.w^' 
 
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 BL 2759 .S53 1907 
 Sheldon, Henry C. 1845-1928 
 Unbelief in the nineteenth 
 century 
 
Other Works by the Same Author: 
 
 HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE— Two volumes. 
 Octavo. Per set ^3.50. 
 
 SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. Octavo, $2.50. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH— Five vol- 
 umes. Cloth. Per volume ^2.00. 
 
UNBELIEF 
 
 ^^ OF mfjci> 
 16 1942 
 
 IN THE 
 
 NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
 A CRITICAL HISTORY 
 
 BY 
 
 HENRY C. SHELDON 
 
 Professor in Boston University 
 
 NEW YORK: EATON & MAINS 
 CINCINNATI : JENNINGS & GRAHAM 
 
Copyright, 1907, by 
 EATON & MAINS. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 PART I 
 
 Philosophical Theories 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Radical Idealism 
 section page 
 
 I. Kantian Antecedents 1 1 
 
 II. Grounds of a Favorable Estimate of the Post- 
 Kantian Idealism i6 
 
 III. Questionable Points in Fichte's Thinking 23 
 
 IV. Schelling's Philosophy, Especially in its Middle 
 
 Stage 28 
 
 V. The System of Hegel 32 
 
 VI. Tendencies Derived from the Post-Kantian Ideal- 
 ism 40 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 Radical Sensationalism and Materialism 
 
 I. The Sensational Psychology — Its Leading Represen- 
 
 tatives and its Distinguishing Features 42 
 
 II. Failure of the Sensational Psychology 48 
 
 III. A Question as to the Genuine Representatives of 
 
 Materialism 54 
 
 IV. Cardinal Conclusions of Materialism 64 
 
 V. Shortcomings of the Materialistic Theory 69 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 Positivism 
 
 I. The Positivism of Comte 78 
 
 il. Representatives of Positivism in Germany and 
 
 England 91 
 
 V 
 
vi CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 Agnostic and Antitheistic Evolutionism 
 
 section page 
 
 I. Herbert Spencer's Evolutionary Philosophy 96 
 
 II. Comments on the Spencerian System 108 
 
 III. Features of Haeckel's Evolutionism 119 
 
 IV. Recent Teachings More or Less Affiliated with 
 
 Agnostic or Antitheistic Premises 123 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 Pessimism 
 
 I. The Teaching of Schopenhauer 135 
 
 II. Von Hartmann and Other Advocates of Pessimism. 144 
 
 PART II 
 Quasi-Scientific, Theological, and Ethical Theories 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 The Challenging of the Supernatural 
 
 I. The Different Forms op the Challenge 153 
 
 II. Examination op the Grounds of the Challenge. . . . 167 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 The Denial of the Finality of Christianity 
 
 I. Free Religion 181 
 
 II. Theosophy and Kindred Mysticisms 188 
 
 III. Secularism and Ethical Culture 204 
 
 IV. A Word on the Superior Claims of Christianity 215 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 Denial of the Transcendent Sonship of Jesus Christ 
 
 I. The Principal Instances of Denial 227 
 
 II. The Denial in the Light of New Testament Attes- 
 tations 236 
 
CONTENTS vii 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Utilitarian and Naturalistic Ethics 
 SECTION page 
 
 I. Specimen Theories 241 
 
 II. Points of Failure in the Theories 253 
 
 PART III 
 Critical Theories 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Criticism of the Gospel History by Strauss 
 
 I. Assumptions and Conclusions of Strauss 263 
 
 II. Grounds of Exception to the Criticism of Strauss. 275 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 Criticism of the New Testament by Baur 
 
 I. Main Contentions of Baur 282 
 
 II. Arbitrary and Extravagant Features in Baur's 
 
 Criticism 291 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 Critical Reconstruction of the Life of Jesus by 
 Renan and Others 
 
 I. Renan's Vie de Jesus 298 
 
 II. Schenkel's Sketch of the Character of Jesus 313 
 
 III. Keim's History of Jesus .... 317 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Elements of Radicalism in the Recent Criticism 
 OF the Old Testament 
 I. Views Relative to the Stories of the Patriarchs. . 324 
 II. Estimates of Moses as Leader and Lawgiver 334 
 
 III. Judgments on Prophecy 342 
 
 IV. Conclusions Respecting the Significance of the 
 
 Old Testament Revelation in General 353 
 
viii CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 Elements of Radicalism in the Recent Criticism 
 
 OF THE New Testament 
 
 section page 
 
 I. Denial of the Supernatural Conception 362 
 
 II. Unfriendly Treatment of the Gospel History.... 372 
 
 III. The Elimination of Pauline Authorship 377 
 
 Conclusion 387 
 
 Index 395 
 
PREFACE 
 
 Compact and accurate exposition was the first end kept 
 in view in the preparation of this treatise. Criticism of 
 the different forms of unbehef was the second end. The 
 author would express the hope that he has not been 
 greatly at fault as respects observing a proper balance 
 between these two ends. 
 
 Boston University, February, 1907. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Complete self-consistency is not to be expected in 
 the average man, or even in the superior man. Fini- 
 tude implies limitation of vision, and the imperfect out- 
 look is likely to effect a wryness in the judgment. Thus 
 it may come about that an unbelieving head should be 
 yoked with a believing heart, a mutilated creed be asso- 
 ciated with unreserved committal to known truth. 
 Doubtless the sound disposition is favorable to the sound 
 belief, and in the long run works for its ascendency. But 
 in the case of the individual, as he is found at a particular 
 epoch, the harmonious adjustment may fail to appear. 
 The same person who gives place to a very considerable 
 measure of intellectual skepticism may be liberally 
 endowed with the ethico-religious temper of faith. In 
 spite of the negations to which he subscribes in theory, 
 he may be intent to discover the highest ideals and culti- 
 vate a habit of hearty surrender to them. And herein 
 lies the very essence of faith as a principle of personal 
 worth. No man who is bent upon knowing the highest 
 and the best, and who unites himself with it, so far as 
 discovered, in affectionate loyalty and self-devotement, 
 is practically an unbeliever. 
 
 In the light of the above discrimination it will be 
 readily understood that it is quite foreign to this volume 
 to pas3 judgment upon persons. The volume deals with 
 unbelief taken purely in the theoretic or intellectual 
 sense. There is no intention to render a decision respect- 
 ing the practical unbelief of any person or party. Indeed, 
 
2 INTRODUCTION 
 
 it is freely admitted that not a few of those who, on the 
 score of their opinions, are made to represent one or 
 another phase of unbehef may have been, in the practical 
 or ethico-religious sense, very stanch behevers, and 
 entitled in this respect to outrank many whose reputation 
 for orthodoxy is unblemished. 
 
 II 
 
 That the theme in hand should be treated in an objec- 
 tive manner is quite obvious. At the same time the 
 nature of the theme makes it difficult to exclude a subjec- 
 tive element. What is to be embraced in unbelief can be 
 determined only by reference to a standard, and there is 
 no standard available in which the personal standpoint, 
 the element of individual faith, does not enter. The 
 absolute standard, fixed and indubitable, untouched by 
 personal prejudice or preference, has never been num- 
 bered among the possessions of men. Granting that it 
 exists in the intellectual and ethical nature of God, we 
 have nevertheless to look for guarantees that it has been 
 made available in its pure objectivity for human use. 
 And who can furnish such guarantees? Who can point 
 to the standard and say, "There it is, entire, faultless, 
 accessible"? We have before us, it is true, the biblical 
 revelation. But the presence of this revelation affords 
 no sure pledge of entire release from the bonds of sub- 
 jectivity. Even if it be supposed — a thing beyond the 
 range of possible demonstration — that no one of the 
 biblical writers mingled aught of his own individual 
 thought or feeling with the divine message, it still 
 remains true that our possession of the biblical contents 
 must measure our competency to use them as a standard, 
 and that possession in our case is conditioned by our 
 intellectual and religious development. So long as we 
 
INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 keep clear of dogmatic frenzy, and are sane enough to 
 recognize our indubitable limitations, we must confess 
 that we cannot bring the opinions of our fellows to the 
 judgment seat of an absolute standard, but must estimate 
 them by a standard in which our individual point of 
 view is more or less of a factor. 
 
 It follows that in developing the present theme the 
 reasonable requirement is simply the reduction of the 
 subjective factor to the lowest terms that are practicable. 
 And by what is practicable is meant, in this connection, 
 that which may have place within the limits of conformity 
 to the requirements of essential Christianity. In a treatise 
 which is written professedly from the Christian standpoint 
 unbelief naturally will not be judged by a less exacting 
 standard than the essential content of the Christian sys- 
 tem. Accordingly, the reduction of subjectivity to the 
 lowest practicable terms implies simply the use of proper 
 caution against reckoning into the essential content of 
 Christianity any items of a merely personal faith. Just 
 what a wise caution will permit to be included in this 
 content will doubtless be a subject for varied opinions. 
 To the writer it seems evident that nothing should be 
 included which is not easily to be derived from the 
 Scriptures by a fair exegesis, and for which also a clear 
 support is not provided in the general consensus of 
 Christian scholarship. We say general consensus, for a 
 demand for strict unanimity would be exorbitant in 
 a world which has never yet shown itself to be proof 
 against eccentricities. Applying now the double test 
 just stated, we are under compulsion, in the first place, 
 to reckon as a part of the essential Christian content a 
 stanch theistic conception, that conception in which the 
 ultimate reality is presented as thoroughly personal. 
 Authentic Christianity knows nothing of a supra-per- 
 
4 INTRODUCTION 
 
 sonal God. The supra-personal, in its view, is an ill- 
 chosen name for the infra-personal. It regards person- 
 ality as the highest category, and will not consent to take 
 up with any substitute for the God who, as intelligent and 
 free, can create a kingdom of intelligent and free beings, 
 and provide for their beatification in true fellowship 
 with himself. In the second place, we are under com- 
 pulsion to include in the essential Christian content the 
 truth that Jesus Christ was a transcendent personality, 
 and came into the world to fulfill an extraordinary 
 mediatorial office. In construing Christ's person and in 
 interpreting his mediatorial work, it may not be neces- 
 sary to insist upon a clear-cut, exclusive theory. But 
 both the extraordinary personality and the extraordinary 
 work are of vital importance. Preeminence and finality 
 belong to Christianity precisely on the ground that he in 
 whom it centers was fitted, in virtue of his extraordinary 
 personality and office, to be the perfect bearer of the 
 truth and grace of God; and, of course, real faith in 
 Christianity cannot claim anything less for this reli- 
 gion than preeminence and finality. In the third place, 
 we are under constraint to locate within the essential 
 Christian content such a view of man as is consonant 
 with his dignity as a subject of moral rule, as a servant 
 and a son of the Most High, and as a candidate for the 
 pure blessedness and high fellowships of an immortal 
 life. Any theory which makes man simply a part of a 
 cosmic mechanism, a mere link in a chain of causes 
 operating according to the law of mechanical necessity, 
 abolishes the subject which Christianity contemplates. 
 From first to last it requires that man should be defined 
 as a free personality, dowered with essential aptitudes 
 for morality and religion. 
 
 With this essential content of Christianity, which can- 
 
INTRODUCTION 5 
 
 not be denied without exposure to a legitimate charge 
 of unbeHef, is to be associated the claim that the content 
 in its full compass has received a credible historic attesta- 
 tion. Christianity is not a name for a purely speculative 
 system or a body of ideal truth. It assumes to be an 
 historical religion, to rest upon a basis of ascertained 
 facts. A contrary assumption would involve a manifest 
 incongruity, a contradiction to the fundamental Christian 
 postulate as to the ultimate reality. Given a God who 
 stands to men in the relation of a Supreme Father, and 
 it inevitably follows that he must reveal himself. What 
 kind of a father would he be who would not show himself 
 to his children, or to those having an inborn capacity to 
 become in spirit his children? God's fatherhood toward 
 men implies revelation to men. Human history under 
 the superintendence of the Divine Father could not be 
 left to run a meaningless course. The clearest demands 
 of fitness require that it should be utilized to disclose the 
 Father to the dim vision of men, and to lift them up to 
 the realization of their filial privilege. Had Christianity 
 postulated a merely transcendent God, a being dwelling 
 apart in lofty indifference, it would not be so clearly 
 committed to the idea of an historic revelation. With 
 its actual theistic content it is under rational compulsion 
 to assume that by the divine ordination an ofiice of revela- 
 tion is fulfilled in the unfoldments of human history. 
 Theoretically this history in its entirety might serve 
 as a medium of revelation; and doubtless within limits 
 it does fulfill that office. But, inasmuch as Jesus Christ 
 in his extraordinary personality and mediatorial work 
 is central to the Christian system, from the point of 
 view of that system revelation must be regarded as hav- 
 ing its crown or focus in him. And here is the consider- 
 ation which justifies the claim of a certain primacy for 
 
6 INTRODUCTION 
 
 the Bible. It is the most authentic record of the revela- 
 tion leading up to and culminating in Jesus Christ. As 
 such it fulfills a special function in mirroring the truths 
 which are of the highest ethical and religious import. It 
 has authority as being on the whole a trustworthy com- 
 pendium of these truths. This, rather than the question 
 of the precise quality of the inspiration of its authors, 
 is the vital consideration. If, when taken in its trend 
 and outcome, the Bible conveys to us a trustworthy wit- 
 ness on the essential content of the true religion, it is a 
 worthy instrument of divine providence, and fulfills as 
 high an office as could properly be asked of a sacred 
 literature. Christian theologians, it is true, have often 
 gone further, and claimed a detailed infallibility for the 
 Bible. But the defense of so adventurous a theory 
 involves a very troublesome task, and with the advance 
 of scholarship becomes more and more a matter of 
 despair. Least of all is there any propriety in using such 
 a theory as a test of the Christian character of opinions. 
 It is enough to claim that the Bible in its trend and out- 
 come affords to the candid and intelligent inquirer trust- 
 worthy means of ascertaining the essential content of the 
 true religion. Accordingly, in the following pages only 
 those critical theories which seem to contradict or to 
 compromise this office of the Bible will be treated as 
 belonging to the sphere of unbelief. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The disposition of the subject-matter into three parts 
 has been adopted on the score of general convenience 
 rather than of strict logical propriety. Some of the items 
 reserved for the second part might, without breach of 
 consistent terminology, have been considered in the first 
 part. It seemed desirable, however, to treat of them 
 
INTRODUCTION 7 
 
 aside from specific connection with the historical sys- 
 tems which are dwelt upon in that part. In relation to 
 the terms used in the title of the third division, it only 
 needs to be said that under "critical theories" are included 
 various products of the historico-critical study of the 
 Bible. 
 
 IV 
 
 A due regard to the demands of economy will, of 
 course, forbid a detailed description of each of several 
 forms of unbelief, which, however distinct a place they 
 may appear to have had in the historical evolution, are 
 very nearly identical in substance. The same demands, 
 as also the fitness of things, will exclude reference to 
 manifestations of unbelief which have had no basis in 
 scholarly industry or acquisitions, and which seem to 
 have been thrust into the face of the public mainly for 
 the purpose of gratifying an intemperate appetite for 
 notoriety. Even to manifestations of unbelief which 
 have come from men of masterful scholarship it will not 
 always be appropriate to render any large consideration. 
 An expert in a particular branch of scientific study may 
 have some competency in the domain of philosophy or 
 of theology; and again he may be signally incompetent 
 to pass upon the great questions of those domains. His 
 just reputation, therefore, in his special branch is not 
 to be taken as in itself a valid recommendation of 
 opinions which he may choose to utter on philosophical 
 or theological themes. These opinions may be wise 
 and profound, but there is a liability of their being 
 venturesome and superficial. A species of fraud, or at 
 least of unwitting deception, takes place when expert 
 scholarship is allowed to give prestige to judgments 
 which fall quite outside the province of that scholarship. 
 
PART I 
 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 RADICAL IDEALISM 
 
 I. — Kantian Antecedents 
 
 The idealistic philosophizing of the early part of the 
 nineteenth century owed so much of incentive and direc- 
 tion to Kantian points of view that it becomes fitting, 
 before bringing it under examination, to notice briefly the 
 more characteristic features of Kant's system. 
 
 1. A fundamental postulate of the system is the activity 
 of the mind, its real agency or determining efficiency in 
 the processes of cognition. The mind, according to Kant, 
 is far from being like a sheet of blank paper which merely 
 takes the record which may be inscribed upon it by an 
 exterior power. No more is it like an empty vessel which 
 is simply receptive of a content that may be poured into 
 it. So far from being the passive subject of impres- 
 sions, the mind by its own intrinsic energy reacts upon 
 impressions and supplies from itself necessary factors in 
 rational experience. 
 
 2. The activity of the mind proceeds according to 
 certain constitutional aptitudes or necessities. By virtue 
 of this constitutional outfit the mind is able to organize 
 the data which are supplied through sense impressions 
 and to find in a particular order of impressions a par- 
 ticular meaning. Its constitution is not evolved out of 
 experience, but it has the experience of a cognitive being 
 because of its possession from the start of a constitution. 
 In other words, the mind as such is dowered with a priori 
 forms. It construes reality by applying to it a series of 
 
12 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 categories, such as unity, plurality, causality, existence, 
 possibility, and necessity. Temporally considered, these 
 a priori forms are not indeed antecedent to experience, 
 but logically they are prior to experience and serve as 
 its condition. 
 
 3. The a priori forms which belong to the mind, as 
 being simply subjective forms, cannot by themselves 
 serve as an adequate ground for deducing a system of 
 reality. Any structure that could be formed out of them 
 would be purely ideal, and no guarantee could be afforded 
 of its correspondence with aught in the sphere of the 
 actual. Knowledge of the real comes only with the pre- 
 sentation of objects. While the objects can gain no 
 intelligible presentation without the a priori forms of 
 intuition and thought, the forms are empty without the 
 objects. Even with the conjunction of the two only a 
 limited knowledge is guaranteed. For just one class of 
 objects is presented, namely, appearances or phenomena. 
 The noumena, the things-in-themselves, the substantial 
 entities back of appearances, are inaccessible to us. They 
 lie beyond the range of cognition. They are not defined 
 to us by the categories, for these, as being subjective 
 forms, cannot be assumed to have any objective validity. 
 It seems, therefore, that our knowledge is confined within 
 rather narrow limits ; that, in fact, we are debarred from 
 confident assertion even on such important matters as 
 the substantial being of the soul and the existence of God 
 as Supreme Person. At least, on the basis of purely 
 intellectual or theoretical procedure, which in its infer- 
 ences pays strict deference to the causal relation, we have 
 no clear means of passing beyond the province of the 
 phenomenal. 
 
 4. The limited results of intellectual procedure do not 
 by any means consign us to a blank agnosticism. Man 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 13 
 
 is not simply intellect; he is, above all, a moral agent. 
 Deeply inbedded in his moral nature there is an all-com- 
 prehending law of duty, a categorical imperative, which 
 requires him so to act that the maxim of his will can 
 serve at the same time as a principle of universal legis- 
 lation. In the presence of this great law, which it is 
 impossible for him to challenge, he is under compulsion 
 to infer his freedom, his immortality, and his relation 
 to a personal God. This inference may partake of the 
 nature of faith, as opposed to strict knowledge; but the 
 faith is rational and warranted, and thus has the prac- 
 tical worth of knowledge. In the exercise of this rational 
 faith man passes beyond the bounds of the phenomenal 
 in which he seemed to be inclosed, and secures a good 
 degree of certitude respecting the substantial existence 
 of finite spirits and of God as the intelligent ruler over 
 all. 
 
 5. Man's highest dignity lies in the recognition and the 
 fulfillment of the moral law. In achieving this fulfill- 
 ment there is no substitute for personal endeavor. Strenu- 
 ousness of righteous will is the great demand. Religion 
 offers no valid substitute for this. The best that it can 
 do is to illustrate and enforce the moral law which is 
 contained in the constitution of man. Only as it fulfills 
 this end has a revealed religion a just claim to univer- 
 sality. 
 
 With the first two of these cardinal points of the Kan- 
 tian system the idealistic philosophers who followed the 
 Konigsberg sage were in substantial agreement. They 
 did not, indeed, regard Kant's list of categories as beyond 
 revision, but they accepted his fundamental conceptions 
 as to the nature and agency of mind. In relation to the 
 third point they received a profound incentive. The 
 unfinished construction which seemed here to pertain 
 
14 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 to the Kantian system served to them as a summons to 
 pass on to a speculative standpoint more inclusive and 
 adequate than that occupied by their great predecessor. 
 They were not willing to leave the thinking subject set 
 over against an inaccessible noumenal realm or sphere of 
 substantial being. It was the proper task of philosophy, 
 as they conceived, to overcome the agnosticism and dual- 
 ism pertaining to this order of representation, and to 
 achieve a unified view of the entire sum of reality. The 
 ways in which they attempted to execute this task gave 
 to their respective philosophies their distinctive pecul- 
 iarities. The fourth point, or the primacy which Kant 
 assigned to the practical reason — that is, to the demands 
 of the nature of man as a moral agent — was made funda- 
 mental in Fichte's system. As regards the fifth point, 
 all the great idealists who built on the foundations sup- 
 plied by Kant differed from him in making larger account 
 of religion as distinguished from simple morality, and in 
 explicit stress laid upon the divine immanence, as opposed 
 to the somewhat deistic way in which the Kantian 
 philosophy expounded the relation of God to the human 
 spirit. 
 
 It is a very common judgment that, in spite of its 
 greatness and suggestiveness, the system of Kant is 
 open to strictures on its metaphysical as well as on its 
 religious side. In relation to the former it may be said 
 to err by giving place to an unnecessary agnosticism. 
 This appears in the assumption of an unqualified antithe- 
 sis between phenomena and things-in-themselves. The 
 supposition seems to be entertained that the knowledge 
 of the one does not imply any real knowledge of the other. 
 But this certainly is a quite gratuitous supposition. In a 
 universe built on a rational plan — as the universe in which 
 man is placed must be understood to be, if he has any 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM iS 
 
 vocation to think about it at all — phenomena may war- 
 rantably be conceived to truly advertise the realities to 
 which they belong, so that the knowledge of the one must 
 involve a valid, though not necessarily an exhaustive, 
 knowledge of the other. A like qualification of the 
 agnostic element in Kant's thinking may be reached 
 through an inspection of his thesis upon the purely sub- 
 jective validity of the categories. This thesis he has not 
 justified. He has not even been true to it himself, since 
 in one relation or another he has assumed that the objec- 
 tive world has that which corresponds to our subjective 
 forms of thought. Furthermore, he has indirectly fur- 
 nished a very cogent ground for accepting the objective 
 validity of the categories. In considering man as a 
 moral agent he has assumed that the arrangement of the 
 universe must correspond with the demands of moral 
 personality. Why not assume also that the universe is 
 harmoniously related to man as an intellectual being? 
 Why suppose that our knowledge must be subject to sus- 
 picion just because we must know as men? If as men 
 we are aliens in the universe, then an attempt to philoso- 
 phize is pure foolishness. If, on the contrary, we are in 
 any wise properly coordinated with the rest of the uni- 
 verse, then we are entitled to conclude that our necessary 
 forms of thought have their counterpart in the sphere of 
 objective realities. 
 
 The deficit of the Kantian system of thought on the 
 side of religion has already been intimated. It applies 
 to this domain an inadequate measure. While it magni- 
 fies worthily the grandeur of the moral law, it makes 
 scanty room for the sense of dependence upon God and 
 for the thought of inner enrichment through communion 
 with him. 
 
i6 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 II, — Grounds for a Favorable Estimate of the 
 Post-Kantian Idealism 
 
 Idealism as such has no necessary affiliation with unbe- 
 lief. On the contrary, it is the natural ally of a spiritual 
 creed. In giving the primacy to the supersensuous, in 
 contending that spirit or mind is ultimate and funda- 
 mental, so that a comprehensive and rational interpreta- 
 tion of the universe must proceed from the conception of 
 spirit or mind, idealism takes ground that lies very close 
 to many a declaration in the Christian oracles. Has not 
 Christ said that God is Spirit and must be worshiped 
 in a spiritual manner ? Has not Paul taught that in this 
 infinite Spirit we all live and move and have our being? 
 Has not the apostle furthermore identified the eternal 
 with the unseen and the temporal with the seen? Such 
 statements are obviously quite in line with idealistic pos- 
 tulates, and along with other sentences of a similar tenor 
 serve to manifest the congenial relation subsisting between 
 idealism and Christian faith. Even radical idealism is not 
 necessarily hostile to any part of the Christian creed. For, 
 however far it may go in its assumption that in the last 
 analysis all forms of being reduce to thought, mind, or 
 spirit, it may still affirm that it makes no question about 
 the actuality of the world, and only advocates a special 
 view of the nature of the world. Now, this special view of 
 the nature of the world, so long as it does not deny the 
 proper conception of God or of man, will make no trouble 
 for Christian faith; since what this faith requires is 
 simply the actuality of the world, the presence of con- 
 ditions or powers which have for the consciousness of 
 the individual the practical worth of a standing theater 
 or environment. Religious faith can assume a neutral 
 position toward the most radical idealism which leaves 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 17 
 
 God and man in their integrity. But, while this is true, 
 it is legitimate to be somewhat slow and cautious in 
 accepting the claims of any specific scheme of radical 
 idealism. However little ground of suspicion there may 
 be against idealism, there is considerable ground for 
 a doubting and halting attitude toward radicalism. It 
 often happens that the radical system-maker, in order to 
 gain for his system the credit of being all-inclusive, 
 treats as non-existent that which is really existent. Radi- 
 cal idealists, as being men of like infirmities with other 
 radicals, may, of course, have fallen sometimes into the 
 fault of sacrificing fact in an intemperate exaltation of a 
 favorite theory. 
 
 The capacity of idealism to stand in friendly relations 
 with Christian faith found an appreciable measure of 
 illustration in the post-Kantian idealistic philosophy, 
 which was represented in particular by Fichte, Schelling, 
 and Hegel, and which had its principal literary period 
 between the last years of the eighteenth century and the 
 fourth decade of the nineteenth. In truth, the teaching 
 of these illustrious men contains not only much of high 
 intellectual interest, but also much that must command 
 the appreciation of any serious and enlightened believer 
 in Christianity. 
 
 In the first place, it was characteristic of these philoso- 
 phers profoundly to emphasize the religious element in 
 man's life. It would not be easy to find stronger words 
 on this theme than those which they have written. "All 
 irreligion," says Fichte, "remains upon the surface of 
 things, caught in the empty appearance, and just on this 
 account presupposes a lack of power and energy of spirit, 
 and betrays a weakness of the head as well as of charac- 
 ter ; on the contrary, religion, as rising above the appear- 
 ance and pressing into the essence of things, necessarily 
 
i8 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 discloses the happiest use of the powers of the spirit, the 
 greatest profundity and penetration, and, as necessarily 
 connected therewith, the highest strength of character."^ 
 "The one thing truly noble in man, the highest form of 
 the one idea which has become clear within him, is 
 religion."^ "In religion there is no fate, but only wisdom 
 and goodness, to which man is not compelled to submit 
 himself, but which embrace him with infinite love."^ 
 "Religion elevates him who is devoted to her service above 
 time as such, above the transient and the perishable, and 
 puts him in immediate possession of eternity."^ "Blessed- 
 ness is unwavering repose in the One Eternal ; wretched- 
 ness is vagrancy amid the manifold and transitory."^ In 
 Schelling much the same high estimate of religion may 
 be observed. "A philosophy," he says, "which in its 
 principle is not already religion we do not acknowl- 
 edge to be a philosophy."^ Again he remarks, "Only he 
 who knows God is truly moral."'^ If Hegel speaks with 
 less warmth than does Fichte of personal religion, his 
 estimate is still a very exalted one. "All that has worth 
 and dignity for man," he says, "all wherein he seeks his 
 happiness, his glory, and his pride, finds its ultimate 
 center in religion, in the thought, the consciousness, and 
 the feeling of God."^ "Religion is the ultimate and 
 highest sphere of human consciousness."^ "Religion is 
 a product of the Divine Spirit; it is not a discovery of 
 man, but a work of Divine operation and creation in 
 him."^*' "The object of religion as well as of philosophy 
 is eternal truth in its objectivity, God and nothing but 
 
 * Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben, Vorlesung xi. 
 
 ' Characteristics of the Present Age, trans, by William Smith, Lecture xvii. 
 
 ' Ibid., Lecture xvii. * Ibid., Lecture xvi. 
 
 'Anweisung, Vorlesung i. ^ -^^gj-ke, v. ii6. 
 
 ^ Cited by Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie, vi. 882. 
 
 * Philosophy of Religion, trans, by Speirs and Sanderson, i. 2. 
 » Ibid., i. 54. »« Ibid., i. 33. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 19 
 
 God and the explication of God."^ "Religion is not con- 
 sciousness of this or that truth in individual objects, but 
 of the absolute truth, of truth as the universal, the all- 
 comprehending, outside of v^hich there lies nothing at 
 all."2 
 
 In the second place, these philosophers occupied in the 
 main a friendly attitude toward Christianity as a his- 
 torical religion, and made no question as to its preemi- 
 nence and finality. Fichte may not have been very rever- 
 ential toward some of the objects of common Christian 
 appreciation. He spoke, for example, very disparagingly 
 of the Pauline writings as being largely given to a futile 
 argumentation. It was his conviction, however, that the 
 New Testament, especially in the writings of John, 
 serves as a trustworthy mirror of the eternal verities of 
 true religion. He expressed the judgment that a candid 
 review of the content of Christianity would show that 
 it had the same purpose as his own philosophy.^ That he 
 considered Christianity distinctly superior to every other 
 form of religion, and above the liability of being super- 
 seded, is manifest from the position which he assigned to 
 Christ. According to the Christian dogma, he says, 
 "Jesus of Nazareth absolutely, by and through himself, 
 without deliberate act, is the perfect sensible manifesta- 
 tion of the eternal Word, as no one whosoever has been 
 before him ; while those who become his disciples are 
 as yet not such, since they still stand in need of its mani- 
 festation in him; they must become such through him." 
 This dogma he approved in both its parts, expressing his 
 assent to the first part in these terms : "Jesus of Nazareth 
 is in a wholly peculiar manner, attributable to no one but 
 him, the only begotten and first born Son of God ; and all 
 ages which are capable of understanding him at all must 
 
 ' Philosophy of Religion, I. 19. 2 Ibid., I. 22. 
 
 ' Appelation an das Publicum, Werke, V. 223, 224. 
 
20 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 recognize him in this character."^ Schelling was not 
 uniform throughout his philosophical career in his atti- 
 tude toward Christian tenets. He seems, however, in 
 all stages to have been appreciative of the fact of the incar- 
 nation in Christ as being at least the central specimen of 
 that union of the divine with the human which is ever 
 in process, and in his later teaching distinctly attributed 
 a transcendent nature to Christ. With Hegel the abso- 
 lute character of the Christian religion was a clearly 
 recognized conclusion. The Christian doctrine of the 
 Trinity, taken in its essential meaning, was pronounced 
 by him to be indispensable to a sound philosophy. He 
 spoke of the life story of Christ as a true history with a 
 divine content. He affirmed that the Son, as the other 
 of the Father, has "the entire fullness of the divine nature 
 in himself," and repudiated the application to him of 
 merely human measures in these emphatic terms : "If we 
 say nothing more of Christ than that he was a teacher 
 of humanity and a martyr of the truth we do not occupy 
 the Christian standpoint, the standpoint of the true reli- 
 gion. "^ A question may indeed be raised as to whether 
 Hegel always put the sense of catholic Christianity into 
 catholic formulas; but that his estimate of historical 
 Christianity was very high there is no good reason to 
 doubt. 
 
 Once more, these philosophers may be credited with a 
 real service to Christian faith by their forceful advocacy 
 of important elements of truth. Thus Fichte profoundly 
 emphasized man's moral agency as conditioning his 
 insight. "Only by the fundamental improvement of my 
 will," he says, "does a new light arise within me con- 
 cerning my existence and vocation ; without this, however 
 much I may speculate, and with what rare gifts soever I 
 
 1 Anweisung, Vorlesung vi. ^ Philosophy of Religion, Hi. 70, 78. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 21 
 
 may be endowed, darkness remains within me and around 
 me."^ Not only did he make moral agency the neces- 
 sary basis of enlightenment as respects our higher rela- 
 tions ; he affirmed also that it is the one substantial ground 
 of intellectual confidence in the existence of the world. 
 "Whatever has existence for me," he contends, "has it 
 only through its relation to my own being. But there is 
 in the highest sense, only one relation to me possible; 
 all others are but subordinate to this: my relation to 
 moral activity. My world is the object and sphere of 
 my duties and absolutely nothing more. . . . From this 
 necessity of action proceeds the consciousness of the act- 
 ual world. . . . We do not act because we know, but we 
 know because we are called upon to act; the practical 
 reason is the root of all reason. The laws of action for 
 rational beings are immediately certain; their world is 
 certain only through that previous certainty."^ "Our 
 world is the sensible material of our duty; this is the 
 properly real in things, the true basal principle (Grund- 
 stoff) of all appearance."^ Fichte may be thought to 
 have run into paradox in the stress which he placed upon 
 the worth of moral agency for cognition; but it cannot 
 well be denied that he touched here upon a great truth 
 which no sane philosophy can overlook. Among the con- 
 tributions of Schelling special mention may be made of 
 the stimulus which he gave to the recognition of the 
 divine in nature. To Hegel belongs the merit of helping 
 forward a needful revision of the conception of spirit, 
 whether taken in the divine or the human range. Over 
 against the abnormal stress upon simplicity of essence 
 as distinctive of spirit and especially of God, which had 
 
 * Vocation of Man, trans, by William Smith, Book iii. 
 ^ Ibid., Book iii. 
 
 5 Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine gottliche Weltregierung, 
 Werke, V. 185. 
 
22 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 place in Christian dogmatics from the days of the 
 fathers, Hegel profoundly emphasized the truth that a 
 certain manifoldness pertains to spirit, that its capacity 
 for life is based in contrast, and that it comes to self- 
 realization through diverse activities. "Whatever," he 
 says, "is merely or abstractly simple, v^ithout complexity, 
 is a dead thing."^ From this point of view he laid great 
 stress upon the trinitarian conception, declaring that 
 "God is recognized as spirit only when known as the 
 Triune."^ Doubtless exception may be taken to the 
 way in which Hegel carried out his thought of spirit as 
 subsisting in its proper character only through a pro- 
 cess; but it can scarcely be questioned that in his general 
 thought on this theme he provided an improved basis for 
 conceiving of God as the living God, to say nothing 
 about furnishing a suitable foundation for the specific 
 doctrines of trinity and incarnation. 
 
 In addition to the several grounds of appreciation 
 which have been stated, it may be noticed that these 
 philosophers were decidedly antagonistic to the rational- 
 ism of the preceding century, the "Illuminism," with 
 its deistic preferences and its infinite confidence in its 
 possession of all truth. The terms in which they men- 
 tion it are little less than scornful. Schelling remarks 
 that in relation to Christianity the so-called Aufklarerei 
 might better be called an Ausklarerei, a clearing-out 
 rather than a clearing-up.^ Hegel characterizes the sys- 
 tem of Illuminism as "only an abstract metaphysic of 
 the understanding," which turns God into a poor and 
 empty being.^ 
 
 1 Logic, trans, by Wallace, chap, iv, p. 82. 
 
 ' Philosophy of History, trans, by Sibree, p. 331; see also various state- 
 ments in the Philosophy of Religion. 
 
 ^ Vorlesungen ueber die Methode des akademischen Studiums, Werke, 
 V. 300. ■* Philosophy of Religion, I. 29,30. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 23 
 
 It was appropriate to notice the post-Kantian idealism 
 on the side of its affihation with Christian behef before 
 turning to the reverse side. In the light of this pro- 
 cedure it will be understood that the mention of that 
 idealism in a history of unbelief involves no judgment 
 that it made on the whole for skepticism rather than for 
 faith. All that the mention imports is that certain fea- 
 tures had place in the philosophies of Kant's idealistic 
 successors upon which a superstructure of unbelief might 
 be built, and to some extent has been built. The asser- 
 tion of this much will still leave one free to attribute a 
 distinct value to those philosophies as contributions 
 toward the solution of great problems with which man's 
 spirit has been wrestling through the ages. 
 
 III. — Questionable Points in Fichte's Thinking 
 
 Zeller remarks respecting Fichte that "the paradoxical 
 nature of a proposition was to him no occasion for sub- 
 jecting it to doubt."^ His earnest, doctrinaire temper 
 stopped at nothing which seemed to be implied in an 
 accepted point of view. This characteristic may serve 
 to explain in a measure the remarkable speculative shift 
 by which Fichte essayed to gain the unified view of reality 
 which Kant failed to achieve. Instead of permitting the 
 world, as an objective entity, to confront the self, or 
 ego, he reduced all to the ego. The ego, he maintained, 
 is the thing-in-itself, the real noumenon, and there is no 
 other. In its essence the ego is activity, an activity which 
 is aware of itself, and thus is at once being and con- 
 sciousness, the real and the ideal. But to be properly 
 aware of itself the ego needs to be set in antithesis with 
 an object, or non-ego, since a self-conscious subject is 
 
 Geschichte der deutschen Philosophic seit Leibniz, p. 600. 
 
24 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 conceivable only in relation to an object. The ego comes 
 into this necessary relation by its own act. It posits the 
 non-ego, not as an objective reality, but as a limit set up 
 within itself, by reacting against which it fulfills its 
 calling to free self-development. The world appears, 
 indeed, as an exterior object, but in truth it is only a 
 limit which the ego from out of itself imposes upon 
 itself, and thereby secures a ground for that perpetual 
 striving with which its very being is identified. The 
 goal toward which it looks is independence of all limits ; 
 but, as this can never be reached, the striving, and with 
 that the selfhood, never ceases. As has been intimated 
 in the preceding section, the striving falls under the 
 law of duty, and may be described as the action of the 
 moral will. Fichte's system appears thus as a monism 
 in which the moral will is everything. 
 
 Upon this philosophical scheme two criticisms may be 
 passed, a lesser and a greater. The lesser criticism 
 relates to the forced and unsatisfactory account which 
 is given of the non-ego. If we start with the definition 
 of the ego as pure activity, where shall we find a logical 
 warrant for the conclusion that the ego sets up a limit 
 to itself in the non-ego? Is it the nature of activity to 
 raise a barrier across its own path, the nature of pure 
 spontaneity to erect a wall against which it may deceive 
 itself with a sense of passivity? Surely the Fichtean 
 account of the non-ego is somewhat fantastic as well as 
 entirely gratuitous. Such a tremendous fact as is the 
 outer world in the experience of the ego cannot credibly 
 be explained as simply the ghostly product of a subjec- 
 tive activity. How does it happen that a purely subjec- 
 tive working is so amazingly particular to furnish, in 
 connection with a given impression of geographical loca- 
 tion, a substantially identical impression of the collocation 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 25 
 
 of objects on any number of successive occasions and 
 in any number of conscious subjects? The "productive 
 imagination," to use Fichte's phrase, which works with 
 such persistent conformity to infinite complexities, is cer- 
 tainly a most astonishing thing, especially as it works 
 in the dark, or beneath consciousness. As against such 
 a miracle it is comparatively easy to accept a real world 
 with which the ego proper, or the finite self, stands in 
 relations of interaction. How this world is to be con- 
 strued in the ultimate analysis may be very difficult to 
 determine, but that it is the mere product of the observer 
 into whose experience it enters only a very peculiar 
 intellectual demand can make one believe. 
 
 The greater criticism of the Fichtean philosophy 
 applies to the way in which it construes the thought of 
 the absolute, or God. Implicitly and explicitly it collides 
 at this point with the requirements of Christian theism. 
 It is openly intolerant of the idea of a personal God. 
 While it speaks of an absolute ego, its own premises show 
 that the term is a misnomer. The only personal sub- 
 ject which it acknowledges is the empirical ego, the self- 
 conscious finite being, which has personality just because 
 it exists under limitations. Whatever God may be, 
 according to Fichte, he cannot be a personal, conscious, 
 distinct being. The moment we describe him as such 
 we deny his infinitude, and fashion him after the pattern 
 of our own finiteness. It would seem, then, that we must 
 apply to him some impersonal or abstract term, or 
 renounce the attempt to define him. Between these alter- 
 natives Fichte does not appear to have occupied a per- 
 fectly consistent position. On the one hand, he has said 
 that to form a concept (Begriff) of God is to misrep- 
 resent him and turn him into an idol.^ On the other 
 
 ' Gerichtliche Verantwortungsschriften, Werke, V. 266, 267. 
 
26 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 hand, he defines God formally as the moral order of the 
 world. "That living and working moral order," he says, 
 "is itself God ; we need no other and can conceive of no 
 other."^ In this definition the terms "living" and "work- 
 ing" may be permitted to imply that God is not a mere 
 abstraction; but evidently he is left to be regarded as 
 simply a common factor in a plurality of moral persons. 
 He cannot be thought to have any real existence apart 
 from this company of moral persons, since a moral order 
 without moral persons is an empty figment. 
 
 For this denial of the personality of God Fichte can- 
 not be said to have offered grounds that merit any great 
 amount of respect. His assumption that personality is 
 incompatible with, infinitude is to be challenged, as involv- 
 ing both a false measure of greatness and a false view of 
 the necessary conditions of consciousness. It involves 
 a false measure of greatness because it pays no proper 
 respect to the supereminence of the qualitative element 
 in greatness. Being is great by the possession of great 
 qualities, and the greatest of qualities are those of per- 
 sonality, foremost among which are self-knowledge and 
 self-direction. To apply tliese qualities in their highest 
 reach to God is to exalt him. To lock God out of such 
 high attributes is to lower, diminish, and degrade him. 
 He is infinite as being all-comprehending in his intelli- 
 gence and of unlimited potency in his will. To place him 
 as person over against finite persons does not reduce him 
 to finitude; for these finite persons, if not simply 
 moments or factors in the process of his personal life, at 
 any rate subsist only by his permission and through his 
 efficiency. The sole original and independent one, 
 faced by no limits that are not self-imposed, what does 
 
 1 Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine gottliche Weltregierung, 
 Werke, V. i86. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 27 
 
 he lack of being the greatest conceivable, the truly 
 infinite? Surely it is a strange procedure to deny infini- 
 tude to such a personality and to claim it for an imper- 
 sonal moral order which has no existence outside a 
 totality of finite persons, a totality that cannot be certified 
 to be infinite. 
 
 The Fichtean view, as was noticed, is also to be chal- 
 lenged as involving a false view of the necessary con- 
 dition of the consciousness which is indispensable to 
 personality. Consciousness, it is claimed, can exist only 
 in antithesis to an object; and, accordingly, only a sub- 
 ject, that is limited by an object, and therefore not 
 infinite, can possess consciousness. The claim is arbi- 
 trary, and is especially gratuitous in connection with 
 Fichte's conception of the nature of being. What con- 
 sciousness requires is not an object proper, or anything 
 presented under the category of objectivity, but simply 
 a content. Suppose an ego that is essentially static or 
 passive, and then we may have occasion to assume the 
 impact of an outside power to set it in motion and to 
 furnish it with the requisite content for consciousness. 
 But Fichte, very rightly, as we think, rejects this 
 fiction of a passive ego. Activity, as he contends, 
 is its very essence. Why, then, should the ego 
 require to be put in antithesis to an object to become 
 conscious? In its own activities it is revealed to itself 
 — in other words, made conscious of itself. Fichte 
 seems in this relation to have made the mistake of judg- 
 ing self-consciousness universally by the peculiarity of 
 one form or element of self-consciousness. So far as 
 consciousness is shaped by the instrumentality of sense 
 perception, it has, as an indispensable content, an 
 impression of externality. But consciousness is much 
 wider than this impression. It is not dependent upon 
 
28 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 the impression, since it finds means of realization in the 
 activities of an ego which is in its nature active. Only 
 a self that is a mere blank, or at least empty of every 
 element of spontaneity, and therefore no true self, needs 
 to run its head against a barrier in order to become 
 aware of itself. Thus the assumption on which Fichte 
 based his denial of the personality of God is found in 
 both of its members to be groundless. 
 
 It is not too much to say that the system of Fichte 
 ran into speculative collapse at the point of its inade- 
 quate conception of God. The philosopher himself seems 
 to have come ultimately to a half-confessed conviction 
 that, to gain a sufficient world ground, we must posit 
 something else than a moral order. He therefore veered 
 toward the Spinozistic notion of a universal substance 
 of which finite personalities are forms of manifesta- 
 tion. The revision, however, was implicit rather than 
 formal, so that his philosophy ends in a very consider- 
 able mist.^ 
 
 IV. — Schelling's Philosophy, Especially in its 
 Middle Stage 
 
 It has been said of Schelling that he conducted his 
 philosophical education before the public ; and the remark 
 cannot be charged with any serious trespass against 
 the claims of charity. Brilliant, enthusiastic, and adven- 
 turous, he figured as the champion of views toward 
 which his own zeal cooled after a brief interval. Apart 
 from any special account of transition periods, at least 
 three marked stages may be noted in his thinking. In 
 the first he wrought as a disciple of Fichte. In the third 
 he advanced to the theistic standpoint, but at the same 
 
 > Compare Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophic seit Leibniz, pp 
 630-635; Weber, History of Philosophy, pp. 486, 487. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 29 
 
 time neutralized to a considerable extent the philosoph- 
 ical advantage of this standpoint by his predilection for 
 theosophic vagaries. To the intermediate stage belongs 
 that phase of Schelling's thinking which naturally claims 
 most attention in a general glance at modern speculation. 
 
 The system brought out at this middle stage has been 
 called the "philosophy of identity." The name expresses 
 the goal to which Schelling was directed in his quest 
 after complete unity. Having come to the conclusion 
 that Fichte's scheme failed to give a satisfactory account 
 of the non-ego, he was led to postulate the absolute as 
 that which is above and beyond all contrast, the primal 
 and basal unity, which is neither ego nor non-ego, sub- 
 ject nor object, ideal nor real, but the identity of these. 
 It is the essence in which all distinctions are abolished, 
 to which the terms universal and particular, infinite and 
 finite, are alike inappropriate. It is such a unity as 
 incloses a complete synthesis even of unity and contrast. 
 
 The absolute, which is thus in itself void of all con- 
 trasts, comes to manifestation in a double series, the sub- 
 jective and the objective, the sphere of thought and con- 
 sciousness and the sphere of nature. Inasmuch as there 
 is the same identical essence in both — namely, the abso- 
 lute — the two spheres are contrasted phenomenally 
 rather than essentially. Nature is objective only so far 
 as contemplated in relation to a subject. It is not mere 
 body or mass. "There is no pure corporeity in nature. 
 . . . Everything in the universe is possessed of soul. In 
 other words, there is nothing in the universe that is 
 merely body and not as such also immediately soul."^ 
 Plants and even inorganic nature have a psychic interior. 
 Existence as individual has in the union of body and soul 
 
 ^Vorlesungen ueber die Methode des akademischen Studiums, xi ; System 
 der gesammten Philosophic, Werke, VI. 217. 
 
30 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 its necessary form, and action is to be imputed neither 
 to the soul nor to the body, but to the one identical 
 essence that is in both. As appears from these state- 
 ments, Schelling's philosophy of nature was a panpsy- 
 chism, in which the world as a whole was viewed as an 
 organism, and every part of it as sharing more or less 
 in psychic life. 
 
 Schelling's attempt to construe nature in an a priori 
 manner, while it had its suggestive points, was con- 
 fessedly very much of a failure as respects details. But 
 this is a ground of criticism which we have little occasion 
 to emphasize. The great objection to be urged against 
 the "philosophy of identity" is that it is a pantheistic 
 monism, which satisfies neither philosophy nor religion 
 in the substitute which it offers for a personal God, and 
 which also is compromising to the personality of man. 
 For the legitimacy of at least the former part of this 
 objection the philosopher's own maturer judgment may 
 be cited. 
 
 An obvious ground of exception, from the philo- 
 sophical standpoint, to Schelling's notion of the absolute 
 is the logical impossibility that such a primal being 
 should ever evolve anything out of its own blankness. 
 As well look to empty space to act the part of the world- 
 maker as think of getting a world out of an abyss of 
 being which is totally void of distinctions, which in its 
 lack of consciousness cannot purpose to make anything, 
 and which affords in itself no pattern for anything. 
 Schelling says, indeed, that the orignial being must 
 reveal itself by bringing to actuality both the ideal and 
 the real, but he neglects to tell us how it has in itself any 
 basis of such a revelation. In fact, it is by the merest 
 violence that any result can be gotten out of the dis- 
 tinctionless absolute. One is reminded of the expedient 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 31 
 
 to which Herbert Spencer resorts for getting his primary 
 undifferentiated being into motion, namely, the assump- 
 tion of the instabihty of the homogeneous. The homo- 
 geneous must forsooth evolve motion and difference, 
 but why it should do so, apart from the mere accom- 
 modation of the philosopher, is not in the slightest 
 degree apparent. On the premises of Schelling and 
 Spencer alike it is a perfect enigma how the primal 
 Dead Sea of the undistinguished absolute should have 
 escaped from its motionless calm and bestirred itself to 
 any intelligible result. As respects satisfying the 
 demands of religion, it is quite evident that the colorless 
 absolute of Schelling is entirely incompetent to provide 
 for the sense of fellowship in which religion has its per- 
 manent life. Doubtless the thought of divine imma- 
 nence has great worth for religious feeling, and panthe- 
 istic teaching like that of the "philosophy of identity" 
 does emphasize the divine immanence. But in the long 
 run the religious mind must make demands as to the 
 character of the divine which is supposed to be imma- 
 nent. What it wants is the Father of spirits, not an imper- 
 sonal absolute in which the beating heart of love and 
 sympathy can be placed only by an ill-disguised fiction. 
 
 As might be expected, the pantheistic standpoint of 
 the "philosophy of identity" is shown to have its dubious 
 bearings on questions of anthropology. Pantheism is 
 intrinsically unfriendly to freedom in the sense of a 
 power of real alternativity. And as a matter of fact 
 the statements which Schelling put forth on this theme, 
 at the pantheistic stage, are compromising. "Only such 
 an act," he says, "as follows with absolute necessity from 
 the essence of the soul or, what is the same thing, from 
 the divine so far as it is the essence of the soul, Is an 
 absolutely free act. ... In the soul as such there is no 
 
32 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 freedom, but only the divine is truly free, and the essence 
 of the soul so far as it is divine."^ Here we have the 
 assumption that freedom in its whole range is identical 
 with necessity; an assumption which certainly does not 
 tend to conserve the notion of freedom in its integrity. 
 In like manner Schelling retrenches the idea of immor- 
 tality. As identical with the primal essence the soul must 
 indeed live on, but it is not immortal in the sense in 
 which the term includes the persistence of individual 
 existence. "For, since this cannot be thought apart from 
 connection with the finite and the body, so would immor- 
 tality in this sense be in truth only a perpetual mortality 
 and no liberation, but rather a continued imprisonment 
 of the soul."^ That a liberation which extirpates indi- 
 viduality and leaves no place for a sense of personal 
 identity is not to be counted any great boon Schelling 
 himself seemed to realize at a later stage. 
 
 V. — The System of Hegel 
 
 Like his idealistic associates, Hegel considered the dis- 
 tinctive task of philosophy to consist in discovering and 
 construing the all-embracing unity. With the Fichtean 
 attempt to fulfill this task he could not reconcile himself, 
 since it involved a too easy-going and arbitrary disposal 
 of the objective world. To Schelling's conception of a 
 neutral absolute coming to manifestation in the parallel 
 streams of nature and spirit he could not long render 
 his assent, as this conception seemed to him to afford 
 no adequate account of movement and diversity, and 
 also to fail of attributing to spirit its rightful supremacy. 
 He therefore sought an improved interpretation of the 
 absolute, that is, one in which the absolute, instead of 
 
 * System der gesammten Philosophic, Werke VI. 539, 541. 
 ' Philosophie und Religion, Werke, VI. 60. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 33 
 
 figuring as a neutral background of the world process, 
 is presented as subsisting in and through the world 
 process ; an interpretation also in which nature takes the 
 rank of a factor or stage in the self-realization of spirit 
 and is thus made subordinate. 
 
 According to a basal assumption of the Hegelian sys- 
 tem the universe is not merely rational, or built accord- 
 ing to a thought plan, but is thought itself. "God him- 
 self," says Hegel, "exists in his proper truth only in 
 thought and as thought."^ A thinker he defines as 
 "thought conceived as a subject."^ He considers it 
 admissible to speak of nature as "the system of uncon- 
 scious thought, or, to use Schelling's expression, a fos- 
 silized intelligence."^ In comprehensive terms he 
 declares, "Everything we know, both of outward and 
 inward nature, is in its own self the same as it is in 
 thought."^ According to a second assumption equally 
 distinctive, thought is an organism in which all the parts 
 or members are so related that each demands the whole 
 and can be contemplated in its full truth only in relation 
 to the whole. To isolate a part is to put it out of the 
 plane of reality and make it abstract. A lower category 
 never affords a point of rest. A complement is demanded 
 in a higher category, and so on to the highest, the abso- 
 lute idea, the category of self-consciousness, wherein 
 all the other categories find their unity and proper sig- 
 nificance. The movement from the lower to the higher 
 is dialectic; that is, it proceeds by contradiction and 
 reconciliation. Thus the idea of "pure being" is con- 
 fronted immediately by the idea of "nothing," and the 
 union of the two gives the idea of "becoming." In the 
 same way the other categories, or fundamental concepts, 
 
 * Logic, chap, ii, p. 28, in trans, by Wallace. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 30. s Ibid., p. 39. * Ibid., p. 37. 
 
34 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 are evolved until the crown of the hierarchy is reached. 
 For the consummation of the movement of thought 
 three great stages are required, corresponding to which 
 are the three principal branches of philosophy: logic, 
 the science of the idea in itself ; the philosophy of nature, 
 the science of the idea in the reflection of itself; the 
 philosophy of mind or spirit, the science of the idea in 
 its return to itself from its self-estrangement in nature. 
 As passing on through different stages the evolution of 
 thought may seem to involve a time element, but it is 
 probable that Hegel meant to predicate succession in the 
 logical rather than in the temporal sense, though a ques- 
 tion may be rasied as to whether the philosopher kept 
 with entire consistency to this point of view.^ 
 
 Philosophical method, as Hegel maintained, is prop- 
 erly determined by the nature of the universe as the 
 complete system or organism of thought. The great 
 demand in philosophical thinking is to produce a rescript 
 of thought in its essential relations, a rescript which 
 by the nature of the case will be no fanciful structure, 
 but a true mirror of reality. To meet this demand the 
 thinker must give himself over to the impulsion of 
 thought and permit himself to be carried in its direction. 
 In true thinking, says Hegel, "we renounce our selfish 
 and particular being, sink ourselves in the thing, allow 
 thought to follow its own course, and if we add anything 
 of our own we think ill."^ Using the words of Pro- 
 fessor Paulsen, we may give a succinct description of 
 Hegel's conception of philosophical method as follows : 
 "Reality as such is thought, an idea unfolding itself with 
 inner necessity. Perfect knowledge consists in thinking 
 the actual thoughts over again. In the dialectical evolu- 
 
 * Compare McTaggart, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, pp. 166-176 
 Zeller, Geschichte der deutschen Philosophic seit Leibniz, pp. 792, 793. 
 'Logic, chap, ii, p. 41. Compare Philosophy of Religion, L 33. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 35 
 
 tion of philosophical thinking the self-existent and active 
 absolute idea is repeated, or rather becomes conscious 
 of itself."^ The emphatically a priori character of the 
 philosophical construction which conforms to this pattern 
 is quite apparent. 
 
 In the application of philosophical tests critics have 
 found various faults in the Hegelian system. They have 
 noticed that its assumption of the self-evolving nature 
 of thought is without any good warrant; that it is not a 
 mere thought element which calls up its opposite, or a 
 spontaneous movement of thought by which two notions 
 are united in a third ; that what really achieves this is a 
 true self, or thinking agent, which has had experience 
 of reality in its fullness and complexity, and so cannot 
 rest in the partial and isolated. Again, the charge has 
 been made against the Hegelian system that it fails to dis- 
 tinguish consistently between the simply logical and the 
 metaphysical or ontological. "Hegel," says Professor 
 Seth, "systematically and in the most subtle fashion con- 
 founds these two points of view, and ends by offering us 
 a logic as a metaphysic."^ Still further, the Hegelian 
 system has been criticised as providing no intelligible 
 account of the transition from the ideal to the sensible, 
 from the realm of categories to the realm of a material 
 manifold in space and time. Hegel, it is claimed, has 
 simply made a resolute leap across "the ugly broad 
 ditch." He has made a bridge of nothing better than 
 metaphorical phrases. "His passage from logic to nature 
 is to the full as mythological as anything we find in 
 Plato."3 
 
 These criticisms, it strikes us, are not without sub- 
 
 • Introduction to Philosophy, p. 2 1 . 
 'Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, p. 104. 
 ' Ibid., p. 11^. 
 
36 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 stantial foundations; but, not dwelling upon them, we 
 will notice some grounds of objection to the Hegelian 
 system which may be urged both from a philosophical 
 and a religious point of view. In the first place, the 
 system is chargeable with a one-sided intellectualism. 
 Under the constraint of an imperious ambition to secure 
 a completely unified view of reality it confines reality 
 within the terms of a definition that is distinctly too 
 narrow. Thought cannot be admitted to be another 
 name for being. One might as well join Schopenhauer 
 in reducing all to will as side with Hegel in reducing 
 all to thought. Will in a rational universe may be pre- 
 sumed, indeed, to act in conformity with the demands 
 of reason or thought, but only by giving to thought an 
 unnatural breadth of meaning can it be made to include 
 what customary speech denotes by will. My thought of 
 a given possible act is one thing; my willing, or putting 
 forth of energy, which consummates the act, is a differ- 
 ent thing. Again, the thought which I entertain about 
 certain matters of conduct may be fairly correct, while 
 my attitude of will in relation to the same matters may 
 be decidedly perverse. To merge the latter in the former 
 is, accordingly, compromising to an ethical or religious 
 interest as well as metaphysically defective. The same 
 remark applies to the slighting treatment which Hegel 
 accords to the element of feeling. He renders even less 
 scanty justice to this element than to that of will. While 
 his general postulates are implicitly adverse to accredit- 
 ing to will its proper province, he explicitly disparages 
 the office of feeling. "The form of feeling," he says, 
 "is the lowest in which spiritual truth can be expressed."'^ 
 Again he remarks: "God exists essentially in thought. 
 The suspicion that he exists through thought, and only 
 
 * Logic, chap, ii, p. 28. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM n 
 
 in thought, must occur to us from the mere fact that 
 man alone has religion, not the beasts."^ This certainly 
 is in amazing contrast with the biblical statements, 
 which represent God as no less alive, and no less rich, 
 in the element of feeling than in that of intelligence. 
 And plainly the reason of the case is with the biblical 
 representation. A plenitude of the nobler order of feel- 
 ings is an immense factor in the inner wealth of the 
 normal man. By a thoroughly warrantable inference 
 we may conclude that personality in its highest range 
 cannot be destitute of this kind of wealth, for the source 
 of our nature cannot be poor in that which enters so 
 largely into our riches. Hegelianism cannot be said to 
 make even a plausible case for its one-sided intellectual- 
 ism. 
 
 In the second place, the Hegelian system is open to 
 criticism on the score of its ambiguous treatment of the 
 subject of the personality of God. It contains, indeed, 
 no denial of this great theistic postulate. On the con- 
 trary, some of its representations are capable of being 
 interpreted as implying divine personality. Thus the stress 
 which is placed upon self-consciousness, as the supreme 
 category, can easily suggest that this distinctive char- 
 acteristic of personality must be attributed to God. Fur- 
 thermore, sentences occur which look like formal asser- 
 tions that God is true person. "The Christian God," 
 says Hegel, "is God not known merely, but also self- 
 knowing; he is a personality not merely figured in our 
 minds, but rather absolutely actual. "^ Again, referring 
 to Spinoza's doctrine, he says : "Though an essential 
 stage in the evolution of the idea, substance is not the 
 same as absolute idea, but the idea under the still limited 
 form of necessity. It is true that God is necessity, or, 
 
 > Philosophy of Religion, I. 132. * Logic, chap viii, p 233. 
 
38 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 as we may put it, that he is the absolute thing or fact; 
 he is, however, no less the absolute person. That he is 
 the absolute person, however, is a truth which the phi- 
 losophy of Spinoza never perceived; and on that side it 
 falls short of the true notion of God which forms the con- 
 tent of the religious consciousness in Christianity." 
 To have completed his view Spinoza should have added 
 to the Oriental conception of the unity of substance the 
 Occidental principle of individuality.^ But, in spite of 
 declarations apparently so unequivocal, Hegel affords 
 grounds for doubt as to his dogmatic intention. We are 
 left to question whether he designs to attribute to God 
 a proper consciousness of his own, or merely such a con- 
 sciousness as is mediated through finite spirits. The 
 latter meaning is at least suggested in such statements 
 as these: "God knows himself in the finite spirit."^ 
 "The self-consciousness of God knows itself in man's 
 knowing."^ "This vast congeries of volitions, interests, 
 and activities [displayed in history] constitutes the 
 instruments and means of the world-spirit for attaining 
 its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realizing 
 it. And this aim is none other than finding itself, 
 coming to itself, and contemplating itself in concrete 
 actuality."* "History in general is the development 
 of spirit in time, as nature is the development 
 of the idea in space."^ Along with these statements 
 may be placed others which if they do not directly 
 testify on the mode of the divine consciousness, do serve 
 to raise the query as to whether God has any other than 
 a purely immanent being, such as may naturally be 
 regarded as implying only a mediated consciousness, or 
 
 * Logic, chap, viii, p. 236. 'Philosophy of Religion, II. 327, 328. 
 ' Vorlesungen ueber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes. 
 
 * Philosophy of History, pp. 24-27. ^ Ibid., p. 75. 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 39 
 
 one brought to realization in finite spirits, whose thought 
 of God is taken to signify God's thought of himself. 
 Thus Hegel says of the idea, which he makes to be 
 God as he is in himself: "Everything actual, in so far as 
 it is true, is the idea, and has its truth by and in virtue 
 of the idea alone. Every individual being is some one 
 aspect of the idea."^ "The truth is that there is only one 
 reason, one spirit; that spirit as finite has no true exis- 
 tence."^ As appears in these citations, Hegel was minded 
 to make room for but one subject in the universe. That 
 everything should be referred to one subject he regarded 
 as the demand of unity. So he preferred to speak, not 
 of the Divine Spirit and of human spirits, but simply 
 of spirit. In some of his propositions the reality of 
 finite spirits seems to be seriously abridged; in other 
 infinite spirit seems to be conditioned, in respect of con- 
 tent, upon the experience of finite spirits. On the whole, 
 it must be said that Hegel has left the question of the 
 proper personality of God in a dubious light. Discrimi- 
 nating critics, like Seth and Zeller, have opportunity to 
 question his fidelity, on this subject, to the Christian 
 standpoint. The latter remarks : "Hegel's expressions 
 relative to the personality of God have such an indefi- 
 nite sound that it is difficult to extract from them his 
 real meaning. However, if account is taken of his phi- 
 losophy as a whole, it will appear that for him the essen- 
 tial meaning of this item of faith was only the fact of 
 God's becoming personal in human personality."^ 
 
 A third criticism upon the Hegelian system concerns 
 the dependent relation toward the world in which it 
 places God. Whatever ambiguity may attach to Hegel's 
 thought respecting the divine personality, it is quite 
 
 ' Ix>gic. -"hao ix p 305. ' Philosophy of Religion, III. 77. 
 
 * Ge'^chichte der deutschen Philosophic seit Leibniz, p. 834. 
 
40 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 certain that he conceived of the mundane process as a 
 necessary means of self-realization on the part of God. 
 The trinity which he predicates is intramundane rather 
 than transcendent or extramundane. It relates to the 
 stages of a cosmic process which are likewise stages in 
 the self-realization of spirit. Now, it is quite evident 
 that a theory of this sort is remote from the platform 
 of catholic Christianity. It may well be claimed also 
 that there are good grounds for preferring the latter. 
 Surely it is the higher conception which represents God 
 as being self-sufficient through the independent posses- 
 sion of trinitarian life and then describes the world as 
 the product of freedom and intelligence, a sphere of 
 being which fulfills, indeed, the far-reaching purpose of 
 God but does not condition his subsistence in any such 
 sense as he conditions its being. 
 
 VI. — Tendencies Derived From the Post-Kantian 
 
 Idealism 
 
 The review which has been given has sufficiently indi- 
 cated that, under the category of adverse tendencies, 
 each of the prominent forms of this idealism may be 
 charged with rendering support to pantheism. Fichte's 
 denial of personality to God coincided with the charac- 
 teristic assumption of Occidental pantheism, and was 
 more than once cited by the advocates of pantheistic 
 teaching. It is not to be overlooked, however, that 
 Fichte's stress upon the moral will provided somewhat of 
 a counterpoise to the pantheistic incentives furnished by 
 his system ; since, undoubtedly a stress of this kind is 
 congenially related to a theistic conception, as being the 
 one conception which makes room for freedom back of 
 the world, and so for freedom in the world. The adap- 
 tation of Schelling's philosophy, in one of its stages, to 
 
RADICAL IDEALISM 41 
 
 promote a pantheistic propagandism was illustrated by 
 several of his disciples. Thus Lorenz Oken merged 
 philosophy into a theory of nature and identified God 
 with the universe. 
 
 While the Hegelian philosophy numbered adherents — 
 such as Gabler, Goschel, Hinrichs, and Marheineke — 
 who regarded it as reconcilable with Christian ortho- 
 doxy, it also served as the starting-point of radicalisms 
 of the most extreme and anti-Christian character. That 
 Hegelianism was responsible for the whole brood can- 
 not fairly be asserted. Still it must be admitted that the 
 sweeping attempt of that philosophy to reduce everything 
 to a unified point of view afforded a certain stimulus 
 to extreme theories. Disciples who varied from the 
 standpoint of the master were not less insistent than the 
 master in accommodating the whole round of facts to 
 the chosen standpoint. So we have in criticism schemes 
 as radical as those of David Friedrich Strauss and 
 Bruno Bauer; in religious philosophy, the ultra teaching 
 of Ludwig Feuerbach which left no place for any God 
 beyond the human race ; in psychological theory, the em- 
 phatic sensationalism, not to say materialism, of both 
 Strauss and Feuerbach; in socialistic speculation, the 
 theories of F. J. G. Lassalle and Karl Marx. A closer 
 consideration of the views of some of these men will be 
 given later. The mention of their names here serves to 
 indicate either that Hegel was unfortunate in his follow- 
 ing or that his philosophy was not so thoroughly friendly 
 to the Christian system as he assumed it to be. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 RADICAL SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 
 
 I. — The Sensational Psychology — Its Leading 
 Representatives and its Distinguish- 
 ing Features 
 
 In introducing the theme of the preceding chapter 
 occasion was found to disclaim any intention to dis- 
 parage ideaHsm or to question its compatibility, even in 
 its radical forms, with the Christian faith. For the 
 theme of the present chapter a disclaimer of this kind 
 is not seriously demanded. Judged by their content, radi- 
 cal sensationalism and materialism can be seen to stand 
 in the way of assigning to man such attributes and 
 such a position in the world as are agreeable to the Chris- 
 tian point of view. Moreover, in actual history — at 
 least in that of more recent times — they have exhibited 
 a distinct tendency to ignore or to set aside the Chris- 
 tian system. Among the prominent representatives of 
 radical sensationalism in the nineteenth century a few 
 may have indulged in appreciative references to one or 
 another Christian truth ; but not one of them stands 
 revealed as a cordial friend of the Christian faith. As 
 for nineteenth century materialism, where it has come 
 to undisguised expression it has almost uniformly 
 treated Christianity as quite outside the province of 
 rational belief. 
 
 The most conspicuous field of the sensational psy- 
 chology in the last century was supplied by Great Britain. 
 Very radical doctrines in the line of that psychology 
 had been advocated by writers of the preceding century, 
 
 42 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 43 
 
 especially by Hume and Hartley. Among those who 
 appropriated these doctrines and industriously cham- 
 pioned them four men have taken a preeminent rank, 
 namely, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, 
 and Herbert Spencer. While Jeremy Bentham was in a 
 sense the forerunner of the group, his attention was 
 directed rather to ethics and to civic reforms than to the 
 elaboration of psychological theory. Other writers 
 might be mentioned, particularly G. H. Lewes, but there 
 is no cogent ground for making any specific reference 
 to their views, since the full scheme of the sensational 
 psychology can be reviewed in the works of the four 
 principal champions mentioned. Within this list John 
 Stuart Mill claims a special interest on account of the 
 admissions which his candor and mental alertness led 
 him ultimately to make against the scheme which fell 
 to him by inheritance. Relative to Herbert Spencer, it 
 may be noticed that in his attempt to found a cosmic 
 philosophy he went beyond the province of the school 
 which is here under consideration, so that there will be 
 occasion to give attention to his speculations in another 
 connection as well as in the present. 
 
 Proceeding now to a rapid characterization of the 
 sensational psychology, as taught by its foremost rep- 
 resentatives in Great Britian, we notice, in the first place, 
 its resolute denial of all a priori elements of knowl- 
 edge, and its reference of the entire mental content to 
 experience. It unhesitatingly adopted the tabula rasa 
 doctrine, according to which the mind, essentially blank 
 in itself, derives its entire fund of materials through the 
 senses. It contributes nothing out of itself to the struc- 
 ture of knowledge. As John Stuart Mill asserts, it does 
 not originally contain so much as the principle of con- 
 tradiction. All the so-called necessary truths, so far 
 
44 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 from being dictated by the constitution of the mind, are 
 the product of experience. Mill supposes them to be the 
 product of individual experience. Spencer differs from 
 Mill and the earlier members of the school in making 
 them the product of race experience — in a sense a priori 
 for the individual as being given to him, but a poste- 
 riori for the entire series of individuals.^ In the view of 
 Spencer no less than of Mill they are no original datum 
 of mind. Instead of being the logical antecedent of 
 experience, they are the product or result of experience. 
 
 In the second place, the sensational psychology under 
 review exhibits a decided bent to subsume experience 
 under the category of sensations or feelings, making 
 these the units of the mental life and postulating noth- 
 ing aside from them and their relations. James Mill 
 speaks of feeling as including "every phenomenon of 
 the mind," and construes ideas as transformed sensa- 
 tions.2 "My mind," says John Stuart Mill, "is but a 
 series of feelings, a thread of consciousness, however 
 supplemented by believed possibilities of consciousness 
 which are not, although they might be, realized."^ 
 "Mind," says Herbert Spencer, "consists of feelings 
 and the relations among feelings."* 
 
 In the third place, it is characteristic of the sensational 
 psychology to lay great stress upon the association of 
 ideas as the means by which the mind is furnished with 
 its habitual points of view — its so-called intuitions or 
 necessary beliefs. Defining the teaching of his school on 
 this subject, John Stuart Mill makes the following sum- 
 mary of the laws of association: "(i) Similar phe- 
 nomena tend to be thought of together. (2) Phe- 
 
 * Principles of Psychology, II. 414, edition of 1876. 
 ' Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians, II. 290. 
 ^ Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 207. 
 
 * Data of Ethics, p. 104. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 45 
 
 nomena which have either been experienced or conceived 
 in close contiguity to one another tend to be thought 
 of together, (3) Associations produced by contiguity 
 become more certain and rapid by repetition. (4) When 
 an association has acquired this character of insepara- 
 bihty, when the bond between the two ideas has been 
 thus firmly riveted, not only does the idea called up by 
 association become, in our consciousness, inseparable 
 from the idea which suggested it, but the facts or phe- 
 nomena answering to those ideas come at last to seem 
 inseparable in existence: things which we are unable to 
 conceive apart, appear incapable of existing apart, and 
 the belief we have in their coexistence, though really a 
 product of experience, seems intuitive."^ 
 
 In the fourth place, it is distinctive of the sensational 
 psychology to question the fact of a conscious self. This 
 point may not have been put explicitly by Professor 
 Bain, and may have been qualified in the exposition of 
 John Stuart Mill. Still there was an evident inclina- 
 tion on the part of the sensational school to follow Hume 
 in substituting for the self-knowing agent a mere suc- 
 cession of feelings or psychical phenomena. The defi- 
 nition of mind as "a series of feelings," which was cited 
 above from Mill, is quite in line with Hume's negation 
 of the conscious self, and with Herbert Spencer we find 
 an express denial of the possibility of any direct con- 
 sciousness of the self. "A true cognition of self," he 
 says, "implies a state in which the knowing and the 
 known are one, in which subject and object are identified, 
 and this Mr. Mansel rightly holds to be the annihilation 
 of both."2 
 
 Once more, the sensational psychology exhibits a 
 
 * Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 191. 
 2 First Principles, p. 65. 
 
46 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 decided affiliation with necessitarianism. Professor 
 Bain, it is true, made room for an element of spontaneity 
 in the human constitution; but his description of this 
 element does not seem to identify it with a proper capa- 
 bility of choice or power of alternativity pertaining to 
 a conscious agent. "Spontaneity," he says, "expresses 
 the fact that the active organs may pass into movement, 
 apart from the stimulus of sensation."^ James Mill is 
 credited with rating free will as "nonsense."^ John 
 Stuart Mill questioned the right to assume the fact of any 
 direct control over the volitions, and placed events of 
 this order on the same plane with physical events as 
 respects relations to determining antecedents. "A voli- 
 tion," he says, "is a moral effect, which follows the cor- 
 responding moral causes as certainly and invariably as 
 physical effects follow their physical causes. Whether 
 it must do so I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignor- 
 ant, be the phenomena moral or physical. All I know 
 is that it always does."^ Herbert Spencer characterized 
 the sense of free will as an illusion, and urged against 
 the fact of free will the requirement of conserving due 
 credit to his treatise on psychology, as also to similar 
 treatises. "Psychical changes," he remarked, "either 
 conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform 
 to law this work, in common with all works on the sub- 
 ject, is sheer nonsense; no science of psychology is pos- 
 sible. If they do conform to law there cannot be any such 
 thing as free will."^ 
 
 Sensationalism, in its compromising bearing upon the 
 recognition of a true mental agent, has a certain kin- 
 ship with materialism. It is to be observed, however, 
 
 'Mental Science, p. 318, edition of 1868. 
 ^Stephen, The English Utilitarians, II. 313. 
 ^Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 501. 
 * Principles of Psychology, I. 503. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 47 
 
 that a confessed preference for materialism has not been 
 characteristic of the school to which consideration is here 
 given. Its representatives in general have emphasized 
 the broad contrast which, to our apprehension, subsists 
 between mental facts and physical facts. As respects the 
 teaching of John Stuart Mill, it is more properly de- 
 scribed as leaning to idealism than as affiliating with 
 materialism. Alexander Bain made large account of the 
 physiological basis or accompaniment of the mental life, 
 and also spoke betimes in a rather apologetic vein for 
 the champions of materialism; but in his concluding 
 statement, in place of materialism pure and simple, he 
 adopted the monistic conception. "The one substance," 
 he says, "with two sets of properties, two sides, the 
 physical and the mental — a double-faced unity — would 
 appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case."^ 
 Herbert Spencer's theory may also be characterized as 
 formally monistic. He assumed the existence of one pri- 
 mordial force or substance, the manifestations of which 
 fall into two aggregates "constituting the world of con- 
 sciousness and the world beyond consciousness."^ 
 Furthermore, he considered, although confessing the ab- 
 sence of strict proof, that it is agreeable to experience to 
 suppose feeling and nervous action to be "inner and 
 outer faces of the same change."^ In consideration of 
 the fact that both the mental and the physical are manifes- 
 tations of an unknown ground, he rated the controversy 
 between the materialist and the spiritualist as a war of 
 words.^ It is not to be overlooked, however, that he has 
 scarcely succeeded in maintaining a neutral attitude 
 toward the controversy. Much in his writings is cer- 
 tainly adapted to convey the impression that mind, so 
 
 1 Mind and Body, p. 196. ^ pirst Principles, p. 156 
 
 3 Principles of Psychology, I. 128. ■♦ First Principles, pp. 556, 557. 
 
48 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 far as discoverable in the universe, has its efficient ante- 
 cedent, or real source, in physical energy. Whether con- 
 sistently or not, he has accorded a certain primacy to 
 matter. 
 
 As has been intimated, the attitude of the sensational 
 school toward the Christian and theistic faith was by no 
 means cordial. When not hostile it was cold and nega- 
 tive. Herbert Spencer was willing, indeed, to grant 
 large liberties to religion in what he considered its ap- 
 propriate province, the field of the unknown, at least on 
 condition that religion should confess utter ig-norance 
 of its supreme objects. We find, however, in a late 
 writing of John Stuart Mill the most distinct concessions 
 to fundamental points of theism and Christianity that 
 are on record from the pen of any prominent representa- 
 tive of the school. In his essay on Theism, while he 
 emphasized the difficulty of reconciling the goodness of 
 God with his omnipotence, he admitted a balance of evi- 
 dence on the side of creation by intelligence, denied that 
 science has any refutation of the doctrine of immortality,, 
 and confessed that religion has made a discreet choice 
 in fixing upon Christ as the ideal representative and guide 
 of humanity. That herein he went beyond the commonly 
 recognized standpoint of his school is evinced by the fact 
 that his disciples were somewhat scandalized by the 
 essay on Theism.^ 
 
 II. — Failure of the Sensational Psychology 
 
 Whether the sensational psychology be judged by fun- 
 damental rational demands, or by the success of its advo- 
 cates in maintaining agreement with their own premises, 
 it offers very scanty claims to appreciation. On the side 
 of rational demands it offends against a sane conception 
 
 * Stephen, The English Utilitarians, III. 433. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 49 
 
 of the conditions of mental experience. It is simply 
 turning experience into a magician when it is given 
 credit for every characteristic and item of the mental 
 content. Experience surely is not something that floats 
 in vacuo. In order to experience there must be that 
 v^^hich experiences. In order to community in experience 
 there must be a plurality of beings fundamentally alike 
 as respects their constitution. It contradicts the prin- 
 ciple of sufficient reason to suppose that men universally 
 must, or that they assuredly do, follow certain lines of 
 rational procedure without being put upon those lines by 
 inner and essential characteristics of being. Granting 
 that a common environment may work toward com- 
 munity of mental habits, we must still hold that environ- 
 ment can be efficient for a given result in a plurality of 
 individuals only on the score of a definite coordination 
 between the outer and the inner; and this means, of 
 course, that the inner or mental sphere has characteris- 
 tics of its own. In short, in analyzing away the mind, 
 as the sensational psychologists really do in at least some 
 of their utterances, they take away the intelligible 
 ground for the experience from which they endeavor to 
 derive all the laws and necessities as well as the con- 
 crete items of the mental life. 
 
 More specifically, the sensational psychology offends 
 against a reasonable account of that unity of conscious- 
 ness which is presupposed in even the elementary forms 
 of mental activity. Discrimination and combination lie 
 at the very beginning of cognition and condition it at 
 every step of progress. But how is discrimination or 
 combination conceivable apart from a unitary psychical 
 agent, which, in its capability of being present to several 
 terms, can isolate them from one another or bring them 
 into conjunction, now taking note of this, now of that, 
 
50 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 and now recalling a term as one previously recognized? 
 Under the definition of mind as a mere series of feelings 
 this entire process would seem to be outlawed. A 
 series, such as that in question, has no existence except 
 in its present member ; that is, it has no actual existence 
 at all as a series, but only a conceptional existence. The 
 past feeling, as simply nonexistent, cannot, of course, 
 exercise any agency, whether of discrimination or com- 
 bination. As for the present feeling, if it is to recall the 
 past feeling and discriminate itself from it or combine 
 itself with it, then it passes far beyond the rank of a 
 simple feeling and takes on the character of a conscious 
 subject, being made to fulfill under another name the 
 role of a real agent. Openly or surreptitiously the con- 
 scious subject, the real agent, is bound to be introduced. 
 It cannot be dispensed with in an exposition of the 
 simplest facts of the mental life. The supposition that 
 evolution releases from the necessity of postulating such 
 an agent is much like the mythological attempt to find 
 a firm support for the earth by placing it upon an ele- 
 phant, and the elephant upon a tortoise. Evolution can- 
 not dispense with the indispensable. Rational experi- 
 ence, involving as It does at Its very initiation acts of 
 discrimination and combination, can neither begin nor 
 continue apart from a real subject, a unitary psychical 
 agent. 
 
 A serious ground for objection lies against the sensa- 
 tional psychology on the score of Its rank necessitarian- 
 ism. In canceling freedom it cancels the intelligible 
 ground of proper moral distinctions. Room may be left 
 for aesthetic distinctions. Some forms of conduct may 
 be adapted to produce spontaneous impressions of unseem- 
 liness and ugliness, others to excite impressions of seem- 
 llness and beauty. But all, as being equally necessitated, 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 51 
 
 are on a perfect parity as respects praiseworthiness or 
 blameworthiness, and to speak of responsibility for any 
 of them is like ascribing responsibility to the nettle for 
 being a nettle, or to the rose for being a rose. Trouble 
 is also made for the theory of knowledge by this sweep- 
 ing denial of freedom. If every act is determined, if 
 nothing is left to a better or worse use of free agency, 
 then false judgments have the same basis as the true. 
 All alike are dictated by the nature of things, and the 
 conclusion follows, not merely that it is difficult to fix 
 upon a standard for the discrimination of truth from 
 error, but even to conceive that there can be such a stand- 
 ard. As for Herbert Spencer's plea in behalf of neces- 
 sity, cited above, if it is not, as characterized by Pro- 
 fessor James, "beneath criticism,"^ it is certainly far 
 from being weighty. It is not warrantable to assume 
 either that man was made for the convenience of the 
 psychologist or that his freedom makes him an impos- 
 sible subject for psychological treatment. Only a psy- 
 chology that is bent upon seeing nothing in the universe 
 but mechanism is ruled out by the supposition of free- 
 dom. Freedom may, indeed, transcend law as it applies 
 to mechanisms, but who is qualified to say offhand that 
 it is not in accordance with one of the higher laws of 
 the universe that personalities should subsist which are 
 above the plane of mechanism as being dowered with a 
 power of initiation? The possession of such a power 
 may interfere with the certain forecast of conduct; but 
 who pretends to be able to write biographies in advance? 
 Probability has been characterized as the guide of life, 
 and free beings are subjects for probable conclusions, 
 since motives, if not in strictness causes of conduct, are 
 yet persuasives. Political science asks for no more defi- 
 
 ^ Principles of Psychology, IL 576. 
 
