'•/*'3 ■.^r.ni /3.~i^ ALUMNI LIBRARY, THEOI,pGieAL SEMINARY, PRINCETON, N. J. ., BT 1101 .L44 1818 v. 2 Leland, John, 1691-1766. -^'^^^'^J . . . The advantage and Bool necessity of the Christian ^ '\ IJ? THE ADVANTAGE AND NECESSITY OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION, SHEWN FROM THE STATE OF RELIGION IN" THE ANTIENT HEATHEX WORLD: ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE KNOWLEDGE AND WORSHIP OF TH^ ONE TRUE GOD: A RULE OF MORAL DUl'Y: AND A SI' ATE OF FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, A Preliminary Discourse on JSTcitural and Mevealed Religion^ IN TWO VOLUMES. BY JOHN LELAND, D. D. AUTHOR OF THE VIEW OF THE DEISTICAL WRITERS, Ssc 'W\VWVWVW VOLUME XL PHILADELPHIA: PUBLISHED BY ANTHONY FTNLEY, AT THE N. E. CORNER OF CHESNUT AND FOURTH STREEt^,- William Fry, Printer, ^ V x«s C^ >» >* f PREFACE TO THE SECOND VOLUME. Although in the general preface prefixed to the for- mer volume, I have given an account of the nature and de- sign of this work, yet I think it not amiss to say something farther iii the beginning of this volume, for removing or ob- viating some prejudices, which might be conceived against the plan I have formed, and the manner in which it is exe- cuted. Some learned persons seem not willing to admit, that the main principles of religion and morality were originally communicated by Divine Revelation to the first parents of mankind, and from them conveyed by tradition to their pos- terity. They think it more probable, that they were led by their own natural sense and reason to the knowledge of those pAiciples. I readily own, that those principles, when once discovered, will be found upon examination to be perfectly agreeable to the best reason of mankind; but I think enough is offered in this treatise to shew, that in fact the first notices of these things were communicated to the first ancestors of the human race by a revelation from God. And in this I have the satisfaction of agreeing with many eminent divine^, and with those two great masters of reason, and. who are justly reckoned among our best writers on the law of nature, iv PREFACE. Grotius and PufFendorff. The supposing the knowledge of the main principles of religion to have been originally- owing to a Divine Revelation, docs not at all deny that those principles are really founded in the nature of things, and confirmed by the dictates of pure and unprejudiced reason. These things are perfectly consistent; and when taken toge- ther, give one a more extensive view of the wisdom and goodness of God in his dispensations towards mankind, and the various ways that have been taken for leading men into the knowledge of religion and morals. That this is most agreeable to the Mosaic accounts, is sufficiently shewn both in the former volume and in this. Ana that there were very ^ntient traditions among the Heathen nations, concerning some of the main principles of religion, though in process of time grccttly depraved and corrupted, appears from the accounts that are given us by the Heathen writers them- selves. But there is another objection which I have met with, and which deserves to be more particularly considered. It is this, That the making such a representation as I have done, of the state of the Pagan world, may possibly be turn- ed to the disadvantage of natural religion itself, and may tend to the weakening those principles which lie at the foun- dation of all religion and morality. If by natural religion be meant religion as it is founded %n nature, and which may be proved to be agreeable to the best and soundest principles of human reason, there is no- thing in this work that can bring any real prejudice to it. And though I am far from thinking that the Gospel is mere- ly a republication of the law of nature, yet this may be safe- ly affirmed, and is what I have endeavoured in the course oi this work to shew, that it is one excellent design of the Chriscian Revelation to confirm and establish it, to place it |n the properest light, and to clear it from that amazing load of rubbish which had been heaped upon it in a long succes- PREFACE. y sion of ages. Nowhere is natural religion, taken in the sense I have mentioned, so well understood, so clearly ex- plained, and so strongly asserted, as where the Christian Religion is duly entertained and professed. But if by natural religion be understood religion as it stands merely on the foot of the powers of unassisted rea- son, entirely independent on Divine Revelation, and as it was actually taught and professed by those who made the high- €st pretences to reason and religion in the Pagan world, I confess it has been one principal part of my design in this work to shew its weaknesses and defects. And as a high admiration of the antient philosophers, especially those who flourished in the celebrated nations of Greece and Rome, has inspired many with a contempt of the Holy Scriptures, and caused them to entertain mean and undervaluing thoughts of the Gospel of Christ, I cannot but think it a real service to religion, to shew how unfit those boasted lights of the Pagan world were to be the guides of mankind; and that they fell vastly short of the first teachers and publishers of Christianity, mean and illiterate as some have esteemed them. The Scriptures make the most striking representations of the darkness and corruptions of the Heathen world. And the antient apologists for Christianity give the same account of the state of the Pagan nations. They set themselves to expose their gross idolatry and polytheism, the impurities and abominations of their religion and worship, their great corruption and dissoluteness of morals, and the uncertain- ties and contradictions of their best writers, and thence ar- gue the great usefulness and necessity of the Christian Re- velation, and the advantage it was of to mankind. And who- ever would have a just and full view of the inestimable be- nefits and privileges we are made partakers of by the Gospel, ought by no means to lose sight of this. ^ It is not the intention of any thing that is said in this book to degrade and vilify human reason, as if it were of I vi PREFACE. no use in religion, and only fit to lead men astray. I ana fully persuaded that reason, duly exercised and improved, is very friendly to religion and morals: and that the main principles of the Christian Religion, if set before men in a proper light, will approve themselves to right reason, when freed from vicious and sinful prejudices* it is by reason that we are enabled to detect false revelations, and to dis- cern the proofs and evidences of the true, and the glorious characters of wisdom and goodness, of purity and truth, which shine in it Bat I confess I am far from conceiving so high an opinion of reason, if left merely to itself in the present state of mankind, as some have entertained of it. I am fully convinced by arguments drawn from undeniable fact and experience, that reason, when puffed up with a pre- sumptuous conceit of its own ability and strength, and ne- glecting or despising proper assistances, or when boldly in- truding into things too high for it, or led aside by corrupt custom and mere human authority, by vicious prejudices and passions and carnal interests, is often apt to pass very- wrong judgments on things, especially in divine matters. Nor do I apprehend, that it is any disparagement to reason, to lay open the faults and errors of those who have made the greatest pretensions to it, or that it follows from this, that reason is a vain thing, and has no certain foundations to rely upon. Thus, e. g. if some that have professed to go- vern themselves by reason, have entertained very wrong no- tions of God, of his perfections, attributes, and providence, it by no means follows, that the proofs of the divine nature and perfections, or of God's governing providence, are not built upon sure and solid grounds, or that reason is not able to discern the force of those proofs, when clearly set before it. In like manner with regard to morals, it would be wrong to conclude that there is no certainty in any moral principles, because some persons of great name have passed very false judgments in matters which appear to be of great impor- PREFACE. yii tance in morality: or that there is nothing base or deformed in vicious actions or affections, because in some nations and ages, and in the opinion of persons pretending to superior wisdom, they have been regarded as matters of indifferency, and as either no faults at all, or very slight ones. In the course of this work, especially in that part of it which relates to the state of morality in the Heathen world, I have been under a necessity of taking notice of several things which can scarce be mentioned without being offen- sive to virtuous minds, though frequently practised among those that have passed for the most learned and polite of the Heathen nations, and even by many of the philosophers themselves. The subject was so disagreeable to me, that I intended more than once to have passed it over altogether, or to have mentioned it very slightly, and only in a general way. But what determined me to insist upon a full proof was, that otherwise the charge might have been looked upon to be groundless and calumnious. And not only have some real friends to Christianity attempted to clear them from it, but others of a different character have taken occasion to censure the apostle Paul, as having made an unjust and odi- ous representation of the state of the Gentile world, beyond what can be justified by truth and fact. The proofs I have brought are from the antient Heathen writers themselves, and not from any Christian authors, except as far as they are supported by the former. Nor can I think there is any danger of what some good persons might possibly be appre- hensive of, that this might tend to diminish the horror of vices, which are justly accounted most detestable and odi- ous. The only inference that can justly be drawn from it is, that the bias of corrupt customs, and vicious appetites and passions, are apt to over-rule the moral sentiments of the human mind, and tend to stifle the remonstrances of con- science, and even to bribe reason to judge too favourably concerning practices which it would otherwise reject with VUl MEFACE. abhorrence. It also shews, that a Divine Revelation, and art express law of God, enforced by the strongest sanctions, may be of great use in point of morals, even with respect to the restraining men from those things, the evil and turpi- tude of which seem to be most apparent to reason and na- ture. Notwithstanding the corruptions that have prevailed among many who have taken upon them the name of Chris- tians, and which some have taken pains to exaggerate, the most abominable vices have been far from being so general among them, as they were in those that have been esteemed the most reiined nations of Paganism. It is not to be doubted, but that vast numbers of those who believe the Gospel have been and are preserved by the purity of its precepts, and the power of its sanctions, from vices to which otherwise thev would have given a boundless indulgence. Nor can any who believe the Christian religion allow themselves in vi- cious practices, without sinning against the clearest light, and breaking through the strongest engagements. I do not see, therefore, how they can be accounted real friends to the puri- ty of morals, who are for taking away or diminishing the force of those motives and sanctions which the Gospel proposes, and which, where they arc really believed, tend both to ani- mate good men to a holy and virtuous practice by the most glorious hopes and prospects, and to deter the wicked from their evil courses by the most amazing denunciations of God's righteous vengeance. When we consider the strange fluctuations of persons of the greatest abilities in the Pagan world, with respect to several important points of religion and morality, and to the retributions of a future state, it ought surely to make us highly thankful that we have a written well-attested Reve- lation in our hands, to which we may have recourse, both for assisting us to form a right judgment in matters of the greatest consequence, and for regulating our practice. And it has pleased God in his great wisdom and goodness to es- PREFACE. ix tablish its divine authority by such an abundance and va- riety of proofs, as are every way suitable to the importance of the case, and are amply sufficient to engage though not to constrain the assent. Christianity is not afraid of the light, or of a free and impartial examination and inquiry. It has always met with the best reception from those who have ex- amined it, in the integrity of their hearts, with that serious- ness and attention which the great importance of it well de- serves. Let us therefore, with minds freed as far as possible from vicious prejudices, consider the nature and excellency of the Christian religion, the spirittiaiiiy and heavenliness of its doctrines, the discoveries that are there rt\ade to us of those things which it is of the highest concernment to us to know, especially relating to the wonderful methods of the Divine Wisdom and Grace for our redemption and salva- tion, the unquestionable excellency of its morals, and purity of its laws, the power of those motives by which the prac- tice of them is enforced, and the admirable tendency of the whole to promote the glory of God, and the cause of right- eousness, piety, and virtue in the world: let us then make proper reflections on the holy and spotless life, and most perfect and sublime character of the great Founder of our religion, and also on the character of his disciples, who pub- lished it to the world in his name: that they appear to have been persons of great probity and simplicity, incapable of carrying on an artful imposture, or of being themselves the inventors of that scheme of religion which they taught, and which was contrary in several instances to their own strong- est prejudices; nor is there any thing in their whole temper and conduct, in the doctrine they preached, or in the manner of propagating it, that savours of the views of worldly poli- cy, or that is cunningly accommodated to humour men's pre- judices and vicious passions, and gratify their a^Tibition and sensuality. But especially let us consider the ilUistrious at- testations given from heaven to the divine mission, both of Vol. II. ' b X PREFACE. the first Author and publishers of the Christian religion, by a series of the most wonderful works, done in express con- firmation of the religion they taught, and which manifestly transcended all human power or skill, and bore the evident tokens of a divine interposition: and that the truth of these facts is ascertained to us with all the evidence that can be reasonably desired in such a case, and which, all things con- sidered, is as great as could be expected concerning any facts whatsoever done in past ages. To all this may be added the evidence arising from clear and express prophecies, re- lating to events which no human sagacity could foresee, some of them undeniably delivered and committed to writ- ing many ages before their accomplishment, and yet in due time punctually fulfilled. All these are of great force, even separately considered; but when viewed and taken together in their just connection and harmony, form such a chain of proofs, as carries a mighty force of conviction with it to an honest and unprejudiced mind, that is animated with a sin- cere love of truth. The advocates of Christianity have fre- quently urged these arguments with great clearness and strength; and whilst these proofs continue firm, and the ori- ginal facts are well supported, the truth and divine authority of the Christian religion stand upon solid and immoveable foundations. Nor should we suffer prejudices arising from the ill conduct of many of its professors and teachers, or from some particular passages of Scripture hard to be un- derstood, or the difficulty of comprehending some of its doc- trines which relate to things of a very, sublime and mys- terious nature, at all shake our belief of true original Christianity. It is a rule laid down long since by Aristotle, and the justness of which has never been controverted, that we ought not to expect in all things the same kind of evi- dence, but in every thing content ourselves with such proofs as the nature of the subject will bear. To insist upon mathe- matical demonstration in matters of religion and morality, PREFACE. xi is perfectly absurd and unreasonable; and yet the evidence may be such as is sufficient to produce a certainty, though of another kind, and which may very fully satisfy the mind, and make it reasonable for us to give our assent to it, not- withstanding some objections that may be made against it, and from which scarce any truth is entirely free. I shall on this occasion consider a pretence that has been often made use of by men of sceptical minds, that without an absolute certainty (which they pretend is not to be had in what relates to religion) they may reasonably and safely withhold their assent. But such persons ought to consider that if there be a probability on the side of religion, though short of an absolute certainty, this would induce an obliga- tion upon them to receive it, and to govern their temper and conduct by the rules it prescribes. Where a thing appears to be probable, i. e. that there is more reason for it than the contrary, this does not leave the mind in a perfect equili- brium, and at liberty absolutely to susp'-nd its assent if it be a matter of speculation, or to abstain from acting if it be a matter of practice. This the Pyrrhonists, who carried scep- ticism to the greatest height, were sensible of, and therefore would not allow that anv one thing is more probable than another; which seems to me to be one of the greatest extrava- gancies that any man pretending to reason can be guilty of; nor do I believe that any one man, \\hatever he might pre- tend in words, could really bring himself to think so. Those of what was called the New Academy, though at the bot- tom little better than sceptics, saw the absurdity of this, and therefore though they would not acknowledge a certainty, yet allowed a probability in things; and if they had pur- sued this concession to its genuine consequences, it would have subverted the scheme they had in view of a perpe- tual suspension of assent. It is an undeniable maxim, that we ought to follow evidence as far as it appears to us, and therefore that which is probable ought to sway our Xii PREFACE. judgment, and influence our practice, according to the measure of its probability, and the preponderancy of the reasons which are brought for it. It is manifest to every one that has any knowledge of mankind, that it is pro- bability which governs our conduct, if we act prudently; and that the author of our beings designed it should be so. We are so constituted, that in almost all cases rela- ting to practice, we are obliged to follow what appears to us upon a proper consideration of it to be most pro- bable; and for any man wilfully to neglect a thing which would probably be of great advantage to him, or to do any thing ^^hich probably will expose him to great loss and damage, would be justly deemed a very foolish and unreasonable conduct, and in matters where duty is con- cerned a very guilty one. Some of those who were other- wise much addicted to sceptism in speculation, have yet acknowledged, that in the affairs of common life, people ought to follow probable appearances. And if this is to be done in what relates to our present temporal interest and advantage, why not in that which relates to our highest happiness? The more important any affair is, and the greater the danger is in neglecting it, or the damage to be sustained by such a neglect, the more we are obli- ged, by the soundest maxims of reason and good sense, to govern ourselves, and act according to what 'appears to us upon a diligent enquiry to be most probable. And what reason can be assigned, that we should not act so in . matters of the greatest consequence, and in which our everlasting salvation appears to be nearly concerned? In cases of this nature, if the hazard be vastly greater on one side than on the other; all the rules of prudence lead us to take that part, which has the least hazard attending it, even though the evidtnce on that side should be supposed to be no greater, or perhaps something less, than on the other. But when both the evidence is PREFACE. xiii much stronger on one side, and at the same time the hazard men run by rejecting it much greater, to take that side which is both less probable and more danger- ous, would be the most foolish and inexcusable conduct in the world. If therefore, upon a fair enquiry, there is at least a great probability that the Christian Revelation came from God, it is boih our wisdom and duty to embrace it, and to go- vern ourselves by its excellent rules. No man in that case would run a hazard by embracing the Gospel, or at least a hazard in any degree equal to what he would expose himself to by rejecting it: Let us suppose that by com- plying with the terms of salvation which are there pro- posed, he should deny himself some of those liberties which he would otherwise indulge, and controul his passions by the Christian rules, which do not require us to extir- pate the passions and appetites, but to govern and keep them within the bounds of moderation and temperance, this is no more than the wisest men have advised as the properest way for securing a man's own tranquillity, and for preserving body and soul in a right temper. In other cases, men think it reasonable to hazard some present loss, and to undergo some present hardships and inconve- niencies, on the probable prospect of avoiding a much greater evil, or procuring some valuable and superior ad- vantage. But when the advantage proposed is so infinitely great as the rewards promised to good men in the Gos- pel, and the evils so great as the punishments there denounced against the obstinately impenitent and disobedi- ent, it ought certainly to have proportionably a more power- ful influence. 1 hope every reader that brings with him a mind sin- cerely disposed to know the truth and follow it, willjohi with me in earnest supplications to God, who is a lover of truth and holiness, that he would be graciously pleased Xiv PREFACE. to clear our minds from vicious prejudices, and dispel the clouds of ignorance and error, that we may receive the truth in the love of it, may behold it in its convinc- ing light, and feel its transforming power, and may bring forth fruits suitable to it in a holy and virtuous life, to the glory of God, and our own eternal salvation. CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME. PART II. CHAPTER I. Man appears from the frame of his nature to be a moral agent, and designed to be governed by a law. Accordingly, God hath given him a law to be the rule of his duty The scheme of those who pretend that this law is naturally and necessarily known to all men without instruction, contrary to fact and experience. Yet there are several ways by which men come to a knowledge of this law, and of the duty required of them; viz. by a moral sense implanted in the human heart; by a principle of reason judging from the natures and relations of things; by education, and human instruction: besides all which, God hath made discoveries of his will concerning our duty, in a way of extraor- dinary Divine Revelation. Page 1. CHAPTER n. The principal heads of moral duty were made known to mankind from the be- ginning, and continued to be known and acknowledged in the patriarchal ages. When men fell from the right knowledge of God, they fell also in important Instances from the right knowledge of moral duty. The law given to the peo- ple of Israel was designed to instruct and direct them in morals, as well as in the knowledge and worship of the one true God. A great deal was done in the methods of Divine Providence, to preserve the sense and knowledge of morals among the heathen nations; but they did not make aright use of the helps afforded them. Page 18. CHAPTER m. A particular enquiry into the state of morality in the Heathen world. A com- plete rule of morals, taken in its just extent, comprehends the duties relating to God, our neighbours, and^ourselves. If the Heathens had such a rule among xvi CONTENTS. them, it would appear either in the precepts of their reheion, or in the pre- scriptious of theii- ci\il laws, or customs which have the force of laws, or in the doctrines and instiuctions of their philosophers and moralists. It is proposed distinctly to consider each of these. As to what passed among them for reli- gion, morality did not properly make any part of it, nor was it the office of their priests to teach men virtue. .\s to the civil laws and constitutions, supposing them to have been never so proper for civil government, they were not fitted to be an adequate rule of morals. The best of them were, in several respects, greatly defective. Various instances produced of civil laws, and of customs' which had the force of laws, among the most civilized nations, especially an>ong the antient Egyptians and Greeks, which were contrary to the rules of morality. Page 33. CHAPTER IV. Farther instances of civil laws and customs among the Pagan nations. Those of the antient Romans considered The laws of the twelve tables, though mighti- ly extolled, were far from exhibiting a complete rule of morals. The law of Romulus concerning the exposing of diseased and deformed children. This continued to be practised among the Romans. Their cruel treatment of their slaves. Their gladiatory shows contrary to humanity. Unnatural lusts common among them as well as the Greeks. Observations on the Chinese laws and customs Other laws and customs of nations mentioned, which are contrary to good morals. Page 57. CHAPTER V. Concerning morality as taught by the antient Heathen philosophers. Some of them said excellent things concerning moral virtue, and their writings might in several respects be of great use. But they could not furnish a perfect rule of morals, that had sufficient certainty, clearness, and authority. No one philosopher, or sect of philosophers, can be absolutely depended upon as a proper guide in matters of morality. Nor is a complete system of morals to be extracted from the writings of them all collectively considered. The vanity of such an attempt shewn. Their sentiments, how excellent soever, could not properly pass for laws to mankind. Page 72. CHAPTER Vr. Many of the philosophers were fundamentally wrong in the first principles of morals. They denied that there are any moral differences of things founded in nature and reason, and resolved them wholly into human laws and customs. Observations on those philosophers wlio made man's chief good consist in plea- sure, and proposed this as the highest end of morals, without any regard to a Divine Law. The moral system of Epicurus considered. His high pretences to virtue e.vamhied. The inconsistency of his principles shewn, and that, if CONTENTS. xvii pursued to their genuine consequences, they are really destructive of all virtue and good morals. Page 83. CHAPTER VIL The sentiments of those who are accounted the best of the Pagan moral philoso- phers considered. They held in general, that the law is right reason. Bnt reason alone, without a superior authority, does not lay an obliging force upon men. The wisest Heathens taught, that the original of law was from God, and that from him it derived its authority. As to the question, how this law comes to he known to us, they sometimes represent it as naturally known to all men. But the principal way of knowing it is resolved by them into the mind and reasen of wise men, or, in other words, into the doctrines and instructions of the phi- losophers. The uncertainty of this rule of morals shewn. They talked highly of virtue in general, but differed about matters of great importance relating to the law of nature; some instances of which are mentioned. Page 107. CHAPTER Vni. Epictetus's observation concerning the difficulty of applying general preconcep- tions to particular cases, verified in the antient pbilosophei's. They Avere gene- rally wrong with respect to the duty and worship proper to be rendex'ed to God, though they themselves acknowledged it to be a point of the highest im- portance. As to social duties, some eminent philosophers pleaded for revenge ^nd, against forgiveness of injuries. But especially they were deficient in that part of moral duty which relates to the government of the sensual appetites and passions. Many of the philosophers countenanced by their principles and pi-actice the most unnatural lusts and vices. Those of them that did not carry it so far, yet encouraged an impurity inconsistent with the strictness and dig- nity of virtue. Plato very culpable in this respect, so also were the Cynics and Stoics. Simple fornication generally allowed amongst them. Our modern deists very loose in their principles with regai^d to sensual impurities. Page 119. CHAPTER IX. The Stoics the most eminent teachers of morals in the Pagan world. Mightily admired and extolled both by the antients and moderns. Observations on the Stoical maxims and precepts with regard to piety towards God. Their scheme tended to take away, or very much weaken, the fear of God as a punisher of sin. It tended also to raise men to a state of self-sufficiency and independency, inconsistent with a due veneration for the Supreme Being. Extravagant strains of pride and arrogance in some of the principal Stoics. Concession of sin in their addresses to the Deity made no part of their religion. Page 145. Vol. II. c xviii CONTENTS, CHAPTER X. The Stoics gave excellent precepts with regard to the duties men owe to one another. Yet they carried their doctrine of apathy so far, as to be in some in- stances not properly consistent with a humane disposition and a charitable sym- pathy. They said fine things concerning forgiving injuries and bearing with other men's faults. But in several respects they carried this to an extreme, and placed it on wrong foundations, or enforced it by improper motives. This is particularly shewn with regard to those two eminent philosophers Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus The most antient Stoics did not allow pardoning mercy to be an ingredient in a perfect character. Page 1G7. CHAPTER XI. The Stoical precepts with regard to self-government considered. They talk in high strains of regulating and subduing the appetites and passions; and yet gave too great indulgence to the fleshly concupiscence, and had not a due re- gard to purity and chastity. Their doctrine of suicide considered. Some of tlie most eminent wise men among the Heathens, and many of our modern ad- mirers of natural religion, faulty in this respect. The falsehood and pernicious consequences of this doctrine shewn. Page 187. CHAPTER Xn. The Stoics professed to lead men to perfect happiness in this prcsentlife, abstract- ing from all consideration of a future state. Their scheme of the absolute sufficien- cy of virtue to happiness, and the indifFerency of all external things considered. They were sometimes obliged to make concessions which were not very con- sistent with their system. Their philosophy in its rigour not reducible to prac- tice, and had little influence either on the people or on themselves. They did not give a clear idea of the nature of that virtue which they so highly extolled^ The loose doctrine of many of the Stoics, as well as other philosophers, with regard to truth and lying. Page 208, CHAPTER Xm. The nations were sunk into a deplorable state of corruption, with regard to morals, at the time of our Saviour's appearing. To recover them from their wretched and guilty stale to holiness and happiness, one principal end for which God sent his Son into the world. The Gospel Dispensation opened with a free offer of pardon and salvation to perishing sinners, upon their returning to God by faith and repentance, and new obediencei at the same time the best directions and assistances were given to engage them to a holy and vir- tuous practice. The Gospel scheme of morality exceeds Avhatsoever had been published to the world before. A summary representation of the excellency «f the Gospel precepts with regard to the dutieis we owe to God, our neigh- CONTENTS. xix bours, and ourselves. These precepts enforced by the most powerful and im- portant motives. The tendency of the Gospel to promote the practice of holi- ness and virtue, an argument to prove the Divinity of the Christian Reve- lation. . Page 230. PART III. CHAPTER I. The importance of the doctrine of a future state. Tt is agreeable to right reason. The natural and moral arguments for a future state of great weight. Yet not so evident, but that if men were left merely to their own unassisted reason, they would be apt to labour under great doubt and difficulties. A Revelation from God coucerning it would be of great advantage. Page 266, CHAPTER n Some notions of the immortality of the soul and a future state obtained among mankind from the most antient times, and spread very generally through the nations. This was not originally the effect of human reason and philosophy, nor was it merely the invention of legislators for political purposes: but was derived to them by a most antient tradition from the earliest ages, and was probably a part of the primitive religion communicated by Divine Revelation to the first of the human race. Page 272. CHAPTER HI. The antient traditions "concerning the immortality of the soul and a future state became in process of time greatly obscured and corrupted. It was absolutely denied by many of the philosophers, and rejected as a vulgar error. Others represented it as altogether uncertain, and having no solid foundation to sup- port it.The various and contradictory sentiments of the philosophers concerning the nature of the human soul. Many of the Peripatetics denied the subsistence of the soul after death, and this seems to have been Aristotle's own opinion. The Stoics had no settled or consistent scheme on this head: nor v,'as the doc- trine of the immortality of the soul a doctrine of their school. A future state not acknowledged by the celebrated Chinese philosopher Confucius, nor by the sect of the learned who profess to be his disciples. Page 283. CHAPTER IV. Concerning the philosophers who professed to believe and teach the immortality of the soul. Of these Pythagoras is generally esteemed one of the most emi- nent. His doctrine on this head shewn to be not well consistent with a state of future rewards and punishments. Socrates believed the immortality of the soul, and a future state, and argued for it. In this he was followed by Plato. The XX CONTENTS. Doctrine of Cicero with regard to the immortality of the soul considered. As also that of Plutarch. Page 301. CHAPTER V. Those of the antient philosophers who argued for the immortality of the soul, placed it on wrong foundations, and mixed things Avith it which weakened the belief of it. Some of them asserted, that the soul is immortal, as being a por- tion of the Divine Essence. They universally held the pre-existence of the hu- man soul, and laid the chief stress upon this for proving its immortality. Their doctrine of the transmigration of souls was a great corruption of the true doc- trine of a future state. Those who said the highest things of future happiness, considered it as confined chiefly to persons of eminence, or to those of philoso- phical minds, and afforded small encouragement to the common kind of pious and virtuous persons. The rewards of Elysium were but temporary, and of a short duration: and even the happiness of those privileged souls, who were supposed to be admitted not merely into Elysium, but into heaven, was not everlasting in the strict and proper sense. The Gospel doctrine of eternal life to all good and righteous piersons was not taught by the antient Pagan philo- sophers. Page 324. CHAPTER VI. Those that seemed to be the most strenuous advocates for the immortality of the soul and a future state among the antients, did not pretend to any certainty concerning it. The uncertainty they were under appears from their way of managing their consolatory discourses on the death of their friends.To this also it was owing, that in their exhortations to virtue they laid little stress on the rewards of a future state. Their not having a certainty concerning a future state, put them upon schemes to supply the want of it. Hence they insisted upon the self-sufficiency of virtue for complete happiness without a future re- corapence: and asserted, that a short happiness is as good as an eternal one. Page 343. CHAPTER YH. A state of future rev/ards necessarily connotes future punishments. The belief of the former without the latter might be of pernicious consequence. The an- tient philosophers and legislators were sensible of the importance and necessity of the doctrine of future punishments. Yet they generally rejected and dis- carded them as vain and superstitious teri'ors. The maxim universally held by the philosophers, that the gods are never angiy, and can do no hurt, consi- dered. Page sqa. CHAPTER Vni. The generality of the people, especially in the politer nations of Greece and Rome, had fallen in a great measure from the belief of a future stat.e before the CONTENTS. ^^• time of our Saviour's appearing. This is particularly shewn concerning the Greeks, by the testimonies of Socrates and Polybius. The same thing appears with regard to the Romans. Future punishments were disregarded and ridi- culed even among the vulgar, who iti this fell from the religion of their ances- tors. The- resurrection of the body rejected by the philosophers of Greece and Rome. Page 381. CHAPTER IX. Our Lord Jesus Christ bi'ought life and immortality into the most clear and open light by the Gospel. He both gave the fullest assurance of that everlasting hap- piness which is prepared for good men in a future state, and made the most in- viting discoveries of the nature and greatness of that happiness. The Gospel also contains express declarations concerning the punishment which shall be inflicted upon the wicked in a future state. The necessity and importance of this part of the Gospel Revelation shewn. The Conclusion, with some general reflections upon the whole. Page 399. THE ADVANTAGE AND NECESSITY OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION, STATE OF RELIGION LS THE A3>rTIEXT HEATHEJSr WORLDs PART II. RELATING TO A RULE OP MORAL DUTY. CHAPTER I. Man appears from the frame of his nature to be a moraHtgent, ahd designed i& be governed by a law. Accordingly, God hath given him a law to be th6' rule of his duty. The scheme of those who pretend that this law is naturally and necessarily known to all men without instruction, contrary to feet and experience. Yet there are several ways by which men come to a knowledge of this law, and of the duty required of them; viz. by a moral sense implanted in the human heart; by a principle of reason judging from the natures and relations of things; by education, and human instruction: besides all which^ God hath made discoveries of his will eonceming our duty, in a way of extraor-' dinary Divine Revelation. Having considered the state of the antient HeatheiS Nations, with respect to the knowledge and worship of the one true God, and shewn the need they stood in of an ex- traordinary Divine Revelation, to recover them from that^ amazing ignorance of God, and that idolatry and polythe- iism, into which they were fallen; I now proceed to the iiexi Vol., II, "A . 2 Man is a Moral Agent. Part IL thing I proposed, which was to consider the state of the antient Heathen world with regard to a rule of moral duty. That it is of great importance to mankind to have clear directions given them concerning moral duty in its just extent, and to have it enforced upon them by a sufficient authority, and by proper arguments and motives, is evident to a considering mind. And many have been of opinion, that this is so manifest and obvious to natural reason, that there is no need of Divine Revelation, either to teach men their duty, or to enforce upon them moral obligations. This seems to have a plausible appearance, if we consider the matter abstractly, and in a way of speculation. But the surest way of judging of it is from fact and experience: for if it appears that in fact the most knowing and civilized nations in the heathen world, and the wisest and ablest men among them, have laboured under great uncertainties, and even fallen into dangerous errors with regard to several important branches of moral duty; and that they have also been greatly deficient in the proposing such motives, as might be most proper and efficacious for enforcing the practice of it; this affordeth a strong presumption of the weakness of human reason in this respect, when left merely to itself in the present state of mankind: and that an express Revelation from God, both for instructing us in moral duty in its just extent, and enforcing it upon us by the most powerful motives, would be of the greatest advantage to mankind. . To prepare our way for a due consideration of this sub- ject, it will be proper, in the first place, to offer some gene» ral observations concerning man as a moral agent, and concerning the several ways by which he may be supposed to come to the knowledge of his duty. That man is a moral agent, the proper subject of mora! government, is as evident as that he is a reasonable crea- ture, or that he is capable of virtue and vice, praise and Chap. !• God hath given a Law to Mankind^ &c. s blame. And whatever some persons may dispute in a way of speculation, moral or free agency, though it may be dif- ficult to settle the precise metaphysical notion of it, or to answer all the objections which subtil and sceptical men may form against it, is what all men are intimately con- scious of. The self-approving and self-condemning reflec- tions of a man's own mind plainly shew it to be so. God hath not only given man a body, and animal powers and instincts, suited to the uses and enjoyments of the animal and sensitive life, but he hath made him capable of dis- cerning the moral differences of things, and hath given him a sense of good and evil, right and wrong, a self-determin- ing and a self-reflecting power, whereby he is capable of ch using and acting for himself, and of passing a judgment on his own actions. There are few, but have had experience of an inward self-approbation or disapprobation, arising from the workings of a conscious principle within, accord- ing as they have been sensible of their having performed their duty or the contrary. And God's having made them creatures of such a kind, i. e. reasonable and moral agents, capable of a sense of moral obligation, is a demonstrative proof, that he designed them to be governed in that way, in which it is fit for moral agents to be governed; i. e. by giv- ing them laws to be the rule of their duty. And if God hath given men laws, it must be his will that those laws should be obeyed; and as a wise and righteous moral Governor, he will deal with them agreeably to the laws which he hath given them, and will reward or punish them according to their obedience or disobedience to those laws. But since no law is obligatory, except it be promulgated, and in some way published to those who are to be governed by it, we may reasonably conclude, that if God hath given a law to mankind, which they are obliged to obey, he hath not left them under an invincible ignorance of that law, but hath made such discoveries of it to them, that if it be not 4 The Knowledge of Moral Duty Part II, their own fault, they may know what that duty is which God requireth of them, as far as it is necessary for them to do so. Some have carried this so far as to assert, that all men have a natural knowledge of the whole of their duty by an intimate conscious perception, and an inward universal light, independent of all outward teaching. To this they Sipply the passage of Lucan, « -^ nee vocibus ullis Numen eget, dixitque semel nascentibus auctor Quicquid scire licet." As if God dictated to all men from their very birth, the whole of what is necessary for them to know with regard to their duty, so that they stand not in need of any farther vocal or verbal instruction. This seems to have been Lord Herbert's scheme, and is that of Dr. Tindal, in his famous book, intituled, " Christianity as old as the Creation." Lord Polingbroke frequently expresses himself to the same pur* pose. He says, that " natural Revelation (as he calls it) produces a series of intuitive knowledge from the first principles to the last conclusions («)." Where he supposes, that both the first principles of the law of nature, and all the conclusions drawn from them, are intuitively and infal- libly known to every man. Accordingly he declares, that *' it is a perpetual standing Revelation always made, always inaking, to all the sons of Adam," and affirms, that " it is intelligible at all times and all places alike, and proportion- ed to the meanest understanding (^)." Or, as he elsewhere has it, " The tables of the natural law are so obvious to the gijght of all men, that no man who is able to read the plain-^ (a) Bolingbroke's Works, vol. IV. p. 276. edit. 4to. (6)Ibid. p. 93.94. 96,97, Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways. 5 est characters can mistake them (c)." According to this scheme, there is not the least need of any extraordinary- external Revelation. And it would equally prove, that all the endeavours of philosophers, moralists, and legislators, to instruct mankind in matters of morality, were perfectly needless and superfluous. I have already offered some con- siderations to shew the absurdity of this scheme (d): and the following treatise will contain the fullest confutation of it; by which it will appear how prone mankind have always been to mistake the law of nature, in very important in- stances of moral duty. It is indeed so contrary to the expe- rience and observations of all ages, that one would be apt to wonder that any men of sense should insist upon it: and yet the same pretence is still repeated by the enemies of Revelation. And some others of a different character have expressed themselves very inaccurately and unwarily on this subject. But though this pretence of the universal clearness of the law of nature to all mankind, independent of all farther in- struction, cannot be admitted, as being contrary to the most evident fact and experience, yet it must be acknowledged, that a great deal hath been done in the course and order of Divine Providence, to lead men into the knowledge of the duty required of thtm. And 1. There is a moral sense implanted in the human mind, which, if duly cultivated and improved, might be of great use for leading men, in many instances, to the notion and practice of moral duty. I know this is a point that has been contested, and I shall not here enter into the debate. But it seems to me, that something of this kind, by what- (c) Bolingbroke's Works, vol. V. p. 153. (d) See the first volume of this Work, Preliminary Discourse, 6 The Knowledge of Moral Duty Part IL soever name it is called, must be admitted. Whosoever carefully examines his own heart, will be apt to think that there are moral feelings, distinct from mere reasoning, which incline him to certain ways of acting; and that the mind of man is so constituted, as to have an inward sense of moral beauty or deformity in affections and actions, which, when the human nature is in its right state, carries him to delight and take a complacency in some actions as right and fit, beautiful and lovely, and to dislike and disap- prove the contrary. Some traces of this are to be found in the human mind, even limits most degenerate state, and which can scarce ever be utterly erased. As there are natu- ral instincts distinct from reason, which tend to the preserva- tion and convenience of the animal and vital frame, so there seem to be instincts of a moral kind, or propensions and in- clinations, which, when duly regulated and improved, are of considerable use for leading men to a proper course of action. Such are the social and kind affections, so natural to the human heart, that they have obtained the name of hu- manity, and which shew that men were born not merely for themselves, but were designed by the author of their beings for mutual assistance, and the offices of benevo- lence. But then, for preventing mistakes in this matter, there are several things proper to be here observed. One is, that this moral sense is not of equal strength and force in all men. It is most conspicuous and eminent in some noble and •generpus minds, in which a kind of natural propensity to justice, benevolence, gratitude, &c. remarkably appears, and powerfully operates: and in others it is so weak, as scarce to be perceived, or is overpowered by vicious habits and corrupt affections and appetites. It must be acknowledged on the one hand, that the moral sense is capable of being improved and strengthened by reason and reflection: and that on the other hand, it may be greatly perverted and de- Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways. 7 praved by vicioU55 customs, inordinate lusts, and selfish in- terests, by false judgments of things, and evil examples. And I think it cannot be denied, that it is so much weakened in the present state of the human nature, that it is no way fit to be alone a sufficient guide in morals, but standeth in great need of farther direction and assistance. Some have carried their notions of the extent and efficacy of this moral s^nse beyond what reason and experience will warrant. The ingenious and polite Earl of Shaftesbury, after having ob- served, that there is a natural beauty of actions as well as figures, adds, that " no sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them discerned as soon as felt) than straight an in- ward eye distinguishes, and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable and admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, and despicable." This is elegantly expressed: but I should think, that any one who impartially considers human nature, as it appears in the generality of mankind, must own that the inward eye, the eye of the mind, is now very much vitiated and obscured, and that there are many things which hinder its just discernment. The experience of all ages shews, that men have been generally apt to mis- take idolatry and superstition, than which nothing in the opinion of this noble author can be more odious and des- picable, for the most amiable thing in the world, true reli- gion and piety. And even with respect to the duties men owe to one another, and the government of their own affec- tions and passions, how often have they been mistaken in their notions of the fair, the amiable, and admirable, apart from the foul and deformed, the odious and despicable? The custom of exposing weak and helpless children, which, one should think, is contrary to the most intimate feelings of humanity, obtained very generally among the most civilized nations; and yet they do not appear to have been sensible that in this they acted a wrong and inhuman part, but rather 8 The Knowledge of Moral Duty PArt it, looked upon it to be a prudent and jusiifiable practice. The various tribes of American savages, whom some have re- commended as following the genuine dictates of nature, are so far from feeling any remorse for the most cruel instances of revenge on their enemies, or those who, they think, have injured them, that they rejoice and glory in them as the no- blest exploits, and both applaud themselves, and are ap- plauded by others, on the account of them. Many other instances of the like kind might be mentioned, some of which I shall have occasion to take notice of in the course of this work. It is not therefore a rule to be depended on, which some have laid down, that no man can violate the law of nature without condemning himself. The pleasure or remorse men feel in their reflections on their own actions, is far ^rom being a sure mark and criterion of the moral goodness or evil of an action in the present state of man- kind. It is true, that the mind is naturally carried to ap- prove what it takes to be right and fit, and praise-worthy, and to disapprove and condemn what it takes to be base and wrong; but then, in many instances, it stands in need of direction and instruction as to what is right and wrong. And when it is well informed, then it is that it is fitly qualified to approve and condemn in the proper place. It appears, therefore, that what is called the moral sense was not designed to be an adequate guide in morals; nor is it alone considered, and left merely to itself, fit to have the supreme direction as to the moral conduct. It never was in- tended to preclude the necessity of instruction, but to be an assistant to our reason, to incline the mind more readily to its duty, and produce a complacency in it; and to create a dislike and abhorrence of that which is evil and base, and to restrain us from committing it. This leads me to observe, 2dly, That there is in man a principle of reason, which Gil AP. I. communicated to Mankind 'in various Ways. % is designed to preside over the propeasions and affections^ and to direct the moral temper and conduct. Man has an un- derstanding given him, by which he is capable of enquiring? into the natures and relations of things, and considering what those relations require. And whatsoever clearly appeareth from the very nature and relations of things to be fit and right for reasonable creatures to perform, we may justly conclude^ that it is the will of God who constituted that nature and those relations they should perform; and when once it is considered as the will of God, the supreme universal Lord and moral governor, then it is regarded not merelv as fit and reasonable in itself, but as a divine law, in the strictest and properest sense. This way of discovering our duty by searching into the nature and relations of things, when rightly performed, is of great extent. It signifiies, that we must form just and worthy notions of God, and of his glorious attributes and perfections, and the relations between him and us: that w© must know ourselves, and the frame and constitution of our' own natures, as also the relations we stand in towards our' fellow-creatures: that we must carefully consider and com-- pare all these, and the fitnesses and obligations arising from- them; and thence collect our duty towards God, our neigh- bours, and ourselves. There are many who represent this not only as the surest way of coming to the right knowledge of the duty which God requireth of us, but as easy and ob-' vious to all mankind. Lord Bolingbroke frequently talks,- as if every man was able in this way to fonii a complete system of Religion and Morals for himself, without the least difficulty. He says, that " we more certainly know the will of God in this way, than we can know it in any otheri*^ VoL.IL B 10 The Knowledge of Moral Duty Part II. and, " that it admits of no doubt (^)." And that, "by env- ploying our reason to collect the will of God from the fund of our nature physical and moral, and by contemplating fre- quently and seriously the laws that are plainly and necessa- rily deducible from them, we may acquire not only a parti- cular knowledge of those laws^ but a general, and in short an habitual knowledge of the manner in which God is pleased to exercise his supreme power in this system, beyond which we have no concern (/ )•" I readily own, that this searching into the relations and constitution of things, when carried on in a proper manner, may be of great use for coming at the knowledge of the law of nature, and for shewing, that the main principles of moral duty are founded in the nature of things, and are what right reason, duly exercised, will ap- prove, when fairly explained and set in a proper light. But cenainly this is not the ordinary way for the bulk of man- kind to come to the knowledge of their duty. There are few who have leisure or capacity, or inclination for profound enquiries into the natures and reasons of things, and for drawing proper conclusions from them concerning the will of God. That which the ingenious and noble author now now mentioned seems to lay the principal stress upon, viz* the employing our reason to collect the will of God from the fund of our nature physical and moral, is far from being so easy a task as he represents it. The knowledge of the hu- man constitution, taken in a physical and moral view, in- cludes a knovrledge of body and soul in man, of the dis- tinction between them, and the union, of both, from whence duties result relating to the welfare of the whole compound: it takes in the knowledge of our appetites and passions, our (e) BoUngbrokc's Works, Vol. IV. p. 287. and Vol. V. p. 196. edit. 4to. (/) Ibid. Vol. V. p. 100. See also p. 154. 178. 196. 271. Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways, ii affections and instincts, and of our rational and moral powers, that by comparing all these, we • may know where- in consisteth the proper order and harmony of our natures, what are the just limits of our appetites and passions, how far they are to be gratified, and how far to be restrained. And can it be pretended, that every particular person, if left merely to himself, is able, without assistance or instruc* tion, to consider and compare all these, and to deduce from them a complete system of laws for his own conduct? The rule which a noted author has laid down as sufficient for the direction of mankind is this, that "they are so to regu- late their appetites, as will conduce to the exercise of their reason, the health of their bodies, and the pleasure of their senses, taken and considered together, since therein their happiness consists (^)." But if this be all the law that any man has to govern him in this matter, it is to be fear- ed, that the bias of his appetites and passions, and the plea« sures of his senses, would generally bring over his reason to judge in their own favour. Lord Bolingbroke, who, in the passage cited above, supposes that all men may easily collect the will of God from the fund of their own nature physical and moral, gives this account of the human system: that "man has two principles of determination, affections and passions excited by apparent good, and reason, which is a sluggard, and cannot be so excited. Reason must be willed into action: and as this can rarely happen, when the will is already determined by affections and passions; so when it does happen, a sort of composition generally hap- pens between the two principles: and if the affections and passions cannot govern absolutely, they obtain more indul- gence from reason than they deserve, or than she would shew if she were entirely free from their force (/^).^' And ^g") Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 14. (A) Bolingbroke*s Works, Vol. V. p. 150. See also ibid. p. 1 !&, \S7, 22r. 313 The Knowledge of Moral Duty Part II. he expressly affirms, that " the appetites, passions, and im- jnediate objects of pleasure, will always be of greater force to determine us than reason (z)." This, indeed, is too uni- versally expressed. It is not true, that the appetites and passions, and immediate objects of pleasure, will always be of greater force to determine us than reason. Many instances there have been of excellent persons, in whom reason has been of greater prevalence to determine them, than the pas- sions or present sensual pleasure. But it cannot be denied, that, in the present state of mankind, the case is generally as his Lordship represents it: and that, as he elsewhere speaks, " amidst the contingencies that must arise from the constitution of every individual, the odds will be on the side of appetite (i^)." To set up every man therefore for his own legislator, as if he were fit to be left to form a system of law and duty for himself, without any farther instruc- tions, is a romantic scheme, and would tend to introduce a general confusion and licentiousness, to the subversion of all good order and morality. As to the duties we owe to God, it sufficiently appears, from what was observed in the former part of this work, how little mankind are qualified, if left to themselves without instruction, to form a right judgment con^- cerning them. And with respect to that part of our duty which relates to the government of our own appetites and pas- sions, it will be easily acknowledged, that the bulk of mankind are not fit to be left to indulge them, as far as they themselves think reasonable. If every man was to judge of his duty by what, in his opinion, tends most to his. own happiness in the circumstances he is in (which is the rule laid down by those who make the highest pretences to the Law and Religion (0 Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 267, 268, \k) Ibid. p. 479. Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways, 13 of Nature (/) in opposition to Revelation) it would soon bring in a very loose morality: since there is nothing in which men are more apt to deceive themselves, and to form false judgments, than in what relates to their proper happiness. And even as to that part of morals which re- lates to our duty towards mankind, and which includes the exercise of justice, fidelity, benevolence, charity, and the various offices of the social life, though there seem to be strong traces of it in the human mind, and it is what right reason must approve as agreeable to the relations we bear to one another, yet I believe it will be granted, that it would not be very propfer to leave every man merely to himself, to fix the measures of just and unjust, of right and wrong, in his dealings and transactions with other men. He would be often apt to judge by false weights and measures,^ and would be in great danger of being led aside by his passions and selfish affections and interests, which, it is to be feared, would frequently bribe his reason to form wrong and partial judgments of things. No human government could be safe upon this plan, if every man were to be left absolutely to his own direction, without any other guide. All the laws enacted by states and commonwealths, and all books of morality, written by the wisest men in all ages, proceed upon this supposition, that men stand in need of instruction and assistance, in order to the right forming and regulating their moral con- duct. Accordingly, I would observe, 3dly, That another way by which men come to the knowledge of moral duty, is by the instructions of others. This seems to be manifestly intended by the Author of (/) Dr. Tindal, Morgan and ot^iers. 14 The knowledge of Moral Duty Part 11. our beings. We come into the world in an infant state: we receive our first ideas of things, the first rudiments of knowledge, from our parents, and those about us: and the notions which are instilled into our minds in our early years, often make a deep and lasting impression, and have no small influence upon our after- conduct. It is therefore one of the principal duties of parents to endeavour to train up their children betimes to worthy sentiments. Thus we find that, in the Jewish law, it is the express command of God, frequently urged by the highest authority, that pa- rents should take great and assiduous care to instruct their children in the statutes and precepts which God had given them, and in the duties there required. It is mentioned to the praise of that excellent person Abraham, that he com- manded his children " and household after him to keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment (?»)." The wisest men in all ages have been sensible of the great ad- vantage of a good education (n), and that men are not to be left merely to follow the dictates of rude, undisciplined, and uninstructed nature. As to matter of fact, it can scarce be denied, that no small part of the notions men have of right and wrong, and of what is blameable and praise- worthy, comes by education and custom, by tradition and instruction. And the vulgar almost every where adopt that scheme of religion and morals, which prevails in their respective countries. That great statesman and moralist PufFendorf, who was remarkable for his knowledge of the law of nature and of mankind, ascribes " the facility which children and ignorant people have in determining between just and unjust, right and wrong, to the habitude which (m) Gen. xviii. 19. (tt) See the Preliminary Discourse, in the first volume of this Work, p. 10. Chap. I. communicated to Mankind in various Ways, is they have insensibly contracted from their cradles, or from the time they first began to make use of their reason; by observing the good approved, and the evil disapproved, the the one commended and the other punished: and that it is owing to the ordinary practice of the principal mgixims of natural law in the events of common life, that there are few people who have any doubt whether these things might not be otherwise (o)." And Mr. Barbeyrac, in his notes upon it, after having observed that " there is a manifest proportion between the maxims of natural law, and the dictates of right reason; so that it is perceived by the most simple people from the moment they are proposed to them, and that they attend and examine them;" adds, that "per- haps they could never have discovered them of themselves, and cannot always comprehend the reasons of them, or distinctly explain what they perceive concerning them; and that though no man who is arrived at the age of discretion can reasonably pretend to excuse himself as to this matter by invincible ignorance, yet it is nevertheless true, that education, instruction, and example, arc the ordinary canals by which these ideas enter into the minds of men: without this, the greater part of mankind would either almost en- tirely extinguish their natural light, or would never give the least attention to them. Experience shews this but too plainly. Many things there are among savage people, and even among the most civilized nations, sufficient to justify this melancholy and mortifying truth. From whence (saith he) it ought to be concluded, that every man should use his best endeavours to contribute, as far as is in his power, to instruct others in their duty, to establish, strengthen, and (o) De Jur. Nat. et Gent. lib. ii. chap. 3. sect. 13. 1© The knowledge of Moral Duty Part II. propagate so useful a knowledge (/»)." This is certainly one considerable instance in which the Author of our be- ings intended that men should be helpful to one another, in proportion to their abilities and opportunities. But it is, in a particular manner, incumbent upon parents, masters of families, legislators and magistrates, the ministers of reli- gion, and those who profess to instruct men in the science of morals. And such instructions properly given are, no doubt, of great advantage, and what we ought to be very thankful for. But it is manifest from experience, that mere- ly human instruction cannot be absolutely depended upon: and that men have been often led into wrong notions of morality, in very important instances, by those who ought to have instructed them better. I would therefore observe farther, that besides the se- veral ways which have been mentioned, whereby men come to the knowledge of moral duty, there is great need of a Divine Revelation, in order to the setting their duty before them in its just extent, and enforcing it upon them by the highest authority. It cannot reasonably be denied, that God can, if he thinks fit, make discoveries of his will to mankind, in a way of extraordinary Revelation (^); and it is manifest, that if he should please to do so, such a Di- vine Revelation, confirmed by sufficient evidence, and prescribing in his name the particulars of our duty in plain and express precepts, would be of great use, and would come with much greater weight and force, than merely human laws, or the reasonings of philosophers and mo- (/? ) See Barbeyrac's Puffendorf, torn. I. p. 217. not. 7. edit. Amst. (y) See concerning this in the Preliminary Discourse prefixed to the former volume, p. 20, et seq. Chap, h communicated to Mankind ifi various Ways, if ralists: and this method also hath God taken in his deaU ings with mankind; which is a convincing proof of his goodness, and the care he hath exercised towards them, in order to the leading men to the right knowledge and prac^ tice of their duty. VaL. II. 1 8 The principal Heads of Moral Law made known Part II. CHAPTER II. The principal heads of moral duty were made known to mankind from the be^ ginning, and continued to be known and acknowledged in the patriarchal ages, "When men fell from the right knowledge of God, they fell also in important instances from the right knowledgt- of moral duty. The law given to the peo- ple of Israel was designed toins-tiucl and direct them in morals, as well as ia the knowledge and worship ot the one true God. A great deal was done ia the methods of Divine Providence, to preserve the sense and knowledge oC morals among the heathen nations; but they did not make aright use of the helps afforded them. IT has been shewn, in the former part of this work, that as the first man was formed in an adult state, and placed in a world ready prepared, and amply provided for his re- ception and entertainment, so there is great reason to think, that God communicated to him the knowledge of religion, in its main fundamental articles, especially relating to the existence and perfections of the Deity, and the crea- tion of the world, that he might be in an immediate capa- city of serving his Maker, and answering the great end of his being. And one of the first and most natural enquiries, when he was made acquainted with the existence of a God of infinite perfections, his Creator and Sovereign Lord, must have been what God would have him to do, and what was the duty required of him, in order to secure the Divine Favour and Approbation. For it cannot rea- sonably be supposed, that he was left absolutely to himself, and to his own will, to act as he thought fit, without any higher direction or law to govern him. He could have no human instructor to teach, or to advise him: he had no pa- rents or progenitors, whose knowledge and experience might have been of use to him; and as he had no expe- perience of his own, it is not probable that, in his circum- Chap. II. to Jjian in the Beginning by Diving Revelation. 