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THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 
 
 TO THE 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED 
 
 TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS? 
 
 L OX PERSONAL IDENTITY.— 11. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 BY 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER, D,aL. 
 
 Ejus [Analogiae] haec vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo non quferitur, 
 referat ut incerta certis probet. — Quintil. 1. i. c. d. 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, CONSPECTUS, AND AMPLE INDEX, 
 
 y -^ 
 
 HOWARD MALCOM, D.D. 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, LEWISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 SIXTH EDITION. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 
 
 1869. 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by 
 
 J. B. LIPPIXCOTT & CD. 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States in and for the 
 
 Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 FAGB 
 
 Editor's Introduction 6 
 
 " Preface 19 
 
 " Conspectus 21 
 
 Author's Advertisement 66 
 
 " Introduction 67 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF NATURAL RELIGION. 
 
 Chap. L— A Future Life 77 
 
 Chap. II. — The Government of God by Rewards and Punishments 95 
 
 Chap. III. — The Moral Government of God ^ 105 
 
 Chap. IV. — Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and Danger 128 
 
 Chap. V. — Probation, as intended for'^Moral Discipline and Improvement. 136 
 
 Chap. VL — The Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice. 157 
 
 Chap. VII. — The Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Consti- 
 tution, imperfectly comprehended 171 
 
 Conclusion 1S$ 
 
 3 
 
4 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF KEVEALED RELIGION. 
 
 PAQI 
 
 Chap. I. — The Importance of Christianity 186 
 
 Chap. II. — The supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered 
 
 as miraculous 202 
 
 Chap. III. — Our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected in a 
 Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must con- 
 tain things appearing liable to Objections 209 
 
 Chap. IV. — Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imper- 
 fectly comprehended 223 
 
 Chap. V. — The Particular System of Christianity; the Appointment of a 
 
 Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him 230 
 
 Chap. VI. — "Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the supposed 
 
 Deficiency in the Proof of it 247 
 
 Chap. VIL— The Particular Evidence for Christianity 263 
 
 Chap. VIII. — Objections against arguing from the Analogy of Nature to 
 
 Religion 296 
 
 CoNCLnsioN 306 
 
 DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 Dissertation I. — Personal Identity 317 
 
 DissEBTATiON 11. — The Nature of Virtue 324 
 
 Index to Part 1 338 
 
 Index to Part II , 343 
 
€Vits}x's fntrobutiifln. 
 
 Joseph Butler was born at "Wantage, England, May 18th, 1692, 
 the youngest of eight children. The biographies of that day were 
 few and meagre ; and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as 
 in Butler's. It would have been both interesting and profitable to 
 trace the development and occupations of one of the mightiest of 
 human minds. But no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his 
 life, and now all efi'orts to elicit them have been without success. 
 
 His father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant, who, at the time 
 of his son's birth, had retired from business with a competency, and 
 resided in a suburban mansion called " The Priory," still in existence. 
 
 Being a non-conformist, he educated Joseph at a "dissenting'^ 
 academy at Gloucester, under Samuel Jones, a gentleman of great 
 ability, and a skilful instructor, who raised up some of the greatest 
 men of their day.* 
 
 It was while a member of this academy, and about the age of 
 twenty-one, that Butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of 
 abstract reasoning, in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarice, 
 in relation to that eminent author's "Demonstration of the Being and 
 Attributes of God." This correspondence is now generally inserted 
 at the end of that work. 
 
 Mr. Butler having deliberately adopted Episcopal views, and re- 
 solved to unite himself with the Established Church, his father, with 
 praiseworthy liberality, sent him to Oxford, where he entered Oriel 
 College, March, 1714. Of his college life there is no account; nor 
 of the time and place of his ordination. He removed to London 
 in 1718, on receiving the appointment of "Preacher at the Rolls." 
 His famous Fifteen Sermons were preached in that chapel, and 
 published before resigning the place, with a dedication to Sir Joseph 
 Jekyl, "as a parting mark of gratitude for the favors received during 
 his connection with that learned society." 
 
 * Among these were Jones, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon 
 of the New Testament : Lardner, Maddox, Chandler, Archbishop Seeker, &c. 
 
 1* 6 
 
6 editor's introduction. 
 
 One of Butler's warmest college friends was Edward Talbo^ 
 second son of a clergyman wlio afterwards became Bishop of Durham. 
 This admirable young man died of smallpox ; in his last hours re- 
 commending Butler to his father's patronage ; and scarcely had that 
 gentleman attained the see of Durham, before he gave Mr. B. the 
 living of Haughton, from whence he transferred him, in 1725, to the 
 richer benefice of Stanhope. 
 
 On receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment, he re- 
 signed the Lectureship at the Bolls, and in the autumn of 1726 retired 
 to his beautiful residence at Stanhope. Here, without a family to 
 occupy his time, he devoted himself to his great work, the Analogy; 
 using horseback exercise, seeing little company, living abstemiously . 
 and caring for his flock. 
 
 Seven years thus rolled away ; when to draw him from what seemed 
 to his friends too great retirement and application, Lord-Chancellor 
 Talbot made him his chaplain, and afterwards, in 1736, gave him a 
 prebend's stall in Rochester. In 1736, Butler being now forty-four, 
 Caroline, consort of George II., appointed him " Clerk of the Closet," 
 an office which merely required his attendance at the Queen's apart- 
 ments every evening, from seven to nine. 
 
 Being now in London, convenient to the press, and enjoying both 
 leisure and competency, he published his immortal Analogy — ^the 
 cherished work of his life. The Queen was delighted with the book, 
 and made herself master of its glorious array of reasoning. But she 
 died the same year, and he lost not only a patroness, but a friend. 
 He returned to his benefice at Stanhope, the income of which had 
 been held during his residence in London. 
 
 On her death-bed, the Queen had urged her husband to promote 
 her honored chaplain to a bishopric ; and next year, the see of 
 Norwich becoming vacant, the Bishop of Bristol was translated to it, 
 and the see of Bristol given to Butler. Bristol was the poorest 
 bishopric in England, its emoluments being but $2,000 per annum; 
 less than those of the rectorship of Stanhope. Butler distinctly 
 disclosed his disappointment in his letter to the minister Walpole, 
 accepting the position; and declared that he did not think it "very 
 suitable to the condition of his fortune, nor answerable to the recom- 
 mendation with which he was honored." The king was not dis- 
 pleased at this candor, and in 1740 improved his income by giving 
 him, in addition to his bishopric, the profitable and influential office 
 of Dean of St. Paul's. Butler, who had retained the living of Stan- 
 
editor's introduction. T 
 
 nope along with his bishopric, now resigned that rectorship. *' The 
 rich revenues," says Professor Fitzgerald, " of the Deanery of St. Paul^ 
 enabled him to gratify his taste at Bristol." He expended about 
 $25,000 in improving and beautifying the episcopal residence and 
 gardens. He fostered useful charities, and employed his wealth for 
 others rather than for himself. 
 
 In 1750, upon the death of Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of 
 Durham, Butler was promoted to that see, the most honorable and 
 lucrative in England. He had before been offered the Primacy, on 
 the death of Archbishop Potter, but declined it,«with the remark that 
 ** it was too late for him to try to support a falling church." On 
 assuming his diocese at Durham, Butler delivered and published his 
 famous Charge to the Clergy, upon " The Use and Importance of 
 External Religion." He was at once assailed vigorously, in pamph- 
 lets and papers, by Archdeacon Blackburn, the Rev. T. Lindsay, and 
 others, on the charge of Popery ; an imputation which is still some- 
 times cast upon him, and which finds some slender support in his 
 setting up a marble cross over the communion-table at Bristol. That 
 he never was a Papist, is now so evident, that we can account for the 
 imputation only by the strong jealousy of the Romish Church then 
 prevalent. 
 
 Butler now became still more munificent. His private charities 
 were exceedingly generous, and his public ones seemed sometimes to 
 border on extrav? q;ance. He gave §2,000 a year to the county hospital, 
 and often gave away thousands of dollars at a time. But though 
 quite lavish in buildings and ornaments, as well as in benevolence, 
 he was remarkably frugal in his personal expenses. It is said of 
 him, by Rev. John Newton, that on one occasion, when a distin- 
 guished visitor dined with him by appointment, the provision con- 
 sisted of. a single joint of meat, and a pudding. The bishop remarked 
 to his guest on that occasion, that he " had long been disgusted with 
 the fashionable expense of time and money in entertainments, and 
 was determined that it should receive no countenance from his 
 example." 
 
 Of his amusements we know little except that he took much horse- 
 back exercise, and often employed his secratary, Mr. Emms, to play 
 for him on the organ. 
 
 Butler held the see of Durham less than two years. Symptoms 
 of general physical decay betrayed themselves about the time of 
 his promotion, and in spite of all that skill and affection coula 
 
8 
 
 prompt, he sunk to rest June 16tli, 1752, aged sixty. He was never 
 married 
 
 A considerable number of his sermons and charges have been 
 printed, but are too philosophical to be generally read. His great 
 work is the Analogy, published in 1736, and from that day read and 
 admired by every highly-cultivated mind. He was induced to write 
 by a state of things very remarkable in the history of religion. 
 Debauchery and infidelity were almost universal, not in any one class 
 of society but in all. England had reached the culminating point 
 of irreligion, and the firm re-establishment of Episcopacy had as yet 
 done nothing to mend the nation's morals. Piety was deemed a mark 
 of ignorance and vulgarity, and multitudes of those who professed it 
 were persecuted to dungeons and death. 
 
 Infidel writers, warmed into life by court corruption, became more 
 numerous and audacious than ever before. Their methods of attack- 
 ing Christianity were various ; but the most successful then, as 
 always, was to impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the 
 Sacred Scriptures, as irrational, and hence reject the whole. They 
 generally admitted the Being and perfection of God, and extolled the 
 sufficiency of natural religion ; but denied any revelation, or any 
 necessity for one. The verdict of the world was that the Bible is not 
 authentic, that man is not accountable, nor even probably immortal, 
 that God neither rewards nor punishes, and that present indulgence, 
 as far as our nature admits, is both wise and safe. 
 
 Bishop Downam,"^ one of the most learned of the clergy, in the 
 early part of the seventeenth century v^rites thus: "In these times, 
 if a man do but labor to keep a good conscience, though he meddle 
 not with matters of state, if he make conscience of swearing, sanctify 
 the Sabbath, frequent sermons, or abstain from the common corrup- 
 tions of the times, he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan, 
 and be less favored than either a carnal gospeller, or a close Papist." 
 
 It was considered settled, especially in polite circles, that Chris- 
 tianity, after so long a prevalence, had been found out to be an im- 
 posture. The clergy, as a body, did nothing to dispel this moral 
 gloom, but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous con- 
 duct. In the sad language of Bishop Warburton, *' Religion had 
 lost its hold on the minds of the people." He adds with great point, 
 ** Though a rule of Hglit may direct the philosopher to a principle of 
 
 * Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham's trial 
 
editor's introduction. 9 
 
 action ; and the point of Jionor may keep up the thing called man- 
 ners, among gentlemen : yet nothing but religion can ever fix a sober 
 standard of behavior among the common people/' Even the uni- 
 versities vv^ere on the side of irreligion ; for professorships, as well as 
 pulpits, were given to men, not for positive worth and fitness, but for 
 possessing qualities then most in vogue with those who held the 
 appointing power. Such were the trying times which had driven our 
 pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid the wilds of an unexplored con- 
 tinent, and to face the dangers of sea and savage. 
 
 It must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of God's 
 bringing good out of evil, that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity 
 brought out a host of champions for the truth of His word ; who 
 boldly met the odium of discipleship, and waged battle in such style 
 that the Deistical controversy was settled forever. Never was a dis- 
 pute more determined on both sides, and never was victory more 
 complete. Literary infidelity not only recoiled, but was routed ; and 
 can never again prevail. Henceforth, no scholar will ever treat the 
 evidences of Christianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt. 
 
 "When we contrast the stupendous learning, and powerful logic, of 
 the Christian writers of that century, with the superficial and almost 
 contemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended, 
 we are tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to 
 overthrow such weakness. But we must remember, that frail logic 
 and shallow considerations, will persuade men to indulge their vices ; 
 while the soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements, 
 with difiiculty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness. 
 
 The infidel writers of that day have sunk into such oblivion that 
 their works are now seldom found but in great libraries ; and even 
 well-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names. 
 Yet so perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the 
 times and the universal depravity of the carnal heart, that they 
 enjoyed the highest popularity with all classes. Forever honored be 
 the names of that noble band, who, in face of such odds, established 
 the authority of the Bible, and left the advocates of atheism and im- 
 morality without a lurking-place.* In this noble cohort Butler 
 
 * Among them were Cudworth, born 1617; "Intel. Syst. of the Universe:" 
 Boyle, 1626,- "Things above Reason:" Stillixgfleet, 1635; "Letters to a 
 "V)pist:" Sir I.Newton, 1642; "Observations on Prophecy:" Leslu:, 1630 ; 
 *' Short Method wiih Deists :" Lowth, 1661, Vindic. of the Divide Authoi 
 
10 editor's introduction. 
 
 btands conspicuous : and to him, I think, more than to all the others, 
 is to be atti'ituted the sudden and total overthrow of infidelity, when 
 it was in its glor/. 
 
 As a metaphysician, few have equalled him. What he added to 
 the science, has ever since remained a part of it, which can be said 
 of scarcely another. He advanced more that was new, fortified old 
 positions more ably, and applied speculation to religion more usefully 
 than any before him. Our language furnishes no profounder thinking. 
 Merely to understand him is an honorable distinction, and requires 
 no small previous training of the power of attention. As a polemic, 
 he is keen, sagacious, candid, patient, persevering, calm, inventive, 
 and profound ; every page indicates that repose of mind, which belongs 
 only to true greatness, combined with a full knowledge of the subject. 
 So far as I am able to judge, he never presses a consideration beyond 
 its just limits, and seldom introduces an illustration which has not 
 the force of an argument. Fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch. 
 
 The Analogy employed much of his life. It was begun in his 
 twentieth year, but was not published till he was forty-five. Such a 
 mode of writing never makes large books, for the matte.-*, constantly 
 revised, becomes constantly condensed. The Analogy is so con- 
 densed, as that to make a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable. 
 Hence, though my Conspectus and notes have aided my pupils to 
 understand and remember the argument, they do not in any measure 
 obviate the necessity of studying the book itself. If they do not 
 increase the number of those who shall studiously peruse the book 
 itself, my aim and expectations will be disappointed. 
 
 To this work no reply has ever been attempted ! Extensive as is 
 its diffusion, and great as is its acknowledged influence, infidelity has 
 had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside. Written for 
 a present purpose, and most signally accomplishing it, it- is yet so 
 written as to endure, in full value, through all coming time. It is 
 
 of the Bible: King, 1669; "Origin of Evil:" Sam. Clark, 1675; "Evidences 
 of Nat. and Rev. Religion:" Waterland, 16S3; "Scripture Vindicated:" 
 Lardxer, 16S4; "Credibility of Gospel History:" Leland, 1691; "View of 
 Oeistical Writers," and "Advantage and Necessity of Rev. :" Chandler, 1693; 
 'Definition of Cbristianity," on " Prophecy," Ac. : Warbdrton, 1698; "Di- 
 vine Leg. of Moses;" Bishop Newton, 1704; "On the Prophecies:" Watson, 
 1737 : "Apology for Christianity," (against GibbonJ and also " Apology for tha 
 Bible," (against Paine.) 
 
editor's introduction. U 
 
 undoul'tedly "the most original and the most profound work extant, 
 in any Idnguage, on the philosophy of religion/''* "the most argu- 
 mentative and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted 
 to the vs^orld.'^t 
 
 Writers in defence of Christianity had, before Butler, amply dis- 
 cussed the several departments of evidences ; but still there remained 
 objections. The structure of the globe, the course of nature, the 
 organization of animals, &c. were affirmed to contradict revelation. 
 Its doctrines and duties, moreover, were pronounced inconsistent with 
 sound reason. Butler repeats none of the old arguments, but confines 
 himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation are in per- 
 fect harmony with facts seen daily in the world, and which all admit. 
 That the world might not have been ordered and governed otherwise, 
 he does not choose to dispute. Taking things as they are, and closely 
 studying the connection between one thing and another, we ought to 
 inquire what course of action on our part, will conform to the needs 
 of such a nature and such circumstances. Our bodies are constructed 
 of parts, all adapted to each other, and also to one general end. So 
 too, our souls. And the two together have relations and adaptations, 
 which may, to some extent at least, indicate what is designed to be 
 the general end of our existence. If Christianity befits these several 
 parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses, then there is no- 
 thing incongruous between the two ; and no objections against Chris- 
 tianity can be drawn from the course of nature. On the contrary, all 
 seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is, and shows that the 
 Author of man and the Author of the Bible is the same. This is still 
 more impressive when we consider that we have a moral faculty; for 
 it is the very object and business of this faculty to deal with right 
 and wrong, good and evil ; the facts and magnitudes of which are 
 obvious in the course of nature. If Christianity does, in an especial 
 manner, hejit this faculty, if it is adapted to promote our general 
 rectitude and happiness, and if it contains no principle which is not 
 discernible in the government of the visible world, then there is no 
 discrepancy between Christianity and Providence. 
 
 This is Butler's position. lie confines himself to proving such an 
 analogy between revelation and the daily course of things, as that 
 nothing known in the universe can be ojQTered in disproof of Chris* 
 
 * McIntosh : " Progress of Ethical Philosophy." 
 I Brougham : " Disc, on Nat. Theology." 
 
12 EDITUK S INTRODUCTION. 
 
 tianity. The mode of Avarfare was new. Without professing to 
 prove Christianity to be true, he demonstrates that it cannot h\. 
 proved to be false ; and that if it be even probable, the rejection of it 
 is a gross folly and a tremendous hazard. Every objection against it 
 he proves to be equally forcible against facts which constantly occur, 
 and which all admit, though none profess to understand. Thus leav 
 ing the ramparts of the church to be guarded by the mighty men 
 who had valiantly maintained its defence, he quietly walked out into 
 the camp of the enemy, and spiked every gun ! 
 
 It has been said that the whole argument of the "Analogy" seems 
 to be built on Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24: "All things are double, one 
 against the other, and God hath made nothing imperfect." If it be 
 so, it involves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal 
 idea of this immortal work. Who else has so gloriously discerned 
 and expanded the profound philosophy of the son of Sirac ? Others 
 have uttered sentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition 
 of Butler. Origen affirms that "he who believes the Scripture to 
 have proceeded from Ilim who is the Author of nature, may well ex- 
 pect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in nature." 
 Shall we assign to Origen the whole credit of the "Analogy"? As 
 well might we bestow all our admiration for the delightful papers of 
 Addison, in the Spectator, to the classical authors from whom he 
 selected appropriate mottoes! By such a rule, the entire merit of 
 this most Christian work of Butler should be attributed to the pagan 
 Quintilian, from whom he derives the motto which so appropriately 
 graces his title-page. 
 
 A rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student 
 at his outset. He begins by taking for granted the existence of an 
 intelligent Author and Governor of the universe. Then, from the con- 
 ditions and changes observed in the visible world, he argues the folly 
 of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but 
 declare the same general laws and the same principles of govern- 
 ment. That there is this harmony, he proves ; and hence the proba- 
 bility that the same sort of government will prevail hereafter, which 
 prevails now. He demonstrates that man is under exactly such a 
 probation in this world, and as to this world, as revelation affirms 
 him to be under, as to the next ; and that embarrassments produced 
 by the doctrine of necessity, involve nature no less than religion. He 
 then evinces the need that man should be placed in a state of train- 
 iti^and trial, if he is ever to be qualified for better conditions; and 
 
editor's introduction. ' 13 
 
 thai this -World, as ^ow governed, is exactly adapted to give that 
 training, and to produce such a character as will insure happiness 
 under any possible contingencies. This is the argument of Part I. 
 
 Proceeding to examine Christianity, he discusses its importance, its 
 proofs, the unavoidableness of its containing strange things, the 
 absurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements, and the 
 abundance of its evidence for candid minds, though they are not, 
 and ought not to be, irresistible. He answers not only the objections 
 to Christianity, but the objections against its proofs ; which he shows 
 are very different things. Though he keeps rigidly to the refutation 
 of objections, and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of Chris- 
 tianity, yet, by removing every objection, he does in fact confirm its 
 claims. This clearing away of objections, after the usual proofs are 
 presented, crowns and completes the evidence. Thus the ultimate 
 result of a study of his book is not only negative but positive ; and 
 such has been its effect on every candid and competent student. 
 
 AVe should remember that we have no right to require the removal 
 of objections, and that therefore the whole of Butler's work is in fact 
 supererogatory; a concession and kindness to such as have doubts, 
 either honest or captious. Our only rightful demand of Christianity 
 is for cred entials. It presents these in its nature, its miracles, its 
 prophecies, its propagation, its influence, and its success. If these 
 are competent, we should bow to its teachings. To suppose that we 
 are capable of judging of the propriety of all God's law, or even to 
 understand his reasons for it, if they were disclosed, is absurd. 
 
 It is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words, and a 
 revelation by natural objects and the visible order of things, would 
 coincide ; but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence, 
 is not our first business. We are to weigh the testimony in favor of 
 religion, embrace it, if sufficient, and attribute the obscurity of any 
 part, to our present want of capacity. The solution of difficulties 
 serves to confirm our faith in Christianity, but has no place in our 
 ground of reception: and we have no right to wait for such solution, 
 however painful and embarrassing jnay be the difficulties. 
 
 Another, and perhaps even more important, use of the "Analogy," 
 is to dissipate the prejudices and objections to Christianity which 
 prevent a candid study of its evideuces. These prepossess and poison 
 the mind, and obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments. 
 Few, if any, after a careful examination of the positive evidences of 
 Christianity, conclude them to be inadequate. But many are they, 
 
 2 
 
14 editor's introduction. 
 
 who iiL,ving heard objections which their scanty learning does not 
 enable them to answer, and their no less scanty interest in the subject 
 does not induce them to examine, or which their inclinations lead 
 them to cherish, cast it all aside. In this way they relieve themselveg 
 from the labor of investigation, as well as their compunctions of 
 conscience ; while they indulge both their love of sin and pride of 
 singularity. 
 
 An instance of the use of this book to such a mind, we have in the 
 case of Chalmers. He had read, when a young man, several infidel 
 productions. Their semblance of logic and learning, and supercilious 
 confidence of style, disposed him to regard all religion as mere super- 
 stition. His mind was poisoned. Accustomed as he had been to the 
 positive and precise reasonings of mathematics, he could not find 
 similar proofs for Christianity. But he Avas induced, by some friends, 
 to study Butler's Analogy. This, as he expresses it, took Christianity 
 " out of the class of unlikelihoods.'' It brought him to the investi- 
 gation, as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus. He examined 
 the evidences as he would have done a declaration that Cicero weighed 
 just one hundred and fifty pounds ; open to the smallest proof or 
 presumption on the positive side of the question. Delivered from 
 prejudice, not only against Christianity but against its proofs, he soon 
 saw the madness of deism, and immovably accepted the word of 
 God, though he did not, at that time, feel its transforming power 
 on his own heart. Long afterwards he writes, "I cannot render 
 Bufiicient homage to the argument, which first, addressing itself to the 
 suhjed-matter of Christianity, relieves it of all disproof, and pro- 
 nounces it worthy of a trial ; and then, addressing itself to the evi- 
 dence of Christianity, relieves it of all objections, and makes good, to 
 that evidence, all the entireness and efficiency which natively belong 
 to it." Years afterwards he said, "Butler made me a Christian." 
 That it did far more for him than to efi*ect his change of sentiment, 
 that it continued to be a light in his firmament, is touchingly told in 
 the Preface of his Bridgewater Treatise, where he says, " I have 
 derived greater aid from the views and reasonings of Butler, than I 
 have been able to find, besides, in the whole range of our extant 
 authorship." 
 
 To the sincere believer in the word of God the study of Butler is 
 of great use. Doubts are among Satan's tried weapons, and often 
 haunt the holiest, especially if of a contemplative turn. They see 
 goodness oppressed, and vice rampant; the world ruled by wuktd 
 
EDITOR S INTRODUCTION. l6 
 
 men, and truth making its way with difficulty. Their heans are 
 traitorous, their surroundings full of temptation, and the direct evi- 
 dence of Christianity they may never have studied. To such the 
 analogical argument comes with full power, meets a candid exami- 
 nation, and prevails. 
 
 To no Christian is this book so useful as the minister. He is con- 
 stantly confronted by the difficulties which Butler so triumphantly 
 handles. Here he Ife furnished, not only with a shield to protect his 
 own mind from subtle darts, but a sword to demolish the cavil, and 
 defend the system of which he is a public teacher. 
 
 To all persons this book is of great value. We arrive at certainty 
 in but few of our decisions, and are often obliged, even in matters of 
 great moment, to act on probability. Thus we employ precautions 
 when an evil is ' not certain to occur. If the evil would be very 
 serious, we adopt the precaution, when there is but little probability, 
 or perhaps a bare possibility, of its occurrence. Now, Butler has 
 shown that if the proofs of revelation were weak, nay, if it had abso- 
 lutely no proof, nay further, if on fair examination there appeared 
 not even a probability of its truth, still there would remain a possi- 
 hility, and this alone, considering the tremendous issues at stake, 
 should make every man a Christian. This argument cannot be 
 applied to Mahometanism or any other religion, because against those 
 much may be advanced as disproof. Our author, having shown the 
 utter absence of disproof, shuts us up to the reception of Christianity, 
 were its truth barely possible. 
 
 There have not been wanting persons to disparage the " Analogy," 
 because it affords, as they say, no direct proof of revelation. As well 
 might we demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy. 
 Scores of writers pi^ove Christianity, and here we have one to relieve 
 us from the difficulties which beset it, and objections which still 
 remain. There is an aspect in which the Analogy may be said to 
 contribute the best of proof. What can go further towards establish- 
 ing a point, than to demonstrate that there is no proof of the con- 
 trary? What can show the fallacy of a set of objections, more than 
 to prove that they might be urged with no less force against the 
 obvious course of nature? This use of analogy is conformable to the 
 severest logic, and though offering no pretence of positive argument, 
 goes far towards establishing full conviction. "The probabilities," 
 «ays Stewart, "resulting from a concurrence of different analogies, 
 
16 editor's introduction. 
 
 may riso so high as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely di* 
 cingiiishable from moral certainty." 
 
 When it is considered that Butler's argument is wholly in addition 
 to the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence, 
 and removes even the objections which attend the subject, we see the 
 rejection of Christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd. We 
 see the skeptic condemned at his own bar, for acting in the most 
 momentous of all possible concerns, in a manner khe very opposite of 
 that which he calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs. The 
 "Analogy" establishes, beyond cavil, strong presu7nptioiis that Chris- 
 tianity is true, aside from all inspection of its proofs. The man, 
 therefore, who really understands this book, and refuses to be a 
 Christian, is led by his lusts and not his reason. 
 
 Some admirers of this book have lamented as a defect, its want of 
 evangelical tincture, and its exclusive reference to natural things. 
 To me, this is a prime recommendation. Were it otherwise, the 
 reasoning would be in a circle. The very structure of the argument 
 demands that it should avoid quotations from the Bible. 
 
 It must be admitted, however, that some expressions, taken just 
 as they stand, without qualification by the current of the argument, 
 tend to lead astray. For instance, "There is nothing in the human 
 mind contrary to virtue." "Men^s happiness and virtue are left to 
 themselves." " Religion requires nothing which we are not well 
 able to perform." "Our repentance is accepted, to eternal life." 
 "Our relations to God are made known by reason." Such expres- 
 sions are not to be taken alone, but as explained by the general drift 
 of sentiment and doctrine. No one can be familiar with his works, 
 without finding the fullest evidence that Christianity was to Butler 
 infinitely more than a creed or a ritual. Nor should we forget that 
 such expressions are not to be interpreted by the tenor of the 
 "Analogy" only, but by that of his whole 'Works.' 
 
 Even if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in 
 such phrase as we usually call evangelical, it should be remembered 
 that he was a Church-of-England man, at a time when there was a 
 powerful reaction against the evangelism of the Puritans, and when 
 a real lack of en\otional piety was general in his church. 
 
 That he did not enjoy in his last illness, which extended over a 
 long period, that sustaining sense of the love of Christ which hearty 
 Christians generally feel, is certain. A friend, trying to relieve his 
 depression, reminded him of his excellent life, and espeeiaiiv nis 
 
editor's introduction. 17 
 
 vricle liberalities. He immediately replied, "lam but a steward! 
 All is His, intrusted to me, to promote his glory and the good of 
 mankind ; how can I know that I have not abused the trust ? I 
 reflect on all these things, and they fill my soul with terror by the 
 feeling of responsibility they awaken.^' 
 
 On another occasion, his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit 
 by referring to the extensive influence of his Analogy in reclaiming 
 skeptics. His reply was, " I began the Analogy with a view to the 
 glory of God ; but as I proceeded, visions of the fame it might bring 
 me mingled themselves with my motives, and all was polluted and 
 made sinful ! The book may be a blessing to others, but it weighs like 
 lead on my soul." "Admit all this," tenderly replied the chaplain; 
 "yet has not Jesus said, 'Whosoever cometh unto me shall in no wise 
 be cast out' V Instantly the Bishop raised himself in the bed, exclaim- 
 ing, "How wonderful that the force of this passage never struck 
 me before! 'AVhosoever,' — all, all! 'In nowise,' — no amount of 
 sin can prevent acceptance ! Christ's righteousness will hide the 
 iniquities of all who accept his offer of mercy V 
 
 From that time, for weeks, Butler spoke to all who approached 
 him, of a full and free salvation. He died triumphantly repeating 
 this passage. 
 
 If all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in Butler or 
 his book be conceded, it certainly cannot impair either the value of 
 the analogical argument, or the force of our author's use of it. 
 
 Various circumstances conspire to make the study of " The 
 Analogy" difficult. The nature of the reasoning — the conciseness, 
 and often obscurity of the style — the dislocation of parts by frequent 
 digressions — the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer 
 objections — and the abstruseness of the subject itself — combine to 
 make the full comprehension of its import difficult. Mackintosh says, 
 " No thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer.'^ But this, like some 
 other objections of Sir James, is stated too strongly.. The language 
 is good, sinewy Saxon, and will endure when much that is now 
 Jailed fine writing, will seem grotesque. Still it is possible to 
 write philosophy in better phrase, as has been shown by at least 
 two great men, Berkeley and Stewart. Had Butler but possessed the 
 glowing style of Berkeley, or the smooth, graceful, and transparent 
 diction of Dugald Stewart, his work, instead of serving only for close 
 thinkers, or a college text-book, would have been read by all classes, 
 and banished that vulgar infidelity which flippant writers still di&- 
 B 2* 
 
J8 
 
 seminiite. That it is thus restricted in its influence is a misfortune 
 to the world. But he wrote for a class, and did his work completely. 
 Literary infidelity was conquered. Vulgar, ignorant, licentious 
 infidelity, will always exist, and is even now deplorably prevalent. 
 Both Europe and America contain conceited and malignant igno- 
 ramuses, who by their sneers, their cavils, and their audacity, make 
 havoc of souls. Of these, Tom Paine is a type, whose book, the 
 contempt of cultivated minds, continues to be sold and read. For 
 this class of persons, "Baxter's Call," or "Alleine's Alarm," are 
 far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of Christianity, or 
 even Butler's Analogy. 
 
^bitor's f refacj. 
 
 The text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal 
 editions. Occasionally solecisms are corrected, and a "word transposed 
 or put in italics, when a sentence could thus be made perspicuous. 
 The author had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sen- 
 tences with " and,'' " but," " now," " indeed," " however," &c., which 
 often served to perplex, and in such cases they have been omitted. 
 Long paragraphs, comprehending different topics, have been so 
 divided as to correspond with the true analysis ; which will greatly 
 assist the student in detecting the successive stages of the argument. 
 Special pains has been taken to correct and improve the punctuation. 
 Hundreds of sentences have thus been rendered more perspicuous, 
 and many which were obscure, have been made lucid. In no respect 
 was Butler's style, as printed, so defective. 
 
 The Conspectus is made much ampler than any other, for this 
 reason : that students are apt to content themselves with such help 
 instead of mastering the full discussion by the author. In the present 
 case they cannot so do, for such is the fulness of the Conspectus, that 
 if they master this, they have mastered the subject itself in full. 
 
 Notes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the 
 author by being enclosed in brackets. They are designed to open out 
 further views, to elucidate the text, to facilitate extended researches, 
 and to suggest topics for conversation in the class-room. 
 
 The Index has cost far more labor than would be supposed, and 
 
 may not be of much benefit to the undergraduate. Its advantages 
 
 \^ ill not be small to him in after life when he desires to recur to par- 
 
 19 
 
20 
 
 ticular topics. The general scliolar will find it enable him to make 
 use of the book for occasional reference. "Without it the work is not 
 complete for the class-room, still less for the library. 
 
 That students of the Analogy need help, is confessed ; and all 
 attempts to furnish it have been kindly received. As is remarked by 
 Bishop Wilson, "His argument, clear and convincing as it is to a 
 prepared mind, is not obvious to the young reader, whose experience 
 of life being small, and his habits of reflection feeble, has not the 
 furniture necessary for comprehending, at first, the thoughts and 
 conclusions of such a mind. The style is too close, too negligent, too 
 obscure, to be suitable for the young.^' 
 
 If it be asked why, with several existing helps to the study of the 
 Analogy, I ofier another, I frankly reply, because I have found none 
 of them satisfactory, either to the public or to myself. 
 
 Some teachers prefer their text-books to be accompanied by a set 
 of questions. Such will find in this edition all they desire. They 
 have only to enunciate each sentence of the Conspectus in the 
 interrogative form, and they will have every possible question 
 prepared to their hand. 
 
€m^tdn 0f % ^wt^wr's lutotarimn^ 
 
 I. What is probable evidence ? 
 
 1* It differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees; of all degrees. 
 1.) One probability does not beget assurance. 
 2.) But the slightest presumption makes a probability, 
 3.) The repetition of it may make certainty. 
 2. What constitutes probability is likeness; in regard to the event itself, or its 
 kind of evidences, or its circumstances. 
 1.) This daily affords presumptions, evidence, or conviction : according as it 
 
 is occasional, common, or constant. 
 2.) Measures our hopes and fears. 
 3.) Regulates our expectations as to men's conduct. 
 4.) Enables us to judge of character from conduct. 
 3* It is an imperfect mode of judging, and adapted to beings of limited 
 
 capacities. 
 4. Where better evidence cannot be had, it constitutes moral obligation, even 
 though great doubts remain. 
 1.) We are as much bound to do what, on the whole, appears to be best, as 
 
 if we hieic it to be so. 
 2.) In questions of great moment, it is reasonable to act when the favorable 
 
 chances are no greater than the unfavorable. 
 3.) There are numberless cases in which a man would be thought distracted 
 if he did not act, and that earnestly, where the chances of success were 
 greatly against him, 
 
 II. The use and application of probabilities. 
 
 Shall not go further into the nature of probable evidence, nor inquire why 
 likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far analogical 
 reasoning can be reduced to a system; but shall only show how just and 
 conclusive this mode of reasoning is. 
 X* In determining our judgments and practice. 
 
 1.) There may be eases in which its s^alue is doubtful. 
 2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such. 
 3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and conclusive. 
 it* In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God's govenip 
 ment. 
 
 21 
 
22 CONSPECTUS OF INTRODUCTION. 
 
 3 ) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in tlie Bible, as we do 
 
 in Nature. 
 2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these difficulties, requires U8 
 
 to deny that the world was made by him. 
 3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of nature, it 
 
 affords a presumption that both have the same author. 
 4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world, without 
 
 settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis. 
 5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are not applicable, 
 
 is no better. 
 6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of facts, and argue, 
 from known present things, to what is likely or credible, must be 
 right. 
 7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all. 
 3* In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural. This is the use 
 which will be made of analogy in the following work. In so using it, 
 1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent Creator and 
 Ruler. 
 — There are no presumptions against this, prior to proof. 
 — There are proofs : — from analogy, reason, tradition, &c. 
 — The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics. 
 2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how the world 
 might have been made and governed. 
 — Such prating would amount to this : 
 
 • All creatures should have been made at first as happy as they 
 
 could be. 
 
 • Nothing of hazard should be put upon them. 
 
 • Should have been secured in their happiness. 
 . All punishments avoided. 
 
 — It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not faculties 
 for such speculations. 
 3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to ends; and may conclude that Na- 
 ture and Providence are designed to produce virtue and happiness; 
 but of the means of producing these in the highest degree, we are not 
 competent judges. 
 — We know not the extent of the universe j 
 — Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection. 
 — We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each other. 
 — ^As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his universe; 
 but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing this end. 
 4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes for God's 
 conduct, we must study what is. 
 — Discovering general laws. 
 
 — Comparing the known course of things with what revelation teaches 
 us to expect. 
 
 III. The force of this use of Analogy. 
 1* Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof. 
 2* Confirms what is otherwise proved. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 3* Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to ridicule, than tho 
 system of nature. 
 
 4. Answers almost all ohjections against religion. 
 
 5. To a great extent answers objections against the proo/a of religion. 
 
 IV. General scope of the book. 
 
 1. The divine government is considered, as containing in it. 
 Chap. 1. Man's future existence. 
 
 " 2. In a state of reward or punishment. 
 
 " 3. This according to our behavior. 
 
 " 4. Our present life probationary. 
 
 " 5. And also disciplinary. 
 
 " 6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity. 
 
 " 7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness. 
 2* Revealed religion is considered, 
 Chap. 1. As important. 
 
 " 2. As proved by miracles. 
 
 " 3. As containing strange things. 
 
 " 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended. 
 
 *' 5. As carried on by a mediator. 
 
 " 6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to girt 
 
 " 7. As having sufficient and full evidence. 
 
 &m$i^ttim tit % ^natogs. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 Will not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what analogy sug- 
 gests from changes which do not destroy; and thus see whether it is not 
 probable that we shall live hereafter. 
 
 I. The probabilities that we shall survive death. 
 
 J . It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different stages, and 
 in various degrees of perfection. 
 — Worms turn into flies. 
 — Eggs are hatched into birds. 
 
 — Our own present state is as different from our stat« in the womb, M 
 two states of the same being can be. 
 
24 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 —That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from the present &A 
 
 the present is from our state in the womb, is according to analogy. 
 2* We now have capacities fur happiness, action, misery, &c., and there is 
 always a probability that things will continue as they are, except when 
 experience gives us reason to think they will be altered. This is a gene- 
 ral law; and is our ojili/ natural reason for expecting the continuance of 
 any thing. 
 3. There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us. 
 
 If there was, it would arise from the nature of death 3 or from the analogy 
 
 of nature. 
 1.) Not from the nature of death. 
 — We know not what death is. 
 — But only some of its effects. 
 
 — These effects do not imply the destruction of the living agent. 
 — We know little of what the exercise of our powers depends upon; and 
 
 nothing of what the poicers themselves depend on. 
 — We may be unable to exercise our powers, and yet not lose them — 
 
 e.g. sleep, swoon. 
 2.) Not from analogy. 
 
 — Reason shows no connection between death and our destruction, 
 
 — We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it. 
 
 — The possession of living powers, up to the very moment when our 
 
 faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a probability of their 
 
 continuing. 
 — We have already survived wonderful changes. 
 — To live after death is analogous to the course of nature. 
 
 II. Presumptions against a future life. 
 
 1. That death destroys us. 
 
 Ans. 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and material beings, and 
 hence discerptible ; which is not true. 
 1.) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of course the subject ot 
 
 it must be. 
 2.) The material body is not ourself. 
 
 3.) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of a different kind, 
 or of having more or fewer senses, or of having no bodies at all, or of 
 hereafter animating these same bodies, remodelled. 
 4.) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange bodies, would have 
 no tendency to destroy us. 
 Ans. 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being cannot be provei by 
 ex2)erimcnt, yet facts lead us so to conclude. We lose limbs, <fcc. 
 Our bodies were once very small, but we might, then, have lost part 
 of them. There is a constant destruction and renewal going on. 
 1.) Thus we see that no certain hulk is necessary to our existence, and unless 
 it were proved that there is, and that it is larger than an indissoluble 
 atom, there is no reason to presume that death destroys us, even if we 
 are discerptible. 
 2.) The living agent is not an internal material organism, whioh dies -witli 
 the body. Because 
 
CONSPifCTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 25 
 
 —Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to other systemf 
 
 of matter. But we see these are not necessary to us. 
 —It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were not essential-^ 
 
 who is to determine? 
 —The relation between the living agent, and the most essential parts of 
 the body, is only one by which they mutually affect each other. 
 8.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we come to the 
 same result. 
 — We see with the eyes, just as we do with glasses. The eye is not a 
 
 recipient, any more than a telescope. 
 —It is not pretended that vision, hearing, &c. can be traced clear up to 
 the percipient ; but so far as we can trace perceptions, the organ 
 does not perceive. 
 — In dreams we perceive without organs. 
 
 — When we lose a limb we do not lose the directing poicer ; we could 
 move a new one, if it could be made, or a wooden one. But the 
 limb cut off has no power of moving. 
 —Thus, our loss of the organs of perception and motion, not being the 
 destruction of the power, there is no ground to think that the de- 
 struction of other organs or instruments would destroy «s. 
 Objection. These observations apply equally to brutes. 
 
 Ans. 1. Be it so. Perhaps they are immortal : — may hereafter improve : we 
 know not what latent powers they may have. 
 1.) The human being at one period looks as little likely to make great 
 intellectual attainments ; for a long time he has capacities for virtue 
 and religion, but cannot use them. 
 2.) Many persons go out of the world who never became able to exercise 
 these capacities; e.g. infants. 
 Ans. 2. If brutes were immortal, it does not prove them to be moral agents. 
 1.) It may be necessary, for aught we know, that there should be living 
 
 creatures not moral agents, nor rational. 
 2.) All difficulties as to what would become of them, are founded in our 
 ignorance. 
 2* That our souls, though not material, so depend upon the bodily structure, 
 
 that we cannot survive its destruction. 
 Ans. 1. Reason, memory, &c. do not depend on the body, as perceptions by 
 the senses do. Death may destroy those instruments, and yet not 
 destroy the poioers of reflection. 
 Ana. 2. Human beings exist, here, in two very different states, each having its 
 own laws: sensation and reflection. By the first we feel; by the 
 second we reason and will. 
 1.) Nothing which we know to be destroyed at death, is necessary to reflect- 
 ing on ideas formerly received. 
 2.) Though the senses act like scaffolds, or levers, to bring in ideas, yet when 
 once in, we can reflect, &c. without their aid. 
 A*». 3, There are diseases which prove tatal, «fec., yet do not, in any part of 
 their course, impair the intellect; and this indicates that they do not 
 destroy it. 
 
26 CONSPECTUS or THE ANALOGY. 
 
 i.) In the diseases alluded to, persons have their reflective power^ in full, 
 
 the very moment before death. 
 2.) Now, why should a disease, at a certain degree, utterly destroy powers 
 
 which were not even affected by it, up to that point? 
 3* That death at least suspends our reflective powers, or interrupts our con- 
 tinuing to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now. 
 Ana. There appears so little connection between our powers of sensation and 
 
 our powers of reflection that we cannot presume that what might 
 
 destroy the former, could even suspend the latter. 
 1.) We daily see reason, memory, &c. exercised without any assistance, that 
 
 we know of, from our bodies. 
 2.) Seeing them in lively exercise to the last, we must infer that death is not 
 
 a discontinuance of their exercise, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings 
 
 of such exercise. 
 3.) Our posthumous life may be but a going on, with additions. Like the 
 
 change at our birth — which produced not a suspension of the faculties 
 
 we had before, nor a total change in our state of life ; but a continuance 
 
 of both, with great alterations. 
 4.) Death may but at once put us into a higher state of life, as our birth 
 
 did ; our relation to bodily organs may be the only hinderance to our 
 
 entering a higher condition of the reflective powers. 
 5.) Were we even sure that death would suspend our intellectual powers, it 
 
 would not furnish even the lowest probability that it would destroy 
 
 them. 
 Ohjec. From the analogy of plants. 
 Ans. This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our frailty, but affords no 
 
 proper analogy. Plants are destitute of perception and action, and 
 
 this is the very matter in question. 
 
 EEMARKS. 
 
 1. It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we know, we see no 
 
 probability of ever ceasing to be : — it cannot be concluded from the reason 
 of the thing: — nor from the analogy of nature. 
 
 2. We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence. 
 
 3* Our going into neio scenes and conditions, is just as natural as our coming 
 
 into the world. 
 4. Our condition may naturally be a social one. 
 
 5* The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed 
 law, in proportion to one's degrees in virtue. 
 1.) Perhaps not so much as now hy society; but by God's more immediate 
 
 action. 
 2.) Yet this will be no less natural, i.e. stated, fixed, or settled. 
 3.) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater knowledge of God 
 
 and his works. 
 4.) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole of Chris- 
 tianity is as natural as the visible course of nature seems to us. 
 6. These probabilities of a future life, though they do not satisfy curiosity, 
 answer all the purposes of religion, as well as demonstration. 
 1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not demonstrate religion, 
 but would be reconcilable with atheism. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 27 
 
 2.) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a 
 
 state, would be a presumption against religion. 
 3.) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and 
 
 prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine of religion. 
 
 CHAPTER ir. 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 The question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for 
 happiness and misery. 
 
 Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct. 
 
 "We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject. 
 
 And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other than the 
 probabilities just discussed. 
 
 I. In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great extent, 
 
 in our oxon power, 
 
 1. We see them to be consequences of our actions. 
 
 2. And we can foresee these consequences. 
 
 3. Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of exertion. 
 
 4. By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may make us 
 
 miserable. 
 5* Why this is so is another matter. 
 
 1.) It may be impossible to be otherwise. 
 
 2.) Or it may be best on the whole. 
 
 3.) Or God's plan may be to make only the good happy. 
 
 4.) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us. 
 Ohjec. It may be said '' this is only the course of nature." 
 Ans. It is granted : but 
 
 1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit that God is the 
 
 natural governor of the world : and must not turn round and deny it 
 because his government is uniform. 
 
 2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is his appointment. 
 
 3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment. 
 
 4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God's instruction how we are 
 
 to act. 
 Ohjec. By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our appetites, and such 
 
 gratification is our reward for so doing. 
 Ans. Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper motives to action 
 in general; but we may, in particular cases, damage ourselves by 
 indulgence. Our eyes are made to see with, but not to look at every 
 thing : — for instance the sun. 
 It follows, from what has been said, that 
 
 II. We are, now, actually under God^s government, in the strictest 
 
 sense. 
 I. i dmittiug that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of speculation, aa 
 of experience, that he governs us. 
 
28 CONSPECTUS or the analogy. 
 
 2. The annexii\g of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and giving notice 
 
 of them, is the very essence of government. 
 3* Whether by direct acts apon us, or by contriving a general plan, does not 
 affect the argument. 
 1.) If magistrates could make laws which should execute themselves, their 
 
 goA-ernment would be far more perfect than it is. 
 2.) God's making fire burn us, is as much an instance of government, as if 
 he directly h)Jlicted the burn, whenever we touched fire. 
 4. Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render incredible the Bible 
 doctrine of God's rewarding or punishing according to our actions. 
 
 Additional remarks on Punishment. 
 
 As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show further that 
 the course of administration, as to present punishment, is analogous to what 
 religion teaches as to the future. 
 
 Indeed they add credibility to it. 
 
 And ought to raise the most serious apprehension. 
 
 I. Circumstances to he observed touching present punishments. 
 
 1. They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or advantage. 
 
 2. The sufferings often far exceed the pleasui'e or advantage. 
 
 3. They often follow remotely. 
 
 4. After long delay they often come suddenly. 
 
 5. As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they may not be thought 
 
 of at the time ; or if so, there is a hope of escaping. 
 
 6. There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do not recur. 
 
 7. Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain point, may 
 
 retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation is of no avail. 
 
 8. Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful wrong-doing. 
 
 9. As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are some natural 
 
 punishments. 
 1.) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way. 
 2.) Or as an example to others. 
 
 II. These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws. 
 
 1. They are matters of daily experience. 
 
 2. Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is governed. 
 
 III. They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future punish- 
 
 ment, that both might be expressed in the same words. 
 
 e.g. Proverbs, oh. i. 
 
 The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the Scripture doctrine 
 of future punishment, such as 
 
 1.) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of vice. 
 
 2.) Or the objection from necessity. 
 
 3.) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted. 
 
 4.) Or that he cannot be offended. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 29 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 1. Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and considered. 
 
 3. Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing short of a 
 demonstration of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines afi"ord no justifi- 
 cation. 
 
 3. There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the licentious will not 
 find it better for them that they had never been born. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 As the structure of the world shows intelligence, so the mode of distributing 
 pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God's natural government, 
 such as a king exercises over his subjects. 
 
 But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the moral character of 
 such government. 
 
 I. What is a moral or righteous government? 
 
 1. Not mere rewarding and punishing. 
 
 2. But doing this according to character. 
 
 3. The perfection of moral government is doing this exactly, 
 Ohjec. God is simply and absolutely benevolent. 
 
 Ans. Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him to produce the greatest 
 
 possible happiness, regardless of behaviour. This would rob God of 
 
 other attributes ; and should not be asserted unless it can be proved. 
 
 And whether it can be proved is not the point now in hand. 
 
 The question is not whether there may not be, in the universe, beings to 
 
 whom he manifests absolute benevolence, which might not be incompatible with 
 
 justice; but whether he treats us so. 
 
 4. It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a disordered world, to esti- 
 
 mate with exactness the overplus of hanpiness on the side of virtue: and 
 there may be exceptions to the rule. But it is far from being doubtful 
 that on the whole, virtue is happier than vice, in this world. 
 
 II. The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature. 
 1. It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God governs : and it is reasonable to sup- 
 pose that he would govern righteously. 
 
 1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for. 
 2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, and the 
 wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a method of 
 government, now begun, shall be carried on. 
 'i. The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show a right consti- 
 tution of nature; and our ability to foresee and control these consequences, 
 shows that we are under moral law. 
 ?. God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, is actually 
 punished by it. 
 1.) Without this, society could not exist. 
 
80 CONSPECTUS OP THE ANALOGY. 
 
 2.) "[This i God's government, through society; and is as natural, as society; 
 3.) Since .he course of things is God's appointment, men are unavoidably 
 accountable for their behaviour. 
 Ohjec. Society often punishes good actions, and rewards wickedness. 
 Ans. 1. This is not necessary, and consequently not natural. 
 
 2. Good actions are never punished by society o« good, but because 
 considered bad. 
 4* By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice punished, as such, 
 which proves a moral government; as will be seen if we rightly distin- 
 guish between actions and their qualities. 
 1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be wrong : in 
 which case the gratification is in the act, not the morality of it: in other 
 cases the enjoyment consists wholly in the quality of virtuousness. 
 2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, vexation, 
 remorse, &c. 
 — This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere misfortune. 
 — Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not their own fault. 
 3.) Honest and good men are befriended as such. 
 
 4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good oflSces are regarded 
 with gratitude on account of the intention, even when they fail to 
 benefit us. 
 — This is seen in family government, where children are punished for 
 
 falsehood, fretfulness, <fec., though no one is hurt. 
 — And also in civil government, where the absence or presence of ill 
 intention goes far in determining the penalty of wrong-doing, 
 5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, turns much upon 
 
 approbation and disapprobation. 
 6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of our being 
 under God's moral government. 
 — "We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on our moral 
 
 nature. 
 — Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of vice, as such, 
 is a rule, never inverted. If it be thought that there are instances 
 to the contrary, (which is not so,) they are evidently monstrous. 
 — The degree in which virtue and vice receive proper returns, is not the 
 question now, but only the thing itself, in some degree. 
 7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice prospers ; but this 
 
 is disorder, and not the order of nature. 
 8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, a declaration 
 from God, for virtue and against vice. So far as a man is true to virtue, 
 is he on the side of the divine administration. Such a man must have 
 a sense nf security, and a hope of something better. 
 S, This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has necessary tendencies 
 beyond their present efi"ects. 
 1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals. 
 2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society. 
 
 — The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends to prevail 
 over power not so directed, just as power under direction of reason, 
 tends to prevail over brute force. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 81 
 
 — As this may not be conceded, wo will notice how the case stands, 
 as to reason : 
 
 • Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for reason 
 
 to triumph over brutes. 
 . Kational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and treacherous, may 
 be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves by instinct: but this 
 would be an inverted order of things. 
 —A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority. 
 
 • By making the good of society, the object of every member 
 
 of it. 
 
 • By making every one industrious in his own sphere. 
 
 • By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice. 
 
 3.) If the part of God's government which we see, and the part we io 
 not see, make up one scheme, then we see a tendency in virtue to 
 superiority. 
 4.) But to produce that superiority there must be 
 — A force proportioned to the obstacles. 
 • — Sufficient lapse of time. 
 
 — A fair field of trial ; such as extent of time, adequate occasions, and 
 opportunities for the virtuous to unite. 
 5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its tendencies, 
 
 though real, are hindered. 
 6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter. 
 — Eternity will be lasting enough. 
 — Good men will unite ; as they cannot do now, scattered over the earth, 
 
 and ignorant of one another. 
 — Other orders of virtuous beings will join ; for the very nature of virtue 
 is a bond of union. 
 7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by vicious beings 
 in any part of the universe, would be to the amendment of all who 
 were capable of it, and their recovery to virtue. 
 8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are contingent, and 
 
 that its beneficial tendencies are God's declarations in its favor. 
 9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too speculative, wo 
 may easily come to the same result by reflecting on the supremacy 
 which any earthly nation would attain, by entire virtue for many ages. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world 
 is one ; it is moral ; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness ; and to 
 see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to 
 consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or 
 virtue the contrary. 
 
 Objec, Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and continue 
 
 always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and disordered 
 
 state as at present? 
 
 An8. We are not proving that God's moral government is perfect, or the truth 
 
 of religion, but only seeing what there is in the course of nature, to 
 
 confirm it, supposing it to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, 
 
82 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 but the y resent distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no 
 ground to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished 
 exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would bo no 
 indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the preceding observa- 
 tions confirm the doctrine of future retribution ; for, 
 
 1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue 
 and vice. 
 
 2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in hind, but in degree 
 only, from God's present government. It would be the effect, towards 
 which we see the tendency. 
 
 3.) That higher rewards and punishments may he hereafter. 
 
 4.) That we should expect it to be so ', because the tendencies of vice and 
 virtue are immutable, while the hinderances are only artificial. 
 
 [This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in 
 i condensed a form as possible.] 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OF A STATE OF PROBATION. 
 
 The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the most 
 common notion is that our future interests are depending ; and depending on 
 ourselves. And that we have opp)ortunities for both good and bad conduct, 
 and temjytotions to each. 
 
 This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for it 
 implies allurement to evil, and diflaculties in being good. 
 
 Hence needs to be considered by itself. 
 
 Doctrine. The natural government of Gob, in this world, puts us on 
 
 TRIAL AS TO THE THINGS OF THIS WORLD; AND SO IMPLIES, WHAT 
 RELIGION TEACHES, THAT HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT PUTS US OX 
 TRIAL AS TO A FUTURE "WORLD. 
 
 I. So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal 
 interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests. 
 
 1. The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or bad, and 
 
 enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our interests, in part at 
 least, depend on ourselves. 
 
 2. We often hlame ourselves and others for evils, as resulting from mis- 
 
 conduct. 
 3* It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and incur evils, not for 
 
 want of knowing better, but through our fault. 
 4* Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from othei ouusei 
 
 than ignorance. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 3^ 
 
 II. These natural or teinporal trials are analogous to our moral 
 
 and religious trial. 
 
 1. In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our circumstances 
 or in our nature. 
 1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary temptations. 
 2.) Others will seek evil, and go out of their way after wicked indulgence, 
 
 when there are no external temptations. 
 3.) But even those who err through temptation, must have that within which 
 
 makes them susceptible of temptation. 
 4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to both present 
 and future interests. 
 2* If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both capacities, we see 
 the same analogy. 
 1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification. 
 2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better judgment and 
 
 feeble resolutions. 
 3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice. 
 
 4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong apprehensions of future 
 misery. 
 3« The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of others upon us. 
 1.) Bad example. 
 2.) Wrong education. 
 3.) Corruptions of religion. 
 
 4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness. 
 4. In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well as vice. 
 
 III. The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered 
 
 state, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests. 
 
 This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint ; for, 
 
 1. We viay manage to pass our days in comfort and peace. 
 
 2. And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion. 
 
 3. We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of beings. 
 
 1* """t is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion says we are in, is 
 credible; for it exactly corresponds to what we see. 
 1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security of enjoyment, 
 without care or correctness, it would be a presumption against religion. 
 2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an infinitely good Being 
 would not expose us to the hazard of misery. This is indeed a diffi- 
 culty, and must remain so ; but still the course of nature is as it is. 
 3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more unavoidable than 
 our deportment. 
 1, It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as to our interests, 
 
 both present and future. 
 3» The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present enjoyments and 
 honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so this may be the case, 
 as to that chief and final good which religion proposes. 
 C 
 
34 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PROBATIOi'J INTENBED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT. 
 
 Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, is 
 a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not under- 
 stand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just now. It 
 certainly is consistent with God's righteous government. 
 
 Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified for 
 a better state. 
 
 This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry why we are so placed, 
 answers an infinitely more important question, — viz. : What is our business 
 here f 
 
 I. We are ^placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in 
 virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and 
 happiness. 
 
 1. Every creature is designed for a particular way of life. 
 
 1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature's nature and its 
 
 circumstances. 
 2.) Man's character might be so changed as to make him incapable of 
 
 happiness on earth. 
 3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a world where he 
 must be wretched, for want of the proper objects to answer to his 
 desires. 
 4.) So that without determining what is the future condition of good men, 
 we know there must be necessary qualifications to make hs capable of 
 enjoying it. 
 2* Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and different 
 conditions. 
 1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up. 
 2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action. ^ 
 
 3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers. 
 4.) We can form habits — both bodily and mental. 
 
 As these operate in producing radical changes in human character, we will 
 look for a moment at the process. 
 
 — Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though necessary to 
 
 forminy them. 
 — There are habits of perception, however, and habits of action : the 
 
 former are passive, the latter active. 
 — Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of mind by 
 
 the exertion of principles; i.e. carrying them out. 
 — Resolutions to do well are acts, and may help towards forming 
 good habits. But mere theorizing, and forming pictures in the 
 mind, not only do not help, but may harden the mind to a 
 contrary course. 
 —Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus familiarity with 
 danger lessens fear 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 85 
 
 — Hence active habits maybe formed and strengthened, by acting accord* 
 ing to certain motives or excitements, which grow less sensibly felt 
 and less and less felt, as the habit strengthens. 
 
 • Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion of pity, 
 
 and the active principle of benevolence. But inquiring out 
 cases of distress in order to relieve them, causes diminished 
 sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and stronger benevolence 
 and aptitude in relieving it. 
 . So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon, produce 
 good; if not, harden. 
 6.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even inexplicable, 
 
 but the thing itself is matter of certain experience. 
 6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often pleasurable: 
 opposite inclinations grow weaker : difficulties less : and occasions more 
 frequent. 
 7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed. 
 3. We should not have these capacities for improvement and for the recon- 
 struction of character, if it were not necessary. 
 1.) They are necessary, even as to this life. 
 
 — We are not qualified, at first, for mature life: understanding and 
 
 strength come gradually. 
 — If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be distracted 
 and bewildered, ani our faculties would be of no use previous to 
 experience. Ignorant of any employment, we could not provide 
 for ourselves. 
 ■ — So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as to this world, 
 till he acquire knowledge, experience, and habits. 
 2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the requisite qualities for 
 manhood. 
 — Children learn, from their very birth, 
 
 • The nature and use of objects. 
 
 • The subordinations of domestic life. 
 . The rules of life. 
 
 — Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem like in- 
 stinct; but some requires great care and labor, and the doing of 
 things we are averse to. 
 
 —According as we act during this formative period, is our character 
 formed; and our capacity for various stations in society determined. 
 
 — Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered. 
 3.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another, is exactly of the 
 
 ^ same kind : and comprehended under one general law. 
 
 — If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us for a higher 
 life, it would be no objection. 
 
 • We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the child's body; 
 
 nor would we expect such a result, prior to experience. 
 
 • Nor do children understand the need of exercise, temperance, 
 
 restraint, &c. 
 —We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that the 
 present life is preparatory. 
 
S6 CONSPECTUS OP THE ANALOGY. 
 
 4* If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness, then we see otir 
 need of the moral culture of our present state. 
 1.) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social. 
 
 —Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the Scripture 
 
 doctrine that this future community will be under the more imme- 
 diate government of God. 
 —Nor the least proof that its members will not require the exercise of 
 
 veracity, justice, &c. towards each other; and that character which 
 
 results from the practice of such virtues. 
 •^Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a virtuous 
 
 character must, in some way, be a condition of happiness in that 
 
 state. 
 2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right. 
 — We have desires for outward objects-. 
 
 —The times, degrees, &o. of gratifying these desires, are, of right, sub- 
 ject to the control of the moral principle. 
 —But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their being 
 
 excited. 
 —They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or gratified 
 
 at all. 
 —When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful, we are 
 
 tempted. 
 3.) The only security is the principle within. , 
 
 — The strengthening of this lessens the danger. 
 — It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise. 
 • Noting examples. 
 
 . Attending to the right, and not to preference. 
 « Considering our ti'ue interests. 
 — When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength, our security 
 
 from the dangers of natural propensions. 
 —Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue ; and im- 
 proved virtue must produce increased happiness, if the government 
 
 of the world is moral. 
 4.) Even creatures made upright may fall. 
 
 — The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the nature of 
 
 liberty ; for that would only belaying that an event happened 
 
 because it might happen. 
 —But from the very nature of propensions. 
 —A finitely perfect being would have propensions corresponding to its 
 
 surroundings; its understanding; and its moral sense; and all these 
 
 in due proportions. 
 —Such a being would have propensions, though the object might not 
 
 be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to its moral sense j 
 
 and this would have some tendency, however small, to induce 
 
 gratification. 
 —The tendency would be increased by the frequency of occasions; and 
 
 yet more by the least indulgence, even in thought; till, under peculiar 
 
 conjunctures, it would become efi"ect. 
 — The first transgression might so utterly disorder the constitution, and 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 3 
 
 change the proportions of forces, as to lead to a repetition of irregu- 
 larities; and henco to the construction of bad habits, and a depraved 
 character. 
 5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher virtue, and 
 more security, by obeying the moral principle. 
 — For the danger would lessen, by the increased submissiveness of 
 
 propensions. 
 — The moral principle wovTld gain force by exercise. 
 6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue is not only 
 right, but improving. 
 — The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of sinning 
 
 may be almost infinitely lessened. 
 — Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a state of dis- 
 cipline; making such a state altogether fit and necessary. 
 7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to fallen and 
 corrupt creatures. 
 — The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed. 
 — Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the other; and of a 
 severer sort. 
 
 II. The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we need. 
 
 1. Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical knowledge, <fec. 
 
 very different from a mere speculative knowledge of our liability to vice 
 and misery. 
 
 2. Our experience in this world, with right views and practice, may leave 
 
 eternal impressions for good. 
 3* Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue, must, from the very 
 make of our nature, form habits of virtue, and a more intense virtuous 
 principle. 
 4. Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and violent temptations, is 
 a continued act of virtue, and that in a higher degree than if the seduction 
 were transient and weak. 
 5* Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost essential to discipline and 
 improvement. 
 1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no difficulty, but agree 
 with our inclinations, may be done merely from inclination, and so not 
 be really virtuous. 
 2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty, virtuousness is 
 increased, and confirmed into a habit. 
 Objec. 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be overtasked, so may our 
 
 moral. 
 Ana. This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not confute the argument. 
 In general, it holds good. All that is intended to be proved is, that this 
 world is intended to be a state of improvement, and is fitted for it. 
 1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving, require a 
 
 trying measure of attention, which some will not submit to. 
 2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice: but this vicious- 
 ness of many is the very thing which makes the world a virtuous 
 discipline to good men. The ivhole end in placing mankind as they 
 4 
 
6h CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 are ■we know not; but these things are evident — the virtues of soma 
 are exercised : — and so exercised as to be improved : and improved 
 beyond what they would be in a perfectly virtuous community. 
 S.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no proof that their 
 improvement was not intended. Of seeds and animals not one in a 
 million comes to perfection ; yet such as do, evidently answer an end 
 for -which they were designed. The appearance of icaste in regard to 
 seeds, &o. is just as unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents. 
 
 Objec. 2. Eectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the discipline of 
 self-love. 
 
 Ans. Obedience is obedience, though prompted by hope or fear: and a course 
 of such obedience, forms a habit of it : and distinct habits of various 
 virtues, by repressing inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c. 
 require. 
 Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God's authority, and self-interest, are 
 coincident; and each, separately, a just principle. To begin a good 
 life from either of them, and persist, produces that very character 
 which corresponds to our relations to God, and secures happiness. 
 
 ObJec. 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, and produced by it, are 
 not wanted to qualify us for a state of haj^piness. 
 
 Ans. Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive submission is essential to 
 right character. Prosperity itself begets extravagant desires ; and 
 imagination may produce as much discontent as actual condition. 
 Hence, though we may not need patieitce in heaven, we shall need that 
 temper which is formed by patience. 
 Self-love would always coincide with God's commands, when our interest 
 was rightly understood ; but it is liable to error. Therefore, habits of 
 resignation are necessary, for all creatures; and the proper discipline 
 for resignation is affliction. 
 
 Objec. 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have been avoided 
 by making us at once, what we are intended to become. 
 
 Ans. What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to do. God's natural 
 government is arranged not to save us from trouble or danger, but to 
 enable and incline us to go through them. It is as natural for us to 
 seek means to obtain things, as it is to seek the things ; and in worldly, 
 things we are left to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so 
 better our condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the 
 advantage. 
 Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to a future 
 state. 
 
 III. This stale of discipline may be necessary for the display of 
 character. 
 
 1. Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or pai-t of it, and in manj 
 
 ways which we know not, 
 
 2. It may be a means in disposing of men according to character. 
 3* And of showing creation that they are so disposed of. 
 
 4. Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to the genera? 
 course of things considered in this chapter. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOaY. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT. 
 
 Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold 
 the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature. 
 
 The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Chris- 
 tianity teaches. 
 
 To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; 
 and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused. 
 
 I. Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and 
 Governor of the world. 
 
 1. It does not exclude design and deliberation. 
 
 1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness. 
 
 — Necessity does not account for the existence of any thing, but is only a 
 circumstance relating to its origin. Instance the case of a house: 
 the fatalist admits that it had a builder, and the only question would 
 be, was he obliged to build it as he did ? 
 2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say it exists by 
 necessity must mean it had a maker, who acted by necessity: for 
 necessity is only an abstract notion, and can do nothing. 
 3.) We say God exists by neccss^tjs because we intuitively discern that there 
 must be an infinite Being, prior to all causes; but we cannot say that 
 every thing so exists. The fact that many changes in nature are pro- 
 duced by man's contrivance is a proof of this. 
 4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by necessity an agent 
 
 acting necessarily, he is obliged to mean this. 
 5.) And it also follows that a thing's being done by necessity does not exclude 
 design. 
 2* It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion. 
 . 1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own principles, — viz. : that 
 he cannot do otherwise than he does; and is not subject to praise or 
 blame. 
 (It might be asked, would he, if possessed of common sense, so educate 
 
 his child?) 
 — The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would soon prove 
 
 a pest, and go to destruction. 
 ^He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach him that he 
 
 toas accountable. 
 — He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine was wrong, 
 or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, and misapplied it. 
 2,) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be found equally 
 
 fallacious ; e.g. that he need not take care of his life. 
 3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom. 
 
 — Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience. ^ 
 
 —The constitution of things is as if we were free. 
 
40 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we apply it to life, 
 always misleads us ; how, then, can we be sure it would not mislead us 
 with respect to future interests ? 
 5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the supposition of free- 
 dom, they are just as conclusive on the supposition of necessity. 
 3. It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a character. 
 
 1,) It does not hinder ua from having a will and a character; from being 
 
 cruel, or benevolent, or just, <fec. 
 2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally excuses the 
 punisJiment of crime; for if it destroys the sin of the one, it destroys 
 the sin of the other. 
 3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows that we can- 
 not rid ourselves of the notion of justice and injustice. 
 Objec. If necessity be reconcilable with the character of God, as portrayed in 
 Christianity, does it not destroy the proof that he has that character ; 
 and so destroy the proofs of religion ? 
 An8. No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the results of our con- 
 duct. God's government is that of a father and a magistrate; and his 
 natural rule of government must be veracity and justice. We shall 
 proceed to show that, 
 
 II. Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion. 
 
 1. It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes. 
 
 1.) He has given us a moral facult}', by which we discern between actions, 
 
 and approve or disapprove, &c. 
 2.) This implies a rxde, a peculiar kind of rule; i.e. one from which we 
 
 cannot depart without being self-condemned. 
 3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God's laws, with sanctions. It not 
 
 only raises a sense of duty, but a sense of security in obeying, and 
 
 danger in disobeying; and this is an explicit sanction. 
 4.) God's government must conform to the nature he has given us; and we 
 
 must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow virtue, and misery 
 
 vice. 
 6.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of keeping up the 
 
 sense of this government. 
 6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of proof. 
 
 — The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not from what 
 might appear to us to be fit, but from what his actions tell us he 
 wills. 
 
 2, Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if true, does not 
 
 affect. 
 1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural religion, but 
 ignorant of history, and of the present state of mankind, he would 
 inquire: 
 — How this religion came? 
 — How far the belief of it extended? 
 
 — If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a deduction 
 of reason, then, though its evidences from reason would not be i^u* 
 paired, its history would furnish no further proof. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 4i 
 
 2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary, 
 
 — That essentially it had been professed in all countries. 
 
 — And can be traced up through all ages. 
 
 — And was not reasoned out, but revealed. 
 3.) These things are of great weight. 
 
 — Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common sense of 
 mankind. 
 
 — And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the mind. 
 
 — The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its being 
 revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned. 
 J)arly pretences to revelation indicate some original real one from which 
 
 they were copied. 
 
 — The history of revelation is as old as history itself. 
 
 —Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is no pre- 
 sumption. 
 
 — And indicates a revelation prior to the examination of the book said 
 to contain it; and independent of all considerations of its being 
 corrupted, or darkened by fables. 
 • It is thus apparent that the external evidence of religion is considerable} 
 
 and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity. 
 
 1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule. 
 1.) We are all liable to prejudice. 
 
 2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded. 
 3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment. 
 
 2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof. 
 
 Objec. Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may be overbalanced by 
 greater probabilities : much more by demonstration. Now, as the 
 doctrine of necessity must be true, it cannot be that God governs us 
 as if we were free when he knows we are not. 
 Ana. This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is not to be evaded, — 
 viz.: that the whole constitution and course of things shows this 
 reasoning to be false, be the fallacy where it may. 
 The doctrine of freedom shows where, — viz. : in supposing ourselves neces- 
 sary agents when in fact we are free. 
 Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently lies in denying 
 that necessary agents are accountable; for that they are rewarded and 
 punished is undeniable. 
 
 vONCLiJSiON. — It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that God will 
 not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct, nor 
 destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, necessity, practically, ia 
 
 4* 
 
42 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 
 
 Moral government, as a fact, has now been considered; it remains for ua 
 to remove objections against its wisdom and goodness. A thing Dving true 
 does not prove it to be good. 
 
 In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. But, if 
 a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it credible that it is 
 a scheme or system, and that man's comprehension of it is necessarily so 
 limited, as to be inadequate to determine its injustice. 
 
 This we shall find to be the case. 
 Doctrine. On the supposition that God exercises moral government, 
 
 THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TEACHES THAT IT MUST BE A SCHEME, 
 AND ONE QUITE BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION. 
 
 I. The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by 
 analogy, that moral government is a scheme. 
 
 1. The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to individuals, 
 
 species to species, events to events ; and all these both immediate and 
 remote. 
 
 2. This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the future; including 
 
 all creatures, actions, and events. 
 1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence on some 
 further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole account of 
 any one thing. 
 2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be necessary to others, 
 of the greatest importance. 
 3* If such is God's natural government, it is credible that such is his moral 
 government. 
 1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme. 
 
 — One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable kingdom subserves 
 
 the animal, and our animal organization subserves our mental. 
 —Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to have 
 
 reference to a general plan. 
 —There is evidently a previous adjustment. 
 
 • The periods, &c. for trying men. 
 
 • The instruments of justice. 
 
 • The kinds of retribution. 
 
 2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is known to 
 
 us : therefore no objections against any part can be insisted on. 
 3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in arguing against 
 religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to objections against 
 religion, we proceed to show. 
 — Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been prevented by 
 repeated interpositions ; or that more good might have been so pro- 
 duced ; which would be the utmost that could be said : still, 
 —Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections arising 
 from apparent disorders in the world. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 43 
 
 — The government of the world might bo good, even on those supposi 
 
 tions ; for at most they could but suggest that it might be beHer. 
 — At any rate, they are mere assertions. 
 
 — Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach, of supposi- 
 tions palpably impossible,'which all do not see to be so : nor any, 
 at first sight. 
 4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to all objections 
 against the divine government. 
 — An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected with 
 any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered by our 
 ignorance. 
 — But when the objection is made against an act related to other and 
 
 unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer. 
 — Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render the act 
 not only good, but good in the highest degree. 
 II. Consider some particular things, in the natural government of 
 God, the like of which we may infer, hy analogy, to he con- 
 tained in his moral government. 
 1. Xo ends are accomplished without means. 
 
 1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable results. 
 
 2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but experience. 
 
 3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected contrary 
 
 results. 
 4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected against God's 
 
 moral government, produce good. 
 5.) It is evident that our not seeing how the means work good, or their 
 seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no presumption against their 
 fitness to work good. 
 8.) They may not only be fit, but the only means of ultimate good. 
 Objec. Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote virtue, and our 
 suffering for sin be better than if we were restrained by force, yet it 
 would have been better if evil had not entered the world. 
 Ana. It is granted that though sinful acts may produce benefits, to refrain 
 from them would produce more. We have curative pains, yet pain is 
 not better than health. 
 3. Natural government is carried on by general laws. 
 
 1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is because there 
 are general laws. They enable us to forecast for the procurement of 
 good. 
 2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all irregularities, or 
 
 remedy them. 
 3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders arising 
 under them, but this would have bad effects. 
 — Encouraging improvidence. 
 — Leaving us no rule of life. 
 
 — Every interposition would have distant effects : so that we could not 
 guess what would be the whole result. 
 . If it be replied that those distant effects might also be corrected 
 by direct interpositions— this is only talking at random. 
 
44 CONSPECTUS or the analogy. 
 
 Objec, If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes, we are tod 
 ignorant to understand the proofs of religion. 
 
 Ans. 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but partial ignorance 
 does not. We may, in various degrees, know a man's character, and 
 the way he is likely to pursue certain ends; and yet not know how he 
 onrfht to act to gain those ends. In this case objections to his mode 
 of pursuing ends may be answered by our ignorance, though that be 
 docs act in a certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have 
 evidence of God's character and aims, and yet not be competent judges 
 as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the difficulties 
 of religion, but no objection to religion itself. 
 
 Ans. 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of religion, as well as the 
 objections, yet is it undeniable that moral obligations remain un- 
 affected by our ignorance of the consequences of obedience or viola- 
 tion. The consequences of vice and virtue may not be fully known, 
 yet it is credible that they may be such as religion declares : and this 
 credibility is an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin. 
 
 ^n«. 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are not equally valid 
 against the proofs of it. 
 [Answers rehearsed.] 
 
 Ans. 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based on our ignorance, 
 are really not so, but on what analogy teaches concerning our igno- 
 rance, — viz. : that it renders us incompetent judges. They are based 
 . on experience, and what we do knoic ; so that to credit religion is to 
 trust to experience, and to disregard it is the contrary. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 1. The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this life as part of a 
 larger plan of things. 
 1.) AVhether we are connected with the distant parts of the universe, is 
 uncertain ; but it is very clear we are connected, more or less, with 
 present, past, and future. 
 2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but progressive; 
 and one equally incomprehensible, whether we regard the present, past, 
 or future. 
 2* This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion does : for 
 it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature came into existence 
 without a Creator, as that there should be a Creator: and as wonderful 
 that the Creator should act without any rule or scheme, as that he should 
 act with one ; or that he should act by a bad rule, rather than a right-eous 
 one. 
 
 3, Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and character of the 
 
 Author of nature, is just and good. 
 
 4. Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and controls it as 
 
 he does, and has assigned us our part and lot. 
 5* Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot, without reflection?, 
 but creatures endued with reason, can hardly avoid reflecting whittier v/o 
 go, and what is the scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselvef?. 
 [Here follows a recapitulation of the book.] 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 45 
 
 PART n. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 IMPORTANCE OP CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 Every one must admit that we need a revelation. Few, if any, could reason 
 out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is no probability 
 that they would. Such as might, would still feel the want of revelation. To 
 say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild as to say all are happy. 
 
 No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of small 
 importance. 
 
 If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his reasons 
 for giving it; and also that those reasons no longer exist; at least in our case. 
 This we cannot know. 
 
 The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it 
 
 I. As a republication of natural religion. 
 
 1. It gives the moral system of the universe. 
 1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that 
 — Jehovah created all things. 
 — governs all things. 
 
 — Virtue is his law. 
 
 — Mankind will be judged according to character. 
 2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively. 
 3.) With vastly more clearness ; e.g. the doctrines of a future state : danger 
 
 of sin : efficacy of repentance. 
 4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from the world by 
 peculiar institutions. 
 Ohjec. The perversions of Christianity, and the little good it has done. 
 Ana. 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has done less good. 
 
 2. The benefits of Christianity are not small. 
 
 3. The evils ascribed to it, are not its effects. Things are to be judged 
 
 by their genuine tendencies. 
 
 4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces acquiescence. 
 
 5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is bound to instruct 
 and persuade others. 
 
 II. As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason. 
 
 1, A mode of salvation for the ruined. 
 
 *Z» I'uties unknown before. 
 
 3. Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost. 
 
 1.) Hence the form of baptism. 
 
 2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our relation* to 
 them. 
 1. The manner of external worship. 
 
46 CONSPECTUS or the analogy. 
 
 III. The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity. 
 
 !• Those who think natural religion sufficient, must admit that Christianity id 
 highly important. 
 
 2. Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious regard to him is 
 
 an evident obligation. 
 
 3. These relations being real, there is no reason to think that our neglect of 
 
 behaving suitably to them, will not be attended with the same kind of 
 consequences as follow the neglect of duties made known by reason. 
 
 4. If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and if we need 
 
 God's Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a slight thing 
 whether we make use of the means for obtaining such assistance? 
 
 5. Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it is most rash and 
 
 presumptuous to treat it lightly. 
 
 REMARKS. 
 
 1. The distinction between positive and moral obligations. 
 
 1.) For moral precepts we can see the reason: for positive we cannot. 
 
 2.) Moral duties are such prior to command j positive duties tvie such because 
 
 commanded. 
 3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, d«es not make it moral or 
 
 positive. 
 
 2. The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive. 
 1.) Both have the nature of moral commands. 
 
 2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral. 
 — Positive institutions are means to moral ends. 
 — Ends are more excellent than means. 
 
 — Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as proceeding from 
 moral principle. 
 3.) Both moral and positive duties are revealed, and so are on a level; but 
 the moral law is also interwoven with our very nature, and so its 
 precepts must prevail when the two interfere. 
 
 3. There is less necessity for determining their relative authority, than some 
 
 suppose. 
 1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion, nothing can give 
 
 us acceptance with God, without moral virtue. 
 2 ) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties. 
 
 3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light of positive 
 institutions, because less important than moral. 
 — We are bound to obey all God's commands. 
 
 — A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God, creates moral 
 obligation, in the strictest sense. 
 
 COXCLUSION. 
 
 This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the 
 Scriptures. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 4T 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 
 
 Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions 
 against it. 
 
 The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against 
 miracles. 
 
 They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events. 
 
 I. Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of 
 
 Christianity, 
 
 1. It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not the discovery of, 
 
 reason, or of experience. 
 
 2. Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it contains things unlike 
 
 the apparent course of nature. 
 1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be just like what 
 
 is the course of nature in this little world. 
 2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see many things 
 greatly unlike. 
 3* If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of things, miraculoua, 
 still that does not make it improbable. 
 
 II. There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should 
 
 now call miraculous, being made, at the begiiining of the 
 
 world, 
 1. There was then no course of nature, as to this world. 
 
 2* Whether man then received a revelation involves a question not of miracles, 
 but of fact. 
 
 3. Creation was a very different exertion of power from that which rules the 
 
 world, now it is made. 
 4r. Whether the power of forming stopped when man was made; or went on, 
 
 and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as to the degree or 
 
 extent, to which a power was exerted. 
 5* There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing man had a 
 
 revelation when created. 
 6. All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts to a real and 
 
 material proof. 
 
 III. There is no presumption against miracles, or a miracidous revelu' 
 
 tion, after the course of nature was settled, 
 1. Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some parallel case. 
 *Z, This would require us to know the history of some other world. 
 3* Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the presumption would 
 be very precarious. 
 To be more jinrticular, 
 !• There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is proved — which yel 
 is overcome by almost any proof. 
 
48 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 * 
 
 — Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, involves only 
 the degree of presumption, (not whether the presumption is peculiar 
 to miracles,) and whether that degree is such as to render them 
 incredible. 
 
 2. If we leave out religion, we are in total darkness as to the cause or circum- 
 
 stances on which the course of nature depends. 
 
 ^Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and reasons for 
 miraculous interpositions of Providence. 
 
 3. Taking in religion, there are distinct reasons for miracles; to afford 
 
 additional instruction ; to attest the truth of instruction. 
 It, Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with uncommon; 
 earthquakes, pestilence, &c. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible. 
 
 2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them. 
 
 3. There are no presumptions against them, ^ecu^^ar to them, as distinguished 
 
 from other unusual phenomena. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ODR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION 
 FROM GOD. 
 
 Beside the objectors to the evidences of Christianity, there are many who 
 object to its nature. They say it is not full enough : has in it foolish things : 
 gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known : not 
 Well arranged : figurative language, &c. 
 
 It is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would 
 show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections 
 against its evidences, are frivolous : as will now be shown. 
 
 Let the student look to the force of the proofs, rather than any consequences 
 which may be drawn from them. 
 
 I. The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition 
 to the material laws of the world. 
 
 1. If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide and form one 
 whole, then our inability to criticise the system of nature, renders it 
 credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace. 
 
 'Z» Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior to expe- 
 rience. 
 
 3. Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion. 
 
 4, If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the general laws of 
 
 his government, he is equally incompetent to judge when and how far 
 those laws should be suspended, or deviated from. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 49 
 
 II. We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted. 
 
 Whether to every man, or to some for others ; or what mode 
 or degree of proof should be given ; or whether the know- 
 ledge should be given gradually or suddenly. 
 
 1. We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be given 
 
 by revelation. 
 
 2. Nor how far, nor in what way, Ood should qualify men to transmit any 
 
 revelation he might make. 
 3* Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or doubtful. 
 4r, Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it. 
 
 5. Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be said that if not in 
 
 writing it would not have answered its purpose: I ask, what purpose? 
 Who knows what purposes would best suit God's general government? 
 
 6, All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation 
 
 as unsuitable. 
 
 III. Hence the oj^ly question, concerning the truth of revelation is, 
 
 whether it is a revelation. 
 
 1. No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a revelation. 
 
 2. It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs. 
 
 3. Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed, it still 
 
 should control our conduct, 
 
 IV. Modes of arguing, lohich are perfectly just, in relation to other 
 
 books, are not so as to the Bible. 
 
 1. We are competent judges of common books, but not of Scripture. 
 2* Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense. 
 
 3. In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external proof; but in 
 regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are improbabilities. 
 1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, will imagine 
 
 they find improbabilities. 
 2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things. 
 
 — It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that man should 
 be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly 
 bodies, than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease, which 
 much more nearly concerns him. 
 — Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, even when 
 thinking of something else, which we had been vainly trying to 
 discover for years. 
 — Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every man may be 
 
 a deceiver. 
 —Or that brute instinct should ever bo superior to reason. 
 
 V. Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, 
 
 as distinguished from objections against its evidence. 
 
 For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic ag«i 
 ttsed their miraculous gifts. 
 1. This does not prove the acts not miraculous, 
 D 5 
 
50 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 2. The person having any such gift, -would have the same power over it which 
 
 he would have over any other ability, and might pervert it. 
 3* To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain its use, 
 is but saying why did not God give a higher degree of miraculoua 
 endowment? As to which we are not competent judges. 
 
 4. God does not confer his natural gifts, (memory, eloquence, knowledge, <fec.) 
 
 only on those who are prudent and make the best use of them. 
 
 5. Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in the happiest 
 
 manner. 
 YI. There is a resemblance behveen religion and nature in several 
 other respects. 
 1. In both, common and necessary things, are plain ; but to " go on to perfec- 
 tion" in either, requires exact and laborious study. 
 2* The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, are the same 
 in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought about, 
 1.) By the progress of learning and liberty. 
 2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the generality. 
 
 3. It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should be small; for 
 
 the natural world has laid open to inspection, for thousands of years, and 
 yet onl}' lately are any great discoveries made. 
 
 4. Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of opening and 
 
 ascertaining Bible truth. 
 Ohjec. The cases are not parallel ; for natural knowledge is of no consequen<;e, 
 
 compared to spiritual. 
 .Ahs. 1. The cases are parallel; for natural knowledge is as important to 
 our natural well-being, as spiritual knowledge is to our spiritual 
 well-being. 
 Ans. 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of other analogies, 
 which show that God does not dispense his ^ifts according to our 
 notions of their value. 
 Ohjec. 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of men, why not sooner 
 
 introduced, and more widely diffused ? 
 
 Ans. The objection is just as strong against the natural sciences. Nay, if the 
 
 light of nature and of revelation are both from the same source, we 
 
 might expect that revelation would have been introduced and diffused 
 
 just as it is. 
 
 1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not known at all, nor to 
 
 any without care and study. 
 2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated with derision, and 
 
 the use rejected by thousands whom they might have cured. 
 3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so made to produce 
 
 more disease. 
 4.) Their benefit may come very slowly. 
 6.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual. 
 (&.) They may be so disagreeable that many will not submit to use them, even 
 
 with the prospect of a cure. 
 7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if wo were re^dy 
 to take it. 
 
 All this reasoning may bo applied to Christianity. 
 
CONSPECTUS OP THE ANALOGY. 51 
 
 VII. Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its con- 
 taining things we should not have expected, we will now 
 consider the objections against its morality. 
 
 1. Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things contrary to 
 
 justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are taught by natural religion. 
 But no such objections are advanced, except such as would equally 
 condemn the constitution of nature. 
 
 2. There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, which would be 
 
 immoral, but for the precept. The precept changes the nature of the 
 action. 
 3* None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never commanded to 
 cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, <fec. 
 
 4. God may command the taking of life or property because these are At*. 
 
 5. The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable to be perverted by 
 
 the wicked to their own horrid purposes ; and to mislead the weak. But 
 such objections do not lie against revelation, as such, but against the very 
 notion of relifjion aa a trial. 
 
 6. The sum of the whole is, objections against the scheme of Christianity 
 
 do not affect its truth ; since there are no objections against its morality. 
 Hence objections against it, aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objec- 
 tions against the eoidence, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, 
 [i.e. ch. viL] 
 
 CHAPTER rV.* 
 
 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDETISTOOD. 
 
 In the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a 
 revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections. 
 
 This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them. 
 
 But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good, 
 or credible. 
 
 It was a suflBcient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course 
 of nature, that it was a scheme, imperfectly comprehended. 
 
 If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer. 
 
 I. Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension. 
 
 !• Ood's general plan is to conductr'things gradually, so that, finally, every one 
 
 shall receive what he deserves. 
 3, Christianity is a partieidar arrangement, under this general plan : is a part 
 
 of it, and conduces to its completion. 
 3. It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy. 
 1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man. 
 
 2 ) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were preparatory to it, 
 3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus Christ came. 
 
 * [In studying this cnapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.] 
 
52 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy. 
 b.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, judge tha 
 world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c. 
 4:. Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme. 
 
 5. We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very much unrevealed. 
 
 6. Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging as to the whole 
 
 system of religion, as we are as to the whole system of nature. 
 
 II. In both material and spiritual things, means are used to 
 
 accomplish ends. 
 
 1. Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know its object 
 
 and end. 
 
 2. Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so. 
 
 III. Christianity is carried on hy general laivs, no less than nature. 
 
 1« Why do we say there are laios of nature? 
 
 1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many things, e.g. 
 • Pestilence. • Storms. • Earthquakes. • Diversities of 
 
 human powers. • Association of ideas. 
 2.) Hence we call many things accidental, which we know are not matters 
 
 of chance, but are subject to general laws. 
 3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their general laws. 
 4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy. 
 
 2. Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with God's general 
 
 laws of tvisdom. These laws may be unknown to us ; but no more so than 
 those by which some die as soon as born, or live to old age, or have 
 superior understandings, &c. 
 
 3. We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of nature as a 
 
 scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such. 
 1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would be liJcelg to be 
 
 a scheme. 
 2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an arrangement to 
 
 accomplish ends, there would of course seem to us, in it, irregularities; 
 
 just as we see in nature. 
 3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the same manner 
 
 as objections against the other. 
 
 Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to Christianity 
 as a matter of fact, and in this, as a general question of loisdom and goodness, 
 the next thing is to discuss objections in particular. 
 
 As one of these is directed against the scheme, as just now described, it will 
 be considered here. 
 
 Objec. Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; just such as 
 men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged to adopt, in 
 their designs. 
 Ans. ].) God uses just such complex arrangements in the natural world. The 
 mystery is quite as great in nature as in grace. 
 
CONSPECTUS OP THE ANALOGY. 53 
 
 2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends. 
 3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but progressive. 
 4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; e.g. animals, vege- 
 tables, geological periods, &g. 
 6.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining another. 
 6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM. 
 
 Nothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to 
 Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation. 
 
 I. Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of others. 
 1. If 60 in the natural world, why not in the spiritual? 
 
 2* The objection therefore is not only against Christ's mediation, but all 
 adediation. 
 
 II. We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by 
 
 whom he should punish. 
 
 !• Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a broken limb 
 
 is of falling from a precipice. 
 S* This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and giving it to 
 
 nature ; ^it is only distinguishing ordinary events from miraculous. 
 
 III. In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad 
 
 consequences of actions do not always folloio. 
 
 1. "We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he permits it, 
 
 and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect remedies for it. 
 1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be prevented 
 
 by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance. 
 2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad consequences of 
 
 our misdeeds. 
 S.) Still moi-e if assisted. 
 
 2. It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but that it is so, shows 
 
 compassion, as distinguished from goodness. 
 
 3. The course of nature affords many instances of such compassion. 
 
 4. Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous consequences 
 
 of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some cases. 
 
 5. If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which we scarcely call 
 
 vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend that the bad consequences 
 will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is greater. 
 
 6. A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a religion, is incomparably 
 
 more reprehensible than the mere neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life. 
 T.. As the eS"ects of worldly imprudence and vice are often misery, ruin, and 
 even death, no one can say what may be the consequences of blasphemy, 
 contempt of God, and final impenitence. 
 5* 
 
54 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 8. Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great wickedness 
 
 can possibly be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right. 
 
 9. Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for pardon. 
 
 IV. There is no prohahility that any thing we could do alone, would 
 entirely preve7it the effects of our irregularities. 
 
 1. We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it should be fit 
 
 to remit punishment. 
 "i. Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should not know how 
 
 to prevent them. 
 3. Vice impairs men's abilities for helping themselves. 
 4r. Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would not have 
 
 been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our future interests? 
 5* In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not repair old errors, 
 
 why should it as to future things ? 
 
 6. Were it so in all cases it would be contrary to all our notions of government. 
 
 7. It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases, it would be 
 
 so, even if we knew it might in some cases. 
 
 8. The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to atonement, is contrary 
 
 to the general sense of mankind; as shown by the prevalence of pro- 
 pitiatory sacrifices. 
 
 V. In this state of apprehensioji, awakened by the light of nature, 
 revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of 
 pardon and safety. 
 
 1. Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin. 
 
 2. Declares the world to be in a state of ruin. 
 
 3. That repentance alone will not secure pardon. 
 
 4. That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition. 
 
 5. That God's moral government is compassionate, as well as his natural 
 
 government. 
 
 6. That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to save men. 
 
 7. All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless degradation. But 
 
 it is not Christianity which puts him so. All philosophy and history 
 show man to be degraded and corrupt. 
 
 VI. Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim, testimony of the 
 light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory 
 sacrifice. 
 
 1. He is "that prophet." 
 
 1.) Declared the will of God. 
 
 2.) Published anew the law of nature. 
 
 2.) Taught with authority. 
 
 4.) Revealed the right manner of worship, 
 
 5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance. 
 
 6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments. 
 
 7.) Set us a perfect example. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 56 
 
 2* He has a kingdom -R-hicli is not of this world. 
 1.) Founded a church. 
 2.) Governs it. 
 
 3.) Of it, all who obey him are members. 
 4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever. 
 3. He is a propitiatory sacrifice. 
 
 1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly told. 
 
 2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain. 
 
 3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him produce his 
 
 claim to it. 
 4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their creed; and 
 
 regard Christ only as a teacher. 
 6.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about how it was 
 procured. 
 
 VII. We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, lohether a mediator 
 
 was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his 
 office. 
 
 1. We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted. 
 2< Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary. 
 
 3. The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as indifferent whether 
 
 he punishes the innocent or guilty. 
 1.) We see, in this world, the innocent forced to suffer for the faults of 
 
 the guilty. 
 2.) But Christ suffered voluntarily. 
 
 4. Though, finally, every one shall receive according to his own deserts; 
 
 yet, during the progress of God's scheme, vicarious sufferings may be 
 necessary. 
 1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it costs ua 
 
 suffering and toil. 
 2.) One person's sufferings often tend to relieve another. 
 5* Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the authority of God's 
 
 laws, and to deter men from sin. 
 6. Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not objections to Christianity, 
 
 but to the whole course of nature. 
 T. The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than saying that a 
 divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, because the objector does 
 not see it to be so ; though he must own he is no judge, and could not 
 understand why it should be necessary, if it were so ! 
 
 VIII. We have no reason to expect the same information touching 
 
 God's conduct, as we have in relation to our oivn duty. 
 
 1. God instructs us by experience. 
 
 IS. This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an infinitely small 
 part of his providence. 
 
 3. The things not understood involve God's appointment, and Christ's exe- 
 cution ; but what is required of us, we are clearly informed. 
 
 4:. Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious. 
 
5(5 CONSPECTUS or the analogy. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 STJPrOSED LACK OP PROOF OF REVELATION-, AND ITS WANT OF rNIVERSALITT. 
 
 It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that ita 
 evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed. 
 
 But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any 
 favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly 
 the same for everybody else. 
 
 Such a notion, all analogy contradicts. 
 
 I. Hen act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence. 
 
 1. It is often absolutely impossible to say which of two modes of acting will 
 
 give most pleasure or profit. 
 
 2. If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, satiety, ill 
 
 health, kc. might produce, so as to destroy our pleasure. 
 
 3. We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off". 
 
 4. Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we 
 
 adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter us. 
 
 5. We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our passions, &,c. 
 
 6. Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, even when the 
 
 probabilities of success are against them. 
 
 II. As to the light of Christianity not being universal. 
 
 1, Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures 
 
 of the same species. 
 2* Yet it is certain that God governs. 
 
 3. We may prudently or imprudently use our good things. 
 
 4. The Jewish religion was not universal. 
 
 5. If it be intended that Christianity should be a small light, shining in a 
 
 great and wide-spread darkness, it would be perfectly uniform with 
 other parts of God's providence. 
 
 6. If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as to cause 
 
 thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some countries; and if, 
 where it is the purest, some learn much less from it than they might, there 
 are manifest parallels in God's natural dispensations. 
 
 7. No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his circumstances. 
 
 8. Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he can, and to 
 
 instruct his neighbor. 
 9» If revelation uere universal, in extent and degree, different understandings, 
 educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon 
 make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present. 
 
 III. Practical reflections. 
 
 First. That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all, 
 
 may be part of our probation. 
 1* It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Juat as ii 
 the case in coir'Tion affairs. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 57 
 
 2. Intellectual inaf.tention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disoLe* 
 
 dience after conviction of the truth. 
 Secondly. If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation. 
 1. If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest 
 
 favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he oughv 
 
 not to regard that person as he would if there were no reason to think so. 
 2* So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity may te true, we 
 
 are as much bound to examine, &c. as we would be bound to obey, if we 
 
 knew it was true. 
 3* Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much diflfer- 
 
 ence as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced 
 
 and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in 
 
 kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same. 
 4r» Doubts presuppose some evidence, belief more, and certainty more still. 
 
 Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things. 
 5. It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a 
 
 corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering. 
 Thirdly. Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint, 
 than difficulties in practising it. 
 
 1. They constitute a wholesome discipline. 
 
 1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself. 
 
 2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties. 
 
 2. In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of 
 
 religion is the princij^al trial. A full conviction of its truth would 
 
 constrain some to obedience. 
 Fourthly. The difficulties may be in the objector rather than in the religion. 
 1. Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed. 
 2 Secretly wishes religion not to be true. 
 3» Looks at objections rather than replies. 
 4. Treats the subject ludicrously. 
 Fifthly. The proof of Christianity is level to common men. 
 
 1. They are capable of being convinced of the existence of God, and of their 
 
 moral accountability. 
 
 2. And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the fulfilment of 
 
 prophecy. 
 3* If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are capable of understand- 
 ing the proof. 
 4, If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or cannot examine 
 them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just as they do as to the 
 sciences. 
 Objec. Our directions should be too plain to admit of doubt; like those of an 
 
 earthly master. 
 Ans. The earthly master only wants his work done, and is careless as to the 
 state of the heart; but as the whole of morality consists in the state of 
 the heart, the cases are not parallel. 
 Finally. The credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great 
 as the credibility of there being any religion. Our probation may 
 be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty, and then 
 •whether we choose to do it. 
 
58 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what is 
 best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves doubts: 
 and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when there may 
 be doubt, is often fatal. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 POSITIVE EVIDENCES OP CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of Christianity, 
 and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to consider the positive evi- 
 dence of its truth ; i.e. what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence. 
 
 There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or 
 prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, direct 
 and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now consider 
 the proofs from miracles and prophecy. ^ 
 
 I. Miracles. 
 
 1. Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles described, as for 
 
 common events. 
 1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as speeches are by 
 
 historians and poets put into the mouths of heroes. 
 2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by various writers, 
 
 from that day to this. 
 3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events ; and the miracles 
 
 alone, can account for those events. 
 4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, and their reception 
 
 in the world, is that the things really happened. 
 5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if doubtful. 
 
 2. Paul's Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what can attach to 
 
 mere history. 
 1.) Additional. His evidence is quite detached. He received the gospel not 
 
 in common with the other apostles, but separately, and direct from 
 
 Christ, after his ascension. 
 2.) Peculiar. He speaks of Christ's miracles and those of others incidentally, 
 
 as familiar facts, fully believed by those to whom he wrote. 
 
 3. Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, and was so 
 
 received by great numbers, at the time and on the spot; which is the 
 case with no other religion. 
 1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground. 
 2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such fearful 
 
 sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these miracles. 
 3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of evidence as 
 
 if they had testified to the truth of the miracles in writing. 
 4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to inform themselves. 
 5.) It is a sort of evidence distinct from direct history, though of ^bo sam» 
 nature. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 59 
 
 6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to believe against xhtii 
 interests, as these did. 
 4. It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof is to be 
 rejected; but in such an important concern we shall proceed to notice 
 some possible objections. 
 Objec. 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle follies. 
 Ana. 1. This ol>jection ignores the distinction between opinions and facts. 
 Suffering for an opinion is no proof of its truth ; but in attestation 
 of observed facts, it is proof. 
 
 2. Enthusiasm weakens testimony, it is true, even as to facts ,■ and so does 
 
 disease, t« particular instances. But when great numbers, -not weak, 
 nor negligent, afiirm that thei/ saw and heard certain things, it is the 
 fullest evidence. 
 
 3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires that the 
 
 things testified be incredible; which has not been shown, as to 
 religion, but the contrary. 
 
 4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which witnesses are liable 
 
 to enthusiasm. In common matters, we get at the truth through 
 witnesses, though influenced by party spirit, custom, humor, 
 romance, &g. &g. 
 Objec. 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the apostles 
 
 and first Christians. 
 Ans. Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in Scripture; but not 
 more in religious than in common affairs. Men in all matters deceive 
 themselves and others, in every degree, yet human testimony is good 
 ground of belief. 
 Objec. 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles. 
 Ans. Not oftener than by other pretences. 
 Objec. 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence. 
 
 Alls. 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles, the evidence for the 
 latter would not be imjjaired. The objection really amounts to this, 
 that evidence proved not to be good, destroys evidence which is good 
 and unconfuted ! Or to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, 
 testify, in cases not related to each other, and one is proved false, the 
 other must not be believed ! 
 
 2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is incompetent, 
 
 or misled. 
 
 3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that Christianity was 
 
 too serious a matter to allow the first converts to be careless as to its 
 evidence ; and also that their religion forbid them to deceive others. 
 
 II ^5 to the evidence from prophecy. 
 
 1. Obscurity as to part of a prophecy does not invalidate it, but is, as to us, as 
 if that part were not written, or were lost. We may not see the whole 
 prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough fulfilled to perceive in it more 
 than human foresight. 
 
 7. A long series of prophecies, all applicable to certain events, is proof that 
 such events were intended. This answers the objection that particular 
 prophecies were not intended to be applied as Christians apply them. 
 
60 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 Mythological and satirical -writings greatly resemble proi^liecy. Now "^we 
 apply a parablOj or fable, or satire, merely from seeing it capable of such 
 application. 
 So if a long series of prophecies be U2)2^licahle to the present state of the 
 
 world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that they were so intended. 
 Besides, the ancient Jews, lefore Christ, applied the prophecies to him, just 
 as Christians do now. 
 3. If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand their own pre- 
 dictions, or that their prophecies are capable of being applied to other 
 events than those to which Christians apply them, it would not abate the 
 force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those instances. 
 For, 
 1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the whole 
 meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is not 
 knowing the whole mind of the author. 
 2.) If the book is a compilation, the authors may have meanings deeper 
 than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke by inspiration, they are 
 not the authors, but the writers of prophecy, and may not have known 
 all that the Divine Spirit intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy 
 shows a foresight more than human. 
 
 This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those will 
 be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor of understanding 
 it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to allow an argument its due 
 weight; or who wilfully discard the whole investigation. 
 
 We now proceed to the general argument embracing both direct and cir- 
 cumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and cannot 
 be expected here ; but something should be said, especially as most questions 
 of difiiculty, in practical afiiiirs, are settled by evidence arising from circum- 
 stances which confirm each other. 
 
 The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring himself 
 to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and disclosing a 
 plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising them to perfect and 
 final happiness. 
 
 I. Consider this revelation as a historr/. 
 
 1. It furnishes an account of the world, as God's world. 
 
 1.) God's providence, commands, promises, and threatenings. 
 
 2.) Distinguishes God from idols. 
 
 3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors, in a world 
 
 considered as apostate and wicked. 
 4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not for their 
 
 importance as mere political events. 
 5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the world. 
 'Z, It eo-braces a vast variety of other topics; natural and moral. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOG . 61 
 
 1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism. 
 
 2.) So that douhts of its truth confirm that truth, for io this enlightened age 
 
 the claims of a book of such a nature could bo easily and finally shown 
 
 to be false, if they were so. 
 3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that Christianity has been 
 
 thus confuted. 
 
 3. It contains a minute account of God's selecting one nation for his peculiar 
 
 people, and of his dealings with them. 
 1.) Interpositions in their behalf. 
 2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled. 
 3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince ; so clearly as to raise a general 
 
 expectation, &g. 
 4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be the Savior of 
 
 the Gentiles. 
 
 4. Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his life and labors ; and 
 
 the result, in the establishment of a new religion. 
 
 II. As to the authenticity of this history. 
 
 Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not knowing 
 even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of authenticity, he 
 would find, 
 
 1. That natural religion owes its establishment to the truths contained in this 
 
 book. This no more disproves natural religion, than our learning a 
 proposition from Euclid, shows that the proposition was not true before 
 Euclid. 
 
 2. The great antiquity of revelation. 
 
 3. That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by known facts. 
 
 4. That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken suspicion of its 
 
 fidelity, 
 1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is conformable to the 
 
 manners of that age and country. 
 2.) The characters are all perfectly natural. 
 3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some of these, 
 
 taken alone, seem strange to some, in this day; but not more so than 
 
 things now occurring. 
 4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more numerous 
 
 than in other ancient books; and none of them impair the narrative. 
 
 5. That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts. 
 
 6. That the credibility of the general history, confirms the accounts of the 
 
 miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make but one statement. 
 
 7. That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews ; whose form of 
 
 government was founded on these very books of Moses; and whose 
 acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept them a distinct race. 
 
 8. That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time when the Jews 
 
 expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was prophesied, and was 
 received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied. 
 5). That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the religion of the 
 world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; and has ontinuea uU 
 now. 
 
 6 
 
()2r CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 10. That the Jewis'n government was destroyed, and the people dispersed into 
 all lands; and still for many centuries, continue to be a distinct race, 
 professing the law of Moses. If this separateness be accounted for, in 
 any way, it does not destroy the fact that it was predicted. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 1. Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations. 
 
 2. Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the world, aside from 
 
 the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history. 
 
 3. These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with each other, in 
 
 a joint view, will appear to be of great weight, and would impress one 
 who regarded them for the first time, more than they do us who have 
 been familiar with them. 
 
 4. The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to proof of some- 
 
 thing more than human in this matter. 
 1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the existence of them 
 
 cannot be. 
 2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be accidental, but 
 
 the conformity itself cannot be denied. 
 3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it cannot be said 
 
 they are nothing. Probabilities may not amount to demonstration, but 
 
 they remain probabilities. 
 
 5. Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, and judge 
 
 of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that toe/ether they 
 amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, added together, not 
 only increase evidence, but multiply it. 
 
 6. It is very well to observe objections; but it should be remembered that a 
 
 mistake on one side is far more dangerous than a mistake on the other j 
 and the safest conclusion is the best. 
 
 7. Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the evidence taken 
 
 together. Unless all its proofs be overthrown, it remains proved. If 
 no proof singly were sufficient, the whole taken together might be. 
 
 8. It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend the united force 
 
 of a whole argument. 
 
 9. Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation cannot be destroyed, 
 
 though it should be lessened. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no 
 need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn • 
 and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the luinds ot 
 those -who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be con- 
 sidered. They are these : — it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say 
 that there are as great in natural religion : — it will not make men religious to 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 63 
 
 show them that it is as important as worldly prudence, for showing that, docs 
 not make them prudent: — the justice of God in the system of religion, is not 
 proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence: — no rea^uu- 
 ing from analogy can carry full conviction : — mankind will not renounce pre- 
 sent pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which 
 a reply will now be given. 
 
 I. As to requiring a solution of all difficulties. 
 
 1* This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and the whole plan 
 
 of his government throughout eternity. 
 3. It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is disputed. We 
 
 are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician does not understand 
 
 all diseases, yet we do not despise what he does know. 
 3* It is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as 
 
 strong, not only against natural religion, but against the course of nature. 
 
 II. As to men's having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they 
 
 have for being religious. 
 
 1. If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as 
 
 they have to practise worldly prudence, then there is a reason for being 
 religious. 
 
 2. If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has the same reasons 
 
 for belief, then it has proportionally a greater claim. 
 
 3. If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then doubts as to the 
 
 success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong. Yet we constantly 
 act, even in the most important affairs, without certainty of being right. 
 
 III. As to the Justice and goodness of God in religion. 
 
 1, Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, governed as we 
 
 are ; which is a very different thing. It has been shown that if we knew 
 all things, present, past, and future, and the relations of each thing to all 
 other things, we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so : 
 and it is probable we should. 
 
 2. We do not say that objections against God's justice and goodness are 
 
 removed by showing the like objections against natural providence, but 
 
 that they are not conclusive, because they apply equally to what we know 
 
 to be facts. 
 ?. The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts. The 
 
 fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, though men may think 
 
 it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human acts, does no more to abolish 
 
 justice than it does injustice. 
 1. Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown from analogy, 
 
 the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be proved without regard 
 
 ic its quality. The reasonableness of obeying Christianity is proved.^ 
 
 if we barely prove Christianity itself to be possible. 
 H, Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, it proves 
 
 them to be credible. 
 
64 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 
 
 IV. The analogical argument does not remove doubt. 
 
 1. What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no doubt? 
 
 Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, is not agreed 
 upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our objects, is always 
 uncertain; and still more whether the objects, if accomplished, will 
 give us happiness. Yet men do not on this account refuse to make 
 exertion. 
 
 2. This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. The embracing of it 
 
 presupposes a certain degree of candor and integrity, to try which, and 
 exercise, and improve it, is its intention. Just as warning a man of 
 danger, presupposes a disposition to avoid danger. 
 
 3. Keligion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such; and would not 
 
 be such, if it compelled assent. 
 
 4. We never mean by suflBcient evidence, such an amount as necessarily 
 
 determines a man to act, but ouly such as will show an action to be 
 prudent. 
 
 V. ^45 to the small influence of the analogical argument. 
 
 1. As just observed, religion is a test, and an exercise, of character; and that 
 
 some reject it is nothing to our purpose. We are inquiring not what sort 
 of creature man is, but what he should be. This is each man's own 
 concern. 
 
 2. Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether individuals believe 
 
 or not. 
 3* Even this objection admits that religion has some weight, and of course 
 it should have some influence; and if so, there is the same reason, 
 though not so strong, for publishing it, that there would be, if it were 
 likely to have greater influence. 
 
 Further. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the 
 principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted, 
 because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and the abstract fitness 
 or unfitness of actions. The general argument is just a question of fact, and 
 is here so treated. Abstract truths are usually advanced as proof; but in this 
 work, only facts are adduced. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to 
 two right angles, is an abstract truth : but that they so appear to us, is only 
 a matter of fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which 
 determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion of an 
 abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world rewarded and 
 punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience, this 
 would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if all acknowledged this as a 
 fact, all would not see it to be right. If, instead of his doing it now, we say 
 he will do it hereafter, this too is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. 
 This fact could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but 
 without them, there has now been given a conclusive practical proof; which 
 though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, caunol 
 be answered. 
 
CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY. 65 
 
 Hence it may Le said as to the force of this treatise, 
 
 1, To sucli as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as proved on the 
 
 principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will furnish a full confirmation. 
 To such as do not admit those principles it is an original proof. 
 
 2, Those who believe will find objections removed, and those who disbelieve 
 
 will find they have no grounds for their scepticism; and a good deal 
 beside. 
 
 3, Thus though some may think too much is here made of analogy, yet there 
 
 can be no denying that the argument is real. It confirms all facts to 
 which it can be applied; and of many is the only proof. It is strong 
 on the side of religion, and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts 
 to abstract reasonings. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the classes 
 af persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and declares these who 
 reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse. 
 
^toalisenunt ^rdeJr t0 l^t |irst €^xim. 
 
 If the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not 
 before attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the consti- 
 tution and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the appli- 
 cation of them ; in which, though there is nothing but what appears 
 to me of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he 
 will observe several things, which will appear to him of very little, 
 if he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any 
 real weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the 
 proper force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy 
 considered together. 
 
 It is come, I know not how io be taken for granted, by many 
 persons, that Christianity is not st. much as a subject of inquiry; 
 but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly 
 they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point 
 among all people of discernment ; and nothing remained, but to set 
 it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way 
 of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the 
 world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not 
 taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will 
 thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is 
 of his own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing 
 in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth ; but it is certain 
 no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary. 
 The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to 
 by every one who is concerned in it. 
 
 Mar/, 1736, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demon- 
 strative by this, that it admits of degrees ; and of all variety of 
 them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest pre- 
 sumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon 
 one very slight presumption for it; because, as there may be pro- 
 babilities on both sides of a question, there may be some against 
 it; and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not 
 beget that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a 
 thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presump- 
 tion is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence ; that 
 such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral 
 certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of 
 the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the 
 lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow : but the 
 observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages 
 together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full 
 assurance that it will. 
 
 That which chiefly constitutes prohahilttT/ is expressed in the 
 word likely, i.e. like some truth,* or true event ; like it, in itself, 
 in its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances.* For 
 when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an 
 event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind's remarking 
 in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed has 
 come to pass. This observation forms, in numberless daily in- 
 stances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such 
 event has or will come to pass ; according as the observation is, 
 that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so 
 
 * Verisimile. 
 
 * [These three ways of being *' like," are very distinct from each other. The 
 first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because 
 the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an 
 analogy, in the popular sense of the term.] 
 
 67 
 
68 INTRODUCTION 
 
 far as our observation readies, come to pass at like distances of 
 time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief, 
 tbat a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature 
 and strength of a man ; that food will contribute to the preserva- 
 tion of its life, and the want of it for such a number of days, be 
 its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure of our 
 hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our ex- 
 pectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances ; 
 and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; 
 all these rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, 
 fear, expect, judge ; I say, upon our having observed the like, 
 either with respect to others or ourselves. Thus, the prince* 
 who had always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in 
 the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water's be- 
 coming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and 
 yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there 
 is no presumption at all against this : that it is supposable there 
 may be frost in England any given day in January next; pro- 
 bable that there will on some day of the month ; and that there 
 is a moral certainty, i.e. ground for an expectation without any 
 doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter. 
 
 Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect 
 kind of information ; and is to be considered as relative only to 
 beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible 
 object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be pro- 
 bable to an infinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned 
 absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But 
 to us, probability is the very guide of life. 
 
 From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or 
 such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot 
 be had, or is not seen ; if the result of examination be, that there 
 appears upon the whole, any even the lowest presumption on one 
 side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, 
 though in the lowest degree greater; this determines the ques- 
 tion, even im matters of speculation. In matters of practice, it 
 will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of 
 prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low 
 probabilit}^, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great 
 * The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability. 
 
BY THE AUTHOR. 6^ 
 
 doubt whicli is the trutli. For surely a man is as really bound 
 in prudence to do what upon the whole, according to the best of 
 his judgment, appears to be for his happiness,'' as what he cer- 
 tainly knows to be so. 
 
 Further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man 
 will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and pre- 
 sumptions than these ; such as amount to no more than showing 
 one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the 
 other : nay, such even as but amount to much less than this. 
 For numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the com- 
 mon pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal 
 sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application 
 too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and 
 where the probability or chance was greatly against his suc- 
 ceeding.* 
 
 It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the 
 foundation, and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds 
 that likeness, should beget that presumption, opinion, and full 
 conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, 
 and which it does necessarily produce in every one ; or to guard 
 against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is liable. 
 This belongs to the subject of Logic; and is a part of that sub- 
 ject which has not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed I, 
 shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, and 
 force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general heads 
 and rules ; and the whole be formed into a system. But though 
 so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated 
 of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them ; this does 
 not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, 
 that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards determin- 
 ing our judgment and our practice. Nor does it in any wise 
 cease to be of weight in those cases, because persons, either given 
 to dispute, or who require things to be stated with greater exact- 
 
 ^ [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it 
 's not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. " He that believeth not 
 shall be damned :" Mark xvi. 16. "He that believeth hath everlasting life:" 
 John iii. 36. "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness:" Rom. x. 10. 
 Belief is part of the sinner's dufT/ in submitting himself to God ; and not merely 
 a ijuestiou of prudence.] 
 
 * See Part II. chap. vi. 
 
70 INTRODUCTION 
 
 ness than our faculties appear to admit of in practical matters, 
 may find other cases in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, 
 or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies, 
 which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to 
 observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, 
 just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question 
 but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen 
 at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square. 
 
 Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen* has with 
 singular sagacity observed, that " lie icho believes the ScrfjHure 
 to hade proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may 
 tcell expect to find the same sort of dijjicidties in it^ as are found 
 in the const itution of nature." And in a like way of reflection 
 it may be added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been 
 from God upon account of these difiiculties, may, for the very 
 same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On 
 the other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between that 
 system of things and dispensation of Providence, which revela- 
 tion informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of 
 Providence, which experience together with reason informs us 
 of, i.e. the known course of nature; this is a presumption, that 
 they have both the same author and cause ; at least so far as to 
 ^ answer objections against the former's being from God, drawn 
 from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the 
 latter, which is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of 
 nature is here supposed. 
 
 Forming our notions of the constitution and government of 
 the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles 
 which we assume, whether from the attributes of God, or any 
 thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. 
 Forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are 
 certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to 
 apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human 
 body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, from mere mathe- 
 matics,) is an error much akin to the former: since what is as- 
 sumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis. 
 But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the 
 observation of facts, and argue, from such facts as are known, to 
 * Pliilocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant. 
 
BY THE AUTHOR. 71 
 
 otliers that are like them ; from that part of the divine govern- 
 ment over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to 
 that larger and more general government over them which is 
 beyond it 3 and from what is present, to collect what is likely, 
 credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter. 
 
 This method then of concluding and determining being prac- 
 tical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the 
 common pursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various 
 degrees, proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole 
 analogy or likeness ; and having so great authority for its intro- 
 duction into the subject of religion, even revealed religion; my 
 design is to apply it to that subject in general, both natural and 
 revealed : taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Author 
 of nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no 
 presumption against this prior to the proof of it : so it has been 
 often proved with accumulated evidence; from this argument of 
 analogy and final causes; from abstract reasouiogs; from the 
 most ancient tradition and testimony ; and from the general con- 
 sent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be 
 denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dis- 
 satisfied with the evidence of religion. 
 
 As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is 
 in fact the constitution of nature, form their notions of God's 
 government upon hypothesis : so there are others, who indulge 
 themselves in vain and idle speculations, how the world might 
 possibly have been framed otherwise than it is ; and upon sup- 
 position that things might, in imagining that they should, have 
 been disposed and carried on after a better model, than what ap- 
 pears in the present disposition and conduct of them.*= Suppose 
 now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, 
 till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature, 
 as appearing to him the best. — One shall scarce be thought guilty 
 of detraction against human understanding, if one should say, 
 even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person 
 would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, 
 probably would not be the very best, even according to his own 
 
 "- [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and 
 iiiipiety, may be fouud in Lajle's great "Historical and Critical Dictionai-y." 
 bee a& iniitiinces, the articlcvi Origen, Manioh^eus, Paulicians.] 
 
72 INTRODUCTION 
 
 notions of hest; whetlier lie thought that to be so, which afforded 
 occasions and motives for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or 
 which was productive of the greatest happiness, or that these two 
 were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the same 
 plan. 
 
 It may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the 
 amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon 
 the system of nature, or how far they would mislead us. It 
 seems there could be no stopping, till we came to some such con- 
 clusions as these : that all creatures should at first be made as 
 perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever being : that 
 nothing, surely, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to 
 do; some indolent persons would perhaps think nothing at all : 
 or certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that they should, 
 whether necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do 
 what was right and most conducive to happiness ; which would 
 be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by not giving 
 them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, or 
 by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their 
 minds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing 
 them to act conformably to it : and that the whole method of go- 
 vernment by punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an 
 awkward roundabout method of carrying things on ; nay, as con- 
 trary to a principal purpose, for which it would be supposed 
 creatures were made, namely, happiness. 
 
 Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to 
 the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has 
 been above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it ; namely, 
 that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this 
 kind of speculation. For though it be admitted that, from the 
 first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine 
 some ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and 
 that the ends now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that 
 this one is absolutely the best ; and consequently that we must 
 conclude the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of nature 
 and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness pos- 
 sible ; yet we are far from being able to judge what particular 
 disposition of things would be most friendly and assistant to vir- 
 tue ; or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce the 
 
BY THE AUTHOR. 73 
 
 must happiness in a system of sucli extent as our own world may 
 be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should sup- 
 pose it detached from the whole things. Indeed we are so far 
 from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what- 
 may be the necessary means of raising and conducting one per 
 son to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, 
 even in the little affairs of tlio present life, we find men of differ- 
 ent educations and ranks are not competent judges of the con- 
 duct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all 
 moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. 
 And this will forever be a practical proof of his moral character, 
 to such as will consider what a practical prOof is ; because it is 
 the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that virtue 
 must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature ; 
 and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally 
 in a universe under his government. But we are in no sort 
 judges, what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end. 
 
 Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent em- 
 ployment of forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes 
 of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we experience to be 
 the conduct of nature with respect to intelligent creatures ; which 
 may be resolved into general laws or rules of administration, in 
 the same way as many of the laws of nature respecting inanimate 
 matter may be collected from experiments. Let us compare the 
 known constitution and course of things with what is said to be 
 the moral system of nature; the acknowledged dispensations of 
 Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, 
 with what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see 
 whether they are not analogous and of a piece. Upon such a 
 comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very much 
 so : that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and 
 resolved into the same principles of divine conduct. 
 
 The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large 
 extent, and consists of several parts ; in some more, in others less 
 exact. In some few instances perhaps, it may amount to a real 
 practical proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirma 
 tion of what is proved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what 
 too many need to have shown them, that the system of religion, 
 both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior 
 
 7 
 
74 INTRODUCTION 
 
 to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless tbat oi iia- 
 ture be so too. And it will aiford an answer to almost all objec' 
 tions against the system both of natural and revealed religion j 
 though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very 
 considerable degree an answer to the objections against the evi- 
 dence of it : for objections against a proof, and objections against 
 what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are different 
 things. 
 
 The divine government of the world, implied in the notion of 
 religion in general and of Christianity, contains in it : that man- 
 kind is appointed to live in a future state 3* that there every one 
 shall be rewarded or punished }'f rewarded or punished respect- 
 ively for all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the 
 words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil :J that our pre- 
 sent life is a probation, a state of trial, § and of discipline, || for 
 that future one; notwithstanding the objections, which men may 
 fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there being 
 any such moral plan as this at all;^ and whatever objections may 
 appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so 
 imperfectly made known to us at present :** that this world being 
 in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, 
 and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly cor- 
 rupted amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dispensa- 
 tion of Providence ; of the utmost importance ;ff proved by mira- 
 cles ;JJ but containing in it many things appearing to us strange, 
 and not to have been expected ;§§ a dispensation of Providence, 
 which is a scheme or system of things ;|||| carried on by the media- 
 tion of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of 
 the world ;^^ yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the 
 strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; 
 but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular 
 evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.**''' 
 
 The design then of the following treatise will be to show, that 
 the several parts principally objected against in this moral and 
 Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and 
 the proof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the pa/- 
 
 * Ch. i. 
 
 t Ch. ii. X Ch. iii. 
 
 g Ch. iv. II Cb. V. 
 
 IT Ch. vi. 
 
 •» Ch. vii. 
 
 ft Part II. Ch. i. 
 
 XX Cb. ii. ^^ Ch. iii. 
 
 I!!l Ch. iv. 
 
 
 •T^ Ch. V. 
 
 *** Ch. vi. vii. 
 
 
BY THE AUTHOR. 75 
 
 ticular parts principally objected against in this wliole dispensa- 
 tion, are analogous to wliat is experienced in the constitution and 
 course of nature or Providence; that the chief objections them- 
 selves which are alleged against the former, are no other than 
 what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where 
 they are found in fact to be inconclusive ; and that this argu- 
 ment from analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly 
 of weight on the side of religion,* notwithstanding the objections 
 which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there 
 may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of 
 weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of 
 what may be looked for in the following treatise. I shall begin 
 it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all 
 our fears ; all our hopes and fears, which are of any conside- 
 ration 3 I mean a future life. 
 
 * Ch. viii. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION 
 
 PART I. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 A FUTURE LIFE.* 
 
 Strange difficulties have been raised by some concerning per- 
 Bonal identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the 
 notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in any two succes 
 
 * [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: 
 not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure 
 metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. 
 has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of con- 
 sciousness; and by no means that he does not fairly use it. 
 
 We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain. 
 "Who has explained identity, or motion-, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any 
 thing ? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay, 
 ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, "Existence itself, 
 which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incom- 
 municable to two beings of the same kind." I had rather define it "the un- 
 interrupted continuance of being." What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: 
 for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed be- 
 fore it existed. Locke makes consciousness to constitute identity, and argues 
 that a man and a person are not the same ; and that hence if I kill a man, but 
 was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, I am not the same 
 person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously. 
 
 Butler, in his "Dissertation," urges that consciousness j9re8i/^/)ose« identity, 
 as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke's theory, no person would have 
 Existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot 
 suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if ma- 
 <ejial, spread itself over successive years of life.] 
 
 7-» 77 
 
78 A FUTURE LIFE. part i. 
 
 give moments; which, whoever thinks it worth while, may see 
 considered in the first dissertation at the end of this treatise. 
 But without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the 
 analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have under- 
 gone, and those which we know we may undergo without being 
 destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not, 
 have upon us ; and whether it be not from thence probable, that 
 we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life 
 and perception. 
 
 I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless 
 imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to 
 mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own 
 species, that the same creatures, the sa77ie individuals, should 
 exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action, 
 of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their being, greatly 
 different from those appointed them in another period of it. In 
 other creatures the same law holds. For the difference of their 
 capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and 
 in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlarge-" 
 ment of their locomotive powers by such change : and birds and 
 insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this means 
 entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations 
 for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; 
 these are instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the 
 various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken 
 into consideration here. The states of life in which we ourselves 
 existed formerly, in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as 
 different from our present in mature age, as it is possible to con- 
 ceive any two states or degrees of life can be. Therefore that we 
 are to exist hereafter, in a state as different (suppose) from our 
 present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy 
 of nature ; according to a natural order or appointment of the very 
 game kind, with what we have already experienced. 
 
 II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of hap- 
 piness and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying 
 pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and 
 capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain 
 them through and after death ; indeed a probability of it aban- 
 dantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason 
 
CHAP I. A FUTURE LIFE. 79 
 
 to thiDk that deatli is tlie destruction of tliose living powers • be- 
 cause there is in every case a probability, that all things will con- 
 tinue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in 
 which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This 
 is that hind^ of presumption or probability from analogy, ex- 
 pressed in the very word continuance, which seems our only na- 
 tural reason for believing the course of the world will continue 
 to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge 
 of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only reason for 
 believing, that any one substance now existing will continue to 
 exist a moment longer ; the self-existent substance only excepted. 
 Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was 
 not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action, 
 there would be no apprehension that any other power or event, 
 unconnected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just 
 at the instant of each creature's death ; and therefore no doubt 
 but that they would remain after it ; which shows the high pro- 
 bability that our living powers will continue after death, unless 
 there be some ground to think that death is their destruction. "j* 
 For, if it would be in a manner certain that we should survive 
 death,^ provided it were certain that death would not be 
 our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive 
 
 * I say Idnd of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to afiirm that 
 there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will continue after 
 death, as there is, that our substances will. 
 
 f Destruction of living 2^oicer8, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambi- 
 guous ; and may signify either the deatruction of a living being, so as that the same 
 living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all; or the 
 de>itruction of those means and instruments by which it is cai)able of its present 
 life, of its present state of j^erception and of action. It is here used in the 
 former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet prese»J is added. The 
 loss of a man's eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But 
 we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former 
 sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with 
 living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that 
 a stone ever acquires them. 
 
 b [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers tLinks, 
 consider this argument as " handing us over to an absolute demonstration." It 
 just places all arguments for and against the soul's future life, in that balanced 
 condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presump- 
 tions against its truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection aa 
 to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revela- 
 tion, as to the futm-e, both of man and beast.] 
 
80 A FUTURE LIFE. part i. 
 
 it, if tliere. be no ground to think cleatli will be our destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 Though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the 
 natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, 
 there would arise a general confused suspicion, that in the great 
 shock and alteration which we shall undergo by death, we, i.e. 
 our Hying powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet even prior to 
 those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground or reason 
 for this apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it 
 must arise either from the reason of the thing , or from the analogy 
 of nature. 
 
 But we cannot argue from the reason of the tiling, that death 
 is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all 
 what death is in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the 
 dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones. These effects do in no wise 
 appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. Besides, as 
 we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our living 
 powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers them- 
 selves depend upon ; the powers themselves as distinguished, not 
 only from their actual exercise, but also from the present capa- 
 city of exercising them ; and as opposed to their destruction : for 
 sleep, or certainly a swoon, shows us, not only that these powers 
 exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion 
 does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when 
 there is no present capacity of exercising them : or that the capa- 
 cities of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual 
 exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers them- 
 selves remain undestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon 
 what the existence of our living powers depends, this shows fur- 
 ther, there can no probability be collected from the reason of the 
 thing, that death will be their destruction : because their exist- 
 ence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death; 
 upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors. 
 So that there is nothing more certain, than that the reason of the 
 thing shows us no connection between death and the destruction 
 of livino; ao-ents. 
 
 Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole analogy of 
 nature to afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals 
 ever lose their living powers ; much less if it were possible, that 
 
CHAP I. A FUTURE LIFE. g] 
 
 they lose them by death : for we have no faculties wherewith tc 
 trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes of 
 them. This event removes them from our view. It destroys 
 the sensible proof, which we had before their death, of their being 
 possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least 
 reason to believe that they are, then, or by that event, deprived 
 of them. 
 
 Our knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to 
 the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing 
 them, is itself a probability of their retaining them beyond it. 
 This is confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by ob- 
 serving the very great and astonishing changes which we have 
 experienced ; so great, that our existence in another state of life, 
 of perception and of action, will be but according to a method of 
 providential conduct, the like to which has been already exer- 
 cised even with regard to ourselves; according to a coui«e of 
 nature, the like to which we have already gone through. 
 
 However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult 
 it is to silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason 
 even distinctly heard in this case ; as we are accustomed, from 
 our youth up, to indulge that forward, delusive faculty, ever ob- 
 truding beyond its sphere; (of some assistance indeed to appre- 
 hension, but the author of all error,) as we plainly lose ourselves 
 in gross and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that 
 we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly ignorant of: 
 it may be proper to consider the imaginary presumptions, that 
 death will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early 
 and lasting prejudices ; and to show how little they really amount 
 to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. 
 And, 
 
 I. All presumption of death's being the destruction of living 
 beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded;" and 
 
 c [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are 
 not nnturnlhj immortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in re- 
 generation. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. 
 Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject. 
 
 These "presumptions" form the base of materialism, and hence tht denial 
 of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. 
 But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick ?. How 
 superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been ! Cicero 
 
82 A FUTURE LIFE. part i. 
 
 SO, di;bcerptibie. But since consciousness is a single and indi- 
 visible power, it. should seem that the subject in which it resides 
 must be so too. For were the motion of any particle of matter 
 absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a con- 
 tradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not 
 to exist, i.e. part of this matter to move, and part to be at rest, 
 then its power of motion would be indivisible ; and so also would 
 the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle of 
 matter : for it this could be divided into two, one part might 
 be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the sup- 
 position. 
 
 In like manner it has been argued,* and, for any thing ap- 
 pearing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or con- 
 sciousness, which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so 
 as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be 
 here and the other there ; the perceptive power, or the power of 
 consciousness, is indivisible too : and consequently the subject in 
 which it resides, i.e. the conscious being. Now, upon supposi- 
 tion that the living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single 
 being, which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving 
 than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is the 
 proof now mencioned; it follows, that our organized bodies are no 
 more ourselves or part of ourselves, than any other matter around 
 us. And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part 
 of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which our 
 present bodies are ; as how we can receive impressions from, and 
 have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that we may 
 exist out of bodies, as in them -, and that we might have animated 
 bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these 
 now given us; and that we may hereafter animate these same or 
 new bodies, variously modified and organized; as to conceive how 
 
 makes Cato say, " The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, wi'^hout parts 
 or mixture : it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish." And iu another place, 
 " I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless 
 matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;" and 
 agiiin, " I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to 
 live iu this world." Xonophou reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, 
 " my sons ! do not imagine that when death has taker me from you, I shall 
 cease to exist."] 
 
 * See Pr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defence.'' of it 
 
CHAP I. A FUTURE LIFE. gg 
 
 •we can animate sucli bodies as our present. And lastly, tlie dis- 
 solution of all these several organized bodies, supposing ourselves 
 to have successively animated them, would have no more con- 
 ceivable tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves, or de- 
 prive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and of 
 action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which we are 
 capable of receiving impressions from^ and making use of, for the 
 common occasions of life. 
 
 II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent can- 
 not, from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experi- 
 mental observations. But as these fall in with the supposition 
 of its unity, so they plainly lead us to conclude certainly, tbat our 
 gross organized bodies, with which we perceive objects of sense, 
 and with which we act, are no part of ourselves ; and therefore 
 show us, that we have no reason to believe their destruction to be 
 ours : even without determining whether our living substance be 
 material or immaterial. For we see by experience, that men may 
 lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part 
 of these bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. Persons 
 can trace up the existence of themselves to a time, when the bulk 
 of their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it is 
 in mature age : and we cannot but think, that they might then 
 have lost a considerable part of that small body, and y£t have re- 
 mained the same living agents; as they may now lose great part 
 of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, that the 
 bodies of all animals are in a constant flux,*^ from that never- 
 ceasing attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now, 
 things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between 
 these living agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in 
 which we are very nearly interested; since these may be alien- 
 ated, and actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing 
 their owners; whilst we are assured, that each living agent re- 
 
 ^i [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an ave- 
 rage life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes 
 with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the 
 sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to aflfirm that the 
 whole is not altered, though every particle be changed. 
 
 This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, 
 and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all pre- 
 gumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?] 
 
S4 A FUTURE LIFE. part i. 
 
 mains one and the same permanent being.* And this general 
 observation leads us on to the following ones. 
 
 First, That we have no way of determining by experience, 
 what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls him- 
 self: and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than 
 the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground 
 to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason 
 to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, 
 even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible. 
 
 Secondhj, From our being so nearly related to and interested 
 in certain systems of matter, (suppose our flesh and bones,) and 
 afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents, 
 ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding 
 such alienation ; and consequently these systems of matter not 
 being ourselves, it follows further that we have no ground to 
 conclude any other (suppose internal^ systems of matter, to be 
 the living agents ourselves; because we can have no ground to 
 conclude this, but from our relation to and interest in such other 
 systems of matter : and therefore we can have no reason to con- 
 clude what befalls those sj^stems of matter at death, to be the 
 destruction of the living agents. We have already several times 
 over, lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our body, accord- 
 ing to certain common established laws of' nature, yet we remain 
 the same living agents. When we shall lose as great a part, or the 
 whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why 
 may we not also remain the same ? That the alienation has been 
 gradual in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does 
 not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed 
 through those many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly 
 appropriated to us oui'selves ; why should we imagine death will 
 be so fatal to us? Nor can it be objected, that what is thus 
 alienated or lost, is no part of our original solid body, but only 
 adventitious matter. Because we may lose entire limbs, which 
 must have -contained many solid parts and vessels of the original 
 body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that any of 
 these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though we 
 are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious maiter, 
 whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts o^ 
 -•■ Sec Disserlatiou I. 
 
CHAP. I. A FUTURE LIFE. gg 
 
 our solid bod}^ yet after all, the relation a person bear» to those 
 parts of his body, to which he is most nearly related, amounts but 
 to this, that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutu- 
 ally affect each other.® The same thing, the same thing in kind 
 though not in degree, may be said of all foreign matter, which 
 gives us ideas, and over which we have any power. From these 
 observations the whole ground of the imagination is removed, 
 that the dissolution of any matter, is the destruction of a living 
 agent, from the interest he once had in such matter. 
 
 Thirdli/, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, 
 as made up of organs and instruments of perception and of mo- 
 tion, it will brinsf us to the same conclusion. Thus the common 
 optical experiments show, and even the observation how sight is 
 assisted by glasses shows, that we see with our eyes in the same 
 sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, 
 that we see with them in any other sense ; any other, I mean, 
 which would lead us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like 
 is to- be said of hearing; and our feeling distant solid matter by 
 means of something in our hand, seems an instance of the like 
 kind, as to the subject we are considering. All these are in- 
 stances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body, 
 being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them 
 to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar to the manner in 
 which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are 
 in a like way instruments of our receiving such ideas from ex- 
 ternal objects, as the Author of nature appointed those external 
 objects to be the occasions of exciting in us. Glasses are evident 
 instances of this; namely of matter which is no part cf our 
 body, preparing objects for and conveying them towards the per- 
 ceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs do. And if 
 we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do with 
 glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, of all 
 our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said, to 
 affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by 
 
 e [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, 
 anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it alto- 
 gether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and 
 hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, 
 seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that 
 there was no functional derangement] 
 
 8 
 
80 A FUTURE LIFE. part x. 
 
 any otbor sense, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to 
 the living power of seeing, or perceiving : but that so far as it 
 can be traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that 
 our organs of sense prepare and convey objects, in order to their 
 l^eiug perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without 
 affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves per- 
 ceive. And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense 
 percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons losing some of 
 them, the living beings themselves, their former occupiers, re- 
 maining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of 
 dreams ; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, 
 and what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of 
 perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner with- 
 out our external organs of sense, as with them. 
 
 So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing 
 motion by will and choice ] upon the destruction of a limb, this 
 active power evidently remains, unlessened; so that the living 
 being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of moving as 
 before, if it had another limb to move with. It can walk by the 
 help of an artificial leg. It can make use of a pole or a lever, 
 to reach towards itself and to move things, beyond the length 
 and the power of its arm ; and this it does in the same manner 
 as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer and 
 of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of our 
 limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing them- 
 selves; though they are adapted, like the several parts of a 
 machine, to be the instruments of motion to each other; and 
 some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of motion to the 
 other parts. 
 
 Thus a man determines that he will look at an object through 
 a microscope ; or being ' lame, that he will walk to such a 
 place with a staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no 
 more determine in these cases, than the microscope and the staff. 
 Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determi- 
 nation in practice ; or that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the 
 movers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff 
 are. Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense, and our limbs, 
 are certainly instruments,'^ which the living persons ourseH'es 
 ^ ["S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts mth lis 
 
j.HAP. I. A FUTURE LIFE. 87 
 
 make use of to perceive and move with : there is not any proba- 
 bility, that tbey are any more; nor consequently, that we have 
 any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to any 
 other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception ana 
 motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind 
 of relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor con- 
 sequently is there any probability, that the alienation or disso- 
 lution of these instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving 
 and moving agent. 
 
 And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which 
 living beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; 
 and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments 
 of perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their 
 destruction ; shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to 
 think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of 
 any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or 
 destruction of living agents, from the like kind of relation. And 
 we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation 
 to any thing which we find dissolved by death. 
 
 But it is said, these observations are ec[ually applicable to 
 brutes :^ and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they 
 
 instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does 
 he use his eyes also, in making shoes ? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he 
 who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, 
 and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. 
 S. Does a man then use his whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, 
 and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something 
 different from his own body." Plat. Alcibi. Prim. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed. 
 
 " It may easily be perceived that the mind both sees and hears, and not those 
 parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind." "Neither are we bodies; 
 nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body." " Whatever is done 
 by thy mind, is done by thee." Cicero, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 62, 
 
 "The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed 
 out with the finger." Cic, de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.] 
 
 s [Butler's argument, if advanced ior proof would prove too much, not only 
 as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove preexistence. And this is really 
 the tenet, {i.e. transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immor- 
 tality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a 
 future state, nor can it afford any presumptions against either a future or a 
 oreexistent state. 
 
 Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the 
 Boul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the 
 doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who can 
 
88 A FUTURE LIFE. part i. 
 
 should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting 
 happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and 
 weak : but the thing intended by it, is really no difl&culty at all, 
 either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Sup- 
 pose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of expres- 
 sion, were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural 
 immortality of brutes, namely, that they must arrive at great 
 attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this 
 would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and 
 capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to 
 experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as 
 there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of 
 understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace 
 up our own existence to the same original with theirs. We find 
 it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with 
 capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition 
 of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them, 
 for a considerable length of their duration* as in infancy and 
 childhood. And great part of the human species go out of the 
 present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities 
 in any degree. 
 
 2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least 
 imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a 
 rational or rtioral nature. The economy of the universe might re- 
 quire, that there should be living creatures without any capacities 
 of this kind. And all difficulties as to the manner how they are 
 to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded in our 
 ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by 
 any, but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted 
 with the whole system of things. There is then absolutely 
 
 create, under infinite diversity of forms, can sustain existence, in any mode he 
 pleases. 
 
 The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immor- 
 tality of brutes, will find it spread out in Polignac's Anti-Lucretius, and still 
 w ve in Bayle's Dicticnary, under the articles Perkira, and Rorarius. 
 The topic Is also discussed in Des Cartes on the Passions: Baxter on The 
 Nature of the Soul: Hume's Essays, Essay 9: Search's Light of Nature: 
 Cjieyne's Philosophical Principles : Wagstaff on the Immortality of Brutes 
 Edwards' Critical and Philosophical Exercitations : Watt's Essays, Essay 9* 
 Coj.ljber's Enquiry: Locke on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix. • Dittoh ou 
 <iie Resurrection : Willis De Anima BrutiC.J 
 
;hap. I. A FUTURE LIFE. 89 
 
 nothing at Q.V in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged, 
 against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of 
 the immortality of human minds ; I say the greatest part, for it 
 is less applicable to the following observation, which is more 
 peculiar to mankind. 
 
 III. As it is evident our present powers and capacities of 
 reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross 
 body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense 
 does ; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all, in any such 
 manner as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this 
 body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflec- 
 tion, as it will of our powers of sensation; or to give ground 
 to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the 
 former. 
 
 Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and per- 
 ception, greatly different from each other ; each of which has its 
 own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and suffer- 
 ings. When any of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified 
 with the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a 
 state of sensation. When none of our senses are affected or 
 appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we 
 may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now it is 
 by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death, 
 is in any way necessary to the living being, in this its state of 
 reflection, after ideas are gained. For, though, from our present 
 constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense 
 are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as 
 carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architecture -y^ yet when 
 these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the 
 most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and 
 feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without 
 
 ^ [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger 
 feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If the nerve be 
 paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken 
 or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down. 
 
 The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, 
 retained his faculties. In some, th^ body survives the mind. Morgagni, 
 Haller, Bonnet, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, 
 rfot even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, 
 ivhei<t there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such 
 (iisease, during life.] 
 
 8» 
 
90 A FUTURE LIFE. part i. 
 
 any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, whicli we 
 know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It 
 does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the 
 reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking ; to in- 
 tellectual enjoyments or sufferings : nor, consequently, that the 
 dissolution or alienation of the former by death, will be the 
 destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of 
 this state of reflection. 
 
 Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not 
 at all affect our present intellectual powers ; and this affords a 
 presumption, that those diseases will not destroy these present 
 powers. Indeed, from the observations made above,* it appears, 
 that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each 
 other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the 
 living agent. By the same reasoning, it must appear too, that 
 there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, 
 that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present 
 reflecting powers : indeed instances of their not affecting each 
 other, afibrd a presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal 
 diseases not impairing our present reflecting ^powers, evidently 
 turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the 
 destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly affect all our 
 living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of them ; as 
 for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound sleep : 
 and hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till 
 we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. 
 But in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this 
 shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to 
 the reflecting powers which we have at present. For in those 
 diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the 
 highest vigor of life. They discover apprehension, memory, 
 reason, all entire ; the utmost force of affection ; a sense of cha- 
 racter, of shame and honor; and the highest mental enjoyments 
 and sufferings, even to the last gasp. These surely prove even 
 greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what pre- 
 tence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when 
 arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, 
 will destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which wvra 
 * Pp. 84, 85. 
 
CHAP. I. A FUTURE LIFE. 91 
 
 not affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to t"hat 
 degree ? And if death by diseases of this kind, is not the 
 destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be 
 thought that death by any other means is. 
 
 It is obyious that this general observation may be carried 
 further. There appears to be so little connection between our 
 bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of reflection, 
 that there is no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys 
 the former, does so much as suspend the exercise of the latter, or 
 interrupt our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection 
 which we do now.^ For suspension of reason, memory, and the 
 affections which they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor 
 implied in our notion of it. Our daily experiencing these powers 
 to be exercised, without any assistance, that we know of, from 
 those bodies which will be dissolved by death ; and our finding 
 often, that the exercise of them is so lively to the last; afford a 
 sensible apprehension, that death may not perhaps be so much as 
 a discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the 
 enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.* So that our post- 
 humous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our present, 
 may yet not be beginning entirely anew; but going on. Death 
 may, in some sort and in some respects, answer to our birth; 
 which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before 
 it, or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when 
 in the womb ; but a continuation of both, with such and such 
 great alterations. 
 
 Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life and 
 of death, death may immediately, in the natural course of 
 
 i [We are told by sceptics that "mind is the result of a curious and compli- 
 cated organization." A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material, 
 there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death 
 has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a 
 swoon, till chemical changes begin.] 
 
 * There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered : 
 Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not. Whether it be the 
 destruction of their present powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruc- 
 tion of their present powers of sensation ; and if not, Whether it be the sus- 
 pension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. 
 Now. if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that wer« 
 possible, Jsss for me nest, and less still for the first. 
 