52 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 nite basis than this, and psychology has no call to fret 
 over the lack of mechanical exactness in a sphere to 
 which it is foreign. 
 
 The difficulty on the part of leading representatives 
 of the sensational psychology, in adhering to their own 
 premises, has been pretty amply illustrated. John Stuart 
 Mill has furnished some striking instances. Referring 
 to the definition of mind current in his school, he added : 
 "If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are 
 obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series 
 of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; 
 and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that 
 the mind, or ego, is something different from a series of 
 feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the 
 paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a 
 series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series."* 
 Again he remarked: "There is a bond of some sort 
 among all the parts of the series which makes me say that 
 they were the feelings of a person who was the same 
 person throughout, and this bond, to me, constitutes 
 my ego,"^ In making such admissions Mill seems to have 
 opened a trapdoor in the floor of his own philosophy.^ 
 He as much as confessed that the atomistic conception of 
 mind with which he set out must be rated as inadequate. 
 "When Mill," says Hoffding, "recognizes the uniting 
 bond as equally real with the particular elements he cor- 
 rects the entire conception of consciousness from which 
 Hume, and, following him, James Mill, had started. The 
 laws of association are now seen to be nothing more than 
 special forms of the uniting principle."^ 
 
 » Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 213. 
 
 2 Notes on James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human 
 Mind, II. 175. 
 
 ^ Masson, Recent British Philosophy, p. 215. 
 < History of Modem Philosophy, II. 4131 416. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 53 
 
 Illustration has also been given by Herbert Spencer 
 of the difficulty of maintaining a consistent and straight- 
 forward adherence to the demands of the sensational 
 creed. As Thomas Hill Green has noted, he smuggles 
 in the unity of consciousness which he assumes to de- 
 duce.* As Professor Bowne has pointed out, though he 
 had made the mental order the resultant of the physical 
 order, and characterized the notion of free will as pure 
 illusion, he yet, in his argument with the idealist, brings 
 back the ego as a real agent. "It is no longer a series 
 of faint impressions, or the inner side of nerve motions, 
 but a true source of energy, and the warrant for affirm- 
 ing a thing-series, apart from the thought-series, is found 
 in the fact that our energy is resisted by an energy not 
 our own."^ Furthermore, Spencer seems to have 
 afforded means of controverting his own assertion that 
 nothing can be subject and object at once, which he urges 
 against the possibility of direct self-consciousness. 
 While he defines consciousness as the sum of our psy- 
 chical states, and affirms that the absolute is manifested 
 in all our psychical and physical states alike, he main- 
 tains that there is in us not merely a negative, but a posi- 
 tive, though indefinite consciousness of the absolute.* 
 Now, in saying that the absolute is manifested in the 
 states mentioned, Spencer obviously meant to imply that 
 it is the ultimate or true subject of the states. Therefore, 
 as being manifested in every psychical state, the absolute 
 is the subject of all consciousness; accordingly, it is the 
 subject of the particular consciousness of which it is the 
 object — that is, subject and object at once. 
 
 Clearer illustration of the bankruptcy of the sensa- 
 tional psychology could not well be given than that which 
 
 * Works, I. 438-440. 2 Metaphysics, revised edition, pp. 319, 320. 
 
 3 First Principles, pp. 65, 88-92, 156, 157; Principles of Psychology, 
 I. 627, II. 503. 
 
54 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 has been furnished by its own representatives. It has 
 suffered the hard, but appropriate, fate of being dis- 
 credited in the house of its friends. 
 
 III. — A Question as to the Genuine Representa- 
 tives OF Materialism 
 
 Somewhat of an incentive to the spread of materiaHstic 
 theories was naturally furnished by the great advance in 
 the physical sciences which began to be made near to the 
 middle of the nineteenth century. Absorbed in this line 
 of studies, and elated by the discoveries made, various 
 minds experienced a temptation to assign to the physical 
 point of view a preeminent or even exclusive place in the 
 interpretation of the universe. The tendency thus evoked 
 was reinforced, at least in some quarters, by a reaction 
 from the great speculative systems of the early part of 
 the century. Not a few were made to feel that the prac^ 
 tical achievements of these systems fell vastly short of 
 their lofty claims. 
 
 A relative decline of interest in the fundamental ques- 
 tions of metaphysics ensued. An opportunity was thus 
 provided for the insinuation of materialistic thinking; 
 for, as Professor Eucken has remarked, "materialism, 
 powerless against every scientific philosophy, always 
 steps forward instantlv in a time of speculative exhaus- 
 tion."i 
 
 Among scientific writers of any considerable note dis- 
 tinct professions of the unadulterated creed of material- 
 ism have been rather infrequent. Even where they have 
 given expression to points which the most thorough- 
 going materialist is wont to assert they have hesitated 
 formally to subscribe to the materialistic scheme in its 
 totality. Accordingly, a question of classification ob- 
 
 *The Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophy, Eng. trans., p. 123 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 55 
 
 trudes itself. We need to inquire whether this or that 
 name, conspicuous in recent Hterature, belongs in the 
 list of genuine materialists. 
 
 If we take this inquiry into English territory no name 
 will be more readily called up than that of Thomas H. 
 Huxley. It takes but little search to reveal the fact that 
 he was free to express himself in such terms as might 
 be employed by a stanch materialist. Taken as they 
 stand, the following statements seem certainly to favor 
 the materialistic theory: "As every future grows out of 
 past and present, so will the physiology of the future 
 gradually extend the realm of matter and law until it is 
 coextensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with 
 action."^ "What we call the operations of the mind are 
 functions of the brain, and the materials of consciousness 
 are products of cerebral activity."^ "There is every rea- 
 son to believe that consciousness is a function of nervous 
 matter, when that nervous matter has attained a certain 
 degree of organization, just as we know the other 'actions 
 to which the nervous system, ministers,' such as reflex 
 action and the like, to be."^ "If these positions [set forth 
 in an article on Conscious Automatism] are well based, 
 it follows that our mental conditions are simply sym- 
 bols of consciousness of the changes which take place 
 automatically in the organism ; and that, to take an ex- 
 treme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the 
 cause of the voluntary act, but the symbol of the state 
 of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act."* 
 But, in spite of all this stress on the primacy and efficacy 
 of matter, Huxley refuses to be classified as a material- 
 
 1 Collected Essays, I. 159 f-. cited by James Ward in Naturalism and 
 Agnosticism, I. 17. 
 
 2 Collected Essays, VI. 94, cited by Edward Clodd in Life of Huxley, 
 p. ri6. 
 
 ^ Darwiniana, p. 162. 
 'Cited by Ward, I. 179. 
 
56 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 ist. He notices that in the ultimate analysis matter and 
 motion are names for phenomena of consciousness, so 
 that the making of mental phenomena the products of 
 material phenomena amounts to an assertion that one 
 order of phenomena of. consciousness may be presumed 
 to be preceded by another order. ^ He expresses his sense 
 of the groundlessness of materialism in these strong 
 words : "I understand the main tenet of materialism to 
 be that there is nothing in the universe but matter and 
 force; and that all the phenomena of nature are explic- 
 able by deduction from the properties assignable to these 
 two primitive factors. . . . But all this I heartily disbe- 
 lieve. In the first place, it seems to me pretty plain that 
 there is a third thing in the universe, to wit, conscious- 
 ness, which, in the hardness of my heart or head, I can- 
 not see to be matter or force, or any conceivable modi- 
 fication of either, however intimately the manifestations 
 of the phenomena of consciousness may be connected 
 with the phenomena known as matter and force. In the 
 second place, the arguments used by Descartes and 
 Berkeley to show that our certain knowledge does not 
 extend beyond our states of consciousness appear to me 
 as irrefragable now as they did when I first became 
 acquainted with them some half century ago. All the 
 materialistic writers I know of who have tried to bite 
 that file have simply broken their teeth. But, if this is 
 true, our one certainty is the existence of the mental 
 world, and that of Kraft imd Stoif falls into the rank of, 
 at best, a highly probable hypothesis."^ Accordingly, 
 he testifies, "If I were forced to choose between material- 
 ism and idealism I should certainly elect for the latter."^ 
 It is to be noticed, further, that he repudiates the anti- 
 
 ' Collected Essays, VI. 94, 95, cited by Clodd 
 
 * Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, 1892, pp. 171, 172. 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 174. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 57 
 
 theistic dogmatism largely characteristic of materialism as 
 "not merely baseless, but impertinent."^ We seem to be 
 restrained, therefore, from numbering Huxley among 
 materialists. Following his own choice of names, we 
 might call him an agnostic; but we should have reason to 
 add that for an agnostic he said too much which looks 
 like an assurance of the primacy of matter over mind. 
 
 In his famous address at Belfast John Tyndall used 
 words which may be understood to be a declaration of 
 materialistic faith. The passage which probably elicited 
 most remark was the following: "Believing as I do in 
 the continuity of nature, I cannot stop abruptly where 
 our microscopes cease to be of use. Here the vision of 
 the mind authoritatively supplements the vision of the 
 eye. By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary 
 of the experimental evidence, and discern in that matter 
 which we, in our own ignorance of its latent powers, 
 and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its 
 Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the 
 promise and potency of all terrestrial life."^ On the 
 other hand, Tyndall strongly emphasized the utter con- 
 trast between the physical and the mental. "The pas- 
 sage," he says, "from the physics of the brain to the cor- 
 responding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. 
 Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular 
 action in the brain occur simultaneously, we do not pos- 
 sess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment 
 of the organ, which would enable us to pass by a process 
 of reasoning from the one phenomenon to the other."^ 
 Again, he rated as inconceivable the notion that atoms 
 which individually are destitute of thought and sensa- 
 
 * Essays upon Some Controverted Questions, pp. 26, 27. 
 
 ^Address, revised edition, pp. 58, 59. 
 
 ^ Cited by Romanes in Mind, Motion, and Monism, p. 64. 
 
58 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 tion should by their combination give thought and sen- 
 sation.^ Furthermore, he intimated that he had as Httle 
 ambition as Huxley to espouse antitheistic dogmatism. 
 Referring to the doctrine of "material atheism," he 
 added : "I have noticed during years of self-observation 
 that it is not in hours of clearness and vigor that this 
 doctrine commends itself to my mind ; that in the pres- 
 ence of stronger and healthier thought it ever dissolves 
 and disappears, as offering no solution of the mystery in 
 which we dwell, and of which we form a part."^ On 
 the whole, it appears that Tyndall did not hold a clear- 
 cut materialistic creed, and was able to view matter as 
 a sufficient source of all terrestrial life only by putting 
 into matter a mystical and indefinable meaning. 
 
 At the time when he wrote his Candid Examination 
 of Theism, G. J. Romanes was disposed to maintain that 
 a sufficient explanation of everything in the world may 
 be found in the persistence of force and the primary 
 qualities of matter. While not very definite, this 
 language implies a certain affiliation with the material- 
 istic point of view. Near the close of his life he recovered 
 his theistic faith. In his ultimate psychological theory 
 he endeavored to combine the materialistic and the spirit- 
 ualistic points of view. Unhappily, the resulting monism 
 took the least credible of all forms, that of an identifica- 
 tion of physical and mental phenomena. Defining the 
 chosen form, he said : "This theory is that mental phe- 
 nomena and physical phenomena, although apparently 
 diverse, are really identical."^ This looks very much like 
 saying that unlike appearances are identical appearances. 
 The theory is staggering to the mind's power of con- 
 ception. As Professor Ladd remarks: *Tt is not simply 
 
 1 Belfast Address, p 38. ^ Preface to Belfast Address. 
 
 3 Mind, Motion, and Monism, p. 83. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 59 
 
 true that to identify these two kinds of phenomena — 
 phenomena of the motion of material atoms and phe- 
 nomena of change in mental states — is difficult for the 
 average mind, but attainable by the scientific observer; 
 it is rather true that no mind can frame any intelligible 
 idea of what would be meant by identifying the two."^ 
 In the passage cited, Romanes, by identifying physical 
 and mental phenomena, seems to have placed the two 
 upon a parity. It may be noticed, however, that he some- 
 times indulged in expressions which imply the primacy 
 of mind — expressions that lie very close to a pronounced 
 idealism. "According to monism," he observes, *'all 
 matter in motion is mind; and, therefore, matter in 
 motion is merely the objective revelation to us and for 
 us, of that which in its subjective aspect — or in its ulti- 
 mate reality — is mind. . . . Everywhere the reality may 
 be psychical, and the physical symbolic ; everywhere mat- 
 ter in motion may be the outward and visible sign of 
 an inward and spiritual grace."^ Evidently the mind 
 from which these sentences issued was not anchored in 
 materialism. 
 
 Under the peculiar term "mind-stuff" Professor W. K. 
 Clifford has been thought to give harborage to material- 
 istic suppositions. As summarized by himself, his main 
 thoughts are these: "(i) Matter is a mental picture in 
 which mind-stuff is the thing represented. (2) Reason, 
 intelligence, and volition are properties of a complex 
 which is made up of elements themselves not rational, 
 not intelligent, not conscious."^ His editor, F. Pollock, 
 interprets these statements as significant of an idealistic 
 monism. It is not to be denied, however, that the ideal- 
 
 1 Elements of Physiological Psychology, pp. 589, 590. 
 
 2 Mind, Motion, and Monism, pp. iii, 114. 
 
 3 Lectures and Essays, second edition, p. 286. 
 
6o PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 ism which they inclose, if indeed the term is applicable, 
 is of a special kind as making- consciousness and intelli- 
 gence late and limited products in the universe. As Pro- 
 fessor Clifford taught, the elements of the mind-stuff 
 themselves are totally void of this order of attributes or 
 activities. Only in connection with such an organism 
 as the brain do they have any subsistence. In the lack 
 of evidence of a cosmic or universal brain structure it 
 follows that the theistic conception is unfounded. So 
 Clifford seems to have concluded, though expressing his 
 reverence for the conception and his sense of its great 
 practical worth. Speaking of those who have felt com- 
 pelled to part with the thought of a personal God, he 
 said : "We have seen the spring sun shine out of an empty 
 heaven to light up a soulless earth; we have felt with 
 utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead."^ We 
 conclude that, while not formally materialistic, Clifford's 
 scheme, in its derivation of the conscious and intelligent 
 from the unconscious and nonintelligent, has a prominent 
 point of affiliation with materialism. Romanes noticed 
 the bearing of this item both in the teaching of Clifford 
 and in that of Herbert Spencer. "The essential feature 
 of materialism;," he remarked, "remiains untouched — 
 namely, that what we know as mind is dependent 
 (whether by way of causality or not is immaterial) on 
 highly complex forms of zvhat we know as matter, in 
 association with highly peculiar distributions of what we 
 knozv as force."^ 
 
 In passing from England to Germany we enter a field 
 which has witnessed, on the part of men of standing in 
 science and literature, a more explicit and unequivocal 
 advocacy of materialism. We find here, nevertheless, 
 
 ' Lectures and Essays, p. 389. 
 
 * A Candid Examination of Theism, Supplement, p. 188. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 6i 
 
 several prominent writers respecting whom a question 
 of classification may be raised. This question applies 
 first of all to Ludwig Feuerbach. Stated in brief the 
 ascertained facts are these: The pronounced materialists 
 in Germany in the latter part of the century recognized 
 Feuerbach as the great oracle in philosophy, and counted 
 him as being in an important sense their own forerunner. 
 In an early statement of his standpoint he expressed his 
 assent to a leading postulate of sensationalism. *T 
 found my ideas," he said, "on materials which can be 
 appropriated only through the activity of the senses."^ 
 Somewhat later, in reviewing Moleschott's Lehre der 
 Nahrungsmittel, he penned these words: "Food be- 
 comes blood, blood becomes heart and brain, thoughts 
 and mind-stuff. Man is what he eats."^ Such a state- 
 ment might very naturally be taken as an explicit decla- 
 ration of the most unqualified materialism. Still, it is 
 to be doubted whether Feuerbach would have consented 
 to be classed as a materialist. His strong language may 
 be in part explained by his penchant for smart hyper- 
 bolical sayings. While he was definitely committed to 
 sensationalism, he was inclined to an agnostic position 
 on the nature of the human spirit. His biographers 
 represent him as refusing to subscribe formally either to 
 materialism or spiritualism.^ As will be noticed later, 
 his scheme may be described as positivism, being quite 
 analogous to that of Comte. Like his French contem- 
 porary, he had no real use for the notion of a personal 
 God. 
 
 In his ultimate confession of belief, as it appears in his 
 book entitled The Old Faith and the New, D. F. Strauss 
 
 • The Essence of Christianity, Preface to second edition. 
 'Cited by Hoffding, History of Modem Philosophy, II. 281. 
 ' W. Bolin, Ludwig Feuerbach, sein Werken und seine Zeitgenossen, 
 1 891; A. Levy, La Philosophie de Feuerbach, 1904. 
 
62 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 put himself in line with Feuerbach both in his rejection 
 of the theistic conception and in his apparent sanction 
 of the materialistic theory. Ulrici has declared of his 
 teaching at this stage that it was nothing but "naked 
 atheism and materialism."^ If acknowledging no God 
 besides an impersonal cosmos stamps one as an atheist, 
 then certainly Strauss earned that name. It is also cer- 
 tain that he indulged in expressions which furnish very 
 plausible grounds for classifying him as a materialist. 
 He pronounced the continued existence of the soul, after 
 the destruction of the brain, to be as little conceivable 
 as the existence of the center of a circle after the dis- 
 solution of its circumference.^ He described life as 
 "only a special, namely, the most complicated, kind of 
 mechanics."^ He intimated his conviction that the psy- 
 chical may properly be referred to a purely physical 
 source. Apparently forgetful of the fact that "heat" is 
 a name for a sensation, he asked, "If, under certain con- 
 ditions, motion is transformed into heat, why may it 
 not, under other conditions, be transformed into sensa- 
 tion?"* As Strauss himself admitted that his conclusion 
 had an appearance of "unmitigated materialism," there 
 is little occasion to search for qualifying considerations. 
 The most that can be said is that he placed more em- 
 phasis upon the proposition that man in body and soul 
 is of one substance than upon the theory that this sub- 
 stance is definable in the proper terms of matter. 
 
 While Ernst Haeckel is very emphatic in styling him- 
 self a "monist" rather than a materialist, there is good 
 reason for affirming that in the quality of his monism 
 there lurks a large amount of materialism. That is the 
 
 * Strauss as a Philosophical Thinker, Eng. trans., p. 78. 
 
 2 The Old Faith and the New, sixth edition, Eng. trans., pp. 150, 151. 
 ^ Ibid., p. 199. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 240. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 63 
 
 judgment of many German scholars. His claim that the 
 monism which he represents is patterned after the pan- 
 theism of Spinoza is not allowed to pass without chal- 
 lenge. As Professor Adickes observes, he replaces the 
 unitary substance of Spinoza with an aggregate, and sub- 
 stitutes for the conception of a parallelism between the 
 corporeal and the mental a doctrine of the dependence 
 of the latter upon the former.^ He asserts in undis- 
 guised terms almost every proposition which has been 
 made a shibboleth by recent materialism. At the same 
 time it must be admitted that his teaching includes some 
 elements that are no necessary part of a materialistic sys- 
 tem. This is especially true of his hylozoism, or sup- 
 position that a kind of soul belongs to each of the atoms 
 which make up the universe. On the whole, a recent 
 manual of the history of philosophy probably comes as 
 near to a true description as is practicable when it styles 
 Haeckel's system an "inconsequent materialism."^ We 
 may therefore cite from him without compunction in a 
 resume of materialistic postulates, only reserving some 
 special features of his thinking for notice under the topic 
 of antitheistic evolutionism. 
 
 By general consent three writers belonging to the 
 middle and latter part of the nineteenth century have been 
 classified as champions of materialism pure and simple. 
 These writers were Carl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, and 
 Ludvvig Biichner. A question may, indeed, be raised as 
 to whether one or another of them did not ultimately 
 make some revision of his materialistic creed ; but in case 
 of all of them that which most prominently calls atten- 
 tion to their names is the fact of their outspoken advocacy 
 
 1 Kant contra Haeckel, Erkenntnistheorie gegen natiirwissenschaftlichen 
 Dogmatismus. 
 
 ^ Vorlander, Geschichte der Philosophie, II. 438. 
 
64 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 of an unmitigated materialism. Among contemporaries 
 in Germany who approximated to their platform were 
 Heinrich Czolbe, J. C. Fischer, and Eduard Lowenthal. 
 
 In France materialism has had its representatives dur- 
 ing the last century, but they can hardly be said to have 
 vied in reputation with their predecessors of the pre- 
 ceding century, such as La Mettrie and Baron d'Hol- 
 bach. Cabanis, who wrote in the last years of the 
 eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth, used 
 some very ultra materialistic phraseology in repre- 
 senting thought as a secretion of the brain^ ; but his con- 
 sistent committal to the materialistic creed has been 
 questioned. 
 
 In both Germany and France materialism has had con- 
 siderable currency in the ranks of advanced socialists. 
 This currency, however, cannot be taken as a measure of 
 well-rooted conviction. Evidently antipathy to an estab- 
 lished regime, which is thought to owe its life very largely 
 to religious ideas and traditions, has helped to commend 
 the materialistic system as appearing to be the negation 
 of religion. 
 
 IV. — Cardinal Conclusions of Materialism 
 
 Four main conclusions are characteristic of the ma- 
 terialism of recent times. In the first place, it denies 
 the substantial existence of mind, and describes all mental 
 activities — thoughts, feelings, volitions — as products or 
 functions of the material organism. On this point Vogt 
 reproduces, not to say aggravates, the crude representa- 
 tion of Cabanis. "In my opinion," he says, "every investi- 
 gator of nature will, in the use of consistent thinking, 
 come to the view that all those capabilities which we 
 include under the name of activities of soul are simply 
 
 1 Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, II. 339. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 65 
 
 functions of the brain substance, or, to employ a some- 
 what rude expression, that thoughts stand in the same 
 relation to the brain as gall to the liver or urine to the 
 kidneys."^ Moleschott affirms that in the "strictest 
 sense" the brain is the instrument or organ of thought. 
 Taken according to his meaning, Vogt, he maintains, 
 was entirely justified in employing the figure which he 
 did. "Thought is a movement, a transposition of brain 
 substance" (eine Umsetzung des Hirnstoffs).^ Biichner 
 adrrtits that Vogt's illustration was badly chosen, as 
 seeming to imply that thoughts are a palpable stuff ; but 
 of the absolute dependence of the mind upon the physical 
 organism he makes no question. "The brain," he says, 
 "is bearer and generator, or, better said, sole cause of 
 thought. . . . Psychical activity is a function of the brain 
 substance."^ Haeckel shows very distinctly his judgment 
 on the ontological subordination of the mental to the 
 physical by repeated references to psychology as a branch 
 of physiology.^ More specifically he asserts the same 
 judgment in such declarations as the following: "Con- 
 sciousness, like feeling and willing, among the higher 
 animals is a mechanical work of ganglion cells, and as 
 such must be carried back to chemical and physical events 
 in the plasma of these."^ "We now know that the flame 
 is a sum of electric vibrations of the ether, and the soul 
 a sum of plasma movements in the ganglion cells."*^ "The 
 'soul' is merely a collective title for the sum total of man's 
 cerebral functions; and these are just as much determined 
 by physical and chemical processes as are any of the other 
 
 1 Physiologische Briefe fiir Gebildete aller Stande, pp. 323-325. 
 
 * Der Kreislauf des Lebens, second edition, pp. 385, 418, 419. 
 ' Kraft und Stofif, tenth edition, pp. 146, 150. 
 
 ■* Monism as Connecting Science and Religion, trans, by Gilchrist, p. 42; 
 The Riddle of the Universe, trans, by McCabe, p. 88 ; The Wonders of Life, 
 trans by McCabe, p. 18. 
 
 * Monism, p. 47. ^ Ibid., p. 113. 
 
66 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 vital functions, and just as amenable to the law of sub- 
 stance."^ 
 
 A second characteristic conclusion of materialism is the 
 groundlessness of the notion of freedom. Following the 
 obvious demands of the theory of the mechanical deter- 
 mination of all events in the universe,, it scouts the notion 
 of any possible option as to human conduct. "Man," 
 says Moleschott, "is the sum of parents and nurse, of 
 place and time, of pleasure and weather, of sound and 
 light, of food and clothing. His will is the necessary 
 result of all these causes, bound to a law of nature, like 
 the planet to its course, like the plant to the soil."^ In 
 very similar terms Biichner defines man as a product of 
 "outward and inward workings," a being that is subject 
 to the same law which rules plant and beast.^ For 
 Haeckel the doctrine of freedom ranks as an obsolete 
 fiction. "The freedom of the will," he says, "is not an 
 object for critical scientific inquiry at all, for it is a pure 
 dogma, based on an illusion, and has no real existence."* 
 
 A third main conclusion of recent materialism is the 
 necessary repudiation of the doctrine of man's immor- 
 tality. The indispensableness of the physical organism 
 to mental activities involves, it claims, the certainty that 
 the dissolution of the body results in the total cessation 
 of personal existence. "Physiology pronounces," says 
 Vogt, "definitely and categorically against an individual 
 immortality."^ Biichner approves this statement of 
 Vogt, and says, "Not conviction but mere selfish caprice, 
 not science but mere faith, can support the idea of con- 
 tinued personal existence."® Haeckel contends that the 
 
 1 The Riddle of the Universe, p. 204; compare Wonders of Life, p. 23. 
 * Der Kreislauf des Lebens, p. 436. ^ Kraft und Stoff, p. 260. 
 
 "The Riddle of the Universe, p. 15. 
 ^ Physiologische Briefe, p. 634. « Kraft und Stoff, p. 210. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM (>7 
 
 advance of science in the last sixty years has rendered the 
 notion of personal immortality inexcusable.^ That no- 
 tion, he says, marks "the highest point of superstition," 
 and is in "hopeless contradiction with the most solid em- 
 pirical truths of modern science."^ 
 
 The fourth conclusion of recent materialism gives ex- 
 pression to its antitheistic position. With the same con- 
 fidence with which it vetoes man's freedom and immor- 
 tality it puts under ban the thought of a personal God. 
 There is no occasion, it assumes, to postulate an almighty 
 designer of the universe, since the universe reveals no 
 design. All changes take place with unfailing necessity 
 under the control of the eternal laws immanent in the 
 eternal matter. A personal agent in connection with the 
 world-process would be a superfluity and an impertinence. 
 To identify the fixed laws of nature, says Biichner, with 
 the workings of an eternal reason will not answer. 
 "Either the laws of nature rule, or the eternal reason 
 rules; the two must come into conflict every instant"^ — 
 a statement which certainly is very disparaging either to 
 reason or to nature, and leads one to inquire what 
 Biichner could have meant by speaking as though man 
 might properly felicitate himself on being a child of 
 nature.^ In the view of Haeckel the conception of a 
 personal God is so clearly untenable that it is scarcely a 
 matter for discussion. Speaking of monistic science as 
 interpreted by himself, he says: "It marks the highest 
 intellectual progress, in that it definitely rules out the 
 three central dogmas of metaphysics — God, freedom, and 
 immortality."^ Again he remarks : "Our clear modern 
 insight into the regularity and causative character of 
 
 ^Monism, pp. 54, 55. ' The Riddle of the Universe, pp. 188, 210. 
 
 3 Kraft und StofI, p. 42. ^ Ibid., eighth edition, Preface. 
 
 *The Riddle of the Universe, p. 232. 
 
68 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 natural processes, and especially our knowledge of the 
 universal reign of the law of substance are inconsistent 
 with a belief in a personal God, the immortality of the 
 soul, and the freedom of the will."^ 
 
 From these four main conclusions of materialism vari- 
 ous inferences obviously follow, such as the complete 
 nullity of all supposed miracles and revelations, and the 
 vanity of the notion that man is in any sense the end to 
 which the terrestrial system is directed. The last of these 
 inferences is strongly emphasized by Haeckel. Indeed, 
 his despite toward the anthropocentric conception of the 
 world is of a piece with his antipathy against the notions 
 of God, freedom, and immortality. "The ridiculous im- 
 perial folly of Caligula," he says, "is but a special form 
 of man's arrogant assumption of divinity."^ 
 
 A very striking feature of the German school of ma- 
 terialists is the satisfaction which they seem to take in 
 their negation of God and of man as he is represented in 
 Christian thought. Here they stand in broad contrast 
 with the English scholars to whom reference has been 
 made. When Romanes felt obliged to admit that the 
 evidences for theism had been rendered inconclusive to 
 his mind he confessed that for him the universe had lost 
 its "soul of loveliness," and spoke of "the appalling con- 
 trast between the hallowed glory of the creed" which 
 once was his and "the lonely mystery of existence" to 
 which he had been consigned by its departure. Words of 
 similar import are on record from Clifford. On the other 
 hand, not one of the writers with whom we have been 
 dealing in this connection, so far as we have been able 
 to discover, ever expressed a regret for the necessity of 
 believing in an aimless, godless world, in the blotting out 
 
 1 Wonders of Life, p- 67. 
 
 2 The Riddle of the Universe, p. 14; compare Monism, pp. 13-15. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 69, 
 
 of the individual souls of men, and in the prospective 
 extinction of humanity as a race. The complacency with 
 which they have held their barren and dismal creed and 
 their eagerness to bear down a competing faith suggest 
 that they must have gravitated unconsciously into a con- 
 dition of scientific, or rather unscientific, fanaticism. 
 
 V. — Shortcomings of the Materialistic Theory 
 
 A very poor opinion of the merits of materialism is 
 derived from a review of its constituency. The list of its 
 outspoken advocates among recent scholars who have 
 any considerable reputation is by no means formidable. 
 Even those who have affiliated more or less closely with 
 materialistic theories have quite generally preferred not 
 to dress up their thoughts in the plain garb of material- 
 ism, and have sought for them a more seemly costume in 
 the wardrobes of monism and agnosticism. Their quest 
 for an improved terminology may be taken as a sign of an 
 underlying consciousness that, philosophically, material- 
 ism takes a low rank. And there is good reason for this 
 order of consciousness. Notwithstanding the wide cir- 
 culation of the popular works of Biichner and Haeckel, 
 the general verdict of contemporary philosophy in Ger- 
 many, as well as elsewhere, is decidedly hostile to the 
 materialistic platform. As is stated in a recent history 
 of philosophy, "the Neo-Kantian movement in all its 
 forms, with its earnest work upon the problem of knowl- 
 edge, has had the result of rendering the superficial meta- 
 physics of materialism evidently inadequate and impos- 
 sible."^ That this is a true description of the trend of 
 philosophical conviction is indicated by the words of 
 Haeckel. In bitterness of spirit over the undeniable facts 
 
 iWindelband, History of Philosophy, Eng. trans., p. 643; compare Sie 
 bert, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Philosophic seit Hegel, p. 477. 
 
70 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 he remarks: "Most of the representatives of philosophy 
 at the universities are narrow metaphysicians and ideal- 
 ists, who think more of the fiction of the 'intelligible 
 world' than of the truth of the world of sense."^ Not 
 less significantly he confesses that he stands with a 
 minority even of physiologists on a question of capital 
 importance. "Most physiologists," he says, "share the 
 view of Dubois-Reymond, that consciousness is not a 
 natural phenomenon, but a hyperphysical problem." 
 This point of view, he adds, is naturally very agreeable 
 to the prevalent metaphysics.^ In view of such a pro- 
 nounced disparity between the advocates of materialistic 
 and of anti-materialistic philosophy one might almost 
 suspect that the vociferous champions of the former are 
 shouting for the purpose of keeping up their courage. 
 Even the casual reader of the materialistic treatises cannot 
 fail to discover reasons why they receive so little notice 
 from men of eminence in philosophical circles. They 
 abound in dogmatic assertions, but scarcely touch the 
 deeper problems of metaphysical inquiry. You will find 
 in them, for instance, the assumption of the infinitude 
 of the world, but when you ask for the proof not so much 
 as a first installment is discoverable. You will encounter 
 the most positive affirmation of the objective reality of 
 space and time, but you will look in vain for any serious 
 attempt to justify the affirmation. You will meet the 
 unqualified declaration that science cannot admat the 
 notion of a personal God, but when you inquire for the 
 grounds of so confident an assertion you find nothing 
 better than the supposed demands of a disputable definition 
 of substance, or the flimsy assumption that a personal 
 will is incompatible with a system of laws; and if the 
 more serious consideration of the incongruities in the 
 
 ^Wonders of Life, p. 71. ^ Ibid., pp. 289, 290. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 71 
 
 world system is brought forward, the right to use it is 
 seen to be voided by the endeavor, which appears in one 
 connection or another, to present the world as an object 
 of trust and reverence. In short, while Professor Adickes 
 may not have been over observant of the demands of 
 polite discourse when he said of Buchner and Haeckel, 
 "als Philosophen sind beide Nullen,"^ he can hardly be 
 accused of sinful exaggeration. 
 
 An easy-going assumption, which is specially charac- 
 teristic of Haeckel, appears in emphatic declarations that 
 recent science, especially in the line of microscopic inves- 
 tigation, has profoundly modified the basis of psycholog- 
 ical theory, so that the spiritualistic conception has no 
 longer a standing-ground against the materialistic. 
 What now are the facts? What discoveries have been 
 made which require a radical transformation of psycho- 
 logical theory? A more minute knowledge may have 
 been gained of the outward manifestations of the body 
 in its embryological beginnings. A clearer understand- 
 ing of brain structure and a more detailed acquaintance 
 with the capacities of movement in the brain substance 
 may have been attained. But what is there in all this of 
 revolutionary import? Was it unknown prior to the last 
 two generations that man's bodily life began at an in- 
 finitesimal point? Was the truth utterly hidden sixty 
 years ago that in his present embodied state man's mental 
 life is intimately connected with the body, and especially 
 with the brain ? What, then, has the microscope done in 
 the hands of modern scientists? It has simply furnished 
 the ground for the specification of certain details within 
 the lines of long-admitted facts. Microscopic inspection, 
 whether of the embryo or of the brain, never discovers 
 the psychical, and never can. The only sphere in which 
 
 • Kant contra Haeckel, p. 2. 
 
72 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 the psychical comes to true revelation is the sphere of 
 consciousness. Sense-perception, however aided by me- 
 chanical appliances, can never apprehend aught besides 
 masses and movements, to which mental significance can 
 be given only by reference to experiences of the conscious 
 thinking subject. Progress in physiological investigation 
 is doubtless something to be thankful for ; but it is simply 
 a bad case of illusion which is presented when one sup- 
 poses that the data of recent physiological research can. 
 be used to settle the fundamental questions of psy- 
 chology. 
 
 Coming now to a closer consideration of the shortcom- 
 ings of materialism, we notice in the first place that it 
 commits a palpable fault in judging the near and the 
 known by the remote and relatively unknown. First- 
 hand knowledge is confined to the content of conscious- 
 ness, to the mind in its concrete states or modifications. 
 Everything beyond this range is reached only by infer- 
 ence. The inference to the material environment may be 
 very direct and spontaneous, but it is conditioned, never- 
 theless, upon antecedents in the conscious subject, who 
 knows his own modifications first of all, and accounts for 
 some of them by reference to an outside reality. Now, 
 what sort of a procedure is it to bring in this relatively 
 remote and inferred outside reality to the virtual or for- 
 mal negation of the conscious subject? The incongruity 
 into which materialistic theory runs at this point is glar- 
 ing and unmistakable. "Let it be assumed," says Pro- 
 fessor Ladd, "that the phenomena of consciousness have 
 no real subject in the mind. Such phenomena must, ac- 
 cordingly, be attributed to the peculiarly constituted and 
 mutually interacting molecules of the brain. But these 
 supreme physical beings are themselves, so far as they are 
 the object of knowledge, preeminently mental creations ; 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 73 
 
 and the sole warrant for carrying them over into the realm 
 of extramental reality consists in certain irresistible con- 
 victions or assumptions of mind. To make their real 
 being the account of the mental phenomena, and thus to 
 deny the real being of the subject of mental phenomena, 
 is not only to explain what is most direct and certain by 
 what is most indirect and uncertain ; it even involves the 
 wonderful paradox that the one being in whose active 
 energizing all conceptions of all real being arise feels justi- 
 fied in denying its own reality in the supposed favor of 
 certain of its most remote and doubtful conceptions."^ 
 As Huxley remarked, the attempt of the materialist to 
 bite this file is quite certain to be repaid with broken 
 teeth. 
 
 In the second place, materialistic theory fails decidedly 
 to give any satisfactory explanation of the unity and 
 continuity of the mental life. That life in its oneness and 
 persistence requires a unitary subject. Such a subject is 
 not supplied by the material organism, as being an aggre- 
 gate of separable and inconstant parts. One may, indeed, 
 imagine the parts to act together to produce a general 
 effect, but this effect could not be regarded as anything 
 else than a sum, not a real unity, save as it is seen to be 
 the state or modification of a unitary being. And then, 
 too, how is the effect in question to be united with ante- 
 cedent effects, and all be recognized as experiences of the 
 same subject? Surely a mere aggregate of molecules, 
 which are in perpetual flux, ought not to be thought of as 
 working such a miracle. Even if we suppose the incom- 
 ing molecules to be in like position with their antecedents, 
 and to be subject to similar vibrations, we have done next 
 to nothing toward explaining the continued identity of 
 the conscious subject. Mere similarity does not consti- 
 
 * Physiological Psychology, p. 677. 
 
74 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 tute identity, any more than the agreement of two minds 
 in their thoughts makes them the same mind. The uni- 
 tary persistent subject alone is adequate to explain the 
 facts of unity of consciousness and continuous personal 
 identity. That the assumption of such a subject does not 
 provide full insight into the problem of unity and identity 
 may be granted. It is, however, an immense advantage 
 to have a subject which by supposition is not an aggregate 
 of separable and fugitive parts, as opposed to a subject 
 which is understood to be of that order. 
 
 Again, materialistic theory sins against the law of 
 causality in deriving the higher from the lower. It re- 
 quires us to suppose that the unfeeling generates the 
 emotional, the unconscious the conscious, the nonintelli- 
 gent the intelligent, and that something which is without 
 recognition of itself either as past or present gives origin 
 to memory. Materialists pride themselves on their strict 
 deference to the principle of causality; but how is that 
 principle respected in a scheme which thus makes results 
 to transcend so immeasurably their assumed causes? A 
 spiritual power being supposed, to which emotion, con- 
 sciousness, intelligence, and memory belong as native 
 capacities, it is quite conceivable that in the specific exer- 
 cise of these capacities this power should be influenced by 
 adjacent matter. But to attribute to matter the origina- 
 tion of the spiritual power itself, with all its qualitative 
 superiority, Involves a distinct violation of the principle 
 of sufficient cause, unless the term "matter" is arbitrarily 
 made to cover what belongs under the category of mind or 
 spirit.^ 
 
 Furthermore, materialistic theory is chargeable with 
 being entangled in this dilemma: either it must collide 
 with the law of the conservation of energy, or it must 
 
 1 Compare Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories, pp. 140-145. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM 75 
 
 pronounce the entire mental content a counterfeit of real- 
 ity, a perfectly empty and powerless phenomenon. If 
 the mental content is simply the product of physical 
 energy, or of matter in motion, then in the act of produc- 
 tion a portion of the latter must pass over to the former, 
 and so take on a form which is incapable of being de- 
 scribed in physical terms and cannot consistently be sup- 
 posed to fulfill physical functions. The physical energy 
 in question must thus be regarded as having escaped from 
 its proper circle or as lost. If this breach of the law of the 
 conservation of energy is not accepted, then the other 
 alternative must be taken, and the conclusion drawn that 
 physical energy in producing the mental has produced 
 nothing real, the mental being as empty as the shadow 
 which accompanies the moving train, and having as little 
 function in determining aught in the world. But what less 
 is this than the turning of human experience in its en- 
 tirety into mockery and illusion? If feelings, ideas, 
 hopes, aspirations, and purposes are not veritable powers 
 in the world, then men are under the hopeless dominion 
 of the purely phantasmal. 
 
 Once more, materialism involves sheer fatalism with 
 all its baneful consequences. It assumes that everything 
 in the mental range is in the clutches of the same inexor- 
 able laws which rule the physical realm. No man has 
 any more power to determine his own conduct than has 
 the piece of wood cast upon the sea to select its own 
 course. The morally evil has the same right in the world 
 as the morally good, having come in by the same com- 
 pulsion of absolute necessity. The rankest pessimism 
 has at least an equal claim with optimism, for there is, 
 according to the materialistic scheme, no wise or benevo- 
 lent will back of things to guarantee a worthy outcome; 
 and who can tell what blind necessity will effect in the 
 
Tfi PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 course of the ages ? For a stanch materiahst to be with- 
 out hope, as well as without God in the world, must be 
 regarded as perfectly in order. 
 
 As has been noticed, outspoken materialism distinctly 
 renounces the hope of immortality. In doing this it places 
 much emphasis on the assumption that modern biology 
 has outlawed faith in a future conscious existence of the 
 individual. The assumption is baseless. Modem biology 
 has not appreciably changed the conditions of faith in im- 
 mortality. If, on the one hand, it has enlarged the circle 
 of detailed observation of the dependence of psychical 
 experience on the physical organism, on the other hand it 
 has enlarged the scope of observed dependence of physical 
 processes on psychical activity. The balance has not 
 turned against the psychical factor. And since all the 
 objections to construing this factor as a mere function of 
 a material organism remain in full force. Christian faith 
 is as free as ever it was to found on the existence of a 
 personal God, conceived as universal Father, an assurance 
 of immortality. Where this great theistic postulate is 
 firmly grasped that assurance has also a firm tenure. As 
 has been well remarked, "The hope of immortality for 
 the individual is a hope in God as perfect Ethical Spirit, 
 regnant over all life in every stage and form of its mani- 
 festation,"* 
 
 The above exposition has indicated that materialism 
 is quite apt to take refuge under the name of "monism." 
 It is not to be supposed, however, that monism is neces- 
 sarily in affiliation with materialism. A spiritualistic mon- 
 ism, or a doctrine which makes spirit the one substance, 
 is quite as possible as a materialistic or agnostic monism. 
 In our view the only tolerable monism is that which 
 makes infinite Spirit the ultimate reality, and regards 
 
 1 G. T. Ladd, Philosophy of Rehgion. II. 537. 
 
SENSATIONALISM AND MATERIALISM -77 
 
 matter and finite spirits as diverse forms or products 
 of his energizing, having in him their constant source, 
 and also in him their uniting bond. Materiahstic mon- 
 ism is rationally excluded, and an agnostic monism is 
 likely to suffer mortal pangs in its attempt to avoid a 
 virtual affirmation of either materialism or spiritualism. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 POSITIVISM 
 
 I. — The Positivism of Comte 
 
 The era of positivism, so far as it may be considered 
 to have been marked by the Hterary activity of Comte, 
 fell between the years 1824 and 1857. As might be in- 
 ferred from these limits, positivism received an incentive 
 from the absorbing interest which began to be taken in 
 the natural sciences in the second quarter of the last cen- 
 tury. But perhaps a more potent cause of its origin may 
 be found in the social ideals which were inherited from 
 the French Revolution. As a result of that great crisis 
 there was begotten in not a few minds an enthusiastic 
 confidence in the possibility of making over society 
 according to new and improved patterns. Comte shared 
 largely in this confidence. His early association with 
 Saint Simon was indicative of his bent; and, though he 
 came to speak disparagingly of the scheme of this social- 
 istic leader, he ever regarded the working out of a social 
 ideal as the supreme end to be achieved. 
 
 In the view of Comte the great excellence of positivism 
 consists in its being the one system which observes nor- 
 mal philosophical method. It builds, not upon unfounded 
 assumptions, but upon observed facts. Eschewing all 
 metaphysical speculations, and recognizing the insuper- 
 able limits of human knowledge, it confines itself to 
 the study of phenomena and to such inductions as this 
 study may warrant. Its domain is the relative. As 
 John Stuart Mill observes, "We have, according to 
 Comte, no knowledge of anything but phenomena, and 
 
 78 
 
POSITIVISM 79 
 
 our knowledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. 
 We know not the essence nor the real mode of production 
 of any fact, but only its relation to other facts in the way 
 of succession or of similitude. These relations are con- 
 stant, that is, always the same in the same circumstances. 
 The constant resemblances which link phenomena to- 
 gether, and the constant sequences which unite them as 
 antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The 
 laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. 
 Their essential nature and their ultimate causes, either 
 efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us."^ 
 In dealing with the laws of phenomena the positive 
 philosophy endeavors to reduce them to the least possible 
 number.^ 
 
 Cognition of phenomena takes place, Comte contends, 
 through the instrumentality of the senses. There is no 
 such thing as a first-hand knowledge of psychical facts, 
 at least of those in the intellectual order as distingnished 
 from the emotional or moral order. Discovery by intro- 
 spection is out of the question. We can study, to some 
 extent, the physiological basis of our mental operations, 
 and we can find grounds of inference in the tokens of 
 mental operations which are on exhibition in the history 
 of the race; but we have no means of directly observing 
 our mental content or activities. Psychology, so far as 
 based on an assumed capability of introspection, is pure 
 illusion.^ On the other hand, phrenology has genuine 
 claims to consideration, and Gall, though his scheme 
 needs revision, is to be regarded as a precursor of posi- 
 tivism.'* In this stress upon sense perceptions as the 
 channel of authentic information Comte seems to come 
 
 1 The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, pp. 7, 8 
 
 ^ Comte, Cours de Philosophic Positive, I. 12. 
 
 Mbid., I. 28-30. 
 
 * Catechism of the Positive Religion, Eng. trans., pp. 252-254. 
 
8o PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 very close to the platform of the sensational psycholo^. 
 Still he does not commit himself distinctly to that plat- 
 form, as may be concluded from his reference to the sup- 
 plementary phrase, "except the mind itself," which 
 Leibnitz added to the maxim, "There is nothing in the 
 understanding which was not previously in the senses."^ 
 As for the claims of materialism, Comte was not inclined 
 to concede to them any formal recognition.^ On the 
 whole, his system in relation to psychological theory may 
 be described as a kind of halting sensationalism and a 
 naive empiricism which accepted the testimony of the 
 senses at full worth without making any serious effort 
 to scrutinize the grounds of that acceptance. 
 
 In commending his theory of philosophical method 
 Comte appealed in particular to an historical attestation, 
 namely, to the fact that men's conceptions, or ways of 
 thinking about things, pass through three great stages, 
 of which the last is the positive. "The human spirit," 
 he says, "by its nature, employs successively in each of its 
 researches three methods of philosophizing essentially 
 different in character and radically opposed : first the 
 theological method, then the metaphysical method, and 
 finally the positive method. Consequently we have three 
 kinds of philosophy or general systems of conceptions 
 respecting the totality of phenomena, systems which are 
 mutually exclusive : the first is the necessary point of 
 departure of the human intelligence ; the third is its fixed 
 and definite state; the second is solely destined to serve 
 as a means of transition. In the theological stage the 
 human spirit, essentially directing its researches toward 
 the interior nature of beings, the first and final cause of 
 all effects by which it is impressed — in a word, toward 
 
 * System of Positive Polity, Eng. trans., III. 15. 
 
 * Ibid., I. 39-41; Catechism, p, 161. 
 
POSITIVISM 8i 
 
 the field of absolute knowledge — represents phenomena 
 as produced by the direct and continuous action of super- 
 natural agents, more or less numerous, whose arbitrary 
 intervention explains all the anomalous appearances of 
 the universe. In the metaphysical stage, which is at 
 bottom only a general modification of the first, the super- 
 natural agents are replaced by abstract forces, true 
 entities (abstractions personified) inherent in the differ- 
 ent beings of the world, and conceived as capable of 
 engendering by themselves all the observed phenomena, 
 the explanation of which consists, then, in assigning to 
 each the corresponding entity. Finally, in the positive 
 stage, the human spirit, recognizing the impossibility of 
 obtaining absolute notions, renounces the search for the 
 origin and destination of the universe and for the knowl- 
 edge of the interior causes of phenomena, in order to 
 attach itself solely to the discovery, by a suitable combina- 
 tion of reasoning and observation, of their effective laws, 
 that is to say, their invariable relations of succession and 
 similitude."^ That the three stages are repeated in the 
 progress of the individual from childhood to manhood 
 was regarded by Comte as confirming the conclusion that 
 the positive is the ultimate stage, the only one tolerable to 
 mature thinking.^ Among the several stages the meta- 
 physical was evidently least esteemed by the positivist 
 philosopher. Metaphysics, he said, is nothing but simply 
 a solvent of theology. "It has no other effect, in the orig- 
 inal evolution, whether of the individual or of society, 
 but to facilitate the gradual passage from theology to 
 positivism."^ 
 
 In the intention of Comte, as was noticed, the positive 
 philosophy was directed toward a great social ideal. He 
 considered that society was suffering grievously from 
 
 * Cours de Philosophic Positive, I. 2-4. * Ibid., I. 6. 
 
 ^Catechism, pp. 169, 170. 
 
82 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 anarchical or excessively individualistic tendencies, that 
 homogeneity in doctrine was the necessary antecedent to 
 the overcoming of these tendencies, and that only by the 
 method of the positive philosophy could this homogeneity 
 be attained. How pronounced was his conviction upon 
 this subject may be judged from the following sentences : 
 "A doctrine of universal validity — such is the sole 
 remedy, if the reason of the West is to be freed from its 
 present contradictory position, in which destruction of 
 the whole becomes more and more irreconcilable with 
 construction in detail."^ "The object of our philosophy 
 is to direct the spiritual reorganization of the civilized 
 world. "2 "We must call in an authority superior to all 
 individual judgment, to be able to prescribe, even in 
 unimportant points, rules which shall have any real 
 efficacy. Such rules will then rest on a view of the needs 
 of society which shall admit of no hesitation as to obedi- 
 ence."^ "One of the leading features of our modern 
 anarchy is the general tendency to a dispersive, special 
 action. It is a lamentable waste of strength. Such 
 special action is as absurd as it is immoral."* "In. the 
 sphere of theory there must be no specialty."^ Evidently 
 by Comte the individual was rated at a very small figure 
 as compared with society, and his view of the ideal con- 
 stitution of society left as little place for doctrinal variety 
 as did the scheme of the stanchest Ultramontanist, His 
 respect, therefore, for such an advocate of theocratic 
 sovereignty as De Maistre was not a token of inconsist- 
 ency. He designed for the reconstituted society to which 
 he looked forward a full equivalent for the government 
 of the pope and the hierarchy.^ 
 
 1 System of Positive Polity, IV. 321. *Ibid , I. 3 5• 
 
 3 Catechism, p. 50. -I Ibid . p. 112. Mbid., p. 113. 
 
 'Compare Levy-Bruhl, The Philosophy of Auguste Comte, Eng. trans., 
 pp. 297, 298. 
 
POSITIVISM 83 
 
 The superiority assigned by Comte to the social inter- 
 est is reflected in his classification of the sciences. Ar- 
 ranged according to the degree of generality and sim- 
 plicity they run as follows : mathematics, astronomy, 
 physics, chemistry, physiology, social physics or soci- 
 ology. The last-named is the crown of the series to 
 which all the others are tributary. In a later enumeration 
 Comte gave a distinct place to ethics. 
 
 The interest in sociology also dominated the religious 
 scheme of the positivist philosopher. In the earlier part 
 of his career religion stood in the background. During 
 his latest years it was treated as of foremost concern. 
 This change in attitude was not unrecognized by Comte 
 himself. In the grandiloquent style to which he was 
 very much inclined he represented himself as fulfilling 
 in the earlier stage the role of Aristotle and in the later 
 that of Saint Paul ; the one being reflected in the Course 
 of Positive Philosophy, and the other in the System of 
 Positive Polity, as also in the Catechism of the Positive 
 Religion. 'Tn the first," he says, "I have carefully kept 
 the objective method in the ascendant ; as was necessary 
 when the course of thought was always proceeding from 
 the world in the direction of man. But the fulfillment of 
 this preliminary task, by the fact of placing me at the 
 universal point of view, involves henceforth the preva- 
 lence of the subjective method as the only source of com- 
 plete systematization, the procedure now being from man 
 outward toward the world. Thus the higher logic under 
 which man's primitive belief arose adapts itself, when 
 regenerated by positivism, to his final constructions. Its 
 ultimate position is indicated in the principle of the ascen- 
 dency of the heart over the intellect."^ This language 
 seems to assume that the heart which has been well 
 
 ^ System of Positive Polity, Preface, p. xiL 
 
84 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 schooled in positivist doctrines can be trusted to impel 
 in the right direction. Certainly this assumption is 
 needed to secure Comte from the charge of self-contra- 
 diction. Such a charge has been more than once pre- 
 ferred against him. It was urged at an early date by 
 Littre. Though an ardent disciple, he found it impos- 
 sible to follow his master, believing that his later teach- 
 ing, in method, spirit, and content, was irreconcilable 
 with the earlier. "All that which Comte produced," he 
 says, "after 1845 is under the dominion of the subjective 
 method and often of mysticism."^ Doubtless Comte con- 
 sidered himself entirely faithful to the fundamental pos- 
 tulates with which he set out. It is also to be admitted 
 that these postulates were repeated to the end. Still it is 
 true that his teaching, after he began to pose as the fabri- 
 cator of a religion, took on so largely a changed aspect 
 as to seem like a new system. There was a substantial 
 ground for the division which occurred among French 
 Positivists by the refusal of one wing to follow the 
 founder in his second role. 
 
 As the positive philosophy contemplates human society 
 as the supreme subject of investigation, so the positive 
 religion, as formulated by Comte, knows of no higher 
 object of worship than collective humanity. The fact of 
 the existence of a transcendent Deity is either ignored or 
 discredited by him. In one connection he gives place 
 to the shallow assumption, which occurs in the writings 
 of the German materialists, that the admission of a 
 supernatural or infinite will is incompatible with the idea 
 of a stable system of laws.=^ Again, he remarks, that 
 the consensus of positive philosophy essentially ex- 
 cludes the hypothesis of a higher Providence.^ On the 
 
 * Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive, p. 58Q. 
 
 'Catechism, p. 218. ^ System of Positive Polity, I. 51, 5a. 
 
POSITIVISM 8s 
 
 Other hand, he repudiates all connection with formal 
 atheism and pronounces it foreign to his teaching. 
 "Atheism," he says, "even from the intellectual point of 
 view, is a very imperfect form of emancipation; for its 
 tendency is to prolong the metaphysical stage indefinitely 
 by continuing to seek for new solutions of theological 
 problems instead of setting aside all inaccessible re- 
 searches on the ground of their utter inutility,"^ Prac- 
 tically he rules out the thought of a personal God, but 
 a sense of the dogmatism inherent in atheism makes 
 him hesitate to assert definitely the atheistic negation. 
 
 In setting up humanity as the object of worship the 
 founder of the positive religion recognized that his 
 divinity needed some pruning and decorating. Only the 
 meritorious are given a place in the Great Being, that is, 
 in the collective humanity which is the proper object of 
 public worship. Among the objects of private worship 
 woman holds a preferred position. She is the best rep- 
 resentative of the Great Being. She embodies the moral 
 providence of the race. She stands to man as his guar- 
 dian angel and household divinity. The nearest objects 
 of worship for the man are the mother, the wife, and the 
 daughter, while the woman does well to worship the 
 mother, the husband, and the son. In religious art the 
 woman holding a child in her arms is the proper symbol. 
 
 A singular feature in the positive religion is the sym- 
 pathy manifested for fetichism. Comte is very emphatic 
 in acknowledging the close association between it and his 
 own system. "Each in its manner," he says, "consecrates 
 the universal supremacy of feeling; and they are only 
 distinguished morally in that positivism substitutes the 
 adoration of products for that of materials."^ Even this 
 
 * System of Positive Polity, I. 36. 
 
 * System of Positive Polity, II. 118; Catechism, p. 365. 
 
86 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 much of distinction seems not to have been held very 
 tenaciously. In a late writing Comte felt at liberty to 
 speak of natural objects, such as the sun, the planets, and 
 space, as holding a sympathetic relation to the human 
 race, and actually styled the earth the Grand Fetiche} 
 
 In securing the practical supremacy of the positive 
 religion Comte placed great dependence upon a priest- 
 hood the members of which are to be subjected to a most 
 thorough training, and first at the age of forty-two are 
 to attain full recognition as priests. This body is not to 
 interfere directly with political affairs, but will neverthe- 
 less exercise a potent influence upon the management of 
 the state by giving moral and intellectual guidance to 
 the rulers. Its general point of view will fit it to fulfill 
 a prominent function in relation to the division of labor.^ 
 On account of its encyclopedic training it will be qualified 
 to resume the medical office, and indeed will treat that 
 office ''as the inseparable complement of its principal 
 function."^ Its power extends to the passing of such 
 sentence upon the unworthy as shall exclude them from 
 the benefits of human society.'* Within the priesthood 
 "the supreme power is vested in the high priest of 
 humanity, whose natural residence will be Paris as the 
 metropolis of the regenerated West. He is the sole gov- 
 ernor of the positive clergy. He ordains its members, 
 he changes their residence, he revokes their commission, 
 all on his own responsibility. The high priest of hu- 
 manity will be, more truly than any mediaeval pope, the 
 only real head of the Western world. "^ 
 
 The priesthood was regarded by Comte as the fit instru- 
 
 iLittr6, Auguste Comte et la Philosophic Positive, pp. 573-577: Mill, 
 The Positive Philosophy of Comte, pp. 174. i75- „. ^- 
 
 = System of Positive Polity. IV. 634. ' Ibid., IV. 66. 
 
 * Catechism, p. 296. ' Ibid., pp. 303, 359. 
 
POSITIVISM 87 
 
 ment for bringing about that intellectual homogeneity or 
 uniformity of doctrine upon which, as has been observed, 
 he laid immense emphasis. In achieving this end the 
 priestly body was not expected to make use of forcible 
 repression. At the same time it was not put under obli- 
 gation to respect any radical maxim on liberty of exam- 
 ination and of speech. Indeed, Comte expressly taught 
 that, while freedom of discussion was needed to secure the 
 triumph of positive principles, it is properly made sub- 
 ject to limitations when those principles have come into 
 the ascendant. "Systematic tolerance," he declares, 
 "cannot exist, and never has existed, except in relation 
 to opinions regarded as indifferent or as doubtful."^ In 
 short, Comte's scheme openly and explicitly contem- 
 plated the control of the race through the instrumentality 
 of a priesthood. It was in particular this aspect of posi- 
 tivism which led John Stuart Mill to speak of it as "the 
 completest system of spiritual and temporal despotism 
 which ever yet emanated from a human brain, unless 
 possibly that of Ignatius Loyola."^ 
 
 Remark has often been made on the colossal vanity 
 of Comte ; and certainly it is scarcely conceivable that his 
 own estimate of his system should ever be seconded in 
 a sane understanding. The positive philosophy is remote 
 enough from the perfection and ultimateness which were 
 ascribed to it in his thought. In the first place, it is 
 chargeable with superficiality in its views of the office of 
 philosophy and in its scrutiny of philosophical problems. 
 Making philosophy to consist in a sum of general con- 
 clusions drawn from the subject-matter of the various 
 sciences, it slights its distinctive vocation to examine the 
 
 ' Cours de Philosophic Positive, IV. 39-47. 
 * Autobiography, pp. 212, 213. 
 
88 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 notions on which the sciences repose.^ While repudiating 
 metaphysics, it admits the conception of "property" (or 
 quahty), which has an obvious metaphysical implication. 
 It makes free use of the terms "phenomena" and "law" 
 without stopping to define them. Phenomena are treated 
 by it as though they were given outright; whereas it is 
 impossible rationally to interpret them without taking 
 account of the constructive action of the perceiving mind, 
 or the fact that the mind has part in making the phe- 
 nomena to be what they are. It denies the possibility of 
 any direct self-knowledge or introspective study, and 
 thus blocks the way to an explanation of our cognition 
 of psychical facts. According to Comte, "our knowledge 
 of the human mind must be obtained by observing other 
 people. How we are to observe other people's mental 
 operations, or how interpret the signs of them without 
 having learned what the signs mean by knowledge of 
 ourselves, he does not state. "^ That he should so limit 
 the office of psychology, and exalt, as he did, the function 
 of phrenology, must be regarded as a very poor testi- 
 monial to philosophical competency. 
 
 In the second place, the positivism of Comte is open to 
 criticism as resting upon an arbitrary historical induc- 
 tion. Doubtless there is an element of truth in the doc- 
 trine of the three stages. The childish mind, as also the 
 mind of the maturer individual who from lack of train- 
 ing is but little above the plane of childish conceptions, 
 is much inclined to an indiscriminate anthropomorphism. 
 Out of the vivid consciousness of its own agency it 
 derives an impulse to refer events in the world to agents 
 like itself in feeling and volition. With the progress of 
 intelligence and experience the generalizing faculty 
 
 * Compare Fouill^e, Le Mouvement Positiviste, pp. 14, 15. 
 2 Mill, The Positive Philosophy of Comte, p. 59. 
 
POSITIVISM 89 
 
 comes into play, and an enlarged reference is made to 
 laws, principles, and cosmic powers as compared with 
 manlike agents. But a development like this, resulting 
 in an amendment of the cruder and more spontaneous 
 anthropomorphism, is very dififerent from Comte's repre- 
 sentation of three successive and mutually exclusive 
 stages. Taken in the broad sense in which the repre- 
 sentation is made by him, it is contradictory to the facts. 
 The theological is by no means a past and forsaken stand- 
 point. According to Comte, theistic conceptions are of 
 the theological type; but theism never had before such 
 an august intellectual constituency as it has today. As 
 for metaphysics, the teaching of the universities in every 
 country at all distinguished for mental life is clear evi- 
 dence that it has not abandoned the field. So far is the 
 positive method, as defined by Comte, from being regnant 
 that the study of origins, which that method excludes 
 as impertinent, never commanded greater interest than 
 it has during the last half century.^ Judged by the actual 
 evolution up to date the positive method has failed to 
 establish its claim to finality. It has not been installed 
 as the exclusive method, and even if it had been that 
 fact would fall short of a demonstration that it is to be 
 reckoned the final method. One might look forward to 
 a process of reconciliation and claim, as does Fouillee,^ 
 that the ideal is to be realized in a synthesis of the theo- 
 logical, the metaphysical, and the positive. In building 
 upon the doctrine of the three stages Comte was resorting 
 to a very shaky foundation for a philosophy. 
 
 In the third place positivism, as formulated by Comte, 
 is chargeable with an artificial and fantastic scheme of 
 
 1 Compare Belot, L'ld^e et la Methode de la Philosophic Scientifique chez 
 Auguste Comte, Bibliotheque du Congres Internationale de Philosophie. 
 IV. 460, 461. ^ Le Mouvement Positive, p. 268. 
 
90 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 religion. That which it sets forth as the supreme object 
 of worship is confessedly neither supreme nor actual. 
 It is not supreme, for humanity appears only as a tran- 
 sient product in a perishing world. It is not actual for, 
 according to Comte's denial of personal immortality, the 
 dead are extinct, while the future generations do not yet 
 exist. Since the living make but a small fraction of the 
 great whole, the object of worship is for the major part 
 a mental fiction. And even if the object were thoroughly 
 real it is not such as could satisfy the deeper religious 
 sentiments. These find no adequate object in a merely 
 relative greatness and goodness. They demand the abso- 
 lute. As Edward Caird has remarked, "A 'relative' 
 religion is not a religion at all; it is at best a morality 
 trying to gather to itself some of the emotions which were 
 formerly connected with religious belief."^ Without 
 doubt the discourse of Comte on religion contains very 
 excellent maxims. But these are only commonplaces of 
 Christianity. Taken as a whole his religion is a paltry 
 substitute for the Christian faith, and it is no wonder 
 that its existence has been mostly on paper. 
 
 Once more, the positive philosophy of Comte labors 
 under a serious burden of self-contradiction. As was 
 noticed, he justifies his transition from the objective to 
 the subjective method on the ground that his preceding 
 investigations had placed him at the universal point of 
 view, whereas the possibility of attaining anything more 
 than a relative and fragmentary outlook upon reality 
 is a fundamental postulate of his system. He repudiates 
 metaphysics as being occupied with unreal abstractions 
 and universals, and yet centers thought and worship 
 upon a humanity which, as defined by him, is mostly out- 
 side the plane of the actual; a mixture of the abstract 
 
 » The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte, p. 139. 
 
POSITIVISM 91 
 
 and the concrete ; a strange sort of universal. He repudi- 
 ates theology as belonging to a vanquished stage of 
 human development, and yet in the end justifies the 
 fetichism which he had characterized as representing the 
 primary form of theological conceptions; at least he justi- 
 fies a fetichistic devotion, and if it be supposed, as his 
 original philosophy required, that there is no object cor- 
 responding to the devotion, then it must be said that he 
 justifies the paying of religious respect to fictions which 
 are known to be fictions. The incongruities are marked, 
 and provoke well-nigh a feeling of compassion for the 
 man who could believe that he was publishing the pro- 
 gram of the final philosophy and religion. 
 
 II. — Representatives of Positivism in Germany 
 AND England 
 
 A biographer of Feuerbach has said of him, "He over- 
 threw the system of Hegel, and founded positivism in 
 analyzing the essence of Christianity and the essence of 
 religion."* The last half of this statement may be ac- 
 cepted as containing a measure of truth. While the 
 teaching of Feuerbach was not precisely parallel to that 
 of the contemporary French positivist, it contained points 
 of obvious resemblance. In the former as well as in the 
 latter the senses were emphasized as the channels of all 
 knowledge. In both alike the human species was re- 
 garded as the great reality. In both also humanity was 
 set forth as the object of religious worship. On the last 
 point, however, a difference may be noticed. The fun- 
 damental thesis in the religious philosophy of Comte 
 was that humanity should consciously be accepted as the 
 object of religious veneration in place of the transcen- 
 dent Deity. The central proposition of Feuerbach was 
 
 * Albert Levy, La Philosophie de Feuerbach, Intro., p. xxii. 
 
'92 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 that humanity is actually the object of religious venera- 
 tion, since men are only objectifying their own nature 
 and needs when they present their prayers and ascriptions 
 to the God who is over all, "Man," he says, "projects 
 his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself 
 an object of this projected image of himself converted 
 into a subject."^ Even the least anthropomorphic con- 
 ception of God stands within the objectifying process. 
 "The God free from anthropomorphisms, impartial, pas- 
 sionless, is nothing else than the nature of the under- 
 standing itself regarded as objective."^ "God as a 
 morally perfect being is nothing else than the realized 
 idea, the fulfilled law of morality, the moral nature of 
 man posited as the absolute being."^ Belief in Provi- 
 dence is simply belief in the divine reality and signifi- 
 cance of man's own being.* "In prayer man turns to 
 the omnipotence of goodness, which simply means that 
 !in prayer man adores his own heart, regards his own feel- 
 ings as absolute."^ "The beginning, middle, and end of 
 religion is man."^ "Religion is a dream, in which our 
 own conceptions and emotions appear to us as separate 
 existences, beings out of ourselves."^ 
 
 Had Feuerbach deliberately set to work to write a sat- 
 ire upon religion it is difficult to imagine that he could 
 have found any terms better suited to his purj^ose than 
 those which he has actually employed. In religion, as 
 he makes out, man walks from beginning to end as the 
 helpless victim of illusion. He thinks that he is cultiva- 
 ting practical relations with God, while all the time he 
 is paying respect to himself. The only mitigation of this 
 idolatry which Feuerbach suggests lies in an arbitrary 
 
 »The Essence of Christianity (1841), pp. 52, 53. « Ibid., p. 58. 
 
 'Ibid., p. 73. < Ibid., p. 144. Mbid., p. 169. Clbid., p. 239 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 264. 
 
POSITIVISM 93 
 
 ascription of divinity and infinitude to man. "Con- 
 sciousness," he says, "is essentially infinite in its nature. 
 In the consciousness of the infinite the conscious subject 
 has for his object the infinity of his own nature."^ In 
 line with this high-sounding description is his designation 
 of man as the true ens realissimnm.^ Dowered with such 
 attributes man might be regarded as somewhat excus- 
 able for making a god of himself, only it is to be noticed 
 that this "most real being," who has in the fact of con- 
 sciousness a certificate of infinitude, is destined, in accor- 
 dance with Feuerbach's denial of immortality, speedily 
 to lose consciousness and to pass into the estate of a 
 practical nullity. 
 
 The discourse of Feuerbach is so purely oracular, so 
 little characterized by sober argumentation, that to pay it 
 the tribute of serious criticism would be an ill-placed gra- 
 tuity. It is enough to observe that his conception of 
 religion conducts logically to the wrecking of all intellec- 
 tual confidence. If in his deepest and most inveterate 
 impulsions man is but the victim of illusion, there is no 
 testimony of his nature which affords any reliable ground 
 of inference. 
 
 One is hardly authorized to speak of a positivist school 
 in Germany; but a number of writers in the latter part 
 of the century shared in the views of Feuerbach. The 
 German materialists, as has been observed, were much 
 inclined to exalt him into an oracle on matters religious 
 and theological. An admiring biographer gives a con- 
 siderable list of his followers,^ but many of those men- 
 tioned cannot be regarded as disciples in any strict sense. 
 
 In England John Stuart Mill was an appreciative stu- 
 dent of positivism. For a period he maintained a friendly 
 
 * The Essence of Christianity, p. sr. ' Ibid., p. 6. 
 
 ^ Bolin, Ludwig Feuerbach, sein Werken und seine Zeitgenossen. 
 
94 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 interchange of views with Comte. He was very largely 
 in sympathy with the French positivist's conception of 
 the proper domain of human knowledge, and also with 
 his exaltation of the claims of sociology. On the other 
 hand, as appears above, he sharply criticised various fea- 
 tures in Comte's system, and considered that in the latter 
 part of his career he strayed widely from the path of 
 philosophical sobriety. He may be said to have figured 
 more largely as the critic than as the disciple. 
 
 Among those approaching more nearly to the charac- 
 ter of disciples a prominent rank has been taken by R. 
 Congreve, J. H. Bridges, and Frederic Harrison. With 
 some measure of propriety Marian Evans (George Eliot) 
 may also be mentioned among the English followers of 
 the French philosopher. Herbert Spencer wrote of her: 
 *'She has been more a disciple of Comte than of mine; 
 although her acceptance of Comte's views was very much 
 qualified, and indeed hardly constituted her a Comtist in 
 the full sense of the word. Still she had strong leanings 
 to the 'religion of humanity,' and that always remained 
 a point of difference between us."^ 
 
 Frederic Harrison has been especially brought to no- 
 tice, as a champion of positivism, by his controversy with 
 Herbert Spencer. In the course of this controversy he 
 took pains to indicate that he was not committed to the 
 entire scheme of the positivist philosopher. *'I look," he 
 said, "upon very much that Comte threw out for the 
 future as tentative and purely Utopian."^ In his defini- 
 tion of religion he so far followed Comte as to make 
 humanity the highest object of reverence. "The final 
 religion of enlightened man," he remarked, "is the sys- 
 
 * Autobiography, II. 430. . 
 
 2 The Nature and Reality of Religion, a Controversy between Frederic 
 Harrison and Herbert Spencer, p. 125. 
 
POSITIVISM 95 
 
 tematized and scientific form of the spontaneous religion 
 of natural man. Both rest on the same elements — belief 
 in the power which controls his life, a grateful rever- 
 ence for the power so acknowledged. The primitive 
 man thought that power to be the object of nature affec- 
 ting man. The cultured man knows that power to be 
 humanity itself, controlling and controlled by nature ac- 
 cording to natural law."^ But, while thus exalting 
 humanity, it would appear that Harrison was not minded 
 to make it the object of any formal worship. "My 
 friends and I," he said, "address no prayers to humanity 
 as 'holy' or otherwise."^ Again he observed : "I mean by 
 religion this sense of social duty, pushed to its full ex- 
 tent, strengthened by a sound view of human nature, and 
 warmed by the glow of imagination and sympathy. It 
 has been said in a vague way that religion is 'morality 
 touched by emotion.' The religion of humanity, as I 
 conceive it, is simply morality fused with social devotion 
 and enlightened by sound philosophy."^ This contrasts 
 favorably with the fantastic elements in the scheme of 
 Comte. Nevertheless, there is very little hope for a 
 religion like that which is here sketched. It differs too 
 little from pure secularism to have any other goal than 
 inanity and helplessness. 
 
 ^The Nature and Reality of Religion, p. 46. * Ibid., p. 124 
 
 'Ibid., p. 133. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 
 
 I. — Herbert Spencer's Evolutionary Philosophy 
 
 While French positivism and German materialism 
 were initiated apart from any distinct recognition of the 
 modern theory of evolution, the "synthetic philosophy," 
 as Spencer named his system, made that theory funda- 
 mental from the start. As early as 1851 he had taken 
 note of Von Baer's statement that the development of 
 every organism is a "change from homogeneity to hetero- 
 geneity." In the years which intervened between this 
 date and the publication of Darwin's epoch-making 
 treatise on The Origin of Species (1859), his thinking, 
 if not properly Darwinian, was quite emphatically evo- 
 lutionary. The change effected by contact with the 
 teaching of the great naturalist consisted in a modifica- 
 tion of his view as to the efficient factors in the evolution- 
 ary process. Hitherto it had been his conviction that "the 
 sole cause of organic evolution is the inheritance of 
 functionally produced modifications." Darwin made it 
 plain to him that a wide sphere must be accorded to the 
 operation of natural selection, or to the superior chance 
 for survival in the struggle for existence which pertains 
 to those individuals in any given group which have been 
 gifted by nature with points of advantage.^ It remained, 
 however, his opinion that the inheritance of characters 
 acquired by use has been a great factor in evolution, and 
 he was never fully satisfied with the scope which Darwin 
 conceded to this factor. On the whole, aside from a rein- 
 
 ' Autobiography, IT. 37- 
 
 96 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTrONISM 9; 
 
 forcement of his confidence in the legitimacy and scien- 
 tific worth of the evolutionary hypothesis, he seems not 
 to have received from Darwin a very conspicuous and 
 effective contribution to his own system. 
 
 So far as Spencer endeavored to transcend the proper 
 sphere of the particular sciences, and to deal with reality 
 in general, he manifestly owed nothing to the author of 
 The Origin of Species ; for the latter was chary of philo- 
 sophical speculations, and never undertook to speak the 
 authoritative word within their domain. As to his per- 
 sonal faith, Darwin has indicated that at the time he 
 wrote his great work, though somewhat troubled by the 
 contemplation of the pain and misery incident to animal 
 existence, he still counted himself a theist. Later his 
 conviction appears to have been somewhat wavering as 
 respects the warrant for inferring design in nature. In a 
 letter written in 1879, three years before his death, he 
 has given us this testimony: "In my most extreme fluc- 
 tuations I have never been an atheist in the sense of deny- 
 ing the existence of a God. I think that generally (and 
 more and more as I grow older), but not always, an ag- 
 nostic would be the more correct description of my state 
 of mind."^ 
 
 Among philosophical antecedents English empiricism 
 and sensationalism exerted the largest influence upon 
 Spencer. His interest in the German systems was not 
 very vital, and his borrowing from them took place 
 largely through the instrumentality of an English inter- 
 pretation. As Professor Ormond has remarked, "The 
 foundation of the synthetic philosophy was achieved in 
 a union of Hume with Kantism as it had filtered down 
 through the medium of the school of Hamilton."^ 
 
 ' Autobiography and Selected Letters, edited by Francis Darwin, p. cc 
 bee also pp. 61. 62, 236. * Foundations of Knowledge, p. 6. 
 
98 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 In reviewing the philosophy of Spencer it will be suf- 
 ficient for the purposes of this treatise to take note of its 
 agnosticism, its formal attitude toward the theistic faith, 
 and the bearing of its exposition of evolution upon that 
 faith. 
 
 The proper subject-matter of religious ideas and 
 theories, according to a fundamental assumption of 
 Spencer, is ultimate reality, or the first cause which we 
 are driven to postulate. This ultimate reality we are 
 compelled to regard as absolute and infinite. The sub- 
 ject-matter of religion, therefore, may be described as the 
 absolute and the infinite. Now, any attempt to construe 
 this subject-matter is certain to miscarry, as bringing us 
 face to face with the inconceivable and tangling us up 
 with manifold contradictions. To explore the absolute 
 and infinite, or even to gain a first installment of a gen- 
 uine apprehension of its nature, is beyond our com- 
 petency. It results obviously that religion has for its 
 domain the unknowable, the sphere of unqualified mys- 
 tery. Not merely does it impinge upon mystery, at some 
 point, but its proper subject-matter is wholly included in 
 the region of absolute mystery. This conclusion is ex- 
 pressed with sufficient explicitness in the following sen- 
 tences : ''Religion under all its forms is distinguished 
 from everything else in this, that its subject-matter is that 
 which passes the sphere of experience."^ "The mystery 
 which all religions recognize turns out to be a far more 
 transcendent mystery than any of them suspect — not a 
 relative but an absolute mystery."^ "Religion and 
 science are necessary correlatives. They stand respect- 
 ively for those two antithetic modes of consciousness 
 which cannot exist asunder. A known cannot be thought 
 of apart from an unknown ; nor can an unknown be 
 
 1 First Principles, fifth edition, J4. *lbid., S14. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 99 
 
 thought of apart from a known. And by consequence 
 neither can become more distinct without giving greater 
 distinctness to the other. To carry further a metaphor 
 before used, they are the positive and negative poles of 
 thought."^ With the foregoing statements it is appro- 
 priate to conjoin the declaration that it is permissible to 
 represent the inconceivable object of religion in some 
 form of thought, provided "we treat every notion we thus 
 frame as merely a symbol, utterly without resemblance 
 to that for which it stands."^ We may add also the 
 assertion that, in respect of the ultimate power, "we lack 
 the faculty of framing even the dimmest conception of 
 it."3 
 
 While Spencer thus denies to religion the least frag- 
 ment of a valid conception of its proper subject-matter, 
 he finds an excuse for its continued existence in a pecul- 
 iar fact of consciousness, "In the very denial," he says, 
 "of our power to learn zvhat the absolute is there lies 
 hidden the assumption that it is ; and the making of this 
 assumption proves that the absolute has been present to 
 the mind, not as nothing, but as something."^ We have 
 thus a consciousness of the absolute, indefinite, to be sure, 
 and incapable of formulation, but positive and insistent, 
 the counterpart of our sense of the relative and the con- 
 ditioned. The affirmation of this vague consciousness, 
 which is not permitted to count for real knowledge, is 
 the sole modification of agnosticism admitted by the 
 Spencerian system in relation to the subject-matter of 
 religion. 
 
 How much better is science conditioned than religion 
 as respects ability to claim a basis in the knowable? 
 Some of Spencer's statements might be taken as imply- 
 
 ^ First Principles, fifth edition, § 30 ^Ibid., 5 31. 
 
 'Principles of Psychology, II. 503. * First Principles, §26 
 
loo PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 ing that the former has very Httle occasion to boast 
 against the latter. Every one of the main factors with 
 which science has to deal is declared by him to be quite 
 beyond the reach of intelligible definition. Space and 
 time are wholly incomprehensible. The immediate 
 knowledge which we seem to have of them proves, when 
 examined, to be total ignorance."^ "Matter in its ulti- 
 mate nature is as absolutely incomprehensible as space 
 and time. Frame what suppositions we may, we find on 
 tracing out their implications that they leave us nothing 
 but a choice between opposite absurdities."^ "All efforts 
 to understand the essential nature of motion do but bring 
 us to alternative impossibilities of thought."^ "While 
 it is impossible to form any idea of force in itself, it is 
 equally impossible to comprehend its mode of exercise."* 
 Consciousness cannot be known or conceived as either 
 infinite or finite in duration, and "the personality of 
 which each is conscious is a thing which cannot be truly 
 known at all."^ 
 
 As thus dealing with symbols which have no trans- 
 latable meanings, science might seem to be utterly pov- 
 erty-stricken in respect to knowledge. But it is far from 
 Spencer's intention to represent science as a mere play 
 with the unknown. He assigns that role to religion, and 
 gives to science the antithetic office of investigating the 
 known and the knowable. This antithesis is expressed 
 in one of the passages already cited, and is very distinctly 
 set forth in the following : "Regarding science as a gradu- 
 ally increasing sphere, we may say that every addition to 
 its surface does but bring it into wider contact with sur- 
 rounding nescience. There must ever remain, therefore, 
 two antithetic modes of mental action. Throughout all 
 
 » First Principles, 5 15. 'Ibid., » 16. 3 Tbid., » 17. «Ibid., » 18. 
 
 *Tbid., S§ 19, 20. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM lol 
 
 future time, as now, the human mind may occupy itself, 
 not only with ascertained phenomena and their relations, 
 but also with that unascertained something which phe- 
 nomena and their relations imply. Hence, if knowledge 
 cannot monopolize consciousness — if it must always con- 
 tinue possible for the mind to dwell upon that which 
 transcends knowledge — then there can never cease to be 
 a place for something of the nature of religion."^ The 
 import of such language is quite unmistakable. Religion 
 contrasts with science as the sphere of nescience with the 
 sphere of knowledge, as the imagined with the verified. 
 Nor is there any considerable ambiguity as to the way in 
 which Spencer deduces this conclusion. Implicitly or 
 explicitly he makes use of the following propositions : 
 The manifestations of the ultimate reality do not make 
 it known to any extent. The manifestations (or phe- 
 nomena) may be known and their relations truly specified. 
 Religion has to do solely with the ultimate reality, and 
 therefore its sphere is the unknown and the unknowable. 
 Science has to do with the manifestations, and there- 
 fore its sphere is the known and the knowable. 
 