19 stances, he was left to frame a rule of duty for himself, and to find out the will of God by profound disquisitions into the nature and relations, of things. We may therefore justly suppose, that a wise and good God, who designed him to be governed by a law, gave him a law by which he should be governed, and communicated his will to him in relation to the duty required of him. And that this wa» actually the case in fact, may be concluded from the short account given us by Moses of the primaeval state of man. From that account it appears, that man was not left at hi» first formation merely to acquire ideas in the ordinary way, which would have been too tedious and slow as he was circumstanced, but was at once furnished with the knowledge that was then necessary for him. He was imme- diately endued with the gift of language, which necessarily supposes that he was furnished with a stock of ideas; a specimen of which he gave in giving names to the inferior animals, which were brought before him for that purpose. The same gift of lianguage was imparted to the consort provided for him; and they both were admitted in several instances to a near intercourse with their Maker, and were immediately favoured with notions of several things which it concerned them to know. It pleased God to acquaint ihem with the dominion he had invested them with over the several creatures in this lovver world: they had a di- vine allowance and directions as to the food it was proper for them to eat: they were instructed that they were to be the parents of a numerous offspring, and that they were to replenish the earth. The institution and law of marriage, which was given them, shews that they were made ac- quainted with the duties of the conjugal relation; with which are nearly connected the duties required of them as parents towards the children which should proceed from them, and the duties which their children should render to them, and to one another. As God gave them the law of $0 The principal Heads of Moral Law made known Part II. the Sabbath, we may well conclude that he directed them as to the proper way of sanctifying it by worshipping him the great Creator and Lord of the universe, and cele- brating his glory as shining forth in the creation of the world, of which the Sabbath was designed to keep up a religious remembrance. The precept and injunction which was laid upon them not to eat the forbidden fruit, compre- hended a considerable part of the moral law under it. It was designed to instruct them that they were not the abso- lute Lords of this lower world, but were under the do- minion of an higher Lord, to whom they owed the most entire subjection, and unreserved obedience, in an implicit resignation to his supreme wisdom and goodness: that they were bound to exercise a government over their appetites ?ind inclinations, and not to place their highest happiness in the gratification of them^ and that they were not only to govern their bodily appetites, but to guard against an in- ordinate ambition, and to restrain their desires of know- ledge within just bounds, without prying with an unwar- rantable curiosity into things which God thought fit to con- ceal from them. Upon the whole, we may justly conclude, that the first parents of the human race had the knowledge of God, and of the main articles of their duty divinely com- fnunicated to them, as far as was proper, and suited to the state and circumstances they were in (r). (r) Puffendorf, who must be acknowledged to be a very able judge in what relates to the law of nature, declares, in a passage J cited before, that *'itis very probable, that God taus^ht the first men the chief heads of natural law, which were afterwards preserved and spread among their descendants by means of education and custom." He adds, that this does not hinder, but that the knowledge of them maybe called natural, inasmuch as the truth and certainty of them may be discovered in a way of reasoning, Grotius Chap. II. to Man in the Beginning by Divine Revelation, 21 After the fall and disobedience of our first parents, new duties arose suited to the alteration of their circumstances. They were now to regard God as their offended Sovereign and Lord: discoveries were made to them both of his jus- tice and righteous displeasure against sin, and of his placa- bleness towai'ds penitent sinners, and his pardoning mercy; without an assurance of which they might have sunk under those desponding fears which a consciousness of their guilt was apt to inspire. Repentance towards God, a submission to his justice in the punishment inflicted upon them for their disobedience, hope in his mercy, and a reliance on the promise he was graciously pleased to make to them, a fear of offending him for the future, and* a desire of approving themselves to him by a new and dutiful obedience; these were dispositions which it was the will of God they should exercise. And as they stood in great need of a divine direc- tion in those circumstances, it is reasonable to think that he signified his will to them in relation to their future con- duct, and the religion required of fallen creatures. The history which Moses has given of the antediluvian world is very short: but in the account given of Cain and Abel it is plainly intimated, that there was in those early ages an intercourse between God and man, that he did not leave them without discoveries of his will, that a law had been given them with relation to the external worship of God, and particularly concerning the offering of sacrifice. Accordingly they both observed it as an act of religion; but Abel, who was a better man, with a more pious disposi- tion than Cain. He is said, by the sacred writer to the He- Grotius also gives it as his opinion, that the law was oriq^inally promulgated to Adam, the father of mankind, and througl. Jiim to the human race; and again to Noah, the second father of man- kind, and by him transmitted to his descendants. 22 The Principal Heads of Moral Law made known Part H. brews, to have oflfered sacrifice by faith, which seems plainly to refer to a divine institution and appointment; and that he well knew it was a rite which God required, and would accept. And its having spread so universally, among all nations from the most nntient times, can scarce be accounted for but by supposing it to have been a part of Religion transmitted from the first ages to the whole race of mankind {s). What was said to Cain, and the curse inflicted upon him, supposed a divine law obliging to mu- tual love and benevolence, and of which the violence com- mitted on his brother was a manifest breach. There were in the old world preachers of righteousness, who, we have reason to think, declared the will and law of God to men, and urged it upon them in his name, and by his authority. So Noah is called, 2 Pet. ii. 5. and such was that excel- lent person Enoch, and probably several others. To which it may be added, that if God had not made express dis- coveries of his will to men, and given them laws bound upon them by his own Divine Authority, their guilt would not have been so highly aggravated as to draw down upon them so dreadful a ruin and condemnation. But they sin- ned presumptuously, and with a high hand: they allowed themselves in an unrestrained indulgence of their lusts and appetites, and committed all sorts of violence, rapine, and wickedness, in the most manifest opposition to the divine law. They seem to have fallen into an atheistical neglect and contempt of all religion; and therefore are justly called (s) The reader may compare what is here said with the first chapter of the former volume, in which several of the things Jiere mentioned are more fully insisted upon; but it was necessary to take some notice of them in this place, to show that God from the beginning made discoveries of his will to men concerning their duty. Chap. II. to man in the Beginning by Divine Revelation. 2a " the world of the ungodly," 2 Pet. ii. 5. And the pro- phecy of Enoch, mentioned by St. Jude, seems particularly to charge them with the most audacious profaneness, and open contempt of Religion, both in their words and actions, for which the divine judgments were denounced against them. Noah, with his family, who survived that destruction, was no doubt well acquainted with those divine laws, for the transgression of which the sinners of the old world were so severely punishedj and a man of his excellent character, we may be sure, took care to transmit them to his children and descendants: and the awful proofs of the divine justice and displeasure against the wicked and disobedient, tended to give the instructions and admoni- tions delivered to them by this preacher of righteousness a peculiar force. It appears from the brief hints given by Moses, that God made renewed discoveries of his will after the flood to this second father of mankind, and gave laws and injunctions which were designed to be obligatory on the whole human race. The tradition of the Jews relating to the precepts delivered to the sons of Noah is well known. And though we have not sufficient proof, that they were precisely in number or order what they pretend, yet that the substance of those precepts was then given and promulgated to mankind by Divine Authority, there is good reason to believe. And consider- ing the narrowness of the Jewish notions, their strong prejudices against the Gentiles, and the contempt they had for them, this tradition of theirs deserves a particular regard. For it shews, that it was an antient tradition among them, derived from their ancestors, that God was the God not of the Jews only but also of the Gentilesif that he had not entirely cast the Gentiles off from the be- ginning, without making discoveries of his will to them concerning religion, and tbeir moral duty: but had given 24 A great deal was done for the Heathen Nations Part II« them laws, upon the observance of which they were in a state of favour and acceptance with God (^). The moral laws which were afterwards published to the people of Israel, a summary of which is contained in the ten com- mandments, were in substance known before in the patriarch- al times. And these divine injunctions, which were regarded as having been given by God to men, and enforced by a Divine Authority, may justly be supposed to be referred to in that remarkable passage. Gen. xviii. 19. where God saith concerning Abraham^ " I know him, that he will com- mand his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment." And no doubt that great patriarch did what God knew and declared he would do: and from him proceeded many and great nations. If we examine the antient book of Job, who descended from Abraham, and lived before the promulga- tion of the Mosaic law, we shall find that there is scarce any one of the moral precepts, which were afterwards pub- lished to the people of Israel, but what may be traced in (^) In the Talmudical books mention is made of " the pious among the nations of the world," and a portion is assigned to them, as well to as the Israelites, in the world to come. Agree- ably to this determination, Maimonides positively asserts, that the pious among the Gentiles have a portion in the world to come, De Poenit. cap. 3. i e.; as it is there explained, those that observed the precepts given to the sons of Noah; by whom they understood all mankind. See also Geniar. Babylon, ad titul. Aboda Zara, cap. i. Menasseh Ben Israel de Resur. Mort. lib. ii. cap. 8 et 9. These, with other testimonies, are cited by Sel- den de Jure Nat. et Gent. lib. vii. cap. 10. p. 877. Edit. Lips* The passage there quoted by him from the Gemara Babylonica ad titul. Aboda Zara, is remarkable; which he translates thus, *1 etiam Paganum, qui diligenter legem observaverit, voluti Pontificem Maximum habendum:" i. e. as Mr. Selden explains it, " inter primaries Ebraeorum, quantum ad prsenaium attinet? ceusendum." Chap. 11. to lead them to the knowledge of Moral Duty, 25 the discourses of that excellent man and his friends, and which are there represented as having been derived by tradition from the most antient times (w). After the deluge, it is probable that the heads and lead- ers of the dispersion, carried with them some of the main principles, both of religion and law, into the several places where they respectively settled: from whoih they were transmitted to their descendants. For in those early ages, as Plato observes in the beginning of his third book of laws, the people were wont to follow the laws and customs of their parents and ancestors, and of the most antient men among them. It strengthens this, when it is considered, that the most important moral maxims were delivered in the earliest times, not in a way of reasoning, as they were afterwards by the moralists in the ages of learning and phi- losophy, but in a way of ' authority, as principles derived from the antients, and which were regarded as of a divine (u) Grotius mentions some institutions and customs common to all men, and which cannot be so properly ascribed to an in- stinct of nature, or the evident conclusions of reason, as to a perpe- tual and almost uninterrupted tradition from the first ages, such as the slaying and otfering up of sacrifices, the pudor circa res vene- reas, the solemnities of marriage, the abhhorrence of inces uous copulations. De Verit. Rclig. Christ, lib. i. sect. 7. See also De Jur. Bel. et Pac. lib. ii. cap. 5. sect. 13. And Mr. Le Cierc, though fond of the hypothesis, that many of the Mosaic rites were instituted in imitation of those of the Egyptians, yet, speak- ing of the offering of the first-fruits to God, which was in use both among the Egyptians and Hebrews, says, that it was not derived from the one of these nations to the oiher, but came to both from the earliest ages, and probably was originally of di- vine appointment. And he adds, that perhaps from the «anie source many other usages among both those people were deri- ved. See Cleric. Commentar. in Pentat. in his notes on Levit. xxiii. 10. Vol. ii. D 26 A g-r eat deal was done for the Heathen Nations Part IL original. It was a notion which generally obtained among the Heathens, that the original law was from God, and that it derived its obliging force from a Divine Authority. The learned Selden has collected many testimonies to this purpose from poets, philosophers, and other celebrated Pagan writers (^). It is probable that this notion was owing not only to the belief which obtained among them of a divine superintending providence, but to the traditionary accounts they had of God's having given laws to the first men in the most antient times. And so strongly was a sense of this impressed upon the minds of the people, that it belong- ed to the Divinity to give laws to mankind, that the most antient legislators, in order to give their laws a proper weight and authority, found it necessary to persuade them that these laws were not merely of their own contriving, but were what they had received from the gods. And it is probable, that they took some of the chief heads of moral law, which had been handed down by antient tradition, into the laws of their respective states and civil communities, especially as far as they tended to the preservation of the public order and good of the society. It was in the eastern countries, where men first settled after the flood, that civil polities were first formed: there they were near the foun- tain-head of antient tradition, and there the greatest remains of it were preserved (z/). And from thence the legislators . {x) De Jure Nat. et Gent. lib. i. cap. 8. p. 94. et scq. edit. Lips. (y) " The eastern sages were famous for their excellent mo- ral maxims, derived by tradition from the most antient times. This is observable concerning the antient wise men among the Persians, Babylonians, Bactrians, Indians, Egyptians. That cele- brated Chinese philosopher and moralist Confucius, did not pre- tend himself to be the author of the moral precepts he delivered, but to have derived ihem from wise men of much greater an» Chap. II. to lead them to the Knowledge of Moral Duty, 27 in Grttece and Italy, and the western parts, principally de- rived their laws. It appears from the account which hath been given, that a great deal had been done, in the course of the Divine Providence, for leading men into the knowledge of their duty. God had given laws to mankind from the beginning, and made express discoveries of his will to the first pa- rents and ancestors of the human race, concerning the prin- cipal points of duty required of them. They were bound by his authority, and by all manner of obligations, to transmit the knowledge of them to their descendants. And this was the more easily done, as they were agreeable to the best moral sentiments of the human heart, and to the dictates of reason, which, if duly exercised, might see them to be con- formable to the nature and relations of things. To which it may be added, that the^good tendency of them was confirm- ed by observation and experience. And accordingly, the bulk of mankind, in all ages and nations, have still retained such notions of good and evil, as have laid a foundation for the approbation and disapprobation of their own minds and consciences. Taking all these things together, the laws and precepts originally given by Divine Revelation, the remains of which continued long among the Gentiles, the moral sense of things implanted in the human heart, and the dic- tiquity: particularly from Pung, who lived near a thousand years before him, and who also professed to follow the doctrine of the anlients; and especially from Tao and Xun, two eminent Chinese legislators, who, according to the Chinese chronology, lived above 1500 years before Confucius. Or, if we should sup- pose their chronology not to be exact, yet still it would follow, that the knowledge of morals was derived from the earjiest ages, when philosophy and sciences had made but small progress." See Navarette's Hist, of China, p. 123. and Scientia Sinensis Latine exposita, p. 120. . 29 Idolatry had a bad Effect in corrupting Part II. tates of natural reason and conscience, which were never utterly extinguished in the Pagan world, together with the prescriptions of the civil laws, which in many instances ex- hibited good directions for regulating the conduct; I say, taking all these things together, it must be acknowledged, that the Pagans were not left destitute of suitable helps, which, if duly improved, might have been of great use for leading, them to the right knowledge and practice of moral duty (z). And undoubtedly there were eminent (z) St. Paul represents the Gentiles as having the " work of the law written in their hearts." The expression is evidently me- taphorical, and not to be pushed too far. It is not designed to signify, as some have understood it, that all mankind have the whole law of God, comprehending every part of moral duty, written in plain characters upon their hearts: for this would prove that all men have naturally a clear knowledge of the whole of their duty without instruction: which is contrary to the most evident fact and experience, and to what the apostle elsewhere observes concerning the Gentiles. But though this could not be his meaning in this manner of expression, yet it certainly signi- fies, that the Gentiles, who had not the written law in their hands, were not left entirely destitute of a law. And when in any instances, they did some of the things contained in the law (for they were far from doing all things therein contained, as the apostle proves) they shewed that in those instances they had the work of the law written in their hearts; i. e. that they had an inward sense of the Divine Law in some of its important branches, so as to lay a foundation for the self-approving or self- condemning reflections of their own minds, and for their being judged by God on the account of them. This is evidently the apos- tle's intention in this passage. And it must be acknowledged, that there were scarce any of the Heathens, even in times of their greatest degeneracy, but had in some respects the work of the law written in their hearts, i. e. some inward sense of right and wrong, of good and evil; to which their consciences bore wit- ness: though undoubtedly this sense of moral duty was in some Chap. II. their moral Notions and Practices. 29 examples among them of generosity, patience, fortitude, equanimity, a love of justice, benevolence, gratitude, and other virtues. In Greece and Rome, in their best times, there seem to have been some hereditary notions, derived from their ancestors, and cherished and confirmed by edu- cation and custom, of what is virtuous, honourable, and praiseworthy, and the contrary; which had a great effect upon their conduct. But, after all, it cannot be denied, thaf the notions of morality among them and the other Pagans, were in many respects greatly defective, and depraved with corrupt mixtures. As they fell from the right knowledge of the one true God, which, as a learned author (a), who is a warm advo- cate for the Morality of the Pagans, observes, is " the great foundation of morality," they fell also from a just know- ledge of moral duty iTh very important instances. Idolatry not only introduced a great corruption into the worship of God, and all that part of duty which immediately relateth to the Supreme Beifig, but also into their moral conduct in other respects. Especially, when the worship of hero deities of them far clearer and of greater extent than in others, and in all of them vastly short of what weenjoy, who have the benefit of the Christian Revelation. The apostle, speaking of the Gen- tiles at the time of the publication of the Gospel, represents them as amazingly corrupted, even in their moral notions of things. He gives it as their general character, that they " had their understandings darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that was in them, because of the blindness of their hearts." And then he goes on to shew the happy change that was wrought in those of them who were "taught the truth as it is in Jesus.'V Eph. iv. 17, 18, 19,20, 21, kc. (a) Sykes's Connect, and Principles of Natural and Revealeel Religion, p. 364. 50 The Law given to the People of Israel of use Part IL became general, many of whom gave examples of vicious conduct, the worship of such gods naturally tended to cor- rupt their moral notions and sentiments, and to make them very loose and dissolute in their practice: to which may be added bad and immoral customs, owing to various causes. And in many places their civil laws, though they were of use to their morals in several instances, yet led them astray in others. And even their wise men and philosophers fre- quently advanced notions inconsistent with the truth and purity of morals, of which full proof will b^ given in the ensuing part of this treatise. When idolatry and polytheism began to spread generally among the nations, it pleased God to select a peculiar peo- ple, among whom a polity was erected of an extraordinary kind; the fundamental principle of which was the knowledge and worship of the one true God, and him only, in opposi- tion to all idolatry. He also gave them a code of holy and excellent laws, containing the main articles of the duty which God requires of men, in plain and express precepts. The moral laws obligatory on all mankind were summarily comprehended in the Ten Commandments, which were promulgated by God himself with a most amazing solemnity at mount Sinai, and written in the two tables of stone, to be a standing law to that people. They were not left to them- selves, to work out a system of moral duty merely by their own reason. Even such things as seemed most plain to the common sense of mankind, as the precepts prescribing the honouring our parents, and forbidding to kill, steal, and commit adultery, were bound upon them by express laws from God himself, and enforced by his own Divine Autho- rity. And he commanded them to be very assiduous and diligent in teaching those laws to their children, and in- structing them in the particulars of the duty which God Chap. II. to preserve the Knowledge of Moral Duty, 31 required of them (b). And it is very probable, that the fame of their laws, and the glorious proofs of a Divine Autho- rity bywhich they were enforced, was spread abroad among the nations. This seems to be plainly signified in what Mo- ses declares to the people of Israel, when speaking of the statutes and judgments which the Lord commanded them, he saith, " Know therefore, and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding, in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and sa\ , Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people." He adds, "And what nation is there so great that hath statutes and judg- ments so righteous as all this law which I set before you this day (c)?" It may reasonably be supposed that as the reputation of Moses as a lawgiver was very high among the nations, his la^ s might, in several instances, serve as a pattern to other lawgivers, who might borrow some of the Mosaic precepts and institutions. Artapanus, as cited by Eusebius, probably speaks the sentiments of many other Heathens, when he so highly extols the wisdom of Moses and his laws, and saith, that he delivered many things very useful to mankind, and that from him the Egyptians them- selves borrowed tnany institutions ( do so (Ji). And many passages might be produced to shew, that both he and Plato, and the philosophers in general, urged it as the duty of the citizens to make the laws of their country the rule of their practice, both in religious and civil matters. Some modern authors have talked in ths same strain, and have laid the chief stress on human laws and government, as giving the best directions, and furnish- ing the most effectual means, for the securing and im- proving the moral state (/). It cannot be denied, that there Qi) Hume's Nat. History of Religion, p. 1 54. (?) Xenoph. Memor. Socr. lib. iv. cap. 4. sect. 13. (Ar) Ibid. lib. i. sect. 1, 2, et seq. (/) Lord Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 480, 481. edit. 4to. This* 38 Laws and Customs of the Heathens considered. Part II. were many excellent laws and constitutions among the Heathen nations, and which were of grtat use in regulating iIe manners of men, and preserving good order in society: but it is no hard matter to prove, that the civil laws of any community are very imperfect measures of moral duty. A man may obey those laws, and yet be far from being fuly virtuous: he may not be obnoxious to the penalties of those laws, and yet be a vicious and bad man. Nor indeed is it the proper design of those laws to render men really and inwardly virtuous, but so to govern their outward be- haviour, as to maintain public order. The highest end they propose is the temporal welfare and prosperity of the state. The heart, the proper seat of virtue and vice, is not within the cognizance of civil laws and human governments. Nor can the sanctions of those laws, or any rewards and pu- nishments which the ablest human legislators can contrive, be ever applied to enforce the whole of moral duty. They cannot reach to the inward temper, or the secret affections aid dispositions of the soul, and intentions of the will, on vhich yet the morality of human actions, or their being good and evil in the sight of God, does principally depend. Seneca says very well, that " it is a narrow notion of inno- cence to measure a man's goodness only by the law. Of how much larger extent is the rule of duty or of good cffices, than that of legal right? How many things are there vhich piety, humanity, liberality, justice, fidelity require, vhich yet are not within the compass of the public statutes? — Quafn angusta innocentia est ad 'legem bonum esse? Quanto latius officiorum patet quam juris regula? Quam This also is the scheme of the author of the book De TEsprit, who makes the law of the state to be the only rule and measure of virtue and duty, and what he calls a good legislation to be the only means of promoting it. Chap, III. Civil Laws no adequate Rules of Morals, 39 multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, justitia, fides exigunt, quse omnia extra publicas tabulas sunt (m)?" But let us more particularly, enquire into the most cele- brated civil laws and institutions among those that have been accounted the most civilized and best policed nations. The Egyptians were antiently much admired for the wisdom of their laws, which were looked upon to be well fitted for the maintenance of public order: but they were far from furnishing adequate rules of virtue, and were, in some respects, greatly deficient. There is a passage of Porphyry, which has been thought to give an advantageous idea of the Egyptian morality. He informs us, that when they embalmed the body of any of the nobles, they were wont to take out the belly, and put it into a chest; and then holding up the chest towards the sun, one of the em- balmers.made an oration or speech in the name of the de- funct person; which contained the dead man's apology for himself, and the righteousness on the account of which he prayed to be admitted to the fellowship of the eternal gods. " O Lord the Sun, and all ye gods that give life to men, receive me, and admit me to the fellowship of the eternal gods: for whilst I lived in the world, I religiously wor- (m) Sen. de Ira. lib. ii. cap. 27. The learned bishop of Glou- cester has set this matter in a very clear light, in his Divine Legation of Moses, vol. I. book i Sect. 2. p. 13, et seq. where he shews, that the laws of civil society, alone considered, are insufficient to prevent or cure moral disorders; that they can have no further efficacy than to restrain men from open trans- gressions; nor can their influence be extended thus far in all cases; especially where the irregularity is owing to the violence of the sensual passions: they also overlook what are called the duties of imperfect obligation, such as gratitude, hospitality, charity, &c. though these duties are of considerable importance in the moral character- 40 Concerning the Egyptian Laws and Customs, Part II. shipped the gods which my parents shewed me: those that generated my body I always honoured: I neither killed any man, nor fraudulently took away any thing that was com- mitted to my trust; nor have I been guilty of any other very heinous or inexpiable wickedness; if in my life-time I offended in eating or drinking any of the things which it was not lawful for me to eat or drink; the offence was not committed by myself, but by these;" pointing to the chest, which contained his belly and entrails, and which was then thrown into the river: after which, the rest of the body was embalmed as pure. Porphyry cites for this Euphantus, who translated this prayer or oration out of the Egyptian tongue (n). This may seem to have been well contrived to point out the most eminent parts of a virtuous life and character, which tended to recommend a man to the divine favour. But it is to be observed, that the sun is here ad- dressed to as the Sapreme Lord, together with other gods, who are represented as the authors and givers of life: and that the first and principal thing here mentioned as a proof of the person's piety is, his having worshipped the gods which his parents had shewn him. And what kind of deities they were which the Egyptians worshipped is generally known. So that they were wrong with respect to the fun- damental principle of morality, the knowledge and worship of one true God. A late learned and ingenious author has shewn, that though the Egj^ptians had some ver}- good con- stitutions, there reigned in their government a multitude of abuses and essential defects, authorized by their laws, and the fundamental principles of their state. There were great indecencies and impurities in many of their public establish- ed rites and ceremonies of religion. It was permitted among them for brothers and sisters to marrv^ one another. There (n) Porph. de Abstin. lib. iv. sect. 10, Chap. III. Concerning the Grecian Laws and Customs. 41 is a law of theirs mentioned by Diodorus Siculus, lib, i, cap. 9. p. 69. edit. Amst. and by Aulus Gellius, lib. ii, cap. 20. which, under pretence of making it easy for the citizens to recover what was stolen from them, really en- couraged and authorized theft: it not only assured the thieves of impunity, but of a reward, by given them the fourth part of the prize, upon their restoring that which they had stolen (o). The same author observes, that the Egyptians were universally cried out against for their want of faith and honesty, as he shews from many testimonies (/? ). And Sextus Erapiricus informs us, that among many of the Egyptians, for women to prostitute themselves was ac- counted evxXea^ a glorious or honourable thing (^). It is universally acknowledged, that the Greeks were amongst the most knowing and civilized nations of anti- quity. There ^ the most celebrated philosophers and mo- ralists opened their schools, and among them learning, and the arts, eminently flourished. Accordingly, they had a very high opinion of their own wisdom, and looked upon the rest of the world as much inferior to them, and to whom they gave the common title of Barbarians. Let us see therefore whether their laws and constitutions bid fair- er for improvement in morals, than those of other nations. Some of their wisest men and legislators travelled into Egypt, and other parts of the east, to observe their laws, and transplant such as they most approved into their own. It has been already hinted, that the learned have observed a near affinity in some remarkable instances between the anticnt Attic laws, as also those of the twelve tables, and (o) De rOrigine des Loix, des Arts, &c. torn. I. liv. i. art. 4. p. 49, et torn. III. p. 28. et p. 352. a la Haye 1758? (A) Ibid. p. 354. (y) Pyrrh. Hypotyp. lib. iii. cap. 24. Vol. II. " F 42 The Grecian Laws and Customs in Part II. those of Moses (r); which makes it probable, that the laws delivered to the Israelites, which were of a divine original, and were of greater antiquity than any of the laws of the Grecian states, were in several respects of great advantage to other nations. Excellent laws and constitutions there undoubtedly were in several of the Grecian republics: but if the best of them were selected, and formed into one code, they would be far from exhibiting a complete rule of morals. They were all, like the laws of other nations, fundamentally wrong in all that part of moral duty which relates to the service and adoration we owe to the one true God; and in several respects also in granting too great an indulgence to the sensual passions, and in making some im- portant points of morality give way to what they looked upon to be the interest of the state. The laws of Lycurgus have been highly celebrated both by antients and moderns. Plutarch observes, that this law- giver was pronounced by the oracle the beloved of God, and rather a god than a man: that he stands an undeni- able proof, that a perfect wise man is not a mere notion and chimera, as some have thought, and has obliged the world with a nation of philosophers. He expresses a high admiration of the Lacedaemonian institutions, as excellent- ly fitted to form men to the exercise of virtue, and to maintain and to promote mutual love among the citizens. (r) ^ee Sam Petit. Comment, in Leg. Attic, printed at Paris 1635. See also Grot, in Matt. v. 28. et de Verit. Rel. Christ, lib. i, sect. 15. p. 28. edit. Cleric. It is true, i hat Mr. Le Clerc, in a note which he has there added, supposes, after Dr. Spenser, that both the Athenians and the Hebrews derived the laws Gro- tius refers to from the Egyptians. But no authorities can be pro- duced to shew that the E.i^yptians had such laws, but what are much posterior to the time of Moses. Chap. III. many instances contrary to g-ood Morals, 43 He prefers them to the laws of all the other Grecian states, and observes, that all those who have written well of poli- tics, as Plato, Diogenes, Zen©, and others, have taken Ly- curgus for their model: and that Aristotle himself highly extols him, as having deserved even greater honours then the Spartans paid him, though they offered sacrifices to him as to a god (*). Many of the moderns, and among others the celebrated Mons. de Montesquieu professeth himself a great admirer of the laws of Lycurgus. He observes, that he promoted virtue by means which seemed contrary to it (t). But I think there are several of his laws and institu- tions to which this observation cannot justly be applied; and which, instead of promoting the practice of virtue, counter- acted it in important instances. Some of his admirers have acknowledged, that his laws vvere all calculated to establish a military con^monwealth, and that every thing was looked upon as just, which was thought to contribute to that end. Plato observes, in his first book of laws, that they were fit- ted rather to render men valiant than just. Aristotle makes the same observation (w). And Plutarch owns, that some person blamed the laws of Lycurgus as well contrived to make men good soldiers, but very defective in civil justice and honesty. It appears from the testimony of several au- thors, as well as from some remarkable facts, that they were for sacrificing probity and every other consideration, to what they thought the good of the state required; and judged every method lawful which might procure them suc- (s) See Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus, especially at the latter end. (/) L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i. livre iv. ch. 6. p.^49, 50. Edit. Edinb. (w) Arist. PoliUc. lib. ii. cap. 9. p. 331. et lib. vii. cap. \4. p. 443. Oper. torn. II. edit. Paris, 44 The Grecian Laws and Customs in Part II* cess. The breach of faith cost them nothing. Herodotus says, that they who were acquainted with the genius of of that people knew that their actions were generally contrary to their words, and that they could not depend upon them in any matter {x). And though they were undoubtedly very brave, yet they valued a victory more which was gained by deceit and guile, than one that was obtained by open valour. How haughtily and cruelly, as well as perfidiously, did they behave towards Athens and Thebes, and all those whom they thought it their interest to oppress! Many of their laws and customs were contrary to hu- manity. And the rigour of their discipline tended in seve- ral instances to stifle the sentiments of tenderness and bene- volence, of mercy and compassion, so natural to the human breast. I have in the former part of this Work, chap. vii. taken notice of their custom of whipping boys, even to death, at the altar of Diana Orthia. To which it may be added, that their young men and boys were wont to meet and fight with the utmost rage and fierceness on certain days of the year; of which Cicero says he himself was witness (?/). But nothing ccnild exceed their cruelty to their slaves, the helotes, as they called them, who laboured the ground for them, and performed all their works and manufactures. These slaves could have no justice done them, whatever insults or injuries they suff'ered. They were regarded as the slaves not merely of one particular mas- ter, but of the public, so that every one might injure them with irhpunity. Not only did they treat them in their gene- ral conduct with great harshness and insolence, but it was part of their policy to massacre them, on several occasions, in cold blood, and without provocation. Several authors (x) Herod, lib. ix. n. 51. Francof. 1605. (y) Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 27. p. 401. edit. Davis. Chap. III. in many instances contrary to good Morals, 45 have mentioned their k^vk^iu^ so called from their lying in ambuscade, in thickets and clefts of rocks, from which thev issued out upon the helotes,^and killed all they met; and sometimes they set upon them in the open day, and mur- dered the ablest and stoutest of them, as they were at work in the fields. The design of this was to prevent their slaves from growing too numerous or powerful, which might en- danger the state. But as M. de Montesquieu very proper- ly observes, the danger was only owing to their cruel and unjust treatment of them; whereas among the Athenians, who treated their slaves with great gentleness, there is no instance of their proving troublesome or dangerous to the public (2). Plutarch is loth to believe that this inhuman custom was instituted by Lycurgus, though he does not de- ny that it was in use among the Lacedaemonians. But Aris- totle says, it was an institution of Lycurgus. And who- ever duly considers the spirit of several of his laws, will not think him incapable of it. And from the same cruel policy it was, that, as Thucydides informs us, they destroy- ed two thousand of the helotes, whom they had armed, when the exigences of the state required it, and who had served them bravely and faithfully in their wars. Anotlier instance of the inhumanity of the laws of Ly- curgus was this. The father was obliged bv the laws to bring his child to a certain place appointed for that purpose, to be examined by a committee of the men of that tribe to which he belonged. Their business was carefully to view the infant, and if they found it deformed, and of a bad constitu- tion, they caused it to be cast into a deep cavern near the mountain Taygetus, as thinking it neither good for the child itself, nor for the public, that it should be brought up. (2) L'Esprit des Loix, vol. i, liv. xy. chap. 16. p. 356f 357. 46 The Grecian Laws and Customs in Part II. Plutarch, who takes notice of this, passes no censure upon it. And he pronounces in general, at the conclusion of his life of Lycurgus, that he could see no injustice, or want of equity, in any of that lawgiver's institutions. Many have taken notice of that constitution of his, by which the Spartan boys were trained up to dextrous thiev- ing. They were obliged to steal their victuals, or be without them; which put them upon watching oppoitunities, and seizing what they could lay their hands on. It behoved them to do this with dexterity and activity; for if they were taken in the fact, they were whipped most unmercifully; not for stealing, as Sextus Empiricus observes, but for being catched (a). This was designed to sharpen their invention, and to exercise their agility and courage. Some authors, and among others, the celebrated Mr. Rollin, in his An- tient History, are of opinion, that this could not be called theft, because it was allowed by the state. But, I think, it cannot be denied, that in this method the youth were early enured to arts of rapine, and were taught to think there was no great hurt in invading another man's property, and to form contrivances for that purpose. Notwithstanding all the austerity which appeared in the laws of Lycurgus, there were some of his constitutions, which seemed to be very little consistent with modesty and decency. There were common baths in which the men and women bathed together. And it was ordered, that the young maidens should appear naked in the public exercises, as well as 'the young men, and that they should dance naked with them at the solemn festivals and sacrifices (b)-. and as (a) Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. lib. iii. cap. 24. {b) That eminent philosopher Plato, in forming the model of a perfect commonwealth, proposed the laws of Lycurgus, in this and other instances, for his pattern, as I shall have occasion to Chap. III. many instances contrary to good Mordh. 4,f to married women, Lycurgus allowed husbands to impart the use of their wives to handsome and deserving men, in order to the begetting healthy and vigorous children for the commonwealth. It is a little odd to observe that learned and grave philosopher Plutarch endeavouring to justify these constitutions, in his Life of Lycurgus. That lawgiver was observe afterwards. Thus neither the philosopher nor lawgiver shewed any great regard to the rules of modesty and purity. A remarkable proof this, that the erieatesi men among the Pagans, when left to their own judgments in matters of morality, were apt to form wrong notions concerning it, even in instances where one should think the dictates of nature and reason might have given them better directions. It may not be improper, on this occasion, to mention an observation of an eminent political wri- ter, Mons. de TMontesquieu. He observes, that all nations are agreed in looking upon the incontinence of women as a thing that deserves contempt: and he supposes that " a natural mo- desty is implanted in women, as a defence and preservative against incontinence: that therefore it is not true, that inconti- nence follows the laws of nature: i; violates those laws: and on the contrary, it is modesty and reservedness that follows those laws." He adds, that " where the physical force of certain cli- mates carries persons to violate the natural law of the two sexes, and that of intelligent beings, it is the business of the magistrate to make civil laws, which may overcome the nature of the cli- mate, and re-establish the primitive laws of nature*.*' According to this way of reasoning, a legislator is much to be blamed, who, like Lycurgus, establishes constitutions which tend to break down that natural fence of modesty, which is designed as a pre- servative against incontinence. In this certainly M. de Mon- tesquieu has judged much better than another writer of the same nation, the author of the book De TEsprit, who seems to make the great art of legislation to consist in giving a loose to the most licentious inclinations, and proposes the indulgence of them as a reward to merit, and an incentive to the noblest actions. * L'Esprit des l^oix, vol. I. liv. xvi. chap. 12. p. S73, 374. 48 Some of the Grecian Laws and Customs Part II. for sacrificing modesty, and the sanctity of the marriage- bed, to what he thought was for the benefit of the state. But these constitutions had, as might reasonably have been expected, a very bad influence upon their morals. The Spar- tan women were accounted the most immodest and licen- tious of any in Greece, as Aristotle observes (c). I shall conclude this account of the Lacedaemonians, and of their laws and customs, with the account given of them by a late ingenious author: that they were a people proud, imperious, deceitful, perfidious, capable of sacrificing every thing to their ambition and their interest, and who had no esteem of the liberal arts and sciences. And after some other strokes of the like nature, he concludes, " Such were the manners and the genius of a people admired and pro- posed by all profane antiquity as a pattern of wisdom and virtue. — Telles etoient les mceurs et le genie d'un peuple admire, ei; propose, par toute I'antiquite profane, comme un modele de sagesse et de vertu (^)." The law and custom of exposing children, so contrary to the dictates of nature and humanity, was not peculiar to Lacedaemon, but was common in other parts of Greece, as well as among other nations. And it is reckoned as a sin- gular thing among the Thebans, that the law forbade any Theban to expose his infant under pain of death (e). Even the most eminent philosophers, in their treatises of laws, prescribed or approved this unnatural practice. Plato would have it ordered by law, that men or women, who are past the age of getting and conceiving strong children, should take care that their offspring, if they should have any, should not come to the birth, or see the light; or if that (c) Arisi. Politic, lib. ii. cap. 9. (rf) De I'Origine des Loix, des Arts, &c. torn. III. p. 380. (e) iElian. Histor. var. lib. ii. cap. 7. Chap. III. in many instances contrary to good Morals, 49 should happen, they should expose them without nourish- ment (/). Aristotle expressly says, that it should be a law not to bring up or nourish any child that is weak or maimed: and that when the law of the country forbids to expose in- fants, it is necessary to limit the number of those that should be begotten: and if any one begets children above the num- ber limited by the laws, he advises to procure abortion before the foetus has life and sense (^). Justly is this men- tioned by Mr. Locke, as a remarkable instance to shew, that reason had failed mankind in a perfect rule, and resolv- ed not the doubts that had risen amongst the studious and thinking philosophers; nor had been able to convince the most civilized parts of the world, that they had not given^ nor could without a crime take away the lives of their chil- dren, by exposing them (/^)." But what I would especially take notice of as a palpable proof of the great corruption of the Greeks, both in their notions and practice, with regard to morals, is, that the most unnatural filthiness was countenanced and encouraged in several places, by their public laws, and almost every where by their known customs. It is a charge that has been often brought against them, that they were very much addicted to the impure love of boys. I am sensible there is a great authority against it. The learned Doctor, afterwards Archbishop Potter, in his excellent Greek Antiquities, has taken great pains to clear them from that charge; and seems willing to have it thought, that the love of boys, so generally allowed and practised (/) Plato Republ. lib. v. Oper. p. 461. edit. Lugd. ^) Arist. Politic, lib. vii. cap. 16. Oper. torn. II. p. 447. edit. Paris. Qi) Locke's Reason, of Christ, in his Works, vol. II. p. 534. edit. 3d. Vot. IL G 50 The Grecian Laws and Customs in Part II. among them, was perfectly innocent and virtuous. And it were to be wished, for the honour of human nature, that it could be proved to be so. I am far from saying, that the love of boys, for which the Greeks were so noted, was uni- versally of the criminal and vicious kind. But that this most abominable and unnatural vice was very common among them, and, in some of their cities and states, encou- raged by their laws, admits of a clear proof. There need no other vouchers for it, than the authors produced by this learned writer himself. One of these authors is Maximus Tyrius. And it is observable, that, at the end of his tenth dissertation, he celebrates it as a most heroic act of Agesi- laus, a more glorious conquest than any he had achieved against the Persians, and as more to be admired than the fortitude of Leonidas, who died for his country, that being in love with a beautiful Barbarian boy, he suffered it to go no farther than looking at him, and admiring him (?). No- thing could be more impertinent and absurd than this en- comium on Agesilaus, if the Spartan love of boys was ge- nerally as pure and innocent as the same author in that very dissertation represents it. The testimonies of Xenophon and Plutarch are produced to shew that the love of boys at Sparta, and which was prescribed by the laws of Lycur- gus, was pure and laudable. But the prejudices these two (?) Epictetus has a passage not unlike this in commendation of Socrates*s extraordinary virtue. " Go to- Socrates (says he) and see him lying by Alcibiades, yet slighting his youth and beauty. Consider what a victory he was conscious of obtaining! What an Olympic prize! So that, by heaven, one might justly salute him; Hail! incredibly great, universal victor!** If this shameful vice had not been extremely common, even at Athens, Socrates's ab- staining from it could not have been celebrated, as it is here by Epictetus, as an act of virtue that deserves the highest admira* tion. See Epictetus's Dissert, book ii. ch. 18. sect. 4. Chap. III. many instances contrary to ^ood Morals. 51 great authors had in favour of the Lacedjemonians, the high opinion they entertained of their laws and customs, and their willingness to put the fairest colours upon them, is well known, and does not a little weaken the force of their testimony. It will soon appear, that Plutarch is not very consistent with himself in what he advances on this head. As to Xenophon, it is to be observed, that at the same time that he vindicates the Lacedaemonians, he represents that criminal love as very common among the Greeks, and in many places authorized by the laws: " I know (says he) that there are many who will believe nothing of this;" i. e. that the love of boys among the Spartans was innocent and virtuous; " nor do I wonder at it, the unnatural love of boys is become so common, that in many places it is esta- blished by the public laws." This testimony of Xenophon is very remarkable with regard to others of the Greeks, though he will not allow that the Lacedaemonians were guilty of it. But Plato, his contemporary, whose testimony must be allowed to be; of great weight, in his eighth book of laws, supposes that the masculine love, which he there condemns as contrary to nature, was allowed both among the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans (i). The excellent writer above-mentioned will by no means allow that the love of boys usual among the Cretans was criminal; and asserts, that nothing passed between them and their lovers that was contrary to the strictest rules of virtXie: for which he quotes Maximus Tyrius and Strabo, who tells us, that the Cretans professed that it is was not so much the exter- nal beauty of a boy, as his virtuous disposition, his courage and conduct, that recommended him to their love. And this might be the pretence they alleged; and in some in- {k) Plato de Leg. lib. viii. Oper. p. 645. G. H. edit. Lugd. 52 The Laws and Customs among the Greeks Part II. Stances might really be the case. But, I think whosoever impartially examines what Strabo says concerning it, will not be apt to look upon the love he there speaks of as very innocent. The whole turn of the passage seems to me to have a contrary appearance. And I find the learned and ingenious author De I'Origine des Loix, &c. looks upon it in the same light, and cites this very passage of Strabo to shew that unnatural lust was encouraged by the Cretan law. And Plutarch, at the same time that he represents the love of boys in use at Athens and Sparta as having nothing blameable in it, expressly condemns that sort of it in Crete, which they called by the name of u^TFuyfAoi (/), which is that very love which Strabo speaks of in the passage referred to (w). Plato, not only in the eighth bock of laws already cited, but in his first book of laws, blames the Cretans for masculine mixtures; and intimates, that they were wont to justify themselves by the example of Jupiter and Gany- mede (n). Aristotle tells us, that to prevent their having too many children, there was a law among the Cretans, for encouraging that sort of unnatural love (o). It appears from some passages of Plutarch, that he was willing to liave it thought that the love of boys in use among the Greeis was a pure and generous affection: but at other times he makes acknowledgments which plainly shew the contrary. In his life of Pelopidas, he tells us, that the legislators encouraged the love of boys, to temper the manners of their youth, and that it produced excellent effects, and particularly among the Thebans. But (/) Plutarch, de liber, educandis, Oper. torn. II. p. 1 1. edit. Xyl. (m) Strabo, lib. x. p. 739, 740. edit. Amst. (n) Plato de Leg. lib. i. Oper. p. 569. G. edit. Lugd. 1590. (o) Arist. Politic, lib. ii. cap. 10. Oper. torn, II. p. 333. A. edit. Paris. 1629. Chap. III. contrary to ^ood Morals. 58 the same great philosopher, who undoubtedly was inclined to give a favourable account of the Thebans whose coun- tryman he was, in his treatise De liberis educandis, ex- pressly declares, that such masculine loves were to be avoided, as were in use at Thebes and Elis {p). And his joining Thebes with Elis shews that it is a very criminal passion he speaks of. For we have the testimony of Maxi- mus Tyrius, in that dissertation in which he endeavours to vindicate some of the Grecian states from the charge, that the Elians encouraged that licentiousness, as he calls it, by a law (q). Nothing can be more evident than it is from Plutarch's treatise called 'e^^t/xo? or Amatorius, that this abominable vice had made a great progress among the Greeks, and was openly countenanced and pleaded for. One of his dialogists there argues for it at large, and highly commends it.^ He represents th« Lacedaemonians, Bseotians, Cretans, and Chalcidians, as much addicted to it. And ano- ther of his dialogists, who, it is to be supposed, expresses Plutarch's own sentiments, condemns it in very strong terms, and shews its pernicious effects. Athenseus tells us, that it was not only practised, but encouraged and promoted in many of the cities of Greece (r). At Athens indeed there was a law against it. And Plutarch seems to recom- mend the love of boys in use at Sparta and Athens as vir- tuous, and worthy to be emulated, though he condemns that at Thebes and Elis (*). As to Sparta, the accounts ^iven of it by antient authors, and by Plutarch himself, seem to vary. But, whatever might have been the ori- ginal design of the constitution established by Lycurgus, (/z) Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 1 1. [ {q) Max. Tyr. Dissert. 10. p. 128. Oxon. 1677. (r) Deipnosoph. lib. xiii. p. 602. edit. Lugd. (s) Plutarch, ubi supra. 54 The Laxvs and Customs among the Greeks Part II. with respect to it, these is too much reason to think, that, as it was generally practised among the Lacedaemonians, it was not very innocent. With regard to the Athenians, Plu- tarch tells us concerning their great lawgiver Solon, that it appears from his poems, that he was not proof against beautiful boys, and had not courage enough to resist the force of love. He observes, that he was in love with Pisis- tratus, because of his extraordinary handsomeness: and that by a law he forbade paederasty or the love of boys to slaves; making that, as Plutarch observes, an honourable and repu- table action; and as it were inviting the worthy to the prac- tice of that which he commanded the unworthy to for- bear (^). And in his Amatorius above referred to, he introduces Protogenes, one of his dialogists, arguing in favour of that practice, from this constitution of Solon (u), Maximus Tyrius, who takes a great deal of pains to vindi- cate Socrates from that charge, owns, that at the time when this philosopher flourished, this vicious passion had arrived to the greatest height, both in the other parts of Greece, and particularly at Athens; and that all places were full of unjust or wicked lovers, and boys that were enticed and delud- ed (;c). So that if there was a law against it at Athens, it seems to have been little regarded. To the testimonies which have been produced may be added that of Cicero, who represents that practice as very common among the Greeks: and that what helped to intro- duce and spread it, was the custom of the youths appearing ivaked in the public exercises. And he . observes, that their poets, great men, and even their learned men and philoso- Q) Plutarch. See Plutarch's Life of Solon, at the beginning, (w) Plutarch. Oper. torn. II. p. 751. edit. Xyland. (x) Max. Tyr. dissert. 10. initio. Chap. III. contrary to ^odd Morals. SS phers, not only practised, but gloried in it (i/). And accord- ingly he elsewhere represents it as the custom, not of parti- cular cities only, but of Greece in general. Speaking of the things that might be thought to contribute to Dionysius'a happiness, he mentions his having paramours of that kind " according to the custom of Greece. — Habebat, more Graecise, quosdam adolescentes amore conjunctos (2)." And in a passage cited by Lactantius, he mentions it as a bold and hazardous thing in the Greeks, that they consecrated the images of the Loves and Cupids in the places of their public exercises (cr). I have insisted the more largely upon this, because there cannot be a more convincing proof, that the laws and cus- toms, even in the most learned and civilized nations, are not to be depended upon as proper guides in matters of mo- rality. The Greeks are regarded and admired as the most eminent of the Pagan nations, for their knowledge in phi- losophy, and especially in morals, and as having cultivated their reason in an extraordinary degree. They valued them- selves mightily upon their wisdom, and the excellency of their laws; and yet their laws or generally allowed customs, shewed that they were become amazingly corrupt, both in their notions and practices, with regard to morals; and that in instances, as to which one would have thought the light of nature would have given them a sufficient direction. I say, they were beccme very corrupt in their notions as well as practices. For though some of them acknowledge the (y) Tuscul. Disput. lib. iv. cap. 33. (2) Ibid. lib. V. cap. 20. p. 385. edit. Davis. (a) " Magnum Cicero audaxque consilium susccpisse Grae- ciam dicit, quod Cupidinum et Amorum simulachra in gymnasiis consecrasset," Lactant. Divin. Instit. lib. i. cap, 20. p. 106. luUgd. Bat. 1660. $9 The Laws and Customs, £s?c. Part IL evil and turpitude of that unnatural vice, yet, in the general opinion, it seems to have passed among them for no fault at all, or a very light one. And many of their philosophers and moralists, as I shall have occasion to shew afterwards, represented it as a matter perfectly indifferent. Barolesanes, an antient and learned writer, in a large extract quoted from him by Eusebius, after having mentioned some bar- barous nations, which were much addicted to that vice, and others who had it in abhorrence, observes, that in Greece such kind of masculine loves were not accounted disgrace- ful, even to the wise (<^). St. Paul, therefore, in drawing up the charge of an amazing corruption of morals in the Hea- then world, very justly put this in the first place, as being both of the highest enormity, and very common not only among the people, but the philosophers themselves. Nor is it probable, that any thing less than a Divine Law, en- forced by the authority of God himself, and by the most ex- press denunciations of the Divine Wrath and Vengeance against such crimes, could have over-ruled the force of such inveterate custom and example, countenanced by the maxims and practice of those who made high pretences to wisdom and reason. (d) Euseb. Prgep. Evangel, lib. vi. cap. 10. p. 276. D, 57 CHAPTER IV. Farther instances of civil laws and customs among the Pagan nations. Those of the antient Romans considered. The laws of the twelve tables, though mighti- ly extolled, were far from exhibiting a complete rule of morals. The law of Romulus concerning the exposing of diseased and ^)." It appears from what Seneca says, in his 95th epistle, that in his time it was practised at Rome openly, and without shame. He there speaks of flocks and troops of boys, distinguished by their colours and nations; and that great care was taken to train them up for that detestable employment (/). It is not necessary to add any thing more to shew, that among the Greeks and Romans, the most celebrated nations in the antient Pagan world, their laws and constitutions, though in many respects excellent, were far from exhibiting a (k) Dr. Tailour*s Notes and Paraphrase on the Epistle to the Romans, on chap. i. 26. " Quotus enim quisque formosus est? Athenis cum essem, e gregibus Ephseborum vix singuli reperie- bantur^ Video quid subriseris. Sed tamen ita se res habet. Deinde nobis, qui concedentibiis philosophis adolesceniulis de- lectamur, etiam vitia ssepe jucunda sunt." And he immediately after mentions Alcgeus's being pleased with a blemish in the boy he was in love with; and Q. Catulus's being in love with Roscius, who had distorted eyes. Cic, de Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. 28. (/) " Puerorum infelicium greges, agmina exoletorum, per nationes coloresque descripta," &c. Ep. 95. Chap. IV. among" the antient Romans. ©3 proper rule of morals to guide the people: they failed in very important instances: and some of the customs, which at length became very prevalent among them, were of a most immoral nature and tendency, and shewed them to be sunk into an amazing corruption and depravity of manners. It may not be improper^ on this occasion, to take notice of the Chinese, who have been mightily extolled for their antiquity, the extent of their empire, the wisdom and ex- cellency of their laws and constitutions, and the goodness of their morals. A noted author, who has distinguished himself by asserting the clearness and sufficiency of the Law and Religion of nature in opposition to Revelation, lays a particular stress upon this. He represents *' the in- fidels of China (as he calls them) as having the preference to Christians in regard to all moral virtues." And he tells us, from the famous Mr. Leibnitz, that " such is our growing corruption, that it may almost seem necessary to send some Chinese missionaries to teach us the use and practice of Natural Theology, as we send missionaries to them to teach them revealed Religion (?«)." But if we take their laws and constitutions in the most advantageous light, it must be owned, indeed, that they are well calcu- lated for preserving external public order and decency, and for the regulation of the civil polity, but are altogether in- sufficient to furnish a complete rule of morals, or to lead men into the practice of real piety and virtue, considered in its just extent. F. Navarette, who lived many years in China, and was well acquainted with their language, their laws, and books, and who seems to have given an honest and impartial account of them (n), says, that " he believes (w) Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 366, 3^67. edit. 8vo. (n) I do not find that Father Navarette's name appears in the list of the authors, whose names are prefixed to F. Du Haiders 64 Immoral Customs among the Chinese Part II, the outward behaviour is not taken care of so much in any part of the world, as it is in China: that whatever they do or say is so contrived, that it may have a good appear- ance, please all, and offend none: and that doubtless that nation excels all others in outward modesty, gravity, good words, courtesy, and civility (o)." Yet what he says of them in several parts of his book, gives one a very disad- vantageous idea of their morals. He represents the sin against nature as extremely common among them; and that in the time of the former Chinese emperors, there were public stews of this kind at Pequin, though not allowed by the Tartars (/>). That they do not look upon drunkenness to be a crime (^). That every one takes as many concu- bines as he can ketp (r). That many of the common peo- ple pawn their wives, and that some lend them for a month, or more, or less, according as they agree (5). That there are many things in China which make matrimony void, some of them very trifling. He quotes a book of great authority among them, in which it is said, concern- ing the antient wise men of China, who are there celebrated as men of greater sincerity and virtue than the moderns, that they turned away their wives, because the house was History of China, and out of whose accounts he compiled his his- tory. But as he found fault with the wron^ and partial accounts given by several authors of the society, I suppose it was thought proper to take no notice of him; though he well deserved to have been mentioned among the best of- those who have given accounts of China. (0) See Navarette's Account of the Empire of China, book ii. chap. 6. p. 122, 123. in the first volume of Churchiirs Collec- tion. {fi ) ibid, book i. chap. 13. p. 29. and book ii. p. 68. (g) Ibid, book i. chap. 14. (r) Ibid, book ii. chap 7. p. 68, \s) Ibid. CiiAP. IV. and othef- antient Heathen Nations. 65 full of smoke, or because they frightened the dog With their disagreeable noises And that the antients dissolved the knot of matrimony without a word speaking. In the same book it is determined, that when the wife is turned off, the husband may marry another (?). F. Navarettei farther observes, that the Chinese sell their sons and daughters when they please, and do it frequently (w). But what is still worse, very many of them, rich as well as poor, when they are delivered of daughters, stifle and kill them. Those who are more tender-hearted leave them un- der a vessel, where they let them die in great misery: of which he gives a most affecting instance to his own know- ledge. And he says it was the common opinion that there were about ten thousand female children murdered every year within the precincts of the City Lao Ki, where he lived some time. " How many then (says he) must we imagine perished throughout the whole empire (^)?" Yet^ he says, " all the sects among them, except that of the learned, think it a siii to kill living creatures: they plead humanity and compassion, thinking it a cruel thing to take that life which they cannot give. But it is very well worth remarking (says he) that they should endeavour to shew* themselves merciful to beasts, yet murder their own daugh- ters." He adds, that " in India they have hospitals for all sorts of irrational creatures, and yet they let men die with-* out assisting them in their sickness («/)." Many have talked of the brotherly affection and benevolence of the Chinese towards one another; but it appears from the same writer^ (?) Navarette*s Account of the Empire of Chink, book ii. chaf^^ 7. p. 67. {u) Ibid, book i. chap. 20. p. 47. (a?) Ibid, book ii. chap-l 0. p. 77, (y) Ibid, book ii. chap. 10. p. 77, Vol.. IL * I 66 Immoral Customs among the Chinese Part II. that though they carry a fair appearance, and " are exqui- site at concealing the mortal hatred they bear any man for several years, yet, when an opportunity offers, they give full vent to it. It often happens, that in law suits, the de- fendant hangs himself, only to ruin and avenge himself of the plaintiff: for when he is hanged, all his kindred repair to the judge, complaining that he hanged himself to avoid the trouble and vexation the plaintiff put him to, having no other remedy left him. Then all join against the plaintiff, and the judge among them; and they never give over, till they ruin him and his family (2)." Father Trigaltius, and from him Cornelius a Lapide, say, concerning the Chinese, that "they wonderfully follow the track of nature and rea- son, and are courteous, and apt to learn, as well as ingeni- ous and great politicians, and therefore very capable of Christian wisdom,'* &c. F. Navarette, who mentions this, remarks upon it, that " if their being so addicted to super- stitions, sodomy, fraud, lying, pride, covetousness, sensu- ality, and other vices, is following the course of nature and reason, then that father was in the right («)." To what has been produced from F. Navarette, I would add, that an author of great reputation for political knowledge has ob- served, that " the Chinese, whose whole life is entirely go- verned by the established rites, are the most void of com- (2) Navarette's Account of the Empire of China, book i. chap. 20. p.' 47. What Navarette here says concerning the litigiousness of the Chinese, is confirmed by the testimony of the Jesuits, who compiled the Scientia Sinesis Latine exposita. They observe that there is an infinite numi3er of law suits in China, and every where a thousand arts of cheating, of which all the tribunals are full. " Infinitus litium et uiigantium in Chin^ hodie est nu- merus; mille passim failendi fingendive, artes, quibus tribunalia omnia plena sunt." Scient. Sin. lib. i. p. 12. (a) Ibid, book v. p. 173. I Chap. IV. and other antient Heathen Nations. 67 mon honesty of any people upon earth;— le peuple le plus fourbe de la terre;" and that the laws, though they do not allow them to rob or to spoil hy violence, yet permit them to cheat and to defraud (^). Agreeable to this is the charac- ter given of them in Lord Anson's Voyages, where there are striking instances of the general disposition that is among them to commit all kinds of fraud. It were easy to produce several other laws and customs of different nations contrary to the rules of morality. Some nations there have been, among whom theft and robbery were accounted honourable. Others gave a full indulgence by law to all manner of impurity and licentiousness, both in men and women. Others, as the Persians, allowed the most incestuous mixtures. And there were several nations, among whom it was usual to expose and destroy their nearest friends and relatives, and even their parents, when they grew old and very sick, esteeming those to be most misera- ble that died a natural death (c). Eusebius gives several other instances of absurd and immoral laws and customs, which obtained among many people before the light of the (b) L'Esprit des Loix, vol. I. liv. xix. chap. 17. p. 437. et ibid, chap. 20. p. 440, 441. edit. Edinb. (c) The author of a late periodical paper, published at Paris, entituled, Le Conservateur, pleads in favour of the laws of those nations, which ordered old and infirm persons to be put to death. He pretends, that there is nothing in this but what is conform- able to reason, though he owns it is not reconcileable to the Gospel. And he thinks it would be fit and reasonable, to deter- mine by law the term beyond which persons should not be suf- fered to live. Le Conservateur for March 1757, as cited by the Abbe Gauchet, in his Lettres Critiques. An instancejhis, among many others that might be mentioned, of the extravagances men are apt to fall into, through a high opinion of ^heir own reason. 08 Farther Instances of immoral Laws and Part II. Gospel shone amongst them. But he observes, that no sooner did any of them embrace Christianity', but they abandoned those laws and customs, which nothing could prevail with them to do before. And this he justly men^ tions as a proof of the happy effects produced by the Gos^ pel, in reforming the manners of men (d)» The same learned father has a long extract from Barde* panes, an eminent antient writer, concerning the various customs and laws in different nations,, partly written, and partly unwritten, some of which were good and laudable, others of an immoral nature and tendency. It is too long to be transcribed here, but may be seen in the sixth book of Eusebius's Evangelical Preparation, cap. 10. p. 175. etseq. The reader may also consult Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhon* Hypotyp. lib. iii. cap. 24. and a modern author, who has made a large collection of absurd and shameful laws and customs in several nations, antient and modern, especially such as tend to encourage all manner of lewdness and de- bauchery (e). It is easy to observe that this last -mentioned writer enlarges upon some of those laws and customs which are contrary to all the rules of modesty and purity, in a manner which shews that he is far from disapproving them, ^nd seems rather to recommend them as models of a wise legislation. We may see by this what fine systems of legis- lation might be expected from some of those, who make the highest pretences to an extraordinary sagacity; and what an advantage it is, not to be left merely to what men's boast- ed reason, which is too often guided and influenced by their passions, would be apt to dictate in morals. ' J shall conclude what relates to the laws and customs of (d) Praepar. Evangel, lib. i. cap. 4. p. 11, 12. edit. Paris. (^e) L'Esprit, tome I. disc. 2. chap. 14 et 15, Chap. IV. Customs among the Pagan Nations, 6^ the Pagan nations, with observing, that Lord Bolingbroke, who, as hath been already hinted, seems to lay the principal stress on human laws, as furnishing the most effectual means for promoting and securing the practice of virtue, yet has thought fit to own, that " the law of nature has been blend- ed with many absurd and contradictory laws in all ages and countries, as well as with customs, which, if they were in- dependent on laws, have obtained the force of laws (y)." The same noble writer, who frequently represents the law of nature as universally clear and obvious to all mankind, has made this remarkable acknowledgment, that " the law of nature is hid from our sight by all the variegated clouds of civil laws and customs. Some gleams of true light may be seen through them, but they render it a dubious light, and it can be no better to those who have the keenest sight, till those interpositions are removed (^)»" It may not be improper here to add a passage or two from a celebrated antient, relating to civil laws. Cicero declares, that " the commands and prohibitions of human laws have not a suf- ficient force, either to engage men to right actions, or avert them from bad ones. — Intelligi sic oportet, jussa ac vetita populorum vim non habere ad recte facta vocandi, et a peccatis avocandi (A)." And he pronounces, that " it would be the greatest folly to imagine, that all those things are just which are contained in popular institutions and laws.