u!3R/,kY of PrjNCETON 
 
 HEOLO'-IC" SEMINARY 
 
TRUTH AS REVEALED ; 
 
 OR, 
 
 VOLUNTARYISM AND FREE CHURCHISM 
 
 OPPOSED TO THE WORD OF GOD ; 
 
 WITH 
 
 AN ANSWER TO THE PROTEST 
 
 LEFT ON THE 
 
 TABLE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN MAY 1843. 
 
 / 
 
 THE REV. GEORGE SMITH, 
 
 MIOTSTEE OF BtRSE. 
 
 " Truth is the last link of many long chains, the first links of all of which 
 nature has placed in our hands .... if we stop before we have arrived 
 at the last, mamtaining that there cannot be yet another hnk after that which 
 we have reached, it matters not how far we may have advanced. Truth is still 
 beyond us."— Zfrown'* Philosophy of the Human Mind. 
 
 EDINBURGH: MYLES MACPHAIL. 
 
 LONDON : SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, AND CO. 
 
 M.DCCC.XLVII. 
 
WILLIAM MA.CPUAIL, rRINTEK, 2 GREKNSIDli PLACE, KDINBLKUU. 
 
:f PSIITOaTOIT 
 
 % 
 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Page 
 
 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS BEGABDING ESTABLISHMENTS, 1 
 
 Interest felt regarding the Voluntary and Free Church Controversies ; Identity 
 of these Parties in their Objection to an Establishment ; Ground of this Ob- 
 jection ; Alleged Surrender of Spiritual Independence ; Voliuitaryisin Defined ; 
 All its Objections to an Establishment. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 GROUNDS OF COLLISION, . - 11 
 
 Charge of Surrendering Independence ; Original Transaction between Church 
 and State; Church's Rule; Reasons of Obhgation to adhere to it; Whole 
 Grounds of CoUision between Churcli aud Civil Power ; First Ground Exa- 
 mined; Second; Third. 
 
 CHAP. m. 
 
 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED, - - 28 
 
 Claim respecting Spiritual Independence ; What it is not ; What it is ; Logical 
 Definition ; Proved by Free Church ; by Volimtaiies ; Involves an Absurdity 
 Monstrous Results ; Contrary to God's Word. 
 
 CHAP. rv. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO WHICH SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE IS LIABLE, .50 
 
 Objections to Spiritual Independence ; Alleged Erastianism of EstabHslmient ; 
 Wliat it is not ; Wliat it is ; Civil Obligation ; Correct View of; Aualngies 
 from Scripture. 
 
*^ CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 ANSWER TO THE PKOTEST OP THE FREE CHURCH, . ^ 
 
 Answer to the Protest; Its Principles; First Disproved; Second Principle ; 
 Principle on wliich Civil Courts proceeded; Acts which the Churcli of Scot- 
 land can be called on to Vindicate; Other Acts; Deposition of Ministers- 
 Interdicts against Preaching ; Free Churchism inconsistent with itself; Gene- 
 ral View of. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 INQUIRY INTO THE SCRIPTURAL AUTHORITY FOR NON-INTRUSION, 90 
 
 Non-Intrusion ; Light in which held ; Logical View of; Prelmiinary Objection ; 
 Prejudice; Persuasion of Mind ; Statement of Reasons; Absurdity in inter- 
 preting Scripture ; Adjudication by Church Courts; Inconsistency; Result of 
 Discussion. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 THE SECOND OBJECTION OP VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED, 102 
 
 Second Objection of Vohmtarj-ism; Apparent Strength; Twofold View; State 
 ought not to give Public Sanction to Religion ; Falsehood of this ; State ouglit 
 not to endow Rehgion ; Meaning of the Objection; Results; Inconsistent with 
 Civil Govenuncut ; State knows Religion ; ObUgations thence arising. 
 
 CHAP. VIIL 
 
 THE THIRD OBJECTION OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED, - 124 
 
 TWrd Objection of Voluntarjism; CoiTcct View of the Ai-ginnent from Scripture; 
 What is an Establishmeut ; Injunctions of Scripture not Inconsistent with it ; 
 Assiuned Prohibition, John xviii. 36 ; No Prohibition in Scriptiu-e ; Result 
 of this; Volimtary's Objections reduced to Expediency; Conclusion. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Note A. Stewarton Case - . J41 
 
 Note B. Anti-Patronage , . 142 
 
 Note C. True principle of Voluntaryism . . ,/,_ 
 
 Note D. Puseyism and the right of private judgment - - 145 
 

 YT n T^ rn 
 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 It may be naturally asked, why an attempt should 
 now be made to bring again into view, controversies 
 which from many considerations ought rather to be 
 allowed to rest in quiet. No intention of this sort has 
 been the motive leading to the present publication. 
 But when engaged in reflection on the first principles 
 of these controversies, the Author became convinced 
 that false conclusions had been drawn from them, 
 and that much misapprehension existed regardino^ 
 them, it seemed but a small tribute to the cause of a 
 great national institution, to attempt an exposure of 
 these misrepresentations. 
 
 A strict regard to truth does not warrant the asser- 
 tion, that either of the controversies in which the Na- 
 tional Church has recently been involved can be re- 
 garded as at rest. On* the one hand. Voluntaries still 
 avow the same hostility to the principle of Union be- 
 tween Church and State, and their resolution to seek 
 its repudiation. On the other hand, the Free Church 
 party exhibit no return of better feeling, and no increase 
 of a spirit of forbearance toward the Church of Scot- 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 land. They cease not to speak of Ler principles and 
 constitution in terms of unequivocal condemnation, 
 while both their writings and proceedings shew that 
 they refuse to recognize her Scriptural character. 
 
 On neither side therefore, can the hope be enter- 
 tained, that past opposition to the Establishment will be 
 relaxed. In these circumstances it becomes the duty 
 of every well-wisher to its cause to contribute w^hat- 
 ever may tend to strengthen its foundations. 
 
 The Church of Scotland has recently been subjected 
 to a severe and painful ordeal. Loose and inaccurate 
 thinking, aided possibly by regard for favourite notions, 
 has misconceived or misrepresented her principles ; 
 and on the ground that these are no longer in accord- 
 ance with the Word of God, the cry for her destruc- 
 tion has been raised. Yet, when fair and sound argu- 
 ment is brought to the investigation of her first princi- 
 ples, nothing contrary to Scripture will be found in her 
 existence as a national institution, nor in her present 
 constitution as recognized in the statutes of the king- 
 dom. We concede no weakness in the principles of our 
 Church. We bespeak not for her, in such a light, the 
 sympathies of men. We plead not in extenuation of 
 her present position, dissevered it may be from many 
 who were formerly her friends, that the rust of time 
 has obscured her ancient scriptural beauty and simpli- 
 city. Knowing that the Church of Scotland has 
 
PREFACE. VU 
 
 nothing to fear from the strictest application of the 
 test of divine truth, we boldly say in her defence, if 
 her jmnciples he not in accordance with the Word of God, 
 let her name perish fvm the earth. 
 
 But while thus confident of the purity of our own 
 Church, we have arrived at a different conclusion re- 
 specting the principles opposed to her. To many 
 of these the admission cannot be conceded, that they 
 have any foundation in truth. On the other hand, 
 close inquiry has forced on us the conviction, that 
 neither the Voluntary nor the Free Church cause can 
 be maintained in reason or in Scripture, and by con- 
 sequence that both of these parties have been main- 
 taining a needless and unjustifiable opposition to a 
 great national good. 
 
 The grounds on which our assertion rests, are set 
 forth in the following pages ; the thoughts in which 
 have not been hastily adopted, but are the result of 
 mature and deliberate reflection. 
 
 The Author desires to cast no imputation on those 
 who have espoused opposite views on the subjects in 
 question. To their own master they stand or fall. 
 But as he maintains strongly the cause w^ith which he 
 has become associated in these painfully exciting times, 
 he feels justified in attempting to expose the false 
 reasoning of his opponents, and in laying before the 
 
Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 world the vindication of the principles which he main- 
 tains. 
 
 If no other good shall arise from this publication, the 
 language of a foreign writer, whose name of late has not 
 been in much repute, may be adopted. " I did hope 
 that if I gained nothing else, yet I would obtain this, 
 that they seeing our arguments, would become more 
 calm, and would think that we did not without reason 
 dissent from them." (Erastus — Br. i?. Zee's transla- 
 tion.) 
 
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS REGARDING THE 
 ESTABLISHMENT. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTEREST FELT BEGARDING THE VOLCVTAKT AND FREE CHURCH CONTRO- 
 VERSIES — IDENTITY OF THESE PARTIES IN THEIK OBJECTION TO AN ES- 
 TABLISHMENT — GROUND OF THIS OBJECTION — ALLEGED SURRENDER OF 
 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE VOLUNTARYISM DEFINED — ALL ITS OBJEC- 
 TIONS TO AN ESTABLISHMENT. 
 
 Of those questions to which public attention has of late 
 been directed, and in the discussion of which much in- 
 terest has been excited, no one has occupied larger room 
 than that of the proper position of the Church and State 
 towards each other. That the discussion of this question 
 should have awakened considerable measure of attention, 
 is not sui'prising, for it is one of no small importance to 
 the progress and influence of religion, and the best inter- 
 ests of society. 
 
 If the footing on which the outward frame-work of re- 
 ligion has hitherto been placed in this country be wrong, 
 and if the machinery employed for the promulgation of 
 divine truth, has been, or continues to be at the present 
 moment, contrary to the Word of God, or reasonable infer- 
 ence therefrom, then the divine blessing cannot be expect- 
 ed. Just in proportion as this frame-work and machinery 
 have been opposed to the plain principles of Scripture, must 
 it be assumed, that religion itself, and vital piety in the 
 land have been injured, and must continue to suffer wrong. 
 
 A 
 
2 
 
 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS 
 
 \ et SO long have wo been accustomed to have our religion 
 presented to us by an Establishment, that any doubt re- 
 garding the soundness of that mode of communication was 
 not entertained, at least by the great mass of the commu- 
 nity ; consequently when heavy charges against it were, 
 at length, brought forward, it would have been amazing 
 if public attention had not been awakened and public in- 
 terest deeply excited. Such have been the effects produced 
 by the two great controversies which have recently been 
 carried on respecting Establishments. 
 
 In the first instance, no small degree of excitement 
 arose from the Voluntary Controversy, whose abettors as- 
 serted that the principle of national Establishments was 
 unsound, and that any union between the Church and the 
 State was not accordant with Scripture, and ought to be 
 repudiated. By the next great controversy, viz. that with 
 the Free Church party, public interest, at least in Scot- 
 land, was excited in a still higher degree. The assertion of 
 this, the second controversy was, that though the existence 
 of an Establishment was right in principle, yet there 
 ought not to exist any Civil interference with the Church, 
 in the discharge of her spiritual and ecclesiastical func- 
 tions, and that the interference which the Civil Courts 
 claimed and exercised over the Establishment, was opposed 
 to the AVord of God. Betwixt these two controversies such 
 have been the excitement and feverish agitation produced 
 in men's minds, that of the great masses now connected 
 with the one party or the other, few, perhaps, have been 
 able to take a cool and dispassionate view of the opt-, 
 nions and principles which have been thrust upon them ; 
 or, by accurate investigation to test the accordance of 
 such principles with truth. For want of this dispassionate 
 reflection, to the exercise of which the heat of controversy 
 must ever be unfavourable, strange and even false princi- 
 ples have been advanced, and unwarily adopted as truth, 
 while multitudes have been led into the assertion of opi- 
 nions, whereof they would be heartily ashamed had they 
 employed snfficient time and pains to know them better. 
 
 Now that the heat of the controversies may be said, in 
 some measure to have subsided, and that the storm of 
 passion and prejudice has been succeeded by the calm and 
 the quiet of comparative peace, it may be useful to the 
 cause of truth to take a survey of some of the principles 
 advanced, for the purpose of educing their true charac- 
 ter. 
 
AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT. 3 
 
 On those who, dissatisfied with the argument in favour 
 of a national Establishment, or with the principles on which 
 the legislature chooses to recognize it, have already taken 
 their place beyond its communion, such a survey, what- 
 ever may be its results, cannot be expected to have much 
 practical influence. These persons have adopted their 
 views with apparent deliberation, and have openly avowed 
 them before the world ; and the past history of human 
 nature leads us to the conclusion, that in such circum- 
 stances men will not be very open to the conviction of 
 error, nor even, though convinced of it, be very ready to 
 change^ their conduct. But to those still recognizing the 
 validity of the argument for a national Establishment, 
 and seeing nothing in the principles acted on by the legis- 
 lature, respecting it, to detach them from its communion, 
 a close investigation of the principles involved in the late 
 controversies, may be productive of good. If it shall ap- 
 pear that principles have been avowed, and are openly 
 acted on, which are opposed to reason, and unsupported 
 by the Word of God, the effect must be to attach still more 
 firmly to the cause of Establishments every one of its ad- 
 herents, and to render him thankful that, in the heat of 
 public excitement, he was not led away into the ranks of 
 its adversaries. 
 
 Although the systems of the Voluntary and of the 
 Free Churchman be, in some respects, dissimilar, yet 
 in others they are completely identical. They differ 
 in this, that while the former rejects the Establish- 
 ment principle, the latter maintains it — that while it is 
 the avowed object of the Voluntary to effect the demo- 
 lition of all Church Establishments, and to obtain the 
 recognition of the principle, that there shall be no nation- 
 al support or countenance given to religion, it is the object 
 of the Free Churchman to plead for the adoption of a na- 
 tional Establishment on his own terms and conditions. 
 Both parties, however, in this country, are identical to this 
 extent, that they maintain an opposition to the present 
 Established Church of Scotland on the assumed ground of 
 the fundamental principles which she recognizes. To 
 these principles the concession is denied, that they are ac- 
 cordant with truth, a position so firmly maintained by 
 the ministers of the Free Church, that they hesitate to ac- 
 knowledge the ministers of the Establishment as true mi- 
 nisters of Christ. 
 
 The point of identity between the two systems opposed 
 to the Church of Scotland, is that which respects the prin- 
 
4 STATEMENT OV OBJECTIONS 
 
 ciple of spii-itual independence. By either party, this in- 
 dependence is asserted in its M'idest form, and the smallest 
 limitation of it is declared to bo a sinful invasion of the 
 Church's Scriptural character. As illustrative of the views 
 held on this subject, we shall cite the language of the par- 
 ties themselves. Dr. Wai-dlaw, the eloquent advocate of the 
 former system, says of it* — " To the Church, regarded in it- 
 self, we cheerfully grant, there are no terms that can be con- 
 demned as excessive in the assertionof her independence — 
 her independence I of course mean of all earthly authority. 
 In all that has been said, or that can be said on this point, 
 we Voluntaries more than acquiesce. It is for this in- 
 dependence that we make our stand. It is because we 
 Avould not have it any way or in any measure qualified, that 
 we disown and resist the Church's Establishment by the 
 State, for it is clear as day that such Establishment involves, 
 and must involve a qualifying of this independence: The 
 Church considered in itself was founded, and its constitu- 
 tion dictated by the supreme authority of its only Head. 
 That authority was exercised through his inspired vicege- 
 rents, the twelve apostles, and with the constitution of the 
 Redeemer's kingdom as originally settled by that autho- 
 rity, no power on earth ever had, has now, or ever can 
 have a right to interfere." On the part of the Free Church 
 we have the language of Dr. Chalmers, in his published 
 speech delivered in the General Assembly 1839, on the 
 Auchterarder debate. " Such then is the precise footing 
 on which the Church enters into that alliance with the 
 State, by which it becomes what is termed a national 
 Church, or an Established Church, or a Religious national 
 Establishment. It may have subsisted for many ages as 
 a Christian Church, Avith all its tenets and its usages, not 
 as prescribed by human authority, but as founded either 
 on the Word of God, or on their own independent views 
 of Christian expediency — meaning by this their OAvn views 
 of what is best for the good of imperishable souls. None 
 of these things were given up to the State at the time 
 when the Church entered into an alliance with it : but 
 one and all of them remained as intact and inviolable, 
 after this alliance, as before it. She did not make over 
 her liberties to the State, at the time when she entered 
 into fellowship with it in this new character of a national 
 Establishment ; she only made over her services." As in 
 some measure a commentary on the meaning of the inde- 
 
 * ])r. Wardlaw's Lectures on Establishments, p. 4, Popular Edition. 
 
AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT. O 
 
 pendence of the Church here claimed, and of its practical 
 bearing on the exercise of her functions, we niay also in- 
 sert the views which Dr. Cunningham has given of the 
 same principle contended for in the recent controversy :* 
 — " Our principle is, that the courts of Christ's Chiirch, 
 in determining whether they will admit and ordain or 
 not, and whether they will depose or not, are bound to 
 be regulated solehf by a regard to Christ's revealed will, 
 and their own conscientious convictions of duty." ^ These 
 extracts may tend to shew on the one hand the identity 
 of the two systems, as respects the claim of spiritual 
 independence held to be essential to the Chm-ch's proper 
 character, and on the other, the idea attached to this inde- 
 pendence. From the identity of view between Yolun- 
 tarpsm and Free Churchism, 'there necessarily arises be- 
 tween them an agreement in condemning the Established 
 Church of Scotland. According to these parties, our 
 Church has denuded herself of independence, having basely 
 surrendered it to the State, for the sake of the en- 
 dowments granted to her. On this ground, her consti- 
 tution is objected to, as based on principles opposed to the 
 Word of God, and derogatory to the honour of her great 
 Head. 
 
 Now, in so far as it is objected by either of these parties 
 against the constitution of the Church of Scotland, that 
 there is implied in it a limitation of the spiritual inde- 
 pendence claimed by the Voluntary for the Church in all 
 circumstances, and by the ministers of the Free Church 
 before the late secession from the Establishment, the ob- 
 jection is just. No Established Church can, without 
 'making the fundamental principles of her constitu- 
 tion an absurdity, and an outrage on all common sense, 
 possess the spiritual independence of which these parties 
 speak. No Established Church can have independence in 
 the sense which implies unrestricted liberty, to intei-pret 
 Scripture as she pleases, and so to deviate from that 
 rule of doctrine, discipline, and government, which has 
 been sanctioned by the State. Adherence to this rule, as 
 exhibiting her past interpretation of Scripture, and an ob- 
 liiration to what is there alone expressed, are essential 
 features of an Established Church, and such independence 
 as is inconsistent with this view of her connection with the 
 State, the Church of Scotland never possessed, and could 
 not have surrendered. 
 
 * Vide " Witness," Jan. 29, 1S42. 
 
6 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS 
 
 But in so far as any conclusion, adverse to the soundness 
 and Scriptural character of her present constitution, or to 
 the principle of Establishments generally, is drawn from 
 the assert;ion, that such surrender or limitation has been 
 made, and is openly avowed, that conclusion is entirely 
 false. It is altogether gratuitous assumption to say, that 
 because an Established Church cannot possess spiritual in- 
 dependence in the widest sense of the term, that because 
 she is bound by civil statute to adhere to the rule of doc- 
 trine, discipline, and government originally approved by 
 the State, therefore, the entire principle of an Establish- 
 ment is unsound, and contrary to the Word of God. This 
 is taking for granted the very thing Avhich yet remains to 
 be proved, namely, that an JEstablished Church ought to 
 possess such spiritual independence as has been claimed, 
 or has been guilty of any violation of principle in having 
 surrendered it, and that it is essential to the Scriptural 
 character of the Church to enjoy a higher degree of spiri- 
 tual independence than either is, or at least may be had 
 within the walls of an Establishment. When these points 
 are proved, then the conclusion will be just, that the pre- 
 sent constitution of the Church of Scotland is unsound, or 
 as it has been termed, Erastian;* and that the princi- 
 ple of an Establishment, repudiating as it necessarily 
 does, any other spiritual independence than what is en- 
 joyed under the rule sanctioned by the State, is in vio- 
 lation of the Word of God. That such views of the 
 importance and necessity of this independence to the 
 Church's proper character were adopted by parties who 
 have now left the Establishment, or that such views are 
 held by other parties, who, on this very ground, are ini- 
 mical to its cause, is no argument for their soundness. 
 Either or both of these parties may choose to condemn 
 the cause of Establishments, because the principles on 
 which they are recognised by the Legislature happen not 
 to coincide with their peculiar notions, but the questions 
 after all remain to be solved. Is the ground of this con- 
 demnation just ? Is that spiritual independence, the limit- 
 
 • Throughout the whole of this discussion, the term Erastian is used, 
 not as having any reference to the opinions of Erastus, but simply as 
 the terra which, by common usage, has been employed to denote the 
 wrong which the Church, when Established, may suffer from the State. 
 The recent translation of the opinions of Erastus, shews how little simi- 
 larity there is betwixt these and the wrong which has received ita appel- 
 lation from his name. 
 
AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT. 7 
 
 ation of which is avowed by the Established Church of 
 Scotland, and which, in the very nature of things, must 
 be held as limited in every Establishment, an essential 
 part of the Church's spiritual character ? Does the want 
 of spiritual independence, as understood by our oppon- 
 ents, render the defence of the principle of an Establish- 
 ment hopeless? An affirmative answer has been given 
 to these questions without any close investigation, but 
 when such investigation is brought to bear upon the 
 points at issue, it will be found that the answer has^ been 
 given rashly ; and, moreover, that this answer is in op- 
 position to the soundest conclusions of reason, and the 
 plainest principles of the Word of God. 
 
 In maintaining, as we now mean to do, that the repu- 
 diation of spiritual independence, in the sense understood 
 by the Voluntary and Free Churchman, can form no charge 
 against the Scriptural character of the Church, and that 
 the claim put forth in behalf of this independence is alto- 
 gether unreasonable and unscriptural, we are brought in 
 collision with the entire system of Voluntaryism ; for one 
 of the great objections which Voluntaries have to the prin- 
 ciple of an Establishment is, that it involves, in its very 
 nature, a sinful surrender of the Church's true and Scrip- 
 tural liberty. Before the late Secession the advocates of 
 the Free Church, in defending themselves from this objec- 
 tion, maintained that no such surrender of the Church s 
 independence was implied in the existence and constitu- 
 tion of the Church of Scotland, while eventually their 
 determination to uphold this view of the Church's consti- 
 tution, was the cause of the late conflict with the Civil 
 courts ; and, finally, of their separation from the Esta- 
 blishment. In the 'views so put forth and acted upon by 
 the ministers of the Free Church, they adopted principles 
 respecting the constitution of the Establishment which 
 were not recognised b y the State, and which are at variance 
 with sound reason. The Established Church of Scotland 
 does not possess, never possessed, and never ought to pos- 
 sess spiritual independence in the sense in which these 
 parties understood it. Independence in such sense the 
 Church of Scotland has surrendered, and her act in doing 
 so we openly avow and mean to vindicate. In taking this 
 as the ground to be maintained, we are led into the posi- 
 tion of defending the principle of a National Establish- 
 ment without that species of spiritual independence that 
 has been claimed, and of seeking to meet the objection of 
 the Voluntary, that because an Established Church cannot 
 
8 
 
 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS 
 
 possess such independence, there is implied in its constitu- 
 tion a saci-ifice of clear Scriptural principle. 
 
 Before entering upon the discussion of the important 
 subject here opened up, we will take a brief glance at what 
 Voluntaryism itself as a system is. In the first instance, 
 we give Dr. Wardlaw's view of it : " The voluntary prin- 
 ciple is a designation to which we not only do not object, 
 but which we have ourselves adopted, and in which we 
 glory. If any persons will employ the compellation of the 
 Voluntaries as one of derision we cannot help it. We 
 probably like it somewhat better than the compulsories 
 like theirs. I do not like nicknames on either side : but 
 regarding the Voluntaries, as simply meaning the abettors 
 of the Voluntary principle, as the true Scriptural principle 
 for the maintenance and propagation of the Gospel, and 
 the enlargement of the Churcli^ we accept it, and count 
 the scorn associated with the application of it our honour. 
 For what is the Voluntary principle? What but the 
 principle of faith working by love ; what but the principle 
 of zeal for the glory of Christ inspired by his love, and 
 operating in a cheerful contribution and active effort for 
 the support and extension of the knowledge of his name, 
 and the principles of his spiritual reign ? The advocates 
 of the Voluntary principle hold and avow the conviction, 
 that to the operation of this faith, and love, and zeal, 
 and liberality, and effort within the Church of God itself, 
 the Church's exalted Head was pleased to commit his 
 cause on earth."* 
 
 Voluntarism may be said to consist in an opposition to 
 National Establishments, as the Scriptural mode of carry- 
 ing on the great ends for which the Church of Christ exists 
 in the world. This principle of opposition to Establish- 
 ments enters into the very first idea of Voluntarvism. It 
 matters not Avhat may be 'the efficiency of a Church Esta- 
 blishment for spreading the knowledge of divine truth 
 throughout a nation, what maybe its suitableness to bring 
 the sound of salvation to the cars of the poorest, and the 
 most helpless ; what may be its success in offering the in- 
 struction and consolations of the Gospel to those for whose 
 souls no man might otherwise have cared. Still such an 
 institution, in the estimation of the Voluntary, is wrong in 
 principle, it is a violation of the right order" according to 
 Avhich the Church ought to be constituted, and as sudi it 
 ought not to exist. It may be observed here, in order to a 
 
 * Lectures, p. 9. 
 
AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT. 9 
 
 just appreciation of this system, that the opposition Avhich 
 the VoluntaiT manifests to the existence of Establish- 
 ments, is chiefly based, as he alleges, on Scripture, It is 
 not merely because he thinks the Voluntary principle 
 would be more efficient, or would have greater claims in 
 expediency to recommend it than an Establishment, that 
 he objects to the latter. His objection rests upon stronger 
 ground. He objects to an Establishment, for this main 
 reason, that he regards it to be unsct'lptural. His ai-gu- 
 ment is, that a Church Establishment is a violation of the 
 principles laid down in the Word of God regarding the 
 Church's constitution. '• "\Ve are opposed to Establish- 
 ments," says the author above referred to, " because we 
 are deliberately and devoutly convinced, that they are 
 destitute of the authority of Jesus Christ, a human inno- 
 vation upon the divine constitution of the Church." 
 
 The great strength of the objection of the Voluntary to 
 an Establishment thus lies in the assertion of its being 
 unscriptural — of its being an institution contrary to the 
 principles of the Word of God. And the knowledge of 
 this brings us at once to the question, What is it in a 
 Church Establishment that the Voluntary holds to be un- 
 scriptural, and on account of Avhich he pronounces on such 
 institution sentence of condemnation, and seeks to get it 
 uprooted from the land ? The answer to this question will 
 bring out the several objections of his system ; or, in other 
 words, will lead us to see the entire argument by which 
 the Voluntary cause is maintained. 
 
 The objections of Voluntaryism to Church Establish- 
 ments may be stated to be the following, which, though 
 not adduced in the most precise order of their importance, 
 are set down in the most convenient form for discussion. 
 
 1st, The Voluntary objects to an Established Church, 
 because there is involved in the nature of such institution 
 a surrender of that spkitual independence which, in fide- 
 lity to her great Head, she ought to possess. 
 
 '2dly, The Voluntary objects to an Established Church 
 because he holds that the State has nothing to do with re- 
 ligion, and has no right to grant public sanction to it, or 
 to endow its ministers from the national funds. 
 
 odly, The Voluntary objects to an Established Church 
 because he holds that a different mode of provision for her 
 ministers is set forth in Scripture. 
 
 The discussion of these three objections will bring out 
 the chief grounds on which the cause of Voluntarvism 
 
 a2 
 
10 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS, &C. 
 
 rests, although there may be other minor points of the sys- 
 tem which are left unnoticed. 
 
 Our direct concern, properly speaking, is only with the 
 first, the object in view being simply that of defending the 
 principle of a National Establishment from the charge 
 of being unscriptural in its character, because there is 
 involved in such institution an assumed surrender of 
 spiritual independence. But as we were brought in colli- 
 sion while discussing this point, with one of the main ob- 
 jections of Voluntaryism to our cause, it might have been 
 supposed to argue weakness in the system we were advocat- 
 ing, had no reference been made to the other objections. 
 
GROUNDS OF COLLISION BETWEEN CHURCH AND 
 
 STATE. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CHARGE OF StlRREXDERING INDEPENDENCE — OraGIN'AL TRANSACTION BE- 
 TWEEN CHUaCa AND STATE — CHURCU'S RULE REASONS OF OBLIGATION 
 
 TO ADHERE TO IT — WHOLE GROUNDS OF COLLISION BETWEEN CilUKCH 
 AND CIVIL POWER — FIRST GROUND EXAMINED — SECOND — THIRD. 
 
 The advocates of spiritual independence, as the inalien- 
 able privilege of the Church, be they Voluntaries or Free- 
 churchmen, (for herein the two parties agree,) have repre- 
 sented the act of an Establishment, in the surrender or 
 limitation of any part of that independence which they 
 claim, as a wrong of the most grievous magnitude, and 
 they have given it the distinctive name of Erastianism. 
 A Church which surrenders, under any circumstances what- 
 ever, her spiritual independence, has been said to deny the 
 Headship of Christ, and to give up the crown-rights of the 
 Redeemer ; and the Church of Scotland, which has con- 
 sented to regard a limitation of her independence as one 
 of the fundamental principles of her union with the State, 
 has been called by the Free Church party, the creature of 
 the State, the slave of the Civil Courts, an Erastian cor- 
 poration, a moral nuisance which ought to be swept away. 
 
 Of the guilt of all Establishments in surrendering the 
 Church's independence, the same views are held by the 
 Voluntaries generally, though it may be the language used 
 on the subject has been somewhat less offensive in its 
 character. 
 
 " We charge it on Establishments," says Dr. Wardlaw, 
 " as one of their serious evils, that they interfere with the 
 
12 
 
 GROUNDS OF COLLISION 
 
 Scriptural and divinely chartered independence of the 
 Church." " AVhile we consider the requisition of the sur- 
 render, (of spiritual independence,) as in the principle of it 
 on the part of the State, perfectly fair, we denounce com- 
 pliance with the requisition on the part of the Church, as 
 onno Scriptural ground susceptible of vindication ; as a 
 shameless dereliction of herprimary allegiance, a simoniacal 
 sacrifice of the exclusive authority of her Lord for tempo- 
 ral benefits, a sacrifice unjustifiable even on the ground 
 alleged on its behalf of these temporal benefits being sought 
 for spiritual ends."^ 
 
 The wrong whereof Establishments generally, and the 
 Church of Scotland in particular, have been charged as 
 guilty in surrendering to the State the Church's inalienable 
 right of spiritual independence, has assumed the peculiar co- 
 lour attached to it, from the want of clear apprehension of 
 its true nature on the one hand, and of the meaning of 
 spiritual independence on the other. Had the advocates 
 of this principle, distinctly seen the exact nature of the 
 wrong supposed to be done' by the State, in its exercises 
 of power towards an Establishment whose independence 
 has been limited, or had they seen the true character of 
 their own claim on behalf of the Church, there would 
 have remained little ground for the charges adduced against 
 Establishments, or for the language used against them by 
 their opponents. 
 
 It is in this way that we propose to meet the objections 
 urged against Establishments on the ground of their imply- 
 ing a sinful surrender of the Church's spiritual indepen- 
 dence. We mean to point out in the first place all the 
 grounds of collision thatcan possibly exist between the Stcite 
 and the Establishment ; and, in the next place, to state 
 the logical definition and true nature of this independence 
 as claimed. 
 
 In pointing out all the grounds of collision between 
 the parties, means will be afforded to judge how far the 
 Church, as an Establishnient, can be controlled in her 
 sacred functions by the State, and in shewing exactly what 
 spiritual independence is, we shall be enabled to estimate 
 rightly its necessity to the Church's proper character, and 
 the consequent value of the charge that an Establishment 
 does wrong in consenting to its surrender or limitation. 
 
 As a preliminary step to this part of the discussion on 
 which we ai'e entering, it is necessary that a brief review 
 
 * Lectures, p. !>4. 
 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. lo 
 
 should be taken of the original transaction between the 
 Church and the State, when the former was adopted and 
 established as a national Institution. Our attention will 
 necessarily be confined to that respecting the Chui'ch of 
 Scotland, but in the nature of things the same transaction 
 must be held as taking place in the case of every other na- 
 tional Establishment. Historically, the transaction refeiTcd 
 to is easily narrated. " The Presbyterian Church, lately 
 emerged from Popery in Scotland, drew up her Confession 
 of Faith and standards of Government, and laid them before 
 the parliament of the realm, by whom they were sanctioned 
 and embodied in legislative statutes, while upon herministers 
 a permanent temporal provision was bestowed." All this 
 was accomplished at diiferent periods, and amid many 
 difficulties, but it is needless here to consider it in any 
 other light except that of a single simple transaction. 
 Theologically this transaction Avas as follows : — " The 
 Church, in the exercise of her Scriptural independence, 
 drew up in a Avritten form, her own convictions of the will 
 of Christ respecting her doctrine, discipline, and govern- 
 ment. These convictions she laid before the State as her 
 present sense of the will of Christ, ascertained by her from 
 his own Word, and as the rule which she held to be obli- 
 gatory upon her conscience in the discharge of all her 
 spiritual and ecclesiastical functions, and moi'eover, as the 
 rule under which she intended to act when erected into an 
 Established Church. The State approved, and adopted 
 this rule, and endowed the Church, as professing to be 
 guided thereby, granting a legislative sanction to the rule 
 itself, and to the endowment connected with it."* 
 
 Now, although this transaction on the part of the State 
 implied no obligation on the Church, as a Church of Christ, 
 to adhere to those convictions of his will in the matter of 
 her doctrine, discipline, and government, which she had 
 just professed, or, in other words, to abide by that rule 
 which had been legislatively sanctioned, any longer than 
 she pleased, it did imply such an obligation on the Es- 
 tablishment. It did imply that the Church had become 
 formally bound to adhere to this rule so long as she con- 
 tinued to receive the endowments conferred upon her, 
 under the original act of the realm passed in her favour. 
 
 As much of the importance of our future discussion de- 
 pends on making out this obligation clearly, we must here 
 state the grounds on which it rests. 
 
 * Vide Calderwood's History of the Kirk of Scotland, Vol. ii. p. 15 
 and iljby Wodrow Society. 
 
14 GROUNDS OF COLLISION 
 
 There are three separate grounds on which the obligation 
 spoken of must be placed. 
 
 First, if the Church as an Establishment be not bound 
 to adhere to the rule, no conceivable reason can be as- 
 signed for the legal sanction given by the Scottish Parlia- 
 ment to the rule of the " Confession of Faith," and the 
 other powers of the Church recorded in the statutes. The 
 simple and plain view of this transaction is, that the 
 sanction referred to was given to point out to the State, 
 what were the doctrine, discipline, and government of 
 the Church upon which the benefit of an Establishment 
 had been conferred, and conferred too by statute finally 
 and permanently.'^ But if the Church was not bound to 
 adhere to the rule, this could not have been the reason for 
 the legal sanction given, the truth being, that in this ease 
 the rule did not tell the State what were the doctrine, dis- 
 cipline, or government of the Church so endowed. It told 
 the State in so far ; but whether the Church would 
 abide by the rule or not, and whether in deviating she 
 would do so in many or few particulars from it, of all this 
 the State had no means of information. In this light the 
 legal sanction formerly given by the Scottish Parliament, 
 and all those formalities connected with it, recorded in 
 history, were so many acts of legislative inanity and folly, 
 neither meant by those who gave, nor by those who sought 
 them, to serve any purpose at all. 
 
 The Second ground above referred to is this : — If the 
 Church be not bound by the rule, the first principles of 
 the Establishment set reason at defiance. Let us sup- 
 pose, for illustration's sake, the reverse to have been the 
 case, and that in the first transaction between the parties, 
 the Church was left at liberty to deviate at pleasure 
 from the rule sanctioned, yet still continuing to have right 
 to the endowments granted by the original statutes of Par- 
 liament. What a singular position as to principle would 
 the parties have consented to occupy relatively to each 
 other? On the one hand, the Church, acknowledging no 
 obligation to adhere to the original rule, yet retaining her 
 right to the endowments formerly granted by Parliament, 
 would have been maintaining the principle that the State 
 was bound to approve and endow, yea, had actually ap- 
 proved and endowed, not only her present and existent 
 
 * Free Church Catechism, Q. 40 — " Confessions of Faith and Cate- 
 chisms are proper and useful, as exhibitions of Church belief, testimonies 
 against error, &c." How can tiie " Confi-ssion of Faith" and standards 
 of the Church of Scotland serve this purpose to the State, unless the 
 former is bound to adhere to them * 
 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. 15 
 
 convictions of the Word of God as these had been recorded 
 in her " Confession of Faith" and standards, but all her 
 future and non-existent convictions of that Word, however 
 adverse these might eventually become to what she had re- 
 cently professed, or to the State's sense of what these con- 
 victions had been. Nor would it save the Church from 
 the adoption of this anomalous principle, were it asserted 
 that the State could, upon its own responsibility, withdraw 
 the endowments when in any of the former particulars the 
 original rule was renounced. For unless the Church gave 
 consent to this act of the State, that is to say, voluntarily 
 acknowledged her original right to the endowments to be 
 forfeited, she would be condemning the act of the State 
 in taking them away, and so would be asserting the prin- 
 ciple above mentioned. In other words, the Church would 
 be asserting her right while retaining the endowments con- 
 ferred by the State, to follow convictions different from 
 those embodied in the rule, and so would be holding the 
 State to sanction and promote by past enactments what 
 could not have been known, seeing it was not then in exist- 
 ence. 
 
 On the other hand, had the State acquiesed in the Church's 
 power of deviating from the rule without renouncing her 
 temporalities, it would have been acting on principles purely 
 absurd. It would have acknowledged an obligation to 
 sanction and endow those convictions on the part of the 
 Church which it never knew, or could only have known by 
 an act of prescience. None but the Church's present con- 
 victions of divine truth, as these existed in the mind of 
 her original founders, could have been known to the State. 
 Her subsequent convictions of that truth, were not in exist- 
 ence at the time of her endowment, and if these were 
 sanctioned and endowed then by the State, which must 
 have been the case, unless the Church was shut out from 
 adopting convictions different from those expressed in the 
 rule, (that is, unless the Church was bound to adhere to the 
 rule, or leave the Establishment,) the State must be held 
 to have adopted the principle that it was bound to endow 
 what it never knew, or to know what was not in existence. 
 
 Principles such as these, are a violation of all common 
 sense. They require only to be stated to carry their own 
 condemnation with them. In what light are we to regard 
 the learning, talents, and intellectual powers of Knox, 
 Melville, and all those great men, who at various periods 
 were engaged in framing the constitution of our Church, 
 if we suppose that these were the principles on which they 
 
16 GR01ND>: OF COLLISION 
 
 founded the Establishment. In what lipjht are we to re- 
 j^ard the wisdom of the Scottish Parliament, if we believe 
 that for a moment it gave heed to, or acquicsed in such 
 principles. 
 
 The Third ground on which the obligation of the Church 
 as an Establishment to adhere to the rule, must be inferred, 
 is as follows : — Unless such an obligation exist, the State 
 must either be at liberty to renounce the Establishment 
 principle altogether, or elffe it cannot be responsible to God 
 for its act in giving or withholding an endowment to the 
 Church. 
 
 If not astricted to the rule, the Church may deviate^ 
 from it, and may do so to an extent which the State 
 never did nor can approve. In this case, should the prin- 
 ciple of the State's responsibility to God be held, its liber- 
 ty to take away the endowments, and entirely to repudi- 
 ate the Establishment principle, must follow as a neces- 
 sary consequence. On the other hand, if it be regarded as 
 the duty of the State originally to maintain, and continue 
 to uphold the principle of an Establishment, and to do this 
 while recognizing the Church's freedom to depart from the 
 rule, then the former has no power left of approving or 
 disapproving, of forwarding or hindering the acts of the 
 latter. Nay, it has no power over the property formerly 
 given as an endowment to the latter, and by necessary con- 
 sequence, can have no responsibility to God.'* 
 
 Looking now at the reasons which exist for the princi- 
 ple that tlie Church as an Establishment must be under 
 an obligation to adhere to the rule as sanctioned by die 
 
 * We shall mention two other reasons without enlarging on them, 
 one referring to the general argument, and the other to the special case 
 of the Cliurch of Scotland : — 
 
 1st, Tlie Church must be bound to adhere to the rule sanctioned by 
 the State ; or, in other words, unist he under a civil obligation regard- 
 ing it, because, in no other possible way cm the State secure perma- 
 nency of that purity in doctrine, di«cipline, and government, as im- 
 plied in the Church's rule, when originally adopted : every departure 
 from this rule being, in truth, a departure fi"om such purity. 
 
 2dl!/, An "act p.issed at the Union of the two kingdoms, provided 
 that " for the better security of the Protestant faith, the worship, dis- 
 cipline, and government of the Church (of Scotlaml) shall continue witli- 
 out any alteration to' the peoi)le of tliis liiiid, in all succeeding generfi- 
 tions." Now, unless the Church be bound to adhere to tlie rule, tliis 
 statute becomes a mere inanity, in as niucli as the sovereign authority 
 of the kingdom has"'no power to carry out this protisicin of it. If tiiis 
 statute, asked by the Church, and passed by tlie Legislature, does not 
 imply the existence of a civil obligation on the former, tlie attempt may 
 henceforth be regarded as hopeless to express an idea of the mind in 
 language. 
 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. 17 
 
 State, any idea to the contrary cannot for a moment be 
 sustained. Such idea, however plausible it itself, is op- 
 posed to the plainest dictates of reason, and to principles 
 which, when we come to see the grounds on which they 
 rest, must be held as clearly revealed in the Word of God. 
 
 By the original transaction between the two parties, 
 therefore, the Church came under an obligation either to 
 adhere to the rule sanctioned by the State, or else to sur- 
 render the privileges of the Establishment. 
 