92 A FUTURE LIFE. part i. 
 
 tilings, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as 
 our birth does;* a state in which our capacities, and sphere of 
 perception and of action, may be much greater than at present. 
 For as our relation to our external organs of sense, renders us 
 capable of existing in our present state of sensation ; so it may 
 be the only natural hinderance to our existing, immediately, and 
 of course, in a higher state of reflection. The truth is, reason 
 does not at all show us, in what state death naturally leaves us. 
 But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive and 
 active powers ; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction 
 of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience 
 from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from 
 one to the other; or conclude even to the lowest degree of pro- 
 bability, that the same kind of force which is sufl&cient to sus- 
 pend our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will be 
 sufficient to destroy them.-" 
 
 These observations together may be sufficient to show, how 
 little presumption there is, that death is the destruction of 
 human creatures. However, there is the shadow of an analogy, 
 which may lead us to imagine it, — viz. : the supposed likeness 
 which is observed between the decay of vegetables, and of living 
 creatures. This likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the poets 
 very apt allusions to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of 
 the frailty of our present life. But in reason, the analogy is so 
 far from holding, that there appears no ground for the com- 
 parison, as to the present question ; because one of the two sub- 
 jects compared is wholly void of that, which is the principal and 
 chief thing in the other, the power of perception and of action; 
 which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continU' 
 
 *■ This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, voyii^uv fiiv 
 yap Sn Tov jjiiv h'daSe (iiov, wj av aKiviv Kvojiivcov eivai' rov 6t ^dvaTov, yivsmv dg rov Svtcjs 
 (Slov, Koi TOV cvSaijiOva roXg (piXoaocpftaaai' Lib. XV. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. ["For 
 they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be 
 born ,• and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those 
 who have practised philosophy."] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may 
 allude in these words, wj vvv Trtpijxki/tig, -kotc euPpvov ck rng yacrrpos rng ywaiKOg o-ou 
 clekOi), ourwj eK(:kxeaBai, t))v uipav tv ji to ipvXciptov aov tov sXvTpov tovtov EKTrtae'iTai. Lib. 
 ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left 
 untranslated.] 
 
 J [The increase of a force in any direction, cannot of itself change thlt direc- 
 tion. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some 
 othe' object, by being shot with more force.] 
 
CHAP. I. A FUTURE LIFE. 9^ 
 
 ance of. So that the destruction of a vegetable, is an eveni not 
 similar or analogous to the destruction of a living agent. 
 
 If, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of 
 substituting imagination in the room of experience, we would 
 confine ourselves to what we do know and understand; if we 
 would argue only from that, and from that form our expectations, 
 it would appear at first sight, that as no probability of living 
 beings ever ceasing to be so, can be concluded from the reason 
 of the thing, so none can be collected from the analogy of 
 nature ; because we cannot trace any living beings beyond death. 
 But as we are conscious that we are endued with capacities of 
 perception and of action, and are living persons ; what we are to 
 go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee some acci- 
 dent, or event, which will endanger those capacitities, or be likely 
 to destroy us : which death does in no wise appear to be. 
 
 Thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new 
 scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we 
 came into the present. And this new state may naturally be a 
 social one.^ And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind, 
 may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed general laws 
 of wisdom, upon every one in proportion to the degrees of his 
 virtue. And though the advantages of that future natural state 
 should not be bestowed, as these of the present in some measure 
 are, by the will of the society; but entirely by his more imme- 
 diate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature depends : yet 
 this distribution may be just as natural, as their being distributed 
 here by the instrumentality of men. Indeed, though one should 
 allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to 
 put upon the word natural, it would be a shortness of thought 
 scarce credible, to imagine, that no system or course of things 
 can be so, but only what we see at present :* especially whilst the 
 
 * [Our nature will ahoays he ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and 
 become something else. And this nature is social. Every one feels, at least 
 sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; 
 and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he can- 
 not produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are re- 
 sorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food ia 
 of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in 
 a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But 
 such society must include God.] 
 
 * Sec Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv. 
 
94 A FUTURE LIFE part t, 
 
 probiibilitj of a future life, or the natural immortality of the 
 soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason ; because this ia 
 really both admitting and denying at once, a state of being differ- 
 ent from the present to be natural. But the only distinct mean- 
 ing of that word is, stated, fixed ^ or settled; since what is natural 
 as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render 
 it so, i.e. to effect it continually, or at stated times, as what is 
 supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. 
 
 Hence it must follow, that persons' notion of what is natural, 
 will be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the 
 works of God, and the dispensations of his providence. Nor is 
 there any absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the 
 universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, may be so 
 extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to 4ihem 
 appear natural, i.e. analogous or conformable to Grod's dealings 
 with other parts of his creation ; os natural as the visible known 
 course of things appears to us. For there seems scarce any other 
 possible sense to be put upon the word, but that only in which it 
 is here used ; similar, stated, or uniform. 
 
 This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted 
 upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to 
 answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner as a demon- 
 strative proof would. Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of 
 a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For, that we are 
 to live hereafter, is just as reconcilable with the scheme of 
 atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are 
 now alive is : and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to 
 argue from that scheme, that there can be no future state. 
 But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against 
 such a state, is a presumption against religion. The foregoing 
 observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to 
 a very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doc- 
 trine of religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and 
 dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence 
 of the whole. 
 
«HAP. II. GOVEKNMENT OF GOD. 95 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 That which makes the question concerning a future life to be 
 of so great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and 
 misery. And that which makes the consideration of it to he of 
 so great importance to us, is the supposition of our happiness and 
 misery hereafter depending upon our actions here. Indeed, 
 without this, curiosity could not but sometimes bring a subject, 
 in which we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts ; espe- 
 cially upon the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our 
 own. But reasonable men would not take any further thought 
 about hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally to 
 rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future interest no 
 way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, on the con- 
 trary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, 
 to think it does, then there is reason also for the most active 
 thought and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as 
 that we may escape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in 
 another life, which we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but 
 which we apprehend also is put in our own power. And whether 
 there be ground for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve 
 to be most seriously considered, were there no other proof of a 
 future life and interest, than that presumptive one, which the 
 foregoing observations amount to. 
 
 In the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of 
 what we suffer, is put in our own power. Pleasure and pain are 
 the consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the 
 Author of our nature with capacities of foreseeing these conse- 
 quences. We find by experience that he does not so much as 
 preserve our lives, exclusive of our own care and attention, to 
 provide ourselves with, and to make use of, that sustenance, by 
 which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved ; and with- 
 out which, he has appointed, they shall not be preserved. In 
 general we foresee, that the external things, which are the objects 
 of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, 
 without exerting ourselves in such and such manners : but by 
 
96 GOVERNMENT OF GOD parti- 
 
 thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in 
 which our natural good consists; or by this meaDS God gives u^ 
 the possession and enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have 
 any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by the means of our 
 own actions. By prudence and care, we may, for the most part, 
 pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet : on the contrary, we 
 may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by 
 negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And 
 many do please to make themselves extremely miserable, i.e. to 
 do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow 
 those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, ex- 
 ample, and experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sick- 
 ness, and untimely death. This every one observes to be the gene- 
 ral course of things ; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by 
 experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies. 
 
 Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures pro- 
 miscuously such and such perceptions, without regard to their 
 behavior; why he does not make them happy without the instru- 
 mentality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any 
 sufferings upon themselves, is another matter.* Perhaps there 
 may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are 
 unacquainted with.* Or less happiness, it may be, would upon 
 the whole be produced by such a method of conduct, than is by 
 the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mis- 
 take not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a 
 bare single disposition to produce happiness ; but a disposition to 
 make the good, the faithful, the honest, happy. Perhaps an 
 infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures 
 behave suitably to the nature which he has given them ; to the 
 relations which he has placed them in to each other; and to that 
 which they stand in to himself: that relation to himself, which, 
 during their existence, is even necessary,** and which is the most 
 
 » [Objections and diflficulties belong to all subjects, in some of their bearings. 
 Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may 
 remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked 
 with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two 
 opposite means : — a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable 
 cavilling at certain truth.] 
 
 * Part I. cliap. vii. 
 
 *> [Our relation to God is "even necessary," because we are his creatures; to 
 
CHAP. II. BY REWARDS AXD PUNISHMENTS. 97 
 
 important one of all : perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect mind 
 may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for 
 itself; as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive 
 to the happiness of his creation. Or the whole end, for which 
 God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond 
 the reach of our faculties : there may be somewhat in it as im- 
 possible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to 
 have a conception of colors. However this be, it is certain 
 matter of universal experience, that the general method of divine 
 administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to fore- 
 see, with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall 
 have such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufi'erings; and giving 
 us those enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in 
 consequence of our actions. 
 
 "But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature.'' 
 True. This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be 
 ascribed to the general course of nature : i.e. not surely to the 
 words or ideas, course of nature; but to Him who appointed it, 
 and put things into it; or to a course of operation, from its 
 uniformity or constancy, called natural;* and which necessarily 
 implies an operating agent. For when men find themselves 
 necessitated to confess an Author of nature, or that God is the 
 natural governor of the world, they must not deny this again, 
 because his government is uniform. They must not deny that 
 he does things at all, because he does them constantly,'' because 
 the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting be so 
 or not ; though there is no reason to think it is not. In short, 
 every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the fore- 
 thought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good : 
 and if the natural course of things be the appointment of God, 
 and our natural faculties of knowledge and experience are given 
 
 that the relation must endure so lon^ as we endure. But our relations to other 
 creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.] 
 
 * Pp. 93, 94. 
 
 « ["The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but 
 e-Tipty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The 
 raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of 
 one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one 
 is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we 
 should call that natural." Dr. Claiuce, Controv. with Leibnitz.] 
 
98 GOYERXMEXT OF GOD parti. 
 
 US by him, then the good and bad consequences which follow our 
 actions, are his appointment, and our foresight of those conse- 
 quences, is a warning given u^ by him, how we 'are to act. 
 
 " Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every particular 
 gratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying our- 
 selves in every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for 
 so doing T' No, certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes 
 were naturally intended to give us the sight of each particular 
 object, to which they do or can extend; objects which are de- 
 structive of them, or which, for any other reason, it may become 
 us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt, but that our 
 eyes were intended for us to see with.*^ So neither is there any 
 doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the 
 passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind to act in 
 such and such manners. 
 
 From this general observation, obvious to every one, (that God 
 has given us to understand, he has appointed satisfaction and 
 delight to be the consequence of our acting in one manner, and 
 pain and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our not act- 
 ing at all; and that we find these consequences, which we were 
 beforehand informed of, uniformly to follow;) we may learn, that 
 we are at present actually under his government in the strictest 
 and most proper sense; in such a sense, as that he rewards and 
 punishes us for our actions. 
 
 An Author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a 
 deduction of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are 
 thus under his government ; under his gov ^rnment, in the same 
 sense, as we are under the government of civil magistrates. 
 Because the annexing of pleasure to some actions, and pain to 
 others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this 
 
 ^ [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of 
 the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what 
 it in, and what it is to do : e.g. the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental 
 faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, 
 compassion to induce us to relieve distress. Jn observing our whole make, we 
 may see an ultimate design, — viz. : not particular animal gratif cations, but in- 
 tellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be 
 our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, 
 anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin. 
 
 Se© Law's Notes on King's Origin of Evil.l 
 
CHAP. u. BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 99 
 
 appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper 
 formal notion of government. 
 
 Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our 
 behavior, be owing to the Author of nature's acting upon us 
 every moment which we feel it ; or to his having at once con- 
 trived and executed his own part in the plan of the world; 
 makes no alteration as to the matter before us. For if civil 
 magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place, 
 without interposing at all, after they had passed them; with- 
 out a trial, and the formalities of an execution : if they were 
 able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to 
 execute them upon himself; we should be just in the same sense 
 under their government then, as we are now; but in a much 
 higher degree, and more perfect manner. 
 
 Vain is the ridicule, with which one foresees some persons 
 will divert themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as 
 instances of divine punishment. There is no possibility of 
 answering or evading the general thing here intended, without 
 denying all final causes. For final causes being admitted, the 
 j)leasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too as in- 
 stances of them. And if they are ; if God annexes delight to 
 some actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design 
 to induce us to act so and so ; then he not only dispenses happi- 
 ness and misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for 
 example, the pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the 
 destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to 
 fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the Author of 
 nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruction ; 
 this is altogether as much an instance of his punishing our 
 actions, and consequently of our being under his government,^ as 
 declaring by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so, he would 
 inflict such pain upon us; and inflicting it, whether it be greater 
 or less. 
 
 Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author 
 
 ^ [It is almost amazing that pbilosophy, because it discovers the laws of 
 matter, shculd be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a su2:)er- 
 intending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this ver3' result of philosophy, 
 — viz. : that the world is governed by rjcncral laics. See Prov. viii. 29 : Job. 
 txxviii. 12, 24, 31, ;^3 : Ps. exix. 90, 91 : Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 26.] 
 
100 GOVERNMENT OF GOD parti. 
 
 of nature, is ibat of a master or governor, prior to the considera- 
 tion of liis moral attributes. The fact of our case, which we 
 find by experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or 
 government over us at present, by rewarding and punishing us 
 for our actions, in as strict and proper a sense of these words, 
 and even in the same sense, as children, servants, subjects, are 
 rewarded and punished by those who govern them. 
 
 Thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course 
 of things, most fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in 
 the general doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish 
 men for their actions hereafter : nothing incredible, I mean, 
 arising out of the notion of rewarding and jDunishing. For the 
 whole course of nature is a present instance of his exercising that 
 government over us, which implies in it rewarding and punishing. 
 
 As divine punishment is what men chiefly object against, and 
 are most unwilling to allow; it may be proper to mention some 
 circumstances in the natural course of punishments at present, 
 which are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a 
 future state of punishment; indeed so analogous, that as they 
 add a further credibility to it, so they cannot but raise a most 
 serious apprehension of it in those who will attend to them. 
 
 It has been now observed, that such and such miseries natu- 
 rally follow such and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness, 
 as well as actions more commonly and more distinctly considered 
 as vicious ; and that these consequences, when they may be fore- 
 seen, are properly natural punishments annexed to such actions. 
 The general thing here insisted upon, is, not that we see a great 
 deal of misery in the world, but a great deal which men bring 
 upon themselves by their own behavior, which they might have 
 foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these natural 
 punishments, particularly deserving our attention, are such as 
 these. Oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence 
 of, actions which procure many present advantages, and are ac- 
 companied with much present pleasure ; for instance, sickness 
 and untimely death are the consequence of intemperance, though 
 accompanied with the highest mirth and jollity. These punish* 
 
CHAP. n. BY REWAEDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 101 
 
 ments are often much greater, than the advantages or pleasures 
 obtained by the actions, of which they are the punishments or 
 consequences. Though we may imagine a constitution of nature, 
 in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to follow, 
 would follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or very 
 soon after ; we find on the contrary in our world, that they are 
 often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the 
 actions occasioning them are forgot ; so that the constitution of 
 nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree 
 of presumption of final impunity. After such delay, these 
 natural punishments or miseries often come, not by degrees, but 
 suddenly, with violence, and at once ; however, the chief misery 
 often does. As certainty of such distant misery following such 
 actions, is never afforded persons, so perhaps during the actions, 
 they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of its following :* 
 and many times the case is only thus, that they see in general, or 
 may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, will bring 
 after it diseases ; civil crimes, civil punishments ; when yet the 
 real probability often is, that they shall escape ; but things not- 
 withstanding take their destined course, and the misery inevi- 
 tably follows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. 
 Thus also though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness 
 and folly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foresee- 
 ing all the consequences of being untractable and profligate, this 
 does not hinder_, but that these consequences follow; and are 
 grievously felt, throughout the whole course of mature life. 
 Habits contracted even in that age, are often utter ruin : and 
 men's success in the world, not only in the common sense of 
 worldly success, but their real happiness and misery, depends, in 
 a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in which 
 they pass their youth; which consequences they for the most 
 part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said 
 to believe, beforehand. In numberless cases, the natural course 
 of things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to 
 ourselves at certain times, which we cannot procure when we 
 will ; nor ever recall the opportunities, if we have neglected 
 them. Indeed the general course of nature is an example of 
 this. If. during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile 
 
 * See Part 11. chap. vi. 
 9* 
 
102 GOVERNMENT OF GOD parti, 
 
 a.nd self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their future life, for 
 want of those acquirements, which they neglected the natural 
 set(Son of jvttaining. If the husbandman lets seedtime pass 
 without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. 
 Though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance vp 
 to a certain degree, it is often in their power, to retrieve their 
 affairs, to recover their health and character, at least in good 
 measure ; yet real reformation is in many cases, of no avail at all 
 towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, natu- 
 rally annexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree 
 There is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which 
 being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the 
 natural course of things. It is further very much to be re- 
 marked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention,* 
 not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often at- 
 tended with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active 
 misbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. And lastly, 
 civil government being natural, the punishments of it are so too : 
 and some of these punishments are capital ; as the effects of a 
 dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal. So that many 
 natural punishments are finalf to him who incurs them, if con- 
 sidered only in his temporal capacity; and seem inflicted by 
 
 ■* Part 11. chap. vi. 
 
 f The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently 
 belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections 
 should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scrip- 
 ture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and 
 poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration 
 and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the 
 Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of 
 mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great dis- 
 tinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this 
 world; that each shall then receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it 
 well might, conclude that it should, finallj' and upon the whole, be well with 
 the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon 
 any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been ap- 
 pointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive 
 justice should finally and eflfectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that 
 the next state of things after the present is appointed for tLie execution of this 
 justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but the mystery of God, the great 
 mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, shall then he finished ; 
 and he will take to him his great j^otcer and will reign, by rendering to p.verv 
 one according to his works. 
 
CHAP. ir. BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 103 
 
 natural appointment, either to remove the offender out of tho 
 way of being further mischievous, or as an example, thougti fre- 
 quently a disregarded one, to those who are left behind. 
 
 These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with 
 only now and then; but they are things of every day's expe- 
 rience. They proceed from general laws, very general ones, by 
 which God governs the world in the natural course of his 
 providence.^ 
 
 And they are so analogous, to what religion teaches us con- 
 cerning the future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece 
 with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the very same 
 words, and manner of description. In the book of Proverbs/'' for 
 instance, wisdom is introduced, as frequenting the most public 
 places of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as tho 
 natural appointed guide of human life. How long, speaking to 
 those who are passing through it, liow long, ye simple ones, will 
 ye love folly, and the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools 
 hate knowledge ? Turn ye at my reproof Behold, I will pour 
 out my spirit upon you, I will tnahe known my tvords unto you. 
 But upon being neglected. Because I have called, and ye refused, 
 I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; hut ye 
 have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my re- 
 proof : I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when 
 your fear cometh ; when your fear cometh as desolation, and 
 your destruction cometh as a whii'lwind ; when distress and 
 anguish come up>on you. Then shall they call vp)on me, hut I 
 will not answer ; they shall seek me early, hut they shall not find 
 me. This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and some parts of 
 it are highly figurative ; but the meaning is obvious. And the 
 thing intended is expressed more literally in the following words; 
 For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of 
 
 the Lord therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own 
 
 way, and he filled with their own devices. For the security of 
 
 ^ [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. 
 Eutler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted 
 on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and over- 
 throws them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the 
 universally observed course of nature.] 
 
 * Chap. i. 
 
104 GOVERNMENT OE GOD. parti 
 
 the simjjle sJiall day tliem, and the prospcrlti/ of fools shall de- 
 stroy them. Tiie whole passage is so equally applicable to what 
 we experience in the present world, concerning the consequences 
 of men's actions, and to what religion teaches us is to be expected 
 in another, that it may be questioned which of the two was prin- 
 cipally intended. 
 
 Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a 
 future state of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can 
 give one so sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representa- 
 tion of it to the mind, as observing, that after the many dis- 
 regarded checks, admonitions, and warnings, which people meet 
 with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance, warnings 
 from their very nature, from the examples of others, from the 
 lesser inconveniences which they bring upon themselves, from 
 the instructions of wise and virtuous men : after these have been 
 long despised, scorned, ridiculed : after the chief bad conse- 
 quences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have been de- 
 layed for a great while, at length they break 'in irresistibly, like 
 an armed force : repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve 
 only to aggravate their distress, the case is become desperate : 
 and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and 
 death, the efiects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond 
 possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account of what is, 
 in fact, the general constitution of nature. 
 
 It is not in any sort meant, that, according to what appears at 
 present of the natural course of things, men are always uniformly 
 punished in proportion to their misbehavior. But that there are 
 very many instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways 
 now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too; sufficient to 
 show what the laws of the universe may admit, and, if thoroughly 
 considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against the 
 credibility of a future state of punishments, from any imagina- 
 tions, that the frailty of our nature and external temptations, 
 almost annihilate the guilt of human vices : as well as objections 
 of another sort ; from necessity, from suppositions, that the will 
 of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he must be 
 incapable of offence and provocation.* 
 
 Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to .serious 
 * See chaps, iv. and vi. 
 
CHAP. III. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. j.05 
 
 persons, e^ en the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest 
 strength of mind ; but it is fit that things be stated and con- 
 sidered as they reall^^ are. There is, in the present age, a certain 
 fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the 
 government of God, which nothing but a universally acknow- 
 ledged demonstration on the side of atheism can justify; and 
 which makes it quite necessary, that men be reminded, and if 
 possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being 
 thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles. For, 
 may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the 
 world, he may behave so as to be of no service J:o it, but by 
 being made an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly? 
 That he may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous 
 execution from the hands of civil justice, or in some other 
 course of extravagance shorten his days ; or bring upon himself 
 infamy and diseases worse than death ? So that it had been 
 better for him, even with regard to the present world, that he 
 had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for 
 people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain 
 proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be 
 nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more gene- 
 ral interest, under the providence and government of the same 
 God? 
 
 CHAPTER III.» 
 
 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OE GOD. 
 
 As the manifold appearances of design, and of final causes, in 
 the constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an in- 
 telligent mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain 
 distributed amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his 
 
 ^ [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. 
 If in this world, we have proofs that God is a moral governor, then in order to 
 evince that we shall be under moral government hcrco/ter, we have only to 
 supply an intermediate consideration. — viz. : that God, as such, must be un- 
 changeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form; 
 because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very princijyles on which 
 G'^d's government goes at present, compel us not only to supijose that the priu- 
 e^pi<>3 of God will remain, but to believe so.] 
 
106 THE MORAL GOYERXMENT OF GOD. parti. 
 
 gjv'''irnment ; wliat may be called his natural government of 
 creaturis endued witli sense and reason. This implies somewhat 
 more than seems usually attended to, when we speak of God's 
 natural government of the world. It implies government of 
 the very same kind with that which a master exercises over 
 his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter 
 instances of final causes, as really prove an intelligent Governor 
 of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before"^ distinctly 
 treated of; as any other instances of final causes prove an intelli- 
 gent Maker of it. 
 
 But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any 
 thing certainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of 
 nature, considered in this relation of governor; does not ascer- 
 tain his government to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous 
 Judge of the world. Moral government consists, not in barely 
 rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most 
 tyrannical may do, but in rewarding the righteous, and punish- 
 ing the wicked : in rendering to men according to their actions, 
 considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral govern- 
 ment consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, 
 in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits. 
 
 Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of 
 nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence. This, con- 
 sidered as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposi- 
 tion to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard 
 to persons' behavior, otherwise than as such regard would pro- 
 duce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only 
 character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing 
 but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Surely this ought not to 
 be asserted, unless it can be proved ; for we .should speak with 
 cautious reverence upon such a subject. Whether it can be 
 proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired into ; but 
 whether in the constitution and conduct of the world, a righteous 
 government be not discernibly planned out : which necessarily 
 implies a righteous governor. There may possibly be in the 
 creation beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests himself 
 under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite abso- 
 lute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
CHAP. III. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. i07 
 
 perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests 
 himself to us under the character of a righteous governor. Ha 
 may, consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, 
 in the sense now explained : but he is (for he has given us a 
 proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that he is) a 
 governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our 
 actions. And in the constitution and conduct of it, he may also 
 have given, besides the reason of the thing, and the natural pre- 
 sages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations, that his govern- 
 ment is righteous or moral : clear to such as think the nature ot 
 it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless person, 
 who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.* 
 
 It is particularly to be observed, that the divine government, 
 which we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken 
 alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of moral government. 
 Yet this by no means hinders, but that there may be somewhat, 
 be it more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous government 
 may plainly appear to be carried on to some degree, enough to 
 give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or C'-^rried on 
 to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall ; 
 but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine adminis- 
 tration be seen, than can be seen in the present life. The design 
 of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the case : how far, 
 over and above the moral naturef which God has given us, and 
 our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his 
 creatures, to whom he has given this nature 3 J I say how far be- 
 sides this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government 
 over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all 
 the confusion and disorder of it. 
 
 One might mention here, what has been often urged with 
 
 * The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, 
 nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural reli- 
 gion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them 
 belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these 
 objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider 
 them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged 
 against Christianity, being almost equally opplicable to them as urged against 
 the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that 
 chapter. 
 
 t Dissertation II. t Chap. vi. 
 
108 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. parti. 
 
 grejit foi'ce, tliat, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfac- 
 tion, are the natural consequences* of a virtuous than of a vicious 
 course of life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral 
 government established in nature ; an instance of it collected 
 from experience and present matter of fact.^ But it must be 
 owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and un- 
 easinesses, each amongst themselves, and also against each other, 
 BO as to make an estimate with any exactness, of the overplus of 
 happiness on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that, 
 amidst the infinite disorders of the world, there may be excep- 
 tions to the happiness of virtue ; even with regard to persons, 
 whose course of life from their youth up has been blameless : and 
 more with regard to those who have gone on for some time in the 
 ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an in- 
 stance of the latter case ; a person with his passions inflamed, 
 his natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of in- 
 dulgence, and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, 
 craving their accustomed gratification ; who can say how long it 
 might be, before such a person would find more satisfaction in 
 the reasonableness and present good consequences of virtue, than 
 difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it? Experience 
 also shows, that men can to a great degree, get over their sense 
 of shame, so as that by professing themselves to be without priu- 
 
 * See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part 11. 
 
 ^ [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is 
 right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a con- 
 viction that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil. 
 As creation is full of the evidences of design, so is Providence. And as the 
 human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the 
 government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the 
 attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay 
 plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good : and a 
 facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure 
 success iu our plana. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our 
 modes, constitutes an evident adaj)tedness to a moral government on the part 
 of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. 
 Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be 
 regarded as God's law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, 
 arc God's retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teach- 
 ings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do 
 actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motfon, distance, 
 gravitation, heat, electricity, <tc. <fec., is received as God's law; and we ;vould 
 deem it insane to act in opposition.] 
 
CHAP. III. THE MORAL GOVER^^MENT OF GOD. 109 
 
 ciple, and avowing even direct villanj, they can support them- 
 selves against the infamy of it. But as the ill actions of an^ 
 one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown in his 
 "way, upon his reformation; so the infiimy of them will be much 
 more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is re- 
 covered. Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the 
 account of former vices : yet it will be said they are in part the 
 consequences of reformation. Still I am far from allowing it 
 doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice 
 in the present world. If it were, yet the beginnings of a 
 righteous administration may, beyond all question, be found in 
 nature, if we will attentively inquire after them.° 
 
 I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral government 
 over the world might be treated, if it did not appear, whether he 
 were in a proper sense our governor at all ; yet when it is certain 
 matter of experience, that he does manifest himself to us under 
 the character of a governor in the sense explained,* it must 
 deserve to be considered, whether there be not reason to appre- 
 hend, that he may be a righteous or moral governor. Since it 
 appears to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the method 
 of rewards and punishments, according to some settled rules of 
 distribution ; it is surely a question to be asked, what presump- 
 tion is there against his finaJJi/ rewarding and punishing them 
 according to this particular rule, namely, as they act reasonably, 
 or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously? Eendering men happy 
 or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls in, 
 with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, tban doing 
 so by any other rule whatever; since rewarding and punishing 
 actions by any other rule, would appear much harder to be ac- 
 counted for, by minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the 
 evidence of religion then more or less clear, the expectation 
 which it raises in us, that the righteous shall, upon the whole, 
 be happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot possibly be con- 
 
 c [Consult Capp on the Gov. of God : TwissE Vindiciae Prov. Dei : Wittichii 
 Excrc. Theol. : Dwight's Theol. : Martinius de Gubernatione Mundi : Lief- 
 CHiLD on Providence : Morton on do. : Sherlock on do. : Rutherford on 
 do. : and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus. Topping, Hunt, Daviea, 
 Horseley, South Wisheart, Seed, CoUings, and Doddridge.] 
 
 * Chap, ii 
 
 10 
 
no THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. parti. 
 
 sideied j»s absurd or cliiuierical; because it is no more tlian an 
 expectation, that a method of government already begun, shall 
 bo carried on, the method of rewardiDg and punishing actions; 
 and shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably 
 appears to us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule 
 which we call distributive justice. Nor, 
 
 II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity, satis- 
 faction, and external advantages, being the natural consequences 
 of prudent management of ourselves, and our affairs ; and rash- 
 ness, profligate negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them 
 many inconveniences and sufferings ; these afford instances of a 
 right constitution of nature, as the correction of children, for 
 their own sakes, and by way of example, when they run into 
 danger or hurt themselves, is a part of right education.* Thus, 
 that God governs the world by general fixed laws, that he has 
 endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of 
 things, and foreseeing the good and bad consequences of behavior, 
 plainly implies some sort of moral government; since from such 
 a constitution of things it cannot but follow, that prudence and 
 impnideuce, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* must 
 be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished. 
 
 III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to 
 a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society ; and 
 besides punishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is 
 also the feai and apprehension of it in those persons, whose 
 crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery; 
 this state of fear being often itself a very considerable punish- 
 ment. The natural fear and apprehension of it too, which re- 
 strains from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. 
 It is necessary to the very being of society, that vices, destruc- 
 tive of it, should be punished as heiiig so ; the vices of falsehood, 
 injustice, cruelty: which punishment therefore is as natural as 
 
 ^ [Tn the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for 
 disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their beinj;^, 
 enjoy happiness: and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, 
 as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, nud 
 would often learn it too late to retrieve our afl'airs, or our souls' peace, God tiap 
 in mercy given forth his teachings, by which, beforehand, we may &now th^ 
 effects of actions.] 
 
 * See Dissertation II. 
 
CHAP. III. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. HI 
 
 societ}', and so is an instance of a kind of moral government, 
 naturally established, and actually taking place. And, since tho 
 certain natural course of things is the conduct of providence or 
 the government of God, though carried on by the instrumentality 
 of men, the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind 
 find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as that they 
 are unavoidably accountable for their behavior; and are often 
 punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in 
 the view of their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to 
 society. 
 
 If it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial 
 to society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and 
 in other cases; and that ill and mischievous actions are often 
 rewarded f- it may be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no 
 sort necessary, and consequently not natural in the sense in 
 which it is necessary, and therefore natural, that ill or mis- 
 chievous actions should be punished : and in the next place, that 
 good actions are never punished, considered as beneficial to 
 society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of their being 
 hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any thing on the 
 side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature 
 has as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as mis- 
 chievous to society, should be punished, and put mankind under 
 a necessitT/ of thus punishing them, as he has directed and neces- 
 sitated us to preserve our lives by food. 
 
 IV. In the natural course of things, virtue as sucli is actually 
 rewarded, and vice as such punished : which seems to afford an 
 instance or exampl^, not only of government, but of moral 
 government, begun and established ; moral in the strictest sense, 
 though not in that perfection of degree, which religion teaches 
 us to expect. In order to see this more clearly, we must distin- 
 guish between actions themselves, and that qualify ascribed to 
 them, which we call virtuous or vicious.' The gratification itself 
 
 <* [It was contended by Mandeville in his "Fable of the Bees" that private 
 vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. 
 This idea is fully refuted by Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1 : 
 <5f;nKEiEY, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by Browx, Characteristics, 
 Ess 2.] 
 
 ^ [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the "delivering up" of 
 our fcavior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it 
 
113 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. part i. 
 
 of every cattiral passion, must be attended with deliglit -, and 
 acquisitions of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the 
 means or materials of enjoyment. An action then, by which 
 any natural passion is gratified, or fortune acquired, procures 
 delight or advantage; abstracted from all consideration of the 
 morality of such action. Consequently, the pleasure or advan- 
 tage in this case, is gained by the action itself, not by the 
 morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be per- 
 haps virtuous or vicious. 
 
 To say that such an action or course of behavior, procured 
 such pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience 
 and pain, is quite a different thing from saying, that such good 
 or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or 
 behavior. In one case, an action abstracted from all moral con- 
 sideration, produced its effect : in the other case, for it will ap- 
 pear that there are such cases, the morality of the action under 
 a moral consideration, i.e. the virtuousness or viciousness of it, 
 produced the effect. Now I say virtue as such, naturally pro- 
 cures considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice as such, 
 naturally occasions great inconvenience and even misery to the 
 vicious, in very many instances. The immediate effects of virtue 
 and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be mentioned as in- 
 stances of it. Vice as such- is naturally attended with some sort 
 of uneasiness, and not uncommonly, with great disturbance and 
 apprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser 
 matters and in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself, 
 and in matters of importance and in more serious language, re- 
 morse ; is an uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a 
 man's own, reflected upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable, 
 faulty, i.e. vicious in greater or less degrees : and this manifestly 
 is a different feeling from that uneasiness, which arises from a 
 sense of mere loss or harm. What is more common, than to 
 hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and adding — but 
 
 referred, 1. To God the Father, John iii. 16 : Acts ii. 23 : Rom. viii. 32. 2. To 
 Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally 
 delivered himself. 3. To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20 : Mark xii. 12. 4, To 
 Pontius Pilate, Matt, xxvii. 26 : Mark xv. 15 : John xix. 6. 5. To Judas. Matt, 
 xxvi. 15: Zee. xi. 12. 
 
 As to the mere act, Judis and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our 
 Lord Jesus did. But how intiuitely unlike the qualities of the actlj 
 
CHAP. m. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. HR 
 
 however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for 
 it ; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of being sen- 
 sible it was his own doing? Thus also the disturbance and fear, 
 which often follow upon a man's having done an injury, arise 
 from a sense of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would, 
 in many cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to 
 fear resentment or shame. On the other hand, inward security 
 and peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life, 
 are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue. To which 
 must be added the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of 
 heart, which accompany the exercise, the real exercise of grati- 
 tude, friendship, benevolence. 
 
 And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future 
 punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who 
 fully believe, or have any serious apprehension of religion : be- 
 cause these hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfac- 
 tion to the mind, and cannot be got rid of by great part of the 
 world, even by men who have thought most thoroughly upon the 
 subject of religion. And no one can say, how considerable this 
 uneasiness or satisfaction may be, or what upon the whole it may 
 amount to.^ 
 
 In the next place comes in the consideration, that all honest 
 and good men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such, 
 and to discountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some 
 degree ; indeed in a considerable degree : from which favor and 
 discouragement cannot but arise considerable advantage and in- 
 convenience. Though the generality of the world have little 
 regard to the morality of their own actions, and may be supposed 
 to have less to that of others, when they themselves are not con- 
 cerned ; yet let any one be known to be a man of virtue, some- 
 how or other he will be favored and good offices will be done him, 
 from regard to his character, without remote views, occasionally, 
 and in some low degree, I think, by the generalit}^ of the world, 
 
 g ["When one supposes be is about to die, there comes over him a fear and 
 anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories 
 which are told about Hades, that sucli as have practised wrong, must there 
 Buffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul 
 iest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant 
 4nd good 1 ^pe, which will support old age." Plato, Respub. i. s. 6.] 
 
 10* 
 
114 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. part i. 
 
 as it happens to come in their way. Public honors too and ad- 
 vantages are the natural consequences, and sometimes at least, 
 the consf.quevices in fact, of virtuous actions ; of eminent justice, 
 fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of 
 being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often infamy 
 and external inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice 
 as vice. For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, 
 injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of 
 misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revo- 
 lutions, which make a figure even in the history of the world. 
 For it is plain, that men resent injuries as implying faultiness, 
 and retaliate, not merely under the notion of having received 
 harm, but of having received wrong ; and they have this resent- 
 ment in behalf of others, as well as of themselves. So likewise 
 even the generality are, in some degree, grateful and disposed to 
 return good ofiices, not merely because such a one has been the 
 occasion of good to them, but under the view, that such good 
 ofiices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. 
 
 To all this may be added two or three particular things, which 
 many persons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so, 
 which at all comes in towards determining a question of such im- 
 portance, as, whether there be or be not, a moral institution of 
 government, in the strictest sense moral, visihly established and 
 begun in nature. The particular things are these : That in 
 domestic government, which is doubtless natural, children and 
 others also are very generally punished for falsehood, injustice, 
 and ill-behavior, as such, and rewarded for the contrary: which 
 are instances of veracity and justice and right behavior, as such, 
 naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, more or less con- 
 siderable. That, though civil government be supposed to take 
 cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to 
 society, without respect to the immorality of them, yet as such 
 actions are immoral, so the sense which men have of the im- 
 morality of them, very greatly contributes, in different ways, to 
 bring ofi'enders to justice. And that entire absence of all crime 
 and guilt in the moral sense, when plainly appearing, will almost 
 of course procure, and circumstances of aggravated guilt ^r.svent, 
 a remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many 
 cases, though by no means in all. 
 
CHAP. III. THE MOEAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 115 
 
 Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects of 
 virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the course or tbe world 
 does, in some measure, turn upon the approbation and disappro- 
 bation of them as such, in others. The sense of well and ilJ 
 doiDg, the presages of conscience, the love of good characters 
 and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, resentment, gratitude, all 
 these, considered in themselves, and in their effects, do afford 
 manifest real instances, of virtue as such naturally favored, and 
 of vice as such discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course 
 of human life; in every age, in every relation, in every general 
 circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral nature,* may 
 most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his moral 
 government : but that he has placed us in a condition, which 
 gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in 
 which it does unavoidably operate ; i.e. influence mankind to act, 
 so as thus to favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and 
 punish vice, this is not the same, but a further additional proof 
 of his moral government; for it is an instance of it. The first 
 is a proof, that he will finally favor and support virtue effectually: 
 the second is an example of his favoring and supporting it at 
 present, in some degree. 
 
 If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that 
 virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished, 
 aod this rule never inverted, it will be found to proceed, in part, 
 immediately from the moral nature itself, which God has given 
 us f- and also in part, from his having given us, together with 
 
 * See Dissertation II. 
 
 ^ [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived 
 from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our m%ral sense, which con- 
 strains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral 
 worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It 
 does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own con- 
 ceptions, for it is but the argument a fortiori, " He that formed the eye, shall 
 he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?" Ps. xciv. 
 9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do ; but that he svex, for 
 he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have 
 Jiem, from him. 
 
 This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknow- 
 ledge God's physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to their 
 understanding, but deny his moral ones, because their hearts are hardened 
 through the deceitfulness of sin.] 
 
116 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OE GOD. part t. 
 
 this nature, so great a power over eacli other's happiness and 
 misery. For, first, it is certain, that peace and delight, in some 
 degree and upon some occasions, is the necessary and present 
 effect of virtuous practice; an effect arising immediately from 
 that constitution of our nature. We are so made, that well-doing 
 as such, gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances ; ill-doing 
 as such, in none. And, secondly, from our moral nature, joined 
 with God's having put our happiness and misery in many respects 
 in each other's power, it cannot but be, that vice as such, some 
 kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men will 
 be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable ) and the villain 
 will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy, any 
 more than he will be able to escape this further punishment, 
 which mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the 
 notion of his deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side 
 of vice, to answer this; because there is nothing in the human 
 mind contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue 
 consists in a regard to what is right and reasonable, as being so ; 
 in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves : and there 
 is surely no such thing, as a like natural regard to falsehood, 
 injustice, cruelty. If it be thought, that there are instances of 
 an approbation of vice, as such, in itself, and for \\jBr own sake, 
 (though it does not appear to me, that there is any such thing at 
 all 3) it is evidently monstrous : as much so, as the most acknow- 
 ledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such instances of 
 perversion then being left out, as merely imaginary, or at least 
 unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and 
 from our condition, in the respects now described, that vice can- 
 not at all be, and vh'tue cannot but be, favored as such by others, 
 upon some occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For 
 what is here insisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue and 
 vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they 
 are so in some degree ; though the whole good and bad effect of 
 virtue and vice as such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But 
 that they must be thus distinguished in some degree, is in a 
 manner necessary: it is matter of fact of daily experience, even 
 in the greatest confusion of human affairs. 
 
 It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things, 
 happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules, 
 
CHAP. III. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. II7 
 
 than only the personal merit and demerit of characters. Thej 
 may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline. There 
 may be the wisest and best reasons, why the world should be 
 governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distri- 
 bution perhaps must follow; and also why our happiness and 
 misery should be put in each other's power, in the degree which 
 they are. And these things, as, in general, they contribute to 
 the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so they often 
 contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible, 
 but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked ; afflicted, 
 though righteous ; and, which is worse, to the rewarding some 
 actions, though vicious, and punishing other actions, though 
 virtuous.* But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the 
 conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way 
 of distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our being so 
 constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and 
 discountenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as such, is 
 an intuitive proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so; 
 otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus im- 
 mediately and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot 
 be said, because virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and 
 vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though 
 this great disorder is brought about, as all actions are, by means 
 of some natural passion ; yet this mai/ be, as it undoubtedly is, 
 brought about by the perversion of such passion, implanted in us 
 for other, and those very good purposes. And indeed these other 
 and good purposes, even of every passion, may be clearly seen. 
 
 We have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect, 
 from Him who is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or 
 what part he takes ; a declaration for virtue, and against vice. 
 So far therefore as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, 
 to equity and charity, and the right of the case, in whatever he 
 is concerned ; so far he is on the side of the divine administra- 
 tion, and co-operates with it : and from hence, to such a man, 
 
 * [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less 
 conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view 
 of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view 
 to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we culti- 
 vate virtue for its own sake.] 
 
118 THE MORAL GOYERXMENT OF GOD. part i. 
 
 arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and 
 iinpliuit hope of somewhat further. 
 
 V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of 
 virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at present 
 discernible in nature; and so afford an instance of somewhat 
 moral in the essential constitution of it. There is, in the nature 
 of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and 
 bad effects now mentioned, in a greater degree than they do in 
 fact produce them. For instance; good and bad men would be 
 much more rewarded and punished as such, were it not, that 
 justice is often artificially eluded,'' that characters are not known, 
 and many, who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, are 
 hindered from doing so, by accidental causes. These tendencies 
 of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individuals. But 
 it may require more particularly to be considered, that power in 
 a societi/, by being under the direction of virtue, naturally in- 
 creases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite 
 power, not under the direction of it; in like manner, as power, 
 by being under the direction of reason, increases, and has a 
 tendency to prevail over brute force. There are several brute 
 
 J [The common remark, "virtue brings its own reward," is true only with 
 qualifications. The apostles, as to this life, were the most miserable of men: 
 (1 Cor. XV. 9.) Virtue does not always bring earthly rewards. The grand 
 support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which 
 the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct 
 man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very 
 good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future 
 safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness 
 were the only reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but fur 
 the encouragement of virtue, it must have obvious triumphs. 
 , On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so 
 that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, 
 owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, wholly 
 deprives him of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain 
 who kills himself, escapes his only punishment. 
 
 Virtuous persons, in the strong language of Robert Hall,* would be " tho 
 only persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons 
 who (by a ft tal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness 
 in iui imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present 
 pleasures, of Avhicb others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at 
 shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual 
 struggle against their natural propensities and passiuns, and all in vain !"'] 
 
 Sermon on the Vauitv of Man 
 
CHAP. in. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 119 
 
 creatures of equal, and several of superior strength, to that of 
 men ; and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes may 
 be greater than that of mankind; but reason gives us the advan- 
 tage and superiority over them; and thus man is the acknow- 
 ledged governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority 
 considered by any as accidental ; but as what reason has a ten- 
 dency, in the nature of the thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps 
 difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as well as the truth, 
 of the assertion, that virtue has the like tendency. 
 
 To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly, how the 
 case stands with regard to reason ; which is so readily acknow- 
 ledged to have this advantageous tendency. Suppose then two or 
 three men, of the best and most improved understanding, in a deso- 
 late open plain, attacked by ten times the number of beasts of 
 prey : would their reason secure them the victory in this unequal 
 combat? Power then, though joined with reason, and under its 
 direction, cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power, 
 though merely brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to 
 the other. Again : put the imaginary case, that rational and 
 irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner : it 
 is certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distin- 
 guish each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to form 
 a union among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in 
 several respects upon great disadvantage; though united they 
 might be vastly superior : since union is of such efficacy, that 
 ten men united, might be able to accomplish, what ten thousand 
 of the same natural strength and understanding wholly ununited, 
 could not. In this case, brute force might more than maintain 
 its ground against reason, for want of union among the rational 
 creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon an island 
 inhabited only by wild beasts; men who, by the regulations of 
 civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of 
 some years, could they be preserved so long, would be really suffi- 
 cient to subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in 
 security from them : yet a conjuncture of accidents might give 
 «uch advantage to the irrational animals as they might at once 
 overpower, and even extirpate, the rational ones. Length of 
 time tuen, proper scope, and opportunities for reason to exert 
 
120 THE MOEAL GOVERXMEXT OF GOD. part t. 
 
 xtself, may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over brute 
 force. 
 
 Furtlier : there are many instances of brutes succeeding in 
 attempts, wbich they could not have undertaken, bad not their 
 irrational nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger 
 of such attempt, or the fury of passion hindered their attending 
 to it : and there are instances of reason and real prudence pre- 
 venting men's undertaking what, it has appeared afterwards, 
 they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness. In certain 
 conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness and discord, may have 
 their advantages. So that rational animals have not necessarily 
 the superiority over irrational ones; but, how improbable soever 
 it may be, it is evidently possible, that in some globes the latter 
 may be superior. And were the former wholly at variance and dis- 
 united, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, 
 and consequent rage and malice against each other, whilst the 
 latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this might 
 greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order of 
 things. For every one would consider it as inverted : since 
 reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute 
 force ; notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the 
 necessity, which there is, of many concurring circumstances to 
 render it prevalent. 
 
 Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure 
 superiority and additional power : whether this power be con- 
 sidered as the means of security from opposite power, or of ob- 
 taining other advantages. It has this tendency, by rendering 
 public good, an object and end, to every member of the society; 
 by putting every one upon consideration and diligence, recollec- 
 tion and self-government, both in order to see what is the most 
 eifectual method, and also in order to perform their proper part, 
 for obtaining and preserving it; by uniting a society within itself, 
 and so increasing its strength ; and, which is particularly to be 
 mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For as 
 these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence or public 
 spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows what. 
 
 And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensa 
 tions of Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous to what appears : 
 or that both together make up one uniform scheme, the two parra 
 
CHAP. m. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 121 
 
 of which, the part which we see, and that which is beyond our 
 observation, are analogous to each other : then, there must be a 
 like natural tendency in the derived power, throughout the uni- 
 verse, under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general over 
 that which is not under its direction ; as there is in reason, 
 derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force. 
 
 But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may 
 actually produce, what it has a tendency to produce ; the like 
 concurrences are necessary, as are, to the prevalence of reason. 
 There must be some proportion, between the natural power or 
 force which is, and that which is not, under the direction of 
 virtue : there must be sufficient length of time ; for the complete 
 success of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the nature of the 
 thing, be otherwise than gradual : there must be, as one may 
 speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough, 
 proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous to join to- 
 gether, to exert themselves against lawless force, and to reap the 
 fruit of their united labors. Now indeed it is to be hoped, that 
 the disproportion between the good and bad, even here on earth, 
 is not so great, but that the former have natural power sufficient 
 to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances 
 would permit this power to be united. For, much less, very 
 much less, power under the direction of virtue, would prevail 
 over much greater not under the direction of it.^ However, 
 good men over the face of the earth cannot unite; because, 
 (among other reasons,) they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of 
 each other's characters. And the known course of human things, 
 the scene we are now passing through, particularly the shortness 
 of life, denies to virtue its full scope in several other respects. 
 
 The natural tendency which we have been considering, though 
 real, is hindered from being carried into effect in the present 
 state : but these hinderances may be removed in a future one. 
 Virtue, to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here; and 
 various untoward accidents contribute to its being often over- 
 
 *,[Becanse, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man 
 to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he 
 is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mis- 
 chief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in 
 Lcther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.] 
 
 11 
 
122 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. parti. 
 
 borne : but it may combat with greater adyantage hereafter, and 
 prevail completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards, in some 
 future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps 
 despised and oppressed here; there maybe scenes in eternity, 
 lasting enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford it a 
 sufficient sphere of action; and a sufficient sphere for the natural 
 consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally 
 immortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as 
 childhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite, 
 not only among themselves, but also with other orders of vir- 
 tuous creatures, in that future state. For virtue, from the very 
 nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some degree, 
 among all who are endued with it, and known to each other; so 
 as that by it, a good man cannot but recommend himself to the 
 favor and protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole 
 universe, who can be acquainted with his character, and can 
 any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration. 
 
 One might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of 
 virtue to become effect, among one or more orders of creatures, 
 in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders 
 of vicious creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God ; 
 this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency, by way of ex- 
 ample, and possibly in other ways, to amend those of them who 
 are capable of amendment, and of being recovered to a just sense 
 of virtue. If our notions of the plan of Providence were 
 enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have 
 enlarged our views with respect to the material world, representa- 
 tions of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. They 
 are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of what 
 is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot be 
 known without revelation : for suppositions are not to be looked 
 on as true, because not incredible : but they are mentioned to 
 show, that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to 
 itself such superiority and advantages, is no objection against its 
 having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to pro- 
 cure them. And the suppositions noAv mentioned do plainly show 
 this : for they show, that these hinderances are so far from being 
 necessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive, how they may 
 be removed in future states, and full scope be granted to virtue 
 
CHAP. III. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 123 
 
 And all these advantageous tendencies of it are to be considered 
 as declarations of God in its favor. This however is taking a 
 pretty large compass : though it is certain, that, as the material 
 world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there 
 must be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it. 
 
 But let us return to the earth our habitation ; and we shall see 
 this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so 
 vast and remote : by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon 
 it, perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages ; to which, 
 if 3'ou please, may be given a situation advantageous for universal 
 monarchy. In such a state, there would be no such thing as 
 faction : but men of the greatest capacity would of course, all 
 alongj have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to 
 them; and they would share it among themselves without envy. 
 Each of these would have the part assigned him, to which his 
 genius was peculiarly adapted ', and others, who had not any dis- 
 tinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very 
 happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who 
 had. Public determinations would really be the result of the 
 united wisdom of the community: and they would faithfully be 
 executed, by the united strength of it. Some would contribute 
 in a higher way, but all in some way, to the public prosperity : 
 and in it, each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And 
 as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among 
 themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their 
 neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in 
 injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction and intestine 
 treachery; these on one hand would be found mere childish folly 
 and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public 
 spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing both 
 a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general 
 influence, which such a kingdom would have over the face of the 
 earth, by way of example particularly, and the reverence which 
 would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and 
 the world must gradually come under its empire; not by means 
 of lawless violence ; but partly by what must be allowed to be just 
 conquest; and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves 
 voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its 
 protection, one after another, in successive exigencies. The head 
 
124 THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. pari w 
 
 of it would be a universal monarch, in another sense than any 
 mortal has yet been ; and the Eastern style would be literally 
 applicable to him, that all peoj^le, nations, and languages should 
 serve him. And though indeed our knowledge of human nature, 
 and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, with- 
 out some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here 
 on earth, should unite in one society or government, in the fear 
 of God and universal practice of virtue ; and that such a govern- 
 ment should continue so united for a succession of ages : yet ad- 
 mitting or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out. 
 Thus for instance, the wonderful power and prosperity promised 
 to the Jewish nation in the Scripture, would be, in a great mea- 
 sure, the consequence of what is predicted of them ; that the 
 people should he all righteous, and inherit the land forever y^ 
 were we to understand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, 
 sufficient to give things time to work. The predictions of this 
 kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to pass, in the 
 present known course of nature; but suppose them come to pass, 
 and then, the dominion and preeminence promised must naturally 
 follow, to a very considerable degree. 
 
 Consider now the general system of religion ; that the govern- 
 ment of the world is uniform, and one, and moral ; that virtue 
 and right shall finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud 
 and lawless force, over the deceits as well as the violence of 
 wickedness, under 4he conduct of one supreme governor : and 
 from the observations above made, it will appear that Grod has, 
 by our reason, given us to see a peculiar connection in the 
 several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards the com- 
 pletion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue : which 
 tendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential 
 constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of 
 little importance, I desire him to consider, what he would think, 
 if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous 
 tendencies ) or if virtue had essentially the contrary ones. 
 
 It may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural 
 effects and natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now 
 going on throughout the universe, and may go on hereafter, in 
 the same mixed way as here at present upon earth : virtue some- 
 
 * Isa. Ix. 21. 
 
CHAP. III. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 125 
 
 times prosperous, sometimes depressed ; vice sometimes punished, 
 sometimes successful. 
 
 The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this 
 chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God's perfect 
 moral government over the world, or the truth of religion ; but 
 to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature, 
 to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known : and 
 that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may 
 be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are, to a certain 
 degree, say to a very high degree, distributed among us without 
 any apparent regard to the merit or demerit of characters. And 
 were there nothing else concerning this matter discernible in the 
 constitution and course of nature, there would be no ground 
 from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or to fear 
 that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according to 
 their deserts : which, however, it is to be remarked, implies, that 
 even then there would be no ground from appearances to think, 
 that vice upon the whole would have the advantage, rather than 
 that virtue would. Thus the proof of a future state of retribution 
 would rest upon the usual known arguments for it ; which are 
 [ think plainly unanswerable; and would be so, though there 
 were no additional confirmation of them from the things above 
 insisted on. But these things are a very strong confirmation 
 of them. For, 
 
 First, They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent 
 to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration, from him, 
 determinate and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and against 
 the other; such a declaration, as there is nothing to be set over 
 against or answer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, 
 laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine from the 
 course of nature only, whether it were most probable, that the 
 righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future 
 life ; there can be no doubt, but that he would determine the 
 pwbability j;o be, that the former would. The course of nature 
 then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real prac- 
 tical proof of the obligations of religion. 
 
 BeconcUy, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God 
 shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every 
 «.2ie shall, upon the whole, have his deserts; this distributivo 
 
 11* 
 
126 THE MOllAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. part r 
 
 justice w^'ll not be a thing different in hind, but only in degree, 
 from what we experience in his present government. It will be 
 that in effect, towards which we now see a tendency. It will be 
 no more than the completion of that moral government, the prin- 
 ciples and, beginning of which have been shown, beyond all 
 dispute, discernible in the present constitution and course of 
 nature. 
 
 Thirdly, As under the natural government of God, our expe- 
 rience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which 
 we do experience at present, gives just ground to hope for, and 
 to fear, higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future state, 
 supposing a future state admitted : so under his moral govern- 
 ment our experience, that virtue and vice are, in the manners 
 above mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, in 
 a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear, that they 
 way he rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. It 
 is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient ground to 
 think, that they actually will he rewarded and punished in a 
 higher degree, rather than in a lower : but then, 
 
 Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good 
 and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are 
 essential, and founded in the nature of things : whereas the 
 hinderances to their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not 
 necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly 
 argued, that these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and 
 punishments, of virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the 
 nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the accidental 
 hinderances of them will. And if these hinderances do not 
 remain; those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried 
 on much farther towards the perfection of moral government: 
 i.e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect; but 
 when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at 
 all, but by revelation. 
 
 Upon the whole: there is a kind of moral governn^ent implied 
 in God's natural government:* virtue and vice are natundly re- 
 warded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society ;'(' 
 and rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice.| The 
 notion of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but 
 * P. 109. t P- 110^ *c. X P- 111> **J 
 
CHAP. HI. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD [2*^ 
 
 natural ; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution 
 and course of nature : and the execution of this scheme 12 
 actually begun, in the instances here mentioned. Ana these 
 things are to be considered as a declaration of the Author of 
 nature, for virtue, and against vice : they give a credibility to 
 the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter; 
 and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be rewarded 
 and punished in higher degrees than they are here. All this is 
 confirmed, and the argument for religion, from the constitution 
 and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that 
 there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only arti- 
 ficial hinderances, to this moral scheme's being carried on much 
 farther towards perfection, than it is at present.* 
 
 The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more 
 perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion ', 
 for it is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of 
 virtue and vice. These teodencies are to be considered as in- 
 timations, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author 
 of nature, of much greater rewards and punishments to follow 
 virtue and vice, than do at present. Indeed, every natural ten- 
 dency, which is to continue, but which is hindered from becom- 
 ing effect by only accidental causes, affords a presumption, that 
 such tendency will, some time or other, become effect : a pre- 
 sumption proportionable in degree to the length of the duration, 
 through which such tendency will continue. From these things 
 together, arises a real prCvSumption, that the moral scheme of 
 government established in nature, shall be carried on much 
 farther towards perfection hereafter ; and, I think, a presumption 
 that it will be absolutely completed. From these things, joined 
 with the moral nature which God has given us, considered" as 
 given us by him, arises a practical prooff that it icill be com- 
 pleted : a proof from fact ; and therefore a distinct one from 
 that which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, 
 the fitness and unfitness of actions. 
 
 * P. 118, &c. f See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi. 
 
I 8 PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, pabti 
 
 CHAPTEE IV. 
 
 PROBATION; AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND 
 DANGER.* 
 
 The general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a 
 :tate of probation for a future one, comprehends under it several 
 particular things, distinct from each other. The first and most 
 common meaning of it seems to be, that our future interest is 
 now depending, and depending upon ourselves; that we have 
 scope and opportunities here, for that good and bad behavior, 
 which God will reward and punish hereafter; together with 
 temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other. 
 And this, in a great measure, is the same as saying, that we are 
 under the moral government of God, and to give an account of 
 our actions to him. For the notion of a future account and 
 general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations to 
 what is wrong : otherwise there would be no moral possibility of 
 doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But 
 there is this difference, that the word probation is more dis- 
 tinctly and particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or 
 difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the 
 danger of miscarrying by such temptations, than the words moral 
 government. A state of probation then, as thus particularly im- 
 plying in it trial, difficulties, and danger, may require to be 
 considered distinctly by itself.'' 
 
 As the moral government of God, which religion teaches us, 
 
 * [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suflfer- 
 ing and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its 
 theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity, 
 Mus^i Disput. : Holtzsfusii Disp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum : Selden de Laps. 
 Augelorum : Stapferi Inst. : Witsii Econom. Feed. : Bate's Harmony of the 
 Divine Attrib. : Calcott on the Fall: Shuckford on the Creation of Man : 
 Manton's Sermons: South's do.: Toplady's do.: Pearson on the Creed: 
 Le Clerc's Diss.: Henly's Dissert.: Kennicott on the Tree of Life: and 
 Fabricius de Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.] 
 
 b [The evils of life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarjly, into 
 God's plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scripturea 
 ehow that all suffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first wa.s to 
 be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.] 
 
CHAP. IV. DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 229 
 
 implies that we are in a state of trial witti regard to x future 
 world, so also his natural government over us implies that wo 
 are in a state of trial, in the like sense, with regard to the pre- 
 sent world. Natural government by rewards and punishments, 
 as mucli implies natural trial, as moral government does moral 
 trial. The natural government of God here meant,* consists in 
 his annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, which 
 are in our power to do or forbear, and giving us notice of such 
 appointment, beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he has 
 made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to depend in part 
 upon ourselves. So far as men have temptations to any course of 
 action, which will probably occasion them greater temporal incon- 
 venience and uneasiness, than satisfaction, so far their temporal 
 interest is in danger from themselves; or they are in a state of 
 trial with respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even 
 themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And 
 we find many are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss that 
 natural happiness, which they might have obtained in the present 
 life : perhaps every one does in some degree. But many run 
 themselves into great inconvenience, and into extreme distress 
 and misery, not through incapacity of knowing better, and doing 
 better, for themselves, which would be nothing to the present 
 purpose, but through their own fault. These things necessarily 
 imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less 
 degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness. Every 
 one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the 
 hazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the 
 world : hazards from other causes, than merely their ignorance, 
 and unavoidable accidents. And some courses of vice, at least, 
 being contrary to men's worldly interest or good ; temptations to 
 these must at the same time be temptations to forego our present 
 and our future interest. 
 
 Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state of 
 trial, i.e. of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral 
 and religious trial. This will more distinctly appear to any one, 
 who thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it 
 is which constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe^ 
 how oiankind behave under it. 
 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
130 PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, part i. 
 
 That wliieli constitutes this trial, in both these capacities, must 
 be something either in our external circumstances, or in our 
 mature. For, on the one hand, persons may be betrayed into 
 wrong behavior upon surprise, or overcome upon any other very 
 singular and extraordinary external occasions, who would, other- 
 wise, have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue : 
 in which cases, every one, in speaking of the wrong behavior of 
 these persons, would impute it to such particular external circum- 
 stances. On the other hand, men who have contracted habits of 
 vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular passions in 
 excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their 
 way, to gratify themselves in these respects, at the expense of 
 their wisdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one would say, 
 not by external temptations, but by such habits and passions. 
 And the account of this last case is, that particular passions are 
 no more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable self-love, 
 the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are with the 
 principle of virtue and religion ; but often draw contrary ways 
 to one, as well as to the other : and so such particular passions 
 aro as much temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our 
 wo»-idly interest, as to act viciously.* When we say, men are 
 mi&ied by external circumstances of temptation ; it cannot but be 
 upderstood, that there is somewhat within themselves, to render 
 those circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of 
 impressions from them. So when we say, they are misled by 
 p^sions J it is always supposed, that there are occasions, circum- 
 sUnces, and objects, exciting these passions, and affording means 
 for . gratifying them. Therefore, temptations from within, and 
 from without, coincide, and mutually imply each other. The 
 several external objects of the appetites, passions, and affections, 
 being present to the senses, or offering themselves to the mind, 
 and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature ; not only in 
 cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and 
 prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be 
 gratified imprudently and viciously : this as really puts them in 
 danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as 
 their future 3 and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure 
 
 «- See Sermons preached at the Bolls, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &o. 
 SBrin. p. 21, &c. 
 
CHAP. IV. DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 131 
 
 one, as the other : i.e. we are iu a like state of trial with respect 
 to both, by the very same passions, excited by the very same 
 means. 
 
 Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upoa 
 themselves, and a pi'udent course of behavior being necessary lo 
 secure it, passions inordinately excited, whether by means of 
 example, or by any other external circumstance, towards such 
 objects, at such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be 
 gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are temptations ; 
 dangerous, and too often successful temptations, to forego a 
 greater temporal good for a less; i.e. to forego what is, upon the 
 whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a present gratifica- 
 tion. This is a description of our state of trial in our temporal 
 capacity. Substitute now the word future for te^nj^oral, and 
 virtue for prudence; and it will be just as proper a description 
 of our state of trial in our religious capacity; so analogous are 
 they to each other.° 
 
 If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both capa- 
 cities, we go on to observe farther, how mankind behave under it ; 
 we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it, that 
 they scarce look beyond the passing day : they are so taken up with 
 present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of con- 
 sequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life • 
 any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to b« 
 blinded and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly con- 
 cerns, as much as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it 
 were forcibly carried away by the like passions, against their 
 better judgment, and feeble resolutions too of acting better."* And 
 there are men, and truly not a few, who shamelessly avow, not 
 their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, to be their law 
 of life : and who, in open defiance of every thing reasonable, 
 
 " ["If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then 
 should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous 
 Deity, or that there is no Deity at all." — Dr. Chalmers.] 
 
 ^ [Shall we be of such ? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that 
 when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will 
 remain ? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with 
 nouses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present, hut atill oicrselven. 
 Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified^ and capacities to be 
 employed and developed !] 
 
132 PROBATIOX, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, part i. 
 
 will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with 
 no remorse and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin ; 
 and some of them, under the apprehension of the consequences 
 of wickedness in another state. To speak in the most moderate 
 way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong 
 voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so, 
 with respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect 
 to religion. 
 
 Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal 
 and our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes, 
 and have the same efiect upon men's behavior, are evidently ana- 
 logous, and of the same kind. 
 
 It may be added, that the difficulties and dangers of miscarry- 
 ing in our religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one 
 is ready to think, are in a manner wholly made, by the ill 
 behavior of others; by a wrong education, wrong in a moral 
 sense, sometimes positively vicious ) by general bad example ; by 
 the dishonest artifices which are got into business of all kinds; 
 and, in very many parts of the world, by religion's being cor- 
 rupted into superstitions, which indulge men in their vices. In 
 like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently 
 in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being led 
 aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish educa- 
 tion ; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and 
 carelessness of others, with whom we have intercourse : and by 
 mistaken notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from 
 common opinion, concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it 
 consists. 
 
 Persons, by their own negligence nnd/olli/ in temporal affairs, no 
 less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties, 
 and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through 
 them : and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to 
 guch a degree, that they know not whereabout they are; and 
 often makes the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that 
 it is difficult to trace it out; difficult even to determine what is 
 the prudent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong be- 
 havior in one stage of life, youth ; wrong, I mean considering 
 ourselves only in our temporal capacity, without taking in reli- 
 gion ; thiS; in several ways, increases the difficulties of right 
 
CHAP. IV. DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 133 
 
 behavior in mature age; i.e. puts us into a more disadvantageous 
 state of trial in our temporal capacity. 
 
 We- are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are 
 natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation.* We 
 certainly are in a condition, which does 7iot seem.; by any means, 
 the most advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our 
 natural or moral capacity, for securing- either our present or 
 future interest. However, this condition, low, and careful, and 
 uncertain as it is, does not afford any just ground of complaint. 
 For, as men may manage their temporal affairs with prudence, 
 and so pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satis- 
 faction, by a moderate degree of care : so likewise with regard to 
 religion, there is no more required than what they are well able 
 to do,^ and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if 
 they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon them, 
 which they are well able to go through, and no more, we natu- 
 rally consider as an equitable thing ; supposing it done by proper 
 authority. Nor have we any more reason to complain of it, with 
 regard to the Author of nature, tban of his not having given us 
 advantages belonging to other orders of creatures. 
 
 [Remarks.] The thing here insisted upon is, that the state 
 of trial, which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible, 
 by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general 
 conduct of Providence towards us, in all other respects within 
 the compass of our knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered 
 in their natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world only, found 
 themselves, from their birth to their death, in a settled state of 
 
 * Part II. chap. v. 
 
 « [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a state- 
 ment not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to 
 have overlooked the great fact of man's fall and corruption. That the argu- 
 ment properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man as Chal- 
 mers. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, 
 "There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to 
 found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achieve- 
 ment of this volume. The analogy lies here: — that if a man wills to obtain 
 prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and 
 wisdotu prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessed- 
 cess in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most 
 certJiinly make "* good; in conformity with the declaration, *he that uCekelh 
 findetb.'"] 
 
 12 
 
1H4 PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, part i. 
 
 J5rcurity and happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their 
 own : or if they were in no danger of being brought into incon- 
 veniences and distress, by carelessness, or the folly of passion, 
 through bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful 
 appearances of things : were this our natural condition, then it 
 might seem strange, and be some presumption against the truth 
 of religion, that it represents our future and more general in- 
 terest, as not secure of course, but as depending upon our be- 
 havior, and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. 
 It then might be alleged, "What you say is our condition, in one 
 respect, is not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by expe- 
 rience, is our condition in another. Our whole present interest 
 is secured to our hands, without any solicitude of ours ; and why 
 should not our future interest, if we have any such, be so too?'^ 
 But since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the volun- 
 tary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course 
 of behavior, far from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely 
 necessary to our acting even a common decent, and common 
 prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the 
 present world, and be received upon any tolerable good terms 
 in it : since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial 
 and attention being necessary to secure our higher interest,^ is 
 removed. 
 
 Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, 
 that it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be 
 put upon us by an infinite being; when every thing which has 
 hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will end in 
 error, confusion, and misery, is already certain in his foreknow- 
 ledge. Indeed, why any thing of hazard and danger should be 
 put upon such frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a 
 difficulty in speculation ; and cannot but be so, till we know the 
 whole, or at least much more of the case. But still the consti- 
 tution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted 
 to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, 
 in many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to 
 
 ^ [It comes to this : — good things, in this life, are not forced upon us: for we 
 may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our 
 mere acceptance : but only as the results of self-control and painj-taking So 
 is it, as to heaven.] 
 
CHAP. IV. DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER. 135- 
 
 do, or to sivffer, as we choose. All t"he various miseries of life; 
 which people bring upon themselves by neglfgeuce and folly, 
 and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this : 
 which miseries are, beforehand, just as contingent and undeter- 
 mined as conduct, and left to be determined by it. 
 
 These observations are an answer^ to the objections against the 
 credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real 
 danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under 
 the moral government of God. And they show, that, if we are 
 at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an 
 interest, the general analogy of Providence must lead us to ap- 
 prehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, 
 as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part be- 
 longing to us in that capacity. For we have a present interest 
 under the government of God, which we experience here upon 
 earth. This interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it 
 offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition ; and in such 
 manner, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of 
 temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it; and without atten- 
 tion and self-denial, we must and do miss it. It is then perfectly 
 credible, that this may be our case, with respect to that chief and 
 final good, which religion proposes to us. 
 
 e [They a^-e an answer, but a cavil remains, — viz. : '' the difference between 
 temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous." 
 Faii-ly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only in degree, and not at 
 all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small 
 one. 
 
 Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of 
 some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the hap- 
 piness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings 
 of a higher order, who witness the afi'airs of this earth? It would but bo 
 securing "the greatest good of the greatest number." No analogies could 
 teach this, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures con- 
 tained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is 
 here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions ?] 
 
,3G PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. parti 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE 
 AND IMPROVEMENT. 
 
 From the consideration of our being in a probation-state, of 
 so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how 
 we came to be placed in it ? But such a general inquiry as this 
 would be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though 
 some of these difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all 
 wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion j and 
 that many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects : 
 yet, when we consider other circumstances belonging to both, 
 and what must be the consequence of the former in a life to 
 come, it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and presump- 
 tion, to pretend to give an account of the wliole 7'easons of this 
 matter; the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out 
 of which so much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced, 
 would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties, not 
 only to find out, but even to understand; or, though we should 
 be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would 
 be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impos- 
 sible to say. But as our present condition can in no wise be 
 shown to be inconsistent with the perfect moral government of 
 God : so religion teaches us we were placed in it, that we might 
 qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state 
 which is to follow it. This, though but a partial answer, a very 
 partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned; is yet a more 
 satisfactory answer to another, which is of real, and of the utmost 
 importance to us to have answered, — viz. : What is our business 
 here ? The known end then, why we are placed in a state of so 
 much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our improvement in 
 virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state 
 of security and happiness. 
 
 Tbe beginning of life, considered as an education for mature 
 age in the present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous 
 to this our trial for a future one : the former being in our tern 
 poral capacity, what the latter is in our religious capacity. 8om«9 
 
OHAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 13''' 
 
 observations common to both, and a more distinct consideration 
 of each, will more distinctly show tbe extent and force of the 
 analogy between them ; and the credibility, which arises from 
 hence, as well as from the nature of the thing, that the present 
 life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one. 
 
 I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a par- 
 ticular way of life ; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, 
 and qualifications, of each species, are as necessary as their ex- 
 ternal circumstances. Both come into the notion of such state, 
 or particular way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change 
 a man's capacities or character, to the degree in which it is con- 
 ceivable they may be changed, and he would be altogether in- 
 capable of a human course of life, and human happiness; as 
 incapable, as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he were placed 
 in a world, where he had no sphere of action, nor any objects to 
 answer his appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One 
 thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses 
 it.* Our nature corresponds to our external condition. With- 
 out this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any such 
 thing as human life and happiness : which life and happiness are, 
 therefore, a result from our nature and condition jointly: mean- 
 ing by human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole 
 complex notion commonly understood by those words. So that 
 without determining what will be the employment and happiness, 
 the particular life, of good men hereafter; there must be some 
 determinate capacities, some necessary character and qualifica- 
 tions, without which persons cannot but be utterly incapable of 
 it : in like manner, as there must be some, without which men 
 would be incapable of their present state of life. 
 
 II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all 
 creatures which come under our notice, is such, as that they are 
 capable of naturally becoming Ciualified for states of life, for 
 which they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we 
 may indeed conceive of creatures, incapable of having any of 
 their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally 
 to acquire any new qualifications. But the faculties of every 
 
 a [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, "All things are double, one against 
 ai^other; ani He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing establisheth the 
 good •! another :" Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.] 
 
 12* 
 
l38 PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. part i 
 
 species known to us, are made for enlargement; for acquirements 
 of experience and habits. We find ourselves, in particulai, en- 
 dued with capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of know- 
 ledge or perceiving truth, but also of storing up ideas and know- 
 ledge by memory. AVe are capable, not only of acting, and of 
 having different momentary impressions made upon us; but of 
 getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled altera- 
 tions in our temper or character. The power of the two last is 
 the power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor 
 knowledge of any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to 
 the forming of them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, 
 which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly im- 
 proved by exercise. Whether the word habit is applicable to all 
 these improvements, and in particular how far the powers of 
 memory and of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall 
 not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds readily 
 and of course, by means of their having been there before, seems 
 a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of 
 action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. Aptness to re- 
 collect practical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly 
 habit in many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits 
 of action. An instance of the former, is our constant and even 
 involuntary readiness, in correcting the impressions of our sight 
 concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judg- 
 ment in the room of sensation, imperceptibly to ourselves. It 
 seems as if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected, 
 might be called passive habits; as properly as our readiness in 
 understanding languages upon sight, or hearing of words. Our 
 readiness in speaking and writing them, are instances of active 
 habits. 
 