 The grounds of Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable 
 are derived in large part from the speculations of Ham- 
 ilton and Mansel. Appeal is made to Hamilton's doc- 
 trine that to think means to condition, and that conse- 
 quently the unconditioned, whether infinitely great or 
 infinitely little, lies entirely beyond the sphere of 
 thought.^ The like doctrine is cited from Mansel, and 
 the same skeptical believer is drawn upon for the demon- 
 stration that the absolute and infinite, as having a possible 
 existence out of all relations, cannot consistently be re- 
 garded as a cause, or a self-conscious subject, or indeed 
 as the bearer of any intelligible predicate.^ To considera- 
 
 ' First Principles, » 4. ^Ibid., i 24. ^ Ibid., i 13- 
 
102 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 tions 01 this order Spencer adds the assumption that 
 knowledge always subsists in and through the classifica- 
 tion of its objects, and that the ultimate reality, as being 
 incapable of assignment to a class, is plainly unknowable. 
 "The first cause," he says, "the infinite, the absolute, to 
 be known at all, must be classed. To be positively 
 thought of, it must be thought of as such or such — as 
 of this or that kind. Can it be like in kind to anything 
 of which we have sensible experience? Obviously not. 
 . . . The unconditioned, therefore, as classible neither with 
 any form of the conditioned nor with any other uncon- 
 ditioned, cannot be classed at all. And to admit that it 
 cannot be known as of such or such a kind, is to admit 
 that it is unknowable."^ 
 
 Agnosticism of so radical a type would seem to be 
 obliged in self-consistency to occupy a neutral attitude 
 toward the theistic conception or the doctrine of a per- 
 sonal God. In rare instances Spencer has given a token 
 of consent to this attitude. Opposing Mansel's declara- 
 tion that it is our duty, in spite of metaphysical difficul- 
 ties, to think of God as personal, he observed: "Duty 
 requires us neither to affirm nor to deny personality. 
 Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to the 
 established limits of our intelligence, and not perversely 
 to rebel against them."^ But, notwithstanding this 
 statement, Spencer cannot be said to have maintained an 
 even balance between the supposition of a personal 
 God and the contrary supposition. He grants a place to 
 the former only at the expense of reason, only in virtue 
 of the possibility that the seeming demands of rational 
 thinking on this subject may be, after all, without sub- 
 
 1 First Principles, 5 24. 
 
 2 Ibid., I 31. Compare The Nature and Reality of Religion, a Con- 
 troversy between Harrison and Spencer, p. 97. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 103 
 
 stantial basis. He takes pains to enforce the conclusion 
 that so far as reason may be credited with any com- 
 petency it requires in our thought of the ultimate reality 
 the rejection of every distinctive feature of personality. 
 "A consciousness," he says, "constituted of ideas and 
 feelings caused by objects and occurrences cannot be 
 simultaneously occupied with all objects and occurrences 
 throughout the universe. To think of divine conscious- 
 ness men must refrain from thinking what is meant by 
 consciousness." Equally abortive must be the attempt to 
 think of divine intelligence. "Intelligence, as alone con- 
 ceivable by us, presupposes existences independent of it 
 and objective to it. It is carried on in terms of changes 
 primarily wrought by alien activities — the impressions 
 generated by things beyond consciousness, and the ideas 
 derived from such impressions. To speak of an intelli- 
 gence which exists in the absence of all such alien activi- 
 ties is to use a meaningless word." In like manner ref- 
 erences to the divine will turn out, on examination, to 
 be empty verbiage. It follows that the higher anthro- 
 pomorphic characters must be dropped as the lower have 
 been. "The conception [of God] which has been enlarg- 
 ing from the beginning must go on enlarging until, by 
 disappearance of its limits, it becomes a consciousness 
 which transcends the forms of distinct thought, though it 
 forever remains a consciousness."^ A plainer declara- 
 tion could hardly be made of the conviction both that 
 rational thinking is opposed to the theistic conception, 
 and that the evolutionary process must eliminate that 
 conception. Now, inasmuch as Spencer's interpretation 
 of evolution discredits the supposition that he thought of 
 it as working for the final instatement of a false type of 
 thought or consciousness, he appears on record, not as 
 
 * The Nature and Reality of Religion, pp. 26-28. 
 
104 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 holding a neutral attitude toward theism, but one dis- 
 tinctly adverse. 
 
 So far as can be discovered, this adverse attitude was 
 never modified by Spencer. The change which took 
 place in his thought of religion did not consist in the 
 attainment of a more favorable estimate of the rational 
 basis of theism. It consisted simply in the development 
 of a more tolerant feeling for the historical embodiments 
 of religion in doctrines and institutions, in consideration 
 of the needs which they have met. His revised point of 
 view has been expressed in these terms : "I have come 
 more and more to look calmly on forms of religious 
 belief to which I had, in earlier days, a pronounced aver- 
 sion. Holding that they are in the main naturally 
 adapted to their respective peoples and times, it now 
 seems to me that they should severally live and work 
 as long as the conditions permit, and, further, that sud- 
 den changes of religious institutions, as of political insti- 
 tutions, are certain to be followed by reactions."^ 
 
 For a complete view of the bearing of Spencer's teach- 
 ing on theistic faith it is necessary to consider, besides 
 his more direct statements, the exposition which he has 
 given of the central topic of his philosophy. The ques- 
 tion needs to be asked to what extent his theory of evo- 
 lution contains a virtual affirmation or negation of a 
 personal agent, or supreme intelligence, in connection 
 with the world process. This question invites first of all 
 to a glance at his provision for initiating the evolutionary 
 movement. What, then, is the provision which he has 
 elected for this momentous function? Simply the prin- 
 ciple of the instability of the homogeneous, described as 
 a necessary inference from the axiomatic or primordial 
 
 1 Autobiography, II. 547. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 105 
 
 truth of the persistence of force — an instabihty conse- 
 quent upon the different exposures of the different parts 
 of any aggregate to incident forces. This principle, he 
 maintains, if not strictly of universal validity, is so nearly 
 of that character that there is no real discount on its 
 reliability as a basis of evolutionary theory. We may 
 adopt with scientific confidence the formula, "The abso- 
 lutely homogeneous must lose its equilibrium, and the 
 relatively homogeneous must lapse into the relatively 
 less homogeneous." This is strictly a law for all cog- 
 nizable or finite magnitudes. The sole possible excep- 
 tion is to be located beyond that range. "One stable 
 homogeneity only," says Spencer, "is hypothetically pos- 
 sible. If centers of force, absolutely uniform in their 
 powers, were diffused with absolute uniformity through 
 unlimited space they would remain in equilibrium. This, 
 however, though a verbally intelligible supposition, is 
 one that cannot be represented in thought, since unlimited 
 space is inconceivable."^ The appeal here to the incon- 
 ceivability of unlimited space cannot be regarded as at 
 all effective for disposing of the supposition in question, 
 since Spencer could not venture to deny that the alterna- 
 tive notion of limited space is equally inconceivable, and 
 in fact has said as much. By his own admission, accord- 
 ingly, a serious qualification upon the principle of the 
 instability of the homogeneous is left standing. It is 
 seen that this principle must have preestablished con- 
 ditions to work upon — conditions for which there is no 
 natural guarantee — or assurance will be wanting that 
 any differentiation will result. But, passing by this con- 
 sideration, we notice the fact pertinent to the connection, 
 namely, that Spencer's theory of origins includes no 
 slightest reference to intelligent agency. The persistence 
 
 * First Principles, i 135- 
 
io6 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 of force being premised as a necessary postulate, the 
 instability of a material aggregate is made the sufficient 
 explanation of the initiation of the world process. 
 
 As in the account given of the initiation of evolution, 
 so also in the description of its progress up to organisms 
 and civilizations, nothing is attributed by Spencer to 
 intelligent agency, purpose, or choice. The evolutionary 
 process, as construed by him, starts from a basis de- 
 scribed in the terms commonly applied to matter, and 
 goes forward under the operation of a causality which at 
 every point is defined in terms appropriate to what is 
 known as matter. No hint of any other kind of causality 
 appears in the following general formula: "Evolution is 
 an integration of matter and a concomitant dissipation of 
 motion; during which the matter passes from an indefi- 
 nite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent hete- 
 rogeneity; and during which the retained motion under- 
 goes a parallel transformation."^ The implication of 
 this formula that the laws of matter and motion furnish 
 a sufficient account of all change and progress in the cos- 
 mos comes to frequent expression in the writings of 
 Spencer. Thus it is remarked, "Evolution is a continu- 
 ous redistribution of matter and motion; and a process 
 of evolution which is not expressible in terms of matter 
 and motion has not been reduced to its ultimate form."^ 
 It follows, of course, that natural selection may be ex- 
 pressed in terms of matter and motion, and this is 
 asserted in the following sentence: "In recognizing the 
 continuance of life as the continuance of a moving 
 equilibrium, early overthrown in some instances by inci- 
 dent forces and not overthrown in others until after they 
 have reproduced the species, we see that this survival 
 and multiplication of the select becomes conceivable, in 
 
 * First Principles, J 145. ^Principles of Biology, I. 548. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 107 
 
 purely physical terms, as an indirect outcome of a com- 
 plex form of the universal redistribution of matter and 
 motion."^ As the formula of evolution w^as meant to be 
 all-embracing, the genesis of all mental activities is 
 obviously understood to be referable to matter and 
 motion. "The actions of all organic beings," says Spen- 
 cer, "including those of our own species, are known to 
 us only as motions," and "the initiator or primary gen- 
 erator of motion is the nervous system." The same 
 changes which, regarded as modes of the ego, are ex- 
 pressed in terms of feeling, are, when regarded as modes 
 of the non-ego, expressed in terms of motion.^ Mind 
 may be presumed to be the subjective face of the same 
 thing of which nervous action is the objective face^ ; and 
 it is to be understood, according to the tenor of Spencer- 
 ian representations, that the objective face has the logi- 
 cal priority. Nerves are likewise the efficient antecedents 
 of our recognition of moral distinctions. By continued 
 transmission and accumulation nervous modifications 
 have become faculties of moral intuition.^ 
 
 The conclusion is unavoidable that in the exposition 
 of evolution, which occupies so large a place in the "syn- 
 thetic philosophy," the theistic conception of intelligent 
 agency back of the world has no place. The whole line 
 of changes, from the primordial homogeneity onward, is 
 treated as properly definable in terms of matter and 
 motion. No causation other than the physical comes into 
 view. An unknowable power is indeed postulated as 
 the ultimate reality, but this power is not permitted to 
 count for anything which cannot be described in material- 
 istic terms. And what practical superiority to matter 
 has such a power, in spite of the mystery with which it 
 
 * Autobiography, pp. 1 11;, 116. ^ Principles of Psychology, I. 5, 14. 
 3 Ibid., I. 140. ''"Data of Ethics, i 45. 
 
io8 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 is invested ? As a critic of the Spencerian philosophy has 
 said, "The recognition of an unknowable power behind 
 chemistry and physics, yet limited to the laws of chem- 
 istry and physics, is equal only to our estimate of chem- 
 istry and physics."^ 
 
 The system of Spencer, in short, is antitheistic In tenor, 
 and barely falls short of being a negation of theistic 
 belief. The concession which it makes to theism might 
 be stated succinctly in this form : If anyone is foolish 
 enough to believe that the world-ground is intelligent 
 and personal he is not strictly prohibited from doing so. 
 
 11. — Comments on the Spencerian System 
 A review of Herbert Spencer's philosophy cannot fail 
 to bring to the front these two inquiries : Does he furnish 
 any proper justification of the radical agnosticism which 
 he asserts? Is he successful, to any appreciable degree, 
 in his attempt to construe the universe entirely apart 
 from theistic postulates? 
 
 In regard to the agnostic premises which Spencer bor- 
 rows from his English predecessors, it is a very common 
 verdict in philosophical circles that they are not valid. 
 Hamilton's doctrine that to think is to condition, and 
 that consequently God as the unconditioned is quite 
 beyond the range of thought, is found to be greatly in 
 need of confirmation. If to condition means to limit, 
 then it must be said that there is no warrant for attach- 
 ing that function to thought universally. In uttering the 
 words unconditioned, infinite, and the like, Hamilton 
 himself, if he put any meaning into his language, made 
 the unlimited the object of his thought. So far was his 
 thinking from being a process of limitation that it was 
 explicitly directed to the end of excluding limitations. 
 
 * Malcolm Guthrie, Spencer's Data of Ethics, pp. 108-110. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 109 
 
 Only through confusing the power of thought with the 
 abiHty to picture can any plausibiHty be attached to the 
 Hamiltonian dictum. The picturing faculty is indeed 
 baffled in its attempt to form any distant image of that 
 which rejects all limitations; but thought, as not being 
 in strict bondage to the space category, as able to deploy 
 itself in the qualitative range as well as in the quantita- 
 tive, can affirm the absence of limits and be aware of 
 what it is doing in making the affirmation. The un- 
 limited, though unpicturable, is not inconceivable. In 
 fact, it is the correlate of the limited and is necessarily 
 grasped in thought along with the limited. Supposing, 
 then, Hamilton to mean what the phrase "to condition" 
 naturally implies, his proposition on the helplessness of 
 thought to apprehend the unconditioned or infinite is 
 simply to be rejected as contradictory to the known facts 
 of our mental operations. If by that phrase he meant to 
 denote the assignment of definite attributes, and held 
 such assignment to be incompatible with the proper con- 
 ception of the unconditioned or infinite, he was again 
 drawing an unwarranted conclusion. Attributes do not 
 in themselves involve of necessity any limitation. On the 
 contrary, to name the appropriate attributes of the un- 
 conditioned and the infinite amounts simply to illus- 
 trating the truth that, from every available point of view, 
 the subject in question is indeed the unconditioned and 
 the infinite. Thus the reasoning of Hamilton falls far 
 short of being a philosophical justification of agnos- 
 ticism. 
 
 With all its subtlety the reasoning of Mansel is 
 equally futile. It proceeds on the basis of a gratuitous 
 definition of the absolute as that which rejects all rela- 
 tions. To be sure, the absolute is formally defined simply 
 as that which has a possible existence apart from all re- 
 
no PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 lations. But in the argnment it is treated as the strictly 
 unrelated, that which is intolerant of all relations, inter- 
 ior and exterior. On that basis the conclusion is easily 
 drawn that it cannot be a cause or a self-conscious sub- 
 ject, or indeed aught but an unmitigated blank. But why 
 set up such an absolute as that? What is wanted is the 
 independent or self-sufficient being", the being able to 
 account for the universe as known in experience. Must, 
 now, the self-sufficient be a blank? The very contrary 
 is the rational supposition. Variety in unity is the mark 
 of all affluent being that is known to us, and so must be 
 supposed to be characteristic of the highest conceivable, 
 or that which is self-sufficient and independent. To sup- 
 pose that the variety contradicts the unity, or involves a 
 demand to select one element to serve as the independent 
 over against the remaining elements viewed as dependent 
 upon it, is to indulge in an illegitimate process of abstrac- 
 tion. Every perfection that can be named is to be 
 regarded as necessarily implied in the reality of the self- 
 sufficient being. It is only by separating the ontologically 
 inseparable and playing with abstractions that trouble is 
 made by the conception of an absolute which is charac- 
 terized by interior relations, that is, the relations of per- 
 fectly harmonious attributes and activities. As regards 
 exterior relations, what the true absolute rejects is merely 
 the enforced or imposed — in other words, relations not 
 consequent upon its own creative activity. It may be 
 objected, it is true, that the notion of creation collides 
 with that of infinitude, as supposing that what had not 
 previously been a source of causal energy should become 
 such and so improve upon its own state. The objection, 
 however, is not appalling. Even if resort is not made to 
 the conception of an eternal exercise of creative power^ 
 there remains the conception of a being whose ability to 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM iii 
 
 create is unlimited, incapable of being exhausted in any 
 conceivable product; and to deny infinitude to such a 
 being would have no w^arrant outside of an artificial 
 application of the quantitative category. In short, what 
 the reasoning of Mansel furnishes is rather an illustra- 
 tion of the entanglements which are entailed by a strained 
 definition of the absolute than a proof that no valid idea 
 of the absolute can be formed. 
 
 It was noticed that, besides quoting the representa- 
 tions of Hamilton and Mansel, Spencer found a reason 
 for excluding the absolute or unconditioned from the 
 sphere of cognition in the fact that it is incapable of classi- 
 fication. The assumption seems to be that nothing can 
 be known except through a relation of likeness to some- 
 thing else. But why may not a thing be defined to the 
 mind through relations of contrast ? Do men use an un- 
 meaning phrase when they speak of this or that as being 
 sni generis f Must intelligible grounds for putting a 
 thing with other things count for knowledge, and intel- 
 ligible grounds for putting a thing by itself in no wise 
 count for knowledge? Certainly the act of distinguish- 
 ing the absolute from everything else, if it is a sane pro- 
 cedure, involves some knowledge of the absolute. More- 
 over it is not to be conceded that no relations of likeness 
 subsist between the absolute and anything else. If it is 
 appropriate to represent the highest under the highest 
 known categories, then we must attribute to it self-con- 
 sciousness, intelligence, and will. In this point of view 
 the absolute stands at once in relations of likeness and of 
 contrast to ourselves — as possessing attributes that be- 
 long to us, but possessing them on a scale that infinitely 
 transcends all human measures. 
 
 While Spencer's agnosticism is chargeable with ill- 
 founded and arbitrary premises, it is also open to attack 
 
112 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 on the score of quite obvious inconsistencies. In many 
 passages he speaks of the ultimate power, which by hypo- 
 thesis is entirely unknowable, as being manifested; in- 
 deed, he has no scruple about conjoining the two phrases^ 
 "unknowable power" and "knowable manifestations." 
 Thus he remarks : "Our postulates are : an unknowable 
 power; the existence of knowable likenesses and differ- 
 ences among the manifestations of that power; and a 
 resulting segregation of the manifestations into those of 
 subject and object."^ Again he says: "It is one and the 
 same ultimate reality which is manifested to us subjec- 
 tively and objectively. For, while the nature of that 
 which is manifested under either form proves to be in- 
 scrutable, the order of its manifestations throughout all 
 mental phenomena proves to be the same as the order of 
 its manifestations throughout all material phenomena."^ 
 What better is such language than a conjunction of con- 
 tradictory terms? It amounts to the declaration that 
 manifestation in no wise manifests. Had the declaration 
 been that finite realities only partially manifest their 
 infinite ground, no objection could be made. But to 
 assert that manifestations do not in the slightest degree 
 fulfill the office of manifestation is to indulge in a bewil- 
 dering use of speech. 
 
 Consistency fails also to be conserved in the descriptive 
 terms which Spencer applies to the unknowable. It is 
 power ; it is infinite ; it is eternal ; it is creative in the sense 
 of being that from which all things proceed. If these 
 terms are warrantable the unknowable would seem to be 
 known to at least some extent. Moreover, there appears 
 to be very slight occasion to confine ourselves to these 
 terms. Why should so much prominence be given to 
 the notion of power ? Why should that aspect of reality 
 
 1 First Principles, * 45. » Principles of Psychology, I. 627 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 113 
 
 be selected, and be projected to infinity, while other as- 
 pects which are vitally related to the worth of being are 
 neglected? Why not also raise intelligence, and right- 
 eousness, and all the other lofty attributes of personality 
 to their highest terms, and count them characteristic of 
 the ultimate reality? Spencer assuredly has provided no 
 consistent ground for vetoing such a procedure.* 
 
 Again, the consistency of the Spencerian agnosticism 
 may be challenged as to the antithesis which it affirms 
 between science and religion as dealing respectively with 
 the knowable and the unknowable. "Spencer has failed," 
 says Balfour, "to see that, if the certitudes of science lose 
 themselves in depths of unfathomable mystery, it may 
 well be that out of these same depths there should emerge 
 the certitudes of religion; and that if the dependence of 
 the knowable upon the 'unknowable' embarrasses us not 
 in the one case no reason can be assigned why it should 
 embarrass us in the other."^ 
 
 Once more, Spencer exhibits a very scanty degree of 
 consistency in at once admitting the necessity of religion 
 and denying to it any proper means of sustenance. His 
 testimony to its necessity is sufficiently explicit. "The 
 universality of religious ideas," he says, "their independ- 
 ent evolution among different primitive races, and their 
 great vitality, unite in showing that their source must 
 be deep-seated instead of superficial." Referring to the 
 religious sentiment, he adds : "Here is an attribute which, 
 to say the least, has had an enormous influence — which 
 has played a conspicuous part throughout the entire past 
 as far back as history records, and is at present the life 
 of numerous institutions, the stimulus to perpetual con- 
 troversies, and the prompter of countless daily actions. 
 
 * Compare Iverach, Theism in the Light of Present Science and Phi« 
 losophy, p. 274. ^The Foundations of Belief, p. 296. 
 
114 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 Any theory which takes no account of this attribute must, 
 then, be extremely defective."^ He expresses the expec- 
 tation that this sentiment or attribute will survive and 
 continue to demand the forming of conceptions of the 
 ultimate reality.^ But, on the other hand,he requires 
 the religious man to recognize the total unlikeness of any 
 conception which he may form to the reality for which it 
 stands. He condemns religion to extinguish all its posi- 
 tive convictions as false lights, and to acknowledge that 
 its path is in the thick darkness of an absolute mystery 
 from which it can never emerge. In this way, he argues, 
 it will gain the boon of a reconciliation with science. 
 Doubtless in a sense that is true; for, if the program 
 should be strictly carried out, there would not be enough 
 of religion left to seriously antagonize science or any- 
 thing else. Religion needs something more than the bare 
 postulate of an absolute about whose nature and purpose, 
 if purpose there be, nothing can be known. It cannot 
 live on mystery alone. Pfleiderer did not speak too em- 
 phatically when he said, "A religion of nothing but mys- 
 tery is an absurdity"^ ; and Frederic Harrison was not 
 guilty of intemperate language when he remarked, in 
 relation to the Spencerian scheme, "It would be difficult 
 to find for religion a lower and more idle part to play in 
 human life than that of continually presenting to man a 
 conundrum which he is told he must continually give 
 up."^ 
 
 The second of the proposed inquiries — that respect- 
 ing the success of Spencer's attempt to construe the uni- 
 verse apart from theistic postulates — involves an in- 
 spection of certain assumptions and prominent features 
 
 1 First Principles, § 4. ^ Ibid., § 31. ^ Philosophy of Religion, II. 159. 
 ^ Nature and Reality of Religion, a Controversy between Harrison and 
 Spencer, p. 117. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 115 
 
 of his theory of evolution. And here we naturally take 
 note, in the first place, of his characterization of the per- 
 sistence of force (otherwise styled the conservation of 
 energy) as an axiomatic principle or datum of con- 
 sciousness. Were this a legitimate description, did hu- 
 man consciousness as such attest the persistence of force, 
 or the fact of the "dynamic equivalence of antecedents 
 and consequents in physical change," it would be a marvel 
 that the datum should so often have been ineffective. 
 Why should naturalists come to the recognition of a 
 truth thus attested only on the basis of a careful induction 
 from observed facts ? "If this principle lies so wondrous 
 deep, 'deeper even than demonstration, deeper even than 
 definite cognition,' then let Mr. Spencer explain Newton's 
 ignorance of it and the general skepticism that greeted its 
 enunciation by Mayer, Joule, and Helmholtz."^ 
 
 That the author of the synthetic philosophy should 
 wish to represent the principle as established beyond 
 question is intelligible enough, since he had a huge task 
 for it to perform — making it, in fact, the ground from 
 which the changes constitutive of evolution proceed as 
 "necessary consequences." The task, in truth, seems to 
 be much too large for the selected agent. Under the 
 closest examination the persistence of force cannot be 
 seen to explain any given change or to afford a ground 
 for predicting any specific change. It is not a formula 
 which in any wise suggests direction of movement. It 
 simply implies that through all movement and change 
 the original force or sum of energy remains intact. On 
 the Spencerian doctrine of the unknown nature of force 
 the formula cannot yield any further inference. As 
 Malcolm Guthrie remarks : "Since we cannot know the 
 
 'James Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, I. 216. Compare Bowne, 
 Methodist Review, July, 1904, 
 
ii6 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 nature of the original force or energy, we can get no 
 corollaries from it. If we are asked to draw corollaries 
 from the persistence of force, and we know not force, 
 the stress of getting the corollaries is thrown upon the per- 
 sistence, and the only corollaries derivable therefrom are 
 merely that if one kind of force augments another will 
 diminish, and vice versa."'^ With equal incisiveness 
 James Ward says : "The conservation of energy is not a 
 law of change, still less a law of qualities. It does not 
 initiate events, and furnishes absolutely no clue to 
 qualitative diversity. It is entirely a quantitative law. 
 When energy is transformed there is a precise equiva- 
 lence between the new form and the old ; but of the cir- 
 cumstances determining transformation, and of the pos- 
 sible kinds of transformation, the principle tells us noth- 
 mg. 2 
 
 The criticism passed upon the Spencerian use of the 
 principle of the persistence of force may be substantially 
 duplicated in relation to the famous maxim on the insta- 
 bility of the homogeneous. This maxim is used for much 
 more than it is worth, and the ground of the temptation 
 thus to employ it is quite evident. It gives an aspect of 
 thoroughness to the account rendered of the evolutionary 
 process to represent that process as going back of all 
 differentiation and beginning in the homogeneous ; and, 
 of course, if the homogeneous is to serve as the starting 
 point of change, it must be unstable. Thus it comes 
 about that the high-sounding phrase, the "instability of 
 the homogeneous," plays a great role in the synthetic 
 philosophy. The phrase, it is claimed, gives expression 
 to a "universal principle."^ Spencer seems to have found 
 
 1 Spencer's Unification of Knowledge, pp. 46-49- 
 ' Nattiralism and Agnosticism, I. 214. 
 »The Factors of Organic Evolution, p. 71. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 117 
 
 it necessary, however, to qualify the assumption of its uni- 
 versaHty, as was noticed in another connection. The 
 truth is, no proof can be given that the homogeneous is 
 intrinsically unstable. On the contrary, the rational sup- 
 position is that, without impact from without, an abso- 
 lutely homogeneous aggregate of being would be incap- 
 able of inaugurating any change. And even if instability 
 were predicable of the homogeneous, this principle would 
 account only for the fact of change in general, without 
 affording any insight at all into the reasons for specific 
 changes. As a means of explaining the actual universe 
 the maxim of the instability of the homogeneous is per- 
 fectly barren and impotent. 
 
 What has been said affords means of judgmg the gen- 
 eral formula of evolution as set forth by Spencer.^ Like 
 the maxims on which it purports to be founded, it is bar- 
 ren. Being of the nature of vague, external description, 
 it affords no guidance to a real insight into the evolution- 
 ary movement. "The requirement of the situation is not 
 that the philosopher should tell us (truly enough) that 
 evolution involves both shrinkings and swellings, both 
 mixings and sortings, both variety and order, but that he 
 should show us hozv these various tendencies are, in the 
 various types of evolutionary process, kept in that peculiar 
 balance which, each time, constitutes an evolution. This 
 is what Spencer seems not to have done.'" 
 
 Notwithstanding the generality of the formula which 
 Spencer employs to describe the evolutionary process, 
 the formula falls far short of covering the facts. The 
 purely materialistic terms in which it is expressed make 
 it of impossible application to wide domains. "Evolu- 
 tion," as has been well said, "may be applied to mind as 
 
 *See p. 106. 
 
 'Royce, Herbert Spencer, an Estimate and Review, pp. 114, 115. 
 
Ii8 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 well as to matter in the sense of growing complexity; 
 but what shall we make of the statement that there is an 
 'integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of 
 motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite 
 incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent hetero- 
 geneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes 
 a parallel transformation'? Thought cannot be stated 
 in terms of matter and motion ; there is a gulf between the 
 two. No doubt brain may grow more and more complex 
 as mind advances; but that is a physiological truth, not 
 a truth of psychology. Even if, then, this science exem- 
 plifies the evolutionary tendency to complexity, it does 
 not and cannot fulfill Spencer's formulated law of evo- 
 lution. The case is no less clear as regards sociology and 
 ethics."^ 
 
 It follows that, in defining philosophy as "completely 
 unified knowledge,"^ Spencer has implicitly rendered an 
 adverse judgment on the philosophical character of his 
 own system. He has not given a unified view of reality. 
 In spite of the formula which is propounded as all-em- 
 bracing he presents us with disparate realms respecting 
 the interconnection of which, or the method of transition 
 from one to the other, no intelligible account is given. 
 A relation of analogy or general resemblance is indeed 
 established between the purely physical, the biological, the 
 psychological, and the sociological, in so far as in each 
 of these spheres there is an apparent advance from sim- 
 plicity to complexity; but the mystery which separates 
 one sphere from another is not vanquished. We look in 
 vain in the Spencerian system for the self-consistent, 
 unified representation of reality. The inadequacy of the 
 physical formulas, which have such a controlling place in 
 
 1 Mackintosh, From Comte to Benjamin Kidd, p. 84. 
 'First Principles, 5 37. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 119 
 
 his philosophy, stands effectually in the way of success 
 in the attempt at unification. 
 
 We find, then, that Spencer's endeavor to construe the 
 universe apart from theistic premises was essentially 
 futile. The believer in an absolute which is more than 
 an indefinable somewhat, which in the height and fullness 
 of its attributes answers to the conception of the absolute 
 person, can only have his faith strengthened by the out- 
 come of the Spencerian philosophy. The scientific con- 
 clusion that evolution is a great fact may be, and prob- 
 ably is, well grounded; but evolution theory, if we may 
 judge by the system under review, runs into vain pre- 
 tense when it assumes to dispense with tlie need of divine 
 intelligence and purposeful action. 
 
 III. — Features of Haeckel's Evolutionism 
 Haeckel's scheme for construing the universe was so 
 largely indicated in connection with the exposition of 
 materialistic theories that only a few supplementary 
 statements are needed. Moreover, the character of his 
 adventures in the domain of philosophy is not such as to 
 justify lengthy consideration. Any distinction which at- 
 taches to his name pertains to achievements in specific 
 lines of scientific investigation. As respects a philoso- 
 phical justification and exposition of evolutionism, his 
 significance is exceedingly slight. 
 
 In regard to form, Haeckel's disquisition contrasts with 
 that of Spencer as giving less space to metaphysical 
 elaboration. While the latter exhibits a certain delight in 
 subtle reasoning, the former is so prodigal of dogmatic 
 assertion that one is disposed to inquire where he obtained 
 his diploma to practice as a pope in the world of philoso- 
 phy. In harmony with this feature Haeckel treats the 
 question of theism with much less reser\^e than does the 
 
120 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 English expositor of evolution. He will not admit the 
 remotest possibility that the world-ground can be per- 
 sonal. With a mental decision which can more properly 
 be termed gnostic than agnostic, he turns the theistic con- 
 ception out of doors as being absolutely incompatible with 
 scientific verities. In comparison with the unrestrained 
 expression of antipathies indulged in by Haeckel the atti- 
 tude of Spencer toward the traditional ideals of religion 
 might almost be described as polite. 
 
 In construing the primordial being or substance, 
 Haeckel, as has been indicated, makes it a composite, con- 
 stituted largely, if not exclusively, of very minute par- 
 ticles. Respecting the ether, which is assumed to fill up 
 the spaces between the more palpable entities which are 
 made up of mass atoms, he is not fully decided. "This 
 extremely light and attenuated ether," he says, "causes 
 by its vibrations all the phenomena of light and heat, 
 electricity and magnetism. We can imagine it either as 
 a continuous substance occupying the space between the 
 mass atoms or as composed of separate particles ; in the 
 latter case we might perhaps attribute to these ether atoms 
 an inherent power of repulsion in contrast with the im- 
 manent attracting power of the mass atoms, and the whole 
 mechanism of cosmic life would then be reducible to the 
 attraction of the latter and the repulsion of the former."^ 
 While allowing a problematic element in regard to the 
 nature of the ether and also of its precise relation to the 
 mass atoms, Haeckel is positive in the conviction that in 
 these forms of being the whole sum of original existence 
 was comprised, and that from this ground the universe, 
 as known in experience, was derived by a slow process of 
 evolution. "At the outset," he afiirms, "there is nothing 
 in infinite space but mobile, elastic ether and innumerable 
 
 * Monism as Connecting Religion and Science, p. 21. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 121 
 
 separate particles — the primitive atoms scattered through- 
 out it in the form of dust."^ 
 
 A pecuHarity in the theory of Haeckel is his claim that 
 the atoms possess in some sort a psychical character. He 
 denies, indeed, that they have consciousness,^ but holds 
 that they are characterized by sensation, these two being 
 "different physiological functions, which are by no means 
 necessarily associated." He admits that most chemists 
 and physicists repudiate the notion of atomic sensation. 
 His own faith, however, in this notion is very decided. 
 "Every shade," he says, "of inclination, from complete 
 indifference to the fiercest passion, is exemplified in the 
 chemical relation of the various elements toward each 
 other, just as we find in the psychology of man, and es- 
 pecially in the life of the sexes. . . . Even the atom 
 is not without a rudimentary form of sensation and will, 
 or, as it is better expressed, of feeling and inclination."^ 
 "When we rub together sulphur and mercury, two totally 
 different elements, the atoms of the finely divided matter 
 combine and form a third and different chemical body, 
 cinnabar. How would this simple synthesis be possible 
 unless the two elements feel each other, move toward each 
 other, and then unite?"* Thus the scientist, who is so 
 ready to lampoon the historical embodiments of religious 
 thoughts, constructs on his own account a fantastic 
 mythology. 
 
 The imputation of a psychical characteristic to the 
 primitive atoms might seem to have a certain advantage 
 over the purely materialistic theory as implying a less 
 magical genesis of mind or soul. But the advantage 
 amounts to very little so far as the system of Haeckel is 
 
 * Monism, p. 34. 
 
 ^The Riddle of the Universe, pp. 179, 180; Wonders of Life, pp. zSg, 290. 
 
 *The Riddle of the Universe, pp. 224, 225. * Wonders of Life, p. 309. 
 
122 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 concerned. He gives no sort of an explanation of how 
 these ultimate and irreducible individuals, called atoms, 
 which are assumed to be dowered with sensation but to 
 be void of consciousness, can be combined into a unitary 
 conscious subject. Furthermore, he as good as ignores 
 the psychic element in the atoms, assigning to it no intel- 
 ligible function in the production of the thinking con- 
 scious self, but referring all to physical and chemical 
 agency. "Consciousness," he says, "like all the other 
 mental powers, is a function of the brain, and may be re- 
 duced to physical and chemical processes in the cells of the 
 cortex." Again, in a passage already cited, he remarks, 
 "The soul is merely a collective title to the sum total of 
 man's cerebral functions ; and these are just as much de- 
 termined by physical and chemical processes as are any 
 of the other vital functions, and just as amenable to the 
 law of substance."^ In short, the verbal acknowledgment 
 of a primitive psychical element cannot be seen to modify 
 appreciably the essential materialism of Haeckel's system. 
 Haeckel's substitute for a personal God is about as 
 strange as are his mythological atoms with their loves and 
 hates. In one connection he says : "Religion in its rea- 
 sonable forms can take over the ether theory as an article 
 of faith, bringing into contradistinction the mobile cosmic 
 ether as creating divinity, and the inert, heavy mass as 
 material of creation. "^ That both of these factors may 
 properly enter into the definition of God is indicated in 
 this statement : "We might represent God as the infinite 
 sum of natural forces, the sum of all atomic forces and 
 ether vibrations."^ To make God thus a sum, a being 
 reached by the addition of one infinitesimal entity or ac- 
 tivity to another, has its difficulty for philosophical think- 
 
 1 The Riddle of the Universe, p. 204 ^ Monism, p. 24 
 
 *Ibid., pp. 78, 79. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 123 
 
 ing. There is also this perplexing fact, that, according 
 to the judgment of Haeckel, atomic forces and ether 
 vibrations exhibit very largely the reverse of both wisdom 
 and benevolence. They combine to make a world which 
 is the scene of an "unceasing and terrible war of exist- 
 ence," a world in which it is impossible to detect wise 
 providence or moral order.^ It follows, therefore, with 
 indisputable logic from the premises of Haeckel that his 
 God is at best a union of the divine and the diabolical, so 
 that he is parading a transparent abstraction when he sets 
 up the True, the Beautiful, and the Good as the object of 
 worship. Possibly an inkling of the shabbiness of the 
 substitute which he offered for Christian theism may ex- 
 plain the small ambition which he has exhibited to go 
 forward with his attempt to found a monistic religion. 
 
 IV. — Recent Teachings More or Less Affiliated 
 WITH Agnostic or with Antitheistic Premises 
 
 The teaching of Albrecht Ritschl and also of his school, 
 as represented by Herrmann, Kaftan, Harnack, Reischle, 
 and others, deserves no association with antitheistic specu- 
 lation and only a qualified one with agnosticism. The 
 occasion, therefore, for mentioning that teaching in this 
 connection is not very cogent, except as there is a demand 
 for a judicial estimate of the position of a party which has 
 been the subject of somewhat diverse judgments. 
 
 The challenge of Ritschl was directed not so much 
 against the trustworthiness of religious or theological con- 
 victions as against the competency of metaphysics to make 
 any real contribution to the subject-matter of religion or 
 theology. In thus limiting the office of metaphysics he 
 was not appropriating the platform of a radical phenome- 
 nalism or positivism. With Lotze, he qualified the Kan- 
 
 ^ Monism, pp. 71-74; The Riddle of the Universe, pp. 272-274. 
 
124 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 tian antithesis between phenomena and things-in-them- 
 selves, and held that through phenomena we have a real, 
 though partial, knowledge of things. He also credited 
 to metaphysics a useful office on the side of method. In 
 so far as it is concerned with the theory of knowledge it 
 furnishes a proper conception of the limitations which at- 
 tach to speculative thinking, and thus advises against 
 placing too large a dependence upon that instrumentality. 
 But at this point its good offices come to an end. It can 
 furnish nothing better than a general conception of the 
 world-ground, a conception which is quite incapable of 
 being put to theological use. The true basis for theology 
 is not contained in the findings of pure intellect or in 
 judgments of truth; it is found rather in the historical 
 and experiential, in revelation accredited to the indi- 
 vidual by the response which it calls forth in his emotional 
 and volitional nature. The objects of faith are made such 
 by the worth with which they are invested. They are, in- 
 deed, accounted real, but confidence in their reality is 
 based in the sense of their value. Judgments of value 
 constitute thus the characteristic function of the religious 
 man and furnish the one available ground for theological 
 construction. This is the great contention of the Ritsch- 
 lian school. While not entirely uniform in their concep- 
 tions, the members of that school make much account of 
 the antithesis between the theoretical and the practical, 
 between judgments of truth and judgments of value, and 
 emphasize the latter as properly controlling the subject- 
 matter of theology. 
 
 As against the overplus of the theoretical element, 
 which often has cumbered the theological domain, the 
 Ritschlian point of view is doubtless very largely in the 
 right. Still it is properly subject to criticism as making 
 a somewhat artificial contrast between the theoretical and 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 125 
 
 the practical, between the demands of intellect and the re- 
 quirements of the emotional and volitional nature. In 
 so far as judgments are supposed to conform only to the 
 latter class of demands, a species of agnostic disparage- 
 ment is visited upon them. Generally speaking, judg- 
 ments do not belong exclusively to the one domain or the 
 other. The nature of man requires satisfaction on its 
 intellectual side, and necessarily recognizes, implicitly or 
 explicitly, a worth in that which renders the satisfaction. 
 On the other hand, the apparent worth of objects which 
 appeal to the emotional and volitional nature of man can- 
 not to be altogether independent of an estimate of their 
 truth or their harmonious relation to the general system 
 of reality. From this point of view metaphysical inquiry 
 becomes pertinent. Indeed, it is in constant demand as 
 an auxiliary of a scientific Christian theology. Even if 
 metaphysics cannot say the decisive word on most theo- 
 logical questions, it has a highly important office to fulfill 
 in showing that no datum of reason stands against any 
 essential tenet of the Christian system. While it is no 
 substitute for the value judgment, it is capable of serving 
 as a useful supplement thereto. In order to afford a firm 
 basis of confidence the value judgment needs to furnish 
 guarantees that it is not merely personal, or the product 
 of an eccentric subjectivity. In supplying such guaran- 
 tees the best work will not be done short of thorough 
 inquiry in the field of metaphysics as well as in that of 
 history. Of course, the religious man cannot wait for 
 such work, but directly or indirectly he may reap from it 
 no inconsiderable benefit.^ 
 
 ^ See Ritschl, Theologie und Metaphysik; also The Christian Doctrine of 
 Justification and Reconciliation; Herrmann, The Communion of the Chris- 
 tian with God; Kaftan, Das Wesen der Christlichen Religion: Reischle, 
 "Werturtheile und Glaubensurtheile; Ecke. Theologische Schule Ritschl's; 
 Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology; Flugel, Ritschl's Philosophische und 
 
126 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 A party among French Protestants has advocated a 
 conception of the basis of Christian theology which is not 
 unhke the RitschHan. It makes faith, in the sense of 
 Hducia, the central element in religion, emphasizes expe- 
 rience of the moral and religious order as the one valid 
 basis of doctrinal construction, and insists upon the sym- 
 bolical character of all the terms which attempt to express 
 the objects of religious thought and feeling. The stand- 
 point of the party may be judged from the following 
 statements of a prominent representative, Auguste Saba- 
 tier : "What is not in religious experience should find no 
 place in religious science and should be banished from 
 it. . . . Rational truths not born of religious feel- 
 ing would be in dogmatics so many dead weights and 
 heterogeneous elements, which would lead to the greatest 
 incoherence. . . . The object of religious knowl- 
 edge only reveals itself in the subject of the religious 
 phenomena themselves. . . . God only reveals him- 
 self in and by piety."^ "With Schleiermacher the Protest- 
 ant consciousness finally passed the strait which separates 
 the theology of authority from the theology of experience. 
 Religious truth could no longer be given by an oracle; 
 henceforth it must spring out of Christian experience it- 
 self, and never cease to reproduce itself in pious souls, 
 under the permanent influence of the Spirit of Christ. 
 Holy Scripture could no longer be the foundation of faith ; 
 it became an auxiliary, a means of grace."^ "Religious 
 knowledge is symbolical. All the notions it forms and 
 organizes, from the first metaphor created by religious 
 feeling to the most abstract theological speculation, are 
 
 Theologische Ansichten; Pfleiderer, Die Ritschl'sche Theologie; Swing, The 
 Theology of Ritschl; Orr, The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical 
 Faith ; Keirstead, Metaphysical Presuppositions of Ritschl, American Jour- 
 nal of Theology, Oct., 1905. 
 
 1 Outlines of Philosophy of Religion, pp. 273-308. 
 
 ^ Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit, p. 210. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 127 
 
 necessarily inadequate to their object. . . . Symbols 
 are the only language suited to religion. We need to 
 know that which we adore; but it is not less necessary 
 that we should not comprehend it, for one does not adore 
 that which he comprehends too clearly, because to com- 
 prehend is to dominate. Such is the twofold and con- 
 tradictory condition of piety, to which symbols seem to 
 be made expressly to respond. Piety has never had any 
 other language."^ 
 
 The general theory of Sabatier, like that of Ritschl, 
 doubtless has its rights, as against much of the specula- 
 tive elaboration of past times. Some of its statements, 
 however, savor of a one-sided subjectivity. As respects 
 the degree of agnosticism pertaining to his scheme, the 
 verdict must depend upon the sense in which he is under- 
 stood to make the expressions of religious truths symboli- 
 cal. If the symbols are construed as mere arbitrary signs, 
 then we have the pronounced agnosticism of Spencer. 
 But Sabatier and his associates seem not to have taken 
 them in that sense. They are not, therefore, chargeable 
 with a radical agnosticism. 
 
 In Benjamin Kidd's exposition of social evolution ex- 
 pressions occur which seem to savor of agnosticism, in 
 that they place religion outside the domain of reason. 
 "There can never be," he says, "such a thing as a ra- 
 tional religion. The essential element in all religious 
 beliefs must apparently be the ultra-rational sanction 
 which they provide for social conduct. When the fun- 
 damental nature of the problem involved in our social 
 evolution is understood it must become clear that that 
 general instinct which may be distinguished in the minds 
 of men around us is in the main correct, and that no form 
 
 * Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, pp. 322, 327. 
 
128 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 of belief is capable of functioning as a religion in the 
 evolution of society which does not provide an ultra- 
 rational sanction for social conduct in the individual. In 
 other words, a rational religion is a scientific impossi- 
 bility, representing from the nature of the case an inher- 
 ent contradiction of terms. "^ 
 
 Such language might seem to challenge the claim of 
 religion to respect. But it was quite remote from the 
 intention of Mr. Kidd to have his words taken as a war- 
 rant for disparagement. On the contrary, he maintains 
 that nothing in evolutionary theory or modern discovery 
 tends properly to diminish our estimate of the value and 
 necessity of religion. He ascribes to it a utilitarian func- 
 tion of immense import, and criticises the account which 
 Spencer gives of it in his Sociology as being beneath the 
 demands of the subject. "It is hard," he says, "to follow 
 the author, in his theories of the development of religious 
 beliefs from ghosts and ancestor worship, without a con- 
 tinual feeling of disappointment, and even impatience, 
 at the triviality and comparative insignificance of the 
 explanations offered to account for the development of 
 such an imposing class of social phenomena. "^ 
 
 A large part of the explanation of the ultra-rational 
 character assigned to religion by Mr. Kidd is contained 
 in his conception of the office of reason. What reason 
 has to do is simply to direct man in the path of self-inter- 
 est. It never dictates the sacrifice of self. There is in it 
 no element of altruism. Its gaze is always fixed upon the 
 good of the individual, not upon that of society. A man 
 becomes the servant of his kind only through the con- 
 straint of a power in conflict with his reason, and that 
 power is, above all, religion. 
 
 In this representation justice is not done to reason, and 
 
 » Social Evolution, pp. io8, 109. ^ Ibid, pp. 22-24. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 129 
 
 therefore fails also to be done to religion. Reason is shut 
 up to the contemplation of self-interest, of self-interest in 
 the sense of immediate gratifications of a purely self-re- 
 garding order. But why may not reason take the larger 
 view, in which the antithesis between the interest of self 
 and the interest of one's fellows is for the most part over- 
 come? Why may it not recognize that the isolated life 
 is barren and desolate, that withholding impoverishes, 
 that giving enriches, that no investment can bring such 
 revenue to man's spirit as expenditure for the well-being 
 and happiness of others ? This certainly must be the case 
 if wisdom, righteousness, and benevolence are back of the 
 world system in which man is inclosed. Thus, while self- 
 interest is far from being the only motive in the perform- 
 ance of social offices, there is no essential antagonism 
 between it and such offices, and reason is not tied up to 
 the one as against the other. In the larger view reason is 
 seen to join hands with altruism, and the occasion falls 
 away to consider religion as ultra-rational or as the source 
 of an ultra-rational sanction. 
 
 The very subtle treatise of F. H. Bradley, entitled 
 Appearance and Reality, recalls both Hegel and Schel- 
 ling. An affinity with the thinking of the former is ap- 
 parent in the close association which is made between 
 reality and experience, or rather in the identification of 
 all reality with the experience of absolute spirit. Thus 
 it is said, "Reality is sentient experience. To be real 
 is to be indissolubly one thing with sentience. It is to be 
 something which comes as a feature and aspect within 
 one whole of feeling, something which, except as an in- 
 tegral element of such sentience, has no meaning at all. 
 . . . Every element of the universe, sensation, feeling, 
 thought, and will, must be included within one compre- 
 
130 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 hensive sentience. . . , There is but one reality, and its 
 being consists in experience. In this one whole all appear- 
 ances come together."^ The point of affinity with Schel- 
 ling lies in the conception that the absolute is above all 
 contrasts, being that in which all distinctions, if not 
 strictly obliterated, are so transformed as to be quite 
 beyond any power of representation with which we are 
 endowed. "Spirit," says Bradley, "is a unity of the mani- 
 fold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly 
 ceased. ... It is above the relational form and has 
 absorbed it in a higher unity, a whole in which there is 
 no division between elements and laws. . . . Pure spirit 
 is not realized except in the absolute."^ "We have 
 no knowledge of a plural diversity, nor can we attach 
 any sense to it, if we do not have it somehow as 
 one."3 
 
 Formally considered, Bradley's teaching is not emphati- 
 cally agnostic. In fact, he is far from approving the Spen- 
 cerian talk about the unknowable. "The unknowable," 
 he says, "must be prepared to deserve the name or not. 
 But, if it actually were not knowable, we could not know 
 that such a thing existed."^ "To say that reality is such 
 that our knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know 
 reality; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind which 
 must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that 
 transcendence. For, if we had no idea of a beyond, we 
 should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or 
 success. And the test by which we distinguish them must 
 obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of the 
 goal. ... I am so bold as to believe that we have a knowl- 
 edge of the absolute, certain and real, though I am sure 
 that our comprehension is miserably incomplete. But 
 
 'Appearance and Reality, pp. 146, 159, 455. ^ Ibid., p. 499- 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 141. *Ibid., p. 129. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 131 
 
 I dissent emphatically from the conclusion that, because 
 imperfect, it is worthless."^ 
 
 Though repudiating a sweeping denial of our com- 
 petency to know the absolute, Bradley's teaching is both 
 agnostic and antitheistic in tendency. It is chargeable 
 with both characteristics for the same reason, namely, 
 a denial of the proper applicability to the absolute of the 
 categories by which personal and ethical being is repre- 
 sented to our minds. Even the term God is declared to 
 be inapplicable, as standing for a too partial and figurate 
 conception. "We may say that God is not God till he has 
 become all in all, and that a God which is all in all is not 
 the God of religion. God is but an aspect, and that must 
 mean but an appearance, of the absolute."^ There is no 
 propriety, it is maintained, in calling the absolute personal, 
 or good, or beautiful. It has indeed personality, good- 
 ness, and beauty ; but it is not any one of these any more 
 than it is their opposites. It is to be considered not so 
 much personal and moral as super-personal and super- 
 moral. In other words, if we catch Bradley's meaning 
 we are only authorized to assume in the absolute the inde- 
 finable grounds of that which comes forth in the realm 
 of appearances as personal, moral, and beautiful.^ Being 
 thus forbidden to employ the highest categories which 
 have any meaning for our minds, we are left by Bradley's 
 speculation with exceedingly scanty means for represent- 
 ing the absolute. The primal unity of Neo-Platonism could 
 not make a more dim or distant object for our thought. 
 
 This barren outcome may be regarded as the product 
 of an intemperate effort to push thought beyond the plane 
 of all distinctions. Bradley is by far too intolerant of 
 the notion of an intelligible manifoldness or diversity as 
 
 * Appearance and Reality, pp. 2, 3 ^ Ibid., p. 448. 
 
 Mbid., pp. 173, 402, 488. 533. 
 
132 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 pertaining to ultimate being. He exaggerates the logical 
 demand for representing the real and ultimate as that 
 which is above all difference, or at least above all nama- 
 ble difference. The greater demand lies on the side of 
 so construing the absolute that a satisfactory account can 
 be given of the manifold in the universe, and especially 
 of the diversities of which we are immediately cognizant 
 as self-conscious personalities. That the universe con- 
 tains that which appears to us as impersonal affords 
 small occasion for positing a nonpersonal ground, since 
 will is a fundamental element in the conception of person- 
 ality, and the energizing of a personal, infinite will is the 
 most intelligible account that can be given of that impres- 
 sion of an external world which forms part of the experi- 
 ence of finite personalities. 
 
 It might be expected that reference would be made in 
 this connection to Professor Huxley, since he both in- 
 vented the term "agnosticism" and declared it descriptive 
 of his own standpoint. But Huxley was little concerned 
 with the deeper problems of speculation. As an agnostic 
 he devoted himself principally to the task of vexing the 
 theologians on questions which touch the province of bib- 
 lical criticism ; and here the products of his pen were not 
 of sufficient import to claim much attention from any 
 but the contemporary generation. In so far as he battled 
 to secure a fair hearing for science he is deserving of 
 respect and praise. But the spirit which he manifested 
 in his excursions into the theological domain was not 
 particularly scientific. "In his temper and mental habits, 
 in his attitude toward what he believed the truth, Huxley 
 was as veritable a dogmatist as any of his theological an- 
 tagonists."^ 
 
 ^ Schurman, Agnosticism and Religion, p. 12. 
 
AGNOSTIC AND ANTITHEISTIC EVOLUTIONISM 133 
 
 Other names associated with agnostic or antitheistic 
 theories might be mentioned; but most of them do not 
 stand for any distinctive type outside of those already 
 characterized. Probably the teaching of E. de Roberty 
 has as much claim to peculiarity as any. In form that 
 teaching is very largely a polemic against agnosticism, 
 representing Comte, Spencer, and kindred speculators as 
 fulfilling, in spite of their antipathy toward theology and 
 metaphysics, a theological and metaphysical role in their 
 postulate of the unknowable. "Religious faith or meta- 
 physics and the beliefs of agnosticism," says De Roberty, 
 "appear to us as perfectly homologous groups of sociolog- 
 ical phenomena, fulfilling essentially the same functions 
 and following the same laws of metamorphosis. . . . The 
 supernatural and the unknowable are only two different 
 names applied to one and the same object. . . . The un- 
 knowable is well-nigh the only phantom of the theological 
 past of humanity which has not been exorcised by 
 science."^ All such unreal abstractions, it is asserted, as 
 the unknowable and the absolute should be discarded. In 
 their place it suffices to speak of the verifiable and the 
 unveriiiable, and it should be recognized that the prov- 
 inces to which these terms respectively apply are of chang- 
 ing boundaries. In the normal mental process account 
 will be taken only of the results reached by the concrete 
 sciences and of such deductions as are legitimated by these 
 results. 
 
 Evidently the tenor of De Roberty's teaching implies 
 that the subject-matter of theology and religion lies out- 
 side the range of scientific deductions. His scheme, there- 
 fore, as repudiating an attempt to construe ultimate 
 reality, is of the agnostic type, notwithstanding its seem- 
 ing hostility to agnosticism. Neither is it consistent or 
 
 * L'Inconnaissable, pp. 24, 25, 56. 
 
134 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 profound in the contempt which it expresses for meta- 
 physics. No one reasons without resort to metaphysical 
 premises. There is absolutely no safeguard against the 
 mischief of a faulty metaphysics, except that which is to 
 be found in a sound metaphysics. As Professor James 
 has remarked, "Metaphysics means only an unusually ob- 
 stinate attempt to think clearly and consistently."^ 
 
 1 Cited by H. C. King, Theology and the Social Consciousness, p. 36. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 PESSIMISM 
 
 I. — The Teaching of Schopenhauer 
 
 As a form of philosophy pessimism, in its Occidental 
 phase, belongs mainly to the second half of the nineteenth 
 century. It is true that Arthur Schopenhauer (1788- 
 1860), the pioneer of this species of philosophy, published 
 his principal work. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 
 as early as 18 18. But exceedingly scanty attention was 
 given to the work till the middle of the century. Even 
 after that date the confessed disciples of the pessimistic 
 philosopher were relatively few. His thinking, however, 
 has commanded considerable attention for several dec- 
 ades. Naturally, the boldness and novelty of his creed, 
 the mordant character of his diatribes, and the real acute- 
 ness of his exposition of various themes have claimed a 
 measure of notice from a generation that has become 
 rather loose in* its attachments to the great philosophical 
 systems of the past. 
 
 With a wolfish hunger for the applause of the very 
 world which he affected to despise, Schopenhauer com- 
 bined an enormous vanity, or confidence in his own philo- 
 sophical primacy. This made it impossible for him to 
 grant to contemporary philosophers anything like a cor- 
 dial recognition. Of Hegel in particular he spoke uni- 
 formly in terms of bitter contempt. In a characteristic 
 reference to the Hegelian system he described it as "this 
 most miserable of all the meager philosophies that ever 
 existed."^ His estimate of other systems belonging to his 
 
 1 Religion and Other Essays, trans, by Saunders, p. 68. 
 
 135 
 
136 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 own age was only less disparaging. "As far as Germany 
 is concerned," he remarked, "the total philosophical in- 
 competence of the first half of the century following upon 
 Kant is plain." 
 
 The philosophies of Kant and Plato and the early sys- 
 tems of India were the intellectual products of the past to 
 which Schopenhauer considered special deference to be 
 due. The first of these he did not profess to follow 
 throughout. He disagreed with prominent features of the 
 Kantian ethics, and had no sympathy at all with the Kant- 
 ian partiality for the theistic conception. But his formal 
 estimate of Kant was high, and he believed that he stood 
 in substantial agreement with the Kantian teaching on 
 a number of topics, notably on the contrast between the 
 real and the ideal, on the thing-in-itself, on the a priori 
 forms of the understanding, on the opposition between 
 the intelligible and the empirical character, and on the 
 coexistence of freedom and necessity.^ 
 
 The Platonic teaching which specially appealed to 
 Schopenhauer was the doctrine of the ideas. These he 
 construed as the immediate and only adequate objectifi- 
 cation of the ultimate reality, the true universals which 
 science names in its reference to species, subsisting above 
 the limitations of time and space, always existing and 
 never becoming, and thus standing in wide contrast with 
 the sense world which is ever becoming but never attains 
 to real being. As related to the things of the phenomenal 
 sphere, the ideas are the perfect patterns, full conformity 
 to which is nowhere realized."^ 
 
 Toward the philosophical speculations and religious 
 ideas of India the attitude of Schopenhauer was one of 
 
 ' Compare Hecker, Schopenhauer und die Indische Philosophie, p. 6. 
 ■" Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, third edition, I. 153, 201-209, 44 25, 
 3^-33- 
 
PESSIMISM 137 
 
 warm appreciation. He spoke of the Hindu as the 
 "wisest of all mythologies," and characterized the Vedas 
 as "the fruit of the highest human knowledge and wis- 
 dom." He described the publication of the Upanishads 
 as "the greatest gift of the century." He confessed that, 
 if the outcome of his own philosophy were to be taken 
 as a measure. Buddhism must be given the preference 
 among religions, and maintained that the consideration 
 for the welfare of animals characteristic of both Bud- 
 dhism and Brahmanism showed them to be nearer perfec- 
 tion than either Judaism or Christianity. He saw in 
 the kinship between certain Christian ideas and the doc- 
 trines of Hinduism evidence that the former were shaped 
 in some way by the latter.^ In practical advertisement of 
 his affiliation with the Oriental systems he named his dog 
 Atman and kept a statuette of Buddha in his chamber. 
 
 Schopenhauer interpreted his relation to Hindu philos- 
 ophy and religion to be one of simple agreement rather 
 than one of dependence. It is not improbable, however, 
 that the tone and content of his thinking received some 
 positive impress from that quarter, since already before 
 writing his principal work he had begun to make acquaint- 
 ance with the ancient literature of India. What is cer- 
 tain is that in his system elements like those found in 
 the Vedanta philosophy, or the orthodox philosophy of 
 Brahmanism, are blended with points of view that are 
 essentially Buddhistic. In common with the Vedanta 
 philosophy Schopenhauer affirmed one sole substance, the 
 all-one. He agreed also with that philosophy in regard- 
 ing this one substance as impersonal. He agreed like- 
 wise with it in following out these pantheistic premises 
 to a denial of the proper conception of individual souls. 
 
 *Die Welt als Wille, I. 324, 419, II. 186; Religion and Other Essays, 
 pp. 112, 115. 
 
138 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 On the other hand, he diverged from the Vedanta sys- 
 tem in emphasizing will, rather than intellect or reason, 
 as the thing of supreme theoretical and practical interest. 
 At this point he approached Buddhism. With the Bud- 
 dhistic pessimism, which represents the world system as 
 interwoven with misery, he was in full accord. He also 
 approved the Buddhistic conception of salvation as con- 
 sisting essentially in a negation of the will and a recession 
 into an absolute quietism. Doubtless, a complete cor- 
 respondence cannot be traced between the thinking of 
 Schopenhauer and the content of either Brahmanism or 
 Buddhism, but with approximate fidelity to the facts his 
 system can be described as a combination of the two. 
 "The philosophy of Schopenhauer," says Professor 
 Hecker, "is emphatically a synthesis of Brahmanism, in 
 the form of the Vedanta, and Buddhism. . . . His meta- 
 physics is the pantheistic Vedanta doctrine of identity; 
 his ethics the annihilation of desire taught by Buddha."^ 
 The basal conceptions of Schopenhauer are indicated 
 by the title which he chose for his principal work, The 
 World as Will and Idea [or Representation]. Will and 
 its phenomenal expression make up, in his view, the sum 
 of reality. The thing-in-itself of which Kant spoke is 
 simply will. This it is which is back of all phenomena, 
 of whatever order. Force or energy is not a name for 
 that which includes will ; on the contrary, every force in 
 nature falls properly under the designation of will. As 
 thing-in-itself, will is above the categories of space, time, 
 causality, and necessity. The sphere of these categories 
 is the sphere of the phenomenal. Here they have full 
 sway. And in saying this we affirm their application to 
 the individual; for, as related to the thing-in-itself, "the 
 individual is only phenomenon." The individual, accord- 
 
 ^ Schopenhauer und die Indische Philosophie, p. 254. 
 
PESSIMISM 139 
 
 ingly, falls under the law of causality, and, being deter- 
 mined in each act by a causal antecedent, must be 
 regarded as destitute of freedom in the sense of alterna- 
 tivity. To the individual the world stands as appearance. 
 Matter has no meaning apart from the percipient indi- 
 vidual. Materialism, therefore, is at fault in attempting 
 to explain that which is immediately given by that which 
 is mediately given, the knowing subject by the appear- 
 ance. Of the world of appearance the body is the part 
 which holds direct relation with the individual. Every 
 act of his will is at the same time a movement of his body. 
 In fact, "the whole body is nothing else than the objecti- 
 fied will, that is, the will brought to manifestation."^ 
 
 As appears from the above, the formal attitude of 
 Schopenhauer toward materialism was distinctly hostile. 
 Nevertheless he indulged in statements which have a 
 decided resemblance to materialistic postulates. Not only 
 did he make knowledge purely instrumental to will ; he 
 described the intellect as a mere function of the brain. 
 "The intellect," he declared, "is as transitory as the brain, 
 whose product, or rather action, it is. The brain, how- 
 ever, like the entire bodily organism, is product or mani- 
 festation of the will, which is alone permanent."^ Pre- 
 dicating thus only a perishing intellect, or instrument of 
 knowledge, for the individual man, Schopenhauer evi- 
 dently could make no provision for the thought of per- 
 sonal immortality. That he should have no wish to make 
 the provision was dictated by his radical pessimism. 
 
 As Schopenhauer conceived, the world is necessarily 
 bad because the source from which it proceeds is a prin- 
 ciple of restless, unsatisfied striving. This tendency be- 
 longs to will as such, and it must therefore pervade its 
 concrete forms. Man in particular, as being the most per- 
 
 iDie Welt als Wille. I. 119. 2 Ibid., II. 224. 
 
140 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 feet objectification of will, is full of needs and remote 
 from satisfaction. An imperious impulse drives him to 
 strive for the maintenance of the life which is not worth 
 having; and the striving, too, is without any assurance 
 of the desired result, since nature, respecting only the 
 species, has no care or mercy for the individual. His pur- 
 suit of positive enjoyment is ever an illusion, the best that 
 can be attained being the abridgment of pain. Man tires 
 of the very life which he fights desperately to sustain, 
 until at length its insipidity and tediousness paint veri- 
 table despair upon his face. His life is like bad ware with 
 nothing better to commend it than a false glitter; and it 
 runs its course, in the great majority of cases, with about 
 as little understanding of its purpose and meaning as 
 belongs to a wound-up clock. Where the preponderance 
 lies, as between weal and woe, is strikingly illustrated by 
 Dante. When he wished to paint hell he found in this 
 world no lack of materials for concrete delineations. 
 When, on the other hand, he wished to paint heaven, he 
 could discover no suitable materials, and proceeded to 
 report, not the joys of paradise, but the instruction vouch- 
 safed to him by Beatrice and various saints. While thus 
 man is placed in a world which is lavishly provided with 
 the proper furniture of hell, he is not even permitted to 
 find compensation for his misery in the thought of his 
 nobility and good desert ; for his misery is an authentic 
 measure of his worthlessness and guilt. At this point 
 the pessimism of Schopenhauer seems to pass over into a 
 kind of optimism, since he asserts the perfect reign of 
 justice in the world. And in truth we should have here a 
 gleam of optimistic faith had the reign of justice been 
 •.onceived to lead on to anything better than blankness 
 and nothingness.* 
 
 »Die Welt als Wille, I. 325-415, ii 54-63. 
 
PESSIMISM 141 
 
 Inasmuch as the source of misery was located by our 
 pessimistic philosopher in blindly operating will, he 
 naturally located the remedy in the negation of the will. 
 This act of negation he considered dependent upon knowl- 
 edge. When a man attains to an enlightened vision of 
 the vanity of all pursuit after enjoyment, and discovers 
 that desire is the bitter fountain of unrest and pain, then 
 he is prepared to choose the only haven of peace, the 
 state of complete quiescence. Thus he gains in the present 
 a relative redemption anticipatory of that more perfect 
 emancipation which is wrought by the extinction of in- 
 dividual existence in death. 
 
 As was noticed, Schopenhauer found in Buddhism the 
 most satisfactory anticipation both of his pessimistic view 
 of life and of his notion of salvation. He considered, 
 however, that original Christianity afforded a fairly close 
 parallel to his way of thinking, the other-worldliness and 
 cross-bearing taught by Christ being interpreted by him 
 as genuine tokens of a pessimistic standpoint. Among 
 Christian ideas he valued in particular those which relate 
 to the facts of original sin and redemption. Judaism 
 with its monotheistic creed he thoroughly contemned, 
 but conceded that in its doctrine of the fall it had served 
 to propagate a highly important truth. Of the mystical 
 element in religion he was rather tolerant. Indeed, he 
 considered that those who have an ambition to pare away 
 all the mystery of religion are rendering to it the poorest 
 sort of service. Accordingly, he greatly preferred Augus- 
 tine and Luther to all rationalizing expounders of Chris- 
 tianity. "Rationalism in the form of modern free thought 
 or antisupernaturalism was to Schopenhauer about the 
 poorest and blindest and the most ignorant of all phi- 
 losophies."^ 
 
 * Caldwell. Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance, p. 384. 
 
142 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 As an offset to the one-sided intellectualism of the 
 HegeHan system, Schopenhauer's philosophy, with its 
 predominant stress upon the will, may have been adapted 
 to render a certain service. It may be granted also that 
 on individual points it reveals a very good insight. But 
 taken in its entirety it has very scanty claims to apprecia- 
 tion. Not only is it bizarre and extreme, it is also bur- 
 dened with a very uncomfortable list of self-contradic- 
 tions. A veritable heap of inconsistencies appears, for 
 instance, in the place and function assigned to the intel- 
 lect. On the one hand, the intellect is regarded as the 
 product of an antecedent world running through various 
 stages of organization up to the human brain; on the 
 other hand, it is made the necessary antecedent of the 
 world system, since only through the forms of the intel- 
 lect does the world have existence as a system-, a unity 
 characterized by manifoldness and conformity to law. On 
 the one hand, the intellect is described as a mere function 
 of the brain ; on the other hand, the brain, as known only 
 to the intellect, is made a phenomenon to the intellect; 
 in other words, that which is defined as having the place 
 or character of a subject is made a phenomenon to that 
 which is defined as having the character of a function. 
 On the one hand, the intellect is denied the nature of a 
 subject proper, since it is made a mere product or form of 
 activity of a physical organism ; on the other hand, it is 
 treated as a proper subject, an agent equipped with 
 powers of discrimination, comparison, and logical pro- 
 cedure in system building. On the one hand, the intellect 
 holds an abject position as a mere instrument of the will; 
 on the other hand, the intellect in the proper course of 
 things comes to a mastery over the will, and restrains it 
 even to the point of complete cancellation.* On the one 
 
 * Compare Kuno Fischer, Schopenhauer's Leben, Werke und Lehre. 
 
PESSIMISM 143 
 
 hand, as being the product of irrational will, the intellect 
 would seem to be destitute of any valid claim to ration- 
 ality ; on the other hand, Schopenhauer philosophizes with 
 a supreme confidence which distinctly implies that intel- 
 lect, as embodied in himself, is beyond question rational. 
 Glaring contradictions are also observable in other rela- 
 tions. Thus Schopenhauer asserts that the world has 
 moral significance, and stigmatizes the opposite view as 
 "the greatest and most pernicious of all errors."^ But 
 what basis is there in his fundamental conception for at- 
 tributing a moral significance to the world? According 
 to that conception the one reality, of which the world is 
 the manifestation, is blind aberrant will, which exercises 
 its creative function so badly as to make a world which 
 may be described as the worst possible. What a theater 
 for the presentation and glorification of ethical ideals! 
 Who can draw inspiration for righteousness from the 
 contemplation of such a supreme being? What can 
 there be worth working for under such an administra- 
 tion? Practical extinction of self and the abolition of 
 the world, says Schopenhauer; and the answer is not 
 illogical from his standpoint. But what kind of a moral 
 world is that which thrusts upon men the one task of 
 working toward its own abolition and the throwing of 
 all things back into the primitive night of unconscious 
 will? What wisdom, benevolence, or righteousness can 
 be discovered in this imposition of painful struggle after 
 nothingness? The fact is that on the basis of the rank 
 pessimism of Schopenhauer the world is too much of a 
 madhouse to make it consistent to attempt to find in it 
 any ethical meaning or any ground whatever of rational 
 interpretation. 
 
 It was noticed that Schopenhauer construed the other- 
 
 * Essay on Human Nature. 
 
144 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 worldliness of Jesus and his doctrine of cross-bearing" 
 as equivalent to the assertion of the pessimistic stand- 
 point. The legitimacy of the interpretation can in no 
 wise be admitted. Between placing at the center of the 
 universe a blind aberrant power, which is totally regard- 
 less of the weal of the individual, and placing there the 
 benignant form of the heavenly Father who notes the fall 
 of the sparrow, who numbers the very hairs upon the 
 heads of his children, and whose tender, all-comprehend- 
 ing care makes it unnecessary to borrow anxious thought 
 about the morrow, there is an enormous difference. The 
 controlling view of Jesus was so emphatically optimistic 
 that in the light of it human life in the world, in spite of 
 all demands of cross-bearing, is made to appear rather as 
 a cheerful and glorious than a somber and dismal thing. 
 It is only by a fundamental caricature that the message 
 of Jesus can be made tributary to pessimism. 
 
 II. — Von Hartmann and Other Advocates of 
 Pessimism. 
 
 In 1869, or nine years after the death of Schopen- 
 hauer, Eduard Von Hartmann published a system of 
 pessimistic philosophy under the title Die Philosophic 
 des Unbewussten. This was supplemented in the follow- 
 ing years by numerous other writings. While influenced 
 by Schopenhauer, and earning a close association with 
 him on the score of his radical pessimism. Von Hart- 
 mann was not in an emphatic sense a disciple of his 
 predecessor. He has himself taken pains to publish this 
 fact. Many topics are enumerated by him on which 
 he claims to be in contrast with Schopenhauer. The 
 subjective idealism of the latter which reduces the world 
 to appearance, his monism by which all is merged in 
 will, his scanty regard for historical development, his 
 
PESSIMISM 145 
 
 mained and inconsistent treatment of teleology, his doc- 
 trine of the intelligible character (itself undetermined 
 and the source of determination to the individual in his 
 empirical character), his affiliation in his theory of salva- 
 tion with a radical quietism — all these are features, says 
 Von Hartmann, with which he stands in disagreement.^ 
 He makes plain also that he does not share his predeces- 
 sor's unqualified contempt for Hegelianism. Indeed, he 
 expresses high appreciation for certain aspects of Hegel- 
 ianism, and defines his own philosophy as a "synthesis 
 of the philosophies of Hegel and Schopenhauer, in which 
 a decided preponderance is given to the former, a syn- 
 thesis formed under the guidance of Schelling's doc- 
 trine of principles as contained in his first philosophy. "^ 
 In his attitude toward the Hindu pantheism Von Hart- 
 mann was well-nigh as appreciative as Schopenhauer. 
 Religion, he contended, must embrace the essence of the 
 pantheism of the East, if it is to survive and be a world- 
 power.^ Respecting Christianity he spoke often in very 
 disparaging terms. He declared it no longer a vital 
 factor in our civilization. Its characteristic forms, he 
 said, are all outlived, and soon, reduced to a shadow of 
 its mediaeval greatness, it will again be whit it was ex- 
 clusively at the start, the last consolation of the poor and 
 the wretched. On the other hand, it may be noticed that 
 he was not content to be rated as a despiser of Chris- 
 tianity. "I have, in fact," he said, "the greatest respect 
 for the Christian religion as representing one of the most 
 developed stages of the religious consciousness, and in 
 religion as a whole I venerate the deepest spring and 
 the highest summit of the life of the spirit."^ Like 
 
 ^ Erganziingsband zu ersten bis neunten Auflage der Philosophic des 
 Unbewussten, Vorwort zur zehnte Auflage, p ix. ' Ibid., p. x. 
 
 'Philosophy of the Unconscious, trans, by Coupland. II. 270, 271; 
 Religion of the Future, trans, by Dare, p. 97. * Erganzungsband, p. xv. 
 
146 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 Schopenhauer, he made place for a mystic element in 
 religion. In agreement with his predecessor also, he 
 considered an ultra-liberal Protestantism about the 
 poorest apology for a religion that could be found. 
 
 The system of Von Hartmann is no less antitheistic 
 than that of Schopenhauer. In his conception of ulti- 
 mate or absolute being, however, the former differs from 
 the latter in that he supposes intellect or reason to coex- 
 ist in that being with will. The absolute is indeed uncon- 
 scious, but, as is illustrated by instinct, purpose may 
 work apart from consciousness. Thus it operates in the 
 absolute. In that timeless being an unconscious ideation 
 and an unconscious willing are conjoined in inseparable 
 unity. Though unconscious, the absolute is not to be 
 esteemed blind, but rather clairvoyant. 
 
 In ascribing intelligence and purposive action to the 
 absolute. Von Hartmann would seem to close the door 
 against error on its part. But, in pursuance of his pes- 
 simism, he was obliged to admit that the world, if not 
 the worst possible, is assuredly vastly worse than none. 
 He was therefore put under compulsion to construe the 
 origination of the world as a great error. And this he 
 has done. He characterizes the production of the world 
 as an "irrational act," a bare activity of will in which 
 reason had no part. The misery of existence, he argues, 
 makes it impossible to impute creation to aught but the 
 "mere groundless will."^ 
 
 In his extravagant estimate of the misery in the world 
 Von Hartmann comes very near to the standard set by 
 his predecessor. He affirms that in all relations the sum 
 of pain greatly exceeds that of pleasure. The advance 
 of civilization changes the balance only to increase the 
 
 iThe Philosophy of the Unconscious, II. 367, 368, III. 13 ■ Zur Geschichte 
 und Begrundung des Pessimismus, p. 67. 
 
PESSIMISM 147 
 
 overplus of pain, and improvement in material conditions 
 is no source of happiness. Civilized peoples are more 
 wretched than those in a state of nature; the poor, the 
 low, and the rude are happier than the rich, the aristo- 
 cratic, and the cultivated. Stupidity is a much better 
 title to happiness than cleverness. "As the life of a 
 fish is more enviable than that of a horse, so is the life 
 of an oyster than that of a fish, and the life of a plant 
 than that of an oyster, until, finally, on descending- be- 
 neath the threshold of consciousness, we see individual 
 pain entirely disappear."^ In these facts the teleological 
 shaping of the world is made manifest. The design of 
 the increasing sum of misery is to educate the intelli- 
 gence of men and to discipline their feeling up to the 
 point of choosing in common the one means of escape, 
 the cessation of conscious individual existence. This is 
 the ideal goal. The one appropriate aspiration for the 
 individual is "to become freed from the painful duty of 
 assisting in the process of evolution, to plunge itself 
 again into the Brahm like the bubble into the ocean, to 
 be extinguished like a light in the wind."^ 
 
 Of Von Hartmann's philosophy it is not too much to 
 say that it is arbitrary in its starting-point and farcical 
 in its outcome. There is no reason to believe that the 
 unconscious has any competency for the ideation and 
 purposive action with which it is credited. These are 
 terms which derive their meaning from the sphere of 
 conscious experience, and it is a perfectly arbitrary shift 
 to exploit them in the domain of the unconscious. More- 
 over, as was observed. Von Hartmann portrays the un- 
 conscious as a blind power in a relation of capital impor- 
 
 ' The Philosophy of the Unconscious, III. 76, 77. 
 'The Religion of the Future, p. 112. 
 
148 PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES 
 
 tance, inasmuch as he imputes creation to mere ground- 
 less will. And here the inept character of his teleology 
 is brought to view. If the unconscious absolute has 
 acted in such an irrational way once, why may it not 
 be expected to act in a kindred way a second time ? What 
 guarantee is there that, after the race has been led by a 
 most painful discipline to elect non-existence, the uncon- 
 scious absolute will not again, by an irrational and pre- 
 cipitate act, inaugurate a new stage of wretched exis- 
 tence? If the world originated as Von Hartmann sup- 
 poses, and is the stupendous piece of cosmic tomfoolery 
 which he makes it to be, it is surely absurd to associate 
 with it any wise design or to feel secure of any desirable 
 outcome. Taken seriously, this pessimistic philosophy is 
 only fitted to quench the last gleam of hope in the human 
 spirit. 
 
 Very few disciples of either Schopenhauer or Von Hart- 
 mann have won any distinction in philosophical litera- 
 ture. Of the recent adherents of the latter the most 
 prominent is A. Drews, who has given expression to his 
 ambition to propagate the system of his philosophical 
 master in an elaborate compendium.^ Among the fol- 
 lowers of Schopenhauer, Philipp Mainliinder is perhaps 
 as noteworthy as any. It is only in a partial sense, how- 
 ever, that he can be called a follower of that philosopher. 
 He took exceptions to Schopenhauer's metaphysics and 
 was by no means at one with him in ethical theory. 
 Indeed, one gains the impression that there was little 
 in his predecessor's system, aside from its rank pessi- 
 mism, that was adapted to take captive his thinking. That 
 element Mainlander appropriated in full measure. While 
 making little effort to paint in detail the miseries of life, 
 
 > Von Hartmann's philosophisches System im Grundriss. 
 
PESSIMISM 149 
 
 he gave very emphatic expression to the judgment that 
 human Hfe is worse than nothingness, and saw in the 
 reduction of all things to naught the complete consum- 
 mation of redemption. Like Schopenhauer, he was 
 appreciative of the great systems of India. He differed, 
 however, in giving a formal preference to the teaching 
 of Christ as against both Brahmanism and Buddhism. But 
 this is no token of real friendliness to Christianity, since 
 Mainlander obtained a basis for his preference only by a 
 most puerile and arbitrary exegesis wherein Christ is 
 represented as inculcating the pessimism which identifies 
 the redemption of the world with its annihilation.^ 
 
 Mainlander gave undisguised expression to the atheis- 
 tic standpoint. Herein he was true to the logic of pes- 
 simism. As the writings of the whole school attest, the 
 blotting out of hope for humanity and the negation of 
 God belong together. So long as the thought of a right- 
 eous and benevolent God survives there is ground for ex- 
 pecting something far better than extinction. That 
 thought in the truly filial spirit is naturally a source of 
 healthful and happy anticipation of an inexhaustible 
 good. 
 
 * Die Philosophic der ErlCsting, pp. 262-368. 
 
 ^ 
 
PART II 
 
 QUASI-SCIENTIFIC, THEOLOGICAL, 
 
 AND ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 
 
 I. — The Different Forms of the Challenge 
 
 Whoever supposes that God, as infinite Spirit, is not 
 merely immanent in the world, but also transcends the 
 world, recognizes in one sense the supernatural. A 
 supramundane Deity, in so far as he is supramundane, 
 falls outside the category of "nature," and is properly 
 described as a supernatural being. There is occasion, 
 however, for a further discrimination in the use of terms. 
 A question may be raised as to whether the transcendent 
 Deity ever exercises his prerogative to introduce into the 
 world factors not included in the complex of ordinary 
 world forces, thus giving origin to events which those 
 forces, left to themselves, would never produce. The 
 rendering of an affirmative answer implies the occurrence 
 of extraordinary events — extraordinary not in the sense 
 of being necessarily fuller manifestations of wisdom and 
 power than other events, but extraordinary simply in the 
 sense that they are not classifiable with those stated man- 
 ifestations of wisdom and power which a study of the 
 world reveals as belonging within the compass of the 
 regular world system. In common terminology, these 
 extraordinary events, which are referable to a specific or 
 exceptional as distinguished from an ordinary exercise of 
 divine efficiency, are called miracles. Conceivably events 
 of this kind may take place either in the physical or in the 
 psychical domain, either in the sphere of sense-percep- 
 tion or in that of the inner life and character. How- 
 ever, the more usual association of the term "miracles" is 
 
 153 
 
154 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 with the former sphere. From this point of view Domer 
 defines miracles as "sensuously cognizable events not com- 
 prehensible on the ground of the given system of nature 
 as such, but essentially on the ground of God's free action 
 alone."^ In the following discussion the ruling concep- 
 tion will correspond to this definition, with the under- 
 standing, however, that the "given system of nature" 
 need not mean anything else than the ordinary mode of 
 divine energizing. 
 
 The challenging of the supernatural might be under- 
 stood to include a denial of a transcendent Deity, as well 
 as a denial of workings on the part of that Deity which 
 may be classed as extraordinary, miraculous, or super- 
 natural. It is only the latter denial, however, that will 
 receive direct attention under the present theme, reference 
 to the former being introduced only as dictated by the 
 intrinsic connection between the two forms of denial. 
 
 In reviewing the various forms of the challenge to the 
 supernatural we may properly begin with the views of the 
 parties which have occupied our attention in the preced- 
 ing pages. A general measure of the attitude of these 
 parties toward miracles may be found in the degree to 
 which their thinking compromised or expelled the theis- 
 tic conception, though account will also need to be taken 
 of differing aptitudes for appreciating the element of mys- 
 tery in the universe. 
 
