particular notice." "If Mr. Foster desired a discussion with us!" Strange, Doctor — ^I had almost said, shame ! Do you not know that your own imprudent intermeddling with your neighbors provoked the whole controversy, which now engrosses our columns ? Why, now, do you talk as thougli we sought con- tioversy with you. When a man repels the assassin, does he APPENDIX. 260 court the figlit ? Have you forgotten your haughty repliei^ to our published deprecations of the whole matter? — that even in the commencement of these letters, you were in exceeding good heart? That your tune has changed, is not without cause. That courtesy should have induced me to wait till you were done with Dr. Simpson, I an\ almost inclined to admit; for your troubles ought not to be in- creased. But, then, did you not court it? Did you not proclaim your readiness and resources? As to the matter of preliminaries, did you stop to make preliminary arrange- ments when you commenced your abusive misrepresen- tations of Methodism? And why did you not think of this before, when you promised, at the appearance of my first letter, to assist me in the discussion? There was no complaint then ! And you talk about arranging to pubhsh our articles in both papers ! Do you not know that nothing could induce you to publish my letters in your columns ? And have you forgotten that I promised to publish your replies, whether you would insert my letters or not, if you would attempt a candid examination of the subject? This attempt of yours to present matters in a false light, and to elicit sympathy, comes with a poor grace from Dr. Rice. You are surprised that I address myself so confidently to you ! Did you not tell us that you were the man ? Have you not put yourself forward as the great champion ? Have you not assailed us? and, then, does it surprise you when we take up your vaunting challenge, and repel your virulent attacks? 0, sir, it is too late to supplicate pity ! "We propose, however, in connection with our preceding articles on Divine decrees, to pay our respects briefly tu Mr. Foster. He has quoted brief extracts from the Con- fession of Faith, and from Calvinistic writers ; but it is easy for one who takes up a doctrine without understanding it, to make quotations from writers, so partial, or so com- pletely severed from explanations and qualifications given. 270 APPENDIX. as entirely to misrepresent them. This Mr. Foster haj done — we do not say intentionally." " He has quoted brief sections of the Confession." Do you not know that I have quoted whole chapters of your Confession, without the omission of a word? How can you, in sight of this fact, print, to be read by your readers, who will never see my letters, that I have garbled your Confession? Why have you done this? You say, I have misrepresented your authors. Will you point out a single instance ? Will you take any quotation I have made, and show that I have put a meaning on it contrary to the meaning of the author? Do this, or your readers may have occasion to question your accuracy, not to say candor. "From his quotations, he comes to the conclusion that, according: to the faith of Calvinists, the decree of God is the efficient cause, not onl}- of the acts of men and angels, but of the affections and passions under which they are performed. Hence he concludes that men can no more avoid the murders, blasphemies, etc., which they commit, than theyxould resist the fiat of Omnipotence, or subvert the purposes of the Almighty — that sin results as an effect from the Divine decree as its cause. It is upon this grossly false view of the subject that all his objections to Calvinism are based, such as that, according to this doctrine, * God is the author of sin; man's free agency is destroyed,' etc. The correction of the false view of the doctrine, of course, destroys the force of his objections." "From his quotation, he comes to the conclusion," etc. Now, Doctor, the question here is, did the quotations war- rant the conclusion I came to ? If they did, Calvinism is guilty. If not, will you please make it appear? This is the point in a nutshell. No dodging here. Come up squarely to the work. "Upon this grossly false view of the subject all Ins objections are based." Why don't you show that I has'e APPENDIX. 271 taken a false view of the subject? Why assert and reit- erate this for the ten thousandth time? Are assertions arguments among Calvinists ? "The correction of this false view of the doctrine, of course, destroys the force of his objections.'* Exactly so. Doctor; but will you correct this false view, not by cant» but by reasoning? This is precisely what we want! Don't waste your time ; I know it is precious, " On the general subject we make the following remarks : 1 . If Mr. Foster desired a fair and intelligible discussion of the difference between Methodists and Presbyterians, he should have stated precisely wherein they differ. But, though he has attempted to state the doctrine of Presby- terians, he gave no account of that of the Methodists. Do the latter hold that God has no purposes or decrees at all ? Do they deny that God foreordained any one event which was to be fulfilled by the free agency of man ? Why does Mr. Foster give us no light on this subject ? How can we determine which of two systems is the better, or more accordant with Scripture truth, unless we have them fairly stated, that we may compare them ? Why had Mr. Foster no desire to make the public acquainted with the Methodist faith on this important subject ? " This would be rather amusing, if it were not unkind to be amused at the vexation and confusion of a fellow- worm. It is now the third time you have turned attention to this subject, and one of your correspondents condoles with you in your distress ; it has evidently perplexed you not a httle. But, Doctor, how came you to imagine that I ought to write about Methodist doctrine? I assure you I had no such intention ; I saw no occasion for it. My object was simply to examine your faith, and show my objections to it. If you have any desire to know what Methodism is, no one will question your right; and, if you find objections, in due time, we will most probably assist you to examine them 272 APPENDIX. This absurd struggle to keep away from the issues, and tc escape from an examination of the objections I have made to your system, is fruitless; men will understand it, and attribute it to its proper cause. Put an end to all this los? of time, and labor, and self- confusion, and come up to the work like a man; take up my letters consecutively, and demolish them ; you say it is an easy work. Many of youi readers, to my personal knowledge, are extremely anxiou.« to see it done. Many of mine are anxious to see if it can be done. You have every facility; my arguments and authorities are before you. When you have done this, you will have sustained Calvinism. If, then, you desire to examine other subjects connected with the doctrines of Methodism, you will find no foreign matters introduced; no evasion ; no special pleading. You have provoked this controversy. Nothing else would do you. Now, then, let there be a direct, candid, Christian, thorough work made of it. " The faith of the Presbyterian Church is clearly stated in the Westminster Confession. Whatever individuals may have said, more than is there written, or different from it, our Church is not responsible for. We make this remark, not because we believe that any one of the writers quoted by Mr. Foster has materially departed from the doctrine, as there stated, but because a discussion concerning the views of each of them would fill a volume, instead of a few columns of a newspaper." I agree with you here, Doctor, that the Westminster Confession is the standard of your faith. Hence, in making my statements of your doctrine, I have invariably quoted from it fully first, and I have called in other authors of great authority among you — Calvin, Hill, Witsius, Dwight, Edwards, Boston, Shaw, Dickinson, Ridgley, Chalmers, Toplady, Zanchius, etc. — simply to show the common view taken of these doctrines by yourselves. I was not willing APPENDIX. 273 to venture an interpretation of your faith without your own sanction, knowing what a wonderful faciUty you have in the use of such epithets as " misrepresentation, ignorance, do not understand,'" etc. My deductions are all based upon the Confession of Faith, as interpreted by these authors; and, if you will show that they are not, I 2>'>'omise a public recantation of the charges made against you. But let me remind you again, that the question is not, whether your Confession and these authors teach an opposite doctrine to that which I have derived from them, but do they tea,ck this? When you attempt to derive an opposite doctrine from them, without correcting and removing my reasonings and quotations, you only prove that you have a contra- dictory creed, liable to all the objections I bring against it, and, the more grievous than all the rest, that it diametri- cally contradicts itself, and its defenders destroy themselves. First, show that the arguments with which I sustain my interpretation are faulty, and then favor us with your new translation. "Now, in the Confession of Faith, we have first the general declaration, that 'God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather estab- lished.' (Chap, iii, sec. i.) We have a particular explanation of the doctrine. The shorter Catechism teaches that God executeth his decrees in the works of creative providence. The fourth chapter of the Confession states what God did, in fulfillment of his decrees in creation. To tlie doctrine of this chapter Mr. Foster has taken no exception. In the fifth chapter, we have stated the fulfillment of the Divine decrees by the providence of God. After stating that Goa upholds, directs, disposes, and governs all creatures, actions. 