 For distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the 
 body, or to the mind : and the latter will be explained by the 
 former. Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities 
 or motions, whether graceful 'or unbecoming, which are owing to 
 use: u^der the latter, general habits of life and conduct; such as 
 those of obedience and submission to authority, or to any par- 
 ticular person; those of veracity, justice, and charity; those of 
 attention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge. Habits of 
 this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, as well as Jhe 
 
CHAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 139 
 
 former. And as habits belonging to the body are produced by 
 external acts, so habits of the mind are produced by the exertion 
 of inward practical principles; i.e. by carrying them into act, or 
 acting upon them ; the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, 
 and charity. Nor can those habits be formed by any external 
 course of action, otherwise than as it proceeds from these princi- 
 ples: because it is only these inward principles exerted, which 
 are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of 
 charity. 
 
 So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are 
 in the same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and 
 revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought 
 and intention; i.e. inward act: for such intention is an act. 
 Resolutions to do well, are also properly acts. And endeavoring 
 to enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to 
 beget in others that practical sense of it, which a man really has 
 himself, is a virtuous act. All these, therefore, may and will 
 contribute towards forming good habits. But going over the 
 theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine 
 pictures, of it; this is so far from necessarily or certainly con- 
 ducing to form a habit of it, in him who thus employs himself, tliat 
 it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradu- 
 ally more insensible; i.e. form a habit of insensibility to all moral 
 considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, passive im- 
 pressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often 
 passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly: being accus- 
 tomed to danger, begets intrepidity, i.e. lessens fear; to distress, 
 lessens the passion of pity; to instances of others' mortality, 
 lessens the sensible apprehension of our own. 
 
 From these two observations together, that practical habits are 
 formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive im- 
 pressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow, 
 that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening, 
 by a course of acting upon such and such motives and excite- 
 ments, while these motives and excitements themselves are, by 
 proportionable degrees, growing less sensible; i.e. are continually 
 less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen. 
 And experience confirms this : for active principles, at the very 
 lime that they are less lively in perception than they were, are 
 
140 PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. part i. 
 
 found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into the temper 
 and character, and become more effectual in influencing our prac- 
 tice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of it. 
 Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and 
 active caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter 
 are gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually 
 lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, 
 passively to pity, and actively to relieve it: but let a man set 
 himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, 
 and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the 
 various miseries of life, with which he must become acquainted; 
 when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not as a 
 passion, but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen : 
 and while he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will 
 acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. 
 So also at the same time that the daily instances of men's dying 
 around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or appre- 
 hension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to 
 the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; i.e. to 
 forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it. 
 
 This seems further to show, that passive impressions made 
 upon our minds by admonition, experience, or example, though 
 they may have a remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards 
 forming active habits, yet can have this efficacy no otherwise 
 than by inducing us to such a course of action : and that it is not 
 being affected so and so, but acting, which forms those habits : 
 only it must be always remembered, that real endeavors to enforce 
 good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action. 
 Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the nature of things, 
 that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits; 
 i.e. what is wrought by use and exercise. The thing insisted on 
 is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the appointment 
 of nature : which is, that active habits are to be formed by exer- 
 cise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible 
 in its steps : it may be hard to explain the fiiculty, by which we 
 are capable of habits, throughout its several parts; and to trace 
 it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in ou'' 
 mind : and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to 
 it. But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield 
 
CHAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 141 
 
 to use and exercise, in some such manner as this, is matter of 
 certain experience. 
 
 Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get 
 an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in 
 it. The inclinations which rendered us averse to it, grow weaker; 
 the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, 
 lessen; the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts 
 upon all occasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to 
 make us go on, in a course of action, to which we have been ac- 
 customed. Practical principles appear to grow stronger, abso- 
 lutely in themselves, by exercise; as well as relatively, with 
 regard to contrary principles; which, by being accustomed to 
 submit, do so habitually, and of course. Thus a new character, 
 in several respects, may be formed; and many habitudes of life, 
 not given by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire. 
 
 III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had 
 these capacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge, 
 and habits, had they not been necessary, and intended to be made 
 use of. And accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much 
 intended, that without them we should be utterly incapable of 
 that which was the end for which we were made, considered in 
 our temporal capacity only : the employments and satisfactions 
 of our mature state of life. 
 
 Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for 
 this mature state of life. Even maturity of understanding, and 
 bodily strength, not only are arrived at gradually, but are also 
 very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body 
 and mind from infancy. If we suppose a person brought into 
 the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, 
 he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of 
 mature age, as an idiot. He would be in a manner distracted, 
 with astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense: 
 nor can one guess, how long it would be, before he would be 
 familiarized to himself and the objects about him, enough even to 
 set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too, whether the 
 natural information of his sight and hearing would be of any 
 manner of use to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, 
 that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and dis- 
 porvd to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would 
 
142 PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. parti 
 
 render society insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, 
 were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government, some 
 aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing 
 their sense of things. Want of every thing of this kind which 
 is learnt would render a man as incapable of society, as want of 
 language would; or as his natural ignorance of any of the par- 
 ticular employments of life would render him incapable of pro- 
 viding himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the 
 necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably in many 
 more of which we hivve no particular notion, mankind is left by 
 nature, an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and 
 unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, 
 and habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of 
 his creation, considering him as related only to this world. 
 
 But, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying. those 
 deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits; so 
 likewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and 
 youth, fitted for it; fitted lor our acquiring those qualifications 
 of all sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence 
 children, from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted 
 with the objects about them, with the scene in which they are 
 placed, and to have a future part ; and learning something or other, 
 necessary to the performance of it. The subordinations, to which 
 they are accustomed in domestic life, teach them self-government 
 in common behavior abroad, and prepare them for subjection and 
 obedience to civil authority.** What passes before their eyes, and 
 daily happens to them, gives them experience, caution against 
 treachery and deceit, together with numberless little rules of 
 action and conduct, which we could not live without; and which 
 are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be mistaken per- 
 haps for instinct, though they are the efiect of long experience 
 and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in particular 
 business, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to the 
 several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days 
 is adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and 
 practice of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, 
 instruction, and the care of others ; but a great deal is left to 
 
 *> [Consult jMillman's Histi of Christ, vol. i. : Priestley's Institutes of Nat. 
 and Kev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i • and WhatiiLy's Pol. Econ.j sec. 5.1 
 
CHAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 143 
 
 ourselves to do. And of this, as part is done easily and of 
 course; so part requires diligence and care, the voluntary fore- 
 going many things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what 
 we should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or expe- 
 dience of it. For that labor and industry, which the station of 
 so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly unqualified 
 for, in maturity, as those in other stations would be for any other 
 sorts of application; if both were not accustomed to them in 
 their youth. And, according as persons behave themselves, in 
 the general education which all go through, and in the particular 
 ones adapted to particular employments, their character is 
 formed," and made to appear; they recommend themselves more 
 or less ; and are capable of, and placed in, different stations in 
 society. 
 
 The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an im- 
 portant opportunity, which nature puts into our hands ; and 
 which, when lost is not to be recovered. And our being placed 
 in a state of discipline throughout this life, for another world, is 
 a providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind, as 
 our being placed in a state of discipline during childhood, for 
 mature age. Our condition in both respects is uniform and of a 
 piece, and comprehended under one and the same general law 
 of nature. 
 
 If we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the 
 present life could be our preparation for another ; this would be 
 DO objection against the credibility of its being so. We do not 
 discern, how food and sleep contribute to the growth of the 
 body; nor could have any thought that they would, before we 
 
 <= [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which ia 
 often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor 
 used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for 
 the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be 
 sharpened again; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled 
 judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on 
 ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole 
 future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an 
 occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare, 
 and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular 
 act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on 
 themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a 
 subsequent part of this chapter.] 
 
144 PIIOBATIOX AS A DISCIPLINE. part i. 
 
 had experience. Nor do children at all thiuk, on the one hand, 
 that the sports and exercises, to which they are so much addicted, 
 contribute to their health and growth ; nor, on the other, of the 
 necessity which there is for their being restrained in them. Nor 
 are they capable of understanding the use of many parts of dis- 
 cipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go through, in 
 order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were we 
 not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could 
 form us for a future one ; yet nothing would be more supposable 
 than that it might, in some respects or other, from the general 
 analogy of Providence. And this, for aught I see, might reason- 
 ably be said, even though we should not take in the consideration 
 of God's moral government over the world. But, 
 
 IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the 
 character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the 
 future state, and then we may distinctly see, how, and in what 
 respects, the present life may be a preparation for it; since we 
 want, and are capable of, improvement in that character, hy 
 moral and religious habits; and the present life is Jit to be a. 
 state of discipline for such improvement : in like manner as we 
 have already observed, how, and in what respects, infancy, child- 
 hood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a natural state 
 of discipline, for mature age. 
 
 Nothing which we at present see, would lead us to the thought 
 of a solitary inactive state hereafter. If we judge at all from 
 the analogy of nature, we must suppose, according to the Scrip- 
 ture account of it, that it will be a community. And there is no 
 shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there 
 be no analogy for it, that this community will be, as the Scrip- 
 ture represents it, under the more immediate, or, if such an ex- 
 pression may be used, the more sensible government of God. 
 Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments of this 
 happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular 
 scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, 
 justice, and charity, among the members of it with regard to 
 each other, any proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise 
 for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our igno- 
 rance any proof, that there will be no occasion for that frame of 
 mind, or character, which is formed- by the daily practice of those 
 
CHAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLmE. 145 
 
 particular virtues liere, and which is a result from it.^ This at 
 least must be owned in general, that, as the government esta- 
 blished in the universe is moral, the character of virtue and 
 piety must, in some way or other, be the condition of our happi- 
 ness or the qualification for it. 
 
 From what is above observed, concerning our natural power of 
 habits, it is easy to see, that we are capahle of moral improve- 
 ment by discipline. And how greatly we icant it, need not be 
 proved to any one who is acquainted with the great wickedness 
 of mankind; or even with those imperfections, which the best 
 are conscious of. But it is not perhaps distinctly attended to by 
 every one, that the occasion which human creatures have for dis- 
 cipline, to improve in them this character of virtue and piety, is 
 to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions, by indul- 
 gence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite 
 creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before 
 habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from 
 what is right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, for 
 a security against this danger. For, together with the general 
 principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame 
 various afi"ections towards particular external objects. These 
 affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the government 
 of the moral principle, as to the occasions upon which they may 
 be gratified ; as to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the 
 objects of them, may be pursued. But the principle of virtue 
 can neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On the 
 contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are 
 present to the mind, not onl}^ before all consideration whether 
 
 ^ [''It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no 
 temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of indulging these vices here 
 ■would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary 
 habits no qualification. But habits of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely 
 securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the 
 principles of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends upon the 
 ratio between our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state 
 where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood, 
 injustice, &c., must depend on our having formed a love for their opjjosites. 
 
 Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove 
 temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo 
 in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one." — Prof. 
 Fitzgerald.] 
 
 K 
 
 13 
 
X46 PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. part i. 
 
 they can be obtaiDcd bj lawful means, but after it is .found they 
 cannot. The natural objects of affection continue so; the neces- 
 saries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally de- 
 sirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently : nay, though 
 they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects 
 of any affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful 
 means; but may be obtained by them: such affection, though its 
 being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as 
 innocent as it is natural and necessary, yet cannot but be con- 
 ceived to have a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such 
 unlawful means : and therefore must be conceived as putting 
 them in some danger of it. Now what is the general security 
 against this danger, against their actually deviating from right? 
 As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within : from 
 the practical principle of virtue.* The strengthening or improving 
 this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle of action, 
 will lessen the danger, or increase the security against it. And 
 this moral principle is capable of improvement, by proper dis- 
 cipline and exercise: by recollecting the practical impressions 
 which example and experience have made upon us: and, instead 
 of following humor and mere inclination, by continually attending 
 to the equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, 
 be it in greater or less matters ; and accustoniin-g ourselves always 
 to act upon it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action ; 
 and as this moral course of behavior must necessarily, under the 
 divine government, be our final interest. Thus the principle of 
 
 * It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain 
 creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest is meant a specula- 
 tive conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion theai 
 greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to present 
 experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from 
 thus indulging themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical 
 regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident 
 with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. 
 And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as 
 any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not onlj'^ by the 
 more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any 
 thing, even indolence : especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, 
 which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate 
 men mistaken, Avhen they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness 
 and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim th's priu- 
 ciple. — See p. 131. 
 
CHAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLmE. 147 
 
 Virtue, improved into a liahit, of which improvement we are thus 
 capable, will p)lainli/ he, in p>ro2Jortion to the strength of it, a 
 security against the danger which finite creatures are in, from 
 the very nature of propension, or particidar affections. This 
 way of putting the matter, supposes particular affections to re- 
 main in a future state; wliicli it is scarce possible to avoid sup- 
 posing. And if tliej do; we clearly see, that acquired habits of 
 virtue and self-government may be necessary for the regulation 
 of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in 
 this supposition, but to speak only in general; the thing really 
 comes to the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by dis- 
 cipline, are improvement in virtue: and improvement in virtue 
 must be advancement in happiness, if the government of the 
 universe be moral. 
 
 From these things we may observe, (and it will further show 
 this our natural and original need of being improved by discipline,) 
 how it comes to pass, that creatures made upright, fall; and how 
 those who preserve their uprightness, raise themselves by so 
 doing, to a more secure state of virtue. To say that the former 
 is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than 
 that an event's actually happening is accounted for by a mere 
 possibility of its happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable 
 from the very nature of particular affections or propensions. For, 
 suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of life, for 
 which such propensions were necessary: suppose them endued 
 with such propensions, together with moral understanding, as 
 well including a practical sense of virtue as a speculative percep- 
 tion of it; and that all these several principles, both natural and 
 moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the most 
 exact proportion possible; i.e. in a proportion the most exactly 
 adapted to their intended state of life; such creatures would be 
 made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, 
 from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being 
 present; though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the 
 allowance of the moral principle. If they can be gratified without 
 its allowance, or by contradicting it, then they must be conceived 
 to have some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some 
 tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden gratification. This 
 tendency, in some one particular propension, may be increased, 
 
14» PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. part i. 
 
 by the greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than 
 of occasions exciting others. The least voluntary indulgence in 
 forbidden circumstances,^ though but in thought, will increase 
 this wrong tendency; and may increase it further, till, peculiar 
 conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect; and danger 
 of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation from it; a danger 
 necessarily arising from the very nature of propension, and which 
 therefore could not have been prevented, though it might have 
 been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would be, as 
 if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person, in 
 which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady: but 
 if he would not attend, in this degree, any one of a thousand 
 objects, catching his eye, might lead him out of it. 
 
 Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt 
 act of irregularity, might disorder the inward constitution; un- 
 settle the adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed 
 it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted: but repe- 
 tition of irregularities would produce habits. Thus the constitu- 
 tion would be spoiled; and creatures made upright, become 
 corrupt and depraved in their settled character, proportionably to 
 their repeated irregularities in occasional acts.^ On the contrary, 
 
 « [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small indi- 
 vidual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the 
 sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we 
 may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems 
 indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. 
 A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with 
 exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole 
 destiny ! 
 
 It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences, 
 that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression 
 of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence maybe either an obstacle or 
 an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we 
 can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its 
 mastery over us is broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, 
 from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete. 
 Ascetic acts are only useful as means, and so long as they are ascetic (askesis) 
 are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good only as discipline j and 
 when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to 
 a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.] 
 
 ' [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony 
 •with the Sc-ipture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butler 
 cf course does nut copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from tie 
 
CHAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 149 
 
 these creatures might have improved and raised themselves, to a 
 higher and more secure state of virtue, by the contrary behavior : 
 by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part 
 of their nature : and thus iDitlistandliig that unavoidable danger 
 of defection, which necessarily arose from propension, the other 
 part of it. For, by thus preserving their integrity for some time, 
 their danger would lessen; siuce propensions, by being inured to 
 submit, would do it more easily and of course : and their security 
 asainst this lessenino- dansfer would increase: since the moral 
 principle would gain additional strength by exercise : both which 
 things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits. 
 
 Thus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also 
 depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous 
 self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the 
 inward constitution or character : and may improve it to such a 
 degree, that though we should suppose it impossible for particular 
 affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle; 
 and consequently should allow, that such creatures as have been 
 above supposed, would forever remain defectible, yet their danger 
 of actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened, 
 and they fully fortified against what remains of it; if that may 
 be called danger, against which there is an adequate, effectual 
 security. Still, this their higher perfection may continue to con- 
 sist in habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this 
 their more complete security remain to proceed from them. 
 
 Thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, 
 as they came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going 
 wrong; and so may stand in need of the security of virtuous 
 habits, additional to the moral principle wrought into their natures 
 by him. That which is the ground of their danger, or their 
 want of security, may be considered as a deficiency in themselves, 
 
 aim and nature of his book. The Bible says man fell suddenly, no less in his 
 state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason out how much 
 disorder and damage would ensue from the first sin : and in saying this, avoids 
 any incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B. 
 Bays of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be 
 gainsayed. 
 
 Adam "died," the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner "lives" 
 the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt, 
 br growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is aa 
 ioi^ant transition into a new relationship with God.] 
 
 13* 
 
150 PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. part i. 
 
 to wliich virtuous liabits are the natural supply. And as they 
 are naturally capable of being raised and improved by discipline, 
 't may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be placed 
 in circumstances with an eye to it : in circumstances peculiarly 
 fitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in 
 virtue. 
 
 But how much more strongly nnist this hold with respect to 
 those who have corrupted their natures, are fallen from their 
 original rectitude, and whose passions are become excessive by 
 repeated violations of their inward constitution ! Upright crea- 
 tures may want to be improved : depraved creatures want to be 
 renewed. Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees 
 and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are expedient for those : 
 but. must be absolutely necessary for these. For these, discipline 
 of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be 
 necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits ; to recover their 
 primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence must 
 have weakened ; to repair, as well as raise into a habit, the mordl 
 principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuoxis 
 happiness. 
 
 Whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see that tbe 
 present world is 'peculiarly jit to be a state of discipline for this 
 purpose, to such as will set themselves to mend and improve. 
 For, the various temptations with which we are surrounded; our 
 experience of the deceits of wickedness ; having been in many 
 instances led wrong ourselves; the great vieiousness of the world; 
 the infinite disorders eonsec|uent upon it; our being made ac- 
 quainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, 
 or from the sight of it in others ; these things, though some of 
 them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet 
 when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency 
 to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper* 
 the contrary both to thoughtless levity, and also to that unre- 
 strained self-will, and violent bent to follow present inclination, 
 which may be observed in undisciplined minds. 
 
 Such experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty 
 of our nature ; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned 
 passion ; of the power which an infinite being has over us, by 
 the various capacities of misery which he has given us ; in short, 
 
CHAP. V. PROBATIOX AS A DISCIPLINE. 151 
 
 tliat kind and degree of experience, wliicli the present state 
 affords us, that the constitution of nature is such as to adraiu 
 the possibility, the danger, and the actual event, or creatures 
 losing' their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious and 
 wretched; has a tendency to give us a practical sense of things 
 very different from a mere speculative knowledge, that we are 
 liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, whether 
 the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of 
 perfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a 
 sense of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, 
 in some state of probation. And passing through the present 
 world with that moral attention, which is necessary to the acting 
 a right part in it, may leave everlasting impressions of this sort 
 upon our minds. 
 
 To be a little more distinct : allurements to what is wroag, 
 difl&culties in the discharge of our duty, our not being able to act 
 a uniform right part without some thought and care, and the 
 opportunities which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding 
 what we dislike or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, 
 when we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by 
 lawful ones, these things, i.e. the snares and temptations of vice, 
 are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of 
 discipline, to those who will preserve their integrity: because 
 they render being upon our guard, resolution, and the denial of 
 our passions, necessary in order to that end. The exercise of 
 such particular recollection, intention of mind, and self-govern- 
 ment, in the practice of virtue, has, from the make of our nature, 
 a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue; as implying, not 
 only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exer- 
 cise of the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger 
 effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know 
 himself to be in particular danger, for some time, of doing any 
 thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves not to do; continued 
 recollection and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good 
 bis resolution, is a continued exerting of that act of virtue 
 m a high dcyree, which nec^d have been, and perhaps would 
 nave been, only instantancons and iccqIl, had the tcmptatioQ 
 been so. 
 
 It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to 
 
352 PROBATION AS A DISCIPLIXE. pakt i. 
 
 virtue and piety i^ but it would have been nearer the truth, 
 though not strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essen- 
 tial to discipline and improvement. For though actions ma- 
 terially virtuous, which have no sort of difl&culty, but are per- 
 fectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, may possibly be 
 done only from these particular inclinations, and so may not be 
 any exercise of the principle of virtue, i.e. not be virtuous actions 
 at all; yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise of that 
 principle : and when they are, they have a tendency to form and 
 fix the habit of virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous 
 principle is more continued, oftener repeated, and more intense; 
 as it must be in circumstances of danger, temptation, and diffi- 
 culty, of any kind and in any degree; tbis tendency is increased 
 proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the consequence. 
 
 This undoubtedly holds to a certain length : but how far it 
 may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our 
 bodily strength can be improved beyond a certain degree : and 
 both may be overwrought. Possibly there may be something 
 analogous to this, with respect to the moral character; which is 
 scarce worth considering. I mention it only, lest it should come 
 into some persons' thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing 
 observations, which perhaps it is ; but as a confutation of them, 
 which it is not. And there may be several other exceptions. 
 Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, 
 and in every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And 
 these plainly hold so far, as that from them may be seen dis- 
 tinctly, (which is all that is intended by them,) that the ^present 
 world is jpeculiarly jit to he a state of discipline, for our im- 
 j^rovemcnt in virtue and piety: in the same sense as some 
 sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, not to be sure 
 of such persons as will not, but of such as will, set themselves 
 to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of attention. 
 
 e [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly hap- 
 piness; but may, in the highest degree promote our future happiness. It will 
 Dot lone/ mar our happiness, even here; because being based on principle, and 
 establit^hed b}^ habit, it will, in process of time, be superseded by prompt and 
 pleasurable submission. Thus a person habitually virtuous, is hardly conscious 
 of self-denial ; a fact noticed fc^ Aristotle. " He who abstains from bodily 
 pleasures and delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who ia 
 troubled by it, is undisciplined." Ethic. Kic. ii. 3.1 
 
«BAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 153 
 
 Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a dis- 
 cipliue of virtue to the generality of men, that on the contrary 
 they seem to make it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness 
 of the world is, in different ways, the great temptation which 
 renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to 
 good men. The whole end, and the whole occasion, of man- 
 kind's being placed in such a state as the present, is not pre- 
 tended to be accounted for. That which appears amidst the 
 general corruption, is, that there are some persons, who, having 
 within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to 
 and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear 
 or more obscure, which are afforded them ; and that the present 
 world is not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an 
 exercise of it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it : 
 apt to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would be, 
 by the exercise of it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or 
 in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But 
 that the present world does not actually become a state of moral 
 discipline to many, even to the generality, i.e. that they do not 
 improve or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it 
 was not intended for moral discipline, by any who at all observe 
 the analogy of nature. For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables 
 and bodies of animals, which are adapted and put in the way to 
 improve to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfec- 
 tion, we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually does. 
 Far the greatest part of them decay before they are improved to 
 it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. -Yet no one, who does 
 not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds and bodies, 
 which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection, answer 
 the end for which they were really designed by nature ; and 
 therefore that nature designed them for such perfection. I can- 
 not forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that 
 the appeai'ance of such an amazing luaste in nature, with respect 
 to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccount- 
 able, as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin 
 of so many moral agents by themselves, i.e. by vice. 
 
 Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be ob- 
 jected, in another way; that so far as a course of behavior, 
 materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only 
 
;54 PEOBATIOX AS A DISCIPLINE. parti. 
 
 ft disbipline and strengtlieniiig of self-love. But doing what God 
 commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it pro- 
 ceeds from hope or fear. A course of such obedience will form 
 habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, justice, and 
 charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues ; and 
 will certainly form habits of self-government, and of denying our 
 inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. 
 Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which 
 some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all 
 religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, 
 and charity, regard to Grod's authority, and to our own chief in- 
 terest, are not only all three coincident; but each of them is, in 
 itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action. He who 
 begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as 
 he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more 
 and more, of that character which is correspondent to the con- 
 stitution of nature as moral ; and to the relation which God 
 stands in to us as moral governor of it : nor consequently can he 
 fail of obtaining that happiness, which this constitution and rela- 
 tion necessarily suppose connected with that character. 
 
 These several observations, concerning the active principle of 
 virtue and obedience to God's commands, are applicable to pas- 
 sive submission or resignation to his will : which is another es- 
 sential part of a right character, connected with the former, and 
 very much in our power to form ourselves to. It may be imagined, 
 that nothing but afBictions can give occasion for or require this 
 virtue; that it can have no respect to, nor be any way necessary 
 to qualify for, a state of perfect happiness : but it is not expe- 
 rience which can make us think thus. Prosperity itself, while 
 any thing supposed desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and 
 unbounded thoughts. Imagination is alto2;ether as much a source 
 
 O CD O 
 
 of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. It is in- 
 deed true, that there can be no scope for patience, when sorrow 
 shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind, 
 which shall have been formed by patience. For, though self- 
 love, considered merely as an active principle leading us to pur- 
 sue our chief interest, cannot but be uniforndy coincident with 
 the principle of obedience to God's commands, our interest being 
 rightly understood; because this obedience, and the pmvnii of 
 
CHAP. V. PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. 155 
 
 our own chief interest, must be in every case one and tlie samo 
 tiling: yet it may be questioned, whether self-love, considered 
 merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from 
 its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the 
 will of Godj any more than particular affections can:* coincident 
 in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and 
 in degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the consti- 
 tution of things, or the divine appointments. So that habits of 
 resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures : 
 habits, I say; which signify what is formed by use. However, 
 in general it is obvious that both self-love and particular affection 
 in human creatures considered only as passive feelings, distort 
 and rend the mind; and therefore stand in need of discipline. 
 Now denial of those particular affections, in a course of active 
 virtue and obedience to God's will, has a tendency to moderate 
 them; and seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind, 
 to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness which is 
 allotted us, i.e. to moderate self-love. But the proper discipline 
 for resignation is affliction. A right behavior under that trial ; 
 recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the view, in which 
 religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of God, re- 
 ceiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his 
 world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to 
 a dutiful submission. Such submission, together with the active 
 principle of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, 
 which answers to bis sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs 
 to the condition of our being, as dependent creatures. Nor ean 
 it be said, that this is only breaking the mind to a submission to 
 mere power; for mere power may be accidental, and precarious, 
 and usurped: but it is forming within ourselves the temper of 
 resignation to His rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme 
 over all. 
 
 Upon the whole: such a character, and such qualifications, are 
 necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature 
 alone does in no wise bestow; but has put it upon us, in great 
 part, to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, 
 horn childhood to mature age ; put it upon us to acquire them, 
 by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the 
 
 * P. U5. 
 
it(\ PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE. part l 
 
 beglnnicig of life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general 
 analogy to our condition in the present world, as in a state of 
 moral discipline for another. 
 
 It is in vain to object against the credibility of the present 
 life's being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the 
 danger unavoidably accompanying such discipline, might have 
 been saved us, by our being made at once the creatures and the 
 characters, which we icere to be. For we experience, that what 
 we iccre to he, was to be the effect of ichat ice icould do: and 
 that the general conduct of nature is, not to save us trouble or 
 danger, but to make us capable of going through them, and to 
 put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own, experience 
 and habits, are the natural supply to our deficiencies, and secu- 
 rity against our dangers : since it is as plainly natural to set our- 
 selves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things, which 
 we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general law 
 of nature, that we should with regard to our temporal interest, 
 form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, 
 use, and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly 
 in the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of 
 it. The alternative is left to our choice: either to improve our- 
 selves, and better our condition; or, in default of such improve- 
 ment, to remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly 
 credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our 
 case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the 
 qualifications necessary for it. 
 
 There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present 
 world's being a state of probation; that it is a theatre of action^ 
 for the manifestation of persons' characters, with respect to a 
 future one : not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his 
 creation or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence 
 of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. How- 
 ever, it is not impossible, that men's showing and making mani- 
 fest, what is in their heart, what their real character is, may have 
 respect to a future life, in ways and manners with which we are 
 not acquainted : particularly it may be a means, (for the Author 
 of nature does not appear to do any thing without means,) of 
 their being disposed of suitably to their characters; and of its 
 being known to the creation, by way of example, that they are 
 
CHAP. VI. THE OPIXIOX OF NECESSITY. 157 
 
 thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural account 
 of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of persons' 
 characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the carrying 
 on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting man- 
 kind, which comes under our observation at present. I shah 
 only add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that 
 treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral govern- 
 ment; since by persons' behavior under it, their characters can- 
 not but be manifested, and if they behave well, improved. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCINa 
 PRACTICE. 
 
 Throughout the foregoing treatise it appears, that the con 
 dition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, 
 and under the government of God which we experience, is greatly 
 analogous to our condition, as designed for another world, or as 
 under that farther government, which religion teaches us. If 
 therefore any assert, as a fatalist must, that the opinion of uni- 
 versal necessity is reconcilable with the former; there immediately 
 arises a question in the way of analogy, whether he must not also 
 own it to be reconcilable with the latter, i.e. with the system of 
 religion itself, and the proof of it. The reader then will observe, 
 that the question now before us is not absolute, i.e. whether the 
 opinion of fate be reconcilable with religion ; but hypothetical, 
 whether, upon supposition of its being reconcilable with the con- 
 stitution of nature, it be not reconcilable with religion also. Or, 
 what pretence a fatalist, not other persons, but a fatalist, has to 
 conclude from his opinion, that there can be no such thing as 
 religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoid- 
 ably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of 
 universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as 
 easily be excused.'* 
 
 * [The student sliould learn to distinguish between the hinds of necessity. 
 There is — 1. " Logical necessity," which requires the admission of a consequent 
 to a premise 2. ' Moral necessity," which requires means in order to ends. 
 
 li 
 
158 THE OPINIOX OF NECESSITY, part i. 
 
 Since it li.'is been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, 
 that there is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor 
 of the world; and since an objection may be made against the 
 proof of this, from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may 
 be supposed, that such necessity will itself account for the origin 
 and preservation of all things; it is requisite, that this objection 
 be distinctly answered ; or that it be shown, that a fatality sup- 
 posed consistent with what we certainly experience, does not 
 destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of 
 nature ; before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys the 
 proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a state of 
 religion. 
 
 When it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of 
 nature, the actions of men, every thing, and every mode and 
 circumstance of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly 
 have been otherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does 
 not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from cer- 
 tain principles, and to certain ends : because all this is matter of 
 undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man 
 may, every moment, be conscious of. Hence it follows, that 
 necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the con- 
 stitution of nature, and how things came to he and to continue as 
 they are; but only an account of this circumstance relating to 
 their origin and continuance, that they could not have been other- 
 wise, than they are and have been. The assertion, that every 
 thing is by necessity of nature, is not an answer to the question ; 
 Whether the world came into being as it is, by an intelligent 
 Agent forming it thus, or not : but to quite another question ; 
 Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner 
 which we call necessarilt/, or in that way and manner which we call 
 
 3. "Physical necessity," which is the compulsory connection of sequences to 
 antecedents, in the material world. 4. "Metaphysical necessity," which be- 
 longs to God only, as existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and 
 operate, and by them we govern ourselves. 
 
 But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious, 
 which may be groujjed unc''er two heads: — 1. "Atheistic," sometimes called 
 the Democritio, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter. 
 2. " Theistic," which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral 
 character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and 
 creatures not responsible. See Colltngs on Providence, Price's Dissertations, 
 RoTHERFOKD cu Providence, Charnock's Sermons, and Whately's Logic J 
 
CHAP. VI. AS INFLUEXCIXa PRACTICE. 159 
 
 freely? For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and 
 one who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed him- 
 self a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their 
 respective opinions; and they should happen to instance a 
 house; they would agree that it was built by an architect. Their 
 difference concerning necessity and freedom would occasion no 
 difference of judgment concerning this; but only concerning an- 
 other matter ; whether the architect built it necessarily or freely. 
 
 Suppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the consti- 
 tution of nature. In a lax way of speaking, one of them might 
 say, it was by necessity; and the other, by freedom : but if they 
 had any meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free 
 agent, so the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent, 
 whether he would say one or more, acting by necessity: for ab- 
 stract notions can do nothing. "We indeed ascribe to God a neces- 
 sary existence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within our- 
 selves the idea of infinity, i.e. immensity and eternity, impossible, 
 even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to 
 discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, some- 
 thing, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype 
 of it. Hence, (for tlih ahstract, as much as any other, implies 
 a concrete^ we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be, an in- 
 finite and immense eternal being, existing prior to all design con- 
 tributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. From the scanti- 
 ness of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced; 
 that necessity is the foundation, the reason, the account of the 
 existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be at all 
 intended, that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of neces- 
 sity : a necessity antecedent in nature to design : it cannot, I 
 say, be meant that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of 
 necessity, upon several accounts; and particularly because it is 
 admitted, that design, in the actions of men, contributes to many 
 alterations in nature. If any deny this, I shall not pretend to 
 reason with them. 
 
 From these things it follows; First, That when a fatalist 
 asserts, that every thing is hy necessity, he must mean, hy an 
 {igcnt acting necessarily ; he must, 1 say, mean this, for I am 
 very sensible he would not choose to mean it. Secondly, That 
 the necessity, by which such an agent is supposed to act, does 
 
160 THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, part i. 
 
 not exclude iDtelligence and design. So that, were the system 
 of fatality admitted, it would just as much account for the for- 
 mation of the world, as for the structure of a house, and no 
 more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary 
 agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the 
 former of the world. And the appearances of design and of fnal 
 causes in the constitution of nature as really prove this acting 
 agent to be an intelligent designer, or to act from choice ; upon 
 the scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of 
 freedom. 
 
 It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy 
 the proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature and 
 natural Governor of the world ; the present question, which the 
 analogy before mentioned suggests,* and which, I think, it will 
 answer, is this : Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed con- 
 sistent with possibility, with the constitution of the world, and 
 the natural government which we experience exercised over it, 
 destroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of 
 religion : or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion ; 
 with the system, and the proof of it. 
 
 Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, 
 in his own principles; that the child should reason upon them, 
 and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise 
 than he does, he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor 
 can deserve to be rewarded or punished. Imagine him to eradi- 
 cate the very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his 
 mind, by means of this system ; to form his temper, and cha- 
 lacter, and behavior to it; and from it to judge of the treatment 
 he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming 
 abroad into the world: as the fatalist judges from this system, 
 what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard 
 to a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether 
 any one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be 
 put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to prac- 
 tice. And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not 
 sensible, that we are all children in speculations of this kind. 
 However, the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find 
 himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame, wi*h vvhicb 
 
 * P. ir.7. 
 
CHAP. VI. AS INFLUEXCING PRACTICE. IGl 
 
 his play-fellows were fettered and embarrassed ; and tiigbly v3on- 
 ceited in his superior knowledge, so ftir beyond his years. But 
 conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence, 
 which these principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted 
 upon, during the course of his education. He must either be 
 allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself 
 too, even to his own destruction, or else correction must be con- 
 tinually made use of, to supply the want of those natural percep- 
 tions of blame and commendation, which we have supposed to 
 be removed; and to give him a practical impression, of what he 
 had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was in fact an 
 accountable child, and to be punished for doing what he was 
 forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, but that the correc 
 tion which he must meet with, in the course of his education, 
 must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were 
 not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and some- 
 how or other misapplied it to practice and common life ; as what 
 the fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, 
 ought in all reason to convince him, that this scheme is mis- 
 applied, when applied to the subject of religion."^ But supposing 
 the child's temper could remain still formed to the system, and 
 his expectation of the treatment he was to have in the world, be 
 regulated by it ; so as to expect that no reasonable man would 
 blame or punish him, for any thing which he should do, because 
 he could not help doing it : upon this supposition it is manifest 
 he would, upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupport- 
 able to society, and the treatment which he would receive from it 
 would render it so to him ; and he could not fail of doing some- 
 thing very soon, for which he would be delivered over into the 
 hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be con- 
 vinced of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor. 
 
 Suppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to 
 practice, such practical application of it will be found equally 
 absurd; equally fallacious in a practical sense. For instance, that 
 if a man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it, 
 though he take no care of his own preservation ; or if he be 
 destined to die before that time, no care can prevent it, there- 
 fore all care about preserving one's life is to be neglected : which 
 
 * P. 158. 
 L ' 14* 
 
162 THE OPIXIOX OF XECESSITY, paiit r. 
 
 is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients. On tlie contrary, 
 none ot tliese practical absurdities can be drawn from reasoning, 
 upon the supposition that we are free; but all such reasoning 
 with regard to the common affairs of life is justified by experience. 
 Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity 
 were sjyccuJativcly true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it 
 were false, so far as our experience reaches : that is, to the whole 
 of our present life. For, the constitution of the present world, 
 and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we 
 were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since 
 the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, 
 deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as 
 we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so.^ 
 
 The thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural 
 government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, 
 as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are so or 
 not. Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be 
 ever so true; yet such is in fact our condition and the natural 
 course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice, 
 this application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead 
 us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to our present interest. 
 How then can people think themselves so very secure, that the 
 same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also, 
 in some analogous manner, with respect to a future, a more 
 general, and more important interest? For, religion being a 
 practical subject; and the analogy of nature showing us, that we 
 have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to 
 practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of re- 
 ligion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations, 
 it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will 
 still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that 
 we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner, as when 
 people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions from the 
 idea of infinity. 
 
 ^ [Hume says, "tliough man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all hia 
 actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from 
 him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent." 
 
 Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men ar* 
 important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume 
 found him out ! ] 
 
CHAP. VT. AS INFLUENCma PRACTICE. 1G3 
 
 From these thinfrs togetlier, the attentive reader Till see it 
 follows, that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of reli- 
 gion be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity, 
 because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical sub- 
 jects : i.e. with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor 
 does this contain any reflection upon reason, but only upon what 
 is unreasonable. For to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition 
 to practical principles, which the Author of our nature gave us to 
 act upon; and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with 
 regard to which, our own short views, and even our experience, 
 will show us, it cannot be depended upon; and such, at best, the 
 subject of necessity must be; this is vanity, conceit, and un- 
 reasonableness. 
 
 But this is not all. "We find within ourselves a will, and are 
 conscious of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with 
 fate, it is reconcilable with it in the Author of nature. Besides, 
 natural government and final causes imply a character and a will 
 in the Governor and Designer;"*^ a will concerning the creatures 
 whom he governs. The Author of nature then being certainly 
 of some character or other, notwithstanding necessity; it is evi- 
 dent this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character 
 of benevolence, veracity, and justice, in him, which attributes 
 are the foundation of religion, as with any other character: since 
 we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevo- 
 lent, than cruel; true, than faithless; just, than unjust; or, if 
 the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. It is said indeed, that 
 what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just punishment, 
 upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust : because 
 it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not 
 avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy 
 the injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the 
 injustice of punishing it! However, as little to the purpose as 
 this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to ob- 
 serve from it, how the notions of justice and injustice remain, 
 even while we endeavor to suppose them removed; how they 
 
 * By loill and character is meant that which, in speaking of men, we should 
 express, not only by these words, but also by the words temper, taste, dispo- 
 tinons, practica-. principles : that whole frame of mind, from ivhence ice act iit 
 one manner i ather than another. 
 
164 THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, part i. 
 
 force themselves upon the mind, even while we are making suppo- 
 sitions destructive of them : for there is not, perhaps, a man in 
 the world, but would be ready to make this objection at first 
 thought. 
 
 But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be 
 reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in 
 the x\uthor of nature, which is the foundation of religion; ''Yet, 
 does it not plainly destroy the j97'<9o/ that he is of that character, 
 and consequently the proof of religion T' By no means. Foi 
 we find, that happiness and misery are not our Jate^ in any such 
 sense as not to be the consequences of our behavior; but that 
 they are the consequences of it.* We find God exercises the 
 same kind of government over us, which a father exercises over 
 his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, 
 whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and 
 necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice 
 must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority 
 or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or in- 
 terfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects. 
 
 But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, 
 may be perplexed with difiiculties, which run up into the most 
 abstruse of all speculations; and as the opinion of necessity seems 
 to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may 
 be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations 
 of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed 
 by this opinion. 
 
 The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature 
 is not afiected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a 
 thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of 
 things. "I* It is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other 
 speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards 
 and punishments : J and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, 
 by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as 
 virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and 
 of ill desert. § This moral discernment implies, in the notion of 
 it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind : for it 
 carries in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such 
 a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being self-cou- 
 
 * Chap. ii. t P. 157, <tc. % Cliap. ii. I Dissert. 11. 
 
CHAP. VI. AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. Ig^ 
 
 demned.* And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which aro 
 by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a 
 sense including sanctions; may be thus proved. Consciousness 
 of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of con- 
 sidering it as given them by their Maker, not only raises imme- 
 diately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following 
 it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of the Author 
 of nature, given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such, 
 is plainly a command from him : and a command from him neces- 
 sarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in case of obe- 
 dience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the 
 sense or perception of good and ill desert, f which is contained in 
 the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes 
 It appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of 
 government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed 
 to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others 
 of ill, this surely amounts to declaring, upon whom his punish- 
 ments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. He must 
 have given us this discernment and sense of things, as a presenti- 
 ment of what is to be hereafter : that is, by way of information 
 beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this world. There 
 is then most evident ground to think, that the government of 
 Grod, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature 
 which he has given us : and that, in the upshot and issue of 
 things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made 
 to follow virtue and vice respectively ; as he has already, in so 
 peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our minds. 
 And hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious 
 worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving 
 upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and 
 securing our obedience to it : which yet is an extremely imper- 
 fect view of that most important duty. 
 
 No objection from necessity can lie against this general proof 
 of religion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that 
 we have such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a 
 mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is 
 thus constituted : none against the conclusion ; because it is 
 immediate and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion, that 
 
 * Serm. 2, at the Eolln. f Dissert. II. 
 
166 THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, pakt i. 
 
 God will finally reward the righteous and punish, the wicked, is 
 not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit'*' that he should ; but 
 from its appearing, that he has told us, he will. And this he 
 hath certainly told us, in the promise and threatening, which it 
 hath been observed the notion of a command implies, and the 
 sense of good and ill desert which he has given us, more dis- 
 tinctly expresses. This reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in 
 some degree even verified, by other facts ; by the natural tenden- 
 cies of virtue and of vice;j" and by this, that God, in the natural 
 course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous 
 to society; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense. | 
 So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real^ even 
 upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon. 
 
 It must be observed further, that natural religion has, besides 
 this, an external evidence; which the doctrine of necessity, if it 
 could be true, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the 
 observations and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of 
 the truth of religion ; that there is a God, who made the world, 
 who is the moral governor and judge of mankind, and will upon 
 the whole deal with every one according to his works : I say, 
 suppose a person convinced of this by reason, but to know 
 nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind : it 
 would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what was the 
 history of this system of doctrine ; at what time, and in what 
 manner, it came first into the world; and whether it were be- 
 lieved by any considerable part of it. Were he upon inquiry to 
 
 "* However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is deter- 
 mined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case ,• though one chooses 
 to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when 
 one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to sa}', that it is fit and 
 reasonable for every one to consult fit's own happiness, then fitness of action, or 
 the riyht and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And 
 it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or 
 one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies 
 that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground 
 of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be 
 true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discern- 
 ment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative t( 
 perception, than abstract truth is ; or that it is any more improper to .«peak of 
 the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as fuiinded in the nature oi thii gs, 
 than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded. 
 
 t P. 118. X P. 110, ^-c. 
 
CHAP. VI. AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 1G7 
 
 find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of an proposed 
 it, as a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before 
 wholly ignorant of it; then, though its evidence from reason 
 would remain, there would be no additional probability of its 
 truth, from the account of its discovery. 
 
 But instead of this being the fact, he would find, on the con- 
 trary, what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation 
 of its truth : First, That somewhat of this system, with more or 
 fewer additions and alterations, hath been professed in all ages 
 and countries, of which we have any certain information relating 
 to this matter. Secondly, That it is certain historical fact, so 
 far as we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, 
 that there is one God, the creator and moral governor of the 
 world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received 
 in the first ages. And Tliirdly, That as there is no hint or in- 
 timation in history, that this system was first reasoned out; so 
 there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as 
 history, that it was taught first by revelation. 
 
 Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The 
 first of them, general consent, shows this system to be conform- 
 able to the common sense of mankind. The second, namely, 
 that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, especially 
 as it does not appear that there were then any superstitious or 
 false additions to it, cannot but be a further confirmation of its 
 truth. For it is a proof of this alternative : either that it came 
 into the world by revelation ; or that it is natural, obvious, and 
 forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the conclu- 
 sion of learned men. And whoever will consider, how unapt for 
 speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from 
 hence aloue, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth. And 
 as it is shown in the second part* of this treatise, that there is 
 nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the 
 beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against subse- 
 quent ones ; a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which 
 would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pre- 
 tences to revelation ; than by supposing some real original one, 
 from whence they were copied. 
 
 And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express 
 
 * Chap. ii. 
 
16S THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, part i. 
 
 liistorical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the 
 system of religion being taught mankind by revelation, this must 
 be admitted as some degree of real proof, that it was so taught. 
 For why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as 
 some additional proof of a fact, against which there is no pre- 
 isumption ? This proof is mentioned here, because it has its 
 weight to show, that religion came into the world by revelation, 
 prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book 
 supposed to contain it; and even prior to all consideration, 
 whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down, or 
 mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account, 
 which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circum- 
 etances, is a real confiriLation of its truth, no way affected by 
 the opinion of necessity. And the external evidence, even of 
 natural religion, is by no means inconsiderable. 
 
 It is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after 
 all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as 
 speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, 
 so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, 
 and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This indeed 
 proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical 
 faculties of perception ; against their being intended by nature, 
 to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are 
 to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence of our 
 behavior. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are liable, to 
 prejudice and perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to bo 
 upon our guard, with respect to what is of such consequence, as 
 our determinations concerning virtue and religion ] and par- 
 ticularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of 
 honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to 
 mankind, for the only moral rule."^ 
 
 The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the 
 thing, and the history of religion, amount, iclien taken together, 
 to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted : such a proof 
 as, considering the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, 
 would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence tho 
 actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection, if it were ad- 
 mitted that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said; 
 
 * Dissertation II. 
 
CHAP. VI. AS IXFLUEXCIXG PRACTICE. 169 
 
 *• There are many probabilities, whicb cannot indeed be confuted^ 
 i.e. shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by 
 greater probabilities, on the other side ; muck more by demon- 
 stration. And there is no occasion to object against particular 
 arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be 
 clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such arguments 
 at all, but leaving them just as they are.* Now the method of 
 government by rewards and punishments, and especially reward- 
 ing and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must 
 go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents. 
 And it is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us 
 upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and 
 therefore absurd to think, he will reward or punish us for our 
 actions hereafter; especially that he will do it under the notion, 
 that they are of good or ill desert."' 
 
 Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer 
 is full, and not to be evaded, — viz. : that the whole constitution 
 and course of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows 
 beyond possibility of doubt, that the conclusion from this reason- 
 ing is false ; wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom 
 indeed clearly shows where: in supposing ourselves necessary, 
 when in truth we are free agents. But, upon the supposition of 
 necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is in- 
 credible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished. 
 That, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, 
 is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even brute 
 creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the 
 natural course of things. Men are rewarded and punished for 
 their actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being 
 so, punished for vicious actions as such ; by the natural instru- 
 mentality of each other, under the present conduct of Provi- 
 dence. Nay, even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of 
 resentment, and the rewards and punishments following from 
 them, which in general are to be considered as natural, i.e. from 
 the Author of nature; these rewards and punishments, being 
 naturally\ annexed to actions considered as implying good inten- 
 tion and good desert, ill intention and ill desert; these natural 
 rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to 
 «- Pp. 68, 71. t Serm. Stb, at the BMs. 
 
 15 
 
170 NECESSITY, AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. paet i. 
 
 the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact and 
 complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert as such. 
 So that if it be imcredible, that necessary agents should be thus 
 rewarded and punished ; then, men are not necessary but free ; 
 since it is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded and 
 punished. If, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have 
 been arguing upon, it be insisted that men are necessary agents; 
 then, there is nothing incredible in the further supposition of 
 necessary agents being thus rewarded and punished : since we 
 ourselves are thus dealt with. 
 
 From the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity sup- 
 posed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, 
 does in no sort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor 
 destroy the proof that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his 
 eternal government, render his creatures happy or miserable, by 
 some means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, to express 
 this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter, 
 the analogy of nature shows us, that the opinion of necessity, con- 
 sidered as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the suppo- 
 sition above mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural 
 religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed. 
 
 From these things likewise we may learn, in what sense to 
 understand that general assertion, that the opicion of necessity is 
 essentially destructive of all religion. First, in a practical sense; 
 that by this notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encou- 
 rage themselves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to 
 all religion. And secondly, in the strictest sense ; that it is a 
 contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and to what we 
 may every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns 
 e^ery thing. But by no means is this assertion to be understood, 
 as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the 
 constitution of things, and with what we experience, were not 
 also reconcilable with religion: for upon this supposition, it 
 demonstrably is so.° 
 
 <= [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers gene- 
 rally ; such as Fichte, Hegel, D'Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux, 
 and Holyoake — also, Belsham's Essays, Collins on Liberty, Crombie on 
 Phil. Necessity, IIoebes' Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan, Priestley on 
 Liberty, Hartley on Man, and Edwards on the Will. 
 
 Against the doctrine, see Beattie's Works, Part 2 ; Replies to Hobbes by 
 
CHAP. VII. GOVERNMENT OF GOD, INCOMPREHENSIBLE, 171 
 
 CHAPTER Yir. 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR 
 CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 
 
 Though it be acknowledged, as it cannot but be, that the ana- 
 logy of nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of 
 religion, and to the several particular things contained in it, con- 
 sidered as so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows 
 this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity : 
 still, objections maybe insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, 
 and goodness of the divine government implied in the notion of 
 religion, and against the method by which this government is 
 conducted; to which objections analogy can be no direct answer. 
 For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, does 
 not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or good- 
 ness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately or directly, 
 than show such and such things to be true or credible, considered 
 only as matters of fact. But if, upon supposition of a moral con- 
 stitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy sug- 
 gests and makes it credible, that this government must be a 
 scheme, system, or constitution of government, as distinguished 
 from a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice 
 and goodness; and likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imper- 
 fectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to 
 afford a direct general answer to all objections against the justice 
 and goodness of it : then analogy is, remotely, of great service in 
 answering those objections; both by suggesting the answer, and 
 showing it to be a credible one. 
 
 Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, 
 First, Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government 
 over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests 
 and makes it credible, that his moral government tnust be a 
 scheme, quite beyond our comprehension : and this affords a 
 
 Bn.\Mn.\LT> and Latvson; Replies to Priestley by Palaier and Bryant; Grove 
 on Liberty; Clarke's Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; Gibe's Contemplations; 
 Jvixg's Origin of Evil; Reib on the Mind; Watts on Liberty; Harris' Boylo 
 Lectures; Jacksox's Defence; Butterworth on Moral Government.] 
 
172 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, parti. 
 
 general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness 
 of it. Secondly, A more distinct observation of some particular 
 things contained in God's scheme of natural government, the like 
 things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral 
 government, will further show, how little weight is to be laid 
 upon these objections. 
 
 I. Upon supposition that Grod exercises a moral government 
 over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests 
 and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a 
 scheme, quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a 
 general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness 
 of it. It is most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that, 
 upon supposition of a moral government, it must be a scheme. 
 For the world, and the whole natural government of it, appears 
 to be so : to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts 
 correspond to each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of 
 art, or as any particular model of a civil constitution and govern- 
 ment. In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals 
 have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their own 
 species. Whole species are, we find, variously related to other 
 species, upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much further 
 these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any 
 action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single 
 and unconnected, as not to have a respect to some other actions 
 and events; so possibly each of them, when it has not an imme- 
 diate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions 
 and events, much beyond the compass of this present world. 
 There seems indeed nothing, from whence we can so much as 
 make a conjecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events, 
 throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each other 
 But, as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown conse 
 queuces; so if we trace any event, as far as we can, into what id 
 connected with it, we shall find, that if it were not connected 
 with something further in nature, unknown to us, something 
 both past and present, such event could not possibly have been 
 at all. Nor can we give, the whole account of any one thing 
 whatever; of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those 
 adjuncts, I mean, without which it could nut have been. By 
 this most astonishing connection, these reciprocal correspondences? 
 
CH4P. vri. A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. I73 
 
 and mutual relations, every thing which we see in the course 0^ 
 nature is actually brought about. Things seemingly the most 
 insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be necessary 
 conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so that 
 any one thing whatever, may for aught we know to the contrary, 
 be a necessary condition to any other. 
 
 The natural world then, and natural government of it, being 
 such an incomprehensible scheme ; so incomprehensible, that a 
 man must, really in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is 
 not sensible of his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, 
 and strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world and 
 government of it may be so too.* Indeed the natural and moral 
 constitution and government of the world are so connected, as to 
 make up together but one scheme : and it is highly probable, 
 that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to 
 the latter; as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized 
 bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, without in- 
 quiring how far the administration of the natural world is bub- 
 ordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that 
 one should be analogous or similar to the other: that theiefore 
 every act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look 
 much beyond itself, and its immediate object; may have some 
 reference to other parts of God's moral administration, and to a 
 general moral plan ; and that every circumstance of this his moral 
 government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole 
 of it. For example: the determined length of time, and the 
 degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain in a state of war- 
 fare and discipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have 
 
 * [Maimonides makes use of the following similitude. " Suppose one of good 
 understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to be brought 
 up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father nor the female 
 of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced. 
 He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that 
 while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. Tho 
 young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not eat, and drink, 
 and breathe, as we do now, and is answered. No. Then he denies it, and offers 
 demonstration that it could not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to 
 breathe our life is gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb 
 for months ? So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child 
 live so for months ? and thus he satisfies himself that it is impossible man 
 anould come into existence in such a manner."] 
 
 15* 
 
174 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, part i. 
 
 it3progre&s; the times appointed for the execution of justice j 
 the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and punish- 
 mentS; and the manners of their distribution; all particular in- 
 stances of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of 
 them, may have such respects to each other, as to make up alto- 
 gether a whole, connected and related in all its parts ; a scheme 
 or system, which is as properly such, as the natural world is, and 
 of the like kind. Supposing this to be the case, it is most evi- 
 dent, that we are not competent judges of this scheme, from the 
 small parts of it which come within our view in the present life : 
 therefore no objections against any of these parts can be insisted 
 upon by reasonable men.^ 
 
 This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it, 
 are universally acknowledged upon other occasions; and though 
 scarce denied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to 
 argue against religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the 
 most reasonable men, always to bear in mind the degree of our 
 ignorance, and make due allowances for it. Upon these accounts, 
 it may not be useless to go a little further, in order to show more 
 distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to objections 
 against the scheme of Providence. Suppose then a person boldly 
 to assert,*' that the things complained of, the origin and continu- 
 ance of evil, might easily have been prevented by repeated inter- 
 positions;* interpositions so guarded and circumstanced, as would 
 
 ^ [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting, 
 ■before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few 
 inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning strip of foreground, derive 
 any conception of the figures yet concealed ? Much less is he able to criticize 
 their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist ? 
 The small fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite 
 unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beautj^, fitness, or 
 grandeur. Now the portion of God's dominions within our surve^^, is as utterly 
 insignificant, compared to the universe, and its interminable duration, as an 
 atom compared to a planet or a man's age to eternity. 
 
 The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every diffi- 
 culty as to such ignorance being as valid against the proofs of religion, as it is 
 against objections to it.] 
 
 c [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the wider the range 
 of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance. The young stu- 
 dent may well hesitate to decide points, on which the profoundest thinkers 
 take opposite sides, and when conscious of inability intrust himsai^ to the 
 guidance of those whose lives are best. 
 
 * Pp. 177, 178. 
 
CHAP. vii. A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. J-J 9 
 
 preclude all mischief arising from tliem. Or, if this were in.- 
 practicable, that a scheme of government is itself an imperfection, 
 since more good might have been produced, without any scheme, 
 system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated acts 
 of distributive justice and goodness; because these would have 
 occasioned no irregularities. Farther than this, it is presumed, 
 the objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious : 
 that were these assertions true, still the observations above, con- 
 cerning our ignorance in the scheme of divine government and 
 the consequence drawn from it, would hold, in great measure; 
 enough to vindicate religion, against all objections from the dis- 
 orders of the present state. Were these assertions true, yet the 
 government of the world might be just and good notwithstanding; 
 for, at the most, they would infer nothing more than that it 
 might have been better. But they are mere arbitrary assertions ; 
 no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of 
 things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of proba- 
 bility. For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet 
 many instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our 
 reach, of suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the 
 most palpable self contradictions, which, not every one would per- 
 ceive to be such; nor perhaps any one, at first sight suspect. 
 
 From these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our igno- 
 rance, as it is the common, so it is really a satisfactory answer, 
 to all objections against the justice and goodness of Providence. 
 If a man, contemplating any one providential dispensation, which 
 had no relation to any others, should object, that he discerned in 
 it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of goodness ; nothing 
 would be less an answer to such objection, than our ignorance in 
 other parts of providence, or in the possibilities of things, no way 
 related to what he was contemplating. But when we know not 
 but the part objected against may be relative to other parts un- 
 known to us; and when we are unacquainted with what is, in 
 the nature of the thing, practicable in the case before us; then 
 our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because, some unknown 
 relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is 
 objected against, just and good; nay good in the highest practi- 
 cable degree. 
 
 II. How little weight is to be laid upon such objections, will 
 
176 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, part i. 
 
 further appear, by a more disMnct observation of some particular 
 things contained in the natural government of God, the like to 
 which may be supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his 
 moral government. 
 
 First, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear 
 to be accomplished without means : so we find that means very 
 undesirable, often conduce to bring about ends in such a measure 
 desirable, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the 
 means. And in cases where such means are conducive to such 
 ends, it is not reason, but experience, which shows us, that they 
 are thus conducive. Experience also shows many means to be 
 conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before 
 experience, we should hav€ thought, would have had even a con- 
 trary tendency. From these observations relating to the natural 
 scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to it, , 
 arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each 
 other's power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice 
 to the degree we are; and in general, that those things which 
 are objected against the moral scheme of Providence, may be, 
 upon the whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive 
 of an overbalance of happiness: i.e. the things objected against 
 may be means, by which an overbalance of good, will in the end, 
 be found produced. And from the same observations, it .appears 
 to be no presumption against tbis, that we do not, if indeed we 
 do not, see those means to have any such tendency, or that they 
 seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus those things, which we 
 call irregularities, may not be so at all; because they may be 
 means of accomplishing wise and good ends- more considerable. 
 It may be added, as above, that they may also be the only means, 
 by which these wise and good ends are capable of being accom- 
 plished. 
 
 It may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and 
 wicked conclusion from any of these observations, that though 
 the constitution of our nature, from whence we are capable of 
 vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the 
 perfection and happiness of the world; and though the actual 
 permission of evil may be beneficial to it : {i.e. it would have 
 been more mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself 
 abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly 
 
CHAP. VII. A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.. 1^7 
 
 prevented it, than that it was permitted :) yet notwithstanding, 
 it might have been much better for the world, if this very evil 
 had never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that 
 the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, 
 and yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to re- 
 frain from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the 
 natural world, there are disorders which bring their own cures ; 
 diseases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man would 
 have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would 
 be thought madness to assert, that sickness is a better or more 
 perfect state than health; though the like, with regard to the 
 moral world, has been asserted. 
 
 Secondly, The natural government of the world is carried on 
 by general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons : 
 the wisest and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And 
 that there are such reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the 
 analogy of nature ; by our being made to experience good ends 
 to be accomplished, as indeed all the good which we enjoy is 
 accomplished, by this means, — viz. : that the laws, by which the 
 world is governed, are general. We have scarce any kind of 
 enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental 
 in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we foresee 
 likely to procure them : now this foresight could not be at all, 
 were not the government of the world carried on by general laws. 
 And though, fur aught we know to the contrary, every single 
 case may be, at length, found to have been provided for even by 
 these : yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they 
 arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in 
 the nature of things ; as we see it is absolutely impossible in civil 
 government. 
 
 But then we are ready to think, that, the constitution of nature 
 remaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go 
 on, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to 
 prevent irregularities; though they could not have been pre- 
 vented, or remedied by any general laws. There would indeed 
 be reason to wish, which, by-lhe-way, is very different from a 
 \ight to claim, that all irregularities were prevented or remedied 
 by present interpositions, if these interpositions would have no 
 other effect than this. But it is plain they would have some 
 M 
 
178 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, parti. 
 
 visible and immediate had effects : for instance, they would 
 encourage idleness and negligence; and they would render 
 doubtful the natural rule of life^, which is ascertained by this 
 very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general 
 Jaws. And further, it is certain they would have distant effects, 
 and very great ones too; by means of the wonderful connections 
 before mentioned.* So that we cannot so much as guess, what 
 would be the whole result of the interpositions desired. It may 
 be said, any bad result might be prevented by further interposi- 
 tions, whenever there was occasion for them : but this again is 
 talking quite at random, and in the dark.^ 
 
 Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of 
 the world should be carried on by general laws, and good ends 
 accomplished by this means : and for aught we know, there 
 may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends accomplished 
 by it. We have no ground to believe, that all irregularities could 
 be remedied as they arise, or could have been precluded, by gene- 
 ral laws. We find that interpositions would produce evil, and 
 prevent good : and, for aught we know, they would produce 
 greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater good 
 than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not 
 interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is 
 an instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient : and 
 going further, seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties. 
 
 It may be said, that ''after all, these supposed impossibilities 
 and relations are what we are unacquainted with ; and we must 
 judge of religion, as of other things, by what we do know, and 
 look upon the rest as nothing : or however, that the answers here 
 given to what is objected against religion, may equally be made 
 use of to invalidate the proof of it ; since their stress lies so 
 very much upon our ignorance.'' But, 
 
 First, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed 
 equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and 
 objections against it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we 
 may in any degree be convinced, that a person is of such a cha- 
 racter, and consequently will pursue such ends ; though we are 
 greatly ignorant, what is the proper way of acting, in order the 
 most effectually to obtain those ends : and in this case, objections 
 * P. 173, &c. t V. 17S 
 
CHAP, vit A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 1.79 
 
 against bis manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to ob- 
 tain tbem, migbt be answered by our ignorance ; tdougti the 
 proof that sucb ends were intended, migbt not at all be invali- 
 dated by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral 
 character of God, and consequently that his government is moral, 
 and that every one upon the whole shall receive according to his 
 deserts ; a proof that this is the designed end of his government. 
 But we are not competent judges, what is the proper way of 
 acting, in order the most effectually to accomplish this end.* 
 Therefore our ignorance is an answer to objections against the 
 conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as seeming 
 contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so obvious, that our 
 ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a 
 thing, and yet not affect the proof of it ; till it can be shown, it 
 is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates the proof of 
 religion, as it does the objections against it. 
 
 Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown rela- 
 tions, might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, 
 as well as to answer objections against it; and that, in conse- 
 quence of this, the proof of it were doubtful. Still, let the 
 assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, 
 that moral obligations would remain certain, though it were not 
 certain what would, upon the' whole, be the consequences of 
 observing or violating them. For, these obligations arise, im- 
 mediately and necessarily, from the judgment of our own mind, 
 unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being self- 
 condemned. And they would be certain too, from considerations 
 of interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future 
 consequences of virtue and vice ; yet it is, however, credible, 
 that they may have those consequences, which religion teaches 
 us they will : and this credibility is a certainf obligation in point 
 of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the 
 conscientious practice of all that is good. 
 
 Tliirdly^ The answers above given to the objections against 
 religion cannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. 
 For, upon suspicion that God exercises a moral government over 
 ihe world, analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that 
 this moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond 
 * Pp. 72, 73. t P. 68, and Part II. cbap. vi. 
 
180 CONCLUSION. PART I. 
 
 our comprehension. A thousand particular analogies show us, 
 that parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, 
 may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought 
 they had no tendency to accomplish : nay ends, which before ex- 
 perience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory 
 to, and had a tendency to prevent. Therefore all these analogies 
 show, that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against 
 religion is delusive : because they show it is not at all incredible, 
 that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find the per- 
 mission of the disorders objected against to be consistent with 
 justice and goodness; and even to be instances of them. Now 
 this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the 
 objections against it;* and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, 
 as it does these objections. 
 
 Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that 
 the answers above given to the objections against Providence, 
 though, in a general way of speaking, they may be said to be 
 taken from our ignorance ; yet are by no means taken merely 
 from that, but from something which analogy shows us concern- 
 ing it. For analogy shows us positively, that our ignorance in 
 the possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature, 
 renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, 
 in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to 
 object. So that the things above insisted upon are not mere 
 suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations : but they 
 are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observa- 
 tion of serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of 
 nature. Therefore to take these things into the account, is to 
 judge by experience and what we do know : and it is not judg- 
 ing so, to take no notice of them. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this 
 little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as 
 having a reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan 
 of things. Whether we are, any way, related to the more dia-- 
 
 * germ, at the Rolls, p. 312, 2d ed 
 
CHAP. VII. CONCLUSION. Jgl 
 
 tant parts of the boundless universe, into wbicli we are brought, 
 is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that the course of 
 things, which comes within our view, is connected with some 
 things, past, present, and future, beyond it.* So that we are 
 placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not fixed 
 but progressive, every way incomprehensible : incomprehensible, 
 in a manner equally, with respect to what has been, what now is, 
 and what shall be. This scheme cannot but contain in it some 
 things as wonderful, atid as much beyond our thought and con- 
 ception, ■}■ as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in 
 his senses say, that it is less difl&cult to conceive, how the world 
 came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelli- 
 gent Author and Governor of it '/ Or, admitting an intelligent 
 Governor of it, that there is some other rule of government more 
 natural, and of easier conception, than that which we call moral? 
 Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of nature, 
 no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the part of 
 it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be, and the 
 course of it to be carried on, as it is : nor any, of its general end 
 and design, without a moral governor of it. That there is an 
 intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world, 
 is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise ; as proved, and 
 generally known, and confessed to be proved. And the very 
 notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular 
 final causes, implies a will and a character. | 
 
 Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, 
 leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and 
 good : so we can scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be 
 otherwise. However, in consequence of this his will and cha- 
 racter, whatever it be, he formed the universe as it is, and carries 
 on the course of it as he does, rather than in any other manner ; 
 and has assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a 
 lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and 
 undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any 
 reflection. But one would think it impossible, that creatures 
 endued with reason could ayoid reflecting sometimes upon all 
 this ; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, 
 •whither we are going- and what the mysterious scheme, in the 
 
 » P. 172, &c. t See Part 11. ch. ii. t P. 173. 
 
 IG 
 
182 CONCLUSION. PART I. 
 
 midst of wticli we find ourselves, will, at lengtli, come out and 
 produce : a scheme in wtiich it is certain we are highly interested, 
 and in which we may be interested even beyond conception."* 
 
 For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that 
 we shall cease to be, at death. Particular analogies do most 
 sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be thought strange, in 
 our being to exist in another state of life. And that we are now 
 living beings, affords a strong probability that we shall continue 
 so; unless there be some positive ground, and there is none from 
 reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a per- 
 suasion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely, 
 be little reason to take pleasure in it. Indeed it can have no 
 other ground, than some such imagination, as that of our gross 
 bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience. Expe- 
 rience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from the 
 body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the 
 dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And 
 there are remarkable instances of their not affecting each other, 
 which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, 
 which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature 
 will continue after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to 
 form an institution of life, or to act, upon any other supposition. 
 
 All expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, 
 opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears : since 
 we see the constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery, 
 as well as to be productive of happiness, and experience ourselves 
 to partake of both in some degree; and since we cannot but know, 
 what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there is no 
 presumption against believing further, that our future interest 
 depends upon our present behavior : for we see our present in- 
 terest doth; and that the happiness and misery, which are natu- 
 rally annexed to our actions, very frequently do not follow, till 
 long after the actions are done, to which they are respectively 
 annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether 
 it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness 
 and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not: 
 yet, since we find by experience that he hath such regard, tho 
 
 ^ [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argur»em 
 from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.] 
 
CHAP. vii. CONCLUSION. 183 
 
 whole sense of things whicli he has o-iven us, plainly leads us, at 
 once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, 
 indeed must, be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed 
 happiness, and to bad actions misery; or that he will, upon the 
 whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do evil. 
 
 To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been 
 observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily im- 
 plied in that natural government of God, which we experience 
 ourselves under; that good and bad actions, at present, are natu- 
 rally rewarded and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous 
 to society, but also as virtuous and vicious : and that there is, in 
 the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded 
 and punished in a much higher degree than they are at present. 
 And though this higher degree of distributive justice, which 
 nature thus points out and leads towards, is prevented for a time 
 from taking place; it is by obstacles, which the state of this world 
 unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore are in their 
 nature temporary. Now, as these things in the natural conduct 
 of Providence are observable on the side of virtue; so there is 
 nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A moral 
 scheme of government then is visibly established, and, in some 
 decree, carried into execution : and this, together with the essen- 
 tial tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise 
 in us an apprehension, that it will be carried on further towards 
 perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there receive 
 according to his deserts. 
 
 And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under 
 the moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our 
 behavior; notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, 
 of securing it, and the danger of losing it : just in the same man- 
 ner as our temporal interest, under his natural government, is 
 appointed to depend upon our behavior; notwithstanding the 
 like difficulty and danger. For, from our original constitution, 
 and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted 
 with ourselves; with our own conduct and our own interest. 
 And from the same constitution of nature, especially joined with 
 that course of things which is owing to men, we have temptations 
 10 be unfaithful in this trust; to forfeit this interest, to neglect 
 it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From these tempta- 
 
184 CONCLUSION. PART 1 
 
 tions arise tlie difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal 
 interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. 
 There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be 
 the like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final 
 good, which religion lays before us. 
 
 The whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed 
 in such a condition as this, must indeed be beyond our compre- 
 hension. But it is in part accounted for by what religion teaches 
 us, that the character of virtue and piety must be a necessary 
 qualification for a future state of security and happiness, under 
 the moral government of God; in like manner, as some certain 
 qualifications or other are necessary for every particular condition 
 of life, under his natural government : and that the present state 
 was intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in our- 
 selves that character. Now this intention of nature is rendered 
 highly credible by observing; that we are plainly made for im- 
 provement of all kinds; that it is a general appointment of Provi- 
 denpe, that we cultivate practical principles, and form within 
 ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were 
 wholly unfit for before; that in particular, childhood and youth 
 is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; 
 and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral 
 discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole 
 notion of moral government and a probationary state, from the 
 opinion of necessity; it has been shown, that God has given us 
 the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all objections against 
 religion, on this head, are vain and delusive. He has also, in 
 his natural government, suggested an answer to all our short- 
 sighted objections, against the equity and goodness of his moral 
 government; and in general he has exemplified to us the latter 
 by the former. 
 
 These things, which it is to be remembered, are matters of 
 fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken mankind; to induce 
 them to consider in earnest their condition, and what they have 
 to do. It is absurd, absurd to the decree of being ridiculous, if 
 the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to think them- 
 selves secure in a vicious life; or even in that immoral thought- 
 lessness, into which far the greatest part of them are fallen. The 
 credibility of religion, arising from experience and faces here con- 
 
CHAP. VII. CONCLUSION. 185 
 
 sidered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in 
 the general practice of all virtue and piet}^; under the serious 
 apprehension, though it should be mixed with some doubt,* of a 
 righteous administration established in nature, and a future judg- 
 ment in consequence of it: especially when we consider, how 
 very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained by 
 vice,")- how unquestionably little as well as precarious, the pleasures 
 and profits of it are at the best, and how soon they must be parted 
 with at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason, concern- 
 ing what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to 
 any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case, so in- 
 ducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest 
 so small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, ia 
 the view of reason to be almost nothing in themselves j and in 
 comparison with the importance of religion they quite disappear 
 and are lost. 
 