-^ lUud stultissimum existimare omnia justa esse, quae sita sunt in populorum institutis aut legibus (?)." Thus it appears, with great evidence, that the civil laws (/) Bolingbroke's Works, vol. V. p. 15. edit. 4to, \g) Ibid. vol. V. p. 105. edit. 4to. (/j) De Leg. lib. ii. cap. 4. {i) Lib. i. cap. 15. 70 Farther Instances of immoral Laws and Part II. and constitutions in the Pagan world were far from afford- ing a safe and certain rule, which might be depended upon, for the direction of the people in moral duty. As to the mysteries of which a very eminent writer has made a beautiful representation, as an excellent expedient contrived by the legislators and civil magistrates, for re- claiming the people from their idolatry and polytheism, and engaging them to a life of the strictest virtue, I need nof here add any thing to what is offered on this subject in the former volume (i). It is there shewn, that there is no suf- ficient reason to think that the mysteries were intended to detect the error of the vulgar polytheism, but rather, on the contrary, by striking shows and representations, to create a greater awe and veneration for the religion of their country. - And as to morals, notwithstanding the high pretensions of some Pagan writers, especially after Christianity had made some progress, it does not appear, that the original design of them went farther, than the humanizing and civilizing the people, and encouraging tht-m to the practice of those virtues, and deterring them from those vices, which more immediately affect society. It will scarce, I believe, be pre- tended, that admitting the most favourable account of the mysteries, the people were there instructed in a complete body of morals. But the truth is, there were great defects and faults in the original constitution of them, which na- turally gave occasion to corruptions and abuses, which be- gan early, and continued long; so that it is to be feared, the mysteries, as they were managed, greatly contributed to that amazing depravation of manners, which, like a deluge, overspread the Pagan world. It is observed by the cele- brated author above referred to, that " God, in punishment (At) See vol. I. chap. viii. and ix. Chap. IV. Customs among the Pagan Nations. 71 * for their turning his Truth into a lie,' suffered their mys- teries, which they erected for a school of virtue, to dege- nerate into an odious sink of vice and immorality, giving them up unto all uncleanness and vile affections (/)." (/) Divine Legation of Moses, vol. I. book ii, sect. 4. p. 196, marginal note, edit. 4th. 72 Concerning Morality PartIL CHAPTER V. Concerning morality as taught by the antient Heathen philosophers. Some of them said excellent things concerning moral virtue, and their writings might in several respects be of great use. But they could not furnish a perfect rule of morals, that had sufficient certainty, clearness, and authority. No one philosopher, or sect of i)hilosoi)hcrs, can be absolutely depended upon as a proper guide in matters of morality. Nor is a complete system of morals to be extracted from the writings of them ali collectively considered. The vanity of such an attempt shewn. Their sentiments, how excellent soever, could not properly pass for laws to mankind. T HOUGH the civil laws and constitutions, or those cus- toms which obtained the force of laws, in the Heathen world, could not furnish out a rule of morality, which might be depended upon, to guide men to the true know-= ledge and practice of moral duty in its just extent; yet it may be alleged, that the instructions and precepts of the philosophers were, if duly attended to, sufficient for that purpose. This is what many have insisted on, to shew that there was no need of an extraordinary Divine Revelation to give men a complete rule of moral duty. It is well known what praises many of the antients have bestowed on philo- sophy, and that they have particularly extolled its great usefulness and excellency with regard to morals. Cicero has several remarkable passages to this purpose (w). He says (m) « Cultura animi philosophia est, haec extrahit vitia radi- citus: est profecto animi medicina philosophia, medetur animis: ab ea, si.et boni et beati volumus esse, omnia adjumenta et aux- ilia petemus bene beateque vivendi: vilioruni peccatorumque nostrorum, omnis a philosophia petenda correciio est. O vitae philosophia dux! virtutis indagatrix, expultrixque vitiorum! Quid non modo nos, sed omnino vita hominum, sine te esse po- tuissetl Tu inventrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplinag Chap. V. as taught by the Heathen Philosophers, 73 that " philosophy is the culture of the mind, and plucketh up vice by the roots; that it is the medicine of the soul, and healeth the minds of men: that from thence, if we would be good and happy, we may draw all proper helps and as- sistances for leading virtuous and happy livest that the cor- rection of all our vices and sins is to be sought for from philosophy." And he breaks forth into that rapturous en comium upon it: " O philosophy, the guide of life! the searcher out of virtue, and expeller of vice! What should we be, nay, what would the human life be without thee! Thou wast the inventress of laws, the mistress or teacher of manners and discipline. To thee we flee: from thee we beg assistance. And one day spent according to thy precepts is preferable to an immortality spent in sin." Seneca says, that *' philosophy is the study of virtue (72)." And some of the moderns have' come little behind the antients, in the admi- ration they have expressed for the Heathen moral philoso- phy. I am far from endeavouring to detract from the praises which are justly due to the antient philosophers and moral- ists among the Pagans. Admirable passages are to be found in their writings. They speak nobly concerning the dignity and beauty of virtue, and the tendency it hath to promote the perfection and happiness of the human nature: and con- cerning the turpitude and deformity of vice, and the misery that attends it. They give useful and excellent directions as to many particular virtues, and shew the reasons upon fuisti. Ad te confugimus: a te opem petemus. Est autem unus dies bene et ex praeceptis tuis actus, peccanti inimortalitati an- teponendus." See Cicero Tuscul. Dibput. lib. ii. cap. 4 et 5. lib. iii. cap. 3. lib. iv. cap. 38. but especially ibid. lib. v. cap. 2. (n) " Philosophia studium virtutis est." Sen. epist. 89. et epist. 90. Vol. II. K ' 74 Pretence that the Gospel Moral Duty was Part II. which they are founded, in a manner which tends to recom- mend them to the esteem and practice of mankind. And I doubt not some of them were useful instruments under the direction and assistance of Divine Providence, for preserv- ing among men an esteem and approbation of virtue, for strengthening and improving their moral sense, and giving them, in many instances, a clearer discernment of the moral reasons and differences of things. But it will by no means follow from this, that therefore mankind stood in no need of a Divine Revelation, to set be- fore them a clear and certain rule of duty, in its just extent, and enforce it upon them by a Divine Authority. It hath been confidently asserted, by those that extol what they call Natural Religion in opposition to Revelation, that *' there is no one moral virtue, which has not been taught, explained and proved by the Heathen philosophers, both occasionally and purposely." And that " there is no moral precept in the whole Gospel, which was not taught by the philosophers (o)." The same thing has been said by other writers of a different character, and who assert the Divine Original and and Authority of the Gospel Revelation. The learned Dr. Meric Casaubon, in his preface to his translation of Antoni- nus's Meditations, expresses himself thus: '' I must needs sav, that if we esteem that natural, which natural men of best account, by the mere strength of human reason, hav^e taught and taken upon them to maintain as just and reason- able, I know not any evangelical precept or duty, belonging to a Christian's practice * (even the harshest, and those (o) Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 205, 206. 218. Edit. 4to. (*) I cannot but regard it as a rash thing in any Christian Divine to say, as Df. Casaubon here does, that " there is not one evangelical precept or duty belonging to a Christian's practice" Chap. V. taught by the Philosophers examined, tS that seem to ordinary men most contrary to flesh and blood not excepted) but upon due search and examination will prove of that nature." In like ^manner, another learned and ingenious writer has lately asserted, that " there is not any one principle, or any one practice of morality, which may not be known by Natural Reason without Revelation. By Reason we may come at a certainty of the existence of God, and of his Providence, his Justice, Mercy, and Truth: by that we may trace out our duty to him, and may discover a future state of rewards and punishments: by that we may come at the knowledge of such truths as relate to our neighbours, and the corresponding duties to them: what we are to do in social life; how we are to behave towards go- but what natural men, by the mere strength of human reason, have taught and taken upon them to maintain as just and reason- able; since all that believe the Gospel must own, that there is a part of duty which necessarily enters into the evangelical moral- ity, and belongs to the Christian practice, which yet cannot be pretended to have been taught by the antient Pagan Moralists; and that is, that part of Christian practice which immediately ariseth from the discoveries made to us in the Gospel of the Work of our Redemption: e.g. the duties of Love, Affiancci Subjection, and Obedience, which we owe to our Lord and Sa- viour Jesus Christ, and which are of such importance, that the Christian life is represented as a living to him who died for us and rose again. To which it may be added, that the living by that faith which is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen, and the seeking and minding the thint^s which are above, did not, in any of the Pagan systems of morality, before the coming of our Saviour, necessarily enter into a good man*s character; whereas it must be now acknow- ledged to be essential to the Christian life, and^a necessary branch of Gospel holiness. Some other instances of evangelical duty will come to be considered afterwards, which were riot pre- scribed by the best moralists among the antient Pagans. 7Q Pretence that the Gospel Moral Duty xvas Part II. vernors, and what obedience is to be paid in the civil state; wherein true happiness consists, and what it is that must lead to it; and what we ought to do in our private relations. These and such like points may be traced out by Natural Reason; nor do I know of any one point of duty towards God or man, but what reason will suggest, and supply us with proper motives to do it (/>)." He afterwards observes, that " as the powers of reason are sufficient in themselves to discover all and every duty, and likewise to discover proper and sufficient motives to do them. Revelation may- add many more; and if so, it must be deemed by them that have it a singular advantage (^)." We see here, that this learned writer asserts, that the powers of reason alone, with- out any assistance from Revelation, are sufficient to discov- er all and every duty towards God, our neighbours, and ourselves, and also to supply proper and sufficient motives to do them: and all that he leaves to Divine Revelation, is not to make a discovery of any part of our duty, but only to furnish some additional motives to duty, besides what the light of our own unassisted reason is able of itself to discover. I readily allow, that if Revelation did no more than this, it would yet be of great advantage to those that have it, and what they ought to be very thankful to the Di- vine Goodness for. But I cannot think this is all the bene- fit we have by Divine Revelation, and that it gives us no knowledge or information with respect to any part of the duty required of us, but what the light of Natural Reason was able clearly and certainly to discover, and actually did discover by its own unassisted strength. I join with the learned Doctor in the declaration he makes, that " there (fi) Dr. Sykes's Principles and Connection of Natural and Re- vealed Religion, p. 108, 109. (q) Ibid. p. 110. Chap. V. taught by the Philosophers examined, *;i*j can be no surer way of knowing what Reason can discover, and what not, than by examining what proficiency was ac- tually made in moral knowlrfdge, by those who lived where Revelation was unknown (r)." Let us therefore put it to this issue. But then it is to be observed, that there is one capital mistake, which runs through all that this very in- genious and able writer, and others of the same sentiments, have advanced on this head; and that is, that they take it for granted, that whatever the Heathen moralists and phi- losophers have taught with regard to religion, or any part of duty, they discovered it merely by an effort of their own reason, without any light derived from Revelation at all. But this is impossible for them to prove. There is just ground to believe, as has been shewn, that the knowledge of the one true God, the Creator of the World, and of the main principles of religion and morality, were originally communicated by Divine Revelation to the first parents and ancestors of the human race, and from them transmitted to their descendants; some traces of which still continued, and were never utterly extinguished in the Heathen world. Besides which, the chief articles of moral duty were deli- vered and promulgated with a most amazing solemnity, by an express Divine Revelation, to a whole nation, and commit- ted to writing, before any of those philosophers, who are so much admired, published their moral discourses. And it is well known, that many of those great men travelled into countries bordering upon Judea, in order to gain knowledge, especially in matters of religion and morality. And those of that nation were pretty early spread abroad in several parts of the Pagan world. This learned author himself ac- (r) Dr. Sykes's Principles and Connexion of Natural and Re- vealed Religion, p. 109. 7S Pretence that the Gospel Moral Duty was Part II. knowledges, that the wisest men in Greece travelled into Egypt, that they might come at the knowledge of the unity of God; so that they did not attain merely by the force of their own unassisted reason, to the knowledge of that which he himself affirms to be the fundamental princi- ple of all morality (s). To which it may be added, that some of the most eminent of those philosophers were sen- sible of the great need they stood in of a Divine Assistance, to lead them into the right knowledge of religion and their duty, and frequently take notice of antient and venerable traditions, to which they refer, and which they suppose to have been of divine original. But if we should grant that they had all, which they taught in relation to religion and morals, purely by their own reason, it is far from being true that there is not any any one evangelical precept, or point of moral duty, taught and enforced in the Gospel, that was not taught by the Hea- then philosophers. I shall at present only instance in one, which is of very great importance; it is that precept men- tioned by our Saviour, " Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." Matt. iv. 10. The philosophers were universally wrong, both in conforming themselves, and urging it as a duty upon the people to con- form in their religious worship, to the rites and laws of their several countries, by which polytheism was establish- ed, and the public worship was directed to a multiplicity of deities. This was a grand defect, and spread confusion and error 'through that part of duty which relates to the exer- cises of piety towards God, which some of the philosophers themselves acknowledged to be an essential branch of mo- (5) Dr. Sykes's Principles and Connection of Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 383. Chap. V. taught by the Philosophers examined. 79 rality. I shall have occasion afterwards, in the course of this work, to take notice of some other evangelical precepts which were not taught by the philosophers. But, not to insist upon this at present, I would observe, that it cannot reasonably be pretended, that a complete sys- tem of morality, in its just extent, and without any mate- rial defect, is to be found in the writings of any one phi- losopher, or sect of philosophers. The utmost that can be alleged with any shew of reason is, that there is no one moral duty prescribed in the Gospel, but which may pos- sibly be found in the writings of some or other of the an- tient Pagan philosophers. But if this were so, what use or force could this be supposed to have with respect to the people, or the bulk of mankind? Must they be put to seek out their duty amidst the scattered volumes of philosophers and moralists, and to pick out, every man for himself, that which seemeth to him to be the best in each of them? Or, if any one philosopher should undertake to do it for the peo- ple, and select out of them all a system of morals, which in his opinion would be a complete rule of duty, upon what foundation could this pass for a code of laws, obligatory on all mankind, or even on any particular nation or person, un- less enforced by some superior authority? Mr. Locke has expressed this so happily, that I cannot give my sense of it better than in his words. Speaking of moral precepts, he saith, " Supposing they may be picked up here and there, some from Solon and Bias in Greece, others from Tally in Italy, and to complete the whole, let Confucius as far as China be consulted, and Anacharsis the Scythian contribute his share; what will all this do to give the world a complete morality, that may be to mankind the unqut-stionable rule of life and manners? Did the saying of Aristippus or Con- fucius give it an authority? Was Zeno a lawgivt-r to man- kind? If not, what he or any other philosopher delivered 80 The Sentiments of the Philosophers Part IL was but a saying of his. Mankind might hearken to it or reject it as they pleased, or as suited their interests, pas- sions, inclinations, or humours, if they were under no obli- gation {t)y Let us suppose that the lessons and instructions given by philosophers and moralists, with respect to any particular duty, appear to be fit and reasonable, this is not alone suffi- cient to give them a binding force. A thing may appear to be agreeable to reason, and yet there may be inducements and motives on the other side, which may keep the mind suspended, except there be an higher authority to turn the scale. The observation which Grotius applies to a particular case, holds of many others. That "that which has less utility is not merely for that reason unlawful: and it may happen that a more considerable utility may be opposed to that which we have in view, whatever we suppose it to be. — Neque enim quod minus utile est statim illicitum est, adde quod accidere potest; ut huic qualicunque utilitati alia ma- jor utilitas repugnet (m)." In matters of practice, a thing may seem to be reasonable, and yet cannot be proved to be certainly and necessarily obligatory. So much may be said in opposition to it, as may very much weaken the force of what was offered to recommend it: and a prevailing appe- tite or worldly interest has often a great influence on the mind, and hinders it from passing an impartial judgment. But a divine revelation, clearly ascertaining and determining our duty in those instances, in plain and express terms, and enforcing it by Divine Authority, and by sanctions of re- wards and punishments, would decide the point, and leave no room to doubt of the obligation. A noble author, speak- (j) Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, See his Works, vol. II. p. 533. edit. 3d. (m) Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. ii. cap. 5. sect. 12. Chap. V. were not Lazvs obligatory upon Mankind, 81 ing of the philosophers, saith, that " some few particular men may discover, explain, and press upon others the mo- ral obligations incumbent upon all, and our moral state be little improved {x)^ And therefore he lays the principal stress upon the institutions of civil laws and governments, and the various punishments which human justice inflicts to enforce those laws. But how little fitted those institutions are to enforce morality and virtue, taken in its true notion and proper extent, has been already shewn. The greatest men of antiquity seem to have been sensible, that neither bare reason and philosophy, nor a mere human authority, is sufficient to bind laws upon mankind. Accordingly, the last mentioned author, who was eminent for his political knowledge, has observed, that " the most celebrated philo- sophers and lawgivers did enforce their doctrines and laws by a Divine Authority, and call in an higher principle to the assistance of philosophy and bare reason. He instances in Zoroaster, Kostanes, the Magi, Minos, Numa, Pytha- goras, and all those who framed and formed religions and commonwealths, who made these pretensions, and passed for men divinely inspired and commissioned (?/)." And these pretensions, though not vouched by sufficient creden- tials, gave their laws and institutions a force with the peo- ple, which otherwise they would not have had. But as the several sects of philosophers in succeeding ages, among the Greeks and Romans, only stood upon the foot of their own reasoning, and could not pretend to a Divine Autho- rity, this ver}^ much weakened the effect of their moral les- sons and precepts. And, indeed, the best and wisest among them acknowledged on several occasions, the need they stood in of a Divine Revelation and Instruction. That the {x) Bolinghroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 480. (v) Ibid. p. 227. Vol. II. L $? The Sentiments of the Philosophers^ £s?c. Part IL philosophers in general had no great weight with the people, appears from what is observed in the first volume of this work, chap. 10. To which it may be added, that Cicero, after having given the highest encomiums on philosophy, especially as the best guide in morals, adds, that " it is so far from being esteemed and praised, according to what it merits of human life, that it is by the mobt of mankind ne- glected, and by many even reproached. — Philosophia qui- dem tantum abest, ut proinde ac de hominum est vita me- rita, laudetur, ut a plerisque neglecta, a multis etiam vitu- peretur (2)." (2) Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 2. p. 344. edit. Davis. u CHAPTER VI. Many of the philosophers were fundamentally wrong in the first principles of morals. They denied that there are any moral differences of things founded in nature and reason, and resolved them wholly into human laws and customs. Observations on those philosophers who made man's chief good consist in plea- sure, and proposed this as the highest end of morals, without any regard to a Divine Law. The moral system of Epicurus considered. His high pretences to virtue examined. The inconsistency of his principles shewn, and that, if pursued to their genuine consequences, they are really destructive of all virtue and good morals. JMORAL philosophy, properly speaking, had its beginning^ among the Greeks with Socrates. Cicero says, " he was the first that called down philosophy from heaven, and intro- duced it into cities and private houses, and obliged it to make life and manners the subject of its enquiries.— Primus philosophiam devocavit a coelo, et in urbibus coUocavit, et in domus etiam introduxit, et ccegit de vita et moribus, re-* busque bonis et malis quserere («)•" Not that he was the first philosopher that ever treated of morals, but, as the same great man elsewhere observes, Socrates was the first that, quitting abstruse disquisitions into natural things, and curious speculations about the heavenly bodies (which had principally employed all the philosophers before him) as being things too remote from our knowledge, or if known, of little use to direct men's conduct, brought philosophy into common life, and made virtues and vices, things good and evil, the only object of his philosophy (b). From his time the science of morals was cultivated. All the different (a) Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 4, (6) Academic, lib, ir cap, 4. 84 Many of the Philosophers were wrong Part II. sects of philosophers treated of morality, but they went upon very different principles. Some of the philosophers were wrong in the very funda- mental principles of morals. And since the foundation was wrong, they could not build upon it a proper system, nor be depended upon for leading mankind into right notions of their duty. Such were those who maintained, that nothing is just or unjust by nature, but only by law and custom. This was the opinion, as Laertius informs us, of Theodorus, Archelaus, Aristippus, and others. This way also went Pyrrho, and all the sceptics, who denied that any thing is in itself, and by its own nature, honest or dishonest, base or honourable, but only by virtue of the laws and customs which have obtainLcl among men: for which they are de- servedly exposed by Epictetus (c). Plato represents it as a fashionable opinion, which very much prevailed in his time, and was maintained and propagated by many that were es- teemed wise men and philosophers, " That the things which are accounted just, are not so by nature: for that men are always differing about them, and making new constitutions: and as often as they are thus constituted they obtain autho- rity, being made just by art and by the laws, not by any natural force or virtue (^)." Thus did many of the philosophers resolve all moral ob- ligations into merely human laws and constitutions, making them the only measure of right and wrong, of good and evil. (c) Epictet. Dissert, lib. ii. cap. 20. sect 6. Our modern scep- tics, as well as the ancient, set themselves to shew the uncer- tainty of morals. Mr. Bayle has many passages which look that way. And this particularly is what the author of a late remark- able tract, intituled, Le Pyrrhonisme du Sage, has attempted to shew. .{d) Plato de Leg. lib. x. Oper. p. 666. C. edit. Lugd. Chap. VI. in the fundamental PrincijAes of Morals, 85 So that if the people had a mind to be instructed what they should do or forbear, they sent them to the laws of their several countries, and allowed them to do whatsoever was not forbidden by those laws. And in this those philosophers agreed with the politicians. When Alcibiades asked Peri- cles, What is law? he answered, That all those are laws which are prescribed with the consent and approbation of the people, declaring what things ought to be done, or ought not to be done: and intimated, that whatsoever things are appointed by legal authority, are to be regarded as good, and not evil (e). And indeed Socrates himself, and the most celebrated philosophers and moralists, though they acknow- ledged a real foundation in n'tture for the moral differences of things, yet every where inculcate it as a necessary ingre- dient in a good man's character, to obey without reserve the laws of his country. But what uncertain rules of morality the civil lav.s and constitutions are, and that they might often lead men into vicious and immoral prac- tices, sufficiently appears from what hath been already ob- served. Some of the philoscphers, as Laertius tells us of Theo- dorus, declared, without disguise, that " a wise man might, upon a fit occasion, commit theft, adultery, and sacrilege, for that none of these things are base in their own nature, if that opinion concerning them be taken away, which was agreed upon for the sake of restraining fools." Tov <77r»5^/o» ttta^^oq (pv(Tet, TKi l^r' ciVT<{ii ^d|jj5 «/go^8vjj?) ? O'vytcUTeci 'ivtKX rtii rat i(p^ovojv a-vfox.'Hi (f^» Aristippus, who also held that "nothing is by nature just, or honourable, or base, but by law and (e) Xenoph. Memor. Socr. lib. i. cap. 2. sect. 42. (/) Diog. Laert. lib. ii. segm. 99. 86 The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part 11. custom," yet is pleased to declare, that a prudent man will not do an absurd thing, «Sev etrovai\ any thing out of the common usage, because of the dangers it might bring upon him, and the censures it might expose him to (^). And hovV weak a tie this would be to a man that had nothing else to restrain him, I need not take pains to shew. It is evident that, upon this scheme of things, there can be no such thing as conscience, or a fixed notion of virtue. It opens a wide door to licentiousness, and to the perpetrating all manner of vice and wickedness without scruple, if they can but escape public notice, and the punishments of human judicatories. What fine instructors in morals v/ere those philosophers who taught such maxims! Among those antient philosophers who were wrong in the fundamental principles of morals, they may be justly reckoned who laid this down as a foundation of their moral system, that a man's chief good consists in sensual pleasure, and that this is the supreme end he is to propose to him- self, to which every thing else should be subordinate. There is a remarkable passage of Cicero in his first book of laws relating to this subject, in which he represents pleasure as an enemy within us, " which being intimately complicat- ed with all the senses, lays all kinds of snares for our souls: that it hath a semblance of good or happiness, but is really the author of evils: and that being coiTupted by its blandish- ments, we do not sufficiently discern the things which are in their own nature good, because they want that sweetness and tickling or itching kind of sensation it affords. — Animis omnes tenduntur insidise ab e^, quse penitus omni sensu im- pljcata insidet imitatrix boni voluptas, malorum autem autor omnium, cujus blanditiis corrupti quse natura bona sunt. (g) Diog, Laert. lib. ii. segm. 93. Chap. VI. The Morality of Epicurus considered, gr quia dulcedine hac et scabie carent, non cernimus satis (/i)." And again, speaking of those who stiffly maintained that pleasure is the greatest good,. he says, that." this seems to be rather the languages of beasts than of men: — quae quidem mihi vox pecudum videtur esse non hominum (?)." Aris- {li) De Leg. lib. i. cap. 17. (0 De Parad. cap. 1. Some of our modern admirers of reason differ very much from Cicero in their sentiments on this sub- ject. 1 he author of Les six Discours sur THomme, said to be written by the celebrated M. de Voltaire, who sets up for a zeal- ous advocate for natural rehgion, says, that " nature attentive to fulfil our desires, callelh us to God by the voice of plea- sures." '* La nature attentive a remplir nos desirs, Nous rappelle au Dieu par le voix des plaisirs." At this rate, men will be apt to regard all their inclinations and appetites, as the significations of the will of God concerning the the duties he requireth of them. This is also the prevailing max- im of the author of the famous book De TEsprit, who observes, that " since pleasure is the only object which men seek after, all that is necessary to inspire them with the love of viriue is to imitate nature. Pleasure pronounces what nature wills, and grief or pain shews what nature forbids, and man readily obeys it. The love of pleasure, against which men, more respectable for their probity than their judgment, have declaimed, is a rein, by which the passions of particular persons may be always directed to the general good. — Si le plaisir est I'lmique objet de la recherche des hommes, pour lui inspirer Pamour de la vertu, il ne faut qu* imiter la nature: le plaisir en annonce les volontes, le douleur les defenses; et Phomme lui obeVt avcc docilite. L'amour du plaisir contre lequel se sont eleves des gens d'une probiie plus respect- able qu' eclaircee, est un frein, avec lequel on peut toujours di- riger au bien general les passions des particulicrs."^De PKsprit, disc. 3. chap. 16. tome II. p. 67. Amst. And what kind oi plea- sure he intends, clearly appears from the latter end of the 13th chapter of his 3d discourse, where he says, that *' there are only ^ The Morality of Epicurus conaidered. Part 1 1. tippus, and his followers of the Cyrenaic sect, taught this doctrine in the grossest sense, and without disguise. They held corporeal pleasure to be our ultimate end; that pleasure two kinds of pleasures: the pleasures of the senses, and the means of obtaining them; which may be ranked among plea- sures; because the hope of pleasure is the beginning of plea- sure." And this is agreeable to the general scheme of his book, which goes upon this principle, that physical sensibi- lity is the source of all our ideas, and that man is not capable of any other motive to determine him than the pleasures of the senses: and these are all expressly reduced by him to love, the love of women. And he makes the perfection of legislation to consist in exciting men to the noblest actions, by fomenting and gratifying those sensual passions. He says, " If the pleasure of love be the most lively and vigorous of all human pleasures, what a fruitful source of courage is contained in this pleasure? and what ardor for virtue may not the love of women inspire?" Ibid, tome II. disc. 3. chap. 15. p. 51. And accordingly he pleads for gallantry in a nation where luxury is necessary, (and it is well known, that under the name of gallantry, especially in that na- tion to which this gentleman belongs, is comprehended an unlaw- ful commerce with married women). He thinks, " that it is not agreeable to policy to regard it as a vice in a moral sense: or, if they will call it a vice, it must be acknowledged that there are vices which are useful in certain ages and countries." And to to say that those vices are useful in certain countries, is, ac- cording to this scheme, to say, that in those countries they are .virtues: for he holds, that every action ought to be called virtu- ous, which is advantageous to the public. " C'est une inconse- quence politique que de regarder la galanterie, comme un vice moral: et si Ton veut lui conserver le nom de vice, il faut con- venir, qu*il en estd'utiles dans certains siecles, et certains pays." Ibid, tome I. disc. 2. chap. 15. p. 176. et seq. The author of Le Discours sur la Vie Heureuse, printed at the end of Pensees Philosophiques, carries it still farther. The design of that whole treatise is to shew, that happiness consists only in sensiaal pleasure, and in the gratification of the fleshly Chap. Vl. The Morality of Epicurus considered, 8$> which actually moves and strikes the senses: and they round- ly affirmed, that the pleasures of the body are much better than those of the soul, and its pains and griefs much worse. See Laert. lib. ii. segm. 87. et 90. Epicurus, who held the same principle, that pleasure is the chief good and hit(hest end of man, endeavoured to explain it so as to shun the odious Gonsequences which are charged upon it. His morality was appetite, and that wisdom consists in pursuing it. From this principle, that the actual pleasurable sensation of the body is the only true happiness, he draws conclusions worthy of such a principle: that '^ we ought to take care of the body before the soulj to cultivate the mind only with a view to procure more advantat^e^ for the body; to deny ourselves nothing that can give us plea- sure; to use nature (by which he means the bodily appetites) as a guide to reason.'* It is no wonder that he asserts, that '* the law of nature directs us to give up truth to the laws, rather than oui* bodies; and that it is naturaf to treat virtue in the same way as truth. — Ues lors il faut songer au corps, avant que de songerst Fame; ne cultiver son ame, que pOur procurer pius de commo-* dites a son corps; ne point se priver de ce que fait plaisir; don- ner a la raison la nature pour guide. La loi de la nature dicte de leur [\. e. aux loix des hommesj livrer plutot la verite que nos corps; il est naturel de traiter la vertu comme de la verite.**' Such is the morality taught by some of our pretended masters of reason in the present age, who are too wise to be guided by revelation, and express a contempt for those as weak and super-* stitious persons, who are for governing themselves by its sacred rules. It can hardly be thought too severe a censure to say, that the principal reason for their endeavouring to discard the Gospel is, that they may be free from the restraint it lays Upon their sen- sual and depraved passions, and that they may be left loose in matters of morality, to follow their own inclinations, and to do whatsoever their appetites would prompt them to. ^ * Discours sur la Vie Heureuse, a Potsdam 1748. p. 34. See L'Abbe Gauchet Lettres Critiques, torn. i. lettre iv. Vol. il M 90 The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part II. highly extolled by some of the antients, and has had very learned apologists among the moderns, some of whom have not scrupled to prefer it to any other of the heathen philoso- phers. It is necessary, therefore, in considering the systems of the Pagan moralists, to take particular notice of that of Epicurus, that we may see whether it deserves the enco- miums which have been so liberally bestowed upon it. And I cannot help thinking, that, whatever plausible appearance it may put on, yet if we take the whole of his scheme to- gether, and impartially consider it in its proper connection and natural consequences, we shall find it destructive of true virtue. It is evident that there is one essential defect which runs through his whole system of morality, and that is, that it had no regard to the Deity, or to a Divine Authority or Law: the gods he owns (for he does not speak of one Su- preme God) were such as lived at ease, and without care, in the extra-mundane spaces, and exercised no inspection over mankind, nor ever concerned themselves about their actions and affairs. There was therefore no room upon his scheme foi thi: exercise of piety towards God, a submission lo his aut'n.' rity, and resignation to his will, or for a dependance upon Providence, and a religious regard to the Divine fa- vour and Jipprobation. It is true, that Epicurus writ books about piety and sanctity (i), for which he is deservedly ridiculed by Cotta in Cicero (/). And Epictetus ob- (A-) Laert. lib. x. segm. 27. (/) De nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. 41. It is a little surprising, that so great a man as Gassendus, among the many fine things he says of Epicurus, has thought fit to mention his disinterested piety, and fili?l affection towards the Divine Nature. What he offers on this hrad is extremely weak, and is a remarkable in- stance of what may be often observed, that when learned men Chap. IV. The Morality of Epicurus considered. 91 serves concerning the Epicureans, that " they got them- selves m ide priests and prophets of gods, which according to them, had no existence, and consulted the Pythian priest- ess, only to hear what in their opinion were falsehoods, and interpreted those oracles to others." This he treats as a monstrous impudent imposture (w). As to that part of morality which relates to the duties we owe to mankind, in this also the scheme of Epicurus, at least if pursued to its genuine consequences, was greatly defective. He taught, that a man is to do every thing for his own sake: that he is to make his own happiness his chief end, and to do all in his power to secure and preserve it. And he makes happiness to consist in the mind's being freed from trouble, and the body from^ pain. Accordingly, it is one of his maxims, that ** business and cares do not consist with happiness.*'— 'Oy 0'vfAvS(ri Treaty f*xrt7ett }^ (p^ovTihg (nxKcc^toTUTt (n). According to this scheme of principle, no man ought to do any thing that would expose him to trouble and pain, or give him disturbance: and therefore he ought not to run any hazard, or expose himself to suf- ferings, for the public good, for his friend, or for his coun- try. I know that he sometimes expresses himself in a differ- ent strain. But this is the natural consequence of his avow- ed principles. And therefore Epictetus charges him with having mutilated all the offices of a master of a family, of a citizen, and of a friend. He observes, that, from a desire of shunning all uneasiness, Epicurus dissuaded a wise man from marrying and breeding up children; because he was have undertaken an hypothesis, they seemed resolved at any rate to defend it. See Gassend. de Vita et Moribus Egicuri, lib. iv. cap. 3. (w) Epictet. Dissert, book ii. cap. 20. sect. 2, 3, 4. (w) Laert. lib, x. ^gm. 77. ^ The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part II. sensible, that if once a child is born, it is no longer in a pa^ rent's power not to be solicitous about it. For the same reason he says, that a wise man will not enga^^e himself in public business, or meddle with the affairs of the common- wealth (o). His own practice was suitable to it, for he loved an easy and retired life. But, as Epictetus there observes, many of the Epicureans, though they talked at this rate, both married and engaged in public affairs, Let us now come to that part of Epicurus's morals, which has the fairest appearance, and which has prejudiced many persons in his favour. He has given excellent lessons of moderation, temperance, patience, meekness, and forgive- ness of injuries, and even continence with regard to venereal pleasures. He represents the inconveniences of indulging them in strong terms. He declares, "that when he makes pleasure the chief end, he does not mean the pleasures of the luxurious, as ignorant persons, and those that do not rightly understand his sentiments, suppose: but principally the freedom of the body from pain, and of the mind from anguish and perturbation. For, says he, it is not drinking or revelling, nor the enjoyment of boys and wo- men, nor the feasting upon fish, and the other things that a sumptuous table furnisheth, which procure a pleasant life, )but sober reason, which searcheth into the causes of things, why and how far they are to be chosen or avoided, and teacheth us to cast out those opinions which fill the soul with perturbation and tumult." He adds, that " the princi- ple of' all these things is prudence (/>)." What the opinions are that he thinks inconsistent with happiness or tranquil- (o) Dissert, book ii. chap. 20. sect. 3. and ibid, book i. chap, 3. ^nd book lii. chap. 7. See also Laert. lib. x. segm. 119. (p) Laert, lib. x. segm. 132, Chap. VI. The Morality of Epicurus considered, 93 lity, will be seen afterwards; at present I shall only observe, that he here openly declares, that the pleasures he intends are not those of luxury and excess, as many are apt to sup- pose, but such as are under the conduct of reason and pru- dence. He frequently speaks in high terms of virtue, and the happiness which attends it. It was one of his maxims, or Kv^ixi }c^ociy that " it is not possible for any man to live pleasantly, unless he lives prudently, and honestly, and just- ly: nor can he live prudently, honestly, and justly, without living pleasantly (5'):" and that " virtue is inseparable from a happy life (r)." He often recommends frugality and temperance, and the being content with a little: and says, that a simple meal is equal to a sumptuous feast: and that coarse bread and water yields the greatest pleasure to a man that takes it when he needeth it. And it is said by Cicero, Seneca, and other antient authors, that Epicurus himself lived a sober and temperate life, and took up with slender fare. So that those who allow themselves in un- bounded gratifications of their appetites, and make pleasure to consist in licentiousness and excess, carry it much farther than Epicurus did, and cannot justly avail themselves of his authority. But notwithstanding all that can be alleged in favour of Epicurus, his scheme of morality appears to be wrong at the very foundation. The virtue he prescribes is resolved ulti- mately into a man's own private convenience and advantage, without regard to the excellence of it in its own nature, or to its being commanded or required of us by God: for, as has been already hinted in his system of morals, there is no respect had to a divine law. The friendship of Epicurus, (q) Laert. lib. x. segm. 1 (r) Ibid. segm. 131, 132 32. et 140. 94 The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part II. and his followers, has been highly extolled, and proposed as a model; and yet, according to him, friendship, as well as justice and fidelity, is to be observed and exercised, only because of the profit or pleasure which it procures us. So it is that Torquatus the Epicurean argues, in Cicero's first book De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. He says the same thing of temperance: and blames luxury and effemi- nacy, because they who indulge it, being allured by present pleasures, expose themselves to greater pains, diseases, &c. afterwards. It is one of Epicurus's maxims, as it was also of the Cyrenaics, that no pleasure is in itself an evil, but the things that are the causes of some pleasure, bring on many more troubles then pleasures (s); where he seems to blame no pleasures as evil, except on account of the great- er troubles to which they expose the man that indulges them. Agreeably to this maxim, he says, " a wise man will not have carnal commerce with any woman which the law forbids him to touch (^)." So that he makes the laws, i. e. the laws of the country where a man lives, and a man's own convenience, the only measure of continence: and in effect allows a man to indulge himself in any pleasures or grati- fications, which are not prohibited by the laws, provided he does not run into such excesses in those pleasures as may hurt himself. Epicurus, therefore, if he had lived in Per- sia, would have had no objection to the incestuous mixtures there allowed by the laws. At Athens, where he dwelt, adultery was forbidded under severe penalties, he would not therefore, according to his principles, touch married women. But Leontium, a philosophical Athenian courtezan, was mistress both to him and his intimate friend and com- («) Laert. lib. X. segm. 141. (r) Ibid. lib. x. segm. 118. Chap. VI. The Morality of Epicurus considered. 95 panion Metrodorus (w). Other mistresses of his are men- tioned (^). Some authors, indeed, contend, that these stories were forged by his enemies, and extol his conti- nence and chastity: but I do not see that Epicurus, upon his principles, could have any scruple about those practices as vicious, though he might abstain from them on other con- siderations. It may not be improper here to take notice of a remarkable passage in his book Uegi TeAa?, de fine, in which ht says, that he " cannot understand what good there is, if we take away the pL^asures which are perceived bv the taste, those which arise from venereal gratifications, those that come in b the ears, ind the agreeable emotions which are excited by the sight of beautiful forms." This passage is mentioned by his gr< at admirer Laertius, who represents it as urged against Epicurus by those that endeavoured to calumniate him (z/). But he does not deny, that it was real- ly to be found in that book, which was accounted one of the best of his treatises. It is also produced more fully by Athenaeus (z), and by Cicero, ^vho often refers to it. He gives a fine translation of it in the third book of his Tus- culan Disputations, cap. 18. p. 224. where Dr. Davis's note upon it may be consulted. And he elsewhere gives the sense of it thus: " Nee intelligere quidem se posse ubi sit, et quid sit uUum bonum, prseter illud quod sensibus cor- poreis, cibis, potioneque, formarum aspectu, aurium delec- tatione, et obscsena voluptate percipitur («)." The same great author charges Epicurus with maintaining, that all (m) Laert. lib. x. segm. 6. et 23. {x) See Menagius's Observations on Laertius, p. 448. Edit. West. (t/) Laert. lib. x. segm. 6. (2) Deipnos. lib. vii. p. 208. et lib. xii. p. 546. (a) De Finib. lib. ii. cap. 3. And see Davis's note. 96 The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part II* the pleasures and dolours of the mind, belong to the plea- sures and pains of the body; and that there is no joy of the mind, but what originally arises from the body (^). Though at the same time he said, that the pleasures and pains of the mind are more and greater than those of the body; in which he differed from Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. To let us farther into Epicurus's scheme of morals, it may be observed, that though he forbids injustice and other great crimes, it seems to be not upon the most noble and generous principles, but for fear of human punishments. Seneca, who, though a Stoic, often speaks favourably of Epicurus, and mentions many of his moral sentences with approbation^ represents his sense thus: " Nihil justum esse natura, et crimina vitanda esse quia metus vitari non possit (c)." — ■ That "nothing -is just by nature, and that crimes are to be avoided, because fear cannot be avoided:" that is, if a man commits crimes, he cannot avoid the fear of detection or punishment. And that in this he justly represents Epi- curus's sentiments, may be fairly concluded from the pas- sages cited from Epicurus himself by Laertius, who had a high esteem for him. In the account he gives of his Kv^Ut ^oloti or principal maxims, one is. That "justice would be nothing of itself, but for the conventions or agreements men have entered into in many places, not to hurt others, or be hurt by them." And again, that " injustice is not an evil in itself, « «3<»/« » ««3-* Itcvrm xccKovy but because of the fear which attends it, arising from a suspicion that it can- not be hid from those who are constituted the punishers of sUch things." He adds, "Let not that man, who se- cretly does any thing contrary to the conventions men (b) De Finib. lib. i. cap. It, (c) Sen. epist. 97. Chap. VI. The Morality of Epicurus consider ed» 97 have established among themselves, not to hurt others, or be hurt by them, believe that he shall be able to keep it secret, though he has escaped detection a thousand times, even to this present: for even to the end of his life, it is still uncertain whether he shall be able to conceal it (d)y Here it is plain, that the reason he gives why a man should abstain from doing an unjust thing, is not because it is in itself evil, but because of the punishment it may expose him to, not from God (for all fear of this kind he rejects as ▼ain and superstitious) but from men: either from public justice, or private resentment and revenge, which no man can be sure he shall always escape. Accordingly, it was an advice of his, as Seneca informs us, " Do every thing as if some person saw thee do it;" i. e. as if some man saw thee. For he denied that the gods observe or concern them- selves with men, or any of their actions: "Sic fac, inquit, tanquam spectet aliquis (t?)." Upon these principles there is no villany which a man may not commit, if he can but persuade himself (which bad men are often apt to do) that he shall not be detected or punished for it by men: or, as Cicero expresses it, " ut hominum conscientia remoia, nihil tam turpe sit, quod voluptatis causa non videatur esse facturus (y^)." Epictetus sets these principles of Epicurus, and their pernicious consequences, in a strong light (^). That which Epicurus valued himself principally upon, and for which he was mightly extolled and admired by his followers, was, that he proposed to instruct men in the nature of true happiness, and to direct them to the only proper means of attaining to it. Happiness he made to ccm- {d) Laert. Jib. x. segm. 150, 151. (e) Sen. epist. 25. (/) De Finib. lib. ii. cap. 9. p. 108. edit. Davis. {g) Dissert, book ii. cap, 20. and book iii. cap. 7. sect. 1. .Vol. II. N ■ ' 98 The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part II. sist, as hath been already hinted, not merely as Aristippus and the Cyrenaics did, in the actual motions of sensual pleasures and gratifications, though these also he admitted, but chiefly in indolence of body and tranquillity of mind; i. e. that the body be freed from pain, and the mind from trouble, both in the most perfect degree, and so as to admit of no increase. This happiness he supposed to be perfectly attainable in this life; and, indeed, this he must suppose, or that it is not attainable at all, since he allowed no other life but this. The Cyrenaics, in this matter, talked more reasonably than Epicurus; for, as they looked upon pleasure to be the chiefest good, and could not deny that men are now subject to many pains and troubles, some of them asserted that it is extremely difficult, and others that it is impossible to attain to a life of perfect happiness (A). Nor would they allow with Epicurus, that a freedom from pain can be accounted pleasure, and even the highest pleasure (i). And in this also they talked more reasonably than he. As to the means for attaining to what Epicurus accounted perfect happiness, some of those he prescribed were cer- tainly very proper. He advised to exercise sobriety, mo- deration, and temperance; to avoid all excess; not to indulge pleasure to a degree that might bring greater evils; not to do an unjust thing, or any thing that might expose a man to punishment; to avoid a restless ambition; to shun envy and revenge, and the bitter ill-natured passions; and to cul- tivate friendship and benevolence. On these heads Epicurus (A) Laert, lib. ii. segm. 90 et 94. (/) Ibid. segm. 89. See also Cicero de Finib. lib. i. cap. 11. where Torquatus the Epicurean says, " CJmni dolore carere, non modo voluDiatem esse, serl ^unirn-^m voliipiaiem." Cicero ciposes this very well, de Finib. lib. ii. cap. 5. p. 89. et cap. 7. p. 93. edit. Davis. Chap. VI. The Morality of Epicurus considered. 99 said excellent things, and judged very' rightly that this was the best way a man could take, even for his own sake, and to secure to himself an easy and pleasant life. But his chief recipe for happiness was the raising men above all fear of evil, and thereby placing them in a state of perfect tran- quillity. And there are two things which he especially looked upon to be inconsistent with happiness, the fear of the gods, and the fear of death: and he boasted that he would deliver men from both these. His remedv against the first was to deny a Providence, or that the gods have any concern with men, or take any notice of their affairs. And it must be acknowledgi^d, that nothing could be better contrived to free bad men from the terrors they might be under from an apprehension of divine punishments; but, at the same time, it took away the strongest restraints to vice and wickedness, and the most solid support of virtue, and that which is the principal source of a good man's satisfac- tion and confidence under the greatest adversities. As to death, he would have a man accustom himself to this thought, " That death is nothing to us." He says, " the knowledge of this will enable him to enjoy this mortal life; and that there is nothing evil or grievous in life to a man, who rightly apprehends that the privation of life has no evil in it." And the way he takes to prove his capital maxim, which he so frequently repeats, "That death is nothing to us," is, because " that w^hich is dissolved is void of sense, and that which is void of sense is nothing to us." And again, that " whilst we live, death is not; and when death is, we are not (/^)." As if such quibbles and subtilties as these furnished a sufficient remedy against the natural fear of death. But if, as he says, we are without sense at (k) Lacrt. lib. x. segm. 124, 125. ct 139. 100 The Morality of Epicurus considered. Part 1 1. death, this does not prove that death is nothing to us. For is it nothing to us to be deprived of life, which he himself represents as a thing to be desired and embraced (/)? Since this life, according to him, is the only season in which we can enjoy happiness, how can it be said, that death is nothing to us, which puts an utter end to all happiness and enjoyment? Is it not natural for a man that is happy to de- sire to continue to be so, and to be averse to every thing that would deprive him of it? But Epicurus endeavours to provide against this, by observing, that " a right knowledge takes away the desire of immortality (mj.'' Accordingly, one of his Kyg/«< 5o|«< is this, "That an infinite and finite time yield an equal pleasure, if any man will measure the boundaries of pleasure by reason." — 'O ^.xs<§«« %§<>vo5 iV>i» 'ly^ti yiTf^m (w). Cicero expresses it thus; " Negat Epicurus diu- turnitatem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid conferre: nee minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis, quam si ilia sit sempiterna ()^iV,t6«T« €A« ^g» S-i^j tl^xi THi vofAHi rarai to7< «».^^a»T<)<$ B-iTvxi. Xen, Memorab. lib. iv. cap. 4. sect. 19, 20. 110 The Antients held that natural Law derives Part II. legislator, to whom it beiongt-th to give laws obligatory upon all mankind. But then the quescion naturally arose, how these divine laws came to be known to men. Cicero, in the remarkable passage before referred to, quoted by Lactantius, represents the universal law he speaks of, and of which he supposes God to be the Su- preme Author, as naturally known to all men: that we are not to seek any other interpreter of it but itself; and he in- timates that every man carries the interpretation of it in his own breast (/?). This scheme has been already con- sidered, and I shall not here repeat what I have offered to shew, that the hypothesis concerning the universal clearness of the whole law of nature, as if it were so obvious to all men that they need no direction or instruction, is contrary to the most evident fact and experience. To what has been before observed, I shall now add a remarkable testimony from Cicero himself. " If (says he) we had been naturally so formed from our birth, that we could clearly behold na- ture herself, and under her excellent guidance accomplish the course of life, there would have been no need of learn- ing and instruction." But he goes on to shew, that "this is not the case; that nature, indeed, hath given us some small sparks, but which, being depraved by corrupt customs and wrong opinions, we soon extinguish, so that the light of nature no where appears ($')." And he afterwards repre- {fi ) " Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocat ad officium jubendoj vetando a fraude deterreat; neque est quaerendus ex- planator, aut interpres ejus alius." Cic. de Republ. lib. iii. Frag- ment, apud Lactant. (§r) " Quod si tales nos natiira genuisset, ut earn ipsam intueri et perspicere, eademque optunia duce cursum vitae conficere posse m us, baud sane erat quod quisquam rationem et doctrinam requireret. Nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriler Chap, VII. its Authority and obliging Force from God. Ill sents vice as having the consent of the multitude on its side; and that popular fame is for the most part inconsi- derate and rash, and an applauder of sins and vices (r). And from thence he argues the great usefulness and excel- lency of philosophy, for instructing and directing mankind, and healing the distempers of the mind. It is an observation of the learned and ingenious Dr. Middltrton, that Cicero " took the system of the world, or the visible works of God, to be the promulgation of God's law, or the declaration of God's will to mankind: whence, as we might collect his being, nature, and attributes, so we could trace the reasons also and motives of his acting, till, by observing what he had done, we might learn what we ought to do, and by the operations of the Divine Reason be instructed how to perfect our own; since the periVction of man consisteth in the imitation of God (a*)*" " ^ believe (says Cicero, in the person of Cato) that the immortal gods have dispersed souls into human bodies, that there might be beings who should behold the earth, and contemplate the order of the heavens, and be thereby engaged to imi- tate that order in the regularity and constancy of their lives (0«" To the same purpose he elsewhere observes, malis moribus opinionibusque depravati, sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat." Tuscul. Disput. lib. iii. cap. 2. (r) " Quasi raaximus quidam magister populus, atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo; temeraria atqae incon- siderata, et plerumque peccatorum vitiorumque laudatrix fama popularis." Ibid. («) Life of Cicero, Vol. II. sect. 12. p. 612. Dublin edit. (r) " Credo decs immortales sparsisse animos in corpora hu- mana, ut essent qui terras tuerentur, quique coelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo et constantia.** Cato Major, sive De Se'nectute, cap. 21. 112 The Ways in which the Philosophers supposed Part IL that "man was originally made for contemplating the world, and imitating it (w)." And that " the contemplation and knowledge of the heavens, and the orderly disposition of things, teaches men modesty, greatness of mind, and justice (^)." But whatever influence this might have upon some philosophical and contemplative minds, how few are there that can read their duty in the heavens, or collect it from the order and harmony of the celestial bodies? To re- fer the bulk of mankind to this for direction in morals, would be of small advantage, and would give to them, or even to philosophers themselves, little light or instruction with respect to the particulars of their duty. Accordingly, many of the H athens were sensible, that they needed a more particular and explicit declaration of the Divine Will and Law. The most eminent legislators, as was before observed, pretended to have received the laws they delivered to the people by communication from the gods, in order to give them the greater weight and au- thority: or, which amounted to the same thing, had them approved by oracles, which were looked upon as making authentic declarations of the Divine Will. To those ora- cles the people had frequent recourse for direction, and in this they were encouraged by the philosophers themselves. Socrates, as Xenophon informs us, was wont to consult the oracle, to know the will of the gods, and especially the Delphian oracle (z/). Plato ascribes " the first, the greatest, and most excellent laws and institutions," T)A«/5, J^ tjfuv ivToU {d), Maximus Tyrlus seems to have had this passage in view, when he saith. That " the same thing is not good or evil to all, nor is the same thing base or honourable to (c) Bolingbroke's Works, Vol V. p. 204, 205. edit. 4to. (d) Plato Opera, p. 35 1. F. edit. Lugd. Chap. VII. common to all Mankind* 115 all men.'^ And speaking of law, and right, or justice, he de- clares, that, *' neither nation agreeth with nation in these things, nor city with city, nor family with family, nor one man with another, nor the same man with himself (^)." And with regard to the philosophers themselves, some of the most celebrated of them, as will be shewn afterwards, ap- proved things as permitted by the law of nature, which others condemned as contrary to it. Socrates, in a passage before referred to, speaks of un- written laws, which he supposes to be of divine original, and to be observed by all men in every region after the same manner (f). But this can only be understood of a few general maxims and principles: and even with respect to these, when they came to be explained, there was far from being an universal agreement. The first article of that unwritten law mentioned by Socrates, and which he seems to make the chief and the most univer- sally acknowledged, is," that the gods should be worshipped." Hx^u, vZtrtv uvB-^aTToti nr^^Tov vo^i^ereci tiig B-iiSi a-iZuv. He doth not represent the law thus, that we are to worship God, but that we are to worship the gods: as if polytheism, or the worship of many gods, was the first law of nature (^). It has been often (e) Dissert, i. p. 5. Oxen. (/) Xen. Memor. Socr. lib. iv. cap. 4. sect. 19. (g) Lord Herbert de Relig. Gentil. makes the first articles of his catholic universal religion, acknowledged by all mankind, to be these, That there is one Supreme God, and that he is chiefly to be worshipped. Lord Bolingbroke carries it farther, and says, That " the religion and law of nature shews us the Supreme Being, manifested in all his works, to be the true and only object of adoration." And if this be the law of nature, that God only is to be worshipped, it is evident, that the greatest among th# Pagan philosophers were so far from agreeing universally in this, that they universally' neglected and counteracted it, by worshipt 116 Socrates*s Account of the unwritten Laws Part II, said, and manv^ passages of the antients are produced to that purpos-% that there has been a general consent or agreement among all nations, the most barbarous not excepted, in the ac- knowledgmf.ntof a Deit)^ And it is true that thet have gen- erally agreed in the notion of a superior, invisible Divine Pow- er or Powers; but not so generally as some have represented it, in the belief of one Supreme God: though many of them had some notion of this, and there was an antient tradition concerning it, which had spread far and wide, and never was entirely extinguished. But when we proceed to examine more distinctly into the ideas they had of the Divinity, or of superior invisible powers, and the worship that was to be rendered to them, here we shall find a great difference. Plu- tarch observes, That " poets, philosophers, and lawgivers, were all along the first that instructed and confirmed us in our opinion of the gods. For all agree that there are gods: but concerning their number, their order, their essence, and power, they vastly differ from one another. The philosophers differ from the poets and lawgivers, and these from them." See hisAmator. Oper. torn. IL p. 763. C, D. edit. Xyl, Francof. 1620. Another instance produced by Socrates of an universal unwritten law observed in every region after the same man- ner, is that of honouring our parents. And in this mankind have generally agreed: and yet they have differed in their observation of this law. In several nations in antient times, they were wont to expose or destroy their sick and aged pa- ping a muUiplicity of deities, and encouraging others to do so. And this, as was before observed, is a plain confutation of what his Lordship has confidently aflfirmed, " That tfiere is not one moral precept in the whole Gospel, which was not taught by the philosophers." See Bolingbroke's "Works, Vol. V. p. 97, 98. compared p. 205. Chap. VII. common to alt Mankind, 117 rents, pretending that this was better for them than to wait for their natural deaths. The same custom is still observed among some nations, particularly those that inhabit the countries near the Cape of Good Hope. Socrates also sup- poses it to be a part of the natural universal law, that parents should not have carnal commerce with their children, nor children with their part nts. And yet it is well knovv^n, that there were some nations, particularly the Persians (A), who in other respects had many good laws, among whom this was done without scruple. And the Persian magi, who were esteemed very v/ise men and great philosophers, allowed and approved these and other incestuous mixtures (i). So did some of the principal Stoics, as Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch inform us (/^). That parents should love and nourish, and take care of their children, may be also justly regarded as a law of na- ture; and yet the practice of exposing and destroying their children was common, as I have shewn, even among the most civilized nations, approved and even required by some of the most famous legislators, and wisest philosophers. Other instances might be mentioned in relation to things (/z) St. Jerom attributes the custom of incestuous marriages to the Medes, Indians, ^Ethiopians, lib. ii, advers. Jovinian. Oper. torn. II. p. 75. edit. Basil. See Grot, de Jure Belii et Pacis, lib. ii. cap. 5. sect. 12. who observes, that Euripides, in his Andro- mache, speaks of it as a custom general among the barbarians. See also Selden de Jure Nat. et Gent. lib. v. cap. 11. And it appears from Levit. chap, xviii. that these practices were com- mon among the Canaanites and other neighbouring nations, which shews the great propriety of prohibiting these things by an ex- press divine law, enforced by the authority of God himself, and by powerful sanctions. (i) Laert. Prooem. segm. 7. (Jc) Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. lib. iii, cap. 24. Plutarch. Stoic. Re- pugn, torn. II. p. 1044, 1045. lia Socrates^ s Account^ £i7*c. Part II. which, one should be apt to think, are plain from the law of nature, concerning which yet some of the most eminent philosophers have passed very wrong judgments. This shews, that even men of the greatest abilities, if left merely to their own unassisted reason, are apt to mistake in matters of great consequence in morality, and that their dictates and instruc- tions could not furnish a complete rule of duty that might be safely depended upon. This will farther appear from the instances which shall be brought in the following chapter, of great errors which they have actually fallen into with re- gard to morals. 119 CHAPTER VIII. Epictetus's observation concerning the difficulty of applying general preconcep. tioas to particular cases, verified in the antient philosophers. They wero gene- rally wrong with respect to the duty and worship proper to be rendered to God, though they themselves acknowledged it to be a point of the highest im- portance. As to social duties, some eminent philosophers pleaded for re\enge and against forgiveness of injuries. But especially they were deficient in that part of moral duty which relates to the government of the sensual appetites and passions. Many of the philosophers countenanced by their principles and practice the most unnatural lusts and vices. Those of them that did not carry it so far, yet encouraged an impurity inconsistent with the strictness and dig- nity of virtue. Plato very culpable in this respect, so also were the Cynics and Stoics. Simple fornication generally allowed amongst them. Our modern deists very loose in their principles with regard to sensual impurities. It is an observation of that excellent philosopher Epic- tetus, That " the cause of all human evils is the not being able to adapt general preconceptions to particular cases ( /)." This he frequentlv repeats. By preconceptions, ^poXii-^as, he understands general common notions, which the Stoics sup- posed to be originally and naturally implanted in the human mind. He instances in these, that good is eligible, and to be pursued; that justice is fair and becoming. In these and the like principles and maxims men of all ages and nations agree. But in applying these general notions there is great difference: and the best education consists in learning to do this properly. See the 22d chapter of the first book of his Dissertations. This is also the subject of the 11th and 17th chapters of his second book, where having observed that we have natural ideas and preconceptions of good and just, he represents it as the proper business of phitosophy, to in- ( 4 ) Epict. Dissert, book iv. chap. 1. sect. », 120 The Philosophers 7mstaken in their applications Part II. struct men how to apply such preconceptions in a right manner: and that it is not possible to do this as we ought, without having minutely distinguished them, and examined what is the proper subject to each. But it is no hard mat- ter to shew, that the philosophers themselves frequently erred in their application of general notions and maxims (w), aBd were wrong themselves, and led others wrong in mat- ters of great consequence, with regard to the particulars of moral duty: which shews the great need they stood in of a superior auth'iitv and direction. Many of the philosophers were sensible in general of the great importance of the duties we owe to the Deity: that, as Hierocles speaks, piety is the miother of all virtues. Cicero in his Offices, in representing the order of duties, places those relating to the gods in the first place, before (m) Though Lord Bolingbroke frequently asserts the uni- versal clearness of the law of nature, and, in a passage men- tioned above, intimates that all men have an intuitive knowledge of it, from the first principles to the last conclusions, yet he elsewhere makes this acknowledgment, that " when we make particular applications of the general laws of nature, we are liable to mistake." He adds, '* That there are things fit and unfit, right and wrong, just and unjust, in the human system, and discernible by human reason, as far as our natural imper- fections admit, I acknowledf^e most read'ly. But from the dif- ficulty we have to judge, and from the uncertainty of our judg- ments in a multitude of cases which lie within our bounds, I would demonstrate the folly of those who affect to have know- ledge beyond them. They are unable, on many occasions, to de- duct from the constitution of their own system, and the laws of their own nature, with precision and certainty, what these re- quire of them, and what is right or wrong, just or unjust, for them to do." Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 444. edit. 4to. Chap. VIII. of genertil Rules to particular Cases. i2i those we owe to our country, and to our parents (n). Yet it is observable, that in that book, which is one of the most excellent moral treatises that was written by any of the philosophers, he very slightly passes over the duties relating to the Divinity. He sometimes, though seldom, makes mention of the gods, but takes no notice of the one Supreme God. No where does he in that treatise draw any arguments or motives to enforce the practice of duty from the authority and command of God, but merely from the beauty and excellency of the Honestum, and the evil and turpitude of vice. It is a just observation of Mr. Locke, that " the philosophers who spoke from reason, make not much mention of the Deity in their ethics (o)." The Stoics, indeed, gave precepts of piety, which would have been ex- cellent, if they had been directed not to the gods, but to the one true God. But of these I shall treat distinctly af-- terwards. The philosophers generally acknowledged, that God, or the gods, as they usually expressed it, were to be worshipped. But what kind of worship this should be^ they were greatly at a loss to know. Some of them, under pretence of the most exalted thoughts of the Divinity^ were only for worshipping inwardly in the mind, and were hot for rendering any outward worship to the Supreme Being, or Him whom they called the Highest God of alL Others, in accommodation to the imaginations of the peo- ple, were for worshipping the Divinity by images and gross corporeal representations. Many were for rendering reli^ gious worship to the things of nature and parts of the uni- (n) De Offic. lib. i. cap. ult. And to the samC^purpose, Ibid. lib. ii. cap. 3. (o) Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, in his Worksy Vol. II. p. 534. edit. 3d. Vol. XL Q 121^ The Philosophers generalkj wrong Part IL verse, under pretence of worshipping God in them, as being either parts and members of the Divinity, or animated by his powers and virtues. They all in general encouraged the worship of a multiplicity of deities; and with respect to the particular rites of worship, they referred the people to the decision of oracles, and to the laws of their respective countries; though some of those rites were no way fit to make a part of that worship, which reasonable creatures should offer to a pure and perfect mind (/?)• (Ji) Plato, in his Euthyphro, says, that holiness and piety is that part of justice which is conversant about the service and worship of the gods: the other part of justice is that which re- lates to men*. As to the former, he does not in that dialogue give any directions what kind of worship and service is to be rendered to the gods. But in other parts of his works, he is for the people's worshipping the gods appointed by the laws of the state, and in the manner there prescribed. It is true, that the Platonists speak in hi.^h strains of what they call their divine virtue, as distinguished from that which is ethical and politi- cal: they also talk frequently of assimilation to God. Plato in his Thegetetus, seems to have placed this in holiness and justice, together with prudencef. But the most eminent of his fol- lowers, those especially that lived after Christianity had made some progress in the world, seem not lo understand this of a piety or virtue which the people were supposed capable of at- taining to: nor will they allow this to have been Plato's sense. They sd explain their divine virtue, as to-make it of little use to the people. It belonged properly to the philosophers, and was chiefly of a theoretical nature, consisting in abstracted contem- plations of the Platonic intelligible gods, the eternal ideas and archetypal forms of things, and the t' ayjeS-ov, which is to be discerned by a " boniform light," as Plotinus calls it, and which he represents as above intellectl:. They placed the height • Plato Opera, p. 52. F. edit. Lugd. 1590. f Ibid. p. 128. G. \ Plotin. Enn. VI. lib. viii. cap. 15. Chap. VIII. with respect to the Duties we ozve to God, 123 An oath has been always accounted a sacred thing, and regarded as a solemn appeal to the Divinity. In the law of Moses it is required as a part of the religious homage due to the Supreme Being, to swear by his name, when it is necessary to do so; and the swearing by other gods is forbidden (^). No precept of this kind is to be found in the writings of the Pagan philosophers and moralists; nor do they any where forbid swearing by the creatures, which is condemned by our Saviour (r). Dr. Potter, in his ex- cellent Greek Antiquities, observes concerning Socrates, that he told his disciples, that Rbadamanthus, the justest man that ever lived, had disapproved men's swearing by the gods, but instead of this, allowed them to swear by a dog, a goose, a ram, or such like creatures. And accord- ingly that philosopher was wont to swear, either by ani- of their divine virtue or deiform life in a perfect apathy* and an absolute abstractedness from all material objects, as if all body and matter were in itself a pollution, and of a contaminat- ing nature. They contrived also methods of purging and puri- fying the soul, and raising it to communion with the gods, by what they called theurgy. And it is to be observed, that amidst all their sublimities, and though some of them rose to extrava- gant flights of mysticism and enthusiasm, they made no attempts to reclaim the people from the common idolatry, but endeavoured so to model their philosophy and theology, as to countenance and uphold the Pagan system of superstition and polytheism. But it is the great advantage of the Gospel Revelation, that the piety and conformity to God which it requires, is such as the gene- rality of good men are capable of, whom it teaches to form the most just and worthy notions of the Deity, and to worship him in spirit and in truth. ^ (<;) Deut. vi. 13. Josh, xxiii. 7. (r) Matt. V. 35, 36, 37. James v. 12. • Enn. I. lib. iv. cap. 7. 15. t%4 The Philosophers geryerally wrong Part II, mals, as by a goose, by a goat, by a dog, or, as he some- times expresses it, by the dog which the Egyptians wor- shipped: sometimes he swears by a plant, as an oak, or a plane-tree (*). Though, if Plato represents him right, he also swears by the gods, by Juno, and frequently by Jupiter; of which there are several instances in one of his most re- markable dialogues, which is entituled, Euthyphron. It was a saying of Plaio, '^O^**? Tsgi 9r«yT«5 a-xi^a. " Juramentum prae omnibus absit," as Grotius renders it (?); where he seems to advise the abstaining from all oaths. And yet, certain it is, that oaths every where abound in Plato's works. Ztno, the father of the Stoics, was wont to swear >« t^v x««^5r«§<»5 by a shrub that bears capers. It is an advice of Epictetus, "Avoid swearing as much as possible^ if not, as far as vou are able." This probably is to be understood of swearing before a magistrate, which some of the philosophtrs, and particularly the Pythagoreans, disapproved. Yet he himself swears in his discourses, particularly by heaven, and by J'ipiter, and by all the gods {ii). Marcus Antoninus also swears by Jupiter, and by the gods (at). The emperor Julian frquently swears by the gods. Pythagoras rarely swore by the gods, or allowed his disciples to do so. But they used to swear ^i t«» TfT^*e»Tyv, by the tetractys, or the number four. But whatever was the meaning of the te- tractys, in the explication of which the Pythagoreans them- selves were not agreed, the swearing by the .tetractys was (s) Potteri Archaeolog. Graec. Vol. I. book ii. chap. 6. p. 215. first edit. (r) Grotius in Matt. v. 34. (m) Epict. Dissert, book ii. chap. 19. sect 3. ct ibid. chap. 20. sect. 6. and in other passages. {x) Antonin. book v. sect. 5. et book yii. sect. 17. and e^se* where, Chap. VIII. xvith respect to the Duties ive owe to God, 125 so understood by them, as to include the swearing by him that taught them the tetractys, i. e. by Pythagoras him- self (?/). Hierocks, in his commentary on the golden verses of Pythagoras, in explaining that precept, (ri&a o^kov, " reve- rence an oath," gives good directions about oaths, that we ought not only to keep our oaths when we make them, but to abstain from swearing, and not accustom ourselves to it (z). Yet afterwards, commenting upon that part of those verses which relates to the swearing by the author of their institution, who taught them the tetractys, Hierocles thinks it reasonable, that so much honour should be done to the master who taught them the truth, as to swear by him, whenever it was netdful, for the confirmation of his doctrine; and not only to pronounce that he taught those doctrines, but to swear they were true. For that though he was not of the number of the immortal gods or heroes, he was adorned with the similitude of the gods, and retained among his disciples the image of the Divine Authority: and that therefore they swore by him in great matters, to shew how much he was honoured by them, and what dignity he had acquired by the doctrines he had delivered (a). As to the civil and social duties, which men owe to one another, the absolute necessity of this part of morals to the welfare, and in some respects to the being of society, helped, no doubt, to preserve the sense of them in some conside- rable degree among mankind. The philosophers said ex- cellent things, and gave many good instructions and di- rections concerning them. And the measures of just and unjust, of right and wrong, were for the mqst part settled (y) Stanley's Hist, of Philos. p. 516. edit. 2d. Lend, (z) Hierocles in Aur. Carm. p. 31 et 32. edit. Needham. Caniab. (a) Ibid. p. 169, 170. 126 The Philosophers differed in their Sentiments Part II. by the civil laws, as far as was necessary for the preserva- tion of public order*. The philosophers frequently speak of that benevolence which should unite men to one another, and represent all mankind as formed and designed by nature for mutual as- sistance, and an intercourse of kind offices. Yet in this, as well as other instances, they were not always consistent with themselves, and fell short of that noble universal be- nevolence which the Gospel requires. In Plato's fifth Re- public, Socrates is introduced as saying, That the Greeks should look upon one another as brethren of the same fa- mily and kindred; but upon the barbarians, which was a name they bestowed upon all nations but themselves, as strangers and aliens: that the Greeks were ^irti ^iXetj by nature friends; and therefore they should not go to war with one another, or if they did, they should do it as if they were one day to be reconciled; but that the barbarians were TFeXsf^cm (pirii, enemies by nature, with whom they were to be continually at war: that therefore it would be wrong * The lawyers preferred their institutions, as more proper to form men to a virtuous practice, than those of the philosophers. See to this purpose what Cicero says concerning the laws of the twelve tables. De Orat. lib. i. cap. 42, 43. and Cotta's declara- tion in the 3d book De Nat. Deor. cap. 2. To which may be added that of Tribonian upon the Pandects. " Justitiam colimus et boni et sequi notitiam profitemur, aequum ab iniquo separantes, licitum ab ilRcito discernentes, bonos non solum metu paenarum, verum etiam praimiorum exhortatione efficere cupientes, veram, nisi fallor, philosophiam, non simulatam affectantes.*' But though civil laws and constitulions are undoubtedly very useful, and pro- bably had a greater effect upon the people than the moral lessons of the philosophers, yet, as I had occasion to observe before, they are not adequate measures of moral duty, nor are the sanction of civil laws fitted to inforce virtue in its just extent. See here above, chap. ii. Chap. VIII. concerning the Forgiveness of Injuries. 127 for the Grecians to destroy Grecians, to reduce them to slavery, or to waste their fields, or burn their houses; but that they should do all this to the barbarians (l)). The forgiving those that have injured us, is a noble part of that benevolence which men should exercise towards one another. Some of the most eminent philosophers were sen- sible of this. Plato lays it down as a maxim, in his Crito, that a man when provoked by an injury ought by no means to retaliate it. And Maximus Tyrius has a whole disserta- tion in defence of that maxim. Grotius has collected other testimonies to the same purpose (c). But above all, Epic- tetus and Marcus Antoninus have given excellent lessons on this head. But there were other philosophers of great name, who taught a different doctrine. Among the moral maxims of Democritus, one is this, which Stobaeus has preserved, that " it is the work of prudence to prevent an injury, and of indolence, when it is done, not to revenge it." Aristotle speaks of meekness Ss seeming to err by defect; " because the meek man is not apt to avenge himself, but rather to forgive."— 'Oy yet^ Ti^a^viTDcog o argaej, eiXXet fAeiXXov cvyyvaf^ovtxof (d). Anger was usually described by the philosophers, «gg|v5 ^i|<«, veterum nonnullis, sapientise nomine claris, inter u^ioi). But not to insist longer upon vices shocking to human na- ture, which yet passed among many of the philosophers for matters of indifFerency, there were other instances of impu- rity countenanced by them, which, though not so unnatural, yet are not consistent with the strictness and dignity of vir- tue. None of the philosophers was more admired than the di- vine Plato, as he was usually called, and who, Cicero says, was a kind of god among the philosophers: and yet his doctrine in the fifth book of his Republic, where he propo- ses to give a perfect model of a well-ordered commonwealth, is such as can scarce be reconciled to the rules of common modesty and decency. He would have the women appear naked, as well as the men, at the public exercises, and apo- logizes for it, under pretence that they will be clothed with virtue instead of garments (^). In the same book he ap- points the commuility of women in his commonwealth (r): (Ji) Origen cont. Cels. lib. vii. p. 365. {q) Plato de Republ. lib. v. Oper. p. 459. edit. Lugd. 1590. (r) There have been several nations, among whom a commu- nity of wives was allowed. This is said to have been the custom of the Troglodytes, Agathyrsi, the Massagetae, and Scythians, of whom Strabo saith they had their wives in common, agreeable to the laws of Plato. Geograph. lib. vii. p. 461. A. edit. Amst. Puffendorf has give a long list of other nations, which have the same custom among them, such as the antient inhabitants of Britain, the Sabeans, those of the kingdom ot Calecut, the antient Lithuanians, &c. See Puffend. de Jure Nat. et G^nt. lib. vi. cap. L sect. 15. where he proves very well that this is con- trary to the law of nature. And it is a remarkable instance to shew> 134 The Philosophers greatly deficient in that part F art II. that the wives of those whom he calls ce5) the guardians of the city and commonwealth, should be common to them all, and that the children should be so too; so that the father should not know his son, nor the son his father; but all should be the children of the commonwealth. He farther proposes, that those young men who had distinguished them- selves in war, or were eminent in other respects, should be rewarded, by allowing them a larger liberty of accompany- ing with the women; that more children might be had from them for the commonwealth than from others (s). And again, he would have the man that was remarkable for his bravery, to be allowed, upon a military expedition, to kiss whomsoever he pleased, and that it should not be permitted to any one to refuse him; that if he happened to be in love with any person, whether male or female, it should make him more eager by his courageous exploits, to obtain the rewards of his valour (t). There is another passage in the same book, which I had occasion to hint at before, and which admits of no excuse, that when men and women have passed the age which he assigns to them as fit for the begetting and conceiv- ing strong and healthy children for the commonwealth, which, according to him, is the age of forty for the women, and fifty-five for the men, they should be at liberty both and women) to accompany with whom they pleased, only excepting their parents and children, or those in a direct line above or below either of these. And if it should happen that any chi^d should be begotten, care should be taken, either to prevent its coming to the birth, or to expose it afterwards that men are apt to pass wrong; judgments even in things which are really founded in nature and reason. (s) Plato Republ. lib. v. Oper. p. 460. edit. Lugd. (t) Ibid. p. 464. edit. Lugd. Chap. VIII. of Morals relating to Chastity a7id Purity. 135 without nourishment (w). I am sorry that I am obliged to mention these and other things of the like kind, which may- shock the delicacy of the reader; but the subject I am up- on makes it necessary to take notice of them, as they fur- nish striking instances, that men of the greatest abilities and genius, when left to themselves, may fall into the most gross mistakes in matters of great importance in morals. For who might seem more to be depended on than Plato, whose wri- tings have been admired in all ages by the best judges, as containing some of the noblest efforts of human genius, and who is particularly celebrated for his moral sentiments^ which, in many respects, were undoubtedly very just as well as sublime. This great man has observed in this fifth book of his Republic, from whence I have extracted the passages here referred to, that *' except philosophers were to have the rule over cities and kingdoms, or kings and rulers were to be well instructed in philosophy, and both united in one, and not separated as now, neither cities nor human kind would have any rest from evil (^)." But I believe it will be allow- ed, that Plato has given a specimen in this book, that if phi- losophers were to have the making of laws and the govern* ment of cities and kingdoms committed to them, they might make very wrong regulations with regard to the morals of their subjects. The Cynics were a sect of philosophers, who professed to make morals their entire study, and to govern themselves by the pure simple dictates of nature and right reason, with- out any regard to popular opinions and customs, and accord- ingly they are highly praised by Epictetus and others. But though they gave excellent precepts, and examples too, of equanimity, patience, contentment, and a contempt of world- (M)Plato RepubV lib. v. Oper. p. 461. B, C. {x) Ibid. p. 466! B. edit. Lugd. 136 The Philosophers greatly deficient in that part V ART 11^ ly riches and honours, the usual objects of ambition and ava- rice, they allowed themselves great liberties in the gratifica- tion of their sensual passions. Diogenes was one of the most celebrated among them; for whom Epictetus frequently pro- fesses the greatest esteem, proposing him, as well as Socra- tes, as a model and pattern of virtue, and especially of a great mind, superior to the honours, riches, and pleasures of the world (z/). He employs a whole large chapter in des- cribing the true Cynic, of whom he speaks with the highest admiration; and particularly he there celebrates Diogenes, as sent by Jupiter to men to instruct them concerning good and evil (2). And he elsewhere calls him the minister of Jove, and the divine Diogenes (a). This shews, that some of the best of the Heathens, for such undoubtedly Epictetus was, laid no great stress on chastity and purity, as a neces- sary ingredient in the character of a man of virtue, Dio- genes never married, for which he seems to be commended by Epictetus; but he found other ways of gratifying his concupiscence, which he did without any regard to modesty or shame. Some of his base acts of filthiness, committed in public, were approved by the famous Stoic Chrysippus, as Plutarch informs us (^). And Laertius says, that Dio- genes held, " that women ought to be common, looking upon marriage to be nothing, and that every man and woman might keep company with those they liked best, and that therefore the children ought to be in common (c)." The custom of lending their wiveis, which was common (t/) Epict. Dissert, book i. chap. 24. sect. 1. and book ii. chap, 16. sect. 3. (z) Ibid, book iii. chap. 22. (a) Ibid. chap. 24. sect. 3, 4. and Enchirid.chap. 15. (b) De Stoic. Repugn. Oper. torn. II. p. 1044. B. (c) Laert. lib. vi. segm. 72. Chap. VIII. Morals relating to Chastity and Purity, 137 at Sparta, and authorized by the laws of Lycurgus, is not condemned, but seems rather .to be approved by that emi- nent philosopher Plutarch, in his life of Lycurgus {d). And he gives a remarkable instance of it among the Romans, in his life of Cato of Utica. That rigid Stoic, who was ac- counted a perfect model of virtue, lent his wife to the ora- tor Hortensius. This was agreeable to the doctrine of the Stoics, who held, according to Laertius, that women ought to be common among the wise; for which he cites Zeno and Chrysippus. As to fornication, it was generally allowed among the Heathens. And I do not find that any of the philosophers absolutely condemned it, provided it was done in a legal way. Plato, in his eighth book of laws, orders that no man should presume to touch noble or free women, except his own wife; but he does not forbid them to accompany with other women, provided they were such as they had bought, or acquired in any other lawful way (e). Solon made a se- vere law against adultery; but allowed prostitutes to go openly to those that hired them {/)» And Demosthenes speaks of it openly, and without scruple, as what was daily {d) This is not disapproved by some of our modem sceptics, Mr. Bayle, in his Nouvelles Lettres contre Maimbourg, lettre 17, maintains, that if we only consult reason as separated from grace, and the light of divine faith, a man would make no more difficulty of lending his wife, than of lending a book; and that were it not for the ridiculous fear of cuckoldom, reason would rather advise the community than the propriety of wives. This is well answered and exposed by Mr. Barbeyrac, in his notes on Puffendorf's Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens, Hvre vi. chap* 1. sect. 15. (e) Plato Opera, p. 646, 647. (/) See Plutarch, in his Life of Solon. Vol. II. S 138 The Philosophers very deficient in that part of PartII. practised, and universally allowed among the Greeks (^). The philosophers took as great liberties this way as any others, without being at all ashamed of it, or thinking they had done a wrong thing. Epictetus praises Socrates and Diogenes, in opposition to those who corrupt and intice women. But if they did not corrupt other men's wives, which, it is said, Socrates never did, yet it is well known, that Diogenes did not scruple the making use of common women. The same thing is affirmed of Socrates by Porphy- ry, in his third book of the Lives of the Philosophers, who produces the testimony of Aristoxenus, a celebrated antient author; which testimony is also referred to by Cyril Alex- andrinus (A) and Theodoret (J). Socrates the ecclesiastical historian censured Porphyry on this account; but Holstenius has vindicated Porphyry against that censure, in his book De Vita et Scriptis Porphyrii, p. 41. 43. at the end of the Cambridge edition of Porphyr. de Abstinentia, 1655. It is true, that some of the Heathens were sensible that there was a turpitude in women's prostituting themselves; or, as Ulpian expresses it, " Meretrices turpiter facere quod meretrices essent." — That harlots acted basely in being " harlots." And that there was a probrum or infamy in such a conduct. — " Probrum intelligitur etiam in his mulieribus esse, quae turpiter viverent, vulgoque qusestum facerent, etiamsi non palam." And in some nations they had public notes of disgrace put upon them, and were not suffered to enter into their temples. Tacitus, speaking of Vestilia, a Roman lady of a noble family, who before the sediles published herself a prostitute, observes, that the an- tient Romans thought that these women were sufficiently {g) Orat. cont. Neaeram, ap. Athen. Deipnos. p. 573. (Ji) Cyril Alex. cont. Julian, lib. vi. (0 Theodoret Therap. serm. 1. as also serm. 4 et 12. Chap. VIII. Morals relating to Chastity and Purity. 13^ punished by their very avowing their own infamy. " Satis pcenarum adversus impudicas in ipsa professione flagitii cre- debatur (^)." One should have thought, therefore, that they must have acknowledged that the indulging meretricious loves is contrary to that purity and decency which becomes the rational nature, as distinguished from the brutal kind: and that if there is a turpitude iii women's prostituting themselves, there must be also in men's making use of pro- stitutes, and thereby encouraging such prostitutions. And yet it does not appear that this was regarded among the men as a crime. It has been observed, how universal this was among the Greeks. And as to the Romans, the say- ing of Cato to a young gentlemen, whom he saw coming out of a brothel, is well known, in which he encouraged young men to that practice, provided they took care not to abuse other men's wives (/). And the famous passage of Cicero, in his oration for M. Caelius, is still more remark- able, in which he openly declares before a public assembly of the Roman people, " That to find fault with meretri- cious amours was an extraordinary severity, abhorrent not only from the licentiousness of that age, but from the cus- toms and constitutions of their ancestors." And he asks, '' When was this not done? When was it found fault with? When was it not allowed? Can the time be named when this practice, which is now lawful, was not accounted so? Quan- do enim hoc factum non est? Quando reprehensum? Quan- do non permissum? Quando denique fuit, ut quod licet, non liceret (w)." Indeed, after Christianity had made some progress, some of the Pagans declared positively against it. Grotius has produced some remarkable testimonies to this {k) Tacit. Annal. lib. ii. cap. 85. (0 Horat. Sat..lib. i. sat. 2. ver. 31. et seq. (m) Orat. pro M. C^lio, cap. 20. 140 ThePhihsophers very deficient in that part of Va'R.t IL purpose, particularly from Dion Chrysostomus, Musonius, and Porphyry (rz). But the generality of the philosophers seem not to have regarded it as a sin. Origen hath the philosophers of his time particularly in view, when he speaks of those, who, like the vulgar, wallowed in the lusts of uncleanness and lasciviousness, and went promiscuously to brothels, teaching that in this there was nothing contrary to decency and good morals. A<3«5-3c«»t£? fiit Tetnuq Ttet^ei to x«- SS;*«» tSto -/s»«5-3-fle; (5), The Stoics, who were the most famous teachers of morals in the Pagan world, yet carried it so far as to maintain, that it is not absurd or unreasonable to cohabit with a harlot, rn aros/^* o*y»o, or to get a livelihood by such practices, as Sc^xtus Empiricus informs us (/7).The Evangelical Precept, therefore, which forbids fornication as a sin, and contrary to the Divine Law, is not without reason produced by some judicious authors as an instance of amoral precept not to be found in the writings of the an- tient Pagan philosophers. The learned Dr. Sykes, indeed, will not allow this. But all that he offers to the contrary only shews, that it was looked upon as having a turpitude in it for women to prostitute themselves (y): but he has produced no testimony to prove that it was accounted a sin in the men to make use of such prostitutes; or that the philosophers, before the coming of our Saviour, prohibited or condemned it as a vicious practice, and contrary to good morals, except w^hen it was carried to an excess. It is not, therefore, so much to be wondered at, that all man- (n) Grot, in Matt. v. 27. (0) Orig. cpnt. Cels. lib. iv. p. 177. edit. Spenser. Qi) Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. lib iii cap 24. (7) Dr. Sykes's Principles and Connection of Natural and Re- vealed Religion, p. 412. Chap.VIII. Morals relating to Chastity and Purity, 141 ner of impurity abounded so much in the Pagan world, since even their wisest men were so loose in their notions as well as in their practice. To convince men of the evil of that impurity which so greatly prevailed, was one noble de- sign of the Gospel, as St. Paul signifies to the Christian converts, in that excellent passage, 1 Thess. iv. 3,4, 5. " This is the will of God, even your sanctification, that ye should abstain from fornication: that every one of you should possess his vessel in sanctification and honour, not in the lust of concupiscence, even as the Gentiles which know not God." Several learned writers on the law of nature, and among others Puffendorf, have produced good arguments to prove, that the conjunction of men and women out of marriage, and a vague and licentious commerce between the sexes, is contrary to the law of nature and reason. There is also a remarkable passage to the same purpose, from M. de Montesquieu, which the reader may find above, p. 47 (r)» To which may be added another passage from the same celebrated author, where he observes, 1 hat " there are so many evils attending the loss of virtue in a woman, the whole soul is so degraded by it, and so many other faults follow upon it, that in a popular state public incontinence may be regarded as the greatest of misfortunes, and a sure prognostic of a change in the constitution (5)." And yet if this matter had been left merely to the judgment of phi- losophers, there was no likelihood of their determining the point: and there was great need of an express Divine Law and Authority, to ascertain our duty in this respect, and enforce it upon us by the most powerful sanctions. (r) See L'Esprit des Loix, Vol. I. livre xvi. chap. 12. («) Ibid, livre yii. chap. 8. See also Vol. II. livre xxiii. cbap. ^* 142 Modern Deists allow great Liberties Part IL From the instances which have been produced it suffi- ciently appears, that as to that part of moral duty which relates to the government of the sensual appetites and passions, the philosophers, even those of them that said the noblest things concerning virtue in general, and the neces- sity of keeping the fleshly appetite in a due subjection to reason, were greatly deficient, and not to be depended upon as proper guides to mankind. The same may be observed concerning those among the moderns, who shew the greatest zeal for the absolute clearness and sufficiency of the law^ of nature, independent of all Divine Revelation. It IS to be feared, that if left merely to themselves, and to what they would call the dictates of nature and reason, they would prove very loose interpreters of that law, in that part of it which relates to the restraining and govern- ing the carnal appetites. Some of them, in the accounts they give of natural religion and law, make it to consist in worshipping God, and being just to men, and loving one's countrv; but scarce take any notice at all of temperance and purity (t); or at least they allow much greater indul- gence in this respect, than is consistent with that purity of heart and life which Christianity requires. Dr. Tindal seems to lay no other restraint on the fleshly concupi- scence, than that it be gratified in such a manner, that the species may be propagated, and the happiness of the per- (?) This seems to be the scheme of the famous M. De Vol- taire, in his poem on Natural Religion. See Abbe Gauchet's Lettres Critiques, tome IV. lettre 37. And, indeed, if we may judge from many passages in the works of that very ingenious author, chastity and purity, and the exercising a due govern* ment over the sensual passions, does not seem to make a neces- sary part of his scheme of religion and morals. Chap. VIII. with regard to the sensual Passio7is, 143 ^ sons promoted: and of this, according to his scheme, f \ ery man must be a judge for himself, according to the circum- stances he is in (u). Lord Bolingbroke has no great notion of the virtue or obligation of chastity, which he resolves in^o a vanity inherent in our nature of appearing to be superior to other animals. He says, That " the shame of modesty is artificial, and has been inspired by human laws, by preju- dice, and the like causes: and thinks the law of nature does not forbid incest, except it be perhaps, that of the highest kind." He concludes, that " Increase and multiply is the law of nature. The manner in which this practice shall be executed with the greatest advantage to society, is the law of man (^)." Here this matter is left wholly to po- litical considerations and human laws, without any Divine law to restrain or regulate it. And what scandalous liberties this way have been countenanced and encouraged by the laws of many nations, I have before had occasion to shew. The author of the famous book De I'Esprit has given a large account of them, and seems himself to be for allow- ing an almost boundless indulgence to the fleshly concu- piscence. And it may be observed concerning many of the foreign writers, who profess to be admirers of Natural Religion, and are thought to be no friends to Revelation, that they have written in a very loose manner: they abound in lascivious anecdotes, and stories of gallantry; and paint impure scenes and pleasures in a very alluring s|;yle, at the same time intermixing strokes against Religion. But surely authors who are so loose in their writings, are not very proper to be guides in matters of religion and morality. It {u) See Answer to Christianity as old as the Creation, Vol. I. p. 203. 2d edit. {x) Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V. p. 172. et seq. edit. 4to. 144 Modern Deists allow great Liberties^ £s?c. Part II. looks a little odd, that men who set up for delivering man- kind from superstition, and leading them into the paths of reason and virtue, should,nnstead of endeavouring to correct and restrain the prevailing licentiousness of manners, open a wide door to libertinism and impurity. 145 CHAPTER IX. The Stoics the most eminent teachers of morals in the Pagan world. Mightily admired and extolled both by the antients and moderns. Observations on the Stoical maxims and precepts with regard to piety towards God. Their scheme tended to take away, or very much weaken, the fear of God as a punisher of sin. It tended also to raise men to a state of self-sufficiency and independency^ inconsistent with a due veneration for the Supreme Being. Extravagant strains of pride and arrogance in some of the principal Stoics. Confession of sin ia their addresses to the Deity made no part of their religion. IF the people had been to depend upon any one sect of philosophers, for leading them into right notions of moral duty, the Stoics seem to have bid the fairest for it, as they made the highest pretences to a pure and sublime morality^ Many admirable precepts and moral instructions are to be found in their writings, and the main principle which lay at the foundation of their whole system was this, that virtue is the chief, the only good. A celebrated author, M. dc Montesquieu, expresses his admiration of the Stoics in very high terms. He says^ that " of all the sects of philosophers among the antients,- there was none whose principles were more worthy of man, or better fitted to make men good, than that of the Stoics: and that if he could abstract a moment from the consideration of his being a Christian, he could not help regarding the extinction of the sect of Zeno as a misfor- tune to the human race: that if it were chargeable with car- rying things too far, it was only with respect to those things which had a certain grandeur in them, the contempt of pleasures and of pain: that whilst they regarded riches and honour, pains and pleasures, as vain things, they were wholly employed in labouring for the happiness of man- kind, and in exercising the duties of society, for the gooci* Vol. IL T 14G Stoics the most eminent of Part II. of which they looked upon themselves to be born and destined: and this without looking for any other rewards than what were within themselves; as if being happy in their philosophy alone, nothing but the happiness of others was capable of augmenting their own." I would observe by the way, that this ingenious writer seems here not to be quite exact. For, according to the Stoic principles, the hap- piness of a wise man is complete in himself, absolutely in- dependent on that of others, and incapable of receiving any addition from it. This excellent author adds, that " it looked as if the Stoics regarded that sacred spirit, which they believed to be in them, as a kind of favourable provi- dence, which watched over the human race." And that this sect alone '' knew how to make good citizens, great men, and good erpperors (j/)." There is also a fine encomium on the principles of the Stoic philosophy, in the learned Gataker's Prseloquium or Preliminary Discourse prefixed to his excellent translation and commentary on Antoninus's Meditations. He there gives a summary of the Stoical maxims and principles, both with respect to the duties of piety towards God, and those we owe to man, or the social duties and affections (2). The passages he produces to this purpose are almost all taken from Epictetus and Antoninus: both of whom lived after Christianity had made some progress, and had spread among many of the people the knowledge of God, and of a pure morality. These two excellent philosophers seem to (z/) L'Esprit des Loix, Vol. II. liv. xxiv. chap. 10. p. 157, 158. edit. Edinb. (z) The reader may see this part of Gataker*s Preliminary Discourse translated, with the references to the several passages, and some additional notes, at the end of the Glasgow translation of Antoninus's Meditations. Chap. IX. the Pagan Moralists, I47 have carried the doctrine of morals to a greater degree of perfection than any of the more antient Stoics. And any one that would form a judgment of the Stoical system, merely from the summary which that learned man gives out of their writings, must needs have a very advantageous notion of it, as having a near affinity to the rules laid down in the Gospel. I am far from denying to the Stoics their just praises. But, in order to our forming a right and impartial judgment, it is proper to take their whole system together, and not the fair side of it only. Several instances may be men- tioned, some of them of considerable importance, in which they were defective, others in which they carried things to an extreme. From whence it will appear, that the Stoical doctrines and precepts were not sufficient guides to man- kind, nor exhibited a complete rule of moral duty, and con- sequently, furnish no just objection against the usefulness and necessity of the Christian Revelation. I shall begin with some observations on the Stoical doc- trines and precepts with regard to the duties of piety to- wards God. This is, by their own acknowledgment, the noblest and most important part of our duty. That great philosopher and emperor Marcus Antoninus advises, "to do every thing, even the most minute, as mindful of the connection there is between divine and human things. For (says he) you will neither rightly discharge any duty to man without a due regard to divine things, nor, on the other hand, any duty to God without a regard to human things («)." And again he declares. That, "the soul is formed for holiness and piety towards God, no less than for justice towards men." And he adds, that "these are (a) Anton. Medit. book iii. sect. 13. 148 The Stoical Precepts deficient -with regard Part II, rather more venerable than acts of human justice." Mecxx$y One great defect which runs through their noblest pre- cepts of piety, is, that the duties they prescribe of devo- tion, submission, absolute resignation, trust and dependence, prayer, praise and thanksgiving, are promiscuously ren- dered to God and to the gods. There are many passages in the writings of the Stoics, which would deserve the highest praise, if understood of the duty we owe to the one true God; but there are numerous other passages in which they prescribe the same duties to a multiplicity of deities. Zeno defines piety to be " the knowledge of the worship of the gods." He taught, that " wise men are pious and religious, and understand the rites relating to the gods; that they sa- crifice to the gods, and are acceptable to them, and that they alone are priests (c)." Thus their precepts of piety are so managed as to uphold the people in their polytheism. This holds true, even of Epictetus and Antoninus; for a distinct proof of which I refer the reader to the former volume of this work, in the latter part of the fourteenth chapter; and it must be observed, that those which are eminent acts of piety, when rendered to the one true God, are very culpable acts of idolatry, when directed to false and fictitious deities. An essential part of religion, and upon which a great stress is laid in the Holy Scriptures, is the fear of God. This ,is a disposition becoming reasonable creatures to- wards the Supreme Being, and which his infinite perfec- tions, his justice and purity, and sovereign dominion, justly demand from us. But with regard to this, the Stoics seem to have been greatly deficient. I do not deny, that they pre- (Jb) Anton. Medit. book xi. sect. 20. (c) Diog. Laert. lib. vii. segm. 1 19. Chap. IX. to the Duties of Piety towards God, 149 scribed a fear of reverence or veneration. 'A«5« S-esj, " reve- rence the gods," was one of their precepts, and is urged urged by Antoninus. But there is a fear of God as the just punisher of vice and wickedness, which is also of great importance in religion in the present state of mankind, and this had properly no place in the Stoical system. Zeno makes it one of the requisites to happiness, not to fear the gods. And perfect liberty and tranquillity of mind, accord- ing to Seneca, consists in neither fearing the gods nor men, and in a man's having an absolute power over himself. " Quseris quae sit ista? [tranquillitas animi et absoluta libertas.]" He answers, '" Non homines timere non deos: in seipsum habere maximam potestatem; inestimabile bo- num est suum fieri (^)." And indeed, according to their scheme of principles, and the idea they give of a wise man, it is not in the power of God to hurt him, or to hinder his being completely happy. For as to what are accounted ex- ternal evils and bodily pains, they are really no evils at all, and the wise man can enjoy himself, and be perfectly happy in the severest torments: and as to his mind, he can wrap himself up in his own virtue, which is self-sufficient and independent: so that it may be said, not only that God will not, but that he cannot do any thing to render him unhappy (^), {d) See at the end of his 75th epistle. {e) The Stoics, through an affectation of greatness of mind, destroyed, as far as in them lay, the influence of fear in mortals, by taking away the fear of the gods, of pain, sickness, disgrace, and death, which tends to subvert one of the main principles of government, both human and divine. Any one tjiat has made due reflections on the state of the world, and on human nature, must be sensible that the passion of fear is implanted in liie heart of man for very wise ends, and, if properly made use of, may answer very important purposes. It seems evident, that this- 150 The Stoical Precepts dejicient zvith regard Part II. To which it may be added, that the Stoics advanced such a notion of the Divine Goodness, as tended to free men in a great measure from the fear of God, and was scarce con- sistent with punitive justice. Antoninus declares, speak- ijig of the Intelligence which governs the universe, that no man is hurt by it (/). I do not remember that he ever speaks of God's being angry with bad men for their wicked- ness; nor indeed can I well see what room there is for it upon his scheme. Some of the reasons which are urged by him and Epictetus, and which I shall particularly consider afterwards, to shew that good men should not be angry at the wickedness of others, would equally prove, if they were just and well founded, that God should not be so. And ac- cordingly, never do Epictetus or Antoninus, as far as I re- member, give any intimation of God's calling men to an account, and punishing them for their sins. Antoninus says. That " the gods in a long eternity must always bear with a numerous wicked world (^)." The Stoics, indeed, acknowledged an imperial head of the universe, and main- tained that the world was governed by laws: but they al- lowed no proper sanctions of rewards and punishments to enforce obedience to those laws, but such as necessarily flow from the nature of the actions themselves. I'hey af- firmed, that their own virtues were the only rewards of the good and virtuous, and their own vices the only punish- ments of the wicked. There are many passages of Epictetus is one way by which the Author of Nature designed mankind should be g:overned; and that it is this which gives force to the sanctions of law, and without which they would have small effect. (/) Anton. Medit. book vi. sect. 1. (g") Ibid, book vii. sect. 70. Chap. IX. to the Duties of Piety towards God, 151 to this purpose (Ji). So Seneca says, that the greatest punishment of an injury that .is done, is the having done it. " Maxima est injurise tactse pcena, fecisse: nee quisquam gravius afficitur, quam qui ad supplicium poenitentiae tra- ditur (i)." This seems to be a noble way of talking, and to argue high notions of the intrinsic excellency of virtue, and the evil and deformity of vice and sin. But if this were all the punishment wicked men were to expect, to be left to their own reflections, and to the natural consequences of their own actions, without any farther punishment to be inflicted upon them by a governing authority, it would be of the most pernicious consequence to the peace and order of the moral world. No human government could subsist upon this foot; and if no other punishment were to be ex- pected from God, it would go a great way to banish the fear of God from among men. Plutarch observes, that the famous Stoic Chrysippus, in bis books against Plato, con- cerning justice, says, that " Cephalus did not rightly deter men from injustice by the fear of the gods; and that many things may be probably off'ered to the contrary; impugning the discourse concerning divine punishments, as nothing different from the tales of Akko and Alphito, which women are wont to frighten children withal." Yet Plutarch adds, as an instance of the Stoical contradictions, that Chrysippus elsewhere speaks of the gods as sending punishments, that, admonished by these examples, men may not dare to at- tempt the doing wicked things (J-)* {h) The reader may consult his Dissertations, book i. chap. 12. sect. 2. book iii. chap. 7. at the end. And ibid. chap. 24. sect. 2. and book iv. chap. 9. sect. 2. (i) Sen. de Ira, lib. iii. cap. 26. ik) De Stoic. JRepugna. Oper. torn. II. p. 1040. edit. Xyl. 152 The Stoical Precepts deficient with regard Part II* It is a noted saying of Seneca, that " no man in his sound reason fears the gods: for it is a madness to be afraid of the things which are salutary." '' Deos nemo sanus timet; furor est enim metuere sakitare (/)." And again, he represents the gods as of a mild and gentle nature, '' hav- ing it neither in their inclination, nor in their power, to hurt any one; and that they have no power but what is be- nificent and salutary"— "Quaedam sunt quae nocere non possunt, nuUamque vim nisi beneficam et salutarera habent: ut dii immortales, qui nee volunt obesse, nee possunt. Na- tura enim illis mitis et placida est, tam longe remota ab aliena injuria quam a sua (m)." He expresses himself to the same purpose in another place. " Errat, siquis putat illos nocere velle; non possunt: nee accipere injuriam queunt, nee facere;" i. e. " He errs, who thinks the gods are wil- ing to hurt any man; they cannot do it: they can neither do nor suffer any hurt or injury." And yet he there talks of their sending chastisements, to correct and restrain some persons, and putting on a shew of punishing them {n), I think upon the whole, it may be justly said, that the doctrine of the Stoics tended to take away, or at least very much to weaken and diminish, the fear of God as a punisher of sin. Such a fear was frequently represented by them as base and superstitious. And yet some fear of this kind seems to be a necessary and most useful part of the religion of sinful creatures, and is one of the most power- ful preservatives against sin and wickedness. Accordingly, it is what our Saviour most expressly prescribes, at the §ame time that he directs his disciples not to be afraid of (/) Sen. de Benefic. lib. iv. cap. 19. (m) Sen. de Ira, lib. ii. cap. 27. (n) Sen. Epist. 95, Chap, IX. to the Duties of Piety towards God, 153 the power or displeasure of the greatest man upon earth, Luke xii. 4, 5. There is another part of the Stoical system, which is not very consistent with that profound veneration for the Su- preme Being, and that humble sense of our entire .depen- dence upon him, which is a necessary branch of true piety. They proposed to raise men to a state of absolute indepen- dency, and they thereby put them upon affecting a kind of equality with God himself. The notion they had of making the souls of men effluxes and portions of the Divinity had a manifest tendency to cherish this presumption. That this was the notion even of the best of the Stoics, such as Epic- tetus and Antoninus, appears from express passages quoted from both these excellent philosophers in the former part of this wprk, chap. xii. To what was there observed, I shall here add one passage more from Epictetus. " As to the body (saith he), thou art a small part of the universe; but in respect of the mind or reason, neither worse nor less than the gods. Will you not place your good there, where you are equal to the gods (0)." I cannot think it becoming the veneration we owe to the Supreme Being, to assert, as Epictetus does, that the will of man is unconquerable by God himself. In opposition to the threatning, " I will fetter thee," he answers, " What sayest thou, man? Fetter me! Thou wilt fetter my feet: but Jupiter himself cannot overcome my choice;" i. e. my deliberate election or determination. T«v zyfoxi^e^n kV 0 Zev^ UK^(rtci ^vvecTeti (fi). He seems elsewhere to say, that it is God that hath appointed it to be so. *' God (saith he) hath given us faculties, by which we may bear every event without being depressed or broken by it; but like a good prince, and (0) Epict. Dissert, booki. chap. 12. sect. 3. {fi) Ibid. chap. 1. sect. 6. Vol. II. U 154 The Stoical Precepts deficient with regard Part II. a true father, hath rendered them incapable of restraint, compulsion, or hindrance, and entirely dependent on our own pleasure; nor hath he reserved a power even to him- self, of hindering or restraining them (^)." This he after- wards explains in this manner. *' If God hath constituted that portion, which he hath separated from his own essence, and given to us, capable of being restrained or compelled, either by himself or by any other, he would not have been God, nor have taken care of us in a due manner (r)." This appears to me to be a very rash and presumptuous way of talking. I do not well understand the strain of his reason- ing. But it seems to be this: that God hath made us, with respect to the freedom of our will, independent of himself, yea, and to have necessarily made us so; because we are parts of God, which he hath separated from his own essence; and therefore are no more to be constrained and compelled than he is; and that if he had made us capable of being com- pelled, either by himself or by any other, he would not have been God: for it would follow that he himself might be compelled, if we, who are portions of his essence, might be so: and consequently he would not be God. For it is neces- sarily included in the idea of God, that he is independent, and not liable to compulsion. Seneca, Epictetus, and Antoninus, often talk of our hav- ing a God within us, by which they understand the rational human soul. And many of the Stoics carried to it such a height of arrogance, that they in effect equalled their wise man with God, in virtue, perfection, and happiness. " It is a common conception concerning the gods (saith Plutarch) that in nothing do they so much excel men as in happiness (5^) Epict. Dissert, book i. chap. 6. sect, 6, (r) Ibid. chap. 17. sect. 2. Chap. IX. to the Duties of Piety towards God. 155 and virtue: but Chrysippus does not allow them this prero- gative." Accordingly, he produces a passage from that fa- mous Stoic, in which he saith, that "Jupiter has no pre- eminence above Dion in virtue: but that Jupiter and Dion, being both wise, are in like manner helpful or profitable to one another." 'A^ijtIJ te ny, vare^z^eiv rov Alec rQ Aiavoi, a^piXeh^ut re ofAciaq vzs-o uXXiiXav rov A/at >^ ror Aicova ned to humble us, and to put us upon proper methods of correcting our miscarriages, and con- ciliatmg the Divine favour. The Stoical wise pian could not con- sistently consider them in this view. His resignation is rather an assent to the will of God than a submission to it, according to that of S^eneca: " Nihil cogor, nihil patior invitus, nee servio Deo sed assentio*." Taken in connection with the rest of their principles, the resignation prescribed by the Stoics seems to be a part of the scheme they had formed for securing that liberty and self-sufficiency, to raise men to which is the great aim of their philosophy. ( / ) Epict. Dissert, book iv. chap. 10. sect. 2. ♦ Sen. de Provid. cap. v. Chap. IX. to the Duties of Piety towards God. 163 note upon it, in her excellent translation of Epictetus. " I wish (says she) it were possible to palliate the ostentation of this passage, by applying it to the ideal perfect charac- ter." [i. e. to the character of the Stoical wise man, which some look upon to be only an ideal one.] '' But it is in a a general way, that Epictetus hath proposed such a dying speech, as cannot without shocking arrogance be uttered by any one born to die. Unmixed as it is with any acknowledg- ments of faults or imperfections at present, or with any sense of guilt on account of the past, it must give every sober reader a very disadvantageous opinion of some prin- ciples of the philosophy on which it is founded, as contra- dictory to the voice of conscience, and formed on an abso- lute ignorance or neglect of the condition and circumstances of such a creature as man." And yet sometimes they cannot help making acknow- ledgments, which should have led them to an humbler way of thinking. " If we would be equal judges of all things (saith Seneca) let lis in the first place persuade ourselves, that none of us is without fault." — '' Hoc primum nobis suadeamus, neminem nostrum esse sine culpa." He after- wards adds, " Who is he that professes himself with re- spect to all laws to be innocent?" — Quis est iste qui se profitetur omnibus legibus innocentem? (m) Epictetus seems to say, that *' to be absolutely faultless is impracticable (?z)." And that " the beginning of philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper manner, is a consciousness of our own weakness, and inability in necessary things (o)." M. Antoninus having mentioned gravity, sincerity, a contempt of pleasure, an heart never repining against Providence, (w) Sen. de Ira, lib. ii. cap. 27. (w) fcLpict. Dissert, book iv. chap. 12. sect. 4, (o) Ibid^. book ii. chap. 1 1. sect. 1.^ 164 The Stoical Precepts defcient with regard Part II, with other virtues, charges the person he is speaking to, by which he probably there intends himself, as having volun- tarily come short of them. And having mentioned the con^ trary faults, swears by the gods, ^\vou might have escaped these vices long ago (/? )." And is not here matter of in- genuous confession and humiliation before God? Though it must be owned, that he elsewhere represents all sins and faults as involuntary. We see, by tht; instances I have mentioned, that the Stoics were sometimes obliged to come down from their heights, and express themselves in a lower strain. But the general tendency of their principles led them to an undue self-f xaltation; and this entered into the character of their wise and virtuous man. An instance of this we have in He- raclitus, a philosopher much admired by the Stoics, who in many things adhtred to the tenets of his philosophy. No- thing can be more boastful and assuming, or discover a higher degree of pride and self-sufficiencv, than the man- ner in which he speaks ot himself in his epistle to Hermo^ dorus. " I am excellent in wisdom (saith he): I have per- formed many difficult l.;bours: I have vanquished pleasures; I have vanquished riches; I have vanquished ambition: I have wrestled against and subdued cowardice and flattery. Fear and intemperance have nothing to say against me; sorrow is afraid of me; anger is afraid of me. For these thiagb am I crowned, not by Eurystheus [as Hercules was] but by myself, as being my own master, and under my own c6i)imand." *Efietvrt» hnrecrlav. See .also his epistle to Amphidamas, in which, among other high things, he saith of himself, "• I shall not build altars to others, but others to me (^).'* (/?) Anton. Medit. book v. sect. 5. (q) Stanley's Hist, of Philos. p. 739. 741. edit. 2d. Lend. 1687. Chap. IX. to the Duties of Piety towards God, 165 The great philosopher Plotinus, so highly extolled by Mr. Bavle, for his eminent virtues, frequently speaks in the same vain-glorious strain with the Stoics: That the wise and virtuous man is not impressed by any thing with- out him: that he accounteth the death of mortals, the over- turning of his citv, or any public calamities, no great mat- ter: nor can the captivit) of himself, or his nearest friends and relations, in the least diminish his felicity (r). That he is void of all fear, misting in himscUV ^^s-iyo-ets I«ut«, that no evil shall ever touch him (v). It may help to let us into the pride of his character, that vvhen Amelius invited him to assist at a sacrifice, which he intended to offer to the gods at a solemn festival, he answered, " It is for them to come to me, not for me to go to them (0»" Some learned persons have denied that humility, either as to name or thing, is to be found in the writings of the Pagans; and it must be owned, that humility is of a bad sound among the philosophers, and among the Stoics it is always taken for a vice: but the word '' humble" some- times occurs in the Pagan writers in a good sense, nor were they altogether strangers to the virtue intended by it. But if we take humility as it implies, a deep sense of our own unworthiness and insufficiency in ourselves, and of the manifold defects of our obedience and righteousness, ac- companied with a true contrition of heart for our sins, and which carrieth us to acknowledge, that if God should enter into strict judgment with us we could not be justified in (r) Plotin. Ennead. I. lib. iv. cap. 7. (s) Ibid. cap. 14, 15. {t) Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, prefixed to his works, p. 8. B. The same vain-glorious spirit animated the Indian brrich- mans. When Apollonius asked them what they were? larchas, the chief of them, answered, that they thought themselves gods. 166 The Stoical Precepts deficient, £5fc. Part II. his sight; this humility, which is opposed to self-confidence and self-dependence, and which causeth us to place our whole trust in the infinite grace and mercy of God for sal- vation, seems not to enter into the Pagan systems of piety and morality, especially that of the Stoics (w). There is a spiritual pride and self-sufficiency running through their whole scheme, scarce reconcilable to that humble frame of spirit which our Lord insists upon as a necessary ingredient in the piety and virtue of such imperfect creatures as we are in the present state. Here then is a remarkable instance of an evangelical precept relating to a temper of mind, which is represented as of great importance to our accep- tance with God, and which yet is not to be found in the Pagan moralists. {y) It is true, that the Stoics seemed to require, that a man, as a preparative for philosophy, should have a consciousness of his own weakness and inability: See a passage to this purpose in Epictetus, cited above, p. 163. But the design of their philo- sophy, when once a man was engaged in it, was to inspire him with a confidence in his own strength, and the absolute suffi- ciency of his own virtue. 167 CHAPTER X. The Stoits gave excellent precepts with regard to the duties men owe to one another. Yet they carried their docti'ine of apathy so far, as to be in some in- stances not properly consistent with a humane disposition and a charitable sym- pathy. They said fine things concerning forgiving injuries and beai^ng with other men's faults. But in several respects they carried this to an extreme, and placed it on wrong foundations, or enforced it by improper motives. This is particularly shewn with regard to those two emintnt xjhilosophers Epictetus and Mfircus Antoninus The most ancient Stoics did not allow pardoning mercy to be an ingredient in a perfect character. J HE Stoics were particularly remarkable for the precepts and directions they gave with regard to the duties men owe to one another. They taught that men were born to be help- ful to each other in all the offices of mutual assistance and benevolence, and that they are united by the strongest ties, as all belonging to one common city of gods and men (;c). Many of their precepts tended to set the obligations we are under to love and, do good to one another, and to all mankind, in a strong and affecting light. Yet it must be acknowledged, that some parts of their scheme were little consistent with that humanity and mutual benevolence, which it was the de- sign of many of their precepts to recommend. To support their vain-glorious scheme of self-sufficiency and independency, they prescribed an unnatural apathy. Their wise man was to be devoid of passions, of fear and grief, of sorrow and joy. He must not be grieved for the loss of wife, children, or friends, or for any calamity which can befal himself or them, or even for the public distresses Qc) Cicero de Finib. lib. iii, cap. 19. p. 258. 168 The Stoical Doctrines of Apathy not consistent Part II* and calamities of his country. There is a fragment of a trea- tise in Plutarch to shew, that the Stoics speak greater nn- probabilities than the poets: and he produces as an instance of it, their asserting, that their wise man continue s fearless and invincible in the subversion of the walls of his city, and in other great calamities of a public nature (i/). Seneca says, in his 74th epistle, that "^ a wise man is not afflicted at the loss of his friends or children."— •* Non affligitur sapiens liberorum amissione aut amicorum." And in the same epis- tle, among the things which should not grieve nor disturb him, he reckons " the besieging of his country, the death of his children, and the slavery of his parents." — ** Obsidio patriae, liberorum mors, parentum servitus (2)." Nor is this merely an extravagant rant of Seneca, who often gave into an hvperbolical way of expression. Epictetus, one of the gravest and most judicious authors among ihe Stoics, and who adhered very closely to the principles of their philoso- phy, expresseth himself to the same purpose. It is true that he says, " I am not to be undisturbed by passion in the same sense that a statue is, but as one who preserves the natural and acquired relations, as a private person, as a son, as a bro- ther, as a father, as a citizen («)." And he allows a man '' to preserve an affectionate temper, as becomes a noble-spirited and happy person (^)." It is usual with the Stoics to throw in every now and then some hints, which seem to correct and soften their extravagant maxims, and reduce them with- in the bounds of nature and humanity. But that great phi- (y) Plutarch. Opera, torn. ii. p. 1057, 1058. edit. Xyl. Fran- cof. 1620. (z) Sen epist. 74. Plotinus expresses himself to the same pur- pose. See above, p. 165. (a) Epict. Dissert, book iii. chap. 2. sect. 3. (6) Ibid. chap. 24. sect. 4. Chap. X. with Humanity and a charitable Sympathy, 169 losopher himself has several passages which it is very diffi- cult for the most candid censurer to interpret in a favourable sense. Having mentigned those which he says are called " great events," viz. wars and seditions, the destruction of numbers of men, and the overthrow of cities, he asks, " What great matter is there in all this? Nothing. What great matter is there in the death of numerous oxen, numb, rs of sheep, or in the burning or pulling down numbers of nests of storks or swallows?" He affirms, that ''these cases are perfectly alike: the bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of sheep and oxen: the houses of men are burnt, and the houses or nests of storks. What is there great and dreadful in all this?" He owns afterwards, that there is a difference between a man and a stork; but not in body (c). To talk with such indifference of great public calamities, is more a proof of the want of humanity than of a real great- ness of mind, and is not well consistent with a true benevo- lence towards mankind, or with a g nerous patriotism or love to our country, which yet the Stoics made great pro- fession of. To the same purpose he expresses himself in another remarkable passage, the design of which is to sig- nify, that the slaughter of armies is an indifferent matter; and that it ought not to have given Agamemnon concern if the Greeks were routed and slain by the Trojans (^)." ■ (/) Anton. Medit. book v. sect. 22. (,§•) Ibid, book v. s^ct, 35. (A). Ibid, book viii. sect. 5S. \i) Aci ording to the account Plutarch gives from Chrysippus, sin tends to the good of the whole. He says, that virtue and vice, like the difference and variety of the seasons, tend to the har- mony of the universe. De Stoic. Repug. Opera) p. 1050, 1051. torn. 2 edit. Xyl See also ibid. p. 1066. {k) Anton, Medit. book x. sect. 6. Chap. X. placed by the Stoics on a -wrong Foundation, 181 I shall mention &ome other passages which tend to illus- trace this. " When you are disgusted, says he, with the impudence of any one, immediately ask yourself. Can the universe then be without the shameless? It cannot. Do not demand then what is impossible. For this is one of those shameless men who mast needs be in the universe. Have the same question also at hand, when shocked at the crafty, the faithless, or the faulty in any respect." See Ant. Medit. b. ix. sect. 42. Here and in some other passages he speaks as if those persons and actions, which seem to us bad and vicious, were so connected with the whole, as to be neces- sary to the order of it, and without which the whole would run into confusion. And accordingly he supposes, that every event which comes to pass tends to the prosperity and felicity of Jupiter himself in his administration, who never ^yould have permitted this event if it had not con- duced to good. But if this be applied to particular bad men and particular wicked actions, as if these very men and these evil actions were necessary to the good order of the universe, and that the whole would be less perfect, and God less happy, if those particular persons had not existed, and those actions had not been done, this appears to me to be a false supposition, and dishonourable to the Deity. It is indeed for the good of the universe, and the glory of the divine administration, that God hath made reasonable crea- tures, endued with liberty and free agency; and that he dealeth with them as such, and consequently permits them to use their liberty even in doing evil actions. But it does not follow, that every particular action of theirs conduceth to good, and that God permitteth it for that reason. He may indeed in his infinite wisdom over-rule it to good, and bring good out of it; but in its own nature vice and sin is evil, and of a pernicious tendency: and therefore a righteous and holy God hath a just displeasure against it, and against the persons that commit it; and may, in an entire consist- 182 The Stoical Doctrine of Part II. ency with his governing wisdom, righteousness, and good- ness, punish them for it. And in like manner a good and vir- tuous man may and ought to conceive a just abhorrence of such evil actions, and may, without any imputation upon his goodness, be displeased with those that are guilty of them. I acknowledge that there are many considerations, seve- ral of which are very properly urged both by Epictetus and Antoninus, ^vhich should dispose us not to be too rigorous in our censures upon the actions of others, and to put the most favourable construction upon them, which the cir- cumstances of the case can possibly admit. But it is cer- tainly wrong, under prttence of engaging men not to be angry at the faults of others, to endeavour to palliate the evil and deformity of vice and sin, and, to make such a re- presentation of it as if it were true, and pursued to its genuine consequences, would shew that neither God nor man should be angry at it, and punish it. This seems to be the plain tendency of some of the passages which have been produced from Marcus Antoninus; though I am far from charging that excellent emperor and philosopher with in- tending those consequences, and indeed he has other pas- sages of a different strain. For though he expressly asserts, as has been shewn, that " the particular wickedness of any individual hurts not another, it hurts himself only; and that no injury or evil action can be hurtful to the whole;" yet he elsewhere says, that " he who is guilty of an injury is guilty of an impiety: for since the nature of the whole has formed rational animals for being useful to one another, he who trangresses this her will, is thus guilty of impiety against the most antient and venerable of the gods." By which he means what he so often calls the whole, and the nature of the whole. Here he seems plainly to suppose, contrary to what he elsewhere teaches, both that a man may hurt and do an injury to another of the same species with himself, Chap. X. forgiving Injuries considered, 183 and that in so doing he is guilty of an impiety against the whole. And he there adds, that " he who willingly lies is guilty of impiety, in as far as by deceiving he does an in- jury; and he who lies unwillingly, in as far as his voice dissents from the nature of the whole; which as he had ob- served just before is truth, and the first cause of all truth." — He there also says, " that he who pursues plea- sure as good, and shuns pain as evil, or who is not indiffer- ently disposed to pain and pleasure, life and death, glory and ignominy, all which the nature of the whole regards as indifferent, is plainly guilty of impiety ( /)." I have insisted the more largely on the Stoical doctrine of forgiving injuries, and doing good to those that have used us ill, because it is that part of their doctrine in which they had been thought to come up to some of the sublimest precepts of morality as taught by our Saviour. I readily acknowledge that an excellent spirit breathes in several of their precepts on this head. But it appears from the ob- servations which have been made, that by placing that duty in some respects on a wrong foundation, and enforcing it by motives which will not bear a strict scrutiny, and carry- ing it in some instances to an extreme, they weaken what they endeavour to establish. All that is just in this doctrine is taught in the Gospel, without running into extremes. The best and properest of the motives proposed by these philosophers are also there urged to engage us to bear with one another's faults and infirmities, and to forgive and da good to those that injure and offend us: besides which there are additional motives proposed, which are of the greatest weight. This duty is bound upon us by the ex- press command and authority of God himself,' who hath also made our forgiving other men their offences commit- (0 Anton. Medit. bookix. sect, 1. 