274 APPENDIX. and things, to his own glory, it employs the following language : * Thf almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves in his providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men, and that not by a hare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful hounding, and otherwise ordering and govern- ing them, in a manifold dispensation to his own holy ends ; yet so as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God ! ' How did the providence of God extend to the fall of man ? The sixth chapter answers : ♦ This their sin God was pleased to permit, according to his wise and holy counsel, having proposed to order it according to his own glory.' *' Now, concerning the sin of our first parents, and all sins of men and angels, the Confession states two things : 1. God decreed, or chose to permit them. 2. That he not only determined to permit them to have sinful inclinations, but powerfully to bound, order, and govern their actions, so as to bring to pass his own wise designs. God knew the design of Satan to tempt Eve. He had power to pre- vent it. For wise reasons, he chose to permit him to tempt her, and to permit her to sin. Was her free agency de- stroyed by this permission? Or was it destroyed by the purpose of God to bring good out of the evil designs of Satan and the sin of Eve ? Or did either of these things make God the author of her sin? God decreed to harden the heart of Pharaoh, so that he would not let the Is- raelites go out of Egypt, and he did harden it. (Exodus iv, 21, and vii, 13.) By this hardening, the purposes of God are fulfilled. Was the free agency of Pharaoh de- stroyed? Did God become the author of his sins? God decreed to send the Assyrian king against the rebellious Jews, to chastise them, and he did send him. (Isaiah X, 5-15.) And yet he punished the king for his sins, APPENDIX. 275 committed in that very war against tlie Jews. Will Mr. Foster tell us how he explains this plain Bible fact ? " God permits the sinful dispositions of men ; and he so controls them that he accomplishes by them his holy pur- poses ; and this is precisely what he decreed to do, and no more. Francis Turretine has long been used as a standard author, by Presbyterians. How does he answer the objec- tion that the doctrine of Divine decrees makes God the author of sin ? He says, ' The decree does not flow into the thing, and is not effective of the evil, but only per- missive and directive ! God simply permits and directs, or controls, and, therefore, is not the author of sin; or, as Solomon says, " A man's heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps." ' " When the doctrine is thus correctly and briefly stated, all the potent objections so triumphantly urged by Mr. Foster become, not only powerless, but almost ridiculous. More on this subject hereafter, if we are spared." Here, Doctor, you reiterate an argument for the third time, in support of the doctrine of Divine decrees. I must, therefore, notice it, to save your printers the trouble of setting up the type again, or, perhaps, you might lay it aside to insert from week to week, to avoid the trouble and expense of composition. I cannot help but think it re- markable. Doctor, that, though you have written, directly and indirectly, five lengthy articles upon my letters, you have not named one of my arguments or quotations ! For some cause, you cannot help but write, though with evident irresolution and dispiritedness ; and, for some other cause, you cannot venture to attack one of my arguments, by way of examination and refutation. Why is this, Doctor? Can you tell? You seek to avoid all the objections I alledge against your doctrine of decrees, by assuming that I mis- represent you. I quote from your distinguished authors, to show you that the view I take is their view. You don't 276 APPENDIX. examine my quotations at all ! I show you that these authors are against you. You answer not a word ! I make an argument, from the language of the Confession itself, against your interpretation. You say nothing in reply ! I show, from the system, that your interpretation is discord- ant. Not a response do you make ! You know very well that, before you can defend your doctrine of decrees, it must be defined. The whole con- troversy, at present, is upon this point. What is youi doctrine? I have defined it. You disagree with me. I quote from your authors to prove that I am correct, and make additional arguments to the same point. Now, mani- festly, the first thing to do, is to settle this point. Will you attend to this? No evasions. And the way to settle it, is to show that the arguments which I employ, to sustain my interpretation, are not competent. When you examine foregoing arguments, you shall have others, and if you can unsettle ray interpretation, you gain your point. Come, sir, with good heart; the path is plain before you. Your pres- ent course is like the Irishman's, when brought before the court, on charge of a trifling theft. It being proved that Paddy was guilty, the judge proceeded to condemn him, on the testimony of some witness who had actually seen him perpetrate the theft. Whereupon Paddy very quickly replied, with all the vivacity of his countrymen, "May it plase yer honor, I can bring fifty men that didn't see me take the thing at all, at all, so I can." But in dismissing this subject, one word more to you. I am heartily glad that you renew your promise to attend to this matter hereafter. Don't forget this promise ; and at- tend to it right. I shall not promise to notice any future equivocations. If you desire to discuss, and will do so, we shall find great pleasure in having your co-operation, both with respect to your doctrine and our own; but, in any event, we shall progress with our letters, and not complain APPENDIX. 27^ at jou, whatever course 3^011 may deem best in the defense. I doubt not you know perfectly well which is the wisest course for you to pursue. I had almost said, I can but admire your shrewdness. Four questions : 1. Do you not know that a decree, or purpose to permit whatsoever comes to pass, is not a decree that the things should come to pass? 2. Do you not know that when you assume the doctrine of permission, you become an Arminian, and desert Cal- vinism ? 3. Do you not know that all your questions and Scrip- tural arguments, in the above, have no bearing whatever on the points between you and myself, and are mere sub- terfuges and evasions? 4. Do you not know that I defend the doctrine of per- mission, against you, who deny it? God permits whatsoever comes to pass ! Is this Calvin- ism? or have I not proved that your doctrine is, that he ne- cessitates whatsoever comes to pass? Come, Doctor, no equivocation. Meet the matter squarely; let us get at the truth. NUMBER IV. ^'Foster on Calvinism. — As already we have proved, the Presbyterian Confession teaches, concerning the sins of angels and men, that God decreed, or purposed to permit and to direct. This is all. Mr. Foster, however, is in difficulty about two points, (see his 2d Letter,) namely, 1. He is under the impression that sin is a thing. He reasons thus : • God's decree [according to Calvinists] is the ne- cessity of things; but sin is something; therefore, God's decree is the necessity, or necessitating cause of sin.' We reply, that sin is not a thing, but a quality; and, therefore, when it is said, that God's decree is the necessity of things. It does not follow^ that it is the necessitating cause of sin. 278 APPENDIX. Such a blunder looks badly in a man who evidently glories ill his acuteness and in his logical powers. Again, he says, * God decreed whatsoever comes to pass ; but sin comes to pass; therefore, God decreed sin.' We answer, this is a gross abuse of language. It is not true, that sin comes to pass. It is true, that events come to pass, in connection with whi:h men commit sin. Mr. Foster proves, that Cal- vinists make God's decree the necessitating cause of sin, by assuming what every one ought to know is untrue, that sin is an event or a thing/ Having thus perverted their language, he proceeds to do battle against a doctrine despised by every enlightened Calvinist on earth." Dr. Rice commences, by stating that he has already proved, that "the Presbyterian Confession teaches, con- cerning the sins of angels and men, that God decreed, or purposed to permit and direct. This is all." To this I reply, Dr. Rice has proved nothing more than was stated and admitted in my letters — ^nothing but what is subversive of his own creed; but he has overlooked the real issue, and he seeks to keep it from the view of his readers. It is this : I have proved, by several arguments, which the Doctor is too cunning to notice, that his Con- fession and standard authors teach, that God has effi- ciently decreed whatsoever comes to pass — ^that he causes, not permits, all things. To this he makes no reply. He well knows that he has adopted an interpretation of his system which cannot be sustained ; and for this very reason he will not meet me here. Not a word will he say on this subject. He knows that the doctrine of permission is ai? abandonment of the doctrine of decrees, as taught by his Church — that it is Arminianism, and not Calvinism. He escapes the difficulties I bring against him by deserting his creed! — by turning Arminian ! Calvinism says, God de- crees whatsoever comes to pass. Arminianism says, God permits whatsoever comes to pass. Where is Dr. Rice? APPENDIX. 