 Mere passion may indeed be alleged, though not as a reason, 
 yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an 
 excuse it is, will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in 
 a condition in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our 
 passions, by being necessitated to govern them : and to lay our- 
 selves under the same kind of restraints, and as great ones too, 
 from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course 
 of things, require. The plea of ungovernable passion then, en 
 the side of vice, is the poorest of all things; for it is no reason, 
 and a poor excuse. The proper motives to religion are the proper 
 proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of con- 
 science, and our natural apprehension of God under the character 
 of a righteous Governor and Judge: a nature, and conscience, 
 and apprehension, given us by him; and from the confirmation 
 of the dictates of reason, by life and immortality brought to light 
 hy the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven 
 %gainst all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. 
 
 «• Part II. cb. vi. f P. 108. 
 
 END OF THE FIRST PART. 
 
 16* 
 
PART 11. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY." 
 
 Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the liglit 
 of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion in- 
 credible, and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain, 
 no revelation would have been given, had the light of nature 
 been sufficient in such a sense, as to render one not wanted and 
 useless. But no man, in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can 
 possibly think it so, who considers the state of religion in the 
 heathen world before revelation, and its present state in those 
 places which have borrowed no light from it : particularly the 
 doubtfulness of some of the greatest men, concerning things of 
 the utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention and 
 ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say, who 
 would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, 
 which we call Natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear 
 
 ^ [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls into the old 
 plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before determining its truth. 
 Paley discards this order of arrangement, in his very first sentence; and with 
 good reason. The necessity of revelation is an abstraction ; the proofs of it 
 are patent facts. To hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Chria- 
 tianit}', till we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such 
 announcements, is uuphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter discusses the 
 importance rather than the necessity of revelation; and so is a fitting com- 
 mencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed in revelation, over and 
 above the truths which natural religion furnishes, proves the necessity of 
 revelation, if we would know any thing of such truths. And it is such truths 
 ■which constitute the very peculiarities of revelation, and teach the icay r/ 
 tahation, for the sinful and helpless.] 
 186 
 
CHAP. I. niPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. ]87 
 
 of superstition : but there is certainly no ground to affirm that 
 the generality could. If they could, there is no sort of pi'oba 
 bility that they would. Admitting there were, they would highly 
 want a standing admonition to remind them of it, and inculcate 
 it upon them. 
 
 And further, were they as much disposed to attend to religion, 
 as the better sort of men are ', yet even upon this supposition, 
 there would be various occasions for supernatural instruction and 
 assistance, and the greatest advantages might be afforded by 
 them.^ So that to say revelation is a thing superfluous, what 
 there was no need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to 
 talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it be more extrava- 
 gant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present 
 state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to 
 suppose our condition capable of being, in any respect, better. 
 
 There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who 
 seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, over- 
 looking revelation, as of small importance provided natural reli- 
 gion be kept to. With little regard either to the evidence of 
 the former, or to the objections against it, and even upon sup- 
 position of its truth; "the only design of it," say they, "must 
 be, to establish a belief of the moral system of natiu'c, and to 
 enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue. The belief and 
 practice of these were, perhaps, much promoted by the first pub- 
 lication of Christianity : but whether they are believed and prac- 
 tised, upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation, 
 is no great matter."* This way of considering revelation, though 
 
 ^ [No one can read the writings of tbe great sages of antiquity witbcat a 
 full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of God, the sioful- 
 ness of man, the future state, and the rules of living, those prime points on 
 which we need knowledge, they were almost profoundly ignorant. See on ihis 
 point, Leland's Adv. and Necess. : Chalmers' Nat. Theol. : McCosn's Div. 
 Gov. : Pascal's Thoughts : Warburtox's Div. Legation.] 
 
 * Invents multos propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficnint 
 
 sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi praecepturus est 
 Cbristus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est 
 Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nuUam rapinam facio, res 
 (jiienas non concupisco, nuUo adulterio contaminor? Nam inveniatur in 7 ita 
 mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. /up 
 in Psp' xxxi.' [You find many who refuse to become Christians, becjfis* 
 they feel sufiicient of themselves to lead a good life. "We ought to live wt«i. 
 
188 IMPOP TANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. part ii 
 
 it is not the same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, 
 and very much, at length runs up into it : and requires to be 
 particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem to 
 be getting into this way. The consideration of it will likewise 
 further show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the 
 truth of the observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And 
 an inquiry into the importance of Christianity, cannot be an 
 improper introduction to a treatise concerning the credibility 
 of it. 
 
 Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and- com- 
 manded those things which are commanded in Christianity; it is 
 evident, at first sight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent 
 matter, whether we obey or disobey those commands : unless we 
 are certainly assured, that we know all the reasons for them, and 
 that all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to mankind in 
 general, or to ourselves in particular. It is absolutely impossible 
 we can be assured of this.° For our ignorance of these reasons 
 proves nothing in the case: since the whole analogy of nature 
 shows, what is indeed in itself evident, that there may be infinite 
 reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted. 
 
 But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear, 
 by considering it more distinctly : First, as a republication, and 
 external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to 
 the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote 
 natural piety and virtue : Secondly, as containing an account of 
 a dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason, in conse- 
 quence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. For 
 though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of 
 Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it. 
 
 I. Christianity is a republication of Natural religion. It in- 
 structs mankind in the moral system of the world : that it is the 
 work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his government, 
 that virtue is his law, and that he will finally judge mankind in 
 
 fiays one. "AVhat will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what 
 need then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I 
 eovet no man's goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in 
 me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a Christian."] 
 
 c [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or individual com- 
 mand from such as are of universal and perpetual ol ligation, is well iaid ao«a 
 by Wayland, Mor. Sci. ch. ix. sec. 2.] 
 
©HAP. I. IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. Ig9 
 
 righteousness, and render to all according to their works, in a 
 future state. And, which is very material, it teaches natural 
 religion in its genuine simplicity; free from those superstitions, 
 with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a 
 manner lost. 
 
 Revelation is, further, an autlioritative publication of natural 
 religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth 
 of it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, 
 were intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, 
 i.e. the redemption of the world by the Messiah : but this does not 
 hinder, but that they may also prove God's general providence 
 over the world, as our moral governor and judge. And they 
 evidently do prove it; because this character of the Author of 
 nature, is necessarily connected with and implied in that par- 
 ticular revealed dispensation of things : it is likewise continually 
 taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who 
 wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So that 
 indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture 
 revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation 
 been nothing else than to prove it. 
 
 But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove 
 natural religion; and notable objections may be urged against 
 this proof of it, considered as a matter of speculation : but 
 considered as a practical thing, there can be none. For 
 suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, who 
 had lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it; and to 
 declare that he was commissioned by God so to do ; suppose him, 
 in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no 
 human foresight could have guessed at ; to divide the sea with a 
 word ; feed great multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure all 
 manner of diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; 
 would not this give additional credibility to his teaching, a credi- 
 bility beyond what that of a common man would have; and be 
 an authoritative publication of the law of nature, i.e. a new 
 proof of it ? It would be a practical one, of the strongest kind, 
 perhaps, which human creatures are capable of having given 
 them. The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ, are 
 authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they afford 
 a proof of God's general providence, as moral Governor of the 
 
laO IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. part ii. 
 
 world, iM well as of his particular dispensations of providence 
 towards sinful creatures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel. 
 As they are the only evidence of the latter, so they are an addi- 
 tional evidence of the former. 
 
 To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and 
 most improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, con- 
 vinced upon the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the 
 world, that it was under the direction and moral government of 
 an infinitely perfect Being; hut ready to question, whether he 
 were not got beyond the reach of his faculties : suppose him 
 brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of being carried 
 away by the universal bad example of almost every one around 
 him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical sense at least, 
 of these things : and this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a 
 situation with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any 
 man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a person, 
 all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was revealed 
 to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had 
 from principles of reason believed in : and that the publishers of 
 the revelation proved their commission from him, by making it 
 appear, that he had intrusted them with a power of suspending 
 and changing the general laws of nature. 
 
 Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the 
 utmost importance, that life and immortality are eminently 
 brought to light by the Gospel. The great doctrines of a future 
 state, the danger of a course of wickedness^ and the efiicacy of 
 repentance, are not only confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, 
 especially the last is, with a degree of light, to which that of 
 nature is but darkness. 
 
 Further. As Christianity served these ends and purposes, 
 when it was first published, by the miraculous publication itself, 
 so it was intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by 
 means of the settlement of a visible church :^ of a society, dis- 
 
 ^ [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the infinite danger 
 of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of restoration after death. And as 
 tu the efficacy of repentance, it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. 
 At least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to 
 cancel guilt, but restore to the favor of God.] 
 
 « [" Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in like mannef 
 as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in general. There wai 
 
CHAP. I. IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 191 
 
 tinguished from common ones, and from the rest of the world, oy 
 peculiar religious institutions; by an instituted method of Instruc- 
 tion, and an instituted form of external religion. Miraculous 
 powers were given to the first preachers of Christianity, in order 
 to their introducing it into the world : a visible church was esta- 
 blished, in order to continue it, and carry it on successively 
 throughout all ages. Had only Moses and the prophets, Christ 
 and his apostles, taught, and by miracles proved, religion to their 
 contemporaries; the benefits of their instructions would have 
 reached but a small part of mankind. Christianity must have 
 been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To 
 prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible 
 church was instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing 
 memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our Maker : to 
 call men continually, both by example and instruction, to attend 
 to it, and, by the form of religion, ever before their eyes, remind 
 them of the reality; to be the repository of the oracles of God; 
 to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and to 
 propagate it, throughout all generations, to the end of the world — 
 the light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than as 
 designed to enforce natural religion. And in proportion as 
 Christianity is professed and taught in the world, religion, natural 
 or essential religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid 
 before mankind, and brought again and again to their thoughts, 
 as a matter of infinite importance. 
 
 A visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural 
 religion, as being an instituted method of education, originally 
 intended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it. 
 For one end of the institution was, that, by admonition and re- 
 proof, as well as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and 
 public exercises of religion, the body of Christ, as the Scripture 
 speaks, should be edified; i.e. trained up in piety and virtue for 
 a higher and better state. This settlement, then, appearing thus 
 
 ho-wever this difference that by an institution of external religion with a stand- 
 ing ministry for instruction and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christians 
 into visible churches, and all along to preserve them over a great part of the 
 ■world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel." Butler's 
 sermon before the Soc. for Prop, the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that dis- 
 course, that these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories 
 for the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their heresies.] 
 
192 rMPOETAXCE OF CHRISTIANITY. part n. 
 
 beneficial, tending in the nature of tlie thing to answer, and, in 
 some degree, actually answering, those ends, it is to be remem- 
 bered, that the very notion of it implies positive institutions; for 
 the visibility of the church consists in them. Take away every 
 thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion itself. So that 
 if the things now mentioned are advantages, the reason and im- 
 portance of positive institutions in general is most obvious; since 
 without them these advantages could not be secured to the world. 
 And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing the 
 reasons, vjliy such particular ones were fixed upon rather than 
 others. 
 
 The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which 
 Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are 
 very slow in apprehending. And yet it is a thing distinct in 
 itself, and a very plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest 
 really say, that the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were 
 in as advantageous a situation, w^ith regard to natural religion, as 
 they are now among us : that it was laid before them, and en- 
 forced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as much tending 
 to influence their practice '/ 
 
 The objections against all this, from the perversion of Chris- 
 tianity, and from the supposition of its having had but little good 
 influence, however innocently they may be proposed, cannot be 
 insisted upon as conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead 
 to downright Atheism; because the manifestation of the law of 
 nature by reason, which, upon all principles of Theism, must 
 have been from God, has been perverted and rendered iuefi'ectual 
 in the same manner. It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that 
 the good effects of Christianity have not been small; nor its sup- 
 posed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. Per- 
 haps, too, the things done have been aggravated; and if not, 
 Christianity hath been often only a pretence, and the same evils 
 in the main would have been done upon some other pretence. 
 However, great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it 
 have really been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments 
 against it, upon principles of Theism. For one cannot proceed 
 one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon 
 Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle, that the 
 dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by their per 
 
CHAP. I. IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 193 
 
 versions, but bj their genuine tendencies : not by wbat they do 
 actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if mankind 
 did their part; that part which is justly put and left upon them. 
 It is altogether as much the language of one as of the other : Hg 
 that is unjust, let Mm he unjust still : and he that is holy, let him 
 he holy still.^ The light of reason does not, any more than that 
 of revelation, force men to submit to its authority; both admonish 
 them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with the con- 
 eequences of each; and after this, leave them at full liberty to 
 act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. 
 Every moment's experience shows, that this is God's general ] x\q 
 of government.' 
 
 To return then : Christianity being a promulgation of the law 
 of nature; being moreover an authoritative promulgation of, it; 
 with new light, and other circumstances of peculiar advantage, 
 adapted to the wants of mankind; these things fully show its 
 importance. 
 
 It is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case re- 
 quires, so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their 
 profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render 
 it such a promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is 
 the very scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his 
 degree, contribute towards continuing and carrying it on : all by 
 uniting in the public profession and external practice of Chris- 
 tianity; some by instructing, by having the oversight and taking 
 care of this religious community, the church of God. Now this 
 further shows the importance of Christianity; and, which is what 
 I chiefly intend, its importance in a practical sense : or the high 
 obligations we are under, to take it into our most serious considera- 
 tion; and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating 
 
 * Rev. xxii. 11. 
 
 ' ["It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say 
 that since Christianity is a remedial system, designed to obviate those very 
 evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature, 
 it ought not to be liable to the same perversions. Because — 1. Christianity is 
 not designed primarily to remedy the defects of nature, but of an unnatural 
 state of ruin into which men were brought by the Fall. And 2. It is remedial 
 of the defects of nature in a great decree, by its giving additional advantages. 
 3. It might be impossible that it should bo remedial in a greater degree than 
 it is, without destroying man's free agency; which worad be to destroy its own 
 end, the practice of virtue." — Fitzgerald's Xo^cs.] 
 N 17 
 
194 IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. part u. 
 
 it despitefullj, wliicli I am not now speaking of, but in dis- 
 regarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to do what 
 is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the 
 world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all 
 this holds, even though the only thing to be considered in Chris- 
 tianity were its subserviency to natural religion. 
 
 II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view ; as con- 
 taining an account of a dispensation of things, not at all dis- 
 coverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct 
 precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not only an external 
 institution of natural religion, and a new promulgation of God's 
 general providence, as righteous governor and judge of the world; 
 but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensation of 
 Providence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery 
 and salvation of mankind, who are represented in Scripture to 
 be in a state of ruin. And in consequence of this revelation 
 being made, we are commanded to he hcqjtized, not only in the 
 name of the Father, but also, of the Son, and of the Holy 
 Ghost: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the 
 Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of 
 these duties may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not 
 from positive command merely, but also from the offices which 
 appear, from Scripture, to belong to those divine persons in the 
 Gospel dispensation ; or from the relations, which we are there 
 informed, they stand in to us. By reason is revealed the rela- 
 tion, which God the Father stands in to us. Hence arises the 
 obligation of duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are 
 revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in 
 to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty/ which we are under 
 to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of 
 these three respects being admitted : that God is the governor 
 of the world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the 
 mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide 
 and sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation : the truth of the 
 
 8 [Chalmers (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. He shows 
 the elides of natural religion to be one thing and its objects another. Natural 
 religion discloses no Redeemer or Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should 
 regard such a person, if there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such 
 a being by the relation in which we of course stand to him. How we are to 
 express that love and obedience it cannot teach.] 
 
CHAP. I. IMrORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 195 
 
 case, I say, in eacli of ttese respects being admitted, it is no 
 more a question, why it should be commanded, that we be bap- 
 tized in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that 
 we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter seems 
 to require to be more fully stated.* 
 
 Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the 
 twofold consideration of internal and external : for the latter is 
 as real a part of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now, 
 when religion is considered under the first notion, as an inward 
 principle, to be exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind 
 and heart, the essence of natural religion may be said to consist 
 in religious regards to God the Father Almiyhti/ : and the essence 
 of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in 
 religious regards to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost. The obliga- 
 tion we are under, of paying these religious regards to each of 
 these divine persons respectively, arises from the respective rela- 
 tions which they each stand in to us. How tbese relations are 
 made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration 
 in the case : because the duties arise out of the relations them- 
 selves, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them. 
 The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great dis- 
 pensation of Providence, the redemption of the world; the one 
 our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not then the duty 
 of religious regards to both these divine persons, as immediately 
 arise to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices 
 and relations ; as the good-will and kind intention, which we owe 
 to our fellow-creatures, arise out of the common relations be 
 tween us and them? But it will be asked, "What are the in 
 ward religious regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Sor 
 and Holy Spirit ; as arising, not merely from command in Scrip- 
 ture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which 
 they stand in to us?'' I answer, the religious regards of reve- 
 rence, honor, love, tnist, gratitude, fear, hope. 
 
 In what external manner this inward worship is to be ex- 
 pressed, is a matter of pure revealed command, as perhaps the 
 external manner, in which God the Father is to be worshipped, 
 may be more so than we are ready to think. But the worship, 
 
 *■ See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments, 
 *c., \hy Waterland,] and Collibkr of Revealed Keligion, as there quoted. 
 
X96 IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. part it. 
 
 the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no 
 further matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations 
 they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation : for the rela- 
 tions being known, the obligations to such internal worship are 
 obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. 
 In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the 
 reason of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the 
 words. Son and Holy Ghost. 
 
 If this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons 
 who can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided 
 jiatural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even 
 what is peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural reli- 
 gion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. 
 For the office of our Lord being made known, and the relation 
 he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is 
 plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is ; since this obli- 
 gation arises, before external command, immediately out of that 
 his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, 
 that revelation is to be considered, as informing us of somewhat 
 new, in the state of mankind,^ and in the government of the 
 world : as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which 
 could not otherwise have been known. These relations being real 
 (though before revelation we could be under no obligations from 
 them, yet upon their being revealed), there is no reason to think, 
 but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended 
 with the same kind of consequences under God's government, as 
 neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations, made known 
 to us by reason. Ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, 
 so far as we can possibly see, will just as much, and just as little, 
 excuse in one case as in the other : the ignorance being supposed 
 equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases. 
 
 If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between God and 
 man, i.e. if Christianity be true ; if he be indeed our Lord, our 
 Savior, and our God, no one can say, what may follow, not only 
 
 ^ [If Christianity were but "a republication of natural religion," or as 
 Tindall says, "as old as creation," why do deists oppose it? It does indeed 
 republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths beside. If it gave ua 
 no new light, no new motives, it would be but a tremendous curse, making ua 
 all the more responsible, and none the more instructed or secure.] 
 
CHAP. I. IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. I97 
 
 the obstinate, but the careless disregard to him, in those high 
 relations. Nay, no one can say, what may follow such disregard, 
 even in the way of natural consequence.* For, as the natural 
 consequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered as 
 judicial punishments inflicted by Grod, so for aught we know, the 
 judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like way or 
 a like sense, the natural consequence of vice :f of men's violating 
 or disregarding the relations which God has placed them in here, 
 and made known to them. 
 
 If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral cha- 
 racter, and so are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to 
 prepare for his disciples ; and if the assistance of God's Spirit 
 be necessary to renew their nature, in the degree requisite to 
 their being qualified for that state ; (all which is implied in the 
 express, though figurative declaration, Except a man he horn of 
 the Spirit^ he cannot enter into the kingdom of God:^ supposing 
 this, is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter, 
 whether or no he makes use of the means, expressly commanded 
 by God, for obtaining this divine assistance ? Especially since 
 the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect 
 any benefits, without making use of the appointed means for 
 obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing, of 
 the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal or 
 spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from 
 experience or revelation. And experience, the present case does 
 not admit of. 
 
 The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity 
 being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreve- 
 rence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a 
 light matter. It can never justly be esteemed of little conse- 
 quence, till it be positively supposed false. Nor do I know a 
 higher and more important obligation which we are under, than 
 that of examining most seriously into its evidence, supposing 
 its credibility; and of embracing it, upon supposition of its 
 truth. 
 
 The owo following deductions may be proper to be added, in 
 order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent theii 
 being mistaken. 
 
 * P. 94. t Ch. V. ± John iii. I, 
 
 17* 
 
108 IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. part n 
 
 First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction 
 between what is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral 
 precepts, are precepts the reasons of which we see : positive pre- 
 cepts, are precepts the reasons of which we do not see.* Moral 
 duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external 
 command. Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the 
 case, but from external command; nor would they be duties at 
 all, were it not for such command, received from Him whose 
 creatures and subjects we are. But the manner in which the 
 nature of the case or the fact of the relation, is made known, this 
 doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That we 
 be baptized in the name of the Father is as much a positive duty, 
 as that we be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise 
 equally from revealed command : though the relation which we 
 stand in to Grod the Father is made known to us by reason, and 
 the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. On the 
 other hand, the dispensation of the Gospel being admitted, grati- 
 tude as immediately becomes due to Christ, from his being the 
 voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God the 
 Father, from his being the fountain of all good; though the first 
 is made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason. 
 Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness' sake, it may be 
 worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold 
 consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural 
 religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; (though this has 
 also a particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in 
 the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ :) or 
 they are external institutions founded on revealed rt^'giou; as 
 baptism in the name of the Son^ and of the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Secondly, From the distinction between what is moral and 
 what is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar 
 preference, which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the 
 former. 
 
 The reason of positive institutions in general, is very obvious; 
 
 * This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered re- 
 spectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, 
 we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive 
 precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they 
 are alike, we discern the reasons of both ; so far as they are different, we discei»» 
 the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, &g. 
 
CHAP. I. IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. I99 
 
 though we should not see the reason, why particular ones are 
 pitched upon rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead 
 of cavilling at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly 
 see, that positive institutions in general, as distinguished from 
 this or that particular one, have the nature of moral commands; 
 since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, the external 
 worship of Grod is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it 
 be so. Care then is to be taken, when a comparison is made be- 
 tween positive and moral duties, that they be compared no further 
 than as they are different; no further than as the former are 
 positive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of 
 which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are moral, 
 or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such ex- 
 ternal command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run 
 into endless confusion. 
 
 Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts en- 
 joined by the same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is 
 impossible to obey both; that the former is moral, i.e. a precept 
 of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular 
 case before us; but that the latter is positive, i.e. a precept of 
 which we do not see the reasons : it is indisputable that our obli- 
 gations are to obey the former; because there is an apparent 
 reason for this preference, and none against it. Further, positive 
 institutions, all those I suppose which Christianity enjoins, are 
 means to a moral end : and the end must be acknowledged more 
 excellent than the means.* Nor is observance of these institutions 
 any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as 
 it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the strict 
 logical way of stating and determining this matter; but will, per- 
 haps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be thought 
 at first sight. 
 
 Therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of con- 
 
 * [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparativo 
 value of moral and positive institutions, it should not be overlooked that some- 
 times, obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit, than 
 obedience to a moral rule. The latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over 
 and above the command, and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The 
 former rests singly on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who 
 would repel a temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are inseunble to the duty 
 oi. baptism or the Lord's supper.] 
 
200 IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. part n. 
 
 Bideration, and taking the words, moral lata and positive institu- 
 tions, in the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as 
 much matter of revealed command, as positive institutions are : 
 for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect 
 then they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, 
 written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very nature. And 
 this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be 
 preferred, when they interfere. 
 
 But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determi- 
 nation of this question, as some persons seem to think. Nor are 
 we left to reason alone to determine it. For, First, Though 
 mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their reli- 
 gion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience 
 to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all 
 between them, and consequently without determining which is to 
 have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all 
 notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion, as 
 they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip- 
 ture; and likewise to the most express particular declarations of 
 it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral 
 virtue. 
 
 Secondly, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive 
 and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion 
 upon the latter, and never upon the former. This, though no 
 sort of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere 
 with the latter, is yet a plain intimation, that when they do, the 
 latter are to be preferred. And as mankind are for placing the 
 stress of their religion anywhere, rather than upon virtue; lest 
 both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christi- 
 anity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be in- 
 effectual against this prevalent folly, our Lord himself, from 
 whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, 
 has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and 
 moral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him, for eating 
 with publicans and sinners; and also when they censured his 
 disciples, for pluching the ears of corn on the Sahhath day. 
 Upon this comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, 
 which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by 
 delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner 
 
t-nAP. I. IMPORTANCE OF CHEISTIANITY. 2{jl 
 
 of expression, lie has made it general : I will have mercy, and 
 not sacrifice.'^ The propriety of the word proverbial, is not the 
 thing insisted upon : though I think the manner of speaking is 
 to be called so. But that the manner of speaking very remark- 
 ably renders the determination general, is surely indisputable. 
 For, had it been said only, that Grod preferred mercy to the rigid 
 observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, most 
 justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise, 
 to the observance of other ritual institutions; and in general, 
 moral duties, to positive ones. And thus the determination 
 would have been general; though its being so were inferred and 
 not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the Gospel, 
 it is much stronger. For the sense and the very literal words of 
 our Lord's answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a 
 comparison, between positive and moral duties, as to that upon 
 which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy 
 is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought, 
 that justice is to give place to them. It is remarkable too, that, 
 as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are 
 introduced, on both the forementioned occasions, with a declara- 
 tion, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them. 
 This, I say, is. very remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible, 
 for the most \gnorant person, not to understand the literal sense 
 of the passage in the prophet ^f and since understanding the 
 literal sense would not have prevented their condemning the guilt- 
 less,'^ it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord 
 really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had 
 not learned from it, as they might, wherein the general spirit of 
 religion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as 
 distinguished from ritual observances. However, it is certain we 
 may learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the 
 Gospel. 
 
 But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, 
 when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of 
 greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of 
 scarce any importance at all: it is highly necessary that we re- 
 mind ourselves, how great presumption it is, to make light of any 
 institutions of divine appointment; that our obligations to obey 
 
 * ]Latt. ix 13, and xii. 7. f Hosen vi. 6. % See Matt. sii. 7. 
 
202 KEVELATIOX CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. pakt ii. 
 
 all God's commands whatever are absolute and indispensable; 
 and that commands merely positive, admitted to be from bim, 
 lay us under a moral obligation to obey tbem : an obligation 
 moral in tbe strictest and most proper sense. 
 
 To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now 
 given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us 
 the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order to see, what 
 the scheme of revelation really is ; instead of determining before- 
 hand, from reason, what the scheme of it must be.* Indeed if 
 in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming meaning 
 of which is contrary to natural religion ; we may most certainly 
 conclude, such seeming meaning not to be the real one.J But it 
 is not any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of 
 Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine, which the 
 light of nature cannot discover ^-j- or a precept, which the law 
 of nature does not oblige to. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED 
 AS MIRACULOUS. 
 
 Having shown the importance of the Christian revelation, 
 and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, 
 upon supposition of its truth, or its credibility, the next thing in 
 
 - See ch. iii. 
 
 J [Dr. Angus judiciously remarks on tbis sentence, "This sentiment, as un- 
 derstood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, tbe Bible must be 
 so interpreted as to agree with all known truth, whether of natural religion or 
 natural science. At the same time, to correct the theology of the Bible by the 
 theology of nature, as finite and guilty men understand it, may involve the 
 rejection of Bible theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was 
 intended to suppl3\ The converse of Butler's statement is equally true, and 
 even more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the 
 seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming lesson 
 is not the real one." Practically, it will be found that seeming meanings of 
 Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts of Scripture itself. I 
 understand Butler as only affirming that we must interpret Scripture according 
 to immutable principles, and known truth. The infidel rejects it for u< t con 
 forming to his assumed hi/pothesis.'] 
 
 t P. 203. 
 
CHAP. II. REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 203 
 
 order, is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation 
 in general; which shall be the subject of this chapter: and the 
 objections against the Christian in particular, which shall be the 
 subject of some following ones.* For it seems the most natural 
 method, to remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we 
 proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and 
 the objections against that evidence. "j* 
 
 It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar 
 presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian 
 scheme of things, at least against miracles ; so as that stronger 
 evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than 
 would be sufl&cient to convince us of other events, or matters of 
 fact. Indeed the consideration of this supposed presumption 
 cannot but be thought very insignificant, by many persons. Yet, 
 as it belongs to the subject of this treatise; so it may tend to 
 open the mind, and remove some prejudices, however needless 
 the consideration of it be, upon its own account. 
 
 I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of 
 nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, that God 
 created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by 
 him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, i.e. render to 
 every one according to his works; and that good men are under 
 the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or 
 are not, to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about 
 words; or however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy 
 of nature raises any presumption against this general scheme of 
 Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discoverable by 
 reason or experience ; or else, because it is unlike that course of 
 nature, which is. But analogy raises no presumption against the 
 truth of this scheme, upon either of these accounts. 
 
 First, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth 
 of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or expe- 
 rience. Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most 
 improved understandiog, and acquainted with our whole system of 
 natural philosophy and natural religion ; such a one could not but 
 be sensible, that it was but a very small part of the natural and 
 moral system of the universe, which he was acquainted with. 
 He could not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable 
 
 * Chaps, iii., iv., v., vi. t Chap. vii. 
 
.1 EEVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. paut ii. 
 
 things, i'l the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible 
 governmen-^. over the world at present carrying on, and in what 
 is to come ; of which he was wholly ignorant,* and which could 
 not be discovered without revelation. Whether the scheme of 
 nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not ; it is evidently 
 vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And doubtless that 
 part of it, which is open to our view, is but as a point in com- 
 parison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout 
 eternity past and future; in comparison of what is even now 
 going on, in the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in 
 comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And therefore, 
 that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no 
 sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them ; be- 
 cause it is certain, there are innumerable things, in the constitu- 
 tion and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the 
 natural reach of our faculties. 
 
 Secondly, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the 
 things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now men- 
 tioned, upon account of their being unlike the known course of 
 nature. For there is no presumption at all from analogy, that 
 the icliole course of things, or divine government naturally un- 
 known to us, and every thing in it, is like to any thing in that 
 which is known ; and therefore no peculiar presurap*-ion against 
 any thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any 
 thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural govern- 
 ment of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we 
 see things, in a great degree, unlike one another : and therefore 
 ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible 
 and invisible. However, the scheme of Christianity is by no 
 means entirely unlike the scheme of nature; as will appear in 
 the following part of this treatise. 
 
 The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine 
 mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines; and is, 
 I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There are also 
 invisible miracles/ the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, 
 
 * P. 172. 
 
 * [Papists urge that the antual conversion of tne bread and wine in the 
 Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is such because 
 wrought under circumt-tances which exclude examination : while transubstttn- 
 
CHAP. 11. REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 205 
 
 being secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of sucb a mission ; but 
 require themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation 
 itself too is miraculous; and miracles are the proof of it; and 
 the supposed presumption against these shall presently be con- 
 sidered. All which I have been observing here is, that, whether 
 we choose to call every thing in the dispensations of Providence, 
 not discoverable without revelation, nor like the known course of 
 things, miraculous; and whether the general Christian dispensa- 
 tion now mentioned is to be called so, or not ; the foregoing 
 observations seem certainly to show, that there is no presumption 
 against it from the analogy of nature. 
 
 II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some opera- 
 tions, which we should now call miraculous; particularly none 
 against a revelation at the beginning of the world : nothing of 
 such presumption against it, as is supposed to be implied or ex- 
 pressed in the word, miraculous} A miracle, in its very notion, 
 is relative to a course of nature; and .implies something differ- 
 ent from it, considered as being so. Now, either there was no 
 course of nature at the time which we are speaking of; or if 
 there were, we are not acquainted what the course of nature is, 
 upon the first peopling of worlds. Therefore the question, 
 whether mankind had a revelation made to them at that time, is 
 to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a 
 common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it 
 more or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this 
 question, and concerning common matters of fact of the same 
 antiquity; for instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. 
 
 Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this state, there 
 was a power exerted, totally different from the present course of 
 nature. Now, whether this power, thus wholly different from the 
 present course of nature, (for we cannot properly apply to it the 
 word miraculous ;~) whether this power s^o/jpecZ immediately after 
 it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself further in giving 
 him a revelation, is a question of the same kind, as whether an 
 
 nation invites and facilitates examination. ''It is wrought publicly, and con- 
 stantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a miracle. Indeed it supposes the 
 working of a second miracle, to make the first invisible."] 
 
 ^ [Paley shows conclusively t'uat a denial of miracles leads not only to 
 a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God, all of whoso 
 octraordinc.-y acts are necessarily miraculous.] 
 
 18 
 
205 REVELATION COXSIDERED A.S MIRACULOUS, part n. 
 
 ordinary power exerted itself in such a particular degree and 
 aiauner, or not. 
 
 Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be 
 considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the 
 case will not be different : since it must be acknowledged, that 
 such a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that 
 our Savior spent some years in a course of working miracles:" 
 there is no more presumption, worth mentioning, against his 
 haying exerted this miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, 
 than in a certain degree less; in one or two more instances, than 
 in one or two fewer; in this, than in another manner. 
 
 It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, 
 from the analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when 
 man was first placed upon earth. "^ 
 
 Add,' that there does not appear the least intimation in history 
 or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out : but the whole 
 of history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came 
 into the world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the 
 first ages of which we have any account, seems to suppose and 
 imply, that this was the original of it among mankind. "^ And 
 these reflections together, without taking in the peculiar authority 
 of Scripture, amount to real and a very material degree of evi- 
 dence, that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world. 
 
 " [Whately, in his Logic, b. iii., has shown the folly of the Deistical at- 
 tempts to explain our Savior's miracles as mere natural events. Having 
 labored to show this of some one of the miracles, they then do so as to another, 
 and thence infer that all were accidental conjunctures of natural circumstances. 
 He says, they might as well argue "that because it is not improbable one may 
 throw sixes once in a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that 
 one may throw sixes a hundred times running." 
 
 Fitzgerald says, "the improbability of a whole series of strange natural 
 events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts to a far greater 
 improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles."] 
 
 <i [That man, at first, must have had supernatural instructions, or in other 
 words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop Whately in his " Oiigin of 
 Civilization." Rev. Samuel Stanhope Smith expresses his conviction, both 
 from reason and history, that man in his savage state could not even have pre- 
 served life without instruction from his Creator.] 
 
 ® [The maintenance by the Jews, of a sj'stem of pure Theism, through so 
 many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to their neighbors» 
 in science and civilization, can only be accounted for on the presumption of a 
 tevelation.] 
 
CHAP. II. REVELATION CONSIDEHED AS MIRACULOrS. 207 
 
 Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and tlierefora 
 mentioned in the former part of this treatise;* so likewise it 
 has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent 
 revelation. 
 
 III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar 
 presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against 
 revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a 
 course of nature. 
 
 Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be ob- 
 served in general, that before we can have ground for raising 
 what can, with any propriety, be called an argument from analogy, 
 for or against revelation considered as something miraculous, we 
 must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the his- 
 tory of some other world, seemingly in like circumstances with 
 our own, is no more than a parallel case : and therefore nothing 
 short of this can be so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive 
 proof, for or against a revelation, from being informed, whether 
 such world had one, or not; such a proof, being drawn from 
 one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More 
 particularly : 
 
 First. There is a very strong presumption against common 
 speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the 
 proofs of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. 
 
 * P. 166, Ac. 
 
 ' [Mills (Logic, chap. 24, ^ 5,) points out what he deems a mistake of ''some 
 of the writers against Hume on Miracles," in confounding the improbabilit}'^ of 
 an event, before it? occurrence, with the improbability afterwards; that is, con- 
 sidering them equal in degree. He fully proves that the great Laplace fell 
 into this error, and the student should consult the passage. 
 
 Prof. Fitzgerald holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted to 
 by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make him say 
 ;hat such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills, nor do I see that 
 Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very contrary. He expressly 
 aflarms, and most truly, that the strongest presumption may lie against " tho 
 most ordinary facts before the proof which yet is overcome by almost any 
 proof." Butler's position here, may be thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred 
 numbers to be put in a box, and it is proposed to draw out the number 42. 
 Now there are 99 chances to 1 against drawing that, or any other given number. 
 8ut suppose a child tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew 
 •jut one, and it proved to be 42; ypu at once believe, for that was as likely to 
 come as any other. 
 
 The proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus 
 viewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be bom 
 
208 REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. part ii. 
 
 There is a presumption of millions to one, against the story of 
 Caesar, or of any other man. For suppose a number of common 
 facts so and so circumstanced, of which we had no kin I of proof, 
 should happen to come into one's thoughts; every one would, 
 without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the 
 like may be said of a single common fact. Hence it appears, 
 that the question of importance, as to the matter before us, is, 
 concerning the degree of the peculiar presumption supposed 
 against miracles; not whether there be any peculiar presumption 
 at all against them. For, if there be the presumption of millions 
 to one, against the most common facts; what can a small pre- 
 sumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar? 
 It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material 
 question is, whether there be any such presumptions against 
 miracles, as to render them in any sort incredible. 
 
 Secondly, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are 
 in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or 
 circumstances, the present course of nature depends; that there 
 does not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that 
 five or six thousand years may have given scope^ for causes, 
 occasions, reasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous 
 interpositions may have arisen. And from this, joined with the 
 foregoing observation, it will follow, that there must be a pre- 
 sumption, beyond all comparison greater, against the particular 
 common facts just now instanced in, than against miracles in 
 general; before any evidence of either. 
 
 Thirdly, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral 
 system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons 
 for miracles : to afford mankind instruction additional to that of 
 nature, and to attest the truth of it. This gives a real credibility 
 to ihe supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of 
 things, that there should be miraculous interpositions. 
 
 at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular circumstances. 
 The probabilities against such a conjuncture of events are almost infinite; yet 
 they happened exactly as foretold.] 
 
 s [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly accumulate for an 
 age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village. Or a planet, or cornet^ 
 may have been gradually nearing our earth for a million of years, without pro- 
 ducing, as yet, any effect on our orbit; but in process of time, its proxloiity 
 may work great changes in our condition.] 
 
CHAP. III. REVELATION LIABLE TO OB JECTIOl^S. 209 
 
 Lastly, Miracles must not be compared to common natural 
 events, or to events whicli, though uncommon, are similar to 
 what we daily experience : but to the extraordinary phenomena 
 of nature. And then the comparison will be between the pre- 
 sumption against miracles, and the presumption against such 
 uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against there 
 being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so 
 contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these 
 powers. And before any one can determine, whether there be 
 any peculiar presumption against miracles, more than against 
 other extraordinary things; he must consider, what, upon first 
 hearing, would be the presumption against the last mentioned 
 appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the 
 daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this earth, 
 and with those common powers of matter which we every day see. 
 
 Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such pre- 
 sumption against miracles, as to render them in any wise in- 
 credible : that, on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons 
 for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in 
 eases where those reasons hold : and that it is by no means cer- 
 tain, that there is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, 
 even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished from 
 other extraordinary phenomena : though it is not worth while to 
 perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature of evi- 
 dence, in order to determine a question, which, without such in- 
 quiries, we see* is of no importance. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OUR INCAPACITY OP JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED 
 IN A REVELATION; AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, 
 THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 
 
 Besides the objections against the evidence for Christianity, 
 many are alleged against the scheme of it; against the whole 
 manner in which it is put and left with the world; as well as 
 <gainst several particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn 
 
 * P. 208. 
 IS* 
 
.-^lO REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. part ii. 
 
 from the deficiencies of revelation : from things in it appearing 
 to men foolishness ;^ from its containing matters of ofience, 
 ■T^hich have led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into 
 strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the 
 purposes of tyranny and wickedness; from its not being universal; 
 and, which is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not 
 being so convincing and satisfactory as it might have been : for 
 this last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its 
 truth.f 
 
 It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the 
 several particulars comprehended under the objections here re- 
 ferred to; they being so various, according to the diiferent 
 fancies of men. There are persons who think it a strong objec- 
 tion against the authority of Scripture, that it is not composed by 
 rules of art, agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. 
 And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic 
 parts of Scripture are treated : partly through the rashness of 
 interpreters ; but very much also, on account of the hieroglyphical 
 and figurative language, in which they are left us. 
 
 Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly 
 considered in the following chapters. But my design at present 
 is to obseiTe in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, 
 that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible before- 
 hand, that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great de- 
 gree: and that it would contain many things appearing to us 
 liable to great objections; in case we judge of it otherwise, than 
 by the analogy of nature. Therefore, though objections against 
 the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered, 
 yet objections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, 
 frivolous: almost all objections against it, excepting those which 
 are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God. 
 I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify 
 reason; which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to 
 judge concerning any thing, even revelation itself: or be mis- 
 understood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be proved 
 false, from internal characters. For, it may contain clear immo- 
 ralities or contradictions ; and either of these would prove it false. 
 Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can po-s^ibly 
 * 1 Cor. i. 28. t See Chop. ri. 
 
CHAP. III. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 211 
 
 render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observa' 
 tion above, is, I think, true beyond doubt; that objections against 
 Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, 
 are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the 
 present chapter. 
 
 With regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, 
 that the i^oofs, might be attended to; rather than the assertions 
 cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable consequences, real 
 or supposed, which may be drawn from them. For, after all, 
 that which is true, must be admitted, though it should show us 
 the shortness of our faculties : and that we are in no wise judges 
 of many things, of which we are apt to think ourselves very 
 competent ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable 
 men ; at least upon second thought it will not be any objection 
 with such, against the justness of the following observations. 
 
 As God governs the world and instructs his creatures, accord- 
 ing to certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature; 
 known by reason together with experience: so the Scripture 
 informs us of a scheme of divine Providence, additional to this. 
 It relates, that God has, by revelation, instructed men in things 
 concerning his government, which they could not otherwise have 
 known; and reminded them of things, which they might other- 
 wise know; and attested the truth of the whole by miracles. 
 Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are 
 both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together 
 make up one scheme of Providence ; our being incompetent 
 judges of one, must render it credible, that we may he incompe- 
 tent judges also of the other. Upon experience, the acknow- 
 ledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly 
 diiferent from what, before experience, would have been ex- 
 pected; and such as, men fancy, there lie great objections 
 against. This renders it beforehand highly credible, that they 
 may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as 
 they do of the constitution of nature, very difi"erent from expec- 
 tations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great 
 objections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the 
 degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which 
 it was attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern 
 Qis dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known 
 
212 REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. paiit ii. 
 
 laws ; and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these 
 laws; and govern, in several instances, in a different manner. 
 If one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, by 
 what common rules the government should or would be carried 
 on; it could not be expected, that the same person would be a 
 competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to 
 wliat degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended 
 or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the 
 ordinary administration, there is no reason to think he would be 
 a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he 
 had objections against the former; doubtless, it is highly sup- 
 posable, he might think also, that he had objections against the 
 latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, 
 whenever we pretend, otherwise than from experience and ana- 
 logy, to judge of the constitution and course of nature; it is evi- 
 dently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into as great, 
 in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation. 
 Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should 
 appear to us clear of objections, than that the former should. 
 
 These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are 
 applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort 
 judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by 
 what means, it were to have been expected, that God would natu- 
 rally instruct us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and 
 instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us 
 by I'eason and experience, we are in no sort judges, by what 
 methods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected that this 
 supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We 
 know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information 
 it were to be expected Grod would afford men, each by his own 
 reason and experience : nor how far he would enable and effectu- 
 ally dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to 
 each other ; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, 
 highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with 
 equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon 
 any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the 
 faculty itself, by which we are capable of attaining it, reason, 
 would be given us at once, or gradually. 
 
 In like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new 
 
REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECriONS. 
 
 21S 
 
 knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankiDd by 
 revelation, upon supposition of his affording one : or how far or 
 in whai way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to 
 whom he should originally make the revelation, for communi- 
 cating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to 
 the age in which they should live; and to secure its being trans- 
 mitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, whether the evi- 
 dence of it would be certain or highly probable, or doubtful :* or 
 whether all who should have any degree of instruction from it, 
 and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same : 
 or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded 
 gradually.* Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether 
 it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have 
 been committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and 
 consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk 
 under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as 
 they are permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as 
 they will. 
 
 But it may be said, ^' that a revelation in some of the above- 
 mentioned circumstances, one, for instauce, which was not com- 
 mitted to writing, and thus secured against danger of corruption, 
 would not have answered its purpose.'' I ask, what purpose ? It 
 would not have answered all the purposes, which it has now 
 answered, and in the same degree : but it would have answered 
 others, or the same in different degrees. And which of these 
 were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general 
 government, we could not at all have determined beforehand. 
 
 Now since we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge 
 beforehand, how it were to be expected that revelation should 
 have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of 
 government, in any of the forementioned respects; it must be 
 quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them, against its 
 being left in one way, rather than another: for this would be to 
 object against things, upon account of their being different from 
 expectations, which has been shown to be without reason. 
 
 Thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of 
 Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation ; i^ot whether it 
 ^Q attended with every circumstance which we should hava 
 
 * See Chap. vi. a [See note, page 218.] 
 
214 REA'ELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. part ii. 
 
 looked for : and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether 
 it be what it chiims to be ; not whether it be a book of such sort, 
 and so promulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book contain- 
 ing a divine revehition should be. Therefore, neither obscurity, 
 nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early 
 disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor any other 
 things of the like kind, though they had been much more con- 
 siderable in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority 
 of the Scripture : unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, 
 had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation 
 should be exempt from those things. Nor indeed can any objec- 
 tions overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims 
 to be, (since there are no objections against the morality of it,*) 
 but such as can show, that there is no proof of miracles wrought 
 originally in attestation of it; no appearance of any thing mira- 
 culous in its obtaining in the world ; nor any of prophecy, that 
 is, of events foretold, which human sagacity could not foresee. 
 If it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these is abso- 
 lutely none at all, then is revelation overturned. But were it 
 allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower than 
 is allowed; yet, whil-t any proof of them remains, revelation 
 will stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the 
 purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence 
 upon our behavior. 
 
 From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those 
 who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth 
 remarking, that there are several ways of arguing, which though 
 just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scrip- 
 ture : at least not to its prophetic parts. We cannot argue, for in- 
 stance, that such and such cannot be the sense or intent of a passage 
 of Scripture, for, if it had, it would have been expressed more 
 plainly, or represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic. 
 Yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common books. 
 And the reason of this difi'erence is very evident. In Scripture 
 we are not competent judges, as we are in common books, how 
 plainly it were to have been expected, that the sense should 
 have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The 
 only question is, what appearance there is, that -this h the sense; 
 
 * P. 220. 
 
CHAP. III. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 215 
 
 and scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately/ it 
 might have been expressed or figured.'' 
 
 "But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of all 
 kinds weaken external probable proof?" Doubtless. But to 
 what practical purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been 
 proved before,* that real internal improbabilities, which rise even 
 to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; 
 and when it now has been made to appear, that we scarce know 
 what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here consider- 
 ing : as it will further appear from what follows. 
 
 From the observations made above it is manifest, that we are 
 not in any sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction 
 were to have been expected; and it is self-evident, that the 
 objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous. Yet 
 it may be proper to go one step further, and observe, that if men 
 will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of the 
 Scripture by preconceived expectations; the analogy of nature 
 shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible they may, 
 but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong objec- 
 tions against it, however really unexceptionable. For so, prior to 
 experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances, 
 and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is 
 afforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction 
 which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere pro- 
 pensions, and to mankind by these together with reason, matter 
 of probable proof, and not of certain observation ; it would be 
 rejected as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account 
 of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming dis- 
 proportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and circum- 
 stances of it. For instance : would it not have been though* 
 highly improbable, that men should have been so much more 
 
 ^ [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the ordinary rules 
 of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures. Because the interpretation, 
 "if not gathered otit of the words, must be brought into them." We cannot 
 interpret them as if we knew beforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say; 
 as Spinoza proposes to do, in his Philosophia Scripturae Interpretes. The 
 student will do well to consult Benson •; Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Diffi- 
 culties : King's Morsels of Criticism : Storr, Exertationes Exeget. : Michaelis, 
 lutrod. ad. Nov. Test. : and Featlky's Key.] 
 
 * Pp. 207, 208. 
 
216 REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. part ii. 
 
 capable of discovering, even to certainty, tlie general laws of 
 matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions, of heavenly 
 bodies ; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many 
 other things in which human life seems so much more nearly con- 
 cerned, than in astronomy ? How capricious and irregular a way 
 of information would it be said, is that of invention, by means 
 of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in many 
 things, upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend : that 
 a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with a thing 
 in an instant, (when perhaps he is thinking of something else,) 
 which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, for years. 
 
 So likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by 
 which nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts 
 to each other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, 
 inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negli- 
 gence 3 and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive 
 and betray by it. And, to mention but one instance more; that 
 brutes, without reason, should act, in many respects, with a 
 sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those 
 respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do 
 act with such superior foresight : whether it be their own, indeed, 
 is another question. From these things, it is highly credible 
 beforehand, that upon supposition that God should afford men 
 some additional instruction by revelation, it would be with cir- 
 cumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, against the credi- 
 bility of which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections. 
 Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against Chris- 
 tianity in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of 
 nature would beforehand — not perhaps give ground to expect; 
 (for the analogy may not be sufiicient, in some cases, to ground 
 an expectation upon;) but no more nor greater, than analogy 
 would show it, beforehand, to be supposable and credible, that 
 there might seem to lie against revelation. 
 
 By applying these general observations to a particular objec- 
 tion, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to 
 others of the like kind; and indeed to almost all objections 
 against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its 
 evidence. It appears from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual 
 in the apostolic age, for persons, upon their conversion to Chris- 
 
CHAP. m. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIOXS. 217 
 
 tianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts; so, some of those 
 persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and dis- 
 orderly manner;*' and this is made an objection against their 
 being really miraculous. Now the foregoing observations quite 
 remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at 
 first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of these 
 gifts, for instance that of tongues : it is to be supposed, that he 
 had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have 
 had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it 
 ordinarily is ; or the same power over it, as he had over any other 
 natural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same 
 Tnanner as he did any other; either regularly, and upon proper 
 occasions only, or irregularly, and upon improper ones : accord- 
 ing to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence.* 
 Where then is the objection ? Why, if this miraculous power 
 was indeed given to the world to propagate Christianity, and 
 attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that 
 other sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested 
 with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been 
 endued with prudence; or that they should have been con- 
 tinually restrained and directed in the exercise of it : i.e. that 
 God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different 
 manner, or higher degree. But, from the observations made 
 above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not judges in what 
 d*3grees and manners it were to have been expected he should 
 miraculously interpose; upon supposition of his doing it in some 
 degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, 
 are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other 
 talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence 
 and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use 
 
 « [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10 : xiii. 1 : and xiv. 1-19.] 
 
 ^ [" The power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the whole course 
 of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of the general laws of matter 
 and motion. It was therefore fit that this power should be given occasionally. 
 But the S2)eahing with tongues, when once the gift was conferred, became thence- 
 forth a natural power; just as the free use of members of the body, after being 
 restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. In healing, the 
 apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle ; in speaking strange 
 tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is performed." — Wakburtox, Doct. of 
 'vrare, b. i. ch. iii.] 
 
 19 
 
218 REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. part ii. 
 
 of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally 
 afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our education, 
 commonl;y given in a manner the most suited to recommend it; 
 but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such 
 instruction. 
 
 One might go on to add, there is a great resemblance between 
 the light of nature and of revelation, in several other respects. 
 Practical Christianity, or that faith and behavior which renders 
 a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing : like the common 
 rules of conduct, with respect to ordinary temporal affairs. The 
 more distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the study 
 of which the apostle calls going on unto perfection,^ and of the 
 prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even 
 civil knowledge, may require very exact thought, and careful 
 consideration. The hinderances too, of natural, and of super- 
 natural light and knowledge, have been of the same kind. And 
 as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet under- 
 stood ; so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the restitution 
 of all things,'\ and without miraculous interpositions, it must be 
 in the same way as natural knowledge is come at : by the con- 
 tinuance and progress of learning and of liberty;® and by par- 
 ticular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing, intimations 
 scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded 
 by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all 
 improvements are made; by thoughtful men's tracing on obscure 
 hints, dropped us by nature as it were, accidentally, or which 
 seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, 
 that a book which has been so long in the possession of man- 
 kind, should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all 
 the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, 
 
 * Heb. vi. 1. t Acts iii. 21. 
 
 ^' [The doctrine of " development" has of late been popular in some quarters. 
 Butler here shows the only safe notion we may entertain on that subject. 
 "Exact 'thought, and careful consideration" may show us bow to confute 
 specious heresies, expound embarrassing passages, dissipate painful doubts, 
 and remove many prejudices or misapprehensions. But revelation is complete 
 as it stands. 
 
 We may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in tho 
 development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians pretend, but in 
 the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect interpretation oi God's 
 word.] 
 
CHAP. iiT. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 219 
 
 from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have 
 been made in the present and last age, were equally in the pos- 
 session of mankind, several thousand years before. And possibly 
 it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, should 
 open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. 
 
 It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material re- 
 spect : for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence. 
 But I have been speaking of the general instruction which nature 
 does or does not afford us. And besides, some parts of natural 
 knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of the words, 
 are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of 
 life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this 
 respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied, from the whole 
 constitution and course of nature : which shows, that God does 
 not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage 
 and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, 
 with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would 
 together make out an analogy full to the point before us. 
 
 But it may be objected still further and more generally; "The 
 Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Chris- 
 tianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in these respects 
 where nature fails : in particular, to supply the deficiencies of 
 natural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages should have 
 been let pass, before a matter of such a sort, of so great and so 
 general importance, was made known to mankiud; and then that 
 it should be. made known to so small a part of them? Is it con- 
 ceivable, that this supply should be so very deficient, should have 
 the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like perver- 
 sions, in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the light of 
 nature itself ?"*" 
 
 Without determining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer; it 
 is by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of 
 nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are 
 naturally liable to diseases : for which God, in his good provi- 
 dence, has provided natural remedies. f But remedies existing 
 in nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages ; are 
 known but to few now; probably many valuable ones are not 
 •inown yet. Great has been and is the obscurit}^ and difiiculty, 
 *■ Chap. vi. f Chap. v. 
 
220 BEVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. part ii. 
 
 in the nature and application of them. Circumstances seem 
 often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely 
 necessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccess- 
 ful endeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are; 
 after high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we 
 have; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be 
 endless. The best remedies too, when unskilfully, much more 
 when dishonestly applied, may produce new diseases ; and with 
 the rightest application the success of them is often doubtful. 
 In many cases they are not effectual : where they are, it is often 
 very slowly: and the application of them, and the necessary 
 regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable, 
 that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with 
 the excuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would 
 be successful. And many persons, who labor under diseases, for 
 which there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to 
 be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies 
 which nature has provided for diseases are neither certain, per- 
 fect, nor universal. And indeed the same principles of arguing, 
 which would lead us to conclude, that they must be so, would 
 lead us likewise to conclude, that there could be no occasion for 
 them ; i.e. that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore 
 our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is credible 
 beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for 
 them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they 
 are, neither certain, nor perfect, nor universal ; because it shows, 
 that the principles upon which we should expect the contrary are 
 fallacious. 
 
 And now, what is the just consequence from all these things ? 
 Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of 
 divine revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable 
 to judge of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all 
 things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the 
 meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of revelation. 
 
 First, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of 
 the Scripture; i.e. not whether it contains things different from 
 what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; 
 (for objections from hence have been now obviated :) but whether 
 it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or 
 
CHAP. III. REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 221 
 
 goodness; to wliat the liglit of nature teaches us of God. And 
 I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, exceptint^ 
 such objections as are formed upon suppositions, which would 
 equally conclude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory 
 to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not. 
 There are, indeed, some particular precepts in Scripture, given 
 to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be immoral 
 and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, 
 that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the 
 whole nature of the case and of the action ; and both constitutes 
 and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the 
 precept, must have appeared and really been so : which may well 
 be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable 
 morality. If it were commanded, to cultivate the principles, 
 and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the 
 command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, 
 in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, 
 which require only the doing an external action : for instance, 
 taking away the property, or life of any. For men have no 
 right, either to life or property, but what arises solely from the 
 grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease to have 
 any right at all in either : and when this revocation is made 
 known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be un- 
 just to deprive them of either. And though a course of ex- 
 ternal acts, which without command would be immoral, must 
 make an immoral habit; yet a few detached commands have no 
 such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of 
 the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious actions, 
 but actions which would have been vicious, but for such pre- 
 cepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and 
 great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. 
 
 To me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but 
 what arises from their being offences : i.e. from their being liable 
 to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, 
 to serve the most horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the 
 weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not 
 objections against revelation; but against the whole notion of re- 
 'dgion, as a trial : and against the general constitution of nature. 
 
 iiecondly, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence 
 19* 
 
t22 REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. part n. 
 
 of revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence: 
 which shall be the subject of a following chapter.* 
 
 The- consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the 
 question upon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarcely 
 at all what objections there are against its scheme, since there 
 are none against the morality of it, but ichat objections there are 
 against its evidence; or, ichat ^roof there remains of it, after 
 due allowances are made for the objections against that proof; 
 because it has been shown, that the objections against Chris- 
 tianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are 
 frivolous. For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be 
 laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied 
 to the general constitution of nature, experience shows not to be 
 conclusive: and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting 
 treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into princi- 
 ples, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think, that 
 the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does; 
 or would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does 
 not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of ob- 
 jecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief 
 things thus objected against are justified, as shall be further 
 shown, f by distinct, particular, and full analogies, in the consti- 
 tution and course of nature. 
 
 It is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the 
 foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed reve- 
 lation is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and 
 uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances con- 
 sidered, could have been expected from enthusiasm and political 
 views, this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from 
 them, and so of its truth : because we are competent judges, what 
 might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views.* 
 
 * Chap. vii. f Chap. iv. latter part, and y. vi. 
 
 f [This pregnant paragraph should receive very fall attention. We know 
 much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or say, in certain 
 circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may be guessed at. But 
 Vfhat God would do or say in new contingencies, who shall attempt -to prescribe 
 or predict? We are poorly qualified to assert that such and such declarations 
 could not have come from infinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to a{«^ 
 firm that such and such things could not have come from humaii «jottrivanoo 
 or enthusiasm.] 
 
CHRISTIANITY, A SCHEME, ETC. 223 
 
 CHAPTER ly. 
 
 CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, 
 IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 
 
 As hatli been now shown,* tlie analogy of nature renders it 
 highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a revelation to be 
 made, it must contain many things very different from what we 
 should have expected, and such as appear open to great objections : 
 and that this observation, in good measure, takes off the force of 
 those objections, or rather precludes them. It may be alleged, 
 that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very 
 unsatisfactory way of obviating them : because it does not show 
 at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just, and 
 good ; much less, that it is credible they are so. It will there- 
 fore be proper to show this distinctly; by applying to these 
 objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Chris- 
 tianity, the answer above"|" given to the like objections against 
 the constitution of nature : before we consider the particular 
 analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against 
 in the former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer to 
 objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the con- 
 stitution of nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or 
 scheme, imperfectly comprehended ;* a scheme in which means 
 are made use of to accomplish ends ; and which is carried on by 
 general laws. For from these things it has been proved, not 
 only to be possible, but also to be credible, that those things 
 which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, 
 justice, and goodness; nay, maybe instances of them : and even 
 
 * In the foregoing chapter. 
 
 f Part I. ch. vii., to which this all along refers. 
 
 ^ ["It is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of things 
 which surpass it." — Pascal. " The wall of adamant which bounds human 
 inquiry, has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer, till he was 
 aroused by the shock that drove him back." — Sir Jas. Mackintosh. " Of the 
 dark parts of revelation there are two sorts : one which may be cleared up by 
 the studious; the other which will always reside within the shadow of God'a 
 throne where it would be impiety to intrude.'" — Warburton. "A Christianity 
 Without mystery is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural." — Angus.] 
 
224 . CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME part ii. 
 
 that, tlie constitution and government of nature may be perfect 
 in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a scheme, 
 and of the like kind; it is evident, the like objections against it 
 must admit of the like answer. And, 
 
 I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension. 
 
 The moral government of God is exercised, by gradually con- 
 ducting things so in the course of his providence, that every one, 
 at length and upon the whole, shall receive according to his 
 deserts; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, 
 shall finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under 
 this general plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive to 
 its completion, with regard to mankind : consisting itself also of 
 various parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been carry- 
 ing on from the time the world came into its present wretched 
 state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine per- 
 son, the Messiah ; who is to gather together in one the children 
 of Godj that are scattered, abroad^ and establish an everlasting 
 Mngdom, wherein dicelleth rfghteousness.'f In order to it; after 
 various manifestations of things, relating to this great and gene- 
 ral scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages ; 
 (For the Sjnrit of Christ which was in the prophets, testijied 6e- 
 forehand his sufferings, and the glory that shoidd follow : unto 
 whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, hut unto us they 
 did minister the things ichich are now reported unto us hy them 
 that have preached the Gospel ; ichich things the angels desire to 
 look into ; J) — aft^r various dispensations looking forward and pre- 
 paratory to, this final salvation : in the fidness of time, when in- 
 finite wisdom thought fit; He, being in the form of God, — made 
 himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a 
 servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found 
 in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient 
 to death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath 
 highly exalted him, and given him a name, which is above every 
 name : that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of 
 things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things under the 
 earth : and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is 
 Lord, to the glory of God the Father.^ Parts likewise of this 
 economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his 
 * John xi. 52. f 2 Peter iii. 13. t 1 I'eter i. 11, 12. ^ PhU. ii. t"&-ll.] 
 
CHAP. IV. IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 225 
 
 ordinary assistances given to good men :^ the invisible govern- 
 ment, which Christ at present exercises over his church : that 
 which he himself refers to in these words : In my Father's house 
 are many mansions — I go to prej^are a place for you :^ and his 
 future return to judge the world in 7'ighteousness, and completely 
 re-establish the kingdom of God. For the Father judgeth no 
 man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all 
 men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. "f All 
 power is given unto liim in heaven and in earth."^ And he must 
 reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh 
 the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, 
 even the Father ; when he shall have put down all rule, and all 
 authority and power. And when all things shall he subdued 
 unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject un^o him that 
 put all tilings under him, that God may be all in all\ Surely 
 little need be said to show, that this system, or scheme of things, 
 is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The Scripture expressly 
 asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a passage re- 
 lating to this great mystery of godliness, \\ but what immediately 
 runs up into something which shows us our ignorancf in it; as 
 every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitu- 
 tion of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part 
 of the Christian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture, will find 
 so much more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the 
 purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as of 
 the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much 
 an answer to our objections against the perfection of one, as 
 agpinst the perfection of the other. ^ 
 
 II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation, as 
 much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of 
 to accomplish ends. 
 
 The observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, to 
 objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections 
 of the like kind, against the constitution of nature. It shows 
 
 ^ [The influences of the Holy Spirit are not only "given to good men,"' but 
 aie sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening their con- 
 sciences, enlightening their understandings and arresting their passions, a«d 
 tJius it is they are converted unto the truth in Christ.] 
 
 « John xiv. 2. f John v. 22, 23. % Matt, xxviii. 18. 
 
 J 1 Cor. XV. 28. II 1 Tim. ill. 16. \ P. 174, &c. 
 
 P 
 
226 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME part ii. 
 
 the credibility, that tlie things objected against, how foolish^ 
 soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of ac- 
 complishing the very best ends. And their appearing foolish- 
 ness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond 
 our comprehension. "I" 
 
 III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may have 
 been, all along, carried on by general laws,J no less than the 
 course of nature, may require to be more distinctly made out. 
 
 Consider then, upon what ground it is we say, that the whole 
 common course of nature is carried on according to general fore- 
 ordained laws. We know indeed several of the general laws of 
 matter; and a great part of the natural behavior of living agents 
 is reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing, 
 by what laws, storms, tempests, earthquakes, femine, pestilence, 
 become the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the 
 laws by which persons born into the world at such a time and 
 place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws by 
 which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases ; 
 and by which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influ- 
 ence upon the affairs and state of the world. These laws are so 
 wholly unknown to us, that we call the events which come to 
 pass by them, accidental; though all reasonable men know cer- 
 tainly, that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance; 
 and conclude that the things which have this appearance are the 
 result of general laws, and may be reduced to them. It is but 
 an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we 
 can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general 
 laws. It is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it 
 to be capable of being reduced to them : only from our seeing 
 that part is so. It is from our finding, that the course of nature, 
 in some respects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we con- 
 clude this of the rest. 
 
 If that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just 
 ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it 
 Bupposable and credible, which is sufficient for answering objec- 
 tions, that God's miraculous interpositions may have been, all 
 along in like manner, by general laws of wisdom. Thus, that 
 miraculous powers should be exerted, at such times, upon such 
 * 1 Cor. i. [18-25.] t Pp. 178, 179. % Tp. ISO, ^8^. 
 
CHAP. IV. IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 227 
 
 occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such 
 persons, rather than others; that the affairs of tlie world, being 
 permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should, just at 
 such a point, have a new direction given them by miraculous in- 
 terpositions; that these interpositions should be exactly in such 
 degrees and respects only; all this may have been by general 
 laws. These laws are indeed unknown to us : but no more un- 
 known than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as 
 they are born, and others live to extreme old age ; that one man 
 is so superior to another in understanding; with innumerable 
 more things, which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to 
 any laws or rules, though it is taken for granted, they are as 
 much reducible to general ones, as gravitation. If the revealed^ 
 dispensations of Providence, and miraculous interpositions, be 
 by general laws, as well as God's ordinary government in the 
 course of nature, made known by reason and experience; there 
 is no more reason to expect that every exigence, as it arises, 
 should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous inter- 
 positions, than that every exigence in nature should be, by the 
 general laws of nature. Yet there might be wise and good 
 reasons, why miraculous interpositions should be by general laws; 
 and why these laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated 
 from, by other miracles. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies and ir- 
 regularities in nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part 
 made known, and of such a certain particular kind in other re- 
 spects. We see no more reason why the frame and course of 
 nature should be such a scheme, than why Christianity should. 
 And that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible, that 
 the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as 
 it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part, 
 and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish 
 ends, like to that of nature : so the credibility, that it may have 
 been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course 
 of nature, has been distinctly proved. From all this it is before- 
 hand credible that there might, I think probable that there 
 would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities 
 In Christianity, as in nature; i.e. that Christianity would be 
 liable to the like objections, as the frame of nature. And these 
 
228 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME part ii; 
 
 objections are answered by these observations concerning Chris- 
 tianity; as the like objections against the frame of nature are 
 answered by the like observations concerning the frame of 
 nature. 
 
 The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of 
 fact,* having, in general, been obviated in the preceding chapter; 
 and the same, considered as made against the wisdom and good- 
 ness of it, having been obviated in this: the next thing, accord- 
 ing to the method proposed, is to show, that the principal objec- 
 tions, in particular, against Christianity, may be answered, by 
 particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of them is 
 made against the whole scheme of it together, as j'ust now de- 
 scribed, I choose to consider it here, rather than in a distinct 
 chapter by itself. 
 
 The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, '^that 
 it seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long 
 series of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the 
 recovery and salvation of the world : in like sort as men, for 
 want of understanding or power, not being able to come at their 
 ends directly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use 
 of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." Now every 
 thing which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an ob- 
 jection against the truth of Christianity. For, according to our 
 manner of conception, God makes use of variety of means, what 
 we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, 
 for the accomplishment of all his en(is. Indeed it is certain 
 there is somewhat in this matter quite beyond' our comprehen- 
 sion : but the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity. 
 "VYe know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends : and what 
 courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But 
 we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the 
 Author of nature,, under the single notion of means and ends; 
 so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and that merely 
 a means, in his regard. And whether there be not some peciliar 
 absurdity in our very manner of conception, concerning this 
 matter, something contradictory arising from our extremely im* 
 perfect views of things, it is impossible to say. 
 * P. 172, &c. 
 
CHAP. IV. IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 229 
 
 However, this much is manifestj that the whole natural world 
 and government of it, is a scheme or system; not a fixed, but a 
 progressive one : a scheme in which the operation of various 
 means takes up a great length of time, before the ends they tend 
 to can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of 
 fruits, the very history of a flower, are instances of this : and so 
 is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals, 
 though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a 
 mature state. And thus rational agents, who animate these 
 latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners 
 and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and expe- 
 rience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only 
 successive, as it must be of necessity; but one state of our life 
 and being is appointed by God, to be a preparation for another; 
 and that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one : 
 infancy to childhood; childhood to youth; youth to mature age. 
 Men are impatient, and for precipitating things : but the Author 
 of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations; accom- 
 plishing his natural ends by slow successive steps." And there 
 is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which, from the nature 
 of it, requires various systems of means, as well as length of 
 time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution. 
 
 Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates 
 in the very same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity; 
 making one thing subservient to another; this, to something 
 further ; and so on, through a progressive series of means, which 
 extend, both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. 
 Of this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course 
 of nature is as much an instance, as any part of the Christian 
 dispensation. 
 
 c ["Providence hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of tho 
 principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it out in the lapse of ages. 
 Even according to our reasoning logic is none the less sure, because it is slow." 
 — GuizoT on Civilization, Lect. I. 
 
 How impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and as- 
 tronomy !] 
 
 20 
 
^50 ^ THE APPOINTMENT OF 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY; THE APPOINT- 
 MENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE 
 WORLD BY HIM. 
 
 There is not, I think, any tiling relating to Christianity, which 
 has been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in 
 some or other of its parts. Yet upon thorough consideration, 
 there seems nothing less justly liable to it.* For, 
 
 I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presump- 
 tion against the general notion of a Mediator heticeen God and 
 man.* For we find all living creatures are brought into the 
 world, and their life in infancy is preserved, bythe instnimeut- 
 ality of others : and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is 
 bestowed by the like means. So that the visible government, 
 which God exercises over -the world, is by the instrumentality 
 and mediation of others. How far his invisible government be 
 or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by reason. The 
 supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, alto- 
 gether as credible, as the contrary. There is then no sort of ob- 
 jection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a 
 mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Chris- 
 tianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation : since we find 
 by experience, that God does appoint mediators, to be the instru- 
 ments of good and evil to us : the instruments of his justice and 
 his mercy. And the objection here referred to is urged, not 
 against mediation in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in 
 
 «■ [" Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they judge 
 of the Divine economy. lie cannot, they tell us, act thus, it would be contrary 
 to his wisdom, or his justice, &c. But while they make these j^eremptory as- 
 sertions they show themselves to be unacquainted with the fundamental rules 
 of their own science, and with the origin of all late improvements. True 
 philosophy would begin the other way, with observing the constitution of the 
 world, how God has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and 
 then from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus 
 might they learn 'the invisible things of God from those which ar« clearly 
 Been' the things which are not accomplished from those which are.*' — -P-MVELii's 
 Use and Abuse of Philosophi/.] 
 
 * 1 Tim. ii. 5. 
 
CHAP. V. A MEDIATOR AXD REDEEMER. 281 
 
 whicli Christ is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole 
 notion itself of a mediator at all. 
 
 II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper 
 moral government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can 
 enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the 
 redemption of it by Christ : so that supposition is here to be dis- 
 tinctly noticed. Now the divine moral government which reli- 
 gion teaches us, implies that the consequence of vice shall be 
 misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. 
 That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his appoint- 
 ment, is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be 
 supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the ends or 
 reasons, for which it is fit that future punishments should be in- 
 flicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent 
 misery to follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how 
 or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, 
 or by the instrumentality of what means; so there is no absurdity 
 in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that in which 
 many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present; 
 poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from 
 the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing 
 future punishment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak, 
 or in the way of natural consequence from God's original consti- 
 tution of the world; from the nature he has given us, and from 
 the condition in which he places us; or in a like manner, as a 
 person rashly trilling upon a precipice, in the way of natural con- 
 sequence, falls down ; in the way of natural consequence of this, 
 breaks his limbs, and in the way of natural consequence, without 
 help, perishes. 
 
 Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken 
 of as a supposable thing that future punishments of wickedness 
 may be in the way of natural consequence : as if this were taking 
 the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to 
 nature. But they should remember, that when things come to 
 pass according to the course of nature, this does not hinder them 
 from being his doing, who is the God of nature: and that the 
 Scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice, which are 
 known t^ be natural; and which must be called so, when dis- 
 tinguished from such as are miraculous. After all, this suppo- 
 
232 THE APPOINTMENT OF part n. 
 
 sition. or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only 
 by woy of illustration of the subject before us. For since it must 
 be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a 
 matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; 
 it. comes for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is sup- 
 posed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the 
 temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any 
 other way. And though there were a difi"erence, it is allowable, 
 in the present case, to make this supposition^ plainly not an in- 
 credible one, that future punishment may follow wickedness in 
 the way of natural consequence, or according to some general 
 laws of government already established in the universe. 
 