 The post-Kantian idealists certainly trespassed against 
 the distinct conception of divine personality. At the same 
 time they were appreciative of the mystical side of reality, 
 and criticised the bent of the eighteenth century ration- 
 alists to make a prosaic understanding the measure of the 
 universe. Accordingly, while they provided a defective 
 basis for faith in miracles, they seem not to have been 
 
 • Domer, System of Christian Doctrine, S 55. 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 155 
 
 animated by any pronounced spirit of antagonism to them. 
 This was clearly the case with Hegel. His estimate of 
 the evidential value of the supernatural sensible event was 
 indeed quite humble. "Miracle," he says, "can produce 
 a kind of verification for the man who is guided by his 
 senses; but this is merely the beginning of verification, 
 by which what is spiritual cannot be verified."^ But, 
 while thus rating miracles at a low figure in relation to 
 spiritual ends, he by no means challenged their credibility. 
 Spirit, he affirmed, is the essential miracle. Both by its 
 weakness and its strength it is capable of working on 
 nature. "Terror can produce death, anxiety illness, and 
 so in all ages infinite faith and trust have enabled the lame 
 to walk and the deaf to hear. Modern unbelief in occur- 
 rences of this kind is based on a superstitious belief in the 
 so-called force of nature and its independence relatively 
 to spirit."^ 
 
 The leading representatives of the English sensational 
 school, as holding in general a negative attitude toward 
 religion, were, of course, inclined to render a very cold 
 hospitality to the idea of supernatural events. It does not 
 appear, however, that they were agreed in denying their 
 possibility, or even the possibility of a credible attestation 
 of them, at least for those occupying the theistic stand- 
 point. Thus John Stuart Mill remarks: "A miracle is 
 no contradiction to the law of cause and effect; it is a 
 new effect, supposed to be produced by the introduction 
 of a new cause. Of the adequacy of that cause, if pres- 
 ent, there can be no doubt ; and the only antecedent im- 
 probability which can be ascribed to the miracle is the 
 improbability that any such cause existed. All, therefore, 
 which Hume has made out — and this he must be con- 
 sidered to have made out — is that no evidence can prove 
 
 1 Philosophy of Religion, II. 338. 'Ibid., IIT. up. 
 
156 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 a miracle to anyone who did not previously believe in the 
 existence of a being or beings with supernatural power; 
 or who believes himself to have full proof that the char- 
 acter of the being whom he recognizes is inconsistent with 
 his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question. 
 If we do not already believe in supernatural agencies no 
 miracle can prove to us their existence. The miracle 
 itself, considered merely as an extraordinary fact, may be 
 satisfactorily certified by our senses, or by testimony, but 
 nothing can prove that it is a miracle ; there is still another 
 possible hypothesis, that of its being the result of some 
 unknown natural cause, and this possibility cannot be so 
 completely shut out as to leave no alternative but that of 
 admitting the existence and intervention of a being 
 superior to nature. Those, however, who already believe 
 in such a being have two hypotheses to choose from, a 
 supernatural and an unknown natural agency, and they 
 have to judge which of the two is the more probable in 
 the particular case. In forming this judgment an impor- 
 tant element of the question will be the conformity of the 
 result to the laws of the supposed agent; that is, to the 
 character of the Deity as they conceive it."^ Mill inti- 
 mates a preference for the supposition that the Deity 
 works only through general laws, but he offers no com- 
 pelling ground for excluding the opposing supposition. 
 
 Professor Huxley, though giving sufficient tokens of 
 a disinclination to admit the verity of reported miracles, 
 was in substantial agreement with Mill on the lack of 
 any decisive warrant for excluding the possibility of 
 events which the common judgment of men would pro- 
 nounce miraculous. He took exception to Hume's defi- 
 nition of miracle as an infraction of the laws of nature, 
 and contended that it should rather be defined as a won- 
 
 ' Logic, Book iii, chap, xxv, $ 2. 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 157 
 
 derful event. He denied that observation of what cus- 
 tomarily happens is a certain measure of what is possible 
 under the rule of natural laws. "These laws, even when 
 they express the results of a very long and uniform 
 experience, are necessarily based on incomplete knowl- 
 edge, and are to be held as grounds of more or less justi- 
 fiable expectation."^ Verbally, in this instance, Huxley 
 may have excluded the wonderful event from the category 
 of the miracle proper by identifying it with an extraor- 
 dinary effect of natural laws ; but he at least made room 
 for the possibility of events as extraordinary as the sane 
 believer in miracles would care to affirm. Moreover, in 
 another connection he has placed himself on record as 
 scouting the notion of a scientific veto of belief in a super- 
 natural being to whom may reasonably be imputed a 
 power to effect results in nature which are quite beyond 
 the range of man's abilities. "Looking at the matter," 
 he said, "from the most rigidly scientific point of view, 
 the assumption that, amidst the myriads of worlds scat- 
 tered through endless space, there can be no intelligence 
 as much greater than man's as his is greater than a black 
 beetle's, no being endowed with powers of influencing the 
 course of nature as much greater than his as his is greater 
 than a snail's, seems to me not merely baseless, but imj>er- 
 tinent. Without stepping beyond the analogy of that 
 which is known, it is easy to people the cosmos with enti- 
 ties, in ascending scale, until we reach something practi- 
 cally indistinguishable from omnipotence, omnipresence, 
 and omniscience."^ Language like this evidently amounts 
 to an admission of the possibility of an influence on the 
 course of nature distinctly supernatural in its mode and 
 measure. 
 
 'Hume, pp. 127-137. 
 
 2 Essays on Some Controverted Questions, pp. 26, 27. 
 
158 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 In the materialistic school the notion of miracles was 
 treated with uncompromising intolerance. Biichner con- 
 sidered their non-occurrence so nearly axiomatic that he 
 rated the bringing forward of formal disproof as an 
 unjustifiable waste of time and effort.^ With characteristic 
 dogmatism Haeckel remarked : "We can at once set aside 
 all mythological stories, all miracles and so-called revel- 
 ations, for which it is claimed that they have come to us 
 in some supernatural way. All such mystical teachings 
 are irrational, inasmuch as they are confirmed by no 
 actual experience, but, on the contrary, are irreconcilable 
 with the known facts which have been confirmed to 
 us by a rational investigation of nature."^ "It is our 
 duty and task to attack the belief in miracles, wher- 
 ever we find it, in the interest of the race. . . . The 
 struggle against superstition and ignorance is a fight 
 for civilization. Our modern civilization will only 
 emerge from it in triumph, and we shall only elimi- 
 nate the last barbaric features from our social and politi- 
 cal life, when the light of true knowledge has driven 
 out the belief in miracles and the prejudices of dual- 
 ism."^ With this class of writers the absolute exclusion 
 of miracles followed logically from their categorical 
 denial of God and of freedom. 
 
 For positivism, as being obligated by its postulates 
 to repudiate atheistic metaphysics as well as theistic, the 
 agnostic attitude toward miracles was obviously the only 
 consistent one, at least as respects the possibility of their 
 occurrence. It was noticed, however, that Comte, while 
 he criticised dogmatic atheism, gave some tokens of 
 aversion to the idea of a supernatural will and of a provi- 
 dence higher than the plane of humanity. We may say, 
 
 ^ Kraft und Stoff, p. 40. * Monism, p. 61. 
 
 ^ Wonders of Life, pp. 56, 70. 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 159 
 
 then, that the animus of the Comtean postivism was un- 
 friendly to the basal conceptions which support faith 
 in miracles. In the positivism of Feuerbach miracles 
 were classed with all other religious products as mere 
 creations of the human spirit. Imagination and feeling 
 serve as their fertile source. Seen in clear daylight they 
 present "absolutely nothing else than the sorcery of the 
 imagination,"^ 
 
 An adverse attitude toward faith in the supernatural 
 is implicit in the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. The 
 primacy which he assigns to mechanical causation, his 
 exclusion of freedom, and his denial of all warrant for 
 ascribing to the absolute a single attribute or function of 
 personality, leave no intelligible ground for the occur- 
 rence of miraculous events. Moreover, in treating of 
 the world's religions he finds in the fact that they exhibit 
 common features, including prophecies and miracles, a 
 ground for the conclusion that they have had in common 
 a purely natural genesis.^ The proper bearing of the 
 Spencerian speculations was well illustrated by John 
 Fiske, who at the time of writing his Outlines of Cosmic 
 Philosophy was well intrenched in the antitheistic teach- 
 ing of Spencer. In this treatise he characterizes the idea 
 of the Infinite Person as a pseud-idea, and decries the 
 ascription of intentions or purposes to God as an ill-con- 
 sidered anthropomorphism. From this standpoint 
 miracles are, of course, excluded, since a God who enter- 
 tains no purposes could have no motive to work in excep- 
 tional modes. It is not, however, by the efiicacy of such 
 considerations that Fiske looks for the extirpation of faith 
 in miracles. That result is rather to be brought about 
 gradually by the study of the sciences. In this way those 
 scientific habits of thought will be engendered which will 
 
 *The Essence of Christianity, p. 180. 'Sociology, III. 33-36. 
 
i6o SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 stifle theological habits of thought "as easily as clover 
 stifles weeds."^ 
 
 The pessimistic philosophers, Schopenhauer and Von 
 Hartmann, in their repudiation of the theistic conception 
 left as little basis for the occurrence of miracles as was 
 provided in the Spencerian evolutionism. At the same 
 time, like the post-Kantian idealists, they were sensitive 
 to the presence of mystery in the universe, and had no 
 pleasure in the common rationalism. Accordingly, they 
 were not conspicuous for zeal against supernaturalistic 
 tenets. 
 
 Among writers less definitely associated than the fore- 
 going with specific philosophies the typical forms of chal- 
 lenge to the supernatural have been conspicuously repre- 
 sented by Paulus, De Wette, Strauss, Renan, Matthew 
 Arnold, Theodore Parker, and Otto Pfleiderer. Since the 
 mythical hypothesis of Strauss was intimately associated 
 with a noted movement in New Testament criticism, there 
 will be occasion to give attention to that hypothesis in 
 connection with a subsequent theme. We notice, then, 
 at the present point only the fact that Strauss was very 
 liberal in ascribing to the ideas at work in the minds and 
 hearts of a people a power to objectify themselves in 
 forms simulating a real history. On this basis he ex- 
 plained the stories of miracles in the Gospels, describing 
 them as spontaneous and unpremeditated products of the 
 lively ideas in the minds of those who felt the attractive 
 power of the Christ. 
 
 In the exposition of Paulus (1761-1851) reports of 
 miracles are identified with uncritical interpretations of 
 natural events. The biblical writers, or those from whom 
 they received their matter, did not intend to falsify his- 
 
 * Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, Part iii, chaps, i and ii. 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL i6i 
 
 tory ; they simply misinterpreted facts in accordance with 
 the easy-going method of the time. Thus meteoric phe- 
 nomena were construed as angelic appearances ; the feed- 
 ing of the five thousand, though brought about simply 
 by the liberality of Christ, and of those who were inspired 
 by his example, in distributing the food in their posses- 
 sion, was taken as evidence of a marvelous multiplication 
 of loaves; the coming forth of Lazarus when he was 
 roused from his stupor by the loud voice of Jesus was re- 
 garded as a rising from the dead ; and the resuscitation of 
 Jesus from the deep swoon into which he had fallen, in 
 consequence of his experience of torture upon the cross, 
 was thought to be a veritable resurrection.^ With Paulus 
 it was a fixed maxim, as it was with his contemporary 
 Wegscheider, that miracles do not occur. He con- 
 sidered, therefore, that a principal task of the biblical 
 historian and exegete consists in explaining them away. 
 That he executed this task successfully has never been the 
 verdict of any large body of scholars. Some of his ex- 
 planations may have a measure of plausibility, but in 
 attempting to apply his naturalistic exegesis to the entire 
 list of gospel miracles he so ran into obvious artificialities 
 as very largely to discredit his method. 
 
 The point of view of De Wette (1780-1849) was con- 
 trasted with that of Paulus in a twofold respect. On the 
 one hand, it was less decidedly opposed to the possible 
 occurrence of miracles ; on the other hand, it was much 
 more appreciative of the religious worth of the biblical 
 marvels. While Paulus saw in stories of the supernatural 
 simply accretions which needed to be cut away with the 
 unsparing knife of criticism, De Wette saw in them the 
 symbolical forms which serve at once to express and to 
 satisfy the deep sentiments which pertain to man as a re- 
 
 ^ Das Leben Jesu. 
 
i62 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 ligious being. Accordingly, he was unwilling to measure 
 their value by their historicity. A large proportion of them, 
 especially of those recounted in the Old Testament, he 
 considered to be unable to meet the historic test. The 
 books with which they are incorporated approach the 
 character of didactic poetry. A sort of epic cast pertains 
 to the Pentateuch. "If an historical narrative," says De 
 Wette, "written without critical investigation of facts, 
 but treated so as to suit religious and poetical ideas, is an 
 epic composition, then the Pentateuch may be called the 
 theocratical epic poem of the Israelites without denying 
 that there is an historical basis at the bottom. This epic 
 treatment shows itself, (i) In the poetic form of the 
 narrative, which satisfies the poetic sense, not only by its 
 intuitiveness and spiritedness, but even by the rhythmic 
 elevation of the style. (2) In the subject matter, and 
 indeed in the miraculous events and the supernatural in- 
 tercourse with God; for the epic loves the miraculous. 
 The popular legend had prepared the way for this treat- 
 ment."^ Respecting the miraculous element in the New 
 Testament, Be Wette preferred to speak with much 
 reserve. 
 
 Renan treated the subject of miracles with dogm_atic 
 intolerance. If he did not deny the possibility of their 
 occurrence he did deny the existence of any credible evi- 
 dence of their occurrence, and intimated his intention to 
 keep up the denial until a miracle should transpire in the 
 face of such tests as might be agreeable to his mind. 
 Among the requirements of a proper authentication of a 
 supernatural event, he reckoned as indispensable its being 
 wrought under the inspection of a conclave of skeptics. 
 This requirement, he assumed, has never been met, and so 
 
 » Introduction to the Old Testament, trans, by Theodore Parker, SI i45~ 
 147- 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 163 
 
 the historian must refuse all serious consideration to re- 
 ports of supernatural occurrences. "It is an absolute rule 
 of criticism," he said, "to deny a place in history to narra- 
 tives of miraculous circumstances; nor is this owing to 
 a metaphysical system, for it is simply the dictation of 
 observation. Such facts have never been really proved. 
 All the pretended miracles near enough to be examined 
 are referable to illusion or imposture. Discussion and 
 examination are fatal to miracles. In other words, 
 miracles only exist when people believe in them. The 
 supernatural is but another name for faith. A miracle 
 never takes place before an incredulous and skeptical pub- 
 lic, the most in need of such a convincing proof. Credu- 
 lity on the part of the witness is the essential condition 
 of a miracle."^ 
 
 In his estimate of the competency of mere ideas and 
 feelings to generate stories of miraculous events Renan 
 stood quite on a level with Feuerbach and Strauss. This 
 appears conspicuously in his sketch of the origin of belief 
 in the resurrection of Jesus. "To acknowledge," he says, 
 "that death could have the victory over Jesus, over him 
 who came to abolish the power of death, this was the 
 height of absurdity. The very idea that he could suffer 
 had previously been revolting to his disciples. They had 
 no choice, then, between despair and heroic affirmation. 
 A man of penetration might have announced during the 
 Saturday that Jesus would arise. The little Christian 
 society, on that day, worked the veritable miracle ; they 
 resuscitated Jesus in their hearts by the intense love which 
 they bore toward him. They decided that Jesus had not 
 died. The love of these passionately fond souls was truly 
 stronger than death." Preeminently was this true of 
 Mary Magdalene. "Only Mary loved enough to pass the 
 
 *The Apostles, pp. 37, 38. 
 
i64 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 bounds of nature and revive the shade of the perfect Mas- 
 ter. The glory of the resurrection, then, belongs to Mary 
 of Magdala. After Jesus it is Mary who has done most 
 for the foundation of Christianity."^ At this point one 
 might reasonably ask whether the denier of miracles is 
 not on record as asserting a stupendous miracle in the 
 person of the Magdalene. 
 
 While Renan assigned to feeling and imagination the 
 chief function in originating narratives of the miracu- 
 lous, he was not above insinuating the existence of an 
 element of intentional deception. He hinted that some 
 in the company of the disciples could have told what had 
 become of the body of Jesus had they not been un- 
 willing to dampen a newly enkindled faith.^ By this 
 insinuation he placed these disciples in line with that 
 group of the friends of Jesus whom he has represented 
 in his Vie de Jesus as planning the fictitious raising of 
 Lazarus. 
 
 In this odious insinuation against the moral integrity 
 of the disciples Matthew Arnold took no share. "The 
 good faith of the Bible writers," he said, "is above all 
 question ; it speaks for itself ; and the very same criticism 
 which shows the defects of their exegesis and of their 
 demonstrations from miracles establishes their good 
 faith. "^ Arnold also differed from Renan in the measure 
 of his reverence for Jesus. He never could have followed 
 the French critic in laying a soiling hand upon the his- 
 toric picture of the Master. Uniformly he represented 
 him as standing high above the heads of his reporters, 
 "inconceivably great and wonderful." It is to be observed 
 also that Arnold, while himself reckoning miracles an 
 unnecessary support to religious faith, grants that the 
 
 iThe Apostles, pp. ■;7, 6i. * Tbid., p 63. 
 
 ^Literature and Dogma, p. 143. 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 165 
 
 mass of men have found in the conviction of their occur- 
 rence no small stimulus to faith. He considers, neverthe- 
 less, that their office must be a waning one. Belief in the 
 historic reality of the supernatural events recorded in the 
 Bible cannot endure the advance of the scientific temper 
 and the light which is derived from a comparative study 
 of the vast list of reputed miracles. "To pick Scripture 
 miracles to pieces one by one," he said, "is an odious and 
 repulsive task ; it is also an unprofitable one, for whatever 
 we may think of the affirmative demonstrations of them, 
 a negative demonstration of them is, from the circum- 
 stances of tlie case, impossible. And yet the human 
 mind is assuredly passing away, however slowly, from 
 this hold of reliance also. It is what we call the time- 
 spirit that is sapping the proof from miracles — it is the 
 Zeit-Geist itself. Whether we attack them, or whether 
 we defend them, does not much matter ; the human mind, 
 as its experience widens, is turning away from them. 
 And for this reason, it sees, as its experience widens, 
 how they arise. It sees that under certain circumstances 
 they always do arise ; and that they have not more reality 
 in one case than in another."^ 
 
 Theodore Parker asserted the transcendence as well as 
 the immanence of God. He also asserted an all-inclusive 
 divine providence. But he contended that the exercise 
 of that providence is quite aside from miraculous make- 
 shifts. "God, inasmuch as he is God," he said, "acts 
 providentially in nature not by miraculous and spasmodic 
 fits and starts, but by regular and universal laws, by con- 
 stant modes of operation. ... As the infinitely perfect, he 
 must accomplish his providential purpose by the laws 
 which belong to the nature and constitution of things; 
 that is, by the normal and constant mode of operation 
 
 * Literature and Do^ma, pp. 139, 130. 
 
i66 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 of the natural powers resident in those things them- 
 selves."^ 
 
 Substantially the same theoretical objection as that 
 urged by Parker may be detected in these words of 
 Pfleiderer: "As we have recognized the order of nature 
 as the revelation of the divine omnipotence, we cannot 
 establish such an opposition between the one and the 
 other as that God would be fettered or limited by the 
 order of nature, and could now and again feel a need to 
 break through or limit this fetter. As little as God is 
 confined within limits by the moral order of the world, 
 just as little is he so limited by the natural order. Both 
 are, in fact, posited wholly and equally by his will, and 
 are revelations of his eternal Logos — a violation of which 
 would therefore be a self-contradiction of God, which is 
 excluded by his eternal perfection. And as miracle con- 
 tradicts the right conception of God, so does it also con- 
 tradict the connection of causes and effects in conformity 
 with law."^ 
 
 In explaining the genesis of stories of miracles, Pflei- 
 derer follows quite closely in the wake of Strauss. "Mir- 
 aculous legends," he says, "arise in a twofold way — partly 
 out of the idealizing of the real and partly out of the 
 realizing of the ideal. ... It is quite conceivable on psy- 
 chological grounds that occurrences which have made a 
 deep and lasting impression, not merely on individuals but 
 on whole circles of religiously excited men, become invol- 
 untarily idealised, even on the occasion of their being per- 
 ceived by the first eyewitnesses, and still more in their 
 recollection of them. . . . Thus arise the relative miracu- 
 lous histories, in which a real historical background is to 
 
 1 Sermons of Theism, Atheism, and Popular Theology, Works, XI. io8, 
 185;, 189, 192. 
 
 2 Philosophy and Development of Religion, Gifford Lectures for 1894, 
 
 P- 293- 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 167 
 
 be presupposed, but which was overlaid with mystical 
 accessories by the idealizing fantasy. . . . But the religious 
 spirit idealizes not merely real occurrences of the external 
 world ; it also produces of its own spontaneity ideas and 
 ideals to which nothing real in the outer world corre- 
 sponds, but in which only inner living experiences of the 
 pious soul, its struggles and triumphs, its beliefs and 
 hopes, are brought to expression."^ 
 
 Though denying the historic character of the reports 
 of miracles, Pfleiderer credits them with an important 
 religious office, and considers it out of place to treat them 
 with unsympathetic harshness. "To the matured faith," 
 he says, "the world itself is the one great miracle of the 
 successive realizing of the divine ideal ; and therefore such 
 faith honors in all miracle-legends the beautiful symbol 
 of the one great miracle of the divine government of the 
 world and of the education of humanity, that heavenly 
 treasure which mankind could not hide otherwise than 
 in earthen vessels. Thus for us too the words of Goethe 
 hold true, that 'Miracle is faith's own dearest child.' "^ 
 
 II. — Examination of the Grounds of the 
 Challenge 
 
 Very little consideration needs to be given to objections 
 to miracles in so far as they proceed from an antitheistic 
 standpoint. The theistic conception is too firmly in- 
 trenched in the history of human thought, and in the 
 demands of man's religious, ethical, and rational life, to 
 be exposed to any real danger of displacement. At any 
 rate, there is nothing in the philosophies which have been 
 reviewed that approaches to an adequate ground for its 
 relinquishment. By the general consent of philosophers, 
 
 'Philosophy and Development of Religion, pp. 295-297. 
 ^Ibid., pp. 297, 298. 
 
i68 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 no less than of theologians, a faulty, superficial, and in- 
 consistent metaphysics underlies the negations of pessi- 
 mism, positivism, and materialism. The Spencerian argu- 
 ment against the doctrine of divine personality is far from 
 being formidable. On the one hand, as has been indi- 
 cated, it rests on an arbitrary play with abstract terms, 
 on an antithesis between "absolute" and "personal" manu- 
 factured by the assignment of a gratuitous sense to the 
 former term. On the other hand, it runs into an excess 
 of the anthropomorphism which Spencer affects to con- 
 temn ; since it makes, intelligence, self-consciousness, and 
 will, as they are conditioned in us, the measure of all pos- 
 sible intelligence, self-consciousness, and will, and so ex- 
 cludes these high attributes from the infinite — a pro- 
 cedure essentially on a level with a denial of the infinite 
 and absolute because man's experience is in the sphere of 
 the finite and relative. As respects the Fichtean objec- 
 tions to divine personality, it was found that theistic faith 
 has no serious occasion to be stumbled by them. The 
 same answer, in fact, applies to them as to the Spencerian 
 objections.^ 
 
 For some minds, doubtless, a real difficulty in the way 
 of theistic faith is involved in evolutionary science, with 
 its disclosure of the enormous reach of the process of 
 struggle and destruction in the past. But there is reason 
 to conclude that the somber feature of this process has 
 been overdrawn. Already scientific conviction has begun 
 to admit abatements. Account has been taken of an altru- 
 istic factor in the evolutionary movement and of the 
 affluent provision for the weal of sensitive being which is 
 disclosed in the complex system of nature alongside of the 
 harsher aspects. Enigmas doubtless remain; but to in- 
 terpret them against the existence of a benevolent God 
 
 * See part i, chap, i, sect. iii. 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 169 
 
 would only serve to enlarge and to darken the element of 
 enigma. It would be going in the face of the better and 
 more compelling evidence. Nature is but a dim mirror 
 compared with a rational spirit luminous with unsullied 
 righteousness and perfect love. Even if, then, we should 
 grant that nature's testimony fails to give full assurance, 
 we have a mighty supplement to that testimony in the 
 lofty intuitions of Jesus Christ, and in the firm convictions 
 of all that vast multitude of elect spirits who have tasted 
 and seen that the Lord is good. The light that rises on 
 the inner world furnishes a rational ground for postpon- 
 ing the explanation of some uncanceled shadows in the 
 outer world. 
 
 Theistic faith, then, has not been put to hazard by the 
 special conditions of nineteenth century thought. A little 
 disturbance may have occurred pending the adjustment 
 to new outlooks, but no important foundation has been 
 displaced. The right to construe God as self-conscious 
 person abides in undiminished force. Rather we may 
 say, the obligation thus to construe him abides; for, in 
 the words of Andrew Seth, "the admission of real self- 
 consciousness in God seems demanded of us if we are not 
 to be unfaithful to the fundamental principle of the theory 
 of knowledge — interpretation by the highest category 
 within our reach. The self-conscious life is that highest, 
 and we would be false to ourselves if we denied in God 
 what we recognize as the source of dignity and worth in 
 ourselves."^ 
 
 The theoretical objection to miracles urged from a the- 
 istic point of view by Theodore Parker and Pfleiderer rests 
 on an assumption that needs a clearer and stronger vindi- 
 cation that it has carried at their hands. The assump- 
 tion is that God would be resorting to an unworthy make- 
 
 * Hegelianism and Personality, p. 224. 
 
170 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 shift in using the miracle, the proper thought of his per- 
 fection requiring that he should realize his purposes with- 
 out interfering with the established order of nature which 
 he himself has posited. In this claim there is at once a 
 gratuitous disparagement of the miracle and a gratuitous 
 exaltation of the order of nature. The miracle seems to be 
 rated as a kind of afterthought, an event which is violently 
 intruded into the divine scheme. But it is not to be thus 
 considered. Viewed from the human standpoint, it ap- 
 pears, indeed, outside of the regular sequence of events. 
 This does not imply, however, that on the divine side it 
 is chargeable in the least degree with caprice or irregu- 
 larity. On the contrary, if we give a suitable extension to 
 the conception of law, and include under that term the 
 fixed principles of divine action, we may affirm that the 
 miracle is entirely conformable to law, since it occurs only 
 in accordance with the fixed principles of the divine ad- 
 ministration, only in accordance with the eternal plan and 
 purpose of the all-wise Administrator. With entire 
 propriety we may adopt the sentiment of Jean Paul Rich- 
 ter, Wunder auf Erden sind Natiir im Himmel; that is, 
 we may think of the wonderful events which, in the 
 earthly point of view, fall outside the regular sequence, 
 as being part and parcel of the eternal and divinely 
 ordered scheme, the conditions of their occurrence being 
 as unequivocally determined by divine wisdom as are the 
 conditions of any other events whatever. Only on the 
 ground of the insight that no valuable purpose can be 
 accomplished by the events which men classify as extra- 
 ordinary or miraculous is it legitimate to rule them out as 
 unworthy of God. But who has such insight ? Doubtless 
 miracles, in the sense of extraordinary workings in the 
 sphere of sense-perception, are not the highest form of 
 the verification of spiritual truths. Nevertheless, as 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 171 
 
 means of awakening attention, interest, and confidence 
 they may serve for men at a given stage as an efficient 
 auxiliary to that verification. No one is qualified to deny 
 that in the divine process of educating the race a certain 
 ideal combination of the extraordinary with the ordinary 
 may be adapted to reach a better result than could be 
 attained by the ordinary alone. The conclusion, there- 
 fore, remains open that God as a practical being, having 
 respect to the actual needs of men, may accord a certain 
 sphere to miraculous workings. To bind him to respect 
 impersonal nature to that extent that he will never super- 
 induce upon it any new factor, after the analogy of man's 
 free working, is to bind him to treat the subordinate part 
 as the whole. Impersonal nature is only the theater 
 on which the kingdom of righteousness is being unfolded, 
 only the scaffolding incident to the erection of the spirit- 
 ual edifice. Hence, to require God to treat it strictly as 
 an end is no compliment to his wisdom and benevolence. 
 Moreover, it is not to be granted that the miracle does 
 any real despite to the system of nature. That supposition 
 involves an imperfect apprehension of the divine infini- 
 tude. If God holds all things, so to speak, in the hollow 
 of his hand, and his energy is the constant ground of their 
 being and interrelations, it stands to reason that he can 
 take care of the results of the act which, from the human 
 viewpoint, is outside the established order. It is, indeed, 
 well-nigh ridiculous to suppose that omnipotence cannot 
 make special adjustments within the sphere of nature 
 without causing a wrench to the natural system. If men, 
 within the measure of their abilities, can manipulate the 
 forces of the world without any disastrous result, surely 
 it may be presumed that God can manipulate those 
 forces on a greater scale without any real damage to the 
 world. 
 
172 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 Among the historical objections to miracles some writers 
 have emphasized, as was noticed, the fact that their credi- 
 bility is being excluded by the spirit of the age. The age, 
 it is claimed, is scientific in animus, and scientific habits 
 of thought extinguish faith in miracles as the growing 
 clover chokes the weeds. In reply it may be said, in the 
 first place, that the essential hostility of the age to the 
 supposition of the miraculous has not been established 
 by a complete historical induction. While a certain per- 
 centage of scholarly minds have been inclined to retrench 
 or even to reject belief in supernatural occurrences, faith 
 in a miracle-working God has remained vital in great mul- 
 titudes of intelligent people. In the second place, it is 
 legitimate to note that the habit of mind which results 
 from certain ranges of scientific study may well include a 
 faulty tendency. The one who immerses himself in the 
 study of mechanically working forces, or in the investi- 
 gation of the subhuman forms of life, or in the minute 
 inspection of the physiological side of man's being, stands 
 in some danger of an abnormally reduced appreciation 
 for the higher altitudes and the grander facts in man's 
 nature and religious history. Truth may be quite as much 
 sacrificed in the ultra-prosaic as in the ultra-poetic view. 
 A superstitious attitude may be taken toward the uni- 
 formities of nature as well as toward a power supposed to 
 transcend nature. The animus begotten by a narrow 
 range of scientific study may be actually unscientific 
 before the proper standard of openness and fealty to the 
 entire sum of facts. If so-called theologians may be 
 tempted to overlook too largely one side of reality, so- 
 called scientists may be tempted to make too scanty ac- 
 count of another side of reality. To contrast the two 
 classes, as though the one stood for the method of mere 
 assumption and the other for the method of complete 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 173 
 
 induction, is as rash in logic as it is objectionable in point 
 of manners. Theology may conceivably represent quite 
 as searching a scrutiny as does this or that compendium 
 of inferences which has been labeled "scientific." We 
 conclude, then, that those who have been prophesying the 
 total extinction of faith in miracles by the advance of the 
 scientific spirit need to give further proof of their pro- 
 phetic gift before serious heed to their forecasts can be 
 made obligatory. Of course, the spirit of the age, in so 
 far as it is normal, must work against a heedless over- 
 extension of the province of the supernatural ; but that is 
 a result quite different from a comprehensive negation 
 of the supernatural. 
 
 The discrimination just made is pertinent in connec- 
 tion with a second historical objection, namely, that based 
 on the wideness of the area covered by stories of miracles, 
 or on the facility with which narratives of this order 
 have gained a place in the annals of all peoples. This 
 super-abundance, it is alleged, is indicative of a universal 
 appetite for miracles, and in the force of this appetite 
 we have a sufficient explanation of the rise and currency 
 of stories of miracles. A measure of weight, it must be 
 conceded, belongs to this consideration. But it is quite 
 overrated when it is treated as a means of summarily 
 dismissing all reports of miracles. Suppose the fact of 
 genuine miracles, and suppose at the same time a general 
 predilection in the various peoples of the world for tales 
 of miraculous deeds, what would be the result? Mani- 
 festly a great crop of unauthentic marvels alongside the 
 reports of real miracles. The presence of the latter could 
 not abolish the ever-fruitful source of the former. The 
 unauthentic marvels would be quite certain to ap]>ear, 
 whatever rivals might be on the field. Their mere pres- 
 ence, therefore, would be no disproof of the subsistence 
 
174 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 of truthful reports of miraculous events. As the wild 
 growths of paganism do not enforce the conclusion that 
 religion in general has no substantial claims, so the exces- 
 sive crop of marvels does not disprove the occurrence of 
 true miracles. 
 
 What the known fact of the facile multiplication of 
 stories of miracles justifies is, not a sweeping denial of 
 such events, but simply insistence upon the appropriate 
 tests. These can fitly be made very severe. Renan was 
 indeed asking too much when he required, as a condition 
 of approval, that the miracle should be wrought under 
 the inspection of a conclave of skeptics. There is no 
 rational guarantee that divine sovereignty will wait on 
 such a conclave and respond to its challenge. The grant- 
 ing of signs on demand might be attended with mischie- 
 vous results. Not thus, it may warrantably be presumed, 
 will the miracle come. If it comes at all it will appear not 
 as a response to the challenge of unbelief, but as an har- 
 monious incident in the fulfillment of a lofty providential 
 vocation by the servant and representative of the divine 
 kingdom. Still, while the dignity of the divine adminis- 
 tration may exclude one or another form of attestation, 
 it is right that the tests applied to the reports of miracles 
 should be made very stringent. It is an important, if not 
 an absolute, requirement that the supernatural events 
 should appear to have been associated with the decisive 
 epochs in the unfoldment of the kingdom of God in the 
 world. It is a perfectly normal demand that they should 
 seem to have been dictated by motives and to have sub- 
 served ends that are worthy of a God of wisdom, love, and 
 righteousness. With entire legitimacy also it may be 
 asked that their verity should be approved by substantial 
 testimony. 
 
 The application of this last test to the gospel miracles 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 175 
 
 could better be made at the end of a review of the ap- 
 proved results of New Testament criticism than in this 
 connection. No real trespass, however, against historical 
 sobriety will be involved in noting here these facts : that 
 the canonical Gospels contain excellent marks of a re- 
 strained zest for the supernatural in ascribing no miracles 
 to John the Baptist and in imputing no marvels to Jesus 
 prior to his public ministry; that the ancient tradition 
 which represented Mark as founding his Gospel largely 
 upon the testimony of Peter is thoroughly credible; that 
 criticism very generally approves the conclusion that both 
 Matthew and Luke, besides drawing to a considerable 
 extent from Mark, also made use of other writings, of a 
 comparatively early date, wherein, in all likelihood, some 
 references to miracles were contained; and that conse- 
 quently the reports of miracles in the Gospels were based 
 largely upon apostolic testimony. The merits of apostolic 
 testimony may doubtless be called in question; but the 
 day is not likely to dawn soon when devout and sober 
 minds will agree in rating as a poor set of witnesses, on 
 the facts of a public ministry, the men whom the incom- 
 parable Master of all the ages chose for the most respon- 
 sible work of the ages. 
 
 As respects all other legitimate tests, it is difficult to 
 conceive how a judicial mind can ask for a better com- 
 pliance with their demands than that exemplified by the 
 gospel miracles. These events as a whole evince in their 
 spirit and aim a holy benevolence, and thus fulfill a 
 perennial office of revelation for the inspiring and 
 strengthening of men's souls. More than this, they are 
 woven as a congruous factor into a unique fabric, a story 
 of marvelous beauty and spiritual wealth. They are con- 
 genially related to the personality in whom the greatest 
 sanity, the finest balance of the higher attributes of man- 
 
176 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 hood, was combined with the loftiest type of self-conscious- 
 ness that ever came to manifestation within the limits of 
 the human race. Now, shall marvelous deeds be counted 
 foreign to this marvelous personality? Shall he in 
 whom tender humanity and transcendent lordship were 
 united and reconciled be denied a title to those exhi- 
 bitions of good will and might which are contained in the 
 gospel miracles, just because legendary or invented mar- 
 vels have a place in the world? This would be nothing 
 less than to deny the inimitable just because there are so 
 many common products in existence. As Theodore 
 Parker admitted, none but a Jesus could fabricate a 
 Jesus.^ With nearly equal propriety it may be said, noth- 
 ing but the historic reality could have bequeathed 
 that gospel picture in which the marvelous personality 
 and the marvelous deeds are so happily adjusted to one 
 another. 
 
 For one who occupies the Christian standpoint, who 
 heartily believes that Jesus Christ is central to a great 
 redemptive economy, it is not illogical to admit that super- 
 natural workings entered into the preparation for his 
 coming and also supplemented his finished ministry. It 
 may be granted that the attestations for these are not 
 equal to the evidences which certify to us the verity of the 
 gospel miracles; it may even be admitted that a legend- 
 ary growth may have gained a place within one or an- 
 other part of the biblical domain ; but as one contemplates 
 in the temper of a redeemed man the transcendent impor- 
 tance of the economy which is centered in Christ he will 
 find it agreeable to reason to believe that a miracle-work- 
 ing providence has met special demands of that economy 
 outside of the theater of the gospel history. 
 
 Notice was taken of Renan's very easy method of dis- 
 
 »The Bible. What Tt Is and What It Is Not. 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 177 
 
 posing of the resurrection of Christ. In truth, it is much 
 too easy to claim any considerable amount of respect. The 
 disciples of the preeminently sane Jesus, chosen by him 
 for a momentous task, were not, in all likelihood, the 
 volatile enthusiasts that the sketch of the romancing critic 
 makes them to have been. Moreover, a unique complex 
 of mutually supporting factors is contained in the evi- 
 dence for the miracle of Christ's resurrection. Briefly 
 stated, these closely related factors are as follows : ( i ) 
 The extraordinary event is perfectly consonant with the 
 extraordinary mission ascribed to Christ by the New 
 Testament from beginning to end. It stands forth as the 
 appropriate consummation of his manifestation as Re- 
 deemer, being supremely adapted to support confidence 
 in his saving office and to enkindle a salutary hope in 
 men as respects their own heirship to immortal life. (2) 
 The resurrection of Christ is made credible by the inti- 
 mate relation subsisting between its pre-announcement and 
 an indubitably fulfilled prophecy. All the evangelists 
 testify that Christ foretold to the disciples, with specifica- 
 tion of approximate date and circumstances, his violent 
 death. Now these same historians who record this line 
 of fulfilled prophecy associate with it a line of prophecy 
 respecting the rising of the Son of Man from the dead. 
 As there was fulfillment of the one line of prophesying 
 it is reasonable to suppose that there was fulfillment of 
 the other also. He who foresaw with such certainty that 
 he must pass on to a tragic death may very well be re- 
 garded as having been endowed with authentic foresight 
 when he spoke of the resurrection from the dead. (3) 
 The victorious confidence with which the disciples took 
 up and prosecuted the cause of their crucified Master must 
 be referred to some adequate cause. What was it that 
 turned the dark night of their grief and despair into a 
 
178 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 brilliant day of joy and hope? All the causes which a 
 skeptical fancy has conjured up seem empty and futile 
 compared with the actual reappearance of Christ as victor 
 over death and the grave. (4) We have from the hand of 
 Paul in his First Epistle to the Corinthians testimony to 
 a succession of appearances of the risen Christ. And this 
 testimony comes from no mean witness. As having been 
 formerly a special agent of the Pharisaic and priestly 
 party in its attempt to suppress those who believed on 
 Jesus, he must have known what that party was able to 
 offer against the fact of the resurrection. He was on the 
 field and had the advantage of close association with the 
 bitter opponents as well as with the friends of the new 
 religious movement. While he was thus furnished with 
 substantial sources of information, he wrote within about 
 twenty-five years of the crucifixion, and accordingly, 
 under circumstances which advised to carefulness and 
 sobriety in his statements ; for at that time many of those 
 to whom he referred as witnesses of the reappearance 
 of Christ were still at hand. It must therefore be con- 
 sidered a weighty historical testimony which we have in 
 these words of the apostle: "I delivered unto you first 
 of all that which also I received, how that Christ died for 
 our sins according to the Scriptures, and that he appeared 
 to Cephas ; then to the twelve ; then he appeared to above 
 five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part 
 remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then he 
 appeared to James; then to all the apostles."^ (5) In 
 speaking of the burial of Christ, Paul makes an implicit 
 reference to the empty tomb. Herein he corroborates an 
 item witnessed to by all the New Testament writers who 
 give any detailed account of the resurrection. A question, 
 therefore, arises as to the ground of the disappearance 
 
 1 1 Cor. XV. 3-7. 
 
CHALLENGING OF THE SUPERNATURAL 179 
 
 of the body. If the party hostile to the followers of Christ 
 had the body in their possession they could not have neg- 
 lected to produce it for the confounding of the hated sect 
 of the Nazarene. On the other hand, to charge the dis- 
 ciples with having stolen and concealed the body is 
 to make choice of an alternative that must sink under 
 the weight of its own absurdity; for, a dead body under 
 the hand of the disciples and a lie upon their consciences 
 could never have fitted them to be the heroes and martyrs 
 of a new dispensation. (6) Each of the evangelists is 
 in agreement with Paul in teaching that the risen Christ 
 appeared not merely to one or another individual, but to 
 the entire company of the apostles. Mark's Gospel, it is 
 true, does not in the extant conclusion reach to a descrip- 
 tion of the appearance, but it clearly presumes upon the 
 fact of the appearance sketched in the appended verses. 
 Paul mentions two visitations of Christ to the whole 
 group of the apostles. John also mentions two visitations, 
 though taking note that Thomas was absent from the 
 apostolic company on the occasion of the first of these. 
 
 Such is the remarkable historical complex which stands 
 forth as a basis for faith in the resurrection of Christ, 
 The basis is too firm to be overthrown by some divergen- 
 cies in the details of the gospel stories. That something 
 of this sort would be found in such condensed and frag- 
 mentary accounts was antecedently probable. A criticism 
 which has not become nearsighted and picayunish by too 
 continuous grubbing in small details will not magnify the 
 import of discrepancies in the subordinate particulars of 
 brief and independent narratives.^ 
 
 We conclude, then, that the miracle has not been ban- 
 
 * For a fuller elaboration of the theme see the author's System of Chris- 
 tian Doctrine, pp. 581-590; also C. W. Rishell, The Foundations of the 
 Christian Faith, pp. 523-558. For an excellent monograph on the subject 
 of the gospel miracles see A. B. Bruce, The Miraculous Element in the 
 Gospels. 
 
i8o SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 ished from the province of a rational faith. At the same 
 time it is to be admitted that the nineteenth century chal- 
 lenge has not been without its result. It has undoubtedly 
 served to promote caution in the scholarly world against 
 giving too wide an extension to the area of the super- 
 natural, as also against an imperfect deistic conception 
 of the supernatural. 
 
 It may have occurred to the reader that any exercise 
 of a power of initiation proper, as being outside the line 
 of natural causation, is in a sense a supernatural event. 
 Of course there has been no design to ignore this truth so 
 greatly emphasized by Bushnell; but in the present dis- 
 cussion it has been convenient to take the term "super- 
 natural" in a more restricted significance. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE DENIAL OF THE FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 I. — Free Religion 
 
 In Germany congregations which made "Free Reh- 
 gion" their shibboleth were instituted about 1845 at Halle, 
 Magdeburg, and Konigsberg. Kindred societies soon 
 sprang up in other places, the number being ultimately 
 increased by the contemporary "German Catholic" move- 
 ment, which was started under the leadership of Ronge 
 and Czerski. The platform of these congregations 
 (Freireligiose Gemeinden) included from the start eman- 
 cipation from the trammels of confessionalism, repudia- 
 tion of all forms of traditional authority, the exaltation 
 of reason as the one obligatory standard, and the approxi- 
 mate reduction of religion to morality. While their or- 
 iginal principles would not necessarily exclude a certain 
 partiality for Christianity as affording the richest content 
 of any historic religion, it appears that, to a considerable 
 extent at least, the congregations have come to disclaim 
 any preference for Christianity. Recent deliverances in 
 connection with the Berlin congregation distinctly reflect 
 this position. Christianity is therein brought into un- 
 favorable comparison with Buddhism. In one address this 
 very frank statement is made : "Unquestionably the scheme 
 of Free Religion of our time stands nearer to Buddhism 
 in its views than to Christianity."^ It is also made quite 
 evident that the tenor of thinking in the Berlin congrega- 
 tion is distinctly antitheistic. The notion of a God who 
 in any wise transcends the world is scouted in various 
 
 1 Buddha und Christus, Vortrag von Professor Albert Gehrke, Nov. 27, 
 1904. 
 
 181 
 
i82 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 addresses, and these are shown to be fully representative 
 by the definition of religion which appears in the pub- 
 lished statement of principles. According to that defi- 
 nition, religion pays no respect to a supernatural being 
 or life, and signifies only an harmonious adjustment to 
 the world on the basis of personal truthfulness and con- 
 scientiousness.^ Naturally a very scanty radiance illum- 
 inates the sanctuaries which are thus placarded with a 
 veto against the existence of a personal God and of the 
 v^hole realm of the supernatural. It is to be hoped, how- 
 ever, that in power to meet the demands of religious 
 sentiment occasion has been afforded to improve the de- 
 scription which was given by Strauss in his latest book. 
 *'I have attended," he said, "several services of the free 
 congregation in Berlin, and found them terribly dry and 
 unedifying. I quite thirsted for an allusion to the biblical 
 legend or the Christian calendar, in order to get at least 
 something for the heart and the imagination, but nothing 
 of the kind was forthcoming. After the edifice of the 
 church has been demolished, to go and give a lecture on 
 the bare, imperfectly leveled site is dismal to a degree that 
 is awful. "2 
 
 In New England the movement which issued in 1867 
 in the institution of the Free Religious Association en- 
 listed at its beginning the support of a number of men 
 who had been touched by the breath of transcendentalism, 
 and who combined with their radical opinions a good 
 measure of religious sensibility. Accordingly, it was 
 here that the most noteworthy literary products of Free 
 Religion were evolved. 
 
 A very potent factor in preparing the platform of Free 
 Religion in New England was doubtless furnished by 
 
 *Grundsatze der freireligiosen Gemeinde zu Berlin, adopted in 1877, 
 amended in 1891. *The Old Faith and the New, pp. 340, 341. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 1&3 
 
 the ministry of Theodore Parker between 1840 and i860. 
 In the eariier years of his ministry Parker, though ex- 
 pressing himself betimes with a freedom which shocked 
 the great majority of his Unitarian brethren, still gave 
 formal assent to the lofty preeminence and exceptional 
 claims of Christianity. He spoke of it, indeed, as the 
 "absolute religion,"^ and depicted its transcendent and 
 imperishable worth in these glowing terms : "That pure 
 ideal religion which Jesus saw on the mount of his vision, 
 and lived out in the lowly life of a Galilean peasant; 
 which transforms his cross into an emblem of all that is 
 holiest on earth ; which makes sacred the ground he trod, 
 and is dearest to the best of men, most true to what is 
 truest in them, cannot pass away. Let men improve 
 never so far in civilization, or soar never so high on the 
 wings of religion and love, they can never outgo the flight 
 of truth and Christianity. It will always be above them. 
 It is as if we were to fly toward a star, which becomes 
 larger and more bright the nearer we approach, till we 
 enter and are absorbed in its glory,"^ In harmony with 
 this rating of Christianity, Parker rendered to Jesus very 
 exahed tributes. "This Galilean youth," he affirmed, 
 "strode before the world whole thousands of years, so 
 much of divinity was in him. His words solve the ques- 
 tions of this present age. In him the godlike and the 
 human met and embraced, and a divine life was born."^ 
 "I look on Jesus as the highest product of the human 
 race. I honor intellectual greatness; I bend my neck to 
 Socrates, and Newton, and Laplace, and Hegel, and Kant, 
 and the vast minds of our own day. But what are they 
 all compared with this greatness of justice, greatness of 
 
 1 Christianity: What Tt Ts, and What It Is Not. 
 
 ' Discourse on the Transient and Permanent in Christianity. 
 
 •Mbid. 
 
l84 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 philanthropy, greatness of religion?"^ "Here was the 
 greatest soul of all the sons of men; one before whom 
 the majestic mind of Grecian sages and of Hebrew seers 
 must veil its face. His perfect obedience made him free. 
 So complete was it that but a single will dwelt in him and 
 God, and he could say, *I and the Father are one.' For 
 this reason his teaching was absolute ; God's word was in 
 him."^ Sentences alive with the warmest appreciation 
 for the Scriptures were also uttered by Parker. Thus he 
 exclaimed : "How the truths of the Bible have blessed us ! 
 There is not a boy on all the hills of New England ; not a 
 girl born in the filthiest cellar which disgraces a capital in 
 Europe, and crying to God against the barbarism of 
 modern civilization; not a boy or girl in all Christen- 
 dom through, but their lot is made better by that great 
 book."3 
 
 The above citations present one side of Parker's teach- 
 ings. Somewhat of a reverse side could easily be brought 
 into evidence. Even in the earlier part of his career he 
 proceeded as a free lance, and commented without much 
 restraint on the limitations and on the defects of the Bible, 
 as well as on what he considered the enormities of the 
 traditional Christianity. From the start he greatly dis- 
 counted the notion of an external authority, and was 
 enamored of the theory that in the intuitions of the human 
 spirit the great truths of religion have their one reliable 
 and sufficient certificate. Man's inner nature, he claimed, 
 bears unequivocal testimony to such fundamental truths 
 as the existence of God, the moral law, and immortality. 
 As J. W. Chadwick remarks: "With Parker, God, im- 
 mortality, the moral law, were intuitional certainties of 
 
 * Thoughts about Jesus, p. 281 in volume of Parker's "Views of Re- 
 ligion," edited by J. F. Clarke. 
 
 2 Christianity: What It Is, and What It Is Not. 
 
 3 Discourse on the Transient and the Permanent in Christianity. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 185 
 
 irrefragable stability. It was as if he had set aside a 
 public supernatural revelation only to substitute for it a 
 private one in each several mind and heart. "^ By rational 
 induction, he contended, from premises thus furnished 
 genuine progress in religion may be achieved, whereas a 
 scrupulous adherence to a particular set of written oracles 
 must shackle the minds of men and restrain from a 
 normal advance. 
 
 The radical and confident intuitionalism of Parker 
 naturally served as a ground for diminishing stress upon 
 any standard afforded by historical Christianity. In the 
 end he concluded that Christianity cannot with propriety 
 be styled the absolute religion. This conclusion is clearly 
 stated in a biographical letter written shortly before his 
 death. The statement runs as follows : "All the six great 
 historic religions — the Brahmanic, Hebrew, Classic, Bud- 
 dhistic, Christian, Mohammedan — profess to have come 
 miraculously from God, not normally from man ; and spite 
 of the excellence which they contain, and the vast service 
 the humblest of them has done, yet each of them must 
 ere long prove a hindrance to human welfare, for it claims 
 to be a finality, and makes the whole of human nature 
 wait on an accident of human history — and that accident 
 the whim of some single man. The absolute religion 
 which belongs to man's nature, and is gradually unfolded 
 thence, like the high achievements of art, science, litera- 
 ture, and politics, is only distinctly conceived of in an 
 advanced stage of man's growth ; to make its idea a fact 
 is the highest triumph of the human race."^ But, while 
 thus distinctly denying the finality of Christianity, Parker 
 still expressed his partiality and ardent esteem for the 
 Christian religion and the Christian Scriptures. "To me 
 
 'Old and New Unitarian Belief, p. 24. 
 
 ' Letter to the Members of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society of 
 Boston, Apr. 19, 1859, Works XII. 298. 
 
i86 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 the name of Christianity," he said, "is most exceeding 
 dear, significant of so great a man and of such natural 
 emotions, ideas, and actions as are of priceless value to 
 mankind. ... I take exquisite delight in the grand words 
 of the Bible, putting it before all other sacred literature 
 of the whole ancient world. ... As a master the Bible were 
 a tyrant ; as a help, I have not time to tell its worth."^ 
 
 The ultimate position of Parker on the necessity of 
 transcending the Christian system has often been asserted 
 by representatives of the Free Religious Association. 
 The following may serve as typical declarations : ''Reli- 
 gious is a higher and broader word than Christian; and so 
 is human. Jewish, Brahman, Buddhist, Parsee, Moham- 
 medan — these too are churches of the one living God, the 
 Father of all. With advancing light thoughtful men in 
 all of them will come out of what is peculiar and special 
 in each, and so local and temporary, into the broad ground 
 of universal, spiritual religion, which is piety, righteous- 
 ness, humanity: that belief in God and man which is 
 the creed of all creeds."^ "Buddha, Pythagoras, Jesus, 
 Luther, and the rest are children of their times : out of 
 Greece and Judaea came Christianity; out of Christianity 
 and Brahmanism, and Parseeism and Judaism and Islam, 
 and all the grand currents of this century's civilization, 
 flows the vaster wave of Universal Religion."^ Unless 
 all exclusiveness can be banished from the word Christian 
 the name should be abandoned. The adherents of the 
 religions of the East cannot be expected to surrender their 
 faith in favor of Christianity. "They will hardly adopt a 
 religion that degrades Confucius and Buddha into the 
 position of blind heathen guides, unworthy of confidence, 
 
 ^Works, XII. 334, 335. 
 
 'Samuel Longfellow, Freedom and Fellowship in Religion, a Collection 
 of Essays and Addresses, 1875, p. 91. 
 ^Samuel Johnson, Ibid., p. 124. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 187 
 
 and deifies a prophet of another race; but they will receive 
 a religion which shall count Moses and Jesus and Confu- 
 cius and Buddha, and all the greatly wise and good in the 
 line of its prophets, giving to each the honor due for the 
 truth he saw and told, and for the good his life achieved. 
 Am I a visionary — a mere dreamer — if I seem to see that 
 from all these manifest tendencies will come forth event- 
 ually another form of faith and worship, which shall not 
 be Hinduism nor Buddhism nor Judaism nor Chris- 
 tianity, nor any system of faith now existing, but a 
 broader religious development of humanity, in which 
 all technical distinctions between these specific forms 
 of religion shall be obliterated, and nations and races 
 shall unite in a spiritual fellowship whose limits shall 
 be commensurate with humanity itself? Nay, not a 
 dreamer. I believe that I am but reading the future 
 by the light of past history and of present social and 
 mental forces."^ "In the soul of Jesus the great aspira- 
 tion of the Hebrew race became purified from its alloys 
 and stamped forever with the impress of his superior 
 spirit. But, being essentially Hebrew still, it is incapable 
 of expansion into the aspiration of universal humanity; 
 and Jesus, though endowed with that sanity of genius 
 which is madness in the eyes of mediocrity, is no longer 
 in the van. . . . The time has come to see and to say that 
 the Christian confession is not a truth. Jesus was not the 
 Christ of God. The Christ prophesied and longed for 
 has never come, and will never come. The office and func- 
 tion is a mythical, an impossible one. No individual man 
 has ever stood, or ever can stand, in the relation of Lord, 
 King, and Saviour of the whole world. It would be an 
 infinite usurpation for any man to occupy that office, 
 either in a temporal or spiritual sense Man 
 
 • W. J. Potter, Freedom and Fellowship in Religion, pp. 220. 221. 
 
i88 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 does not need to be Christianized; he does need to be 
 humanized."^ 
 
 Judged by these citations Free Rehgion appears on 
 record as repudiating any special affihation with Chris- 
 tianity. Still it is not quite true to the historic facts to 
 say that a formal repudiation of such affiliation has taken 
 place. In the short-lived organ named The Examiner 
 the policy was advocated of cutting away parasitic 
 growths from Christianity in place of taking up a position 
 outside of the Christian system. And, though the cur- 
 rent seems to have run rather strongly in the direction of 
 the latter policy, the Free Religious Association in 1894 
 declined to award it a formal approval. A proposition 
 in favor of "avowed independence of Buddhism, Juda- 
 ism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, or any other religious 
 creed or organization that is by nature dogmatic, based on 
 personal leadership or limited in its fellowship," was 
 voted down. This action was a bitter disappointment to 
 the more advanced party. F. E. Abbot, in particular, 
 criticised it as amounting to a denial of the very principle 
 for the advocacy of which the Free Religious Associa- 
 tion had been founded.^ It does not appear, however, 
 that the Association was moved to take any steps toward 
 an adoption of the proposition which was rejected in 
 1894. 
 
 II. — Theosophy and Kindred Mysticisms 
 
 In Franz von Baader (1765-1841) Theosophy had a 
 distinguished representative in the early part of the nine- 
 teenth century. But there is little occasion to refer to his 
 system in this connection. Like his philosophical master, 
 Jacob Boehme, he considered Christianity to be the true 
 
 ' F. E. Abbot, Freedom and Fellowship in Religion, pp. 245, 2t;4, 259. 
 ' Free Church Tracts, originally published in the Free Church Record. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 189 
 
 religion, and had no thought of offering a substitute for 
 it, or of placing it on a parity with any other historic faith. 
 Theosophy of the type which denies the primacy of Chris- 
 tianity, and undertakes to supersede it with an authorita- 
 tive system of its own, first claimed attention in the clos- 
 ing decades of the century. Its master spirit was Madame 
 H. P. Blavatsky. In the Theosophical Society which was 
 founded at New York in 1875 it obtained a principal 
 instrument of advertisement and propagandism. 
 
 It accords with the worshipful attitude of this recent 
 Theosophy toward Oriental wisdom that its representa- 
 tives should give scanty consideration to the Occidental 
 philosophies. With no one of them do they seem to have 
 made close connection. Schopenhauer is given honorable 
 mention by several of them^ ; but it is easy to divine that 
 the principal reason for their reference to him is not so 
 much their hearty appreciation of the specific contents 
 of his philosophy as a sense of kinship with him in their 
 estimate of Eastern philosophy and religion. 
 
 Were we to accept the claims of the Theosophists, we 
 should need to conclude that the anxious quest after truth 
 should no longer burden humanity, since their system 
 has at once the character of ultimate science and of ulti- 
 mate religion. "Theosophy," says Madame Blavatsky, "is 
 divine knowledge or science," and its chief aim is "to 
 reconcile all religions, sects, and nations under a common 
 system of ethics, based on eternal verities. . . . The Wis- 
 dom-Religion was ever one, and being the last word of 
 possible human knowledge was, therefore, carefully pre- 
 served. It preceded by long ages the Alexandrian The- 
 osophists, reached the modem, and will survive every 
 
 'Blavatsky, Isis Unveiled, I. 55-60: H. S. Olcott, Theosophy, Religion, 
 and Occult Science, p. 15; J. D. Buck, The Nature and Aim of Theosophy, 
 P- 15- 
 
190 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 other religion and philosophy,"^ "Our work is a plea 
 for the recognition of the Hermetic philosophy, the 
 ancient universal Wisdom-Religion, as the only possible 
 key to the absolute in science and theology."^ "Theos- 
 ophy," says W. O. Judge, "is that ocean of knowledge 
 which spreads from shore to shore of the evolution of 
 sentient beings; unfathomable in its deepest parts, it 
 gives the greatest minds their fullest scope, yet shallow 
 enough at its shores, it will not overwhelm the under- 
 standing of a child. . . . Embracing both the scientific 
 and the religious, Theosophy is a scientific religion and 
 a religious science."^ 
 
 While asserting superiority to the historic religions as 
 commonly understood, Theosophy, or the Wisdom-Reli- 
 gion, assumes to be identical with those religions viewed 
 as to their inner essence, or taken in that esoteric character 
 in which they have been known from the beginning to 
 the enlightened few. From this point of view tolerance 
 can be exercised toward Christianity as containing, back 
 of its dogmatic formularies and ceremonies, the very core 
 of theosophic wisdom. "True Theosophy," says a promi- 
 nent exponent, "is esoteric Christianity as truly as it is 
 esoteric Buddhism, and belongs equally to all religions, 
 exclusively to none."* Another exponent speaks of oc- 
 cultism — meaning by this term theosophic theory and 
 practice — as knitting together apparently divergent sys- 
 tems. "Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and the Egyp- 
 tian theology are thus brought into one family of ideas,"^ 
 
 But, in spite of formal statements which seem to recog- 
 nize Christianity as standing on a parity with other great 
 religions of the world, it is easy to discover in theosophical 
 
 iThe Key to Theosophy, pp. i, 3, 7. ^ Isis Unveiled, Preface, p. vii. 
 
 ^The Ocean of Theosophy, p. i. 
 
 ••Mrs. Anne Besant, Esoteric Christianity and the Lesser Mysteries, 
 Preface, p. x. ^A. P. Sinnett, The Occult World, p. 6. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 191 
 
 writings an antichristian tone, a tendency to disparage the 
 worth and historical significance of Christianity as com- 
 pared with the ancient rehgions of India and the far East. 
 It is not advisable, perhaps, to emphasize the acknowl- 
 edged purpose of the Theosophical Society to antago- 
 nize the work of Christian missionaries in the Orient,^ 
 since the society could rejoin that its design has been only 
 to oppose an exoteric imperfect form of Oiristianity. 
 Leaving aside this item, we may notice several indications 
 of a disposition on the part of Theosophists to make sec- 
 ondary account of Christianity, and to award an unmis- 
 takable primacy to Oriental philosophy and religion. In 
 the first place, they exhibit a decided inclination to borrow 
 from Oriental stores, rather than from the stock supplied 
 by a Christian civilization, such metaphysical, psycho- 
 logical, and theological terms as they have occasion to 
 use. In the second place, as will be shown presently, they 
 are partial to tenets which are characteristic of Oriental 
 speculation and are foreign to catholic Christianity. 
 Again, they suppose the living oracles or personal medi- 
 ums of the higher wisdom in the present to be located 
 principally in the East, and especially on "the high 
 plateau of the Himavat." Once more, they distinctly 
 affirm that the Oriental systems were the primary source 
 of all true religion, and that Christianity has held to them 
 a dependent relation. "What has been contemptuously 
 termed paganism," says Madame Blavatsky, "was 
 ancient wisdom replete with Deity; and Judaism and its 
 offspring, Christianity, and Islamism derived whatever 
 inspiration they contained from this ethnic parent. Pre- 
 Vedic Brahmanism and Buddhism are the double source 
 from which all religions sprang. "^ "Buddha," remarks 
 
 * Blavatsky, Isis Unveiled, Preface, pp. xli, xlii. 
 'Ibid., II. 639. 
 
192 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 Judge, "is the last of the great avatars, and in a larger 
 circle than is Jesus of the Jews, for the teachings of the 
 latter are the same as those of Buddha and tinctured with 
 what Buddha had taught to those who instructed Jesus." ^ 
 Another statement of the same writer indicates how de- 
 cided is his preference for Eastern wisdom. "Real psy- 
 chology," he says, "is an Oriental product today."^ An 
 equal disposition to face to the East is very distinctly ex- 
 hibited in these words of Olcott : "We are giving to India 
 the knowledge and advantage of many practical things re- 
 lating to our lower needs and nature. In return she offers 
 us the wisdom acquired by thought and experience on 
 a higher plane."^ Even Mrs. Besant, though manifesting 
 a larger appreciation for Christianity than most of her 
 school, gives it the characteristic of a derived product. 
 The far East was a principal source, though Egypt also 
 made contributions. In his youth Jesus received the ele- 
 ments of true wisdom from the Essene community in the 
 southern Judaean desert. "When at the age of nineteen he 
 went on to the Essene monastery near Mount Serbal, a 
 monastery which was much visited by learned men travel- 
 ing from Persia and India to Egypt, and where a mag- 
 nificent library of occult works — many of them Indian 
 of the Trans-Himalayan regions — had been established. 
 From this seat of mystic learning he proceeded later to 
 Egypt, He had been fully instructed in the secret teach- 
 ings which were the real fount of life among the Essenes, 
 and was initiated in Egypt as a disciple of that one sub- 
 lime lodge from which every great religion has its 
 founder,"^ Thus the unequivocal statements of Theoso- 
 phists indicate tliat they claim only a secondary associa- 
 
 *The Ocean of Theosophy, p. 120. 'Ibid., p. 136. 
 
 'Theosophy, Religion, and Occult Science, p. 27. 
 * Esoteric Christianity, p. 130. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 193 
 
 tion with Christianity, their more direct ahgnment being" 
 with the Oriental systems, and especially with Brahman- 
 ism and Buddhism. 
 
 That Orientals should be gratified with the homage 
 rendered by their Western brethren may readily be in- 
 ferred. It would seem, however, that for the most part 
 they have actually a much less vital appreciation of the 
 wisdom which belongs to them by direct inheritance than 
 that which warms the breasts of their Occidental advo- 
 cates. Speaking to a native audience in Bombay in 1879, 
 Mr. Olcott had occasion to remark : "Since we landed on 
 your shores we have met hundreds of educated Hindus, 
 Parsis, and men of other sects. Out of all these we have 
 found few — so few that we might almost reckon them 
 upon the fingers — who really know what Aryan, Zend, 
 Jain, and Buddhistic philosophies teach. "^ The pundits, 
 he discovered, were ready to applaud his flattering words, 
 but when summoned to put on exhibition the riches of 
 the ancient literature of India they remained provokingly 
 quiescent.^ On the whole, the practical faith of the 
 Hindus in their own historic greatness must have seemed 
 to the ardent apostle of Theosophy to have been lament- 
 ably weak. That he was led by his experience to charge 
 himself with having cherished a highly colored illusion 
 we have not ascertained. 
 
 In explaining their confident possession of absolute 
 truth recent Theosophists, like the Gnostics of old, make 
 large account of a secret tradition. This tradition, 
 which affords the key to the mysteries of the universe, is 
 the property of a brotherhood composed of men who, 
 through a good improvement of the discipline of succes- 
 sive incarnations, have reached a specially advanced stage 
 
 ^ Theosophy, Religion, and Occult Science, pp. 71, 72. 
 
 'Ibid., pp. 127, 128. Compare Sinnett. The Occult World, p. 37. 
 
194 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 of evolution. These men, variously styled Elder Brothers, 
 Humanity's Teachers, Hierophants, Adepts, Initiates, 
 and, in the Indian tongue, Mahatmas (that is. Great 
 Souls), have extraordinary faculties for acquiring and 
 communicating knowledge. Though possessing physical 
 bodies of the ordinary type, they are not fettered by 
 them. By means of the subtle astral body, which indeed 
 pertains to each individual but is efficiently controlled by 
 the adept alone, they can practically annihilate space and 
 time in their movements, and work great marvels. "The 
 adept," says Madame Blavatsky, "can control the sen- 
 sations and alter the conditions of the physical and astral 
 bodies of other persons not adepts; he can also govern 
 and employ, as he chooses, the spirits of the elements."^ 
 It would appear also that his sources of knowledge are 
 substantially unlimited. Not only does he have access 
 to the correct philosophical and religious traditions which 
 from time immemorial have been handed down in the 
 brotherhood of which he is a member ; he is also favored 
 with direct vision of the authoritative record of truth. 
 "All things," says our foremost oracle of Theosophy, 
 "that ever were, that are, or that will be, having their 
 record upon the astral light, or tablet of the universe, the 
 initiated adept, by using the vision of his own spirit, can 
 know all that has been known, or can be known. "^ Like 
 estimates of the wonderful faculties of the adept are com- 
 mon in theosophical writings. "A Mahatma," says Mrs. 
 Besant, "is the perfected flower of humanty, the ideal 
 man, the promise of the future realized today. In him 
 the spiritual nature is developed and works unrestrain- 
 edly through the mental and physical, so that he has 
 become the master of all the forces in nature and can 
 utilize them at will. Holding this position of royalty 
 
 Usis Unveiled, II. 590. Mbid., TI. 588. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 195 
 
 over nature, he becomes the servant of humanity, dedi- 
 cating himself with perfect self-devotion to the good of 
 mankind."^ The power, says Judge, over space, time, 
 mind, and matter which belongs to the great initiate 
 exists germinally in all men. "The difference lies solely 
 in the fact that we have in general not developed what 
 we possess the germ of, while the Mahatma has gone 
 through the training and experience which have caused 
 all the unseen human powers to develop in him, and con- 
 ferred gifts that look godlike to his struggling brother 
 below. "^ 
 
 From the above it is quite evident that Theosophy, or 
 the Wisdom-Religion, is a religion of authority, in which 
 the prerogative of infallible guidance belongs to an in- 
 visible hierarchy, that is, to a company entirely unknown 
 in its true character to men generally. This mystic com- 
 pany is active, but prefers to keep in the background, 
 using for visible instruments in the execution of its be- 
 nevolent purpose such responsive men and women as are 
 found in the Theosophical Society. An eminent form of 
 the gracious working of the hidden Brothers consists in 
 the rendering of aid for the composition of theosophical 
 writings. "There are passages," says Madame Blavatsky, 
 "entirely dictated by them and verbatim, but in most 
 cases they only inspire the ideas and leave the literary 
 form to the writers."^ We are invited to believe that 
 she herself was greatly aided by inspiration from this 
 source, and even relieved in part of the task of writing. 
 "The assistance," says Sinnett, "she derived from the 
 Brothers by occult agency, throughout the composition 
 of the book, was so abundant and continuous that she is 
 not so much the author of Tsis' as one of a group of 
 
 * Exposition of Theosophy, p. 19. ^The Ocean of Theosophy, p. 12 
 
 ^The Key to Theosophy, p. 290. 
 
196 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 collahoratcurs by whom it was actually produced. . . . 
 Quantities of actual manuscript in other handwritings 
 than her own were produced while she slept. In the 
 morning she would sometimes get up and find as much 
 as thirty slips added to the manuscript she had left on her 
 table overnight."^ To the best of our knowledge, the 
 portions supplied in this way have not been specified; 
 but, as expressing the unadulterated wisdom of the 
 Mahatmas, they ought to be subject to discovery by the 
 higher criticism of the age. 
 
 Viewed as to its doctrinal content, recent Theosophy 
 is essentially a reproduction of the old Brahmanical 
 pantheism. It denies the personality of God, and in the 
 declarations of at least some of its exponents reduces the 
 world to an empty appearance. On these points Madame 
 Blavatsky remarks : "We reject the idea of a personal, 
 or extra-cosmic and anthropomorphic, God. . . . We 
 believe in a universal divine principle, the root of all, 
 from which all proceeds, and within which all shall be 
 absorbed at the end of the great cycle of being. . . . 
 The esoteric doctrine teaches that the one infinite and 
 unknown essence exists from all eternity, and in regular 
 and harmonious successions is either passive or active. 
 In the poetical phraseology of Manu these conditions are 
 called the 'day' and the 'night' of Brahma. . . . No one 
 creates the universe. Science would call the process 
 evolution ; the pre-Christian philosophers and Orientalists 
 called it emanation ; we, Occultists and Theosophists, see 
 in it only the universal and eternal reality casting a 
 periodical reflection of itself on the infinite spatial depths. 
 This reflection which you regard as the objective ma- 
 terial universe we consider as a temporary illusion and 
 
 ' The Occult World, pp. 159, 160. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 197 
 
 nothing else. That alone which is eternal is real."^ 
 "As to the absolute," remarks Judge, "we can do no more 
 than say. It is. None of the great teachers of the school 
 ascribe qualities to the absolute although all qualities 
 exist in it. Our knowledge begins with differentiation, 
 and all manifested objects, beings, or powers are only 
 differentiations of the Great Unknown. The most that 
 can be said is that the absolute periodically differentiates 
 itself, and periodically withdraws the differentiated into 
 itself."2 
 
 In accordance with these pantheistic postulates man is 
 represented as being identical in the highest part of his 
 being with the absolute essence. His constitution, how- 
 ever, in the view of the Theosophist, is decidedly com- 
 plex. He is, in fact, a sevenfold entity. Taken in as- 
 cending order the constituents which make up his being 
 are (i) body, (2) vitality, (3) astral body, (4) animal 
 soul, (5) human soul, (6) spiritual soul, (7) spirit or 
 Atma.^ The first four of these are dissoluble. On the 
 disintegration of the physical body the departed one 
 finds a corporeal vehicle in the astral body, which consists 
 of matter of very fine texture, electrical and magnetic 
 in its essence. But this form of embodiment is also 
 temporary. The astral body perishes, its dissolution tak- 
 ing place in seven successive stages, as though it con- 
 sists of seven concentric shells. When the purgatorial 
 process has been completed, and all that belongs to the 
 sphere of mortality has been cast off, the individual enters 
 devachan, or heaven, where he remains for a period 
 proportioned to his merits. On the expiration of this 
 period he becomes a subject for reincarnation. And so 
 
 *The Key to Theosophy, pp. 6r, 63, 84 j Isis Unveiled, II. 264 
 ^ The Ocean of Theosophy, pp. 14, 15. 
 'Judge, The Ocean of Theosophy, p. 31. 
 
igS SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 "the ever-whirling wheel" carries him on, through the 
 long series of births and deaths, until he reaches nirvana, 
 or the state which ensues when the differentiated is 
 merged in the one infinite essence. In the prominence 
 given to this notion of reincarnation, as in its acosmistic 
 pantheism, Theosophy appears as a copy of Hindu think- 
 ing. It may be noticed, however, that the Occidental 
 Theosophist is inclined to rebel against the idea of incar- 
 nation in animal forms, and to accept the maxim, *'Once 
 a man always a man."^ 
 
 In relation to modem spiritism, or so-called "Spiritual- 
 ism," the type of Theosophy which is here reviewed 
 adopts a disparaging tone. It admits in large part the 
 reality of spiritualistic phenomena, but denies that they 
 are to be explained as the products of the agency of 
 spirits. The real causes are the astral body of the 
 medium which, as being detached, appears as the so-called 
 spirit, or the astral shell of a deceased person, or possibly 
 a picture reflected on an invisible mass of electrical and 
 magnetic matter. Mediumship is unhealthy, since the 
 medium, for the exercise of his office, must be in a pas- 
 sive state, and thus exposed to the working of misleading 
 and pernicious influences. Judged, too, by the charac- 
 ter of the messages which are communicated through 
 mediums, their office must be rated at a very humble 
 figure. In truth, the emptiness and contradictory char- 
 acter of the messages discredit the claims of Spiritualism 
 to be a valid instrument of revelation.^ That deceiving 
 messages, as well as enlightening, may come from the 
 
 * Judge, The Ocean of Theosophy, p. 67. 
 
 2 Blavatsky, The Key to Theosophy, pp. 27, 28: Isis Unveiled, I. 70, 
 490, U. 588; Besant, Exposition of Theosophy, p. 23; The Ancient Wisdom, 
 p. 95: Judge. The Ocean of Theosophy, pp. 43, 44, 149-153; Olcott, The- 
 osophy, Religion, and Occult Science, pp. 252, 253; George Wyld, Theos- 
 ophy or Spiritual Dynamics, second edition, pp. 10-12, 30. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 199 
 
 spirit world has sometimes been admitted by Spiritualists 
 themselves.^ 
 
 Doubtless, as representing a predilection for the mystic 
 or occult, Spiritualism has a certain bond of association 
 with Theosophy. This was recognized by Madame Bla- 
 vatsky^ ; nevertheless, in common with her associates, she 
 passed ultimately a very disparaging verdict upon medi- 
 umistic performances. 
 
 References to "Christian Science," so called, rarely 
 occur in theosophical writings. This may be explained 
 in part by the fact that the prophet of the new medico- 
 religious dispensation had not secured a large amount 
 of public attention at the time when the theosophical 
 movement was started, the scriptures of that dispensa- 
 tion, as embodied in Mrs. Mary Baker G. Eddy's Science 
 and Health, being first issued in 1875, the year which 
 marked the organization of the Theosophical Society. 
 On the score of its contents Mrs. Eddy's teaching might 
 properly have elicited rather frequent remark from such 
 admirers of Oriental pantheism as the Theosophists have 
 been for the most part. Her system, however, stands in 
 contrast with theirs on various points. In the first place, 
 the former gives to the transcendent powers which are 
 assumed to be available for man's use a much closer 
 association with the healing of disease than is affirmed 
 by the latter. In the second place, Mrs. Eddy differs 
 from the more prominent representatives of Theosophy 
 in her formal attitude toward the Christian oracles. While 
 she finds in the Bible whatever, in the application of her 
 peculiar exegesis, she chooses to put into it, she claims 
 that it was the only text-book which served to introduce 
 
 * Robert Dale Owen, Address in Boston, May 30, 1867. 
 'The Key to Theosophy, p. 196. 
 
20O SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 her into the great truths of her system/ Again, she 
 differs, in a measure, from the leading representatives of 
 Theosophy on divine personaHty. While she has penned 
 words which seem to reduce God to an impersonal prin- 
 ciple, she is still on record as admitting that God is 
 ^'infinite Person.'" Once more, the Christian Science 
 scheme of Mrs. Eddy is contrasted with the scheme of the 
 Theosophists in that the former is comparatively void 
 of references to the future life, while in the latter the 
 theme of eschatology commands a position of overshad- 
 owing importance. 
 
 On the side of resemblance Christian Science, as ex- 
 pounded by Mrs. Eddy, agrees with Theosophy in claim- 
 ing to be a perfectly authoritative system, lying in the 
 whole sum of its teachings beyond any possible improve- 
 ment. Madame Blavatsky never spoke with a tone of 
 more absolute confidence than that which pervades every 
 utterance of the author of Science and Health. Indeed, 
 the claim of the former to be on good terms with the 
 Mahatmas, and thus to be in condition to give out por- 
 tions of that higher wisdom which has ever been the pos- 
 session of the elect spirits of the race, falls noticeably 
 below the position arrogated by the latter. No mystic 
 brotherhood stands in the background to share with 
 Mrs. Eddy the honor of being the oracle of absolute 
 truth. God alone prepared her "for the reception of a final 
 revelation of the absolute principle of scientific being and 
 healing." Common mundane factors were out of the 
 field. "No human pen or tongue," she says, "taught 
 me the science contained in this book. Science and Health ; 
 and neither tongue nor pen can overthrow it." It is im- 
 perishable because it is the unadulterated truth. "Be- 
 tween Christian Science and all forms of superstition a 
 
 * Science and Health, 1902, pp. 110, 126. 'Ibid., p. 116. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 201 
 
 great gulf is fixed, as impassable as that between Dives 
 and Lazarus. . . . Science is immortal and coordinate 
 neither with the premises nor with the conclusions of 
 mortal beliefs." And the authentic compendium of 
 Christian Science, Mrs. Eddy is careful to affirm, is to 
 be found precisely in her writings. "A Christian Scien- 
 tist requires my work, Science and Health, for his text- 
 book, and so do all his students and patients. Why ? Be- 
 cause it is the voice of truth to this age, and contains the 
 whole of Christian Science, or the science of healing 
 through mind. Its thorough perusal serves as a means 
 or occasion of restoring the sick."^ 
 
 Again, Christian Science resembles the later Theos- 
 ophy, as has been intimated, in its distinct kinship with 
 Brahmanical pantheism. This feature has been noted by 
 a theosophical writer.^ As is well known, Brahmanical 
 pantheism is of the acosmistic or world-denying type. 
 It admits of only one reality, the absolute Spirit or Self. 
 The world — all that passes under the name of matter — 
 is empty appearance, illusion pure and simple. Now, this 
 is the cardinal doctrine of Mrs. Eddy, the tenet which is 
 reiterated with tireless persistence. She falls not a 
 whit below Sankara or any other representative of Brah- 
 manical pantheism in stress on the unity of substantial 
 being, or on the sole ontological reality of the one infi- 
 nite Spirit. Statements like these proceed from her pen : 
 "God is the only Spirit. . . . Christian Science reveals 
 incontrovertibly that mind is all-in-all, that the only 
 realities are the divine mind and idea. . . . God is the only 
 intelligence of the universe, including man. . . . Spirit is 
 infinite. There is but one Spirit, because there can be 
 
 •Science and Health, 1902, pp. 83, 84, 107, no, 202, 446, 456. 
 ' Short Lessons in Theosophy, compiled by Miss S. C. Clark from the 
 teachings of W. J. Colville, pp. 9, 10. 
 
202 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 but one Infinite. . . . Soul or Spirit signifies Deity, and 
 nothing else. There is no finite soul or spirit. Those 
 terms mean only one mind, and cannot be rendered in the 
 plural. . . . This belief that there is more than one mind, 
 is as pernicious to divine theology as are ancient mythol- 
 ogy and pagan idolatry."^ With equal definiteness the 
 associated doctrine of the nothingness of matter is as- 
 serted. "Matter will finally be proven to be nothing but 
 a mortal belief. . . . Matter and death are but mortal 
 illusions."^ Disease, of course, shares the unreality of 
 matter. "Every sort of sickness is a degree of insanity; 
 that is, sickness is always hallucination."^ In addition 
 to these two points of close afiiliation with Brahmanical 
 pantheism a third may be mentioned. Brahmanism in 
 its soteriological theory emphasizes the value of a special 
 kind of knowledge. The illusion of a multifold world 
 and all the evil entailed thereby, as it teaches, can be 
 remedied only by the knowledge of the identity of the 
 individual with the absolute self. Similarly, Mrs. Eddy 
 puts a premium on the efficacy of a special kind of knowl- 
 edge. While will is not denied by her to the one infinite 
 Spirit, it is treated in its human character as a subject 
 for mere disparagement, and the stress is put upon the 
 mental contemplation and grasp of the principles of the 
 science which finds through herself its authoritative ex- 
 pression. "Will-power," she says, "is not science, and 
 its use is to be condemned. . . . Human will is an animal 
 propensity, not a faculty of soul. Hence it cannot govern 
 man aright."* 
 
 Along with these points of intimate correspondence 
 to Brahmanical pantheism Mrs. Eddy's teaching exhibits, 
 no doubt, a measure of unlikeness. For instance, she 
 
 ' Science and Health. 1902, pp. 73, 109, 330, 334, 466, 469. 
 
 • Ibid., pp. 125, 289. ' Ibid., pp. 407. 4o8. ■• Ibid., pp. 14S. 49°- 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 203 
 
 seems not to have been quite in line with that system in 
 her conception of the relation of man to the one Mind 
 or Spirit. Instead of predicating identity between the 
 two, she prefers to represent man as holding to the one 
 Spirit the relation of an idea in which that Spirit eternally 
 comes to expression.^ But whatever differences may be 
 specified are quite overbalanced by the pronounced agree- 
 ments. Whether consciously or unconsciously, Mrs. 
 Eddy has incorporated into the foundations of her sys- 
 tem the characteristic teachings of Brahmanical panthe- 
 ism. Her formal attitude toward pantheism is doubt- 
 less hostile; but that results from the association which, 
 in her narrow use of the term, she makes between pan- 
 theism and materialism. 
 