279 To my argument, "God's decree is the necessity of tilings; but sin is something; therefore, God's decree is the necessity, or necessitating cause of sin," he replies, " Sin is not a thing, hut a quality'' Again: to my argument, "God decreed whatsoever comes to pass; but sin comes to pass; therefore, God decreed sin," he rephes, that ''this is a gross abuse of language. It is not true, that sin comes to pass. Mr. Foster proves that Calvinists make God's decree the neces- sitating cause of sin, hy assuming what every one ought to know is untrue, that sin is an event or a thing." Sin is not a thing ! Not an event ! It does not come to pass! It is a quality! Therefore, though God decreed all things and events, with whatsoever comes to pass, yet he did not decree sin! A cardinal's cap for the learned Doctor! If sin is a thing, or an event, or if it comes to pass, the Doctor will admit my argument. Very well, then. Is sin a thing? What is a thing? Webster says, a "thing is an event or action; that which happens or falls out ; that which is done, told, or purposed." Now, what is sin? John says, "Sin is the transgression of the law." But is it an act to transgress the law ? Then sin is an action. But perhaps John is mistaken. I have a better authority with Dr. Rice — the Confession of Faith. "Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God," etc. " Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of any law of God." But what now? May be transgression is a quality! Webster says, "transgression is the act of passing over or beyond any law or rule of moral duty; the violation of law or known principle of rectitude; breach of com- mand." So, between John and Webster, we find that sin is an act — an act is a thing ; so sin is a thing ! Again: nothing is more common than for ministers, luihorized by the Bible, to warn men against committing, 280 APPENDIX. doinr/, perfonnhig sins ! Now, do they warn them against committing qualities or actions? Again: will Dr. Rice inform us what a qualit}' is, sep- arate from a thing? or what a thing is, separate from its qualities ? But sin is not an event! What is an event? "Event," says Webster, "is that which comes, arrives, or happens; that which falls out; any incident, good or bad." Well, now, what is sin? "Sin is the transgression of the law." Query: Did it ever occur that the law was transgressed? or, if Dr. Rice prefers it, did it never hap- pen that an act occurred embracing a sinful quality ? if so, was this an event? Then sin is an event! But, again, either all sin is eternal, or sins do come to pass in time, or there is no sin. But Dr. Rice says, sin does not come to pass in time; therefore, there is no sin, or all sins are eternal. Which will the Doctor choose ? But again: Dr. Rice quotes the Confession of Faith, to prove that the Presbyterian Church believe that God per- mitted sin. What does he mean by this ? Permitted sm — how? in what sense? Permitted it to come to pass? Can he mean any thing else ? But he says, it is an abuse of language to say sin came to pass ! Will the gentleman help us here? He says, also, concerning sin, "that God decreed to order, govern, and bound them." What does he mean by this? That God bounds and governs qualities, or events and things — the acts of men and angels ? But I have perpetrated a great blunder — am guilty of a great abuse of language — in making sin a thing — an event — in saying it comes to pass! It is not any thing! It is not an event! It never did come to pass! So says Dr. Rice, and he ought to know. Hencefortn let it be known, sin is a quality! an abstraction! It is an abuse of language to say, men commit sin, oi APPENDIX. 281 to speak of it as a thing that is effected or brought to pass? What men do, or think, or purpose, are not sins — nothing could be Tnore unscholarly than to say they are. But, now, if it should seem to my readers, after all, that gin is something, and not nothing, my argument, by tacit admission of Dr. Rice, bears unanswerably against his system. I could very easily show, that all his authors, the Con- fession, and God himself, speak of sin in the same manner in which I speak of it — as an event — an action ; of course, the action nor event are ever stripped of their qualities. But really this is too ridiculous: it shows to what an extremity a man will permit himself to be driven in sup- port of a bad cause. I have met with many attempts to escape the difficulty; but this last, I must admit, in justice to my distinguished antagonist, is the climacteric. He admits that God decreed all acts and events, but not their quality. Now, look at this. He decreed every blas- phemy, every murder, every theft, every enormity, with every intention — and his decree necessitated their occur- rence; but he did not decree sin, and his decree did not necessitate the occurrence of sin. Very well. Now, ad- mit that sin is a quality separate from all these acts and intentions — the idea of which is preposterous- — ^}^et can the acts and intentions exist without the sins? Will Dr. Rice say they can? If they cannot, if the thing is impossible, does not the decree, which necessitates the act and inten- tion, necessitate the quality of sin, also ? I this moment observe, that Dr. Rice speaks of sin as action in this very connection, showing how error causes its advocates to blunder and fall in its defense. He saj^s, "It is true that events come to pass, in connection with whif'h men commit sin." What does this mean. Doctor? Do men commit qualities, or acts? Sin is not an event — 24 282 APPENDIX. not an act. When men commit sin, what do they commit ^ something or nothing ? Doctor, what do you suppose candid, thoughtful men must think of a system admitting no better defense than you find yourself able to make here? In all candor, are you not ashamed of such quibbling yourself! Come, sir, come, put it away — discuss this subject, for once, in a manner worthy of yourself and worthy of it. But I thank you for admitting that God has decreed all events and actions, in a manner which necessitates their existence. This is making some progress, and looks as though you were about to give up your subterfuge of permission, and come out an up and down Calvinist. Stick to this, and you will fare much better than by at- tempting to defend two contradictory systems. "2. Mr. Foster is wholly unable to understand, that God may direct certain acts, without being chargeable with the sin men commit in performing those acts ; and he IS quite certain, that if the act can be attributed to God, the feeling or motive which prompts it, must also be at- tributed to him. Strange that a man should so stumble and blunder concerning a principle perfectly familiar to every tliinking mind. Joseph's brethren hated him, and determined to kill him; but Reuben persuaded them to put him in a pit, 'that he might rid him out of their hands, and deliver him to his father again.' (Genesis xxxvii, 21, 22.) Now, was not Reuben the author, in an important sense, of the act of putting Joseph into the pit? But for his influence that act would not have been performed. But was he chargeable with the sin com- mitted by his brothers in performing the act ? They were influenced by malignant feelings; he by benevolent feel-- ings. The act, so far as Reuben was concerned, was good ; so far as his brothers were concerned, it was bad. They would have killed him ; Reuben persuaded them APPENDIX. 283 to do a different thing, which, though it gratified their revenge, offered the prospect of saving him." Here follows a number of quotations from the Bible ; but as they do not bear on the point in dispute, and as what is given is a specimen, we need not insert them in full. The Doctor here takes up what he calls my second diffi- culty ; and he says *'it is to understand how God may direct to certain acts, without being chargeable with the sin men commit in performing those acts." Query: Why did not Dr. Rice state my difficulty in my own language ? Why does he scrupulously avoid giving my arguments in his replies? Can any body guess? Does the Doctor know? Does the Doctor know why he will not examine my repHes even, if he supposes himself able, triumphantly, to defend his cause? My difficulty, which the Doctor is here trying to state and remove, is this : not to distinguish between an act and its morality, but to separate morality from an act and its intention. My language is this: "There is a discrimination between the sinful act and the sin of the act. This is cor- rect. An act and its sinfulness are certainly distinct. (Act is here spoken of as free from the intention.) Sin resides in the intention, not the act. Well, then, is this the mean- ing of our Calvinistic brethren, that, though God's decree is the efficient cause of the sinful act, as an act, it is not the cause of its sin ; for the sin is in the sinner's intention in committing it? But, then, a question arises right here: Was not the sinner's intention decreed ? If you answer me no, then there is something which comes to pass which was not decreed. If you answer yes, and the sin Avas in the intention, then God, who was the author of the intention, was author of the sin." Now, Dr. Rice must know that the point I make here is (his: that God has decreed all acts, with the intentions that produced these acts, and, hence, that he decreed sin, 284 APPENDIX. bccaivse the act and the intention do constitute the sin — the sinful quahty must necessarily belong to them — they aie the sin itself. It K ould be a useless task to take up the cases he intro- duces to assist him, because they do not touch the point in dispute between us ; but to show you how superficial th.