 III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe 
 Bomewjiat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of 
 nature or appointments of Providence: the provision which is 
 made, that all the bad natural consequences of men's actions 
 should not always actually follow; or that such bad consequences, 
 as, according to the settled course of things, would inevitably 
 have followed if not prevented, should, in certain degrees, be pre- 
 vented. We are apt presumptuously to imagine, that the world 
 might have been so constituted, as that there would not have 
 been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary we find 
 the Author of nature permits it: but then he has provided reliefs, 
 and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains and 
 difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the 
 fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature, 
 would have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such 
 remedies. And this is an instance both of severity and of in- 
 dulgence, in the constitution of nature. Thus all the bad conse- 
 quences, now mentioned, of a man's trifling upon a precipice, 
 might be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of them 
 might, by proper interposition, if not rejected:^ by another's 
 coming to the rash man's relief, with his own laying hold on that 
 relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may do a great 
 
 t> [The iutorposition of a man of known probity and wortli often saves the 
 thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen in a thousand 
 forms in the arrangements of social life j and the common sense of all mankind 
 approves of it. The release of the offending, by the intercession of the good, 
 and all the benefits of advice, caution, example, instruction, persuasion, ana 
 authority, are instances of mediation.] 
 
*CHAP. V. A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 235 
 
 deal themselves towards preventing tlie bad consequences of tlieir 
 follies : and more may be done by themselves, together with the 
 assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which assistance nature 
 requires and prompts us to. This is the general constitution of 
 the world. 
 
 Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions 
 were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery 
 to the doer, it should have been no more in human power to have 
 prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than 
 it is in all : no one can say, whether such a more severe constitu- 
 tion of things might not yet have been really good. But, on the 
 contrary, provision being made by nature, that we may and do, 
 to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our follies; 
 this may be called mercy or compassion in the original constitu- 
 tion of the world : compassion, as distinguished from goodness in 
 general. And, the whole known constitution and course of things 
 affording us instances of such compassion, it would be according 
 to the analogy of nature, to hope, that however ruinous the 
 natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of 
 God's government over the universe; yet provision might be 
 made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing 
 those ruinous consequences from inevitably following: at least 
 from following universally, and in all cases. 
 
 Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, 
 or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of man- 
 kind are so far from having that awful sense of things, which the 
 present state of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but 
 reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension or thought at 
 all about this matter, any way : and some serious persons may 
 have spoken unadvisedly^ concerning it. But let us observe, 
 what we experience to be, and what, from the very xjonstitution 
 of nature cannot but be, the consequences of irregular and dis- 
 orderly behavior: even of such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as 
 we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, that the 
 bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion as 
 th^ irregularity is so. And there is no comparison between these 
 /-Tregularities, and the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute 
 profligate disregard to all religion ; if there be any thing at all in 
 religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral agents, 
 
 20* 
 
234 THE APPOINTMENT OF part ii. 
 
 presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the 
 kingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced: to 
 blaspheme the Sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; 
 to be injurious, to the degree they are, to their fellow- creatures, 
 the creatures of God. Add that the effects of vice in the present 
 world are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even 
 death : and upon putting all this together, it will appear, that as 
 no one can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences 
 of vice may be, according to the general rule of divine govern- 
 ment; so it is by no means intuitively certain, how far these 
 consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, be pre- 
 vented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what 
 is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there 
 would be large ground to hope, that the universal government 
 was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or 
 for having those penal consequences prevented. Yet, 
 
 ly. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do 
 would alone and of itself prevent them : prevent their following, 
 or being inflicted. But one would think at least, it were impos- 
 sible that the contrary should be thought certain. For we are 
 not acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not informed 
 of all the reasons, which render it fit that future punishments 
 should be inflicted: and therefore cannot know, whether any 
 thing we could do would make such an alteration, as to render it 
 fit that they should be remitted. We do not know what the 
 whole natural or appointed consequences of vice are; nor in what 
 way they would follow, if not prevented : and therefore can in no 
 sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be sufficient 
 to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us 
 recollect the analogy of nature or Providence. For, though this 
 may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in 
 this matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary asser- 
 tion, without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection 
 against a doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revela- 
 tion. Consider then : people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; 
 they bring diseases upon themselves by excess; they incur the 
 penalties of civil laws; and surely civil government is natural; 
 will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving Well for the future, 
 alone and ^f itself prevent the natural consequences of them ? 
 
CHAP. V. A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 235 
 
 On the contrary, men's natural abilities of helpinp;; themselves 
 are often impaired ; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden 
 to the assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in differ- 
 ent ways ; assistance which they would have had no occasion for, 
 had it not been for their misconduct ; but which, in the disad- 
 vantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is abso- 
 lutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs. 
 Since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants! 
 of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the 
 natural government of God, which however has a great dea( 
 moral in it; why is it not supposable that this may be our case 
 also, in our more important capacity, as under his perfect moral 
 government, and having a more general and future interest 
 depending?" If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, 
 and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment, 
 which God has annexed to vice : it is plainly credible, that 
 behaving well for the time to come may be — not useless, God 
 forbid — but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent 
 that punishment : or to put us in the condition which we should 
 have been in, had we preserved our innocence. 
 
 Though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we 
 reason concerning the divine conduct : yet it may be added, that 
 it is clearly contrary to all our notions of government, as well as 
 to what is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose, 
 that doing well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the 
 judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punish- 
 ment annexed to disobedience. We have manifestly nothing 
 from whence to determine, in what degree, and in what cases, 
 reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing that 
 it would in some. And though the efficacy of repentance itself 
 
 <= [Mr. Newman notices a distinction between the facts of revelation, and its 
 principles ; and considers the argument from analogy more concerned with its 
 principles than with its facts. " The revealed facts are special and singular, 
 from the nature of the case, but the revealed principles are common to all the 
 works of God; and if the Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be 
 expected that the principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a 
 connecting link between them. In this identity of princijjle, lies the analogy 
 of natural and revealed religion, in Butler's sense of the word. The Incarna- 
 tion is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature : the doctrine 
 of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified in nature." — Essay 
 on Devdopmenls.'] 
 
236 THE APPOINTMENT OF part ri. 
 
 alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered themselves ob- 
 noxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, is now insisted 
 upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the general preva- 
 lence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion 
 of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to 
 be contrary to the general sense of mankind.*^ 
 
 Upon the whole then ; had the laws, the general laws of God's 
 government been permitted to operate, without any interposition 
 in our behalf, the future punishment, for aught we know to 
 the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevitably have 
 followed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to pre- 
 vent it. 
 
 V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you 
 please, revelation comes in; and confirms every doubting fear, 
 which could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future 
 Tinprevented consequence of wickedness. It supposes the world 
 to be in a state of ruin (a supposition which seems the very 
 ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable 
 by reason, yet is in no wise contrary to it ;) and teaches us too, 
 that the rules of divine government are such, as not to admit of 
 pardon immediately and directly upon repentance, or by the sole 
 efficacy of it. But teaches at the same time, what nature might 
 justly have hoped, that the moral government of the universe 
 was not so rigid, but that there was room for an interposition, to 
 avert the fatal consequences of vice ; which therefore, by this 
 means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the 
 unknown laws of God's more general government, no less than 
 the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at 
 present, are compassionate,* as well as good in the more general 
 notion of goodness : and that he hath mercifully provided, that 
 there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of 
 human kind ; whatever that destruction unprevented would have 
 been. God so loved the world, that lie gave his only liegottcn 
 Son, that ichosoever helieveth, not, to be sure, in a speculative, 
 but in a practical sense, that whosoever helieveth in him, shoidd 
 
 ^ [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel guilt, beauti- 
 fully exhibited by Waylaxd, Mor. Science : Magee, Atonement : Howb. 
 Living Temple.] 
 
 * P 232. <fcc. 
 
CHAP. V. A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 237 
 
 not perish ;* gave his Son in the same way of goodnes? to the 
 world, as he afibrds particular persons the friendly assistance of 
 their fellow-creatures, when, without it, their temporal ruin would 
 be the certain consequence of their follies : in the same way of 
 goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely higher 
 degree. And the Son of God loved us, and gave himself /or ii.s, 
 with a love, which he himself -compares to that of human friend- 
 ship : though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely 
 short of the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He inter- 
 posed in such a manner as was necessary and efi'ectual to prevent 
 that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed 
 should otherwise have been executed upon them ; or in such a 
 manner, as to prevent that punishment from actually following, 
 which, according to the general laws of divine government, must 
 have followed the sins of the world; had it not been for such 
 interposition.*!* 
 
 If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, in- 
 consistent with divine goodness ; a second, I am persuaded, will 
 entirely remove that appearance. For were we to suppr^se the 
 constitution of things to be such, as that the whole creation must 
 
 * John iii. 16. 
 
 f It cannot, I suppose, he imagined, even by the most cursory reader, that 
 it is, in any sort, afiBrmed or implied in any thing said in this chapter, that 
 none can have the benefit of the general redemption, but such as have the 
 advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may 
 be needful to mention, that several questions, which have been brought into 
 the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here . 
 questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal 
 rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the 
 world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the gene- 
 ral laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the world, what 
 ■would have been the future condition of the better sort of men; those just per- 
 sons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses in his prayer^ asserts, re- 
 pentance was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is 
 greatly ambiguous : and neither of them can properly be answered, without 
 going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the 
 case. And perhaps the very inquiry, What would have fvllowed, if God had 
 not done as he has, may have in it some very great impropriety : and ought 
 not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help our partial and 
 inadequate conceptions of things. 
 
 e [The "praT-er of Manasses"' is one of tte apocryphal books of the Old Testament, which 
 ncyt precedes •'Maccabees."] 
 
288 THE APPOINTMENT OF part ii. 
 
 have perished, had it not been for something, which God had 
 appointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin : even this 
 Buppasition would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with the 
 most absolutely perfect goodness. Still it may be thought, that 
 this whole manner of treating the subject before us supposes 
 mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so 
 it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this 
 state. Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, and the 
 extreme wickedness of the world; that the best have great 
 wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of, and 
 endeavor to amend ; but that the generality grow more profligate 
 and corrupt with age ; that even moralists thought the present 
 state to be a state of punishment : and, that the earth our habi- 
 tation has the appearances of being a ruin : whoever, I say, will 
 consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he 
 has little reason to object against the Scripture account, that 
 mankind is in a state of degradation ; against this being the 
 fact: how difficult soever he may think it to account for, or even 
 to form a distinct conception of the occasions and circumstances 
 of it. But that the crime of our first parents was the occasion 
 of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a 
 thing throughout and particularly analogous to what we see in 
 the daily course of natural providence ; as the recovery of the 
 world by the interposition of Christ has been shown to be so in 
 general. 
 
 VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the 
 redemption of the world, or his office as Mediator, in the largest 
 sense, between God and man, is thus represented to us in the 
 Scripture. He is the light of the i€orId ;* the revealer of the 
 will of God in the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory 
 sacrifice ;f the Lamb of God:'l and, as he voluntarily offered 
 himself up, he is styled our High Priest. § And, which seems 
 of peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in the Old Testa- 
 ment, under the same characters of a priest, and an exjiiatory 
 victim. II And whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by 
 
 "5 John i., and viii. 12. 
 
 t Rom. iii. 25, v. 11 : 1 Cor. v. 7 : Eph. v. 2 : 1 Jolin ii. 2 : Matt, xxvi 28. 
 
 J John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation. 
 
 g Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews. 
 
 II Isa. liii, Dan. ix. 21: Ps. ex 4. 
 
CHAP. V. A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 239 
 
 way of allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the Apostle 
 on the contrary affirms, that the law tvas a shadow of good things 
 to come, and not the very image of the things ;* and that the 
 priests that offer gifts according to the law — serve unto the ex- 
 ample and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished 
 of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see, 
 saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern 
 showed to thee in the mouiit :"[ i.e. the Levitical priesthood was a 
 shadow of the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as the taber- 
 nacle made by Moses was according to that showed him in the 
 mount. The priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the 
 mount, were the originals ; of the former of which the Levitical 
 priesthood was a type; and of the latter the tabernacle made by 
 Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly is, 
 that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final 
 atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that this 
 was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express 
 and determinate than the following passage. It is not p>ossible 
 that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. 
 Wherefore ichen he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice 
 and offering, i.e. of bulls and of goats, thou icouldest not, but a 
 body hast thou prepared me. Lol I come to do thy icill, God. 
 By which will we are sanctified, through the offering of the body 
 of Jesus Christ once for all.'l And to add one passage more of 
 the like kind : Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many : 
 and unto them that look for him shcdl he appear the second time, 
 without sin; i.e. without bearing sin, as he did at his first 
 coming, by being an offering for it; without having our iniqui- 
 ties again laid upon hiyn, without being any more a sin-offering : 
 — unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time, 
 without sin, unto salvation.^ Nor do the inspired writers at all 
 confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning the 
 satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in What he did and 
 suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, ex- 
 ample, and government, in great variety of expression : That 
 Jesus should die for that nation, the Jews: aiid not for that 
 nation only, but that also, plainly by the efficacy of his death, 
 
 * HeL. X. 1. t Heb. viii. 4, 5. 
 
 X Ileb. X. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. g Heb. ix. 28. 
 
240 THE APPOINTMENT OF part n. 
 
 he should gather together in one the children of God that were 
 scattered abroad ;* tliat he suffered for sins, the just for the un- 
 just :'f that he gave his life, himself, a ransom ;| that ice are 
 bought, bought with a price :§ that he redeemed us icith his 
 blood: redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a 
 curse for us :\\ that he is our advocate, intercessor, and prop it ia- 
 tion ;^ that he was made perfect, or consummate, through suffer- 
 ings ; and being thus made perfect, he became the author of sal- 
 vation ;** that God was in Christ reconciling the world to him- 
 self; by the death of his Son, by the cross ; not imputing their 
 ■trespasses unto them :'\'\ and lastly, that through death he destroyed 
 him that had the power of death.\^ Christ having thus humbled 
 himself, and become obedient to death, even the death of the cross; 
 God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, which 
 is above every name : hath given all things into his hands : hath 
 committed all judgment unto him ; that all men should honor the 
 Son^ even as they honor the leather. ^^ For, worthy is the Lamb 
 that was slain, to receive power, and riches, a7id wisdom, and 
 strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing. And every crea- 
 ture which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying. Bless- 
 ing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth 
 iip)07i the throne, and unto the Lamb forever and ever.\\\\ 
 
 These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express 
 the chief parts of Christ's office, as Mediator between God and 
 man, so far, I mean, as the nature of this his office is revealed; 
 and it is usually treated of by divines under three heads. 
 
 First, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: that Pro- 
 phet that should come into the icorld,\^ to declare the divine 
 will. He published anew the law of nature, which men had 
 corrupted; and the very knowledge of which, to some degree, 
 was lost among them. He taught mankind, taught us authorita- 
 tively, to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this j^ resent world, 
 in expectation of the future judgment of God. He confirmed 
 
 * John xi. 51, 52. f 1 Pet. iii. 18. 
 
 I Matt. XX. 28 : Mark x. 45 : 1 Tim. ii. 6. 
 
 ^ 2 Pet. ii. 1 : Rev. xiv. 4: 1 Cor. vi. 20. 
 
 I) 1 Pet. i. 19 : Rev. v. 9 : Gal. iii. 13. ^ Heb. vii. 25 : 1 John ii. 1, 2. 
 
 «:=:• Heb. ii. 10.: v. 9. ff 2 Cor. v. 19 : Rom. v. 10 : Eph. ii. 16. 
 
 \X Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, xxxiii. 24. 
 
 Ii Phil. ii. 8, 9 : John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23. \\l Rev. v. 12, 13. 1| f John vi. 14. 
 
CHAP. V. A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 241 
 
 the trutli of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional 
 evidence of it; the evidence of testimony.* He distinctly- 
 revealed the manner, in which God would be worshipped, the 
 efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a 
 future life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other 
 ever was. To which is to be added, that he set us a perfect ex- 
 ample, that ice slio id d folio ic his steps. 
 
 Secondly, He has a hingdom which is not of this luorld. He 
 founded a Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of 
 religion, and invitation to it; which he promised to be with 
 always even to the end. He exercises an invisible government 
 over it, himself, and by his Spirit : over that part of it which is 
 militant here on earth, a government of discipline, for the per- 
 fecting of the saints, for the edifying his hody : till we all come 
 in the unify of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of 
 God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the 
 fulness of Christ.'\ Of this Church, all persons scattered over 
 the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are members. For 
 these he is gone to prepare a place, and will come again to re- 
 ceive them, unto himself that where he is, there tliey may he also; 
 and reign with him forever and ever :^ and likewise to take 
 vengeance on them that hnoio 7iot God, and obey not his 
 Gospel. § 
 
 Against these parts of Christ's office I find no objections, but 
 what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter. 
 
 Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and 
 made atonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned 
 last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expia- 
 tion were commanded the Jews, and obtained among most other 
 nations, from tradition, whose original probably was revelation. 
 And they were continually repeated, both occasionally, and at the 
 returns of stated times : and made up great part of the external 
 religion of mankind. But 7iow once in the end of the world 
 Christ ap)peared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself. \\ 
 This sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the most ex- 
 tensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, 
 which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacri 
 
 ♦ P. 188, &c. t Eph. iv. 12, 13. % John xiv. 2, 3 : Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15 
 I 2 Thess. i. S. \\ Ileb. is. 26. 
 
 Q 21 
 
242 THE APPOINTMENT OF part it. 
 
 fices to have been^ and which the Jewish sacrifices really were 
 in some degree, and with regard to some persons.* 
 
 IIow and in what particular icay it had this efficacy, there are 
 not wanting persons who have endeavored to explain : but I do 
 not find that the Scripture has explained it. We seem to be 
 very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the 
 ancients understood atonement to be made, i.e. pardon to be 
 obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as surely it 
 has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left 
 somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if 
 not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one 
 reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can 
 show his claim to it. 
 
 Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ 
 has done and sufi'ered for us, beyond what the Scripture has 
 authorized : others, probably because they could not explain it, 
 have been for taking it away, and confining his office as Re- 
 deemer of the world, to his instruction, example, and government 
 of the church. Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to 
 be, not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but ren- 
 dered it of the efficacy of which it is, by what he did and 
 sufi'ered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit of having our 
 repentance accepted unto eternal life : not only that he revealed 
 to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how 
 they might obtain it; but moreover that he put them into this 
 capacity of salvation, by what he did and sufi'ered for them; put 
 us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining 
 future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept 
 the benefit, by performing the conditions, upon which it is 
 ofi'ered, on our part, without disputing how it was procured on 
 his. For, 
 
 VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a 
 future state would have followed wickedness in this : nor in what 
 manner it would have been inflicted, had it not been prevented; 
 nor all the reasons why its infliction would have been needful, 
 nor the particular nature of that state of happiness, which Christ 
 is gone to prepare for his disciples : and since we are ignorant 
 
 '■[Consult Magee, on Atonement; Stapferi Institutioiies : Turretin, I>e 
 Satisfactione : Chalmers, Discourses : Owen, Satis, uf Cliiist,.] 
 
CHAP. V. A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 213 
 
 how far any thing which we could do, would, alone and of itself, 
 have been effectual to prevent that punishment to which we were 
 obnoxious, and recover that happiness which we had forfeited; 
 it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently to revelation, 
 whether a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain those 
 ends: to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to 
 the final happiness of their nature. For the very same reasons, 
 upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more 
 judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his 
 office, or of the several parts of which it consists ; or of what was 
 fit and requisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the 
 ends of divine Providence in the appointment. Hence it follows, 
 that to object against the expediency or usefulness of particular 
 things, revealed to have been done or suffered by him, because 
 we do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly 
 absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with, than this 
 absurdity. If it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are not 
 judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, with any 
 shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ's 
 mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown posi- 
 tively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be 
 accomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable. 
 
 There is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, 
 which looks to be of this positive kind : that the doctrine of his 
 being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents 
 God as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent or 
 the guilty. Now from the foregoing observations we may see 
 the extreme slightness of all such objections; and (though it is 
 most certain all who make them do not see the consequence) that 
 they conclude altogether as much against Grod's whole original 
 constitution of nature, and the whole daily course of divine Provi- 
 dence in the government of the world, (i.e. against the whole 
 scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion,) as against 
 Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system, whose 
 parts have a mutual reference to each other: and there is a 
 scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of na- 
 ture, to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various 
 ways, to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural 
 providence; it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for 
 
241 THE APPOINTMENT OF part il 
 
 the faults of tlie guilty, this is liable to tlie very same objection, 
 as the instance we are now considering. The infinitely greatei 
 importance of that appointment of Christianity, which is objected 
 against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an ap- 
 pointment of the very same kind, with what the world affords us 
 daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the ob- 
 jection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural 
 providence, than against Christianity : because under the former 
 we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated whether 
 we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the suffer- 
 ings of Christ were voluntary. 
 
 The world's being under the righteous government of God 
 does indeed imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one 
 shall receive according to his personal deserts : and the general 
 doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the comple- 
 tion of the divine government. But during the progress, and, 
 for aught we know, even in order to the completion of this moral 
 scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and absolutely neces- 
 sary. Men by their follies run themselves into extreme distress; 
 into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to them, were it 
 not for the interposition and assistance of others. God commands 
 by the law of nature, that we afford them this assistance, in manjr 
 cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, and labor, 
 and sufferings to ourselves. We see in what variety of ways one 
 person's sufferings contribute to the relief of another: and how, 
 or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, from 
 the constitution and laws of nature, which came under our notice : 
 and, being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So 
 that the reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing 
 kind against the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not 
 consider God's settled and uniform appointments as his appoint- 
 ments at all; or else they forget that vicarious punishment is a 
 providential appointment of every day's experience. And then, 
 from their being unacquainted with the more general laws of 
 nature or divine government over the world, and not seeing how 
 the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it, 
 unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, they conclude his suffer- 
 ings could not contribute to it any other way. And yet, what 
 has been often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even fivui 
 
CHAv. V. A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 245 
 
 the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemption; 
 its tendency to vindicate the authority of God's laws^ and deter 
 his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered, and is 
 I think plainly unanswerable : though I am far from thinking it 
 an account of the whole of the case. But, without taking this 
 into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations 
 above made, that this objection is not an objection against Chris- 
 tianity, but against the whole general constitution of nature. 
 And if it were to be considered as an objection against Chris- 
 tianity, or considering it as it is, an objection against the consti- 
 tution of nature; it amounts to no more in conclusion than this, 
 that a divine appointment cannot be necessary or expedient, be- 
 cause the objector does not discern it to be so: though he must 
 own that the nature of the case is such, as renders him incapable 
 of judging, whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to be neces- 
 sary, though it were so ! 
 
 It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to 
 find people arguing in this manner: objecting against the credi- 
 bility of such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they 
 do not see the necessity or expediency of them. For though it 
 is highly right, and the most pious exercise of our understanding, 
 to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of God's 
 dispensations : yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue from 
 our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from God, is in- 
 finitely absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections 
 seems almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them 
 is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, against 
 things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural dispensa- 
 tions of Providence, which are matter of experience. Let reason 
 be kept to : and if any part of the Scripture account of the re- 
 demption of the world by Christ can be shown to be really con- 
 trary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up. 
 But let not such poor creatures as we are, go on objecting against 
 an infinite scheme, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness 
 of all its parts, and call this reasoning; and, which still further 
 heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are 
 not actively concerned in. For it may be worth mentioning, 
 
 Lastli/, That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole 
 analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like 
 
246 THE APPOINTMENT, ETC. part ii. 
 
 information concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our 
 own duty. God instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, 
 but experience which instructs us,) what good or bad conse- 
 quences will follow from our acting in such and such manners : 
 and by this he directs us how we are to behave ourselves. But, 
 though we are sufficiently instructed for the common purposes of 
 life : yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural provi- 
 dence, which we are at all let into. The case is the same with 
 regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator between God 
 and man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of 
 some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was done 
 on God's part in the appointment, and on the Mediator's in the 
 execution of it. For what is required of us, in consequence of 
 this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can 
 complain for want of information. The constitution of the world, 
 and God's natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as 
 the Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has given 
 men all things pertaining to life; and under the other all things 
 pertaining unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is 
 nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common precepts 
 of Christianity : though if there were, surely a divine command 
 is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations 
 to obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the Chris- 
 tian precepts are evident. Positive institutions are manifestly 
 necessary to keep up and propagate religion among mankind. 
 And our duty to Christ, the internal and external worship of 
 him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly arises 
 out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and 
 dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand ia 
 to us.* 
 
 * P. 194, &c. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND TEC 
 SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT 
 
 It has been thouglit by some persons, that if the evidence of 
 revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argu- 
 ment against it : because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were 
 true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And 
 the objection against revelation from its not being universal is 
 often insisted upon as of great weight. 
 
 The weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing 
 the suppositions on which they are founded : which are really 
 such as these ; that it cannot be thought Grod would have be- 
 stowed any favor at all upon us, unless in the degree which we 
 think he might, arid which, we imagine, would be most to our 
 particular advantage; and also that it cannot be thought he 
 would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed the same 
 upon all ; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not by a few 
 instances in God's natural government of the world, but by the 
 general analogy of nature together. 
 
 Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, 
 and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against 
 it, should be put upon considering, what that evidence is, which 
 they act upon with regard to their temporal interests. It is not 
 only extremely difficult, but in many cases absolutely impossible, 
 to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to 
 be able to say on which side is the overplus. There are the like 
 difficulties and impossibilities in making the due allowances for a 
 change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health : any 
 of which render men incapable of enjoying, after they have ob- 
 tained what they most eagerly desired. Numberless too are the 
 accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may even 
 probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes : and strong 
 objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed 
 or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the 
 other side; so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the 
 pursuit are, by every one, thought justly disregarded^ upon 
 
 247 
 
248 BEYELATION" NOT UNIVERSAL : part a 
 
 account of llie appearing greater advantages in case of success, 
 though there be but little probability of it. Lastly, every one 
 observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, to be 
 deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false appearances of 
 things : and this danger must be greatly increased, if there be a 
 strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to favor the 
 deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of 
 proof, wherein our temporal interest really consists; what are the 
 most probable means of attaining it; and whether those means 
 will eventually be succes^iful. And numberless instances there 
 are, in the daily course of life, in which all men think it reason- 
 able to engage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly 
 against succeeding ; and to make such provision for themselves, 
 as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though the plain 
 acknowledged probability is, that they never shall. 
 
 Those who think the objection against revelation, from its light 
 not being universal, to be of weight,^ should observe, that the 
 Author of nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon 
 some, which he does not upon others, who seem equally to stand 
 in need of it. Indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts with the 
 most promiscuous variety among creatures of the same species : 
 health and strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, 
 means of improvement, riches, and all external advantages. As 
 there are not any two men found, of exactly like shape and 
 features ; so it is probable there are not any two, of an exactly 
 like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to the goods 
 and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and 
 varieties, God does exercise a natural government oter the world; 
 and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution 
 of life, with regai-d to our health and our affairs, under that his 
 natural government. 
 
 As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been uni- 
 versal ; and as they have been afforded to a greater or less part 
 
 a [This objection is ably urged by Tixdall. The answer of our author is 
 complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of mankind, revela- 
 tion has been universal. The first pair, and the occupants of the ark, ocm- 
 prised the whole population. But how soon was light rejected! Christianity 
 is universal, in nature and intention'; is to become so in fact; and accoraing 
 to a very probable construction of prophecy, will continue to be universal, for 
 three hundred and sixty thousand years.] 
 
CHAP. VI. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 24& 
 
 of the world, at clifFereut times; so likewise at different times, 
 both revelations have had different degrees of evidence. The 
 Jews who lived during the succession of prophets, that is, froxu 
 Moses till after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth 
 of their religion, than those had, who lived in the interval be- 
 tween the last-mentioned period, and the coming of Christ. And 
 the first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought 
 in attestation of Christianity, than what we have now. They 
 had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps 
 of much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of 
 which we have very little remaining; I mean the presumptive 
 proof of its truth, from the influence which it had upon the lives 
 of the generality of its professors. And we, or future ages, may 
 possibly have a proof of it, which they could not have, from the 
 conformity between the prophetic history, and the state of the 
 world** and of Christianity. 
 
 And further : if we were to suppose the evidence, which some 
 have of religion, to amount to little more than seeing that it tnay 
 be true ; but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties 
 about both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities con- 
 cerning the rule of life : others to have a full conviction of the 
 truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and 
 others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of religious 
 light and evidence, which lie between these two — if we put the 
 case, that for the present, it was intended that revelation should be 
 no more than a small light, in the midst of a world greatly over- 
 spread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and darkness: that 
 certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and be directed, 
 to remote distances, in such a manner as that those who really 
 partook of it should not discern whence it originally came : that 
 some in a nearer situation to it should have its light obscured, 
 and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted : and that others 
 should be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more 
 enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet that even to these 
 
 ^ [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse ? As the book of 
 Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith of the Jew, by 
 the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse, rightly studied must 
 powerfully, and through all time, support the faith of the Christian by the 
 continual unfolding and verification of its predictions.] 
 
250 REVELATION KOT UNIVERSAL: part ii. 
 
 it sbould be no more than a light sliining in a darh place: all 
 this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the conduct 
 of Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If the 
 fact of the case really were, that some have received no light at 
 all from the Scripture ; as many ages and countries in the heathen 
 world : that others, though they have, by means of it, had essen- 
 tial or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have 
 never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, 
 proposed to their consideration; and the ancient Persians and 
 modern Mahometans may possibly be instances of people in a 
 situation somewhat like to this; that others, though they have 
 had the Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, yet 
 have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity so in- 
 terpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with 
 false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness 
 and uncertainty about the whole ; which may be the state of 
 some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who call them- 
 selves Christian : and lastly, that others have had Christianity 
 offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper 
 evidence, as persons in countries and churches of civil and of 
 Christian liberty; but that even these persons are left in great 
 ignorance in many respects, and have by no means light afforded 
 them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their 
 life, to teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful 
 discharge of it. I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat of 
 a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light 
 and evidence, which were intended to be afforded mankind, and 
 of what has actually been and is their situation, in their moral 
 and religious capacity; there would be nothing in all this igno- 
 rance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties, and 
 supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respect- 
 ing religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the 
 natural dispensations of Providence at present, considering our- 
 selves merely in our temporal capacity. 
 
 Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would 
 seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we 
 would really keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably 
 with : instead of forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it ie 
 acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all 
 
CHAP. VI. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 251 
 
 harsh appearaDces, in tliis various economy of Providence, would 
 be lost, if we would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance 
 shall be made, and no more be required of any one, than what 
 might have been equitably expected of him, from thp circum- 
 stances in which he was placed; and not what might have been 
 expected, had he been placed in other circumstances: i.e. in 
 Scripture language, that every man shall be accepted according 
 to what he had, not according to wliat he had not* This how- 
 ever does not by any means imply, that all persons' condition 
 here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity. And 
 Providence's designing to place some in greater darkness with 
 respect to religious knowledge, is no more a reason why they 
 should not endeavor to get out of that darkness, and others to 
 bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people in 
 matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn, or 
 should not be instructed. 
 
 It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good 
 principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature 
 to make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also 
 to place creatures of like kinds in different situations. And that 
 the same principle which disposed him to make creatures of 
 different moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of 
 like moral capacities in different religious situations; and even 
 the same creatures, in different periods of their being. The ac- 
 count or reason of this is also most probably the account why the 
 constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral natures 
 or capacities, for a considerable part of that duration in which 
 they are living agents, are not at all subjects of morality and reli- 
 gion ; but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so more and more, 
 gradually from childhood to mature age. 
 
 What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, 
 we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so 
 very little even of our own case. Our present state may possibly 
 be the consequence of something past, of which we are wholly 
 ignorant : as it has a reference to somewhat to come, of which 
 we know scarce any more than is necessary for practice. A 
 system or constitution, in its notion, implies variety; and so 
 implicated a one as this world, very great variety. So that 
 * 2 Cor. viii. 12. 
 
252 KEVELATIOX XOT UNIVERSAL: part ii. 
 
 were revelation universal, yet, from men's different capacities of 
 "understanding, from the different lengths of their lives, their 
 different educations and other external circumstances, and from 
 their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious 
 situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some 
 in comparison of others,-perhaps, altogether as much as at present. 
 The true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part 
 of mankind, are ^^laced in this condition of ignorance, must be 
 supposed also the true account of our further ignorance, in not 
 knowing the reasons why, or whence it is, that they are placed 
 in this condition. 
 
 The following practical reflections may deserve the serious con- 
 sideration of those persons, who think the circumstances of man- 
 kind or their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of 
 complaint. 
 
 First, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may 
 constitute one particular part of some men's trial in the religious 
 sense : as it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect 
 of their understanding, in examining or not examining into that 
 evidence. There seems no possible reason to be given, why we 
 may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the exer- 
 cise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are 
 with regard to our behavior in common affairs. The former is as 
 much a thing within our power and choice as the latter. And I 
 s'uppose it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character, 
 the same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced of 
 the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts of it, 
 would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an examination 
 of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts : 
 and that in the latter state his examination would be with an 
 impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what 
 his obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, 
 want of all serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and 
 such importance, when offered to men's consideration, is, before 
 a distinct conviction of its truth, as real depravity and dissolute- 
 ness, as neglect of religious practice after such conviction: so 
 active solicitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of its 
 evidence before such conviction, is as really an exercise of a 
 morally right temper; as is religious practice after. Thus, thai 
 
^HAP. VI. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF, 253 
 
 religion is nc^ intuitively true, but a matter of deducti m and 
 inference; that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every 
 one, but left to be, by some, collected with heedful attention to 
 premises; this as much constitutes religious probation, as much 
 affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behavior, 
 as any thing whatever does. And their manner of treating this 
 subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and 
 is an exertion of it. 
 
 Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not 
 so much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the 
 evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest 
 supposable degree; even this doubtful evidence will, however, 
 put them into a general state of lyrobatlon in the moral and reli- 
 gious sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether 
 such a person had not done him the greatest favor; or, whether 
 his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person; no 
 one, who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence, could 
 possibly consider himself in the same situation, with regard to 
 such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just 
 to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the situa- 
 tions now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in 
 point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain 
 he had received no favor from such person; or that he no way 
 depended upon him. Thus, though the evidence of relioion 
 which is afforded to some men should be little more than they 
 are given to see, the system of Christianity, or religion in general, 
 to be supposable and credible; this ought in all reason to beo-et a 
 serious practical apprehension, that it may be true. And even 
 this will afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and de- 
 liberation, for moral resolution and self-government; because the 
 apprehension that religion may be true does as really lay men 
 under obligations, as a full conviction that it is true. It gives 
 occasion and motives to consider further the important subject; 
 to preserve attentively upon their minds a general implicit sense 
 that they may be under divine moral government, an awful solici- 
 tude about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such appre- 
 hension ought to turn men's eyes to every degree of new light 
 which may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce 
 ♦,hem to refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live 
 
 22 
 
254 BEVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: paet n. 
 
 in the conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially 
 arc they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute 
 profaneness, for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to 
 treat with highest reverence a matter, upon which their own 
 whole interest and being, and the fate of nature, depend. This 
 behavior, and an active endeavor to maintain within themselves 
 this temper, is the business, the duty, and the wisdom of those 
 persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of religion : is what 
 they are under the most proper obligations to. And such beha- 
 vior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in them, 
 that character, which the practice of all the several duties of reli- 
 gion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and 
 has a tendency to improve in others: others, I say, to whom God 
 has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite im- 
 portance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may 
 be said in general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly 
 may see, there is not near so much difference, as is commonly 
 imagined, between what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to 
 those persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and to those 
 who have only a serious doubting apprehension, that it may be 
 true. Their hopes, and fears, and obligations, will be in various 
 degrees: but, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is 
 the same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they 
 are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. 
 
 It. is to be observed further, that, from a character of under- 
 standing, or a situation of influence in the world, some persons 
 have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or good, by 
 setting an example of profaneness and avowed disregard to all 
 religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps doubt- 
 ing, apprehension of its truth, and of a reverent regard i-o it 
 under this doubtfulness; than they can do, by acting well or ill 
 in all the common intercourses among mankind. Consequp^itly 
 they are most highly accountable for a behavior, which, they may 
 easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there is tnost 
 plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence ot reli- 
 gion to be as doubtful as is pretended. 
 
 The ground of these observations, and that which renders them 
 just and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies somt decree 
 of evidence for that, of which we doubt. For no person would 
 
CHAP. VI. SUPPOSED DEFICiEiNCY IN ITS PROOF. 255 
 
 be in doubt concerning the triitli of a number of facts so and so 
 circumstanced, which should accidentally come into his thoughts, 
 and of which he had no evidence at all. And though in the 
 case of an even chance, and where consequently we were in 
 doubt, we should in common language say, that we had no evi- 
 dence at all for either side; yet that situation of things, which 
 renders it an even chance and no more, that such an event will 
 happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is 
 such evidence on both sides of a question,* as leaves the mind in 
 doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases, there is 
 no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is 
 (what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth 
 of a number of facts, which come into one's thoughts at random. 
 Thus, in all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, in 
 lower degrees, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher 
 still. Any one, who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, 
 will easily carry this observation on, and see, that between no 
 evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground of 
 doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees, as there are, be- 
 tween that degree which is the ground of doubt, and demonstra- 
 tion. And though we have not faculties to distinguish these 
 degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness; yet, in proportion 
 as they are discerned, they ought to influence our practice. It 
 is as real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be in- 
 fluenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, 
 as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in all 
 subjects which men consider, they diiicern the lower as well as 
 higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of 
 understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in 
 practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportion- 
 ably to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to de- 
 fects in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees 
 of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not 
 glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases; so, in pro- 
 portion to the corruption of the heart, they seem capable of satis- 
 fying themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence 
 acknowledged to be real, if it be not overbearing. From these 
 things it must follow, that doiibting concerning religion implies 
 * Intruduotion. 
 
256 EEVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL; part ir. 
 
 6ucl. a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with tlie consideration 
 of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the obligations 
 before mentioned^ to have a dutiful regard to it in all their 
 behavior. 
 
 Thirdly^ The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is 
 involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of 
 complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which 
 others are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, 
 after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state 
 a more improving state of discipline,* than it would be other- 
 wise : as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the 
 virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more, than 
 an easier or less attentive exercise of it could. Speculative diffi- 
 culties are, in this respect, of the very same nature with these 
 external temptations. For the evidence of religion not appearing 
 obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without any 
 consideration at all; and therefore requires such an attentive 
 exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider that evi- 
 dence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such temptation. 
 And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been 
 in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of 
 explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence 
 which it might see; and also for men's encouraging themselves 
 in vice, from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus 
 much at least, that these hopes are uncertain. In like manner 
 the common temptation to many instances of folly, which end in 
 temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not being 
 detected, and of escaping with impunity; i.e. the doubtfulness 
 of the proof beforehand, that such foolish behavior will thus end 
 in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in 
 the evidence of religion calls fur a more careful and attentive 
 exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves 
 up to the proper influence of any real evidence, though doubtful; 
 and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though under some 
 uncertainty,* whether the government in the universe may nut 
 possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And 
 in general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allure- 
 ments to wrong and difficulties in the discbarge of our duty, a? 
 
 * Part I. chap. v. 
 
CHAP. VI. SUPPOSED DEFICIEXCT IN ITS PROOF. 257 
 
 well as tlie greater ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every 
 kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional 
 to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an 
 additional discipline and improvement of virtue, as well as proba- 
 tion of it in the other senses of that word.* So that the very 
 same account is to be given, why the evidence of religion should 
 be left in such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive, 
 solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of their understanding about 
 it; as why others should be placed in such circumstances, as that 
 the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the 
 truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains: or, 
 why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to aiford matter 
 of temptation to some; as why external difficulties and allure- 
 ments should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others. 
 The same account also is to be given, why some should be exer- 
 cised with temptations of both these kinds; as why others should 
 be exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some 
 have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. 
 
 Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the 
 speculative difficulties, in which the evidence of religion is in- 
 volved, may make even the principal part of some persons' trial. 
 For as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are 
 the ordinary motives to injustice, or unrestrained pleasure, or to 
 live in the neglect of religion, from that frame of mind which 
 renders many persons almost without feeling as to any thing dis- 
 tant, or which is not the object of their senses; so there are 
 other persons without this shallowness of temper, persons of a 
 deeper sense as to what is invisible and future; who not only see, 
 but have a general practical feeling, that what is to come will be 
 present, and that things are not less real for their not being the 
 objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of 
 body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have 
 small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, 
 in the common course of life. Now when these latter persons 
 have a distinct full conviction of the truth of religion, ;vithout 
 any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them 
 unavoidable, unless they do a constant violence to their own 
 minds; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than 
 * Part I. cbap. iv. and pp. 150, 157. 
 
258 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL : part n, 
 
 it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may 
 possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise, in a higher 
 degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion. 
 Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they 
 should give some further manifestation* what is their moral cha- 
 racter, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would 
 be. Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which 
 men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly 
 constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be 
 the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved : and 
 their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will 
 behave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circum- 
 stances in men's situation in their temporal capacity, analogous 
 in good measure to this respecting religion, are to be observed. 
 We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world, 
 as that their chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the 
 doing what is prudent when it is known ; for this, in numberless 
 cases, is as easy as the contrary : but to some the principal exer- 
 cise is, recollection and being upon their guard against deceits, 
 the deceits suppose of those about them ; against false appear- 
 ances of reason and prudence. To persons in some situations, 
 the principal exercise with respect to conduct is, attention in 
 order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really the 
 reasonable and prudent part to act. 
 
 [^Fourthly.'] As I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that 
 men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing 
 to their neglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other 
 hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the case 
 plainly requires should be added, that such dissatisfaction pos- 
 sibly may be owing to those, possibly may be men's own fault. 
 For, 
 
 If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily 
 and in earnest to be informed in religion : if there are any, who 
 secretly wish it may not prove true; and are less attentive to 
 evidence than to difficulties, and more to objections than to what 
 is said in answer to them : these persons will scarce be thought 
 in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were 
 most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully proved 
 * Pp. 156, 157. 
 
CHAP. VI. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 259 
 
 If any accustom themselves to consider this subject m the 
 way of mirth and sport: if they attend to forms and repre- 
 sentations, and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the 
 real things intended by them : (for signs often can be no more 
 than inadequately expressive of the things signified :) or if they 
 substitute human errors in the room of divine truth ; why may 
 not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that 
 evidence, which really is seen by others ; as a like turn of mind, 
 with respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, 
 we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge 
 and right understanding, in matters of common speculation and 
 practice, which more fair and attentive minds attain to? And 
 the efi"ect will be the same, whether their neglect of seriously 
 considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect behavior 
 with regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the 
 grosser vices; or whether it be owing to this, that forms and 
 figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, administer 
 occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth 
 itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to 
 lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, 
 as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, 
 levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice do hinder us from 
 being rightly informed, with respect to common things : and they 
 mai/, in like manner, and perhaps, in some further providential 
 manner, with respect to moral and religious subjects : may hinder 
 evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it 
 is. The Scripture* does declare, that every one sJiall not iinder- 
 stand. And it makes no difference, by what providential con- 
 duct this comes to pass : whether the evidence of Christianity 
 was, originally and with design, put and left so, as that those who 
 are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it ; and 
 
 *- Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13, 14 : Matt. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and xiii. 
 11, 12 : John iii. 19, and v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14, and 2 Cor. iv. 4 : 2 Tim. iii. 13: 
 and that affectionate as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times 
 inculcated, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear. Grotius saw so strongly the 
 thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as 
 to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, 
 for this very purpose : Ut ita sennn Uvangelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad 
 quern ivc/eiiia sanabilia explorarentur. De Ver. R. C. lib. ii. [So that the 
 Gospel should be a touchstone, to test the honesty of men's dispositions.] 
 
200 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL; part ir. 
 
 that lionest-minded persons should : or, whether it comes to pass 
 by any other means. 
 
 Further : \_FtfthIi/.'\ The general proof of natural religion and 
 of Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men : even 
 those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, 
 is taken up with providing for themselves and their families the 
 common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life : those I mean, 
 of this rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or 
 attending to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest 
 about religion, as about their temporal affairs, are capable of 
 being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God who 
 governs the world : and they feel themselves to be of a moral 
 nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely 
 falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capa- 
 ble, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that 
 there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and 
 many appearing completions of prophecy. 
 
 This proof, though real and conclusive, is liable to objections, 
 and may be run up into difficulties ; which however persons who 
 are capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capa- 
 ble also of seeing through : i.e. not of clearing up and answering 
 them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we 
 are not capable with respect to any one thing in nature ', but 
 capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, 
 or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examina- 
 tion into religion with regard to these objections, which cannot 
 be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, 
 and, from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as 
 time and attention ; to see, how the evidence comes out, upon 
 balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is 
 the amount of it. If persons who pick up these objections from 
 others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon the word 
 of those from whom they received them, or, by often retailing of 
 them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight ; will 
 not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a com- 
 petent degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and 
 attention to the subject, which, from the nature of it, is neces- 
 sary for attaining such information : in this case, they must 
 remain in doubtfulness, ignorance^ or error : in the same way as 
 
CHAP. VI. SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 261 
 
 they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters of com- 
 mon life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed 
 in them. 
 
 Perhaps it will still be objected, that if a prince or com- 
 mon master were to send directions to a servant, he would take 
 care, that they should always bear the certain marks, who they 
 came from, and that their sense should be always plain: so as 
 that there should be no possible doubt if he could help it, con- 
 cerning the authority or meaning of them. The proper answer 
 to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it 
 is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is 
 the Governor of the world : and that he does not afford us such 
 information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, 
 experience abundantly shows. 
 
 However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very 
 nature of religion. The reason why a prince would give his 
 directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires an 
 external action done, without concerning himself with the motive 
 or principle upon which it is done : i.e. he regards only the ex- 
 ternal event, or the thing's being done ; and not at all, properly 
 speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas the whole 
 of morality and religion consisting merely in action itself, there 
 is no sort of parallel between the cases. But .if the prince be 
 supposed to regard only the action ; i.e. only to desire to exercise, 
 or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant ; 
 he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It 
 may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality 
 and religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only con- 
 ditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should 
 act virtuously in such given circumstances ; not that we should be 
 brought to act so, by this changing of our circumstances. And if 
 God's will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest 
 and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will ; which is a 
 most weighty consideration. Or his will maj^ be considered only 
 as conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded ; if 
 otherwise, punished : of which conditional will of the xiuthor 
 of nature, the whole constitution of it affords most certain 
 instances. 
 
 Upcn the whole : that we are in a state of religion necessarily 
 
262 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL. part ii. 
 
 implies, that we are in a state of probation : and tne credibility 
 of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no 
 peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it is, 
 in those respects which are above objected against. There seems 
 no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say, that the trial 
 cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act 
 suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for 
 doubt; so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but 
 either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or 
 from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. 
 For, since ignorance and doubt, afford scope for probation in all 
 senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty; and since 
 the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in 
 practice ; men's moral probation may also be, whether they will 
 take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration, 
 and afterwards whether they will act as the case requires, upon 
 the evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this, we 
 find by ex2^erience, is frequently our probation,* in our temporal 
 capacity. For, the information which we want with regard to 
 our worldly interests is by no means always given us of course, 
 without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to self- 
 deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of 
 others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, 
 often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we 
 have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we 
 must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to 
 a very high degree. And the constitution and course of the 
 world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration 
 what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses be- 
 cause it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often natu- 
 rally, i.e. providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct occa- 
 sioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or 
 disregarding it from overbearing passion. 
 
 Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, 
 perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons 
 for whose sake they are made think so, (persons who object as 
 above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of wanl 
 of evidence ;) I desire them to consider again, whether their thiuk- 
 * Pp. 100, 257, Ac. 
 
CHAP. vii. PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. 263 
 
 ing so be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations, 
 or to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious 
 solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all 
 reason require ? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of 
 these persons, that our nature and condition necessarily require 
 us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower 
 than what is commonly called probable : to guard, not only against 
 what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it sup- 
 posable may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits when the proba- 
 bility is greatly against success, if it even be credible, that 
 possibly we may succeed in them. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 The presumptions against revelation, and objections against 
 the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating 
 to it, being removed, there remains to be considered, what posi- 
 tive evidence we have for the truth of it; chiefly in order to see, 
 what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence, 
 and the objections against it : or to see what is, and is allowed 
 to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in our 
 temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of 
 evidence, and the same kind of objections- against it, that we 
 have in the case before us. 
 
 In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things 
 of great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or 
 the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the 
 words. But these two are its dire'ct and fundamental proofs : 
 and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought 
 never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be 
 joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a 
 long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning 
 of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, 
 taking in both the direct and also the collateral, proofs, and 
 making up, all of them together, one argument. The conviction 
 arising from this kind of pruof may be compared to what they 
 
2C4 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part it. 
 
 call the effect, in architecture or other works of art; a result from 
 a great number of things, so and so disposed, and taken into one 
 view. I shall therefore, firs,t, make some observations relating 
 to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and 
 consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections 
 brought against this evidence. And, secondly, I shall endeavor 
 to give some account of the general argument now mentioned, 
 consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered 
 as making up one argument : this being the kind of proof, upon 
 which we determine most questions of difficulty, concerning 
 common facts, alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to 
 happen ; especially questions relating to conduct. 
 
 First, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of 
 Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections 
 alleged against it.* 
 
 I. Now the following observations relating to the historical 
 evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity ap- 
 pear to be of great weight. 
 
 1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence 
 of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common 
 civil history of Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the 
 affairs of the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the Acts 
 afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ 
 and the apostles, as of the common matters related in them. 
 This indeed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, 
 if the authors of tl*ese books, like many other historians, had 
 appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing, and hence 
 interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances and upon 
 proper occasions. These might have* animated a dull relation, 
 amused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same 
 account would naturally have been given of them, as of the 
 speeches and descriptions given by such authors : the same ac- 
 count, in a manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of 
 wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and 
 natural, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narratives, 
 
 «• [See WiTSii Meletemeta, Diss. IV. : Pfafii Disput: Campbell on Miracles : 
 Douglass' Criterion : Farmer's Dissertations : Paley's Evid. : Taylor's ApoL 
 of Ben Mordecai : Tucker's Light of Nat. : Watson's Tracts, vol. iv. : Jortin'8 
 Bermons : Bp. Fleetwood's Essays : Boyle Lectures : Lakdner s Credibility.] 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHHISTIANITY. 265 
 
 and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same 
 foot of historical evidence.'' 
 
 Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of 
 miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are 
 quoted as genuine, from the age in which they are said to be 
 written, down to the present : and no other parts of them, 
 material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such 
 manner, as to aiford any sort of proof of their not being genuine. 
 And, as common history, when called in question in any instance, 
 may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent 
 events more known and acknowledged; and as the common 
 Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed; so like- 
 wise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular in- 
 stances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish 
 and Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the 
 miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subse- 
 quent to them, these events are just what we should have ex- 
 pected, upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to 
 attest the truth of those religions. These miracles are a satis- 
 factory account of those events : of which no other satisfactory 
 account can be given; nor any account at all, but what is merely 
 imaginary and invented 
 
 It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and 
 direct account of this history, how it came to be written, and to 
 be received in the world as a true history, is that it really is so; 
 nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though 
 an account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, 
 may be and often is, the true account of a matter, yet it cannot 
 be admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, 
 supposition, and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, 
 prove nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative. 
 
 The just consequence from all this, I think is, that the Scrip- 
 ture history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine 
 history, till something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate 
 
 ^ [" The miracles of the Jewish historian, are intimately connected with all 
 the civil aflfairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part. The whole 
 history is founded in them ; it cousirts of little else ; and if it were not a 
 history of them, it would he a history of nothing." — Bolingbroke, Posthumous 
 "Works, vol. iii. p. 279.] 
 
 23 
 
266 THE PARTICULAK EYIDEXCE part ii. 
 
 it. No man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be 
 rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to 
 be of none; even though the evidence now mentioned for its 
 authority were doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by 
 historical evidence on the other side, if there be any: or general 
 incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the general 
 turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But 
 since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general view, 
 the appearance is, that it is an authentic history, it cannot be 
 determined to be fictitious, without some proof that it is so. 
 The following observations in support of these, and coincident 
 with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the 
 truth of Christianity. 
 
 2. The Epistles of Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, 
 and moreover from several of them being written, not to particu- 
 lar persons but to churches, carry in them evidences of their 
 being genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical narrative, 
 left to the world at large. This evidence,'' joined with that 
 which they have in common with the rest of the New Testament, 
 seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence for deny- 
 ing their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter of fact, 
 or of criticism: I say particular pretence, for denying it; be- 
 cause any single fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may 
 have general doubts raised concerning it, from the very nature of 
 human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be men- 
 tioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of 
 the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians; 
 from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in 
 an epistle of his own to that church.* Now these epistles afford 
 
 <! [An admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth of the New 
 Testament narrative, is Paley's Horte Paulinae. The same department of evi- 
 dence is ably handled by Birk, in his Horae Evangelicae, and Horse Apostolicae : 
 Graves on the Pentateuch : and Bltjnt in his " Undesigned Coincidences both 
 of -the Old and New Testament." Grotius, De Yeritate, has some excellent 
 passages on the same subject.] 
 
 * [Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47.] CLEirEXT, who is here quoted, lived in the first 
 century, and is mentioned Phil. iv. 3. His epistle to the Corinthians, written 
 in Greek, contains the passage here referred to, which may be thus translated- 
 "Take the letter of the blessed Paul the Apostle. What did he write to you, 
 in the first beginning of the Gospel? Truly he sent you a divinely inspired 
 letter about himself, and Cephas, and Apollos.^' 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 267 
 
 a proof of Christianity, detached from all others, which is, 1 
 think, a thing of weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind 
 peculiar to itself. For, 
 
 In them the author declares, that he received the Gospel in 
 general, and the institution of the Communion in particular, not 
 from the rest of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but 
 alone, from Christ himself; whom he declares likewise, conform- 
 ably to the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension.* 
 So that the testimony of Paul is to be considered, as detached 
 from that of the rest of the apostles. 
 
 He declares further, that he was endued with a power of work- 
 ing miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, 
 speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then 
 subsisting in those very churches, to which he was writing; 
 which he was reproving for several irregularities, and where he 
 had personal opposers. He mentions these gifts incidentally, in 
 the most easy manner, and without effort; by way of reproof to 
 those who had them, for their indecent use of them; and by 
 way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues. In 
 short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous powers, 
 in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which 
 was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as 
 any thing in the world. f And this, as hath been observed by 
 several persons, is surely a very considerable thing. 
 
 3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity 
 offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon 
 the allegation, (i.e. as unbelievers would speak, upon the pre- 
 tence,) of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in 
 such an age; and that it was actually received by great numbers 
 in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of 
 these miracles. And Christianity, including the dispensation of 
 the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other 
 religions. I mean, that this does not ajjpear to be the case with 
 regard to any other; for surely it will not be supposed to lie 
 upon any person, to prove by positive historical evidence, that it 
 was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahometanism was first 
 
 * Gal. i. : 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c. : 1 Cor. xv. 8. 
 
 t Rom. XV. 19 : 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, kc, and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and the whole 
 I4th chapter : 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13 : Gal. iii, 2, 5. 
 
268 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part n. 
 
 received in tlie world upon the foot of supposed miracles,* i.e. 
 public ones :^ lor, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence 
 to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles. And it 
 is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, pro- 
 pagated by other means. And as particular institutions, whether 
 in Paganism or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles after 
 those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose : so, were 
 there what might be called historical proof, that any of them 
 were introduced by a supposed divine command, believed to be 
 attested by miracles; these would not be in any wise parallel. 
 For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, after 
 parties are formed, and have power in their hands; and the 
 leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude ; and politi- 
 cal interests are blended with religious claims, and religious dis- 
 tinctions. But he/ore any thing of this kind, for a few persons, 
 and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great 
 numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon the 
 particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing. 
 
 I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact 
 now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances, is peculiar to the 
 Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that 
 Christianity obtained, i.e. was professed to be received in the 
 world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in 
 which it is said those miracles were wrought: or that this is 
 what its first converts would have alleged, as the reason for 
 their embracing it. It is not to be supposed that such numbers 
 of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should forsake the 
 religion of their country, in which they had been educated; 
 separate themselves from their friends, particularly in their 
 festival shows and solemnities, to which the common people are 
 so greatly addicted, and which were of a nature to engage them 
 much more, than any thing of that sort among us : and embrace 
 
 ••■ See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii. 
 
 d [Mahomet expressly declares that he worked no ]puhlic miracles in con- 
 firmation of his mission, "because the former nations have charged them with 
 imposture." He claims, however, to have had private miraculous assurancea 
 of his mission, and most preposterous they were. 
 
 Whately, in his Christian Evidences, has handled this aspect of miracles 
 •with great ability. See also Paley's Eviderces, sec. 3 : and Gibbon's Decline 
 and Fall, chap. 1.] 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIANITY. ft(j9 
 
 a religion^ wliicli could not but expose them to many incon 
 veniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a 
 great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire en- 
 gaged in form against them : it cannot be supposed, that such 
 numbers should make so great, and to say the least, so incon- 
 venient a change in their whole institution of life, unless they 
 were really convinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the 
 knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it. And 
 it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the generality 
 of the first converts to Christianity must have believed them : 
 that as by becoming Christians they declared to the world, they 
 were satisfied of the truth of those miracles; so this declaratiSh 
 was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same kind 
 of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing, 
 and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evi- 
 dence, because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full 
 opportunity to inform themselves of. 
 
 It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence, 
 though it is of the same kind : and would be allowed to be dis- 
 tinct in all cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or 
 more ancient historians, and disputed in after ages; that this 
 fact is acknowledged to have been helieved by great numbers of 
 the age in which the historian says it was done, would be allowed 
 an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the express 
 testimony of the historian. The credulity of mankind is acknow- 
 ledged : and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged 
 too; and their backwardness even to believe, and greater still to 
 practise, what makes against their interest. And it must par- 
 ticularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and 
 authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking 
 of. So that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real 
 presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter.^ I 
 
 e [Alexander, in his Evidences, and several other writers have placed this 
 argument in a very convincing light. Arnobius, one of the earliest Christian 
 writers, asks, "Shall we say that the men of those times were inconsiderate, 
 deceitful, stupid, and brutish enough to feign having seen what they never 
 saw? and that when they might have lived in peace and comfort, they chose 
 gratuitous hatred and obloquy?" 
 
 The rejection of Christianity by so many in the first age was the result of 
 tJie continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice and depravity 
 
 23* 
 
270 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part n. 
 
 say presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by 
 itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this 
 chapter be considered as a proof by itself: and yet all of them 
 together may be one of the strongest.* 
 
 Upon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both 
 direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of 
 Christianity, collected by those who have writ upon the subject; 
 it lies upon unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be 
 credited. This way of speaking is, I thint, just; and what per- 
 sons who write in defence of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in 
 a matter of such unspeakable importance, the proper question is, 
 not whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to 
 maintain or confute objections : but whether there really are any, 
 against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to destroy the credit 
 of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them the part 
 of showing that there are. 
 
 They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different 
 ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties 
 which the primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up 
 their lives for the most idle follies imaginable. It is not very 
 clear, to what purpose this objection is brought. For surely, 
 every one, in every case, must distinguish between opinions and 
 facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, 
 or of any opinion at all; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to 
 be a proof of facts. A person's laying down his life in attesta- 
 tion of facts or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believ- 
 ing them. And if the apostles and their contemporaries did be- 
 lieve the facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves 
 to sufferings and death; this their belief, or rather knowledge, 
 must be a proof of those facts: for they were such as came 
 under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of 
 equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next 
 age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts. 
 
 capable of resisting any supposable evidence. The recejytion of Christianity 
 by multitudes, under the same evidences, and to their immediate personal 
 damage, shows strongly that there was enough evidence to produce those 
 effects. Thus the rejection by some does not countervail Jhe accep*^nce by 
 others.] 
 
 * P. 294, &c. 
 
CHAP. vir. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 271 
 
 as were the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full 
 opportunity to inform themselves whether they were true or not. 
 and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true. 
 
 But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of 
 testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion: some 
 seem to think it totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of 
 testimony upon this subject. The powers of enthusiasm, and of 
 diseases too, which operate in a like manner, are indeed very 
 wonderful, in particular instances. But if great numbers of 
 men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under any 
 peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard 
 such things plainly, with their eyes and their ears, and are 
 admitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evidence of the 
 strongest kind we can have, for any matter of fact. Possibly it 
 may be overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things 
 thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an instance 
 where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider, 
 how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm; for 
 it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it. 
 But till such incredibility be shown, or contrary testimony pro- 
 duced, it cannot surely be expected, that so far-fetched, so in- 
 direct and wonderful an account of such testimony, as that of 
 enthusiasm must be ; an account so strange, that the generality 
 of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by 
 it; it cannot, I say, be expected that such an account will be 
 admitted of such evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and 
 obvious account of it, that people really saw and heard a thing 
 not incredible, which they affirm, sincerely and with full as- 
 surance, they did see and bear. 
 
 Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an 
 absurd, but a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest, 
 that the very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition, 
 that the things so attested are incredible : and therefore need not 
 be considered, till they are shown to be so. Much less need it 
 be considered, after the contrary has been proved. And I think 
 it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there is no incredi- 
 bility in a revelation, in general; or in such a one as the Chris- 
 tian, in particular. However, as religion is supposed peculiarly 
 liable to enthusiam, it may just be observed, that prejudiceii 
 
272 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part il 
 
 almost without number, and without name, such as romance, 
 affection, humor, a desire to engage attention, or to surprise, 
 party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable likings 
 and dislikings; these influence men strongly in common matters. 
 And as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon 
 by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are 
 to be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet 
 human testimony, in common matters, is naturally and justly 
 believed, notwithstanding. 
 
 It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, 
 that though it should be proved, that the apostles and first Chris- 
 tians could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and 
 in other respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose 
 upon the world, yet it will not follow that their general testi- 
 mony is to be believed, though truly handed down to us : because 
 they might still in part, i.e. in other respects, be deceived them- 
 selves, and in part also designedly impose upon others; which, 
 it is added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real 
 enthusiasm, and real knavery, 'to be met with in the same 
 characters/ 
 
 I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this 
 <)bservation upon mankind is not to be denied ; and that some- 
 thing very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a 
 very common case, and most severely reproved. But it were to 
 have been expected, that persons capable of applying this obser- 
 vation as applied in the objection, might also frequently have 
 met with the like mixed character, in instances where religion 
 was quite out of the case. The thing plainly is, that mankind 
 are naturally endued with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing 
 between truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued 
 with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say: but from 
 many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and biassed and 
 deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive others, 
 in every degree : insomuch that, as we are all liable to be de- 
 ceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon 
 thing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not 
 invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate 
 it with heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and 
 ' [Compare Butler's Sermons; on Balaam, and on Self-d<»;(?Jt.] 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 27S 
 
 set a-going. And others, tliougli they would notjjrojpar/afe a lie, 
 yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without 
 contradiction. But notwithstanding all this, human testimony 
 remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent a 
 natural principle of action. 
 
 It is objected further, that however it has happened, the fa<:,t 
 is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded 
 with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means 
 to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more 
 liable to be deceived by these than by other pretences. 
 
 It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of his- 
 torical evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknow- 
 ledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were even the like 
 historical evidence for these, to what there is for those alleged in 
 proof of Christianity, which yet is in no wise allowed, but sup- 
 pose this ; the consequence would not be, that the evidence of 
 the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the 
 world, who in common cases, would conclude thus. For what 
 would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence, 
 confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys 
 the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor over- 
 balanced ? To argue that because there is, if there were, like 
 evidenoe from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for 
 those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the 
 latter case is not to be credited ; this is the same as to argue, that 
 if two men of equally good reputation had given evidence in 
 different cases no way connected, and one of them had been 
 convicted of perjury, this confuted the testimony of the other ! 
 
 Upon the whole then, the general observation, that human 
 creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in reli- 
 gion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, 
 and in both from negligence ; and that they are so capable of 
 dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others; this does indeed 
 weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not 
 destroy it in any. And these things will appear, to different 
 men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in different degrees : 
 in degrees proportionable to the observations they have made, or 
 the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the weak- 
 ness and negligence and dishonesty of mankind ; or concerning 
 
274. THE PARTICULAR EYIDEXCE part ii. 
 
 the powers of entliusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But 
 it seems to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm 
 these things to destroy the evidence from testimony which we 
 have, of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the 
 evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability, 
 that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they 
 give testimony; or that they are actually under some indirect 
 influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till this be made 
 out, the natural laws of human actions require, that testimony 
 be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct 
 historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many prin- 
 ciples, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves, 
 and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, 
 that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising per- 
 sons can help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking sup- 
 poses they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, 
 of which they speak thus ; or that they can avoid observing, if 
 they do make this reflection, that it is on such a subject, a very 
 material one.* 
 
 Over against all these objections is to be set the importance of 
 Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first 
 converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived 
 from carelessness, than they would in common matters ; and like- 
 wise the strong ohllgations to veracity^ which their religion laid 
 them under : so that the first and most obvious presumption is, 
 that they could not be deceived themselves nor deceive others. 
 And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony 
 we have been considering. 
 
 In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have 
 an air of positiveness which sometimes is not very easy : yet they 
 are necessary, and necessary to be repeated ; in order to connect 
 a discourse, and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader, 
 what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now 
 the conclusion from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond 
 all doubt, this : that unbelievers must be forced to admit the ex- 
 ternal evidence for Christianity, i.e. the proof of miracles wrought 
 to attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable ; thouo-h 
 they cannot allow it to be sufficient, to convince thofa of the 
 * See the foregoing chapter. 
 
CHAP. vrr. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 275 
 
 reality of those miracles. And as tliey must, in all reason, admit 
 this; so it seems to me, that upon consideration they would, in 
 fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who know any thing at 
 all of the matter; in like manner as persons, in many cases, own 
 they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of things, 
 which yet they cannot be convinced are true : cases, suppose, 
 where there is contrary testimony; or things which they think, 
 whether with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is 
 no testimony contrary to that which we have been considerino- : 
 and it has been fully proved, that there is no incredibility in 
 Christianity in general, or in any part of it. 
 
 II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall 
 only make some few general observations, which are suggested 
 by the analogy of nature; i.e. by the acknowledged natural rules 
 of judging in common matters, concerning evidence of a like 
 kind to this from prophecy. 
 
 1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy 
 does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising 
 from the appearing completion of those other parts, whicb are 
 understood. For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts 
 which are not understood were lost, or not written at all, or 
 written in an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be 
 commonly attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can scarce 
 bring oneself to set down an instance in common matters, to 
 exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in cipher, and 
 partly in plain words at length; and that in the part one under- 
 stood, there appeared mention of several known facts ; it would 
 never come into any man's thoughts to imagine, that if he under- 
 stood the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not 
 in reality known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example 
 and in the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not under- 
 standing the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a para- 
 graph) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether one understood 
 the literal meaning of such a part : but this comes under another 
 consideration. 
 
 For the same reason, thougb a man should be incapable, for 
 want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having 
 turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge whether 
 particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled; 
 
I>76 THE PAETICULAR EVIDENCE part ii. 
 
 yet lie may se^, m general, that they have been fulfilled to such 
 a degree, as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight 
 more than human in such prophecies, and of such events being 
 intended by them. For the same reason also, though, by means 
 of the deficiencies in civil history, and the difierent accounts of 
 historians, the most learned should not be able to make out to 
 satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history have been 
 minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong 'proof of 
 foresight may arise, from that general completion of them, which 
 is made out. As much perhaps, as the giver of prophecy in- 
 tended should ever be afibrded by such parts of prophecy. 
 
 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such 
 events, is itself a proof that it was intended of them : as the rules 
 by which we naturally judge and determine, in common cases 
 parallel to this, will show.^ This observation I make in answer 
 to the common objection against the application of the prophe- 
 cies, that, considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does 
 not at all appear, that they were intended of those particular 
 events to which they are applied by Christians; and therefore it 
 is to be supposed, that if they meant any thing, they were in- 
 tended of other events unknown to us^ and not of these at all. 
 
 Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great re- 
 semblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before us : the 
 mythological, and the satirical, where the satire is to a certain 
 degree concealed. And a man might be assured, that he under- 
 stood what an author intended by a fable or parable related with- 
 out any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily 
 capable of such application, and that such a moral might natu- 
 rally be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured, that 
 such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing, 
 merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to the 
 last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, 
 
 s [""Whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer, that 
 Bcheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader, for unlocking the 
 meaninj^ of particular parts, which would otherwise not be seen clearly to refer 
 to such scheme. The inspired writers had one common and predominant 
 Bcheme in view, which was to hear testimony to Jesus. Whatever passages 
 occur in their writings, which bear an apt and easy resemblance to the hi?tory 
 of Jesus, may, or rather must in all reasonable construction, be applied to 
 him." — HuRD on the Proph., p. 117.] 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 27? 
 
 though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the storj 
 of such persons to understand half the satire. For, his satisfac- 
 tion that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of 
 these writings, would be greater or less in proportion as he saw 
 the general turn of them to be capable of such application; and 
 in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it. 
 And thus, if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present 
 state of the church, and to the political situations of the king- 
 doms of the world, some thousand years after these prophecies 
 were delivered ; and a long series of prophecy delivered before 
 the coming of Christ is applicable to him; these things are in 
 themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of 
 him, and of those events : in proportion as the general turn of it 
 ts capable of such application, and to the number and variety of 
 particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way 
 of consideration, the obvious completion of prophecies is to be 
 allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine, their mean- 
 ing; yet it is to be remembered further, that the ancient Jews 
 applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming,*" in much 
 the same manner as Christians do now : and that the primitive 
 Christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the 
 church and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the 
 event seems to confirm and verify. From these things it may be 
 made appear : 
 
 3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could 
 be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and 
 such predictions, and not those which Christians allege to be 
 completions of those predictions; or that such and such prophe- 
 cies are capable of being applied to other events than those, to 
 which Christians apply them — that this would not confute or 
 destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with re- 
 gard to those very instances. For, observe how this matter really 
 is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a 
 book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that 
 one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one should be 
 assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole 
 
 *' [Consult on this point, Gulick, Tlieologia Prophetica: Vitringa, Observa- 
 tiones : Hengstenburg, Christologia: Horsley's Tracts and Sermons: King's 
 Morsels c*" Criticism : Waugh's Dissertations : Lyall's Propcedia Piophetica.] 
 
 24 
 
278 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part n. 
 
 meaning of that book : for the meaning of a book is nothing but 
 the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have 
 compiled a book out of memoirs, which he received from another, 
 of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it 
 were a book full of great intricacies and dijficulties; it would in 
 no wise follow, that one knew the whole meaning of the book, 
 from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler : for the original 
 author of them, might have, and there would be no presumption, 
 in many cases, against supposing him to have, some further 
 meaning than the compiler saw. To say then that the Scrip- 
 tures, and the things contained in them, can have no other oi 
 further meaning than those persons had, who first recited or 
 wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the 
 original, proper, and sole authors of those books, i.e. that they 
 are not inspired : which is absurd, while the authority of these 
 books is under examination; i.e. till you have determined they 
 are of no divine authority at all. Till this be determined, it 
 must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, (for 
 this is taking for granted that they are inspired;) but that they 
 may have, some further meaning than what the compilers saw or 
 understood. And, upon this supposition, it is supposable also, 
 that this further meaning may be fulfilled. 
 
 Events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a difierent 
 meaning from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have 
 understood them; afi'ords in a manner, the same proof, that this 
 difierent sense was originally intended, as it would have aff"orded, 
 if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense 
 -it is supposed they did : because there is no presumption of their 
 sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has been 
 already shown, that the apparent completions of prophecy must 
 be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So that the ques- 
 tion is, whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a 
 natural or proper, i.e. in any real sense of the words of it. For 
 such completion is equally a proof of foresight more than human, 
 whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have under- 
 stood it in a difi'erent sense. I say, supposed: for, though 1 
 think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full 
 meaning of their predictions, it is another question, how far they 
 thought they did; and in what sense they understood them 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIAXITY. 279 
 
 Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy 
 themselves, who endeavor to prove, that the prophetic history js 
 applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages 
 before j.t. To have proved this, before there was any appearance 
 of a further completion of it, might have answered some purpose; 
 for it might have prevented the expectation of any such further 
 completion. Thus could Porphyry have shown, that some prin- 
 cipal parts of the book of Daniel, for instance the seventh verse 
 of the seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the 
 latter ages, was applicable to events, which happened before or 
 about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; this might have prevented 
 them from expecting any further completion of it. And, unless 
 there was then, as I think there must have been, external evi- 
 dence concerning that book, more than is come down to us; such 
 a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way of 
 Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Savior 
 has given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general 
 scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even 
 this discovery, had there been any such,''' would be of very little 
 weight with reasonable men now; if this passage, thus applicable 
 to events before the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable 
 also to events, which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman 
 empire. I mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate, that 
 the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly was 
 divided into about that number, were, alone and by itself, of any 
 moment in verifying the prophetic history : but only as an ex- 
 ample of the thing I am speaking of. Thus upon the whole, the 
 matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether the 
 prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of 
 the world, and of the church; applicable in such a degree, as to 
 imply foresight : not whether they are capable of any other appli- 
 
 * It appears that Porphyry did nothing -worth mentioning in this way. For 
 Jerome on the place says : Duas ]posteriores bestias — in imo Macedonum regno 
 ponit. And as to the ten kings; Decern reges ennmerat, qui fuernnt scevissimi : 
 ipsosque regea non unius ponit regni, verhi gratia, Mucedoniai, Syrian, Asiix, et 
 /Egypti ; sed de diversis rfgnis unura efficit regum ordiiiem. ["The two latter 
 ieasts he places in one of the Macedonian kingdoms." " He reckons up ten kings 
 who hud been excessively cruel and these not kings of one country, as Mace- 
 donia, for instance, or Syria, or Asia, or Egypt; but makes up his set of kinga 
 out of different kingdoms."] In this way of interpretation, any thing may b« 
 made of -any thing. 
 