 Christian Science in its practical code pays a just trib- 
 ute to ethics, emphasizing in particular the worth of un- 
 selfish love. But when examined as to its ability to pro- 
 vide a logical and consistent basis for ethical theory it 
 appears decidedly open to criticism. It is difficult to 
 see how man, under Mrs. Eddy's definition of his rela- 
 tion to the one Spirit, can have the autonomy needed for 
 real moral agency. Then, too, it is not apparent how he 
 can be a subject for responsibility, merit, or blame, so 
 long as sin is made an illusion of mortal mind, which, 
 as being itself unreal,^ cannot be supposed to harbor the 
 least approach to reality. That sin is an illusion of this 
 sort is very distinctly asserted. "Whatever indicates the 
 fall of man," says Mrs. Eddy, "or the opposite of God, 
 or God's absence, is a mortal belief. . . . Matter and its 
 belief — sin, sickness, and death — are states of mortal 
 mind which act, react, and then come to a stop. They 
 are not ideas, but illusions. . . . Man is incapable of sin, 
 
 'Science and Health, pp. 303 470, 475. 
 ' Ibid., p. 114. 
 
204 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 sickness, and death, inasmuch as he derives his essence 
 from God, and possesses not a single original or unde- 
 rived power. Hence the real man cannot depart from 
 holiness; nor can God, by whom man was evolved, 
 engender the capacity or freedom to sin."^ Thus the 
 long tragedy which sin is supposed to have enacted in 
 the world turns out to have been only a deceptive 
 dream.^ 
 
 III. — Secularism and Ethical Culture 
 
 The French writer Guyau, in his Non-Religion of the 
 Future,^ figures as a prophet of Secularism, though he 
 seems neither to have appropriated the term nor to have 
 written as the exponent of any organized secularist move- 
 ment. 
 
 In predicting the disappearance of religion Guyau 
 does not ignore the powerful dominion which it has ex- 
 ercised over the human race in the past and its sub- 
 stantial universality. In accord with recent anthropo- 
 logical investigation, he says : "After the labors of Herr 
 Roskoff, M. Reville, and M. Girard de Rialle, it is im- 
 possible to maintain that there exist nowadays on the 
 surface of the earth whole peoples absolutely without 
 religion or superstition, which among noncivilized peo- 
 ple amount to the same thing.'"* But this fact, that re- 
 ligion appears to be rooted in human nature, does not 
 argue, in the opinion of Guyau, its permanence, since 
 human nature itself, instead of being unchanging, falls 
 under a law of evolution. "To show," he says, "the deep 
 roots that religion has sent down into the depths of the 
 
 * Science and Health, pp. 282, 283, 457, 476. _, , ^^ t>i.-i u 
 
 » For a succinct estimate of Christian Science see G. T. Ladd, Philosophy 
 of Religion, L 167. . 
 
 ' L'lrreligion de I'Avenir. The citations are from the English translation. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 22. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 205 
 
 human mind, is not to demonstrate the perpetuity of re- 
 hgion, for the human mind itself is incessantly changing. 
 . . . The eighteenth century hated religion and wished 
 to destroy it. The nineteenth century endeavors to un- 
 derstand religion and cannot reconcile itself to seeing so 
 charming an object of study disappear. The historian's 
 device is, 'What has been, will be'; he is naturally in- 
 clined to model his conception of the future on his knowl- 
 edge of the past. A witness of the futility of revolutions, 
 he sometimes forgets that complete evolution is possible : 
 an evolution which transforms things to their very roots 
 and metamorphoses human beings and their beliefs to 
 an extent that renders them unrecognizable."^ 
 
 As specific causes of the ultimate elimination of reli- 
 gion Guyau makes account of the progressive overthrow 
 of the beliefs and customs on which religion depends 
 and of the dissolving agency of private judgment. "The 
 elements," he remarks, "which distinguish religion from 
 metaphysics and from ethics, and which constitute a 
 positive religion, properly so called, are, in our judg- 
 ment, essentially caducous and transitory, and, if so, we 
 reject the religion of the future as we should reject an 
 alchemy of the future, or an astrology of the future. . . . 
 The reign of sensibility over intelligence is not perpetual ; 
 sooner or later the positions of the two must be reversed. 
 . . . The perpetuity of religious sentiment depends upon 
 its legitimacy. Born, as it is, of certain beliefs and cus- 
 toms, its fate is one with theirs. . . . There exists in the 
 bosom of every great religion a dissolving force, namely, 
 the very force which served in the beginning to consti- 
 tute it and to enable it to triumph over its predecessor: 
 the right of private judgment. It is upon this force, this 
 right, that one may count for the ultimate establishment, 
 
 * L'lrreligion de I'Avenir, pp. 15-17. 
 
2o6 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 after the gradual decomposition of every system of dog- 
 matic belief, of a final absence of religion."^ 
 
 What is to take the place of the vanquished religion ? 
 According to Guyau, philosophy, free individualistic 
 speculation in the domains of metaphysics and ethics — a 
 speculation that will be all the more energetic because re- 
 ligion will be out of the way. "Human beliefs," says our 
 author, "when they shall have taken their final form in 
 the future, will bear no mark of dogmatic and ritualis- 
 tic religion, they will be simply philosophical. "^ "The 
 day when positive religion shall have disappeared, the 
 spirit of curiosity in matters of cosmology and metaphys- 
 ics, which has been more or less paralyzed by an effort 
 to dwell within the unyielding limits of indomitable 
 formulas, will be more vivacious than ever before. There 
 will be less of faith but more of free speculation, less 
 of contemplation but more of reasoning, of hardy induc- 
 tion, of an active outleap of thought."^ "Metaphysical 
 speculations will tend to become, like the highest aesthetic 
 products, a luxury; they will be sought for their own 
 sakes, and for the general elevation of mind that they 
 bestow, rather than for guidance in particular matters 
 of conduct. The destiny of the world will interest us 
 quite apart from any question of our own destiny, and 
 our voyages into the unknown will be prompted not by 
 selfishness but by disinterested curiosity."* 
 
 Though proclaiming so emphatically the destined dis- 
 appearance of religion, Guyau makes place for a sort of 
 religion in the line of admiration for the cosmos and of 
 devotion to social ideals. He says : "To be non-religious 
 is not to be anti-religious. More than that, the non-reli- 
 gion of the future may well preserve all that is pure in 
 
 * L'lrreligion de TAvenir, pp. lo, 12, 230, 231. ^ Ibid., p. 364. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 13. * Ibid., p. 427. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 207 
 
 the religious sentiment: an admiration for the cosmos 
 and for the infinite powers which are there displayed; a 
 search for an ideal not only individual, but social, and 
 even cosmic, which shall overpass the limits of actual 
 reality. . . . Non-religion, as we here understand it, may 
 be considered as a higher degree simply of religion and 
 of civilization,"^ 
 
 In England Secularism assumed in the latter part of 
 the nineteenth century an organized form. Here George 
 Jacob Holyoake served as the prime mover. As repre- 
 sented by him, Secularism, while not formally atheistic, 
 is practically so. On the one hand, he says, "I never 
 shared that notion of atheism so positive and dogmatic 
 as to declare that no other hypothesis of the universe is 
 possible to be entertained. The ideas of the infinite and 
 universal can never be, or at least have never been, so 
 sharply defined and permanently conceived as to war- 
 rant us in declaring theism, under any form, to be im- 
 possible."^ On the other hand, he makes this statement : 
 "I recognize in nature but the aggregation of matter. . . . 
 I can conceive of nothing beyond nature, distinct from it 
 and above it. The language invented by Pope, to the 
 effect that Sve look through nature up to nature's God,' 
 has no significance for me, as I know nothing besides 
 nature and can conceive of nothing greater."^ 
 
 The supreme end contemplated in Secularism is earthly 
 good, and for the reaching of this end it makes large 
 account of material means. "It seeks," writes Holyoake, 
 "to supply the material and social conditions under which 
 whatever of good exists in human nature may manifest 
 itself unchecked. It would place the intellect under the 
 
 * L'Trreligion de I'Avenir, pp. 10, 11. 
 
 2 The Trial of Theism, p. 146. ' Ibid., p. 200. 
 
2o8 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 dominion of true ideas, and show to others that virtue, 
 is an advantage as well as a duty. . . . Secularism teaches 
 the good of this life to be a rightful object of primary 
 pursuit, inculcates the practical sufficiency of natural 
 morality apart from atheism, theism, or the Bible, and 
 selects as its method of procedure the promotion of human 
 improvement by material means. "^ 
 
 In admitting the propriety of a sense of awe before 
 the cosmos, Holyoake made room for a quasi-religious 
 sentiment. A more recent expositor of Secularism seems, 
 to entertain very scanty tolerance even for this much of 
 approach to religion. The movement in progress in the 
 industrial and scientific world involves, according to J. 
 M. Bonham, "the ultimate dissipation of all worshipful 
 feeling." In the conflict which is going on between, 
 idealism and a crass realism the issue is not at all doubt- 
 ful. "This contest involves the constant challenge of 
 sacred idealism and sacred authority, and nothing in it 
 warrants the belief that it will cease so long as any 
 sacred authority and any reverence for ideals remains."^ 
 In harmony with this point of view, Bonham takes ex- 
 ception to the conclusion of Leslie Stephen, that the 
 religious instincts of mankind will survive and demand 
 some form of expression. They will be attenuated, he 
 holds, to the point of practical extinction.^ A religion- 
 less race sitting on the ash heap of an utterly prosaic real- 
 ism — such is the engaging picture which this writer 
 manufactures from his secularist postulates. 
 
 Secularism would not seem to be a very promising 
 subject for a ritual. Nevertheless it has exercised its 
 talent in that direction, having devised formularies for 
 
 1 The Trial of Theism, pp. 221, 222. 
 
 'Secularism, its Progress and its Morals, pp. 360, 362, 363. 
 
 Mbid., pp. 148-155- 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 209 
 
 the naming of infants, for marriage, and for burial, in 
 all of which it has not disdained to utilize suggestions 
 from the Anglican models. Guyau has taken notice of 
 this borrowing and has characterized it in this rather 
 caustic fashion: "Secularism is a purely atheistic and 
 utilitarian religion, which has borrowed all it could from 
 the ritual of the English Church. This contradiction 
 between the outer form and the inner void resulted in a 
 positive parody."^ 
 
 In passing from' Secularism to the "Ethical Culture" 
 movement we enter a much warmer atmosphere as re- 
 spects appreciation of the worth of religion. This move- 
 ment was initiated in the eighth decade of the century 
 under the leadership of Felix Adler, From New York, 
 where the first Ethical Society was founded, the move- 
 ment spread in various directions. Kindred societies 
 were established in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Saint 
 Louis; also in London, in various cities of the German 
 empire, in Vienna, in Buda-Pesth, and in Venice. Fur- 
 thermore, independent societies, differing in some meas- 
 ure from those which received the initial incentive from 
 Felix Adler, have arisen in London and Cambridge. 
 
 A general aim rather than a precise platform binds 
 the Ethical Societies together. "No one man," says an 
 exponent, "is authorized to speak for the Ethical Move- 
 ment beyond giving his personal opinions and convic- 
 tions concerning it. The attitude of one group of men 
 might meet with disapproval from another group. Yet 
 it should be said that a few years ago the societies in 
 America, which have grown out of the parent organiza- 
 tion in New York city, formed an Ethical Union in this 
 
 1 The Non-Religion of the Future, p. 365. Compare C. M. Davies, Hetero- 
 dox London, II. 185. 
 
210 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 country, with the following* statement as a section of the 
 constitution: 'The general aim of the Ethical Move- 
 ment as represented by this Union is to elevate the moral 
 life of its members and that of the community; and it 
 cordially welcomes to its fellowship all persons who sym- 
 pathize with this aim, whatever may be their theological 
 or philosophical opinions.' "^ The purpose of the move- 
 ment is further defined in this comparative view from the 
 pen of Stanton Coit: "An Ethical Society," he says, 
 "differs from Christian Churches in being broader in its 
 fellowship. It excludes no one because of skepticism as 
 to the existence and personality of God or the divinity 
 of Christ. But, on the other hand, let it be distinctly 
 known that we are not as a society agnostic. We do 
 not deny the possibility of knowing the existence of 
 God. ... As a society we are not pledged to any theory 
 of the origin of the universe, or of conscience itself, or 
 to any theory as to the limits of human knowledge. . . . 
 But, though thus different from all Christian Churches, 
 it does not follow that we approach any nearer to non- 
 Christian religious organizations that have recently 
 sprung up than we do to the Christian Churches. We 
 are quite as distinct from positivism, secularism, and 
 socialism."^ 
 
 In emphasizing the sufficiency of morality the ad- 
 herents of the Ethical Movement take a high view of 
 what is meant by morality, a view akin to that of Kant 
 and Fichte, in which the moral law is invested with super- 
 eminent sanctions, so that it may be accounted the most 
 august and indisputable thing in the universe. Morality 
 in this sense, it is claimed, includes the very core of re- 
 ligion. It coincides with religion in emphasizing man's 
 
 * W. L. Sheldon, An Ethical Movement, 1896, p. xiii. 
 
 ' Ethics and Religion, a Collection of Essays, pp. 287-290. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 211 
 
 relationship to the universal and absolute, and, while 
 it cannot subscribe to the dogmas of religion taken in 
 their literal sense, it can tolerate them ag symbolical ex- 
 pressions of great truths. These are points of view which 
 find recurring expression in the words of the spokes- 
 men of the Ethical Movement. Thus Adler says : "The 
 authority of conscience is founded on human nature it- 
 self. The imperative which we cannot disown comes 
 from within. The distinction between the right and the 
 wrong is as aboriginal as that between the true and the 
 false."^ "Religion is that which brings man into touch 
 with the infinite: this is its mission. If we put aside 
 the materialistic explanations of morality, and see the 
 majesty, the inexplicable augustness of it, we shall find 
 that, in the moral life itself, in the moral experience it- 
 self, we possess religion. Religion is at the core of it, 
 for religion is the connection of man's life with the abso- 
 lute, and the moral law is an absolute law."^ "All that 
 is best and grandest in dogma is due to the inspiration 
 of the moral law in man. The time will come when the 
 tenets of faith will no longer be narrowly understood as 
 now; and while their influence will still be great, they 
 will cease to be harmful and confining, they will be 
 used as rare imagery to deck the sublime meanings which 
 they symbolize; not as vessels that contain the abso- 
 lute truth, but as choice and beautiful vases, fit to 
 hold the ever-fresh and ever-blooming flowers of the 
 ideal. "^ To the same effect William Salter remarks : 
 "A higher is unfolded to us in the very nature of 
 morality: it is given to vis in our very constitution 
 as rational beings. . . . We cannot go beyond the law of 
 right; God is not more ultimate; human reason is but 
 
 1 Life and Destiny, p. 78. 2 The Religion of Duty, p. 94. 
 
 ' Creed and Deed, p. 60. 
 
212 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 that in us which perceives it."^ "The moral nature is 
 that by which we transcend ourselves and enter into an 
 ideal region."^ "Ethics is a pure concern of man with 
 man, it is often said; it is religion that binds us to the 
 higher order of things. Yet ethics is nothing but the 
 response which man and man make to the higher order of 
 things; for the reason of justice is, not that another 
 wants it and I choose to give it, but that he ought to 
 have it and I ought to give it. The duty is absolute, not 
 conditioned on our will or thought, but given to us in and 
 by the nature of things. Ethics realized in its meaning 
 is religion."^ In a similar strain a prominent representa- 
 tive of the Ethical Movement in Germany, G. von 
 Gizycki, says: "Our moral duties do not bind by con- 
 tract, but are unconditional. . . . The divine dwells in us, 
 and everything great, good, and holy in the idea of God 
 arises out of our own heart; moral consciousness is the 
 spring of all that has value in religion."* 
 
 On the question of divine personality the exponents of 
 the movement under review are disinclined for the most 
 part either to negation or to affirmation. Salter has, in- 
 deed, characterized the thought of a personal Deity as 
 an illusion.^ Most of his school, however, seem to have 
 taken a position of greater reserve. The points main- 
 tained by all are the existence of an infinite and ultimate 
 power which makes for righteousness and the location 
 of the one great proof of the reality of such a power in 
 man's moral constitution. The following statement of 
 Adler is quite representative: "I believe that there is a 
 higher Being, an ultimate, divine Reality in things. In 
 the attempt to describe this Being language faints, im- 
 
 1 Ethical Religion, pp. 65, 70. ^Ibid., p. 7. ' Ibid., p. 18. 
 
 * Ethics and Religion, a Collection of Essays, pp. 172, 195. 
 
 * Ethical Religion, pp. 12, 39 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 213 
 
 agination grows dizzy, thought is paralyzed. On moral 
 grounds, and in the last analysis on moral grounds only, 
 I assume the existence of such a Being. All I can say 
 by way of description is, that there really exists that 
 which corresponds to the moral ideal, that there is a 
 Power back of the effort toward righteousness, which 
 gives effect to it beyond our finite power."^ 
 
 Though questioning the possibility of the impersona- 
 tion of the complete moral ideal in a single individual, 
 the representative writers of the Ethical Societies speak 
 of Jesus in terms of tender respect, and accord to him 
 a certain primacy among all who have taught and 
 wrought in human history. Scanty justice, says Adler, 
 is done to the greatest of the Hebrew prophets when he 
 is described as simply a "moralist," for that term does 
 not properly call attention to "his depth, his spiritual 
 wealth, his real greatness, to the 'virtue that went out 
 from him.' "^ Referring to the need of giving a central 
 place to the theme of "the kingdom of God," Salter re- 
 marks: "In this sense we are still on the foundation of 
 the prophets, Jesus himself being the corner stone. "^ The 
 ideal of self-denial, says W. L. Sheldon, was manifested 
 in marvelous beauty and completeness in Jesus. "In the 
 picture of the human Christ we see an absolute self-sur- 
 render. Jesus was humility itself. I watch the suffering 
 Christ on the cross after all the agony he had undergone, 
 without one thought about himself, anxious only to 
 achieve the purpose to which he had consecrated his life 
 and to show the human race the true way of conquering 
 evil. And I say to myself, what wonder that men have 
 clung to the crucifix! This human Jesus did conquer 
 evil ; he showed mankind how to subdue the wild, erratic. 
 
 * The Religion of Duty, pp. 39, 40. * Ibid., p. 77. 
 
 ' Ethical Religion, p. 199. 
 
214 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 self-asserting spirit which exists in every one of us. He 
 hung there upon the cross a conqueror."^ 
 
 While those who make "ethical culture" their shibbo- 
 leth do not take the Bible as an authority to which they 
 are in any wise bound to submit, they are free to acknowl- 
 edge and to laud the wealth of its contents. "Purity of 
 diction," writes Adler, "power of striking antithesis, 
 simple yet sublime imagery, a marvelous facility in the 
 expression of complex states of feeling, and those the 
 deepest of which the human soul is capable, are but a 
 few of the obvious features that distinguish the golden 
 age of Hebrew literature. Never, perhaps, has the sym- 
 bolism of nature been used with such supreme effect to 
 express the unspeakable emotions that are deep down 
 in the heart of man. Such music as that which swells 
 through the pages of Isaiah's prophecies cannot be for- 
 gotten ; such ringing rhythmic periods, in which the elo- 
 quence of conviction bursts forth into the rounded fulness 
 of perfect oratory, can never fail to touch and inspire."^ 
 "The Bible," says Salter, "glows with the idea of right- 
 eousness as no other book does that has become the 
 property of the Western world, and to those who have 
 the wit to distinguish substance from form it is still, and 
 may always be, a means of moral inspiration."^ In his 
 suggestive book. An Ethical Sunday School, W. L. Shel- 
 don provides for a large use of the Bible. Referring to 
 the needs of the younger pupils, he makes this very sig- 
 nificant remark : "I have been reluctant to employ series 
 of tales from other literatures, as, for instance, from 
 Homer, or the fairy tales from German sources, or even 
 the beautiful legends concerning King Arthur and the 
 Knights of the Round Table — partly for the reason that 
 
 i.An Ethical Movement, p. 117. '.Creed and Deed, p. 222. 
 
 ^"Ethical Religion, p. 255. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 215 
 
 they would tend to run together in the minds of the Httle 
 ones with the stories from the Bible. As a matter of fact, 
 the Bible tales, on the whole, are so much superior in 
 their moral import to the legends in other classic litera- 
 ture that it has seemed better to let the Scripture tales 
 stand out boldly by themselves in the minds of the 
 young. "^ 
 
 IV. — A Word on the Superior Claims of 
 Christianity 
 
 The types of thought which have been considered may 
 be regarded as embracing successively these four propo- 
 sitions : ( I ) The highest attainable religion is not to be 
 identified with Christianity, but rather is to be com- 
 pounded from the best religious products that can be 
 discovered anywhere in the world. (2) To assert a dis- 
 tinct primacy for Christianity is quite illegitimate; in- 
 deed, that honor may with better right be awarded to 
 the great religions of the East. (3) Religion expresses 
 no permanent need of human nature, and is destined to be 
 outgrown. (4) Morality at its best takes up all that is of 
 value in religion, so that the specifically religious may 
 properly cease to be a matter of any emphasis. These 
 propositions constitute the more significant contentions of 
 Free Religion, Theosophy, Secularism, and the Ethical 
 Movement, respectively. 
 
 The second proposition, it is true, does not fully cover 
 the peculiarities of the theosophical scheme. In that 
 scheme the doctrine of adepts, the doctrine that religion 
 in its perfect form has been the property of highly de- 
 veloped and illuminated men, and has been handed down 
 by them in its completeness and purity through all the 
 ages, holds an important place. But it is impossible to 
 
 ' Ethical Religion, p. 39. 
 
2i6 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 treat seriously a doctrine like this which throws con- 
 tempt on the researches of the most distinguished an- 
 thropologists and students of comparative religion. Noth- 
 ing but an intemperate appetite for the queer can secure 
 a moment's hospitality for the Mahatma vagary. Even 
 if the existence of beings so wonderfully gifted, and so 
 wonderfully indisposed to make any fruitful employment 
 of their gifts, could be credited, there is not a scrap of 
 satisfactory evidence of any real connection with them. 
 Madame Blavatsky, certainly, has furnished no convin- 
 cing proof of such connection. For years after her re- 
 puted novitiate in Thibet she figured as a common spirit- 
 ualistic practitioner. Either, then, she had not learned 
 that Spiritualism was unacceptable to the hidden sages, 
 or she knowingly chose a false and condemned path. The 
 conclusion is scarcely to be avoided that the effective de- 
 mand for exchanging Spiritualism for Theosophy lay in 
 the ambition of the restless devotee of occultism to figure 
 in a more imposing role. The supposition of communi- 
 cation with superior sources of illumination is adapted to 
 elicit from sober-minded people only the smile of in- 
 credulity.^ 
 
 Turning now to the first of the propositions named, 
 we notice that there is very little promise of vitality in 
 a religion formed simply by the process of compounding 
 selected teachings. As the nutritive elements of the soil 
 cannot be made to minister to life and movement by being 
 merely brought together, and can fulfill that function 
 only when taken up by a living organism already present, 
 so religious truths cannot be combined into a living 
 whole by a mere process of juxtaposition. A living 
 
 1 Compare Arthur Lillie, Madame Blavatsky and her Theosophy; Ed- 
 mund Garrett, Isis Very Much Unveiled, Being the Story of the Great 
 Mahatma Hoax. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 217 
 
 religion, sufficiently comprehensive in its fundamental 
 principles, can be hospitable toward truths found any- 
 where in the limits of the accessible universe; but the 
 simple compiling of the truths will not make a religion 
 endowed with victorious energy. 
 
 The comparative inefficiency of a compiled religion 
 has received a measure of historical illustration. In the 
 era of the French Revolution the so-called Theophilan- 
 thropists undertook to make a new religion by the process 
 of selecting good maxims from all available sources. The 
 result was a collection of very eligible teachings. But 
 was there any power of conquest or satisfying efficacy 
 in the religion thus formed ? The very scantiest amount. 
 In fact, propagation of the eclectic faith went on so poorly 
 that one of its leading representatives is said to have 
 asked Talleyrand what he should do to win the merited 
 success. The subtle diplomatist replied, *T should advise 
 you to get yourself crucified, and to rise from the dead on 
 the third day." 
 
 The trouble with a religion made by the intellectual 
 method of searching out and assorting acceptable teach- 
 ings is its vague, abstract, and distant character. The 
 hungry heart of humanity craves something more than 
 worthy ideas respecting the divine. It requires that the 
 thought of God should be supplemented by practical attes- 
 tations that he is not merely a beautiful ideal, but a God 
 who is with the race and for the race, a Being who has 
 disclosed great and benevolent purposes and given as- 
 surance of their certain fulfillment. In other words, 
 no religion is qualified to meet the actual demand which 
 does not take on the forms of a sacred history. A super- 
 latively rich and well-authenticated sacred history must 
 in the very nature of the case arm a religion with incom- 
 parable efficiency for the task of capturing and molding 
 
2i8 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 the minds and hearts of men. It is seen, then, to be 
 worthy of an infinitely wise and benevolent providence 
 to adopt this potent expedient, this method of historic 
 attestation in working out the proper religious destiny 
 of mankind. The rational demand harmonizes with the 
 claim of Christianity to have won its place in the world 
 in and through a sacred history which brings into effec- 
 tive contact with men the highest and best that is con- 
 ceivable. 
 
 That Christianity in its historic form embraces every- 
 thing that is capable of finding a place in an ideal system 
 need not necessarily be assumed ; for Christianity rightly 
 understood is not a completely finished fact. In its funda- 
 mental principles it is indeed unchanging. Here the ideal 
 is at the same time the real. But in drawing out the logi- 
 cal inferences from these principles, and in securing for 
 them a practical realization through all the complex life 
 of human society, there is abundant opportunity for a 
 progressive movement. In this movement the fruits of uni- 
 versal experience can be appropriated without the slight- 
 est incongruity. The divine sufficiency of Christianity 
 is not denied but rather illustrated by its capacity to 
 assimilate whatever of good is contained within the hori- 
 zon of human achievement. Only the soundness of its 
 central principles could enable it to possess in full meas- 
 ure this capacity. There is, accordingly, the very slightest 
 need to think of parting company with Christianity for 
 the sake of adding to one's store of religious riches. The 
 hesitation of the Free Religious Association to make 
 a formal declaration of independence of historical 
 Christianity had weighty grounds, more weighty prob- 
 ably than some of its members were conscious of enter- 
 taining. 
 
 In considering the preference of modern Theosophists 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 219 
 
 for the great religions of the East there is occasion to 
 weigh only the merits of Brahmanism and Buddhism, 
 since it is with these two Oriental systems that the the- 
 osophical mind has been so enamored as practically to 
 rate them above Christianity. The repudiation of this 
 estimate does not, of course, involve a denial that very 
 worthy elements may be found in both Brahmanism and 
 Buddhism. The challenge to the theosophical judgment 
 properly takes the form of the contention that there are 
 glaring defects in both these religions which rationally 
 exclude the possibility of placing them on a level with 
 Christianity. 
 
 Brahmanism stands for one of the most radical and 
 overgrown systems of sacerdotalism that the world has 
 ever seen. This feature, too, does not appear a mere 
 attachment or artificial appendage. The sacred books of 
 the religion are deeply permeated with the notion of the 
 deified rank of the Brahman, and respect to that rank as 
 expressed in the caste system has been for ages a most 
 conspicuous characteristic of the civilization of India. 
 With extravagance in priestly assumption a kindred ex- 
 travagance in magnifying the virtue of ceremonies 
 manipulated by the priest has been closely associated. 
 It is not too much to say that in Brahmanism the cere- 
 monial vies with the ethical and overslaughs it at vari- 
 ous points. Very sane maxims are, indeed, found in the 
 Brahmanical scriptures on the superior worth of the 
 ethical; but maxims and representations of a precisely 
 contrary import are also found.^ The natural result is 
 a compromising of the supremacy which belongs of right 
 to the ethical as against everything in the sphere of ritual. 
 Along with these grave defects another must be charged 
 against Brahmanism. In its representation of the Su- 
 
 * Vasishtha, chap, xxvii; Baudhayana, iv. 6; Laws of Manu, ii. 79. 
 
220 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 preme Being it gives place to conceptions that are gro- 
 tesquely inadequate to the thought of God as the absolute 
 and perfect. Take that picture of Brahma as alternating 
 between active and passive conditions, projecting the 
 world in one state, withdrawing the world into himself 
 in another state, living now in the day, and now in the 
 long deep night in which all diversities are submerged 
 and lost. How is it possible that anyone should imagine 
 that such a doctrine is comparable to the thought of God 
 as the ever-living, the light which cannot be invaded or 
 superseded by darkness, the sleepless wisdom and love, 
 the pure intelligence and holy will that work ceaselessly 
 to lead on the universe stage by stage toward the highest 
 possible goal ? Plainly, Theosophy is convicted of making 
 an extremely bad bargain in so far as it puts aside au- 
 thentic Christianity for Brahmanism. 
 
 In the preference awarded to Buddhism an equally ill- 
 founded judgment is apparent. What element of high 
 worth does Buddhism contain which is not also char- 
 acteristic of Christianity? The former profoundly em- 
 phasizes the duty of compassion and good will toward 
 all. The latter is not at all behind in its emphasis upon 
 this duty, and at the same time provides a vastly more 
 logical basis for the energetic and persistent fulfillment 
 of the duty. Buddhism is quietistic in its ideal. Sup- 
 pression of desire is central to its conception of salva- 
 tion. In consistency, therefore, the fully saved man must 
 be disburdened of all active solicitude for his fellows. 
 A negative, cloistral, quiescent benevolence, as opposed 
 to a striving and world-conquering good will, is the logi- 
 cal outcome of Buddhistic postulates. If Buddhism has 
 ever made any considerable exhibition of active benevol- 
 ence, that achievement is rather to be imputed to the 
 spirit and practical maxims of the founder than to a con- 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 221 
 
 sistent carrying out of its fundamental conceptions of 
 the ideal state of the individual. Furthermore, its de- 
 ficiency at this point, as compared with Christianity, is 
 enhanced by its conception of man as a candidate for 
 quite the reverse of a vital immortality. The end to be 
 attained, as it represents, is entrance into nirvana; and 
 nirvana, whatever amelioration of its significance may 
 have been brought in ultimately, seems to have meant 
 in original Buddhism just simply extinction of personal 
 subsistence, the reduction of the individual to the state 
 of the blown-out flame of a lamp.^ Retrenching thus 
 the significance of human personality. Buddhism, in its 
 most authentic form, offers a less inspiring motive to 
 work for the best development of humanity than does 
 Christianity with its conception of men as called to be 
 the immortal children of a divine household. It must 
 be charged also against Buddhism that it is far less 
 adapted than the religion of Christ to sustain the proper 
 intensity of ethical life. In the aim of the former, es- 
 cape from pain takes the foremost place. The misery of 
 unsatisfied desire is emphasized as the great evil to be 
 vanquished. Only a secondary stress falls upon the vile- 
 ness and demerit of sin. For this deficit, too, there is 
 no means of repair in the religion of Gautama; on the 
 contrary, it is closely related to a distinctive shortcoming. 
 As taking a negative attitude toward the thought of God, 
 Buddhism lacks the great means of vitalizing the con- 
 sciousness of sin which resides in a pure theistic system, 
 with its stress upon responsibility to a holy and trans- 
 cendent Person. Nor is this the whole extent of the 
 damage resulting from the failure of original Buddhism 
 
 > Oldenberg, Buddha: His Life, his Doctrine, his Order, pp. 264-274: 
 Hopkins, Religions of India, p. 321; Sacred Books of the East, American 
 edition, Vol. IX. Part ii, p. 275; Vol. X, Part i, pp. 63, 279, 280. 
 
222 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 to take any account of the idea of God. The devotees 
 of the system could not permanently leave that void un- 
 filled. Neglect to make a suitable recognition of the 
 Divine Being only helped to give free course to fanciful 
 and superstitious representations of the higher powers. 
 Notwithstanding, then, all the beautiful sayings which 
 may be gathered from Buddhistic literature, there are 
 such marked defects in the Buddhistic system that it 
 requires very peculiar eyesight to see in it a proper rival 
 of Christianity. 
 
 The Theosophic assumption of the obligations of 
 Christianity to Buddhism require, as a ground of cre- 
 dence, vastly better evidence than has ever been afforded. 
 The fact can indeed be cited that a few writers outside 
 the theosophical school have supposed the reality of 
 such obligations. Thus Rudolph Seydel points to a 
 series of parallelisms between the Gospels and certain 
 Buddhist writings, and draws the inference that the 
 former borrowed from the latter. Furthermore, Ernst 
 von Bunsen and Arthur Lillie have rendered support to 
 the notion that Christianity drew largely from Essenism, 
 which on its side found in Buddhism a principal source. 
 But judicial scholarship finds very slight occasion to take 
 serious account of these verdicts. Suppose some paral- 
 lelisms are discoverable between the Gospels and Bud- 
 dhist narratives; it still remains true that the Gospels 
 in their sharp contrast to Buddhistic teaching on funda- 
 mental themes evince a high degree of independence. 
 The parallels, too, are not so significant as Seydel assumes 
 them to be. It may be contended that some of the 
 Oriental sources on which he depends were probably of 
 later origin than the Gospels, and that the points of re- 
 semblance are not so precise as to necessitate the sup- 
 position of borrowing from either side. As respects 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 223 
 
 the notion that Buddhistic teaching- was transmitted 
 through Essenism to Christianity, the following state- 
 ment may be accounted a sober estimate of the evidence : 
 "When we consider that in all the Palestinian Jewish 
 literature there is not a trace of distinctively Buddhist 
 teaching, when we bear in mind that the name of Buddha 
 is not once associated with the Essenes, when we see 
 scholars most competent to pronounce on the question, 
 like Zeller, Lightfoot, Schurer, Ginsberg, Edersheim, and 
 Conybeare, denying- even a remote connection of Essen- 
 ism with Buddhism, we are amply justified in setting 
 down the theory in question as an absolute failure."* 
 The supposition that Jesus was closely associated with 
 the Essenes is stamped by Harnack as an unhistoric 
 vagary in these terms: "Jesus could not have had any 
 relations with the Essenes. Were that so, he would have 
 belonged to the pupils who show their dependence on 
 their teachers by proclaiming and doing the opposite of 
 what they have been taught. The Essenes made a point 
 of the most extreme purity in the eye of the law, and held 
 severely aloof not only from the impure but even from 
 those who were a little lax in their purity. It is only 
 thus that we can understand their living strictly apart, 
 their dwelling in particular places, and their practice of 
 frequent ablutions every day. Jesus exhibited complete 
 contrast with this mode of life : he goes in search of sin- 
 ners and eats with them. So fundamental a difference 
 alone makes it certain that he had nothing to do with the 
 Essenes. His aims and the means which he employed 
 divide him off from them. If he appears to coincide with 
 them in many of his individual injunctions to his dis- 
 
 ^ C. F. Aiken, The Dhama of Gotama the Buddha and the Gospel of 
 Jesus the Christ, pp. 195, 196. See also Edmund Hardy, Der Buddhismus 
 nach aelteren Pali-Werken Dargestellt. 
 
224 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 ciples, these are accidental points of contact, as his mo- 
 tives were quite other than theirs."^ 
 
 The assumption of Secularism that with the progress 
 of society religion will fade out of sight, until finally it 
 shall be practically extirpated from human feeling and 
 practice, has every appearance of being rather a wish 
 than an induction, so flimsy are the grounds that can be 
 cited in its behalf. As John Fiske has remarked, "None 
 can deny that religion is the largest and most ubiquitous 
 fact connected with the life of mankind upon earth."^ 
 Universally art and literature and the biographies of 
 men testify to the incomparable power of the religious 
 incentive. Are we to be told, then, that this incen- 
 tive is to be eradicated, that the future of man is to 
 stand in complete contrast with his past? Yes, says 
 Guyau, for man is capable of being evolved into some- 
 thing quite unlike his former self. Yes, says Bon- 
 ham, for all reverence for ideals is destined to be extir- 
 pated from the human breast. But why should anyone 
 care to push antireligious credulity to the extreme of 
 such assertions? We rightly judge of what man is in- 
 trinsically by what he has shown himself to be through- 
 out his history. To suppose that he can be evolved or 
 desiccated into something quite unlike himself is to deal 
 very unkindly with logic and common sense. Doubt- 
 less within limited areas seasons of a relative religious 
 dearth may occur. But to take such instances of dearth 
 as a prophecy of universal secularism is far from being 
 warranted. According to the ample testimony of his- 
 tory, the minds and hearts of men cannot endure to be 
 
 > What is Christianity? first edition, p. 32. Compare Wellhausen, 
 Israelitische und Jiidische Geschichte, p. 2g.i;: H. J. Holtzmann, Lehrbuch 
 der neutestamentlichen Theologie, I. 118; W. Bousset, Jesus, p. 35. 
 
 'Through Nature to God, p. 189. 
 
DENIAL OF FINALITY OF CHRISTIANITY 225 
 
 permanently impoverished, and in the absence of normal 
 religious satisfactions will gravitate into the vagaries 
 and excesses of superstition. Nor can intellectual culture 
 neutralize the natural result of religious impoverishment ; 
 for intellectual culture is powerless to abolish the deep 
 requirements of the emotional life ; and, besides, the intel- 
 lect has demands for religious conceptions in forming 
 a tolerable theory of the universe. 
 
 In relation to the Ethical Societies, it may be conceded 
 that no slight occasion has been given for the putting 
 forth of their contention. Beyond question, scanty jus- 
 tice has sometimes been rendered to morality. All too 
 frequently it has been placed by the incautious advocate 
 of the claims of piety in disparaging contrast with reli- 
 gion, where the contrast ought to have been drawn be- 
 tween a superficial and a profound morality, or at most 
 between a superficial morality and a thoroughly ethical 
 religion. A practical protest against such misleading 
 discourse was quite in order. 
 
 But the Ethical Societies, it strikes us, have erred in 
 attempting to bring morality to the front at the expense 
 of religion. If the latter is a debtor to the former, the for- 
 mer must in the long run acknowledge profound obliga- 
 tions to the latter. The true relation between the two is 
 presented in ideal form in the consciousness of Jesus. 
 How intense his scorn of a religiosity which makes small 
 account of the demands of righteous dealings with one's 
 fellows ! How scathing his rebuke of the man who links 
 ceremonial scrupulosity with any species of inhumanity 
 or moral laxity! How like a flame of fire his words 
 burn through the pretenses of those who would claim 
 a monopoly of merit on the score of their orthodoxism ! 
 But, on the other hand, how vital his sense of all the 
 
226 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 higher rehgious truths and relationships ! What strength, 
 peace, and radiance the thought of the heavenly Father 
 brings into his spirit! What inspiration for labor and 
 hardihood for suffering he gains from his far-reaching 
 vision of the kingdom of God in its destined unfoldment 
 to a transcendent and imperishable glory! Truly in the 
 consciousness of Jesus the proper relation between 
 morality and religion has received an ideal exemplifica- 
 tion, and our best discretion will be manifested in an 
 earnest attempt to realize the model which is here set 
 before us. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 DENIAL OF THE TRANSCENDENT SONSHIP OF JESUS 
 
 CHRIST 
 
 I. — The Principal Instances of Denial 
 
 A CURRENT of dissent from the catholic conception of 
 the divinity of Christ was started in England before the 
 close of the first quarter of the eighteenth century. This 
 current ran in the first instance in the direction of Arian- 
 ism, its course being mainly through the territory of 
 English Presbyterianism. It is understood that Nathaniel 
 Lardner and Richard Price, among others, subscribed to 
 the Arian doctrine. Toward the end of the century a 
 transition began to be made to the humanitarian con- 
 ception of Christ. Among the early champions of this 
 conception Joseph Priestley, Thomas Belsham, and Theo- 
 philus Lindsey were conspicuous. The competing view 
 persisted for a time, but its constituency was so reduced 
 before the end of the fourth decade of the nineteenth 
 century that a New England Unitarian could write home, 
 "There are only three or four Arian societies in Eng- 
 land."^ In Ireland at the same time the Arian element, 
 though on the wane, was relatively stronger. 
 
 The antitrinitarian movement was initiated in this 
 country twenty or thirty years later than in England. 
 Very soon after the middle of the eighteenth century 
 Arianism was held and propagated in an unobtrusive 
 manner by several prominent ministers in eastern Massa- 
 chusetts. In this somewhat vague, mildly assertive type 
 it went on winning adherents. The development oc- 
 curred within the Congregational body, the breaking 
 
 * Life of Ezra Stiles Gannett, by William C. Gannett, p. 177. 
 
 227 
 
228 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 away of King's Chapel from its Episcopalian moorings 
 in 1787, under the leadership of James Freeman, being 
 an exceptional instance. By communication with Eng- 
 land, as well as by the force of inner tendencies, an in- 
 centive was given toward a transition to a modified 
 Socinian teaching ; in other words, a humanitarian teach- 
 ing stripped of the Socinian prescription of worship of 
 the exalted Christ. The transition proceeded by degrees, 
 from the last years of the eighteenth century, but seems 
 not to have made very large headway up to the time of 
 the crisis in 181 5 which hastened the formation of an in- 
 dependent communion, A letter of Channing written in 
 that year expressed the judgment that those who held to 
 the simple humanity of Jesus Christ formed only a small 
 proportion of the Unitarians with whom he was as- 
 sociated.^ The balance, however, was soon changed. 
 "Stuart said to Channing as early as 18 19, 'The younger 
 men are nearly all outstripping you.' Even Professor 
 Ware at the Divinity School was soon after teaching 
 that to him Christ seemed a man. There were doubtless 
 several like him, and more every year. Probably few 
 who were over forty years old at the time of the disclos- 
 ure in 181 5 died other than Arians. Probably there were 
 few under forty then who did not at least grow doubtful, 
 if not certain, the other way."^ The drift indicated in 
 this statement fell little short of its perfect goal by the 
 end of the century. Writing in 1894, J. W. Chadwick 
 testified : "Today the pure humanity of Jesus is the prevail- 
 ing doctrine of the Unitarian body. It would be hard to 
 find among us an Arian thinking of Jesus as the creator of 
 all worlds, himself created before time began to be. It 
 would be only less hard to find a true Socinian thinking 
 
 ' Life of W. E. Channing, by W. H. Channing, p. 196. 
 2 W. C. Gannett, Life of E. S. Gannett, p. 183. 
 
DENIAL OF TRANSCENDENT SONSHIP 229 
 
 of Jesus as a human being exalted to the rank of God. 
 But there are not a few who still think of him as a per- 
 fect man ; and more who speak of him as such, without 
 thinking much about it.''^ Serious thinking, our wit- 
 ness intimates, must serve to engender doubts, not, in- 
 deed, respecting the rare excellence of Jesus, but respect- 
 ing his unblemished human perfection ; and so Unitarian 
 thinking must logically pass on to the denial that the ideal 
 has yet been fulfilled in any individual among the sons of 
 men. 
 
 In the view of Channing and his associates in the early 
 part of the nineteenth century Jesus possessed an exalted 
 dignity, was intrusted with a thoroughly exceptional 
 mission, and was armed with a complete, divinely attested 
 authority. "His character," wrote Channing, "has in it 
 nothing local or temporal. It can be explained by noth- 
 ing around him. His history shows him to us a solitary 
 being, living for purposes which none but himself com- 
 prehended, and enjoying not so much as the sympathy 
 of a single mind."^ "We believe firmly in the divinity 
 of Christ's mission and office, that he spoke with divine 
 authority, and was a bright image of the divine perfec- 
 tions. We believe that God dwelt in him, manifested 
 himself through him, taught men by him, and communi- 
 cated his Spirit to him without measure. We believe 
 that Jesus Christ was the most glorious display, expres- 
 sion, and representative of God to mankind, so that in 
 seeing and knowing him we see and know the invisible 
 Father. In Christ's words we hear God speaking; in his 
 miracles we behold God acting; in his life and character 
 we see an unsullied image of God's purity and love."^ 
 
 Not a few of those who in the next generation after 
 
 iQld and New Unitarian Belief, p. 160. 2 Works, III. 121 
 
 3 Ibid., V. 394. 
 
230 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 Channing embraced the humanitarian doctrine were able, 
 in spite of their revised creed, to make a pretty close 
 approach to his conception of the dignity and worth of 
 Christ's person. Taking a high view of human capaci- 
 ties, and strongly emphasizing the thought of divine im- 
 manence, they placed Christ in such vital relation with 
 the divine and conceived him to be so largely receptive 
 of the Father's fullness, that he was made to appear quite 
 as sufificient for man's spiritual needs as the middle being 
 of Arianism, who indeed was formally rated higher, but 
 seemed to be less closely conjoined both with God and 
 with man. 
 
 This point of view was represented by James Free- 
 man Clarke. He saw in Jesus the ideal of manhood 
 close-linked with divinity. In the unconsciousness of 
 sin characteristic of the Man of Nazareth he recognized a 
 valid sign of inward stainlessness.^ This qualified him 
 for perfect communion with the Father. "In all that 
 he said and did he spoke from the knowledge of God ; 
 he acted from the life of God. Here was one, then, at 
 last, to whom God was not an opinion, but a reality; 
 through whose life flowed the life of God in a steady 
 current. . . . The Word thus 'became flesh and dwelt 
 among us.' The word of the Lord came to the prophets, 
 but it dzvelt in Christ. ... In him truly 'dwelt the fulness 
 of the Godhead bodily."^ 
 
 In like manner F. H. Hedge strongly emphasized the 
 vital connection of Christ's humanity with divinity, not 
 indeed postulating in strictness a divine-human person- 
 ality, yet conceiving of such a close relation between 
 manhood and Godhead that he was not disposed to quar- 
 rel with the terms of the Chalcedonian creed.^ As com- 
 
 • Sermon, 1859. • Orthodoxy, its Truths and Errors, chap. viii. 
 
 3 Ways of the Spirit and Other Essays, pp. 77, 78. 
 
DENIAL OF TRANSCENDENT SONSHIP 231 
 
 pared with Arianism he regarded the Nicene doctrine 
 as embodying a great truth, since the former made a dis- 
 junction between God and man, while the latter accentu- 
 ated their union. Indeed, he did not hesitate to describe 
 the Council of Nicaea, because of its service to this truth, 
 as "one of the most important assemblies that was ever 
 convened on this earth.''^ But, while making this appar- 
 ent approximation to the catholic Christology, Hedge 
 took pains to indicate that he had not really moved on 
 to the ground of that Christology. His view of the incar- 
 nation of the divine in Christ was closely akin to that 
 which Schelling proclaimed in his Vorlesungen ilber 
 die Methode des akademischen Studiums. Incarnation, 
 as he conceived, is a process in which Christ, though he 
 is at the summit, does not stand alone. "Divine sonship 
 is not exhausted in Christ. Humanity is the son of God, 
 humanity in esse or in posse. This is the truth which 
 Jesus represents, which he illustrates by a supreme in- 
 stance."^ 
 
 With Clarke and Hedge we may associate the English 
 Unitarian James Martineau. Though starting with the 
 materialistic necessitarian scheme of Priestley and Bel- 
 sham, he soon threw off its fetters and began to shape 
 his conception of the person and work of Christ accord- 
 ing to the suggestions of an idealistic philosophy. Less 
 stress was placed upon the notion of an authoritative dek- 
 gate, and more upon that of the unique medium for mani- 
 festing, under finite conditions, the mind and heart of 
 the Infinite. The following words testify how strongly 
 he could put this point of view : "Christ standing in soli- 
 tary greatness, and invested with unapproachable sanc- 
 tity, opens at once the eye of conscience to perceive and 
 know the pure and holy God, the Father that dwelt in 
 
 1 Ways of the Spirit and Other Kssays, pp. 350, 351. 
 * Unitarian Affirmations, p. 16 
 
232 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 him and made him so full of truth and grace. Him that 
 rules in heaven we can in no wise believe to be less perfect 
 than that which is most divine on earth; of anything 
 more perfect than the meek yet majestic Jesus no heart 
 can ever dream. And accordingly, ever since he visited 
 our earth with blessing, the soul of Christendom has 
 worshiped a God resembling him."^ That this conviction 
 remained in the mind of Martineau with but little abate- 
 ment is evidenced by these words penned near the end of 
 his career: "In Christ's life of communion with God re- 
 hgious experience, as known to us, reaches its acme, and 
 the ideal relation between the human and the divine is 
 realized. If in any other instance the elevation has been 
 reached, it has not been historically presented so as to 
 single itself out as a revelation to us of what we are 
 meant and called to be. If ever something higher is set 
 before us it will be time enough to quit the step on which 
 we stand. But some objective personalization of our 
 spiritual sonship to God is essential to hold us in brotherly 
 unity together, and carry a religious inspiration into 
 morals."^ In common with Hedge, Martineau thought 
 of Christ as the supreme instance of a divine-human reali- 
 zation. "The incarnation is true, not of Christ exclusively, 
 but of man universally and God everlastingly. He bends 
 into the human to dwell there, and humanity is the sus- 
 ceptible organ of the divine."^ 
 
 How far Unitarianism in the present conforms to the 
 teaching of these eminent representatives of the preceding 
 generations it is difficult to determine. That in part it 
 has fallen to a lower plane in its conception of Christ has 
 been made evident by one and another exponent of con- 
 temporary thinking. 
 
 1 Studies of Christianity, edited by W. R. Alger, p. 194. 
 ' Letter of June 5, 1895, cited by J. E. Carpenter, in James Martineau, 
 Theologian and Teacher, pp. 593, 594. ' Ibid-, p. 404. 
 
DENIAL OF TRANSCENDENT SONSHIP 233 
 
 At the beginning of its history American UniversaHsm 
 was not distinguished by any special antagonism to the 
 cathohc Christology. John Murray's trinitarianism may 
 have been of the Sabelhan type, but his most distinguished 
 colaborer, Elhanan Winchester, is not known to have 
 renounced the common orthodox theory of the divine tri- 
 unity. Scarcely, however, had the line been crossed into 
 the nineteenth century before a decided transition was 
 inaugurated. Hosea Ballou criticised the doctrine of 
 the Trinity in 1805. Within a dozen years from that 
 time, as we are informed by the historian of the denomi- 
 nation, the number of Trinitarians in the Universalist 
 ministry had been reduced to two.^ 
 
 Antitrinitarian sentiment, more commonly of the 
 humanitarian type, has had representatives outside of the 
 domains which have been considered in the foregoing 
 sketch. A sporadic manifestation of it has occurred in 
 Germany. There is reason, however, to doubt the war- 
 rant for the assertion which is sometimes put forth 
 respecting its wide prevalence in that country. Doubt- 
 less among the numerous adherents of the Ritschlian 
 school, as well as in the more limited ultra-liberal school, 
 advocates of the pure humanitarian conception of Christ 
 are to be found. But the more representative theologians 
 of the Ritschlians, however unwilling they may be to 
 commit themselves distinctly to the formulas of the tra- 
 ditional Christology, have not declared for the proper 
 humanitarian conception. Their Christology is of a 
 somewhat agnostic type, which makes room for a tran- 
 scendent factor in Christ, and even affirms the presence of 
 such a factor, though stopping short of an attempt to 
 construe it closely. To go further would involve a de- 
 
 ' Richard Eddy, UniversaHsm in America, II. 104. 
 
234 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 parture from the example of the founder of their school ; 
 for Albrecht Ritschl refused to deal with the metaphysical 
 side of Christology. He considered it sufficient to main- 
 tain that the practical worth of divinity pertains to Christ 
 as reflecting the divine attributes and asserting over the 
 race an unlimited moral lordship. "An authority," he 
 said, "which excludes all other standards or subordinates 
 them to itself, which at the same time fundamentally 
 directs all human trust in God, has the worth of divi- 
 nity."i 
 
 In the Christological discussions of Professor Julius 
 Kaftan quite emphatic recognition is given to a tran- 
 scendent factor in Christ. He notices that in the self- 
 consciousness of Christ there was an extraordinary ele- 
 ment, not merely as respects official standing, but as 
 respects relationship to God, a sense of oneness with the 
 Father which was the spring of life and activity. He 
 affirms that the distinction between him and his disciples 
 reaches beyond the fact that he is the head of the body 
 to which they pertain as members. "His significance lies 
 precisely in this, that he is the mediator between God 
 and men, inasmuch as he belongs with God and again 
 with men. In order to be that he must have stood 
 in a relation to God which in an emphatic sense was 
 peculiar to himself."^ This lofty, peculiar relation to 
 the divine on the part of Christ is the needful basis o£ 
 the exceptional claims of Christianity. "The effort is ever 
 being renewed to bring him into the line and sink him 
 to the plane of a religious hero, without at the same time 
 giving up the absolute character of Christianity. These 
 attempts will not succeed, for Christianity is the absolute 
 religion only in case it stands in unique connection with 
 
 ' Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versohnung, III. 376 
 2 Dogmatik, 5S 41-47- 
 
DENIAL OF TRANSCENDENT SONSHIP 233 
 
 the absolute God. And it does this only on condition 
 that this connection is given in Jesus Christ. He who 
 will have the one will be brought to the inner conviction 
 that he cannot let go the other. He who knows Chris- 
 tianity as the absolute religion will not be able perman- 
 ently to forbear agreeing with the church in confessing 
 Jesus Christ as Lord."^ 
 
 The representations of Professor Max Reischle involve 
 the like contention that the Christ of history stands in 
 a unique relation to God and man and furnishes a basis 
 for faith which cannot be superseded. If it be alleged, 
 he says, that Christ as historically conditioned can have 
 only a relative, not an absolute, significance, it is to be 
 replied that this is no ascertained truth, but a dogmatic 
 assumption, based in a pantheistic or naturalistic evolu- 
 tionary world-view.^ 
 
 Adolf Harnack, while careful to respect the agnostic 
 phase of the Ritschlian Christology, gives sufficiently 
 definite hints of faith in a peculiar and transcendent son- 
 ship pertaining to Christ. "Jesus is convinced," he says, 
 "that he knows God in a way in which no one ever knew 
 him before. In this consciousness he knows himself to 
 be the called and instituted of God, to be the Son, and 
 hence he can say, My God and my Father, and in this 
 invocation he puts something which belongs to no one 
 but himself. "3 "No one who accepts the Gospel, and 
 tries to understand him who gave it to us, can fail 
 to affirm that here the divine appeared in as pure a 
 form as it can appear upon earth, and to feel that for 
 those who followed him Jesus was himself the strength 
 of the Gospel."^ 
 
 1 Zeitschrift fur Theologie und Kirche, Nro. i, 1807. 
 Ubid., Nro. 3, 1897. ^ 
 
 ^ What is Christianity? p. 128. •* Ibid., 146. 
 
zzd SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 One who is attached to the forms in which the catholic 
 creeds affirm the divine nature and relationship of Christ 
 will be much inclined to charge the Ritschlian teaching 
 with a deficit. But it is apparent from the citations made 
 that leading exponents of that teaching assign to Christ 
 the practical worth of divinity, and at least do not nega- 
 tive the supposition of a unique metaphysical relation 
 between him and the Father. 
 
 II. — The Denial in the Light of New Testament 
 Attestations 
 
 The conclusion that large portions of the New Testa- 
 ment ascribe to Christ a transcendent sonship, a filial 
 relation and lordship which ascend to an incalculable 
 height above the human plane, is not in the present the 
 property of any special wing of Christian scholars. 
 Critics whose respect for traditional theories imposes 
 upon them scarcely any restraint show themselves in 
 numerous instances about as free to proclaim this con- 
 clusion as are those who pay the greatest deference to 
 the theological inheritance from the past. Very recently 
 one of the former class has penned words like the follow- 
 ing: "However imperfect their methods of interpreta- 
 tion may appear to modem minds, it would be wrong to 
 charge the Greek apologists and fathers with seriously 
 mistaking the trend of New Testament teaching. And 
 the great ecumenic creeds rest upon patristic Christology. 
 These creeds are a consistent development of certain 
 ideas that unquestionably hold an important place in New 
 Testament literature. . . . The chief factors in the con- 
 struction of Christological dogma were an honest inter- 
 pretation of the Scriptures and an equally honest interpre- 
 tation of the facts of Christian experience."^ Not less 
 
 ' Nathaniel Schmidt, The Prophet of Nazareth, pp. 4, 6. 
 
DENIAL OF TRANSCENDENT SONSHIP 237 
 
 significant is the admission of Beyschlag, as proceeding 
 from one who gave full demonstration of his strong 
 preference for the simple humanitarian conception of 
 Christ's person, "The author of the Apocalypse," he 
 says, "like Paul and the author of the Epistle to the 
 Hebrews, regarded Christ as a preexistent intermediate 
 being between God and the world, God and humanity, 
 related to b deog- as his unique image, and to the world 
 and humanity as a personal archetype, and who, after 
 mediating the creation of the world, appeared among his 
 brethren in the fullness of the times as a child of man 
 and offspring of David, in order to gain an eternal 
 kingship over them by his life, death, and resurrection — 
 in a word, the author of the Apocalypse united the Logos 
 idea with the idea of Messiah realized in Jesus."* That 
 the Christology of the fourth Gospel is not at all below 
 that which Beyschlag here ascribes to the Pauline Epis- 
 tles, to Hebrews, and to the Apocalypse is much too com- 
 mon a verdict in the liberal school of critics to make it 
 appropriate to cite specific instances.^ There is, there- 
 fore, very slight occasion to attempt any formal proof 
 that the thought of the transcendent sonship of Christ 
 is imbedded in extensive portions of the New Testament. 
 The section of the New Testament relative to which 
 our theme imposes upon us a spyecific inquiry is that con- 
 tained in the Synoptical Gospels. Not infrequently the 
 confident affirmation is made that it is only a purely 
 human consciousness in Christ that is attested by these 
 Gospels. This cannot be admitted. It is surely some- 
 thing more than a purely human consciousness which 
 comes to manifestation in this mighty declaration : "All 
 
 • New Testament Theology, II. 380. 
 
 ' See, among others, H. J. Holtzmann, Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen 
 Theologie; Otto Pfleiderer, Urchristenthum ; Julius Grill, Untersuchungen 
 uber die Entstehung des vierten Evangeliums; Paul Wemle, The Begin- 
 nings of Christianity. 
 
238 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 things have been dehvered unto me of my Father: and 
 no one knowetli the Son, save the Father; neither doth 
 any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever 
 the Son willeth to reveal him."^ And in many other 
 sayings of Christ there are kindred suggestions of a 
 sense of thoroughly extraordinary position and relation- 
 ship. He reminds the Pharisees that it is appropriate to 
 think of the Messiah not merely as David's son, but also 
 as David's Lord.^ He so identifies himself with the 
 kingdom of heaven as to allow of no antithesis between 
 relation to it and relation to himself. He proclaims those 
 blessed who are persecuted for his sake.^ He represents 
 that confession or denial of him before men shall earn 
 confession or denial before the Father and the angels.* 
 He pictures the awards of the great day of judgment as 
 apportioned according as affection or despite has been 
 shown to himself.^ In the parable of the vineyard he 
 represents servants of the owners as being sent to receive 
 the fruits, and last of all the beloved Son, thus placing 
 himself on a distinctly higher plane than the prophetical 
 messengers of Israel.^ While emphasizing the impossi- 
 bility of forecasting the day of judgment, he notes that 
 the day is hidden from the knowledge of men, angels, 
 and the Son, indicating by this order of subjects his 
 consciousness that the Son's prerogative stands above that 
 of the whole creaturely universe.'^ He declares himself 
 greater than the temple,^ lord of the sabbath,^ qualified 
 to forgive sins.^^ He offers to gather the weary and 
 heavy laden to himself for peace and rest." He promises 
 to be in the midst where two or three are gathered in 
 
 'Matt. xi. 27: Luke X. 22. 'Matt xxii 45 • Luke xx^ 44- . 
 
 'Matt V. II. ■'Matt. x. 32, 33; Mark viii. 38 Luke xn. 8, 9, ix 26. 
 
 "Matt. XXV. 34-46. 6 Matt. xxi. 33-39; Luke xx. 9-15. 
 
 7 Matt. xxiv. 26: Mark xiii. 32. « Matt xu. 6. 
 
 "Matt. xii. 8: Mark ii. 28; Luke vi 5. __ . 
 
 >«Matt. ix. 2-6; Mark ii. 4-10; Luke v. 20-24, vn 47. Matt. xi. 2» 
 
DENIAL OF TRANSCENDENT SONSHIP 239 
 
 his name/ and to supply speech and wisdom to his disci- 
 ples when they shall be called to answer before adver- 
 saries.^ He claims to be endowed with all authority in 
 heaven and earth.^ He describes the angels, whom Jew- 
 ish thought made the retinue of Jehovah, as sent forth at 
 his behest and serving as his messengers.* He represents, 
 finally, that all nations are to be gathered before him and 
 to receive at his hands the awards of eternity.^ Now, 
 who among men, who that is able to demonstrate his 
 sanity by any approach to the unique balance of the finest 
 human traits which was exemplified in Christ, would 
 ever think of coming before his fellows with such sen- 
 tences upon his lips ? The Synoptical Gospels, then, not- 
 withstanding their relative engrossment in a narrative 
 as distinguished from a theological function, make for 
 faith in a transcendent element in the consciousness of 
 Christ, Occasionally confession is made of this fact even 
 by a representative of a Christological theory to which 
 the fact seems in no way to be congenially related. Thus 
 Wernle, though rejecting the divinity of Christ in terms 
 that might be regarded as savoring of rudeness, finds 
 in the Synoptical Gospels evidences which compel him 
 to impute to the subject of these biographies a conscious- 
 ness which passes beyond human measures. Referring 
 to the lofty assumptions of Christ in forgiving sins and 
 claiming obedience, he says : "Now, it is clear that a self- 
 consciousness that is more than merely human speaks 
 from these words. And this is the mystery of the origin 
 of Christianity. What we need to do above all is to 
 accept it as a fact — a fact which demands a patient and 
 reverent hearing."^ The suggestion is not far to seek 
 that congruity of thinking requires correspondence 
 
 I Matt, xviii. 20. ' Luke xxi. 15. ^ Matt, xxviii. 18. 
 
 * Matt. xxiv. 30, 31. ' Matt. xxv. 31-46. 
 
 8 The Beginnings of Christianity, I. 39. 
 
240 SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL THEORIES 
 
 between self-consciousness on the one hand and person- 
 ality and essential relations on the other. Acknowledg- 
 ment of the transcendent sonship of Christ would seem, 
 on the premise admitted by Wemle, to be in order. 
 
 Since to the modem mind the proper Arian view of 
 the Son has become almost universally distasteful, theo- 
 logical thinking which aims to be faithful to the New 
 Testament cannot well escape from interpreting the 
 transcendence of Christ in a way which is at least closely 
 akin to the Athanasian or Nicene rendering. Room 
 may be made for an aspect of subordination in the Son 
 of God ; but the endeavor must be to construe him as the 
 eternally filial, the counterpart of the Father, the one who 
 dwelt in the bosom of the Father before the ages, and 
 manifested him through a perfect filial record at the full- 
 ness of time. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 
 
 I. — Specimen Theories 
 
 The diversities disclosed in a review of ethical treatises 
 of the last century relate much more largely to theoretical 
 questions about the sources and nature of moral obli- 
 gation than to conclusions respecting the content of the 
 moral ideal. The great majority of these treatises, in 
 whatever way they may deal with the theoretical ques- 
 tions, agree in accepting substantially the altruistic Chris- 
 tian ideal of sympathy and service, the ideal which en- 
 joins a loving regard for the good of the general body 
 alongside of the pursuit of individual interests. Stanch 
 utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham, advocates of a quali- 
 fied utilitarianism like Leslie Stephen, critics as little re- 
 spectful of Christian traditions as Strauss and Feuerbach, 
 positivists like Comte, materialists like Biichner, advocates 
 of a materialistic evolutionism like Spencer and Haeckel, 
 and pessimists of the type of Schopenhauer, all have ap- 
 proached quite near to the commonly recognized Christian 
 standard of conduct as respects the relation of man with 
 man. 
 
 In a few instances, however, the content itself of the 
 moral ideal which commands general assent in the 
 Christian world has been challenged. To some extent this 
 has been done in the name of Secularism, as appears in 
 the adverse remarks of Bonham on the law of equal love 
 to the neighbor, and especially in his contemptuous repudi- 
 ation of the obligation to love one's enemies.^ But the 
 
 • Sectilarism, its Progress and its Morals, pp. 197-204. 
 
 241 
 
242 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 most conspicuous examples of a radical disparag-ement 
 of the moral ideal of Christianity were furnished by Max 
 Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche, the former writing near 
 the middle of the century, and the latter in the closing 
 decades. 
 
 In the book entitled Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum} 
 Stirner figures as the advocate of an egoism to which no 
 other bounds are set than those which pertain to limited 
 power. In his view might is the sole and sufficient basis 
 of right. Respect either for God or for man does not 
 come in as a modifying factor. In deferring to the 
 human genus, Feuerbach, he says, has done no better than 
 to make an exchange of gods. "My affair is neither 
 divine nor human, but solely my own. ... I am my own 
 genus, without norm, without law, without model, . . . 
 What care I for the common weal? The common weal 
 as such is not my weal, but only the extreme point of 
 self-renunciation. ... I am entitled to everything over 
 which I can exercise mastery. I have a right to over- 
 throw Zeus, Jehovah, God, if I can. . . . No majesty, no 
 holiness, nothing which I know how to master makes a 
 limit for me."^ 
 
 If not more radical than Stirner in his repudiation of 
 current ethical standards, Nietzsche has gone quite be- 
 yond him in the volume and violence of the literary war- 
 fare which he has waged against those standards. As 
 Fouillee has remarked, "In all his works he takes the 
 romantic attitude of a Faust in revolt against all law, 
 all morality, all social life."^ 
 
 Though rating Schopenhauer more than any other as 
 his philosophical master, Nietzsche contemns utterly the 
 
 * The title-page indicates that "Max Stirner "is another name for Kaspar 
 Schmidt. 
 
 ' Pages 14, 72, 213, 221, 248 in Universal-Bibliothek, Vol. CCCXII. 
 ' Nietzsche et I'lmmoralisme, Preface. 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 243 
 
 Buddhistic quietism in which the ethical speculation of 
 Schopenhauer eventuated. The fundamental character- 
 istic of life, as he conceived, is will to power. In its very- 
 essence life is aggressive force. It reaches with un- 
 sparing hand after mastery, and makes a perfectly 
 normal manifestation of itself in mastering everything 
 that is too feeble to resist. The man of might may in- 
 deed render courtesy and respect toward those whom he 
 has discovered to be his peers, but no obligation of sym- 
 pathy for the inferior crowd rests upon him. The 
 morality of sympathy is the morality of slaves, which in 
 their impotence they have concocted against the lordship 
 of the regal souls who are competent to exercise sover- 
 eignty. It is the attempt of the lamb to censure the eagle. 
 All altruistic morality is guilty of using false measures, 
 and is linked with weakness and decadence. "What is 
 good? All that to which the feeling of power, the will 
 to power, the power itself, in man gives heed. What is 
 bad [schlecJit] ? All that which springs out of weak- 
 ness. What is weal? The feeling that power is on the 
 increase, that opposition to it is vanquished."^ 
 
 Occupying this point of view, Nietzsche, it is evident, 
 must regard Christianity as a proper object of abhor- 
 rence. As the religion of sympathy, he contends, it 
 works toward abasement. It is intrinsically opposed to 
 manly development. Its idea of God is one of the most 
 corrupt that ever found place in the world. In short, 
 "Christianity is an insurrection of all that creeps on 
 the ground against the high."^ Thus even Voltaire's 
 antipathy to Christianity is quite outdone. In his mad 
 deification of egoistic force Nietzsche is led to assail the 
 Christian ideal with a species of demoniacal fury."^ 
 
 » Der Antichrist, « 2. ^bid, 5 43. 
 
 •'' See in particular his Also Sprach Zarathustra; Jenseits von Gut tuj-d 
 Bose; Zur Genealogie der Moral; Gotzen-Damening ; Der Antichrist. 
 
244 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 The theories of Stirner and Nietzsche are too eccen- 
 tric to claim serious attention. We make haste, there- 
 fore, to consider certain phases of utihtarian and evo- 
 lutionary ethics. 
 
 The strict utilitarian platform was promulgated in 
 England in the early part of the nineteenth century by 
 Jeremy Bentham, whose zeal for it was specially stimu- 
 lated by his conviction that it was adapted to afford an 
 excellent basis for practical politics and civic reform. 
 "Nature has placed mankind," says Bentham, "under the 
 governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. 
 It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, 
 as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one 
 hand the standard of ri^ht and wrong, on the other the 
 chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne ; 
 they govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think. 
 . . . The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, 
 and assumes it for the foundation of that system the ob- 
 ject of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands 
 of reason and of law."^ This principle, Bentham re- 
 marks, may be charged with being Epicurean; but 
 properly understood that term involves no discredit. 
 "Epicurus, it is true, is the only one among the ancients 
 who had the merit of having known the true source of 
 morality; but to suppose that his doctrine leads to the 
 consequences imputed to it is to suppose that happiness 
 can be the enemy of happiness itself." Again, it may be 
 alleged that, if the principle of utility is to be enthroned, 
 each individual will constitute himself a judge of his own 
 interest, and will proceed at once to discard an obligation 
 which is regarded as in conflict with that interest. In 
 reply it is to be affirmed both that a man must be per- 
 mitted to act as judge of his own interest, and that his 
 
 1 Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Works, I. i. 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 245 
 
 investment with this prerogative does not afford him a 
 reasonable ground for treating his engagements with 
 indifference. "He who is not a judge of what is suitable 
 for himself is less than an infant, is a fool. The obliga- 
 tion which binds men to their engagements is nothing 
 but the feeling of an interest of a superior class, which 
 outweighs an inferior interest. Men are not always held 
 by the particular utility of a certain engagement ; but in 
 the case in which the engagement becomes burthensome 
 to one of the parties they are still held by the general 
 utility of engagements — by the confidence that each en- 
 lightened man wishes to have placed in his word, that he 
 may be considered as trustworthy, and enjoy the advan- 
 tages attached to probity and esteem."^ 
 
 It follows from the premises of Bentham that conduct 
 is to be measured solely by reference to its effect upon 
 the sum total of pleasure. Motives are not in themselves 
 a proper measure, but are to be reckoned good or bad 
 according as they make for pleasure or pain.^ Morality 
 depends upon consequences. In wisely calculating the 
 consequences of conduct in respect of the aggregate of 
 pleasure, and in conforming conduct to the calculation, 
 a man fulfills his complete function as a moral agent. It 
 is to be noticed, however, that the pleasure which is to 
 claim supreme regard is not simply that of the individual. 
 This much is implied in Bentham's use of the formula, 
 "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," as 
 affording the test of right and wrong. 
 
 John Stuart Mill, in common with the other eminent 
 exponents of the sensational or associational philosophy 
 in England, gave assent to the general idea of Bent- 
 ham's utilitarianism. He defines that idea in the fol- 
 lowing explicit terms: "The creed which accepts, as the 
 
 1 Works, L 12. Hbid., L48. 
 
246 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness 
 principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as 
 they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
 produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is in- 
 tended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappi- 
 ness, pain and the privation of pleasure."^ That the ulti- 
 mate aim of conduct must be happiness is regarded by 
 Mill as quite obvious. 'There is in reality," he says, 
 "nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired 
 otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, 
 and ultimately to happiness, is desired as a part of hap- 
 piness, and is not desired for itself until it has become 
 so."2 
 
 Mill joined, however, with his general acceptance of 
 the creed of utilitarian morals a token of departure. 
 This may be recognized in the following statement : "It 
 must be admitted that utilitarian writers in general have 
 placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures 
 chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, 
 etc., of the former — that is, in their circumstantial advan- 
 tages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all 
 these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but 
 they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, 
 higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite com- 
 patible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact 
 that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more 
 valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while in 
 estimating all other things quality is considered as well 
 as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be sup- 
 posed to depend on quantity alone." No intelligent being 
 would care to be simply an animal for the sake of the 
 animal's pleasures. "It is better to be a human being dis- 
 
 1 Utilitarianism, p. 91 in the "Ethics of John Stuart Mill," edited by- 
 Charles Douglas, 1897. *Ibid., pp. 154. iSS- 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 247 
 
 satisfied than a pig satisfied ; better to be Socrates dissatis- 
 fied than a fool satisfied."^ As his language implies, 
 Mill supposed that in taking this view he still remained 
 faithful to the utilitarian platform. But this cannot well 
 be granted. To make qualitative distinctions among 
 pleasures, to rate one as of higher order than another, 
 not merely in extent, or in — what is the same thing — 
 intensity, is to assume another standard of worth than 
 mere pleasure. It may be much to the credit of Mill that 
 he admitted this order of distinctions, but he did not do 
 so as a consistent utilitarian,^ 
 
 In the latter half of the century the utilitarian theory 
 was brought into conjunction with the doctrine of evo- 
 lution. A conspicuous example of this conjunction is 
 presented in the teaching of Herbert Spencer. He was 
 not, indeed, fully satisfied with the scheme of Bentham. 
 It seemed to him to be a mistake to make happiness the 
 direct aim in conduct. He thought that moral science 
 is competent to go beyond a mere generalization of the 
 results of actions. It can determine what kinds of action 
 must necessarily produce happiness, and thus is qualified 
 to lay down laws which should be obeyed irrespective of 
 any direct estimation of pleasure or pain.^ At the same 
 time, Spencer approved the Benthamite notion that the 
 ultimate standard for estimating actions lies in their 
 bearing upon happiness. He criticised Aristotle for seek- 
 ing to define happiness in terms of virtue instead of de- 
 fining virtue in terms of happiness. "The implied be- 
 lief," he said, "that virtue can be defined otherwise than 
 in terms of happiness is allied to the Platonic belief that 
 
 ^ Ethics of John Stuart Mill, pp. 93, 97. 
 
 ' Compare Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, II. 317, 330; Paulsen, 
 System der Ethik, I. 247; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 170. 
 
 3 Letter to Mill, cited by C. M. Williams, A Review of the Systems of 
 Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution, pp. 35, 36. 
 
248 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 there is an ideal or absolute good, which gives to particu- 
 lar and relative goods their property of goodness."^ 
 
 Conduct was furthermore estimated by Spencer ac- 
 cording to its bearing on life, good conduct being that 
 which is favorable to the totality of life in one's self, 
 one's offspring, and one's fellows.^ In this use of terms 
 the philosopher doubtless had no design to infringe on 
 the utilitarian principle, it being regarded by him as an 
 understood maxim^ that pleasure-giving actions are iden- 
 tical with life-favoring actions. 
 
 In accordance with his thoroughgoing evolutionary 
 scheme Spencer conceived of morals as a result pure and 
 simple of a cosmic process. The human race was evolved 
 out of a non-moral base, and in the human race by a long- 
 continued process of selection certain forms of moral 
 belief were instated, and these were transmitted through 
 the medium of nervous modifications with accumulating 
 strength. "J^^t in the same way," writes Spencer, "that 
 I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living 
 individual, to have arisen from: organized and consoli- 
 dated experiences of all antecedent individuals who be- 
 queathed to him their slowly developed nervous organi- 
 zations, so do I believe that the experiences of utility, 
 organized and consolidated through all past generations 
 of the human race, have been producing corresponding 
 nervous modifications, which, by continued transmis- 
 sion and accumulation, have become in us certain facul- 
 ties of moral intuition — certain emotions responding to 
 right conduct, which have no apparent basis in the indi- 
 vidual experiences of utility."^ 
 
 In the order of evolution, according to Spencer, egoism 
 precedes altruism; but the latter follows closely in the 
 wake of the former, and mounts up through ascending 
 
 » Data of Ethics, $ 13. * Ibid., J 8. » Ibid., i 45- 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 249 
 
 Stages. "As there has been an advance by degrees from 
 unconscious parental altruism to conscious parental altru- 
 ism of the highest kind, so has there been an advance by 
 degrees from the altruism of the family to social altru- 
 ism."^ Supposing that this growth of altruistic impulses 
 and habits is to proceed, Spencer pictures as the goal of 
 evolution an ideal society in which individual and general 
 interests will be thoroughly harmonized, and the conflict 
 between duty and inclination will be abolished. 
 
 Taking as emphatic a view as did Spencer of the all- 
 comprehending reach of evolution, Huxley differed from 
 him in his frank admission that the cosmic process affords 
 no intelligible explanation of the validity of moral dis- 
 tinctions. An examination of that process may serve 
 in a measure to reveal how diverse moral products arise; 
 but an account of the genesis of the products is quite 
 another thing than the justification of the approval of 
 one order as against another. "The propounders," 
 writes Huxley, "of what is called 'the ethics of evolution' 
 adduce a number of more or less interesting facts and 
 more or less sound arguments in favor of the conclusion 
 that the moral sentiments arose, in the same way as other 
 natural phenomena, by a process of evolution. I have 
 little doubt, for my own part, that they are on the right 
 track; but as the immoral sentiments have no less been 
 evolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction for 
 the one as the other. The thief and the murderer follow 
 nature as much as the philanthropist. Cosmic evolution 
 may teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man 
 may have come about; but in itself it is incompetent to 
 furnish any better reason why what we call good is pref- 
 erable to what we call evil than we had before. Indeed, 
 the predominant cosmical method is so far from affording 
 
 » Data of Ethics, S 76. 
 
250 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 insight into ethical demands that it seems itself to be 
 distinctly counter to those demands. The practice which 
 is ethically best involves a course of conduct which, in 
 all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in 
 the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless 
 self-assertion it demands self-restraint ; in place of thrust- 
 ing aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires 
 that the individual shall not merely respect but shall help 
 his fellows; its influence is directed not so much to the 
 survival of the fittest as to the fitting of as many as pos- 
 sible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of 
 existence. . . . Let us understand, once for all, that the 
 ethical progress of society is realized not in imitating the 
 cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but 
 in combating it."* Such a view of the intrinsic heartless- 
 ness of nature evidently affords a very scanty basis for 
 optimism. Huxley confesses as much. "The theory of 
 evolution," he says, "encourages no millennial expecta- 
 tions." The upward road may be pursued for a long 
 period, but sooner or later the downward route must be 
 commenced. Meanwhile men will make the most of their 
 opportunities not by any direct attempt to fulfill hedonist 
 maxims, but rather by casting aside the notion that es- 
 cape from pain and sorrow is the proper object of life."^ 
 With Leslie Stephen we find about the same qualifi- 
 cation of the utilitarian theory as appears in the com- 
 ments of Spencer. In his own exposition of the nature 
 and genesis of morals he makes much account of social 
 instincts and needs — a point of view which had been 
 emphasized by Darwin.^ By way of summarizing his 
 main contentions Stephen remarks : "Morality is a prod- 
 uct of the social factor; the individual is moralized 
 
 1 Evolution and Ethics, Romanes Lecture of 1893, pp. 31-34-. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 36, 37. ^ Descent of Man, Vol, I, chap. lii. 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 251 
 
 through his identification with the social organism; the 
 conditions, therefore, of the security of morahty are the 
 conditions of the persistence of society; and if we ask 
 from the scientific point of view what these conditions 
 are, we can only reply by stating that the race is depend- 
 ent upon the environment, by tracing, so far as we are 
 able, the conditions under which it has been developed, 
 and trying to foresee the future from the past."^ That in 
 the naturalistic scheme of Stephen any better outcome 
 is guaranteed than that which is outlined in the somber 
 sketch of Huxley is not apparent. 
 
 Haeckel in his brief dogmatic references to the origin 
 of morality lays the whole stress on physiological and 
 social antecedents. His principal propositions are con- 
 tained in the following sentences : "The notion of duty 
 can be traced to a long series of phyletic modifications 
 of the phenomena of the cortex. . . . Morality, whether 
 we take it in the narrower or broader sense, can always 
 be traced to the physiological function of adaptation, 
 which is closely connected through nutrition with the 
 self-maintenance of the organism. . . . Social habits be- 
 come moral habits, and their laws are afterward taught as 
 sacred duties, and form the basis of the juridical order. 
 The morals of nations are nothing more than social in- 
 stincts, acquired by adaptation, and passed on from gen- 
 eration to generation by heredity. "^ 
 
 The ethical teaching of Guyau, while proceeding no 
 less than the foregoing theories from the naturalistic 
 standpoint, is distinguished by a special effort to recon- 
 cile egoism and altruism. Both, he maintains, are based 
 in the very nature of life, in its intrinsic tendency at once 
 to sustain and to enlarge itself. This is the fundamental 
 tendency to which even the pursuit of happiness is subor- 
 
 1 The Science of Ethics, p. 454. 2 The Wonders of Life, chap, xviii. 
 
252 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 dinate. Comparing this point of view with that of the 
 hedonist school, Guyau remarks: "We are far distant 
 from Bentham and the utiUtarians, who everywhere try 
 to avoid pain, who see in pain the irreconcilable enemy; 
 it is as if one would not breathe too strongly for fear of 
 too great expenditure. Even in Spencer there is still 
 too much utilitarianism. Besides, he too often looks at 
 things from the outside, and does not see in the unselfish 
 instincts anything but a product of society. There is, 
 we believe, in the heart of individual life itself an evolu- 
 tion corresponding to the evolution of social life which 
 makes the latter possible, and which is the cause of it in- 
 stead of the result. . . . Life, like fire, only maintains itself 
 by communicating itself, and this is none the less true 
 with regard to the intelligence than with regard to the 
 body. It is as impossible to shut up the intelligence as 
 to shut up flame; it exists in order to radiate. We find 
 the same force of expansion in sensibility. We need to 
 share our joy; we need to share our sorrow. It is our 
 whole nature which is sociable. Life does not know the 
 absolute classifications and divisions of the logicians 
 and metaphysicians; it cannot be entirely selfish even if 
 it wished to be. We are open on all sides, encroaching 
 and encroached upon. This springs from the funda- 
 mental law which biology teaches us : Life is not only nu- 
 trition; it is production and fecundity. To live is to 
 spend as well as to gain."^ 
 
 As might be expected, all these advocates of naturalis- 
 tic ethics deny freedom in the sense of alternativity. In 
 justification of this denial they commonly contend that an 
 act which does not stand to antecedent character or feel- 
 ing in the relation of an effect pure and simple must be 
 
 1 A Sketch of Morality Independent of Obligation or Sanction, trans, by 
 Gertrude Kapteyn, pp. 88, 209, aro. 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 253 
 
 rated as characterless or destitute of moral significance. 
 With equal unanimity these writers make no place for a 
 divine sanction of obligation. If they do not say with 
 Nietzsche that the adoption of any point of view by theo- 
 logians is a sure sign of its falsity, they do hold that 
 theological conceptions cannot afford any valid assistance 
 in construing the subject of morals. Guyau, with frank 
 atheistic irreverence, declares, "God has become, and will 
 become more and more, useless."^ Even Leslie Stephen 
 is at pains to argue that the theistic postulate is not of the 
 slightest use in interpreting the ethical side of life.^ 
 
 II. — Points of Failure in the Theories 
 
 In making qualitative distinctions between different 
 kinds of pleasures. Mill, as was noticed, virtually chal- 
 lenged the utilitarian principle that pleasure is the sole 
 and sufficient measure of conduct. Why did Mill admit 
 such distinctions? In all probability because his knowl- 
 edge of his own inner life and his acquaintance with his 
 fellows made it apparent to him that large account is 
 actually taken of qualitative differences in pleasures, 
 that men repeatedly distinguish one gratification as 
 higher, and worthier, and holier than another, and not 
 merely as larger and more intense. In his revision of 
 the utilitarian theory he was simply qualifying an ex- 
 travagant assumption out of deference to well-attested 
 facts. For, as Ladd has remarked, "It is a fundamental 
 and indisputable fact that men estimate the different con- 
 scious states of the self as differing in value according 
 to a standard which is not merely quantitative. In other 
 words, goods differ, as estimated in human conscious- 
 ness, not only in degrees, but also in excellence or worth. "^ 
 
 1 A Sketch of Morality, p. 60. ^ The Science of Ethics, pp. 454, 455. 
 
 ' Philosophy of Conduct, p. 41. 
 