^.y are, we will take up the first. To show that an act may be bad or good, in itself considered — a thing not disputed— and, hence, to decree an act is not to decree its quality, he takes up the case of Joseph's brethren. He says, "Now, w^as not Reuben the author, in an important sense, of the act of putting Joseph into the pit ? But was he chargeable with the sins committed [that is, qualities committed] by his brothers in performing the act? They were influenced by malignant feelings ; he, by benevolent feelings. The act, so far as Reuben was concerned, was good; but, so far as his brothers were concerned, it was bad." Now, with this statement of the Doctor I agree perfectly. But, now, mark. Why was the act good in Reuben? Because his intention was good. Why was the act had — acts, you see, are sins — in his brothers? Because their intention was bad. But whence came that intention ? Dr. Rice says God de- creed it, in a manner to necessitate its existence. If God's decree was the cause of the intention, and sin was in the intention, who caused the sin? Doctor, will you tell us? Every other case admits of the same easy answer, in a word. " The Scriptures abound in such facts — facts which Mr. Foster, soaring aloft in the airy regions of abstract logic, did not think worth while to notice. His arguments are not against Calvinism — they are against the inspiration of the Bible. In his zeal to pull down Calvinism, he has struck at the foundations of Christianity. In his anxiety to furnish his Methodist brethren with arguments, he has furnished the infidel with arguments no less conclusive. If we were an mfidel, we could desire no better arguments against the APPENDIX, 285 truth of the Bible than those of Mr. Foster, if they are at all sound. With those arguments we would prove, not that Calvinism destroys man's free agency and account- ability, and makes God the author of sin, but that the Biblo is liable to these charges !" The Doctor does not like my logic. I do not wonder at this. It is very natural he should not. But I am at some loss to know how the truths of logic and the truths of Scripture conflict w*ith each other. Perhaps the Doctor will enlighten us here. And as for Scripture facts, I am prepared to examine any that shall be submitted upon the real points at issue; and I further boldly deny, that Dr. Rice can find any passage of Scripture sustaining what I object to. I defy the gentleman to produce it. Let him do so, before he accuses me of using logic in opposition to the Bible. He says, "My arguments are not against Cal- vinism — they are against the inspiration of the Bible. In his zeal to pull down Calvinism, he has stnick at the foundations of Christianity." I suppose the Doctor means Calvinism is Christianity! I cannot perceive how other- wise his strange charge is to be understood. But what a posture is this for Dr. Rice, the champion of Calvinism! How are the mighty fallen ! He finds he cannot answer my logic, and, hence, deprecates its use. My arguments are unanswerable ; and he cries the ark is in danger — " to your tents, Israel!" . He says, "With those arguments we would prove, not that Calvinism destroys man's free agency and accountability, and makes God the author of sin, but that the Bible is liable to these charges." Docs the gentleman mean that the Bible is hable to these charges ? If so, of course he believes them ; for he believes the Bible. If not, of course he does not believe the arguments suffi- cient to convict the Bible; and why, then, would he use them against it? But who, besides Dr. Rice, has ever imagined that my letters assailed the Bible? 286 APPENDIX. "Mr. Foster seems wholly unable to comprehend, what i3 perfectly plain, that the same moral feeling may lead to the commission of any one of fifty acts. And hence he argues, ihat if God decreed to bring to pass a certain event, he must have decreed to produce in the heart the moral feeling by which that event is brought to pass. A man Jiates another. Under the influence of that hatred he may slander him ; he may injure his property; he may institute vexatious civil suits; he may insult him; he may striki him. A man is ambitious; and his ambition may be grati- fied in many ways. To what particular acts it may lead him, will depend entirely upon the circumstances in which he may be placed. A man is covetous. His covetousness makes him desire to accumulate money and property; but there are many ways in which this may be done. What particular acts his love of money may lead him to perform, depends upon what moral principle he has, and by what circumstances he may be surrounded. Now, all that Cal- vinists hold on this subject, is simply, that God decreed to permit the fall and sinfulness of men, and that he decreed so to control their sinful dispositions, as to bring to pass his wise and holy ends. That he did permit the fall and the depravity of men, Mr. Foster will not deny. That he exer- cises a controlling providence over the wicked, the Bible most abundantly teaches. "The enlightened Calvinist has no insuperable difficulty in finding a satisfactory explanation of these things. God purposed to permit the temptation and the fall of our first parents. In consequence of that event all their posterity are sinful. God, withdrawing from them his divine influ- ence, permits them to be so ; but he does not allow them to wander abroad uncontrolled. In its native freedom, * the heart of a man deviscth his w^ay ;' but in his divine sover- eignty * the Lord directeth his steps.' " This paragraph is, if possible, still more remarkable than APPENDIX. 287 either of the former. I have read from Dr. Rice's pen for some years; but the inaccuracies of this letter are more unaccountable than in any of his former writing that has come under my observation. I attribute this to the badness of his cause, and his evident confusion. He says, "Mr. Foster seems wholly unable to comprehend, what is per- fectly plain, that the same moral feelings may lead to the commission of any one of fifty acts." Where did you learn this, Doctor? I assure you it is news to me. I have many difficulties, upon some of which I have asked your assist- ance; but this I never dreamed of in my life. "And hence," he says, "he argues, that if God decreed to bring to pass a certain event, he must have decreed to produce in the heart the moral feeling by which that event is brought to pass. A man hates another. Under the influ- ence of that hatred he may slander; he may injure his property; he may institute vexatious civil suits," etc. I suppose the Doctor means that I argue, that if God decreed the event or act, he decreed the sin. If this is his meaning, I answer yes. For if God decreed all things whatsoever come to pass, he decreed the act and the intention, and the state of heart that produced them; for these all come to pass. If he decreed that a man should slander another, or kill, or any otherwise injure, and if these things proceed from intention, and this intention springs from hatred, and all these come to pass, he decreed them all ; for he decreed whatsoever comes to pass. The Doctor does not seem to remember, that though a great diversity of bad acts can flow from one bad feeling, yet not one of them can flow, as a bad act, without the feeling. He says, "The enlightened Calvinist has no insuperable difficulty in finding a satisfactory explanation of these things. God purposed to permit the temptation and fall of our first parents." Is permitting it decreeing it. Doctor? I ai^k 288 APPENDIX. you this short question. You will never answer it! You cannot ! Its answer is fatal to Calvinism. *' Such arguments are proper weapons of infidelity ; they bok exceeding badly in a Christian minister. Let hinc come down from his airy logic, and grapple with Bible facts, and we will hear him patiently." When Dr. Rice shows that my logic is bad, it will then be time to attend to Bible facts. First let us know what the system is ; then inquire whether it is found in the Bible. I am ready, how- ever, at any time, to hear Dr. Rice prove Calvinism from the Bible. Will he ever do it ? I have no fear that any of our readers will suppose that I have less reverence for that book than my friend has. I am ready to show that the Scriptures sustain against his system all the objections I have laid. If the system is logically liable, it cannot escape. This is the first question. In conclusion, I repeat that I am now noticing Dr. Rice's seventh letter, diiect and indirect, and as yet he wavers as to the mode and point of attack. Will he ever come up to it? NUMBER v. Dr. Rice notices me in two columns of his last issue. He reiterates the charges of slander, and misrepresentation, but, as usual, without bringing a solitary proof to sustain it, or attempting to refute or correct a single statement I have made. But my readers will remember that I have not made a single charge against him which I have not sustained by numerous arguments and authorities. Why does not the gentleman attend to these ? It is a plain case. Do I sustain my charges against him ? If I do, he is not slandered. If I do not, cannot Dr. Rice, the acute polemic, expose the fallacy? I regret to see ebullitions of feeling upon the part of the gentleman ; but 1 can only remind him of former times, when he was in a better humor with himself — he may find comfort in the reference. His appeal to Presbyterian ministers is amusing. APPENDIX. 289 vVLat, sir, have we not your Confession of Faith, and the 'vorks of your great men, hving and dead ? Are not these tlie exponents of your creed ? The question between us, and at the bar of the pubhc, is simply this: Have I cor- rectly stated these authorities? What are the logical con- sequences flowing from them? This is a question easily settled. That you would be glad to have a jury of Presly- terian preachers to settle the matter between us, I have no doubt. / have great respect for these brethren, hut will txcuse them, on the same principle that relatives are excused in important civil suits. But I must protest that I neither think them vile nor unlearned, but believe them generally a pious and worthy class of men. I further believe that, if they were the court, they would admit that I have correctly stated their system. But they will disclaim the conse- quences I deduce. But the point is not to disclaim, but to disprove- This, sir, troublesome as it is — and I know it exceedingly vexes you — is what you must do. He repeats in this number the learned argument (!) about sin not being a thing or event. What has been said above will satisfy the gentleman on this subject; but I predict he will never show it to his readers. He next gives a long list of quotations from Calvin, dis- claiming the consequences charged against him. But are disclaimers arguments? Suppose a volume of such quota- tions were given — a thing I could easily do myself, and so I notified my readers at first — what avail would it be ? If Calviif, and all Calvinistic authors, teach contradictory doc- trines, or embrace premises, but deny the logical consequences, are they, for this reason, to stand acquit, and those who show the consequences to be accounted