280 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part n. 
 
 cation. Though I know no pretence for saying the general turn 
 of them is capable of any other. 
 
 These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred 
 to in them real : though there may be people who will not accept 
 of such imperfect information from Scripture. Some tjo have 
 iiot integrity and regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, 
 which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which 
 is much of a different sort from what they expected. It plainly 
 requires a degree of modesty and fairness, beyond what every 
 one has, for a man to say, not to the world but to himself, that 
 there is a real appearance of great weight in this matter, though 
 he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it; but that it 
 shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its apparent 
 reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in with 
 the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to 
 determine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. 
 The prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, 
 with which this evidence is treated in the world, I do not men- 
 tion. For what can be said to persons, who are weak enough in 
 their understandings to think this any presumption against it; 
 or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be in- 
 fluenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject i' 
 
 JSecondlj/, I shall endeavor to give some account of the general 
 argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the 
 direct and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one 
 argument. To state and examine this argument fully, would be 
 a work much beyond the compass of this whole treatise; nor is so 
 much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the 
 present subject requires to have some brief account of it given. 
 For it is the kind of evidence, upon which most questions of diffi- 
 culty, in common practice, are determined : evidence arising from 
 various coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and 
 in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under 
 consideration. I choose to do it also: First, because it seems to 
 be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every 
 one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express 
 things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; 
 and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is 
 indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be 
 
CHAP. vn. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 281 
 
 joined together; for that the proper force of the c/idence con- 
 sists in the result of those several things, consider-sd in their 
 respects to each other, and united into one view. Ii the next 
 place, because it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set 
 down, which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must b-^ acknow- 
 ledged by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of 
 great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several things 
 before themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider 
 them together; instead of that cursory thought of them, to which 
 we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the cursory thought 
 of things as really hinders the weight of them from beino- seen, 
 as from having its due influence upon practice. 
 
 The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired 
 into, is this: That over and above our reason and affections, 
 which God has given us for the information of our judgment and 
 the conduct of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given 
 us an account of himself and his moral government over the world, 
 implying a future state of rewards and punishments; i.e. hath 
 revealed the system of natural religion : (for natural religion may 
 be externally* revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it 
 by their fellow-creatures) — that God, I say, has given us the evi- 
 dence of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain 
 this moral system; together with an account of a particular dis- 
 pensation of Providence, which reason could no way have dis- 
 covered, and a particular institution of religion founded on it, for 
 the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition, 
 and raising them to the perfection and final happiness of their 
 nature. 
 
 This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered 
 as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of 
 events before they come to pass; doctrines also are matters of 
 fact; and precepts come under the same notion. The general 
 design of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus 
 considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account 
 of the world in this one single view, as God's world: by which 
 it appears essentially distinguished from all other books, so far as 
 i have found, except such as are copied from it. It begins with 
 an account of G-)d's creation of the world, in order to ascertain, 
 
 * P. 1S9, (fee. 
 24* 
 
282 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part n. 
 
 and distmginsli from all others, who is the object of our worship, 
 by what he has done : in order to ascertain, who he is, concerning 
 whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this 
 sacred book, all along, treats; [viz.] the Maker and Proprietor 
 of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature: in 
 order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, 
 which are either imaginary beings, i.e. no beings at all; or else 
 part of that creation, the historical relation of which is here given. 
 And John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account 
 of the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our Savior's 
 pre-existence, and that all things were tnade by him; and with- 
 out him was not any thing made that was made:* agreeably to 
 the doctrine of Paul, that God created all things by Jesus Christ.'\ 
 This being premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to pro- 
 fess to contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the 
 world, in the view just now mentioned: that is, a general account 
 of the condition of religion and its professors, during the continu- 
 ance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness, which 
 it everywhere supposes the world to lie in. And this account 
 of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the 
 political state of things, as religion is aflPected by it. Revelation 
 indeed considers the common affiiirs of this world, and what is 
 going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction ; and cannot be sup- 
 posed to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or 
 Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most 
 conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all 
 places equally aspire to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give 
 any account of this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to 
 contain some very general account of the chief governments of 
 the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall 
 be, affected by them, from the first transgression, and during the 
 whole interval of the world's continuing in its present state, to a 
 certain future period, spoken of both in the Old and ^ew Testa- 
 ment, very distinctly, and in great variety of expression : The 
 times of the restitution of all things :\ when the mystery of God 
 shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the 2)rophets :^ 
 when the God of heaven shcdl set up a kingdom, which shall 
 •never be destroyed : and the kingdom, shall not be left to otlier 
 * John i. 3. t Eph. iii. 9. J Acts iii. 21. ^ Rev. x 7. 
 
CHAP. vn. FOR CnRISTIANITY. 283 
 
 people,'^ as it is represented to be during this apostasy, but judg- 
 ment shall he given to the saints{\ and they shall reign .-^ ann the 
 hingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under 
 the 'wliole heaven, shall he given to the people of the saints of the 
 3IostHigh.% 
 
 Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how 
 great a length of time the whole relation takes up, near six thou- 
 sand years of which are past; and how great a variety of things 
 it treats of; the natural and moral system or history of the world, 
 including the time when it was formed, all contained in the very 
 first book, and evidently written in a rude and unlearned age; 
 and in subsequent books, the various common and projjhetic his- 
 tory, and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now all 
 this together gives the largest scope for criticism; and for the 
 confutation of what is capable of being confuted, either from 
 reason, or from common history, or from any inconsistence in its 
 several parts. And it deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that 
 whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence 
 for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true; it 
 appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is 
 true. For, could any common relation of such antiquity, extent, 
 and variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now ob- 
 serving lies) be proposed to the examination of the world : that 
 it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or 
 shown to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable 
 men; would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth. 
 Indeed it must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the proba- 
 bility, that if it were false, it might be shown to be so: which, I 
 think, is scarce pretended to be shown, but upon principles and 
 in ways of arguing, which have been clearly obviated. || Nor 
 does it at all appear, that any set of men, who believe natural 
 religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has been thus 
 confuted. But to proceed : 
 
 Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testa- 
 ment contains a chronological account of the beginning of it, 
 ■Jind from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many 
 ages before, common history begins; and carried on as much 
 
 * Dan. ii. 44. f ^^^' v". 22. J Rev. xi. 17, IS; xx. 6. 
 
 I Pan. vii. 27. H Chap. ii. iii. (fee. 
 
284 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE pakt n. 
 
 farther as to make up a continued thread of history, of the 
 length of between three and four thousand years. It contains 
 an account of God's making a covenant with a particular nation, 
 that they should be his people, and he would be their God, in a 
 peculiar sense ; of his often interposing miraculously in their 
 affairs ; giving them the promise, and long after, the possession, 
 of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest national 
 prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the 
 idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his com- 
 mands ; and threatening them with unexampled punishments if 
 they disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry : insomuch 
 that this one nation should continue to be the observation and 
 the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, that God 
 would scatter them among all jyeo^le, from one end of the eai^th 
 unto the other ^ but that when they shoidd return unto the Lord 
 their God, he would have com2Dassion upon them, and gather 
 them from all the nations, whither he had scattered them: that 
 Israel should he saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation ; 
 and not he ashamed or confounded toorld without end* And as 
 some of these promises are conditional, others are as absolute as 
 any thing can be expressed : that the time should come, when 
 the people shoidd he all righteous, and inherit the land forever : 
 that though God would make a full end of all nations whither 
 he had scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of 
 them, : that he would hring again the captivity of his people 
 Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they should he no 
 moi^e pulled up out of their land : that the seed of Israel shoidd 
 not cease from heing a nation forever.^ It foretells, that God 
 would raise them up a particular person, in whom all his promises 
 should finally be fulfilled; the Messiah, who should be, in a high 
 and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and Savior. This was 
 foretold in such a manner, as raised a general expectation of such 
 9, person in the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and 
 is an acknowledged fact ; an expectation of his coming at such a 
 particular time, before any one appeared claiming to be that per- 
 son, and when there was no ground for such an expectation, but 
 from the prophecies : which expectation, therefore, must \\i all 
 
 * Deut. xxviii. 64; xxx. 2, 3 : Isa. xlv. 17. 
 
 t Isa, Ix. 21 : Jer. xxx. 11 ; xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14, 15 : Jer. xxxi. 3(^ 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 285 
 
 reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if 
 there were any doubt about their meaning. It seems moreovei 
 to foretell, that this person should be rejected by the nation to 
 whom he had been so long promised, though he was so much 
 desired by them.* And it expressly foretells, that he should be 
 the Savior of the Gentiles; and that the completion of the 
 scheme contained in this book, and then begun, and in its pro- 
 gress, should be something so great, that in comparison with it, 
 the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. 
 It is a light thing that thou shoiddest he my servant to raise up 
 the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel : I will 
 also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou may est be for 
 salvation unto the end of the earth. And, In the last days, the 
 mountain of the Loj-d's house shall he established in the top of 
 the mountains, and shall he exalted above the hills ; and all na- 
 tions shall flow into it — for out of Zion shall go forth the laio, 
 and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge 
 among the nations — and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that 
 day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish.f 
 
 The Scripture further contains an account, that at the time 
 the Messiah was expected, a person rose up in this nation, claim- 
 ing to be that Messiah, to be the person to whom all the pro- 
 phecies referred, and in whom they should center : that he spent 
 some years in a continued course of miraculous works ; and 
 endued his immediate disciples and followers with a power of 
 doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that religion, which 
 he commissioned them to publish : that invested with this au- 
 thority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest 
 countries, and settled and established his religion in the world j 
 to the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic 
 account of the state of this religion among mankind.' 
 
 Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have 
 
 » Isa. viii. 14, 15 ; xlix. 5; chap. liii. : Mai. i. 10, 11, and chap. iii. 
 
 f Isa. xlix. 6, chap, ii., chap, xi., chap. Ivi. 7: Mai, i. 11. To -n-hich must 
 be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament, 
 and very many in the Oldj which describe what shall be the completion of the 
 revealed plan of Providence. 
 
 * [See Davidson's Disc, on PropL. : Bi,aney on Daniel's LXX. Weeks : 
 Hurd's In^rod. to the Study of Proph. : Jortin's Ser. at Boyle Lect. : Ful- 
 ler's Go.<p its own Witness, part ii. : WAroH's Diss. : Apthorpe's Discoursee.l 
 
286 THE PARTIC^'LAR EVIDENCE part n. 
 
 all tliis related to him out of the Scripture. Or suppose such 
 an one, hiiving the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these 
 things in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil his- 
 tory, as well as the other parts of it, might be, from beginning 
 to end, an entire invention; and to ask. What truth was in it, 
 and whether the revelation here related was real, or a fiction ? 
 Aod, instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once, to be 
 told the following confessed facts; and then to unite them into 
 one view. 
 
 Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and 
 establishmenc of natural religion, the belief that there is one 
 God to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind 
 shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and dis- 
 obey it here ; in how very great a degree, I say, the profession 
 and establishment of this moral system in the world is owing to 
 the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in this book : 
 the establishment of this moral system, even in those countries 
 which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the Scripture.* 
 Let him be told also, what number of nations do acknowledge its 
 proper authority. Let him then take in the consideration, of 
 what importance religion is to mankind. And upon these things 
 he might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed revelation's 
 obtaining and being received in the world, with all the circum- 
 stances and efiects of it, considered together as one event, is the 
 most conspicuous and important event in the history of mankind: 
 that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended 
 to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to 
 have its claims most seriously examined ; and that, before such 
 examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is 
 an offence against natural piety. It is to be remembered, that 
 how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the 
 world is owing to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy 
 the proof of religion from reason, any more than the proof of 
 Euclid's Elements is destroyed, by a man's knowing or thinking, 
 that he shouM never have seen the truth of the several proposi- 
 tions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into hi* 
 thoughts, but for that mathematician. 
 
 Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next pliice, 
 * P. 250. 
 
CHAP. yii. FOE CHRISTIANITY. 287 
 
 informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this 
 book; and that its chronology, its account of the time when the 
 earth, and the several parts of it, were first peopled with human 
 creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the 
 natural and civil history of the world, collected from common 
 historians, from the state of the earth, and from the late inven- 
 tion of arts and sciences. 
 
 And as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common 
 and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for between 
 three and four thousand years ; let the person we are speaking 
 of be told, in the next place, that this general history, as it is 
 not contradicted, but confirmed by profane history" as much as 
 there would be reason to expect, upon supposition of its truth ; so 
 there is nothing in the whole history itself, to give any reasonable 
 ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a faithful 
 and literally true genealogy of men, and series of things. I 
 speak here only of the common Scripture history, or of the 
 course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished from 
 miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all the Scripture 
 narrations of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing 
 ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing related as 
 done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that age : 
 nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would 
 say could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of 
 things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters, 
 which would raise a thought of their being feigned ; but all the 
 internal marks imaginable of their being real. It is to be added 
 also, that mere genealogies, bare narratives of the number of 
 
 ^ [Hundreds of instances might be adduced, in which profane historians 
 corroborate the statements of the Scriptures. The following are merely speci- 
 mens : DiODORtJS SicuLus, Strabo, Tacitus, Pliny, and Solinus, speak of 
 the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The lives of David and Solomon are 
 given in the remains of the Ph(enician Annals, in Damascenus, and Ei:po- 
 LEMus. Menander describes the carrying away of the Ten Tribes by Sal 
 manasor. Suetonius, Tacitus, Pliny the younger, and Numenius, speak of 
 Jesus Christ. His miracles are owned by Celsus, Porphyry, Julian, and 
 Jewish writers opposed to Christianity. Suetonius, Tacitus, Pliny, Julian, 
 and ol-hers describe his being put to death ; and Tacitus says that many were 
 put to death for adhering to his religion. Phlegon mentions the miracles of 
 Peter; and Paul is enumerated among eminent authors, in a fragment of 
 LonGtnus.] 
 
288 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part n. 
 
 years, whicli persons called by sucli and sucli names lived, do not 
 carry the face of fiction; perhaps do carry*some presumption of 
 veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to 
 surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presump- 
 tion too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly 
 credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken 
 alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange; espe- 
 cially to persons of other manners, temper, education : but there 
 are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or most persons' 
 lives, which, in the same circumstances, would appear to the full 
 as strange.^ There may be mistakes of transcribers, th^re may 
 be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly ac- 
 counted for : but there are certainly no more things of this kind 
 in the Scripture, than what were to have been expected in books 
 of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to dis- 
 credit the general narrative. 
 
 Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, 
 and extending in one continued series, through so great a length 
 of time, and variety of events, should have such appearances of 
 reality and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remark- 
 able circumstance in its favor. And as all this is applicable to 
 the common history of the New Testament, so there is a further 
 credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane authors: 
 many of these writing of the same times, and confirming the truth 
 of customs and events, which are incidentally as well as more 
 purposely mentioned in it. And this credibility of the common 
 Scripture-history, gives some credibility to its miraculous history : 
 
 1 [This thought is elaborated with skill by Whately in his " Historic Doubts.'* 
 He takes up all the popular infidel objections as to the life of Christ, and applies 
 them with undiminished or even increased force against the evidences that such 
 a man as Buonaparte ever existed. 
 
 Johnson in a lively sally once said — " It is easy to be on the negative side. 
 I deny that Canada is taken. The French are a much more numerous people 
 than we; and it is not likely they would allow us to take it.' * But the Govern- 
 ment have announced the fact.' 'Very true. But the ministry have put us to 
 an enormous expense by the war in America, and it is their interest to persuade 
 us that we have got something for our money.' '* But the fact is confirmed by 
 thousands who were at the taking of it.' * Aye, but these men have an interest 
 in deceiving us : they don't want you should think the French have beat them. 
 Now suppose you go over and find it so, that would only satisfy yourself; for 
 when you come back we will not believe you. ^V^e will say you have beeu 
 bribed.' '' — Boswell.] 
 
CHAP. vir. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 289 
 
 especially as this is interwoven with the common, so as that they 
 imply each other, and both together make up one relation. 
 
 Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that 
 it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in 
 the foregoing observation, that there was such a nation as the 
 Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose government and general 
 polity was founded on the law, here related to be given them by 
 Moses as from heaven : that natural religion, with rites additional 
 yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion, which 
 cannot be said of the Gentile world : and that their very being 
 as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment of one Grod, 
 the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in 
 Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, 
 there would have remained p^ bond of union, to keep them a 
 distinct people. And while they were under their own kings, in 
 their own country, a total apostasy from God would have been 
 the dissolution of their whole government. They in such a sense 
 nationally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven 
 and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as 
 rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. This re- 
 markable establishment and preservation of natural religion 
 among them, seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical 
 evidence for the miracles of Moses and the prophets. Because 
 these miracles are a full satisfactory account of this event, which 
 plainly needs to be accounted for, and cannot be otherwise. 
 
 Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be ac- 
 quainted further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish 
 extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from the pro- 
 phecies above mentioned, expected the Messiah: that he was 
 rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he should, by the 
 body of the people, under the direction of their rulers : that in 
 the course of a very few years, he was believed on and acknow- 
 ledged as the promised Messiah, by great numbers among the 
 Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon 
 the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,* of which miracles we 
 have also strong historical evidence; (by which I mean here no 
 more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious 
 frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they 
 
 * P. 26r, 4c. 
 T 26 
 
290 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part ,i. 
 
 destroy our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity :)* 
 that this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and 
 carrying its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of 
 its system, and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of 
 it which require to be believed upon the mere authority of its 
 Author; that this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported 
 itself for some hundred years, not only without any assistance 
 from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and 
 often the bitterest persecutions from it; and then became the 
 religion of the world : that in the mean time the Jewish nation 
 and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner, 
 and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the 
 most distant countries; in which state of dispersion they have 
 remained fifteen hundred years : and that they remain a numerous 
 people, united among themselves, and distinguished from the rest 
 of the world, as they were in the days of Moses, by the profession 
 of his law; and everywhere looked upon in a manner, which 
 one scarce knows how distinctly to express, but in the words 
 of the prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it 
 came to pass: Tliou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, 
 and a byioord, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead 
 thee.'\ 
 
 The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining 
 a distinct people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which 
 this event appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be 
 thought to be answered, by their religion's forbidding them inter- 
 marriages with those of other nations, and prescribing them many 
 peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred from in- 
 corporating with the people in whose countries they live. This 
 is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which it pretends to 
 account for. But what does it pretend to account for? The 
 correspondence between this event and the prophecies; or the 
 coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence, of a 
 peculiar nature, towards that people ? No. It is only the event 
 itself, which is offered to be thus accounted for: which single 
 event, taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and 
 coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous: but 
 that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the event 
 * P. 270, &c. t Deut. xxviii. 37 
 
CHAP. vir. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 291 
 
 itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's 
 being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy 
 and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous; the series of 
 prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event, being admitted : 
 though the event itself appears to have been brought about in a 
 natural way; of which, however, no one can be certain. 
 
 As several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to 
 have verified the prophetic history already, so likewise they may 
 be considered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the 
 full completion of it; as affording some presumption that the 
 whole of it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the 
 Jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide 
 dispersion; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophe- 
 cies, but is now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat 
 yet to come : that natural religion came forth from Judea, and 
 spread, in the degree it has done over the world, before lost in 
 idolatry; which, together with some other things, have distin- 
 guished that very place, in like manner as the people of it are 
 distinguished : that this great change of religion over the earth 
 was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment, 
 that Jesus was the promised Messiah : things of this kind natu- 
 rally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion 
 of the prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that 
 people; concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom 
 amoug them, the kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state 
 of the world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances 
 and events, compared with these prophecies, though no comple- 
 tions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in 
 the argument, by a person upon his first being informed of them. 
 They fall in with the prophetic history of things still future, give 
 it some additional credibility, and have the appearance of being 
 somewhat in order to the full completion of it. 
 
 Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great 
 calmness and consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of 
 the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part of the 
 prophetic history which relates to the situation of the kingdoms 
 of the world, and to the state of the church, from the establish- 
 ment of Christianity to the present time. But it appears from a 
 general view of it, to be very material. And those persons who 
 
292 THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE part ii. 
 
 have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of the 
 coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations 
 of prejudice, insist upon it as detenu inately conclusive. 
 
 [Conclusion.] Suppose now a person quite ignorant of his- 
 tory, first to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scrip- 
 ture, without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then 
 to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to 
 unite them all into one view : that the profession and establish- 
 ment of natural religion in the world is greatly owing, in differ- 
 ent ways, to this book, and the supposed revelation which it 
 contains; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; 
 that its chronology and common history are entirely credible ; 
 that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, 
 appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a distin- 
 guished sense ; that, as there was a national expectation among 
 them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such 
 a time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; 
 that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, 
 not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles ; that the 
 religion he taught supported itself under the greatest difiiculties, 
 gained ground, and at length became the religion of the world ; 
 that in the mean time the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, 
 and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that not- 
 withstanding this, they have remained a distinct numerous people 
 for so many centuries, even to this day; which not only appears 
 to be the express completion of several prophecies concerning 
 them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy 
 possibility that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet 
 be fulfilled. 
 
 To these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been 
 supposing add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow 
 it or no, the obvious appearances which there are, of the state 
 of the world, in other respects besides what relates to the Jews, 
 and of the Christian church, having so long answered, and still 
 answering to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts 
 set over against the things before mentioned out of the Scrip- 
 ture, and seriously compared with them ; the joint view of both 
 together must, I think, appear of very great weight to a con 
 Biderate reasonable person : of much greater indeed, upon having 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 293 
 
 them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so familiar- 
 ized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention for 
 that purpose. 
 
 All these things, and the several particulars contained under 
 them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined 
 into ; that the weight of each may be judged of, upon such exa- 
 mination, and such conclusion drawn, as results from their united 
 force. But this has not been attempted here. I have gone no 
 further than to show, that the general imperfect view of them 
 now given, the confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the 
 many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together with 
 the collateral things* here mentioned, and there are several 
 others of the like sort ; that all this together, which, being fact, 
 must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of 
 somewhat more than human in this matter : evidence much more 
 important, than careless men, who have been accustomed only to 
 transient and partial views of it, can imagine ; and indeed abun- 
 dantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, 
 must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may 
 say, that the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attesta- 
 tion of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them, that such 
 miracles were really wrought : they cannot deny, that there is 
 such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that 
 there is. They may say, the conformity between the prophecies 
 and events is by accident : but there are many instances in which 
 such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with 
 regard to such kind of collateral things as those above mentioned, 
 that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a 
 meaning found in them by fanciful people : and that such as are 
 fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coinci- 
 dences, which seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, 
 may talk thus : but no one who is serious, can possibly think 
 these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of 
 collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the evi- 
 dence of probability, as distinguished in nature, from the evidence 
 of demonstration. In many cases indeed it seems to require the 
 truest judgment, to determine with exactness the weight of cir- 
 
 * All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the 
 tead of "certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. See p. 263. 
 
 26* 
 
294 THE PARTICITLAR EVIDENCE part ii. 
 
 cuinstantial evidence : but it is very often altogether as convincing, 
 as that wUch is the most express and direct. 
 
 This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered 
 as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious 
 persons, to set down every thing which they think may be of 
 any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many 
 seeming completions of prophecy: and they will find, that, 
 judging by the natural rules, by which we judge of probable 
 evidence in common matters, they amount to a much higher 
 degree of proof, upon such a joiiit revieio, than could be sup- 
 posed upon considering them separately, at different times; how 
 strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such 
 separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not 
 only increase the evidence, but multiply it.°* Nor should I dis- 
 suade any one from setting down, what he thought made for the 
 contrary side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to 
 influence his judgment, but his practice, that" a mistake on one 
 side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous, than a 
 mistake on the other. And what course is most safe, and what 
 most dangerous, will be thought a very material consideration, 
 when we deliberate, not concerning events, but concerning con- 
 duct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by this considera- 
 tion in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed 
 as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other pre- 
 judices, it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are 
 
 ^ [Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity, and its 
 force is not seen without reflection. " If contrivance or accident could have 
 given to Christianity any of its apparent testimonies, its miracles, its prophe- 
 cies, its morals, its propagation, or [the character of] its founder, there could 
 be no room to believe, or even imagine, that cr^^ these appearances of great 
 credibility, could be tinited together, by any such means. If successful craft 
 could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, it requires 
 another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it 
 required not only a different, but a totally opposite art to conceive and pro- 
 mulgate its admirable morals. Again, its propagation, in defiance of the 
 powers and terrors of the world, implied still other qualities of action. Lastly, 
 the model of the life of its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom, 
 as could be the ofif?i3ring only of consummate poweis "^f invention, or rather 
 never could have been devised, but must have come from real li^e. The hypo- 
 thesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these supposirions of coitrivauce, 
 being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an extra. fagaace."— 
 Davjson, on Prophecy.] 
 
CHAP. VII. FOR CHRISTIANITY. 295 
 
 iuclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. 
 And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men's passions 
 in order to jrain their assent. But in deliberations concerning: 
 conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken 
 into the account, than the importance of it. For, suppose it 
 doubtful, what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in 
 the contrary manner : still, that taking one side could be attended 
 with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be 
 attended with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced reason, 
 of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act. 
 The truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is 
 to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. And unless 
 the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argu- 
 ment, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be sup- 
 posed to have been by accident (for here the stress of the 
 argument for Christianity lies) ; then is the truth of it proved : 
 in like manner, as if in any common case, numerous events 
 acknowledged, were to be alleged in proof of any other event 
 disputed ; the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not 
 only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly 
 imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if the whole 
 of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason 
 be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were 
 true. 
 
 It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence 
 gives to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in con- 
 versation. For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, 
 that such and such things are liable to objection, that this and 
 another thing is of little weight in itself; but impossible to 
 show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument 
 in one view. 
 
 Lastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presump- 
 tion against a revelation as miraculous ; that the general scheme 
 of Christianity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to 
 the experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly 
 credible : so the account now given of the positive evidence for 
 it, shows, that this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, ' 
 cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened. 
 
CHAPTEH VIII. 
 
 OBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OP 
 NATURE, TO RELIGION. 
 
 If every one would consider, with such attention as they are 
 bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge 
 and give characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in 
 some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to 
 be expected; for some we find do not concern themselves to 
 understand even what they write against : since this treatise, in 
 common with most others, lies open to objections, which may 
 appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight ; and, be- 
 sides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can 
 judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without 
 judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these 
 objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. 
 Th(-y are such as these : 
 
 *<-That it is a poor thing to solve difiiciilties in revelation, by 
 sayidg, that there are the same in natural religion ; when what 
 is w&nting is to clear both of them of these their common, as 
 well as other their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange 
 way Indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to 
 show them, that they have as little reason for their worldly pur- 
 suits : and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness 
 of the Author of nature, and of removing the objections against 
 both, to which the sj^stem of religion lies open, to show, that the 
 like objections lie against natural providence; a way of answering 
 objections against religion, without so much as pretending to 
 make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it 
 objected against, are reasonable — especially, perhaps some may 
 be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when 
 it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections : that 
 when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can 
 be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very uq- 
 satistied state ; and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of 
 mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their 
 296 • 
 
CHAP. Till. OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY. 291 
 
 present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon 
 doubtful evidence.'^ 
 
 Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that ap- 
 pearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views, 
 which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and 
 to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often 
 deceived by others, and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even 
 those, who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily dis- 
 entangle, and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in 
 which subjects themselves are involved; and which are height- 
 ened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter 
 sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection 
 severally, may be of some assistance ; as it may also tend a little 
 to stop and silence others. 
 
 First, The thing wanted, i.e. what men require, is to have all 
 difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we 
 know to the contrary, it may be, the same as requiriog to com- 
 prehend the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence 
 from everlasting to everlasting ! But it hath always been allowed 
 to argue from what is acknowledged, to what is disputed. And 
 it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from natural reli- 
 gion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to 
 argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction and infer- 
 ence, in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to 
 the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be applied, 
 I fear as properly, to great part or the whole of human life, as it 
 is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor 
 thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of 
 diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act 'upon con- 
 jecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned ? Un- 
 doubtedly it is : but not in comparison of having no skill at all 
 in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark. 
 
 Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge 
 objections against revelation, which are of equal weight aj^ainst 
 natural religion; and those who do this, if they are not confused 
 themselves, deal unfiiirly with others, in making it seem that 
 they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines 
 of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence ; 
 :t is a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are as 
 
298 OBJECTIONS AGAINST part ii. 
 
 mucli lavel'ed against natural religion, as against revealed. Ob- 
 jections, which are equally applicable to both, are properly speaking 
 answered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the 
 former be admitted to be true. And without taking in the con- 
 sideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very mate- 
 rial to observe, that as the things objected against in natural 
 religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of expe- 
 rience in the course of providence, and in the information which 
 God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his govern- 
 ment; so the objections against the system of Christianity, and 
 the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which 
 are made against the system and evidence of natural religion. 
 However, the reader upon review may see, that most of the 
 analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do 
 not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in 
 the former; [viz.] that there is an Author of nature, or natural 
 Governor of the world: and Christianity is vindicated, not from 
 its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the 
 experienced constitution of nature. 
 
 Secondly/, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a 
 determinate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is 
 commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, 
 be our happiness under his government. If men can be con- 
 vinced, that they have the like reason to believe this, as to be- 
 lieve that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their 
 advantage; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them 
 for the practice of religion. And if there be really any reason 
 for believing one of these, and endeavoring to preserve life, and 
 secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it; then 
 there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavoring to 
 secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the interest, which 
 religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater than our whole tem- 
 poral interest; then there must be proportionably greater reason 
 for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by the sup- 
 position, the probability of our securing one is equal to the proba- 
 bility of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable; 
 and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what 
 our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally 
 appointed to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the termd 
 
CHAP. viir. THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. 299 
 
 upon whicli we live, and attend to and follow that practical in- 
 struction, whatever it be, which is afforded us. 
 
 But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in 
 the objection, lies in another place. The proof of religion, it is 
 said, is involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it 
 doubtful ; and that it cannot be supposed that if it wero true, it 
 would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and 
 above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these 
 difficulties and objections taken together are turned into a posi- 
 tive argument against the truth of religion; which argument 
 would stand thus. If religion were true, it would not be left 
 doubtful, and open tq objections to the degree in which it is: 
 therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it 
 weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of such 
 objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general presump- 
 tion of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural 
 constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal con- 
 cerns, almost continually, and even in matters of great conse- 
 quence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence 
 of religion, is an answer to this argument. Because it shows, 
 that it is according to the conduct and character of the Author 
 of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that, 
 which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint 
 we should act upon : it is an instance, a general one, made up of 
 numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, 
 similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this 
 answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the 
 evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer 
 is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, 
 by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evi- 
 dence of the latter to be lower. 
 
 Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the 
 character of God, but to show the obligations of men : it is not to 
 justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. 
 These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though 
 they may at length run up into each other, yet observations may 
 immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by 
 any immediate connection, to the purpose of the former; which 
 is less our concern, than many seem to think. For, first, 
 
300 OBJECTIONS AGAINST part ii. 
 
 It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Provi- 
 dence against objections^ any farther than to show, that the things 
 objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with jus- 
 tice and goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the 
 system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which 
 taken alone would be unjust : yet it has been shown unanswer- 
 ably, that if we could take in the reference, which these things 
 may have to other things, present past and to come; to the 
 whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of; 
 these very things might, for aught we know, be found to be, not 
 only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has 
 been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that 
 this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objec- 
 tions, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is 
 vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary. 
 
 Hence it appears. Secondly, that objections against the Divine 
 justice and goodness are not endeavored to be removed, by show- 
 ing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie 
 against natural providence: but those objections being supposed 
 and shown not to be conclusive, the things objected against, con- 
 sidered as matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, from 
 their conformity to the constitution of nature; for instance, that 
 God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from 
 the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their 
 actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight. 
 
 Thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections 
 were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above 
 set down; and religion implying several facts; for instance again, 
 the fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for 
 their actions hereafter; the observation, that his present method 
 of government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future 
 fact not to be incredible: whatever objections men may think 
 they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their 
 notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief 
 of necessity. I say, as im]?rol>ahlc : for it is evident no objec- 
 tion against it, as unjust, can be urged from necessity; since this 
 notion as much destroys injustice, as it does justice. 
 
 Fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the 
 system of religion cannot indeed be answered without entering 
 
CHAP. Yiii. THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. 301 
 
 into consideration of its reasonableness; yet objections against 
 the credibility or truth of it may. Because the system of it is 
 reducible into what is properly matter of fact: and the truth, the 
 probable truth of facts, may be shown without consideration of 
 their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though, in some cases 
 and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not neces- 
 sary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept en- 
 joined us, and of every particular dispensation of Providence, 
 which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the more 
 thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the 
 perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he 
 will advjince towards that perfection of religion, which John* 
 speaks of.^ But the general obligations of religion are fully 
 made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. 
 And that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shown, 
 though no more could- be proved, than that the sj^stem of it mai/ 
 be so, for aught we know to the contrary: and even without 
 entering into the distinct consideration of this. 
 
 Fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is 
 not an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the 
 justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet 
 it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is 
 really intended by such objections; which is, to show that the 
 things objected against are incredible. 
 
 FourthJi/, It is most readily acknowledged, that- the foregoing 
 treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but 
 so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a 
 system, together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the 
 case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures 
 overbalance our pains: and whether it be, or be not, eligible to 
 live in this world.'' And were all such controversies settled, 
 which perhaps, in speculation, would be found involved in great 
 
 * 1 John iv, 18. — [''There is no fear in love," &o.] 
 
 * [Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive, precludes ad- 
 vance toward perfection; for "He that feareth is not made perfect in love." 
 But obedience from a discernment of the reasonableness and beneiicence of 
 religion, and of the perfections of its Author, increases love till it " casteth out 
 fear."] 
 
 b [See a discussion of this subject, in Bayle's Historical and Biographical 
 Dicti'^nary: art. Xexophanes : notes D, E, F, G.] 
 
 26 
 
302 OBJECTIONS AGAINST part ii. 
 
 difficulties ; anJ were it determined upon the evidence of reason, 
 as nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be pre- 
 served : still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us, 
 for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the 
 rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering it when 
 lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being 
 exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future contingen- 
 cies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is the 
 best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success 
 of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word suc- 
 cess, is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them 
 in the proper sense of the word; i.e. what happiness or enjoy- 
 ment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher 
 degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with 
 which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is 
 scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or dis- 
 regard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. 
 The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those who 
 object against it, as not satisfactory, i.e. as not being what they 
 wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being : for 
 satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature 
 as man. 
 
 And, what is more material, they forget also the very nature 
 of religion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will 
 embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it 
 was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exercise in 
 such as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion presup- 
 poses this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking to a man 
 presupposes he understands the language in which you speak ; or 
 as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he hath such 
 a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it. There^ 
 fore the question is not at all. Whether the evidence of religion 
 be satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove 
 and discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evi- 
 dence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes oi probation ; 
 how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of 
 curiosity, or any other : and indeed it answers the purposes of 
 the former in several respects, which it would not do, if it were 
 as overpowering as is required. Besides, whether tl»e motives or 
 
CHAP. viir. THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. 303 
 
 the evidence for any course of action be satisfactory, meaning 
 here, by that word, what satisfies a man that such a course of 
 action will in event be for his good; this need never be, and I 
 think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical question in com- 
 mon matters. The practical question in all cases is. Whether 
 the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all cir- 
 cumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and 
 judge of conduct,* determine that course of action to be pru- 
 dent. Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or 
 happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent : but 
 evidence almost infinitely lower than this, determines actions to 
 be so too ; even in the conduct of every day. 
 
 Fifthli/, As to the objection concerning the influence which 
 this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to 
 have upon men ; I observe, as above, that religion being intended 
 for a trial" and exercise of the morality of every person's cha- 
 racter, who is a subject of it; and there being, as I have shown, 
 such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men 
 to embrace it : to object, that it is not to be imagined mankind 
 will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of 
 the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire, 
 what sort of creatures mankind are ; but what the light and 
 knowledge, which is afi"orded them, requires they should be : to 
 show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, in fact, 
 they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their 
 own concern ; the personal concern of each man in particular. 
 How little regard the generality have to it, experience indeed 
 does too fully show. But religion, considered as a probation, 
 has had its end upon all persons, to whom it has been proposed 
 with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice : for 
 by this means they have been put into a state of probation ; let 
 
 * See Dissertation IL 
 
 o [It is remarked by Dean Fitzgerald, that "It is not inconceivable that 
 the Almighty should apply such a test of men's candor and fidelity, as should 
 require them first to act upon a thins; as true, before they were so fully satis- 
 fied of its truth as to leave no doubt remaining. Such a course of action 
 might be the appointed, and for all we know, the only possible way of over- 
 coming habits of thought and feeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so 
 that a fixed religious faith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course 
 of pradent behavior. "j 
 
304 OBJECTIONS AGAINST part ii. 
 
 them behave as they will in it. Thus, not only revelation, but 
 reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion being 
 laid before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not 
 only with regard to those who will be influenced by it, but like- 
 wise with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the objection here 
 referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this treatise to be 
 of some weight ; and if so, it may be hoped it will have some 
 influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at 
 all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay 
 it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a greater 
 influence. 
 
 Further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the 
 whole of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have 
 argued upon the principles of others,* not my own : and have 
 omitted what I think true, and of the utmost importance, because 
 by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have arscued 
 upon the principles of the fatalists, which I do not believe : and 
 have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which I do be- 
 lieve, — [viz.] the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior 
 to all will whatever; which as certainly determine the divine 
 conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine 
 the divine judgment. Indeed the principle of liberty, and that 
 of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that moral- 
 ists, ancient as well as modern, have formed their language upon 
 it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endea- 
 vored to avoid it ] and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been 
 obliged to express myself in a manner, which will appear strange 
 to such as do not observe the reason for it. But the general 
 argument here pursued, does not at air suppose, or proceed upon 
 these principles. 
 
 Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness 
 being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than 
 merely as a question of fact : and in this view it is here con- 
 sidered. It is obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, 
 are both historical. Even natural religion is, properly, a matter 
 
 * By nrgtiing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is meant, 
 not proviug any thing from those principles, but notioithstanding them. Thug 
 religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity j which is absurd: out, 
 notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true. 
 
CHAP. Ym. THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. 805 
 
 of fact. For, tliat there is a righteous Governor of the world, ia 
 so : and this proposition contains the 4!;eneral system of natural 
 religion. But then, several abstract truths, and in particular 
 those two principles, are usually taken into consideration in the 
 proof of it : whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of 
 fact. To explain this ; That the three angles of a triangle are 
 equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth ', but that they ap- 
 pear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must 
 have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, 
 who woTild not admit the former : but pretended to doubt, 
 whether there were any such thing as truth, or whether we 
 could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for 
 the knowledge of it in any case. 
 
 The assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original 
 standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all 
 will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exer- 
 cise that moral government over the world, which religion teaches, 
 (i.e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men re- 
 spectively as they act right or wrong;) contains an abstract truth, 
 as well as matter of fact. But suppose that in the present state, 
 every man without exception, was rewarded and punished, in 
 exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of 
 right and wrong, which God has implanted in his nature : this 
 would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. 
 And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, yet the 
 same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the ab- 
 stract questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should 
 have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that the govern- 
 ment of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the con- 
 sideration of those questions : and this proof would remain, in 
 what way soever they were determined. 
 
 Thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object 
 of which is actions, and which naturally approves some actions 
 as right, and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and 
 of ill desert; that he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the 
 former and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract 
 truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present 
 would be. This future fact I have not, indeed, proved with the 
 foi-ce with which it might be proved, from the principles of liberty 
 U 26* 
 
30(5 " CONCLUSION. PART II. 
 
 and moral fitness; but witlioiit tliem have given a really conclu- 
 sive practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the 
 general analogy of nature ; a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown 
 not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as such;) but im- 
 possible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the obliga- 
 tions of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions con- 
 cerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed 
 with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may. 
 
 Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force 
 of this treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion 
 upon the proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles, 
 an additional proof and confirmation of it: to such as do not 
 admit those principles, an original proof of it,* and a confirma- 
 tion of that proof. Those who believe, will here find the scheme 
 of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a 
 peculiar manner strengthened. Those who do not believe will at 
 least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity 
 false, the plain undoubted credibility of it; and, I hope, a good 
 deal more. 
 
 Thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, 
 as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, un- 
 answerable ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from 
 it in a disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but 
 that it is a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, 
 implying in it numerous facts; analogy, being a confirmation of 
 all facts to which it can be applied, and the oidi/ 'proof of most, 
 cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and 
 truly of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed. 
 And it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to 
 follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Whatever account may be given of the strange inattention 
 
 and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter of such 
 
 importance as religion; it would, before experience, be incredible, 
 
 that there should be the like disregard in those, who have ha»I 
 
 «- P. 141, <fec. 
 
PART II. CONCLUSION. SOT 
 
 the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Chris- 
 tianity, and often inculcated upon them: because this moral 
 system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon 
 its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no need of 
 abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced 
 understanding, that there is a God who made and governs the 
 world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be 
 necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are 
 raised : when the very meaning of those words, which express 
 most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to 
 be uncertain; and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured 
 by the intricacies of speculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten 
 thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a de- 
 signer. And it is intuitively manifest, that creatures ought to 
 live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and 
 charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social, 
 and placed in society. 
 
 The truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not in- 
 deed self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its 
 being received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, 
 will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of 
 mind, as inattention to natural religion : because, when both are 
 laid before us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of 
 liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both 
 upon supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. 
 Eevelation claims to be the voice of God : and our obligation to 
 attend to his voice is surely moral, in all cases. And as it is in- 
 sisted, that its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough considera« 
 tion of it; so it offers itself with obvious appearances of having 
 something more than human in it, and therefore in all reason 
 requires to have its claims most seriously examined into. 
 
 It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what 
 manner soever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous 
 revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of 
 our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence 
 and awe. And this is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what 
 claims to be so, with such appearances of truth. It is therefure 
 most certain, that our obligations to inquire seriously into the 
 evidence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to 
 
308 CONCLUSION. PART iw 
 
 embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest 
 and most proper sense. Let us then suppose, that the evidence 
 of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously in- 
 quired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many 
 professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infi- 
 delity. All of them do not content themselves with a bare neg- 
 lect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its 
 restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God's 
 moral government over the world. They renounce his protection, 
 and defy his justice. They ridicule and vilify Christianity, and 
 blaspheme the author of it; and take all occasions to manifest 
 scorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active 
 setting themselves against religion; to what may be considered 
 as a positive principle of irreligion, which they cultivate within 
 themselves; and, whether they intend this efi"ect or not, render 
 habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. Others, 
 who are not chargeable with all-this profligateness, yet are in 
 avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless. 
 
 Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that 
 these persons act upon what they think principles of reason, (and 
 otherwise they are not to be argued with,) it is really inconceiv- 
 able, that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence 
 of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all : nor do they pre- 
 tend this. They are far indeed from having a just notion of its 
 evidence : but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if 
 they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were 
 credible, like other matters of science or history. Their manner 
 of treating it must proceed, either from such kind of objections 
 aoainst all religion, as have been answered or obviated in the 
 former part of this treatise; or else from objections, and diffi- 
 culties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they 
 entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and 
 miraculous interpositions. They find thiogs in Scripture, whether 
 in incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which 
 appear to them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if 
 Christianity were true, the light of it must have been more 
 general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather over- 
 powering : that it must and would have been, in some way, other- 
 wise put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagining thej 
 
PART 11. CONCLUSION. 309 
 
 see the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable; but ^^uite 
 another thing. It is being fortified against the evidence, in 
 some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of 
 Christianity, or something which appears to them necessarily con- 
 nected with it, to be incredible or false; fortified against that 
 evidence, which might otherwise make great impression upon 
 them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in 
 doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems 
 owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, 
 that such doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being 
 certain against it. 
 
 To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning reli- 
 gion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the general 
 objections against the moral system of nature having been ob- 
 viated, it is shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at 
 all against Christianity, considered either as not discoverable by 
 reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth 
 mentioning, against it as miraculous, if any at all; none, cer- 
 tainly, which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown, 
 that, upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy of 
 nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think probable, 
 that many things in it must appear liable to great objections; 
 and that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. 
 This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very 
 utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope it will be under- 
 stood, with great caution not to vilify the faculty of reason, 
 which is the candle of the Lord icithin us;^ though it can afi"ord 
 no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where it has no 
 principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being 
 first answered in the view of objections against Christianity as a 
 matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more 
 immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the 
 Christian dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they 
 admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the 
 like objections against the constitution of nature admit of: that, 
 as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, 
 upon further consideration and knowledge of their relations to 
 other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly credible, 
 * Prov. XX. 27. 
 
810 CONCLUSION. PART m 
 
 that tlie tliino's objected against the wisdom and goodness of the 
 Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom 
 and goodness, by their reference to other things beyond our 
 view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much above our 
 comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme in 
 which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, 
 as is most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And 
 it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken 
 merely or chiefly from our ignorance : but from something posi- 
 tive, which our observation shows us. For, to like objections, 
 the like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless parallel 
 cases. 
 
 The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the 
 method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in 
 general, and together; the chief of them are considered dis- 
 tinctly, and the particular things objected to are shown credible, 
 by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. 
 Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be re- 
 stored, and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing 
 our recovery: it were to have been expected, it is said, that this 
 should have been effected at once; and not by such a long series 
 of means, and such a various economy of persons and things; 
 one dispensation preparatory to another, this to a further one, 
 and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the end 
 of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a 
 scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty 
 power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing 
 in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on, shows 
 such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unreason- 
 able; and is a satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objec- 
 tions against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence 
 in the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be 
 accomplished in this manner. 
 
 As to the particular method of our redemption, the appoint- 
 ment of a Mediator between God and man : this has been shown 
 to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature, 
 i.e. the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instru- 
 ments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course of Pro- 
 vidence. The condition of this world, which the doctrine of ou? 
 
PART II. CONCLUSION. 311 
 
 redemption by Clirlst presupposes, so much falls in witt nntural 
 appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appear- 
 ances : inferred that human nature was fallen from its original 
 rectitude, and in consequence of this^ degraded from its primi- 
 tive happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these 
 appearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. 
 And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that 
 repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufiicient 
 to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties an- 
 nexed to it; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead 
 to any such conclusion ; so every day's experience shows us, that 
 reformation is not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present dis- 
 advantages and miseries, which, in the natural course of things, 
 God has annexed to folly and extravagance. 
 
 Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, 
 which, by the general laws of divine government, are annexed 
 to vice, may be prevented : that provision may have been, even 
 originally, made, that they should be prevented by some means 
 or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we 
 have daily instances of such mercy, in the general conduct of 
 nature : compassion provided for misery,* medicines for diseases, 
 friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original 
 constitution of the world, that much of the natural bad conse- 
 quences of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot 
 prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance 
 which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to afford. 
 By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay 
 in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, God so loved the ivorld, 
 that he gave his onJi/ -begotten Son to save it : and he being made 
 'perfect by suffering, became the author of eternal scdvation to all 
 them that obey liivi.-\ Indeed neither reason nor analogy would 
 lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, ia 
 the manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy 
 for recovery of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was. 
 But neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other 
 particular means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows 
 they are, in numberless instances. Therefore, as the case before 
 us does not admit of experience; so, that neither reason nor 
 
 * Serin, at the Rolh, p. 106. f John iii. 16 : Heb. v. 9. 
 
^12 CONCLUSION. PARTir. 
 
 analogy can show how, or in what particular way, the interposi- 
 tion of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy, which 
 it is there represented to be ; this is no kind nor degree of pre- 
 sumption against its being really of that efficacy. 
 
 Further: the objections against Christianity, from the light of 
 it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possi- 
 bly be given, have been answered by the general analogy of 
 nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed 
 an answer to the former : but that he dispenses his gifts in such 
 variety, both of degrees and kinds, among creatures of the same 
 species, and even to the same individuals at different times ; is a 
 more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from being 
 the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such over- 
 bearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity; that 
 on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally ap- 
 pointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part 
 of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, 
 that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of 
 religion ; the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties 
 and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not im- 
 possible,* surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's 
 own fault; it deserves their most serious consideration, whether 
 it be not so. However, it is certain, that doubting implies a 
 degree of evidence for that of which we doubt : and that this 
 degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations as demon- 
 strative evidence. 
 
 The whole of religion then is throughout credible : nor is 
 there, I think, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation 
 of things, more different from the experienced constitution and 
 course of nature, than some parts of the constitution of nature, 
 are from other parts of it. If so, the only question which re- 
 mains is, What positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of 
 Christianity? This too in general has been considered, and the 
 objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to 
 be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight 
 which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what 
 the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them : and 
 then consider, what are the practical consequences from all this 
 * P. 258, «fcc. 
 
PART II. CONCLUSION. 813 
 
 upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am 
 writing to persons wlio entertain these principles) : and upon 
 such consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as little 
 excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons 
 who have been made acquainted with Chriatianity, whether they 
 believe it or not : because the moral system of nature, or natural 
 religion, which Christianity Inys before us, approves itself, almost 
 intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. 
 
 In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be ob- 
 served that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the 
 truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state 
 of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension, 
 that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it is so. And this, 
 upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far towards 
 speculative infidelity, as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go, 
 who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidences of it, 
 laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them. 
 For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever 
 heard of it; because it seems evident, that in many countries 
 called Christian, neither Chiristianity nor its evidence, is fairly 
 laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear 
 to be some who have very little attended to either, and who reject 
 Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention^ and 
 yet ai'fe by no means without understanding in other matters. 
 Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Chris- 
 tianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations 
 of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life ; a 
 regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same 
 with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under. 
 
 Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with 
 regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is 
 no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; 
 and these, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are 
 no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a 
 just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or dis- 
 regard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a 
 demonstration of its falsehood, there is no reason to think they 
 would alter their behavior to any purpose, though there were a 
 demonstration of its truth. 
 
 27 
 
DISSEETATIONS. 
 
 OF PERSOI^AL IDEl^TITY. 
 OF THE E"ATUEE OF VIRTUE. 
 
^Hn'tistmtnt. 
 
 In the first copy of tnese papers, I had inserted the 
 two following dissertations into the chapters, on a Future 
 Life, and on the 3Ioral Cfovernmcnt of Crod; with *^hich 
 they are closely connected. But as these do not directly 
 fall under the title of the foregoing treatise, and would 
 have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems 
 more proper to place them by themselves. 
 
 316 
 
DISSERTATION I. 
 
 Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most 
 important question wliich can possibly be asked, so it is the most 
 intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange 
 perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity 
 or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our 
 living now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. 
 And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the 
 difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained 
 so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no 
 consequence at all to us the persons who are making it. And 
 though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be 
 proper to consider them a little. 
 
 When it is asked luherein personal identity consists, the answer 
 should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists simili- 
 tude, or equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex 
 it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For 
 as, upon two triangles being compared or -viewed together, there 
 arises to the mind the idea of similitude ; or upon twice two and 
 four, the idea of equality: so likewise, upon comparing the 
 consciousness of one's self, or one's own existence, in any two 
 moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of 
 personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only 
 give us the ideas of similitude and equality; but also show us 
 that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal : so 
 the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal 
 identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two 
 moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or 
 the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In 
 
 27* 317 
 
318 PEKSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and 
 that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not 
 two, but one and the same self. 
 
 But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain 
 our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it makes per- 
 sonal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to 
 say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one 
 action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he 
 reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that 
 consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore 
 cannot constitute, personal identity; anymore than knowledge, 
 in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. 
 
 This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; 
 that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea 
 of a person, or intelligent being. For, this might be expressed 
 inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and 
 from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity 
 But though present consciousness of what we at present do and 
 feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet pre- 
 sent consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to 
 our being the same persons who performed those actions, or once 
 had those feelings. 
 
 The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common 
 acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to 
 this of personal identity : because, the word same, when applied 
 to them and to a person, is not only applied to different subjects, 
 but it is also used in different senses. For when a man swears 
 to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he 
 means only the same as to all the purposes of property, and uses 
 of common life; and not that the tree has been all that time the 
 same, in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does 
 not know, whether any one particle of the present tree be the 
 same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same 
 place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle 
 of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic 
 sense of the word same: it being evidently a contradiction in 
 terms, to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no 
 one of their properties is the same : no part of their substance, 
 by the supposition; no one of their properties, be^.ause it is 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY. 319 
 
 allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from ono 
 substance to another. Therefore when we say the identity of 
 sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, 
 communicated under the same organization, to a number of par- 
 ticles of matter, whether the same or not ; the word same, when 
 applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood 
 to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to 
 matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organ- 
 ization and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwith- 
 standing the perpetual change of the parts. But in strict and 
 philosophical language^ no man, no being, no mode of being, no 
 any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed 
 nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, 
 when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, can^ 
 not subsist with diversity of substance. 
 
 The thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively 
 determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, Whether 
 it, i.e. the same self or person, he the same identical substance? 
 And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the ques- 
 tion, than that which he gives it in form. For he defines person, 
 a thinking inteliigent being, &c., and personal identity, the same- 
 ness of a rational being.^ The question then is, whether the 
 same rational being is the same substance : which needs no an- 
 swer, because being and substance, in this place, stand for the 
 same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person 
 be the same substance, is said to be this; that the consciousness 
 of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two 
 joint successive moments, is not the same individual action,^ 
 i.e. not the same consciousness, but difi'erent successive conscious- 
 nesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned such 
 perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may 
 have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same 
 now, which it was when he contemplated it formerly : yet in this 
 case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the 
 same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and 
 the same perception. And thus, though the successive conscious- 
 nesses, which we have of our own existence, are not the same, 
 yet are they consciousnesses o^ one and the same thing or object; 
 * Locke's Works, voL i. p. 146. f Locke, pp. 146, 147. 
 
S20 PERSOXAL IDENTITY. 
 
 of the same person, self, or living agent. The person, of whose 
 existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a 
 year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the 
 same person; and therefore is one and the same. 
 
 Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear hasty: and 
 he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which 
 he has made relating to it.* But some of those hasty observa- 
 tions have been carried to a strange length by others; whose 
 notion, when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I 
 think, to this :")" " That personality is not a permanent, but a tran- 
 sient thing: that it lives and dies, begins and ends continually: 
 that no one can any more remain one and the same person two 
 moments together, than two successive moments can be one and 
 the same moment: that our substance is indeed continually 
 changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to 
 the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, 
 which constitutes personality : which consciousness, being succes- 
 sive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently 
 the personality constituted by it." Hence it must follow, that it 
 is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any 
 thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any 
 thing which befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be 
 interested in what will befall us to-morrow: since our present 
 self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but 
 another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for 
 it; to which another self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, 
 must follow. For if the self or person of to-day, and that of to- 
 morrow, are not the same, but only like persons; the person of 
 to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person 
 of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other person. 
 
 It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representa- 
 tion of the opinion we are speaking of: because those who main- 
 tain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his remem- 
 brance reaches. Indeed they use the words, identity, and same 
 person. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside; 
 since if they were, there must be I know not what ridiculous 
 
 * Locke, p. 152. 
 
 ■j- See an answer to Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodweli, 
 2d edit. p. 44, 56, Ac. 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITt. 321 
 
 periphrasis substituted in the room of them. But they cannot, 
 consistently loith themselves, mean, that the person is really the 
 same. For it is self-evident, that the personality cannot be really 
 the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is 
 not the same. And as, consistently with themselves, they can- 
 not, so, I think it appears, they do not tnean, that the person is 
 really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense : in 
 such a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert, that any 
 number of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare 
 unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems 
 the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to 
 be put upon it, I add the following things. 
 
 First, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain 
 conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, 
 when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon 
 what is past, and look forward upon what is to come. All imagi- 
 nation of a daily change of that living agent which each man 
 calls himself, for another, or of any such change throughout our 
 whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense 
 of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his 
 conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, 
 that, though he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, 
 be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be reasonable to act, 
 with respect to a future life, upon the notion that personality is 
 transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the pre- 
 sent. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to 
 temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible 
 absurdity of it in the latter case ; therefore, if any can take up 
 with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the 
 thing, but must be owing to inward unfairness, and secret cor- 
 ruption of heart. 
 
 Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but 
 a heing only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and 
 misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during 
 the whole time of their existence. Consider then a living being 
 now existing, and which has existed for any time alive. This 
 living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it 
 has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I 
 Bay, and not another) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys, 
 V 
 
S22 PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these suc- 
 cessive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoy- 
 ments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are 
 so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting : 
 since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the 
 truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued 
 with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no 
 more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing 
 itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, 
 of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoyments, 
 and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or remember 
 or forget any thing else. 
 
 Thirdly^ Every person is conscious, that he is now the same 
 person or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches : 
 since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he 
 is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely, 
 himself who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the 
 action was done at all. Nay, very often a person's assurance 
 of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured, 
 arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it. 
 This he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the 
 property of some substance. If he, a person, be a substance; 
 then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness 
 that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the 
 property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the same 
 property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the 
 same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would 
 be ; since the same property cannot be transferred from one 
 substance to another. 
 
 But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, 
 living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as 
 our remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not 
 possibly be deceived in it ? And this question may be asked at 
 the end of any demonstration whatever : because it is a question 
 concerning the truth of perception by memory. He who can 
 doubt, whether perception by memory can in this case be de- 
 pended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by deduction 
 and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed whether 
 intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. Fo/" 
 
PERSONAL IDENTITY. 323 
 
 it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, 
 whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions 
 of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the 
 same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our 
 faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or 
 means of those very suspected faculties themselves.* 
 
 * ["One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of what is 
 called The common-sense echool of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor can there be 
 any doubt that Reid, in particular, was largely indebted to Butler, of whose 
 writings he was a diligent student, for forming that sober and manly character 
 of understanding which is, I think, his great merit." — Fitzgerald.] 
 
DISSERTATION II. 
 
 f fee iatott jof f irtae. 
 
 That whicli renders beings capable of moral government, is 
 their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception 
 and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by 
 various instincts and propensions : so also are we. But addi- 
 tional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and 
 characters, and making them an object to our thought : and on 
 doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, 
 under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good 
 desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. That 
 we have this moral approving and disapproving"^ faculty, is cer- 
 tain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in 
 each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the 
 approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from 
 the words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, 
 with many others of like signification in all languages applied to 
 actions and characters : from the many written systems of morals 
 which suppose it, since it cannot be imagined, that all these 
 authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no mean- 
 ing at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical : from 
 
 * This way of speaking is taken from Epietetus,f and is made use of as 
 seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be 
 understood to have these two epithets, doKiixaarlKii and aTtoioKijimTLKn [applauding 
 and condemning] upon a double account ; because, upon a survey of actions, 
 whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; 
 and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in 
 contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in 
 ihe very same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of 
 speculative truth and falsehood: and at the same time is attended with a con- 
 sciousness upon reflection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it. 
 
 f Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. L 
 324 
 
NATURE OF VIRTUE. 325 
 
 our natural sense of gratitude, wMcli implies a distinction be- 
 tween merely being the instrument of good, and intending it : 
 from tlie distinction every one makes between injury and mere 
 harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind ; and between 
 injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior 
 to the consideration of human laws. 
 
 It is manifest that great part of common language, and of 
 common behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of 
 such a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, 
 moral sense, or divine reason ; whether considered as a sentiment 
 of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart; or, which 
 seems the truth, as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in 
 the general, what course of action this faculty, or practical dis- 
 cerning power within us, approves and what it disapproves. For, 
 as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or what- 
 ever ground for doubt there ma}^ be about particulars ; yet, in 
 general, there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard 
 of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made 
 profession of in public : it is that, which every man you meet 
 ]mts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and funda- 
 mental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth 
 make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of 
 upon mankind : namely, j ustice , v eracity , and r egard to common 
 good^ It being manifest then, in general, that we have such a 
 faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some 
 things more distinctly concerning it. 
 
 Firsty It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty 
 is actions,* comprehending under that name active or practical 
 principles : those principles from which men would act, if occa- 
 sions and circumstances gave them power; and which, when 
 fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character. It does 
 not appear, that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as 
 distinguished from events : or that will and design, which con- 
 stitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all an object to 
 their perception. But to ours they are: and they are the object, 
 and the only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty. 
 
 * Owi !] lipe-rj Kal kokio — ev netaei, dWa kvzfiyda, [Virtue and vice are not in feel- 
 ing, but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione con- 
 %istjc. "The whole praise of virtue, depends on action.] Cie. Off. lib. i. cap. 6. 
 
 28 
 
326 NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 Acting, noncluct, behavior, abstracted from all regard to wbat is 
 in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself the natural ob- 
 ject of the moral discernment; as speculative truth and false- 
 hood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such 
 consequences, is indeed, always included; for it is part of the 
 action itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences 
 do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action, as 
 if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of characters, 
 abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil, which 
 persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do. 
 We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves 
 or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for haviog im- 
 pressions made upon us, which we consider as altogether out of 
 our power : but only for what we do or would have done, had it 
 been in our power ; or for what we leave undone, which We might 
 have done, or would have left undone, though we could have 
 done. 
 
 Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good 
 or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good 
 or ill desert. It may be difficult to explain this percep- 
 tion, so as to answer all the questions which may be asked con- 
 cerning it : but every one speaks of such and such actions as 
 deserving punishment; and it is not, I suppose, pretended, that 
 they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now 
 the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of 
 society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer. 
 For if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who by some 
 innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left to 
 perish, lest, by other people's coming near him, the infection 
 should spread ; no one would say he deserved this treatment. 
 Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always 
 supposes guilt : and if one be no part of the other, yet they are 
 evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a 
 man in misery raises our compassion towards him ; and if this 
 misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against 
 the author of it. But when we are informed, that the sufferer 
 is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty; 
 our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in many instances our 
 indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect is 
 
NATURE OF VIRTUE. 327 
 
 ilie conception of that in tlie sufferer, whicli we call ill desert 
 Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of vice 
 and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And 
 thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, 
 natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this 
 association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing : 
 but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to 
 attend to it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away. 
 
 It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good 
 and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to 
 common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that 
 it does not appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue 
 proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle 
 is prevalent : since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient 
 to make men act well in many common instances. On the other 
 hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in 
 proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to 
 such vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in 
 the absence or want of the virtuous principle; though a man be 
 overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence appear to 
 what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that ap- 
 pears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over 
 the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would 
 have rendered him proof against common temptations. 
 
 Thirdltj, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and 
 is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capa- 
 cities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we 
 ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined by all men to 
 be in the highest degree vicious. This determination must arise 
 from such comparison, and be the result of it; because such 
 neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and 
 capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with respect to positive 
 vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought not. For 
 every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, mad- 
 man, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding.: 
 though the action of both, including the intention, which is pan 
 of the action, be the same : as it may be, since idiots and mad- 
 men, as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief 
 but also of inteudino- it. Now this difference must arise from 
 
328 NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 BomewLat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, whicK 
 renders the action vicious; and the want of which, in the other, 
 renders the same action innocent or less vicious: and this plainly 
 supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between 
 the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining 
 an action to be vicious. Hence arises a proper application of the 
 epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to ac- 
 tions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. 
 
 Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more 
 at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable with- 
 out reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to 
 neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser 
 gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom 
 nature has committed to their care. It would seem, that a due 
 concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable 
 endeavor to secure and promote it, (which is, I think, very much 
 the meaning of the word prudence, in our language;) it would 
 seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty and 
 blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of 
 the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and 
 others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether 
 difi"erent from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and 
 from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion of this 
 last kind of perception is satisftiction or uneasiness: whereas the 
 object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our 
 thoughts fix upon is our condition : in the other, our conduct. 
 
 It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a 
 disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in ourselves or 
 others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty : I suppose, because 
 that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which 
 we always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapproba- 
 tion less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently 
 neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, 
 than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others, 
 to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard : 
 and also because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its 
 own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious 
 behavior, it less needs the additional punishment, which would 
 be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible iudigua- 
 
NATURE OF VIRTUE. 329 
 
 tion against it^ as ajxainst injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Be^ 
 sides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion^ 
 the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it 
 be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course 
 lessens our displeasure against them. Still it is matter of expe- 
 rience, that we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the 
 greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both 
 in ourselves and others. In instances of this kind, men often 
 say of themselves with remorse, and of others with some indigna- 
 tion, that they deserved to suffer such calamities, because they 
 brought them upon themselves, and would not take warning. 
 Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by a long 
 course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though 
 without falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such 
 people as alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought 
 into the same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these 
 things it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly 
 of vice : meaning by folly ^ something quite different from mere 
 incapacity; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to 
 our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And this the 
 word properly includes; and, as it seems, in its usual accepta- 
 tion : for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures. 
 
 However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I 
 shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as 
 not applicable to prudence and folly : but must insist, that the 
 faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of pru- 
 dent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones : I say prudent and 
 imprudent actions as such, and considered distinctly from the 
 happiness or misery which they occasion. And by the way, this 
 observation may help to determine what justness there is in the 
 objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested and 
 selfish. 
 
 Fifthly, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue 
 is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it 
 may be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, 
 singly considered, are in no sort the ichole of virtue and vice. 
 For if this were the case, in the review of one's own character, or 
 that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would 
 be indifferent to every thing, but the degrees in which benevo- 
 
 28* 
 
850 NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 lence prevailed, and the degrees in wliich it was wanting. That 
 is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons 
 rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon 
 any other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness 
 was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by 
 the second. On the contrary, suppose two men competitors for 
 any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage to each 
 of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent, 
 than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred 
 to the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a 
 friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant 
 consequences: as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation 
 of friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, 
 suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another 
 the fruit of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who he 
 thought would have as much pleasure from it as would balance 
 the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the 
 enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that 
 no bad consequences would follow : yet such an action would 
 surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, violence, and 
 injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce 
 an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a man 
 could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, 
 as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon 
 others by it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would 
 not be faulty or vicious at all : because it would be no more than, 
 in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to 
 another's, in equal degrees. 
 
 The fact, then, appears to be, that we are constituted so as to 
 condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to ap- 
 prove of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted 
 from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an 
 overbalance of happiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author 
 of nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the pro- 
 duction of happiness, were his moral character merely that of 
 benevolence ; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition indeed, 
 the only reason of his giving us the above mentioned approbation 
 of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disappro- 
 bation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must h'i, 
 
NATURE OF VIRTUE. 331 
 
 tliat he foresaw tins constitution of our nature would produce 
 more happiness, than forming us with a temper of mere general 
 benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, 
 violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to some, 
 preferably to others, virtue ; abstracted from all consideration ot 
 the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to 
 produce. 
 
 Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature 
 as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural 
 object of which is actions : moral government must consist in 
 rendering them happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing 
 them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of 
 action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by 
 this moral faculty;* in rewarding and punishing them upon ac- 
 count of their so doing. 
 
 I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contra- 
 dicted what any author designed to assert. But some of great 
 and distinguished merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in 
 a manner, which may occasion some danger, to careless readers, 
 of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, ac- 
 cording to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness 
 of mankind in the present state; and the whole of vice, in doing 
 what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an over- 
 balance of unhappiness in it : than which mistakes, none can be 
 conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that some of the most 
 shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and 
 even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the 
 appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery 
 in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary 
 appearance. 
 
 This reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The 
 happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and 
 the proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when 
 we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but 
 those which he has directed; that is indeed in all ways not con- 
 trary to veracity and justice. I speak thus upon supposition of 
 persons really endeavoring, in some sort, to do good without 
 regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed 
 
 -> P. 145. 
 
332 NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 endeavors proceed, almost always, from ambition, tlie spirit of 
 party, or some indirect principle, concealed perhaps in great 
 measure from persons themselves. And though it is our business 
 and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and 
 justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerful- 
 ness and diversion of our fellow-creatures : yet, from' our short 
 views, it is greatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in par- 
 ticular instances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the 
 whole; since so many and distant things must come into the ac- 
 count. And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some 
 appearance that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to 
 balance this, on the contrary side; and also, that such benevolent 
 endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous 
 principles, the active principle of benevolence. 
 
 However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule 
 of life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the 
 way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, 
 generally understood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that 
 there can be no designed falsehood, without designing to deceive. 
 It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases, a man 
 may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will 
 deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible not to 
 foresee, that the words and actions of men, in different ranks and 
 employments, and of different educations, will perpetually be 
 mistaken by each other. And it cannot but be so, while they 
 will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what 
 they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges 
 of, even though they considered it with great attention. 
 
INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR'S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Abstract reasonings may mislead. 1C2 
 
 fitness of things note 1S6 
 
 Actions 
 
 distinguished from their quali- 
 ties Ill 
 
 manifest character 156 
 
 rewarded and punished £8 
 
 this world a theater of. 156 
 
 what sort exercise virtue 152 
 
 Active and passive impressions. . 140 
 
 Advantages of virtue 113 
 
 may never recur 101 
 
 Affections, excited by objects. . . . 145 
 
 need control 1C6 
 
 part of our constitution 147 
 
 Affliction, a discipline 150 
 
 chiefly of our own making. . . . 10-0 
 
 Agent, the living, not compounded 81 
 
 Alienation of parts of our body. . Si 
 
 All things made double IS'' 
 
 Allurements, use of. 151 
 
 Analogy 
 
 answers objections as to a pre- 
 sent state of trial 135 
 
 as to modes of existence 78 
 
 carrying the force of positive 
 
 argument [105 
 
 deals only with facts 171 
 
 indicates future punishment. . 101 
 
 may amount to proof. 168 
 
 objections which it cannot an- 
 swer 171 
 
 the only proof of some things. 79 
 
 Antiquity of religion 167 
 
 PAQS 
 
 Atheists not argued with, in this 
 
 treatise. 181 
 
 Beginnings of a righteous govern- 
 ment seen on earth 107 
 
 Bible, teaches the existence of 
 
 general laws [99 
 
 Bodies 
 
 not necessary to us 82 
 
 not ourselves. ." 83 
 
 only instruments 85, 86 
 
 their solid elements 88 
 
 Bodily and mental habits 134 
 
 Brain, does not think [89 
 
 Brahminical notion of death .92 
 
 Brutes, 
 
 are they immortal ? [88 
 
 may have greater strength than 
 
 man 119 
 
 under man's control 119 
 
 Capacities, 
 
 state of in infancy 88 
 
 not destroyed by death 89 
 
 not dependent on the body. . . 79 
 
 Causes and ends incomprehensible 172 
 
 Changes compatible with iden- 
 tity 78, 83 
 
 Character 
 
 manifested by probation 156 
 
 not given but acquired 155 
 
 what it means note 163 
 
 Conscience, 
 
 how it acts 164^ 
 
 333 
 
334 
 
 INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Conscience 
 
 implies government 115 
 
 a rule 164 
 
 authority 164 
 
 future retribution. ... 165 
 
 may be impaired 168 
 
 perverted 168 
 
 Conscionisness an indiscerptible 
 
 entity 82 
 
 presupposes identity [77 
 
 Consequences 
 
 may sometimes be avoided. . . 102 
 
 may be foreseen 98 
 
 show a moral government. ... 98 
 
 Course of nature constant 97 
 
 Cpeatures finitely perfect 147 
 
 may fall 148 
 
 have each a way of life 137 
 
 Panger of wrong doing, how in- 
 creased 132 
 
 Death 
 
 and birth similar 91 
 
 enlar^^es our sphere 92 
 
 has no power over matter. . . . [91 
 is not a suspension of our 
 
 powers 91 
 
 is not our destruction 80 
 
 what it is 80 
 
 Decay c^ vegetables, inference 
 
 from 92 
 
 Definitions of identity 77 
 
 Delivering up of the Lord Jesus 
 
 Christ [Ill 
 
 Destruction of seeds 153 
 
 Different states of human existence. 89 
 Difficulties belong to all subjects. [96 
 exercise the virtuous principle. 152 
 Disadvantages of virtue tempo- 
 rary 126 
 
 Discipline, its true nature and 
 
 use [148 
 
 Disease not destructive to the soul. 90 
 
 sometimes remedial 177 
 
 Disorder produced by sin 148 
 
 Distress excites passive pity and 
 
 active relief. , . . 140 
 
 Distributive justice a natural rule. 110 
 Divine government a scheme, chap.vii. 
 