184 The Stoical Doctrine of Part IL ted against us, a necessary condition of our obtaining the forgiveness of our own offences from God. We are assured, that the unmt-rciful and unforgiving shall have no mercy «he\vn them at the day of Judgment (m). But especially the motives drawn from the wonderful love of God in sending his Son to suffer and die for us whilst we were yet enemies and ungodh , and the exceeding riches of his grace towards penitent sinners, together with the perfect example of a forgiving disposition in our most amiable and benevolent Saviour, must needs, where they are heartily believed, have a mighty force upon an ingenuous mind. And yet at the same time great care is taken to keep up a deep sense of the evil of sin, and an abhorrence of it in the minds of men, which is of the utmost consequence to the cause of virtue, and the good order of the moral world. I shall conclude this part of the subject with observing, that the benevolent doctrine which hath been mentioned^ seems not to have been carried by any of the Stoic philoso- phers so far as by Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus; both of whom lived after this doctrine had received its utmost improvement in the Gospel of Jesus, and was exemplified in many of the primitive Christians, who prayed for their enemies and persecutors with their dying breath. The more antient Stoics seem to have wrought up their scheme with greater rigour, and to have advanced maxims not very consistent with that humane and forgiving disposition so strongly recommended by Marcus Antoninus. Mr. Stanley in his excellent History of Philosophy gives it as part of the Stoical description of their wise man, or man of perfect virtue, that " he is not merciful or prone to pardon, remit- (rn) James ii. 13. CtiAP. X. forgiving Injuries considered, 185 ting nothing of the punishments inflicted by law, as know- ing them to be proportioned to, not exceeding, the offi ncej and that whosoever sinneth, sinneth out of his own wicked- ness. A wise man therefore is not benign, for he who is benign mitigates the rigour of justice, and conceives the punishments inflicted by law to be greater than they ought; but a wise man knoweth the law to be good, or a right rea- son, commanding what is to be done, and what not (w)." Stanley refers for the proof of this to Laertius and Stobaeas, but does not point out to the particular passages of those authors, which therefore I shall here mention. The reader may consult Laert. lib. vii. segm. 123. and Stobaeus Eclog. Ethic, p. 178. edit. Plant. To which may be added what Seneca says concerning it, de Clem. lib. 2. cap. 6 et 7. where he endeavours to explain and apologize for the Stoi- cal doctrine on this head (o). *' Mercy, (says he,) is the vice or fault of souls that are too favourable to misery, which if any one requireth of a wise man, he may also require of him lamentations and groans." — To shew that a wise man ought not to pardon he observes, that " pardon is a remis- {n) Stanley's Hist. Philosoph. p. 468. second edit. Lond. (o) Misericordia vitium est animorum nimis miseriae faven- tium: quam siquis a sapiente exigii, prope est utlameutatmnem exigat, et in alienis funeribus gemiius. At quare non i^^noscat dicam: constiluamus nuoc quoque, quid sit venia, ut sciamus dari illam a sapiente non debere. Venia est poenae meriiae re- missio — ei ignoscitur qui puniri debuit bupiens autem nihil fach, quod non debet, nihil praetermirtit quod deb^t. Itaque paenam quam exigere debet, non donat. Sed iliud quod eX venia consequi vis, honestiori tibi via tiibuil. — Parcii enim sapiens, consulit et corrii^it. Idem facit quod si i^nosceret, nee ignoscit: quoniam qui ignoscit, fatetur aliquid se quod fieri de- buit omisisse — ignoscere autem est, qu) Laert. ubi supra, segm. 10, 11. (a) Cicero, in one of the best of his works, joins Aristippus ivilh S»c rates, and represents them both as excellent and extra- ordinary persons of divine endowments, De Offic. lib. i. cap. 41, Chap. XI. to Self -Government considered. . 189 tliral inference, that if those rigid teachers of morals passed so wrong a judgment in a case like this, in which the law of namre seems to be very clear, this ^^ffords a plain proof that they were not to be depended upon for sound instruc- tions in morality: and that if men were left merely to in- terpret the law of nature as they themselves thought agree- able to reason, without any other or higher guide, they might be apt to judge wrong in matters of great conse- quence. That famous Stoic Chrysippus, as we are told by Sextus Empiricus (^), held, that carnal commerce of father and daughter, of mother and son, of brother and sister, has nothing in it contrary to reason: for which he quotes Chry- sippus's book De Republica. Laertius gives the same ac- count, and quotes that book of Chrysippus for it, and says, that he asserts it in others of his treatises (m). The same thing is affirmed by Plutarch, who produces a passage from a work of Chrysippus, which is full to this purpose; where he argues from its being practised by the brutes, that there is nothing in it absurd or contrary to nature (x), Laertius farther acquaints us, that Chrysippus was censured for hav- ing in his commentary on the antient physiology, written obscene things conctrning Jupiter and Juno, such as be- came pi ostitutes rather than gods (z/j. It appears also from Whatever may be said of Socrates, Aristippus is known to have allowed himself great liberties in all kinds of pleasures. In like manner Epictetus, as has been observed before, gives the high- est encon.iums to Diogenes, and sets him up as a perfect model of virtue. {t) Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. ubi supra. {u) Laert. lib. vii. segm. 188. Concerning the obscenity of Zeno and the Stoics, see Menag. ubi supra, p. 2^7, 278. (r) Plutarch, de Stoic. Repugn. Oper. torn. ii. p. 1044. F. 1045. A. Edit. Xyl. Francof. 1620. (y) Laert. ubi supra. 190 Xhe Stoics notwithstanding their Pretences^VAKT II. Laertius, that Zeno, in his book of the Commonwealth, a book much applauded, and Chrysippus, in a book of the same title, held the community of women, and in this they followed Plato and Diogenes (2). It is not therefore to be wondered at, that, as Sextus Empiricus informs us in a pas- sage before cited, the Stoics thought it not absurd or un- reasonable to cohabit with a harlot, nor to get a living by such practices. But it is but justice to Epictetus and An- toninus to observe, that none of these maxims appear in their writings. Epictetus compares adulterers to wasps, whom all men shun, and endeavour to beat down: and he advises to abstain, as far as possible, from familiarity with women before marriage; but he speaks of it in very soft terms, and does not expressly censure it as a fault, provid- ed a man does it lawfully, i. e. by making use of prostitutes allowed by the laws (a). This may suffice to shew, that the Stoics, notwithstand- ing their glorious pretences, were very loose both in their notions and practices, with regard to that purity which is of so great importance to the good order and dignity of the rational nature; and in several instances laid aside that modesty which seems to be implanted in mankind as a fence against those exorbitant fleshly lusts, which dishonour and defile the soul. Another instance, in which the Stoics seem to have al- lowed too great indulgence to the sensual appetites, relates to the drinking to excess. Zeno himself is said to have been a great drinker (3): and Chrysippjiis died of a surfeit (z) Laert. lib. vii. segm. 131. (a) Epict. Dissert, book ii. chap. 4. et Enchirid. chap. 33. Miss Carter's translation. (6) La«rt. lib. vii. segm. 26. See also Menagius's Observa- tions on Laertius, p. 276. edit. Wetstcn. Chap. "^1. gave great Indulgence to the sensual Passions, 191 of drinking sweet wine too freely at a sacrifice, to which he was invited by his scholars (c). Cato of Utica, who was thought to have arrived to the perfection of virtue, appears to have been > addicted to it. Plutarch says, ,he often spent whole nights in drinking (^). Seneca, in his tract De Tran- quillitate Animi, cap. ult. recommends not only " liberalior potio," a drinking more freely than ordinary on some oc- casions, but that "nonnunquam ad ebrietatcm veniendum,"^^ we must sometimes carry it even to drunkenness: and he proceeds to make an apology for it. He observes, that So- lon and Arcesilas indulged themselves in it. And he had said before, that Cato relaxed himself with wine, when he was fatigued with the cares of the public; and he after- wards owns, that he was charged with drunkenness. " Ca- toni ebrietas objecta est." But that it would be easier to prove that drunkenness is. a virtue, t]^an that Cato was guilty of a base or vicious thing. " At facilius efficiet, quisquis objecerit, hoc crimen honestum, quam turpem Ca- tonem." The Stoics held that the wise man might be ine- briated, but not overcome: his body might be disordered with win«, but it could not hurt his mind. They maintained, as Mr. Upton, cited by Miss Carter, observes, that their wise man was a perfect master of himself, when he was in a fever or in drink. And indeed Epictetus seems to repre- sent it as the prerogative of a man arrived at the perfection of wisdom, that he is unshaken by error and delusion, not only when awake, but when asleep, when warmed with wine, when diseased with the spleen (e). Another instance of great importance, relating to the duty incumbent upon us with regard to ourselves, and in (c) Laert. lib. vii. segm. 184. {d) See Plutarch, in the life of Cato Minor. (e) Dissert, book ii. chap. 17. sect. 2, 192 The Stoical Doctrine Part IL which the Stoics fell into a dangerous error, was their doc- trine of suicide or self-murder. Others of the philosophers were faulty in this respect, but it was in a particular manner the avowed doctrine of the Stoics. They asserted, that in some cases it was not only lawful, but a duty, for a wise man to dispatch himself. This they call 8yA«y«» ilxyayiiv^ an exit agreeable to reason; when a man has a just cause of de- parting out of life. And Zeno the founder of the Stoic school declares, that it is reasonable for a man to put an end to his own life, not only for the sake of his friend, or of his country, but " if he be under any severe pain or tor- I ment, or is maimed in his limbs, or labours under any in- I curable disease. Kciv h (rKXn^an^x ymviTxi «6Ay>j3o'w, n uvi^aria-tv 5 virctf «»<«eT«), Cleanthes did the same on account of a painful disorder in his gums (c). What Cato did is well known: and Plutarch says, that the laws enacted by the Stoa, had induced many wise men to kill themselves, that they may be more happy (^). Here, is a remarkable instance of the deficiency of the Stoic morality in a capital point of great importance. What rendered this doctrine peculiarly wrong and absurd in the Stoics was, that they held virtue to be perfectly sufficient to its own happiness: that the wise man is happy in the highest degree under the greatest outward calamities and suflFer- ings: and that bodily pains and diseases, poverty, reproach, &c. which the world calls evils, are really no evils at all: and yet they taught, that a wise man may, and sometimes ought to put an end to his own life, to deliver himself from them: i. e. to put an end to a life which is perfectly happy, in order to free himself from things, which, according to them, are no evils, and cannot in the least disturb or di- (a) Laert. lib. vii. segm. 28. {b) Lucian. in Macob. Oper. torn. II. p. 473. » < (c) Laert lib. vii. et Lucian ubi supra. {d) Plut. de commun. notit. advers. Stoic. Oper. torn. II. p. i063.C. 198 The Stoical Doctrme Part II. minish his happiness. Plutarch exposes them on this head with a great deal of justice and smartness. Epicurus, who had his wise man as well as the Stoics, agrted with them in opinion, that it was proper for a man to put an end to his own life when he judged it reasonable to do so, or when the pains and miseries of life became insupporta- ble (^). And in this he was more consistent with himself than the Stoics; since he looked upon pain to be the greatest evil, and therefore might have recourse to death to get rid of it: though, as he most unarcoantably pretended to the secret of being completely happy under the severest pains and torments, he ought not, one should think, to have ad- vised any man by putting an end to this present life, to put an end to his happiness, since he had no other life in view. The Indian Gymnosophists acted in this matter upon nobler principles, though they were much mistaken in the application of them. Remarkable is the account Porphyry- gives of them in his fourth book de Abstinentia. After having honoured them with the highest encomiums, that they were famous and just persons, and ^to(r6(p»i^ divinely wise, he tells us, that " they endure the term of life with reluctance, as a necessary ministry to nature, and hasten to get their souls at liberty from their bodies; and when they appear to be in health, and have no evil upon them to urge them to it, they freely depart out of this life, telling others before-hand of their intention, who far from hindering them account them happy, and give them commissions to their d-eceased friends. After which they give up their bodies to the fire, that the so\il may be separated as pure as possible from the body, and thus singing hymns they expire (y^)*" (e) Cic. de Finib. lib. i. cap. 15. (/) Porphyr. de Abstin. lib. iv. Chap. XI. of Suicide considered. 199 This is certainly a great abuse of a noble principle, the be- lief of an immortal happiness in a future state: and it shews how apt the best and wisest among the Heathens were to fall into mistakes in very important points of morality; since they who were looked upon as having arrived at an extraordinary degree of wisdom, purity, and virtue, really f committed self-murdtr, under the notion of an eminent and heroic act of piety (^). flow greatly therefore should it recommend the scheme of religion laid down in the holy Scriptures, which at the same time that it raiseth good men to the most lively hopes of a blessed immortality, and ani- (^) Many authors have taken notice of the famous Indian phi- losopher Calanus, who voluntarily burned himself before Alex- ander the Great. And ihe same customs continue among many of the Pai^an Indians to this day. We are told concerning the disciples of Fo in China, that many of them having a disrelish for the present state of existence, seek the means of procuring a better as soon as possible, by putting. an end to their own lives*. The Bramins esteem those to be heroic and purified souls who contemn life and die generously, either by casting themselves from a precipice, or leaping into a kindled pile, or throwing themselves under the holy chariot-wheels, to be crushed to death, when the Papjods are carried about in proces- sion through the townf. And it is related of the ancient inhabi- tants of the Canary Islands, who worshipped the sun and stars, that on solemn festivals kept in honour of the deity they adored, in a temple seated on the brink of a mountain, they threw them- selves down into a vast depth, out of a religious principle, danc- ing and singing, their priests assuring them that they should enjoy all sorts of pleasures after such a noble deathl:. * See a tract of a Chinese philosopher in Du Halde's History of Chiiia, vol. III. p. 272. English translation. * t Xavier's Life, by F. Bouhours, cited by Millar in his History of the Propagation of Christianity, vol. II. p. 138. t Millar, ibid. p. 132 200 The Stoical Doctrine Part II* mates them to a patient and chearful enduring the greatest sufferings and torments, and even death itself, when called to it in a just cause, and for the defence of truth and righteousness, forbids us to put a voluntary end to our own lives! In this as well as other instances it furnisheth us with the most exalted idea of true piety and virtue, without running into any unwarrantable extremes. It is true, that there were some great philosophers among the Pagans who did not appro\e suicide. Seneca, even where he argues in favour of it, acknowledges that there were some among those that professed wisdom, who denied that any violence was to be offered by men to their own lives; and affirmed that it was a wicked thing for any man to be the murderer of himself. " Invenies etiam professos sapientiam, qui vim offerendam vitse suae negant, et nefas judicant ipsum interemptorem sui fieri (A)." Pythagoras taught that a man was placed in a certain watch or post, which it was his duty not to desert without the orders of the great commander, that is God. "Vetat Pythagoras," says Cicero, "injussu intemperatoris, id est Dei, de prse- sidio et statione vitx decedere (0*'* This was also the doc- trine of Socrates and Plato, as appears from his Phsedo. Socrates there observes, that the gods take care of us, and that we may be regarded as their possession and property^ and that as any man would take it ill, if any of his slaves should dispatch himself that he might escape his service, it is reasonable to suppose in like manner, that no man ought to depart out of life, till God has laid a necessity upon him to do so; as he did then upon Socrates. And he there also represents it, as what was taught in the izro^pviTx, or mys- (A) Sen. epist. 70. (/) Cic. Cato Major, cap. 2Q. Chap. XI. of Suicide considered. 201 teries, that we are here in a kind of prison or custody; and that no man ought to break out of it, or run away without a lawful discharge (^). And indeed it is not to be wondered at that this doctrine was taught in the mysteries, consider- ing that they were under the direction of the civil magis- trates, and that suicide is pernicious to society. And ac- cordingly Virgil, in his sixth ^neid, which, as a celebrated writer has shewn, was probably formed upon the plan of the mysteries, represents those that offered violence to their own lives, as in an unhappy condition in the subterraneous regions. "Proxima deinde tenent moesti loca, qui sibi lethum Insontes peperere manu, vitamque perosi Projecere animas Qudm vellent aethere in alto Nunc et pauperiem, el duros perferre laboresl" jEneid. VI. ver. 434, &c. The Attic laws appointed, that the hand of the self-murderer should be cut off, and that it should be buried apart (/). Among the Thebans, those who had killed themselves were burned with infamy (m). The Roman civil laws ordered, that those " qui mala conscienta sibi manus intulerant," should not be lamented by their relations, and that their wills should not be valid. And yet they gave too much al- lowance to suicide; for, as Ulpian has it, " Quod si quis tsedio vitae, vel valetudinis adversae impatientia et jactatione, ut quidam philosophi, mortem sibi consciverunt, in ea causa sunt, ut eorum testamenta valeant (w)." So that if they kill- er) Plato Opera, p. 2>77. D. edit. Lugd. 1590. (/) Sam. Petit, in Leg. Attic, lib. vii. tit. 1. p. 522. (w) Zenobius ex Aristot. apud S. Petit, ibid. (n) Ulpian in Leg. VL De injusto, rupto, irrito facto Testa- mento, et Paulus Jurisconsultus in Lege 45. De Jure Fisci. Vol. IL 2 C - ' 202 The Stoical Doctrine Part IL ed themselves through weariness of life, or from impatience under sickness, or from a principle of vain-glory, as some philosophers did, they were to be excused from the penalty. To which the famous lawyer Paulus adds as a reason for suicide, the shame of being in debt, " pudorem seris alieni." That great magistrate and philosopher Cicero seems to be not quite consistent with himself in what he delivereth upon this subject. In the passage cited above from his Cato Ma- jor, he approves the opinion of Pythagoras. But still more clearly in his dream of Scipio, v/here he makes Paulus tell Scipio, " Except God shall free thee from the bonds of this body, there can be no entrance for thee into this place," i. e. into heaven. And he adds, "■ That therefore it was his duty, and that of all pious persons, to endeavour to keep the soul in the body as in custody, and not to depart out of this life without his orders who gave us our souls, lest we should seem to have quitted the work and office which God hath assigned us (o)." To the same purpose, in the first book of his Tusculan Disputations, Cicero says, that God forbids us to depart hence, and to desert our station, except he commands us to do so: but then he adds, that " when God himself gives a just cause of departure, then a wise man may go joyfully out of his prison, as if dismissed by law and the orders of the magistrate." And this he supposes to be there the case of Cato. This is to give a licence to sui- cide in several cases, and leaves it to men themselves to in- (o) " Nisi Deus istis te corporis vinculis liberaverit hue tibi aditus patere non potest. — Quare et tibi et piis omnibus retinen- dus est animus in custodia corporis: nee iiijussu ejus, a quo ille est nobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum est, ne munus humanum assignatum a Deodefugisse videamur." In Som. Scip, cap. 3. Cicer. Oper. Gronov. p. 1408. Lugd. Bat. Chap. XI. of Suicide considered* 203 terpret the circumstances they are in as an express order from God to destroy themselves; which may be of perni- cious consequence (/>). In his Offices, speaking of men's acting suitably to their different characters, their stations, and geniuses, he says, that in consequence of this, one man may be obliged to make away with himself, whilst another, though like him in other circumstances, may be obliged to the contrary. And he vindicates Cato's killing himself, as what was suited to his character, and that it became him. rather to die, than to see the face of the tyrant (jq). And in the fifth book of his Tusculan Disputations, having spoken of death as a safe harbour and refuge from all cala- mities, he declares, that in his opinion " that law ought to be observed in life, which obtained among the Greeks in their banquets, either let a man drink, or go off and quit the company. — So (says he) when you cannot bear the injuries of fortune, you may by fleeing from them leave them be- hind you." — " Mihi quidem in vita servanda videtur ilia lex quse in Grsecorum conviviis obtinet, aut bibat, aut abeat. — Sic injurias fortunse, quas ferre nequeas, defugien- do relinquas (r)." I shall only add one passage more. It is in one of his epistles, where, writing to his friend Papirius Psetus, he seems to plead for it, as in some cases not only lawful but commendable, and praises Cato's killing himself as a glorious action. " Ceteri quidem, Pompeius, Lentulus tuos, Scipio, Afranius, foede perierunt: at Cato prseclare. Jam istuc quidem si volumus licebit («)." This is a remark- able instance of the uncertainty the ablest of the Heathen {ii) Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 30. (glDe Offic. lib. i. cap. 31. (r) Tuscul. Disput lib. v. cap, 40, 41. C«) Epist. lib. ix. epist. 18. 204 The Stoical Doctrine Part 11. philosophers were under in matters of very great conse- quence: and that even where they had a notion of what was agreeable to right, they were ever varying for want of more certain guidance on which they might entirely de- pend (t). The same uncertainty appears in several of the moderns, who profess to be goverened by the law of reason and natu- ral religion. Some of them have pleaded for the lawfulness of suicide. The noted author of the Oracles of Reason, Mr. Blount, practised it on himself: and this practice was jus- tified in the preface of that book: though the writer of that preface, Mr. Gildon, afterwards saw his error, and retracted it in a book he published against the deists, intituled. The Deist's Manual. Some foreign writers have gone the same way. Among the Lettres Persanes, there is one which is particularly desigm^d to apologize for suicide. This is also the intention of a tract published in France not long ago, intituled, Question Royale. And in a periodical paper lately published at Paris, Le Conservateur, an attempt is made to shew that suicide is not contrary to reason, though it is acknowledged to be contrary to religion. The argu- ments in these and some other treatises of the like kind are judiciously answered, and the case of suicide largely consi- dered, in the second tome of La Religion Vengee, ou Re- • (?) The Platonists themselves were not quite agreed with relation to the doctrine of suicide. There are some passages of Plotinus, which seem to allow a good man in some cases to put an end to his own life. And even Plato sometimes expresses himself in a manner that looks that way. Ficinus, who was well acquainted with the writings of both those philosophers, and was strongly prejudiced in their favour, leaves it undetermined, what were their sentiments in this matter. Ficin. in Plotin. p. 84. Chap. XI. of Suicide considered, 205 futation des Auteurs impies, from lettre 10, to lettre 18, a Pans 1757. I cannot quit this subject, which appears to me to be of great importance, without observing, that for a man volun- tarily to put an end to his own life, is an act of impiety against God, tne Author of life,and who alone hath an ab- solute dominion over us. It is not unfitly compared, as was before hinted, by some celebrated antients, to a soldier's deserting his post and station, without the leave of his com- mander or general. Nor can it be pretended, that when we meet with great adversities in life, it is a call from God to quit it; on the contrary, it is a call to the exercise of patience, resignation, and fortitude. The author of our beings has so constituted our bodies, that as it is not in our power to con- tinue in life as long as we please, so neither does it depend upon ourselves to put an end to it, except by an act of vio- lence to our nature, which it is not lawful for us to commit. If that law of God which commands us not to kill, obliges us not to take away the life of another man by our own pri- vate will, without lawful authority, much more does it oblige us not to murder ourselves whtn we think fit: since the duty of preserving our own lives is more directly and immedi- ately incumbent upon us than the preserving the lives of others. And hence the right a man hath to kill another, when it is necessary to his own defence. Suicide is also contrary to the duties a man owes to the society. It is mistake to imagine that any man is absolutely " sui juris" at his own disposal. He is not only under the dominion of God the Su- preme Lord, to whom he is accountable, but as a member of society bears a relation to his king, his country, his fami- ly, and is not at liberty to dispose of his life as he himself pleases. If this were the natural right of one man, it would be so of another: and so every man would have a right to put an end to his own life, whenever he thinks proper, and 206 The Stoical Doctrine Part II. of this, he himself is to be the judge. And if he has a right to kill himself when any great evil befals him, or when he is under the apprehension of it, why might he not have an equal right to kill another who he apprehends has brought evil upon him, or who he fears will do it? And what confusion this would produce in society, I need not take pains to shew. To all which it may be added, ihat for a man to kill him- self, because he is under the apprehension or pressure of some grie\ ous calamit}'^, is, whatsoever may be pretended to the contrary, inconsistent with true fortitude. It is an ar- gument of a pusillanimous soul, that takes unwarrantable methods to flee from a calamity; whereas he ought nobly and patiently to bear it, which is true magnanimity and fortitude. The poet says well: " It is an easy thing to contemn life in adversity: he acts a courageous part, who can bear to be miserable." "Rebus in adversis facile est contemnere vitam: Fortiterille facit, qui miser esse potest." Upon the whole, the practice we have been considering, and which was justified, and in several places even prescribed, by many of the philosophers, especially by the Stoics, the most eminent teachers of morality among the antients, is a practice deservedly rendered infamous by our laws, as being a murder committed by a man upon his own person, in opposition to the most sacred obligations of religion, and to the rights of the community to .which he belongs, and to the strongest i^nstincts of the human nature, wisely implanted in us by the Author of our beings, as a bar to such inhuman practices. The observations which have been made are sufficient to shew that the Stoics are not to be absolutely depended upon in matters of morality. This will further appear from a dis- Chap. XI. of Suicide considered. 207 tinct examination of the main principles on which their mo- ral system is founded, and on the account of which they have been thought to be the most strenuous advocates for the cause of virtue, and to have carried their notion of it to the noblest height. 208 Stoical Scheme of the absolute Part II. CHAPTER XII. The Stoics professed to lead men to perfect happiness in this present life, abstract- ing from aU consideration of a future state. Their scheme of the absolute sufficien- cy of virtue to happiness, and the itidifFerency of all external things considered. They were sometimes obliged to make concessions which were not very con- sistent with their system, Thfir philosophy in its rigour not reducible to prac- tice, and had little influence either on the people or on themselves. They did not give a clear idea of the nature of that virtue which they so highly extolled. The loose doctrine of many of the Stoics, as well as other philosophers, with regard to truth and lying. 1 HE professed design of the whole Stoical scheme of mo- rality was to raise men to a state of complete felicity. This, indeed, was what all the philosophers pretended to; and Ci- cero represents this as the principal thing which induced men to spend so much time and pains in the study of it. (w). But none of them made such glorious pretences this way as the Stoics, nor spoke of virtue in such high terms as they did. They maintained, that virtue alone, without any out- ward advantages, is sufficient to a life of perfect happiness in this present state. And to support this scheme, they as- serted that all outward things are indifferent, and nothing at all to us: y^h lar^oe, ^uoii. Indiffi^rent things, ret a^iei^o^ety as La- ertius represents the sense of the Stoics (:v), neither profit nor hurt us; of this kind are life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, riches, honour, nobility; and their contraries, such as death, sickness, pain, deformity, poverty, dishonour, &c. (77) Cic. de Finib. lib. iii. cap. 3. Et Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 1. {x) Laert. lib. v'.i. segm. 105, 106. Chap. XII. sufficiency of Virtue to Happiness. 209 And again, that those things are indifterent, which are nei- ther good nor evil, neither to be desired nor shunned, con- ducing neither to happiness nor unhappiness. In this sense, all things are ilidifFc^rent, which are between virtue and vice* No philosopher ever carried the Stoic notion in this matter farther than Epictetus. It it a principle which runs through his whole system, and most of his magnificent precepts are built upon it, that nothing is good or evil, but what is in the power of our own wills: that none of the things without us are either profitable or hurtful: that neither life nor death, health nor sickness, bodily pain nor pleasure, neither afflu- ence nor poverty, honour or ignominy, neither the having wife, children, friends, possessions, nor the want or loss of them, are to be the objects of our desires or aversions, they are nothing to us, nor of the least moment to our happiness. Agreeable to this is the idea the Stoics give of him whom they call a wise man: that he has all his goods within him- self, wants nothing, never fails of obtaining what he desires, is never subj ct to any disappointment; because he never has a desire or aversion to any thing but what is in his own power; nor can any outward calamity touch him, whether of a public or private nature. And what is especially to be ob- served, they assert, that he is pt- rfectly happy even in the extremity of torments and sufferings. This is the principle upon which they chiefly valued themselves, and were admir- ed by others. Ctcero represents their opinion thus, concern- ing the wise or virtuous man: ''That suppose him to be blind, infirm, labouring under the most grievous distemper, banished from his country, bereaved of his children or friends, in indig- ice, tortured upon the rack, he is in that instant, and in those circumstances, not onlv happy, but hap- py in the highest degree (z/)." And this happiness^they suppos- (y) " Sit idem [sapiens"] csccus, debilis, morbo gravissimo ad- Vol. II. 2D 210 Stoical Scheme of the absolute Part II# cd to be wholly in a man s own power, and entirely owing to virtue itself; that it is sufficient merely by its own intrinsic force and excellence to produce and secure an independent felicity, without any foreign support, and abstracting from all consideration of a future state or recompence. This was in reality making an idol of their own virtue, and erecting it into a kind of divinity. And accordingly their scheme, as was before observed, sometimes betrayed them into a way of talkinp; which bordered upon profaneness; as if theirwise man was equal in virtue and happiness with God himself. The Peripatetics agreed with the Stoics in affirming, that virtue is the greatest good, and that a wise and good man is happy under the severest bodily torments. But they would not al- low, that in that case he was most happy, or happy in the highest degree. Thus it is that Cicero represents their sense, in the fifth book of his Tusculan Disputations, where he ar- gues pretty largely against those who supposed that a wise and good man is " happy" in such circumstances, but not "most happy:" ^'beatum esse, at non beatissimum (z)." He thinks, that he who wants any thing that is requisite to an happy life, cannot with any propriety be said to be happy at all: " Si est quod desit, ne beatus quidem est:" that happi- ness includes the full possession and enjoyment of all good things, without any evil joined to it or mixed with it: and that if any thing relating to the body or outward circumstan- ces were good, a wise man could never be sure of being hap- py, because these out»vard things are not in his own pow- er {a). In this the Stoics seem to have had the advantage fectus, exsul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: quem hunc ad- pellat Zeno? Beatum, inquit, etiam beatissimum." De Finib. lib. V. cap. 28. p. 427. edit. Davis. (z) See particularly Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 8. et cap. 14. et seq. (a) Ibid. cap. 10. p. 365. edit. Davis. Ghap. XII. sufficiency of Virtue to Happiness* 211 of the Peripatetics. They both agreed that wise and good men are happy in this present state: for in their disquisitions on this subject, a future state of happiness was never brought into the accou-nt. They also agreed, that this happiness was in every wise and good man's own power. But the Stoics plainly saw, that it was not in any man's power to obtain external advantages when he pleased, or to attain to a per- fect freedom from all outward pains and troubles. And there- fore they would not allow that external things are either good or evil, or have the least concernment with the happi- ness of human life. This, though contrary to nature and experience, yet was a consistent scheme, which that of the Peripatetics was not. Cato, in arguing against the Peripa- tetics, urges, that if they allowed pain to be an evil, it would follow that a wise man could not be happy when tortured up- on the rack: whereas, according to those who denied pain to be an evil, a wise man kept the happiness of his life unvio- lated in the severest torments (Ji). He there takes it for granted on all sides, that a wise man is happy on the rack, and treats it as an absurdity to suppose the contrary. And indeed, this seems to have been a principle common to all the philosophers, and it was looked upon as shameful to de- ny it. Hence it was, that Epicurus himself, that he might not come behind them in a glorious way of talking, though in his system pain was the greatest evil, asserted that a wise man would be perfectly happy in Phalaris's bull. Theophras- tus, indeed, one of the most eminent of the Peripatetic phi- losophers, was sensible of the absurdity of this. He thought, (b) " An vero certius quicquam potest esse quam illorum ra- tione qui dolorem in malis ponunt, non posse sapientem beatum esse cum eculeo torqucdtur? Eorum autem, qui dblorem in ma- ils non habent, ratio certe cogit, uti in omnibui tormends con- servetur vita beata sapientis." Apud Cic. de Finib. lib. iii. cap. 13.p. 239. edit. Davis. 212 Virtue alone not absolutely sufficient to Part II. as Cicero informs us, that " great external calamities, pains and torments, were absolutely incompatible with a happy- life: and that it was a contradiction to suppose, that the same man could be happy, and oppressed with many evils." Yet, as Cicero intimates, he durst not speak his mind clear- ly, and was blamed by all the other philosophers, for seem- ing to suppose, though he did not directly affirm, that a wise man could not be happy on the rack, or under the severest torments (c). What led the philosophers in general into this way of ta king, was with a view to extol the high advan- tages of their philosophy as the only infallible way to make men completely happy, and raise them a'oove all outward evils. This is the account Cicero gives of what philosophy- makes profession of, that " every man who obeys its dictates shall be alwavs armed against the attacks of fortune, and shall have in himself all the helps necessary to a good and happy life: and finally, that he shall be always happy (<3?)." Such were the glorious pretences of the Pagan philosophy. Their whole scheme was founded on the supposition of at- taining to the perfection of virtue and happiness in this pre- sent state: and this involved them in inextricable difficulties, how to reconcile those high pretences with experience, and the presnt appearances of things. It is manifest, that the virtue of the best men is at pre- sent mix^r^d with weaknesses and dc fects. Or, if it were never so perfect in itself, it meets with many obstacles in a (c) De Finib. lib. v. cap. 26. p. 261. Et Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 9. p. 361. edit Davis. (c/) " Nam quid profitetur [philosophia]? O dii bonil perfec- turam se, qui legibus suis paruisset. ut esset contra fortunam semper armatus. ct omnia praesidia haheret in se be ne beateque Vivendi, ut esset semper denique beatus." Tuscul. Disput. lib. v. cap. 7. p. 357. Chap. XII. complete Happiness in this present State. 218 world full of vice and disorder, and cannot exert itself as it would, nor produce the effects it is naturally fitted to produce, and which it would actually produce in a better state of things. Many are the temptations and snares to which our virtue is here exposed, and which it requires a constant care and vigilance to guard against, as well as to keep all our appetites and passions under a perfect subjec- tion to the law of religion and reason. And as we are united to others by many social ties, their calamities often by a tender sympathy become our own; and in such cases and circumstances, even our virtue and benevolence itself, except we cast off all human affections, will be apt to pro- duce uneasy feelings. To which may be added, the many hindrances arising from the body, its pains, weaknesses, diseases, and languors; which by the present constitution of our nature, cannot but greatly affect our minds, and often have such an influence, as to fill the whole soul with black and dismal ideas. And this has frequently happened to virtuous and excellent persons under the power of an habitual prevailing melancholy. Or, if we put the case of a good man's being exposed to a series of the most bitter persecutions and sufferings for the cause of truth and righte- ousness, to pretend that in these circumstances he is per- fectly happy by the mere force and sufficiency of his own virtue, without any foreign assistances or any future hopes, is a visionary scheme, contrary to reason and nature. So far is it from being true, that human virtue is of itself alone sufficient to render a man completely happy in such circumstances, that it would not hold true, if such a sup- position could possibly be admitted, even with resp. ct to the divine nature. That God is perfectly happy Is a prin- ciple acknowledged by all that believe a Deity. But who would account him perfectly happy, though never so per- fect in moral excellence, if he were subject to pain or ex- ternal violence, or to those inconveniencies and sufferings 214 Virtue alone not absolutely siifficient to Part II. to which good men are liable in this present state, and which often by the allowance of the Stoics themselves, make it reasonable for them to put an end to their own lives? And indeed there cannot be a more manifest proof of the vanity of their pretences than this, that they who professed so absolute a contempt of all external things, and declared in their solemn addresses to God that they were able to bear whatsoever he should see fit to lay upon them, frequently recommend self-murder as a remedy to free them from external calamities. " It is remarkable," says Miss Carter, " that no sect of philosophers ever so dogma- tically prescribed, or so frequently practised suicide, as those very Stoics, who taught that the pains and sufferings which they sought to avoid by this act of rebellion against the decrees of Providence, were no evils. How absolutely this horrid practice contradicted all their noblest principles of resignation and submission to the Divine Will, is too evident to need any enlargement (^)." Indeed this seems to shew that their affected contempt of all outward things, was, for the most part, little more than a pompous osten- tation of high-sounding words. Epicurus himself, as hath been already observed, spoke as magnificently of a wise man's being happy in the severest torments, as the Stoics did. It is no hard matter to put on an air of grandeur in the expressions. But where there is no prospect of a future recompence or happiness, this magnanimity has not a solid foundation to support it, or can only have an effect on a very few minds of a particular constitution. The Stoics after all their high talk of the absolute in- differency of all external things, found themselves obliged to make some concessions which were not very consistent (e) See Miss Carter's introduction to her translation of Epic- tetus, sect. 26. Chap. XII, complete Happiness in this present State. 215 with the rigor of their principles; and which involved them in seeming contradictions. Plutarch takes great advantage of this for exposing them in his two treatises of the Con- tradictions of the Stoics, and of Common Conception against the Stoics. Cato in Cicero's third book de Finib. after having laid it down as a principle, that that only is good which is honest, and that only is evil which is base; " Solum esse bonum quod honestum est, et id malum so- lum quod turpe;" sets himself largely to shew, that with regard to other things, which the Stoics would not allow to be cither good or evil, or to contribute in the least to render life happy or wretched, there is, notwithstanding, a real difference between them: so that some of them were aestimabilia, as he calls them, that is, fit to have some value put upon them, others the contrary; and he positively affirms, as what cannot be doubted, that of those which they called middle or indifferent things, i. e. neither good nor evil, some are to be chosen or taken, others to be rejected (y): and that some of these things are se- cundum naturam, according to nature, others are con- trary to nature. The same account of the Stoical doc- trine is given by Laertius (^). Cicero observes in his first book of laws, that what the Peripatetics, and those of the Old Academy, called bona, good things, were called by the Stoics, commoda, commodious or convenient things; what the former called mala, evil things, the latter called incommoda, incommodious or disagreeable: from which he concludes, that they changed the names of things, when the things themselves continued the same (Ji), (/) " Non dubium est, quin ex his quae media' dicimus, sit aliud sumendum, aliud rejiciendum." Apud Cic. de Finib. lib. iii. cap. 18. p. 254. "» {g) Laert. lib. vii. segm. 102. {h) Cic. de Leg, lib. i. cap, 13. et cap. 21. 216 The Stoics obliged to make Concessions Part I L And in his fourth book de Finib. h- undertakes to prove at large, that the Stoics and Peripatetics, if narrowly ex- amined, differed more in the manner of expression than in the thing itself, (z) But the same great author seems to assert in his Offices, that there was a real difference between them, and gives the Stoical system the preference to that of the Peripatetics (Ji), If there was a real difference between the Stoics and Peripatetics, it seems to have consisted principally in this, that though the Peripatetics allowed, that virtue is the highest good, yet they held that the commodities of life, which they called good things, contributed in some degree to human happiness. But the Stoics would not allow that these things were of the least moment to happiness, and asserted that with respect to the happiness of life, all out- ward things were nothing, and of no concernment to us at all. This indeed was necessary to support their system con- cerning the absolute felicity and independency of their wise and virtuous man. But it is contrary to nature and expe- rience ( / ). Nor can I well conceive how the Stoics could allow, as they did, external things to be commodious for us, or the contrary, if they had no influence at all to pro- (i) See particularly de Finib. lib. iv. cap. 6. et cap. 8. et 9. {k) De Offic. lib i. cap. 24 et lib. iii. cap. 4. (/) Aristotle's opinion, which was generally followed by the Peripatetics, was, that though virtue is the greatest good, yet outward good things are necessary to happiness: for that nature is npt self-sufficient, the body must be in health, and men must have the necessaries and conveniencies of life. See his Ethic' ad Nicom. lib. 10. cap. 9. oper. torn II. p. 140, C. edit. Paris 1629. et Magn. Moral, lib. 2. cap. 8. ibi i. p. 184. D In this matter Posidonius and Panaetius, two eminent Stoics, quitted the docU'ines of their sect. They denied that virtue alone is sufficient for beatitude, and affirmed that it requires the assistance of health, strength, and necessaries. Laeit. lib. vii. segm. 128. Chap. XII. not very consistent with their Principles. 217 mote or to obstruct human happiness. These philosophers themselves did not pretend to deny, that man is an animal compounded of body and soul: and from thence it follows that that which is good or evil for the compound, may be properly said to be good or evil to man in his present state. Marcus Antoninus says, that " pain is either an evil to the body, and then let the body pronounce it to be an evil, or to the soul: but the soul can maintain her own serenity and calm; and not conceive pain to be an evil (w)." But if the body pronounces pain to be an evil, the soul as united to the body feels and pronounces it to be so. Cato in explaining the doctrine of the Stoics, says, " Ic is ma- nifest that we have a natural abhorrence of pain:" '' Per- spicuum est natura nos a dolore abhorrere (z?)" And how the Stoics could consistently acknowledge this, and \ et not own it to be an evil, or assert that men may be perfectly happy under it, is hard to see. Cicero observes that the Stoics said, that " pain is sharp, troublesome, odious, hard to be borne, contrary to nature," but would not call it evil: and he adds, speaking to Cato, " you deny that any man can have true fortitude, who looks upon pain to be an evil: but why should not that man have as much fortitude, as he that owns it to be grievous, and scarce to be endured, as you yourself grant it is? For timidity arises not from names, but from things (<, to ^l/SXct^t^ov utr^^h (y ). Since, therefore, both he and others of the philosophers held that a lie in many cases is profitable, they must hold that a lie is often xaAov, honestum. But that excellent (c) Platon. Opera, p. 460. D. edit. Lugd. 1590. (d) Stob. Eclog Ethic, lib. ii. p. 183. edit. Plantin. (e) Max. Tyr. dissert. 3. p. 35. edit. Oxon. 1678. (/) Plato Repubi. v. Oper. p. 459. D. E. edit. Lugd. It is to be observed, that Plato there makes use of this maxim, to vindi-. cate the women's appearing naked at the public exercises, which he looked upon to be decent, because in his opinion it was profitable for the connnonweahh. Chap. XII. Philosophers respecting Truth and Lying, 227 emperor and philosopher Marcus Antoninus, from the ge- nerosity of his nature, judged better in this, as well as se- veral other instances, than most of the other philosophers. He says, that a wise and good man should say and do no- thing falsely and insincerely, hi^'^vTf^Utiti xu} f^i^' vTreK^/rwi, that the mind should be just, and the speech so as never to tell a lie; Aoy«5 «<«? fA^Trore ^lec-^ivrcttrB-ar, and that he who lies willingly is guilty of impiety (^). Some of our modern admirers of the law of nature fall short of thia great philo- sopher in this respect, and seem to allow nothing comely or venerable in truth, in itself considered, but to judge of it merely by profit or convenience (/?). I have now finished the enquiry I proposed into the state of the antient Heathen world, with regard to a rule of moral duty. 1 have considered the doctrine of morals as taught by their most eminent legislators and philosophers in those nations which were most renowned for learning and knowledge. It might have been expected, that as all the main doctrines of morals are built upon the most solid grounds, and when duly considered, are agreeable to right reason, some of those great men would have furnished the world with a complete rule of moral duty, which might be safely depended upon. But it appears that in fact it was otherwise, and that the most celebrated of them mistook or perverted the law of nature in matters of great impor- tance (f). I think, therefore, it must be acknowledged that (g) Anton. Medit. book ii. sect. 17. and book iv. sect. 33. and 49. and book ix. sect. 1. (h) See particularly what Dr. Tindal says upon it', whose doc- trine on this head is fully considered. Answer to Christianity as old as the Creation, Vol. I. chap. vii. ^ (z) No particular notice has been here taken of the philosophers of the Alexandrian school, or of the sacred succession, as they 228 The loose Doctrine of the Stoics a?id other Part II. Mr. Locke was not in the wrong in asserting, that " what- ever was the cause, it is evident in fact, that human reason, unabsisted, failed in its great and proper business of mo- rality. It never from unquestionable principles, by clear deductions, made out an entire body of the law of na- ture (/^)." The same excellent author, who was himself a great master of reason, and far from denying it any of its just prerogatives, observes, that "it should seem by the little that has been hitherto done in it, that it is too hard a task for unassisted reason, to establish morality in all its parts, with a clear and convincing light (/)." But whatever he supposed concerning this, what he afterwards observes cannot be reasonably denied, that " be the cause what it will, our Saviour found mankind under a corruption of manners and principles, which age after age had prevailed, and must be confessed was not in a way or tendency to be mended — The rules of morality were in different countries v/ere called, who flourished a considerable time after Christianity had made its appearance. Some of them had noble notions of morality. But 'hey cannot be properly brought as/proofs of what unassisted reason can do in morals: since it is £;enerally agreed among the learned, that they were acquainted with the Holy Scriptures, and with the doctrines and morals of Christianity, of which they made their own advantage, though they would not acknowlcdee the obligation. But as to this, I would refer the reader to what has been obset ved in the first volume of this work, at the latter part of the 2 1st chapter. (k) See Mr. Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, in his Works. Vol. 11. p. 532 3d edit. ' (I) Mr. Locke, Ibid. There is a remarkable passage to the same purpose in an author who has shown himself far from being prejudiced in favour of Religion. Mor. Philos. Vol. I. p. 143, 144. I have already cited this passage in the Preliminary Discourse, p. 7, 8. Chap. XII. Philosophers respecting Truth and Lying. 229 and sects different, and natural reason no where had nor was like to cure the defects and errors in them (m)." This could only he effectually done by a Divine Revelation, and ho»v admirably Christianity was fitted to answer this excel- lent end, I shall now proceed to shew. (m) Locke, ubi supra, p. 534. 230 Deplorable State of the Heathens zvith regard Part 1 1. CHAPTER XIII. The nations were sunk into a deplorable state of corruption, with regard to morals, at the time of our Saviour's appearing. To recover them from their wretched and guilty state to holiness and happiness, one principal end for which God sent his Son into the world. The Gospel Dispensation opened with a free offer of pardon and salvation to perishing sinners, upon their returning to God by faith and repentance, and new obedience: at the same time the best directions and assistances were given to engage them to a holy and vir- tuous practice. The Gospel scheme of morality exceeds whatsoever had beert published to the world before. A summary representation of the excellency of the Gospel precepts with regard to the duties we owe to God, our neigh- bours, and ourselves. Thpse precepts enforced by the most powerful and im- portant motives. The tendency of the Gospel to promote the practice of holi- ness and virtue, an argument to prove the Divinity of the Christian Reve- lation. t ROM the account which hath been given it appears, that the Pagan nations, even those of them which were most learned and civilized, were- sunk about the time of our Sa- viour's coming into the most deplorable corruption in re- gard to morals. God had in his wise and good providence done a great deal to preserve among men a sense and knowledge of their duty, but they had neglected and abused their advantages. By the influence of vicious appetites, cor- rupt habits and customs, and wrong opinions, their moral sense and taste was become greatly depraved. The divine laws which had been originally given to mankind, and the traditions relating to them, were very much obscured and defaced. What passed among them for religion, and which ought to have been the greatest preservative to their morals, was amazingly corrupted. Their manifold idolatries, the rites of their worship, and the examples of their deities, contributed not a little to the general depravity. The laws of their respective countries were by no means fitted to be Chap. XIII. to Morals at our Saviour^s Coming'. 231 an adequate rule of morals, and in many instances allow- ed and even prescribed things not consistent with the purity of religion and virtue. The same may be said of their phi- losophers and moralists: many of them did hurt by their maxims and examples. The best of them were deficient in material points of duty; and they generally countenanced the people in their idolatries, and gave a great loose to sen- sual impurities. And even where they were right, and gave good instructions, their finest sentiments had little weight, and passed only for beautiful speculations of this or that philosopher, but were not looked upon as laws obligatory upon mankind. They had no divine authority to plead, or, if they had pretended it, were not able to produce any proofs or credentials to shew that God had sent them to de- clare his will. In this condition the state of things grew worse and worse: and at the time when the Gospel was published, all kinds of wickedness and dissoluteness of manners had ar- rived to a most amazing height. This is represented in a very striking manner in the first chapter of St. Paul's Epis- tle to the Romans. And the account he gives is attested and confirmed, even with regard to the most shocking part of the description, the monstrous and unnatural vices and impurities which prevailed among them, by undeniable tes- timonies of the most celebrated Pagan writers, philosophers, poetb, and historians. The extreme corruption of manners • in the Heathen world is represented in several other parts of the New Testament. Hence they are said to be " dead in trespasses and sins." And St. John gives this emphatical description of their state, " The whole world lieth in wick- edness (n)." (n) 1 John V. 19. See also Eph. ii. 1, 2, 3. iv. 18, 19. y. 6, 7. 232 Deplorable State of the Heathens with regard Part IL Justly might. God have left the nations to perish in their sins, but in his great mercy he had compassion up^^n therai in this their wretched and lost estate. At the time which had been marked out by a series of illustrious prophecies, and which was in itself the fittest, and when the great need men stood in of an extraordinary interposition in the cause of religion and virtue was most apparent, it pleased God, in his infinite wisdom and goodness, to send his own Son into the world to save and redeem mankind, and to recover them from their guilty and corrupt state to holiness and happiness. God had for a long time suffered the nations to walk in their own ways, without making any new and ex- traordinary discoveries of his will to them. But now he commanded all men every where to repent. The wrath of God was revealed from heaven in the Gospel against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. The clearest dis- coveries were made of the great evil of those idolatries, that wickedness and corruption of all kinds in which mankind were then generally involved. The consequence of this must have been, that when they were thoroughly convinced of the evil of their ways, a sense of their guilt would be apt to fill them with awful thoughts of the divine vengeance justly due to them for their manifold offences. It pleased God, therefore, in his sovereign grace and wisdom, so to order it, that the Gospel Dispensation opened with a free and uni- versal offer of pardoning mercy. They were assured, that upon their returning to God through Jesus Christ, the great Saviour whom he had provided, by -an humble faith and sincere repentance, their past iniquities should be forgiven them, they should be received into the divine favour, and 11, 12. 1 Pet. iv. 3, 4, 1 Thess. iv. 5. and other places to the same purpose. Chap. XIII. to Morals at our Saviour'^s Coming, 233 admitted to the most glorious hopes and privileges. At the same time, the most holy and excellent laws and precepts were given them for instructing and directing them in their duty. And God condescended to deal with them in the way of a gracious covenant, which contained the most clear and express promises of eternal life and happiness as the reward of their sincere persevering obedience. What happy tidings were these to a guilty apostate world, to creatures ready to perish in their sins! And what a glorious display was made of the divine goodness and love to mankind! What the subject I am now upon leads me particularly to consider, is the excellency of the Gospel morality, as de- livered to us in the Sacred writings. The Scriptures of the Old Testament are full of admirable precepts and instruc- tions relating to the duties which God requireth of man. These had been published long before, and as the Jews and their Scriptures were generally dispersed, it is reasonable to conclude that they were of use to many of the Gentiles who had access to them. But the Jews were for the most part very unpopular, and kept separate by distinct rites and usages, and their doctors had by wrong interpretations wrested and perverted the true sense of the law and pro- phets. And even with regard to several of the moral pre- cepts, they had, as our Saviour charges them, made the law void by their traditions, teaching for doctrines the com- mandments of men. One valuable end therefore of his com- ing with such illustrious proofs of his divine authority and mission, was to clear the true sense of the law and the pro- phets, to confirm and establish the moral precepts, and to carry them to a still higher degree of excellence, and give them additional light and force. As he came, to instruct men in the right knowledge of God, and the nature of true religion, so also to set before them a complete rule of moral duty in its just extent, enforced by all the sanctions of a divine authority, and by the most powerful and engaging Vol. IL 2 G 234 One great design of Christian Revelation xvas Part II. motives, and beautifully exemplified in his own sacred life and practice. 1 o consider the evangelical scheme of morality at large, as it justly deserves, would furnish mati'-r for a distinct volume, and could not well be brought wiihm the compass of this work. But it may be of use to set before the reader a summary of it under three principal heads, as relating to the duties required of us with respect to God, our neighbours, and ourselves, which St, Paul expresses by our living soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world. The most eminent part of our duty, which is the first in order and dignity, and gives a binding force to all the rest, is the duty we more immediately owe to God. And as a right idea of the Supreme Bcmg lies at the foundation of the duties we o^ve him, so it is not possible to form more just, more noble, and sublime ideas of the Deity than are held forth to us in the sacred writings, both of the Old Tes- tament and of the New. All the admirable descriptions of the divine nature and attributes, which are to be found in the law and the prophets, do also belong to the religion of Jesus, who hath farther confirmed and improved them. We are taught that there is one only living and true God, who existeth of himself from everlasting to everlasting: that he is a spirit, invisible to a mortal eye, and who is not to be represented by any corporeal form: that he is possessed of all possible perfection, and in him is no variableness, neither shadow of turning (o). That his greatness is unsearchable, hrs understanding is infinite, his power, almighty and irre- (o) The passages of Scripture rehiting to the Divine Nature and Attributes are too many to be here enumerated. I can only point to a very few Exod. iii 14. Deut, vi. 4. Psal. xc. 2. cii, 26. John iv. 24. I Tim. vi. 16. Jam. i. If. Chap. XIII. to give us a perfect rule of Moral Duty, 235 sistible (/?). That at the time which seemed most fit to his own wisdom and gooJnrss he made heaven and earth, and all things that are therein; he only commanded and they were created:^ that he continually uphold-th all things by the word of his power: and in him all things consist (^), That he exerciseth an universal government and Provi- dence over all the orders of bt ings which he hath created. An i particular care is taken to inform us, that though he be infinitely exalted above our highest conceptions, and though it be a condescension in him to regard the most ex^ alted of created beings, yet his care extendeth to the meanest of his creatures. But we are in an especial manner assured, of what it most nearly concerneth us to know, that his providential care extendeth to the individuals of the hu- man race; that he is the author of all the good things we enjoy, and that all the events which befal us are under his direction and superintendency (r). That he fiUeth heaven and earth with his presence, and is not far from any of us, seeing it is in him that we live, move, and have our being: that all things are naked and opened unto him, and there is not any creature that is not manifest in his sight (^). * But above all we are there instructed to form right no- tions of God's illustrious moral perfections: that he is infi- nitely wise, and directeth all things in the best and fittest manner {t)\ and though sometimes clouds and darkness are (Ji) Psal. cxlv. 3. cxlvii. 5. Job xi. 7. xii. 13. {jj) Gen. i. 1.3, &c. Psal. xxxiii. 6, 7, 8, 9. cxlviii. 5. Nehem. ix. 5, 6. Acts xiv. 15. Col. i. 16. Revel, iv. 1 1. (r) Psal. ciii 19. Job iv 18 Psal. cxiii. 5, 6, 7. Psal. cxlv. 15, 16. Matlh. vi. 26. 30. x. 29, 30. 1 Sam. ii. 6, 7, 8. («) Psal. cxxxix. 7 — 12. Jerem. xxiii. 24. Acts xvii. 27, 2 8. Heb iv. 13. (0 Deut. xxxii. 4. 1 Tim. i. 17. 236 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part II. about him, and we cannot penetrate into the reasons of his dispensations, yet he is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works: that he is of invariable faithfulness and truth, and that it is impossible for God to lie (u). That he is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works: and he is continually doing good even to the sinful human race (at). That he is the God, not of the Jews only> but also of the Gentiles: and that with him there is no re- spect of persons, but in every nation he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted of him (z/). The mercy of God towards penitent returning sinners is fre- quently declared both in the Old Testament and in the New, But it is especially in the Gospel that all the riches of di- vine grace are represented in the most engaging manner, and the wonderful love of God towards mankind is most affect ingly displayed in the methods of our redemption and salvation through Jesus Christ. And therefore that most amiable description is there given of him, that " God is love (2)." Yet at the same time, that the riches of the di- vine grace and mercy may not be abused as an encourage- ment to licentiousness, he is every where represented in Scripture as infinitely just and holy: his goodness, as there described to us, is not such a soft indulgence as might encou- rage sinners to transgress his laws with impunity, but is always in conjunction with the most perfect wisdom and righteousness. His just displeasure against sin, and the pu- nishments he will inflict on obstinate impenitent sinners, are represented in a striking manner. And we are assured that (w) Psal. xcvii. 2. cxlv. IT.cxvii. 2. Tit. i. 2. Heb. vi. 18. (x) Psal. cxlv, 9. Matth. v. 45. Acts xiv. 17. (t/) Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7. Psal. Ixxxvi. 9. 15. Is. Iv. 7. Rom. iii. 29. Acts X. 34, 35. 2 Pet. iii. 9. (z) 1 John iv. 8, 9, 10. 16. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures, 237 he will judge the world in righteousness, and render to all men according to their deeds, not merely their outward ac- tions, but the secret dispositions of their hearts («). Such is the idea which is there given us of God and his glorious perfections and attributes: the noblest that can be conceived, and the best fitted to produce worthy affections and dispositions towards him.* And accordingly as in the Gospel we are instructed to form the most becoming no- tions of the Deity, so we have the most excellent directions given us as to the duties we should render to him. We are commanded to love the Lord our God with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength: this our Sa- viour represents as the first and great commandment {b). And what an amiable idea does this give us of religion, as flowing from and comprehended in this divine principle! It includes our having the highest esteem and admiration of his incomparable perfections, and especially of his mar- vellous grace and goodness: that we must rejoice and de- light ourselves in him, and seek for our highest happiness in him alone (c). That we must be animated with a pure zeal for his glory, and must prefer the pleasing and honour- ing him before the gratifying our fleshly inclinations, or promoting our worldly interests, all which we must be rea- dy to abandon when called to do so for his sake, or which is the same thing, for the cause of truth, real religion, and righteousness (jd). Divine love is the source of a holy, in- genuous, delightful obedience. Hence it is declared, that (a) Eccles. xii. 14. Acts xvii. 31. Rom. ii. 9, 10. 16. (b) Deut. vi. 5. Matth. xxii. 37, 38. (c) Psal. xxxvii. 4. Ixxiii. 25. Phil. iv. 4. (rf) Matth. V. 10. X. 37. ^ 238 A Sumary of the Gospel Morality Part II. " this is the love of God, that we keep his command- ments (0*" But then we are also taught, that this love to God, in order to its being of the right kind, must be accompanied with a holy fear of his Divine Majt^sty: a temper highly becoming reasonable creatures, towards the Supreme and absolutely perfect Being, our Almighty Maker, our Sove- reign Lord, and most righteous Governor and Judge. This is of such importance, that the fear of God and real piety are often made use of as terms of the same significa- tion. To serve God with reverence and godly fear is re- presented as essential to a true and acceptable worship (y). And where this prevails, it will be the most effectual pre:>ervative against sin and wickedness, it will produce in us the profoundest siibmission to his divine authority, it will make us afraid, above all things, of offending him, and will raise us above the base and inordinate fear of men is)- It is also required of us, that we exercise a firm trust and confidence in him, and an entire unreserved resignation to his will, from a steady persuasion of his just dominion over us, his power, wisdom, goodness, and all-sufficiency(A). On him we are encouraged to cast all our burdens and cares, to commit ourselves wholly to his disposal, and to acquiesce in all his providential dispensations, being satisfied that he ordereth all things really for the best, and will cause all events to work together for good to them that love him (z). (t) I Jahn V. 3. (/) Deut. X. 20. Heb. xii. 28. {g) Prov. xvi, 6. Eccles. xii. 13. Luke xii. 4, 5. 1 Pet. iii. 14, 15. {h) Psal. Ixii 8. Is. xxvi. 4. 1 Tim. vii. 17. Q) Psal. xxxvii. 4, 5. Psal. Iv. 22. 1 Pet. v. 7. Rom. viii. 28. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures. 239 We are every where taught in Scripture that an habitual regard to God, to his presence and approbation, must in- fluence our whole conduct. This is expressed by our walking before the Lord, and walking worthy of the Lord, unto all pleasing. We are directed to refer all to God; to make it our constant care and endeavour to glorify him in the world with our bodies and spirits which are his; and are commanded whether we eat or drink, or whatsoever we do, to do all to the glory of God (i). As God is the great original of all perfection, and ex- cellence, and his moral attributes are in an especial manner very clearly revealed to us in the Sacred Writings, so it is there represented as a noble part of our dut\' to aspire after a conformity to him in them, as far as he is imitable by such frail creatures as we are. It is required of us that we en- deavour to be holy as he is holy, perfect (as far as our limit- ed capacities will allow) as our Heavenly Father is periect, and to be followers or imitators of God as becometh dear children (/). And for this we have peculiar advantages un- der the Gospel, as we have his moral excellencies and per- fections, his holiness and purity, his love and goodness, his faithfulness and truth, his condescending grace and mercy, most beautifully exemplified in his well beloved Son, the unspotted image of his own excellence. It is then we best resemble God, when the same mind is in us that was in Christ Jesus. With respect to the worship we are to render to the Supreme Being, we are required to worship him who is an infinite Spirit in spirit and in truth. The worshipping false gods, and the worshipping the true God under cor- (Ar) Gen. xvii. 1. Psal. cxvi. 9. Col. i. 10. 1 Cor. vi. 20. x. 3U (0 Matt. V. 48. Eph. v. 1, 2. I Pet. i. 15, 16. 240 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part II* poreal images and representations, is most expressly for- bidden (w). The multiplicity of idol deities which were adored in the Pagan world, whilst the only true God was neglected, together with the cruel, the impure, and absurd rites of their worship, are rejected. And under the Gospel we are also freed from the various rices and sacrifices pre- scribed in the law of Moses, which though originally in- stituted for wise ends, well suited to that time and state of things, yet were burdensome in the observance, and not so fitted to that more spiritual and perfect dispensation which our Saviour came to introduce. There is a noble purity and simplicity in the Gospel-worship as represented in the New-Testament; and the sacred rites and ordinances there prescribed are few in number, and excellent in their use and significancy. And at the same time great care is taken to instruct us, that no external rites will be of any advan- tage or avail to our acceptance with God without real ho- liness of heart and life. As to the spiritual sacrifices of prayer and praise, we have both the best directions given us in the sacred Writ- ings, and the noblest patterns set before us of a pure and elevated devotion. We are there taught to celebriUe and adore his transcendent excellencies and perfections, as shining forth in his wonderful works; and in the revela- tions of his word, and to give him the praise that is due to his great and glorious name (/z). To him we are directed to offer up our thankful acknowledgments for all the mer- cifes we receive, and our petitions and. supplications for all the good things we stand in need of: which tends to keep (;n)'Exod. xx. 3. 