 Such, then, being the original transaction between the 
 parties, when Voluntaries or others maintain the unscrip- 
 tural character of the Established Church of Scotland, 
 and prefer an objection to her as embodying in her consti- 
 tution Erastian principles, the ground of the objection, or, in 
 other words, the Erastianism so charged, must necessarily 
 consist of one of the two following things :— It maybe said 
 by them — 1st, That the Church of Scotland is unscriptu- 
 ral and Erastian, because of having entered into union 
 with the State at all, whereby she would be limited to any 
 specified rule in respect to her spiritual and ecclesiastical 
 functions : or, 2dly, That she is Erastian, because those 
 exercises of the Civil power whereby this rule may be en- 
 forced upon her must imply a sinful interference with the 
 faithful performance of her functions. 
 
 The former may rightly enough be the ground of the 
 Voluntary's objection to the Establishment, because he 
 utterly repudiates the Establishment principle, and is thus 
 perfectly consistent in maintaining that the Church ought 
 not to acknowledge an obligation to abide by any specified 
 rule of duty. He is perfectly consistent in maintaining 
 that the Church ought not to consent to the limitation of 
 one iota of that spiritual independence which he holds that 
 she should possess. 
 
 But by those still professing to adhere to the Establish- 
 ment principle, as the members of the Free Church do, it 
 cannot be contended that the Erastianism of the Church 
 of Scotland consists in this limitation of her independence 
 which is imposed on her as an Establishment, and in her 
 astriction to the rule formerly sanctioned by the State. 
 Such an objection would, on their part, be pure absurdity, 
 and would, as already shewn, involve the assertion of 
 principles which, set reason at defiance. To hold that 
 such is the view of Erastianism taken by the Free Church, 
 and adopted, moreover, as the ground for the late Seces- 
 sion from the Establishment, would be tantamount to an 
 
18 
 
 GROUNDS OF COLLISION 
 
 affirmation, that Erastianism means acting in accordance 
 with the dictates of reason, while the spiritual independence 
 for which they contend means acting contrary to reason. 
 
 Leaving then the Voluntary's view of Erastianism, or 
 his assertion of the sin committed hy the Church in limit- 
 ing her own independence by entering into union with the 
 State, to be considered in a subsequent part of the discus- 
 sion, we direct attention to what must, in right reason, be 
 the Free Church's view of it, or, in other words, to the ob- 
 jection against an Establishment founded on those exer- 
 cises of the Civil power to which the Church must sub- 
 mit, in having the sanctioned rule enforced upon her. 
 
 Now, however much has been said at times by those ini- 
 mical to Establishments, in condemnation of the principles 
 adopted by the Church of Scotland ; however much the ears 
 of men have been amused, and their indignation roused by 
 declarations respecting the tyranny of the State over 
 the Establishment, and by language depicting the inva- 
 sion of every sacred and spiritual function to which an 
 Establishment must submit — though it has been alleged 
 against the Church of Scotland, in particular, that whatever 
 semblance of freedom she might be permitted to retain, 
 the iron yoke of the Civil power lay upon all her jurisdic- 
 tion ; though these and a thousand other things have been 
 said and believed, there are, in reality, but three possible 
 grounds of collision between the Church and the State. 
 There are no more than three distinct cases where the lat- 
 ter can exercise any direct control over the Establishment, 
 in the exercise of any of its sacred functions. They are as 
 follow : — 
 
 1st, When the original rule by which the Church is 
 bound, was understood by the two parties in different senses, 
 at the time the union between them took place. 
 
 2dly, Where the sense attached to the rule by the two 
 parties was originally the same, but subsequently the State 
 put a different sense upon it. 
 
 3dly, Where this new sense is put on the rule by the 
 Church. 
 
 These three cases exhaust all the conceivable grounds 
 whereon there can be any collision between the State and 
 the Established Church, and in which the power of the 
 former can in any way touch the liberty of the latter. 
 Now, in one of these cases of collision, the Erastianism 
 charged, at least by the Free Church against the Church of 
 Scotland, ought to be found. 
 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. 19 
 
 We shall -examine them separately, in order if possible 
 to discover wherein there is any un scriptural exercise of 
 power — an exercise justifying all the objections usually 
 brought against the Establishment, and weakening its 
 energies in the discharge of its ordinary functions. 
 
 First, The two parties will come in collision when the 
 original rule of the Church's doctrine, discipline, and go- 
 vernment, which was sanctioned at the union between 
 them was understood in different senses. 
 
 But should a collision between the parties take place, on 
 such ground, what is there unscriptural in this ? The very 
 nature of an Establishment implies, that the two parties 
 entering into union understand the rule under which the 
 Church is to act, and on the faith of her adherence to 
 which an endoAvment is promised to her, in the same sense, 
 and not in a different sense. Unless the sense attached 
 by either party to this rule, when first proposed, be un- 
 derstood by both identically, no union between them can 
 possibly take place. If the rule proposed by the Cliurch, 
 and sanctioned by the State, does not contain her con- 
 victions of divine truth, and does not express her own 
 sense of these convictions, the Church cannot, by ac- 
 cepting it, agree to form herself into an Establish- 
 ment, without a violation of her conscience. So also 
 the State must he satisfied with the convictions of the 
 Church laid before it in the rule, and with its own sense 
 attached to this rule, or else it will not agree to grant the 
 Church the privileges of an Establishment. In the case, 
 therefore, before us, wherein the rule happens to have been 
 understood in diiFerent senses, the existence of the Church 
 as an Establishment at all, must necessarily be a mistake — 
 an error arising out of the fact, that the difference of sense 
 attached to the rule by the two parties was not originally 
 perceived. Had the error been perceived at the time the 
 Church was being formed into an Establishment, it must 
 have proved an insuperable barrier in the way, if neither of 
 the parties had yielded to the other ; that is to say, if the 
 sense attached by both to the rule had not become identical. 
 Let us suppose, for example's sake, that the Non- Intru- 
 sion principle was believed to be expressed in the rule, ac- 
 cording to the Church's sense, but was not so understood, 
 according to the State's sense of it. If this difiference of 
 sense attached to the proposed rule had been originally 
 perceived, it must be very evident that no union between 
 the parties would have been formed at all, and, moreover, 
 
20 GROUNDS OF COLLISION 
 
 that if the union between the parties did take place, with 
 such difference of sense, then unknown to either of them, 
 attached to the rule, this union Avas altogether a mistake, 
 an inadvertency, an accidental blunder. When, therefore, 
 the course of time, and the progress of events, caused this 
 original difference of sense to become apparent, and a col- 
 lision was threatened, or had actually occurred, how can it 
 be said, that a flaofrant wrono: is done bv the State to the 
 Establishment, in the steps taken by it to enforce that 
 sense of the rule to which it ever consented. Such exer- 
 cise of power in place of being a flagrant wrong, or a 
 violation of right principles, must be the mere correction 
 of the original mistake, — a correction which before the 
 union took place, the State would have been bound to 
 make, (by not consenting to that union) without any 
 such imputation of wrong made against it. If the Non- 
 Intrusion principle was not in the State's sense of the 
 rule, when it consented to it, though it may have been 
 in the Church's, the steps taken by the State to hinder 
 the Church from acting upon that principle in the Esta- 
 blishment, are but the exercises of Civil power to amend 
 the former error, exercises of power necessary to shew 
 that the State was not to be held to have originally 
 adopted a sense of the rule which it did not adopt. I\Iore- 
 over, these exercises of the Civil poAver of the State cannot 
 be fairly regarded as a collision Avith the EstahlisJnnent at 
 all — they are directed against the CJmrch, }ust for the pur- 
 pose of preventing her from becoming the Establishment, 
 or continuing to be the Establishment, as she had inad- 
 vertently become, on terms which the State never knew, 
 and to Avhich it never agreed. 
 
 The terms proposed by the State are those of the 
 Church's adherence to the rule as understood by the State, 
 in other words, to that form of doctrine, discipline, and 
 government draAvn up by the Church herself, and sanc- 
 tioned by the State. On these terms alone it proposes 
 to erect the Church into an Establishment, and until 
 these terms are formally agreed to, and complied Avith, by 
 the Church, she docs not exist as an Establishment. 
 Whatever argument then, might be adduced, for the pur- 
 pose of shoAving that there was an unscriptural and Eras- 
 tian exercise of power against the Establisliment in such a 
 case as that before us, in which the collision arose out of 
 an original misunderstanding between the parties, must 
 necessarily pi'esuppose that it Avas the CJhurch's sense of 
 the rule, and not its own, Avhich the State ay as all along 
 
BETWEEN CHURCH AXD STATE. 21 
 
 bound to adopt, and had formerly adopted and sanctioned. 
 But how is such an idea consistent with the fact of the 
 rule itself, having been subjected to the State's inspection, 
 and of a legal approbation of it having been obtained, previ- 
 ous to the Establishment being fonned, and the endow- 
 ments granted, this legal approbation of it, being the 
 very tliiu}; on which the Establishment was founded. 
 Such a fact clearly shews that not the Church's, but the 
 State's sense of the rule was that which gave a right to 
 the pnvileges of the Establishment. The Civil Magistrate 
 may justly and righteously interfere when he sees a sense 
 put upon the rule, and acted on within the Establishment, 
 never contemplated by him in the oiiginal transaction be- 
 twixt him and the Church, nor can such interference be 
 regarded as any intrusion into a province that does not be- 
 long to him, or as any unjust control imposed by him on 
 the sacred and spiritual functions of the Establishment, 
 and in so far furnishinir an argument against its existence. 
 For, in reality, the interference referred to is no exercise of 
 power against the Establishment at all, but a legitimate 
 resisten'ce of the unjust and unreasonable claims of the 
 Church, and a dutv to which the ^Magistrate, in adhering 
 to the enactments made by him, and acquiesced in by the 
 Church, is imperatively called. 
 
 It may be ai-gued, that in the case of an original mis- 
 take having been committed by the two parties respecting 
 the sense put upon the rule, the interference of the Civil 
 power must be limited to withdrawing the temporal 
 emoluments of the Establishment, and that it will be 
 guilty of grievous wrong when it attempts in any other 
 way to coerce the actings of the Church. This argument 
 was much built upon during the late controversy. It was 
 the argument by which the ministers of the Free Church, 
 before the Secession, vindicated all their own acts of re- 
 sistance to the Civil Courts, and condemned the acts of the 
 latter. Their assertion, then, was, " that the interference 
 of the Civil power must be limited to the mere act of with- 
 drawing the endowments ;" or, as the language then was, 
 to " the withholding of Civil effects from Ecclesiastical de- 
 crees." But it is very clear that this argument is a two- 
 edged sword, cutting both ways. For if it be wrong in the 
 State not to content itself with withdra\ving the endow- 
 ments, but to insist on its right to control the Establish- 
 ment, into its own views of the rule, it must be equally 
 wrong in the Church to remain in the Establishment, and 
 to refuse to relinquish her endowments, when she has dis- 
 
22 GEOUNDS or COLLISION 
 
 covered that the views of the two parties regarding the rule 
 are no longer identical. Her act in doing so is equally ano- 
 malous as that of the State, for it is attempting to fix down 
 upon the State the Church's sense of the rule as that to 
 which the endowments were oi'iginally granted, or else 
 doing that which is an impossihility, viz., asserting a claim 
 to define what was the original sense attached hy the 
 State to this rule. 
 
 Secondly, the next case of collision which may occur 
 between the State and the Establishment, and in which 
 the power of the former will control the actings of the 
 latter, is where the two parties understood the rule origin- 
 ally in the same sense, but the State has afterwards come 
 to put a new interpretation on it. 
 
 In this case, if we still adopt our former illustration, the 
 Non-Intrusion principle was included by both parties in 
 the sense originally attached by them to the rule, but sub- 
 sequently the State came to exclude this principle from it. 
 Were such a case as the one referred to, to occur, the 
 Civil power of the State might, and would, be exercised to 
 enforce upon the Establishment its own altered sense of 
 the rule. But neither here, any more than in the former 
 instance, can there be in right reason any collision between 
 the parties, or in other words, any undue application of the 
 Civil power to coerce the conscience of the Establishment. 
 Originally, it is to be observed, the two parties under- 
 stood the rule in the same sense. So long as this Avas the 
 case, matters went on smoothly between them. There was 
 no controlling power applied to the Establishment on the 
 part of the State ; there was no resistance on the part of 
 the Establishment to the will of the State, for the sense 
 which each had of the rule was identical. At some subse- 
 quent period however, the State took occasion to change 
 its views, to regard the original transaction in a diffe- 
 rent light, to attach a new sense to the rule. Now when 
 such change came over the mind of the State, it must in 
 some way have given expression to this change. It must 
 by some means have instructed the Establishment in 
 the fact, that it no longer regarded the rule as formerly, 
 that it now attached a difierent sense to that which both 
 parties had hitherto interpreted alike. The State could 
 not, all at once, instantaneously as it were, come down 
 with the weight of its power to overbear the Establishment 
 in some of its spiritual or ecclesiastical functions, without 
 any note of preparation sounded, without any warning 
 given by solemn deed or otherwise, that the previous har-r 
 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. 23 
 
 mony which had existed between them, in interpreting the 
 rule of the Church's conduct, no longer continued. To 
 refer to our example, if it had been true, that the State 
 originally included in its sense of the rule, the Non-Intru- 
 sion principle, but aftei-wards ejected it, it must, in the 
 very nature of things, have first given intimation in some 
 way, of the changed sense now attached by it to the for- 
 mer rule, before its power was exercised to coerce the 
 Establishment into compliance with this sense. In accord- 
 ance with the illustration we are using, such intimation 
 was given to the Establishment in the first Auchterarder 
 decision of the House of Peers, finding the Veto law, or 
 non-intrusion principle, embodied in it to be illegal. But 
 this decision was no application of the Civil power against 
 the Establishment ; for had this decision been acquiesed 
 in, the pre-existing harmony between the parties would 
 have remained undisturbed. The decision itself was only 
 an expression in the first instance, of the mind of the State, 
 regarding the point at issue. It was only an intim.ation 
 given of the sense noAv attached, and that would hereafter 
 be attached to the rule, obligatory on the Establishment. 
 Such intimation being now given, it was for the Establish- 
 ment to determine, after having become cognizant of the 
 fact, that in the sense of the rule now adopted, its convic- 
 tions of the Word of God were no longer expressed, whether 
 it would await the certain enforcement by the civil power, 
 of this new sense adopted by the State, or escape that en- 
 forcement by a voluntary surrender of its endowments. 
 
 There is no question what right reason must have ob- 
 liged an Establishment placed in such circumstances to do. 
 It must renounce the endowments. To wait the enforce- 
 ment of the Civil decree, by refusing either to quit the 
 endowments, or to obey the State's sense of the rule (al- 
 tered though it be) Avould argue, on the part of the Esta- 
 blishment, the adoption of principles, which, on no consider- 
 ations of equity or justice, are capable of vindication. It 
 would argue, that what the State had all along been bound 
 to sanction and endow, was the Church's sense of the rule 
 which had been laid before it, not its own ; that the State's 
 approbation of the terms of the Union was no essential 
 element in its fomiation ; and that when this approbation 
 was withdrawn, the Church had still a right to the Civil 
 benefits of that Union, derived from the original transac- 
 tion between the parties. 
 
 Principles such as these carry on their face repugnance 
 to common sense, therefore, the Establishment would 
 
24 GROUNDS OF COLLISION 
 
 be bound, as soon as it received sufficient and final in- 
 timation of the mind of the State, to the eflect that 
 the rule henceforth to be enforced no longer expressed 
 as formerly its own convictions of the will of Christ, to 
 make surrender of its endowments, and this before its con- 
 science was coerced by the Civil power. The surren- 
 der thus rendered unavoidable, would however prevent a 
 collision between the parties. The Church, as an Esta- 
 blishment, incurred no compromise of her Scriptural liber- 
 ty, and was subjected to no control from the State in her 
 spiritual functions. She entered the Establishment in the 
 possession of all that freedom which she believed to be 
 essential, and she left it before that freedom was invaded, 
 and she brought with her no stain derogatory to the 
 honour of her spiritual Head. 
 
 While thus voluntarily relinquishing the position of an 
 Establishment, because the rule on which she formerly 
 agreed to act, was now changed by a new sense attached 
 to it by the State, the Church might protest, and would 
 naturally protest, against the change so made. Yet she 
 could only protest against it as being, on the part of the 
 State, an error in judgment, a sin of ignorance, or a change 
 of the agTeement formerly made. She would have no 
 more right to affix a higher degree of guilt to this act, or 
 to designate the wrong done to her by the term of what 
 has been called Erastianism, viz. a sinful invasion of the 
 Church's province, than any other class of Dissenters 
 would have to call that act of the State Erastian, which 
 selects, for the National Establishment, any other form of 
 outward Christianity than its own. 
 
 If it cannot be denied, which we scarcely think it will, 
 that the State might have refused the terms of the Church, 
 by disapproving of the rule laid before it, at the formation 
 of the Establishment, without being liable to the charge of 
 Erastianism, it is very clear that, during the existence of 
 the Establislnnent, the State may change the terms of the 
 Union without being liable to this charge. If there be 
 Erastianism in the change, there would have been Eras- 
 tianism in the original refusal to agree to the terms offer- 
 ed, had such taken place. And this just ends as before, 
 in the assertion of the Church's infallibility, and the as- 
 sertion that the State ought to adopt the Church's terms, 
 whether it approve them or not, and is not responsible 
 for its acts to God. 
 
 It has thus been shown, as we conceive, satisfactorily, 
 that, in the second case of collision between the State and 
 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. 25 
 
 the Establishment, no invasion is made, or can be made, 
 of the Scriptural liberty or conscience of the latter in 
 the performance of her ordinary functions, any more 
 than in the first. It has been proved only, that were 
 such contingency to occur, the Church might be neces- 
 sitated to relinquish the Establishment. As principles, 
 not probabilities, are here the subject of discussion, it is 
 not necessary to enter upon the question, whether such a 
 case be likely to occur in reality, nor consequently to con- 
 sider the argument for the inexpediency of Cliurch Esta- 
 blishments which might thence be raised, from the consi- 
 deration that, by a sudden change of the mind of the 
 State respecting the rule, all the ecclesiastical arrange- 
 ments might be disturbed and overturned. Guarded 
 from rash innovation as the British Constitution is, and 
 calmly discussed as every important question must be 
 which comes before the Civil Courts, the interpreters of 
 the mind of the State, in all points which are v.'ritten in 
 the statutes of the kingdom, it may safely enough be 
 averred, that the probability of such a thing happening, 
 as the final mind of the State at one time, becoming 
 suddenly and violently opposed to the same mind at 
 another, and this, too, about so important a matter as the 
 rule obligatory upon a great Tsational Institution, is not 
 very great. Far less can this probability be reckoned to 
 be of such magnitude as to risk the stability of the Esta- 
 blishment by a sudden and violent interpretation of the 
 Church's rule, at variance with that which has obtained 
 the sanction of time, and has remained unchallenged, possi- 
 bly for ages, in the past actings of the Establishment itself. 
 
 odly, The only other case of collision between the State 
 and the Establishment which can occur, is that where, as 
 in the former instance, the original sense attached to the 
 rule by the two parties was identical, but, at a subsequent 
 period, the Church came to put a new inteipretation upon 
 it, by adding to, or taking away from that which had been 
 formerly understood. In this case, referring to our pre- 
 vious illustration, the Non-Intrusion principle was not in- 
 cluded in the rule according to the original sense of either 
 of the parties, but subsequently this principle found a 
 place in the sense attached to it by the Church. 
 
 Now, it is plain, that when a case such as that to which 
 reference is here made, does actually occur, a real collision 
 between the parties is inevitable. The Church will not 
 be at liberty to carry out, in the character of the Esta-- 
 blishment, what have become, by the change of her 
 
2Q GROUNDS OF COLLISION 
 
 mind, her new convictions of duty as distinct from those 
 she fonnerly professed. It is impossible to deny, that this 
 wrong, if it be one, will now be inflicted on the Church as 
 an Establishment, viz. that her solemn, though new con- 
 victions of duty, will be overborne by the power of the 
 State. It deserves, however, to be marked, that this is 
 the only instance of ivrong which can by possibility hap- 
 pen from the one party towards the other. 
 
 But the questions after all arise, what is the nature of 
 the wrong itself? Has the Establishment, in the restraint 
 thus put upon her liberty, really suffered wrong? Did 
 the State, at the time the Union between the parties was 
 formed, inflict any wrong on the Church, by requiring 
 that, as an Establishment, she should be tied down to 
 those convictions of duty expressed in the rule laid 
 before the State, and by it solemnly sanctioned? The 
 answer to these questions necessarily involves the inquiry, 
 whether spiritual independence, such as is claimed by those 
 opposed to us, be essential to the Church's proper character, 
 or can be limited, as it necessarily is, in an Establishment, 
 and it opens up the far more important inquiry, what this 
 spiritual independence is. 
 
 It will be of no small service in guiding our minds 
 throughout this inquiry, to mark distinctly the nature of 
 the restraint put upon the Establishment by the State, in 
 the case to which we were just referring. Though the Esta- 
 blished Church be liable to civil coercion in respect to 
 her solemn convictions, yet the restraint put upon her 
 is not from carrying into effect what were originally 
 her present convictions of the will of Christ. These 
 convictions, as at that time present to the minds of 
 the Church's founders, were recorded in the rule sanction- 
 ed at the outset by the State. To the sense originally 
 attached to this rule by both parties, and which was the 
 basis of the union between them, the State still continues 
 to adhere, nor has one iota of the liberty previously sanc- 
 tioned to the Establishment — the liberty, namely, to act 
 in accordance with this rule, been taken away. It is the 
 new intei-pretation put upon the rule, the addition or sub- 
 traction made, which alone forms the subject of the State's 
 conti-ol. This addition or subtraction — this outgoing be- 
 yond the original line, the State did not formerly know 
 nor sanction ; therefore, it is, in this respect, though in 
 this respect alone, that it controls the Establishment, or 
 can be charged as interfering with any of its spiritual 
 or ecclesiastical functions. 
 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. 27 
 
 We have now traced closely all the cases of collision 
 which can possibly occur between the State and an Es- 
 tablished Church. In the course of this investigation 
 it has been shown, that if a collision arise either from 
 an original misunderstanding of the parties respecting 
 the sense put by each on the rule, or from a new sense 
 afterwards put by the State on the rule, no act of aggres- 
 sion against the Church, in her character of an Establish- 
 ment, can be committed. And in regard to that sin- 
 gle case of actual collision which can occur, it has been 
 shewn, that the power of the State does not control the 
 Establishment from carrying into effect what were origi- 
 nally the present convictions of the will of Christ held by 
 its founders. The controlling power of the State can 
 be directed only towards departures from the Church's ori- 
 ginal convictions. If this be wrong, call it Erastianism, 
 a denying of the Headship of Christ, or any other name, 
 it is a wrong inseparable from the existence of an Esta- 
 blishment. It is a wrong for which there is no remedy 
 but the concession by the State of spiritual independence 
 in the widest form — the acknowledgment of the principle, 
 inconsistent as it unquestionably is with the existence of 
 an Establishment, that the Church's liberty cannot be 
 limited. 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED, 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CLAIM RESPECTING SPIRITTAL INDEPENDENCE — TTHAT IT IS NOT — WHAT 
 IT IS — LOGICAL DEFINITION PROVED BY FREE CHIRCH BY VO- 
 LUNTARIES — INVOLVES AN ABSURDITY — MONSTROUS RESULTS — CON- 
 TRARY TO god's WORD. 
 
 The assertion of spiritual independence as the inaliena- 
 ble right of the Church, and one which in no circumstances 
 whatever can be surrendered or limited without violation 
 of God's Word, is the common ground whereon Volun- 
 taries and Free Churchmen have reared their objection 
 against the Church of Scotland. Whilst, therefore, we are 
 engaged in investigating the argument by which this ob- 
 jection is maintained, the two parties may be regarded as 
 identical. Were the argument which is advanced by them 
 on the point at issue, sound, the opposition exhibited to 
 the principles of our Church would be just. If it be true, 
 as is alleged, that spiritual independence is the unfailing 
 mark of the Church s Scriptural character, the right con- 
 ferred on her by the Lord Jesus Christ, and which cannot 
 be restricted without denying his Headship over all things 
 in the Church, and without sinning against her own con- 
 science ; if these things be true, then the present consti- 
 tution of the Church of Scotland is unsound, the cause of 
 our Establishment is hopeless, and the attempt to vindi- 
 cate its accordance with Scripture, is more than Herculean 
 labour, since, in the constitution of that Church, as well as 
 in that of Establishments generally, the avowal is openly 
 made that spiritual independence is limited. But ere we 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 29 
 
 thus relinquisli a cause dear to the mind of Scotland, and 
 entwined in the hearts of her people with their earliest 
 and most hallowed associations, ere we thus permit sen- 
 tence of condemnation to be pronounced on the nobles, 
 institution of our land — an institution whose existence i 
 designed to promote the glory of God, and whose work^ 
 ings, in no small degree, have been instrumental in rais-" 
 ing up the religious, moral, and literary grandeur of our 
 country — ere we allow it to be said, that the Church where 
 our Fathers worshipped, and beside whose venerable walls 
 their dust now reposes, is no longer the house of God, the 
 place which is sanctified by the presence of the Saviour — 
 ere we permit all this to be done, justice and equity 
 entitle us to inquire what spiritual independence is ^ 
 Nor where an interest so great is on the issue as the 
 Scriptural character of the National Establishment, will 
 it be suiScient to give as an answer to our question some 
 vague generality, or meagre definition of the term, which 
 conveys no distinct idea to the mind. Vagueness of defini- 
 tion has been the bane of theology, and the fruitful source of 
 many needless controversies, carried on to the prejudice of 
 truth, and the destruction of Christian charity. In recent 
 times, no subject has suffered more misapprehension, and 
 consequent misrepresentation, from mere generality and in- 
 distinctness of definition than that now before us. 
 
 From the pulpit, the press, and the platform, has re- 
 sounded, at various times, the cry of the Church's spintual 
 independence, and because of the limitation of this inde- 
 pendence, necessarily implied in Church Establishments, 
 these institutions have been vilified and denounced in the 
 strongest language. The terms applied by the advocates 
 of spu'itual independence during the recent controversy, 
 must be fresh in the ears of others. Language was em- 
 ployed respecting the Established Church of Scotland, by 
 those who have since gone out from her, which, coming 
 from one class of Christians to another, was an outrage on 
 every feeling of charity, and which true religion requh'es 
 only to be forgiven and forgotten. But the same views of 
 the necessity of spu-itual independence to the Church's 
 proper character, and of the unholy position of Establish- 
 ments, as having renounced this independence, have been 
 held by others. 
 
 Speaking of certain points of the recent controversy of 
 the Chm'ch of Scotland, Dr. Wardlaw expresses his opi- 
 nion regarding spiritual independence in a way not to be 
 mistaken : " The simple fact of the cause being there, (in 
 
30 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 the House of Peers,) is an acknowledgment of dependence. 
 If the decreet of the Court of Session be affirmed, it is by 
 State authority that the Church's powers are declared to 
 be less ample than her representative body had supposed. 
 And even should it be reversed, and the Assembly declar- 
 ed not to have gone ultra vires, it is still by the same State 
 authority that the legitimate amplitude of her powers is 
 ascertained. We regard all this as a flagrant outrage on 
 the rights and liberties of the spiritual kingdom of Christ, 
 and a treasonable derogation from his supreme and exclu- 
 sive authority. It is with feelings of shame and indigna- 
 tion that we contemplate such appeals as a letting down of 
 the independent dignity of the Church of the living God, 
 and an insult to that KJng whom Jehovah hath set on his 
 holy hill of Zion/'^ 
 
 But while the Church's spiritual independence has been 
 thus spoken of, and while the surrender or limitation of 
 that independence has been made the ground of ob- 
 jection to the principle of National Esta])lishments, there 
 are few of those raising the objection who have sought to 
 apprehend very clearly or logically the idea of this inde- 
 pendence itself. To the minds of the generality of those 
 who have been most clamorous in demanding it, spiritual 
 independence conveys no other idea but that of something 
 which ought to belong to the Church, and which is inse- 
 parable from her right character. But what this some- 
 thing is, how far it enters, or does not enter, into the con- 
 stitution of an Established Church, and how far the in- 
 dependence claimed is itself consistent with reason and 
 the Word of God, are points, in regard to the subject, 
 which they are unable to explain. In being told that a 
 Church consenting to surrender, or limit her spiritual in- 
 dependence, becomes by this act guilty of sin against the 
 honour of the Church's Head, and that an Establishment 
 whose fundamental principle implies such limitation, is an 
 unscriptural institution, we are entitled to obtain the true 
 logical definition of spiritual independence, and when wo 
 have obtained it to test the principles implied in it by 
 those of reason and Scripture. And not until this has 
 been done, and done satisfactorily, can we be required in 
 fairness and equity to surrender our cause to our adver- 
 saries. Tried by this test, the argument in favour of Es- 
 tablishments will be found unassailable. 
 
 We now come to the important question, What is spiri- 
 
 * Lectures, p, 8G. 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 31 
 
 faal independence ? An answer to this question may be 
 j^rrived at without difficulty, by a review of the original 
 transaction which took place between the State and the 
 Church at the time the Establishment was formed. When 
 the Church of Scotland was established, her Confession of 
 Faith and Standards had a legal sanction given them by 
 the State, and a written rule of her doctrine, discipline, 
 and government, as extracted by her founders from the 
 Word of God was formed, which was laid before the 
 Scottish Parliament, and formally adopted by it. Now, 
 this rule of the future Establishment thus sanctioned 
 by Parliament, by being engrossed in the statutes of 
 the kingdom, embodied to a certain extent (we do not 
 at present assert how far) the Church's present convictions 
 of the word and will of Christ respecting her doctrine, dis- 
 cipline, and government. 
 
 According to the views of those now forming the Church 
 of Scotland, it is obligatory on the Church, as an Esta- 
 blishment, to adhere to this rule, for the very nature of 
 such an institution implies, as formerly shewn, an obliga- 
 tion to fulfil the rule, and also to be thereby restricted. 
 Such obligation respecting the rule is a fundamental prin- 
 ciple of our Church, and. rests on the reasons formerly 
 given. But to this view of the rule, Voluntaryism ex- 
 hibits insuperable repugnance. According to the prin- 
 ciples of this system, a civil obligation on the Church 
 having respect to the performance of her spiritual func- 
 tions, is inconsistent with independence, and a Church 
 which owns such obligation, or which is restricted hy legal 
 sanction to a ride, stands thus confessed of having sur- 
 rendered spiiitual independence. 
 
 Such being the Voluntary's views of a civil obligation, 
 in its bearing on the Church's performance of her duties, 
 spiritual independence must imply a liberty to do some- 
 thing from which an Establishment is excluded — some- 
 thing from which the astriction to the rule, by the civil obli- 
 gation, must hinder. If spiritual independence meant any 
 thing coming within the range of the civil obligation, that 
 is to say, coming within the powers of an Establishment 
 under the rule sanctioned by the State, it could not be said 
 that such independence had been sm*rendered. The very 
 fact of such surrender being involved, as is alleged, in the 
 principle of an Establishment, and being brought as an 
 objection against it, teaches, that by the idea of spiritual 
 independence, is meant the liberty of exceeding the powers 
 enjoyed by the Establishment under the rule it possesses. 
 
 An important question here natm'ally arises as to the 
 
32 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 extent of the liberty possessed by an Establishment in 
 matters contained within its rule. Does that liberty 
 pennit the rule according to which it has been formed to be 
 freely and fully cai*ried out ? A simple consideration will 
 settle this question. The Establishment has the same se- 
 cui'ity for its liberty when acting within the rule, and up 
 to the limits of the rule sanctioned by the State, that Dis- 
 senters themselves have for their toleration in the king- 
 dom, and that the entire community has for the liberty of 
 professing the Christian religion. That security is the sta- 
 tutes of the British Parliament, and the intei-pretation of 
 these statutes by the Civil Judges of the land. Upon what 
 other foundation does religious toleration practically rest, 
 but upon the statutes of the realm ? 
 
 Now, if Voluntaries themselves are satisfied with this 
 practical basis of their religious liberty — are satisfied that 
 the statutes of the realm confer a sufficient security to them 
 for the enjoyment of the privileges conveyed by these sta- 
 tutes — by parity of reasoning, the same security of the 
 statutes must be sufficient to the Establishment for the 
 free exercise of its privileges. In other words, the Esta- 
 blishment must be regarded as possessing full liberty within 
 the rule. The liberty which it does not possess is without 
 the rule and beyond it. The rule sanctioned by the sta- 
 tutes may possibly be narrow, but whatever its limits may 
 be, within those limits an Establishment is free and fully 
 secured of its liberty.* 
 
 * Our opponents frequently boast of their own freedom in spiritual 
 matters, and one class of them has adopted the distinctive appellation 
 oi Free Church. Let us just for a moment examine the nature and li- 
 mits of this freedom. While indulging in frequent reflections against 
 the subjection of the Established Church to tlie Civil power, are thoy 
 themselves free, in the strict sense of the term ? that is, free to do what- 
 ever they may define to be a spiritual act, without reference to the idea 
 held of it by the Civil authorities ? No. Their boasted freedom simply 
 consists of this — liberty to do that which does not infringe upon the 
 statutes of Parliament, as interpreted by the Civil Judges. Let them, 
 under the name of a spiritual act, as they themselves may regard it, in- 
 fringe upon the statutes of Parliament, and where will their boasted free- 
 dom be then ? The spiritual acts tliey are at liberty to perform, are not 
 those defined by themselves to be such, but tliose held as such by Judges 
 of the Civil Courts. No doubt, were a decision contrary to their own 
 views given against them, on such a question, by Civil interference, a 
 cry of persecution by the State might be raised, yet notwithstanding such 
 (;ry, there might be as little justice in it as there is at tliis day, for the 
 assertion of papal powers, tliat wrong is done them because they are no 
 longer at liberty to dethrone kings, imprison and burn heretics, &c., all 
 wliich were once claimed by ecclesiastics under their own definition of 
 spiritual acts. The truth is, that the freedom of the Church of Scotland, 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 33 
 
 The liberty of an establishment within the rule being 
 thus clear, when it is said by others, that such an institu- 
 tion has surrendered its spiritual independence, this inde- 
 pendence cannot refer to any thing ivithin the rule, but to 
 something ivithout it. An Establishment has surrendered 
 no liberty within the rule. All that it can be charged with 
 having surrendered, is beyond it, and altogether on the 
 other side of it, and thus the true idea of the independence 
 surrendered is, that it implies something which is not in- 
 cluded in the rule at all. 
 
 The spiritual independence contended for by our oppo- 
 nents, can now only by possibility be one of the two fol- 
 lowing things : — 
 
 First, Liberty to act in accordance with the Church's ^>'d- 
 sent con\-ictions of the Word of God, not included in the 
 rule which the State has sanctioned. Or, 
 
 Secondly, Liberty to act in accordance with the Church's 
 future convictions of that Word. 
 
 In the solution of this apparently simple question, the 
 whole difficulty of the controversy respecting spiritual in- 
 dependence lies, and with this solution is inseparably linked 
 the vindication or condemnation of the cause of Establish- 
 ments. 
 
 Now, spiritual independence cannot mean " liberty to act 
 in accordance with the Church's y resent convictions not in- 
 cluded in the rale sanctioned by the State," for this rea- 
 son. If the Church accepted from the State a rule not 
 embodying all her present convictions of Christ's will, and 
 consented, moreover, to be bound or restricted by that rule 
 in her spii'itual and ecclesiastical functions, then she entered 
 the Establishment in the performance of an act of dishonesty 
 to Christ. She sacrificed conscience for the sake of an endow- 
 ment to her ministers. She surrendered a part of her con- 
 victions of God's Word, to obtain the countenance and sup- 
 port of the State. The assertion of such a charge against the 
 Church, would be a libel on the piety and integrity and 
 moral worth of the founders of the Establishment, a charge 
 moreover, continued against all the piety that has ever 
 existed among its ministers down to the ]3resent day, and 
 
 and that of the Voluntaries or Free Church party, stands exactly upon 
 the same basis, \h.. Civil statutes interpreted by Judges — the only dif- 
 ference being this, that the freedom of our opponents is limited by the 
 statutes negatively, ours positively. As to the question, whether an 
 Established Church commits any wrong in allowing her rule or the 
 limits of her liberty to be defined by the statutes positively, this will 
 come to be settled by the subsequent discussion respecting a civil ob- 
 ligation, 
 
 b2 
 
34 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 from wliich those who have lately seceded from the Church 
 of Scotland would not he exempted, for their secession 
 then becomes a mere tardy act of repentance for past 
 transgression. No one can venture to prefer such a charge 
 of dishonesty and want of conscience against all who 
 have ever belonged to the Establishment, without overturn- 
 ing belief in the truth and reality of religion itself. If 
 the Church then was bound by the rule, in her union with 
 the State, that rule must have embodied all her present 
 convictions of the will of Christ. 
 
 Matters of expediency, to the insertion of which in the 
 rule the State's consent could not be obtained, might have 
 been placed originally in abeyance for the sake of the va- 
 lue of an Establishment : but matters oi faith, matters be- 
 lieved to belong to the will of Christ as revealed in his 
 Word, could not for a moment be placed in abeyance 
 without a clear sacrifice of conscience. 
 
 It may be argued on the other side, that if the Church 
 be not bound as an Establishment to abide by the rule 
 sanctioned by the State, then she would not be guilty of 
 any dishonesty in accepting a rule which did not embody 
 all her present con^^ctions, and that, consequently, in this 
 view, the liberty to act in accordance with these convictions, 
 not included in the rule, may constitute the spiritual inde- 
 pendence claimed. But the very method rendered neces- 
 sary to give this view of spiritual independence, shews the 
 untenable nature of the argument. That argument can 
 only be sustained by supposing that an Established Church 
 is not civilly bound or astricted to the rule sanctioned by 
 the State, but may act on other convictions of her duty 
 than those expressed in it, whenever she pleases. Such a 
 theor}' of an Establishment is pure absurdity. It presumes, 
 that in the formation of such an institution, men are at 
 liberty to set reason and God's Word equally at defiance, 
 and to act on no other principle but that of their own 
 prejudice or conceit. An Establishment must be bound 
 by the rule sanctioned by the State, and such being the 
 case, this rule must embody all the present convictions of 
 the Word of God held by its founders. 
 
 The liberty surrendered by such an Institution cannot 
 therefore have respect to present convictions of God's 
 Word, but must and can only have respect to future con- 
 victions. 
 
 A little farther reflection will show us however, that 
 this must be the case, whether there be an obligation on 
 the Chui'ch to adhere to the rule or not. 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 35 
 
 Let us suppose chat the Church is under such obligation, 
 then what must be the language of the founders of the 
 Establishment to the State on the idea that all her present 
 convictions of God's word are not included in the rule ? 
 
 " You have sanctioned a rule for us containing a measure 
 of our convictions. There are, however, other convictions 
 of God's word known to us, which you have refused to 
 sanction. But these we agree to lay aside, and so sacri- 
 fice our conscience that we may get from you an endow- 
 ment.'' 
 
 Or, let us suppose that the Church is not held to be 
 under the obligation referred to, then what is the lan- 
 guage of her founders to the State ? " You have sanctioned 
 for us with all legislative formalities, a rule embodying a 
 measure of our present convictions, but we have other con- 
 victions besides these — Why you have sanctioned or we 
 have asked you to sanction this rule, we do not know, since 
 we are not bound to adhere to it, even w^hile retaining our 
 civil right to the endowments w^iich you have now granted 
 us. But you will be guilty of denying the Headship of 
 Christ, should you on the one hand withdraw our en- 
 dowTuents from us, when we act on those convictions w^hich 
 you have not sanctioned, or on the other, should you hold 
 us bound to adhere to the rule which you have sanctioned, 
 that is, should you place the constitution of the Church on 
 a basis which would require that all our knoAvn convictions 
 must be included in that rule." 
 
 The men who would address to the State, or the State 
 which would for a moment listen to such language, could 
 only be regarded as bereft of reason. 
 
 By no way of stating the argument can it be maintained, 
 that the rule sanctioned by the State does not comprehend 
 all the Church's present convictions of God's Word, and the 
 consequence must be, that as spiritual independence means 
 something not included in the rule, so that independence in 
 the sense of our adversaries, can only have respect to the 
 Church's future convictions. 
 
 The exact logical definition of Spiritual Independence 
 is then as follows : — 
 
 Liberty to act in accordance ivith the Church's future 
 convictions of God's tvord. 
 
 That the view here given of what has all along been 
 meant by the term Spiritual Independence, is the true 
 one, may be inferred from the way in which it has been 
 spoken of by its advocates ; and as this is a matter of some 
 
36 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 importance, we shall cite the language of our opponents on 
 botli sides respecting it. 
 
 On this subject it has been said by the Free Church, 
 " The Church has no poiver to fetter herself by a con- 
 nexion with the State, or otherwise in the just exercise of 
 any part of her spiritual functions.''* " While the Church 
 in this manner may lend her services to the State, as the 
 State may give its support to the Church, each still re- 
 mains supreme as before ;" that is, the Church still retains 
 her spiritual freedom unlimited. Now, such expressions 
 have no meaning, except as implying that whatever may 
 be the amount of the Church's present liberty, she has no 
 power, and will not consent to restrict her future liberty — 
 that though she may possess the utmost degree of free- 
 dom, to carry out her present convictions of the Word of 
 God, she cannot submit to be fettered as to her future 
 convictions. 
 
 The same thing might be argued from the remedy which 
 it is said the State has against the Church when it disap- 
 proves her acts, namely, that of taking away her endow- 
 ments. " If the State should disapprove of the Church's 
 proceedings, it cannot indeed coerce or !punish her, in re- 
 spect of her actings within the spiritual province, but it 
 may if it thinks necessary, either wholly or partially with- 
 draw the endowments and immunities of the Establish- 
 ment, leaving of course the responsibility Mith. the State 
 to whom it exclusively belongs." Now as it cannot be 
 supposed that the State will take away the endowments 
 for any act which the Church may do in accordance with 
 her present convictions, since these have all been sanc- 
 tioned by itself, so the only ground on which the re- 
 medy (as declared by our opponents,) can ever come to 
 be applied, must be when the Church is acting in ac- 
 cordance with her future convictions, that is, with convic- 
 tions not embodied in the rule. Thus the proposal or adop- 
 tion of the remedy referred to implies the possibility of 
 its exercise, or in other words, implies the claim for the 
 Church's liberty to act in accordance with her future con- 
 victions. 
 