slanderers ? Such letters as Dr. Rice's may satisfy his people — this is their object. He may persuade them that somebody is greatly traducing their faith ; but what will all candid men think of such defense by such a man ? What a strange reluctance 25 290 APPENDIX, Dr. Rice has to make a definite issue on any point or argu- ment ! Why is this ? He accuses me of slander — he deals in generals — he stands aloof from all issues. Piesbyterians, what do you think of such defense? Many of you will think for yourselves. Will you be content witn this ? Is this the strength of your champion ? Here I distinctly challenge Br. Mice: he accuses me of misrepresentation; I challenge him to specify in what particular. I have stated fiis system, and then I have deduced logical consequences. I defy the gentleman to make good his charge of misrepreseiito tion. Now let him do it — let him specify. Eight replies, direct and indirect, and no issue yet ! What must be the confusion and trouble of Dr. Hice when such is the case ! What must the strength of the argument be which keeps him thus in abeyance ! NUMBER VI. The course of Dr. Rice, with respect to my letters, thus far, has, at least, afforded some amusement to many ob- servers. The amusement may, indeed, in many instances, have amounted to innocent merriment. His confusion and flounderings — his bold and resolute assaults and rapid re- treats — his fruitless effort to escape, or cover up the points in debate — his boastings, and pious horrors, and suppliant entreaties — his evident bad spirits, with his endeavor to seem in good heart — all taken together, combined with the recollection of the man who enacts the scene, constitute an exhibition provoking, at the same time, an involuntary smile and a sense of pity. First he ridicules ; then he becomes demure and morose ; then he commences a stately defense, in articles regularly numbered; then he stops still; then he turns round, and riommences anew at No. 1 again ; then he denies and dis- claims; then he attacks: thus he runs through eleven 'etters, without making a single intelligible issue with a single proposition I have made. His best performances I APPENDIX. 291 have quoted fully to my readers, and they can judge about the correctness of this representation. Verily, Calvinism has found but a feeble defense in this instance. But it is not Dr. Rice's fault — he wants neither the will nor the abil- ity to defend it to the utmost it will admit of — it is the fault of the system. He has done nobly. What more could he have done? Has he not cried "misrepresen- tation?" Has he not refused to meet all the issues? Has he not faithfully kept all my charges from his people ? Has he not done his best to divert attention? Has he not praised the system, and told his readers what could be done, and what has been done a thousand times ? Has he not quoted sentiments, from his authors, precisely contra- dictory to the sentunents I quoted from the same authors ? Has he not declaimed against logic as a weapon of infi- delity ? Nay, more : has he not assumed to be an outright Arminian? What more could the gentleman have done? I say again, if it all fails, it is not his fault. He has strug- gled nobly, and with his accustomed tact. The system alone is to blame. I hope Presbyterians will understand tliis. Let not your wrath come down upon the Doctor. He has done all that mortal could do, and you should do your utmost to comfort him. Make the best of a bad cause. In his last, with admirable precision, he runs the same old round of his former nine. First, he enters a denial of my charges, and declares me a false accuser; but not a word, not an allusion, to my arguments or authorities ! A conclusive mode of reasoning, as you all know! It tears arguments and authorities right up by the roots! It is good old Calvinistic, Geneva logic! Then he quotes dis- claimers from the authorities employed by us ! An admi- rable method of meeting logical consequences! Nothing could be more to the point than this! "A man," says John Smith, "is a murderer; and whoever murders deserves 202 APPENDIX. to be hanged." A listener says, "Then John Sm»th de- serves to be hanged." The former speaker becomes en- n.ged ; says he is misrepresented — he never said John Smith deserved the fate of hanging! It's logic! He is not accountable for logic! It is an infidel weapon! He does not believe what is charged against him! He does not believe, more than his accuser, that John Smith ought to be hanged! Of course, the disclaimer annihilates the logic! Nobody will presume to doubt it! Nobody will believe that he said or thought that John Smith ought to be hanged ! The Doctor follows his declamation with this fatal ad- mission : " We denounce that doctrine [the doctrine I charged upon Calvinists] as unequivocally as he does ; and we readily admit that he has proved it perfectly absurd and blasphemous." Thus, it will be perceived, the cogency and correctness of my arguments is admitted. The doctrines I antagonize, it is confessed, are shown to be perfectly absurd and blasphemous/ This is Dr. Rice's judgment. Well, now, my readers know perfectly well, that these very doctrines are quoted alo7ie and only from the Confession of Faitli, and such authors as Calvin, Edwards, Buck, Witsius, Dick, etc. Are these Calvinistic authorities, or not? If so, the doctrines proved to be perfectly absurd and blasp)hemous, Dr. Rice himself being judge, are Calvinistic; and so Calvinism, in the judgment of its champion, is absurd and blasphemous! What worse than this have I said of it? He next introduces, as wont, the doctrine of permission, but, of' course, without alluding to the fact that I have tri- umphantly exposed the fallacy. He has no idea of letting his readers know what weakness marks his defense — what contradictions he is involved in. He knows too much, as an old and practiced polemic, to quote arguments which he cannot answer, or to admit replies which uncover his naked- ness. He never will do this. APPENDIX. 203 The learned Doctor, having thus lucidly, and creditahU to himself, defended his own system, proceeds, in answer to the inquiry, " Are our Methodist brethren free from diffi- culty upon this subject?" to make quotations from Wesley and Watson, which, Ave infer, he supposes involve us in similar difficulties to those besetting his own system, which he admits is shown to be absurd and blasphemous ; but I confess I have not discernment enough to perceive the diffi- culty. I find nothing objectional in the quotations. I find no logical consequences that give me a moment's uneasiness. When the gentleman names consequences, or premises, which he deems objectional, we may help him. He prom- ises to do this. In the meantime, will he attend to the matters in hand ? Will he reheve his own system ? Come, Doctor, keep in good heart. You have a troublous task, it is true ; but keep up your spirits — don't get out of humor — do the best you can, and, for your encouragement, always remember, nobody will censure you in the event of failure and defeat. Your abilities are admitted, and it will be set down to the fact that you have a bad cause. NUMBER VII. This letter, as the former, starts out with the stereotyped charge of misrepresentation. The point here named is this : he says that I attach to the word necessity the idea of com- pulsion; although Calvinistic writers have been careful to say that they use it in no such sense — that by the word necessity they mean only certainty. To this statement I reply, 1. It is not correct in point of fact. Calvinists do not attach the simple idea of certainty to necessity — and here I will join particular issue with Dr. Rice whenever he chooses — ^but they do attach to their use of the term necessity the idea of an inevitable effect following a pre- ceding cause. 2. I deny that Calvinists, as a class, have been careful to state that they use it in no such sense. 3. I assert, they cannot, in consistency with their system. 204 APPENDIX. employ it simply in this sense. Dr. Rice cannot sustain his issue. Let him try it. He next proceeds to discuss the doctrine of election. Ho makes his statement of the doctrine ; and, though there is an evident effort to obscure or vail its fiercer features, he admits all that we could desire, to warrant our statement of this point, deduced from other and more distinguished authors. He says, *'What is the doctrine of election? 1. Not that God, from eternity, determined to save any of the human race in their sins, but that he determined to work in a great number to will and to do — to call them, by his word and Spirit, out of darkness into his marvelous light — to sanctify and to save them. 2. Not that he determined to prevent others from repenting and believing in Christ, but simply to pass them by, leaving them to their own free choice. 3. Not that he determined to punish any, without regard to their moral character, but only for their sins. 4. Not that God has not the best reasons for choosing some to life, and passing by others, but that the reasons are not found in the foreseen goodness of the formei', and are not revealed to us. 5. Not that the atonement of Christ -is not, in its nature, sufficient for all, or is not offered to all Avho hear the Gospel, but that he particularly desig^icd by it to redeem to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works'' Every one will admire the prudence and precau- tion, not to say timidity, with which the Doctor has selected his ground. But, in despite of all his pains to cover it up with a lamb's skin, or invest it in a dove's feathers, the claws and teeth of the monster will appear. He does nobly to keep them out of view ; but it is of no avail. After all, it is the same old monster, which the honest Calvin ex- hibited without a covering, labeled election and reprobation, which he admitted himself was most horrible. Election, Dr. Rice says, "is the determination, from eternity, to work in a great number to will and to do — to sanctify and save APPENDIX. 