4, 5. Matt. iv. 10. John iv. 24. Gal. iv. 8. 1 Tliess. i. 9. Acts xiv. 15. (n) See Psal. ciii. civ. cxiviii. Nehem. ix. 5, 6. I Tim. i. 17. vi. 15, 16. Rev. iv. 10, 11. v. 13. xv. 3, 4. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures^ 241 up in our minds a constant sense of our absolute depen« dence upon God, and our great obligations to his good- ness (o). We must also confess our sins before him with penitent and .contrite hearts, humbling ourselves on the account of them, and imploring his meres ; which is a part of religion justly becoming sinful creatures, and frequently- recommended in the Holy Scriptures (/?). It is farther to be observed, that we are required in the Gospel to offer up our prayers, praises, and solemn acts of dt volion to God in the name of Jesus Christ, the great Mediator whom he hath in his wisdom and goodness ap- pointed for the great work of redeeming and saving tnim- kind. This is the stated order of the Gospel- worship f^). And the regard we are obliged to have in all things to the Mediator, through whom we have access bv one Spirit unto the Father, is a wise and gracious provision for God's dispensing his blessings to us in such a way as is most be- coming his own infinite majesty, and the honour of his government and perfections. It tendeth both to impress our hearts with a just sense of God's infinite greatness and spotless purity, and of the evil of sin, which rendereth us unfit to approach immediately to so holy and glorious a majesty; and is at the same time excellently fitted to dispel our guilty jealousies and fears, and to inspire us with an ingrnuous trust and affiance in him. For we cannot now reasonably doubt of God's kind intentions towards us, and of his gracious acceptance of our sincere though imperfect services, since he requires us to offer them to him in the name of his well-beloved Son, in whom he *' is always (o) Psal. evil, cxxxvi. 1 Thess. v. 17, 18. Mat. vi. 6—13. viL 7—11. Phil. iv. 6. Psal. Ixv. 2 {p.) Psal. xxxii. 5. Prov. xxviii. 13. 1 John i. 9, (^r) John xvi. 23. Col. iii. 17. Eph. ii. 18. Vol. II. 2 H 242 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part IIv well-pleased," who by his wise appointment offered him- self a sacrifice for our sins, and who " is able to save unto the uttermost all them that come unto God by him,, seeing he ever livcth to make intercession for us (r)." The Gentiles had some notion of the propriety of applying to God through a Mediator, which perhaps might be owing to some remains of an antient tradition derived from the first ages. But this, like other branches of the primitive religion, became greatly perverted and obscured. As they had a multiplicity of idol gods, so also of idol mediators: and these being all of their own devising, without any di- vine warrant and appointment, spread a strange confusion through their worship. They had, as St. Paul expresseth it, " gods many, and lords many," whom they worshipped and adored: but to us Christians, " there is but one God the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." And he elsewhere observes, that " there is one God and one Mediator between God and man, and that Jesus Christ is he (' and mercy assures us, that particular notice shall be taken of them at the great day of judgment, and that men shall then be rewarded or condemned, according to their abounding in or neglecting the practice of those duties. And whereas the most di'fficult part of the duty required of us towards mankind relates to the temper and conduct we are to observe towards our enemies and those that have injured us, our blessed Lord hath given us in this respect the most admirable precepts and directions. If we have suf- fered injuries from others, he enjoineth us to exercise a forgiving temper towards them, and not to give way to the bitterness of revenge. Some of our Lord's precepts to this (z) Matt. V. 23, 24. xxiii. 23. Is. i. 1 1 — 18. (a) Is. i. 17. Iviii. 6—11. Gal. vi. 10. 1 Tim. vi. 18. Hebr. xiii. 3. 16. James v. 20. Gal. vi. 1. Levit. xix. 17. Rom. xii. 15. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures. 245 purpose in his admirable sermon on the mount, are express- ed in a proverbial way, and not to be urged in the utmost rigour; but the design of them is obvious and excellent, to suppress as fgir as possible the motions of a furious and vin- dictive spirit, which hath done so much mischief in the world, and to signify to us, that it is better patiently to bear injuries, than to be forward to retaliate them. He hath re- quired us to insert it in our prayers, that God would forgive us our sins, as we forgive others the offences committed against us. The same is the design of some of his excellent parables. And in this as well as other instances the apos- tles taught the same doctrine with their divine Lord and Master, that we should recompense to no man evil for evil, and instead of being overcome of evil, should overcome evil with good (^). This leads me to add, that our Lord not only forbiddeth the rendering evil for evil, but commandeth us to render good for evil. This is the design of that glorious precept, whereby we are commanded to love our enemies, to bless them that curse us, to do good to them that hate us, and to pray for them that despitefuUy use us and persecute us. Instead of cursing we must pray to God for them, not in- deed that they may go on and prosper in their evil courses, but that they may be brought to a right temper of mind, and so may become the objects of the divine favour: and if they be reduced to distress, we must be ready to assist and serve them in the kind offices of humanity. " If thine enemy hun- ger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink (c)." And this cer- tainly is carrying benevolence to the noblest height. And (6) Rom. xii. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. 1 Thess. v. J 5. 1 Pet. iii. 9. Levit. xix. 18. (c) Matt. V. 43, 44. Rom. xii. 20. Prov.xxv. 21. 246 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part II. though there have been high pretenders to reason who have found fault with it, yet some of the most eminent among the antient philosophers, as was observed before, have been sensible of the beauty and excellency of such a conduct, but they wanted the authority necessary to make it a law obli- gatory on mankind. But in the Gospel of Jesus it is more strongly enforced, urged with more powerful motives than ever it was before, and is bound upon us by a most express divine authority. To this it may be added, that our Lord hath expressly condemned that spirit, which carries men to persecute and do hurt to others, under pretence of zeal for the cause of God and religion (^). Upon the whole, it is the manifest and uniform design and tendency of the Gospel of Jesus to recommend and enforce an universal benevolence. It lays the foundation of the duties we owe to mankind in love. It is there given as a comprehensive summary of the duties we owe to man- kind: " Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself (^)." And by our neighbour we are taught to understand not merely those of the same country, nation, and religion with our- selves, but all of the human race that stand in need of our kindness, and to whom we have an opportunity of doing good. This is beautifully exemplified by our Saviour, in the parable of the good Samaritan (^f)» To which may be added, that other remarkable precept, " Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them (^)." A rule which, if rightly considered, would be of great use in regulating our conduct, towards our fellow- creatures. {d) Luke ix. 54, 55, 56. (e) Matt. xxii. 39. Rom. xiii. 8, 9. Jam. ii. 8. Levit. xix. 18. {J) Luke X. 33, 34, Z5, (g) Matt. vii. 12. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures. 247 But though we are required to love and do good to all men, the design is not, as some who are desirous to im- peach the Gospel morality would insinuate, that we should have the sanie degree of affection for all. The special love and esteem which good men should have for one another, the peculiar ties by which they are united, additional to the common ties of humanity, are recommended and en- forced in the strongest and most engaging manner, and lay the properest foundation for all the intimacies of sacred friendship (A). Besides the general precepts, prescribing the duties of justice and benevolence towards all mankind, there are also particular injunctions given us with respect to the duties incumbent upon us in the several stations and relations we bear in the civil and social life. And these are of great im- portance to the welfare of nations, families, and particular persons. The duties of princes, magistrates, and subjects, are excellently represented, every way sufficient, if duly at- tended to, to preserve the good order and welfare of socie- ty. It is required, that they that rule over men be just, rul- ing in the fear of God. Kings and all in authority are taught to consider themselves as under the dominion of the great and universal Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of hosts, to whom they must be accountable for their conduct, who hath appointed them for the good of the people, over whom he hath placed them, that they may administer jus- tice and judgment without respect of persons, and be a ter- ror not to good works, but to the evil (i). Subjects are Qi) John xiii. 34, 35. Gal. vi. 10. Eph. iv. 1—6. Phil. ii. 1 —5. I Pet. i. 22. 1 Johniii. 16. (i) Deut. i. 16, 17. 2 Sam. xxiii. 3. 2 Chron. xix. 6, 7. Psal. ixxxii. l — 4. Piov. xx. 26 — 28. xxix. 11. 14. Eccles. v. 8. Rom. xiii. 3, 4. 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14, 15. 248 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part II. taught to be submissive and obedient to the higher powers^ to pray for them, to fear God and honour the king, to give unto Csesar the things which are Csesar's, to render tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour; and to dt) all this, not merely because the civil laws require it, and for fear of pu- nishment from men, but for conscience sake, and in obedience to the laws of God (^k). In like manner it is urged as a ne- cessary part of religion, for servants to obey and serve their masters, with all proper respect, fidelity, and diligence, not purloining, not answering again, with good-will doing ser- vice as unto the Lord, and not unto men, knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, that shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free. These things, when really believed, and duly considered, will have a much stronger influence to engage them to a faithful and cheerful discharge of their duty, than mere custom, or the laws of the country. On the other hand, masters are r^ quired to give unto their servants that which is just and equal, for- bearing threatenings, knowing that they also have a Master in heaven, and that with him there is no respect of per- sons (/). The duties of husbands and wives are also admi- rably described, and enforced by motives proper to the Christian dispensation, additional to those drawn from the law of nature and reason (m). Fhe same thing may be said of the duties of parents and children (w). In like manner, {k) Matt. xxii. 21. Ilom. xiii. 1, 2. 5, 6, 7. 1 Tim. ii. 2. Tit. iii., 1. 1 Pet. ii. 13, 14. (/) Eph. vi. 5—9. Col. ill. 22—25. iv. 1. I Tim. vi. 1, 2. Tit. ii. 9, 10, 1 1. Deut. xxiv. 14, 15. Job xxxi 13, 14, 15. (m) Eph. V. 22—3,3. Col. iii. 18, 19. fit. ii. 4, 5. 1 Pet. iii. 1—8. (w) Exod. XX. 16. Eph. vi. 1—4. Col. iii. 20, 21. 1 Tim. v. 4—8. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures* 249 superiors and inferiors, the elder and younger, the rich and the poor, are directed to a proper conduct towards one ano^ ther: and rules are given which tend to regulate the deport- ment of equals among. themselves, that they should be cour- teous, in honour preferring one another, not willingly giving offence to any, and endeavouring as far as possible to live peaceably with all men (o). In a word, all the various offices of humanity, justice, and charity, due from one man to ano^ ther, are frequently described in the Sacred Writings, en- forced by the most powerful motives, and by the authority of God himself, which, where it is firmly believed, must come with greater force upon the conscience than the mere institutions of human legislators, or the reasonings of phi- losophers and moralists. These hints may give us an idea of the excellency of the Scripture precepts with respect to that part of morality which relates to the duties we owe to man-^ kind. As to that part of our duty which relates more imme-^ diately to ourselves, to the governing our affections, appe-^ tites, and passions, and to the due regulation and improve- ment of our temper, the Gospel law is peculiarly excellent,. With regard to the angry passions, wrath, hatred, and re- venge, it hath been already shewn, that great care is taken to restrain and moderate their exorbitances, and to engage men to exercise meekness, lorbearance, and long-suffering^ and above all, to cultivate that friendly temper and univer- sal benevolence, which is one of the most excellent and ami- able dispositions of the human mind {p). As to the concu-^ piscible and voluptuous appetites and passions, th. se at the (o) Rom. xii. 10. 12. 18. 1 Cor. x. 32. Phil.ii.^3. 1 Pet. ii. \1. iii. 8. V. 5. {p) Eph. iv. 26, 27. 31, 32. Col. iii. 12, 13, 14. 1 Cor. xiii. 4, I Vol. II, 2 1 , • 25.0 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part II. time of our Saviour's coming into the world bad broken over all bounds, and had introduced an universal corruption and dissoluteness of manners. One excellent design, there- fore, of the Christian law, was to rportify and subdue the fleshly concupiscence, and to deliver men from their base servitude to the lusts of uncleanness, which, where they ob- tain the dominion, dishonour and defile our nature, and are of the most pernicious consequence to the interests of reli- gion and virtue. The Gospel, wherever it is sincerely be- lieved and embraced, inspires the utmost abhorrence of those unnatural lusts and impurities, which had made so monstrous a progress in the most civilized parts of the Heathen world, and which, as hath been shewn, were abet- ted and countenanced by the maxims and practices of their wise men and philosophers (^). All manner of uncleanness and lasciviousness is forbidden; not adultery only, but for- nication also (r), which among the Pagans passed for no fault at all, or a very slight one. Polygamy and divorces upon slight occasions, which had been greatly abused among the Jews, gratifying their corrupt lusts, are not allowed in the religion of Jesus. And not only are the outward gross acts of uncleanness forbidden, but even the cherishing and (q) I Cor. vi. 9, 10. 1 Tim.,i. 9, 10. And these abominations are also condemned in the strongest manner in the Old Testa- ment. (r) See what St. Paul saith to this purpose, 1 Thess. iv. 3, 4, 5. 7. which I have cii'ed above, p. 141. And whosoever imparti- ally considers what the same great apostle hath said concerning it, I Cor vi. from ver. 13. to ver. 20. will find several considera- tions there urged, which are of the highest moment, and far su- perior to any thing that can be lound in the most refined of the Pagan moralists. See also Prov. v. 5—1 1. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures. 251 indulging impure and vicious inclinations, which are repre- sented as criminal in the sight ol God (s). We are frc quently warned against rioting and drunken- ness, gluttony. and intemperance, which likewise tend great- ly to debase and dishonour our nature. And what ought especially to be observed, Christ and his apostles urge their exhortations against the several kinds of fleshly lusts which have been mentioned, not merely from the many evil conse- quences they bring along with them in this present state, but, Which is of far greater force, from the express autho- rity and command of God, from the strict account we must give of the things done in the body at the day of judgment, and the terrors of the wrath to come (t). They are also re- presented as peculiarly inconsistent with the dignity and privileges to which we are called by the Gospel, and as al- together unworthy of those who have the honour of being the children of God, the members of Christ, the living tem- ples of God and his Holy Spirit, and the heirs and expect- ants of the heavenly inheritance (w). But it is the great praise of Christianity, as delivered in the Gospel, that though chastity, purity, and temperance is there bound upon us by the most sacred obligations, yet care is taken to guard against superstitious extremes. Neither our Sa- viour nor his apostles, under pretence of extraordinary pu- rity, forbid and condemn marriage, as some of the Essenes then did, and as others by a false refinement have since done. On the contrary, it is declared, that " marriage is honour- able in all, and the bed undefiled C^)." And though all in- (s) Matt. V. 27, 28. (0 Luke xxi. 34. Gal. v. 19. 21. Eph. v. 6. 1 Pet. 3, 4, 5. See also Pro V. xxiii. 1, 2,3.20,21.29 — 35. Is. v 11,^12. (m) Rom. xiii. 12—14. 1 Cor. vi. 13. 19, 20. Eph. v. 18. I Thess. V. 5. 8. {oc) 1 Cor. vii. 9. Heb. xiii. 4. 253 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part II. temperance and excess is expressly forbidden, and we are required to keep the body under, yet we are allowed the moderate use of sensible enjoyments; and it is declared, that every creature of God is good, and nothing to be re- fused, if it be received. with thanksgiving, for it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer (?/). It is another instance of the excellency of the Gospel precepts, that particular care is taken to guard us against an immoderate passion for worldly riches. Our Saviour fre- quently takes occasion to shew the great folly ot placing our confidence and h.tppiness in such things as these, and re- presents in strong terms the inconsistency of a predominant love of V orldly wei 1th with the love of God, and with real piety and virtue (z). The possession and enjoyment of riches is not absolutely forbidden; but we are directed to make a proper use of them, and to regard them as a trust committed to us by God, of which we are only the stewards, and for which we must be accountable; we are taught to em- ploy them not as incentives to luxury, but as opportunities of doing good, of honouring God, and being useful to man- kind: and we are assured for our encouragement, that riches so employed will recommend us to the divine favour, and open a v\ ay for us to everlasting happiness in the world to come (a). Pride is frequently represented in Scripture as a very wrong temper of mind, and highly displeasing in the sight of God (b). Many passages in the Gospel are particularly designed to correct and -ubdue it in all its various branches (t/) 1 Tim. iv. 3, 4» 5. (z) Mat. vi. 24. Mark X. 24. Luke xii. 15 — 21. 1 Tim. vi. 9, 10. See also Psal. xxxvii. 16. Ixii. 10. Prov. xi, 28. xxiii. 4, 5, xxviii. 20. (a) Luke xvi. 9, 10. 1 Tim. vi. 17, 18, 19. (6) Prov. viii. 13. xvi. 5. James iv. 6. CiiAP. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures, 253 and appearances, whether as it signifies an inordinate am- bition whicfi puts men upon contending who shall be greatest, or an eager thirst after the applause of men ra- ther than the favour and approbation of God, or a pre- sumptuous haughty arrogance, and a high conceit of our- selves and our own righteousness, and a contempt of others: never was an amiable humility recommended and enforced in such an engaging manner as by our Lord Jesus Christ, who also gave the most perfect and lovely pattern of it in his own example (c). It is the design of several of our Saviour's precepts to in- struct and direct us to posspss our souls in patience, equa- nimity, and contentment. As nothing tends more to dis- compose and disturb the mind than anxious cares, or ex- cessive sorrows and desponding fears, the Gospel provides the most effectual remedies against all these: not by repre- senting worldly evils and calamities as no evils at all, or prescribing an unfeeling apathy, and suppressing the natu- ral affections and passions, but by keeping them within proper bounds. No where are there such powerful con- siderations for supporting us under afflictions and adversi- ties with a calm resignation and a lively hope. We are taught to regard them as sent by God for the wisest and best purposes, and are assured that he will graciously support us under them, and over-rule them to our greater benefit, and that if duly improved they shall issue in a com- plete everlasting felicity (d). Nothing can possibly be bet- (c) Matt, xxiii. 6 — 12. Mark ix. 33, 34, S5. Luke xviii. 9 — 14, John V. 44. Matt. xi. 29. John xiii. 12—17. Phil. ii". 3-— 7. 1 Pet. V. 5. (rf) Matt. V. 4. Rom. v. 4, 5. viii. 18. 28. 2 Cor. iv. 17. Heb. xii. 5—12. Psal. Iv. 22. Psal. ciii. 9, 10. 13, 14. Lam. iii. 31, 32, 33. 254 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part II. ter fitted to deliver us irom anxious disir cting cares rind solicitudes, and a distrust! ul thoughtfulness for to-morrow, than the excellent precepts and directions given us by our Saviour and his apostles {e). But though vi^e are directed to cast our cares upon God in a cheerful and steady depend- ence upon his wise and good Providence, yet we are caution- ed not to neglect the use of proper means and endeavours on our parts. It is urged as our duty not to be slothful in business, to exercise ourselves with diligence in the work of our several callings and employments, that we may have lack of nothing, and we may have to give to him that needeth. Those who lead idle lives are represented as walk- ing disorderly, and it is declared, that if .nny man will not work, neither should he eat (/)' To this it may be added that our Saviour's precepts and instructions are admirably fitted to inspire us with a true divine fortitude, and to raise us above the slavish fear of men, who can only kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do, or of any worldly evils and sufferings. And yet he is far from en- couraging a forward enthusiastic rashness: he directeth his disciples not needlessly to expose themselves to dangers, but to take all proper precautions for avoiding the rage and malice of their persecutors (^): but when this could not be done, without betraying the cause of God, of truth and righteousness, they were to exert a noble fortitude, and to endure the greatest sufferings with constancy and even with (e) Matt, vi- 25—34. Luke xii. 22—31. Phil. iv. 6. 1 I, 12. 1 Tim. vi. 6 8. Heb. xiii. 5. 1 Pet. v. 7. (/) Rom. xii. 11. Eph. iv. 28, 1 Thess. iv. 11, 12. 2 Thess. iii. 10, 11, 12. {g) Matt. vii. 6. x. 16. 23. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures, it 5 5 joy, being assured of divine supports, and that great should be their reward in heaven Qi), As knowledge is one of the noblest improvements of the mind, an^l of mighty advantage to a life of piety and vir- tue, it is frequently urged upon us as our duty, to endea- vour to get our minds furnished with divine and useful knowledge. And the knowledge there required is not merely of the speculative notional, kind or science falsely so called, but such a knowledge of those things which are of the highest importance to our happiness, as may help us to make a progress in all holiness and goodness; we must endeavour to grow in wisdom and spiritual understanding, so as to discern the things which are excellent, and to prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect will of God (i). It is proper farther to observe, that, as the foundation of all the virtues which have been mentioned, and of the right ordering of ourselves, we are directed to endeavour get our hearts purified. Our Saviour represents the heart as the fountain, from whence good or evil thoughts, words, and actions flow. And therefore one principal part of the work required of us is to exercise a proper discipline over the heart, and to maintain a constant watch, not only over our outward conduct and deportment, but over our inward frame and temper. We must not take up with any thing short of a real universal purity and sanctity of soul, that truth in the inward parts, that simplicity and godly sin- cerity, free from all hypocrisy and guile, without which the most pompous external services are of no avail in the (Ji) Matt. V. 10, 1 1, 12. Luke xii. 4, 5. 1 Pet. iii. 14. iv. 12, 13. (0 John xvij. 3. Phil, i, 9, 10. Rom. xii. 2. Ep\i. v. 17. Col. i. 9, 10. 1 Thess. V. 31. Tit. i. 1. Prov. ii. 3, 4, 5. 256 A Summary of the Gospel Morality Part IL sight of God (i). Finally, it is required of us, that we make it our continual endeavour to grow in grace, and in evt ry divine virtue. And in order to this we must live and walk by faith, " which is the substance of things hoped ior, and the evidence of things not seen." And as that future life and immortality is now brought into the most clear and open light, we are required to carry our desires and views beyond this transitory W( rid, and all its enjoyments, and to seek the things which are above, and place < ur choicest affections there (/). Accordingly the Christian life is re- presented under the noble notion of a conversation with heaven, and communion with the Father, and with his son Jesus Christ: it is a continual aspiring towards the perfec- tion of our nature in a conformity to the divine goodness and purity, and an endeavour to do the will of God on earth, as it is done in heaven (/«)• To all which may be added, that it is the distinguishing character of the religion of Jesus, that at the same time that it directeth us to aspire to the highest degree of mo- ral excellence, it teacheth us to maintain a constant sense of our own weaknesses and defects and of our insufficiency in ourselves. In the Gospel all boasting and confidence in our own righteousness and merits is excluded: and we are instructed to place our whole dependence upon the grace of God in Jesus Christ our Lord, giving him the glory of every good thing that is in us, or which we are enabled to perform. • Upon this general view of the Gospel precepts, it ap- {k) Prov. iv. 23. Matt, xxiii. 26. 2 Cor. i. 12. Eph. iv. 21—24, 1 Pet. ii. 1, 2. John iii, 3. 6. 2 Cor. v. 17. Rom. ii. 28, 29. GaL Ti. 15. (/) 2 Cor. V. 7. Col. iii. I, 2. Heb xiii. 14. (m) Phil. iii. 20. 1 John i. 3. Phil. iii. 12, 13, 14. Chap. XIII. as delivered in the Scriptures, 257 pears that they are of a most excellent nature and tendency: they exhibit a beautiful harmonious scheme of practical religion. The best systems of the most celebrated Pagan moralists, are^ in several respects deficient, and in some very wrong; but here there is nothing deficient, our whole duty is set before us in its just extent, without the least mixture of any thing that is wrong. But though it sets be- fore us the noblest idea of moral excellence, it does not carry it to any unwarrantable extremes, or to a degree of strictness unsuitable to the human nature: which is an ob- jection that some have made against it. We are indeed there taught to deny ourselves, but the intention is only that we should endeavour to keep the inferior appetites and passions in a due subjection to the nobler part of our na- tures, and that the pleasures and interests of the flesh and of the world should be made to gave way to the duty we owe to God, and to the love of truth, virtue, and righte- ousness, whenever they happen to stand in competition; in which case our temporary self-denial shall be crowned with the most glorious rewards. We are required not to make provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof; but neither our Saviour nor his apostles have urged it upon us as a duty to macerate our bodies with those unnatural rigors and austerities, or to chastise them with that bloody dis- cipline, which superstition hath often enjoined under pre- tence of extraordinary mortification and devotion. We are to be heavenly-minded, and to set our affections upon the things which are above, yet so as not to neglect the duties and offices incumbent on us in this present state. We are not commanded absolutely to quit the world; but, which is a much nobler attainment, to live above the wt)rld whilst we are in it, and to keep ourselves free from its pollutions; not wholly to renounce our present enjoyments, but to be moderate in the use of them, and so " to use this world as not to abuse it." Finally, the Gospel Morality takes in all Vol. II. ' 2 K , 258 The Gospel Morality inferred by the Part II. that is included in that comprehensive precept, " whatso- ever things are true, whatsoever things are venerable, erzf^vx^ whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever are of good report, if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." Phil, iv. 8. But let a rule of moral duty be never so complete and excellent in itself, it will hardly be sufficient to answer the end in the present state of mankind, unless it be bound upon us by a proper authority, and enforced by the most powerful motives. And in this the religious and moral pre- cepts of the Gospel have a vast advantage (;z). They are not to be regarded as the mere counsels aqd dictates of wise men and moralists, who can only advise and endea- vour to persuade, but cannot pretend to a proper authority over mankind; nor as the injunctions of fallible human le- gislators armed with civil authority, who cannot pretend to judge of the heart, or of men's inward dispositions, and who have nothing farther in view than the external order and welfare of society, and frequently make the rules of morality give way to their political interests; but they are urged upon us as the command of God himself, the sove- reign Lord of the universe, who knoweth our most secret^ thoughts, and to whom we must give an account, not only of our outward actions, but of the inward affections and dispositions of our souls. Another great advantage is, that our Lord Jesus Christ, who was sent into the world to publish these excellent laws of God to mankind,' and hath given us the most illustrious (w) Lord Boline^broke himself se'^ms to acknowledge, that the Christian Revelaiion may be of use to enforce the pi"actice of mo- rality by a superior authority. See his works, Vol. V. p. 294. edit. 4to. CttAP. XIII. highest Authority and powerful Motive, 259 proofs of his divine mission, hath himself exemplified those laws and precepts to us in his own sacred life and prac- tice. Examples have usually a greater force than bare pre- cepts. And what example so proper and engaging as that of the Son of God in human flesh, the most perfect image of the invisible Deity, in v/hom the divine perfections are brought nearer to our view, and within the reach of our imitation? In him we may behold a most complete pattern of universal holiness and spotless purity, of the most ar- dent love to God, the most wonderful love to mankind, the most perfect obedience and resignation to the divine will, the most exemplary patience under the greatest sufferings, the most admirable humility, meekness, and condescen- sion, and of every amiable virtue. And should not we be desirous to tread in his illustrious footsteps? and to live and act as so glorious and divine a person, to whom we are under such infininite obligations, lived and acted before us? It tends farther to recommend and enforce the precepts of the Gospel, that all the charms of the divine grace and goodness are here opened to our view. Motives to obedi- ence drawn from love are fitted to work upon the best principles of our nature. And never was there such a dis- plav of the wonderful -love of God to mankind as in the methods of our redemption and salvation by Jesus Christ. Where this mystery of godliness is heartily received with a true and living faith, it will have a happy influence to en- gage and draw us to a holy and dutiful obedience: since it is every where inculcated in the Gospel that the design of God's sending his own Son into the world, and of all the great things which have been done for us, is to oblige us to die more and more unto sin, and to live urfto righte- ousness. The excellent privileges of the Gospel do also, as was before hinted, furnish very powerful motives to a holy and virtuous practice. For this purpose we are called to 260 Excellency of the Gospel Morals an argument Part II. be saints, honoured to be the members of Christ's church and kingdom, the children of God, and heirs of the hea- venly inheritance, that we may be a people zealous of good works, shewing forth the praises and virtues of him that hath called us out of darkness into his marvellous light. To all which may be added the important motives drawn from the rewards and punishments of a future state, of which the Gospel exhibits far clearer discove- ries, and gives fuller assurances, than were ever given to the world before, as will be shewn in the following part of this work. Finally, for our greater encouragement, divine assistances are provided for us. This is a consideration of great mo- ment, as every one must acknowledge that has a due sense of the weakness and corruption of the human nature in its present state, and the manifold temptations to which we are here exposed. We are not left merely to our own unassisted strength, but have the most express promises and assur- ances given us in the Gospel, that God will send his Holy Spirit to enlighten and sanctify us, to strengthen and assist us in the performance of our duty, if from a sense of our own insufficiency in ourselves we humbly apply to him for his gracious assistances, and at the same time are diligent » in the use of all proper means and endeavours on our parts. For it must be considered, that those divine influences and aids are communicated in such a way as is agreeable to the just order of our rational faculties^ and not so as to ren- der our own endeavours needless, but to assist and animate our endeavours. Upon the whole, considering the great darkness and cor- ruption into which mankind had fallen, nothing was more wanted, than to have a pure system of morals, containing the whole of our duty in its just extent, delivered in plain and express precepts, as the laws of God himself, enforced Chap.XIII. of the Divinity of the Christian Revelation, 261 by all the sanctions of a divine authority, and by all the charms of the divine love and goodness; and this is fully done by the Gospel of Jesus. It is a natural inference from v/hat hath been offered on this subject, that the admirable purity of the Gospel mo- rals, and the uniform tendency of the Christian doctrines, precepts, privileges, and ordinances, to promote real holi- ness of heart and life, furnisheth a very convincing proof of the divinity of the Christian revelation. This is an ar- gument that strikes the mind with great force, and which ought mightily to recommend it to the esteem and venera- tion of mankind, especially of all the impartial lovers of truth and virtue. The first publishers of it were men of great simplicity, plainness and integrity, destitute of all worldly advantages, and the remotest that can be supposed from the character of artful impostors. Animated by a pure and fervent and well regulated zeal for the glory of God and the salvation of men, they exposed themselves to the greatest sufferings, reproaches, and persecutions, to establish a scheme of religion, the design of which was to promote the practice of universal righteousness; a godlike purity shines through the whole of it: there is nothing in it to sooth and flatter the lusts and vices of men, nothing that breathes the spirit of this world, of ambition, avarice, and sensuality. And as little can the Gospel be supposed to be the work of weak hot-brained enthusiasts, as of artful self-designing im- postors. When we consider that the first publishers of Chris- tianity were for the most part men of no learning and edu- cation, and yet taught men to form the most just and sub- lime notions of religion, contrary in several instances to the prejudices which they themselves had deeply iii>bibed, and far exceeding what the world had known before, and that they also advanced the most perfect scheme of morals, vastly superior to what had been taught by the most admir- ed philosophers of the Pagan world, men of the greatest 262 Excellency of the Gospel Morals an argument Part II. parts and genius, and even by the most celebrated Jewish doctors, who had by their corrupt glosses depraved the true sense of the law and prophets, this is a strong confirmation of the truth of their pretensions; that the doctrines they taught, and the precepts they delivered in the name of God, were not of their own invention, a thing of which they were evidently incapable, but were, as they themselves professed, of a divine original. This was farther confirmed by the many glorious attestations given from heaven to the divine mission of our Saviour, and of those that were sent to publish the Gospel in his name. Never were there any facts better attested, or which exhibited more illustrious proofs of an extraordinary divine interposition. They manifestly transcended all human power; and therefore must have been wrought either immediately by the power of God him- self, or of good beings superior to mankind, acting under his direction, and who would never have given their attes- tation to an imposture. And as to evil beings, whatever we suppose their power to be, it cannot be imagined that they would lend their assistance to give credit to a scheme of religion and morals, the plain tendency of which was to turn men from idolatry, vice, and wickedness, to the know- ledge, obedience, and adoration of the only true God, and to the practice of piety and virtue. So convincing was the evidence of these proofs, that the religion of Jesus soon made an amazing progress, notwithstanding the obstacles and opposition it met with, which humanly speaking, it seemed impossible to overcome. And wherever it was really believed and embrace'd, it wrought a wonderful and happy change. Never was there a body of men in the world, so holy and virtuous, of such exemplary piety, charity, purity, and temperance, as the primitive Christians. And accord- ingly one of the topics, which the antient apologists for Christianity constantly insisted upon, and for the truth of which they appealed to the Heathens themselves, was the Ch AP.XIII. of the Divinity of the Christian Revelation, 263 remarkable reformation it wrought in the lives and man- ners of those that embraced it. They shone as lights in the world in the midst of a vicious and corrupt generation. And so they continued whilst they kept close to the reli- gion and morality laid down in the Holy Scriptures. And in proportion as they deviated from that perfect rule, they either became loose in their practices, and fell from their primitive virtue, or under pretence of an extraordinary purity above what the Gospel required, ran into the extremes of superstition. So wise, so admirable, so' justly temper- ed is the Gospel scheme of morality, as delivered by Christ and his apostles, that all the attempts of after- ages to raise it to a higher degree of excellency, really fell short of its original perfection. It must be acknowledged, indeed, and has been often objected by the enemies of the Gospel Revelation, that there is a great corruption of manners among Christians. But this does not prove either that Christianity was not a signal advantage to the world when it was first published, or that it is not now of great use and benefit, and what we ought to be highly thankful for. The best institutions in the world may be abused; and the guilt of those who go on in a course of vice and wickedness, in opposition to the clear light and laws of the Gospel, admits of peculiar aggra- vations. If there are many professed Christians, v.'ho live immoral and dissolute lives, they are generally such as either content themselves with the bare name of Christians, without taking any pains to get a just acquaintance with the religion they profess, or who do not allow themselves seriously to consider and lay to heart its doctrines and pre- cepts, or who do not really believe it, or at least yield but a doubtful and wavering assent to it. And this is often very much owing to the purity of the Gospel^ morals, which creates prejudices against it in the minds of those who are under the power of evil habits and vicious affections. The 264 Excelleticy of the Gospel Morals an argument Part II. infidelity and scepticism of many in the present age, and the growing indifferency to all religion, which is too visible among us, is, I doubt not, one great cause of that abound- ing dissoluteness and corruption, which is so much com- plained of. But still it is certainly true, that if the restraints which the Christian religion lays upon vice and wickedness were remo\ ed, the corruption v/ould be much greater and more general than it is. Many thousands, who would other- wise be vicious and dissolute, are influenced by the doc- trines and precepts of Christianity to lead sober, righteous, and godly lives. And notwithstanding the degeneracy of Christians, there is just reason to conclude, that there are incomparably more and greater instances of a sublime and rational piety, and an exemplary purity of manners among those that profess to believe and receive the Gospel, than are to be found among those of any other profession or charac- ter. The most effectual way, therefore, of recovering men to the practice of real piety and virtue, is to endeavour to en- gage them to a close adherence to the heavenly doctrines, and the pure and excellent laws of the Gospel, which un- deniably gives the best and greatest helps and encourage- ments to a holy and virtuous life. And it is an advantage which calls for our highest thankfulness, that whatever corruptions in doctrine and practice professed Christians have fallen into, or may fall into, we have still a perfect rule or standard laid down in the Holy Scriptures, to which we may have recourse, and by a close attention to which, we may have sure directions given -us as to every part of religion, and the 'practice of universal piety and righte- ousness. I shall conclude this part of the subject with the suffrage of two learned and ingenious gentlemen, who are generally thought not to have been much inclined to superstition and bigotry. The one is the author of the Lettres Juives, who, in the person of a Jew, acknowledges, that " the first Na- Chap. XIII. of the Divinity of the Christian Revelation, 265^ zarenes preached a doctrine so conformable to equity, and so useful to society, that their greatest adversaries now agree, that their moral precepts are infinitely superior to the wisest philosophers of antiquity (o)." The other is the justly admired Mons. de Montesquieu. We are informed by good authority, that he declared with his dving hr(rath, to those that stood around him, and particularly to the Du- chess D'Aiguillon, that "the morality of the Gospel is a most excellent thing, and the most valuable present which could possibly have been received by man from his Creator (o) " Les premiers docteurs Nazarenes ont preche une doc- trine si conforme a I'equite, et si utile a la societe, que leurs plus grands. ad versaires conviennent aujourdhui, que leurs precepts moraux sont infiniment au dessus des plus sages philosophes de Tantiquite." Lettres Jiiives, lettre 142. {fi) See L'Eloa:e de Monsieur de Montesquieu, par Mons. de Maupertuis, Hamburgh 1755. THE END OF PART II, Vol. II. 2 L THE ADVANTAGE AND NECESSITY OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION, SHEWN FBOM THE STATE OF RELIGION IN THE AJ^TTIEJS'T HEATHEN WORLD. PABT III WITH RESPECT TO THE BELIEF OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. CHAPTER I. The importance of the doctrine of a future state. It is agreeable to right reason. The natural and moral arguments for a future state of great weight Yet not so evident, but that if men were left merely to their own unassisted reason, they would be apt to labour under great doubts and difficulties. A Revelation from God concerning it would be of great advantage. IT is a point of vdst consequence to religion, and to the cause of virtue in the world, whether there be a life to come, in which men shall be rewarded or punished, accord- ing to their behaviour in this present state; or whether this present life be the whole of our existence, beyond which there is nothing to be hoped for or feared, in a way of re- tributioa for our present moral conduct. Chap. I. Importance of the Doctrine of a Future State, 267 If there were no future state of retribution, or men gene- rally believed there were none, they would look no farther than the pains and pleasures of this present life: it could not ordinarily be expected that they should have any thing in view, but the gratifying their appetites and inclinations, and promoting what they apprehend to be their present worldly interest, to which every other consideration must be subor- dinate: flesh and sense would be their governing principles: good men would be deprived of those hopes which are a a source of joy and comfort to them in their greatest afflic- tions and distresses, and which tend to animate them to a patient continuance in well-doing: and bad men would t)e freed from those terrors, than which nothirig can be better fitted to put a stop to the exorbitancies of their evil courses, and to avert them even from secret acts of wickedness. Ac- cordingly, it has been always accounted a principal advan- tage of the Christian Revelation, that it gives us the strongest assurances of a future state, and of the rewards and punishments of the life to come. The ablest patrons of Natural Religion, as opposed to Revelation, have been sen- sible of this, and therefore have pretended that the doc- trine of the immortality of the soul, and a state of future retributions, is so obvious to the common reason of all mankind, that there needs no extraordinary revelation, either to discover it to us, or strengthen our belief of it. And yet there is too much reason to think, that they have asserted this rather with a view to depreciate the use and need of Divine Revelation, than that they really believed that doctrine; since at other times they have thrown out suspicions against it, and represented it as a matter of un- certainty; and some of them have used their utmost efforts to invalidate the proofs which are brought for it. I readily acknowledge, that the natural and moral argu- ments for the immortality of the soul, and a future state of retributions, are, when duly considered, of great weight. 265 Importance of the Doctrine Part III. And none have set these proofs in a stronger light than the Christian philosophers and divines. Whosoever impartially considers their manner of treating this subject, will find it vastly superior to that which was made use of by the most eminent Pagan philosophers who lived before the coming of our Saviour. In this, as well as other instances, Reve- lation has been of great advantage for assisting and im- proving our reason in matters of the highest importance. It has been shewn, with great strength and clearness of argument, that matter, as far as we can judge of it from its known essential properties, is in its own nature in- capable of thought, however diversified or modified; that a substance compounded of innumerable parts, as all own matter to be, cannot be the subject of an individual con- sciousness, the seat of which must be a simple and undi- vided substance (a): that intellect and will are of a quite different nature from corporeal figure and motion; and the sublime faculties and operations of the human soul, its power of rising above material and temporal objects, and contemplating things spiritual and invisible, celestial and eternal, appear to be the properties of a substance of a far nobler and higher kind than this corruptible flesh: and that therefore there is no reason to think it will die with the body; but that being of a quite different nature, essentially active, simple, and indivisible, it is designed by the Creator, who made it so, for an immortal existence. To this may be added the strong apprehensions of a future state, so natural to the human mind, and which are not to be found in any of the inferior animals: and that men alone of all the crea- (a) This is very well arpjued by the learned Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his Letter lo Mr. Dodwell, and his several defences of it against an acute and ini^enious adversary. Nor have I ever seen a sufficient answer to that book. Chap. I. of a Future State. 269 tures in this lower world are capable of being governed by the hopes and fears of the world to come. This yields a reasonable presumption, that the Author of their frame de- signed they should be so governed: and it is scarce consis- tent with the best ideas we can form of the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, to suppose that he designed and formed them to be governed by a lie. It strengthens this, when we consider, that it seems absurd to imagine that so noble a creature as man, endued with such admirable faculties, by which he is capable of making immortal proficiencies in knowledge and virtue, should be designed for no other life than this short and transitory existence, in which he is in- capable of arriving at the true perfection and felicity of his nature. These reasonings receive a mighty additional force from the moral arguments for a state of future re- tributions, drawn from the present seemingly unequal dis- pensations of Divine Providence; the many evils and suffer- ings to which the best and worthiest of men are ofttn ex- posed in this present state; and the prosperous condition of bad and wicked men, many of whom have continued in flourishing and splendid circumstances to the end of their lives. From these and several other considerations which might be mentioned, it seems reasonable to conclude, that this is not the only life man is designed for, and that there is a state before us, in which good men shall be amply re- warded, and the wicked punished: and even those secret good or evil actions and dispositions which did not come under the cognizance of earthly tribunals, shall be brought into judgment, and meet with a suitable recompense from the supreme and most righteous Lord and Governor of the world. These things carry a great deal of probability to se- rious and contemplative minds, and shew that what is re- vealed to us in the Gospel on this subject ii suited to the best notions we can form of the nature of man, and the wis- dom and righteousness of the divine administrations. 270 Revelation makes the most eertain Discovery Part III. But vet it must be acknowledged, that there are objec- tions and difficulties brought on the other side, which, if men were left merely to themstlves, and to their own un- assisted reason, might be apt to raise doubts in their minds, and very much weaken their belief ol this great trutn. The metaphysical arguments drawn from the different nature of Ibody and spirit, howevei just in themselves, are only fitted to make impressions on a few persons of philosophical minds, and who have been accustomed to abstracted specu- lations, but carry no great light of evidence and conviction to the generality of mankind; who, having from their birth been wholly conversant with sensible and material objects, cannot easily form a n( tion of a spiritual being distinct irom matter. After the enquiries and disquisitions of men of the greatest genius and ability in all ages, we yet know very little of the nature and essence of our own souls, of the ori- gin of our ideas, and the proper difference between body and spirit, and what influence the one of them may have upon the other. Experience convinces us of the intimate connection and close union there is between our bodies and souls in this present state: and that the exercise of our fa- culties, and the operations of our souls, very much depend upon the due disposition of the bodily organs. To which it may be added, that the soul often seems to decay with the body, and to outward appearance is extinguished with it. Even those who most firmly believe the soul's immortality, find it very difficult to form a distinct conception how it exists and operates when separated from the body. The world to come is hidden from our view: it is not the object of any of our senses: it is a state which we are wholly un- acquainted with, and of which, if left merely to ourselves, we are scarce capable of forming a clear and satisfactory idea; and therefore is the proper object of a Divine Reve- lation, and of the exercise of that faith " which is the evi- dence of things not seen." And as the soul of man does not Chap. I. of a Future State. 271 exist independently by an absolute necessity of nature, but depends for the continuation of its existence upon the will of God, we can be no farther sure of its immortal duration, than we are &ure that it is the will of God that it should be so: and though this may be probably gathered from seve- ral considerations, yet nothing could give us so full an as- surance of it, as a Revelation from God, containing an express discovery of his will concerning it. The moral arguments for a future state are indeed of great force; yet it must be owned, that there are such secrets and depths of Provi- dence, which we are not able to account for; we have such narrow views of things, and know so little of the divine counsels, and of the reasons and ends of the divine admi- nistrations, and what measures it may please Infinite Wis- dom to take in the government of the world, that there may still be room for doubts and uncertainties in a .serious and thoughtful mind, which nothing less than the light of Di- vine Revelation can effectually dispel. But the surest way of judging of what may be expected from human unassisted reason, with respect to the immor- tality of the soul and a future state, is to consider what men of the greatest abilities in the Pagan world, and who seem to have been capable of carrying reason to its highest improvement, have said and thought upon it. This was for many ages the subject of their philosophical enquiries, and which was debated among them with all the strength of argument they were masters of. And how far they suc- ceeded in their enquiries, will appear from the following treatise. 272 The belief of the immortality of the Soul Part IIL CHAPTER II. Some notions of the immortality of the soul and a future state obtained among mankind from the nio&t antient times, and spiead very generally through the nations. This was not originally the effect of human reason and philosophy, nor was it merely the invention of legislators for political pur[>oses: but was derived to them by a most antient tracjition from the earliest ages, and was probably a tiart of the primitive I'eiigion communicated by Divine Revelation to the first of the human race. Before we enter upon an examination of the senti- ments of philosophers on this subject, it is proper to ob- serve, that the belief of the immortality of the soul and a future state obtained among mankind in the earliest ages; of which we hav^e all the proof that a matter of this nature is capable of. This is acknowledged by some who are otherwise no great friends to that doctrine. Lord Boling- broke owns, that " the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, began to be taught before we have any light into antiquity. And when we begin to have any, we find it established, that it was strongly inculcated from times immemorial, and as early as the most antient and learned nations appear to us (^)." And we find it equally obtained among the most barbarous as among the most civilized nations. The antient Scythians, Indians, Gauls, Germans, Britons, as well as the Greeks and Romans, believed that souls are immortal, and that men shall live in another state after death, though it must be confessed their ideas of it were very ob- scure (c). There were scarce any of the American nations, {b) Bolingbroke's Works, Vol. V.p. 237 edit. 4to. (c) Grotius de Verit. Relig. Christ, lib. i. sect, 22. Chap, II. and a future State of great Antiquity, 273 wbrn the Europeans first came among them, but had some notion of it. It is observed by a celebrated writer, that the most antient Greek poets, who represent the manners and cus« toms of their own and other nations, still sptak of this as their popular opinion and belief {d). Timaeus the Pythago- rean commends the lonean poet [Homer] for the account he gives frotn antient tradition of future punishments {e)i and if this was an antient tradition in Homer's time, it must have been of very great antiquity. Socrates, as repre- sented by Plato, endeavoured to prove the immortalitv of the soul in a way of reason and argument, but he never pretended to be the first inventor of this doctrine, or to have himself found it out merely, by his own enquiries, but frequently speaks of it as a most antient and venerable tra- dition. Thus in the Phaedo Socrates saith, " I am in good hope, that there is something remaining for those that are dead; and that, as hath be;_n said of old, [&)T7rt^ y\ ^ Tr^xca yzysrxi] it is much better for good than for bad men (/")." Piato in this agreed with his great master. In his seventh epistle written to Dion's friends and relations, he says, *■' That we ought always to believe the antient and sacred words," [which plainly points to some traditions of great antiquity, and supposed to be of divine original] '' which shew both that the soul is immortal, and that it hath judges, and suffers the greatest punishments, when it is disengaged from the body (^')." From whence he con- (cf) Divine Legation of Moses, Vol. I. book ii. sect. 1. p. 90. 4th edit. (e) See his treatise of the Soul of the World, at the latter end» (/) Platen Opera, p. 378. A. edit. Lugd. {g) Ibid. p. 7 16. A. niiB-i(76iit Ti 'irax; am x,e,^ rolg rccXxiotg >^ il^oiq Vol. II. o M 274 The belief of the Immortality of the Soul Part III. eludes, that it is a less evil to sufft:r tlie greatest acts of in- justice than to do them. Aristotle, as cited by Plutarch, speaking of the happiness of men after their departure out of this life, represents it as a most antient opinion, so old that no man knows when it began, or who was the author of it, that it hath been handed down to us by tradition from infinite ages (Ji), Cicero speaking of the immortality of the Soul, supposes it to have been held " by those of the best authority, which in every case is and ought to be of great weight: and that all the antients agreed in it, who were the more worth}^ of credit, and the more likely to know the truth, the nearer they approached to the first rise of man- kind, and to their divine original (?)•" He also observes, that " the antients believed it, before they became ac- quainted with natural philosophy, which was not cultivated till many years afterwards: and that they were persuaded of things by a kind of natural admonition, without enquir- ing into the reasons and causes of them (i)." He after- wards argues from the consent of all nations concerning it. "Permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum om- nium (/)." And Seneca in his 117th epistle represents this universal consent as of no small moment in this argument. (A) Plutarch, in Consol. ad Apollon. Oper. torn. II. p. 115. C. edit Xyl. (f) " Autoribus quidem ad istam sententiam uti optumis pos- sumus quod in omnibus causis, et debet et solet valere plurimum: et primum quidem oiTini aniiquitate, quae quo propius aberat ab ortu et divina progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse quae crant vera cernebat." Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 12. {k) *' Qui nondum ea quae multis post annis tractari cepissent physicu 'lidicissent, tanlum sibi persuaserant, quantum natura ad- raonente cognoverant, rationes et causas rerum non tenebant." Tuscul Disput. lib. i. cap. 13. (/)lbid. cap. 16. Chap. II. and a future state of great Antiquity, 275 Plutarch in his consolation to Apollonius, not only ap- proves the passage of Aristotle produced above concerning the great antiquity of this tradition, but represents it as an opinion delivered by the most antient potts and philoso- phers [o Tiuv rrxXuTcifv rt Tirosiirifv Kxi (PiXo^oipav Xeyoi"] that some kind of honour and dignity shall be conferred upon excel- lent persons, after their departure out of this life; and that there is a certain region appointed, in which the souls of such persons reside (w). The same eminent philosophtr in his consolatory letter to his wife on the death of their little child, supposes that the souls of infants pass after death into a better and more divine state. And that this is what may be gathered from their antient laws and customs de- rived by tradition from their ancestors (n). I think it sufficiently appears from the several testimo- nies which have been produced, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state obtained very generally among mankind in the earliest ages. It is true that some have pretended to assign the first authors of this opinion. Cicero himself says, that, as far as appears from written accounts, Pherecydes Syrius was the first who taught that the souls of men are sempiternal or immortal. For Cicero uses these words as synonvmous. Thus he speaks of the body's being buried after death in a sempi- ternal sleep, i. e. not a sleep that never had a beginning, but which shall never have an end (o). " Credo equidem (m) Plutarch, ubi supra, p. 120. B. (n) Plutarch. Oper. tom. II. p. 612. (o) Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 16. The author of Le Discours sur la Vie heureuse, published at the end of the Pensees Phiioso- phiques, after having asserted that from the most remote anti- quity, the entire destruction of our being at death was a doctrhie believed among the philosophers, tells us, that Cicero names the 276 The Belief of the Immortality of the Soul Part III. etiam alios tot saeculis; seel quod Uteris extet, Pherecydes Syrius primum dixit animos esse hominum sempiter- man who first took upon him to believe that the soul is immortal. But it is manifest that it was not Cicero's intention to insinuate that Pherecydes was the first man that ever believed the im- mortality of the soul. The san^e confident writer adds, that" in the present enlightened a^e, it is demonstrated by a thousand proofs, thcit there is only one life and one happiness," i. e. a hap- piness confined in this present life. Di.ns un siecle aussi eclaire que le notre, il est enfin demontre par mille preuves sans repli- que, qui'l n'y a qu'une vie, et qu'une felicite." An excellent instance this of the extraoidinary sagacity of the present age: i. e. of those who set up for masters of rea-on in opposition to revelation. And indeed this author plainly and without disguise pushes this system of the mortality of the soul, and the utter ex- tinction of our existence at death, '.o its natural consequences, utterly subversive of all religion and morality. See here above p. 37. of this v>lunie. To what is there observed I now add, that Virtue and Vice, according to this writer, are only different modifications of mat- ter, like a clock's going right or wrong: and a man has no reason to blame himself for doing what he could not possibly help This is a consequence he pkinly avows. *' When I do g(jod or evil," says he, " if I be vicious in the morning, and virtuous in the even- ing, it is ray blood that is the cause of it; and yet I believe I did it by choice, and applaud myself upon my liberty " He asserts^ that an absolutely necessary determination draws us, une deter- mination absolument necessaire nous entraine; and yet we ima- gine we are free. Upon which he exclaims, " What fools are we! and fools by so much the more miserable, that we incessantly reproach ourselves for' not having done that which it was not in our power to do!" Que nous sommes fous! et fous d'autant plus malheureux, que nous nous reprochons sans cesse de ne pas avoir fait ce qu'il n'etoit pas au notre pouvoir de faire. Here he evidently discards, as far as in him lies, all remorse of conscience for evil deeds, as a foolish and unreasonable thing. A doctrine this, which besides the impiety of it, is of the worst consequence to the good order of civil communities. Chap. II. and a future State of great Antiquity. 277 nos (/>)•" But it is evident that he does not here intend to affirm, that Pherecydes was absolutely the first that ever held the immortality of the soul. For he himself represents it as having been believed from all antiquity, by those who were nearest the origin of the human race. And in this very paragraph he declares it as his own opinion, that there were others in the succession of so many ages who had taught it, though their names are not recorded. His meaning therefore is probably this, that though others had believed and maintained it long before, and it stood on the foot of antient tradition, Pherecydes was the first of the philosophers, of whom there was any account then extant, who taught it to his scholars as part of his philosophical doctrine. Diogenes Laertius tells us, that some affirmed that Thales was the first who said that souls are immor- tal (^). Pausanias gives the honour of it to the Chaldeans and Persian Magi, from whom he thinks the Greeks had it (r). And Laertius also mentions it as the doctrine of the Magi, that men shall live again and be immortal (^). According to Athenaeus, Homer was the first who said- that the soul is immortal (^). Others name Pythagoras for the author of it. Herodotus ascrib^s it to the Egyptians (li). And in this he has been followed by others. Lord Boling- broke, after having declared in the passage above referred to, that it began to be taught before we have any light into antiquity, yet pretends to assign the origin of it, and that it was invented in Egypt, and came from thence to the (fi) Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 16. (q) Laert, lib. i. segm. 24. (r) In Messeniacis, cap. 32. (s) Laert. in Procem. segm. 9. (?) Deipnos. lib. xi. p. 507. (w) Lib. ii. cap. 122. 278 The Notion of a future State derived PARf III. Greeks, and from whom it was derived to the Romans (at). All that can justly be concluded from those different ac- counts is, that the author of this doctrine was not known: that the several persons which have been mentioned taught the immortality of the soul, but that this doctrine was really of more antient date than any of them, and even from times immemorial. There is, therefore, just ground to con- clude that it was not originally the result of philosophical disquisitions, to which men did not much apply themselves in those early ages. Nor was it merely the invention of lawgivers for political purposes, as some have represented it. The noble author above-mentioned expressly asserts, "the antient theists, polytheists, philosophers, and legis- lators, invented the doctrine of future rewards and punish- ments, to give an additional strength to the sanctions of the law of nature (t/)." That it gives a mighty sanction to that Jaw will be readily allowed; and its great utility this way, as the learned bishop of Gloucester has very properly ob- served, is no small argument of its truth. It has been al- ready hinted, that men's being capable of being governed by the hopes and fears of the life to come, which cannot be said of any of the inferior animals, seems plainly to shew that the author of the human frame designed man not merely for the present, but for a future state of existence. For who would undertake to propose such sanctions to the brutes? The wisest of the antient legislators encouraged the belief of a future state, as they did that of the existence of a God and a Providence. But they were not the authors or inventers of these' doctrines. They took advantage of the notions of these things, which had already obtained among the people, and endeavoured to make their own use of {x) Bolingbroke*s Works, Vol. V. p. 288. (t/) Ibid. Chap. II. by Tradition from the fir at Ages, 279 them. The most reasonable account which can be given of the early and universal spreading oi" the doctrine of a future state among the nations, is, that it was parr of the primitive religion communicated to the first parents and ancestors of the human race, and which came originally by divine revelation, and was from them transmitted to their posterity. Grotius speaking of the notion that the souls of men survive their bodies, says, that ''this most antient tradition spread from our first parents (for from whom else could it come?) to almost all civizcd nations.*' " Qua antiquissima traditio a primis (unde enim aiioqui?) paren- tibus, ad populos moratiores pene omnes manavit (z)." And indeed it cannot well be conceived, that the first men in the rude illiterate ages, when they were little used to abstracted reasonings, should be able to form notions (if left merely to themselves) of spiritual immaterial beings, or that they had souls within them which should survive their bodies, and continue to think and act without the assistance of the bodily organs: how should they pursue the refined specu- lations concerning the nature and qualities of the soul, which so puzzled and embarrassed the acutest philosophers, and the greatest masters of reason, in the ages of learning and science? The first men could not so much as know, till they were taught by observation and experience, or had informa- tion of it by foreign instruction, that they were to die and have an end put to their lives by the dissolution of the bodily frame, much less that there was to be another life after this, in which they w^ere to be rewarded or punished according to their present conduct. Since therefore it can- not be denied that some notion of a future state obtained very early in the world, and spread very generally among (z) Grot, de Verit. Relig. Christ, lib. i. cap. 22. 280 The Notion of a future State derived Part IIL mankind, and since there is little likelihood that mf^n in those first ages came to the knowledge of it in the way of reasoning and abstracted speculation, it is most reasonable to resolve it into a primitive universal tradition, derived from the first ages. And to this several of the passages which have been produced from the mdst eminent Pagan writers plainly refer, and some of them represent that tra- dition as having been of a divine original. And of this there are plain intimations given us in the Holy Scrip- tures. It is indeed urged by a learned and ingenious writer, who is not willing to allow that the nations received any part of their religion by tradition from the first parents of mankind, that '^ it does not appear that either Adam or Noah received from God any thing concerning the immor- tality of the soul, or a state of future rewards and punish- ments; and that no passage can be produced, which con- tains such revelation (<:/)•" But it appears from the express testimony of the sacred writer to the Hebrews, that Abra- ham and other patriarchs, w^ho lived but a few ages after the flood, looked forward beyond this present transitory state to a better heavenly country. He represents both them, and some of those who lived before the flood, as hav- ing lived and walked by faith, which he describes to be the " substance, or confident expectation (as the word there used in the original might properly be rendered) of things hoptd for, and the evidence of things not seen." And this faith must be supposed to have been originally founded on a divine revelation or promise. And. since it appears from the Mosaic writings, that God communicated by revelation the knowledge of several things relating to religion and their duty to the first parents of mankind, it may be rea- (a) Dr. Sykes's Connection and principles of Natural and Re- vealed Religion, p. 438, 439, 440. Chap. II. hy Tradition from the first Ag^es. 281 sonably concluded, that some notion was also given them of the immortality of the soul and a future state; especially after the sentence of death pronounced upon them after the fall. Some notices of this kind seem to have been particu- larly necessary on occasion of the death of Abel, who pro- bably was the first man that died, and who seemed to perish in his righteousness; and afterwards, by the transla- tion of Enoch, God gave a manifest proof of a future state, prepared for those who had obeyed and served him in a holy and virtuous life here on earth. And as this must be known to Noah, he could not be ignorant of the life to come, and would undoubtedly be careful to instruct his posterity in a point of such vast importance. This, which is plainly intimated concerning the antediluvian patriarchs, is, as hath been already hinted, still clearer with respect to Abraham, and other patriarchs after the flood; as any one may see that will consider what is said concerning them in the eleventh chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews, verse 9, 10. 