 Let us now mark the same views of Spiritual Indepen- 
 dence, as held by the other class of our opponents, the 
 Voluntaries. 
 
 Dr. Wardlaw, adverting to the evils of Establishments 
 
 * Vide Memorial to Sir R. Peel, p. 5 and 6. 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 37 
 
 as destructive of the Church's independence, speaks thus — 
 " As a Church, the Scottish Church or the English may 
 alter its creed, may cancel it entirely, and ac?opf a new one. 
 This is the undoubted prerogative of either, considered sim- 
 ply as a Church. But this is precisely what each has relin- 
 quished in accepting a State endowment." " The fact is, 
 that the Ai-ticles of the Church of England originally settled 
 and passed by regal authority, require the same authority, 
 the authority of her supreme earthly head to legalize any 
 alteration, and that the same is the case with all her forms 
 of worship— that the ' Confession of Faith' of the Church 
 of Scotland, along with its other authorized standards, 
 is binding on that Church, as an Established Church, not 
 by the authority of the Word of God, but solely by sundiy 
 Acts of Parliament ; and that by Act of Parliament alone 
 can any change be introduced. Is this independence ? Is 
 this ' unfettered theology ?' Is this the exclusive defer- 
 ence to Chi-ist's authority, which He, as the Church's only 
 Head demands, and is so supremely entitled to ? Away 
 with the unworthy compromise of the Church's dignity, and 
 the honour of the Church's Lord !"* 
 
 Vvliat does the author here referred to complain of as such 
 an unworthy compromise of the Church's dignity ? The 
 renunciation by an Establishment of its right to alter or 
 change its creed sanctioned by the State. ^And what does 
 alteration or change upon her creed imply, the power of 
 which is held so essential to the Church's independence. 
 It just implies that view of independence which has been 
 given — the Church's acting in accordance with her future 
 convictions of God's Word. The Church cannot effect an 
 alteration upon her present creed, laws, or government, in 
 any other way but through the exercise of her future con- 
 victions, t 
 
 Both Free Churchmen and Voluntaries thus unite in the 
 same view of spiritual independence ; the language of both 
 confirms the meaning we have attached to it, namely, li- 
 berty to act in accordance with the Chm-ch's future convic- 
 tions. 
 
 This. principle, when contemplated at a distance, has 
 presented a bright and shadowy form to the mind. But 
 now, that the distance is removed, and that figure and sub- 
 stance are given to it, we will be enabled to measure its 
 proportions exactly, and more especially to compare its 
 past aspect with its present character. 
 
 * Lectures, p, 85. f Dr. Wardlaw brings out the same idea in p. 87. 
 
38 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 A Church we are told, cannot be Scriptural in her con- 
 stitution or character, which is not free and unfettered in 
 regard to her future convictions of the Word of God. For 
 this reason the Established Church of Scotland, by ac- 
 knowledging an obligation to the State to be bound by the 
 rule which has been legislatively sanctioned, has become 
 Erastian in her constitution, and is guilty of dishonour- 
 ing her great Head — though possessing a rule which em- 
 bodies all her present convictions of God's Word, she is yet 
 to be regarded as a moral nuisance, because in the act of 
 her union with the State, the right of adopting her future 
 convictions of that Word was declared to be limited. 
 
 To ascertain the value of the charges here preferred, and 
 moreover to lay bare the foundations of Voluntaryism 
 and Free Churchism, in so far as they are identical, we 
 have now only to investigate the nature of the principle 
 that a Church cannot in consistency with the Word of God, 
 or in other words, without sin, agree to a surrender, or to 
 any limitation of liberty to adopt her future convictions 
 of duty. 
 
 This principle, on the soundness of which the Voluntary 
 has perilled to a considerable extent his objection against 
 Establishments, and the Free Churchman has risked the 
 adventurous step of the late Secession, is one of a start- 
 ling nature. It implies the assertion of an absurdity as 
 singular and striking as reason is capable of apprehend- 
 ing, namely this, " that truth may be existent and non- 
 existent at the same moment." 
 
 The argument on which this absm-dity rests may be 
 easily stated. Truth must be the subject of the convictions 
 of the Church ; consequently, the principle of our oppo- 
 nents that the Church must have liberty to act in accord- 
 ance with her future convictions, implies the existence of 
 that truth which is to become the subject of them. The 
 subject of the Church's present convictions is the truths of 
 the Word of God, and so the truths of that Word must be 
 the subject of her future convictions. Moreover, as it 
 would be absurdity to say that a Church was unscriptural 
 or guilty of sin because she had renounced liberty to act 
 in accordance with truth which had no existence, so 
 it must follow that there are truths in the Word of God, 
 which may become the subject of these future convictions, 
 and that such truths have a certain existence, and are not 
 to be classed among nonentities. 
 
 On the other hand, it is just as clear, that the truths 
 which arc to become the subject of the Church's future 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 39 
 
 convictions, are nonentities. For what is the subject of 
 her present convictions ? It is the whole truth contained 
 in the Word of God. Within the range of the Chui-ch's 
 present convictions, or within the sense which the Church 
 at present has of her duty to Christ is comprehended all 
 the truths of the Word of God, which she either knows or 
 believes to exist. There is not a single truth, a single 
 matter of doctrine, discipline, or government, which has 
 been revealed to the mind of the Church, that is not in- 
 cluded among her present convictions of duty to God ; so 
 that truths in his Word which may become the subject of 
 her future convictions, have no existence at all in her 
 mind. The Church neither knows nor believes in their 
 existence, and in so far as regards her mind, they are non- 
 entities. There are no such truths in the Word of God. 
 But this is not all. It is perfectly possible that all the 
 truths actually contained in the Word of God may be com- 
 prehended in the Church's present convictions of her duty, 
 and that there is not a single truth existent there beyond 
 those included in such convictions. Xow if this be the 
 case, where can those truths be found which are hereafter 
 to become the subject of other convictions ? In this case, 
 which for aught that she knows or believes to the con- 
 trary, is the real state of the matter at present, the non- 
 existence of the truths referred to is clear, for then their 
 existence becomes an impossibility. 
 
 To state this argument practically. How can truths of 
 the Word of God, viz., those which are to be the subject 
 of the Church's future convictions, be both existent and 
 non-existent, certain and contingent, a reality and non- 
 entity at the same moment of time ? This of course is pure 
 absurdity — yet the whole claim of our adversaries about 
 the Church's spiritual independence, is nothing but the 
 assertion of this absurdity. The Voluntaries and the Free 
 Church party assert, that the Chm-ch must have liberty to 
 act in accordance with her futm-e convictions of the will 
 of Christ, and cannot, without sin, consent to the limita- 
 tion of such liberty: an assertion which simply means, 
 that the Church must have liberty to act in accordance 
 with those truths of the Word of God, in whose existence 
 on the one hand she declares her belief, and on the other 
 hand her disbelief. 
 
 No doubt our opponents may attempt to evade the ab- 
 surdity here charged against their principles by an assertion, 
 to which we shall afterwards direct attention, in order 
 that their whole argument may be fairly discussed. But 
 
40 SPIEITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 in the mean time we are entitled to maintain our objection 
 against them, not merely on the ground of this absurdity 
 and of their own belief that those truths which must form 
 the subject of the Church's future convictions are non- 
 existent, but on the higher ground of the actual non-exist- 
 ence of any such truths. Were the assertion made, that 
 there are no truths in the Word of God which can ever give 
 scope to the Church's exercise of spiritual independence ; 
 it might seem bold and presumptuous, yet it is one on which 
 we are willing to take our stand, because it is difficult to 
 see how we could ever be driven from it. The grounds on 
 which the non-existence of such truths may be pleaded are 
 various. We may argue this point on the unity of the 
 faith— on express declarations of Scripture — and on the 
 past history of the Church. 
 
 The doctrine of the Word of God is, that as there is one 
 Lord so is there one faith, that is, one class of truths 
 revealed in Scripture to be believed to salvation, and to be- 
 come the rule of human conduct. The revelation of these 
 truths and of this rule, was closed with the life of John, 
 the last of the Apostles. The truths themselves were com- 
 mitted to writing during the lives of their inspired authors ; 
 and in such writing they were so expressed, that men were 
 capable of apprehending their meaning clearly, and there is 
 not a shadow of reason to suppose that at the moment the 
 code of inspiration was concluded, men did not apprehend 
 these truths so fully as to be in possession of a rule of faith 
 and manners complete in itself. To the idea that besides 
 the truths known to the people of God in those times 
 from his Word there were others not yet known, but after- 
 wards to be revealed to the mind of the Church as a part 
 of this rule. Scripture itself affords not the slightest coun- 
 tenance ; on the other hand such an idea if entertained, 
 must be accompanied with results of the most painful 
 and repugnant character — results dishonourable to God 
 and ruinous to the peace of men. 
 
 It argues mutability in the terms of the everlasting 
 covenant ; for it implies that the souls of men will be saved, 
 human conduct regulated, and the interests of the Re- 
 deemer's Church promoted on earth by the knowledge 
 of truths varpng in number, and it may be in imyjortance, 
 at different periods of time ; ajul all this too after the code 
 of Kevclation, containing these truths, has been for ever 
 completed. In early periods of the Christian Churcli, these 
 great objects were attained by the knowledge of one class 
 of truths, as ajtprehcnded by men in the intelligent excr- 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 41 
 
 cise of their private judgment, but in after peiiods by an 
 additional class of truths made known through the me- 
 dium of the Church's future convictions, both classes, how- 
 ever, being contained in the same finished code of Reve- 
 lation. 
 
 This idea, that the Word of God is capable of yield- 
 ing through all future generations an unlimited supply 
 of truths binding on the conscience, as they may be 
 drawn forth by the Church's convictions, is one which to- 
 tally detracts from the value of inspiration. The rule of 
 human duty is no longer the volume of inspiration, as ap- 
 prehended by the reasonable mind, but as explained by the 
 convictions of the Church. These convictions hold the key 
 of its inspiration, for just as they enlarge or contract the 
 sphere of truths contained there, so is the sphere of inspi- 
 ration extended or narrowed, and thus does the rule of 
 human duty become liable to uncertainty and change. In 
 this case, infallibility, with all its consequences, must be- 
 long to the Church's convictions, for in no other way can 
 men be secured against delusion in reference to the truths 
 imposed on their belief. 
 
 The idea above referred to subverts religion to its foun- 
 dation. Let the principle once be conceded, that there 
 are truths at present unknown ; but which may be educed 
 from the Word of God by the future mind of the Church, and 
 consequences the most fatal immediately ensue. All that has 
 hitherto been deemed sure and stable in belief is overthrown, 
 and the very existence of salvation is brought into doubt. 
 No man any longer knows or can know what is true or 
 what is false in religion. No fixed standard of God's will 
 exists. No means are left to try the purity of faith, or to 
 condemn the most erroneous and soul-destroying doctrines, 
 which have been or may yet be taught for divine truth. 
 In the world of human belief, universal chaos alone must 
 reign, for by the dogma now propounded, all that has hither- 
 to been hnoivn and received by the heart, may be overturned 
 by the existence of new truths discovered through the me- 
 dium of the Church's future convictions. 
 
 That there are truths in the Word of God, hid under the 
 dark cover of prophecy, which shall hereafter be clearly re- 
 vealed to the Church, is probable and certain. But of what 
 nature must these be ? No reasonable man can believe them 
 to be truths the reception of which is essential to salvation, 
 or to the direction of man's present conduct. It is not pos- 
 sible they can be truths of such a character, that the rule 
 of the Church's doctrine, discipline, and government, should 
 
42 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 be incomplete and imperfect without them. Such an idea 
 is entirely repugnant to the Scripture doctrine of the unity 
 of the faith. The Church's rule of faith and manners must 
 be complete, and however men may differ about what is em- 
 braced in the rule itself, or, however individual saints may 
 be ignorant of parts of it, the truths of the Word of God 
 which form this rule must be held as all already known 
 in the existent convictions of the various branches of the 
 Church of Christ on earth, and any addition to these truths, 
 coming through the medium oi future convictions must be 
 regarded as only chimerical.* 
 
 * This argument must go far to subvert the great fundamental doc- 
 trine of Popery, the infallibility of the Church in interpreting God's 
 Word. Let us see to what truths of God's Word the claim of infallibi- 
 lity must have respect. It cannot be to tiniths at present unknown to 
 the Church; or, in other words, it cannot imply a claim to educe new 
 and previously unknown truths from God's Word, and impose them on 
 the'consciences of men. For were the existence of such truths conceded, 
 Popery itself, as a system, would no longer be certain. All that has 
 hitherto been taught by the Romish Church as essential to human sal- 
 vation, might at once be overturned by the revelation of these unknown 
 truths to her future mind. The infallibility of the Church can, there- 
 fore, be exercised only on truths known, and whose existence is already 
 revealed, and to secure the future with the past identity of Popery, the 
 existence of all others must be repudiated. Such then being the subject 
 of this claim, it is easy to perceive what Popish infallibility means, with 
 reference to known truth. It must mean one of these two things : — 1st, 
 That all the interpretations which this Church has given of God's Word, 
 have since her own existence, been one consistent harmonious whole, 
 and as such, are an exposition of that unity of purpose which exists in the 
 will of God. Or, 2dly, That though any of these interpretations have been 
 at times inconsistent with other interpretations, yet both have been an 
 exposition of, and agreeable to God's will. Should this latter view of 
 the Church's infallibility be adopted, the claim involves a subversion of 
 the unchangeableness of God. His will is no longer the purpose of 
 his own mind from eternity, and wliich, therefore, is incapable of 
 change, but what is declared to be his will by the mutable mind of the 
 Church. Her interpretation of God's Word being an expression of the 
 di\ine will, the Church has thus the power to create that will, and since 
 all her interpretations have not been consistent or harmonious, she 
 thus has the power to make, and, dc facto has made God's eternal pui'pose 
 inconsistent with itself. 
 
 On the other hand, if the first view of infallibility be adopted, the 
 claim, of course, becomes a mere historical question. Have all the Ro- 
 mish interpretations of Scripture, as explained in the Church's actings, 
 since the date of her existence, been one consistent harmonious whole ? 
 A single instance of inconsistency in this long series, well authenticated 
 from liistory, will subvert the claim entirely. History points out to us 
 many such inconsistencies in the interpretations and acts of the Romish 
 Church. Rut though this were denied, as it will be, by the advocates of 
 Popery, and though it were maintained, that all tlie past interpretations 
 of the Church have been consistent, still the claim is subverted. His- 
 
SPIRITUAL IJSTDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 43 
 
 We might argue the point " of the non-existence of other 
 truths than those embraced in the present convictions 
 which the Church has of God's "Word, on the ground of its 
 o\\Ti express declarations." We refer to the prohibition 
 both in the Old and New Testament against adding to or 
 taking away from that W^ord. (See Deut. iv. 2 ; Prov. xxx, 
 6 ; Rev. xxii. 18, 19.} 
 
 The denunciation in Revelations may be held as plainly 
 recognizing the fact, that all the truths which God deems 
 necessary for the purpose of regulating man's faith and 
 conduct in this life, are contained in the inspired Volume, 
 and, moreover, that man is capable of arriving at a full 
 knowledge of them, else why should a denunciation be 
 added against those w'ho seek to extend the limits of divine 
 truth. This denunciation was proclaimed, let it be noted, 
 from the days of the Apostles, and before the Chm-ch's fu- 
 ture convictions could have been in existence. Now, if 
 God, previous to this, utters a denunciation against those 
 who extend the limits of divine truth, beyond what was 
 then kno^vn, the ai'gument thence arising will not be very 
 easily evaded, that there are no truths in his Word, 
 which can be revealed through the Church's future convic- 
 tions. 
 
 But it may be said, the denunciation in Revelations does 
 not refer to extending the limits of divine truth, as such 
 is contained in the inspired Volume, but to the attempt 
 to make additions to the number of books or manusciipts 
 which compose the inspired volume itself, such as the Apo- 
 crypha. 
 
 tory can only vouch for the past, it cannot answer for the future. How 
 does the Papist know what will he the interpretations of his Church in 
 future, and whether they will be consistent ^ith those formerly given ? 
 He may say, an infallible Church cannot give in future, any interpreta- 
 tion which does not harmonize with the past. But this is taking for 
 granted, the very point to be proved. We must first know that the 
 Church is infallible, before we can receive as truth, a system taught by 
 that infallibility. The consistency of her future with her past inter- 
 pretations of God's Word, forms the proof of the Church's infalUbility, 
 and that proof must be complete to entitle her system to the beUef of 
 men. If that consistency fail in a single instance, up to the end of the 
 world, the offered proof of infallibility is destroyed. Papists thus, 
 on their own principles, do not know, and never can know, whether their 
 Church be infallible or not. Up to the end of time, the only proof ad- 
 vanced for it, may be overturned, and on this doctrine, which cannot be 
 proved, the entu-e system of Popery is built. Reflecting minds even 
 among Papists, may see how wretched a foundation this affords, on 
 which to rest the imperishable interests of eternity. 
 
44 SPIEITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 This view of the prohibition will be equally fatal to the 
 doctrine of our opponents. 
 
 When God forbids men to add the Apocrypha, for ex- 
 ample, to the inspired canon, he simply forbids them to 
 add the statements or assertions of this book to the truths 
 which bear the stamp of his authority ; while in the prohi- 
 bition uttered he evidently contemplates the coming of a 
 time when the Church will attempt to compass wicked ends 
 by such addition. But for the purpose of preventing her 
 from doing so, the prohibition is utterly useless, if the doc- 
 trine of our opponents be sound, since the Church could still 
 serve any purpose she pleased, in a far more simple manner 
 than by adding to the books of inspiration, viz. by alleging 
 neiv truths as revealed to her mind from the acknowledged 
 book of inspiration. Even should the view of the passage in 
 Revelations now before us, be the right one, the fact thus 
 brought out, that God prohibits the Church from advancing 
 evil purposes, in no other way but by that of adding the 
 statements hioivn to exist in spurious books to the known 
 truths of his Word, must aiFord a very strong presumption 
 that there does not exist in that word any unexplored mine 
 of unknoivn truth. 
 
 We might farther argue the point of the non-existence 
 of other truth than that at first revealed to the Church, on 
 the ground of her past history. 
 
 What truth connected with the rule of faith and man- 
 ners has ever been made known to her mind during the 
 past periods of her history, which is acknowledged to have 
 been unknown to the mind of the Apostolic Church. 
 Truths once known, have afterwards, through the wicked- 
 ness of men, become obscured, over a wide extent of the 
 Church's domains, and these have again been brought clear- 
 ly into light, but we are ignorant of a single truth, 
 whose existence, previously unknown, has been brought 
 before the minds of men, by the exercise of the Church's 
 future convictions, or, in other words, of her spiritual in- 
 dependence. 
 
 Nay, more, there is not a single sect of Christians in 
 existence, however wild and irrational their principles may 
 be, who do not contend that these were among the truths 
 recognized in the earliest days of the Church's history, and 
 were not afterwards revealed to her mind. And the very 
 fact that any truth (if the expression may be allowed) 
 was classed among those which were revealed to the Church, 
 at a period subsequent to Apostolic times, that is to say. 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 45 
 
 had been the subject of her future convictions, would be 
 held as sufficient by every rational mind to eject it from 
 the rule of God's Word entirely, and to rank it among the 
 inventions of men. 
 
 Xor would it lessen the absurdity of our opponents' 
 claim, were they to assert, as they might possibly do, that 
 they do not pretend to say there are any truths in the 
 Word of God never previously revealed, but that truths 
 foi-merly known may have been lost sight of— that it is 
 the Church's duty to seek out such, and when discovered, 
 to obey them, and that she must be left at freedom to 
 folloAv her future convictions respecting these truths. 
 
 To the claim of independence thus stated, a similar ob- 
 jection occurs as formerly. Xo proof can be given that 
 any such truth lies at present in obscurity, (or, in other 
 words, does not exist in the known convictions which 
 the Church has of divine truth.) Xay, no proof can be 
 given that any truth known in apostolic times ever was 
 obscured throughout the whole limits of the Church. To 
 suppose that any of the truths of God's Word, essential to 
 faith and manners, either now or at any former period of 
 the Church's existence, were entirely blotted out from the 
 known and existent convictions of the whole community 
 of professing believers, would be a contradiction to Christ's 
 words, " On this Rock I build my Church, and the gates of 
 hell shall not prevail against it." For at the time such 
 truths were obscured from the knowledge of men, the 
 gates of hell did prevail against the Church of Christ, and 
 the rule of faith and manners became incomplete. 
 
 So far is the past history of the Church from givin*^ 
 countenance to the idea, that new truths exist in God's 
 Word, which may yet be discovered, or that old truths at 
 present lie there in obscurity, and need to be discovered, 
 that by it such idea is entirely discountenanced. If such 
 then be the lesson taught by the history of the Church 
 throughout a period of more than eighteen centuries, 
 the argument thence arising may be regarded as amount- 
 ing to certainty, that no truths connected with the rule of 
 faith and manners, besides those included in the Church's 
 present convictions, exist, or can exist, in the Word of 
 God. 
 
 Adverting now to the charge brought against the Church 
 of Scotland, that she has violated principle in recognizing 
 a limitation of her liberty to act in accordance with her 
 future convictions of God's Word, we are entitled to ask, 
 where ai-e the truths that are to form the subject of these' 
 
46 SPIKITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 convictions ? Till tlie existence of such truths has been 
 proved, the charge in connection with them, whether desig- 
 nated as sin, Erastianism, or den}Ting the Headship of 
 Christ, is but aiTant folly, or if not, must be false accu- 
 sation. 
 
 In order to form a fair and just estimate of this charge, 
 and of the claim of our opponents respecting spiritual 
 independence, we may here notice what truths alone 
 can possibly become the subject of the Church's future 
 convictions. They must be ranged under the following 
 four classes : — 
 
 1. Truths never previously revealed by the Spirit of God. 
 
 2. Truths formerly revealed, but at present unknown. 
 
 3. Truths known but not included in the Chm-ch's rule 
 sanctioned by the State. 
 
 4. Truths knovra and included in that rule. 
 
 Now, if our opponents' claim about the Church's liberty 
 to act in accordance with her future convictions, has re- 
 spect to the truths contained in the two first classes, it is 
 pm'e absurdity, because as already stated, their existence 
 never can be proved. If it has respect to truths contained 
 in the third class, it asserts against the Church of Scot- 
 land, and against themselves, while they remained in con- 
 nection with her, entire want of conscience, inasmuch as 
 it supposes that a rule was accepted from the State not 
 embodying all the truths of God's Word known to the 
 Church. 
 
 If it respect the truths contained in the fourth class, then 
 by implying that the Church's present and future convictions 
 of known truth may be difterent, it involves a denial of the 
 first principle the philosophy of mind, \hsitoi mental identity. 
 The mind is capable of existing in an infinite variety of 
 states, just as it is affected by objects external to it, or by 
 its own reflections. When a truth of the Word of God is 
 brought in contact with it, such truth must become the 
 cause, or immediate antecedent of a particular state of 
 mind, which may here be called by the name of present 
 conviction. Now, when the same truth is again brought 
 in contact with the mind, and becomes, as before, the sub- 
 ject of mental contemplation, is it not apparent that it 
 must be the cause or antecedent of the mind's existence in 
 precisely the same state as before ? Were it possible that 
 the same truth contemplated in the same aspect, could be 
 the cause of two distinct and opposite states of mind, called 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 47 
 
 present and future conviction, we should then have a cause 
 productive of two, consequently of uncertain effects, and 
 so we should have a violation of the philosophic principle, 
 that similar causes must he productive of similar, not of op- 
 posite effects. A new aspect of truth, or a new truth, may- 
 be productive of a state of mind different from that conse- 
 quent on a former aspect of it, and the mental contempla- 
 tion of the same truth may possibly be the cause of diffe- 
 rent and opposite states of mind in two individuals, but in 
 the same individual, the same aspect of truth never can be 
 productive of opposite states of mind. 
 
 A\^hen a minister of the Church of Scotland attaches his 
 signature to the Confession of Faith, he thus declares that 
 the truths contained in it express his sense or present con- 
 viction of the Word of God, and, moreover, that he repu- 
 diates, as in some measure commingled with error, all 
 other views of the Word of God inconsistent with this For- 
 mulary. To his mind, known truth just implies that spe- 
 cific view of it set forth in the Confession of Faith, under 
 the various heads of doctrine, discipline, and government. 
 Now, this known truth, when brought in contact with the 
 mind, is the cause why it exists in a particular state, called 
 present conviction ; and as other besides known truth does 
 not exist to modify the state of the mind's existence, the 
 effect produced by it on the mind must be the same at 
 one period as at another. In other language, present and 
 future conviction must be identical, and there can be no 
 such thing as these convictions opposed to each other, un- 
 less the identity of the mind itself be changed. 
 
 What rational man could conceive, that having arrived 
 at a conviction subsequent on the statement in Genesis i. 1, 
 being brought in contact with the mind, that God created 
 the world, he would ever arrive at an opposite conviction, 
 and on the authority of the same statement become per- 
 suaded at a future period, that God did not create the 
 world. The idea is pure absurdity, whether applied to one 
 truth or to all. 
 
 Every one capable of reflection, must now perceive the 
 value of the objection which respects the limitation of the 
 Church's^ liberty to adopt her future convictions. The sys- 
 tem of Voluntaryism and Free Churchism is built on the 
 existence of truth which has no existence, and on this 
 ground it must be entirely repudiated. 
 
 In a recent part of our discussion, it was asserted, that 
 in one way the principle of spiritual independence might 
 
48 SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE EXAMINED. 
 
 be freed from the charge of implpng both the existence 
 and non-existence of truth. We now proceed to elucidate 
 this point, and in so doing to present the principle in an 
 entirely new aspect. 
 
 The assertion of our opponents is, that the Church must 
 possess an unfettered liberty as to her future convictions of 
 divine truth. It may then "be said by them, that though 
 the Church's present convictions exhaust all the truths re- 
 vealed to her mind, yet it does not follow that no other 
 truths are in existence. Truth is not necessarily non-exist- 
 ent, because it is unknown. There may be truths in the 
 Word of God, which are at present unknown, but Avhich, 
 when revealed, may become the subject of the Church's 
 future convictions. 
 
 For the sake of argument, it may be conceded that there 
 are such truths in the Word of God, and consequently they 
 are not, as we have said, non-existent, nor is the principle 
 of our opponents any longer chargable with absurdity. 
 But unfortunately one absurdity is only exchanged for an- 
 other. That for which our opponents now contend is, the 
 Church's liberty to act in accordance with truths at present 
 existent, but which shall only be hereafter revealed. To 
 this principle the fatal objection arises, that these truths 
 have no known existence but in the mind of God ; for being 
 unrevealed, they can have no existence in the mind of the 
 Church. Let us then contemplate the charge brought 
 a<yainst our cause, that an Establishment is unfaithful to 
 Christ, because of the limitation of its liberty to act in ac- 
 cordance with truth existent only in the mind of God. 
 The principle involved in such a charge, is one of the most 
 irrational ever asserted, viz. that man's present conduct 
 oufvht to be affected by truth known only to God, and that 
 he°cannot faithfully honour Christ, but by acknowledging 
 the influence of unrevealed truth 
 
 Were it the charge of Voluntaryism and Free Church- 
 ism that an Establishment was unfaithful to Christ and 
 guilty of sin, because it refused to act in accordance with 
 truth as revealed, the charge could not be answered ; but 
 when it is asserted that such guilt is contracted by an Es- 
 tablishment, merely because in its actings it renounces 
 the influence of truth not yet revealed to its mind, and 
 the knowledge of which is only to be found in the mind of 
 the Eternal One, such an assertion can only be character- 
 ized as an insult to the reason which God has given as a 
 light to the human soul, and a reflection on Him who 
 pFaced it there. 
 
sriRrrrAL independence examined. 49 
 
 ^ Of this principle we cannot speak in langua^re of suffi- 
 cient abhorrence. It is a pnnciple like the foi-nTer, destruc- 
 tive of religion, and subversive of Revelation. It overturns 
 the gi-ound of faith in the Word of God, and leaves the 
 sinner without a rule to direct his conduct in all the mo- 
 mentous affairs of eternity. If in any,the least part of his 
 duty to God, man should be influenced or should suffer his 
 present conduct to be affected, not by revealed but by un- 
 revealed truth, and if it be possible that he can be guiltv 
 ot sin against God, in not recognizing the influence of 
 such truth, where is the sinner to find the path of duty 
 made plain, where is he to look for the light which is to 
 guide him to heaven and to glory. Eternity thus becomes 
 enshi-ouded in uncertainty, and darkness besets the path 
 to another world. Yea, man himself now stands forth the 
 piteous object of commiseration to the universe— a bein? 
 responsible to God, and left by that God in ignorance of 
 his duty. ^ 
 
 '^^^y^tm^^^ed.o^i^o^iimn to the plainest declarations 
 ot God s A^ or<l ck)es this fundamental principle of Volun- 
 taryism and Free Churchism appear ? Moses, the inspired 
 lawgiver of Israel, inculcates a very different principle 
 when he says, - Secret things belong unto the Lord oui^ 
 Uod, but those things which are revealed belong unto us 
 and to our children," (Deut. xxix. 29.) Xor does the uni- 
 form voice of Scripture proclaim to us other lesson than 
 this, that the only rule of duty is the revealed will of God 
 and that nothing can be charged against man as sin, but 
 a violation of truth as revealed : " Sin is the transgression 
 of the law;' (1 John ni. 4.) '^f I had not ccme and 
 spoken to them, they had not had sm," (John xv. 22.) 
 
OBJECTIONS TO WHICH SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE 
 IS LIABLE. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE — ALLEGED EBASTIANISM OF ESTA- 
 BLISHMENT — WHAT IT IS NOT — WHAT IT IS — CIVIL OBLIGATION — COE- 
 BECT VIEW OF — ANALOGIES FBOM 6CBIPTUBE. 
 
 In the previous discussion respecting spiritual indepen- 
 dence, it has been shewn that its true definition is " Li- 
 berty to act in accordance with the Church's future con- 
 victions of God's Word ;" and farther, that when Vo- 
 luntaries and Free Churchmen denounce that limitation 
 of this liberty, which is necessarily implied in a Civil 
 Establishment, as Erastian or sinful, they take an ob- 
 jection to such an institution neither accordant with reason 
 nor the Word of God. Having arrived at such a con- 
 clusion, we might be justified in dismissing this noted 
 principle altogether, were it not that the objections to 
 which it is liable are not yet exhausted. Of these ob- 
 jections we shall specify a few. 
 
 Regarding the Voluntary's claim about spiritual indepen- 
 dence, as tantamount with the assertion that liberty to 
 follow her future convictions is essential to the Church's 
 scriptural character, we find in this assertion some very 
 strange, and not very tenable positions ; 1st, It implies 
 that the Church is yet in ignorance of many of the most 
 important truths contained in the Word of God. 
 
 For more than 1800 years has the Church been seeking 
 a knowledge of Christ's will from his Word, for the gui- 
 dance of her conduct in his service ; and throughout this 
 
OBJECTIONS TO WHICH, ETC. 51 
 
 lengthened period, reasonable men hare believed that a 
 competent knowledge of that will, for her guidance in all 
 circumstances, and at least in so far as to keep her 
 from sin, was revealed to her mind. But it now turns out 
 that all this has been delusion ; for she is still in a state 
 of ignorance as respects that will, and many important 
 truths of doctrine, discipline, and government, are kept 
 back from her mind. Nay, more, to the Chm'ch there has 
 not yet been revealed such measure of Christ's will, 
 through his Word, as to afford a sufficient rule of con- 
 duct in all circumstances, and to preserve her from sin, 
 should she as an Establishment bind herself to act in 
 accordance with what has been revealed. For, says the 
 Voluntary, " An Establishment having liberty to act up 
 to all the truths of God's Word at present revealed to its 
 mind, and having renounced liberty to act in accord- 
 ance Avith truth not yet revealed, is guilty of sin, and of 
 dishonour to Christ." 
 
 This view of the Church's position in relation to the 
 truths contained in God's Word, is at least to many minds 
 one altogether new, and it may be added somevrhat humb- 
 ling and discouraging. 
 
 2dly, The assertion referred to about the necessity of 
 having liberty to act in accordance with the Church's' fu- 
 ture convictions, involves in it a heavy reflection on the 
 founders of every Establislied Church in the world, and on 
 all who have expressed then* convictions of God's will in 
 confessions of faith, articles, testimonies, or in anv other 
 formulas. It charges them, in no slight measure, with ig- 
 norance and impiety. In the case of the first founders of 
 our Establishment, they recorded in the rule, which was 
 sanctioned by the State, when such institution was form- 
 ed, all their present convictions of Christ's will, which they 
 had been able to educe from his Word. But says the 
 Voluntary, this is but a defective rule of doctrine, disci- 
 pline, and government to the Church. There are other 
 truths in God's AVord, besides those which formed the sub- 
 ject of such present convictions. There are truths now 
 unknown, which are to become the subject of the Church's 
 future convictions. 
 
 Had the founders of our Establishment been learned 
 men, they might have discovered the one class of these 
 truths as well as the other. Nay, had they been pious 
 men, they would have sought the promised guidance of the 
 Spirit of God, who, in answer to their prayers, might have 
 
52 OBJECTIONS TO WHICH 
 
 revealed to them not a portion, perhaps only a small 
 portion, but all the truths of God's Word. The ignor- 
 ance in which the founders of the Establishment were 
 left, and the consequent defects of the rule which they 
 extracted from God's Word, and for which they obtained 
 a legal sanction, as embodying all they knew of divine 
 tmth, is thus, it may be, a punishment inflicted on them 
 by God for their negligence, and for their impiety, — a 
 punishment of which all members of the Church on earth, 
 not excepting the adherents of Voluntaryism itself, feel 
 the eilects to this day. 
 
 3dly, The assertion and claim referred to, involve in 
 them, we use the language with reverence, a heavy reflec- 
 tion upon the Spirit of God himself. 
 
 The Spirit of God was promised by Christ as the Great 
 Teacher of the Church. Since the days of Chiist's ascen- 
 sion to heaven, this promise of the Spirit's teaching has 
 been the comfort of the Church. It has been pleaded in 
 prayer, and in dependence on him who spake the Word, 
 the gift of the Spirit in all his offices, and the promised 
 guidance into all truth, have been looked for by the 
 Church. But what has been the result, if the principles 
 of Voluntaryism be sound ? That this promised guidance 
 has been bestowed ? No. The guidance of the Church 
 into all truth has been withheld by the Spirit — the Re- 
 deemer's promise has not been fulfilled — the prayers of 
 the Church for nearly nineteen centuries have, to a large 
 extent, been unheeded, for at this day the Church is ignor- 
 ant of her Master's will in many important respects. Now, 
 had this ignorance respected only matters which it did not 
 concem the Church to know, matters in nowise coimected 
 with present conduct, or affecting man's duty to God, it 
 would have been of less moment. But the ignorance in 
 which the Church has been kept, docs affect her present 
 conduct, and the performance of her duty to Christ. If 
 the Church consent to bind herself to act in accordance 
 with that light of divine truth, which is at present re- 
 vealed to her mind by the Spirit, consent to which would 
 be the only effect of the obligation to the State, implied 
 in an Establishment, it would be, according to the Volun- 
 tary on the one hand, and the Free Churchman on the 
 other, an act of dishonour done to Christ, an insult to his 
 kingly power, a direliction of the Church's duty, and a sin 
 a<yainst God. What is this but to say, that the Church 
 has not a sufficiency of present light to keep her from sin, 
 
SPIKITUAL INDEPENDENCE IS LIABLE. 53 
 
 that her duty to Christ cannot be fulfilled by acting in 
 accordance with the light which fehe at present possesses, 
 and, consequently, that this can be done only by the in- 
 fluence upon the Church's mind of a light not yet received, 
 viz., the light of unrevealed truth. Now, as this light has 
 not been bestowed on the Church by the Spirit, the infer- 
 ence becomes undeniable, that it has been withheld to the 
 Church's prejudice, and that the Spirit has not given 
 her the means to avoid sin, to fulfil her own duty, and to 
 preserve the honour of the Saviour, by the present know- 
 ledge of divine truth which he has chosen to impart. 
 
 The adversaries of our Establishment can only attempt 
 to escape this heavy charge as involved in the principles 
 contended for by them in one way. They may maintain 
 that the light which the Spirit has revealed to the Church's 
 mind at present is sufficient for her guidance in duty — 
 that she will be guilty of no sin in acting according to it ; 
 but that she will be guilty of sin in acknowledging a 
 civil obligation to do so. 
 
 But even this assertion does not save one class of our 
 adversaries, viz. the Free Church party, from the charge of 
 reflecting upon the Spirit of God. They hold the Esta- 
 blishment principle, and that it is a clear inference from 
 God's "Word, that the State ought to endow the Church 
 for the good of its subjects, and to do this not in the way of 
 a yearlyl^eleemosynary grant, but of a permanent support 
 secured by statute to the ministers of religion, for such is 
 the endowment possessed by the Church of Scotland. It 
 is obvious, however, that the Church cannot accept of this 
 endowment on terms which would involve her conscience 
 in sin. Now, if all the truths contained in God's Word 
 were at present revealed to the Church's mind, she could 
 be guilty of no sin in acknowledging a civil obligation, as 
 implied in an Establishment, to act in accordance with 
 them. But because only a part of these truths is at pre- 
 sent revealed, and because it would be sinful to acknow- 
 ledge an obligation to act in accordance with present light, 
 to the exclusion of what is future, the Church is thus de- 
 prived of the means of complying with what she herself 
 believes to be a scripture principle, viz. of accepting an en- 
 dowment from the State, just from the want of the addi- 
 tional light she does not possess, which additional light has 
 been withheld by the Spirit of God, to her prejudice, and 
 the dishonour of the principles of his own Word. 
 
 But without insisting farther on this, let us go on to the 
 more important point, namely, the assertion of Yolunta- 
 
54 OBJECTIONS TO WHICH 
 
 ries and Free Churchmen alike, that the performance of 
 duty by the Church under a civil obligation is sin, or as it 
 has been called Erastianism. Amid the haziness of dis- 
 tance, the exact proportions of Erastianism have not been 
 very clearly apprehended ; but now that wo are brought 
 more nearly into contact with it, its true character and 
 merits will be better appreciated. The Erastianism of out 
 Scottish Establishment, so often and so loudly denounced 
 as it has been, must consist of one of the two following 
 crimes : It implies that wrong is done by the Church, 1st, 
 either by the refusal to acknowledge the influence of unre- 
 vealed truth in her present conduct; or, 2dly,by her acting in 
 accordance with all revealed truth under a civil obligation. 
 
 To the first view of Erastianism here supposed, the best 
 answer is furnished by a question in our Catechism : — 
 " What is the duty which God requires of man ? " The 
 duty which God requires of man is obedience to his revealed 
 will." That Avhich is not revealed cannot be the subject 
 of duty, and where there is no duty there can be no sin. 
 
 The first view of Erastianism being thus untenable, it 
 must be fixed down to the other, or, in other language, 
 Erastianism must imply the sinfulness of acting in accord- 
 ance with revealed truth under a civil obligation. 
 
 This idea of a civil obligation, as attached to the duties 
 of the Church, constituted that precise view of her position 
 which the advocates of spiritual independence so stre- 
 nuously denounced during the late controversy, and the 
 acknowledgment of which was declared to be inconsistent 
 with the Church's scriptural character. The assertion of 
 this civil obligation finally made and confirmed by the 
 judgment of the House of Peers in the second Auchterar- 
 der decision, raised the storm of opposition to the Church's 
 constitution as laid down by the Civil courts, and prepared 
 the way for the disi'uption of 1843. In the proceedings 
 which then took place, the principle was maintained that 
 the attempt, on the part of the State, to regard the Esta- 
 blishment as bound to the performance of her duties by a 
 civil obligation, was an innovation on its past constitution, 
 and tliat submission to such an obligation, on the part of 
 the Church, was sinful and dishonourable to her Divine 
 Head. On this subject our opponents themselves say, " It 
 has now been finally decided, however, by the Supreme 
 Civil Court, that the astricting clause (held as revived after 
 its repeal in 1690, by the act of Anne 1711) imports no- 
 thing less than a complete civil obligation enforceable 
 against the Church by pains of law. It is clear that had 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE IS LIABLE. 55 
 
 the Church so understood the act 1592 ; had she under- 
 stood it as quaUfying her tenui-e of the temporalities by 
 such a condition as this, she never could in conscience have 
 accepted them.'' — Statement in reference to the Convoca- 
 tion Resolutions, p. 2. 
 
 In asserting, as is here done, the sinfulness of perform- 
 ing duty under a civil obligation, our opponents deal more 
 ^^ith what is specious in argument than with what is true/* 
 If the Church of Scotland be at present guilty of sin, be- 
 cause she is bound to perfonn her duties by civil obliga- 
 tion, and is liable to civil pains should she violate the rule 
 under which, as an Establishment, she acts, in what does 
 the sinfulness of that obligation consist ? It must consist 
 in one of two things ; 1st, In the fact that the civil obli- 
 gation hinders the Church from doing something which 
 otherwise she would feel bound in conscience to do, or, 
 2dly, In the civil obligation itself. With reference to the 
 first, let it be remembered how far the civil obligation ex- 
 tends, in order that we may see what the Establish- 
 ment is hindered by it from doing. The civil obligation 
 binds the Establishment to adhere to the rule adopted by 
 the Church herself, and sanctioned by the State. But the 
 rule referi'ed to embodies all her present convictions of the 
 will of Christ ; in other words, the whole of divine truth 
 revealed to her mind. All from which the Establishment 
 is hindered by the civil obligation, is from adopting fu- 
 ture convictions of divine truth, or of adopting truth not 
 yet revealed to its mind. But surely this eifect of the civil 
 obligation cannot be regarded as sinful. Sin is only com- 
 mitted by a violation of the law of God. But how can sin 
 be committed by the violation of truth, (if it deserve to be 
 called by this name,) whose very existence is incapable of 
 proof, nay, it may be, is impossible, and which at any rate 
 has not been revealed by the Spirit of God to the Church's 
 mind. To hold that such act is sinful, or thiit the refusal 
 to acknowledge non-existent or unrevealed truth implies 
 any violation of principle, is setting at defiance the autho- 
 rity of God in his Word, and laying down a standard of 
 
 * Were it possible to believe such absurdity, what must be the result ? 
 Every ci^il statute in existence, which respects the Church's duty, must 
 be sin. Obedience by the Church to the sixth or eighth command- 
 ment, under a ciAil obligation, must be sin. Or if this be denied, then 
 the question must arise, how does it happen, that the Church may per- 
 form some part of her duty to God, under a civil obligation, but not the 
 whole ; and by what rule is the limit to be drawn betwixt the two ? 
 