254 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 Equally indisputable is the fact that in making these 
 qualitative distinctions men are ruled by a sense of obli- 
 gation. Their moral sense requires them to rate one 
 form of pleasure as superior to another. And this evi- 
 dently means the rejection by the moral sense of the 
 notion that pleasure in itself affords a complete norm. 
 If the quality of the pleasure must be looked after — its 
 altruistic character, its intellectuality, its nobility, its 
 spirituality, its holiness, its godlikeness — then obviously 
 the conceptions by which quality is measured must have 
 a place in the norm of conduct enthroned in the moral 
 sense. 
 
 No doubt the utilitarian is right in contending that 
 contemplated pleasure is both actually and legitimately 
 a great motive-power in conduct. What is to be chal- 
 lenged is the assumption that pleasure, or happiness, 
 either is or ought to be the sole motive-power. It must 
 plainly come into the account in any complete vision of 
 things. No one who believes in a rational world order 
 can believe that conduct and happiness are indifferently 
 related. Good conduct, he is compelled to hold, must in 
 the long run eventuate in happiness; holiness must ulti- 
 mately minister to blessedness. In other words, if the 
 world scheme is rational and moral, one real value which 
 is open to pursuit therein must harmonize with another 
 real value. The mistake of the utilitarian consists in 
 substituting the notion of a single value for the notion of 
 harmoniously related values ; or — if one prefers that form 
 of expression — in emphasizing one element of value to 
 the neglect of other elements. Happiness is assuredly a 
 value ; but to the normal man nobility, righteousness, and 
 conformity to the personal and social ideal are also values. 
 He pursues them as desirable and obligatory in them- 
 selves, and not merely because of their subserviency to 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 255 
 
 happiness, though he feels that they must be harmoni- 
 ously related to the latter value, and that he would be 
 lacking in appreciation of them if he could admit that 
 they were intrinsically suited to despoil him of that value. 
 The ultra assumption of naturalistic evolutionism, that 
 morality has been evolved from a nonmoral ground, en- 
 counters substantially the same criticism as that which 
 stands against the attempt to get intelligence from a non- 
 intelligent ground. As Spencer, Haeckel, and other 
 naturalistic evolutionists were far from success in this 
 attempt,^ so they fail to justify their assumption of the 
 derivation of morality from the play of nonmoral cos- 
 mic forces. The failure is indeed a double one, since 
 morality, besides implying sensibility of a special kind, 
 is conditioned upon intelligence. To get the moral agent, 
 then, out of forces that are described as acting simply in 
 mechanical and chemical ways has a look of sheer magic. 
 The derivation is, in fact, a mere pretense. This is well 
 illustrated in Spencer's Data of Ethics. One looks in 
 vain for any suggestion of the ethical in the original 
 factors of the universe as pictured by him. Nor does 
 one find in his representations of the biological process, 
 for the greater part of its course, any valid suggestions 
 of the ethical. As an acute critic of the Synthetic 
 Philosophy has remarked: "We continually find in Mr. 
 Spencer's exposition that, notwithstanding his attempt 
 to affiliate ethics upon the biological law, it is only in 
 the increased correlation of subjective individuals that 
 ethics arises, and it is only the modification of the indi- 
 vidual by society, and the mental and emotional growths 
 in the individual consequent on the action of the social 
 environment, that constitute the groundwork of ethics."^ 
 
 * See part i, chap, ii, sect, ii, v; chap, iv, sects, ii, iii. 
 'Malcolm Guthrie, On Spencer's Data of Ethics, p. 57. 
 
256 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 Society is thus in reality offered as the explanation of 
 ethics. But the explanation is itself very much in need of 
 being explained. Society is only an aggregate of indi- 
 viduals, and, unless the individuals as such possess an 
 ethical groundwork, v^hat means has society of working 
 moral effects? "Mr. Spencer, indeed, supposes men to 
 have been scared into moral obligation by the baton o£ 
 the primitive policeman, the ostracism of primitive so- 
 ciety, and the hell of the primitive priest. How a society 
 could exist to deal out these political, social, and religious 
 sanctions, unless it rested on a moral basis, the evolutionist 
 does not explain. And one may, therefore, be pardoned 
 for seeing here only another of the countless attempts to 
 derive morality from ideas and institutions which presup- 
 pose it."^ Society is, of course, a potent agent in develop- 
 ing the moral aptitudes of the individual, but society no 
 more explains the existence of the moral nature in man 
 than schools explain the existence of the mathematical 
 faculty. Far from giving an intelligible account of moral- 
 ity, naturalistic evolutionism serves only by its futile ef- 
 forts to emphasize the great truths that it is utterly vain to 
 attempt to graft morality upon a primitively nonmoral 
 subject, and that the rational explanation of the moral sub- 
 ject is to be found in a moral background to the creaturely 
 universe. It was noticed that Guyau qualified the function 
 of society in the production of morality, and emphasized, 
 as the prime source of the moral sentiments, the impul- 
 sions which belong to individual life as such. To this 
 extent he improved upon the platform of some of the 
 representatives of the naturalistic school. On the other 
 hand, however, in assimilating morality to a kind of 
 vegetative working of life potencies he is remote from a 
 satisfactory exposition. 
 
 » J. G. Schurman, The Ethical Import of Darwinism, pp. 147-149. 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 257 
 
 A cardinal objection to all the theories which are here 
 considered lies in their fatalism or unqualified necessi- 
 tarianism. The weighty character of this objection has 
 been urged in another connection.^ It only remains, 
 accordingly, to notice here the plea that is offered for the 
 superior congruity of the necessitarian hypothesis with 
 the assignment of moral quality to actions. The plea 
 is that actions are characterless save as they are the out- 
 flow of the antecedent character of the individual, save 
 as they are in the strict sense determined by that char- 
 acter. To this allegation a reply may be made in the 
 first place by way of counter charge. It may be said, and 
 justly said, that very little moral character belongs to the 
 action of a mere instrument ; that it makes no appreciable 
 difference whether the instrument is conscious or not, 
 so long as it is only an instrument ; that the action of a 
 man absolutely determined by a character given to him, 
 or wrought by a series of absolutely determined choices, 
 is the action of an instrument pure and simple, an instru- 
 ment of the Creator or the cosmos or whatever else may 
 be regarded as the ultimate ground of determinations; 
 that consequently such an action, whatever aesthetic im- 
 press may attach to it, is in the proper point of view of 
 morals essentially characterless. In the second place, 
 positive illustration may be given of the arbitrariness of 
 the necessitarian in assuming that an action must be 
 strictly determined by antecedent character in order to 
 be saved from falling under the category of the indif- 
 ferent or characterless. Antecedent character may be 
 a mighty persuasive even where it is not strictly determin- 
 ing, and so may come to manifestation in the general 
 run of habitual actions. Moreover, an action may serve 
 to realize an increment of character in the direction of 
 
 • Part i, chap, ii, sect. ii. 
 
2S8 ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 good or of evil. Every time the individual performs, in 
 the face of competing alternatives, an action above his 
 ordinary level, he gives himself an improved character 
 through that very action, which is thus quite remote from 
 being characterless — is, in fact, penetrated through and 
 through with moral quality as a character-forming action. 
 In the reverse case the individual lowers his character. 
 Here lies the intelligible account of progress in character 
 and of responsibility for the outcome. Give a man a real 
 part in forming his moral disposition, and you have a 
 rational ground for making him chargeable with its pro- 
 gressive improvement or deterioration. Deny him that 
 part, and you forfeit the theoretical warrant for making 
 him chargeable. You reduce him from the plane of the 
 moral agent to that of the thing affording a more or 
 less aesthetic impression. You affront his moral con- 
 sciousness by turning its most fundamental attesta- 
 tions into illusions. This, we contend, is much too 
 great a price to pay for an abstract notion of the law 
 of causation — a notion unwarrantably intolerant of the 
 fact of creative efficiency. The necessitarian might bet- 
 ter modify his imperious abstraction than disparage the 
 standing deliverances of man's moral consciousness as 
 illusions. While it may be a dictate of reason that no 
 change can be wrought without an expenditure of effici- 
 ency, it may still be true that personality has the unique 
 distinction of being able to use efficiency in more than 
 one way under given conditions. 
 
 Reference was made to the very inhospitable treat- 
 ment awarded by the theories under review to the theis- 
 tic conception. In some instances that conception has 
 even been charged with a disturbing effect upon ethics, 
 as implying that right and wrong are made such by the 
 determinations of an infinite will. Spencer assumes that 
 
UTILITARIAN AND NATURALISTIC ETHICS 259 
 
 this is the common postulate of theological parties.* It 
 hardly needs to be said that the assumption is grossly 
 unhistoric. Duns Scotus, it is true, has been followed 
 by some extreme advocates of divine sovereignty in mak- 
 ing the bare will of God the ultimate standard ; but more 
 commonly the view of Thomas Aquinas, that the will of 
 God is conditioned by his intellectual and moral nature, 
 has been followed.^ In recent times the conclusion of 
 the "Angelic Doctor" has claimed a substantially undis- 
 puted supremacy, being held even by the most resolute 
 champions of divine sovereignty, like Charles Hodge.^ 
 The theological claim, accordingly, is not that the bare 
 will of God makes right and wrong, but rather that the 
 perfect norm of righteousness has its ultimate ground 
 in the nature of God — in his absolutely perfect intel- 
 ligence and ethical disposition. 
 
 Keeping in mind this interpretation of the relation of 
 divine personality to the moral standard, we cannot ad- 
 mit that the thought of God has any such insignificant 
 value for ethics as is assumed by naturalistic evolutionists. 
 The essential content of the moral ideal may, indeed, be 
 discovered with reasonable confidence by an examina- 
 tion of human experience and an analysis of human 
 nature ; but the connections of that ideal are by no means 
 a matter of indifference. If in the regress of our thought 
 we come to a blindly working energy, a force operating 
 under the law of absolute necessity, we are put under 
 constraint to mar the ideal itself by cutting out from it 
 the element of freedom, since that which has in itself no 
 capacity of freedom cannot be supposed to generate the 
 free. Then, too, if freedom must be reckoned an illu- 
 sion, the title of moral distinctions to be placed under any 
 
 » Data of Ethics, $ 18. 
 
 ^ See the author's History of Christian Doctrine, I. 336, II. 93-95, 310, 
 3II' ^ Systematic Theology, part i, chap, v, 5 9. 
 
26o ETHICAL THEORIES 
 
 more honorable category may easily be called in question. 
 Thus a great advantage in rounding out and safeguard- 
 ing the moral ideal comes from making free personality 
 the ultimate ground. No other ground is congenially 
 related to the thought of man as a free person. Also in 
 the forecast the theistic conception affords a very de- 
 cided advantage. The significance of the moral ideal 
 depends in no small degree upon its prospective theater. 
 What guarantees the suitable theater? Not simply the 
 law of the survival of the fittest, if that law means only 
 that those forms of life are entitled to survive which 
 are best adapted to meet the conditions. Under deterio- 
 rating cosmic conditions it might come about, as Huxley 
 observes, that lichens would be the fittest to survive, and 
 so would be entitled to the field as opposed to all higher 
 forms. But lichens are not favorable subjects for illus- 
 trating the moral ideal, and naturalistic evolutionism in 
 its failure to furnish guarantees that any better subjects 
 will be afforded in perpetuity cannot be regarded as giv- 
 ing high honor to that ideal. It is a chilling and dis- 
 couraging theory as compared with the Christian theistic 
 conception of an all-wise and holy God, who makes it 
 his great purpose to lead forward a countless host of im- 
 mortal children in the ways of moral excellence and pure 
 blessedness. 
 
PART III 
 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 CRITICISM OF THE GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 
 
 I. — Assumptions and Conclusions of Strauss 
 
 David Friedrich Strauss^ whose name was made 
 famous by the pubH cation of his Hfe of Jesus (Leben 
 Jesu) in 1835, derived first of all from Schelling some- 
 what of an impulse in speculative thinking. As his ref- 
 erences indicate, he was not a little impressed by the con- 
 ception entertained by this philosopher respecting the in- 
 carnation as progressively accomplished in the human 
 race, instead of being achieved once for all in an extra- 
 ordinary personality. His thought was also directed by 
 Schelling to that conception of the myth according to 
 which it is not so much the product of conscious invention 
 as the result of a pronounced inclination to the pictorial 
 form, for the expression of truth, the form to which the 
 mind naturally resorts at the stage where it finds difficulty 
 in resting in the conceptual or ideal. ^ 
 
 Further on the philosophical premises of Strauss were 
 largely shaped by contact with the Hegelian system. 
 Quite manifestly he took from this system an emphatic 
 conception of ideas as the great factors in history, the de- 
 termining forces back of the chain of events, ever unfold- 
 ing according to a law of inner necessity, and finding 
 even in the greatest of personalities not so much masters 
 as instruments. There is indication also that the Hegel- 
 ian method of fusing contrasts into unity wrought to 
 some extent upon his thinking. This appears in his re- 
 mark that things which are approved to the higher phil- 
 
 1 Streitschriften, 1S37, Heft III, pp 65. 67; Leben Jesu, fourth ed., S 8. 
 
 263 
 
264 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 osophical insight appear as absurdities to the understand- 
 ing (Verstand), or the faculty which is tied up to ab- 
 stract thinking. "That God is one with the world," he 
 says, "and still different from it, that the will is free, and 
 still implicated in the higher necessity of the world's 
 development, that the evil is in itself the good, and yet 
 antithetic thereto — these are absurdities for the under- 
 standing with its readiness to recognize here simply an 
 either, or, and can be grasped only from the higher stand- 
 point of the philosophically reborn."^ As is intimated 
 by the first clause in this citation, Strauss modified the 
 conception of divine personality after the manner of 
 Hegel, giving to that conception a pantheistic tinge, in 
 so far as it is characteristic of pantheism to implicate 
 God with the world or to make the latter necessary to the 
 subsistence of the former. The speculative thinking of 
 the age, he observes, represents that God has the charac- 
 ter of self-conscious Spirit through a process of self- 
 objectivation in the world and return into himself. He 
 is not person alongside of or over other persons. The 
 personality of God must not be thought of as single- 
 personality, but as all-personality, and as such realized 
 through a world-process. This does not mean that God 
 attains completeness in time. "He is ever finished and 
 perfect, but he is this only because and in so far as he has 
 created from eternity and continues to create ; his eternal 
 ingoing into himself is conditioned upon his eternal out- 
 going from himself."^ The point of view embraced in 
 this phraseology is given, it is true, in the name of con- 
 temporary philosophy and speculative theology ; but there 
 is no reason to doubt that it was the point of view of 
 Strauss himself. Up to the time of writing his Glaubens- 
 lehre he was in close affinity with the underlying con- 
 
 1 Streitschriften, III. 23. ^ Glaubenslehre, 1840-41, H 33. 48. 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 265 
 
 captions of the Hegelian system.^ It would be going too 
 far, however, to suppose that he was, or conceived him- 
 self to be, in complete accord with Hegel. We find him 
 expressing the conviction that Hegel would not have ap- 
 proved his Leben Jesu, it being quite contrary to the mind 
 of the philosopher to subject the great characters of an- 
 tiquity to the gnawing-away action of critical doubts.^ 
 Furthermore, Strauss has noticed that Hegel in some of 
 his references to Christology may be understood to con- 
 cede that Christ exemplified the union of the divine and 
 the human in a more special sense than he, for his part, 
 was willing to acknowledge.^ Again, he indicated his 
 opinion that Hegel, at least as construed by his followers, 
 was overtolerant of the notion of the possibility of 
 miracles.'* 
 
 From whatever sources Strauss had obtained his 
 speculative outfit, he has made it evident that he came 
 to the task of New Testament criticism with certain 
 fixed philosophical presuppositions which could not fail 
 to have a very decided effect upon the execution of that 
 task. Among these presuppositions none was more con- 
 fidently asserted than the impossibility of admitting that 
 the divine efficiency ever is intruded into the creaturely 
 sphere so as to work specific results in that sphere. Speak- 
 ing of the laws universally governing events, Strauss 
 remarks : "To these laws it belongs before all, that, in 
 conformity as well with correct philosophical ideas as 
 with all accredited experience, the absolute causality 
 never breaks in upon the chain of conditioned causes 
 in single acts, seeing that it rather manifests itself only 
 in the production of finite causes and of their interwork- 
 ing."^ The opposing view, which assumes a positive 
 
 ^ Compare Zeller, David Friedrich Strauss in his Life and Writings 
 Eng. trans., pp. 71, 72. 2 streitschriften, III. 61, 62. 
 
 ^ Ibid., III. 76-94. * Glaubenslehre, § 17. * Leben Jesu, J 16. 
 
266 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 intervention or miraculous working, involves, he main- 
 tained, the inclosing of God in a temporal scheme. "A 
 God who now, and then again at another time, works a 
 miracle, who accordingly uses a certain kind of activity 
 at one time and refrains from it at another, would be a 
 being under subjection to time, and consequently no ab- 
 solute being; the doing of God, therefore, is rather to 
 be construed as an eternal act, which on its own side is 
 simple and like to itself, and only on the side of the 
 world appears as a series of divine acts following one 
 after another."^ With this speculative exclusion of the 
 miracle Strauss coupled objections to the notion of special 
 revelations in any form. "The acceptance," he claimed, 
 "of an immanent relation between God and the world is 
 incompatible with the theory of a special revelation. 
 When all have a share in the revelation it cannot pertain 
 exclusively to individuals."^ In another connection he 
 urged that a direct or supernatural revelation, while, on 
 the one hand, it supposes an interference that is contra- 
 dictory of the proper conception of the divine nature, 
 on the other hand is in conflict with the legitimate notion 
 of man. "A revelation," he said, "that is, an immediate 
 working of the Highest Being upon the human spirit, 
 leaves to the latter nothing but absolute passivity; for 
 the Highest Being is absolutely active, but the necessary 
 correlate of absolute activity is absolute passivity. It 
 follows at once, then, from this side that the conception 
 of revelation is an impossible one."^ Thus Strauss 
 started out with a speculative foreclosure against the 
 ideas of miracle and special revelation. From the begin- 
 ning to the end of his literary career he was dogmati- 
 cally intolerant of these ideas. 
 
 1 Leben Jesu fur das Deutsche Volk bearbeitet, 1864, 5 24. 
 
 2 Streitschriften, III. 47, 3 Qlaubenslehre, 5 19- 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 267 
 
 Another presupposition was entertained by Strauss 
 with equal pertinacity, namely, that relative to the in- 
 validity of the catholic theory of incarnation. That 
 theory, he argued, wrongly supposes that the idea of the 
 union of the human and the divine can be adequately 
 realized in a single individual. "That is not the way in 
 which the idea is realized, to pour all its fullness into one 
 exemplar, and to deal parsimoniously with all the rest, 
 to express itself perfectly in that one and ever in all the 
 rest only imperfectly ; but rather it loves to spread out its 
 riches in a multiplicity of mutually supplementary exem- 
 plars, in the succession of individuals that posit and cancel 
 one another."^ No specimen of a class can by itself ex- 
 emplify the ideal. ''Could the species be realized fully in 
 a single individual it would not take the trouble to break 
 itself up into a plurality of individuals, and to run through 
 a course of temporal development; but it would exist 
 only in identity with that individual as a generic indi- 
 vidual ; just as God, if he could be immediately a single 
 personality, would be relieved of the entire enormous ap- 
 paratus of world-creation and world-history for the 
 bringing forth of personalities."^ 
 
 Harboring these presuppositions, Strauss had only to 
 consider, as respects the supernatural elements in the 
 Gospels, the most eligible way for disposing of them. In 
 making choice here he felt obliged to repudiate for the 
 most part the supposition of conscious invention or fraud. 
 This method of accounting for the biblical marvels 
 seemed to him to imply that religion is a matter for pri- 
 vate manufacture, a kind of artificial device which a cun- 
 ning schemer may fashion and attach to a people. To 
 construe the matter thus, he held, is quite superficial and 
 warped. Far from creating the religion of a people, the 
 
 1 Leben Jesu, J 151. 2 Glaubenslehre, § 66. 
 
268 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 individual representative is rather to be accounted the 
 organ through which its more potent impulses and senti- 
 ments come to expression. In the true view it must be 
 seen that the marvels of sacred history are not so much 
 thrust upon a people as evolved out of its own inner lif e.^ 
 But how are they evolved? Does the poetizing faculty 
 of the people take natural events and by an uncritical 
 exaggerating rendering turn them into supernatural 
 events, as was claimed by Paulus? No, replied Strauss; 
 at least the major part of the explanation must be sought 
 elsewhere. This naturalistic interpretation is discredited 
 by the arbitrary shifts to which its exponents are forced 
 to resort.^ For many of the miracles of the Gospels it is 
 impossible to find a probable historic basis, a substratum 
 of fact which might be transmuted into a supernatural 
 event under the action of a lively fancy. Large account 
 must, therefore, be made of subjective agency, and the 
 miracles recorded in the Gospels must be regarded as 
 the product of the ideas which had gained lodgment in 
 the religious consciousness of the people, the congenial 
 forms under which the hoped-for and the expected were 
 given a standing in the sphere of the real. In other 
 words, the naturalistic explanation, if not entirely ex- 
 cluded, must be reduced to small dimensions, and the 
 primacy be given to the mythical hypothesis, the theory 
 of the creative working of ideas, whereby the subjective 
 is made to take on the guise of objective history. 
 
 In his formal definition Strauss says: "We rate as 
 gospel myths any narrative related directly or indirectly 
 to Jesus, which is not, and in so far as it is not, to be 
 accounted an expression of fact, but a precipitate of an 
 idea of his earliest disciples."^ In its pure form as he 
 
 » Streitschriften, III. 41, 42. ' Leben Jesu, {{ 18, 28, 35, etc. 
 
 3 Ibid., I 15. 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 269 
 
 goes on to state, the myth contains the whole substance 
 of the narrative; in its modified form it is attached to 
 a substratum of real history. The myth-making faculty 
 which was operative in the gospel narratives was set to 
 work first of all by Messianic expectation. As the Mes- 
 siah was to crown the prophetical succession in which 
 Moses stood, it was deemed necessary that he also should 
 do mighty works. As the countenance of the great law- 
 giver was glorified by the divine presence, so it was 
 deemed fitting that the Messiah should appear in a scene 
 of transfiguration. Thus anticipation put its own fashion 
 upon the Christ, wrought to make him seem to have been 
 and to have done actually what was called for by the ideal 
 of his ofiice. As a second cause which contributed effi- 
 ciently to the rise of myths, we have to note the extraor- 
 dinary impression which was made by the personality, 
 the working, and the fate of Jesus. From this source 
 came both pure myths and mythical attachments to his- 
 toric incidents. 
 
 Among the tests of the mythical, or, to speak some- 
 what more broadly, the unhistorical character of narra- 
 tives, Strauss numbered the following: contravention of 
 the laws which universally govern events; disagreement 
 of a narrative with itself and with other narratives ; dis- 
 course of a more poetic and elevated description than 
 suits the actors or the situation ; marked conformity be- 
 tween the content of a story and the views of the circle 
 within which it originated.^ By the first of these tests 
 all accounts of supernatural or miraculous events were 
 decisively excluded for Strauss himself, since it was a 
 fixed postulate with him that miracles do not and cannot 
 occur. Apart, then, from a wish to accommodate himself 
 to the standpoint of others, he had very slight occasion 
 
 * Leben Jesu, S 16. 
 
270 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 to apply any further tests to this order of events. But, 
 as a matter of fact, he made large use of the discrepan- 
 cies between the narratives of the several evangelists, as 
 means of challenging their historical character. 
 
 The way in which Strauss applied his critical maxims 
 and the conclusions which he drew, in long succession, 
 on the pages of his Leben Jesu, gave his contemporaries 
 the impression that his method was supremely adapted 
 to turn the subject-matter of the Gospels into a set of dis- 
 solving views. Nor was this impression seriously at fault. 
 While the critic did not assail the reliability of every- 
 thing, he took no pains to point out and to emphasize the 
 historical residuum. In this way he gave his readers oc- 
 casion to think that his interest in the historicity of the 
 Gospels was near the vanishing point. Moreover, he as 
 moich as asserted that he set very little store by the actual 
 facts in the life of Jesus, that to him the matter for real 
 concern was the religious ideas which by their efficient 
 working had fashioned for themselves the forms of the 
 supposed history. At the publication of his Leben Jesu 
 he endeavored to excuse the destructive aspect of his 
 work by declaring himself well affected toward the ideal 
 significance of the gospel narratives, and by expressing 
 a purpose to pay his debt to Christian dogmas by under- 
 taking an elaboration of that significance.^ But for this 
 constructive effort he showed very little appetite. When 
 his Christliche Glaubenslehre came forth (1840-41) it 
 was found to be well suited to fulfill for Christian dog- 
 mas the same unfriendly office which the Leben Jesu 
 had fulfilled for the gospel history. What was really 
 aimed at in the later work was to show that the histori- 
 cal evolution had found its logical consummation in the 
 disintegration of dogmas. Not even the tenets which 
 
 'Vorrede; also i 144. 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 271 
 
 the ordinary rationalism took under its protection were 
 spared,^ 
 
 In the controversial writings which Strauss issued, 
 in response to strictures upon the method and results of 
 his criticism, a somewhat better tribute was paid to the 
 historical elements in the Gospels than the reader would 
 be likely to discover in his primary work. Especially is 
 this true of the Sendschreiben addressed by him to Ull- 
 mann, one of the most courteous of his opponents. He 
 declares here that he regards the discourses of Jesus (re- 
 ported in the Synoptical Gospels) as in the main faith- 
 fully transmitted, and that to a portion also of the deeds 
 and fortunes ascribed to the hero of these writings he 
 is ready to apply the titles "certain" or "credible." Rela- 
 tive to the person of Jesus he remarks : "To me also he 
 is the greatest religious personality which history has 
 brought to view. In his greatness, too, his natural en- 
 dowment had, in my opinion, the largest share. . . . His 
 power over the minds of men, with which very likely also 
 a physical power of healing was combined, which we may 
 explain somewhat after the analogy of magnetic force, 
 effected cures which must appear as miracles. His stand- 
 point at the highest height of religious self-consciousness 
 was expressed in lofty sayings, even as his pure human 
 sense was revealed in edifying, and his originality in 
 ingenious, discourse. His fortune, like his person, was 
 from the beginning to the end of his life extraordinary. "^ 
 
 In the second Life of Jesus — Leben Jesu fiir das 
 deutsche Volk bearbeitet — which Strauss published for 
 popular circulation nearly thirty years after the first Life, 
 he gave more specific attention to the demand for an esti- 
 mate of sources. This part of his work, however, has 
 
 * Compare Zeller, Life and Writings of Strauss, p. 75; Hausrath, Strauss 
 und die Theologie seiner Zeit, II. 16—31. 
 
 * Streitschriften, III. 145, 152, 153. 
 
272 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 little significance, since he appropriated in the main the 
 result of Baur's criticism. It will suffice to note that 
 among the Synoptical Gospels he gave the preference to 
 Matthew as respects originality and authority, and that 
 he radically disparaged the historicity of the fourth Gos- 
 pel, denying its apostolic authorship and its intent to give 
 an objective statement of the facts of Christ's life. This 
 was substantially his attitude toward the fourth Gospel 
 from the start, except that he was temporarily inclined 
 to a more favorable consideration, and permitted this 
 phase in his thinking to color the third edition of the 
 Leben Jesu. In the later work there was more of formal 
 attention than in the preceding to the positive side of the 
 life of Jesus ; but to the one who was looking for a con- 
 crete and intelligible picture of the Master the gain could 
 not appear very large. Moreover, such gratification as 
 might have been experienced on this score was pretty 
 well offset by the severer thrust which was now made at 
 the gospel historians. As Strauss himself was careful 
 to state, in the later Life of Jesus he took much larger 
 account, than in the earlier Life, of the operation of con- 
 scious invention — bcwusstcr unci absichtlicher Dichtimg 
 — in the production of the gospel stories.^ It may be 
 noticed also that, while in the earlier treatise Strauss 
 deemed it not incredible that Jesus may have applied to 
 himself the idea of preexistence which is known to have 
 been attached by Jewish thought to the Messiah not far 
 from his time, in the later treatise the critic bluntly de- 
 clared that one who should lay serious claim to a previous 
 life, and to a knowledge of aught that transpired therein, 
 would advertise himself for a fool if not for a deceiver.^ 
 Two years before his death, which occurred in 1874, 
 
 1 See S 25. 
 
 » Leben Jesu, i 64; Leben Jesu fur das deutsche Volk, i 33. 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 273 
 
 Strauss thought it worth while to send forth another mes- 
 sage to the German people. This bore the title, The Old 
 Faith and the New, a Confession. As has been indicated 
 in another connection, the new faith to which the veteran 
 litterateur confessed adherence was that of a material- 
 istic monism. What needs in particular to be noticed 
 here is that in this closing manifesto Strauss took pains 
 to brush away for the most part such grounds of confi- 
 dence in our ability to reproduce the life of Jesus as he 
 had left standing in his previous writings. He asserted 
 that we know far too little respecting the Man of Naza- 
 reth to warrant the cherishing of any religious dependence 
 upon him. "It is an idle notion," he said, "that by any 
 kind of operation we could restore a natural and har- 
 monious picture of a life and a human being from sources 
 of information which, like the Gospels, have been adapted 
 to suit a supernatural being, and distorted, moreover, 
 by parties whose conceptions and interests conflicted with 
 each other's. To check these we ought to possess in- 
 formation concerning the same life, compiled from a 
 purely natural and common-sense point of view ; and in 
 this case we are not in possession of such. Every en- 
 deavor of the most recent delineators of the life of Jesus, 
 however grandiloquently they may have come forward, 
 and pretended to be enabled by our actual sources of in- 
 formation to depict a human development, a natural 
 germination and growth of insight, a gradual expansion 
 of Jesus's horizon, discloses the true character of their 
 essays as apologetic devices devoid of all historical value. 
 But not only does the manner of Jesus's development re- 
 main enveloped in impenetrable obscurity; it is by no 
 means very apparent into what he developed and ulti- 
 mately became. To mention only one more fact after all 
 we have said, we cannot even be certain whether at the 
 
274 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 last he did not lose his faith in himself and his mission. 
 . . . The Jesus of history, of science, is only a problem; 
 but a problem cannot be an object of worship, or a pattern 
 by which to shape our lives. "^ This certainly is very 
 frigid in tone compared with the following words in the 
 closing paragraph of the Leben Jesu for the German 
 people, written only eight years earlier: "Among those 
 who have helped to perfect the ideal of humanity Jesus 
 stands in any case in the first line. He has introduced 
 into it features which before were wanting or had re- 
 mained undeveloped; other features which stood in the 
 way of its universal validity he has restricted; through 
 the religious cast which he has imparted to it and through 
 the incorporation of it with his own person he has given 
 to it a higher consecration and the most living warmth ; 
 while the religious communion which emanated from him 
 has procured for this ideal the widest dissemination 
 among mankind." 
 
 The critical radicalism in which Strauss ended had 
 been rivaled, not to say surpassed, soon after the publi- 
 cation of the first Leben Jesu, by a representative of the 
 Hegelian left, Bruno Bauer. This eccentric critic differed 
 from Strauss in denying that the Judaism antecedent to 
 the rise of Christianity harbored any potent Messianic 
 expectations. The Messiah, he contended, was the prod- 
 uct of the Christian consciousness and was rather carried 
 over from the Christian domain into Judaism than bor- 
 rowed from the latter source.^ As for the Gospels, 
 Bruno Bauer was less disposed than Strauss to recognize 
 in them an historical basis. Tradition, he said, was no 
 real source of their subject-matter. All that they contain 
 
 1 The Old Faith and the New, Eng. trans., S 28. 
 
 * Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker, 1841, Band I, 
 Beilage. 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 275 
 
 — reputed deeds and discourses alike — was the offspring 
 of free invention. The evangelists took various features 
 or characteristics pertaining to the Christian brother- 
 hood and to its situation in the world, and embodied 
 these in the person and history of the one who was recog- 
 nized as the founder of the brotherhood. They did this 
 as individual writers, but yet as writers who were so 
 far the exponents of the demands of the religious con- 
 sciousness of the circle to which they belonged that they 
 could not fail to find a cordial response. What we have, 
 then, in the Gospels is not so much history, serving as a 
 basis for dogmas, as dogmas or abstract conceptions 
 turned into history. "We have shown," says Bauer in 
 his estimate of his own critical achievement, "that all 
 that which constitutes the historical Christ, what is said 
 of him and what we know of him, belongs to the world 
 of conception (Vorstellung), and indeed of Christian 
 conception, and consequently has nothing to do with a 
 man belonging to the real world.''^ Very naturally the 
 excursions of this critic have rarely commanded the 
 tribute of serious consideration. A criticism which, if 
 it does not formally deny the existence of Jesus Christ, 
 reduces him to the merest cipher, so far as any recog- 
 nizable influence in the world is concerned, has outlawed 
 itself in the sight of all sober judges. 
 
 II. — Grounds of Exception to the Criticism of 
 
 Strauss 
 
 "The true criticism of dogma," Strauss has said, "is 
 its history."^ It would not be altogether unfair to apply 
 a kindred maxim to his own critical performances, and 
 to say that in their outcome a striking judgment upon 
 
 * Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker, { 91. 
 ^ Glaubenslehre, J 6. 
 
276 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 them has been rendered. Of course, it would be arbi- 
 trary to assume that the great body of his critical work 
 was immediately discredited by the plunge which he 
 took in his latest years into the abyss of materialism and 
 negation. Yet this dismal transition cannot be wholly 
 put out of sight in the estimate which is to be formed of 
 the competency of Strauss to deal successfully with the 
 deeper problems which belong to the history and phi- 
 losophy of religion. It may properly serve to raise a 
 question as to the intellectual poise, comprehensiveness, 
 and health of this would-be leader of the thought of his 
 age. That he was highly gifted is not to be denied. He 
 was keen in analyzing the matters that came under his 
 review, and was the master ol a clear and incisive style. 
 But he was not a speculative mind of the larger mold, 
 not a creative thinker. He was not broad enough to be 
 secure against one-sidedness, and a veritable pathologi- 
 cal element came to manifestation near the end. The 
 eccentricity of his intellectual career taken as a whole, 
 while it does not directly refute his theory of the gospel 
 history, prepares us to find in it a deficit on the side of 
 judicial balance. 
 
 The a priori exaggerating character of the treatment 
 which Strauss applies to the Gospels is clearly manifest. 
 As was noticed, he issued an uncompromising prohibition 
 of all miracles and special revelations. Among the 
 grounds urged for this dogmatic sentence the most plausi- 
 ble consists in the plea that any interference with the 
 eternal order would bring God under the time category 
 and would contradict his absoluteness. To this plea it is 
 to be replied, as in the case of the Spencerian handling 
 of the notion of the absolute, that it is a poor compliment 
 to the absoluteness of God to suppose that it debars him 
 from the prerogatives of free personality. Inability to 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 277 
 
 act outside of the given world scheme implies a falling 
 short of the highest conceivable potency. We pass, then, 
 under the constraint of a narrow definition of the abso- 
 lute, and accept something less than the real absolute, 
 when we deny to God the prerogative to act creatively, 
 or to initiate a new series in the physical, moral, or in- 
 tellectual world. Doubtless the adjustment of such action 
 to the timeless life of God makes a puzzle for beings like 
 ourselves who naturally think of events under the time 
 category. But the puzzle is not peculiar to the supposition 
 of miraculous agency. If the world is not at a perfect 
 standstill, if it passes through actual transitions, how 
 shall the all-seeing God not recognize the transitions? 
 And is it any easier to suppose that intellect can recognize 
 transitions without an experience of time, than it is to sup- 
 pose that will can initiate new events without a like ex- 
 perience? Assuredly the former difficulty is on a level 
 with the latter, and we must not only negate miracles 
 and special revelations, but also all change and progress 
 in the world, in order to protect God from the experience 
 of time. If this is too much for our sanity, then very 
 likely the best we can do is to suppose that things which 
 to our view stand in a temporal order stand for God's 
 contemplation and activity simply in a logical order. But 
 in a logical order miracles and special revelations may 
 find quite as congenial a place as any other events, namely, 
 as antecedents to the perfect unfoldment of the kingdom 
 of righteousness. That a logical order obtains in the 
 divine sphere, Strauss himself assumed in declaring that 
 God's ingoing into himself is conditioned upon his out- 
 going from himself. 
 
 The other objections that were mentioned require very 
 little consideration. Manifestly we are assailed with 
 purely verbal reasoning when we are asked to believe 
 
278 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 that an immediate working of God upon the human 
 spirit could reduce the latter to absolute passivity, since 
 God is absolutely active, and the necessary correlate of 
 absolute activity is absolute passivity. It is only neces- 
 sary to ask, what is to prevent God from so wisely ad- 
 justing his action to the human spirit that this subject 
 shall be at once both active and acted upon? The com- 
 bination certainly is entirely conceivable. The God who 
 knew enough to fashion the human spirit in all likeli- 
 hood knows enough to be able to influence it without 
 canceling its characteristic functions. With equal deci- 
 sion we may challenge the assumption of Strauss that an 
 immanent relation between God and the world shuts out 
 the fact or the possibility of special revelation. If God 
 is so immanent in the world that he is swallowed up and 
 lost in it, then, of course, the alleged result will follow. 
 But if he is not thus swallowed up, if he retains directive 
 intelligence, then it m.ay suit his wise purpose to select 
 some men to bear his message to others, and to these 
 select agents he may make revelations that exceed in some 
 respects those which fall to men generally. 
 
 In questioning the ideal character assigned to Jesus 
 in Christian thought, Strauss, as was observed, denied 
 that it is agreeable to the known order of the universe to 
 suppose that the ideal should be adequately represented 
 in an individual. To this contention it may be conceded 
 that under the conditions of a special historical environ- 
 ment, and within the limits of a brief period, a complete 
 illustration of the ideal of character on all sides could 
 hardly occur. But this is not saying that the essential 
 content of the ideal, the ideal as respects all cardinal 
 excellencies, cannot be possessed and also exhibited within 
 those limits. The contrary conclusion is the one which 
 seems to be voiced by the accumulated evidence of the 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 279 
 
 centuries. The character of Jesus does not suffer in the 
 least from comparison with the noblest personalities 
 which investigation of the ethnic literatures has brought 
 to light. As for those who have borne the badge of 
 discipleship, the best in any one of them cannot soberly 
 be rated as anything higher than an approximation to 
 the ideal spirit in Jesus. Who stands in competition with 
 him as respects tender, serene, and lofty union with the 
 heavenly Father? Who can inspire anyone to improve 
 on the model of loving service of men which is presented 
 in him? Who has ever rivaled his combination of in- 
 tolerance of sin with compassion for the sinner? Who 
 has ever known how in equal degree to unite simplicity 
 with grandeur? To take Jesus for the ideal means, in 
 short, little else than to accept the historical demonstra- 
 tion. Men simply find it impossible out of all the re- 
 sources furnished by the annals of the past to paint in 
 the abstract an ideal which can take precedence of that 
 which stands forth in concrete form in the gospel story. 
 No theory about the necessary imperfection of the indi- 
 vidual can be permitted to contradict the well-attested 
 fact that in Jesus Christ the real and the ideal found 
 their identity. The theory in question is but an induc- 
 tion from the ordinary, and cannot cover an instance 
 that has superior claims to be regarded as unique. 
 
 It was noticed that in his final message Strauss spoke 
 of Jesus as a mere problem. This language is not a little 
 suggestive. Why should one who has so powerfully 
 affected the course of history be accounted a perfectly 
 unsolved problem? Is not such a conclusion a virtual 
 judgment on the criticism of Strauss? A valid criticism 
 surely ought to make of Jesus something better than a 
 mere enigma. If this is the proper outcome of the par- 
 ing-down process indulged in by the critic, that process 
 
28o CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 is very much in need of justification. Either Strauss 
 was needlessly unkind to his own work, or the natural 
 issue of his work was critical bankruptcy. In any case 
 his course is suggestive of the difficulty of carrying nega- 
 tions so far as he did in his primary treatise without re- 
 ducing Jesus to a mere enigma or unsolved problem. 
 
 With the disallowance of the presuppositions of 
 Strauss much of the force of his attack upon the historicity 
 of the Gospels is annulled. When once standing room is 
 given to faith in an extraordinary person, and in the ful- 
 fillment by him of an extraordinary mission, there is 
 such self-evidencing power in the gospel content that it 
 mightily commends itself in spite of the discrepancies 
 which appear in the records. Strauss overrates the 
 damaging effect of these discrepancies. Men who are 
 familiar with courts of justice, or with practical life in 
 general, are well aware that in matters which have any 
 degree of complexity even the most competent witnesses, 
 however sure they may be of the main facts, will differ 
 noticeably in respect of details. The general story of the 
 evangelists, therefore, is not justly subject to challenge 
 on the score of the variations in their reports. Indeed, 
 there is a certain incongruity in admitting, so far as 
 Strauss did for the greater part of his career as a critic, 
 a faithful transmission of the discourses of Jesus, and at 
 the same time questioning so largely the report of his 
 doings. Minds that were retentive and honest enough 
 to reproduce so well the spoken words might properly 
 be trusted more fully, were not certain sweeping assump- 
 tions interposed, to give a substantially faithful account 
 of the Master's deeds. In the particular way also in 
 which Strauss disposed of the marvelous deeds there is 
 a certain incongruity. Lively expectations of what the 
 Messiah would do, he said, gave rise very largely to the 
 
CRITICISM OF GOSPEL HISTORY BY STRAUSS 281 
 
 reports of the miracles. But, if the miracles were not 
 actually wrought, how did it happen that the expectant 
 minds were not turned away in chill and disappointment, 
 and made hopelessly skeptical as to the identity of Jesus 
 with the Messiah? Strauss supposes, indeed, that Jesus 
 by a natural exercise of influence healed demoniacs. 
 This, however, was a function which was not counted 
 beyond the reach of contemporary exorcists. Had Jesus's 
 demonstration of his power stopped at this point, had he 
 not merely refused to respond to a captious demand for 
 signs, but also, as Strauss avers, declined altogether to 
 work marvels, he would rather have disappointed than 
 satisfied the expectations entertained respecting the Mes- 
 siah. To the extent of this disappointment the expecta- 
 tions would have wrought against faith in him and 
 abridged the impression made by his personal attractions. 
 Thus the explanation of the reputed miracles of Jesus 
 through the force of Messianic expectations becomes 
 very largely self-defeating. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 CRITICISM OF THE NEW TESTAMENT BY BAUR 
 
 I. — Main Contentions of Baur 
 
 Ferdinand Christian Baur, who occupied the chair 
 of historical theology at the University of Tubingen from 
 1826 to his death, in i860, was one of the marked char- 
 acters of the century in respect of scholarly ability and 
 achievement. Though the senior of Strauss, in the his- 
 tory of criticism he naturally is placed subsequent to the 
 author of the famous Leben Jesu, since a defect in the 
 miethod of the latter served very largely to define for him 
 his critical task. Strauss had failed to preface his treat- 
 ment of the gospel history with a close scrutiny of the 
 Gospels for the purpose of determining their inter-rela- 
 tions and the relative authority of each. This task of 
 examining and rating documents Baur undertook with 
 great energy to accomplish in relation not only to the 
 Gospels but to the New Testament books in general. He 
 considered that by this means alone can one gain ah 
 authentic picture of the way in which Christianity was 
 developed from its primary content. 
 
 The presuppositions entertained by Baur, though not 
 set forth by him very definitely, are commonly acknowl- 
 edged to have been very much of a factor in the process 
 of his criticism. In the shaping of them the Hegelian 
 philosophy wrought conspicuously. From this source 
 was borrowed a conception which was controlling in the 
 early Tubingen criticism, the conception, namely, that 
 the logical movement of thought includes in succession 
 thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; in other words, that a 
 
BAUR'S CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 283 
 
 thought content is given first of all in simple immediate- 
 ness, then is parted into antagonistic elements, then 
 reaches a higher unity in the reconciliation of the ele- 
 ments. This point of view, if not formally paraded by 
 Baur, w^as certainly exemplified in his work with a fidelity 
 worthy of the most loyal Hegelian. He was also quite 
 near to Hegel in his disposition to put the stress rather 
 upon the intrinsic demands of the thought process than 
 upon the directive force of uniquely endowed personali- 
 ties. 
 
 Baur's affiliation with Hegelianism appears, further- 
 more, in his approximation to a pantheistic conception 
 of God and of his relation to the universe. In a treatise 
 on religious philosophy published in 1835 he gives a 
 relatively full exposition of Hegel's notion of divine 
 personality. He represents the philosopher as teaching 
 that God attains to self-realization only by a process of 
 incarnation in nature and in man, "that it is only the 
 finite spirit in which the absolute Spirit determines it- 
 self to self-conscious Spirit." He mentions the objection 
 that this view puts the personality of God in the mist, 
 and so is poorly accommodated to the religious needs of 
 men ; but he declines to give any deciding weight to the 
 objection. He declines also to find in the thought of a 
 conditioned self-consciousness in God a serious stumb- 
 ling-block. That thought, he observes, does not imply 
 the limitation of divine self-consciousness to human 
 history, since world-evolutions in an unending series 
 may have preceded that which is known to us, and some 
 class of beings may ever have been at hand in which the 
 absolute Spirit could manifest itself under the form of 
 finite spirit. The self-contemplation of God in the 
 totality of finite spirits, he says, "is alone the true con- 
 ception of the immanence of God in the world. Is one. 
 
284 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 however, disposed to name this the logical pantheism of 
 the Hegelian system, then very little regard needs to be 
 paid to the mere name; the important thing being to 
 show that there is any other satisfactory way of recon- 
 ciling the equally valid claims of the speculative and of 
 the Christian and religious interest."^ From the tenor 
 of this exposition it is sufficiently manifest that Baur was 
 willing to accept as much pantheism as is implicit in the 
 Hegelian idea of the divine Being, The notion of a tran- 
 scendent Deity was quite foreign to his standpoint.^ 
 
 In respect of Christology and miracles Baur's presup- 
 positions were very much in line with those of Strauss. 
 He may not have expressed himself on these themes 
 in the categorical terms of his younger contemporary; 
 but he gave adequate indications of his dogmatic prefer- 
 ences. For him the idea of the God-man was the idea 
 of the unity of humanity in general with God. The 
 peculiar eminence of Christ consisted in the fact that in 
 him the unity of the divine and the human nature first 
 attained to concrete reality, first became a matter of per- 
 sonal consciousness, so that it could be effectively ex- 
 pressed and taught.^ As regards miracles, Baur does not, 
 so far as we are aware, challenge outright their possi- 
 bility. He notices, however, that the conception of 
 miracle proper is not acceptable to religious philosophy.* 
 He uses language that is naturally taken in the reverse 
 of a complimentary sense when he says, speaking of the 
 futility of an attempt to rationalize miracles, "the ele- 
 ment of the miracle is precisely the contradiction which 
 cuts ofif any further question."^ Most significantly of 
 
 1 Die christHche Gnosis, oder die christliche Religions-philosophie in 
 ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, pp. 700-706. 
 
 ^Comnare Siebert, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Philosophie seit 
 Hegel, pp. ,-?3--^5. ^Die christliche Gnosis, p. 717- ^ Ibid., p 641. 
 
 sKritisclie Untersuchungen uber die Kanonischen Evangehen. 1847 
 p. 225. 
 
BAUR'S CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 285 
 
 all, he disputes and excludes every miracle to which he 
 awards a detailed consideration. In one connection, it 
 is true, he gives a verbal acknowledgment to the fact 
 of a psychological miracle in the conversion of PauV hut 
 in another connection he distinctly objects to the supposi- 
 tion of a miracle proper at this crisis of the apostle's ex- 
 perience.^ On the whole, his attitude toward supernatu- 
 ral elements in the biblical narratives was scarcely more 
 tolerant than that of Strauss. 
 
 In construing the New Testament history Baur has 
 very little to say about the person of Christ. He sup- 
 plies, indeed, some ground for the judgment that he con- 
 sidered the ideal Christ, or the Christ as he was pictured 
 in the contemplation of the believing community, as 
 being of more consequence than the actual historical 
 Christ. The thought process leading on to catholic 
 Christianity appears to have been to him the object of 
 controlling interest. The life and teaching of Christ 
 engaged his consideration only as supplying a certain 
 basis for that process, and the process, in accordance with 
 the movement of the idea in the Hegelian logic, was con- 
 ceived to consist in the unfolding of antagfonisms and in 
 their ultimate reconciliation in some higher point of view. 
 
 Somewhat of a ground for antithetic types of thought 
 was observed by Baur to have place in Jesus, inasmuch as 
 on the one side his consciousness was of a universal 
 ethico-religious cast, transcending national peculiarities, 
 and on the other side was modified in its historic mani- 
 festation by the specifically Jewish conception of the 
 Messiah. In the latter feature there was a bond to the 
 old Jewish particularism. To throw off the restraint of 
 this bond, to contemplate religion from any other than 
 
 * Kirchengeschichte, third ed., I. 45. 
 
 ' Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi, second ed., I. 86. 
 
286 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the specifically Jewish standpoint, was not easy for those 
 whose outlook from childhood had been entirely defined 
 by a Jewish horizon. The earliest disciples were not 
 equal to this task. Not one of the twelve conceived of 
 the religion which they were called upon to propagate in 
 the world according to the suggestions of the more uni- 
 versal elements in the consciousness of their Master. 
 They represented him rather on the side of his connec- 
 tion with Judaism, and did not consider themselves 
 under obligations to break away from the ancestral sys- 
 tem. They were Judseo-Christians in thought and pur- 
 pose, Jews who were looking for a second instead of a 
 primary coming of the Messiah. 
 
 The element of universality in Christ's consciousness 
 first found opportunity successfully to assert itself in the 
 Christian community through Paul, though an incipient 
 tendency to the broader standpoint was manifested by 
 the protomartyr Stephen. In Paul's case, however, it 
 seems not to have been through the contemplation of 
 what was contained in the personal life of Jesus that he 
 surmounted Jewish particularism. Rather, he reached 
 that result by the path of inner experience. The way in 
 which he came to the knowledge of salvation in Christ 
 made him think of that salvation as antithetic to Jewish 
 legalism. He was led to look upon Christ as the end of 
 the law, and consequently the end of Jewish national 
 limitations, a spiritual and universal power, the head of 
 the religion of humanity. The revelation that the Father 
 was pleased to make of the Son in him brought him to 
 the standpoint of Christian universalism, which was im- 
 plicit in the consciousness of Jesus but had failed to gain 
 an adequate recognition from the older disciples.^ 
 
 Thus the stage of antagonisms was introduced. The 
 
 • Kirchengeschichte, I. 45-48. 
 
BAUR'S CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 287 
 
 antagonisms, too, were very sharp and persistent. Paul 
 became on principle the champion of evangelical free- 
 dom. He considered that nothing less than a sacrifice 
 of the grace of Christ, a veritable betrayal of his religion, 
 would be involved in an attempt to maintain the legal 
 system of Judaism among the Gentiles. The Epistle to 
 the Galatians shows how resolute and uncompromising 
 he was upon this subject. In this epistle we have the 
 authentic statement of his position from his own hand, 
 and thus are shut up to the conclusion that he was per- 
 fectly unyielding in his opposition to the Judaizers, and 
 that any writing which represents him as making con- 
 cessions to their prejudices and prepossessions must be 
 regarded as untrustworthy. On the other hand, the or- 
 iginal apostles stubbornly maintained their adherence to 
 a Judaizing platform. As the references of Paul show, 
 during a period of fourteen years following his con- 
 version they did not advance a step toward recognizing 
 the independent and universal character of Christianity. 
 The story of Peter's ministry to Cornelius and his house- 
 hold may seem to contradict this, but that story had its 
 origin in an irenic intent rather than in actual history. 
 Up to the conference at Jerusalem the original apostles 
 had not caught a glimpse of the great truth that men 
 could become Christians without first passing through the 
 gateway of Judaism. They were behind those who dis- 
 turbed Paul's congregations by urging that it was neces- 
 sary to keep the law of Moses. Though at the conference 
 at Jerusalem they gave the apostle the right hand of fel- 
 lowship, they by no means became cordial supporters of 
 his interpretation of the relation between Christianity and 
 Judaism. The conduct of Peter at Antioch, in withdraw- 
 ing from the table of the Gentiles, shows how little de- 
 pendence he could place upon the concurrence of these 
 
288 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 men in his plan of Christian evangelism. It was from 
 them that the zealots who disturbed the Corinthian 
 Church derived their letters of commendation. In the 
 disturbances which led to Paul's arrest at Jerusalem, 
 Jewish Christians, who had been under apostolic tuition, 
 were in all probability co-agents with the infuriate dis- 
 ciples of the Pharisees. 
 
 And so the story runs on to the end of Paul's career. 
 Nor did the antagonism to the great champion of Chris- 
 tian universalism cease to proclaim itself after he had 
 finished his course. The apostolic author of the Apoca- 
 lypse made a thrust at him in speaking of those who 
 claimed a license to eat things offered to idols, and ad- 
 vertised still further his exclusion from the apostolic 
 group by representing only twelve names as engraved 
 upon the foundations of the wall of the New Jerusalem. 
 Even far into the second century the antipathy toward the 
 apostle to the Gentiles came to manifestation. We may 
 see it in the lack of reference to him on the part of Papias 
 and Hegesippus. Still more distinctly we may see it on 
 the pages of the Pseudo-Clementine writings, where Paul 
 is reprobated in the person of Simon Magus, who very 
 likely was a fictitious character devised on purpose to set 
 off the faults of the late-born apostle.^ 
 
 While the antagonism was yet in progress a move- 
 ment in the direction of reconciliation was started. This 
 went on with widening current into the second century. 
 To its advance both parties contributed. The Judaizers 
 began to retrench their demands, beginning with a relin- 
 quishment of circumcision, and carrying over to baptism 
 much of the stress which they had placed upon the ancient 
 rite. On the other side, the followers of the apostle to 
 
 1 See Baur's Paulus, Kirchengeschichte, und Kritische Untersuchungen 
 for the matter of this paragraph. 
 
BAUR'S CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 289 
 
 the Gentiles began to modify in one way or another the 
 PauHne antithesis between the law and the gospel, be- 
 tween the old dispensation and the new. Thus a basis 
 of unity was reached, and the sharp struggle of the 
 primitive age passed gradually out of the sight and recol- 
 lection of the Christian body. 
 
 The New Testament books, according to Baur and his 
 immediate followers in the Tubingen school, reflect more 
 or less distinctly the various stages of the movement just 
 described. Most of them may be characterized as "tend- 
 ency writings," having been composed in the interest 
 of the Judaizing party, or of the Pauline party, or with 
 the purpose of mediating between the two. Thus to a 
 greater or less extent their subject-matter was the off- 
 spring of free construction. They represent more of de- 
 sign and less of unconscious evolution of myths than was 
 assumed by Strauss. As to date, the majority of them 
 were second century products. The earliest were the 
 four epistles of Paul which are beyond challenge. A 
 relatively early date is also to be assigned to the Apoca- 
 lypse, a book credibly imputed to the apostle John. 
 
 Among the Gospels that of Matthew is to be regarded 
 as the most primitive. It is also the most trustworthy. 
 Its reports of Christ's discourses are substantially reliable. 
 Matthew is strongly tinged with the Judaic way of think- 
 ing, but contains some tokens of a transcendence of Juda- 
 ism. It may be characterized as a Jewish-Christian 
 Gospel. On the other hand, Luke in its original form, 
 which was at least approximately identical with Mar- 
 cion's version,^ was distinctly a Pauline composition. It 
 contained tokens of a designed disparagement of the or- 
 iginal apostles, notably in its representations respecting 
 
 1 Compare Kritische Untersuchungen, pp. 395 ff. with Das Marcusevan- 
 gelium, Anhang. 
 
290 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the seventy disciples whom Jesus is assumed to have sent 
 forth as his messengers. Later, by the incorporation of 
 Jewish elements, somewhat of a mixed character was 
 given to Luke. The Gospel of Mark borrowed its contents 
 from both Matthew and Luke, though much more largely 
 from the former than from the latter. In tone it is less 
 sharply defined than either of the two to which it owed 
 its contents, and may be described as a mediating or neu- 
 tral Gospel. The fourth Gospel is separated from the 
 synoptical group by a wide chasm. Written late in the 
 second century, after the mediating movement had in good 
 part been accomplished, it represents Christian universal- 
 ism from the standpoint of a speculative conception of 
 Christ as the Logos, the principle of light and life in a 
 world largely given over to blindness and insensibility. 
 Its fundamental idea is "the divine greatness and glory 
 of Jesus over against the unbelief of the Jews and in con- 
 tinuous conflict therewith."^ The discourses which it 
 purports to reproduce are not borrowed from history 
 proper. They simply express the Christian consciousness 
 of the writer, a consciousness, however, of so lofty a type 
 that a lasting worth belongs to its deliverances. In the 
 fashioning also of the narrative portions of the fourth 
 Gospel a subjective interest was decidedly influential. 
 
 Among the other New Testament books the Apocalypse 
 stands in closest affiliation with the Judaizing party. The 
 Epistle of James is on one side anti-Pauline, as appears 
 in its treatment of the subject of justification; but on 
 another side it makes an approach to Paulinism, since 
 it spiritualizes the conception of the law and makes no 
 attempt to uphold the literal Mosaic code. Among the 
 epistles ascribed to Paul the four which alone are entitled 
 to bear his name — Galatians, Romans, First and Second 
 
 * Kritische Untersuchungen, p. 87. 
 
BAUR'S CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 291 
 
 Corinthians — represent the standpoint of energetic un- 
 compromising opposition to Judaizing tenets and prac- 
 tices. The epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philip- 
 pians, while Pauline in substance, have a milder tone, and 
 thus were suited to fulfill a mediating function. The 
 late-appearing Pastoral Epistles represent also an attempt 
 at mediation on a Pauline basis. In the Epistle to the 
 Hebrews we are confronted by a mediating writing 
 which proceeds from a Jewish-Christian standpoint of 
 a liberal, idealizing type. First Peter reflects also the age 
 of synthesis or of vanishing antagonisms. As for the 
 book of Acts, its reconciling purpose is stamped upon its 
 whole content. In a radical sense it is to be accounted 
 a "tendency writing." The first part of the book makes 
 Peter as Pauline as possible, and the second part makes 
 an industrious attempt to paint Paul in Petrine colors. 
 So resolute is the writer in his purpose to maintain an 
 even balance that he takes pains to parallel every great 
 deed or marvel ascribed to one of the two apostles with 
 an equally remarkable item in the story of the other. 
 
 Such in outline are the results which Baur reached in 
 the prosecution of his critical undertaking. That under- 
 taking was evidently worth while. It serves a genuine 
 historical purpose to assign to the New Testament books 
 their proper location in connection with the unfolding 
 thought and life of early Christianity. Had the execu- 
 tion of the task been as normal as the task was legitimate, 
 the Tubingen critic would have won extraordinary and 
 lasting honors. 
 
 II. — Arbitrary and Extravagant Features in 
 Baur's Criticism 
 
 The philosophical presuppositions of Baur were so 
 nearly in line with those of Strauss that it would be 
 
292 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 superfluous to give them any independent consideration. 
 We may proceed at once, therefore, to deal with the basal 
 assumption of his criticism,, namely, the fact of an un- 
 mitigated and persistent antagonism within the apostolic 
 group, a relentless conflict between Pauline universalism 
 and the Jewish particularism intrenched in the minds and 
 the hearts of the original apostles. 
 
 That an element of truth is contained in the assump- 
 tion is not to be denied. Paul was undoubtedly a pioneer 
 in the cause of Christian universalism ; and it is equally 
 indubitable that he encountered for a season a measure 
 of resistance within the apostolic circle. But the unquali- 
 fied and long-continued antagonism which Baur assumes 
 is not to be admitted. The assumption of the critic runs 
 into the incredible in the picture which it requires us to 
 sketch of either party. It is far from being probable 
 that in a complex transitional age Paul and his apostolic 
 colleagues should have been embodiments respectively of 
 a single idea or religious pattern in so radical, exclusive, 
 and constant a way as the Tubingen theory supposes. 
 Why should it be taken for granted that Paul was always 
 in the tense mood which is reflected in an epistle like that 
 to the Galatians, written at a great crisis and under stress 
 of great provocation? As is made manifest in other 
 writings, the apostle had tender feelings toward his own 
 nation, and was most earnestly desirous to win them to 
 faith in Christ. Why, then, should it be deemed incredi- 
 ble that he was ready to exercise some accommodation to 
 Jewish prejudices in connections where this could be 
 done without endangering the principle of the freedomi 
 of the Gentiles from the old legal yoke? He has him- 
 self testified : "To the Jews I became as a Jew, that I 
 might gain Jews; to them that are under the law, as 
 under the law, not being myself under the law, that I 
 
BAUR'S CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 293 
 
 might gain them that are under the law" (i Cor. ix. 20). 
 Surely, then, we are not required to suppose that he was 
 such a walking abstraction that he could practice no sort 
 of flexibility in adjusting himself to the varied require- 
 ments of a complex situation. On the other side, there 
 is very slight demand for conceiving of the original 
 apostles as stolidly fixed in a Judaizing scheme. It is 
 natural to conclude that somewhat of a leavening influ- 
 ence came into their minds from the broad, unfettered 
 spirit which was in their Master, and that this by its own 
 virtue would gradually work toward a freer standpoint 
 on their part. The action of this cause in such a direc- 
 tion is made esp€cially credible when the conditions of the 
 age are taken into account. These men had before their 
 eyes a growing demonstration that Judaism was too nar- 
 row to hold the religion of which they were called to be 
 the heralds. They saw this religion claiming ever wider 
 victories in the Gentile world, and could not well avoid 
 having their thoughts broadened and liberalized by the 
 new and stimulating events. To assume that they receded 
 from the attitude toward Paul which they expressed at 
 the Jerusalem conference in giving him the right hand 
 of fellowship is to suppose them strangely impervious 
 to the lessons of the age. 
 
 That Baur was importing, to a large extent, his own 
 abstractions into the apostolic history is further made 
 evident by the forced interpretation which he places upon 
 various New Testament items, and by the judgment which 
 he renders on one or another New Testament book. 
 Take, for instance, his assumption that the Apocalypse 
 gives a distinct evidence of John's intent to exclude Paul 
 from the number of the apostles in its representation of 
 just twelve names being inscribed upon the foundations 
 of the walls of the New Jesusalem. How utterly gra- 
 
294 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tuitous is the assumption! In a symbolic book like the 
 Apocalypse the Jewish preference for round numbers 
 would infallibly operate for the selection of the number 
 twelve to represent the apostolic group, even on the part 
 of a writer who had not the slightest question about the 
 apostolic standing of Paul. Take again the inference 
 that Luke, as representing a Pauline platform, designed 
 to disparage Peter by recording the statement that the 
 apostle did not know what he was saying when he opened 
 his lips at the close of the mystic scene of the transfigura- 
 tion. Who but one controlled by a radical presupposi- 
 tion would see in this statement anything more than a 
 simple intimation that Peter, speaking without premedi- 
 tation and under the bewildering impression of the extra- 
 ordinary situation, did not properly grasp the meaning of 
 his words? Look also at the assumption that Luke's 
 mention of a temporary mission of seventy disciples was 
 dictated by a Pauline interest and was meant to cast a 
 slight on the office of the twelve. What could be more 
 gratuitous than the putting of such an intention into a 
 narrative that describes simply an expedient adopted by 
 Christ to prepare the people for his own speedy visita- 
 tion and contains nothing at all to call up the thought of 
 Paul's person or work? Still further, consider the allega- 
 tion that the author of Acts was at pains to construct a 
 detailed parallelism between the achievements of Peter 
 and those of Paul so that the rival apostles might be 
 glorified in equal degree. Even if it be supposed that the 
 writer was morally capable of dealing so recklessly with 
 the facts of history, it is in no wise probable that his com- 
 mon sense would dictate the need of such artificial bio- 
 graphical construction just for the sake of equalizing 
 Petrine and Pauline claims; and, besides, it takes peculiar 
 powers to discover a veritable parallelism of the kind and 
 
BAUR'S CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 295 
 
 extent which is pictured. Finally, take the ground on 
 which the Pauline authorship of the little Epistle to Phile- 
 mon is rejected. Baur is obliged to confess that, taken 
 by itself, this epistle offers no good reason for challen- 
 ging its genuineness. Why, then, does he make the chal- 
 lenge? Simply because Philemon reflects the same his- 
 torical situation which is discoverable in the Epistle to 
 the Colossians,^ and so, in case its genuineness should be 
 granted, is too favorable to the Pauline authorship of an 
 important epistle which it does not suit the Tiibingen 
 scheme to acknowledge as Paul's. Judged by its spirit 
 and content the Epistle to Philemon is one of the last 
 specimens of literature in the world that one would care 
 to number among the products of imitation or dishonest 
 contrivance. Jiilicher gives the verdict of sane criticism 
 when he says, "Philemon belongs to the most certain 
 property of the apostle"^ ; and Professor Ropes does not 
 utter an extravagant judgment when he says, "The man 
 who holds the Epistle to Philemon to be fictitious alle- 
 gory has lived too much in the abstractions of eternity 
 and not enough in the world of men to be a perfectly 
 trustworthy critic."^ 
 
 The one-sided and extravagant character of Baur's 
 criticism is proclaimed in rather emphatic terms by the 
 history of its fortunes. Even among those in the direct 
 line of succession from the Tubingen professor it was 
 not long able to maintain its ground. While Schwegler 
 was quite as radical as Baur himself, and Zeller in the 
 period of his theological activity represented substantially 
 the same platform as his master, Albrecht Ritschl made 
 a conspicuous departure from that platform. Before the 
 death of its promulgator he published his dissent from the 
 
 » Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi, II. 88, 89. 
 
 2 Einleitung, fourth edition, p. 99. 
 
 ' The Apostolic Age in the Light of Modem Criticism, p. 301. 
 
296 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 fundamental contention respecting a radical and long- 
 continued antagonism between a Petrine and a Pauline 
 party.^ Somewhat later another disciple, Adolf Hilgen- 
 feld, expressed the conviction that Baur had gone too far 
 in his emphasis upon antagonisms within the apostolic 
 group and in his characterization of the New Testa- 
 ment books as "tendency writings."^ A kindred judg- 
 ment has been rendered by Otto Pfleiderer, who began 
 his career as a teacher at Tubingen, and has always been 
 known as a representative of the liberal school of criti- 
 cism. Referring to Baur's disparagement of the book of 
 Acts as being mainly a work of conscious invention, 
 written for a mediating purpose, he says : "It is certainly 
 much more probable that the author, possessed with the 
 consciousness of his own time, in which Paulinism had 
 in fact already become very different from what it was, 
 apprehended in good faith the circumstances of the apos- 
 tolic time also, and understood and honestly made use of 
 his sources of information regarding it, with the presup- 
 position that the relation of Jewish and heathen Chris- 
 tianity could have been no other in the time of primitive 
 Christianity than it was in his own, namely, that of 
 mutual approximation, agreement, and union of the more 
 sober elements of both sides, in opposition to the extreme 
 views of either party. "^ 
 
 In relation to a large proportion of the New Testa- 
 ment books the judgment of Baur has not been sustained 
 by later scholarship. His theory of the interrelations of 
 the Synoptical Gospels has been almost universally set 
 aside, Mark being assigned the place of the most primi- 
 tive instead of being reckoned the latest and most depend- 
 ent. The late date ascribed to the fourth Gospel has 
 
 » Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche, 1850, second ed., 1857. 
 » Historisch-Kritische Einleitung in das neue Testament, 1875, pp 
 197-199. 3 Paulinism, Eng. trans., 1877, II. 230, 231. 
 
BAUR'S CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 297 
 
 been exchanged for an earlier one. Even those who ques- 
 tion its Johannine authorship locate it, in most instances, 
 within the first quarter of the second century. To Baur's 
 short list of the genuine epistles of Paul additions have 
 been made by nearly all critics. Hilgenfeld added First 
 Thessalonians, Philemon, and Philippians. Pfleiderer 
 admitted the same epistles, and in part also Second Thes- 
 salonians and Colossians; while critics as remote from 
 bondage to traditionalism as Harnack and Jiilicher have 
 confessed the Pauline authorship of all these epistles, 
 and have been tolerant, furthermore, of the supposition 
 that Ephesians came from Paul's hand. In short, taken 
 in its specific contentions, Baur's criticism is largely a 
 fallen structure. In saying this, however, we have no 
 intention to deny that the impulse received from him is 
 still a factor in scholarship. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 CRITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LIFE OF JESUS B^ 
 RENAN AND OTHERS 
 
 I. — Renan's Vie de Jesus 
 Ernest Renan had reached the age of forty when, 
 in 1863, he pubHshed, under the title The Life of Jesus 
 (Vie de Jesus), the first vokime of a series on the 
 "Origins of Christianity." In the six succeeding volumes 
 of the series Christian history was carried forward, in 
 close conjunction with the course of events in the Roman 
 empire, to the age of Marcus Aurelius.^ Eighteen years 
 before the publication of the Life of Jesus, Renan in con- 
 sequence of the discovery that he could no longer accept 
 the Roman Catholic faith, had left the Seminary of Saint 
 Sulpice, where he was preparing for the priesthood. In 
 the interval between taking this step and the epochal 
 year of 1863 he had given full expression to his essential 
 platform in a number of writings, two of the more con- 
 siderable of which were The Future of Science^ and 
 Studies in Religious History.^ The former was withheld 
 from publication till within two years of the author's 
 death, which occurred in 1892. As a product of early 
 zeal it contained some notions, especially in the direction 
 of claiming a practical omnipotence for experimental 
 science, which seemed to mature reflection to savor of 
 extravagance. Still the book shows with a good degree 
 
 iThe titles of these volumes are as follows: Les Ap6tres, 1866; Saint 
 Paul, 1869; L'Antechrist,i87i; Les Evangiles et la Seconde G6n6ration 
 Chr^tienne, 1877: L'Eglise Chr6tienne, 1879: Marc Aurele et la Fin du 
 Monde Antique, 1882. 
 
 2 L'Avenir de Science, 1848-49. ^ Etudes D'Histoire religieuse, 1857. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 299 
 
 of fidelity the assumptions and ways of thinking which 
 were controlhng in the mind of its author throughout his 
 literary career. 
 
 As the criticisms of Strauss and of Baur were shaped 
 by very emphatic presuppositions, so also was that of 
 Renan. The last, however, was distinguished from the 
 German critics in that he was less closely affiliated with 
 a specific philosophy. It would be going beyond the 
 mark to say that he owned what might properly be called 
 a philosophical system. The question of philosophical 
 method was quite subordinate with him ; he never made 
 it the object of a particular examination.^ While form- 
 ally disparaging the office of metaphysics, he failed to 
 practice the reserve logically involved in such an atti- 
 tude, and employed metaphysical premises after the man- 
 ner of the easy-going eclectic. He took what suited his 
 bent from Kant, Hamilton, Comte, and Hegel. He sym- 
 pathized with Kant's theory of the categories as the 
 necessary molds of human conceptions, with Hamilton's 
 views on the impossibility of construing God as the infi- 
 nite and the absolute, with Comte's stress on the primacy 
 of the empirical sciences as against the claims of all 
 speculative philosophy, and with Hegel's idea of history 
 as an ordered evolution in the progress of which the 
 union of contraries has a prominent place. For the 
 subtle dialectic of Hegel he had scanty appreciation ; but 
 with the underlying thought of Hegelianism respecting 
 an all-embracing evolution he was quite in accord. With 
 this thought he seems to have conjoined a vague mon- 
 ism.^ In general an equivocal phase attaches to his 
 treatment of the deeper themes. As several of his fellow- 
 countrymen have pointed out, he made small account of 
 
 1 Raoul Allier, La Philosophic d'Emest Renan, p. 14. 
 ' The Future of Science, Eng. trans., p. 89. 
 
300 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the demand for self-consistency.^ His talents, in short, 
 were rather those of the brilliant litterateur than of the 
 profound thinker. 
 
 Among the characteristic features of Kenan's think- 
 ing there were two which so far conditioned his critical 
 work that they require special notice. The first of these 
 may be defined as a compromising dealing with the sub- 
 ject of divine personality. If Renan did not squarely 
 deny the proper theistic conception he certainly obscured 
 and discounted that conception to a serious degree. In 
 the first elaborate declaration of his faith as a free- 
 thinker he wrote: "Let us say that the Supreme Being 
 is eminently possessed of all that is perfection; let us 
 say that he has in him something analogous to intelli- 
 gence, to liberty; but do not let us say that he is intelli- 
 gent, that he is free: this would be trying to limit the 
 infinite, to give a name to the ineffable."^ In a later 
 writing he seems to lean to the notion that such intelli- 
 gence as may be attributed to the Supreme Being is 
 more akin to instinct than to the cognitive function of 
 self-conscious personality ; for he makes his representative 
 in the dialogue say: "The world evidently has an aim, 
 and is steadily elaborating a mysterious work. There 
 is a something which is developing itself by an internal 
 necessity, by an unconscious instinct, in a manner analo- 
 gous to the movement in plants toward water or the 
 light, analogous to the blind effort of the embryo to leave 
 the womb, or to that inner necessity which directs the 
 metamorphoses of the insect."^ Other statements of 
 Renan look toward the same idea of God as a kind of 
 
 1 S^ailles, Ernest Renan, Essai de Biographie Psychologique, pp.192, 212, 
 242, 279; Bourdeau, Les Maitres de la Pens6e Contemporaire, pp. 57, 67 
 Brunetiere, Cinq Lettres sur Ernest Renan, pp. 20-22. 
 
 2 The Future of Science, p. 44Q. 
 
 3 Philosophical Dialogues and Fragments, Eng. trans., pp. la, 13. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 301 
 
 world-soul, working after a manner quite other than that 
 of a self-conscious agent. Thus he remarks : "In order 
 to be consistent, we ought to push anthropomorphism to 
 its extreme limits and endow God with a body. . . . There 
 never was such a thing as memory, foresight, the percep- 
 tion of external objects — in a word, consciousness — with- 
 out a nervous system."^ Again he says : "God does not 
 see himself except in his incarnations."^ Once more he 
 approves the words of Strauss : "An absolute personality 
 is nonsense, an absurd idea. God is not a person beside 
 and above other persons." However, it would not suit 
 his method to abide by so definite a position, and accord- 
 ingly he adds : "If we make him impersonal, conscience 
 protests, for we conceive existence only under a personal 
 form, and to say that God is impersonal is tantamount, 
 in our way of thinking, to saying that he does not exist. 
 Of these two theories one is not true and the other is 
 not false. Neither the one nor the other rests on a solid 
 basis ; both imply a contradiction."^ This leaves the mat- 
 ter in a thick mist; but if the tenor of Renan's state- 
 ments is considered it is manifest enough that his atti- 
 tude toward the conception of divine personality was not 
 friendly. That he stood at a vast remove from the plane 
 of a warm theistic faith was evinced by the following 
 words written late in life : "The whole of human develop- 
 ment may be of no more consequence than the moss or 
 lichen with which every moist surface is covered."* Such 
 language obviously implies that the thought of a God 
 who puts any value upon man or opens any door to real 
 fellowship with himself may be a pure illusion. 
 
 The other element in Renan's thinking that calls for 
 
 * Letter of 1862 in Philosophical Dialogues and Fragments, p. 138. 
 'Cited by Allier, La Philosophie D 'Ernest Renan, p. 68. 
 
 " Letter of 1861 in Philosophical Dialogues and Fragments, pp. 176, 177 
 
 * The Future of Science, Preface of 1890. 
 
302 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Special observation is little else than a corollary from the 
 foregoing. A God who cannot be described as free and 
 conscious personality, who is conceived simply as the im- 
 manent life of nature, possessed of the ability to view 
 himself only in his incarnations, is plainly no credible 
 source of supernatural workings. From postulating such 
 a God it is but a logical step to pass on to the denial of 
 the miraculous or supernatural. And this step Renan 
 took with unwavering decision. From the time that he 
 turned his back on the ancestral faith his mind was per- 
 fectly intolerant of the notion of miracle. His refer- 
 ences to the subject constitute a string of dogmatic nega- 
 tions. The following are specimen statements taken in 
 chronological order : "There is no such thing, so modern 
 science teaches, as the supernatural. . . . The sole cure of 
 this strange malady, which to the disgrace of civilization 
 has not disappeared as yet from humanity, is modern 
 culture. . . . Posterity will look upon those who are fight- 
 ing supernaturalism in our days as we look upon those 
 who fought against the belief in magic in the sixteenth 
 and seventeenth centuries."^ "Criticism, whose first prin- 
 ciple is that miracle has no more place in the tissue of 
 human affairs than it has in the series of natural facts, 
 evidently cannot fall in with the theological schools 
 which employ a method opposed to its own. ... Its essence 
 is the denial of the supernatural. "^ "Till we have new 
 light we shall maintain this principle of historical criti- 
 cism, that a supernatural relation cannot be accepted as 
 such, that it always implies credulity or imposture."^ "It 
 is an absolute rule of criticism to deny a place in history 
 to narratives of miraculous circumstances."^ "No trace 
 
 1 The Future of Science, pp. 40, 41. 
 
 ^ Studies of Religious History and Criticism, trans, by O. B. Frothing 
 ham, p. 42, 171. 5 Life of Jesus, introduction. 
 
 *The Apostles, Eng. trans., p. 37. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 303 
 
 of the action of an intelligent hand, as interposing even 
 for a moment to insert itself in the compact tissue of the 
 world's affairs, has ever once been authentically verified."^ 
 ''The negation of the supernatural has become an abso- 
 lute dogma for every cultured spirit."^ In face of such 
 a list of declarations it amounts to very little for Renan 
 to aver that he does not deny the possibility of miracles. 
 He absolutely denies the fact of miracles, and further- 
 more shuts out all possible verification of the fact by 
 the test upon which he insists. That test presumes that 
 God may appropriately be called upon to crown the ex- 
 perimentation of a select commission with either an in- 
 fallible affirmation or a negation of miracles.^ As was 
 indicated in another connection, this is by no means a 
 temperate supposition. Who, in truth, has any right to 
 assume that God will work miracles on demand, and es- 
 pecially that he will work them in answer to the challenge 
 of unbelief ? Is it not the plainest dictate of reason that 
 not man's curiosity over theoretic issues, but God's judg- 
 ment as to the exigencies of his kingdom, must decide 
 the where and when of miraculous agency? Is it not also 
 quite apparent that a reputed miracle, wrought under 
 artificial and prearranged conditions, might be subject, 
 in spite of all precautions, to graver suspicions than those 
 pertaining normally to a reputed miracle which is con- 
 genially related to great moral ends and given the place 
 of an harmonious factor in a unique chapter of sacred 
 history? The proposed test of the critic is plainly out- 
 side the sphere of practicability, and it would be quite 
 gratuitous to allow it to obscure the essential dogmatism 
 of his sweeping denial of the supernatural. 
 
 Coinciding thus with Strauss in the total exclusion of 
 
 * Philosophical Dialogues and Fragments, p 8. 
 