295 them." Of course, their salvation is inevitable, or the de- termination of God must fail. All the consequences charged m my letters follow. But, again : election is the determina- tion, from eternity, ''to pass by" those not elected, "leaving them to their own choice." Of course, if they were passed by, they could not be saved; and, if they could not be saved, they must necessarily and inevitably be damned; and so, again, all the consequences charged in my letters follow. If they are punished simply for their sins, they are punished for what was inevitable to them; because, being passed by, they could not avoid sinning. So the Doctor, notwithstanding all his effort to soften down the asperities of the doctrine, beheves outright in eternal elec- tion and reprobation ; that is, that a certain definite number of the human race were elected, by a determination which cannot fail, to be saved — ^that another definite number were reprobated to be damned, being so passed by, that they could not, by any possibility, avoid damnation. The gen- tleman has committed himself here ; and now, how perfectly ridiculous his former disclaimers, when, by his own state- ment, he is involved in the very worst consequences charged upon him! But, again: election "is not that the atonement is not sufficient for all, but that he particularly designed by it to redeem to himself a peculiar people." Here, again, in defiance of an effort to keep in the dark his beloved tenet of Umited atonement, it will exhibit its deformities. The atonement, though sufficient in itself for all, was not made or designed for any but the peculiar people — the elect; for the residue it was not an atonement, though sufficient to be Df unlimited efficacy — ^it was not hmited in its sufficiency, Dut in the will of God. All the consequences charged in my letters follow. Those for whom it was not designed cannot enjoy it — they are under an eternal necessity to be damned. The gentleman never will state my objections on this point, and attempt to remove them. His policy will be 296 APPENDIX. to Strike at tliem in a general manner, without letting his readers know what they are, and close by telling them that he has entirely met them. Let the reader now remember, that Dr. Rice is convicted upon his own statement — and I defy the gentleman to escape — of beheving and teaching, that, by a determination of God, from eternity, a certain number of men were as- signed to eternal life, and a certain other number to eternal death, in a way that the event must answer the determina- tion : then let him refer to the many objections urged in our letters against him, and it will be seen how dreadful is his system, and how hopelessly he is involved in contradictions, or, as he has unwittingly admitted, on another point, in ah- surdity and hlasphemy. He proceeds, having stated the doctrine of election, as given above, to inquire how far Methodists and Calvinists are agreed upon the subject. Upon this point I find no oc- casion to make any remarks. If they agreed exactly, it would not, in the slightest degree, relieve his system. But though the statement he makes is, to some extent, inaccu- rate, it is so innocent it needs no correction. If he wishes to involve Methodism in the dilemmas which encompass himself, he must strike more severely than this. We have not been able yet even to feel the thrust. When he pre- monished us several times of the "bottled thunder "he had in reservation for us, we began to think, may-be, he had discovered some crevice, or seam, where he would make deadly onset ; but, when the threatened storm bursts, it is but the cooing of the dove! We find no alarm! Twist your cords again. Doctor, and lay on harder, or vre shall not realize that the attack has commenced. Having run the parallel, he next proceeds to take up the objections urged in my letters. For once, he seems really as though he were going to work like a man. He com- mences at objection first; and you would imagine that now APPENDIX. * 297 comes the tug of war; but, lo! without delaying for a moment to make battle, he says, "This objection is based upon the false view of the doctrine of decrees," and, with this masterly blow, flies from it as from the face of pesti- lence. Wliat a Hercules! How masterly this mode of argumentation ! He then takes up objection second ; but here, as he can- not but perceive, the point of the argument is misstated. Our point is this: that persons are elected to salvation, and decreed to damnation, irrespective of any conditions; so that, as an unavoidable consequence, the event of their salvation or damnation is in no sense under their control, but is inevitably fixed, independently of them. They have nothing whatever to do with it, as it was all fixed before they had an existence, and for causes independent of them. Let the gentleman meet this point, and he will meet one point of difficulty. Will he grapple this objection ? If he admits the point I make, he admits that neither sin nor holiness were taken into the account, in the decree of elec- tion and reprobation, unless sin and hohness are inevitable to the subjects of them. If he denies the point, he, by- necessary consequence, admits that the decree proceeded upon foresight, and in consequence of some voluntary act of the creature. The former involves him in all that I charged in my letters — the latter is a desertion of Cal- vinism. He says, "All that our Confession teaches upon the subject is, that God chose to pass thein by, and punish them for their sins." This is all we ask to justify all the objections we have urged — this is unconditional reproba- tion enough for us; and the gentleman will struggle till doomsday to escape, and struggle in vain. Hear his feeble attempt to sustain this position. I give it because it re- sembles the forms of an argument, and looks as if he had not forgotten that there is such a thing as reasoning. "Now, was it unjust to pass them by, and not renew 298 » APPENDIX. their hearts? If so, God is bound to offer salvation to men, and to exert upon them divine influence to induce them to accept it; and then the whole plan is simply a matter of justice, and not of grace toward men. If not, who has the right to object to it as unjust?" This is a refreshing specimen, I say> because it looks as though the gentleman had some respect to rules of reasoning. But, upon examination, it will appear that his logic is about as objectionable as his theology. In the first place, the premise does not contain the issue. It is not pretended in our letters that it is unjust "to pass them by> and not renew their hearts;'' but this is the point where injustice is charged — the jMSsinff men hy, and leaving them ifi a state in which it is impossible for them to have their hearts renewed, and then damning them for not performing the impossibility. This correction of the premises being made, the "if so/' and "if not," of course, are not legitimate, ^nd the at- tempted argument falls to the ground. The plan of sal- vation is not a scheme of mere justice, and such a conse- quence cannot be shown to result from the premises ; but if it is not a plan of mere justice, so neither is it contrary to justice — it is a scheme of mercy in harmony with justice. The plan of Calvinists, as is abundantly shown, is neither a plan of justice nor mercy, but is alike cruel and unjust. Take another specimen of logic. I do not wonder that the gentleman is on bad terms with logic ! I think it is on no better terms with him ! He says, " Again : either the finally impenitent will deserve eternal punishment for then* sins, or they will not. If not, the penalty of God's law, which will be executed upon them, is unjust; if so, Mr. Foster rep- resents it as horrible that God should do what is perfectly just." What is this argument intended and competent to prove? This : that the final destruction of the impenitent will be perfectly just. Who has ever questioned this ? No Arminian. Not a word in my letters. On the contrary, APPENDIX. 299 1 contend that the damnation of the finally impenitent will be perfectly just; and, because it will, I contend that Calvinism is totally false. The gentleman supplies me with a premise which overthrows his system. Here is my argu- ment : the damnation of the finally impenitent is perfectly just. But if that damnation were for a cause over which the subject of it had no possible control, then it would be unjust; for it would be damnation for not performing an impossibility. But Calvinism teaches that the sinner's damnation is for sins which he had no power to avoid; hence, that it is unjust. Therefore, Calvinism is false, because it makes the sinner's damnation unjust. Doctor, try your hand on this logic : see how it suits you. He next takes up my third objection, " that the doctrine makes God a partial being, and destroys entirely the foun- dation for the doctrine of grace;" and he absolutely/ refers to my letter! He says, "See Letter VHI!" but where shall his readers find it ? He is too shrewd to show them any part of it ! He never would have told them to see it, only he knew that most of them could not, and that his reference would seem to imply a willingness on his part, if it were possible — a show of confidence. To the objec- tion, that his doctrine makes God a partial being, ne attempts an answer, by giving AValker's definition of par- tial: "A partial being is one who is inclined to favor one party or person above another without reason." He denies that God favors one above another without a rea- 6on. My readers must judge of this themselves, see- ing what the system actually teaches, namely, that God viewed all men as sinners, without a particle of difference between them — in all respects exactly alike; and thus beholding them, he chose A., B., C, and D. to eternal life, and consigned E., F., G., and H. to an eternal hell. Now, if this does not imply partiality, then I admit Cal- vinism does not make God partial — he has not favored 300 ' APPENDIX. one person above another without reasons, such as acquit him from partiahty — he has been equally