56 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO WHICH 
 
 right cand vrrong for the regulation of human conduct 
 which he has repudiated. 
 
 The sinfulness of a Civil obligation, when attached to 
 the duties of the Establishment, cannot then consist in 
 this, that any hindrance is imposed by it on conscience from 
 duty which would otherwise be performed, for no such hin- 
 drance exists. 
 
 Neither can it consist of the pains and penalties which 
 may follow the breach of the obligation. 
 
 Pains and penalties of whatever nature are but an 
 efect of a previous act, viz., of the Civil obligation itself. 
 Now an efiect of an act cannot be the chief ground on 
 which we regard that act as a violation of principle. Theft 
 exposes a man, when convicted of it, to imprisonment. 
 But who would ever think of regarding that imprisonment 
 as the chief stain on the man's character ? It is the moral 
 crime M-hereof imprisonment is the result. Theft itself is 
 a wrong against God. But it is not the chief gi-ound or 
 cause of the wrong. This lies in the corruption of the 
 heart, whereof theft is but a fruit or effect. The wrong 
 committed by an Establishment, in submitting to a Civil 
 obligation, cannot consist of subjection to pains and 
 penalties, or of any mere effect of a previous act, it must 
 consist of that act itself. 
 
 On this point, viz., the act constituting the sinfulness con- 
 nected with a Civil obligation, our opponents themselves do 
 not seem to have a very accurate or clear conception. 
 This may be gathered from the definition of a Civil obli - 
 gation given in the Free Church Cateehism— a publication 
 of her principles, issued by authority— Question 67, " What 
 is a Civil obligation ? An obligation which it is competent 
 and proper to enforce by the secular arm, and the breach 
 of which is punishable with damages and imprisonment, 
 and other civil pains and penalties." 
 
 Any one accustomed to reflection may easily perceive, 
 that in this definition nothing is stated but the mere 
 effects which flow from a Civil obligation. — cflects not ne- 
 cessarily connected with it, and whiuh might have been 
 entirely different from those mentioned, or which might 
 not have existed at all. On the all-important point, 
 what in truth constitutes a Civil obligation, and what 
 renders it sinful for the Church to have her duties con- 
 nected with it, we arc left entirely ignorant, and appa- 
 rently for this reason, that our opponents do not know 
 themselves. 
 Now, apart from every other consideration, the fact here 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE IS LIABLE. 57 
 
 broadly staring us in the face, that on the fundamental 
 ground of the entire controversy between us, our opponents 
 have been dealing with the effects in place of the cause, and 
 have been expending their artillery of denunciation upon 
 Civil pains and penalties, while they ought to have reserved 
 it for the Civil obligation itself, may very fairly give rise to 
 a suspicion, that the controversy has not been earned to 
 the right issue. 
 
 We come now to the inquiry — What constitutes that 
 Civil obligation to which the Church, in being Established, 
 becomes subject, and by which she is bound ? 
 
 It simply consists of that overt act by which the Church 
 having laid before the State in her " Confession of Faith 
 and Standards," a distinct statement of those truths believed 
 by her, and of those duties, to the performance of which she 
 feels an internal obligation of conscience arising from the 
 Woi-d of God, expresses her formed consent to adhere to them. 
 
 Historically speaking, this overt act was probably per- 
 formed by the founders of the Scottish Establishment 
 through some deed of writing addressed to the State, but 
 undoubtedly it was implied in the formal application made 
 by them for a legislative sanction to the Church's rule, and 
 for a statutory title to the endowments, or in the formal ac- 
 ceptance of the sanction and title so given. Let us espe- 
 cially take notice that the overt act here performed by the 
 Church does not alter, by one iota, the length and breadth 
 of her duties. It does not in the slightest degree in- 
 terfere with the entire circle of those spiritual duties, 
 which the Church by an internal obligation of conscience, 
 ai-ising from God's Word, knows she ought to perform. It 
 is only something as it were external, superadded to what 
 is internal. But because of this overt act, this something 
 external added to what is internal on the conscience — this 
 distinct marking out of the Church's duties, that the State 
 may know her sense of God's Word, before it grants her an 
 endowment, she becomes, say our opponents, guilty of 
 sin, and is transformed into a tilthy mass of Erastianism. 
 
 Before conceding the justice of the condemnation thus 
 pronounced on our Church, let us first look to the Word 
 of God, whether any thing, bearing the closest analogy to 
 the Civil obligation referred to can be discovered in it. 
 
 The Civil obligation acknowledged by an Establishment 
 has been shewn to be a mere overt act of the Church, giv- 
 ing her formal consent before the State to the per- 
 formance of all those spiritual and ecclesiastical duties 
 which her own sense of God's Word, required of her— 
 
 c2 
 
58 OBJECTIONS TO WHICH 
 
 a mere superadding an external act to an internal obliga- 
 tion of duty to God. 
 
 Now this external act may be regarded in two lights : 
 First, as an act confirmatory of the internal obligation. 
 Secondly, as an act defining and limiting it. 
 
 In whichsoever of these two lights the Civil obligation 
 is regarded, we shall find acts in the Word of God stand- 
 ing in the strictest analogy with it. 
 
 If the Civil obligation or overt act of the Church be re- 
 garded as one confirmatory of the internal obligation of 
 conscience lying on the Church, we refer as analogous cases 
 in the Word of God to the vow which Moses and Joshua im- 
 posed on the chihlren of Israel — ^to the vow which several 
 of the kings of Judah imposed on their people at periods of 
 national reformation — to the vow which David frequently 
 speaks of, as having been taken by him — and, lastly, to the 
 Jewish and Christian sacraments. 
 
 When the believer has taken on his soul the sacramental 
 vow, does the circle of his duty to God become, by this act, 
 one iota wider than before ? Every believer feels that there 
 was previously lying upon his conscience, an internal obli- 
 gation to the obedience of all revealed truth, derived 
 from the fact of his being the responsible creature of God. 
 The sacramental vow is, therefore, merely an overt act by 
 which he consents more formally than before to perfonn 
 the duties he already feels that he owes to God. It is an 
 outward act which serves to confirm an internal obligation, 
 the measure of the obligation being the present conviction 
 which the individual may possess of God's revealed will. 
 In this respect, then, either the vow taken by the Israelites 
 of old, in the wilderness, and not unfrequent among Jew- 
 ish saints in after periods, or the vow taken by the believer 
 at the Lord's table, is an obligation exactly parallel to that 
 of an Establishment to the State. In either case it is 
 something external superadded for the pui-pose of render- 
 ing more valid and practically efficient the inward sense 
 which the conscience has of its duty to God. 
 
 It will bo said by our opponents, the cases to which we 
 have referred are not similar in two important respects — 
 First, Because though the Israelites, for example, took a 
 vow or obligation to God, in the wilderness, still the motive 
 to the fulfilment of this obligation, and to the perform- 
 ance of the duties it implied, was the authority of God, 
 while in the case of a Church Establishment, the motive 
 to duty is not the authority of God, but the fear of Civil 
 pains and penalties. Secondly, Because the obligation of 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE IS LIABLE. 59 
 
 the Israelites did not exclude every additional light of duty 
 which the conscience might attain, while the Church 
 is excluded from the performance of every duty not in- 
 cluded within the limits of the Civil obligation, or within 
 the rule sanctioned by the State. 
 
 This attempt, however, to draw a distinction between 
 the Scriptural obligation to which we have referred, and that 
 of the Church as Established, is not correct. As to the first 
 distinction, it is not true, that the Church performs her 
 duty in any respect, from fear of Civil pains and penalties, 
 and not from regard to the authority of God. The per- 
 formance of that duty was an inward obligation on her con- 
 science before the Civil obligation was in existence, and as 
 such, the motive leading her to perform it must have been 
 derived from the authority of God. The Civil obligation has 
 not changed in the smallest particular the range of the 
 Church's duty, and so cannot by possibility have super- 
 seded the antecedent authority which would have led her 
 to the performance of that duty, though the Civil obligation 
 had never been acknowledged, and would still lead to the 
 performance of the same duty, were this obligation an- 
 nulled. 
 
 Nor is there any more truth in the other distinction at- 
 tempted to be drawn between the religious obligation of 
 the Israelitish Church, or a Jewish saint to God, and that 
 of the Church Establishment ; for the external vow or obli- 
 gation of the one excluded those taking it from acting in 
 accordance with the additional light of after ages, as effec- 
 tually as the Civil obligation of the other, except in one 
 particular way, which is common to both. 
 
 To illustrate this, we shall make a supposition, not 
 certainly a very unnatural one, namely, that when Nath- 
 anael was seen by Christ under the fig tree, he had just 
 been engaged in taking a vow to God's service such as 
 that which David refers to in Ps. Ixi. or Ixvi. Now what 
 would have been the effect of this vow ? It would have 
 been a vow binding the conscience of Xathanael to act in 
 accordance with his present convictions of duty to God. 
 which was in other words, to observe all the statutes and 
 ceremonies prescribed by the law, and in this way alone 
 to serve and worship God. Beyond this, the limits of his 
 vow could not extend, because nothing more was then re- 
 vealed to his mind. The purer dispensation of Christi- 
 anity, soon after introduced by Christ, could have been at 
 this time only the subject of Nathanael's future convic- 
 tions. When, however, this more spiritual dispensation 
 
60 OBJECTIONS TO WHICH 
 
 was revealed, and obedience to it became obligatory on the 
 conscience, the only way in which this obedience could be 
 yielded by Nathanael, was by relinquishing his former ob- 
 ligation, because it no longer comprehended what he felt 
 to be his duty to God. Now, in exactly the same way 
 may the Established Church of Scotland preserve purity 
 of conscience. Should she ever come through the medium 
 of her future convictions to any other sense of her duty to 
 God, than that which she has expressed within the limits 
 of her civil obligation, (a matter not very probable, should 
 it even be possible,) and should she fail in getting these 
 limits extended by the State to meet her altered sense of 
 duty, she can do Avhat the Jewish saints did when con- 
 verted to the Gospel — renounce their former obligation 
 that they might act on the latter. The Church may re- 
 nounce her civil obligation by renouncing her connexion 
 with the State. 
 
 If the civil obligation, or overt act of the Clmrch be re- 
 garded in the second of the two lights formerly mentioned, 
 namely, as an act dejining and limiting her internal obli- 
 gation or duty to God, we can still refer to the Word of 
 God for an analogous example. 
 
 Obviously this is the view of the Church's civil obliga- 
 tion, on which our opponents must rest the strength of 
 their objection to it as sinful. It may be said the Church 
 can have no right to limit or define her duty to God. Her 
 proper position must be that of readiness to obey her 
 Lord's will, as he makes it known, which cannot be the 
 case if her duty be limited or defined as it necessarily is 
 in the civil obligation, or the rule of spiritual and ecclesias- 
 tical function by which she has become bound. 
 
 Now there would undoubtedly be soundness in this as- 
 sertion if the civil obligation did not comprehend within 
 its limits the Chui'ch's entire sense of revealed truth. But 
 when this obligation imposes no limits on her obedience 
 to those truths of God's Woitl of which she is at present 
 cognizant, and when the existence of other truths can 
 never be proved, the objection refeiTcd to can have no 
 value. And as to a Scripture example of man's duty to 
 God being circumscribed and defined to the exclusion of 
 everything beyond it — what else is the law of the Ten 
 Commandments ? Nay, what else is the Book of Inspira- 
 tion itself? And sure no rational man would think of 
 objecting as sinful to an obligation by which another 
 bound himself to act in accordance with the one or the 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE IS LIABLE. 61 
 
 other. That which is contained in the civil obligation, is 
 simply the Church's sense of the Book of Inspiration, a 
 sense held by her identically with that maintained by thfe 
 State to which she becomes united as an Establishment. 
 
 And here we would venture to put the minds of others 
 right as to the true nature of Erastianism. Erastianism 
 according to the view of it taken by our opponents, implies 
 the Church's acting in accordance with all the truths of 
 God's Word, revealed to her mind, under the additional ob- 
 ligation of an Act of Parliament to adhere to it. But the 
 charge of sinfulness brought against the Church of Scot- 
 land, because of such obligation, is entirely at variance 
 ■with those principles declared in the Word of God. In 
 this act of the Established Church, there is no Erastianism, 
 no sacrifice of a single Scriptural principle. Of Erastian- 
 ism proper, the Church could only be guilty were she 
 to acknowledge a civil obligation not to relinquish her 
 endowments. If the civil obligation to which the Church 
 submitted in entering into union with the State were 
 to this effect, that she should not have liberty to re- 
 linquish her endowments — should not have power to quit 
 her position, whatever Avere the enactments of the State 
 respecting her duties, then would she deserve all the hard 
 names that have been given her by our opponents — then 
 would her constitution as an Establishment be unscriptu- 
 ral, then would she be the slave of the Civil power, and 
 then truthfully would she be dishonouring her Great Head. 
 But of this, the correct view of Erastianism, the Church 
 of Scotland has not been guilty; she stands as free of 
 Erastianism as the Voluntaries or Free Churchmen them- 
 selves do ; and of this fact in the history of our Church's 
 constitution, the clearest and most unquestionable evidence 
 is to be found among our adversaries themselves, namely, 
 in the occurrence of the late disruption. 
 
 The opponents of our venerable Establishment, have 
 in the course of assailing its principles, brought against it 
 charges of the most heinous character. In investigating 
 these, it has been shewn in the first place, that they have 
 no foundation in truth ; and in the next place, that charges 
 of an equally heinous character, and with far greater jus- 
 tice, can be brought against the principles opposed to us. 
 While putting forth in the light which they have done 
 the claim about the Church's spiritual independence, or as 
 the term truly means, in the assertion they make of the 
 Erastianism and sinfulness of the Church of Scotland, be- 
 
62 OBJECTIONS TO WHICH 
 
 cause, as an Establishment she has consented to a limita- 
 tion of her liberty, in regard to her future convictions of 
 divine truth, convictions "which after all can never exist, 
 the Voluntary and Free Churchman are adopting princi- 
 ples alike contrary to reason, and contradicted by the 
 plainest statements of the Word of God. AYhen sober- 
 minded men, in the coolness of reflection, and apart from 
 the agitation and intellectual confusion of actual contro- 
 versy, come to apprehend in whole the result of the prin- 
 ciples adopted by the opponents of an Establishment, at 
 what conclusion must they arrive — that the objection 
 brought against it is sound, and that there exists any 
 ground in the Word of God for seeking the overthrow of 
 such an institution — no, but that the opposition to its 
 cause is false, and that the argument brought against 
 it in relation to spiritual independence has no founda- 
 tion whatever. The only spiritual independence which 
 can exist, or which is consonant with reason and the 
 Word of God is, that the Church must have liberty to 
 act in accordance with her 'present, not her future convic- 
 tions of the will of God, as revealed in his Word. If the 
 Church, in consenting to an union with the State, has fully 
 secured to her the liberty to carry out the present views of 
 divine truth held by her founders, a liberty which she must 
 have secured, unless she acted in violation of her conscience 
 in the formation of that union, she possesses the utmost 
 limits of spiritual independence ; an independence which 
 takes a wider flight than this, and expands into the 
 regions of futurity, may be fair and beautiful in theory, 
 but is in reality a mere figment of the imagination. 
 
 In reply then to the Voluntary we say, that the inde- 
 pendence of acting according to the present convictions of 
 divine truth, which were adopted by its founders, and 
 sanctioned by the State, in the rule by which it is 
 bound, an Establishment may possess, consequently this 
 objection brought by him to its principle falls to the 
 ground. 
 
 In reply to the Free Churchman we say, that this inde- 
 pendence the Established Church of Scotland possesses 
 at the present moment, consequently the great ground of 
 his secession from her, namely, the alleged surrender of 
 spiritual independence, is subverted. And hero a re- 
 mark may be made still farther tending to shew the 
 strength of the cause of the Establishment, and the weak- 
 ness of that of our o])ponents. Wo say that the 
 Church of Scotland possesses at the present moment a 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE IS LIABLE. 63 
 
 liberty and independence of acting according to her own 
 convictions of divine truth. Now it is not a matter of 
 moment whether the convictions of divine truth which 
 must at present be acted upon by the Church of Scot- 
 land, be identical with those of the first founders of the 
 Establishment or not. The Free Churchman will say, 
 that a change has been made upon her constitution, and 
 that he alone, in adhering to the Non-Intrusion prin- 
 ciple, which the Church of Scotland, in his sense of it 
 has repudiated, maintains the original convictions of 
 divine truth professed by the founders of the Establish- 
 ment.'^ Leaving entirely out of view the historical accuracy 
 or inaccuracy of this assertion, let us suppose that such a 
 change as that refeiTed to has been made, and that the 
 views maintained by the Free Church regarding Non-In- 
 trusion, and not those of the Church of Scotland, are those 
 of the original founders of the Establishment. Still the 
 question arises, Does the rule now prevailing in the Esta- 
 lishment express the convictions of divine truth held by 
 her present ministers ? That such is not the case the Free 
 Church party can never be able to shew, unless they can 
 reveal what are the inward convictions of others. That 
 the rule does express the convictions of the present mi- 
 nisters of the Church, must be believed, unless they are all 
 to be charged with wilful violation of conscience. If then 
 the ministers of the Church of Scotland have liberty by the 
 rule to which they are bound, to act in accordance with 
 their own convictions of divine truth, a liberty which it 
 will not be denied they do possess, and their security for 
 which is the same that every subject in the realm has for 
 the exercise of freedom of conscience, namely, the statutes 
 of the British Parliament, and the intei-pretation of the 
 judges, they are placed by the State at the present mo- 
 ment in exactly the same position as the original founders 
 of the Church were, and no charge of moral wrong can be 
 brought by others against them. 
 
 No doubt it is true, that the convictions which others may 
 have of divine truth as existing in the Word of God, may 
 be different from theu's. Differences in the way of inter- 
 preting the record of God's Word, more particularly on 
 points where that record has not been explicit, are insepar- 
 able from the present weakness of the human mind, and 
 
 * The value of this assertion about a change in the constitution of 
 the Church, will be best estimated, when the Non-Intrusion principle 
 has been discussed in another chapter. 
 
64 OBJECTIONS TO WHICH 
 
 these differences may be of such magnitude as to keep 
 others in a separate communion from that of the Establish- 
 m.ent. The Free Churchman may regard his Non-Intru- 
 sion, the Independent his Church government, the Baptist 
 his views about this Sacrament, and other sectaries their 
 distinctive tenets, in such a light as to justify to their own 
 minds their continued separation from the Establishment of 
 the country. But while in this land of religious liberty 
 and toleration, others are entitled to connect themselves 
 with that religious community which their conscience 
 directs, and to profess Christianity under that external form 
 which they think most in accordance with the Scriptural 
 model, let them receive with gratitude the liberty and the 
 toleration so awarded them by the State, but let them also 
 cease to object to a great national institution, on the ground 
 that its existence or constitution is unscriptural, when 
 neither by reason nor by Scripture can the objection be 
 maintained. Let them no longer pronounce on Establish- 
 ments sentence of condemnation, when such sentence can 
 only be pronounced in violation of every principle which 
 ought to influence the immortal soul of man.* 
 
 * It is a some\\hat curious circumstance, that however strongly our 
 opponents have pleaded in theory the doctrine of independence, they have 
 gone far in practice to renounce it. When a legislative settlement of the 
 controversy was at one period deemed probable, the Non-Intrusion commit- 
 tee instructed the Deputation sent by them to London, to watch over its 
 progress, to seek a settlement on the basis of the Veto law, and to reject, 
 except as a last resource, a settlement on that of the recognition of the 
 Church's liberty to determine by a judicial act on every case coming before 
 her courts. Now what was the latter mode of settlement, the " liber- 
 um arbitrium" measure, as it was called, but the recognition of the Church's 
 liberty to act in accordance with her future convictions ; yet this measure 
 was repudiated, except as a matter of necessity by the Non-Intrusion Com- 
 mitee, and preference given to a measure, which, by restricting civil effects 
 to those acts of the Church that were in accordance with her present, or 
 as they may here be more properly styled, her past convictions, would in 
 so far operate as'a mean to prevent the adoption of her future convictions. 
 Writing on the same subject. Dr. Candlish, inadvertently perhaps, 
 furnishes us with an argument, to our view at least, unanswerable, 
 in favour of that civil obligation held in so much abhorrence by 
 the whole party. After washing his hands of all responsibility of the 
 acceptance of the " liberum arbitrium" measure, he says, (Narrative p. 
 18,) " It is true that such a i)lan, (namely, tlie liberum arbitrium) would 
 make no provision against the Church becoming unfaithful, and de- 
 parting from her own principle." Let us suppose then that a civil obli- 
 gation lies upon the Church respecting the perfurinance of her duties, 
 and mark wliat the effect of it must be. According to the Rev. Dr., 
 the Church by this obligation would be kept from beioniing w/i/ai/A/Hi, 
 that is to say, would be kept a faiihfid Churchy faithful to what? 
 
SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE IS LIABLE. 65 
 
 faithful to a rule which, if he had heen one of the Church's founders, 
 would have embodied aU his convictions of the Word of God — faithful 
 to that which, as the case stood, he has a thousand times proclaimed to 
 be a principle of God's Word, namely, Non-Intrusion. Such an effect of 
 a civil obligation must go far with most minds, to settle for ever the ques- 
 tion of its sinfulness. So long as the State believes that the original 
 convictions of the founders of the Church of Scotland, expressed in the 
 rule of the Confession of Faith, were a faithful sense of the truths of 
 God's Word, and does not believe that this Word is a field in which there 
 may continually be found successive supplies of new truth to be reaped 
 by the sickle of the Church's future convictions, it must be not only en- 
 ' titled, but solemnly bound to insist that the Church shall act under a 
 civil obligation, for in no other way can it pro\ide for faithfulness and 
 purity in doctrine, discipline and government ; every exercise of spiritual 
 independence, being in fact a deviation from such faithfulness and purity. 
 
ANSWER TO THE PROTEST OF THE FREE 
 CHURCH. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 AMSWEB TO THE PROTEST — ITS PRINCIPLES — FIRST DISPROVED — SECOND 
 
 PRINCIPLE — PRINCIPLE ON WHICH CIVIL COURTS PROCEEDED ACTS 
 
 WHICH THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND CAN BE CALLED ON TO VINDICATE 
 
 OTHER ACTS — DEPOSITION OF MINI-^TERS — INTERDICTS AGAINST PREACH- 
 ING — FEEE CHURCHISM INCONSISENT WITH ITSELF — GENERAL VIEW OF. 
 
 Having now conducted our inquiry into the truth of the 
 first mentioned objection against Establishments to a con- 
 clusion, we may here shew the bearing of the principles 
 brought out in that inquiry upon the late controversy in 
 the Church of Scotland. 
 
 The reason adduced by those who recently seceded, 
 was the interference of the Civil courts with the spiri- 
 tual and ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Church. A dis- 
 tinct narration of the acts complained of is given in the 
 " Protest," a document left by the seceding party on the 
 table of the General Assembly, when they finally with- 
 drew from the Church of Scotland. INIuch stress has been 
 laid on the fact, that this document has never been for- 
 mally answered by the Church, and for this reason, it 
 has been called unanswerable ; whereas adverting to the 
 principles laid down in the preceding discussion, an answer 
 can be given to it Avithout difficulty. 
 
 The strength of this apparently formidable document, 
 rests upon two assumptions. 1st, That a Church cannot 
 be Scriptural whose consitution recognizes any limitation 
 of her spiritual independence. 2dly, That the acts of the 
 Civil courts complained of in the " Protest" are wrong in 
 
ANSWER TO THE PROTEST, ETC. 67 
 
 principle, that is to say, are in violation of the Word of 
 God. 
 
 If these, which are the principles asserted in the " Pro- 
 test," be false, then its whole charges against the Church 
 of Scotland must be mere empty assertion — whether they 
 are so or not we now proceed to inquire. 
 
 In regard to the first assumption of the " Protest" we 
 have shewn what is the spiritual independence claimed by 
 the party who seceded, namely, " liberty to act in accor- 
 dance with the Church's future convictions." Kow if it 
 were at all certain, that the Church should ever amve at 
 such convictions, or should ever have any other sense of 
 Scripture and duty to Christ than that which was embo- 
 died in the present convictionsof her founders — convictions 
 which were all expressed in the rule sanctioned by the 
 State, and in this light have been adopted by every mini- 
 ster who has/succeeded them in the Establishment, then it 
 might be said with some shadow of truth, that a limitation 
 of independence was Scripturally wrong. But when the 
 very existence of any such convictions is uncertain, and 
 may even be impossible — and certainly according to the 
 belief of all parties is impossible — when the limitation sub- 
 mitted to by the Church does not exclude anything which she 
 herself believes to be revealed or to be deducible from what 
 is revealed in the Word of God, then the charge brought 
 against us by the Protest, because of this limitation, is 
 itself a violation of the Word of God. It is a charge which 
 implies that the Church is bound to adopt as her rule of 
 duty more than God himself has commanded, and is re- 
 quired " to be wise above what is written," 
 
 With this answer to its first and great principle the 
 "Protest" might be entirely dismissed, but an answer may 
 also be given to its second, namely, that the acts of the 
 Civil courts reclaimed against were in violation of God's 
 Word. 
 
 Much useless sensitiveness both in and out of the Estab- 
 lishment has been exhibited regarding these acts. In what 
 tei-ms of reprobation have the following charges, for example, 
 been spoken of. " That the said Civil courts have power to 
 interfere with and interdict the preaching of the Gospel and 
 administration of ordinances as authorized and enjoined 
 by the Church courts of the Establishment. That the 
 said Civil courts have power to reduce, and set aside the sen- 
 tences of the Church courts of the Establishment, depo- 
 sing ministers from the office of the holy ministry." 
 
 ISow let these and all the other interferences of the Civil 
 
68 ANSWER TO THE mOTEST 
 
 courts detailed in the " Protest," and which have so often 
 been the theme of popuhar dcchimution, he reduced to their 
 fundamental principle, and to -what do they amount? 
 Just to one of the two following acts — 
 
 1st, They restrained the Church from adopting what 'were 
 her future convictions of God's Word at the period when 
 the rule obtained the State's sanction, and obliged her to 
 adhere to her original convictions therein expressed. Or, 
 
 2dly, They imposed on the Church the State's sense of 
 these original convictions. 
 
 One of these two acts must be the whole charge brouo-ht 
 against the Civil courts, and in what way either of them 
 can be regarded as a violation of the Word of God, with- 
 out involving principles which are opposed to that AVord, 
 it will be ditlicult to shew. 
 
 The rule of doctrine, discipline, and government which 
 the Church as Established was not allowed to contravene, 
 was drawn up by herself in former times, was a record of 
 her sense of duty to Christ as educed from his Word, and 
 expressed the whole of that duty, as far as the founders of 
 the Church believed that any obligation was laid on them, 
 and in all these lights it was adopted and sanctioned by 
 the State as the rule of the Establishment. Now was 
 there any violation of Scripture in that civil interference 
 which compelled adherence to this rule ? If so, wherein 
 did it consist ? The rule expressed the entire sense which 
 the Church had of Scripture, and the civil interference en- 
 forced the rule. In all this, how is it possible that Scrip- 
 ture could have been violated ? Either the rule did not 
 express the entire sense which the Church originally had 
 of Scripture, in which case the founders of the Establish- 
 ment violated their own consciences in accepting it, and all 
 ministers who succeeded them have been guilty of the 
 same sin, or else Scripture was not violated in that which 
 the Civil courts enforced, when requiring an adherence to 
 the original rule, or " Confession of Faith. All that the 
 Civil interference prevented, was the, adoption by the 
 Church of what must bo called her future or' sub- 
 sequent convictions of Cln-ist's will and word, for they were 
 not known to the Church's founders, and were not even in 
 existence at the time the rule was drawn up. Now is it 
 said that such hindrance on the part of the Civil courts was 
 a -violation of Scripture committed by them ? Is it said (to 
 adduce the case which occurred,) when the adoption of 
 the Non-Intrusion principle became, accord in«>- to her so- 
 lemn conviction, a part of the Church's duty to Christ, al- 
 
OF THE FREE CHURCH. 69 
 
 though such principle formed no part of the present con- 
 victions of that duty in the minds of those who drew up 
 the rule, for according to the idea now entertained, it is an 
 effect of the Church's future convictions, that the inter- 
 ference of the Civil courts in this matter, with the judica- 
 tories of the Establishment, was in violation of Scripture. 
 Is all this said by the adherents of the Free Church ? 
 Then let us mark what are the first principles of such an 
 assertion. *' The original rule drawn up by the Church's 
 founders cannot be regarded as a faithful or complete ex- 
 pression of the truths of God's Word — the State originally 
 had no right to expect that the Church would adhere to 
 the very rule, adherence to which yet constituted the 
 ground on which her Civil privileges were asked and ob- 
 tained — the limitation of the Church to a rule expressing 
 her own sense of ail revealed truth is sinful, and conse- 
 quently, her rule of present duty must be more than God 
 has taught her present mind,'' 
 
 So utterly gross, unreasonable, and anti-scriptural, must 
 the assertion be, that there was any violation of God's 
 Word in that interference of the Civil courts by which the 
 Church was hindered from acting in accordance with her 
 future convictions of Christ's will, or with the convictions 
 of God's Word, which were not stated in the Confession of 
 Faith ; so well known to the leaders of the Free Church 
 were all the absurdities implied in such a doctrine, that 
 these men never ventured to assert that what they were 
 attempting to carry out did belong to the class .of the 
 Church's future convictions. They maintained on the 
 other hand, that the Non-Intrusion principle, and the 
 other points involved in the controversy, belonged to the 
 class of the ijresent convictions of those who had founded 
 the Establishment. In other language, they maintained 
 that the rule originally agreed to by the State permitted 
 them to act on the principle referred to — entitled them to 
 possess all that they claimed, and to do all that they at- 
 tempted, and that the interference of the Court was an in- 
 novation on the original constitution of the Church — that 
 is, they asserted that the sense of the rule as now admi- 
 nistered by the Com-t was changed from that which had 
 been previously agreed to by the Church. 
 
 This brings us to the second view of the proceedings of 
 the Court. 
 
 The interference of the Court with the Church's juris- 
 diction was reducible, as formerly mentioned, to one of two 
 acts. The first which charges the Court with having bin- 
 
70 ANSWER TO THE PROTEST 
 
 dered the Church from adopting her future convictions of 
 God's Word must be repudiated ; let us then look to the 
 second and inquire into its nature, that is to say, let us 
 inquire whether there was any violation of Scripture in the 
 Civil court's giving the State's sense of the Church's original 
 convictions, and enforcing that sense in her actings. 
 
 Much has been said regarding the acts of the Civil courts 
 in " suspending spiritual censures pronounced by the 
 Church courts of the Establishment, reponing deposed 
 ministers, issuing interdicts against the preaching of the 
 Gospel, staying processes of discipline before the courts of 
 the Establishment," &c. The interference of Civil courts 
 in these proceedings was, and continues to be, the avowed 
 ground for the recent secession. Now before speaking of 
 them, let us first endeavour to settle the question as to 
 the right and nature of the interference which the Civil 
 courts may claim with respect to the Church. 
 
 This interference may be of a twofold character, namely, 
 the interference of dictation, or the interference of pro- 
 tection. An interference of the former kind would im- 
 ply an attempt to prescribe to the Church her duty to God, 
 and to dictate to her the true sense of Scripture. This 
 would plainly be inconsistent with the province of the 
 State, and be an invasion of the Church's spiritual preroga- 
 tive. An interference of the latter kind would only imply a 
 purpose of protecting some office ofthe State which the Church 
 had invaded, or of protecting members of the Church from 
 unjust aggression. For example, were the Church to take it 
 upon her to levy taxes or inflict secular pains and penal- 
 ties, such as fine and imprisonment, on any of her members, 
 the courts of the State would interfere to prevent this 
 wrong being done, and such interference would be no in- 
 vasion of the Church's liberty, but an act of righteous 
 protection extended towards parties whom the Church 
 was oppressing by acts clearly beyond her province. This 
 shews that there is a province beyond which the Church 
 has no right to go, and within which she immediately be- 
 comes amenable to civil interference — interference not of 
 dictation but of protection. 
 
 Now it is very obvious that the province within which the 
 actings of the Church ought to be sacred from Civil inter- 
 ference, must be different according as her position in the 
 State, is that of a church, or of a church established by law. 
 In her former character the Civil power can have no right to 
 interfere with her, so long as she does not intrude upon 
 matters civil ; but in her latter character, this right of in- 
 
OF THE FREE CHURCH. 71 
 
 terference must be affected by another circumstance, name- 
 ly, her adherence or non-adherence to the rule formerly 
 sanctioned by the State, and to those arrangements be- 
 tween the parties on which a continued possession of the 
 endowment by the Church must depend. 
 
 The sanction of the Church's rule which was given by 
 the State, implies on its part an act of selection — se- 
 lection, viz., of certain doctrines, forms, and government, 
 which were to distinguish from others that Church on 
 which an endowment was to be conferred. Now, just as 
 the Church's adherence to the rule and arrangments selec- 
 ted, constitutes her title to possess the endowments gi-anted, 
 so does the Church's continued possession of the endow- 
 ments granted, constitute the State's title to see that the 
 Church adheres to the rule and an-angements referred to. 
 For this reason, the right of the Civil power to interfere 
 with the way in which the Church as established, dis- 
 charges her duties, must be undoubted. In so doing, it is 
 only protecting from possible abuse its own endowments, 
 and interposing its power to prevent its gifts from being 
 diverted, (viz., by 'ministers retaining them) to purposes for 
 which they were not intended, and would never have been 
 granted. Should such right of exercising this interference 
 of protection be denied to the State, principles must be 
 adopted regarding the Church's title to her endowments 
 which no reasonable man will venture to advance. These 
 principles are — a denial of the State's original right to select 
 for the benefit of an endowment, the form of religion 
 which it pleases, or a denial of its right after having made 
 that selection, to see that the parties continuing to pos- 
 sess this endowment are the same in doctrine, discipline, 
 and government, as those on w^hom it was originally be- 
 stowed. 
 
 The title of the State to exercise an interference of pro- 
 tection toward the Church as Established, being thus clear, 
 we come to the question, whether the recent acts of the 
 Civil Courts were of this character ? 
 
 The Free Church party maintain, that these acts implied 
 an interference of dictation, for on such ground alone can 
 their secession be vindicated. This interference of the Courts 
 with the Church has been called analogous to that which 
 marked the days of the Covenanters, while they themselves 
 are compared with the suffering ministers of these times. 
 But the difference between the two cases, and between the 
 two principles at issue, is widely marked. In the former case 
 the interference was that of dictation, in the latter it was 
 
72 ANSWEE TO THE PROTEST 
 
 that of protection. The principle contended for by the 
 Covenanters was in effect simply this, that the Church 
 herself, or the mind of reasonable men in the Church, had a 
 right to educe from the "Word of God the rule of duty, and 
 that additions to, or alterations of this rule made by the 
 State, could not be binding on conscience. They struggled 
 in days when toleration did not exist, for liberty to worship 
 God according to conscience. The struggle of the late 
 controversy was altogether of a different character. The 
 principle contended for by the Free Church party had no 
 reference to conscience, or toleration from the State, see- 
 ing this was not denied them, but to the Church's duty as 
 Established. It was to this effect : — " The Church as Es- 
 tablished has a right to retain all the Civil privileges en- 
 joyed from the State, and at the same time to maintain a 
 different sense from the latter of the rule or Confession 
 of Faith formerly sanctioned." 
 
 The principle of present is as different from that of for- 
 mer times as darkness is from light. That of the Cove- 
 nanters was in strict accordance with the Word of God, 
 that of the Free Church party is clearly opposed to it. 
 And the same distinction exists between the principle of 
 the recent controversy, and that of the Swiss ministers, to 
 whom our opponents have also compared themselves. 
 These latter have been prevented by the State from yield- 
 ing obedience to their own rule of duty to Christ, while in 
 the case of the Free Church party, the State only pre- 
 vented them from maintaining as an Established Church, 
 a different sense from itself of a rule formerly adopted by 
 both. In the various decisions given by the Civil Courts 
 for this purpose, there was no interference of dictation to 
 the Church. It was merely an interference of protection, 
 raspecting the endowments. In the acts done by them, 
 nothing more was attempted than to lay down the State's 
 sense of the rule and ecclesiastical ari-angement to which 
 the Church, while choosing to possess these endowments, 
 was bound to adhere. They did not assume power to de- 
 clare in any instance, what ought to be the duty of the 
 Church as a Church of Christ, but simply interpreted on 
 behalf of the State that sense of the existing rule of duty 
 under which the Establishment was to act. In all their 
 actings, this principle only was adopted, that the State's sense 
 of the rule, and the State's endowments must be in harmony 
 t-ogether, and when parties retaining these endowments 
 claimed a right to violate this principle, the Courts pre- 
 vented them from doing so. Such interference, in place of 
 
OF THE FREE CHUFtCH, 73 
 
 being wrong, was demanded of the Courts, for the purpose 
 of protecting the State's endowments from being misap- 
 propriated to a use not contemplated, and of protecting 
 parties injured from an aggression on them, which the 
 Church had no right to make, while retaining a position 
 that implied the identity of her own with the State's sense 
 of the original rule. 
 
 Our opponents, however, do not seem to call in question 
 the nght of the interference of the Courts, for the purpose 
 of laying down the State's view of the rule, but what they 
 call in question is the right to impose this view on the 
 Church. The whole burden of " the Protest" is to main- 
 tain, that the Courts were limited by the statutes to give 
 to their sentences Civil eifects, that when the Church re- 
 fused to adopt in her proceedings the State's sense of the 
 rule in any controverted matter of principle, the compe- 
 tent redress was to withhold the endowments, and that 
 the imposition by pains and penalties of this sense, on the 
 Church, Avas contrary to the statutes, and in violation of 
 Scripture. 
 
 With the duty of the Courts, arising from the Statutes, we 
 have no concern. Our only business is with the eternal prin- 
 ciples of truth. The Chui-ch of Scotland has been charged 
 with acting in violation of these principles, in submittino- 
 to have it recognized as part of her constitution, that her 
 ministers should be under obligation to adopt the sense of 
 the rule laid down by the Courts, This has been called 
 surrendering the crown rights of the Redeemer. Let us 
 then inquire, whether there was any violation of Scripture 
 in those acts whereby the Civil Courts imposed on the 
 Church the State's sense of the rule, or, in other words, 
 whether principle was violated in the Civil interference 
 complained of in " the Protest." 
 
 The inquiry is easily solved. The Ci^^l Courts had an 
 undoubted right of interference to protect the State's en- 
 dowments from abuse in the hands of those who possessed 
 them. Now, this right of interference must have implied 
 not merely a right to lay the State's sense of the nile 
 before the Church, but to see that it was acted on by 
 those who enjoyed the endowments, and refused to surren- 
 der them. \^ere it true that the Church ever could have 
 been entitled to retain her original right to the endowments 
 of the State, and yet take whatever view of her duties she 
 pleased, calling such, it may be, conscientious conviction, 
 then it might have been a' violation of principle in the 
 Courts to impose on her ministers the State's sense of those 
 
 D 
 
74 ANSWER TO THE PEOTEST 
 
 duties, but when the very existence of the Church, in tho 
 attitude of asserting her right to the endowments, as 
 originally gi-antcd, implies, and must imply coincidence of 
 opinion and agreement between the parties on all fun- 
 <lamental questions, then it is mere perversion of language 
 to say, that principle was violated, or wrong of any kind done 
 by the Courts, in enforcing this coincidence and argument. 
 So long as the Church maintained the character of an 
 Establishment, she could not stand in any other position 
 than that of being under obligation to adopt and obey the 
 State's sense of her rule of duty, the security of conscience 
 consisting in this, that her sense of the duty of God's 
 Word was identical with that of the State, or when it was 
 not so, that she had liberty to relinquish her connection 
 with the latter. 
 
 The principle on which the Courts acted during the late . 
 conflict with the Church being thus unquestionable, we ^ 
 may now look at some of those exercises of the principle 
 complained of in the Protest. 
 
 Before doing so, two remarks may be made in reference 
 to them. First, whatever may have been the actual pro- 
 ceedings of the Civil Courts towards the Church, the claim 
 made by them to institute such proceedings, can form no 
 objection in principle against the constitution of the Church 
 of Scotland. These Courts have a right, in strict accor- 
 dance with the Word of God, to interpret and impose on 
 the Church the State's sense of the rule, and by conse- 
 quence the exercise of this right by them, and the submis- 
 sion of the Church of Scotland to such exercise, cannot be 
 wrong. If a fundamental objection be taken to our Chm-ch 
 with reference to the interference of the Civil Courts, such , 
 objection must have respect, not to the claim made by 4 
 them to interfere, but to the interference itself. In other 
 language, the objection must be, that though the Courts 
 had a right to impose on the Church the State's sense of 
 the rule, yet the sense given to it by their acts has contra- 
 vened divine authority, and as such cannot be submitted 
 to. The question then arises. Were any of the acts of the 
 Civil Courts complained against, of such a nature as to con- 
 travene the Word of God ? This introduces the second 
 of the remarks which were to be made, namely, that of 
 the acts of the Civil Courts niin-ated in " the Protest," the 
 Church of Scotland can only be bound to vindicate two, viz. 
 those implied in the first and second Auchterarder decisions 
 by the House of Peers, since in these alone has the mind 
 of the State been finally given. Respecting others, we do 
 
OF THE FEEE CHURCH. 75 
 
 not know what its mind may be. They were not brought 
 by appeal before the Supreme Courts, and until the princi- 
 ple adopted by the State shall have been given, it is utterly 
 unreasonable to charge the acts of an Inferior Court against 
 us, or even to call on us to vindicate our submission to 
 them as in accordance with the Word of God. 
 