 2 Marcus Aurelius, Eng. trans., p. 367. ^-Lifg of Jesus, introduction. 
 
304 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 miracles, Renan was, of course, obliged to curtail the his- 
 toricity of the Gospels much after the pattern of the Ger- 
 man critic. He assumed, however, to proceed more con- 
 servatively in a number of respects. Strauss, he said, 
 pushed the supposition of myth beyond reasonable bounds, 
 underestimated the importance of the personal character 
 of Jesus, made too much of the controlling influence of 
 a preexisting Messianic ideal, and took too little account 
 of the efficacy of the marked traits of Jesus to modify 
 that ideal.^ He also objected to the late date which 
 Strauss assigned to the Gospels. "The more I have re- 
 flected on it," he remarked, "the more I have been led to 
 believe that the four texts received as canonical bring us 
 very near to the age of Christ, if not in their last edition, 
 at least in the documents that compose them. Pure 
 products of the Palestinian Christianity, exempt from all 
 Hellenic influence, full of the vivid and frank sense of 
 Jerusalem, the Gospels are, in my opinion, an immediate 
 echo of the reports of the first Christian generation."^ 
 This was written some years before the publication of 
 the Vie de Jesus. A parallel utterance belonging to a 
 later date appears in the following : "The Gospel was born 
 amongst the family of Jesus, and up to a certain point 
 is the work of his immediate disciples. This fact it is 
 which gives us the right to believe that the image of 
 Jesus, as portrayed in the Gospels, resembles the original 
 in all essential particulars."^ Relative to Mark's Gospel, 
 Renan conceded that it is properly given a very intimate 
 apostolic association. "The document, though composed 
 after the death of Peter, was in a sense his work ; it was 
 the way in which he had been accustomed to relate the 
 life of Jesus."^ The Gospel of Matthew, in the judg- 
 
 1 Studies of Religious Histoiy, pp. 187-191. * Ibid., p. 195. 
 
 3 The Gospels, p. 45- * ^^id-, p. 59. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 305 
 
 ment of Renan, presents a less faithful narrative than 
 Mark, but has a great compensation in that it contains 
 so largely the discourses of Jesus, "preserved with an 
 extreme fidelity, and probably in the relative order in 
 which they were first written."^ In the third Gospel his- 
 torical materials are handled with much freedom; but 
 still we have here a token of close regard for the tra- 
 ditional form of Christ's discourses in the wide contrast 
 which subsists between them and the discourses which 
 Luke has recorded in the book of Acts.^ As respects 
 the fourth Gospel, Renan, while disparaging the trust- 
 worthiness of the discourses, took considerable account 
 of the narrative portions. On the question of authorship 
 he was somewhat wavering. In the preface to the thir- 
 teenth edition of the Vie de Jesus, written four years 
 after the publication of the first edition, he expressed the 
 conviction that he had been somewhat too favorable to 
 the authenticity of the fourth Gospel, and that it can be 
 attributed with better right to a Johannine school, ex- 
 isting at the end of the first or the beginning of the sec- 
 ond century, than to the apostle John. At the same time 
 he testified: "I persist in thinking that this Gospel pos- 
 sesses a value at bottom parallel to that of the Synopti- 
 cal Gospels, and even superior at times." Later he re- 
 turned to the supposition that John may have had some 
 direct connection with the peculiar version of the life of 
 Jesus which has been attributed to him. "We think 
 now," he wrote, "that it is more probable that some part 
 of the Gospel which bears the name of John may have 
 been vn^itten by himself, or by one of his disciples dur- 
 ing his lifetime. But we persist in believing that John 
 had a manner of his own of telling the life of Jesus, a 
 
 ' The Gospels, p. in. Compare Life of Jesus, introduction. 
 » Ibid., p 148. 
 
3o6 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 manner very different from the narratives of Batanea 
 [utilized by the Synoptists], superior in some respects, 
 and in particular w^here the parts of the life of Jesus 
 which were passed in Jerusalem afforded a larger de- 
 velopment."* In the aggregate these comments on the 
 Gospels seem to pay a rather emphatic tribute to their 
 historicity. But the fact is not to be overlooked, on the 
 other hand, that Renan was very free to hint at the fabu- 
 lous character of the gospel contents. Quite as little is 
 the fact to be overlooked that he licensed himself to cast 
 slurs upon the sincerity of the actors who figure in the 
 gospel stories, going in this respect much beyond the 
 position taken by Strauss in his original Leben Jesu. 
 His method is at times violently iconoclastic. On the 
 whole, therefore, the practical impression fostered by 
 his style of criticism is scarcely more favorable to faith 
 in the gospel history than that which is derived from the 
 revolutionary book of Strauss. His total elimination of 
 the miraculous element involves by itself a serious mutila- 
 tion of that history. Renan falls little short of confessing 
 as much in saying, "If the miracle has any reality my book 
 is a tissue of errors."^ 
 
 A distinct characteristic of Renan's reconstructed 
 biography of Jesus is the broad contrast drawn between 
 the earlier and the later career of the founder of Chris- 
 tianity. In the former he figured as the clear-minded 
 teacher, ardent and idealistic, but self-composed. His 
 horizon was wholly that of Judaism. He was untouched 
 by Hellenism, and knew next to nothing of the world at 
 large. Within the circle of Judaism he was probably 
 influenced not a little by the maxims of Hillel. To the 
 Psalms his lyrical soul gave a ready response, and he 
 
 'The Gospels, p. 220. 
 
 2 Vie de Jesus, Preface to the thirteenth ed. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 307 
 
 was much at home in the splendid dreams of Isaiah and 
 Daniel. Without argumentative process he took up what 
 these sources had to give. "Our hesitations, our doubts, 
 never touched him." His disposition was harmoniously 
 related to the delightful scenery of Galilee. A joy as of 
 the bridegroom was in him. "The whole history of the 
 birth of Christianity thus became a delightful pastoral."* 
 Meanwhile there was an element in Jesus which tran- 
 scended his antecedents and his surroundings. He had the 
 most exalted consciousness of God that ever existed in the 
 breast of humanity. "A lofty idea of divinity which he 
 did not owe to Judaism, and which seems to have been 
 entirely the creation of his great soul, was the foundation 
 of all his power."^ He looked to God as Father, and 
 lived in the bosom of God by uninterrupted communica- 
 tion. The idea that he was the son of God, the intimate 
 of his Father, "inhered in the very roots of his being. "^ 
 With these deep elements of soul-life he combined the 
 charm' of a winsome appearance. His countenance was 
 doubtless one of transporting beauty. There was a charm 
 in his person and speech that was quite irresistible in its 
 effect upon the friendly and artless people. "His preach- 
 ing was sweet and gentle, full of nature and the perfume 
 of the fields. . . . He traversed Galilee in a perpetual holi- 
 day. . . . The children and the women adored him."* 
 The enchantment which those experienced who were ad- 
 mitted to companionship with him made them careless to 
 register the passage of the weeks and the months. "None, 
 during the course of this wonderful advent measured time 
 any more than we measure a dream. Duration was 
 suspended; a week was as a century. But whether it 
 filled years or months, the dream was so beautiful that 
 
 * Life of Jesus, chap. iv. ' Ibid., chap. v. ' Ibid., chap, vii 
 
 * Ibid., chaps, ix-xi. 
 
3o8 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 humanity has since lived by it, and it is our consolation 
 yet to welcome its diminished perfume."^ 
 
 But a cloud passes over this idyllic scene. In his later 
 career, as Renan pictures it, Jesus bears another mien 
 than that of the serene prophet of Galilee who put the 
 whole stress upon the ethical aspect of the kingdom of 
 God and made it truly the kingdom of the meek and the 
 lowly. He began to harbor the apocalyptic notion that 
 the kingdom is to be ushered in by power, and is to gain 
 ascendency by a sudden and revolutionary transforma- 
 tion of the world. In the estimate of his own nature 
 and rank an element of exaggeration came to be enter- 
 tained. "The admiration of his disciples overwhelmed 
 him and carried him away. It is evident that the title 
 Rabbi, with which he was at first content did not longer 
 suffice ; the title of prophet even, or of messenger of God, 
 did not now respond to his idea. The position which he 
 attributed to himself was that of a superhuman being, and 
 he wished to be regarded as having a more elevated com- 
 munion with God than other men."^ He yielded also to 
 the influence of his surroundings in becoming a thauma- 
 turgist, or wonder-worker. While he felt the emtptiness 
 of public opinion in this matter, he did not greatly re- 
 sist its pressure, so that "acts which would now be con- 
 sidered traits of illusion or of hallucination figured largely 
 in his life."^ In one single instance, the raising of Laza- 
 rus, there is ground for suspecting either that he himself 
 was deceived by those who arranged the conditions of the 
 pretended resurrection, or else that he condescended to 
 be a partner in a deceiving spectacle. "His conscience,'* 
 so Renan writes in this connection, "by the fault of men, 
 and not by his own, had lost something of its primitive 
 clearness. Desperate, pushed to extremities, he no longer 
 
 » Life of Jesus, chap. xi. ^ Ibid., chap, xv ' Ibid., chap. xvi. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 309 
 
 retained possession of himself. His mission imposed 
 itself upon him and he obeyed the torrent."^ Even before 
 this strange episode, which preceded his crucifixion by a 
 narrow interval, he had begun to make it manifest that he 
 had undertaken a task too great for any actor upon the 
 theater of a real world. The character which he had 
 assumed could not long be sustained. *Tt was time that 
 death should come to release him from a condition 
 strained to excess, to deliver him from the impossibilities 
 of a way without exit."^ 
 
 It would naturally be supposed that in a mind thus 
 prolific of disparagement the springs of eulogy would 
 finally have been closed. But the case was quite other- 
 wise. After all his thrusts at the practical balance and 
 moral majesty of Jesus, Renan proceeds to extol him as 
 the immortal leader of the race, destined to become, after 
 the dark hours of sacrifice, the corner stone of humanity 
 so entirely that to tear his name from this world would 
 rend it to its foundations.^ He declared him so far above 
 the plane of the evangelists who undertook to report his 
 words and deeds that it was impossible for them to do 
 him justice. The transcendent worth and finality of 
 his work he pictured in these strong terms : "His perfect 
 idealism is the highest rule of unworldly and virtuous 
 life. He has created the heaven of free souls, in which 
 is found what we ask in vain on earth, the perfect no- 
 bility of the children of God, absolute purity, total abstrac- 
 tion from the contamination of the world ; that freedom, 
 in short, which material society shuts out as an impossi- 
 bility, and which finds all its amplitude only in the domain 
 of thought. The great master of those who take refuge 
 in this ideal kingdom of God is Jesus still. He first pro- 
 claimed the kingdom of the spirit; he first said, at least 
 
 ^ Life of Jesus, chap. xxii. * Ibid., chap. xix. » Ibid., chap. xxv. 
 
310 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 by his acts, 'My kingdom is not of this world.' The 
 foundation of the true rehgion is indeed his work. After 
 him there is nothing more but to develop and fructify."* 
 
 It was a very severe comment which Hausrath pro- 
 nounced upon Kenan's book when he said : "This Life 
 of Jesus would be beautiful were not this Jesus there."^ 
 The comment is just. Renan has given us some fine 
 scene-painting. He has vividly sketched some of the ac- 
 cessories of the life of Jesus. But for the hero of the 
 story, as he stands forth in moral beauty and strength 
 upon the theater of the gospel history, he has substituted 
 an unfamiliar form. Who can recognize the Jesus whom 
 he depicts? What heart of man can feel toward that 
 Jesus an impulse of worship or trust? Crowned indeed 
 he is with lavish praises. The praises, however, cannot 
 suffice to recommend a subject characterized as, on the 
 whole, he has been characterized. Never did eulogy ring 
 more hollow than that with which Renan strews his 
 pages. In spite of it all, the reader is left with the im- 
 pression that he has produced not so much a description 
 of the Son of Man as a defamation. 
 
 Giving attention to a few of the more obvious criti- 
 cisms that may be brought forward, we notice, in the 
 first place, the gratuitous character of an underlying 
 assumption of Kenan's attempt at biographical recon- 
 struction. We do not mean his dogmatic fiat against 
 miracles, though that might properly be adduced in this 
 connection, but rather the strong contrast which he af- 
 fects to find between the earlier and the later career of 
 Jesus. Where is the warrant to be found for that con- 
 trast? Certainly not in the gospel narratives. There is 
 
 * Life of Jesus, chap, xxviii. 
 
 * David Friedrich Strauss und die Theologie seiner Zeit, II. 276. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 311 
 
 no ground there for the highly colored picture which is 
 given of Galilee as a fit theater for a perpetual holiday on 
 the part of the young prophet and his intimates. As has 
 been well said, "The Galileans were a comparatively rude 
 and simple people; their country was more joyous and 
 fruitful [than the Judsean region] ; their cottage-life more 
 sweet, peaceful, and idyllic; their habits in all respects 
 more natural. But of a higher spiritual susceptibility, 
 or a richer spiritual wisdom among them there is no 
 trace. It was at Nazareth, where our Lord was brought 
 up, that 'they rose up and thrust him out of the city.' 
 It was of his native district that he said, 'A prophet 
 is not without honor, save in his own country, and in his 
 own house.' It was of Capernaum, a town of Galilee, 
 and Chorazin and Bethsaida, kindred villages, that he 
 laments with such pathetic sadness, that they were utterly 
 indifferent to his teaching. In Galilee were found, no 
 doubt, the simple Shulamite, and the penitent Magdalene, 
 and the good Joseph and Mary; but side by side there 
 were also found the political schemer, the dark bigot, 
 the fanatical enthusiast, no less than in Jerusalem. The 
 same variations of natural character, with unimportant 
 modifications, appear in both."^ It was, in short, a mixed 
 cup, compounded of joy and grief, which Jesus was com- 
 pelled to drink in every part of his public ministry. The 
 greatest bitterness may have been reserved for the closing 
 scenes at Jerusalem and its neighborhood; but Renan 
 in his picture of the long-drawn Galilean festival in- 
 dulges in a mere fancy sketch. No more does he respect 
 historical data in his representation of a radical change in 
 the bearing of Jesus. That the Son of Mary, contrary 
 to his earlier practice, allowed himself to be crowded into 
 the role of a thaumaturgist is an unsupported assump- 
 
 * John TuUoch, Lectures on Kenan's Vie de J6sus, 1864, pp. 176-178. 
 
312 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tion. The representation of the primitive biographies 
 is that from the very beginning of his pubHc ministry 
 his benevolence and tender sympathy began to flow out 
 in acts of heahng. Equally void of all historic basis is 
 the allegation that the inward harmony and the poise 
 characteristic of his early career were wanting in the later. 
 Never, according to the extant memorials, was he more 
 completely master of himself and of the situation than in 
 the closing epoch. In his silencing of cavilers, in his 
 discourses to his disciples, in the dignity of the reserve 
 which he maintained before accusers and judges, he ex- 
 hibited as calm and worthy a lordship as he had ever 
 manifested. In seeing the contrary the critic sees what 
 has no basis in any historic record. When he says that 
 "Jesus no longer retained possession of himself" he is 
 simply drawing upon his own imagination for bio- 
 graphical materials. 
 
 In the second place, an element of radical incongruity 
 must be charged against Renan's portrait of Jesus. Who 
 can reconcile the two parts of the portrait ? On the one 
 hand is the pure and lofty spirit whose intuition of the 
 divine quite transcended the plane of Judaism, who dwelt 
 in the bosom' of the Father in uninterrupted communica- 
 tion, and who is worthy to be accorded the scepter of 
 moral dominion over all the generations of mankind. 
 On the other hand is the enthusiast who allows himself 
 to be forced into an unworthy scheme of wonder-work- 
 ing, who forsakes the path of truth and sobriety in mak- 
 ing exorbitant claims for himself, who grows desperate 
 over threatened disaster to his impracticable program, 
 and who needed to be saved from ending in a spectacle of 
 impotency and defeat by the speedy intervention of a 
 tragic death. The incongruity is glaring. To take both 
 sides of the picture would require a faculty which may 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 313 
 
 have been resident in the French critic, but which makes 
 no part of the ordinary mental constitution. 
 
 Finally, it must be said that an element of ethical 
 shallowness and obliquity enters into this fanciful biog- 
 raphy. It contains a strain of apology for acts that a 
 clear and stanch moral sense must condemn. Observe 
 the tone of the following : "He who takes humanity with 
 its illusions, and seeks to act upon it and with it, cannot 
 be blamed. Caesar knew very well that he was not the 
 son of Venus. France would not be what she is had she 
 not believed for a thousand years in the sacred ampulla 
 of Rheims. It is easy for us, impotent as we are, to call 
 this falsehood, and, proud of our timid honesty, to treat 
 with contempt the heroes who accepted under other con- 
 ditions the battle of life. When we shall have done with 
 our scruples what they did with their falsehoods, we 
 shall have the right to be severe upon them."^ 
 
 Brunetiere gives a just estimate of Renan's Vie de 
 Jesus where he says, "It is not history, but romance, or 
 less and worse than romance."^ More than one passage 
 in the book may well incite one to accentuate the last 
 clause in this statement. 
 
 II. — Schenkel's Sketch of the Character of Jesus 
 
 In 1863, the same year in which Renan published his 
 Vie de Jesus, Daniel Schenkel (1813-85) sent forth his 
 Charakterbild Jesu. His book, like that of the French 
 author, was designed for popular use. In tone it was 
 more moderate and reverent. No very pronounced in- 
 fluence of philosophical premises appears upon its pages. 
 A doctrinaire phase is indeed observable; but this consists 
 rather in the representation of Jesus as the champion of 
 such a scheme of antidogmatic liberalism as was agree- 
 
 ^ Life of Jesus, chap. xv. ^ Cinq Lettres sur Ernest Renan, p. 80. 
 
314 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 able to the thought of the biographer than in any pecuHar 
 postulates respecting God and the universe. So far as 
 is discoverable, Schenkel proceeded from the standpoint 
 of the ordinary theistic conception. The same may be 
 said of Keim, whose more elaborate work on the life of 
 Jesus was published a few years later. 
 
 In his view of the Gospels, Schenkel stood nearer to 
 Renan than to the Tubingen school. Among the Synop- 
 tists he considered that Mark gives the life of Jesus in 
 the purest objectivity. He supposed, however, that our 
 Gospel of Mark was based on an earlier biography of 
 Jesus, written at Rome by Mark before the year 60. Of 
 this primitive document large use was made in the com- 
 position of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. The fourth 
 Gospel, as Schenkel conceived, cannot be referred to the 
 direct authorship of the apostle John. Yet it may be 
 credited with Johannine connections. It is probable that 
 John lived at Ephesus to an advanced age. Here, under 
 the stimulus of new conditions, his thought of Jesus and 
 of his mission took on an elevated cast. Disciples appro- 
 priated his representations, and gave them such specula- 
 tive coloring as was naturally imparted by minds in con- 
 tact with the incoming Gnostic teaching. Thus the basis 
 was prepared for the fourth Gospel, which appeared after 
 the death of John, its date being the interval between 1 10 
 and 120. In portraying Jesus the evangelist has used 
 large liberty in carrying back the standpoint of his own 
 age. His composition, nevertheless, is a real source for 
 the characterization of the founder of Christianity. While 
 the Son of Man was not in the particular events and 
 stages of his life just as he is pictured by the fourth 
 evangelist, a true suggestion is still given by that evangel- 
 ist as to what he was in the height and depth of his 
 activity. To do justice to the eternal significance of his 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 315 
 
 personality we need to supplement the synoptical narra- 
 tives by the portraiture contained in the fourth Gospel.^ 
 
 A qualification on the historical character of all the 
 Gospels is found, according to Schenkel, in stories of 
 miraculous deeds. He affirms that we can form no proper 
 conception of a miracle-working power which passes 
 human measures. Applying this standard, he cuts off 
 all the recorded nature miracles. These, he says, were 
 doubtless reported in good faith. Fervent admiration 
 for the Master combined with the influence of Old Testa- 
 ment narratives gave rise to tales of workings which 
 belong rather to the province of omnipotence than to that 
 of a finite personality. The only credible marvels as- 
 cribed to Jesus are the acts of healing which he is said to 
 have performed. Apart from all supernatural interven- 
 tion, a specially gifted personality, a man of ideal moral 
 force, is able to elicit a mighty faith in those affected with 
 bodily or mental ailments, and through this faith to work 
 certain transformations in their behalf. So Jesus by 
 virtue of extraordinary, yet purely human, endowments 
 accomplished numerous works of healing. To the people 
 of that time they were miracles ; to us they are psychologi- 
 cally explainable. Being thus intolerant of the notion of 
 miracle proper, Schenkel, of course, cannot admit the 
 literal resurrection of Jesus. The appearances of the 
 Crucified One he puts in a class with the disclosure of the 
 Lord which was vouchsafed to Paul. Not a bodily resur- 
 rection, but continuous working in spirit, was the impor- 
 tant thing. By his power over the company of his fol- 
 lowers Jesus was shown to have truly escaped the bonds 
 of death. 
 
 With intolerance for miracles Schenkel joined a pro- 
 nounced antipathy for the catholic Christology. Indeed, 
 
 * Das Charakterbild Jesu, third ed., pp. 12-14, 17-26. 
 
3i6 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 his ambition to antagonize that Christology was obviously 
 among the motives which impelled him to write his book. 
 He takes pains to make prominent his conviction that 
 Jesus was in essence a purely human being. At the same 
 time he places him far above the plane of ordinary man- 
 hood. He implies a conviction of his sinlessness by 
 teaching that in his baptism Jesus confessed not his own 
 sin, but the sin of the people with which he humbly 
 associated himself and whose cause he made his own.^ 
 In very pronounced terms he affirms in the inner life 
 of Jesus extraordinary factors. His consciousness of 
 God was infinitely higher and deeper than that of the 
 prophets.^ He came to understand that in his person 
 eternal truth in its original energy had given itself a 
 new form, and that he was made the medium for institu- 
 ting in creative efficiency a new beginning of life for 
 mankind.^ 
 
 A tribute to the incomparable greatness of the person 
 and the work of Jesus is still further paid by Schenkel 
 in the comments which he makes on the shortcomings of 
 rationalism in dealing with this theme. "It has not done 
 justice," he says, "either in a religious or historical re- 
 spect to the sublimity and uniqueness of the character 
 of Jesus. Not only does the rationalistic portraiture of 
 Jesus leave the feeling cold, the imagination empty, the 
 heart indifferent, but also the understanding in its deeper 
 inquiries fails to conceive how this wise Rabbi of 
 Nazareth, how this enlightened Jew, whose ambition to 
 carry forward a work of enlightenment precipitated his 
 crucifixion, through the wrath of priests and the envy 
 of officials, came to found a world religion, and to pre- 
 scribe for centuries its course to the whole stream of 
 
 » Das Charakterbild Jesu, p. 33. ' Ibid., pp. 14. 15 
 
 ' Ibid., pp. 66, 122. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 317 
 
 advancing culture. To really believe upon the rationalis- 
 tic Christ is impossible. His person is altogether trans- 
 parent and intelligible to the understanding; only his 
 working is beyond interpretation. For comprehending 
 this there is wanting to the personality the original fellow- 
 ship with the divine and infinite. The divine does not 
 appear as present in that personality. It is simply supra- 
 mundane, and, accordingly, no new revelation is intro- 
 duced with Christ, no new creative beginning is posited 
 in the history of the world. "^ 
 
 This is just criticism ; but in rendering it Schenkel 
 has unconsciously described a deficit in his own attempt 
 to portray the Jesus of the Gospels. In spite of formal 
 tributes, the general character of his delineations leaves 
 the impression that it is not the Saviour known to the 
 early Church and to the devout of the later centuries 
 that he presents to us, but only a specially eminent reli- 
 gious hero. The formal tributes, too, naturally raise a 
 question as to whether Schenkel does not make a miracle 
 of the person of Jesus, and thus expose himself to the 
 charge of inconsistency in excluding miracles. But the 
 consideration of this point is properly postponed, since 
 there will be occasion to raise the like question in connec- 
 tion with the biography of Jesus which is forthwith to 
 claim' our attention. 
 
 III. — Keim's History of Jesus 
 
 Theodor Keim (1825-78), who was a pupil of Baur 
 but who advanced to a somewhat independent position, 
 produced a critical biography of Jesus^ which exceeded 
 in bulk the very ample Leben Jesu of Strauss. In re- 
 spect of standpoint he had a larger sympathy than Strauss 
 
 * Das Charakterbild Jesu, pp. 6, 7. 
 
 ' Geschichte Jesu von Nazara, three vols., 1867—72. 
 
3i8 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 with the inheritance of cathohc convictions, and was 
 disposed to render greater deference to the historical 
 basis of the Gospels. Nevertheless, he did not keep his 
 criticism free from a strain of a priori dogmatism. In 
 various connections he seems to have consulted rather 
 the demands of a preformed theory than any discoverable 
 requirement of the historical data. 
 
 Keim followed the Tiibingen school in giving the pref- 
 erence to the Gospel of Matthew. He concluded that 
 this, in its original form, dates from about the year 68, 
 and that additions of comparatively small compass were 
 made near the end of the century. To this primitive 
 Matthew, he says, a good degree of historic credibility 
 belongs. "The discourses of Jesus in particular bear 
 along with time-marks signs of a unique originality, of 
 a masterful nature, of a divine consecration and might, 
 to such a degree that even the single word, as being 
 clothed with an antique drapery that was soon lost in the 
 Church, wears the stamp of a spirit whom no follower, 
 no evangelist, Jewish or Gentile, and also not even a Paul 
 could invent."* Matthew in its original form served as 
 one of the sources for the third Gospel, which was written 
 by a moderate representative of Paulinism a considerable 
 interval after the destruction of Jerusalem. The Gospel 
 of Mark was regarded by Keim as dependent on both 
 Matthew and Luke. At first he placed it about the year 
 loo; later he was inclined to locate it between 115 and 
 120.^ In a similar manner he shifted the date for the 
 composition of the fourth Gospel. It was placed as early 
 as from no to 117 in the first volume of the larger biog- 
 raphy of Jesus ; in the shorter biography, on the other 
 hand, it was assigned to the interval between 130 and 
 
 > Geschichte Jesu von Nazara, I. 64. 
 
 * Geschichte Jesu iibersichthch erzahlt, third ed., 1875, p. 36. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 319 
 
 135. As respects the historical worth of this Gospel, the 
 estimate of Keim was exceedingly disparaging. He can 
 hardly be said to have expressed himself in as appreciative 
 terms as did Schenkel. 
 
 While persistently adhering to his original theory on 
 the interrelation of the Synoptical Gospels, Keim was 
 aware that the current of New Testament criticism had 
 set strongly against that theory. Judged by the broad 
 consensus of recent scholarship in favor of the priority 
 of Mark's Gospel, he must be pronounced quite unfortu- 
 nate in a prominent part of his critical presuppositions. 
 
 Keim expresses the opinion that in dealing with a per- 
 sonality like Jesus, who so greatly transcended the meas- 
 ure of his time and of all times, it is not legitimate to dis- 
 pose of the question of miracles by the summary and 
 easy-going method of Strauss.^ Nevertheless, his own 
 dealing with this question approximates to that of his 
 radical predecessor. In his view misinterpretation of the 
 words of Jesus, magnifying of simple incidents under 
 the impulse of a boundless admiration, and readiness to 
 paint a beloved Master after the pattern and deeds of the 
 greatest characters of the Old Testament, explain many 
 of the stories of miraculous doings. For the reports of 
 the nature miracles no more substantial sources than 
 these are to be recognized. On the other hand, a very 
 considerable proportion of the acts of healing, whether 
 wrought in relation to the physically afflicted or in rela- 
 tion to the so-called demoniacs — in other words, the men- 
 tally afflicted — are deserving of credence. The way in 
 which these acts are described invites to confidence. "It 
 is the genuinely historical Jesus, who here in compassion- 
 ate response to need performs his deeds, there reluctantly 
 exercises his power over the might of evil, who resorts 
 
 ' Geschichte Jesu von Nazara, I. 65, 66. 
 
320 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 under compulsion to the healing- office, who works on prin- 
 ciple with the spiritual word and desires spiritual faith, 
 and who finally imposes silence upon the healed. That is 
 a kind of Jesus such as the sensuous appetite for marvels 
 belonging to the time could scarcely have invented,"^ 
 The ground of the ability to perform these works re- 
 sided in the spiritual life of Jesus, in his power of will, 
 confidence, and compassion. A supplementary ground 
 was supplied by the faith of those for whom the benefi- 
 cent works were performed. "The decisive power lay 
 manifestly in the combined outburst of the faith [Glaii- 
 benssturm] of the sick and of the healer. "^ 
 
 On the subject of the resurrection of Jesus, Keim 
 championed a theory which may be regarded as a com- 
 promise between the catholic affirmation of a real bodily 
 resurrection and the assumption of Renan and others 
 that the appearances of the one who had gone to the cross 
 and the tomb were mere subjective appearances. Keim 
 granted, indeed, that the appearances came through the 
 medium of visions, but maintained at the same time that 
 these had an objective ground in the activity of Jesus, 
 who in this way made himself manifest to his followers.^ 
 An extraordinary psychical working is thus made to take 
 the place of the physical miracle. 
 
 Though denying the supernatural conception and the 
 preexistence of Jesus, and defining him as in essence 
 purely human, Keim hardly stops short of a worshipful 
 eulogy in the tribute which he pays to him. He accepts 
 the fact of his sinlessness, and declares that this by itself 
 puts him above the category of the mere religious genius. 
 Any small infirmities, he says, which may be thought to 
 have been manifested by Jesus were not real sins, but only 
 natural incidents of the human constitution in Jesus and 
 
 • Geschichte JesuvonNazara, II. 141. ^Ibid., II. 155. ' Ibid., III. 600-603. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 321 
 
 of the historical situation. As regards the hidden Hfe of 
 his earher years, we can reason back to its exemption from 
 the stain of transgression. The one who in his sinless 
 manhood felt no smart over his past record must have 
 been distinguished by a blameless youth. And in respect 
 of positive endowments Jesus stands equally above the 
 ordinary level. In the characteristics of his inner life 
 and in his historical significance he is without parallel. 
 He represents a new stage in the development of tlie 
 human spirit. In his person a divine miracle (das 
 Wimder Gottes) is disclosed. The spirit of sonship 
 came to perfection in him, and he had in full measure 
 that sense of human dignity and of divine love which 
 exists in others in marred and fragmentary form. He 
 stands for a new creation in humanity, a completion of 
 the divine image. He is the divine man in whom the 
 striving of God after complete manifestation and the 
 restless struggle of man to grasp God came to a satisfy- 
 ing result. He exemplifies the highest attainable stage 
 of the inner union of God and man, and one is merely 
 giving place to an unworthy and impertinent dream when 
 he supposes it possible for another to surpass Jesus in 
 achievement and personality. In his transcendence of 
 the conditions of his time and the characteristics of his 
 contemporaries he makes the impression of a mysterious 
 uniqueness, a superhuman marvel, a divine creation. To 
 view his person is to view not merely a work among 
 many works of God, but the most peculiar work, the speci- 
 fic revelation of God. In harmony with his extraordinary 
 standing he attributes, even in the face of seeming down- 
 fall, eternal validity to his own person and cause. He is 
 the basis of rest and the spring of motion in the history 
 of the world, the creator of a new higher cosmos whose 
 days are reckoned by millenniums. Even his opponents. 
 
322 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 in so far as they strive for the worthy, are compyelled to 
 fight under the banner of the man who, after the fashion 
 of God, called out of nothingness, as no other beside him 
 has done, a world of life.^ 
 
 In view of his estimate of the person of Jesus, Keim 
 — and also Schenkel in a somewhat less emphatic sense — 
 may be said to have set the door ajar for a return to an 
 essentially catholic standpoint. If one is to admit so great 
 a miracle in human history as Jesus is made out to have 
 been, why should real miracles be treated with so much 
 incredulity? Whence comes the assurance that the in- 
 comparable person, in the fulfillment of an unparalleled 
 mission, did not perform deeds of superhuman might? 
 Why cut out this work, and that and the other — which 
 are properly subordinated to ethical ends and which fit 
 harmoniously into narratives that fulfill a great didactic 
 purpose ? We submit that Keim's conception of the per- 
 son of Jesus provides a rational basis for a larger toler- 
 ance than that which he has awarded to the narratives of 
 miracles in the Gospels. 
 
 In relation to Christological theory, also, Keim's esti- 
 mate of Jesus may be regarded as affording an apologetic 
 ground for the catholic belief. The altogether excep- 
 tional personality and life of this wonderful benefactor 
 of the race call for an explanation. Is it certain that any 
 better explanation can be found than the assumption 
 of a special bond between Jesus and the divine? And, 
 if a special bond is to be assumed, is it certain that we can 
 do better than to regard Jesus as the expression in time 
 of the eternally filial, as has been claimed in catholic 
 thinking? A manifest ground for taking this course lies 
 in the New Testament content. Anyone who assigns to 
 
 ^ Geschichte Jesu von Nazara, I.i, 6, 360, 447—449 ; II. 575 ; 111.219,649—667. 
 
RENAN AND OTHERS ON LIFE OF JESUS 323 
 
 Jesus the lofty character and mission depicted by Keim 
 must contemn the notion that he came by accident, and 
 must insist that here, more certainly and grandly than at 
 any other point of history, the providence of God is made 
 manifest. Now, what else than a consistent supplement 
 to the providence which furnished Jesus can we find in 
 the providence which is adapted to afford a substantially 
 authentic interpretation of his person and mission ? Evi- 
 dently it is favorable to the conservation of cong-ruity in 
 divine procedure to suppose that divine illumination was 
 efficiently operative in producing that picture of the son- 
 ship of the Lord Jesus Christ which is set before us in 
 the more constructive portions of the New Testament. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 ELEMENTS OF RADICALISM IN THE RECENT CRITICISM 
 OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 
 
 I. — Views Relative to the Stories of the 
 Patriarchs 
 
 In the opinion of a large proportion of scholars the 
 modern movement in biblical criticism has legitimated 
 very considerable departures from the traditional con- 
 ceptions of Old Testament books and institutions. The 
 theory that large portions of the Pentateuch were of post- 
 Mosaic origin, which seemed, as it was voiced in the seven- 
 teenth century by Hobbes, Peyrere, Spinoza, and Simon, 
 to be a rash and unwarrantable speculation, has claimed 
 extensive acceptance. The documentary hypothesis which 
 Astruc in the eighteenth century applied to Genesis, and 
 which claimed the approval of Michaelis and Eichhorn, 
 was given a much wider application in the nineteenth 
 century by a succession of scholars, among whom a con- 
 spicuous place was occupied by De Wette, Ewald, Vatke, 
 Reuss, and Graf. The distinctive thesis of the last men- 
 tioned, whose treatise on The Historical Books of the Old 
 Testament appeared in 1866, was the late origin of the 
 priestly legislation embodied in the middle books of the 
 Pentateuch. The same thesis, which locates this legis- 
 lation in its literary form within exilian or post-exilian 
 times, was earnestly championed by Kuenen, Wellhau- 
 sen, and others, and thus came to be ranked in the clos- 
 ing years of the century as a characteristic feature of 
 Old Testament criticism. Meanwhile revised views on 
 other portions of the Old Testament, notably on the 
 books of Isaiah and Daniel, obtained large currency. 
 
 324 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 325 
 
 Extent of acceptance is doubtless no infallible measure 
 of the merits of critical theories. Still, when we con- 
 sider the large number of scholars, whose temper is 
 neither iconoclastic nor anti-evangelical, with whom cer- 
 tain cardinal contentions of the newer criticism have be- 
 come matters of assured conviction, we seem in all 
 sobriety to be debarred from rating these contentions as 
 being in themselves specific manifestations of radicalism. 
 Consequently as here used that term has a less extensive 
 scope than has often been given to it by the advocate of the 
 strict traditional standpoint. Without attempting to 
 decide just how much of the recent criticism of the Old 
 Testament has valid claims to tolerance or approval, we 
 make note of various conclusions which seem to us to in- 
 volve gratuitous disparagement of the Hebrew oracles, 
 and to be the product rather of a doctrinaire temper than 
 of a sober historical judgment. 
 
 First among these conclusions is that which denies that 
 the narratives of the patriarchal progenitors of Israel 
 contain anything of the character of real personal his- 
 tory. On two different grounds this negative proposition 
 has been put forth : first, on the ground that the patriarchs 
 Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc., are to be regarded as per- 
 sonifications of tribes, being the forms under which later 
 generations pictured the lost beginnings of the national 
 antecedents; secondly, on the ground that what is given 
 under these titles is in substance nothing but a group of 
 myths relative to the sky and its orbs. 
 
 The former method of negating the historicity of the 
 patriarchal narratives is the one which claims the larger 
 currency in the ranks of Old Testament critics. Use is 
 made of it, for instance, by Kuenen. "The 'sons of 
 Israel,' " he says, "who penetrated into Canaan under 
 Joshua formed a union or bond of twelve kindred tribes. 
 
326 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 For the present we will pass over the question how that 
 bond originated. Once in existence, it led to the idea that 
 the twelve tribes — just as each separately had sprung from 
 one father — were collectively children of one ancestor. 
 ... In short, the tribes were regarded and treated as 
 individuals, and were transferred to the house of their 
 common father in the same mutual relation in which they 
 actually stood to each other. ... Of course, we do not 
 hesitate to apply also to the rest of the patriarchs the in- 
 terpretation which we have proposed for Jacob and his 
 sons. As progenitors of tribes — and it is in this char- 
 acter that they appear in Genesis — they too are not per- 
 sons, but personifications. ... Of course, in the abstract, 
 it is possible that such persons as Abraham, Isaac, and 
 Jacob should have existed. . . . But our present investi- 
 gation does not concern the question whether there ex- 
 isted men of those names, but whether the progenitors 
 of Israel, and of the neighboring nations who are repre- 
 sented in Genesis, are historical personages. It is this 
 question which we answer in the negative."^ 
 
 The same scheme of interpretation is adopted by Well- 
 hausen. In his view the stories of the forefathers in 
 Genesis proceeded from the ethnological relations and 
 arrangements of worship of the time of the kings, being 
 the representations with which the story-tellers and 
 writers of that age, borrowing from their own surround- 
 ings, filled up the empty canvas beyond the Mosaic 
 period.2 The stories are not pure myths ; but such facts 
 as they may embrace belong rather to national or tribal 
 history than to that of individuals. "The Leah tribes 
 were comprehended with the Rachel tribes under the 
 common father Jacob-Israel ; then entire Israel with the 
 
 > The Religion of Israel to the Pall of the Jewish State, trans, by A. H. 
 May, I. 111-113. 
 
 ' Israelitische und Judische Geschichte, second edition, p. ir. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 327 
 
 people of Edom under the old name Isaac ; further, Isaac 
 with Lot, the father of Moab and Ammon, under Abra- 
 ham. . . . The historical succession and juxtaposition 
 conform to the method of logical or statistical subordina- 
 tion and coordination; in reality the elements are com- 
 monly older than the groups, and the smaller groups 
 older than the larger." Thus Abraham is the youngest 
 figure in the series, and probably was prefixed to Isaac 
 at a comparatively late date. Abraham, it is true, is not 
 known to have been the name of a tribe or people. But 
 that affords no suitable warrant for regarding him as an 
 historical person; "sooner he might be esteemed the free 
 creation of spontaneous poetizing."^ 
 
 Stade is equally pronounced in denying to the patri- 
 archs the character of historical persons, and decides that 
 the representation of their sojourn in the country west 
 of the Jordan is without any good basis in fact.^ The 
 thoroughly legendary character of the Genesis narratives 
 is also affirmed by Smend. "The history of the fore- 
 fathers," he maintains, "is only an ideal prefiguration of 
 the history of Israel, and the intercourse of Jahve with the 
 forefathers is only an expression of the faith that his 
 grace was already operative in the first beginnings of 
 Israel."^ 
 
 As a representative of those who see in the patriarchal 
 history, above all else, a set of myths relating to the sky 
 and its orbs, we may mention Goldziher. "Originally," 
 he says, "the names of the patriarchs and the actions 
 which are told of them signified nothing historical, but 
 only something in the domain of nature. The names are 
 appellations of physical phenomena, and the actions are 
 
 1 Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels, second edition, pp. 336-338. 
 ' Geschichte des Volkes Israel, I. 127; Biblische Theologie des Alten 
 Testaments, § 22. 
 
 " Lehrbuch der alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte, p. 12. 
 
328 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 actions of nature."^ The way in which Goldziher appHes 
 this exegetical canon may be observed in the following 
 sentences : "We see in the myths of Abraham and of 
 Jephthah the two sides of the same idea, each having its 
 peculiar form and frame: the former tells of the victory 
 of the night, the dark sky of night, over the sun; the 
 latter of that of the dawn over the shades of night. . . . 
 One of the most conspicuous names of the dark sky of 
 night or clouds in the Hebrew mythology, and contain- 
 ing a rich fund of mythical matter, is Jacob. . . . Both 
 Esau and Laban are solar figures. What we learn of 
 them in the epic treatment of the old myth found in the 
 Old Testament presents a multitude of solar character- 
 istics. We especially note this in Esau, whose heel Jacob 
 grasps at their birth. This mythical expression is clear 
 enough. Night comes into the world with day's heel in 
 his hand, or, as we should say. Night follows close upon 
 day, driving him from his place. "^ 
 
 Winckler resorts in ample measure to a similar line 
 of interpretation in his radical curtailment of the his- 
 toricity of the biblical narratives up to the accounts of the 
 early kings of Israel. On the one hand, it is true, he sup- 
 poses that these narratives were born of the tendency 
 of a relatively late age to depict the past after the pattern 
 of its own conditions, a procedure which was patronized 
 with special industry by David and the writers of his court 
 under the pressure of a political exigency. But, on the 
 other hand, he supposes Babylonian mythology and as- 
 trology to have been a potent factor in shaping the nar- 
 ratives in question.^ Abraham when placed in conjunc- 
 tion with Lot reduces in his interpretation to one of the 
 
 • Mythology Among the Hebrews and its Historical Development, trans, 
 by R. Martineau, p. i8. ' Pages 104, 133, 134. 
 
 3 Geschichte Israels. Die Keilinschriften und das alte Testament, 3te 
 aufl. von E. Schrader, neu bearbeitet von H. Zimmem und E. Winckler. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 329 
 
 Dioscuri. As the husband of Sarah, who stands for Ish- 
 tar, he is identified with Tammuz, and thus is associated 
 with the moon god Sin, the father of Tammuz and Ish- 
 tar. Jacob also bears the character of a moon divinity, 
 only as the father of twelve sons he is connected rather 
 with the completion of the year than with the month. 
 Stucken is at one with Winckler in his disposition to read 
 into the early history of Israel a set of myths derived from 
 star-worshiping Babylonia. He is minded, however, to 
 construe Abraham as primarily representing Orion, and 
 Sarah as standing for Sirius.^ Zimmern, while admit- 
 ting that some of the points made by Winckler, in his 
 endeavor to detect lunar, solar, or stellar myths in the 
 stories of the forefathers, are untenable, still holds that 
 his work in that direction is quite legitimate and in vari- 
 ous points successful."^ 
 
 Evidently the two theories for explaining the content 
 of the patriarchal narratives, if taken in a radical sense, 
 are not compatible each with the other. If the funda- 
 mental motive in the construction of these narratives was 
 supplied by ethnological conditions, then it was not fur- 
 nished by a vivid impression of solar, lunar, or stellar 
 phenomena. If the narratives are in essence personifica- 
 tions of tribal facts, then they are not in essence astral 
 myths. Place can logically be made for either theory 
 only by reduction of emphasis upon the other. As re- 
 spects the relative merits of the two, the weight of 
 scholarship and the demands of sober thinking alike, as 
 it seems to us, award the preference to the former. It 
 makes by far too great a strain upon a reasonable faith 
 to ask one to believe that the most vital factors in the na- 
 
 * Astralnrv'then der Hebraer, Babylonier und Aegypter. 
 ^ Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament, p. 365. 
 
330 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tional and religious consciousness of a people had noth- 
 ing to do with a real historical evolution, an actual na- 
 tional drama, but were simply translations into other 
 terms of facts open to the common gaze of men on the 
 face of tlie sky. To suppose that the Israelites, to the 
 neglect of all reminiscence of their own past, engrossed 
 themselves in a play with mythological phantoms is to 
 suppose that they were veritably a moonstruck people. 
 Then, too, how closely it borders on the grotesque to 
 assume any sort of connection between various passages 
 in the patriarchal stories and the alternating appearances 
 of day and night, of sun and moon, of clear sky and 
 clouds. When the mythologist asks us to see in the de- 
 scription of the relations between Sarah and Hagar a 
 figurative representation of the rivalry between the moon 
 and the sun, we are inclined to ask him what there is to 
 prevent an unfelicitous item, which may chance to find 
 a place in his own domestic annals, from being inter- 
 preted in the same way. Positive disproof of his peculiar 
 exegesis may not be easy ; but there is scanty need of such 
 disproof. Its own fancifulness and artificiality may 
 safely be trusted to limit very decidedly the patronage 
 awarded to his scheme of interpretation. 
 
 The ethnological theory, which supposes that under 
 the names of the patriarchs of Israel the tribes, out of 
 which the nations of later times grew, were pictured in 
 their inferred characteristics and relations, has its most 
 plausible ground in the fact that in the early biblical lists 
 a close discrimination between individuals and tribes or 
 peoples seems not to have been observed. In the tenth 
 chapter of Genesis, for example, nations are mentioned 
 as individuals, and on the other hand the individual Nim- 
 rod is placed in relation to one of them, namely Cush, as 
 a son. But too much is not to be made out of instances 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 331 
 
 like these. The failure to discriminate verbally between 
 the tribe and the individual in a passing reference is quite 
 a different thing from treating a tribe as an individual 
 throughout the details of an extended narrative. The 
 proof that a biblical writer could proceed in the former 
 way is far from conclusive evidence that he was capable 
 of proceeding in the latter way. 
 
 Quite as inconclusive is another ground which has been 
 urged for the ethnological theory. The Israelitish con- 
 ception of the patriarchal history, says the advocate of 
 that theory, goes on the supposition that nations or tribes 
 come into being by the growth of a family which had its 
 beginning in a single ancestor. This supposition, it is 
 claimed, is baseless. "It is quite certain," writes Kuenen, 
 "that, although it is not entirely supposititious, this theory 
 of the origin of nations is not the true one. Families 
 become tribes, and eventually nations, not only, nor even 
 chiefly, by multiplying, but also, nay, principally, by com- 
 bination with the inhabitants of some district, by the 
 subjection of the weaker to the stronger, by the gradual 
 blending together of sometimes very heterogeneous ele- 
 ments."^ The trouble with this pronouncement is that it 
 takes too little account of varying conditions. Where 
 causes, whether social, moral, or physical, conduce to a 
 relative isolation it is quite possible that for a consider- 
 able period family expansion should be the principal 
 means of approach to tribal or national dimensions. That 
 Israel in its early stages grew principally — it is not neces- 
 sary to say exclusively — in this way is quite conceivable, 
 and is not to be summarily denied on the score of a 
 sweeping postulate as to historic process. 
 
 The theory under review, it should be observed, would 
 not be justified by the discovery that one or another 
 
 * The Religion of Israel, I. 1 10. 
 
22,2 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 item appropriate to a tribe had been associated by the 
 bibhcal writer with the name of a patriarch. Not to men- 
 tion the fact of possible similarities between the char- 
 acter and position of an individual and of the tribe 
 emanating from him, it is quite conceivable that, in his 
 attempt to picture the remote historical individual, the 
 sacred writer might blend with matter properly descrip- 
 tive of the individual something which was primarily 
 suggested by tribal or national facts. Indeed, there are 
 scholars who, while they contend that the Israelitish 
 patriarchs were actual persons, still are disposed to admit 
 that the narratives about them in the Bible were colored 
 to some extent by ethnological data in the mind of the 
 narrator.* 
 
 Positive objections to the scheme which excludes patri- 
 archal individuals in favor of tribes are not wanting. In 
 the first place, it is not known that the names of some of 
 these reputed individuals were employed as a customary 
 or even exceptional designation of a tribe. This is true 
 of the head of the patriarchal list. As was noticed above, 
 Wellhausen confesses as much, and knows not how better 
 to dispose of Abraham than to classify him as the prod- 
 uct of spontaneous poetizing. 
 
 Again, if in the early and continuous tradition of Israel 
 no reference was made to great personalities back of Moses 
 their intrusion upon the theater of the national history by 
 a late generation needs to be explained. We may say with 
 Driver, "Why, unless there had been positive historical 
 recollections forbidding it to do so, did not Israelite tra- 
 dition concentrate all the glory of founding the national 
 Church and State upon Moses ? If, in spite of the great 
 deliverance undoubtedly achieved by Moses, Israelitish 
 tradition nevertheless goes back beyond Moses, and finds 
 
 * Ryle, article "Abraham " in Hastings's Dictioifery of the Bible, I. 15. 16. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 333 
 
 in the patriarchs the first roots not only of the possession 
 of the land, but also of the people's higher worship of God, 
 this can only be reasonably accounted for by the assumption 
 that memory had retained a hold of the actual course of 
 events."^ The high importance claimed by the patriarchs 
 in the national consciousness is, in truth, a pretty cogent 
 evidence on the side of the belief that they were not mere 
 products of artificial construction. No lengthy discourse, 
 it is true, is expended upon them by the prophets; but 
 they are introduced in a way which presumes upon a 
 common recognition of their lofty standing and function. 
 Even the earliest of the literary prophets have recorded 
 indubitable references to Isaac and Jacob,^ and both of 
 these are coupled in Deuteronomy with Abraham,^ who 
 further is mentioned by the elder Isaiah,* by Micah,'* 
 by Jeremiah,^ by Ezekiel/ and by the later Isaiah.® Some 
 of these references may have been denied by various 
 critics to the writers under whose names they are given. 
 It does not appear, however, that their challenge has any 
 very solid grounds aside from theoretical bias.^ The war- 
 rantable conclusion is that the prophets as a body made 
 no more question about the historic verity and eminence 
 of the Israelitish patriarchs than they did about the 
 reality of Moses and the redemption from Egyptian 
 bondage. 
 
 Finally, we have an evidence which is adapted to ap- 
 peal equally to the ordinary reader and to the scholar. 
 The patriarchal stories read like the history of individuals. 
 Most of their details were not needed for the portrayal 
 of tribal facts, and it is impossible to imagine any motive 
 
 ' The Book of Genesis, with Introduction and Notes, p. xlvii. 
 
 2 Amos vii. 9, 16; Hos. xii. 3-5, 12. 3 Deut. i. 8; vi. 10; xxx. 20. 
 
 * Isa. xxix. 22. 5 Mic. vii. 20. ' Jer. xxxiii. 26. 
 ' Ezek. xxxiii. 24. ' Isa. xli. 8; li. i, 2. 
 
 • Compare James Orr, The Problem of the Old Testament, pp. 94-98. 
 
334 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 for their introduction by a writer who had a design to 
 sketch facts of that order.^ 
 
 II. — Estimates of Moses as Leader and Lawgiver 
 It is only at the extreme end of critical negation that 
 an out-and-out denial of the historicity of Moses has been 
 entered. Occasionally an intemperate champion of celes- 
 tial mythology or a zealot for the pan-Babylonian concep- 
 tion of ancient history may have gone to that excess. 
 But with the great body of critics the reality of Moses 
 as an historical character has been a steadfast datum. 
 The question, therefore, which it is worth while to con- 
 sider concerns not so much his real existence as the na- 
 ture and extent of the work whicli he accomplished. 
 
 In pronouncing on these points Kuenen hardly repre- 
 sents the acme of critical radicalism. He admits the 
 actual occurrence of an exodus from Egypt, in the man- 
 agement of which a potent leadership was demanded and 
 exercised. "We may not doubt," he says, "that the 
 exodus is an historical fact. Independently of the Penta- 
 teuch and the book of Joshua, it is proved by the testi- 
 mony of the prophets. They obviously start from the sup- 
 position that none of their contemporaries disagree with 
 them as to the deliverance out of Egypt. This would be 
 inexplicable if the Israelites had not really dwelt in 
 Egypt, and escaped from Pharaoh's control before they 
 settled in Canaan."^ Kuenen also concedes the proba- 
 bility that in the Pentateuch, as we have it, there is one 
 great memorial of the legislative activity of Moses. "He 
 endeavored," writes the critic, "to inculcate his own con- 
 ception of the requirements of Jahve^ on the people whom 
 
 1 Compare Driver, article "Jacob," Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible, 
 II. 534. 2 The Religion of Israel, I. 117- 
 
 s Some of the critics with whom we are dealing use this form, and we 
 have taken the liberty to employ it generally in references to the covenant 
 God of Israel. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 335 
 
 he liberated. We learn what this conception was from 
 the ten commandments, or 'the ten words,' as they are 
 called in the Pentateuch itself. They are most probably 
 derived, if not in their present form, yet as far as the 
 main thoughts are concerned, from Moses himself."^ 
 But, on the other hand, Kuenen makes a sweeping reduc- 
 tion from the record traditionally connected with Moses. 
 We have in that record, he contends, as also in that rela- 
 tive to Joshua, an illustration of a compacting process. 
 "Events which in reality were distributed over a very- 
 long period, deeds which were achieved by more than one 
 generation and mostly by particular tribes, were com- 
 pressed by tradition into a very short space of time and 
 were ascribed to all Israel."^ Nor was this all. A very 
 free hand was used in describing the events associated 
 with the Mosaic period. The books from Exodus to 
 Joshua inclusive abound in accounts which will not en- 
 dure critical inspection. "Their representations, to put it 
 in a word, are utterly unhistorical, and therefore cannot 
 have been committed to writing, till centuries after Moses 
 and Joshua."^ Even those passages in the reputed his- 
 tory which exhibit Moses as the inculcator of a monothe- 
 istic faith cannot be accepted without qualification. What 
 can legitimately be affirmed is that he imposed a type of 
 religious obligation which naturally worked in the direc- 
 tion of the lofty monotheistic standpoint of the literary 
 prophets. "It is highly probable that he received a deep 
 impression of the might and glory of the God of his na- 
 tion, chose him for the sole object of his adoration, and 
 elevated this his choice into a law for all Israel."^ As re- 
 spects the authorship of written laws, nothing can be 
 
 1 The Five Books of Moses: a Lecture Delivered in 1870. See also The 
 Religion of Israel, I. 274; II. 7. ' The Religion of Israel, I. 134. 
 
 ^ An Historico-Critical Inquiry into the Origin and Composition of the 
 Hexateuch, p. 42. * The Religion of Israel, I. 280. 
 
336 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 accredited to Moses aside from a brief form of "the ten 
 words." No authoritative code having Mosaic associa- 
 tions was pubHshed before the age of Josiah. Any col- 
 lections of laws which may have been in existence before 
 that time were without governmental sanction. To no 
 extant collection did the prophets as a body accord the 
 character of a divinely sanctioned code. "Least of all 
 did they recognize the authority of the ceremonial in- 
 junctions; for if we except Ezekiel and certain utterances 
 relative to the Sabbath, they show complete indifference 
 toward them or even declare that they do not include 
 them among the commands of Jahve."^ 
 
 Wellhausen agrees very largely with Kuenen, but on 
 some points appears a shade more negative in his views. 
 He qualifies very appreciably the office of Moses as the 
 reputed founder of a theocratic state. Moses, he says, 
 proclaimed Jahve as the God of Israel. But a state specifi- 
 cally distinguished by holiness he did not found on that 
 basis ; or, if he did, it did not have the slightest practical 
 consequence or the least historical significance. "Out of 
 the common religious feeling grew for the first time the 
 state, and indeed not a specially holy state, but the state 
 as such."2 Again, Wellhausen treats as utterly unhis- 
 torical the supposed connection of Moses with the Penta- 
 teuchal legislation. "The law," he asserts, "is the prod- 
 uct of the spiritual development of Israel, not the start- 
 ing point thereof. As a whole it is first adapted to post- 
 exilian Judaism and shows itself then for the first time 
 as operative; previously it had no adaptation and was 
 perfectly latent."^ Not even so much as "the ten words" 
 can be referred to Mosaic authorship. So at least the 
 critic seems to teach in what he says of the relation of the 
 
 1 The Religion of Israel, II. 7, 8; The Origin and Composition of the 
 Hexateuch, p. 175. 
 
 2 Israelitische und Judische Geschichte, p. 30. ' Ibid., p. 17- 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT Z2,7 
 
 decalogue to the Deuteronomic reformation in the reign of 
 Josiah,^ Further, Wellhausen is very positive in repudia- 
 ting the conclusion that Moses is entitled to be regarded 
 as an inaugurator of monotheism. "That is contra- 
 dicted," he argues, "most emphatically by the simple fact 
 that Jahve is a proper name, which gives prominence to 
 one individual in a genus. Monotheism was unknown to 
 ancient Israel." He adds: "As little as Jahve was the 
 universal God, so little was he in our sense the super- 
 sensible and spiritual God. Finally, if the idea of the God- 
 head as fundamentally moral is to be regarded as a Mosaic 
 inheritance of ancient Israel, that can occur only with 
 very limited right. At least we must keep at a distance 
 our conception of morality."^ 
 
 Stade and Smend so nearly coincide with Wellhausen 
 on this theme that there is no need to give their views in 
 detail. Both deny that Moses fulfilled the role of a law- 
 giver in any eminent sense and locate his historical im- 
 portance in what he did rather than in what he wrote, 
 namely, in the fruitful beginnings of a new national and 
 religious career which he helped to create for Israel. Both 
 teach that he inculcated rather the exclusive service of 
 Jahve than a proper theoretical monotheism. The Mosaic 
 authorship of the decalogue is questioned by Stade, and 
 Smend discredits the historic verity of the Sinaitic 
 covenant.^ 
 
 In an attempt to estimate Moses the scientific inquirer, 
 it must be admitted, deals in considerable part with proba- 
 bilities rather than with certainties. Just how much of the 
 traditional views can stand the test is not a matter for 
 precise and conclusive historical induction. The best that 
 
 • Israelitische und Judische Geschichte, p. 130. ^ Ibid., pp. 30-32. 
 
 ' Stade, Geschichte des Volkes Israel, also Biblische Theologie des Alten 
 Testaments; Smend, Lehrbuch der alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte. 
 
338 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 can be done is to observe a just balance in weighing evi- 
 dences which seem to make for conflicting propositions. 
 In our view the more negative critics have sometimes 
 shared in the fault which they have so freely charged 
 against the traditionalists. In their partiality for certain 
 presuppositions they have permitted themselves to be 
 pushed into a one-sided review of the evidences and have 
 used the faculty of critical divination with unwarrantable 
 freedom and confidence. 
 
 What has just been said may be applied on the theme 
 of the significance of Moses as a religious leader. Some 
 weight may undoubtedly be given to the presupposition 
 that the high ideal of ethical monotheism was progres- 
 sively developed in Israel. But this presupposition may 
 easily be overworked. If history attests that the law of 
 gradual progress has had a wide scope in the perfecting 
 of religious thought, it attests no less that gifted person- 
 alities have been the efficient agents of progress, and have 
 betimes struck levels of religious feeling and conception 
 to which succeeding generations for lengthened periods 
 have found it difficult to ascend. As Kautzsch remarks, 
 "Those who recognize everywhere simple development 
 in a straight line from crude or at least naive naturalism 
 to more and more purified moral conceptions quite over- 
 look the circumstance that their contention is opposed 
 by demonstrably historical facts. Epoch-making religious 
 ideas generally come upon the scene in full strength and 
 purity; it is only in course of further development that 
 these products of religious creative genius, or, better, 
 of divine impulse, are corrupted and disfigured by the 
 intrusion of vulgar ideas and selfish interests. Such was 
 the fate of the religion of Jesus Christ in the Roman 
 Church with its popes and monks; and the same thing 
 happened to many of the great fundamental ideas of the 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 339 
 
 Reformation at the hands of Protestant scholasticism. 
 And we are quite safe to assume something of the same 
 kind in the process of the development of Jahvism. The 
 great fundamental ideas upon which its institution rests 
 were often forced into the background during the wander- 
 ing period of the people's history and in the time of end- 
 less struggles for national existence under the Judges."^ 
 From this standpoint it is clearly apparent that criticism 
 makes a very dubious venture when it selects from the 
 books pertaining to the post-Mosaic period sentences 
 which imply an inferior conception of Jahve or of his 
 moral government, and then proceed to draw the infer- 
 ence that a high standard could not have been set forth 
 by Moses. In the same books glimpses of higher and 
 better conceptions unquestionably are in evidence. Now, 
 it is easy enough to affirm that the latter were bor- 
 rowed by the historians from a late stage of development, 
 while the former are a true token of views handed down 
 from the age of the founder and left unchallenged by his 
 standard. But evidently it is not so easy to prove that 
 the lower grade of conceptions does not represent a lapse, 
 by reason of intellectual and moral slowness, from an ideal 
 recognized at an earlier time by at least the best spirits 
 in Israel. Certainly the early publication of the high 
 ideal was matter of earnest conviction throughout the 
 later ages. Not a single champion of ethical monotheism 
 in the post-Mosaic history of Israel has left on record 
 the slightest intimation that he regarded himself as an 
 innovator in his advocacy of that system. In the ab- 
 sence, then, of an a priori theory as to the necessary 
 course of religious development, there is no positive veto 
 to the conclusion that Moses stood practically on the plane 
 of ethical monotheism, though it may be admitted that 
 
 ^ Article "Religion of Israel," Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible, V. 632. 
 
340 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 his interest was rather centered upon the exclusive right 
 of Jahve over Israel than upon the theoretic question of 
 the sole validity of the monotheistic postulate. The ob- 
 jection that Jahve as a personal name denotes one repre- 
 sentative of a genus is rather verbal than substantial. An 
 historical consideration could easily have afforded, espe- 
 cially in an age not given to abstract terminology, a pref- 
 erence for the personal name even on the part of one 
 who was disposed to put into it a monotheistic significa- 
 tion. 
 
 In regard to the legislative function of Moses, if there 
 is reason to stop short of dogmatic affirmations there is 
 equal ground to refrain from sweeping negations. One 
 broad fact may legitimately be given much weight as 
 against the latter. In all the later ages of Israel's history 
 Moses was accorded an unrivaled position as the national 
 lawgiver. That reputation evidently antedated every Old 
 Testament code which criticism finds any reason for as- 
 signing to post-Mosaic times ; for, apart from such reputa- 
 tion, the compiler or editor of a code could neither have 
 experienced a motive nor apprehended a right to associ- 
 ate it with the name of Moses. The fact that the associa- 
 tion was made so uniformly is a clear proof of a ruling 
 conviction that the groundwork of Israd's legislation 
 was derived from the great leader in the Exodus. The 
 firm intrenchment of this conviction in the national con- 
 sciousness may properly count for something as an his- 
 torical token. It is claimed, it is true, on the other side, 
 that the prophets as good as ignored the function of Moses 
 as lawgiver. But this claim is in need of a better justi- 
 fication than has been given. Doubtless, in their lofty 
 appreciation of the ethical conditions of the divine king- 
 dom, and in their struggle against a shallow and lax 
 public conscience, the prophets were capable of speaking 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 341 
 
 in a depreciatory tone of the virtue of ceremonial obser- 
 vances. This fact, however, is perfectly intelligible apart 
 from the supposition that they entertained very slight 
 regard for the function of Moses as lawgiver. Their 
 zeal for higher things made it possible for them to put 
 into an impassioned message a disparaging reference to 
 the inferior interest of mere ritual.^ 
 
 The infrequency of their formal references to Moses 
 might seem, indeed, to imply the lack of any vivid im- 
 pression of his achievements as a framer of national 
 institutions. But we are advised against a hasty resort 
 to this inference by prominent historical facts. In the 
 book of Deuteronomy, which no one supposes to have 
 been, in its main contents, later than the reign of Josiah, 
 and which therefore was in evidence in the midst of the 
 great prophetical era, the lawgiving function of Moses is 
 profoundly emphasized. That a book so largely imbued 
 with the prophetical animus as is Deuteronomy should 
 take this ground may be counted no mean indication of 
 the common understanding in the ranks of the prophets 
 as to what was actually included in the providential vo- 
 cation of Moses. Moreover, it is not to be presumed that 
 their minds escaped being influenced by the picture of 
 Mosaic leadership and of the transactions at Sinai which 
 were contained in the Jahvist and Elohist narratives. 
 In short. Professor Orr seems to keep within the bounds 
 of a sober induction when he says : "If Deuteronomy was 
 promulgated in the reign of Josiah ; if the JE histories 
 existed a century and a half earlier, it is strange inconse- 
 quence to talk of the paucity of references in the prophets 
 before Malachi as showing that Moses was not connected 
 in the Israelitish mind with the work of legislation."^ As 
 
 1 Compare Konig, Der Offenbarungsbegriff des Alten Testaments, II. 351, 
 352. * The Problem of the Old Testament, pp. 99, 100. 
 
342 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 previously indicated, it is remote from our intention to 
 attempt to measure precisely the function of Moses as 
 legislator. What we have said we have said in justifica- 
 tion of the conviction that the more negative theories 
 proceed beyond the warrant of the evidence. The repu- 
 tation of Moses as lawgiver is not shown to have been 
 simply the product of an unhistoric imagination or of 
 sacerdotal invention. It is permissible to believe that it 
 was built upon a real historic basis. 
 
 III. — Judgments on Prophecy 
 
 Sentences which read like distinct declarations of a 
 naturalistic standpoint occur in the writings of Kuenen. 
 The notion that Israel was specially selected of God to 
 serve as the medium of a divine revelation he repudiates 
 as a childish fancy. 'Tsrael," he says, "is no more the 
 pivot on which the whole world turns than the planet 
 which we inhabit is the center of the universe. In short, 
 we have outgrown the belief of our ancestors. Our con- 
 ception of God and of the extent of his activity, of the 
 plan of the universe and its course, has gradually become 
 far too wide and too grand for the ideas of Israel's 
 prophets to appear any longer otherwise than misplaced 
 in it." Again he remarks: "Although, considered as a 
 whole, the Old Testament may with justice be adduced 
 as testifying in favor of supernaturalism, its separate 
 parts regarded in the light of criticism speak loudly for 
 a natural development both of the Israelitish religion 
 itself and of the belief in its heavenly origin."^ 
 
 This naturalistic conception of the Old Testament re- 
 ligion Kuenen applies specifically to Hebrew prophecy. 
 He admits, indeed, the exceptional character of that 
 
 1 The Religion of Israel, I. 9, 11. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 343 
 
 prophecy, but refuses to see therein any token of a 
 specifically divine or supernatural origin. "The proph- 
 ets of Baal and Ashera," he writes, "of whom the 
 Old Testament itself informs us, can only have had some 
 unessential traits in common with those of Jahve, at least 
 with the later prophets of Jahve. In short, Hebrew 
 prophecy is indeed something quite peculiar, just as much 
 as, for instance, the Greek philosophy. Just as the latter 
 can only be explained by the character and the history 
 of the Hellenes, so the turn of mind peculiar to the Israel- 
 ites and the course — certainly no ordinary course — of 
 their fortunes must have combined to bring about the 
 rise, and especially the later development, of prophecy 
 in Israel. But if we take both into consideration, even 
 this unique phenomenon is explained without difficulty."^ 
 Prophecy is a human phenomenon, the highest utterance 
 of the Israelitish spirit.^ In a sense, the critic grants, 
 it is from God. But this admission is no clear token of 
 an intention to modify the naturalistic premises to which 
 he has given such unequivocal expression. One who 
 substitutes pantheism for theism proper could say as 
 much, since all things are, in his view, from the ultimate 
 power to which he chooses to apply the divine name. 
 
 Unfulfilled predictions, Kuenen contends, contradict 
 the supposition of the supernatural inspiration of the 
 prophets. On the other hand, fulfilled predictions do 
 not establish that supposition. "From the nature of the 
 case the agreement between the prediction and the event 
 admits of more than one explanation. It must first be 
 proved that the prediction actually preceded the event. 
 If that proof is given, the agreement itself can be derived 
 either from the divine inspiration of the prophet, or his 
 
 1 The Religion of Israel, I. 212. 
 
 ' The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel, p. 4. 
 
344 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 right discernment of the course of the events, or the influ- 
 ence which the prophecy itself exercised on the dispo- 
 sitions and actions of those who became acquainted with 
 it — if, for this possibiHty also cannot be excluded, it is 
 not to be regarded as accidental."^ The citation is sigpiifi- 
 cant as showing the dogmatic determination with which 
 Kuenen excludes the supernatural. Very likely it was a 
 crass form of supernaturalism which he had in mind 
 rather than the idea of an immanent divine working 
 directed by purpose and foresight, and regardful of the 
 psychical constitution of its subject. But in his recorded 
 statements he seems not to admit so much as this kind 
 of working. Prophecy reduces in his definition to the 
 fully explained product of national characteristics and 
 conditions. 
 
 Holding these premises, Kuenen evidently could not 
 be inclined to deal sympathetically with that element of 
 prophecy which relates to the Messiah and to the Mes- 
 sianic age and kingdom. He admits, indeed, that Chris- 
 tians cannot be blamed for seeing in some of the words of 
 the prophets and the psalmists forms of expression 
 adapted to portray their suffering Master, Nevertheless, 
 he holds that in making the application they depart from 
 the domain of strict exegesis. Under close inspection the 
 meaning which the common Christian interpretation has 
 put into the Old Testament passages proves to be illusive. 
 "The traditional Messianic prophecy is undoubtedly a 
 beautiful whole. As an expression of the belief of 
 Christendom in the unity and regular development of 
 God's plan of redemption, it preserves its value for us 
 and for all subsequent ages. But it forms no part of the 
 historical reality. One stone after another must be re- 
 moved from it, and placed elsewhere. When, finally, 
 
 * The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel, p. 277. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 345 
 
 the support which the eariiest Christian Hterature seemed 
 to offer has fallen away the whole edifice collapses."^ 
 
 The definite expression of a naturalistic standpoint in 
 which Kuenen indulged is not found, so far as we have 
 discovered, in the writings of Wellhausen. Indeed, he 
 seems to disagree with the older critic's assumption of 
 the competency of criticism to explain everything on the 
 score of natural and ascertainable causes. "The reason 
 why," he says, "the Israelitish religion has led from an 
 approximately like beginning to an altogether different 
 outcome from that of the Moabitish does not admit of an 
 ultimate explanation. However, a succession of changes 
 can be described in which the way was laid down from 
 heathenism onward to the rational worship of God in 
 spirit and in truth. "^ Such language, if it does not 
 assert, at least makes room for the idea of specific divine 
 purpose and causation back of Israel's history. 
 
 In relation to the Messianic element in prophecy Well- 
 hausen shares in the coldness of Kuenen. He discovers 
 very little of that element in most of the prophetical 
 writings. The Jewish Messianic hope, he maintains, was 
 not adapted to prefigure the real Christ, and no deference 
 was paid to it by him. Indeed, he cut himself entirely 
 loose from it, and disowned the titles which might serve 
 to suggest any connection with it. In calling himself by 
 the name which is rendered "Son of Man" he had no 
 thought of assuming the role of Messiah. "Since Jesus 
 spoke Aramaic, so he did not call himself 6 vlbg- rov 
 dvOpoJnov, but barnascha. That, however, signifies man [der 
 Mensch] and nothing further; the Aramaeans had no 
 other expression for the conception. The earliest Chris- 
 tians, however, did not understand that Jesus called him- 
 
 ^ The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel, p. 496. 
 ^ Israelitische und Jiidische Geschichte, p. 35. 
 
346 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 self simply man. They regarded him as the Messiah, 
 turned, accordingly, barnascha into a designation of the 
 Messiah, and translated, not as they ought to have 
 done, with ^ dvepconog; but quite falsely with 6 vlbg- rov 
 dvdpd-novj" ^ 
 
 In passing upon Kuenen's naturalistic estimate of 
 Hebrew prophecy it is appropriate to notice the con- 
 cessions which he makes relative to the extraordinary 
 character of that great factor in the Old Testament sys- 
 tem. In the first place, he concedes a remarkable sense 
 of divine vocation in the prophets. "The canonical 
 prophets," he says, "all, without distinction, are possessed 
 by the consciousness that they proclaim the word of 
 Jahve, and express that conviction on frequent occasions 
 and in the most unambiguous manner. . . . This self- 
 consciousness of the Israelitish prophets is a fact of the 
 very greatest importance. We see here men who can 
 find no words sufficient to declare the might and majesty 
 of Jahve; who have a deep and lively feeling of their 
 own utter nothingness before him, and nevertheless, in 
 spite of the distance which separates them from him, 
 declare emphatically that they know his counsels and 
 speak his word."^ Now, what is the explanation of this 
 unique sense of vocation which the critic so strongly 
 asserts? Certainly the supposition does not seem far- 
 fetched that the Spirit of God was there and wrought 
 specifically to induct these men into the execution of a 
 great providential task. 
 
 Again, Kuenen admits that the prophets, far from 
 being the mouthpiece of national wishes and sentiments, 
 stood very largely in distinct opposition to the popular 
 
 1 Israelitische und Jiidische Geschichte, pp. 342, 346, 349. 
 ^ The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel, pp. 74, 76. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 347 
 
 current. "The canonical prophets," he writes, "have 
 struggled forward in advance of their nation and of their 
 own fellow prophets. In consequence of this, their view 
 of the state of the people and their expectation regarding 
 Jahve's dispensations have become different, and their 
 preaching frequently directly opposed to the popular 
 spirit and its organs."^ Why as a class should they have 
 been thus distinguished ? Who can say that this peculiar- 
 ity in their activity is not consonant with the supposition 
 that the Spirit of God wrought in them as select agents 
 of the kingdom of truth and righteousness ? 
 
 Again, Kuenen accords to the message of the prophets 
 a lofty preeminence as respects the essential worth of its 
 content. "Ethical monotheism," he affirms, "is their crea- 
 tion. They have themselves ascended to the belief in one 
 only holy and righteous God, who realizes his will, or 
 moral good, in the world, and they have by preaching 
 and writing made that belief the inalienable property of 
 our race. . . . The one God of heathenism was another 
 than that of Israel ; he was not, like the latter — if I may 
 so express myself — ethical to the very core."^ If, now, 
 the source is to be regarded as correspondent to the 
 product, why should not the preeminent excellence of 
 the prophetical message be taken as a mark of the pre- 
 eminent working of the Divine Spirit? 
 
 Still further, our critic commends the moral and re- 
 ligious disposition of the prophets as corresponding in 
 very fair degree with their lofty message. "Here is a 
 series of men," he remarks, "for whom religion is the 
 highest thing, and the realization of religion the aim 
 of their life. Where do you find more earnestness in 
 the conception of a task so beautiful ? where greater per- 
 severance amid temptation and contest? where heartier 
 
 'The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel, p. 582. ^ Ibid., pp. 585, 590. 
 
348 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 love of good and of the One who works good? where 
 firmer confidence in the triumph of truth and right ?"^ 
 With these questions we may well join the supplemental 
 inquiry, Does not the harmony between the character 
 of the prophets and their lofty message afford us a 
 specially firm warrant for the conviction that the Spirit 
 of God wrought mightily in them as the select instru- 
 ments for achieving a great purpose? 
 
 Once more, Kuenen supposes the religion of the 
 prophets to have been the congenial antecedent of that 
 incomparable historic person on whom Christianity is 
 founded. "The prophecy," he says, "that Jahve would 
 give his law in the inward parts of the children of Israel 
 and write it in their hearts had become realized in him. 
 . . . He was therefore able both to practice himself and 
 to recommend in his preaching to others the purely 
 spiritual religion of the heart. Thus the altogether 
 unique significance of Jesus is unmistakable. Chris- 
 tianity is the religion of Jesus, his creation, the fruit of 
 his most excellent individuality. But it is no less true 
 that in Christianity the religion of Israel fulfilled its 
 destiny and became a world-religion."^ The significance 
 of the connection is obvious. If Jesus stands forth as 
 the practical realization of the religious ideal, and Hebrew 
 prophecy prepared the way for him, then it is entirely 
 credible, if God has any connection with this world's 
 events, that his Spirit wrought with special potency in 
 Hebrew prophecy. It is difficult to see how there can be 
 any motive to resort to a different belief on the part of 
 one who is not wedded to a deistic or pantheistic stand- 
 point. 
 
 The argument for the naturalistic interpretation of 
 prophecy which Kuenen bases on the fact of unfulfilled 
 
 1 The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel, p. S91. ' The Religion of 
 
 Israel, II. 278, 279. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 349 
 
 predictions suffers from an element of exaggeration and 
 arbitrariness. The imprint of divine agency upon the 
 lofty ethical and religious content of prophecy is not to be 
 regarded as obliterated by failure of this or that presage 
 to obtain a discoverable fulfillment. Furthermore, it is 
 no plain dictate of logic that fulfilled prophecies can 
 count for nothing in favor of prophetical inspiration 
 so long as any specimens of unfulfilled prophecies are 
 in evidence. No reasonable theory of inspiration ignores 
 the modifying influence of human conditions, or claims 
 that the prophet never mingled with the divine mes- 
 sage any element of personal opinion or preference. 
 The dead level conception has no indefeasible right as 
 applied even to the work of a single biblical writer. 
 There might, then, be instances of unfulfilled predic- 
 tions, and yet so much be found, within the compass of 
 prophecy, of lively presage, firm anticipation, and con- 
 fident delineation of issues lying beyond the horizon — 
 so much to which the actual course of events corres- 
 ponded — that it would be reasonable to infer a power of 
 uplift and direction back of the prophets' thoughts about 
 the future. To this consideration there is, of course, 
 to be added the commonly admitted maxim that the con- 
 ditional element, largely characteristic of prophetical fore- 
 casts, serves to modify the demand for strict fulfillment. 
 The downfall of the edifice of Messianic prophecy, 
 which Kuenen assumes, has not been made obvious ex- 
 cept to eyes anointed with a special kind of critical eye- 
 salve. It may be admitted, doubtless, that one and 
 another stone which have been located in that edifice 
 by the traditional interpretation might better have been 
 left out; but that is not saying that sufficient materials 
 are not left for a comely edifice. It may be admitted, 
 furthermore, that prophecy in depicting the Messiah and 
 
350 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the Messianic age made use to a considerable extent of 
 local colors, and thus sketched ideals in terms which could 
 not be literally fulfilled under different historical con- 
 ditions, but only as respects their more essential import. 
 In other words, account may need to be taken of a typical 
 or emblematic sense in not a few of the prophetical 
 delineations. This however, may be done with entire 
 legitimacy. In picturing the ideals to which they looked 
 forward it was the most natural thing in the world for 
 the prophets to borrow from their environment, to frame 
 their conceptions in forms which did not so much closely 
 describe future realities as typify them more or less per- 
 fectly. It would be asking too much to require that their 
 forecasts should be free from incidental features supplied 
 simply by their surroundings. It was enough that their 
 delineations should sketch with measurable fidelity the 
 great consummations of the kingdom of God to which 
 the Christ stands central. That they accomplished this end 
 was evidently the deeply rooted conviction of the New 
 Testament writers. There is substantial ground for be- 
 lieving that it was the vital conviction of the Master 
 himself. No good reason is apparent why that convic- 
 tion should be surrendered. Traditional interpretations 
 of prophecies reputed to be Messianic may indeed need 
 in some instances to be revised, but the great truth 
 remains that the landscape of Old Testament prophecy 
 slopes upward to Jesus of Nazareth. 
 
 The attempt of Wellhausen to emphasize the discon- 
 nection between Old Testament Messianic prophecy and 
 New Testament reality, by denying to the consciousness 
 of Jesus the recognition of a Messianic vocation, cannot 
 be regarded as a happy undertaking. While his conten- 
 tion has its partisans, it is not countenanced by the ma- 
 jority of New Testament critics, whether of the moderate 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 351 
 
 or of the radical class. Thus Haraack, referring to Well- 
 hausen's disinclination to admit the assertion of Mes- 
 sianic claims on the part of Jesus, says : "In that doubt 
 I cannot concur; nay, I think that it is only by wrenching 
 what the evangelists tell us off its hinges that the opinion 
 can be maintained. The very expression 'Son of Man' — 
 that Jesus used it is beyond question — seems to me to be 
 intelligible only in a Messianic sense. To say nothing 
 of anything else, such a story as that of Christ's entry 
 into Jeusalem would have to be simply expunged if the 
 theory is to be maintained that he did not consider him- 
 self the promised Messiah and also desire to be accepted 
 as such."^ With equal force of conviction Wernle con- 
 tends for the conclusion that Christ recognized himself 
 as the Messiah. The finality, he argues, which was at- 
 tached by him to his own work strongly sustains that 
 conclusion. "That is the decisive consideration. The 
 superhuman self-consciousness of Jesus, which knows 
 nothing higher than itself save God and can expect none 
 other, could find satisfactory expression in no other form 
 but that of the Messianic idea. That which weighs with 
 Jesus in accepting this idea is not its political but its final 
 and conclusive character. "^ Bousset concurs with this 
 point of view. "We cannot eliminate," he remarks, 
 "from the personality of Jesus, without destroying it, 
 the trait of super-prophetic consciousness, the conscious- 
 ness of the accomplisher to whose person the flight of the 
 ages and the whole destiny of his followers are linked. 
 And when Jesus wished to give form and expression to 
 this consciousness, and thereby to lift it from its state of 
 fermentation into one of clearness and stability, the only 
 possibility that presented itself was that of the Messianic 
 
 ^What is Christianity? p. 131. 
 
 ' The Beginnings of Christianity, I. 44, 45. 
 
352 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 idea." In the judgment of Bousset it is not improbable 
 that Jesus cherished this idea from the time of his bap- 
 tism; and that expHcit declaration of it was made at 
 Csesarea Philippi he regards as historically certain.^ 
 
 While thus opposed by the weight of critical authority, 
 Wellhausen's theory depends too largely on a narrow 
 verbal basis to command confidence. The assumption 
 that the Aramaic term which was rendered into the 
 Greek phrase, 6 vldg- rov dvOpuj-nov, had in itself a less defi- 
 nite sense than belongs with that phrase does not forbid 
 the conclusion that it was used by Jesus in such special 
 connections as to suggest and legitimate the meaning 
 which from the earliest days of Christianity was put into 
 the selected Greek form. It is to be noticed, moreover, 
 that Wellhausen feels compelled to admit that Jesus 
 actually figured as the Messiah in his final entrance into 
 Jerusalem.^ Did he proceed, then, in conformity with his 
 self-consciousness in that act ? Who would wish to sup- 
 pose that he consented to have part in an artificial 
 pageant? If, however, the element of Messianic con- 
 sciousness asserted itself at that point, why not on previ- 
 ous occasions — as, for instance, in the celebrated conver- 
 sation with his disciples at Caesarea Philippi ? But, says 
 Wellhausen, the Messiahship to which he gave counte- 
 nance in that closing incident was, in its high spiritual 
 import, in contrast with the ordinary Judaic conception. 
 Assuredly it was. It remains, however, to be shown that 
 Jesus did not see in the old prophecies much of the linea- 
 ments of the ideal which he himself cherished. We be- 
 lieve that he did, and that his attitude toward those 
 prophecies was characterized by inward sympathy and 
 appreciation rather than by a feeling of disjunction. 
 