13, 14, 15, 16. To which may be added, that St. Paul seems to refer to some very antient promise or revela- tion concerning this matter, when he speaks of God's hav- ing " promised eternal life, wgo x^^^^^ utmim-, before antient times," or as Chrvsostom, Theodoret, and Oecumenius render it, uvcHv utt* m^x^s^ " of old time from the beginning of ages." Titus i. 2. (^) Thus we have the testimony of the Holy Scriptures, and of the most eminent Heathen writers, concerning the great antiquity of the doctrine of a future state. But in process of time, in this as well as other instances, the antient pri- mitive traditions became greatly corrupted: and at the time of our Saviour's coming the belief of it was very much ob- (b) See Dr. Whitby's Commentary on Tit. i. 2. See also Dr. Benson's Paraphrase and notes on that place. Vol. II. 2 N • ' 282 The Notion of a future State derived^ ^c. Part III. scured and almost lost, even in the most learned and ci- vilized parts of the Heathen world. There was therefore great need of a divine revelation, which should exhibit far clearer discoveries, and give fuller assurances of it than had been ever given to the world before. This was done to the greatest advantage by the Christian revelation: so that it may be justly said, that our Lord J' sus Christ hath "brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel." 283 CHAPTER III. The antient traditions concerning the immortality of the soul and a future state became in process of time greatly obscured and corrupted. It was absolutely denied by many of the philosophers, and rejected as a vulgar error. Others represented it as altogethei- uncertain, and having no solid foundation to sup- port it. The various and contradictory sentiments of the philosophers concerning the naiuie of the human soul Many of the Peripatetics denied the subsistence of the soul after death, and this seems to have been Aristotle's own opinion. The Stoics had no settled or consistent scheme on this head: nor was the doc- trine of the immortality of the soul a doctrine of their school A future state not acknowledged by the celebrated Chinese philosopher Confucius, nor by the sect of the learned who profess to be his disciples. It has been shewn, that the belief of the immortality of the soul, and a future state, obtained very early among the nations, even in ages that were accounted rude and illiterate. One would have hoped that afterwards in the ages of learning and philosophy, a doctrine so useful to mankind, and so agreeable to right reason, would have ac- quired new strength. But the fact was otherwise: many of those who pretended to a wisdom and penetration above the vulgar, quitting the antient traditions, and affecting to govern themselves by the pure dictates of reason, abso- lutely denied the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state, and exploded it as a vulgar error, un- worthy of men of sense, and fit only to be left to the un- thinking multitude. There were whole sects of philoso- phers, whose professed tenet it was, that the soul died with the body. Such were Democritus and his followers, the Cynics, Cyrenaics, and especially the numerous and wide extended sect of the Epicureans: and many other phi- losophers agrvcd with them in this point. The several sorts of Sceptics, according to their manner, employed all the subtilty they were masters of against the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and a future state, as well as 284 The Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul Part III. against other articles of popular belief. The famous Aris- totle expresses himself in such a manner as leaves his greatest admirers in doubt what his real sentiments were on this subject. Plutarch seems to give it as Aristotle's opinion, "that death belongs only to the bodv, not to the soul; for that there is no death of the soul." Qxivxrov ehen fAa- V09 tS cra)f^etroq<) k -^^Xt^^^i rctvT^i yec^ is^ vziru^^ti B-civetToi (^c). But Iq the first book of the Nicomachian Ethics, the eleventh chapter, having put the question, whether any man can be happy after death, Aristotle intimates that it would be al- together absurd for those to say so, who make happiness to consist in operation, which was his own opinion (). In enquiring into the opinions of the philosophers on this subject, it is particularly proper to take notice of the Stoics. As none of the philosophers were stricter moralists, or pro- fessed greater zeal for the cause of virtue than they did, one might be apt to expect, that they would have been strong advocates for the immortality of the soul, and a fu- (w) Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 9, 10, 11. (n) Senec. Epist. 88. (o) Plutarch. Oper. torn. II. p. 898. edit. Xyl. (//) Galen quod animi mores, &c. cap. 1, 2, 3. 5. 9. as cited by Dr. Campbell, Neces. Revel, p. 185. et seq. where the reader may see it at large. Chap. III. not the Doctrine of the Stoic School. 287" ture state of rewards and punishments. But this was far from being the case. Lactantius indeed tells us concern- ing Z .^no the father of the Stoic sect, that he taught that "the abodes of good men in the subterraneous regions were distinct and separate from those of the wicked; the former inhabit pleasant and delightful regions, the latter suffer punishments in dark places, and in horrid gulphs full of filth and nastiness." " Esse inferos Zeno Stoicus docuit, et stdes piorum ab impiis esse discretas, et illos quidem quietas et delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere pccnas in tenebrosis locis atque cceni voraginibus hor- rendis (^)." This was agreeable to the representations made of these things in the mysteries. And it might well be, that Zvuo expressed the popular opinion in this mat- ter rather than his own. But whatever were his sentiments upon.it, certain it is that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, was not the professed doctrine of his school, nor was it ever reckoned among the avowed principles of the Stoic sect. I cannot indeed say with a very learned writer, " we know that the philosophic principle of his school was that the soul died with the body," for which he refers to Plu- tarch's treatise de Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. 7. But Plu- tarch there only gives it as their opinion, that when the soul goes out of the body, "that of the weaker, that is, of the unlearned, is mixed with the concretions, or earthly elements; but that which is more strong and vigorous, such as are the souls of the wise, shall continue to the con- flagration." And he there distinguishes the sentiments of the Stoics from that of Democritus and Epicurus, who, he says, taught that the soul is corruptible, and p^risheth with (y) Lactan. Divin. Instit. lib. vii. cap. 7. 288 The Immortality of the Soul Part IIL the body. Cicero expressly ascribeth to the Stoics the opinion that the soul surviveth the body, and subsisteth in a separate state for some time after death, but not always. I " Aiunt manere animos cum a corpore excesserint, sed non /' semper." And he blames them, for that when they ac- knowledged that the soul continues to subsist separately from the body, which is the most diflBcult part of the con- troversy, yet they would not allow that which is the na- tural consequence of it, that the soul shall never die (r). Agreeable to this is that which Laertius saith, that the Stoics held that " the soul remaineth afttr death, but that it is corruptible." -^vx^-^v ^6T«e ^xmrh iTrtf^ivuv. (r< 6€go-<5i' ^£T^5-«o-{•)" Unam animam communem et universalcm somniabant Stoici, unde reliquae omnes essent quasi decisae, sive quae reli- quarum omnium fons quidam existeret, in quem etiam denuo quasi refunderenter.*' Gat. Annot. in Antonin. p. 141. (/) Anton. Med. book v. sect. 13. See also book vii. sect. 10. Chap. III. 7iot acknowledged by Confucius, 297 men's being judged or called to an account after death for their conduct in this lite, or that the wicked shall be pu- nished in a future state. It is observed by the celebrated Mons* de Montesquieu, that " the religion of Confucius denies the immortality of the soul, and the sect of Zeno did not believe it."— *•• La' religion de Confucius nie I'immortalite de I'ame, et la secte de Zenon ne la croyoit pas (?w)." I have already consi- dered the sentiments, of the sect of Zeno on this head. As to the famous Chinese philosopher Confucius and his disciples^ who, like the Stoics, have always professed to make morals their chief study, it appears by the best accounts which are given of them, that they do not acknowledge the im- mortality of the soul and a state of future retributions* Father Navarette, who was a long time in China, and well acquainted with their books, affirms, that Confucius knew nothing of the rewards and punishments of another life (/z). He also observes concerning the second great Chinese phi- losopher Meng Zu, who lived one hundred years after Confucius, and to whom the Chinese erect temples, hold- ing him in great veneration next to Confucius, that he has admirable moral sentences; but in his books there is not the least appearance of his having the knowledge of God^ of the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and pu- nishments of a future life: and he would have mentioned this in his writings, if he had found any such thing in the doctrine of Confucius, which he diligently learned and studied {p). The same author observes, that the Chinese (m) L'Esprit des Loix, Vol. 11. liv. 24. chap. 19. p. 166. edit. Edinb. ^ (w) See his Account of the Empire of China, in the first vo- lume of Churchill's Collection of Travels and Voyages, p. 113* (o) Ibid. p. 139. Vol. II. 2 P . 298 Immortality of the Soul and a future State Part IIL often speak of heaven's rewarding the virtuous and punish- ing the wicked; but that most certain it is, that they speak not of what is in the other life, but in this. They look upon rewards and punishments to be the natural and necessary attendants of virtue and vice, which accompany them as the shadow does the body (/?). F. Longobardi, in the treatise I have cited before, says it is the general opinion of the Chinese, that he who does well shall be naturally and of ne- cessity rewarded, and he that does ill punished; as he is warmed that draws near the fire, and he grows cold that is in the snow (^). The same father shews, both from their classical books of greatest authority, and from the unani- mous profession of the most learned mandarins, that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is not received or acknowledged by the learned sect. Speaking of himself and other missionaries that were with him, he says, " We asked doctor King Lun Ju, a mandarin of the court of rites, whether, according to the sect of the learned, there was any reward or punishment in the other life? He laughed at the question; and then answered, that it could not be denied that there were virtues and vices in this world; but that all ended with death, when the man in whom v/ere these things expired: and therefore there was no need of providing for the next life, but only for this." F. Longobardi produces several other testimonies to the same purpose, which I need not particularly mention, and declares, that he had often conversed with their most learned mandarins in se- veral parts of China during the time he resided there, and (/i) See his Account of the Empire of China, in the first volume of Churchill's Collection of Travels and Voyages, p. 137, 138. {q) Ibid. p. 185. Chap. III. not acknoxvledged by Confucius, 299 found that they all agreed unanimously in this (r). He also mentions a conversation he had with Dr. Michael, a learn- ed Chinese Christian, who himself was of the sect of the learned, and perfectly well acquainted with their tenets, and (r) Navarette's Account of the empire of China, in the first volume of Churchill's Collection of Voyages and Travels, p. 197, 198. I shall on this occasion mention what a mandarin said to F. Math. Riccio when he discoursed with him about the Christian faith, and eternal life. After having treated what the father had said concerning a future state as nothing but talk and vain words, which the wind driveth away, the mandarin plainly declared, that he looked for no higher happiness than what ariseth from things present and visible. " What we see (said he) is the advantage of governing and commanding others. Gold, silver, wives and con- cubines, as also a numerous train, goods, feastings, diversions, and all sorts of happiness, honoi5r and glory, are the consequen- ces of being a mandarin. This is the happiness we covet, and which we enjoy in our great and mighty empire; and not the happiness you talk of, which is as unprofitable as it is invisible, and impossible to obtain." And in this he seems to have spoke the sense of the mandarins in general. These notions of theirs have a very bad influence on their moral conduct. As they, look upon the enjoyment of this present world, its riches, honours, and pleasures, to be the highest and only happiness, they stick at no methods, how unfair or unjust soever, to obtain them. It is agreed by all, even by those that are most prejudiced in favour of the Chinese, that though the learned mandarins speak highly of vir- tue, and profess to make the doctrine of morals, and the good or- der of the state in general, and the happiness of each particular person, their whole study, there is a great and general corrup- tion among them, and little regard is had to justic,e and honesty, but cvery.thing is carried by the force of money at their tribu- nals. See among others, Gemelli Carreri's Acc^ount of China, in his Voyage round the World, Part IV. book ii. chap. 4. p. 310. and ibid. chap. vii. p. 328. 330. in Churchill's Collection of Tra- vels, &c. Vol. IV. 300 Immortality of the Soul, ^c. Part III. was one of those who were willing, as far as possible, to in- terpret them so as to bring them to a conformity "v^ith the Christian doctrine. Being asked by the fatiier, " Whether after death there be any rewards or punishments for good or wicked men according to the doctrine of the learned sect? He answered, they make no mention of any such things. Here he sighed, and complained of the professors of that sect, for not teaching the things of another life: which, said he, is the cause that the multitude is not encouraged to prac- tise virtue in earnest. And he commended the sect of Foe for preaching up heaven and hell (^)." Confucius being asked by one of his disciples what an- gels or spirits are, answered, that they are air. And this is the notion that the Chinese have of the soul. They look upon it to be a material thing, though highly rarified: and that when the soul is separated from the body, both of them lose the individual being they had before, and nothing re- mains but the substance of heaven and earth, which had before concurred to the composition of man, and which, as general causes, ever continue in their substantial being, and are only changed in their accidental forms (^). This may suffice concerning the opinions of the learned sect in China, with respect to the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rttributions. The reader may also con- sult to the same purpose a tract of a Chinese philosopher in Du Halde's collection of Chinese pieces, in the third volume of his History of China. (s) Navarette*s Account of the Empire of China, in the first volume of Churchill's Collection of Travels and Voyages, p. 199. (0 Ibid. p. 195. 301 CHAPTER IV. Concerning the philosophers who professed to believe and teach the immortality of tie soul. Of these Pythntjoras is generally esteemed one of the most emi* nent. His doctrine on this head shewn to be not well consistent with a state of future rewards and punishments. Socrates believed the immortality of the soul, and a future state, and argued for it. In this he was followed by Plato. The Doct ine ot Cicero with regard to the immortality of the soul ©onsidered. As also that of Plutarch. It sufficiently appears from what was observed In the former chapter, what confusion there was among the Hea- then Philosophers, with regard to the doctrine of the im- mortality of the soul and a future state: that great num- bers of them absolutely denied it; and others treated it as a mere uncertainty, and did not teach it as a doctrine of their schools. But then it must be acknowledged, that there were other celebrated philosophers whose professed tenet it was that the soul is immortal. This is said to have been the doc- trine of the Persian Magi, and the Indian Gymnoso- phists (w). But what I shall particularly consider is the doctrine of those among the Greek philosophers, who held the immortality of the soul. Of these the most eminent were the Pythagoreans and Platonists. Let us therefore en- quire into their sentiments on this head, and whether they were likely to lead the people into right notions concerning it, and which might be of real service to the cause of reli- gion and virtue. (m) Concerning the Indian Gymnosophists, and the wrong use they and others made of this doctrine, see what is said above, p. 198, 199. of this volume. 302 The Doctrine of Pythagoras Part III. The Pythagoreans were generally reckoned among the most strenuous asserters of the immortality of the soul: but in asserting it they went upon a wrong principle. Pytha- goras, as was observed before {x)^ taught that the soul was a part of the divinity or universal soul, which was every where diffused; and in this, as Cicero assures us, he was followed by all the Pythagoreans (z/). And hence he argued, that the soul is immortal; because that out of which it is discerped is immortal (2). Plutarch asserts, that Pytha- goras and Plato held, that the soul is immortal or incor- ruptible, "because when it departs out of the body, it goes to the soul of the universe, to that which is congenial with itself." n§o$ to oj^oyiih (a). But then this returning into the soul of the world must not be understood, according to Pythagoras's notion, to take place immediately, till after the soul had gone through several transmigrations. For it is a known doctrine of his, that the souls of men after death transmigrate from one body to another, and even to the bodies of beasts as well as men. Porphyry, after having observed that what Pythagoras delivered to his auditors, i. e. to his own proper disciples, cannot be certainly affirm- ed, for there was a great and strict silence obiserved amongst them, says, that his doctrines known to all are these: first, that " the soul is immortal, then that it enters into other kinds of living creatures.'' He held also, that, " after cer- tain periods, the things that were formerly done are done over again." Or, as Mr. Stanley renders it, " the same things that are now generated are generated again, and that {x) See here above, Vol. I. chap. xii. {y) Cic. Cato Major, cap. 21. et De'Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. 1 1. (2) Laert. lib. vii. segm. 28. (fl) Plutarch, de Placit. Philos. lib. iv. cap. 11. Chap. IV. concerning' the Immortality of the Soul, £s?c. 303 there is nothing absolutely new: and that all animals are near a-kin, and of a like kind (^)." Diodorus Siculus affirms, that he learned his doctrine of the transmigration of souls from the Egyptians (c). And Herodotus informs us, that the antient Egyptians said, " that the soul of man is immortal, and that the body being corrupted, the soul goes into the body of one animal after another, and after it has gone round, ^gpj, or per- formed 4ts circuit, through all terrestrial and marine ani- mals and birds, it again entereth into some human body, and that this circuit or circumvolution was completed in three thousand years." He adds, that this opinion some of the Greeks usurped, as if it was their own invention, and that he knew their names, but chose not to mention them, in which probably he had a particular view to Pythagoras (d). This transmigration of souls taught by the Egyptians, as here represented by Herodotus, seems to be physical, and necessary by a natural and fatal necessity, and is a quite different thing from a future state of rewards and punish- ments designed for moral purposes. Agreeable to this is the representation Laertius makes of Pythagoras's doctrine, That " the soul, passing through the circle of necessity, lives at several times in different living creatures (^)." But he is mistaken in supposing Pythagoras to have been the first author of this doctrine, for the Egyptians had taught it before him. But though this transmigration as taught by the Egyptians, according to Herodotus, was natural and necessary, yet they endeavoured so to explain it, as to {b) Porphyr. Vita Pythag. (c) Biblioth. lib. i. p. 86. et Euseb. Prsepar.^ Evangel, lib. x, cap. 8. p. 482. (rf) Herod, lib. ii. (e) Laert. lib. viii. segm. 14. 304 The Doctrine of Pythagoras Part IIL , apply it to moral purposes. And so also Pythagoras seems to have done, at least in his popular discourses. Laertius tells us, that " he held that the soul being cast out upon the earth, wanders in the air, like to a body, and that M rcury is the keeper and conductor of souls, and brings them out of bodies, both from earth and sea; and that pure souls are led into high places; but that the impure neither come near them, nor to one another, but are bound by the furies into indissoluble chains (y)." Theodoret represents it as his opinion as well as that of Plato, that " souls are pre- cxistent to bodies, and that those which transgress are sent again into bodies, that being purifi-d by such discipline, they may return to their own place: that those which whilst they are in the body lead a wicked life, are sent down farther into irrational creatures, hereby to receive punishment and right expiation; the angry and malicious into serpents, the ravenous into wolves, the audacious into lions, the fraudulent into foxes, and the like (^ )." Timseus the Locrian, an eminent Pythagorean, in that celebrated passage at the end of his treatise of the Soul of the world, gives pretty much the same account. That "souls trans- migrate or change their habitations: those of the cowards and effeminate are thrust into the bodies of women; those of murderers, into the bodies of savage beasts; the lascivi- ous, into the forms of boars or swine; the vain and incon- stant are changed into birds, and the slothful and ignorant into fishes (/0»" He represents it as necessary to teach these things to the pepple, and to instil into them the (/) Laert. lib. viii. seg:m. 31. (^) Stanley's History oi Philosophy, p. 559. edit. 2d, Lend. (A) The reader may see the whole passage quoted from th© original, and elegantly translated. Divine Legation of Moses, VoL 11. book iii. p. 143, 144. edit. 4th. Chap. IV. concerning the immortality of the Soul^ ££?c. 305 dread of foreign torments: though he plainly intimates, that they were false relations, and that he himself did not be-* lieve them to be literally true, which probably was the case of Pythagoras himself* Ovid, in his Metamorphosis, introduces Pythagoras as delivering his doctrine to the people of Crotona, and represents him as directing them not to be afraid of punishments after death, of Styx, dark- ness, vain names, and false terrors: that they were not to think that the body can feel any evil; and as to the soulsj they are immortal, and are always changing their habita- tions, and leaving their former abodes, are received into new ones. - " O genus attonitum stolidae formidine mortis! Quid Styi^a, quid tenebras, et nomina vana timeti&j . Materiem vatum, falsiqiie piacula mundi? Corpora sive rogus flamma, sou tabe ve'ustas Abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla puietis. Morte careni animae, semperque priore relicta Sede, novis domibus vivunt, habitantque receptae." Metamorph. lib. xv. ver, 153, et seq- Mr. Sandys translates it thus: ** O you, whom horrors of cold death aflPright, Why fear you Styx, vain names, and endless nightj The dreams of poets, and feign*d miseries Of forged hell? Whether last flames surprize? Or age devours your bodies; they nor grieve, Nor suffer pain Our souls forever live: Yet evermore their antient houses leave To live in new, which them as guests receive." Ovid here represents Pythagoras as maintaining perpetual transmigrations of the soul into other bodies, and this by a kind of physical necessity: which seems not well to con^ sist with what Plutarch gives as Pythagoras*s opinion, thai Vol. IL .^ Q 306 The Doctrine of Pythagoras Part III. the soul, when it departs out of the body, recedes to the soul of the world, as being of the same kind with it. It is farther to be observed, that though Pythagoras seemed to make a transmigration into other bodies common and necessary to all souls; yet he made an exception in favour of some highly privileged souls, as if they were ex- empted from the common law and necessity to which others are subject. Laertius represents it as one of his tenets, that some souls become daemons and heroes (i). And the golden verses of Pythagoras, which contain a summary of his moral doctrine, conclude with promising to him who should obey his precepts, that he should, upon leaving the body, go into the free aether, and become an immortal god, incor- ruptible, and no more obnoxious to death. Whosoever impartially considers and compares the dif- ferent accounts that are given us of the Pythagoric doctrine, will find it very difficult to form them into a consistent scheme. Plutarch, as was before observed, represents it as Pythagoras's opinion, that the souls of men return to the universal soul, out of which they were taken, immediately upon their quitting the body {k). But if that were the case, (f) Laert. lib. viii. seg^m. 32. Plutarch ascribes the same opinion, not oTjly to Pythagoras, but to Thales, Plato, and the Stoics. De Placii. Philos. lib. i cap. 8. Oper. torn. II. p. 882. edit. Xyl. (^) In like manner Numenius represents it as the doctrine of some of the Stoics, who, as well as the Pythagoreans, held the re- fusion of the soul into the universal nature, that the "soul of the univer'oe was eternal, and other souls would be mixed with it at death, \-sr) reXivrvi*' Apud Euseb. Prsep. Evang. lib. xv. cap. 20. And Antoninus in a passage cited above, p. 296. supposes that souls shall continue after leaving the body, for some short time in the air, and then be resumed into the universal soul. And he elsewhere speaks of the resumption of the active principle, or the soul, into the intelligence of the whole, as done rei^i^tti " very Chap. IV. concerning' the Immortality of the Saul, ^c. 307 it must be said, either that there are no transmigrations at all, which is contrary to Pythagoras's known opinion, or that after the soul has been for a while re-united to the uni- versal soul of the world, it is again separated from it, in order to animate other bodies, and undergo different trans- migrations. Others represent Pythagoras's doctrine, as if the transmigration of souls were to commence immediate- ly upon their departure out of the body, and that after hav- ing accomplished the course of transmigrations appointed them, they should be refunded into the universal soul. Some authors, who in this as well as other instances affix Christian ideas to the passages they meet with in Pagan au- thors, have represented this refusion of the soul as a state of complete happiness, peculiar to the souls of good men, and consisting in the beatific vision and enjoyment of the Deity. But this is not the idea the Pagan writers them- selves give us of it. The learned and ingenious author of the Critical Enquiry, &:c. whom I have before referred to, has proved by express testimonies, that this refusion of the soul was not supposed to be a privilege peculiar to the righteous and innocent; that all souls without distinction were to be absorbed at length into the universal soul, and that this refusion was of a physical nature, not properly for any moral purpose or design, but to furnish the " anima mundi" with materials for the reproduction and renovation of things (/). If there were any happiness for departed souls, it was to be before the refusion, which was supposed to put an end to their separate individual existence (m). soon, quam celerrime," as Gataker renders it. Anton, lib. vii* sect. 10. X (/) See Critical Enquiry into the Opinions of the Antients, Sec. chap. 5. (m) They explained it, as an eminent writer observes, bj^ a hot- 308 The Doctrine of Pythagoras Part III. Seneca has a remarkable passage in his 72d epistle, which it is proper to mention here. " Magnus animus Deo pareat, et quicquid lex universi jubet sine cunctatione patiatur." ** Aut in meliorcm emittitur vitam, lucidius tranquilliusque inttr divina mansurus, aut certe sine uUo futurus incom- modo, naturae suas remiscebitur, et revertetur in totum." Where he represents it as the part of a great mind cheer- fully to submit to what the law of the universe requires, and that either he shall go free into a better life, where he shall remain in a luminous and serene abode among the gods, or he shall without any evil or inconvenience be re- mingled with his nature, and return into the whole. The utmost that he says of this re-union to ihe whole, is that the soul shall then be without any evil or inconvenience, tie filled with sea-water, which, swimming a while upon the ocean, does upon the bottle's breyking mingle with common mass. To this purpose he cites a remarkable passage from Gaffendus, in which that very learned author says, " Vix ulli fuere (quae humanse mentis caligo et imbecillitas est) qui non incideiint in errorem ilium de refusione in animam mundi. Nimirum sicut existimarunt singulorum animas particulas esse animae mundana?) quarum quae libet sue corpore, ut aqua vase includitur, ita et re- putarunl unamquamque animam, corpore dissoluto, quasi diffract© vase effluere, atque animae mundi e qua deducta fuerit iterum uniri.'* See Divine Legation, vol, II. bouk iii. sect. 4. p. 205, 206, 4th edition. TertuUian indeed tells us, that the Egyptian Hermes taiiglu that the soul, when departed from the body, is not refund- ed into the nature of the liniverse, but retains its distinct deter- minate existence. " Mercurius -/Ejijyptius animam digrcssam a corpore non refund! in naturam universi, sed manere determina- tam." Terlul. de Anima, cap. 33. But besides that 'l'rismegistus*s writings are of suspected authority, it is here plainly implied, that if the human soul was refunded into the universal soul, which certainly was the common opinion of the Pagan philosophers, it ^vould lose its individual existence, Chap. IV. concerning- the Immortality oftheSoul^^c. 309 "animus sine uUo futurus incommodo," which, as the learned author of the Enquiry observes, is the account he elsewhere gives of death, on supposition of its being an ex- tinction of our individual existence. " D^ath," says he, " brings no evil or inconvenience along with it; for that must have an existence which is subject to any inconvenience." *' Mors nullum habet incommodum: esse enim debet ali- quid, cujus sit incommodum." Epist. 34. Pythagoras in^ deed supposed, as the Stoics did afterwards, that all things that were done in the former world were to be done again, when the soul of the universe was to go forth into new pro- ductions, and form another world at stated. periodical revo- lutions, or at the end of the great year: but this was the ef- fect of a physical necessity, and without any respect in a way of moral retribution to the good or evil actions which had' been done in the former world. I think therefore it may be justly said, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul in the sense in which Pytha- goras taught it, could be of no great advantage to mankind, with regard to the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments. And though those of his school generally so far asserted the immortality of the soul as to maintain that it did not die with the body, but lived to animate other bodies, yet some of them supposed death to be common to the soul and body, and expressed themselves in a manner which has a near affinity with the doctrine of Epicurus* This is what the learned author of the Critical Enquiry has shewn, to whom I refer the reader (n). I shall conclude what relates to Pythagoras with observ- ing, that we cannot lay any stress upon the doctrines he publickly taught, as containing his real sentiments, because (n) See the Critical Enquiry, &c. chap. i. p. 4, 5, 6, 1st edit. 310 The Doctrine of Socrates and Plato Part III* he made no scruple of imposing upon the people things which he himself could not but know were false, and which, we may be sure, he did not himself believe. Se- veral instances of his frauds might be produced; but I shall only mention one relating to his celebrated doctrine of the transmigration of souls. Not con Lent with affirm- ing that doctrine in general, he pretended to mention the several transmigrations which he himself had undergone, and to name the particular persons whom his soul had ani- mated in a succession of some ages, and that he himself had a distinct remembrance of it. Let us next proceed to take some notice of Socrates and Plato, who are generally regarded as the principal of the antient Pagan philosophers before the coming of our Sa- viour, who taught the immortality of the soul and a future state. As to Socrates, the learned Bishop of Gloucester acknowledges that he really believed not only the immor- tality of the soul, but a state of future rewards and punish- ments, though he seems not willing to allow that any of the other antient philosophers believed it (o). His senti- ments are most fully represented in Plato's Phaedo, which contains the discourse he had with his friends the last day of his life, and in which he sets himself to prove the im- mortality of the soul. And though it is probable that Plato in this dialogue very much enlarges upon what Socrates then said to his friends and disciples, yet he had too great a regard to decency to put any thing upon him on such an occasion, but what was agreeable to his known sentiments. And if he had done so, others would not have failed to ex- pose him for it. The same may be said of Socrates's apology as delivered by Plato. (o) Divine Legation of Moses, &c. vol. II. book iii. sect, 4, p. 235. 4th edit. €hap. IV. concerning the Immortality of the Soul^ csfc. 311 In the beginning of the Phsedo Socrates declares to Ce- bes, and the others who then came to see him, that did he not think that he should go to wise and just gods, and to men that had^ departed this life, and who were better than those who were then living upon the earth, it would be wrong in him not to be troubled at death; " but know assuredly," says he, '' that I hope I am now going to good , men, though this I would not take upon me peremptorily 1 to assert: but that I shall go to the gods, lords that are absoluteh good, this, if I can affirm any thing of this kind, I would certainly affirm. And for this reason I do not take it ill that I am to die, as otherwise I should do; but am in good hope that there is something remaining for those that are dead, and that (as it hath been said of old) it will then be much better for good than for bad men." He then pro- poses to offer reasons, why a man that had all his life ap- plied himself to philosophy should expect death with confi- dence, and should entertain good hope that he should ob- tain the best of good things after his departure out of this In other parts of that dialogue Socrates says excellent things concerning the happiness to be enjoyed in a future state. But then he seems to regard this as the special privilege of those who having an earnest thirst after know- ledge addicted themselves to the study of philosophy. He talks of the soul's going at his departure hence, " into a place like itself, noble, pure, invisible, to a wise and good God, whither," says he, " if it pleases God, my soul shall soon go (^)." And again, that " the soul which gives itself up to the study of wisdom and philosophy, and lives ab- stracted from the body, goes at death to that which is like {ti) Plato Oper. p. 377. H. 378. A, B. edit. Lugd, {q) Ibid. p. 385. G. edit. Lugd. 312 Socrates taught the Immortality of Part lit. itself, divine, immortal, wise, to which wh^n it arrives, it shall be happy, freed from error, ignorance, fears, disor- derly loves, ity^im IfaTav^ and other human evils, and lives, as is said of the initiated, the rest of its life with the gods (r)." He adds, that they who only minded the body and its appetites and pleasures, having something in theni ponderous and earthy, shall after their departure out of the body be drawn down to the earth, and hover about the sepulchres, being punished for their former ill-spent life, T»!)» ^ixiiv rivacrui tS? 'nr^ors^x^ r^o^ uiumrh zr^v^k if unt '*of necessity the soul must be an ungenerated and immortal thing («)." Cicero highly commends this as both elegantly and acutely argued, and afterwards sums it up himself thus: " The soul perceives that it moves, and at the same time perceives that it moves not by a foreign force, but by its own; and it can never happen that it should be deserted by itself: from whence it follows, that it must be eternal." "Sentit igitur animus se moved, quod cum sentit illud una sentit, se vi sua non aliena moveri, nee accidere posse ut ipsa unquam a se deseratur: ex quo efficitur aeter* pitas (^)." This way of arguing so much admired by Cicero might be made use of to prove the eternal exis^ tence of the one self-existent independent Being, the first cause of all things, and the principle and original of all motion. But when applied to the human soul, if it proved any thing, would prove that it is self-originate, independent, and necessarily eternal by the force of its own nature. So that if it be not strictly of the same essence with the su- preme God, it is of a nature perfectly like his, underived, and which existed of itself from everlasting, and continueth always to exist by its own force, and can never be des- troyed or cease to exist (c). Hence it was that some of the (a) Plato in Phaedro, Opera, p. 344. D, E. edit^ Lugd. 1590. (Jb) Cic. Tuscul. Disput. 1. i. cap. 23. p. 52. et seq e'it. Davis. (c) This seems to be the course of Plato's argument for the immortality of the soul, as urged by Plato in hi-. Phaedrus, and after him by Cicero. And yet the same Plato in, his Timaeiis 334 The Philosophers placed the Immortality of Part III, antient fathers found fault with the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul as taught by the Heathen philoso- phers; because they thought it tended to prove that the soul continued to exist by a necessity of nature, and was independent on God. Arnobius particularly charges them with holding, that the soul was equally immortal with God himself; which, he thought, had a tendency to take away the dread of the supreme power, and of a future judgment and punishment; and thereby to encourage men to all manner of wickedness, and the licentious indulgence of their lusts and appetites. " Quid enim," says he, " pro- hibebit quo minus hsec faciat? metus supremse potestatis, judiciumque divinum? Et qui poterit territari formidinis alicujus horrore, cui fuerat persuasam, tam se esse immor- talem, quam ipsum Deum primum? nee ab eo judicari quicquam de se posse: cum sit una immortalitas in utro- que, nee in alterius altera conditionis possit sequalitate vexari." It has been shewn that the principal arguments made use of by the antient Pagan philosophers to prove the immor- tality of the soul placed it on wrong foundations. I shall not enter on a particular consideration of the other argu- ments offered by them in proof of that important article. One would have expected to have met with some solid and satisfactory reasonings on this subject in Plato's Phsedo, a treatise highly celebrated by antiquity, and the professed .design of v/hich is to prove the immortality of the soul. And it may reasonably be supposed, that Plato has there laid together, and put into the mouth of Socrates, whatever he judged to be of the greatest force, whether it had been makes the immortality of the secondary gods to depend not mere- ly upon their own nature, but upon the will of the supreme God. And surely this equally holds concerning human souls. Chap. V. the Soul on wrong Foundations, 335 advanced by Socrates, or was of his own invention. But I am sorry to observe, that, abstracting from the fine man- ner of carrying on that dialogue, there is not much strength of argument even in those things on which he seems to lay the greatest stress: and that some of them are obscure and trifling, and what one would not have expected from so great a man {d), Socrates and Plato seem to be among the first that undertook to prove this point in a way of reason and argument. But, as was before observed, they both re- present it as having been transmitted by antient traditions, to which it was just to give credit as being of a divine original. Another remarkable instance, in which those of the (c?) The reader that would see a summary of Socrates's argu- ments for the immortality of the soul, as represented in Plato's Phaedo, may consult the account given of them by Dr. Campbell in his Necessity of Revelation, sect. 3. p. 100. et seq. upon all which that learned writer observes, that " Socrates by no means arrived at this truth, in pursuing any series of ideas or notions that could arise in one's mind from the nature and relation of things. He is much like a man who has some way or other pick- ed up a truth, but can give no account of it, but casts abroad to find out something to justify his opinion in the best manner he can, without advancing any thing to the purpose." Ibid. p. lOT. Indeed some of the latter Platonists and Pythagoreans who lived after life and immortality was brought into the most clear and open light by the Gospel, seem to have managed the argument with much greater advantage than Plato himself This may be particularly observed concerning Plotinus; and indeed this great article seems then to have been more generally acknowledged among the philosophers, than it was before. And yet Porphyry, one of the most learned of them, and a great admirer of Plotinus, observes, that the reasons whereby the philosophers endeavoured to demonstrate the immortality of the soul were easy to be over- thrown. Ap. Euseb. Praepur. Evangel, lib. xiv. cap. 10. p. 741. C. :^36 The Philosophers placed the Immortality of Part III^ antients who professed to believe the immortality of the soul, and a state of future rewarris and punishments, greatly weakened and corrupted that doctrine, relates to the notion they universally held of the transmigration of souls. This has been already mentioned; but it is proper to take some further notice of it in this place* As they maintained the pre-existence of human souls before their entrance into their present bodies, so also that they transmigrated after their departure out of these bo^ dies, from one body to another. These notions were looked upon as having a near connexion; and those that held the former maintained the latter too. And indeed they who be-* lieved that their souls had existed long before they ani- mated their present bodies, would find no difficulty in con- ceiving that after quitting these bodies they passed into others. And what might contribute to the general reception and propagation of this notion, both among the more learn- ed and the vulgar, was, that they believed, upon the credit of a very antient tradition, that the soul did not die with the body, and that it survived in a future state, and yet could not well conceive how it could live and subsist with- out animating some body: this led them to suppose that^ when it was dislodged from one body, it animated another. And as they believed that the inferior animals had souls as well as men, they might suppose that human souls might transmigrate into the bodies of those animals {e). But whencesoever this notion of the transmigration of souls had its rise, it spread very generally among the na- tions, and was embraced not only by the vulgar, but by the (e) Some suppose that the doctrine of transmigration might have been owing to an abuse or perversion of an antient tradition concerning the resurrection of the body: concerning which see below, chap. viii. Chap. V. The Soul on -vbrong Foundations. 337 most wise and learned. And it proved to be a great cor- ruption and depravation of the true original doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and a future state. They endea- voured indeed to explain it so as to accommodate it to moral purposes, by supposing different kinds of bodies which they were appointed to animate, in order to preserve some, appearance of future rewards and punishments. But in reality upon this scheme there could be no proper retri- butions in another life for what was done in the present. For in the several transmigrations from one body to ano- ther, the soul Vvas generally supposed to have no remem- brance in a succeeding body of the actions it had done, and the events which had happened to it in a former. Py- thagoras indeed pretended to remember the several trans- migrations he had passed through, and what he had done, and what had bef.dlen him in the S' veral bodies he had animated: but this was represented as a peculiar and ex- traordinary privilege, granted to him by Mercury, and which was not supposed to be the common case of trans- migrated souls. And if the soul in its several removes forgets what was done in the former body, it cannot, when entered into another body, be properly said to be rewarded or punished for what it had done before, and of which it had no consciousness. It is plain therefore that the doctrine of the transmigra- tion of souls, on supposition that this transmigration was to begin immediately upon the soul's departure from the present body, which seems to be the notion that many en- tertained of it, and probably Pythagoras himself, left no proper place for a state of future retributions. Others therefore supposed that souls were first to go to Hades or the Inferi, where they were supposed to have a remembrance of their past actions, and to be rewarded or punished accordingly. And when they had abode there for some time they were to enter into bodies of various* Vol. II. 2 U . ' 338 Their Doctrine of Future Rewards Part III. kinds, and after a succession of transmigrations were to be refunded into the universal soul, and to lose their indi- vidual subsistence. The transmigrations which have been mentioned were supposed to belong to all human souls in general. But there were exceptions made in favour of some privileged persons. This leads me to another observation upon the doctrine of those philosophers who professed to believe a future state; and that is, th^it when they speak in the highest strains of future happiness, it relates chiefly to some pri- vileged souls of distinguished eminence, but affords no great comtort or encouragement to the common sort of pious and virtuous persons. With regard to these last, So- crates and Plato suppose them to go to Elysium and the Islands of the blessed, but after temporary abode there (^ ), to pass through several transmigrations, and were at length to return to life again in such bodies of men or beasts as were best suited to them, or as they themselves should chuse (^). But both these philosophers give a high idea (/) The learned Bishop of Gloucester has observed, that " the antients distinguished the souls of men into three species, the human, the heroic, and the daemonic. The two last were indeed believed to enjoy eternal happiness for their public ser- vices on earth, not indeed in Elysium, but in heavent where they became a kind of demigods. But all of the first which include the great body of mankind, were understood to have their designa- tion in purgatory, Tartarus, or Elysium. The first and last of which abodes were temporary, and the second only eternal." Div. Leg. vol. I. p. 396. 2d edit. (g) See here above p. 311. 312. and compare what Plato says in his Gorgias, Oper. p. 312. F. with what is said in the Phaedo, ibid. p. 386. E, F. and in his tenth Republic, ibid. p. 521. edit. Lugd. Chap. V. unfavourable to common Persons. 339 of the happiness which some persons shall be raised to after their departure hence, that they shall be admitted to the fellowship of the gods in celestial abodes, but these were only such as having applied themselves to the study of philosophy, had lived abstracted from the body and all corporeal things, and had arrived to an eminent degree of wisdom and purity: or such great and heroic souls as had been eminently useful to the public. Plato in his fifth Re- public says, that they who died in war, after having behaved with courage and bravery, become holy and terrestrial daemons, averters of evil, and guardians of mankind, and that their sepulchres should be honoured, and they them- selves should be worshipped as daemons Qi), But it cannot be denied, that a person might behave with great courage and bravery, and die in the war in the cause of his country, and yet in other respects be far from deserving the charac- ter of a good and virtuous man. And in that very book he allows such a man, as a reward of his bravery, liberties in indulging his amorous inclinations, in no wise consistent with the rules of purity and virtue. But in this, as well as other instances, Plato and the other philosophers took care to adapt their notions of a future state and its rewards to political ends and views, and had not so much a regard to what they themselves thought to be the truth, as to what they judged to be for the public utility, and the interest of the state. Cicero places those who had been serviceable to their country, in preserving and assisting it, and enlarging its dominion, not merely in Elysium, which was only a tem- poral felicity, but in heaven, where they were to be happy for ever. " Omnibus qui patriam conservarint, juverint, auxe- rint, certum esse in ccelo ac definitum locum, ubi beati aevo (A) Plato Oper. p. 464, 465. edit. Lugd. 340 The Gospel Doctrine of Eternal Life Part III. sempiterno fruentur (i)*" The Stoics held that the common souls at death, or soon after it, were to be resolved into the universal nature, but that great and eminent ones were to continue to the conflagration, and that some of them should be advanced to the dignity of gods. The Egyptians, notwithstanding their notions of the transmigration of souls, supposed that some souls might be taken immediately into the fellowship of the gods; as appears from the remarkable prayer addressed to the sun, and all the gods the givers of life, on the behalf of the person deceased; of which some notice was taken above (i). But this seems to have been confined to persons of eminence, and was not supposed to extend to the vulgar. In like manner the Indian Gymno- sophists, who were zealous abettors of the doctrine of transmigration, seem to have made exceptions to the ge- neral law in their own favour, as having attained to an ex- alted degree of sanctity; and that by burning themselves in the fire they should go out of the body perfectly pure, and have an immediate access to the gods. It is also sup- posed in the Golden Verses of Pythagoras, that they who came up to the height of the Pythagorean precepts, and lived an abstracted and philosophical life, would at their death be made heroes or daemons, and taken into the fel- lowship of the gods ( /). To this notion of many of the phi- losophers concerning the happiness reserved in a future state for some eminent souls, Tacitus seems to refer in his life of Agricola, when he saith, " Si, ut sapieniibus placet, non cum corpore extinguuntur animse' magnse, &c." where he seems to make it the'special privilege of great souls, not (i) Cic. in Somnio Scipionis, cap. 3. (k) Page 39 of this volume. (0 Ibid. Chap. V. promised to all Good Men. 341 to be extinguished with the body: and even of this he speaks doubtfully. It appears then that the Gospel doctrine of eternal life and happiness, promised and prepared for all good men without exception, whether in a high or low condition, learned or unlearned, who live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, and go on in a patient con- tinuance in well doing, was not taught by the most emi- nent of those philosophers, who professed to believe the im- mortality of the soul and a future state. The happiness proposed to be enjoyed even in their Elysium, was to be comparatively but of a short duration: Virgil fixes it to a thousand years. And though they talked of some eminent and privileged souls of great men and philosophers, who were supposed to be raised to h< aven, and there to enjoy eternal happiness, or even to become demi-gods or daemons, yet they could not, in consistency with their schemes, un- derstand this of a happiness which was in the strict and proper sense eternal, and never to have an end. For, as hath been already shewn, it was a notion which generally obtained among them, that at certain periods which the Stoics termed conflagrations, and which w^ere to happen at the end of what they, as well as the Pythagoreans and Platonists, called the great year, there should be an utter end put to the present state of things; and the souls of all men, and even of those of them which had become gods, daemons, or heroes, were to be resumed into the universal soul, and thereby lose their individual existence: after which there was to be an universal renovation or repro- duction of all things; and a new course was to begin in every respect like the old; and that such periodical de- structions and renovations should succeed gne another in infinitum. The observations which have been made are sufficient to shew that those antient philosophers, who are generally 7- 342 The Gospel Doctrine, ^c. Part III. looked upon as the ablest asserters of the immortality of the soul and a future state, had wrong and confused no- tions concerning it; and that those Christian writers are much mistaken who represent the antient Pagan philoso- phers as having taught the same doctrine concerning a fu- ture state, which, to our unspeakable comfort and advan- tage, is brought into a clear and open light by the Gospel. 343 CHAPTER VI. Tho3e that seemed to be the most strenuous advocates for the immortality of the soul and a future state among the antients, did not pretend to any certainty concerning it. The uncertainty they were \mder appears from their way of managing their consolatory discourses on the death of their friends.To this also it was owing, that in their exhortations to virtue they laid little stress on the rewards of a future state. Their not having a certainty concerning a future state, put them upon schemes to supply the want of it. Hence they insisted upon the self-suflRciency of virtue for complete happiness w ithout a future re- compence: and asserted, that a short happiness is as good as an eternal one. Another important observation with regard to those antient philosophers, who were esteemed the ablest advo- cates for the immortality of the soul and a future state, is, that after all the pains they took to prove it, they did not pretend to an absolute: certainty, nor indeed do they seem to have fully satisfied theaiselves about it. The passages to this purpose are well known, and have been often quoted, but cannot be entirely omitted here. Socrates himself, when he was near death, in discours- ing with his friends concerning the immortality of the soul, expresses his hope that he should go to good men after death, "but this (says he) I would not absolutely affirm." He indeed is more positive as to what relates to his going to the gods after death, though this he also qualifies, by saying, that " if he could affirm any thing concerning mat- ters of such a nature, he would affirm this. — 'Emg rl uXXorm Ttiirui ^ao-^v^iTec/^et av tj rSro (w)." And he concludes that long discourse concernmg the state of souls after death with saying, " That these things are so as I haye represented (m) See Platens Phaedo, Opera, p. 377. H. edit. Lugd. 344 The best of the Philosophers did not pretend to Part IIL them it does not become any man of undv^rs landing to af- firm:" though he adds, " that if it appears that th soul is immortal, it seems reasonable to think, that either such things or something like them are true, with regard to our souls and their habitations after death: and that it is worth making a trial, for the trial is noble («)." And in his apology to his judges, he comforts himself with this consideration, that " there is much ground to hope that death is good: for it must necessarily be one of these two; either the dead man is nothing, and hath not a sense of any thing; or it is only a change or migration of the soul hence to another place, according to what we are told, X'ecTtc 7U >,eyofAsvu. If there is no sense left, and death is like a profound sleep, and quiet rest without dreams, it is wonderful to think what gain it is to die; but if the things ■which are told us are true, that death is a migration to ano- ther place, this is still a much greater good.'' And soon after, having said, that those " who live there are both in other respects happier than we, and also in this, that for the rest of their time they are immortal," he again repeats what he said before; " If the things which are told us are true," '^EiTFtp Tu, Xi'yoiu,ivu <«A)j3-jJ hiv: where he seems to refer to some antient traditions which were looked upon as divine, and which he hoped were true, but which he was not absolutely sure of. And he concludes his apology w^ith these remarkable words; " It is now time to depart hence: I am going to die; you shall continue in life; but which of us shall be in a better state, is unknown to all but God (o)." What has been observed concerning Socrates, holds equally concerning Plato, who generally speaks his own (n) See Plato's Phaedo, Opera, p. 401. A. (o) Ibid. p. 368. H. 369. A. C> D. edit. Lugd, Chap^ VI. n full certainty concerning a Future State, 345 Sentiments, especially in what relates to the immortality of the soul and a future state, by the mouth of Socrates. None of the antient philosophers has argued better for the immortality of the soul than Cicero: but at the same time he takes care to let us know, that he followed only that which appeared to him the most probable conjecture, and which was the utmost he could attain to, but did not take upon him to affirm it as certain. This is what he de- clares in the beginning of his discourse upon that subject: " Ut homunculus unus a multis probabilia conjectura se- quens, ultra enim quo progedior, quam ut verisimilia videam j non habeo (/>)•" And after having mentioned a grfeat variety of opinions about the human soul, and particularly whether it dies with the body, or survives itj and if the latter,- •whether it is to have a perpetual existence, or is only w continue for a time after its departure from the body; he concludes with saying, *' Which of these opinions is true, some god must determine. Which is most probable, is a great question."^—" Harum sententiarum quae vera sit deus aliquis viderit: quas verisimillima magna questio? est (y).» The uncertainty of the most excellent Pagan philosophers were under with regard to a future state farther appeafs, in that in their disputations and discourses, which were de- signed to fortify themselves or others against the feiir of death, as also in their consolatory discourses on the death of deceased friends, they still proceeded upon alternatives^ that death is either a translation to a better state, or is an utter extinction of being, or at least a state of insensibilityo It was with this consideration that Socrates comforted him- self under the near prospect of death, as appears from the Qi) Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 9. {q) Ibid. cap. U. Vol, II, ^ X 346 The best of the Philosophers did not pretend to Part III. passages already produced. In like manner Cicero's whole disputation in his celebrated book above-mentioned, the professed design of which is to fortify men against the fear of death, turns upon this alternative, with which he con- cludes his discourse: That " if the day of our death brings with it not an extinction of our being, but only a change of our abode, nothing can be more desirable; but if it absolutely destroys and puts an end to our existence, what can be better than, amidst the labours and troubles of this life, to rest in a profound and eternal sleep?" — Si su- premus ille dies non extinctionem, sed commutationem ad- fert loci, quid optabilius? Sin autem perimit ac delet om- nino, quid melius quam in mediis vitse laboribus obdormis- cere, et ita conniventem somno consopiri sempiterno (r)?'* And this is the consideration that he seems to me to rely principally upon. There are several passages of Seneca to the same pur- pose, some of which are cited above, p. 292. To which I shall add one more from his Consolation to Polybius, who was grieved for the death of his brother. He directs him to argue with himself thus: " If the dead have no sense, my brother has escaped from all the incommodities of life, and is restored to that state he was in before he was born: and being free from all evil, fears nothing, desires nothing, suffers nothing. If the dead have any sense, the soul of my brother, being let loose as it were from a long confinement, and entirely his own master, exults, and enjoys a clear sight of the nature of things, and looks down as from a higher situation upon all things human with contempt; and he has a nearer view of divine things, the reasons of which he has long sought in vain. Why therefore do I languish (r) Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 49. Chap. VI. a full certainty concerning a Future State. 347 for the want of him, who is either happy, or not at all? To lament one that is happy is envy, and one that has no exist- ence is madness (*)." Plutarch, as was before observed, has several passages, from which it may be concluded that he looked upon the immortality of the soul as a probable opinion, yet he some- times expresses himself in a manner which seems to shew that he either did not believe it, or was not certain of it. In his consolation to ApoUonius he observes, that Socrates said that death is either like to a deep sleep, or to a journey afar off and of a long continuance, or to the en- tire extinction of soul and body. This he quotes with ap- probation, and sets himself distinctly to shew, that in none of these views can death be considered as an evil {t). And in the treatise which is designed to prove that no man can live pleasantly according to the tenets of Epicurus, speak- ing of the hope of immortality, he calls it « TCifi to fAv^uTu («) Senec. Consol. ad Polyb. cap. 27. " Si nullus defuncus sensus sit, evasit omnia frater meus vitas incommoda; et in eum restitutus est locum, in quo fuerat antequam nasceretur, et expers omnis mali nihil timet, nihil cupit, patilur. Si est aliquis defunc- tis sensus, nunc animus fratris mei, velut ex diutino carcere missus, tandem sui juris et arbitrii, gestit, et rerum naturae spec- taculo fruitur, et humana omnia ex superiore loco despicit, di- vina vero, quorum rationem tamdiu frustra quaesierat, propius inluetur. Quid itaque ejus desiderio maceror, qui aut beatus aut nullus est? Beatum deflere, invidia est, nulhim dementia.'* (?) Plutarch. Opera, torn. II. p. 107. D. Here one part of the alternative is the utter extinction of being; and he endeavours to shew, that on that supposition death is not an evil; and yet, ibid. p. 1105. A. in his treatise Non posse suaviter viv>he very justly argues, that the notion of utter dissolution and extinction at death does not take away the fear of death, but rather confirms it; since this very thing is what nature has a strong aversion to. 348 Th^ Uncertainty of the best Philosophers Part III, fSt 4<3«'tjjt(^ iXTciq^ " the fabulous hope of immortality." Or, as the learned Mr. Baxter renders it in his English transla^ tion of that tract, " The hope conceived of eternity from the tales and fables of the antients (ji)»''' And in his treatise of superstition, he supposes death to be the final period of our existence, and that the fear of any thing after it is the effect of superstition: " Death (says he) is to all men the end of life, but to superstition it is not so. She stretches out her l^ounds beyond those of life, and makes her fears of a long- er duration than our existence." Ut^x^ t5 /3/« zr»s-iv ecvB-^coTreie, pfiKStytt TK ^tiv, fAXK^oTS^ov T» (ound mind." And he goes on to declare, that therefore he " would endeavour, to the utmost of his power, to live and die a good man: and exhorts others to do (tw) Plato's Republ.x. Chap. VI. of a future State to the cause of Virtue. 359 so too (n)." And he concludes his discourse in the Phsedo with observing, that on the account of what he had said concerning the rewards and happy abodes prepared for good men in a future state, *' it is necessary to do what we can to attain wisdom and virtue in this life. For, (says he,) the prize or reward of the conflict is excellent, andthe^ hope is great." KabAok y«p to osS-Aav, Koii k 'ix%ig f^iyttM. He adds, that it does not become any man of understanding peremp- torily to affirm that these things are as he represented them; but that it is reasonable to think that these things, or some- thing like them, are true, and that it is worth making a trial though with hazard, for the trial is noble (o). Plutarch in his treatise, that no man can live happily ac- cording to the tenets of Epicurus, represents those who have led pious and just lives as expecting glorious and di- vine things after death; and " it is admirable to think how carefully they apply their minds to virtue, «/«!/ (pg^yQa-i rij ^^ur?,- who believe that as the athlette in the public games do not receive the crown till after they have gone through the con- test and proved victorious, so the reward of the victory achieved by good men in this life is reserved for them after this life is at end (/?)•" And he afterwards says, that *' they who look upon death to be the beginning of another and a better life, have both more pleasure in the good things they now enjoy than other men, as expecting still greater hereafter; and if things do not go according to their mind they do not take it much amiss; but the hopes of good things after death, which contain ineffable pleasures and expectations, take way and obliterate every defect and (n) See at the end of Plato's Gorgias, Opera, p. 3U. B. edit. Lugd. (o) Ibid. p. 401. A. Ifi) Plutarch. Opera, torn. II. p. 1105. C. . . 360 They acknowledged the Importance Part III/ offence out of the soul; which thereby is enabled to bear the things which befal it with ease and moderation (y)." I can- not but remark on this occasion, that at the time when Plutarch flourished, Christianity had made a considerable progress in the world, and with it the knowledge and hope of life and immortality, or of eternal happiness for the good and righteous, was far more generally diffused than before. It is true, that some notion of the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and punishments ,of a future state, had ob- tained among the nations from the most remote antiquity, though mixed with much obscurity and many fables; but at the time of our Saviour's coming the belief of these things was, as I shall have occasion to shew, very much lost even among the people, especially in the Roman empire, then the most knowing and civilized part of the Gentile world. But wherever the light of Christianity shone, the doctrine of eternal life was openly professed by those that embraced it; and the notion of it came to spread more and more among the Heathens themselves. The belief of that future happiness had produced wonderful effects in the converts to Christianity, both in their constancy and even joy under the greatest sufferings, taken notice of by the Pagan writers themselves (rj, and in the purity and innocency of their (9) Plutarch. Opera, torn. II/p. 1106. A, B. (r) Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus, among others, represent the Christians as shewing great fortitude, and a contempt of death, but attribute it to habit and obstinacy, though it was built on a much nobler foundation than Stoicism could pretend to. Epict. Dissert, book iv. chap. 7. sect. 2. and Anton. Medit, book xi. sect. 3. In the Glasgow translation of Antoninus there is a note upon the passage now referred to, which deserves to be transcribed here. " It is well known, that the ardor of Christians for the glory of martyrdom was frequently immoderate, and was Chap. VI. of a future State to the cause of Virtue* 361 lives and manners. To this Pliny gives a noble testimony in his celebrated epistle to Trajan, who lived about the same time with Plutarch. The Christian apologists, in their public writings addressed to the emperors, frequently men- tion the virtuousness and regularity of their lives, as a thing that could not be denied even by their bitterest ad- versaries. Celsus himself, notwithstanding his strong pre- judices against Christianity, yet owns that there were among Christians temperate, modest, and understanding persons, kx) ^er^tag »ci} WtetKug^ x-ul (^werisg (^), I do not there- fore see any absurdity in supposing, that when Plutarch speaks of pious and just persons that expected such glori- ous and divine things after death, he might have a secret reference to the Christians, the purity of whose lives, and their being strongly animated by the hopes of a blessed immortality, was well known; and if he thought them in an error, he might think them " felices errore suo," happy in their error, as Lucan. expresses it, and that thtir hope of future happiness had a good effect upon them, which was very proper to the purpose he had in view in that treatise; his never expressly mentioning the Christians in all his works, though a man so curious as he was may well be supposed to have had some knowledge of them, as they were then very numerous both in Greece and Rome and in censured by some even of the primitive fathers. This is no dishonour to Christianity, that it did not quite extirpate all sorts of human frailty. And there is something so noble in the stead- fast lively faith, and the stable persuasion of a future^state, which must have supported that ardor, that it makes a sufficient apolo- gy for this weakness, and gives the strongest contirmution of the divine power accompanying the Gospel.'* (s) Orig. cont. Gels. lib. i. p. 22. edit. Spenser. Vol. II. 2 Z 362 The Importance of a future State, &?g. Part III. several parts of the Lesser Asia, seems to be an affected silence: and it may possibly be owing to this, that as he did not think proper to give a favourable account of them, so on the other hand he had no mind to speak ill of them, and therefore chose not to speak of them at all. .363 CHAPTER VII. ▲ state of future rewards necessarily connotes future punishments. The beli^ of the former without the latter might be of pernicious consequence. The an- tient philosophers and legislators uere sensible of the importance and necessity of the doctrine of future punishments. Yet they generally rejected and dis- carded them as vain and superstitious terrors. The maxim universally held by the philosophers, that the gods are never angry, and can do no hurt, consi' dered. 1 HE doctrine of a future state comprehends both the re» wards conferred upon good men, and the punishments which shall be inflicted upon the wicked in the world to come. The one of these cannot be rightly separated from the other. And' the belief of the latter is at least as necessary as the former; and without which the consideration and belief of a future state will have no great influence on the moral state of mankind. It is a good observation of M. de Montesquieu, that the idea of a place of future rewards necessarily imports that of a place or state of future punishments: and that whea the people hope for the one without fearing the other, civil laws to have no force (t). It would probably among other ill effects encourage self-murder, which is said to be very common amongst the disciples of Fo in China, who hold the immortality of the soul (li). Several passages might be prO"? duced to shew that the wisest of the Heathens were sensi- ble of the great importance and necessity of the doctrine of (0 L'Esprit des Loix, vol. II. liv. 24. chap. 14^ p. 162. edit, Edinb. (u) See a treatise of a Chinese philosopher in Du Halde*s History of China, vol. III. p. 272. English translation. 