 AVhat then are the principles adopted by the State 
 in the two decisions referred to? The first is the re- 
 pudiation of the Non-Intrusion principle, from the sense 
 of the rule obligatory on the Establishment. The se- 
 cond is the principle that the Church is under a Civil 
 obligation in the performance of her duties. To the first, 
 attention will be directed in the next chapter. To the 
 second it has already been directed. The vindication 
 of the principle asserted stands upon the reasons which 
 exist for maintaining that the Church must be bound to 
 adhere to the rule sanctioned by the State, and on the fact 
 that, in accordance with God's Word, no charge of sinful- 
 ness can be brought against a civil obligation as attached 
 to the Church's duties.* But though we are not bound to 
 vindicate any of the other proceedings of the Civil Court 
 as consistent with principle, attention may be directed to 
 some of them for the mere purpose of shewing how entire- 
 ly they have been misunderstood. 
 
 For example, a strong objection has been taken to the 
 proceeding of the Court, in setting aside the sentence of 
 the General Assembly by which seven ministers of the 
 Presbytery of Strathbogie had been deposed from the 
 sacred ofiice. This has been said to involve the exercise 
 of direct authority over the Church in her most spiritual 
 functions, and has been branded as an assumption of •' the 
 power of the keys." A little reflection will, however, shew 
 that the charge is wholly unfounded. 
 
 The proceeding of the Court, in setting aside the sen- 
 tence referred to, bears a twofold aspect, and before pro- 
 nouncing judgment on it, it is necessary to ascertain dis- 
 tinctly in which of the two aspects it ought to be viewed. 
 1st, It was a formal decision of the incompetency of the 
 Church in the circumstances, and for the reasons assigned, 
 to pronounce sentence of deposition on these ministers. In 
 this light it was a mere declaration of the inanity of the 
 act so performed against them by the Assembly, as one 
 that could alfect their position in the Establishment ; or, 
 2dly, It was a restitution to these ministers of that status 
 
 * See pages 14 and 57. 
 
76 ANSWER TO THE PROTEST 
 
 whicli the Church, by the exercise of competent authority, 
 had taken away. Is'ow, if the act of the Civil Court is to 
 be regarded in this second aspect, then there may be 
 ground for the charge of our opponents against it, that it 
 implies an assumption of the " power of the keys ;" but 
 let us examine whether it can possibly bear to be viewed in 
 this light. The Court could not restore to the Strathbogie 
 ministers what the Church had deprived them of, viz. 
 their ministerial status, but by first acknowledging the 
 competency of the latter to take this status away, and so 
 by conceding the point that it had de facto been taken 
 away. But did the Court ever make such acknowledg- 
 ment ? On this point appeal may be made to its own lan- 
 guage, and to the principles which it was bound to main- 
 tain. " The jurisdiction of this Court, then, is sustained in 
 the present case, because the General Assembly, in pro- 
 nouncing the sentence complained of, did not act within 
 their powfers, but to an unheard of extent and degi'ce be- 
 yond them." — Lord Cunninghams Note on the Strath- 
 bogie Case, November 1842. 
 
 But not only is it the fact as thus clearly seen, that the 
 Court never acknowledged that these men had been de- 
 prived of their ministerial status by competent authority ; 
 but in reality it never could have acknowledged except by 
 a violation of principle, that this status was by the Assem- 
 bly's sentence taken away at all ; that is to say, the Court 
 must first have violated those principles which it was 
 bound to maintain, before it could have been in a situa- 
 tion to assume the power of the keys. 
 
 The gi-ound of chai-ge preferred against the ministers of 
 Strathbogie was their compliance with the State's sense of 
 the rule. Such is the fact, whether this charge be con- 
 sidered with reference to the Assembly's ordei's to them 
 respecting the Veto law, or to their application to the Civil 
 authorities for protection, as contained in the libel brought 
 against them. Now, could the Civil Court acknowledge 
 that it was competent for the Church to sustain such a 
 charge, and depose any of her ministers on it without ac- 
 knowledging that the State's sense of the rule was not ob- 
 ligatory on the Establishment, or in other words, without 
 allowing the fundamental principles of the Establishment 
 to be subverted ? Knowing that the existence of the Es- 
 tablishment as a National Institution implied an obligation 
 to act in accordance with this sense, the (burt was neces- 
 sitated to regard as a mere inanitv every act of the Church 
 which was in violation of it, and so to hold as null and void 
 
OF THE FREE CHURCH. 77 
 
 the sentence of the Assembly, excluding these ministers 
 from connection with the Establishment, and in like man- 
 ner to treat every other proceeding of the Assembly which 
 refused to recognize such connection. It was bound and 
 entitled to do all this, because in so doing it was only up- 
 holding the original principles of the Establishment, and 
 maintaining that view of them which alone is accordant to 
 reason and the Word of God. 
 
 The right aspect in which the proceeding of the Civil 
 Court with reference to the Strathbogie ministers ought to 
 be regarded, may thus be seen. It was not a restoration 
 of that which the General Assembly had taken away, as 
 must be alleged by those who bring against it the charge 
 of being an assumption " of the power of the keys :" it was 
 a mere decision of the inanity of what the Assembly as- 
 serted that it had done. In this there was no more exer- 
 cise of unwarranted power over the Church, than there 
 would be in setting aside as incompetent a sentence of 
 the Church condemning any of her ministers to imprison- 
 ment or death. The incompetency in the latter case 
 would arise from the fact, that in no circumstances has 
 the Church liberty to imprison or put to death; in the 
 former, that the Church herself had said that in cer- 
 tain circumstances she would not depose. 
 
 There is no difficulty obviously in vindicating the pro- 
 ceeding of the Civil Court in the matter before us, in so 
 far as its own interference was called for and exercised. But- 
 the case is somewhat more involved in another view to be 
 taken, viz., that which concerns the Strathbogie ministers 
 themselves, and the minority of the Assembly who sup- 
 ported them, or in general, that which concerns the mini- 
 sters of the Church of Scotland, who homologate the pro- 
 ceedings of the Court. 
 
 The difficulty connected with these parties evolves itself 
 from the question, whether they who formed the minority 
 in the Assembly were entitled to regard its sentence of de- 
 position as incompetent, and thus were at liberty to view the 
 act of the Ci\'il Court as a mere declaration of the inanity 
 of this sentence, and not as a restoration of ministerial sta- 
 tus. Practically this was the view which was taken by the 
 minority of all the proceedings of the Assembly against the 
 Strathbogie ministers, and which v/as persevered in after 
 the disruption ; and such was the view entertained of the 
 proceedings of the Civil Court respecting these ministers : 
 but after all the question arises, was this view right? 
 On this point we shall simply state tne arguments on 
 
78 ANSWER TO THE PROTEST 
 
 either side, and leave others to draw their own conclu- 
 sions, premisint^, however, that ditiiculties of principle 
 must bo encountered in cither aspect. 
 
 The Free Church party argue, that the sentence passed 
 by the Assembly being iniiicted by a competent Court, was 
 a valid spintual act, that as such it was binding on the 
 Stratlibogie ministers, and must be recognized by the 
 whole minonty of the Church. If the pnnciple is to be 
 maintained, that an inferior Court has a right to judge for 
 itself of its duty in opposition to the decision of a superior, 
 as tlie Presbytery of Stratlibogie did ; or that a minority is 
 entitled to disregard the commands and sentences of the 
 supreme judicatory represented by the majority, then 
 authority is at an end, and God's Word is violated. For 
 this reason the minority in the Assembly were bound by 
 the act of the majority, and were required to hold the 
 sentence pronounced as valid, and consequently must re- 
 gard the proceeding of the Civil Court as a restoration of 
 ministerial status to the said parties. 
 
 Such are the arguments on one side of this question by 
 which the Church of Scotland is condemned, but let us 
 now sec those on the other. 
 
 " When the Stratlibogie ministei-s entered the Church of 
 Scotland they did so, maintaining in common Avith her 
 ministers at large those views of an Establishment which 
 are accordant to reason and Scripture. One great funda- 
 mental principle then held was, that the Church as Esta- 
 blished, was bound to act on the State's sense of the rule 
 which had been sanctioned. At a subsequent period, the 
 supreme judicatory adopted a course of proceedings in the 
 government of the Church entirely subversive of this ori- 
 ginal principle, thus bringing her constitution in collision 
 with the Word of God. These unscriptural proceedings and 
 principles it required the ministers of the inferior judica- 
 torv, contrary to their former convictions of duty to homo- 
 logate ; and by so doing, tlio Assembly asserted a right to 
 t'v'rannize over conscience, and to demand an obedience to 
 tiieir injunctions which was unlimited even by divine autho- 
 rity. The position of these ministers was rendered more 
 perplexing, because no remedy was left them consistent with 
 principle, by Avliich they could be extricated fi-om it. If 
 they applied to the State for protection, intimating to it 
 at the same time their readiness to perform their duties in 
 the same aspect as when they entered tlie l^lstablishment ; 
 they committed a crime subjecting them to deposition by 
 the supreme judicatory of that Establishment, a deposi- 
 
OF THE FREE CHURCH. 79 
 
 tion which the State itself was called on to recognize : if 
 on the other hand they renounced connection with the 
 Establishment, they did so maintaining identity of princi- 
 ple with the State, that is, maintaining the only funda- 
 mental principles on which the Establishment could exist 
 as a national Institution. A power lodged in the hands of 
 the supreme judicatory, which could involve the members 
 of the infeiior judicatory in such a position could not be 
 legitimate power ; it was a power destructive of human 
 responsibility ; therefore its exercises, as in the deposition 
 of the Strathbogie ministers, were not entitled to obedience, 
 but were to be held as mere acts of inanity T 
 
 Between these opposing views we shall not attempt to 
 decide. Enough has been done, if it has been shewn that 
 difficulties of principle occur on either side, and on the 
 side of those who, holding the sentence of the Assembly 
 to be a valid spintual act, contend that it was set aside by 
 the Civil Court, just as great as on the side of those who 
 maintain an opposite opinion. 
 
 Let us advert to another of the acts of the Civil _ Court 
 by which interdict was passed against preaching in the 
 parishes of the seven ministers of Strathbogie, by other 
 ministers of the Establishment under the authority of the 
 General Assemblv. In support of the objection taken to 
 this proceeding of the Court, it has been argued by the 
 Free Church party, that the original constitution of the 
 Church guaranteed' by Statutes of Parliament, reco.gnized 
 as belonging to her supreme judicatory free and unfettered 
 power of preaching the Word, and of regulating all the 
 duties of her ministers regarding preaching, that the in- 
 terdicts passed were in violation of this constitution, and 
 were so manifestly an asumption of authority in a merely 
 spiritual matter, that they must be held as in opposition 
 to God's Word. To parties who have not investigated the 
 subject with much correctness, the interdict referred to 
 mav appear an unwarranted invasion of a province pecu- 
 liarly recognized as belonging to the Church, but more 
 accurate inquiry will lead to an opposite conclusion. It 
 wall shew that these interdicts were mere interferences of 
 the Civil Court to hinder the fundamental principles of the 
 Establishment from being set at nought, and to prevent 
 legally innocent men from being disturbed in the per- 
 formance of duties to which they became pledged to the 
 State at their ordination, and this on account of charges 
 which the Church, while herself maintaining these princi- 
 ples, could have no right to prefer against them. Just let 
 
80 
 
 ANSWER TO THE PROTEST 
 
 US suppose tliat the claim of the Free Church party on this 
 controverted point was right, and that the Church by her 
 oriorinal constitution was entitled to exercise that free and 
 unfettered liberty in the regulation of preaching within her 
 parishes which has been asserted, that is to say, that she 
 was at liberty to separate the performance of ministerial 
 duty in her parishes from the possession of the State's en- 
 dowments, whenever she pleases ; let us suppose that she 
 may do this for any reason, or for no reason, and for 
 reasons which the State not only cannot approve but must 
 condemn ; then how completely must all our past concep- 
 tions of what the national Establishment in Scotland has 
 been, be overturned. 
 
 There are two theories of a national Establishment 
 which may be advanced. First it may imply the recogni- 
 tion or public approval by the State of tliose religious 
 doctrines, and of that outward form of Church government 
 and discipline which it believes to be accordant to the 
 Word of God. Secondly, it may imply in connection with 
 such public recognition and approval, the grant of an en- 
 doAvment for the purpose of teaching to its subjects the 
 doctrines and maintaining the forms referred to. 
 
 Now whichsoever of these theories may be the one 
 adopted by the State, the end designed by it would be the 
 instruction of its subjects, (viz., by the' Church herself,) 
 in that form of religion which it approves ; but under the 
 second theory, this end would be sought in a very different 
 way from what is done under the first. Under the former, 
 the State has no concern with and takes no interest in the 
 instrumentality by which religion is taught — the Church has 
 all this inher own hands, and may employ wdiat instrumen- 
 tality she pleases, or may alter that instrumentality when 
 she chooses. Under the latter, on the other hand, the in- 
 strumentality used is the subject of the State's special 
 concern. When it provides an endowment for teaching 
 the religion which it approves, it obviously means that 
 religion shall be taught by parties in possession of this en- 
 dowment, and when, as in the case of the Church of Scotland, 
 it has provided an endowment for every separate parish, an 
 endowment to be bestowed not on any one whom the 
 Church, in the mutability of her own will, chooses to send 
 there as a religious teacher, but on him whom the State 
 approves as such, (through the pre-arranged mode of his 
 settlement,) the obvious inference from all this is, that it 
 accords M'ith the design of the State, that the approved 
 truths of religion shall be taught in the parish, by this 
 
OF THE FREE CHURCH. 81 
 
 party, and by this party alone. In other words, wherever 
 the second theory referred to is that which has been adopted, 
 it must be the intention of the State that religion shall be 
 taught to its subjects through the endowment granted, and 
 that the ministerial duties to be performed in a particu- 
 lar parish, and the endowment provided for it, shall not 
 be separated. On these grounds, and adverting to the fact 
 that it was the second theory of an Establishment, viz. 
 that which gave the State a direct concern with the instru- 
 mentality used in teaching religion, which was selected in 
 Scotland, and which has not yet been reclaimed against 
 by the Church since the days of Knox and Melville its 
 founders, we cannot see how it can be maintained, that 
 the original constitution of the Church ever entitled her 
 to separate the ministerial duties to be performed in a 
 parish, from the endowments bestowed on it, as was done 
 in the case of the ministers of Strathbogie, on grounds 
 which the State must have regarded as arbitrary, tyranni- 
 cal, and destructive of fundamental principles, and for this 
 reason we cannot see why the Civil Courts should be 
 chargeable with a violation "of principle in preventing her 
 from doing so. 
 
 The claim put forth by the Free Church party, in refer- 
 ence to the parishes of the ministers of Strathbogie, was a 
 claim consistent only with the first theory of an Esta- 
 blishment, which gives the State no concern with the in- 
 strumentality used in perfonning the ministerial functions 
 of a parish. The interdicts issued by the Civil Courts on 
 this subject, were merely the assertion of the principle that 
 the ministers incompetently deposed by the Assembly, 
 were the proper parties to continue to exercise these func- 
 tions in connection with the Establishment, and that so 
 long as no charge had been brought against them which 
 the Church, in adhering to her principles as a National 
 Institution, could competently bring, any other office-bearer 
 of such National Institution should not be allowed to exer- 
 cise these functions to their annoyance. 
 
 So far was all this from being an attempt, on the part 
 of the Civil Court, to regulate ministerial duty, as has been 
 wrongfully alleged, that it was only an interference to 
 keep the Chm-ch to the performance of those duties to 
 which she became pledged, when she chose that theory of 
 an Establishment, in preference to all others, which se- 
 cures the teaching of religion in every parish, by a special 
 endowment set aside for that parish. 
 
 It appears needless to direct attention to any of the 
 
 D 2 
 
82 
 
 ANSWER TO THE PROTEST 
 
 the Other acts of civil interference which have been re- 
 claimed against by the Free Church party, since similar 
 argumentation with that already stated, 'would lead to 
 similar conclusions respecting them, as have been ob- 
 tained in relation to those noticed. The principle on which 
 the Courts proceeded, as already asserted, is unquestion- 
 able, that the Church as established, is under obligation 
 to act on the State's sense of the rule sanctioned, 
 and all the acts complained of in "the Protest," are but 
 varied exercises of this principle. 
 
 A fundamental objection against the constitution of the 
 Church of Scotland, would indeed remain, were it true that 
 the Acts of the Court in interpreting that constitution, have 
 in any respect brought the sense attached by the State to 
 the Church's rule, in collision with the Word of God. But no 
 objection can be brought against it on the ground of its recog- 
 nizing such power of interpretation as belonging to the Court. 
 
 As respects the former point, the vindication of our 
 Church's constitution cannot be regarded as ditficult, in 
 every case where the final mind of "the State is known ; 
 while in cases, not yet known, it must be the language of 
 reason to say that our condemnation will be just, when at 
 the proper time a vindication has been attempted and fails. 
 
 To all the argumentation here adduced in defence of 
 the Church of Scotland, the reply of our opponents will 
 be, that the principle adopted in support of that defence, 
 and in vindication of the acts of the Civil Court, is wholly 
 unsound. Jt implies that the Church as Established came 
 imder obligation to obey the State's sense of the rule for- 
 merly sanctioned, whereas in truth it was her oivn sense of 
 it to which the obligation refers. 
 
 The inconsistency of such a pnnciple with reason or 
 Scripture, has already been shewn in a former chapter, 
 but we here repeat it. 
 
 It w^ould argue that the obligation spoken of was an ob- 
 ligation limiting the State to perform its duty in a past 
 sense, as promising the endowments by former treaty, but 
 only limiting the Cliurch to perform her duty in a present 
 .sense, as she chose to intei-pret her Confession of Faith and 
 Standards. In this view of the Church's obligation, the 
 State could have had no riglit, when the rule or Confession 
 was laid before it at the formation of the Establishment, 
 to form any judgment of its contents, or to propose any 
 modification of its arrangements as these were laid down by 
 the Church ; it could have no riglit at any subsequent period 
 to protect its own endowments from any purpose to which 
 
OF THE FREE CHURCH. 83 
 
 the Church by keeping possession of them, chose to appropri- 
 ate them, nor even to inquire whether the same doctrines, 
 discipline, and government prevailed at present in the 
 Church as had been selected at a former period for the 
 benefit of an endowment, and consequently it could have 
 no responsibility to God— no responsibility arising from 
 the fact of giving or withholding the endowments, or 
 from the fact of selecting for its endowments one system 
 of doctrines and form of religion, any more than another. 
 Moreover, if the above principle be asserted, how will 
 the Free Church party get over the absurdity of a legal 
 sanction having been formerly asked and obtained for a 
 rule which was obligatory only in the Church's sense, and 
 which therefore, while the State was permitted to read, it 
 was yet bound to adopt even though the sanction asked had 
 not been given ; the absurdity also, of having defended 
 all their own proceedings during the late controversy— and 
 of having sought a settlement of that controversy by Acts 
 of Parliament — acts of a State which was under obliga- 
 tion to comply with the Church's sense of her own rule, 
 and had no redress against any use or abuse (arising out of 
 this sense,) which the latter chose to make of its endow- 
 ments, except that of taking them away, an alternative 
 which simply meant that it must repudiate and deny the 
 Establishment principle altogether. 
 
 On the ground here assumed by our opponents, alt these 
 absurdities must be defended, the task of doing which be- 
 longs not to us, but to others. 
 
 The argument of the Free Church is thus proved to be 
 untenable, whether it be contended that the obligation to 
 obedience of the rule sanctioned, in other words, the " Con- 
 fession of Faith," respects the State's sense of it, or her 
 own. 
 
 There remains, therefore, in ^dndication of the charge 
 brought against the Civil Court in the Protest, because of the 
 obedience which was required to its sense of the rule, only 
 one possible assertion, namely this, that the Church never 
 acknowledged any obligation at all to the State, respecting 
 the rule of doctrine, discipline, or government which she 
 would maintain, accounting such obligation to be sinful, 
 that the courts have been guilty of violating principle in 
 maintaining such obligation to exist. 
 
 If this be the vindication set up for the charges of the 
 " Protest," the assertion it makes is contrary to reason, 
 and repudiated by Scripture, as formerly shewn. Irre- 
 spectively of implying that the Civil Magistrate has no re- 
 
84 
 
 ANSWER TO THE PUOTEST 
 
 sponsibility to God, the assertion directly reflects on the 
 Ahni;yhty. He has circumscribed the duty of man by the 
 limits of revealed truth, but our opponents say that a 
 pledge or obligation on the part of the Church is sinful, 
 even when the limits of such obligation embrace all that 
 he has been pleased to reveal. On the same ground an 
 obligation might be condemned, which bound man to 
 adhere to the Ten Commandments because it excluded 
 obedience to an eleventh. Man's duty however ex- 
 tends not to what is possible, but to what God has re- 
 vealed, and as no obligation can be sinful which extends 
 to divine truth as revealed, so there can be no viola- 
 tion of principle in the Church's submission to such obli- 
 gation, nor in those acts of the Civil Courts which pre- 
 sume its existence. 
 
 This last objection may be somewhat extended or varied, 
 as is actually done when maintained by one class of the 
 opponents of Establishments. Granting, it may be said 
 that an obligation embracing trutli as revealed in God's 
 AVord cannot be sinful, how does it appear that such 
 is the case with the rule sanctioned for an Establish- 
 ment ? What the State sanctions, and what the Church 
 adopts is not the Word of God, but merely " the Confes- 
 sion of Faith," or a rule drawn up in human language from 
 God's Word. Now, no rule of man's duty, or of God's 
 will, fs contained in his Word, can be drawn up, and by 
 consequence no civil obligation can express the entu-e will 
 of God obligatory on conscience. To this objection, how- 
 ever specious in appearance, a sufficient answer is easily 
 found. Though it be true that God's Word alone is the rule 
 of human duty, yet the obligation to obedience of this rule 
 can only extend to man's own sense of it. Now, if man's 
 own sense, or if the Church's sense of God's Word, and of 
 her own duties arising from thence, cannot be fully ex- 
 pressed in human language as in a " Confession of Faith," 
 this must arise from one of two causes ; 1st, Because the 
 will of God respecting human duty is continually chang- 
 ing; or, 2dly, Because though God's will is not change- 
 able, it is yet expressed in his Word, in such form as to 
 be incomprehensible to the reasonable mind, or to the 
 mind of any body of men, like the founders of the Church 
 who sought to ascertain it. Under the first view of this 
 objection, the unchangcableness of God, under the second, 
 the responsibility of man will be subverted. 
 
 There is still another charge against the entire system 
 
OF THE FKEE CHURCH. 85 
 
 of Free Churchism, which it may be proper briefly to ad- 
 duce, viz. that it is not consistent with itself, for a very 
 short argument A\all shew, that its advocates must either re- 
 nounce their own principles, or else approve the acts of the 
 Civil Courts, against which " the Protest" reclaims. In the 
 system for which they contend, the State's duty to main- 
 tain the Establishment principle is asserted, for the lan- 
 guage of the Protest is, " While firmly asserting the right 
 and duty of the Civil magistrate to maintain and support 
 an Establishment of religion in ^accordance with God's 
 Word ;" and so also is the principle that, in giving or with- 
 holding endowments from the Church, the Civil magistrate 
 possesses responsibility to God ; for, on this subject, the 
 uniform language of the Free Church party was, that when 
 the Civil Magistrate could not homologate the acts of the 
 Church, he Inid the remedy of taking away the Church's 
 endowments, though in doing so he acted on his own re- 
 sponsibility. 
 
 Now, these two principles cannot be maintained in the 
 Free Church system, as will be evident, when we look at 
 its practical working, in doing which we shall confine our 
 view to the case of collision which recently occurred. 
 
 When the State, for reasons deemed by itself sufficient, 
 saw fit to reject the application of the Church, for its sanc- 
 tion to the principle of Non-intrusion, or the Veto law, as 
 included in the rule to which the endowments would be 
 continued, the question arises, In this difficulty what was 
 to be done ? Two courses were only possible for the State 
 to pursue. Either to grant its sanction to the Veto law, 
 contrary to its own convictions, and so renouncing one of 
 the fundamental principles of Free Churchism, its own 
 responsibility, or to take away all the endowments from 
 the Establishment. It could not adopt, and it could not 
 be asked to adopt the former, and so by consequence, 
 must have been necessitated to pursue the latter. Let 
 us then suppose, that either by a slow and gradual pro- 
 cess, or by one sweeping act the above issue has ar- 
 rived, and that the previous union between the parties has 
 been finally dissolved, the former question again arises, 
 What is the State to do next ? And just as before, only 
 one of two courses presents itself; 1st, It may renounce 
 the Establishment principle altogether ; or, 2dly, It may 
 endow some other form of religion from that which it has 
 repudiated."^ Were the former of these alternatives to be 
 
 * A third course ^Thich may suggest itself, and has in fact been fol- 
 
86 ANSWER TO THE PllOTEST 
 
 adopted, the second of the fundamental principles of Free 
 Churchism above mentioned would be renounced, conse- 
 quently the only course which, in this or any similar con- 
 tingency, could be pursued, would bo for the State to en- 
 dow some other form of religion in place of that repudiated 
 — say Episcopacy, Independency, or Presbytcrianism with- 
 out Non- Intrusion. A single consideration will now bring 
 the argument to issue. Would the State be entitled, in 
 re-endowing, or as it may be better stated, in first endow- 
 ing a form of religion for its subjects, to make its own 
 selection of that form, and to exercise its own judgment 
 on the rule of doctrine, discipline, and Church government 
 asserted by that religious system, or sect of Christians which 
 it proposes to endow ? Should this be denied, the princi- 
 ple of the State's responsibility to God is again renounced. 
 Should it be granted, as it must needs be by the Free 
 Church party, unless they repudiate all their own asser- 
 tions and acts, they then give their adherence to the prin- 
 ciple, that the Church's rule was sanctioned in the State's 
 sense of it, and that to this sense of it alone the endow- 
 ments belong, and by consequence they now homologate 
 the proceedings of the Civil Courts against which they have 
 protested, since the sole object of these proceedings was 
 to bring the State's sense of the rule, and the State's en- 
 dowments, into the original and requisite harmony. ]\Iore- 
 over, should it be granted, that, at the first Establishment 
 of the Church, the State was entitled to see that tlic terms 
 of the Union were agreeable to itself, and that harmony 
 existed between its own sense of the rule professed by the 
 Church, and its own endowments granted to her, by what 
 imaginable process of reasoning can it be shewn, tiiat a 
 right which might once be legitimately exercised could ever 
 afterwards be lost, so that when jinew exeiciscd by the 
 State, through the medium of its Courts, it and they should 
 become obnoxious to the charge of such a grievous crime 
 as taking away the crown rights of Christ, and converting 
 the Church into a moral nuisance. 
 
 The system opposed to us is thus self-condemned, since 
 
 lowed by certain states, viz. that of endowinpr all rclij^ions, is indefensi- 
 ble in principle. Such a proceeding inijjliLS the incompetency of the 
 State to know what form of religion itself believes to be true; and, 
 moreover, its obligation to deal with religion as a more matter of civil 
 policy, and not as a system of divine trutli for the advancement of man's 
 spiritual good. On what grounds both these i)rinciples must be rei>B- 
 diated, the discussion of tlie second objection of Voluntaryism will 
 shew. 
 
OF THE FREE CHURCH. 87 
 
 its first principles are inconsistent with one another. Mow, 
 it is surely drawing largely on the credulity of men to 
 require, that the Church of Scotland should renounce her 
 principles for a system, which cannot be reconciled with 
 itself.^ 
 
 In one aspect of the great fundamental principles be- 
 fore us, it is no doubt true, that Free Churchism may be 
 presented as a consistent system, and it will be but fair 
 here to notice it, that its various features may be appre- 
 hended clearly. When contending, as the Free Church 
 party did, that the power of the Civil Magistrate must be re- 
 stricted to that of withholding from the Church's actings 
 mere civil effects, or in other words, to that of taking 
 away the endowments when he cannot homologate what 
 the Church spiritually or ecclesiastically does, the position 
 into which the former would thus be driven, never seems 
 to have been adverted to. In taking away the endow- 
 ments the Civil Magistrate would be thrown back on his 
 original heathenism, or at least be compelled to assume 
 towards the Church the character of a merely non-perse- 
 cuting magistrate. Now, a non-persecuting is not neces- 
 sarily a Christian Magistrate. The Emperor of China has 
 recently assumed the former character towards Christianity, 
 but this does not entitle him to the appellation of Christian 
 Magistrate. In this latter character there is plainly im- 
 plied, not only toleration of, but active agency (through 
 civil means) in behalf of religion. Surely then that system 
 cannot be Scriptural, which, if it compel the Magistrate, on 
 his own responsibility, and in defence of the rights of con- 
 science, to take away the endowments, denudes him of the 
 power to exercise active agency in favour of Christianity, 
 or which deprives him of these rights and the liberty of 
 private judgment on questions of religion, should it main- 
 
 * The Free Church Catechism contains, singularly enough, an able 
 defence of the principles of the Church of Scotland, and a distinct re- 
 pudiation of its own. It says in answer to Question 86, " "Wliat then is 
 it competent for the State to do, if it is of opinion, or if its tribunals de- 
 cide, that the Church has broken the terms of alliance ?" The only 
 thing after trying to convince the Church of its error, is to withdi'aw the 
 civil benefits it had conferred." Now what is here asserted but the 
 identical principle for which we have been contending, and on which the 
 Civil Courts proceeded, viz., that the State's sense of the Church's rule 
 gives the right to the endowments, and that the State's sense of this rule, 
 and the State's endowments must be in harmony together. This mean- 
 ing of the above question is farther confirmed by the fact, that with any 
 other meaning attached to it, Questions 86 and -19 would be inconsistent 
 with each other. 
 
88 ANSWER TO THE PROTEST 
 
 tain his obligation not to take away the endowments by 
 "withhokling the Church's responsibility from his act. 
 
 The only way whereby this monstrous anomaly in the 
 position of the Civil Magistrate could be avoided, Avhich is 
 inherent in the piinciples of Free Churchism, must be the 
 following : — that in dealing with religion he be required 
 and bound to regard it only as a mere civil expedient, but 
 that he is excluded from looking on it as a system of divine 
 truth for promoting the eternal good of the souls of men. 
 In this aspect, Free Churchism will indeed be cleared of all 
 inconsistency, for then the Civil ^Magistrate may take 
 away the Church's endowments, and in so doing, will 
 violate no fundamental principle. He will only be placing 
 religion in jibeyance, as he does any other Civil expedient 
 which he happens to reject. But if this be the aspect of 
 the great fundamental principles involved, for which the 
 Free Church party have struggled so keenly, how singular 
 and unexpected are the results. 
 
 1st, The Church of Scotland occupies at the present mo- 
 ment, a higher ground of scriptural principle than the 
 Free Church herself, because she maintains the obligation 
 of the Civil Magistrate to be a Christian, and actively to 
 promote the diffusion of Christianity from regard to its 
 spiritual blessings. 2dly, In consequence of occupying 
 this higher ground, the Church of Scotland has, according 
 to our opponents, denied the Headship of Christ. If such a 
 charge, however, can lie at all, it must lie not against our 
 Church, whose fundamental principle is, that all power which 
 exists. Civil as well as Ecclesiastical, is called on in its acts, 
 to contemplate and promote the interests of the Redeemer's 
 kingdom, but against those whose principles denude the 
 Civil powers of the world of the means, and even the pos- 
 sibility of advancing this glorious object. These alone are 
 the parties who, whatever the language of prejudice may 
 be, must stand convicted before the bar of reason, of doing 
 dishonour to the Headship of Christ. 
 
 Looking now to the broad view of Free Churchism, 
 which has been presented to us thi'oughout the whole of 
 the previous discussion of its principles, what do we find it 
 to be ? As a system it maintains — 
 
 First, That the legislators of the Scottish Parliament, 
 and the founders of our Establishment were engaged with 
 all solemnity in an act of idle folly, when " the Confession 
 of Faith" and Standards of the Church wei'e sanctione<l 
 by Statute. 
 
 Secondly/, That the State, contrary to every principle of 
 
OF THE FREE CHURCH. 89 
 
 reason, was bound, when it endowed the Church, to know 
 what was not in existence. 
 
 Thirdly, It is a system which is contrary to the Word 
 of God, for it requires the recognition of truth, whose exist- 
 ence cannot be proved, or should the existence of such truth 
 be conceded, it is a system contrary to God's \\'ord, be- 
 cause, it either reflects on the Spirit, or condemns as 
 sinful an act sanctioned by Scripture. 
 
 Fourthly, It is a system whose principles cannot be re- 
 conciled with themselves. 
 
 All these absurdities are asserted and maintained in 
 " the Protest" of our opponents. When thus regarded, 
 is this document to be viewed with alarai or disquietude ? 
 No. Standing hy the arJc of God, the sacred receptacle of 
 the law and the testimony, and maintaining as our rule, 
 truth as revealed, ive cast it aside as a statement of griev- 
 ances which never existed, and a detail of wrongs ivhich ad- 
 mit not of remedy. I\ien, whose thoughts on the sub- 
 ject of this gi'cat controversy have been more superficial 
 than they might have been, may deem it to be unan- 
 swerable ;■ — men , whose mental powers and cultivation do 
 not enable them to follow those close processes of rea- 
 soning, by which the distinction between truth and error 
 is perceived, may be frightened at it, as in former days 
 similar minds were frightened at Papal thunder ; but 
 those who have employed close reflection in aid of their 
 inquiries after truth will only disregard it. Such persons 
 know, that when brought to the severe scrutiny of strict in- 
 vestigation, all the charges of " the Protest" are visionary, 
 and rest on no better authority than the assertion of the 
 parties who prefer them. They know, that against the 
 Church of Scotland no accusation can be substantiated of 
 violating in her constitution a single principle, or of exclud- 
 ing from her rule a single truth of the W^ord of God, and 
 that, therefore, in so far as it attempts to bring such an 
 accusation against her, " The Protest" of the Free Church 
 is a nullity — '' Vox et preeterea nihil." 
 
INQUIRY INTO THE SCRIPTURAL AUTHORITY FOR 
 NON-INTRUSION. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 NON-INTKCSION— LIGHT IN WHICH HELD — LOGICAL VIEW OF — PHELIMiyABY 
 OBJECTIOX — PERSUASION OF MIND— STATEMENT OF REASONS -ABSURDITY 
 
 IN INTERPRETING THE SCRIPTUKE— AD J UDICATION BT CHURCH COURTS 
 
 INCONSISTENCY — RESULTS OF DISCUSSION. 
 
 In the preceding discussion the weakness of the princi- 
 ple of spiritual independence vieAved as an objection against 
 Establishments has been pointed out, the objection being 
 held by Voluntaries and Free Churchmen in common. 
 Before quitting this part of the subject, attention may 
 be directed to another principle held by the latter class 
 of our opponents, the repudiation of which, no less than 
 of the former, has been adduced by them in condem- 
 nation of the Church of Scotland. We refer to the 
 principle of Non-Intrusion, or that principle which as- 
 serts that "no pastor can be intruded on a congregation 
 contrary to the will of that congregation." As the foun- 
 dation of the Free Church, if, perchance laid on this prin- 
 ciple, is equally unsafe as when built on the other, it 
 may be useful to prove this averment. Were not such the 
 case, the Non-Intrusion principle might afford a vindication 
 of the conduct of our opponents, in seceding from the 
 Church of Scotland, even though it Avere granted by them, 
 that their views regarding the other had been errone- 
 ous. 
 
 The right of the State to interpret that sense of the rule 
 which must be binding on the Establishment, might be 
 scripturally unquestionable, while the interpretation so 
 
INQUIRY INTO THE, ETC. 91 
 
 given might, in the Church's opinion, be directly at va- 
 riance with Scripture. This is, in effect, what has been as- 
 serted in reference to the principle now under review. In 
 the interpretation given by the State of the rule which must 
 be acted on, the right of ordering the settlement of pastors 
 in accordance with the principle of Xon-Intrusion, has been 
 repudiated. By this decision, say our opponents, a clear 
 principle of God's Word has been contravened ; and to a 
 rule thus narrowed, the Church cannot submit without 
 sin. 
 
 As the exact light in which the principle before us is 
 held by the Free Church is a matter of no small import- 
 ance, in the discussion respecting it, this must be authori- 
 tatively fixed as a preliminary step. On this subject, the 
 words of the " Protest" may be cited : — " That the Church 
 Courts are subject to be compelled to intrude ministers on 
 reclaiming congregations, in opposition to the fundamental 
 principles of the Church, and their vieivs of the Word of 
 God, and the liberties of Christ's people."* Dr. Candlish 
 in one of his publications speaks of it thus : — " Holding 
 the fundamental principle, that ' no pastor ought to be in- 
 truded on any congregation contrary to the will of the 
 people,' on grounds of Christian expediency, as well as 
 Scriptural duty. Believing that when that principle is 
 violated there can be no warrant for expecting the divine 
 blessing on the ministrations of the pastor." t From these 
 extracts it is very e^^dent that the Non-Intrusion principle 
 is regarded by our opponents as possessing the authority of 
 God's Word. It is assei-ted by them not simply as a rule 
 of expediency, but on the higher ground of being a princi- 
 ple clearly deducible from Sciipture. During the recent 
 controversy which agitated the Church, this high ground for 
 maintaining the principle of Non-Intrusion was frequently 
 lost sight of, and the Church's claim to exercise it was too 
 often vindicated on the authority of great names, the ori- 
 ginal constitution of the Church and old statutes of Parlia- 
 ment, all of which were asserted to favour it. But it is 
 not because, as is alleged, the principle referred to may 
 have been held by great names, or may have been acted 
 on by the Church in former days, or may have been recog- 
 nized by old statutes of Parliament, that Non-Intrusion 
 can be obligatory on conscience, and that the Esta- 
 blished Church of Scotland can be condemned for repudi- 
 ating it. These may be all good reasons, if true, for urg- 
 
 *■ See also Claim of Right. t Narrative, p. 15. 
 
92 INQUIRY INTO THE SCRIPTURAL 
 
 ing this claim, on the ground of expediency ; but if our op- 
 ponents seek to justify the condemnation pronounced by 
 them, on the Church of Scotland, when they assert she has 
 done wrong in renouncing it, they must maintain, for this 
 principle, the high ground of the authority of God's Word 
 alone, for, " The consent of antiquity is worth nothing, 
 save as it agrees with what the Bible declares.'* Nor can 
 the cause of Non-Intrusion be sustained, unless the Scrip- 
 ture argument by which the principle is supported fully 
 establish the point, that it is the Non-Intrusion of our op- 
 ponents as contradistinguished from that recognized by 
 ourselves, which is the doctrine of the Word of God. Non- 
 Intrusion possibly may be proved from the Word of God, 
 but is it the Non-Intrusion which is opposed to ours ? Is 
 it the Non-Intrusion of the Free Church in contradistinction 
 to the powers recognized by Lord Aberdeen's Bill, as be- 
 longing to the Church of Scotland ? If not, the clearest 
 Scripture argument that can be bi-ought proves nothing 
 in favour of our opponents, and nothing against ourselves. 
 It only proves as a Scripture principle, one which is com- 
 mon to both. We trust this will bo kept in mind, as it is 
 very material in leading us to a right estimate of tlie argu- 
 ment from God's W'ord, adduced by our opponents in sup- 
 port of their cause. 
 
 Let us now investigate the exact nature of the Non-In- 
 trusion principle contended for by the Free Church party. 
 In common language, it is thus described, " That no pastor 
 shall be intruded on any congregation contrary to the will of 
 the people." Dr. Candllsh defines the meaning of the term 
 will somewhat more accurately when he calls it "an honest 
 conviction," a " religious persuasion," in the minds of the 
 majority of a congregation, or of the communicants, (viz. 
 " that the settlement of a particular presentee would not be 
 for their spiritual good."t) Looking at the definition of the 
 Non-Intrusion here given, and keeping in mind the point 
 previously adverted to, that it is maintained as a principle 
 possessing the authority of God's Word, the clear and lo- 
 gical view of it must be as follows : — 
 
 1st, It implies a persuasion in the mind of a majority of 
 the communicants, to the etfect that a particular presen- 
 tee is unfit to edify their souls. 
 
 2nd, That violation done to this persuasion (viz. by the 
 Church Courts in disregarding it) is contrary to God's 
 Word. 
 
 In apprehending the meaning of the Non-Intrusion prin- 
 * Free Church Catechism, Q. 37. t Narrative, p. 26. 
 
AUTHORITY FOR KOK-IKTRUSION. 93 
 
 ciple these two points must be contemplated together, for 
 otherwise we will not judge of it fairly. 
 