 1 Jesus, chap. ix. Note also Schmiedel's argument for the fact of con- 
 fessed messiahship, article "Gospels." Encyclopaedia Biblica, col. 1888. 
 ^ Israelitische und Jiidische Geschichte, p. 349- 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 353 
 
 IV. — Conclusions Respecting the Significance of 
 THE Old Testament Revelation in General 
 
 It is gratifying to observe that the school of modern 
 literary criticism, however it may deal with one and an- 
 other section of Old Testament history, accords a high 
 religious value to the outcome of the movement which 
 has its record in the Hebrew oracles. As has been seen, 
 Kuenen, in spite of his naturalistic standpoint and his 
 curt declaration that the biblical religion is just one of the 
 religions of the world, assumes that even in its Old Testa- 
 ment division it ascends to a height which places it in 
 very favorable contrast to the ethnic systems. Well- 
 hausen pays a tribute of unstinted appreciation to the 
 tender, lofty, and spiritual piety which came to expres- 
 sion through Jeremiah and the prophets of the exile. 
 Stade speaks in strong terms of the religious preemi- 
 nence of Israel. "Without doubt," he says, "Israel has 
 been in the domain of religion a much more epoch-mak- 
 ing, unique, and powerful agent than the Romans have 
 been in the domain of the state, or the Greeks in that of 
 art or philosophy."^ Again he remarks that Christian 
 faith regards the great representatives of Old Testament 
 teaching as "bearers of a special revelation of God, 
 through which preparation was made for the perfect rev- 
 elation of God in Christ, and recognizes in the history 
 of Israel and Judaism the special guidance of God."^ 
 Smend speaks of Israel's religion as a "God-given re- 
 ligion which could serve as the mother-soil of Chris- 
 tianity," and describes the vocation of Israel in these 
 emphatic terms: "Divine Providence fashioned here a 
 people whose national faith possessed and asserted a 
 
 * Geschichte des Volkes Israel. I. 3. 4. 
 
 ' Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments, J i. 
 
354 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 peculiar power of life, and which in its highest perfection, 
 was to become the religion of all the world. "^ As may 
 be judged from citations like the above, these writers 
 recognize in the Old Testament a high providential func- 
 tion in preparing for Christianity, It may be added that 
 in common they regard the Old Testament level as tran- 
 scended in important respects in the person and teaching 
 of the Christ, who, as Wellhausen says, "was more than 
 a prophet," since "in him the Word was made flesh."^ 
 
 The most disparaging estimate of the Old Testament 
 which has come from scholarly circles in recent times 
 is that represented by certain archaeologists who are dis- 
 posed to exalt Babylon as the source of about all that was 
 good or eminent in the ancient world. As being promi- 
 nent advocates of this judgment, Hugo Winckler and 
 Friedrich Delitzsch may be brought under review, though 
 a consideration of their writings may take us a little 
 beyond the bounds of our period. 
 
 Winckler makes this broad statement : "The Old Testa- 
 ment is rooted in form and content in Babylonian 
 science. The expression of the spiritual life of Israel, so 
 long as it subsisted as a people, proceeded from Baby- 
 lonian wisdom and was continuously fashioned in con- 
 formity to it, in like manner as the entire Israelitish 
 civilization in conformity to the Babylonian."^ This is 
 equivalent to saying that the Israelitish system in its 
 whole extent was based upon Babylonian astronomy and 
 astrology, since religious theory in Babylon was very 
 much of the nature of an attachment to those branches 
 of scientific and speculative inquiry. "The foundation 
 of all Babylonian wisdom," says our author, "is religion, 
 the teaching respecting the gods, and these gods present 
 
 * Lehrbuch der alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte, pp. 6, 3a. 
 ^ Israelitische und Jiidische Geschichte, p. 350. 
 'Geschichte Israels, I. 123. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 355 
 
 themselves in visible form to the human eye in the stars. "^ 
 The lines, accordingly, along which Israel received the 
 most important contributions from Babylon would seem 
 to be pretty well determined. Thence came not merely 
 a general view of the world as a physical system, but also 
 plentiful elements of a mythology which was closely 
 linked with the sun, moon, and stars. A previous page 
 has indicated how large a portion of Babylonian mytliol- 
 ogy Winckler thinks to be discoverable in the history of 
 Israel. It remains for us to notice here that he places the 
 crowning distinction of the Israelitish religion, its mono- 
 theistic faith, under pronounced obligation to Babylonian 
 thinking. The rise of this faith, he argues, must have 
 had, as its immediate antecedent, a highly developed 
 polytheism, along with a stage of culture involving such 
 comprehensive views of things as to make the polytheistic 
 interpretation seem inadequate. Now, it was precisely at 
 the great center of Oriental wisdom that this antecedent 
 was supplied. The Israelites may have worked up the 
 monotheistic idea in their own way, but the basis for 
 this achievement was derived by them preeminently from 
 Babylonian sources; "from the central points of culture 
 where the human spirit was actively interested to unite 
 the products of a highly developed knowledge with all 
 the phenomena of the surrounding world, and where new 
 views were in conflict with the old."^ Thus in religion, 
 as well as in the matter of secular science, Israel takes on 
 essentially the character of a dependency of Babylonia. 
 Delitzsch, in the first of the two popular lectures on 
 "Babel und Bibel," which occasioned for a little space 
 considerable agitation in Germany, emphasizes the influ- 
 ence of Babylon within the Israelitish domain not only 
 
 * Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament, p. 157. 
 ^ Ibid., pp. 208, 209. 
 
356 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 on such matters as coinage, weights and measures, and 
 the outward forms of laws, but also on the content of the 
 sacrificial and priestly systems, on the institution of the 
 Sabbath, and on the accounts of creation and the flood. 
 He takes note also of a pictorial representation (a cylin- 
 der-seal) in which he is inclined to see a Babylonian 
 version of the Eden story. Even traces of a monotheis- 
 tic faith, he believes, are discoverable in words brought 
 in by northern Semites about 2500 B. C, and he judges, 
 moreover, that, in spite of the crass polytheism of the 
 current religion, the more enlightened spirits recognized 
 the superior claims of the monotheistic conception in the 
 assumption that the various gods are one in Marduk, 
 the god of light. In his second lecture Delitzsch reaf- 
 firms in strong terms his conclusion as to the pervasive 
 influence of Babylon in the biblical province, denies to 
 the Old Testament the character of revelation, and makes 
 disparaging references to its legislation as compared with 
 the Babylonian. From the tone of the lecture it may be 
 inferred that it was written under the spur of the exasper- 
 ated feeling caused by rather intemperate comments on 
 the preceding lecture. 
 
 In considering the merits of this pan-Babylonian 
 theory of ancient history, with its minifying estimate of 
 Israelitish achievement, we may properly notice that to 
 a very large extent it is repudiated even by the advanced 
 school of biblical criticism. Notwithstanding his fellow- 
 feeling for ultra critics in general, and for Winckler in 
 particular, Cheyne takes exception to this scholar's work 
 in these pronounced terms : "In his treatment of religion 
 he is far from satisfactory, owing to his unfortunate 
 lack of religious sympathy. With all his earnestness 
 and acuteness he has not succeeded in making it probable 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 357 
 
 that prophecy, even in its poHtical aspect, can be explained 
 from Babylonia, And neither he nor anyone else has been 
 able to show that the course of development of the idea 
 of Jahve can be altogether paralleled in Babylonia. That 
 Babylonian and perhaps Arabian influences affected that 
 development at certain points need not to be denied. 
 But the predominant character of the religion of Israel 
 refuses to be accounted for by the pan-Babylonian 
 theory."* Stade gives emphatic expression to the like 
 conclusion. Referring to Winckler, Delitzsch, and others, 
 he says : "The oft-recurring representation on the part 
 of Assyriologists that the Israelite-Jewish religion is 
 essentially a reflection of old Babylonian religious ideas, 
 and that the birthplace of monotheism is to be sought 
 in that quarter, stands in contradiction not only with Old 
 Testament data, but with all that we know respecting 
 the history of man's spiritual life and of the religions 
 serving as the vehicles of that life. It overlooks (i) 
 the significance of personality in history, especially in 
 the religion of Israel; (2) the fact that the thoughts 
 which direct the spiritual life of men into new paths 
 arise and win strength not in the centers of culture but 
 aside from these. The representation in question results 
 from a tendency occasioned by imperfect historical and 
 theological training, to lay hold of superficial resem- 
 blances, to the overlooking of fundamental differences, 
 and to a consequent failure to apprehend the peculiar 
 character of phenomena. "^ Quite as significant as this 
 judgment of Stade is that of Gunkel, as coming from a 
 scholar who has himself taken generous account of 
 Babylonian influence. With specific reference to the 
 opinions of Delitzsch he draws this contrast between the 
 
 ^ Bible Problems and the Materials for Their Solution, p. 145. 
 2 Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments, i i. 
 
3s8 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 religion of Babylon and that of Israel : "There crass poly- 
 theism, here in the classic time monotheism; the Baby- 
 lonian religion thoroughly interwoven with magic, 
 which lies far beneath the feet of the great prophets; 
 there the veneration of images, here the absence of 
 images in the Jewish worship; there the implication of 
 the gods with nature, here the exaltation of religious 
 thought in the classic age to faith in one God who stands 
 above the world; there religious prostitution, which once 
 also had swept over Israel, but which here was driven 
 away in affright by the holy storm of prophecy. The 
 fairest treasure of Israel, however, is the maxim of her 
 prophets, for which they cherished a passionate zeal, the 
 maxim, namely, that God desires no offerings and cere- 
 monies, but piety of heart and righteousness of deeds. 
 This most intimate connection of religion with morality 
 is that preeminently in which the religion of Israel as- 
 cends to a towering height above all the other religions 
 of the ancient Orient."* It is worth while to add the 
 judgment of Jeremias as being likewise that of an ap- 
 preciative student of Babylonian antiquities. "The new 
 historico-religious information," he observes, "which 
 comes from the monuments of the ancient Orient will 
 show ever more clearly the superiority of the Israelitish 
 religion even for the pre-prophetical period."^ 
 
 The supposition of Winckler and Delitzsch that Israel- 
 itish monotheism was under distinct obligations to 
 Babylon seems to rest on very unsubstantial grounds. 
 The fact which Delitzsch brings up respecting the names 
 introduced by the northern Semites — that is, names in 
 which El, meaning God, is contained — has very little 
 bearing on monotheistic faith. The polytheistic Greeks 
 
 •^ Israel und Babylonien. Der Einfluss Babyloniens auf die israelitische 
 Religion, p. ^:i. ^ jm Kampfe um Babel und Bibel, p. 5. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 359 
 
 made perfectly analogous compounds, such as Theophilos 
 and Theopompos, and other polytheistic peoples have 
 given illustration of the same usage.^ As regards the 
 texts which are supposed to imply that the gods are one 
 in Marduk, scholars are not agreed on the warrant for 
 putting this sense into them^ ; and even should its pres- 
 ence there be admitted we should have only a pale specu- 
 lation, which did nothing to vanquish polytheism, and 
 thus bears only the scantiest resemblance to Israel's 
 mighty attestation of the sole right and rule of one God. 
 Israel's prophets cannot fairly be supposed to have de- 
 rived any vital incentive to their monotheistic message 
 from such texts. In general, Babylonian soil was poorly 
 adapted to grow a crop of effective monotheistic sug- 
 gestions. "There is not the slightest trace," says Jas- 
 trow, "of any approach to real monotheism in Babylonia, 
 nor can it be said that the penitential psalms constitute 
 a bridge leading to such approach. The strong hold that 
 astrology at all times, and up to the latest periods, had 
 upon both the popular and the educated mind was in 
 itself sufficient to prevent the Babylonians from passing 
 to any considerable degree beyond the stage in which 
 the powers of nature were personified and imbued with 
 real life."^ 
 
 That some of the Old Testament narratives show a 
 distinct family likeness to representations in the Baby- 
 lonian literature is the common admission of unbiased 
 scholarship. The parallelism between the flood stories 
 of the two literatures is striking. There are also points 
 of obvious correspondence between the cosmogony of the 
 first chapter of Genesis and that of the Babylonian tablets. 
 Yet in both instances the contrasts are sufficient to show 
 
 1 Compare Gunkel, Israel und Babylonien, p. 30. 
 
 - See the objection of Jensen as cited by Konig, The Bible and Babylon, 
 Eng. trans., p. 77. 3 x^e Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, p. 319. 
 
36o CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 that Israel was no mere copyist, and the conclusion would 
 seem to be justified that, appropriating at a remote point 
 traditions which were common to the Semites, it shaped 
 them in conformity with its own higher standpoint. A 
 qualified indebtedness to Babylonian precedent is also to 
 be alarmed in relation to the institution of the Sabbath. 
 Indisputably the Babylonians recognized in some sense 
 the seven-day division of time. The seventh, the four- 
 teenth, the twenty-first, and the twenty-eighth days of the 
 month were signalized as unfavorable days and as days 
 of propitiation. Furthermore, important restrictions as 
 to occupation were imposed for those days. It is to be 
 noticed, however, that the nineteenth day had the same 
 character as the four special days mentioned, and that the 
 restrictions on occupations applied especially to the king, 
 though perhaps not exclusively.^ That a serious attempt 
 was made to impose the obligation of the Sabbath rest 
 upon the people at large does not appear. In the code of 
 Hammurabi no such obligation is implied. Whatever 
 suggestions, then, may have come from Mesopotamia, 
 the Israelites were not mere borrowers as respects the 
 institution of the Sabbath. Even in its central conception 
 the Israelite Sabbath, as being a day of holy festival, 
 differed from the Babylonian. 
 
 As concerns the paradise story, nothing more has been 
 found in the Babylonian records than dim and uncertain 
 resemblances to the principal items of the narrative in 
 Genesis. The general picture of "the island of the 
 blessed" at the confluence of rivers and the legend of 
 Adapa's failure to partake of the food of immortality 
 can be found reproduced in the second and third chapters 
 of Genesis only by the assistance of a fertile imagina- 
 
 » Jastrow, The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria, pp. 377. 378: Barth 
 Babel und israelitisches Religionswesen, pp. 6-14; Gunkel, Israel und 
 Babylonien, p 28. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF OLD TESTAMENT 361 
 
 tion. In its misty notion of the location of the garden 
 of Eden the bibhcal narrative may, indeed, partially coin- 
 cide with a Babylonian hint on the situation of the island 
 of the blessed, but otherwise the parallelism is of the 
 faintest kind. Of the biblical story of the temptation and 
 fall of the first parents the Babylonian monuments have 
 not furnished an unequivocal counterpart. This may be 
 said in spite of the cylinder-seal on which Delitzsch com- 
 ments, and which contains the picture of a tree, of a 
 serpent, and of two beings in human form. Some of the 
 features of the biblical story do not appear in the picture. 
 The two beings are fully clothed, and neither is repre- 
 sented as the medium by which the fruit of the tree is 
 passed to the other. Expert scholarship also finds rea- 
 son to question whether the pictured persons were meant 
 to represent human beings rather than divinities. Says 
 Jensen : "Should one see in the two forms two divinities, 
 who dwell by the tree of life, and in the serpent its guard- 
 ian, all would be fully explained."^ 
 
 The above argument against the pan-Babylonian 
 theory is not to be understood as implying that it would 
 have been contrary to a special divine vocation on the part 
 of Israel to have appropriated many products of Babylon- 
 ian thought and legislative industry. Why should not the 
 culture of such a world center be made tributary to the 
 outfit of a people having a great and specific religious 
 mission ? The paramount question is not as to the source 
 whence various materials in the Israelitish system were 
 derived. That question respects rather the amount of 
 competency shown by Israel to subordinate materials to 
 the high points of view which have permanent worth and 
 significance for the kingdom of God in the world. 
 
 * Cited by Konig, Bibel und Babel, p. 28 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 ELEMENTS OF RADICALISM IN THE RECENT CRITICISM 
 OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 
 
 L — Denial of the Supernatural Conception 
 
 The types of New Testament criticism reviewed in 
 preceding chapters, together with such themes as the 
 challenging of the supernatural and the denial of the 
 transcendent sonship of Christ, have already given occa- 
 sion to deal with a subject-matter which might be regarded 
 as falling in considerable part under the heading of the 
 present chapter. It will be appropriate, therefore, to 
 limit our attention to a few special topics. 
 
 We begin with the most significant item in the preface 
 to the biography of Jesus as given by Matthew and 
 Luke. This item — the supernatural conception or virgin 
 birth — has been assailed by "advanced" criticism in recent 
 years with something like intolerant zeal. Indeed, the 
 tone of more than one critic in treating of the subject 
 suggests that the time has come for displacing the 
 statement of the venerable creed by the declaration, / 
 disbelieve in the supernatural conception. 
 
 The grounds urged in behalf of this confidently asserted 
 negation are mainly the following: (i) The genealogy 
 of Jesus, as given in both Matthew and Luke, respects 
 the line of Joseph, and therefore is indicative of the pre- 
 supposition that Joseph was the natural father of Jesus. 
 (2) Joseph and Mary are freely referred to in the evan- 
 gelical narrative as the parents, or as the father and 
 mother, of Jesus. ^ (3) Stress is placed in the Gospels 
 
 » Luke ii. 27. 33. 41. 43' 48. 
 
 362 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 363 
 
 upon the reception of the Spirit by Jesus at his baptism — 
 a point of view that ignores the supposition of origination 
 through the specific and extraordinary agency of the 
 Spirit. (4) Joseph and Mary are said to have marveled 
 at the high strain in which Simeon indulged over the 
 newborn infant, and also to have been puzzled by the 
 words which Jesus spoke at the age of twelve, whereas, 
 if they were cognizant of the miracle of the supernatural 
 conception, they should have been prepared for such 
 things. (5) With that miracle in view Jesus could not 
 have spoken as he is said to have done respecting his 
 mother,^ nor could his mother and brethren have uttered 
 the recorded words respecting him^ ; moreover, on the 
 given premise the doubt of his brethren respecting him 
 ought not to have found place.^ (6) The silence of 
 Mark and of John is adverse to the historical reality of 
 the supernatural conception. (7) Paul speaks of Jesus as 
 having been born of the seed of David, and makes no 
 qualification of the statement by reference to an extraor- 
 dinary agency of the Holy Spirit. Again, he emphasizes 
 the community of Jesus with those whom he came to 
 redeem, by saying that he was "born under the law," there- 
 by intimating the conviction that he was not essentially 
 distinguished as to birth from his brethren of Israelitish 
 stock. (8) Certain ancient versions of the first chapter 
 o-f Matthew are unfavorable to the idea of the super- 
 natural conception. Thus the Sinai-Syriac manuscript, 
 while it gives the accepted text of Matt. i. 18-20, re- 
 cords in i. 16 the contradictory declaration that Joseph 
 begat Jesus. A like reading is found in one of the cita- 
 tions in the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila, belonging 
 presumably to the early part of the fifth century.* 
 
 1 Mark iii. 33-35; Matt. xii. 48. 2 Mark iii. 20, 21. ^ John vii. j. 
 
 * For this list of objections see in particular Schmiedel, Encyclopccdia Bib- 
 
 lica, articles "Mary" and "Gospels"; Lobstein, The Virgin Birth of Christ. 
 
364 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Respecting the origin of the story of the supernatural 
 conception, different views have been expressed among 
 opponents of its historical character. Schmiedel, while 
 he makes some account of suggestions furnished by Jew- 
 ish prophecy and by the way in which Philo refers to the 
 birth of children of promise, concludes that the efficient 
 source of the story must be sought in a different quarter, 
 namely, "in Gentile-Christian circles."^ This is as much 
 as saying that the notion of the supernatural conception 
 sprang out of habits of thought nurtured by Gentile 
 mythologies. On the other hand, Lobstein emphasizes 
 the adequacy of the explanation afforded by Old Testa- 
 ment antecedents. "It is unnecessary," he says, "to re- 
 sort to the hypothesis of pagan influences or of Hellenic 
 or Oriental factors in order to explain the origin of the 
 belief in the supernatural birth of Christ. The tradition 
 consecrated by our Gospels has its roots deep down in 
 Israel's religion, transformed by the new faith. The 
 dogma of the supernatural birth is the result of the union 
 of traditional interpretation with the Christian principle. 
 Recent researches, completing and enriching observa- 
 tions made long ago, have collected numerous and strik- 
 ing analogies between the biblical myth and legends of 
 Greek or Eastern origin. Yet in such analogies it would 
 be rash to see direct imitations or positive influences. 
 The aversion which primitive Christianity felt for poly- 
 theistic paganism was so deep-seated that before suppos- 
 ing the new religion to have been influenced by pagan 
 mythologies we must examine with the utmost care the 
 points of resemblance which are sometimes found to exist 
 between beliefs and institutions. "^ Cheyne agrees with 
 Schmiedel more nearly than with Lobstein. He thinks 
 
 ' Encyclopasdia Biblica. article, "Mary," col. 2963, 4. 
 2 The Virgin Birth of Christ, pp. 75, 76. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 365 
 
 that the emphasis should be placed upon the Gentile 
 mythologies as sources of the belief in the supernatural 
 conception of Jesus, but holds at the same time that the 
 contribution from these mythologies came through Jew- 
 ish channels.^ 
 
 With all due respect to the distinguished critics, it may 
 be affirmed that most of the grounds which are urged 
 against faith in the supernatural conception are quite 
 trivial. In speech which was not designed to be formally 
 dogmatic it was the most natural thing in the world to 
 place Joseph along with Mary under the parental cate- 
 gory, since he fulfilled parental offices toward Jesus, and 
 in the common view was undoubtedly taken as his father. 
 Whatever may have been the conviction of Mary, it was 
 in the nature of the case next to impossible that belief in 
 the extraordinary distinction of her child should gain 
 real lodgment in the minds of neighbors and acquaint- 
 ances generally in advance of an extraordinary history 
 of the child.^ Inevitably he would be referred to as the 
 carpenter's son, and the evangelist in admitting a like 
 form of words was only adopting an accommodation 
 which it was much easier to admit than to exclude. With 
 respect to the alleged incompatibility between the super- 
 natural conception of Jesus and his replenishment with 
 the Spirit at his baptism, it is perfectly in place to remark 
 that the incompatibility is no dictate either of ancient 
 or modern dogmatics. Indeed, it is a strange conceit 
 that the origination of embryonic life by special divine 
 efficiency should involve the absence of further demand 
 for the working of the Spirit. Rather, one might argue 
 that the fact of the supernatural conception, as being a 
 
 * Bible Problems, pp. 71-73- 
 
 ' Compare R. J. Cooke, The Virgin Birth of Our Lord, Methodist Review. 
 Nov., 1904. 
 
366 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 sign of an extraordinary vocation, contained in itself a 
 pledge of the special induement with the Spirit which is 
 reported to have occurred at the baptism in the Jordan. 
 The objection based on the marveling of Joseph and 
 Mary over one and another incident is equally gratuitous. 
 There is no reason to suppose that for their minds the 
 extraordinary conception should have furnished a basis 
 for any complete induction as to the issues of the future. 
 Though they may have been brought thereby into a gen- 
 eral frame of expectancy, they could form no definite 
 picture of coming events, and so remained subjects for 
 various surprises. That Mary should even have been dis- 
 quieted at a particular turn in the career of Jesus is noth- 
 ing incredible. Complete immunity from human frailty 
 alone could have repressed all excessive maternal solici- 
 tude. On the other side, the attitude of Jesus toward his 
 mother involved no denial of the special honor placed 
 upon her by the fact of the supernatural conception, but 
 only accentuated worthily the spiritual point of view 
 which recognizes no bond of kinship on earth superior 
 to that of a common absorption in the will of the heavenly 
 Father. Relative to the hint that the brethren of Jesus 
 were not above the temptation to doubt about his divine 
 mission, it only needs to be said that no report about the 
 miracle of Jesus's birth, had it come to their ears, would 
 have afforded security against doubt. In common with 
 others they could be prepared for an unshaken faith, 
 whether in the supernatural conception or the Messiah- 
 ship of Jesus, only in sight of his finished career, with the 
 great crowning event of the resurrection included. As 
 for Mark's neglect to report the miraculous conception, 
 it is quite unjustifiable to see therein any denial of that 
 event. With about equal right one might charge Mark 
 with denying the human birth of Jesus altogether, since 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 367 
 
 he says nothing about it, and makes the baptism in the 
 Jordan the opening scene in his narrative. His object 
 seems to have been to give a succinct account of the pub- 
 he ministry of Jesus. According to a credible tradition 
 he based his Gospel on the testimony of Peter. In doing 
 so he may have found a motive to begin with the public 
 ministry of Jesus, that being the only part of the life of 
 the Master respecting which Peter could give first-hand 
 testimony. Furthermore, he has recorded nothing that 
 makes against the supernatural conception. The same is 
 true of John. The latter, with his pronounced doctrine 
 of the Logos, may not have been inclined, it is true, to 
 greatly emphasize the supernatural conception. But he 
 in no wise excludes it. On the contrary, an opportunity 
 for its insertion comes readily to hand in a consideration 
 of the method by which the Word was made flesh. As 
 regards Paul also, it Is noteworthy that, while he has not 
 asserted the supernatural conception, he has interposed 
 no obstacle to its acceptance. It would have been as easy 
 for him to have said that Jesus was begotten by a human 
 father as it was to affirm that he was born of a woman. 
 Only the latter statement occurs. The description of 
 Christ as being of the seed of David is not invalidated 
 by the supposition of supernatural conception. It remains 
 literally true if Mary was of Davidic lineage, and true in 
 point of legal right, as will be seen below, even if descent 
 be reckoned in the line of Joseph. The implicit denial 
 of the supernatural conception which is found in the 
 Pauline statement that Jesus "was born under the law" 
 is far from being a necessary implication of that state- 
 ment. Whatever extraordinary fact may have charac- 
 terized his birth, he was born into a family which recog- 
 nized the law of Moses, and the full yoke of that law 
 certainly passed upon him. 
 
368 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 The two remaining objections have a somewhat better 
 claim to consideration than those which have been com- 
 mented upon. It is not apparent, however, that they are 
 entitled to vanquish faith in the supernatural concep- 
 tion. The recorded genealogy, it may be admitted, ap- 
 pears to give, in either version, the line of Joseph rather 
 than that of Mary, But it remains to be proved that this 
 was not justified by the fairest application which could be 
 made of the Jewish standpoint to the extraordinary situa- 
 tion. "The descent from David," says Dalman, "is at- 
 tested by the evangelists with regard to Joseph only, and 
 not Mary, in accordance with the view that descent on 
 the mother's side does not carry with it any right of 
 succession, and that her husband's recognition of Mary's 
 supernatural child conferred upon it the legal rights of 
 his son. Lichtenstein [Heb. Comm. on Mark and Luke, 
 1896] recalls the fact in this connection that all property 
 acquired by a spouse becomes uniformly the possession 
 of the husband according to Keth. vi. i, and that in the 
 case of any question as to one's origin common opinion 
 was, in point of law, the decisive consideration. Neverthe- 
 less, neither of these points touches the right of succession* 
 The criterion for this, according to Bab. bathr. viii. 6, 
 is whether the father is willing to recognize anyone as 
 his son. A case such as that of Jesus was, of course, 
 not anticipated by the law ; but If no other human father 
 was alleged, then the child must have been regarded as 
 bestowed by God upon the house of Joseph, for a be- 
 trothed woman, according to Israelitish law, already 
 occupied the same status as a wife. The divine will, in 
 the case of this birth, conferred upon the child its own 
 right of succession, which, once Joseph recognized it, 
 would not have been disputed even by a Jewish judge. "^ 
 
 ' The Words of Jesus Considered in the Light of Post- Biblical Jewish 
 Writings and the Aramaic Language, pp. 319, 320. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 369 
 
 In brief, the genealogy was constructed in a manner zp- 
 propriate to Jewish points of view, even on the supposition 
 of the supernatural conception. 
 
 In relation to the divergent texts the judicial statement 
 of Professor Sanday will indicate how inconclusive they 
 are. Referring to the reading in the Sinai-Syriac and 
 the Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila he remarks : "There 
 would appear to be three main possibilities: (i) The 
 genealogy may have had an existence independently of 
 the Gospel, and it may have been incorporated with it by 
 the editor of the whole. In that case it is quite conceiv- 
 able that the genealogy may have ended, 'luorjcf) de eyewrjoev 
 rbv 'It/otovv. Unless it were composed by some one very 
 intimate indeed with the Holy Family, it might well re- 
 flect the state of popular opinion in the first half of the 
 apostolic age. (2) The reading might be the result of 
 textual corruption. There would always be a natural 
 tendency in the minds of scribes to assimilate mechanic- 
 ally the last links in the genealogy to preceding links. 
 A further confusion might easily arise from the ambigu- 
 ous sense of the word yevvdv, which was used of the 
 mother as well as of the father (cf. Gal. iv. 24). If we 
 suppose that the original text ran, 'Iwa^^ rbv dvdpa Uapiag- 
 ij eyivvijosv ^Irjaovv rov Xeyofievov Xpcarov, that would ac- 
 count for the two divergent lines of variants better than 
 any other. A reading like this appears to lie behind the 
 Coptic (Bohairic) version. (3) It is conceivable that the 
 reading (or group of readings) in Syr-Sin may be of 
 definitely Ebionite origin. That which we call 'heresy' 
 existed in so many shades, and was often so little consist- 
 ent with itself, that it would be no decisive argument 
 against this hypothesis that the sense of the readings 
 is contradicted by the immediate context. It would be 
 enough for the scribe to have Ebionite leanings, and 
 
370 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 he may have thought of natural and supernatural genera- 
 tion as not mutually exclusive."^ Thus the divergent 
 texts form no secure basis for negating the common 
 Christian faith on this theme. Supposing the super- 
 natural conception to have been a fact, it could not with 
 the least degree of prudence and propriety have been 
 given any prominence till after the finished career of 
 Jesus, and then only in the bosom of a believing com- 
 munity. The original popular notion that Jesus was in 
 the full sense the son of Joseph would therefore have a 
 chance to keep in the field for a season, and that it should 
 have left some trace on the literature of the early cen- 
 turies is not to be accounted improbable. 
 
 A review of the attempted explanations of the origin 
 of the belief in the supernatural conception is rather 
 favorable than prejudicial to that belief. As was noticed, 
 Schmiedel disputes the adequacy of Jewish antecedents 
 to account for the belief. He does not find that it was any 
 part of the customary Messianic faith. "The notion of 
 a supernatural birth," he says, "never at any time attached 
 to the idea of the Jewish Messiah."^ Dalman fully con- 
 curs with this statement,^ and it may be regarded as con- 
 firmed by the known position of the stricter wing of the 
 Ebionites, by the statement which Justin Martyr puts 
 into the mouth of the Jew Trypho,"* and by the testimony 
 of Hippolytus.^ On the other hand, Lobstein is doubt- 
 less in the right in supposing antipathy to pagan mytholo- 
 gies to have served as a strong barrier in the early Chris- 
 tian community against borrowing from that source. 
 The comments in the primitive Christian literature upon 
 the pagan stories of the misalliances of the gods are brim- 
 
 ' Hastines's Dictionary of the Bible, article "Jesus Christ," 11. 645. 
 
 ^Encyclopaedia Biblica. article 'Mary,'' col. 2956. 
 
 ' The Words of Jesus p. 276. 
 
 * Dial, cum Tryph., xlix. i. ^ Philosophumena, ix 25. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 371 
 
 ful of scorn and rebuke. Accordingly, we rrvay presume 
 that hesitation rather than readiness to promulgate the 
 superhuman birth of Jesus, even in such ideally discreet 
 phrases as are used in the Gospels, would have been in- 
 spired by a reference to the content of pagan mythologies. 
 As regards the Philonic references to divine agency in the 
 birth of children of promise, while they might possibly 
 arrest the attention of one whose mind was already pos- 
 sessed by the thought of the supernatural conception, 
 they were much too remote from all semblance of sober 
 historical statements to be efficient sources of that 
 thought ; and it is to be noticed, too, that the New Testa- 
 ment books which afford the clearest tokens of Philonic 
 influence make no mention of the supernatural concep- 
 tion. But if neither Jewish belief, in its common or in 
 its speculative form, nor Gentile mythology stands forth 
 as the probable cause of the Christian affirmation that 
 Jesus was conceived by the Holy Spirit, we are entitled 
 to look for that cause in the center of the Christian com- 
 munity itself. We may identify it with the testimony of 
 the mother, whose modesty was suitably proportioned to 
 the unparalleled honor bestowed upon her, and with the 
 faith which her testimony found with the chosen few who 
 were admitted to her inmost confidence. 
 
 That this faith was able to maintain itself and to pass 
 on into a wider circle was due to its congruity with the 
 total manifestation of Christ in the world. The sup- 
 position of the supernatural conception is in accord with 
 the extraordinary personality and vocation of its sub- 
 ject. Doubtless it would be going too far to say that this 
 supposition is theoretically indispensable. Of course, 
 the maintenance of the divinity of Christ is not at all 
 dependent upon it, since divinity proper is no subject for 
 generation in time. Supernatural conception could have 
 
372 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 a bearing only upon the finite human factor in Christ. 
 It helps to explain the uniqueness of his humanity. We 
 are bound, however, to admit that a singular relation 
 of humanity with divinity, however that humanity may 
 have been originated, might be expected to yield a unique 
 result. So we may properly hesitate to affirm an impera- 
 tive dogmatic demand for the supernatural conception. 
 But the truth remains that this item of the evangelical 
 record appears in eminent accord with the unique per- 
 sonality and career of the Christ. It was enshrined in 
 an early and vital Christian tradition. To compel the 
 mind and heart of Christendom to surrender it, criticism 
 will need to bring forward more cogent evidences than 
 it has yet furnished. 
 
 II. — Unfriendly Treatment of the Gospel History 
 
 Among the recent contributions of radical criticism a 
 canon for judging the gospel content challenges atten- 
 tion. Proceeding on the assumption that the worshipful 
 attitude toward their hero which was maintained by the 
 biographers of Jesus was a fruitful source of exaggera- 
 tion, Schmiedel concludes that a basis of credibility must 
 be sought in such items of the gospel records as do not 
 reflect the attitude in question, such items as rather run 
 counter to the demands of a bent to glorification than 
 afford satisfaction thereto. Items of this description 
 constitute "foundation pillars," and whatever is con- 
 formable to them may be used with a fair degree of con- 
 fidence in constructing our idea of the person, the teach- 
 ing, and the work of Jesus,* In the view of Schmiedel 
 a careful scrutiny of the Gospels reveals nine passages — 
 very brief in every instance and consisting mostly of 
 
 * Encyclopaedia Biblica, article "Gospels." 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 373 
 
 single verses — which are sufficiently credible to serve as 
 a basis of historic inference.^ 
 
 A critic who is prepared to give a sweeping application 
 to the above canon will, of course, dispose very easily 
 of large sections of the Gospels. As a matter of fact, 
 Schmiedel proceeds with great facility in this line of 
 critical achievement. He cuts off at a stroke all of 
 Christ's acts of healing which are not explainable on or- 
 dinary grounds of medical science. "It is quite per- 
 missible for us," he says, "to regard as historical only 
 those of the class which even at the present day physicians 
 are able to effect by psychical methods — as, more es- 
 pecially, cures of mental maladies." The greater mar- 
 vels imputed to Christ, he concludes, have rather a para- 
 bolic than a proper historical content. A narrative like 
 that in the fourth Gospel on the raising of Lazarus thor- 
 oughly subordinates the literal to the symbolical. It may 
 be described as a symbolical story designed to magnify 
 the office of Christ as the giver of life to the world. 
 Even in the Synoptical Gospels certain striking accounts 
 of miracles may be regarded as simply transformations 
 of parabolic utterances. "As for the feeding of the five 
 thousand and the four thousand, so also for the withering 
 of the fig tree, we still possess a clue as to the way in 
 which the narrative arose out of a parable. . . . And it 
 is not difficult to conjecture expressions made use of by 
 Jesus out of which the narrative of the walking on the 
 water and the stilling of the tempest could be framed." 
 Account may also be made of the influence of Old Testa- 
 ment stories. While it may not be necessary to go with 
 Strauss in supposing these stories to have been well-nigh 
 
 1 The following is the list- Mark x. 17 f. : Matt. xii. 31 £., Mark iii. 31; 
 Mark xiii 32 . Mark xv 34 with Matt, xxvii. 46 ; Mark viii 12, Mark vi. 5 f. , 
 Mark viii. 14-21 ; Matt, xi 5 with Luke vii. 22 (the stress being here upon 
 the concluding clause). 
 
374 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the sole originating cause of the narratives of incredible 
 marvels in the Gospels, they may still be judged to have 
 contributed to the shaping of such narratives. 
 
 Some of those who have figured as associates with 
 Schmiedel in critical enterprise have given even more 
 striking illustrations than he has afforded of the ease 
 with which the gospel content may be retrenched. Cer- 
 tainly it would be a rare critic who could outdo the 
 achievement of the editor in chief of the Encyclopaedia 
 Biblica in eliminating the story of Judas the betrayer. 
 *'The growth of the story of Judas," he writes, "can be 
 adequately explained. Supposing that the original tra- 
 dition left the ease with which the capture of Jesus 
 was effected unaccounted for, Christian ingenuity would 
 exert itself to find an explanation. Passages in the 
 Psalms which spoke of the righteous man as treated with 
 brutal insolence by his own familiar friends (Psa. xli. 9; 
 Iv. 12-14) would suggest the originator of the outrage; 
 the betrayer of Jesus must have been a faithless friend. 
 And if an apostle, who could he have been but Judas 
 Iscariot? For Iscariot was not a Galilean, like the other 
 apostles; he had a harsh, crabbed temper {^aXE-rroif), 
 and he carried the purse of the little company. The last 
 circumstance suggested a reminiscence of Zech. xi. 
 12 f. — a mysterious passage which seemed to become 
 intelligible for the first time if applied to Jesus." This 
 view may indeed be regarded as opposed by the story of 
 the treason in our oldest documents and by the account 
 of the appointment of Matthias to the vacancy in the 
 apostolate. "It cannot, however, be proved that Judas's 
 treason formed part of the oldest tradition ; it is separable 
 from the surest traditions of the life of Jesus, and the 
 appointment of Matthias may perfectly well have taken 
 place, even if Judas did not betray Jesus. The proba- 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 375 
 
 bility is that no one knew how the emissaries of the 
 Pharisees found Jesus so easily, and that the story of 
 Judas's treason was a very early attempt to imagine an 
 explanation."^ After contemplating this specimien of 
 critical skill one will, of course, suffer no surprise in en- 
 countering from the same fertile writer the statement 
 that "We cannot, perhaps, venture to assert positively 
 that there was a city called Nazareth in Jesus's time."^ 
 
 The element of historical induction in the illustrative 
 instances of critical procedure just presented is much 
 too scanty to earn serious consideration. To a mind 
 convinced that the gospel content must be eliminated, or 
 transformed into something quite unlike to itself, the 
 given instances may afford a measure of satisfaction, as 
 furnishing descriptions which may possibly bear some 
 resemblance to actual occurrences in the life of Jesus. 
 But if one is not already convinced of the necessity of 
 putting aside the gospel content, or of subjecting it to 
 a radical metamorphosis, he will not be placed under ra- 
 tional compulsion to do so by specimens of criticism like 
 those recorded. They simply represent ingenious at- 
 tempts to give a shade of plausibility to preconceived 
 points of view. We may appropriately leave them with- 
 out further comment to edify whom they can edify. In 
 so far as they are based on a dogmatic exclusion of the 
 supernatural they fall under considerations which have 
 been given in a preceding connection.^ 
 
 It is quite in place, however, to inspect the canon for 
 judging the gospel content which is put forth by 
 Schmiedel. Evidently the canon in question cannot be 
 characterized as wholly false. What the biographer 
 
 • Cheyne, Encyclopaedia Biblica, article " Judas Tscariot." 
 
 ^ Encyclopaedia Biblica. article "Nazareth." ' Part ii, chap. i. 
 
376 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 could not have reported out of the incentives of homage 
 and admiration has good claims to the character of real 
 history. At least, it is well secured against one kind of 
 challenge, namely, that based on the liability of a wor- 
 shipful biographer to exaggerate. Of course, it is con- 
 ceivable that a writer having the highest regard for his 
 hero might out of carelessness and dullness do less than 
 justice to that hero on one or another point. Still, his- 
 torical criticism will proceed discreetly in taking distinct 
 note of any statements which could not have emanated 
 from the deep reverence and intense affection of the nar- 
 rator. Candor requires us to admit that Schmiedel's 
 canon may legitimately be given a certain sphere of 
 application. But that is far from saying that it consti- 
 tutes an adequate basis for estimating a great and ex- 
 traordinary subject-matter like that of the gospel history. 
 Taken in an exclusive fashion, it is supremely adapted 
 to reduce to utter meagerness any wealthy biographical 
 content to which it is applied. Suppose one attempts 
 to rate Martin Luther according to its prescription, 
 going through the extant biographies of the reformer, 
 selecting the items alone which present him at such a 
 low level that they cannot be suspected to have been gen- 
 erated or colored by an overwrought admiration. Would 
 a life of Luther reconstructed out of that assortment of 
 materials afford any rational explanation of the mighty 
 task which he achieved in the transformation of Europe? 
 Who would not say that such a method of reconstruction 
 would serve only to turn history into a dumb enigma? 
 Still less can Jesus Christ and his world-transforming 
 mission be satisfactorily expounded by the like method. 
 The method is too grudging; yea, it is intolerably narrow. 
 The person and work of Christ as pictured in the Gospels 
 rightfully claim a broader basis of judgment. They are 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT z^^ 
 
 entitled to be judged from the standpoint of their con- 
 gruity with the crowning consummations of the Old 
 Testament religion; from the standpoint of the mighty- 
 influence which went forth from them as attested by the 
 apostolic and post-apostolic literature; from the stand- 
 point of their intrinsic excellence and self-consistency. 
 In connection with this last basis of judgment it is appro- 
 priate to repeat a sentiment which has been expressed in 
 the striking but sober maxim, "None but a Jesus could 
 fabricate a Jesus." No unbalanced biographer, easily 
 parting company with facts in order more fully to exalt 
 his hero, could have provided the immortal portrait which 
 meets Christian contemplation in the gospel records' — 
 the Christ who so marvelously combined the most beau- 
 tiful and worthy traits, who maintained such an ideally 
 perfect balance between morality and religion, and in 
 whose consciousness the ordinary and the transcendent 
 were so perfectly reconciled, the divine and the earthly 
 being mingled in such a way that "the lowly and human 
 never degrade him in our eyes, nor his power and great- 
 ness remove him out of our sympathies and understand- 
 ing." When critics neglect ranges of important data 
 like these, and suggest the need of reconstituting the 
 gospel history on the basis of a few texts which exhibit 
 the Son of Man merely on the side of ordinary earthly 
 limitations, we are tempted to recall the case of that 
 ancient party which Jesus reproved for losing sight of 
 the greater things through absorption in the smaller. 
 
 III. — The Elimination of Pauline Authorship 
 
 While the scholarly world as a whole has become 
 increasingly intrenched in the conclusion that Paul 
 wrote more of the New Testament epistles than the 
 Tubingen criticism accepted as coming from his hand, 
 
378 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the "advanced" school in Holland, following confessedly 
 in the wake of Bruno Bauer, has gone on to the goal of 
 an absolute negation of Pauline authorship. Speaking 
 for this school, W. C. Van Manen, of Leyden, says : 
 "With respect to the canonical Pauline epistles, the later 
 criticism has learned to recognize that they are none of 
 them by Paul; neither fourteen, nor thirteen, nor nine, 
 nor ten, nor seven, nor eight, nor yet even the four so 
 long universally regarded as unassailable. They are all, 
 without distinction, pseudepigrapha."* As contributors 
 in greater or less degree to this critical verdict. Van 
 Manen names such scholars among his own countrymen 
 as A. Pierson, S. A. Naber, A. D. Loman, J. C. Matthes, 
 J. Van Loon, H. U. Meyboom, and J. A. Bruins. Beyond 
 this circle of compatriots he scans the horizon well-nigh 
 in vain for supporters. He is able, it is true, to point 
 to Rudolf Steck, of Zurich, and to Daniel Volter, of 
 Amsterdam. But only the former of these can be char- 
 acterized with full right as an outside advocate of the 
 thesis of the Dutch school. Volter, not to mention the 
 fact of his ultimate residence in the Dutch domain, can- 
 not be described as a German scholar who coincides alto- 
 gether with the radical Dutch critics. On the contrary, 
 he expressly distinguishes his position from that of Pier- 
 son, Naber, Loman, Van Manen, and Steck, emphasizing 
 the fact that in the epistles to the Corinthians, the 
 Romans, and the Philippians he recognizes portions 
 which are to be attributed to the apostle Paul.^ In the 
 English-speaking world the following of the extreme 
 Dutch school is in number and weight quite insignificant. 
 With the denial of the epistles to Paul the critics under 
 consideration unite the denial that any one of them can 
 
 * Encyclopaedia Biblica, article "Paul." 
 
 * Paulus und seine Brief e. Kritische Untersuchungen, 1905. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 379 
 
 be referred to a single author. As described by Van 
 Manen, these epistles are composite doctrinal treatises 
 which emanated from a distinct circle in approximately 
 the same age, an age not earlier than the end of the first 
 century nor later than the middle of the second. In place 
 of the individual writer, says Steck, we are to recognize 
 in the so-called Pauline epistles the work of a school, 
 and this thought of a school is to be applied even to the 
 four principal epistles in spite of the impression which 
 they make of unity in respect of content and language.^ 
 Among the grounds which the Dutch school alleges 
 for disallowing to Paul even the four principal epistles 
 the following are prominent : ( i ) The doctrinal and re- 
 ligious contents of these writings are indicative of a 
 development which Paul could not possibly have reached 
 a few years after the crucifixion of Jesus. (2) In these 
 writings widely divergent lines of thought come to mani- 
 festation, on the one hand a kind of teaching claiming 
 to pass beyond Paul, and on the other a teaching which 
 seems to lag behind in a Jewish or Jewish-Christian 
 range. That these sharply drawn contrasts should have 
 been evolved in Paul's lifetime is hardly to be imagined. 
 Furthermore, Paulinism itself, as it is exhibited in the 
 principal epistles, presupposes that the original form of 
 Christianity, with its Jewish conception of the Messiah, 
 had been replaced by larger and more spiritual concep- 
 tions; and for this transformation a very considerable 
 period of time was requisite. (3) The problems, theoret- 
 ical and practical, which come to discussion in these 
 epistles — problems respecting justification, election, the 
 use of sacrificial flesh, Sabbath observance, the estate of 
 marriage, and the like — are not such as would naturally 
 have been brought forward within twenty or thirty years 
 
 1 Der Galaterbrief nach seiner Echtheit untersucht, p. 363. 
 
38o CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 after the death of Christ. (4) Advanced points of view- 
 in the line of a Christian gnosis indicate as the time of 
 composition a post-apostoHc era. And the same is true 
 of representations about the rejection of Israel and about 
 the persecutions of the Church. (5) Contrasts between 
 the several epistles, or between different portions of the 
 same epistle, as making against unity of authorship in 
 general, are adverse to the theory of a Pauline origin.^ 
 
 As has been indicated, this sweeping negation of Paul- 
 ine authorship is opposed by an overwhelming consensus 
 among scholars. Many of the most eminent students of 
 the New Testament have not been able to convince them- 
 selves that it deserves the tribute of serious attention. 
 It is repudiated by the radicalism as well as by the con- 
 servatism of Germany. Critics representing almost all 
 degrees of divergence from the traditional standpoint — 
 Harnack, Jiilicher, Holtzmann, Pfleiderer, Clemen, 
 Peine, Von Soden, Weinel, Vischer, Bousset, Wernle, 
 Wrede, Schmiedel, and others — esteem it an eccentricity 
 in criticism, a fanciful extreme to which sane scholarship 
 can render no countenance. 
 
 This consensus appears as the reverse of arbitrary, 
 whether viewed in connection with the grounds asserted 
 by the party of negation or in relation to the positive evi- 
 dences for Pauline authorship. The former can hardly be 
 called plausible, much less weighty. Take the alleged 
 impossibility that Paul should have reached in the given 
 period such a doctrinal development as is reflected in 
 the epistles attributed to him. Why should not the 
 gifted mind of this profoundly earnest man, under the 
 stimulus of contact with those who had been with Jesus, 
 
 * Thus substantially Van Manen, Encyclopaedia Biblica, articles "Paul. 
 "Romans," etc. 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 381 
 
 after once being convinced of the futility of Pharisaism, 
 and of the glory of the risen Christ, advance rapidly along 
 the pathway of his new faith? Indeed, as regards the 
 cardinal principles of that faith, in what period would 
 these have been so likely to have been set forth in sharpest 
 antithesis to Pharisaic legalism as in the period in which 
 both the recollection of his own emancipation existed 
 in full intensity and the company with which he had be- 
 come allied was wrestling with the problem of its rela- 
 tion to Judaism ? Did not Luther go in two decades as far 
 as he ever went in revolt from; the mediaeval system? 
 Did not Zwingli in scarcely more than a decade make a 
 most radical departure from Romtan legalism, polity, 
 ceremonialism, and image-worshiping customs? Was it 
 not in the first burst of the Reformation that the strongest 
 doctrines of divine grace and sovereignty which have 
 ever found place in Lutheranism came to utterance with- 
 in its bounds? Did not also the Reformed Church very 
 speedily commit itself to a most stalwart type of teach- 
 ing on these themes? What, then, is there past reason- 
 able faith in the supposition that Paul, when once his 
 point of view had been revolutionized, should have 
 moved on by rapid stages to a grasp of the main issues 
 logically involved in his revised outlook? Absolutely 
 nothing. We have only to suppose him to have been the 
 kind of man revealed in the record to secure a valid 
 basis for the conviction that, under the guidance of 
 Divine Providence, he achieved what he is represented 
 to have achieved in the way of doctrinal construction. 
 
 As for the various parties which come to manifesta- 
 tion in the Pauline epistles, a relatively early period is 
 just the one best suited to the presence and activity of 
 the most conspicuous, not to say of all of them. When 
 should the question of the relation to Judaism be in the 
 
382 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 first degree a burning question? Evidently at the time 
 when the new faith began to push its way into the Gentile 
 world and the task of adjusting the relations of Jew and 
 Gentile became insistent. When should this question 
 cease to be a burning question? Evidently at a point 
 when the advance of Christianity in the Gentile world 
 had begun to disclose that world as the great field of 
 promise for Christianity, and had caused the Jewish 
 constituency to appear as an inconsiderable factor in the 
 Church. The conditions are thus seen to imply just 
 what the known literature of the second century attests 
 to have been the fact, namely, that the cause of the 
 Judaizers had come to be in that century a comparatively 
 indifferent issue. To place, then, at that late date such 
 writings as Galatians and Romans, with their fervid 
 and anxious polemic against Judaizing, is to wrench them 
 out of all credible historical connections. Both the 
 Judaizers and the intense opposition to their scheme be- 
 long where the commonly accepted view of the Pauline 
 epistles places them. The other parties, too, do not 
 appear to be misplaced. In relation to the great principle 
 of evangelical freedom, no party is disclosed which went 
 beyond Paul. That some in their haste and shortsighted- 
 ness should have applied that principle in a way which 
 outran the prudence of the broad-minded apostle is no 
 cause for surprise. As respects the enlarged and spirit- 
 ualized conception of the Messiah reflected in his epistles, 
 a door of entrance for that had been prepared in the 
 teaching of Jesus. For a time, it is true, the minds of 
 the first disciples may have retained from their Jewish 
 education a competing conception. But — to repeat a 
 previous statement — the higher viewpoint embraced in 
 the sayings of Jesus must naturally have worked as a 
 leaven to modify that conception, and concurring with 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 383 
 
 this cause was the vital impression coming from the vic- 
 torious progress of the gospel in the Gentile world. In 
 face of the actual demonstration that the gospel could 
 not be confined within the metes and bounds of Judaism, 
 the disciples could not well avoid going forward to the 
 standpoint of Christian univeralism. Accordingly, there 
 is no reason to suppose that Paul, in representing that 
 standpoint, would have been isolated. In at least the 
 latter part of his career he must have stood in the midst 
 of a Christian body which held substantially his own 
 view respecting the relatively independent and the world- 
 embracing character of the religion of Christ. 
 
 In the above we have already responded to the objec- 
 tion of the Dutch critics, that the ordinary view supposes 
 a too early intrusion of such theoretical problems as 
 those relating to justification and election. The same 
 conditions which made the relation to Judaism a burning 
 question involved an occasion to approach the given 
 problems. A masterful mind, dealing fundamentally with 
 that question, would be under compulsion to look those 
 problems in the face, since they are logically implicated 
 therein. As concerns the practical problems mentioned, 
 such as the use of sacrificial flesh, it is puzzling to under- 
 stand how anyone should imagine that a long period 
 was requisite to bring them forward. The most primary 
 adjustment between Jewish and Gentile standpoints re- 
 quired attention to them, and it is scarcely conceivable 
 that in an alert and mobile community, like that of 
 Corinth, for instance, a decade could pass without invol- 
 ving a very positive demand for administrative dealing 
 with them. 
 
 The allegation that even the principal epistles show 
 traces of a post-apostolic doctrine of the gnosis has no 
 real historic warrant. Speculative tendencies had a 
 
384 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 place in Judaism before Paul was born. Not long after 
 his death a quite pronounced Gnostic scheme was pub- 
 lished by Cerinthus. It goes entirely beyond warrant, 
 therefore, to suppose that Paul in his day could not have 
 touched upon anything in the line of the gnosis. Even 
 if the culture with which he came in contact furnished 
 no suggestions in that line, it by no means follows that 
 his versatile mind could not have grasped such con- 
 ceptions of a higher wisdom or gnosis lying at the basis 
 of the Christian dispensation as are intimated in the 
 principal epistles. In all that there is nothing which pre- 
 supposes the full-blown Gnostic systems of the second 
 century; nothing, in fact, which might not have had 
 place at the middle of the first century. By that time also 
 it was quite in order for Paul to speak of the rejection 
 of the Jews. The observed fact that as a nation they 
 repudiated the Christ, while the Gentiles were receiving 
 him, involved by itself the conclusion that, for the time 
 being at least, they had come short of the grace of God. 
 Paul was only describing the actual situation in speaking 
 of their temporary rejection. In like manner, there is 
 no occasion to suppose that the apostle would have set 
 foot in an imaginary sphere in making such mention of 
 persecutions as occurs in the epistles bearing his name. 
 A religion so high and exacting in teaching and purpose 
 as Christianity could not take many steps in the world 
 of that age without provoking a fierce hostility. This 
 hostility, it is true, may not have issued forthwith into a 
 settled governmental opposition; but that is not what 
 is depicted in the Pauline epistles. The impression which 
 this group of writings imparts respecting Roman admin- 
 istration is perfectly adapted to the time anterior to the 
 Neronian outbreak. 
 
 In reply to the objection based on contrasts in the 
 
RECENT CRITICISM OF NEW TESTAMENT 385 
 
 epistles it is legitimate to observe that these are no greater 
 than might be expected to be exhibited by a writer liv- 
 ing in a creative period, moving through changing con- 
 ditions, and sharing in some measure in the common 
 human liability to changing moods. Indeed, did the 
 epistles bear a reverse character, were they distinguished 
 throughout by a smooth self-consistency, there would be 
 ground for the suspicion that they had passed under the 
 hand of the prosaic method-worshiping reviser. En- 
 kindled religious oratory is never conformed to the model 
 of a flat country. In saying this, however, we have no 
 intention of admitting that the Pauline epistles are speci- 
 ally lacking in the characteristics of continuity and inner 
 consistency. On the contrary, they attest everywhere 
 a subtle mind that entertained a fair respect for logical 
 connections. We may even speak, w^ith an eminent 
 commentator, of "the well-balanced arrangement of the 
 greater epistles."* 
 
 On the side of positive evidences we have strong ex- 
 ternal attestations. Especially weighty is that furnished 
 by Clement of Rome in his first epistle. He formally 
 refers to First Corinthians as a writing of Paul,^ and 
 copies from the first chapter of Romans.^ Now, Clement 
 was a writer who stood in close proximity to the apos- 
 tolic age. Harnack finds convincing evidence that he 
 wrote in the last decade of the first century,^ and 
 Schmiedel considers this the probable date of his epistle.^ 
 This date is strongly approved by the testimony of 
 Hegesippus respecting the occurrence at that time of the 
 disturbance in the Corinthian church which is presup- 
 posed in Clement's communication.^ Not less is the 
 
 ^ Von Soden, The History of Early Christian Literature, pp. 25, 26. 
 ^ I Epist. ad Cor., chap, xlvii. ^ Ibid., chap. xxxv. 
 
 * Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur, I. 251—255. 
 
 * Encyclopaedia Biblica, article "Galatians," 
 
 * Eusebius, Hist. Eccl., iii. 16. 
 
386 CRITICAL THEORIES 
 
 given date approved by the content of the epistle, with its 
 apparent identification of presbyters and bishops/ and 
 its lack of any reference to second century Gnosticism. 
 
 Again, we have a cogent evidence for the emanation 
 of the PauHne epistles from their professed source in a 
 multitude of peculiar details which are brought in 
 naturally enough, but which, nevertheless, are quite aside 
 from the main purpose of the epistles. Mere compilers 
 or manufacturers of dogmatic instructions would have 
 had neither an adequate motive to bring them in nor the 
 skill to impress upon them their stamp of individuality. 
 They attest most emphatically a definite personal source 
 and definite historical situations. 
 
 Finally, in their combination of intellectual subtlety 
 with spiritual sensibility, in their union of daring for 
 doctrinal construction with comprehensive practical wis- 
 dom, in the sense of possession and in the fervency of 
 expectation to which they alike testify, the epistles bear- 
 ing the name of Paul, or at least the great majority of 
 them, demonstrate that they emanated from a master- 
 ful personality. Had not history furnished us with the 
 commanding figure of the apostle to the Gentiles, it would 
 be necessary to conjure up a man of like dimensions to 
 occupy the vacant place. 
 
 We conclude, then, that the critical nihilism of the 
 Dutch school and of its scanty following is totally with- 
 out warrant, not merely because it contradicts the faith 
 and scholarly conviction of nineteen centuries, but be- 
 cause it is unequivocally vetoed by a sane application of 
 historical canons.^ 
 
 1 Epistle of Clement, chaps, xlii, xliv. 
 
 2 On the general theme of the section see Clemen, Paulus, sem Leben und 
 Wirken; Knowling, The Testimony of St. Paiil to Christ, Boyle Lectures 
 foi 1903-05. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the light of the review which has been made it is 
 scarcely possible to avoid the impression that the nine- 
 teenth century has been, to an extraordinary extent, a 
 period of testing for the Christian faith. Whatever may 
 be thought of the relative weight of the practical diffi- 
 culties which have stood in the way of that faith in dif- 
 ferent ages, it may safely be said that, in respect of 
 fullness and variety of intellectual ordeals, no other 
 period has been so prolific as the recently completed 
 century. 
 
 What is the result? Can the friends of Christianity 
 congratulate themselves on means of assurance that 
 nothing has been changed, that the era of energetic test- 
 ing has brought forth no demands for the modification 
 of belief? That would hardly be a valid ground for 
 congratulation. A living religion, deep enough and real 
 enough to meet the needs and to command the loyalty 
 of an advancing race, ought to be able to secure an im- 
 proved exposition of one or another point in its content 
 through such an intellectual engagement as that of the 
 nineteenth century. Had any previous age gained a 
 complete exposition of Christianity, the fact would tend 
 to the prejudice of its claim to finality, as making it to 
 appear insufficiently large and comprehensive to chal- 
 lenge to perpetual study. There is likely to be room for 
 an improved understanding of the preeminent religion, 
 and it is only requisite that the better understanding 
 should tend rather to confirm and glorify than to over- 
 throw and obscure the great characteristic features of 
 that religion. This is the point of view which is properly 
 
 387 
 
388 CONCLUSION 
 
 brought to the front in connection with an inquiry after 
 resuhs. The inquiry respects the effect of the extraor- 
 dinary testing on the great characteristic features of the 
 Christian faith. 
 
 It may be affirmed in all sobriety that these have suf- 
 fered no loss of prestige from the movements of thought 
 in the nineteenth century. Take that basal constituent of 
 the Christian system, the conception of God as supreme 
 ethical Person. It has been brought into competition 
 with pantheism, with materialism, with certain forms 
 of evolutionism, with positivism, and with pessimism. 
 The idealistic philosophies of the early part of the century 
 had at least points of affiliation with pantheism. Un- 
 doubtedly a considerable incentive to pantheistic as 
 against theistic thinking was derived from them. The 
 outspoken materialism of the middle and latter part of 
 the century was consistently and boldly antitheistic, 
 formally intolerant of the notion of a personal God. 
 Evolutionism in the dogmatic form advocated by Haeckel 
 was radically intolerant of that notion, and in the pro- 
 fessedly agnostic form championed by Spencer it was 
 far from friendly to the same notion. Positivism and 
 pessimism also were implicitly or explicitly antitheistic. 
 What now have these adverse forces effected? Abso- 
 lutely no permanent detriment to Christian theism. 
 Materialism has been discredited. By an overwhelm- 
 ing consensus of philosophical thinkers it has been de- 
 clared an impossible theory of the universe. The short- 
 comings of antitheistic evolutionism, whether in the 
 Spencerian form or in that of Haeckel, have been effectu- 
 ally exposed. The latter never won any title to respect 
 for philosophical competency, and the former has been 
 condemned to a waning influence. As for positivism and 
 pessimism, championship of their distinctive features is 
 
CONCLUSION 389 
 
 much too feeble to have any serious bearing on the out- 
 look for theistic belief. In relation to the predilection 
 for pantheistc teaching which was fostered by the ideal- 
 istic philosophies, it may be needful to say that it has 
 not yet been fully spent. But it is also in place to say 
 that potent correctives to that predilection have gained 
 a standing in philosophical thinking. The idealistic sys- 
 tems themselves contained some elements that are more 
 congenially related to the theistic than to the pantheistic 
 standpoint. Such an element was the profound stress 
 which Fichte placed upon the ethical will as the most 
 fundamental thing in the sphere of reality. Such an 
 element also was the rank which Hegel assigned to self- 
 consciousness among the categories. Through these 
 representations the philosophers named provided some- 
 what of an offset to the pantheistic implications of their 
 own systems. And in recent philosophical thinking this 
 offset has been reinforced by a conspicuous tendency to 
 make enlarged account of the element of will in constru- 
 ing ultimate reality and in explaining the world. At the 
 same time doubt about the compatibility of teleology with 
 the evolutionary process in organic nature has in large 
 degree been vanquished. Thus the conditions have been 
 made favorable, in a philosophical point of view, for 
 assuming that a will, working according to purpose, is 
 back of, and operative in, the world. In other words, 
 the conditions favor the ascendency of the theistic postu- 
 late, the establishment of the truth that in naming ulti- 
 mate reality we name simply the Supreme Person. Never, 
 in fact, has the wide firmament of human contemplation 
 been more thoroughly and securely illuminated by this 
 transcendent truth than it is in the precise epoch in which 
 we stand. 
 
 Take another fundamental constituent of the Christian 
 
390 CONCLUSION 
 
 system, the unique preeminence and lordship of Jesus 
 Christ, the conception of Christ as central to the redemp- 
 tive process in the world and qualified to be thus central 
 by the intrinsic worth and glory of his personality. Has 
 any ground been afforded for slackened faith in that 
 constituent? We fail to discover substantial evidence 
 of any such thing. The trend of exegesis as a whole 
 has been in the direction of establishing, beyond the 
 possibility of contradiction, that the thought of the tran- 
 scendent sonship and of the redemptive office of Christ 
 is deeply imbedded in the New Testament. The outcome 
 of critical investigation in general is to approve the con- 
 clusion that in the Christ of the New Testament the un- 
 blemished ideal is presented to us, and that the ideal is 
 there depicted because the reality had been furnished and 
 had made its ineffaceable impression. How infrequently, 
 within the limits of respectable scholarship, has a sug- 
 gestion to the contrary been offered during the past 
 century! Before the matchless figure of the Gospels 
 the voice of disparagement has almost always been 
 hushed, and in the few cases in which it has been heard 
 has so obviously failed to justify itself that its message 
 has been hollow and ineffective. In more than one in- 
 stance the critic who has been free to treat much of the 
 Christian tradition with a ruthless hand has felt com- 
 pelled to acknowledge in the Son of Man a greatness 
 and goodness surpassing all natural explanation. For 
 example, the author of a very radical book, in which 
 the notion of miracles is treated with conspicuous in- 
 tolerance and catholic Christianity as known in past ages 
 is supposed to have been placed upon the shelf, remarks : 
 "The empirical inexplicability of Jesus may as well be 
 conceded." Such admissions are properly regarded as 
 decidedly significant. If Jesus is not to be explained 
 
CONCLUSION 391 
 
 on ordinary grounds, then why may not the explanation 
 be sought on a higher ground? Why may not the 
 cathoHc conception of his unique relation to the divine, 
 the conclusion that in him the Word was made flesh, im- 
 bedded as this conclusion is in the New Testament, re- 
 ceive friendly recognition? Plainly, it is no long or 
 hazardous step which is taken when one passes on from 
 a confession of inexplicable perfection in the historic 
 Christ to accepting the substance of the catholic teaching 
 respecting his nature and relationship. In the demon- 
 strated power of the Christ to effect perennially a living 
 impression of his transcendent perfection the catholic 
 teaching regarding his person is shown to have no mean 
 tenure. 
 
 Once more, take that element of Christian faitli which 
 concerns the primacy of the Bible in the world's ethical 
 and religious literature. Has the basis for confidence at 
 this point been wrecked? Not at all. Doubtless the 
 enormous and unexampled industry expended upon the 
 task of biblical criticism in the nineteenth century has 
 wrought to modify the conception of the Bible. It has 
 rendered the high technical theory, characteristic of 
 theological thinking in the seventeenth century, an un- 
 comfortable and precarious theory for almost any 
 scholar, and has condemned it to the category of an im- 
 possible theory for the great majority of scholars who 
 either have made an adequate review of modern thought 
 or achieved anything like a detailed and searching in- 
 vestigation of the Bible. But to say that much is by no 
 means equivalent to saying that the cause of the Bible has 
 suffered damage. Without doubt some inconveniences 
 result from the relative dethronement of the technical 
 theory. But ample compensation is provided for these 
 in the release of Christian apology from an artificial and 
 
392 CONCLUSION 
 
 overburdensome task, and in an enlarged freedom to 
 concentrate attention upon that which constitutes a sure 
 title to an immortal primacy of the Bible. That title 
 has not been touched and cannot be touched by criticism. 
 This is made evident by the fact emphasized above, 
 namely, that criticism, with insignificant exceptions, has 
 been compelled to pay homage to the unique perfection 
 of the Christ. For the Bible is the book which depicts 
 the Christ, and which in its tenor and outcome is con- 
 genially related to him. By virtue of this fact it holds 
 an incomparable religious treasure, and is placed beyond 
 the reach of earthly competition. And the primacy 
 which is seen to belong to the Bible from this point of 
 view is only confirmed by careful comparison of its 
 ethico-religious content with that of the ethnic scriptures. 
 Means of such comparison have been made available 
 in full measure by the scholarly industry of the last 
 century. The result is not at all embarrassing to the 
 friend of the Bible. Though he may endeavor to be as 
 hospitable as possible toward every point of excellence 
 in the ethnic scriptures, he will still be compelled to 
 say that, in the full and balanced presentation of the most 
 precious truths, they fall much below the Bible, and that 
 their scattered lights taken together are no substitute 
 for the illumination which it supplies to the human spirit. 
 In the amplitude of its ethico-religious wealth, in the 
 perfection and balance of the exposition and illustration 
 of the truths most vitally important, the Bible, at the end 
 of all criticism and comparison, retains still for clear- 
 sighted scholarship its distinct primacy. No child of the 
 race who comes to it in the spirit of candor and earnest 
 inquiry can fail to find in it the word of life. 
 
 The Christian believer has no occasion to walk with 
 downcast eyes and desponding heart. Doubtless it is 
 
CONCLUSION 393 
 
 incumbent upon him to keep in mind the demands of 
 humility. To vent scornful reproaches upon those who 
 do not share his faith is out of harmony with the require- 
 ment for brotherly regret over their destitution. Anath- 
 emas are strangely inappropriate upon the lips of one 
 who in the midst of the tokens of his fallibility must 
 confess that he is still striving after better light. But 
 a demand to avoid arrogance involves no interdict 
 against cheerful confidence. The Christian believer, at 
 the opening of the twentieth century, should exercise 
 his prerogative to go forward with illumined counte- 
 nance and joyful spirit. No formidable barrier has been 
 placed in the way of his faith. The outlook, whatever 
 array of hostile forces may be In sight, is, on the whole, 
 inspiriting. Never, in fact, since the time when the reve- 
 lator was entranced by the vision of the New Jerusalem 
 descending out of heaven, has the prospect for Christian- 
 ity been better than it is at present. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Abbot, F. E., 187, 188 
 Adickes, E., 63, 71 
 Adler, F., 209, *fiE. 
 Agnosticism, 12, 14, 98, ff., 
 
 108, ff., 123, £E. 
 Aiken, C. F., 223 
 AUier, R., 299 
 Aquinas, T., 259 
 Arianism, 227, flE. 
 Arnold, M., 164, 165 
 
 Baader, F. von, 188 
 
 Babylon, influence of, 328, 
 
 354. ff. 
 Bain, A., 43, 46, 47 
 Balfour, A. J., 113 
 Ballou, H., 233 
 Barth, F., 360 
 
 Bauer, B., 41, 274, 275, 378 
 Baur, F. C, 282, ff. 
 Belot, G., 89 
 Belsham, T., 227 
 Bentham, J., 43, 241, 244, 245 
 Besant, A., 190, 192, 194, 198 
 Beyschlag, W., 237 
 Bible, primacy of the, 5, 6, 391. 
 
 See Criticism 
 Blavatsky, H. P., 189, ff., 216 
 Bolin, W., 61, 93 
 Bonham, J. M., 208, 224, 241 
 Bourdeau, G., 300 
 Bousset, W., 224, 351 
 Bowne, B. P., 53, 115 
 Bradley, F. H., 129, ff. 
 Brahmanism, 137, 138, 196, 201, 
 
 219, 220 
 
 Bridges, J. H., 94 
 Bruce, A. B., 179 
 Bruins, J. A., 378 
 Brunetiere, F., 300, 313 
 Btichner, L., 63, 65, fif., 158 
 Buck, J. D., 189 
 Buddhism, 137, 138, 181, 220, ff. 
 Bunsen, E. von, 222 
 
 Cabanis, P. J. G., 64 
 Caird, E., 90 
 Caldwell, W., 141 
 Carpenter, J. E., 232 
 Chadwick, J. W., 228 
 Channing, W. E., 228, ff. 
 Channing, W. H., 228 
 Cheyne, T. K., 356, 364, 374, 
 
 375 
 Christianity, essential content 
 
 of, 3; finality of, 181, ff. 
 Christian Science, Mrs. Eddy's, 
 
 199, ff. 
 Christology, 4, 19, 20, 183, 227, 
 
 ff., 233, ff., 265, 267, 271, 273, 
 
 278, 284, 306, ff., 316, 320, ff., 
 
 390 
 Clarke, J. F., 230 
 Clemen, C, 380, 386 
 Clifford, W. K., 59 
 Clodd, E., 55 
 Colville, W. J., 201 
 Comte, A., 78, ff., 158 
 Conception, the supernatural, 
 
 362, ff. 
 Congreve, J. H., 94 
 Cooke, R. J., 365 
 
 *ff. indicates that the matter in question is referred to on a number of 
 successive pages. 
 
 395 
 
396 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Criticism, Old Testament, i6i, 
 162, 214, 324, S.; New Tes- 
 tament, 160, 161, ff., 175, 
 263, flf., 272, 275, ff., 285, fif., 
 291, fif., 303, ff., 314, 318, 
 362, S. 
 
 Czerski, J., 181 
 
 Czolbe, H., 64 
 
 Dalman, G., 368, 370 
 
 Danvin, C, 96, 97, 250 
 
 Davies, C. M., 209 
 
 Delitzsch, F., 354, flf. 
 
 De Wette, W. M. L., 161, 162, 
 
 324 
 Domer, J. A., 154 
 Drews, A., 148 
 Driver, S. R., 332, 333, 334 
 Dubois- Reymond, E. H., 70 
 Duns Scotus, 259 
 
 Eddy, M. B. G., 199, ff. 
 Eddy, R., 233 
 Eichhom, J. G., 324 
 Essenism, 192, 222, 223 
 Ethical Ctdttire, Societies of, 
 
 209, ff., 225 
 Ethics, theories of, 241, fE. 
 Eucken, R., 54 
 Evolution, doctrine of, 96, 97, 
 
 104, fE., IIS, fE., 247, flE., 255, 
 
 260, 299 
 Ewald, H., 324 
 
 Peine, P., 380 
 
 Feuerbach, L., 41, 61, 91, fE., 159 
 
 Fichte, J. G., 17, fE., 23, flE., 40, 
 
 389 
 Fischer, K., 18, 142 
 Fiske, J., 159, 224 
 Flint, R., 74 
 Fltigel, O., 125 
 Fomllde, A., 88, 89, 242 
 
 Freedom and necessity, 31, 46, 
 50, 66, 75, 138, 158, 252, 257, 
 258 
 
 Freeman, J., 228 
 
 Free Religion, 181, flE., 215, fE, 
 
 Gabler, G. A., 41 
 
 Gannett, E. S., 227, 228 
 
 Gaimett, W. C, 227 
 
 Garrett, E., 216 
 
 Garvie, A. E., 125 
 
 Gizycki, G. von, 212 
 
 God, views respecting. See 
 
 Theism 
 Goldziher, I., 327, 328 
 Goschel, K. F., 41 
 Gospels, criticism of the, 265, fE., 
 
 280, 289, 290, 296, 304, 305, 
 
 314, 315, 318, 322, 372, fE. 
 Graf, K. H., 324 
 Green, T. H., 53, 247 
 Grill, J., 237 
 Gunkel, H., 357, 359 
 Guthrie, M., 108, 115, 255 
 Guyau, M., 204, flE., 224, 251, 
 
 253. 256 
 
 Haeckel, E., 62, 65, flE., 119, flE., 
 
 158, 251, 25s, 388 
 Hamilton, W., 97, loi, 108, 109 
 Hardy, E., 223 
 Hamack, A., 123, 223, 235, 297, 
 
 351. 380 
 Harrison, F., 94, 95, 114 
 Hartmann, E. von, 144, flE., 160 
 Hausrath, A., 271, 310 
 Hecker, M. F., 138 
 Hedge, F. H., 230, 231 
 Hegel, G. W. F., 17, flE., 32, flE., 
 
 38,41, 129, 135, 145. 155. 263, 
 
 282, 299, 389 
 Herrmann, J. G. W., 123, 125 
 Hilgenfeld, A., 296, 297 
 
INDEX 
 
 397 
 
 Hinduism, 137, 145. See Brah- 
 
 manism 
 Hobbes, T., 324 
 Hodge, C, 259 
 Hoffding, H., 52, 61 
 Holtzmann, H. J., 224, 237, 380 
 Holyoake, G. J., 207, 208 
 Hopkins, E. W., 221 
 Hume, D., 45 
 Huxley, T. H., 55, flf., 132, 156, 
 
 249, 260 
 
 Idealism, the post - Kantian, 
 
 16, flf. 
 Immortality, 32, 48, 66, 76, 90, 
 
 93. 139 
 Iverach, J., 113 
 
 James, W., 51, 134 
 
 Jastrow, M., 359, 360 
 
 Jensen, P., 359, 361 
 
 Jeremias, A., 358 
 
 Johnson, S., 186 
 
 Judge, W. Q., 190, 192, 195, 197 
 
 Jiilicher, A., 295, 297, 380 
 
 Kaftan, J., 123, 125, 234 
 Kant, Immanuel, 11, S., 299 
 Kautzsch, E., 338 
 Keim, T., 317, ff. 
 Kidd, B., 127, 128 
 King, H. C, 134 
 Knowling, R. J., 386 
 Konig, F. E., 341, 359 
 Kuenen, A., 324, 331, 334, 342, 
 346, 353 
 
 Ladd, G. T., 59, 73, 76, 204, 253 
 
 Lardner, N., 227 
 
 Lassalle, F. J. G., 41 
 
 Levy, A., 61. 91 
 
 Levy-Bruhl, L., 82 
 
 Lewes, G. H., 43 
 
 Lillie, A., 216, 222 
 
 Lindsey, T., 227 
 Littr^, E., 84, 86 
 Lobstein, P., 363, 364, 370 
 Loman, A. D., 378 
 Longfellow, S., 186 
 Loon, J. van, 378 
 Lotze, H., 123 
 
 Mackintosh, R., 118 
 McTaggart, J. McT. E., 34 
 Mahatma, the, 194, 195, 215, 
 
 216 
 MainlSnder, P., 148. 149 
 Manen, W. C. van. 378, 379 
 Mansel, H. L., 45, loi, 109 
 Marheineke, P., 41 
 Martineau, J., 231, 232, 247 
 Marx, K., 41 
 Masson, D., 52 
 
 Materialism, 42, 47, 54, fi., 135 
 Matthes, J. C, 378 
 Meyboom, H. U., 378 
 Michaelis, J. D., 324 
 Mill, J., 43. 44 
 Mill, J. S., 43. S., 78, 86, 88, 93, 
 
 155, 245. 246 
 Miracles, 68, 153, flf., 265, 284, 
 
 302, 303, 315, 319, 322 
 Moleschott, J., 63, 65, ff. 
 Monism, 24, 29, 47, 48, 62, 69, 
 
 76, 120, ff., 273, 299 
 Moses, as leader and lawgiver, 
 
 334, ff. 
 Myths, 166, 267, ff., 327, ff. 
 
 Naber, S. A., 378 
 Nietzsche, F., 242, 243, 253 
 
 Oken, L., 41 
 
 Olcott, H. S., 189, 192, 193, 198 
 
 Oldenberg, H., 221 
 
 Ormond, A. T., 97 
 
398 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Orr, J., 126, 333, 341 
 Owen, R. D., 199 
 
 Pantheism, 25, 29, 30, 38, 40, 
 41, 137, 145. 196, 199. 201, 
 283, 388, 389 
 
 Parker, T., 165, 183, S. 
 
 Patriarchs, 324, flf. 
 
 Pauline epistles, 290, 291, 377,5. 
 
 Paulsen, P., 34, 247 
 
 Paulus, H. E. G., 160, 161 
 
 Pentateuch, 324, ff. 
 
 Pessimism, 135, fif. 
 
 Peyrere, I., 324 
 
 Pfleiderer, O., 114, 126, 166, 
 237, 296, 297, 380 
 
 Pierson, A., 378 
 
 Pollock, F., 59 
 
 Positivism, 78, ff. 
 
 Potter, W. J., 187 
 
 Price, R., 227 
 
 Priestley, J., 227 
 
 Prophecy, Hebrew, 342, ff. 
 
 Quietism, 138, 202, 203 
 
 Rationalism, 22, 141, 146, 160, 
 
 316, 317 
 Reischle, M., 123, 125, 235 
 Renan, E., 162, ff., 298, ff. 
 Resurrection of Christ, 163, 
 
 177. ff-. 315. 320 
 Reuss, E., 324 
 Richter, J. P., 170 
 Rishell, C. W., 179 
 Ritschl, A., 123, ff., 234, 295 
 Ritschlians, 123, 233 
 Roberty, E. de, 133 
 Romanes, G. J., 57, 58, 60, 68 
 Ronge, J., 181 
 Ropes, J. H., 295 
 Royce, J., 117 ' 
 
 Ryle, H. E., 332 
 
 Sabatier, A.. 126, 127 
 
 Salter, W. M., 211, 213, 214 
 
 Sanday, W., 369 
 
 Schelling, F. W. J., 17, ff., 28, ff., 
 
 40, 129, 263 
 Schenkel, D., 313, ff. 
 Schleiermacher, F. D. E., 126 
 Schmidt, N., 236 
 Schmiedel, P. W., 352, 363, 364, 
 
 370, 372, ff., 380, 385 
 Schopenhauer, A., 36, 135, ff., 
 
 160, 189, 242 
 Schurman, J. G., 256 
 Schwegler, A., 295 
 S^ailles, G., 300 
 Secularism, 204, ff., 241 
 Sensationalism, 42, ff., 61, 62, 
 
 79 
 Seth, A., 35, 39, 169 
 Seydel, R., 222 
 
 Sheldon, W. L., 210, 213, 214 
 Siebert, O., 69, 284 
 Simon, R., 324 
 
 Sinnett, A. P., 190, 193, 195 
 Smend, R., 327, 337, 353 
 Sociology, the Comtean, 78, 
 
 81, ff. 
 Soden, H. von, 380, 385 
 Spencer, H., 31, 43, ff., 94, 96, ff., 
 
 159, 247, ff., 255, 388 
 Spinoza, B., 37, 63, 324 
 Spiritualism, or spiritism. 198, 
 
 199 
 Stade, B., 327, 337, 353, 357 
 Steck, R., 378, 379 
 Stephen, L., 44, 46, 48, 208, 241, 
 
 250. 253 
 Stimer, M., 242 
 Strauss, D. F., 41, 61, 182. 
 
 263, ff. 
 Stucken, E., 329 
 Supernatural, the, 153, ff. See 
 
 Miracles 
 Swing, A. T., 126 
 
INDEX 
 
 399 
 
 Theism, compromised or denied, 
 
 25, 29, 38, 60, 61, 62, 67, 84, 
 92, 102, flf., 120, 131, 137, 146, 
 154, 158, 159, 181, 196, 207, 
 212, 253, 300, 301; defended, 
 
 26, 30, 89, 114, ff., 132, 167, ff., 
 258, ff., 388,389 
 
 Theosophy, 188, ff., 218, fif. 
 Trinity, 22, 40. See Christology 
 Tulloch, J., 311 
 Tyndall, J., 57 
 
 Ulrici, H., 62 
 Unitarianism, 227, S. 
 Universalism, 233 
 Utilitarianism, 244, ff., 253, ff. 
 
 Vatke, J. K. W., 324 
 Vischer, E., 380 
 Vogt, C. 63, fif. 
 
 Volter, D., 378 
 Vorlander, K., 63 
 
 Ward, J., 55, 115, 116 
 
 Ware, H., 228 
 
 Weber, A., 28 
 
 Wegscheider, J. A. L., 161 
 
 Weinel, H., 380 
 
 Wellhausen, J., 224, 326, 336, 
 
 345. 350. 353. 354 
 Wernle, P., 237, 239, 351, 380 
 Williams, C. M., 247 
 Winckler, H., 328, 354, ff. 
 Windelband, W., 69 
 Wrede, W., 380 
 Wyld, G., 198 
 
 Zeller, E., 23, 28, 34, 39, 265, 
 
 295 
 Zimmem, H., 328, 329 
 
Date Due 
 
 r'; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f) 
 
 
 
 
Theological Semmary-Speei 
 
 1 1012 01012 4875