kind to all. It is a plain case : you will judge for yourselves. He next attempts to show that the difficulty lies against Methodism. Noav, if he could sustain this, he does not help his own case; and his attempt shows evidence of conscious weakness. He denies that his creed shows par- tiality in God. He then endeavors to show that Meth- odism is as liable as himself; but what he charges to Methodism he believes, and much more : how then can he pretend that Methodism is guilty, when he assumes that he is not ? But his attempt to involve Methodism in this, as in the former case, is fruitless. The particular in his creed, on which we base the charge of partiality, Meth- odists do not believe. If the charge lays against it justly, it does not lay against Methodists, for Methodists do not embrace it. If there are other things which the Metho- dists do believe, in common with Calvinists, against which the charge of partiality justly lays, then my objection is still true, for the Calvinists are guilty with the Methodists. But I defy the gentleman to sustain the charge against Methodism, even in common with himself — ^much more do I defy him to escape the odium of the charge, as bearing specially against the doctrine of Calvinian election and reprobation. The gentleman asks, in view of the fact admitted by all, that there is a manifest difference in the condition of men and nations, "How great a difference may God make before he is chargeable with partiahty?" He asks this question as though he thought it would be difficult to answer, and as if it bore more upon others than himself. I will answer it for him. God, as an impartial being, is bound to deal with all men upon the same great, immutable principles of wisdom, goodness, and justice — never to deal unwisely, unkindly, or unjustly by any one — not to be influenced by one set of principles toward one, APPENDIX. 301 and another set toward another. If the gentleman will show that such is not the fact, he will show that God is a partial being. I have shown that his system teaches that such is not the fact, and, hence, that it is liable to the charge of making God partial. . If he will show any thing in Methodism that renders us liable, he will involve us, together with himself, but will not relieve himself in the slightest degree. The point for Dr. Rice, at present, is either to admit the truth of my charge or escape from it. But he never will do either. I could wish, for the sake of Dr. Rice's reputation, and the edification of our readers, that he would, in a more sturdy manner, meet arguments ; but I suppose this is like requiring impossibilities, and I must not do this. The char- acter of his replies must explain the style of my rejoinders. NUMBER VIII. In the first part of this letter, the Doctor continues to urge that Methodists are not free from difficulties on the subject of election. To this I paid sufficient attention in my last letter, as it forms no part of the present issue. Indeed, as yet I see no occasion to vindicate our views upon this subject— his remarks are so perfectly harmless. When we see Methodism trembling under potent assault, we might even turn aside from the point in debate to defend it; but w^e cannot be decoyed without something more serious than has yet been submitted. Our apprehensions are yet all asleep. The Doctor continues: "Mr. Foster, in his ninth letter, presses with great earnestness the objection, that the doc- trine of election is inconsistent with all those passages of Scripture which teach that Christ died for all men. Now, he ought to know that the word for, like all other preposi- tions, has a number of meanings. What, then, does he mean, when he affirms that Christ died for all men? Does he mean, simply, that the atonement made by Christ is 302 APPENDIX. sufficient to save all men, if they would believe? If so, we heartily agree with him. Does he mean that God de- signed freely to offer salvation to all men, without distinc- tion, through the atonement ? If so, we have no controversy with him." To the above interrogations, abating the word simply, as it occurs in them, I will answer, yes. We believe that, in this sense, Christ died for all. But we believe more than this. But, as our faith is, not the matter in controversy, we need not name it. It is known of all men ; it has no equivocations; it ^ simple and one. We are under no necessity to resort to far-fetched explanations to protect it, or make it understood. But I shall now show you what difficulty he has involved himself in by his ad- missions. He states just what I stated for him, in my regular letter on this point; and all the difficulties there named bear against him, and I defy the gentleman to escape them. Corroborating the statement above, and im- mediately following it, he says: "The Calvinistic doctrine of election is, 1. The atonement of Christ is of infinite value. 2 . Salvation, through Christ, is freely offered to all." He admits these two propositions. But, now, mark : lie believes, 3. That Christ died only for the elect, in the eternal purpose of God — in other words, that his death was limited, in the design of God, to a part of mankind, and did not extend to the rest, in such a sense as to make their salvation possible under the circumstances. I def}' the gentleman to deny this statement. He dares not do it He dares not say that Christ died for all men in such manner, all the circumstances included, as to make their salvation possible. Will he come out here? Here is the precise point where we call upon him for light. But, now, mark the difficulties resulting from his admis- sions. " He believes that the atonement is of infinite value, sufficient for all, if they would believe," What does the gentleman mean, when he says the atonement is of infinite APPENDIX. 303 value — is sufficient for all? Does he mean that it was sufficient to remove all the hinderances in the way of tho salvation of all ? — that it was competent to save all ? Then the question arises, why does it not save all? The gentle- man must answer, because it was not desicfned for all ; the limitation, then, is in the design of God. Is this so? then the damnation of some arises purely from the sovereign design, or will of God, that they should be damned. Look at this. There was a sufficient atonement for all ; nothing more was necessary. But God, of his own will, limited what was sufficient for all to a part. Is it withheld from any? it is because it is the will of God. Are they con-^ sequently damned? it is because it is the will of God. But, again: what does he mean when he says, "if they would believe?" Does he know and teach that they cannot believe, because Christ did not die for them ? Wh}^, then, does he speak of faith in them as possible, "if they would believe," when he knows they cannot? That very want of faith is, according to his creed, the proof that Christ did not die for them. His death was sufficient, but it never was intended for them; God limited it to these, not to them. It was no more possible to the reprobates than to the devils; it was no more an atonement for them, than it was for the devils. Now, Dr. Rice, no dodging here. If you have the courage, come out and meet this point can- didly, and in such a way, as to show where you stand. Sir, at the risk of being called immodest, I say, you will not dare to defend your ground here. You cannot escape by an old trick — and it is well to remind you of it — by saying that they are not saved because of unbelief. For, accord- ing to your system, the very reason why they do not believe, is, Christ did not die for them. Their unbelief is an effect of the previous cause, that they were not atoned for — the first cause why they are not saved is the want of an atone- ment for them. J?04 APPENDIX. And now, sir, we come to the second point: "Salvation is freelj offered to all who hear the Gospel." You believe all are invited to come to Christ. I ask, how they can be invited to come, when Christ did not die for them; you answer, "All may come, and all are, therefore, invited." Now, here, again, I urge you, by your love of truth and consistency, to meet this point openly and fairly. You say that "all are invited to come to Christ, because all may come." Dr. Rice, hear me patiently, when I say you do not believe this proposition ; you cannot; you have imposed upon yourself. In your zeal to reconcile your creed with the Scriptures which antagonize it, you have overstepped yourself — not intentionally, but certainly. This will appear to yourself, if you will attempt to answer to yourself — and I should like for you to answer them to the public — a few questions. Is it possible for all men to come to Christ and be saved? If you answer, yes, then it must be possible for all men to have the will to come; for no man can come without the will, and if any cannot have the will to come, they cannot come. But you do not believe it possi- ble for all to have the will to come, unless you believe that it is possible for some to have a will different from that which they actually have, under the circumstances, which you know is not your faith. But, again : do you not believe thatj though the atonement is sufficient for all in itself, yet that it is limited, in the design of God, to a part — and that another part are passed by, to whom it is not purposed to be applied ? To this you must answer, yes. Well, if it is limited, in the design of God, to a part, can those to whom it is not extended ever enjoy it ? If you say, yes, then the design of God must change or fail. If you say, no, then you admit they cannot come. But, again: do you not believe that the atonement is sovereignly applied to those for whom it was made, before t\\Qj can come to Christ, m their regeneration? You must answer, yes. Well, then, APPENDIX. 