 Now, at the very outset a general objection may be stat- 
 ed to the charge of our opponents, that the principle of 
 Non-Iiitrusion has been repudiated by the Church of Scot- 
 land — an objection vrhich arises out of the very constitu- 
 tion of an Establishment. By an Establishment we sim- 
 ply mean, " An offer of religion under a specified form of 
 doctrine, discipline, and government, made by the State, 
 through the instrumentality of the Church, to those of its 
 subjects who are willing to avail themselves of it." If we 
 suppose, then, that a clear argument from Scripture can be 
 adduced in favour of tlio principle, that the religious per- 
 suasion of a congi-egation, adverse to a presentee, ought 
 not to be violated, how can it be said, that, in our Scot- 
 tish Establishment, any infringement is made on this prin- 
 ciple. If a section of a congregation, whether the majo- 
 rity or the minority, have come to the honest persuasion 
 of the ministerial unfitness of a presentee after trial, 
 what hindrance does the offer of religion, through the 
 forms of the Establishment, lay upon them from acting on 
 this persuasion. They are not bound to worship with the 
 minister whom the State offers them, if they disapprove of 
 him. They may attach themselves to another minister 
 within the Establishment, or to one^ without it. Nor is 
 the hardship of this, in any measure greater towards the 
 dissentient part of such congi'egation than is felt by all 
 dissenters from the Establishment in the country. Such 
 parties have tried not " the spirits" only, but the Esta- 
 blishment itself, and being dissatisfied therewith, they 
 have found their remedy in forming themselves into a se- 
 parate communion, ^^'ere men compelled to worship God 
 under that minister whom the State provides for them, 
 then they might complain of a violation of Scripture, in 
 having a pastor thrust upon them contrary to their honest 
 persuasion of his ministerial fitness. But such compulsion 
 does not attach to the Establishment in Scotland, and, 
 consequently, the violation of Scripture referred to cannot 
 be said to exist. 
 
 But waiving this preliminary objection, let us come to a 
 more strict investigation of the principle of Non-Intrusion it- 
 self. It implies, as has been said, a jyersuo.sion in the mind, 
 (viz. of the m.ajority which is adverse to the presentee.) 
 
 xSow, a persuasion of the mind can only be of two 
 kinds: 1st, K persuasion without reasons or grounds for 
 
94 INQUIRY INTO THE SCItirTUKAL 
 
 its existence in the mind ; 2dly, A persuasion founded on 
 such reasons. 
 
 Were a man to affinn that one and one made three, and 
 that, notwithstanding his contradicting in this the opi- 
 nions of men universally, he had no other reason for his 
 averment save the existence of a persuasion to that effect 
 in his own mind, all would agree that his belief (if belief 
 it could be called) was the product of mental incapacity, 
 hallucination, or madness — of mental incapacity, if unable 
 to perceive the relations of numbers — of hallucination, 
 if unfit to appreciate them — of madness, if his conduct 
 was regulated by this or similar deceptions. It is clear 
 enough, that however such persuasion might be suf- 
 ficient to actuate the conduct of the individual referred to, 
 it could not be regarded by others as a legitimate mo- 
 tive of action. 
 
 Now, if the persuasion of mind implied in the Xon-In- 
 trusion principle be of this description — a persuasion disso- 
 ciated from, and altogether unconnected with, grounds and 
 reasons for its existence, then the assertion of the second 
 part of this principle, viz., that violation done to it con- 
 travenes God's Word, is not true.* It is an assertion con- 
 tradicted by reason and Scnpture itself. The first princi- 
 ples of reason teach, that it is not morally wrong to violate 
 prejudice or hallucination of mind in others, and more 
 especially when such violation is calculated to produce 
 good, which the existence of the prejudice would have pre- 
 vented. The Word of God aftbrds us many instances of this 
 violation. Such persuasion, unconnected with grounds or 
 reasons justifying its existence, or, in other words, such 
 prejudice prevailed in the minds of the Jews against the 
 Saviour as a divine messenger, and against the apostles, 
 as teachers of divine truth ; yet both Christ and his 
 apostles did violence to such prejudice, for when not 
 hindered by persecution, they continued in the face of 
 it to teach and to preach to the Jews. Such unreasonable 
 persuasion or prejudice exists in the mind of every uni-e- 
 generate man against God and his law, yet, in violation of 
 such prejudice, God commands sinners to love and obey 
 him, and he characterises such prejudice as sin. 
 
 The persuasion of mind implied in the Non -Intrusion 
 principle cannot then be unreasonable or groundless, but 
 must be one for which grounds and reasons exist ; and the 
 fact must be held as clearly ascertained, that these grounds 
 and reasons have a real existence in the mind. 
 
AUTHORITY FOE NON-INTRUSION. 95 
 
 Having settled thus far the exact nature of the persua- 
 sion itself, "we now come to inquire into the second assertion 
 of the Non-Intrusion principle, namely, whether the viola- 
 tion of it by the Church Courts in the settlement of an un- 
 acceptable presentee, be in opposition to the AVord of God. 
 
 If such be the case, the opposition referred to must 
 be found in the dilference between the Non-Intrusion 
 principle of the Free Church, and that of the Church of 
 Scotland. The principle of the former, as is alleged, is 
 in conformity with God's Word, while that of the latter 
 violates it. Now, as the diiFerence between the two con- 
 sists in this, that the former accounts the mere assertion 
 of the existence of the persuasion in the minds of the 
 people to be sufficient, while the latter requires reasons 
 for such persuasion to be stated, the statement, so required, 
 must be the thing which is contrary to God's Word. 
 
 The violation of Scripture, charged against the prin- 
 ciple of the Chm-ch of Scotland, must either lie in the state- 
 ment refeiTed to, or else in the fact that the Church Courts 
 are not satisfied with the simple statement of the reasons, 
 but go on to adjudicate on them, and when dissatisfied 
 theroAvith proceed to thq settlement. 
 
 Both of these views of the violation charged against us 
 may be noticed. 
 
 In reference to the first, how can it be any violation of 
 God's Word on the part of the people, to state the reasons 
 for that persuasion, adverse to the presentee which they 
 feel, or for the Church Courts to require such statement 
 when the reasons referred to are acknowledged to have an 
 actual existence in their mind. A question might be 
 raised as to the expediency of requiring the reasons to 
 be stated, founded on the difficulty which might occur 
 to vindicate them before others, but the assertion that 
 such statement by the people, is any violation of God's 
 Word, must, in the .circumstances supposed, be one 
 which every reasonable man will repudiate. And here 
 we may notice the insufficiency of the argument by 
 which the Non-Intrusion principle was almost entirely 
 defended during the late controversy. It was to this 
 effect : " A simple-hearted pious man might be unable to 
 state to a Church Court, satisfactory reasons against a 
 presentee, yet all the while there might remain in his 
 mind a conscientious conviction that such presentee was 
 unable to edify his soul.'' Now, however substantial an 
 argument this might be against the expediency of requiring 
 reasons to be stated for that particular persuasion of mind 
 
96 INQUIRY INTO THE SCRirTl RAL 
 
 which exists in the majority of a congregation regarding 
 an unacceptable presentee, unquestionably it is no argu- 
 ment for condemning as a violation of God's Word, that 
 view of the Non-Intrusion principle which requires reasons 
 to be stated. If the reasons referred to exist in the mind, 
 as confessedly they do, neither the statement of them by 
 the people, nor the requisition of such statement by the 
 Church Courts, can be sinful or wrong. 
 
 Let us only look into what singular absurdity and in- 
 consistency in interpreting the Word of God, the Free 
 Church party must run if they hold that the statement by 
 the people of the reasons referred to involves any thing 
 that is sinful, or contrary to Scripture, In proof of their 
 views of Non-Intrusion, the passage 1 John iv. I. is cited, 
 " Try the spirits wiiether they be of God." Let us inquire 
 what is the meaning of the expression " Try,"'the word in 
 the original being ooy./,i«6t^£T£,for upontUis meaning the sense 
 of the passage entirely turns. The only idea which it can 
 express is that of " got a reasonable pei'suasion," namely, as 
 to the gifts of the otfered presentee. But if this be the 
 only idea implied in the original word, then the passage 
 does not carry out by Scriptural authority the Non-Intru- 
 sion principle of our opponents. It merely expresses an 
 idea equally applicable to the Non-Intrusion of the Free 
 Church, and to that of the Church of Scotland — for the 
 principle of the latter as well as that of the former allows 
 the congregation " by trying" to get a reasonable persua- 
 sion of the gifts of the presentee. With this simple idea 
 of " getting a persuasion'' attached to it, the passage affords 
 no condemnation of the principle of the Church of Scot- 
 land. To bear out that condemnation the original word 
 must have attached to it, a more extended meaning, viz., 
 the sinfulness of stating reasons for the persuasion arrived 
 at. Taken however, in this extended meaning, the 
 word loKif^ci^ezi will carry with it no sense in other pass- 
 ages of Scripture. We shall adduce one example from 
 Luke, xiv. 19 : "I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I 
 go to prove them,'' loKif^a^siv. All the rules of criticism 
 require that the same meaning should be attached to the 
 word in this as in the former passage. In the restricted 
 meaning, which is obviously the true one, the passage in 
 1st John does not bring out as a Scriptural principle the 
 Non-Intrusion of our opponents, as contradistinguished 
 from our own. In the extended meaning, the passage in 
 Luke becomes pure absurdity. " I go to get apei-suasion as 
 to the qualities of my oxen, by trying them, but it will be a 
 
AUTHORITY FOR NON-INTRUSION. 97 
 
 violation of God's "Word to state the reasons of that 
 persuasion to others.'''* 
 
 So much for the violation of God's Word charged against 
 the Church of Scotland, because of her repudiation of the 
 Non-Intrusion of her opponents, alleged by them to be a 
 clear Scriptural principle. 
 
 Let us now look to the only other view of that viola- 
 tion which can be taken. When it cannot be main- 
 tained that any contradiction to God's Word is implied 
 in the mere statement by the people of the reasons 
 for the persuasion referred to, the next assertion must 
 be, that the adjudication upon these reasons by other 
 parties than those holding the persuasion, is a violation 
 of God's AYord, that is to say, our opponents must main- 
 tain that though the majority of a congi-egation may be 
 called on to state their reasons for the persuasion they 
 entertain adverse to a presentee, yet v,'hen the Church 
 Courts pass judgment upon these reasons, and havmg 
 done so, see cause to violate the persuasion referred to, by: 
 settling the presentee, then an act is done by them which 
 is contrary to God's Word. 
 
 Before attempting to detemiine upon the alleged sinful- 
 ness of this act of the Church Courts, let us endeavour 
 clearly to apprehend the nature of the act itself. 
 
 The point has already been settled, that there can be no 
 sinfulness in the mere statement of the reasons by the con-, 
 gregation to the Church Courts ; the sinfulness, if there be 
 anv, must be in the adjudication by the latter on these rea- 
 sons. Now, when reasons for the persuasion held by the 
 congregation are giA'en to the Church Coui-ts, it is very evi- 
 dent, that the character of the persuasion itself depends 
 on the truth or falsehood of the reasons, and that just as 
 these reasons are in themselves true or false, and justify or 
 not the persuasion founded upon them, must the persua- 
 sion be reasonable or mere prejudice. The nature of the 
 persuasion itself must therefore first be settled, before it- 
 can be seen whether the act of the Church Courts in set- 
 ting it at nought can be a violation of God's Word at 
 all. We will give an illustration of this. Let us suppose 
 that the majority of a congregation assert an honest per- 
 
 * The same argument used in reference to the passage in 1 John Tvill 
 apply to the other passages which have been adduced as directly support- 
 ing the Nun-Intrusion principle of our opponents. None of these pas- 
 sages express mor^ than the simple idea of 'r getting a reasonable persua- 
 sion." 
 
 £ 
 
 I 
 
9^ INQUIKY INTO THE SCRIPTUEAL 
 
 suasion as implied in the Non-Intrusion principle ; that a 
 presentee is incapable of edifying them, and let us suppose 
 that the reason they assign for this persuasion, and in rea- 
 lity the reason on which it rests, is, that the presentee " has 
 red hair." Let us farther suppose, that the Church Courts 
 adjudicate, that this is an insufficient reason, and that 
 they contravene the foi'C-mentioned persuasion by settling 
 the presentee. Will it be maintained, that this act is in 
 violation of God's Word ? Every intelligent mind must 
 perceive that the act refen'ed to, is only opposition to un- 
 reasonable prejudice or hallucination of mind on the part 
 of the people, an opposition which is not contrary to, but 
 in accordance with the Word of God. 
 
 In every case, therefore, where the reasons are in reality 
 false and insufficient to justify the persuasion that rests 
 upon them, the adjudication of the Church Coui'ts that 
 they are so, and the subsequent violence done to the per- 
 suasion in the mind of the people which may be commit- 
 ted in the settlement, is not an act opposed to God's Word, 
 but the reverse. The only instance, therefore, in which the 
 Chm-ch Courts can contravene, as is alleged, God's Word, 
 in violating a religious persuasion in the mind of the majo- 
 rity of a congregation is this, when the grounds and reasons 
 of this persuasion are in reality true and sufficient to jus- 
 tify it, but when the Church Courts adjudicate them to be 
 false and insufficient, and so disregard them by settling 
 the presentee. 
 
 We request it particularly to be marked, that no other 
 case but that just mentioned is conceivable, wherein the 
 charge can be brought against the Church Courts, that 
 they act contrary to God's Word, by violating a persua- 
 sion in the mind of a majority or people with reference to 
 a presentee. 
 
 On this single case then, we now offer two remarks. 
 
 The first refers to its probability of occun-ing. Is it a 
 likely thing that sufficient reasons against a presentee — 
 reasons justifying the persuasion adverse to his settle- 
 ment, held by the people or majority of the communi- 
 cants, should exist, and that in the public discussion 
 of them which must ensue, Presbytery, Synod, and Gene- 
 ral Assembly, should all be blind to their true nature, 
 and acting upon their responsibility to God, should finally 
 adjudge them to be false ? The very improbability of the 
 occurrence of the case before us and the difficulty which 
 the occurrence of it must encounter, is sufficient to war- 
 rant our assertion, that this possible violation of God's 
 
AUTHORITY FOR NON-INTRUSION. 99 
 
 "Word, is not a very strong argument by which to con- 
 demn the present arrangements which subsist in the 
 Church of Scotland, nor to justify those demanded by her 
 opponents. Moreover, should such a case of intrusion ever 
 be perpetrated, the blame must lie with the Chm-ch Courts 
 themselves, since Lord Aberdeen's bill affords more than 
 sufficient liberty from the State to guard against it. 
 
 But our second remark comes more effectively against the 
 principle opposed to us. It is this, that in every case, where 
 the Xon-Intrusionof the Free Church is acted upon, the same 
 violation of a religious persuasion of mind is committed, 
 which when done by the Church Courts, is charged against 
 them as in opposition to God's word ; we mean by the ma- 
 jority of a congregation versus the minoriti/. If the majo- 
 rity have adopted a reasonable persuasion of mind adverse 
 to the presentee, so have the minority adopted a reason- 
 able persuasion in his fcivour. In either case, it is a per- 
 suasion justified by the reasons on which it stands.* Isow, 
 what becomes of the persuasion of the m-inority, when the 
 presentee is rejected in virtue of the application of the 
 Non-Intrusion piinciple ? It is overborne by that of the 
 majority. Violation is done to it by a party who do not 
 even proceed to inquire into the soundness' or unsound- 
 ness of the persuasion, but merely set it at nought through 
 the power of numerical strength. Nor when such a case 
 happens, is it ever alleged by the advocates of the Non-In- 
 trusion principle, that any violation of the Word of God is 
 committed. The question then very naturally arises, how 
 can that act be contrary to the Word of God, on the part 
 of tho Church Courts towards the majority of a congrega- 
 tion, which is no contradiction to God's Word on the part 
 of the majority towards the minority? If the Church 
 Courts violate the persuasion of mind which exists in a 
 hundred of the congregation, they contravene God's Word, 
 but if the hundred violate the persuasion of mind which 
 exists in ninety-nine, no such contradiction to God's Word 
 occurs. Consistency surely requires that both should be 
 viewed in the same light, and that if the violation of a reli- 
 gious persuasion of mind in reference to a presentee be an in- 
 fringement of God's Word in one case, so must it be in an- 
 other ; while, if it be no infringement of God's Word on the 
 part of the majority towards the minority, neither can there 
 be any such infringement when the Church Courts by adju- 
 
 * Should it be said, that the persuasion in both cases cannot be reason- 
 able, then numerical strength is no proof that this character belongs to 
 the one any more than to the other. 
 
100 INQUIRY INTO THE SCRIPTURAL 
 
 dicating on tlie reasons of the majority violate their per- 
 suasion in the settlement of a presentee ; — all this being ir- 
 respective of the power which as Church Courts they pos- 
 sess over Church members, and no part of which power is 
 possessed by the maj;)rity over the minority. 
 
 The result of our whole discussion must be obvious ; in 
 so far as it bears at all on the principle of Non-Intrusion 
 Scriptural authority only reaches to the point where there 
 is coincidence between that of the Church of Scotland 
 and of the party opposed to her. If any rule be laid dowm 
 in the Word of God, it is merely the right of a congregation, 
 or majority of communicants, to get a ]-easonable persua- 
 sion respecting the gifts of an offered presentee, " by try- 
 ing.'' Regarding all that stretches beyond this point, and 
 the procedure which may take place for judging of the 
 grounds and reasons of this persuasion, the Word of God 
 is entirely silent. 
 
 The very ground-work of the Non-Intrusion controversy, 
 or in other words, the distinction betwixt the principle of 
 the Church of Scotland and that of her opponents, in 
 place of being a distinction founded on the Word of God, 
 is there unnoticed, and consequently can be one only of 
 expediency. Such intervening space between the tAvo prin- 
 ciples being mere matter of expediency, the charge of 
 our opponents, that in repudiating Non-Intrusion in their 
 sense we have repudiated the Word of God, must be false. 
 
 In the late controversy, the Church of Scotland had to 
 choose between the eocpediency of preserving the Non-In- 
 trusion of the Free Church party, a principle repugnant 
 in its nature to many at least of her ministers, and the 
 expediency of preserving the National Establishment, since 
 the State refused to sanction that principle. Of these 
 alternatives she chose the latter, and in so doing she chose 
 the higher national good, and what to her own view was 
 most to the glory of God. 
 
 Our remarks on the questions at issue betwixt ourselves 
 nnd the Free Church being now finished, a momentary 
 consideration may be allowed us before finally taking 
 leave of the subject, to notice the position in which we 
 find the Church of Scotland to be placed. 
 
 In reference to the two great principles of spintual in- 
 dependence and Non-Intrusion, the conclusion to which 
 our investigation has been brought is this, that the first in 
 the view of it held by our opponents, is contrary to reason 
 and to Scripture, and that the second is not supported by the 
 
AUTHORITY FOR NON-INTRUSION. 101 
 
 authority of God's Word in the sense contended for, as 
 contradistinguished from our own. 
 
 To every one capable of reflection, this conclusion rnust 
 appear one of no small moment, for now we are entitled 
 to say, Scripture justifies the position of our Church. Do 
 our opponents tell us — that men of former times held dif- 
 ferent principles from ours — that the ancient constitution 
 of the Church of Scotland is the reverse of what we main- 
 tain — that former statutes of Parliament recognise other 
 views of the Church's constitution and powers than those 
 espoused by us. By such imphed accusations they attain 
 no advantage over us, and no additional strength to their 
 own cause. The probability that these assertions are false 
 is entirely on our side, abating altogether ft-om the his- 
 toi-ical evidence which proves it. But even though they 
 were all true, and though a thousand other arguments 
 could be brought against us, tlie simple answer to them 
 all is this : " Scripture is not against us, divine authority 
 sustains our principles." 
 
 To those who have espoused views and principles op- 
 posed to our% we deny not the meed of intellectual power 
 and moral Avorth which they deserve. The services that 
 have been rendered by some of them to the cause of our 
 common Christianity have been large and efficient. In the 
 ranks of those who esteem our principles as erroneous, are 
 to be found names of high Christian eminence — names 
 which shall flourish in the bright page of history, when 
 other and meaner spirits shall have passed into oblivion. 
 But principles derive then* vital energy and their power of 
 endurance not from the celebrity of names, nor from the 
 strength of numbers, but from their own accordance with 
 truth, and their consistency with the unerring "Word of 
 God. By such a standard the first principles of the Church 
 of Scotland, and not those of her opponents, will bear to 
 be measured. The principles for which we contend are 
 few and simple, and they carry A\dth them the impression 
 of the Book of Inspiration. They are only these : " Man's 
 responsibility to God, the measure of that responsibility 
 being truth as revealed to his mind." 
 
THE SECOND OBJECTION OF VOLUNTARYISM 
 EXAMINED. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 SECOND OBJECTION OF VOLUNTARYISM — APPARENT STRENGTH — TWOFOLD 
 
 VIEW STATE OUGHT NOT TO GIVE PUBLIC SANCTION TO RELIGION 
 
 FALSEHOOD OF THIS — STATE OUGHT NOT TO ENDOW RELIGION — MEANING 
 OF THE OBJECTION— RESULTS — INCONSISTENT WITH CIVIL GOVERNMENT 
 — STATE KNOWS RELIGION— OBLIGATIONS THENCE ARISING. 
 
 The second of those objections formerly mentioned, 
 brought by Voluntaries against the cause of Establish- 
 ments asserts the principle, that the State has nothing to 
 do with religion, and ought not by any official act to sanc- 
 tion it. The argument by which this objection is sustain- 
 ed may be easily stated. " The office of the ruler of 
 the State has reference only to Civil government, and was 
 designed to promote temporal and secular objects for the 
 good of the community. To these objects he is necessarily 
 confined. Religion is a matter of conscience, and cannot 
 become the subject of Civil regulation. With the rights of 
 conscience among his subjects, the ruler cannot lawfully 
 interfere without assuming the character of a persecutor, 
 consequently he goes beyond the prescribed limits of his 
 office, when by any public act he gives a direct sanction or 
 approbation to religion." 
 
 By Voluntaries themselves, the objection before us is 
 regarded as their great stronghold, nor can its apparently 
 formidable character be denied, when we first look at the 
 imposing light in which it is placed, and the various ar- 
 guments by which it has been defended. Objections to a 
 system are however often found to resemble the difficulties 
 encountered in life. Seen at a distance they appear great 
 and formidable, but when approached they are easily 
 overcome. 
 
THE SECOND OBJECTION, ETC. lOo 
 
 The objection before us, in order to be fairly discussed, 
 must be regarded in two lights : First, As an objection to 
 any recognition or approbation of religion by the State. 
 Secondly, To any State endowment of religion. The lat- 
 ter is undoubtedly the great objection to the cause of Esta- 
 blishments, though the former may be and is maintained. 
 Dr. Wardlaw has repudiated to a great extent the idea of 
 an Establishment of religion by the State, unless in con- 
 nection with endowments received by its ministers, for he 
 calls such " a Ansionary fancy," and says, " we entirely agree 
 with Dr. Chalmers in conceiving " legal provision to be es- 
 sential to an Establishment— a State Established Church, 
 to be a State endowed Church."^ Yet as the recognition 
 of religion by the State is entirely different from the 
 endowment of it, it may be right to discuss the two ob- 
 jections separately. 
 
 First, then, it is said by Voluntaries, there ought to be 
 no recognition of religion by the State, — no official act done 
 to give public sanction and approbation to divine truth, 
 such being contrary to the purpose for which the magiste- 
 rial office exists. 
 
 In adverting to the way by which this objection 
 is defended, we find that the attempt to sustain it is 
 made by two assertions. One is, that the magistrate 
 must be excluded from publicly recognising religion, be- 
 cause he cannot know what it is, his office having relation 
 only to what is Civil. The other assertion is, that all 
 recognition of religion on his part must be wrong, because 
 it is in violation of the magisterial office as appointed by 
 God. Now, if the two assertions here adduced be true, a 
 strong argument would unquestionably arise from thence in 
 favour of the principle, that the State ought not to recog- 
 nize religion. But the very opposite of these assertions is 
 the truth. The chief magistrate must know what is reli- 
 gion, and must recognize many of the truths of revelation 
 in his office, and for this reason he ought to give it 
 public sanction and countenance. 
 
 In denying that the magistrate knows what is religion, 
 our opponents have overlooked the fact, that their own 
 principle necessarily implies such knowledge. The princi- 
 ple of Voluntaryism is, that the magistrate ought not to 
 recognize religion in any of his public acts. But how can 
 he refuse to recognize religion without knowing what reli- 
 gion is ? The re'fasal, equally with the consent to recog- 
 nize religion, implies and must imply a knowledge of it 
 
 * Page 2. 
 
104 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 The maa;istrate ought to recognize in his public office what 
 is Civil. Can he do this without knowing what belongs to 
 the Civil office ? JBy parity of reasoning, therefore, he can- 
 not know when the Civil limit is transgressed, and when 
 the province of religion is invaded in his actings ; in other 
 words, he cannot know when the principle contended 
 for becomes applicable, without knowing what is re- 
 ligion. How very clear is this implied knowledge in 
 other matters. Every right thinking person will say, 
 The State ought not to oppress or tyrannize over its sub- 
 jects. But of what value would this principle be in its 
 application to a State which did not know what oppression 
 or tyranny was. Antecedent to the possibility of applying 
 the principle there must be a knowledge of what is oppres- 
 sion and tyranny. The same holds true in reference to 
 religion. Antecedent to the possibility of applying the 
 principle that religion ought not to be officially recognized, 
 there must be in the State's mind a knowledge of religion. 
 
 At the very outset of our argument, we come to the 
 conclusion that the State must know what is religion, and 
 thus, in so far as the principle of Voluntaryism, that the 
 State ought not to recognise it, depends on asserting its 
 ignorance of religion, the principle cannot be maintained. 
 It is altogether false. What are the results arising out 
 of the fact now obtained, that the State does know what 
 is religion, and what are the obligations flowing from this 
 knowledge, as connected with the principle of Establish- 
 ments, will afterwards be adverted to when discussing the 
 question of Endowments ; meantime they may be omitted. 
 
 We may now proceed to the other assertion of Volun- 
 taryism, that the State ought not to recognize religion be- 
 cause its act in doing so would be inconsistent with the 
 magisterial office. To shew the unsoundness of this prin- 
 ciple, it will only be necessary to notice some of the offices 
 of the magistracy — meaning thereby the Christian magis- 
 tracy. 
 
 The following acts of the magistrate are those which 
 may be specially adduced as bearing on our argument. 
 
 First, In the judicial office he is authorized to impose 
 an Oath on witnesses. 
 
 Secondly, It is his duty not to persecute his subjects on 
 account of their i-cligion, but to enact laws of toleration 
 for those who conscientiously dissent from the form of re- 
 ligion professed by him. 
 
 Thirdly, He ought not to give countenance or Civil 
 sanction to man-stealing or slavery. 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 105 
 
 In our own country at least, the acts referred to will be 
 regarded as inseparable from the office of the Christian 
 magistrate. Let us now see Avhat truths of religion are 
 involved in these offices. When the magistrate imposes 
 an oath, he thus recognizes the first principle of reli- 
 gion, namely, the existence of a God, and in reference 
 to God he recognizes the following truths, namely, that 
 he is an all-seeing and heart-searching God, that ho 
 loves truth, and hates falsehood; that he will reward the 
 one and punish the other either here or hereafter ; that 
 consequently there must be a day of final judgment, 
 when the secrets of the heart shall be revealed. !Mo]'e- 
 over, in reference to man, the same judicial act of the 
 magistrate recognizes these points, that he is a fallen 
 and imperfect being, on whose regard for truth no depen- 
 dence can be placed without the additional security of an 
 appeal to the deity ; that he ought to acknowledge and 
 fear God : that the application of religious truth to the 
 mind, is the most effective means of influencing human 
 conduct ; and that acquaintance with a measure of religious 
 truth on the part of subjects is essential to the right dis- 
 charge of the functions of the magistracy. 
 
 Again, if we advert to the next act of the magistrate's 
 office, namely, that which asserts his duty to enact laws of 
 toleration, and not to persecute for religion any of his sub- 
 jects, how many truths regarding conscience are here re- 
 cognized — such as, that man is responsible to God, that 
 conscience must be regarded in the service paid to God, that 
 man ought to draw near to God with sincerity and truth, 
 not with hypocrisy and lip service, and that he ought to 
 obey God rather than man. Moreover these important 
 points are acknowledged regarding the magisterial office 
 itself, namely, that it does not reach to acts of the mind, 
 and has no right to control opinion in religion. 
 
 Or again, if we advert to the office of the magistracy 
 which requires a repudiation of man-stealing or slavery, 
 we have here a recognition of many of the most important 
 religious truths connected with man in the social system. 
 A state renouncing slavery adopts the principle, that be- 
 fore God, the natm-al rights of all are equal, that men owe 
 one another the duties of love, kindness, sympathy, justice ; 
 that the strong ought not to oppress the weak ; nay, it 
 adopts at once the entire second table of the moral law, 
 that we are bound to love our neighbour as ourselves. 
 
 In the acts of the magistracy mentioned, these and 
 many such like truths of religion, are plainlv and neces- 
 
 e2 
 
106 
 
 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 sarily recognized. Now if the principle of Voluntaryism 
 be sound, that the ruler ought not publicly to recognize 
 religion, he ought not to recognize these truths, and by 
 consequence, no act can be regarded as necessarily con- 
 nected with his office, which requires a public recognition 
 of these truths ; and on this ground, no charge of doing 
 wrong could be brought against him for repudiating any 
 or all of the acts referred to. The fact is, that a public 
 sanction given to certain truths of religion is inseparable 
 from the execution of the office of the magistrate. He 
 must lay aside his functions as understood in every Chris- 
 tian nation, if the liberty of giving such sanction be 
 denied to him. In reference to the truths now specified, 
 the recognition of which is implied in the magisterial office, 
 an important question may here be asked, namely, where 
 did the magistrate get the knowledge of them ? From 
 reason or revelation? It could not be from reason, for 
 unassisted reason never was acquainted with all these 
 truths, nor in any heathen country are they adopted. It 
 must therefore have been from revelation. Now if the 
 Civil magistrate obtained the knowledge of divine truths 
 essential to the existence and ri^ht discharge of his office 
 from revelation, he is thus giving his sanction to the entire 
 book of revelation as a code of truth for man's instruc- 
 tion. It will not do to say he is only recognizing the 
 truths of revelation essential to his own office. In re- 
 cognizing revelation as the origin of these truths, he is 
 recognizing and giving his sanction to revelation, as a 
 whole, and no limitation can be made of the truths which 
 he is bound to recognize, unless such limitation come from 
 the Word of God itself. God's Word may undoubtedly 
 limit the public sanction which he may and ought to give 
 to revealed truth, but except in so far as coming from 
 this source, no limitation exists. 
 
 But, says the Voluntary, such limitation does exist in the 
 Word of God. Christ says " INIy kingddm is not of this 
 world,'' and in thus declaring that the kingdom which he 
 set up on earth was entirely a spiritual kingdom, he in 
 eiFect prohibits the ruling powers of the world from giv- 
 ing public sanction to religion in their government. 
 
 Now, if this or any similar text be understood as prohi- 
 biting all sanction whatever to religion in the magisterial 
 office, then the execution of this office, as already shewn, 
 must bo impracticable in the world. No act inferring a 
 public recognition of religious truth can properly belong to 
 it, and in refusing to adopt in his government any such jvct^ 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 107 
 
 the magistrate can be guilty of no wrong towards his sub- 
 jects, entitling them to reclaim against it. On the other 
 hand, if the passage referred to does not prohibit the re- 
 cognition of, and public sanction given to such portion of 
 religious truth as the execution of the magisterial office 
 requires, then how singular and inexplicable does that rule 
 of the interpretation of Scripture become, which in a pas- 
 sao-e of very general meaning, discovers a prohibition di- 
 rected to the Civil magistrate from sanctioning certain 
 truths of religion, but not excluding others— a prohibition 
 ever varying in its extent, as time or country, ignorance 
 or intelligence, may alter the functions performed by the 
 ruling powers of a Christian State. 
 
 The previous remarks may suffice to prove how untena- 
 able is the principle of Voluntaryism, which asserts that 
 the State ought not to give any public sanction to religion. 
 In so far, therefore, as the objection brought against the 
 cause of Establishments depends on the condemnation of 
 such public sanction, it has no foundation in truth. 
 
 The opposition which Voluntaries exhibit to Establish- 
 ments does not however respect so much the State's pub- 
 lic recognition of religion, as the State's endowment of it. 
 It is against an Establishment as a Church deriving legal 
 provision from the State, that they have directed their 
 main arguments. Let us now see what is the value of 
 their objection to our cause in this new light. 
 
 A few preliminary remarks will here be necessary to 
 bring out clearly and distinctly the meaning of the objec- 
 tion referred to. 
 
 ^Vhen Voluntaries assert that the State has nothing 
 to do with religion, they cannot mean that it is not enti- 
 tled to intei-pret the Word of God for its subjects, or to 
 draw up a rule of doctrine, discipline, and government for 
 the Church, which the latter is bound to adopt. In this 
 sense the objection in question could have no possible bear- 
 ing upon the cause of Establishments, inasmuch as its 
 defenders ascribe no such power to the State. If brought 
 fonvard for the purpose of subverting this cause, another 
 and an entu'ely different meaning must be attached to it. 
 Now, the only other meaning that can be attached to 
 the objection is, that " the State has nothing to do with re- 
 ligion" in the way of offering it to its subjects— that is, the 
 State has no right to bring religion within the power or 
 reach of its subjects, by making a public offer of it to them, 
 as it subsists in the form of doctrine and arrangement 
 adapted by the Church herself. Such being the real 
 
108 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 meaning of this objection, if understood as expressing 
 the condemnation of a National Establishment, let us 
 advei-t to the truth of the assertion which it makes, viz., 
 that the State is not entitled to offer religion to its sub- 
 jects. 
 
 In order to this, it is needful to inquire, in what way is 
 the State capable of offering religion to its subjects ? It 
 cannot do so directly by its own emissaries, as it sends 
 forth Civil Judges, and other parties, to administer the 
 statutes of the realm. Such a proceeding would be con- 
 trary to the "Word of God, which empowers the Church 
 alone to teach reli'^jion to men. The State can merelv make 
 the offer indirectly, by assuming religion as it exists under 
 the authority of the Church ; and should various outward 
 forms of religion exist in the kingdom, by selecting one of 
 these, in order that its ministers may become teachers of 
 divine truth through an endowment granted them from the 
 national treasury. 
 
 For the sake of precision, let us observe that the ques- 
 tion betwixt us and our opponents at present, is not as 
 to the right of the State to pay the ministers of religion at 
 all from the national treasury. This question, though an 
 important one, does not belong to the objection of Volun- 
 taryism which we are at present discussing, but to the next, 
 which adverts to the rule of Scripture on this subject. The 
 question before us respects the State's title to assume 
 the position of offering religion. Its title to offer reli- 
 gion, and the means by which alone it is capable of mak- 
 ing the offer, are points entirely different. It may be 
 true that the State has no means within its power to offer 
 or diffuse the knowledge of religion among its subjects, 
 except that of paying the ministers who preach it to them ; 
 but the settlement of this latter point has no relation to the 
 otlier, whether it be entitled from the Civil chair to make 
 such offer at all, and whether it will violate some principle 
 of truth in doing so. Yoluntaiies say that the State is not 
 entitled to offer religion to its subjects, which rightly trans- 
 lated, means simply that it has no title to offer it by the 
 only means competent to accomplish its purpose, viz. by 
 paying for it through an endowment to the ministers select- 
 ed to teach it. They thus charge the State's offer of reli- 
 gion, through an endowment given for it, as a violation of 
 principle. What is the nature of this violation, becomes 
 now the subject of inquiry. 
 
 The act of the State objected to being merely an offer 
 of religion made to its subjects by means of the endow- 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 109 
 
 ments, no wrong is done to the conscience of any of tliem 
 by persecution or compulsion to adopt the form of religion 
 which it has seen meet to endow. In offering the religion 
 of the Establishment to its subjects, the State proposes it 
 simply as that which itself believes to be true, but it does 
 not compel them to believe it to be true, or to adopt it. It 
 leaves those who dissent at liberty to embrace religion in 
 the form of the Establishment, or reject it as they think 
 right. The only wrong done by the State in the matter 
 of an Establishment must be, not that which is done to 
 conscience by the offer of religion; but that which is 
 done to conscience by the medium through which the offer 
 is made, viz., the endowments to which, as coming from 
 the national funds, Dissenters contribute their share^ By 
 such contribution involuntarily exacted of them. Volun- 
 taries mav say their consciences are indirectly violated. 
 They are "compelled to pay for the State offer of a system 
 of religion which they conscientiously disapprove, and the 
 State, in demanding such payment, acts wrongfully and 
 unjustly towards them. 
 
 Here' then at last we have got the true meaning of the 
 Voluntary's assertion, that " the State has nothing to do 
 with religion." It just means that the State has no right 
 to violate the conscience of those M^ho dissent from the 
 Establishment, by paying its ministers from the national 
 funds to which these Dissenters contribute. 
 
 The principle of the objection of Voluntaryism being 
 now before us, let us examine its soundness. Is it true 
 that the State has no title to make Dissenters pay through 
 their contributions to the national funds for the support of 
 a svstem which their consciences disapprove ? Is it true 
 tha't the State would be guilty of doing wrong by i-equiring 
 pavment — would, on the other hand, only do right by not 
 requiring a dissenting portion of its subjects to contribute 
 to the support of an object to which they are conscientious- 
 Iv opposed ? If this principle be sound, then another, some- 
 what strange in its results, must also be sound, namely, 
 " Thcit the funds of a nation are to be dispensed, not ac- 
 cording to the legislator's will, but according to the con- 
 science of the contributor to them." The two principles 
 must stand and fall together. 
 
 Now, what shall be said of the principle in political eco- 
 nomy, that a nation's funds are to be appropriated in ac- 
 cordance with the conscience of those contributing them, 
 and not according to the will of the legislator who exacts 
 them. Such a principle would reduce all legislation and 
 
110 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 the functions of government to a nullity. For before a 
 single grant of public money is made, the previous question 
 would in all instances require to be solved, Will the ob- 
 ject of the grant violate the conscience of contributors to 
 the national funds or not ?" And the difficulty here would 
 be all the more unmanageable, because this claim about 
 the non-violation of conscience, is made, not on behalf of 
 the majority of the nation contributing to the public 
 funds, for Voluntaries do not pretend to be the majority, but 
 on behalf of the minority of the nation — a minority which 
 may be diminished down to a single unit or individual in 
 the community, who, by pleading conscientious scruples to 
 the object of any legislative grant of the public money, 
 would have it in his power effectually to prevent it. 
 
 Nor will it in any measure obviate the absurdity in legis- 
 lation to which the adoption of the principle referred to 
 about conscience inevitably leads, were it affii'med that it 
 is only in grants of the public money for religious objects, 
 in which a regard to the conscientious scruples of dissent- 
 ing minorities of the subjects ought to be consulted, A 
 Voluntary will say, " In all Civil matters the will of the 
 legislator is absolute as to the disposal of the national 
 funds, and against the purposes to which they are applied, 
 no man has a right to reclaim as inferring a violation of 
 conscience. But it is different in regard to endowments 
 given for the support of religion — for the encouragement 
 of religious systems from which others dissent. In these 
 the conscience of those who dissent ought not to be vio- 
 lated The religious scruples of subjects ought to be re- 
 spected, and when such are not respected, they have a 
 right to complain of injustice done them.'' But in carry- 
 ing out this principle about conscience, an insuperable 
 difficulty immediately arises, rendering it altogether im- 
 practicable. Who is to judge when the object of the 
 grant referred to is for a civil or for a religious pur- 
 pose ? If the grant be for tlie ibrmer, the Avill of the le- 
 gislator is the absolute rule disposing of it. But if the 
 grant be for the latter, his will is not the rule determining 
 it ; it is the conscience of the contributor — of the mino- 
 rity — of the single unit, it may be, of the community. In 
 what way then do we arrive at the solution of the ques- 
 tion — when is the object of the gi-ant a mere Civil one, or 
 when is it a grant for the endowment of religion ; in order 
 that it may be known which of the two rules above refer- 
 red to, is the one by which it must be determined. It is 
 obvious there arc but two parties who can solve this (question 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. Ill 
 
 — who can define when religion is affected by the grant, and 
 consequently when the principle about the non -violation 
 of conscience comes into operation. These parties are, 
 either the legislator or the contributor — the State or the 
 subject. Now it may be, the right of the legislator to de- 
 termine the question before us will be denied by om* op- 
 ponents. The Voluntary perhaps will say, the legisla- 
 tor may know what is Civil, but he is incapable of know- 
 ing what is religion. He can have no right to intei'pret 
 the Word of God to the effect of ascertaining anything 
 connected with religion. Such seems to be the view of 
 Dr. Wardlaw, who, in answer to the question what is the 
 magistrate's province in regard to religion ? gives this dis- 
 tinct answer : " His true and legitimate province is — to 
 have no province at all — and religion has authority over 
 him, the same as it has over all ; but in it, or over it, or 
 over his subjects in anything that pertains to it, his autho- 
 rity is null. If he exercises it, it is the exercise of power 
 without right. ""^ If this be the Voluntary's assertion, that 
 the legislator has no province respecting religion, and is 
 incapable of knowing what it is, we must then seek the 
 answer to our question, not from him, but from the con- 
 tributor — the minority, to wit, complaining of the violation 
 of conscience in the pui-pose for which the public funds are 
 applied. Let us then suppose that such is the case, and 
 that the principle is recognized as to the party having right 
 to judge when a grant of the public money is for a purpose 
 strictly religious — namely, the contributor. "What end- 
 less latitudinarianism on the subject of religion must now 
 be the result. The legislator does not know Mhat is re- 
 ligion. In his public character he is declared to be incap- 
 able of knowing it, or of interpreting the Word of God for 
 the purpose of discovering it. But while thus incapable 
 in his own person of discovering what is religion, he is 
 bound not to violate the conscience of any dissenting min- 
 ority by a grant of the public money. To prevent him 
 from doing so, an answer to the question, what is religion ? 
 must be found, and can be found in no other way but by 
 every dissenting minority answering the question for it- 
 self, yea, by every single unit of the community answer- 
 ing the question for himself. Let this principle about the 
 non-violation of conscience in religious grants be once ad- 
 mitted, and before a single grant of the public money be 
 ever made, the legislator must be necessitated to put the 
 question to each of the subjects, " Do you hold this pro- 
 
 ♦ Page 46. 
 