364 The Notion of a future State includes Part III*. future punishments as well as rewards, to the well-being of society. Accordingly this always made a part of the repre- sentations of a future state exhibited in the mysteries, which were under the direction of the civil magistrate. Zaleucus in his excellent preface to his laws represents it as a thing which ought to be believed, that the gods inflict punishments upon the wicked. And he concludes with taking notice of the happiness of the just, and the vengeance attending the wicked (a). Future punishments are here plainly implied, though not directly mentioned. Timoeus the Pythagorean, at the latter end of his treatise of the soul of the world, praises the Ionian poet for recording from an- tient tradition the endless or irremissiljle torments prepared for the unhappy dead. And he adds, that there is a necessi- ty of inculcating the dread of these strange or foreign pu- nishments. Plato in his fourth book of Laws takes notice of an antient tradition concerning the justice of God as pu- nishing the transgressors of his law. '' God, as antient tradition teacheth, having or holding in himself, the begin- ning, the end, and middle of all things that are, pursues the right way, going about according to nature, and justice al- ways accompanies and follows him, which is a punisher of those that fall short of the divine law (//)•" This passage represents C»od as a just punisher of transgressors, but makes no express mention of the punishments of a future stats. But in another passage in his seventh epistle, written to Dion^s friends, which I had occasion to mention before, see above p. 273. he says, " we ought always to believe the (jr) Apud Stob. scrm. 42, Plat. Oper. p. 600. G. edit. Lugd. Chap. VII. future Punishments as xvell as Rewards. 365 antient and sacred words, or traditions, which shew both that the soul is immortal, and that it hath judges, and suf- fers the greatest punishments, when it leaves the body (2)." Ami on several other occasions, when speaking of a future state, he takes notice of the punishments which shall be in- flicted upon the wicked, and describes them in .1 popular and poetical manner. In the conclusion of his Phaedo, iie introduces Socrates, in one of his most serious and solemn discourses just before his death, talking after the manner of the poets of the judges after death, of Tartaruy, Acheron, the Archerusian lake, Pyriphhgethon, and Cocytus: that some after having gone througli various punishments shall be purged and absolved, and alter certain periods shall be freed from their punishments: '■'■ Hut those who l)y reason of the greatness of -their sins seem to be incurable, who have comniitted many and great sacrileges, or unjust and unlaw- ful murders and other crimes of the like nature, shall have a fate suitable to them, being thrown down into Tartarus, from whence they never shall escape (<'/)•" The like repre- sentation is made at the latter end of Plato's tenth Republic, in the story of Erus Armcnius. In his Gorgias also he sup- poses the wicked, and those who were incurable, to be sent to Tartarus, where they shall be punished with endless tor- ments, as an example to others: and he approves of Homer, for representing wicked kings who had tyrannized over mankind, among those who shall be so punished (/;). There is another passage in his Phsedo which ought not to be omitted. He says, that " if death were to be the dissolution of the whole, it would be good news to bad men when they die, t^f^cttov h roiq KicKOig u7ro6etvS) Ibid. p. 313. E, F. edit. Lugd, 366 The wisest Heathens were sensible of the Part III, body, and to their own pravlty, as well as to their souls: but that since the soul appears to be immortal, there is no other way of escaping evil, no other safety, but to become as good and as wise as they can (c)." Cicero in his second book of Laws, shewing the usefulness of religion to society, observes, that many have been reclaimed from wickedness by. the fear of divine punishment. '*• Quam multos divini supplicii metus a scelere revocavit (^)." Plutarch in his treatise, That it is not possible to live pleasurably according to the doctrine of Epicurus, observes, that Epicurus himself says, there is no other way of re- straining bad men from doing evil and unju t actions, but by fear of punishment: and Plutarch gives it as his own opinion, that therefore it is proper to propose to them all kinds of terrors and punishments, both from heaven and earth: and that it is for tb^ir own advantage to be deterred from perpetrating criminal actiuns by the fear of those things which are to follow after death {e). And in his trea- tise De sera Numinis vindic^a, he observes, that *^ if no- thing remains to the soul after the expiration of this life, but death puts an end to all favour and all punishment, one might say that the Deity dealt very tenderly and remissly with those bad men, who are punished quickly, and die soon (/)." If we proceed from the philosophers to the poets, who were the popular divines, and generally spoke agreeably to the common notions and anient tr .ditions, they often speak of future punishments. This is particilarly true of Homer. Euripides represents it as a certain thing, that Cc) Plato. Oper. p. 397. H. p. 398. A. (d) Cic. de Leg. lib. ii. cap. 7. (c) Plutarch, Opera, torn. II. p. 1 105. edit. Xyl. Francof. 1620. (/) Ibid. torn. II. p. 5 55. C. Chap. VII. importance of the Doctrine of future^ ^c. 367 whosoever among mortals is bad and vicious is punished by the gods. ■ ' K«t} y/ig «V/c uv Z^arav KdCKO^ TFI^VKIH l^1ifAiH(ni 0( S'Cfl/. Eurip. Ion. There is, a passage which Justin Martyr ascribes to Phi- lemon, Clemens Alexandrinus and Theodoret toDiphylus, in which, after having said, that there are in Hades two several paths, the one of the just, the other of the unjust, he adds, " don't be deceived; there is a judgment in Hades, which God the Lord of all, whose dreadful name I dare not so much as mention, will certainly execuce." And soon after he says to those who imagine there is no God, " there is, there is a God; and if any man does evil, he will at length suffer- punishment for it (^)." Virgil in his sixth iEneid, where he probably has a par- ticular reference to the representations made of a future state in the mysteries, as well as to those made by Homer, represents several sorts of persons, who had been guilty of very heinous crimes, as adjudged to grievous punishments in Tartarua. Vers. 565 et seq. The passages which have been produced shew that the wisest among the Heathens saw the importance of the doc- trine of future punishments; and how necessary it was in their opinion to the preserving good order in the world. Celsus was so sensible of this, that he would not allow Christianity the honour of being thought to have taught this doctrine to mankind. He says, that " they [the Chris- tians] rightly'maintain, that these persons who lead good lives shall be happy, and that the unjust shall be subject (g*) See Dr. Sykes's Principles and Connection of Natural and Revealed Religion, cap. xiv. 375. 368 Future Punishments generally rejected Part IIL to eternal evils,'' «>< 5e ahMoi (arocf^Trui uavioi^ xxKoJi (ran^ovrcct' and he adds, that '-'' trom i':i< doctrine neither tliey {lOr any one else should depart (^)." What makes this testimony more remarkable is, thac Ctlsus was an Epicurean, and therefore did not himself really believe this doctrine. It must there- fore be only owing to the conviction he had that it was a doctrine useful to society. And it is proper to observe upon this occasion, that those among the Heathens who professed to believe, or would have the people to believe future pu- nishments, thought it would not be sufficient to answer the end, if some of the punishments for incorrigible sinners, guilty of enormous crimes, were not eternal. Notwithstanding what has been said, it cannot be denied, that many of the most celebrated philosophers have endea- voured to weaken and explode that doctrine of future punishments, which they themselves could not but acknow- ledge to be useful and even necessary to society. It has been already shewn that Pythagoras, according to the account Ovid gives of his sentiments, which seems to be a just one, rejects the stories of future punishments as vain terrors. And Timseus, a celebrated disciple of his, at the same time that he says there is a necessity of inculcating the doctrine of those foreign torments, plainly intimates that he looks upon the accounts which are given of them to be fabulous and false. Though Plato has many passages concerning future pu- nishments, and even in some of his most serious discourses adopts the representations made of them by the poets; yet at other times he rejects them, as giving too frightful an idea of Hades, or the future state. In the begmning of his third Rtpublic he declares his disapprobation of them be- .(Ji) Origen cent. Cels. lib. viii. p. 409. edit. Spenser. Chap. VII. "by the Philosophers, 369 cause they tended to intimidate the soldiery. After saying that no man can be brave who fears death, he asks " do you think that man will face death with coarage, and in battle prefer death to slavery, who believes that the things which are said concerning the state of the dead are true, and as dreadful as they are represented?" He therefore blames those who make such a discouraging representation of Hades, and would have them rather commend and praise it, " otherwise they neither say the things that are true, nor what is proper for military men to hear. Therefore," says he, " all those direful and terrible names are to be rejected, Cocytus, and Styx, and the Inferi, and the ghosts of the dead, and all the names of that kind, which cause all that hear them to shudder and tremble (?). ' Nothing can be a more express condemnation of the doctrine he himself in- troduces Socrates as delivering in his Phsedo, the very day of his death; and the reason he here gives for rejr^cting these things, viz. the not rendering death frightful, will hold not merely against the poetical representation, but against all future punishments after death, which yet he elsewhere represents as antient and sacred traditions, to which an en- tire credit is to be given. We must therefore either say, that Plato himself did not believe future punishments, or (it) Oviciv iTi f^ rot Ts-i^i rctvret Ofo/u.xrec -aeivrcc ^uvu ri. icj (po^epeb T8T» T» Ty-T» ovof4,u^ojt^evee. (P^iletv 5g zro,c7, &15 oiov re, zroivTct^ t»^ uxiiovretg. Flaton. Oper. p. 432. E. It may also be observed, that in his Cratylus Plato introduces Socrates, as blaniintj; those who represent Hades as a dark and gloomy abode, and derive the word from to AeiUi. as if it were void of light; and is rather foP deriving it uto ra "srcivret ret kuXu ii^ivuh from kncwiKg all things good and beautiful. Here he excludes every thini^ from the no- tion of a future siate that might be apt to create terror, and seems to leave n > room for future misery. Vol. II. 3 A ' 370 Future Punishments g'^ner ally rejected Part III, that from political views he judged it not proper to teach them to the people, that they might not have too frightful notions of death, which he thought would intimidate the citizens and soldiers. 1 would observe however, that he was not very consistent in his politics, since he sometimes declares for rejecting the future punishments in Hades, as not fit to be laid btjfore the people, and yet at other times represents them as of great use for restraining men from vice and wickedness; which seems also to be the notion that the managers of the mysteries, who considered them in a political view, entertained of them. None of the philosophers argued better for the immor- tality of the soul, and a future state in general, than Cicero. And yet in that very treatise where he takes the most pains to prove it, he discards the notion of future punish- ments, and openly disavows and ridicules them. Having mentioned Cocytus, Acheron, and the infernal judges, and the punishments which were supposed to be inflicted upon bad men after death, he introduces his auditor as saying, " adeone me delirare censes, ut ista credam?" " Do you think me so mad as to believe these things?" And again, " quis est tam vecors quem ista moveant?" " Who is so senseless as to be moved by them?" Nor can it be pre- tended, that he only rejects the fabulous representations made of these things bv the poets, but admits the moral of those fables, or what they were designed to signify, viz. that there shall be punishments inflicted upon the wicked after death. For the whole argument 'of that book is so conducted as to exclude future punishments. His professed design is to fortify men against the fear of death, by prov- ing that death is no evil. And his reasoning turns upon this point, that either our souls shall be extinguished at death, and then we shall have no sense of evil; or if they survive, and depart to another place (as he endeavours to prove they will) we shall be happy, and there is no future Chap. VII. by the Philosophers. 371 misery to fear. And indeed, it may be observed concern- ing the philosophers in general, that in all their consola- tions against death, or discourses to shew that death is not to be feared, they constantly argue thus. That death shall be either an extinction of being, and a state of utter insen- sibility, or a remove to a better place; and they never once put the supposition of the souls being exposed to any evil or misery in a future state. The alternative still was this, that they were either to be happy after death, or not to be at all. " Si maneant beati sunt," says Cicero; or as Seneca has it, " Aut beatus, aut nullus." What little regard Cicero himself, or even the Roman people in general, had to the doctrine of future punish- ments, is evident from that noted passage in his oration for Aulus Cluentius, delivered before the judges, .and a public assembly of the people. He is there speaking of one Oppianicus, whom he represents as the worst of men, guilty of the most, atrocious crimes, of repeated murders of his wives and nearest relations, and other heinous acts of wickedness, for which he was at length condemned and banished. And he observes, that if he had been a man of spirit, he would have chosen rather to have put an end to his own life, than to have endured the miseries of his exile. And as he was dead at the time when Cicero made this oration, he asks, " What evil hath death brought upon him, except we are induced by silly fables to think that he suf- fers the punishments of the wicked in the infernal regions, and that he has met with more enemies there than he left behind him here? and that by the punishments inflicted upon him for what he had done to his mother-in-law, his wives, his brother and children, he is precipitated headlong into the abodes of the wicked? If these things are false, as all men understand them to be, what has death taken from 0T2 Future Punishments generally rejected Part III. him but a sense of pain (z)?" I do not think there can be a more express declaration against future punishments. And certainly, if such monsters of wickedness, as Oppianicus is represented to have been, suffer no punishments in another world, no man has reason to fear them. Seneca has a very strong passage to the same purpose, in which, after absolutely rejecting the stories of future tor- ments, as fables and idle terrors invented by the poets, he asserts, that "the dead man is affected with no evils." — '^ NuUis defunctum malis affici:" — that " death is the end and a release from all our pains and sorrows, be\ ond which our evils do not extend; and that it replaceth us in the same state of tranquillity we were in before we were born (/^)." The observation I made on Cicero holds equally with re- spect.to Seneca. If he had contented himself with merely rejecting and ridiculing the poetical fables, he might have been excused: but it is evident that both these philosophers rejected the very substance of the doctrine itself, and al- lowed no future punishments at all. The same may be said concerning Epictetus and the Stoics in general: as to which I refer the reader what is observed here above, p. 150, 151. et p. 294, 295. (?) " Nam nunc qiiidem quid tandem mali illi mors attulit? Nisi forte ineptiis ac fabulis ducimur, ir existimenuis ilium apud inferos impiorum supplicia perferre, ac pluses illic ofFendisse ini- micos quam hie reliquisset? A socrus, ab uxoruni: afratris et 11- berorum poetiis actum esse praecipitem in iiupiorum sedematque regionem; qiiee si falsa sint, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem alii'd uiors eripuit, praeter sensum doloris?" Orat. pro A. Clueniio, cap. 61. {k) " IN'or^ omnium dolorum et solutio est et finis: ultra quam tnala nobira non eweunt: quae nosin ilium tranquiililutem, in qua antequam nascevemur jacuimus, reponit." In conbol. ad Mar- ciam, cap. 19. Chap. VII. by the Philosophers* 373 Plutarch (as was observed before) in his treatise De ser^ numinis vindicta, argues for the immortality of the soul, and seems to assert the justice of God, and future re- wards and punishments; yet in that very treatise he gives it as his own opinion, that the wicked need no other pu- nishments, but their own bad lives and actions. " I am of opinion (saith he) if it be lawful to say so, that wicked men need neither the gods nor men to punish them: but their own life, being wholly corrupted and full of perturbation, is a sufficient punishment (/)•" And in his treatise to shew that it is not possible to live pleasurably according to the tenets of Epicurus, he calls the fear of punishment after death superstition; and afterwards he calls it to T^etihiKov hciivo 3go5, '* that childish fear;" and represents what was said of them as " fabulous stories, and the tales of mothers and nurses (w)." In his celebrated tract of superstition, he expresses him- self as if he looked upon all fear of God, at least considered as a punishtr, to be superstition: and that the man that feareth God, who is every where present, and whom no- thing can escape, must be miserable. He blames those who look upon the evils and calamities which befal them, as di- vine punishments inflicted upon them for their sins (n). But (/) Plutarch. Opera, torn. II. p. 556. D. edit. Xyl. (m) Ibid. p. 1104. B, C. 1105. B. (n) Those no doubt are in the wrong, who interpret all the misfortunes of human life, which befal themselves or others, as divine judgments. But that in many cases it is hip^lily just and proper to regard the afflictions and calamities which happen to us, as sent by God to correct and punish us for our sins, is not only the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, but perfectly agreeable to the dictates of sound reason, on supposition there is a God and a Providence; and if really believed, must have a good ef- fect on the religious and moral conduct. And that Plutarch had 374 Future Punishments generally rejected Part III, especially he censures those who have a dread of future pu- Bishments and torments after death, and condemns all fear of that kind as groundless, and the effect of a foolish super- stition, without making any distinction, or giving the least hint that there are punishments prepared for wicked men in a future state. He finds fault with superstition for not looking upon death to be the end of life, but extending its fears beyond it, and for connecting with death the imagina- tion of immortal evils. ^wotTrrav tZ B-ccvdra xetKtiv eirivoixv uB-ccva- rvv (o). I would observe by the way, that this treatise of Plutarch, which is written in a very elegant and artful manner, and has been very much admired, and often quoted by our modern sceptical writers, and opposers of Revelation, has been very well answered, and the false rea- soning and sophistry of it exposed by the learned bishop of Gloucester, in the last edition of his Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated (/>). There is another consideration of great moment, which has been strongly urged by the last-mentioned celebrated author, to prove that the philosophers did not believe fu- ture punishments. It is drawn from a remarkable passage of Cicero, in which he represents it as the opinion of all the philosophers, not only of those who denied a Provi- dence, but of those who acknowledged it, that God is never angry, nor hurts any person. Some learned men, who are unwilling to admit the consequence which seems na- turally to follow from it, are of opinion, that it is capable of a favourable interpretation; and that it is only designed to signify, that the Deity has no anger or passion like that a notion of Divine Justice pursuing^ and punishing men for their sins, appears from his excellent tract De sera numinis vindicta. (o) Plutarch. Opera, torn. II. 166. F. (/?) Vol. II. book iii. sect. 6. p. 257, et seq. Chap. VII. by the Philosophers, Z73 which is in us, nor is ever carried by it to do hurt to his creatures. But Cicero seems to carry it much farther, so as not only to exclude all perturbation from the divine mind, but all punitive justice. His manner of introducing it is remarkable. He is speaking of Regulus's strict regard to the oath he had taken, even though he thereby exposed himself to the severest torments and death. And then he supposes an objection made, that Regulus acted a foolish part, since if he had violated his oath he had nothing to fear from Jupiter. ^' For it is a principle universally held by all the philosophers, both those who say that God never meddleth with the affairs of men, and those who think he is always active and concerning himself about us, that God is never angry, nor hurteth any one." He answers, " That in an oath its binding force is to be considered: for an oath is a religious affirmation; and what a man promises, as it were calling God to witness, ought to be kept; not out o£ fear of the anger of the gods, for there is no such thing, but out of regard to justice and fidelity (jf)^ There is ano- ther passage of Cicero, in the second book of his Offices, which it is proper to mention on this occasion. Having proposed to treat of those things which may be most be- neficial or hurtful to men, he observes it as a thing gene- {q) <* Quid est igitur, dixerit aliquis, in jurejurando? Num iratum timemus Jovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum; non eorum modo qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt nihil exhibere alteri, sed eorum etiam qui Deum semper agcre aliquid et moliri volunt, nunquam nee irasci Deum, nee nocere. Haec quidem ratio, non magis contra Regulum quam contra omne jusjurandum valet. Sed in jurejurando non qui me- tusj sed quae vis sit debet inte ligi: est enim jusjurandum affirma- tio religiosa. Quod auteiu affirmate quasi Deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est: jam enim non ad iram deorum quae nulla est, sed ad justitiam ct fidem pertinet." De Offic. lib. iii. cap. 28, 29. 3r6 Future Punishments generally rejected Part IIL rally believed, that to hurt men is incompatible with the divine nature; and seems to give this :^s a reason for taking no particular notice of the gods in that place (r). This may be compared with a remarkable passage of Seneca, which I mentioned before, but which ought not to be omitted here. Having observed that the gods are carried to do good by the goodness of their own nature, he adds. That " they neither will nor can hurt any one: they can neither suffer an injury nor doit; for whatsoever is capable of doing hurt, is capable of receiving it. That supreme and most excellent nature, of which they are partakers, both exempts them from dangers themselves, and renders them not dangerous to others (^)." Where he seems to affirm, that no hurt or danger is ever to be apprehended from the gods, as being contrary to their nature. Marcus Antoninus, speaking of the intelligence which governs the universe, saith, that no one is hurt by it {t)» And he argues, that " if there be gods, then leaving the world is no such dreadful thing, for you may be sure they will dp you no hurt." Upon which Dacier remarks, that " the Stoics believed there was nothing to fear after death, because it was contrary to the nature of God to do ill to any one (w)." It must be acknowledged, that there is no small diffi- culty in these and other passages of the like kind, which (r) De Offic. lib. ii. cap. 3. (■«) *' Quae causa est diis benefaciendi? Natura. Errat siquis putat eos nocere velle Non possupt. Nee accipere injuriani que- unt, nee facere. Laedere enim laedique conjunctum est. Summa ilia et pulcherrima omnium natura, qwos periculo exemit, ne periculosos quidem facit." Sen. epist. 95. See also Sen. de Ira, lib. ii. cap. 27. quoted above, p. 15 1, I 52. {t) Anton. Mtd. book vi. sect. I. (w) See Divine Legation of Moses, Vol. II. p. 186. marg. notCy 4.tb edit. Chap. VII. btj the Philosophers. S7f occur in the writings of the antients. If they are to be takeri in the strictest sense, we must suppose them to have held, that no punishment was to be apprehended from God either here or hereafter: and this would in its conse-^ quences destroy a Providence^ which yet there is good reason to think Cicero, as well as several others of the philosophers, and particularly the Stoics, believed. In the passage above cited from him, he supposes God to be a witness of the oath, and yet not to be an avenger of the perjury, or angry at it; which is certainly a most incon- sistent scheme, less defensible than that of Epicurus, who supposed the gods were far removed from our world, and knew nothing of our affairs, nor ever gave themselves the least concern about them. A very learned and ingenious writer has endeavoured to account for this, by supposing that when Ciccro represents it as the universal doctrine of the philosophers, that God is never angry, nor hurts any one, it is to be understood of the highest God, who, they supposed, did not concern himself immediately with man- kind, but committed the several regions of the universe to the vicegerency and government of inferior deities: and that these have passions and affections, and by them alone^ according to their opinion, a particular providence is ad- ministered {x). But this, I am afraid, will not solve the difficulty. For in that very passage Cicero speaks not merely of God, but of the gods, " Ira deorum nulla est," — " The gods have no anger." And it is of the gods that Seneca says, in the passage I have quoted from him, that they neither will nor can hurt any one, nor is any danger to be apprehended from them. And this he, as well as Cicero, supposes to be inseparable from the clivine nature, {x) Divine Legation of Moses, Vol. II. p. 194, Vol, II. 3 B o7S Future Punts hments generally rejected Part III. of which they are all partakers. Besides, if the inferior gods, to whom the administration of things relating to mankind was committed, were supposed to be angry, and to be avengers of the perjury, it would destroy the force of Cicero's argument as here managed: since on this sup- position the fear of their anger or of punishment from them, might be supposed to have had an influence to deter Regulus from violating his oath, which Cicero will not allow (if). For it is to be observed, that he here all along goes upon the Stoical scheme, that virtue and fidelity is to be preserved for its own sake, without regard to any re- ward or punishment, but what flows from the nature of the actions themselves. What increases the difficulty with regard to that passage of Cicero, is, that he represents that maxim that God or the gods are never angry, nor do hurt to any one, as com- mon to all the philosophers, both to the Epicureans who denied a Providence, and to those who owned it. And every one knows, that Epicurus intended by it to free men from all fear of punishment from the gods; and when Cicero joins the other philosophers with the Epicureans, as all agreeing that there is no anger in the gods, it looks {y) In the course of the argument, Cicero takes it for granted, that Jupiter himself, if he had been angry, and had punished Re- gulus for violating his oath, could not have inflicted a greater punishment upon 'lim, than he brought upon himself by keeping his oath, and returning to the Carthaginians, who put him to a cruel death. This seems to suppose, that it is riot in the power of God himself to inflict a greater punishment upon men than ihey can inflict upon one another: and that temporal and bodily death is the worst any man has to fear from God. This puts his displeasure upon an equal footing with that of an earthly prince; and is very' different from the doctrine taught by our Saviour, Luke xii. 4, 5. Chap. VII. bij the Philosophers, 379 as if the one as well as the other maintained, thot no punishment is to be feared or apprehended from them. And yet I can hardly bring myself to think, that those philosophers who really believed a Providence, intended by that maxim to signify, that the gods had no displeasure against sin and wickedness, nor ever chastised men on the account of it. Seneca himself, in his 95th epistle, soon after the words above produced from him, saith, " The gods neither cause evil, nor suffer evil: yet they chastise some persons, and restrain them, and lay penalties upon them, and sometimes punish them in a way that looks like doing them hurt."—" Hi nee dant malum, nee habent: cseterum castigant quosdam et coercent, et irrogant pcenas, et aliquando specie mali puniunt." Where he represents the gods as laying chastisements and coercions upon men, and as sometimes inflicting punishments upon them, which have the appearance of evil. Stobaeus gives it as the doc- trine of the Stoics, that " since the gods love virtue and its works, and have an aversion to vice and the things which are wrought by it, and sin is the work or effect of vice, it is manifest that all sin is displeasing to the gods, and is an impietv."— -Kfl6Tg6>j5 hfim^yo^^ and saith, that to him it belongs to determine when, and in what manner, and to what degree, to punish every one of the wicked (e). The people in general had a notion of the divine justice in punishing offenders, and of avenging deities. And in this the poets generally expressed themselves agreeably to the popular sentiments. And as a sense of guilt is apt na- turally to create uneasiness and anxious fears, this gave occasion, in the state of darkness and ignor^mce they were in, to much superstition, and many expedients for averting the displeasure of the gods. The Epicureans pretended an effectual remedy against all this, by denying a Providence, ©r that the gods take any notice of men or their actions. The other philosophers, who acknowledged a Providence, though they could not deny that vice and wickedness was displeasing to the Deity, yet endeavoured to make them- selves and others easy, by making such representations of {b) Platen. Oper. p. 518. (c) Ibid. p. 600. G. See the passage cited above, p. 364. {d) Plutarch, advers. Colot. torn. II. p. 1 124. edit. Xyl. (e) Ibid. p. 550. A. Chap. VII. by the Philosophers, 381- the Divine Goodness as vvt^re not well consistent with rec- toral justice. And they carried their notions of God's being never angry, and of his being by nature incapable of doing hurt, so far as in a great measure to take av ay the fear of punishment. Or if they allowed that God or the gods sometimes inflict punishments upon men in this pre- sent state, yet they seem generally to have rejected those of the life to come. It is true, that they could not help ac- knowledging that it was useful to society that the people should believe them; and accordingly they frequently ex- pressed themselves in a popular way, as if they thought it reasonable to admit, that there are punishments prepared for bad men after death, but at other times they plainly discarded them, and represented all fears of that kind as the effects of superstition; and this, as shall be shewn in the next chapter, came at length to have a very b)." AH the exercises, all the enjoyments, are pure and holy, and the blessed above are continually employed in praising and serving God, and in doing his will. The last thing to be observed concerning that future happiness is, that it shall be unchangeable, and of ever- lasting duration. Hence it is so often described to us under the notion of eternal life. They that are admitted to that heavenly felicity, shall not be put upon any new hazards or states of trial. They shall be raised for ever above all fe.ar of change, or of losing their happiness, and shall be kept through the mighty power and goodness of God, who (w) Matt. V. 8. Col. i. 12. Acts xxvi. 18. {n) Rom. ii. 7. (o)Heb. xii. 14. (/?) Rev. vii. 15. xxii. 3. compared with Psal. ciii. 20, 21, Matt. vi. 10. Chap. XI. of the IStature of Future Happinessi 409i shall niaintain and preserve them in their holy aiid happy- state to all eternityi This happiness shall commence with regard to the soula -of the righteous, in a lower degree, immediately upon their departure out of the body. This seems to be plainly intimated by our Saviour, when he saith concerning La- zarus, that "he died, and was carried by angels into Abraham's bosom," a state of rest and joy (^). So he pro- mised the penitent thief, that he should "that day," i; eo the day of his death, "be with him in paradise (>')»" And. dying Stephen prajed to the Lord Jesus "to receive his spirit," i. e. to be with him in bliss and glory (.^). St. Paul saith concerning himself, " I desire to depart, and to be with Christ:" intimating the desire and hope he had that he should be with Christ, when he departed out of this present life {t). And to the same purpose, after having said, that whilst " we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord," he declares in his own name, and that of all true Christians, " we are confident and willing rather to be absent from the body and present with the Lord (w)." Where it is intimated, that when the souls of good men are absent from the body, and consequently while they are in the separate state before their being re- united to thtir bodies at the resurrection, they are "pre- sent with the Lord," present in such a manner, that the nearest communion with him they are admitted to have on earth, may be regarded as comparatively a state of absence from the Lord. Yet notwithstanding this, it is not till the* {cf) Luke xvi. 22. (r) Luke xxiii. 4S. («) Acts vii. 59. (0 Phil. i. 23. \u) 2 Cor. V. 6, 7, 8. Vol. 1 1. 3 F 410 The Gospel makes the clearest Discoveries Part II Ir general resurrection, that the happiness of the righteous shall be completed. It is at the time of Christ's glorious appearing, that the dead shall be raised, and their entire nature consummated in bliss. And there is something in- expressibly noble and sublime in the account M^hich is given us of the glory of that day, when the saints shall be put in full possession of their heavenly inheritance, and so shall continue to all eternity. Any one that impartially considers this account of future happiness brought to us by the Revelation of Jesus Christ, will see the greatest reason to adore the Divine Goodness, which hath favoured us with such glorious discoveries* There is nothing in this account, when once it is revealed, but what is worthy of God, and what right reason duly exercised will approve, yet it is what it could not have dis- covered with any certainty by its own unassisted force. Men of fine imaginations might form pleasing conjectures concerning the happiness of a future state, in some in- stances nearly resembling the accounts given in the Gospel, but they could at best have passed for no more than agree- able visions of fancy, w^hick could nor yield any solid as- surance or conviction to the mind. And indeed, how could any man pretend, by the force of his own reason, without the assistance of Divine Revelation, to explore the secrets of the invisible world, or take upon him to determine with certainty, in what manner or degree the Supreme Lord of the universe will, in a future state, reward the sincere though imperfect obedience of his frail creatures here on earth? This depends upon the councils of his own infinite wisdom, and unobliged grace and goodness, which such short-sighted creatures as we are cannot pretend certainly to know, except he himself should declare his will and purpose concerning it. No doubt the goodness of God, of which there are many proofs in the course of his providence in this present Chap. XL of the Nature of Future Happiness, 411 world, might administer grounds of comfort on supposition of a future state. But then it is not his goodness alone which is to be considered, but his wisdom and governing justice too. Let us suppose him never so good, yet if we believe him to be also perfectly wise and just, and to have a sacred regard to the authority of his government and laws, and are at the same time sensible that we have in many instances transgressed his holy laws, and acted con- trary to the duty he requireth of us, might We not have just reason to apprehend the awful effects of his righteous displeasure? Or, to make the most favourable supposition, upon what ground could we hope that he would raise us to a complete eternal felicity in a future state, as the re- ward of our imperfect obedience in this, when we could not have pretended to lay claim to such a reward as strictly due to us in a way of merit, even though we had perfectly obeyed, and never in any one instance fallen short of our duty? But if. it should please God to make an ex- press declaration of his gracious purpose to pardon all our iniquities, upon our turning to him by a true repentance and humble faith, and to crown our sincere persevering obedience, though not absolutely sinless, or free from failures and defects, with the glorious reward of eternal life, this would lay a just foundation for a divine hope and joy. And this is our unspeakable comfort and privilege under the Gospel Revelation. And what mightily recommends the discoveries there made to us of future rewards, is, that they are not con- fined to a few persons of distinguished eminence. The Gos- pel-promises extend to all righteous, holy, and virtuous persons of whatsoever condition or degree, of whatsoever tribe or tongue, or family or nation. It is^true, that it is plainly intimated in the New Testament, that there shall be different degrees of glory among the blessed above, in a wise and fit proportion to the different degrees of ^ their 412 The Gospel Discovery of eternal Life is Part III holiness and usefulness here on earth (x). But yet the hap- piness shall be complete in all, according to their different nieasures and degrees; all shall be perfectly pleased and ^atisfied, and admitted to those holy beatifying exercises ^nd enjoyments, which tend to the true felicity of their na- ture. Our Saviour declares concerning all the "righteous" in general, that they shall " go into life eternal (?/)." We are assured, that unto them that by a " patient continuance in w-ell-doing seek for glory, honour, and immortality," whatever their outward condition and circumstances may Jdp here on earth, whether they be high or low, rich or poor, learned or unlearned, God will give eternal life. — ? Glory, honour, and peace to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile (z)." Thus our Saviour in the parable represents Lazarus, who was a good man, but reduced to the lowest degree of poverty, as (Carried at his death by angels into Abraham's bosom (a). And St. James tells us, that " God hath chosen the poor pf this world, rich in faith, an(i heirs of the kingdom, which he hath prepared for them that love him (^)." Christ is said to be the author of eternal salvation unto all them that obey him (c). Not the meanest of the human race shall be excluded from that heavenly felicity, if they go on in the practice of real piety and virtue, and serve God with simplicity and godly sincerity, in the station and circumstances in which his providence hath placed them. (jr) Luke xix. 1 6 — 20. (j/) Malt. XXV. 46. (z) Rom. ii. 2. 10. (a) Luke xvi. 22. {b) Jdm. ii. 5. \c) Heb. V. 9. Chap. IX. of the most beneficial Tendency. 413 And now how justly may it be said, that our Lord Jesus Christ hath brought life and immortality to light by the Gospel! And uhat a glorious scene doth this open to us! What a source of spiritual and divine joy, amidst all the adversities and tribulations of this present state! For the '* sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be com- pared wiih the glory which shall be revealed in us ( 43. Several of his institutions contrary to the rules of a sound morality, 43, et seq. See Laced(£monian8. M. Man — a moral agent, and designed to be governed by a law, 2, 3 — nor left at his first creation merely to fix a rule of moral duty to himself, 19. God made early discoveries of his will to him concerning his duty, 19 et seq. Meng-Zu — esteemed the second great Chinese philosopher after Confucius, 297 — never makes the least mention in his wri- tings of the immortality of the soul, and a future state, ibid. Mixtures, incestuous^ and unnatural lusts — common among many of the Heathen nations, 116, 117. N. — reckoned by many of their antient wise men among things indifferent, 129. 188. 224. Montesquieu, Mons. de — commends the laws of Lycurgus, 43. A good observation of his to shew, that incontinence is con- trary to the law of nature, and ought to be restrained by the magistrate, 46, 47. N. et 141 — gives a disadvantageous charac- ter of the Chinese, 66 — is a great admirer of the Stoics, 145, 146 — declared with his dying breath, that the Gospel morality was the most excellent present which could possibly have been made to man from his Creator, 264, 265. He observes, that the belief of future rewards without future punishments would be a great prejudice to society, 363. He attributes the wrong no- tions which have obtained among some nations, as if the future state was to be in all respects like the present, to a corruption and abuse of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, 397. His judicious observation, that it is not sufficient that a religion should teach the doctrine of a future state, but that it should also direct to a proper use of it; and that this is admirably done by the Christian religion, 398 — and that the resurrection there taught leads to spiritual ideas, ibid. He shews, that the Chris- tian religion, considered in a political view, is of great advan- tage to civil government, 424. Moral Law. See Law. Moral sense — implanted in the human heart, 5 — not equally strong in all men, ibid. — weak and depraved in the present state INDEX. 447 of mankind, 6, 7, 8 — not designed to be alone an adequate guide in morals, or to preclude the necessity of instruction, 8.224,225. Morality — taken in its just extent, comprehends the duties we more immediately owe to God, as well as those that respect our neighbours and ourselves, 33, 34. Morality^ Pagan. See Heathens. Morality^ Goafiel scheme of- — exceeds what had ever been pub- lished to the world before, 232, 233. A summary representa- tion of the Christian morality, with respect to the duties re- quired of us towards God, our neighbours, and ourselves, 233, et seq. It is in nothing deficient, but complete in all its parts, 256 — raised to an high degree of purity, yet does not carry it to an unnatural or superstitious extreme, ibid. This is shewn in several instances, 257, 258 See also 172. 183. 199. 218. It is enforced by the most powerful motives, far superior to any that were urged by the most celebrated antient moralists, 258, et seq. It is so admirable, that all attempts in after-ages to add to its perfection, have fallen short of its original ex- cellency, and only tended to weaken and corrupt it, 263. Moses, law of- — was designed to instruct men in morals, as well as to lead them to the right knowledge and worship of the one true God, 29, 30. The fame of it spread to other nations, and was probably in several respects of use to them, 30. "^ Mysteries, antient Pagan — became at length greatly corrupted to the general depravation of manners in the Pagan world, 70. They had little effect in preserving the sense of a future state, and especially of future punishments among the Greeks and Romans, 383. 388, N. ATavarette — His account of China seems to be an impartial one, 63 — referred to, ibid et 64. 291. 350. JVbah — had th^ divine law made known to him, which was from him transmitted to his descendants, 23. JSfoahy sons q/^— Jewish tradition concerning the precepts given to them, 25. O. Oaths. See swearing. Orac/e«— The philosophers directed the people to consult and 448 INDEX. obey the oracles of the gods in all matters relating to religion and divine worship, 112. This was Socrates's own practice, and his advice to others, ibid. Plato ascribes the greatest and most excellent laws to the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, ibid. P. Parents — A custom among some of the Heathen nations to ex- pose or destroy their sick and aged parents, 67. '16. Peripatetics — They held as well as the Stoics, that a wise and good man is happy under the severest tornients, but would not allow that he is haj)py in the highest df:gree, 210. The difference between them and the Stoics about the absolute in- differency of all external things considered, 2?4, etseq. Some of them denied the immo'tality of the soul and its subsistence in a separate state, 284. They are blamed by Cicero for sup- posing that some things may be profitable which are not honest, 354. Philosojihy — High encomiums bestowed upon it by many of the antients, as of the greatest use with regard to morals, 72, 73 — and as the only infallible way to make men completely happy? 211,212. Philosofihers, Pagan — Some of them said excellent thinajs con- cerning moral virtue, and their instructions were probably in several instances of considerable use, 73 The pretence that there is no moral precept in the Gospel, but what the philo- sophers had taught before, examined, 74, et seq. No proof can be given that they derived all they taught merely from their own reason, without any help from antient tradition, or the light of Divine Revelation, 76. They were universally wrong in encouraging polytheism, nor did any of them pre- scribe the worship of the one true God, and of him only, 78, 79. A complete system of morality not to be found in the writ- ings of any one philosopher, 79 — nor in them all collectively considered, ibid. Their sentiments, for want of a proper divine authority, could not pass for laws obligatory to mankind, 80, 8 1 . Many of the philosophers were wrong in the fundamental principles of morals, 83. Some of them denied that any thing is just or unjust by nature, but only by human law and cus- tom, 84, 85 — others made man's chief good consist in sensual pleasure, 85, et seq. The sentiments of those who are account^ INDEX. 445 cd the best of the Pagan philosophers and moralists consider- ed, 107, et seq. They held, that law is right reason; but they generally derived the original of law, and its obliging force> from God, or the gods, 108, 109. They sent the people to the oracles to know the law ot God, especially with respect to di- vine worship, 112 — and gave it as a general rule, confirmed by the oracles, ihat ah men should conform to the laws and re- ligion of their country, ibid But the way they seem chiefly to propose for men's coming at the knowledge of the divine law is, by the doctrines and instructions of wise men, i. e. of the philosophers, 112, 113. They spoke nobly of virtue in gene- ral, but when they came to particulars differed in their notions of what is virtue and vice, and what is agreeable to the law of nature and reai>on, or contrary to it, 114, 115. Some of tha most eminent of them passed wrong judgments in relation to several important points of the law of nature, 1 17. They often erred in applying general rules to particular cases, 1 19. They were for the most part deficient and wrong with respect to the duty and worship proper to be rendered to God, which yet they acknowledged to be of the highest importance, 120. They all encouraged the worship of a multiplicity of deities, 121. Swearing by the creatures was not forbidden by them, 123, et seq. They gave good precepts and directions about civil and social duties, 124, 125. Some of them said excellent things concerning the forgiveness of injuries, but were contradict- ed by others of great name, 127. They were generally wrong in that part of morals which relates to purity and con- tinence, and the government of the sensual passions, 109, et seq. Many of them chargeable with unnatural lusts and vices, which they reckoned among things of an indifterent nature, 130, et seq. They generally allowed of fornication, as having nothing in it sinful, or contrary to reason, 137, 138, 139. Many of them pleaded for suicide as lawful and proper in some cases, 192. 204. N. They made high pretensions of leading men to perfect happiness in this present state, abstracting from all regard to a future reward, 211. 223. Notwithstanding they said such glorious things of virtue, they did n^t clearly explain what they understood by it, ibid. They were generally loose in their doctrine with regard to the obligation of truth, and thought lying lawful when it was profitable, 225, 226. Vol. 1 1. 3 L ' ' 450 INDEX. Philosofihers — the great corrupters of the antient tradition con- cerning the immortality of the soul and a future state, 238. There were whole sects of them that professedly denied it, ibid. They who set up as advocates for it placed it for the most part on wrong foundations, 234. It was a general notion among them, that the human soul is a portion oT the divine essence, 325, et seq. They universally held the pre-existence of the soul, and from thence argued its immortality, 327, 328. Some of their arguments tended to prove that the soul is na- turally and necessarily eternal, 332, 333. Hence their doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul was censured by some of the primitive fathers of the Christian church, 333. They also taught the transmigration of souls, which tended greatly to deprave the doctrine of a future state, 336. Those of them who talked in the highest terms of the future happiness were for confining it to souls of special eminence; and did not teach the d 'Ctrine of eternal life and happiness to all the good and righteous without exception, 338, et seq. The best of the phi- losophers, amidst all their arguings, often spoke doubtfully about a future state, 343, et seq. In their consolations to their friends, and in their discourses against the fear of death, they generally expressed themselves in a way of alternative, 345, 346. Their fluciu tions and seeming contradiciions, were not merely owing to the distinction between the exoteric and eso- teric doctrine, but to the uncertainty of their own minds, 351, 352. They did not apply the doctrine of a future state to its proper ends and uses; and laid little stress on future rewards in iheir exhortations to virtue, ibid, et seq. To supply the want of this, they cried up the self-sufficiency of virtue as its own reward, abstracting from all consideration of a future recompence, 352, 353. With the same view they asserted, that a short and temporary happisiess is as good as an eternal one, 356, 357. They did not generally believe future punish- ments. See Puniiihments. p/a/o— directs to follow the Delphian Apollo as the best guide in matters of religion, 112 — seems to advise the abstain- ing from oaths, and yet oaths are very frequent in all his works, 123. He would -have the Greeks behave in a very friendly and brotherly manner towards one another, but ap- proves their regarding and treating the Barbarians, a name INDEX. 451 they bestowed upon all other nations but their own, as by na- ture their enemies, 126, 127 — prescribes a community of wives in his commonwealth, 133 — gives great liberties to incontinency, not reconcileabie to the rules of modesty and decency, 134. He allows and in some cases prescribes the ex- posing and destroying children, ibid See also 48. Teaches, that lying is lawful when it is profitable, and in a fitting or needful season, 225, 226. He pleads in all his works for the immortality of the soul, 315 — and often represents the re- wards and punishments of a future state in a popular and poetical manner, ibid. He also speaks of them in a more re- fined and philosophical sense, ibid, et 316. The transmigra- tion of souls is what he frequently asserts, 317. He also maintains the pre-existence of the human soul, and from thence endeavours to prove its immortality, 328. He some- times argues, as if he thought the soul was properly eternal by the necessity of its own nature, 332. He manages his doc- trine of a future state so as to answer political ends and pur- poses, 339— but represents the belief of it as of great impor- tance to the cause of virtue, 357, 358. The doctrine of future punishments, is recommended by him as a most antient and sacred tradition, 273. 364. He frequently insists upon those punishments, and asserts some of them to be eternal, ibid, et 365 — yet he sometimes expresses himself in a manner that seems not to admit of punishments in a future state; and finds fault with those representations, as tending to discourage the people, and make them afraid of death, 368, 369. Pleasure — The scheme of those philosophers who made sensual pleasure the chief good considered, 85, et seq. Some of our moderns have carried this doctrine farther than Epicurus himself, 88, 8^ N. 93. Pliny^ the natural historian thinks a timely death one of the greatest blessings of nature, and that it is what every man may procure for himself, 193, He openly declares and ar- gues against the doctrine of the immortality o^ the soul, and a future state, 387. N. Plotinus — talks in the same extravagant strain^with the Stoics, of self sufficiency and apathy, and the absolute indifferency of all external things, 165. A proud saying of his, ibid. — seems to approve self-murder in some cases, 204. N.—— supposes 452 INDEX. the human soul to be of the same nature with the soul of the world, 326, 527. Plutarch — looks upon Lycurgus to have been a divine man, 42 — expresses a great esteem and admiration of his institu- tions and laws, not excepting those of them which have an appearance of being contrary to good morals, 45. 47. 136. He represents the immortality of the soul as a matter of antient tradition, and which ought to be believed, and produces ar- guments for it, 322 — yet at other times he speaks dubiously about it, and as if he looked upon it to be only an agreeable fable, not founded on any solid reasons, 347. He represents the remarkable effects which the hope of future happiness had upon them that believed it; and the account he gives suits the primitive Christians, but seems not well applicable to the antient Pagans, 360, 361. He rejects future punish- ments, and treats the fear of them as vain and childish, and the effect of a foolish superstition, 373, 374. Poets — The most antient of them represent the immortality of the soul, and a future state, as generally believed among the nations, 273. They often speak of future punishments, 366 — yet there are many passages, both of the Greek and Latin poets, which speak of death as putting a final period lo our existence, and extinguishing all sense of good and evil, 392, 393. Polybius — blames the great men and magistrates among the Greeks for rejecting the doctrine of a future stale, and espe- cially of future punishments, and propagating the disbelief of it among the people, 384, 385. To this he attributes the great want of honesty among fhe Grecians; yet he himself repre- sents these things under the notion of useful fictions, ibid, et 385. Prayer — A general practice among the Pagans, but chiefly in- tended for obtaining outward advantages, not for wisdom and virtue, 158. N. Priests^ Heathen — It was not looked upon as their proper office to teach men virtue, 34, 35. Puffendorff—oi opinion, that men usually come to the know- ledge of natural law by education and custom, 14 — and that the chief heads of that law were originally communicated to Adam by divine Revelation, and from him transmitted to his INDEX. 453 descendants, 17. N. He proves, that a vague and licentious commerce between the sexes out of marriage is contrary to the law of nature, 141. Punishments — The Stoics seem to have denied that any proper punishments are inflicted upon men by the gods, either here or hereafter, 150. 375, 376. Punishments^ future — The doctrine of future rewards neces- sarily connotes future punishments, 568 — the belief of the former without the latter would be of pernicious consequence, ibid. The wisest of the Heathen legislators and philosophers sensible of the great importance and necessity ot the doctrine of future punishments, 364, et seq. Celsus represents it as a doctrine taught by Heathens as well as Christians, that ■wicked men shall be subject to eternal punishments, 366, 367 — yet it appears that the most celebrated philosophers really rejected that doctrine of future punishments, the belief of which they owned to be necessary to society, 367, et seq. The philosophic maxim that the gods are never angry, nor hurt any person, was generally so understood as to exclude the punishments of a future state, 374. 380, 381. The notion of future punishments seems to have been generally discarded among the Greeks in the time of Polybius, 384. It was be- lieved among the Romans in the most antient times of their state, but was afterwards rejected and discarded even by the vulgar,- 385, et seq. The Christian doctrine of a future state includes not only the rewards that shall be conferred upon the righteous, but the punishments which shall be inflicted on the wicked in the world to come, 413. The usefulness and impor- tance of this part of the Gospel Revelation shewn, and that this doctrine as there taught is both reasonable and neces- sary, 415, et seq. Pythagoras — held, that the human soul is a part of the divine substance, and that therefore it is immortal, 302, 303 — and that after its departure from the body it is resolved into the universal soul, ibid. — yet he maintained the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, which he learned of the Egyptians, ibid. He supposed it to be physical and necessary, but endea- voured to apply it to moral purposes, 303, According to Ovid he rejected future punishments, 304. He excepted some emi- nent souls from a necessity of transmigration, and supposed 454 INDEX. them to go immediately to the gods, 306. It is hard to form a right notion of his scheme, which seems not to have been well consistent with itself, ibid. The doctrine of the immor- tality of the soul, as he taught it, of little advantage to man- kind, 309. He held periodical revolutions of the world, and that the same course of things shall return, and all things that have been done shall be done over again, ibid. See also 303. We cannot be sure of his real sentiments, as he made no scruple to impose upon his hearers, 309. Reason — arguing from the nature and relations of things, may be of great use to lead men to the knowledge of moral duty, 9nd to shew that it has a real foundation in nature, 8, 9 — but this is not the ordinary way in which the bulk of mankind come to the knowledge of morals, 10. Reason is apt to be influ- enced by the passions to form wrong judgments in things of a moral nature, 1 1, et seq Reason alone has not properly the force of a law to mankind, without the interposition and autho- rity of a superior, 107,108. If left merely to itself in the present state of mankind, it is not a safe and certain guide in matters of religion and morality, 421 — yet it is a valuable gift of God, and in many respects of great advantage, especially when as- sisted by Divine Revelation, ibid. Men's having too high an opinion of the powers of their own reason, has often had a bad effect both in religion and philosophy, 422. N. Religion — when it is of the right kind, and considered in its most comprehensive notion, takes in the whole of moral duty, and enforces it by a divine authority, and the most important mo- tives, 34. Religion, Heathen — as established by the laws, had no proper ar- ticles of fuiih necessary to be believed, nor proposed any set- tled rule of moral duty for directing and regulating the prac- tice, 34, 35. It consisted properly in the public rites and cere- monies which were to be observed^in the worship of the gods, i()id. The rites of their worship had in several respects a bad influence on the morals of the people, 36. Resurrection of the body — denied and ridiculed by the philoso- phers of Greece and Rome, 394. Some notion of it said to have obtained among the Eastern Magi, ibid. It might have been part of the original tradition derived from the beginning together with the immortality of the soul, ibid. It obtained INDEX. 455 among the Jews long before the time of our Saviour, but their noiions of it obscure and gross, ,394, 395. The tenet of the transmigration of souls might have arisen from a corruption of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body; as also the no- tion, which obtained among many nations, that after their death they would have ihe same bodily wants and be in the same condition which they are in at present, 395, 396. The no- tion of the resurrection taught by our Saviour and his apostles noble and sublime, and leads to spiritual ideas, 397. 405. Revelation^ divine — one way of communicating to men the know- ledge of morals, 12. The great usefulness of the Christian re- velation for that purpose, 31. 232, et seq. See Morality. Reunion — or refusion of the soul at death, or soon after it, into the universal soul, taught by the Stoics and other philosophers, 289. 296. 307, 308 — not to be understood of a moral but a phy- sical union, 289. It is quite different from the Christian doc- trine of the beatific vision and enjoyment of God, 307, 308. It was supposed to be common to all souls without distinction, not peculiar to the innocent and righteous, ibid. If there was any happiness provided for departed souls, it was supposed to be previous to the reunion in which souls lost their indivi- dual subsistence, ibid. Romans^ antient — their character, 29. S7 . The custom of exposing children continued long among them, 60— their cruel treatment of their slaves, ibid. — their gladiatory shews contrary to humanity, and destroyed more men than the wars, 76zrf.-— unnatural lusts very common among them, especially in the latter times of their stale, 62. S. ^acrZ/Jces— a part of the primitive religion, originally of divine appointment, 21. Sages.) Eastern. See Eastern. Sce/itics"-deiued, that any thing is in its own nature honest or dishonest, base or honourable, but only by virtue of the laws and customs which have obtained among men, 84. Seneca — says, it is a narrow notion of innocencyv to measure a man's goodness only by the laws, 38 — asserts, that no man in his sound reason fears the gods, 151 — and that it is neither in their power or inclination to hurt any one, ibid. Extravagant 456 INDEX. strains of Stoical pride and arrogance in his writings, 15 5-- raises a wise man to an equality with God in virtue and hap- piness, ibid. — seems to make prayer unnecessary, yet at other times advises to it, 157, ISS—justifies Cato*s drunkenness, 191— pleads for self-murder, 163— uncertain in his notions about the immortality of the soul, and a future state, 291. He sometimes speaks nobly of future happiness, z^zV/.— at other times expresses himself doubtfully about it, ibid. — and some- times positively affirms, that the soul is void of all sense after death, and that a man is then in the same condition he was in before he was born, 292, 293. He absolutely rejects tuture pu- nishments as vain terrors invented by the poets, and asserts that a dead man is affected with no evils, ibid, et 372 . 373. Shaftesbury, Earl of- — A passage of his relating to the clearness of the moral sense examined, 7. Sin — according to the principles laid down by Marcus Antoni- nus, necessary and unavoidable, 176, 177 — can do no hurt, either to pariicular persons, or to the whole, 179 — contributes in the Stoical scheme to the harmony of the universe, ibid. Socrates — the first among the Greeks that made morak the pro- per and only subject of his philosophy, and brought it into common life, 83 — was wont to consult the Oracles, to know the will of the gods, 1 12 — takes notice of some unwritten laws which he supposes to be of divine original, and common to all mankind, ll5,et seq. — represents the worshipping, not one God only, but the gods, as the first and most universal law of nature, ibid. It was a custom with him to swear, but espe- cially to swear by the creatures, 123. He is charged with in- continence, and making use of prostitutes, 137. He taught the immortality of the soul, and a future state, 190, et seq. He sometimes gives a noble account of future happiness, but seems to confine it principally to those who had made a great progress in wisdom and philosophy, 311 — mixes his doctrine of.a future state with that of the transmigration of souls, ibid, — gives a mean idea of the happiness reserved for the com- mon sort of good and virtuous men after death, 312. Cicero's summary of Socrates's doctrine concerning a future state, 312, 313. None of his disciples, but Plato and his followers, taught the immortality of the soul as the doctrine of their School, 319. Most of the arguments produced by him in the Phsedo INDEX. 457 For the immortality of the soul, weak and inclusive, 334. lie expresses his hope of it in his last discourse when he was going to die, but does not pretend to a certainty, 344. He re- presents the belief of it as of great importance to the cause of virtue, 358, 359 — but says, it was disbelieved by most of the people among the Athenians and Greeks in his time, 3U2, Soul of Man — strange diversity of opinions among the philoso- phers about the nature of the human soul, 285. The most emi- nent of them from the time of Fythagoras, maintained that it is a portion of the divine essence, 325, 326. N. Sfiarta^ and Sfiartans. See Lacedamonians. Stoics — the most eminent teachers of morals in the Pagan world, 145 — highly admired and extolled both by antiquity and mo- derns, ibid et 146. Observations on their maxims and pre- cepts with regard to piety towards God, 147; et seq. One great defect in all their precepts of piety, is, that they gene- rally run into the polytheistic strain, and are referred promis- cuously to God and the gods, 147, 148. Their scheme tended to take away the fear of God as a punisher of sin, 149, et seq. and advanced such a notion of the divine goodness as is scarce consistent with punitive justice, 150. They proposed to raise men to a state of self sufficiency and independency, 152, 153, Extravagant strains of pride and arrogance in some of the principal Stoics, 154, 155. Confession of sin before God, and sorrow for it, made no part of their religion, 159, 160. The resignation to God, for which they are so much admired, was in several respects diff'ercnt from that meek submission to the divine will which Christianity requires, 160. 161, N. Evange- lical humility had not properly a place in their system of mo- rals, 166. They gave many good precepts concerning benevo- lence and social duties, but their doctrine of apathy was not well consistent with a humane disposition and a charitable sympathy, 167, et seq. They said excellent things concerning forgiveness of injuries, and bearing with other men's faults, but in some instances carried it to an extreme, and placed it on wrong foundations, 173, et seq. Their pretence that no injury can be done to a good man, leaves no pro'^er room for his forgiving injuries, 178, 179 Some of the Stoics taught that pardoning mercy was inconsistent with the character of a wise man, 184, 185. They talked in high strains of governing the Vol. II. 3 M . ' 458 INDEX. fleshly appetites, and yet the heads and leaders of that sect were very loose, both in their doctrine and practice, with re- spect to purity and chastity, and gave great indulgence to the sensual passions, 187, et seq. See also 138, 139. They were favourable to drunkenness, 190, 191 — allowed, and even in se- veral cases prescribed self-murder, 193, et seq. They propos- ed lo lead men to perfect happiness in this present life, with- out regard to a future state; and to this end asserted the ab- solute self-sufficiency of virtue, and the indifferency of all external things, 208, et seq. It was a principle with them that a wise man is happy in the highest degree, merely by the force of his own virtue, under the severest torments, 209, 210. Their scheme in several respects not consistent with itself: and they were obliged to make concessions which cannot be well reconciled to their principles, 214, 215. Their philoso- phy in its rigour not reducible to practice, and had little influ- ence either on the people or on themselves, 219, 220. They did not give a clear idea of the nature of that virtue of which they said such glorious things, 221, et seq. They taught that lying in words is lawful and allowable on many occasions, 225. The immortality of the soul was not a doctrine of their school, 286, 287. Some of them held, that the soul is absorbed at death into the soul of the world, and then loses its individual subsist- ence, 288 — others supposed it to subsist for some time after death, but that it shall be dissolved and resumed into the soul of the universe at the conflagration, 289. Their doctrine of successive periodical dissolutions and conflagrations of the world, and the restitution of all things precisely to the state they were in before, not well consistent with a state of future retributions, 290, 291. N. They held, that some great and eminent souls after death became gods, but that even these were to be dissolved at the conflagration, 290. It was a maxim with them, that duration is of no importance to happiness, and that a temporal felicity is as good as an eternal one, 356, 357, They maintained, that nothing is profitable but what is honest; which is true, if a future recompence be taken into the ac- count, but does not always hold if confined only to this present life, 354, 355. Suicide — recommended by many of the philosophers and especi- ally by the Stoics, 192, et seq>— censured by some philoso- « INDEX. 459 phers, and condemned in some countries by the laws of the state, 200, 201. The Roman laws gave too great allowances to it, 201. Some of our modern Deists plead for it, 204. The absurdity and pernicious consequences of it shewn, 205, 206. Svjearing — common among many of the philosophers, 123, 124, 125. None of them forbid swearing by the creatures, ibid. Sykesy Dr, — lays it down as a principle, that the right knowledge of the one true God is the great foundation of morality, 29— asserts, that the light of natural reason, merely by its own force, discovered to the Heathens the whole of moral duty, without any assistance from Divine Revelation, 75, 76 — says that it was the philosophic notion among the Greeks from the time of Pythagoras, that the human soul is a portion or sec- tion of the divine substance, 325, 326. N. T. Tables^ laws of the twelve. See Laws» Theofihrastus — held, that the suffering great outward evils and calamities is incompatible with a happy life, 211 — for which he was blamed by the other philosophers, ibid. Timaus Locrus — held the transmigration of souls; and that it is necessary to instil into the people the dread of future punish- ments; yet seems not to have bplieved them himself, 304. Tradition — There were several customs derived by a most an- tient tradition from the first ages, and common to all nations, and which probably had their original from a Divine appoint- ment. 25. N. Transmigration of souls — taught by the Egyptians, who represent- ed it as the effect of a physical necessity, yet apphed it to moral purposes, 303. It was maintained by all the philoso- phers who taught the immortality of the soul, 335. It was a great corruption of the doctrine of a future state of retributions, and tended to weaken and defeat the good effects of it, 336. Truth — Many of the philosophers looked upon .truth to be no farther obligatory than as it is profitable; and lying to be lawful when itis so, 225,226. Some of our modern Deistsof the same sentiments, 227. * 460 INDEX. V. Virtue — The doctrine of the absolute self-sufficiency of virtue to happiness, even under the severest torments, examined, 212, 2 J 3. The philosophers generally supposed virtue to consist in living according to nature; but did not clearly explain what is to be understood by it, 22 1, et seq. Many of them represent- ed it to be equivalent to the to kuXov, or honestum, but were far from being agreed as to what actions come under that character, 228, 229. Virtue y divine — of the Platonists, considered, 121, 122, 123. N. Voltaire^ Mons. cle — says that nature, attentive to our desire, leads us to God by the voice of pleasure, 87. N. Purity and chastity seems not to enter into his scheme of the religion and law of nature, 142. W. IViveSf community of. Siee Community, Custom of lending their wives common at Sparta, and prescribed by Lycurgus, 47 — approved by Plutarch, ibid, et 136 — and by the Stoics, ibid, — pleaded for by Mr. Bayle, ibid. Worship — of one God, and of him only, not taught by any of the philosophers, 77^ 78 The worship of the gods represented by Socrates as the first law of nature, 1 1 5. 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