 Domestic goverament 114 
 
 Dreams, what they prove 86 
 
 Earthly satisfactions attainable. . 183 
 Effects of actions on the actor. . . [143 
 Ends often produced by unlikely 
 
 means 180 
 
 Enjoyments in our own power to 
 
 a great degree 95 
 
 Error, how spread [96 
 
 Evidence of natural religion 166 
 
 Evil, may possibly be useful. . . . 177 
 
 its possible origin 147 
 
 not a necessary part of proba- 
 tion [128 
 
 Exceptions to the happiness of 
 
 virtue 108 
 
 Experience indispensable 141 
 
 Faculties, human, not perfect at 
 
 first 141 
 
 Fall of man 133, [148 
 
 Fallacy in fatalism 169 
 
 Fallen creatures require discipline. 150 
 
 Fatalism, — see Necessity. 
 
 Fear a proper motive to obe- 
 dience 154 
 
 Folly, destructive, as weU as 
 
 crime 132 
 
 Formal notion of government. ... 99 
 
 Foundation of moral improve- 
 ment [108 
 
 Future advantages, how propor- 
 tioned 93 
 
 Future existence probable. . . chap. i. 
 of brutes [79 
 
 Future interest dependent on con- 
 duct 95 
 
 Future life, 
 
 a solemn subject 95 
 
 not an inactive condition. . . . 144 
 reconcilable with atheism. ... 94 
 this life preparatory to it. chap. Y. 
 
 Future punishment credible 103 
 
 Future retribution, how proved. . i2d 
 
INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 335 
 
 Future state 
 
 different from the present. ... 78 
 brings us into new scenes. ... 93 
 
 may have temptations [146 
 
 social 14.4 
 
 will not require such virtues 
 
 as does the present life. . 154 
 
 General laws 
 
 govern the world 177, [99 
 
 produce punishment 103 
 
 wisdom of them 178 
 
 General method of God's govern- 
 ment 97 
 
 General system of r^igion 124 
 
 Gradual improvement, a wise 
 
 arrangement. » . . . . 141, 142 
 
 GOD 
 
 an intelligent governor 106 
 
 determined by what is fit, . . . [166 
 governs by human instruments. Ill 
 
 governs justly [108 
 
 has a will and a character. . . . 163 
 his aims incomprehensible. . . 97 
 his attributes inferred from our 
 
 own [115 
 
 his general government 97 
 
 his government just and good. 176 
 
 his indirect commands 165 
 
 moral government of. . . chap. iii. 
 
 natural " " ii. 
 
 necessarily existent 159 
 
 not indifferent to human ac- 
 tions 125 
 
 not simply benevolent 106 
 
 rewards and punishes 169 
 
 the only necessary being 159 
 
 Good actions, how punished Ill 
 
 Good habits necessary even to the 
 
 virtuous 149 
 
 Good men befriended as such. . . 112 
 cannot now all unite 121 
 
 Good not forced upon us [134 
 
 Government, 
 
 civil, an ordinance of God. . . Ill 
 considered as a scheme, chap. vii. 
 of God CHAP. n. 
 
 Government, 
 
 not perfected in this world. . . 107 
 
 the formal notion of it 98 
 
 the perfection of. 106 
 
 Habits, 
 
 how formed, &c 139 
 
 necessary to us hereafter. . . . [145 
 
 of resignation 155 
 
 often ruinous 101 
 
 of virtue an improvement in 
 
 virtue. 147 
 
 passive 138 
 
 shape the character 141 
 
 Happiness 
 
 not always the immediate re- 
 ward of virtue 108 
 
 not given promiscuously 138 
 
 requisites for 137 
 
 the result of virtue 118 
 
 Helplessness of man [138 
 
 Higher degrees of retribution pro- 
 bable 127 
 
 Hinderances to virtue 121 
 
 History of religion 169 
 
 Honest men befriend the honest. . 112 
 Hope and fear appeal to self- 
 love 153 
 
 are just principles of action. . 154 
 
 Human life preparatory 144 
 
 Hume's wonderful discovery. , . . [162 
 Human powers may be overtasked. 152 
 
 Identity 
 
 does not depend on the same- 
 ness of the body 83 
 
 of living agents 77, 78 
 
 not explicable [77 
 
 Ignorance 
 
 acknowledged on all subjects 
 
 but religion 174 
 
 answers objections 175 
 
 the argument from 180 
 
 total, destroys proof. 178 
 
 Illustration of the modification of 
 an action by its inten- 
 tion [Ill 
 
INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Imagination a source of discontent. 154 
 
 produces much error 81 
 
 Immortality of brutes 88 
 
 Improvement 
 
 by discipline 144 
 
 by habit. 147 
 
 of our faculties gradual 141 
 
 wisdom of this 142 
 
 Incomprehensibilityof God's plans 97 
 Inconsiderateness destructive. . . 102 
 
 Inferiority of brute force 119 
 
 Infidelity unjustifiable 105 
 
 Insignificance of our knowledge. . [174 
 Interest coincident with virtue. . . 154 
 not a sufficient restraint. . note 146 
 Interpositions to prevent irregu- 
 larities 177 
 
 would produce evil 178 
 
 Intentional good rewarded 114 
 
 Irregularities perhaps unavoid- 
 able 177 
 
 seeming may not be such. . . . 176 
 Inward peace attends virtue. . . . 112 
 
 Kingdom, idea of a perfect 123 
 
 Knowledge of man insignificant. [174 
 
 Liberty does not account for the 
 
 f\ill 147 
 
 implied in ourpresent condition 162 
 Life a probation 128 
 
 one part of it preparatory to 
 
 another [142 
 
 what is it intended for 137 
 
 Living agent not subject to death. 79 
 
 Living powers see Death. 
 
 Locke on human identity [77 
 
 Maimonides, his similitude [173 
 
 Man 
 
 an inferior part of creation. . . 133 
 
 a system of parts [98 
 
 by nature social [93 
 
 capable of improvement 145 
 
 connected with present, past, 
 
 and future 181 
 
 dealt with as if free 102 
 
 PAOl 
 
 Man 
 
 has a moral nature 115 
 
 his fall not accounted for by 
 
 his free agency 147 
 
 his helplessness [138 
 
 knows nothing fully 173 
 
 may become qualified for new 
 
 states 137 
 
 not a competent judge of God's 
 
 schemes 174 
 
 requires moral culture 145 
 
 Mania often produced by moral 
 
 causes [85 
 
 Materialism, its philosophical ab- 
 surdity. ' [81 
 
 Matter and mind not the same. . . [83 
 
 affect each other 85 
 
 Means 
 
 learned by experience 176 
 
 man not a competent judge of 
 
 the fitness of them 178 
 
 not always agreeable 176 
 
 Men often miss possible temporal 
 
 good 129 
 
 Men's temporal interests greatly 
 
 depend on themselves. . 131 
 
 Might of unarmed virtue [121 
 
 Mind 
 
 influenced by the passions. . . 131 
 
 is the man [87 
 
 its effects on the body [85 
 
 may survive the body [89 
 
 the only real percipient 85 
 
 uses the body as an instru- 
 ment [87 
 
 Miracles, properly speaking, not 
 
 unnatural 94 
 
 Miseries as contingent as conduct. 135 
 
 generally are avoidable 100 
 
 IMixture of suffering and enjoy- 
 ment in this world. . . . [128 
 Moral and natural government of 
 God similar to each 
 
 other 184 
 
 Moral attributes of God may be 
 
 inferred from our own. . [115 
 Moral discipline. . . chap. y. 
 
INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 837 
 
 Moral government of God. . chap. hi. 
 Moral improvement, basis of. . . . [108 
 Moral world, its apparent irregu- 
 larities 176 
 
 Mystery of God, finished. . . . note 102 
 
 Natural, the true meaning of the 
 
 word 94 
 
 Natural government of God. chap. ii. 
 Natural religion, 
 
 its evidences not affected by the 
 
 doctrine of necessity. . . 166 
 
 proof of. 166 
 
 teaches the doctrine of punish- 
 ment 102 
 
 Necessary agents may be punished 169 
 Necessary bulk of one's self. .... 84 
 
 Necessary existence of God 159 
 
 Necessary tendencies of virtue. . . 118 
 Negligence and folly disastrous. . 132 
 Necessity 
 
 consigns us to a fallacy 169 
 
 contradicts the constitution of 
 
 nature 170 
 
 destroys no proof of religion. . 170 
 
 different kinds of. [157 
 
 does not exclude design 160 
 
 doctrine of. chap, vi., 
 
 not an agent 159 
 
 not applicable to practice. ... 163 
 not in conflict with religion. . . 160 
 our condition indicates freedom 162 
 reconcilable with religion. . . . 168 
 
 the doctrine absurd 157 
 
 what it means 158 
 
 writers for and against [170 
 
 New scenes in the next world. . . 93 
 
 Obedience, reluctant, useful [152 
 
 Objections 
 
 against a proof and against a 
 
 thing to be proved 179 
 
 against the scheme of Provi- 
 dence 174 
 
 analogy of plants 92 
 
 Christianity not universal, . . . 169 
 
 course of nature 97 
 
 W 
 
 Objections, 
 
 destruction of seeds 153 
 
 difference between temporal 
 
 and eternal things [135 
 
 discipline might have been 
 
 avoided 156 
 
 God simply benevolent 106 
 
 good and evil may be mixed in 
 
 the next world 124 
 
 gratification of appetites natu- 
 ral and proper 98 
 
 ignorance, the argument from 
 invalidates the proof of 
 
 religion 178 
 
 immortality of brutes 87 
 
 incredible that necessary agents 
 
 should be punished. . . . 169 
 irregularities of the moral world 176 
 necessity destroys the proof of 
 
 religion 165 
 
 our powers may be overtasked 152 
 probabilities may be over- 
 balanced by probabili- 
 ties 169 
 
 punishments are only natural 
 
 events 99 
 
 rectitude arising from hope and 
 
 fear, sordid 153 
 
 rewards and punishments. ... 95 
 sin need not have entered the 
 
 world 177 
 
 society punishes good actions. Ill 
 special interpositions might 
 
 prevent evil 177, 178 
 
 to the doctrine of neces- 
 sity CHAP. VI. 
 
 to the doctrine of future punish- 
 ments 100-103 
 
 virtue sometimes punished. . . Ill 
 virtues of the present life not 
 
 wanted hereafter 154 
 
 world disciplines some to vice. 153 
 Obligation certain, when proofs 
 
 are not 179 
 
 Occasional disadvantages of virtue 117 
 Occasional indulgences in wrong- 
 doing awfully dangerous [143 
 
838 
 
 INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 One period of life preparatory to 
 
 anothe'r [142 
 
 Opportunities once lost irrecover- 
 able 143 
 
 Organs of sense mere instruments 89 
 
 Our moral nature proves a moral 
 
 government 115 
 
 Pain, no contrivance for it in man. [110 
 Partial ignorance does not destroy 
 
 proof. 178 
 
 Passions 
 
 carry away the judgment. . . . 131 
 make our condition one of 
 
 trial 130 
 
 may account for the fall of man 147 
 may be excited where gratifi- 
 cation is impossible or 
 
 unlawful 146 
 
 may remain in a future state. . 147 
 should be subject to the moral 
 
 principle 145 
 
 the bare excitement of, not 
 
 criminal 145 
 
 but dangerous 146 
 
 Passive habits 138 
 
 Passive impressions weakened by 
 
 repetition 139 
 
 Passive submission essential. . . . 155 
 
 Peace of the virtuous 112 
 
 Perception, instruments of. 85 
 
 possible without instruments. . 86 
 Perfection of moral government 106,107 
 
 of an earthly kingdom 123 
 
 Persecution unnatural Ill 
 
 Philosophy never arrogan-t [174 
 
 what it cannot teach [87 
 
 Pleasure 
 
 not a sufficient reason for action 98 
 and pain mostly depend on 
 
 ourselves 95 
 
 the distribution indicates moral 
 
 government , 105 
 
 Powers 
 
 may be improved by exercise. . 138 
 
 may be overtasked 152 
 
 may exist and not be exercised. 80 
 
 Powers 
 
 no reason for supposing that 
 
 death will destroy them. 81 
 
 Practical proof, what 168 
 
 Present existence unaccounted for 
 
 by atheism 94 
 
 Presumptions that death will de- 
 stroy us 81 
 
 that it will suspend our exist- 
 ence 91 
 
 Presumptuousness unjustifiable. . 105 
 Private vices not public benefits. [Ill 
 Probabilities in favor of religion 
 may be overbalanced by 
 probabilities against it. . 169 
 
 Probation chap. it. 
 
 applies to the present life as 
 
 well as the future 130 
 
 does not necessarily imply 
 
 suffering [128 
 
 implies allurements 129 
 
 is more than moral govern- 
 ment 128 
 
 requires severe discipline. ... 150 
 
 Proofs of natural religion 166 
 
 of religion not affected by the 
 
 doctrine of necessity. . . . 160 
 Propensions necessarily create 
 
 temptations 146 
 
 are excited by their appropriate 
 
 objects 147 
 
 Proper gratification of the appe- 
 tites 98 
 
 Prosperity of a virtuous commu- 
 nity 123 
 
 may beget discontent 154 
 
 Providence, objections to God's 140, 174 
 Public spirit a fruit of virtue. . . . 120 
 Punishment 
 
 an alarming subject 105 
 
 especially considered 100 
 
 greater hereafter than now. . . 127 
 in a future state credible. 103, 125 
 is God's voice of instruction. . [108 
 
 is sometimes capital 102 
 
 not unjust 163 
 
 often long delayed - 101 
 
INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 839 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Punishment 
 
 often overtakes suaaeniy. ... 101 
 
 of virtuous actions Ill 
 
 religious and natural similar. . 100 
 results from folly as well as 
 
 crime 132 
 
 the result of general laws. . . . 103 
 
 Quotations. 
 
 Aristotle [152 
 
 Chalmers [131, 138, 148 
 
 Cicero [82, 86 
 
 Clarke [97 
 
 Fitzgerald [145 
 
 Robert Hall [US 
 
 Hume [162 
 
 Maimonides [173 
 
 Mandeville [Ill 
 
 Plato [87, 113 
 
 Son of Sirac [137 
 
 Strabo [92 
 
 Rashness, consequences of. 96 
 
 Reason 
 
 an incompetent judge of means 178 
 gives power over brute force. . 119 
 
 needs experience 141 
 
 not dependent on bodily powers 89 
 requires a fair opportunity 119-121 
 
 Recapitulation of the whole argu- 
 ment 180 
 
 Rectitude, is self-interest a proper 
 
 motive to it? 153 
 
 References to other authors. 
 
 Bates [128 
 
 Baxter [88 
 
 Bayle [88 
 
 Beattie [170 
 
 Belsham [170 
 
 Berkeley [Ill 
 
 Bonnett [89 
 
 Bramhall [171 
 
 Brown [Ill 
 
 Bryant [171 
 
 Butterworth [107 
 
 Calcott [128 
 
 Cnpf,. . , [109 
 
 PAQB 
 
 References to other authors. 
 
 Chalmers [77, 79, 148 
 
 Charnock [158 
 
 Cheyne [88 
 
 Clarke 82, [81, 97, 171 
 
 Colliber [88 
 
 Collings [158,170 
 
 Compte [170 
 
 Crombie [170 
 
 Crouse [170 
 
 Davies [109 
 
 D'Holbach [170 
 
 Descartes [88 
 
 Ditton [88 
 
 Doddridge [109 
 
 Dodwell [81 
 
 Dwight [109 
 
 Edwards [88, 170 
 
 Fabricius [128 
 
 Fichte [170 
 
 Gibbs [171 
 
 Grove [171 
 
 Haller. [89 
 
 Harris [171 
 
 Hartley [170 
 
 Hegel [170 
 
 Henly [128 
 
 Hobbes [170 
 
 Holtzfusius [128 
 
 Holyoake [170 
 
 Horseley [109 
 
 Hume [88 
 
 Hunt [109 
 
 Jackson [171 
 
 Kennicott [128 
 
 King. ..- [98, 171 
 
 Law [98 
 
 Lawson [171 
 
 Le Clerc [128 
 
 Leland [109 
 
 Leroux [170 
 
 Liefchild [109 
 
 Locke [88 
 
 Manton [128 
 
 Martineau [170 
 
 Martinius [119 
 
 Milman [142 
 
S'iO 
 
 INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 References to other authors. 
 
 Morgagni [89 
 
 Morton [109 
 
 MusEeus [128 
 
 Palmer [171 
 
 Pearson [128 
 
 Polignac [88 
 
 Porteus [109 
 
 Price [158 
 
 Priestley [142, 170 
 
 Reid [170 
 
 Rutherford [109, 158 
 
 Search [88 
 
 Seed ., . . . [109 
 
 Selden [128 
 
 Shaftesbury 108 
 
 Sherlock [109 
 
 Shuckford [128 
 
 Son of Sirac [137 
 
 South [109, 128 
 
 Stapfer [128 
 
 Strabo 92 
 
 Toplady f . . . [128 
 
 Topping [109 
 
 Twisse [109 
 
 "WagstaflF. [88 
 
 Warburton [Ill 
 
 Watts [77, 88, 171 
 
 Whately [142, 158 
 
 Willis [88 
 
 Wisheart [109 
 
 Witsius [128 
 
 Wittichius [109 
 
 jReflection not dependent on sensa- 
 tion 91 
 
 Reformation is attended with dis- 
 comfort 108 
 
 may not prevent penalties. . . . 102 
 
 Relation between us and our bodies 85 
 
 Relations of things, limitless. . . . 173 
 
 Religion 
 
 a question of fact 165 
 
 historical evidence of. 168 
 
 professed in all ages 167 
 
 its proofs not affected by the 
 
 doctrine of necessity. . . 170 
 nor by our ignorance 178 
 
 Reluctant obedience profitable. . [152 
 Remedies often very disagreeable 176 
 
 Repentance may be too late 104 
 
 Requisites to the superiority of 
 
 reason 119 
 
 of virtue 120, 121 
 
 Resentment of injuries 114 
 
 Resignation 
 
 a temper consonant with God's 
 
 sovereignty 155 
 
 essential to virtue 154 
 
 the fruit of affliction 155 
 
 the habit necessary hereafter. . 155 
 Retributions are divine teachings [108 
 Revelation, 
 
 antiquity of. 167 
 
 not improbable 167 
 
 not universal note 107 
 
 Rewards and punishments, how 
 
 distributed 126 
 
 Satisfactions of virtue 108 
 
 Scheme of God incomprehensible. 172 
 Self-denial, its relations to present 
 
 happiness 134 
 
 not essential to piety 152 
 
 Self-discipline, what [148 
 
 Self-love 
 
 a just principle of action. . . . 154 
 
 appealed to 153 
 
 how moderated and disciplined 155 
 not a sufficient restraint. . note 146 
 
 reasonable and safe 130 
 
 Sensation not necessary to reflec- 
 tion 91 
 
 Senses not percipients 85 
 
 Severe discipliae necessary 150 
 
 Similitude of a historical painting [174 
 Simplicity of the living agent. . . 83 
 Sin, why not kept out of the world 177 
 Skepticism does not justify irre- 
 
 ligion 105 
 
 Social, our nature essentially such [93 
 Society 
 
 must punish vice 110 
 
 natural and necessary [93 
 
 sometimes punishes the good- 111 
 
INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 341 
 
 Soul 
 
 a simple substance 82 
 
 not destroyed with the body. . 79 
 
 not naturally immortal [81 
 
 Souls of brutes 88 
 
 Special interpositions of Provi- 
 dence 177, 178 
 
 Stages of existence 78 
 
 State of probation chap. iv. 
 
 State of discipline and improve- 
 ment CHAP. V. 
 
 Submissive temper necessary. . . . 155 
 Subordinations exceedingly bene- 
 ficial 142 
 
 Subserviencies in nature 173 
 
 Sufferings may be avoided 95 
 
 not necessary to the cultiva- 
 tion of virtue [128 
 
 Temporal and religious probation 
 
 similar 132 
 
 Temptations 
 
 increased by bad examples. . . 132 
 
 and by former errors 132 
 
 intended for our improvement. 136 
 
 involve probation 129 
 
 may improve or injure us. . . . 153 
 
 security against their evils. . . 146 
 
 sources of, to upright beings. . 147 
 the necessary result of propen- 
 
 sions 146 
 
 Tendencies of virtue 118 
 
 hindered 121 
 
 essential, not accidental 126 
 
 Terms "nature" and "course of 
 
 nature" [97 
 
 Theorizing no aid to virtue 139 
 
 Thoughtlessness often fatal 101 
 
 Transmigration of souls [87 
 
 Trials 
 
 manifest character 156 
 
 may exist in a future state. . . 147 
 
 produced by our propensions. 131 
 
 qualify for a better state 144 
 
 unreasonable ones are not in- 
 flicted 133 
 
 why we are subjected to them. 136 
 29 
 
 Ultimate design of man [98 
 
 Understanding may bo perverted. 168 
 Uneasiness produced by former 
 
 sins 109 
 
 Union of good beings 122 
 
 Unjustifiableness of religious in- 
 difference 105 
 
 Upright creatures may fall 147 
 
 need good habits 149 
 
 Universe and its government im- 
 mense 123 
 
 Vice 
 
 actually punished by society 110,111 
 
 must produce uneasiness 112 
 
 never rewarded as such 116 
 
 not only criminal but depraving 149 
 
 often increased by trials 153 
 
 punished as such 114 
 
 Vicious men lose their influence. [121 
 
 Virtue 
 
 a bond of union 122 
 
 as su(jti, rewarded on earth. . . Ill 
 "brings its own reward". ... [118 
 has occasional disadvantages. [117 
 
 hinderances accidental 121 
 
 how and why rewarded Ill 
 
 improved by trials 151 
 
 its benefits to a community. . . 123 
 
 natural, not vice 116 
 
 not always rewarded in this life 108 
 on the whole happier than vice 113 
 
 secures peace 112 
 
 tendencies essential 126 
 
 tends to give power. . . . 118, [121 
 
 Virtuous beings need virtuous 
 
 habits 149 
 
 Virtuous habits a security 147 
 
 how formed 139 
 
 improve virtue 147 
 
 necessary in a future state. . . [145 
 
 Voice of nature is for virtue 117 
 
 Waste of seeds 163 
 
 Wickedness may produce some 
 
 benefits 177 
 
 voluntary 136 
 
342 
 
 INDEX TO PART I. 
 
 Will and character 
 
 of God, how determined. . note 166 
 what they mean iiote 163 
 
 Wonderful discovery of Hume. . [162 
 
 World 
 
 a system of subordinations. . . 173 
 a thedter for the manifestation 
 
 of character 156 
 
 PA3B 
 
 World, (continued.) 
 
 disciplines some to vice 153 
 
 fitted for man's discipline. . . , 150 
 governed by fixed laws 110 
 
 Youth 
 
 a determining period 101 
 
 if lost, not to be recovered. . . 143 
 its beneficial subordinations. . 143 
 
INDEX TO PART 11. 
 
 REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR'S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 A common absurdity 243 
 
 Abstract truth distinguished from 
 
 facts 305, [186 
 
 Absurdity of some objections to 
 
 Christianity 245 
 
 Abuse of our natural endowments 217' 
 Accidental, what events are so 
 
 called 226 
 
 Accountability gradually increases 251 
 Actions, 
 
 definition of, in morals 261 
 
 distinguished from things done 261 
 their bad consequences some- 
 times escaped 232 
 
 virtue and vice consist in them 261 
 Advantage, as proper a considera- 
 tion in religion as in tem- 
 poral affairs 298 
 
 variously bestowed 249, 312 
 
 Analogy 
 
 a confirmation of all facts to 
 
 which it can be applied, . 306 
 affords no argument against the 
 
 scheme of Christianity. . 203 
 nor against miracles. . . 203 
 answers presumptions against 
 
 miracles 207 
 
 does not prove the wisdom of 
 
 God 301 
 
 Hoes not teach that the ichole 
 of God's government is 
 like that on earth. ..... 204 
 
 easily cavilled at, but unan- 
 
 gwerable , . . > . 306 
 
 ?aQ1 
 
 Analogy, {continued.) 
 
 between natural information 
 and that derived from 
 inspiration 212 
 
 between the remedies of nature 
 
 and those of grace 219 
 
 between the gospel and human 
 
 discoveries 219 
 
 between the light of nature and 
 
 of revelation 218 
 
 between the use of natural 
 
 gifts, and miraculous. . . 217 
 
 between the government of God 
 and that of a human mas- 
 ter 261 
 
 its small influence on men. . . 303 
 
 how used in this treatise. . . . 306 
 
 may show our duty, but not the 
 
 design of the requirement 246 
 
 objections to this mode of 
 
 arguing chap. viil. 
 
 shows that there may be infinite 
 reasons for things, with 
 which we are not ac- 
 quainted 188 
 
 the only ground for some of 
 
 our knowledge 306 
 
 Antidote to heresies [191 
 
 Apocalypse, its principal object. . [249 
 Appearances of men and things 
 
 deceptive 248 
 
 Arguments proper as to human 
 writings, are not so as 
 
 to Scripture 214 
 
 343 
 
344 
 
 INDEX TO PART 11. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Atonement, 
 
 how held by the ancients. . . . 241 
 makes the innocent suffer for 
 
 the guilty 243 
 
 Author of nature taken for granted 298 
 Authoritativeness of revelation. . 189 
 
 Baptism 
 
 a test of obedience [199 
 
 commanded and important. . . 194 
 
 why the form of words 194 
 
 Bible, how to be interpreted. [202, 215 
 
 Brutes, their great sagacity 216 
 
 Boundary of human inquiry. . . . [223 
 
 Candor necessary in judging of 
 
 Christianity 302 
 
 Chance, really no such thing. . . 226 
 Characters drawn in Scripture 
 
 evidently unfeigned . . . 287 
 Christ 
 
 a mediator chap. v. 
 
 a prophet 240 
 
 a priest and king 241 
 
 his history, as given in Scrip- 
 ture 285 
 
 his pre-existence taught 282 
 
 bis satisfaction 239 
 
 his sufferings voluntary 243 
 
 manner of his interposition. . . 238 
 not merely a teacher and ex- 
 ample 242 
 
 offered himself a propitiatory 
 
 sacrifice 241 
 
 Christianity 
 
 a fearful curse, if it give no 
 more light than natural 
 
 religion [196 
 
 a question of fact 301 
 
 a remedial system [193 
 
 an authoritative republication 
 of the religion of na- 
 ture 188, 189 
 
 a particular scheme under a 
 
 general plan 194, 224 
 
 a scheme imperfectly compre- 
 hended CHAP. IV. 
 
 Pi OB 
 
 Christianity, [eontimied.) 
 
 a scheme revealed but in part. 226 
 brings life and immortality to 
 
 light 190 
 
 could not possibly be a contri- 
 vance [222, 294 
 
 demands attention, if barely 
 
 probable 253 
 
 has evidences besides miracles 
 
 and prophecy 263 
 
 in what degree remedial. . . . [193 
 
 is a real revelation 213 
 
 is conformable to the constitu- 
 tion of things .295 
 
 its benefits require the use of 
 
 means 197 
 
 its establishment and preva- 
 lence, the most conspicu- 
 ous and important event 
 
 in history 286 
 
 its evidences chap. vir. 
 
 its good effects not small. ... 192 
 its precepts plain and obvious. 218 
 
 its proof historical 304 
 
 its proofs liable to objection. . 260 
 men bound to examine its evi- 
 dence 197 
 
 miracles and prophecy its direct 
 
 and fundamental proofs. 263 
 
 must have mysteries [223 
 
 no objection to the morality of 
 
 it 214, 220, 222 
 
 not merely a republication of 
 
 natural religion. ...... [196 
 
 not primarily designed to re- 
 medy the defects of na- 
 ture [193 
 
 not the discovery of reason. . . 188 
 objections to its evidence. . . . 210 
 
 objections to its nature 210 
 
 offered to some in a corrupt 
 
 state 250 
 
 prescribes new duties 194 
 
 preserves natural religion in 
 
 the world 191 
 
 propagated against all obstruc- 
 tions [294 
 
INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 345 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Christianity, (continued.) 
 
 rashness of treating it light- 
 ly 194, 196, 197 
 
 requires means to accomplish 
 
 ends 225 
 
 reveals a particular dispensa- 
 tion of Providence 194 
 
 reveals important facts 196 
 
 eome of its dark parts may be 
 cleared up, others can- 
 not [223 
 
 teaches more than natural re- 
 ligion 194 
 
 the evils ascribed to it, are 
 
 not its evils 192 
 
 the one great question concern- 
 ing it 213, 214 
 
 the only religion professedly 
 
 confirmed by miracles. . 268 
 
 to be transmitted by Chris- 
 tians [190 
 
 universal, in nature and in- 
 tention [248 
 
 what alone could disprove it. . 295 
 
 •why not remedial to a greater 
 
 degree 193 
 
 ■why not sooner promulgated. . 219 
 Christians 
 
 bound to spread Christianity. 190 
 
 primitive, their testimony. . . . 267 
 Church 
 
 men bound to support it 193 
 
 preserves a knowledge of reli- 
 gion 191 
 
 visible, its design 190, 191 
 
 Circumstantial evidences of Chris- 
 tianity 263, 281 
 
 often as convincing as direct 
 
 testimony 294 
 
 Clemens Romanus, testimony of. 266 
 
 his letter to the Corinthians. . [266 
 Climax of infidel extravagance. . [294 
 Coincidence of natural and re- 
 vealed religion 211, 218 
 
 Coincidences of Scripture 266 
 
 Comparison, how it may mislead 
 
 us 201 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Compassion distinct from goodness 233 
 visible in the constitution of 
 
 the world 233 
 
 Consequences of infidelity; more 
 dangerous than those of 
 
 faith. : 294 
 
 of sin, often averted 233 
 
 Conversational objections to reve- 
 lation 295 
 
 Conversion, how produced [225 
 
 Course of nature 
 
 diflerent from what we might 
 have supposed, previous 
 
 to experience 211 
 
 none at the beginning 205 
 
 our total darkness as to its 
 
 causes 208 
 
 Creation 
 
 Mosaic account of, referred to 
 
 by John 282 
 
 a different exertion of power 
 
 from government 205 
 
 why Scripture describes it. . . 281 
 Creatures of like moral qualities 
 placed in different reli- 
 gious situations 251 
 
 Credulity of mankind acknow- 
 ledged 269 
 
 Cumulative proof of Christianity. [20/ 
 
 Daniel 
 
 his book had more evidence of 
 authenticity than has 
 
 come to us 279 
 
 his predictions a support of 
 
 Jewish faith [249 
 
 quoted by Christ 279 
 
 Dark parts of revelation [223 
 
 Degrees of evidence have degrees 
 
 of weight 255 
 
 require nice examination. . . . 258 
 Deistical explanation of Christ's 
 
 miracles [206 
 
 Deists, why do they oppose Chris- 
 tianity [196 
 
 Depravity of man obvious 238 
 
 doctrine of. [218 
 
346 
 
 INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 Desert of gDod and ill, the notion 
 
 of. 305 
 
 Development, of truth 218 
 
 modern, doctrine of. [218 
 
 Differences of religious advantages 
 may have like reasons as 
 those for different tem- 
 poral advantages 251 
 
 would remain if revelation 
 
 were universal 252 
 
 Difficulties 
 
 absurdity of requiring them to 
 
 be all removed 297 
 
 as to the evidence of religion, 
 analogous to those at- 
 tending the practice of it 256 
 cannot be solved by analogy. . 296 
 speculative, may be the chief 
 
 trials of some 257 
 
 the discernment which can see 
 them, might suffice to 
 
 see through them 260 
 
 Direct and circumstantial evidence 
 
 must be taken together. 280 
 Diseases of body and mind, analo- 
 gous as to their reme- 
 dies 220 
 
 Disobedience, without possible ex- 
 cuse 253 
 
 Dispensations, preparatory one to 
 
 another 310 
 
 Disregard of religion a great pro- 
 fligacy 233 
 
 Distinction between moral and 
 
 positive obligation. 198, [198 
 ^between acts and principles. . [235 
 between temporary, individual, 
 
 and universal commands [188 
 Doubt 
 
 affords scope for probation. . . 262 
 exercises our virtuous princi- 
 ples 256 
 
 implies some evidence. 252, 254, 283 
 involves some obligation. . . . . 263 
 
 puts us upon probation 253 
 
 Doubtful evidence should have 
 
 some influence 255 
 
 Duties arising from revealed rela- 
 tions 195 
 
 moral and positive 194 
 
 Earth, its appearances confirm 
 
 Scripture 238 
 
 Effect of Adam's transgression. . . 238 
 of combined probabilities. 294, [294 
 
 Efficacy of repentance [190 
 
 not taught by the light of na- 
 ture 190 
 
 End, God's not known 246 
 
 Enthusiasm 
 
 is not peculiar to religion. . . . 272 
 impairs no testimony for Chris- 
 tianity 271 
 
 may often weaken testimony. . 271 
 sometimes mixed with knavery 272 
 the absence of all sign of it in 
 Christianity, a presump- 
 tive proof in its fiivor. . . 222 
 will not account for the spread 
 
 of Christianity 270 
 
 Enthusiasts make as great sacri- 
 fices as Christians. . . . 270 
 
 Epistles of Paul, proof from 266 
 
 Eternal retribution not taught by 
 
 natural religion [190 
 
 Ethics of natural religion distin- 
 guished from its objects [194 
 
 Events expound Scripture 219 
 
 Evidence 
 
 of Christianity impregnable. . 295 
 collateral and direct to be 
 
 viewed together 294 
 
 from miracles and prophecy. . 267 
 imperfect, should yet influence 
 practice in proportion to 
 
 its degree 255 
 
 of circumstances may be most 
 
 direct 294 
 
 of religion, open to all 260 
 
 of religion, the same in kind 
 as that which controls us 
 
 in temporal things 258 
 
 much lower than satisfactory 
 
 often determines us. . . , 303 
 
INDEX TO PART 11. 
 
 347 
 
 JHJvidence, (continued.) 
 
 not only increased but multi- 
 plied by a combination 
 
 of probabilities 294, [294 
 
 reason the proper judge of. . . 221 
 
 requires careful sifting 256 
 
 candor in judging. . . 302, [303 
 safety always in admitting it. 294 
 
 why liable to objection 257 
 
 Evil, remedies provided for it. 219,232 
 Exaggeration practised by many 
 
 who will not lie 272 
 
 External manner of heart worship 195 
 Experience 
 
 affords no presumption against 
 
 Christianity 203 
 
 corroborates Christian doc- 
 trines 245 
 
 teaches the effects of actions. . 246 
 Extravagance of some objec- 
 tions 187, 1S8 
 
 Facts 
 
 analogy the only proof of 
 
 some 306 
 
 distinguished from abstract 
 
 truths 305 
 
 of revelation distinguished 
 
 from its principles [235 
 
 Fall of man, assumed as a fact. . . 236 
 confirmed by appearances. . . . 238 
 Falsehood, its degrees and induce- 
 ments 272 
 
 False miracles have deceived many 273 
 have some historic evidence. . 273 
 Fatalists, their principles argued 
 
 upon 304 
 
 Fear cast out by love [301 
 
 Fitness, moral 304, 305 
 
 Flippant objections to Christianity 295 
 
 Folly, a real vice 280 
 
 Foresight of brutes 216 
 
 Future punishments, 
 
 all the reasons for them not 
 
 known 234 
 
 not arbitrarily appointed. . . . 232 
 natural sequences 231, 232 
 
 I PA.aB 
 
 Future punishments, 
 
 rendered cr 'dible by temporal 
 
 punishments 300 
 
 Genealogy of mankind given in 
 
 Scripture 283 
 
 General laws 
 
 a wise arrangement 227 
 
 do not render miracles in- 
 credible 227 
 
 control the Christian dispensa- 
 tion 226 
 
 few events can be traced up to 
 
 them 226 
 
 miracles may be their re- 
 sults 226, 227 
 
 the ground of believing there 
 
 are such 226 
 
 things called accidental go- 
 verned by them 226 
 
 Geology, its impressive lessons. . [229 
 GOD 
 
 a master giving laws 261 
 
 all his reasons for giving a 
 command must be cer- 
 tainly known, and known 
 to have passed away, be- 
 fore we can safely disre- 
 gard it 188 
 
 duties towards him as the 
 
 Father 194, 195 
 
 governs by mediation 230 
 
 his government shows com- 
 passion 233 
 
 progressive 229 
 
 his means and ends we cannot 
 
 distinguish 228 
 
 his providence, objections to it 
 
 idle 300, 301 
 
 his reasons not assigned 246 
 
 his will, as absolute or con- 
 ditional 261 
 
 how he would act in contingen- 
 cies, unknown [222 
 
 how to be worshipped, a pure 
 
 matter of revelation. . . . 195 
 
 instructs us by experience. 211, 246 
 
348 
 
 INDEX TO PART 11. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 GOD, (continued.) 
 
 little known [222 
 
 not indifferent as to who suflFer. 2i3 
 reveals our duties, not his 
 
 plans 246 
 
 the real author of the prophe- 
 cies 276 
 
 Good and evil unequally distri- 
 buted 248 
 
 Government of God sometimes, 
 apparently, tardy in its 
 
 results 224, 225 
 
 Gradual growth of causes [208 
 
 Happiness not always secured by 
 
 well-laid schemes 247 
 
 Hazard of neglecting Christianity. 262 
 Heathen world, condition of. 186, 250 
 Hieroglyphic and figurative lan- 
 guage of Scripture 210 
 
 Hinderances to natural and spiri- 
 tual knowledge similar. . 218 
 History 
 
 of miracles 264 
 
 ^ of the Jews confirmed by their 
 
 condition 289,290 
 
 of the origin of religion 206 
 
 furnishes no parallel to revela- 
 tion 207 
 
 prophecy is history anticipated 281 
 Scripture, has not been inva- 
 lidated 283 
 
 Holy Spirit, its operations on the 
 
 heart [225 
 
 Human contrivance unequal to 
 
 some things [222 
 
 Human life, in what sense it may 
 
 be called poor 297 
 
 Human testimony, reliable not- 
 withstanding the preva- 
 lence of falsehood 273 
 
 Identity of principle between na- 
 tural and revealed re- 
 ligion [2 35 
 
 Ignorance 
 
 of heathen writers [187 
 
 Ignorance 
 
 of other worlds, forbids objec- 
 tions to Christianity on 
 the ground of miracles. 207 
 of the laws of miracles, not 
 greater than of natural 
 
 laws 256 
 
 of the reason of our present 
 
 condition 251 
 
 much of it our own fault. ... 259 
 Imagination may fancy unreal 
 
 coincidences 293 
 
 Immorality not authorized in 
 
 ^ Scripture 221, 222 
 
 Impassable limit to human know- 
 ledge [223 
 
 Imperceptible accumulation of 
 
 forces [20S 
 
 Imperfect knowledge, better than 
 
 acting in the dark 297 
 
 Imperfection of language 216 
 
 Importance of revelation. . . chap. i. 
 
 an abstraction [186 
 
 precludes the idea that the first 
 
 witnesses were careless. . 274 
 Improbability before and after an 
 
 event [207 
 
 of the Deistical theory greater 
 
 than that of miracles. . . [206 
 
 Inadequacy of repentance [236 
 
 Inattention to religion, real depra- 
 vity 252, 307 
 
 prevents convincement 258 
 
 Incarnation an invisible miracle. 204 
 
 cannot be paralleled [23-5 
 
 Influence of the Holy Ghost. . . . [225 
 of the analogical argument. . 303 
 Innocent sometimes suffer for the 
 
 guilty 243 
 
 Inspiration, the proper kind and 
 extent of it not discover- 
 able by reason 212 
 
 not to be interpreted like other 
 
 writings 2] I 
 
 Inspired writers, key to their 
 
 meaning [276 
 
 their one great schem©. . . . [276 
 
INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 349 
 
 Inspired writers, (continued.) 
 show a foresight more than 
 
 human 278, 279 
 
 Instruction from God to savages. [206 
 
 Intercession by the good for the 
 
 bad [232 
 
 Interest, temporal, not always 
 
 apparent .302 
 
 Interpositions of men for each 
 
 other [232 
 
 Internal improbabilities weaken 
 
 external proof. 215 
 
 Interpretation of Scripture [215 
 
 Irregularity, really no such thing. 226 
 whence the appearance of. . . . 227 
 
 Irregularities of men, conse- 
 quences proportioned to 
 magnitude 233 
 
 Irreligion an aggravated sin. . . . 233 
 especially in persons in high 
 
 standing 254 
 
 not justifiable on any pre- 
 tence 256, 312 
 
 Invention an irregular way of in- 
 formation 216 
 
 Invisible miracles [204 
 
 things of God, how learned. . [230 
 
 Jews 
 
 God's dealing with them .... 290 
 their continuance, a standing 
 
 miracle 290 
 
 their history confirmed by facts 291 
 
 their system of Theism [206 
 
 Jewish miracles, a part of civil 
 
 history [265 
 
 John, his allusion to Christ, in the 
 
 beginning of his gospel. 282 
 his doctrine agrees with that 
 
 of Paul 282 
 
 Kingdom of Christ on earth 241 
 
 Knowledge 
 
 profound, not necessary to 
 
 piety 218 
 
 Bcientific and religious, have 
 
 the same difficulties. ... 218 
 
 Knowledge of Scripture, improved 
 in the same way as know- 
 ledge of the sciences. . . 218 
 unequally distributed 249 
 
 Language necessarily ambiguous. 216 
 of the prophecies, often figura- 
 tive 210 
 
 Laplace, error of. [207 
 
 Levity destructive to religious 
 
 influence 259 
 
 Liberty 
 
 belief of our, unavoidable. . . . 304 
 of the will, not discussed, note 304 
 necessary to the progress of 
 
 knowledge 218 
 
 the principle so natural that 
 language is formed on 
 
 it 304 
 
 Life 
 
 future, brought to light by the 
 
 gospel 190 
 
 may be taken away by com- 
 mand 221 
 
 not thrown away because suc- 
 cess is uncertain 302 
 
 whether desirable or not 301 
 
 Light of nature 
 
 displayed in the Scriptures. . . 188 
 does not teach our future con- 
 dition 190 
 
 favors the doctrine of a Me- 
 diator 230 
 
 has left the greatest heathen 
 
 in doubt 186 
 
 Ludicrous turn, danger of. 259 
 
 Mahometanism not received on 
 
 the footing of miracles. [268 
 
 Mahometans and ancient Per- 
 sian 6, how situated as to 
 revelation 250 
 
 Man 
 
 accepted according to what he 
 
 hath 251 
 
 his circumstances no ground 
 
 of complaint 252 
 
 30 
 
S5y> 
 
 INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 Man, (coMtiniied.) 
 
 liis obligation to study the 
 
 Scriptures 202, 262 
 
 must be renewed 197 
 
 Manasses, prayer of. [237 
 
 Manner of -worship a matter of 
 
 pure revelation 195 
 
 Martyrs 
 
 could not have been impostors 272 
 had full knowledge of facts 269, 271 
 the full force of their testimony 269 
 their obligations to veracity. . 274 
 
 were not enthusiasts . . 271 
 
 Means as related to ends 225 
 
 Mediation seen everywhere 230 
 
 exemplified in social life. . . . [232 
 Mediator, 
 
 appointment of. chap. v. 
 
 the notion of, natural 230 
 
 the Scripture doctrine of. 238-2-iO 
 whether one was necessary. . . 243 
 
 why most objected to 243 
 
 Medium between full satisfaction 
 of a truth and full satis- 
 faction to the contrary. . 313 
 Memory, eloquence, &c. impru- 
 dently used 217 
 
 Men apt to be deluded by pre- 
 tences 273 
 
 their conduct may be guessed 
 
 at [222 
 
 Mercy seen in the constitution of 
 
 the world 233 
 
 Messiah came at the expected time 285 
 
 his mission 224 
 
 Minuteness of predictions touch- 
 ing Christ 207 
 
 Miracles 
 
 admitted evidence for such as 
 are false does not impair 
 the evidence of Chris- ^ 
 
 tian 273 
 
 contrary to the course of na- 
 ture ? 206 
 
 denying them leads to 
 
 Atheism [205 
 
 disorderly use of. 217 
 
 PAau 
 
 Miracles, [continued.) 
 
 distinct reasons for them. . . . 208 
 
 large historical evidence for 
 
 their truth 270 
 
 manner in which related .... 264 
 
 no argument of analogy against 
 
 them 205-207 
 
 none parallel to those of Scrip- 
 ture 207 
 
 not mere embellishments. . . . 264 
 
 not to be compared to common 
 
 events 209 
 
 nowise incredible 209 
 
 occasions for them likely to 
 arise in the course of 
 ages 208 
 
 of the Old Testament, insepa- 
 rable from history [265 
 
 operate by general laws 226 
 
 Pagan and Popish, were 
 wrought after those sys- 
 tems had obtained 268 
 
 peculiar to the Jewish and 
 
 Christian religions 268 
 
 received as genuine from the 
 
 first 268, 269 
 
 regulated by general laws. . . . 227 
 
 satisfactorily account for the 
 
 existence of Christianity 265 
 
 should be compared to uncom- 
 mon events 209 
 
 the credentials of Christianity 267 
 
 the evidence of their truth at 
 
 first 249 
 
 the question of their truth only 
 one of degree in point of 
 evidence 208 
 
 the only satisfactory account 
 
 of some events 265 
 
 the real nature of presump- 
 tions against them 208 
 
 the term a relative one 205 
 
 their direct proof of Chris- 
 tianity 264 
 
 their evidence the same as that 
 
 for common facts 264 
 
 their force as proofs. ...;... 189 
 
INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 351 
 
 Miracles, (continued.) 
 
 visible and invisible. . . . 204, [204 
 ■what evidence arises from their 
 having been accepted as 
 true by the first Chris- 
 tians 268 
 
 writers upon [264, 268 
 
 Miraculous power 
 
 creation not properly an act of 205 
 
 misused by some 217, 267 
 
 pretences of, have deluded 
 
 some 273 
 
 why bestowed 190 
 
 Misconduct creates need of assist- 
 ance 235 
 
 Mistake of some of Hume's oppo- 
 nents 207 
 
 Mistakes of philosophers dan- 
 gerous [230 
 
 of transcribers, <fcc 228 
 
 Modern geology, lesson from. . . . [229 
 
 Moral action, the nature of. ... . 261 
 
 an action becomes such by 
 
 command [221 
 
 Moral duties. See Positive. 
 
 Moral faculty, its object 305 
 
 Moral government. See Govern- 
 ment. 
 Moral precepts. See Positive. 
 Moral system revealed to man- 
 kind 190 
 
 Morality of Scripture, reason a 
 
 judge of. 220 
 
 Mysteries to be expected in reve- 
 lation 223, 224 
 
 as many in nature as ia Scrip- 
 ture 246 
 
 Mystery of godliness 225 
 
 Mythological writings resemble 
 
 prophecy 276 
 
 Narratives of Scripture unadorned 228 
 Natural consequences of vice are 
 
 judicial punishments. . . 197 
 and spiritual things analogous 
 
 in importance 219 
 
 ©naowmeuis often abused. . . . 217 
 
 PAQB 
 
 Natural light compared to revela- 
 tion 218 
 
 Natural religion 
 
 and revealed, coincide 211 
 
 as much perverted as Chris- 
 tianity 192 
 
 could not have been reasoned 
 
 out 192 
 
 discloses no Redeemer [194 
 
 its ethics and objects distin- 
 guished [194 
 
 its light wholly insufficient. . . 187 
 might be authenticated by 
 
 miracles 190 
 
 moral system of. 187 
 
 taught and confirmed by Chris- 
 tianity 188, 286, 292 
 
 what it does not teach. . . [190, 194 
 Nature carried on by uniform 
 
 laws 226 
 
 implies the agency of God. . . 231 
 
 its light insufficient 186 
 
 Nature and obligation of sacra- 
 ments note 195 
 
 Necessity of revelation [186 
 
 Negligence prevents the recogni- 
 tion of truth 258 
 
 wholly inexcusable 197 
 
 Obedience from dread [301 
 
 or disobedience, an important 
 
 matter 188 
 
 to a positive rite, especially 
 
 indicative of piety 199 
 
 Objections 
 
 to certain precepts of Scrip- 
 ture, as immoral 221 
 
 to prophecy, from its obscurity 275 
 to revelation, are of equal 
 weight against natural 
 
 religion 97 
 
 to the analogical argument, as 
 
 such CHAP. VHI. 
 
 to the distribution of good and 
 
 evil 248-250 
 
 to the doctrine of media- 
 tion CHAP. V. 
 
352 
 
 INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Objections, (continued.) 
 
 to the evidence for mi- 
 racles CHAP. II. 
 
 to the unequal distribution of 
 
 religious knowledge. . . . 249 
 Objections to Christianity 
 
 as a matter of fact 301 
 
 as a remedial system. . . . [19.S, 219 
 as a roundabout, perplexed 
 
 contrivance 228 
 
 as deficient in point of truth. . 247 
 
 as a scheme 209 
 
 as mysterious [223 
 
 as to its wisdom and good- 
 ness CHAP. IV. 
 
 as unimportant chap. i. 
 
 atonement makes the innocent 
 
 suffer for the guilty. 227, 243 
 contains things unlike the 
 
 course of nature 204 
 
 does not remove difficulties . . [223 
 
 has been perverted 192 
 
 has been productive of evils. . 192 
 has internal improbabilities 225-227 
 disclosed to the world so re- 
 cently 219 
 
 disorderly use of miraculous 
 
 gifts 227 
 
 has small influence 192, 303 
 
 if true would not be left doubt- 
 ful 299 
 
 is not satisfactory 260, 261 
 
 its doctrine of mediation, chap. v. 
 its external proof weakened 
 by internal improbabili- 
 ties 215 
 
 its lack of evidence. . . . chap. vi. 
 
 its late introduction 219 
 
 may be advanced flippantly, 
 but cannot be so an- 
 swered 295 
 
 natural things too unimportant 
 to furnish analogies in 
 
 its favor 219 
 
 not just and good chap. iv. 
 
 not necessary 147 
 
 not universal chap. vi. 248 
 
 PAQB 
 
 Objections to Christianity, (con- 
 tinued.) 
 
 slowly developed 219 
 
 some of its precepts immoral. . 221 
 suflBciency of natural religion. 187 
 
 vicarious sufferings 245 
 
 Obligation arises from the bare 
 supposableness of Chris- 
 tianity 253, 262 
 
 Obligations to God arising out of 
 
 relationship 196 
 
 Obscurity in part of a prophecy, 
 does not impair the evi- 
 dence of foresight 275 
 
 Offenders often shielded by friends [232 
 OflBces of Christ as a mediator 238-240 
 Opinions must be distinguished 
 
 from facts 270 
 
 Ordinary rules of interpretation. . [215 
 
 Pagan and Popish miracles easily 
 
 accounted for 268 
 
 Parables show what the author 
 
 intended 276 
 
 Partial views give an appearance 
 
 of wrong 309 
 
 Passion hinders correct judgment 259 
 
 Paul, his separate testimony. . . , 266 
 how he received the gospel. . . 267 
 summary of his testimony. . . 267 
 
 Perfection of religion, what ? chap. Vlil. 
 
 Persons for whom this treatise is 
 
 written 309 
 
 Philosophy, its true mode of pro- 
 ceeding [230 
 
 Piety superior to ritual observ- 
 ances 201 
 
 Pleasures and pains, which over- 
 balance ? 301 
 
 Political events, how mentioned 
 
 in Scripture 282 
 
 Popish doctrine of a miracle at 
 
 the Eucharist [204 
 
 Popular conversational objections 295 
 
 Porphyry's mode of interpretation 
 
 frivolous note 279 
 
 objections to the book of Daniel 279 
 
INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 35a 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Chris- 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 200 
 
 246 
 201 
 
 200 
 
 Positive evidence of 
 
 tianity 
 
 «sitive institutions 
 belong to the notion of a 
 
 church 192 
 
 \aj us under the strictest obli- 
 gation 202 
 
 means to moral ends 199 
 
 men disposed to depend on 
 
 them 
 
 necessary to keep up and pro- 
 pagate religion 
 
 not to be made light of. 
 
 not to supersede moral obe- 
 dience 
 
 the reason of them often ob- 
 
 • vious 198 
 
 two modes of viewing them. . . 198 
 Positive precepts compared with 
 
 moral 198, 201 
 
 create moral obligations 221 
 
 Power of healing [217 
 
 Practice should be influenced by 
 
 probability 254 
 
 Predictions of Christ very nume- 
 rous and minute. . . 207, 208 
 Prejudice a hinderance to know- 
 ledge 
 
 a mark of weakness 
 
 as hostile to truth as enthu- 
 siasm, . . T ■ 
 
 operates contrary ways 
 
 Preservation of the Jews as a dis- 
 tinct race 291 
 
 Presumptions 
 
 against miracles 205 
 
 against revelation as miracu- 
 lous CHAP. II. 
 
 none against the general • 
 
 scheme of Christianity. . 203 
 n*^e peculiar to miracles. . . . 207 
 strong, overcome by weak 
 
 proof. 207, [207 
 
 Priesthood of Christ 238 
 
 Jewish, typical of Christ 239 
 
 Principles argued upon in this 
 treatise f • • 
 
 258 
 280 
 
 272 
 294 
 
 PAGK 
 
 Progressions in our existence. . . . 229 
 Progress in theology probable. . . [218 
 Probable proofs, by being added, 
 not only increase evi- 
 dence, but multiply it. . . 294 
 Probability should influence prac- 
 tice 254 
 
 Profane history corroborates 
 
 Scripture statements. . . 287 
 Proofs of Christianity 
 
 a touchstone of honesty [259 
 
 level to common men 260 
 
 some important ones omitted 
 
 in this treatise, and why. 304 
 
 why not more plain 261 
 
 Prophecy 
 
 a joint review of prophecies 
 furnishes a far stronger 
 proof than examination 
 
 in detail 294 
 
 a series of, being applicable to 
 certain events, is proof 
 that it was intended of 
 
 them 276 
 
 compared to compiled me- 
 moirs 278 
 
 created the expectation of a 
 
 Messiah 284 
 
 confirmed by appearances. . . . 292 
 
 evidence from 275 
 
 expressed in figurative lan- 
 guage 275 
 
 how understood by ancient 
 
 Jews 277 
 
 in relation to the Jews 284 
 
 is history anticipated 281 
 
 its obscurity 275 
 
 its proofs amazingly strong. . [207 
 may not always have been un- 
 derstood by the writer. . 278 
 
 proves foresight 276, 279 
 
 sometimes obscured by inter- 
 preters 210 
 
 summary of, concerning Christ 284 
 
 use of, to future ages 249 
 
 writers upon 277, 285 
 
 304 
 
 Prophet, Christ a. 
 
 240 
 
 30^ 
 
354 
 
 INDEX TO PART 11. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Prcpbets 
 
 not the authors of what they 
 
 wrote 278 
 
 their sense of their predictions 
 not necessarily the whole 
 
 sense 278 
 
 whether they had in view the 
 events which Christians 
 consider fulfilments. . . . 277 
 
 Proverbial, use of the word 201 
 
 Providence, never hasty [229 
 
 objections to it useless. . . 300, 301 
 the course of, progressive. . . . 229 
 
 Province of reason 220 
 
 Prudence, its best plans often 
 
 frustrated 247 
 
 often requires us to act with 
 . uncertain prospect of 
 
 success 247,- 248 
 
 Punishment 
 
 follows wickedness, o/ course. . 231 
 
 instances of vicarious 244 
 
 not always avoided by reforma- 
 tion 235 
 
 not promiscuously inflicted. . . 243 
 provision made for escaping 
 
 it 232, 311 
 
 we cannot of ourselves escape 
 
 it 234 
 
 we cannot know why such and 
 
 such are inflicted 231 
 
 Quotations. 
 
 Angus [202, 223 
 
 Augustine note 187 
 
 Arnobius [269 
 
 Clemens Romanus [266 
 
 Davidson [294 
 
 Fitzgerald [303 
 
 Grotius [259 
 
 Guizot [229 
 
 Hurd [276 
 
 Dr. Johnson [288 
 
 Mahomet [268 
 
 Powell [230 
 
 Warburton [217, 223 
 
 Whately [206 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Rashness of interpreters 210 
 
 of treating religion lightly. . . 197 
 Reason 
 
 could not have invented Chris- 
 tianity 206 
 
 could not ascertain the power 
 
 of penitence 194 
 
 discovers our relation to God 
 
 the Father 194 
 
 but not our relation to the Son 
 
 and Holy Ghost. . . 194, 196 
 
 its limits very narrow [223 
 
 its proper province 220 
 
 must have right principles. . . 220 
 
 needs the aid of experience in 
 judging of the conse- 
 quences of actions 246 
 
 not suflBicient to construct a 
 system of natural reli- 
 gion free from supersti- 
 tion 1&6 
 
 our only faculty for judging 
 
 even revelation 210 
 
 requires the importance of a 
 question to be taken into 
 account 295 
 
 teaches nothing of the certain 
 means of either temporal 
 or spiritual good 197 
 
 very incompetent to judge 
 what a revelation ought 
 
 to be 210-212 
 
 Reasoning by analogy to any 
 extent, leaves the mind 
 
 unsatisfied 29fl 
 
 Redemption 
 
 agreeable to our natural no- 
 tions 235 
 
 analogous to natural remedies. 232 
 
 conjectures about it must be 
 
 uncertain 242 
 
 mode of, not discoverable by 
 
 reason 243 
 
 men not competent judges of 
 
 its plan 24£ 
 
 on whom are its benefits. . note 237 
 
 Scripture account of ... . 239, 24C 
 
INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 855 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Kedemption, (continued.) 
 
 we should be thankful for it, 
 •without disputing how it 
 was procured 242 
 
 Keferences to other authors. 
 
 Alexander [269 
 
 Apthorpe [285 
 
 Bayle [301 
 
 Benson [215 
 
 Birk. : [266 
 
 Blaney [285 
 
 Blunt [266 
 
 Boiingbroke [265 
 
 Boswell [288 
 
 Boyle [264 
 
 Butler [190, 272 
 
 Campbell [264 
 
 Celsus [287 
 
 Chalmers [187, 194, 242 
 
 Colliber 195 
 
 Damascenus [287 
 
 Davidson [285 
 
 Diodorus Siculus [287 
 
 Eupolemus [287 
 
 Featley [215 
 
 Fitzgerald [193, 206, 207 
 
 Fleetwood [264 
 
 Fuller [285 
 
 Gibbon [268 
 
 Graves [266 
 
 Grotius [266 
 
 Gulick [277 
 
 Hengstenburg [277 
 
 Horseley [277 
 
 Howe [236 
 
 Kurd [285 
 
 Jortin [264, 285 
 
 Julian [257 
 
 King [215, 277 
 
 Lardner [264 
 
 Leland [187 
 
 Longinus [287 
 
 Lyall [277 
 
 McCosh [187 
 
 Mackintosh [223 
 
 Magee [236, 242 
 
 Manasses [237 
 
 PAQB 
 
 References, (cojitlnued.) 
 
 Menander [287 
 
 Michaelis [215 
 
 Mills [207 
 
 Newman [235 
 
 Numenius [287 
 
 Owen [24? 
 
 Paley [205, 266, 268 
 
 Pascal [187, 223 
 
 Pfaffius [264 
 
 Phlegon [287 
 
 Phoenician Annals [287 
 
 Pliny [287 
 
 Porphyry. 279, [287 
 
 Samuel Stanhope Smith [206 
 
 Solinus [287 
 
 Spinoza [215 
 
 Stapfer [242 
 
 Storr [215 
 
 Strabo [287 
 
 Suetonius [287 
 
 Tacitus [287 
 
 Taylor [264 
 
 Tindall [196, 248 
 
 Tucker [264 
 
 Turretin [242 
 
 Vitringa [276 
 
 Warburton [187 
 
 Waterland [195 
 
 Watson [264 
 
 Waugh [277, 285 
 
 Wayland [188, 236 
 
 Whately [206, 268, 288 
 
 Witsius [264 
 
 Reformation does not always pre- 
 clude punishment 235 
 
 Regard due to the Son and Holy 
 
 Spirit 195 
 
 Regard to God as Creator, the 
 essence of natural reli- 
 gion 195 
 
 Rejection of Christ by many,at first, 
 
 the argument from it. . . [269 
 foretold 285 
 
 Relations, being learned, duties 
 
 are perceived 194 
 
356 
 
 INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 Relatif/os of man to Deity 194 
 
 to fche Son and Holy Ghost. . . 195 
 Religion 
 
 a practical thing 298 
 
 a question of fact 301, 304 
 
 aflfords particular reasous for 
 
 miracles 208 
 
 confirmed hy the establish- 
 ment of a church 191 
 
 considered as external and 
 
 internal 195 
 
 doubt of its evidence does not 
 release from moral obli- 
 gation 254 
 
 has its end on all persons to 
 
 whom proposed. . . 303, [303 
 if true, why susceptible of any 
 
 possible doubt? 299 
 
 its acceptance safe 295 
 
 its general spirit intimated 200, 201 
 
 its great importance 254 
 
 its introduction into the world 206 
 its reasonableness fully shown, 
 if it can only be proved 
 that it may be reason- 
 able 301 
 
 its very nature overlooked by 
 those who insist that it 
 should have overwhelm- 
 ing evidence 302 
 
 may be true, though doubtful. 299 
 must be judged by its evi- 
 dences taken together. . . 294 
 
 not a thing reasoned out 206 
 
 not equally taught to all men. 206 
 objections to it removed by 
 
 analogy 300 
 
 presupposes candor in those 
 
 who examine it 256,302, [303 
 reason may judge of its mo- 
 rality 220 
 
 reasonable, for aught which 
 can be shown to the 
 
 contrary 301 
 
 the perception of. 302 
 
 the view of it taken in this 
 
 treatise 299 
 
 Religion, {continued.) 
 
 the evidence for it may be 
 lessened, but cannot be 
 destroyed 295 
 
 why its evidences are allowed to 
 
 admit of doubt. 249, 253, 299 
 
 Relief for evils provided 232 
 
 Remedial nature of Christianity. [193 
 Remedies 
 
 provided in nature 219, 232 
 
 may be unskilfully used 220 
 
 show the compassion of 
 
 God 233 
 
 and also his strictness 234 
 
 Repentance 
 
 cannot cancel guilt 236, [236 
 
 general sense of mankind on 
 
 the subject 236 
 
 its efiicacy not taught by na- 
 tural religion [190 
 
 its efficacy taught in the Scrip- 
 tures 190 
 
 not sufficient to preclude 
 
 disaster 234, 235 
 
 Revelation 
 
 a particular part of a great 
 
 plan 224 
 
 accounts for the Theism of the 
 
 Jews [206 
 
 at the beginning of the world, 
 
 would not be miraculous 205 
 
 cannot be neglected with im- 
 punity 260-262 
 
 considered as miraculous, chap. ii. 
 
 considered historically 281 
 
 difference between its facts 
 
 and its principles [235 
 
 discovers new relations, and so 
 
 new duties 194 
 
 distinguished from natural re- 
 ligion 195 
 
 does not compel assent 253 
 
 has twice been universal. . . . [248 
 
 how it could be overturned. . . 214 
 
 its disclosures, of course, could 
 not have been antici- 
 pated 211, 21J 
 
INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 357 
 
 Revelation, {continued.) 
 
 its measure of evidence puts 
 
 us on probation 253 
 
 its facts necessarily singular. [235 
 
 no more dififerent from the 
 course of nature than 
 some parts of the course 
 of nature are different 
 from other parts 312 
 
 necessar}'^ chap. i. 
 
 republishes and confirms na- 
 tural religion 188, 189 
 
 nothing incredible in it 271 
 
 teaches that God's laws are 
 
 compassionate 236 
 
 the use of unwritten revela- 
 tion 213 
 
 what is to be expected in reve- 
 lation 210, 212 
 
 Reverence for the will of God. . . [199 
 Ridicule of Scripture 
 
 an offence against natural 
 
 piety 286 
 
 easier than examination 259 
 
 the great weakness of being 
 
 influenced by it 280 
 
 Roman Empire mentioned 279 
 
 Rules for health very fallible and 
 
 inexact 302 
 
 of Biblical interpretation. . . . [215 
 
 Sacrifices 
 
 commanded •. . . . 241 
 
 expiatory 239 
 
 how the ancients regarded 
 
 them 242 
 
 learned by the heathen from 
 
 tradition 241 
 
 really efficacious 242 
 
 the prevalence of. 236 
 
 Sacrifice of Christ 
 
 an objection to it 243 
 
 how efficacious, not taught. . . . 242 
 
 proper and real 239-241 
 
 puts us into a capacity for 
 
 salvation 242 
 
 voluntary 244 
 
 Safety an important consideration 
 
 in judging 294 
 
 Satirical writings, how under- 
 stood 276, 27? 
 
 Scheme of nature, vast 20* 
 
 progressive 229 
 
 Scheme of providence, if under- 
 stood, would justify facts 
 which are objected to. . . 300 
 Schemes, the best may be discon- 
 certed 247 
 
 Science confirms Scripture history 287 
 
 Scorn of prophetic diction 210 
 
 Scripture 
 
 announces a general restora- 
 tion of things 282 
 
 antiquity of, 287 
 
 characters evidently not feigned 287 
 confirmed by profane authors. 288 
 confirmed by the state of the 
 
 earth 287 
 
 considered historically 281 
 
 contains an abridged history 
 
 of the world 282 
 
 exposed to criticism 283 
 
 expounded by itself. [202 
 
 gives a history of this world as 
 
 God's world 281 
 
 gives an account of civil go- 
 vernments only as they 
 
 affected religion 282 
 
 has internal evidence of truth 287 
 
 history genuine 265 
 
 how distinguished from other 
 
 books 281-283 
 
 how to be interpreted [202 
 
 if false could be shown to 
 
 be so 283 
 
 includes a history of thou- 
 sands of years 283 
 
 includes the chronology of 
 nearly four thousand 
 
 years 284 
 
 its authority the great ques- 
 tion, not its contents. . . 214 
 its chronicles confirmed by 
 
 history 287 
 
858 
 
 INDEX TO PART 11. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sv-ripture, (continued.) 
 
 its evidences comprise a series 
 of things of great variety 
 and reaching to the be- 
 ginning of time 263 
 
 its evidences not intended to 
 
 be overpowering 253 
 
 its great proofs are miracles 
 
 and prophecy 26i 
 
 its relation to miracles only 
 to be accounted for on 
 the supposition of their 
 
 truth 265 
 
 its strangeness not surprising. 288 
 
 its style objected to 210 
 
 its truth must be judged of by 
 the evidence taken to- 
 gether 295 
 
 may contain things not yet 
 
 discovered 218 
 
 miracles, their first reception. . 265 
 naturalness of its statements. . 287 
 not composed by rules of art. . 210 
 nothing improbable related in 
 
 any part 287 
 
 not to be judged by precon- 
 ceived expectation 215 
 
 not to be judged exactly as 
 
 other books 214 
 
 ordinary rules of interpreta- 
 tion [215 
 
 our duty to search it. . . . 202, 262 
 precepts, some give offence. . . 210 
 reveals our relation to the Son 
 
 and Holy Spirit 194 
 
 the possibility of its truth de- 
 mands investigation. . . . 258 
 truths not discoverable by 
 
 reason 203 
 
 variety of topics introduced. . 283 
 
 written in a rude age 283 
 
 why it describes creation. . . . 282 
 Searching the Scriptures a great 
 
 duty 202 
 
 Self-deceit, our liability to it. . . . 262 
 Serious apprehension may com- 
 port with doubt 313 
 
 PAQK 
 
 Shameful mistakes of philosophers [230 
 
 Similarity of objections to reli- 
 gion and nature 298 
 
 Sincerity of belief proved by 
 
 dying for it 270 
 
 Skepticism no justification of irre- 
 
 ligion 253 
 
 Sorrow cannot of itself restore 
 
 abused benefits 234 
 
 Speaking with tongues [217 
 
 Speculative difficulties similar to 
 
 external temptations. . . . 256 
 the chief trial of some. . . 257, 259 
 
 Spread of Christianity unaccount- 
 able if it were an im- 
 posture 290 
 
 Standing ministry, what for. . . . [191 
 
 Strangeness of some Scripture 
 
 events 288 
 
 Stupidity of the martyrs, if in- 
 sincere [269 
 
 Subserviences, the world a system 
 
 of. 229 
 
 Success, temporal, always uncer- 
 tain 302 
 
 Suffering, ignorance does not pre- 
 vent it either in tempo- 
 ral or spiritual things. . . 196 
 
 Sufferings of Christ vindicate 
 
 God's law 244 
 
 of the early Christians 269 
 
 SufBciency of light of nature pre- 
 
 .tended 186 
 
 Summary of Jewish history 284 
 
 of the historical evidence of 
 
 Scripture 292 
 
 Supernatural instructions neces- 
 sary from the first. .... [206 
 
 Temporal interests not always 
 
 discerned 247, 248 
 
 managed by prudent persons 
 on the very principles 
 proposed by religion as 
 to spiritual interests 298, 299 
 
 Temporal interests often decided 
 by considerations which 
 
INDEX TO PART II. 
 
 359 
 
 fall short of demonstra- 
 tion 299 
 
 Temporary commands, distin- 
 guished from perpetual. [188 
 Temptation 
 
 a wholesome discipline 256 
 
 earthly and spiritual similar. . 256 
 
 calls forth virtuous effort 257 
 
 Testimony 
 
 oan be destroyed only by 
 counter-testimony, or by 
 the incompetency of the 
 
 witness 274 
 
 for miracles not mentioned in 
 Scripture, does not im- 
 pair the testimony for 
 those there recorded. . . . 273 
 of Paul, separate and inde- 
 pendent 266 
 
 of profane authors to the truth 1 
 
 of Scripture history. . . . [287 I 
 of the first Christians. . . . 269, 271 j 
 must be judged candidly. . . . [259 ' 
 none counter to Christianity. . 275 I 
 slight, overcomes strong pre. | 
 
 sumptions 20S i 
 
 unconfuted, must be admitted. 273 I 
 value af, lessened by enthu- 
 siasm 271 
 
 Theism of the Jews accounted 
 
 for [206 
 
 Theology of the Bible, not to be 
 
 corrected [202 
 
 Things which it is unreasonable 
 
 to dispute 307 
 
 Thoughtlessness of men 233 
 
 Tradition teaches that there was 
 a revelation at the be- 
 ginning 205 
 
 of the fall of man 311 
 
 Transubstantiation [205 
 
 Trial by speculative difl&culties, 
 
 analogous to other trials. 256 
 
 True philosophy inductive [230 
 
 Truth 
 
 of Christianity proved, unless 
 the whole of its history 
 
 PAGE 
 
 and influence can be ac- 
 counted for by accident. . 295 
 
 Truth, how developed [218 
 
 the, of an event may be fully 
 proved, though no one 
 of sundry proofs may be 
 
 complete 296 
 
 whether there is any such 
 
 thing, denied by skeptics 305 
 
 Twofold efi"ect of the analogical 
 
 argument 306 
 
 Unbelievers, acknowledgment of . 289 
 cannot deny a conformity be- 
 tween prophecy and 
 events 293 
 
 Understanding, its right use 245 
 
 Undesigned coincidences in Bible 
 
 history [266 
 
 Un determinate language deceives 
 
 many 297 
 
 Unequal distribution of religious 
 
 knowledge 249 
 
 Unfair dealing of objectors 297 
 
 Unreasonableness of applying to 
 
 passion for guidance. . . . 295 
 
 Unsatisfactory evidence, men 
 often obliged to act 
 upon it 302 
 
 Variety in the distribution of 
 
 God's gifts 249, 312 
 
 Vastness of the scheme of nature. 204 
 Veracity of the first Christians. . . 274 
 Vicarious punishments witnessed 
 
 every day 244 
 
 deter from sin ,. 245 
 
 Vice 
 
 appointed to be punished. ... 231 
 blinds men to just evidence. . . 255 
 its eflFects in the present world 234 
 its natural consequences are 
 
 God's judicial inflictions. 197 
 
 its real enormity 234 
 
 not palliated by any supposed 
 lack of evidence for reli- 
 gion 256 
 
860 
 
 INDEX TO PART 11. 
 
 Vindication of religion by ana- 
 logy impossible 296 
 
 of the character of God, not 
 attempted in this trea- 
 tise 299, 300 
 
 Way of salvation for the helpless [186 
 "Will of God, as absolute or con- 
 ditional 261 
 
 World, wickedness of. 238 
 
 "Worship, mode of, a matter of 
 
 pure revelation 195 
 
 Writers 
 
 on the atonement [242 
 
 Christian sacraments [195 
 
 miracles [264, 268 
 
 necessity of revelation [187 
 
 prophecy [277-285 
 
 Scripture difficulties [215 
 
 undesigned coincidences. . . . [266 
 
 xju siro. 
 
Date Due 
 
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