112 THE SECOXD OBJECTION 
 
 posed grant to affect religion, or not ? for if you do, I 
 must respect your religious scruples of conscience." 
 
 It will be of no use to say, the Bible is a standard to 
 which reference may be made for the purpose of deter- 
 mining whether the thousand assertions ccming from sub- 
 jects on the point of what they hold to be religion, be 
 strictly so or not. The legislator has no nght to inter- 
 pret the Bible for this purpose, and no man has a right to 
 interpret it for his neighbour, nor has any class of the 
 community any right to interpret it in regard to any other 
 class. Every man has a right to interpret it for himself, 
 and this interpretation the legislator is bound to take 
 from every man, as for himself. Thus the principle about 
 the non-violation of conscience must be applied in the 
 case of every class who chose to assert that they took their 
 notions and belief from the Bible ; yea, to every wild vi- 
 sionary who was pleased to conceive that his lawless, 
 unreasonable, anti-social hallucinations of mind, w'ere to 
 be found in the Word of God. To these and to every other 
 fanatical class existing, or that might hereafter exist, the 
 legislator would be obliged to listen, when they declared 
 their notions to be religion, as educed by them from the 
 Word of God. To these he would be obliged to give the 
 benefit of the principle that their conscience in religion 
 was not to be violated. To these he must subject every 
 proposed gi'ant of the public money, and when to such 
 party the object seemed to be religious, the grant must be 
 repudiated. In this way the Quaker, on the one hand, 
 wdth his religious scruples about the unlawfulness of war, 
 the Socialist, with his principles subversive of the well- 
 being and existence of society, and a thousand others 
 whom the recognition of the principle referred to would 
 call into existence, as w^ell as the more sober-minded Inde- 
 pendent or Baptist, would all be coming in collision with 
 the ordinary functions of Government, in pleading that the 
 various grants of the public money were a violation of their 
 conscience, and in this way they w^ould so clog its wheels, 
 as to bring the machinery of Government to a stand. Nor 
 could the obligation of the State to rcs])cct the conscience 
 of parties objecting to grants of the public money, be at all 
 aflccted by the circumstance of the numbers bringing for- 
 ward their objection. It may be that in one instance the ob- 
 jection might be brought forward by some wild visionary 
 who was a single unit in the community ; in another, 
 by a class of dissenters who possibly might number mil- 
 lions. Still the rule of procedure being, on the ono 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 113 
 
 hand, the non-violation of conscience in all matters where 
 the national funds are to be granted for the support 
 of religion, and on the other, the right of a minority 
 not to be dictated to respecting their religion, but to be 
 left at liberty to educe it from the AVord of God for them- 
 selves, the single unit is entitled to demand the application 
 of the rule as well as the many, nor can his conscience be 
 violated without a renunciation of the entne principle, 
 for which Voluntaries contend. The truth is, that so long 
 as it shall be maintained that the contributor to the na- 
 tional funds is the proper party to detennine the question, 
 whether the purpose for which they were applisd be 
 strictly a religious one ? the most satisfactory answer to the 
 principle of Voluntaryism, " that the State has nothing to 
 do with religion," or in other words, " is not entitled to "vio- 
 late the conscience of a minority of the subjects, by mak- 
 ing them pay from the national funds for the support of a 
 religion whose forms they disapprove," is to be found in 
 its own absurdity and impracticability. In consistency 
 with this principle, no act of government in disposal of the 
 national funds can be performed which the subject chooses 
 to say infers the violation of his conscience, and if every 
 act of Government is to be hindered, or characterized as 
 persecution, whereof some one is found to complain that 
 thereby his conscience is wounded, then reason must thus 
 be outraged, one of the plainest ordinances of God, 
 namely, the office of Civil government, must be extin- 
 guished, society subverted, and the world brought into 
 irremediable confusion. 
 
 It thus appears that the party having right to solve the 
 inquiry when the object of any proposed grant from the 
 national funds is to be considered as affecting religion, can- 
 not be the contributor to these funds, or the minoiity dis- 
 senting from the establishment, and raising the outcry, that 
 in contributing to its support their consciences are violated. 
 The very existence of government requires that no such 
 power should be recognized as belonging to them, and re- 
 quires moreover that the chief ruler should have a title to 
 judge of every appropriation of the national funds, 
 whether that appropriation be for civil or religious purposes. 
 Parties disapproving of the appropriation made of these 
 funds, may employ all legitimate means to alter it, by 
 various modes of application to the ruling powers them- 
 selves, but to these powers it must belong to determine 
 authoritatively when to give and when to withhold the 
 national funds, and to set aside, if they so please, the out- 
 
114 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 cry of the minority or the dissenting body about the vio- 
 lation of conscience when these funds are appropriated for 
 the support of religion. 
 
 Having now looked at one side of the argument, viz, that 
 wherein the Voluntary claims for the contributor to the 
 national funds the title of determining when the appro- 
 priation of them is for a religious and not for civil purpose, 
 and consequently when his own principle about the non-. 
 violation of conscience ought to be applied, we must next 
 look at the other side, viz., where it is conceded that the 
 legislator himself must judge of this question. 
 
 The point for present consideration is reduced to narrow 
 limits. It is simply this. The legislator having the title 
 authoritatively to determine when the purpose for which 
 he gi-ants the national funds is a religious one, and having 
 determined that in a particular instance the grant contem- 
 plated, is for the endowment of religion, ought he or ought 
 he not to violate the conscience of those who dissent from 
 the foi-m of religion adopted by him in making them pay 
 for its support from the national funds. 
 
 Before answering this question, let us first examine the 
 concession made in the acknowledgment, that the legis- 
 lator himself is entitled to judge when the object of a na- 
 tional grant is strictly a religious one. In this acknow- 
 ledgment there is implied the principle at which we former- 
 ly arrived, viz., that the civil magistrate is capable of disco- 
 vering from the Word of God, what is religion, for it would be 
 absurdity to suppose that he could determine or define any 
 object for which the public money was claimed to be a re- 
 ligious one, if he had not a previous knowledge of what 
 religion is, as distinguished from what is civil. If two 
 objects were presented to the eyes of an individual at 
 once, a ball and a staif for example, and he were called 
 on to determine which was the one, and which the other, 
 it is obvious he could not do so, unless he previously knew 
 what a ball was and what a staif was. The decision given 
 in the case supposed must either be the exercise of know- 
 ledge already existing in the mind, or that of mere blind 
 chance. Now, when the civil magistrate is called on to deter- 
 mine whether the purpose of a grant of the public money bo 
 a civil or religious object, there must be a pre-existing know- 
 ledge in his own mind as to the precise nature of these two 
 things before he can distinguish between them, and the 
 judgment pronounced must be the exercise of this pre-exist- 
 ing knowledge. It cannot be denied that the civil magistrate 
 knows what is civil, knows those civil expedients (the ne- 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 115 
 
 cessity of encouraging agriculture and commerce fjr exam- 
 ple) which are in his opinion adapted to promote the na- 
 tional benefit. It belongs to the magisterial office to know 
 what is civil, and if the chief magistrate does not know what 
 is civil, then his administration of government is mere blind 
 chance, and not the result of reason or intelligence. In this 
 light he cannot be responsible for either success or failure, 
 national prosperity or national calamity, as connected with 
 the measures of government. But in what way does the ma- 
 gistrate know what is Civil? His knowledge of Civil objects, 
 essential as it obviously is to responsible and intelligent 
 government, must be the result of intelligence or reason. 
 Now, if the exercise of intelligence, possessed by the mind 
 itself, enables the magistrate to know what is Civil, must 
 not the same intelligence enable him to know what is re- 
 ligion as stated in the Word of God ? "When he knows the 
 one by an exercise of intelligence, surely he must also 
 know the other, if the same causes are to be followed by 
 the same or similar effects. It cannot be here said, that 
 his office, as ruling over the temporal affairs of the nation, 
 bnngs him in contact with the one, and not with the other. 
 We have shewn that the magistrate's office brings him di- 
 rectly in contact with religion; 1st, Through the alleged prin- 
 ciple that he ought not to recognise it ; and, 2dly, Through 
 the question, " When is the object of a national grant of 
 the public money properly speaking a religious one." To 
 him, and to him alone, it must belong to answer this ques- 
 tion, and he cannot answer it, unless he intelligently knows 
 what is religion, any more than he can answer a question 
 about Civil things, unless he intelligently knows what is 
 Civil. The Yoluntury requires that, in cases where reli- 
 gion is the object of a proposed grant from the national 
 treasury, his principle about the non-riolation of conscience 
 should be applied. To enable him to do so, the magistrate 
 must be intelligently acquainted with religion, unless he is 
 to determine by blind chance. One of these things must 
 therefore undeniably be true. Either that the principle 
 about the non-violation of conscience does not apply in 
 disposing of the national funds, or else that the Civil ma- 
 gistrate possesses that intelligent knowledge about reli- 
 gion Avhich enables him to apprehend it just as clearly as 
 he apprehends what is Civil. If the former alternative be 
 adopted, then the whole argument of Voluntaryism, about 
 the State having nothing to do with religion, or in other 
 words, about its obligation not to violate conscience in re- 
 ligious endowments, falls to the ground. But if the latter 
 
116 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 alternative be adopted, and it be allowed that the magis- 
 trate is intelligently acquainted with religion ; the discus- 
 sion admits of still farther extension, and a new question 
 now opens up for consideration, viz. what are the results 
 arising from the fact, that the magistrate possesses an in- 
 telligent knowledge of religion ? 
 
 It might, perhaps, be a somewhat difficult inquiry to 
 solve, How far into the minutipe of religion such an intel- 
 ligent knowledge of it as the Civil magistrate must possess, 
 even on the principles of Voluntaryism, may be said pro- 
 perly speaking to extend ? But without attempting to 
 solve this inquiry, it may be safely asserted that the know- 
 ledge referred to must extend thus far. He must know 
 that religion is a system of divine truth intended to regulate 
 man's daily conduct, and in so doing to exei'cise an influence 
 for good on his present and his future well-being, and that 
 the influence of this truth on human conduct is through the 
 medium of moral suasion, and not through that external 
 force which exacts obedience to Civil laws. The supreme 
 magistrate must know this of religion, because in this con- 
 sists its great distinction from what is Civil. What is 
 Civil has to do with human conduct, through the medium 
 of the compulsitors of law. What is religion has to do 
 with it through the medium of divine truth operating on 
 the mind, and thus eftecting the regulation of the conduct. 
 Religion being, moreover, presented before him under va- 
 rious and different forms, the magistrate must know with 
 reference to these forms what is truth. Not what is 
 truth absolutely in contradistinction to what is Scripturally 
 false ; but what is truth in the judgment and estimation 
 of his own mind. Such knowledge is inseparable from an 
 intelligent being, for every such being must know what he 
 himself believes to be true or false. 
 
 -The knowledge which the Civil magistrate must have of 
 religion might perhaps be stated more simply thus : In his 
 possession he has the Word of God, which declares what 
 religion is, and just as by his own intelligence he discovers 
 from many sources what is Civil, and what are the most pro- 
 per expedients for the nation's temporal prosperity, so by the 
 same intelligence he discovei's from God's W ord alone what 
 religion is. He ascertains what are its duties, its sanctions, 
 its rewards, its promises, and what are the chief truths by 
 which it seeks to regulate human conduct. He ascertains 
 that the promises and threatenings held forth by it are in- 
 tended to teach men to live righteously and godly in the 
 present world ; and moreover, that these promises and 
 
OF VOLUNTAr.YlSM EXAMINED. Il7 
 
 threatenings are not confined to the influence they may 
 have on men here ; but that they extend to a never-end- 
 ing world hereafter, where the good shall be happy for 
 ever, and the wicked eternally miserable. These and such 
 like truths of religion, the knowledge of which is plainly a 
 mere effort of intelligence, the Civil magistrate as possessed 
 of it is capable of ascertaining, and must necessarily 
 ascertain. 
 
 And now having shevrn that the Civil magistrate knows 
 what relii^ion is, the remainder of the argument in favour 
 of the Establishment principle is very easy. If he possesses 
 the knowledge referred to, and knows moreover what fonn 
 of religion he himself believes to be true, then upon the 
 twofold ground ; 1st. Of Civil expediency; and 2dly, Out 
 of regard to the eternal good of his subjects, he may offer 
 this fonn of religion to them, provided there he nothing in 
 the Word of God inconsistent with his doing so. 
 
 If religious instruction were regarded only in the light of 
 Civil expediency, and like the education of youth as a mean 
 for training the subjects to habits of peace, industry, and 
 obedience to government, it seems very doubtful whether 
 any hindrance could in principle be thrown in the way of 
 its being employed as such to the community. In regard 
 to what may be civilly expedient for the nation, or most 
 fitted in the estimation of the ruling powers for advancing 
 its temporal interests, and for securing the stability of the 
 realm itself, the Word of God cannot be regarded as the 
 proper source of knowledge, or at least it is indirectly so. 
 In devising Civil expedients for advancing the interests of 
 society, the rulers of the State are not required to look for 
 them in the Word of God ; but are to be guided by what 
 seems to their own enlightened judgment most fitted for 
 this purpose, merely taking care that they do nothing 
 which is at variance with the Word of God. Now, should 
 religious instruction to the community appear the most 
 suitable expedient for effecting the outward prosperity of 
 the kingdom, and for diffusing the largest share of tem- 
 poral happiness, peace, and security to the nation, in which 
 light it must appear to every enlightened Christian govern- 
 ment, then it is hard to see in what possible way, even upon 
 this low ground of Civil policy, the State could be condemn- 
 ed for employing it, or rather should not be held under an 
 obligation to employ it ; and it is far more difficult to con- 
 ceive how any argument could be brought from the Word 
 of God condemning such act as sinful. 
 
 But to view instruction in religion, when bestowed upon the 
 
118 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 community in the light of a mere Civil expedient of govern- 
 ment, seeking to advance by the most simple means its own 
 ends, though it may afford a clear and undeniable ground for 
 vindicating a National Establishment, and in this respect 
 of doing away with the objection of Voluntaryism to its 
 existence, yet it is not a very satisfactory foundation on 
 which to rest the claims of this great institution. On this 
 basis, there is no secunty given whether the religion offer- 
 ed by the State for the national instruction shall or shall 
 not be what itself believes to be truth. It may as an ex- 
 pedient endow for the instruction of its subjects what as a 
 system of religion it yet believes to be false. An attempt 
 to vindicate such an act, on the part of the State, might 
 possibly be made. It might be said, the State believes 
 one system and form of religion to be more in accordance 
 with the Word of God than another fonn. It believes that 
 the foundation of the former is laid upon a greater num- 
 ber of divine truths than that of the latter ; and, that the 
 latter as a system is mixed up with gross error. But against 
 this better, and in favour of the worse system, there prevails, 
 among a portion of its subjects, prejudice so strong, that 
 they refuse to receive any but their own more erroneous 
 system. Now, in such a case, the State being shut up to 
 a solitary course, may it not offer some measure of sup- 
 port to what is believed the more erroneous system, on the 
 ground that it is better the subjects referred to should have 
 this than no religion at all ? 
 
 Thus stated, the act may seem plausible, yet it is more 
 than questionable, whether when tried by principle it can be 
 justified, as will appear from the following considerations: — 
 The end of all Civil government is the good of the com- 
 munity, and in seeking this good, the State must be bound 
 to employ the best expedients in its power. Now, regarded 
 as a mei'e expedient for the advancement of temporal 
 good, that form of religion which is most accordant with 
 truth, that is to say, which will be least fitted to lead astray 
 from, and be most adapted to guide men toward that out- 
 ward peace and morality of conduct, which constitutes the 
 good of the community, and is moreover essential to the 
 security of the State, must be in its own view the better 
 expedient, for otherwise there can be no difference be- 
 tween truth and error, as means productive of the ends 
 proposed by religion. A State, therefore, violates this 
 plain principle of government, when it offers to any por- 
 tion of its subjects the more erroneous, in place of the 
 sounder form of religion. In so doing, it maintains that 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 119 
 
 it is not bound to adopt the best expedients known, which, 
 in other words, means that government may be conducted 
 on principles of caprice. 
 
 Cases however may occur, wherein the State is unable, 
 from external causes, to apply the best expedients known, 
 and such being the circumstances of the case supposed, the 
 question still remains to be solved, might not the State be 
 justified in acting upon this principle, when a portion of 
 its subjects will only receive from its hand the more erro- 
 neous fonn of religion ? To this question the following 
 seems the only answer that can be given : — 
 
 Should it be held that the State is bound to regard reli- 
 gion only in the light of a Civil expedient, then it may be 
 justified in the act supposed, if the religion mingled up 
 with error or human invention be believed to be a better 
 expedient for the good of its subjects than no religion at 
 all. In thus granting support to an en'oneous fonii of re- 
 ligion, the State cannot however be entitled to bestow a 
 permanent endowment, for such permanency given to 
 eiTor would be the exclusion of itself from the means of 
 adopting a better expedient in the form of the purer sys- 
 tem, and of judging whether an opportunity to do so had 
 at any future period arrived. On the other hanff, should 
 it be held that the State is bound to regard religion in the 
 more important aspect of a mean of spiritual and eternal 
 good to its subjects, then the question of its title to grant 
 support to a system of religion believed to be erroneous, 
 becomes one more difficult to be settled. 
 
 On this point we shall not venture more than to ad- 
 duce some remarks tending to clear the way a little 
 towards its solution. The error in that system of religion, 
 which the State alone has in its power to ofler, may be in 
 its view of vital moment in matters of salvation, or it may 
 only be an hindrance to the clear perception of divine 
 truth. If it be of the former character, the State cannot 
 be entitled to ofi^'er it to its subjects, or grant it any measure 
 of support at all. Such an act would be to seek the sal- 
 vation of its subjects, through vital error and departure 
 from the truth. If the error referred to be not regarded as 
 fundamental, but be looked at merely as an hindrance to 
 a clear apprehension of truth, the State cannot be entitled 
 to endow it permanently, for in so doing, it would be 
 attempting to fasten down this very hindrance upon the 
 minds of its subjects. Moreover it would be recognizing 
 the principle, that the clearest views of divine truth ought 
 
120 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 not to be sought by itself, or when known, ought not to be 
 placed within the reach of its subjects, and it would be 
 shutting out the means of doing the highest good which 
 was attainable to those over whom it presided. 
 
 But as the State's duty to regard religion as the means 
 of promoting the spiritual well-being of its subjects has 
 not been proved, let us proceed to inquire on what ground 
 this obligation rests. 
 
 It has been shewn in the previous part of this discussion 
 that the ruling powers of the State, in other words, the 
 Civil magistrate, is intelligibly acquainted Avith religion 
 fi-om the ^^^ord of God, and with that form of religion 
 which he himself believes to be truth. Now from this 
 intelligent acquaintance with religion Avhich he possesses, 
 there must result the moral obligation to act according to it 
 in the discharge of the office he holds, just as much as his ac- 
 quaintance with those Civil expedients which he believes 
 to be fitted for promoting the nation's temporal good, im- 
 plies a moral obligation to avail himself of, and to use 
 them. What is the very end and purpose of the otlice of the 
 Civil magistrate ? the design of the government which he 
 publicly exercises ? It is the promotion of the nation's 
 good and prosperity — by which we mean at present the 
 nation's temporal good. Now let us suppose that in a 
 period of public pecuniary difficulty, two civil expedients 
 are suggested to the mind" of the Civil Magistrate, (a pro- 
 perty tax on the inhabitants, and an impost on foreign 
 wood, for example ;) if in the exercise of his own intelli- 
 gence, he knows, or believes the former to be a better expe- 
 dient for the end in view, than the latter, then unques- 
 tionably he must be under a moral obligation to adopt it, 
 for otherwise he is defeating the very end of the otlice 
 which he holds, by counteracting in place of promoting the 
 nation's good. But from whence does this n^.oral obliga- 
 tion arise ? Is it not from the previous knowledge pos- 
 sessed, of the difference betwixt the two modes of replen- 
 ishing the treasury referred to ; in other words, from 
 the intelligent knowledge he had, which, in his own 
 judgment, was the better expedient ? If the Civil magi- 
 strate did not intelligently know the better of the two 
 expedients, there would be no moi-al obligation to pre- 
 fer the one to the other, or if all expedients were ex- 
 actly alike in his own judgment, then there uould be no 
 moral obligation to employ one rather than another. But 
 because the one expedient must, in the very nature of 
 
CF VOLUXTARYISM EXAMINED, 121 
 
 things be better adapted to promote the national good 
 than the other, and because the magistrate intellicre'ntlv 
 knows vrhich of the two he himself believes to be tlie bet- 
 ter expedient, therefore, he must be under a moral obli^ra- 
 tion to employ this better expedient, unless it shall ^be 
 maintained that he holds his oftice merely to gratify his 
 own caprice, and not for the national good. 
 
 The inference arising from this is perfectly obvious, viz., 
 that intelligent knowledge possessed by any responsible 
 being, infers the moral obligation to act according to that 
 knowledge and that this moml obligation must be co-inci- 
 dent with the extent of the knowledge possessed. Were 
 it supposed that moral obligation was not comm.en surate 
 with the knowledge possessed, or that a responsible be- 
 ing possessed a measure of knowledge which he was not 
 bound to make use of in the station he filled, then the 
 consequence must be, that to this extent, knowledge was 
 bestowed on him for no purpose at all, an idea which re- 
 flects on God. 
 
 Such m.oral obligation to act according to the measure of 
 the intelligent knowledge he possesses, must be incumbent 
 on the Civil ^Magistrate in the functions of his office just as 
 much as upon every indi^^dual who is responsible to God. 
 As far as he intelligently knows what measures are for the 
 good of the nation, that is its temporal good, just in so far 
 must he be under a moral obligation to adopt these mea- 
 sures, and the opposite view would be to maintain that the 
 Civil Magistrate was entitled to hold his othce for some 
 other purpose than for the good of the nation , which is 
 contrary to express scriptural declaration, " that he is the 
 minister of God to thee for good." 
 
 Now, to shew the bearing of this upon the point 
 which we are seeking to establish, viz., the Civil Ma- 
 gistrate's duty to seek the eternal good of his subjects 
 by providing for them the means of religious instruction. 
 He possesses an intelligent knowledge of what is civilly 
 expedient for the nation's good, and because he has this 
 intelligent knowledge, is morally bound to act up to the 
 measure of it, in his office. He also possesses, as we have 
 formerly shewn, an intelligent knoM-ledge of what is reli- 
 gion and religious truth, in his own estimation ; must not, 
 therefore, the same rule of moral obligation apply in the 
 one case as in the other ? It cannot be true, that intelli- 
 gent knoAvledge infers moral obligation in the one in- 
 stance, and does not also infer moral obligation in the other. 
 If intelligent knowledge be the foundation and origin of 
 
] 22 THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
 nior.-a obliofation, qnoad one class of objects, viz. all things 
 civillv expedient for the good of the nation, the same in- 
 telligent knowledge must also be the fomidation of moral 
 obligation qvoad cinothcr class of objects, viz., those of re- 
 ligion. And it must either be true, that the Civil Magis- 
 tnite ought to bring the knowledge which he has of religion 
 to bear upon his acts in the government of the nation, just 
 as he brings the knowledge he has of Civil expedients to 
 bear upon that government, or else it must be true in 
 reference to the latter, that he may have a knowledge of 
 what is civilly expedient, without being under any obliga- 
 tion to use it. 
 
 This argument very clearly settles the question of the 
 Civil Magistrate's duty to provide religious instruction for his 
 subjects from a regard to their future well-being. He has 
 an intelligent knowledge of religion, knows that a regard to 
 the duties presented by it is the best means for promoting 
 man's temporal well-being, knows that it is a system of 
 divine truth for securing the salvation of the souls of men ; 
 and as there is a moral obligation lying upon him to recog- 
 nize officially, the full measure of intelligent knowledge 
 possessed by him, so he is bound to execute his office accord- 
 ing to the measure of his knowledge of religion, that is, to 
 regard it as the means of everlasting good to the souls of his 
 subjects, and as such to offer it to them. If the Civil Ma- 
 gistrate is not bound to do this, then he is not bound to 
 use the knowledge he possesses, in administering the affairs 
 of his government, he is not bound to conduct that govern- 
 ment according to the extent of his knowledge, he is not 
 bound to adopt the best civil expedients which he knows, 
 and not bound to make the national good the sole end 
 and object of the measures pursued. 
 
 In arguing that the intelligent knowledge which the 
 Civil Magistrate possesses of religion infers a moral obliga- 
 tion to acknowledge religion in his government, we, of 
 course, mean that he is bound to do so, m the only way 
 tliat he is capable of acknowledging it, viz. by a national 
 establishment of religion. When the ruler of the nation 
 knows what is a good Civil expedient, the encouragement 
 for example of some particular manufacture, he immedi- 
 ately seeks to procure for his subjects the benefit of it. 
 But he cannot do this with reference to religion. The Word 
 of God has committed the active agency of spreading reli- 
 gion to the Church, therefore the chief magistrate of a 
 nation can acknowledge religion in his government in no 
 other way but by a national employment of the Church her- 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 123 
 
 self, and through the instrumentality of the Church's mini- 
 sters, bringing it within the reach of his subjects, and caus- 
 ing its provisions and truths to be offered to them. It is in 
 this way only that he can provide for the eternal good of 
 those over whom he rules, and fulfil that moral obligation 
 which his knowledge of what religion is, makes incumbent 
 on him. 
 
 The only thing which can qualify this moral obli- 
 gation is the direct command of God. Irrespectively of 
 any such command or prohibition, the moral obligation is 
 clear. It is perfectly possible, however, that though there 
 may be a moral obligation incumbent on the chief magis- 
 trate of the State, arising from the considerations above 
 adduced, to provide for the salvation of his subjects by 
 means of a national Establishment of religion, yet, for some 
 special purpose, God in his Word has suspended this obli- 
 gation, and has been pleased to give such injunctions re- 
 garding the Church as to render it null and void. 
 
 This brings us, therefore, to the third and last objection 
 which Voluntaries have adduced against the cause of Esta,- 
 blishments, namely, the assertion made by them, that the 
 Word of God lays down such rules and regulations in re- 
 ference to the Church, as plainly imply the unlawfulness 
 of such inetitution. 
 
THE THIRD OBJECTION OF VOLUNTARYISM 
 EXAMINED. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THIED OBJECTION OF VOLtTNTARTISM-CORRECT VIEW OF THE ARGUMEST 
 FROM SCRIPTURE-WHAT IS AN ESTABLISHMENT-INJUNCTIONS OF 
 SCRIPTURE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH IT— ASSUMED PROHIBITION, JOHN 
 XVIII. 36.— NO PROHIBITION IN SCRIPTURE— RESULT OF THIS— VOLUN- 
 TARY'S OBJECTIONS REDUCED TO EXPEDIENCY— CONCLUSION. 
 
 Before enteritis on the discussion of those considera- 
 tions from the Word of God, by which our opponents are 
 persuaded, that they so easily dispose of the cause of a na- 
 tional Estahlishment, it may be proper to notice the ex- 
 act position of our argument against them at present. 
 
 In discussing the last objection, we have shewn that 
 there is a moral obligation and responsibility mcumbent on 
 the Civil magistrate, arising out of his intelligent know- 
 ledge of religion, to execute his office in accordance with 
 this knowledge. Now the only way in which this moral 
 oblicration can be got rid of, must be by a direct comniand 
 of God, suspending that obligation, or laymg down certain 
 injunctions cither to the magistrate or to the Church, incon- 
 sistent with its being acted upon. Such must therefore be 
 the nature of the Scripture argument adduced for the purpose 
 of subverting the cause of Establishments, or else it cannot 
 bo regarded as conclusive. The question about the magis- 
 trate's ricrht of interference with religion was reduced to this 
 -Ou-ht he to make a grant of the public money for the 
 purpo'se of endowing religion, when his doing so ^villbem 
 violation of the conscience of those dissenting from the 
 Establishment ? The only Scriptural argument which can 
 bear on this question, or in other words, which can amount 
 to a suspension of the moral obligation which lies on the 
 
THE THIRD OBJECTION, ETC. 125 
 
 chief magistrate, respectino^ religion, must therefore be 
 some express declaration of God's Word, which enjoins this 
 non- violation of the conscience of subjects, or the statement 
 of some principle clearly implying it. Moreover, since pay- 
 ment for national religion through their contributions to 
 the public funds, is the only wrong suffered by Dissenters 
 in the matter of an Establishment, and thus is the_ only 
 way by which the magistrate can violate their conscience, 
 so the Scripture argument, if it be viewed as destructive 
 of our cause, must be either some command given to the 
 Church, which hinders her from receiving temporal sup- 
 port from the State, or some distinct prohibition to the 
 State from imparting such support. 
 
 Much needless discussion has been entered into, in re- 
 ference to the Scripture argument against Establishments, 
 but these are the exact points which it must embrace, in 
 order to be satisfactory to the mind. 
 
 The entire Scripture argument may be summed up in 
 these two questions. What has God's Word commanded ? 
 What has it forbidden ? 
 
 Our opponents speak, in general, with much complacency 
 of the strength of their cause, as deduced from the autho- 
 rity of Scripture. They feel so confident that this autho- 
 rity is entu-ely on their side, and opposed to Establish- 
 ments, that they almost refuse to argue on the subject. 
 They seem to say to us, " Scripture is against you, there- 
 fore, argument is vain." Now, we do not dispute the as- 
 sertion here made. As Dr. Wardlaw says, " With the dis- 
 covery of the mind of God, inquiry ends, and obedience com- 
 mences." If Scripture be against the advocates of an Esta- 
 blishment, then argument is closed. But smely we are en- 
 titled to see clearly, that Scripture is against us, and to as- 
 certain the exact points on which, if Scripture condemn us 
 at all, it must record that sentence of condemnation : and 
 we are not to hold our cause as defenceless, because argu- 
 ments are brought from Scripture in refutation of principles 
 ascribed to us, but which vre do not maintain. Of this 
 nature has no small portion of the Scripture argument 
 consisted, which has been brought against the principle of 
 an Establishment- Conceiving that the advocates of this 
 cause ascribed to the power of the State such a direct 
 right of interference Avith, and direction of the affairs of 
 religion, as seems for wise and important purposes, to have 
 been committed to the secular magistrate, under the Old 
 Testament, lengthened and learned arguments have 
 been adduced from Scripture to shew, that this state 
 
126 THE THIRD OBJECTION 
 
 of things was only adapted to a theocracy, that intima- 
 tions of a change in the first constitution of the Church 
 are held out in the Prophets, and that under the New 
 Testament not a single hint is given of the recognition of 
 the secular power, in administering the affairs of the Church. 
 And because these and such like points are supposed to be 
 confirmed by Scripture authority, it is maintained that the 
 cause of Establishments is subverted. But the Scripture 
 argument for these points has nothing to do with this 
 cause, unless it were previously shewn, that the points re- 
 futed are essential to it, which is not the truth. The only 
 idea of a national Establishment for which we contend, is 
 this : — " The Church, in the exercise of her own independ- 
 ence draws up her own convictions of the will of Christ 
 educed by her from his word, in a written rule of doctrine, 
 discipline, and government. This rule the Civil magis- 
 trate adopts, and receives from the Church an obligation 
 to adhere to it, as long as the union between the par- 
 ties subsists. Through the medium of the Church herself, 
 by simply paying her ministers from the national funds, he 
 offers the form of religion expressed in the rule which he 
 has adopted and sanctioned to the nation at large, as a 
 great educational school for teaching those truths which 
 shall be useful to men here, and be means " of salvation to 
 their souls." 
 
 Let us now inquire what argument from Scripture can 
 be brought against such an Establishment. 1st, What has 
 God's Word commanded which shews it to be unlawful ? 
 
 The wrong done by the existence of this national Institu- 
 tion, is that of violating the conscience of Dissenters in the 
 payments they are obliged to make to the national funds. 
 Has Scripture then said any thing by express command 
 or by principle condemnatory of this wrong ? The entire 
 anthority of Scripture is in the very opposite direction. 
 The civil magistrate, as we have formerly shewn, is an 
 intelligent being, acquainted with religion, and as such 
 under moral obligation to act according to his knowledge 
 in the office he holds. Moral obligation implies conscience. 
 The civil magistrate being under moral obligation must 
 be regarded as acting under conscience ; now the en- 
 tire authority of Scripture in regard to conscience is to 
 this effect, that an intelligent being ought to follow in 
 duty not the rule of another's conscience but that of 
 his own. In bestowing a grant of money to endow reli- 
 gion, tho civil magistrate acts in accordance with the 
 moral obligation which lies upon him as intelligently ac- 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 127 
 
 quainted with it, that is to say, he acts in accordance with 
 his own obligations of conscience, and though his act in so 
 doing happens to be in violation of the conscience of others, 
 viz, those who dissent from the Establishment, yet it can- 
 not be charged as wrong, because it is in conformity with 
 Sciipture principles, not in contradiction to them. If A o- 
 luntaries are to get rid of this answer to their assumption 
 regarding the non- violation of conscience, they can only do 
 so by overturning the whole of our last argument under the 
 2d objection. They must shew that the civil magistrate 
 has no conscience, or responsibility, or moral obligation,^ 
 is not acquainted with religion as he is with civil things, is 
 devoid of intelligence, ought to conduct his government by 
 blind chance not by reason, and is at liberty to administer 
 his ofl&ce according to his own caprice and not for the na- 
 tional good. 
 
 Having thus seen what Scripture commands the civil 
 magistrate, let us now inquire what does it command 
 the'Church inconsistent with the Establishment principle, 
 or with the Church's receiving and accepting State pay and 
 provision for her ministers. On this point we are referred 
 to two thin.rs — 1st, to the New Testament example of the 
 Church in providing for the support of her ministers by the 
 free-will contributions of her own members ; and 2dly to 
 two passages of Scripture, 1 Cor. ix. li. " Even so hath the 
 Lord ordained, that they wdio preach the Gospel should live 
 of the Gospel." Gal. vi". 6. " Let him that is taught in the 
 Word couununicate unto him that teacheth in all good 
 things.'' 
 
 To both these considerations the same answer may be 
 given, viz. that neither are inconsistent with the Establish- 
 ment principle. Let us suppose for a moment that the 
 principle of Establishments is inculcated by God's Word ; 
 even in this case the example and injunctions referred to 
 must still have found the same place in Scripture which they 
 do at present. Both were matter of necessity for the state of 
 the Church then subsisting. The New Testament Church 
 had no possible means of providing for her ministers but by 
 the voluntary contribution of her own members ; conse- 
 quently the example exhibited by her was one in which she 
 had no choice. She was compelled to exhibit it from the force 
 
 * If the Ci^-il magistrate have no conscience, how can he be capable of 
 doing wrong ? — a charge brought against him by Voluntaries, when he 
 does not act in accordance with their own principles. The power of do- 
 ing wrong as well as doing right implies conscience. 
 
128 THE THIRD OBJECTION 
 
 of circumstances. Such may be also said of the injunctions 
 given in the passages that have heen cited. They must 
 have existed as they now do, although the Establishment 
 principle had been openly 'recognized. It was known to the 
 Spirit of God, under whose inspiration Paul wrote, that for 
 upwards of 300 years, this principle would not be recog- 
 nized by the heathen rulers of the Avorld, and moreover 
 that in all ages there would be places and circumstances in 
 which it would not be i-ecognized. Now what must have 
 become of the ministers of the Church, before this duty 
 (supposing it to be one) was recognized at all by Magis- 
 trates, or when afterwards it was repudiated by them, had 
 no such injunctions as those we find in the above passages 
 been given. Under the Jewish dispensation, let it be re- 
 collected, the support of religion had not come from the 
 free-will oflerings of worshippers, but from a permanent 
 provision altogether of another character appointed by God. 
 Such an example before worshippers under the New Tes- 
 tament dispensation, it cannot be supposed, would have 
 operated strongly to lead them to provide gratuitously for 
 the wants of ministers. Prejudice in favour of the ancient 
 practice, as well as the natural selfishness of the heart, 
 would have hindered them from doing so, had there been 
 no injunctions in the New Testament on this subject. 
 From the distinct recognition of the Establishment prin- 
 ciple in the Old Testament, and in the absence of any ex- 
 press command in regard to the support of ministers in the 
 New, it is easy to see, from the known principles of human 
 nature, that they would have been left in great measure 
 without adequate provision, or given over to their own pri- 
 vate resources to the detriment of their ofiice, in all cir- 
 cumstances where provision was withheld by the State. 
 To protect them against such contingency, the injunctions 
 of the xS'evv Testament, which form the ground workof the 
 Voluntary's objection to the principle of an Establishment, 
 must have formed part of the sacred record, although we 
 suppose that this principle is in accordance with it. 
 
 Now, how can it be said, that the existence of a certain 
 example and of certain injunctions in the New Testament 
 affords proof of the unlawfulness of Establishments, when 
 the same example and the same injunctions must have ex- 
 isted tlierc, although Establishments were lawful ? Such a 
 mode of aigument and inference is entirely inconclusive. 
 On a subject of such vital importance to religion and the 
 well-being of the human race through all ages, we are at 
 least entitled to have unquestionable evidence from Scrip- 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 129 
 
 ture — to have an array of argument -which does not admit 
 of adaptation to both sides of the point in dispute. 
 
 The direct command of God being thus inconclusive 
 against us, we must now turn to what it has forbidden. Has 
 it proiiibited the Civil magistrate, in the administration of 
 his office from giving support to religion or its ministers ? 
 
 Without such prohibition clearly and distinctly stated, 
 the Civil magistrate would have been apt to misapprehend 
 the proper way of discharging his duty towards the Church. 
 Looking to Scripture itself, he could only read commands 
 and principles, apparentlyof universal application, which en- 
 joined that " God should be glorified in every thing" — that 
 every creature was but the steward of God — that " kings 
 themselves were to be the nursing fathers" to the Church, 
 and that all power on earth subsisted for the advance- 
 ment of the kingdom of the Redeemer, and he could not 
 know that he himself, as intelligently acquainted with re- 
 ligion, and under moral obligation to act in his office, on the 
 knowledge which he possessed, was exempted from the appli- 
 cation of such principles, nor that he would be guilty of sin 
 and dishonour to Christ, in employing the public money 
 with which he was entrusted, for promoting the extension 
 of the Gospel, and through it the present and eternal well- 
 being of his subjects, unless he had been clearly and un- 
 questionably forbidden to do so by an authority he dared 
 not resist. A direct prohibition to the magistrate from 
 rendering any support to religion, through the aid that 
 might be given by him to the Church, was thus rendered 
 imperative, and on the existence of such prohibition in the 
 Word of God, it may be very safely averred that the truth 
 or falsehood of Voluntaryism depends. Now, this pro- 
 hibition is hinged by our opponents, on the meaning of a 
 single passage, viz., Christ's answer to Pilate, " My king- 
 dom is not of this world." 
 
 Here, say Voluntaries, is the prohibition clearly writ- 
 ten. Christ himself declares that his kingdom is not of 
 this world ; hence all unions with the State, be they more 
 or less destructive of the Church's liberty — be they more 
 or less for or against the Caurch's efficiency, are in oppo- 
 sition to Christ's own command. 
 
 If Voluntaries have given the correct meaning of this 
 passage, then their inference is undeniable ; but the 
 strength of their cause depends on the fact of their having 
 given the right meaning of it. 
 
 In meeting them in this part of the controversial field, 
 it has been usual to deny the Voluntary's interpretation 
 
 f2 
 
130 THE THIRD OBJECTION. 
 
 of the passage, and to shew, on the one hand, that the 
 expression " my kingdom," cannot properly be understood 
 of ministers only, but of believers generally, or to shew, 
 on the other hand, that in the assertion here made, Christ 
 was only disabusing the mind of Pilate from prejudice re- 
 specting the nature of the kingdom he was setting up, and 
 assuring him, that he himself was no object of jealousy to 
 temporal sovereignty, since he only exercised, through the 
 influence of truth, a spiritual dominion over men's hearts. 
 
 We say, it has been usual to meet Voluntaries in this 
 way, respecting the right sense of the passage in question, 
 but we prefer at present a different proceeding. Our ob- 
 ject shall be to inquire what is the meaning which 
 Voluntaries themselves must attach to it. The passage 
 is adduced by them as aftbrding a plain Scriptural re- 
 futation of the principle of national Establishments, as 
 utterly extirpating, by the authority of God himself, the 
 claim of this principle to be recognised and adopted. 
 Unless, therefore, the meaning of the passage, when as- 
 certained, be to this effect, it can have no bearing on the 
 controversy which it is intended to settle. 
 
 When Christ says, " My kingdom is not of this world," 
 according to the argument of Voluntaries he utterly 
 subverts the cause of Establishments. Now, in what way 
 is this done ? His words do not pronounce any direct con- 
 demnation of Establishments, in such way as the Sixth 
 Commandment, for example, condemns murder. If such 
 condemnation be contained in these words, it is at least 
 indirect — it must be in asserting something which is in- 
 consistent with their existence. But what is this some- 
 thing, this precept or principle, or whatever it may be ? 
 By the words, " My kingdom is not of this world," Christ 
 cannot mean, even according to our opponents, my king- 
 dom, that is, my ministers are to have nothing to do with 
 the money of this world. For Voluntary ministers, as well 
 as others, have to do with the money of this world, and, 
 consequently, were this the correct sense, the passage 
 would condemn them as well as those of the Establish- 
 ment. Again, when he says, " ]My kingdom is not of this 
 world," he cannot mean, my kingdom is not to be sub- 
 jected to the rulers of this world, that they may take the 
 ovoi'sight of its affair's, interpret for it the Word of God, 
 and, in short, prescribe for the Church her doctrine, disci- 
 pline, laws, and government. For in this sense, the pas- 
 sage is no refutation of the Establishment principle, inas- 
 much as those who maintain it ascribe no such power to the 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 131 
 
 rulers of this Avorld, nor does this principle imply a sur- 
 render to the State of a single iota of the present convic- 
 tion which the Church may have of her duty to Christ 
 when she consents to hecome an Establishment, The on- 
 ly moaning, therefore, which the Voluntaries can put on 
 this passage, in order to bring out of it a refutation of the 
 principle they oppose is this, " My kingdom is not of this 
 world, so as to derive the temporal provision of its mini- 
 sters from the rulers of the world." And such being the 
 meaning of the passage, in order that it may serve the 
 purpose for which it is made use of, we are again cai'ried 
 back to a question formerly put. If the ruling povvei's 
 of the world do impart a temporal provision to the mi- 
 nisters of Christ's Church, in an Establishment, wherein 
 lies the wrong before God whereof they are guilty in so 
 doing ? 
 