305 can those to whom it is not thus applied come to him ? If you say, yes, you say a man may turn himself to God and be saved; if you say, no, you say that none but those tc whom it is sovereignly applied can come. But, again : some of the human race will finally be lost. Do you believe that those persons, who will so be lost, ever had the power to come to Christ and be saved, undei the circumstances and influences in which they were placed ? If you answer, yes, then you admit that their salvation was in their own power, and might have been achieved by their own exertions. If you answer, no, you admit that these persons never could come to Christ. But, again: you believe that a definite number of the human race were elected unto everlasting life, and a definite number not elected. Now, answer me this question: do you believe that any but the elect can be saved? You must answer me, no or yes. If yes, then a man may be saved whom God passed by, and never chose to be saved ; if no, then those passed by could not, cannot, come to Christ, to be saved ; the thing is impossible. If you still say the thing is impossible, because of the will, I charge you, as you dread to mislead and deceive the ignorant, that you say, at the same time, that the will to come is not possible to the creature unless it is given ; and it is only given to those for whom Christ died, and, there- fore, that those who have not the will, have it not because Christ did not die for them. Sir, you know, that those for whom Christ did not die, m the 2'>urpose of God, cannot come to him. How, then, I ask you, in the name of all that a Christian, above all, a Christian minister, should hold dear — how can you say you invite them, because they may come? There is a feast spread for a thousand guests, but is designed for only five hundred particular persons: it is impossible that any others should come. These five hundred are vonder, in au 26 306 APPENDIX. assemblage of a thousand. Now, how can the master of the feast send his servant to mvite the thousand, without the charge of insincerity ? Again : suppose that, of the one thousand, the five hundred for whom the feast is not in- tended are chained, so that they cannot move until the master of the feast unloose them — ^how can they be invited to come without sheer mockery? The cases are precisely analogous if you add, that, for not complying with the base, heartless invitation, those who refuse are to be doomed to nameless tortures! But if Christ did not die for all, why are reprobates commanded lo beheve? Dr. Rice undertakes to answer this question He says, " Because it is their duty to be- lieve." Let us look at this. What is it that is required of the reprobates ? To believe on Jesus Christ, in order to salvation. This, Dr. Rice says, is their duty. Now, if Jesus Christ did not, in the design of God, die for these persons, which Dr. Rice contends is the fact, then it is cer- tain he is not their Savior — he has no salvation for them. If he has, it is contrary to the design of God ; but if he has not, then. Dr. Rice says, it is the duty of reprobates to believe a lie ; and, for not believing a lie, they are damned ! Will the gentleman inform us how he escapes this ? But, further, if it is the duty of reprobates to believe in Christ, they either can believe, or they cannot. If they can, they may come to Christ ; and they will be either saved or not. If they will be saved, they will be saved by beheving a he, and by a Savior who never died for them ; if not, they will faisify Dr. Rice's creed and the Scriptures, which equally teach that whosoever believeth shall be saved ! Will the Doctor help us here ? If they are not able to beheve in Christ, and yet it is made their duty to believe in hun, then it is made their duty to do an impossibiUty ; and if they are damned for not performing their duty, they are damned for not doing an impossibility ! APPENDIX. 307 What a most remarkable sentence is the following, to come from the pen of Dr. Rice ! " Since salvation is freely offered to all, and all are free to accept or reject it, there is no inconsistency in inviting all, and no injustice in the con- demnation of those who abide in unbelief." Look at this. If salvation is freely offered to all, and if Christ did not die for all, then salvation is freely offered to some for whom there is no salvation, or else there is salvation for some for whom Christ did not die ! What an offer is this ! Is it not hypocritical and empty ? Can it be any thing else ? And who makes it? The God worshiped by Dr. Rice! But, again: are all free to accept it? Then are some free to accept what has no existence! What absurdities beset this most miserable system at every point! When will Dr. Rice extricate himself from the diflBculties he has thus invested himself with ? Never ! He will not try — he knows the thing is impossible! But this comes of his fruitless effort so far. It is now proved by himself, that my statements of his creed were true and correct, and that the difficulties alledged are insuperable. The Doctor proceeds to state, in his bland and Christian manner, that " a more outrageous misrepresentation of Calvinism was never made — more glaring injustice to authors was never done. Our business has been that of correction much more than argument ; for the correction of misrepresentations is the best answer to arguments founded upon them." Now, to this statement I find but one objec- tion. Its style and spirit, of course, are unobjectionable! Shall I say commendable ? The objection I make is this : it is quite a small matter — it only relates to one word — ^the Doctor, I think, will admit it, and then it will be a fine paragraph. Let him strike out the word correction, and substitute assertion; then it will be perfect. It will read, " My business has been that of assertion much more than argument." That is true, Doctor. No one who has been at 308 APPENDIX. the pains to read your singular replies, will doubt it for a moment. But as for con-ections, I have yet to find a single one. I defy you, sir, to name it. You have rej)eatedly asserted that I misrepresented you, but, sir, you have nci. corrected one of my statements; unless you consider your assertions corrections ! I suppose this is your meaning. In closing up this volume, I cannot avoid expressing astonishment, that Calvinism should find favor and ad- vocacy with wise and good men. It is most strange that it should be so. No system is so encompassed with serious difficulties. It is not less beset with contradictions than Atheism itself. It is less defensible than Deism or Univer- salism. Bhnd, universal skepticism would be a refuge to reason and religion compared with it. Let it be under- stood, we now speak of Calvinism proper — not of the systems of faith in which it is included — not of the com- munities embracing it. Calvinism, in the creeds of the various Churches entertaining it, is surrounded with many wholesome and saving truths — with, indeed, whatever is essential to be believed ; but itself is an unmitigated blotch. This is the reason why an effort is always made by its advocates to disguise it — to explain it away — to mystify it. This is the reason why it is reserved for special occasions — why it is kept for the study, not for the pulpit — why, when persons become troubled on account of it, they are told th'i it is not a suitable subject for them to seek to understand — ^why it is not made a condition of member- ship in the Church — why, in a word, it has been debated by its defenders whether or not it ought to be preached. This is the reason why Dr. Rice has been so anxious to escape from its examination — why he has perpetually de- claimed about our misrepresentation — why he has avoided to discuss the case upon its merits. He knows full well it will not bear the light — that it can only be kept in countenance by keeping the deceptive cover on it — that APPENDIX. 309 to stacc it is to damn it. Hence his fruitless attempt at defense. His abilities — great, confessedly — liave failed him in the support of such a cause. The cause has put him to shame. It has been no pleasure, but, on the contrary, extremely painful to me, to make the plain statements contained in the foregoing pages. Nothing but a provocation, which it would have been unchristian to endure longer, could have induced it — unchristian, because truth and righteous- ness were suffering, and likely to suffer more by silence. We would have been content to let this controversy slum- ber for ever, leaving truth to work out error by a peaceable process, which it was doing> rather than to have caused pain to a single disciple of Christ — ^much more, rather than to involve two large Christian bodies in unpleasant conflict. We were willing for our friends to hold their opinions, though we believed them erroneous, rather than to insult and wound them, and provoke unkind feelings between those who ought to be friends, leaving time and progress to correct them. But nothing would do but controversy. We, therefore, reluctantly yielded to the necessity. We have spoken plainly, that we might be understood, and sometimes, it would seem, severely; but God is our wit- ness, we have not intended to be unkind — we do not feel it in our hearts. We do not call in question the piety of our opponents. They hold much truth. Many of them have been, in the Church, high and shining lights. But as the sun may have its spots, and yet be brilliant, so may the wise and good err in judgment. We love the Pres- byterian Church, and will still try to love it, and the reverend Doctor with whom we have been engaged, just as well as though nothing had passed. We believe them in error, and have given our reasons; but we claim no infaUibility — we dogmatize our opinions upon nobody — they are uttered only in self-defense, and 810 APPENDIX. in defense of what we believe to be truth. Our readers will judge for themselves of the merits of the perform- ance. And, now, may God bless our humble endeavors to do good, and bring both writer and reader to that world, where we shall see as we are seen, and know as we are known! Amen. THB SND. Date Due S '• - . V. / 1 i.i«w*«»*^ f ^ , K^V<''»^ * JUN3I I2t50!' MAY 8 ?on4 i ^Ris; !00S i ^ • Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer 1 1012 01002 9397