 The wrong done can be none other than that formerly 
 mentioned, viz., " That they violate the conscience of Dis- 
 senters from the National Establishment, in making them 
 pay through contributions to the public funds for the offer 
 to the subjects of a religion whose forms they disapprove." 
 
 The passage therefore, in the sense attached to it by Vo- 
 luntaries, is simply a positive precept to this effect, forbid- 
 ding those who rule over the kingdoms of the world to vio- 
 late the conscience of any portion of their subjects, in any 
 grant of the public money which they may give for the 
 support of religion. Now, such a precept, maintained as 
 such on the authority of God's Word, is, as already shewn, 
 a contradiction to the principles of eternal truth. 
 
 The foundation of such a precept, as brought out in the 
 discussion of the second objection of Voluntaryism, is one 
 of these two, either that Civil government, though an or- 
 dinance of God, cannot exist, all its proceedings being lia- 
 ble to obstruction by the pleadings of the subjects, that 
 their conscience is violated in grants of the public money, 
 or that the Civil ^Magistrate, though lying under moral ob- 
 ligation and responsibility to God, is yet bound to regulate 
 his acts, not by his own, but by the conscience of others. 
 
 Either of these principles is false. It is a principle in- 
 consistent with the conclusions of reason, and the clearest 
 declarations of God's Word. Such being the case, 
 the question arises, which it rests with Voluntaries 
 to answer ; How can a precept, whose fundamental 
 principle is false, exist in the Word of God i How 
 can it be supposed, that Scripture lays down an in- 
 junction or mandate to men, the foundation of which is 
 
132 THE THIRD OBJECTION 
 
 contrary to any of the principles of eternal truth ? Were a 
 man for example to contend for some positive precept as 
 existing in God's Word, which when examined was found 
 to rest on the assertion, that two and two made five, or 
 that God loved wickedness, every one would be persuaded 
 that he had interpretated Scripture wrong, and this just 
 from the consideration that Scripture is a transcript of 
 truth, a declai-ation of the mind of the God of truth, before 
 whom all its principles are continually present. Scripture 
 then cannot bo inconsistent with truth, or with itself. Be- 
 tween all its fundamental truths, and the precepts founded 
 on them, there must exist unbroken harmony. 
 
 On this ground, that the positive precept educed by Vo- 
 luntaries out of the passage referred to, rests on a princi- 
 ple contradicted by Scripture itself, the interpretation 
 given to it must be regarded as involving a moral impos- 
 sibility. Such an inteipretation of God's ^^'ord cannot 
 for a moment be sustained by any reasonable mind. 
 
 With the renunciation of the meaning which had 
 been attached to this passage of Scripture, the v.hole argu- 
 ment reared up about the prohibition against Establish- 
 ments is demolished. Nay, on the ground now asserted, 
 no such prohibition can exist in God's Word at all. In 
 vain for such a puqiose is the New Testament searched. 
 The silence of Scripture on this subject is a fact of grave 
 moment, for it constitutes the want of the chief link of the 
 chain in the Voluntary's argument, and without which it 
 entirely fails. Had it been the case that the argument 
 which has been brought forward under the question, what 
 has God's Word commanded ? — was entirely on the side of 
 Voluntaryism, then the want of the prohibition to the 
 rulers of this world from yielding a national support to the 
 ministers of the Church, would have been of less moment. 
 But when the considerations adduced on this head are just 
 as applicable to the existence, as the non-existence of 
 an establishment, as consistent with God's Woi'd, the 
 want of this additional link of a prohibition is the want of 
 all that can bring conviction to the mind, and in effect 
 only becomes a more clear exposure of the weakness of 
 Voluntai-yism. 
 
 Wo have now discussed the great objections adduced by 
 this system in opposition to the cause of National Esta- 
 blishments, and however formidable they may have seemed 
 at a distance, it has not been found that any of them will 
 bear close and strict investigation. These objections, be 
 it remembered, were made on the score of principle. The 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 133 
 
 argument of the Voluntary was, that Establishments 
 ought not to exist, because they were wrong or unscriptural 
 in principle. The value of his objection on the ground of 
 principle has now been put to the test, and what has been 
 the result ? We have found in regard to his first objec- 
 tion, in which he, as well as the Free Churchman main- 
 tains that the principle of an Establishment, as now 
 existing in the Church of Scotland, involves a sur- 
 render of spiritual independence, that it neither coincides 
 with reason nor Scripture. In regard to his second objec- 
 tion about the State having nothing to do with religion, 
 we have found that, traced to its origin, it is inconsis- 
 tent with the essential functions of government on the 
 one hand, or with the duty owing to conscience on the 
 other, and so also is contrary to reason and Scripture. 
 And in reference to his third objection deduced from Scrip- 
 ture itself, we have found it to be entirely unsatisfactory. 
 
 Thus weighed in the scales of principle the objections 
 to our cause are seen to be untenable. Other objections 
 to a National Establishment based on principle, objections 
 of such moment as to justify attempts to get our venerated 
 institutions uprooted from the land, may be in reserve. 
 With these, if such there be, we are not at present ac- 
 quainted, and thus cannot put them to the same test as we 
 have done the others. Still it is satisfactory to know, that 
 those hitherto brought foi*ward against this great cause 
 are false, and that inquiry into their nature can have no 
 other efiect but that of adding to its strength. 
 
 No doubt, it is true, that though the previous objections 
 of Voluntaryism to any connexion between the State and 
 religion be untenable in principle, they may all be brought 
 forward anew on the ground of expediency, and that, if it 
 cannot now be said a Church Establishment involves in its 
 existence any violation of Scripture, still it may be averred 
 that such an institution is very inexpedient. 
 
 Before proceeding to remark on the objection to our 
 cause in this entirely new aspect, it may be worth our 
 pains to ascertain the true value of an objection in expe- 
 diency when taken to a system. When a system is objected 
 to in principle, the meaning of such objection is, that it is 
 held to be contrary to, or not in accordance with, the 
 Word of God. Such is the nature of the objection in Pro- 
 testant minds to the system of Popery. We hold it to be 
 contrary to the Word of God. But very different would 
 be the meaning of the objection were it merely said, 
 we object to Popery on the ground of expediency. 
 
134 THE THIRD OBJECTION 
 
 The terms " expediency"' and " Christian expediency" are 
 like others, often made use of in argument without a de- 
 finite idea of their meaning. When correctly analysed, 
 " Christian expediency" is a term of much the same sig- 
 nificancy as " heathen expediency" would be, having no 
 reference ■whatever to Christian motive. It just means 
 that which appears right to the reasoning faculty of 
 man — a faculty which may reason as soundly in a hea- 
 then as in a Christian. 
 
 We shall best illustrate this, by referring back to a cita- 
 tion from 13r. Candlish's writings formerly made. He 
 says, " Holding the fundamental principle (^. e. Non-inti'u- 
 sion) on grounds of Christian expediency as well as Scrip- 
 tural duty." Now, how much of the specific view 
 of Non-intrusion held by the Rev. Doctor, is occupied 
 by the latter of the grounds here referred to ? Scrip- 
 tural duty plainly exhausts all that Scripture teaches 
 on the subject, that is, all that it directly commands, 
 or that can fairly be deduced from it ; consequently 
 it exhausts every thing bearing reference to man as a 
 Christian. All that I'emains therefore of the Rev. Doc- 
 tor's view of Non-intrusion to be influenced by expediency j 
 is just what happens to appear right to human reason. 
 The above assertion, then, when fairly analyzed, simply 
 means that Dr. C. holds Non-intrusion to be right, 1st, on 
 the ground of his sense of what God's Word teaches, and 
 2dly, on the gi-ound of what his own reason approves. In 
 regard to the conclusions at which human reason may 
 arrive, no infallible standard can however be found by 
 which they may be tried. For while Dr. Candlish's reason 
 leads him to think that Non-Intrusion is right, another 
 man's reason will lead him to think it wrong. The ar- 
 guments of reason, however clearly stated, ever have 
 afiected, and will affect minds differently, and although 
 one man may feel the utmost confidence in the soundness 
 of the conclusions of his own reason, he is not entitled to 
 impose these with authority upon the reason of another. 
 
 An objection founded on expediency, or Christian ex- 
 pediency, is thus the mere assertion or conclusion of a man's 
 reason, that a certain thing is wrong.* 
 
 * The above analysis will enable us to solve any question as to the 
 complexion of an order by the State to tlie Church having respect to a 
 matter not included in God's Word. Any act of Church government 
 wliich does not profess to be an embodiment of a scriptural truth, rests 
 not on divine, but on human authority ; consequently opposition to it by 
 the State is only opposition to au act of human reason, which is expe- 
 diency and not principle. 
 
or VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 135 
 
 Such then is the value of the objection to the cause of 
 Establishments we are now to consider. It simply asserts 
 that the reason of the Voluntary leads him to the conclu- 
 sion that they ought not to exist, just as the reason of 
 another man, possibly from the very same or similar con- 
 siderations, leads him to a conclusion exactly the reverse. 
 
 Adverting to this as the only remaining ground of hos- 
 tility to the principle of Establishments, which the Volun- 
 tary is left to occupy, he has now a very narrow base to 
 stand upon. He is here placed in a very diiferent position 
 from that which he recently held, when he denounced the 
 cause of Establishments as invohing in it a violation of 
 principle — a contradiction to the Word of God. 
 
 To meet his argument on the low ground from which he 
 thus attempts to assail us, cannot be difficult. 
 
 It may be then, we shall be told, that it would be more 
 expedient for the Church if she were left to follow her 
 future convictions of divine truth, should these be possible 
 or ever happen to come into existence — that it would be 
 more expedient for the Church if the Civil Rulers, did not 
 aid and support the cause of religion, however necessary 
 such may be for their office, and above all, that they gave no 
 part of the national funds, in order that, through an endowed 
 ministry, the temporal and spiritual blessings of religion 
 might be oiiered to all the subjects of the realm, — that it 
 would be more expedient for the Church, if the practice of 
 the primitive Christians, adopted from the necessity of 
 their circumstances, was resumed, and the sustentation of 
 miuisters was vvholly drawn from the private resources of 
 her members. It may be, we say, that all these things 
 would be more expedient than the system at present pre- 
 vailinof, and that the Church would be more efficient on the 
 Voluntary principle than she can ever be expected to prove 
 as an Establishment. Still, there is comfort in the thought, 
 that the position of the Church under its present form can 
 no longer be regarded as wrong, or as involving any viola- 
 tion of the Word of God. 
 
 The simple question now between Voluntaryism and 
 the Establishment principle is, that of mere efficiency, 
 which is the better system ? Which is more likely to be 
 successful in carrying out the great ends for which the 
 Church exists — the universal diffusion of the Gospel, and 
 the gathering of all nations, families, and individuals into 
 the kingdom of Christ ? 
 
 That Voluntaryism as a system, or rather that Churches 
 acting on the Voluntary principle have efficiently aided in 
 
136 THE THIRD OBJECTION 
 
 carrying on tliis mighty work both in our own and in other 
 lands is readily allowed. It has made many successful and 
 praiseworthy efforts in this noble cause. But that alone 
 and unaided, it wouhl be able to maintain the cause of 
 divine truth, and uphold the purity of faith against the 
 powers of darkness, or that it would be equally efficient as 
 a Church recognized by the State in the general diffusion 
 of the habits and blessings of religion through all the rami- 
 fications of a national community, nothing in the past his- 
 tory of Voluntaryism leads us to believe. It is entirely a 
 mistaken view of its powers and capabilities, to look to its 
 working in our own country, where it deiives strength and 
 stability from the two Establishments amid which it dwells 
 — an aid which it may be, is unseen, and remains un- 
 acknowleged. It must be to Voluntaryism as it stands by 
 itself, resting on its own powers, living on its own vigour, 
 that we are to look, in order rightly to appreciate its me- 
 i^ts — and can be in a position to compare its value with an 
 Establishment. 
 
 Voluntaryism thus exists in America, where every preju- 
 dice supports it, and every external circumstance has been 
 favourable to its development. But what have been its 
 effects and efficiency there ? We shall merely advert to 
 two, which may the rather be regarded as fair tests of the 
 system, because they are indicative of the degree in which 
 it has been capable of acting on the public mind in that 
 great country. Now, in judging of any general system, 
 the direct object of which is, to influence human conduct 
 in all its actings, we must direct our attention to great 
 and not to small effects. 
 
 1st, Then, Voluntaryism has failed to preserve the tone 
 of public morality in America, so high as it exists in 
 every other nation of Europe. This effect appears in 
 the repudiation principles regarding the public creditor 
 openly avowed and adopted by so many of the States of 
 the Union. 
 
 2dlrj, Voluntaryism has failed to impress, on a large 
 section of that country, the rights and privileges of huma- 
 nity. This appears from the barbarous system of sla- 
 very, still so widely prevailing in the Southern States, 
 and hitherto assailed in vain within the walls of its legis- 
 lature. 
 
 With such an example before our minds, of the ofiici- 
 ency, or rather the non-efficicncy of Voluntaryism, in pro- 
 ducing great results on the human race, and all this too, 
 in circumstances most favourable for the experiment — with 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 137 
 
 the instrucfcive fact before our eyes, that Yoluntaryism, as 
 a system by which religious truth is brought in contact 
 with the human mind, has not succeeded in preventing the 
 growth of enormous evils in the heart of the community, 
 men may be excused if they hesitate in pronouncing it to 
 be the best adapted form for the outward diffusion of that 
 truth — they may be excused if they still persist in main- 
 taining their old prejudices in favour of an Establishment, 
 and of the continuance of that union between Church and 
 State, to which they have long been accustomed. In the cool- 
 ness and calmness of reflection, men will judge of the value 
 of an institution by the effects it produces, and estimate 
 its future efficiency by what they discern of the past. 
 The benefits of an Establishment, with all the imperfec- 
 tions that may adhere to it, will be commended to their 
 minds by the happy expenence of ages, and these known 
 and approved benefits, they will be loth to pai-t with for 
 Voluntaryism, of which it may be said in truth, that 
 in so far, at least as its past history is concerned, it has 
 not been more successful in great effects on man, and 
 is less expansive in its powers to reach and ameliorate the 
 universality of human depravity, than that vilified system 
 which it desu'es to supersede. 
 
 In concluding this lengthened discussion, into which we 
 have been led respecting the objections prefen-ed against 
 Establishments generally, and that of our own Church in 
 particular, we cannot avoid noticing the obligation upon 
 all classes of professing Christians, to exercise mutual for- 
 bearance and candour. 
 
 It is melancholy to diink, that those who have one Lord, 
 one faith, one hope of their heavenly calling, should live 
 here below in bitterness of feeling and strife. And it is 
 still more sad, to reflect how often the causes of this bit- 
 terness and strife have been of a trivial character. If the 
 controversies which have so frequently disti-acted and dis- 
 united the Protestant Churches of our country, had in ge- 
 neral been matters of vital importance, affecting the salva- 
 tion of sinners, and the general interests of the Redeemer's 
 kingdom, some excuse might have been found for the keen 
 spirit of partizanship with which they have been carried 
 on. But when these controversies have less frequently 
 concerned matters of faith, than outward Church order, 
 and have more frequently respected things of expediency 
 than of principle, the spirit which they have called forth 
 and nourished within the Church, is the less to be sympa- 
 
133 THE THIRD OBJECTION 
 
 thizod -with, and the disunion and schism thence arising, are 
 the more to be deplored. All the causes which have led 
 to the evils referred to, it might be very difficult to state, 
 but there is one deserving of special regard, which it is pro- 
 per to notice, namely, the general tendency of men to 
 confound the will of God with human reasonings respecting 
 that will. YVhat else has produced the diversity of Chris- 
 tian sects, but the diversity of human reasonings respect- . 
 ing the will of God. God's will, expressed in his Word, 
 is infallible, and must be unchangeable, and the obedience 
 of every creature is due to it, but human reasonings in 
 explanation of it are not infallible, and are not entitled to 
 obedience, except when identical with what God has com- 
 manded. Were Christians habitually to keep this distinc- 
 tion in view, they would not speak so dogmatically of their 
 principles, which are merely the reasoning of their own 
 minds regarding the divine will, nor would they so harshly 
 brand as violators of the word and will of God, others, 
 Vvhose reasonings respecting it do not coincide with their 
 own. 
 
 Those who have paid much attention to the religious 
 controversies Avhich have agitated the world, can have had 
 little difficulty of coming to the conclusion, that on many 
 questions, human reasonings have taken the place of the 
 will of God, and that not unfrequently have these reason- 
 ings been dogmatically advanced on points for which there 
 was no authority of God's Word at all. Such, we venture 
 to affirm, has been the case in some of the controversies of 
 recent times, and the consequence has been the existence 
 of disunion and bitterness of feeling among Christians, 
 where forbearance and charity ought to have been exhi- 
 bited. 
 
 If there be points on which, in our reasonings respecting 
 the will of God, we must still ditler, let our differences be 
 distinguished not by dogmatic authority and unholy feeling 
 towards each other, but by a spirit of candour, as becomes 
 fallible men, and of love as becomes Christian brethren. 
 
 Too long have the dift'erences which divided Christians in 
 our land been magnified into subjects of mighty moment, 
 affording ground for useless and unprofitable controversy. 
 Would that these unhappy days were ended ! The world is 
 sufficiently wide to engage the attention of all who have de- 
 voted themselves to Christ, without expending their energies 
 in devouring one another, and in contesting jioints which 
 God has left without express intimation of his will. The 
 souls of those who arc jicrishing for lack of knowledge, are 
 
OF VOLUNTARYISM EXAMINED. 139 
 
 sufficiently valuable to occupy the undivided attention of 
 the labourers in the vineyard, without wasting precious time 
 in discussion of outward fonns which, even M'hen Scriptural, 
 are but steps on the way of salvation. Had much of the 
 energy which has been devoted to controversy on mat- 
 ters of inferior moment been employed on more important 
 objects, how many of the strongholds of Satan might 
 have been gained, which are still the dark places of the 
 earth, and the habitations of cruelty. If Christians un- 
 happily will not all agree to range themselves under one 
 Church form, let them range themselves under one di- 
 vine banner, and let the fire of their zeal be expended not 
 on each other, but in seeking to accomplish the more glo- 
 rious victory of " winning souls to Christ," and of hastening 
 forward the blessed day, when " Ephraim shall not envy 
 Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim, for the earth 
 shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters 
 cover the sea." 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 NOTE A.— Page 89. — Stewarton Case. 
 
 Allnsiou to the case of the Chapel of Ease ministers, whose exclusion 
 from the powers conveyed to them by the Act of the General Assembly 
 in 1834, was decided 'by the Court of Session in the Stewart on case, 
 has not been deemed necessary, because the vindication of this decision 
 rests on the same reasoning as that apphed to the second of the two 
 cases which were noticed. 
 
 The powers exercised by the General Assembly in the Act of 1834 
 were not consistent with that theory of an EstabUshment which gave the 
 State a dkect concern with the instrumentaUty by which the rehgion 
 approved by it, was taught to its subjects ;— a theory which, by pro- 
 viding an elidowment for every parish of Scotland, thereby necessary im- 
 plied, that the various functions of the ministr}-, reco.gnized as connected 
 with the Estabhshment, were to be discharged only by the party in 
 possession of the parochial endowment. 
 
 So far was the decision in the Stewartcn case from being an inva- 
 sion of the spiritual privileges of the Church, that nothing more was 
 done by the Court of Session than to declare this principle, that the 
 General Assembly was not entitled by its o^ti authority to substitute 
 one theoiT of an Estabhshment for another, this latter having been 
 adopted by Church and State, ui the first amangements between them. 
 
 Nor can it be maintained, that in this adopted theoiy, there was any 
 thing wrong in piinciple. For if it was provided under it, that full 
 ministerial status, and more especially the right of sitting in the various 
 judicatories of the Church, should be held in connexion only with State 
 endowment, it must be supposed, that by the original an-angements 
 agi-eed to, a sufficient number of parishes and of ministers was afforded 
 for the existing population of Scotland. If any violation of principle 
 was then committed, it lay only in this, that the Church did not require 
 an obligation from the State for the subdivision of her parishes, and the 
 increase of her ministers in proportion to the growth of population. On 
 this subject it is sufficient to know, that from the naiTow-minded pohcy 
 of the times, such obligation would never have been obtained, and that 
 the founders of our Establishment had no alternative before them re- 
 garding the hne of action which they were necessitated to pursue. 
 
 With the question of the policy which guided the State both in these 
 and in subsequent times to refuse additional provision for a frequent 
 expansion of the EstabUshment, it is needless to deal, farther than to 
 remark, that the State has thus to a great extent defeated its own end 
 and design, in the original formation of a national Establishment, and 
 that the error like others has brought its own results in the vast increase 
 and present power of dissenters — a power which is capable of controlling 
 the State itself. 
 
142 APPENDIX. 
 
 KOTE B.— Page 101.— Anti-Patroxage. 
 
 It is difficult to see how the views of the late anti-patronage party in 
 the Chui-ch of Scotland, or how any objection in principle to patronage 
 as there existing, could be maintained. It has been said that, in the 
 Apostolic Church, the election of ministers was exercised by the people, 
 and that this example must therefore be binding on all ages. But even 
 although the former of these positions were true, the inference that the 
 latter must also be true cannot be made out without a solution of the- 
 following question, Was the election of the pastor in apostolic times 
 made by the party who was to provide for his temporal maintenance, 
 or by the party over whom he was spiritually to preside? 
 
 These jiarties in the primitive Church were identical from the neces- 
 eity of her circumstances, but it did not follow from this, that they must 
 continue to be so in all ages, and far less that an election made by two 
 parties when united, must henceforth be regarded as essentially belong- 
 ing to one of them. However clearly the apostolic practice respecting 
 the election of pastors might be proved, such practice can afford no 
 element in support of the argiunent for its permanent obligation, imtil 
 we know by scriptural authority to which of the two parties above men- 
 tioned the election belonged. To suppose that the Apostles sanctioned 
 a system by which this election was made by the second of the parties, 
 altogether irrespective of their other character, as those who were to 
 provide for the pastor's support, would be to ascribe to these inspired 
 men such an entire disregard of prudence and expediency as was not 
 exhibited by them in other matters, and as has not been imitated by 
 those who favour so strongly the voluntary system. On the other 
 hand, if we suppose that the parties electing the pastor in Apostolic 
 times, were those who were to provide for his temporal wants, we have 
 then in Scripture itself the elements of patronage as existing in the 
 Church of Scotland. Patronage there is the selection of a pastor by 
 the party providing temporal support, or by one possessing a delegated 
 authority from him. It is the selection of one from a class, on each 
 member of which the Chm-ch has put her ovm seal, in the license she has 
 given him ; a selection not absolutely infemng promotion to the pas- 
 toral office, but made under control of all those rvdes and regulations 
 regarding it which can be proved clearly to possess the authority of 
 God's Word. These rules and regulations arc, the right of the Church 
 Courts to try and determine the moral and literary qualifications of a 
 candidate, and his fitness for the ministerial office^; the right of the peo- 
 ple, for whom he has been selected as pastor, to get a " reasonable per- 
 suasion by trying" of his special suitableness for the work of the ministry 
 among them. 
 
 'NOTE C. — Pack 139. — Tuue Principle of Voluntaryism. 
 
 An attentive consideration of the views stated in the preceding dis- 
 cussion of Voluntaryism, will enable us to perceive the true nature of 
 the principle for which it contends, and to state it in precise terms. It 
 u as follows : — " The civil magistrate is not entitled, in his actings, to 
 
APPENDIX. 143 
 
 contemplate, or by the medium of a civil mean (endowments, <&:c.) to 
 promote the spiritual and eternal interests of his subjects." 
 
 From this view of Voluntaryism, it is obvious that Free Churchism 
 becomes identical with it, not only as regards the first, but also the 
 second of those objections against Establishments which were previously 
 mentioned. For while the fonner system assumes that the office of 
 civil government must be restricted in the objects sought by it, to those 
 which respect civil good alone, the latter requires for the sake of con- 
 sistency to assert, that religion must be viewed and dealt with in this 
 light ; and thus both systems unite in excluding from the mind of civil 
 rulers the eternal interests of man. Now, to this principle, that the 
 magistrate, in his apphcation of civil means and expedients, is not en- 
 titled, or rather, is not permitted to have respect to the moral and eter- 
 nal good of those over whom he rules, there exist the strongest objec- 
 tions. Its falsehood will appear on the following grounds : — 
 
 l5^, Because it is contrary to the ends and purposes of civil govern- 
 ment, as laid down in Scriptiu'e. 
 
 2dly^ Because it reflects on the wisdom of God. 
 
 3rf/^, Because of its own results. 
 
 In Rom. xiii. 3, 4, Paul declares the end and design of civil govern- 
 ment in these words, " For rulers are not a terror to good works, but 
 to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power, do that which 
 is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister 
 of God to thee for good." Kulers are thus set 'over their subjects for 
 good, and this good is the end to be sought by them in all the acts of 
 their government, or in the administration of those civil means which 
 belong to their office. But of what nature is the good which they are 
 commanded to seek ? Is it the spiritual and eternal as well as the tem- 
 poral good of their subjects ? Were this to be conceded, om- controversy 
 with Voluntaryism would be ended, and that system would stand con- 
 demned by divine authority. Voluntaries therefore say, it is not spi- 
 rital good, it is civil good only, which rulers are bound to seek for their 
 subjects. 
 
 Now, if such be the meaning attached to the passage of Scripture be- 
 fore us, the natural inquiry arises. By what rule of biblical criticism is it, 
 that the term good is here restricted to imply only what is civil, for ex- 
 ample, the increase of national wealth, and that the other terms good 
 VBorlcs and evil works must be understood as having no reference to the 
 moral or spiritual conduct of mvan, when, probably, in every other pas- 
 sage of Scripture where they occur, precisely the same words bear an 
 opposite meaning, and imply not civil only, but spiritual and eternal 
 good ? The citation of examples is needless. The difficulty in criticism 
 here mentioned, will shew how little countenance Scripture affords to 
 Voluntaryism, and by what false modes of interpretation this system 
 must be sustained. 
 
 2dhj, The principle before us reflects on the wisdom of God. The 
 glory oif the Redeemer's kingdom, which, in other words, means the 
 eternal good of perishmg sinners, has engaged fi'om everlasting the coun- 
 cils of heaven. With this mighty object have been Hnked the great 
 events of providence since the creation, the rise and fall of empires, and the 
 
144 APPENDIX. 
 
 presen'ation of tlie world from its final dissobtion. For the advancement 
 of the kintjdom of Cliri!-;t it is the commanded duty of every one of his 
 people continually to pray and to labour ; and just in proportion to his 
 zeal in this cause will be his final reward. As the direct agent in car- 
 rying on this glorious kingdom towards universal establishment, a di- 
 vine ordinance, viz. the Church, has been instituted by God, to which, 
 iowever, no other power has been committed but that of moral suasion. 
 But while such have been the mighty preparations both in eternity and 
 in time, for accomplishing man's eternal good, while this has been the. 
 one great object on which both the wisdom and the power of the Infinite 
 Mind has been e.-tpended, there yet exists an ordinance instituted by that 
 wisdom from which the mighty interests of the Redeemer's kingdom 
 are excluded. Civil government, which, in its own sphere, might 
 have helped forward Christ's kingdom by encouragement and support 
 given to the direct instrament of its advancement, is yet so far fi.-om 
 being commanded to do so, that it is not even permitted in any one of 
 its actings to contemplr.te men as the subjects of that kuigdom, or 
 raise an arm for the diffusion of its blessings. 
 
 Such a notion v.diich is identified with Voluntaryism, reflects so strong- 
 ly on the wisdom of God, and is so inconsistent with the unity of pur- 
 pose and harmony of design, existing through all the councils of 
 Omniscience, that we dare not maintain it. On the other hand, what- 
 ever we know of the ways and works of God, teaches us to believe that 
 if " all things were created by Christ and for him," so there can exist 
 no ordinance in the worid, as appointed by God, be it ecclesiastical or 
 civil, whose exercises were not designed to contemplate the interests of 
 Christ's mediatorial kingdom, inseparably connected as these are with 
 the everlasting good of men. 
 
 Zdly, The principle of Voluntaryism must be false fi-cm its own re- 
 sults. 
 
 If it were true, not only would the iiiling powers of a State be re- 
 stricted from giving a civil endowment to religion, but also from bestow- 
 ing a grant from tlie public funds, or in any way countenancing the 
 cause of national education. Education would indeed come within the 
 sphere of their ofiice in so far as mere secular knowledge was imparted, or 
 as civil ends were kept in view, but in so far as education either con- 
 templated, or could become the instrument of the tuition of youth, as spi- 
 ritual and immortfd beings, its promotion would be contrary to the ends 
 for which the means of government could lawfully be employed. Neither 
 would the Civil powers be entitled to gi'. e aid or countenance to a public 
 penitentiary or other institution, whose object was the moral reformation of 
 the most depraved classes of society, and their restoration to the right 
 position and conduct of immortal beings. Foi* this reason the civil ap- 
 pointment of chaplains or religious teachers, in prisons or bridewells, and 
 the provision of means of grace for penal settlements would be in vio- 
 lation of Scrii)tural duty. To the same category of prohibited acts 
 would belong all punishments inflicted for the sake of example— the 
 admonition of the judge in pronouncing sentence of death, and the exe- 
 cution of that sentence to be in public — since the end of all these acts 
 is moral and spiritual, not civil good. ln_ short, were the principle of 
 
APPENDIX. 145 
 
 Voluntaiyism true, and were it to be fairly carried out in all its exer- 
 cises, as must needs, be the ca.se, if Establislmients are to be condemned, 
 civil society would require to be remodelled, all its institutions must be 
 changed, and govemment must exist, were its existence possible, on 
 a footing never yet recognized by any Christian state, and what is more, 
 never realized in any State whatever. 
 
 NOTE D. — PUSEYISM AND THE RlGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 
 
 However little sympathy there may be apparently between the va- 
 rious i)arties who have recently been exerting a disturbing iutluenee on 
 the peace of the Established Churches of our land, true it is, tiust we 
 find among all the operation of some of the same false principles. 
 
 One of the distinctive features of Puseyism, is the systematic efforts 
 which it is making to revive under the name of veneration for antiquity, 
 opinions and practices wliich have been usually regarded as belonging 
 only to the Church of Rome. By those who advocate this system, the 
 opinions and practices of antiquity are regarded as the proper and oidy 
 rule by which to interpret Scripture, and in accordance with this notion, 
 Romanism itself has been held up as the mere expansion of primitive 
 Christianity — an expansion for which the earlier periods of its exist- 
 ence were not suiiiciently prepared, but which in after periods became 
 full and complete.* This notion of a gradual expansion or development 
 of Christian doctrine and practice in the Church, was iuiijeratively re- 
 quired on the part of Romanism, in order to explain its seeming diver- 
 sity of opinion and observance from the simplicity of primitive" times ; 
 and the same necessity has exacted from Puseyism the favourable ex- 
 pression towards this notion, which, in vindicating the attempt to 
 resume opinions and practices formerly repudiated, has been freely be- 
 stowed. To find in Apostolic times the germ of all the dogmatic state- 
 ments and leligious observances which have aftenvards prevailed in the 
 Church, might liave been difhcult, but with the doctrine of Christian 
 development in reserve, the difhculty vanishes, while, in the minds of 
 those recei\-ing it, the doctrine itself 'can scarcely fail to awaken that 
 veneration for antiquity which will probably residt in the adoption of its 
 obseiTances. 
 
 Now, what is the doctrine of an expanding Christianity, or of Christian 
 dcvelojiment, froni which Romanism and Puseyism have drawn so large 
 support, and out of ivhich has more especially grown the claim of Apos- 
 tolic succession V It is but another name for the Voluntarv and Free 
 Church principle of spirituq^ independence, the assertion of all these 
 systems behig, that there -are in God's Avord truths of doctrine, discipline, 
 and government which were unknown to the Apostolic mind, but 
 which may be, and have been educed through the medium of the 
 Church's future convictions. If there be any different between the 
 systems referred to, it is simply this, that while I^omaiiism asserts, or 
 seems to assert, that all the unknown truths were educed bv the Church 
 during the indefinite period — antiquity, it is the princijilp of \'olun- 
 
 * See Edinburgh Rcviciu for 1844, Art. Puseyism, p. Z?,'l and SGI. 
 
 o 2 
 
146 APPENDIX. 
 
 taryism and Free Cliui-chism, that of these truths the Church continues 
 still to be ignorant. 
 
 To the doctrine itself, by whatever name it may be called, we have al- 
 ready stated oiu: objections, (p. 40.) It is one so prejpiant with evil to man, 
 so destructive of the fundamental principles of religion, so subversive of , 
 all that the soul has been accustomed to look to for peace and hope, 
 and so dishonourable to God, that no evidence short of that which has 
 been adduced in proof of the divine origin of the Bible itself, can lead 
 the reflecting mind for a moment to believe it. Could any thing justify 
 the scoff and the scorn which at times the infidel has heaped on reve- 
 lation, it might well be found in the doctrine before us — a doctrine 
 which requii-es him to receive in the hght of divine truth, that of whose 
 character, or even consistency with past revelation, reason could form 
 no judgment, because it has no present existence, that which could 
 afford nothing fixed or definite in the mind, because it might be different 
 to-morrow from what it has seemed to-day. 
 
 There are two corollaiies deducible from the doctrine before us, whether 
 designated by Papists as Christian development, or by Free Chm-chmen 
 as spiritual independence. These are, 1st, a denial of the right of pri- 
 vate judgment in the interpretation and application of Scripture ; 2dly, 
 the past, present, and futm-e infaUibility of the Cluurch in the exercise 
 of this function. 
 
 If there were truths in God's Word not at first revealed to the apos- 
 tolic mind, truths having respect to Christian doctrine and practice, and 
 consequently to the salvation of sinful souls, or if there be any such 
 truths unknown to the Chmxh at present, then it cannot belong to pri- 
 vate judgment to educe, (or rather indeed to invent,) them for itself, 
 smce in so doing, men firom the constitution of their minds will educe 
 them variously and inharmoniously. The Chm-ch alone must be entit- 
 led to interpret and apply Scriptm-e authoritatively, and in this func- 
 tion she must be infallible ; for this infalhbility is the only security 
 enjoved by her members against eiTor — error arising either from excess 
 or diminution of the traths of God's Word, obligatory on conscience. 
 Let us now briefly dhect attention to these principles. 
 When I exercise private judgment in the interpretation of Scripture, 
 what is it that I do ? I merely exercise my own mind respecting what 
 God has commanded me to believe and to do. Private judgment is there- 
 fore the mind's sense or conception of its duty, as educed from and made 
 incumbent by God's Word. Now the mind's sense of duty is but another 
 name for the exercise of judgment and emotion of mind, called con- 
 science. In the state of mind called conscience, the mind has present to 
 it its own sense and conception of duty, as educed by its own previous 
 workings, which sense and conception of duty must be the rule of action 
 to man. In conscience therefore the rule of action is internal in the mind 
 itself. But Avhen the right of private judgment is refused, the rule of 
 action is not internal, it is external to the mind. It is the mind not of 
 the individual, but of tlie Clmrch which is the rule of action to that indi- 
 vidual. Now, how is it possible that in reference to two classes of actions 
 to be performed, viz., those prompted by conscience, and those enjoined by 
 God's Word, the rule of action can be different— that in the former case the 
 
APPENDIX. 147 
 
 rule of action is internal, while in the latter it is exteraal to the mind. 
 Let us suppose the case of conscience prompting to one act, and of 
 God's Word as intei-preted by the Chiu-ch prompting to the opposite. 
 Here the internal and the external rules of action are brought into colHsion, 
 and the inquiry comes, which of them is a man to obey, seeing he can- 
 not obey both, while both are yet maintained as the proper rale of 
 action, by those who will not concede the principle of private judgment. 
 One of two things must obviously be granted. ]st, that the rule of 
 action in ever)' case of conduct must be mtemal in the mind itself. 
 Or, 2dly, that it must be external to the mind. If the fonner prmci- 
 ple be maintained, then man cannot be deprived of the liberty of private 
 judgment in interpreting Scripture. If the latter be asserted, there can 
 be no moral obhgation to obey conscience, and moreover, man is thus left 
 without any rale in his own mind to guide his conduct, a notion which 
 subverts his character as an intelligent and responsible bemg, and re- 
 duces him to the level of the irrational animals. 
 
 These are a few of the absiu-dities involved in the position of those who 
 repudiate the principle before ixs. But it will be equally easy to find 
 others by slightly var}dng the process of inquiry. It is said that the inter- 
 pretation and application of Scripture belongs of right to the Church and 
 not to the private judgment of individuals ; but in what ckcumstances 
 is this claim enforced by the former against the latter ? In a case where 
 the interpretation of the Church and that of my private judgment is 
 identical, the principle is not apphed, for I am not deprived of the exercise 
 of pnvate judgment. If the Chiu-ch and I have interpreted the ei^rhth 
 commandment alUvC, then in acting conformably to this passage of Scrip- 
 ture, my conduct has been guided by the interpretation made by private 
 judgment, ^ and not by that of the Church. It may be said, however, 
 by Romanists, that though the two interpretations be identical, vet, in 
 the case supposed, it is not the interpretation of my private judgment 
 but that of the Chm-ch which constitutes the authority for the °act or 
 com-se of action that Scripture mav have commanded. But were such 
 a docti-me admitted, it would impfy that the rale of action to the mind 
 can be something external to itself, and so would necessai'ily mvolve a 
 denial of the obligation of conscience. 
 
 In no case, therefore, where the interpretation put on Scripture bv the 
 Church IS identical with that which has been attached to it by private 
 judgment, has there been any refusal of the liberty to exercise the lat- 
 ter. Such refusal does only exist in cases wherein the two interpreta- 
 tions are difterent. The precise cu-cumstances in which private judg- 
 ment is not allowed, being thus seen, we can now apprehend the nature 
 ot the claim asserted for the C^hurch by those who advocate extreme 
 views on the question before us. Do such parties maintain that the 
 Church is entitled, and that private judgment is not entitled authorita- 
 tively to mterpret and apply Scripture ? This is tantamount to the princi- 
 ple that the former is entitled to impose on my mind an interpretation 
 and application of Scripture different from my own, that is to say, that 
 my mind is boimd to receive and obey an interpretarion of Scripture 
 which contradicts my own sense of duty as deduced from Scripture, and to 
 receive and obey the interpretation thus given as the will and mind of God 
 
148 APPENDIX. 
 
 Sucli a principle is oontraiy to Soripturc itself, ^vhioli toaclics this uni- 
 versal rule, " Whatsoever is not of faith is sin," or whatsoever the mind 
 is not fully persuaded of as lawful, is sin, if performed. 
 
 No doubt it niavbe said, in tliis process of reasoning, by which the re- 
 fusal of the right of private judgment, or the assertion of the Chm-ch's 
 rif'ht to impose on the mind of man a sense of duty different from his 
 own, is found to infer a violation of Scriptm-e, that I have exercised the 
 ver\' right which is denied, since it is only by an interpretation of pri- 
 vat'e judgment that the passage cited is brought to express the condem- 
 nation of those rejecting this mode of interpretation. But such an at- 
 tem])t to evade the force of the argument adduced will only end in ab- 
 surdities subversive of society. For if the right inteqiretation of the 
 above passage, that is to say, if the true interpretation of it, which is 
 that held by" the Church, has not been stated above, then as formerly 
 shewn it cannot be identical witli, but must be different from that which 
 lias been given by private judgment, and tlws the true interpretation 
 must express an idea similar to that v.hicli would be conveyed by the 
 language, " Whatsoever is not of faith is not sin." From this doctrine 
 one of two sc^quences must arise, 
 
 l.s^, That language is the mean of universal confusion to men, never 
 expressing the idea which it seems to private judgment to convey, or, 
 
 '■Idlij, That the same words when made use of in the familiar inter- 
 course of men, and when employed to state a tmth of Scripture, express 
 ditt'eri'nt ideas. 
 
 But leaving to others the results of their own principles, we deem it 
 sufficient to abide by the old beaten groimd, that man is an intelligent 
 and responsible being — that if he be an intelligent and resi)onsible being 
 he must have a rule of action to guide his conduct — that if he has a 
 nilc of action it nmst l)c internal in his own mind — that if he has a nde 
 of action within himself, lie must be imder obligation to act according 
 to conscience, — and that if he be under obligation to act according to 
 conscience, he must possess the liberty of private judgment in inteqiret- 
 ing and ap])lying Scripture. 
 
 In regard to the other principle, which must be maintained by those 
 who advocate the doctrine of Christian development or spiritual inde- 
 pendence, viz., the infallibility of the Church, it has already been 
 adverted to, when the nature of this claim was pointed out, p. 42. 
 It cannot imply the Church's right to change at pleasure the will 
 of an immutable God, and consequently must mean that the Clmrch is 
 capable of giving in all ages a consistent harmonious interi)retation of 
 this immutable will, in so far as it has been revealed in Scripture. But 
 snice this proof of the Church's infallibility cannot exist, vmtil the end of 
 the world, we must either believe that to be consistent which, after all 
 may not be consistent, and historically has not been consistent, or else 
 we must do dishonour to (Jod, by supjtosing that he requires us to be- 
 lieve as the fundamental doctrine of our faith, one for which no proof 
 can possibly exist, till all the interests dependent on it shall have jiassed 
 awav, and time shall have merged into eternity. 
 
2365TC^„. G3B 
 
 03-03-05 32180 HS 
 
Princeton Theoloaical , Semnarj Jr {tei" 
 
 ■i 1012 01255 0598